

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/2/20

20 Infantry Brigade

June 1944

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C 2110⁸
(adapted.)

Page 1

Unit HQ 20 AUST INF BDE

Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44 To 30 Jun 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	1 Jun		Brig WINDEYER visited Div HQ in the morning. In the afternoon accompanied by Capt MAUGHAN, the Bde Comd went to 2/15 Bn where he watched instruction at the weapon trg cadre, after which he went to 2/17 Bn	
	2 Jun		Lt-Col BARHAM (G 1 9 Aust Div) visited Brig WINDEYER and discussed with him (a) alterations in the Div trg programme (b) the writing of a pamphlet on jungle warfare, parts of which are to be written by this bde.	
		1700	Brig WINDEYER (accompanied by Capts GLASGOW and MAUGHAN) visited 2/13 Bn	
			A large draft of reinforcements (341) was received to-day by 2/15 Bn, all from 62 Aust Inf Bn which has been broken up. It is the C-in-C's policy with respect to these reinforcements that in the transfer individuals who had been associated together by being in the same section or sub-unit should as far as possible not be separated. The policy is being carried out generally by posting each reinforcement to that sub-unit in 2/15 Bn which corresponds to the sub-unit of 62 Aust Inf Bn from which he came.	
	3 Jun	0900	Lt RYAN (LO 111), who has been made responsible for co-ordinating the training of Bn Pnr pls held a conference attended by the three Bn Pnr pl comds, 3 offrs of 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn and offrs of RAE 9 Aust Div at which it was arranged that Bn Pnr personnel should receive trg from 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn under engineer supervision	
		1100	Brig WINDEYER and Capt MAUGHAN visited 2/15 and 2/17 Bns. At 2/15 Bn the Bde Comd met Col NORTH (Queensland L of C)	<i>[Signature]</i>

25 OCT 1944

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Page 2

Army Form C. 211c
(adapted.)

Unit HQ 20 AUST INF BDE

Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44 To 30 Jun 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	3 Jun (cont)	1500	Brig PORTER (Comd 24 Aust Inf Bde) called	
		1530	Adjnt of 62 Aust Inf Bn (Capt ROSE) called at Bde HQ and then went to 2/15 Bn where he will assist in compiling the records of the draft which joined the unit yesterday.	
		1600	Brig WINDEYER and Capt GLASGOW (A/SG) visited 24 Aust Inf Bde where the Bde Comd interviewed offr's of 62 Aust Inf Bde who are to be posted to units of 9 Aust Div including units of this Brigade.	
			To-day 3 of the NCOs of 6 Aust Div attached to the Brigade (two of whom had previously been instructing at 2/8 Aust Fd Amb and one at 2/13 Aust Inf Bn) were sent to 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn to assist in their inf trg	
	4 Jun		Lt-Col SHAVE (G I 1 Aust Corps) called at Bde HQ	
	5 Jun		Heretofore the Bns have been largely engaged in camp construction work. This morning full time trg commences in all units. From now on only the minimum number of troops required for camp duties will be allowed in the camp	
		1400	Brig WINDEYER conferred with the three Bn Comds	
		2230	Maj HILL (HM) returned to Bde HQ from LHQ School of Arty (TKA Wing)	
	6 Jun	0900	Lt-Col COLVIN called to see the Bde Comd	
		1020	Lt-Col OUTRIDGE (CO 2/8 Aust Fd Amb) was visited this HQ	<i>Outridge</i>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Page 3

Army Form C. 211R
(adapted.)

Unit HQ 20 AUST INF BDE Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44 To 30 Jun 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	6 Jun (cont)		42 reinforcements (mainly NCOs ex 62 Aust Inf Bn) marched into 2/15 Aust Inf Bn	
	7 Jun		This morning Lt-Col COLVIN and Lt-Col BROADBENT called and saw the Bde Comd	
			8 OR from the pnr pl of each Bn went to 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn for trg	
		1330	The Bde Comd conferred with Lt-Col GRACE Capt TIMSON (IO 7 Aust Inf Bde) called to see Bde IO	
		1400	A lecture on the fitting of boots was given at Bde HQ to RMOs, QMs, RQMSs and CQMSs of the Bns by a visiting Ordnance Officer <i>by Maj HIRSCHFELDT (AAMC, 2/2 AGH)</i>	
		1400	Brig WINDEYER visited 2/17 Aust Inf Bn to inspect their trg	
	8 Jun		Capt MAUGHAN (IO) visited 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn to discuss Intelligence trg in that unit. Offrs from units of the bde attended a preview of trg films at Div HQ to select films for trg use by the Bns.	
			To-day Capt LECKY, after a period of illness following on leave, marched into HQ 9 Aust Div. Capt LECKY will take up an appointment at Div HQ after having served as OC "J" Sec Sigs (which later became 20 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec) on this HQ since Jul 1941	
	9 Jul	1020	Maj-Gen WOOTTEN (GOC 9 Aust Div) visited Brig WINDEYER at Bde HQ	
		1200	Capt LECKY paid a visit to Bde HQ	<i>[Signature]</i>
			To-day 2/13 Bn received a draft of 5 offrs and 126 OR reinforcements	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Page 4

Army Form C. 2118.
(adapted.)

Unit HQ 20 AUST INF BDE

Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44

To 30 Jun 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	10 Jun	0830	Capt MAUGHAN and the IOs or acting IOs of the Bns attended the first of a series of conferences of all IOs of the Division held by Capt PEARCE (G III I 9 Aust Div) at 2/23 Aust Inf Bn	
			Capt E TAIT WILLS marched into Bde HQ and will take up the appointment of SC	
	11 Jun		The usual combined bde Church Parade on 2/17 Bn parade ground. After the service, the troops marched past the Bde Comd who took the salute.	
			Lt BARWICK (2IC Bde Sig Sec) marched in ex leave and hospital	
			Lt POLLOCK relinquished duty as assistant IO and returned to 2/17 Bn	
	12 Jun	0900	The Bde Comd attended a Bn parade at 2/15 Bn, accompanied by Maj HILL (HM). In an address to the Bn the Bde Comd said that in his opinion there was no better form of service to the country than in an Inf Bn	<i>than</i> 1
		1400	Brig WINDEYER left for AHERTON to attend a conference convened by Lt-Gen STURDEE (Comd First Aust Army) to consider the Suppression of Tropical Diseases (see Appx)	
		1800	Capt JENSEN (SC(L)) left on 14 days special leave	
	13 Jun	1400	Capt MAUGHAN (IO) went to 2/13 Aust Inf Bn trg area to observe fd sketching exercise by Int Sec.	
		2200	Brig WINDEYER returned	<i>Just</i>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Page 5

Army Form C. 2118.
(adapted.)

Unit HQ 20 AUST INF BDE Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44 To 30 Jun 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	14 Jun		This morning Bde Pnr Pl personnel who had been trg with 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn returned to their units.	
		1000	The Bde comd called a conference of the COs and Adjts of ^{the} three Bns at which he spoke of the importance of enforcing all possible measures to suppress tropical diseases, particularly malaria. The Bde Comd stressed the necessity of getting all tps to believe in the proved efficiency of Atebrin for suppressing malaria	
		1400	Capt WORTHLEY (EM(L)) returned from hospital	
		1700	Capt BEIRNE (HQ 3 Aust Div) visited Bde HQ	
	15 Jun		To-day all offr (except duty offr) and the majority of the NCOs of the Bde attended a course of lectures on tropical hygiene delivered at the Camp Cinema under Div arrangements	
			In the morning lectures were given on Malaria and Dengue Control (Major ENGLISH) and the Control of Intestinal Diseases and Scrub Typhus (Maj COCK), and in the afternoon the Suppression of Malaria with ATEBRIN (Brig FAIRLEY)	
		1700	Maj HALLIDAY called on Brig WINDEYER	
	16 Jun	0900	Brig WINDEYER saw Lt ASH	
			Later Brig WINDEYER conferred with Padre BEGBEE (Senior C of E Chaplain HQ 9 Aust Div) on ways of improving the singing at Church Parades.	
	17 Jun	0900	Brig WINDEYER, accompanied by Maj HILL, attended a Bn parade at 2/13 Bn and addressed the Bn	<i>[Signature]</i>

L.

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Page 6

Army Form C. 2118.
(adapted.)

Unit HQ 20 AUST INF BDE

Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44 To 30 Jun 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	17 Jun (cont)		In the evening Brig WINDEYER and Maj HILL attended the official opening of 2/15 Bn O ffrs' Mess	
	18 Jun	0930	A combined church parade held on 2/13 Bn parade ground was taken by Padre BEGBIE (Senior C of E Chaplain 9 Aust Div)	
		1100	After the parade the Bde Comd held a conference attended by Lt-Col COLVIN, Lt-Col GRACE and Lt-Col BROADBENT to discuss the tactical doctrine and terminology to be adopted in Bde trg in the employment of the various components, -riflemen, Bren gunners etc., of Inf Sec	
		1230	A message was received from Div to inform the Bde Comd that he would be required to assist at an exercise conducted by 1 Aust Corps Combined Ops Gp for trg of 2 Aust Beach Gp	
			Maj JONES (LO 1 9 Aust Div) called	
	19 Jun	1030	Maj LECKY (Sigs 9 Aust Div) called	
		1100	Lt-Col BARHAM (G1 9 Aust Div) called and saw Brig Windeyer	
		1130	Capt MITCHELL visited this HQ in reference to the waterproofing of signal equipment	
			In the afternoon Lt-Col GODSALL (1 Aust Corps Combined Ops Gp) arrived. Lt-Col GODSALL will stay at Bde HQ to make arrangements for the participation by the Bde Comd in the projected amphibious ops exercise	
			Lt-Col MORGAN (AA & QMG) visited Brig WINDEYER	
			Capt GIOVANELLI was evacuated.	

[Handwritten signature]

L.

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

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Unit.....HQ 20 AUST INF BDE.....

Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44.....

To 30 Jun 44.....

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	20 Jun	1445	<p>Gen BLAMEY (C-in-C Allied Land Forces) accompanied by Lt-Gen STURDEE (GOC First Aust Army) Lt-Gen BERRYMAN (GOC 1 Aust Corps) and Maj-Gen WOOTTEN made a brief visit to the Bde. The C-in-C met the Bde Comd and the Bn Comds and then visited 2/13 and 2/15 Bns. He apologised for being unable through lack of time to visit 2/17 Bn.</p>	
		1700	<p>Capt MAUGHAN (IO) was evacuated.</p>	<i>D. W. [signature]</i>

L.

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Page 8

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

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Unit HQ 20 AUST INF BDE

Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44 To 30 Jun 44

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	21 Jun	1130	Brig WELLS (BGS 1 Aust Corps) arrived at Bde HQ and had a conference with Brig WINDEYER. In the afternoon he visited the three bns accompanied by the Bde Comd.	
		1400	IOs and Acting IOs of 2/13, 2/15, 2/17 Aust Inf Bns and 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn attended a conference at Bde HQ presided over by Capt WORTHLEY (EM(L)) which was held to discuss the standardisation of patrol reports and the equipment of intelligence sections for tropical warfare.	
		1600	Brig WINDEYER accompanied by Capt GLASGOW visited 2/17 Bn.	
	22 Jun	1500	Brig WINDEYER accompanied by Capt WORTHLEY (EM(L)) and Maj PIKE (2/17 Bn) visited the jungle trg assault courses of 2/17 Bn.	
	23 Jun	1200	Col MAITLAND (ADMS 1 Aust Corps) and Col HANSON (ADMS 9 Aust Div) attended at Bde HQ a conference held by the Bde Comd to discuss medical aspects of operations in countries where the population is infected with Cholera.	
			Padre BYRNE (RC Chaplain att to 2/15 Bn) relinquished duty with this Bde and left for 9 Aust Div where he will become senior Chaplain. Padre BYRNE has served with this bde as its only Roman Catholic Chaplain since 21 Apr 42 when he was posted as padre to 2/17 Bn. He remained with that battalion until June of this year when he was posted to 2/15 Bn.	
	24 Jun		This morning Capt WORTHLEY (EM(L)) left to attend an exercise in amphibious operations to be held at KURANDA by 1 Aust Corps Beach Gp.	
		1430	Brig WINDEYER went to Div HQ.	<i>John M...</i>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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Page 9

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde

Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44 To 30 Jun 44

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	25 Jun	0930	A combined bde Church of England Church Parade was held on the 2/13 Bn parade ground. The service was conducted by Maj Gen RILEY (SCF)	
		1000	Lt BARWICK with a party of signallers left to attend the exercise at KURANDA	
		1400	Brig WINDEYER left for KURANDA (Lt-Col BROADBENT (CO 2/17 Bn) will also attend the exercise.	
	26 Jun	0830	A recce party consisting of Capt GLASGOW and the intelligence officers of the three bns of this bde and of 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn set out to reconnoitre for bivouac sites for the proposed move to MT GARNET. This move is in connection with a divisional parade to be held at MT GARNET for the C-in-C. A divisional parade, a recce meeting and a recce are to be held on successive days. The parade is expected to be held on the second SATURDAY of JULY.	
	27 Jun		A course of exercises on tactics for junior officers of the Brigade commences today at Bde HQ. They will be conducted by the Brigade Major on a cloth model which has been constructed here.	
		1500m	Maj HILL (HM) went to HQ 26 Aust Inf Bde to arrange adjustments in the boundaries of the trg areas of the two brigades.	
	28 Jun		Brig WINDEYER, Capt WORTHLEY, Lt BARWICK and the det of Bde HQ Sigs returned from KURANDA.	
	29 Jun		Brig WINDEYER, Maj HILL, Capt WORTHLEY, Capt GLASGOW, Lt RYAN and as many NCOs from this HQ as could be made available attended a lecture given at the Camp Cinema by Dr Thomas WOOD of the British Ministry of Information on the war effort of Great Britain.	<i>[Signature]</i>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Page 10

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit HQ 20 AUST INF BDE

Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 44 To 30 Jun 44

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	29 Jun (cont)		<p>Lt MURISON (LO ii) returned from leave.</p> <p>This month has seen the reinforcement of all three batallions to about normal strength, both in officers and men. This has to a great extent counterbalanced the heavy drain of malaria casualties, and units have been raised to sufficient strength to carry out full time training effectively.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;"><i>W. J. Vandey</i> Brig. COMD. 20 AUST. INF. BDE.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>W. J. Vandey</i> Capt 10 20 AUST INF BDE</p>

20 AUST INF BDE - TRG INSTN 3

NOTES ON CONFERENCE AT HQ 20 AUST INF BDE - REF TRG OF INF PNR PLATOONS

1. Present: 1 Officer RAB
3 Officers 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn
Pnr Pl Comds or representatives from 2/13; 2/15 ;
2/17 Aust Inf Bns.
2. Experience in last campaign showed great advantage of unit pnr officers having some engr training, not only for technical knowledge but to assist in requisitioning for correct stores.
3. The following subjects were decided upon as those to be covered in training pnr pls of 20 Aust Inf Bde. This is not put forward as a complete syllabus for pnr training, but are the subjects in which in this Bde, at the present time, refresher courses are required.
- Some subjects, e.g., wiring obstacles and corduroy roads are not covered, personnel being already trained in these subjects. Refresher instn will be included at end of course if time is available.
- Subjects to be covered, in order of priority, include:-
- (i) Knots and lashings, including groundfasts, block and tackle etc.;
 - (ii) Bridging, both foot and jeep types;
 - (iii) Location of tracks. Experience has proved, that in this, there is a tendency to follow native pads, whereas a more direct route is often preferable determined by compass, markers, etc, consideration being given to gradients;
 - (iv) Theory of explosives and hasty demolitions;
 - (v) Mines and booby traps;
 - (vi) Rafting and river crossings.
4. Method of Instruction
- (a) An intensive instruction cadre course at 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn, for eight pnr personnel from each unit. Period 7 - 14 Jun 44.
 - (b) Unit instruction on same syllabus for period 15 Jun - 7 Jul 44.
- During the latter period lectures will be given two nights a week by pnr pl Comd on
- (i) Field Geometry;
 - (ii) Mines and booby traps.
5. Training stores will be indented for by this HQ and made available to units, as required.

J. H. ... Maj
HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde

20 AUST INF BDE - TRG INSTR 4

INTRODUCTORY

1. Training in int requirements will not be confined to the trg of int secs.
2. In order that, in ops, the maximum amount of accurate infm be obtained, it is necessary that in trg all tps and particularly those to be engaged in actual fighting should be taught what kind of infm is required and how to provide it. The work of int secs consists largely in handling infm obtained in the first place, not by themselves, but by other troops.
3. During the last campaign in NEW GUINEA many instances occurred of inaccurate reporting by sub-unit comds and patrol leaders. That this was not entirely due to the difficulties of observation through jungle and the inaccuracy of maps is apparent from the fact that the reports of patrols which were accompanied by a member of an int sec were generally more detailed and accurate than those of patrols not so accompanied. It is appreciated that the leader of a patrol cannot have his mind as free for general observation as a soldier merely accompanying the patrol and that the object of many patrols was less to gain infm than to attack the enemy. Nevertheless, it is considered that the difference in the standard of reporting must be ascribed, largely, to a lower standard of training of officers and NCOs commanding patrols, partly in map reading, partly in observing, noting down and accurately reporting facts. There were cases where, it is thought, a better report would have been given had the patrol comd made notes during the patrol.

