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2/1 Infantry Battalion

October - December 1942,
Narrative New Guinea Campaign

2/1 AUST. INF. BN.

NARRATIVE OF NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN ACROSS THE

OWEN STANLEY RANGES - 6TH. OCTOBER, 1942

TO 18TH. DECEMBER, 1942.

Headquarters,
2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.,
3 June, 43.

MILITARY HISTORY AND
INFORMATION SECTION.

Ref. WAR DIARY NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN OCTOBER-
NOVEMBER, DECEMBER, 1942.

From our records it is not clear whether any documents have been forwarded to you in regard to the above. Unfortunately, the Adjutant and Intelligence Officer are both still in hospital, having been evacuated during the campaign, and accordingly the doubt referred to above still exists.

As the two Officers are not likely to return to the Unit for some time, the following documents are forwarded herewith and represent the only War Diary information available. The documents forwarded herewith are as follows :-

- (1). Narrative of the campaign based on the diary notes and personal knowledge.
- (2). Summary of battle casualties indicating the actions where they occurred.
- (3). List of Officers, showing actions in which they took part.
- (4). Ration strength for the period.
- (5). Typed copy of diary notes made by Intelligence Officer.
- (6). Explanatory notes in date order regarding same.
- (7). Copies of recommendations for Honours and Awards in connection with the campaign, which illustrate aspects of the various actions.
- (8). Sketch maps illustrating the following actions :-

(i).	<u>TEMPLETON'S CROSSING.</u>	<u>20 Oct 42.</u>
(ii).	<u>EORA CREEK.</u>	<u>22-23 Oct 42.</u>
(iii).	<u>EORA CREEK</u>	<u>27-29 Oct 42.</u>
(iv).	<u>GORARI.</u>	<u>3 - 9 Nov 42.</u>
(v).	<u>GORARI.</u>	<u>9 - 12 Nov 42.</u>
(vi).	<u>SANANANDER TRACK.</u>	<u>20-21 Nov 42.</u>
(vii).	<u>SANANANDER TRACK.</u>	<u>20-30 Nov 42.</u>
- (9). Signals received and sent during campaign.
- (10). Sundry papers and documents left by the Intelligence Officer.

Paul A. Cullen

.....Lt.Col.
Comd. 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.

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NARRATIVE OF NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN ACROSS THE
OWEN STANLEY RANGES 6 OCTOBER, 1942 TO 18
DECEMBER, 1942.

At the end of SEPTEMBER, the JAPANESE FORCES had reached IORABAIWA RIDGE, where they were held up by the 25th. Brigade, and advanced no further. It was known that they had their Force HQ and base at NAURO, and GOC 7 Div. decided that a force should be sent around our right flank in order to threaten their rear at NAURO.

The route to NAURO was via. KOITAKI, ITIKI, SABITANA and JAWARERE, then northwards over the 8,000 ft hills through NIGUBAIFA, LIDIBIBAIFA to NAURO.

Accordingly, the 16 Brigade was warned for this task, and 2/1 Battalion was sent as leading battalion of the Brigade.

At this time, in order to counteract any JAPANESE patrols attempting to reach MORESBY by this route, a force, known as JAW FORCE, comprised of details of the 21st. Brigade, were based at SABITANA.

The battalion moved to JAWARERE, and on the 10 miles along the track to that place gained valuable experience in marching discipline, which was to stand the battalion in good stead in its march across the OWEN STANLEYS. One of the companies, "C" Company, was sent from JAWARERE to NIGUBAIFA, and established itself there and sent out patrols a day's march further ahead, but no JAPANESE were contacted.

However, the idea of this outflanking movement was abandoned when the 25th. Brigade forced the JAPANESE back over the main trail ^{to} KOKODA, and accordingly orders were given for the 16 Brigade to be prepared to move along the main track. The 2/1 Bn received orders to withdraw from JAWARERE, having handed over to the 36 Battalion CMF, and accordingly the unit marched back, and followed the 16 Brigade as last battalion along the main track.

During the period at JAWARERE the battalion had time to shake itself down under campaign conditions, and, generally speaking, all parts of the battalion functioned smoothly.

The track was a most muddy and difficult one and, owing to the changes in plan by Division, the C.O. had to attend two conferences at Brigade, necessitating six trips over the route from SABITANA to JAWARERE on foot. All the time a Jeep track was being pushed through, but they were not reliable for transportation owing to traffic jams, boggings etc.

Whilst at JAWARERE, one company, "D" Coy, was left as the rear protection along the route - At this stage our 108 sets worked admirably, and another 108 set sent up to NIGUBAIFA also functioned reliably.

On return to base area, the battalion had a day's rest at the staging camp, and on the 6th. OCTOBER the battalion, less "C" Coy, left at 0600 hours by truck for Newton's Dump. "C" Coy followed later in the day, spending the night at UBERI. The remainder of the battalion by the night 6/7 OCTOBER, crossed the IMITA RIDGE and

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and camped at the creek at the foot of it.

By the 8th. OCTOBER, the battalion reached NAURO, and camped at the side of the BROWN RIVER. Everyone was rather tired after the trip, but fresh rations were received from the dropping ground at NAURO, and the men were soon ready to start off again. Two days were spent at NAURO.

On the 11th. OCTOBER the battalion moved off again and reached MENARI at night. Two days were spent at MENARI, and the men were busy improving the dropping ground and building bridges. One bridge they built in particular had previously been demolished by the JAPANESE withdrawing. Not only was the bridge rebuilt, but stone steps were hewn out of the rock. This eliminated a bottle neck and speeded up the passage of the Brigade.

On the 14th. OCTOBER the battalion left MENARI and marched to EFOGI NORTH, probably the most arduous march of the whole of the campaign. Most of the battalion did not get in until nine or ten O'clock that night.

The track had been boggy and precipitous, and it had rained almost the whole time.

The next day, 15th. OCTOBER, the battalion moved to LAKE MYOLA, where several days were spent in picking up rations. This was the highest point reached during the march, being approximately 8,000 ft, and it was found that the half blanket carried by all ranks was not adequate for the climate. At MYOLA, various details who had arrived in NEW GUINEA after the battalion, caught us up, and when we moved forward to TEMPLETON'S CROSSING, the strength of the battalion all ranks was 599.

The march had been a most arduous one as everything had to be carried, including 3 days' hard rations, 3 days' emergency rations, 100 rounds per man, 2 grenades per man, 8 filled magazines per Bren gun, 200 rounds per Tommy Gun, as well as tools, one 3-inch mortar, Vickers gun, 12 belt boxes, 2-inch mortars and 12 rounds per mortar. This resulted, when added to the tin hats, filled water bottles etc. in each man carrying a minimum of 55-lbs, and a maximum of 70-lbs per man.

On the 19th. OCTOBER, the battalion moved from LAKE MYOLA to TEMPLETON'S CROSSING with the object of taking over from the 25th. Brigade.

TEMPLETON'S CROSSING.

(see Sketch Map 1.)

This was the Battalion's first contact with the enemy during the NEW GUINEA Campaign.

Generally the plan of the 16 Bde was to relieve the 25 Bde, who were held up by JAPANESE defensive position at TEMPLETON'S CROSSING.

On 19 OCT 42 the Battalion had occupied bivouac positions in the 2/33 Bn's area, which was the reserve Bn of 25 Bde.

Orders were received that on the 20 OCT 2/2 Bn would attack the JAP positions from the right flank, and that 2/1 Bn would occupy positions of the 3rd. Militia Bn, doubling up with them to do so. As soon as 2/2 Bn had driven the JAPS away 2/1 Bn was to continue the advance.

Accordingly, commencing movement at 0715 hours on 20 OCT. 42 the Bn moved forward and into the area occupied by the 3rd. Militia Bn, and the Companies were all in position by 1022 hours.

The 2/2 Bn commenced their attack at 1100 hrs, and enemy mortar fire shortly after this caused the Bn's first casualties in "C" Coy's area, wounding Lieut. Carew and killing one and wounding four O.Rs.

The only part by our Bn was to support the 2/2 Bn's attack with mortar and LMG fire. This proved very difficult to do as, although the enemy were only 40 to 60 yds in front of our positions, we could not see them, nor could we see the progress of the 2/2 Bn's attack which was scheduled to advance down our front. Considerable fire support was given, and probably caused casualties amongst the JAPANESE, but it could not be observed, and as the 2/2 Bn's attack went on most of the day, could not be kept up. This of course is common to all supporting fire in the jungle, and represents one of the most difficult aspects of jungle fighting.

When the 2/2 Bn attack was held up in the afternoon after driving in many of the JAPANESE positions and inflicting heavy casualties, it was decided that as soon as possible after first light on the morning of 21 OCT. our "B" Coy should put in an attack through the 2/2 Bn Companies on their immediate front and continue their advance down to the main track at the foot of the valley.

Accordingly Capt. Catterns made full preparations with a plan providing for considerable fire support by other Companies with LMG and 2" mortar and with a diversion on the right flank, to be provided by Coy C.S.M. with as much noise as possible. The attack started off, but the enemy had gone, owing to their heavy casualties the day before, and the advance was continued along the main track with "B" Coy as vanguard Coy of the Bde. "A" Coy followed "B" Coy, and Bn.H.Q. were at the head of "A" Coy.

At approximately 1500 hours "B" Coy's forward scouts struck the enemy in position on a ridge, up which the track climbed, and they pressed forward in an attempt to infiltrate and outflank, but had two killed and four wounded. The jungle up the slope to the right was very thick, and it was 1900 hours before "A" Coy could get into position to attack from the right flank. Accordingly, it was decided to bivouac for the night and for "A" Coy to put in an attack at first light on the morning of the 22 OCT.

On the morning of the 22 OCT., just after first light, "B" Coy's patrols reported that the enemy had gone. Accordingly, the advance was continued.

At 0745 hours "A" Coy went forward and took over as vanguard.

The hold-up of our advance by the JAPANESE was, as usual, in a carefully selected defensive position on a spur, over which the track climbed, with good cover for their troops and covered a silent exit for their withdrawal. Though their position had little depth, it extended more than 300 yds up the ridge to the right of the track (as we advanced) and would have no doubt given way to a planned and determined attack. Unfortunately, our late arrival, and the terrifically thick jungle at this point, made a quick attack very difficult.

The lesson to be learnt from such an encounter is that for troops to be able to do a quick attack such as "A" Company was in a position to do, they must be much fresher than were our troops at the time. If soldiers in a jungle campaign have always to carry the 50 to 70-lb. load, then it will nearly always cause them to be slow in such operations, which demand speed for their quick success.

"A" Company continued the advance along the track and Brigadier Lloyd came up and ordered that a company be sent around the left flank, avoiding EORA CREEK village, and to continue the advance to ALOLA - the object of this was to avoid what Intelligence informed us was a likely place for a hold-up and ambush at EORA CREEK. This intelligence proved to be correct eventually, but unfortunately the company sent around did not have sufficient rations to gain its objective. However, "D" Company left the main track for this purpose at 1030 hours in its endeavour to get to ALOLA across country. Capt. Simpson was in command, and his strength was approximately 70 all ranks. Shortly after this at 1100 hours, companies of the 2/3 Bn, which had come up around the ridge on the right, arrived down at the main track just in front of our vanguard, and they took over the task of leading troops. The 2/3 Bn leading troops reached EORA CREEK village, but JAPANESE rearguard inflicted casualties on them and forced them to halt. At 1140 hours, 2/1 Bn and leading company arrived on the ridge above EORA CREEK village, and in accordance with instructions to press forward, the C.O. told Company Comd. "A" Coy, Capt. Sanderson, to take his Coy across the creek on the left, up the ridge above the JAPANESE, and to attack them from above - either when he got there, or if that was too late in the day, then to attack early the following morning.

Experience had taught that such an out-flanking movement in thick jungle across a creek might take many hours, even though the actual distance covered would probably not exceed two (2) miles.

The estimation of enemy strength, based on the LMG and MMG fire at this time, was that at least a company was holding up our advance. Eventually, it proved to be a battalion with artillery and Engineer attachments.

By 1445 hours ^{there} ~~they~~ were present on the bare ridge above the village - C.O.'s of 2/1 and 2/3 Bns. - "C" Coy, BHQ and part of "B" Coy 2/1 Bn, and approximately 100 of 2/3 Bn - the remainder of these Bns was further back along the track awaiting orders. At this time the JAPANESE fired for the first time their two Mortars and Mountain Gun on the ridge, causing numerous casualties, including a slight wound to Lt. Col. Stevenson, (See recommendations for Awards for Capt. Connell and L/Sgt. Doran,

After viewing this bare ridge from the JAPANESE positions at a later date, it was apparent that with their perfect observation they must have been watching us the whole time, and waited only until the concentration of troops on the ridge, consequent upon the hold-up of our forward troops, made the target an ideal one for them. They continued to bring down gun fire, mortar fire and MMG fire on to our positions on this ridge, on the track below and on the track further back, over the whole of the period that they were in occupation of the

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ridge, and during this time probably caused the Brigade more than 200 casualties by these means. In addition, they made the problem of supply to the forward troops across the creek an exceedingly difficult one, and forced the use of a detour jungle track by day. Because of these factors, the evacuation of casualties from forward positions across the creek became a constant night-mare.

During the early afternoon the 2/3 Bn patrols were endeavouring to find flank crossings of the creek, and at 1700 hours the Brigadier came down again and ordered that the first thing on the next morning the 23rd. Oct. ^{2/1 Bn} should attack across the two bridges, ^{at} present held by the enemy - In order to enable this attack to concentrate on the JAP positions, 2/3 Bn was ordered to establish a bridge-head over both bridges by 0600 hrs 23 Oct. 42. Capt. J. Gall (M.C.), 2/3 Bn, was also to provide guides to take 2/1 force across the bridges as his company had been reconnoitring the area during the afternoon.

In order to plan the attack, the C.O.'s of 2/1 and 2/3 Bns endeavoured to reconnoitre forward and came under MMG and mortar fire continuously whilst making their reconnaissance, which rather restricted it. Similarly, the Officers of "C" Coy, who had been detailed to do the attack, had their reconnaissance restricted. However, a fair idea of the topography was obtained, which gave no cause for optimism or satisfaction.

At this stage "D" Coy had been sent on their detour of ALOLA, "A" Coy had been sent round the left flank to do their attack on the JAPS holding up force. In addition, a Platoon of "B" Coy had been sent to do a special patrol on the left flank under orders from 16 Bde. "HQ" Coy, had by a mischance, followed "D" Coy, and did not arrive at ~~EORA~~ creek until the next day after finding they were on the wrong track. Accordingly, 2/1 Bn had only with them - "C" Coy complete, "B" Coy less 1. platoon and advanced BHQ, consisting of C.O., Adjt., "I.O.", R.P. Sgt., 2 Sigs, and 2 "I" Section, *M.O. - S.B.'s & R.A.P.*

Accordingly, the 2/1 Bn attack plan was first for "C" Coy to attack across the bridges at first light, and consequent upon the 2/3 Bn obtaining the bridgehead, "B" Coy with BHQ were to follow the attack and exploit along the track as far as possible. The question as to whether the 2/1 Bn attack was to go on irrespective of whether the 2/3 Bn succeeded in establishing a bridge-head, as ordered, was discussed at length with Commander, 16 Bde. The outcome of this conference with C.O. 2/3 Bn, was that the attack must be pushed forward whether or not the 2/3 gained the bridge-head. At that time, as will be seen from the diagram, the JAPANESE held commanding positions covering both bridges on the ridge at the rear. The two creeks, which converged at the toe of the spur on which we were situated, were only crossable at two other points, one on each side, and each at a considerable distance from the bridges - Having crossed the creek on the right, there still would be one bridge to cross, and little would have been gained.

"A" Coy had already crossed at the crossing on the left, and accordingly, merely to have followed in their footsteps might not have provided a decisive result. Accordingly, the Brigadier decided that attack must be made across the bridge.

Rain fell continuously during the night 22/23 Oct, but at 0230 hrs it stopped and the moon came up - immediately the C.O. and Adjt. went forward on a reconnaissance down the track, which had been covered by fire during the day-time, and through EORA CREEK village down to the creek level, which, to their surprise they succeeded in getting across the first bridge without being fired on, and returning into the shadow back behind the first bridge discussed the situation. Accordingly, it was decided that "C" Coy's attack should be put forward in order to get across the bridges during the last of the moonlight so that whilst we would be invisible to the enemy, they would also

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have the advantage of seeing where they were going. It was hoped that they would get into the enemy positions in the darkness before dawn and be able to drive him off then and in the succeeding day-light. It was hoped that this would co-ordinate with "A" Coy's attack, which, as it had not eventuated during the afternoon of the 22nd. Oct., would no doubt commence in the early hours of the 23rd.

Accordingly, the Adjt remained forward to gain more information if possible whilst the C.O. returned up the ridge to organise "C" Coy's attack for 0430 hours. The "I.O." in the meanwhile indicated the route to be followed down to the first bridge by pieces of paper on sticks stuck in the ground. This was very necessary as the track was a morrass where it was level, and as slippery as ^{could} be on the slopes, and zig-zagged down the 200 ft. track to the creek - For men loaded with weapons and ammunition, and endeavouring to be silent, it was essential that the track should be marked. At no time were any of the 2/3 Bn seen, and apparently they had gone elsewhere - It was subsequently found that they had decided to gain bridge-head by an out-flanking movement. This provedth successful, and they did not gain the bridge-head. Four men had been sent across right hand creek, working around the right flank to try and get across the bridge, but this was the only force sent to do the job. The main handicap at this stage was undoubtedly the lack of communications - The 108 sets would not work, and no cable was available. Consequently, it was not possible to inform Capt. Sanderson of "A" Coy and Capt. Simpson of "D" Coy what was going on. This lack of communications handicapped the whole of the operations in this area.

At 0400 hours "C" Company started to move down the track, and were guided across the first bridge by Capt. Cox. They succeeded in getting half of the company across the second bridge before they were discovered by the JAPANESE, who had apparently retired to their positions across the second bridge during darkness. By this time, however, the JAPANESE had awakened, but their fire, whilst the company was crossing the bridge, only wounded two, the remainder getting across safely. The last platoon to cross, however, had to wait their opportunity and dodge ^{the} bullets. The Pl. Comdr. of the last platoon, Sgt. Armstrong, moved his platoon across after the leading platoons had moved away from the area immediately across the second bridge, and this avoided congestion. At this time the moon had gone down and it was dark until first light at approximately 0630 hours.

"C" Coy's plan in the absence of detailed knowledge of the topography, was as follows :-

The Company moved across the bridge in the order - 13 Pl., 14 Pl., 15 Pl. Coy H.Qs. 13 Pl. was to move up the ridge to the left of the track, 15 Pl. to move along the axis of the track, and 14 Pl. to the right of the track. The track was thus planned to be the axis of the advance. Coy H.Q. to move with and slightly behind 14 Pl. Just after crossing the bridge the main track swings slightly ^{South} and crosses a little creek, then moves West up a little spur, and turning North recrosses the creek. However, the JAPANESE, whilst camping in their defensive position had made numerous tracks in the area, and had beaten down or cleared away the whole of the undergrowth in the basin formed by the re-entrant between two spurs, as shown in the sketch.

In the darkness, owing to the fog of war, the platoons were unable to stick to the main track and went slightly off their course and generally towards enemy fire. As a result, 13 Pl. went up the ridge on the left of the track, followed by Capt. Barclay and part of Coy H.Qs., where they encountered and overcame JAPANESE opposition, as witnessed by the many bodies, including that of an officer, which were later buried in that area.

15 Pl. moved along the track and followed it until the second time it crossed the little creek, when they also turned to the left in the same direction as 13 Pl. had previously gone. Both platoons came together on the little spur and discovered one another just as day-light was breaking.

14 Pl., endeavouring to keep to the right of the track, followed a natural tendency to drift to the right and moving through JAPANESE position, killing an Officer, Warrant Officer and several privates, moved along the bank of the creek and on to the right of the track. Unfortunately the ground rises sharply from the creek, and as dawn broke they found themselves moving into a defile with the torrent of EORA CREEK on their right flank, and sheer rocks and a 20° slope on their left, which ended in a cul-de-sac. They succeeded in maintaining their position there, though fourteen (14) of the platoon of strength twenty-three (23) were killed or wounded. It was due to the action of L/Cpl. Hunt in stalking the JAPS from the flank by climbing up the slope, which enabled the platoon to exist. L/Cpl. Hunt was later killed in action. The remainder of the company, i.e. 13 and 15 platoons, had moved up to the left, and after Capt. Barclay was killed in this area, Lieut. McCloy assumed command, and it was decided that they should resume their attack now that light had broken, in a northerly direction and following the general axis of the track. By now the JAPANESE had thoroughly reorganised their defences and advance across the open ground in the basin became impossible. At the same time Capt. Sanderson of "A" Coy was putting in his attack down the ridge but on the other side of the basin in the thick jungle, and although McCloy's force could HEAR this firing and understood that it would be "A" Coy, they were unable to assist owing to their inability to see what was actually going on. Shortly after this McCloy's force met

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two platoons of "A" Coy moving down the ridge towards them, viz. 8 and 9 platoons, respectively under command of Lieuts. Blakiston and Wyburn.

To return to "A" Coy, which had crossed EORA CREEK on the previously afternoon, it transpired that they had moved up and encountered especially heavy going, including a waterfall and matted vine jungle. They had not been able to reach their objective during the 22 Oct. and accordingly Capt. Sanderson decided to put in the attack on the morning of the 23rd. Oct., and to move into position for the attack on the evening of the 22nd.. Capt. Sanderson gave his orders for the Coy to move down the ridge towards what he thought to be general area of the JAPANESE position. The slope down which he was moving was exceptionally steep, varying from 20° to 40°, and it required in most parts the use of both hands clasp trees to enable the descent to be made. During this descent Capt. Sanderson moved with 7 Pl. under Lieut. Johnson, who was on the left flank. 8 and 9 platoons were the centre and right platoons, and these two platoons, owing to the nature of the country became separated from 7 Pl. and drifted to the right, finishing up on the spur, up which McCloy's force had moved. By the time 8 and 9 Pls arrived at that point, McCloy's force from "C" Coy had eliminated the JAPANESE opposition in that area. These two Pls were with "C" Coy when the endeavour was made to move forward across the open basin. Capt. Sanderson, Coy HQs and 7 Pl. had encountered stiff JAPANESE opposition, but had succeeded in reaching the basin, where they inflicted heavy casualties on the JAPANESE, but were unable to drive the JAPS out of their positions. A fire fight ensued, and another party of JAPANESE worked around the slope above and to the rear of Capt. Sanderson. From this position with LMGs they practically wiped out Capt. Sanderson's party, killing Capt. Sanderson, Lieut. Johnson and nine (9) others, the remainder, who were mostly wounded, succeeded in making their way up the ridge. During this action Capt. Sanderson, who carried a German "Mauser" sub-machine gun which he had obtained in LIBYA, fired off over 300 rounds of ammunition, which were discovered around his body when the position was occupied later in the day. As a result of these operations, the JAPANESE withdrew from the bridge and basin area on to their main defensive position on the top of the next spur. Their losses in the action were considerable, and JAPANESE subsequently buried in the area included 2 Officers, 2 Warrant Officers and 28 ORs. Their wounded and dead, which they possibly moved, must have been considerably greater. Our losses for both companies were :-

Killed ... 3 Offrs. 17 ORs. Wounded ... 1 Offr. 25 ORs.

Shortly afterwards, 13 and 15 Pls under Lieut. McCloy, and 8 and 9 Pls with Lieuts. Blakiston and Wyburn, moved up the ridge, where they contacted Capt. Simpson with "D" Company. The following day they joined the 2/3 Bn, who were moving into position in that area.

As soon as it became light, advanced BHQ with "B" Coy less 1. Pl., were to follow along the track taken by "C" Coy, but when this was attempted JAPANESE gun and MMGs on their main defensive spur opened up and it was impossible to proceed along the main track to the bridges. Accordingly, as it was essential to exploit in the area where "A" and "C" Coys had gone, where a battle had obviously been proceeding during the early morning, another way round had to be found. Accordingly, the remainder of the Bn referred to above, moved around the right flank, and after the usual slow progress through the jungle, a way was found across the creek, and on the other side the party arrived in the area between first and second bridges, having laid the sig. wire with them. It was not until 1120 hours that this point was reached. The party then moved across the bridge with considerable caution, and just across the other side found three (3) men of the 2/3 Bn, who had got across during the previous night when their section had attempted to establish the bridge-head. One of the men had been killed, and of the three, one was wounded.

By this time the JAPANESE had withdrawn from the basin, which

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was occupied by "B" Coy, who proceeded along the main track. At this time, Lieut. Pollitt of 14 Pl. with the remnants of his platoon, and his wounded men, reported back from the position, which he had held between the creek and the track. He had been wounded by grenade splinters in the knee and ankle and other places, and with his other wounded men was evacuated. At this time fire was continuing ahead and "B" Coy's progress was held up at 1245 hours. By 1400 hours "B" Coy, who had attempted an outflanking movement after they had contacted the enemy, reported that they were unable to advance as ^{the} enemy was in considerable strength, with several LMGs and two (2) MMGs apparently in position along the spur-from the top of which their mountain gun and mortars were firing.

As the Battalion had no other troops available at that time to commit, and it was obvious that further progress would depend upon ~~the~~ a strong attack on the JAPANESE position from our left flank, a report was made to Bde HQs and assistance requested.

At 1600 hours the Pioneer Pl. arrived under Lieut. Lainey, and were immediately sent up the ridge, with orders to attack the JAPANESE position down the hill and as an extension of "B" Coy's left flank. At the same time "B" Coy were to support and press forward.

The Pioneer Pl. got into position and did a good attack considering the limitations of their numbers (18 all ranks) and succeeded in killing four (4) JAPANESE and wounding others and capturing a medium M.G., which they put out of action. A JAPANESE counter-attack by a superior force drove them back however, and they consolidated on the left flank of the Company (see recommendations for Awards Lieut. Lainey and Cpl. Stewart.

At 1715 hours, "B" Coy of the 2/3 Bn with their MMG Pl., arrived.

It had taken Lieut. Lainey from 1615 hours to 1800 hours to get into position, viz. one and three-quarters hours ($1\frac{3}{4}$ hrs), and accordingly, after discussing this position with Capt. Lysaght of the 2/3 Bn, it was decided it would be better for him to wait until the morning before continuing the attack. This decision was reached on account of the near approach of darkness and Capt. LYsaght's Coys shortage of rations, which were expected to arrive that night.

After dark, Major Baines, with the rest of HQ Coy arrived in the area, with the exception of the Mortar and MMG Pls, which were left on the ridge above EORA CREEK village for the purpose it was hoped to give fire support from there. Major Miller the 2 i/c of 2/1 Bn and "B" Echelon, also established in that area.

During the night 23/24th. OCTOBER, 42, intermittent firing and grenading continued. Stand-to was at 0545 hours on the morning of 24th. OCT., and the C.O. went forward and visited the forward platoons of "B" Company, who reported that the JAPANESE had re-organised and consolidated their positions which they had taken^{up} the previous day, and that sounds of wood-chopping was heard on the ridge above our positions.

Rations arrived during the night, and ammunition at first light. This had necessitated two carries by personnel of "HQ" Company platoons left back on the ridge. Each of these carries was of $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 hours' duration: each were dependent on whether it was done in darkness or daylight, loaded or unloaded. To do two trips between darkness and first light meant about ten hours' working, and with the attendant delays, meant that carrying parties were busy throughout darkness. As they were also occupied in daylight digging-in on the ridge, and bringing up rations from our rear supply dump in readiness for the next night's carry, these platoons of "HQ" Company did not average more than 3 hours' sleep a day for the following week. It has been noteworthy that most of the members of these platoons, and especially the two Officers, have suffered more severely from attacks of Malaria, Typhus and Dysentery etc. than the general average of the Battalion, which is possibly due to the complete state of exhaustion to which they were reduced in doing these carrying parties. On most of the carries at night, it might be mentioned, that after bringing down ammunition and rations, they were more often than not called upon to carry back stretcher cases, which was the hardest work of all on the narrow and muddy track. In doing this work, inevitably along paths under enemy fire, four (4) were killed and seven (7) wounded during the period.

