
AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/8
CORPS

2 Australian Corps General Branch (2 Aust Corps 'G' Branch)

September 1942



1/4/8-0044

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit G Branch 2 Aust Corps *Date and Time.—From* 1 Sep 42 *To* 30 Sep 42

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
ESK	1 Sep		Daily Intell Summary No 11	Appx 184
			SD Instn No 17	" 185
	2		Daily Intell Summary No 13	" 186
			As an experiment to test efficiency of HQ working day and	
			night 72 hrs, period of 8 hr shifts began	
	3		Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 1 Sep 42	" 187
	4		SD Instn No 18	" 188
			Daily Intell Summary No 15	" 189
			2 Aust Corps ROs Part 1	" 190
	5		3 Aust Div ordered to move immediately by MT as a tactical	
			operation by tactical Bde Gps into the NAMBOUR-CABOOLTURE	
			areas. Ref 0101	" 191
			Daily Intell Summary No 16	" 192
			Amendment to Location Statement of 3 Sep 42	" 193

Govt. Printer, Brisbane

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

*Unit*_____ *Date and Time.—From*_____ *To*_____

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
ESK	6 Sep		Daily Intell Summary No 17	Appx 194
	7		Daily Intell Summary No 18	" 195
	8		Daily Intell Summary No 19	" 196
			LHQ Intell Instn No 25	" 197
			Training and Adm - personnel of G and att	" 198
	9		Daily Intell Summary No 20	" 199
	10		Daily Intell Summary No 21	" 200
			Requirements of Trg Stores for year ending 30 Jun 43	" 201
	11		Daily Intell Summary No 22	" 202
	12		Daily Intell Summary No 23	" 203
	13		Daily Intell Summary No 24	" 204
			TEWT - Operational Role of 2 Aust Corps	" 205
	14		Daily Intell Summary No 25	" 206
	15		Daily Intell Summary No 26	" 207

Govt. Printer, Brisbane

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

*Unit*_____ *Date and Time.—From*_____ *To*_____

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
ESK	15 Sep		Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 14 Sep 42	Appx 208
	16		Daily Intell Summary No 27	" 209
	17		Daily Intell Summary No 28	" 210
	18		Daily Intell Summary No 29	" 211
	19		Daily Intell Summary No 30	" 212
			SD Instn No 19	" 213
	20		Daily Intell Summary No 31	" 214
	21		Daily Intell Summary No 32	" 215
	22		Daily Intell Summary No 33	" 216
	23		Daily Intell Summary No 34	" 217
	24		Daily Intell Summary No 35	" 218
	25		Daily Intell Summary No 36	" 219
	26		Daily Intell Summary No 37	" 220
			SD Instn No 20 and amendments to SD Instn No 19	" 221

Govt. Printer, Brisbane

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

*Unit*_____ *Date and Time.—From*_____ *To*_____

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
ESK	27 Sep		Daily Intell Summary No 38	Appx 222
	28		Daily Intell Summary No 39	" 223
			General HERRING relinquished comd 2 Aust Corps	
			Rd priorities 2 Aust Corps Area	" 224
	29		Daily Intell Summary No 40	" 225
			Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 28 Sep 42	" 226
	30		Daily Intell Summary No 41	" 227

Govt. Printer, Brisbane

War Diary

Appx. 1 14

SECRET

Copy No. 122

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.11

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 1 Sep 42

(a) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comd.

(b) No receipt is required for this Summary, but recipients will note the copy No. issued to them and make enquiries in the event of non-receipt.

(c) Unless otherwise stated all times are GSI.

PART 1

OPERATIONS - ENEMY

(i) Land: NEW GUINEA - BISMARCKS Area: 1 destroyer and 1 tpt unloaded tps, stores and motor trucks at SALAMAUA on 28 Aug. Two hundred JAPANESE moved from SALAMAUA to LOCAMAU (8 miles SOUTH of SALAMAUA) on 29 Aug. At 1030 hrs on 30 Aug it is reported that 400 JAPANESE using native carriers, passed along the KOMIATUM - MAU Track. It is also reliably reported that 100 JAPANESE crossed the FRISCO River.

BUNA Area: Our Naval Operation Patrol reports on 30 Aug that NO enemy were in BUNA (SOUTH Coast of BUNA), but there are many signs of recent occupation. A further reliable report that NO enemy tps remain in REMBUCO 6 miles ESE of DILLI or HERA 8 miles EAST of DILLI. The road between HERA and DILLI has been repaired.

(iii) Air: MILNE Area: 7 Bombers and 6 Fighters were observed on PENSOKI Aerodrome KOEPANG on 30 Aug.

NORTH AUSTRALIA Area: The harbour and oil installations at DARWIN were bombed at 0310 hrs on 30 Aug. The enemy used flares to assist the attack. Little damage was caused and no suffered no casualties.

PART 2

ENEMY

(i) Sightings: An unidentified warship approx EAST of SAMI BAY was reported by the Observation Post LOWER SANDBROOKE IS at 0955 hrs on 31 Aug.

(iii) Identifications: TOKYO Radio 25/8 :- "The Emperor to-day honoured the Yokoyama and Oda Engineering Corps for their heroism in the MALAYAN Campaign. The units had greatly facilitated the speedy advance through MALAYA. The YOKOYAMA Engineers had rebuilt 50 bridges in record time and had enabled a quick passage across the JOHORE Straits. The ODA Engineers had landed at SINGORA and enabled the advance along the WEST Coast of MALAYA." (HQ. Allied Air Forces SWPA Summary No.29).

(vi) Equipment: Japanese Landing Craft.

'D' CLASS M.L.C. LARGE TYPE.

Length -	40 to 45 ft.
Draught -	(fully laden) 36 inches.
Beam -	10 ft.
Speed -	6 to 7 knots.
Carrying Capacity -	70 men (fully armed men)
Methods of Disembarkation -	Double flap-door, forward, lowered by wires.
Anchor -	Large storm anchor weighed by hand. Two small anchors forward.
Armament -	1 Hy MG., 1 lt MG.
Protection	Engine possibly protected by bullet-proof plating. Temporary metal shields over coxswains on occasions.
Weight -	(estimated) 6 tons.

PART 3.

TOPOGRAPHICAL.

(i) Corps Area: (a) Rd GAYNDAH - COALSTOUN LAKES - BIGGENDEN - CHILDERS.
Ref Map MARYBOROUGH Strat. From GAYNDAH 467815 to x rds 481818 to rd junc 490808 to BIGGENDEN 515826 to CHILDERS 542861 B1 metal.

(b) Rd COALSTOUN LAKES - GOOROOIBA. From rd junc 498817 to rd junc 489627 B1(C2) metal; to GOOROOIBA 489828 B1 (C1) metal.

[signature]
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 3.

Appx. 185

1184

SE EXECUTIVE NO. 17

2 Aust Corps.

3 Aug 42.

1. [illegible]

Be it known no Offr or OR will be admitted to the Double Foom after 1200 hrs daily, unless he has the consent of Brig.

The Regt Med Off has duty as sent to all Battalions and Formations, and it is suggested that all Offrs and ORs make themselves conversant with this piece of.

2. ADMITTANCE OF GUESTS.

The Movement Order will be attached to the Routine Roll.

All Offrs leaving Camp on duty or on leave will enter upon the Movement Order, their destination, the time and date of return.

/ DCS.
2 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION.

COS	CRE	
DCS	DDFS	
A (O)	DDOS	
G (Ops)	DDST	
DA & QMG	ADH	
A	SVO	
G	Comp	(2)
CCRA	Files	(3)
CE	Msg Diary	(1)

Appx 16

SECRET

Copy No.

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 13

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 2 Sep 42

(a) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comd.

(b) No receipt is required for this Summary, but recipients will note the copy No. issued to them and make enquiries in the event of non-receipt.

(c) Unless otherwise stated all times are ZSE.

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA. Enemy bombing raids were made on DARWIN during 31 Aug at 0555 hrs and 0645 hrs. Details are NOT yet available.

(ii) TIMOR: Allied air recce on 31 Aug reported NIL enemy shipping DILLI HARBOUR.

(iii) NEW GUINEA: At 0645 hrs 31 Aug the enemy attacked our forward patrols in the LAE - SALAMAUA area and occupied LUBO. Buildings at LAE aerodrome were reported at 0730/31 to be burning, and subsequent recce confirmed the fact which would appear to be the result of a bombing raid, particulars of which are NOT yet available. LAE aerodrome was bombed and strafed by our A/C at 1200 and 1206 hrs on 31 Aug. Bombs were dropped on the runway and buildings. Vehicles and fuel dumps were left burning and grounded enemy A/C were heavily damaged. BASAMO village (7 miles NW BUNA) was bombed and strafed by Allied A/C at 1255/31. A camp area sufficient for about 2000 men was observed near BUNA. Enemy posns near KOKODA were located and strafed on 31 Aug. There are indications that enemy reinforcements have arrived in this locality. Our patrols encountered and eliminated large numbers of Japanese 1½ miles EAST of K B MISSION (MILNE BAY) and approx 50 dead Japs were found near LOSI. Allied A/C destroyed 4 barges at this point. The position in MILNE BAY is reported well in hand and NIL shipping was reported on 31 Aug.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO: Allied air recce over GASMATA (NEW BRITAIN) at 1400/30 report NIL enemy A/C on the runway.

(v) SOLOMONS: There were a few casualties but NO damage as a result of an enemy bombing attack on GUADALCANAL at 2340 hrs 28 Aug. Another raid at 1035 hrs on 29 Aug achieved some damage and slight casualties but Allied intercention accounted for at least 4 fighters and 3 bombers.

Details are awaited of a reported enemy air attack on Allied shipping off NUKUNU which is on the NORTH coast of GUADALCANAL.

Bombing raids on GUADALCANAL are said to be now a daily occurrence between 1030 and 1300 hrs and since 7 Aug at least 170 enemy A/C have been destroyed in this theatre. The enemy is probably using BUKA drome for these raids.

There are further indications reported of enemy submarine activity around this area during the last few days.

(2)

PARA 2

I NEW:

(i) Sightings: One 7,000-ton cargo vessel and a probable gunboat were sighted approx 100 miles NNE CAPE GLOUCESTER (WNW NEW IRELAND) at 1056 hrs on 31 Aug.

Allied A/C report a light cruiser and 3 destroyers approx 28 miles SSE ONGEONG JAVA at 0925 hrs 31 Aug course NW. An enemy destroyer was sighted about 100 miles NORTH of ONGEONG JAVA on a NW course at 0945/31.

(ii) O of B: Total enemy shipping in the BUIN - FAISI area on 31 Aug was considered to be one "SHIRAI" class cruiser, Six destroyers, nine transport, three unidentified vessels, two possible destroyers. In BUKA PASSAGE on that date there was considered to be operating one seaplane tender, one destroyer, one gunboat and one transport and there were two large transports, one destroyer, and one gunboat stationary in the bay SE SOHANA.

(iii) Identifications: There are indications that the Japanese 58, 69 and 70 DIVS were formed from the 18, 16 and 20 Ind Mixed Bdes.

(iv) Organisation: The Jap Parachute Bn consists of a HQ., a supply unit (which can tow 15 reserve aero engines), three parachute coys and flying personnel. The flying personnel and material are part of the unit and are under the command of the unit command. The total strength of the unit is believed to be 700.

It was reported in 1941 that the age limit for a Bn Comd was 35 and that he must have qualified at the Staff College.

Last year it was estimated that the Japs had sufficient tp transport A/C to carry a force of 3,300 men. (Based on info contained in IHQ, IS 186).

(vi) Equipment: "C" Class MLC (large type).

Length - 45-50 ft

Draught - (fully laden) 36 in.
Beam - 12 ft.
Speed - 10-12 knots.

Means of disembarkation - Double flap door fwd lowered by means of wires.

Anchor - Large stern anchor weighed by hand.
Armament - None.
Protection - Engines possibly protected by bullet-proof plating. Temporary metal shields for coxswains on occasions.

Carrying Capacity - 80 fully armd men.

Weight - 8 tons (estimate)

The two propellers (fore and aft) are in tunnels to prevent fouling in shallow water.

Lt. H. Anderson

Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.5.

G 1143

appx 187

S E C R E T.

2 Aust Corps
3 Aug 42.

Subject : Location Statement 2 Aust Corps

3 Aust Div	1 - 2	GOC	18
32 [illegible]	3 - 4	BGS	19
15 Aust Inf Bde	5	DA & QMG	20
1 Aust [illegible]	6	G	21
HQ [illegible] 7 Aust Div	7	A	22
2 Aust Corps [illegible]	8	Q	23
HQ 2 Aust Corps [illegible]	9	CCRA	24
HQ [illegible]	10	CE	24 - 26
HQ 2 Aust Corps [illegible]	11	CSO	27 - 29
HQ [illegible]	12	[illegible]	30
2 Aust Corps [illegible]	13	[illegible]	31
2 Aust Corps [illegible]	14	[illegible]	32
4 Aust [illegible]	15	[illegible]	33
41 [illegible] Div	16	DDMS	34 - 36
[illegible]	17	DAG [illegible]	37
		[illegible]	38
		[illegible]	39
		[illegible]	40
		File	41-42
		War Diary	43-44.

1 Herewith 2 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 1 Aug 42.

2 It is requested that any errors or omissions noted in this statement be notified to this HQ by the formation or unit concerned.

3 [illegible] statement.

[illegible] CAPT
for BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

ENCLOSURE
V-3

[illegible]

[illegible]

All [illegible] letters refer to USMACV and COMUSJ [illegible] 4 [illegible] 1.

[illegible]	Unit	Location	Remarks
	I ARVN CORPS		
	HHC		
1	HHC 1 Arty Corps	DAK	
2	2 Ar[illegible] 1 Sig Battalion [illegible]	DAK	
3	9th Coy FSE	DAK	
4	2 Bn [illegible] Group 1 (Type A)	DAK	
5	1 Bn [illegible] Unit	[illegible]	
6	1 [illegible] Unit A Engr [illegible]	DAK	
7	1 Bn [illegible] Psychological [illegible] Unit	[illegible]	[illegible] Corps unit ATTLEBORO CHARLIE DAKTO 1 Arty Corps
	1 Arty Co Defense (Mbl) Unit		
	Div		
8	HHB 1 Arty Corps	DAK	
10	HHB 2 Arty Corps	PLEI	
11	2/9 Arty A Fd Regt	ARAKOUN	Ex 1 Arty Corps.
12	1/40 Arty A Fd Regt	TIENPHU	
13	6 Fd Regt	CAMRAU	
14	1 Arty Med Regt	NEUNUM	
15	2/1 Arty Med Regt	CHILLYUS	Ex 1 Arty Corps.
16	2/1 Fd Sy Bty	ARAKOUN	2nd 1 Arty Corps.
17	2 Fd Sy Bty	NEUNUM	
18	2/2 Arty A Tk Regt	WOODPECK	Ex 1 Arty Corps.
19	2/1 Fd Sy Bty (2nd 1 Arty Corps)	ARAKOUN	Formed from 2/1 Sy Regt.
20	2/1 Fd Sy Bty (2nd 1 Arty Corps)	"	
21	HQ Survey Bty	"	
	Four		
22	HQ 4th 2 Arty Corps	PHILEASUTE	
23	2/10 Arty Army Fd Coy	CHANTIER	
24	1st Arty Army Fd Coy	QUANTENG	
25	21 Arty Army Fd Coy	ANASLANE	Ex 1 Arty Corps employed on LEQ tas Es.
26	60 Arty Corps Fd Pk Coy	CANTHAN	
27	2 Arty Corps Cavalry Unit	VIANCHAU	
	Five		
28	Sig 2 Arty Corps	DAK	
29	Hq Det 2/9 Arty A Fd Regt	ARAKOUN	
30	" " 2/11 Arty Fd Regt	TIENPHU	
31	" " 8 Fd Regt	CAMRAU	
32	" " 1 Arty Med Regt	NEUNUM	
33	" " 2/1 Arty Med Regt	CHILLYUS	
34	" " 2/2 Arty A Tk Regt	WOODPECK	
35	2 Arty Corps Cavalry Sqn	DAK	
	AASC		
36	HQ Coy 2 Arty Corps Tps AASC	TIENPHU	
37	2 Arty Corps Tps Amn Coy	"	
38	2 Arty Corps Tps Pet Coy	"	
39	2 Arty Corps Tps Sup Coy	"	

Serial No.	Unit	Location	Remarks
	ANZAC Corps.		
40	HQ 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	PALMALI VILLA	Ex 1 Aust Corps
41	2/1 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy	ST MARIE	" "
42	2/1 Aust Corps Tps Pet Coy	PALMALI VILLA	" "
43	2/1 Aust Corps Tps Sup Col	PALM VILLE	" "
44	HQ 2 Aust Corps Tps Coy	549650	
45	129 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	ANNPID	
46	1 (A) Aust Gen Tpt Coy	MARIBOROUGH CA	Att 3 Aust Div
47	2/1 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	707625	
48	2/2 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	691650	
49	2/3 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	559650	
50	HQ 2 Aust Corps Tps Coy	BUNDAMBA (LAIDLEY)	
51	2/1 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	COOMERA	Ex 1 Aust Corps
52	2/2 " " " "	REDBANK PLAINS	" "
53	2/3 " " " "	LOGANHOLME	" "
54	2/10 " " " "	REDBANK PLAINS	" "
55	2/11 " " " "	" "	" "
	(Det Tpt 2/2 Gen Tpt Coy at BSK		
	Det 1 Tpt Coy GOLDSBAR)		
56	2/2 AGH	CALOUNDRA	
57	2/3 AGH	CALOUNDRAE	
	(AMC		
58	2/3 Fd Amb Fd Amb	CALOUNDRA	Det 1 Aust
		(Det C.S. BSK)	Corps C of E.
59	2 Aust Fd Amb	570674	
60	2 Aust CCS	IPSWICH	
61	10 Aust CCS	BSK	
62	2 Aust MAC	570654	
63	2/1 Aust MAC	REDBANK	
64	205 Aust Dental Unit	WOODFORD	
65	207 " " "	CALOUNDRA	
66	215 " " "	BSK	
67	219 " " "	ARAROOM	Att 2/11 Aust Fd Regt.
68	220 " " "	MARYBOROUGH	Att 3 Aust Div
69	222 " " "	"	
70	228 " " "	"	
71	233 " " "	"	
72	2/7 Aust Dental Unit	GEMPIS	Ex 1 Aust Corps
73	2/9 " " "	CABOOLTURE	" "
74	2/5 " " "	ARAKOON	"
75	369 " " "	CABOOLTURE	" "
	AAOC		
76	205 Aust MAD (2 Aust Med Regt)	NEURUM	
77	244 " " (Sigs 2 Aust Corps)	BSK	
78	229 " " (8 Aust Fd Regt)	CALUNDRA	
79	290 " " (100 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy)	GLENFERN	
80	315 " "	GLENFERN	
81	2/54 " " (2/2 Aust A Tk Regt)	WOODFORD	
82	2/60 " " (2/1 Aust Med Regt)	BELLEVUE	
83	2/66 " " (2/9 Aust A Fd Regt)	ARAKOON	
84	2/7 0 " " (2/11 Aust A Fd Regt)	584656	
85	2/90 " " (2/1 Sty Regt)	ARAKOON	

Serial No.			
	[illegible]		
90	[illegible]	[illegible]	
91	[illegible]	[illegible]	
92	[illegible]	[illegible]	
93	[illegible]	[illegible]	
94	[illegible]	[illegible]	
95	[illegible]	[illegible]	
96	[illegible]	[illegible]	
97	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	[illegible]		
98	[illegible]	[illegible]	

Ser No	Unit	Location	Remarks
	3 AUST DIV H.Q. 10 AUST INF BDE.		
	HQ.		
99	HQ 3 Aust Div	TIMANA	
100	3 Aust Div Sec Int Corps	TIMANA	
101	E Sec FSS	TIMANA	
102	13 Def [illegible] Wksp Pl	TIMANA	
	ARMOUR		
103	2 Aust Armd Bn	[illegible]	
	RAA		
104	[illegible]	TIMANA	
105	[illegible]	[illegible]	
106	[illegible]	[illegible]	
107	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
	RAE		
108	[illegible]	TIMANA	
109	[illegible]	TIMANA	
110	[illegible]	[illegible]	
111	[illegible]	TIMANA	
	RAAOC		
112	HQ Maint 3 Aust Div	TIMANA	
113	[illegible]	MELBOURNE	
114	Bty Sec [illegible]	TIMANA	
115	[illegible]	DARWIN	
116	[illegible]	DARWIN	
117	[illegible]	TIMANA	
118	[illegible]	TIMANA	
	RAE.		
119	HQ 4 Aust Inf Bde	TIMANA	
120	4 Aust Bde Wksp Det Pl	TIMANA	
121	2/2 Aust Fd Pk	TIMANA	
122	2/3 Aust Fd Pk	TIMANA	
123	2/4 Aust Fd Pk	TIMANA	
124	HQ 10 Aust Inf Bde	DARWIN	
125	10 Aust Bde Wksp Det Pl	DARWIN	
126	2/9 Aust Fd Pk	DARWIN	
127	2/7 Aust Fd Pk	DARWIN	
128	2/8 Aust Fd Pk	DARWIN	
	AASC		
129	H Coy AASC 3 Aust Div	TIMANA	
130	19 Aust Coy AASC	TIMANA	
131	20 Aust Coy AASC	DARWIN	
	AAMC		
132	4 Aust Fd Amb	TIMANA	
133	2/13 Aust Fd Amb	DARWIN	
134	3 Aust Fd Hyg Det	TIMANA	
	AAOC		
135	2/3 Aust LAD (3 Aust Fd Regt)	DARWIN	
136	214 Aust LAD (4 Fd Regt)	[illegible]	
137	253 Aust LAD (105 Aust A Tk Regt)	TIMANA	
138	230 Aust LAD (2/2 Aust Inf Bde Coy)	TIMANA	
139	231 Aust LAD (HQ Elms 3 Aust Div)	TIMANA	
140	264 Aust LAD (HQ 4 Aust Inf Bde)	[illegible]	
141	269 Aust AD (HQ 10 Aust Inf Bde)	DARWIN	

Serial No	Unit	Remarks
	[illegible]	
142	[illegible]	
143	[illegible]	
144	[illegible]	
145	[illegible]	
146	[illegible]	
147	[illegible]	
148	[illegible]	
149	[illegible]	
150	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
152	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
153	[illegible]	
	[illegible]	
154	[illegible]	
155	[illegible]	
156	[illegible]	
157	[illegible]	

Serial No	Unit	Location	Remarks
	[illegible]		
158	HQ [illegible]	[illegible]	
159	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	S&A		
160	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	S&S		
161	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	S&T&A		
162	[illegible]	CASING	
	T&T		
163	[illegible]	[illegible]	
164	[illegible]	CASING	
165	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	AMES		
166	[illegible]	[illegible]	
	CAMO		
167	[illegible]	CASING	
	AAOC		
168	[illegible]	CASING	
169	[illegible]		
		Wkshop	CASING
170	" " " " " " "	[illegible]	
		Pl Pk	CASING

Serial No	Unit.	Location	Remarks.
	1 AUST MOT BDE.		
171	HQ 1 Aust Mot Bde	GERMER	
172	5 Aust Mot Regt	"	
173	11 Aust Mot Regt	"	
174	16 Aust Mot Regt	"	
175	6 Bty of 102 Aust A Tk Regt	"	
176	3 Sqn Sigs 1 Aust Fol Div	"	
177	1 Aust Lt Fd Amb	"	
178	1 Aust Mot Bde Aa&Q Coy	"	
179	211 Aust LAD (16 Aust Mot Regt)	"	
180	299 Aust LAD (5 Aust Mot Regt)	"	
181	300 Aust LAD (11 Aust Mot Regt)	"	
182	1 Aust Mot Bde Ord Wkshop	"	
183	1 Aust Mot Bde Ord Sub Pk	"	
184	Det 1 Aust Mot Div Postal Unit	"	
185	2/7 Aust Dental Unit	"	

Ser Ial No	Unit	Location	Remarks.
	32 Int Div		
186	HQ 32 Int Div	Camp [illegible] (Vicinity VILLAGE AREA)	
187	HQ Coy 32 Int Div	"	
188	32 Sig Coy	"	
189	32 Cav Recce Sqn	"	
190	126 Int Regt	"	3 Bn Amphibian school PORT STEPHENS.
191	127 Int Regt	"	
192	128 Int Regt	"	
193	32 Div Arty	"	
194	120 Fd Arty Bn	"	6 Bty " " "
195	121 Fd Arty Bn	"	
196	122 Fd Arty Bn	"	
197	123 Fd Arty Bn	"	
198	10[illegible] Fd Regt R.A.	"	
199	10[illegible] Fd Bn	"	
200	114 Engr Bn	"	
	ATTACHED:		
201	6[illegible] Amph Sup Shipping Pln	"	

Units	Key Ref	Place.
ATTACHED UNITS (ALL ARMY)		
2/6 Armd Fd Regt	C [illegible]	CALCOUTERS
C Sec 7 Armd Div Sigs	[illegible]	"
2/10 Armd LAD	[illegible]	"
2/9 Armd Delhi Mdls	[illegible]	"
2/9 Armd Delhi Mdls	[illegible]	"
20/ Armd Delhi Mdls	[illegible]	
2/ Bde Sec 7/ Armd Div Sig N'Shops	C [illegible]	"
2/ Bde Sec 7/ Armd Div Sig Fd Park	C [illegible]	"
2/7 Armd Fd Coy Regt (less [illegible] Sigs)	C [illegible]	"
C Sec 7 Armd Div Sigs	C [illegible]	"
2/10 Armd LAD	C [illegible]	"
2/ Armd A Tk Regt [illegible]	[illegible]	KILCOE
H Sec 7 Armd Div Sigs	[illegible]	KILCOE
2/ Armd LAD	[illegible]	KILCOE
2/ Armd Fd Regt	[illegible]	D'ANGELAR
E Sec 7 Armd Div Sigs	[illegible]	D'ANGELAR
2/ Armd Fd Regt (less 4 Bty)		"
F Sec 7 Armd Div Sigs		"
2/ Armd LAD		
2/ Armd Fd Regt (less Stocles Sec)		
2/ Armd LAD		STOCLES
2/ Armd [illegible]		
2/ Armd [illegible]		
2/ Armd [illegible] (less Dets)		
2/ Armd [illegible] (less Dets)		D'ANGELAR
2/ Armd LAD		
Det [illegible] Armd Div	[illegible]	
"A" Sec [illegible] Armd Div Regt	[illegible]	
"B" Sec [illegible] Armd Div Regt	[illegible]	
"C" Sec [illegible] Armd Div Regt	[illegible]	

Tel Maps - [illegible]

Appx 188

1157

SD INSTRUCTION NO 18

2 Aust Corps.
3 Sep 42.

1. Attention is directed to saluting, vide Camp Order No. 7.

2. The GOC 2 Aust Corps views with grave concern the lack of interest shown by officers in the above order.

3. It is considered that officers should set an example and should see that saluting is carried out by all ranks. Officers should be particularly careful and ensure that all salutes from other officers or soldiers are correctly acknowledged.

4. It should be noted that saluting by officers and OR's should be carried out at all times when on duty or on leave. It is one of the outward and visible signs of a well trained officer or soldier.

R A Bourchier
Lt. BGS.
2 Aust Corps.

Distribution.

GOC	CSO	
BGS	DDST	
G (O)	DDOS	
G (I)	DDMS	
DA & QMG	APM	
A	Svy	
Q	Camp	(2)
CCRA	File	(2)
CE	War Diary	(2)

Appx 188 189

Secret

Copy No.

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 15

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 4 Sep 42

Notes A B & C See Summaries No. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART I

OPERATIONS

(ii) NEW Areas: It is reported that the border of DUTCH and PORTUGESE TIMOR is patrolled daily by JAP aircraft.

There is many a report occurring to cause trouble between DUTCH and PORTUGESE natives.

On 2 Sep, 70 well armed JAPANESE marines were located at DOBO on ALOR IS.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area: On 31 Aug reports indicate that the JAPS are consolidating their forces at MUBO, whilst others are moving in a Southeasterly direction.

LAE aerodrome was bombed by Allied aircraft at 1205 hrs on 2 Sep. Bombs fell on the target area.

Enemy adv guards were punished severely by our tps in the KOKODA Area on 1 Sep.

Many JAPS and natives are reported to have occupied the MISSAME - AIBORI area. Heavily reinforced JAP forces are pressing in this area.

On 2 Sep enemy activity in the MILNE BAY Area was confined to sniping and mortar fire. Enemy dead in KB MISSION area now total 162. More equipment has been captured by our tps. There are indications of an enemy unit on the NE side of GOODENOUGH IS

(v) SOLOMONS Area: Daily rec[illegible] of BUNA/GAVA is made by JAP aircraft.

BUNA aerodrome and shipping in BUNA passage were bombed by Allied aircraft at 0115 hrs on 1 Sep 42.

PART II

ENEMY

(i) Sightings: NEW GUINEA. 1 cruiser, 1 probable destroyer were observed on a S.E. course approx 47 miles E.N.E. KILLERTOON PT MILNE BAY at 1712 hrs on 2 Sep. At 2015 hrs 2 enemy vessels, probably the two abovementioned, were sighted in MILNE BAY.

NEW IRELAND: One 10,000 ton transport, one 8,000 ton cargo vessel and 3 small launches were observed in KAVIENG HR on 2 Sep

SOLOMONS: Sightings on 1 Sep FAISI were:- 5 medium 3 large merchant ships and 4 large seaplanes.

3 cruisers were anchored at KIETA (BOUGAINVILLE) on 2 Sep.

It is reported that 1 cruiser, 2 supply ships and 6 destroyers left BUIN on the night of 1 Sep. Other sightings in BUIN area on 1 Sep at 1100 hrs as follows:- 1 cruiser, 1 supply ship and 9 destroyers on an Eastern course EAST of BUIN, travelling at high speed.

At 1515 hrs on 1 Sep, 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer reported entering DUM. P'[illegible] on the previous night, were observed departing SOUTH along West coast of BOUGAINVILLE.

SIBUYAN. It is reported that 6 battleships and 1 unidentified vessel entered MEMPIL ROADS on 2 Sep. (Landops Revsit[illegible] of 5 Sep).

(vi) Equipment:

A/TK LAND MINE. A prisoner from the 14th Independent A/Tk Coy described the Japanese A/Tk land mine as a round, shallow drum with a flat, bottle-shaped detonator placed in the middle, the top of the bottle neck extending slightly above the mine. The mine is exploded by the tyre or caterpillar of a vehicle depressing the projecting bottleneck of the detonator.

Another method of using these mines is by means of a thin rope or tape threaded through two rings, fitted at opposite sides of the mine. The rope is controlled by two men who lie hidden on either side of the path of the approaching tank, and seek to guide the mine under the caterpillar.

37mm GUN, TYPE 94. The gun was described as capable of firing 20 rds per minute, but a maximum of only 15 rds a minute was actually achieved by a crew of 8 men. This gun fires a six pound shell, is semi automatic and self ejecting, and is considered to be a useful weapon. It was originally designed as an A/tk gun. It is fitted with telescopic sight, aimed and fired by one man and loaded by another, both sitting on separate legs of the gun carriage. The gun is very accurate up to 700 m, but beyond that range results were bad owing to the inefficiency of the crew, and their failure to keep cool when casualties occurred. For the same reasons there were frequent miscalculations of the range, and wrong firing commands were often given.

(xiv) General:

PARIS radio reports DOMEI announced that SHIGENORI TOGO has tended his resignation, for personal reasons, as Foreign Minister. Gen [illegible] has assumed the position. Mr TOGO's wife is German. On 15 JUL he declared that the Soviet had assured JAPAN that the ANGLO-SOVIET and the SOVIET-AMERICAN Agreements contained no article affecting JAPAN, and that SOVIET-JAP relations were still regulated by their neutrality treaty.

Para 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Communications. See Appx "A".

Para 5

SECURITY:

Packages forwarded by mail to units from Stationery, Ordnance etc have disclosed the location of units in the address. The question of overcoming this difficulty is at present under consideration, it being hoped that shortly there will be introduced a system of military forwarding officers.

Until the new system is developed it is suggested that arrangements be made for such packages to be addressed personally to an officer of the formation or unit concerned, care of the railway station nearest to such formation or unit, and at the same time the officer concerned be advised by letter or signal of such action.


Geo H Anderson
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No 5.

HQ 2 A I T CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 18. Appx B

TOPOGRAPHY.

(Contd)



3 Sep 42

Prepared by
(GSI 2 Aust Corps)

File War Diary G 2 190
afft 184

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

The information contained in this document is not to be communicated either directly or indirectly to the Press or to any person not holding an official position in His Majesty's Forces.

Serial No. 15

Nos. 109-120

Australian Military Forces

2 AUST CORPS ROUTINE ORDERS, PART 1

By

Maj-Gen E. F. HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED
Comd. 2 Aust Corps

HQ 2 Aust Corps,
4 Sep 42.

GS

109. CENSORSHIP—CORRESPONDENCE WITH STRANGERS.

(1) Para 7 of Appx C to Army Fd Censorship Instn No. 22 provides as follows:—

"Advertisements, Circulars "Penpals" etc.

(*a*) All ranks are forbidden to insert advertisements or letters inviting correspondence with strangers in any newspaper or magazine. Nor must they enter into correspondence with any stranger in response to such advertisements or invitations.

(*b*) Correspondence with "Pen Pals" is prohibited.

(*c*) All ranks are forbidden to reply to circulars.

(*d*) All ranks are warned to exercise the greatest care in acknowledging presents from unknown 'friends.' "

110. TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXERCISES—SUPERVISION OF AND UMPIRING.

(1) In order that the Corps Comd may be kept informed of the tng methods and activities of Formations, Divs, and Corps units unallotted to Formations, will submit returns of proposed tactical exercises to reach Corps HQ by 1st and 15th of each month commencing 15 Sep.

(2) The returns, will, for the time being, incl bde or combat gp regimental and bn exercises etc. They will be arranged in chronological sequence and will show the following details for each exercise.

(*a*) Nature.

(*b*) Formations or units participating incl enemy when represented.

(*c*) Scope—incl major lessons.

(*d*) Area or place.

(*e*) Duration in hrs.

(*f*) Brief instns for assembly.

(*g*) Composition of DS and scale of umpires.

(3) It is the intention that the Corps Comd and/or Staff will attend selected exercises. Formations will be notified and will be prepared to submit one complete detailed copy of the exercise on request.

(4) All proposed arty practices incl details thereof will be submitted direct to CCRA 2 Aust Corps at least 14 days in advance. CCRA will inform GS2 Aust Corps of the arrangements of the practice, and will submit remarks on the practice to 2 Aust Corps forwarding a copy to Formation HQ.

(5) CURA, CE, CSO, DDS & T, and DDMS will be supplied direct with detailed arrangements for exercises of their own arms by Formations in addition to requirements in para 2 above. They will arrange to be represented and will, if necessary, submit recommendations to Corps HQ forwarding copy to Divs.

(6) Particular attention is to be paid to the composition of the D and U Staff. All must be trained for their duties in general, and in the scheme in particular. They will always be adequate for the task (on a liberal scale) and be provided with their own means of tpt, intercomn, and other administrative matters independent of the unit being exercised.

(7) Every exercise with tps irrespective of scope proposed will be adequately and carefully umpired by pers who have been properly trained in the proposed operation by the DS.

(8) The administrative situation and plans, incl tpt and traffic control will be considered and umpired in every exercise.

R. M. THOMPSON, Brig.,
BGS, 2 Aust. Corps.

ADM

111. PUNISHMENTS AND AWARDS.

(1) AMR & O 418 (8) has been amended by inserting therein after the word "punishment" the words "other than a fine."

(2) The effect of the amendment is that awards of detention exceeding 7 days may, if the CO so determines, be awarded in conjunction with a fine of any amount not exceeding £5.

112. SPORTS GOODS AND MATERIALS.

There will probably be an acute shortage of sports goods and materials. All formations must carefully conserve such goods already in possession or hereafter supplied, and arrange for adequate storage and properly controlled issue and return. Attention must be given to the avoidance of loss or waste and to arrangements for repair and salvage of all parts of worn-out goods which can be reconditioned or re-used.

113. SHIRTS, WEARING OF.

Shirts will be worn at all times by all ranks when carrying out their normal duties within Camp Areas and will not be removed except when ordered by a responsible offr.

114. SALUTING.

The attention of all ranks is drawn to the following 2 Aust Corps Routine Order No. 98.

GRO A198 is re-published hereunder:—

(1) WOs, NCOs and private soldiers in uniform shall salute an offr at all times, except when passing or being passed by him—

(i) in a crowded thoroughfare or assembly; or

(ii.) during an exercise in the fd or

(iii) when on parade under the immediate control of a superior

(iv) when precluded by the nature of their duties from so doing

(2) In view of the no of offrs who have been recently commissioned, care is to be taken to ensure that they fully understand the implications of the provisions concerning saluting.

All offrs are to salute their seniors before addressing them on duty or on parade. When not on duty or parade, offrs under fd rank are to salute all offrs of fd rank and upwards. Gen offrs and fd offrs are to salute their superiors in rank.

(3) Offrs are to salute offrs in any of His Majesty's Naval or Air Forces and of the Allied Naval, Military or Air Forces, in accordance with para 2."

115. CASUALTIES—DISPOSAL OF PERSONAL EQPT OF.

(1) Attention is directed to First Aust Army Order No. 83.

(2) Complaints have been received that pers have arrived at Con Depots NOT accompanied by personal eqpt specified in para 1 (a) of such order. This has resulted in varying degrees of hardship to individuals and unnecessary comns to obtain such eqpt.

(3) It is directed that strict compliance with above order be effected by units evacuating casualties.

116. PERSONAL PARTICULARS OF THE FORCES.

(1) Attention is directed to LHQ circular 83705 of 31 Jul 42 which is being distributed to units by L of C Areas.

(2) Units not in receipt of copies will notify L of C Area concerned.

117. PAY—PERS. PROCEEDING ON LEAVE.

(1) It has been brought to notice that many units have failed to observe First Aust Army Order No. 179 with the result that DFO Q[1]Land L of C Area has been approached by tps on leave demanding pay.

(2) Units will ensure that strict compliance with such is effected henceforth.

(To be rptd in formation and unit orders.)

118. STRENGTH STATES AND RETURNS.

(1) In numerous instances units are not submitting AF W3006 daily, nor compiling AFs W3008 and W3009 in accordance with the revised forms as mentioned in GRO A127 of 26 Jun 42. Their failure to do so precludes Area Records Offices from consolidating Weekly Strength Returns in terms of LHQ requirements.

(2) It is therefore directed that all units adopt the revised AFs W3008 and W3009 according to the instns referred to in abovementioned GRO.

119. FD. PUNISHMENT CENTRE—CHURCHILL.

(1) This centre has been taken over by 2 Aust Corps.

(2) Any soldier convicted of an offence and awarded Fd Punishment for 14 days and up to 90 days will be sent to this centre to undergo the punishment.

120. LEAVE FOR SEASONAL OCCUPATIONS.

1. It is essential in all cases where leave is granted in accordance with GRO A199 that AFs W3011 are rendered promptly.

2. Failure of units to advise DRO of such releases results in an incorrect total of releases being shown by records, which is detrimental to the efforts made to assist Man Power authorities from Service pers.

3. Action is to be taken to ensure the prompt rendering of Cas Returns covering all releases.

W. J. URQUHART, Brig.,
D.A. & Q.M.G., 2 Aust Corps.

By Authority: A. H. Tucker, Government Printer, Brisbane.

War Diary

Copy/CM.

191

TO 3 AUST DIV RPTD 15 AUST INF BDE AQ, DDST.

FROM 2 AUST CORPS 0.101 5 ...

SECRET (.) 3 AUST DIV REORGANIZED ON TWO BDE GP BASIS WITH 4 AND 15 AUST INF BDE GPS WILL MOVE BY MT AS A TACTICAL OPERATION BY TACTICAL BDE GPS INTO THE NAMBOUR AND CABOOLTURE AREAS FORTHWITH (.) WESTERN BOUNDARY 3 AUST DIV INCL MALENY BRACALBA DAYBOROUGH EXCL WOODFORD (.) OPS ROLE DEF OF BRISBANE FROM NORTH AND NE (.) MOVE TO COMMENCE 8 SEP (.) DETAILS OF ADM INSTNS INCL ALLOTMENT OF TWO ADDITIONAL GEN TPT COYS WILL REACH 3 AUST DIV AND 15 AUST INF BDE BY 2400 HRS (.) ACK

TOO 1320

Appx 192

SECRET

Copy No. 109

G Ops.

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 16

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 5 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries No 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1.

OPERATIONS:

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area: An enemy vessel possibly a cruiser, shelled our posns at K B MISSION from 0240 hrs to 0315 hrs on 4 Sep. At 0345 hrs an enemy vessel appeared to be landing tanks 1 mile EAST of K B MISSION. At KOKODA during the withdrawal to BORA Ck, some ?ps of the 2/10 Bn were cut off and they have NOT yet been reported. The HAROUBRA force reports a satisfactory day except for a period of intense fire from lt guns, mortars and MGs. The enemy is working round our right flank and it is intended to withdraw our forces to TEMPLETON CROSSING, approx 3 miles SOUTH of ISURAVA. Enemy advance guards were ambushed in this vicinity and 10 killed. It is estimated that enemy casualties total 700 in this area. Allied A/C bombed and strafed KOKODA at 1013 hrs on 3 Sep. Bombs fell in the vicinity of AIOLA, ISURAVA, MISSIMA and the KOKODA Aerodrome.

At 1130 hrs on 3 Sep Allied A/C bombed BUSAMA, MUBO and SALAMAUA. Bombs fell on SALAMAUA Aerodrome and fires were started at BUSAMA.

MILNE BAY: At 2050 hrs on 2 Sep Allied forces were attacked 1 mile EAST of K B MISSION. The attacks ceased at 2200 hrs. Our mopping-up operations are being continued. It is estimated that enemy dead number 600.

At 1405 hrs on 3 Sep a large enemy destroyer was reported in the vicinity of KIRIWINA IS in the TROBRIAND Gp.

It is suggested that the Japs have established a S/P base at PANNIET Is in the DEBOYNE Is.

(v) SOLOMONS Area: An Allied A/C attacked a large enemy tanker, S/P tender 20 miles NNW of REKATA BAY - YSBEL Is at 0953 hrs on 2 Sep. A direct hit was obtained and the vessel left burning. A near miss was observed on a destroyer possibly escorting a submarine 460 miles NE of ONTONG JAVA.

BUKA Aerodrome was bombed on the night of 2/3 Sep. Fuel dumps were hit and fires started on both sides of the runway.

IETA MISSION ½ mile EAST of the Aerodrome was also hit.

At 1200 hrs on 3 Sep enemy shipping in FAISI Hr was attacked. Two F/Bs and 1 F/P were strafed.

OCEAN Is was occupied by the enemy on 26 Aug 42.

It is now reported that the enemy probably occupied ABEMAMA in the GILBERT Is on 1 Sep 42.

PART 2

ENEMY:

(i) Sightings. NEW BRITAIN: One 3,000-ton merchant ship was

sighted 31 miles SOUTH of CAPE ORFORD on a NORTHERLY course, at 0905 hrs on 2 Sep.

SOLOMONS: A large merchant vessel and 4 unidentified warships were observed stationary in FAISI Hr at 1200 hrs on 3 Sep.

Further to sightings reported in Intell Summary No.15, 8 more destroyers were reported off BUIN at 1720 hrs on 3 Sep.

(xi) Material Resources & Manpower:

A DOMEI report that THAILAND will NOT only attain self-sufficiency in cotton, but will be in a position to ship its surplus to JAPAN when the five year plan, beginning in 1942 materialises, combined with the announcement that sugar plantation and idle and reclaimed land will be devoted to cotton production in the PHILIPPINES is interesting in view of the following extract from HQ Allied Airforces Intell Summary 28 on Jap Economic Targets. :-

> "Dependence on imported cotton is her economic Achilles heel and is a factor of such fundamental importance in the whole structure of Jap self-sufficiency that it may even dictate Japan's military policy if a solution is NOT found within 12 months."

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area: See Appx "A".

Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.5

(Contd)
"A"

MILLY BOROUGH Strat 4 in to 1 in

Recce by
3 Aust Div

Prepared by
(GSI 2 Aust Corps)
3 Sep 42

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

appx 193

SECRET

2 Aust Corps
5 Sep 42.

1168

Location Statement G1143 of 3 Sep 42.
Amendment No 1.

Serial No 15 delete "2/1 Sup Sty ARAKOON RAA 1 Aust Corps"

After Serial No 21 Insert Serial 21A 2/7 Svy Bty ARAKOON
Formed from 2/1 Svy Regt.

Serial 64 delete 2/5 Aust Dental Unit MOTIVATOR

Serial 73 delete 2/6 Aust Dental Unit JABBERWOCK

Serial 75 delete 2/9 Aust Dental Unit JABBERWOCK

Serial 208 should read 8 Aust Recce Sqn. and 8Sig sec and 297 Aust LAD

Serial 213 delete 2/8 Aust A Tk Regt 587 and 8 Bty 2/3 591668 WILKY.

Serial 214 delete M sec 7 Aust Div Sigs (591668) WILKY

Serial 215 delete 2/54 Aust LAD 2 591656 UTI KY

Page 9. Add the following:-

Other units under comd 2 Aust Corps for rlm and emergency ops.

Serial 232	59 Aust Corps Id Tk Coy (239 Aust LAD)	PERNVALE
Serial 233	3 Aust Army Grd Wkshop	SMITH
Serial 234	1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry and Bd dean Unit	PERNVALE
Serial 235	1 Aust Corps PE Punishment Centre	CHURCHILL

Capt
for BGS.
2 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION.

3 Aust Div	(2)	G(O)	(1)
5? US Div	(2)	BGS	(1)
15 Aust Inf Bde	(1)	DA&QMG	(1)
1 Aust Mot Bde	(1)	G	(1)
HQ Inf Units 7 Aust Div	(1)	I	(1)
2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec	(1)	A	(1)
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tps Adm Pl	(1)	CCRA	(1)
HQ 1 Aust Corps Tps Adm Pl	(1)	CE	(2)
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tps Pro Pol	(1)	CSO	(3)
HQ 1 Aust Corps Tps Pro Pol	(1)	Signmaster	(1)
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	(1)	DDST	(1)
2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	(1)	DDMS	(1)
4 Aust AC Sqn	(1)	ADMS (O)	(1)
42 US Div	(1)	DDOS	(3)
Island L of C Area	(1)	CAD Units	(1)
		LEGAL	(1)
		CAZ	(1)
		FIRST ARMY	(1)
		AHQ	(2)
		WAR DIARY	(1) ✓

aftac 194

Copy No.

SOS

NO 2 AUSE CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 17

Compiled from information received 0800 hrs (I Zone) 5 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries No 1-13 22 hrs (I Zone) 5 Sep 42

PART 1.

OPERATIONS:

(1) (ii) NEW Area: Reports from TINCR on 4 Sep indicate that the native rising has been quelled by acts of the PORTUGESE Army. The DUTCH natives appear to be more friendly.

(2) (iii) NEW GUINEA Area: On 3 Sep an enemy submarine was reported approx 12 miles SSW of PORT MORESBY.

(3)(4) Ph R of the EAST-SAR MAPA area reveals repairs to damaged runways and 11 small ships in harbour. Enemy activity is

(5) continuing in the vicinity of JACOBSON'S Plantation on the [illegible] VALLEY RD.

