
AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/8
CORPS

2 Australian Corps
General Branch (2 Aust Corps 'G' Branch)

December 1942



1/4/8-0077

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118 (adapted.)

Unit Hq 2 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Dec 42. To 31 Dec 42.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
Esk	1 Dec		2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No 102	Appx 1
			" " No 103	2
	2 "		" " No 104	3
	3 "		" " No 105	4
	4 "		" " No 106	5
			First Aust Army Training Instruction" 13	6
			Amdt No 1 to 2 Aust Corps Op Instr No 5	7
	5		2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No 107	8
	6		" " No 108	9
	7		Notes on GOCs comments on practice move of Corps HQ 12-14 Nov 42	10
			Lessons from Operations	11
		0900	Recce party and advance party moved from Esk to establish Hq	
			at new location at Mt.MEE ref map CABOOLTURE one inch to	
			one mile 917397 to	

Govt Printer, Brisbane

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit _____ *Date and Time.—From* _____ *To* _____

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
Mt Mee	Dec 7		Amendment No 1 to 2 Aust Corps Location Statement	Appx 12
			2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No 109	" 13
	8	0900	Advance HQ closed at Esk	
		1600	Advance HQ opened at MT Mee	
			2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No. 110	Appx 14
	9	0900	Rear HQ closed at Esk	
		1600	Rear HQ opened at Mt Mee	
	10		2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No. 111	" 15
	11		" " No. 112	" 16
	12		" " No. 113	" 17
	13		" " No. 114	" 18
	14		" " No. 115	" 19
	15		" " No. 116	" 20
		1200	RAA 1 Aust Corps passed to command First Aust Army (AIF)	

Govt. Printer, Brisbane

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

*Unit*_____ *Date and Time.—From*_____ *To*_____

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	Dec 15	1800	1 Aust Mot Bde came under command 3 Aust Armd Div	
	16		2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No. 117	Appx 21
	17		" " No. 118	" 22
	18		" " No. 119	" 23
		1130	CDH Brisbane phoned and reported the sighting of a submarine	
			at 0900 hrs that morning off BRUNSWICK HEADS heading north on	
			the surface. It was travelling fast and submerged after 15	
			minutes. As the navy could not identify it, the vessel it	
			is presumed that it was an enemy craft.	
		1330	CDH phoned again re the above to say that COIC Sydney had	
			accepted full responsibility for the sighting. Recce aircraft	
			had been sent out but so far had reported nothing.	
	19	0600	In spite of a careful search by aircraft the submarine was not	
			discovered.	

Govt Printer, Brisbane

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit _____ *Date and Time.—From* _____ *To* _____

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	Dec 19		2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No 120	Appx 24
	20		SD Instruction No 31 re franking of messages.	" 25
			2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No. 121	" 26
	21		" " No. 122	" 27
			2 Aust Corps Engineer Training Instruction No. 2	" 28
	22		2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary " " No. 123	" 29
	23		" " No. 124	" 30
	24		" " No. 125	" 31
		1900	Milbase Brisbane informed HQ that the boom over the BURNETT	
			RIVER had broken but that Repairs would be effected immediately	
			at low tide.	
			Distribution List 2 Aust Corps.	" 32
	25		2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No. 126	" 33
	26		" " No. 127	" 34

Govt. Printer, Brisbane

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit _____ *Date and Time.—From* _____ *To* _____

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	Dec 27		2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No 128	Appx 35
	28		" " No 129	" 36
	29		" " No 130	" 37
			Training of personnel HQ 2 Aust Corps	" 38
			Location Statement 2 Aust Corps as at 2400 hrs 28 Dec	" 39
	30		2 Aust Corps Daily Intel Summary No 131	" 40

Govt. Printer, Brisbane

Army Form C.2118
(Adapted, Inf. Bde)
(Pads of 100)
Reprinted March, 1943—a.w. 10m pads.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No. WAD

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO 3 aust div, 1 aust mot bde, 21 aust cav regt, 5 aust mg bn, 5 AC Sqn, 4 AS control, rptd GOC, First Aust Army, Queensland L of C Area.

FROM	Originator's Number	Date	In Reply to Number
2 Aust Corps	C 361	5	

(Write horizontally)					
secret	(.)	adv	hq	2	5
aust	corps	closes	ESK	0900	10
hrs	opens	new	location	ref	15
CABOOLTURE	1	inch	917397	1600	20
hrs	8	dec	(.)	rear	25
hq	closes	ESK	0900	hrs	30
opens	new	location	1600	hrs	35
9	dec	(.)	ack		40
					45
					50
					55
					60
					65
					70
					75
					80
					85
					90
					95
					100
					105
					110
					115
					120
					125
					130

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS: *(EXCEPT) ( ) WIRELESS

SIGNATURE

* ORIGINATOR MAY DELETE "EXCEPT" AND INSERT "INCLUDING."

THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER** IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS.

SIGNATURE

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN 1700

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	RELEASED	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	RELEASED	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	RELEASED	SENDER

SECRET

Copy No. 65

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.102

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 30 Nov 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

PART 1.

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA -

DARWIN 28 Nov 1242 hrs. One or two u/i A/C were over DARWIN.

(ii) NEI AREA -

TIMOR 27 Nov 1600 hrs. A 500-ton cargo vessel was sighted at KOEPANG. 28 Nov 1026 hrs. Allied A/C attacked LAGA eleven mls East of BAUCAU and LAVAI seventeen mls East by North of BAUCAU. Seven empty barges were strafed and buildings left burning. MAOBISSE was later bombed but NO details are yet known.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE 27 Nov. An analysis of aerial photos revealed five damaged med Bs, one possible DB, twenty-five serviceable and twenty-two unserviceable F A/C on the aerodrome. 28 Nov. During the morning enemy A/C bombed native villages at WAMPIT, twenty-four mls West by South of LAE and BANKORA twenty mls West by North of LAE.

SALAMAUA 28 Nov 0737 hrs. Nineteen u/i objects considered enemy submarines were seen 100 mls East of SALAMAUA.

GONA SANANANDA 26 Nov. Allied tps attacked SANANANDA from the direction of SOPUTA but were held up by organised enemy MG fire. Our outflanking movement is progressing. 1700 hrs. A patrol on the left flank contacted the enemy and inflicted casualties and captured twenty Rabaul natives. There was light enemy shelling to the right of our posns. 27 Nov. During the morning our tps with arty sup repulsed an enemy counter attack on the right flank. Night 26/27 Nov. One of our patrols dispersed an enemy patrol of forty on the AMBOGA-SOPUTA track near OMBA, 3,000 yds East of AMBOGA. Our patrols reported that parties of Japs on rafts were leaving the mouth of the KUMUSI RIVER for GONA. Two barges were seen on the GONA beach night 26/27 Nov.

BUNA 27 Nov. Our tps continued to attack in the direction of the main strip and CAPE ENDAIADERE. 1645 hrs. Three enemy A/C strafed the strip at DOBODURA. 1700 hrs. Eight Zeros recced the whole area and carried out lt strafing. 28 Nov Allied tps made a slight adv at BUNA but enemy hy MG fire was retarding progress. Strong recce patrols were determining the enemy strength and disposns.

CAPE WARDHUNT. Night 27/28 Nov. Ground patrols reported an enemy warship anchored near the CAPE. It was still anchored when sighted by Allied A/C in the morning 28 Nov.

MILNE BAY 27 Nov. One Jap was captured by natives at AHIOMA. 29 Nov 0245 hrs. An air raid was reported to be in progress.

(v) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

GASMATA 27 Nov. Some enemy tps were seen near the drome and RINGRING PLANTATION three mls East of GASMATA. NO enemy were seen to the West.

NEW IRELAND 28 Nov 0015 hrs to 0225 hrs. Allied A/C attacked KAVIENG drome. 0100 hrs. Two possible tpts were seen in NUSA CHANNEL, KAVIENG.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BOUGAINVILLE Is. 28 Nov 0905 hrs. A small boat was seen thirty-eight mls North by East of KIETA on a course SE.

BUIN-FAISI 28 Nov 1715 hrs. Twelve destroyers, one sloop, three cargo vessels and two tankers were seen in the area.

NEW GEORGIA GP 28 Nov 0710 hrs. Three destroyers and two tpts were seen forty-three mls West by South of LUNGA PT, GANONGA Is. on a course NW. 0800 hrs. Two destroyers and two tpts were seen ten mls South of the Pt on a course NW. 0845 hrs. Three u/i vessels and one destroyer were seen eighty-one mls WNW of the same Pt on a course ENE. The enemy were continuing exploitation towards the Eastern side of NEW GEORGIA.

GUADALCANAL Night 26/29 Nov. Two enemy A/C bombed LUNGA RIVER area. There was NO damage.

(Landops Rcvsit No.121)

P A R T 3.

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(ii) Other Areas -


See Map of NORD AFRIKA (2 Sheets) Att.

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.82.

NORD-AFRIKA

001319E


Sizilien
Catania
Malta
Golf von Gabes
Tripolis
Tripolitanien
Grosse Syrte
Kyrenaika
Bengasi
Mittel-Meer
Alexandrien
Kairo
Port Said
Damiette
Libysches Wüsten Plateau
Siwa
Ägypten
Assiut
Luksor
Assuan
Oasen von Kufra
Libysche Wüste
Fessan
Mursuk
Ghat
Hamada el-Hamra
Tibesti
Borku
Erdi
Tschad
Kanem
Bornu
Bagirmi
Wadai
Dar Fur
El Fascher
El Obeid
Wadi Halfa
Nubien
Dongola
Anglo-Ägyptischer Sudan
Omdurman
Khartum
Sudan
Faschoda
Mongalla
Kamerun
Adamaua
Ubangi-Schari
Sahara
Libreville
Fernando Po

0013206

G10

SECRET

Copy No. 65

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 103

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 1 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No. 80

PART 1

OPERATIONS

(i) NW AUSTRALIA Area -

DARWIN. 29 Nov 1240 hrs. Four enemy Zeros were over DARWIN and our AA shot down one plane.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR. 24 Nov. The Portuguese reported that an enemy tpt with one destroyer as escort, brought to DILLI a new comd and 2,000 tps. 26 Nov. 1000 Japs incl natives moved along the trail from AINARO to ATSABE which the Japs occupy by night. By day work is done on the rd from ATSABE to HATOLIA. This rd has been passable to MT since 24 Nov. There were indications that the Japs have endeavoured to open all rds in this area to MT. 27 Nov. Hy casualties were inflicted on 200 hostile natives who were led into a trap near MINDELO in the MAOBISSE area. The survivors fled in the direction of MAOBISSE.

EASTERN TIMOR. 26 Nov. It was reported that 100 Japs wearing camouflaged clothes, and natives on foot, entered OSSU, twelve mls South of BAUCAU, and later went North. They then returned to VINILALE, fifteen mls South by West of BAUCAU. 500 Japs unloaded trucks and probable tractors at the new wharf at LAGA. These were considered to be for aerodrome construction. 27 Nov. Fifteen trucks of Japs and natives arrived at LAGA and thirteen of these trucks proceeded East. The Japs have been building a new aerodrome at FUIJORO, near VILA DE AVIS, nine mls SE of LAUTEM.

(iii) NEW GUINEA -

LAE. 28 Nov. 1920 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed the aerodrome. Bombs fell among A/C on the SE end of the aerodrome and two received direct hits. Other A/C strafed grounded Zeros on the NE corner and several fires were started. On the SE corner, a large number of personnel were observed. 29 Nov 0315 hrs. Allied A/C dropped 640 bombs on the aerodrome, but results were NOT observed. There was hy AA opposition. 0552 hrs. Allied A/C again attacked the aerodrome, but the results were NOT observed. During 28/29 Nov. There was much A/C activity in and around the aerodrome.

GONA. 28 Nov. During the morning, a successful mortar shoot of 130 bombs was carried out on enemy posns by our tps advancing on SANANANDA along the SOPUTA track. Another of our patrols brought in 150 Rabaul natives. A small party of Japs, some without arms and eqpt was contacted by our tps one ml South of GONA. Others of our tps almost in GONA village met hy opposition. Throughout the night 28/29 Nov. harassing fire was directed against enemy posn and a stores-dump. Nov 29. Between 0930 hrs and 1120 hrs. Allied A/C made four attacks on GONA, and fires were started. An enemy wreck thought to be a supply dump, was hit by three 1,000 lb bombs. 1300 hrs. Our tps secured a footing on the SE corner of the GONA MISSION, but met with strong apposition from the North and West.

BUNA. 28 Nov, 1605 hrs. Allied A/C bombed the area and fires were started. 29 Nov. 0800 hrs. Allied patrols located and attacked with mortar fire enemy MG posns near the new strip, the results of this action are NOT known. Our arty fire was concentrated on the BUNA MISSION. 1815 Hrs. One Jap B supported by Zeros was over DOBODURA and PORLOCK HARBOUR.

KUMUSI RIVER. 29 Nov. It was reported that this area is clear of the enemy and that between 19 and 28 Nov. native patrols killed ninety-five Japs.

MILNE BAY. 29 Nov. 0224 hrs. Three to four enemy A/C approached from the direction of GOODENOUGH ISLAND and attacked the area near GURNEY FIELD, without causing damage or casualties

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

NEW BRITAIN. 29 Nov. 1155 hrs to 1335 hrs. Allied A/C attacked four enemy destroyers on a Westerly course approx twenty-five mls West by North of CAPE KING, ROOKE ISLAND. Several hits were made on one destroyer which was set on fire and was last seen motionless and listing badly. Another destroyer was hit twice and although heavily damaged, was seen to be moving slowly. A third destroyer was possibly hit but NO apparent damage was observed. 1710 hrs. Four destroyers were seen approx eighteen mls WNW of CAPE GLOUCESTER on a course East. 30 Nov 0230 hrs. Three destroyers were sighted approx forty-eight mls North by West of TALASEA on a course ENE.

(v) SOLOMON'S

BUKA PASSAGE. 29 Nov 1014 hrs. One destroyer and two med small tpts were sighted in BUKA PASSAGE.

BUIN-FAISI. 26 Nov. Air Ph Rs reveal four twin-engined hy B's, forty-one F's, and 13 FB's on the KAHILI aerodrome at BUIN. Two lt cruisers, twelve destroyers, one large tanker and ten cargo vessels were sighted in the area.

(vi) GENERAL

BURMA. 27 Nov. It was reported that 26,000 tons of shipping, incl four merchant vessels and one tanker, were at RANGOON.

INDIAN OCEAN. 28 Nov 1900 hrs. The German vessel "RAMSES" on route from KOBE to GERMANY via BATAVIA was scuttled approx 800 mls W by N of SHARK BAY WESTERN AUSTRALIA, when intercepted by Allied warships.

(Landops Revsit No. 122)

P A R T 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(ii) OTHER AREAS

See Map of the Mediterranean att.

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 82.

W/A

Appendix 3

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.104

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 2 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA -

DARWIN. 30 Nov 1059 hrs to 2030 hrs. Ten enemy A/C made three attacks on an Allied warship about 230 mls NW of DARWIN. Allied A/C sent to intercept, forced the enemy to jettison their bombs. One enemy B was possibly shot down and one Zero damaged.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 29 Nov 1330 hrs. One enemy destroyer and one tanker arrived at DILLI from the North. 30 Nov 0700 hrs. A small enemy merchant vessel arrived from the East.

LAGA. 30 Nov 0630 hrs. Sixteen trucks with tps and fifty tps on foot, moved from LAGA to the DILLI area. 0700 hrs. A ship arrived at LAGA. Later 500 Japs with thirty-nine trucks arrived at LAGA; two trucks proceeded CAILCAI, five mls South of LAGA.

MANATUTO. The Portuguese report that the Japs are digging in. All sources confirm a considerable increase in enemy eqpt and men during the past month.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE. 27 Nov. It was reliably reported that the Japs berth ships at LAE and then transport cargo to SALAMAUA in pinnaces. 30 Nov 0900 hrs. Eleven Fs were on LAE Aerodrome. Ph R revealed five med unserviceable Bs, one probable DB, thirteen serviceable and twenty-five unserviceable A/C on the aerodrome.

SALAMAUA. 29 Nov. As a result of consistent Allied bombing the enemy moved the majority of his tps and material from SALAMAUA to LABABIA, ten mls SSE of SALAMAUA. Recent Allied bombings killed a great number of natives working for the enemy in this area. It was reliably reported that there were NO Japs between LABABIA and PAIAWA, thirty-eight mls SE of SALAMAUA.

GONA-SANANANDA. 29 Nov. Allied arty with air observation sank four enemy barges and registered hits on several store houses at SANANANDA Pt. Our tps in the SE corner of GONA village were withdrawn out of range of hy enemy fire. Other tps met hy opposition 300 yrds East of GONA. Our attack was pressed on with arty and mortar sp on the SE and East of GONA. Some Allied tps were within 100 yds East of GONA. 30 Nov 0445 hrs. Allied A/C attacked and scored one hit and a very near miss on the wreck at GONA.

BUNA. 28 Nov 1930 hrs. Enemy A/C attacked two Allied warships about fourteen mls NE of BUNA. One enemy A/C was

probably shot down and another possibly damaged. 29 Nov 1145 hrs. One enemy B attacked PORLOCK Harbour but NO damage was done. 1800 hrs. Allied mortar fire destroyed an enemy MG posn between the two BUNA strips. A Jap attack to reoccupy the posn was dispersed with hy casualties. 30 Nov. Fwd Allied tps were in BUNA village but NO details were available. 0500 hrs. There were indications of enemy naval units seventy mls and ninety mls NNW of BUNA. Between 0730 hrs and 1850 hrs Allied A/C made four attacks in the BUNA area starting fires. Between 1320 hrs and 1530 hrs Allied patrolling A/C attacked twelve intercepting Zeros over DOBODURA. Seven enemy A/C were shot down.

PORT MORESBY (Ref Int Sum 103) 30 Nov 0330 hrs, an unknown number of enemy A/C raided PORT MORESBY for the ninety-first time. JACKSON'S FIELD was bombed but NO damage or casualties were reported.

(v) SOLOMON'S Area -

BUKA PASSAGE. 30 Nov 0820 hrs. Two destroyers and two 7000-ton tpts were seen in BUKA PASSAGE.

BUIN-FAISI. 30 Nov 1350 hrs. Six destroyers and four cargo vessels were seen in TONOLEI Harbour and three cargo vessels at SHORTLAND Island.

(Landops Revsit No.123)

P A R T 4

OTHER FRONTS -

Infm to 23 Nov

SEA:

Northern Waters -

During the week four more independently routed ships reached RUSSIA and three from RUSSIA reached ICELAND. A considerable reduction in enemy activity off NORWAY has been apparent since operations began in NORTH AFRICA.

North Africa -

A number of enemy submarines have been sunk in the Atlantic&Mediterranean near GIBRALTAR. Seven were sunk by surface craft, two by our submarines and one was torpedoed by naval A/C. This was the first time an A/C has torpedoed a submarine. A convoy from EGYPT and also two ships with food and personnel reached MALTA. This was the first from the Eastern end of the Mediterranean since Mar.

Solomons Area -

Night 13/14 Nov US forces claimed to have sunk one battleship, three hy cruisers, two light cruisers and five destroyers. A tp convoy heading towards GUADALCANAL was attacked by US A/C. Eight tpts were sunk and the remaining four were beached and destroyed later. Night 14/15 Nov US forces sank a further battleship three more hy cruisers and a destroyer.

Russian Front -

DON Sector. Several RUSSIAN divs with tk sp launched a strong attack in the KLETSKAYA area. Penetration was

effected against the RUMANIAN Army inflicting hy casualties.

Stalingrad Sector - A major break through was effected South of STALINGRAD. The thrust reached KALACH cutting the ry serving Axis forces East of the DON.

France:

Ten to twelve divs, incl 6, 7 and 10 armd divs have moved into the former unoccupied zones. Three ITALIAN divs, incl one mot div, have moved Eastwards over the frontier.

Corsica:

One ITALIAN div is estimated to be in this area.

Tunisia:

The Axis strength on 21 Nov 42 was estimated at 12,000, and was being reinforced.

Libya:

Bad weather was delaying operations. It was reported that TOBRUK port was serviceable.

Burma:

Japs were patrolling in the CHIN HILLS SW from KALEMYO and West from KHAM. Limited activity was continuing in UPPER BURMA and AKYAB area.

(World Revsit w/e 23 Nov 42).

PART 5.

SECURITY:

An article which appeared in the Courier Mail BRISBANE, and which contravenes many principles of Security, discloses the location of the formation, the names of comds and the numbers of original members of unit.

The disclosure of names of senior comds is one of the most fruitful methods of identifying formations and units, and thereby building up an Order of Battle.

In the present instance it may possibly be thought that the enemy already knew that 6 Aust Div was in NEW GUINEA, but in this connection it is interesting to note that a recently captured Jap document reveals that the enemy believed that 6 Aust Div (reconstituted) was in NEW GUINEA.

It may also be thought that the contents of articles in Australian newspapers cannot reach the enemy. This is far from being the case, for NOT only do our papers go to neutral countries, and to such countries as EGYPT, where enemy agents can readily see them, but instances have occurred of articles appearing in the Australian press being commented on by Jap broadcasts within a few days of publication.

So long as the Press is permitted to publish articles of this nature giving away information to the enemy, the efforts of the postal censorship and the Security orders and instns issued to tps to prevent the disclosure of the identity of formations, their composition and movements, are NOT only rendered abortive but ridiculous.

The following is the article referred to

AMONG 6 DIV UP IN NEW GUINEA

"Amst tps now fighting the Japanese in NEW GUINEA incl the famous 6 Div of the AIF, which took part in the campaigns in LIBYA, GREECE, CRETE and SYRIA.

In less that 2 years since they first went into action in LIBYA in Dec 40, these men have fought in four continents, which they claim is unparalleled in history. They have fought against tps of 4 nationalities - Italians, Germans, Vichy French and Japanese.

During the last few months practically every senior comd in the NEW GUINEA army has been held by an offr of the original 6 Div of Dec 40. Tps of the div spent less than 6 weeks in Aust between their return from the M.E. and their departure for NEW GUINEA.

VETERANS FROM GREECE.

Even before they went into action in NEW GUINEA, NO British div had seen such varied service.

The div fought through the first LIBYAN campaign and in Greece, and about half of the survivors of the Greek campaign fought in Crete.

Within a few weeks after the evacuation of Crete 3 bns of the div - the 2/3, 2/5 and 2/1 Bns - were in action in Syria.

The 4 brigs of 6 div, as it was then it went into action in Dec 40, and 9 of its cols are now generals. They are Maj-Gens H.F.Berrimen, W.J.Allen, H.C.H.Robertson, S.F.Savige, V.H.Berryman, and A.S.Vasey. At least 40 of the div's original offrs are now commanding bdes, as are 3 of its original majs - D.Macarthur-Onslow, R.King, and S.H.Porter.

Casualties, sickness and transfers have robbed the veteran units of many of their originals, but, when the bns returned to Aust each of them still had from 400 to 500 of its original members still with it."

(MO Int Sum No.27).

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution:

3 Aust Div	1 - 27	GOC	57
1 Aust Mot Bde	28 - 33	GSRA	58
2/1 Aust Cav Regt	34	CE	59
5 Aust MG Bn	35	CSO	60
2/1 Aust MG Bn	36	G(O)	61
4 Aust A/S Control	37	DA & QMG	62
3 Aust A/L Sec	38	DDST	63
HQ RA 2 Aust Corps	39	DDMS	64
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	40	DDOS	65
8 Aust Fd Regt	41	First Aust Army	66
1 Aust Med Regt	42	32 US Div	67
2 Aust F Sp Bty	43	Qld L of C	68
2/1 Aust F Sp Bty	44	Office of Int Officer	
HQ RAM 2 Aust Corps	45	HQ Base Sec 3	
10 Aust Fd Coy	46	APO 923	69
19 Aust A Fd Coy	47	1 Aust A/L Sec	77
60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy	48	War Diary	78
2/3 Aust Ord A Fd Wksh	49		
Sigs 2 Aust Corps	50		
HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	51		
HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	52		
HQ 2 Aust Corps TpsCol	53		
HQ 1 Aust Corps TpsCol	54		
22 Aust Fd Amb	55		
2 Aust CCS	56		

G(O)

BK 3/12.

Appendix 4

SECRET

Copy No. 61

GSI

HQ " AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.105

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 3 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA -

WYNDHAM. 1 Dec 1235 hrs. One enemy a/c was reported high over the town heading North.

(ii) N.E.I. Area --

MAKASSAR STRAIT. 30 Nov. 1000 hrs. An enemy naval force consisting of one a/c carrier, one hy cruiser and one destroyer were sighted thirty-five mls NNW of TAMU BAY (West coast of CELEBES IS.) on a course SSE.

TIMOR 1 Dec. Between 1000 hrs and 1932 hrs. Enemy a/c made six attacks on Allied warships in an area approx 100 mls SE of SUAI, thirteen mls SW of BECO. There are NO further details.

2035 hrs. Two cruisers were sighted thirty-five mls SSE of SUAI, course East. At 2100 hrs Allied a/c attacked one on an Easterly course approx forty-five mls SSE of SUAI, but the bombs overshot the target.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE 29 Nov. 0552 hrs. Allied a/c attacked grounded a/c on the aerodrome. They also strafed the sides of the runway, but results were NOT observed.

1 Dec. It is now believed that the enemy are using HOPOI for the night dispersal of a/c from LAE. Natives report that enemy supplies reach LAE by submarine.

SALAMAUA. JAWANI IS., seventeen mls SE SALAMAUA. It is reliably reported that enemy S/Ps occasionally use the area as a landing place.

GONA-SANANANDA. 1 Dec 0105 hrs. Three enemy barges which attempted to land East of GONA village were driven off. Our tps successfully cleared six enemy MG posns and a pocket of thirty Japs, approx 1,000 yards East of GONA Mission. The enemy, wearing life-belts attempted to escape by swimming from the beach.

1 Dec 1000 hrs. Four destroyers were sighted sixteen mls SW by West of CAPE ORFORD, NEW BRITAIN, course West. Between 1500 hrs and 0130 hrs Dec 2, Allied a/c made several attacks on these ships whilst approaching GONA. There was a probable near miss on one destroyer. Our a/c, which were shadowing and attacking these destroyers, were intercepted on five occasions by enemy fighters, varying in number up to thirty a/c. As a result of these engagements, twelve Zeros were destroyed and two damaged.

Contd.

1 Dec. Our tps, advancing on SANANANDA from the South, are making progress and have captured three enemy trucks.

BUNA, 30 Nov. Ph R reveals that the main enemy defence line extends from the North end of the Eastern strip Westward along the rd North of the main strip, then along South of the coconut plantation to A/A posn, 1,000 yards SSE of the BUNA Mission. A strong MG posn is located West of the main strip at a point where the rd enters the coconut plantation, approx 2,000 yards SE of BUNA Mission.

Between 30 Nov 2335 hrs and 1 Dec 1355 hrs. Allied a/c made five attacks on enemy installations in the BUNA area. Bombs fell on the BUNA aerodrome and GIROPA POINT and many fires were started. Enemy A/A gunners were strafed and casualties inflicted. One seventy-five ton vessel was observed apparently sinking off the point near the runway and a twelve foot boat was seen twelve mls North and heading for BUNA.

Our attack continues, hy arty fire being concentrated on the BUNA Mission.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA 1 Dec. 1150 hrs. One destroyer and two tpts accompanied by one submarine were observed to leave BUKA on a NW course.

PASSAGE

BUIN FAISI. 1 Dec 0222 hrs. Allied a/c bombed KAHILI aerodrome. Bombs fell in the target area and one grounded enemy a/c was destroyed.

0825 hrs, One hy and one light cruiser were sighted thirty mls East by South of FAISI, course West.

NEW GEORGIA. 30 Nov. A native report states that thirteen Japs landed from life-boats near BILI ENTRANCE, the Northern extremity of GATUKAI IS.

GUADALCANAL, 1 Dec 0856 hrs. Twelve enemy a/c were seen approx sixty-one mls WNW of LUNGA POINT. (Landops Revsit 124).

PART 2

ENEMY: SUMMARY OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS and SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRENGTH

GENERAL:

Since the defeat of the enemy naval force in the engagement of 14-16 Nov, and his consequent failure to land additional tps on GUADALCANAL, there are many indications that the enemy has turned his attention to the NEW GUINEA zone. There is definite infm that he has decided to hold the GONA-BUNA area as long as possible, and several indications that extensive preparations have been made for increasing his hold on LAE and SALAMAUA, and for developing his air landing grounds at WEWAK, MADANG, Cape GLOUCESTER and GASMATA. At the same time, this increased enemy interest and activity in TIMOR may mean either that he is extremely nervous of our intentions in that area or that he himself comtemplates offensive operations.

NEW GUINEA:

The outstanding development in this zone has been the enemy's last-minute stand in the GONA-BUNA Area. Our forces first met considerable resistance north of SOPUTA on 20 Nov.

Since then resistance has hardened, and the enemy's defensive posns appear to have been carefully prepared with MG and mortar emplacements, and in some localities with wire. Resistance has now been maintained for seven days from three main centres: BUNA itself from Cape ENDAIADERE to the swamps near BUNA Mission, around Capes SARAMATA and KILLERTON, and near GONA. The enemy has made several attempts to reinforce these areas in the last 10 days, some of which are known to have been successful. It has been established that at least part of one fresh Special Naval Landing Party has been landed recently. Total reinforcements are probably between 1500 and 3000 and the total enemy forces in the area from 4000 to 5000. The enemy has also been developing LAE and SALAMAUA as a fortress, and has again brought his landing strips at LAE into full commission, whilst his repair and maintainance installations have been built up. Present estimates of his air strength at LAE are 25 fighters and 15 bombers. In addition his control of the area South of SALAMAUA has been assisted by the occupation of a village opposite LABABIA Is. as a base of supply for MUBO.

SOLOMONS:

The increased activity in NEW GUINEA has been accompanied by a marked falling off in enemy effort in the SOLOMONS. The number of ships sighted in the BUIN-FAISI area has dropped from 49 vessels on 1 Nov and 33 on 13 Nov to 15 on 26 Nov.

TIMOR:

On 20 Nov a large enemy bomber landed at DILLI from the West and was met by 4 staff cars with a H/C escort. This was followed three days later by the arrival of some tps by air. These events coincide with a further increase in Jap activity in the Island. Renewed attempts are being made to clear up the continued resistance of our force in the N.E. area, and the nine major anchorages on the North coast of PORTUGUESE TIMOR have been occupied. In addition, there has been an increase in enemy bomber strength at KENDARI, and several raids have been made on DARWIN, incl three in the last four days. More attention than usual has been paid to recce over the NW coast of Aust from DARWIN to perhaps as far South as DERBY. On the naval side, it is worthwhile noting that the number of Jap 6" cruisers in the NW sector has increased from 2 on 5 Nov to 7 on 27 Nov.

(Adv Allied Land Forces Int Sum 17).

SECURITY: PART 5

FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITY in AUSTRALIA:

(To be repeated in all Int Summaries)

An important angle of Fifth Column activity regularly practised by the Axis powers has been, and still is, to create dissension and ill-feeling between Britain and her Allies.

One of the methods used is to capitalise any incidents involving differences of opinion or view-point, and to engineer, or foster, any opportunity of arousing jealousy or ill-feeling between the Allies, both amongst civilians and members of the fighting services.

SECRET

When such incidents occur the facts are skilfully twisted and exaggerated, and then used as propaganda with the objects of -

(a) Creating or widening any gap that might exist,
(b) Bolstering up the morale of the Axis people,&
(c) Swaying neutral opinion away from the Allies.

Reference has been made in FAA Int Summaries to the insidious Jap "Batavia" broadcasts.

Two examples of these are quoted:-

(1) On 29 Sep references were made, implying that Aust is rent with internal dissension, and is economically and financially unsound. It spoke of "open disagreement with the Labour Govt," to strikes and shortages, increases in commodity prices and poor response to the Austerity Loan.

(2) On 9 Nov attempts were made to create ill-feeling between Aust and America thus:-

References were made to trouble and expense caused by the presence of American tps in Aust. "America's interest in Aust is only strategic" is a catch-phrase both in Tokyo and Batavia, and Australians are warned that in the event of an Allied victory they will find themselves "bound head and foot to the dollar imperialism of the US."

Clashes between Australian and American tps were also referred to.

There are, unfortunately, in Aust irresponsible - or worse - elements, whose ill-considered actions play right into the hands of enemy Fifth Columnists, and it is certain that they make full use of them. An instance of this occurred on the night 26 Nov at BRISBANE, when a member of the American military police attempted to arrest an American soldier who was in the company of an Australian soldier at a canteen. According to reports, the Australian resented the arrest of his American companion and struck the M.P., which led to a first-class "brawl" between American and Australian soldiers on the one hand, and American Provost personnel and some others, on the other. Shooting took place with the result that one soldier was killed and a number of casualties occurred.

This incident - serious enough in itself but NOT apparently premeditated - was seized upon by some ill-disposed persons and feeling was inflamed so that on the following night, 27 Nov, a much uglier incident occurred. It appears that from reports organised gangs set out to "beat up" any Americans they could find, and had it NOT been for prompt action by the authorities concerned, a very dangerous situation might have developed. As it was there were a number of casualties. It must be impressed upon all ranks that this kind of thing is exactly what the enemy wants; and is what his Fifth Columnists are always trying to foster.

Any indication of such trouble brewing should immediately be reported to Unit Security Offrs or Fd Security personnel. Assisting or failing to report this activity is equivalent to FIGHTING FOR THE ENEMY.

(Adv Allied Land Forces Int Sum 17)

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

Q4 and 5

W/D

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 106

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 4 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No. 80.

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA

DARWIN. 2 Dec. (Ref Int Sums 104 and 105) An Allied warship which was attacked by Jap A/C three times 30 Nov and twice 1 Dec arrived at DARWIN. 1154 hrs. An enemy A/C flew over DARWIN from the East to the West.

(ii) N.E.I. Area

TIMOR. 2 Dec 1002 hrs. Allied A/C strafed the aerodrome at PENFOEI Fifteen to eighteen med B's (incl five observed burning) and two or three Zeros, were considered damaged. A fuel dump was set on fire and a column of smoke, five hundred feet high, was visible for fifty mls.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area

LAE. 2 Dec 0800 hrs. Ten Zeros were seen on the aerodrome.

GONA. 1 Dec. Allied forces advancing from the South passed through GONA and were then held up by MG fire from the North and NW. 2 Dec. Allied patrols were active. There was slight enemy activity. Seventy natives were captured and thirty-four Japs buried by our forces between one and two mls East of GONA MISSION. 0635 hrs. Allied A/C attacked small enemy boats in the area. Two empty barges were destroyed and the GONA wreck strafed. Two other barges each carrying twenty Japs, were sunk two or three mls NW of the GONA wreck. Some enemy activity was seen on MANGROVE ISLAND.

BUNA. 1 Dec. Ph R showed the greatest enemy activity in a narrow wooded sec adjoining the main runway on the North and extending around the SE end of the main runway between the two strips. In the late afternoon, Allied forces attacked North along the DOBODURA-BUNA rd from a posn 300 yds South of the rd junc (200 yds from the Western end of the new strip) in conjunction with Allied forces attacking West along the Southern edge of the new strip about 400 yds from the rd. Some of our forces which were advancing West along the North edge of the new strip, were held up 600 yds East of the DOBODURA-BUNA rd while others on the immediate right were attacking NW. There were some Allied forces on the South edge of BUNA village and patrols were operating across ENTRANCE CREEK. Between 0500 hrs and 0820 hrs Allied A/C made four attacks on enemy installations in the area. Fires were started and an MG post at GIROPA PT was silenced. Fifteen Jap A/C, believed F's, were seen air-borne ten mls SE of BUNA. Large fires appeared to be burning between the North end of the strip and BUNA. 1000 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the area between WAITUTU PT and CAPEKILLERTON and fires were seen over the entire area.

Allied A/C made eight attacks on four Jap destroyers approaching the BUNA Area. A hit on one destroyer was seen and there were near misses on others. Our A/C were twice intercepted by as many as twenty Zeros. Six Jap F's were shot down and probably three others. Some air crews claimed that one of the destroyers was an A/C Carr. The vessels were last seen heading North from BUNA. There was nothing to indicate that a landing or embarkation had taken place.

(iv) ISMARCK'S Area -

NEW BRITAIN. 2 Dec. 0950 hrs. One 4,000 ton cargo vessel and one escort vessel were sighted seventy mls NNW of CAPE HOLLMAN, WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA, on a course West.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

NEW GEORGIA. 29 Nov. Fourteen enemy barges arrived at TURO-VILU ISLAND in BEAGLE CHANNEL, VELLAIAVELLA ISLAND. NO Japs were seen on the island. 1 Dec. 1215 hrs. Some enemy were seen on LUNGA PT on GANONGGA ISLAND.

BUIN-FAISI. 2 Dec. 0703 hrs. Nine destroyers, one sloop, two tankers and five cargo vessels were in the area.

(Landops Revsit No. 125)

P A R T 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(11) Other Areas -

Access to the MARKHAM VALLEY from the South - See Appx "A" and Map Att.