During the morning of the 24th. Oct. enemy mortar fire was brought down intermittently on our area, causing a few casualties. The JAPS were firing from the ridge 150 feet above our positions and approximately two to three-hundred (300) yards away, and this gave them observation of the tree tops of the area in which they knew we were located. The mortar bombs would burst in the trees above and have a shrapnel effect. Quite a proportion, probably 15 per cent of these mortar bombs were duds, and caused many scares by all of a sudden slithering through the foliage into a slit trench occupied by very scared people - very scared because one did not know for certain until they actually hit the ground whether they would explode or not.

Details of "A", "C" and "D" companies, who returned to the area, were organised as a composite coy under Lieut. Prior, and Lieut. O.B. Brown was attached for that purpose.

The C.O. thought that the enemy was in considerable strength, and that an attack by at least two companies from the left flank would be the only method of forcing him to leave his position, and accordingly this appreciation was passed on to Brigade. At 1000 hours information was received that "B" Coy of the 2/3 Bn, which had bivouaced in the area during the previous night and another Coy of the 2/3 Bn would be sent around to carry out this task. A recce party was sent out on to the feature to the EAST and across the creek in an endeavour to find an "O.P." from which to conduct mortar shoots on to the position occupied by the enemy. A platoon from the composite company was also sent out across the creek to cover the right flank of our position from high ground there.

During the morning, Lt.Col. Stevenson of 2/3 Bn, with "C" Coy of his Bn and his Bn.HQ, passed through the area to join his "B" Coy on the ridge above our position, and with the intention of organising an attack. Lieut. Frew, who had gone out on a patrol at dawn in an endeavour to locate the enemy's exact position, had been wounded. As an indication of the steepness of the ridge, an enemy rifleman firing on Lieut. Frew, who was moving

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up the ridge, shot him through the foot, the same bullet just missing his head - the second shot passed through Lieut. Frew's other foot, but he managed to shoot the rifleman who at that time was potting at him from a position of advantage on top of a large rock. This also indicates the difficulty of approaching an enemy who is in a carefully selected position. 12 Pl. of "B" Coy arrived and went into a position as an extension of that Coy's flank, and in an endeavour to cover the gap between "B" Coy and the Pioneer Pl., who were still on the extreme left flank.

During the afternoon the 2/3 Bn reported that they had contacted the enemy and were making a wider out-flanking movement in an endeavour to come down on them. The Brigadier came down and inspected the positions, and felt that greater precaution should be taken to guard our flanks on both sides of the creek - accordingly, dispositions were altered to comply.

During the night, 24/25th. OCT. the MMG Platoon on the bare ridge dug in their Vickers gun with the view to bringing harrassing fire down on to the enemy position. The night was extremely cold and it rained continuously. First thing on the morning of the 25th. OCT., the enemy gun opened up and blew the Vickers gun out of its pit, causing casualties. Even at this stage it was not appreciated what perfect observation the enemy had from his position.

On the 25th. OCTOBER, just before first light, the rations arrived with some mail, which was very much appreciated. During the morning two of our aircraft strafed the enemy's positions, but too far back and it had no effect on the situation. The Pioneer Platoon made a successful sortie on the enemy, killing two (2) and wounding a unknown number.

Col. Stevenson stated that he was still striking JAP patrols further up the ridge, and that in his opinion a regiment was engaged in this operation.

During the afternoon a mortar "O.P." was found on the EAST side of the creek - line was laid and preparations were made to fire our 3" mortar on the 26th. Oct. on what was thought to be the part of the ridge held by the JAPANESE. Identification of the exact location from a flank was extremely difficult, as only the tree tops could be seen. The mortar itself was to be fired from the SOUTH portion of the bare ridge. During the day mortar fire was brought down on our position, and sporadically on ridge whenever movement was observed there.

Our forward platoons in contact with the enemy were being as offensive as possible, sniping and grenading to the maximum extent possible with our limited ammunition. By changes of their positions during darkness and firing at enemy position from a new angle, they hoped to give the impression that an attack might be made from our positions.

On the 26th. OCTOBER, our 3" mortar fired and the rounds fell on what we subsequently discovered to be the main JAPANESE position. The enemy mortar or gun replied and knocked out our mortar, inflicting casualties on the crew, (see recommendation for Award - Sgt. Madigan). Accordingly, the mortar position was changed and firing continued.

During the night 25/26th. OCTOBER, "D" Coy and 8. and 9 platoons of "A" Coy, together with 13 platoon of "C" Coy, arrived in Brigade area, and during the morning, 26th. OCTOBER, came into the Battalion area.

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Lieut. Prior assumed command of "C" Coy in place of Capt. Barclay, who had been killed on the 22nd. Oct., and Lieut. Wiseman took over command of "A" Coy in place of Capt. Sanderson, who had also been killed on the 22nd.

During the afternoon, Sgt. Miller of "B" Coy (now R.S.M.), took a 2" mortar and 24 bombs, 12 grenades and two Bren guns, up to the Pioneer Platoon's position. He went forward from there as far as he could go around the JAP flank, and at extremely close range, used the above ammunition. Considerable squealing came from the enemy's position, which indicated the success of this operation. Sgt. Miller used considerable initiative in going forward and carrying out this operation, as during the whole of the time he was being sniped at and subjected to unaimed but disconcerting LMG fire.

Capt. Simpson of "D" Coy reported that although he lost two men just above ALOLA, he had killed at least six (6) JAPS and wounded and possibly killed an unknown number, as they had surprised the enemy in a bivouac area, and thrown grenades and tommy-gunned them before being forced to retire by a counter-attack from the flank. "D" Coy and remnants of "C" Coy were sent up to left flank to the immediate left of the Pioneer Platoon, with the view to endeavouring to do a left out-flanking attack, as 2/3 Bn had moved much further up the ridge and out of contact with our operation. Where it is mentioned in these notes that a certain number of JAPS have been killed, it refers only to authenticated casualties observed, and not to estimates of what might have been.

Lieut. Nathan with five (5) G.R.'s went out around the right flank to do a reconnaissance in an endeavour to find a possible route for an out-flanking movement around that flank. He was to remain out for three (3) days, and if possible he was to interrupt the JAPANESE supplies, ~~if observed~~.

During the afternoon the JAPANESE mountain gun started firing from a new position to which they had moved. It was later discovered that they had moved into a dug-out made of logs and earth, and this explained the chopping previously heard from this position. Later it was also found that an Engineer Coy had been attached to this position, which accounted for the extremely strong wooden pillar-boxes and dug-outs which the JAPANESE constructed in this area. Any attack up the steep ridge against these strongly held positions would have been most unlikely to have succeeded.

The JAPANESE rifles and ammunition in the area, amounting to 4,000 rounds, were collected and sent up to "B" Coy, who used them in firing unaimed harrassing fire into the JAPANESE positions almost continuously throughout the following night and day.

The heavy rain of the previous night and this morning, which amounted to an absolute down-pour of several inches, estimated by some of the countrymen at 5 to 8 inches, caused the creek to rise several ~~feet~~ inches and washed away portions of the bridge, which fortunately stuck between two rocks a little further down stream. This made crossing it extremely hazardous, especially as it was all submerged. Getting casualties across this bridge was an absolute night-mare, and was only managed by a line of men bracing themselves in the water against the sunken bridge and passing the stretchers across. To do this in the darkness in the very cold water was a rotten job, and the enemy fired mortar on to the area during the period. Padre Cunningham was outstanding in organising these evacuations (see recommendation for Award for Padre Cunningham). During the day, Capt. Burrell, who had been seconded as B.M. Learner, came back to the Battalion and

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assumed command of "C" Coy. Lieut. Long, who was seconded as "L.O." to Bde was wounded and Lieut. Fisher went to Bde to replace him.

Enemy mortar fired on BHQ during the day caused two casualties there, and several others in the Battalion area.

During the night 26/27 OCTOBER, the C.O. and Adjt. considered position and decided it would be best to move BHQ up to the area occupied by the Pioneer Platoon, and ~~that~~ "C" and "D" Coys in that area to endeavour to organise heavy pressure with a view to turning the enemy flank. Accordingly, at first light advanced BHQ moved up the ridge, and when they reached the position occupied by "C" Coy, the C.O. was called to the telephone, where he was informed by "B" Coy that the enemy had gone. It was then 0745 hours. Orders were then given for "B" Coy to continue the advance, and to follow their patrols which had already been sent by their Coy Commander; "C" Coy was to advance northwards along the ~~top of the~~ ridge and BHQs were ordered to remain near the creek and prepare to advance. Accordingly the C.O. and Adjt. returned to the bottom of the ridge in order to follow the leading company in its advance. Shortly after the C.O. had re-established BHQ on the track near the creek, reports arrived from both "B" and "C" Coys that the enemy had again been contacted. Apparently he had merely moved back about 500 yards to even stronger positions on a steeper part of the ridge.

Sgt. Ritchie (later Lieut.) leading a patrol, by clever patrolling, avoided an ambush which the JAPS had prepared.

On occupying their positions, the partly eaten body of one of our soldiers killed in the initial advance was discovered. His mutilations were obvious, with a view to obtaining food as steaks were cut off his thigh and buttocks in a neat and butcher-like manner.

During the period spent in this area, the personnel of "B" Coy were constantly becoming casualties due to unaimed JAP rifle and LMG fire, and also from grenades which they would roll down the hill. At night, these could not be seen, and casualties were constant. In these forward positions the troops were 20 to 40 yards from the JAPS and could not move out of their two-man pits, as any such movement brought considerable fire. It was only at night that they could move out to carry out essential administration, replenishment ^{of ammunition and evacuation} of casualties etc., and such essential movement was also dangerous. From these new positions the JAPANESE would roll stones down on to our positions, and Capt. Catterns in his Coy HQ received a bad contusion of the knee from one of these stones - he had previously been wounded by a grenade splinter but remained on duty. In this difficult defensive position, Capt. Catterns used every device to maintain some pressure on the JAPANESE, and kept up the morale of his men by his visits to their forward positions and his personality. The men were in an extremely exhausted condition after being in their exposed forward positions continuously under fire, wet and hungry, and at no time during the campaign were any of the Battalion in such a miserable condition. Notwithstanding this, they kept up their spirits and maintained the maximum pressure possible on the JAPANESE opposite. At various times JAPANESE patrols endeavoured to move forward but were always driven back.

During the afternoon "C" and "D" Coys pressed forward on our left flank and suffered casualties, but at the same time causing them. They were endeavouring to move forward on what we subsequently discovered to be a junction of the tracks comprising the main JAPANESE supply route to their positions further up the ridge where they were opposed to the 2/3 Bn. They

posted ~~in~~ a strong mobile defensive force with the apparent object of preventing any such disruptions of their communications, and it was this force that "C" and "D" Coys were constantly meeting whenever they tried to move forward. In retrospect it seems that had the decision to establish strong opposition up the ridge been carried out, and a proper concerted attack plan organised, it would have been possible to force back the enemy at this point and probably have caused his withdrawal earlier than was subsequently achieved by the 2/3 Bn attack. However, it was impossible at the time to form an accurate picture of the enemy dispositions, and failure to carry out the plan referred to can only be considered an unlucky occurrence caused unwittingly by the JAPANESE withdrawal. It is curious to think that by this manoeuvre, which they no doubt intended merely as a retirement to stronger positions, they caused our plans to be altered undoubtedly to their advantage. It is possible of course that such an effect was in their minds at the time.

(See Sketch 3)

For the rest of the period at EORA CREEK, our own and JAPANESE patrols were constantly clashing in this area on the left flank without a decisive result either way.

The Sappers commenced to repair the bridge with infantry assistance. A Company of the 2/2 Bn relieved our sub-units on the EAST of the creek. Accordingly, for the first time in this position the whole of the Bn occupied the one area. It was only on this day that the re-organisation of "A" Coy was completed. "A" Coy was then posted in the position formerly occupied by the Pioneer Pl. on the left flank, but also extended to contact "B" Coy. Thus for the first time our left flank was properly secured. The Pioneer Pl. was withdrawn at this stage and came in as reserve.

Our 3" mortar commenced firing at 1745 hours and Major Baines observed for it. Unfortunately, the 14th. round of our 3" mortar caused it to blow up and killed three (3) of the detachment. The first twelve (12) rounds which were fired were ones which had been carried the whole way up the track by our mortar platoon, and after they had expended these, others were obtained from A.S.C. dump, which had been air-dropped. It was the second one of these which caused the accident.

During the night 27/28 OCTOBER, rifle fire and grenades were almost constantly being used by both sides. The "B" Coy men who we were unable to relieve, were still in close contact and very exhausted.

Translation arrived back from Bde of papers taken from a dead Officer after our attack on the 22nd. Oct., which indicated that we had opposite us in this position a Bn of the "TATE" with Engineers and artillery attached.

From this time on our telephones, which had become gradually water logged, were always faulty, making considerable difficulties in communications.

During a patrol attack by "C" Coy our men reported that a JAP sniper wearing an Australian helmet wounded one of our men. The JAP patrols succeeded in cutting our wire between BHQ and "C" Coy in three places. Our patrols succeeded in driving out the JAP patrols.

"D" Coy, in execution of their orders, succeeded in occupying the position further NORTH than "C", i.e. more

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directly above the main JAP position. The JAPANESE immediately counter-attacked, casualties occurring on both sides. An unfortunate incident occurred in "D" Coy's area in the afternoon - when the 2" mortar was being fired in order to repulse the JAPANESE attack it blew up. This was undoubtedly due to faulty air-dropped ammunition.

Capt. Simpson reported that during the afternoon the JAPANESE were patrolling between himself and "C" Coy and that he could not fire owing to the danger to "C" Coy whose exact position in relation to his own was indefinite, especially as patrols from both companies were constantly manoeuvring in the area. In this position at the top of the ridge a very serious game of what was really equivalent to "blindman's bluff" was constantly being played by patrols from the opposing forces as visibility seldom exceeded 10 yards. During the afternoon the JAPANESE were unfortunately very successful in their grenade rolling, and "B" Coy had five (5) casualties. Only Bully Beef and 2 ozs of biscuits arrived for the day's rations, which were really scarcely sufficient, as throughout the period in this position rations were from 30 to 70 per cent short in various commodities (see the QM's report to BHQ attached covering the ten days' ending 1st. Nov.)

Lieut. Nathan's patrol returned and reported that the country was extremely rough and precipitous and that in order to reach the track behind the JAPANESE position it would take at least a day and the troops would arrive in a very exhausted condition. He stated that the creek was even wider further down stream, and that an opposed crossing would be very difficult by day.

Lieut. Wiseman lead a successful patrol against the JAPS during the afternoon.

During the afternoon the 2/3 Bn put in their attack, and this caused the enemy to withdraw during the night 28/29 OCTOBER.

At first light "B" and "C" Coy patrols reported that the enemy had moved and "B" Coy immediately occupied the enemy positions, and another corpse was found also neatly butchered.

Orders were given for the advance to continue - "A" and "B" Coys to move along the axis of the track in that order, and "C" and "D" Coys to move parallel to them from their positions up the ridge.

The total casualties in this EORA CREEK area was 44 killed, 88 wounded and 3 missing. The action had lasted nine (9) days and was extremely exhausting. The Battalion had achieved tactical successes in capturing the bridge-head after heavy fighting, and also by extremely offensive and effective patrolling on his immediate flank. On the other hand, some opportunities had been missed, but whether alternate plans would have been successful is uncertain.

Looking back on our mental and physical condition during this period, there was no doubt that the physical exhaustion and continual hunger, being continually wet and intermittently under mortar and small arms fire, and with rather heavy casualties, caused a sort of torpor. This did not mean that the morale was weakened because in fact the morale was high all the time, but it did mean that the ability to plan and execute bold plans requiring energetic preparation

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and execution was affected.

The advance continued until 1530 hours when movement, identified as JAPANESE troops, was observed on the ridge ahead, which was thought to be and subsequently proved to be ALOLA.

"C" Coy was sent up the ridge to the left to do an outflanking movement in case the JAPANESE were holding position in force.

On the following day the whole force moved forward. There were plentiful signs that the JAPANESE had had mule pack transport up to their positions at EORA CREEK, and discarded pack saddles, horse shoes and carcasses were observed.

By the time ALOLA was reached at 1400 hours the JAPANESE had retired and the Battalion occupied the position.

"B" Coy was sent forward towards ISURAVA rest-house and ridge, which positions dominated ALOLA. "D" Coy was up the ridge on the left flank and the remainder of the Battalion remained in the ALOLA area.

Another point which should be mentioned in regard to the EORA CREEK operation was that no fires could be lighted in the Battalion area, as smoke rising through the trees inevitably brought mortar fire down on to that position. Accordingly, during the nine (9) days there the personnel of "B" Company did not have any hot tea or a hot meal of any kind. The personnel of the other companies, whilst passing through the Brigade area, did obtain one hot meal during the period, and BHQ and HQ Coy were also able to obtain three or four hot meals or drinks by using a petrol blower borrowed from the 2/3 Battalion.

On the 31st. OCTOBER, elements of the 25th. Bde passed through the Battalion along the track to KOKODA, and thus relieved the 16 Bde from the responsibility of being forward troops.

Dropping was commenced, but the dropping ground was very small and on a ridge, consequently a very small percentage of the stores dropped were able to be collected. However, enough was available for one day's rations to be issued.

At 1330 hours, the Battalion commenced to move, taking the EAST track through ABUARI, and proceeding across EORA CREEK North along the ridge the other side. The men were allowed to light fires here for the first time, and a hot meal was cooked.

On the 1st. and 2nd. NOVEMBER, the Brigade advanced northwards through a number of villages, whose gardens provided us with yams and marrows in reasonable quantities. As these two days were done on one day's ration, the use of these native foods was essential, and for the first time in two weeks the men were able to eat as much as they could. On the 3rd. NOVEMBER, the floor of the KOKODA valley was reached, and more and more gardens appeared, full of plantains, papaws etc. KOKODA was plainly visible from several points during the descent, and this was the nearest the Battalion ever got to that place.

KOBARA was reached after two hours' march along the flat, and dropping was in progress by the time the Battalion arrived. At this time we were the last Battalion, and consequently were the last unit to receive rations.

During the day the 2/2 Bn moved around to the main KOKODA-BUNA track, and their forward elements came in contact with the enemy at OIVI.

On the 4th. NOVEMBER, more dropping commenced, which the men picked up, and we were warned to move as soon as our rations were issued.

(see Sketch 4) The suggestion was made to the Brigade Commander that our battalion should move EAST from KOBARA towards GORARI and ILIMO in an endeavour to out-flank the JAPS in the OIVI position. The Brigadier agreed to mention this to 6 DIV., and eventually orders were received from Brigade for the battalion to move around Eastwards from KOBARA in an endeavour to get to ILIMO. The actual order was as follows :-

"TO: CULLEN.
FROM: LLOYD. 1. 5.

Ref. Map BUNA SE 2 mile one inch stop Situation stop EDGAR meeting strong enemy opposition right OIVI feature stop One company STEVENSON is on left OIVI feature with one company working around to cut track NE of OIVI stop Remainder STEVENSON around SOUTH of right OIVI feature to attack enemy from SE direction early AM 6 Nov stop your message T.O.O. 1330 received stop You will secure and hold vicinity GORARI and ILIMO patrolling south stop east stop west with view to subsequent contact with STEVENSON or EDGAR stop UNCLE SAM apparently making satisfactory progress watch out for him.

1645"

In order to assist the battalion in this operation, 70 additional native carriers were provided, and a 208 wireless set, but unfortunately no Operator was provided for it.

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In our hurry to depart, and being out of contact with Brigade, it was not possible to net the instrument into the set at Brigade HQ., and consequently it was proved to be useless to us. On many occasions during the next few days the set was set up with an aerial, and although we could hear Brigade talking, they could not hear us. No wire was available for telephones except one coil which the Sigs. carried, and consequently we were out of contact with Bde from then on.

The maps available showed no details of the country and proved to be inaccurate.

The Battalion moved off at 1615 hours after having a lot of bother getting the native carriers moving, and getting rations for them to take.

After crossing two streams and following the track which we assumed to be the correct one, we passed a native village, and at 1810 hours halted for the night.

After we had ^{halted} ~~stopped~~ on the edge of a creek, the ANGAU Staff Sergeant in charge of the native carriers came up and asked if we were stopping for the night. He said - "Well, that is very funny, because if you look across the creek, about 300 yards away you will see some native huts, and those are the ones we slept in last night and are only 300 yards from KOBARA dropping ground."

This was quite correct, and the afternoon had been spent following tracks which led us around in a three-quarter circle - lack of knowledge of the country and lack of maps made this quite inevitable, and we all thought it a good joke, thought it had wasted a fair amount of time.

In the village we had passed, were natives who had just come back, and they were very friendly and the first natives, other than carriers, we had seen during the whole campaign.

on the 5th. NOV.

At 0730 hours/ the Battalion moved off, and the track passed through a series of villages and native gardens.

The villages were deserted, and in one of them, SENGAI, we found the bodies of five (5) Australians of the 2/16 Bn, which were buried and the identifications sent back.

During the afternoon we came upon the signs of a recent JAPANESE patrol, foot-marks, cigarette packets etc. At one point a little fire was still burning, and apparently we were following in the foot-steps of a JAPANESE recon patrol returning to its base.

At 1700 hours, whilst moving Easterly, we came to a track junction going NORTH, which we correctly surmised was the track to GORARI. The JAP patrol had obviously turned up this junction, and accordingly a platoon of "A" Coy was sent forward to investigate. They did a good job and surprised three JAPS sheltering in a little hut and succeeded in wounding two (2) of them, but the third one returned our fire and covered the withdrawal of the others. They left behind, however, their equipment and rifles and a lot of blood.

The track junction was referred to as Lainey's corner; and it was decided that "A" Coy, commanded by Lieut. Lainey, should be left at this corner for the purpose of securing our flank and rear and to establish a base to which rations could be brought (see sketch map of the area).

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"A" Coy was told not to get too involved in an action against this JAPANESE position, as it was felt that our main objective was to reach ILIMO, and that a side-show at this stage was not justified.

At 0630 hours on the 6 NOVEMBER, a patrol from "D" Coy was sent Eastwards and on their reporting that the track appeared secure for 1500 yards, the Battalion moved off at 0830 hours.

The track from here on was very slow, crossing innumerable creeks, and native gardens, which were patrolled before the Battalion moved through them. This was necessary because at various places signs of recent JAPANESE movements were observed. The native gardens hereabouts showed traces of JAPANESE food gathering.

At 1230 hours, a large stream was encountered. The only means of crossing it was by a creeper, which was got across. The water in the middle was five feet deep, and the stream was flowing very rapidly. In order to get across, one held on to the creeper with both hands and moved side-ways. In the middle of the stream the force of the water swept one's feet off the bed of the stream and almost horizontally behind. By hanging on to the creeper, it was possible to get into the calmer water on the other side, but wet through - as the troops said "right up to the paybook." The Pioneers in the meantime built a bridge at a narrow point slightly down stream, and just as the Bn finished wading across over a period of three hours, the bridge was completed. The bridge was built, not only for the purpose of getting the Bn across, but in order to make our L. of C. easier. It was later discovered that the creek crossed was the IRIMU CREEK, and that the track to ILIMO was just across the creek and Northwards. Unfortunately, the maps did not indicate this at all.

In a village just across the creek, called WALLOPA, a friendly village Councillor tried to be helpful. Unfortunately, his limited knowledge of English led us to believe that the track to ILIMO either did not exist or that it went on through the village in an Easterly direction. Neither of these deductions were correct, but both partly were. In fact there was a track to ILIMO leading off from half a mile down stream, but it had not been used for many years, and for that reason we could not find it, although patrols were sent out to investigate in that direction. There is little doubt also that eventually the Easterly track or the branch from it would have led to ILIMO had we known the country.

At 1500 hours a Runner arrived from "A" Coy, and brought along a signal from Brigade, which was the written confirmation of the order received and quoted as on the 5th. NOVEMBER. A message was sent back with the Runner but unfortunately he never reached "A" Coy and was posted as missing later on.

From now on the track improved, but progress was still slow due to crossing many little creeks with steep banks, which caused bottle-necks in the single file column.

Another Runner was sent back and reported that he had seen a JAP patrol ^{just} across the creek from WALLOPA. The message he was to take was then sent back with an escort. No doubt it was this patrol which killed our first Runner.

The Bn. halted at 1730 hours and

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now had only an incomplete day's ration left plus emergency rations.

A conference was held in an endeavour to establish our position. The track had led Easterly and Northerly at various times, but unfortunately only Northerly enough to make us believe that we might be turning towards ILIMO. Then it would go Eastwards again. It was decided that the next morning a company would be sent forward for as far as they could go, and be back by 1300 hours. If the track were to turn NORTH, then the Battalion would follow it, but if it continued Easterly the Battalion would have to turn back for lack of rations. Accordingly, on the 7th. NOVEMBER, "C" Coy went forward at 0745 hours, and at 1230 hours returned with the information that the track continued to lead EAST. Apparently this track was the one leading to ASISI, but to us at the time it was obvious that it could not lead to ILIMO, and it was decided to turn back, reach Lainey's Corner, and carry out our alternative task as set out in our original order, and proceed NORTH to GORARI.

At this stage nearly everyone in the Battalion was suffering severely with diarrhoea, still, however, the morale was high - the men, though exhausted, were quite cheerful. The contents of the order from Brigade had been communicated to them, and the thought of meeting American troops was a great morale booster.

In order not to disclose our position, no fires had been lighted during this march, and accordingly for the last three days there had been no hot meals. It rained constantly all the afternoon and night, and this did not add to our health.

The fact that no rations had arrived, despite the arrangements made, decided us to turn back, as it was thought possible that the JAPANESE patrols may have ambushed supply column.

At 1300 hours a Runner arrived to say that the rations were on their way, but it was decided to send them back to Lainey's Corner, where the Battalion would reach that night.

Accordingly the unit moved at 1330 hours and reached the creek EAST of Lainey's Corner at night. A good assortment of rations were available, sausages, jam, butter and beans, which were the first we had seen for a month; also some mail. There was only a little of each of these good things, but they were ~~xxx~~ much appreciated and very cheering. Fires were allowed to be lighted, and everyone felt happier.

A message was received that Major Miller was transferred to the 2/31st. Battalion with the rank of Lt. Colonel, and although we were very sorry to lose him, we were very pleased with his promotion.

The C.O. and Adj. went forward and reached Lainey's Corner that night.

Sitreps were received from Brigade, but nothing to interfere with our plans. Accordingly, it was decided in view of the fact that the remainder of the Brigade was held up at OIVI and we now had rations and extra ammunition, that we could move up the track to GORARI, and plans were made and orders issued for an attack against the JAPS, who were in position NORTH along the track. The attack to commence early the next morning.

The first thing the next morning information was received that the 25 Bde was only an hour's march away. "A" Coy moved forward and made preparations to attack the JAPANESE along the track, and the C.O. went back to meet Brigadier Eather,

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as the signal advised that we now came under command of the 25 Bde. Just along the track the 2/31st. Bn was met, now under the command of Lt. Col. Miller, and they also had orders from Brig. Eather to do this attack. Colonel Miller was informed of the arrangements already made, and he went back to contact Lieut. Lainey, O.C. of "A" Coy, to gain information from him. The C.O. met Brig. Eather who decided that the attack should be done by the 2/31 Bn and that the 2/1 Bn should rest during the morning ready to pass through the 2/31 Bn and exploit towards GORARI. The rest of the plan was for the the remainder of the 25 Bde to turn WEST at GORARI and attack OIVI in the rear, whilst 2/1 Bn was to exploit EAST towards ILIMO from GORARI.

At 1200 hours the 2/31 Battalion's attack commenced, having passed through our "A" Coy's position, and at 1300 hours word was received that 2/31 Bn was held up by strong enemy forces.