(6) It is now estimated that 500 JAPS accompanied by 1,000 native carriers took part in the attack on MUNE on 1 Sep.

(7) Patrol activity is continuing in the [illegible] it is estimated that enemy casualties since 18 Aug total [illegible].

(8) Allied aircraft detailed to attack enemy [illegible] the HUNTER BAY area on 4 Sep failed to locate [illegible] vessel 150 Ft long was seen to be zig-zagging in the [illegible] stacks of bones were observed on the beach.

(9) A full-scale En attack by our tps on 4 Sep in this area proved successful. An advance was made and our line consolidated 1,000 yds EAST of RABI.

(10) Heavy and continuous gunfire was reported [illegible] IS. at 2118 hrs on 4 Sep.

(11) At 1341 hrs 4 Sep a Hy cruiser was sighted approx 40 miles EAST of WOODLARK IS. on an Easterly course. This ship was unsuccessfully attacked by Allied aircraft 4 hrs later.

(12) Three enemy warships steaming SOUTH were [illegible] NORMANBY IS. at 1714 hrs on 4 Sep.

(13) (v) SOLOMONS Area: On 1 and 2 Sep two enemy submarines were reported

(14) in this area; one approx 45 miles S.S.E. Cape [illegible] IS), the other 110 miles EAST by NORTH of [illegible]

(15) Five enemy ships are reported to have shelled GUADALCANAL between midnight and 0100 hrs on 5 Sep.

(16) Only two enemy vessels were reported in [illegible] on 3 Sep.

(16) Natives report heavy enemy casualties and many damaged JAP aircraft at [illegible] on 4 Sep.

(17) Seven enemy vessels incl 2 cruisers are reported at TARAWA (GILBERT I S). (Landcpn Revsit 4 Sep).

PART 2

ENEMY

(18) (ii) O of B. The minimum estimate of enemy naval strength in [illegible]

(19) BUIN Area (SOUTH of BOUGAINVILLE) is considered to be as follows: 5 cruisers, 13 destroyers and 10 subs (FIRST MISS AMT [illegible]).

G-2

Appx 195

~~Secret~~

Copy No. 132

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.18

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 7 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries No 1-15 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area:

PORT MORESBY 5 Sep. The report of an enemy submarine 12 miles SSW of PORT MORESBY on 5 Sep is now discounted.

SALAMAUA Hr 5 Sep 0730 hrs. A recce A/C sighted 2 ships.

BUNA BAY 5 Sep 0730 hrs. 10 to 20 barges were sighted in the bay and at CAPE SUDEST (4 miles SE of BUNA) tents and supplies were seen. 0905 hrs BUNA Aerodrome was strafed and bombed by allied A/C. Bombs fell on the runway and 2 grounded A/C. 2 landing barges and a motor car containing personnel were destroyed and a MG posn was silenced and 2 small boats in the hr were destroyed. 1001 hrs and 1015 hrs the aerodrome was again strafed and an A/A posn silenced.
KOKODA Area 4 Sep. There was a strong enemy attack in the MYOLA Area. It was reported that this area was considered unsuitable for defence, and it was intended to withdraw to EFOGI situated 9°11' SOUTH 147°38' EAST. 5 Sep 1015 hrs. Houses at KOKODA Aerodrome were strafed and huts and tents at ISURAVA and AIOLA. Between these places 2 clearings and equipt were observed and men were seen running from huts at ISURAVA.

MILNE BAY 4 Sep. Allied tps successfully attacked enemy posns EAST of KB MISSION. Enemy opposition was met EAST of GARAMI, 2 miles EAST of KB MISSION. Destroyed enemy W/T and equipt was found in this vicinity. Allied A/C bombed and strafed GARAMI, WAGA WAGA, LILIHOA and AHIOMA, but results were unobserved owing to the heavy timber. 5 Sep 1314 hrs 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer and 2 unidentified vessels were sighted off MILNE BAY. 1925 hrs recce A/C reported NIL sightings in MILNE BAY. The evidence now suggests a partial enemy withdrawal during the night of 3 Sep, covered by the shelling reported in Intell Summary No.16.

(v) SOLOMONS Area:

TAIVU POINT, GUADALCANAL 4 Sep. Allied A/C machine gunned boats and barges SE of TAIVU POINT. 5 Sep 0330 hrs. GUADALCANAL. Enemy vessels reported shelling in Intell Summary No. 16 withdrew.

REKATA BAY, SANTA YSABEL IS 5 Sep 0926 hrs. Allied A/C sighted 3 enemy ships approx 65 miles NORTH of REKATA BAY on a WNW course.

BUKA PASSAGE 5 Sep 1140 hrs. NIL sightings.

KIETA 5 Sep 1210 hrs. 1 enemy tanker sighted.

PART 2

ENEMY:

(ii) O of B. BUIN FAISI Area. 5 Sep. The total enemy shipping

estimated from sightings is 1 flat-decked vessel of 10,000 tons, 2 hy 4 lt cruisers, 2 small gunboats, 4 merchant vessels, 3 cargo vessels and 6 unidentified vessels.

(xiii) Morale & Propaganda:

Japan. Enemy. Morale: A Chinese Military Intell Offr who, throughout the present war, has been responsible for the interrogation of Japanese P.Ws., states that prisoners fell into 4 categories :-

(a) During the SHANGHAI fighting, P.Ws were in an almost hysterical state of shame and anger. They refused to talk, repeatedly tried to escape, and frequently attempted suicide.

(b) During the second period of the war, i.e. the taking of NANKING and subsequent fighting on the lower YANGTZE, prisoners still refused to talk but, on the other hand, did not appear to be ashamed of their position. There were no more cases of attempted suicide.

(c) The campaign leading to the capture of HANKOW showed that prisoners could frequently be made to talk and that they were also prepared to undertake non-military, but paid work for the Chinese Govt.

(d) During the 4th, last and more static period of the war, morale of prisoners has shown marked deterioration. They talk freely, seem anxious to give all possible information, and are ready to undertake any sort ofwork (for reasonable payment) for the Chinese Govt.

Experience with P.Ws captured in MALAYA and BURMA confirm para (d) above. There is no indication that Japanese soldiers are instructed NOT to talk if captured; neither, apparently, are they warned of the kind of info which can be most damaging. Presumably such instruction would be inconsistent with the doctrine of "death before surrender." All prisoners firmly believe however, that it will be impossible for them to return to Japan after the war.

It has been found that a friendly, casual attitude, without threats or derision, and with confessed concern for their predicament, yields best results. With this in mind, any interviewer with a knowledge of Japanese psychology can usually find a way to induce a communicative mood.

(Allied Land Forces HQ Intell Summary 188)

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area: See Appx "A"


Lieut-Colonel
GS 2 Aust Corps.

APPX "A" HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 18

TOPOGRAPHY.

MARYBOROUGH STRAT 4m to 1 in.

Recce by 3 Aust Div.




Sealed ———
Metal or Gravel — — —
Sand or Earth .....

Prepared by
GSI 2 Aust Corps
6 Sep 42

TOPOGRAPHY

MARTUBA-GAZALA STRIP 4m/c Dia

Recce by 3 Aust Div



Sealed
Metalled Gravel - - - -
Sand or Earth .....

Prepared by
GSI. 2 Aust Corps
6 Sep 42.

G (Opns)

Appx 196

OGI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 19

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 8 Sep 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summaries No. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

SECRET

1.9

OPERATIONS:

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area:

KOKODA Area 6 Sep 0820 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed enemy tps and installations at MYOLA LAKE. All bombs fell on the target area. At 1016 hrs Allied A/C again bombed and strafed enemy installations and huts in the vicinity of MYOLA LAKE. Superior enemy forces threatened to out-flank our tps who withdrew to EFOGI. At 1800 hrs JAPANESE employing H.G. fire, engaged our forces and occupied EFOGI. Our patrols report that a large number of JAPANESE are at MYOLA.

MILNE BAY Area 5 Sep. Allied forces repulsed an enemy attack at WAGA-WAGA between LEKWIND and WIWI. Our forces counter-attacked and pushed the enemy back 1,000 yds East of WAGA-WAGA. One barge and a large enemy dump were captured. On 5 Sep, it is estimated 70 JAPANESE were killed in the area. Three enemy dive bombers were found on the beach at MULLENS HARBOUR 25 miles S.W. of GILI-GILI. On 6 Sep at 1025 hrs Allied A/C bombed 2 enemy destroyers, one tpt and 2 small unidentified vessels sighted approx 35 miles N.E. of CAPE PIERSON, NORMANBY ISLAND. Two runs were made on the large tpt. NIL results were observed. At GILI-GILI, one enemy cruiser at 1217 hrs shelled the wharf and shipping. The enemy shipping operating in the vicinity of TROBRIAND ISLANDS to the MILNE BAY AREA is considered to be one cruiser, 4 destroyers, one tpt and 2 small unidentified vessels.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area:

NEW BRITAIN 6 Sep 0304 hrs. The analysis of photos of RABAUL HARBOUR reveals one hy cruiser and 4 destroyers, one seaplane tender, one torpedo boat, one mine-layer, one large submarine, one submarine chaser, 2 tpts of 6,000 tons, eleven cargo ships, 5 small motor boats, seventy landing barges and 30 small unidentified vessels, possibly including some midget submarines. At VUNAKANAU aerodrome, destroyed A/C are dispersed among the trees. At LAKUNAI there are 21 fighter A/C and 5 hy bombers, at MATUPI 5 fighters, at SULPHUR CREEK 10 flying boats, and at MALIGUNA there are 1 flying boat and 7 float planes

(v) SOLOMONS Area:

S.E. COAST of SANTA YSABEL ISLAND 3 Sep. In this area, allied A/C located, bombed and machine-gunned 13 enemy vessels and 30 landing craft off the SW Coast of ST. GEORGE IS., South of SANTA YSABEL IS. Most of these vessels were burnt or sunk.

NEW GEORGIA GROUP 6 Sep 6000 hrs: Recce A/C sighted 2 enemy destroyers approx 22 miles North of MAROVO LAGOON, VAGUNA IS.

SANTA YSABEL IS. 6 Sep 0900 hrs. Recce A/C sighted one destroyer approx 10 miles West of REKATA BAY, course NNW.

BOUGAINVILLE 5 Sep: It is reported that 100 JAPANESE landed at KANGU near BUIN, ventured 3 miles inland, but then returned to their ship. On 6 Sep it was reported an enemy party landed at BUIN.

BUIN-FAISI Area: 6 Sep. The minimum composition of enemy shipping in this area is 3 light cruisers, 26 destroyers, 1 armed motor boat, 1 possible seaplane tender, and 5 supply ships.

ENEMY

(vi) Equipment: 'D' Class H.L.C. (Large Type)

Length	50-55 ft.	Means of disembarkation: - Double flap door fwd lowered by wires.
Draught (Fully Laden)	30 ins.	Anchor: - Power winch for weighing large stern anchor.
Beam	14 ft	Armament: - None
Speed	7-8 knots	Protection: - Engine possibly protected by bullet-proof plating. Temporary shields on occasions for coxswains.
Carrying capacity	100 fully armed men.	
Weight	10 tons(estimate)	

(viii) C.W.

Japanese temporary smoke battalions are formed from field gas coys and consist of a HQ and a number of Coys, each about 220 strong. The HQ is divided into executive, metcorological, signal and first aid sections. Coys consist of a HQ and 3 pls each of 3 secs. Each Sec has 1 NCO and 23 men, 7 of which are drivers, with 6 one-horse carts. The Sec works in 4 Gps of 3 men each, the remaining 4 men being used for intercomm and protective duties. Four of the 6 carts each carry six boxes of "smoke" candles, whilst the remaining 2 carry rations and forage for 10 days.

The total number of candles carried by the Coy is 3,240 but it is NOT certain whether this number applies to the special smoke (Arsenical Toxic Smoke) candles or to the ordinary smoke and green gas (C.A.P. non-persistent lachrymator) candles as well.

(xiv) General:

A twin-engined bomber, believed to have been a type 96 MITSUBISHI H/B, was sighted during a strafing attack on BUNA aerodrome.

This aircraft had been destroyed by fire, but had GERMAN crosses on the fuselage. (Allied Air Forces Intell Summary No. 30).

Lieut Rogers Capt
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 5.

GSI/ 1120

Appx 197

HQ 2 Aust Corps,

7 Sep 45.

Subject: AIR INTELL Instn No. 20 - Military Security

5 Aust Div	(9)	G(I)	(2)
Units under 7 Aust Div	(16)	DA&QMG	(1)
4 Aust Armd Bde	(4)	A	(1)
8 Aust Inf Bde	(4)	Q	(1)
4 Aust Mx Control	(1)	DDSM	(23)
CCPA	(23)	DDMS	(16)
CE	(5)	DDOS	(7)
CSO	(2)	2 Aust Corps Fd Cash	(1)
G(O)	(2)	2 Aust Corps Postal	(1)
		2 Aust Corps Provost Coy	(1)
		2 Aust Corps Sigs Units	(4)
		HQ 2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	(1)

1 The attached Intell Instn is forwarded for info and action; vide it's para 2.

2 Please submit the returns requested in First Aust Army's GSI/1272 of 4 Sep 45, to reach this HQ not later than 20 Sep 45.

[signature]
Lt Col, BGS,
2 Aust Corps

S E C U R I T Y.

SUBJECT :- LHQ Intell Instn No 25
Military Security.

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY
4 Sep 42
GSI/1372

List "D" (Branches and units down to Inf Bn or independent units)
Less serials 13 - 27 (incl)
29 & 37

All FSS Secs.
All FIRST AUST ARMY Schools.

For Infm:
HQ NE Allied Air Forces.

The attached Intelligence Instn dealing with the safeguarding of infm likely to be of value to the enemy has been received from Adv LHQ (Aust) and is fwded for your infm and action vide it's para 2.

2. Formations and Independent units will submit returns showing the names of all Security Offrs to reach this HQ not later than 25 Sep.

Lt-Col
for Maj-Gen
GS FIRST AUST ARMY

	Copies to
G.O.C.	
Q.	
Int.	
R.E.	

29/401/619

ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

SECURITY.

L. H. Q.
29 August, 1942.

S.M. 16543

H.Q. First Aust Army
" Second " "
" 3 Aust Corps
" N.T. Force
" N.G. "
" Tas. "
1 Aust Armd Div
1 Aust Motor Div
2 Aust Motor Div

Q'Land L of C Area
N.S.W. "
Vic. "
S.A. "
W.A. "

Copy to A.G.; Q.M.G.; M.G.O.; C.F.O.; D.M.I.; D of I. (R.A.A.F.); G.H.Q., S.W.P.A.; H.Q., U.S.A.S.O.S.; R.M.C. & S.S; S. of M.I.; M.L.O. Security Service; Adv L.H.Q.

L.H.Q. Intelligence Instruction No. 25
Military Security.

Commanders will impress on all Officers and O.Rs. serving under them the necessity of unremitting attention to safeguarding information likely to be of value to the enemy.

2. Commanders of every formation and unit will appoint an officer forthwith to act as Security Officer, if no such appointment has been made already. The Security Officer will be responsible at all times to his commanding officer for the security measures of the formation or unit concerned.

3. On behalf of commanders, security officers will issue appropriate Security Standing Orders which will be amended from time to time as local circumstances require. All reports and matters affecting security will be referred to the security officer immediately.

4. Attached as Appendix "A" is a series of notes on the subject of military security. These notes may be of assistance to officers and N.C.O's and serve as a basis for lectures and talks to troops.

(Sgd) J.D. ROGERS, Col GS
for Lieutenant-General,
Chief of the General Staff

APPENDIX "A".

NOTES ON MILITARY SECURITY.

1. Military Security may be roughly defined as the measures taken to defeat the enemy's secret attack by Espionage, Sabotage and propaganda.

2. (a) Even in times of peace, nations maintain an intelligence system, the function of which is to obtain and systematically to record information likely to be of value for purposes of national defence.

(b) When war breaks out the acquisition of knowledge about the enemy, what he is doing and what are his intentions, becomes at once more difficult and more important, for without such knowledge a belligerent is merely groping in the dark.

(c) Ceaseless efforts are therefore made by each side to obtain such scraps of information as may be picked up by stealth and cunning. Even if the scraps may be unimportant in themselves, yet when pieced together with patience and perseverance, gradually the completed picture is revealed, as in a jigsaw puzzle.

3. We cannot doubt that our enemies have already gathered a great fund of information about our preparations for defence and attack. So much the more important is it therefore that all ranks should, so far as humanly possible, prevent any unnecessary leakages. The enemy's task will be the more difficult to the extent that all ranks at all times strictly observe the commonsense rules of secrecy.

4. It is the duty of Security Officers to police Security in every aspect of its military incidence. Their major responsibilities are briefly set out as follows :-

(a) To ensure that there is no leakage of information which could possibly be of use to the enemy.

(b) To take all possible steps to anticipate and combat espionage.

(c) To study and promulgate information on practical camouflage and deception, as well as special measures for the safeguarding of all forms of intercommunication in the field.

(d) To take steps to protect the troops of their Formation or Unit against seditious or subversive propaganda and activities of every kind.

(e) To take adequate intelligence measures to safeguard war material and supplies from covert enemy action.

(f) To ensure that the procedure laid down in A.M.R. & O's. and other instructions is adhered to re the handling and disposal of confidential or secret documents, articles, ciphers and codes.

(g) To enforce existing security instructions and to suggest matter for inclusion in Formation and Unit orders for the security of premises, camps, bivouacs, military establishments, etc.

(h) To ensure that all ranks of their formation or unit are adequately instructed in necessary security measures

/ 5. ...

5. (a) The appointment of a Security Officer does not relieve the commanding officer of personal responsibility for ensuring that all necessary security measures are taken in his unit;

(b) On the other hand, the utmost endeavours of C.O's., S.O's. and Intelligence staff will be largely unavailing without the co-operation of all officers and other ranks. Adequate safeguards to counter the secret moves of the enemy are the responsibility of everyone.

6. It is essential, therefore, that all ranks should have a proper understanding of the value and necessity of security measures. S.O's. should give the personnel of their units systematic instruction in the subject. The training will be carried out by lectures and informal talks as well as by the inclusion of security intelligence measures during practical exercises.

7. It should be made plain to all ranks that it is an offence punishable under the Crimes Act, the National Security Act and other Commonwealth statutes for any member of the forces to communicate to any person, otherwise than in the course of his official duties, any information concerning plans or documents or any other matters whatever relating to the defence of the Commonwealth.

8. The following warnings requirs emphasis :-

(a) Enemy agents and sympathizers may be present in places where and under disguises in which they are least suspected.

(b) Any happening which is the subject of gossip or general conversation may become known to such agents and so to the enemy. This knowledge by the enemy may endanger many lives and the success of our operations.

(c) A chance remark made carelessly by an unthinking soldier may well be of untold value to an enemy agent, if not in itself, yet when fitted together with other items gathered here and there.

(d) The danger of disclosure of information by officers and other ranks in the course of conversations with friends and relatives, especially at parties and on other convivial occasions when tongues are loosened, cannot be exaggerated.

(e) The only real safeguard is absolute silence on the part of all ranks with regard to military matters, at all times and at all places, except in the course of their military duties.

9. Details of security measures are contained in Pamphlets 2 & 4 of Manual of Military Intelligence in the Field, 1938.

The following are some important points :-

(a) <u>Security of Information</u>.

It should be a matter of discipline that officers and other ranks must never discuss subjects relating to the Naval, Military or Air Force organisation, operations, or movements of any kind, in the presence or hearing of any stranger whatever, whether in uniform or not, when on duty or on leave.

/ (b) ...

(b) Security of Personnel.

Our troops must be protected against hostile propaganda and subversive influences. Arrangements must be made for intercepting dangerous literature, leaflets and propaganda of all kinds.

(c) Security of Material.

Precautions must be taken against sabotage, and the intrusion of unauthorised persons into defence establishments.

(d) Security of Operations.

The success of an operation will depend largely on the secrecy observed during the necessary preparatory period. Leakage of information may be fatal.

(e) Security of Documents.

The procedure laid down for the handling, custody and destruction of secret and confidential documents is set out in A.M.R. & O. 1584 to 1595. These instructions must be scrupulously observed by all ranks.

(f) Security of Signal Traffic.

Any carelessness in handling the signal traffic results in leakages of information eagerly seized upon by the enemy. With the increased use of wireless communication there is of course increased risk of interception. Even apparently harmless administrative messages may reveal to the enemy information of operational value.

(g) Security of Ciphers and Code Names.

The use of ciphers safeguards the secrecy of wireless and other means of communication, and the security of the ciphers themselves is therefore of great importance. Routine cipher messages in stereotyped form must be avoided, since they assist the enemy in his efforts to break our ciphers. Code names are designed to conceal the identity of units and must be protected against disclosure to unauthorised persons.

10. Security Officers should be familiar with all Field Censorship instructions, and should see that everyone else in the unit is aware of the danger of unguarded disclosures in writing. The following prohibitions deserve mention :-

(a) The location of a field unit should never be given as part of the address. The use of hotel stationery and notepaper provided by the Y.M.C.A. and other welfare organisations, cannot be permitted if the letterhead includes the name of a town or locality.

(b) No letters should on any account be posted in civilian letter boxes, or given to civilians to post. Not only does this infringe unit orders, but in the case of field units the postmark reveals locations.

(c) The name of the unit and the formation to which it belongs should never be linked, whether in writing or in speech.

(d) Only plain language will be used in private correspondence. Codes, ciphers and shorthand are not permitted.

/ (e) ...

(e) The despatch of private diaries through the post is forbidden. The procedure to be adopted with regard to the disposal of diaries is laid down in A.F.C.I. All ranks should be warned against carrying diaries (or any other documents disclosing military information) if there is any risk of their loss or capture by the enemy.

(f) Unless specially authorised, correspondence with strangers, e.g., "pen-friends", in response to newspaper advertisements or personal invitation, is prohibited.

(g) Members of the Forces are not permitted to publish, anonymously or otherwise, their views on any questions of military policy, discipline or administration. Nor may they take part in public debates or meetings at which such questions are discussed.

(h) Any instructions relating to the carrying of cameras and taking or posting of photographs should be strictly enforced.

11. Security of Information.

Information which is of particular interest to the enemy includes the following :-

(i) Our intentions and plans for the conduct of the war by land, sea and air.

(ii) Means whereby any enemy operations have been or will be frustrated.

(iii) The order of battle, movements, locations and morale of our forces. The names, characteristics and particulars of our Commanders and their Staffs.

(iv) Developments in all forms of armament, equipment and training.

(v) Location of bases, supply depots, distribution centres and key industrial plants. Details regarding sources and systems of supply of all kinds.

(vi) Sailing dates, routes, and destinations of all types of shipping.

(vii) Any reference to spies or suspicious persons in our hands whether awaiting trial or already disposed of.

(viii) Casualties or losses in men and material.

(ix) Detailed effects of enemy air or land attack.

(x) The situation in regard to man power, economic resources and the civilian morale.

12. Security of Personnel.

(a) One of the surest ways of weakening the efficiency of an armed force is to sow within it the seeds of disaffection and sedition.

(b) In its early stages, subversive propaganda is extremely difficult to detect, since those who are sent as agents are almost invariably highly trained intelligent men, who very rarely give the slightest indication of being anything other than what they purport to be, namely,

/ exemplary ...

exemplary soldiers or highly respectable civilians, as the case may be. They are infinitely more dangerous than the street corner or public park agitator whose utterances seldom deserve serious attention.

(c) The enemy agent works by a process of subtle suggestion and without haste. He is frequently something of a psychologist and knows exactly the type of argument to suit the person he seeks to influence, and, what is important, he can generally recognise the man whom it would be dangerous for him to approach.

(d) Since the detection of such subversive activity is so difficult, the most efficient counter-measure which can be adopted is to make the ground unreceptive to the seed which the agent will seek to sow. All ranks should be warned against accepting at its face value any propaganda designed to create in their minds doubts concerning the successful conclusion of the war, government policy, defence measures or local administration, or in any other way to cause disaffection within the unit.

(e) Troops should be instructed and encouraged to report immediately any suspicions they may have in this regard direct to the unit Security Officer, without giving any indication either to the person suspected, or anyone else, that they have done so.

14. Security of Material - Counter-Sabotage.

(i) Our war material and supplies have to be protected against covert enemy action.

(ii) All military establishments, barracks, camps, depots, dumps, offices, etc., should accordingly be guarded against the prying eyes of enemy agents as well as against physical damage, or sabotage.

(iii) No person of whatever rank, whether in uniform or civilian clothes, should be allowed to approach vulnerable buildings or areas except in the course of duty. Precise instructions should be issued with regard to the action to be taken against persons seeking to enter, or lingering in the vicinity of, vulnerable points.

(iv) It is the duty of the S.O. to advise, if consulted, on concealment and camouflage against air observation and attack as well as on the siting of dumps, vehicle parks, etc., with an eye to protection against sabotage.

15. Security of Operations and Movements.

(a) In order to ensure the succes of projected operations against the enemy, the preservation of strict secrecy is essential. The vital importance of this should be made clear to all ranks. All the ordinary security precautions must therefore be greatly intensified when active operations are impending.

(b) Additional precautions must also be taken when ordinary movements of troops are in progress or preparation. Any knowledge of moves on our part, whether in operational areas or not, is of the greatest value to the enemy in planning his own moves and operations. Special measures must be taken to prevent leakage of information by advance parties, signal and orderly room personnel,

/ and ...

and even friendly members of welfare organisations, railway officials, hotel employees, etc. More rigorous censorship control of all letter-writing and the prohibition of personal telephone calls may be necessary.

16. Points to Remember.

In conclusion it will be well to remember -

(i) That dangerous as are enemy agents, traitors, defeatists, "communists", etc., the greatest menace of all is generally the well-meaning but unthinking soldier of whatever rank who by unguarded speech or writing gives away information of military value.

(ii) That security precautions cannot be regarded as a fixed code of rules but must be adapted to changing circumstances.

(iii) That suspicious incidents do not necessarily have a sinister significance, but may be capable of a simple explanation. A reputation for "spy-mania", once acquired, cannot easily be shaken off. The exercise of common sense, especially in unusual circumstances, is essential.

(iv) That security-mindedness is in no sense a thing different from or independent of discipline in general. Security-mindedness is indeed only one of many military virtues embraced by the term "discipline".

(v) That defensive action to counter the enemy's strategems and to prevent him from acquiring valuable information is not enough. Offensive action against the enemy, by covert or hidden means, must constantly be undertaken. By "Military Security" we understand measures designed to provide the maximum security for our own forces and insecurity for those of the enemy.

Qftc 198

G 1186

2 Aust Corps
8 Sep 42.

Subject: Tng and Adm - Personnel of G and att.

GOC	DA & QMG	CE	DDMS
EGS	A	CSO	Camp
G	Q	DDSV	File
Intell	CCRA	DDOS	War Diary.

1 For purposes of tng and local adm, personnel of G Branch and att will be known as G Coy, organised as follows:-

OC - Capt F.E.G. Batley
2 i/c Lieut B.W. Johnstone
CSM - WO2 F.H. Robertson

1 Pl. - Pl Sgt S/Sgt Staples
G Branch Clerks Orderlies and Batmen
CSO "
Lt. defs, cooks, general and hygiene duty men.

2 Pl. S/Sgt Sardent
I Branch Clerks Orderlies and Batmen
FSS
CE Clerks Orderlies and Batmen.

Att. Offrs of G, I, CSO, and CE Branches.

2 Subject to para 3, G Coy will observe the following timetable, commencing on Thurs, 10 Sep.

0600 - Reveille
0605 - Coffee and Biscuits
0630 - Roll call, & a Physical tng pde, on SOUTH end of oval. Dress, Shorts, and sweaters. This parade will be attended by:-

(a) Offrs up to, and incl rank of Capt.
(b) Batmen of above.
(c) ALL ORs except cooks and one dutyman from mess.

Note. Offrs and their batmen as in (a) and (b) above who are living in C and D Mess areas will carry out the same procedure in the r respective areas, under the senior Capt.

0730 - Breakfast
0820 - Inspection parade on coy parade ground (Race track in front of of I Tents) of personnel for tng and office duty.
1330 - Squad for afternoon tng parade fall in at Tng area.
1400 - Squad for afternoon office duty report to respective offices.

3 (a) CSO and CE Branches will detail personnel to attend P T Parade, and advise G Branch one week in adv of personnel so detailed.

(b) Personnel who have been on duty after 2100 hrs on previous night will be excused from P T Parade. Such personnel will obtain a certificate from the Branch concerned, which they will produce to the CSM.

P.A. Rogerson
A/ BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

Appx 199

SECRET

Appx No. 10

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 22
Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 2 Sep 42
Notes A B & C. See Summaries No 1-15 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART I

OPERATIONS:

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area:

PORT MORESBY 7 Sep 1226 hrs. Twenty six enemy H/Bs escorted by 6 Zeros, bombed PORT MORESBY. Three direct hits were scored on runways and others on taxi way to dispersal area. No casualties were caused. One raider was destroyed by A/A fire.

LAE - SALAMAUA 6 Sep 1755 hrs. Allied A/C attacked LAE, but owing to low clouds results were NOT observed.

KOKODA Area 5 Sep. MYOLA LAKE No.1 and KORA CK (approx three-quarters of a mile NORTH of MYOLA LAKE) were bombed and strafed by our A/C. Bombs fell in the target area and M.G. posts at the SOUTH end of the Lake were silenced. As the result of a second attack made on 6 Sep at 1400 hrs, hits were scored on the target area, installations on the NW side of the Lake were strafed and large fires left burning.

MYOLA - EFOGI Area: 7 Sep 0800 hrs and 0815 hrs. Enemy huts and installations were bombed and strafed. On the night of 5/7 Sep the JAPANESE subjected our tps to LY mortar and M.G. fire. Our tps using mortar fire and supported by air attacks, silenced the enemy. At 1135 hrs the enemy, estimated 1 Coy strong, were observed moving backwards to EFOGI then around the right flank. Two Coys were also observed moving round the left flank. At 1700 hrs Allied patrols grenaded enemy posts, killing six and capturing 1 L.M.G. and a grenade discharger. Examination of enemy dead reveals that they were carrying rations for 10 days.

MILNE BAY 7 Sep: Allied patrols have reached LILIHOA. Patrols reported that there is no sign of the enemy at DOGURA on the SOUTH coast of GOODENOUGH BAY. At 1650 hrs our A/C sighted 2 enemy cruisers on a Southerly course approximately 18 miles East of CAPE PIERSON on MOAMARRY I3. Our land posns at MILNE BAY are reported to have been shelled by enemy warships at 0001 hrs on 8 Sep.

(v) SOLOMONS Area:

GUADALCANAL Area 5 Sep: Allied A/C attacked landing barges off ST. GEORGE IS. and large landing boats carrying approximately 75 men each, WEST of CAPE ESPERANCE. Ph R reveals that 36 of these craft were destroyed. At 1045 hrs enemy a/c attacked GUADALCANAL without success. Two enemy bombers and 1 fighter were shot down. The estimated total of enemy shipping in the BUIN-FAISI Area on 7 Sep is as follows:- 2 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, 1 armed motor boat, 1 possible seaplane tender and 6 supply ships. (LANDOS Revolt 39).

PART 2

ENEMY:

(iii) Identification: The original landing force at MILNE Bay has been identified as a naval landing party. A colour patch worn by enemy tps on this front consisted of a 3-inch blue circular shoulder patch with red crossed anchors on a red star. This suggests that the shoulder patch is one normally worn by special landing parties. This deduction is confirmed by captured documents which disclose that nos 3 and 5 special landing forces were to take part in the operations in MILNE Bay. (LHQ Intell Summary No. 5).

(vi) Equipment: It is reported from NEW GUINEA that some hy mortars (4 to 5" calibre) were used by the Japs at MILNE Bay. Should this info be correct, it indicates the employment of a new type of mortar heavier than those hitherto encountered. The heaviest mortars known to be used by the enemy to date are the "STOKES BRANDT" type 81 mm (4.15") and the type 90 mm (3.5"). It is believed however, that the latter type is mainly used for the firing of gas bombs.
(LHQ Summary No.5).

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:


(i) Corps Area: See Appx "A".

Lieut Colonel
G.S.O. 2nd,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.5.

APPX "A" HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.20.

TOPOGRAPHY.



MARYBOROUGH

(SURVEYED ... AUST CORPS.)

SEALED ——·——

METAL SURFACE - - - -

SAND OR EARTH ·····

MARYBOROUGH

4 MILES TO 1 IN.

(Recce. by 3 Aust Div)


TOPOGRAPHY.

Sealed ——————

Metal or Gravel - - - - -

Sand or Earth .....

APPX "A" HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 20.



Prepared by GSI 2 Aust Corps

8 Sep 42

War Diary

appx 200

SECRET

Copy No. 122

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 21

Compiled from information received to 0600 hrs 10 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries No. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii) N.E.I. Area:

TIMOR Area 6 Sep: The DILLI-MAI rd is NOT yet passable to M.T. but it is being patrolled by JAPANESE. At DILLI the shore beacon and the cathedral are now camouflaged, and there is an unconfirmed report that 2 ships disembarked JAPANESE tps. There are persistent rumours that JAPANESE are at MAUBARA 18 miles West of DILLI and LIQUICA 16 miles West of DILLI. The native risings at MAOISSE are apparently quelled but disorder is reported in the TIBAR area. From an unconfirmed Portugese report, several thousand natives are moving across the border of DUTCH TIMOR into the frontier province. At DILLI aerodrome on 8 Sep at 1610 hrs, an Allied recce A/C sighted 2 hy-type enemy A/C; NO shipping was observed in the harbour.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area:

LAE-SALAMAUA Area 7 Sep 1400 hrs. Fourteen enemy medium bombers flew over LAE from an Easterly direction, but only 7 landed on the aerodrome there. Allied patrols report NO enemy activity West of BUSAMA. In the HUBO-KAISINIK Area, the enemy is reported to be of considerable strength. On 8 Sep at LAE aerodrome, recce A/C sighted 8 large and 10 small enemy A/C dispersed on both sides of the runway.

BUNA Area 8 Sep 0835 hrs. At WAYTUKU POINT, COMBE BAY, 4 miles SW of BUNA, Allied A/C sighted 24 barges close to the shore. At 1530 hrs at BUNA one Allied A/C attacked barges. One was directly hit, and there were 2 near misses. Fires were observed on the barges and for 100 yards inland.

KOKODA Area 7 Sep 0840 hrs. In the vicinity of MYOLA LAKES, the enemy were bombed and strafed by Allied A/C. Considerable damage resulted and fires were started. Then at 0845 hrs EFOGI was bombed and strafed, but NO result was observed. Sightings indicate that the enemy has probably established a supply dump at MYOLA LAKES. Forward of MANARI, 1 mile South of EFOGI, there was heavy and confused fighting.

MILNE BAY Area 7 Sep 1705 hrs. Approx 18 miles S.E. of CAPE PIERSON, NORMANBY IS, our A/C bombed and strafed 1 hy enemy cruiser and 1 large destroyer. NIL bomb hits were reported, but the decks were machine-gunned. At 0743 hrs on 8 Sep, another attack was made on an enemy cruiser and destroyer approx 45 miles N.E. of KARAUBA POINT, KIRIWINA IS, TROBRIAND Gp. There were near misses at the stern of the destroyer. At MILNE BAY on 8 Sep at 1215 hrs, 9 enemy twin-engined bombers, escorted by 5 Zeros, destroyed 1 truck and damaged 6, and destroyed 10 drums of M.T. fuel. Approx 58 miles N.E. by East of KARAUBA POINT at 1239 hrs, Allied A/C attacked 2 enemy warships. NIL hits were observed. At 2000 hrs, it was reported that 6 JAPANESE from the 3 dive bombers that crashed in MULLENS HARBOUR (reported in our Summary No. 19) are heading inland armed with revolvers and 2 MGs, with our Patrol following. Our tps are patrolling between LILIHOA and LILIHI. A conservative estimate of the enemy killed in this area is 700.

OPERATIONS (Contd.)

(iv) BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO Area:

NEW BRITAIN 7 Sep. Approx 70 ships were sighted in RABAUL HARBOUR. On 8 Sep recce A/C reported that the West end of the runway of CASMATA Aerodrome appeared re-surfaced.

NEW IRELAND 7 Sep. At KAVIENG air photos reveal one 6,000 ton cargo ship, 5 landing barges and 10 small craft in the vicinity of the harbour. One Ky bomber, believed to be a dummy, is on the aerodrome. At least 12 blast bays appear to be completed in the dispersal area. On the N.E. end of the runway, a broad taxi-strip has been constructed.

(v). SOLOMONS Area:

FLORIDA IS. 8 Sep 2400 hrs: An undetermined number of enemy surface craft are reported to be shelling TULAGI.

BUIN-FAISI-TREASURY IS Area 8 Sep. Sightings indicate the maximum enemy shipping in this area is 5 cruisers, 15 destroyers, 8 tpts and 6 possible cargo ships or tankers (Landops Revsit 40 9 Sep).

PART 2

ENEMY

(v) Personalities: A report from CHINESE sources states that Lt-Gen M. MCHEA has been appointed C-in-C in the NEW GUINEA-AUSTRALIA area. Lt-Gen HOMMA was previously G.O.C. in the PHILIPPINES but, on the 14 Aug TOKYO radio announced that he had been recalled, his place being taken by Lt-Gen SHIZUICHI TANAKA as Chief of the Military Administration in the PHILIPPINES (Adv LHQ Weekly Intell Summary No.5)

(vi) Equipment: Effectiveness of Japanese Grenades. Interrogation of our own tps concerning fighting in the KOKODA area revealed that enemy grenade discharger fire caused few casualties. One Offr, who was within 10 ft of one burst, suffered only a few scratches, but was covered with a black substance. The weapon created terrific noise. (Adv LHQ Intell Summary No. 4).

(vii) Tactics: The JAPANESE are employing extensive camouflage in concealing their A/C. Their methods are crude but effective, particularly from high altitudes. Small trees are cut and placed against the A/C. Brush is placed on and around the A/C thereby breaking the normal lines of the A/C and breaking the shadows cast. (A.A.F. Summary No. 30)

(xi) Material Resources & Manpower: See Appendix "A"

(xiv) General: Dr. Van Der PLAS, former Governor of EAST JAVA, who has just flown from EUROPE and who is en route to AUSTRALIA, announced today that "so thoroughly was the earth of JAVA 'scorched' that the JAPANESE have abandoned hope of using the oil fields and are planning to compound a substitute from sugar and rubber." (Los Angeles Examiner, 1/7/42).

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Coros Area: See Appx "B".

[illegible] Capt
for Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 5

APPX "A" TO HQ 8 AUST CORPS INTELL SUMMARY No. 21

Japan's Economic Targets.

The following notes, extracted from a document prepared by the branch of Ministry of Economic Warfare in Colombo have a double value for Intelligence Sections. They represent excerpts from one of the first studies on the vitally important economic war against Japan to be received here, and they underline the necessity for co-ordinated target selection as between various theatres of war against Japan. One point which appears to have been given insufficient value is the loss of external markets formerly held by Japan's conquered territories, with the consequent drain on Japan's economy caused by the necessity of artificial stimulation to stave off economic collapse in the occupied countries.

Fragmentary as these excerpts may be, they are the beginnings of truly modern warfare against Japan.

General.

1. Since the outbreak of the China incident in July 1937 the publication in Japan of statistics regarding the iron, steel, and shipbuilding industries has ceased, with the result that exact information on this important part of Japan's war effort is lacking. Even with the limited information at our disposal it is possible, however, to arrive at certain broad conclusions and these are stated below in the case of the most important resources.

Situation of essential Commodities and Services.

2. Oil:- Japan probably has oil stocks sufficient for full scale war effort for another year, by which time the oilfields of N.E.I. and Sarawak, added to Japanese domestic production, should be producing enough for Japan's needs. A year hence the Japanese are still likely to be short of refining capacity, but there cannot be complete certainty on this point which is discussed later in some detail. The Japanese are short of tankers, but, in view of the short hauls from the N.E.I., the tanker position should not be as serious as it might be otherwise.

3. Metals:- Japan has access to adequate supplies of iron ore and scrap, copper, aluminium, zinc, lead, chrome, tin and tungsten. She is short of nickel,which shortage will be serious unless she can capture a source of supply. New Caledonia would meet her requirements in this respect. The position as regards steel is somewhat conjectural owing, as stated above, to non-publication of statistics since 1937. Iron mines in Malaya and the Philippines can probably be extended quickly to cover Japan's requirements, and, of the alloys necessary for making steel, supplies of chrome and tungsten are adequate but, as already mentioned, nickel is deficient. Production of steel depends largely on manufacturing capacity and efficiency, and on both these points we lack reliable up-to-date information. It was known, however, in 1937 that Japan's steel industry was, by western standards, relatively weak. Since that time Japan embarked on a major war, and, considering the calls made on the industry by a large army, a large navy and (for the highest grade steel)a large air force, it is reasonable to suppose that the steel industry is one of Japan's vulnerable points.

4. Salt:- Japan is short of salt, though strenuous efforts were made to increase stocks just before the war. Recent conquests have contributed very little, and the chemical industry will suffer, but there will probably be enough for war industries.

5. Copper:- Japan produces only about half of her requirements but she is believed to have large stocks and, in any case, can replace it for many uses with aluminium.

6.Coal:- The K.M.A. mines at Tongshan in North China supply Japan with practically all the supplies of coking coal essential to her steel industry. Destruction or dislocation of these mines would be critical to the Japanese.

7.Cotton:- Japan is entirely dependent on imports for raw cotton, cleaned and packed in bales. Her chief suppliers were British India and U.S.A. Recent conquests have contributed very little, but it is believed that present stocks are sufficient for at least twelve months, for war requirements only. Japan will no doubt make desperate efforts to stimulate cotton growing in North China, but in view of previous failures, success is problematical. India would provide the solution for future needs, and would also provide a tremendous potential market for cheap manufactured goods. A further point of interest and possible significance is that Japan is likely to run short of better grades of (Egyptian) cotton, generally used for tyre manufacture.

Finally, it must be remembered that Japan's large textile industry would be paralysed by a stoppage in the supply of raw materials and that Japan would be deprived of one of the major exports on which the balance of the co-prosperity scheme depends. This is assuming that silk, of which Japan has large domestic supplies, could not be substituted for cotton sufficiently to sol the problem.

8. Wool:- Japan's war requirements, like her supplies, are small, unless she should become involved in a winter campaign against the U.S.S.R.

9. Shipping:- Maintenance of production on a full war basis will make large demands on Japanese shipping for the import of raw materials and the export of manufactured goods and military stores. Japan should be able to meet her shipping requirements provided that the rate of destruction is not excessive (particularly in regard to tankers). She will make every effort to salvage all allied ships sunk in shallow waters in the Far East and with those that have been captured, her shipping position, at least in the immediate future, is very strong.

10. Conclusion:- If Japan is able to consolidate her gains she will be economically secure except for cotton, copper, wool and nickel; of these cotton is by far the most important. Unless she is able to find, within about one year from now, adequate supplies of cotton herwhole economy is liable to collapse even though she may, within that period, have succeeded in getting Dutch oilfields and refineries into adequate production and may have maintained her shipping and tankers, in particular, at an adequate level. Cotton is Japan's major long-term economic problem.

Influence of Japanese Economic situation on Allied Strategy.

11. It follows naturally from the conclusions so far reached that the Allied nations have two main problems in the economic war against Japan. They are:-

(i) To prevent Japan from consolidating her gains, within the next year to eighteen months.

(ii) To make certain that, if the measures taken to achieve (i) should fail short of success, Japan is not allowed to lay her hands on Indian or Egyptian cotton.

As regards the immediate problem of preventing Japanese consolidation, material in relation to important aspects is set out below.

(i) K.M.A. Mines - the mines are about 700 miles from Siam, in Shensi province, and about 1,100 miles from Chungking. The

dislocation of the power-house would result in the flooding of the mines and their denial to the Japanese for a long period.

The coal from the K.M.A. mines is shipped from the port of Chinwangtao, near the China-Manchuria frontier, which is specially equipped for this task. This port would form a complementary target to the mines at Tongshan.

(ii) Oil Refineries:- It is believed that the refineries in Japan, which are concentrated in two main centres, Tsurumi, between Tokio and Yokohama, and Tokuyama (naval), 50 miles east of Shimonoseki, depended largely on imported American machinery. There is a doubt as to whether the Japanese are yet capable of manufacturing the delicate machinery required in such installations. Any damage to their refineries would therefore be serious. Furthermore, it is doubtful if the Japanese would be able to replace the machinery destroyed in Palembang and elsewhere. In any case, while repairs are proceeding it is probable that crude oil will be taken to Japan for refining. Any interference with Tsurumi, Tokuyama or Palembang should therefore help to produce a bottleneck in a most vital war supply.
The raid on Tokio and its striking demonstration of the possibility of attacking Japan in a most vulnerable spot are of interest in this connection.

(iii) Shipping:- To some extent the position has been improved by short hauls on which the bulk of Japan's shipping is now employed, but this in turn is offset by the necessity of replacing the British and other shipping formerly engaged in supplying the needs of many countries now under Japanese control and the shipping chartered for her own needs. The exact position is largely a matter of conjecture but there can be no doubt from our point of view of the necessity for sinking Japanese shipping, especially tankers, faster than they can be replaced.

(iv) Cotton:- If we should fail to retard Japanese consolidation sufficiently by the means suggested above we still have the whip hand of them in respect of cotton. The importance of countering any Japanese attempt on India in search of cotton by the removal from vulnerable areas of cotton stocks, gins, compresses, and equipment for packing cotton is obvious

Conclusion.

To sum up, it would appear from such knowledge as we have of Japan's economic and industrial position, that while the K.M.A. mines constitute her industrial soft spot, dependence on imported cotton is her economic Achilles heel and is a factor of such fundamental importance in the whole structure of Japanese self-sufficiency that it may even dictate Japan's military policy, if a solution is not found within about twelve months. (From AMB I.S. 28).

. . . . . .

———oOo———

MARYBOROUGH

4 Mls to 1 IN


(Recce by 3 Aust Div.)

Sealed ———

Metal or Gravel – – – – –

Sand or Earth .....

Prepared by GSI 2 Aust Corps
9 Sep 42



Appx 201

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

G.1198

HQ 2 Aust Corps
10 Sep 42

Subject:- Requirements of Tng Stores for Year Ending 30 Jun 43.

3 Aust Div
2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt
HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps
CSO
DDST (5)
DDMS
DDOS
File (2)
War Diary ✓(2)

Copy for infm to :-
C
AQ

1. Please submit to this HQ not later than Sunday, 20 Sep 42, consolidated requirements of tng stores for all units under your control, for year ending 30 Jun 43, under the following headings: headings:-

(a) SAA - incl .303 9 mm, .380, .455, .55, showing nature of unit, number of personnel to fire, rounds per man, CO's pool, unit total, number of units, grand total.

(b) .303 blank and tracer. Details as for (a).

(c) Arty amn. Nature of unit, number of guns, type of amn, number of rounds per gun, grand total.

(d) Bombs - Mortars, Grenades, Pyrotechnics, etc. Designation of stores, number and nature of units, total for each nature of units, grand total for all natures of units.

(e) Demolition explosives. Details as for (d)

(f) Gas stores. Detail as for (d).

2. For authorized entitlements, ref should be made to :-

(a) GRO 161 and 162 of 10 Jul 42.

(b) 2 Aust Corps G.1106 of 31 Aug (Amn for 6" Hows).