MAP READING

4. The standard of map reading of junior offr and NCOs is in some instances unsatisfactory.
5. This is probably due not to any lack of understanding of the principles but to lack of practice.
6. During trg all offr and NCOs will be practiced in map reading. Map reading problems will, where possible, be worked into pl, coy and bn trg exercises, and in addition exercises will be set specifically in map reading. Such exercises are most instructive when set in country not already known to the participants, and in an area removed from any road marked on the map. A useful method of instr is to set tactical problems and require answers to be given entirely by map; then to collect the maps. At a later stage the class should be taken out to the area, the maps re-issued, and the solutions re-considered on the ground.

PHOTO READING

7. Air photographs are likely to be extensively employed in the future in addition to or, in place of maps. Officers and NCOs should be able to work from either.
8. An effort should be made to train all offr in the principles of photo reading and interpretation. It is essential that Coy comds and likely coy comds be so trained. A list of subjects which should be covered is attached at Appx "A".
9. All NCOs should be given sufficient elementary trg to follow instrs given from air photographs, and to work from them. In Appx "B" att is given what is considered the minimum standard of instr to be given.

10. This instr is issued now in anticipation of stereoscopes becoming available later.

PATROLS AND PATROL REPORTS

11. Patrols are, within the area which they cover, the principal (and should be the most accurate) source of info both of enemy dispositions and of topography. The locating and mapping of tracks not discernible on air photographs depends almost entirely on the reports of patrols.
12. Provision will be made in unit trg programmes for the trg of offrs and NCOs in
- (a) the briefing of patrols, and
 - (b) the making of patrol reports.
13. (a) Briefing Patrols Patrol reports are often deficient because the patrol leader has been inadequately briefed. Attention is drawn to Inf Trg (Trg and War) 1937, sec 50, para 3. To report accurately on the route followed, timings, the going, the nature of the terrain and vegetation, any inaccuracy or incompleteness in the map and any other matter which might affect ops over the area patrolled should be regarded as a routine task of all patrols (except those detailed for a specific fighting task). This must be made clear to the patrol comd in the orders issued to him.
- (b) Patrol Reports During trg, in all exercises which involve patrolling, the patrol comd (and in suitable cases other members of the patrol) will be required to make a report at the conclusion of the patrol. Such reports will be required to be detailed and accurate. Competitions in reporting may be run between two patrols assigned (at different times) the same task.


A full and accurate report of a long patrol cannot be made by the patrol comd unless during the patrol he makes written notes to assist his recollection. These can be brief. It is not essential that they be comprehensible to others. Offrs and NCOs, will be trained to take notes as part of the routine of patrolling.

RETURN OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND EQPT

14. Conduct in regard to the return of captured documents was very good in this Bde during the last campaign. Info of the utmost value for ops, and in some cases of a most secret nature was obtained from this source. It is important that the same standard should be observed in future. Particular attention must be given to the instr of reinfts. Soldiers must be taught that no document is too insignificant to send back. If a soldier desires any document or eqpt as a souvenir, he may request that it be returned to him when no longer required for military purposes at his home address. Great care is taken by Int in higher formations to see that any such request is complied with. In the last campaign, in many cases, documents and eqpt were handed back to soldiers through this HQ. It is an offence to appropriate any captured document or eqpt or to send it through the post.

Distribution:

2/13 ; 2/15 ; 2/17 Aust Inf Bns
2/3 Aust Pnr Bn
File
War Diary (2)


Maj
HM 20 Aust Inf Bde

APPX "A"

Instr in Air Photograph Interpretation for Officers

The following subjects should be covered.

1. Types - Vertical and Oblique.
2. Verticals - (a) Orientation and Titling.
(b) Scale
(c) Practice with Stereoscope
(d) Stereoscopy unaided by instruments.
3. Obliques - degree of distortion.
4. Interpretation - (a) Effect of shadow
(b) Vegetation; recognition, significance of different types
(c) Tracks and streams, recognition
(d) Signs of occupation
(e) Gun posns, dump areas etc.
5. Annotation - ability to annotate for use and ref by subordinate comds.

APPX "B"

Instr in Air Photograph Interpretation for HCOs

1. Types - Vertical and Oblique.
2. Verticals - Practice with pocket stereoscope.
3. Obliques - Fact that there is distortion.
4. Interpretation -
 - (a) Vegetation, recognition of
 - (b) Tracks and streams, recognition
 - (c) Signs of occupation.

20 AUST INF BDE - TRG INSTR 5

INTL SEC

1. Attention is drawn to 9 Aust Div Trg Instr No 10 (already fwded), para 2.
Each bn will send one representative to the weekly conferences mentioned in para 2 of the Instr.
2. It is proposed to invite G 111 (I) 9 Aust Div to lecture at each bn on the Int lessons of the FINSCHHAFEN campaign. Units will submit by 1600 hrs, Fri, 9 Jun 44 suggestions for lectures in other subjects by G 111 (I) or IO 9 Aust Div. Further suggestions can be made later.
3. The trg of int secs will be as laid down in Appx "A" att.
4. Attention is drawn to ATM (Aust) No 11-5 (consolidated) Part 11, Sec 16.
5. The maximum amount of time will be spent on traversing, plotting and mapping exercises in the field, employing only eqpt which can be carried in ops.
6. Provided eqpt and material are available, it is proposed to hold a Bde course for int sec personnel in Air Photo Interpretation during pl and coy trg period.
7. Bde HQ int staff can be made available to assist in any phase of unit int trg.
8. Any personnel likely to be responsible in ops for rendering patrol reports must be trained to examine critically and cross-examine comds of patrols.

[Handwritten Signature]

BM 20 Aust Inf Bde Maj

Distributions:

2/13 Aust Inf Bn
2/15 Aust Inf Bn
2/17 Aust Inf Bn
2/3 Aust Pnr Bn (for info)
War Diary (2)
File.

APPX "A" TO 20 AUST INF REG - THE INFANTRY

All members of int secs will be trained in the following subjects:

1. To be covered during an individual and sec trg period
 - (a) Map reading
 - (b) Enlarging
 - (c) Field sketching
 - (i) Sketching from intersected points
 - (ii) Paralining
 - (iii) Sketching by eye
 - (d) Conventional signs
 - (e) Air Photographs
 - (i) Tiling
 - (ii) Orientation
 - (iii) Scale
 - (iv) Interpretation of natural features, vegetation, tracks, buildings, signs of activity
 - (v) Sketching from Air Photographs
 - (vi) Stereoscopy with and without instruments
 - (vii) Annotation.
 - (f) Abbreviations
 - (g) Message - writing
 - (h) Patrols
 - (i) Notification of projected patrols
 - (ii) Patrol reports
 - (iii) Patrol maps
 - (i) Reports
 - (i) Shelling
 - (ii) O P
 - (iii) Crashed Aircraft
 - (iv) Minefields and UMB
 - (j) Compass work
 - (k) Traversing
 - (l) Recce
 - (i) Procedure
 - (ii) Reports
 - (m) Track infm.— Recording. Special attention to be paid to
 - (i) Time of movt each way and in what weather conditions
 - (ii) Obstacles and defiles.

Pl and coy trg period:

- (a) Office work
- (b) Routine in ops - immedi te reporting, sitreps etc
- (c) Battle drill
- (d) C P work (inconjunction with coy trg)
- (e) R/T code
- (f) Exercises in
 - (i) Mapping an area without assistance from existing maps
 - (ii) Sketching, and reporting disposns, in areas of restricted visibility
 - (iii) Adding detail to and correcting maps from air photographs.
- (g) Stereoscope - practice
- (h) Experiments with eqpt, determination of man-loads etc.

Bn trg period

- (a) Participation in bn exercises
- (b) Handling of captured eqpt, documents, PW
- (c) Enemy orders of battle - how complied
- (d) Enemy eqpt.

It was a part time job for an
NCO - or rather to make it
a full time job he had to be

taken off something else -

Is there an NCO ^{salarii} ~~also~~ as
such or establishment -

States "NCO 2 ORS PW ? min
amount by Reg NCO

In bulk not on Gps?

Do men
did you carry them
later when or do move
or did they the natives
or jeeps bring them

WD Smith

Conference attended by
B de Cord at Atherton

MALARIA AND TROPICAL DISEASE CONFERENCE.

Monday, 12 Jun 44.

1400 hrs.

Maj Gen LLOYD

Disease Wastage.

Brig FAIRLEY ✓

Malaria with special reference
to atabrin suppression in the
Field.

Tuesday, 13 Jun 44.

0930 hrs

Maj ENGLISH ✓

Malaria and Dengue control in
the Field.

Discussion.

1100 hrs

Maj COOK ✓

Control of Intestinal Diseases
- Dysentery and Cholera.

1400 hrs

Maj COOK

Scrub Typhus.

1430 hrs

Maj Gen BURSTON

General summing up and Discussion.

War Diary
[Signature]

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
Ref: G3/8/210
12 Jun 44

Subject: CHEMICAL WARFARE TRAINING

1. Elementary training in CW will be carried out at a later stage in the training period.
2. Div policy is not to hold gas equipment but units are now permitted to carry a proportion equivalent to one fifth of unit strength.
3. Until full instructions are given, units will withdraw into unit store all CW equipment now on issue.
4. CW equipment surplus to the proportion in para 2 above will be returned to Ordnance.
5. Units will report their holdings of this equipment stating proportion held by 19 Jun 44.

[Signature]
Maj
HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde

Distribution: List "B" less serials 7 & 8

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 3 / 6 / 1944 HQ 20 AUST INF BDE (Unit)

W.E. 11 / 2 / 3 OFFRS. 19 O.R.'s 67 + OFFRS. - O.R.'s. - ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1				2				3				4				5				6				7				8				9				10			
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.								DETAIL.								ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.																							
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.	Arm or Corps.				Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.																												
				W.Os. Class I.																																			
NR	1		1	W.Os. Class II.																																			
NR	1		-	Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.																																			
			1	Staff Sergeants																																			
NK 1	3	2	4	Sergeants																																			
NR	2		7	Corporals																																			
11	22	1	28	Troopers, Privates, etc.																																			
				Civilians counting as O.R.																																			
12 *	29	3	41 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.																																			

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2). ** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.	Detail	A.I.F.	C.M.F.		A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
			Under 19 Years.	19 Years and over.							
	1st Class AIF	40									40
	B(1)	1									1
	B(2)										

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.
1	2/13 Aust Inf Bn			1	2/15 Aust Inf Bn		
1	Y M C A			10	A R L		
1	HQ 9 Aust Div						
3	9 Aust Div Postal						

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To.....(Unit) is Particularly Requested. / .. / 194

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 3/ 6/1944 .

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.
				B/Fwd	2	2		B/Fwd	9	8	NR	B/Fwd	15	13	
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, E.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores			
Computers								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd's. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)	2	2		Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks	3	2	NR	Woodturners				Non-Specialists			
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics								Batmen	13	7	4 NR
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)								Drivers MT	4	2	NR
Fitters				Driver-Operator								MT Orderl's	9	4	2
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers								Hyg Duties	1	2	
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians								Sig Ord's	6	3	3
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)								Water Dut's	1	1	
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				Gen Duties	3		2
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN			
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				C S M	1		NR
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks	6	5	NR	C O M S	1		NR
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply				SERVICES			
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical				AASC Clerk	1	1	
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties	4	4		Coach Trimmers				Batman	1	1	
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concretors				Dvr MT		1	
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks				AAMC MedOrd	1	1	
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies				AAOC AmnExm	1		1 NR
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				B'tm Dr	1		NR
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.				AEME Arm'r	1	1	
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics				Fitter MT	1		NR
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Tptn. Plant				Mech MT	1	1	
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, L.C.				AACHD			
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers				Batmen Drs	3	1	NR
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers				AALC Clerk	1	1	
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates				Batmen	1	1	
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD	2	2		CARRIED FORWARD	9	8	NR	CARRIED FORWARD	15	13	NR	Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	67	41	12

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
 (b) Authorized trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
 (c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
 (d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reints. Required."
 (e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

1 JUN 44
Date of Despatch

[Signature]
SC 20 Signature of Commander Capt

Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 3/6/1944
PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in

Details of NCOs

Trade	Rank	GROUP I (cont.)					Surp	Def	Details of Trade
		W	E	P	S	Surp			
Draughtsmen (Int)	Cpl	1		1				Ammunition Examines	
Cooks	Cpl	1		1				Ammunition Examiners	
Intelligence Duties	s/sjt	1		1				Ammunition Examiners	
"	Cpl	1		1				Ammunition Examiners	
Clerks	WO ii	1		2				Ammunition Examiners	
Clerks (Amenities & Education) Sjts	Sjts	2		1			1	Ammunition Examiners	
Clerks	Cpl	1					1	Ammunition Examiners	
Drivers MT	Cpl	1		1				Ammunition Examiners	
Transport	Sjt	1					1	Ammunition Examiners	
Gen Duties	Cpl	1					1	Ammunition Examiners	
C S M	WO ii	1					1	Ammunition Examiners	
C Q M S	s/sjt	1					1	Ammunition Examiners	
SERVICES									
AASC Clerk	Cpl	1		1				Ammunition Examiners	
AAEC Med Orderly	Cpl	1		1				Ammunition Examiners	
AAOC Amn Examiner	Sjt	1					1	Ammunition Examiners	
AEME Armourer	Sjt	1		1				Ammunition Examiners	
AALC Clerk	Cpl	1		1				Ammunition Examiners	
TOTALS		18		11			7		
SURPLUS									
Hygiene Duties	1 Sjt								
Intelligence Duties	1 Sjt								
CARRIED FORWARD		8		9			2		

NOTES—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Anticipated trades or specialties not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are detailed show details on back.
(d) Where reinforcement not detailed note accordingly on return by insertion of 'R.E.' in col. 'Reinforce Required'.
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words 'See Back' should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

Date of Despatch: 1 JUL 44
Signature: [Signature]
Rank: [Rank]
Post: [Post]

Not Sealed

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

...../.....(Serial No.)

11 2 At 0600 Hrs. Saturday / **67** 194..... (Unit)

W.E. OFFRS. O.R's. + OFFRS. O.R's. ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'ts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'ts Required.
			1	Brigadier					
NR	1		1						
NR	6		4	Lieut.-Colonels					
NR	5		1	Majors					
				Captains					
				Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
NR	12		7	Civilians Counting as Offrs.					

DETAIL.	A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	..	TOTAL
"A" Class	7									7
A.										
E.(1)										
E.(2)										

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
 ** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.
QX6198	Capt	JANSEN H C	2/6 A G H	21-5-44	
VX47864	Chap	BYRNE J L	2/6 A G H	21-5-44	

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.
QX6197	Capt	WORTHLEY H G	2/1 C C S	21-5-44	

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194.....

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

SC 20 AUST INF BDE Unit

44 16 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 3/6/1944 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Brig	HX396	WINDYER	W J V	COMD	YES		
Maj	HX380	HILL	A J	B M	NO	Lt Col School of Arty (Fd) Tk/A Wing Senior Officers	
Capt	HX70449	WATERS	A J	BRSCO	YES		20-5-44
Capt	QX6196	JENSEN	H C	S C L	YES		
T/Capt	QX364	GLASSON	D	L O I	YES		
T/Capt	HX21195	HAUGHAN	D W B	I O	YES		
Lieut	QX949	MURISON	W G	LO 11	YES		
Chap	QX2294	LAWRENCE	H	PADRE	NO	DET 2/17 AUST INF BN	18-5-44
Chap	VX47864	BYRNE	W L	PADRE	NO	DET 2/15 AUST INF BN	31-5-44

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Lieut	HX14881	RYAN J W	2/13 A Inf Bn	8-1-44	LO 111
Lieut	HX15683	POLLOCK P I	2/17 A Inf Bn	23-5-44	(Temp) LO 111

Date of Despatch

Truth—7/43.

Duncan Glasgow
Signature of Commander Capt

SC 20

No. 12

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 10/6/1944 HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde 44/17 (Serial No.)

W.E. 11/2/3 OFFRS. 19 O.R.'s 67 + OFFRS. O.R.'s ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.									
Rein'ts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'ts Required.					
NR NR NR	1 3 4	-	1 1 7 2	* Brigadier* Lieut.-Colonels Majors Captains Lieutenants Quarter-masters A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs. Civilians Counting as Offrs.										
NR	8		11											
				DETAIL	A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).				"A" Class	11									11
				E.(1)										
				E.(2)										

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.
NX34685	Capt	GIOVANELLI W N L	AALC	8-6-44	Returning from "X" List NIL and Hospital
NX14881	Lieut	RYAN J W	2/13 Aust Inf Bn	8-6-44	Ceased detachment to 20 Aust Inf Bde and becomes seconded as LO.
NX 380	Maj	HILL A J		8-6-44	From Det to HQ School of Army Tr/A Wing - Senior Offrs

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO.....(Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194.....