Brig. Eather gave orders that the 2/25 Bn were to pass through us and in co-operation with the 2/31 Bn, were to out-flank and surround the enemy, which they succeeded in doing by the following morning.

Whilst we had been endeavouring to reach ILIMO, the 25 Bde had had two days' rest at KOKODA, where they had received new clothing, tobacco, chocolate, fresh bread and butter, and two nights' good sleep. The difference observed in comparing our men with their's was most marked. Our men were exhausted and rotten with diarrhoea, whilst their's were fresh and looked much healthier.

The troops very much appreciated the rest allowed them by units of the 25 Bde taking up the forward position.

On 9 Nov The 2/33 Bn also passed through and laying line as they went - made a detour around the 2/31st. and 2/25th. Bns and getting on to the main track ^{to GORARI} behind them and also behind the JAPANESE. At 1145 hours they reported that they had moved along the track to GORARI and encountered JAPANESE opposition, and were unable to reach the main KOKODA-ILIMO track.

Accordingly, we received orders to move up behind the 2/33 Bn and to by-pass them Eastwards and gain the main track.

Accordingly, we moved off, "A" Coy leading. The tail of the 2/33 Bn was reached at about 1700 hours and accordingly the Battalion turned EAST though the jungle, with the intention of going 1000 yards EAST and then turning NORTH to cut the main track. After moving 500 yards an uncrossable river was encountered, and accordingly we turned NORTH and followed the WEST bank of the stream. Firing could be heard, which we presumed to be the 2/33 Bn in contact with the enemy.

(see Sketch 5) At 1745 hours we tapped in on the line which we were laying with us, and received a report from the 2/33 Bn that the JAPS were withdrawing EAST from his front, which meant they were coming towards us. Colonel Buttrose further stated that he could not reach the main track, and did not know whether it was near, and whether he was near GORARI or not.

At 1800 hours, we were continuing our movement Northwards, and were getting rather worried as to whether we should push on or halt for the night. However, we moved on, and at 1830 hours "A" Coy struck the JAPANESE. They used pleny of enterprise, however, and swiftly over-ran the JAPANESE position, killing six (6) and wounding others, and then, much to our surprise, we found that we had reached the

over/

main track, just at a point where a well made bridge crossed the fast flowing river.

Accordingly, we immediately consolidated in this position and reported our success to Brigadier Eather. The battalion perimeter was adopted, with our NORTH end along the main track, our EAST along the creek, and our SOUTH and WEST sides along fairly level ground.

We took the utmost precaution to ensure that no JAPS could cross the bridge or track, laying trip wires and booby traps made of hand grenades.

We realised then that with this swift flowing creek, necessitating a bridge, the JAPANESE would have to make every endeavour to dislodge us if they wished to retain the use of the track. Shortly afterwards ~~the~~ JAPANESE fire from across the track and across the bridge commenced.

Investigation of the position we occupied showed that it included a JAPANESE medical post, and a large quantities of quinine were found, which enabled us to take a prophylactic dose of two (2) tablets per man per day.

The position now was that although the JAPS could not use the bridge, neither could we, and accordingly it was decided that it was essential for us to cross the creek further up stream in order to out-flank the JAPANESE and drive them away from the EAST side of the bridge-head. Orders were issued for "C" Coy, who were on the SOUTH-EAST corner of the perimeter, with the assistance of the Pioneers, to commence building a bridge first thing the next morning.

"A" Company had not been able to gain a bridge-head on the EAST bank of the creek as the JAPANESE were in occupation of a group of rocks 10-feet high, which dominated the bridge completely. From this position JAPANESE snipers from then on until they were killed on the 11th. November, harrassed our position and caused "A" Company many casualties. The use of the 2-inch mortar from this position proved very effective, especially as they had such perfect observation.

The night of the 9th. NOVEMBER was spent generally in digging in as, having appreciated the importance of the position we were occupying, it was anticipated that the JAPANESE would attempt to drive us out.

It was found that ^{the} JAP position which we had occupied, contained as well as defensive posts, several huts, which had been part of a HQ and medical area. They contained bags of rice and wheat, little barrels of plums pickled in brine, and medical stores, including quinine, morphia, bandages and mercurichrome crystals, which the Doctor found was the best cure for the tropical ulcers which most people were now suffering from. This find of quinine also enabled the battalion to commence its suppressive treatment with two tablets per day per man, and all ranks appreciated this as they were now thoroughly convinced of the importance of not getting Malaria.

During the night 9/10 NOVEMBER no rain fell, which was most unusual, and consequently everyone felt much happier the next morning instead of standing-to in a sodden condition. During the night there was some rifle fire, but little other activity. It was decided that it would be advisable to seize the ground NORTH of the track with a view to relieving the pressure on the 2/33 Bn, which Colonel Buttrose advised was considerable. Accordingly, orders were given to "D" Coy to attack at 0745 hours on the 10th. November - move across the track and then turn WEST and move towards piece of higher ground, which we correctly assumed to be the ground held by the JAPANESE who were holding up the advance of the 2/33 Bn.

At 0830 hours a report was received from "D" Coy that they had struck JAP opposition almost straight after crossing the main track. By 1100 hours "D" Coy, which had made several endeavours to move forward by infiltration and out-flanking movement, reported that they were unable to make any progress and had had sixteen (16) casualties out of an initial strength of fifty (50) all ranks. Accordingly, "D" Coy withdrew back across to our side of the track, that is, SOUTH of the track, and took up position in the NORTH-WEST area of the battalion perimeter. Although they had not been successful in gaining their objective, viz. the high ground, they had caused the JAPS many casualties, and had indicated to the enemy our offensive spirit, and forced him to withdraw forces operating against the 2/33 Bn to meet the threat from "D" Coy. This was clearly indicated by the continuous increase in their resistance during the course of "D" Coy's attack.

Several acts of gallantry were performed during this action by "D" Coy (see recommendations for awards for Lieut. Wiseman and Cpl. Ward).

During the day "A" Coy, particularly Lieut. Blakinston's platoon, who were right at the bridge, were engaged in a sniping duel with the JAPANESE situated in the rocks across the creek. Their shooting was quite accurate, and although our men were dug in, they often were forced to expose themselves in order to return the enemy fire, and three of them were killed in the area during that day. On "C" Coy's front, they, with the Pioneers, had succeeded in getting three logs across the creek at its narrowest point, ^{by 1100 hrs} and Lieut. Gosnell's platoon (14 Pl.) immediately went across and established a bridge -

over/

head. As soon as the whole platoon was across they moved NORTH from the EAST bank of the creek with the task of endeavouring to dislodge the JAP snipers and consolidate our right flank. The crossing was a slow business as, owing to the thin logs which we were forced to use, the bridge could only be crossed by sitting down and levering oneself forward, one man at a time. It might be mentioned here that the creek was a fast flowing torrent, 35 yards across. In endeavouring to make the bridge trees were fallen across the creek. The trees were quite big ones with trunks up to 14-feet, but with all foliage they were washed down stream as if they had been little sticks.

14 Platoon advanced according to orders, and at 1530 hours killed three (3) JAPS in an encounter with them. The remainder of the company was still engaged in crossing the river ready for a Company operation on that side of the river the following morning.

On "D" Coy's withdrawal back into the perimeter, it was thought that the JAPANESE might counter attack, especially as it was hoped that his forces from OIVI might reinforce those at present opposite us. Lieut. Powell, who was in command of "B" Coy at the time was ordered to make plans for an immediate counter attack should the enemy attack our perimeter in the "A" or "D" Coys' sectors (see attached sketch).

During the night 10/11th. NOVEMBER, the JAPS did make several attempts to break into our area and drive us out of our bridge-head position. Firing and grenading was almost continuous during the night, and on one occasion the JAPANESE made a bayonet attack. All attacks were driven off, however, although we had some casualties.

Throughout the day casualties were coming into the R.A.P. with wounds from mortars and mountain gun, which the JAPS opened up in the afternoon. Fortunately only a few rounds were directed against us, but over 70 rounds from his gun were directed onto the 2/33 Bn, who were two to three hundred yards WEST of us.

On the 11th. NOVEMBER, as soon as it was light, "C" Coy succeeded in getting their whole company across the river, and the Pioneer Platoon became responsible for the WEST bridge-head. "C" Coy were given orders to attack and capture the rocky position held by the JAPS on the main EAST bridge-head astride the main track KOKODA-WAIROPI, and to consolidate in that area and patrol EASTWARDS until further contact was made.

"D" Coy sent out a patrol NORTH across the track and reported the JAPS held a position only 50 yards in from the track. "B" Coy sent patrols WEST and contacted the 2/33 Bn. The JAPS had cut the wire between 2/33 and 2/25 Bns., and accordingly, "B" Coy's patrol, accompanied by sigs., moved back along the track to clear it of JAPS and to clear the sig. wire. At 1115 hours, "C" Coy commenced their attack and Mr. Armstrong's platoon succeeded in killing nineteen (19) JAPS on their objective, viz. the rocky position. This position was then occupied by "C" Coy HQ, and our troops were then able to cross the creek over the main bridge.

In accordance with their orders, "C" Company sent Lieut. McCloy with 13 Platoon to patrol NORTH across the track and then EAST, while Lieut. Nathan with three (3) GRs patrolled SOUTH of the track and EAST, where within 250 yards they ran into strong opposition, lost one man

over/

killed and one wounded, and returned to "C" Coy HQ to report. Lieut. McCloy's patrol also soon struck JAP opposition and decided to attack for the purpose not only of gaining their objective, but of gaining information. A very gallant and determined attack was pressed home against a position which was eventually found to contain 300 JAPANESE. Two sections, under Cpl. Stoddart and Cpl. Shearwin, who were both wounded, each had every man a casualty bar one per section. In spite of continuous JAPANESE fire they succeeded in extricating the remnants of their sections. (See recommendations for Awards - Cpl. Stoddart - Cpl. Shearwin, and Lieut. McCloy). Lieut. McCloy reorganised his platoon, and leaving men in position opposite the JAPS, reported the information gained to Capt. Burrell.

With this information a battalion attack against the JAPANESE position was planned to take place in the afternoon.

Patrols from our own and the 2/33 Bn reported that all JAPS in the area NORTH of the track and WEST of the creek had gone. Large numbers of mules and horses with pack saddles were found in the area, and it was apparent that a large force had moved through and crossed the KUMUSI RIVER to the NORTH.

Later in the day, the mountain gun, which had been firing at us during the afternoon of the 10th. November, was found buried in the area, together with a lot of other heavy equipment.

Word had been received from the 25th. Brigade that the attack of the 2/25 and 2/31 Bns against JAP positions on the GORARI track had been successful, and that the 2/31 Bn was moving up to move through us and exploit EASTWARDS. Later, information was received that the whole of the JAPANESE holding up the 16 Bde at OIVI feature, had withdrawn, and it was presumably these who counter-attacked us during the 10/11 November. By 1300 hours the 2/25 Bn had moved into the area between ourselves and the 2/33 Bn. At 1400 hours, two platoons of "A" Coy crossed the creek over the main bridge and established a bridge-head on the main bank, and thus leaving "C" Coy to continue operations. "B" Coy also went across the main bridge with orders to get into position NORTH of the enemy, i.e. between the enemy and the KUMUSI RIVER, with a view to attacking from that position after finding out information about their positions.

"B" Coy moved to this area and took over from a platoon of "C" Coy which was established there. "B" Coy reported after deploying the whole of their company they had been unable to find the EAST or left flank of the enemy, but were maintaining pressure.

At 1600 hours, "D" Coy, having crossed the bridge, moved EASTWARDS along the axis of the main track and came in contact with the enemy there.

During the early afternoon, Lt.Cdl. Miller, of the 2/31 Bn, arrived, and it was arranged that he should attack the enemy position from the SOUTH and EAST while we attacked it from the NORTH and WEST. The attack was timed to start at 1730 hours. The co-operation between the two battalions was first-class, and as a result of all round pressure, the JAPANESE position was over-run by men of both battalions.

During the action the JAPANESE made a counter-attack WESTWARDS down the track and against "B" Coy's SOUTH-WEST platoon.

& D Coy's left flank also

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The counter-attack was a complete failure, and more than 40 JAPANESE were killed during this phase of the operation, whilst our casualties were 6 killed and 12 wounded.

By 1855 hours the firing had ceased and the battle was over. It was by now dark and beyond patrolling no activity was possible until the following morning.

The 2/31 Bn established their positions just EAST of the JAPANESE' which had been over-run, and we established our positions EAST and within 200 yards of the main bridge.

One incident is worth recording. When the JAPANESE counter-attacked, Cpl. St. George-Ryder of "B" Coy, standing up behind a tree, emptied the Tommy-Gun magazine, killing three of them. Just as he was changing his magazine a JAPANESE armed with a sword rushed at him, cutting him about the head after knocking off his steel helmet. Cpl. St. George-Ryder there upon closed with the JAPANESE, who was still trying to use his sword, and succeeded in inflicting nasty head injuries. However, Cpl. Ryder, with the use of his knee and superior strength, put the JAP out of action, where upon the JAP was despatched by another soldier who came up to assist.

Another incident which occurred during the JAP attack against "D" Coy's position on the night 10/11 November was also at close quarters. A Gunner, who had "left" the 2/1 Fd Regt. in order to join in the fighting, was at that time attached to "D" Coy, and was a very powerful man. He was occupying a forward position in a pit at the base of a tree when a JAPANESE with a bayonet lunged at him. The soldier, surprised, dropped his own rifle and grabbed the JAPANESE bayonet and, wrenching it out of hands of the JAP, killed him with the butt of the JAP rifle. His hands were badly cut about by the bayonet, but he stuck to his position and helped to repel other JAPANESE attacks during the night.

The battle in the area was now over, and it had certainly been a great tactical success for the battalion. Between our Battalion and the 2/31 Bn over 320 JAPS had been killed, and an unknown number wounded.

The holding of our bridge position had forced the JAPS, who had held up the advance of the main force at OIVI, to withdraw without their heavy equipment. It was later established, almost an absolute certainty, that the force which had retired across the KUMUSI RIVER, had been personally led by Lt. Gen. HORII, and that they continued to follow the course of the KUMUSI RIVER down to its mouth, and had never taken any subsequent part in the operation of the Campaign.

On the 12th. NOVEMBER at first light, patrols were commenced, and it was apparent that there were no JAPANESE left in the area in any formed bodies.

It was planned to spend the day in reorganising the Battalion, and accordingly at 0900 hours a conference of Coy Commanders was called.

During the action at GORARI the Battalion

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lost 18 Killed, 45 wounded and 2 missing, and was now reduced to a strength of 360 all ranks. Accordingly, it was decided to disband the GR. Platoon and the Vickers Platoon less one section of 4 men. Coy Commanders appointed were:- 2 i/c Maj. Baines, HQ Coy Capt. Catterns, A. Coy Lieut. Leaney, B. Coy Capt. Prior, C. Coy Capt. Burrell and D. Coy Capt. Simpson. The re-distribution brought the rifle coys strength up to 50 all ranks.

The day was spent by all ranks washing and dressing their sores. Some rations arrived, and cooking was allowed to be done. Brigadier Eather and Gen. Vaisey both sent their congratulations for the good job the battalion had done. Mail arrived, and to make the day perfect there was no rain that night. One unpleasant fatigue had to be performed, that was burying the large number of JAPS killed in the area.

On the 13th. NOVEMBER the Battalion had another rest day, which was spent burying dead JAP mules and dead JAP soldiers.

It was fine and sunny and the rest was worth a lot in freshening up, especially as supplies were now reaching us by native carriers along the main track from KOKODA. Complete issue of clothing, boots, gaiters, was made, and lots of new anti-gas capes and ground-sheets were available. Orders arrived that the unit reverted to the 16th. Bde. Unfortunately no rations arrived and our rations finished up to-night. Priority of all rations arriving was given to the 25th. Bde, who now resumed the advance as forward troops. Orders were also received for move on the 14th. November.

On the 14th. NOVEMBER, rations arrived at 0630 hours, and the move was delayed slightly to allow them to be distributed.

The 2/2 Bn passed through, and we followed them along the main track, which was good going, flattish, about 6-feet wide, and apart from creek crossings, without hold-ups. These creek crossings made movement very slow, as they caused bottle-necks. The battalion reached its bivouac area half an hour this side of the KUMUSI RIVER at WAIROPI, during the afternoon. Lack of a bridge across the river was causing considerable delay, and the 25th. Bde were not yet completely across.

There were big air droppings at WAIROPI, which was a splendid dropping ground; the best one there was during the campaign. A JAP was sighted in our area during the afternoon, but was chased out, and a patrol sent out failed to find him. There was a large number of horses about abandoned by the JAPANESE, and we collected several of the best to carry themortar, machine gun and sig. gear.

On The 15th. NOVEMBER was another rest day, and being SUNDAY, Mass was held. The Battalion moved up to the bridge-head, that is on the out-skirts of the dropping ground, and helped picking up. Rations were issued, including a block of chocolate per man. The Bn created a record for the campaign by handing into the A.S.C. dump a bag of tobacco, which dropped in our area. The A.S.C. had things very well organised at WAIROPI, with plenty of natives to collect; and again clothing, boots etc. were available for anyone who wanted them. The Battalion was

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warned to be ready to cross the bridge at any time. However, owing to the crossing operation being a very slow job, it was expected that we would not commence to move until the 16th. November. We were advised here that it would be impossible to get the horses across as they were only foot bridges and the river was almost 80 yards wide. Accordingly, they were let loose, bar one, which was in use. One of the soldiers said to the C.O. "I bet I can get this horse across if you want him", and as he was rather a fine looking black pony in fair condition, he was told to go ahead. He was a bushman, and took the horse down stream, and finding a narrower place, took it across. Unfortunately, the C.O. did not know this until after the battalion had moved slowly and painfully across the bridge, otherwise the whole battalion would have crossed quicker in this way. Part of the battalion crossed on the Flying Fox, which was constructed on the uprights of the old wire rope bridge, which our bombs had demolished, and part crossed on a cable bridge, which was under water in the centre.

We were the last battalion of the Brigade in the order of march.

Two-thirds of an ounce of tobacco were issued to each man so that the battalion lost nothing by handing in the tobacco picked up.

The battalion bivouaced for the night in heavy rain at 1730 hours in the midst of an area of native gardens and villages.

The march was continued on the 17th. NOVEMBER, and although the troops were generally in improved health and spirits, there were a large number suffering with diarrhoea and dysentery, which the Doctor had insufficient medicine to treat. The men could carry on in a static position with this trouble, but on the march it played hell with them.

The track which the Brigade took was the SOUTH of the two that lead to BUNA, and was not as good as the main track, there being several very difficult creek crossings. However, the battalion got upon the heels of the 2/3 Bn and camped SOUTH of the creek at ISIVITA. Here we found quarters in a very big native village, and the natives came in with Papaws and fruit of all kinds, which was a great help to the rations.

On the 18th. NOVEMBER the advance was continued and the battalion marched fourteen (14) miles over rough, tough going, passing through SANGARA MISSION, which had been burnt by the JAPS, and which was obviously a very fertile centre with coffee and coconut plantations.

Just after lunch we had a great thrill, as from a piece of high ground half a hour from the mission, we saw the sea. We stopped for the night between two creeks, having passed through the 2/3 Bn.

The place we were camped on was subsequently the POPPENDETTA air-field. It was in fact only one and a half ($1\frac{1}{2}$) miles SOUTH of POPPENDETTA.

On the 19th. NOVEMBER we moved off again as rear battalion, though the 2/3 Bn passed through the 2/2 Bn, who had actually reached POPPENDETTA the night before. At POPPENDETTA a patrol from the 25 Brigade came in from our

over

left, and a patrol from an Independent Company came in from our right.

The track at this point was flat and good going all the way, although it was mostly in the open, not protected by trees, and very hot indeed.

At 1315 hours we got another pleasant surprise as a motor truck passed by driven by Capt. McIntosh the Brigade T.O., who brought information that the 2/3 Bn had struck JAP opposition and occupied a L.A.D. and HQ area about three miles ahead.

The unit moved behind the 2/3 Bn, who, as evening fell, were still held up. Lieut. Ritchie, who was sitting on the track awaiting orders, was wounded by a stray bullet, which passed through both his legs. The place where the 2/3 Bn was held up, and in the rear of which we were camped, was SOPUTA, although from the maps we were not sure of its location until later.

At 0615 hrs. on the 20th. NOVEMBER the C.O. went forward with Brigadier Lloyd to the 2/3 Bn position, and heard that the enemy had withdrawn. It was here that news was received that the 25 Brigade had reached a position one mile SOUTH of GONA, and that AMERICAN FORCES were moving in on BUNA. This made everyone feel the urge to push on to our objective, viz. SANANANDER, as soon as possible.

The plan was that the 2/3 Battalion would go forward for half a mile, and that the 2/1 Battalion would then pass through them and take over as advance guard. Accordingly, the battalion started at 0745 hours, and in the order of march - "C", "HQ", "B", "A" and "D".

At 0825 hours our leading troops passed through the leading troops of the 2/3 Bn, who advised they had not encountered any enemy.

(see sketch 6)

At 0845 hours, just after they had advanced out of the jungle into a Kunai patch, the leading troops were fired on (see sketch attached). At this stage "C" Coy had all deployed in the Kunai patch, and Bn.HQ were 100 yards in the timbered area before the track came into the open. Four (4) rounds of artillery landed right in our area, and accordingly we dispersed. Unfortunately, our sig. cable, which was being laid out with "C" Coy, had just cut out. Accordingly, although it was obvious that it was unwise to establish our Bn.HQ on the track, we were faced with the alternative either having it on the track and with telephone communication, or alternatively, moving into the jungle off the track without telephone communication.

The decision was made to remain on the track, and HQ was accordingly dispersed in its usual perimeter formation in what cover that could be rapidly dug, and in the ditches at the side of the road.

Throughout the day this HQ area came under fire and suffered eleven (11) casualties from artillery shells.

In the little hole occupied by the C.O. and I.O., an examination in the afternoon showed no less than nine pieces of shrapnel, which had landed in the bank and fortunately failed to wound the occupants.

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At 0845 hours the C.O. went forward on a recce to "C" Coy's position, and it was decided to send "B" Coy around the right flank in an attempt to locate the flanks of the enemy immediately opposite our position, and to drive them off.

"C" Coy proceeded to move forward and succeeded in gaining a good deal of ground. During this movement Lieut. McCloy observed a JAP in the Kunai, who apparently was not seen by our forward scouts. At a distance of 300 yards, despite the enemy MMG and rifle fire, which was spraying the area, he stood up and had three shots at the JAP, one of which proved fatal, as his body was later discovered and buried.

Lieut. McCloy's platoon was the leading platoon, and he used considerable skill in working forward.

It was also decided to send "A" and "D" Coys under Capt. Catterns with three of the Protection Platoon under Sgt. Ledden, and an "I" Section man, as an independent force to move wide around the left flank.

Their orders were to move right around the Kunai patch, which extended for some distance NORTH, keeping under cover of the jungle all the way in order to effect surprise, and to get astride the main track in the rear of the main JAP position, including their ~~main~~ ^{arty} rear area shelling us. In addition, he was to hit hard any JAPS in that area and consolidate astride the main track. This order was given with a view to getting the JAPS to withdraw, which they usually did when hit hard in the rear. Accordingly, at 0930 hours Capt. Catterns set off. "B" Coy had been delayed but passed through "C" Coy at 1100 hours, and at 1230 hours made contact with the JAPS. They succeeded in driving in their out-posts, came under heavy fire, had casualties and were unable to make further progress.

Sgt. Miller S.G. displayed particular gallantry in rescuing wounded men on this occasion, and was recommended for the V.C., and ultimately he was awarded the D.C.M.

"B" Coy continued to patrol in an endeavour to locate the enemy flank, but undoubtedly they were in strength, and their flank could not be located.

This was reported to Brigade at 1410 hours, and also that in the C.O.'s opinion the enemy had opposite us two mountain guns, two MMGs, one heavy mortar, several light mortars and an unknown number of LMGs. In view of this the C.O. said he was worried as to whether Capt. Catterns's force was sufficient to carry out the task allotted to them, and assistance was requested. The Brigade Commander advised that as soon as the U.S. forces relieved the 2/2 Bn he would send one of their companies to assist Catterns. The C.O. suggested that the whole battalion would be required to do the job effectively, but the Bde Commander thought not.

At 1415 hours our 3-inch mortar was put in position and twenty-one rounds were fired at the JAP MMG position at the edge of the Kunai ahead. The firing was very accurate, and the MMG was silenced, but unfortunately the JAPS replied right on to our HQ with twenty-nine rounds. Their firing was extremely accurate, and later it was discovered that they had an O.P. in a tree 600 yards ahead, from which they could observe every movement in our area.

The Bde Commander allotted two companies of the 2/2 Bn under Captains Bosgard and Blamey to assist the Bn.

At 1600 hours we were advised that these two 2/2 Battalion ~~Officers~~ ^{Cop.} came under command and at 1630 hours they arrived.

At 1630 hours Capt. Prior came back to report and led both the Officers up through his area. Unfortunately, by the time they got into position in Prior's area, it was too late for them to carry out the out-flanking movement planned.

At 1645 hours another twenty-three shells landed in our area, which again cut the cable, this being the third time. However, repairs were soon effected. This brought the total of shells falling in our area to over one-hundred (100), as, in addition to the three "Blitzes", shells had been falling intermittently all day.

At 1835 hours heavy firing was heard to the NORTH, which we correctly surmised was Capt. Catterns gaining contact.

During the day Bn. HQ, B. and C. companies had four (4) killed and eleven (11) wounded. Another casualty was the black horse which had been brought forward with so much trouble, and was killed by shell fire. Some of the troops were not sorry as during the previous night the horse got loose and had eaten Lieut. Mackenzie's rice and biscuits.

Capt. Catterns had a quick look at the ground from the front and then ordered A - D Coys in that order to move into the jungle 1000 yards WEST 3000 yards NORTH, and then work EASTWARDS back on to the track. Brig. Lloyd arrived at that moment and deprecated what would naturally be a prolonged movement around the flank, and was in favour of a frontal attack to be put in at once. Being of the opinion that the JAPS were here in force, the C.O. convinced the Bde Commander of the desirability of the flanking movement, and Catterns' force was allowed to proceed.

Moving silently, and in closed up single file to facilitate movement through the jungle and ensure control, this force forced its way through tangled undergrowth and treacherous swamps. All through the day they could hear the sound of the JAP guns and mortars mercilessly pounding our forces, so they altered course to make sure of skirting the wide Kunai and, guided by the sound of the firing, moved around wide to come in on the rear of the guns.

(see sketch 7)

Catterns' force by this time had made a very wide encircling movement and making good time were approaching the main track at a point approximately two miles in the rear of the JAP front line holding up the rest of the Bde. In the failing light at about 1800 hours the forward elements of "A" Coy, who were leading, crossed an almost imperceptible foot-track running parallel to the main SOPUTA-SANANANDER track. There were signs of recent activity and a little stream, which was obviously a watering place.

Capt. Catterns was led forward by the leading Sec. Comdr., Cpl. Albanese, to a point where they could both see a party of JAPS huddled over fires cooking the evening rice. There were grass huts and through the trees some distance away could be seen movement on what was evidently the main track. Somewhere down to the right judging by the sound of firing was the JAP gun, which caused more casualties than anything else to our forces, and which

over/

should be put out of action. Straight ahead lay the track, the detailed objective, whilst here on the left was a JAP encampment which was unaware of our presence yet, but who might come down for water at any minute.

There were no communications with Bn.HQ, no way of evacuating casualties, and the force was small, numbering in all 10 officers and 80 ORs, so the idea was dismissed of splitting the two Coys and making a strike for the gun as well. Light was failing fast so Catterns decided on an immediate attack on the JAPS camp, and exploitation through to the main track, there to consolidate in a perimeter position astride the track.

Orders were given to Capt. Simpson (D. Coy) and Lieut. Leaney (A. Coy) that when the signal for the advance was given, their companies in extended order at five paces interval between men were to advance through the jungle dead slow and dead quiet until something broke. They were then to open fire with all weapons irrespective of any targets which could be seen, rush the position and rush through to the track.