3. Returns are to be rendered in duplicate.

[signature]
for BGS
2 Aust Corps

Copy No.

aftac 202

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 22

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 11 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries No. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

(1) (2) TIMOR Area 9 Sep. There are unconfirmed reports that the Japanese have embarked at DILLI for EASTERN TIMOR. At 1530 hrs recce a/c sighted one 1,000 ton motor vessel and two 100 ton vessels at the KOEPANG Wharf.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

(3) LAE-SALAMAUA Area 9 Sep. SOUTH of MUBO enemy patrols are active.

(4) KOKODA Area 9 Sep 0750 hrs. At EFOGI, Allied a/c bombed and strafed enemy installations. All bombs fell on the target area. One MG was silenced. A large number of Japanese were seen on the EFOGI-KAGI Track. (KAGI is 3 miles N.N.E. of EFOGI). At EFOGI and on the hill to the South East, building activity was observed. Heavy and confused fighting continues in the vicinity of EFOGI and MANARI. The enemy suffered heavy casualties.

(5) (6)

(7) MILNE BAY Area 8 Sep. It was reported that 7 or 8 camouflaged enemy barges landed reinforcements on GOODENOUGH ISLAND on the night 28/29 Aug. At 0130 hrs 9 Sep Allied aircraft strafed houses and huts at GALAIWAHU (GOODENOUGH IS). No sign of activity was observed. Aerial recce on 9 Sep embracing MILNE BAY, FERGUSON IS, EAST TROBRIAND IS, to WOODLARK IS. reported NIL sighting.

(8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

(v) SOLOMONS Area:

(13) NEW GEORGIA Area 9 Sep 0854 hrs. Our recce aircraft sighted 9 enemy ships in the vicinity of VAHOLI BAY on the N.E. coast of NEW GEORGIA. At 1008 hrs one of our a/c sighted and attacked 1 battleship and 7 cruisers, presumably part of the same force. The posn was NOT given. The bombs fell short of the target.

NEW HEBRIDES GP. ESPIRATU SANTO IS. Area 8 Sep 0130 hrs. Approx 145 miles N.W. of Cape CUMBERLAND, an enemy submarine on a Westerly course was sighted. (Landers Revsit 41, 10 Sep).

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) Corps Area -- See Appx "A"

PART 5

SECURITY

Identification of Members of USA Naval and Military Forces

The following information will be of assistance in identifying members of USA forces :-

Naval officers will hold either D.R. form 10 (a) or the British Naval Identity Card (S. 1911 - endorsed "USA"), or the United States Navy Identification Card, the details of which are as follows:-

> The card is white and is 2 x 3¼ inches in size. The face, rank or service number of the officer and his height are photographed on the card itself. Other details include the name and signature, colour of hair and eyes, weight, date of birth, and signature of the Validating officer. The holder's finger prints are shown on the reverse side. An exactly similar card with the appropriate heading is in use for the United States Marine Corps.

Naval ratings will hold either British Naval Ratings Pay and Identity Book (S.45 (a)) or the United States Navy Identification Card described above.

All ranks of the Army will hold an Identification Card (W.D.A.G.O. Form No. 65-4) issued by the United States War Dept, the details of which are as follows :-

> One side of the card is brown and the other white. The number of the card is given on the brown side, and on the white side the following particulars are given :- Name, Grade, Arm or Service, Serial No, and personal particulars. A photograph of the holder and the finger-print of his right hand also appear. Measurements of the card are approx 7½" in width and 4" in depth. Some members of the United States Army passing through the U.K. ports and not in possession of Identification Card W.D. AGO Form 65-4 issued for Overseas troops may correctly be in possession of W.D. AGO Form No. 65-1 issued originally for use within the USA. Both types of Identification Card are similar except that 65-4 bears a counter-signature. There is no separate United States Air Force. United States Airmen therefore, hold one of the documents described above. (HQ First A.A.I. Army Fortnightly Summary No.17)

Lt Col
for Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 5.

APPENDIX "A"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 21

MARYBOROUGH

4 MILES TO 1 IN


(Recce by 3 Aust Div)

Sealed ————

Metal or Gravel - - - -

Sand or Earth .....

Prepared by GSI - 2 Aust Corps
9 Sep 42



Appx 103

SECRET

Copy No. 182

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.23

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 12 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries No.1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR Area 6 Sep. It is reliably reported that there is one enemy cruiser at DILLI. 10 Sep. Portuguese state that the JAPANESE have cut all the phone lines from DILLI. There is an unconfirmed report that the JAPANESE forces at DILLI have been relieved.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

KOKODA Area 10 Sep. Hy jungle fighting continues, with the enemy pressing our tps at MISSARI. After making allowance for casualties, the estimated enemy strength in BUNA-GONA area is 5000.

MILNE BAY Area 8 Sep. A skirmish between patrols at PUNI PUNI resulted in 6 JAPANESE being killed. Some of the enemy were reported to be carrying grenades and cutlasses 10 Sep. At WAUPONA our patrols encountered 12 JAPANESE, and killed 5. The enemy appears weak and unshaven and to be making in the direction of GILI GILI.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

GUADALCANAL Area 8 Sep. Allied forces incl paratps landed at LAIVU PT, GUADALCANAL. The enemy was forced to withdraw SW and to abandon R/T equipment, four 75mm guns and one 37mm HG as well as much food and amn. Our tps withdrew before dark, leaving the village of KASIBORO, 2½ miles WEST of LAIVU PT, burning. Enemy strength encountered was estimated at 1000 Twenty-seven Japanese were killed. At 1800 hrs 8 Sep 26 enemy bombers attacked allied shipping at TULAGI. No damage was caused. A second attack on the 9 Sep was equally unsuccessful. Ref HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELL SUMMARY No.21. It is now established that one enemy vessel only shelled TULAGI.

BOUGAINVILLE. Three light cruisers were sighted in the vicinity of KIETA. It is reported that 20 enemy tps land daily at KIETA, and proceed to the old mission site on the hill to sight A/C and patrol the coast. They return to the ship at nightfall.

In reference to the enemy patrol, stated to be moving inland from BUIN on 6 Sep, it is now reported that the party is returning to KINILI Trading Station near BUIN after looting Chinese properties. At 1100 hrs our recce A/C sighted the following ships :- 3 destroyers entering TONALAI Hr from the SE., One hy cruiser, 1 possible A/C carrier, 2 tpts, 4 large warships, 2 gunboats and 1 corvette in the BUIN-TONALAI area. Three destroyers and two cargo vessels at FAISI. Two destroyers approx 20 miles EAST by SOUTH of FAISI steaming ESE. At 1400 hrs an enemy destroyer was observed entering BUKA PASSAGE whilst at 1808 hrs a second destroyer was sighted on a

southerly course 10 miles EAST of BUKA PASSAGE. On 9 Sep there were indications of enemy submarines at each of the following places :- One approx 160 miles NE JAVA and another approx 240 miles NW of ONTONG JAVA. One approx 65 miles NW of the SANTA CRUZ Gp.

(Landops Revsit No.42).

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area - See Appx "A"

PART 5

SECURITY:

Rumours - Reports have been received attributing statements to TOKYO Radio and other Japanese stations which have NOT in fact been made.

Three examples, chosen at random are :-

(a) It was reported that within 5 days of the formation of an Operational Training Unit, a Japanese broadcast gave its location and warned its personnel that it was NOT worth while training because they would never have a chance to fight.

(b) It was reported that Tokyo Radio broadcast that MOSMAN (near Sydney) would be spared when Sydney was bombed because its people had been kind to Japanese woolbuyers. (Another story was that Mosman would be devastated because its people had been unkind to them).

(c) Tokyo Radio was reported to have given the exact number of U.S. tps going into camp at a Victorian town, within a few hrs of their arrival. (This story had wide currency in a RAAF Unit in the neighbourhood, as well as in the town. Spies were detected and reported and the local newspaper denounced the lack of security, incidentally reporting the arrival of the tps in the process of denunciation. The story was eventually tracked down to a sgt of Police who apparently invented it for amusement.

In none of those instances, nor in any of the countless others reported, was there the slightest foundation for the rumour.

It is worth mention that official Service and Govt listening posts monitor every broadcast or morse transmission made by Tokyo, Domei and Jap-controlled stations in conquered countries, in all the languages used thereon, as well as covering most of the important transmissions from other Axis stations. Four reports per day covering these are received in this Directorate and items of use are extracted for the Summary. This coverage is considerably wider and more reliable than the rumours which circulate about Tokyo Radio and its sayings.

It is quite probable that such rumours are spread by agents. They gave Tokyo Radio, at the worst of the crisis, the reputation for omniscience which greatly increased its propaganda power.


All IOs should endeavour to track down the source of these

stories, report them at once and on receiving confirmation of their untruth, see that this is widely known in their unit.

(HQ Allied Air Forces S.W.P.A. Int Summary No.29).

Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.5.



Recce by 9 Aust Div

Prepared by HQ 2 Aust Corps

Appx 204

SECRET

Copy No. 12

War Diary

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 24

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 13 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries No. 1-15 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii) NEI Area -

AMBON: 11 Sep 1220 hrs. Allied A/C report AMBOINA BAY clear of enemy shipping.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

BUNA: 11 Sep 0755 hrs. Eighteen camouflaged A/C in blast bays were sighted on NE side of runway. A possible fuel depot near the unfinished landing strip NORTH of the runway was also observed. Our A/C attacked the aerodrome on 11 Sep scoring hits on the dispersal bays and landing strip. An A/A posn was also silenced.

KOKODA Area 11 Sep 1130 hrs - 1330 hrs. One allied A/C attacked EFOGI and MENARI. Bombs fell on target area at MENARI and from resulting explosions it is believed that an amn dump was destroyed. Hy fighting continues in this area. Allied tps are vigorously attacking the enemy in the vicinity of NAURO CK 4 miles SOUTH of EFOGI. An unconfirmed report indicates that the Japs are employing one regt fwd and one in reserve to maintain impetus. QF mountain guns, hy MG and hy mortars are in use by the enemy.

MILNE BAY Area 11 Sep 1535 hrs. Our recce A/C reported sighting 1 enemy cruiser apprx 32 miles NORTH by EAST of BUYUESI BAY (NORTH coast WOODLARK IS) on southerly course. At 1610 hrs 2 enemy destroyers were reported 27 miles NE of Cape VENTENAT (SE strip of NORMANBY IS). The 2 destroyers were attacked by allied A/C at 1617 hrs. A direct hit aft on the leading destroyer left it listing to port with the stern under water and the ship afire.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area:

RABAUL 11 Sep 0805 hrs - Recce A/C sighted one 5000-ton enemy cargo vessel 15 miles NW of RABAUL steaming NW. One 6000-ton vessel and a small vessel 5 miles NE of RABAUL on a north-easterly course were also observed. Twenty vessels incl warships were stationary in RABAUL Hr.

(v) SOLOMONS Area:

GUADALCANAL 5 Sep - In ref to allied air attack on enemy landing craft WEST of Cape ESPERANCE (2 AUST CORPS SUMMARY No. 23), it is now reported that an enemy party estimated at 260 strong landed WEST of Cape ESPERANCE on 10 Sep.

GIZO 10 Sep - It is reported that enemy A/A posns have been strengthened, dugouts established on the hillside EAST of BURNS PHILP's building and fuel drums and stores are under trees in this vicinity. Ref enemy air attacks

on allied shipping at [illegible] SUMMARY No.23), it is now established that our intercepting A/C shot down 9 enemy bombers and 4 fighters. At 0320 hrs on 11 Sep our recce A/C sighted 1 enemy cruiser and 1 destroyer approx 20 miles NW of Cape HEDDAN (Northernmost tip of BUKA) steering northerly. They also reported 2 cargo vessels anchored in MARCHEN BAY (NW coast BOUGAINVILLE). At 0930 hrs 2 destroyers were observed approx 12 miles SOUTH by EAST of Cape GERARD (SHORTLAND IS). At 0900 hrs recce A/C reported FAIR of TONELAI clear of enemy shipping. The following shipping was sighted in BUKA-PASSAGE :- 2 by armoured, 1 merchant A/C carrier and 2 small vessels. An enemy destroyer and a cargo vessel were attacked by our A/C at 1010 hrs on 11 Sep 190 miles NE of ORMOND JAVA. No results of attack are known. Natives report that Japs have landed 10 motor lorries and a plough at KAHILI landing (Harbour SUVA). There are indications of enemy submarines operating in the following posns :- One approx 190 miles NW and another approx 340 miles E by N of CANTON, JAVA and a third approx 240 miles NE of NDENI IS (SANTA CRUZ Gp).

(Landops Revsit No.43).

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area - See Appx "A".

PART 4

OTHER FRONTS:

(iii) EUROPE - Revsit week ending 7 Sep 42.

RUSSIAN FRONT. Northern and central sector. Although local attacks by the Russians continue there is no substantial territorial change to report.

DON-STALINGRAD Sector. It is still possible that the Russians are holding a bridgehead over the middle DON. Further EAST our allies are still established in the NW corner of the DON bend. Despite stubborn resistance the German NW and SW thrusts on STALINGRAD have now made contact within 8 miles of the city centre.

CAUCASUS Sector . It is now thought probable that German elements from ELISTE have reached the VOLGA. German attempts at infiltration through the CAUCASIAN passes are meeting with strong Russian resistance. There is no evidence that the continued Russian attacks on the NORTH and CENTRAL Sectors are materially influencing the main German operation in the SOUTH as the ring around STALINGRAD has drawn tighter.

SEA - Northern European Waters. It is thought probable that the pocket battleship ADMIRAL SCHEER has been operating in the ARCTIC and entered RUSSIAN WATERS and shelled DIKSON IS in the KARA SEA on 25 Aug. Reports indicate that she has now returned to NORTH NORWAY. The battle cruiser SCHARNHORST is still in the BALTIC and believed to be ready for service.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA - 28 Aug to 3 Sep. Ten enemy merchant ships are claimed to have been sunk or seriously damaged by our submarines or A/C. One enemy destroyer has been damaged.

HQ 2 AUST INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 24.

WEST INDIES. Attacks are still directed against our shipping by U Boats in this area and against ATLANTIC convoys. Twenty-three attacks by our A/C and 5 by our surface craft during the week ending 2 Sep are considered promising.

AIR

WESTERN EUROPE. 30 Aug to 6 Sep. On the night of 2 Sep over 200 bombers attacked the SAAR BASIN whilst on the night 2/3 Sep a slightly smaller force attacked KARLSRUHE, an important ry centre where lines to the RUHR, SWITZERLAND, ITALY, FRANCE and MUNICH intersect. Two hundred bombers raided BREMEN and the FOCKEWULFE assembly works at NEUKLAN. Many fires were started in the target areas and at 1000 hrs on the following morning large fires were burning in BREMEN. Fifty FORTRESSES and BOSTONS with a fighter escort attacked the ry yards at ROUEN and the docks at LE HAVRE. Visibility at ROUEN was excellent and many bursts on the tracks and rolling stock were observed. All the bombers returned safely.

(World Revsit week ending 7 Sep).


Lin Lagen, Capt
for Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 5.

Appendix "A" -

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SURVEY No.24.

EXAMPLE



Recce by 2 AUST CORPS

Prepared by GSI 2 Aust Corps.
12 Sep 42.

Copy No 17.

G 1219

G File.

SECRET

"RISING SUN" - THE WAR IN THE S.W. PACIFIC

"IF AN JAP WOULD LIKE IT"

In Chronological Order.

1. (a) 1 Oct - British NEW GUINEA incl MORESBY and MILNE BAY captured.

(b) 3 Oct - Large Jap fleet with air force decisively defeat Allied fleet north of SOLOMON ISLAND

(c) 15 Oct - US Forces driven from SOLOMON ISLAND and the situation re established as it was.

(d) 22 Oct - Large Jap force occupy NEW CALEDONIA.

(e) 1 Nov - 1½ Jap Div lands at TOWNSVILLE and defeats 5 Aust Div - secures a base.

(f) 4 Nov - 16 Jap Div lands at ROCKHAMPTON and heavy fighting with 1 US Div.

(g) 5 Nov - Intelligence reports movement of Aust Forces north from NSW by RT into QUEENSLAND

(h) 8 Nov - Cond 7 Jap Army at MILNE BAY sends for Lt.-Gen TOJOBLASTUS and after giving him the latest information, issues certain instructions for a further offensive operation against BRISBANE. See Narrative 1.

(j) 10 Nov - 18 Jap Div lands at PIALBA north of MARYBOROUGH and involved in heavy fighting with 6 Aust Div - PIALBA secured, but 18 Div held up along MARY RIVER.

NARRATIVE 1.

Problem from the enemy's point of view.

1. On 8 Nov the Jap Army Cond at MILNE BAY gave Lt.-Gen TOJOBLASTUS Cond X Task force, certain information and instns which he later confirms - major relevant details follow.

2. Repeats, the summary of major events to date as in opening situation. He was optimistic regarding the fighting from TOWNSVILLE to MARYBOROUGH.

3. There is still 3 Aust Div and 1/2 18 Div in the vicinity of BRISBANE.

4. The Australian government is mostly unlikely to send the 3 Aust Div to QUEENSLAND as it was very sensative regarding the vulnerability of SYDNEY and NEWCASTLE but these places would receive attention in due course.

5. The only other force in eastern Australia, was an armoured Div which was training in NW of NSW, but the Div was to be regrouped with a partially trained motor div and two Armoured Div of a new type were to be formed. It was unlikely therefore, that the force could be involved in a major operation within 6 weeks.

6. Recent Jap successes had lowered the morale of the Australian troops and people, and the Jap soldier who had already proved his superiority in battle could claim to take rank in the organisation of offensive warfare. To plan the training policy of our developing armies a revised estimate of operations would again have to be made as it had already to the present.

7. The above basic principles must be kept clearly before [illegible] all issues here by the army [illegible] that new fighting [illegible] to a scale of which hitherto could be available to the Allies in the S.W.Pacific area. These principles have to be and there is not the same critical sphere of direction now [illegible] as it is now.

8. The Jap navy has made a clean sweep of the Malay barrier. Consequently it could ensure the reasonably safe passage of convoys [illegible] precautions and reinforce [illegible].

9. In consideration of the above it is the duty of a responsible [illegible] to proceed with the invasion of the general [illegible] of Australia, step by step, along the [illegible] which making full use of naval superiority [illegible] based wherever [illegible] to secure [illegible] Timor, to overrun [illegible] lines of [illegible] [illegible] by Australia of the great majority [illegible] of American fighting.

10. In view of the nature of the operations [illegible] [illegible] that may proceed with the maximum speed.

11. [illegible] Commander [illegible] Japanese may [illegible] [illegible] to capture [illegible] development as an [illegible] base for the operation of larger land and air forces.

12. The land forces at [illegible] disposal were as shown in Appx A, which also contains details of [illegible] and landing craft available.


13. Appended hereto are the following appendices:-

Appx A	Organisation now [illegible].	
Appx B	"	Aust Div of 3 Bde Gps.
Appx C	"	US Triangular Div.
Appx D	"	Aust and US Corps.
Appx E	Location [illegible] of Jap Air Forces.	
Appx F	Organisation Jap Sea Landing Force.	
Appx G	" " Div	
Appx H	Probable composition Jap forces for [illegible] operations.	

[illegible]

14. [illegible] examination and plan for the execution of his task as shown in para 11 above.


APPX A



Scale Weapons Etc for a Mot Regt		Tpt	
Pistol .455	122	MCs	40
Rifles .303	560	Cars 6 seater	
		Uty	1
SMGs	14	Carriers	37
LMGs	80	Scout Cars	11
A Tk Rifles	72	Trucks 15-cwt GS	67
Mortars	13	Office Unit	1
		Wireless Sigs	5
		Trucks 3-tpn GS	14
		water	1

APPX B

ORGANIZATION OF AN AUST DIV. TWO BDE BASIS



Personnel of Div


Officers	537
Other Ranks	11078

Weapons in Div

Armd Cars	45
Carriers	193
Fd guns, 25 pdr	48
A TK guns, 2 pdr	72
A Tk Rifles .55"	211
MMGs	84
LMGs	558
SMG	780
Mortars 3"	42

INFANTRY DIVISION (Triangular) (2) (2)

- DHQ
  - 0-26 WO-2 EM-74
- 3 Inf Regts (ea)
  - 0-123 WO-1 EM-3325
  - FC & HQ Co & Band
    - 0-18 WO-1 EM-206
    - 3 AT Plats
    - HQ & HQ Det 0-6 EM-67
    - 3 RCOs (ea) 0-6 EM-219
    - 1 Hv Wpn Co 0-6 EM-207
      - 2 Plats HMG cal .30+
      - 1 Plat MG cal .50
      - 1 Plat 81 mm Mrtr (6)
      - 1 Wpn Plat
      - 3 R Plat
  - Serv Co 0-9 EM145
  - AT Co 0-6 EM-181
  - 3 Bns (ea) 0-30 EM-931
  - Cannon Co
    - 2-105 mm SP
    - 6-75 mm SP (X)
- Div Arty
  - 0-131 WO-1 EM-2638
  - HQ, HQ Btry & Band 0-18 WO-1 EM-146 (66)
    - HQ Btry 0-12 EM-139
    - 3 Btries 105mm How (ea) 0-4 EM-118
    - Serv & Amn Btry 0-3 EM-81
  - 3 Bns L Arty (ea) 0-27 EM-574 (66)
  - 1 Bn M Arty 0-32 EM-770 (66)
    - HQ Btry 0-12 EM-137
    - 3 Btries 155 mm How (ea) 0-4 EM-132
    - 1 Btry 75 mm AT Gun (8 guns) 0-5 EM-143
    - Serv & Amn Btry 0-3 EM-94
- Rcn Tr 0-6 EM-141 (66)
  - 3 Rcn Plats (ea) 0-1 EM-31
    - 3 Plats of 3 Sq (ea) 0-1 EM-48
- Engr Bn 0-21 EM-627 (66)
  - HQ & HQ Co 0-9 EM-93
  - 3 COs (ea) 0-4 EM-178
- Inf HQ & MP Co (-Div HQ Plat) 0-7 EM-123
  - Special Plat 0-2 EM-46
  - MP Plat 0-3 EM-64



NOTES:

(1) C = Offrs, EM = ORs

(2) Totals include attached medical personnel and chaplains

(3) Transportation furnished by Quartermaster Battalion

(4) Includes Division Surgeon's Office

(66) Moves by Organic Transportation

(X) Recent amendment. 2 only 105 mm tractor drawn guns supplied

USA INF DIV (TRIANGULAR)

Personnel:	In a Div	624 Offrs	15505 ORs
	" " Regt	123 Offrs	3618 ORs
	" " Bn	30 Offrs	1004 ORs
	" " Coy(Rifle)	6 Offrs	241 ORs
	" " Hvy Wpn Coy	6 Offrs	208 ORs

FIRE POWER OF A USA INF (TRIANGULAR) DIV - WEAPON TABLE.

UNIT	DIV HQ	DIV HQ & MP COY	RECCE TP	DIV SIG COY	3 INF REGTS	DIV ARTY	ENGR BN	MED BN	QM BN	TOTAL DIV
MG Cal 50			17			16				77
MG Cal 50 flexible					36					36
MG Hvy Cal 30			32		72		18			122
LMG Cal 30			3		54					57
TSMG .45			35		180					215
Gun .37 mm A/Tk					36	24				60
Gun 75 mm A/Tk						8				8
How 105 mm						36				36
How 155 mm						12				12
Mortar 60 mm					81					81
Mortar 81 mm					36					36
Rifle Auto .30					258					258
Rifle Semi-auto .30		47	32		6939		516		50	7584
VEHICLES (COMBAT)										
Cars Scout			16							16
Carriers pers W/ Armament					603					603

APPX B

COMPOSITION OF RAAF UNITS.

1	AC Sqn	3 Flights, each of	(6 Operational aircraft (2 Comn aircraft
2	Fighter Sqn	3 Flights, each of 6 aircraft	
3	Med Bomber Sqn	3 Flights, each of 6 aircraft	
4	Dive Bomber Sqn	3 Flights, each of 6 aircraft	

NOTE: All RAAF Flights work on the basis of 4 Immediate and 2 Reserve Aircraft

AIR SUPPORT CONTROL - TYPE A.

STRENGTH: 7 Offrs, 126 ORs
EQPT: 29 Wireless Sets - Range R/T 100 miles
W/T Unlimited

CAPABILITIES.

1 Supply of Wireless comn between Corps, Divs and Bdes to landing grounds for both Recce and support aircraft for all units in the formation.

2 Provides Air Support in the following categories :-

(a) Fighter Air Support
(b) Bomber Air Support, as follows :-

Med Level Bombing
Dive Bombing
Low Level and ground bombing

ANNEX B

LOCATION STATEMENT - TPS OF 2 AUST CORPS

2 AUST CORPS

HQ 2 Aust Corps	ESK
Sigs, 2 Aust Corps	ESK
4 AS Control	ESK
4 AC Sqn	KINGAROY

3 AUST DIV

HQ 3 Aust Div	LANDSBOROUGH
4 Aust Inf Bde Gp	NAMBOUR
15 Aust Inf Bde Gp	CABOOLTURE

CAV

8 Aust Recce Bn	LANDSBOROUGH

RAA

106 Aust A Tk Regt	LANDSBOROUGH-CABOOLTURE

RAE

53 Aust Fd Pk Coy	LANDSBOROUGH

32 US DIV

HQ 32 US Div	TAMBOURINE
HQ 32 US Div Arty	TAMBOURINE
HQ Coy, 32 US Div (Det)	TAMBOURINE
HQ 32 Sig Coy	TAMBOURINE
107 Med Bn (Arty)	TAMBOURINE
114 Engr Bn (Det)	TAMBOURINE
107 QM Bn (Det)	TAMBOURINE
107 Medical Bn (Det)	TAMBOURINE
126 Combat Gp	TAMBOURINE
127 Combat Gp	TAMBOURINE
128 Combat Gp	TAMBOURINE

1 AUST HOT BDE GP — GYMPIE

CORPS TPS

RAA

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	ESK
2/1 Aust Med Regt	BELLEVUE
2/5 Aust Fd Regt	D'AGUILAR
2/9 Aust A Fd Regt	ARAKCON
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	BELLEVUE
2/2 Aust A Tk Regt	WOODFORD
HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	ESK
8 Aust Fd Regt	CASINO
1 Aust Med Regt	NEURUM
2 F Sp Bty	NEURUM

RAE

HQ 2 Aust Corps RAE	VILLENEUVE
2/16 Aust A Fd Coy	GLENFERN
19 Aust A Fd Coy	GLENFERN
60 Aust Army Fd Coy	GLENFERN

(See P 2)

AASC


HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps	FAIRNIE VIEW
1 Aust Corps Amn Coy	FERNVALE
1 Aust Corps Pet Coy	FAIRNIE VIEW
1 Aust Corps Sup Col	FERNVALE
HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps	HARLIN
2 Aust Corps Amn Coy	HARLIN
2 Aust Corps Pet Coy	HARLIN
2 Aust Corps Sup Col	HARLIN
HQ 1 Aust Corps Tpt Col	GOODNA
2/103 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	REDBANK PLAINS
2/104 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	GROVELY CAMP
2/105 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	REDBANK PLAINS
2/106 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	GOODNA
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col	HARLIN
129 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	(att 1 Aust Mot Bde)
130 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	(att 3 Aust Div)
131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	CROSSDALE
132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	HARLIN
133 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	TOOGOOLAWAH

AALC


10 Aust Fd Amb	LANDSBOROUGH
22 Aust Fd Amb	KILCOY
2 Aust CCS	IPSWICK
11 Aust CCS	HARLIN
2/1 Aust MAC	DINMORE
2 Aust MAC	KILCOY

APPX F

COMPOSITION OF A JAPANESE BDE GP TASK LANDING FORCE (ESTIMATED).



ORGANIZATION OF A JAPANESE 3 REGIMENT DIVISION.



FIRE POWER OF JAPANESE 3 REGIMENT DIVISION

	Cav Regt	Div Inf	Fd Arty Regt	Mech AA Arty Unit	Hy AA MG Mech Unit	Chem Unit	Sig Unit	Tk Bn	Engr Regt	Totals
Cars										
37mm AT Guns								12		12
MTR 81mm								4		4
75mm FD Guns										
75mm FA Guns										
105mm How										
150mm How										
75mm AA Guns										
37mm FA Guns										
37mm AT Guns										
20mm AA Guns										
MGs										
LMGs										
SCMW GRENADE DISCHARGERS										
PERSONNEL										

NOTES 1. FIGURES IN THE ABOVE TABLE ARE APPROX
2. LMGs AND MGs IN AFVs ARE NOT INCLUDED

JAPANESE INFANTRY REGIMENT

Personnel
- in a Regt 3030 approx
- in a Bn 892
- in a Rifle Co 168 approx

Weapons Totals
- 75 mm Regtl Guns 4
- 70 mm Bn Guns 6
- 37 mm A-Tk Guns 10 or 12
- LMGs 108
- A-Tk Rifles 21

[illegible] = 24 Ship-of about 5000 tons each

JAPANESE TANKS

The silhouettes are not to scale

LAVs

M 2592 1 MG in turret



M 2598 1 MG in turret
1 MG in hull



Lt Tks

Type used in MALAYA

1 37? mm Gun in turret
1 MG rear of turret
1 MG left front of hull



Med. Tks

M 2594 1 37 mm gun
1 MG in turret
1 MG in hull forward



1935-37 Model
37 mm Gun in turret
1 MG left forward
1 MG left rear



Note. The above tanks are those most likely to be met.

NOTES ON WEAPONS

LMGs 6.5 mm (256 in)

"Taisho II" wt 20 lbs 454 rpm effective range [illegible]

6 clips 5 rds. Rpd [illegible]

"Type 96" wt 20 lbs 550 rpm effective range [illegible]

(approx.) 30 rds in mag. Rare type LMG rated at 700 rpm

MG 7.7 (303 in)

"Type 92" mounted on tripod 500 rpm. Strip feed with 72 rds per strip effective range 900 yds

50 mm GRENADE DISCHARGER [illegible] and bomb 2 lbs used [illegible]

81 mm MORTAR wt of bomb 14 lbs range [illegible]

37 mm A-TK GUN [illegible] Standard A-Tk gun range 550 yds

70 mm BN GUN 8 lb shell, maximum range [illegible]

75 mm FD GUN 14 lb shell, maximum range [illegible]

105 mm HOW 35 lb shell, maximum range [illegible]

Two types of hand grenade exist, [illegible] shape. Steel [illegible]

SVY/MISC/056 [illegible]

POCKET NOTES

on the

JAPANESE ARMY

Information passed back may be the means of saving thousands of lives.

Intelligence always needs information, and needs everyone's co-operation in getting it.

NOTHING IS TOO UNIMPORTANT.

Preserve and pass back all captured equipment and documents, including everything found on prisoners. Speed is always important, delay may be fatal.

G.S.I. (a) H.Q. FIRST AUST ARMY. AUG '42.

G 121

H.Q. 2 AUST. CORPS
968 / 1 / 23 SECRET
G.S. REGISTRY

FILE

Appendix "F" issued with the opening situation narrative (1) is hereby cancelled. It should be destroyed and the following Appendix substituted therefore.

APPX "H"

COPY No 17

14 SEPT 44

COMPOSITION OF JAP FORCES - AF-OSK TOJOHASTOS.

LAND FORCES

Formation	Location	Composition
Div	On types BUIN FAISI area	See details Appx G
Bde Gp Task Landing Force	KOLOMBANGARA	" " Appx F
Bde Gp Task Landing Force	KOLOMBANGARA	" " Appx F

AIR FORCES

Carrier Borne

Carrier	Aircraft	Type
GHOKAKU	60	Fighters
ZUIKAKU	60	Fighters
ZUIHO	45	Dive Bombers
HIYO	35	Med Bombers

S/P Carriers

CHITOSE	16
NOTORO	16
CHIYODA	9
CHUYO	10

LAND BASED (The use of this is doubtful until Landing Grounds Operating).

A Shore Based Group

Flying Boats	2 Sqns - 18
Fighters	2 Sqns - 18
Heavy Bombers	2 Sqns - 18

SHIPPING

Naval Escort

1 Battleship
10 Cruisers
22 Destroyers
Minesweepers
Submarines

Shipping for Convoy

3 MLC Carriers

Merchant Ships

2 10,000 ton
5 7,000 ton
14 5,000 ton

CM.

Available for maintenance after 14 days:-

8	8,000 ton tankers
10	2,000 ton ships

NOTES:-

MLC Carriers:

Each carrier carries:-

24	large MLC
120	small MLC
10	armed launches
4	despatch boats

MLCs: There are 9 Classes divided into two groups as under:-

Large: 45' - 55' long; 90-100 men; draught 30-35 in.; speed 6-8 knots.

Small: 30' - 40' long; 50-60 men; draught 30-36 in; speed 8-10 knots.

AMENDMENTS TO HARBASTUS 1:-

(a) The appx mentioned in para 12 is appx E NOT appx A;

(b) Amend para 15, last line, appx H, to read:-

"The composition of forces available to Lt-Gen TOJOHARSTUS."

DISTRIBUTION:-

	Copy No.
3 Aust Div	1-2
32 US Div	3-4
CCRA	5-6
GOC	7
BGS	8
A & Q	9
First Aust Army	10
Southern Area RAAF	11
GOC 1 Aust Div	12
Comd 1 Aust Bde	13
GOC Q'ld L of C	14
War Diary	15-16
File	17
Spare	18-19-20

Oscillation-Problem 1.

Problem 2

Title

Copy No 17

PROBLEM 2.

NOTES:-

(a) Syndicates are no longer members of the Jap forces but Comd and Staff 2 Corps.

(b) As Comd 2 Corps the exact intentions and movements are unknown. The information available to you is as stated in the opening situation plus the information given in the attached intelligence digest, and Appx "A". You have no direct knowledge of GEN TOJOBLASTUS plan.

(c) The Corps role is the defence of BRISBANE and the area of responsibility is from excl MARYBOROUGH to incl CLARENCE RIVER.

(d) Dispositions of BRISBANE covering force to be given verbally.

PROBLEM 2.

(a) As Commander 2 Corps, your appreciation and plan at 1300 hrs 20 Nov in note form to be given verbally.

2 Aust Corps Exercise - Extracts from Intelligence infm received prior to Ops.

SECRET
Copy No 17

Date	T.O.R.	From	By	Infm
11	0920	First Aust Army	Sitrep	BUIN FAISI area - 1450 K/9. Total sightings this area 1 possible A/C carrier, one 10,000-ton tpt, 5 other ships, 8 small unidentified vessels, 20 barges. GUADALCANAL area 1510 K/9. 1 battleship, 1 S/P carrier, 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 5 gunboats or minesweepers. 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers course NW 35 mls HUE FLORIDA Is. NEW CALEDONIA 1330 K/9. Three 5,000-ton tpts, 1 cruiser, 1 large flat-decked vessel 8,000 tons, 30 barges, 1 possible S/P carrier, 8 destroyers, 10 unidentified vessels anchored NOUMEA. One A/C carrier, 112 mls WEST sighted 1545 hrs course SSE, Speed 18 knots.
12	0830	Qld L. of C.	Signal	Coast Watching Posts report submarine 3 mls off Southern end FRASER Is course SOUTH., estimated speed 8 knots. Observed for 15 mins. All informed.
	1340	A.C.H. E.A.	Signal	Submarine attacked 1120 hrs 126 mls EAST BRISBANE. One direct hit behind conning tower. Bubbles and oil observed for 20 mins.
	1410	First Aust Army	Sitrep	PT MORESBY 1115 K/10. Increase on previous sightings. Total shipping this area now estimated 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 8 tpts or cargo vessels, 1 MLC carrier, 18 small vessels.
13	1025	First Aust Army	Summary	Estimate of forces as at 11 Nov. LAND. TOWNSVILLE, ROCKHAMPTON, MARYBOROUGH one div each. PT MORESBY 2 divs. RABAUL, SOLOMONS 3 divs. NEW CALEDONIA 18,000 tps. NAVAL. 5 A/C carriers, 6 S/P carriers, 4 MLC carriers, 2 battleships, 12 cruisers, 47 destroyers, 24 tpts, 10 supply ships, 3 tankers, 50 smaller vessels.
14	0900	First Aust Army	Sitrep	Sightings SOLOMONS area. 1340 K/12. Total shipping this area estimated 1 battleship, 1 A/C carrier, 1 possible A/C carrier, 2 possible MLC carriers, 7 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 1 10,000-ton tpt, 8 6,000-ton tpts, 45 small craft. NEW CALEDONIA. 1730 K/12. One A/C carrier, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 9 tpts, considerable number of small craft and barges. 10 FBs anchored NOUMEA.

Date	T.O.R.	From	By	Infm
14	1300	A.C.H. E.A.	Sitrep	Five Catalinas bombed shipping and landing ground NOUMEA. Hits observed: dumps, runways dispersal areas. Fires started amongst barges. One our A/C missing.
	1730	3 Aust Div	Signal	Submarine reported 1535 hrs 2 mls EAST CALOUNDRA, course SOUTH, speed 5 knots, submerged after 8 mins.
15	0600	Fighter Sector	Phone	Air raid YELLOW.
	0640	" "	"	Air raid WHITE. Unidentified A/C over BRISBANE, height 28,000', no interception.
	0840	First Aust Army	Signal	MOST SECRET. Secret Sources report that Jap forces estimated one div embarking at RABAUL evening 14 Nov probable destination Qld area. Comment: It is uncertain whether these forces are intended as reinforcements for forces already operating, or whether further landing ops are indicated. There has been a steady increase in sightings in RABAUL-SOLOMONS area over last few days.
16	1025	First Aust Army	Sitrep	Sightings NEW CALEDONIA 1400 K/15. One A/C carrier, 1 possible A/C carrier, 1 S/P carrier, 1 MLC carrier, 12 tpts 5,000 tons, 3 cargo vessels 2/3,000 tons, many small vessels barges. Appeared to be considerable activity NOUMEA loading or unloading stores.
	1350	ACH	Signal	1 S/P carrier, 8 unidentified vessels 80 mls EAST NEW CALEDONIA, course SW, speed 12 knots.
	1750	ACH	Phone	Unidentified A/C over BRISBANE at 1740 hrs, height 32,000'.
17	1015	Allied Air-Forces	Summary	Extract - "The shipping movements in the vicinity of NEW CALEDONIA and the increased shipping at NOUMEA seem to indicate either the enemy is reinforcing the garrison or that he is relieving the tps who were engaged in the original landing. There is much increased activity in the area over the past few days. Whatever the facts may indicate, it is certain that the Jap is preparing to use the island as a base for further operations against this country."
	1920	First Aust Army	Signal	Convoy consisting of 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 5 merchant vessels sighted 50 mls EAST of MAGNETIC IS 1510 hrs, course SSE, speed 10 knots.

Date	T.O.R.	From	By	Info
18	0820	First Aust Army	Sitrep	NEW CALEDONIA - Sightings 1540 hrs 17 - 3 possible A/C carriers, 2 possible S/P carriers, 1 MLC carrier, 8 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 1 tanker 8,000 tons, 14 merchant vessels 4/6,000 tons, numerous small craft barges. Great activity on shore at NOUMEA.
	1030	1 Aust Met Bde	Signal	Unidentified A/C flew WEST over GYMPIE 1005 hrs, height 8.10,000'. Several reports confirmed red spots on wings.
	1115	3 Aust Div	Signal	Unidentified A/C reported by VAOC POINT of NOOSA HEAD 1055 hrs. Appeared to be circling in vicinity. Estimated height 10,000'. Impossible to identify owing to poor visibility.
	2040	ACH	Signal	Recce A/C reports convoy estimated 50 ships 75 mls WEST NOUMEA, course NW at 0830 hrs 18. Endeavour to shadow. Visibility poor. Driven off by shore based A/C.
19	0915	First Aust Army	Sitrep	NEW CALEDONIA. Sightings NOUMEA 1040 K/18 1 vessel 8,000 tons, three 4/6000 tons, 4 destroyers, 8 smaller vessels, 1 tanker, number of small craft. Visibility poor.
	1035	32 US Div	Signal	Reported enemy A/C flew NORTH over SOUTHPORT at 1000 hrs, height 20,000'.
	1140	First Aust Army	Signal	MOST SECRET. Reliably reported large enemy convoy assembled BUIN FAISI area, departed 0930 K/16, course SSW. Large naval escort incl carrier borne A/C. All informed.
	1200	ACH	Signal	Sighting 0935 K/19. Enemy convoy estimated 3 A/C carriers, 2 MLC carriers 5 hy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 10-12 destroyers, 10 tpts 4-6000 tons, several small vessels, minesweepers, etc. at 159°45' E - 24°35' S. A/C shadowing.
	1610	ACH	Signal	Recce A/C reports large enemy convoy 153°30'E 17°40' S 1030 K/19. Endeavoured to shadow but driven off by fighter escort.
	1800	First Aust Army	Signal	Enemy A/C reported BRISBANE and CALOUNDRA 1700 hrs today. No interception.

Date	TOR	From	By	Infm
19	1910	ACH	Signal	Attack at 1350 hrs on convoy sighted 159°45'E 24°35'S by two squadrons of bombers escorted by 1 sqn fighters. Results 1 A/C carrier damaged, 1 ship 4-6000 tons sunk, near misses 1 cruiser. 3 fighters shot down and damaged. Our losses 3 bombers, 2 fighters.
20	0740	First Aust Army	Signal	Enemy convoy estimated 10 large warships incl battleship, A/C carriers, 15 smaller warships, 13 merchant vessels, and smaller ships sighted 153°30' E, 19°10'S course SE 1710 K/19.
	0830	ACH	Signal	Recce report convoy attacked at 1350 hrs now in area 157°50'E, 26°10'S at 0630 hrs.
	0950	Fighter Sector	Phone	Air raid RED. Enemy dive bombers, suspected carrier borne, attacked ARCHERFIELD aerodrome, and satellite LGs. Several our A/C damaged. 3 enemy bombers shot down, 1 crash landed.
	1030	ACH	Signal	Further attack at 0810 hrs by 1 sqn of dive-bombers escorted by one sqn of fighters on convoy sighted at 157°50'E 26°10'S. Results 1 A/C carrier previously damaged set on fire, and listing heavily; hits on another A/C carrier, and 1 MLC Carrier; 2 fighters shot down. Our losses five dive-bombers, 1 fighter.
	1410	ACH	Signal	Enemy recce A/C over BRISBANE-BEENLEIGH area.
	1505	ACH	Signal	Enemy convoy last reported 153°30'E 19°10'S was in area 154°10'E 21°20'S at 1215 hrs.
	1550	ACH	Phone	Air raid TOOGOOLAWAH Aerodrome no damage, 1 F & D.B. shot down. Suspected carrier borne A/C
	1655	First Aust Army	Signal	Two enemy convoys sighted 1645 K/20 close together 156°50'E 27°30'S Course S. Visibility very poor, low cloud. Estimated total strength 25 naval vessels 12 merchant vessels.
	2100	First Aust Army	Signal	Convoys reported previous signal now reported 155°04'E 26°05'S, split 1900 hrs. Visibility nil, impossible identify composition.
	2320	First Aust Army	Signal	Reported that map obtained from Bomber crashed ARCHERFIELD air raid this morning covered coast area BALLINA-MARYBOROUGH. Many indecipherable notes in Jap characters on coastline especially in the NORTHERN area.

APIX "A"

Information on Aerodromes and Landing Grounds.

1. If the enemy attempts a landing between the CLARENCE and MARY RIVERS, he will undoubtedly strive to capture and hold aerodromes as land bases for his aircraft. Preparations should therefore be made for the defence of the following aerodromes close to the coast:-

EVANS HEAD.
ARCHERFIELD and satellites.
AMBERLY and satellites.
LOWOOD and satellites.
TOOGOOLAWAH.
PETRIE.

In addition, open country exists between LOWOOD and TOOGOOLAWAH, in the BRISBANE VALLEY, that could be used for aerodromes with little, if any, preparation.

These aerodromes may be divided into two classes :-

(a) Large fields that would be difficult to render unserviceable.

(b) Strips that may with comparative ease be rendered unserviceable for a limited period. These strips will accomodate a more limited number of aircraft that the fields.

These aerodromes may be divided as follows :-

(a) Fields	(b) Strips
EVANS HEAD.	ARCHERFIELD satellites.
ARCHERFIELD.	AMBERLY satellites.
AMBERLY.	LOWOOD satellites (2).
LOWOOD and satellites	PETRIE.
TOOGOOLAWAH.	

2. Own Air Strength at 1800 hrs 20 Nov.

(a) Fighter	3 Squadrons less 3 aircraft.
(b) Army Co-operation	1 Squadron.
(c) Dive-Bomber	1 Squadron less 5 aircraft.
(d) Medium Bomber	2 Squadrons less 6 aircraft.
(e) GR/Bomber	2 Squadrons.

Problem 2 - DS Appreciation

2 pages

File.

Oqmc 205

SECRET.

2 AUST CORPS TRAINING INSTRUCTION NO. 2.

Copy No.....

13 Sep 42.

TEWT - OPERATIONAL ROLE OF 2 AUST CORPS.

TACTICAL EXERCISE - OBJECTS.

1. A tactical exercise without troops will be held for three days commencing 21 Sep with the following objects : -

(a) To study the problems of 2 Corps in its present operational role of the defence of BRISBANE.

(b) To associate Comd and Staffs of 2 Corps, 3 Aust Div and 32 US Div in working on a common plan. In this way, it is hoped that comd and staffs of US and Australian Forces will make personal contact and get to know each others methods and operational and administrative system of command and control.

(c) To consider the policy and the means for the direction and employment of the Allied Air Forces acting in the common cause for the destruction of invading enemy forces.

LESSONS.

2. It is hoped to bring out the following lessons :-

(a) The necessity of constant appreciations from the enemy point of view.

(b) The differentiation between and the necessity for always being clear about the object, the immediate object and objectives.

(c) Concentration of efforts and mobility.

(d) The offensive spirit and its application to achieve results.

(e) The interdependence of tactics and administration.

(f) The co-ordination of efforts of land and air forces.

DIRECTING STAFF.

3. Director - Maj-Gen E.F.Herring, CBE, DSO, MC, ED.

Staff - Brig R.M.Thompson, DSO, MC.
Colonel Wheeler, US Army.
Lt-Col Macarthur Onslow.
Major Hall.
Captain Rogers,
2 Clerks.

SYNDICATES.

(a) 2 Corps HQ.

Comd	Brig H de Low, DSO, ED.
Staff	Brig Bachtold Brig Disher, CBE Brig Urquhart Lt-Col Pilcher. Lieut McKinven. 2 Clerks.

(b) One Syndicate each from 3 Aust Div and 32 US Div as under :-

Comd	GOC
Staff	Operations Staff Officer. Intelligence Staff Officer. Administrative Staff Officer. Comd Artillery. Comd Engineers. Comd Medical 2 Clerks.

NOTE:- In the case of 32 US Div the Brig-Gen 2 i/c Div will be included.

SETTING.

The opening situation with maps, orders of battle and problem 1 will be issued on 14 Sep. Comds concerned will be prepared to answer problem 1 on assembly.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

The place of assembly will be the NAMBOUR Drill Hall at 1130 hrs on 21 Sep.

The Directing Staff will make arrangements for the quartering of the Directing Staff, Corps HQ and 32 US Div officers syndicates in NAMBOUR at hotels.

3 Div Syndicate will be quartered at presgnt location of HQ 3 Div - cut lunches required.

Other ranks will be quartered in camp at NAMBOUR - Rations will be issued but bedding to be brought.

3 Batmen per syndicate and 3 cars and drivers.

Petrol will be issued from NAMBOUR. Each car should bring 2 full 4 gallon cans.