P A R T 5

SECURITY:

RETICENCE OF BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR

At Hongkong in February, 1942, a Japanese officer attempted to persuade seven members of the Hongkong Volunteer Defence Corps who had been captured to reveal the working of their 4" guns. The men, a Sergeant, Lance/Bombardier and five gunners, were taken from the Prisoner of War Camp, given a good meal and cigarettes, and then taken to their guns at the war stations.

The gunners were models of ignorance; some "had always been numbers 5 and 6 and knew nothing of the mechanism, or the duties of other numbers; some had just joined the Volunteers (two actually had over three years service) and had not been taught anything about the guns". The sergeant and Lance-Bombardier could not claim such alibis, so they asked for the breech - it was not there; the range finder - it was not there; the D.R.F. - everything had gone but the actual gun. This lack of essential material so completely defeated the Non Commissioned Officers that they could hardly recognize the guns, let alone describe the mechanism.

The Japanese officer was very annoyed and expressed his annoyance in no uncertain manner. They were then asked if they knew anything about STANLEY. They knew where it was but were completely ignorant of its guns and defences. They were returned to camp and not questioned again.

(Adv LHQ Int Summary No. 17)

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 104.

Appx "A" to HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELL SUMMARY No. 106.

ACCESS TO THE MARKHAM VALLEY FROM THE SOUTH

1. Air Communication:

There are many landing grounds in the area, some of which provide opportunity for extension to operational dimensions. In many parts the flat open nature of the country would permit of preparation with comparatively little labour.

Main aerodromes and landing grounds, from North to South, are as follows ([redacted]):-

(a) MALAHANG - Runway 600 yds by 90 yds, running NW-SE. Recent extension is probable.

(b) LAE - Runway 1500 yds by 50 yds, running NW-SE. Used as operational aerodrome by Japanese. Recent extension probable.

(c) SALAMAUA - Runway 1250 yds by 35 yds, running NE-SW. Used as operational aerodrome by Japanese. Recent extension probable.

(d) KUBO - A small single strip 300 yds by 57 yds, NOT possible to extend. Has been used only twice, once disastrously.

(e) WARI INLET - Suitable for seaplane base. Considerable sheet of water approx 2 mls long. 6' to 8' deep, mud bottom, no snags, sides carrying much overhanging vegetation, giving cover from air and land. Practically landlocked from the North, giving cover from sea.

(f) DONA - Runway was previously 800 yds long, but landslides in hill in Jan 42 caused considerable shortening. AAF reported in Jul that this strip had been/made permanently unserviceable.

(g) There is much flat grassed country in the vicinity of DONA particularly just South of KOBO, also between ZAKA Mission and the mouth of the WARIA, and along the left bank as far as TSIU. Further, there is a considerable area of flat land at PAI-AWA.

(h) ONO - Runway 600 yds by 60 yds, running WNW-ESE, falling 1 in 20 towards East. Could be extended to take all types of A/C by cutting grass.

(i) JUNI - Runway 525 yds by 75 yds, running NE-SSW. Surrounded by Kunai River flats.

(j) GARINA - Runway 800 yds by 75 yds, running NW-SE. Could be extended to 2 mls in any direction by cutting grass. Usable in all weather.

(k) PANCAKE - Runway 475 yds by 55 yds, running NW-SE. NOT possible to extend, unsuitable for forced landing owing to dead air pocket.

(l) IOMA - Runway at least 700 yds long. Has been used by tri-motored planes, but classed only as Emergency Landing Ground. There is NO evidence of use by Japanese.

(m) BUNA - Main runway 1300 yds by 90 yds, running NW-SE. The Japanese have constructed a new E-W strip 570 yds by 60 yds, evidently NOT yet in use.

(n) YODDA - Runway 700 yds by 50 yds, running NE-SW. Use of aerodrome NOT advisable after midday because of cross currents. Usable in all weathers.

(o) KOKODA - Runway 930 yds by 88 yds, running N-S. Timber is cleared for considerable distance at each end, and for at least a chain on each side. Usable in all weathers.

(p) Grassland areas suitable for establishment as landing grounds exist at DOBODURA, KAKANDETTA and DIVINI-KOARI.

There are landing grounds also at BULOWAT, BULOLO, BULWA, BULIDOG, GABENZIS, MARILINAN, NARAKAPOR, NADZAB, SUNRISE CREEK, SUNSHINE, WAHPIT, WAU (recently improved) and ZENAG.

2. Land Communications:

There is a well-travelled route leading from KOKODA to the MARKHAM River, a similarly much used coastal route from BUNA to the MARKHAM involving the use of canoes in the Northern part, and also access to the MARKHAM from the GULF of PAPUA by way of the LAKEKAMU and TAURI Rivers.

Between the coast and these main Northerly routes there are numerous lateral tracks.

Main Northerly and lateral routes are as follows:-

ROUTE No. 1. KOKODA - NADZAB (on MARKHAM R.)

KOKODA to KUAMA - distance 65-70 mls - 7 days' walking.
First and second days, KOKODA to KARUKARU; over flattish alluvial country and small hills, passing through YODDA mining settlement which is only eight mls from KOKODA (Strat Map incorrect). Third day, KARUKARU to BURI; Fairly easy going over country gradually becoming flatter.
Fourth day, BURI to UAIU; generally descending fast, passes through KARAMA (should be on right bank of CHIRIMA River) and KANDALANA; from KARAMA vegetation changes from grass and secondary growth to hy forest.
Fifth day, UAIU to TOWEDA; Along right bank of CHIRIMA through very rough country.
Sixth day, TOWEDA (YONGAIA village) to GARIMA; over ridges, crossing improvised bridge, with steep ascent to GARIMA.
.X/ Seventh day, GARIMA to KUAMA; steep descent/with steep ascent, then more rough country to KUAMA.

KUAMA to GOILALA (MT CHAMBERLAIN) - Two days' walking (native report). Track traverses high country throughout and crosses several tributaries of the Upper GIULU River.

GOILALA to GARAINA - distance 50-55 mls.
Steep country for first day to MIRI. Open grassy country with occasional patches of scrub, along the western side of AIBALA Valley on second day, to PONI. Thereafter, native reports state, a range with grassland plateau on top, at an altitude of 7000 feet, is crossed, down to the head of the BUBU River. There is a good side-cut track down to the BUBU.

GARAINA to WAU - six days' walking.
First day, GARAINA to BAPI; open grass flats, passing ONO and crossing ONO River at TIMANAGOSA.
Second day, BAPI to BUSUI; grass country with a few patches of timber, along south side of WARIA River.

.X./ = from GARIMA Rest House, then rugged country, cross CHIRIMA

Third day, BUSUI to NAGO; steep grass ridges, then heavily timbered country rising to 9000 feet about the head of the WARIA, then down into BIARU Valley.
Fourth and fifth days, NAGO to WURI WURI; along BIARU Valley then up through rain forest at 8000 feet altitude; wild rough country with no native population, then down through hy timber, followed by steep grass ridges down into BULOLO Valley.
Sixth day, WURI WURI to WAU; good track through KAISINIK village, down BULOLO River crossing it over wire bridge, thence along motor road to WAU.

WAU to NADZAB - distance 36 hrs' walking.
First stage, WAU to SUNSHINE; good motor rd, but frequent landslides, with fair amount of cover available; rd passes through BULOLO and BULWA.
Second stage, SUNSHINE to ZENAG; good mule track through open kunai country, crossing several streams.
Third stage, ZENAG to WAMPIT; mule track over steep country for three mls rising to 3700 feet at PATEP, then down grade through mixed timber and grass, crossing several streams, through TIMUI to WAMPIT.
Fourth stage, WAMPIT to NADZAB; good broad track but boggy in wet weather, through BANKORA and BOBS; through hy grass with a few patches of timber near WAMPIT. The MARKHAM River is crossed by canoe.

There are two routes from the west coast linking up with Route No.1. One, suitable for mule traffic, runs from HALL SOUND and joins Route No.1 just South of Mt CHAMBERLAIN. The other leads from REDSCAR BAY through [illegible] No.1 [illegible] 20 mls provide difficult going over high mountains.

ROUTE No.2. KOKODA - NADZAB.

There is another approach from KOKODA to NADZAB by way of WASIDA, HORATA, OINTATANDI, KORISATA, PETAKAIARI, IOMA, TAKINUMU, SIDEMA, ASSMA, and PEILA, joining Route A at GARAINA. In the main this route traverses open grass and light forest country, with several canoes crossings over streams.

ROUTE No.3. GULF OF PAPUA to NADZAB.

Access to WAU, thence to the MARKHAM Valley from the GULF OF PAPUA may be obtained by way of the LAKEKAMU River and BULLDOG. The trip involves 90 mls by launch up the river to BULLDOG, thence 55 to 60 mls overland to WAU.

Launches up to 3'6" draught can proceed to BULLDOG, the trip occupying a minimum of 2 days. On the overland section jeeps could be used in parts, and mules in most parts. The route lies chiefly over fairly flat land covered with grass or timber, with one range 8500 feet high to be crossed. The overland portion occupies 7 days, the track passing through DEAD CHINAMAN, MIDDLE CAMP, WATERBUNG, DRYWATER, [illegible]DJERU and WINI[illegible]

ROUTE No.4. GULF OF PAPUA TO NADZAB.

Further access to the MARKHAM from the South coast lies up the TAURI River to the Government Depot, thence following the river fairly closely NW and North, through MENYAMA, OLD EFAPAN [illegible] TUT River to the MARKHAM.

The launch journey from the mouth of the TAURI to the Government depot takes two or three days, thence it is "several weeks" trip to MENYAMA. Details of this part of the route

are NOT available. From MENYAMA to MARILINAN the track is mostly over open grass with patches of timber for a distance of 50 mls, with elevations up to 6000 feet. The track from MARILINAN to MARI (on the MARKHAM) provides generally good going, with some swamp country over the last few mls.

ROUTE No.5. BUNA TO MARKHAM RIVER.

A coastal track which provides good going throughout for foot traffic, exists from BUNA to AMOA, thence by canoe to DUALI (on NASSAU BAY), and along a litteral track from DUALI through SALAMAUA to the MARKHAM. There are several canoe crossings necessary over the mouths of rivers.

SALAMAUA can be by-passed by making use ofthe MAI-AMA-GARAINA route (No.8) PAI-AWA-BAPI (No.7) SIPOMA - BAPI (No. 6) or the BITOI track, thence suing the WARIA and BULOLO Valley route (No.1) to NADZAB or MARKHAM POINT.

The coastal track, which follows the sea closely throughout, ends at AMOA, whereafter there is NO coastal route except by sea as far as DUALI. Walking conditions are easy.

LATERAL ROUTES.

ROUTE No.6. SIPOMA TO BAPI (UPPER WARIA).

Distance 5 to 7 days. This is a native track only, used for hunting and trading. It passes through rugged bush country rising to elevations of 7000 feet in BOWUTU RANGE; mountainous all the way; uninhabited in central portion. This track was made during the time of German occupation, and it has NOT been used since except by natives. As a result it has now become overgrown, but could be cleared again fairly easily.

ROUTE No.7. PAI-AWA to BAPI.

Distance 4½ days. An old, little used track passing over hard, rough country. There are NO natives nor camps in the area traversed.

ROUTE No.8. MAI-AMA to GARAINA.

Distance 7 days. A very rough track used only by natives. There are NO natives nor camps in the area. The track passes through a saddle in the BOWUTU Range near the source of the ORIPA River.

ROUTE No.9. MOROBE to PANCAKE AERODROME.

Distance 4 days. The track, which provides reasonably good going throughout, passes through ZARA, PEMA, GOBI, OPUPURO and ARO. Food is generally plentiful along the route.

ROUTE No.10. MOROBE TOWAU,

Distance 11 days. This track passes from MO through ANNA, TIWA, ARU, GARAINA, BAPI, BUSUI, NAGO, WURI WURI to WAU. It provides good going for pedestrians.

ROUTE No.11. MOROBE to IOMA.

This track passes over much rough country which is suitable only for foot traffic even in dry weather. There are many steep grades, some of which are too steep for mules. The track passes through ZAPA ("SAPPA" on Strat Map), crossing the WARIA River, WOMO Creek, WUMU River, EIA River, the GIRA at WADI, through GINEMAI, along the left bank of the MAMBARE, and then up TAMATA Creek to IOMA.

ROUTE No.12. WASIDA - IOMA - MAMBARE BEACH.

This track leaves the BUNA - KOKODA Rd near WASIDA Rest House and over easy country passes through OINTATANDI, KORISATA, to PETAKAIARI (OPI River). Thereafter there is rough broken country with some patches of bad swamp through GAIARI, over MT GREEN, which is precipitous, then over hilly forest country to the MAMBARE River. The GIRA River is crossed at WADI and followed downstream to AINSI whence the track leads over thick undulating forest country to MANAU, thence down the coast to DUVIRA.

ROUTE No.13. SANANANDA to WAIROPI.

Prior to Jap occupation a fair motor rd ran from SANANANDA through POPONDETTA to ANDEMBA, crossing the track from BUNA to KOKODA. Since the Jap acquired KOKODA, however, it is understood that the MT rd has been extended to WAIROPI. This rd presents NO difficulties except in wet weather.

ROUTE No.14. BUNA to IOMA.

This route follows the BUNA - KOKODA track for 13 mls, then turns off through AHORA, OHBA, HAMBURATA (from which a bad track leads to GONA), then over grass areas and by forest patches through HAUGATA, KUKUMBATA, GIRIGIRITA, SAGERI, and OROSUSU, joining the WASIDA - IOMA track just below OINTATANDI.

11 4 6

Subject: FIRST AUST ARMY TRAINING INSTRUCTION No 13.

HQ First Aust Army
4 Dec 42
G(SD) 3565

2 Aust Corps (190)
3 Aust Armd Div (35)
5 Aust Div (50)
TORRES STRAIT Force (6)
CRE First Aust Army Tps (12)
2/3 Aust Indep Coy
2/8 Aust Indep Coy
2 ARD
Copy to:
1 US Corps
BRA
CSO
A
Q
CE
First Aust Army Junior Staff School
First Aust Army Junior Tactical School
First Aust Army Gas School
First Aust Army AASC School
First Aust Army Adm (NCOs) School
First Aust Army MT School
First Aust Army Weapon Trg School
First Aust Army MR & FS School
First Aust Army CTS
First Aust Army Sig School

Reference G(SD)3492 of 28 Nov 42 not to all addressees.

GUERILLA WARFARE

1. It is desired that guerilla warfare training be gradually developed throughout First Aust Army until all personnel in units, particularly infantrymen, are thoroughly grounded in the principles of this type of warfare.

All personnel will not be suited to guerilla work but the general effect of such training will be to make individuals more self-reliant and useful, and will provide a source from which additional guerilla units can be formed if required.

SELECTION OF INSTRUCTORS

2. To achieve value from this form of training it is absolutely essential that personnel selected for training as instructors should be carefully chosen for their suitability for guerilla work and for their enthusiasm. They must be young, physically fit, possessed of imagination, self-reliant and capable of leading and caring for men when thrown on their own resources in sparsely populated or uncivilized areas.

TRAINING OF INSTRUCTORS.

3. (a) Initial cadres. Arrangements have been made with LHQ for a guerilla cadre course to be run for three weeks commencing 24 Dec 42. Vacancies have already been allotted for this course in G(SD)3492 of 28 Nov 42.

(b) Unit cadres. On completion of the LHQ school qualified students will be used by formations to conduct formation courses with the object of training (as instructors) a minimum of one officer and one NCO per

infantry battalion and equivalent unit. In addition one officer per brigade should be trained in guerilla methods.

UNIT TRAINING.

4. (a) As soon as its GR cadre has been trained, each unit will initiate GR instruction by training a proportion of sub-units and, when these reach a reasonable standard, will extend the training to successive sub-units in stages as indicated below:-

(i) One section per rifle company or equivalent sub-unit.
(ii) One section per platoon or equivalent sub-unit.
(iii) Two sections per platoon or equivalent sub-unit.
(iv) All platoons of rifle companies or equivalent sub-unit.

This will ensure that in the event of a unit being involved in active operations before instruction in this subject has been completed beyond the first stage, there will be available in each company etc a nucleus suitable to undertake special GR tasks, if required.

(b) Engineers should be used to assist in teaching the use and methods of handling mines, booby traps and explosives generally. LHQ assistance has been requested in the provision of the necessary equipment and experienced personnel to train a team of instructors in this work, and when these are available it is proposed to conduct special courses in this work.

TRAINING SUBJECTS

5. Some aspects of guerilla training which will require special emphasis are -

(a) Map reading and direction finding by compass, stars and other aids.

(b) Night work.

(c) Use of explosives - demolitions, booby traps etc and methods of countering enemy use of mines and booby traps.

(d) Reconnaissance reports of various types.

(e) Message writing.

(f) Elementary signalling including visual methods.

(g) Knowledge and practice in use of own and enemy weapons.

(h) General toughening, cover and camouflage, bushcraft and ability to improvise from local resources including use of native foods.

(i) Unarmed combat.

J.F. Boase

Maj-Gen
GS First Aust Army

Appendix 7

G 18.76

2 Aust Corps,
4 Dec 42.

2 AUST CORPS OP INSTN NO 5.

AMENDMENT NO 1

1. Para 9 - insert at end of present para:-

"BRIBIE ISLAND and CALOUNDRA are also incl in the area of operational responsibility of QUEENSLAND L of C Area"

2. Para 10 - insert at end of present para:-

"Excl BRIBIE ISLAND and CALOUNDRA. These areas will be the responsibility of QUEENSLAND L of C Area."

3. Role - QUEENSLAND L of C para 15. Insert at end of present para:-

"QUEENSLAND L of C will also be responsible for the defence of BRIBIE ISLAND and the local defence of CALOUNDRA.

R.K. Macarthur Graham Lt Col
for BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

Distribution:

3 Aust Div
1 Aust Mot Bde
Indep Units 7 Aust Div
32 U S Div
3 L of C Sub-Area
QUEENSLAND L of C Area
21 Aust Cav Re gt
5 Aust M G Bn
5 A C Sqn
4 A S Control
GOC
CCRA
CE
CSO
A
Q
DDMS
DDST
DDOS
First Aust Army
NSW L of C Area
File
War Diary.✓

G-(O) Rec'd

S E C R E T

Copy No. 61

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.107

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 5 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80

P A R T 1

O P E R A T I O N S:

(i) NW Australia

DARWIN. 3 Dec 1108 hrs. Three Jap A/C circled over the town and then departed over CHARLES PT.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 26 Nov. An unconfirmed report stated that 500 Japs arrived at ERMERA, eighteen mls SW of DILLI. 29 Nov. There were tp movements in the vicinity of HERAI, eight mls East of DILLI and a staff car and two MCs arrived there from DILLI.
30 Nov. Six trucks of enemy tps towing large guns passed HERAI, moving East. There was one enemy ship off LAGA which appears to be a distributing pt for the Japs in the Eastern province. It was reported that the Japs intend to build an air field at NOVA NAZARE, ten mls East of LAUTEM. The Japs were entrenched at ATSABE. 1 Dec 1045 hrs. Enemy A/C bombed BETANO and at 1545 hrs it was machine-gunned. 2 Dec. Twenty trucks arrived at DILLI from the West. It was reported that some tps landed at LAUTEM and moved East.

DUTCH TIMOR. 2 Dec 1000 hrs. A possible staff car and twelve M/T were seen on the rd from OESAPABESAR, five mls East of KOEPANG, to PENFOEI. Some M/T on the rd from BABAOE, fourteen mls ENE of KOEPANG to OESAPABESAR.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LORENGAU 3 Dec. Allied recce A/C observed NO enemy activity. The aerodrome appeared unused.

PORT MORESBY 3 Dec 2053 hrs. An air raid was reported in progress and the all-clear was given 2021 hrs. NO further details are to hand.

GONA. 2 Dec 1800 hrs. Allied patrols moving East towards CAPE KILLERTON over rough, swampy and trackless country inflicted approx twenty enemy casualties. Other patrols harassed enemy posns near GONA village. Our arty fire sank six barges, damaged others and destroyed huts along the beach bear SURIRIA and GARARA, 1000 and 3000 yds respectively West of CAPE KILLERTON 3 Dec 1000 hrs. Some of our forces captured two enemy posts on GONA beach and reduced the front by seventy-five yds. It is estimated that 400 enemy were killed in this posn. Our A/C scored a direct hit on the GONA wreck and other A/A posns. Twenty barges were seen at SANANANDA PT. Allied A/C made three attacks on enemy installations at SANANANDA PT, and fires were started.

/Contd.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area (Contd.)

BUNA. 2 Dec 1800 hrs. Our tps made a slight advance along the North edge of the new strip. Following arty and air attacks, other tps attacked nine enemy MG nests made of steel drums filled with sand near a bridge in a narrow wooded section between the strip and the West end of the new strip. The attack was successful. Following Allied arty and mortar concentration, other tps attacking the BUNA area gained some ground. Allied arty registering enemy snipers, reported that our tps occupied BUNA at 1000 hrs 3 Dec. Our A/C sighted a large number of enemy personnel crouching behind many log defences on the beach from BUNA MISSION to the East. Enemy A/A fire was experienced from the beach, and mortar fire from the Northern end of the runway.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

NEW BRITAIN. 3 Dec. NO activity was seen at GAROVE ISLAND about fifty mls NW of WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA.

NEW IRELAND. 3 Dec 1000 hrs. Allied A/C attacked a large enemy submarine about seventeen mls South of CAPE ST GEORGE. The submarine crash-dived.

KAVIENG 3 Dec. There were indications of recent work on the aerodrome and in the surrounding area. One S/P tender, one 9,000 ton and three 7,000 ton cargo vessels were seen in the vicinity.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN 3 Dec 2000 hrs. Eighty Japs were seen camped at TURIBOIRU, eight mls NW of BUIN. The natives state that the enemy intend to install A/A guns in the area.

BUIN FAISI 3 Dec 1700 hrs. Three cruisers, seven destroyers, one sloop, three submarines, two gun-boats, two tankers and five cargo vessels were seen in the area.

NEW GEORGIA. 3 Dec 0945 hrs. A submarine was seen forty-eight mls South by West of LUNGA PT, GANONGGA ISLAND.

ONTONG JAVA 3 Dec. A submarine was seen fifty-three mls West by North of the Island on a course South.

GUADALCANAL. 3 Dec. 1945 hrs. A submarine was seen twelve mls North by East of AOLA BAY. (Landops Revsit No.126).

- - - - - - - - - - -

PART 2

ENEMY

(xiv) General -

JAP INTELLIGENCE : See Appx "A" Att.

Capt.,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

S E C R E T

APPX "A" TO 2 AUST CORPS INT SUM No.107

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE

Japanese Espionage Methods: Japanese activities are characterised by a thorough preparation of the scene of possible operations, whether military or political, by intensive Intelligence work. Japanese Intelligence may be divided as follows :-

Military Intelligence: composed of -

(a) The Directorate of Military Intelligence in TOKYO.

(b) The Military Special Service Section. In the FAR EAST this section has dealt particularly with the collection of Intelligence and the preparation of the ground for invasion by actual Fifth Column work or instigation of revolution against the recognised authority.

(c) The China Affairs Board. This has been primarily concerned with recruiting overseas Chinese, but it is also an important branch of Military Intelligence. It has also been particularly connected with the WANG CHING WEI (Chinese Puppet Government) Organisation, and has employed their agents.

There is also apart from the above sub-division, the so-called Formosa Military organisation, which is, or was, centred in Formosa and dealt with Intelligence in the western partof the DUTCH EAST INDIES.

The Foreign Affairs Organisation: This organisation is world-wide and its nerve-centres are the Japanese Embassies and Consulates in neutral countries throughout the world. The FAO almost certainly comes under the Overseas Ministry, which is for JAPAN what the "Propaganda Ministry and Auslands Organisation" is for the Reich, and is believed to dominate the policy of the Foreign Office.

The vast net-work of so-called commercial enterprises covering the whole world come under the Foreign Affairs organisation, and their reports go to the various Embassies and Consulates which forward them to the appropriate Naval, Military or Foreign Office Departments.

In neutral countries the FAO is a most important branch of Japanese Intelligence, as diplomatic channels are often the only available means of communication with TOKYO, and the Japanese have, through the underground activities of their Legations and Consulates, brought to a fine art the abuse of diplomatic privilege.

The following Japanese firms have particularly come to notice overseas as cover for Intelligence activities: MITSUI, MITSUBISHI, THE NIPPON TRADE AGENCY, N.Y.K., O.S.K., and the DOMEI News Agency.

The Naval Intelligence Service, TOKYO: This service is divided on similar lines to the Military Intelligence into the Directorate, the Naval Special Service Section and the China Affairs Boards.

/Contd.

Patriotic and Secret Societies: There are also numberless Japanese patriotic and secret societies which have branches overseas, and in one way or another fit into the general Intelligence network. Prominent amongst these are the Black Dragon, an ultra-patriotic and Pan-Asian association, to which many young Army officers belong: The Nippon Gawa, or "Japanese Current" an association (much in evidence in the Argentine) for overseas Japanese; the Tokyo Club with ramifications throughout the USA and Mexico, and just prior to the invasion of MALAYA the Kame, or Tortoise, was particularly associated with subversive activities in that territory.

In neutral countries the Spanish Falange movement is actively assisting the Japanese as it does the Germans. (Overseas Security Bulletin Jul 42).

------oOo------

Appendix 9

SECRET

Copy No. 57

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.108

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 6 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

PART 1

OPERATIONS

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 3 Dec 1845 hrs. A cruiser departed from DILLI. 4 Dec 1048 hrs. Allied a/c attacked a twenty ton enemy lugger in the WETAR STRAIT area. There were NO hits and an enemy Zero intercepted.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE 4 Dec 0825 hrs. Allied a/c attacked the aerodrome and silenced an A/A posn.

SALAMAUA 4 Dec 0145 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome. Our tps machine gunned and dispersed a party of forty Japs approaching GUADAGASEL two and a half mls South of MUBO. It was reported that the MARKHAM RIVER VALLEY natives had gone bush as a result of bombing of their villages by the Japs.

GONA SANANANDA 3 Dec. Small parties of Japs were being evacuated nightly from the mouth of the AMBOGA RIVER. 1600 hrs. Our investigation patrols contacted and inflicted hy casualties on some of these tps who used mortar and LMG fire. 4 Dec 1800 hrs. Our forces cleared the enemy from a small pocket South of the track, two mls East of GONA. Fwd tps were still advancing over trackless country and sago swamps. Other forces were pushing forward along the SOPUTA rd and advancing on SANANANDA despite enemy opposition on our left flank. 1350 hrs. Allied A/C strafed an enemy posn on the SANANANDA rd. Seven enemy tps carrying a gun and amn were killed. 1355 hrs. An enemy posn at SANANANDA PT was bombed and strafed. 3 Dec 0905 hrs. Allied A/C strafed enemy barges from West of SANANANDA PT to BUNA.

BUNA 1145 hrs. Nine large enemy A/C, escorted by fourteen Zeros parachuted approx thirty objects presumed to be supplies North and West of the old strip, at BUNA MISSION and at BUNA VILLAGE. 120 objects were parachuted near SANANANDA. 4 Dec 1700 hrs. Our attack was continuing.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

NEW IRELAND 3 Dec. Thirty serviceable med Bs and three Fs were seen on KAVIENG aerodrome. 2315 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome and fires were started near twelve A/C on the runway. There was intense A/A opposition.

NEW BRITAIN 3 Dec. A submarine was seen approx seventy five mls SSE and another approx eighty mls East by South of CAPE BEECHY.

/Contd.

S E C R E T

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA 4 Dec 0930 hrs. It was reported that there were strong concentrations of enemy tps at HANGAN on the coast just North of BUKA aerodrome and at BONIS PLANTATION, BUKA. The tps were poorly clothed and shod and fed and their attitude was reported to be changed from arrogance to grave concern. Only damaged planes were visible on the drome. Hy casualties and destruction have been caused by Allied bombing.

BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT. 3 Dec. A submarine was seen approx two mls WSW of FAURO IS. 4 Dec 1430 hrs. Three cruisers and two destroyers were seen six mls SSE of FAURO IS, on a course West.

BUIN FAISI 4 Dec. 1120 hrs. Fifteen destroyers, one sloop, five cargo ships, two tankers and two submarines were seen in the area.

TREASURY IS. 3 Dec. A submarine was seen approx forty eight mls SW of the island.

CHOISEUL IS. 3 Dec. A submarine was seen approx 100 mls NNE of CAPE ALEXANDER.

NEW GEORGIA GP. 3 Dec 1610 hrs. Two hy, two lt cruisers and six destroyers were seen seventeen mls West by South of SOKOVOVI PT, VELLA LAVELLA IS on a course SW. 4 Dec 0640 hrs. Two destroyers and four u/i vessels were seen twenty mls ENE of CAPE PITT, GATUKAI IS on a course WNW. 0650 hrs. A possible battleship and seven escort vessels were seen twenty four mls WNW of VISUVISU PT on a course WNW.

RENDOVA IS. 3 Dec. A submarine was seen approx sixteen mls SSE of CAPE PLEASANT.

GUADALCANAL 4 Dec 0200 hrs. Two u/i vessels were seen five mls SE of CAPE ESPERANCE

(vi) General:

JERVIS BAY 4 Dec 1431 hrs. A submarine was seen six and a half mls ESE of the Bay. (Landovs Revsit 127)

P A R T 2

E N E M Y

(iv) Organization: Jap Army Code Names - See Appx "B" Att.

P A R T 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) Corps Area - WARWICK AREA

It is advised that the traffic br, Ref WARWICK 1" 115015, on main WARWICK ALLORA TOOWOOMBA Rd is at present closed for repairs necessitating a detour of about 1 ml. Detour leaves main rd on ALLORA side of WARWICK at Rly Br at 117023, follows river bank on North side, crosses low level Br at 109019 and rejoins the bitumen in the main St. of WARWICK town.

DETOUR: Surface gravel, suitable only for dry weather. Width: two vehicles can pass if care is exercised. Low Level Br at 109019 is subject to flooding after hy rain or storms. (HQ Qld L of C Area).

P A R T 5

S E C U R I T Y Security in Japan - See Appx "A" Att.

Capt.,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 104.

SECURITY IN JAPAN

A very general comment, or rather criticism, levelled against Allied Intelligence, is the fact that so little was known about the JAPANESE armed forces prior to the outbreak of hostilities in the PACIFIC.

One reason for this is that over a period of many years JAPAN has practised, as a national policy, security measures which, although in the years preceding the war appeared ridiculous owing to the extremes to which they were carried, have now proved to be one of the most valuable weapons on the JAPANESE side in the present conflict.

It must first be appreciated that very few Japanese would be traitors to their country. Pride of race, Emperor and country, are so deeply instilled into every Japanese that there is very little danger of one selling vital information to a foreign power for financial gain. Consequently, the main problem which has to be faced by the security authorities in Japan as far as their own people were concerned is to ensure that NO information is revealed unwillingly. This has been largely accomplished by the creation of a positive spy mania in the country.

The JAPANESE equivalents of the famous BRITISH posters "Walls have ears" and "Careless talk costs lives" introduced as an emergency war-time measure, have been a common factor in JAPAN for at least the last 10-15 years. For example, one of these posters, drawn in a very exaggerated manner, depicted a foreigner travelling in a train, pre pretending to read his newspaper, but actually cocking an ear to the conversation of two JAPANESE passengers.

Security talks have been a daily feature of JAPANESE radio broadcasts for a great number of years now and constant lectures and security talks to the workers have always been a matter of routine in JAPANESE munition works, shipyards and factories. The JAPANESE is taught instinctively to mistrust the intentions of any foreigner with whom he comes in contact. Security measures have always been practised in JAPANESE brothels and cafes which are likely to be visited by foreign seamen.

Security-mindedness therefore has become second nature to every JAPANESE and the authorities' task in preserving security leakages is greatly simplified.

The foreigner in JAPAN is of course very prominent in view of his completely different appearance. This makes it most difficult for him to listen-in to any conversation without the JAPANESE being aware of his presence, and this means that the one source of information open to him is what he can actually see with his own eyes.

The JAPANESE have taken elaborate precautions to ensure that there is no leakage through this means. Every foreigner in JAPAN is kept under close police surveillance and an accurate dossier of all his movements is kept in the police records. Certain areas in JAPAN are "out of bounds" and entry means certain imprisonment and probable deportation after a lengthy and harsh examination.

Important shipyards in JAPAN such as the MITSUBISHI Dock Yard in NAGASAKI have for many years been completely surrounded by a screen some 100-150 ft high. Troop movements even in peacetime are always made at night, the blinds of the train-windows being drawn. On troop ships the troops are always kept below decks in the daytime, and allowed up in batches for a few hours every night. New planes are built and tested out in the country where no foreigner is allowed - artillery and mortars are tested in the mountains. Even troops marching through the street have canvas covering over all field guns and LMGs. NO details of the services expenditure are given in the Diet.

/Contd.

The wisdom of practising extreme security measures as part of the national policy, even in times of peace has been amply justified in the light of events during the past eight months. (GHQ and Air HQ INDIA Monthly Int Summary No.9).

APPX "B" TO 2 AUST CORPS INT SUM No.108

JAPANESE ARMY CODE NAMES AND NUMBERS

Jap army units bear two "code" designations - one relates to its place in the "Home" army orgn and the other is its operational or overseas designation.

The "Home" number consists, when translated into English, of a letter and a number. The letter indicates the geographic division of JAPAN from which it is drawn, and the number is the number of its depot within this geographic division e.g. "C28" means the 28th Depot (NOT "Depot Div" merely Depot or Base Depot) in the Central sub division.

The subdivisions of the "Home" area are NORTHERN, EASTERN, WESTERN, CENTRAL, KOREAN and FORMOSAN.

The whole system behind the Overseas code names is NOT yet clear.

It seems that the names allotted, represent the major formation, whilst the numbers in correct numerical sequence represent the units within the major formation.

With but few exceptions code names are known to represent divisions. A few code names however, may represent formations greater than a div. All code names appear to be words, the writing of which requires only one Chinese character.

There are many inconsistencies in the numbering, but in spite of these it seems that the basic idea was to allot a block of numbers to a Div sufficient to allow one number to be re-allotted as follows:-

Div; Div Inf;
1st, 2nd, 3rd Inf Regts;
Cav; Arty; Engr; Tpt and possibly a few other special units or branches of adm. The numerical sequence also appears originally to have followed substantially the above order.

The system appears to have been upset somewhat by the re-organization of Divs from a four to three regt basis.

It seems possible for two different units to have the same "Home" number but it does NOT appear possible that more than one unit can bear the same overseas number.

From the above, it will be seen that the identification of a code name and one code number will permit deductions, as to the possible units represented by other code numbers within the group, to be made. That is provided all the numbers concerned bear the same code name. (Adv LHQ Int Sum No.16).

. . . . . .

——oOo——

10

NOTES ON GOC's COMMENTS,
FOLLOWING ON PRACTICE MOVE OF CORPS HQ

12 - 14 NOV 42

1. WARNING ORDER. This was issued 12 days in adv, The Sig and Movement Order 8 days in advance. Some 10 hrs after the movt order for the Recce pa ty had been issued, lengthy amendments were issued.

Remarks. Give as much notice of moves as possible, but avoid amendments at all costs, unless absolutely essential.

2. MOVEMENT.

(a) Generally carried out in an efficient manner, but it should be remembered always, vehs are widely dispersed, or are loaded under cover, before they commence to move to the dispersal area.

Remarks. Evolve a drill which will permit vehs moving either to right or to left from the dispersal area to the road. This obtains an orderly move, an even flow of vehs to rd and enables the convoy to proceed on its march to the SP without halts.

(b) VTH and MPH were observed in most cases. The speed of the vehs which were followed by wireless vans in the C and Gp was too great for the delicate instruments in the wireless sets.

Remarks. Speed of fast moving vehs in such cases must be reduced to allow efficient performance of following vehs having regard to their type and fitments, and the road surface.

(c) One case was noticed where a 3 ton lorry was moving at a speed of about 40 mph to catch up with the veh in front of it. The reason for this was that when the leading veh of the convoy had passed over the rough track and reached the rd it immediately accellerated to the speed laid down, quite forgetting that the remainder of the convoy had still to travel over the rough pa t of the rd.

Remarks. The speed of the leading vehs must be so regulated that all vehs of the convoy are on the rd before its speed is increased to that laid down for the march, and to do this, DR's or Traffic Police on MCs should be used.

3. MARKING OF VEHS.

It cannot be expected that loading etc will be carried out in active ops under the same conditions as wer experienced on this exercise. Night loading or loading under stress of bombs must be considered.

Clear marking is therefore essetial:-

(a) in order that vehs may be distinguished by the Officer or NCO in charge of the movements throughout the area.

(b) for use by the men who travel in the vehs.

(c) that the figures of the veh be clearly marked in order that they may be picked up in bad light.

Remarks. It is doubtful that from experience the marking of vehs on the windscreen is satisfactory, as the windscreen often becomes a holiograph during the day. To avoid this, some units smudged the windscreen with sump oil and dust leaving a small clean space of glass for the driver and his companion.

Remarks Cont'd

The number should therefore be painted on the sides on doors etc, in fairly large thin characters, where they may be easily seen. On camouflaged vehs, the use of black paint for the numbers is often useless, as they cannot be ditinguished from the dark camoufla e aint.