The troops were led on to their start lines, "D" Coy on the left along the foot-track, and "A" Coy on the right astride the little stream. The signal was given and the force moved forward and silently. They were about 50 yards from the JAPS before they were detected and a crash of fire thundered in the jungle as 18 Brens, 36 TSMGs, as well as rifles and grenades opened fire simultaneously. The shock of the noise was so great that our troops dropped to the ground, but the officers calling out and leading the advance instantly had the troops on their feet again and pressing forward. It was now apparent that this was a fully prepared defensive position, and the troops were soon crawling through apron fences of vines and leaping over a network of trenches.

The JAPS recovering from the surprise, manned some of the pits and inflicted casualties, but there was no stopping the advance, and the huts were soon blazing as grenades scattered the fires. JAP dead and wounded littered the area, and those that were not hit ran screaming off to the bush. It is estimated that at least eighty (80) JAPS were killed here. Five (5) officers had been killed, including Capt. Simpson and Lieut. Leaney the Coy Commanders, and Lieuts. Wiseman, Owen and McClure, so the force was scattered and parties of troops moved through carrying the wounded to the side of the main track, where Lieut. Murray, now in charge of "A" Coy, was already organising the defensive position. All telephone wires on the far side of the track were cut and our men disposed in a sausage perimeter alongside the track, with "D" Coy details Northward and "A" Coy Southward.

Through the night the work of digging in went on, and the wounded were attended to and stacked around the base of a big tree with thick wall like roots. To the EAST the noise of JAPS moving around was evidence of another JAP position, whilst the noise of trucks to the NORTH told of the evacuation of the survivors. A total of 15 JAPS were killed trying to move along the track, and all movement there ceased, but the enemy was now aware of our position and strength, and the dawn brought the inevitable counter-attack. The position was surrounded on three sides towards the NORTH, and in extended order the attackers advanced. As most of the ammunition had been used in the

previous attack our fire was held to the last moment when L/Cpl. Fletcher leapt from his pit, hurled a grenade in the midst of the JAPS, returned to his pit and opened fire with his TSMG. This, combined with the fire from the rest of the position, broke up the attack at this point.

Throughout the day, however, the JAPS encircled the position like Red Indians attacking a waggon convoy, and made many other attempts to storm the position, but were unsuccessful. They then systematically worked on each pit in turn. Advancing under cover of converging-MMG fire, and grenades were hurled until the occupants of that pit were either killed or wounded. We suffered many casualties, including most of the wounded stacked at the base of the big tree.

The position in which these wounded had been placed appeared safe enough in the darkness, but the attack from the three sides, NORTH, EAST and WEST, subjected them to fire, which they were unable to escape.

One of the men wounded, Pte. Soltan, played an outstanding part in the defence of the position the following day, and accordingly was recommended for M.M. (see recommendation for Award).

The importance of the position occupied by Catterns' Force to the JAPANESE was much greater than realised at the time. Catterns had carried out his orders admirably, and had consolidated alongside the main road NORTH of the JAPANESE forward defence positions, thus creating salient in their main defensive line on to which they decided, as a result of Catterns surprising them, to fall back, and it was thus necessary for the JAPANESE to drive Catterns out of his position - It was only by the greatest determination and gallantry that this little force survived the repeated attacks of the 21st. November.

The defensive position referred to, which the JAPANESE occupied, was the one which they maintained against repeated attacks until Jan 1943, but it must be considered whether a larger force, say a battalion, if it had been sent in place of Catterns' ninety (90) men, might not have succeeded in permanently establishing its position in the area, and thus have forced a further JAPANESE withdrawal to less well prepared positions.

To return to the part by the remainder of the force; during the afternoon and evening of the 20th. NOVEMBER, patrolling and pressure was maintained on the JAPANESE astride the main track, but owing to the action of Catterns' force, they withdrew during the night 20/21 November, and accordingly, on the morning of the 21 November, the advance was continued.

After the 2/1 Battalion had moved in the order, C., HQ and B. until 0830 hours, orders were received for the 2/1 Bn to halt to allow the 2/2 Bn, followed by the 2/3 Bn, to pass through.

By 1100 hours the leading company of the 2/2 Bn had contacted the rear of Catterns' force, and orders were given for two companies of the 2/2 Bn to move around the right flank in an endeavour to get behind the enemy, and relieve Catterns.

A report was received from Catterns that the enemy were endeavouring to get around his left flank, and

accordingly another company of the 2/2 Battalion was sent around to relieve the pressure on his left flank. A Coy of the 2/3 Bn then moved up astride the track and again got in contact with the rear of Catterns.

The whole of the area astride the track to the rear of Catterns' position was swept by fire, but we managed to get a sig. wire and telephone forward up to his position, also further supplies of ammunition, and a small quantity of biscuits. Owing to faulty communications, and the wire being cut, it was not realised how serious was the position in which Catterns' force was situated. However, arrangements were made through Bde for a company of the 2/3 Bn to relieve Catterns as soon as darkness fell, and a message was sent to Catterns' force to be expected to be relieved from 1930 hours onwards. Accordingly, guides were arranged, and Lysaght's Coy (2/3 Bn) moved forward to the advanced HQ of 2/1 Bn, which had been established a few hundred yards to the rear of Catterns' position, and in the area occupied by Gall Coy. (2/3 Bn) astride the track.

As soon as dusk fell, the walking wounded from Catterns' position started to come back. A stretcher party for twelve (12) stretcher cases under Lieut. McCloy was gathered together, with all available personnel as stretcher bearers, and moved forward into Catterns' position, where they did a splendid job collecting the wounded in the darkness. The whole time they were subjected to unaimed small arms fire, and had three (3) casualties. However, all the stretcher cases were brought out and the unwounded personnel of Catterns' force came out too.

Capt. Catterns had come out to report shortly after darkness fell, and met the C.O. at the advanced HQ, where, after discussion, it was recommended by telephone to Bde Commander, that the relieving company should not move into Catterns' position, but occupy the area just at the rear.

Had a greater knowledge of Catterns' position been realised, his salient would doubtless have been held, but at this time the decision made appeared to be a wise one.

During the whole of this period of the relief, and evacuation of wounded, a tropical electrical storm, accompanied by ^{very} heavy rain, was in progress, which made things extremely difficult to organise.

The TOTAL CASUALTIES of CATTERNS' FORCE had been 5 Officers and 26 ORs killed, and two Officers and 34 ORs wounded.

It had been a expensive operation, but in view of the withdrawal forced upon the JAPANESE, it was considered worth while, and during their withdrawal the JAPS had abandoned not only the defensive position where they had held up "B" and "C" Coys of the 2/1 Bn, but another completely ~~prepared~~ defensive position further NORTH but SOUTH of Catterns' force. In addition, the gun which had caused us so many casualties, was found buried next day, where the JAPANESE had been forced to abandon it. Later, this gun, together with a quantity of ammunition for it, was put into working order and used effectively against the JAPANESE.

When Catterns' force came out, with twenty-four (24) unwounded members, they were led back to "C" Coy's

over/

area and given hot milk and some warm bully-beef and rice.

Unfortunately, owing to the heavy casualties, this meant the end of "A" and "D" Coys temporarily, and the surviving members of each company were posted to "C" and "B" Coys respectively

Recommendations for Awards based on this action were for Cpl. Albanese, Sgt. Ledden and Cpl. Baker.

Following on this action, the battalion strength now totalled 17 Officers and 202 other ranks.

On the 22nd. NOVEMBER U.S. Forces moved up through our battalion and occupied a position forward of us, but behind our forward troops.

The battalion occupied the day in administration and local patrols. Additional rations came up, ammunition was replenished, and the battalion was again re-organised and ready for action.

The battalion did not move from this position until the 2nd. December, and, during that time, little of importance occurred with few exceptions.

From now on the evacuations through sickness commenced to be heavy, mainly due to Malaria and ~~S~~crub Typhus.

The rations steadily improved, and a variation from bully beef was made with M. & V. etc., in addition, full rations of sugar etc. were received regularly.

The only activity by the battalion during this period was in the nature of patrols.

On the 24th. NOVEMBER, a platoon of "C" Coy, numbering 20 all ranks, was sent SOUTH to guard the troop of 25-pndr guns, which had been landed at POPPENDETTA.

The same day another platoon of "C" Coy was sent forward, and down to the 2/2 Bn Coy on our extreme left flank.

On the 26th. NOVEMBER we provided two patrols, ~~one~~, under Lieuts. Powell and Murray, to endeavour to find a new route around the JAPANESE right flank and going to SANANANDER. They were to take three days' hard and 3 days' emergency rations, and Runners were to report back each day.

Owing to the terrifically swampy nature of the compass course which they were ordered to go on, the patrols did not reach their objective, and returned on the 29th. November at 1125 hours. They had seen no enemy at all.

On the 27th. November, patrol, under Lieut. Dyer and 25 ORs, was sent out on our right flank, through the 2/2 Bn ^{Coys} there, in an endeavour to find a suspected JAPANESE dump, and to ambush any JAPANESE seen there and bring back a prisoner.

On the 28th. NOVEMBER, Lieut. Dyer's patrol, with a JAPANESE prisoner, returned. The suspected dump had been located, but did not contain any supplies.

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Throughout this period, Sgt. Madigan and mortar detachment from the battalion, fired at the JAPANESE positions from our left flank in the area occupied by the 2/2 Bn Coys. The shooting was very successful, and Sgt. Madigan's work at the "O.P." was outstanding. He could only range by sound, and in order to do so, he used to go forward with his telephone in front of our forward section positions (see recommendation for Award).

Another daily duty during this period was the provision of ration and stretcher parties to the 2/2 Bn Coys, and this job was cheerfully carried out.

On the 1st. DECEMBER, the platoon under Lieut. Gosnell, which had been detached to the 2/2 Bn, was relieved by Lieut. Dyer with another composite platoon, as Gosnell's party had 13 men out of 19 evacuated with Malaria.

On the 2nd. DECEMBER, the battalion received orders to move back to a reserve position ~~around~~ the 25-pndrs, where one of the platoons was already in position.

The C.O. contracted severe Malaria, and for the rest of the period on the SANANANDER track lived in the RAP and controlled operations from that position.

By the 5th. DECEMBER, the strength of the battalion all ranks was only 157.

No Malaria cases were evacuated with a temperature lower than 104°, and, though everyone had Malaria, and by this stage was in a most debilitated condition, few were keen to go back until they actually collapsed.

On the 9th. DECEMBER, Lieut. Simpson, who had flown up from LOB base area, took over the composite platoon's position from Lieut. Dyer.

An aspect of the campaign, which by this time dominated the minds of all Commanders, was the question of evacuation of personnel with Malaria and Typhus.

By the 22nd. November, the only men left with the battalion were men who were keen on doing their job, and they took every possible precaution to suppress their Malaria.

The daily suppressive dose of quinine was 15 grains per man, and as an indication that all personnel were taking their issue, the R.A.P. was constantly asked for quinine for persons desirous of taking an extra dose to keep down an attack of Malaria. This indicates that there was no quinine available within the platoons for such a purpose, and therefore that all ranks were taking their suppressive doses.

On the 3rd. DECEMBER, the RMO obtained a mosquito net per man for all those able to use them, and these were put up at night.

No repellent was available, and, despite all these precautions, everyone in the unit got Malaria.

No doubt a contributing factor was the extremely exhausted condition of all ranks, and from a layman's point of view it appears questionable whether any suppressive treatment would have been ~~successfully~~ effective in the circumstances; ~~apart~~ from all other considerations there was a constantly and changing number of men in forward positions who were not able to use mosquito nets.

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On the 15th. DECEMBER, warning was received that the battalion would be evacuated by air as soon as possible, and on the 17th. DECEMBER the battalion moved back to POPPENDETTA aerodrome, and was evacuated by plane to PORT MORESBY.

Only 91 were evacuated in this way, as unfortunately the platoon under Lieut. Simpson was still in position on the left flank of the 2/2 Bn. Rather, to be correct, on the left flank of the company of the 2/3 Bn, which had relieved the companies of the 2/2 Bn. However, these personnel were evacuated on the 19th. DECEMBER when the 2/3 Bn was relieved.

The battalion concentrated at DONADABU rest camp, where it remained for some days pending the return to AUSTRALIA.

The campaign had been a most exacting one, as casualties totalled 8 Officers and 93 other ranks KIA, 9 Officers and 180 other ranks wounded, and 8 missing. Over 250 had been evacuated sick with Typhus and Malaria of whom more than 15 died. However, the battalion had never failed to carry out any of the tasks given to it, and from that point of view was a success - the men of the battalion had proved that they were superior to the JAPS, and were full of confidence.

2/1 AUST. INF. BN.

CASUALTIES - NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN 1942.

PLACE AND DATE.	OFFICERS.		CRs.		
	K.I.A.	W.I.A.	K.I.A.	W.I.A.	M.I.A.
<u>TEMPLETON'S CROSSING.</u> 20 Oct 42	-	Lieut. Carew.	1	4	-
<u>BETWEEN TEMPLETON'S XING & EORA CK.</u> 21 Oct Adv Gd	-	-	2	4	-
<u>EORA CK.</u> 21 - 22 Oct. Approach Attack.	Capt. Sanderson Capt. Barclay. Lieut. Johnson.	Lieut. Pollitt	29	42	1
23 - 28 Oct. Exploitation Consolidation.	-	Capt. Catterns Lieut. Frew. Lieut. Hollingworth. Lieut. Reardon.	15	46	2
<u>GORARI TRACK.</u> 6-8 Nov.	-	-	-	2	2
<u>GORARI.</u> 9-11 Nov.	-	Maj. Baines	18	43	-
<u>SANANANDER.</u> 20-22 Nov.	Capt. Simpson Lieut. Wiseman. Lieut. Leaney. Lieut. Owen. Lieut. McClure.	Lieut. Ritchie. Lieut. Hollingworth.	28	39	3
	8	9	93	180	8

TOTAL KILLED AND MISSING 109.

TOTAL WOUNDED 189.

TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES ... 298.

2/1 AUST. INF. BN.
OFFICERS ROLL - NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN 1942.

OFFICER.	MYOLA 15 Oct	TEMPLETON'S CROSSING 20 Oct	EO RA CK 22 Oct	GORARI 10 Nov	SANANANDER 21 Nov	POPPENDETTA (Emplaned for PT MORESBY) 18 Dec.
Lt. Col CULLEN	x	x	x	x	x	x
Maj. MILLER	x	x	x	x Trans.	2/33 Bn-died illness.	
Maj. BAINES	x	x	x	x WR	E	
Maj. GOLDING	x					
Capt. COX	x	x	x	x	xE	
Capt. CATTERNS	x	x	xWR	E	x	x
Capt. SIMPSON	x	x	x	x	xK	
Capt. SANDERSON	x	x	xK			
Capt. BARCLAY	x	x	xK			
Capt. BURRELL		Ex. Bde	(x)	x	x	x
Capt. MACARTHUR-KING	xE					
Capt. PRIOR	x	x	x	E	xE	x
Lieut. WISEMAN	x	x	x	x	xK	
Lieut. POWELL	x	x	x	x	x	x
Lieut. NATHAN	x	x	x	x	xE	
Lieut. TRAISE	x	x	x	x	xE	
Lieut. SIMPSON (A.J.)	x		xLOB		x	x
Lieut. LEANEY	x	x	x	x	xK	
Lieut. MURRAY		Ex. Bde	(x)	x	x	x
Lieut. CAREW	x	xW				
Lieut. HOLLINGWORTH	x	x	xW RTU	x	xW RTU	x
Lieut. McCLOY	x	x	x	x	xE	
Lieut. BLAKISTON	x	x	x	x	xE	
Lieut. FREW	x	x	xW			
Lieut. BODY	x	x	x	x	x	x
Lieut. REARDON	x	x	xW			
Lieut. FISHER	x	x	x	To Bde.		
Lieut. WYBURN	x	x	xE			
Lieut. MARSH	x	x	x	x	xE	
Lieut. POLLITT	x	x	xW			

OFFICERS COMMISSIONED DURING AND AFTER CAMPAIGN.

Lieut. OWEN		x	x	x	xK	
Lieut. A.R. CARTER		x	xE			
Lieut. GOSNELL		x	x	x	xE	
Lieut. JOHNSON		x	xK			
Lieut. BROWN (O.B.)		x	xE		x	x
Lieut. GOTTS		x	x	xE		
Lieut. ARMSTRONG				x	xE	
Lieut. DYER		x	x	x	x	x
Lieut. MAVAY				x	xE	
Lieut. RITCHIE				x	xW	
Lieut. McCLURE				x	xK	
Lieut. PHILLIPS				x	xE	
Lieut. JOHNS					xE	
Lieut. S.C. CARTER.					x	x
Lieut. C.S. BROWN					xE	
Lieut. MACKENZIE					xE	
Lieut. ISHERWOOD					xE	
Lieut. ANDREWS					xE	
Lieut. SEATON					x	x
Lieut. THOMPSON.						
Lieut. HAYDEN.						
Lieut. BARRETT.						
	27	32	34	26	34	13

NOTE : x - In action. (x) - Joined during action.
 K - Killed in action. W - Wounded in action & evacuated
 RTU - Returned to unit. E - Evacuated sick.
 WR - Wounded in action & remained.

N.B. Officers were authorised to anticipate their Commission when approved by G.O.C. 7 Div. and are shown above if Pips up at date of action.

2/1 AUST. INF. BN.

DAILY STRENGTHS - NEW GUINEA CAMPAIGN 1942.

(THE FIGURE INCLUDES OFFICERS, ORS AND ATTACHED PERSONNEL ACTUALLY WITH THE UNIT).

OCTOBER.		NOVEMBER.		DECEMBER.	
DAY.	STRENGTH.	DAY.	STRENGTH.	DAY.	STRENGTH.
1	721	1	487	1	209
2	721	2	450	2	192
3	721	3	451	3	183
4	721	4	443	4	172
5	721	5	448	5	157
6	721	6	443	6	144
7	608	7	443	7	141
8	587	8	443	8	136
9	593	9	443	9	132
10	590	10	400	10	126
11	589	11	380	11	122
12	587	12	370	12	111
13	602	13	365	13	105
14	587	14	369	14	105
15	586	15	359	15	93
16	588	16	355	16	88
17	599	17	349	17	80
18	597	18	356	18	82
19	592	19	320	19	83
20	590	20	310	20	89
21	583	21	220	21	86
22	571	22	225	22	78
23	531	23	222	23	94
24	529	24	226	24	88
25	525	25	245	25	98
26	517	26	244	26	90
27	503	27	242	27	83
28	482	28	233	28	82
29	484	29	218	29	96
30	484	30	213	30	99
31	487			31	96

C O P Y .

Q.M. DUMP.

1 NOV 42.

C.O.

Herewith list of daily rations drawn over ten days ending 1 Nov 42.

Items shown in ozs per man.

<u>D A T E .</u>	P.M.	Bisds.	Milk.	Cheese	Sugar	Tea	Rice	Fruit.
ENTITLED. <i>DAILY.</i>	16	6	2	2	3½	1	2	2
<i>OCT.</i> 23 Recd.	10	3	-	½	1½	1	-	1
24 "	12	3	2	½	-	-	-	-
25 "	20	6	2	1	-	-	-	1½
26 "	24	6	4	-	1	-	-	2
27 "	16	3	2	-	1½	--	2	2
28 "	12	3	2	½	¾	-	2	1½
29 "	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
30 "	12	3	1	½	2	-	2	-
31 "	12	7/8	-	½	1	1	2	1
NOV 1 "	13	6	¾	1	1½	-	1	½
ENTITLEMENT	160	60	20	20	45	10	20	20
DRAWN	131	33-7/8	13¾	4½	9¼	2	11	9
DEFICIENT	29	26-1/8	6¼	15½	35¼	8	9	11
% DEFICIENT.	10%	43%	35%	75%	40%	80%	45%	55%

(Salt also received short)

Quite an amount of PM broken by dropping is NOT edible

Some biscuits are mouldy and barely edible.

(SIGNED) S. CARTER. W.O.11.

A.Q.M.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E S .

2/1 AUST. INF. BN.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS AND AWARDS.

Regtl No.	Rank.	NAME.	Honour recommended.	PARTICULARS.	If Awarded.
NX 34302	Lieut.	LEANNEY G. (Later KIA)	MC	EORA CK-Pnr Pl.	Yes.
NX 342	Capt.	CATTERNS B.W.T. (WIA)	MC	EORA CK-B. Coy.	Yes.
VX 13901	Capt.	CONNELL J.	MC	EORA CK- M.O.	Yes.
NX 9045	L/Sgt.	DORAN J. (WIA)	MM	EORA CREEK-S.B.	Yes.
NX 24024	Cpl.	DONOHOE J.T. (WIA)	MM	EORA CK- Sec. Ldr. D. Coy.	Not Yet.
NX 12458	Lieut.	WISEMAN H.C. (Later KIA)	MC	GORARI D.Coy 2 i/c.	Not Yet.
NX 72951	Pte.	WARD G.W. (WIA)	MM	GORARI D.Coy Ord.	Yes.
NX 42526	Cpl.	SHEARWIN H.J. (WIA)	MM	GORARI. Sec. Ldr. C.Coy.	Yes.
NX 68711	Cpl.	STODDART R.R. (WIA)	DCM	GORARI. Sec. Ldr. C.Coy.	Yes.
NX 342	Capt.	CATTERNS B.W.T.	Bar to MC	SANANANDER. Coy Comd.	Not Yet.
NX 4120	Sgt. (Now Lieut)	BROWN C.S.	MM	SANANANDER Pl.Sgt.D.Coy.	Not Yet.
NX 4171	Pte.	STEPHAN V.	MM	SANANANDER-S.B.	Not Yet.
NX 45263	Pte.	VARNUM A.J. (WIA)	DCM	SANANANDER-D. Coy.	Yes. MM Awarded
NX 68683	Pte.	SOLTAN E. (WIA)	MM	SANANANDER-A. Coy.	Yes.
NX 9615	Sgt. (Now WO1)	MILLER S.G.	VC	SANANANDER-B. Coy.	DCM Awarded.
NX 68372	Cpl.	ALBANESE R.H.	MM	SANANANDER- Sec.Ldr A.Coy	Yes.
NX 11538	Cpl. (Now Sgt)	LEDDEN, J.P.	MM	SANANANDER- Sec. Ldr.	Yes.
NX 67897	Cpl.	BAKER L.	MM	SANANANDER- S.B.	Not Yet.
NX 40507	L/Cpl.	FLETCHER J.S. (and resubmitted as periodic) (WIA)	DCM	SANANANDER- Sec. Ldr.	Not Yet.
NX 8576	Capt.	COX, G.S.	MC	Periodic.Adjt.	Not Yet.
NX 54732	Lieut.	HOLLINGWORTH L. (WIA(2))	MC	" Pl.Comd.	"
NX 2642	Lieut.	McCLOY, J.B.	MC	" " "	"
NX 1315	Sgt.	MADIGAN E.S. (WIA)	MM	" Mortars.	"
NX 47465	Cpl.	STEWART J.A. (WIA)	MM	" Pnr Pl EORA CK.	"
NX 17091 42.	Chaplain.	CUNNINGHAM C.W.	MBE	" Padre.	"

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONORS AND AWARDS.

NX 34302 Lieut. G. LEANEY.

For, M.C.

On EORA RIDGE, NORTH of the creek crossing at approx 1600 hrs on 23 Oct 42, the Pioneer Pl under Comd of Lieut. G. Leaney was sent up the feature to the left to harrass the enemy holding up "B" Coys progress in front. Lieut Leaney reached his position and contacted the enemy where an L.M.G. was captured & 4 Japs were killed. The enemy countered by attacking the Pioneers who were forced back. Lieut Leaney again went forward - alone - into enemy territory and brought out a wounded man - Pte Richards.

The next day the Pioneers advanced, made contact, drove back the Japs and consolidated in a forward position after killing 3 more Japs. During the next two days the Pl by its offensive patrolling forced the enemy further back until the Pnr Pl was on a position to fire into the enemy from the high ground on the enemys' right flank. It is considered that the success of these operations was greatly due to the qualities of leadership and courage of a high order, shown by Lieut Leaney, and he is recommended for a Military Cross.

NX 342. Capt. B. CATTERNS.

For M.C.

On the 20 Oct 42, at TEMPLETONS CROSSING "B" Coy Comd by Capt Catterns relieved two Coys of 3 Bn A.M.F. in positions as close as 30 yards to the enemy.

On 22 Oct he organised an attack on the enemy positions but they had withdrawn and he continued his advance as vanguard Coy until contact was made where he pressed the enemy hard and suffered casualties.

On 23 Oct he maved in support of "C" Coys attack on the EORA Ck Bridgehead and occupied a position facing North and ahead of our L of C on top of the ridge. His Coy was well forward and just below the enemy but notwithstanding the unfavourable position the circumstances forced him to adopt, the Coy maintained an offensive attitude during seven days in the position and caused the enemy to withdraw three to four hundred yards up the ridge where "B" Coy followed.

Enemy sniping and grenading were intermittent throughout the period and caused many casualties. The slope between the enemy uphill and our position was so steep that it was a common practice for them to bowl rocks down on our positions - one of which bruised Capt Catterns.

On the 22 Oct Capt Catterns was slightly wounded by Mortar shrapnel. Whilst visiting forward section positions he was often a target for snipers.

Throughout this trying period Capt Catterns continued to show unusually outstanding qualities of leadership and determination and to infuse into his Coy an offensive spirit. Accordingly he is recommended for a Military Cross.

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VX 13901 Capt. J. CONNELL.

For M.C.

On the 22 Oct 42, the ridge South of and above Eora Ck village was heavily shelled & mortared, causing heavy casualties including 4 among the R.A.P. Staff.

Capt Connell worked continuously among the wounded fearlessly exposing himself under heavy fire & succeeded attending to all.

The other M.O. in the area was wounded and 3 R.A.P. Staff killed and one wounded thus making his task harder. He continued to carry on for the next three days & although slightly wounded himself was not evacuated although the ridge continued to be shelled and mortared.

Accordingly he is recommended for a Military Cross.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONORS AND AWARDS.

NX 24024, CPL. DONOHUE. J.T.

For M.M.

On the morning of 27th Oct., 1942, Cpl. Donohue showed outstanding bravery in leading his section as a fighting patrol to a Japanese stronghold known to contain at least three M.G.'s. His section was eventually forced to ground for over an hour and suffered one casualty. Cpl. Donohue skilfully extricated his section from the area without further loss. He then returned into the area and showed great courage in carrying out the wounded man, Pte. Manus, A.P., who subsequently died. Cpl. Donohue on the morning of 29th Oct., 1942 again successfully led a patrol onto the same area in order to gain information and harass the enemy. His conduct throughout the action was inspiration to his Section and Platoon and he showed qualities of leadership and courage. He is recommended for the M.M.

NX 9045, L/SGT. DORAN. J.

For M.M.

During the afternoon of 22nd Oct., 1942, on the high ground to the South of Eora Creek village, the Bn. forward positions came under heavy mortar shell fire from the enemy. There were a number of casualties including 3 killed in the R.A.P. Staff and also 1 wounded in the right foot - L/Sgt. Doran. Doran did not report his wound but continued with his work despite continued enemy fire and it was not until all other casualties had been treated - about 1 hr. later - that Doran reported his wound to the M.O. to whom during that period he gave highly efficient assistance despite his wounds. He was later evacuated as a stretcher case. Doran's fortitude and courage were an example to others and accordingly he is recommended for a M.M.

NX 12458, LIEUT. WISEMAN. H.C.

For M.C.

