

AWM52

Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/8 CORPS

2 Australian Corps
General Branch (2 Aust
Corps 'G' Branch)

April 1943



1/4/8-0101

Unit: General Staff HQ 2 Aust Corps

Date and Time: from 1st April to 31st April 43.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and References to Appendices, Diaries.
BARRINE	14 Apr	1640	GOC met C in C, Lady Blamey and Maj-Gen Burston at Mareeba LG and (accompanied them to Officers Club ATHERTON. Dined with C in C's (party at Officers Club	
	15 Apr		2 Aust Corps Engineers Summary No 11	142
"	"		2 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 2400 hours 13 Apr '43.	143
"	"	0945	GOC met C in C and accompanied him on an "inspection of 9 Div area" (C in C returned to lunch at HQ 2 Aust Corps.	
"	"	1430	GOC accompanied C in C on visit to Lake Barrine Rest Camp and thence to 2/2 AGH	
"	"	1630	GOC returned to HQ 2 Aust Corps.	
16/21 Apr			2 Aust Corps Intelligence Report No 16	144
16 Apr		0930	GOC met C in C at Atherton and accompanied him on inspection of 7 Aust Div area. Lunched at 7 Div and proceeded on inspection of 6 Aust Div area.	
"	"	1830	GOC returned to HQ 2 Aust Corps.	
"	"	1930	C in C and party were guests of GOC for dinner at HQ 2 Aust Corps	
17 Apr			2 Aust Corps Memo G2701 - Subject Defence Plan - Corps HQ	145
"	"		2 Aust Corps Memo G2707 - Subject Air Raid Warnings, Amendment No 1 to G2652 of 2 April 43.	146
"	"	0930	GOC saw C in C off at Mareeba	
"	"	1100	Returned to HQ 2 Aust Corps	
18 Apr			2 Aust Corps Adm Order No 1 - (Q1938)	147
"	"	1130	GOC held conference of Div Comds who remained for lunch	
21 Apr		1430	GOC visited Maj-Gen Stevens at HQ 6 Aust Div and remained ½ hour.	
		1730	GOC returned to HQ	
BARRINE	22/27 Apr		2 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No 17	148
22 Apr			2 Aust Corps Memo G2752 - Subject - SD Instruction No 43	149
			2 Aust Corps Memo G2712 - Subject Amendments to Standing Orders. Chapter 11. Sub-section 2	150
23 Apr			2 Aust Corps Memo G2769 - Subject - SD Instruction No 44	151
"	"	1200	Maj Gen Vasey called and remained for lunch.	
24 Apr		1900	GOC dined with Lady Blamey at Officers Club, Atherton	
25 Apr		1200	(Mr. Richardson and Mr. Coleman (Business Board) visited GOC and remained (1 hour.	
		1900	Mr. Richardson and Mr. Coleman dined with GOC	
26 Apr		0930	(GOC visited 7 Aust Div and witnessed demonstration on jungle assault course (given to Senior Offrs of 9 Div. Lunched with Maj-Gen Vasey.	

SR


10 MAY 1943

Army Form C2118
(Adapted)

Unit: General Staff HQ 2 Aust Corps.