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 10 6 / 194. (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Plt	MX396	WIDENER	J V	COMD	YES		
Plt	MX380	HILL	A J	B M	YES		
Capt	MX6196	JENSEN	H C	SC (L)	YES		
Capt	MX34685	GIOVANNINI	W N L	L S C	YES		
Capt	MX70449	WATERS	A J	B SCO	NO	ARL	
T/Capt	MX354	GLASGOW	D	LO I	YES		
T/Capt	MX21195	HAUGHAN	D W B	I O	YES		
Lieut	MX949	MURISON	W G	LO 11	NO	ARL	
Lieut	MX14881	RYAN	J W	LO 11	YES		
Chap	MX22994	LAWRENCE	H	PADRE	NO	DET 2/17 AUST INF BN	18-5-44
Chap	VX47864	BURNS	L	PADRE	NO	DET 2/15 AUST INF BN	31-5-44

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Lieut	MX15583	HOLLOCK P I	2/17 A Inf Bn	23-5-44	(Temp LO 111)
Lieut	MX66676	JAN T B	2/17 A Inf Bn	25-5-44	T O

10 JUN 44

Date of Despatch

Russell C. ...
Signature of Commander

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

44 / 17 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 10/6/1944 HQ 20 AUST INF BDE (Unit)

W.E. 11 / 2 / 3. OFFRS. 19 O.R.'s 67 + OFFRS. = O.R.'s. = ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
NR	1		1	W.Os. Class II.					
NR	1		-	Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
			1	Staff Sergeants					
1	1	2	6	Sergeants					
NR	2	1	8	Corporals					
7	22	1	28	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
8 *	27	4	44 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2		*			*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail	A.I.F.		C.M.F.		A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.P.	**	TOTAL
	A	B	Under 19 Years.	19 Years and over.							
A	43	1									44
B(1)											
B(2)											

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached
1	2/15 Aust Inf Bn			8	ARL		
1	2/17 Aust Inf Bn						
1	HQ 9 Aust Div						
3	9 Aust Div Postal						
1	YMCA						

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To.....(Unit) is Particularly Requested. /..... /194.....

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 10 / 6 / 1946.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.) B/Fwd	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.) B/Fwd	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.) B/Fwd	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, E.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammormen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangefakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores			
Computers								Biggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd's. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)	2	2	-	Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman				Non-Specialists			
Electricians				Cooks	3	3		Woodturners				Batmen	13	6	4
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics								Drivers MT	4	4	-
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)								MT Orderlies	9	4	2
Fitters				Driver-Operator								Hyg Duties	1	2	-
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers								Sig Ord's	6	6	-
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians								Water Dut's	1	1	-
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)								Gen Duties	3	1	1
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				C S M	1	-	NR
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				C Q M S	1	-	NR
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks	6	5	NR	Services			
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply				AASC Clerk	1	2	-
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical				Batman	1	-	NR
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties	4	3	NR	Coach Trimmers				AAMC MedOrd	1	1	-
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concretors				AACC AmnEgn	1	-	1
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks				Btm Driver	1	-	NR
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies				ARME Armr	1	1	-
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Elders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals				Fitter MT	1	1	-
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.				Mech MT	1	-	NR
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics				AChD			
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Tpin. Plant				Btm Drivers	3	-	NR
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.				AALC Clerk	1	1	-
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers				Batman	1	1	-
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD	2	2	-	CARRIED FORWARD	9	8	NR	CARRIED FORWARD	15	13	NR	Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	67	44	8

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reints. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

10 JUN 44
Date of Despatch

[Signature]
Signature of Commander Capt.

Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 10 / 6 / 1942
 Part E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in
 Details of NCOs

Trade	Rank	W	E	P	S	Surp	Def	Details of	
								Trade	Rank
Draughtsman (Int)	Cpl	1		1					
Cooks	Cpl	1		1					
Intelligence Duties	S/sjt	1		1					
"	Cpl	1		1					
Clerks	WO II	1		1					
Clerks (Amenities & Education)	Sjts	2		1			1		
Clerks	Cpl	1					1		
Drivers MT	Cpl	1		1					
Transport	Sjt	1		1					
Gen Duties	Cpl	1					1		
C S M	WO II	1					1		
C O M S	S/sjt	1					1		
SERVICES									
AASC: Clerk	Cpl	1		2		1			
AAMC: Med Ord	Cpl	1		1					
AAGC: Amn Hxm	Sjt	1					1		
ABME: Armourer	Sjt	1		1					
AALC: Clerk	Cpl	1		1					
TOTALS			18	13	1	6			
SURPLUS:									
Hyg Duties	1 Sjt								
Intelligence Duties	1 Sjt								
AASC Clerk	1 Cpl								
CARRIED FORWARD									

NOTE: (a) If rank other than private is involved give details on rank.
 (b) Authorized trades or specialties not included in list will be added as required in space provided.
 (c) Where A.W.S. and/or A.E.W.S. positions are detailed show details on rank.
 (d) Where reinforcement not detailed note accordingly on return by location of N.C. in col. "Reinforce Required".
 (e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

[Signature]
 Adjutant General

Date of Despatch

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.306
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
44 / 18 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 17 / 6 / 1944 (Unit)

W.E. 11 / 2 / 3 OFFRS. 19 O.R.'s 67 + OFFRS. O.R.'s ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.
-	-	-	1	Brigadier *					
NR	1	-	1	Lieut.-Colonels					
NR	1	1	10	Majors					
NR	4	-	2	Captains					
				Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
NR	6	1	14						

DETAIL	A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
"A" Class	14									14
E.(1)										
E.(2)										

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.
5157	Capt	WORTHLEY H G		14-6-44	RTU from 2/1 C C S

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.
1568	Lieut	POLLOCK P I	2/17 Aust Inf Bn	11-6-44	Ceased to be attached.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 17/6/1944 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Brig	NR396	HINDBYR	J V	COMD	YES		
Maj	NR380	HILL	A J	B N	YES		
Capt	NR6157	FORTLEY	E G	B K L	YES		
Capt	NR11806	TRIT WILLS		S C	YES		
Capt	NR6196	JENSEN	H C	S C L	NO	14 days Emergency Leave	12-6-44
T/Capt	NR364	GLASGOW	D	L O I	YES		
Lieut	NR949	MURISON	W G	L O II	NO	ARL	
Lieut	NR14881	RYAN	J F	L O III	YES		
T/Capt	NR21195	HAUGHAN	D W B	I O	YES		
Capt	NR34685	GIOVARELLI	S H L	L S O	YES		
Capt	NR70449	WATERS	A J	B A C O	NO	ARL	
Chap	NR22994	LAWRENCE	H	P A D R E	NO	DET 2/17 AUST INF BDE	18-5-44
Chap	NR47064	BYRNE	W L	P A D R E	NO	DET 2/15 AUST INF BDE	31-5-44
Chap	NR3975	LAKE	G S	P A D R E	NO	DET 2/15 AUST INF BDE	9-6-44

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Lieut	NR66676	SMAN T H	2/17 AUST INF BDE	25-5-44	T O

17 June 44
Date of Despatch

E. J. Smith
Signature of Commander

No 20 Aust Inf Bde

War Diary
Duffin

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

44 / 18 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 17 / 6 / 1944 HQ 20 AUST INF BDE (Unit)

W.E. 11 / 2 / 3. OFFRS. 19 O.R's. 67 + OFFRS. - O.R's. - ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
NR	1	-	1	W.Os. Class II.					
NR	1	-	-	Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
			1	Staff Sergeants					
1	1	3	7	Sergeants					
NR	2	1	8	Corporals					
4	16		33	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
5 *	21	4	50 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		*			*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail	A.I.F.	C.M.F.		A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
		Under 19 Years.	19 Years and over.							
A	49	1								50
B(1)										
B(2)										

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.
3	9 Aust Div Postal			8	ARL		
1	9 Aust Div			1	2/1 C C S		
1	2/17 Aust Inf Bn						
1	Y M C A						

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To (Unit) is Particularly Requested. / / 194

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 17/ 6/1944.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.
				B/Pwd	2	2		B/Pwd	9	9		B/Pwd	15	15	
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assis.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, B.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevadores			
Computors								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd's Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)	2	2		Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman				Non-Specialists			
Electricians				Cooks	3	4		Woodturners				Batmen	13	6	4
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics								Drivers MT	4	4	
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)								MT Ord's	9	5	NR
Fitters				Driver-Operator								Hyg Duties	1	2	
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers								Sig Ord's	6	7	
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians								Water Dut's	1	1	NR
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)								Gen Duties	3	2	NR
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				C S M	1	-	NR
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				C Q M S	1	-	NR
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks	6	6		Services			
Grinder, Precision				Hello Operator				Clerks, Supply				AASC Clerk	1	2	
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical				Batmen	1	-	NR
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties	4	3	NR	Coach Trimmers				Drivers	-	1	
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concretors				AAMC Med			
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks				Ord	1	1	
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies				AAOC AnnExm	1	-	1
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals				Batmen Dvr	1	-	NR
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.				AME Armr	1	1	
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics				Fitter MT	1	1	
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Tptn. Plant				Mech MT	1	-	NR
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.				AAGD			
Photewriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers				Batmen Dvrs	3	-	NR
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers				AALC Clerk	1	1	
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates				Batmen	1	1	
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD	2	2		CARRIED FORWARD	9	9	NR	CARRIED FORWARD	15	15	NR	Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	67	50	5

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reints. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

17 Jun 44
Date of Despatch

a.w. 6m bks 3/43

Signature of Commander

Capt

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday ^{24 6} / ^{4 HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde} / 194..... (Unit)

11 2 3 19 67 W.E. OFFRS. O.R's. + OFFRS. O.R's. ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1 W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				5		6 ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.	DETAIL.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.						
	2			W.Os. Class II.						
NR	1			Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.						
NR			1	Staff Sergeants						
1	1	8	7	Sergeants						
NR	8	1	7	Corporals						
4	15	2	30	Troopers, Privates, etc.						
				Civilians counting as O.R.						
5	22	6	51	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.						*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail	A.I.F.	C.M.F.		A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL
		Under 19 Years.	19 Years and over.							
A	1	50								51
B(1)										
B(2)										

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.
2	Aust Div Postal			5	NCL		
1	Aust Div Educ						
1	2/17 Aust Inf Bn						
1	ENGA						

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To.....(Unit) is Particularly Requested. / / 194.....

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 24 Jun /1944 .

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.			Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)			Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)			Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)			
W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reints. Required.	
			Surveyors, Engineering			Operating Room Assts.			G.P.O. Assistants			
			Surveyors, E.A.A.			Operator, Keyboard			Hammermen			
			Surveyors, Topographical			Operator, Line			Leather Stitchers			
			Surveyors, Trigonometrical			Operator, Signal			Orderlies, Nursing			
			Toolmakers			Operator, Switchboard			Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
			Turners			Operator, Wireless			Plate Layers			
			Watchmakers			Opticians			Rangetakers			
			Welders			Painters			Riveters			
						Panel Beaters			Roughriders			
						Photographer, Dry Plate			Saddlers			
						Predictor Numbers			Saddletree makers			
						Printers			Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
						Radiographers			Stevedores			
						Riggers			Stokers, Staty. Engine			
			GROUP II.			Sawyers			Storemen, Technical			
			Armourers			Signallers			Tailors			
			Axemen			Signwriters			Textile Refitters			
			Bakers			Telescope Identfn. Numbers			Tinsmiths			
			Bty. Comd's. Asst.			Well Borers			Vulcanizers			
			Boilermakers			Wheelers			Wagon Erectors			
			Carpenters			Winchman			Whitesmiths			
	2	2	Carpenters and Joiners			Wireman			Non-specialists			
			Cooks	3	4	Woodturners			Batmen	13	8	4
			Dental Mechanics						Drivers MT	4	2	NR
			Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)						MT Ord's	9	7	NR
			Driver-Operator						Hyg Duties	1	-	NR
			Drainers						Water Dut	1	1	
			Electricians						Gen Duties	3	2	NR
			Electricians (M.V.)						Sig Ords	6	6	
			Electricians (Signals)						DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
			Fitters			GROUP III.			CSM	1	-	NR
			Fitters (Cycle)			Battery Surveyors			CSM	1	-	NR
			Fitters (Electrical)			Butchers			SERVICES			
			Fitters (Gun)			Clerks	6	6	AASG Clerk	1	2	
			Fitters (Instrument)			Clerks, Supply			Batmen	1	-	NR
			Fitters (M.V.)			Clerks, Technical			Dr	-	1	
			Fitters, Railway Signal			Coach Trimmers			AMC McOrd	1	1	
			Fitters, Signals			Concretors			Hyg	-	1	
			Grinder, Precision			Cooks			AAGC Ann Ex	1	-	1
			Mechanics, Instrument			Dental Clerk Orderlies			ATTACHED BY W.E.			
			Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)			Despatch Riders			Batmen DR	1	-	NR
			Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)			Draughtsmen, Signals			AME Ann'r	1	1	
			Mechanics, Radio			Drivers, H.T.			Fitter MT	1	1	
			Mechanics, Typewriter			Driver Mechanics			Mech MT	1	-	NR
			Mechanics, Wireless			Engine Hands, I.C.			AA ch D			
			Millwrights			Equipment Repairers			Batmen	3	-	NR
			Operators, Excavator			Farriers			AAGC Clerk	1	1	
			Pattern Maker			Fitters' Mates			Batmen	1	1	
			Pharmacist			Gun Layers						
			Photographer, Wet Plate									
			Photewriter									
			Plumber									
			Saw Doctors									
			Surveyors									
CARRIED FORWARD	2	2	CARRIED FORWARD	9	10	CARRIED FORWARD	15	16	Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	67	51	5

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
 (b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
 (c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
 (d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reints. Required."
 (e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

24 Jun 44

Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

(Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday / / 194 (Unit)

W.E. / / OFFRS. O.R's. + OFFRS. O.R's. ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10						
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.										
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.						
			1	* Lieut.-Colonels											
	1		2	* Majors											
	4	1	7	Captains											
	5		8	Lieutenants											
				Quarter-masters											
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.											
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.											
				A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.		
Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).				A.											
				E.(1)											
				E.(2)											

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.
2874111	LT	MILLER	2005 Q Coy 9 Area	22-8-44	Seconded to HQ 30 Aust Inf Bde

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.
2821395	2/Capt	MAGUIRE DUB	2/1 Coy	20-8-44	Sick
2834635	Capt	GROVANS MAH	2/1 Coy	20-8-44	Sick
2827364	Private	BURNS	9 Aust Div	8-8-44	Consented to be seconded to HQ 30 Aust Inf Bde

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. / / 194.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

Unit

(Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 24 Jun 44 / / 194. (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Private	125 000	WATSON	WV	QND	Yes		
V/Adj	12300	HILL	AF	DI	Yes		
Capt	02 6197	WATSON	HO	DI(L)	Yes		
Capt	1231003	SAIT WILLS	B	SC	Yes		
Capt	02 6100	JONES	HO	SC(L)	No	14 Days Emergency Leave	13-6-44
S/Capt	02 354	CLARKE	D	10 1	Yes		
Lieut	02 940	HUGHES	VO	10 11	No	ABL	
Lieut	1231001	RYAN	JV	10 11	Yes		
Capt	1230440	HARRIS	AF	1000	No	ABL	
Lieut	1234111	HILLIS	LO	100	Yes		
Capt	020004	LAWSON	H	Chep	No	Det to 2/17 Aust Inf Bn	13-6-44
Capt	020075	LANE	GO	Chep	No	Det to 2/15 Aust Inf Bn	9-6-44

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.
Lt	1230070	WATSON	12/17 Aust Inf Bn	13-6-44	Awaiting secondment

24 Jun 44

Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

Subject: TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL OF 62 AUST INF BN to UNITS
OF 9 AUST DIV

PA



HQ 9 Aust Div
Ref *A89/1/1483*
27 Jun 44.

20 AUST INF BDE ✓
24 AUST INF BDE
26 AUST INF BDE

1. Reference this HQ *A89/1/978* of 6 Jun 44 to 1 Aust Corps, copies of which were forwarded to addressees for information.
2. Approval has now been given by HQ 1 Aust Corps for the implementation of para 4 of our *A89/1/978* of 6 Jun 44.

W. P. ... Capt
for
Lt-Col
AA & QMG 9 Aust Div

HQ 9 Aust Div

Ref : A89/1/9-18

6 Jun 44



SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL OF 62 AUST INF BN TO UNITS OF
9 AUST DIV

1 AUST CORPS.

Copies to 20 Aust Inf Bde (your A188/302 of 29 May refers)
24 Aust Inf Bde
26 Aust Inf Bde.