4. FLAGGING OF GPS AND SIGNAL VEHS.

This was not done, and outside vehs not knowing the length of the convoy or gp will cut in. Pro e flagging facilitates the work of LOs.

Remarks. All gps or blocks must be flagged i.e. a flag placed on the leading veh and on the last veh of each gp. Different coloured flags must be used by Units and placed on the leading and last veh with a Sig flag for the signal veh. They must be flown high enough to be observed easily.

5. PROTECTION AGAINST AIR ATTACK.

Remarks. It is essential that if an attack is anticipated the covers of the vehs in which personnel travel be immediately removed. A comd should be appointed for each veh and each veh must ha e an air sentry, who sho ld normally sit alongside the driver, so that if necessary he can obtain a clear all round view by standing on the running board. An air sentry placed on the hood of a 3 tonner is useless.

6. TRAFFIC CONTROL PTS.

A group of MCs were noticed near the entrance gate. They like all other vehs must be dispersed under dover.

Remarks. It is the job of the MCs to constantly move along the convoy keeping control over the vehs in regard to MIH and VTH and maintaining comms. Their job is to keep the convoy moving in good order, and not merely stay in the positions allotted to them, in the order of march. In the event of insufficient Provost personnel, the def pl should be used for TCP.

7. FILES.

It appeared that too much paper was taken on the move and that the orders regarding inspection etc once a month had not been carried out.

Remarks. Files must be examined once a month, in order to get rid of unnecessary paper. Essential files should be grouped and carried in special boxes, so that at any halt, any special file demanded by an Officer may be quickly obtained.

8. LAYOUT OF CAMP.

The camp layout was good but a common entrance and exit was provided.

Remarks. Unless absolutely unavoidable, the entry and exit should never be the same. Circuits must be laid down and any existing rds or tracks incorporated on the plan. The exit must be some distance away from the entrance.

9. TENTS.

A number of tents without flys, and flys without tents were noticed. There is no apparent reason for this.

Remarks. Tents and flys must be always used together. When the Corps HQ moves, it moves all tents, and any left behind should be regarded as unessential, and should be withdrawn.

10. DEF HC PLAN. Although this was laid down, most tps did not know the arrgn events made.

Remarks. The plan of def must be [illegible] and made known to all ranks within half an hour of arriving in the area. All ranks must be exercised in performing their role within the defence plan at the earliest and not later than one hour after all tps have arrived in the new area.

The defence plan itself must conform to the lay out of:-

(a) The rest ar a and
(b) the working area.

11. AMOUNT OF GEAR CARRIED BY SPECIALS.

Some officers had [illegible] beds with them.

Remarks. The scale of personal eqpt is laid down in SO and must be observed. The permissable weight must not be exceeded.

2 Aust Corps,
7 Dec 42.

G 1881

Subject: Adv LHQ - Lessons from Ops.

Distribution:- List E.
(Serial 1+15, Serial 12+5, Serial 13+3,
Serial 18+5, Serial 19+4).

Attached hereto First Aust Army G(SD) 3449 of 27 Nov 42 for information and necessary action.

BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

W/D

SECRET

Subject: ADV LHQ - LESSONS FROM OPS

HQ First Aust Army
27 Nov 42
G(SD) 3449

2 Aust Corps (140)
1 US Corps (90)
5 Aust Div (50)
TORRES STRAIT Force (4)
2/3 Aust Indep Coy
2/5 Aust Indep Coy
First Aust Army Junior Staff School
First Aust Army Junior Tactical School (2)
First Aust Army CTS
First Aust Army Weapon Trg School (2)
First Aust Army MT School
First Aust Army AASC School
First Aust Army Gas School
First Aust Army Adm (NCOs) School
First Aust Army MR & FS School
BRA (2)
HQ RAE First Aust Army Tps (12)
CSO (2)
1 Aust AL Sec
3 Aust AL Sec
CE
S & T (16)
Medical (21)
Ord (5)
Pro (2)

Copy to:
1 Aust Fd Censorship Sec
A Aust Fd Censorship Sec
First Aust Army PR Unit
GOC-in-C - Sty (3)
MGGS DA & QMG
G(O) A
G(I) C
G(SD) Camp
G(CW) AD Education
LO File (30)

1. Att herewith sufficient copies of ops SOLOMON Is (7-29 Aug 42) for issue down to units. Addressees will advise this HQ if additional copies are required to complete distribution down to units under comd.

TACTICAL DOCTRINE.

2. Para XIII states that the tactical doctrine throughout these ops proved basicly sound. This fact has been confirmed in all theatres of war. Comds should therefore impress upon all subordinate leaders the necessity for the continual study of manuals in which the tactical principles and common doctrine are laid down and the necessity for the common-sense application of these principles to meet the requirements of the varying situations with which they may have to deal from time to time. It should be stressed that the principles remain constant. It is only the method of application which has to be adapted to meet varying conditions, e.g. nature of country, climate, type of enemy, armament, etc.

JUNIOR LEADERS.

3. Para XIII again stresses the old teaching that initiative and boldness on the part of junior leaders are essential for success in action. The need for speed in modern war makes it seldom possible for a comd in the fd to issue orders for an operation in great detail. Subordinate leaders must therefore be trained to act intelligently on short orders which clearly indicate the comd's intention but of necessity give the method of execution and other requirements in sufficient detail only to ensure co-ordination and co-operation on the part of those concerned. It follows therefore that all leaders must be thoroughly grounded in the tactics of their arm and have a sufficient knowledge of the tactics of other arms to ensure intelligent co-operation; that each is trained to accept responsibility and is capable, when the need arises, of performing the duties required in the next higher appointment to that in which he is serving. During trg, opportunities must be created to develop initiative and to give subordinate comds and leaders opportunities to obtain practical experience in carrying out the duties of the next higher appointment.

FDS OF FIRE.

4. Para XIV(6)(vii). The necessity for fds of fire being prepared in all def posns has already been mentioned in G(SD)2921 of 28 Oct. This fact has again been brought out in the SOLOMONS ops, and regardless of the work and time involved all units will, when occupying def posns or harbouring for the night, clear fds of fire to guard against surprise and to permit of a co-ordinated fire-plan being arranged to provide for all-round def of the posn.

AA GUNS.

5. Para XIV,(7)(ii), confirms recent reports from the ME which stressed the value of allotting AA Arty the secondary role of A Tk def where practicable.

This should be accepted as a normal practice provided that

(a) the AA guns can be sited suitably for A Tk def without prejudicing the performance of their AA role,

and (b) in the event of a simultaneous air and AFV attack the AA guns will carry out their primary role of AA def unless the AA comd orders the contrary

In formulating the A Tk plan AA guns must NOT be regarded as substitutes for the normal A Tk weapons, but merely as supplementary to them as a means of giving greater depth or volume of A Tk fire in certain conditions.

INFILTRATION.

6. Para XV(4), mentions the infiltration methods which were carried out by JAPS in conformity with their normal procedure, enabling considerable bodies of enemy tps to pass through our fwd defs to operate against the rear and flanks of localities.

The answer to such tactics is to retain the maximum possible mob res available to counter-attack such infiltrating parties without delay.

Tps holding defended localities must be trained to expect these tactics and NOT to withdraw merely because enemy forces have got round to the rear of their posns. They must hold on confident in the expectation that the situation will quickly be restored by the action of the mob reserves.

OFFENSIVE PATROLLING.

7. Para XV(13). This principle is as old as war itself, but nevertheless it continues to be disregarded in many units which lack war experience. It should be a point of honour in every fwd unit to maintain control of "No man's land" in its sector at all times. This can be achieved only by acting offensively - usually by sending out fighting patrols frequently. In thick jungle, owing to the noise caused by movement at night, it may be preferable to place ambushes on likely enemy lines of approach instead of using the normal method of patrolling.

All ranks must be trained to think and act offensively and to be inquisitive in order to obtain the maximum possible infm at all times and to avoid being surprised by the enemy.

INF TRG.

8. Para XVII (2)(i). Owing to the ease with which mech units can carry out wide turning movements, and the opportunities for infiltration in jungle areas, any unit or installation even in rear areas may suddenly find itself exposed to attack by enemy land forces. It is essential therefore that def must be planned on an area basis - NOT linear, and the force disposed in mutually supporting gps each capable of all-round def. To enable this to be achieved, all combatant units must be given basic instn in inf weapons (incl A Tk) and tactics. This HQ G(SD)3170 dated 11 Nov, 42, was issued with the object of initiating such trg.

BATTLE PROCEDURE.

9. Para XVII (2)(ii) stresses the necessity for a "Standard Operating Procedure". Inf Trg 1937, Chapter VIII lays down a suggested standard battle procedure for ops under European conditions, which remains correct in principle, but the increasing use of fast moving armd formations and the development of infiltration methods - particularly in jungle warfare, make it essential to speed up preliminaries even more than was previously contemplated. This can be done only by more rapid planning by comds, elimination of all non-essentials from orders, increased use of verbal orders in place of the written op order, and in jungle warfare adoption of standard tactical methods to be applied boldly and almost automatically since it will be impossible in these conditions to wait to obtain anything like complete infm of the enemy's dispositions without prejudicing the success of the operation.

Comds of all combatant units must ensure that a satisfactory battle procedure is developed to meet various situations, that it is thoroughly understood by all subordinate leaders and that it is continually practiced and tested with a view to improvement during trg. Junior leaders should be encouraged to submit suggestions to improve it.

W.J. Sloane

Maj-Gen
GS First Aust Army

SD/HJ

SECRET

ALLIED LAND FORCES IN SW PACIFIC AREA

	Adv LHQ, 8 Nov 42		
GHQ	(10)	HQ Q'ld L of C Area	(8)
HQ First Aust Army	(50)	HQ NSW L of C Area	(8)
HQ Second Aust Army	(40)	HQ Vic L of C Area	(6)
HQ NT Force	(15)	HQ SA L of C Area	(4)
HQ Tas Force	(5)	HQ WA L of C Area	(4)
HQ 1 Aust Armd Div	(5)		
HQ 2 Aust Mot Div	(5)		

Copies for infm to:-

HQ 3 Aust Corps	(40)	AMC School	
HQ NG Force	(2)	S of Army Co-op	
LHQ	(50)	LHQ Gas School	
RMC & Staff School (Aust)	(3)	Guerilla Warfare School	
		S of MI	
Regtl Comds School		Bomb Disposal School	
OTS		P & RT School	
AFV School		S of Radiophysics	
S of A (Fd)		S of Mil Hygiene & Sanitation	
S of A (AA)		Joint Overseas Operational Training School	
S of A (A Tk)		Adv LHQ	(20)
S of Sigs		DMT	
SME (Fd)		War Office, London	
SME (AA & Frt)		DMT Middle East	
SAS		DMT Canada	
ASC School		DMT India	
LHQ Provost School		DMT South Africa	
AOC School		NZ LO Melbourne	
S of Mech			

OPERATIONS SOLOMON ISLANDS - 7 - 29 AUG 42.

LESSONS FROM OPERATIONS - No 3.

These training notes are based on a report submitted by W/Cdr DALE, RAAF, questioning of observers who participated in the operation and supplementary reports. This report covers only the period 7 - 29 Aug 42.

These notes emphasise the need for special training and careful planning for any combined operation. They will be studied by Comds and will be used as a basis for training. They should be read in conjunction with Lessons from Operations No 1 and 2 already issued.

(Sgd) ? IRVING Brig
Maj-Gen
DCGS.

INDEX

PART ONE (OMITTED)

SECTION	CONTENTS
I	General.
II	Terrain and Weather
III	General Plan of Attack
IV	GUADALCANAL.
V	TULAGI Area.
VI	Operations on GUADALCANAL.
VII	Operations in TULAGI Area
VIII	Jap Parachute Drops
IX	Use of Landing Craft by US Marine Corps

PART TWO

X	Captured Jap Landing Craft.
XI	Use of Engineers.
XII	Aerodromes.
XIII	Our Tactics.
XIV	Our Weapons and Equipment.
XV	JAP Tactics.
XVI	JAP Weapons and Equipment.
XVII	Summary.
XVIII	Conclusion.

Due to Security reasons Part One of this document has been given a limited distribution.

PART TWO

X CAPTURED JAP LANDING CRAFT.

Generally speaking the Jap landing craft which was captured is of the twin-keel type and lightly armoured. They can be driven up on a beach and are fitted with a ramp in the bow, that can be lowered, enabling disembarkation of troops, equipment and stores. There is a mounting for a light machine gun forward. The coxswain has armoured protection. A good type of diesel motor is installed. The draught is less than 2 ft.

XI USE OF ENGINEERS.

1. The Engr Troops allocated to the attacking force comprised an Engr Bn of about 800 men. These men were practically without any equipment or tools. In addition, there was one Pioneer Bn of 800 men. The Pioneer Bn was employed almost exclusively on unloading of stores, so they could not have been considered to have been available for engineering works.

2. The plan for the attack and capture of GUADALCANAL was good, except for the fact that the mission of the Engineers was almost completely ignored. In spite of the Intelligence information available to estimate the engineering problems likely to be encountered, there was little planning to provide proper personnel and equipment for this mission. There was inadequate engineer equipment provided to develop the air field and base, when captured.

Consideration should be given to all phases of engineer planning, particularly the following missions :-

(i) Construction of air fields.
(ii) Development of roads.
(iii) Development of dock facilities.
(iv) Construction of field fortifications.

3. The Engineering forces in the SOLOMONS campaign proved to be totally inadequate for the work found to be necessary.

4. Although a Naval Construction Unit was available at the base at ESPIRITU SANTO, it was not sent to GUADALCANAL, for some unknown reason, until after 29 Aug.

5. Works on the below projects were greatly delayed, due to the inadequate engineering forces :-

(i) Completion of the air field, which work included :-
Filling incomplete gap in runways, including gravelling and decomposed coral bindings.
Felling of trees on the west approach.
Ramping up of NE end to allow overrun.
(ii) Construction of splinter-proof shelters for aviation gasoline and bombs.
(iii) Maintenance of wharves.
(iv) Setting up of water purification plants.
(v) Repairs to and running of enemy refrigerator plants, water supplies and electric plants.
(vi) Maintenance of roads.
(vii) Construction of new roads and bridges.
(viii) Demolition of some 300 dud Naval shells.
(ix) Demolition of dud US bombs and dud delayed action enemy bombs.
(x) Filling of bomb and shell craters.
(xi) Construction of 3 temporary bridges.
(xii) Strengthening and repair of 4 existing bridges.

6. The Engineers in this force had practically no mechanical equipment. If trucks, rollers and tractors had not been captured from the enemy, little work could have been carried out. The Japanese were reluctant to destroy much of their engineering material.

7. Engineers were compelled to take up defensive positions at night and work all day, which reduced their output.

8. One example illustrates the overwork by these troops - At the rate of progress maintained by the Japanese, the runway would have been completed within 48 hrs. It took 10 days by American labour, during which time air support could not be given. The work on the air field was assigned as first priority.

9. At another stage although the troops, in addition to the engineers, were made available, bomb craters were being made on the air field by the enemy at a rate faster than they could be repaired.

10. In addition to these normal works, it is considered advisable that a long range defensive and development plan should have been prepared, so that any work carried out would not be wasted, but would form part of a comprehensive design. As an example of this, roads were constructed in places, where they were later replaced by others in a better location. Careful advance planning was neglected.

11. The approach of the wet season requires the paving of many miles of road and the construction of aircraft taxi-ways and drainage, but no plans had been prepared or any provision made for the execution of such work.

12. Experience in this operation demonstrates plainly that the following points require special attention when any offensive is being planned :-

(i) An appreciation of the immediate works that will be necessary during an attack to allow it to proceed.

(ii) Work necessary to bring into use installations captured from the enemy.

(iii) Routine maintenance works on air fields, roads and other communications, wharves, docks and unloading facilities, and camps, including provision of water supply, sanitation and electric power.

(iv) Development works to important defences to allow defensive action being taken against further enemy counter attacks.

13. It is considered advisable that the engineer planning should be carried out by GHQ, because that HQ alone is able to know what is proposed in the future use of the territory captured. A special engineering intelligence section is necessary to co-ordinate all reports and see that the information reaches the proper officers.

14. Maintenance, after active operations had ceased, is likely to be a routine matter, and special units of the following types are needed particularly:-

(i) Engineer Regt (General Service) which does general engineer service and construction of all classes.

(ii) Engineer Regt (Aviation) which provides for the maintenance and construction of aerodromes and the routes thereto.

Additional Engineer troops should be brought in for any development, with a high priority which should be completed quickly. Care must be taken to ensure that adequate equipment and tools accompany each unit.

15. In addition to Engr Units, an efficient salvage organisation should be set up to function immediately after the landing. Often important installations are rendered useless for the want of small parts, which have been lost or thrown away by the enemy. An efficient salvage organisation will identify all material coming to it and route the material to the proper place. In particular, precautions must be taken against any willful or accidental destruction of valuable material or equipment by our own troops.

XII AERODROMES.

1. The aerodrome, as laid out by the Japanese was modified slightly upon its capture by the Americans.

2. The enemy appears to have employed coolie methods of construction, working both day and night. The construction work was lighted by portable electric plants. It was necessary to prepare a sub-grade, which involved filling up to 5ft across a depression and grading 1/600 longitudinally and laterally. This was covered by 6" of gravel. This gravel was carried up from the river bed in small baskets and loaded on a small industrial railroad, then dumped in place. This was covered with 2" of decomposed coral for binding. Both the gravel and the coral were rolled together by 10 small tandem rollers.

The dimensions of the runway were 1200 metres long by 50 metres wide. This runway was located almost in the centre of the clearing.

3. A taxi-way leading out to the splinter-proof pens had received a surface treatment of decomposed coral, bound together with 20% cement.

A number of splinter-proof workshops, designed to shelter fighter type aircraft were in various stages of construction. The design of these splinter-proof pens, made of coconut trunks and sandbags, was similar to our own. They consisted of flat steel trusses on which was laid a 1" thick steel roof, supported by a timber framework, which was to be filled with sandbags. These were proof against anything but a direct hit.

Two fully equipped Radio Direction Finder Installations were captured in tact. The Japanese did not do any damage to these Radio Direction Finders. However, these RDFs could not be used by the US Forces, due to a lack of personnel with the requisite technical knowledge. It is interesting to note that the Japanese did not receive any warning of the approach of the Task Force, with these RDFs.

4. Water supply was available from the river and was pumped and stored in tanks around the aerodrome.

Living quarters were constructed some distance from the air field and well hidden in the coconut groves. They were well built and subsequently used by the US Forces as a hospital. They were of a standard that was comparable to an Australian temporary camp. Workshops had also been erected.

5. The aerodrome was built on black loamy soil, which may become very boggy during the wet season. There was no indication that the Japanese had planned or commenced construction on any other air field. Our ground recces show that other air fields could be constructed practically anywhere along the grassy plain areas found on the Island. Drainage difficulties were very likely to be encountered during the wet season, however. More rain falls on the east coast than on the west.

XIII OUR TACTICS.

1. Our tactical doctrine throughout this entire operation proved basically sound. Too great an emphasis cannot be placed upon quick decisive action in closing with the enemy and the development of initiative and boldness by junior leaders. This action was illustrated repeatedly in three types of operations.

2. At GUADALCANAL, where the enemy was surprised, the landing was effected under covering of naval bombardment, followed by the rapid extension of the beach head and in the advance to the LUNGA camp area, a distance of over 8,000 yds in less than 4 hrs. The rapid overcoming of resistance in dug-outs and pockets was due to the aggressive action of junior leaders.

3. In this area, overhead shelters and quite an elaborate system of underground dug-outs were encountered. These dug-outs were generally constructed approx 6ft deep and 4ft wide, reinforced with 4 x 4 hardwood timber, covered with half-inch steel plating and up to 5ft of sandbags. In general, they were located around camps, air fields and where any concentration of troops could be expected. These dug-outs provided exceptionally effective protection during the naval and aerial bombardment. The landing party expected to find a great many casualties, whereas only 13 were killed and 10 wounded. This conclusion should be taken with caution, due to the probable detonation of shells in the tops of the coconut palms, which caused the majority of explosions to take place prematurely at tree-top height, together with the fact that many shells landed in soft areas. Of the shells that landed in soft ground, a large number failed to detonate.

COMMENT. Naval gun fire was quite ineffective against personnel in protected shelters - particularly so when trees detonate the shells at tree-top height. However, it was believed in the PHILLIPINES that overhead shelters were undesirable because troops were unable to observe the direction of enemy barrages and aerial attack. In slit trenches, troops move promptly out of the line of fire to avoid a creeping barrage or an aerial attack. Another disadvantage is that troops have the tendency to remain too long after the attack in dug-outs with overhead protection.

4. In TULAGI area the attack was essentially divided into two simultaneous actions, first action of which consisted of clearing the enemy from the north end of the island, while the main part of the force crossed the island and advanced to the south with an established rate of advance. The decisive and aggressive action by the individual subordinate commanders was demonstrated when their advance was temporarily held up due to snipers in villages of houses of European construction on the axis of advance. The tactical situation did not permit these centres of resistance to be by-passed. These houses were promptly demolished by mortar fire and all enemy resistance overcome to avoid leaving an enemy occupied locality in the rear of the advance.

5. In the third type of operation at [illegible]ALBOGO, a Parachute Bn, because of its greater fire power, was employed as infantry in landing craft to make a frontal attack, which met with great opposition. Unfortunately an oil dump was set on fire, which silhouetted our troops and disrupted the entire plan of attack. In this case, it was necessary to withdraw after suffering severe losses. Initiative and good judgement on the part of the junior leaders handling their troops in this most difficult operation prevented the annihilation of these especially selected troops and resulted in the majority effecting their escape by swimming.

COMMENT. This use of specially trained paratroops is questionable. Their use as infantry can only be justified on the ground that no other troops are available. The frontal attack is a most difficult form of attack.

6. This illustrates the necessity for every member of the landing force to be able to swim with full equipment.

XIV OUR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

1. The weapons and equipment carried by the individual soldier were standard and non-essentials were left behind. He travelled light with all the extra ammunition he could carry.

2. Uniforms. It is believed that the uniform for this type operation should be redesigned to include a greater number of large pockets, to facilitate the carrying of extra ammunition, particularly grenades. These pockets should have flaps on them to prevent the contents from falling out and should not be on the front of the clothing, where they will interfere with the soldier firing from the prone position. All insignia was removed, but officers and NCOs carried pistols. This is contrary to sound battle practice, since all should be dressed alike. Our uniforms were quite similar to those worn by the Japanese, only of a lighter shade. There is a great similarity between the two types, so that our patrols on occasions were in doubt as to identification. Some pre-arranged means of identification should be worked out for future operations. Our troops initially used green water colours to camouflage their faces and hands. This was not effective, due to the heat of the tropics and excessive perspiration.

3. Gas Masks. Gas masks were carried by all troops, which raises the question of the advisability of such procedure. In ship to shore operations, these gas masks may get wet and be rendered useless. Consideration should be given to a new policy in regard to the carrying of gas masks. In the Middle East, some Australian units adopted the policy of transporting the units' gas masks with their ammunition. The reason for this was when the gas mask was carried continuously it soon became unserviceable. Hence the commander took the risk of keeping the gas mask intact for an emergency, for which he felt reasonably sure there would be ample warning. In case of no warning, they simply faced the fact that the first troops subjected to gas attack would find themselves in a regrettable situation. The latest information from NEW GUINEA area indicates that some Jap units have already adopted this policy, as no respirators were reported from KOKODA - IORIBAIWA Area. There is even a greater need for taking this risk of a gas attack in a landing operation. The gas masks in a dry state, can readily be taken ashore later with the ammunition.

4. American Helmet, New Type. The new type American helmet was worn. Several of these were observed with bullet holes piercing completely through the back and front. Helmets were punctured by calibre.25 bullets fired at about 30 yards range. In the cases observed, there was no difference in the diameter of the bullet holes in the front and rear. Opinion is that the present helmet has the added advantage of protecting the back of the neck from shrapnel fire. However, troops who saw the damaged helmets and noted the effect of the small calibre rifle bullet, lost a certain amount of confidence in the ability of the helmet to protect them.

5. Head Net. It was noticed that the head net in this operation was carried between the liner and steel helmet. A better suggested way of carrying this and one which is now being used by an American Division, is to place the head net securely inside the liner. This has the added advantage of having the head net immediately available when needed and also to absorb the sound waves from the wearers' voice.

6. Infantry Weapons. Standard American weapons were utilised throughout this entire operation.

(i) Calibre .30 Rifle and Browning Automatic Rifle. The calibre .30 Springfield rifle, 1903, as well as the M1 rifle and Browning automatic rifle, proved particularly effective. Many of the Marines seemed to prefer the Springfield rifle on account of its accuracy, Many fleeting targets appeared at ranged varying from 100 to 500 yds. In general, due to the fighting taking place at longer ranges than are normally encountered in Jungle warfare, because the terrain was more open, the hitting power of the calibre .30 weapon was unquestionably superior to the smaller calibre Japanese weapons.

(ii) Bayonet. The American bayonet is not sharpened. It is believed that consideration should be given to a sufficiently sharp tempered steel edged bayonet, that could be used for the dual purpose of bayonet and bolo.

(iii) 37mm A Tk Gun. This weapon was effectively employed against personnel, when no tanks were encountered. Shrapnel was fired into concentrations of troops holding up our advance.

(iv) Mortars. Both 60 and 81 mm mortars were used in this operation and proved to be very effective. The Marines seemed to prefer the 60 mm mortar, due to the greater ease of transport and concealment, where troops were moving rapidly in this situation. Some consideration should be given to the development of a light mortar, similar to the Japanese, which can be carried forward quickly into position by the soldier and fired from the thigh. Our 60 mm mortar lacks this degree of mobility. The 81 mm mortar was effective in the operations on TULAGI, where houses containing snipers had to be demolished.

(v) Thompson Sub-Machine Gun. In this particular operation, there was the impression by observers, that the troops apparently used full automatic. It was particularly noticed that in the early stages of the landing, the troops were careless in conserving ammunition, even to the extent of shooting coconuts out of trees to get the milk. Junior leaders quickly stopped this practice. Consideration should be given in the instruction of troops, to impress upon them the need to conserve ammunition. Greater accuracy of fire and conservation of ammunition is accomplished when the TSMG is employed as a single shot weapon, but volume of fire from a small group is more effective and should be used on appropriate targets.

(vi) Grenades. Grenades were effective in mopping up operations where the Japanese had retreated to caves and underground passages. These shelters were primarily protection against air and naval bombardment, but were useless in infantry defensive positions. The narrow passage from these caves and dug-outs only permitted one or two men to fire at a time. To enter such a restricted passage would have been suicidal for our troops. Our marines were able to blast the Japs out of small dug-outs with grenades. In the larger dug-outs, where the bursting effect of our grenade was not sufficient, these were supplemented by the use of TNT or gasoline.

Particular comment as to the use of grenades has arisen in this operation for a grenade of a different colour and with a shorter time fuse. At night, it was found that our grenades should be painted with a dull green coat of paint, because the Japanese would throw back the shiny grenades at our troops. During the day for close-in work of mopping up machine gun nests etc. if the grenade was thrown as soon as the pin was pulled, the Japanes would throw these grenades back at our troops. Hence our troops allowed the fuse to be armed while they counted up to 3 and then threw the grenade. Grenades thrown in this manner were not picked up and appear to have solved the difficulty.

(vii) Machine guns. Machine guns were excellent in breaking up night attacks, where short fields of fire had been prepared. Training in selecting positions for automatic weapons should be emphasised.

7. Arty. The information regarding arty was extremely meagre and contained only the barest details.

(i) Field Arty. Field Arty was employed effectively in this operation. The employment in the early stages of landing operations differs from their normal employment In ordinary land operations, Field Arty from the beginning executes preparatory and supporting fire, whereas this has to be done by naval guns until the arty is ashore. Difficulty is encountered in transporting guns and ammunition ashore. Co-ordination must be worked out with naval fire. Control of the field arty must be decentralised in the initial phases of the operation, so that the arty can accompany the infantry unit to which attached. This requires much careful advanced planning and setting up of time schedules.

(a) The 75mm Pack How was especially suited for this type of operation, because it could be disembarked from transports by manpower, transported in small boats, landed and moved forward on shore by hand. Assembled it weighs 1390 lbs and has a maximum effective range (which is 85% of its extreme range using standard ammunition) of 8,100 yds.

(b) In addition to the 75mm Pack How, the 75mm dual-purpose guns, mounted on half tracks, were effectively employed in these operations. These self-propelled mounts were able to displace quickly to areas where fire power was required. An illustration of this was the counter battery role of these guns in causing a submarine, firing on LUNGA POINT Area, to submerge.

(c) 105mm Hows furnished the [illegible] arty support. These weigh approx 4,300 lbs and have a maximum effective range (85% extreme range using standard ammunition) of 12,500 yds. Apparently no 155mm Hows nor guns had been brought ashore during the period covered by this [illegible].

(ii) AA Arty.

(a) AA Defence of Task Forces.

The Task Forces had one or more AA ships in the convoy. The number of these ships was not disclosed. These AA ships are either light cruisers or transports mounting several 4" or 5" AA guns.

In addition on each transport, about five of the dual mount 20mm AA guns were set up to increase the density of fire. The 20mm AA guns were mounted in pairs on a carriage somewhat similar to the 37mm AA mount. In general, the air-cooled calibre .50 AA MGs were not employed to supplement the fire from the transports. These AA MGs were apparently reserved for the early stage of the operation, because of the short life of the air-cooled calibre .50 AA MG barrels.

(b) AA Defence of Aerodrome.

The calibre .50 AA MGs were emplaced around the perimeter up to 500 yds away from the aerodrome, which was located in the centre of a clearing. This disposition of AA MGs permits a greater case in tracking targets, because of a less angular travel of the target, when it is strafing the aerodrome and attacking gun positions. Dual mount 20mm AA guns were disposed in a similar manner to the calibre .50 AA MGs. Two 90 mm AA Gun Batteries (8 guns) were taken ashore. The average bombing attack was made from 15,000 to 18,000 ft. Each of the two btys of the 90 mm AA guns were disposed in prolongation with the air field.

(c) Dual Role of AA Arty.

Consideration should be given to the use of 90mm AA guns in the dual role as a beach defence weapon in an area such as the aerodrome at GUADALCANAL. AA Arty has the dual role in anti-mechanised defence already and it might be desirable to employ these guns against naval or land targets of opportunity. In the MILNE BAY operation, when the 3.7" AA ammunition was armed with 25-pdr 117 or 119 fuse, in lieu of the 29.52 second 3.7" AA fuse, it was found that the range was increased from 9,200 yds to approx 20,000 yds. The time fuse was the limiting factor on the range. When the AA fuse was set at safe, the projectile did not detonate upon impact. The 3.7" AA gun is the Australian equivalent of the American 90mm AA gun. The range of the armour piercing 90mm ammunition is not known. This dual mission should not be overlooked when terrain conditions permit these guns to be so used, and appropriate ammunition should be provided.

XV JAP TACTICS

1. Primarily the Japs have been trained through five years of war, including much Jungle fighting in CHINA and MALAYA. As a result, the Jap is both physically and medically prepared for this type of warfare. Reports suggest that the Japs have anti-toxins for jungle diseases that we do not possess. They have been particularly trained in night operations and are reluctant to fight in the open or in the day time. They are convinced that when captured they will be killed and hence few prisoners are taken on either side., Physically they possess great endurance. There are numerous cases where the Jap will crouch or lie in one position, highly camouflaged, for as long as 5 days, to obtain information or to fire one shot, knowing that he will be killed after that shot.

2. Their fanatical attitude was noticed in the case of a Jap Lieutenant and two privates charging a Marine Bn HQ shouting "American Marines you die". One of the Japs bayoneted a Marine Sgt before the three were killed. Another instance was when Japanese nurses led stretcher bearers with wounded Marines into an ambush at a Japanese field hospital. The entire party, including the Japanese nurses, were wiped out by machine gun fire from the hospital. Another example was when Japanese nurses came out to surrender and when within range, threw hand grenades at our Marines. On the second or thirdday after the landing, a Jap Captain of a Labour Bn walked into the Marine Division HQ and surrendered. After

being questioned by the Division Intelligence Officer, the Jap Captain stated an entire Labour Bn would surrender if a detail would accompany them back to the Division HQ. This Marine Colonel took a detail of 20 Marines in a landing boat and proceeded to the specified point along the beach. When the detail stepped ashore all were ambushed and killed, except two runners and one Sgt, who were wounded and escaped. This Sgt reported to HQ that instead of a Labour Bn there was a special Jap Weapons Detachment. Later the Marines wiped out this detachment of about 200 Japs. The Japs frequently attempted to ambush parties by sending natives in to inform the Marines that they could lead rescue parties to their wounded. Bitter experience has warned us against such ambushes. Then there was the case of a Marine doctor, who was stabbed by a wounded Jap whose injured leg he was dressing.

3. The Jap is able to live and move around in swamps, which are considered inaccessible for our troops. Individual Jap soldiers are equipped for independent action with a most efficient type of gear, light but effective. With this equipment they will crawl sometimes through jungle so thick that it would appear impossible for a human being to move, yet they wriggle their way through on hands and knees or on their stomach for miles, taking days if necessary. We find that the Jap frequently crawls over the jungle as well as in the underbrush. They are patient and painstaking in their preparation for operations. They have accurate and complete intelligence information to include the most minute maps, even of jungle areas. They have learned to live off the land, whether in swamps or jungle. They normally go out on a mission with only a pocketful of rice and dried fish. This is supplemented with jungle food of a type that we could not eat. They are experts on knowing what is edible and in avoiding poisonous shrubs, insects and jungle animals.

4. Their main tactics in jungle warfare is infiltration. They infiltrate behind enemy lines and rendezvous in effective patrols to cut off and wipe out enemy outposts. This infiltration has been developed so extensively that they are apparently able to outnumber such enemy positions at will. The Jap then attacks with fanatical devotion to duty and seldom surrenders.

5. An illustration was when a Jap bomber was shot down and 5 members of the crew got into the plane's rubber boat. A US destroyer approached the rubber boat to rescue the Japs. When it became apparent they were going to be forcibly rescued, the only Jap with a gun killed his companions and was turning the gun on himself, when he was killed by machine gun fire from the destroyer.

6. They are careful and successful in their radio interceptions and exploit it to their best advantage. On the second day of the SOLOMONS action, considerable resistance was encountered on a hill on the island of TANEMBOKO. Our Marines withdrew and designated as a target for 1000-lb bombs the occupied area, which had been dug out and developed into a workable gun turret. The Group Air Commander from the USS"SARATOGA" was ordered to bomb this target. On his way to do so he received a counter order, stating that the Marines had now gained possession and not to bomb this gun position. The Group Commander checked the authentication. Authenticators had been worked out among the pilots the previous night, by using the pilot's nickname. The voice, using a perfect American accent and countermanding the bombing order, was unable to furnish the correct authenticator, so the bombing mission continued uninterrupted.

7. The Japs as a standing operating procedure, outline their front lines by use of flares, alternating red and white. These were sent up by front line units and also by units extending the line to the flank. This furnished useful information for our artillery. Another method of indicating front lines has been by

displaying a white flag, with a rising sun tied to a tree. This has been countered by our bombing the areas in which these flags were displayed.

8. Direction of attack at night is sometimes maintained by the use of flares, set up well to the rear of the Japanese troops. These flares are called for by portable voice radio of a type superior to ours. Also the Japs apparently used bird calls for unit identification.

9. The Japs did not use conventional sandbags for revetment, but utilised a bag made of rice straw and filled with dirt. Under the influence of heat and rain, the emplacements grew green sprouts, which blended exceptionally well with the surrounding background. The Japs have developed the art of camouflage to an exceptionally high degree. They were able to change it constantly with each change of surroundings.

10. The Japanese tactics in this operation varied somewhat to meet the terrain encountered, which varied from swamp land to sparsely cultivated land and dense woods. In the attack on GUADALCANAL, a brief description of the operation is given. The first two waves reached BEACH RED, under the protection of our naval guns and landed unopposed. A beach head was established and extended. These troops pushed rapidly to the south and to the west to extend the beach head as more troops arrived. As the troops came to the vicinity of the ILU River, they found the river bed had dried up, leaving nothing but mud. To overcome this terrain obstacle the "Alligator" landing craft was used to get the troops across. The troops advancing to the west advanced through open coconut palms. By noon the troops were west of ALLIGATOR CREEK, where the country was a combination of coconut palms and tall grass, without any jungle underbrush. At this point the Jap resistance consisted mostly of rifle and machine gun fire from dug-outs and prepared emplacements, supplemented by snipers. These snipers were employed both as tree snipers and ground snipers. As a result the fight at this time consisted of a series of attacks on these dug-outs and destruction of the snipers in the trees. Improvised flame throwers and the dynamiting of dug-out entrances proved the most effective means of overcoming these defences.

11. The daytime Japanese defensive tactics was to withdraw and counter attack by night. They would leave a few snipers to harass our troops, but the main body would counter attack by night. It is the usual practice of the Jap snipers to wait until their target has passed by them in order to shoot the individual in the back. Snipers prefer to fire on a stationary target, rather than on troops in movement. For this reason, troops must adopt the standard procedure of taking cover whenever they halt.