Date and Time: from 1st April to 31st April 43.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and Reference to Appendices, Diaries.
KAIRI	30 Mar		Adv HQ 9 Aust Div opened at Kairi ref GORDONVALE one inch 456388	
BARRINE	30 Mar/2 Apr		(2 Aust Corps Intelligence Report No 12	App 131
	31 Mar		(2 Aust Corps Memo G2651 - Subject "2 Aust Corps Standing Orders for War" - Sec 13 para 3".	" 132
	1 Apr		(2 Aust Corps Engineer Summary No 10	" 133
SYDNEY	"	1130	Civic Reception to GOC by Lord Mayor of Sydney.	
BARRINE	2 Apr		2 Aust Corps Memo G2652 - Subject "Air Raid Warnings	" 134
SYDNEY	"	1100	GOC was present at march of 9 Div personnel through Sydney	
"	"	1700	GOC called on Governor General at Admiralty House	
BARRINE	3 Apr		2 Aust Corps Message 1/650 Ref Int Report No 12	" 135
"	"		2 Aust Corps Memo G2643 - Subject Amendments to 2 Aust Corps Standing Orders for War	" 136
SYDNEY	"	0900	GOC left Sydney for Melbourne with C in C	
MELBOURNE	"	1230	GOC arrived Melbourne	
BARRINE	3/6 Apr		2 Aust Corps Intelligence Report No 13	" 137
MELBOURNE	4 Apr	1400	(GOC left Melbourne for Dromand to attend demonstration of combined operations by US Marine Corps.	
"	5 Apr	1600	GOC returned to Melbourne.	
"	6 Apr	1145	GOC called on C in C	
"	"	1530	GOC left Melbourne for Canberra	
CANBERRA	"	1830	GOC called on Prime Minister at Parliament House. Dined with Prime Minister and Members of the War Cabinet.	
BARRINE	7/10 Apr		2 Aust Corps Intelligence Report No 14	" 138
CANBERRA	7 Apr	1030	GOC visited RMC Duntroon	
"	"	1730	GOC left CANBERRA for SYDNEY	
SYDNEY	"	1800	GOC arrived SYDNEY.	
"	9 Apr	0930	GOC left Sydney for Brisbane.	
BRISBANE	"	1230	GOC arrived Brisbane	
BARRINE	10 Apr		2 Aust Corps Memo G2681 - Subject SD Instruction No 42 - Duty Officers	" 139
BRISBANE	"	0500	GOC Left Brisbane for Barrine.	
BARRINE	"	2200	Arrived HQ 2 Aust Corps	
	11/15 Apr		2 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No 15	" 140
	11 Apr		(GOC accompanied Sir Leslie Wilson, Governor of Queensland on a visit to 2/2 AGH	
BARRINE	12 Apr	1415	GOC visited 9 Aust Div and saw Maj-Gen Wootten. Conferred with him, Brig Whitehead and Lt-Col Campbell.	
"	"	1800	GOC returned to HQ 2 Aust Corps	
	14 Apr		(2 Aust Corps Memo G2691 - Subject - 2 Aust Corps Training Directive No 1	

141


Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and References to Appendices, Diaries.
BARRINE	26 Apr	1630	GOC Returned to HQ	
	27 Apr		2 Aust Corps Locst ion Statement as at 2400 hours 25 Apr 43	152
	30 Apr		2 Aust Corps Memo G2846 Subjects - "SD Instruction No 45 Duty Officers and Clerks".	153

Alvin Korman left

GSO3. (C) 2 Aust Corps
6 MAY 43.

10/15/44

affd 153

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Subject: SD INSTRUCTION NO. 45.
Duty Officers and Clerks.

2 Aust Corps.

30 APR 43.

G.2846,

Distribution: List F.
plus all Duty Officers.
Battle Room folder.

Reference SD Instruction 41 of 31 MAR 43.

1.

Paragraph 1(a) will be amended as follows:-

Cancel times and substitute the following:-

1200 hours - 1400 hours on first day.

1700 hours on first day - 0830 hours on second day.

2.

Paragraph 2 will be amended as follows:-

Cancel all after "until further orders" and
substitute:-

The duty officer will apply the stamp shown below
to the top right hand corner of all incoming correspondence
and messages. He will fill in the detail of date, TOR and
number of copies and initial in the bottom right hand corner
of the stamp.

3.

The receiving registry will mark its appropriate letter
(i.e. G, A, Q or I) in the space at the bottom of the stamp.

H.Q. 2 AUST. CORPS	
Date _____	
T.O. _____	
Initial _____	

Handwritten signature
EGS.
2 Aust Corps.

A/H 152

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORDES.

S E C R E T.

Subject: Location Statement 2 Aust Corps
as at 2400 hrs 25 APR 43.

2 Aust Corps,
27 APR 43.
G 2819.

Copy No 46.