1. Reference your A3118 of 1 Jun 44 and further to our A89/1/699 of 23 May 44.

2. It is desired to advise that the position as regards WOs and NCOs as at 27 May 44 of the 2/15 Aust Inf Bn and 2/32 Aust Inf Bn, to which the majority of the other ranks personnel are being posted, is as follows :-

	<u>Surplus</u>	<u>Deficient</u>
2/15 Aust Inf Bn	Nil	Nil
2/32 Aust Inf Bn	5	2 (Tailors)

3. Pending your further instructions as regards the posting of the WOs and NCOs of the 62 Aust Inf Bn, action has been taken to post them supernumerary to the establishment in 2/15 Aust Inf Bn and 2/32 Aust Inf Bn as follows :-

Unit	WO I	WOII	S/SGT	Sgt	CPL	TOTALS
2/15 Aust Inf Bn	1	2	3	11	25	42
2/32 Aust Inf Bn	-	2	2	7	16	27
TOTALS - - -	1	4	5	18	41	69

4. In order that the WOs and NCOs of the 62 Aust Inf Bn may be posted to the best advantage in this Formation the following postings, for which vacancies exist in units, other than 2/15 Aust Inf Bn and 2/32 Aust Inf Bn is recommended for approval :-

TRADE	RANK	NUMBER	RECOMMENDED POSTING	REMARKS
A	B	C	D	E
Int Duties	Sgt	1	2/48 Aust Inf Bn	
	Cpl	1	2/23 Aust Inf Bn	
Signallers	Sgt	1	2/32 Aust Inf Bn	Supernumerary

A	B	C	D	E
Tk/A Nos.	Sgt	2	2/15 Aust Inf Bn (1) 2/32 Aust Inf Bn (1)	Supernumerary Supernumerary
	Cpl	2	2/23 Aust Inf Bn (1) 2/24 Aust Inf Bn (1)	
LMG Nos. and Riflemen	Sgt	9	2/15 Aust Inf Bn (5) 2/32 Aust Inf Bn (4)	Supernumerary Supernumerary
	Cpl	32	2/13 Aust Inf Bn (8) 2/15 Aust Inf Bn (11) 2/32 Aust Inf Bn (7) 2/24 Aust Inf Bn (6)	Supernumerary Supernumerary
MMG Nos.	Sgt	1	2/32 Aust Inf Bn	Supernumerary
	Cpl	2	2/24 Aust Inf Bn (1) 2/48 Aust Inf Bn (1)	
Mortar Nos.	Sgt	2	2/15 Aust Inf Bn (1) 2/32 Aust Inf Bn (1)	Supernumerary Supernumerary
	Cpl	1	2/15 Aust Inf Bn	Supernumerary
Pioneers	Sgt	1	2/15 Aust Inf Bn	Supernumerary
	Cpl	2	2/23 Aust Inf Bn	
Stretcher Bearers	Sgt	1	2/48 Aust Inf Bn	
	Cpl	1	2/24 Aust Inf Bn	
RSM	WOI	1	2/3 Aust Fd Amb	
CSM	WOII	4	2/13 Aust Inf Bn (1) 2/23 Aust Inf Bn (1) 2 Aust Corps Reception Camp (1)	(It is believed that a vacancy exists and application for a CSM has been made to Hq 1 Aust Corps by 2 Aust Corps Reception Camp)
COMS	s/sgt	5	2/13 Aust Inf Bn (2) 2/23 Aust Inf Bn (2) 2/24 Aust Inf Bn (1)	
TOTAL		<u>69</u>		

5. In regard to the NCOs shown above to be posted as supernumerary in 2/15 Aust Inf Bn and 2/32 Aust Inf Bn it is

recommended that they be held with units as shown until 24 Jun 44 when they will be available for reposting within this formation in accordance with GRC A187/43.

Guesoten

Maj.-Gen.
Comd, 9 Aust Div.



HQ 9 Aust Div
Ref: *A89/1/900*
3 Jun 44

Subject: TRANSFER OF PERSONNEL OF 62 AUST INF BN TO 9 AUST DIV.

20 AUST INF BDE, ✓
24 AUST INF BDE:

1. The following is the text of para 2 of LHQ memo SM3575 of 6 Apr 44 which will be complied with to the fullest practicable extent in posting of 62 Aust Inf Bn personnel in 2/15 Aust Inf Bn and 2/32 Aust Inf Bn :

"In view of the history of the 62 Aust Inf Bn and the previous service of its members the Commander-in-Chief has directed that its personnel will be kept together in the units to the greatest extent possible and that they will be absorbed to the greatest extent possible in ~~the~~ sub-units such as platoons or sections."

2. The above confirms telephonic instructions of even date on this subject.


Lt.-Col
AA & QMG 9 Aust Div

Subject: Transfer of OR Personnel
of 62 Aust Inf Bn

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
Ref: A188/302
29 May 44

9 Aust Div

ref your A89/1/699 of 23 May 44.

It is requested that WO and NCOs of 62 Aust Inf Bn^{to} be marched into Reception Camp for re-allocation, the following where possible be allotted to specific units of this brigade:-

2/13 Aust Inf Bn	Rifle Coys	2 sjts	and 6 cpls
	MG		1 cpl
	Mortar	1 sjt	and 1 cpl
	CQMS	1 s/sjt	
	Tk A	2 sjts	and 2 cpls

2/15 Aust Inf Bn

Nil

2/17 Aust Inf Bn

Mortar	1 sjt or cpl
Tk A	1 sjt or cpl
Pnr (with engr experience)	1 sjt or cpl


Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde



Subject: 62 Aust Inf Bn Personnel
QX26898 Pte CRIPPS D H
QX24505 Pte CAVENDISH G R

2/15 Aust Inf Bn
Ref 2/18/1/44
26 May 44

20 AUST INF BDE

1. In accordance with request from your HQ for information re authority for movement of the above, the only information forthcoming is as follows.

62 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Both soldiers were away from unit for some time prior to being marched in to GDD one at a school and the other on 40 days leave.
- (b) GDD REDBANK marched them out to YERONGPILLY STAGING CAMP for draft to 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.
- (c) It appears that GDD REDBANK had all personal documents concerning both soldiers.
- (d) Movement from Brisbane was by properly conducted draft.
- (e) The following documents concerning these soldiers have been received by this unit:-

AF B122 AF I 5033 AAF A63

and draft nominal roll.

[Handwritten signature]

Lieut
A/Adjt

Subject: 62 Aust Inf Bn Personnel
QX26898 Pte CRIPPS D H
QX24505 Pte CAVENDISH G R


2/15 Aust Inf Bn
Ref 2/8/1/44
26 May 44

20 AUST INF BDE

1. In accordance with request from your HQ for information re authority for movement of the above, the only information forthcoming is as follows.
 - (a) Both soldiers were away from unit for some time prior to being marched in to GDD one at a school and the other on 40 days leave.
 - (b) GDD REDBANK marched them out to YERONGPILLY STAGING CAMP for draft to 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.
 - (c) It appears that GDD REDBANK had all personal documents concerning both soldiers.
 - (d) Movement from Brisbane was by properly conducted draft.
 - (e) The following documents concerning these soldiers have been received by this unit:-

AF B122 AF I 5033 AAF A63

and draft nominal roll.


Lieut
A/Adjt

for info

HQ 9 Aust Div
Ref: A89/1/699
23 May 44


Subject: TRANSFER OF O.R. PERSONNEL OF 62 AUST INF BN TO UNITS OF 9 AUST DIV.

HQ 1 AUST CORPS:

Copies to - 20 AUST INF BDE ✓
24 AUST INF BDE
26 AUST INF BDE
RLO 1 AUST CORPS
QID L OF C AREA RECORDS OFFICE;



1. Further to our A89/1/550 of 14 May 44 relative above subject.
2. Attached hereto are appendices setting out the detailed allocation of personnel to units under command.
3. Confirming a recent telephonic communication it is desired
 - (a) Personnel nominated in Appendix "A" be moved at the earliest opportunity.
 - (b) Personnel nominated in Appendix "B" be moved immediately upon reconcentration or by 4 Jun, whichever is the earliest.


Maj.-Gen
Gend. 9 Aust Div

SC

Personnel required by 7/17 Bn from
62 Bn men now at Reception Camp

1 Jk A Cpl

1 Mortar Sgt or Cpl

1 Pnr Cpl (if with large experience)

D. Gulartley Capt

1730 hrs 28 May.

N C Os REQUIRED FROM 62 AUST INF BN

List of NCOs required by 2/13 Aust Inf Bn

Rifle Coys	2 Sjts	and	6 Cpls
MG	1 Cpl		
Mortar	1 Sjt	and	1 Cpl
C Q M S	1 <i>s/sjt</i>		
Tk A	2 Sjts	and	2 Cpls

2/15 Bn. Nil return.

N C Os REQUIRED FROM 62 AUST INF BN

List of NCOs required by 2/13 Aust Inf Bn

Rifle Coys 2 Sjts and 6 Cpls

MG 1 Cpl

Mortar 1 Sjt and 1 Cpl

C Q M S 1

Tk A 2 Sjts and 2 Cpls

62 AUST INF BN (AIF) - ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL1. Following A.I.F. Med Class "A" "QX" personnel (Ptes) to be posted to 2/15 AUST INF BN:

<u>Trade</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Trade</u>	<u>No.</u>
Blacksmith	1✓	M.M.G. Nos✓	15
Butcher	1✓	Mortar Nos✓	25
Carpenters	2✓	Orderlies✓	8
Int. Duties	5✓	Pioneers✓	15
Rangetakers	2✓	Regtl Police✓	3
Tech Storemen	1✓	Storemen	3
Batmen	15✓	Stretcher-bearers✓	10
Hyg Duties	2✓	Tk/A Nos✓	15
L.M.G. Nos & Riflemen	226	Water Duties✓	1
		<u>Total -</u>	<u>350</u>

Note: It is desired that any bandsmen which may exist in 62 Aust Inf Bn be included in the above draft.

2. Following A.I.F. Med Class "A" personnel to be posted to H.Q. 9 AUST DIV:

Clerks	-	Ptes	-	2
		Cpls	-	2
		Sgt	-	1
		<u>Total -</u>		<u>5</u>

3. Following A.I.F. Med Class "A" personnel to be posted TO 2/32 AUST INF BN:

Signallers	-	Ptes	-	23
		Cpl	-	1
		<u>Total -</u>		<u>24</u>

4. Following A.I.F. Med Class "A" personnel - Attached by W.E. - to be posted to units as shown:2/48 AUST INF BN

A.A.M.C. - 1 Cpl Chiropodist
 A.A.P.C. - 1 Cpl Pay Clerk
 A.A.C.C. - 3 Sgt Cooks
 " - 6 Pte Cooks

2/28 AUST INF BN

A.A.C.C. @ 1 W.O.11 Caterer
 " - 1 Cpl Cook

H.Q. R.A.E. 9 AUST DIV

A.A.M.E. - 1 Pte Med Orderly

2/23 AUST INF BN

A.A.C.C. - 3 Cpl Cooks
 " - 5 Pte Cooks
 A.A.M.C. - 1 Sgt Hygiene
 A.A.P.C. - 1 Cpl Pay Clerk

2/9 AUST CAV (COMMANDO) REGT

A.A.M.C. - 1 Sgt Med Orderly
 A.A.O.C. - 1 Cpl Shoemaker

2/24 AUST INF BN

A.A.P.S. - 1 Sgt. Postal Duties

Total - 27

GRAND TOTAL - 406

62 AUST INF BN (AIF) - ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL

1. Following A.I.F. Med Class "A" personnel (Ptes - unless otherwise shown) to be posted to 2/32 AUST INF BN:

<u>Trade</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Trade</u>	<u>No.</u>
Blacksmith	1	M.M.G. Nos	8
Butcher	1	Mortar Nos	23
Carpenters	3	Orderlies	10
Equip Repairers	1	Pioneers	12
Int. Duties	1	Storemen	3
Tech Storemen	2	Stretcher-bearers	6
Batmen	11	Tailor - (Sgt)	1
Gen Duties (Mess)	2	Tk/A Nos	4
Hyg Duties	1	Water Duties	1
L.M.G. Nos & Riflemen	91		
		<u>Total -</u>	<u>182</u>

2. Following A.I.F. Med Class "A" personnel (W.O. & N.C.O's) to be marched to 9 AUST DIV RECEP CAMP pending re-allocation:

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>No.</u>	
Int. Duties	Sgt	1	
"	Cpl	1	
Signaller	Sgt.	1	
Tk/A Nos	Sgt	2	
"	Cpl	2	
L.M.G. Nos & Riflemen	Sgt	9	
"	Cpl	32	
M.M.G. Nos	Sgt	1	
"	Cpl	2	
Mortar Nos	Sgt	2	
"	Cpl	1	
Pioneers	Sgt	1	
"	Cpl	2	
Stretcher-bearers	Sgt	1	
"	Cpl	1	
R.S.M.	W.O.1	1	
C.S.M.	W.O.11	4	
C.Q.M.S.	S/sgt	5	
		<u>Total -</u>	<u>69</u>

GRAND TOTAL - 251

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
Ref: A188/169
18 May 44

Subject: TRANSFER OF O.R. PERSONNEL OF 62 AUST INF BN TO
UNITS OF 9 AUST DIV

2/15 Aust Inf Bn *to FF*

Subtended is copy of HQ 9 Aust Div A89/1/550 of 14
May 44. *to 1 Aust Corps*

Reference your memo on above subject. It is desired to advise that the undermentioned method of transferring personnel of 62 Aust Inf Bn to units of 9 Aust Div is recommended by this HQ and it is requested action be taken accordingly.

- (a) 350 OR personnel (Queenslanders) excl NCOs of and above rank of Cpl be transferred forthwith to 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.
- (b) All NCOs of and above rank of Cpl be held available for posting by HQ 9 Aust Div to units of 9 Aust Div in accordance with present LHQ policy of posting surplus NCOs.
- (c) Remaining OR personnel 62 Aust Inf Bn not included in (a) and (b) above (200-250 dependant on wastage) to be transferred to 2/32 Aust Inf Bn!

Forwarded for your information.

[Signature]
Capt
SC 20 Aust Inf Bde



HQ 9 Aust Div
Ref: A89/1/550
14 May 44

Subject: TRANSFER OF O.R. PERSONNEL OF 62ND AUST INF BN TO UNITS OF 9 AUST DIV.

1 AUST CORPS:

Copy to 20 Aust Inf Bde ✓
24 Aust Inf Bde.

Reference your memo on above subject. It is desired to advise that the undermentioned method of transferring personnel of 62 Aust Inf Bn to units of 9 Aust Div is recommended by this HQ and it is requested action be taken accordingly.

- (a) 350 OR personnel (Queenslanders) excl NCOs of and above rank of Cpl be transferred forthwith to/15 Aust Inf Bn.
- (b) All NCOs of and above rank of Cpl be held available for posting by HQ 9 Aust Div to units of 9 Aust Div in accordance with present HQ policy of posting surplus NCOs.
- (c) Remaining OR personnel 62 Aust Inf Bn not included in (a) and (b) above (200-250 dependent on wastage) to be transferred to/32 Aust Inf Bn.


Maj.-Gen
Comd, 9 Aust Div

*War Diary
N.W.M.*

Subject: Skill-at-Arms Competition

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
Ref: G20/6/225
18 Jun 44

18

9 Aust Div

Copies to:

- 2/13 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/15 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/17 Aust Inf Bn

1. While the proposed Skill-at-Arms competition has certain training advantages, experience has shown, in the opinion of this HQ, that competitions though of value in platoons and companies, are disadvantageous if on a higher level. The spirit of "pothunting" is apt to intrude and the competition becomes more important than the game.
2. Sub-units which win big competitions tend to be regarded as champions but they do not always acquit themselves best in battle.
3. Contests on a level above the company tend to sacrifice co-operation to competition. The emphasis in all training, it is considered, should be on companies, battalions and formations helping one another rather than competing against each other, except in purely sporting events.
4. Where the competition is on a high level, it is thought that training within units may suffer owing to a bias towards those subjects likely to be of value in the competition.
5. Should it be decided that the advantages of a Skill-at-Arms competition outweigh the disadvantages, it is suggested that consideration be given to the following:
 - (a) Only normal sub-units, e.g., platoons, should take part; the inclusion of a number of specially skilled soldiers for the purposes of the contest would defeat its object.
 - (b) As in any given platoon there are likely to be some backward soldiers, it is suggested that the platoon should not necessarily be complete but should be allowed to drop a small percentage of the team from those who are backward.
 - (c) All soldiers on the nominal roll of the platoon should be accounted for.
 - (d) A possible way of selecting teams is to determine by lot which sub-unit in the battalion should be its representative.
 - (e) If the battalions themselves produce their best team, it is possible that an undue proportion of effort be given to training it in the subjects of the competition.
6. Units of this Brigade are arranging for limited competitions within companies.

W. J. V. V. [Signature]
Brig
Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde

*BM seen
Bun (C) [Signature]
SC [Signature]
FO [Signature]
G Super File*

*LO
Boo. [Signature]
RDSW
[Signature]*

*TO JEL
[Signature]*

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
Ref: *520/4/223*
13 Jun 44

Subject: DRAFT PAMPHLET "TROPICAL WARFARE"

9 Aust Div

Ref your G949/50/3 of 1 Jun 44.

1. Attached are five copies of the Draft Notes to shew the proposed treatment of subjects allotted to this Brigade. *This draft is tentative only.*
2. Notes on minor tactics and ambush will follow later.

[Signature]
Brig
Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde

? War Diary

DRAFT

THE APPROACH

1. GENERAL

These notes refer primarily to operations in jungle and country where road communications are undeveloped. Large areas in the tropics are comparatively open and here normal methods will apply.

Axis of advance and main tactical objectives chosen with view to

Security

Simplifying adm problems

Speed of advance

Taking advantage of opportunities for surprise offered by jungle.

Selection based on information gathered from study of air photos and maps. Detailed reports on routes suitable for development required from patrols which should include engineers. When special natural obstacles exist, air recce of great value; should be carried out by engineer officers.

under attack
Planned, determined patrolling vital to secure sufficient information. Enemy dispositions never constant; ground reported clear in the morning may well be held in afternoon. Therefore ground of tactical value must be seized and held. Patrols should not go out and return but report situation and hang on until relieved.

Forward elements must be sufficiently strong to hold as well as probe and must be followed by other troops close enough to occupy in time ground seized by van guard or patrols.