12. During night attacks, the following characteristics were noticed. Infiltration by the enmy, operating on a very narrow front, was the usual method employed. The enmy would try to destroy any automatic weapons that had not been given all round protection. This emphasises the need for training in the proper siting of automatic weapons and the clearing of short fields of fire in front of the position. Such automatic weapons must be protected and be capable of firing in all directions. During the night attacks the Japanese fired their automatic weapons extensively, but made very little use of their rifle fire. Enemy fire was usually high in order to allow their troops to approach our position with grenades. The assault was delivered immediately after a grenade barrage, accompanied by yells and screams. The Japanese used offensive grenades for this purpose.

13. One of the principles employed by the Japanese, which differs from operations in the jungle and thick underbrush, was the direction of the attack at night. The Japanese attacked from low ground, in order to silhouette our troops against the skyline in

the more open country. This, of course, conforms to our sound tactical doctrine, which teaches the occupation of abnormal positions at night. Where the advance of our troops is held up at dusk by the enemy occupying opposing ridgelines, it is essential that strong patrols be sent forward to occupy the low ground to the front, which would silhouette the enemy against the skyline. The main body of our troops must avoid the crest of the hill, but not give up the high ground secured during the day. In brief, our forces must dominate "No Man's Land" during the hours of darkness.

14. In this operation supplies of Japanese ammunition were captured, which included cartridges containing long-nosed wooden bullets. Prior to finding this type of ammunition there were rumours of explosive bullets being used. However, there was no confirmation of this. It is believed that this ammunition was employed by the Japanese after they had infiltrated through our lines and then attacked our troops from the rear. Due to the short range of this ammunition, their own troops were not endangered. The American riot gun or commercial shot-gun is believed to be far more effective than this wooden bullet and some consideration should be given to arming our troops with shot guns for use in a similar situation and for close-in defence, particularly at night.

15. Japanese Anti-Tank Tactics and Anti-Tank Weapons. A platoon of six M3 light tanks was sent to the aid of the attacking force during the fighting west of LUNGA River. These tanks were moving in a column across the grassy clearing from the infantry, to attack Jap machine guns on the edge of the jungle.

No 4 Tank went into the jungle and was never seen again. HQ tank was disabled by a hit on the first sprocket wheel, after going about 40 ft into the jungle.

Tank No 5 backed out of the jungle after entering a short distance, when it was unable to locate any targets. The Japs threw grenades under the tracks of this tank, as it entered the jungle. The explosions of these grenades jarred the tank, but did no appreciable damage. While this tank was stationary it was hit on the right-hand forward side by a shell from an A/Tk gun, estimated to be about 100 yds away. The shell penetrated the turret and hit the opposite wall, where it exploded. Filling from the shell was splattered and started to burn with a yellow flame and bluish smoke. Almost immediately a second hit was received, which likewise splattered filling around and began to burn. Efforts to put out the fire failed. The survivors jumped out of the tank and started for the rear. The Japanese closed in on the tank as soon as it was abandoned and when last seen, the tank was burning fiercely.

No 1 tank was circling in an open field in rear of tank No 5 when it received a hit on the turret, killing the [illegible] and radio man. The diameter of the hole in No 1 tank was slightly larger than that of a 37mm anti-tank shell. Fire in this tank was extinguished with great difficulty and the tank was recovered.

The Company Commander estimated from the number of hits and the location of the tanks when hit, that the enemy had about 5 A/Tk guns of a calibre believed to be about 47mm. This is the first encounter with a Jap 47mm A/Tk gun. These guns were emplaced at close range before opening fire. Attention is drawn to the ammunition, which easily penetrated the turret armour of the light tank at short ranges. The action of the shell after entering the tank, seems to indicate an explosive filler made from a picrate derivative.

Although magnetic tank grenades were captured [illegible]

none appear to have been used against these tanks. It is interesting to note the lack of use of magnetic mines by the Japanese. The failure to use these mines may have been due to the belief that our tanks had been protected against magnetic mines. One method of protection, which the Japs used at MILNE BAY was to cover the tank thoroughly with thick grease.

XVI JAP WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.

The subject of Jap weapons and equipment is not covered in this report. It is being dealt with by the Intelligence Section of this HQ shortly.

XVII SUMMARY

1. Careful advance planning should insure that :-

(i) Secrecy is maintained.

(ii) Air, arty and naval support is co-ordinated before, during and is continued after the landing.

(iii) A thorough system of signal communication is established early and rapidly expanded to provide for the maximum control of all units.

(iv) Troops selected for a Task Force are adequate to carry out their normal tactical missions and should not be diverted from such mission.

(v) Service troops are organised and supplied with proper and adequate equipment to perform their assigned mission.

(vi) Specialised personnel are included with proper Service troops to repair, operate and salvage captured enemy equipment.

(vii) The success of any landing is part of a well co-ordinated plan for future offensive action and includes the ultimate disposition of captured enemy territory.

(viii) Control between Navy, Army and Air is maintained throughout the entire operation, before, during and particularly after the landing has been effected.

COMMENT. After the Marines had secured their objective at GUADALCANAL, the Navy might have landed the supplies closer to the base of operations, in order to avoid the unnecessary work on roads, bridges, etc.

(ix) A definite plan of supply for the immediate and future operations is developed.

2. Training in addition to Combined Operation training, should insure that :-

(i) All troops have been trained as infantry in addition to their normal training.

(ii) Troops are trained in standard operating procedure to ensure teamwork, to prevent confusion and error under the stress of combat and to develop speed in execution.

(iii) All troops are in proper physical condition and are able to swim with full equipment.

(iv) All troops have been instructed in jungle operations, particularly how to make the jungle their friend, so they can live in the jungle on limited supplies.

(v) Troops be indoctrinated on how to avoid ambushes and how to take cover, particularly at halts.

(vi) Troops develop simple methods of unit and individual identification.

(vii) Troops are imbued with the offensive spirit; to close quickly with the enemy; to secure the high ground; and at night, by aggressive patrolling to the front, dominate the low ground.

VIII CONCLUSION

Careful advance planning is essential to insure success and is dependent upon :-

(i) Proper organisation and adequate equipment.
(ii) Teamwork within all tactical units.
(iii) Co-operation between Navy, Army and Air.
(iv) Future development and use of captured territory.

W/D appnd 12

MOST SECRET.

2 Aust Corps,
4 Dec 42.

Copy No 55.....

G 1882

Subject: Amendment No 1 to G 1835 2 Aust Corps Lodation Statement.

As at 2400 hrs 6 Dec.42.

1. Page 2.

Delete serials A34, A35, A36, A37, A44, A45, A46, A47, A53.

2. Page 6.

Insert new locations as under:

15 Aust Inf Bde.

Ref map EULUNDI 1 in to 1 ml

Serial	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks.
B47	HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde and L Sec Sigs	COOROY	E 090167	
B48	266 LAD	"	E 090167	
B49	2 Aust Fd Regt and E Sec Sigs	TINBEERWAH	E 128216	
B50	213 LAD	"	E 128216	
B51	21 Aust A Tk B ty	NOOSA HEADS - details later		
B52	15 Aust Fd Coy	MAROOCHYDORE	E 288886	Under cond
	" det	"	E 133106	3 Aust Div
	" "	"	E 225905	(works)
	" "	"	E 199874	"
B53	24 Aust Inf Bn	COOROY	E 163144	
B54	57/60 Aust Inf Bn	TINBEERWAH	E 156193	
B55	58/59 Aust Inf Bn	"	E 113195	
[redacted]	21 Aust Coy ASC	YANDINA	E 132006	
B57	HQ 15 Aust Fd Amb and MDS	EULUNDI	E 098112	
B58	A Coy	BELLI PARK	E 007059	
B59	B Coy	COOROY	E 061177	
B60	No 1 Sec 54 DOW	COOROY	E 077183	
B61	A Sec 54 Div Ord Fd Pk	COOROY	E 064179	

ACK.

Blair Lawman Capt
for BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

Distribution:	Copy No		Copy No		Copy No
3 Aust Div	1-2	1 Aust A R D	16	DDST	34
1 Aust Mot Bde	3	GOC	17	DDOS	35-37
32 US Div	4	G (I)	18	ADME	38
4 A S Control	5	CCRA	19	APM	39
3 A L Sec	6	CE	20-21	DAD Posts	40
21 Aust Cav Regt	7	CSO	22-24	Salvage	41
5 Aust M G Bn	8	DA & QMG	25	Pay	42
2/1 Aust M G Bn	9	A	26	Signaster	43
2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec	10	Q	27-28	First Aust Army	44-45
		DDMS	29	QUEENSLAND L of C	46
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	11	ADMS (D)	30	5 A C Sqn	47
		Lgl	31	1 U S Corps	48
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Coln	12	DAD Educ	32	File	49-50
		Chaplains	33	War Diary	51-52.
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	13				
2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	14				
2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	15				

Appendix D

C(O)

G2.

G3.

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.109

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 7 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA -

DARWIN. 5 Dec 1125 hrs. It was reported that one enemy A/C was over the DARWIN area.

(ii) NEI Area -

TIMOR. 28 Nov. It was estimated that the enemy strength in PORTUGUESE TIMOR was 7,000 personnel; 2,000 were reported to be at LAUTEM, 500 at LAGA, 1,000 at BAUCAU and 500 at VIKILALE. A strong enemy drive is anticipated against the Allied forces in the near future.

DILLI. 3 Dec. Six enemy landing craft arrived from an Easterly direction and there were thirteen Zeros and nine B's on the aerodrome. 4 Dec 1730 hrs. One small ship arrived at the Harbour.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE. 5 Dec. Jap patrols of forty strong have been at WAIPATI and GUADAGASAL to recruit all available native carriers.

/fire GONA-SANANANDA. During the night 3/4 Dec, our arty maintained harassing/on the GONA wreck and along the SOPUTA-SANANANDA Track. 4 Dec. 1800 hrs. Allied patrols advancing on SANANANDA from the direction of GONA, encountered enemy fire 1,000 yds West of CAPE KILLERTON. During the afternoon, our patrols attacked and inflicted twenty casualties on the enemy at the mouth of the AMBOGA River.

BUNA. 5 Dec 0815 hrs, 0945 hrs and 1504 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed enemy posns near BUNA. Bombs fell in the target area and fires were started.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN. WIDE BAY. 4 Dec. A native report stated that the enemy were in occupation of a Plantation in this area.

RABAUL. 5 Dec 1300 hrs. One probable A/C carrier, one hy cruiser, one S/P tender, one 16,000-ton tpt, two large vessels, two small cargo vessels and seventeen to twenty-two u/i vessels were seen in the Harbour.

NEW IRELAND. KAVIENG. 5 Dec 0445 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome. Bombs fell in the target area and fires were started.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA. 5 Dec. Natives reported that the enemy have been

preparing to enlarge the main runway on the aerodrome.

SHORTLAND ISLAND. 5 Dec 1110 hrs. Twenty-five vessels were seen in the Harbour. 1230 hrs. Two cruisers, two destroyers and one tpt arrived off the Island from the direction of BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT.

NEW GEORGIA GP. An Allied patrol on GAUKAI Island in pursuit of the enemy party reported in Int Sum No.105, contacted thirteen Japs at SOMBIRO on the East coast. Nine of the enemy were killed, one was captured and three escaped. 2 Dec. A large number of Japs occupied all the villages in the ROVIANA Area on the SW Coast of NEW GEORGIA and have constructed trenches at all bases.

GUADALCANAL. 5 Dec. 0830 hrs. An unspecified number of submarines with covering A/C were sighted off CAPE ESPERANCE. 1120 hrs. One submarine was seen off TAGOMA PT, fifteen mls East of LUNGA PT.

SANTA CRUZ GP. NDENI IS. 5 Dec 1125 hrs. One submarine was sighted 367 mls NNE of the Island, course North by West.

(Landops Revsit No.128).

P A R T 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(i) Corps Area - Monthly Statement of Prevailing Conditions for December.

CLOUD: Cloud structure of this month is mainly concerned with the NE stream which produces large Cumulus and Strato-Cumulus cloud, base 4-5,000', and tops in the vicinity of 10,000'. With the passage of fronts base of cloud can be as low as 2-2,500', with lower fragments of cloud below main base. On occasions the SE circulation may operate with the base of cloud at about 3500-4,000' and tops at about 12-15,000'. Amount of cloud reaches a peak of 8-9 tenths approx about 1400 hrs with a gradually lessening towards sunset.
WEATHER: Conditions are generally fine during this month, although scattered thunder storms with hail present themselves mainly associated with cold fronts passing the locality. On succeeding days of the passage of a cold front showers from convective cloud are likely to occur. Approx 5-7 days of the month thunderstorms are likely to occur.
VISIBILITY: Visibility generally is very good at the surface being 30 mls except during the hy showers, when reduced to 1-2 mls. This resultant good visibility is from the effects of convection due to heating during the day. Smoke haze reduces visibility during summer months.
WIND: The wind circulation during Dec is mainly from the NE, and on few occasions does it alter. When a front passes wind may become of a southerly component, but soon the NE component is re-established. Wind velocities reach a peak of 15-20 mls per hr. With passage of a front periods of wind velocity may reach 35-40 mph.
TEMPERATURES: Aver temp ranges about 90° F with a max about 105° and a min of 60-65°.
HUMIDITY: Aver conditions approx 40%-50%.
RAINFALL: Aver over this area is 434" for the month.
UPPER WINDS: With the NE circulation still in progress, and SE circulation NOT coming into its own until Jan or late Jan, this NE wind will operate to a height of 7,000' or thereabouts, and above this level the SE will predominate. Gradually this level will be lowered until about late Jan, when SE will come into its own. PRESSURE DISTRIBUTION: The main feature of a pressure chart in Qld is the persistance of a monsoonal dip extending down from the Gulf region, with a ridge of high pressure along the tropical Qld coast.

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

Appendix 14

S E C R E T

Copy No. 76

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.110

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 8 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

P A R T 1

O P E R A T I O N S

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR. 5 Dec 0930 hrs. There was one small enemy merchant ship at DILLI. An unconfirmed report stated that the Japs had moved from VIQUEQUE to BEACO. 1115 hrs. The enemy camp at HERAI was pulled down and ten trucks of Japs moved to the East. 6 Dec 1707 hrs. Enemy A/C unsuccessfully attacked an Allied vessel in the TIMOR SEA.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE 1 Dec. The enemy were using acrodromes at BUKAUA, twenty-two mls East of LAE. Many A/C were seen and heard going to and from the area. 6 Dec. Between 1500 hrs and 1600 hrs. At least six enemy Bs and twenty-three Fs were in the vicinity of the acrodrome.

GONA SANANANDA. 5 Dec. Our attack on SANANANDA from the South was continuing. 6 Dec. During the morning, other forces which attacked an enemy posn SW of GONA village, gained some ground.

BUNA 5 Dec 1700 hrs. Our attack near the new strip continued in the face of enemy MG and sniper fire covering barricade defences which had been placed in depth along the coast. Another force, attacking BUNA village, was partially successful. Some tps were in the village and others on the coast to the East. Allied arty was continuing with harassing fire between BUNA MISSION and GIROPA PT.

Native carriers, who escaped from the BUNA area, stated that reinfts had been landed by submarines.

2030 hrs. A small ship was seen two mls NE of CAPE WARDHUNT on a course SE.

6 Dec 1315 hrs. Fifteen enemy Bs escorted by sixteen Zeros bombed the POPONDETTA strip. There was NO damage. 1335 hrs. Eighteen enemy Bs escorted by Zeros dropped bombs near PORLOCK HARBOUR. 1625 hrs. Four enemy A/C attacked two trawlers near PORLOCK HARBOUR.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN 5 Dec. An analysis of photographs revealed three hy and four lt cruisers, five destroyers, one minelayer, two patrol craft, two u/i vessels and twelve merchant vessels in RABAUL Harbour. Three Bs and forty nine Fs were on LAKUNAI aerodrome. Twenty serviceable and four damaged Bs and two Fs were on VUNAKANAU aerodrome. There were five F/Bs in SULPHUR CREEK and five F/Ps at MALAGUNA.

/Contd.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN FAISI 6 Dec 0900 hrs. Seventeen vessels were seen in the area.

(vi) General -

INDIAN OCEAN 6 Dec 1407 hrs. The first enemy air attack was made on COCOS IS. Nine bombs were dropped, but damage was slight. (Landops Revsit 129)

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL:

(ii) Other Areas -

MALARIA IN THE AUSTRALIAN REGION: On the basis of distribution of Anopheline mosquitoes, climate, topography, and previous experience, the Australian region may be divided into three areas: -

(a) Malarious: NEW GUINEA and associated islands, to 170°East longitude and 20°South latitude.
CAIRNS: It is expected that CAIRNS will soon cease to be classed as a malarious area. A map is available (at a scale of two mls to 1") defining the present dangerous areas.

(b) Potentially Malarious:
QUEENSLAND: The area lying north of 19° South latitude but excluding HORN ISLAND, and THURSDAY ISLAND and that portion of the ATHERTON PLATEAU above 2,000' elevation.

NORTHERN TERRITORY: The area north of the twenty-five inch isohyet, (a curved line, sweeping from east to west, concave to the South, and reaching its most northerly point near DALY WATERS),

WESTERN AUSTRALIA: Those portions of the KIMBERLEY district which include the valleys of the ORD and FITZROY RIVERS and the coastal strip between them.

(c) Not potentially malarious:

The whole of AUSTRALIA south of the boundaries indicated.

NOTE: There is a transition zone in the north, and a few limited areas on the coast further south, where small outbreaks may occur, but the risk is not assessed as high.
(AHQ Int Summary No.30)

For Magnetic Declination Base Map QUEENSLAND 1942

See Appx "A" Att.

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 104.

APPENDIX A

To 2 Aust. Corps Intell. Summary 110

DATED 5.1.43

MAGNETIC DECLINATION BASE MAP
QUEENSLAND
1942

AREAS KNOWN TO BE DISTURBED BY LOCAL ROCK MAGNETISM SHOWN THUS.

NOTE:- ANNUAL CHANGE VARIES FROM
0° AT CAPE YORK TO
+1° AT S.E. CORNER AND
+2° AT S.W. CORNER OF STATE

APPROX SCALE 144 MILES TO ONE INCH

50 0 100 200 300 400

GSI
FIRST AUST ARMY
MAP NO. 50
DATE 24. 11. '42

CAIRNS
TOWNSVILLE
ROCKHAMPTON
MARYBOROUGH
CHARLEVILLE
BRISBANE
TOOWOOMBA

SVY/MISC/166

REPRODUCED BY 21 AUST ARMY TOPO SURVEY COY NOV '42

Appendix 15.

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.111

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 10 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80

NOTE: NO Daily Summary was issued for the period ending 0800 hrs 9 Dec 42

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA Area -

COLLIER BAY. W.A. 8 Dec 1406 hrs. A report stated that an Allied warship was being shadowed by one enemy A/C approx 115 mls North of the bay. 1520 hrs. This vessel was being attacked approx 115 mls WNW of DRYSDALE RIVER MISSION.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 7 Dec. It was reported that RAEOLIA was still occupied by an unknown number of Japs.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE. 7 Dec 1630 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome and a large explosion was observed.

SALAMAUA. 8 Dec. Further recce confirmed thefact that the Japs have moved the majority of the garrison to LABABIA, where there were large dumps concentrated. The garrison at MUBO is now estimated to be reduced from 500 to 200.

GONA. 8 Dec. Allied tps were attacking the enemy SW of GONA, but NO details have been given. During an arty shoot on the morning of 8 Dec Japs in GONA village were seen wearing respirators. Our patrol activity to ascertain enemy posns and harassing mortar fire is being continued. 1105 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the GONA wreck. There were NO hits but the wreck was seen to be lying on its side at an angle of 45°.

BUNA. Night 6/7 Dec. Enemy trucks were heard moving between the new and main strips. Approx twenty-five Japs were seen to enter pill-box type defences in this area. With the exception of a strongly defended area near the Northern edge, the new strip was clear of the enemy. 7 Dec 0500 hrs. Our tps near the beach, at the SE of BUNA village, were counter-attacked simultaneously by enemy from BUNA Mission and BUNA village. All counter-attacks were repulsed and thirty to forty Japs killed. 1826 hrs. Enemy planes dropped objects, presumed to be supplies, over the old strip. 8 Dec 0915 hrs. Allied A/C strafed a strong enemy A/A posn at the NW end of the old strip. 0930 hrs. Enemy posns at BUNA Mission and CAPE ENDAIADERE were bombed.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

ADMIRALTY Is. 8 Dec 1400 hrs. One S/I tender was seen thirty-eight mls SE of LORENGAU, on a course NE. 1440 hrs.

One lt cruiser, one tpt and two probable destroyers were seen thirty-eight mls East of MANUS Is. on a course SSE.

NEW BRITAIN. 7 Dec 1830 hrs. Two cargo vessels were seen twenty-six mls East by South of GASMATA on a course East. 8 Dec 0335 hrs. Allied A/C attacked GASMATA aerodrome and a large explosion was seen. Between 1020 hrs and 1625 hrs Allied A/C made three attacks on six enemy destroyers on a Southerly course between CAPE ST GEORGE and JACQUINOT BAY. Two direct hits and near misses damaged one or two vessels. 1645 hrs. The six vessels were last seen heading North by East thirty-five mls SW of CAPE ST GEORGE. Allied attacking A/C were intercepted by as many as fifteen Zeros. Seven Zeros definitely and two probably were shot down. Two more were damaged. 7 and 8 Dec. Allied A/C reported sighting a landing strip, with tents nearby, on CAPE CUNNINGHAM at the Southern entrance of JACQUINOT BAY.

RABAUL. 8 Dec 0935 hrs. A 600-ton u/i vessel was seen in MASSAVA BAY, twenty-two mls West of RABAUL. 0945 hrs. A possible battleship or hy cruiser, six possible lt cruisers or destroyers and thirty-two u/i vessels were in RABAUL Harbour.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN-FAISI. 8 Dec 1015 hrs. Eleven to thirteen possible destroyers, three 10,000-ton tpts, five 5,000-ton cargo vessels, a possible S/P tender and two tankers were seen in the area. Three sunken cargo vessels were seen in TONOLEI Harbour.

GUADALCANAL. 7 Dec. A midget submarine was seen ten mls North of LUNGA Point.

(Landons Revsit 131).

P A R T 4

Intn to 30 Nov 42

OTHER FRONTS:

RUSSIAN FRONT -

CENTRAL SECTOR. The Russian thrust SW and West from TOROPETS gained initial ground and cut all rys leading to VELIKIE - LUKI. The thrust West of RZHEV was directed South and SE and cut the RZHEV - VIAZMA ry.

DON - STALINGRAD SECTOR. The Russian Northern thrust extended wider and deeper covering most of the area between the rivers CHIR and DON where mopping up was continued. The German strong point at KLETSKAYA was cleared. The Southern thrust joined this thrust and encircled the major part of the Sixth German Army East of the DON bend. This Army originally comprised fifteen to eighteen divs, but portion may be West of the Russian threat. The Southern thrust extended South Westwards, holding most of the left bank of the DON from KALACH to the river junc at AKSAI. The Germans still hold a bridgehead near the river junc with the CHIR possibly at the ry br. Adv Russian tps were pressing over AKSAI and threatening KOTELNIKOV from the NW.

CAUCASUS SECTOR. Hy rains in the MALGK area were possibly impeding operations.

GENERAL. The Russians are expected to make a great effort to eliminate the trapped Germans, who are expected to fight stubbornly, although dependent on fresh supplies being brought in by air.

TUNISIA:

Night 24/25 Nov. The First Army commenced to adv from posns North of the line LEKEF - ZAGHOUAN. Our tpt was heavily ground strafed. Our forces made progress against considerable resistance and rds were cratered and mined but good progress continued to be made. The Axis forces in TUNISIA were estimated at 12,000 Germans and 6,000 Italians with from forty to eighty tanks.

LIBYA:

28 Nov. Our armd forces made intermittent contact with the enemy South of MERSA BREGA. Allied reinfts were arriving at AGEDABIA. It was expected that the ry to TOBRUK would be open by 1 Dec. BENGHAZI port was open. The situation is considered to be satisfactory.

BURMA:

There was NO confirmation of a Chinese report that the Japs were about to launch an attack on YUNNAN Province.

NAVAL:

GENERAL -

The Russian icebreaker "MIKOWAN" which left the BLACK SEA 3 Dec 41 via SUEZ, CAPETOWN, CAPE HORN, ALEUTIAN Is and NORTH SIBERIA has reached the WHITE SEA. Two enemy blockade runners were scuttled during the week. One in the South Atlantic on the approach of a US cruiser and the other in the INDIAN OCEAN, when attacked by AUSTRALIAN and DUTCH cruisers on 26 Nov 42. A Jap ship Northward bound was torpedoed by British submarine off the NICOBAR Is.

MEDITERRANEAN -

Five enemy ships have been successfully attacked by our submarines since 23 Nov.

TOULON - 26 Nov. French warships in the Harbour included cruisers "DUNKIRK" and "STRASBOURG", the battleships "PROVENCE" the aviation tpt "COMMANDANT TEST," four hy and three lt cruisers, eighteen large and twelve small destroyers, and nineteen submarines. Of the original force the following appeared to be undamaged. One hy, two lt cruisers, three large and two small destroyers and two submarines which escaped.

U-BOAT WARFARE:

Damage and sinkings of U-Boats East and West of GIBRALTAR have caused a decrease in their activities for the time being.

(World Revsit for week ended 30 Nov)

PART 5

SECURITY:

Censorship: In an attempt to reduce postings of tps' mail in civil letter boxes, and incidentally discover some of the reasons why they do so, a number of military mailing boxes were recently set up in a town which is the centre of large tp concentrations. The mailing boxes were provided in rest rooms.

recreation huts, canteens, and outside the civil post office. Prominent notices were posted over these boxes urging tps to post their unsealed letters through the proper channels. Other notices were placed on civil mail boxes appealing to tps NOT to post their letters in those boxes, but in the military mailing box a few yds away. Arrangements were made with Army Postal personnel to clear the boxes daily and deliver the mail to a nearby headquarters where it was censored speedily. The maximum delay to mail was NOT allowed to exceed 24 hrs.

As an experiment this was an unqualified success. The points learned from the experiment were :-

(a) Civil postings decreased considerably, indicating that the bulk of tps will play the game by censorship if posting facilities are provided convenient to the places where they write their letters or gather when in towns on leave.

(b) Comments in letters showed that soldiers were NOT at all averse to having their intimate letters to wives and sweethearts censored by an offr who did NOT know them, whereas they were reluctant to submit such letters to their own unit offrs for fear these offrs would discuss them between themselves and perhaps ridicule the writers.

(c) Knowing that the letters would be censored, very few references were made to tp moves, locations and other forbidden subjects.

(d) A very useful index to the degree of security-mindedness of all units in the area was obtained. Weaknesses in security were reported to FSS personnel and were followed immediately by lectures on Security and Censorship, or reminders to Security offrs.

(e) Other irregularities and causes of friction and complaint in units were speedily detected through letters and in many cases the infm was passed to "A" Branch offrs or representatives of services for remedial action. This means of removing grouches has been of great value in maintaining tp morale at a high standard.

The method outlined above can be applied to many centres of tp concentration. It offers security and censorship offrs a useful means of checking leakages of infm and improving security-mindedness of tps in their areas.

(AHQ Int Sum No.31).

Capt,
GS 2 Amet Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

War Diary.

Appendix 16

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 112

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 11 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No. 80

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA Area -

ARAFURA SEA. 9 Dec. There were indications that several Jap submarines were operating in this area.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR. A recent reliable Portuguese report stated that there were 3,000 Japs at DILLI and approx 3,000 more towards the East end of the island. 7 Dec. One destroyer and two large enemy merchant vessels unloaded at DILLI. 8 Dec. It was reported that the Japs at VIQUEQUE moved towards LACLUTA, thirty-two mls SW of BAUCAU.

(III) NEW GUINEA Area -

MERAUKE (DUTCH NEW GUINEA). 8 Dec. 1315 hrs. One enemy A/C was reported over this area.

SALAMAUA. 9 Dec. The enemy are maintaining the tracks from SALAMAUA to MUBO, & they have replaced native suspension brs. with lt brs. Japs, assisted by native guides, keep a thorough recce on all of the tracks in the BUSAMA, SALAMAUA, LABABIA and MUBO areas.

GONA. Night 8/9 Dec. Our tps killed ninety-five Japs and took four PWs when the enemy attempted to infiltrate one of our out-posts, near GONA. Our patrols contacted and killed eighteen Japs and took three PWs, near the AMBOGA RIVER. 9 Dec. After intermittent firing throughout the day, our tps mopped up enemy posns at GONA and now occupy the whole area.

KUMUSI RIVER. 9 Dec. It is believed that enemy tps recently landed near the mouth of the river. A recent Allied patrol surprised and inflicted hy casualties on approx fifty Japs. An inflatable rubber boat was captured and three enemy motor boats laden with eqpt and sups were sunk.

BUNA. 8 Dec. 1700 hrs. The enemy reply to our fire was limited. Allied tps attacked along the right flank between the Eastern edge of the new strip and South of CAPE ENDAIADERE. Aided by hy mortar fire directed on enemy MG posns they advanced slightly. Other tps were engaging a strong Jap pill-box located at the North edge of a wooded area East of the rd between the two strips. An enemy patrol was seen near the br between the two strips. This br. was blocked with knife-rest barricades.

SECRET

9 Dec. 0905 hrs. Allied A/C bombed the mainenemy AA posn at BUNA and straffed the KUMUSI R area. 0915 hrs. The area between the old runway and the sea was bombed.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

NEW BRITAIN. GASMATA. 8 Dec. 2000 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome. Bombs fell in the vicinity of the aerodrome.

RABAUL. 8 Dec. Ph R revealed one lt and two hy cruisers, nine destroyers, two tenders, two torpedo boats, two tankers and seventeen merchant vessels in the harbour. Four F/B's were in SUPHUR CREEK, at least twenty-eight A/C, belieyed B's, were on LAKUNAI aerodrome and eight to ten F's were air-borne over VUNAKANAU.

(V) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA. 8 Dec. Fires were seen near the aerodrome possibly the result of grass being burnt off. Natives reported that the aerodrome was being enlarged. 9 Dec. Thirty to fifty A/C were seen among trees near the drome.

BUIN-FAISI. 8 Dec. It was reliably reported that the Japs were short of food and A/C. A convoy with air cover is expected to arrive about 16 Dec. 9 Dec 1720 hrs. Four cruisers, sixteen destroyers and eight cargo vessels were seen in the area and several A/C on KAHILI aerodrome.

CHOISEUL Is. 9 Dec. Enemy AA posns were seen North of BAMBATANA, thirty-three mls SE of WEST CAPE.

RENNELL Is. 9 Dec. A submarine was sighted approx 190 mls South by East of the island.

(Landops Revsit 132)

PART 5

SECURITY:

Attached as Appendix "A" is an examination of the disturbances that have occurred between American and Australian tps and of the relations which should exist between the two Forces. This Appendix is to be repeated inall Intelligence Summaries. The matter is of great importance and the subject is to be brought to the notice of all Commanders and officersfor their serious consideration and appropriate action.

(ADV LHQ INT SUMMARY NO. 18)

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 104.

SECRET

APPX "A" TO HQ 2 AUST CORPS INT SUMMARY No. 112

DISTURBANCES BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN TROOPS

1. When Australia was in immediate danger of invasion some 9 months ago, US Air Corps and Army Troops began to arrive here in large numbers. Since then the friendly relations based on comradeship and common service against the enemy, which have existed between the two Forces in Australia, have been marred by a long series of street brawls, stabbings; and actual fights between small groups. The incidents have been widespread, but have occurred principally in TOWNSVILLE, BRISBANE and MELBOURNE. Disturbances occurred in BRISBANE as recently as 24, 26 and 27 Nov.

On the first of these occasions a group of from 15 to 20 Australian soldiers attacked two enlisted men of a US submarine crew, apparently for no better reason than that the sailors refused to give the Australians money. When two USN Shore Patrol men appeared on the scene, and tried to extricate the victims, they were themselves assaulted and were beaten up by the mob. This incident is all the worse as leave to submarine crews is always short and the men never have more than a few days ashore.

On Thursday, 26 Nov, a brawl involving several hundred men altogether started in the Australian Canteen, when some Australian soldiers objected to the arrest of a US enlisted man by the US Provost. Additional American MPs were summoned, shots were fired, and as a result one Australian soldier was killed and at least 16 wounded, including civilians.

The following night there were further incidents, though on a much smaller scale, and in addition individual American Army and Naval officers and isolated American MPs were assaulted in the streets, and in some instances badly bashed. Thanks however to strong action by the Military and Civil Police, an increase in the size of the Provost Patrols, and to other precautions which were taken, there have been no further serious incidents since. It is plain however that feelings on both sides are running high and that only a spark is needed to "touch off" the explosive material which undoubtedly still remains.

2. An analysis of these and other disturbances shows that the brawls and fights fall into two definite classes:-

(a) Brawls between groups of American and Australian troops or less frequently between Americans and Australians together against the Military Police, whether American or Australian.

(b) Assaults by organised gangs on isolated individuals.

Disturbances in the first class are unpremeditated and normally occur only when the troops are under the influence of liquor. Assaults on individuals however are quite different. They are apparently carried out either by "packs" composed of our worst elements who are hunting for a victim or by bands of hooligans in uniform who are bent on giving rein to their lower instincts.

3. There does not seem to be any clearcut single reason for the disturbances in class (a). Whenever large numbers of high spirited young men are thrown together for duty or on leave, there is always the risk of incidents. This is especially true when the young men are of different nationality with different national outlooks and backgrounds. It is important however to try to find the more immediate causes if future trouble is to be avoided and it has been established that the following are at least contributing factors to the disturbances:

(a) Drunkenness.

(b) The different rates of pay and allowances between the two forces. It is admitted that some American Troops have not been discreet in their attitude and have "flashed" their money about. Further most American soldiers and sailors are able to afford a far higher standard of living than are their Australian opposite numbers. All this leads to a feeling of resentment on the part of Australians - however irrational that resentment may be. Such things as the better quality of cloth and fitting of American uniforms, their leave facilities, conditions in their camps, and lower prices in American canteens all tend to augment the ill-feeling.

(c) Discrimination in shops, hotels, cafes and by taxi drivers. Inall these it is normal apparently for Australians, whether officers or men, to be passed over in favour of Americans. More attention and service is given to Americans, and Australians are frequently kept waiting for long periods while Americans who have come later are served first. Some lines of goods, both in hotels and in retail shops, are unofficially reserved for American Troops who, it is thought, will pay higher prices.

(d) The "girl" question. Australians of the better sort are resentful of the loose behavior of many Australian women, whose husbands are servingabroad, with American Servicemen, and of the cheap regard in which a large number of American troops appear to hold Australian girls. In particular, they do not like the way Americans "paw" them and embrace them in public. Australians of other types are annoyed when Australian girls refuse their company, but soon afterwards are seen to accept the advances of the first Americans that offer.

(e) The intentional stirring up of trouble by interested parties. There are definite indications that in numerous cases disturbances have been instigated by civilians for their own ends. It remains to be seen whether these men are criminals, who wish to take advantage of disorder for robbery and violence for their own gain, or mal-contents who are professionally "against the Government" and are only anxious to embarrass the authorities, or straight out enemy agents.

(f) A general hostility towards Americans. This is unfortunately widespread among Australian troops and is partly caused by the attitude of superiority frequently affected by US soldiers themselves. Constant boastings of what the American Forces have done and will do in this war is resented and the tendency of some Americans to draw their knives or guns too freely makes them despised by men who are accustomed to settle their disputes without recourse to arms.

(g) The Militia question. It is known that American soldiers have sometimes picked on Australians who are not in the AIF, ahd have jeered at them for staying at home when better men were fighting their battles. These taunts have lead to hot retorts and from these to blows is a short step.

When brawls have once started, feelings on both sides are further roused by the complete failure of the men of each nation to understand the attitude towards violence and the normal police methods of the other. The carrying of arms, especially fire-arms, is provocative to most Australians and is apt to be regarded as a direct challenge which should be taken up as soon as possible.

On the other hand Americans are quite unable to comprehend the attitude of the Australian Military and Civil Police and consider that their normal methods of handling a difficult situation are "namby-pamby" and the result of spineless fear or culpable weakness.

4. The causes of the cowardly attacks on individuals are harder to determine. Undoubtedly there is a "dingo" element among some Australian troops, which finds a natural outlet for its semi-criminal instincts in these outrages and which "gets a kick" out of organised brutality when the victim has no chance of hitting back. It is probable however that there are other factors: in at least one case robbery was certainly the motive. In others, irresponsible young men with a taste for violence have given way to their lust for blood under the impression that they would thereby "get their own back" for real or imagined wrongs. In others again, the intention may have been to create ugly incidents which would lead to fresh quarrels between the two F orces. This is known to have been the policy adopted by the enemy in other countries, and there is no reason to suppose that Australia is exempt from his attentions.

5. One of the most serious aspects of the disturbances was that on at least two occasions recently Australian Officers were present and did nothing to stop the brawls or to control their men. The duty in this respect of all Australian Officers and NCOs is clear. It is of the utmost importance that every step should be taken to combat the spread of ill-feelings between the men of the two armies and to prevent a recurrence of incidents which, if unchecked, may have a serious effect upon our combined war effort. To do this is the responsibility of every officer and man at all times, whether he is on duty or on leave, and whether the men who are engaged in the brawls are members of his own unit or not.