On 10 Nov., 1942, at Gorari Creek, D Coy attacked Northwards across the main track. Strong enemy opposition was encountered and about 20 yds. North of the track heavy enemy fire forced the attack to a halt. Five men were killed and 12 wounded out of 50. Cpl. James was wounded in the leg by a burst of fire from within 20 yds. Lieut. Wiseman, who was Coy. 2/ic at the time removed his equipment, went forward and took James back across the open track through an area under very heavy fire. Shortly Pte. ~~Armstrong~~ ^{Afterwards} Armstrong who weighed 15 stone was mortally wounded and was being carried across the track by Pte's. Ramsay and McIntyre when Ramsay was killed. Wiseman immediately went forward under fire to McIntyre's assistance and succeeded in bringing back Armstrong. At all times during the operation Lieut. Wiseman showed qualities of courage and leadership and on the two occasions mentioned above showed complete disregard for his personal safety. Accordingly he is recommended for the M.C.

NX 72951, Pte. WARD. C.W.

For M.M.

Pte. Ward is a Coy. Clerk and runner of D Coy. During the attack at Gorari Creek on Nov., 10th, 1942, the Coy suffered heavy casualties and the forward S.B. was killed. The two forward Pls. of the Coy. and Coy. H.Q. reached a position where they were cut off and surrounded by a fire-swept area, particularly by a fixed line low above the track. Pte. Ward volunteered to go back and endeavour to bring forward another S.B. who was with the reserve Pln. across the track. He did this but in returning across the bullet-swept open space the S.B., Pte. Skeen was wounded and unable to walk whilst Ward got safely across. Ward then again returned across the fixed line to Skeen and carried him back to the reserve Pln. He then again crossed the danger area for the fifth time and returned to Coy. H.Q. for duty. For his splendid individual courage and devotion to duty, Pte. Ward is recommended for the M.M.

NX342. Capt. CATTERNS. B.W.T. RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOURS AND AWARDS.BAR TO
MC.

At 1000 hrs on 20 Nov 42 the 2/1 Bn as Advance Guard was held up by the Japs. On the track SOPUTA-SANANANDA. Capt Catterns was then placed in command of A. and D. Coys to move wide round the left or West flank in order to get around behind their positions, attack them in the rear, get astride the main track and to capture or destroy the guns which was firing on our positions. The total strength of his force was 90 all ranks. He found that his route led through a swamp which considerably delayed and exhausted his force. However by 1740 hrs he had reached a point 2 mls north and north of the gun. He personally reconnoitred East and forward and observed a large Jap prepared position and resolutely decided to attack as soon as possible, notwithstanding (a) the superior enemy forces (b) the unlikelihood of any support by our own tps and (c) being completely out of contact with our forces. He organised the attack to start at 1830 hrs. The object of both being the Jap area (which had an apron fence of vines and a continuous trench system), and then the main track. The attack was successful, complete surprise being achieved and the Jap position overrun and severe casualties inflicted on the enemy, Estimated at least 80 killed. Capt. Catterns' force suffered severe casualties, including 5 Officers killed. The force then consolidated on the main track by 1930 hrs, forming a perimeter and the defence was organised by Capt. Catterns. During the night 20/21 Nov. and the following day, the Japs continually harassed and many times attacked the position from 3 sides with every available weapon. Although our casualties were very heavy and ammunition scarce, the position was defiantly held until the force was relieved during the night 21/22 Nov, when only 24 men out of 90 remained alive and unwounded. Further heavy casualties also being inflicted on the enemy. Tx

The results of the operations no doubt contributed to the deeper withdrawal of the Jap forces to an area immediately North of Capt. Catterns' position during the night 20/21 Nov., and to deny them the use of the main track during that period. 15 Japs using it that night being killed. The Japs were forced to abandon the 75 m.m. gun which had caused us many casualties and it was later found buried South of Catterns' position and subsequently recovered. During the whole operation, Capt. Catterns inspired all ranks by his bold and resolute leadership in attack and defence, and by his personal courage which proved a continuous inspiration to those under his command.

In addition to the above action, he showed great personal courage in assisting a wounded Officer after two other men had been wounded going to that Officer's assistance.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONORS AND AWARDS.

"NX 42526, CPL. SHEARWIN. H.J.,
For M.M.

At Gorari Creek on the afternoon of 11th Nov., 1942, "C" Coy had gained the Bridgehead on the East Bank of the Creek. 13 Pln. was sent further North East to exploit this success. Stronger opposition was encountered than was anticipated. However, 13 Pln. surprised the enemy by attacking them from the left flank. Cpl. Shearwin's section entered an area from a flank, surprising the enemy occupants and killing 8 Japs. before being forced, by weight of superior numbers and fire, to go to ground. The area was attacked by 4 Coy. later. The section remained in firing positions still inflicting casualties on the enemy until all members of the section were either killed or wounded (3 killed, 2 wounded). Shearwin, although wounded himself, covered the withdrawal of the other wounded members of his section, before he himself withdrew and reported the position to his Pln. Commander. During the action Cpl. Shearwin showed outstanding qualities of bravery and devotion to duty, and accordingly he is recommended for the M.M.

NX 68711, CPL. STODDART. R.R.
For D.C.M.

On 11th Nov., 1942, at Gorari Creek "C" Coy attacked a very strongly defended enemy position North East of the Bridge. 13 Pln. of which Cpl. Stoddart is a member, led the attack and Stoddart's section was detailed to ascertain the position of the enemy's right flank. The section very boldly and skilfully led, found the enemy's flank where the Pln. attacked, succeeding in surprising the Japs., killing 18 of them and taking the objective. Later, when the Jap. counter-attacked, and by sheer weight of numbers forced the Pln. to withdraw, Cpl. Stoddart was wounded in 3 places, the head, shoulder, and foot but despite his wounds and the fact that his T.S.M.G. had jammed, he continued to fight on with a rifle. During this phase of the battle he killed 3 Japs. and was the last member of his section to withdraw, after which he reported to his Pln. Comd. Later he was evacuated on a stretcher. During the action 7 out of the 15 in the Pln. were killed or wounded. Stoddart's bold leadership and doggedness served as a shining example to his men and it is recommended, that for his gallantry, he be awarded the D.C.M.

MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES.

During the actions at Eora Creek between 22nd and 28th Oct., 1942, and at Gorari Creek between 9 and 11 Nov., 1942, the following Officers and Other Ranks distinguished themselves and it is recommended that they be mentioned in Despatches. The names are in the order in which it is recommended they be mentioned.

2.	NX 10751	A/CPL.	HUNT. J.L.	(E).	(dec'd).
4.	NX 13456	CPL.	GRAHAM. G.	(G).	
5.	NX 11545	LIEUT.	FREW. J.M.	(E).	
6.	NX 67897	CPL.	BAKER. L.T.	(G).	
7.	NX 7657	CAPT.	SANDERSON. A.G.	(E).	(dec'd).
8.	NX 9615	SGT.	MILLER. S.G.	(E).	
9.	NX 4124	CAPT.	BARCLAY. P.	(E).	(dec'd).
10.	NX 47688	PTE.	McINTYRE. R.	(G).	
11.	NX 8576	CAPT.	COX. G.S.	(G).	
12.	NX 46799	PTE.	JOHNSTONE. C.S.	(G).	
13.	NX 3459	LIEUT.	BODY. E.M.	(G).	
14.	NX 72267	CPL.	DONNELLY. W.F.	(E).	
15.	NX 1886	CPL.	JAMES. C.E.	(E).	
16.	NX 5429	SGT.	ARMSTRONG. R.JH.	(E).	
17.	NX 47465	CPL.	STEWART. J.A.	(E).	
1.	NX 2642	LIEUT.	McCLOY. J.B.	(G).	
3.	NX 54732	LIEUT.	HOLLINGSWORTH. L.	(G).	

Nos. indicate order of priority.

(G). Indicates for Services at Gorari Creek.
(E). Indicates for Services at Eora Creek.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS AND AWARDS.

NX 4120. Sgt. BROWN C.S. FOR M.M.

On the 20th. Nov., 1942, "D" Coy took part in an attack on a JAP position 2 miles in rear of the JAP forward troops North of SOPUTA. The Coy was advancing in extended line during the first stage of the attack when a LMG opened fire from 15 yds. range causing casualties on Sgt. Brown's immediate right and temporarily holding up the advance. Sgt. Brown immediately leapt forward and with his Tommy Gun killed the 3 JAP gunners in the position thus enabling the advance to continue. Throughout the rest of the attack he showed outstanding courage and dash and leadership. Later during the consolidation and defence on 21 Nov., he remained offensively defiant, engaged all possible targets and was an inspiration to those nearby. For his courage, leadership and vigorous offensive action he is recommended for a M.M.

NX 4172, PTE. STEPHAN V. FOR M.M.

Pte. Stephan is a Stretcher Bearer attached to "D" Coy. During the attack in the rear of the Jap position on 20 Nov., 1942, the Coy had 12 casualties. Pte. Stephan on all occasions attended to the wounded under heavy fire. On one occasion two men were wounded close together by a LMG which continued to fire. Pte Stephan unhesitatingly went in between them and attended to their wounds, and helped them to crawl back ignoring the enemy fire with complete disregard for his personal safety. For his courage and devotion to duty he is recommended for a MM.

NX 45263, PTE. VARNUM A.J. FOR DCM.

During the night 20/21 Nov., 1942, the remnants of A. and D. Coys consolidated in a defensive position 2 mls in the rear of the Jap forward area. During the night and early the following morning the Japs who were around the position on the North East and West attacked on many occasions with LMGs., Snipers and Grenades and bayonets gradually reducing the garrison from 70 to 24 effectives. Pte Varnum was on the West flank and by 1000 hrs was the only unwounded man along 30 yds of perimetre and was facing a Hotchkiss MMG sited 15 yds away. He was himself wounded in the shoulder at the time but remained at his post and kept his Bren gun in action ~~for~~ ten (10) hours until dark. He continued to give valuable supporting fire to our forward elements, who were being hard pressed whenever he was called on to do so. For ~~his~~ his resolute courage and devotion to duty he is recommended for a DCM.

NX 68683 PTE. SOLTAN E. FOR M.M.

On night 20/21 Nov., after A. and D. Coys had attacked Jap positions in the rear 4 mls north of Soputa, the Coy occupied a defensive position astride the main track. During the occupation Pte. Soltan was wounded in the leg which was badly fractured. His wound was bandaged, but no splints were available and he was placed with other wounded in a central area. The position then came under heavy fire from the right flank and Pte Soltan dragged himself a distance of 15 yds. towards the threatened flank so that he could take up a fire position and assist his comrades in the defence. All the night and following day Pte. Soltan lay out in his exposed position which was continually swept by enemy fire at close ranges. During this period Pte. Soltan was of valuable assistance to the defence in passing X messages and ammunition along the line and reporting enemy movements as he saw them. Whilst thus deliberately exposing himself he was twice more wounded in the other leg and his body. Throughout the action he continuously urged his comrades to aggressive actions and was an inspiration to those about him. For his courage and devotion to duty he is recommended for the M.M.

FOR V.C.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS AND AWARDS.

On the 20 Nov 42 2/1 Bn were held up by enemy forces approximately 2 mls North of SOPUTA. B. Coy endeavoured to move around their left and succeeded in driving the enemy's flank a short distance, but the Coy was eventually ~~dur~~ held up by strong Japanese forces and suffered very heavy casualties. The Japanese positions were only 20 to 35 yds from our own. Distances subsequently measured.

S/Sgt. Miller is the Coy Quarter-Master Sgt. and was in position at Coy HQ with the Coy Comdr, Lieut. Prior. No ~~maxi~~ rations having arrived he had no definite duties to do.

At approximately 1100 hrs it was reported that Pte. Lollback was severely wounded in the shoulder and could not move without assistance. S/Sgt. Miller went forward and brought Lollback out under heavy fire, later Cpl. Benson was shot through the stomach in a forward and exposed position, and as the area was under heavy fire, and the approach was across an area bare of cover it was considered by the Coy Comdr. impossible ^{to help} him during daylight. His cries were demoralising to our own troops and must have been giving satisfaction to the enemy, and S/Sgt. Miller volunteered to the Coy Comdr. to try and reach him and administer Morphine. He then went forward under heavy rifle and LMG fire and reached Benson, gave him Morphine and dressed his wounds. He then came back and had a stretcher made, and with the stretcher, bearer, Cpl. Kemsley, and dragging the stretcher slowly and arduously, crawled for 20 minutes back to Benson, and brought him out despite enemy fire. Later in the day Cpl Benson died at ADS SOPUTA. At 1200 hrs Cpl. Ward was wounded in the knee and S/Sgt. Miller again went forward under fire and helped him out. On all of the above occasions and during the whole action, S/Sgt. Miller showed a complete disregard for his personal safety and conspicuous gallantry and courage in the face of enemy fire far beyond the call of his provisional duty as a QMS. His conduct was an inspiration to all and his actions are worthy of the highest praise. All of the wounded men were subsequently evacuated in the hours of darkness on the night 20/21 Nov.

Accordingly he is recommended for the VICTORIA CROSS.

FOR DCM.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS AND AWARDS.

NX 40507. L/Cpl. FLETCHER J.S.

At dawn on the 21 Nov. 42, the Japs attacked D. Coy's position astride the main track 2 mls in rear of JAP lines North of Soputa. L/Cpl Fletcher occupied a forward pit on the left flank, Advancing under cover of very heavy MG and rifle fire the Japs pressed forward on this flank. Most of our ammunition had been expended in the attack by our troops the previous night, so L/Cpl. Fletcher waited until the enemy were 10/15 yds away, when he leapt forward from his pit, threw a grenade amongst the Japs, returned and immediately opened fire with TSMG. This resolute action broke up the Jap attack at this point and enabled the garrison to maintain its position until full light. For the following 2 hours heavy pressure was maintained by the enemy on this flank until the whole of L/Cpl. Fletcher's Section was either killed or wounded, and he himself was wounded in the arm.

The wound not having been dressed after half an hour, L/Cpl. Fletcher, having used up all his ammunition was given permission to make a break to the SBs if it was possible, ~~wounded~~ as the whole area was being swept by fire. L/Cpl. Fletcher dashed from his pit, but was wounded again in the buttock. He lay in the open for a further period, about half an hour, during which time he urged his men about him to aggressive action, and shouted words of encouragement. Later he managed to drag himself to the Aid Post.

During a previous attack by his Coy at GORARI, L/Cpl. Fletcher, was outstanding in his coolness and courage after his section leader became a casualty and it was after this action that he was made a L/Cpl. and placed in command of a section.

Throughout the Campaign, and particularly in the above action, this soldier displayed to an unusual degree the qualities of initiative, defiant courage and devotion to duty and by his example he inspired his men in their dogged and successful defence.

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NX 67897. Cpl. BAKER L.
FOR MM.

This soldier is a stretcher bearer attached to A. Coy. During the attack on the Jap positions 2 miles in rear of their forward tps North of Soputa on 20 Nov 1942, the Coy suffered many casualties, when a superior Jap force was encountered. Cpl Baker exposed himself to enemy fire in order to attend to the wounded on several occasions at that time. Later the attack swept through the position and the force consolidated 400 yds further East astride the main track. Cpl. Baker realising the position, collected 2 stretcher cases and 3 walking wounded together and remained with them until 1900 hrs on 21 Nov., when he brought out the walking wounded and later led a party back for the stretcher cases. During the whole period they remained within 30 yds of the Jap positions and the area which they occupied became a fire swept area between the Jap defences and 2/2 Bn force - on the left flank. Cpl. Baker's devotion to duty and courage enabled him to evacuate the five men after dark on 21 Nov., and his conduct has set a splendid example.

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NX 8576. CAPT. COX. G.S. FOR MC (PERIODIC).

C. Coy 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn. was ordered to attack across the two bridges at Eora Ck (New Guinea) on the morning of ~~23rd~~ 23rd. Oct. 1942. At 0300 hrs Capt. G.S. Cox, the adjutant personally reconnoitred the route down to and across the first bridge and later at 0530 hrs. led the Coy across the first bridge and up to the second bridge where he saw them all across. The area between the two bridges was previously occupied by the Jap LMGs and according to latest reports received Japs were still in position. Owing to his skilful reconnaissance most of the Coy got across before the Japs were aware of the attack and complete surprise was attained. Heavy fighting then commenced and severe casualties were suffered by both sides which would certainly have been heavier to us if the guiding hadnot been well and quickly done by Capt. Cox. Eventually the bridgehead was gained. On all occasions during actions at Eora Creek and Gorari, Capt. Cox remained cool and determined in difficult circumstances and under fire. His courage, calm bearing & devotion to duty were a splendid example to all.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS AND AWARDS.

NX 68372 CPL. ALBANESE R.H.
FOR M.M. (Periodic).

At approx. 1000 hrs 20 Nov, 1942, 2/1 Bn encountered stiff resistance astride the main track 2 miles north of Soputa. A. and D. Coys were detailed to make a wide and deep flanking movement on the left. During this advance Cpl. Albanese did excellent work in scouting forward and carrying out various recces, eventually leading the whole force close up on the Jap positions 4 miles North of Soputa unknown to the enemy, so that our forces were able to launch a successful attack, gaining complete surprise. During the attack Cpl. Albanese moved with the foremost troops and distinguished himself by the completely cool manner and deliberation he displayed in choosing the targets for his grenades and TSMG and continuing the advance right on through the Jap positions despite the heavy volume of fire which was eventually brought to bear on his Coy. Later in the consolidation and defence of the two Coys' defensive position astride the main track. Cpl. Albanese played an outstanding part in the defence. Although the position was almost continuously swept by mortar, MG and rifle fire, pinning the defenders down. Cpl. Albanese with complete disregard to the dangers on all sides managed to crawl from point to point wherever the threat was greatest. Here again he was an inspiration to those near him by the fearless way in which on many occasions he stood up and took deliberate aim at the advancing Japs also giving fire orders and controlling those around him. Cpl. Albanese displayed great qualities of courage initiative and coolness and his conduct throughout the whole action was of the highest order which set a splendid example.

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NX 11538. CPL. LEDDEN J.P.
FOR M.M. (Periodic.)

Cpl. Ledden of the A/A Pln. accompanied A. and D. Coys when they attacked Jap positions in the rear, 4 miles North of Soputa at 1830 hrs. 20th. Nov. 1942. During the attack Cpl. Ledden moved with the foremost troops although it was not necessary for him to do so. In the attack he displayed great qualities of courage and initiative and was seen throwing grenades and using his TSMG to great effect at close quarters with the enemy despite the fact that the whole area was continuously swept by fire. During the consolidation on the main track which was carried out under fire and with difficulty, Cpl. Ledden ~~was~~ was of considerable assistance to the Commanders in carrying out recces of a dangerous nature and reported the movements of bodies of our troops as they occurred. During the night 20/21 Nov. 1942 and all the following day the defensive position was subject to terrific pressure and was attacked on many occasions. Cpl. Ledden played an outstanding part in the defence, firstly on the West flank until his TSMG was put out of action by enemy fire and later on the East side where by a long and arduous crawl over bullet swept ground he was able to obtain a Bren LMG from a dead man's position, occupy a position of vantage and use this weapon with great effect. Throughout the whole action Cpl. Ledden was active and vigorous to an unusual degree, he continuously urged his comrades to aggressive action. It is definitely known that Cpl. Ledden personally killed 8 Japs and is thought to have accounted for many others. By his initiative, courage and devotion to duty he set a splendid example and was an inspiration to those near him.

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NX 47465. Cpl. STEWART

J.A.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS AND AWARDS.FOR MM.

Cpl. Stewart was comdr. of No. 1 Sec. Pnr Pl. during the Port Moresby-Sananander campaign when it was organised as a rifle platoon. At Eora Ck on 23 Oct 43, a strong Jap position was encountered and the Pnr Pl were ordered to climb the ridge on the left, locate the enemy's flank and attack down the ridge. Cpl. Stewart's section went forward and encountered enemy, including an MMG post.

By this time the Sec. had lost one killed and one wounded. Cpl. Stewart hurled a grenade and dashed forward to the MMG firing his Tommy Gun, and was wounded in doing so. They succeeded in wiping out the crew and covered ~~the~~ by part of the Sec. put the Hotchkiss gun out of action, holding their ground for approximately 10 minutes, against Jap pressure, during which period they lost another killed and another wounded, leaving only two fit ~~and~~ men. Having completed his destruction of the gun and the Jap pressure developing, Cpl. Stewart withdrew, covered by the fit men, and himself assisting a wounded man.

During this action, Cpl. Stewart acted with determination and courage, and by his splendid example inspired his section to carry out a fearless and successful attack with a small force on a well prepared enemy position.

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NX 54732. Lieut. HOLLINGWORTH L. M.

FOR MC.

Lieut. Hollingworth was a Platoon Comdr. during the OWEN STANLEY Campaign. On 23 Oct. D. Coy were engaged on a deep patrol directed on ALOLA. Lieut. Hollingworth's Pl. was leading the Coy when a strong Jap position was encountered on the high ridge above ALOLA. The Coy became committed and suffered casualties, but 17 Pl. by a bold counter attack enabled the Coy to break contact. Lieut. Hollingworth, by his perfect control of the Pl. was able to execute a most difficult manoeuvre in thick jungle in the face of enemy fire.

From 27 to 29 Oct. D. Coy was in position on the left flank of the Bn on EORA ~~BRIDGE~~ and in close contact with the enemy. Patrols were carried out daily by 17 Pl. and frequent skirmishes occurred with Jap patrols, where casualties were inflicted. Lieut. Hollingworth led his Pl. on all these occasions with skill and determination. On the 28 Nov. Lieut. Hollingworth was wounded in the leg by a mortar splinter. After having his wound dressed at the RAP he requested to remain with his Pl. which he did.

At GORARI on 10 Nov. D. Coy attacked Jap position astride the Kokoda track. Lieut. Hollingworth was then Pl. Comdr of 16 Pl. which was forward Pl. in the attack. The attack was successful, and 16 Pl. exploited this success and crossed the track, where they came under very heavy fire from stronger Jap positions. The ground was most exposed, and the Pl. suffered many casualties, but remained firm and held their ground until the Coy Comdr. ordered them to withdraw. Here again Lieut. Hollingworth displayed great qualities of coolness and leadership in carrying out these movements and bringing back his wounded, although the whole area was being swept by MG and rifle fire.

On 20 Nov. A. and D. Coys attacked Jap positions 2 mls in the rear of forward tps North of Soputa. The attack was at dusk, and a much superior force was encountered. Taking full advantage of surprise the attackers cleaned out the position and exploited to the Soputa-Sananander road, where they consolidated in a perimeter. During the attack Lieut. Hollingworth led his men without regard for his personal safety, and although he received a bullet wound in the arm, remained at his post and was conspicuous during the consolidation by the fearless way he moved about in the face of enemy fire, organising the defence in his locality. Three other officers and many ORs in his Coy were killed during this action, including the Coy Comdr. and 2 i/c. Lieut. Hollingworth collected the remnants of the Coy and re-organised the position and though on the following day the position was surrounded and continuously attacked by a much larger Jap force, it was successfully defended.

Through ^{out} the Campaign, Lieut. Hollingworth was outstanding as a splendid example of coolness and courage, resolution and leadership.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS AND AWARDS.

Before dawn on 23 Oct 42, C. Coy attacked across the two bridges at Eora Creek and forced the bridgehead. 13 Pl. was forward, and led by Lieut. McCloy was largely responsible for clearing the Japs from this position. Among others, the Coy Comdr. was killed and, in the dark the Coy became dispersed, but Lieut. McCloy held his Pl. together and continued the advance. Fierce opposition was continually encountered and 13 Japs were killed (later buried) but Lieut. McCloy reorganised the remainder of the Coy in that locality and succeeded in consolidating on the ridge.

On 10 Nov. at GORARI, 13 Pl. commenced patrolling and contacted the Japs whose position was strongly defended, but Lieut. McCloy with great determination immediately attacked. The Pl. exploited surprise fought its way forward for some distance before heavy losses and increasing enemy opposition forced them to withdraw, after inflicting heavy casualties. ~~XXXX~~ A DCM and an MM have been awarded to Section Comdrs for bravery in this action, and it is undoubtedly due to the splendid example and leadership displayed by Lieut. McCloy that so much was done by such a small force, which in this action suffered 11 casualties out of a strength of 13. The success of the Bn. attack which followed was largely due to the information gained by Lieut. McCloy.

On 20 Nov., 13 Pl. was again forward Pl. advancing towards Sananander when contact was made on the edge of a Kunai patch, and we suffered several casualties, Lieut. McCloy worked his Pl. forward by fire and movement and pushed the forward Jap element from the Kunai back to their prepared positions. A Jap stood up beside the track, and owing to the tall Kunai grass he was not seen by our leading section, and he killed one and wounded one, but Lieut. McCloy from a distance of over 100 yds stood on the track and firing three shots from the shoulder, killed the Jap. During this he was under fire of a Jap Mortar and MMG.

Throughout the campaign, and particularly in the above actions, Lieut. McCloy showed outstanding qualities of leadership, courage and determination.

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AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONOURS AND AWARDS.NX 1315. Sgt. MADIGAN E.S.FOR M.M.

Sgt. Madigan was the senior Sgt. of the Mor. Pl. and from 22-28 Oct. 43 the Pl was in an exposed but commanding position on the bare ridge South of Eora Ck, which was constantly under fire from Jap mortars and mountain guns, which caused many casualties in the platoon.

On 26 Oct 43, Lieut. Reardon, the Mortar Pl / Comdr. was severely wounded during a heavy bombardment,, Sgt. Madigan immediately went to ~~thix~~ his assistance and carried him to a medical post, despite the continuous fire at that time, and this action is considered to have saved Lieut. Reardon's life.

On 27 Oct. 42, whilst our mortar was firing, the Jap mountain gun made a direct hit on our mortar pit, blowing up the mortar, mortally wounding a Sgt. and wounding two others. Sgt. Madigan quickly obtained another mortar and two men and carried on.

Whilst conducting the mortar firing by day, Sgt. Madigan was conspicuous in volunteering every night to carry ammunition and bring back wounded from the forward company areas, a journey of 4 to 5 hours, loaded both ways, His cheerfulness under such dreary and trying circumstances was inspiring to all.

On 28 Oct., Sgt. Madigan was firing the mortar, when the fourteenth round prematurely exploded, killing one of the detachment and causing Sgt. Madigan severe concussion and bleeding from the ears etc. He was evacuated on a stretcher to the Fd Ambulance. Arrangements had been made for him to be evacuated to MORESBY, but he paraded himself and persuaded the MO to allow him to rejoin his unit, which was then four days' march forward. He did join the unit on 8 Nov 42, and did splendid work at GORARI, during the three days action there.

On 22 Nov, on the Soputa-Sananander track, Sgt. Madigan went forward to bring mortar fire on to Jap positions. As the visibility was so extremely limited, he took his telephone and one escort forward of our forward section positions, in order to range his mortars judged by the sound of the Japanese squealing on being hit. He succeeded in ranging in this manner, but ~~xxxx~~ it enabled the Japs to direct their small arms fire onto his position, as they apparently could hear his range corrections loudly spoken over the damp D.S. phones. He continued this practice daily until 1 Dec. and directed the fire of over 400 rounds during this period.

Throughout the campaign, Sgt. Madigan showed outstanding qualities of bravery and leadership. His conduct was an inspiration to his platoon, and a splendid example of unsparing effort and courage far beyond the call of duty.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONORS AND AWARDS.REASONS FOR MENTION IN DESPACHES.