Extent of enemy position rarely able to be determined from a viewpoint. Therefore on contact flanks must be probed and threatened. When discovered, forward infantry can be withdrawn and positions shelled. If small force, may be dispersed. If large, can be engaged until main body is deployed. Some delay inevitable while probing.

Fatigue a major factor in approach. Where tracks impassable to jeeps or native porters lacking, men must carry all heavy gear with corresponding increase in fatigue. Hence mobility less, rate of advance reduced.

The size of the force and the extent of its advance largely determined by supplies. Normal means of supply may have to be supplemented or even replaced by air droppings or landings. In a coastwise advance a force may depend on small craft until a jeep track can be opened behind it.

2. CONTROL OF APPROACH MARCH

Effect of narrow tracks. Column often in single file hence difficult to control. Advance of entire column slow. Greater control and security if forward elements push on and secure ground up to which remainder of column then moves. Thus approach becomes series of advances from firm base to firm base.

Choice of bounds. Commander should consider tactical features, obstacles, arty cover, fatigue, water and supply

when selecting bounds. High ground no use if does not provide observation. Supporting arms less mobile than infantry hence rate at which advance can proceed often determined by speed at which guns can be moved. Therefore infantry advance will be something less than range of 25 pr, whenever constant arty cover considered essential.

bound

Engineer effort involved will influence choice of bounds especially when tanks with leading elements. However, in coastwise operations tanks may be moved by landing craft to avoid obstacles.

Water. Tracks follow ridges rather than valleys; frequently over long stretches of country no water within reach.

Traffic Control. Congestion on narrow difficult tracks increases fatigue and wastes time. Traffic control not only requires a plan for employment of Pro but sound training in march discipline and in passing through during reliefs. Whenever possible track developments should aim at widening track early so that opposing traffic may move freely.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF TRACKS

Native pads often unsuitable for development for wheeled traffic. Ground recce of these essential.

Where traffic is heavy tracks require constant maintenance. Rapid improvement of comms should be put in hand to maintain momentum of advance.

Tracks should be developed on side opposite that on which cable is laid by Sigs.

4. WEATHER AND CLIMATE

Where advance likely to lead from humid coast into high mountains very cold at night, considerations should be given to changes in clothing equipment and supplies made necessary by mountain conditions.

Rain may cause the temporary isolation of forward troops since tracks rapidly become impossible to wheeled vehicles in wet weather. Muddy tracks retard the advance of infantry and greatly increase fatigue.

Cloud and mist in high mountains will influence the employment of air forces in support of ground troops.

5. MOVEMENT BY NIGHT

Not impossible but rarely desirable. Much noise made by troops advancing at night.

6. MARCH DISCIPLINE

Difficulties of terrain, narrow tracks, increased fatigue, overcome only by strictest march discipline. Halts should be more frequent than once an hour.

Timings normal in open warfare do not apply under tropical conditions; distance reckoned in hours rather than miles.

7. DECEPTION

In tropical areas where comms poor and fewer not often possible to deceive enemies to main axis of advance. However progress of advance can be concealed.

Characteristic signs of movement and occupation should be concealed or eliminated. Cooking should be done at mid-day never at end of day unless smokeless cookers available.

Actual track on which main effort is being made should not be disclosed to enemy. Good concealment from air and fire discipline required. Activities of small forces on other tracks, lighting of fires and similar ruses useful.

8. INTER-COMMUNICATION

Where all traffic limited to one narrow track sig cable must follow it. Unless cable laying parties trained to lay cable off one side of track only, cables cut by traffic or engineer units developing track. Parties should be accompanied by others who lift cable well off ground making it fast to trees. Several lines should not be fixed to one tree as danger of all being parted if tree destroyed.

A Sig rep should be attached to all major engineer parties or units working mechanical equipment on tracks.

ADVANCED GUARDS

9. GENERAL

Advantage should be taken of native troops attached to advanced guard for distant reconce forward and to the flanks. Greater mobility than white troops, able to detect enemy at greater distance.

Role in jungle operations similar to that in open warfare. Proportion of advanced guard to main body also similar; but distance between advanced guard and main body small.

Composition varies to suit operations. When advance is along track and distances between sub-units much smaller than in open warfare, supporting arms with main body usually able to assist advanced guard. Commander must consider possibilities of ambush if allotting supporting arms to advanced guard.

Should include armour if ground suitable. Attachment of engineers with heavy mechanical equipment to tanks ~~operating with an advanced guard~~ will save delay during an advance. A detachment of infantry should be allotted for close protection of tanks as they are easily ambushed.

Circumstances may make it desirable for advanced guard battalion to leave behind a proportion of weapons e.g. tk A guns, some mortars. More native porters required by advance guard to increase mobility.

Engineer reconce parties well forward as speed of advance to a large extent depends on early engineer information.

Considerable signal resources in men and cable should be allotted to advanced guard. In high jungle wireless ranges much reduced.

10. CONDUCT OF THE ADVANCE

Advanced guard along track until contact; movement through jungle slow and exhausting, in close jungle continuous searching on flanks of track impossible.

Patrols to search features to flank rejoin rear of column; this requires consideration before advance otherwise advanced guard may be unduly weakened. More troops also required for picqueting of lateral tracks.

Owing to the strain on forward troops moving through jungle reliefs should be frequent; daily in the case of vanguard companies. Relief of advanced guard battalion more difficult. Not desirable that it should be frequent owing to lengths of columns and loss of time while relieving column marches through. Passing one unit through another requires strict control and detailed planning.

Rece and Order Groups should be readily available but not necessarily far forward. Main essential is good communications.

ATTACK

1. GENERAL

The conditions of jungle warfare impose important limitations on the power of modern forces in the attack. These spring from physical and climatic conditions and the restriction of view due to the jungle itself. Main limitations are:

- (a) Loss of control. Fog of war denser in the jungle battle. Lateral communications bad or non-existent. Forces cannot be switched except at great cost in time and exertion.
- (b) Supply problem combines with terrain to restrict size of force employed.
- (c) Transport difficulties reduce mobility, increase time required to build up supplies for attack.
- (d) Restricted observation limits power of artillery ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ and air to support attack.
- (e) Effective recce by unit and sub-unit commanders often impossible.

Very careful appreciation of a supply factor is vital not only to ensure initial success but in order to maintain momentum and enable the commander to exploit and pursue.

The effect of action by quite small forces is often disproportionate to their size. Opportunities are many for manoeuvre of units and sub-units; hence a high degree of military skill is demanded of all commanders. Maintenance of the object then becomes a most important principle. Full orders must reach every soldier so that the whole force is aware of the plan and sub-units and even single men can fight on with the same object in view.

Because of the number and size of natural obstacles armour is usually confined to tracks and roads. To produce armour at the decisive point may involve great engineer effort.

2. PREPARATION

Time. To mount an attack in jungle requires more time than an attack by a similar force under normal conditions. Allowance made for slow movement of troops supporting arms and supplies, difficulties of recce and inter-communication. Often long before patrols bring back sufficient information on which to base plans. All ranks familiar with simple and flexible procedures for recce, contact, deployment so that time saved in opening stages.

Information. Plans based on air photographs which should be available in large quantities. All officers skilled interpreters of photographs, able to relate them to map. Detailed knowledge of enemy can only be built up by intensive planned patrolling which should continue until just before attack launched. Loss of contact for even few hours may profoundly influence operations, e.g. enemy may withdraw unobserved, arty and air preparation wasted, time lost before contact renewed.

Simplicity of plan. Difficulties of recce often so great and vegetation has such effect on movement, that plans must be of utmost simplicity. Always danger of clashes between own troops.

everything possible must be done to prevent sub-units colliding and ensure rapid recognition by forces approaching objective along different routes.

Objectives. Not always easy to define in high jungle but ease of recognition when reached one of chief considerations in choosing.

Clear view of objective before attack very desirable. It may be worthwhile to sacrifice advantages of well covered approach to keep objective in sight.

Where advance is long or final objective not immediately visible, intermediate objectives should be given.

The track itself may be the objective especially when attacking the flank of an enemy position astride the track.

Routes. Difficulty lies not so much in finding covered approaches but in selecting routes that are as short as possible and over which supporting arms and stores can be readily moved. Routes to FUP and SL should be marked unless track has been cut. Centre line or lines marked as assaulting companies advance so that carrying parties waste no time in getting stores to objectives. Also assists in collection of wounded.

The compass is indispensable for keeping direction in high jungle.

FUP and SL. Dense cover will often enable troops to form up close to their objective. May form up on SL.

Formations. Intervals and distance must be sufficiently close to ensure control so that in dense jungle attacks launched on comparatively narrow fronts.

Rate of advance. Varies according to nature of ground and vegetation. Very slow where leading elements must cut way through. In this case careful appreciation of time factor required to co-ordinate advance with supporting fire programme. Fatigue must also be considered.

Time to attack. Advantages flowing from movement by night in open country not so apparent in jungle. Cover given by vegetation of jungle has same effect in the day. Immense difficulties of movement and control in jungle after dark. Probably best to attack when sun high enough to give sufficient light to see to move. Impossible to keep silent when moving in the dark. Late afternoon not good as desirable to consolidate while still light. Weight of these considerations varies with amount of artillery enemy can concentrate and extent to which objectives are clearly defined and likely to be subjected to observed artillery fire.

3. SUPPORTING ARMS IN ATTACK

Air. Full air support possible in jungle. Prearranged strikes by bomber and fighter aircraft to soften enemy positions. Indication of target and positions of own troops, particularly difficult in jungle. May be necessary to withdraw forward troops where positions close to target area.

To get best bomb line e.g. a river line sometimes necessary to forego use of some suitable assembly areas and approaches while aircraft are attacking. Arty or mortar smoke to indicate limits of targets.

Airfields generally too distant and situation too obscure for impromptu support to be given during attacks.

Armour. Where ground and vegetation permit armour of great help in destroying pillboxes or positions in bamboo. Crushing power of tank breaking its way through jungle, opening path for infantry should be exploited to the full. Tanks easily ambushed in jungle.

Artillery. Closeness of own FDLs to enemy may prevent full support being given by artillery. Support takes form of timed concentrations rather than barrages.

Lack of observation makes close support of the forward troops slower and more hazardous.

Artillery should be used whenever possible rather than 3" mortar thus saving fatigue of infantry in replenishing mortar ammunition.

Engineers. Main tasks improvement and maintenance of communications so that adequate supplies can be built up for attack. Engineers with mechanical equipment should be well forward to deal with major natural obstacles in line of advance.

Signals. Telephone and walkie talkie down to platoon most satisfactory means of inter-communication. Commanders almost entirely dependent on wireless and telephone as usually unable to watch progress of battle or employ visual signals or DPs. Line maintenance will make heavy demands on men. Large reserves of cable required well forward.

Forward companies in constant touch by telephone supplemented by RT.

4. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK

Choice of HQ. Whenever possible cmdr will place HQ where he can see battle field but this rarely possible in jungle. Battalion commanders thus become dependent on reports from forward troops. HQ should be sited at place readily found, known to troops and where radio messages can be received. Advisable it should be near readily recognisable feature such as stream or edge of kunai patch. Brigade and higher HQ near open ground for dropping Tac R reports and working radio to AC Squadrons.

Reserves. Low visibility allows a reserve to be placed in position well forward. In constant touch with commander by telephone. May be moved forward behind attacking troops to hold intermediate objectives and prevent enemy slipping past flanks of attack and reoccupying positions.

For reasons given in para 1 (a) positioning of formation reserve is of vital importance.

Infiltration. Special opportunities for highly trained troops to work small parties so close into enemy position as to be immune from his artillery. Many engagements begin from positions very close to enemy.

When owing to special difficulties of ground or vegetation not possible to carry position by assault enemy may be forced to withdraw by pressure of intense small arms fire at close range from parties infiltrating from various directions. Series of attacks with very limited objectives may also be used. Heavy expenditure small arms ammunition and grenades in this type of operation.

Ground should be held however small the gain.

difficulty of
Having regard to opportunity for infiltration and attacking on broad front plan may often be to penetrate enemy positions on narrow front. Leading elements spread out threatening rear positions on wider front while other detachments detailed for the purpose maintain pressure on flanks of penetration.

Mopping up. Opportunities for concealed parties and posts bypassed so great that mopping up must go on as attack proceeds. Otherwise forward troops may be cut off by enemy groups so placed in their rear that they are difficult to engage with arty or mortar fire. Such pockets if left intact, can create disorganisation quite disproportionate to own strength.

Exploitation. Detailed knowledge of ground beyond objective impossible to gain before attack. Therefore most important for commander to go forward quickly if it is reported that a view can be obtained. In any case early recce of captured position by commander essential.

Forward troops will exploit to limit given in orders which will be distance in yards if no convenient natural feature.

Consolidation. Very difficult to know where enemy has gone and how far. Opportunity for enemy to reorganise and counter attack quickly is very great. Demands more than usual energy and forethought in reorganisation. Rapid movement forward of weapons and stores, patrolling and recce of front must be carried out to prepare position against counter attack.

Protection of wounded. Since odd enemy ^{parties} ~~classes~~ may be present or may come in from flanks after forward troops have passed arrangements should be made for protection of wounded collected to await evacuation.

PURSUIT

1. GENERAL

Rapidity of pursuit affected by:

Availability of supplies

Availability of reliefs for forward troops

Availability of engineer resources

Tanks may be of great value in speeding up pursuit if they can be got forward quickly.

Supplies. Constant liaison between "Q" staffs and RAE - quick development of L of C of pursuing troops. Air dropping. Has disadvantages - tends to indicate locations and give away progress. May expose weaknesses.

What can forward troops carry? Natives possibly available. If coastal pursuit may land small forces on flank of or ahead of enemy.

Reliefs. Mere effort of marching in tropical conditions wears out troops even when not in contact. See also ADVANCE GUARDS.

Engineers. Recce parties well forward. Mechanical equipment necessary to make tracks for supplies and arty and to get tanks forward. Bridging may be major problem if tanks required. Centralisation of command to allow engineers to be applied rapidly to most essential tasks.

Tac R. Constant air recce invaluable.

2. TANKS

Often possible to use in close country and very useful against bunker type of defence.

Move close to advance guard and ready to go forward quickly when called.

Difficult to move by bounds on narrow tracks when troops following.

Seldom possible to use more than a troop but preserve squadron organisation and keep remainder of squadron close for reliefs.

3. ARTILLERY

Employ boldly and use every opportunity of getting guns forward especially ^{during} spells of fine weather.

Full advantage should be taken of range to keep enemy under shell fire and thus keep him on the move.

Normal "leap-frogging" so that some guns always in action.

Desirable have senior artillery officer well forward as LO with advance guard commander.

Employment of FOCs - more needed than in open country.

4. ENEMY DELAYING POSITIONS

Mountainous jungle affords ideal positions where tracks follow narrow ridges and Japs appreciate value of these positions. One of the main objects of pursuit is to avoid delay, but out flanking usually time-consuming.

Value of quick arty and/or mortar concentrations, especially when frontal attack unavoidable.

WITHDRAWAL

1. GENERAL

As no great speed can be developed by the pursuer in the jungle, the withdrawal is less hazardous than in open warfare. The country favours ambush by the force withdrawing and this threat imposes caution on the pursuer. The cover afforded by jungle permits all rearward movement to be carried out by day thus eliminating many of the risks and some of the fatigue of withdrawing by night. On the other hand, there is less opportunity in jungle of exploiting the range of artillery and MMG to delay the enemy. Vigorous pursuit will threaten the flanks of the rear guard and force it to fall back early.

2. CONDUCT OF THE WITHDRAWAL

Since the withdrawal will be carried out along tracks generally narrow and difficult, the order of movement and timings should be strictly controlled. Guides, guide-vines and sign posts are important in ensuring the steady flow rearward of sub-units.

Assembly areas can be chosen close behind forward positions and beside the axis of withdrawal. All movement must be as quiet as for a normal night operation.

Rear guards should be strong in automatic weapons and should be able to call on artillery to cover their withdrawal. Where there are good fields of fire rear guard positions should take advantage of them and in such cases MMG and mortars may usefully be retained with the rear parties. But where withdrawal is taking place along tracks through more or less continuous jungle, so that observed fire at anything but the closest ranges is impossible, all heavy weapons should be sent back early. The mortars can in such cases be sited in positions further back from which they can engage the enemy when he appears on the track close in front of the rear guard position and cover their withdrawal.

All gear to be carried by native porters should be sent back early.

PROTECTION

1. GENERAL

Jungle conditions give special opportunities for ambush and surprise attacks. Tracks enforce movement in long columns which are particularly vulnerable.

All arms and services responsible for own protection. Therefore must be trained to fight. Supporting arms must be responsible for own close defence.

Defence of Installations - RAP, ADS, MDS, AP, dumps - must be provided for.

Protection of own L of C should not be required of an advancing formation.

In forward areas all parties, especially line parties, armed at all times. Men not to wander about alone. Drivers armed and escort on vehicles.

2. PROTECTION ON THE MOVE AND AT REST

On the march, column should be well closed up. No stragglers.

At halts, drill for facing outwards and adoption of offensive layout by sub-units.

All defensive arrangements must be made and sub-units in position before dark.

Curfew or patrols according to the situation. Sentry groups and listening posts.

Supporting arms and vehicles should bivouac inside infantry dispositions whenever possible.