(Sgd.) R.M.Thompson, BGS
2 Aust Corps

Issued 13 Sep 42.

2 Aust Corps Exercise — SECRET

FORECAST OF ENEMY INTENTIONS

Based on infm received up to 1700 hrs 20 Nov 42.

1. Apart from his commitments in Norther Area, it is know that the enemy had sufficient forces on 11 Nov available in RABAUL and RABAUL - SOLOMONS area for reinforcements or further offensive action. There were additional tps in NEW CALEDONIA well experienced in landing ops.

2. Distances from RABAUL to BRISBANE are 1,400 miles; BUIN FAISI area to BRISBANE 1,2000 miles; NEW CALEDONIA to BRISBANE 800 miles, and the travelling times in convoy are estimated to be 7, 6 and 3/4 days respectively, depending on variations of course, speeds, etc.

3. There was sufficient shipping in the RABAUL area to move one div, and in NEW CALEDONIA to move two Bde Gps, with a balance to maintain forces in these areas. The shipping in the SOLOMONS area was increasing on 12 Nov, and there was other shipping in adjacent areas which could have been available for embarkation by 16 Nov. In NEW CALEDONIA shipping increased up to 17 Nov and sightings on 18 Nov showed that a convoy had left which comprised about 50 ships. Subsequent sightings show that this force may have comprised 3 A/C carriers, 2 possible S/P carriers, 1/2 possible MAC carriers, 6/8 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 10-12 merchant vessels or tpts and smaller vessels. This would be capable of carrying two Bde Gp task landing forces.

4. Reliable infm shows that a large convoy left BUIN FAISI area on 16 Nov. This area could have been the assembly area for forces estimated at one div known to have embarked at RABAUL on 14 Nov. The convoy is probably the one sighted at 155°30' E, 7°40' S on 19Nov which was well protected by fighter escort. There was a strong naval force incl 1 battleship, 1 A/C carrier and 1 possible A/C carrier in BUIN FAISI area on 12 Nov. These would undoubtedly act as escort for a force of one div leaving the area on 16 Nov. Further, there were ample naval vessels in the area to comprise a large escort for this convoy. The convoy incl battleships and A/C carriers was sighted at 1710 hrs 19 Nov moving SE in posns 153°30' E., 19°10' S. and was last sighted at 154°10' E., 21°20' S at at 1215 hrs 20 Nov. This would bring it into ROCKHAMPTON - MARYBOROUGH area on morning of 21 Nov or BRISBANE area on morning of 22 Nov.

5. Enemy activity along the coastal area has been marked. There have been frequent recces by A/C of the area and submarine activity has increased. Today the enemy has attacked our airfields at ARCHERFIELD and TOOGOOLAWAH in an endeavour to reduce our air strength.

6. The last sighting of the convoy which left RABAUL on night 17/18 Nov showed that it was approx 120 miles EAST of the BRISBANE area and had split in two. The result of our air action was 1 A/C carrier possibly sunk, 1 A/C carrier damaged, 1 tpt sunk. 1 MAC carrier damaged and one carrier possibly damaged by near misses. It is impossible to state what effect the loss of one tpt will have on the composition of the force but the effective landing capacity of the force may have been impaired by the damage to the MAC carrier. The air strength of the enemy will have been reduced by the loss of 1 a/c carrier, possible damage to another and losses in aerial combat and attacks.

7. The indications are that the enemy may land either NORTH or SOUTH of BRISBANE on the morning of 21 Nov, and he appears to be organized for at least two landings, each comprised of a Bde Gp Task landing force. The Div force to the NORTH may reinforce the MARYBOROUGH sector by a landing on the morning of 21 Nov or reinforce a successful landing in the BRISBANE area on the morning of the 22 Nov. It is possible that the destination of both these forces may be the areas COFFS HR-NEWCASTLE-SYDNEY. In which case the dates of landing will be deferred, but the present movements seem to indicate that the enemy will prefer ops in the BRISBANE area.

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. (a) Defence that the enemy has the initiative in the employment land forces.

(b) Courses open to the enemy is in [redacted]'s appreciation (paras 16-22). The most likely and most dangerous course to us is to land covering forces on a broad front south of [redacted] and, at the same time, probably seeking a diversion in the [redacted] area accompanied by an attempt to establish shore-based aircraft at: [redacted]. Both these courses to be considered equally.

[redacted]

5. Tasks in order of importance are-

(a) Control WOODFORD GAP.

(b) Disperse forces to prevent enemy firstly establishing himself ashore i.e. destruction of enemy covering forces.

(c) Should the enemy establish covering forces to defeat the whole enemy forces.

[redacted]

6. [redacted] shows that the "area [redacted] and [redacted] is vital to the enemy," (i.e. to us); especially as they control the approaches from the north through WOODFORD GAP.

(a) [redacted]'s Appreciation, Para 13. "The quick capture of the area [redacted] would enable us to achieve our immediate object."

(b) [redacted]'s Appreciation, Para 14. Giving possible objectives of covering forces.

(c) One from BOOSA HEAD to [redacted] and another from [redacted] area to [redacted].

(d) It is apparent then that these covering positions of the enemy must not only be denied after landing, but our covering forces must be disposed to protect them prior to the enemy landing in order to use them as a firm base and move forward therefrom for the destruction of the landing force. There two areas each require an Inf Bde and thus dispose of the 3 Div which is at present quartered with one Bde Gp at [redacted] and the other at [redacted].

[redacted] ACTION AGAINST ENEMY ON [redacted].

7. The possibility of this cannot be ignored and our plans must recognise this by taking adequate preliminary measures.

[redacted] OF REMAINING FORCES.

8. The remaining forces are:-

(a) 32 US Div.

(b) Corps RAA 2 Corps ([redacted]).

(c) Corps RAA 1 Corps ([redacted]).

The [redacted] forces are disposed in combat gps in the [redacted] area, which is about 70-80 miles away from [redacted] GAP via the coast road and 100 miles via the [redacted] VALLEY road. There are several AF ops in the [redacted] area to move this whole division in one lift by AC. The time, at 10 m.p.h. would be 9-12 hrs to concentrate in the [redacted] GAP area with a further three hrs to deploy for effective action. It is doubtful, therefore, whether it would be wise to leave the two Bde Div (3 Div) confronted with an enemy force of similar strength if the enemy is to be smashed and it would appear, therefore, that one combat gp of the 32 US Div should be moved northward to cover the [redacted] GAP and support the 3 Div. It is suggested that this might be done from the [redacted] area as a preliminary measure.

9. In order to protect [redacted] from the south and to destroy the enemy division, one Combat Gp should be prepared to move into the [redacted] area with a detachment

ready to proceed to [illegible] should the enemy attempt a landing there.

10. It will be seen that proposals have been suggested for two AUSTRALIAN Combat Gps to be moved as a preliminary measure prior to the enemy having committed his forces. It would be unwise to cause further dislocation of AUSTRALIAN resources, hence the remainder of 3rd Div should remain concentrated in present position ready to move at short notice if necessary as soon as the enemy intentions are disclosed.

[illegible]

11. If the orders to move are issued by 1900 hrs, 3 Div could be in the battle area by 2030 hrs with advance elements ready to oppose immediately enemy landings in either the [illegible] or CAPE GLOUCESTER-ALEXANDRA areas at first light.

12. (a) The 3rd Div, by using the BRISBANE VALLEY route, should be able to concentrate one Combat Gp at [illegible] by first light tomorrow.

(b) One Combat Gp could concentrate at COOMERA from present location in 3 hrs.

13. The Corps Tps Bde of 2 Corps should be placed under cond of 3 Div and Corps Tps Bde 1 Corps should be ready to move by 0400 hrs into the [illegible] area, arriving there, if necessary, by 0830 hrs.

[illegible]

[illegible]

14. (a) Is to secure the high ground that may be used by the enemy as covering forces areas in the area COOKY-[illegible] and MT [illegible].

(b) To operate from these areas with the utmost vigour and destroy the enemy landing forces ship and whenever met. One Bde and one Bde 2 Corps is placed under cond 3 Div from 2000 hours to move north and clear area CALOOSSA-[illegible]-VALLEY by 2359 hrs 29 Nov.

[illegible]

[redacted]

15. (a) "[redacted]" Combat Gp to move to [redacted] via [redacted] VALLEY in order to secure [redacted] GAP and to be concentrated in the area by 0600 hrs 22 Nov.

16. (b) "[redacted]" Gp to be concentrated in the [redacted] area by 2300 hrs 20 Nov.

(b) Role of this Combat Gp is to stop enemy advancing on [redacted] from the south via the coastal route and subject to this to drive any enemy who land back into the sea.

(c) This Combat Gp will be retained in the [redacted] area until the enemy's intentions are definitely disclosed.

17. (a) [redacted] to remain present location ready to move at half an hour's notice from 0600 hrs 21 Nov.

(b) Possible areas of employment [redacted] area or SOUTHERN area.

(c) Should remainder of 32 US Div move to [redacted], Combat Gp will move under and then the probable area of responsibility of 32 US Div will be the area [redacted].

NARRATIVE 2.

1. The night 20/21 Nov was an eventful night. By orders at 1930 hrs, Comd 2 Corps gave effect to the attached outline plan. Appx "A".

2. A summary of infn received at HQ 3 Div up to 0600 hrs 21 Nov is issued herewith. Appx "B"

PROBLEM 3.

As Comd 3 Div:-

(a) Your action during night 20/21 Nov.

(b) Your appreciation and plan as at 0600 hrs 21 Nov.

War Diary

Copy No 16

APPX "A". ISSUED WITH PROBLEM 3.

OUTLINE PLAN, ARMY.

3 DIV ROLE.

1. (a) Is to secure the high ground that may be used by the enemy as covering force areas in the area COOROY - EUMUNDI and MT MINDERRY - MT BUDERIM.

(b) To operate from these areas with the utmost vigour and destroy the enemy landing force when and wherever met. One Fd and one Med Regt 2 Corps is placed under comd 3 Div from 2000 hrs to move north and clear area CALOUNDRA - MOOLARAH - MALENY by 2200 hrs 20 Nov.

32 US DIV ROLE.

2. (a) "X" Combat Gp to move to WOODFORD in MT via BRISBANE VALLEY in order to secure WOODFORD GAP and to be concentrated in the area by 0600 hrs 21 Nov.

(b) "Y" Combat ___ Gp to be concentrated in the COOMERA area by 2300 hrs 20 Nov.

(c) Role of this Combat Gp is to stop enemy advancing on BRISBANE from the south via the coastal route and subject to this to drive any enemy who land back into the sea.

(d) This Combat Gp will be retained in the COOMERA area until the enemy's intentions are definitely disclosed.

(e) Remainder of 32 US Div to remain present location ready to move at half an hour's notice from 0600 hrs 21 Nov.

(f) Possible areas of employment CABOOLTURE - WOODFORD area or SOUTHPORT area.

(g) Should remainder of 32 US Div move to CABOOLTURE, "X" Combat Gp will come under comd and then the probable area of responsibility of 32 US Div will be the area WOODFORD - NAMBOUR - CABOOLTURE.

OUTLINE PLAN - AIR.

3. (a) One GR Sqn recce seaward from 2300 hrs 20 Nov to locate and report enemy shipping in the area 20 miles from coast from incl WIDE BAY to incl CLARENCE RIVER.

(b) One GR Sqn, two MR Sqns and one DB Sqn to be prepared to attack enemy convoys located by GR Sqn from 0001 hrs 21 Nov. Further instns later.

(c) One AC Sqn under control 2 Corps Tac/R from 0400 hrs 21 Nov.

(d) One Fighter Sqn to be prepared to carry out machine gun attack on enemy landing forces as from 0400 hrs 21 Nov.

(e) Two Fighter Sqns to be held at immediate readiness present bases from 0400 hrs 21 Nov for enemy interception.

FORECAST OF FURTHER AIR REQUIREMENTS.

4. (a) GR Sqn seaward recce 21 Nov to locate and report movement of enemy ships seen off MARYBOROUGH 1215 hrs 20 Nov.

(b) Sqns to be prepared for maximum bomber effort against convoy when located as it reaches a convenient position. This action probably not before 1400 hrs 21 Nov. Further details later.

SUMMARY OF MSG RECEIVED AT DIV HQ BY TAC HQ (AFC) HMS 24 NOV

T.O.D.	FROM	TOO	
0355	ACC	0550	Two enemy convoys attacking A/C in [illegible] (.) ... at BRUSA RED (.) and at NARCONIM DOWN (.) Enemy [illegible] (.) Request ... way to Base. (.) Shedding Tac R reports heavy bombing ... this area (.) permit Tac R being conducted between BRUSA RED and NARCONIM
0415	"	0400	Enemy landings are seven NARCONIM DOWN and BRUSA RED (.) Appear to be on beachheads of 3 to 4 miles (.) Enemy naval forces including ... on beaches
0425	"	0405	F.D. BRIDIE 13. Shelling towards F.D. (.) Enemy continues to move ... in large number of barges from Ryde (.) Naval shelling by enemy ...
0435	"	0420	Enemy landed what appears to be tanks at NARCONIM DOWN (.) ... being ... (.) Enemy troops moving ...
0440	"	0410	S/E ground ... beach.
0450	"	0435	Enemy convoy off BRUSA RED estimated 5 ... ... 3 cruisers 6 ... ... and many small craft
0500	"	0445	Several ... aircraft located enemy convoy ... BRUSA RED ... (.) Formation strength ... vessels (.) a/c ...
0510	"	0450	No report from a/c on Tac R BRISBANE NARCONIM DOWN area since 0425 hrs (.) Personnel lost (.) Another a/c sent out
0520	"	0500	Reported gunfire ... BRUSA RED area (.) 5 barges on beach
0525	"	0505	Enemy shipping off NARCONIM DOWN estimated 4 B.L.C. carrier 3 ... 2 cruisers 7 destroyers many small craft
0535	"	0510	Enemy ... on beaches NARCONIM DOWN ... [illegible] ... and ... Ryde (.) Enemy/Norma a/c engaged our dive bombers attack on this convoy (.) Large force of fighters flew inland ... 7000

E.C.R.	FROM	E.C.O.	
0545	AGN	0530	Heavy barges moving up channel from NOOSAVILLE censored by canal launches
0550	"	0535	Heavy barges 3 miles up NARROOMA R (.) Impossible locate ldg owing to number but they appear to be about 3 mls inland on the leading from NARROOMY DOWN, AT NARROOMA and NOOTOOLAGA
0555	"	0540	Heavy pushy appears to be at SOUTH HEAD (.) Ldg moving west to (.) Heavy smoke seen over spa (.) Small motorboat towing assemblies
0600	"	0545	Heavy beach boats NOOSA HD, AT[illegible] and NARROOMA DAY (.) Steadily forging to [illegible] (.) Dis moving "EU" along NR to NOOSAVILLE

PART II LEFT LEAD ASTERN OUT

0350	R.Bks	0355	E.A.F.S. LEAD HEAD reported astern of entry [illegible] about 2 mls E&E (.) Thought to be two barges (.) Appears to be large number of ships about 5/6 mls eastward (.)
0355	S.Bks	0345	E.A.F.S. NARROOMA DOWN reported (.) E/S [illegible] of the appears to consist of heavy [illegible] (.) Appears to be [illegible] (.) Visibility poor (.) Lead cleared by about (.)
0410	"	0355	[illegible]
0415	"	0400	[illegible]
0420	Bks [illegible]	0405	[illegible]
0425	[illegible]	0410	[illegible]

T.O.R.	FROM	T.O.O.	
0425	32 US Div	0405	Enemy landed at SOUTHPORT from Dpt anchorage 5 mls off shore (.) Appears to be spread over 1 mile of beach (.) Have withdrawn Rcn patrols and am prepared to hold bridge.
0430	H.Bde	0415	Further enemy landings southern shore LAGUNA BAY (.) Our patrols have contacted enemy who appears to be pushing to the roads leading WEST to Rly
0430	S. Bde	0415	Our patrols HAROONAH [illegible] enemy has landed thr (.) Rd blocks establis ½ ml WEST of HAROONAH & ½ ml WEST of [illegible]
0435	H.Bde	0405	Patrols COOLUM BCH [illegible] enemy shelling fire both to NORTH and SOUTH (.) Nothing further to report from this area
0435	Gen Bn CALOUNDRA	0420	Engaged enemy force estimated 1½ strong (.) Heavy casualties inflicted by gunfire from F.D. BRISK IS, which is now filing out to sea (.) Enemy using smoke, mortars, M.Gs and Tommy Guns (.) Consider situation in hand provided no further landings (.) Our ammunition fairly severe
0500	S.Bde	0445	Enemy by passed rd blocks HAROONAH DOWNS and MALENDARIA pushing forward on axis leading WEST (.) Some our patrols cut off remainder falling back (.) Enemy barges ½ miles up MAROOCHY RIVER
0510	32 US Div	0455	One Bn moved from COOMERA to SOUTHPORT (.) Enemy gained SOUTHPORT BR endeavo to bring across more tps and armed Cs under heavy fire from Western end.
0525	H. Bde	0510	Enemy landed from barges TWARTIN and moved [illegible] DUNDULA I (.) One our patrols Mot[illegible] engaged WEST of br (.) Further report states enemy proceedin along G2 (03) track NOOSAVILLE - BUNUNDI
0540	32 US Div	0525	Enemy crossed br into SOUTHPORT (.) Our tps heavily engaged (.) Enemy using armed Cs, mortars, MGs, light arty

T.O.E.	FROM	T.O.C.	
0545	8.8Bo	0530	Heavy loads from barge [illegible] at ELI ELI and ext. serving [illegible] Caution (.) Steady cross [illegible] 1900 2 mby BASE at [illegible] and 1900 4.5 by [illegible]
0713	8.8Bo	0900	No overhead wires from [illegible] at GOLDEN 3 WAY (.) Use [illegible] Heavy load at heavy [illegible] 3000 4 mil [illegible] at [illegible]

F-28 XII	[illegible] FLIGHT 7 DEPT [illegible] Base Alt.		
0545	ADS	0501	Use caution at [illegible] heavy jets and [illegible] use MARIGOLD 3 WAY (.) Use high pwr wires and [illegible] Taxiway lighting is poor (.) Use caution [illegible] (.) Use [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]	"	0545	Use E/W [illegible] Overhead power wires at [illegible] (.) Use [illegible] [illegible] Taxiway edge lights are poor (.) Pilots should observe [illegible] [illegible] (.) Beware [illegible]
[illegible]	"	0545	Use Pipeline [illegible] [illegible] at [illegible] (.) Use caution [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible]	"	0530	Heavy [illegible] (.) Stay [illegible]
0750	"	0545	Use caution because [illegible] 50 miles off coast for [illegible] [illegible] (.) [illegible] (.) Air [illegible]
0545	"	0530	Heavy [illegible] at the [illegible] of [illegible] (.) Use caution [illegible] [illegible] (.) Heavy loads [illegible]

S E C R E T.

Forecast of Enemy Intentions as at 0600 hrs

21 Nov.

1. Enemy has made two main landings.

(a) MOOSA HD. At 0540 hrs he was at TEWANTIN, estimated strength 3,000.

(b) MAROOCHYDORE. Posn line NORTH and SOUTH from 2 miles EAST of FOREST GLEN to BUDERIM, estimated strength 2,700.

2. He is using tanks, armd Cs and arty, and barges on waterways. His tactics are to push boldly forward and overcome or outflank resistance.

3. Shipping losses and diversionary landings must have effected his strength, equipment and supplies in these areas.

4. It appears that his intentions are to penetrate deeply, occupy high ground WEST of the coast and develope his bases for the further landing of his div force.

DISCUSSION ON CO-ORDINATION AND CONTROL OF ARMY AND AIR FORCES. - 2 AUST CORPS EXERCISE AT HAMBOUR 21-23 SEP 42.

QUESTIONS FOR AIR.

1. What is the present system of control of Air Forces operating in EasternArea RAAF?

2. When invasion is emminent, what then is the system of control and co-ordination of the Air Forces around BRISBANE?

3. What Air Forces come under comd of the Army in the event of Invasion, and at what stage does control of the Air Forces pass to Army comd and when do you visualise this happening in the exercise?

4. Will there be any other Air Forces operating in the BRISBANE area in the event of an invasion which are not under comd of the Army. If so, who controls them, allots tasks and what is the system for co-ordination between the Army and Air Comds?

5. Does the Comdr Eastern Area move to BRISBANE in the event of invasion becoming emminent.

IF SO:-

(a) Where does he move to, and when?

(b) What does he control, and how?

(c) Under whose orders does he operate?

IF NOT:-

(a) How are the Air forces controlled and maintained from SYDNEY,?

(b) If not from SYDNEY, where from?

Copies to:-

GOC
Gp Capt SIMMS
Gp Capt FLOWERS
2 Corps Syndicate
3 Div Syndicate
1 Mot Div Syndicate
Qld L of C Syndicate
BGS
Col Wheeler
War Diary 2
File 2
Spare 6

War Diary

[redacted]

[redacted]

Copy No. 16.

G 121 D

13 Sep 42

THE [redacted] OPERATIONAL ROLE OF [redacted] AIR FORCES.

TACTICAL EXERCISE - "MACE".

1. A tactical exercise without troops will be held [redacted] days commencing 21 Sep with the following objects :-

(a) To study the problems of 2 Corps in its present operational role of the defence of [redacted].

(b) To associate Corps and Staffs of 2 Corps, 1 Armd Div and 32 U.S. Div in working on a common plan. In this way, it is hoped that good understanding of US and Australian methods will arise personal contact and get to know each others methods and operational and administrative system of working and control.

(c) To consider the policy and the means for the direction and employment of the Allied Air Forces acting in the common cause for the destruction of invading enemy forces.

AIMS.

2. It is hoped to bring out the following lessons :-

(a) The necessity of constant appreciations from the enemy point of view

(b) The differentiation between and the necessity for always being clear about the object, the immediate object and objectives.

(c) Concentration of efforts and mobility.

(d) The offensive spirit and its application to achieve results.

(e) The interdependence of tactics and administration.

(f) The co-ordination of efforts of land and air forces.

DIRECTING STAFF.

3. Director - Maj-Gen. E P Herring, CBE., DSO., MC.ED.

Staff - Brig. R H Thompson, DSO., MC.
Colonel Wheeler, US Army.
Lt-Col McArthur Onslow.
Major Hall
Captain Rogers,
2 Clerks.

SYNDICATES.

4. (a) 2 Corps HQ.

Cond - Brig R de Low, DSO., ED.

Staff - Brig Backfield
Brig Disher CBE
Brig Urquhart
Lt.-Col Fillmore
Capt Robinson.
2 Clerks.

(b) One Syndicate each from 3 Aust Div and 38 UK Div as under :-

Cond - DCS

Staff - Operations Staff Officer
Intelligence Staff Officer
Administrative Staff Officer.
Cond. Artillery
Cond. Engineers
Cond. Medical
2 Clerks.

(c) In the case of 38 UK Div the Brig-Gen. 2 L/C Div will be included.

TRAINING.

5. The opening situation with maps, order of battle and problem 1 will be issued on 14 Sep. Conds concerned will be prepared to answer problem 1 on assembly.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.

6. The place of assembly will be the NAMBOUR [illegible] Hill at 1100 hours on 21 Sep.

7. The Directing Staff will make arrangements for the quartering of the Directing Staff, Corps HQ and 38 UK Div officers syndicates in NAMBOUR at hotels

8. 3 Div Syndicates will be quartered at present location of HQ 3 Div - own lunches required.

9. Other ranks will be quartered in camp at NAMBOUR - Rations will be issued but bedding to be brought.

10. 3 batmen per syndicate and 3 cars and drivers.

11. Petrol will be issued from NAMBOUR. Each car should bring 2 full 4 gallon cans.

12. ACK.

[signature]
Lt-Col,
2 Aust Corps.

Issued 11 Sep 42.

DISTRIBUTION.

	Copy No.
3 Aust Div	1-2
32 US Div	3-4
3CRA	5-6
GOC	7
BGC	8
A & Q	9
First Aust Army	10
Southern Area RAAF	11
GSO 1 Mot Div	12
Comd 1 Mot Bde	13
GSO 2/IC L of C	14
War Diary	15-16
File	17
Spare	18-19-20

ANNEX B.

PROGRAMME OF EXERCISE [illegible] 21-23 SEP 42.

Date	Time	Units.	Details.
14 Sep		Syndicate 'A' Present location	Issue orders for assembly and commencement exercise with Problem 1 (Dump)
21 Sep	1130	Exercise until [illegible]	Officers assemble, CO's opening remarks.
"	1145	" "	Solution to Problem 1.
"	1400	" "	R&D appreciation on 2nd Problem.
"	1700	" "	Issue Problem 2 (Corps)
22 Sep	1100	" "	Solution to Problem 2.
	1400	" "	Issue Problem 3 (Div)
23 Sep	0900	To be notified	Solution Problem 3.
"	1100	" "	Issue Problem 4 (Bde)
"	1400	" "	Solution Problem 4.
"	1600	Exercise Disperse.	

NOTES.

(a) It is most important that Comd and Staffs should conduct a reconnaissance of the area SIMPLE - HARBOUR - BRISBANE - SOUTHPORT - IPSWICH - [illegible] - WOODFORD - GYMPIE - CURRIMUNDI - GYMPIE prior to the commencement of the exercise.

(b) Moving reconnaissance syndicates will make their own arrangements for quartering during the preliminary reconnaissance mentioned in note (a).

Issued 13 Cys.

[signature]
Brig.
I Aust Corps.

S.I.G.S.I.T.

OPENING SITUATION - WAR IN THE S.W. PACIFIC

AS AT 3P WOULD LIKE IT.

In Chronological Order.

1. (a) 1 Oct - British NEW GUINEA and MILNE BAY captured.

(b) 3 Oct - Large Jap fleet with air force decisively defeat Allied fleet north of SOLOMON ISLAND

(c) 15 Oct - US Forces driven from SOLOMON ISLAND and the situation re established as it was.

(d) 22 Oct - Large Jap force occupy NEW CALEDONIA.

(e) 1 Nov - 15 Jap Div lands at TOWNSVILLE and defeats 5 Aust Div - secures a base.

(f) 4 Nov - 15 Jap Div lands at ROCKHAMPTON and heavy fighting with 2 US Div.

(g) 5 Nov - Intelligence reports movement of Aust Force north from NSW by RR into QUEENSLAND

(h) 8 Nov - Cond 7 Jap Army at MILNE BAY sends for Lt.-Gen TOJOSHASTUS and after giving him the latest information, issues certain instructions for a further offensive operation against BRISBANE. See Narative 1.

(j) 10 Nov - 16 Jap Div lands at MIAMBA north of MARLBOROUGH and involved in heavy fighting with 6 Aust Div - MIAMBA secured, but 18 Div held up along MARY RIVER.

NARRATIVE 1.

Problem from the enemys point of view.

1. On 8 Nov the Jap Army Cond at MILNE BAY gave Lt -Gen TOJOSHASTUS Cond X Task force, certain information and instns which he later confirms - major relevant details follow.

2. Repeats the summary of major events to date as in opening situation. He was optimistic regarding the fighting from TOWNSVILLE to MARLBOROUGH.

3. There is still 3 Aust Div and 16 Jap Div in the vicinity of BRISBANE.

4. The Australian government is mostly unlikely to send the 1 Aust Div to QUEENSLAND as it was very sensitive regarding the vulnerability of SYDNEY and NEWCASTLE but these places would receive attention in due course.

5. The only other force in eastern Australia, was an armoured Div which was training in NW of NSW, but the Div was to be regrouped with a partially trained motor div and two armoured Div of a new type were to be formed. It was unlikely therefore, that the force could be involved in a major operation within 6 weeks.

6. Recent Jap successes had lowered the morale of the Australian Army and people, and the Jap soldier who had already proved his superiority in battle could afford to take risks in the prosecution of offensive methods. He felt the training policy of development and a lavish expenditure of crackers would again achieve results as it had done up to the present.

7. Jap shore based aircraft north of MARYBOROUGH were hounding Allied air forces busy in the area and it was unlikely that more than say 5 to 6 sqns of mixed types could be available to the Allies in the BRISBANE area. These aircraft have many tasks and there is not the same unified system of direction and control as with us.

8. The Jap navy has made a clean sweep of main Allied forces. Consequently it could ensure the reasonably safe passage of convoys for formations and maintenance to AUSTRALIA.

9. In consequence of the above it is the Supreme Commands intention to proceed with the invasion of the coastal strip of Australia, step by step, along the eastern coast making full use of naval superiority and land based aircraft and so capture NEWCASTLE and SYDNEY. Thus, to overcome AUSTRALIA'S means of waging war and to deny entry to AUSTRALIA of the great majority of American Shipping.

10. In view of the nature of the operations it was considered that they proceed with the maximum speed.

11. Lt.-Gen TORBLASTUS Corps Task Force was then instructed "To capture the BRISBANE area for development as an overseas base for the operation of larger land and air forces".

12. The land forces of Lt.-Gen TORBLASTUS disposal were as shown in Appx A, which also contains details of Aircraft and landing craft available.

13. Attached hereto are the following appendices:-

Appx A	Organization Aust Hot Bde.	
Appx B	"	Aust Div of 2 Bde Gps.
Appx C	"	US Triangular Div.
Appx D	"	RAAF and AF Control.
Appx E	Location Statement of Tps in 2 Corps.	
Appx F	Organization Jap Task landing force.	
Appx G	"	" Div
Appx H	Probable composition Jap forces BRISBANE operations.	

PROBLEM 2.

Lt.-Gen TORBLASTUS appreciation and plan for the execution of his task as shown in para 11 above.


[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	1-2
[illegible]	3-4
[illegible]	5-6
[illegible]	7
[illegible]	8
[illegible]	9
[illegible]	11
[illegible]	12
[illegible]	13
[illegible]	14
[illegible]	15-16
[illegible]	17
[illegible]	18-19-20

APPX A


Wrong. this is not 1/2=/4c/3.



Scale Weapons Etc for a Mot Regt		Tpt	
Pistol .455	122	MCs	40
Rifles .303	560	Cars 6 seater	
		Uty	1
SMGs	14	Carriers	37
LMGs	80	Scout Cars	11
A Tk Rifles	72	Trucks 15-cwt GS	67
Mortars	13	Office Unit	1
		Wireless Sigs	5
		Trucks 3-tpn GS	14
		water	1

APPX B

ORGANIZATION OF AN AUST DIV. TWO BDE BASIS





Personnel of Div

Officers	537
Other Ranks	11078

Weapons in Div

Armd Cars	45
Carriers	193
Fd guns, 25 pdr	48
A Tk guns, 2 pdr	72
A Tk Rifles .55"	211
HMGs	84
LMGs	558
SMG	780
Mortars 3"	42


INFANTRY DIVISION (Triangular) (2) (2)
DHQ
0-26 WO-2 EM-74
3 Inf Regts (ea)
0-123 WO-1 EM-3325
HQ & HQ Co & Band
0-18 WO-1 EM-206
Serv Co
0-9 EM145
AT Co
0-6 EM-181
3 Bns (ea)
0-30 EM-931
Cannon Co
2-105 mm SP
6-75 mm SP (X)
3 AT Plats
HQ & HQ Det
0-6 EM-67
3 RCOs (ea)
0-6 EM-219
1 Hv Wpn Co
0-6 EM-207
2 Plats MG cal .304
1 Plat MG cal .50
1 Plat 81 mm Mrtr (6)
1 Wpn Plat
3 R Plat
Div Arty
0-131 WO-1 EM-2638
HQ, HQ Btry & Band
0-18 WO-1 EM-146 (66)
3 Bns L Arty (ea)
0-27 EM-574 (66)
1 Bn M Arty
0-32 EM-770 (66)
HQ Btry
0-12 EM-139
3 Btries 105mm How (ea)
0-4 EM-118
Serv & Amn Btry
0-3 EM-81
HQ Btry
0-12 EM-137
3 Btries 155 mm How (ea)
0-4 EM-132
1 Btry 75 mm AT Gun (8 guns)
0-5 EM-143
Rcn Tr
0-6 EM-141 (66)
3 Rcn Plats (ea)
0-1 EM-31
Engr Bn
0-21 EM-627 (66)
HQ & HQ Co
0-9 EM-93
3 COs (ea)
0-4 EM-178
Serv & Amn Btry
0-3 EM-94
3 Plats of 3 Sq (ea)
0-1 EM-48
Inf HQ & MP Co (-Div HQ Plat)
0-7 EM-123
Special Plat
0-2 EM-46
MP Plat
0-3 EM-64



NOTES:

(1) O = Offrs, EM = ORs

(2) Totals include attached medical personnel and chaplains

(3) Transportation furnished by Quartermaster Battalion

(4) Includes Division Surgeon's Office

(66) Moves by Organic Transportation

(X) Recent amendment. 2 only 105 mm tractor drawn guns supplied

USA INF DIV (TRIANGULAR)

Personnel:	In a Div	624 Offrs	15505 ORs
	" " Regt	123 Offrs	3618 ORs
	" " Bn	30 Offrs	1004 ORs
	" " Coy (Rifle)	6 Offrs	241 ORs
	" " Hvy Wpn Coy	6 Offrs	208 ORs

FIRE POWER OF A USA INF (TRIANGULAR) DIV - WEAPON TABLE.

UNIT	DIV HQ	DIV HQ & MP COY	RECCE TP	DIV SIG COY	3 INF REGTS	DIV ARTY	ENGR BN	MED BN	QM BN	TOTAL DIV
MG Cal 50			17			16				77
MG Cal 50 flexible					36					36
MG Hvy Cal 30			32		72		18			122
LMG Cal 30			3		54					57
T3MG .45			35		180					215
Gun .37 mm A/Tk					36	24				60
Gun 75 mm A/Tk						8				8
How 105 mm						36				36
How 155 mm						12				12
Mortar 60 mm					81					81
Mortar 81 mm					36					36
Rifle Auto .30					258					258
Rifle Semi-auto .30		47	32		6939		516		50	7584
VEHICLES (COMBAT)										
Cars Scout			16							16
Carriers pers W/ Armament					603					603

ANNEX B

COMPOSITION OF RAAF UNITS.

1	AC Sqn	3 Flights, each of	(6 Operational aircraft (2 Comn aircraft
2	Fighter Sqn	3 Flights, each of 6 aircraft	
3	Med Bomber Sqn	3 Flights, each of 6 aircraft	
4	Dive Bomber Sqn	3 Flights, each of 6 aircraft	

NOTE: All RAAF Flights work on the basis of 4 Immediate and 2 Reserve Aircraft

AIR SUPPORT CONTROL - TYPE A.

STRENGTH: 7 Offrs, 126 ORs
EQPT: 29 Wireless Sets - Range R/T 100 miles
W/T Unlimited

CAPABILITIES.

1 Supply of Wireless comn between Corps, Divs and Bdes to landing grounds for both Recce and support aircraft for all units in the formation.

2 Provides Air Support in the following categories :-

(a) Fighter Air Support
(b) Bomber Air Support, as follows :-

Med Level Bombing
Dive Bombing
Low Level and ground bombing

ANNX B

LOCATION STATEMENT - TPS OF 2 AUST CORPS

2 AUST CORPS

HQ 2 Aust Corps	ESK
Sigs, 2 Aust Corps	ESK
4 AS Control	ESK
4 AC Sqn	KINGARCY

3 AUST DIV

HQ 3 Aust Div	LANDSBOROUGH
4 Aust Inf Bde Gp	NAMBOUR
15 Aust Inf Bde Gp	CABOOLTURE

CAV

8 Aust Recce Bn	LANDSBOROUGH

RAA

106 Aust A Tk Regt	LANDSBOROUGH-CABOOLTURE

RAE

53 Aust Fd Pk Coy	LANDSBOROUGH

32 US DIV

HQ 32 US Div	TAMBOURINE
HQ 32 US Div Arty	TAMBOURINE
HQ Coy, 32 US Div (Det)	TAMBOURINE
HQ 32 Sig Coy	TAMBOURINE
107 Med Bn (Arty)	TAMBOURINE
114 Engr Bn (Det)	TAMBOURINE
107 QM Bn (Det)	TAMBOURINE
107 Medical Bn (Det)	TAMBOURINE
126 Combat Gp	TAMBOURINE
127 Combat Gp	TAMBOURINE
128 Combat Gp	TAMBOURINE

1 AUST HOT BDE GP — GYMPIE

CORPS TPS

RAA

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	ESK
2/1 Aust Med Regt	BELLEVUE
2/5 Aust Fd Regt	D'AGUILAR
2/9 Aust A Fd Regt	ARAKCON
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	BELLEVUE
2/2 Aust A Tk Regt	WOODFORD
HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	ESK
8 Aust Fd Regt	CASINO
1 Aust Med Regt	NEURUM
2 F Sp Bty	NEURUM

RAE

HQ 2 Aust Corps RAE	VILLENEUVE
2/16 Aust A Fd Coy	GLENFERN
19 Aust A Fd Coy	GLENFERN
60 Aust Army Fd Coy	GLENFERN

(See P 2)

AASC


HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps	FAIRNIE VIEW
1 Aust Corps Amn Coy	FERNVALE
1 Aust Corps Pet Coy	FAIRNIE VIEW
1 Aust Corps Sup Col	FERNVALE
HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps	HARLIN
2 Aust Corps Amn Coy	HARLIN
2 Aust Corps Pet Coy	HARLIN
2 Aust Corps Sup Col	HARLIN
HQ 1 Aust Corps Tpt Col	GOODNA
2/103 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	REDBANK PLAINS
2/104 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	GROVELY CAMP
2/105 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	REDBANK PLAINS
2/106 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	GOODNA
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col	HARLIN
129 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	(att 1 Aust Mot Bde)
130 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	(att 3 Aust Div)
131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	CROSSDALE
132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	HARLIN
133 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	TOOGOOLAWAH

AAMC


10 Aust Fd Amb	LANDSBOROUGH
22 Aust Fd Amb	KILCOY
2 Aust CCS	IPSWICH
11 Aust CCS	HARLIN
2/1 Aust MAC	DINMORE
2 Aust MAC	KILCOY

APPX F

COMPOSITION OF A JAPANESE BDE GP TASK LANDING FORCE (ESTIMATED).



ORGANIZATION OF A JAPANESE 3 REGIMENT DIVISION.



FIRE POWER OF JAPANESE 3 REGIMENT DIVISION

	Cav Regt	Div Inf	Fd Artg	Mech AA Artg Unit	Hy A A M G Mech Unit	Chem Unit	Sig Coy	Fd Bn	Engr Regt	TOTALS
LMGs										
A Tk Rifles										
MMGs										
75mm Fd Guns										
75mm Bn Guns										
105mm How										
20mm A A Guns										
70mm Bn Guns										
37mm A Tk Guns										
47mm A Tk Rifles										
M 5										
L M 5										
50MM GRENADE DISCHARGERS										
PERSONNEL										

NOTES 1 FIGURES IN THE ABOVE TABLE ARE APPROX
2 GUNS AND MSS ON AFS ARE NOT AUTHORISED

JAPANESE INFANTRY REGIMENT

Personnel
- in a Regt. 3030 approx
- in a Bn. 892
- in a Rifle Coy. 168 approx

Weapons Totals
- 75 mm Regt Guns 4
- 70 mm Bn Guns 6
- 37 mm A-Tk Guns 10 or 12
- LMGs 108
- A-Tk Rifles 21

Additional Supply requirements = 2nd Supply Unit 400 tons each

JAPANESE TANKS

The silhouettes are not to scale

LAV's

M 2592 1 MG in turret



M 2598 1 MG in hull

1 MG in turret



Lt Tks

Type used in MALAYA

1 37? mm Gun in turret

1 MG rear of turret

1 MG left front of hull



Med. Tks

M 2594 1 37 mm gun

1 MG in turret

1 MG in hull forward



1935-37 Model

37 mm Gun in turret

1 MG left forward

1 MG left rear



Note. The above tanks are those most likely to be met.

NOTES ON WEAPONS

LMGs 6.5 mm (.256 in.)

"Type 96" wt. 20.5 lbs. [illegible] 2,400 rds

Approx. 1,300 rds in mag. Rate 550 rpm [illegible]

MG 7.7 (.303 in.)

"Type 92" mounted on tripod 500 rpm. Strip feed with 32 rds per strip [illegible]

50 mm GRENADE DISCHARGER [illegible] and 8 mm 24 lbs used [illegible]

81 mm MORTAR wt. [illegible] 2,000 yds

37 mm A-TK GUN [illegible]

A-Tk gun [illegible]

70 mm BN GUN [illegible]

75 mm FD GUN [illegible]

105 mm HOW [illegible]

Two types of land mine are known [illegible] shape. Size [illegible]

SVY/MISC/058 [illegible]

POCKET NOTES

on the

JAPANESE ARMY

Information passed back may be the means of saving thousands of lives.

Intelligence always needs information, and needs everyone's co-operation in getting it.

NOTHING IS TOO UNIMPORTANT.

Preserve and pass back all captured equipment and documents, including everything found on prisoners. Speed is always important, delay may be fatal.

G.S.I.(a)H.Q. FIRST AUST ARMY. AUG '42.

SECRET

Appendix "F" issued with the opening situation narrative (1) is hereby cancelled. It should be destroyed and the following Appendix "F" substituted therefore.

ANX B

Copy No.....

COMPOSITION OF AF FORCES - KE-SEI TOKUSATSU.

Land Forces

Formation	Location	Composition
Div	On Gpha KUNE KUNE area	see details Appx G
5th Gp Tank Landing Force	KOUERA	" " Appx F
5th Gp Tank Landing Force	KOUERA	" " Appx F

AIR FORCES

Carrier Forces

Carrier	Aircraft	Type
GENKAIKU	80	Fighters
ZUIHAKU	80	Fighters
ZUIHO	45	Div Bombers
HIYO	36	Tor Bombers

Air Garrison

RABAUL	16
BOUGAINVILLE	16
SHORTLAND	8
TAROKINA	10

LAND BASED (The use of this is doubtful until Landing Grounds Operating).

A Shore Based Group

Flying Boats	2 Sqns - 18
Fighters	2 Sqns - 18
Navy Bombers	2 Sqns - 18

SURFACE

Naval Escort

1 Battleship
10 Cruisers
28 Destroyers
Minesweepers
Submarines

Shipping for Convoy

5 MLS Carriers

Merchant Shipping

2	10,000 tons
5	7,000 tons
14	5,000 tons

Available for maintenance after 14 days:-

2 8,000 ton tankers
10 8,000 ton ships

NOTES:-

MLC Carriers:-

Each Carrier carries :-

24 large MLC
180 small MLC
10 assmd launches
4 despatch boats

MLCs: There are 9 Classes divided into two groups as under:-

Large: 45' - 55' long; 90-100 mens; draught 30-36 in.; speed 6-8 knots.

Small: 36' - 40' long; 50-60 mens; draught 30-36 in.; speed 8-10 knots.

AMENDMENTS TO NARRATIVE 1.

(a) The appx mentioned in para 18 is appx K NOT appx A;

(b) Assmd para 15, last line, appx K, to read:-

"The composition of forces available to Lt-Gen Zajchlastan."

DISTRIBUTION:-

	Copy No.
5 Aust Div	1-2
28 (NZ) Div	3-4
GCMA	5-6
GCC	7
RAE	8
A & Q	9
First Aust Army	10
Southern Area RAAF	11
HQ 1 Aust Div	12
Comd 1 Aust Bde	13
HQ Q'Ld L of C	14
War Diary	15-16
File	17
Spare	18-19-20

Copy No 16

PROBLEM 2.

NOTES:-

(a) Syndicates are no longer members of the Jap forces but Comd and Staff 2 Corps.

(b) As Comd 2 Corps the exact intentions and movements are unknown. The information available to you is as stated in the opening situation plus the information given in the attached intelligence digest, and Appx "A". You have no direct knowledge of GEN TOJOBLASTUS plan.

(c) The Corps role is the defence of BRISBANE and the area of responsibility is from excl MARYBOROUGH to incl CLARENCE RIVER.

(d) Dispositions of BRISBANE covering force to be given verbally.

PROBLEM 2.

(a) As Commander 2 Corps, your appreciation and plan at 1800 hrs 20 Nov in note form to be given verbally.

War Diary 4 Aust.

Aust Corps Exercise - Extracts from Intelligence infm received prior to Ops.

SECRET
Copy No 16

Date	T.O.R.	From	By	Infm
11	0920	First Aust Army	Sitrep	BUIN FAISI area - 1450 K/9. Total sightings this area 1 possible A/C carrier, one 10,000-ton tpt, 5 other ships, 8 small unidentified vessels, 20 barges. GUADALCANAL area 1510 K/9. 1 battleship, 1 S/P carrier, 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 5 gunboats or minesweepers. 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers course NW 35 mls NHE FLORIDA Is. NEW CALEDONIA 1330 K/9. Three 5,000-ton tpts, 1 cruiser, 1 large flat-decked vessel 8,000 tons, 30 barges, 1 possible S/P carrier, 8 destroyers, 10 unidentified vessels anchored NOUMEA. One A/C carrier, 112 mls WEST sighted 1545 hrs course SSE, Speed 18 knots.
12	0830	Qld L. of C.	Signal	Coast Watching Posts report submarine 3 mls off Southern end FRASER Is course SOUTH., estimated speed 8 knots. Observed for 15 mins. All informed.
	1340	A.C.H. E.A.	Signal	Submarine attacked 1120 hrs 126 mls EAST BRISBANE. One direct hit behind conning tower. Bubbles and oil observed for 20 mins.
	1410	First Aust Army	Sitrep	PT MORESBY 1115 K/10. Increase on previous sightings. Total shipping this area now estimated 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 8 tpts or cargo vessels, 1 MLC carrier. 18 small vessels.
13	1025	First Aust Army	Summary	Estimate of forces as at 11 Nov. LAND. TOWNSVILLE, ROCKHAMPTON, MARYBOROUGH one div each. PT MORESBY 2 divs. RABAUL, SOLOMONS 3 divs. NEW CALEDONIA 18,000 tps. NAVAL. 5 A/C carriers, 6 S/P carriers, 4 MLC carriers, 2 battleships, 12 cruisers, 47 destroyers, 24 tpts, 10 supply ships, 3 tankers, 50 smaller vessels.
14	0900	First Aust Army	Sitrep	Sightings SOLOMONS area. 1340 K/12. Total shipping this area estimated 1 battleship, 1 A/C carrier, 1 possible A/C carrier, 2 possible MLC carriers, 7 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 1 10,000-ton tpt, 8 6,000-ton tpts, 45 small craft. NEW CALEDONIA. 1730 K/12. One A/C carrier, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 9 tpts, considerable number of small craft and barges. 10 FBs anchored NOUMEA.