1. Lieut. McCloy. Leadership of Pln. in Eora Creek attack and Gorari Creek attack on East Bank.
2. A/Cpl. Hunt. During "C" Coy. attack at Eora Creek. Lieut. Pollitt's Pln. was held up. Hunt worked round and killed 2 snipers and grenadiers enabling the Pln. to get out. Later killed in same attack.
3. Lieut. Hollingsworth. "D" Coy near Alola on the 24th Oct., 1942. Pln. surrounded and Lieut. Hollingsworth coolly withdrew it. At Gorari Creek on 11th Nov., 1942, he put in a good attack. There were heavy casualties but he did not withdraw until ordered.
4. Cpl. Graham. "D" Coy at Gorari Creek, brought out wounded men under fire when all section were killed or wounded and self wounded in shoulder slightly.
5. Lieut. Frew. At Eora Creek. Pln. Comd. of "B" Coy. He was sent forward to patrol and discovered enemy sniper and shot him. Although wounded himself he was a good example. It was a very steep hill and a difficult situation.
6. Cpl. Baker. "A" Coy S. B. When Lieut. Blakiston's Pln. was being constantly sniped, (4K - 2W), Baker attended to wounded each time at great personal risk.
7. Capt. Sanderson. Gallant leadership of Coy during attack at Eora Creek, firing until he was killed.
8. Sgt. Miller. Initiative and skill during 2 mortar shoots from Pioneer Pln. position in support of B. Coy.
9. Capt. Barclay. Gallant leadership of Coy. in frontal attack across bridges at Eora Creek.
10. Pte. McIntyre. During "D" Coy's attack at Gorari Creek, brought out Pte. Armstrong (mortally wounded). When Ramsay killed waited until Lieut. Wiseman arrived then got him out.
11. Capt. Cox. Recce of bridge just before "C" Coy's. attack at Eora Creek. General service as Adjt.
12. Pte. Johnstone. "C" Coy's. runner at Gorari Creek. During operation went to each Pln. - Section under fire - Devotion to Duty.
13. Lieut. Body. Offensive action and leadership - dogged defence - advanced ground. "B" Coy., Templeton's Crossing, Eora Creek and Gorari Creek.
14. Cpl. Donnelly. "A" Coy's attack at Eora Creek. Very active with grenades and T.S.M.G. in attacking enemy and getting his section withdrawn.
15. Cpl. James. "D" Coy. near Alola - killed 6 Japs. - good soldier resolute - cool.
16. Sgt. Armstrong. Splendid leadership in attack on Gorari Creek in ~~xxxxxxx~~ Bridgehead. Pln. killed 19 Japs. and captured 1 prisoner.
17. Cpl. Stewart. Pioneer Pln. above Eora Creek - offensive action - knocked out M.M.G. Post, killed 3 Japs with grenades and withdrew section.

21 Aust. Inf.

7 Aust.

2 Aust.

2/16 Aust. Inf. Bn.

WX 17091, Padre

Charles William Joseph CUNNINGHAM.

On 27 October, 1942, Padre C. Cunningham joined this unit. The Bn. was then holding a bridge head at EORA CREEK, and the Japs were holding high ground in front. From this position he brought mortar fire onto our area, causing casualties and making work difficult.

These conditions lasted seven days and Father Cunningham was untiring in his efforts to help the wounded, comfort the dying and bury the dead, regardless of creed, in extremely difficult circumstances. He physically assisted at night in the evacuation of stretcher cases across the submerged bridge where courage and strength were required.

He accompanied the Bn. on its forced march to GORARI and whilst the Bn. was holding the bridge position there, was again outstanding in his devotion to duty, generally organising the RAP personnel and raising their morale by his cheerful courage and splendid example.

He was without sleep for three days and two nights in order to help patients who could not be evacuated owing to Jap. patrols around

our position and who required constant attention owing to chest wounds etc. The RAP area in this position was also under intermittent mortar and small arms fire. His services were essential as, of the RAP Staff, three had previously been killed in action and 2 wounded whilst the M.O., Capt. J. Connell, M.C., was very sick at the time.

Attached is letter from 21 Bde. H.Q.

M.B.E.

Paul D. Little Lt Col
Comd., 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.

- 6 Oct 42. 0600 Coys left camp. Trucked to Newton's Dump. Coffee from Salvation Army at UBERI. Picked up rations at dump at UBERI and crossed IMITA RANGE camping at creek at the foot of the range. Weather good no rain. Men in good spirits, no one dropped out. C. Coy to spend night at UBERI. C.O. went on with Adj. to Post 44. Very stiff climb from UBERI and steep descent down steps.
- 7 Oct 42. 0600 hrs. Leading Coys left. followed creek and two hrs later came to Post 44 where we were given tea and picked up rations. Started climbing again, taking things very steady. On IORABAWA RANGE saw graves of Australians and Jap soldiers. Plenty of rifles and ammunition etc. along track. Camped near river at foot of IORABAWA RANGE. Flees bad here.
- 8 Oct 42. 0900hrs. Left camp, climbing all the way. Passed through A. Coy 1800 hrs. Men tired, weather good. Near end of march down. On the flat very boggy. Unit camp on bank of river. Ground very boggy, Bde HQ alongside. Rained all night. Stores drawn from dropping area at NAURU. Men in good spirits although tired and wet.
- 9 Oct 42. C.O.'s Conference. We may move tomorrow. Supposed to move on 11th. 1430 hrs. party at dropping area for rations and ammunition.
- 11 Oct 42. Order of march C. Coy 0800 hrs. B. 0815, D. 0845, A. 0915. HQ-BHQ 0930 hrs. Lunch 1200 hrs. Left 1300 hrs. Men to stand-to 1845 hrs - 1915 hrs. Sgt. O'Malley transferred to B. Coy. Water bottles used in sections only. One bottle at a time.
- 13 Oct 42. Tracks improving. Ref. KAGI Map NEW GUINEA 415685. Here B. Coy put in bridge and cut a track out of rock just North of it. The bridge which either our forces or the Japs demolished. Graphite grease landed near G.M. Mention General being here. General came through with 16 Bde. C.O. saw G.O.C. and discussed plan (shorthand note - page 61).
- 19 Oct 42. C.O.'s Conference at TEMPLETON'S CROSSING 1900 hrs. To relieve 3rd. Bn. C. Coy on right, B. centre, A. left on the creek. 2/2 Bn. two coys came through on right and another two passed through, then turned left and passed across front of our Coys. On given signal A. B. and C. will go on to Jap positions. B. will go forward with two platoons and patrol until Jap reached. Blankets and ground-sheets to be put in dumps when Coys take over from the 3rd. Bn. Unit leaves 2/33 Bn. lines at 0700 hrs. It is expected the 2/2 Bn. will go through at 1100 hrs. Mortars and Vickers used as carriers of ammunition. 1415 hrs. A. Coy reported chopping to left. 2/33 and 2/25 Bn patrols out. 1450 hrs. During mortar shoot bomb exploded in barrel. Casualties - two killed 1 seriously injured. 1455 hrs. Heavy firing forward. Another attack. Heavy explosions and short interval before bursts. Probably 75 m.m. gun. 1550 hrs Cameron reported "considered more Japs there than anticipated." Firing on right flank stopped. Cameron considered another attack coming.
- 20 Oct 42. 0720 hrs Jap attacks. Cameron thrown back. 0800 hrs. C.O. contacted Cameron. 1022 hrs. Coys in position. 1055 hrs. 2/2 Bn passed through C. Coy. 1230 hrs. Mortar fire falling in C. Coy area. Casualties - 1 Killed 4 wounded, also Lieut. Carew wounded. One 108 set C. Coy blown up. 1300 hrs. D. Coy arrived, told to be ready in case needed for attack. 1330 to 1405 hrs. Enemy mortar falling in creek behind Bn HQ. 1410 hrs. Our mortars opened up. 1420 hrs. 2 injured D. Coy. 1545 hrs - C. Coy to move forward - D. Coy to replace C. Coy. C. Coy to clear Japs from between forward Coys of 2/2 Bn. One and two lots. Contact 2/2 Bn on right and left. Guide from 2/3 Bn B. Coy. Two units of Withy will move into position occupied by C. Coy.

over/

57

20 Oct 42.
(Contd).

1610 hrs. Orders to A. Coy to try and knock out enemy IMG with 2" mortar. 1645 hrs A. Coy commenced shoot. 1740 hrs D. Coy now in C. Coys position. C. Coy approximately 500 yds further on. ~~1745~~ 1745 Brigadier's Conference. (See Page 6 of Japanese casualties).

21 Oct 42.

~~0615~~ 0615 hrs C.O. went forward to PIHA. 0725 hrs D. Coy reports WITHY pulling out. A. Coy reports Coy HQ gone to centre Platoon 80 yds forward. C. Coy reports that they have contacted 2/2 Bn and our D. Coy. B. Coy contacted Coys of 2/2 Bn at 0915 hrs and expects to move forward 0930 hrs. 0950 hrs our mortar commenced firing. 1005 hrs B. Coy now going forward. 1200 hrs B. Coy moves 600 yds.

Men on the forward ground acting as patrols. D. Coy moving into B. Coy's position. Call from Bde. Message from CULLEN via. BURRELL C. Coy to come in via Bn HQ. A. Coy to move behind B. Coy then follows BnHQ. 1330 hrs - C Coy moving in. A. Coy advancing along track. passing Jap positions - appear to have been at least a Bn. in area. B. Coy held up approximately 3000 from track. Two killed 4 wounded. Gun positions of Japs seen and it appears that it is a mountain howitzer 9 shell cases and fuses sent back. Lieut Nathan and 3 ORs report to Bde HQ. A. Coy position behind B. Coy. on East side of track. 1700 hrs raining slightly. Water is approximately 300 yds behind B. Coy. RAP at water. Unit not to advance beyond 1700 hours. Enemy strength estimated one Coy 3 IMGs 1 MMG. 1915 hrs. A. Coy could not attack before dark as whole unit had not arrived C.O. decided to leave his attack until morning when D. Coy would arrive as reserve. 2000 hrs - B Coy ordered to find out if enemy is still present. Pending which A. Coy will be told tomorrow to out-flank enemy. 2000 hrs advice received ~~at 2000~~ 2/3 Bn has contacted on position on crest, also that Coy of 2/2 Bn would be patrolling down the hill to contact us leaving 0730 hrs. Capt. Sanderson informed.

(1200 hrs - CO's Conference with Brig. Lloyd - Stevenson and Edgar present. Brigadier decided to move forward as enemy appeared to have gone. 2/1 Bn on axis main track less C. and D. Coys. with B. Coy advance guard. Two Coys of 2/3 Bn, whole of 2/2 Bn move on top of ridge above main track .

22 Oct 42.

C.O. went forward 0625 hrs to contact ~~Brigadier~~ PIHA. PIHA to see if enemy still in position. Japs appear to have gone. Weather very cold. 0745 hrs - A. Coy went forward as vanguard. 0840 hrs. D. Coy arrived. 0850 hrs - Brigadier arrived. 0905 hrs - B Coy patrol area between EORA CREEK and AIOLA (high feature). D. Coy now to become vanguard. Skirt EORA CREEK village and limit of exploitation AIOLA. 1000 hrs - B. Coy patrols set out. 1030 hrs - D. Coy left main track. to cut behind village. 1110 hrs - Contact 2/3 Bn on main track. 1140 - arrived above EORA CREEK village. Enemy holding up 2/3 Bn. 1215 - A. Coy left to go around village up ridge and hit Jap on flank. 2/3 Bn have a Coy moving to right flank. Enemy estimated at one Coy. 1430 hrs - C Coy arrives. 1445-1530 hrs. Jap mortar and gun firing. Threekilled 9 wounded, 2 subsequently died. Quiet until 1750 hrs when CULLEN and STEVENSON went forward. They were fired on by MGs and howitzers. Decided 2/3 Bn establish bridgehead across creek. Then C. and B. Coys go across ~~at 1630~~ at 0630 hrs on 23 Oct 42. 2/3 Bn going at night and they will go as far as possible. C.O. considers attack could not get along in face of opposition known to be covering the crossings as reported by Capt. Galle 2/3 Bn. C.O. wants D. Coy 2/3 Bn and A Coy 2/1 Bn time to put in their attack. Opposition - 2 IMGs and 1 mortar trained on bridge and track. Will do as best we can with mortar. Considers plan tactically unsound. Capt. Galle will provide guides at 0430 hrs. Capt. Galle will also try and find out where night hand gun is situated for our mortars. HQ Coy not here .

The following promotions are advised :-

Capt. Golding to be Acting Major.
W.O.s Carter and Gosnell. Sgt Dyer, Johnson
Brown, and Gotts to be Acting Lieuts. Dates not known.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HONORS AND AWARDS.

1. During the actions in around Soputa the following persons distinguished themselves and it is recommended that they be Mentioned in Despatches for their services.

NX 2776	LIEUT.	DYER. J.
NX 47313	CPL.	KENSLEY. W.J.
NX 1315	SGT.	MADIGAN. E.S.

2. The names are in order of priority.

For Mention in Despatches.Lieut. Dyer.

Consistently good leadership and control. Determined in all actions and cool and resourceful.

Cpl. Kemsley.

Stretcher Bearer, (see S/Sgt. Miller's recommendation for V.C.-) Cpl. Kemsley went out with him and brought in Cpl. Benson. Worked under fire on several occasions.

Sgt. Madigan.

Mortar Sgt. Carried out many shoots. Very effective against enemy positions from forward O. P's. Always keen - efficient, cheerful and brave.

24 Oct 42
Contd.

Heavy rain fell at night and it was very cold. One MMG destroyed by mortar fire.

25 Oct 42.

0600 hrs. - Mail arrived with rations. Enemy still in position.
0945 hrs - Two aircraft strafed enemy positions.
1045 hrs - Enemy mortar again firing.

1230 hrs - Lieut. Gosnell went out to guard our rear with a patrol. B. Coy Pl. Patrol reported back. Extremely exhausted.

1300 hrs - Pioneer Pl. reported having killed two Japs and wounded one.

1315 hrs - Stevenson is of opinion one Regt. of Japs holding ridge.

1600 hrs. 2/3 Bn contacted D. Coy early after. D. Coy calling for rations urgently.

Despatch 130 all available to 2/3 Bn.

1400 hrs - GR Pl. back. struck enemy but fld to find ~~no~~ O.P.

1700 hrs - Pnr Pl asked for 2" mortar. Very quiet all afternoon and sunny all day.

Mortar O.P. established East wide of bridge. Hope to shoot on 26 October.

1825 hrs. - Enemy mortar opened up, also MG.

Have Hewetson ready betw'dn 0900 and 1000 hrs to contact Randall's Pl. East bank. Get Tocher on Jap casualties and Jap maps.

26 Oct 42.

Spasmodic rifle fire during the night. Heavy rain fell.

0600 hrs - Enemy reported still in position.

0715 hrs - Out mortar opened up on enemy.

0730 hrs - Enemy mortar opened up and inflicted casualties on our crew, so mortar position changed. D. Coy, 2 Pls A. Coy., 13 Pl. C. Coy. back at Bde. Pior taking over C. Coy. Wiseman taking over A. Coy.

It was decided that more offensive action should be taken as a distraction to the enemy in this area.

A 3" mortar shoot was arranged. 2" mortar to be used from Pioneer Pls position. Sgt. Miller took up 2" mortar, 24 bombs, 12 grenades and brens and fired at enemy. Results not observed. B. Coy Pls fire undoubtedly fell in positions occupied by Jap.

1100 hrs. - B. Coy fired 5 rounds per man, one mag. per bren at known ~~enx~~ enemy positions, which it is hoped caused casualties. C.O. advised

D. Coy ~~xxxxxx~~ returns less two men missing. Advising they nearly reached AIOIA and killed 6 Japs. See Capt. Simpson's report attached.

Lieut. McCloy with 17 men after his C. Coy attack went to the left and joined D. Coy further up the ridge.

1300 hrs. Lieut. Nathan went out on 55 hr patrol down East side of river.

(1) To find a crossing where enemy could be attacked from rear.

(2) To interrupt Jap supply lines.

Two Pls A. Coy returned, these lost contact with Capt. Sanderson on his attack, and later joined D. Coy up the river.

See Lieut. Blakiston's report. All these personnel are being re-rationed and ammunitioned by Major Miller and sent back to Bn after a night's rest.

1500 hrs. Brigadier arrives. Capt. Barclay found. All quiet until 1530 hrs when small arms fire was heard.

1515. Mountain gun opened up new position on ridge just above B. Coy. firing at old Bn.HQ. Time of flight of round 2 secs. Probable explanation of chopping noise heard last two days in making track uphill for gun.

1600. Jap rifles and amm collected in area and sent to B. Coy who are using them for firing at enemy positions intermittently.

Bridge washed away making crossing difficult.

Capt. Burrell back. Fisher to replace Long as L.O. Capt. Simpson came back with B. Coy. A/Cpl. Riches and Pte Burns have been picked up back at 7 Div. camp and will be charged with desertion.

1830 hrs. Enemy dropped 6 mortar bombs on BHQ 2 casualties.

27 Oct 42.

0400 hrs. Fusillade of shots heard.

0700 hrs - C.O. and Adj. went forward to C. Coy.

0745 hrs - PIHA reported enemy shifted. PIHA to advance 500 yds along track. WORA to advance along ridge on top.

0930 hrs - D. Coy commenced to arrive.

1100 hrs - Report from B. Coy patrol. Gone on 500 yds have struck party of 20 Japs.

1100 hrs. Two Pls B. Coy to go forward and assist patrol.

B. Coy to move forward from reserve to B. Coy position.

C. Coy should come down on left. Firing heard from C. Coy posn (Jap).

And Runners sent up to see what is happening. C. Coy encounter Japs when coming down. One man wounded.

Mail arrived.

60.

23 Oct 43.

Rain fell early, moonlight at 0330 hrs. C.O. went forward on recce to bridge. 0400 hrs. C Coy went forward. 0645 hrs Brigadier arrived. Intermittent fire heard at night. 0630 to 0830 hrs - small arms and mortar fire can be heard; Bitter fighting going on ~~at~~ - Howitzer used by enemy.

0815 hrs. 1 Platoon B. Coy tried to get communications with C. Coy. One section got across.

0855 hrs. C.O. tried to go down and establish BHQ forward but MG fire prevented it. It was then necessary to go back round the track.

1120 hrs. C.O. between two bridges.

1140 hrs. Contacted Bde and Major Miller. Some mortar fire on South feature. Bde advise Capt. Lysaght u/c 2/1.

1150 hrs. Lieut. Pollitt, C. Coy. reports to C.O. between two bridges - alleged party of 40 to 50 Japs about to patrol our feature after effecting crossing of river north of second bridge. This is only a supposition as Japs were only seen moving North on Westside of creek. C.O. is of the opinion Japs are moving out ~~NOT~~ doing offensive patrol.

1230 hrs. B. Coy. continue to move along main track. Jap appears to have gone although he has still fired several mortar shells and snipers active along track. Known casualties of the 23rd. 3 Officers killed, 1 Officer wounded, 17 ORs killed. 25 ORs wounded.

B. Coy not using the track. Crossing a small stream just below its junction with a larger stream near the bridge. B. Coy with C.O. HQ Coy still missing.

1330 hrs - Moving on the track and saw where B. Coy had contacted enemy. A lot of our dead about. Collected information from dead bodies and sent back to Bde.

1400 hrs - Struck enemy 400 yards North of bridge using LMGs. B.Coy. ~~asked for assistance~~ Asked for assistance from Bde and one Coy 2/3 Bn sent out.

Only B. Coy and Pioneer Platoon and some Sigs with BnHQ. One Platoon C. Coy that was left remains as a platoon in A. Coy.

1615 hrs - Pioneer Platoon started to go round on left flank.

1625 hrs - Two men arrived from Transit Camp just when we were in a ticklish spot and looking for D. Coy.

1615 hrs. Coy under Capt. Lysaght arrived with 2 LMGs.

1800 hrs - More firing and grenades seem to indicate Lieut. Lainey has got among the Japs. Rain falling.

1845 hrs - West and Stuart reported going back from Pioneer Pl. slightly wounded. after knocking four men operating a LMG. They were driven out.

1905 hrs - Major Baines arrived. Still fighting until dark. Night firing heard at intervals during the night. Casualties 23 rd Oct. 2 Officers killed.

24 Oct 42.

0545 hrs - Stand-to. ~~at~~

0630 hrs - C.O. went forward to B. Coy. Two patrols from B. Coy gone out. Small groups of Japs still about.

0815 hrs - Pioneer Pl. pushed round on left flank. Also one Pl. B. Coy. 2/3 Bn. Rations arrived during the night. Ammunition at first light.

0900 hrs - Three enemy mortars fired. B.HQ caught us up. Details of A., C. and D. Coys organised under Capt. Prior. Lieut. Brown attached to him. C.O. considers enemy in some strength on ridge further back. Gun seems to be in same position but mortar moved back. C.O. wants strong force sent round left flank and deems it improbable that the opposition will shift and asks that two coys be sent out.

0950 hrs - B. Coy 2/3 Bn. sent out to go round. Another Coy 2/3 Bn also going around as well.

1000 hrs. Two GRs sent out to try and find ^{mortar} water O.P.

1030 hrs. - Composition Pl. under Prior and Brown set out ~~and~~ for high ground on right flank.

1105 hrs - 12 Pl. of B. Coy arrive from night patrol flank.

1130 hrs - Commence mortar again - apparently trying to get into this area. C. Coy of 2/3 Bn arrive.

1200 hrs - Colonel Stevenson pass through.

1415 hrs. Stevenson in position on top - expects to attack 1600 hrs. Lieut. Frew wounded. All quiet until 1520 when mortar fired again.

1530 hrs - Reported that 2/3 Bn has contacted enemy and were making headway slowly.

1600 hrs - Brigadier arrived - nothing doing - few mortar bombs at 1830.

27 Oct 42
Contd.

B. Coy open fire Jap got LMG. Ritchie attacking. Miller left and body going on high ground on left.
 1200 hrs - Pnr Pl. reports Japs still in position on spur. B. Coy reports Japs still as strong as was except that he has moved back.
 1210 hrs - D. Coy recalled and sent up to reinforce C. Coy. To move carefully down ridge and not get down in the valley.. Heavy fighting until 1215 hrs when it subsided. Casualties 4 wounded 1 killed. Bridge being repaired by Sappers. It is considered that the main force of Japs has withdrawn and left pockets of resistance.
 1430 hrs - Gun opened up firing bn hill 20 rounds.
 1445 hrs - B. Coy reported enemy in strength along ridge. Will require a reserve in position Pnrs occupied in case Burrell and Simpson cannot shift them.
 1500/10 hrs - Fusillade of shots broke out - Pnr Pl. now withdrawn to position held by Lieut. Gosnell. Gosnell now with C. Coy.
 1600 hrs - C. Coy reported B. Coy moving higher up the ridge in an attempt to find another along to which to advance on the enemy. Lieut. Murray reported into B. Coy. Lieut. Blakiston and two pls. of A. Coy reported in to O.C. Lieut. Prior. One Coy 2/2 Bn. is to place two Pls up spur to protect unit's rear and one Pl. to remain on East side of stream to replace Capt. Prior. C. Coy to do 2" mortar shoot at 1630. A. Coy now to place two pls to the left rear of B. Coy. and one Pl. between track and creek, acting as a reserve for B. Coy. and stopping and gap between left-hand Pl. B. Coy and Pnr Pl. who are now three-hundred yards up the ridge West of Bn HQ.
 1630 hrs. - Enemy mortar dropped 9 bombs at rear of our HQ.
 1800 hrs - Our 3" mortar commenced firing at 1745 hrs. Enemy 2" mortar firing on Bn.HQ.
 1600 hrs - Simpson contacted enemy - lost 1 OR ~~5 killed~~ and killed 5. After firing 14 rounds our 3" mortar blew up killing 3.

28 Oct 42.

Rifle fire and grenades during night. It is now established from papers sent back from us we have a TARTAR Bn and an Engr Coy opposite us.
 0800 hrs - Enemy mortar opened up on our rear BHQ firing several shells.
 090 hrs - All quiet until heavy rifle fire and grenades were heard from B. Coy area - died down at 0930 hrs. Line between here and Bde cut. Possibly by enemy mortar fire. Cpl. Cameron from Sigs. gone out to fix. Communications between D. and C. and BHQ. very bad owing to faulty telephones.
 1015/20 hrs - enemy using 2" mortar again on these HQs and again at 1100.
 1100 hrs - Reported from C. Coy their patrols to D. Coy contacted enemy at 0915 hrs. but fld to contact D. Coy. One OR wounded in the thigh by Jap wearing Australian ~~h~~ helmet camouflaged with leaves. D. Coy reported move back 300 yds back towards C. Coy. His sigs ~~were~~ between C. and D. Coys cut in three places. Yesterday he drove Japs out of small position.
 1130 hrs - Small arms fire and grenade fire fierce for short period.
 1230 hrs - D. Coy reported shortly after reached new position. They were attacked by a small force of Japs from on top. Our casualties 1 killed. 2" mortar was being used in defence and blew up killing one and wounding 4. Simpson considers Jap still patrolling between D. and C. Coys. Enemy casualties unknown.
 1345 hrs. C.O. issued instructions to D. Coy to do something offensive.
 1600/1630 hrs - Fire fight between ~~between~~ B. and C. Coys and Japs. Japs expended a lot of ammunition. We are using Jap ammunition where possible. Jap using 2" mortar frequently during the afternoon.
 1730 hrs - Lieut. Nathan returns.
 1600 hrs - Fighting patrol under Lieut. Wiseman advanced 500 yds towards 2/3 Bn and got within 20 yds of enemy before being discovered. We lost one man and judging by sounds - enemy lost several. Very heavy fire forced Lieut. Wiseman back.
 1700 hrs - after fire fight Jap rolled grenades on B. Coy. causing 5 casualties. Weather has been fine all day. Rations only Bully Beef and a few biscuits. Troops tired but morale good. S.A. fire and grenades early part of night and then quiet.

29 Oct 42. 0600 hrs - C. Coy patrol out.
 0800 hrs - C. Coy report enemy moved out. Left pl. B. Coy report enemy gunner and they have captured their post.
 0830 hrs - ~~Bxxxx~~ Bn to move forward - D. and C. Coys on ridge. A. and B. on axis of track. Then HQ Coy, BHQ.
 Jap positions prove to be a two Coy one, Mortar gun and MMGs well dug in. One of our corpses had steaks taken from his legs.
 1230 hrs - A and D Coys move forward followed by C. and D. Casualties to date - 36 killed 85 wounded Total 121.
 After climbing for about an hour track commenced to run down.
 1530 hrs - A. Coy seeing movement on spur ahead (presumably ALOLA). Patrol was sent forward from A. Coy to try and find out what was doing. Contact had been lost with D. Coy which is moving inside on left.
 1400hrs - D. Coy contacted and has patrol ready to leave.
 D. Coy ordered to take ~~out~~ up position 300 yds from A. Coy.
 C. Coy to be sent around on left to declare spur clear. Rain again kept off. Mail arrived.
 Rations light in morning but ~~and~~ a further issue made at 1230 hrs.
 1730 hrs. - A party of 8 Japs identified on ridge.
 1800 hrs - Col. Edgar came forward and promised to send ~~MMG~~. Rangetaker arrived 1820.
 1830 hrs - Mist obscured target. Range 1715 yds.
 Rain fell during the night.

30 Oct 42. 0600 hrs. Capt. Burrell reported that he was moving forward.
 0745 hrs - No enemy movement seen so pl. from A. Coy going forward ~~up~~ to the hill.
~~x0745xxxxx~~ 1005 hrs - All quiet until 1005 when firing heard in distance. ~~See~~ Sun has been out but mist has come over and is quite ~~odd~~
 Track continues to run down to creek where very bad log crossing is effected. Two easy chair seen on the wayside.
 1230 hrs - Still no contact with C. and D. Coys; The track leads around spur on which Japs were seen last night.
 1245 hrs - D. Coy in touch by phone - half an hour's spell.
 1345 hrs - Another 30 mins climb and ALOLA was reached.
 C. Coy went into ALOLA and reported Jap ammunition dump nearby.
 1400 hrs. - Orders were received that two Coys A. and B. under Capt. Catterns to proceed to ISURAVA.
 Bn less two Coys garrison ALOLA. A water-fall is close by.
 Brigadier's orders to Capt Catterns - We are to be relieved unless B. Coy gets in trouble. Later follow to ABUARI.
 1730 hrs - Capt. Catterns' force reach ISURAVA rest house. No opposition but place showed signs of recent occupation. Pushing on in morning.
 Patrol from D. Coy reported in. D. Coy camping out about 1 and half hours from ALOLA. Will arrive in morning.
 Rations Bully Beef, sugar and some cheese.
 Light rain fell during afternoon. Men are tired. but morale is high.
 D. Coy camp on an old 53 Bn area. and found a considerable quantity of our ammunition and cooking dishes which he salvaged.
 Night quiet and rain fell.