6 Aust Div	1 - 3	Int	28
7 Aust Div	4 - 6	LO	29
9 Aust Div	7 - 9	DA & QMG	30
PAE 2 Aust Corps	10	A	31
Sigs 2 Aust Corps	11	Q	32
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Coln	12	CE	33
Depot Cash Office	13	CSO	34
First Aust Army	14-15	Legal	35
QUEENSLAND L of C Area	16	S & T	36
17 (CAIRNS) L of C Sub-Area.	17	Medical	37
No 1 (M:) L of C Sub-Area	18	Ord	38
Movts CAIRNS	19-20	AEME	39
Movts TOWNSVILLE	21-22	Pro	40
2/2 Aust Gen Hosp	23	Postal	41
106 Aust Con Depot	24	Salvage	42
13 AGD	25	File	43-44
GOC	26	War Diary.	45-46.
BGS	27		

1. Herewith 2 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 2400 hours 25 APR 43.
2. The serial numbers shown in the margin are for convenience of reference only.
3. It is requested that any errors or omissions noted in this statement be immediately notified to this HQ by the formation or unit concerned.
4. All copies of previous 2 Aust Corps Location Statements will be destroyed.
5. Acknowledge.

H. Roda May
BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

Encl.

S E C R E T.

LOCATION STATEMENT 2 AUST CORPS
at at 2400 hrs 13 Apr 43.

Corps Troops.

Veh Sign: Cockatoo on Boomerang.

Map Legend: BF - BARTLE FRERE one inch to one mile.
D - DIMEULA " " " " "
G - GORDONVALE " " " " "
H - HERBERTON " " " " "
I - INNISFAIL " " " " "
MtG - Mt GARNET " " " " "
P - PALMERSTON " " " " "

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Moves projected and Remarks.
<u>HQ</u>					
A1	HQ 2 Aust Corps	107	BARRINE	G555344	
A2	2 Aust Corps Sec Int Corps	107	BARRINE	G555344	
A3	'H' Aust FB Sec	107	BARRINE	G555344	
A4	2 Aust Corps Def & Emp P1	120	BARRINE	G555344	
A5					
A6					
A7					
<u>RAA</u>					
A8					
A9					
A10					
A11					
<u>ENGRS</u>					
A12	HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps (AIF)	101	YUNGABURRA	BF19262	Under Comd
A13	19 Aust A Fd Coy	141	WONGABEL	H397217	1 Aust CE (wks)
A14	10 Aust Fd Coy	149	KAIRI	G487383	for works.
A15	60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy (AIF) & 315 Aust LAD	105	ATHERTON	H390262	
A16	2 Aust Corps Camflg Trg Unit	113	YUNGABURRA	BF519262	
A17	2/22 Aust Fd Pk Coy & 2/80 Aust LAD	59	ROCKY CREEK	D374370	
A18	2/23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy and 2/65 Aust LAD	76	ROCKY CREEK	D373370	Fd Stores sec WASE
A19	27 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	214	WONGABEL	H401391	C.
A20					
A21					
<u>SVY</u>					
A22	5 Aust Fd Svy Coy	111	INNISFAIL		Army Tps. under comd for
A23					
A24					
<u>SIGS</u>					
A25	Sigs 2 Aust Corps & 244 Aust LAD	115	BARRINE	G552340	
A26	2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec	185	BARRINE	G555344	
A27					
A28					
A29					
A30					

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Moves projected and Remarks.
A31.	S & T. HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tpt Cola 116		MALANDA	B524162	
A32	131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less A & C Tpt Pls) 925		MILLAA	P547969	LHQ Tps.
A33	A Tpt Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		RAVENSHOE	MtG405859	
A34	C Tpt Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		ATHERTON	H397269	
A35	132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less B Tpt Pl) 907		TOLGA	D405300	LHQ Tps.
A36	B Tpt Pl 132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		KAIRI	G503392	
A37	8 Aust MAC (AIF) (less C sec) 245		EAST FARRON	BF479228 G480326	
A38	1 Aust DID		KAIRI		
A39	5 Aust DID (less det) 260		WONDECLA Ry Siding	H298087	Army Tps under comd for adm.
A40	Det 5 Aust DID		MARTEBA	D334592	
A41	8 Aust DID (less det) 254		RAVENSHOE	MtG405859	
A42					
A43					
A44					
	<u>MEDICAL.</u>				
A45	2/3 Aust CCS		KAIRI	G476366	Army Tps
A46	6 Aust CCS (less 1t sec) 297		RAVENSHOE	MtG420837	Army Tps.
A47	1 Aust Mob Bact Lab 271		RAVENSHOE	MtG420837	LHQ Tps
A48	First Aust Army Sub Depot Dental Stores		ATHERTON		
	2/1 Aust Dental Unit: (Army Tps) 247				
A49	HQ (1) Sec		WONDECLA		att 2/2 Aust Inf
A50	HQ (2) Sec		TOOWOOMBA		
A51	A Sec		WONDECLA		att 3/22 Aust Inf
A52	B Sec		WONDECLA		att 2/3 Aust Inf
A53	C Sec		WONDECLA		
A54	F Sec		WONDECLA		att HQ 30 Aust Inf Bde.
	2/4 Aust Dental Unit: (Army Tps)				
A55	B Sec		YATEE		att 51 Aust Inf
A56	C Sec		CAIRNS		att 17 LofC S Area.
A57	D Sec		CAIRNS		-do-
	2/5 Aust Dental Unit: (Army Tps)				
A58	HQ (1) Sec		KAIRI		att 2/23 Aust Inf Bn.
A59	HQ (2) Sec		KAIRI		att 2/43 " " "
A60	A Sec		KAIRI		att 2/48 " " "
A61	B Sec		KAIRI		att 2/12 Aust Fd Regt
A62	C Sec		KAIRI		att 2/32 Aust Inf Bn.
A63	D Sec		KAIRI		att 2/7 Aust Fd Regt
A64	E Sec		KAIRI		att 2/15 Aust Inf Bn.
A65	F Sec		KAIRI		att 2/17 " " "