Date	T.O.R.	From	By	Infm
14	1300	A.C.H. E.A.	Sitrep	Five Catalinas bombed shipping and landing ground NOUMEA. Hits observed: dumps, runways dispersal areas. Fires started amongst barges. One our A/C missing.
	1730	3 Aust Div	Signal	Submarine reported 1535 hrs 2 mls EAST CALOUNDRA, course SOUTH, speed 5 knots, submerged after 8 mins.
15	0600	Fighter Sector	Phone	Air raid YELLOW.
	0640	" "	"	Air raid WHITE. Unidentified A/C over BRISBANE, height 28,000', no interception.
	0840	First Aust Army	Signal	MOST SECRET. Secret Sources report that Jap forces estimated one div embarking at RABAUL evening 14 Nov probable destination Qld area. Comment: It is uncertain whether these forces are intended as reinforcements for forces already operating, or whether further landing ops are indicated. There has been a steady increase in sightings in RABAUL-SOLOMONS area over last few days.
16	1025	First Aust Army	Sitrep	Sightings NEW CALEDONIA 1400 K/15. One A/C carrier, 1 possible A/C carrier, 1 S/P carrier, 1 HLC carrier, 12 tpts 5,000 tons, 3 cargo vessels 2/3,000 tons, many small vessels barges. Appeared to be considerable activity NOUMEA loading or unloading stores.
	1350	ACH	Signal	1 S/P carrier, 8 unidentified vessels 80 mls EAST NEW CALEDONIA, course SW, speed 12 knots.
	1750	ACH	Phone	Unidentified A/C over BRISBANE at 1740 hrs, height 32,000'.
17	1015	Allied Air-Forces	Summary	Extract - "The shipping movements in the vicinity of NEW CALEDONIA and the increased shipping at NOUMEA seem to indicate either the enemy is reinforcing the garrison or that he is relieving the tps who were engaged in the original landing. There is much increased activity in the area over the past few days. Whatever the facts may indicate, it is certain that the Jap is preparing to use the island as a base for further operations against this country."
	1920	First Aust Army	Signal	Convoy consisting of 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 5 merchant vessels sighted 50 mls EAST of MAGNETIC IS. 1510 hrs, course SSE, speed 10 knots.

Date	T.O.R.	From	By	Infm
18	0820	First Aust Army	Sitrep	NEW CALEDONIA - Sightings 1540 hrs 17 - 3 possible A/C carriers, 2 possible S/P carriers, 1 MLC carrier, 8 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 1 tanker 8,000 tons, 14 merchant vessels 4/6,000 tons, numerous small craft barges. Great activity on shore at NOUMEA.
	1030	1 Aust Mot Bde.	Signal	Unidentified A/C flew WEST over GYMPIE 1005 hrs, height 8.10,000'. Several reports confirmed red spots on wings.
	1115	3 Aust Div	Signal	Unidentified A/C reported by VAOC NORTH of NOOSA HEAD 1055 hrs. Appeared to be circling in vicinity. Estimated height 10,000'. Impossible to identify owing to poor visibility.
	2040	ACH	Signal	Recce A/C reports convoy estimated 50 ships 75 mls WEST NOUMEA, course NW at 0830 hrs 18. Endeavour to shadow. Visibility poor. Driven off by shore based A/C.
19	0915	First Aust Army	Sitrep	NEW CALEDONIA. Sightings NOUMEA 1040 K/18 1 vessel 8,000 tons, three 4/6000 tons, 4 destroyers, 8 smaller vessels, 1 tanker, number of small craft. Visibility poor.
	1035	32 US Div	Signal	Reported enemy A/C flew NORTH over SOUTHPORT at 1000 hrs, height 20,000'.
	1140	First Aust Army	Signal	MOST SECRET. Reliably reported large enemy convoy assembled BUIN FAISI area, departed 0930 K/16, course SSW. Large naval escort incl carrier borne A/C. All informed.
	1205	ACH	Signal	Sighting 0935 K/19. Enemy convoy estimated 3 A/C carriers, 2 MLC carriers 5 hy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 10-12 destroyers, 10 tpts 4-6000 tons, several small vessels, minesweepers, etc. at 159°45' E - 24°35' S. A/C shadowing.
	1610	ACH	Signal	Recce A/C reports large enemy convoy 155°30'E 17°40' S 1030 K/19. Endeavoured to shadow but driven off by fighter escort.
	1800	First Aust Army	Signal	Enemy A/C reported BEENLEIGH and CALOUNDRA 1700 hrs today. No interception.

Date	TOR	From	By	Infm
19	1910	ACH	Signal	Attack at 1350 hrs on convoy sighted 159°45'E 24°35'S by two squadrons of bombers escorted by 1 sqn fighters. Results 1 A/C carrier damaged, 1 ship 4-6000 tons sunk, near misses 1 cruiser. 13 fighters shot down and damaged. Our losses 6 bombers, 2 fighters.
20	0740	First Aust Army	Signal	Enemy convoy estimated 10 large warships incl battleship, A/C carriers, 15 smaller warships, 13 merchant vessels, and smaller ships sighted 153°30' E, 19°10'S course SE 1710 K/19.
	0830	ACH	Signal	Recce report convoy attacked at 1350 hrs now in area 157°50'E, 26°10'S at 0630 hrs.
	0950	Fighter Sector	Phone	Air raid RED. Enemy dive bombers, suspected carrier borne, attacked ARCHERFIELD aerodrome, and satellite Lbs. Several our A/C damaged. 3 enemy bombers shot down, 1 crash landed.
	1030	ACH	Signal	Further attack at 0810 hrs by 1 sqn of dive-bombers escorted by one sqn of fighters on convoy sighted at 157°50'E 26°10'S. Results 1 A/C carrier previously damaged set on fire, and listing heavily; hits on another A/C carrier, and 1 MLC Carrier; 2 fighters shot down. Our losses five dive-bombers, 1 fighter.
	1410	ACH	Signal	Enemy recce A/C over BRISBANE-BEENLEIGH area.
	1525	ACH	Signal	Enemy convoy last reported 153°30'E 19°10'S was in area 154°10'E 21°20'S at 1215 hrs.
	1550	ACH	Phone	Air raid TOOGOOLAWAH Aerodrome no damage, 1 F 2 D.B. shot down. Suspected carrier borne A/C
	1655	First Aust Army	Signal	Two enemy convoys sighted 1545 K/20 close together 156°50'E 27°30'S Course S. Visibility very poor, low cloud. Estimated total strength 25 naval vessels 12 merchant vessels.
	2100	First Aust Army	Signal	Convoys reported previous signal now reported 155°04'E 26°05'S, split 1900 hrs. Visibility nil, impossible identify composition.
	2320	First Aust Army	Signal	Reported that map obtained from Bomber crashed ARCHERFIELD air raid this morning covered coast area BALLINA-MARYBOROUGH. Many indecipherable notes in Jap characters on coastline especially in the NORTHERN area.

APPX "A"

Information on Aerodromes and Landing Grounds.

1. If the enemy attempts a landing between the CLARENCE and MARY RIVERS, he will undoubtedly strive to capture and hold aerodromes as land bases for his aircraft. Preparations should therefore be made for the defence of the following aerodromes close to the coast:-

EVANS HEAD.
ARCHERFIELD and satellites.
AMBERLY and satellites.
LOWOOD and satellites.
TOOGOOLAWAH.
PETRIE.

In addition, open country exists between LOWOOD and TOOGOOLAWAH, in the BRISBANE VALLEY, that could be used for aerodromes with little, if any, preparation.

These aerodromes may be divided into two classes :-

(a) Large fields that would be difficult to render unserviceable.

(b) Strips that may with comparative ease be rendered unserviceable for a limited period. These strips will accomodate a more limited number of aircraft that the fields.

These aerodromes may be divided as follows :-

(a) Fields	(b) Strips
EVANS HEAD.	ARCHERFIELD satellites.
ARCHERFIELD.	AMBERLY satellites.
AMBERLY.	LOWOOD satellites (2).
LOWOOD and satellite	PETRIE.
TOOGOOLAWAH.	

2. Own Air Strength at 1800 hrs 20 Nov.

(a) Fighter	3 Squadrons less 3 aircraft.
(b) Army Co-operation	1 Squadron.
(c) Dive-Bomber	1 Squadron less 5 aircraft.
(d) Medium Bomber	2 Squadrons less 6 aircraft.
(e) GR/Bomber	2 Squadrons.

2 Aust Corps Exercise — SECRET

FORECAST OF ENEMY INTENTIONS

Based on infm received up to 1700 hrs 20 Nov 42.

1. Apart from his commitments in Norther Area., it is know that the enemy had sufficient forces on 14 Nov available in RABAUL and RABAUL - SOLOMONS area for reinforcements or further offensive action. There were additional tps in NEW CALEDONIA well experienced in landing ops.

2. Distances from RABAUL to BRISBANE are 1,400 miles; BUIN FAISI area to BRISBANE 1,200 miles; NEW CALEDONIA to BRISBANE 800 miles, and the travelling times in convoy are estimated to be 7, 6 and 3/4 days respectively, depending on variations of course, speeds, etc.

3. There was sufficient shipping in the RABAUL area to move one div, and in NEW CALEDONIA to move two Bde Gps, with a balance to maintain forces in these areas. The shipping in the SOLOMONS area was increasing on 12 Nov, and there was other shipping in adjacent areas which could have been available for embarkation by 16 Nov. In NEW CALEDONIA shipping increased up to 17 Nov and sightings on 18 Nov showed that a convoy had left which comprised about 50 ships. Subsequent sightings show that this force may have comprised 3 A/C carriers, 2 possible S/P carriers, 1/2 possible MAC carriers, 6/8 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 10-12 merchant vessels or tpts and smaller vessels. This would be capable of carrying two Bde Gp task landing forces.

4. Reliable infm shows that a large convoy left BUIN FAISI area on 16 Nov. This area could have been the assembly area for forces estimated at one div known to have embarked at RABAUL on 14 Nov. The convoy is probably the one sighted at 155°30' E, 7°40' S on 19Nov which was well protected by fighter escort. There was a strong naval force incl 1 battleship, 1 A/C carrier and 1 possible A/C carrier in BUIN FAISI area on 12 Nov. These would undoubtedly act as escort for a force of one div leaving the area on 16 Nov. Further, there were ample naval vessels in the area to comprise a large escort for this convoy. The convoy incl battleships and A/C carriers was sighted at 1710 hrs 19 Nov moving SE in posns 153°30' E., 19°10' S. and was last sighted at 154°10' E., 21°20' S at at 1215 hrs 20 Nov. This would bring it into ROCKHAMPTON - MARYBOROUGH area on morning of 21 Nov or BRISBANE area on morning of 22 Nov.

5. Enemy activity along the coastal area has been marked. There have been frequent recces by A/C of the area and submarine activity has increased. Today the enemy has attacked our airfields at ARCHERFIELD and TOOGOOLAWAH in an endeavour to reduce our air strength.

6. The last sighting of the convoy which left ROCKHAMPTON on night 17/18 Nov showed that it was approx 120 miles EAST of the BRISBANE area and had split in two. The result of our air action was 1 A/C carrier possibly sunk, 1 A/C carrier damaged, 1 tpt sunk. 1 MAC carrier damaged and one carrier possibly damaged by near misses. It is impossible to state what effect the loss of one tpt will have on the composition of the force but the effective landing capacity of the force may have been impaired by the damage to the MAC carrier. The air strength of the enemy will have been reduced by the loss of 1 a/c carrier, possible damage to another and losses in aerial combat and attacks.

7. The indications are that the enemy may land either NORTH or SOUTH of BRISBANE on the morning of 21 Nov, and he appears to be organized for at least two landings, each comprised of a Bde Gp Task landing force. The Div force to the NORTH may reinforce the MARYBOROUGH sector by a landing on the morning of 21 Nov or reinforce a successful landing in the BRISBANE area on the morning of the 22 Nov. It is possible that the destination of both these forces may be the areas COFFS HR-NEWCASTLE-SYDNEY. In which case the dates of landing will be deferred, but the present movements seem to indicate that the enemy will prefer ops in the BRISBANE area.

PHASE 2. THE LAND ATTACK.

[redacted] THE INTENTION. THE ENEMY APPRECIATION.

4. (a) Deduce that the enemy has the initiative in the employment land force.

(b) Courses open to the enemy is in TOJOBLASTUS's appreciation (paras 16-22). The most likely and most dangerous course to us is to land covering forces on a broad front north of BRISBANE and, at the same time, probably seeking a diversion in the SOUTHPORT area accompanied by an attempt to establish shore-based aircraft at EVANS HEAD. Both these courses to be guarded against.

MY TASK IN RELATION TO ENEMY.

5. Tasks in order of importance are-

(a) Control WOODFORD GAP.

(b) Disperse forces to prevent enemy firmly establishing himself ashore i.e. destruction of enemy covering force.

(c) Should the enemy establish covering force to defeat the whole enemy forces.

COVERING OF THE WOODFORD GAP.

6. TOJOBLASTUS shows that the "area COOROY-[redacted] and NAMBOUR-LANDSBOROUGH-[redacted] is vital to the enemy," (i.e. to us); especially as they control the approaches from the north through WOODFORD GAP.

(a) Tojoblastus's Appreciation, Para 13. "The quick capture of the area TOOWOOMBA-STANLEY DAM-WOODFORD-CABOOLTURE would enable us to achieve our immediate object."

(b) Tojoblastus's Appreciation, Para 14. Giving possible objectives of covering forces.

(c) One from NOOSA HEAD to [redacted] and another from [redacted] area to [redacted].

(d) It is apparent then that these covering positions of the enemy must not only be denied after landing, but our covering forces must be disposed to protect them prior to the enemy landing in order to use them as a firm base and move forward therefrom for the destruction of the landing force. These two areas each require an Inf Bde and thus dispose of the 3 Div which is at present quartered with one Bde Gp at HARBOUR and the other at CABOOLTURE.

ENEMY ACTION AFTER GAIN OF BRISBANE.

7. The possibility of this cannot be ignored and our plans must recognise this by taking adequate preliminary measures.

AREA OF REMAINING FORCES.

8. The remaining force area-

(a) 32 US Div.

(b) Corps RAA 2 Corps (WOODFORD-KILCOY).

(c) Corps RAA 1 Corps (HARACOURT-BELLEVUE).

The AMERICAN forces are disposed in combat gps in the TAMBOURINE area, which is about 70-80 miles away from WOODFORD GAP via the coast road and 100 miles via the BRISBANE VALLEY road. There are several MT coys in the REDBANK-IPSWICH area to move this whole division in one lift by MT. The time, at 10 m.p.h. would be 9-12 hrs to concentrate in the WOODFORD GAP area with a further three hrs to deploy for effective action. It is doubtful, therefore, whether it would be wise to leave the two Bde Div (3 Div) confronted with an enemy force of similar strength if the enemy is to be smashed and it would appear, therefore, that one combat gp of the 32 US Div should be moved northward to cover the WOODFORD GAP and support the 3 Div. It is suggested that this might be done from the WOODFORD area as a preliminary measure.

9. In order to protect BRISBANE from the south and to destroy the enemy division, one Combat Gp should be prepared to move into the COOMERA-SOUTHPORT area with a detachment

ready to proceed to EVANS HEAD should the enemy attempt a landing there.

10. It will be seen that proposals have been suggested for two AMERICAN Combat Gps to be moved as a preliminary measure prior to the enemy having committed his forces. It would be unwise to cause further dissipation of AMERICAN resources. Hence the remainder of 32 US Div should remain concentrated in present position ready to move at short notice if necessary as soon as the enemy intentions are disclosed.

LAND AREAS.

11. If the orders to move are issued by 1900 hrs, 3 Div could be in its battle area by 2400 hrs with advance elements ready to oppose immediately enemy landings in either the BOOBA HEAD or CABOOLTURE-ALEXANDRA areas at first light.

12. (a) The 32 US Div, by using the BRISBANE VALLEY route, should be able to concentrate one Combat Gp at GOLDFORD by first light tomorrow.

(b) One Combat Gp could concentrate at COOMERA from present location in 3 hrs.

13. The Corps Tps RAA of 2 Corps should be placed under cond of 3 Div and Corps Tps RAA 1 Corps should be ready to move by 0400 hrs into the GOLDFORD GAP area, arriving there, if necessary, by 0630 hrs.

AIR FORCE PLAN, ARMY.

3 DIV ROLE.

14. (a) Is to secure the high ground that may be used by the enemy as covering forces areas in the area COOROY-KENILWORTH and MT HIGGINS-MT BUDERIM.

(b) To operate from these areas with the utmost vigour and destroy the enemy landing forces when and wherever met. One Fd and one Med Regt 2 Corps is placed under cond 3 Div from 2000 hours to move north and clear area CALOUNDRA-BOOMARAH-MALENY by 2200 hrs 20 Nov.

32 US DIV ROLE.

32 UK DIV AREA.

15. (a) "X" Combat Gp to move to WOODFORD in NF via BRISBANE VALLEY in order to secure WOODFORD GAP and to be concentrated in the area by 0600 hrs 21 Nov.

16. (b) "X" Combat Gp to be concentrated in the COOMERA area by 2300 hrs 20 Nov.

(b) Role of this Combat Gp is to stop enemy advancing on BRISBANE from the south via the coastal route and subject to this to drive any enemy who land back into the sea.

(c) This Combat Gp will be retained in the COOMERA area until the enemy's intentions are definitely disclosed.

17. (a) Remainder of 32 UK Div to remain present location ready to move at half an hour's notice from 0600 hrs 21 Nov.

(b) Possible areas of employment CABOOLTURE-WOODFORD area or BOONAH area.

(c) Should remainder of 32 UK Div move to CABOOLTURE, Combat Gp will come under comd and then the probable area of responsibility of 32 UK Div will be the area WOODFORD-HARRIS-CABOOLTURE.

War Diary

Copy No 16

NARRATIVE 2.

1. The night 20/21 Nov was an eventful night. By orders at 1930 hrs, Comd 2 Corps gave effect to the attached outline plan. Appx "A".

2. A summary of info received at HQ 3 Div up to 0600 hrs 21 Nov is issued herewith. Appx "B".

PROBLEM 3.

As comd 3 Div your appreciation and outline plan as at 0600 hrs 21 Nov.

APPX "A". ISSUED WITH PROBLEM 3.

OUTLINE PLAN, ARMY.

3 DIV ROLE.

1. (a) Is to secure the high ground that may be used by the enamy as covering force areas in the area COOROY - EUMUNDI and MT NINDERRY - MT BUDERIM.

(b) To operate from these areas with the utmost vigour and destroy the enemy landing force when and wherever met. One Fd and one Med Regt 2 Corps is placed under comd 3 Div from 2000 hrs to move north and clear area CALOUNDRA - MOOLARAH - MALENY by 2200 hrs 20 Nov.

32 US DIV ROLE.

2. (a) "X" Combat Gp to move to WOODFORD in MT via BRISBANE VALLEY in order to secure WOODFORD GAP and to be concentrated in the area by 0600 hrs 21 Nov.

(b) "X" Combat Gp to be concentrated in the COOMERA area by 2300 hrs 20 Nov.

(c) Role of this Combat Gp is to stop enemy advancing on BRISBANE from the south via the coastal route and subject to this to drive any enemy who land back into the sea.

(d) This Combat Gp will be retained in the COOMERA area until the enemy's intentions are definitely disclosed.

(e) Remainder of 32 US Div to remain present location ready to move at half an hour's notice from 0600 hrs 21 Nov.

(f) Possible areas of employment CABOOLTURE - WOODFORD area or SOUTHPORT area.

(g) Should remainder of 32 US Div move to CABOOLTURE, "X" Combat Gp will come under comd and then the probable area of responsibility of 32 US Div will be the area WOODFORD - NAMBOUR - CABOOLTURE.

OUTLINE PLAN - AIR.

3. (a) One GR Sqn recce seaward from 2300 hrs 20 Nov to locate and report enemy shipping in the area 20 miles from coast from incl WIDE BAY to incl CLARENCE RIVER.

(b) One GR Sqn, two MR Sqns and one DR Sqn to be prepared to attack enemy convoys located by GR Sqn from 0001 hrs 21 Nov. Further instns later.

(c) One AC Sqn under control 2 Corps Tac/R from 0400 hrs 21 Nov.

(d) One Fighter Sqn to be prepared to carry out machine gun attack on enemy landing forces as from 0400 hrs 21 Nov.

(e) Two Fighter Sqns to be held at immediate readiness present bases from 0400 hrs 21 Nov for enemy interception.

FORECAST OF FURTHER AIR REQUIREMENTS.

4. (a) GR Sqn seaward recce 21 Nov to locate and report movement of enemy ships seen off MARYBOROUGH 1215 hrs 20 Nov.

(b) Sqns to be prepared for maximum bomber effort against convoy when located as it reaches a convenient position. This action probably not before 1400 hrs 21 Nov. Further details later.

SUMMARY OF R&W RECEIVED AT DIV HQ 01 DIV 0700 TO 2400 21 NOV

T.C.R.	FROM	TOO	
0355	AOR	0355	Our convoy carrying [illegible] to [illegible] course [illegible] (.) [illegible] of HMSA [illegible] (.) One of NARCOMM DUKE (.) Heavy [illegible] (.) Weather [illegible] for to close (.) Shelling Div R vessels [illegible] (.) [illegible] (.) Further Div R firing continued [illegible] DUKE and ORION.
0415	"	0400	Enemy landings are across NARCOMM DUKE and [illegible] (.) Appear to be [illegible] of 3 to 4 miles (.) Heavy naval forces [illegible] coast of beach.
0425	"	0405	F.O. BRIDIR IS. Shelling [illegible] (.) Enemy continue to [illegible] Large number of barges [illegible] (.) Naval shelling by enemy [illegible].
0435	"	0420	Enemy landed what appears to be troops at NARCOMM DUKE (.) [illegible] being dumped (.) Enemy troops moving [illegible] coast.
0440	"	0420	S/M vessel appears [illegible] [illegible] SCHNEIDER (.) Many [illegible] on beach.
0450	"	0435	Enemy convoy off HMSA [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] many small craft
0500	"	0445	Destroyed enemy [illegible] convoy [illegible] [illegible] (.) Destruction strength [illegible] (.) a/c [illegible]
0510	"	0450	No report from a/c on Tac R BRISBANE NARCOMM DUKE area since 0425 hrs (.) Presumed lost (.) Another a/c sent out
0520	"	0500	Reported gunfire [illegible] area (.) 5 barges on beach
0525	"	0505	Enemy shipping off NARCOMM DUKE estimated 4 M.L.C. convoy 3 type 2 escorts 5 destroyers many small craft
0535	"	0510	Enemy parties on beaches NARCOMM and [illegible] unloading material M.T. and landing [illegible] (.) Enemy/Germ a/c engaged our dive bombers attack on this convoy (.) [illegible] Large force of fighters flew [illegible] course [illegible]

T.O.R.	FROM	T.O.O.	
0545	AOE	0530	Heavy barges moving up channel from HOOSAVILLE escorted by armed launches
0550	"	0535	Heavy barges 3 miles W HARCOURT R (.) Impossible locate tgts owing to timber but they appear to be about 3 mls inland on Rds leading from HARCOURT DOWN, ALEXANDRA and HOOLOOLABa
0555	"	0540	Heavy party appears to be in SOUTHPORT (.) Tgt moving west to (.) Heavy firing from our tgt (.) Enemy withdrawing armed casualties
0604	"	0545	Heavy beach heads HOOSA RD, ALEXANDRA and HARBOR DAY (.) Strongly held by Armed (.) Tgt moving N/W along Rd to HOOSAVILLE

PART II BEING FROM ARCHER 256

0350	N.B.M.	0335	O.W.P. HOOSA HEAD reports enemy MT noted in area appear 2 mls E/SE (.) Thought to be barges (.) Appears to be large number of ships about 3/4 mls offshore (.)
0355	S.Bty	0345	O.W.P. HARCOURT DOWN reports (.) 8/9 ships (1 ship offshore large) of heavy patrol motors heard (.) Appear to be proceeding slowly (.) Visibility poor (.) Noise observed by sloop (.)
0410	"	0355	Enemy landing barrels floating towards shore. Have been fired upon by AUSTRALIA.
0415	"	0400	Enemy landings from barges noted also also small craft SOUTH from HARCOURT DOWN
0420	Gun Det OAKHAMPTON	0405	Enemy landing small boats and abouts estimated 6 L.C.Gs (.) P.D. BAILEY IS. opened fire (.) 1 Oldham MP wounded
0425	R.M.L.	0410	Enemy landing ALEXANDRIA have retreated by heavy fire from naval vessels (.) Boats moving into HARBOR BAY (.)

T.O.R.	FROM	T.O.O.	
0425	32 US Div	0405	Enemy landed at SOUTHPORT from DP and advanced 3 mls and stops (.) Appears to be spread over 1 mile x 1 mile (.) Own artillery fire pinpoints and am prepared to hold back.
0430	H.Bde	0415	Further enemy landings possible vic LABOUR DAY (.) Own patrols have contacted enemy who appears to be pushing to the north heading WEST to HQ.
0430	G. Bde	0412	Own patrols HARBOUR TOWN report small enemy parties (.) All blocks established 4 mls WEST of HARBOUR TOWN 4 mls WEST of [illegible].
0435	H.Bde	0405	Patrols CROWN RIVER [illegible] heavy shelling both to SOUTH and SOUTH (.) Nothing further to report from this area.
0435	Gun Bn CHEVRON	0420	Engaged enemy forces estimated 150 strong (.) Enemy casualties indicated by quality from F.F.E. BRISBANE IS, which is now landing out to sea (.) Enemy using smoke, mortars, H.Gs and Enemy Guns (.) Counter situation in hand provided no further landings (.) Our casualties fairly severe.
0500	G.Bde	0445	Enemy by passed at blocks HARBOUR TOWN and [illegible] pushing forward on axis leading WEST (.) Some own patrols out are reported falling back (.) Enemy barges 1½ miles up HARBOUR RIVER.
0510	32 US Div	0455	One Bn moved back to CHEVRON to SOUTHPORT (.) Enemy gained SOUTHPORT BR endeavouring to bring across some tps and armed Cs under heavy fire from Western end.
0525	H. Bde	0510	Enemy landed from barges [illegible] and advanced [illegible] CHEVRON 2 (.) Own own patrols [illegible] engaged WEST of br (.) Further report states enemy proceeding along G2 (US) track M'OSAVILLE - SUBURBAN.
0540	32 US Div	0525	Enemy crossed br into SOUTHPORT (.) Our tps heavily engaged (.) Enemy using armed Cs, mortars, MGs, light arty.

T.O.R.	FROM	T.C.C.	
0545	S.BAS	0550	Enemy leaflet drop bags [illegible] EAST of BLI BLI and now moving WEST towards HAVRE DE (.) Strong enemy forces [illegible] and 1500 2 mile WEST of HAVRE GRACE and 1200 enemy at BIG BEN
0545	R.BAS	0610	Hy fighter sweeps from [illegible] Area at CROWN TOWN (.) One patrol encountered large body of enemy [illegible] 3000 + mile WEST of 2 Airfields

P.W.E. III	ENEMY AIR FORCE & MET. received from [illegible] SOURCES		
0545	ADE	0550	Blue bomber observed [illegible] and naval vessels off MARGATE at 45 (.) One ship hit badly and [illegible] listing heavily at 0547 (.) Two more ships and escorts [illegible] (.) One badly hit ship [illegible]
0550	"	0555	One Ger [illegible] bombed [illegible] convoy off ROSE HEAD (.) One ship [illegible] one [illegible] each 3 [illegible] one ship (.) Fighters [illegible] Bombs [illegible] hit ship [illegible] on beaches (.) Seven bursts observed (.) from [illegible] ship. Fighters (.)
0545		0545	One Ju [illegible] shadowed [illegible] burgs MAP GRID 2 (.) Two bursts each (.) 3 [illegible] [illegible] burgs
0545		0555	Heavy AA [illegible] in progress at KINGSWAY (.) City and ST LUCIA being bombed
0550	"	0555	One Ger [illegible] bombed [illegible] a/c observed 20 miles off coast due EAST of NORTHAM (.) [illegible] 4 [illegible] (.) All [illegible] 3 bursts each [illegible]
0550	"	0555	Enemy [illegible] [illegible] in a northerly [illegible] and [illegible] (.) Two [illegible] bombs [illegible] [illegible] Fighters [illegible] (.) Heavy bursts & flashes [illegible]

G 21

SECRET

APPX "H"

COPY No 18
14 SEPT 44

Appendix "H" issued with the opening situation narrative (1) is hereby cancelled. It should be destroyed and the following Appendix "H" substituted therefore.

COMPOSITION OF JAP FORCES - LT-GEN TOJOHASTUS.

LAND FORCES

Formation	Location	Composition
Div	On types BUIN FAISI area	See details Appx G
Bde Gp Tank Landing Force	MOUNDA	" " Appx F
Bde Gp Tank Landing Force	MOUNDA	" " Appx F

AIR FORCES

Carrier Borne

Carrier	Aircraft	Type
CHOKAKU	60	Fighters
ZUIKAKU	60	Fighters
ZUIHO	45	Dive Bombers
HIYO	35	Med Bombers

S/P Carriers

HAMOI	16
MOTORO	16
TAIGEI	9
TAKYO	10

LAND BASED (The use of this is doubtful until Landing Grounds Operating).

A Shore Based Group

Flying Boats	2 Sqns - 18
Fighters	2 Sqns - 18
Heavy Bombers	2 Sqns - 18

SHIPPING

Naval Escort

1 Battleship
10 Cruisers
22 Destroyers
Minesweepers
Submarines

Shipping for Convoy

3 MLC Carriers

Merchant Ships

2	10,000 ton
5	7,000 ton
14	5,000 ton

Available for maintenance after 14 days:-

2	8,000 ton tankers
10	2,000 ton ships

NOTES:-

MLC Carries:

Each carrier carries:-

9	large MLC
120	small MLC
10	armed launches
4	despatch boats

MLCs: There are 9 Classes divided into two groups as under:-

Large: 45' - 55' long; 90-100 men; draught 30-36 in.; speed 6-8 knots.

Small: 30' - 40' long; 50-60 men; draught 30-36 in; speed 8-10 knots.

AMENDMENTS TO NARRATIVE 1.

(a) The appx mentioned in para 12 is appx H NOT appx A;

(b) Amend para 13, last line, appx H, to read:-

"The composition of forces available to Lt-Gen TOJOBLASTUS."

DISTRIBUTION:-

	Copy No.
3 Aust Div	1-2
38 US Div	3-4
CCRA	5-6
GOC	7
BGS	8
A & Q	9
First Aust Army	10
Southern Area RAAF	11
GOC 1 Mot Div	12
Comd 1 Mot Bde	13
GOC Q'ld L of C	14
War Diary	15-16
File	17
Spare	18-19-20

Wa Diary.

SECRET.

Forecast of Enemy Intentions as at 0600 hrs

21 Nov.

1. Enemy has made two main landings.

(a) NOOSA HD. At 0540 hrs he was at TEWANTIN, estimated strength 3,000.

(b) MAROOCHYDORE. Posn line NORTH and SOUTH from 2 miles EAST of FOREST GLEN to BUDERIM, estimated strength 2,700.

2. He is using tanks, armd Cs and arty, and barges on waterways. His tactics are to push boldly forward and overcome or outflank resistance.

3. Shipping losses and diversionary landings must have effected his strength, equipment and supplies in these areas.

4. It appears that his intentions are to penetrate deeply, occupy high ground WEST of the coast and develope his bases for the further landing of his div force.

SECRET

DISCUSSION ON CO-ORDINATION AND CONTROL OF ARMY AND AIR FORCES. - 2 AUST CORPS EXERCISE AT NAMBOUR 21-23 SEP 42.

QUESTIONS FOR AIR.

1. What is the present system of control of Air Forces operating in EasternArea RAAF?

2. When invasion is emminent, what then is the system of control and co-ordination of the Air Forces around BRISBANE?

3. What Air Forces come under comd of the Army in the event of invasion, and at what stage does control of the Air Forces pass to Army comd and when do you visualise this happening in the exercise?

4. Will there be any other Air Forces operating in the BRISBANE area in the event of an invasion which are not under comd of the Army. If so, who controls them, allots tasks and what is the system for co-ordination between the Army and Air Comdrs?

5. Does the Comdr Eastern Area move to BRISBANE in the event of invasion becoming emminent.

IF SO:-

(a) Where does he move to, and when?

(b) What does he control, and how?

(c) Under whose orders does he operate?

IF NOT:-

(a) How are the Air forces controlled and maintained from SYDNEY,?

(b) If not from SYDNEY, where from?

Copies to:-

GOC
Gp Capt SIMMS
Gp Capt FLOWERS
2 Corps Syndicate
3 Div Syndicate
1 Hot Div Syndicate
Qld L of C Syndicate
BGS
Col Wheeler
War Diary 2
✓File 2
Spare 6

Appx 206

SECRET

Copy No. 1 A.C.

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.25

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 14 Sep 42

Dates A.E.A.S. See Summaries Nos 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR Area 12 Sep. NIL enemy activity at SENNATA IS. (N.E. of PORTUGUESE TIMOR) KAI and ARCE IS is reported by our Allied recce A/C.

(ii) NEW GUINEA Area -

BUNA Area 11 Sep. Between 1705 hrs on 11 Sep and 0805 hrs on 12 Sep BUNA Aerodrome was raided 5 times. Bombs fell on the target area, buildings were hit and strafed, fuel dumps left burning and A/A posns silenced. Eighteen enemy A/C are believed to have been destroyed. Two trucks on the runway and a beached barge were strafed and destroyed. The enemy suffered some casualties.

KOKODA Area 11 Sep. During the afternoon, our fwd tps ambushed enemy patrols inflicting 20 casualties on them. Our losses were NIL. At 1930 hrs in the vicinity of IORIBAIWA (2 miles NNE ISURAVA) the enemy were reported moving to the right in an endeavour to outflank our tps. At 0630 hrs on 12 Sep, after a quiet night, the enemy contacted our fwd patrols. There are as yet no details to hand.

MILNE BAY Area 11 Sep. Two miles NORTH of RABI, during the afternoon, our patrols encountered 5 Japanese. The enemy were fired upon but they crept. The search for them is continuing. One prisoner was captured.

CONFIRMATION RE A NORTH JAPANESE ID, 12 Sep. Our recce A/C crew who were strafed one enemy F/B taking off from GASMATA at the SOUTH end of KILIKILIGUA ID. White sheets in the form of A "T" were observed in the trees tops. The area was searched. At 1235 hrs Allied recce A/C sighted 1 enemy destroyer, course 040° by SOUTH Aspiran 25 miles NORTH of TOWAI POINT, the NORTH end of NEW BRITAIN IS.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN 11 Sep - Analysis of air photographs of RABAUL HR reveal 2 large cruisers, 3 probable seaplane tenders, 5 destroyers, 3 torpedo boats, 3 gunboats, 1 large submarine, 3 tpts 7000 to 10,000 tons and 7 cargo vessels 1000 to 2000 tons, 6 small unidentified vessels, several motor boats and at least 60 landing barges.

NEW IRELAND 12 Sep. At 0930 hrs - approx 50 miles SOUTH of KAVIENG on a SE course, Allied recce A/C sighted and strafed a possible enemy submarine chaser or mine-sweeper.

OPERATIONS (Contd)

(v) SOLOMONS Area: -

CENTRAL JAVA Area: On 10 Sep, approx 200 miles N.N.E. of ONTONG JAVA Allied a/c sighted one enemy destroyer and 1 cargo vessel. At MUKUHANU 35 miles North of ONTONG JAVA, on 11 Sep, Allied a/c sighted tents and red-topped roofs indicating a possible seaplane base.

GUADALCANAL Area. On 11 Sep 1145 hrs. Twenty six hy bombers escorted by Zeros bombed GUADALCANAL. Six enemy bombers and 1 Zero were shot down. At 1230 hrs Allied a/c over LUNGA POINT sighted approx 50 enemy a/c. There are no further details. From the latest report, the enemy estimated at several thousand, have moved in force to the MALIMBU RIVER, 7 miles East of LUNGA POINT. On 13 Sep at 0940 hrs Allied posns at GUADALCANAL were bombed by one enemy cruiser and 4 destroyers.

NEW GEORGIA Area on 12 Sep at 0650 hrs. Approx 20 miles N.N.W. of VAHOLI BAY on a WNW course, Allied a/c sighted 3 enemy cruisers and 1 destroyer.

SANTA YSABEL IS. Area on 12 Sep at 0755 hrs. Approx 60 miles NW of RENATA BAY, on a course E.N.E. Allied recce a/c sighted 2 enemy tpts and 2 destroyers.

BUIN-FAISI Area on 12 Sep. The estimation of shipping at BUIN is as follows: One tanker, 1 supply ship, 2 destroyers and at FAISI, 2 destroyers and 2 supply ships.

SOUTH PACIFIC Area on 12 Sep. Allied a/c operating in this area reported attacking 1 enemy battleship and 7 cruisers. No sightings or details were given.

SANTA CRUZ IS. on 12 Sep at 1239 hrs. Approx 265 miles N.E. of NDENI IS, Allied a/c sighted 1 enemy a/c carrier and cruiser on a course South by West. At 1515 hrs, approx 160 miles S.S.E. of NDENI IS, Allied a/c sighted 2 enemy vessels.

NEW SOUTH WALES Area on 12 Sep at 1340 hrs. A loop crossing at SYDNEY HARBOUR indicated the presence of a large enemy submarine. (Londops Revsit No. 44)

PART 2

ENEMY

(vii) Tactics Japanese tps in addition to making landings from landing craft carriers, have on several occasions landed direct from troop ships in LCM, motor fishing boats, and ordinary ships' boats.

The available reports of tp landings from merchant vessels indicate that such vessels have been employed where no opposition to the landing was anticipated and that the enemy forces are prepared to take great risks to achieve surprise, landing on beaches exposed to storms where it was necessary to land from tpts anchored a considerable distance off shore.

(x) Communications:

Jap signal communications from the Division downward follow the general orthodox system of using radio, M/C and bicycle messengers and occasionally visual signalling. The operation of the system is characterized by extreme simplicity - short mission orders, direct verbal orders by commanders and flag signals. The regtl radio communication system usually goes down as fas as the Coy HQ. Bicycles are used extensively. Each Coy comd has a pool of runners for communication down to pl. In addition, many are euipped with small portable radio sets for direct communication with air and lateral or subordinate units. Within the pl a communications NCO (RENRAKUKASHI) maintained communication between sections either verbally or by using ordinary soldiers or runners.

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i)(Corps Area) - See Appx "A".

(ii) Other Areas -

The eastern littoral of QLD from CAPE YORK to the TWEED receives an annual average rainfall of about 60 inches. On parts of the NORTH Coast between COOKTOWN and TOWNSVILLE, this increases to 150 and 165 inches per annum. The main source of supply is the SE trade wind, and local variations in totals are solely due to differences in elevations of the shore line.

On the Peninsula the rainfall ranges from 69 inches at CAPE YORK to 32 inches at GEORGETOWN; in lower CARPENTARIA it averages about 25 inches.

In the Central districts the average varies from 30 inches on the eastern boundary to 20 inches on the western.


In the MARANOA it averages about 23 inches, and over the Darling Downs from 25 to 30 inches. In the WARREGO, it varies from 15 to 20 inches, and in the Far Western districts, from 10 inches down to 6 inches at BIRDSVILLE, in the extreme SW corner.

(C'wealth Bureau of Meteorology Bulletin No.9).

[signature]
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 6.

HQ 2 Aust Corps Daily Intelligence Summary No. 25



Appx 207

SECRET

Copy No. 130

GSI

[illegible] AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.26

[illegible] information received to 0600 hrs 15 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos.1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART I

OPERATIONS.

(ii) N.E.I. area -

TIMOR area 12 Sep. The rd from DILLI to LIQUICA has been repaired by the Japanese. The enemy tps with natives from ATAMBOEA, are at HATOLIA, 36 mls SW of DILLI and at HANTASSIE 32 mls SW of DILLI. There is an unconfirmed report that all Chinese at DILLI, HERAI and REMIXIO have been ordered to concentrate at ALLEU where there are already 400 Chinese, and those at ATSABE, LETEFOHO and ERMERA are to concentrate at TALO, 40 mls SW of DILLI. The native population is now reported to be quiet.

KAI Islands 13 Sep 1210 hrs. Our A/C bombed a 6,000 ton enemy merchant vessel, beached at WALIR Island, in the Western KAI Gp. Bombs straddled the ship to a distance of 20 yds on either side.

SELOE Is. (TANIMBAR Gp) 13 Sep 1907 hrs. Allied A/C made a successful attack on two 300-ton enemy merchant vessels, approx 65 mls NW SELOE Is. Direct hits were observed on 1 vessel, which was left sinking; the other was damaged.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE-SALAMAUA Area 13 Sep 1046 hrs and 1100 hrs. Our A/C attacked LAE aerodrome. Bombs were observed to land on the runway and on the rd in front of the dispersal area. Others fell along the BUTIBUM River and on the wooded area to the SOUTH WEST. Other A/C dropped bombs in the vicinity of SALAMAUA, but the results were NOT observed.

KOKODA Area 12 Sep. Our patrols have been active, harassing the enemy on the high ground NORTH of IORIBAIWA. On the afternoon and night 12/13 Sep, enemy patrols were actively probing along this front.

MILNE BAY Area 12 Sep. Our patrols are investigating natives' report of 4 unarmed Japs moving along track between AHIOMA and TANAA. 13 Sep 0945 hrs, a Beece A/C sighted an enemy sub on the surface, 7 mls EAST Cape LOOKOUT, BASILAKI Is. (30 miles SOUTH of NORMANBY Is).

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN Area 13 Sep 1245 hrs. Approx 40 mls EAST of WAGUNGOFA (on the EAST coast). Allied A/C attacked an enemy cruiser and a destroyer. NIL hits were observed.

NEW IRELAND Area 13 Sep 1045 hrs. An enemy corvette, 600 to 800 tons, and a 3,000-ton cargo vessel, were observed by our A/C, approx 68 mls SOUTH EAST of KAVIENG, on a SE course.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

GIZO 11 Sep 1001 hrs. Allied A/C made an attack, destroying buildings. On 12 Sep 2 of the 5 enemy float planes which attacked an Allied A/C, near GAGI Is. (off NW tip YSABEL Is) were shot down. 13 Sep 1020 hrs. The enemy are clearing an area, preparatory to constructing an aerodrome at KINIII Trading Station, BUIN.

GUADALCANAL Area 13 Sep 2315 hrs. It was reported that at least 1 enemy cruiser and 2 destroyers were shelling GUADALCANAL.

BUIN-FAISI-SHORTLAND Area 13 Sep. Maximum enemy shipping sighted in this area is 5 cruisers, 16 destroyers, 4 large tpts or tenders, 1 large tpt and 1 small vessel.

SANTA CRUZ Gp. 12 Sep 0117 hrs. NDENI Is. An enemy sub shelled an Allied vessel in this vicinity. On 13 Sep at 1050 hrs, our A/C sighted 2 enemy cruisers, course NNE, approx 85 mls NE of NDENI Is, and between 1005 hrs and 1302 hrs, 5 enemy cruisers and 8 destroyers, approx 240 miles NNW, on a course SSE, were sighted.

N.S.W. Area. In ref sub off SYDNEY (2 AUST CORPS Summary 25) intensive searches have proved negative.

(LANDOPS REVSIT No.45).

PART 2

ENEMY:

(vii) Tactics:

A large part of Japanese air power is an integral part of the Navy.

The following points are worth noting -

1 A/A guns are often placed on even small launches.

2 Submarines co-operate very closely with F/Bs. It is suggested that fuel is provided for the F/Bs from submarines.

3 Japanese Naval guns are reported to be very accurate.

4 Use is made of a torpedo fitted with spiked fins to prevent it plunging too deep.

5 Enemy F/Bs often direct naval fire. Posns indicated by shooting sharply skyward.

6 Japs use method of "hopping" planes to increase range of figaters etc. Carriers are established at intervals and planes hop from one to the other, refuel and so go on.

7 "Wireless ships" are used to guide planes. They are established at predetermined posns, transmit signals that facilitate air navigation. These ships are highly camouflaged and are hard to pick up, but are otherwise vulnerable from the air.

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(1) Corps Area - See Appx "A".


[signature]
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.5.

14 Sep 42.

GYMPIE STRAT

Recce by 3 Aust Div — 4 M to 1" — Prep by GSI 2 Aust Corps.



Sealed ——————

Metal or Gravel - - - - - -

Sand or Earth ....

Appx 208

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

MOST SECRET.

G 1236

2 Aust Corps.,

15 Sep 42.

Subject: LOCATION STATEMENT 2 AUST CORPS AS AT
2400 HRS 14 SEP 42.

Copy No.

3 Aust Div	1-2	GOC	16	DAD Educ	31
32 US Div	3-4	BGS	17	DDST	32
1 Aust Mot Bde	5	G(O)	18	DDOS	33-35
HQ Independent Units 7 Aust Div	6	G(I)	19	DAD Posts	36
		CCRA	20	Pay	37
2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec	7	C.	21-22	Signaster	38
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	8	CSO	23-24	FIRST AUST ARMY	39-40
HQ 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	9	DA & QMG	25	Fld L of C Area	41
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col	10	A	26	1 US Corps	42
HQ 1 Aust Corps Tpt Col	11	Q	27	File	43-44
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	12	DDMS	28	War Diary	45-46
2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	13	ADMS (D)	29		
4 Aust AC Sqn	14-15	Legal	30		

1. Herewith 2 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 14 Sep 42.

2. It is requested that any errors or omissions noted in this statement be notified to this HQ by the formation or unit concerned.

3. ACK. Include in ack, destruction by fire of previous location statement.

Capt.
for/BGS.
2 Aust Corps.

MOST SECRET.