Apart altogether from the natural obligations of courtesy between Allies and of pride in their own service and country, it is plain that Australia owes her continued existence as a free nation to-day to the presence of American Air Corps and land troops in Australia and in New Guinea and the Solomons, and also to the protection of the US Navy. Furthermore, the flow of American munitions and war materials of all kinds has enabled the Australian Army itself to complete its equipment, and in particular, to have at its disposal weapons and vehicles which would not otherwise be available. Reports of the brawls between American and Australian troops, of actual attacks upon American officers and men, and of the general feeling of hostility shown by some unthinking Australians are bound eventually to become known in the United States. The disastrous effect on public opinion can be imagined. It is the duty of all Australian officers and NCOs, especially those in close contact with the men, to do everything in their power by lectures, by informal talks at odd moments and by their own attitude and example to bring these factors home to our Australian troops and to do whatever they can to promote a spirit of friendliness and comradeship with our Allies. Much can also be done by the influence of the troops themselves. There is no doubt that the vast majority in every unit are commonsense decent men whose one aim is to get on with winning the war, and who deplore the riotous behavior of irresponsible elements. Moreover, it is certain that practically all Australians feel nothing but contempt for the cowardly assaults by organised gangs of hooligans or worse. The education of this largemajority to take an active part in preventing disturbances and in developing an attitude of friendliness towards American troops will help materially. It is equally important, however, that the causes of the ill-feeling and hostility that exist should be recognised and that the Army should ensure that whatever it can do to remove these causes will be done as quickly and as completely as possible.

6. Lastly, there is no doubt that lack of discipline, especially self-discipline, on the part of some Australian troops themselves is largely to blame. Few of our men stop to think that, when the AIF was in England and in the Middle East, the differences of pay and general living conditions between ourselves and the British troops were much more unfavourable to the latter than they are now to us in respect of the Americans. It is certain that the preferential treatment frequently accorded to Australians in the ships and hotels of CAIRO and JERUSALEM was just as galling to the "Tommies" as our present experiences in Australia are to us. The British troops, however, "took it" and we have to show that in the interests of our nation - if for no other reason - we can do the same. Already it has been noticed that men, who have seen service overseas, consistently hold aloof from disturbances and brawls in which their more inexperienced comrades so readily take part. Furthermore, it has been found that the nearer one gets to the scene of active operations, the less evidence is there of ill-feeling or friction. In New Guinea, for example, where Australian and American troops are fighting side by side against the enemy, there is complete harmony and mutual respect between the two Forces. It seems, in effect, that one has to come back to rear areas, far behind the firing line, to find men sufficiently inexperienced, untrained, or misguided as to indulge in brawls and quarrels with those who are fighting on the same side as themselves.

7. To sum up, our job is to win the war and we must not make the task any harder by playing the enemy's game. We, who are not in the actual fighting zone, must not sabotage the efforts of those who are. We must permit no dissension to spring up on the home front. Our duty to our country does not begin and end on the battle field. We must ensure that nothing is allowed to detract from the united strength of the Allies or to impair the friendly relations which should exist between comrades in arms. Most of our men realize this already, but they must also be brought to realize that they themselves have a responsibility in enforcing it and in helping to keep the disturbing elements in check.

---------oO+Oo---------

War Diary

Appx 17

S E C R E T

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.113.

Compiled from information received to 0300 hrs 12 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

P A R T 1.

O P E R A T I O N S :

(i) NW AUSTRALIA Area -

DARWIN 10 Dec 2154 hrs. There were indications of enemy A/C on a course South, fifty mls West of DARWIN.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

SALAMAUA 10 Dec 1500 hrs. A possible vessel was seen forty mls SE by E of SALAMAUA.

GONA-SANANANDA. 8 Dec. Allied A/C dive-bombed the SANANANDA-SOPUTA track, but results were NOT observed.

10 Dec. Allied offensive patrols were active and harassing fire was directed on a located enemy posn South of SANANANDA. A strong Allied patrol was moving Eastward along the beach towards CAPE KILLERTON. Other patrols were moving to outflank the enemy in the AMBOGA RIVER area.

BUNA 8 Dec. Our forces, using mortars and 37 mm guns, bombarded enemy pill-boxes between the new and the main strip. 9 Dec. During the afternoon, our tps stormed and captured these pill-boxes. An Allied patrol, pushing towards the jungle North of the new strip, gained some ground and was then held up by enemy MG fire on the edge of the jungle. 1330 hrs. Enemy arty shelled Allied fwd tps from unlocated posns. 2130 hrs. Supported earlier by mortar fire from the Govt Sta, Jap patrols from the Sta and later from the VILLAGE attacked our beach posn. Both attacks were repulsed and two MGs captured. Allied arty continued harassing enemy posns. Six direct hits were reported on enemy A/A posns located 1000 yds South of the DISTRICT OFFICE. 10 Dec 1525 hrs. Nine enemy Bs and eighteen Fs, after eluding Allied A/C, parachuted 100 to 150 packets of supplies at the NW end of the old strip and in trees nearby. 1540 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed an enemy posn at the SW edge of BUNA runway, but results were NOT observed.

N o t e: BUNA GOVT STA has previously been erroneously described as BUNA MISSION.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO area -

NEW BRITAIN. 9 Dec 2239 hrs. One submarine was seen twenty mls SW of GASMATA.

/Contd.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA 10 Dec. 0800 hrs. Natives report that an underground fuel tank and pipe-line have been installed at the aerodrome.

BUIN FAISI. 10 Dec. 1703 hrs. Thirteen destroyers, one sloop, three submarines, five cargo vessels and three tankers were seen in the area.

NEW GEORGIA GP. 9 Dec. A submarine was seen thirty mls West by North of SOKOVOVI PT, VELLA LAVELLA IS. (Landops 133).

P A R T 3

T O P O G R A P H I C A L :

(ii) Other Areas -

Access in LAE - SALAMAUA - GOLDFIELDS AREA - See Appx "A" att.

P A R T 5

S E C U R I T Y

Information: Recent checks at camps disclose that guards rarely challenge the entry of anyone in uniform. When queried by FSS personnel one reply was "a man in uniform is OK". Again when FSS personnel say "FSS" any information is given without request for credentials. Guards must be instructed that all persons authorised to enter any camp will carry an appropriate authority to enter. FSS and Provost will carry a special pass, and this will be checked to guard against imposition by persons posing as FSS or Provost.

Cases are being reported of incorrect information regarding casualties being given by troops either on their return from forward areas or per medium of codes in letters and by parcel post from operational areas. In some instances private notification of the death of a soldier has been received by relatives in circumstances resulting in extreme shock and distress. This information preceded the official notification and in many cases the information has proved incorrect. If troops have information regarding casualties which they consider is not known, this information should be passed immediately to the Adjutant of units or to the 'A' Branch representative of formations.

Censorship : Censorship reveals widespread complaints from various areas that troops' mail is being held up at units while awaiting franking. This is having an adverse effect on morale and tends to encourage use of civil post boxes.
(AHQ Int Sum No.30)

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

APPX "A" HQ 2 AUST CORPS INT SUM No. 113

ACCESS IN LAE - SALAMAU - GOLDFIELDS AREA

1. G E N E R A L -

The area dealt with comprises the coastal area between LAE and SALAMAUA, and inland to (incl) the BULOLO and WATUT Valleys.

The valleys of the BULOLO and UPPER WATUT RIVER are separated by the BULOLO - WATUT DIVIDE. Below the junction of these two rivers the WATUT VALLEY proper commences, and extends to the point where the WATUT flows into the MARKHAM RIVER about twenty miles west of NADZAB.

Geographically the coastal area is separated from the inland by a series of high rugged ranges, over which there are only rough foot tracks, and NO access by waterways.

Access between LAE and SALAMAUA can be had by track for most of the way, but the MARKHAM RIVER must be crossed by canoe or raft. The best method of access from WAU is by way of the BULOLO VALLEY, then down the WATUT VALLEY to the MARKHAM.

The BULOLO and WATUT VALLEYS came into prominence in 1926 with the discovery of gold in payable quantities at EDIE CREEK.

The administrative headquarters of the goldfields area is at WAU, the industry is conducted by two companies, there are five main mining centres, and many independent miners scattered throughout the valley.

MT KAINDU, adjacent to WAU, rises to over 7000 ft. Respective heights of the main inland settlements are :- BULOLO (2200 ft) BULWA (2000 ft) EDIE CREEK (6400 ft), and WAU (3400 ft), Tracks lead over the intervening ranges to the coast, but there are NO roads. Prior to the war, supplies etc., were transported mainly by air to and from the coast.

Separate track systems exist on each side of the MARKHAM RIVER, but these have some connection in that the MARKHAM is usually crossed at one of four points, and tracks invariably lead from each side to these crossing points.

There are aerodromes at MALAHANG, LAE, SALAMAUA, NADZAB, BULOLO and BULWA, and landing grounds at several other places.

Apart from roads within the various settlements, MT roads which are greatly subject to blocking by landslides lead from WAU through BULOLO and BULWA to SUNSHINE, and from WAU to EDIE CREEK.

The inland rivers and creeks are NOT suitable for transport as they are fast-flowing, full of boulders, and liable to sudden flooding.

2. AERODROMES & LANDING GROUNDS -

Description of MALAHANG, LAE and SALAMAUA aerodromes were given in HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intell Summary No.29.

(a) NADZAB - Runway 900 yds long. Could be extended to 2000 yds.

(b) NARAKAPOR - Runway 550 yds by 50 yds, running NW-SE. Could be extended to SE to 880 yds. Subject to flooding in wet weather.

/Contd.

2. AERODROMES & LANDING GROUNDS (Contd.)

(c) KAIAPIT - Runway 725 yds by 75 yds, running NW-SE. A good aerodrome, suitable for all types; could be extended to 1000 yds in all directions.

(d) BOANA - Runway 690 yds by 60 yds, running N-S. NO extension possible.

(e) WAU - Runway 720 yds by 120 yds, running NE-SW, with a fall of 1 in 12 to the NE. All weather.

(f) BULOLO - Runway 1230 yds by 110 yds, running NW-SE. Could be extended at either end. All weather.

(g) BULWA - Runway 875 yds by 200 yds, running NE-SW. Could be extended to NE to 1200 yds. AAF advised on 13 Sep 42 that drome was unserviceable owing to erosion and grass, but could be made serviceable with little difficulty.

(h) KUDJERU - Runway 450 yds by 50 yds, running NW-SE. Limited types only; impossible to extend; soft after rain.

(i) WAU ELG - Runway 450 yds by 50 yds; running NE-SW. Emergency ground only; cannot be extended; gradient 1 in 15.

(j) SURPRISE CREEK - Runway 350 yds by 50 yds, running N-S. Could be extended to 700 yds; fall of 1 in 10 to north; dangerous winds in afternoon.

(k) SLATE CREEK - Runway 600 yds by 50 yds, running E-W. Could be extended to 700 yds; good surface.

(l) UPPER WATUT - Runway 660 yds by 140 yds, running NNE-SSW. Cannot be extended; sometimes dangerous crosswinds.

(m) TUAPEKA - Runway 500 yds by 50 yds; running NE-SW. About $\frac{3}{4}$ mile west of BULWA. Little extension possible.

(n) SONJA - Runway 690 yds by 65 yds, running NW-SE. Situated in gorge; unsuited to forced landings; dangerous afternoon winds; impossible to extend.

(o) SUNSHINE - Runway 400 yds by 70 yds, running NW-SE. Abandoned some years ago, and NOT maintained.

(p) MUMENG - Runway 630 yds by 60 yds, running NW-SE. Fall of 1 in 20 to south; difficult weather conditions.

(q) ROAMER - Runway 440 yds by 50 yds, running NW-SE. Blind approach; NO extension possible; bad ground.

(r) ZENAG - Runway 330 yds by 44 yds, running N-S. Fall of 1 in 12 to south. Dangerous in afternoons; boggy after rain; could be extended to 1000 yds.

(s) EFAFAN - Runway 700 yds long. Could be extended.

(t) MARILINAN - Runway 700 yds by 60 yds. Could be extended to 2000 yds; all weather; much gravel available.

(u) BUBAUF - Runway 750 yds long. Probably suitable for extension.

(v) Between the WATUT GORGE and the MARKHAM RIVER there are many areas of flat grassland, with an abundance of gravel. It is considered that some of these areas are sufficiently large for the establishing of operational aerodromes.

/Contd.

3. TOWNS & SETTLEMENTS -

The towns and main settlements in the goldfields area are :- WAU, BULOLO, EDIE CREEK, BULWA, Camp No.5, Camp No.6, SUNSHINE, GOLDEN RIDGES, KALI No.4 and KORANGA. It is understood that all buildings and installations were "destroyed" earlier this year but a few have been repaired since. Most of the larger buildings were lighted by electricity from the various plants prior to demolition. The population, which was predominantly native, was engaged almost solely in mining. Water was obtained from tanks, wells and streams. The well water was usually unpalatable and was used chiefly for bathing and commercial purposes, and the water from streams was liable to pollution. On the coast the only two towns of note are LAE and SALAMAUA.

4. ROADS AND TRACKS -

(a) WAU to SUNSHINE - Distance 27 miles.

This is a gravel motor road with occasional passing places. From WAU the first two miles and the last seventeen miles present NO difficulties, but in the intervening eight miles the road is cut into the sides of hills, with some very sharp turns, and greatly subject to landslides. Constant maintenance is therefore necessary, particularly in the wet season. The road passes through BULOLO and BULWA. Vehicles up to 5-tons have used this road. Prior to evacuation of the area several bridges along the route were said to have been destroyed. The route provides little cover - along the flats it passes through open country, and in the centre section the sides of the cuttings are too steep to allow vehicles to disperse off the road.

(b) BULWA to UPPER BAIUNE Power House - Distance 2¼ miles. A gravel road with occasional passing places. It has been used by 5-ton vehicles. The road has many steep grades and sharp turns and is subject to blocking by landslides. The land adjacent to the road provides NO cover. There are NO bridges.

(c) BULWA to LOWER BAIUNE Power House - Distance 2 miles. Gravel road with occasional passing places - has been used by 5-ton trucks, but is probably better suited to stand up to 3-ton traffic continuously. The road leads along the left bank of BAIUNE CREEK for nearly half its length. Cover is poor. There are NO bridges along the route.

(d) WAU to EDIE CREEK - Distance 10 miles.

This also is a gravel road with occasional passing places, and is suitable for 3-ton vehicles. It is for the most part cut into the side of hills and climbs steadily at the rate of 1 in 12. There is a very steep bend with a grade of 1 in 4 for a short distance. Landslides are prevalent, and previously a large gang of labourers was employed permanently in keeping it open for traffic. There are NO facilities for dispersion along the route. There are NO bridges.

(e) WAU to BLACK CAT CREEK - Distance 7 hrs walking.

This track is suitable for foot and mule traffic. It crosses the BULOLO RIVER and follows the right bank of BEENLEIGH CREEK past SANDY CREEK workings to BLACK CAT CREEK. From this point a track leads down the BITOI RIVER to SALAMAUA.

(f) WAU towards KAISINIK.

Leading south from WAU there is about two miles of gravelled motor road suitable for 3-ton traffic. Thereafter a track follows the BUISAVAL fairly closely through KAISINIK to SALAMAUA. There are two bridges - over LITTLE WAU and BIG WAU CREEKS respectively.

/Contd.

(g) Access to Coast.

Access to the coast is gained from WAU to SALAMAUA by the BUISAVAL and BITOI routes, and by SHELDON'S TRACK; from WAU to MOROBE (Intell Summary No.29); from WAU to LAKEKAMU (west coast), from MUMENG to the mouth of the BUANG RIVER by the BUANGS route, and from SUNSHINE to the mouth of the BUANG by way of KWATOMANE, MAPOS, and WAGO. In addition two routes lead from WAU to the MARKHAM RIVER (Intell Summary No.29) In general terms these two tracks provide better going than the routes more directly to the coast.

(h) North of the MARKHAM RIVER.

Having crossed the MARKHAM RIVER, there are several means of access to LAE.

There is the main MARKHAM VALLEY road leading from NADZAB to LAE, suitable for MT.

A foot track leads north from HARAKAPOR through MUNUM and NAZSOWAPUM towards BOANA, then turning east across the ATZERA RANGE to MISIM, then south down the BUSU RIVER to MALAHANG.

Access to LAE may be gained also down the bed of the BUMBU RIVER, which contains water only a few inches deep.

There is a further approach to LAE from the east, a landing having first been effected along the coast between HOPOI and SINGAUA. This approach is hampered by the BUSU RIVER, which is very difficult to cross.

Small bodies of troops could approach LAE through the swampy area between the MARKHAM VALLEY Road and the river, along the native and animal tracks.

5. RIVERS.

None of the rivers in the area are navigable. Those south of SALAMAUA, with the exception of the FRANCISCO, are fast-flowing, and enter the sea through gorges.

The FRANCISCO is fordable at the mouth, but not higher up, and further, it is infested with crocodiles.

The MARKHAM is NOT practicable for navigation except by canoes. Near the mouth it is full of submerged snags. With a SE wind native canoes enter the mouth and immediately, to avoid the swift-flowing main current and large dangerous snags, make for the northern bank of the river and proceed upstream in shallows about 18 ins deep. There are several good gravel beaches along the north bank, on which landings could be made from canoes.

6. CLIMATIC CONDITIONS.

The normal seasonal periods in the area are as follows:-

NW Season - Mid-December to Mid-March.
SE Season - Beginning of May to end of October.
Doldrums - Beginning of November to Mid-December, and mid-March to end of April.

The average annual fall at the points mentioned is as follows:-
BAIUNE 65.96 ins; EDIE CREEK 107.21 ins; BULOLO 55.95 ins; LAE 177.74 ins; SALAMAUA 200 ins.

Average temperature at WAU and EDIE CREEK are 83° and 75° respectively; at LAE and SALAMAUA the corresponding figures range between 70° and 95°, and 65° and 90°.

------oOo------

NB All references to First Aust Army Int Sum No.29 also appear in 2 Aust Corps Int Sum No.106.

SECRET

Subject: DISTURBANCES BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN and AMERICAN TROOPS.

HQ 2 Aust Corps,

Dec 42.

GSI/

1. Subtended is Adv LHQ Memo G/13978/Int of 8 Dec 42 for infm and any action deemed necessary :-

"1. Your special attention is drawn to the article on the above subject in Appx "E" to Adv HQ Allied Land Forces Weekly Intelligence Summary No.18, dated 4 Dec 42, issued to Australian addressees only.

2. It is hoped that Commanders will give serious attention to this problem so that our war effort will NOT be impaired by any further incidents which tend to create ill feeling between our Allies and ourselves.

3. The circulation of Appendix "E" is to be restricted to Australian Units."

Lt Logan Capt
for BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per 2 Aust Corps Daily Int Sum No.104 excl Nos 66, 67 and 69 to 76.

H.Q. 2 AUST. CORPS
Date 13 Dec
T.O. 1810 hrs
9 Copies
S E C R E T
G.S. REGISTRY

18

78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 114

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 13 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No. 80.

PART 1

OPERATIONS

(i) NW AUSTRALIA Area -

DARWIN. 11 Dec 1138 hrs. One submarine was sighted in DUNDAS STRAIT between CAPE DON and MELVILLE IS. 1400 hrs. One enemy A/C was reported to reonnoitre DARWIN.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 9 Dec. An unconfirmed report stated that Japs are moving Westward from VIQUEQUE. An enemy working party on the rd DILLI-BAUCAU are repairing the crossing at the North LACLO RIVER. Hostile natives have been active in the LALO area (the place has NOT been located).

10 Dec 0915 hrs. An unknown number of Japs, equipped with mortars and MGs, entered SALE. 0915 hrs. Enemy A/C made a recce of the South coast from East to West. 11 Dec approx twelve enemy Fs were on the old and new aerodromes at DILLI. 1735 hrs. It is reported that the aerodrome at FUIJORA, two mls South of VILA DE AVIZ, is now in use.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE 11 Dec 1645 hrs and 1755 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome, and all bombs fell in the target area. One grounded A/C was hit, an A/A posn silenced and many small fires started in the vicinity of the runways. Photographs revealed ten fighter A/C on the SW side, and many others on the NE side and in the dispersal bays.

GONA-SANANANDA. A search of the GONA MISSION area disclosed a quantity of preserved supplies and amn of all types. 10 Dec. 440 Japs were buried in this area but many corpses remain unburied. Many documents were captured also. Sixteen POW were taken, including ten stretcher cases. Our tps from SOPUTA made a slight advance on SANANANDA and inflicted some casualties on the enemy. A Jap counter-attack was repulsed with hy enemy losses. The Japs in this area appear to be well-clothed and in good physical condition. 11 Dec 1101 hrs. Allied A/C dive-bombed a storehouse near SANANANDA POINT. A direct hit was obtained and some other buildings were demolished.

BUNA. Allied patrols were operating in the area North of the new strip. 10 Dec. Allied forces located and engaged enemy MG posns in the BUNA VILLAGE and GOVT STA areas with mortar and 37 mm fire. NO report of the results has been received. Enemy snipers in the VILLAGE were engaged by SA fire. 1101 hrs. Our arty engaged and silenced enemy A/A posns located West of the old strip. At 1525 hrs further posns were engaged North of the old strip. NO details have been reported.

/Contd.

BUNA (Contd.)--Information from POW states enemy A/A posns are installed in the tall grass on the SE edge of the GOVT garden. 11 Dec 0830 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the enemy in the BUNA area. Bombs fell in the target area and fires were started, one was possibly a fuel dump. --1130 hrs. Twenty-nine enemy Zero Fs were reported over BUNA. 1315 hrs. Enemy A/C attacked the DOBODURA area. There are NO details.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN. 11 Dec. One submarine was sighted approx thirty mls North by West of CAPE HONTS, WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA.

CAPE ORFORD 11 Dec. One submarine was seen approx thirty-nine mls SE of the cape.

RABAUL 11 Dec. 1110 hrs. One cruiser, one probable cruiser, ten destroyers, ten or eleven cargo vessels and thirty-five u/i vessels including one possible S/P tender were in the harbour.

NEW IRELAND 10/11 Dec. One submarine was sighted approx 290 mls NE of EAST CAPE.

TABAR IS. 10/11 Dec. One submarine was seen approx five mls SW of SOUTH CAPE.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN-FAISI. 11 Dec 0856 hrs. Twelve destroyers, two submarines, four cargo vessels and three large tankers were in the area. (Landops 134).

P A R T 2

E N E M Y

(vi) Eqpt.

JAPANESE COLLAPSIBLE BOATS:

The following information has been obtained from a recently interrogated PW. All dimensions, etc are approximate. Boats are paddled by hand.

Construction	Made of rubber and inflated by foot pump. Floor of the craft is made of folding wooden slats, fitting into a side frame to give rigidity.
Dimensions (overall)	Length 8': Width 6'
Dimensions (internal)	Length 5': Width 3'
Weight	About 100 lbs.
Capacity	2 or 3 men.

(Adv AHQ No.18)

Capt.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

War Diary

Apl 19

S E C R E T

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.115

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 14 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

P A R T 1.

O P E R A T I O N S

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE. 11 Dec 1950 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome and bombs fell on buildings and in the dispersal areas; fires were started and explosions observed.

SALAMAUA. 11 Dec 1700 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome. The runway and dispersal areas were bombed. Analysis of Ph R reveal several huts around the fringe of LABABIA Island, thirteen mls South of SALAMAUA. It is reported that the Japs keep natives on this island when NOT required for work.

GONA-SANANANDA. 7 Dec. It is estimated that there are at least 200 Japs at the KUMUSI DELTA and patrolling the area North to the OPI RIVER. An Allied patrol contacted and inflicted casualties on some Japs in this area. 11 Dec. Allied tps are in contact with the enemy in the AMBOGA area. Our tps surprised and killed all personnel of an enemy recce party which included a Lt-Col and two Officers. Five mortars and three LMGs were captured from recently prepared posns. Since GONA was captured, 638 enemy dead have been buried. Our tps on the track SOPUTA to SANANANDA made a slight advance on the right flank. Many Japs were reported in the SURIRAI area. The enemy were observed wading from WAYTUTU towards the wreck at MANGROVE ISLAND and the sandspit at SURIRAI.

BUNA. There is NO change in the general dispositions. Activity is limited to counter-sniping. On night 10/11 Dec, Allied arty were at first active, but later firing was restricted owing to weather conditions and enemy air ops. 11 Dec. 1405 hrs. An enemy fd piece shelled Allied posns near BEURU, eight mls South of CAPE ENDAIADERE. It is reported that the enemy are wearing US helmets and jackets. 12 Dec. 0825 hrs and 0830 hrs. Allied A/C attacked Jap installations from the BUNA GOVERNMENT STA to the MAMBARE RIVER. Bombs were dropped on the STATION area; landing barges at the KUMUSI DELTA and twelve to fifteen native canoes, heading North between the KUMUSI and MAMBARE RIVERS, were strafed.

(iv)BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

NEW BRITAIN RABAUL 11 Dec. An analysis of photographs revealed one hy and one lt cruiser, nine destroyers, three torpedoe. boats, one submarine, one S/P tender, two tankers, twenty-four merchant vessels and two u/i vessels in the harbour.

NEW IRELAND. 12 Dec. 1332 hrs. One 17,000 ton cargo vessel was sighted in the STEFFEN STRAIT, twelve mls SW of KAVIENG.

/Contd.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO (Contd.)

NEW HANOVER. 12 Dec 1330 hrs. Two u/i vessels were seen seven mls SE of CAPE HATANALEM. The course was NOT stated.

(v) SOLOMONS

12 Dec 1235 hrs. One Allied recce A/C was attacked by seven interceptor Zeros. Two Zeros were destroyed and one was damaged.

BUKA. 12 Dec. 0925 hrs. One hy cruiser was seen to be unloading in BUKA PASSAGE, and then it proceeded North.

BUIN-FAISI. 12 Dec. 1645 hrs. Twelve destroyers, one sloop, two submarines, four cargo vessels and three tankers were in the area.

NEW GEORGIA. 11 Dec. 1045 hrs. Eleven destroyers were seen at the North tip of the island. (Landops Revsit No.135.).

PART 5

SECURITY

ANTI-VIVISECTION SOCIETIES

Reports have been received that these societies are endeavouring to influence members of the Forces by the distribution of propaganda pamphlets. While these activities need NOT as yet be regarded as serious, they should be watched. The principal object is to persuade members of the Forces to refuse to be inoculated or vaccinated, on the basis that these mean the introduction of germs into an otherwise healthy body and can cause illness, insanity, or death. (Adv AHQ Intell Sum No.18)

Lin Rogers Capt.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 104.

20

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.116

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 15 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.89

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii). NEI Area -

TIMOR. 11 Dec. Between 1130 hrs and 1450 hrs twelve trucks with enemy tps, four MC's and 150 bicycles passed through HERAI moving East. 1745 hrs. Ten large landing craft passed HERAI on a course East.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

MADANG 13 Dec. Allied recce A/C, shadowing a convoy of five destroyers on a SE course eighty-five mls NNW of MADANG, scored two near misses on one destroyer. Covering Zeros several times attacked our A/C and one Zero was shot down.

SALAMAUA 13 Dec. 2040 hrs. Twelve Allied armed recce A/C bombed the North end of the Isthmus. Results were NOT observed.

CAPE WARD HUNT 14 Dec 0320 hrs. Five destroyers were seen six mls North of The Cape on course SW.

AMBOGA. Captured enemy documents reveal three Coys of 3 Bn, 170 Jap Regt landed between KUMUSI and AMBOGA River from four destroyers during the nights of 1 and 2 Dec, and the tps are now in a posn at the mouth of the AMBOGA River. The Allied attack to 11 Dec inflicted 191 casualties on these tps. Since 11 Dec 1800 hrs, our forces have repulsed two enemy actions, killed ten Japs incl one offr, captured LMG, and then counter-attacked. Slight progress has been made by our tps and our offensive is continuing. 13 Dec 0955 hrs, Allied A/C strafed enemy barges at AMBASI and in the area of the KUMUSI RIVER.

BUNA 12 Dec. Allied arty scored two direct hits on Jap fwd elements near the br between the strips. 13 Dec. Allied pressure supported by mortars, and arty fire, continued on all enemy localities. Recce patrols pushed into the area South of GIROPA PT. There are indications that the enemy operated on a radio frequency used by Allied A/C, to give false direction. 1000 hrs. Allied A/C attacked BUNA STA. Bombs were dropped on target areas but results were NOT observed. 1020 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed the area near CAPE KILLERTON, but results were NOT observed.

PORT MORESBY. 13 Dec 1103 hrs and 2355 hrs, and 14 Dec 0133 hrs. An air raid was reported in progress. There are NO details to hand.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN. GASMATA. 13 Dec 1630 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome. Bombs fell on the targets and a fire was

started. The aerodrome appeared unserviceable.

ST GEORGE'S CHANNEL. 13 Dec 1044 hrs. Allied A/C attacked a destroyer near the Channel. There was one near miss.

(v) SOLOMONS Area

BUKA 12 Dec. Four med B's and twelve F A/C were seen on the aerodrome.

BUIN-FAISI. 12 Dec 1145 hrs. Much activity was observed on the KAHILI aerodrome and one med B and twelve F A/C were seen. 13 Dec 1015 hrs. Fourteen destroyers, one sloop, four cargo vessels and two tankers were in the BUIN-FAISI area.

NEW GEORGIA. VAHOLI BAY. 12 Dec. During the morning, eight destroyers were sighted scattered over an area thrity mls NE of the Bay.

(Landops Revsit No.136)

PART 2

ENEMY

(vi) Eqpt.

Wave Meter: A small and compact wave meter has been recovered from NEW GUINEA. Technical details cannot be reported owing to its badly damaged condition.

This device was apparently fitted with a magic eye for the purpose of measuring and checking wave frequency during transmission, thus indicating the necessity for any adjustment in wave length. It consists of a metal box, 3½" x 4½" x 6" weighing (in its present state) 2½ lbs, with 4 hinged loops at top and bottom apparently for spring suspension, suggesting use in aircraft. (Adv LHQ Intell Sum No.17).

PART 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) Corps Area:

Rd MONTVILLE MALENY is under repair and reconstruction. Rd is closed to all military traffic until 31 Dec 42. (3 Aust Div Sig)

Capt.
GS 2 Aust. Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

War Diary

Vol 21

S E C R E T

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 117

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 16 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No. 80.

P A R T 1

O P E R A T I O N S :

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 11/12 Dec. It is estimated that 2000 to 3000 enemy tps, in a truck convoy, passed through HERAI moving East. Ref Int Sum No. 114. It is now confirmed that 300 Japs from MAOBISSE entered SAME on the night 9/10 Dec. 11 Dec. This force then moved to ALAS. The following morning the force was attacking in the direction of BATUCUA (Comment: This is probably FATUCUAC, South of ALAS towards the coast). 13 Dec. These Japs were reported to be West of BETANO.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

BUNA. Night 12/13 Dec. An Allied patrol advanced to a pt 400 yds South of the rd through the Govt Sta garden and killed ten enemy snipers. 14 Dec. 1000 hrs. Allied forces occupied BUNA village.

SANANANDA 13 Dec. Allied forces were actively patrolling the SOPUTA-SANANANDA track. Night 13/14 Dec. An Allied ration party succeeded in reaching a rd block 600 yds NE of the junc of the SOPUTA-SANANANDA track.

AMBOGA RIVER. Our forces made a slight adv in the direction of the mouth of the river despite enemy MG fire from prepared posns and thick jungle swamps.

14 Dec 0500 hrs. The five destroyers (Ref Int Sum No. 116) landed an unknown number of tps and supplies at the mouth of the KUMUSI and MAMBARE RIVERS. Allied A/C attacked these landings during the day. Barges and tps were strafed and many bodies left in the water. The convoy was later attacked. A direct hit was scored on one destroyer and there were near misses on the others. Enemy A/C covering the convoy intercepted the Allied Bs. Three Zero Fs were shot down. The convoy complete was last seen at 1400 hrs, 14 Dec. twenty five mls East of GASMATA on a course NE.

PORT MORESBY. 13 Dec 2355 hrs. One enemy A/C attacked WARDS AERODROME, but there was NO damage done or casualties reported.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

NEW BRITAIN 14 Dec 0930 hrs. Two small vessels were seen twenty mls East by North of GASMATA on a course East by South.

/Contd.

(v)SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA PASSAGE 14 Dec. 1650 hrs. A 5,000 ton tpt, escorted by a destroyer and gun boat arrived in the passage from the South. The escorting vessels then returned to the South.

BUIN FAISI 14 Dec. 1703 hrs. Five destroyers, four cargo vessels, two tankers and a submarine were seen in the area.

General: 12 and 13 Dec. There were indications that there were six enemy submarines operating in the SOLOMONS area. (Landovs 137).

PART 2

ENEMY

(vii) Tactics: Combat Reports.

Recent preliminary signalled combat reports are showing a great advance in interrogation of, and observation by, crews. A great many details are being reported which are all-important and which formerly failed to reach this Headquarters.

As examples, the last few days have witnessed the reporting of new details as to camouflage, attack tactics of the enemy and armament. Of particular interest have been reports of the dropping of flares from enemy aircraft to silhouette and mark our bombers for enemy ack ack and interception, as well as the firing of rocket flares from enemy naval vessels to silhouette our aircraft again.

More specific comparisons with known types of aircraft in attempting to identify a new enemy plane are most gratifying and helpful. The use of the term "unidentified aircraft", without even an indication as to whether it was single-engined, a monoplane or of any specific type, has given way to earnest attempts to describe fully the plane seen. Every detail or basis of comparison with known types aids, and this effort is indicative of improved co-operation between all concerned. This includes recent reports of details such as the use of searchlights, flares, Verey pistols, mortar barrages against aircraft, length of detail of enemy bombs varying from known figures, and many other points previously often overlooked or omitted. (AAF Int Sum No.57).

Comment: The above shows how important it is to observe and report detail when forwarding such information. It applies just as much to the Army as to the Air Force and should be continuously brought to the attention of all ranks so that when the opportunity arises, relevant details will NOT be missed. The method of comparing an unidentified A/C with a known type, whether enemy or our own, could well be emulated by our own tps.

(xiv) General: JAP NATIONAL FESTIVALS. See Appx "A" att.

Capt.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

S E C R E T

APPX "A" TO HQ 2 AUST CORPS INT SUM No.117

JAPANESE NATIONAL FESTIVALS

There is evidence that Japanese operations are sometimes affected by anniversaries and other national festivals, which are, in general, observed with rather more particularity than is usual among Western nations. This factor may operate in two ways. On the one hand, some holidays may be observed among operational units by granting leave and a general tendency towards relaxation; on the other hand, some festivals (e.g. Navy Day, National Aviation Day and Emperor's Birthday) may give rise to a desire to provide striking war news either just before the day or on the day itself. For example, National Aviation Day in 1941 was marked by a distinct increase of air effort in CHINA.

The nearest of the anniversaries at the moment is that of the outbreak of the Pacific War, of PEARL HARBOUR, the first attacks on SINGAPORE, etc (7 Dec). Already considerable excitement is being worked up by radio propaganda in JAPAN and three days of celebration are promised. If this celebration is reflected in SWPA it is likely to take the second form - an increase in operations.

A list of chief national festivals follows :-

Jan 1 New Year's Religious Service at Court.
Jan 3 Emperor's New Year Festival.
Jan 5 Imperial New Year Banquet.

Above are the most important public holidays in the Japanese calendar, marked by rounds of visits, special food and wine, and general merrymaking. It is practically impossible to get any official or public business done from 1 to 7 Jan, while, for several days at the end of December, new business is seldom commenced, in case it intrudes on the holiday. The Japanese New Year has perhaps more traditional observances than the European Christmas, and troops in battle areas are officially assisted to keep them up - the special components of the New Year meal being a regular issue, whilst beer or wine is often distributed.

Feb 11 Anniversary of Accession of the Emperor JIMMU and the founding of the Empire. (Kigen Setsu).

This date, as well as the year to which the founding is now assigned - 660 B.C. - has, of course, no foundation as an anniversary in fact.

Mar 6 Birthday of Empress.
Mar 20 or 21 Spring Equinox Festival (Shunka Sai).
Apr 3 Anniversary of Death of Emperor JIMMU (JIMMU TENNOSAI).
Apr 29 Emperor's Birthday (Tencho Setsu).

Usually marked by an elaborate military review at the YOYOGI parade ground, TOKIO. It is a day specially associated with the Army.

Apr 30 Festival of the Yasukuni Shrine.

This is a national Shinto shrine, dedicated to those who have died in battle for JAPAN since 1868. For a few years now the relatives of the fallen have been brought to TOKIO on 23 Apr for a week of varied celebration, culminating with the main festival, which consists of Shinto services. Another festival of this shrine is held on 23 Oct.

/Contd.

May 27 Navy Day - Anniversary of Battle of Tsushima.
Sep 20 National Aviation Day.
Sep 23 or 24 Autumn Equinox Festival (Shuki Korei).
Oct 17 Harvest Thanksgiving to the Deities of Ise (Kanname - Sai).
Nov 3 Commemorative Festival for the Emperor Meiji (Meiji Setsu).
Nov 23 Harvest Festival of the Imperial House (Niiname Sai).
Dec 25 Anniversary of the death of Emperor Taisho (Taisho Tenno Sai).