Serial No,	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Moves projected and Remarks.
	79 Aust Dental Unit (AIF) (Army Tps)	284			
A66	HQ (1) Sec		RAVENSHOE	att 2/27	Aust Inf Bn.
A67	HQ (2) Sec		RAVENSHOE	att 2/16	" " "
A68	B Sec		RAVENSHOE		
A69	D Sec		RAVENSHOE	att 2/27	" " "
A70	E Sec		RAVENSHOE	att 2/31	" " "
A71	F Sec		RAVENSHOE	att 2/25	" " "
	<u>ORD.</u>				
A72	16 Bde Sec 6 Aust Div Ord Fd Pk	83	MALANDA	G573173	
A73					
A74					
	<u>AEME.</u>				
A75	2/2 Aust Inf Tps Wkshop	155	MALANDA	G537173	
A76	16 Bde Sec 6 Aust Div Wkshop				Not yet in a...
A77	2/45 Aust LAD	88	WONDER	H321071	
A78	2/56 Aust LAD	66	RAVENSHOE	MtG40064	
A79	319 Aust LAD	107	BARRINE	G555344	
A80	2/90 Aust LAD		TOLGA		att 13 AOD.
	<u>PAY.</u>				
A81	Depot Cash Office		ATHERTON		Det RAVENSHOE
A82					
A83					
	<u>PRO</u>				
A84	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	128	BARRINE	G555341	
A85	2 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre		WASP CK	G533316	
A86					
A87					
	<u>POSTAL.</u>				
A88	One FPO Sec 2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	154	BARRINE	G555344	
A89					
	<u>MISC.</u>				
A90	Mobile Cinema No 11		RAVENSHOE		
A91	Norforce Concert Party		WONDER	H 362046	
A92					
A93					
A94					
A95					

6 AUST DIV.

DIVISIONAL SIGN: Kangaroo on Boomerang.