LOCATION STATEMENT. Copy No 4

2 AUST CORPS. Veh Marking:- COCKATOO ON BOOMERANG.

Serial No	UNIT	Veh No.	LOCATION	Remarks.
A1	HQ 2 AUST CORPS	107	ESK	
A2	2 Aust Corps sec Intell Corps		ESK	
A3	4 Aust Def & Emp Pl	120	ESK	
A4	4 Aust AS Control (Type A)	137	ESK	
A5	2 Aust AL Sec		KINGAROY	
A6	H Sec FSS	107	ESK	
A7	2 Aust Corps PR Fd Unit		ESK	
A8	2 Aust Fd Censorship Sec		BRISBANE	Att for duty HILBASE BRISBANE
A9	3 Aust Fd Censorship Sec			
	ARTY.			
A10	HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	109	ESK	
A11	HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	104	ESK	
A12	2/5 Aust Fd Regt (less one bty) Sig Sec & 2/52 LAD	54	D'AGUILAR	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A13	2/9 Aust A Fd Regt Sig Sec & 2/68 LAD	134	ARAKOON	" " "
A14	2/11 Aust A Fd Regt Sig Sec & 2/70 LAD	142	BELLEVUE	" " "
A15	8 Fd Regt Sig Sec & 229 LAD		CASINO	
A16	1 Aust Med Regt Sig Sec & 208 LAD	104	NEURUM	
A17	2/1 Aust Med Regt Sig Sec & 2/60 LAD	112	BELLEVUE	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A18	2/2 Aust A Tk Regt (less two btys) and 2/54 LAD	62	WOODFORD	" " "
A19	2 Aust F Sp Bty		NEURUM	
A20	2/1 F Sp Bty		ARAKOON)	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A21	2/3 F Sp Bty		ARAKOON)	Formed from 2/1
A22	2/7 F Sp Bty		ARAKOON)	Svy Regt ex
A23	NG Force Svy Bty		ARAKOON)	1 Aust Corps
	RAE			
A24	HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps	101	VILLENEUVE	
A25	10 Aust Fd Coy	54	OAKHURST	
A26	2/16 Aust A Fd Coy	138	GLENFERN	
A27	19 Aust A Fd Coy	141	GLENFERN	
A28	60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy & 315 LAD	105	GLENFERN	
A29	2 Aust Corps Camflg Tng Unit		GLENFERN	
	SIGS.			
A30	Sigs 2 Aust Corps & 244 LAD	115	ESK	
A31	2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec		ESK	
	INF			
A32	5 Aust MG Bn		LANDSBOROUGH	To move to D'AGUILAR
	AASC			
A33	HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	108	HARLIN	
A34	2 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy	136	HARLIN	
A35	2 Aust Corps Tps Pet Coy	146	HARLIN	
A36	2 Aust Corps Tps Sup Col	150	HARLIN	
A37	HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	108	FAIRNIE VIEW	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A38	2/1 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy	136	FERNVALE	" " "
A39	2/1 Aust Corps Tps Pet Coy	146	FAIRNIE VIEW	" " "
A40	2/1 Aust Corps Tps Sup Col	150	FERNVALE	" " "
A41	HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col	116	HARLIN	
A42	129 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	125	GYMPIE	
A43	130 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	131	LANDSBOROUGH	Att 3 Aust Div

Serial No	UNIT	Veh No.	LOCATION	Remarks.
	AASC (Contd)			
A44	131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	121	CROSSDALE	
A45	132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	103	HARLIN	
A46	133 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	160	TOOGOOLAWAH	
A47	HQ 1 Aust Corps Tpt Col	116	GOODNA	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A48	2/103 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	125	REDBANK PLAINS	" " "
A49	2/104 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	131	GROVELY CAMP	" " "
A50	2/105 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	121	REDBANK PLAINS	" " "
A51	2/106 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (one Pl ESK)	103	GOODNA	" " "
A52	2/2 DID		CASINO	
A53	2/3 DID		CABOOLTURE	
	AAMC			
A54	22 Aust Fd Amb	52	KILCOY	B Coy VILLENEUVE
A55	10 Aust Fd Amb		LANDSBOROUGH	Now 1 Aust Corps O of B.
A56	2 Aust CCS	151	IPSWICH	
A57	11 Aust CCS	135	HARLIN	
A58	2 Aust MAC (less one Sec)	294	KILCOY	One sec INGLEBURN U/C 1 Aust Armd Div.
A59	2/1 Aust MAC (less one Sec)	256	DINMORE	
A60	207 Aust Dental Unit		GOODNA	
A61	215 Aust Dental Unit		ESK	
A62	219 Aust Dental Unit		ARAKOON	
A63	220 Aust Dental Unit		ALEXANDRA Area	Att 22 Inf Bn
A64	222 Aust Dental Unit		CABOOLTURE	" 24 Inf Bn
A65	228 Aust Dental Unit		LANDSBOROUGH	" Sigs 3 Div
A66	233 Aust Dental Unit		LANDSBOROUGH	" 106 A/Tk Regt
A67	369 Aust Dental Unit		DECEPTION BAY	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A68	2/7 Aust Dental Unit		GYMPIE	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A69	2/9 Aust Dental Unit		CABOOLTURE	" " "
A70	2/51 Aust Dental Unit		ARAKOON	" " "
A71	2/55 Aust Dental Unit			
	AAOC			
A72	290 Aust LAD		BIGGENDEN	
A73	2 Aust Army Ord Wkshop		INGLEBURN	N.S.W.
A74	2 Aust Army Ord Fd Pk		IPSWICH	
A75	110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Wkshop	114	WOODFORD	
A76	110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk	114	WOODFORD	
A77	2/3 Aust Army Ord Fd Pk	147	IPSWICH	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A78	4 Aust Army Ord Fd Pk			To be raised
A79	3 Aust Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit	173	FERNVALE	
A80	2/90 Aust LAD	-	IPSWICH	Ex 2/1 Aust Svy regt 1 Aust Corps
	PRO			
A81	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	128	ESK	Det IPSWICH
	POSTAL			
A82	2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	154	IPSWICH	
	PAY			
A83	2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office		ESK	

Serial No	UNIT	Veh No.	Location	Remarks.
	MISC.			
A84	2/3 Aust MH & Infm Sec.			Not yet raised
A85	2 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	166	ESK	
A86	101 Aust Mob Bath Unit	132		Being raised by Q L of C.
A87	HQ 2 Aust Corps Reception Camp		ASCOT RACECOURSE BRISBANE	
	RAAF (Under Comd)			
A88	4 Aust AC Sqn		KINGAROY	

3 AUST DIV.

Veh Sign :- KOALA ON BOOMERANG.

Serial No.	UNIT	Veh No.	LOCATION	REMARKS.
	HQ			
B1	Hq 3 Aust Div	84	MOOLOOLAH	
B2	3 Aust Div Int Sec	84	MOOLOOLAH	
B3	E Sec FSS	84	MOOLOOLAH	
B4	13 Def & Emp Pl	58	MOOLOOLAH	Being disbanded
	CAV.			
B5	8 Aust Recce Bn		12 mls south of LOGAN VILLAGE	Moving later to LANDSBOROUGH
	RAA.			
B6	Hq RAA 3 Aust Div	69	MOOLOOLAH	
B7	Hq 106 Aust A Tk Regt & sig sec and 263 Aust LAD.	62	LANDSBOROUGH Area.	
B8	21 Aust A Tk Bty	62	LANDSBOROUGH Area.	
B9	23 Aust A Tk Bty	62	LANDSBOROUGH Area.	
	RAE			
B10	HQ RAE 3 Aust Div	81	GLENVIEW	
B11	53 Aust Fd Pk Coy & 230 Aust LAD	75	GLENVIEW	
	SIGS.			
B12	HQ Sigs 3 Aust Div & 231 LAD	66	LANDSBOROUGH Area.	
B13	No 1 coy Sigs 3 Aust Div		LANDSBOROUGH Area.	
B14	K Sec Sigs 3 Aust Div		LANDSBOROUGH AREA.	
	AASC			
B15	Hq Comd AASC 3 Aust Div	59	LANDSBOROUGH Area.	
B16	20 Aust Coy AASC		LANDSBOROUGH Area	
	AAMC			
B17	2/13 Aust Fd Amb		FOREST GLEN	B Coy LANDSBOROUGH
B18	3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec		GLENVIEW	
	AAOC			
B19	HQ 54 Aust Div Ord Wkshop	76	MOOLOOLAH	
B20	10 Bde Sec 54 " " "		LANDSBOROUGH	
B21	Hq 54 Aust Div Ord Fd Pk	83	MOOLOOLAH	
B22	10 Bde Sec 54 " " " "		LANDSBOROUGH	
B23	6 Aust Mot Laundry & fwd decn Unit	51	LANDSBOROUGH	
B24	8 Aust Salvage Unit	78	LANDSBOROUGH Area	
B25	ADOS Dump		MOOLOOLAH	

Serial No	UNIT	Veh No	LOCATION	REMARKS.
	PRO			
B26	3 Aust Div Pro Coy	99	LAIDSBOROUGH	
	PAY			
B27	3 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	87	MOOLOOLAH	
	POSTAL			
B28	3 Aust Div Postal Unit	56	MOOLOOLAH	
	MISC.			
B29	3 Aust Div Reception Camp		LAIDSBOROUGH	
B30	107 Aust Mob Bath Unit	79	GLENVIEW	
B31	3 Aust Div Camflg Unit		GLENVIEW	
B32	3 Aust Div Rest Sta		CALOUNDRA	
B33	3 Aust Div Cav School		BROOKLANDS	
	4 AUST INF BDE GP			
B34	H. 4 AUST INF BDE sig sec & 264 LAD.	88	FOREST GLEN	
B35	4 Aust Bde Def Pl		FOREST GLEN	Being disbanded
B36	4 Aust Fd Regt, sig sec & 214 Aust LAD	54	FOREST GLEN	
B37	22 Aust A Tk Bty	62	KIELS MOUNTAIN	
B38	4 Aust Fd Coy	60	PALMWOODS	
B39	22 Aust Inf Bn	53	ALEXANDRIA Area	
B40	29/46 Aust Inf Bn	50	5 mls west of CALOUNDRA	
B41	37/52 Aust Inf Bn	61	FOREST GLEN Area	
B42	19 Aust Coy AASC		KULANGOOR	
B43	4 Aust Fd Amb	67	NAMBOUR	
B44	4 Bde sec 54 Div Ord Wkshop		NAMBOUR	
B45	4 Bde Sec 54 Div Ord Fd Pk		NAMBOUR	
	15 AUST INF BDE GP			
B46	H. 15 Aust Inf Bde sig sec & 266 Aust LAD	65	CABOOLTURE	
B47	15 Aust Bde Def Pl	65	CABOOLTURE	being disbanded
B48	2 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec & 213 Aust LAD		CABOOLTURE	
B49	24 Aust A Tk Bty	62	MOODLU	
B50	15 Aust Fd Coy	86	CABOOLTURE	
B51	24 Aust Inf Bn	63	CABOOLTURE Area	
B52	57/60 Aust Inf Bn	82	BURPENGARY	
B53	58/59 Aust Inf Bn	91	North of CABOOLTURE	
B54	21 Aust Coy AASC	72	CABOOLTURE	
B55	15 Aust Fd Amb	70	CABOOLTURE	one coy ELIMBAH
B56	15 Bde sec 54 Div Ord Wkshop		CABOOLTURE	
B57	15 Bde sec 54 Div Ord Fd Pk		CABOOLTURE	

32 US DIV.

Serial No	UNIT	LOCATION	[illegible]
	HQ.		
C 1	Hq 32 Inf Div		
C 2	HQ & Mil Police Coy & Service Det.		
	RECCE		
C 3	32 Cav Recce Tp		
	ARTY		
C 4	Hq)		
C 5	Hq Bty) 32 Div Arty		
C 6	Band)		
C 7	120 Fd Arty Bn *	TARBOURINE	Att.
C 8	121 Fd Arty Bn		
C 9	126 Fd Arty Bn		
C10	129 Fd Arty Bn		
C11	632 TD Destroyer Bn		
	ENGRS		
C12	114 Engr Bn		* 3 Bn 127 Inf Regt and C Bty 120 Fd Arty Bn at PORT STEPHENS joint Operational Tng School.
	SIGS.		
C13	32 Sig Coy		
	INF		** 2 Bn 128 Inf Regt TOURAUL POINT.
C14	126 Inf Regt		
C15	127 Inf Regt *		
C16	128 Inf Regt **		
	S & T.		
C17	107 QM Bn		
	MEDICAL.		
C18	107 Medical Bn		

1 AUST MOT BDE (Under cond 1 AUST MOT DIV).

Vehicle Sign : Greyhound on Boomerang

Serial No	Unit	Veh No	Location	Remarks.
D1	HQ 1 Aust Mot Bde	84	GYMPIE	
D2	5 Aust Mot Regt & 299 LAD	58	GYMPIE	
D3	11 Aust Mot Regt & 300 LAD	80	GYMPIE	
D4	16 Aust Mot Regt & 211 LAD	68	GYMPIE	
D5	6 Bty 102 Aust A Tk Regt	91	GYMPIE	
D6	3 Sqn Sigs 1 Aust Mot Div	85	GYMPIE	
D7	1 Aust Lt Fd Amb	53	GYMPIE	
D8	1 Aust Mot Bde Ord Wkshop	83	GYMPIE	
D9	1 Aust Mot Bde Ord Sub Pk	86	GYMPIE	
D10	Det 1 Aust Mot Div Postal Unit	73	GYMPIE	
D11	1 Aust Mot Bde ASC Coy		GYMPIE	

UNITS OF 1 AUST CORPS AND 7 AUST DIV, AND 1 CORPS 2 AUST CORPS,

FOR PURPOSES OF AD I A.S EMERGENCY OPERATIONS.

Serials 1 to 22 under cond Independent Units 7 Aust Div.

Serial No	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Remarks.
E1	HQ Independent Units 7 Aust Div		CABOOLTURE	
E2	B Sec 7 Aust Div Sigs		CABOOLTURE	Detached from 2/4 Fd Regt/
E3	C Sec 7 Aust Div Sigs.		CABOOLTURE	Detached from 2/6 Fd Regt.
E4	2/53 Aust LAD		CABOOLTURE	
E5	Det 2/4 Aust Fd Regt	75	CABOOLTURE	
E6	25 Bde Sec 7 Aust Div Ord Wkshops		CABOOLTURE	
E7	25 Bde Sec 7 Aust Div Ord Fd Pk		CABOOLTURE	
E8	7 Aust Div Cav Regt	92	CABOOLTURE	
E9	C Sec 7 Aust Div Sigs	92	CABOOLTURE	
E10	2/50 Aust LAD	92	CABOOLTURE	
E11	6 Aust A Tk Bty	62	WOODFORD	
E12	8 Aust A Tk Bty	62	WOODFORD	
E13	2/4 Aust Fd Regt	74	D'AGUILAR	
E14	2/51 Aust LAD	74	D'AGUILAR	
E15	2/25 Aust Fd Pk Coy (less stores and br secs)		DINMORE	Att First Aust Army Br Park
E16	2/55 Aust LAD		DINMORE	
E17	2/1 Aust MG Bn	68	DECEPTION BAY	
E18	2/48 Aust LAD		DECEPTION BAY	
E19	2/4 Aust Coy AASC (Less det)	97	BEACHMERE	
E20	2/6 Aust Coy AASC (Less det)	72	BEACHMERE	
E21	Det HQ AASC 7 Aust Div		BEACHMERE	
E22	2/56 Aust LAD	66	SHOWGROUND WOODFORD	
E23	59 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy (239 LAD)		DINMORE	Att First Aust Army Br Park
E24	3 Aust AL Sec	112	TOOWOOMBA	
E25	2/102 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (3 Pls)	116	GOODNA	
E26	Sec 2/1 Aust HAC		DINMORE	
E27	2/53 Aust Dental Unit			
E28	3 Aust A Ord Wkshop		IPSWICH	
E29	1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit	173	FERNVALE	
E30	1 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre		CHERMSIDE	
E31	2 Aust AS Control	137	near ARAMOON	
E32	2/47 Aust LAD	88		Att HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Appx 209

SECRET

Copy No. 122

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 27

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 16 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42.

PART 1

OPERATIONS

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TANIMBAR IS. Area 14 Sep 0758 hrs. At SAUMLAKI Allied a/c attacked 1 small enemy vessel at the EAST side of the wharf. NO hits were observed. At 1245 hrs, Allied a/c attacked a 1,300 ton enemy vessel at the Jetty. There were 4 near misses but the damage is unknown.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE-SALAMAUA Area 13 Sep. At the Junction one hour's march on the MUBO-WAU track, huts are being built by the enemy. A small skirmish took place near HEATHS PLANTATION on the outskirts of LAE.

KOKODA Area 13 Sep. EFOGI and NAURO were bombed by Allied a/c. At the river crossing North of IOROBAIWA, our forces endeavoured to draw fire without success and patrols were sent out to clear an enemy post. Our forces were shelled by Q.F. guns during the day. NO details are to hand as yet. At MYOLA, some new tents were observed. It is believed our posn in this area is improving. On 14 Sep the enemy were constructing a track from NAURO to IOROBAIWA. Our patrols have been active and it is estimated that 75 JAPS have been killed in the last three days without loss to us. Patrols report that the enemy appears smaller in physique than previous encounters have shown and is wearing darker clothing and lighter coloured equipment with haversacks on the back. The main track NORTH of MANARI to SOUTH of NAURO is still being improved by the JAPS and they are using mule transport and digging in along the track.

MILNE BAY Area 12 Sep. On GOODENOUGH IS. enemy buildings and posns were machine-gunned by our a/c. On 13 Sep our patrols which were searching for the 4 unarmed Japanese mentioned in HQ 2 Aust Corps Intell Summary No. 26, encountered 14 of the enemy. Five Japanese were killed. Our patrol has been reinforced. In Intell Summary No. 21 it was reported that six JAPS from three crashed enemy dive bombers were heading inland at MULLINS HR. On 8 Sep these men were found in a dwelling at MULLINS HR and 3 were killed. On 10 Sep the others were overtaken; they refused to surrender and were all killed. Documents and equipment were captured.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

GAZELLE PENINSULA (NEW BRITAIN) 14 Sep. One 10,000 ton cargo vessel and 1 small gunboat were sighted 8 miles EAST of CAPE PALLISER on a course N.N.E.

(v) SOLOMON'S Area -

BUIN FAISI Area 14 Sep. 1035 hrs. Two cruisers, 3 possible cruisers 5 destroyers, 4 cargo and two large vessels, 8 barges and 7 seaplanes were sighted in the area

SOHANA IS. 14 Sep 1115 hrs. One 12,000 ton tpt and 2 destroyers were observed approx 18 miles S.E. of SOHANA IS. on a course E.S.E.

OPERATIONS

(v) SOLOMON'S Area (Contd.)

SANTA YSABEL IS. Area 13 Sep. Allied a/c attacked 4 float planes anchored in REKATA BAY. One was destroyed, 1 damaged and 1 of 2 enemy planes which attempted to intercept is believed to have been shot down. At 0617 hrs on 14 Sep one possible a/c carrier and 2 other ships escorted by Zeros were sighted approx 20 miles NORTH of REKATA BAY.

TULAGI 13 Sep 0200 hrs, was again bombarded by the enemy.

GUADALCANAL Area 12 Sep 2000 hrs. One enemy a/c dropped flares on the landing field. At KILA POINT at 2030 hrs, 1 enemy destroyer shelled the shore for 20 minutes. At 2305 hrs GUADALCANAL was again shelled by 1 enemy cruiser and 4 destroyers for 45 minutes. (See Intell Summary 25). It is believed that 1 enemy ship was hit.

ULAWA IS, (South of MALAITA IS) 13 Sep 1625 hrs. Allied a/c bombed an enemy task force 180 miles N.E. of ULAWA IS, scoring 2 hits and 4 near misses. The indications are that this is the second force mentioned below.

NDENI IS. (SANTA CRUZ) 13 Sep. Indications of a submarine were observed 161 miles N.E. of the island. 14 Sep at 1045 hrs. one .... a/c carrier, 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers were sighted approx 270 miles N.N.E. of the island on a course S.S.E. At 1315 hrs a second force of 3 battleships, 4 destroyers and 1 tpt was seen approx 204 miles N.N.W. of GRACIOSA BAY (NDENI IS) on a Northerly course.

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) Corps Area - See Appx. "A"

PART 5

SECURITY


It has been established that copies of subversive Communist Party literature such as "SPARK", (Official Organ of Q'land State Centre C.P. of Aust) and "FORWARD" (Issued by Communist members of the Australian Armed Forces) are being included in bundles of papers sent to troops by unknown donors. This method of distribution makes it particularly difficult to trace the originators. All Officers are requested to bring to the notice of higher Comd any further cases of similar nature of which they may become aware. The subject matter of these pamphlets is very dangerous in that it deals sympathetically with and offers suggestions for the relief of the pinpricks of Army life in such a way as to bring both Officers and NCOs into disrepute. In addition, the articles ostensibly have the welfare of the troops at heart whereas in fact the underlying sentiment is the desire to obtain recruits in the Army for the Communist Party by lending a sympathetic ear and ventilating so-called grievances.

Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps

Distribution as per Summary No. 5.

GYMPIE

4 m to 1 in



Prepared by GSI – 2 Aust Corps
15 Sep 42

Appx 210

SECRET

Copy No. 122

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.28

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 17 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos.1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TANIMBAR Is. 15 Sep 0715 hrs. Allied A/C attacked one enemy vessel of 1/3,000 tons in SAUMLAKI BAY. As a result of one hit and one near miss the stern was damaged.

TIMOR. An unconfirmed report states that 300 Japs with motor tpt, bicycles and an aeroplane landed at MANATUTO 126°02'E., 8°28' S., during the night of 14/15 Sep and moved in the direction of BOIKAU (126°40' E., 8°40' S).

AMBON 15 Sep 1140 hrs. One large vessel was sighted at the AMBON jetty.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE area. A late report states that our tps successfully raided enemy posns at HEATHS PLANTATION on the night 12/13 Sep and laid booby traps.

BUNA area. 15 Sep 1225 hrs. Allied A/C attacked barges at SANANANDA four mls NW of BUNA and a stores dump at the SE end of BUNA acrodrome. Bombs fell in the area but there were NO hits on the barges.

KOKODA area 15 Sep 0930 hrs. Allied A/C dropped bombs in the EFOGI and MYOLA camp areas, but results were unobserved. Our forces are engaging the enemy astride the IORIBAIWA to NAURO track. Heavy fighting took place on the left flank and NORTH of IORIBAIWA. Patrols report NO enemy along GOLDIE RIVER, but eighty-four Jap coolies were seen on a track in the rear of the enemy fwd. tps. A recce A/C later reported that the track from EFOGI to MANARI appeared well used, but there was NO sign of movement.

MILNE BAY area 13 Sep. A native report stated that two enemy parties, twenty-five and ten strong, were crossing the hills between AHIOMA and AWAIAMA (approx due NORTH of AHIOMA) on the NORTH coast.

GOODENOUGH BAY. A party of Japs was reported at BINARA village on the upper RUARA RIVER. A patrol is investigating.

NORMANBY Is. 11 Sep. A FERGUSON Is native reported that one launch and one barge filled with Japs, many of whom were wounded, landed at KUANAURA on 11 Sep.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN area 15 Sep 1210 hrs. Allied A/C attacked shipping in RABAUL Hr. Low clouds obscured the observation of results, but one large ship was seen burning fiercely. One of the intercepting Zeros was shot down.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

Buin area - Ref Intell Summary No.26, it is now reported that there is much enemy activity at KIHILI and enemy believed to be marines are patrolling the rds for fifteen mls.

GIZO 15 Sep 0920 hrs. Three destroyers were sighted thirty-seven mls WSW of GIZO on a course NE. 1430 hrs. Four light cruisers and three destroyers were seen approx thirty-two mls NE of KOLOMBANGRA Is ten mls NE of GIZO Is on a course ESE.

SANTA CRUZ (NDENI) 14 Sep 1455 hrs. An enemy task force consisting of three battleships, four hy cruisers, nine destroyers and two merchant vessels was last sighted 210 mls NNW of NDENI on a course NE.

QUADALCANAL Is. 13 Sep. At 0930 hrs and 1245 hrs enemy A/C attacked and four bombers and four Zeros were shot down by our A/C. 14 Sep. At 0830 hrs and 1240 hrs enemy A/C attacked the aerodrome at GUADALCANAL and six A/C were shot down. At 1730 hrs enemy seaplanes attacked the Is., but NO details are available. Ground patrols on the Is accounted for at least forty Japs, on 13 Sep.

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(ii) Other areas - BRITISH SOLOMON Is. See Appx "A" with maps of SOLOMON Is and NGGELA District.

[illegible] Capt
Hllaj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.5

Appx "A"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELL SUMMARY No.28

BRIEF TOPOGRAPHICAL NOTES

BRITISH SOLOMON ISLANDS PROTECTORATE

1 GENERAL:

The BRITISH SOLOMON ISLANDS Protectorate embraces the main portion of the SOLOMON ISLANDS Gp SE of the BOUGAINVILLE Straits (BOUGAINVILLE and its surrounding small islands are part of the Mandated Territory of NEW GUINEA). The SOLOMONS comprise the following islands - GUADALCANAL, MALAITA, YSABEL, CHOISEUL, SAN CHRISTOBAL, NEW GEORGIE, RUSSELL ISLANDS and FLORIDA ISLANDS. There are outlying islands LORD HOWE (ONTONG JAVA) STEWART ISLAND (SIKIANA) and RENELL and BELLONA ISLANDS. TheGp extends in a NW SE direction for 930 miles from SHORTLAND Is to FATANKA Is in the SE. The main islands are mostly composed of volcanic rock and limestone, some of them forming magnificent harbours and anchorages. The mountains of GUADALCANAL, the largest island, rise to a height of 8,000'. All the islands are covered with almost impenetrable jungle except where the undergrowth has been cleared. Large areas of grass plains and hills are situated in the NE coast of GUADALCANAL.

2 POPULATION:

The Native population of the main islands is in the vicinity of 95,000 and is of MELANESIAN stock.

3 RESOURCES:

The main export is copra which is grown in large quantities, and vegetable ivory and trochus shell. There are large supplies of timber (incl Kauri pine) suitable for building. Rubber planting was commenced industrially about the end of 1940. Gold mining was carried on in GUADALCANAL.

4 GEOLOGICAL & TOPOGRAPHICAL FORMATION:

The islands run in two parallel chains in a NW SE direction, and are of volcanic limestone formation with outcrops of volcanic quartz, in the hills. The Kavo Range in GUADALCANAL runs the whole length of the island with peaks ranging from 5,000 to 6,000' at the centre and SE end. In the SW corner the hills rise to 7 and 8,000'. Atabout 6,000' the heavy timber and undergrowth disappear although the tops of the mountains are almost continuously enveloped in clouds.

(a) Coastline: The coastline has many bays and indentations and is mostly composed of alternating stretches of rock, sand and outcrops of shingle and coral. Navigation in many places is hindered by reefs and local knowledge is required. GUADALCANAL anchorages are subject to heavy seas according to the direction of the monsoons. The other islands have good harbours and anchorages.

(b) Rivers: Rivers are short and swift-flowing. The mouths of rivers are changed continually according to the amount of rain and the change of the monsoons. Generally, they are shallow and only navigable by small boats and launches.

(c) Soil & Cultivation: On the foreshore, soil is mainly rich sandy volcanic loam which makes excellent gardens. Further back in the foothills it becomes heavy red loam, resembling clay. The natives cultivate all types of native fruits, such as yams, taro, sweet potatoes, bananas, papaws, etc.

(d) Water Supplies: Rain water is always caught and used for consumption by Europeans. Unlimited supplies of fresh drinking water can be obtained anywhere on the foreshore by the sinking of a well to a depth of 12 or 14'. The river water having run for a considerable distance over limestone, is very hard for some purposes, although it is quite good for drinking.

5 CLIMATE:

The climate is NOT extremely hot, but the degree of humidity is particularly high throughout the year. The Islands are situated in the monsoon belt and receive full force of both the SE and NW monsoons, but the rainfall is neither regular nor seasonal. The first impression of of the climate on newcomers is a feeling of energy which usually disappears after a month or so and is replaced by a feeling of exhaustion and fatigue, so that manual work becomes an effort until 6 months or more residence brings about acclimatisation. The yearly average rainfall is about 125". Except in the hills where morning temperature frequently falls below 49°, there is no great variation in temperature, during the monsoonal seasons; the maximum and minimum are practically the same, that is, 92°and 73°respectively for both NW and SE monsoons.

6 DISEASES:

Malaria is prevalent and TB is common amongst the natives. Blackwater fever is NOT so common. A mild form of dysentry is fairly prevalent. Leprosy and Elephantiasis are the most serious diseases suffered by the natives.


7 COMMUNICATIONS:


GUADALCANAL, MALAITA and SAN CHRISTOBEL are encircled by Govt rds which are often merely an enlarged native track. The numerous streams are unbridged. Bush tracks generally connect the principal villages and Govt Stations. Suitable sites exist on the NE coast of GUADALCANAL for aerodromes. Some of the bush tracks are very bad and travel is slow and tedious, especially as the tracks often lead over large areas of bare rock, which can only be traversed by the walker making use of lawyer vines for support. Due to continuous rain and constant dampness, a type of moss covers the ground and this makes travel slow, awkward and often extremely dangerous.

8 PORTS:

TULAGI is the main port with anchorages for vessels of any tonnage and wharfage for vessels up to 200'. GIZO, FAISI, LAE and WILLIAMS are all ports of entry and accessible to vessels up to 7,000 tons and provide unloading and storage facilities for cargo. Throughout the Islands - particularly in MALAITA, ISABEL and NEW GEORGIA there is excellent anchorage in numerous bays and harbours, but no facility for handling and storing cargo. At HANDIA there is a large modern wharf capable of berthing vessels up to 200'.

9 Att see maps of SOLOMONS and NGGELA District.


156°
159° E.
166° E.
Pinepil
GREEN IS.
Nissan
Yekkla
Yovo
KILINAILAU
Jangaire
Yeharnu
Tauu
Nukumanu
C.Henpan
Queen Carola Hr.
BUKA
Zoller Is.
Sohana
Tinputs Hbr.
Tjop
Inus
Numa Numa
C.Mabiri
Kunua
Mt.Balbi
BOUGAINVILLE
C.Moltke
ISLAND
Empress Augusta Bay
Mutupina Pt.
Gazelle Hr.
Moila Pt.
Fauro
Buin
Faisi
SHORTLAND IS.
Magusaiai
Mono
TREASURY IS.
Stirling I.
Sokovovi Pt.
Baga
Wilson Str.
Palaina
Ganongga
Simbo
Gizo
Arundel
Wana Wana
Rendova Hbr.
Rendova
Blanche Chan.
Telipari
Balfour Chan.
Brougham Shoal
Mbulo
Gatukai
RUSSELL ISLANDS
Banika
Pavuvu
(Murray) Buraku
Coughlan Hbr.
Veisali
West Cape
Popau Hbr.
Wanderer Bay
Aowawa Roadstead
Mt. Popomanasiu
Mt. Taruvi
Poole Reef
C.Henslow
Bellona I.
RENNELL I.
Lake Tungano
White Sand Anchorage
Pocklington Reef
Ontong Java
(Lord Howe Is.)
Pelau
Kelia
Leuaniua
Hagupa Pass
Kumara
Kavsiniu Pass
Roncador Reef
(Candelaria)
Australian Mandate
Great Britain
Bougainville Str.
C.Alexander
Choiseul Bay
Nanango
C.Giraud
CHOISEUL I.
Manning Str.
Arnavon Islands
Molakobi
Gagi
Barora
Kia Passage
Gijunabena Group
Bambatana
Lusi
Mundi Mundi
Rob Roy I.
Progna
VELLA LAVELLA
Vella G.Salikana
KOLOMBANGARA
Vella Gulf
Vila Roni
Ramada B.
Austria Sd.
Long I.
Galere
C.Megapode
Estrella Bay
Solanandiro Pt.
Sule
Fara
Mt.Maresco
Allardyce Hr.
Korrigole Hr.
NEW GEORGIA
Roviana Lagoon
Marovo Lagoon
Furona
Tumbuli
San Jorge I.
Thousand Ships B.
Sepi
C.Prieto
Olevuga
Vatilau
Florida I.
Savo
Rulagi
Gavutu
Tulagi
Veranda B.
Pusu
Deep Bay
Mt.Kolovrat
MALAITA
Maramasike Passage
MARAMASIKE
Port Adam
Mappo Harbour
Royalist Hr.
Rua Sura
Kau Kau B.
Aola
GUADALCANAL I.
Kavo Range
Marau Sd.
C.Zelee
Ulawa
Ariel Hbr.
Maru B.
C.Recherche
Olu Malau
(The Three Sisters)
Achard Pt.
Bio
Ugi
Wanoni B.
Yanuta
C.Mahua
Makira B.
Marau
Kira Kira
Fanarite Pt.
Star Harbour
SAN CRISTOBAL
Marunga Hbr.
C.Surville
Santa Ana I.
Santa Catalina I.
STEWART IS.
Sikaiana
Ndai (Gower)
C.Astrolabe
Manaoba
Atta Cove
C.Arsacides
Leili
Uru Diamond
Nonna Kwoi Hbr.
Obelisk Is.
DUFF ISLANDS
Treasurers I.
Taumako
Bass Islands
Nupani
Nalogo
Nukapu
Sandi
Pileni
Nufiloli
SWALLOW ISLANDS
Matema
Fenualoa
Lomlom
Banepi
Nibanga
Tinakula
Graciosa B.
Carlisle B.
Te Motuo
C.Byron
NDENI
(Santa Cruz I.)
Lord Howe I.
C.Boscawen
C.Mendaña
Basilisk Hbr.
Utupua
SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS
VANIKORO
Tevai
Manevai Bay
Peu
0 50 MILES
10°S.
11°
166°E
167°
162°
9°S.
12°
TICOPIA IS. LAT. 12°20'S LONG. 169° E
ANUDA IS. - 11°30'S - 169°40'E
FATAKA IS. - 11°40'S - 170° E
SOLOMON ISLANDS
0 50 100 200
STATUTE MILES


160°00′
10′
20′
9°00′
VATILAU
OLEVUGA
FLORIDA
Ponebusna I.
Barogahi I.
Kanoasna I.
Ngotana I.
Kalasua I.
Sogasara I.
Tinete Pt.
Burgana I. (Mission)
Mandbliana I.
Lagalal
Tanatau Pt.
Vuturua
Saliasa
Bonaroli
Sandfly Passage
District of
NGGELA
British Solomon Islands Protectorate
Scale of Statute Miles
Scale of Nautical Miles

Appx 21

SECRET

Copy No. 122

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.29

Compiled from information [illegible] 0200 hrs 18 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE area 15 Sep 1400 hrs. Ref Intell Summary No.28. The booby traps laid by our tps at MALAHANG on the rd to HEATH'S PLANTATION caught a body of Japs. The enemy immediately opened fire into the bush using small arms and guns. It is NOT known what casualties were suffered by the Japs.

SALAMAUA area 16 Sep 1245 hrs. Two cruisers were sighted approx 128 mls NE of SALAMAUA, course SW presumably destined for this port. 1500 hrs. Allied A/C detailed to attack failed to locate them.

BUNA - KOKODA area 15 Sep 1420 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed twenty-two barges at SANANANDA four mls NW of BUNA. The results are NOT known.

During the day the Japs were exerting hy pressure at all points of contact SOUTH of the OWEN STANLEY Range.

16 Sep. Our patrols attacked the enemy who were digging LMG and Mortar posns on our right flank. The enemy casualties are unknown. 0930 hrs NAURO and EFOGI were bombed and strafed by Allied A/C without observed results.

MILNE BAY area 15 Sep. Native police patrols encountered a small Jap party NORTH of WAGA-WAGA and LILIHOA. Two were killed and the remainder made off in the direction of EAST CAPE.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN 15 Sep. Allied A/C bombed VUNAKANAU aerodrome. Bombs fell on the target area, but the results were NOT observed. 16 Sep 2140 hrs. Allied A/C successfully attacked LAKUNAI and VUNAKANAU; but details of damage have NOT yet been received.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA. Night 15/16 Sep. Allied A/C attacked BUKA aerodrome. Bombs fell on the target area, and fires were started.

BUIN-FAISI area 16 Sep 1020 hrs. The total sightings in this area were five cruisers, twelve destroyers, one tanker, one gunboat, one motor ship and one supply ship.

ONTONG JAVA area 16 Sep 1310 hrs. One cargo vessel and one gunboat were sighted approx 30 mls SW of ONTONG JAVA on a course SW.

NEW GEORGIA area 16 Sep 0900 hrs. Allied A/C attacked three large enemy cruisers and four destroyers approx thirty-eight mls WNW of LANGSDALE Point (NW tip NEW

GEORGIA). One torpedo hit one light cruiser and another light cruiser received one direct hit and two near misses.

SANTA YSABEL Is. 16 Sep. Allied A/C bombed the enemy base at REKATA BAY and fires were started. Light A/A fire was encountered, but NO ships were observed in the hr.

GUADALCANAL. Night 13/14 Sep, a Jap force striking from both flanks and rear attacked our forces. After severe fighting the enemy were repulsed. Night 14/15 Sep. Only a light attack eventuated and mopping up was continued. The enemy dead was estimated to exceed 500.

PART 2

ENEMY:

(iv) Organisation

Ref Intell Summary No.5 of 26 Aug. The composition of the Jap Div task force seems to be as follows :-

Military

1 Division (15,000 men)
1 Battalion Paratps (800-1500)

Naval

1 to 2 A/C carriers
6 Cruisers
10 to 14 Destroyers
12 to 20 Apts
2 to 4 Submarines

Air

Shore Base Gp
F/B - 2 Sqns
Fs - 2 to 3 Sqns
H/Bs- 3 to 4 Sqns
Total 75 to 100 A/C
Carrier borne - 40 to 80 A/C
Total - 115 to 180 A/C.

(iv) Allied Air [illegible]


PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area - See Appx "A".

[illegible]
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Sum


GYMPIE
4-MILES TO 1 INCH
61
76
62
73
B1
C2
C1
C3
A2
A1
B2
Rd in BAD CONDITION
SEALED
METAL OR GRAVEL
SAND OR EARTH
PREPARED BY
G S I
2 AUST CORPS
17 SEP 42

Appx 212

War Diary

S E C R E T

Copy No. 122

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 30.

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 19 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos. 1-15 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 18 Sep. Three hundred JAPS were reported at VIMILALE, 15 miles S.S.W. BOIKAU.

AMBON 15 Sep 1140 hrs. One armed vessel of 9,000 tons and 3 100 ton vessels were sighted in AMBON HR.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE SALAMAUA Area - 15 Sep. The presence of fifty enemy tps and two trucks at HEATHS PLANTATION indicate a patrol in the MARKHAM VALLEY. One of our patrols successfully penetrated the WAIM district EAST OF LAE. It reported that the natives NORTH and N.E. of LAE are NOT co-operating with the enemy but are afraid to assist us in view of JAP strafing. NO JAPS were at MALAHANG and the aerodrome was NOT in use. NAZI literature was found at BOANA MISSION, 25 miles N.W. of LAE and the aerodrome was not obstructed. It is reported that some villages SOUTH of the BUSO RIVER are being administered by the JAPS. 17 Sep. One probable enemy submarine was sighted at the NORTH of LABU LAKE.

BUNA KOKODA MORESBY Area - 17 Sep. 0955 hrs. Allied a/c attacked 30 enemy barges at SANANANDA, 4 miles N.W. of BUNA. Half of the barges were destroyed, large fires were started and fuel dumps were left burning. 1235 hrs. Our forces contacted the enemy SOUTH of IORIBAIWA and inflicted approx 40 casualties. 1905 hrs. Enemy a/c bombed SEVEN MILE Aerodrome, but there was NO damage done.

MILNE BAY 15 Sep. A JAP OFFR was killed at K.B. MISSION. Parties of enemy troops were reported to be heading in the direction of BUNA. They were passing N.W. of WAWAWAMANA, 1 mile West of TAUPOTA (on the coast due NORTH of RABI) to by pass TAUPOTA. Our patrols in the vicinity of WEDAU engaged 16 enemy tps operating in parties and killed 4. The others scattered EAST and SOUTH.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

17 Sep 0405 hrs Allied a/c bombed LAKUNAI aerodrome. Bombs fell in the target area, three explosions were heard and two large fires were left burning. A very large unidentified vessel was sighted anchored 40 miles N.E. of GASMATA.

OPERATIONS (Contd.)

(v) SOLOMONS Area

BUIN 17 Sep. The enemy are erecting 6 iron buildings in the vicinity of KIHILI. A cleared strip 750 yards long running NORTH and SOUTH was observed EAST of BUIN. All the cleared land is inland from KESSA PLANTATION. There was NO noticeable change in the composition of shipping in the BUIN FAISI Area from that reported in Intell Summary No. 28.

GIZO 0800 hrs. Four cruisers, 16 other vessels incl destroyers, cargo vessels and tpts and ten F/Bs were sighted in the Hr and BIACKETT STRAIT, EAST of GIZO.

NEW GEORGIA 17 Sep 1650 hrs. Two light cruisers were sighted approx 14 miles E.N.E. of MAROUA LAGOON.

(vi) GENERAL

FIJI IS. 17 Sep 0733 hrs. One heavy, two light cruisers were sighted approx 248 miles N.W. of SUVA on a course E.S.E.

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) Camps Area - See Appx "A"

PART 5

SECURITY

INFORMATION: The need for scrupulous attention to minor details of security is emphasised by the observations of an intelligence officer who recently completed a trip along the east Queensland coast. Included in his report was the following:-

"I feel it my duty to comment on the method of advertising the movement of troops which I have consistently noted throughout the full route of my tour. That is the practice of individual troops recording their name, number, rank and unit on the walls of buildings and outhouses, particularly hotel outhouses.

It is quite an easy matter to trace the movements of various troops along this road by the consistent repetition of certain names, numbers, units etc. Unfortunately, the writers are not only rank and file; many officers and in particular certain medical officers' names have been autographed on the walls and various show cards, menus etc along the road.

While it may be the desire of certain rank and file to find their own level per medium of lavatory advertising, it is somewhat surprising to me to note various officers adopting this practice, although on a higher plane than lavatory walls".

SECURITY

INFORMATION: (Contd.)

This report gives a timely reminder that troops must be urged to break this autograph habit before they leave Australia for active operations. German soldiers when following withdrawing Australian troops several times made lists of the names of our soldiers that they found scribbled on walls etc. When they identified the units of the men whose autographs they possessed opposite them in the line, they called to these men by name during night patrols with the object of deceiving outposts or sentries and causing them to withold an alarm. This subterfuge will almost certainly be adopted by the Japs if they are given the chance.

PART 6

CENSORSHIP

The fact that franking officers are still failing in their duties has again been revealed by a review of mail posted at--- by personnel of an Inf Bde during a four-day period.


Although all letters had been franked, and censored within units, a large proportion when examined by a Field Censorship Section was found still to contain censorable matter and 36% of the mail contained information of projected movements.

The most serious aspect however, lies in the fact that the worst offenders were officers who franked their own mail. It is pointed out that officers frank their own mail as a privilege and it must be regarded as such. This privilege if abused may be withdrawn from any officer for any stated period of time.

The nature of censorable matter contained in unit censored mail indicated that many letters had NOT been read by franking officers.

[signature]
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 5.


GYMPIE (STRAT)
58
68
ROUGH & STEEP
VERY SLIPPERY
BAD
SEALED
METAL OR GRAVEL
SAND OR EARTH
PREPARED BY
G S I
2 AUST CORPS
18 SEP 42

Appx 23

G 1246

SD INSTN NO 19

By order of the GOC, SD Instns Nos 1-18 are hereby cancelled and the following orders issued to be read in conjunction with HQ 2 Aust Corps Standing Orders for War (Amended).

1 OFFICE HOURS

(a) Work commences at Corps HQ at 0830 hrs daily, by which time all Offrs and Office Staff will be on duty in their Offices.

(b) All Offices, desks, tables etc are to be cleaned and tidied by Orderlies or clerks of the Branch concerned.

2 OPERATION OF G AND AQ REGISTRIES - Ref SOs for War, Section 4.

(a) All files kept by "G" Branch will be prefixed by the letter "G". "AQ" files will be prefixed by the letters "AQ".

(b) Registry Staff, G Organisation - SOs for War, page 16

Every clerk should be thoroughly conversant with all the functions of the Registry and must be interchangeable. During slack periods, clerks likely to be required to act as Duty Clerks should be instructed in the work. This will allow for continuity of work in case of casualties, sickness or absence on duty.

(c) System of Registration

Incoming correspondence is booked in an alphabetical log book in which is shown; Memo no; from whom; date, subject, short precis and file no. The memo is then placed in the appropriate file and entered on the minute sheet pasted on the front of the file. Each successive memo is given the next successive number. All incoming memos with previous references are placed on the same file as the refsrences.

Outward Correspondence

All outward correspondence is handed to the chief clerk and then to the S/Sgt i/c Registry for the checking of any errors or omissions. It is then passed to the registry clerks where they stamp the file and roneo copy with the file number. The despatch clerk then receives the correspondence and gives it the originator's number prefixed with a "G". The file copy is then entered in the outwards correspondence book and placed on the appropriate file. The outward correspondence book is kept in strict numerical order with the headings as follows :-

To Whom, date despatched, subject, file no.

The roneo copy is placed in a folder in numerical order.

3 CORRESPONDENCE

The GOC-in-C, First Aust Army, directs that official correspondence forwarded to that HQ will bear the signature of the GOC or in his absence Senior SO. Such important documents as recommendations for commission or promotion of Offrs will be signed by the GOC only.

4 SUBJECT MATTER FOR SD INSTNS

(a) Closing times at G (SD) are as follows :-

1200 hrs Monday and Thursday

(b) Drafts should be logically arranged, neatly typed in double spacing, correctly paragraphed, numbered, lettered and signed without amendment.

(c) It is most important that the above be complied with, and the co-operation and assistance of all Branches is sought.

(d) The subject matter will be forwarded by the Staff concerned and not direct by Reps of Services. The submission from AQ will be signed by DA & QMG or his deputy.

5 ISSUE OF ROs

(a) In order to reduce the amount of paper that is written and to ensure a wider circulation of orders and other informative matter, the maximum use is to be made of Corps ROs. It must be accepted as a principle that anything that is not really urgent, security or secret, and has general application should appear in ROs.

(b) ROs are issued by A Branch and the subject matter for inclusion in ROs will be forwarded through the proper branch of the staff to reach A Branch by 1000 hrs each Sunday.

6 DUPLICATING

(a) War Sheets will NOT be used by General Staff for reproducing correspondence when less than 100 copies are required.

(b) Work will be done on the Ditto Machine to comply with the above.

7 TELEGRAMS AND MESSAGES.

(a) Attention is drawn to the correct procedure in multiple addressed telegrams and messages as shown in MTP 23 Part III.

(b) The necessity of repeating messages to other Branches of the Staff and Services requires the earnest attention of all in order to ensure co-operation and co-ordination.

(c) The practice of typing the names of addresses, other than code names, in blocks will cease.

8 WAR DIARIES

War Diaries will be kept in duplicate by "G" and "AQ" Branches as laid down in FSPB Pam II Sec 5.

9 ORDERLY OFFICER.

An orderly offr will be detailed for each Branch of the Staff, and he will be responsible for the normal duties of orderly officers. Offrs of the att Arms and Services may be included in this duty. Duty Rosters will be passed between Branches for the information of the Branches concerned.

Duties

(a) The Orderly Officer will mount duty at 1700 hrs daily - tour of duty 24 hrs.

(b) Thoroughly inspect the area of the camp for which he is responsible, paying particular attention to cleanliness of messes, sleeping quarters, etc.

(c) Inspect mens meals; attend the morning parade of his respective company.

(d) Keep "G" and "AQ" Duty clerk informed of his 'phone number so that he can be contacted day and night.

(e) Inspect each Office to see that adequate measures and precautions have been taken for the protection and custody of documents.

(f) Inspect and test security guards by night at least once after 2300 hrs.

(g) He will be accompanied by the Orderly NCO.

(h) Check the black-out of Offices and Sleeping quarters.

(i) Submit written report to G 3 (SD) and DA & QMG respectively, immediately on dismounting.

10 DUTY OFFR - REF SOs FOR WAR - SEC 13.

(a) Ref SOs for War Sec 13, para 3 (c) - Duty Offr and personnel will be detailed in accordance with this order, with the exception that under present circumstances personnel do not have to remain awake all night.

(b) The Staffs of att Arms and Services are available for this duty.

(c) Tour of duty - 1700 hrs to 0900 hrs
1300 hrs to 1400 hrs

(d) The Duty Offr will be relieved for all meals by next on duty.

11 STATE OF READINESS

(a) At this stage of the war, it must be accepted that the Corps HQ will function immediately in the case of emergency. With this object in view, there must be in each branch of the Staff and att Arms and Services, either an Offr, Clerk or Orderly on duty near a telephone throughout the 24 hrs of the day.

(b) During the night, unless otherwise ordered, those on duty may sleep, but there must be an orderly available at all times who knows the whereabouts of all personnel to warn them for duty in case of alarm.

12 SECURITY

(a) A Security Offr will be appointed by each Branch. This Offr will be responsible for security matters in Offices of his Branch. He will make inspections after Office hrs, and report any breaches of security to the senior Offr of his Branch.

(b) Senior Offr or NCO of any Mess will be responsible for checking on behaving under notice any careless talk in messes

-4-

13 DEF PL

(a) The Def Pl will be trained and will operate under the direction of [illegible] (Ops).

(b) Will be responsible for ground and AA def of the area and for guarding the various buildings at which they are posted.

(c) Emp Sec is administered by and is available to camp for gen duties.

14. GUARDING OF TPT

The tpt lines are to be in a state of defence by day and by night.

15 USE OF MT

(a) The GOC desires it to be brought to the notice of all concerned that, despite his previous instructions, economy in the use of MT is not being observed.