To reduce the danger of being closely surrounded and overrun the smallest group to take up defensive position on its own during the advance should consist of two companies. One company holds scarcely sufficient ground to prevent this. It is better if the whole battalion can be disposed for all round defence.

3. ADVANCE GUARDS

Considered under APPROACH.

4. FLANK GUARDS

Tactical features and tracks overlooking the axis of advance from a flank and within small arms range of it must be cleared by a flank guard.

Commander will lay down bounds to co-ordinate movement with that of main column.

Cannot keep pace with column through jungle unless timber and undergrowth open.

Flank guard may be used to picquet lateral tracks leading into main axis of advance.

Telephone only satisfactory means of communication with main body in high jungle.

5. REAR GUARDS

A small rear guard may be required to secure the rear of the column from ambush or attack by small enemy parties.

6. COAST WATCHING

In all operations near a sea coast a system of coast watching should be organised and likely landing beaches close to own positions should be covered by fire.

Tk A, LAA, and MG units may be employed in this role.

INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT

1. GENERAL

Special requirements arising from tropical conditions e.g. lightness, waterproof, general suitability of existing equipment and weapons. Need for constant care.

2. PERSONAL LOADS

Individual gear to minimum; basic requirements; distribution of section loads.

3. OPERATIONAL READINESS

Loaded ready to fight at any time e.g. packing of grenades, ammunition. Able to adopt light order for special task without delay.

4. RATIONS AND COOKING

Limitations on group cooking; need for individual proficiency; F.O.R, Fires; Heating Equipment; Cookers.

5. MEDICAL

Malarial equipment; water purification.

CLOTHING

1. GENERAL

Clothing designed for tropical warfare must be

Light
Durable
Inconspicuous

Able to withstand much washing.

Should dry readily - sweat, rain, rivers.

Formations should keep reserves of clothing well forward.

Clothing deteriorates speedily; is torn by bushes.
Constant sweating hardens and rots material rapidly. Tattered,
rotting clothes have bad effect on health and morale.

2. HEADGEAR

In tropical campaign soldiers subjected to glare, heat of sun directly overhead, as well as gloom of high jungle and torrential rain. Therefore felt hat or light cloth cap essential. Former better in heavy rain. Hats should be waterproof, have brim to shade eyes.

Steel helmets may be necessary where enemy uses much artillery and heavy mortar fire but weight a disadvantage.

3. BOOTS

Boots should be waterproof, fitted with studs in factory.

High rate of wastage due to mud, wading streams, climbing coral ridges and rocks.

Careful fitting of each soldier.

Battalions should hold own reserves of dubbin and laces.

20 AUST INF BDE - TRG INSTN 3

NOTES ON CONFERENCE AT HQ 20 AUST INF BDE - REF TRG OF INF PNR PLATOONS

1. Present: 1 Officer RAB
3 Officers 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn
Pnr Pl Comds or representatives from 2/13; 2/15 ;
2/17 Aust Inf Bns.
2. Experience in last campaign showed great advantage of unit pnr officers having some engr training, not only for technical knowledge but to assist in requisitioning for correct stores.
3. The following subjects were decided upon as those to be covered in training pnr pls of 20 Aust Inf Bde. This is not put forward as a complete syllabus for pnr training, but are the subjects in which in this Bde, at the present time, refresher courses are required.

Some subjects, e.g., wiring obstacles and corduroy roads are not covered, personnel being already trained in these subjects. Refresher instn will be included at end of course if time is available.

Subjects to be covered, in order of priority, include:-

- (i) Knots and lashings, including groundfasts, block and tackle etc.;
- (ii) Bridging, both foot and jeep types;
- (iii) Location of tracks. Experience has proved, that in this, there is a tendency to follow native pads, whereas a more direct route is often preferable determined by compass, markers, etc, consideration being given to gradients;
- (iv) Theory of explosives and hasty demolitions;
- (v) Mines and booby traps;
- (vi) Rafting and river crossings.

4. Method of Instruction

- (a) An intensive instruction cadre course at 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn, for eight pnr personnel from each unit. Period 7 - 14 Jun 44.
- (b) Unit instruction on same syllabus for period 15 Jun - 7 Jul 44.

During the latter period lectures will be given two nights a week by pnr pl Comd on

- (i) Field Geometry;
- (ii) Mines and booby traps.

5. Training stores will be indented for by this HQ and made available to units, as required.

War Drang

J. H. P. King Maj
HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde

MESSAGE FORM

Register No.

Call

Ser. No.

Priority

Transmission Instructions

ABOVE THIS LINE FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FROM

(A)

Bde HQ

Originator

Date—Time of Origin

05110A

Office Date Stamp

TO

2/13

2/15

2/17

For Action

BNS

(re) For Information (INFO.)

Message Instructions

GR

ORIGINATOR'S No.

043

Ref Para on G2020 of 3 June 44 @ Para 9
Sub Para (b) Amend @ Dues for guards and for our duties by
May at discretion of CO. @ Weather conditions being taken into
consideration @ Dues for mounting Parachute and duty at night in
accordance with previous instruction @

This message may be sent **AS WRITTEN**
by any means { except

Wireless

Signed

If liable to be intercepted or fall into
enemy hands, this message must be
sent **IN CIPHER**

Signed

Originator's Instructions
Degree of Priority

Time	System	Op
THI or TOR		
Time Cleared		

20 AUST INF BDE - TRG INSTN 2
GUARDS AND SENTRIES

1. Some recruits have been found to be confused by the general use of the term Sentry to cover different kinds of sentries and by the different methods of challenging by a sentry in the field and a sentry in camp or barracks. During the present training period all soldiers particularly reinforcements will be clearly instructed in the distinction between
 - (a) Sentries posted in the field against enemy approach and
 - (b) Sentries of a ceremonial character such as those who are found from a quarter guard and mounted at a HQ in camp or barracks and
 - (c) Sentries posted to prevent theft of government property etc.
2. The main distinction does not depend on where the soldier is carrying out his duties so much as on the purpose for which he is posted. For example a sentry in a listening post with the duty of giving warning of enemy approach has a task different from that of a sentry mounted on a ration dump. The latter's duties to prevent interference by unauthorised persons are in general the same whether the dump is in a store at Ravenshoe or on the ground at Kelanca.
3.
 - (a) The duties and method of sentries in section posts, listening posts, coast watches, double sentries etc etc, will be taught as part of individual and section training.
 - (b) The most essential lesson is that any man given those duties must have definite orders. It is no use merely detailing him as a sentry. He must be told exactly what he has to do and the circumstances, if any, in which he is to leave his post.
 - (c) Instruction in accordance with Infantry Minor Tactics 1941 (Aust) pages 150 - 152 will be given in Syllabus.
4. In camps sentries' duties vary. Orders are, therefore, required for each post. For example the sentry found from a quarter guard and mounted over a HQ has duties which are mainly ceremonial. The sentry on prisoners must prevent them escaping. The sentry on an ammunition dump must prevent unauthorised persons taking ammunition.
5.
 - (a) It is often undesirable that sentries of a character found by the quarter guard be posted to perform duties which are better performed by regimental police, light dutymen, picquets, storemen etc, who need not necessarily be armed.
 - (b) It is, however, essential that any soldier detailed for the temporary custody or protection of any person or property has definite orders, and is properly posted and relieved by an NCO in accordance with a roster recording the hours of duty of each man. Sentries must not ordinarily relieve one another. When a sentry has the responsibility of guarding a specified number of prisoners or articles the NCO posting the relief and the sentry should, when possible, count them at the commencement of his tour of duty.
 - (c) All sentries, picquets, etc pay compliments to all officers whether in the field or at home stations when the circumstances permit. Sentries (such as prowlers etc) on operational guard duty in the field in accordance with Dismounted Drill MTP18 Aust page 53.
6.
 - (a) Ceremonial guards and sentries properly mounted have a great value in promoting esprit de corps, improving the standard of military bearing drill and turnout throughout the unit by encouraging emulation between Coys by NCOs and attention to details.
 - (b) They are, however, of no value if their work is slovenly or

- (c) It is better to have a small quarter guard which is of a high standard than a large one which is of a low standard.
 - (d) Men employed on ceremonial guard duties miss other training. They cannot, as is sometimes thought, be usefully instructed while in the guard tent. Sentries on duty properly marching their beat for two hours work hard. When relieved and awaiting their next duty they are normally required either to rest or to be cleaning equipment.
7. In order that guard duties interfere as little as possible with training while ensuring that the regimental value of good guard duties is maintained the following principles will be observed.
8. (a) Until ordered later during collective training all units will mount a quarter guard commencing 4 Jun 44.
- (b) Quarter guards will not ordinarily exceed 12 (Sjt or Cpl, Cpl or L/Cpl and 9 or 10 men all from the one Pl). They will never be more than are required to provide relief for the number of posts needed.
- (c) (i) Tour of duty will ordinarily be from retreat to reveille. COs who wish may retain minimum guard by day necessary to maintain one or two ceremonial posts. Members who are dismissed from the guard by day should normally be employed for orderly duties, runners, fatigues in lines etc and not required to undertake training after guard duties at night.
- (ii) Old guard reassembles at guard tent before retreat to change with new guard.
9. (a) Guard mounting parade should be as formal as possible. The inlying picquet and duties will also be paraded. Guard mounting parade concludes at retreat. New guard relieves old guard at guard tent immediately after retreat. CO or 2 i/c will, where possible, watch guard mounting parade and take salute from duties, marching off. Bde Band will be made available to units in rotation for guard mounting.
- (b) Dress for guards and Bn orderly duties, day and night, as from 4 Jun FS, belt and sidearms, or drill order, greatcoats when ordered by CO. Picquets as ordered by CO.
- (c) Strict attention will be paid to MTP No 18 (Aust) pages 48 - 55. All guard Comds and members of guards will be properly instructed by RSM or CSMS.

HM 20 Aust Inf Bde Maj

Subject: Rationing of 9 Aust Div
in NEW GUINEA.

War Diary



HQ Comd AASC 9 Aust Div
Ref: Q8/32/731
3 Jun
~~15~~ 44.

20 Aust Inf Bde.

Attached hereto for your information is copy of report on
a/m subject submitted by this HQ in accordance with 9 Aust Div Q110/1/75
of 16 May 44.

Lt.-col.
(L.A. Withers)
C.A.S.C. 9 Aust Div.

*Do not destroy this file.
Hand it to P.O. for war diary on completion
Munro 9/6/44.*

REPORT ON RATIONING OF 9 AUST DIV.

1. CONDITIONS IN AUSTRALIA.

It is admitted that during the concentration period of this Div. on the Atherton Tablelands supplies were short. It is pointed out however that the responsibility for the forecasting of supplies and providing of same for this Div. was the responsibility of a higher formation. As soon as shortages were discovered the necessary representations were made by this unit to higher formation and the position was rectified as soon as practicable by them. This action was taken prior to the Minister's visit.

2. PERIOD PRIOR TO FALL OF FINSCHAAFEN.

After the landing of 20 Aust Inf Bde Gp., on 22 Sept, at Finschaafen, on instructions received prior to embarkation, the scale of issue to all units was :-

Tea	5/16	onz.	Milk US	2 1/2oz
Margarine				
or	1 3/4	oz	Sugar	3 1/4oz
Butter Tnd				
Meat Pres	10 2/7	oz	Jam	2 oz

This scale was adopted as it was considered that it was of no use issuing certain commodities to units which, owing to the nature of the operations and country, could not be used economically. After the 24 Sept full SWPA scale was available for issue to all units.

3. TEA.

The ration in early stages of the Finschaafen campaign was on a reduced scale, 50%, on account of short supply from further back of the L of C.

On 28 Sep 43 two chests of Tea were pilfered from a reserve Supply Depot, natives being strongly suspected. As this represented two days Tea ration for the force it was decided to withdraw Tea from the scale after issue on 29 Sep until such time as further supplies of Tea were available all remaining stocks were reserved for MOs use only. In response to signal Tea was air-dropped early in the morning of 30 Sep and Tea was issued from then on. This rectified the position as continuity of supply of this commodity was assured.

It was found necessary to reduce the beverage ration on two other occasions for a short period which in no case exceeded 7 days.

With these exceptions there were no variations from SWPA scale.

About the beginning of Dec the Beverage ration was increased to Tea 7/16 ozs, Milk US 4 ozs, Sugar 5 ozs, and Chocolate Eating was available as an equivalent to Cake fruit 1 Nov. It is pointed out that during the whole period of the operation following the landing at FINSCHAAFEN the sundry items shown on SWPA ration scale attached hereto as appendix "A" were issued.

4. BREAD.

About the beginning of Nov the Field Bakery attached to the force was in operation and regular deliveries of loaf Bread were made to all units. when operations permitted.

BREAD (Cont.)

At times due to operational conditions it was not possible to supply loaf Bread to very forward units. In this case arrangements were made with the Fd Bakery to make rolls and these were placed in drums and sent forward. It was not possible to give units the full scale bread issue of 12 oz in rolls as rolls take considerable more preparation than loaf bread and the bakery at this time was not capable of producing a full scale issue of rolls as well as the loaf bread also required. The scale of issue of rolls was 6 oz (3 rolls) per man per diem.

5. FRESH COMMODITIES.

The question of the supply of fresh rations was always under review and early in Nov 43 experiment at plane loads of fresh meat, butter, eggs, and fresh fruit were received. As the experiment was successful approx. 3 to 4 plane loads of these supplies were received. ^{weekly} The fresh meat received was usually sufficient to enable a general issue of 6 ozs per man. All eggs received were sent to medical installations as regards butter and fresh fruit medical installations always had priority and any surplus was made a general issue with forward units receiving priority.

6. EQUIVALENTS FOR MEAT PRESERVED.

The question of equivalents for meat preserved such as sausages, minced beef loaf, camp pie, etc. was always being taken up by this unit with superior authority and all supplies of these commodities received were always issued to units.

7. MEDICAL COMFORTS.

In the early stages of the FINSCHAAFEN operations, within three days of the initial landing, there were adequate stocks of all MEDICAL COMFORTS, and Tongues Tinned were issued on the authority of the SMO in the area at an increased scale owing to the large proportion of light diets due to abdominal wounds.

After the enemy had been forced to withdraw from the area near the MDS in Oct, not Nov as stated, AASC personnel salvaged quite an amount of medical comforts that had to be left when the MDS was evacuated. These were taken on charge.

During the first days of Oct prior to the fall of FINSCHAAFEN, an issue of Fruit fresh was made to all units, consisting of apples, oranges, and pineapples. There was considerable loss of the pineapples due to fermentation of overripe fruit. At the same time Meat frozen was issued to the MDS at SCARLET BEACH in a small quantity. This had been tried as an experiment by HQ 9 Aust Div to see how the commodities carried under the conditions existing at the time.

8. F.O.E. & EMERGENCY RATIONS.

Field Operational Rations were available for forward troops when required throughout the whole of the operations at FINSCHAAFEN although the new type O2 and the new Emergency Ration A3 were not available until towards the end of Nov

9. GENERAL.

There were several times when, owing to the short time allowed for the unloading of craft and the method of stowage of stores in the craft - supplies were generally loaded first, it was impossible to complete the unloading

stores were taken back when the craft retracted and returned to

GENERAL. (Contd.)

Base. This matter was adjusted when taken up with the sub-area responsible for forwarding supplies.

From the foregoing, supported by the SWPA Ration Scale it will be seen that the supply of rations during the operations FINSCHAAFEN to SIO was as laid down with the few exceptions mentioned. At no time during these operations, apart from the first days, were units not issued with M & V and Fish as per scale and issues were available on alternate days of M & V of Meat Pres. ('Bully Beef').

The inference that Meat Pres. and biscuits were used as road making material is mis-leading and considered a gross exaggeration. Occasionally odd cases that had fallen off vehicles, due to the rough roads, may have been rolled into the mud by the traffic.

10. LAE OPS.

In conclusion it might be pointed out that during the LAE operations the ration scale was on a reduced scale, as per appendix "B". During the period from the landing at RED BEACH and YELLOW BEACH, of the division, to the fall of LAE, approx 2 weeks, all troops were, under instructions from HQ 9 Aust Div. issued with this daily scale per man.

The reduced scale was intended to operate for the first or three days after landing. However, due to the fact that road transport became impossible due to the weather, and small craft, which were in limited numbers, being insufficient for all requirements the scale could not be increased by HQ 9 Aust Div.

After the fall of LAE the full hard scale SWPA ration was issued.