All the above are public holidays - i.e. Government offices are closed, except the Yasukuni festival, Aviation Day and Navy Day. There are many other festivals some of which are noted below:-

Jan 7 Early Herb Fete (Wakana-no-sekku).
Jan 8 Beginning of Army.
Mar 3 Peach Festival (Momo-no-sekku).
Mar 10 Army Day.
Apr 8 Birthday of Buddha.
May 5 Iris Festival (Shobi-no-sekku).
Jul 7 Star Festival (Tanabata Matsuri. (See Lafcadio Hearn).
Jul 13) O-Bon. Buddhist Festival of the Dead. Analagous to
14,15) All Souls Day in belief and ceremony.
Sep 9 Chrysanthemum Fete (Kiki-no-sekku).

There are numerous days in connection with JAPAN'S new earnestness - for instance, the first of every month is named Asi Regeneration Day and on it the loyal citizen must curb his pleasures (no beer is served) to the greater glory of East Asia. There are the normal crop of War Savings Week, National Safety Week (accidents illegal), Kindness to animals Week, and the like.

Both the outbreak of the China Incident, and that of the Pacific War (7 Jul and 7 Dec respectively) are now celebrated with every mark of official approval. (AHQ Int Sum No.31.)

---oOo---

11 Aust 22

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.118

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 17 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA -

CAPE WESSEL (NW tip of GULF of CARPENTARIA). 15 Dec 1412 hrs. One submarine on a SE course was sighted and covered by A/C eight mls North of The Cape.

(ii) NEI Area -

TIMOR 12 Dec. Thirty-four small boats moved from VILA DE MANATUTO to DILLI. Later twenty-eight returned to MANATUTO. 13 Dec. Sixty-two tp trucks left MANATUTO travelling East. 15 Dec. An unknown number of Japs entered MINDELO. They returned in the direction of FAINIAfour mls ESE of MINDELO. A party of 100 Japs and 300 natives from BETANO was heading towards SAME.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

LAE 14 Dec 1120 hrs. Allied A/C bombed the aerodrome.

HUBO. The Japs despatched a large party of armed natives from LABABIA to GUADAGASAL to capture native carriers for HUBO.

SANANANDA. Allied arty fire was effective and casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

AMBOGA. 14 Dec. Our tps advancing on the mouth of the river made slight progress.

MAMBARE 14 Dec. An Allied patrol killed six Japs West of MAMBA MISSION.

BUNA. 14 Dec. Allied forces were re-organizing in the village. 15 Dec. Our tps were attacking Jap posns in a coconut grove South of the GOVT STA.

PORT MORESBY. 14 Dec. 1944 hrs. One enemy A/C attacked BERRY aerodrome, but NO damage was done or casualties reported. 15 Dec 2050 hrs and 16 Dec 0047 hrs. Air raids were reported to be in progress, but NO details were available.

GENERAL (Ref Allied air attacks on convoy in Int Sum No.117). It is now known that ten intercepting Zeros were shot down and two more probably shot down.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN 14 Dec 2235 hrs. Allied A/C attacked GASMATA aerodrome, but results were NOT observed. 15 Dec 2130 hrs. Six destroyers were seen in ST GEORGES CHANNEL on a course SE.

S E C R E T

P A R T 4

Infm to 7 Dec 42

OTHER FRONTS:

RUSSIAN FRONT -

Northern Sector. The situation South of LAKE ILMEN has been obscure for some months but recent infm stated that the Russians were holding DEMYANSK and their front line follows the LOVAT RIVER.

Central Sector. Russian offensive operations were continuing although fierce ground resistance and blizzards were slowing down operations. However, the Russian General Staff was satisfied with the progress at 1 Dec. River marshes and woods made a speedy adv against a fully prepared enemy difficult.

Stalingrad Sector. It is believed that as many as 200,000 tps of the SIXTH GERMAN ARMY are completely encircled in this area. They are entirely dependent on air supplies but are still resisting fiercely against increased Russian pressure. A sudden thaw and hy rains were impeding Russian progress in the DON bend and SW of STALINGRAD. The German bridgeheads near the mouth of the CHIR RIVER have now probably been eliminated. The Russians claim they have two bridgeheads on the lower CHIR RIVER. There has been NO major German counter-action yet, but the enemy claims to have interfered with the Russian supply lines by motorised columns on the KALMUK STEPPE.

Caucasus Sector. The Germans continue on the defensive but Russian progress has been prevented by local counter-attacks and hy rains.

BURMA:

AKYAB. The Jap grn has been reinforced by the withdrawal of some tps from BUTHIDAUNG. Jap patrols have been active in the HOKALIN Area.

TUNISIA:

1/3 Dec. Three counter-attacks were made with tanks and D/B's. Considerable losses were inflicted on the enemy (incl 33 tanks) but he succeeded in re-occupying TEBOURBA. The First Army is re-grouping South of TEBOURBA and improving a heavily strained Adm situation and adv landing grounds.
MATEUR. Commandos who landed at RAS AL KORAN on 1 Dec have now linked up with coln West of MATEUR.

SHIPPING:
NORTHERN WATERS - A convoy of twenty-nine ships from RUSSIA which arrived in the U.K. lost one ship torpedoed by a U-Boat and one was missing. Three independently routed Russian ships arrived in ICELAND from RUSSIA.
An ITALIAN blockade runner was intercepted 500 mls West of CAPE FINISTERRE by a convoy escort. The ship surrendered but owing to bad weather had to be sunk.

MEDITERRANEAN. 1/4 Dec. The Axis lost nine ships and a warship was set on fire as a result of Fleet Air Arm and RAF attacks. Three warship escorts are known to have been sunk and other shipping damaged or destroyed. There was NO sign of activity by the ITALIAN Navy.

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.118

PART 4 (Contd) -

TOULON. It is now confirmed that NO 8" cruiser was left undamaged.

BLACK SEA. The Russians claim that a large tanker, two merchant ships and small craft were sunk by surface forces in the Western BLACK SEA.

U-BOAT WARFARE for week ended 28 Nov 42 -

U-boats were quiet both East and West of GIBRALTAR, but there were signs of greater activity in the Central NORTH ATLANTIC. During the week ended 29 Nov six ships were sunk by U boats, two in the ATLANTIC and four in the INDIAN OCEAN. Two ocean convoys totalling eighty-seven ships arrived in the U.K. without loss. Six promising attacks on U boats were reported during the week.

(World Revsit week ended 7 Dec)

P A R T 5

SECURITY:

The following appeared in Fighter Command, Int Sum No.361.

"Even P/O Prune can understand the need for security where our own operations are concerned (though his practice may sometimes lag behind his comprehension). What is harder to grasp is the necessity for keeping quiet about one's knowledge of the other side, since it is argued that the other fellow presumably knows all about his own affairs already. In point of fact, of course, it is extremely important that the enemy should be kept in ignorance of the extent of our knowledge of his doings, since disclosure may NOT only prejudice one particular source of infm, but reduce the flow of infm from all sources."

In this connection it may be noted that there have been numerous indications lately that the G.A.F. authorities in at least one theatre of war are concerned about the security consciousness of their flying personnel should they come to be interrogated as prisoners of war. Evidence that stringent security drill has been practised is provided by the stubborn refusal of some prisoners to impart any infm whatsoever, even of the most harmless kind. One prisoner stated that a few days before he was shot down the whole of his Gruppe was paraded in flying kit and a search was made of all their pockets and of all A/C of the unit. Personnel found with papers they should NOT have been carrying - such as diaries, notes of targets and times and dates of take off - were severely reprimanded."

The moral is obvious. The more he realises that we profit from his indiscretion, the more discreet the enemy will tend to be; while the more discreet we are, the less he will realize that we do profit from his indiscretions and the more he is likely to commit. (P/O Prune says what does the last sentence mean?)."

(AAF SWPA Int Sum No.57).

PART 5 - Security (Contd) -

Reticence of British Prisoners of War. At HONGKONG in Feb 42, a Jap officer attempted to persuade members of the HONGKONG Volunteer Defence Corps who had been captured to reveal the working of their 4" guns. The men, a Sgt, L/Bombardier and five gunners, were taken from the Prisoner of War Camp, given a good meal and cigarettes, and then taken to their guns at the war stations.

The gunners were models of ignorance; some "had always been numbers 5 and 6 and knew nothing of the mechanism, or the duties of other numbers; some had just joined the Volunteers (two actually had over three years' service) and had NOT been taught anything about the guns." The sergeant and L/Bombardier could NOT claim such alibis, so they asked for the breech - it was NOT there; the range finder - it was NOT there; the D.R.F. - everything had gone but the actual gun. This lack of essential material so completely defeated the Non Commissioned Officers that they could hardly recognize the guns, let alone describe the mechanism.

The Japanese officer was very annoyed and expressed his annoyance in NO uncertain manner. They were then asked if they knew anything about STANLEY. They knew where it was but were completely ignorant of its guns and defences. They were then returned to camp and were NOT questioned again.

(LHQ Int Sum No.17 -27 Nov 42)

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

Mr Denny

Appendix 23

S E C R E T

78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.119

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 18 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C, See Summary No.80.

P A R T 1

O P E R A T I O N S

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR. 16 Dec. 1025 hrs. Allied A/C made an attack on MINDELO and at 1032 hrs attacked MAOBISSE. All bombs fell in the target areas.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

SALAMAUA. 15 Dec. In the morning our fighting patrols entered GUADAGASAL and released nineteen local natives. The pro-Jap natives escaped.

MAMBARE. 15 Dec. 1525 hrs to 16 Dec 0844 hrs. Allied A/C attacked enemy occupied areas from the KUMUSI to the MAMBARE RIVERS, and shacks at TAUTUTU VILLAGE, three mls SSW of MAMBA MISSION, were hit and the shores strafed. Other results were NOT observed.

AMBOGA 16 Dec. A patrol reported strong enemy posns NW of the mouth of the river.

SANANANDA 15 Dec. During the afternoon, several enemy snipers were killed on the SOPUTA SANANANDA track.

BUNA. 15 Dec. An Allied arty shoot during the morning destroyed the centre span of the br South of the mouth of ENTRANCE CREEK, leading to BUNA GOVT STA. 16 Dec. 1204 hrs. Allied A/C bombed BUNA GOVT STA. 1430 hrs. MANGROVE IS. was strafed and SURIRAI SPIT, seven mls NW of BUNA, was bombed. NO enemy activity was seen.

PORT MORESBY. 15 Dec. 2132 hrs. Ref. Int Sum 118. Enemy A/C dropped bombs between WARD'S and JACKSON'S strips. There was NO damage.

G E N E R A L: Ref Int Sum No.118. It is now known that of enemy A/C covering the convoy, twelve Zeros and one med B were shot down for certain, and three more Zeros were probably shot down.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN. 16 Dec. 1000 hrs. One small camouflaged vessel was sighted in JACQUINOT BAY.

NEW HANOVER. 16 Dec 1000 hrs. One cargo vessel was seen eighteen mls West by South of CAPE MATANALEM, course SSE. 1105 hrs. One cargo or hospital ship was seen twenty-seven mls South of CAPE MATANALEM, course West by North.

/Contd.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN-FAISI. 16 Dec. 0818 hrs. Sightings in the area comprised two destroyers, two tankers and two cargo vessels. 1025 hrs. Allied A/C attacked an enemy convoy of one destroyer, two cargo vessels and two tankers, which was stationary approx 117 mls West of BUIN. NO damage was observed. 1400 hrs. One cargo vessel departed from BUIN-FAISI area on a course West.

NEW GEORGIA. 16 Dec. 0758 hrs. One small tpt was seen unloading at the SE end of RUSSELL IS. 1820 hrs. Six destroyers were sighted twenty mls West of VELLA LAVELLA IS, on a course South. (Landops Revsit 139).

P A R T 2

E N E M Y

(vii) Tactics:

Extracts from two letters from members of the Forces in New Guinea:-

(i) "They have completely busted the idea that the Jap will fight to the death. It's the sort of impression one gets from the newspapers. Our boys have a very poor opinion of him as a fighter. His snipers are very good, and he is deadly with his mountain guns, but apart from that and the infinitely weary business of chasing him, the actual cleaning up doesn't give them much bother.
Their rank and file can't shoot much at all. Our percentage of killed of the total number of casualties is very small and they are all killed at long range by snipers. The practice lately has been for our boys to outflank them and surround them, and then attack from all sides at once. When the attack commences, they have to be very careful to take cover, as that is the time the snipers get them, when they are still at a distance. When they have sneaked up close the signal is given for the final dash. The boys yell and scream at the tops of their voices, and as every second man of ours has an automatic weapon the din is terrific. This reduces the oriental to a state of jittery impotence and he actually drops his rifle if you please.
Still, all these things were not so when the boys met the Japs first. It is due I think to the masterly way in which the boys have taken his measure and to their relentless pursuit of him, and the persistence of their attacks, and their general determination to clean him up as soon as possible."

(ii) "I say this about the Jap, he's damn cunning and blood thirsty but he can't stand the cold steel, there were times when we were completely surrounded but when we charged with fixed bayonets he turned tail and off. It was very difficult though on account of the thick jungle, if we could get to a fairly clean place he was nowhere to be seen. He won't come out into the open, it's all sniper work and ambushes. He had all the odds on his side too when we were in but now it's a different tale. He isn't any good with the rifle but he's got a weapon called the mountain gun that's fairly deadly and shattering on your nerves. The only reason he pushed us back was he had already started his drive and had about four times more men than we. (Q'land L of C Area Intell Report No.34)

C o m m e n t : The above are reproduced for the value of the opinions of the individual soldiers and show that our own troops, having mastered the art of jungle warfare, can apply the lessons with characteristic and deadly skill. The attitude of mind of those in direct contact with the Japs is the best proof that, though a cunning and wily opponent, he is by no means insuperable.

Capt.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

War Diary

Appendix 24

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.120

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 19 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii) NEI Area -

TIMOR 16 Dec. Allied A/C bombed MINDELO and TURISCAI, Twenty-one mls SSE of DILLI. Bombs fell in the village areas. 17 Dec. Recce A/C sighted a F strip three mls West of VILA DE AVIZ (forty mls East of BAUCAU). Six trucks with twenty personnel were in the vicinity.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

CAPE WARD HUNT 17 Dec 0910 hrs. A submarine was seen twenty-three mls NW of the Cape.

AMBOGA 16 and 17 Dec. Our tps made slight progress and cleared a small pocket of enemy SE of the mouth of the AMBOGA RIVER. They are now closing in on enemy in the village East of the river mouth.

SANANANDA 16 Dec. Allied patrols were active throughout the day. 17 Dec 1101 hrs. Allied A/C strafed huts on the Southern MANGROVE IS and SURIRAI SPIT.

BUNA 16 Dec. Our forces East of the new strip made a slight adv. Patrols were sent fwd on both flanks. An enemy log and earth barricade 350 yds long and four ft high running East to West was seen 250 yds South of CAPE ENDAIDERE. Other Allied forces endeavouring to encircle enemy emplacements East of the br between the two strips met hy enemy MG fire. Allied A/C and harrassing arty fire are now bearing on these known posns. 16 Dec 1255 hrs. At BUNA GOVT STA Allied tps cleared the coconut grove West of ENTRANCE CREEK capturing an enemy food dump. Some Allied tps are now East of the creek. During the morning our forces repulsed an enemy counter-attack supported by hy mortar and arty fire at the South end of ENTRANCE CREEK. At least twenty enemy were killed in this engagement. 17 Dec 1120 hrs. Allied A/C bombed BUNA GOVT STA and successfully strafed barges at SANANANDA PT.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

ADMIRALTY IS. 17 Dec 1929 hrs. Three destroyers and one 8,000-ton tpt were seen 168 mls NNW of LORENGAU, MANUS IS, on a course ENE.

NEW BRITAIN 16 Dec. It is suspected that an enemy landing was made at CAPE GLOUCESTER from two warships. 17 Dec. 1045 hrs. These ships departed heading in a NE direction.

NEW IRELAND 17 Dec 1625 hrs. One 4,000-ton tpt and three 500-ton escort vessels were sighted thirty-four

mls SSE of KAVIENG on a course NE.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA 17 Dec. The 5,000-ton tpt which arrived 14 Dec is still in BUKA PASSAGE. Ten motor torpedo boats were seen at the NE end of BUKA Is.

BUIN-FAISI. 17 Dec 0900 hrs. Seven cargo and twelve other vessels were in the area.

NEW GEORGIA. 16 Dec 2240 hrs. One destroyer was sighted off MUNDA BAR on a Northerly course.

(Landops Revsit No.140).

P A R T 2

E N E M Y:

(xiv) Shipping -

Rafts & the shipping shortage: Tokyo Radio, 2/12: "The army has used wooden rafts and now the navy has successfully used them for long distance tpt purposes. From an (unnamed) port a new raft 15 metres wide and 75 metres long has arrived at Osaka port. These are expected to relieve shipping shortage" (Home Service).
Comment:- Propaganda b'casts to enemy nations are naturally silent on the problem of shipping, but direct admissions showing a deep concern have been made in both Home Service and German sessions. Appeals for building acceleration are frequently made and, on 25/11, Yashuda, Vice President of the Maritime Affairs Board, based such an appeal on the need for allotting ships for (a) military use (b) tpt of raw materials for war production (c) tpt of daily necessities (d) Maintenance of tpt between Jap controlled territories. The Japan Year Book,39/40, stated that one year of war in China had caused the diversion of 3,500,000 tons of shipping to near sea tption. The problem created by one year of war in the Pacific, summed up by Yashuda in a general sense, is immeasurably greater.
In 38 and 39 legislation was passed in Japan which hadthe effect of placing shipping on a national basis without eliminating the motive of profit. Ultimate control rests with the Govt, and, during this year, the Navy Minister has replaced the Minister for Comms as wartime shipping chief. Since 39, subsidies have been granted on a basis calculated to produce the type of ship most useful in war. In Jul this year, Tokyo Radio told Italy that the new standard types would be 9,500, 7,500, 1,400 and 1,250 tons respectively. The previous standards specially encouraged for the China War were all under 5,000 tons. While the new standards get first priority in materials, it is NOT clear how far the subsidies are still applicable.
Shortage of steel has caused a concentration on wooden shipbuilding. Frequent references have been made to this as a panacea, and, lest ersatz shipping in the form of rafts seemed trying even Jap faith too far, the above announcement was followed by a promise to build "more and more wooden ships."
Corroborative evidence of the shipping problem is seen in frequent b'cast references to (a) shortage of materials in some occupied areas,(b) development of rys in places where the normal means of comm is by sea (c) salvaging of ships sunk before the Jap occupation.

(AAF Int Sum No.57).

[signature] Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.12.

Appendix 25

G1969

7 DEC 42

SD Instruction No. 31

Franking of Messages.

The attention of all officers is drawn to the following extracts rom HQ 2 Aust Corps Standing Orders for War.

"1. Officers holding the appointments as under are authorised to frank messages :-

(a) Emergency Ops - GOC
BGS
DA & QMG
CSO

(b) Immediate - Officers mentioned in paragraph 1 (a) and in addition :-

GGRA
GE
GSO 2 (O)
LOs
Senior Air Staff Officer.
Night Duty Officer of G(O) G(I) A,Q,RAA

(In case of emergency, any officer may frank a message "Immediate", but if his name is not on the authorised list he will be held responsible that the urgency is sufficient to justify his action. The duty of the Sigs in such a case is to accept the message, transmit it with the order of priority ordered, and afterwards report the matter through the usual channels.)

(c) All SOs and Heads of Services.

All officers Corps of Sigs.

2. In the absence from Corps HQ of any of the above officers, the officer(s) acting for him may exercise similar power, endorsing the message after his signature "for .....(by rank and name, but NOT appointment) ACG.

3. (a) Priority messages will be franked by originator by hand on only those copies requiring such priority, Copies not needing such high priority will be endorsed in accordance with the priority (if any) required."

(b) UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL ANY WO NCO OR MAN ON THE STRENGTH OF HQ 2 AUST CORPS ORIGINATE OR FRANK ANY MESSAGE FOR TRANSMISSION BY SIGS EXCEPT WHEN ENGAGED IN URGENT OPERATIONS AGAINST AN ENEMY, AND THEN ONLY WHEN NO OFFICER IS AVAILABLE WITHIN THE AREA

4. "(a) Sigs will notify the originator of the non-clearance of priority messages after the following times from T.H.I.

Emergency Ops.....15 mins.
Immediate.....45 mins.
Important.....2 hrs.

This is to become a matter of "Drill".

(b) When Sigs know that the message will take a longer period than the times stated, the originator will be informed at once.

(c) When a priority message has been cleared, Sigs will inform the originator, and include time of clearance."

BGS.
2 Aust Corps.

Distribution.

4 Def & Emp Pl.
GCC - for information.
G
Int incl I and FSS
RAA
CE
CSC
DA & QMG - for information.
A
Q
S & T
Medical
Ord
AEME
Pay
Legal
Pro
Education
Chaplains
Postal
TO
Camp
Amenities
War Diary (2)
File (1)

Appendix 26

S E C R E T

GSI

78

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.121

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 20 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

P A R T 1

O P E R A T I O N S:

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR, 18 Dec. Allied A/C attacked and sank an enemy vessel near KISAR IS (NE end of TIMOR).

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

ALEXISHAVEN 18 Dec. Between 0936 hrs and 2030 hrs, Allied A/C made four attacks on an enemy convoy of seven vessels heading towards ALEXISHAVEN from MANUS IS. Two direct hits were scored on these vessels which continued on their course. When last sighted between 2315 hrs and 2400 hrs five were anchored at MADANG and the other two stationary off ALEXISHAVEN.

FINSCHAVEN 19 Dec, 0050 hrs. Allied A/C attacked a probable further two destroyers entering FINSCHAVEN. Near misses were reported [illegible] the vessels were last sighted thirty-two mls NNW of FINSCHAVEN at a time NOT stated.

AMBOGA 17 Dec. Allied tps cleared one more enemy strong post and later wiped out enemy opposition in the village South of the river mouth. 18 Dec, 1158 hrs.. Allied A/C bombed and strafed the the area from the KUMUSI to MAMBARE RIVERS. Results were NOT observed and NO enemy activity was reported.

SANANANDA 18 Dec. Allied tps inflicted some casualties on the enemy on the SOPUTA SANANANDA track. Increased enemy arty fire was reported.

BUNA 18 Dec. An Allied tk attack near CAPE ENDAIDERE captured one enemy posn. Strong enemy resistance continues at the East end of the new strip. The supposed enemy barricade (Ref Int Sum No.120) is now considered to be a built up roadway. At dawn on 18 Dec, Allied tps in the GOVT SEA area attacked an island at the mouth of ENTRANCE CREEK. The attack on the rd junc South of ENTRANCE CREEK was continuing. Allied arty located and silenced enemy guns firing from the direction of GIROPA PT. Thirty-seven enemy dead have already been found in the coconanut grove West of ENTRANCE CREEK.

DOBODURA, 17 Dec, 2145 hrs. Eleven enemy A/C attacked the area. There was NO damage done nor casualties reported.

PORT MORESBY 18 Dec, 0035 hrs. One enemy A/C attacked JACKSON FIELD. NO damage was done nor casualties reported.

(iv) BISMARCKS ARCHIPELAGO

NEW HANOVER 17 Dec. A submarine was seen 121 mls WNW of CAPE MATANALEM.

NEW IRELAND 17 Dec. A submarine was seen eleven mls SSE of CAPE ST GEORGE.

/Contd.

(v) SOLOMONS Area. –

BUKA Area 18 Dec 1030 hrs. A destroyer and a cargo vessel were seen twenty mls NE of KIETA on a course NOT stated. 18 Dec. 1129 hrs. A destroyer and a 5,000 ton tpt arrived in BUKA PASSAGE from the South. 1250 hrs. A lt cruiser and a destroyer were seen twenty-five mls West by North of MUTUPINA PT on the West coast of BOUGAINVILLE IS. on a course ENE, 1351 hrs. A destroyer and a large tanker were seen twenty mls East of BUKA PASSAGE on a course North.

BUIN FAISI, 18 Dec. 0715 hrs. Two destroyers, one tanker and three cargo vessels were seen in the area.

G E N E R A L:

TRUK IS. 17 Dec. 1200 hrs. One A/C carrier with escort was seen ninety-seven mls ESE of the island on a course SSE. (Landops Revsit No.141.

P A R T 3

T O P O G R A P H I C A L:

(i) Corps Area –

RC near DAYBORO Rly Sta Ref CADASTURE 1" 978232, now connects with Rd at Ref 982245 (Q'land L of C Weekly Int Summary)

Tropical hurricanes on Queensland Coast:

The Admiralty Hydrographic Office, in 1897, published the following remarks and advice concerning tropical hurricanes on the Queensland coast :–

Tropical hurricanes on the coast of Queensland may be expected during the summer months, namely, December, January, February, March, and the early part of April. These storms appear to originate between latitudes 8° to 12° S., and between the meridians of 155° E. and 170° West. On reaching the Queensland coast they may strike the land at any point between latitude 12° and 26° – that is, between Cape Grenville and Wide Bay. To the Southward of latitude 26° S. those storms break up into heavy gales. If, during the summer months, and the early part of April, a heavy swell sets in from North-East, and there is little or NO wind at the time, bad weather is certain, for the sea is always in advance of a cyclone. With the glass steadily falling, heavy rains, and murky skies, winds between South-South East and East a cyclone may be expected. These storms may extend some distance inland, but their centres do NOT often pass the coastal ranges, which appear to repel them, and they usually emerge from the coast between Broadsound and Cape Moreton. If the barometer is high over a considerable portion of the coast, the storm will recurve some distance off the land, and the wind will be from South-East to South. If, on the contrary, the barometer is low in front of the storm, it will blow home on the land as far as the coast range, and cause floods. When this happens the first of the gale will be southerly, the latter part northerly. The bearing of the storm centre will be at right angles with the waves line. Thus, on a fine day if there is a heavier sea than usual breaking on the beach, and it is coming from the North-East, if the direction remains the same or nearly so, and the barometer is NOT above 30 inches, the gale will blow home on the land, and the first signs of bad weather will NOT precede the gale by more than 12 hours, but if the direction of the swell changes to the eastward the storm is recurving, and the body of it will NOT reach the land. When the swell is from the East the storm centre is past; when there is anything southing in the line of the swell the storm is passed. No matter how threatening the weather signs may be, if the line of swell comes first from the southward, there will be only an ordinary south polar storm, with a low temperature. (Commonwealth Meteorological Bulletin No.9).

Geo H Anderson Maj
for Capt.
GS 2 1st Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

Attach 27

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.122

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 21 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(i) N.W. AUSTRALIA -

CAPE WESSEL 20 Dec. 0130 hrs. One submarine was sighted off the Cape.

CAPE NATURALISTE (WESTERN AUST) 19 Dec. One submarine was sighted seven mls WEST of the Cape.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 19 Dec. One motor torpedo boat was sighted at DILLI.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

ALEXISHAVEN. 18 Dec. Allied A/C made three further attacks on the Jap convoy mentioned in Int Sum No.121 near MADANG and FINSCHAFEN.

2300 hrs. The enemy effected a landing at MADANG. Night 18/19 Dec. Other landings were probably made by night at ALEXISHAFEN and FINSCHAFEN. 0200 hrs. Five small vessels were sighted ten mls East of FINSCHAFEN. 19 Dec. Allied A/C made three more attacks on the convoy. Four direct hits were registered on one tpt. The convoy was evidently damaged and was last sighted heading in the direction of NEW HANOVER. Other Allied A/C bombed the runway at ALEXISHAVEN. During these air operations three enemy intercepting Zeros were shot down and one damaged. 1353 hrs. The convoy consisted of two
.X. cruisers, three destroyers and two tpts when seen 122 mls LAE. 18 Dec 1910 hrs. Allied A/C bombed the aerodrome, but results were NOT observed.

AMBOGA 19 Dec. An Allied patrol killed two Japs at the mouth of the GIRA RIVER.

MAMBARE 19 Dec. A reliable report stated that 250 Japs were now concentrating at the mouth of the river.

SANANANDA. During the morning of 19 Dec Allied Cav, with arty sp, were attacking along the SOPUTA-SANANANDA track. There was hy fighting South of the track junc.

CAPE WARD HUNT. 18 Dec 2131 hrs. Two vessels were seen four mls North of the Cape.

BUNA 18 Dec. Some Allied tps were engaged in mopping up. Difficulty was experienced inthe captured CAPE EDDAIDERE area in clearing enemy log emplacements as they were constructed with a tunnel system. Other Allied tps were attacking along a North to South front extending along a line 600 yds West of the Cape to the East end of the new strip. Allied arty and mortar fire inflicted hy casualties on enemy tps running
.X. NE of MADANG on a course NNE.

from strongly prepared emplacements at the NW end of the new strip. Thirteen concrete emplacements with steel tops were resisting Allied tps. In the GOVT STA area, Allied tps are now defending the island at the mouth of ENTRANCE CREEK. Seven fortified enemy bunkers defend the rd junc area at the South end of the Creek. Allied arty destroyed five of twenty trucks sighted by recce A/C. 19 Dec. An Allied patrol located an enemy sup dump and killed four Japs about 800 yds West of SIVORI CREEK, (West of BUNA VILLAGE). 0745 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed the enemy occupied area at the GOVT STA.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN 19 Dec 1653 hrs. A cruiser and a destroyer were seen ninety-five mls West by North of CAPE LAMBERT on a course East.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA PASSAGE 18 Dec 1900 hrs. A destroyer and a tpt departed on a course South.

BUIN-FAISI 18 Dec. 1745 hrs. Five destroyers, three cargo vessels and a tanker were seen in the area.
(Landoos Revsit 142)

PART 2

ENEMY:

(ii) OOB- New Guinea Area: 38 Div Elements of 228 & 229 Inf Regts of this Div are definitely in BUNA Area.
KURE No.3 SNLP. Elements of this unit are in the BUNA Area.
YAMAGATA HEIDAN: A tpt unit of this HEIDAN was expected to arrive in BUNA at the end of Nov. The Unit is u/i.
18 Army: Is reported to be in RABAUL having come from BURMA. The 15 Army was believed to be in control of ops in BURMA Area. The composition of 18 Army is NOT clear, but appears to control the ops in NEW GUINEA.
SOLOMONS: 16 Div. There are some indications that 20 Inf Regt of this Div was intended to take part in the SOLOMONS Operation. It has NOT been identified in the area.
OTHER AREAS: 32 Div. Is reported to have left CHINA and is now unlocated. (Adv LHQ Int Sum 19).

(vi) Eqpt -

Japanese Cardboard Bomb: Reports to hand state that the Japanese are using a H.E. bomb with a cardboard outer casing. The purpose of this bomb could be to introduce fright, also for its blast effect against light structure. Unconfirmed infm about the bomb states that:-

(i) Such bombs are freely used and range from 12" to 3' 6" long and up to 8" in dia.
(ii) The bombs are initiated with standard Japanese impact type fuze.
(iii) A piece of glass tubing was found near one of these bombs. This may possibly be the housing for a standard type gaine.

Any additional infm, or confirmation of the use of this bomb should be fwded immediately to this HQ. (To be repeated in all Formations & Unit Summaries)
(Adv LHQ Int Sum No. 19).

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

[redacted]

Appendix 28

SECURITY

COPY NO 8

21 DEC 42.

2 AUST CORPS ENGINEER TRG INSTN NO 2.

1. GENERAL.
This instn will be read in conjunction with First Aust Army Engr Tech Instns, 2 Aust Corps Engr Tech Instns, First Aust Army and 2 Aust Corps Trg Instns, and in particular First Aust Army Trg Instn No 12 of 11 NOV 42, and First Aust Army Engr Tech Instn No 42 of 5 DEC 42, the "Training Yardstick."

2. WORKS PROGRAMME (2 Aust Corps).
Every effort will be made by 10 Aust Fd Coy with attached tps to complete the 2 Aust Corps rd-wks programme by 31 DEC 42, after which date only works, such as back-filling br abutments, rendered necessary for safety to traffic, should be carried to completion.
All other rd-wks incomplete at 31 DEC 42 will be "made safe" and abandoned.
10 Aust Fd Coy will advise this HQ by quickest means possible what rd plant, and in particular, power plant, is available for transfer to CRE 3 Aust Div, and will withdraw such plant to central pool in unit lines, as released from rd jobs.
Working parties provided by other arms will be returned to units as early as practicable, 48 hrs advice being given to this HQ prior to their movement.
NO works or accommodation job will be undertaken by 10 Aust Fd Coy without prior reference to this HQ.
The object of the foregoing is to reduce to a minimum the coy works commitments to enable intensified trg to commence in phases of fd engineering, minor tactics, and field craft for which opportunity has NOT yet occurred.

3. TRG PROGRAMMES.
Primary attention will be given to ensure that all ranks are proficient in the use of weapons on establishment.
Pistol (where applicable).
LMG.
Sub-machine Gun.
Rifle.
A/Tk Rifle.
In addition, during the months of JAN and FEB, syllabii will be designed to cover -
(i) Engineering subjects NOT covered to date.
(ii) Minor tactics and field craft, with particular reference to jungle country.
An excellent guide to items to be covered in 3(i) above is contained in First Aust Army Engineer Tech Instn No 42, which comprises a most comprehensive list of phases of engr trg in which all or individuals of fd coy personnel should become proficient.
In connection with para 3(ii) above, trg should always be associated with an actual job of work, and after careful recce for suitable country detachments will be exercised in jungle conditions for periods up to 7 days. The type of job to be introduced into this trg will include -
Constn of tracks and steps.
Flying Foxes and aerial footways, using both cordage and S/WR.
Demolitions incl waterproofing of charges.
Bridge building from local resources.
Use of Army Track and Corduroy Rds.
Suspension Brs.

4. NCO TRG CADRE.
In conjunction with trg programme 10 Aust Fd Coy will conduct a NCO Trg Cadre commencing 1 JAN 43, and arranged to recur periodically as each new phase of trg is introduced.

5. MOBILE BRIDGING.
During the month of JAN 43, 10 Aust Fd Coy will pass two secs at a time through the First Aust Army Bridging School, each period of trg being of two weeks duration.
10 Aust Fd Coy will advise this HQ immediately the date on which it is desired to commence the first period, and the strength of the party attending.
Representative of coy will contact Capt J.J. CUMMINS, CI of the Br School, forthwith to arrange details of syllabus.

6. SUBMISSION OF SYLLABII.
10 Aust Fd Coy and CRE 3 Aust Div will submit fortnightly outline syllabii to reach CE 2 Aust Corps 8 days in advance of date of commencement of period covered. Syllabii will cover the periods 1-14 of month, and 15-31 of month.
10 Aust Fd Coy will submit detailed fortnightly syllabus to reach CE 2 Aust Corps 2 days prior to date of commencement.
Initial syllabii will cover the period 1-14 JAN 43, and will be fwded at earliest possible date.

7. OTHER ARMS.
Ample notice of lectures or demonstrations desired from reps of other arms will be given so that arrangements can be made to procure the services of such reps.

8. NIGHT EXERCISES.
At least two nights per week will be occupied with night work, and commencing the second fortnight, periods of several days will be devoted to working by night and sleeping by day. This is to include the administrative staffs, which will during these periods work on shifts covering the 24 hrs.

9. COMBINED TRG.
During the latter half of FEB or beginning of MAR it is hoped to incorporate periods of combined trg, and an allotment of the First Aust Army Assault Course. In the interim, an assault course should be improvised, and full use be made of offr and NCOs at present attending the REDBANK School.

10. RAE 3 AUST DIV.
It is realised that RAE 3 Aust Div having already covered in large part the trg mentioned in the foregoing, will be actively engaged on works during the coming month, but the maximum trg value should be derived therefrom by continually changing control, and individual plant operators.
It will also to be understood that this instn is issued for guidance only and any direction therein is subject to the assent and approval of general staff.

11. DEMOLITIONS.
Confirming discussions with CsRE 2 Aust Corps Tps and 3 Aust Div, the trg value in recce and preparation for demolitions, in accordance with 2 Aust Corps Demolition Instn No 2, will be fully exploited, and NOT restricted to a small party as is frequently the tendency.

12. MOVEMENT.
During trg and exercises, every opportunity will be taken to practice movement by MT as a drill in convoy control, driving and maintenance and rd discipline.
Practice loading should also be done to determine the irreducable minimum MT necessary for a coy to carry personnel and essential stores, bearing in mind that in a theatre of war such as NEW GUINEA, tpt will in all probability be reduced to 25% of war establishment.

13. ACK.

(H. Bachtold) Brig.
CE 2 AUST CORPS.

DISTRIBUTION.

	Copy No.
10 Aust Fd Coy	1
CRE 3 Aust Div	2
CRE 2 Aust Corps Tps	3 (for infm)
'G' 2 Aust Corps	4 "
CE First Aust Army	5-6 "
File	7
War Diary	8

War Diary

Appx 29

S E C R E T

GSI

Copy No. 78

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.123

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 22 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

P A R T 1.

O P E R A T I O N S:

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

DUTCH NEW GUINEA. 8, 14 and 16 Dec. It is reported that an enemy vessel visited villages on the SW coast.