31 Oct 42. 0630 - B. Coy pushed on to ISURAVA
 0930 hrs - D. Coy arrived-established above dropping area.
 0930 hrs - dropping commenced.
 1020 - Col Dunbar arrived.
 Relief arrangements.
 Two Coys 2/3 Bn going forward to take over from A. and B. Coys. Two Coys behind 2/3 Bn as a backstop.
 5 drums of fuel oil found and a burner.
 2/3 Bn turned over a blower to us.
 1330 hrs. HQ Coy, D. Coy Bn. HQ and C. Coy set off. Very steep descent to stream and again very steep ascent to ABAURI.
 Mortar personnel transferred to C. Coy.
 A. and B. Coys remain at river. Cooker's left there and both were given a hot meal.
 D. Coy got a hot meal at lunch-time.
 1800 hrs - Men allowed to light fires and a hot meal was cooked.

- Nov 1 42. 0600 stand-to.
 1000 hrs - A. and B. Coys leaving river. C. D. HQ and BnHQ resting during morning.
 Tobacco issue on. Ration issue.
 1200 hrs - A. Coy started to arrive.
 1330 hrs - C. Coy move forward followed by D. Coy, HQ Coy BHQ.
 Approximately 1 and 3/4 ~~max~~ hours march gardens were found near track and troops gathered vegetables, ~~yam~~ yams and sweet potatoes.
 Mosquitoes are again noted.
 Valley below, men opening out. It is expected that KOKODA will be seen shortly. A.
 A. and B. Coys remained at ABUARI.
 Tobacco issue 3/4 ozs per man. Chocolate issue ~~3/4~~ 1/4 lb per man.
 Rain fell at night.
 Orders received to march to MISSIMA in morning.
- Nov 2 42. 0600 Stand down Sitnor.
 0900 hrs - C.O. left with advance party.
 0930 hrs 2 C Coy, HQ Coy BHQ and D. Coy.
 An hrs march along fairly level going to MISSIMA, and we got first good view of KOKODA valley.
 A. Coy remaining here and another hrs march along undulating country brought us to KALIE overlooking the valley. ~~C.O.~~ C. and D. coys pushed on. B. Coy and HQ stayed here with BHQ.
 Native gardens all around and vegetables are on for a meal.
 Day has been very dry.
 Diarrhoea is hitting the troops hard.
 A census is taken reveals that at least 20 per cent of tps suffering from what RMO considers due to diet ~~effec~~ deficiencies associated with war conditions.
 1800 hrs. A further issue of a third of a lb. block chocolate. 4 and half pkts of PKs. Mail arrived.
 Most of rations eaten to-night and tomorrow men start on emergency rations and vegetables they can get. Half a pkt of biscuits issued.
 No rain all night.
- Nov 3 42. 0600 Sitnor.
 0715 hrs - First Coy commenced move to KOBARA.
 First half hour very steep climb and then 1 and half hrs down hill.
 Passing numerous valleys with vegetables growing, plenty of paw paws and coconuts.
 1230 hrs - Reached KOBARA. 2 hrs flat going.
 C. ~~and~~ D. HQ and BHQ at KOBARA. A. Coy at crossroads. B. of main track. Coy to patrol a 1000 yds along the track and B. Coy to send out a patrol and contact 25 Bde at KOKODA.
 Rations dropped by plane and were very hard to find owing to KUNAI grass. Tps all carried vegetables from KALIE.
 Light rain fell in afternoon.
 Passed through 2/2 Bn. 2/3 bn at KOBARA.
 Bde moves on to OIVI.
 2/3 Bn waiting for rations.
 1830 hrs - Report that 2/2 Bn has struck enemy this side of OIVI.
 Three mortar bombs heard in distance.
- No. 4 42. ~~Stand~~ 0600 hrs - Stand-to. Sitnor.
 0945 hrs - Dropping started.
 1015 hrs - Report from B. Coy that WEATHER force contacted 1900 hrs 3 Nov.
 1130 hrs - Two Coys C. and B. and 2 i/c instructed to move to GORARI.
 Jap gone back.
 2/2 Bn pushing on and 2 coys to be ready to move by 1500 hrs.
 1245 hrs - Contacted Brigadier and gave further plans subject to Division concurring.
 Responsibility of KOKODA valley passed to 25 Bde as from 1200 hrs. Including OIVI and KOKODA. 2/2 and 2/3 Bns going along main track. 2/1 Bn to go along back track around to ILIMO.
 2/2 Bn pushing along slowing, but resistance being met.
 We have 70 extra natives and one 208 set attached.
 1500 hrs - Bn commenced move from turn-off to KOKODA. D. Coy 1 Pl. went forward
 Rations issued were ~~enikxxx~~ - portion of today's and 2 days Bully Beef, biscuits fruit, milk, salt, sugar. 1/4 Block of chocolate between 2 men. One emergency ration per man.

- 4 Nov 42 3rd Militia Bn.'s position occupied. Dropping commenced as unit moved out.
 Contd. Day has been very sunny and hot, and the troops were cooking flat out.
 1615 hrs - D. Coy forward followed by C. HQ A. and B Coys. Two streams
 were crossed flowing very swiftly - approximately 2 ft deep.
 1730 hrs. Village reached and we had our first contact with native villages
 who appeared friendly.
 1810 hrs. Bn camped for the night as darkness was falling.
 208 set sent back to village.
 Rained very heavily during the night.
- 5 Nov 42. 0730 hrs. 1st Coy moved off bearing approx. 150 degrees. Only native pad.
 Sigs reported they could receive from Bde but Bde could not receive them.
 Followed the track all day struck several deserted villages and gradens.
 1100 hrs. - In one deserted village five Australian bodies were found on
 stretchers - well decomposed. We buried them. They were the 2/16th and
 2/14 Bn lads.
 1700 hrs. Raining fairly heavily and camped the night at junction
 GORARI-ILIMO.
 Recce patrol from A. Coy went forward a 1000 yds and surprised three Japs
 in hut. The Japs were fired on think two were wounded. Jap mortar
 opened up from 200 yds further back and our lads returned.
 C.O. decided to send Pl patrol at first light to search area and gain inform-
 ation.
 It is his intention if possible to push on to ILIMA.
 Patrol under Lieut Blakiston went out and found enemy had gone.
 Tps are very tired and process slow. However are they going to keep going.
- 6 Nov 42. Sitnor.
 C.O.'s Conference.
 A. Coy to stay here and do offensive patrolling and protect L. of C.
 We are to get to ILIMO.
 Gave order march S.T. 0830.
 A. Coy to provide flank protection for us.
 0630 hrs - Patrol found. D. Coy went approximately 1500 yds along ILIMO
 track and found it clear.
 0745 hrs - Patrol of A. Coy went out to secure even further ahead until
 Bn moves through.
 A. Coy patrols towards GORARI again and struck Jap 300 yds further along
 the track. We lost no casualties.
 Unit moved off to ILIMA. Very slow going only native pad and enumerable
 creeks and river crossings to be made.
 Almost every village shows signs of having been ratted by the Japs.
 1230 hrs - One large stream met which took 3 hrs to get unit across.
 Half waded up to their necks, hanging to a creeper as the river was
 flowing very fast. Eventually Pnrs got a bridge across (WALLAPA).
 A track also found leading from WALLAPA to GORARI.
 1500 hrs - Orders received by runner to secure and hold vicinity of GORARI
 and ILIMA. Patrolling South, East and West with a view to subsequent contact
 with 2/2 or 2/3 Bn plus Uncle Sam who was apparently making satisfactory
 progress - Watch out for him. Runner sent back.
 1530 hrs. - Unit pushed on towards ILIMA. Pafe fairly good now but
 hold up numerous due to creeks.
 1630 hrs. - Our runner who has been sent back caught up with us and
 reported he had seen a Jap patrol on the other side of the river and he
 himself had been seen. Another runner sent back with a section from B. Coy
 to protect him to B. Echelon.
 Rain was now falling.
 1730 hrs. Halt was made for the night and estimated distance 2 mls
 from ILIMA.
 We are only rationed until tonight and C.O. is concerned about pushing
 further without knowing his L. of C. is secure and that rations will reach
 us. Night quiet. Halted at 072896.
- 7 Nov 42. 0600 hrs - Stand-to. Sitnor.
 0745 hrs. Patrols C. Coy sent out to recce country between here and
 ILIMA - their object was to find where ILIMA is - and to find where the
 Jap is;
 0800 hrs - D. Coy sent patrol back to WALLAPA and 200 yds beyond and 500
 yds on West of track.
 B. Coy has protective patrols forward.
 0830 hrs - CO's conference. Pointed out position as he estimates 2 mls
 from ILIMA.

8 Nov Contd. 1300 hrs. On quiet - Report from front 2/31 Bn held up. Considers enemy Bn there.
2/25 Bn passes through.
Some lentils issued today and the ~~laxx~~ tps are still able to light fires., and are buying Nigger Twist from the natives at sixpence per stick.
Anything does for cigarette papers, but matches are a problem. Tps are very tired and appreciate spell allowed by 25 Bde going through with the attack. Nothing further eventuated and tps settled down at the track junction.

9 Nov 42. 0600 hrs - Very heavy rain fell during the night. Sitnor. Almost impossible to keep water out and most tps are ringning wet this morning. Waiting all morning.
Piece of cake and two biscuits issued. PKs and tobacco and comforts.
1100 hrs - Word received that 2/33 Bn had reached main track and we were to move forward.
1145 hrs - Moved forward. Found 2/33 Bn had not reached main track but were behind the enemy. We are to move around the 2/33 Bn on towards ILIMO and secure and prepare a suitable dropping ground. Aircraft recognition signal received from 25 Bde.
1600 hrs. B. Coy fired on crossing creek, no casualties.
1645 hrs - Struck 2/33 Bn who had met opposition.
2/33 Bn estimated main track was very close and that it was an ASC dump Japs were holding.
C.O. decided to go East about 700 yds. and then turn North and strike the main track. A. Coy to make their way ahead and D. Coy to turn West and attack down the road approximately 500 yds East of an uncrossable river struck so followed North on the West side.
1745 hrs - 2/33 Bn reported Japs were withdrawing East. Apparently place was not GORARI and he did not know if the track was near.
1800 hrs - Continuing, on, firing came from our flank. Leading Pl. of A. Coy investigating movement ahead. When roadhead was formed one Pl. of B. Coy and the GR's under Lieut. Nathan were to recce Eastwards for likely dropping area as that was our task.
1830 hrs - A. Coy struck opposition and killed one Jap. Bivouac for the night. No rain fell during the day. Booby traps ~~xxx~~ at bridge and sigs were out during the night. Found we are on main BUNA Road.
Japs 5 dead 2 wounded.

10 Nov 42. ~~0630~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ No rain at night.
0630 hrs - Snipers active from East bank of river. Examination of Jap position reveals bags of rice, wheat, barrels fruit and medical stores.
Pl. C Coy trying to cross river but having trouble since 0620 hrs.
0745 hrs - D. Coy going forward - move down road. Enemy 23 mortaring these HQs. Quite heavy fire from in front. Dud ~~29~~ mortar fell in RAP
0830 hrs - D. Coy reported they struck Jap immediately after crossing road (North of it).
0930 hrs - Fighting still continues on D. Coy's front. 2/33 on our left flank on the track and report Jap appears to be attempting to get round South thus cutting our track and line of communications.
1100 hrs - C. Coy Across - One Pl. to make strength each side of creek crossing. Other Pl. to go across and work north up East bank of river with object of clearing East end of bridge and covering right flank of Bn position
1100 hrs - D. Coy reported has had 15 casualties. Unable to make progress. Are in 1/4 circle formation with right flank on North side of creek and left flank astride the track. 150 West of bridge Japs are holding high ground above and North West of him and the cleared bivouac area astride the track and West of D. Coy.

66.

Nov 42.
Contd .

Unit will remain here till 2 p.m. and if rations do not arrive then we will return to WALLAPA and 200 yds beyond and 500 yds on the left West track.

B. Coy has protective patrols forward.

0830 hrs. CO's Conference. Pointed out the position as he estimated it.

Approximately 2mls from ILIMO. Unit will remain till 2 p.m. here and if rations do not arrive then we will return to WALLAPA. Based on here we will drive up to GORARI.

If rations arrive, fresh plans will be made. C.O. is warned about inter-communication and feels he cannot go forward until he knows our line of communication is secure. Men are in an exhausted condition but still keen. Those not engaged on operational duties are washing and shaving, but very little sun penetrates into the jungle and it is difficult to get their gear dry. A great number are still suffering from diarrhoea.

1230 hrs - C Coy patrol reported in and said track continues to lead us.

C.O. then decided that as rations had not come to push back to A. Coy's area and attack that way and gave orders to move as far as the high ground. On the West side of the river crossed the night before. The First Coy to move at 1330 hrs.

1300 hrs. - Rations came but C.O. sent them back to the high ground. 1330 hrs - Unit commenced to move.

1630 hrs - All unit in position. Mail waiting and a change of rations. Sausages, jam, butter, baked beans, tinned vegetables, milk and sugar. The tps thought it was Christmas but the ration only made a small mouthful for them.

on
C.O. and Adj. have gone to B. Echelon.

Word received that Major Miller now Lt. Colonel and leaving us immediately.

Sitrep from Bde points out 2/2 and 2/3 Bns still engaged. Rain fell heavily during the night and everybody wet.

8 Nov 42.

0600 hrs - Sitnot.

0730 hrs - Advance to Lainey's Corner continued.

B.C. D. and HQ Coys.

0900 hrs - Our aircraft seen flying over and shortly afterwards bombing of enemy positions occurred.

Our tps are feeling stronger this morning. Bright sunshine in the clearing but no chance to dry anything. RAP has no Chlorodyne left.

1000 hrs - Arrived at the Junction and found the 25 Bde there.

C.O. has teed up an attack on the enemy holding up NAHU by pushing in C. and D. Coys. However 31 Bn. also arrived to do the same job thinking the 2/1 Bn had gone forward to ILIMO. We now came u/c 25 Bde temp. 25 Bde is to cut the track to ILIMO.

C.O. at present away seeing Brig. EATHER.

Attack hanging fire until position clear. Enemy is approximately 2000 yds down the track. Estimated

~~xxxxxxx~~ One Pl. Depth however unknown. A. Coy approximately 1500 yds down the track.

1100 hrs. 2/31 Bn under Colonel Miller moved down the track to attack. 2/31 Bn to take GORARI and hold it.

2/1 Bn to pass through, turn East along main track and pass on to ILIMO. Remainder of the 25 Bde turn West and attack OIVI feature from the rear.

1200/1300 hrs - S.A. fire and mortar fire can be heard from down the track.

65.

Nov 10 42.
Contd.

1230 hrs - C. Coy got bridge across and 1 Pl. crossed and moving North on East side of creek.
1345 hrs - 2/33 Bn report Jap pushing on his right flank Asks us to be ready.
Rain falling. Battle going on. Jap gun firing.
1530 hrs. - Battle quietened down. Our Casualties 6 Killed, 21 Wounded and 5 back in action.
Jap Casualties - 17.
D. Coy has been withdrawn South of road linking up with B. and A Coys.
1530 hrs - C. Coy Pl on EAST side of river-advanced 300 yds North but are held up. Killed 3 Japs and are securing our right flank.
1830 hrs - Quietening down and now quiet.
Rations arrive - 1 Tin of Bully and almost 1. pkt of biscuits a man. 1/4 block of chocolate, milk and salt.
kxkx

Nov 11 42.

0600 hrs.
Firing coming from D. Coy's front. No rain fell at night
D. Coy report that during the night Jap patrol came into D. Coys area near the main track at 1215 hrs. Driven off, since then intermittent fire on both sides. One man slightly wounded. Wounded man declares he bayoneted a Jap.
C.O. anticipates an attack on D. Coy., and has arranged that 2 pls of B. Coy counter attack from D. Coy's left flank. C. Coy completely move across the river.
Ratxk 0730 hrs. - Patrol of D. Coy move West, South of the road., and found Japs 50 yds to the west of it. One Jap casualty.
0900 hrs - All C Coy have crossed river, Burrell pushing forward to road to where Gosnell's Pl. is.
B. Coy patrol reached ~~at~~ 2/33 Bn and now going to contact 2/25 Bn.
Japs cut sig. wire on GORARI track. 2/25 Bn. state Jap escaping them did this.
1115 hrs - C. Coy attack went in. Very successful. 20 Japs Killed 4 Wounded.
1300 hrs - 2/25 Bn now came in to close the gap between us and the 2/33, and attack feature North of D. Coy. D. Coy reports area cleaning up. B. Coy sent across river to assist D. Coy. Patrol of C. Coy met further opposition 100 yds North and 200 yds East of track.
1400 hrs - 2 Pls of A. Coy sent North of creek on West side, thus securing the bridge.
1500 hrs - Area North of D. Coy now clear of enemy patrol reports. Main river only 100 yds from bridge. No sign of where or how Japs got away.
1530 hrs - B. Coy and one pl. of C. Coy trying to get rear of opposition C. Coy struck.
1600 hrs - Firing broke out again for a short period. D. Coy moved East up the track and astride the track.
1700 hrs - B. Coy held up by snipers. B. Coy going around on North side of track.
Two Coys of 2/31 going around south of enemy.
1730 hrs - B. Coy again making progress. From the noise of battle 2/31 must be coming in on top of enemy.
1800 hrs - Japs are retiring down the track. 2/31 and ourselves still attacking.
1815 hrs - Battle raging fiercely in the last ten minutes.
Japanese casualties 41 Killed, 1 prisoner.
Our Casualties 6 killed, 12 wounded, 1 Missing.
1840 hrs - Firng still going on, Hand grenades now quite numerous.
Apparently 2/31 got in behind Jap area as a number rushed East (some without rifles) into D. Coy who killed 15 and a further four into C. Coy who were killed. Hand to hand struggle with Cpl. Ryder. Ryder won. kx
No rain has fallen, night fine and quiet.

67.

Nov 12.

0600 hrs - Sitnor. Enemy appears to have gone. Fires cane be lit and all tps are flat out cooking breakfast.
 0900 hrs - C.O's Conference - Rain falling.
 Off. reposted.
 Major Baines 2 i/c. Capt. Catterns HQ Coy.
 Lieut. Lainey A. Coy. Lieut. Blakiston 2 i/c, Lieut. Murray.
 Capt. Prior B. Coy - Lieut. Powell 2 i/c.
 Capt. Burrell C. Coy - Lieut. Nathan 2 i/c.
 Capt Simpson - D. Coy - Lieut. Wiseman 2 i/c.
 GRs broken up - going into line Coys.
 Vickers being disbaned except for one section - who can man the gun.
 2/1 Bn remained u/c 25 Bde until KUMUSI river reached.
 Brigadier EATHER congratulates all ranks u/c.
 3 Emergency rations per man.
 Boots urgently required? sizes also.
 1000 hrs - Capt. Burrell returning after C.O's conference to Coy HQs found a Jap Officer whom he shot.
 Rain now stopped.
 Jap big gun found burried in many different places approximately 250 yds West of the track. It appears now that Japs escaped by crossing main river to the North as mules and horses have been found stranded on islands in the stream suggesting Japs crossing that way.
 Rain stopped about 1100 hrs. Tps bathing, shaving, cooking ~~xxxxxxxx~~ resting.
 Mail arrived.
 No rain at night.

Nov 13.

0600 hrs. Sitnor.
 Unit camped near clearing where dropping to commence today.
 Tps to pick up.
 Morning fine and sunny.
 A.A. Pl. burying Jap mules which have died.
 Pnrs. out doing repairs to creek crossing along the track.
 Air droppings have not eventuated.
 In the afternoon an issue of clothing. Boots, shirts, trousers, socks. Long American gaiters, tooth brushes, anti-gas capes and new ground sheets.
 1700 hrs. - Unit now reverts to 16 Bde.
 To move forward tomorrow morning D., C. HQ, B. and A.
 No rations have arrived and tps are only rationed until tonight. Day has been fine. Night also fine.

Nov. 14.

0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 Rations arrived for today. Bully and ~~many~~ biscuits only.
 Time of move delayed slightly ~~xxxx~~ to allow further rations to catch up before we move on.
 The 2 days' rest and cooking has done wonders for the ~~xxxx~~ tp who are ~~in~~ looking much better.
 0700 hrs. Following appointed A/Lieut. as from 10 Nov :-
 WO2 ~~McKxxxx~~ McLure, Sgts. Richie, Armstrong, Mavay and Owen.
 Another day's ration of Bully and biscuits drawn before leaving.
 0945 hrs - Unit commenced to follow 2/2 Bn. - Day very sunny and hot. - Track good about 6 ft. wide.
 25 Bde crossed WAIROPI with little opposition.
 Track gradually widens to approximately 15 ft. but numerous little creek crossings makes tp movement very slow.
 approaching WAIROPI track forms into a road which has been drained on both sides - Bde held up by KUMUSI river and unit campedcamped approximately 35 minutes west of it.
 Air droppings have been made here yesterday and today CO is trying hard to arrange for ations other than Bully and biscuits to be drawn.
 1800 hrs - Some milk and a little dried apples and a very small ration of sugar received.
 Heavy rain fell for a couple of hours just at dusk.
 No move to be made before 1000 hrs tomorrow.
 1730 hrs - Jap sighted close at hand but patrol from B. Coy fld to find him.

68.

Nov 15.

0600 hrs. Sitnor.
 Morning fine. Everybody cooking.
 1030 hrs - Mass held.
 1400 hrs - Unit commenced to move WAIROPI.
 1500 hrs - Reached dropping area 400 yds WEST of KUMUSI river.
 Rations picked up, biscuits, Bully beef, rice, fruit, salt, sugar.
 Rain fell for two hours.
 1 block of chocolate issued per man.
 Owing to difficulty in crossing unit had to camp at river.
 0600 hrs - Sitnor.

Nov 16. 0645-1st Coy moved down to move across.

Unit crossing held up and 1st Coy did not cross until after lunch.
 Air droppings during the morning.
 Tps resting and cooking.
 1500 hrs - D. A. and C. Coys have crossed. BHQ and HQ Coys followed.
 Flying Fox used to take tps across. One small ~~pk~~ one-pole bridge which was under water and it was necessary to hang on to ~~the~~ wire.
~~1730 hrs~~ Turn off to MUMUNI 500 yds North of bridge.
 1730 hrs - Rain commenced to fall and bivouac for night.
 Track fair - Quite a number of villages passed and numerous small hills to climb.
 Tps feeling benefit of rest - Camped on the track with big gardens overgrown on both sides.
 C. Coy 45 minutes back. B. Coy 2 hrs back. B. Echelon at the river.
 Tobacco issued - 2/3rds of an ons per man. and 1 papers one pkt between ~~3 men~~. 3 men.
 Sig Pl. acquire d a horse for gear, swam him across the river.

Nov 17.

0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 0730 hrs - Coys started to move at a quarter of an hour intervals.
 0800 hrs - Leading Coy met rear of 2/3 Bn.
 Going very slow during the morning and all Coys soon caught up.
 Track continues to go steadily up crossing numerous little streams. Approximately 70 men in the unit still suffering with Diaporrea.
 1220 to 1345 hrs - Lunch.
 Going slow as we are still held up by 2/3 Bn.
 Major Baines and Capt. Cox evacuated yesterday.
 Unit now ~~arranging~~ carrying on with C.O., ~~I.O.~~ I.O. and RMO. Being without 2 i/c, Adj. and Sig. Offr.
 Weather fine and hot. Sigs horse still going after having crossed some very difficult defiles.
 1630 hrs - Heavy rain began to fall.
 1700 hrs - Unit arrived at river ~~whex~~ West of ISEVITA.
 Held up here and orders received at 1725 hrs to stop for night. 200
 A village ~~200~~ yds back from village accomodated most of the unit.

Nov 18.

0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 0745 hrs - Coys Comdrs Conference.
 Bde objective - POPENDETTA.
 Japs seen at -
 Order of march, B. C. HQ A.D.
 0800 hrs - Coys started out 1/4 of hour intervals.
 Almost every 400~~x~~ yds a creek has to be crossed. Slowing up the advance.
 1200 hrs - 5 and a quarter hours from SANGI MISSION.
 Weather fine.
 Track from Mission improves and starts on gradual descent.
 1400 hrs - Had first glimpse of the sea. Good going until 1730 hrs. Not many creeks struck.
 Close right on 2/3 Bn.
 10 per cent of tps have tinea badly. 5 per cent Diaporrea with vomiting.

69.

Nov 18.
Contd.

hrs.
~~Annex~~ 1400 Contd.
Between 12 to 14 mls covered today.
1800 hrs. Rain commenced to fall heavily, and rained all night although lightly.
@ 2000 hrs - Bombing and A/A fire heard in the distance.

Nov 19.

0600 hrs - Sitnor.
Still raining slightly.
0730 Hrs - 2/3 Bn moved off.
0930 hrs - Leading Coy moved with 5 minutes gaps between Coys.
Rain fell all the morning.
1020 hrs - First signs of Jap occupation seen in huts which they have been using. Evidence of making themselves comfortable.
Apparently Standing Patrol guarding track to POPPENDETTA.
1030 hrs - POPPENDETTA reached and we struck main road.
Rain has made road very boggy.
1040 hrs - first signs of civilization seen in wire enclosure and two burnt out Chev. trucks.
1200 - 1300 hrs - Lunch.
Rain stopped at 1300 hrs.
1315 hrs - Truck from Bde passes. 2/3 Bn has just captured it one and half hours further ahead.
2/3 Bn came on four trucks (3 without batteries) and some Japs just sitting down to lunch. Japs shot.
Firing heard almost all morning from ahead.
2/3 Bn vanguard, 2/2 Bn, 2/1 Bn.
1330 hrs - Unit held up by 2/2 Bn in front.
Rations sent out at tea tonight and there will be no dropping at SOPUTA today as intended.
2/3 Bn were held up at SOPUTA.
1430 hrs. Unit moved up behind 2/3 bn to take up perimeter defensive position and camp for the night.
Some rations arrived - half a tin of bully, half a pkt of biscuits per man.
Lieut. Richie was wounded in both legs by stray bullet.
Night fine - also afternoon.

Nov 20.

0600 hrs - Sitnor.
1615 hrs - CO went forward with Bde Comdr. to 2/3 Bn.
Enemy gone.
0715 hrs - Coy Comdrs Conference - CO explained the 25 Bde had reached one mile from GONA and would come back along track. USA moving on BUNA. One Regt USA under cmd. 7 Div.
Order of march would be C. B. A. D. Start 0745 hrs.
2/3 Bn to go forward half hour and 2/1 Bn to pass through.
0745 hrs - Bn moved off.
0825 hrs. Bn passed 2/3 .
0845 hrs - Rifle fire heard from front.
One round of gun fire whistled overhead.
Four rounds of gun fire right in our area.
0845 hrs - CO went forward on recce. Decided to send two Coys A. and D. round wide on the left flank under Capt Catterns.
0930 hrs - Catterns set off.
Bde Comdr. Came forward and advised that B. Coy go around the flank.
1100 hrs. B. Coy passed through C. Coy.
1130 hrs - Gun fired 5 rounds. Bde had two killed two wounded.
1230 hrs - C. Coy - Lieut. McCloy and Prior making contact.
S.A. fire and grenades heard.
1410 hrs - 2 i/c B. Coy two pls were committed 800 yds forward C. Coys HQ opposite Jap front which ran East and West of B. Coy. Our casualties one killed and two wounded .
Weapons located 1 MMG - several LMGs.
12 Pl. now patrolling in endeavour to locate enemy right flank.

70.

Nov 20.
Contd.

1410 Contd.

Rang Lloyd 7 (1410) and advised him of Powell's report, and that in CO's opinion enemy's strength was considerable, having at least 2 mountain guns, two MMGs, one heavy mortar, several light mortars, and unknown of LMGs. In view of this CO was worried whether Catterns could obtain objective as mentioned in conferbation one hour previously.

Lloyd 7 said he would send Coy of 2/2 to help Catterns as soon as Americans arrived SOPUTA.