APPENDIX TO NEW GUINEA FORCE ORDER Q 241
Amended ration Scale for AMF

COMMODITY	AMF SCALE	EQUIVALENT COMMODITIES	SCALE
BEVERAGES	(oz)		(oz)
Coffee	1/5	Tea	1/8
Tea	7/16	Cocoa	1-1/4
CEREALS			
Bread	12	Biscuits or Flour or Bread & Biscuit or Dribarm and Flour and Sugar and Salt Coarse and Dripping and NY Malt	9 9 10 2/7 3/7 .144 9.6 .192 .192 .036 .03
Fleur	2	Wholewheat or Oatmeal or Wheatmeal	2 2 2
Rice	1/2	Wholewheat	1/2
Wheatmeal	1	Flaked Oats or Rolled Oats	1 1
CONDIMENTS			
Mustard	1/100	Pe	
Pepper	1/100		
Powder Curry	1/50		
Black Salt	1/2		
FATS			
Butter	1 3/4	Margarine or Tropical Spread or Butter Tinned	1 3/4 1 3/4 1 3/4
Lard	1/2	Dripping or Margarine	1/2 1/2
FRUITS			
Dried	1	Fruit tinned or Pie fruit	4 3
Fresh	4	Fruit tinned	3
MEATS			
Bacon	6/7	Sauseages tinned or Meat fresh	1 5/7 2 4/7

COMMODITY	AMF SCALE (oz),	EQUIVALENT CORE COMMODITY	SCALE (oz)
<u>MEATS etc.</u>		or	
		Meat Pres	1 5/7
		or	
		Fish tinned	1 5/7
Cheese	6/7	Egg Dried	1/4
Fresh	13 5/7	Meat pres	10 2/7
		or	
		Fish tinned	10 2/7
		or	
		Camp Pie	10 2/7
		or	
		Meat Dehyd.	3 3/7
		or	
		Mince beef loaf	10 2/7
		or	
		M & V	13 5/7
		or	
		Sauseages tinned	10 2/7
Ham	1 5/7	Fish tinned	1 5/7
<u>MILK</u>			
Condensed US	4	Condensed Sweet	2 1/2
		or	
		Milk dried FC	2 1/2
		or	
		Milk condensed US	1 1/2
		and	
		Milk dried FC	1
<u>RISINGS</u>			
Powder Baking	1/25		
<u>SUGARS</u>			
Jam	2	Marmalade	2
		or	
		Golden Syrup	2
Sugar	5		
<u>VEGETABLES</u>			
Fresh	12	Vegs Dried	3
		or	
		Fruit Fresh	6
		or	
		Fruit tinned	4 1/2
		or	
		Veg tinned	10
		or	
		Beans baked	6
		or	
		M & V	6
Peas Blue	2/7		
<u>VEGETABLES DRIED</u>			
Onions	1/2	Onions tinned	1 2/3
		or	
		Onions fresh	2

COMMODITY	AMF SCALE (oz)	EQUIVALENT COMMODITY	SCALE (oz)
<u>VEGETABLES DRIED etc.</u>			
Potatoes Dehyd.	2	Potatoes Tinned	4
		or	
		Potatoes Fresh	12
		or	
		Rice	2
		and	
		Tomato Puree	1/4
		or	
		Macaroni	2
		or	
		S paghetti	2
		and	
		Tomato Puree	1/4
		or	
		Potato Fresh	8
		and	
		Rice	1
		and	
		Tomato Puree	1/4

SUNDRY ITEMS

Cake Fruit	3/7
Essence Flavouring	1/350
Juices - Fruit	2
or	
Tomato	2
Powder Custard	1/8
Sauce Tomato	1/4
Spice Mixed	1/350
Tomato Puree	3/7

NOTES : 4 ozs Meat, Pres - 3/4 oz Egg Dried
4 ozs Fish Tinned - 1 1/4 oz Egg Dried
(Egg Dried 1 oz - 3 Eggs Fresh).

LAE CAMPAIGN.

COMMODITY	SCALE - Per Man Per Day.
	(oz)
Tea	5/26
Coffee	1/5
Milk	2 1/2
Sugar	3 1/4
Meat Pres	10 2/1
Biscuits	6
Rice	1/2
Curry Powder	1/50
Salt	1/2
Beans Baked	3
or	
Fish	1 5/7
Margarine	1 3/4

Subject: Rationing and Other Aspects
of 9 Aust Div Administration

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
Ref: A186/295
28 May 44

9 Aust Div

Ref our A186/294 of 27 May 44.

Please delete sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 13 of the report
and substitute:-

(b) commencing on 24 Sep for consumption on and after 25 Sep
the Detail Issue Depot at Scarlet Beach issued rations in
accordance with the SWPA scale to all units desiring them
except in the case of tea, milk and sugar.

(signed) WJV WINDEYER Brig
Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde

Subject: Rationing and Other Aspects
of 9 Aust Div Administration

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
Ref: A186/294
27 May 44

9 Aust Div

Ref your Q110/1/75 of 16 May 44.

1. Report as requested in para 2 is attached.
2. In furnishing this report as ordered I respectfully invite attention to the undesirable circumstances in which it is called for.
3. An anonymous private soldier (it appears, from a Field Ambulance) was allowed access to the Minister apparently not to make a personnel application but to make representations concerning leave for a whole formation - and while there and in the absence of his commander made some specific complaints and a number of extravagant generalisations concerning conditions allegedly prevailing throughout the whole formation during a period of many months.
4. I am required to report on statements permitted to be made in this manner at the same time that I am required to enforce the law concerning the proper channel for complaints and recommendations.
5. Episodes like this become known. Soldiers are thus encouraged not only to make direct representations to the Minister - which by military law they are forbidden to do - but what is worse to provide press and parliamentary critics of the Minister with information often incorrect and garbled.
6. Such incidents strengthen the growing belief that the soldier who obeys his orders is at a disadvantage with those who seek outside influence, and that influence counts for more than merit.

This is discouraging to officers who seek to preserve discipline and who are solicitous for the welfare of their men by recommendations made through normal channels. It is damaging to all efforts to maintain in the Service a tradition of loyalty to superior authority and to the Commonwealth Government irrespective of any political considerations.



Brig
Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde

REPORT ON STATEMENT MADE TO THE MINISTER OF THE ARMY BY A SOLDIER
OF 9 AUST DIV

Introductory

1. (a) This report deals with the more specific statements made in the abovementioned statement.
 - (b) No comment is made on statements which are obviously extravagant or are mere irresponsible generalisations, such as for instance the statement that the troops refused to look at the bully beef and many of them vomited at the sight of it. It is obvious that a private soldier apparently serving with 2/8 Aust Fd Amb is not in a position to generalise concerning conditions throughout the whole of a division during a campaign lasting six months.
 - (c) The Bde Comd's views on the circumstances in which the soldier's statement was made are contained in the covering letter.
 - (d) This report deals only with conditions in 20 Aust Inf Bde, and in units under command for certain periods of 20 Aust Inf Bde. This HQ is not in a position to make any statements concerning other parts of 9 Aust Div.
2. (a) There is nothing in the statement of the soldier to suggest that he has had such a great experience of conditions in different campaigns and different theatres of war as to qualify him to make generalisations and criticisms on matters of administration.
 - (b) The inference from his statement that something "must be done.....to save the morale of the troops" is untrue of the troops of this brigade, and particularly of those who were most subjected to hardships in the recent campaign.
3. The general opinion of experienced infantry officers and soldiers seems to be that from October 1943 to March 1944 the general standard of rations in the New Guinea campaign was better than during the siege of Tobruk, and as good as for those in the line it was during most phases of the operations before and during the battle of Alamein.
 4. The fact that previously in New Guinea and in other campaigns other soldiers may have endured much greater hardship in a much better spirit is however irrelevant to a consideration of how far this soldier's complaints are justified.

Conditions in Australia in 1943

5. (a) The statement of the soldier that the food was "absolutely bad" is untrue. It was for a short period rather insufficient but never bad.
 - (b) The concentration of 20 Aust Inf Bde at Atherton was complete about middle of April 1943. Until the end of April rations were not always up to scale and lacked variety.
 - (c) This was apparently due to shortage of stocks on the Tableland and to the fact that the staff of the Detail Issue Depot during the period of concentration were inexperienced in rationing for a large and steadily increasing number of troops. After AASC 9 Aust Div took over the Detail Issue Depot, a considerable improvement occurred. By about the end of April rations were up to scale and satisfactory.
6. (a) Amenities and canteen buildings had not been erected in the camps before the troops arrived. These were being

constructed by civilian workers during the time troops were there. Progress appeared slow.

(b) Canteen supplies, particularly tobacco, were very short for a time.

(c) Race meetings, pictures, dances, camp fire concerts and sports were organised for the men.

7. There was for a time a certain amount of dissatisfaction among the troops during this period. This was not due to an unreadiness to put up with discomfort but rather to:-

(a) Some general disillusionment on coming home;

(b) A tendency to contrast the lack of proper provision on the Atherton Tableland with the arrangements made in the Middle East by British and Australian authorities for the accommodation of troops coming into an area; and

(c) A tendency to contrast the supply of canteen goods and the provision of amenities generally with conditions which they had seen prevailing in Line of Communication camps in Australia.

8. The statement that "after the Minister's visit things improved" is inaccurate. They had improved some time before the Minister's visit, and the improvement was not associated with the visit.

9. By the middle of May troops had settled down well. By the time of embarkation in July morale was very high.

New Guinea Conditions

10. (a) 20 Aust Inf Bde arrived in New Guinea in July and early August 1943. It took part in the Lae campaign commencing on 4 Sep 43. It landed at Scarlet Beach (near Finschhafen) under fire on 22 Sep 43. Thereafter it was engaged in operations against Finschhafen (captured on 2 Oct 43), and then in further operations in the Finschhafen-Sattelberg-Sio area until 21 Jan 44, when it was relieved at Sio. It remained in New Guinea but not operationally employed until March 1944.

(b) During the period from 22 Sep to about 11 Oct this brigade (with other troops under command to constitute a brigade group) was operating alone in the Finschhafen area. The rest of the division arrived later, mainly between 9 Oct and 15 Oct. During the period 22 Sep to 11 Oct 2/8 Aust Fd Amb, to which unit the Minister's informant appears to belong, was under command 20 Aust Inf Bde. After divisional headquarters and the remainder of the division arrived in the area, 2/8 Aust Fd Amb passed from command of this brigade to ADMS, and the sector in which it was operating was controlled by 24 Aust Inf Bde.

Any comments in this report on incidents alleged by the soldier relating to the hospital at Scarlet Beach are therefore restricted to the period from 22 Sep to 12 Oct. After the later date this HQ was not responsible for the unit.

Rations

11. It is understood that a report is being prepared by AASC dealing in more detail with ration scales and commodities issue. Records of these matters are not kept at this HQ.
12. (a) The soldier's statement generalising as to the whole of the 9 Div that the division "on service at Finschhafen had nothing but bully beef and biscuits for days and days on end" is untrue.
(b) It is not even true of the soldier's own unit.
13. (a) For the day of the landing (22 Sep) and two days thereafter a special hard scale ration was issued, consisting in some cases of Field Operational Ration, in others of the scale shown in Appendix A.
(b) On 24 Sep for consumption 25 Sep the Detail Issue Depot at Scarlet Beach issued rations in accordance with the SWPA scale in all items except tea, milk and sugar to all units desiring to draw it.
14. Some units did not draw full entitlements as they could not handle full ration. At this time and until the capture of Finschhafen on 2 Oct some companies of infantry battalions were operating in the hills in very rough country where the full ration could not be handled. They therefore did not draw some items, which were held on their behalf until a stage was reached in the operations when they could get them to their troops. Similar conditions arose again from time to time in the later stages of the campaign. But these difficulties did not apply to units such as 2/8 Aust Fd Amb Main Dressing Station (the only Australian hospital unit at Scarlet Beach) which were issued with their full entitlement regularly, and also more than their normal entitlement of special hospital food and comforts (see para 16)
15. The tea, sugar and milk ration was only 50% of SWPA scale. This was in accordance with orders received by this HQ. The items were, it is understood, in short supply throughout New Guinea. Stocks landed at Finschhafen did not permit a greater issue. The ration of these items was not increased until December. (see comments in para 17).
16. The statement that bully beef and biscuits were all that were available to the wounded is untrue. 2/8 Aust Fd Amb drew from Advanced Supply Depot and Detail Issue Depot a large quantity of medical comforts consisting of such items as tinned tongue, tinned fruit etc.
17. Tea
Attention was drawn by this HQ to the serious effects of the reduced tea and sugar ration during the campaign.
The matter was made worse by the wholly inadequate supply of solidified alcohol. Troops in areas forward of the beachhead unable to make fires because of proximity to the enemy were at times without any tea or hot meal. Only 1152 usable tins of solidified alcohol were landed. Signals were sent for more but it was not obtainable.
18. (a) The statement that the Brigade Commander "sent out a frantic appeal for tea which was dropped by 'plane" is misleading.
(b) Tea stocks on 29 Sep were depleted. On that day two small chests were found to be missing from a reserve dump of the Advanced Supply Depot. It was at first thought that they had been stolen by troops, but later evidence suggests that they were taken by natives. As this left stocks very low indeed, the Brigade Commander ordered all remaining stocks to be held for the medical services, and requested by signal to 9 Aust Div that tea be dropped by aircraft. This was done very promptly on the early morning of 30 Sep.

19. This was not the only occasion on which commodities urgently required were air dropped when requested. Droppings were also made of atabrin, operational rations and ammunition.

Field Operational Ration

20. (a) The soldier's statement that it was "a rare occasion indeed that the FOR was available to the fighting troops" is incorrect, - probably because he may not have been a fighting troop and therefore was not in a position to know.
- (b) In fact the new Field Operational Ration is for its purpose an excellent ration and after it became available it was regularly supplied to the forward battalions during the advance to Sio.
21. (c) In a unit which is in a position to cook and in which proper attention is given to catering and cooking men prefer not to be given the field operational ration as a ration for daily consumption.
21. (a) The soldier's allegations that he lived on bully beef and biscuits day after day for months is incredible. A field bakery was operating at Finschhafen as from the middle of November. Bread was available to all units. As the soldier's unit was not then under command of this brigade, no certain allegation can be made. But it is assumed that it participated in the issue of bread.
- (b) Fresh meat was issued at frequent intervals from December.
22. (a) This HQ in November, in addition to urging the need for a full tea and sugar ration, made many suggestions from an AASC officer attached to LHQ who visited the brigade seeking information.
- (b) The main recommendations then made were what the Minister's informant now seeks, namely a greater variety in the staple meat ingredient. Camp pie, tinned sausages and meat and vegetable ration were recommended as variants for bully beef.
- (c) Experience has shown however that men get tired of bully beef less quickly than of other forms of tinned meat (especially meat and vegetable ration). Good cooks can use bully beef in a greater variety of ways.
23. It is necessary to remember in assessing comparisons by soldiers of rations in New Guinea and elsewhere that during operations in New Guinea they receive only their rations and a very limited quantity of canteen goods. In camps in the Middle East and in Australia rations are in many units much supplemented by extras purchased out of regimental funds, canteen profits etc. To the soldier it is all food. Its source is often not known. This was particularly the case at Alamein in 1942 when, owing to the proximity of the armies in the field to Alexandria, considerable purchases were able to be made of fresh food of almost every kind both by units and by the supply services. Most experienced soldiers understand that circumstances vary in which such purchases can be made and are appreciative of extras when provided rather than plaintive when they are not available

American and Australian Rations and Equipment

24. (a) The contrast between American and Australian rations and equipment is always striking in rear echelons. The Americans always move with more impedimenta and have more elaborate rations.
- (b) The Australian soldier is trained to live much harder than the American. The contrast is irksome to witness but the conclusion is not that we should live softer than we do. They are no doubt some items of American medical and other equipment which with advantage be added to Australian war equipment, but it is not considered that the Australian Army should adopt the elaborate scale of equipment carried by American units. It would have been impossible for the forward troops in the Finschhafen campaign to operate efficiently had they been encumbered with equipment such as the Americans on the beachhead could enjoy ~~or endeavoured to live as they did.~~
- (c) The Minister's informant, who was himself at the beachhead, could contrast his own conditions with Americans there. It would have profited him more if he had contrasted his own conditions with those of the forward troops, and their spirit with ~~their~~ ^{his} spirit.
25. The soldier's comparison between the American Beach Aid Station's medical equipment and that of the Fd Amb was justified. But it must be remembered that the one was designed to be stationary at a beachhead, the other to be mobile in jungle conditions.

Bombing of MDS

26. ^{in the} The statement that ~~my~~ MDS hot food and tea were ^{for four days} not prepared for the wounded is substantially true. The facts are as follows:
- (a) The whole Scarlet Beach area, which was the main beachhead, was bombed very frequently both by day and night, during the whole period that the MDS was under command of this HQ (see para 10 sub para b). All parts of the beachhead area including the area where the MDS was situated were hit on some occasions. But there is no evidence that the MDS or any other installations or dumps was singled out as a target. All were concealed in the jungle; but the fact that the Scarlet Beach area was our beachhead and maintenance area was necessarily well known to the enemy.
- (b) To reduce the signs of activity and avoid disclosing by smoke the exact location of our troops restrictions were placed throughout the brigade on the use of wood fires, particularly during early morning and evening.
- (c) Some troops in the beachhead were firmly of the opinion that the enemy bombed any place whence smoke was coming. There is little evidence to support this. Bombing occurred whether or not smoke was visible.
- (d) In no part of the beachhead area except the MDS was this curtailment ^{of fire} followed by the cessation of regular cooking, and it is not known to this HQ why it ^{ceased} ~~is~~ there. Other installations were able to cook with petrol mixed in sand or by improvised burners or fires which showed little smoke. In the MDS apparently, primus stoves were used until 4 Oct when the supply of kerosene which was limited was exhausted.
- (e) On 7 Oct the Bde Comd on a visit to the MDS found that regular cooking had been suspended for three days. He ordered that it be resumed immediately and that tea at least should be made regularly for patients by the use of wood fires if other means were not available.