No tpt will leave H.Q. 1 Aust Corps Tpt lines without the authority of DAQMG (Movement).

Requisitions for tpt will be submitted to DAQMG (Movement) and will state:-

Nature of Duty
No of personnel
Duration of use and estimated mileage.

The NCO is authorised to refuse all other requests for tpt unless signed by the proper authority noted above.

This instn applies to all Offrs and ORs of HQ with the exception of Brigs and above who may issue their own instns regarding cars allotted them.

16 PARKING OF MT

(a) All Motor Vehs, with the exception of Offrs of the rank of Brigadier and above, will be kept in Corps HQ Tpt lines.

(b) All Drs, with the exception of the GOC's, BGS', DAQMG's, CCRA's, CE's, and DDMS', will live and mess in the tpt lines.

17 THE RELATION BETWEEN TECH ADVISERS AND HQS OF SERVICES [illegible] COMD AND STAFF AND [illegible]

The following points are issued for guidance:-

(a) A Comd [illegible] through his subordinates and he is assisted [illegible] the Staff and Tech Advisers and [illegible], it should, however, be clearly understood that all orders and instructions are issued [illegible] of the Comd, [illegible] by his Staff, and that Tech Advisers or Heads of Services [illegible] directions [illegible] have troops [illegible] Heads of Services [illegible] with subordinates or [illegible], only on purely technical or financial matters concerning their particular service.

(b) In view of the above, the practice by Reps of Services of issuing instructions, which are not of technical or financial nature, direct to the formations is to cease and all such directions will be signed by the appropriate Branch of the Staff.

(c) Unless it is carefully watched there is a tendency for Tech Advisors and Reps of Services to short circuit subordinate Cmds. In many cases this action is taken "to get things done". This may be so, but in the long run it leads to confusion, counter orders, and division of responsibility.

18 [illegible] OFFICERS.

(a) It is necessary that CSO's be grouped together and work as a team. In order that this can be done, rest days are to be regulated accordingly and the CO will be grouped for rest as under:-

GROUP 1.	GROUP 2.
C 2 (O)	C 1 (O)
C 3 (SD)	C 2 (SD)
C 3 (I)	C 2 (I)
A C 1	1 LO
1 LO	C 3 SL

(b) One of the Ops will always be on duty during the day and there must never be less than three Offrs, two of whom are CSOs available for ops during the night.

(c) A similar grouping will be made for A/ staff.

19 LEAVE GENERAL

(a) It has been the practice for certain personnel who are not on duty, to leave the rest area and move out of the Corps Tk area without pass or check. This practice is to cease. There is a recognised system of rest and leave and this is to be insisted upon.

(b) All Branches of the Staff and Services must be ready with their clerks and orderlies for immediate action day or night. This requires a properly controlled system of rest, recreation and reliefs throughout all Offices of the Staffs and Services.

20 TNG HQ PERSONNEL

(a) During periods of intensive tng for Corps Tk personnel rest days will be granted only at week-ends.

(b) Officers will arrange that rest days for batmen are granted only at week-ends.

21 FORMATION OF COYS

(a) For the purpose of Bde and CO's parades, Tk & Asst Corps will be divided into three Coys - C, Aq and [illegible] Camp.

(b) Coy areas are as follows:-

"C" Coy - "C" Area,
A & B Mess Areas.

"A" Coy - A Area
C Mess Area

"Camp Coy - Camp Area
Main Area

(c) Senior WO or SGT in Coy will act as CSM and will be responsible to Coy Comd for forming up of Coy on parade and for the general cleanliness of the coy area. [NOTE: Camp Comdt is responsible for all other Adm matters - vide Eq 2 Aust Corps SOs for War Sec 2 Para 1(a) and 1(b) and para 6(a) and 6(b).]

(d) Tng syllabi will be arranged by General Staff.

(e) Coy Comds are to be appointed as follows -

A Coy by General Staff.
B Coy by AQ, and
Camp Coy by Camp.

22 SALUTING.

The GOC 2 Aust Corps views with grave concern the lack of interest shown by Officers in the above order. It is considered that Officers should set an example and should see that saluting is carried out by all ranks. Officers should be particularly careful and ensure that all salutes from other Officers or soldiers are correctly acknowledged. It should be noted that saluting by Officers and ORs should be carried out at all times when on duty or on leave. It is one of the outward and visible signs of a well-trained Officer or soldier.

23 MOVEMENT OF OFFRS - Ref SOs for [illegible] SECTION 15.

(a) In the Battle Room an up-to-date posting list will be kept showing the appointment of Offrs and ORs in the order as shown in the AE.

(b) A Movement Board will be kept in the Battle Room. All Offrs leaving camp on duty or on leave will enter upon the Movement Board their destination and time and date of return. Those Offrs whose appointment does not appear on the Movement Board will notify details to next Offr of the Branch when they are leaving camp.

(c) Attention is invited to Corps Hq SOs for War Section 15 para 4. This includes offrs att to Corps Hq.

24 ARM BANDS

When visiting Formations, Bdes and Units on duty, Staff Officers of Hq 2 Aust Corps will wear Red-White-Red Arm Bands, bearing appropriate distinctions showing the Branch, Arm or Service to which they belong. The wearing of Arm Bands with distinctions will be in accordance with SOs for dress 1939, para 220.

25. REVOLVERS.

Revolvers are to be worn by all Offrs when leaving HQ to visit Formations etc.

26 ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER.

(a) All ranks are warned that the Camp Electric Supply is **240 volts and is dangerous. No alterations or extensions of authorised supply lines or fittings will be permitted.** Request for any additional lines or fittings will be made to the CE's Branch.

(b) No radiators will be connected to the supply either by power point or light socket. No irons will be connected to the supply other than to power plugs installed in AWAS Mess and in special ironing tents located adjacent to the Sig Area.

(c) Camp will arrange for use of irons and tables in the ironing tent. The utmost economy is to be exercised in the use of electric lighting and appliances, and restrictions will be placed upon offending users.

27 USE OF THE TELEPHONE

(a) A large number of unduly long telephone calls are being made by Offrs of Hq 2 Aust Corps. This is to cease forthwith and where possible, message form will be used. The normal time for telephone calls is 5 minutes, and in future, except for urgent matters, this time will not be exceeded.

(b) Some Offrs who are not authorised to do so have been ordering priority telephone calls, only those Offrs authorised in Hq 2 Aust Corps SOs for War, page 8, to frank immediate messages will in future make priority calls.

28 INTERVIEWS WITH GOC

In order that the GOC may be kept informed of matters that concern him and that working staffs in offices can proceed on a programme, the GOC will normally be available for interview by the following officers, in connection with their duties, at Hq 2 Aust Corps at the times stated below:-

Offrs.	Mon & Thur
BGS	1100 hrs
DA & QMG	1400 hrs
Reps of a&t Arms and Services	1600 hrs

29 OFFICERS TRAINING PARADE.

Officers selected for special tng will attend one half day parade weekly. This parade will be held in the A Mess Area at 1400 hrs each Wednesday, commencing 23 Sep.

30 TRAINING PARADE - OR's.

At the conclusion of the present syllabus on 30 Sep the present daily tng parades will be discontinued for the time being, and for three weeks thereafter all ranks will work and be trained in their appointments.

At the conclusion of this three week period all ranks of G, AQ and Camp Coys will commence tng in minor tactics.

31 GOC's PARADE.

(a) All officers and ORs will attend GOC's parades when ordered with the following exceptions

One Duty Officer (of the rank of major or above) in each G and AQ Branches, but not in the Arms and Services.

The minimum number of personnel to carry on the routine duties will also remain in their offices

Cooks, (all other Mess personnel will attend parade)

(b) The following times for GOC's parades are laid down unless otherwise specifically ordered:

0930	Pl Parade.
0940	Coy Parade
0950	Offrs formed up ready for posting
1300	Bn parade.

(c) Camp Comdt is responsible for forming up parade. He will hand over to Senior Officer when offrs are posted.

32 BATMEN

The duties of batmen are as set out below:-

(a) Attend Officer to whom they are allotted.

(b) Responsible for cleanliness of Areas adjacent to Offrs tent and the tent in which they live.

(c) Available, when necessary, for Mess duties in the Mess to which their Officer belongs.

NOTES:

(a) Batmen are not available to Camp for Gen duties, but will be tkd as two pls for the def of the HQ, in conjunction with Def Pl.

(b) Batmen may be used for Guard Duties when personnel of def pl are not available.

Lt-Col,
O2 (SD), 2 Aust Corps.

Issued 16 Sep 42.

Distribution.

GOC	CSO	
BGS	DDST	
G (O)	DDGT	
G (I)	DDMS	
DA & QMG	ADM	
A	Coy	
	Camp	(1)
CCRA	File	(1)
CE	War Diary	(2)

Appx 214

S E C R E T

Copy No. 129

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 31

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 20 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1.

OPERATIONS

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR Area 18 Sep. Eighty JAPS passed through OSSU (15 Miles N.N.W. of BEACO) on 17 Sep, en route for VIQUEQUE (9 mls NW of BEACO) and BEACO on the SOUTH Coast of PORTUGESE TIMOR. Ten JAPS were killed by the DUTCH in the OSSU Area. Sixty of the enemy were at VENILALE (15 mls S.S.W BOIKAU). The JAPS also occupied VILA DE MANATUTO (apprcx 30 mls along the coast EAST of DILLI), BOIKA (126° 40' E 8°40'S), LEGA (apprcx 10 mls SOUTH of BOIKA) and VIQUEQUE. Parties of Japanese are stirring up the natives in these areas.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE-SALAMAUA Area 17 Sep 2330 hrs. LAE aerodrome was bombed and strafed by Allied a/c 18 Sep 0033 hrs; the ISTHMUS at SALAMAUA was bombed and strafed. Bombs fell on the target area and fires were started.

BUNA-KOKODA-MORESBY Area 17 Sep. Our tps made light contact with the JAP advance patrols at the foot of the ridge SOUTH of IORIBAIWA. It is estimated that the enemy suffered fifty casualties during the day. 18 Sep, Allied a/c attacked huts and a pack horse train on the BUNA-KOKODA Road. A bridge was seen to be half completed on the WEST side of the WAIROPE. Fifty enemy and a supply dump were observed between WAIROPE and KENDATA (5 mls N.E. WAIROPE).

MILNE BAY Area 16 Sep. One of our patrols contacted the enemy at TAUPOTA and 3 Japs were killed. 17 Sep large food supplies were salvaged at AHIOMA. It is reported that seventy Japs are living in a village situated on the NORTHERN side of NORMANBY ISLAND.

NORMANBY IS. 18 Sep 1010 hrs. Several groups of canoes were observed approximately one mile apart near KWANAURA.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN 17 Sep 2005 hrs. Allied a/c attacked LAKUNAI aerodrome. 18 Sep 0330 hrs, bombs were dropped in the vicinity of VULCAN CRATER.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

GIZO 17 Sep 1010 hrs. No enemy shipping was sighted by Allied a/c in this area.

GUADALCANAL 18 Sep 2315 hrs. At least four unidentified vessels shelled GUADALCANAL. There are NO details as yet to hand.

PART 2.

ENEMY

(vii) Tactics After having disembarked the tps, the JAP H.L.C. wait for some time at the landing place, ready to re-embark the personnel if the attack is turned against them at certain points, where the landing could be successfuñ if it had quick and powerful help to follow up the initial advantage. (AHQ Notes on Jap methods of disembarkation.)

(xiv) General The independent mobility of the Japanese is greatly assisted by the fact that each man carrics one day's iron rations, and five days' rice supply for his own cooking, so there is no waiting about for a hot meal to be brought up. Generally the cooking is done by the Section co-operatively. In any lull, guards are posted and a fire made. NO special cooking stove or apparatus is carried. Often a fire is made only once a day, in the morning, when enough is cooked to last for the day. Naturally the soldiers live on the country to a considerable extent. (AHQ 162).

PART 3.

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) Corps Area - See Appx "A".

W. E. Potts Capt
for Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.


Distribution as per Summary No. 5.

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 31.

Appx "A"

GYMPIE

4 MILES TO 1 INCH



SEALED ————

METAL OR GRAVEL — — — —

EARTH OR SAND .....

PREPARED BY
G S I
2 AUST. CORPS
13 SEP 42.

Appx 215

SECRET

Copy No. 122

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.32

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 21 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos.1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE-SALAMAUA 17 Sep. The enemy were in force at MUBO and were patrolling fwd to QUADAGASAL, three mls SOUTH of MUBO, and to WAIPAL, four mls SW of MUBO. 19 Sep. 0810 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed LAE aerodrome. Bombs fell on the runway. A new landing strip, under construction was reported at PAIAWA, between SALAMAUA and the WARIA River.

BUNA-KOKODA 19 Sep. 0720 hrs. Allied A/C strafed theland-ing strip and huts at BUNA and the BUNA to KOKODA track. One A/A gun was silenced and one enemy fighter and a poss-ible dump were left burning. Our patrols were active SOUTH of IORIBAIWA harassing enemy fwd posns.

MORESBY 19 Sep. 1800 hrs. Enemy A/C bombed HOMBROM BLUFF, but NO damage was done.

MILNE BAY 18 Sep. 10 Japs were observed mcving in the AHIOMA, WAGA WAGA area. 19 Sep. A whaler which was believed to be carrying enemy escaping from GOODENOUGH BAY was strafed and it is considered all the occupants were killed.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN 19 Sep. 1540 hrs. A 1/2,000-ton enemy tpt was bombed and strafed off the WEST coast of UMBOI Is, and there were two near misses.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA. Night 18/19 Sep. A preliminary report states that the aerodrome was successfully attacked by Allied A/C. 19 Sep. 0905 hrs. One destroyer and one medium tpt were sighted approx 73 mls SW of BUKA PASSAGE on a course SE.

BUIN FAISI area. 19 Sep. The minimum sightings were three hy and one light cruiser, eighteen destrcyers, one seaplane tender, four supply ships and one tanker.

NDENI Is. (SANTA CRUZ) 19 Sep. 1145 hrs. Two destroy-ers were sighted approx 300 mls NW of NDENI Is, on a course SSE.

PART 2

ENEMY:

(vii) Tactics -

Aerodrome Demolition in the Far East.

The following verbatim report from the Far East is felt

to be most timely and worthy of recognition by all forces :-

"One of the features of Japanese offensive strategy, a great and, sometimes apparently, decisive factor in the success of her combined operations, has been ability in rendering serviceable at great speed aerodromes and landing grounds which had previously been demolished. This is in addition to the rapidity with which she has been able to effect repairs to runways or landing fields after bombing attacks.

A study of reports dated both during and after the fall of MALAYA on 14 Feb, which are still coming to hand, reveals that in the majority of instances constructional squads had aerodromes which had been 'blown up' fully operational again within a week. In no case was a fortnight exceeded and it is noteworthy that most of the aerodromes brought into use again were fully defended by new A/A btys.

To maintain the impetus of their advance down the peninsula, it was necessary for the Japanese to use large numbers of A/C based on aerodromes very near the fighting. This they were able to do principally because of weak air opposition which was rendered progressively weaker by their constant bombing of those bases still in British hands. It is significant that in the pursuit of their tactics those aerodromes which they had repaired so rapidly were made to accommodate at least double the number of A/C for which they had been designed. This policy has been again successfully employed in NEW GUINEA and BURMA.

Whether this speedy reconstruction is done exclusively by the Japanese forces themselves, by impressed native labour working under their direction, or by a combination of both methods is NOT yet known, but it is evident that the means employed give the maximum results and should be taken into account in calculations affecting aerodromes/as 'destroyed' prior to enemy occupation. reported

(HQ Allied Air Forces Intell Summary 34)

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:


(i) Corps Area - See Appx "A".

W. E. Potts Capt.
for Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.5.

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.32

Appx "A"



Appx 216

S E C R E T

Copy No. 122

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 33

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 22 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries received to 0800 hrs 22 Sep 42

PART 1.

OPERATIONS

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE-SALAMAUA 19 Sep. It was reported that pro-Jap natives were building a new village on the SOUTH bank of the MARKHAM RIVER opposite HEATHS PLANTATION.

LAE 1240 hrs. Allied a/c strafed and left burning one tug and four barges.

BUNA-KOKODA 20 Sep 0715 hrs. Allied a/c bombed and strafed the BUNA-KOKODA track. An explosion was caused at SANGARA PLANTATIONS (about 20 mls N.E. of WAIROPE) fires were started at AREHE near SANGARA PLANTATIONS and a possible dump left burning at KAGI (3 mls N.N.E. of EFOGI). A supply train was observed at EOONDETTA (about ten mls N.E of WAIROPE) +A new track SOUTH of the track WAIROPE to KOKODA was seen in the vicinity of BAINDEMBARI (4 mls S.E. of KOKODA)

IORIBAIWA 20 Sep Patrol activity has increased in the area SOUTH of IORIBAIWA. It is estimated that 200 Japs have been killed since 16 Sep. Native carriers deserting from the Japs state that the enemy are short of rations and are using the natives to find food.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

NEW GEORGIA 20 Sep 1345 hrs. One light cruiser and three destroyers were sighted thirty three mls N.W of LANSDALE POINT (N.W. tip of NEW GEORGIA) on a course E.S.E.

NDENI IS. (SANTA CRUZ) 19 Sep. An unidentified submarine was sighted approx 181 mls N.N.W of NDENI IS. on a course S.E. 20 Sep 1035 hrs. One destroyer and one possible seaplane carrier escorted by two F/Fs were seen approx 375 mls N.N.E of NDENI IS, course EAST. 1345 hrs. Two destroyers were seen approx 210 mls NORTH of NDENI IS. on a course N.W.

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) Corps Area - See Appx "A"

+ Read - A new wide track.

PART 4

TIMES - G.M.T.

OTHER FRONTS

(iii) RUSSIAN FRONT

NORTHERN and CENTRAL Sector. The Russians continued to attack SOUTH of LAKE LADOGA on the LENINGRAD FRONT and in the RZHEV area.

DON and STALINGRAD Sector. The GERMAN bridgehead over the DON N.E. of KLIETSKAYA was extended Eastward. The ring round STALINGRAD was narrowed on the NORTH side and the enemy reached the VOLGA on the SOUTH, thus encircling the city on the land side. The RUSSIANS are resisting and counter-attacking vigorously.

CAUCASUS Sector. GERMAN detachments about seventy five mls WEST of ASTRAKHAN were attacked by the RUSSIANS. Counter attacks on the NORTH bank of the TEREK RIVER about twenty mls N.N.W. of GROZNI drove the GERMANS back. Despite stubborn resistance the GERMANS, SOUTH of the TEREK, succeeded in linking the MOZDOK bridgehead with others to the WEST. RUSSIAN attacks on GERMAN posns in passes of the WESTERN CAUCASES, SUKHUM and TUAPSE areas forced some enemy withdrawal NORTH of SUKHUM. NOVOROSSIK has been captured by the GERMANS.

GENERAL:

The main GERMAN effort is still against STALINGRAD. The capture of NOVOROSSIK should alleviate GERMAN maintenance problems if that port can still be used.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA.

A/c and submarine attacks on enemy shipping were continued. Six or seven merchant ships were hit and heavily damaged, if NOT sunk. Naval a/c torpedoed a ship which was later seen beached off the CALABRIAN Coast. A LITTORIO Class battleship left dry dock and is now presumed to be effective.

SEA - GENERAL

U-Boat WARFARE. An enemy submarine is now operating off the GOLD and IVORY coasts. It is possible that these operations will extend SOUTH towards the mouth of the CONGO in the near future. During the week ending 10 Sep, BRITISH forces reported the presence of one surface craft and seven a/c in the vicinity indicating possible attacks.

SHIPPING

Fourteen homeward convoys totalling 367 ships arrived without loss. Sixteen outward convoys totalling 418 ships reached their destinations without loss. Out of three homeward convoys totalling 170 ships, seventeen were lost; and of two outward convoys totalling seventy six ships, seven were lost.

BRITISH and ALLIED SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

During the past three years the following ships have been sunk or damaged: -

	SUNK	DAMAGED
Surface warships : : : :	26	31
U-Boats : : : : :	30	
Troop and supply ships : : :	301	43

AIR ACTIVITY

6 Sep. During the day bombers escorted by fighters attacked BOULOGNE.

6 Sep. USA Fortresses with Fighter escort attacked an aircraft factory near ALBERT

Night 6/7 Sep. Over 200 bombers raided FRANKFURT and the RHINELAND. Visibility was NOT good and there was NO great concentration.

7 and 8 Sep. Attacks were made on WEST GERMANY.

7 Sep. Fortresses attacked shipyards at ROTTERDAM and Rly yards at UTRECHT, and 17 GERMAN fighters were shot down and many others damaged.


8 Sep. Le HAVRE and CHERBOURG were attacked.

Night 10/11 Sep. Five hundred bombers heavily attacked DUSSELDORF. Photos show great damage was done, but NO detailed assessment has yet been made. (World Revsit week ending 14 Sep)

W. E. Potts Capt
for Maj,
GS 2 AUST CORPS.

Distribution as per Summary No. 5.

Appx "A"


GYMPIE
4 MILES TO 1 INCH
BAD IN WET
B1
B1 (AW)
C2
STEEP
HILLY
C3
C1(C2)
A2
A1
A2 (B1)
71
C2 SANDY
5 6
SEALED
METAL OR GRAVEL
SAND OR EARTH
PREPARED BY
GSI - 2 AUST CORPS
21 SEP 42

Appx 217

SECRET

Copy No. 122

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.34

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 23 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos.1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

MORESBY area 21 Sep 1209 hrs. RORONA aerodrome (fifteen mls EAST of MORESBY) was bombed by twenty-four to thirty enemy bombers escorted by ten Zeros. NO damage or casualties resulted.

BUNA - KOKODA 21 Sep 0920 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and damaged a bridge at WAIROPE and strafed huts on the BUNA-KOKODA track. Small well-camouflaged bridges were observed and the track was much improved. Our posns were consolidated at IMITA RANGE (SW of IORABAIWA). It is estimated that one enemy bn occupies the ridge WEST of IORABAIWA.

MILNE BAY 19 Sep. Enemy parties were reported inland of TOPURA 10 mls NW of TAUPOTA.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

NEW BRITAIN 21 Sep 1045 hrs. One 6,000-ton vessel was sighted twenty-two mls NW of CAPE TAWUI (GAZELLE Peninsula) on an Easterly course.
1053 hrs. One destroyer was seen six mls NE of CAPE TAWUI course SE.
1100 hrs twelve to fourteen unidentified vessels were seen at the NORTH end of SIMPSON'S Hr. (RABAUL).

(v) SOLOMON'S area -

BUKA PASSAGE 21 Sep 0100 hrs. Allied A/C bombed the aerodrome at BUKA and bombs fell in the target area.
0900 hrs one destroyer was seen approx one hundred mls NNE of BUKA PASSAGE on a course NW.

SAN CRISTOVAL 20 Sep 0515 hrs. A submarine was sighted approx forty-five mls ENE of CAPE SURVILLE (EAST tip of SAN CRISTOVAL) course SE.

ONTONG JAVA. 21 Sep 0955 hrs. Two cruisers were sighted approx 140 mls NNE of ONTONG JAVA.

PART 2

ENEMY:

(vii) Tactics:

See Appx "B"

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area - See Appx "A"

PART 5

SECURITY:

Information: Further Security lessons that can be applied with advantage to future tp movements were learned during a recent move of a division.

Date and time of the move were effectively kept from all tps by two rehearsal "exercise" moves. On the day of the actual move tps were led to believe that another "exercise" move was about to be undertaken. A check of inhabitants and tradespeople in an adjoining large country town revealed that this subterfuge had been successful among them too. Though they believed the division was about to move, the departure of the tps took them by surprise. They had NO knowledge of the distination. Civilians along the route of the rd convoy were NOT aware of the destination of the division though many recognised units as those that had passed in the opposite direction many weeks before by the soldiers' color patches and vehicle markings. Necessity for choosing advance guard personnel with the utmost care was shown at the destination of the division. One member of the advance party told a publican that a large body of soldiers was coming to the district.

As the outcome of disciplinary action against tps who posted letters while a previous move was being made, only one soldier was detected trying to induce civilians to post a letter for him during the move under review.

Incomplete destruction of official documents by fire was noted at division and two Bde HQs. One Bn left a large quantity of documents behind. The rear party neglected to destroy these, and they were later found littered about a camp area.

(HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intell Summary 20)

PART 6

CENSORSHIP:

As the result of disciplinary action against offenders, the majority of tps who continue to post mail through civilian channels are adopting methods to hide their identity.

This is strongly evidenced by the fact that of 377 letters posted by tps in civil boxes in one area last week, 290 gave NO indication of the writers' addresses, and were merely signed by a christian name or nick-name.

Contents of the letters left NO doubt that the writers were soldiers.

The possibility of partial breakdown of unit censorship by this means should be borne in mind by Offrs who must take corrective steps by means of Security talks etc. to the men under their command.

(HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intell Summary 20)


W. E. Watt Capt for Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.5

Appx "A"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 34

IPSWICH



SEALED	PREPARED BY
METAL OR GRAVEL	G.S.I
EARTH OR SAND	2 AUST CORPS · 22 SEP 42
FORDS IMPASSABLE IN WET	

(5)

Appx "B"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.34

Jap use of Task Forces in the SOUTH SEAS

(HQ Allied Air Forces Intell Summary No.33 - Material collated from several sources, incl War Information Circular No.S.7 from GHQ India "Summary of Japanese Warfare" published by M.I.S., Washington and Information Bulletin No.8 of M.I.S. Washington).

The material is derived largely from experience prior to Mar 42, and covers the classic principles of Japanese use of combined forces; nevertheless most of it is still applicable, as well as timely, at the present stage.

There should be noted especially :-

a. The fluidity of organisation made possible by possession of a large "pool" of men specially trained in these operations and capable of forming assault units of wide variety of size and type.

b. The close co-operation of the two services.

(2)

c. The remarkably small variations of recce procedure.

d. The fact that fluidity of organisation permits wide variation of the details of the assault. For example, prior possession by the Japanese of fighter aircraft bases in fairly close proximity to the objective may remove the necessity for use of F/P and even of carriers in the earlier stages, by permitting fairly constant air cover for landing operations.

GENERAL: The Japanese advance in the South Seas has been remarkable for the dexterous manner in which they have used combined task forces for the occupation of successive strategic points. From an examination of the brief particulars at present available, it would appear that they have employed two standard types of task force in these operations. These forces have been used to move by bounds from point to point and have given each other mutual air support. The bounds have been approx 600 miles in extent and the period which has elapsed between consolidation and the next forward move has averaged between one to three weeks in each locality. Not only does this performance demand a well-balanced strategic plan, but it also requires a very careful apportionment of administrative means to each task force.

PREPARATION:

The preliminary indication of a Japanese move to a particular locality has been regular submarine recce of inward shipping approx 14 days to a month previous to the anticipated date of the final assault.

The next phase has been an increasing scale of air attack by the air component of the task force. The first stage has been recce by F/Bs, followed by F/B attack by day. After a few sorties, the attack has been taken up by Type H/Bs from a shore base from 400 to 600 miles away.

This attack has been continued intermittently, usually without F protection. The object has been to damage runways and to use anti-personnel bombs for the disruption of aerodrome installations. Towards the end of this H/B attack, a meteorological ship has been detected and considerable traffic on weather reports in the vicinity of the target has been observed.

In the third stage of the air attack F support is provided, either from a shore base of from an A/C carrier. The object is then the destruction of aircraft on the ground by low flying attack. The dive bombers and fighters concentrate on A/C dispersed within revetments near the field, since the revetments lend a considerable measure of protection from high-level bombers unless direct hits are scored. The Japanese keep a close watch for replacements on aerodromes and maintain sustained attacks until defending A/C have been destroyed or forced to leave. In some cases, however, particularly in China, in order to achieve surprise, the Japanese made NO preliminary recces or bombardments.

The final stage of the air attack has been a large scale assault using from 50 to 150 A/C, the objectives of which have been :-

The dive bombing of A/A and coast defence guns.

The destruction of communications.

This attack has normally been delivered about one to two days ahead of the combined assault upon the objective. It is sometimes assisted by shelling from warships. The total number of sorties required for preparation is between 150 and 300 per locality.

The assault:

As the minimum bound has been about 400 miles, it has been necessary for the Japanese to protect the approach of the convoy during the hours of daylight preceeding the night of the final assault. In order to do this, any bases from which air support may be given to the locality under attack or from which an attack may be launched on the convoy during the day of the assault, have to be neutralised. Consequently, the Japanese usually attack the adjoining air bases one day ahead of their intended day of assault. This attack may be delivered from carrier borne A/C, but is more usually a combination of shore based hy Bs with F and dive bombing A/C from an A/C carrier.

In the early hours of the morning a large force, consisting of a naval landing party and army formations in motor landing craft, is launched at one or more localities in the vicinity of their objective. This attack is protected by the guns of light air attack directed against the ground defences and probably controlled by radio telephone communication from the landing grounds. The major part of the air forces are held in reserve to counter attack any base which has NOT been sufficiently disrupted by the air attack delivered on the preceeding day.

The Japanese do NOT consider rough weather or unfavourable beaches as obstacles; in fact, such conditions sometimes are chosen deliberately and considerable loss of life by drowning is accepted in order to achieve surprise. The time for the landing operations usually is 2 or 3 hours before high tide, on moonless nights if possible. This rule is broken only for strategical or navigational reasons.

If feasible, a few landing craft with engrs try to gain the shore secretly, before operations begin, to set up small lights - NOT visible from inshore - to guide the landing craft. In some instances, Fifth Columnists install the lights

for the engrs. As a rule, at least part of the landing boats reach the beach before daylight. From 5 to 16 miles of shoreline are utilized for the landings.

A hy MG and a light MG are set up near the bow of each boat for the landing attack, and each man, NOT otherwise engaged, has a rifle or light automatic weapon to fire. (In one attempt to land on the EAST coast of MALAYA, the Japanese mounted 75 mm guns adn smaller weapons on barges. Effective arty fire from US and Filipino tps sank several of the barges and forced others to withdraw. Japanese losses were heavy). Patrol boats armed with pompoms and MGs give close support to the landings.

In all cases the objective is to seize one aerodrome for the use of Fs. Where this aerodrome is NOT close to the point of attack as at MENADO and PALEMBANG, use is made of paratps to disrupt the defence in the vicinity of the aerodrome, so that its early occupation is ensured.

An example, from POW infm from BURMA is of value:- The initial landings at KHOTA BARU (MALAYA) were made on 8 Dec from three tpts by night between 0100 and 0200 hrs, with a view to making a surprise attack on the aerodrome; the tide was high. The approach was very rough, and considerable loss of life resulted through drowning.

Before commencement of operations, and presumably on the same night, two landing craft were sent ahsore, each with recce parties of four engrs, who installed two lights at suitable points on shore, visible only from the sea. Owing to surf noise, these craft were presumably NOT detected.

NO support fire was given during the initial landings. Naval escort left the day before, and air support did NOT appear until about 0500 hrs.

MT and tanks were landed last. Three lorries were landed from YAMMA by a side loading ramp (YAMMA is a type of MLC). The beaches were sandy and steep. MG fire from pill boxes some yards from the top of barbed wire-protected beaches caused hy casualties.

NO special equipment was used on the be aches. MLC used were Shohatsu (small motor boats) and Daihatsu (large motor boats). The small ones hold 30 and the large ones 60 fully equipped tps, incl grenade units. They are of wood construction, with armour plating, and the small ones are better protected than the large. Landing craft were manned by four to six specially trained engrs. These were employed after completion of landing, in bridging and removing mines and other obstacles.

Consolidation;

If unopposed at the beaches, the Japanese hold to the rds, as a rule, until making contact with the opposition. They also use rivers and creeks to penetrate inland by boat and to turn flanks. They have special craft for such operations, incl pontoons propelled by outboard motors and boats driiven by aeroplane-type motors with propellors rigged above the surface of the water. Smoke screens are used freely to facilitate inland movements. To avoid being fired on by their own A/C, Japanese patrols and smaller units cut in front are required to identify themselves during daylight with Rising Sun flags displayed toward the sky. As soon as the aerodrome has been occupied, F A/C are installed at once and, if necessary, additional cover is given by the use of F.F/Fs from a suitable alighting area until Type "O" Fs are available. The A/C carrier is usually retained in the area until the Fs are operative, when it is withdrawn.

As a rule F cover has been available from F/Ps on the first day of the attack and from Type "O" F on the second or third day.

The next task is the extension of the aerodrome occupied to receive the H/B section of the air component of the task force. This involves the use of working parties, which at KEMA and VUNAKANAU have put up what appears to be a large number of small prefabricated huts within fourteen days of the occupation. Immediate steps are taken for the rapid extension of the runways. As soon as the damage to the surface has been repaired, at least one sqn of H/Bs is moved in. The period of delay before the seized aerodrome is used by H/Bs has been from two to five days. In the case of KUCHING the aerodrome was out of action for a period of seven days.

Whilst the consolidation of the aerodrome is preceding a wireless intercept unit is installed to report on our signals traffic. Small parties, probably equipped with R/T, are placed at suitable points or on small boats, over a 60 to 100 mile range in order to give warning of the approach of our A/C. Our A/C have been constantly intercepted. Whilst the Japanese may and do, no doubt, maintain some F control, the manner in which our A/C have been intercepted strongly suggests that the Japanese have been aware of their impending approach. There have been indications that an effective sound location unit is established, for searchlights have been directed accurately upon our night flying A/C over RABAUL.

The interval between bounds has run from two to three weeks. In this period works, services and supplies are built up for the next bound. One or more tankers have been observed discharging at the nearest port. It is clear that the supply side of the air component has been carefully planned in order that the requisite material can be moved during this period of consolidation.

For composition of Jap Task Forces, ref Intell Summaries Nos 5 and 29.

G OPS.

Appx 218

S E C R E T

Copy No. 108

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 35.

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 24 Sep 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42.

OPERATIONS:

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 19 Sep. The Japs retired from BEACO on the SOUTH coast (126° 26' E 8° 57' S) and VIQUEQUE (126° 20' E 8° 30' S) to OSSU (126° 22' E 8° 38' S). The Provinces of FRONTEIRA and SURA were quiet and native risings appear to be under control.

DILLI HR 22 Sep. Twenty six small vessels were sighted in the Hr.

AMBOINA 22 Sep. Four possible destroyers and one large vessel were seen off the main wharf in AMBON BAY.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE-SALAMAUA 21 Sep. Our patrols were active in the MUBO Area.

BUNA-KOKODA 22 Sep 0805 hrs to 0800 hrs. Allied a/c made three bombing and strafing attacks on trucks, buildings, installations and barges in this area and the WAIDOPE bridge was left unusable. 2315 hrs. BUNA aerodrome was bombed and strafed. Five barges were observed ashore between GONA MISSION and WAYTUTU POINT. Our forces are pushing fwd from UMITA RANGE to ICRIBAIWA. Patrols inflicted casualties on the enemy on the fwd slope of ICRIBAIWA RIDGE. There was NO sign of the enemy S.E. of ICRIBAIWA.

COLLINGWOOD BAY 21 Sep. A small party of Japs were seen at WANIGELA on the coast towards the middle of the BAY.

MILNE BAY 21 Sep. Thirty Japs in small gps were seen in the vicinity of LILIHOA. Enemy with MG were seen at LARIOA five mls EAST of WEDAU.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

NEW BRITAIN 22 Sep 1245 hrs. One destroyer, one gunboat, one 10,000 ton tpt and one 8,000 ton possible S/P tender were sighted approx fifty eight mls E.S.E. of CAPE ORFORD (On the S.E. of NEW BRITAIN) on a course S.E.

(v) SOLOMONS area -

BUKA PASSAGE 22 Sep 0901 hrs. Allied a/c bombed the aerodrome causing heavy explosions on the N.E. side of the runway and starting fires. 1702 hrs. Two small steamers were sighted in this vicinity.

KIETA 22 Sep 0845 hrs. One light cruiser was seen forty two mls N.E. of KIETA on a Southerly course.

BUIN FAISI 22 Sep 1[illegible] hrs. Seven cruisers, seventeen destroyers, one tanker, two supply ships and one large vessel were seen in the area.

PART 2.

ENEMY:

(xi) Material Resources:

Cotton in the Philippines. After eight months to-day since the Japanese occupation of Manila, the entire Philippines have been rejuvenated under the new administration. Besides the assurance of peace and order throughout the Philippines, the development of copper mines and the changing of the sugar industry into the cotton industry are making rapid progress. (Tokio Radio 6/9 Sep)

C o m m e n t : This is the first time that Tokio Radio has disclosed that there is to be a wholesale change from sugar to cotton. Previously only specified acreages have been referred to. Cotton is Japan's most urgent economic need. (HQ Allied Air Forces Intell Summary No. 33)

Favoured by the natural conditions and assisted by the untiring efforts of Celebes residents, cotton cultivation on Celebes has already begun with NOT only a promise of a good harvest this year but excellent prospects that the output will be double and triple within five years. The climate and soil in the so-called Celebes Group which includes North Celebes, South Celbbes and all islands of the Minor Sunda Group have been conclusively proved to be most suitable for cotton cultivation by a party of specially selected official experts, after three months painstaking investigating of these areas. (Domei 14 Sep)

For previous articles on JAP cotton position, refer Intell Summaries Nos. 16 & 21 Appx "A".

PART 3.

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area - See Appx "B".

PART 5.

SECURITY See Appx "A"

[signature]
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 5.

APPX "A" tc 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY Nc 35.

SUBJECT: MCRALE

BRITAIN'S PART IN THE WAR.

Introductien.

Most pcpular subject fcr enemy brcadcasts in English to-day is BRITAIN's War Effort -- from the Axis angle. BERLIN, ROME and TOKYO regularly tell the Empire that the British Army is sitting at home doing nothing behind a ring of bayonets, that BRITAIN has abandoned AUSTRALIA and the other Dominions.

Many Australians both servicemen and civilians, unwittingly back up this propaganda by expressing the same views among friends and comrades, But men who have served abroad do not let such talk go unchallenged; they know the facts. They have served beside the British units, they have been saved from GREECE and CRETE by the Royal Navy, have been carried to and from the MIDDLE EAST in safety; they have seen the RAF in action.

There is real danger to our cause in this type of attack on BRITAIN; that is why it is "played up" by the Axis radio. It is the duty of every man to combat such talk whenever he hears it, inside the Army or out. This is best done, not by hostile argument, but by quiet stating of the facts, and by giving credit where credit is due, Ignorance has been the prime cause of the trouble; knowledge will correct it. The facts given below are for the use of all members of the Service, as opportunity occurs.

WHAT BRITAIN HAS DONE.

So much has happened in the past year that one is apt to forget that two years ago it was BRITAIN alone that stopped a swift and complete Nazi victory. After DUNKIRK's disaster BRITAIN rejected a dishonourable peace, and without outside help kept control of the seas, won the battle for Britain against terrible odds, endured the worst bombings in history, while she rebuilt an Army and swung the nation to a complete war footing. At the same time, an out-numbered MEDITERRANEAN Fleet crippled the Italian Navy, while in AFRICA attacks from LIBYA and ABYSSINIA were held until aid came from AUSTRALIA and the other Dominions.

Since those dark days BRITAIN has -

---Reformed and re-equipped a regular army of 1,500,000 in BRITAIN.

---Supplied almost 50% of the 950,000 men sent to the MIDDLE EAST, and equipped nearly all of the 950,000.

---Sent substantial forces to INDIA, BURMA and the FAR EAST.

---Sent abroad 80% of her total military production.

---Used 50% of all shipping on supplying and maintaining Empire and Allied Armies. In 1941, 200 ships were employed continuously on supplying forces in the MIDDLE EAST, via the CAPE and carried 1,000,000 tons of goods and 30,000 vehicles.

---Fought a bitter Air War, gradually wresting air supremacy from the Luftwaffe over WESTERN EUROPE.

---Used 600 warships to keep open sea lines of communication for the Empire and its Allies.

---Supplied RUSSIA freely with arms, equipment and materials badly needed on many of our own fronts, because the whole

Empire, including Australia, felt that Russia must be supplied at all costs. Supplies to RUSSIA via PERSIA and the ARTIC include:- tanks, aircraft, aluminium, rubber, copper, lead, oil, jute, steel machine tools, sugar, and 3,000,000 pairs of Army boots.

Casualties.

Of all active service casualties suffered by the British Commonwealth of Nations since the war began, 70% were of men from the UNITED KINGDOM. Up to October 1941, (latest figures available), Empire casualties were :-

British Army	100,000
RN (incl RAN)	22,800
RAF (Incl RAAF)	8,500
Australia (AIF)	13,000
India	7,000
New Zealand	6,000
South Africa	600
Other African Tps	500

In addition, civilian bombing raids casualties in GREAT BRITAIN to the end of 1941 were :-

Killed 43,357 - Seriously injured (approx) 50,000.

AUSTRALIA has since lost heavily in SINGAPORE and JAVA; so has the British Army and RN. There have also been British casualties in BURMA, HONGKONG, LIBYA and EGYPT, and in the Battle for the ATLANTIC.

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC WARFARE

---All labour mobilised. Two out of every three adults and seven of every ten boys and girls between 14 and 17 engaged in war work. Civil defence workers (90% volunteers) include:- 2,000,000 Fire Guards, 1,500,000 on Defence Auxiliaries, 33,000 in Royal Observance Corps.

---Two-thirds of national income applied directly to war production (Australia's figures are about one-third).

---Taxation higher than in AUSTRALIA -- up to 94% on large incomes.

---Tax of 100% on increase of profits over pre-war basis.

---Output of munitions greater per head than any other country.

---No petrol available except for essential services.

---Foodstuffs and clothing severely rationed.

REPLIES TO SOME POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS

"Britain keeps a vast Army tied up in the United Kingdom."

Apart from several Canadian divisions (presumably sent where the Canadian Government desires) and some American divisions (not fully trained), BRITAIN has 3,500,000 troops in the UNITED KINGDOM, but of these 2,000,000 are Home Guards. The remainder, which includes base, L of C, AA and training units, guard 3,000 miles of coastline, protect the Empire's main arsenal and centre of war production, and the bases of the Empire's two great striking forces ---- the RN and RAF.

"Britain is shirking and allowing her Dominions and Allies to fight the war for her."

Troops from the UNITED KINGDOM have fought during this war in FRANCE, BELGIUM, NORWAY, [illegible], EAST AFRICA, SOMALILAND, GREECE, CRETE, SYRIA, LIBYA, IRAN, IRAQ, MALAYA, JAVA, HONGKONG, BURMA and MADAGASCAR.

The RAF, comprising 70% U.K. personnel, has fought in every major campaign. It won the Battle for Britain, an incredible triumph of individual bravery over superior equipment and numbers. Since then the RAF has gradually built up supremacy in the air over WESTERN EUROPE. To-day it is estimated that half the Luftwaffe fighter strength and a million and a half Germans are required to guard GERMANY'S Western frontier against the RAF.

Without the strength, skill and sacrifice of the RN, the war would have been lost long ago. The Navy has protected our L of C and enabled supplies to get through to the fighting men; it has ensured safe transport of men to and from battlefronts; it has won resounding victories, notably TARANTO and MATAPAN. It brought most of 6 Aust Div safely out of GREECE and CRETE, enabled TOBRUK to be supplied and therefore held for 8 months.

It does not detract one iota from the achievements of the AIF abroad to recall that U.K. troops played a notable part in what are often regarded as Australian triumphs. In the first Libyan campaign the Italian rout started with a brilliant attack on SIDI BARRANI positions by 7 Armoured Div and British Inf units. 7 Armoured Div was the spearhead throughout the advance to EL AGHEILA. There were as many U.K. troops as Australians in the Syrian campaign.

Every Australian who was in TOBRUK pays tribute to the 6,000 United Kingdom troops there, notably the Royal Artillery and the Northumberland Fusiliers.

"England deserted Australia in her hour of need."

When the Japanese attack on MALAYA began, BRITAIN was in the midst of a severe desert campaign in the MIDDLE EAST. Yet a British division bound for EGYPT was immediately diverted to SINGAPORE. It arrived too late to be of any use. Two capital ships, sorely needed in the Atlantic, were sent to SINGAPORE; both were sunk. The best armoured bde in the MIDDLE EAST was sent out with full equipment to make a flank attack on the Japanese from BURMA.

The suggestion that the greater part of the AIF should be moved from the MIDDLE EAST to defend AUSTRALIA came from the British Prime Minister. BRITAIN provided large quantities of equipment from the MIDDLE EAST reserves to ensure that this force should be fully equipped. Transports and Naval protection were provided without regard to other shipping commitments.

BRITAIN is a party to the arrangements for supplying AUSTRALIA with war material from the UNITED STATES. Dr Evatt, during his recent visit to BRITAIN, paid tribute to the help given by the British Government in this way.

In addition to providing technical data and services of experts, BRITAIN is supplying highly important secret equipment to AUSTRALIA.

"England doesn't matter now: America will win the war for us."

Let a leading UNITED STATES newspaper (New York Times of 2 July 42 answer this: "At this moment, when the fate of EGYPT is in the balance, let us re-affirm our faith in British courage, endurance and honour. Without that courage and sacrifice our own posn would be far more perilous than it is today. British faith and British courage carried democracy through the darkest days, and laid the foundations for what has now become an edifice of 28 united nations. Let us salute a brave people who for more than three years have held the fort for us — brave people who still have endurance, faith and tremendous reserves of unused power. To the end of the road we shall go together staunch allies in a winning cause"


Armed with these facts, Service personnel should easily be able to combat the insidious anti-British propaganda directed against the United Nations by a small body of people who would, some knowingly, others not, stab BRITAIN (and AUSTRALIA) in the back. (HQ First Aust Army, Intell Summary No. 8)

Appx "B"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 35

IPSWICH

4 MILES TO 1 INCH



SEALED ——————

METAL OR GRAVEL — — — —

SAND OR EARTH .....

PREPARED BY
GSI 2 AUST CORPS
23 SEP 42

App 219

SECRET

Copy No. 86

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 76

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs dated

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 23 Sep. Two 3,000-ton enemy vessels were sighted off KOEPANG and one 2,000-ton merchant vessel was reported to be stationary off TENAU (WEST of KOEPANG). Two bombers were seen on the runway of the PENFOIE Aerodrome.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

MADANG 22 Sep 1505 hrs. One enemy A/C made a recce of the area.

MUBO 22 Sep. It is reported that the Japs are concentrating natives at MUBO.

BUNA area 1010 hrs to 1955 hrs. Allied A/C made five raids against enemy installations in the BUNA-KOKODA area. At BUNA bombs fell on the runway of the aerodrome and barges, huts and A/A posns were strafed. It is estimated that seventy-five per cent of the barges in the BUNA-SAN ANANDA (four mls NW BUNA) area were left under water. A mule train was bombed on the track from KOKODA to SANANANDA. AMDEMBA (fifteen mls NE WAIROPE) and the WAIROPE Bridge were machine gunned. On the battle front our patrols continue to harass the enemy, one patrol killing six Japs on the fwd slope of IORIBAIWA RIDGE. Due to our successful arty fire from the ridge, enemy movements SOUTH of the village were completely halted.

MORESBY 22 Sep 1930 hrs to 2015 hrs, enemy A/C dropped flares over our posns from NW of UBERI (24 mls NE MORESBY) to HOMBROM BLUFF (12 mls NE MORESBY). 23 Sep. Enemy A/C bombed SEVEN MILE Aerodrome at MORESBY but NO damage or casualties resulted.

MILNE BAY 23 Sep. A patrol that had been sent to investigate NORMANBY Is returned with eight Jap prisoners incl one offr.