WEWAK. 18 Dec. It was reported that one enemy cruiser and three destroyers were off WEWAK. 20 Dec. Allied recce A/C encountered A/A fire over WEWAK.

ALEXISHAVEN. 18 Dec. Ref Int Sum Nos. 121 and 122. Reports now indicate that one 1/ cruiser was sunk as a result of direct hits approx six mls East of ALEXIS HAVEN. 19 Dec. Allied A/C report three further attacks on the convoy with NO results. Four further intercepting Zeros were shot down and one was damaged.

MADANG 19 Dec. 1104 hrs. Allied A/C bombed the wharf area in the harbour.

AMBOGA. 19 Dec. Approx 200 Japs were seen carrying stores to the West along the beach NW of AMBOGA RIVER. Patrols report that there were NO enemy tpt between the KUMUSI and MAMBARE RIVERS.

SANANANDA. 20 Dec. Allied tps were engaged in clearing enemy pockets near the SANANANDA - SOPUTA track, about 1,900 yds SW of the rd block. Until this is completed, fwd tps near the rd block will make NO advance.

BUNA. 20 Dec. Allied tpt now control all the new strip and occupy an area East of a line running from the coast approx 2000 yds West of CAPE ENDAIADERE South to SINEMI CREEK, thence along the CREEK facing SW, thence along the line of the rd to the br between the two strips, thence SW to the jungle. In the GOVT STA area, Allied tps were attacking to the East along a line from the sand spit North of ENTRANCE CREEK IS through the East side of BUNA VILLAGE, thence South about 400 yds to the track junc. Other tps were attacking to the West. They were clearing out strong enemy emplacements which were still resisting at the apex of two tracks approx 800 yds SSE of SIWORI VILLAGE. Patrols West of SIWORI CREEK, withdrew after inflicting casualties on enemy tps in superior numbers who were making outflanking movements. 0630 hrs. Allied A/C bombed enemy installations at GIROPA POINT, but results were NOT observed.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN. 19 Dec. A submarine was seen eighty mls North of TALASEA, and another sixty-eight mls ESE of CAPE ST. GEORGE. 20 Dec. 1620 hrs. A destroyer, on a course ENE, was seen twenty-eight mls North of GAROVE IS in the WITU GP. 2345 hrs. A 500 ton vessel, on a course WNW, was seen twenty mls SSW of ARAWE IS.

/Contd.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA 20 Dec. 1711 hrs. One tpt was seen in BUKA PASSAGE.

BUIN-FAISI. 20 Dec 1016 hrs. Two destroyers and one cargo vessel were seen thirty-five mls West of BUIN on a course East. 1020 hrs. Five destroyers and fifteen cargo vessels were seen in the area.

GUADALCANAL. 19 Dec. One submarine was seen thirty-five mls North of LUNGA. (Landops Revsit 143).

P A R T 2

E N E M Y:

(ii) O of B. (Ref Int Sum No.122)

The following is an extract from a Japanese diary captured at SANAMANDA on 30 Nov :-

"Hear talk of the coming of Lieut General IMAMURA'S ARMY"

While it is probably a popular rumour among the Japanese, the statement does indicate the possibility of relief for the forces in the BUNA area, there is some evidence that Lieut-General IMAMURA is in command of an Army as yet unidentified, possibly 18 Army. (NGF Enemy Infm Review No.21, quoted AHQ Int Sum No.32).

P A R T 3

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(ii) Other Areas -

RIVERS - BURNETT RIVER (G56/2) -

Owing to recent floodings, the river west of the two bridges has considerably altered, so as to bring HARRIET ISLAND close to S bank, and has practically joined on to the N side by silt, mostly sand. A report suggests that in case of the traffic bridge being damaged, a pontoon bridge could be made readily, there being only some 50 yds of deeper water across to the island, dry land at low tides, thence across island to N side near Railway station. (Q'land L of C Weekly Int Report).

G E N E R A L

The Lighter Side:

Extract from Censorship - "She has been telling people Cliff is getting on so well in the Army. He said in his last letter he was "AWL". Fancy having all these letters after your name". (Q'land L of C Weekly Int Report).

W. E. Potts Capt.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 104.

War Diary

SECRET

Copy No. 73

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.124

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 23 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 18 Dec. An unstated number of Japs with 300 natives using mortars and MGs attacked Allied tps near ATSABE. Our tps after inflicting casualties withdrew. 20 Dec. A party of Allied tps inflicted casualties on the enemy occupying TURISCAL (twenty mls South by East of DILLI).

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

MADANG. It was reliably reported that the enemy after landing night 18/19 Dec occupied MOBANOB, GAU RIVER and BILI BILI villages.

FINSCHAVEN 21 Dec 0600 hrs. Allied A/C attacked a 2,000 ton cargo vessel without success.

1445 hrs Two 500 ton vessels were attacked in the same vicinity. One was left burning and the other was severely damaged.

HERCULES BAY. 21 Dec 2106 hrs. A destroyer was seen twenty nine mls NE of the Bay on a course NNE

AMBOGA. 20 Dec. A patrol captured 186 RABAUL natives near AMBOGA RIVER. The natives stated that there were still about 200 Japs between the AMBOGA and MAMBARE RIVERS.

SOPUTA-SANANANDA TRACK. Night 20/21 Dec. Our tps were preparing to attack strong enemy pockets still resisting South of the rd junc about 1900 yds SW of the rd block. Car patrols after fierce clashes fwd of the rd block captured two lorries loaded with amn and are now close to a probable important supply dump. Other tps with car sp are exploiting this area.

BUNA. 21 Dec. Allied tps were attacking along a line running from the coast approx 2300 yds West of CAPE ENDAIDERE South to SINEMI CREEK, thence along the CREEK to the east end of the old strip, thence SE to the br then SW along the edge of the timber to a pt approx 550 yds South of the East end of the old strip. Enemy bunkers near the br have now been captured. Arty destroyed two enemy AA guns South of the old strip. One hundred enemy dead were found in an area 200 yds square near CAPE ENDAIDERE. In the GOVT STA area our tps were attacking log emplacements in an area at the apex of tracks just SE of the South end of ENTRANCE CREEK. Patrols pushing along SIWORI CREEK met an unstated number of enemy in very poor condition who did NOT offer resistance. 20 Dec 1258 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed GIROPA PT. 21 Dec 0815 hrs. BUNA GOVT STA area was bombed and fires started.

SECRET.

PORT MORESBY. 21 Dec 2244 hrs and 22 Dec 0040 hrs. Air raids were repeated but NO details were given.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

NEW BRITAIN 21 Dec 1530 hrs. One hy cruiser, four lt cruisers, sixteen destroyers, two S/P tenders and forty-two other vessels (incl merchant ships and tankers) were seen in the RABAUL Area.

GASMATA 22 Dec 0230 hrs. A 3,000-ton tpt was seen thirty-six mls West by South of GASMATA on a course West.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA PASSAGE 21 Dec 1509 hrs. A cargo vessel and a destroyer were seen on the West side of the PASSAGE. 1834 hrs. A small cargo vessel left the area on a course south.

NEW GEORGIA GP. 21 Dec 1401 hrs. Two destroyers and a tpt were seen fifteen mls SW of MUNDA on a course South by West.

BUIN-FAISI 21 Dec 1115 hrs. Sixteen u/i vessels were seen in the area.

INDISPENSABLE STRAIT 22 Dec 0815 hrs. A possible passenger vessel and three corvettes were seen on a course NE.

(Landops Revsit No. 144)

PART 4

OTHER FRONTS: (infm to 14 Dec 42)

RUSSIAN FRONT -

Central Sector: The situation was NOT clear. The Germans were counter-attacking fiercely but the Russians claimed the consolidation of their gains and the continuation of the offensive. NO important territorial changes were reported.

Don-Stalingrad Sector: The weather was colder. The Russians retained the initiative but NO progress was claimed. Russian morale was reported as high but tpt was presenting great difficulties.

Caucasus Sector: The Germans were on the defensive.

NOTE: The Russians' claim to have encircled 22 Divs (some of which were Roumanian) in the STALINGRAD area was considered to be optimistic even by comparision with the previous estimate. It is probable that at least 22 Divs have been involved in the operations and that elements of them may be included with the encircled forces. Despite the enormous problem of supplying such large encircled forces, there has been NO report regarding their situation which should be most difficult.

TUNISIA:

It was reported that French forces actively co-operating with the FIRST ARMY total 18,000 men. German forces were

estimated to number 19,000 with 86 serviceable tks. The Italians had 12,000 tps with 50 serviceable tks.

SEA -

NORTHERN WATERS:

The TIRPITZ was reported to be undergoing repairs in TRONDHEIM FIORD. A possible repair ship was seen in that area. Night 11/12 Dec, six destroyers attacked an enemy convoy off DIEPPE. Two escort vessels, one merchant ship and probably another were sunk.

MEDITERRANEAN:

MALTA - Seven supply convoys arrived safely during Nov and Dec.

NAPLES: Photographs show one cruiser sunk and one damaged as a result of air attack on 4 Dec. Our submarines sank five enemy ships during the week and hits were scored on others. One ship was sunk by our naval A/C and one by the RAF. Our A/C claimed hits on shipping, incl a destroyer, in attacks on TUNISIAN ports.

BLACK SEA:

1 Dec. Russian naval forces claim to have sunk three merchant vessels, a Bulgarian gunboat and two other small craft in the Western BLACK SEA.

U-BOAT WARFARE:

There was a slight increase in activity East and West of GIBRALTAR and an attack on a convoy in the North Atlantic. Twenty-three attacks were made on U boats by A/C and five were considered promising. Five attacks were made by surface craft and two were considered promising.

(World Revs of Week ended 14 Dec)

P A R T 5

SECURITY:

Fifth Column Exercise -

The following account of the results of a "Fifth Column" exercise contains several lessons of particular value.

The subject of the exercise was to obtain answers to the following questions concerning an aerodrome in the India Command :-

(a) What is the present role of the aerodrome?
(b) What is its establishment?
(c) Number of aircraft and types?
(d) Photographs of new equipment.
(e) Number of qualified pilots present?
(f) Lay-out of defences?
(g) Likely spots for sabotage?
(h) Any other infm of interest?

The method adopted by the "agents" was as follows. One officer posed as an officer of high rank (a new chief liaison officer from General HQ), and another as his ADC. A telegram was despatched from New Delhi P.O. announcing their arrival, and was timed to arrive after working hours the night before their visit.

On arrival at the gate of the aerodrome, the "General" demanded to see the Commanding Officer who, on arrival was introduced by his Adjutant, already in attendance on the distinguished visitors. The Commanding Officer remarked that he had spoken to District HQ, who had denied knowledge of any visiting General; the visitors, however, gained full answers to all their questions; with the exception of (d) as there were NO photographs available.

The "General" and "ADC" drove up to the gates in an ordinary civilian car, and the "General" was improperly dressed. The only proof of identity was a D.O. letter (written on paper abstracted by an officer from a waiting room at General HQ) and a Tour Programme typed on plain paper. On the strength of these the "General" was shown everything he asked to see.

It was noticed that in his tour of the station in the C.O's car, the CO's Identity Card was frequently asked for; The "General" and the "ADC" were never asked to show their cards throughout the visit. The conclusion is that too much attention is paid to the uniform and rank of the individual and NOT enough to his Identity Card; also, when a vehicle is being checked, every occupant should be required to produce his Identity Card.

(Adv LHQ Int Sum No.19)

W E Potts
Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

War Diary

WDI 31

S E C R E T

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.125

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 24 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C, See Summary No.80.

P A R T 1

O P E R A T I O N S:

(i) NW AUSTRALIA Area -

NORTHERN TERRITORY, 22 Dec. 1930 hrs. One submarine was seen at the entrance of MELVILLE BAY,

WEST AUSTRALIA. 23 Dec. 0704 hrs. One submarine was sighted twenty two mls SSW of CAPE NATURALISTE, SW coast.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 20 Dec. Approx 150 natives, armed by the Japs, have been active East and SE of TURISCAI. 22 Dec. 0950 hrs. Allied A/C strafed enemy construction material, huts and personnel in the vicinity of the aerodrome and village at FUIJORO, two mls South of VILA DE AVIZ.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

DUTCH NEW GUINEA:
21 Dec. An unconfirmed report states that there are 450 Japs, but NO A/C at KAJKENAU. 22 Dec. 1336 hrs. An enemy A/C on recce of MERAUKE, dropped two bombs. There was a near miss on an Allied vessel.

CAPE WARD HUNT. 21 Dec. 2130 hrs. Allied A/C attacked an enemy destroyer, on a NW course, twenty-five mls North of the Cape. Four bombs fell across the stern of the vessel. Further details are awaited.

AMBOGA. 22 Dec. 0930 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed a probable enemy HQ and dump in the AMBOGA RIVER area. Bombs fell in the target area and a fire was started among huts, but NO activity was observed.

SANANANDA. 21 Dec. Our tps made a slight advance on the whole front in the SOPUTA-SANANANDA track area.

BUNA. 21 Dec. An Allied detachment crossed SINEMI CREEK approx 200 yds North of the br between the strips. Mopping up continues in the CAPE ENDAIADERE area. Allied arty destroyed a four-barreled A/A gun firing from the vicinity of a dispersal bay at the West end of the old strip. It is estimated that there are 350 Japs in the vicinity of GIROPA POINT. 22 Dec. Fighting continues in the GOVT STA area in a vicinity 250 yds North of the track junction at the South end of ENTRANCE CREEK. Some Allied tps have prepared and established a bridgehead in an area between 100 yds and 500 yds South of the mouth of ENTRANCE CREEK. West of BUNA VILLAGE, an Allied patrol was moving forward from an established bridgehead West of SIWORI CREEK.

/Contd.

PORT MORESBY. 22 Dec. 0044 hrs. Ref Int Sum 124. In enemy air raid No.96, bombs were dropped in the vicinity of JACKSON aerodrome, but NO damage or casualties were reported.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO Area -

NEW BRITAIN. 22 Dec. Fifty Japs were seen on the CAPE GLOUCESTER aerodrome.

ARAWE. 22 Dec. 0910 hrs. A 1,000 ton vessel was attacked and set on fire in the harbour.

GASMATA. 22 Dec. 0226 hrs. A 3,000 ton merchant vessel, on a course West, was attacked without success thirty-five mls West of GASMATA.

JACQUINOT BAY. 22 Dec. 1200 hrs. A 1,500 ton camouflaged tpt was attacked without success off MALMAL.

CAPE GAZELLE. 22 Dec. 1040 hrs. Two u/i vessels were seen seven mls SE of the Cape on a course South.

RABAUL. 22 Dec. 1057 hrs. Our A/C shot down one enemy recce A/C possibly damaged another and two of three intercepting Zeros near RABAUL. An analysis of photographs taken 21 Dec revealed one hy cruiser, twenty destroyers, two S/P tenders, two subs, one mine-layer, three tankers, three large tpts, forty-one merchant vessels from 1,000 tons to 8,000 tons, two patrol craft, one torpedo boat and many small craft in the harbour. Four F/Bs and five F/Ps were also in the harbour area. Three med Bs and sixteen Fs were on LAKUNAI aerodrome, and twenty-five med Bs on VUNAKANAU aerodrome. New dispersal bays and considerable activity was in evidence at both aerodromes. 1600 hrs. A probable destroyer was seen seventy-five mls WNW of RABAUL, on a course South.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN-FAISI. 21 Dec. 1800 hrs. Two destroyers and a cargo vessel were seen thirty mls ENE of BUIN on a course NE. 22 Dec. 1000 hrs. Three destroyers and three cargo vessels were seen in the area.

NEW GEORGIA GP. 22 Dec 0910 hrs. Two destroyers and a tpt were seen twenty-five mls West of KUNDU PT, GANONGGA IS.
(Landops Revsit 145)

W. E. Potts.
Capt.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No. 104.

S E C R E T

Appx "A" TO HQ 2 AUST CORPS INT SUM No.125

Courses taken by cargo vessels in South West Pacific Area.

The map attached as Appx "B" shows aircraft sightings of enemy cargo vessels in the South West Pacific Area from May to 1 November, 1942. From these plottings (which are indicated by black dots on the map) a pattern emerges of the routes regularly taken by enemy shipping, more especially to the main centres, RABAUL, BUIN-FAISI, KAVIENG, BUKA PASSAGE, LAE-SALAMAUA and BUNA.

The following deductions can be made from the chart and indicate, not only the regular shipping lanes originally used, but also the expedients to which the enemy has been put to meet new lines of attack as these become established.

RABAUL has been, of course, the main shipping base in the area. Northward of that point enemy shipping does not encounter the same close reconnaissance as that given to nearer objectives, so that a clear pattern is not available, but it would appear that many convoys by-pass KAVIENG and proceed direct to RABAUL from the Northern supply centres. This assumption is not completely proved by the plotting, but what indications there are appear to bear it out.

This lesser frequency of Allied reconnaissance North of New Britain makes shipping routes in this area somewhat indefinite, but there are some indications (which have been discussed in earlier issues of Summary) that a new route has been established from the Philippines-Palau area to RABAUL and in the reverse direction. It appears that, in some instances at least, escort vessels (and, sometimes, fighter cover) take convoys out from RABAUL along the North coast of New Britain to a point N.N.W. of Vitias Strait and there rendezvous with incoming convoys. This route may be in use for several reasons. First it is a fairly obvious route for troop movements from the Palau, Philippines or N.E.I. areas and is on a direct line from bases in N.W. Dutch New Guinea. Secondly, it may have been adopted in order to relieve the strain placed on facilities at Truk by the immediate necessities of damaged warships from the Solomons. The rendezvous point would probably be deliberately placed to the westward of the track of our normal reconnaissance from LAE to MANUS ISLAND.

BUIN-FAISI: heavy concentrations of shipping were reported in this area for some months until the recent losses in naval actions (e.g. that of 14 November). The map shows two variations from the earlier route used between RABAUL and this area. The first method, was, no doubt, a fairly direct line between RABAUL and BUIN along the South-West coast of BOUGAINVILLE. Later, two variations were introduced. (a) Some convoys went down the East coast of BOUGAINVILLE. These sightings may have been caused in some instances by convoys coming direct from Northern waters without touching RABAUL. Others, however, were caused by ships coming by RABAUL, but using the East coast route down BOUGAINVILLE to avoid detection by Allied reconnaissance aircraft. The first possibility (that of shipping coming direct to BUIN-FAISI from Northern waters) is difficult to determine, owing to the fact that air reconnaissance extends only occasionally to the East of New Ireland.
(b) Shipping which continued to use the South-West coast route down BOUGAINVILLE has also shown a variation of route since the earlier days. It is clear from the plot that there has been a tendency recently to move more to the South-West, in a semi-circular route from RABAUL. This variation may have been forced on the enemy by his suspecting submarine activities along his earlier route.


/Contd.

Comments have previously been made in the Allied Air Force Summaries on routes followed by convoys between RABAUL and NEW GUINEA. The usual procedure has been to follow the South coast of New Britain under air cover as far as GASMATA, and then to make a run for the air cover provided from LAE. From the point where cover is picked up convoys proceeding to BUNA have made a straight run South to New Guinea coast, timing arrival for unloading to be carried out during hours of darkness. Generally a direct route from New Guinea coast to Gasmata has been used on return. There is usually a gap in the sightings on the return trip as the voyage from Buna area to Gasmata has been made chiefly by night. From Gasmata onwards the outwards route has been followed. The necessary variations have been made for shipping to LAE.

A variation to this method has been to work from RABAUL along the North coast of New Britain to Dampier or Vitiaz Straits and thence to LAE. This latter method has been used during recent weeks by warships, following on loss of shipping during attempts to supply bases in New Guinea, although several convoys of destroyers have also made use of the South coast route. Though the North coast method involves a longer journey and greater difficulties of navigation in narrow waters, some protection is afforded by the land mass of New Britain, both from reconnaissance and attack. (AAF Int Sum No.59).

-----oOo-----

APPX "B" TO 2 AUST. CORPS INT. SUM Nº125.
SIGHTINGS OF CARGO VESSELS
S. W. PACIFIC AREA MAY-NOV 42



G2016

SECRET

HQ 2 Aust Corps,

Issued 24 Dec 42

	Copy No.		Copy No. 38
3 Aust Div	1	CE	20
21 Aust Cav Regt	2	CSO	21
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps	3	DA & QMG	22
10 Aust Fd Coy	4	A	23
2 Aust Corps Camflg Trg Unit	5	Q	24
Sigs 2 Aust Corps	6	S & T	25
2/1 Aust MG Bn	7	Medical	26
5 Aust MG Bn	8	Ord	27
2 Aust Corps Def & Emp Pl	9	AEME	28
4 Aust AS Control	10	Pay	29
3 Aust AL Sec	11	Legal	30
First Aust Army	12	Pro	31
3 Aust Armd Div	13	Education	32
Queensland L of C Area	14	Chaplains	33
NSW L of C Area	15	Postal	34
GOC	16	TO	35
G	17	Camp	36
Int	18	Amenities	37
RAA 2 Aust Corps	19	War Diary	38 - 39
		File	40 - 41

Subject:- Distribution List 2 Aust Corps.

1. Attached hereto is 2 Aust Corps Distribution List of Orders, Instructions, circulars, etc. This cancels previous list distributed as G1937.

2. (a) It should be noted that CCRA will make distribution to the Corps Tps RAA under command.

(b) The CSO, CE and representatives of Services will not normally make distribution to units, as they are not commanders. It will be seen that Corps HQ makes the distribution direct to the units whose activities are directed and co-ordinated by the officers holding the abovementioned appointments.

3. This distribution list will be used by all Branches of the Staff at HQ 2 Aust Corps.

4. Acknowledge.

A. L. Lawrence Brig
DGS.
2 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION LIST 2 AUST CORPS

Copy No.....

Serial.	Unit. List	Op, Adn Orders and instructions. (a)	Branches arms services 2 Aust Corps only. (b)	Branches Arms Services & Formations only. (c)	Branches Arms Services and Formations down to incl bdes (d)	Branches Arms Services and Formations down to Bns and Equivalent units (e)	SD Instns for 2 Corps HQ only. (f)
	FORMATIONS & UNITS UNDER COND 2 AUST CORPS (excl RAA)						
1.	3 Aust Div	1	-	1	10	20	1
2.	21 Aust Cav Regt	1	-	1	1	1	-
3.	HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps	1	-	1	1	1	-
4.	10 Aust Fd Coy	1	-	1	1	1	-
5.	2 Aust Corps Camflg Trg Unit	-	-	-	-	1	-
6.	Sigs 2 Aust Corps	1	-	1	1	1	-
7.	2/1 Aust MG Bn	1	-	1	1	1	-
8.	5 Aust MG Bn	1	-	1	1	1	-
9.	2 Aust Corps Def & Emp Pl	-	1	1	1	1	1
	S & T						
10.	HQ Cond 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	-	-	-	1	4	-
11.	HQ Cond 2 Aust Corps Tpt Coln	-	-	-	1	9	-
12.	2/4 Aust Coy AASC	-	-	-	-	1	-
13.	2 Aust MAC	-	-	-	-	1	-
14.	2/1 Aust MAC	-	-	-	-	1	-
15.	4 Aust DID	-	-	-	-	1	-
16.	6 Aust DID	-	-	-	-	1	-
	MEDICAL						
17.	2 Aust CCS	-	-	-	-	1	-
18.	2/1 Aust Mob Op Unit	-	-	-	-	1	-
19.	2/2 Aust Dental Unit	-	-	-	-	1	-
20.	2/3 Aust Dental Unit	-	-	-	-	1	-
21.	20 Aust Dental Unit	-	-	-	-	1	-
	ORD						
22.	110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk	-	-	-	-	1	-
23.	2/3 Aust Army Ord Fd Pk	-	-	-	-	1	-
24.	3 Aust Mob Laundry and Fwd Decn Unit.	-	-	-	-	1	-
25.	1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry and Fwd Decn Unit.	-	-	-	-	1	-

Serial	Unit. List	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
	AEME						
26.	110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Wkshop	-	-	-	-	1	-
27.	2/3 Aust Inf Tps Wkshop	-	-	-	-	1	-
28.	2/56 Aust LAD	-	-	-	-	1	-
29.	2/90 Aust LAD	-	-	-	-	1	-
30.	290 Aust LAD	-	-	-	-	1	-
	PAY						
31.	2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	-	-	-	-	1	-
	PRO						
32.	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	-	-	-	-	1	-
	POSTAL						
33.	2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	-	-	-	-	1	-
	MISC						
34.	2 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre	-	-	-	-	1	-
35.	2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	-	-	-	-	1	-
36.	2 Aust Corps Mob Bath Unit	-	-	-	-	1	-
37.	2/3 Aust HQ and Infn Sec ✱	-	-	-	-	1	-
38.	2 Aust Salvage Unit	-	-	-	-	1	-
39.	2 Aust Corps Pr Fd Unit ✱	-	-	-	-	1	-
40.	2 Aust Fd Censorship Sec	-	-	-	-	1	-
	(✱ - NOT YET RAISED).						
	ATTACHED UNITS.						
41.	4 Aust AS Control	1	-	1	1	1	-
42.	3 Aust AL Sec	1	-	1	1	1	-
	FORMATIONS AND UNITS CO-OPERATING.						
43.	First Aust Army	1	-	-	-	-	-
44.	3 Aust Armd Div	1	-	-	-	-	-
45.	Queensland L of C Area.	1	-	-	-	-	-
46.	NSW L of C Area	1	-	-	-	-	-
	COMD STAFF AND SERVICES, HQ 2 AUST CORPS.						
47.	GOC	1	1	1	1	1	1
48.	G	1	1	1	1	1	1
49.	Int incl I & FSS Sec.	1	1	1	1	2	1
50.	RAA 2 Aust Corps	1	1	1	2	4	1
51.	CE	1	1	1	1	1	1
52.	CSO	1	1	1	1	1	1
53.	DA&QMG	1	1	1	1	1	1
54.	A	1	1	1	1	1	1
55.	Q	1	1	1	1	1	1
56.	S&T	1	1	1	1	1	1
57.	Medical	2	2	2	2	2	2
58.	Ord	1	2	2	2	2	1

SERIAL	Unit.	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
59.	AEME	1	1	1	1	1	1
60.	Pay	-	1	1	1	1	1
61.	Legal	-	1	1	1	1	1
62.	Pro	-	1	1	1	1	1
63.	Education	-	1	1	1	1	1
64.	Chaplains	-	1	1	1	1	1
65.	Postal	-	1	1	1	1	1
66.	TO	-	1	1	1	1	1
67.	Camp	-	1	1	1	1	1
68.	Amenities	-	1	1	1	1	1
69.	War Diary	2	2	2	2	2	2
70.	File.						
		31	29	38	50	104	29

Agreed

J. A. McCowan 11/6/44
N.B.G.S.
2 Aust Corps.

War Diary

33

SECRET

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.126

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 25 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

PART 1.

OPERATIONS :

(i) NW AUSTRALIA Area -

DARWIN 23 Dec. Between 1101 hrs and 1114 hrs there were indications that two flights of enemy A/C approached within fifty mls WNW of DARWIN.

(ii) NEI Area -

TIMOR 23 Dec. 1133 hrs. Allied A/C strafed enemy works at FUILORO aerodrome. Buildings were set on fire and a truck was hit causing casualties to natives. One of the two intercepting enemy F A/C was hit and possibly destroyed.

AROE Is. 23 Dec 1307 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed DOBO. Fires were started in the building area.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

WEWAK. It is now reported that the enemy occupied WEWAK on 18 Dec.

MADANG and FINSCHAVEN 23 Dec. A recce A/C reported possible new runways at these places.

MOROBE HARBOUR 23 Dec. Huts and new trenches were seen at ZAKA, six mls SE of the harbour.

AMBOGA 22 Dec. Allied patrol activity was continuing 23 Dec. Only nine Japs were seen at DUVIRA CAMP at the mouth of the MAMBARE RIVER. It was reported that large craft reached this area on the night 22/23 Dec. 22 Dec 1445 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed the MAMBA MISSION.

SANANANDA-SOPUTA TRACK. 22 Dec. A tactical recce located trench works at the edge of a timber belt approx 350 yds East of the rd junc., South of the rd block. 23 Dec. Our tps fwd and in the rear of the rd block made a slight advance. 23 Dec 1050 hrs. Our A/C strafed MANGROVE Is and the SANANANDA area.

BUNA 22 Dec. Our tps attacked, gaining further ground in the coastal area East of SINEMI CREEK. Other tps, across the Creek 200 yds North of the br, advanced 1000 yds West along the old strip with fwd elements along a line running North to the Creek. Arty destroyed enemy coastal guns at the NW end of the main strip. In the GOVT STA area, further Allied tps have now crossed to the East side of ENTRANCE CREEK. The enemy was directing mortar and SA fire on ENTRANCE CREEK.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

ADMIRALTY Is. 23 Dec. A possible 10,000-ton tanker was attacked by our A/C without success near LORENGAU.

NEW BRITAIN 23 Dec 0940 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed enemy installations at CAPE GLOUCESTER, but results were NOT observed.

ARAWE, 23 Dec 1125 hrs. Allied A/C attacked a 1,500-ton vessel in the harbour without success. 1650 hrs. A tpt was seen in the harbour.
COMMENT: This may have been the vessel previously attacked.

VITU GP. 24 Dec 0911 hrs. A small u/i vessel was seen at GAROVE Is.

NEW IRELAND. 22 Dec. One submarine was seen sixty mls NNE of CAPE ST GEORGE.

KAVIENG: 23 Dec. 0955 hrs. Two tpts, one 8,000-ton cargo vessel and three u/i vessels were seen in the harbour. 1020 hrs. One Allied recce A/C destroyed one possibly three and damaged two of eight intercepting Zeros near KAVIENG.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA 23 Dec 0920 hrs. One destroyer was seen forty-eight mls West by South of the PASSAGE on a course North. 0935 hrs. One 8,000-ton cargo vessel was seen SW of the entrance to the PASSAGE on a course NOT stated.

BUIN-FAISI 23 Dec 0335 hrs. A lt cruiser and a destroyer were seen between FAISI and VELLA LAVELLA Is on a course SE.

SANTA CRUZ Is, 23 Dec. There were indications that two subs were operating in this area.

(vi) NE AUSTRALIA -

HORNE Is, 23 Dec, One submarine was seen eighty mls WSW of the Island.

(Landops Revsit No.146)

PART 2

ENEMY:

(vi) Equipment -

Japanese Portable Bridge: A pioneer bridge of light metal is now being used by the Jap Army. It has been designed by Lt-Col TABEKAWA and can be easily carried even on most exhausting long distance marches through the jungle of MALAYA and DUTCH EAST INDIES. Notwithstanding its extraordinary light weight it has enough stability to carry heavy mechanical units like guns and tanks. It has proved satisfactory wherever used.

(Adv LHQ Int Sum No.78)

Capt,
GS 2 AustCorps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

War Diary

241 : 361

S E C R E T

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.127

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 26 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80

P A R T 1

O P E R A T I O N S

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 23 Dec. It was reported that one small vessel arrived at DILLI.

LAIVAI (Seventeen mls NE of LAGA) 24 Dec 0900 hrs. One enemy tpt was unloading tps. There were three other tpts and a destroyer in the vicinity. 1855 hrs. Our A/C scored a direct hit on one tpt, but further results were NOT observed.

TURISCAI 24 Dec. Armed hostile natives, after destroying food and huts, have temporarily withdrawn in the direction of MAOBISSE.

FUILORO. 24 Dec. 1247 hrs. Our A/C raided the aerodrome. One F was destroyed on the ground, another was damaged and three M/T were also damaged.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

MADANG. 24 Dec. 1000 hrs. Allied A/C bombed the North end of the runway. The aerodrome was reported as being serviceable.

LAE. 24 Dec. During the morning, Allied A/ C made three attacks on the aerodrome. Bombs fell on the runways and JACOBSENS PLANTATION.

SALAMAUA. 24 Dec. 0917 hrs. Allied A/C strafed a party of twenty Japs in canoes at KELKEL, five mls South of SALAMAUA. Only two of the enemy reached the shore. The village was also strafed.

AMBOGA 24 Dec. Small enemy parties were reported at FUFUDA, five mls South of the mouth of the KUMUSI RIVER, and at SENANI, nine mls SSW of the KUMUSI. A small det has been landed at night between KURENDA, three mls South of the KUMUSI, and DANAWATU, eight mls South of the KUMUSI.

SANANANDA-SOPUTA TRACK. There was NO report of fighting.

BUNA. 24 Dec. Our tps, together with those protecting the left flank (South of the old strip), advanced a further 400 yds. The right flank was secure on SINEMI CREEK. There is still strong enemy resistance at the West end of the old strip.
23 Dec. In the GOVT STA area, Allied tps, with arty sp advanced from SW to the NE of the GOVT garden. They are now on a frontage from just South of the mouth of ENTRANCE CREEK, across the CREEK to a track at a point approx half way between the CREEK and the junc of the tracks. 24 Dec. 1015 hrs. There were indications that some Allied tps were in the coconut plantation near the track junc. Enemy posts in the garden area were being mopped up.

/Contd.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

NEW BRITAIN. 23 Dec. 1800 hrs. Allied A/C attacked CAPE GLOUCESTER aerodrome. Bombs fell in the dispersal area but results were NOT observed.

ARAWE. 24 Dec. 0807 hrs. As a result of a direct hit, an enemy tpt in the harbour exploded and sank within two minutes.

GASHATA 24 Dec. 1200 hrs and 1330 hrs. Allied A/C bombed the aerodrome, but results were NOT observed. Three, possibly four, of twelve intercepting Zeros were shot down. 1655 hrs. A 5,000 ton tpt was seen sinking as a result of direct hits.

NEW IRELAND. 23 Dec. An analysis of photographs revealed two cruisers, one large tpt and two merchant vessels at KAVIENG.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN-FAISI. 23 Dec. One cargo and eight u/i vessels were seen in the area. (Landops 147)

P A R T 5.

S E C U R I T Y

LEAKAGE OF INFORMATION

In a carriage on the MELBOURNE-SYDNEY Express recently three senior officers indulged in several hours' conversation upon important military matters in the presence of two civilian strangers.

In the sitting room on the SYDNEY-ALBURY Express, a merchant seaman informed the whole company of the time taken between TOWNSVILLE and PORT MORESBY by convoys and by various named vessels when they travelled independently of convoys. He went on to describe voyages in general terms referring to submarine and air attacks.

In a Sydney surburban train a Naval officer indulged in conversation with a fellow passenger regarding damaged US ships (named) and mentioned their present localities.

The danger of such conversations as above is illustrated by the following broadcast, intercepted from BERLIN at 2030 hours on 22 Nov, during a session of news in German, although it may have been based purely on deduction: -

> "AMERICAN SHIPS TO BE REPAIRED IN SYDNEY. Heavily damaged American warships are being towed to SYDNEY, as they are unable to make the journey to an American base 3,000 miles away." (Second Aust Army Int Review No.32.)

W. E. Potts
Capt.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

SECRET

Copy No. 73

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 128

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 27 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No. 80

PART 1

OPERATIONS:

(ii) NEI Area -

TIMOR 24 Dec. Ref Int Sum No. 127. It is now reported that our A/C did NOT score a direct hit on a tpt at LAIVAI but there were two close misses. 25 Dec. 1015 hrs. Enemy stores and tps on the beach were strafed by Allied A/C, but results were NOT observed. NO vessels were in the vicinity.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

DUTCH NEW GUINEA. 25 Dec. Our recce A/C observed new huts under construction at KAUKENAU and ATABO on the South coast.

LAE. 25 Dec. Much enemy activity has been observed on the tracks at the North end of the aerodrome. 1437 hrs. Allied A/C dropped bombs in the vicinity of JACOBSEN'S FARM, but results were NOT observed.

SALAMAUA. 159 RABAUL boys, who escaped from SALAMAUA, have now come under our control.

AMBOGA. 24 Dec. Twenty to thirty Japs, in poor condition, were observed at DUVIRA CREEK with two launches, evidently preparing to evacuate. 25 Dec. 1030 hrs. Allied A/C strafed the mouth of the AMBOGA RIVER. Enemy ground to air signals were observed two mls NW of the mouth of the RIVER.

SANANANDA-SOPUTA TRACK. 24 Dec. Allied patrols, who were active throughout the day, reported that the enemy were constructing earthworks to the North of our fwd posns. Enemy planes have been over this area five nights in the last six, and some bombs were dropped. Night 23 Dec, there were indications that sups were dropped to the enemy. Our progress has been made difficult by swamp land and large bodies of Japs in defensive posns East of the TRACK.

BUNA. 24 Dec. Allied tps made a general advance along our front, which now extends from the coast at the mouth of SINEMI CREEK, SSE to a pt 500 yds SW of the East end of the old strip. The enemy were resisting from strong posns in depth near the dispersal bays and the coconut grove at the West end of the old strip. 25 Dec. An Allied advance was made through the GOVT GARDENS, enlarging the bridgehead East of ENTRANCE CREEK. Allied patrols reported that there was a strong Jap patrol 500 yds SE of TARAKENA, in the area West of the VILLAGE.