- (f) This was done. A fire was lit. Very shortly afterwards Scarlet Beach was bombed and some bombs fell on the MDS.
- (g) It has since been learnt that the order for the resumption of the use of fires had been resented by some soldiers of the Fd Amb and the bombing was thought by them to justify their contention that it was inviting bombers.
- (h) It was probably a mere coincidence. The Bde Comd would give the same order again in similar circumstances.
- (i) As a result of this incident, the desirability of providing hydro burners was constantly present to the minds of some soldiers in the Field Ambulance.
- (j) This HQ made a recommendation to 9 Aust Div in October that hydro burners be supplied to medical and other installations. In fact some were received late in November.
- (k) Apparently the reason why they were not taken in the first instance by the MDS was a shortage of shipping space. It is reported that only seven tons of equipment were allowed to the Field Ambulance and a further three tons by LST on the night 22/23 Sep. The allotment of craft to the force and the limitation of loading weights were not determined by this HQ.

Evacuations of Casualties from Finschhafen

- 27.
- (a) This was unsatisfactory. The Casualty Clearing Station consisted of a light detachment only which worked in conjunction with and under the command of 2/8 Aust Fd Amb Main Dressing Station. Neither the Casualty Clearing Station nor the Main Dressing Station had the capacity for holding a large number of patients. In fact, owing to the lack of proper sea transport, many serious cases which would normally have been on high priority for evacuation had to be held in the area for an unduly long period under adverse conditions.
 - (b) Arrangements for evacuation beyond Scarlet Beach were not the task of this HQ. The number of wounded awaiting evacuation and particulars were signalled regularly.
 - (c) As no other craft were made available, LCMs (the barges mentioned by the soldier) had eventually to be employed. These were neither designed nor equipped for the purpose.
28. The soldier's statement that all wounded were evacuated by barge is incorrect. In fact between 20 and 30 wounded were evacuated by LST on the night 22/23 Sep and 139 by APD on the night 30 Sep/1 Oct. Many of the more serious cases however could not then be moved. Appendix B shews evacuations from 2/8 Aust Fd Amb. It does not include the cases evacuated by similar means from Casualty Clearing Station.

Operations against Lae

29. In his statement the soldier does not specifically mention conditions during the operations against Lae, but in the opinion of this HQ the ration supplied to the troops during that campaign was unsatisfactory and consisted too largely of bully beef. It had an adverse effect on the health of some of the troops and was responsible for a tendency to vitamin B deficiency and a general loss of energy.

APPENDIX A TO 20 AUST INF BDE REPORT ON STATEMENT
MADE TO THE MINISTER OF THE ARMY BY A SOLDIER OF 9 AUST DIV

Reduced Ration Scale for early Finschhafen Operations

Meat Pres.	10	2/7	ozs
Biscuit	9		ozs
Margarine tnd	1	3/4	ozs
Tea		5/16	ozs
Milk	2	1/2	ozs
Sugar	3	1/4	ozs
Jam	2		ozs

APPENDIX B TO 20 AUST INF BDE REPORT ON STATEMENT
MADE TO THE MINISTER OF THE ARMY BY A SOLDIER OF 9 AUST DIV

2/8 AUST FD AMB MDS

EVACUATIONS BY SEA

Date	Patients held before Evacuation	Number Evacuated	Type of Craft
Sep			
23	67	22	LST
30	270	100	APD
Oct			
2	182	97	LCM
4	113	31	LCM
5	89	29	LCM
7	141	37	LCM
8	130	71	LCM
10	93	34	LCM

H Q 9 Aust Div

Ref : Q 110/11/75

16 May 44

SUBJECT - RATIONING OF 9 AUST DIV IN NEW GUINEA.

20 Aust Inf Bde ✓
24 Aust Inf Bde
26 Aust Inf Bde
HQ Comd AASC 9 Aust Div
ADMS 9 Aust Div.



- ... 1. Attached hereto is copy of report by a Private of this Division to the Acting Minister of the Army.
2. It is requested that a report be forwarded to this HQ as to the relevant matters contained in this report as early as possible.

[Signature] Lt.-Col.
A A & Q M G., 9 Aust Div.

EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENT MADE BY A MEMBER OF A UNIT OF
THE NINTH DIVISION.
-----GENERAL CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF THE NINTH DIVISION IN AUSTRALIA.

1 Pte stated that, apart from the leave question, he would appreciate the opportunity to place before the Minister, certain views which he held in regard to improvements which might be made in relation to certain matters which had come to his notice while serving with the Ninth Division.

2 On return of the Ninth Division they were sent to the Atherton Tableland. They were told in the Middle East that that is where they would go on their return. On their arrival at Atherton, however, they found that nothing had been done in the way of camp facilities. They had therefore to provide their camps and the camp buildings. They, however, did not object to this, if other conditions had been properly provided for. The food was absolutely bad, there was little tobacco or cigarettes, and little of any amenities, and practically no entertainment, as compared to the conditions in the Middle East, where, while leave conditions were not good, and under any conditions there was nowhere to go other than sight-seeing, but the amenities, entertainment and food were, in the camps themselves, quite good.

3 Pte stated that after the Minister's visit things improved considerably - the food was better, the tobacco ration was also improved, and the resentment then died down.

NEW GUINEA CONDITIONS.

4 Pte suggested that something must be done in regard to New Guinea to save the morale of the troops. He indicated that the food and facilities for cooking the food was shocking and must be improved.

5 He stated that the Ninth Division on service at Finschhafen had nothing but bully-beef and biscuits for days and days on end. He stated that no one would mind bully-beef and that where it was the only meat that could be issued, under other than tropical conditions, the troops were quite fond of it, but under the conditions at Finschhafen, bully-beef melting in the tins, there were days on end when the troops refused to look at it, many of them vomited at the sight of it.

6 The indignation of the lads, however, was intense, when they found out that the same bully-beef and biscuits that had been glided along the supply lines for the fighting troops, was the only food that was available for the wounded. Four days he stated, the wounded did not have a cup of tea, they could not light a fire without the Japanese planes coming over and bombing the smoke. After four days without tea, his unit had lighted a fire with the result that the Japanese planes spotted the smoke and from then on the hospital and the area surrounding it was bombed incessantly. Pte suggested that if foresight had been shown, field cooking apparatus could have been provided, and the absence of it, notwithstanding ~~difficult~~ the extreme difficulties of transportation, was in the opinion of all troops, inexcusable.

7 They were aware that the plan had been worked out for this attack and that in putting the "stunt" on it had not come out according to plan, and for this reason, the troops were prepared to take a certain amount of inconvenience, but when it became generally known that the wounded had been put on barges after nine days in the medical dressing stations, and had received the same bull-beef and biscuits that they themselves had received, they were incensed.

8 He stated that the wounded in the medical dressing ~~st~~stations had been under Japanese fire from the 18th and 19th November, and that later the Japs got to within 100 yds of the station, and in consequence they had to evacuate the wounded, who prior to this had not been receiving adequate treatment in view of the limited facilities available. He stated that he had yet to see a starved Japanese prisoner or dead Japanese looking more starved and haggard than these wounded when they were put on the barges, notwithstanding that the Japs he had seen were mere skin and bone.

9 Compared to the Australian facilities, the American equipment and feeding arrangements were excellent, clearly indicating that if proper attention was given to the supply of equipment and supplies there was no reason why, notwithstanding the difficulties of transport, they could not be got to the troops.

10 An American officer who had been assisting at the medical dressing station stated that in his opinion the conditions of the wounded Australians were a disgrace to any country, and that no civilized people should treat their wounded as the Australians had been treated.

11 The Americans had brought ashore mobile and special cookers on the same style the old-fashioned coolsafe, while they had fresh eggs on their barges, not only for their wounded, but also for their troops.

12 Due to the lack of equipment and supplies, American units adjacent to them, had assisted the Australians in carrying their wounded. They had supplies of tarpaulins to the maximum extent possible from their own stores, and had erected shelters with them. They had even pulled down their own tents and sleeping quarters and worked till 9 p.m. putting them up for shelters for the Australian wounded, supplying them with packets of cigarettes, sticks of candy and boxes of matches - all of which were missing from the Australian stores.

13 It was generally believed that Brigadier Windeyer at this time had sent out a frantic appeal for tea, which had been dropped by plane, and had also begged for improved rations for the troops.

14 The Minister referred to the approvals given by him from time to time for special New Guinea rations, and for equipment.

15 Pte. stated that it was well known to all the troops that there was ample equipment and rations available, but they blamed the planning and supply arrangements for falling down on their job. He stated that he had received the Army rations when he was in southern New Guinea and on the boat returning to Australia. He stated that they were the best rations that he had ever had. For the whole of the six months that he had been in New Guinea the ration had mainly consisted of bully-beef. Fresh meat was the rarest of all rations, but of course the troops understood the difficulties of getting this and had no grievance in regard to its being missing.

16 After the troops had come out of action they were told that General Morshead and Brigadier Evans, in addition to Brigadier Windeyer, had endeavoured to get better rations, but had little success.

17 He stated that the waste of money and transport due to the issue of bully-beef and biscuits must have cost the country many tens of thousands of pounds.

18 In reply to the Minister he stated that the field operational ration, when it was available, was regarded as a good one, and was a big improvement of anything that kind that they had seen before, but it was a rare occasion indeed that any such ration was available to the fighting troops.

19 In regard to bully-beef, the troops could not understand why they did not get a variety of tinned food, such as camp pie, sausages, steak and kidney pie was relished by the troops as superior to bully-beef, although they supposed that as it was more costly they were not entitled to it.

20 The Minister stated that there was no truth in this as the New Guinea ration was a much more costly ration than the normal Australian ration, and the Government had no desire to exclude the troops from proper feeding conditions.

21 Pte stated that in forward operational areas there was a certain tautness of nerves, and the issue of the same bully-beef and biscuits day after day, completely unnerved the troops and made them almost go berserk.

22 This nervous tautness was accentuated when, after receiving bully-beef and biscuits for many days, beans became the order of the day, and they stayed on that for a further seven days; if the two had been alternated each day, it would not have been anything like as bad.

23 In regard to tinned sausages which he stated was a welcome change - none of the troops of the Ninth Division had seen them since their return from the Middle East.

BISCUITS

24 Pte stated that the Australian biscuit was impossible for a man to eat if he had poor or false teeth. He asked why Australians could not have the same biscuit as the Americans, which is not quite so hard, and a little sweeter, but far more palatable.

25 He stated that in Finschhafen and the adjacent areas, he had seen troops taking the biscuits, saturating them with inflammable material, and using them for firewood. He said that the greatest waste he had ever come across in the Army apart from clothing was in bully-beef and biscuits, which he had seen, rolled into the mud by the case unopened by the road making caterpillar type equipment.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX TO NEW GUINEA FORCE ORDER Q 241

Amended Ration Scale for AMF

COMMODITY	AMF SCALE	EQUIVALENT COMMODITIES	SCALE
<u>BEVERAGES</u>			
Coffee	1/5	Tea	1/8
Tea	5/16	Cocoa	1-1/8
<u>CEREALS</u>			
Bread	12	Biscuit or Flour	9
		or Bread & Biscuit	10-2/7
		or Dribarm and Flour	3/7
		and Sugar	.144
		and Salt Coarse	9.6
		and Dripping	.192
		and Mymalt	.192
Flour	2	Wholewheat	.036
		or Oatmeal	2
		or Wheatmeal	2
Rice	1/3	Wholewheat	1 1/2
Wheatmeal	1	Flaked Oats	1
		or Rolled Oats	1
<u>CONDIMENTS</u>			
Mustard	1/100		
Pepper	1/100		
Powder Curry	1/50		
Salt	1/8		
<u>FATS</u>			
Butter	1 1/2	Margarine	1 3/4
		or Tropical Spread	1 3/4
		or Butter tinned	1 3/4
Lard	1/2	Dripping	1 1/2
		or Margarine	1/2
<u>FRUITS</u>			
<u>Dried</u>	1	Fruit Tinned	4
		or Pie Fruit	3
Fresh	4	Fruit Tinned	3

COMMODITY	AMF SCALE (oz)	EQUIVALENT COMMODITY	SCALE (OZS)
<u>MEATS</u>			
Bacon	6/7	Sausages Tinned or Meat Fresh or Meat Pres or Fish Tinned Egg Dried	1 5/7 2 4/7 1 5/7 1 5/7 3/4
Cheese	6/7		
Fresh	13 5/7	Meat Pres or Fish Tinned or Camp Pie or Meat Dehyd or Mince Beef Loaf or M & V or Sausages Tinned	10 2/7 10 2/7 10 2/7 3 3/7 10 2/7 13 5/7 10 2/7
Ham	1 5/7	Fish Tinned	1 5/7
<u>MILK</u>			
Condensed US	2 1/2	Condensed Sweet or Milk Dried FC or Milk Cond US and Milk Dried FC	2 1/2 2 1/2 1 1/2 1
<u>RISINGS</u>			
Powder Baking	1/25		
<u>SUGARS</u>			
Jam	2	Marmalade or Golden Syrup	2 2
Sugar	3 1/2		
<u>VEGETABLES</u>			
Fresh	12	Vegs Dried or Fruit Fresh or Fruit Tinned or Veg Tinned or Beans Baked or M & V	3 6 4 1/2 10 6 6
Peas Blue	2/7		

COMMODITY	AMF SCALE (oz)	EQUIVALENT COMMODITY	SCALE (oz)
<u>VEGETABLES DRIED</u>			
Onions Dehyd	$\frac{1}{2}$	Onions Tinned or Onions Fresh	1 $\frac{2}{3}$ 2
Potatoes Dehyd	2	Potatoes Tinned or Potatoes Fresh or Rice and Tomato Puree or Macaroni or Spaghetti and Tomato Puree Or Potato Fresh and Rice and Tomato Puree	4 12 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ 2 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ 8 1 $\frac{1}{2}$

SUNDRY ITEMS

Cake Fruit	$\frac{3}{7}$
Essence Flavouring	$\frac{1}{350}$
Juices - Fruit	2
or Tomato	2
Powder Custard	$\frac{1}{2}$
Sauce Tomato	$\frac{1}{2}$
Spice Mixed	$\frac{1}{350}$
Tomato Puree	$\frac{3}{7}$

NOTES : 4 ozs Meat, Pres - $\frac{3}{4}$ oz Egg Dried
 4 ozs Fish Tinned - 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ ozs Egg Dried
 (Egg Dried 1 oz - 3 Eggs, Fresh).

Reduced Ration Scale for ^{early F.} LAE Operations

+ Meat Pres.	10 2/7	ozs
+ Biscuit	9	ozs
Beans tnd.	6	ozs
+ Margarine tnd	1 3/4	ozs
Salt	1/2	ozs
+ Tea	5/16	ozs
Coffee	1/5	ozs
+ Milk	2 1/2	ozs
+ Sugar	3 1/4	ozs
Rice	1/2	ozs
Curry Pdr	1/50	ozs
+ JAM	2	ozs

Items marked + were issued for early French Ops. plus JAM 2ozs

2/8 FD AMB MDS

B

EVACUATIONS BY SEA

~~Number of~~ Patients held
before Evacuation

Number
evacuated

Type of
craft.


Subject: Direct Air Support.

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
Ref: G1/5/51
1 Jan 44

3

9 Aust Div.

1. During the advance of this brigade from MASEWENG River it has been possible to assess the value of direct air support with some accuracy. The forward troops usually entered the places bombed not more than twelve hours after the airstrike and evidence was fresh and tangible.
2. The principal targets to date have been HUBIKA, WANDOKAI, KANOMI and NANDA. In each place bombing and strafing has been most accurate. In WONDOKAI direct hits were scored on JAP occupied native huts, while at KANOMI a gun position, defended areas and dumps were similarly treated.
3. The actual number of casualties inflicted is difficult to check but in each area inspected fresh graves and unburied bodies suggest that they are considerable.
4. In general it is suggested that strafing and anti personnel bombs are the most effective agencies employed, targets are rarely substantial enough to warrant the use of heavy bombs.
5. It is felt that the valuable support given by the airforce during recent operations has helped materially in their success.


Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde

Brig

HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde
Ref: GA/2/74
24 Jan 44.

9 Aust Div.

The attached copy of a report from 2/17 Aust Inf Bn, on the effectiveness of Allied bombing in the NAMBARIWA area, is forwarded for information.

W. V. W. W. W.
Brig
Comd 20 Aust Inf Bde

REPORT ON BOMBING
OF NAMBARIWA AREA

G 15/21

20. Inf Bde

22 Jan 44.

All patrol reports have stressed the accuracy & effectiveness of the bombing in this area especially in regard to dumps & bivouac areas. Dumps that were well concealed in heavily timbered gullies on the SOUTHERN side of the GOALING R. were located by the bombers & they caused considerable damage to them. There were three dumps of Engineer stores on the NORTHERN side of the GOALING R. which received many direct hits & were almost completely destroyed. A large bivouac area at REF. MAP S101/25000 sq 4741 received a number of direct hits and approx 20 bodies were found lying in the same area.

There have been a good number of bodies found in all areas and in one thirty five graves were counted.

In addition at least 5 JAP barges & some smaller craft have been reported as being sunk either as the result of bombing or strapping.

These barges were in the upper reaches of the GOALING R. which has been used as a barge hideout.

A number of bomb craters were seen on the river banks and if the bombing had been directed at camouflaged barges it was particularly accurate.

Copy sent to DUE

Robert Tompkin
Lt Col