(iv) BISMARCK Area -

NEW BRITAIN-RABAUL 22 Sep 2035 hrs. Allied A/C attacked enemy shipping at RABAUL. Two probable hits were made on a large vessel anchored at the NE end of the harbour. 2155 hrs. Allied A/C bombed LAKUNAI Aerodrome. The results were NOT observed.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN-TONOLEI. 23 Sep 1040 hrs. Sightings in this area were one possible battleship, six cruisers, two seaplane tenders, six destroyers, four cargo vessels and two small tpts.

PART 2

ENEMY:

(vi) Equipment:

Examination of documents captured at GUADALCANAL shows that the Japs at TULAGI were using ball 80 mm (approx 3") and 25 mm A/A guns. The 80 mm gun has NOT been met before in the SWPA. At the moment it is NOT clear whether this is a Naval A/A gun used to defend shore installations or one found in the army as well.
(Adv LHQ Intell Summary No.6).

(vii) Tactics:

Japanese Field Signals. The following Jap field signals have been taken from a notebook captured in NEW GUINEA about 5 Sep 42.

Completion - or Understand.
Raise one arm straight up.

Change of direction in advancing or marching.
Raise one arm straight up and point toward the direction of advance.

Halt.
Raise one arm straight up and bring it down immediately.

Double-time.
Employ the same signal used in "Advance", except continue it rapidly for several times.

Deployment (of skirmishers).
Raise and extend both arms to the height of the shoulders.

Commence firing.
Extend one arm to the side and describe a loop several times.

Cease Firing.
Extend one arm forward and wave it left and right several times.
Follow the above directions when holding weapons or other articles.
(HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intell Summary 20)

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area - See Appx "A".

Daylight saving will come into effect as from 0200 hrs Eastern Standard Time on 27 Sep 42 and will terminate at 0100 hrs Eastern Standard Summer Time 28 Mar 43.

Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.


Distribution as per Appx "B".

Appx "A"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 35

IPSWICH

4 MILES to 1 INCH



SEALED ——————
METAL OR GRAVEL – – – –
SAND OR EARTH .....

PREPARED BY
G S I
2 AUST CORPS
24 SEP 42

Appx "B"

HQ 2 AUST COPRS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.36

Distribution:

3 Aust Div	1-25	GORA 2 Aust Corps	66
1 Aust Mot Bde	26-31	CE	67
HQ Indep Units 7 Aust Div	32-36	CSO	68
4 Aust A/C Sqn	37	CCC	69
2 Aust A.L.Sec	38	G(O)	70-71
4 Aust A.S.Control	39	G(I)	72-73
HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	40	DA&QMG	74
HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	41	A	75
2/5 Aust Fd Regt	42	Q	76
2/9 Aust A.Fd Regt	43	DDS&T	77
2/11 Aust A.Fd Regt	44	DDMS	78
1 Aust Med Regt	45	DDOS	79
2/1 Aust Med Regt	46	DADOS	80
2 Aust F.Sp Bty	47	First Army	81
2/1 Aust F.Sp Bty	48	32 US Div	82
2/3 Aust F.Sp Bty	49	Qld L. of C.	83
2/7 Aust F.Sp Bty	50	USAFIA Base Sec No.3	84
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps	51	1 Aust A.L.Sec	85
10 Aust Fd Coy	52	War Diary	86-87
2/16 Aust A.Fd Coy	53		
19 Aust A.Fd Coy	54		
60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy	55		
Sigs 2 Aust Corps	56		
5 Aust MG Bn	57		
HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tp AASC	58		
HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tp AASC	59		
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col	60		
HQ 1 Aust Corps Tpt Col	61		
22 Aust Fd Amb	62		
10 Aust Fd Amb	63		
2 Aust CCS	64		
11 Aust CCS	65		

Appx 220.

SECRET

Copy No. 37

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 37

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 26 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART I

OPERATIONS:

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE SALAMAUA 23 Sep 0955 hrs. Superior enemy forces using mortars and MG fire attacked our standing patrols at GUADALCANAL (3 mls SOUTH of MUBO). Our tps were forced back but still in contact. 24 Sep 0800 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed MUBO area, results were NOT observed.
BUNA - KOKODA 22 Sep. Our A/C observed small enemy supply dumps every quarter ml on the BUNA-KOKODA track. 24 Sep 0745 hrs. KOKODA aerodrome was strafed. Storage dumps and huts along the BUNA-KOKODA track were machine gunned and fires started. Night 24/25 Sep our patrols attacked an enemy listening post 2½ of KOMBAIWA and the Japs withdrew to their main posns. Our party continues to harass KOMBAIWA Ridge. The enemy are replying with a QF gun. 25 Sep 0745 hrs. Two tpts were seen stationary at BUNA. Night 23/24 Sep an unidentified vessel used a searchlight on CAPE PIERSON (NE Coast) and later on 24 Sep an enemy bomber made a [illegible].

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

RABAUL Hr 24 Sep 0500 hrs. 20/40 ships of various sizes were seen in the hr.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

A report states the Japs evacuated GIZO night 19/20 Sep.
KUKILI Aerodrome 23 Sep 1831 hrs reported ready for use in one week.
BUKA PASSAGE 24 Sep 0607 hrs. One destroyer and one 7,000-ton tpt were sighted in this area.
BUIN-FAISI 24 Sep. One light, three hy cruisers, ten destroyers, six gunboats, two S/P tenders and two cargo ships were sighted in this area.
NEW GEORGIA 24 Sep. Four destroyers were sighted in VAHOLI BAY (middle of NORTH Coast).

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:


(i) Corps Area - See Appx "A".

Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.36.

Appx "A"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 37



IC

1318

Appx 221

HQ 2 AUST Corps No. 20.

Daily Staff Conference

1. Commencing on Monday, 25 Sep 44, a very short Daily Staff Conference will be held in the Battle Room after the conclusion of the Intelligence Summary each day, Sundays excepted. The Intelligence Summary will be limited to 10 minutes and the Conference should conclude by 0930 hrs.

2. The object of the Conference is to keep senior SO's advised of the general situation as it affects the Corps, and of the activities and plans of other branches and services.

3. Attendance will be limited to the head of each branch (in the case of GS, each section) and service, and one other officer.

4. The agenda will be as follows:-

(a) Summary of movements of tps and 2 Aust Corps. — G (O).
(b) Movement of offrs of Corps Hq. — G (SD).
(c) Summary of activities in accordance with the following roster:-

MONDAY	- G (O),	A
TUESDAY	- G (I),	Q
WEDNESDAY	- G (SD),	S & T
THURSDAY	- RAA,	Ord
FRIDAY	- Sigs,	Medical
SATURDAY	- RAE.	

5. (a) The summary of activities will be given by the head of the branch, section or service concerned. Movements will be arranged accordingly as substitution is NOT satisfactory.

(b) It should cover the past week's activities and forecast of future action. Only major matters of interest to other branches or services should be mentioned, including decisions reached. The activities for the ensuing week will be included in all cases.

(c) The summary will NOT exceed five minutes.

BGS
2 Aust Corps

Issued Sep 44.

DISTRIBUTION:-

GOC	Medical	
BGS	Pro	
G (O)	Legal	
G (I)	S. & T.	
CCRA	Ord	
CE	Post	
CSO	Fy	
DA & QMG	War Diary	(2)
A	File	(2)
Q	Spare	(5)

alla 221

G 1312

2 Aust Corps
26 Sep 42.

Subject: Amendments to SD Instn No 19.

1 Ref para 9 - delete sub para (h).

2 Ref para 25. REVOLVERS - delete para and substitute:

"When visiting formations, bdes and units on duty, offrs on est HQ 2 Aust Corps will carry pistols. Whilst working in offices at Corps HQ, offrs will see that their revolvers are kept handy but they need not be worn except when on parade with tps.

R A Bourne-Wty
Lt-Col,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

/OVER

DISTRIBUTION.

GOC	CRO
DMS	DDSI
G (O)	DDOS
G (I)	DDMS
PMS	APM
DA & QMG	L&O
A	Camp (2)
Q	File (2)
CCRA	War Diary (2)
CE	

Q/4x 222

War Diary

SECRET

Copy No. 84

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.38

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 27 Sep 42

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA:

DARWIN 25 Sep 0410 hrs and 0618 hrs. Enemy A/C bombed DARWIN. NO damage or casualties resulted from the first raid, while in the second raid fourteen drums of petrol were destroyed and power lines were slightly damaged. 26 Sep 0630 hrs. A further raid was in progress but NO details have yet been reported.

(ii) NEI Area -

TIMOR 25 Sep 0720 hrs. Allied A/C detailed to attack shipping at DILLI failed to sight their targets and bombed houses at the SOUTH end of the town. Explosions were seen in the target area and two of four intercepting Zeros were probably shot down. Our losses were NIL.

(iii) NEW GUINEA:

LAE-SALAMAUA 24 Sep 1800 hrs. Our tps attacked and re-occupied GUADAGASAL. 25 Sep. In this area the enemy strength is estimated to be 4,900/5,900 and is disposed as follows - 2,000/3,000 in the MARKHAM VALLEY, mainly at LAE with outposts at HEATHS PLANTATION, 1,000 at BUSAMA (three mls NORTH of SALAMAUA) 1,000 at SALAMAUA and 900 at MUBO.

BUNA-KOKODA. 25 Sep 0645 hrs. 'Our tps drove the enemy off a knoll near the main track, 300 yds SOUTH of IORIBAIWA. Our offensive is being maintained despite heavy rain and bad visibility. Arty support is proving very effective against the enemy. The Japs are holding a reduced number of fwd posns during the day; these are well camouflaged weapon pits, similar to our slit trenches. Our forces pressing fwd found the IORIBAIWA RIDGE strongly held and defended on a limited front by a barricade of tree trunks eight feet high.

WAIROPE 25 Sep 1200 hrs. Allied A/C bombed the bridge, obtaining one direct and two partial hits. A quarter of the bridge was completely destroyed and huts believed to contain stores were set alight.

(iv) BISMARCK ARHCIPELAGO:

NEW BRITAIN 24 Sep 1945 hrs. Allied A/C attacked shipping at RABAUL scoring one probable hit on a large vessel in SIMPSON Hr.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

REKATA BAY (GUADALCANAL Is) 21 Sep. Infm indicates that 400 Japs armed with rifles and MGs were in this area.

BUIN-FAISI 25 Sep. Shipping is believed to be four Hy cruisers, nine destroyers, five gunboats, two S/P tenders or tankers, ten tpts or supply ships.

RUSSELL Is (159°20' E. 9°00' S) 25 Sep. Four destroyers carrying a number of MLC's were sighted approx sixteen mls NW of RUSSELL Is on a course NNW.

PART 2

ENEMY:

(iii) Identifications: According to a statement made by a P.W., identification discs are NOT worn by Japanese Naval landing party personnel. This was further confirmed by examination of dead during the recent MILNE BAY operations. For identification purposes such tps have a cloth patch sewn above the LEFT breast pocket of their tunic. The following is a translation of a patch taken from a P.W. -

Property on Loan	KURE Supply Depot
Year & month of manufacture	December 1941
Size	8
Name	WATANABE SHOJIRO 36458 KURE Conscript Seaman.

(Adv LHQ Intell Summary No.7)

(vi) Equipment: Examination of recently captured 7.7 mm cartridges indicates that the following colours are used by the Japs to identify the various types of their SAA :-

White: Armour piercing
Green: Incendiary (White Phosphorus)
Red: Tracer

Note: It should be noted that attempts to cut the incendiary bullet with pliers etc., will immediately cause it to ignite.

(Adv LHQ Intell Summary No.6)

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Coves Area - See Appx "A" and "B"

Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.


Distribution as per Summary No.36, less copies 71,72,73,75,76,80 and their recipients; remainder will take consecutive Nos. from 71-81 incl.

Appx "A"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 38

IPSWICH STRAT

4 miles to 1 inch




Appx "B"

HQ 2 AUST COPRS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 38

IPSWICH

4 miles To 1 inch



Aust Army

Appx 223

S E C R E T

Copy No. 87

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 39

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 28 Sep 42

Notes. Nil. See Summaries Nos. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42.

PART 1.

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA:

DARWIN 25 Sep 0410 hrs and 0618 hrs. Referring to the enemy air raids on DARWIN reported in our Summary No. 38, bombs were dropped in the vicinity of HUGHES Aerodrome causing NO damage or casualties. 27 Sep 0515 hrs. A further raid lasting twenty minutes took place but NO details have yet been reported.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR. It is reported that Japanese, estimated at 400 strong, have occupied AINARAO (Thirty two miles SOUTH by WEST of DILLI). On 25 Sep our forces were still maintaining contact with the Japs, but were experiencing difficulty in holding native pack trains owing to the enemy air activity.

(iii) NEW GUINEA:

BUNA 26 Sep 1025 hrs. Allied a/c attacked BUNA dropping bombs in the dispersal area on the EAST side of the aerodrome.

KOKODA. Our arty combatted harrassing fire from the enemy during the day of 25 Sep and night of 25/26 Sep. For two hours during the early morning of 26 Sep, the Japs maintained small arms fire on our fwd posns. At 0920 hrs, our a/c bombed NORTH IORIBAIWA and strafed enemy posns on the IORIBAIWA-EFOGI track.

MILNE BAY. 26 Sep 1020 hrs. Allied a/c scored a direct hit on one 500 ton enemy tpt approx fifty two miles E.S.E. KITAVA I. IS. (East of KIRIWINA IS TROBRIAND GP). The vessel was completely gutted and four men were observed putting off in a small boat.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

NEW BRITAIN 26 Sep 0300 hrs. Allied a/c attacked shipping at RABAUL HARBOUR, scoring possible hits on two unidentified vessels.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

SANTA YSABEL IS. 25 Sep. It is reported that the SOUTH WEST X COAST is clear of JAPS. Eleven wrecked motor barges were found along the coast.

BUIN-FAISI Area 26 Sep. Enemy shipping is believed to be six warships, five cruisers, ten destroyers, two submarines, one tanker and four supply ships.

(vi) General:

GILBERT IS. It is reported that the Japs occupied ABEMAMI IS, on 2 Sep, MARAWA IS, on 3 Sep and MANIANA IS, on 24 Sep. BERU IS was was attacked by three Jap warships on 25 Sep, and it is believed that the enemy are now in occupation there. A reported Jap landing at KURIA IS is unfounded.

PART 5.

SECURITY:

A recent Security Check of an area shows that tps persist in disclosing their unit location by pencilling their number, rank, name, AND UNIT in public places. The desire to perpetuate their name and their unit shows a commendable growth in personal pride and "esprit de corps," but it would be far better if they did it on the field of battle rather than in such unbecoming places.

It is recommended as a deterrent, offenders should be ordered to erase the particulars from the wall or public place as it is thought that this would impress on the man the need for care in this regard.

Unit Security Offrs should NOT only issue instns on Security matters, but they must educate their men so that they understand the implications underlying such disclosure. It must be forcefully brought to their minds continuously that number, rank and name is all that they should disclose to anyone, friend or foe, and that their unit name and location must NOT be disclosed in any way whatsoever. They must fully understand and appreciate the reasons behind Security instns.

Lieut Colonel
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 38.

TELEPHONE—

Australian Military Forces—Eastern Command.

Please quote this Number when replying.

G 6316 *Address* 2 Aust Corps

Date 2 Sep 42.

Subject: Rd priorities - 2 Aust Corps Area.

CE
Q ([illegible])

Copies to:
3 Aust Div — Q'ld L of C Area
1 Aust Mot Bde — War Diary (2)
First Aust Army — File.

1. Att as appx "A" is trace showing rd priorities within 2 Aust Corps area, work to be completed by 30 Nov.

2. The work will be carried out under the supervision of CE 2 Aust Corps, who will arrange for the necessary plant.

Labour will be provided from within the resources of this formation, CE to notify requirements.

3. Routes in priorities 1-4 incl should be capable of carrying 24 ton loads.

4. These works are additional to the construction of rd CABOOLTURE - TOORBUL PT, which is being carried out under supervision of 2 Aust Corps at the direction of First Aust Army.

[signature]
BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

ROAD PRIORITIES

2 AUST CORPS AREA

1 OCT - 30 NOV 42

SECRET

APPENDIX "A"
ISSUED WITH G1316 of 28 SEP 42

SUPERIMPOSE OVER

GYMPIE

4 MILES TO 1 INCH

PRIORITIES			SHEWN
1	RD	IPSWICH - ESK - KILCOY - P[illegible]CHESTER BEERWAH - Section KILCO[illegible]VILLENEUVE to be constructed first	———
2	RD	ESK - YIMBUN - KILCOY	———
3	RD	CEDARTON - MALENY via RANGE [illegible]CONONDALE	
4	RD	VILLENEUVE - NEURUM - [illegible]OODFORD	
5	RD	MALENY - KENILWORTH GYMPIE [illegible]HERULLA	———
6	RD	WOODFORD - MT TIBB[illegible] GLASSHOUSE MT [illegible]OOWUCCUM	———
7	RD	KENILWORTH - MAPLETO[illegible] - NAMBOUR	

GYMPIE
⑤
60
70
KENILWORTH
NAMBOUR
MALENY
52
66
PEACHESTER
CEDARTON
BEERWAH
GLASSHOUSE
⑥
KILCOY
VILLENEUVE
ROYSTON
NEURUM
WOODFORD
MT WILLIAMS
YIMBUN
②
①
ESK
60
80
IPSWICH
56
52

SUPERIMPOSE OVER

IPSWICH

4 MILES TO 1 INCH

CARE Owing to climatic conditions care should be exercised in handling this paper & superimposing over map

M W W. (15) (SP42)

Amended

001318D

1K

alpha 225

S E C R E T

Copy No. 90

GSI

[illegible] PACIFIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 40,

Combined Operations Intelligence received to 0800 hrs 26 Sep 42

Joint A.I.B. & G. Daily Summaries Nos. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA

DARWIN 27 Sep 0830 hrs and 0945 hrs. Referring to the Japanese air raid on DARWIN reported in our Summary No. 39, it is now advised, that bombs fell in mangrove swamps and NO damage resulted

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 27 Sep. It is reported that our tps occupied AIMARU (125° 31' East 9° South), the Japs having evacuated the town during the night of 26/27 Sep. It is believed that they have withdrawn to ATTABE (125° 24' East 8° 55' South). 24 Sep. Enemy a/c bombed and machine-gunned BETANO (South Coast of PORTUGUESE TIMOR due SOUTH of DILLI), and one enemy plane was shot down by an Allied warship.

(iii) NEW GUINEA:

BUNA 27 Sep. It is reported that the Japs are moving cargo at night from BUNA to a camp at SANANANDA; a further report states that the enemy have established radio stations at DOBODURA (12 mls SW of BUNA) and POPONDETTA (22 mls SW of BUNA) and that there are a number of Japs at BIAMU+(fifteen S.S.E. BUNA).

27 Sep 0720 hrs to 0930 hrs. Allied a/c made three bombing and strafing attacks on BUNA, KAGI (3 mls NNE of EFOGI) and EFOGI. Buildings were set on fire at BUNA and new huts and a well-worn track were observed at KAGI and EFOGI. At 1040 hrs, Allied a/c dropped bombs on the dispersal area of the BUNA aerodrome and among barges

KOKODA 27 Sep. To act as a night alarm, on the front at IORIBAIWA, the Japs erected signal wires with tins attached in front of the barricade. Our fwd tps penetrated this barricade across the main track and have established contact with the enemy. Our arty is continuing harrassing fire.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN 27 Sep. 0522 hrs. Allied a/c attacked shipping at RABAUL, scoring one direct hit and a near miss on the largest cargo vessel in the centre of SIMPSONS HARBOUR; the vessel was left burning.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN 27 Sep 0030 hrs. Allied a/c bombed KIHILI aerodrome, but the results were NOT observed.

+ Read fifteen miles

(v) SOLOMONS Area (Contd.)

BUIN FAISI 27 Sep. Enemy shipping is believed to be one battleship or a/c Carrier, six cruisers, ten destroyers, one gunboat, one sloop, two submarines, twelve cargo ships and one tanker. At 1005 hrs, one 6,000 ton merchant vessel and one tug were sighted approx 111 miles WSW of BUIN on a course East by North.

PART IV.

TIMES G.M/T.

OTHER FRONTS:

(iii) Russian Fronts:

DON SECTOR. Renewed attacks against the VORONEZH bridgehead by the RUSSIANS gained some success and they were reported to be established in unknown strength on the right bank of the DON fifty mls SOUTH of VORONEZH. The Germans gained some local success in attacks against the bridgehead NW of KLIETSKAYA.
STALINGRAD Sector. The situation is confused but the Germans have probably penetrated to the centre of the city during fierce fighting against tenacious resistance.

CAUCASUS SECTOR. The situation WEST of ASTRAKHAN is unknown. The Germans regained ground lost on the NORTH bank of the TEREK RIVER and extended the MOZDOK bridgehead slightly. The Russians are counter-attacking in the mountain passes where falls of snow have already been reported. The heights commanding NOVOROSSISK are still held by the Russians and the port is unusable. (See Intell Summary No. 35 22 Sep)

GENERAL: It is probable that the future plans of the Germans depend on the immediate fall of STALINGRAD. If this is so, the time factor is assuming increased importance.

SEA

NORTHERN WATERS: 16 Sep. The following naval units, Scheer, Hipper and Koln were seen in ALTERN FIORD in the extreme NORTH of NORWAY. 18 Sep. The Tirpitz was seen in NARVIK area. The Scharnhorst is reported to be undergoing steam trials.

The whale factory ship Solglint is reported to have been severely damaged and possibly gutted as a result of the RAF attack on CHERBOURG on 15 Sep.

U-BOAT WARFARE: Submarine activity was mainly against independently routed ships in the TRINIDAD and SOUTHERN NORTH ATLANTIC areas. Three convoys totalling 149 ships arrived without loss, while six outward convoys totalling 134 ships reached their destination without loss. Two convoys were attacked, but details are NOT available.

AIR ACTIVITY:

ENEMY: There were raids during four days and four nights, but damage was slight.

OWN There were four night raids over GERMANY from 13-20 Sep as under :-

Night	Place	Bombers
13/14	BREMEN	400
15/16	WILHELMSHAVEN	200
16/17	ESSEN	400
19/20	MUNICH & SAAR VALLEY	200

Photographs show severe damage done in the raids on DUSSELDORF and KARLESRUHE. (See Intell Summaries Nos. 24 and 33 on 13 and 22 Sep respectively). At DUSSELDORF thirty factories were hit incl. DUESSCHE, ROPRENWERKE (Manufacturers of check tubing), where seven acres of the main buildings were destroyed, and SCHLESS-DEFRIEDS (makers of magnetic mines) of which half an acre was gutted. At KARLESRUHE ninety acres of industrial buildings and yards were devastated. (World Revsit for week ending 21 Sep).

PART 3.

TOPOGRAPHICAL:


(i) Corps Area: See Appx "A"

Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary 38.

Appx "A"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 49



Alpha 226

MOST SECRET.

2 Aust Corps
29 Sep 42

G.1325

Subject:- Location Statement 2 Aust Corps

As At 2400 hrs 28 Sep 42.

	Copy Nos		Copy Nos
3 Aust Div	1-2	DA & QMG	24
32 US Div	3	A	25
1 Aust Mot Bde	4	Q	26
HQ Indep Units 7 Aust Div	5	DDMS	27
2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec	6	ADMS (D)	28
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	7	Legal	29
HQ 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	8	DAD Educ.	30
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col	9	DDST	31
HQ 1 Aust Corps Tpt Col	10	DDOS	32-34
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	11	DAD Posts	35
2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	12	Salvage	36
4 Aust AC Sqn	13-14	Pay	37
GOC	15	Sigmaster	38
BGS	16	First Aust Army	39-40
G (o)	17	QLD L of C Area	41
G (I)	18	1 US Corps	42
CCRA	19	File	43-44
CE	20-21	War Diary	45-46
CSO	22-23		

1. Herewith 2 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 28 Sep 42.

2. It is requested that any errors or omissions noted in this statement be notified to this HQ by the formation or unit concerned.

3. Ack. Include in ack destruction by fire of previous location statement.

Colin Lawman Capt
for BGS
2 Aust Corps

MOST SECRET

Copy No. 116

LOCATION STATEMENT

2 AUST CORPS

Veh Markings:- COCKATOO on BOOMERANG

Map Legend:- G. GYMPIE 4 mls to 1 inch
IX. IPSWICH 4 mls to 1 inch
I. IPSWICH 1 inch to 1 mile
L. LANDSBOROUGH 1 inch to 1 mile
M. MARYBOROUGH 4 mls to 1 inch
S. SANFORD 1 mle to 1 inch.

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
	HQ				
A 1	HQ 2 Aust Corps	107	ESK		
A 2	2 Aust Corps Sec Intell Corps		ESK		
A 3	4 Aust Def & Emp Pl	126	ESK		Temporarily att 57/60 Bn for tng.
A 4	4 Aust AS Control (Type A).	137	ESK		
A 5	2 Aust AL Sec		KINGAROY		
A 6	H Sec FSS	107	ESK		
A 7	2 Aust Corps PR Fd Unit		ESK		
A 8	2 Aust Fd Censor-Ship Sec		BRISBANE		Att for duty Milbase BRIS-BANE
A 9	3 Aust Fd Censorship Sec				
	ARTY.				
A10	HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	109	ESK		
A11	HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	104	ESK		
A12	2/9 Aust A Fd Regt, Sig Sec & 2/68 LAD	134	ARAKOON		Ex 1 Aust Cor
A13	2/11 Aust A Fd Regt Sig Sec & 2/70 LAD	142	BELLEVUE		Ex 1 Aust Cor
A14	8 Fd Regt, Sig Sec & 229 LAD	75	CASINO		
A15	1 Aust Med Regt, Sig Sec & 208 LAD	104	NEURUM		
A16	2/1 Aust Med Regt, Sig Sec & 2/6[illegible] LAD	112	BELLEVUE		Ex 1 Aust Cor
A17	2/2 Aust A Tk Regt (less two btys & 2/54 LAD)	62	WOODFORD		Ex 1 Aust Cor
A18	2 Aust F Sp Bty	106	NEURUM		
A19	2/1 F Sp Bty	106	Arakoon)		Formed from 2/1 Svy Regt ex 1 Aust Corps.
A20	2/7 Svy Bty	87	Arakoon)		
	RAE				
A21	HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps	101	VILLENEUVE	G.577653	
A22	10 Aust Fd Coy	149	BADDOW	M.585827	
A23	2/16 Aust A Fd Coy	138	GLENFERN	G.575651	
A24	19 Aust A Fd Coy	141	GLENFERN	G.575652	

Serial No	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
	RAE (Continued)				
A25	60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy & 315 LAD.	105	GLENFERN	G.575652	
A26	2 Aust Corps Camflg Tng Unit	118	VILLENEUVE		
	SIGS.				
A27	Sigs 2 Aust Corps & 244 LAD	115	ESK		
A28	2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec		ESK		
	INF				
A29	5 Aust MG Bn & 265 LAD		D'AGUILAR	L.9548	
	AASC				
A30	HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	103	TOOGOOLAWAH	IX.548639	
A31	2 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy	136	HARLIN	G.547648	
A32	2 Aust Corps Tps Pet Coy	146	HARLIN	G.549650	
A33	2 Aust Corps Tps Sup Coy	150	HARLIN	G.547647	
A34	HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	103	FAIRNIE VIEW	S.800587	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A35	2/1 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy	136	FERNVALE	S.798875	"
A36	2/1 Aust Corps Tps Pet Coy	146	FAIRNIE VIEW	S.797879	"
A37	2/1 Aust Corps Tps Sup Col	150	FERNVALE	S.803878	"
A38	HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col	116	KILCOY	G.571656	
A39	129 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	125	GYMPIE	G.582746	Att 1 Aust Mot Bde
A40	130 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	131	LANDSBOROUGH	G.613667	Att 3 Aust Div
A41	131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	121	CROSSDALE	IX.564622	
A42	132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	103	HARLIN	IX.568644	
A43	133 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	160	TOOGOOLAWAH	IX.547639	
A44	HQ 1 Aust Corps Tpt Col	116	GOODNA	I.039717	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A45	2/103 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	125	REDBANKS PLAINS	I.038716	"
A46	2/104 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	131	GROVELY CAMP	I.613598	"
A47	2/105 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	121	Adjoining GROVELY CAMP	I.613598	"
A48	2/106 Aust Gen Tpt Coy.(One Pl att First Aust Army).	103	GOODNA	I.030712	
A49	2/2 DID		CASINO		Moving to WOODFORD
A50	2/3 DID		CABOOLTURE		
	AAMC				
A51	22 Fd Amb	52	KILCOY	G.570655	B Coy VILLENEUVE G.577653
A52	10 Aust Fd Amb		LANDSBOROUGH		

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
	AAMC (Continued).				
A53	2 Aust CCS	151	IPSWICH	Showgrounds	
A54	11 Aust CCS	135	HARLIN	G.548653	
A55	2 Aust MAC (less one sec)	294	KILCOY	G.571656	
A56	2/1 Aust MAC	256	DINMORE		
A57	205 Aust Dental Unit		D'AGUILAR	G.597647	Att 2/4 Fd Regt
A58	207 Aust Dental Unit		GOODNA		
A59	215 Aust Dental Unit		ESK		
A60	219 Aust Dental Unit		ARAKOON		
A61	220 Aust Dental Unit		ALEXANDRA (Area)	E.168865	Att 22 Inf Bn
A62	222 Aust Dental Unit		ELIMBAH	C.116487,	Att 24 Inf Bn
A63	228 Aust Dental Unit		LANDSBOROUGH	L.176725	Sigs 3 Aust Div
A64	233 Aust Dental Unit		LANDSBOROUGH	L.178724	106 A/Tk Regt
A65	369 Aust Dental Unit		Deception Bay	R.198238	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A66	2/7 Aust Dental Unit		GYMPIE		Ex 1 Aust Corps att 1 Aust Mot Bde
A67	2/9 Aust Dental Unit		CABOOLTURE	C.112387	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A68	2/51 Aust Dental Unit		ARAKOON		Ex 1 Aust Corps
	AACC				
A69	290 Aust LAD		MONTO		
A70	2 Aust Army Ord W/kshop		IPSWICH	IX.592573	
A71	2 Aust Army Ord Fd Pk		IPSWICH	IX.592573	
A72	110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord W/kshop	114	WOODFORD	G.594653	
A73	110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk	114	WOODFORD	G.594653	
A74	111 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord W/kshop		WOODFORD		
A75	111 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk		WOODFORD		
A76	112 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord W/kshop		WOODFORD	G.594653	
A77	112 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk		WOODFORD	G.594653	
A78	2/3 Aust Army Ord Fd Pk	147	IPSWICH	IX.592573	Ex 1 Aust Corps
A79	3 Aust Mob Laundry and Fwd Decn Unit	173	FERNVALE		
A80	2/90 Aust LAD		IPSWICH	IX.578596	Ex 2/1 Aust Med Regt 1 Aust Corps. Det IPSWICH
	Pro				
A81	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	128	ESK		
	Postal				
A82	2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	154	IPSWICH		
	Pay				
A83	2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office		ESK		
	Misc				
A84	2/3 Aust MH and Infm Sec				Not yet raised.
A85	2 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	166	ESK		

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
A86	101 Aust Mob Bath Unit	132			Being raised by QLD L of C Area.
A87	HQ 2 Aust Corps Reception Camp		ABCWT Race Course, BRISBANE		
A88	RAAF (Under Comd) 4 AC Sqn		KINGAROY		

3 AUST DIV

Veh Sign:- KOALA on BOOMERANG

Map Legend:- C. CABOOLTURE one inch
E. EUMUNDI one inch
L. LANDSBOROUGH one inch

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
	HQ				
B 1	HQ 3 Aust Div	84	MOOLOOLAH	L.175743	
B 2	3 Aust Div Intell Sec	84	MOOLOOLAH	L.175743	
B 3	K Sec FSS	84	MOOLOOLAH	L.175743	
	CAV				
B 4	8 Aust Div Cav Regt Sig Sec & 297 LAD		LANDSBOROUGH	L.182685	
	RAA				
B 5	HQ RAA 3 Aust Div	69	MOOLOOLAH	L.173746	
B 6	HQ 106 Aust A/Tk Regt Sig Sec & 263 LAD	62	LANDSBOROUGH	L178724	
B 7	21 Aust A/Tk Bty	62	LANDSBOROUGH	L.182728	
B 8	3 Aust Svy Bty		MOOLOOLAH	L.193735	
	RAE				
B 9	HQ RAE 3 Aust Div	81	GLENVIEW	L.223761	
B10	53 Aust Fd Pk Coy & 230 LAD	75	GLENVIEW	L.223760	
	SIGS				
B11	HQ Sigs 3 Aust Div & 231 LAD	66	LANDSBOROUGH	L.176725	
B12	No.1 Coy Sigs 3 Aust Div		LANDSBOROUGH	L.176725	
B13	K Sec Sigs 3 Aust Div		LANDSBOROUGH	L.176725	
B14	3 Aust Div Cipher Sec		MOOLOOLAH	L.175743	
	INF				
B15	2/3 Aust Indep Coy		TOORBUL POINT		CTS for tng.
B16	2/7 Aust Indep Coy		YANDINA	E.170999	
B17	2/8 Aust Indep Coy		YANDINA	E.100989	
	AASC				
B18	HQ Comd AASC 3 Aust Div	59	LANDSBOROUGH	L.215736	
B19	20 Aust Svy AASC		LANDSBOROUGH	L.180736	
	AAMC				
B20	2/13 Aust Fd Amb		LANDSBOROUGH	L.131705	A Coy FOREST GLEN.
B21	3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec		GLENVIEW	L.210757	
	AAOC				
B22	HQ 54 Aust Div Ord W/kshops	76	MOOLOOLAH	L.155755	
B23	10 Bde Sec 54 Aust Div Ord W/kshops		LANDSBOROUGH	L.153703	
B24	HQ 54 Aust Div Ord Fd Pk	83	MOOLOOLAH	L.155755	
B25	10 Bde Sec 54 Aust Div Ord W/kshops		LANDSBOROUGH	L.153703	
B26	265 Aust LAD		MOOLOOLAH	L.153703	To be att 5 MG Bn
B27	6 Aust Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit	51	GLENVIEW	L.210757	
B28	8 Aust Salvage Unit	78	LANDSBOROUGH	L.161712	
B29	ADOS Dump		MOOLOOLAH	L.153703	

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
	Pro				
B30	3 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	LANDSBOROUGH	L.142700	
	Pay				
B31	3 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	87	MOOLOOLAH	L.175743	
	Postal				
B32	3 Aust Div Postal Unit	56	MOOLOOLAH	L.178741	
	Misc.				
B33	3 Aust Div Reception Camp		LANDSBOROUGH	L.155701	
B34	107 Aust Mob Bath Unit	79	GLENVIEW	L.210757	
B35	3 Aust Div Camflg Unit		GLENVIEW	L.223760	
B36	3 Aust Div Rest Sta		CALOUNDRA	L.336720	
B37	3 Aust Div Details Pool		LANDSBOROUGH	L.203725	
B38	3 Aust Div Concert Party		MOOLOOLAH	L.175743	
	4 AUST INF BDE GP.				
B39	HQ 4 Aust Inf Bde, Sig Sec & 264 LAD	88	FOREST GLEN	L.192838	
B40	4 Aust Fd Regt, Sig Sec & 214 LAD	54	FOREST GLEN	L.232772	
B41	22 Aust A/Tk Bty	62	KIELS MOUNTAIN	E.768865	
B42	4 Aust Fd Coy	60	PALMWOODS	E.135841	
B43	22 Aust Inf Bn	53	ALEXANDRA	E.284861	
B44	29/46 Aust Inf Bn	50	5 miles West of CALOUNDRA	L.237733	
B45	37/52 Aust Inf Bn	61	KULANGOOR	E.152961	
B46	19 Aust Coy AASC		6 miles South of FOREST GLEN	L.228799	
B47	4 Aust Fd Amb	67	NAMBOUR	E.145927	
B48	4 Bde Sec 54 Div Ord W/kshop		NAMBOUR	E.141838	
B49	4 Bde Sec 54 Div Ord Fd Pk		NAMBOUR	E.141838	
	15 AUST INF BDE GP				
B50	HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec & 266 LAD	65	CABOOLTURE	C.117380	
B51	2 Aust Fd Regt, Sig Sec & 213 LAD	74	CABOOLTURE	C.128404	
B52	24 Aust A/Tk Bty	62	WOODLU	C.097404	
B53	15 Aust Fd Coy	86	CABOOLTURE	C.103399	
B54	24 Aust Inf Bn	63	ELIMBAH	C.116487	
B55	57/60 Aust Inf Bn	82	BURDENGARY	C.142297	
B56	58/59 Aust Inf Bn	91	North of CABOOLTURE	C.148417	
B57	21 Aust Coy AASC	72	CABOOLTURE	C.128387	
B58	15 Aust Fd Amb	70	CABOOLTURE	C.086378	A Coy C.061405 B Coy C.109391
B59	15 Bde Sec 54 Div Ord W/kshop		CABOOLTURE	C.110370	
B60	15 Bde Sec 54 Div Ord Fd Pk		CABOOLTURE	C.110370	

32 US DIV.

Under Cond 2 Aust Corps for planning and execution of defensive operational role only.

Serial	Unit	Location	Remarks
	HQ		
C 1	HQ 32 Inf Div		
C 2	HQ & Military Police Coy and Service Det		
	RECCE		
C 3	32 Cav Recce Tp		
	ARTY		
C 4	HQ.)		
C 5	HQ Bty) 32 Div Arty		
C 6	Band)		
C 7	120 Fd Arty Bn		
C 8	121 Fd Arty Bn		
C 9	126 Fd Arty Bn		
C10	129 Fd Arty Bn		Tps
C11	148 Fd Arty Bn (1st Bn)		IUSCorps/Attached 32 Div
C12	632 Tank Destroyer Bn		Attached
	ENGRS.	TAMBOURINE	
C13	114 Engr Bn (less det from HQ and two water purification units).		
	SIGS		
C14	32 Sig Coy (less 1 det).		
	INF		
C15	HQ Coy 32 Inf Div		
C16	127 Inf Regt		
	S & T		
C17	107 QM Bn		
	Medical		
C18	107 Medical Bn (less cleaning pl and collecting bn).		

1 AUST MOT BDE

(Under Comd 1 Aust Mot Div)

Veh Sign:- GREYHOUND on BOOMERANG

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Remarks
D 1	HQ 1 Aust Mot Bde	84	GYMPIE	
D 2	5 Aust Mot Regt and 299 LAD	58	GYMPIE	
D 3	11 Aust Mot Regt & 300 LAD	60	GYMPIE	
D 4	16 Aust Mot Regt & 211 LAD	68	GYMPIE	
D 5	6 Bty 102 Aust A/Tk Regt	91	GYMPIE	
D 6	3 Sqn Sigs 1 Aust Mot Div	85	GYMPIE	
D 7	1 Aust Lt Fd Amb	53	GYMPIE	
D 8	1 Aust Mot Bde Ord W/kshop	83	GYMPIE	
D 9	1 Aust Mot Bde Ord Sub Pk	86	GYMPIE	
D10	Det 1 Aust Mob Div Postal Unit	73	GYMPIE	
D11	1 Aust Mot Bde ASC Coy		GYMPIE	

UNITS EX 1 AUST CORPS & 7 AUST DIV

Under Comd 2 Aust Corps for purposes of adm and emergency operations.

Serials 1-19 under comd Independent Units 7 Aust Div.

Map Legend:- C.CABOOLTURE one inch to 1 mile
R.REDCLIFFE one inch to 1 mile
G.GYMPIE four miles to 1 inch
I.IPSWICH four miles to 1 inch

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
E 1	HQ Indep Units 7 Aust Div		CABOOLTURE	C.112387	
E 2	E Sec 7 Aust Div Sigs		CABOOLTURE	C.112387	Det from 2/4 Fd Regt
E 3	2/5 Fd Regt (one det)		CABOOLTURE	C.112387	
E 4	2/6 Fd Regt (one det)		CABOOLTURE	C.112387	
E 5	G Sec 7 Aust Div Sigs		ASCOT		
E 6	2/53 Aust LAD		CABOOLTURE	C.117367	
E 7	25 Bde Sec 7 Aust Div Ord W/kshop		CABOOLTURE	C.113377	
E 8	25 Bde Sec 7 Aust Div Ord Fd Pk		CABOOLTURE	C.112377	
E 9	6 Aust A Tk Bty	62	WOODFORD	G.591656	
E10	2/4 Aust Fd Regt	74	WOODFORD	G.986471	
E11	2/51 Aust LAD	74	WOODFORD	G.986471	
E 12	2/25 Aust Fd Pk Coy (less stores)		DINMORE		Att First Army Br Pk
E13	2/55 Aust LAD		WOODFORD		
E14	2/1 Aust MG Bn	68	DECEPTION BAY	R.198238	
E15	2/48 Aust LAD		DECEPTION BAY	R.198238	
E16	2/4 Aust Coy AASC (less det)	97	BEACHMERE	R.223312	
E17	2/6 Aust Coy AASC (less det)	72	BEACHMERE	R.223312	
E18	Det HQ AASC 7 Aust Div		BEACHMERE	R.223312	
E19	2/56 Aust LAD	66	Showground WOODFORD		
E20	59 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy & 239 LAD		DINMORE		Att First Army Br Pk
E21	3 Aust AL Sec	112	TOOWOOMBA		
E22	Sec 2/1 Aust MAC		DINMORE		
E23	3 Aust A Ord W/kshop		IPSWICH	I.592573	
E24	1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit	173	FERNVALE	I.578596	
E25	1 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre		CHURCHILL		
E26	2 Aust AS Control	137	Near APAKOON		

Alfac 227

S E C R E T

Copy No. 81

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 41.

Compiled from information received to 0600 hrs 30 Sep 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summaries Nos. 1-13 22 Aug to 2 Sep 42.

PART 1.

OPERATIONS:

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

AMBON 28 Sep 1430 hrs. A 1,500 ton two-masted ship was sighted approx ten mls WEST of AMBON - course EAST.

(iii) NEW GUINEA

LAE-SALAMAUA 28 Sep 1005 hrs. Allied a/c bombed LAE aerodrome. Bombs fell on the S.E. end of the runway, but results are unknown. NO activity was observed at FINSCHAVEN.

BUNA KOKODA 28 Sep 0700 hrs to 0845 hrs. Allied a/c attacked enemy installations at BUNA and KAGI. One barge was destroyed at BUNA. Huts were strafed at BUNA, GONA, SANGARA and POPONDETTA and a new house at LAKE MYOLA. The WAIROPE bridge with a width of ten feet is again serviceable. It was attacked but was NOT hit. A camouflaged stores dump was observed along the POPONDETTA road. There was NO activity on the BUNA landing strip. 28 Sep. As a result of an arty fire the enemy barricade at ICRIBAIWA was damaged and by an outflanking movement our tps captured the ridge and forced the enemy Northwards. A quantity of enemy stores and equipment was secured. Our attacking force is consolidating the new posn and the fwd detachment is pushing on.

MILNE BAY Area 27 Sep. Two Japs were killed by our patrol at LARIOA (five mls EAST of WEDAU). There were signs of the recent enemy occupation of a hut one mile NORTH of LILIHOA.

28 Sep 1345 hrs. A destroyer was sighted off AITAPE (eighty five mls W.N.W. of WEWAK on the NORTH coast of NEW GUINEA.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

RABAUL 28 Sep 1045 hrs. Three tpts and two destroyers were sighted twenty five mls NORTH of RABAUL on a course N.N.E. Two 8,000 ton tpts were seen in ST. GEORGES CHANNEL. 1113 hrs. Three hy cruisers, one possible S/P tender, twelve 5/7000 ton cargo (or tpt vessels), three 10/12000 ton cargo vessels, twelve other warships and two tankers were sighted in SIMPSONS HR, and one hy cruiser off RALUANA PT. (six mls SOUTH of RABAUL).

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

27 Sep 2350 hrs. Allied a/c attacked the landing strip at KIHILI (near BUIN) and shipping in the vicinity. Demolition bombs fell on the runway, but the ships were NOT hit. 28 Sep 1245 hrs. Twenty five bombers escorted by eighteen Zeros attacked GUADALCANAL. Our intercepting fighters shot down twenty three bombers and one Zero.

(v) SOLOMONS Area: (Contd.)

We had NO losses. 0645 hrs. One destroyer and two cargo vessels were anchored five mls NORTH of SIKOPO IS. in MANNING STRAIT (between CHOISEUL and ISABEL IS.) 1020 hrs. One destroyer and one bpt on an Easterly course were approx forty seven mls WEST of KOLO IS. in the IRIRASUKY GP. 1822 hrs. One possible cruiser was moving in an Easterly direction at the entrance of BUKA PASSAGE.

BUIN FAISI. The minimum shipping in the area was considered to be three cruisers, eighteen destroyers, one tanker and seven supply ships

PART 2.

ENEMY:

(vii) Tactics:

Treachery and Tenacity.

The numerous reports of both Japanese treachery and tenacity in the present war are supplemented by two reports from the Solomons. These reports again show that the enemy is NOT beyond using any methods to gain his end.

Twenty-three Japanese soldiers with one machine-gun were trapped in a cave for twelve days. They were finally driven out by pouring petrol at the entrance of the cave and igniting it by throwing hand grenades.

Again at one stage of the battle, a party of Japanese were cornered by about 70 U.S. Marines. The Japanese waved the white flag of surrender and sent a small party to approach the Americans. When the Japanese party was almost level with the Americans they fell flat on their stomachs. The Americans were taken by surprise and subjected to machine gun fire from the rear.

Japanese carried some flame throwers but these were NOT used in the action of 19-21 August. Wounds from their 25 calibre bullet were NOT found serious.

A new use was found for U.S. Marine tanks which were run against trees to jar snipers out of the branches. (HQ Allied Air Forces Intell Summary No. 55.)

(xiii) General:

Reported Japanese Submarines with Masts

The Captain of a Dutch ship sunk in July off the S - E coast of Africa has reported what appears to be a new development in Japanese Submarines.

The ship was attacked with gunfire and abandoned at dawn. The Submarine was a large type with a gun mounted forward of the conning tower. It was reported to carry two construction masts of which the aftermast was taller and carried a crows nest rather larger than that normally carried on surface ships. Toplights were lit on the masts, presumably to give an appearance of neutrality at night.

The Submarine surfaced with masts fixed and lights lit. The masts could be unshipped, as required. (HQ Allied Air Forces Intell Summary No. 34.)

PART 3.

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area: See Appx "A"

PART 5.

SECURITY:

Security - Leakage of information from scrap paper.

"Investigations were held recently into the finding on the floor of a city warehouse at PERTH of a paper giving details of beach watching posts. It was found that a civilian confidential typist had thrown the paper into a basket to be sent away for pulping. During transit the paper containing secret information dropped out of the container. This again illustrates the need for careful distribution of secret documents." (From W.A. L of C S S. Report No. 68.)

Comment :-


The waste-paper basket is the traditional source of information for enemy agents - the easiest and safest. During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 a thriving trade in secret waste was plied by charwomen and attendants between the various delegations. The destruction under proper supervision of secret waste is essential during war. (HQ. Allied Air Forces Intell Summary No. 35.)

Lin Rogers Capt
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 38.

Appx "A"

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 41



Sealed ——————

Metal or Gravel - - - - -

Sand or Earth .....

Prepared by
G.S.I 2 Aust. Corps.
29·9·42