PORT MORESBY 25 Dec. 2039 hrs. An air raid was reported but there are NO details to hand.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

NEW BRITAIN. 25 Dec 1325 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the runway at CAPE GLOUCESTER, but NO enemy activity was observed.

GASMATA. 24 Dec 1840 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome.

RABAUL 25 Dec 0330 hrs. One tpt, three cargo vessels, seventy-two u/i vessels and one probable A/C Carr were seen in the harbour.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA. 25 Dec. 1055 hrs. One cargo vessel was seen at the SW entrance of the PASSAGE.

BUIN-FAISI. 24 Dec 1700 hrs. Two u/i vessels departed from FAISI, on a course South.

NEW GEORGIA GP. 25 Dec. 0734 hrs. Two destroyers and one tpt were seen five mls West by North of LUNGA PT, GANONGGA Is, on a course West by North.

(Landops Revsit No.148)

PART 5

SECURITY:

Security of Information -

An object lesson in Security-mindedness is revealed in the recent release of news of the landing of British and American tps in NORTH AFRICA.

Many ships were required to transport this force, many thousands of workers were engaged for months in preparations and yet the enemy were NOT aware of the proposed objective.

Apparently English and Americans, unlike us, realize the danger of loose talk. In Australia it is almost impossible to shift a battalion without someone writing or talking of the move.

Every person who wants to write or talk about news which could be of value to the enemy should stop for an instant and think of the multitude whose silence and self-control made possible the success of the NORTH AFRICAN landings.

(Adv LHQ Int Sum No.20)

N. E Potts
Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

S E C R E T

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.129.

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 28 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

P A R T 1.

O P E R A T I O N S :

(i) NW AUSTRALIA Area -

ARAFURA SEA. 26 Dec. 1315 hrs. Enemy A/C made an unsuccessful attack on an Allied vessel.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR 23 Dec. It was reported that an unknown number of Japs and natives were in the NOVA CAMINSA area, twenty-one mls SE of DILLI. Other Japs and natives were camped at BETANO, and were patrolling the beach East to KELAN RIVER.

DILLI. 25 Dec. 1330 hrs. One destroyer and four large merchant vessels entered DILLI from the East.

LAGA 26 Dec. 1050 hrs. An attack was made by Allied A/C; buildings were demolished and fires started. 1217 hrs. Enemy barges and installations from LAGA to LAIVAI were strafed. Fifty trucks in convoy were observed approaching LAIVAI from LAGA.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

MADANG. Morning 26 Dec. Allied A/C dropped bombs in the dock area.

FINSCHAVEN. Morning 26 Dec. In two attacks, bombs were dropped by our A/C near the runway and wharf area.

SALAMAUA-BUNA COAST. 26 Dec. 1300 hrs. Allied A/C bombed and strafed enemy huts, and destroyed barges over this area.

SANANANDA SOPUTA TRACK. 26 Dec. Fwd Allied tps, near the road block, continued their active patrolling. Tps South of the rd block, attacked Jap posns East of the Track and advanced 150 yds.

BUNA. 26 Dec. Allied tps made progress along the timber edge, South of the old strip. Allied A/C intercepted twelve enemy A/C over DOBODURA, and shot down two Zerosand damaged one.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

NEW BRITAIN. 26 Dec. 1050 hrs. Allied A/C attacked CAPE GLOUCESTER aerodrome and dropped bombs near the runway.

ST GEORGES CHANNEL. 26 Dec. 1005 hrs. Allied A/C attacked an enemy convoy, consisting of one lt cruiser, four destroyers and two merchant vessels. Several direct hits were scored on one large tpt, which was set afire and believed to have been destroyed.

/Contd.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO (Contd.)

NEW IRELAND, 25 Dec. One submarine was sighted twenty-two mls East by North of LIHIR IS. (approx 125 mls SE KAVIENG)

KAVIENG, 26 Dec. 0905 hrs. One 8,000 ton merchant vessel was seen forty-three mls SW of KAVIENG, on a course NE. 0920 hrs. One possible hy cruiser, 1/10,000 ton merchant vessel and two small craft were seen stationary in the harbour.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUIN-FAISI, 25 Dec. Six vessels were seen in the area 1300 hrs. One destroyer was sighted between FAISI and VELLA LAVELLA IS. on a course South

NEW GEORGIA GP. 26 Dec. 1015 hrs. One possible lt cruiser and one cargo vessel were sighted in WICKHAM ANCHORAGE, BOLO LAGOON (between VANGUNU and GATUKAI IS). (Landops Revsit 149).

PART 2.

ENEMY:

(ii) O.O.B.

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION OF ENEMY FORCES

38 Div -

There is reason to believe that this Div has taken or will take over control of the South Seas Detachment in NEW GUINEA. The presence of elements of 38 Div in NEW GUINEA lends some support to this view. Confirmation however is awaited.

2 Div -

This division was never identified in JAVA but recent information shows that it was concerned in operations there. It left FIC 18 Feb 42 and landed at MERAK (NW tip of JAVA) 2 Mar. 29 Inf Regt under Col WATANABE took part in the advance on BUITENZONG. The division apparently moved to the PHILIPPINES about the end of May or beginning of June. Part of 4 Inf Regt left PALAU 27 Aug 42. The division seems to have arrived in the RABAUL area about 10 Sep 42.

17 Army GUADALCANAL and 18th Army NEW GUINEA - the latter possibly commanded by ADACHI Futomi are now under command 8th Army Group commanded by IMAMURA Hitoshi.

Lt-Gen IMAMURA (age 55) who was appointed as G.O.C., N.E.I. Expeditionary Force (probably 25th Army) in Dec 41 succeeding in forcing unconditional surrender of the N.E.I. Forces in slightly under 9 days.

Prior to the abovementioned appointment he commanded the South China Expeditionary Force (21st Army) which included 5,18,38,48 and 104 Divisions. It is notable that he was in charge of the well known 5 Div during 1940 during which time he was reported to have employed para troops for the first time in the history of the Japanese Army.

There is reason to believe that the Headquarters of the "South Seas Detachment" are now at the mouth of the KUMUSI River. (Adv LHQ Int Sum No.20).

W. E. Potts
Capt.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

S E C R E T

Copy No. 78

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.130.

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 29 Dec 42.

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80.

P A R T 1.

O P E R A T I O N S :

(i) NW AUSTRALIA -

CAPE WESSEL. 27 Dec. 1445 hrs. One enemy F/P was sighted eight mls North by West of the Cape.

ARAFURA SEA. 27 Dec 1012 hrs. Enemy A/C attacked and slightly damaged an Allied vessel in this area.

(ii) N.E.I. Area -

TIMOR. 27 Dec 1224 hrs. Allied A/C strafed enemy A/C and personnel at FUILORO, but results were NOT observed. 1232 hrs. Enemy installations from LAGA to LAIVAI were strafed and a probable fuel dump set on fire. A later bombing attack was made on LAIVAI and one of three intercepting Zeros was destroyed. 1330 hrs. The building area at OSSU (South of BAUCAU) was bombed.

BAUCAU. 27 Dec. 1800 hrs. One merchant vessel was seen stationary in the area.

JAVA. 27 Dec. 0215 hrs. A large A/C carr, one hy and one lt cruiser, and two destroyers, on a course ENE were seen eighty two mls NE by North of SOURABAYA.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

MADANG. 27 Dec. 0800 hrs. Our A/C strafed enemy camouflaged launches at SAIDOR BEACH, forty-nine mls SE of MADANG.

LAE. 26 Dec. An analysis of photographic material reveals five med Bs and thirty-two Fs, all unserviceable, on the aerodrome.

AMBOGA RIVER. 27 Dec 1115 hrs. Our A/C bombed and strafed buildings at DONA Mission at the mouth of the WARIA RIVER and the area at the mouth of the AMBOGA RIVER; fires were started.

BUNA-GONA. In two attacks on the GONA Wreck, three direct hits were scored. Fire was started and further listing of the wreck was noticed. 26 Dec. Allied tps made a slight adv South of SINEMI CREEK. A further strong enemy defended posn South of the old strip was cleared. Dual purpose AA and A/Tk 3" guns, without amn, were captured. 27 Dec. In the Government Sta area, enemy pockets were still resisting in the gardens. Allied tps near BUNA VILLAGE and ENTRANCE CREEK were intermittently shelled from seaward by unlocated guns, possibly on a submarine. 1210 hrs and 1244 hrs. Allied A/C intercepted twenty to thirty enemy Fs and seven to eight D/Bs over BUNA. Nine enemy Fs and two D/Bs were definitely shot down, and three Fs were probably shot down. (Ref Int Sum 129).

/Contd.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area (Contd.)

It is now known that four enemy Fs were definitely shot down over DOBODURA on 26 Dec and three more were probably shot down.

GOPUTA-SANANANDA track. 27 Dec. Allied tps in the rear of the rd block made a slight adv East of the track. Many of the enemy were killed and weapons were captured. All of the area East of the track to about the twenty-five Northing Grid is now clear of the enemy. Cav patrols killed four Japssnipers near the rd block and wiped out an enemy listening post North of the rd block.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

NEW BRITAIN. On the night 26/27 Dec, Allied A/C made three attacks on enemy shipping at RABAUL, but results were NOT observed.

NEW IRELAND. 26 Dec. 1500 hrs. Two destroyers and a 7,000 ton tpt were seen twenty-five mls SW of CAPE ST GEORGE on a course North by West. 1510 hrs. Two destroyers and two 3,000 ton cargo vessels (one on fire) were seen twenty mls WNW of CAPE ST GEORGE on a course North by West. 28 Dec. 2207 hrs. Two probable destroyers and a 5,000 ton merchant vessel were seen in KAVIENG HARBOUR.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA PASSAGE. A native report on the night 24 Dec, stated that 200 Japs moved in two schooners from SOHANA to TINPUTZ BAY (twenty five mls East by South of BUKA PASSAGE).

NEW GEORGIA GP. 27 Dec. 1840 hrs. Six destroyers were seen thirty-one mls WSW of MUNDI-MUNDI (VELLA LAVELLA) on a course South.

SANTA YSABEL IS. 26 Dec. It was reliably reported that the Jap strength at REKATA BAY had been increased to 4,000

GUADALCANAL. 27 Dec. A submarine was seen eighty-one mls South by East of CAPE HUNTER.

(vi) NE AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND 2110 hrs. An Allied A/C was pursued by two enemy A/C approx eighty-five mls NE of COOKTOWN. (Landops Revsit No.150)

G E N E R A L:

US Classification of Protected Documents: - As a number of units and services are now in possession of US Army text books and documents it is considered that the classification of protected documents by the US Army should be as widely known as possible.
This classification is as follows: -

Confidential	=
Restricted	= Secret
Secret	= Most Secret

There is also the classification 'VERY SECRET' which indicates that the documents so marked are for the officer to whom it is addressed ONLY and for no other officer. (HQ. NSW L of C Area Intelligence Summary No.6).

/Contd.

S E C R E T

P A R T 4.

INFM to 21 DEC

Other Fronts:

RUSSIAN:

Central Sector: The Russians were still pressing their offensive but made NO progress, possibly due to a violent two day thaw. There was NO confirmation of the GERMAN claim to have destroyed an encircled Russian force Southeast of TOROPETS. The Russians deny this claim.

DON Sector: A fresh Russian offensive announced on 20 Dec made considerable penetrations of ITALIAN forces NW of the sector recently held by the Roumanians.

STALINGRAD: There was No news of the GERMAN forces encircled East of the Don bend. The German thrust from the KOTELNIKOVO area has reached the RIVER AKASIA.

CAUCASUS. Despite bad weather, the Russians were attacking in the TEREK Sector.

G E N E R A L: There was NO detailed information of the strength of the German thrust SW of STALINGRAD and it is impossible to forecast prospects for the relief of the SIXTH ARMY. The German counter offensive in the area may be limited by the Russian success in the BOGUCHAR Area which has cut the lateral railway North of MILLEROVO and must attract GERMAN reserves.

TUNISIA. Operations were confined to patrolling. Enemy forces were estimated to be Germans, 22,000 with 100 tks, Italians 13,000 with about fifty tks.

BURMA: Our tps occupied MAUNGDAW and BUTHIDAUNG on 17 Dec without contacting the Japs. The enemy left small rear parties, but carried out NO important demolitions. They have probably withdrawn to AKYAB where their strength is estimated at 4,000.

SEA:

NORTHERN WATERS:

15 Dec. Convoy escorts from NORTH AFRICA intercepted a large GERMAN tanker outward bound, which was scuttled. Seventy one PsW were taken.

NORWEGIAN WATERS.

There was NO change in the dispns of GERMAN ships. About 150 enemy A/C were in the area. Over twenty submarines in the GULF of BOSNIA, freezing a month later than usual, will intercept SWEDISH iron ore traffic.

+ Russian submarines.

MEDITERRANEAN:

Our submarines sank six enemy ships and damaged and possibly sank four more during the week.

TOULON: From the latest recce it was estimated that three destroyers possibly two 6" cruisers possibly seven submarines and three contretorpilleurs were undamaged.

Contd.

U Boat Warfare : The passage of a recent homeward bound NORTH ATLANTIC convoy gave an outstanding example of collaboration of air and surface craft. The convoy was shadowed and attacked by some twenty U-Boats over a period of three to four days. Two ships only were lost. On the first day, the air escort flew 800 mls to reach the convoy, and stayed in company with it for six hours. It is considered that more than one ship would have been lost on the following night if the presence of this A/C during the day had NOT kept submarines down. Next day it was in company eight hours and made seven attacks, one of which was considered very promising on U-Boats. Two other A/C, also, assisted. On the third day, the weather prevented air escort and the second ship was lost. Next night more than fourteen attacks were beaten off by surface craft which made several promising counter-attacks. The last day, A/C made a very promising attack on a U-Boat. Three other promising attacks were made by naval A/C in other areas during the week. Provisional figures for the week ended 13 Dec were five ships sunk by submarines of which three were in the ATLANTIC. Three ships were lost in convoys. Two inward and three outward bound convoys arrived without loss.

AIR:

Bad weather restricted both day and night ops.

Casualties for the week:

	OURS	ENEMY
E U R O P E : : : :	22	1
GREAT BRITAIN : : :	2	10
MIDDLE EAST : : : :	17	29
T O T A L	41	40

(World Revsit : Week ended 21 Dec 42.)

W. E. Phillips
Capt.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.

G2036.

2 Aust Corps,
29 Dec 42.

Subject: Training of Personnel HQ 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution List F.

1. As a suitable parade ground is NOT available the fortnightly GOCs parade is now cancelled. In lieu all other ranks of HQ 2 Aust Corps will undergo a 2-hour period of training each fortnight.

2. The parade will be held each Monday morning from 0900-1100 hours.

3. Branches, Arms and Services will arrange the working of their offices so that half their personnel attend each training parade.

4. For purposes of administration gps will be organised into 'G' gp, 'A' gp, Camp gp, and an officer (each gp to detail) will be responsible for the submission of nominal rolls and to see that all personnel in his gp are checked and formed up on the necessary parade.

5. PARADE GROUND.

(a) Training parades will be held on the oval (opposite the Amenities Hut.)

6. DRESS.

(a) Shirts, shorts, Battle order.

7. Attached is syllabus covering period 4 Jan-8 Mar 43.

for BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

TRAINING SYLLABUS.

Date	Time	Subject
4 Jan - 1st Gp. 11 Jan - 2nd Gp.	0900-0915 0915-1000 1000-1100	Inspection and Squad Drill. Bayonet Training. Route March and use of rd cover.
18 Jan - 1st Gp. 25 Jan - 2nd Gp.	0900-0915 0915-1000 1000-1100	Inspection and Squad Drill. Indication and recognition of targets. Field craft - section formations - fire control orders.
ø 1 Feb - 1st Gp. 8 Feb - 2nd Gp.	2000-2200	Night Marching - cross country.
15 Feb - 1st Gp. 22 Feb - 2nd Gp	0900-0915 0915-1000 1000-1030 1030-1100	Inspection - Squad Drill. Section in attack. Lecture on use fd. dressing. Map reading.
1 Mar - 1st Gp. 8 Mar - 2nd Gp.	0900-0915 0915-1000 1000-1100	Inspection - Squad Drill. Section ambush. Pl in attack (elementary).

NOTE: (a) The trg as shewn in the first period is repeated the following MONDAY.

ø (b) Morning parade will NOT be held.

Appendix 39

MOST SECRET.

2 Aust Corps

G2047

27 Dec 42

Subject:- Location Statement 2 Aust Corps as at 2400 hrs 28 Dec 42.

	Copy No.		
1 Aust Div	1 - 2	A	26
32 US Div	3	Q	27 - 28
3 Aust Armd Div	4	DDMS	29
4 AS Control	5	ADMS (D)	30
3 AL Section	6	L&I	31
21 Aust Cav Regt	7	DAD Educ	32
5 Aust MG Bn	8	Chaplains	33
2/1 Aust MG Bn	9	DDST	34
2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec	10	DDOS	35 - 37
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	11	DADOS C Tps	38
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Coln	12	APM	39
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	13	DAD Posts	40
2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	14	Salvage	41
2 Aust Corps Reception Camp.	15	Pay	42
1 Aust ARD	16	Signaster	43
GOC	17	First Aust Army	44 - 45
G(I)	18	Q'land L of C Area	46
CCRA	19	5 AC Sqn	47
CE	20 - 21	1 US Corps	48
CO	22 - 24	File	49 - 50
DA & QMG	25	War Diary	51 - 52

1. Herewith 2 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 28 Dec.42

2. It is particularly requested that any errors or omissions noted in this statement be notified to this HQ by the formation or unit concerned immediately.

3. ACK. Include in ack destruction by fire of previous location statement.

Clive Vernon Capt
BGS.
2 Aust Corps.

MOST SECRET.

Location Statement
2 Aust Corps.

As at 2400 hrs 28 Dec 42.
Veh markings - COOKATOO on BOOMERANG.

Map Legend.
B - BRISBANE 4 miles to one inch.
G - GYMPIE 4 miles to one inch.
Ix - IPSWICH 4 miles to one inch.
M - MARYBOROUGH 4 miles to one inch.

Serial	Unit	Vol No	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
	HQ				
A1	HQ 2 Aust Corps	107	MT MEE	Ix592640	
A2	2 Aust Corps Sec Intell Corps		MT MEE	"	
	2 Aust Corps Def & Emp Pl	126	MT MEE	"	
A4	E Sec FSS	107	MT MEE	"	
A5	2 Aust Corps P.R Fd Unit				
A6	2 Aust Fd Censorship Sec		BRISBANE		Att for duty MILBASE Brisbane.
A7	3 Aust Fd Censorship Sec		SYDNEY		ex 1 Aust Corps
	CAV				
A8	21 Aust Cav Regt, Sig Sec & 295 LAD	92	BEENLEIGH	3632559	Two sons vicinity 624180 SPRINGBROCK 1 " to 1 mile
	ARTY				
A9	HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	109	MT MEE		
A10	2/11 Aust A Fd Regt, Sig Sec, & 2/7C LAD	142	WOODFORD	G589656	
A11	Det 2/2 Aust A Tk Regt		WOODFORD		Under comd 2/11 A Fd Regt.
	8 Aust Fd Regt, Sig Sec & 229 LAD	134	BEENLEIGH	3635556	
A13	1 Aust Med Regt, Sig Sec & 208 LAD	112	NERANG	G583650	
A14	2 Aust F Sp Sty	105	NERANG	G581649	
	RAE.				
A15	HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps	101)			
A16	19 Aust A Fd Coy	143)	ATHERTON		Detached for duty under LHQ for ops and works. Remaining under comd 2 Aust Corps for adm.
A17	15 Aust Fd Coy (3 Aust Div)	86)	TABLELAND		
A18	60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy & 315 LAD	105)			
A19	10 Aust Fd Coy	149	GIENTERN	G575652	
A20	2 Aust Corps Camflg Trg Unit	110	VILLENEUVE		
	SIGS.				
A21	Sigs 2 Aust Corps & 244 LAD	115	MT MEE	Ix593538	
A22	2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec	115	MT MEE		

Serial		Unit.	Veh No.	Location.	Map Ref.	Remarks.
		INF				
A23		5 Aust MG Bn & 265 Aust LAD	164	D'Aguilar	IX593646	
A24		2/1 Aust MG Bn (less A and B Coys) & 2/48 LAD.	51	RECEPTION BAY	B619623	Ex 7 Aust Div
		AASC				
A25		HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	108	TOOGOOLAWAH	Ix548639	
A26		2 Aust Corps Amn Coy	136	YIMBUN	Ix549646	
A27		2 Aust Corps Tps Pet Coy	146	HARLIN	G549650	
A28		2 Aust Corps Tps Sup Coy	150	YIMBUN	Ix549646	
A29	HQ	2 Aust Corps Tpt Coln	116	KILCOY	G571656	
A30		129 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	125	WINYA	G573654	
A31		130 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	131	KILCOY	Ix569645	
A32		131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	121	CROSSDALE	Ix564622	
A33		132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	103	ATHERTON TABLELAND		Under LHQ for ops and works.
A34		133 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	160	KILCOY AREA	G565557	
A35		2/105 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	103	GOODNA REDBANK area	Ix502572	Ex 1 Aust Corps.
A36		2/4 Aust Coy AASC (less det)	97	BEACHMERE	B522631	Ex 7 Aust Div.
A37		2 Aust MAC (less one sec)	294	KILCOY	G571656	One sec under comd 1 Aust Armd Div.
A38		2/1 Aust MAC (less HQ det & one sec)	256	DINMORE		A Sec WOODFORD G594553
A39		2 Aust Corps AASC School		SOMERSET DAM		
		AAMC				
A40		2 Aust CCS	151	WOODFORD	G594554	
A41		2/1 Mob Op Unit		HARLIN	G558551	
A42		2 Aust Corps Mob Bath Unit		ASCOT		Moving to NEURUM.
		AACC				
A43		110 Aust Indep Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk	127	WOODFORD	G594553	
A44		2/3 Aust Army Ord Fd Pk	147	IPSWICH	Ix592573	Ex 1 Aust Corps.
A45		2 Aust Corps Mob Laundry and Fwd decn unit.	173	BROADMEADOWS Vic.		
A46		1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry and Fwd decn unit (less det)	173	FERNVALE	Ix578595	Ex 1 Aust Corps.
A47		DADOS Corps Tps Dump		WOODFORD.		

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Map Ref.	Remarks.
	AEME				
A48	2/6 Aust LAD		WOODFORD SHOWGROUND		Ex 1 Aust Corps.
A49	2/2 Aust Indep Bde Gp Wkshop	156	WOODFORD	G594653	
A50	2/3 Aust Inf Tps Wkshop	155	IPSWICH	Ix592573	Ex 1 Aust Corps.
	PRO				
A51	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	128	MT MEE	Ix592637	
	POSTAL				
A52	2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	154	WOODFORD		
	PAY				
A53	2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	162	WOODFORD		
	MISCELLANEOUS.				
A54	2/3 Aust MH & Infm Sec	174			Not Yet Raised.
A55	2 Aust Corps Salvage Unit.	166	ESK		Moving to WOODFORD.
A56	HQ 2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	133	ASCOT RACECOURSE BRISBANE.		
A57	2 Aust Corps Fd Punish-ment Centre.		CHURCHILL		

LHQ TPS UNDER COMD 2 AUST CORPS FOR ADM.

A58	4 A3 Control (Type A)	234	D'AGUILAR	G595549	
A59	3 Aust AI Sec		LOWER CRESSBROOK	Ix550635	

ARMY TPS UNDER COMD 2 AUST CORPS FOR ADM

	AASC				
A60	4 Aust DID		CABOOLTURE		
A61	6 Aust DID		TOOGOOLAWAH		
	AAMC				
A62	2/1 Aust Mob Operating Unit		HARLIN	G550651	See also serial No. A41
A63	2/2 Aust Dental Unit	263			
A64	" HQ sec (2/29)		D'AGUILAR	Att 5 Aust MG Bn	
A65	" HQ Sec (2/31)		NEURUM	" 1 Aust Med Regt.	
A66	" A Sec (2/30)		TINBEERWAH	" 57/60 Inf Bn	
A67	" B Sec (2/34)		MAPLETON	" HQ 3 Aust Div	
A68	" C Sec (2/35)		CABOOLTURE	" 2/1 Aust Med Regt.	
A69	" D Sec (2/36)		DECEPTION BAY	" 2/1 Aust MG Bn.	
A70	" E Sec (2/37)		D'AGUILAR	" 5 Aust MG Bn.	
A71	" F Sec (2/38)		CABARLAH	" First Aust Army Schools	

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location.	Map Ref	Remarks
A72	2/3 Aust Dental Unit	298			
A73	" HQ Sec (2/44)		YIMBUN		Att 2 Aust Corps Tps Sup Coy.
A74	" HQ Sec (2/46)		YIMBUN	"	2 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy.
A75	" A Sec (2/42)		CROSSDALE	"	131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy.
A76	" B Sec (2/39)		BEENLEIGH	"	21 Aust Cav Regt
A77	" C Sec (2/40)		BEENLEIGH	"	6 Aust Fd Regt
A78	80 Aust Dental Unit				
A79	" HQ Sec (305)		CALCUNDRA	"	29/46 Aust Inf Bn.
A80	" HQ Sec (201)		TOOWOOMBA	"	HQ First Aust Army.
A81	" A Sec (215)		COORCY	"	57/59 Aust Inf Bn
A82	" B Sec (219)		MAPIETON	"	HQ 3 Aust Div
A83	" C Sec (220)		ALEXANDRA	"	22 Aust Inf Bn
A84	" D Sec (222)		EULUNDI	"	24 Aust Inf Bn
A85	" E Sec (233)		BELLI PARK	"	106 Aust A Tk Regt
A86	" F Sec (369		NORTH ARM.	"	6 Aust Cav Regt.

IN SUPPORT.

A87	5 AC Sqn		TOOGOOLAWAH

3 AUST DIV.

Veh sign:- KOALA on BOOMERANG.

Map Legend:

Landsborough	L
Eumundi	E
Caloundra	C
Redcliffe	R
Nambour	N

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Map Ref.	Remarks.
B1	HQ 3 Aust Div	84	MAPLETON	N028926	
B2	"E" Sec FS Sec		"	N023945	
	CAV				
B3	8 Aust Cav Regt (AIF)	92	NORTH ARM	E165052	
B4	297 Aust LAD AEME	92	" "	E165052	
	RAA				
B5	HQ RAA 3 Aust Div	69	MAPLETON	N027920	
B6	105 Aust A Tk Regt H Sec sigs and 285 LAD AEME (concentrated)	62	BELLI PARK	N015066 015020, 975020, 975062,	On exercise at SOUTHPORT, returning 3 Jan approx.
B7	3 Aust Svy Bty	87	EUMUNDI	E112076	
	RAE.				
B8	HQ RAE 3 Aust Div	81	MAPLETON	N058914	
B9	53 Aust Fd Pk Coy	67	NAMBOUR	N122936	
B10	230 Aust LAD AEME	67	"	N122936	
B11	3 Aust Div Camflg Trg Unit		"	N122936	
	SIGS.				
B12	HQ Sigs 3 Aust Div	66	MAPLETON	N031958	
B13	3 Aust Div Cipher Sec	66	"	N028926	
B14	No1 Coy Sigs 3 Aust Div	66	"	N031958	
B15	231 Aust LAD AEME	66	"	N031958	
	AASC				
B16	HQ Comd AASC 3 Aust Div	59	MAPLETON	N024917	
	AAMC				
B17	2/13 Aust Fd Amb	52	NAMBOUR	N103930	
B18	3 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	79	YANDINA	E124993	
	AAOC				
B19	HQ 54 Div Ord Fd Pk	83	YANDINA	E113021	
B20	C Sec 54 Div Ord Fd Pk	83	"	E113021	
B21	6 Aust Mob Laundry & Decn Unit.	51	"	E124993	
B22	ADOS Dump		NAMBOUR	N136918	
	AEME				
B23	HQ 3 Aust Div Wkshops AEME	76	YANDINA	E102028	
B24	No 2 Sec 3 Aust Div Wkshops AEME	76	"	E117019	
	PRO				
B25	3 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	YANDINA	E118013	

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location.	Map Ref.	Remarks.
	PAY.				
B26	3 Aust Div Cash Office	87	MAPLETON	N029923	
	MISCELLANEOUS.				
B27	3 Aust Div Salv Unit	78	YANDINA	E138981	
B28	3 Aust Div Reception Camp.	133	YANDINA	E138980	
B29	3 Aust Div Rest Sta		CALOUNDRA	L228723	
B30	3 Aust Div Concert Party.		MAPLETON	N029926	(on tour till 15 Jan 43.
	4 AUST INF BDE.				
B31	HQ 4 Aust Inf Bde & J Sec Sigs	88	FOREST GLEN	L192838	
B32	204 Aust LAD AEME	88	FOREST GLEN	L227845	
B33	4 Aust Fd Regt and F Sec Sigs	74	FOREST GLEN	L229783	
B34	214 Aust LAD AEME	74	FOREST GLEN	L229783	
B35	4 Aust Fd Coy	60	PALMWOODS	L135841	
B36	22 Aust Inf Bn	53	ALEXANDRA	E284861	
B37	29/46 Aust Inf Bn	50	5 miles N CALOUNDRA	L238730	
B38	37/52 Aust Inf Bn	61	4 miles W MAROOCHYDORE	L238868	
B39	19 Aust Coy ASC	97	6 miles S FOREST GLEN	L228789	
B40	4 Aust Fd Amb (less A Coy) less two lt Secs	57	NAMBOUR	E145927	
B41	One Lt Sec		FOREST GLEN	L228912	
B42	One Lt Sec		YANDINA	E149948	
B43	No 3 Sec 3 Aust Div Wkshops AEME	76	PALMWOODS	E141838	
B44	B Sec 54 Aust Div Ord Fd Pk	83	PALMWOODS	E141838	
	15 AUST INF BDE.				
B45	HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde & J Sec Sigs.	65	COOROY	E090171	
B46	266 Aust LAD AEME	65	COOROY	E090167	
B47	2 Aust Fd Regt & E Sec Sigs	54	TINBEERWAH	E126222	On ex at NOOSA HEADS returning approx 10 Jan.
B48	213 Aust LAD AEME	54	TINBEERWAH	E127221	
B49	15 Aust Fd Coy				See serial B47
B50	24 Aust Inf Bn	63	Approx 3 mls NE EUMUNDI.	E103144	
B51	57/60 Aust Inf Bn	82	TINBEERWAH	E156193	
B52	58/59 Aust Inf Bn	91	COOROY	E113195	
B53	21 Aust Coy ASC	72	YANDINA	E119011	
B54	HQ & B Coy 15 Aust Fd Amb	70	COOROY	E077177	
B55	A Coy 15 Aust Fd Amb		COOROY	E061177	
B56	One Lt sec "		KILCOY		
B57	One Lt sec "		CABOOLTURE		
B58	No 3 sec 3 Aust Div Wkshops AEME	76	COOROY	E077183	
B59	A Sec 54 Div Ord Fd Pk	83	COOROY	E064179	

32 US DIVT

Under Comd 2 Aust Corps for planning and execution of defensive operational role only.

Serial	Unit	Location	Remarks
	HQ		
C1	Det Rear HQ 32 Inf Div.		
C2	Det HQ and Military Police Coy and Service Det		
	RECCE		
C3	32 Cav Recce Tp (less one pl)		
	ARTY		
C4	HQ		
C5	HQ Bty 32 Div Arty		
C6	Band		
C7	120 Fd Arty Bn		
C8	121 Fd Arty Bn		
C9	126 Fd Arty Bn		
C10	129 Fd Arty Bn (less A Bty)		
C11	147 Fd Arty Bn		
C12	1st Bn 148 Fd Arty Bn		
C13	632 Tank Destroyer Bn.	Strathpine	Attached
	ENGRS.		
C14	114 Engr Bn (less det from HQ and two water purification units).		
	SIGS.		
C15	Det 32 Sig Coy.		
	S & T		
C17	Det 107 QM Bn		
	MEDICAL		
C18	Det 107 Medical Bn		
	ORD		
C19	Det 32 Div Ord (motor maintenance det).		
	Serials C11 and C12	1 US Corps Tps att 32 US Div.	

Ex.

S E C R E T

Copy No.

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.131.

Compiled from information received to 0800 hrs 30 Dec 42

Notes A B & C. See Summary No.80

P A R T 1.

O P E R A T I O N S:

(ii) NEI Area -

TIMOR 24 Dec. There are unconfirmed reports that Jap vessels at LAIVAI disembarked 5,000 tps and many trucks, equipment and stores. 27 Dec. Japs and natives burnt huts at SAME (26 mls SSW DILLI). Pro-Jap natives are still active at NOVA CAMINHA (20 mls SW DILLI). 28 Dec 0825 hrs. Allied A/C strafed Jap installations at FUILORO aerodrome.

(iii) NEW GUINEA Area -

BUNA 26 Dec. Allied tps on right flank repulsed a brief Jap counter-attack in the strip area.

MILNE BAY Area 27 Dec. One Jap recce A/C was shot down North of GOODENOUGH Is.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO -

RABAUL. Allied A/C scored three direct hits on a hy cruiser or tpt and a probable fuel dump was blown up. Other results were NOT observed owing to blinding searchlights. 28 Dec. Analysis of Ph R revealed sixty-nine u/i vessels in the harbour.

KAVIENG. 27 Dec 2210 hrs. Allied A/C attacked the aerodrome. Bombs were dropped near the runway and large fires started. 28 Dec. Two destroyers, two probable warships, one merchant vessel and three u/i vessels were seen in the area.

(v) SOLOMONS Area -

BUKA PASSAGE 27 Dec 1200 hrs. One cargo vessel was seen anchored. 28 Dec. One large warship arrived from the West.

NEW GEORGIA Gp. 28 Dec 0645 hrs. Six destroyers were seen 25 mls West by North of VELLA LAVELLA.

(Landops Revsit No.151)

P A R T 2.

E N E M Y:

(iii) Identifications -

NEW GUINEA AREA:
170 Inf Regt. 3 Bn (10,11 and 12 Coys) was landed 2 Dec at the mouth of the KUMUSI. Owing to casualties suffered the Bn is NOT thought to have been at full strength when it landed. Strength 13 Dec estim-

ated as 390. 170 Inf Regt was last known to be associated with 108 Inf Regt to form 107 Inf Bde of 104 Div. 107 Inf Bde may be YAMAGATA Bde, which was expected to send reinforcements to NEW GUINEA.
43 Inf Regt: There have been indications of personnel from this Regt being in NEW GUINEA. As, however, this regt is from 11 Div District it is considered that these personnel are reinforcements only.
47 A/A Bn: 1 Bty was at BUNA Aug-Sep, 2 Bty at BASA in July. Part of this Bn was on GUADALCANAL 15 Oct. This Bn appears to be part of 2 A/A Regt.
229 Inf Regt: There are indications that 3 Bn (800 strong) landed in the BUNA area 18/19 Nov and that 1 and 2 Bns went to GUADALCANAL.
SOLOMONS:
203 Inf Regt: Landed with 16 Inf Regt on GUADALCANAL 14 Oct. This regt has NOT previously been identified. It is thought that it may be part of 29 Div which is reported to be located in JAVA.
45 AA Bn: GUADALCANAL 13 Oct with part of 47 AA Bn.
20 Inf Regt: May be on GUADALCANAL.
OTHER AREAS:
6 Engr Regt: Practised combined landing operations with 124 Inf at PALAU mid Jul 42.
57 Div: This Div may now be in the PHILIPPINES.
16 Div: PHILIPPINES and part GUADALCANAL.
9 Div: PHILIPPINES (this eliminates an u/i Div in this area).
48 AA Bn: Believed to have been at KEELUNG Dec 41. C.O. Maj KURODA. (Adv LHQ Int Sum No.20).

(v) Personalities -

NEW GUINEA Area:		
KOIWAI		Now appears to be comd 2 Bn of 41 Inf Regt.
YAMAMOTO	Capt	Commands a Convalescent Unit of the HANKAI Force.
TANIGUCHI Masazaburo	Lt-Col	Was apparently att to 47 A/A Bn, possibly as comd in Jul 41.
FUTAMI Akisaburo		Preceded MIYAZAKI as Chief of Staff 17 Army.
FUKUCHI [illegible]ro	Maj	Was in GIRUWA. Comd unknown.
TOZAWA	Lieut	An Intendance offr of OSAMONO BUTAI NUMA 8925.
BABA	Capt	Comd 14 Billeting Unit.
MIYAKE Toshio	Lt-Gen	Held an administrative appt in RABAUL, Aug 42.
MIYAMOTO	Maj	Is or was a bn comd 41 Inf Regt.
HADAKA	Lieut	Believed to be comds of Nos 1, 2 & 3. Coys of HOZUMI Mountain Arty Unit.
TAKESHI	"	
TAKAGI	"	
YAMASHITA Kiyataro	2nd "	M.O. att No.40 Sea Service Coy of 17 Army.
NAKAZAWA	Capt	M.O. associated with 14 Inf Regt.
SOLOMONS AREA:		
TAMURA	Maj	Comdr 2 Bn, 4 Inf Regt of 2 Div. Was in PALAU Aug 42 but due then to leave for NEW BRITAIN, reported in GUADALCANAL in Oct 42.

(Adv LHQ Int Sum No.20).

W. E. Scott
Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Summary No.104.