C.O. suggested a Bn should be sent around.

Lloyd 7 disagreed.

Our casualties in the area to date - 2 killed, 1 Offr.

~~9 prisoners~~ 9 ORs wounded.

~~1410 hrs~~ 1415 hrs - 3" mortar preparing to fire.

1430 hrs - 21 bombs fired.

Almost immediately the Japs replied with the gun.

1500 hrs - Japs fired 29 rounds at these Hqs. No casualties although shells burst all round.

1520 hrs - B. Coy reported that they required 2 stretcher parties, and that Coy was in a sticky position.

B. Coy Comdr now in, says Jap has 2" mortar and mountain gun in his position. Also reported our mortar fell among the Japs.

Hotchkiss

Jap also has ~~Hotchkiss~~ and LMGs .

Prior is 900 yds forward of Burrell.

A patrol from Prior moved around Japs and Prior considers as they were not fired on he is now getting around Jap flank.

Bde Comdr. has allotted 2 Coys of the 2/2 Bn to assist Prior.

1630 hrs - Two Coys moved up.

1600 hrs - Capt. Bosguard arrived and CO informed him he came under command, and that he was to go into Prior's area and endeavour to outflank Jap and drive him out of ~~his~~ his position.

1615 hrs - Information received Capt. ~~Bakney~~ Blamey to come u/c.

Informed Blamey he was to come U/c. Bosguard and would receive his orders from him.

1630 hrs - Capt. Prior led both Coys up - moving through shrub East of track.

1710 hrs - Burrell reported 2 Coys ~~repx~~ moving through him.

1645 hrs - Approximately 23 shells landed in this area. Cable cut for the third time, but communications re-established. No news yet of Catterns.

Over 100 shells fired by Japs during the day, which cut the line to Bde on several occasions, and places which our Sigs had to repair.

1835 hrs - Heavy fire heard some distance North - probably Catterns. Sigs reported their horse had been killed.

Night quiet and fine. No rations came up.

~~Total~~

Nov 21.

0630 hrs - Enemy reported to have gone. Both C. and D. Coys fired but fld to draw fire. Patrols from both Coys now gone forward. B

0730 hrs. - C. and ~~B.~~ Coys move forward in an attempt to contact Catterns.

C.O. advised if enemy gone on 21 Nov. 2/2 Bn would pass through us then 2/3 and 2/1.

Should 16 Bde not reach SANANANDA by the night of 21 Nov. USA Bn would pass through. Americans now at SOPUTA.

C. Coy moved forward approximately one hour when 2/2 Bn followed by 2/3 Bn passed through. B. Coy remained in Jap positions until 1200 hrs when they were to move forward.

1100 hrs - News received that Catterns' force was astride the track, approximately 4 mls North and contact with the Jap.

Two Coys of the 2/2 Bn were sent in an encircling movement around enemy's left flank.

Catterns reported Jap appeared to be trying to work around his left flank so another Coy of ~~Bn sent out to lengthen~~ flank.

71.

Nov 21.

1100 hrs Contd.

Catterns Reported he had 20 casualties so far.

1400 hrs - Unit moved right up onto rear of 2/3 Bn.

A report came that 25 Bde had again entered GONA and that Americans had commenced attacking BUNA with heavy air support at 0800 hrs this morning.

1530 hrs - Sgt. Pearce from D. Coy reported in and stated that Catterns force attacked approximately 1830 hrs the night before and had caught the Japs unprepared in their defensive positions near the track. Sgt. Pearce had been separated in the attack from his Coy and had spent the night in the Jap lines where he had been stalked and fired upon all night. On two occasions two parties of Japs of 2 and 3 respectively walked onto him and he had shot all five. During the day the airforce had bombed the Japs and according to squeals heard Sgt. Pearce considered bombs fell right among them. Owing to the Japs pulling back Sgt. Pearce had been able to get out and return. He considered that Catterns force had suffered heavy casualties.

CO received instructions if possible Catterns was to be relieved by B. Coy 2/3 Bn which would be ready from 1930 hrs onwards.

2/1 Bn to arrange guides.

2/1 Bn had run out a sign line to Catterns but nobody could be raised.

1730 hrs - Cpl Baker (stretcher bearer of A. Coy) returned to BHQ and stated he had two stretcher cases which he could now get out.

Stretcher parties arranged and sent forward.

These parties were fired on and did not get through. One man being wounded.

Other stretcher parties were arranged to go forward after dusk.

1900 hrs - Stretcher parties moved forward to report centre 400 yds from Catterns but heavy fire from in front and down the road held the party up. As soon as it was dark, stretcher parties with "I" Offr, Cpl. Cameron (~~Sigs~~) (Sigs as a guide and Lieut. Marvay) went forward to contact Catterns. Heavy rain had been falling but had now eased off.

Catterns contacted and was informed he was to be relieved and that wounded would be collected.

Catterns considered that position was not worth holding and went back to CO with I.O.

Collecting wounded was a difficult job as no one knew just where the wounded lay.

Stretcher bearers did a good job and wounded soon began to come out.

The road was covered by Catterns force and was used to bring the parties out.

As the last man came out heavy fire started, but no one was hit. Lightning made going difficult, and it showed up the track.

B. Coy 2/3 Bn moved up and Capt. Catterns guided them forward to a position in rear of Catterns' previous position, and on the right and level with another Coy of the 2/3 Bn which had been on the left rear of Catterns.

As B. Coy moved in enemy again opened up with heavy fire, but Coy got into position without loss.

Our casualties : 5 Officers killed, 25 ORs killed, 1 Officer wounded and 25 ORs.

Officers killed were / Capt. Simpson. Lieuts. Wiseman, Lainey, McLure, Owen. Wounded : Lieut. Hollingworth.

As the remainder of the force came out, C. Coy under Capt. Burrell had Bully Beef stew and hot milk waiting.

A cigarette issue of 14 per man had previously made, and the men received 20 each and were bedded down in some dry Jap huts. The morale of these men was splendid, they were glad to be out, and had nothing but praise for the Officers who had led them. They considered they had inflicted heavy casualties on the Jap, and seeing that they had cut the road the Jap had thrown his guns away as the only 15 Japs who came down the road were lying dead a short distance away.

(SEE APPENDICES A. and B. attached)

Nov 22.

0600 hrs. - Sitnor.
 0800 hrs - Americans moving through us - front appears quiet.
 0930 hrs - C. Coy warned to ready to move forward to fill gap between 2 Coys of 2/3 Bn if necessary. Remainder of A. and D. Coys amalgamated under Lieut. Balkiston. Bn strength now stands at :

Bn.HQ	4	and	22.
HQ Coy	2		56
A	"	2	13
B.	"	3	44
C.	"	5	45
D.	"	1	22

Totals -----
 17 202

1230 hrs - Co called fxxx Coy Comdrs Conference and explained that 1 Bn and a half of the Americans were going forward the remainder of the Regt. going East to BUNA track to assist their other Regt which had struck heavy opposition. Americans were to clear opposition before us and proceed along the track to SANANANDA while 16 Bde took the track approximately 2 mls South of S leading to CAPE KILLERTON. 2/1 Bn to be vanguard Bn and would move when opposition had been cleared.

C.O. decided owing to small numbers in Coys to amalgamate A. and B. Coys and C. and D. Coys under command Lieut. Prior and Capt. Burrell respectively.

More rations came up and men are now rationed to evening meal of 23 Nov. Bully, biscuits, milk sugar and apples.

~~Men are washing, bathing, shaving and resting.~~

Men are washing, bathing, shaving and resting. Everybody doing cooking.

1630 hrs - Padre Glover conducted an all^{de} nomination service among the trees at the rear of RAP. Day has turned out fine and sunny. American troops who have halted along the road have made friends with our tps, and all are cooking and eating together. Rain fell during the night but night was fairly quiet.

Right at dusk S.A. fire of some intensity was heard from in front.

1500 hrs - 75 m.m. gun found buried in rear of position taken by Catterns.

Nov 23.

0600 hrs - Sitnor.

Japs still in position and unit not moving - day fine.

1500 hrs - Reported JEEPS and 25 PDRS landed South of POPPENDETTA.

1600 hrs - JEEP passed through our lines.

1900 hrs - 2/25 Pdrs opened up from just rear of our positions.

Very heavy S.A. fire from in front.

No rain fell during the night. 25 Pdrs opened up during the night.

Nov 24.

0600 hrs-Sitnor.

0700 hrs - Coy Comdrs Conference.

C.O. explained that Japs were still in position and he did not expect to move today unless absolutely necessary it was anticipated that 16 Bde would not be pushed into any future action owing to the exhaustion etc. of the men. As the Japs had not moved 100 men of the 2/3 Bn were to make an outflanking move in an endeavour to get behind and harrass the enemy. Americans were only making very slow progress, having 2 Coys on the left and one on the right. 25 Bde have the Japs at GONA in 250 yds square with their backs to the sea. When GONA cleared up 25 Bde will move EAST to SANANANDA and thence South along road. It is known Jap front is half a mile wide, but depth is unknown. When the whole action is completed, Americans will garrison the coast and 16 Bde is to be withdrawn to POPPENDETTA.

Americans on the right flank were still held up.

C.O. was concerned that men were not reporting to RMO with their

73.

Nov 24.
Contd.

met for treatment, and ordered a foot inspection to be carried out. Men are suffering with some complaint which is taking the skin off them - looking like ringworms. Almost all men are suffering with ~~diarrhoea~~ diarrhoea. At every opportunity is assisting other Battalions with stretcher and carrying parties and yesterday the Pns built a bridge for 2/2 Bn.

0800 hrs - Planes are overhead - Fighters and Bombers, and the concussion of heavy bombs can be felt.

Bde called for our 3" mortar to be taken forward in preparation for a shoot.

1100 hrs - bombing ceased.

3" mortar fired ~~ix~~ seven rounds of smoke as indication of target for 25 pdrs. and then 5 H.E.

1300 hrs - 25 Pdrs opened up with several shells and fired again later in the afternoon.

One Pl. of C. Coy sent back to guard the guns.

1700 hrs - 1 Pl. of C. Coy sent forward to lengthen the left flank of 2/2 Bn. Coys opposing the enemy.

Light rain fell during the night.

Another mortar detachment and mortar arrived brought up by plane.

Adj. arrived back.

Nov 25.

0600 hrs - Sitnor.

Enemy still in position.

0745 hrs - Mortar detachment went forward to Bde to do the shoot. 45 H.E. fired.

2/2 Bn reported shoot very effective.

1430 hrs - Americans firing mortars - some dropped short in 2/2 Bn area causing some casualties.

Approximately 100 letters came in today. Tobacco issue, one ~~ozs~~ a pkt of 20 cigarettes ~~xxxxx~~pkt of papers, and one box of matches.

Fine again ~~ng~~ today.

Warning order received that Two recce patrols would probably be needed tomorrow, each of One Offr and 12 ORs.

Officers chosen Lieuts. Murray and Powell.

Officers to go to Bde at 0615 hrs - Patrols ready to move at 0730 hrs., having 4 days' rations.

Night fine.

Nov 26.

Orders from Brigadier Lloyd to Lieuts Powell and Murray for recce patrol to coast North of SANANANDA.

Present/ Brigade Comd r.

b Co.

Adj..

Lieuts Powell and Murray.

Bde I.O.

Bde Sig. Offr.

Place Bde HQ

Time 0630 hrs.

Information - Probable intention of Div. Comdr. to send ~~Bde~~ 21 Bde to coast North of SANANANDA along ~~the~~ route about 1000 yds to one mile West of SANANANDA track.

Task Recce of possible routes for 21 Bde to coast near SANANANDA.

Method Route out - West through Fairbrother 750 yds from SANANANDA track, thence North or slightly East of North to point about one mile from the coast. From there Murray patrol straight on to coast and Powell patrol East to SANANANDA track.
Time out - 0730 hrs 26 Nov 42.
Expected duration of patrol 3 to 4 days.
Route out if suitable and where possible to be marked by ~~marks~~ by patrol on trees etc. Turn back not later than 28 Nov 42.

Administration - Rations. Four hard and 3 days' emergency.

Tools - Matchetes and 2 shovels each.

Communications - Runners from patrols bi-daily with rough trace giving distances, times, bearings etc.

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Nov 26. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 0615 hrs - Orders for patrol to proceed.
 0845 hrs - Patrols left.
 Americans put in heavy mortar barrage during the morning.
 1500 hrs - Runners reported from patrols Murray and Powell.
 At 1130 hrs patrol had covered 1500 yds.
 Day fine and hot.
 2000 hrs - Mail sent up - only a small ~~lot~~ lot.

Nov 27. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 0700 hrs - Rain commenced falling for almost 2 hrs.
 1000 hrs - 25 pdrs opened up with several shells.
 Jap replied with his 75 m.m. gun.
 Day becoming hot and steamy.
 1430 hrs - Lieut. Dyer and 25 ORs reported to 2/2 Bn to go out on patrol. (1) To recce and if possible find a suspected Jap dump East of road. (2) To find the track leading to the dump and ambush Jap parties. Patrol to be back Nov 28.
 1550 hrs - Runner from Lieut. Powell patrol reported in. He had left patrol 0745 hrs this morning - patrol had covered 2300 yds North and had found going difficult. No Japs encountered.
 1630 hrs - Jap planes flying over area - no bombing or strafing, however.
 Bombed back areas, causing some casualties.
 Mosquitoes are very bad here and also a lot of tps are being evacuated with Typhus Fever.

Nov 28. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 Night again fine.
 Mail arrived and distributed early. Also a copy of paper "Guinea Gold".
 0800 hrs - Sgt. Maddigan with mortar detach. went forward to 2/2 Bn ~~wxthx~~ for a shoot.
 Adj. left for B. Echelon area, approximately one mile south along the river where it is hoped to establish a rest camp for tps not sufficiently ill to be admitted to ~~ADMx~~ ADS.
 S/Sgt. Miller in charge - 2 Cooks and 1 Medical Orderly.
 1005 hrs - 25 pdrs opened up at long range. Almost immediately enemy gun opened up but only fired 3 or 4 rounds. Our mortars commenced firing and a heavy barrage put down all morning.
 2/1 Bn mortar fired 59 rounds.
 1130 hrs - Patrol under Lieut. Dyer reported in. Did not find the dump but found a big Jap area and took a prisoner. Made no other contact and had no casualties.
 1230 hrs - Runner from Powell's patrol reported. Struck very bad going and had to retrace some of their steps. Going then improved but extremely slow.
 Small amount of mail arrived.
 Our casualties to date/

	Officers	ORs.	Total
Officexx Killed .. 8	ORxx .. 83.	Total .. 91.	
Wounded . 8	ORx ..164.	Total ..172.	
Grand Total ...16	ORxxx .247		263.

Afternoon has been very quiet - Sun out and very hot. No rain day or night.

Nov 29. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 Japs still in position.
 1030 hrs - 3" mortar shooting another 50 bombs.
 21 and 25 Bdes attacking this morning on GONA front.
 Americans on this front tomorrow and 21 Bde to push East at the same time.
 Day fine and hot.
 1125 hrs - Lieuts Powell and Murray reported in. Had had no casualties and contacted no enemy.
 1210/20 hrs - Arty firing on GONA area apparently precedent to attack.
 1310/20 hrs - Arty registering on enemy positions on our right flank for tomorrow's attack.
 1400 hrs - Reported on our 3" mortars fell right in target area this morning.

- Nov 29. 1400 Contd.
Rest camp came into operation during the morning. Two Offrs
13 ORs going there.
16 evacuations were made beyond RAP for the day.
Day and night fine.
- Nov 30. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
0615 hrs - Rations on a new scale arrived including cigarettes
~~xxxxxxx~~. matches and soap. Also bag of mail.
0610/20 hrs - Arty opened up on GONA area.
0630 hrs - Jap gun firing on forward position.
0640 hrs - Coy Comdrs Conference called. C.O. explained
Americans would attack this morning at 0900 hrs and unit was
to remain in a state of preparedness all day. Coys sending out
small local patrols in case the Jap made a bolt for it, and some
broke through the attackers as happened at GORARI.
If attack successful unit will start pulling out tomorrow.
Our mortar in position to assist attack - 4 mortars of 16 Bde will
fire.
0700 hrs - Jap gun having duel with our 25 pdrs.
Jap shells falling far too short though.
Our mortar fired 48 rounds.
Ration issue included M. & V., Sausages, baked beans,
dehydrated potatoes, dried fruit, sugar, milk, salmon, bully beef,
ride, biscuits, matches ~~and~~ soap and cigarettes.
0845 hrs - Arty and mortars opened up.
0900/10 hrs - Attack started. S.A. fire heard from left and
front. All appears quiet.
1130 hrs - Reported Americans have advanced 400 yds and advance
continuing.
1530 hrs - Three ZEROs flying around, no straffing, everything
remains quiet except for a burst of small arms fire about
1430 hrs. Reports indicate Jap has withdrawn. All ~~is~~ quiet
during the afternoon - 7 evacuations today.
1900 hrs - CO's Conference.
Americans have cut track - 3 truck loads of Japs have got
through. Unable to stop them but were fired on.
16 Bde to be ready to move forward to a better defensive position
when Americans move North to coast. 2/1 Bn to be vanguard and
would be on half an hour's notice to move as from 1st Dec.
B. Coy, BHQ, HQ Coy and C. Coy -
Day and night fine and hot.
More mail arrived.
Rations in the same scale as day before plus a little butter
~~xxxxxx~~ and jam.
- Dec. 1. 0600 hrs - Arty woke us up putting over 100 shells at extreme
range.
More mail arrived.
0915 hrs - Mortar Sgt. reported that 2 of the 16 Bde mortars
had just finished firing 91 rounds. Jap is still there as he
could hear them talking.
1400 hrs - Pl. under Lieut, Gosnell detached to 2/2 Bn
now relieved by Pl. under Lieut. Dyer owing to 13 out of 19 men
being ill.
Americans reported to be making progress and captured 3 trucks.
Progress very slow. Day and night fine.
Arty firing very heavy during the night. Rations still on good
scale.
Evacuations - Two.
Commissions - Three, Seaton, Isherwood and Andrews.
- Dec 2. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
Japs still in position.
CO is ill and being kept at RAP.
0800 hrs - Adj. called to Bde and orders received to move back
to 25 pdrs to act as ~~xxxx~~ protection.
1115 hrs - Unit in new position around gun's. Position same as
that in which Bn fought last action.
Mail arrives.
Day fine and hot. Water here very poor.

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Dec. 2.

Dec 21.

1200 hrs - Lieut. Simpson arrived by plane. Sent up in mistake for an officer of 2/1 Fd Regt. Posted to C. Coy as Mr. Nathan gone to rest camp. Rations on the good scale including slab of chocolate. 2 ozs of tobacco, box of matches and ~~xxxxxx~~ pkt of papers. Evacuations - 17 during day.

Dec 3.

Arty shelling during the night - light rain also fell. 0600 hrs - Sitnor. Position unchanged. 1000 hrs - Rain fell again for 2 hrs. CO improving. Tps are benefiting by spell and good food. Rations are plentiful. Diarrhea. Also sores which refuse to heal. Slightest scratch turns into a sore. Evacuations - 9. Bn strength - 183 all ranks. Arty did two shoots during the night.

Dec 4.

~~Sitnor~~ 0600 hrs - Sitnor. Japs still in position. Copies of paper "Guinea Gold" have been received regularly over the last week. Papers are greatly appreciated by tps as they are kept up to date with outside news.

CASUALTIES TO DATE.

	<u>officers</u>	<u>ORs</u>
KIA	6	69
Missing believed		
killed	2	11
wounded in action	8	164
Drowned		1
Missing		2
Missing believed		
illegally absent		3
Deserted		4
Evacuated sick ..	14	257
TOTAL	30	511

Unit left Base area with 598 all ranks.

Evacuations - 11.
C.O. still in RAP.
Arty registering on the wreck and on targets for an attack by Americans tomorrow.
Americans now under command of 16 Bde.
25 Bde relieved today and concentrated in SOPUTA area.
Two Coys of 30 Bde are also in SOPUTA.
Arty firing during the night. Rain fell during the night.
Plenty of our planes around.

Dec 5.

0600 hrs - Sitnor. Japs still there.
0715 hrs - Arty putting down barrage for Americans to attack at 0730 hrs.
L. Coy on the ~~xxxx~~ right flank to attack 0730 hrs.
K. Coy on the left flank to move South one hour and then attack South East to the track. Both Coys to consolidate and to patrol North to I. Coy astride the track. ~~xxxxxxx~~
1700 hrs - L. Coy reported attack complete failure. 50 casualties and Coy back in original position.
Rations are only bully and biscuits, milk, sugar, cheese and apples.
1800 hrs - Adj. called to Bde. Informed Bde will be relieved by 30 Bde commencing Dec 6. 2/2 2/3 and Bde HQ will be withdrawn Dec 6 to SOPUTA.
2/1 Bn to remain in present position for day or two and then move to SOPUTA. Bde will be flown out.
Americans to be withdrawn and reorganised. 30 Bde to take over. K. Coy attack also failure. 3 casualties Coy went to ground and remained there.
Our evacuations - 1 Offr 14 ORs.
Strength of all ranks - 157.
Day - hot and dry.

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DEC 6. 0600 hrs - Sitnor. Rain fell during the night.
 1320 hrs - 15 Jap Bombers escorted by Fighters passed over heading South. They disappeared from view and immediately re-appeared and headed North again. Bombs dropped at POPPENDETTA drome. No damage - bombs fell wide.
 1530 hrs - 3 ozs, tobacco, pkt papers and matches per man. Bully and biscuits again, C.O. still in RAP. Rain fell during the night.
 Evacuations 13.
 Marched in - 2.

Dec 7. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 0945 hrs - 49 Bn to attack up same track as Americans fld. Arty opened up a barrage.
 1000 hrs - Advance commenced.
 A and C Coys to advance on right of track and exploit to 900 yds. B and D Coys to move in reserve.
 A and C reached 800 yds and were in contact with 2/2 Coys on right flank.
 B and D struck opposition. B got held up but D pushed around but returned with BHQ to where B was held up. Casualties approximately 70.
 30 Bde Major was killed. Bde I.O. wounded.
 1200 hrs. - Saw first dog fight in ~~rxix~~ the air and then Jap plane crashed in flames towards GONA.
 1515 hrs. Two Coys of the 55/53 Bn to attack on either side of main track. Very heavy fire met. No results known but doubtful if they could get through.
 American rations issued to us to day.
 Day and night fine.
 CO still at RAP.
 Evacuations - 6.
 55/53 Bn gained about 100/150 ydws. but were held up.
 132 wounded for Bde.

Dec 8. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 Day commences very fine. Re-organisation of front line tps of 30 Bde to take place.
 Also harrassing fire with the m rtars.
 21 Bde hope to clean up GONA area during the day.
 1330 hrs - Arty opened up on GONA. X
 No word yet of our relief.
 American rations again today, but no supplementary except a block of chocolate.
 Two more lads from hospital rejoined us, but fever still claiming more victims.
 Day hot and fine.
 1800 hrs - 2 pndr Anti/tank gun seen being takne forward.
 Evacuations - 8 during day.

Dec 9. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 Night fine.
 Programme for today. is further harrassing and air bombing.
 1100 hrs - Planes bombed and strafed.
 Day fine.
 Mail arrived as late as 29 Nov.
 Adj. admittd to RAP.
 1600 hrs - Lieut. Dyer returned Pl. with 2/2 Bn being relieved by Lieut. Simpson and Pl. from B. Coy.
 No sign yet of relief of Bn.
 MDS returning patients (sick as they are) unable to cope with same.
 Bn again re-organised. BHQ, HQ Group and 1 Coy under Capt. Prior.
 1800 hrs - News received that GONA fell during the afternoon.
 Heavy rain fell for short period during the night.
 Australian mixed rations - tinned fruit included.

Dec. 10. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
 Arty moved guns from Kunai onto edge of timber.
 B. Coy position altered.
 0900 hrs - 2/3 Bn passed through to relieve 2/2 Bn.
 Day fine and dry. Good rations again.
 Reported that Japanese killed at GONA very heavy.

Dec 5. K. Coy. 1st Battalion King's Own Australian Light Infantry
Contd.

0800 hrs - 5/3 BU - 1st Battalion King's Own Australian Light Infantry
B* Coy. 1st Battalion King's Own Australian Light Infantry
Village of ...

Dec 10. 0900 hrs - Signal.

...
1800 hrs - ...
1900 hrs - ...
2000 hrs - ...

Dec 8. 0900 hrs - Signal.

...
1800 hrs - ...
1900 hrs - ...
2000 hrs - ...

Dec 9. 0900 hrs - Signal.

...
1800 hrs - ...
1900 hrs - ...
2000 hrs - ...

Dec 11. 0900 hrs - Signal.

...
1800 hrs - ...
1900 hrs - ...
2000 hrs - ...

Dec 12. 0900 hrs - Signal.

Dec 10 Strength of Bn - 126 all ranks.
Contd. Rest Camp broke up.

Dec 11. 0600 hrs - Sitnor.
0900/1000 hrs - Rain fell. Day fine following.
Reported 638 Japs buried at GONA area. Also 25 Bde flying out.
Ration of bread arrived i.e. one third of a loaf per man, first
since 6 Oct.

Dec 12. Rain fell very heavily during the night.
0600 hrs - Sitnor.
Day becoming fine.
Reported 1200 Japs now in this area.
Strength - 112 all ranks.
Mosquito nets received.

DEC 13. Mail received - Day fine - otherwise sitnor.

EXPLANATORY NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER'S DIARY.

- 6 OCT 42. "C" Coy. were one day behind Bn owing to their having left JAWAREHE one day later. This was caused by them having advanced up the out-flanking track to NAURU five hours' march beyond NIGUBAIFA (See September War Diary).
- 8 OCT 42. The camp referred to was two miles along the track past NAURU.
- 9 OCT 42. Extra 2" and 3" mortar ammunition was drawn here from the A.S.C. Dump, and had to be carried by the men as native carriers were fully loaded. This was the ammunition which blew up prematurely at EORA CREEK.
- 13 OCT 42. This was at MENARI. The bridge referred to had previously been demolished by the JAPS when retiring, and they had also blown up the cliff face. This was one of the few instances of JAP withdrawal demolitions.
- 20 OCT 42. "CAMERON" 3rd. Aust. Inf. Bn was not thrown back, but the JAP attack was (sketch of TEMPLETON'S CROSSING position is attached). The code names used in the diary are as follows :-
- | | |
|--------------|-------|
| BHQ | LOKU. |
| A. COY | PIHA |
| B. COY | NAHU |
| C. COY | WORA |
| D. COY | VAVU |
| HQ COY | |
- 22 OCT 42. "D" Coy. were sent out on orders from 16 Bdet o outflank EORA CREEK village in an endeavour to get to ALOLA. There was nothing known about tracks, only that EORA CREEK was a likely place for enemy ambush or holding position. This information proved to be correct, but "D" Coy. had only rations for two days' plus emergency rations for three days. Though they reached within two miles of ALOLA shortage of rations prevented them from carrying out their role effectively.
- 23 OCT 42. The night 22/23 OCT. was bright moonlight, which lasted until 5 o'clock. It was this moonlight which enabled the C.O. and Adj. to do a recce, and eventually enabled "C" Coy to move down into position.
- 24 OCT 42. The MMG destroyed by mortar fire was our own Vickers Gun.
- 26 OCT 42. The reports by Capt. Simpson and Lieut. Blakiston cannot be located.
- 4 NOV 42. The 3rd. Militia Bn occupied our position not vice versa.
- 5 NOV 42. The village where bodies were found was SENGIA.
- 7 NOV 42. The estimate that we were two miles from ILIMO was incorrect, and it is now considered that we were then two mls from ASASI. The track to ILIMO was unused and had been missed.
- 10 NOV 42. The barrels of fruit were plums in brine and could not be eaten. Attached is a statement of rations received during the last 10 days. The shortage indicates the reason for the men's poor physical condition.
- 21 NOV 42. Lieut. McCloy was in command of the large stretcher party which brought out Catterns' force stretcher cases.