Ser- ial No.	Unit	Unit Veh No.	Location	Camp	Map Reference	Moves projected and Remarks.
B1	<u>HQ</u> HQ 6 Aust Div	84	WONDECLA	Div HQ AREA	H366043	
B2	<u>ENGRS</u> HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	81	"	Div Tps area	H325076	
B3						
B4						
B5						
B6	<u>SIGS</u> HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div	66	"	"	H358048	
E1	6 Aust Div Cipher Sec	68	"	"	H358048	
B8	<u>INF</u> HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	88	"	E Bde area	H322070	
B9	J Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div	88	"	"	H322070	
B10	det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"	"	H322070	
B11	2/1 Aust Inf Bn	50	"	Q	H320070	
B12	2/2 Aust Inf Bn	99	"	R	H315063	
B13	2/3 Aust Inf Bn	56	"	P	H325067	
B14	HQ 30 Aust Inf Bde	65	"	F Bde Area	H315078	
B15	30 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	65	"	"	H315078	
B16	3/22 Aust Inf Bn	82	"	L	H314077	
B17	59 Aust Inf Bn	91	"	M	H313077	
B18	49 Aust Inf Bn	77	"	N	H314079	
B19	<u>S & T</u> HQ Comd AASC 6 Aust Div	59	"	Div Tps area	H326076	
B20	2/1 Coy AASC	97	"	"	H326076	
B21						
B22						
B23	<u>MEDICAL</u> 2/1 Aust Fd Amb	57	"	Div Tps area	H325073	
E24	6 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	79	"	"	H322072	
B25	<u>ORD</u>					
B26						
B27						
B28	<u>ARME</u> 2/42 Aust LAD	66	"		H358049	Att Sigs 6 Aust Div.
B29	17 Aust Inf Bde Sec 6 Aust Div Wkshops	76	"		H345063	
B30						
B31						
B33						
B34	<u>MISC</u> 6 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	"	Div Tps area	H362046	
B35	6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	80	"	"	H367043	
B36	6 Aust Div Postal Unit (less dets)	55	"	"	H367043	
B37	det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"	Ry Sta	H298098	
B38	6 Aust Div Reception Camp	71	"	"	H298098	

7 AUST DIV.

Divisional Sign: Kookaburra on Boomerang.

Seq No.	Unit	Unit Veh No.	Location	Camp	Map Reference	Moves Projected & Remarks.
<u>HQ</u>						
C1	HQ 7 Aust Div	84	RAVENSHOE	Tully Falls Rd	P431813	
C2	"C" Aust FS Sec	84	"	"	P431813	
C3	7 Aust Div HQ Emp Pl	58	"	"	P431813	
C4						
<u>CAV</u>						
C5	7 Aust Cav Regt		"	'B' Camp Div Tps Area	MtG321813	
<u>ENGRS.</u>						
C6	HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	81	"	U Camp	MtG340808	
C7	Det 2/4 Aust Fd Coy	60	"	"	MtG340808	
C8	2/5 Aust Fd Coy	89	"	"	MtG340808	
C9	2/6 Aust Fd Coy	86	"	"	MtG340808	
C10	7 Aust Div Camflg Trg Unit	73	"	"	MtG340808	
<u>SIGS</u>						
C11	HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	66	"	Tully Falls Rd	P431817	
C12	C Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	94	"	'B' Camp Div Tps Area	MtG321813	Under comd 2/7 Aust Cav Regt
C13	7 Aust Div Cipher Sec	68	"	Tully Falls Rd	P431813	
<u>INF</u>						
C14	2/7 Aust Div Carr Coy	-	"	'B' Camp Div Tps Area	MtG321813	Under comd 2/7 Aust Cav Regt.
C15	HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	88	"	A Bde Area	MtG386836	
C16	J Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	88	"	"	MtG386836	
C17	2/9 Aust Inf Bn	50	"	A Camp	MtG390835	
C18	2/10 Aust Inf Bn	99	"	B Camp	MtG386832	
C19	2/12 Aust Inf Bn	56	"	C Camp	MtG388827	
C20	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde	96	"	B Bde Area	MtG382815	
C21	K Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	96	"	"	MtG382815	
C22	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde f & emp pl	96	"	"	MtG382815	
C23	2/14 Aust Inf Bn	63	"	G Camp	MtG375815	
C24	2/16 Aust Inf Bn	61	"	E Camp	MtG378812	
C25	2/27 Aust Inf Bn	93	"	F Camp	MtG374812	
C26	HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	65	"	C Bde Area	MtG367819	
C27	L Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	65	"	"	MtG367819	
C28	25 Aust Inf Bde Ref and emp pl	65	"	"	MtG367819	
C29	2/25 Aust Inf Bn	82	"	J Camp	MtG371821	
C30	2/31 Aust Inf Bn	91	"	H Camp	MtG374816	
C31	2/33 Aust Inf Bn	77	"	K Camp	MtG363818	
<u>Pmrs/</u>						
C32	2/2 Aust Pmr Bn		"			

Ser ial. No.	Unit	Unit Veh No.	Location	Camp	Map Reference	Moves projected & Remarks.
<u>S & T</u>						
C32	HQ Comd AASC 7 Aust Div.	59	RAVENSHOE	W Camp	MtG335814	
C33	2/4 Coy AASC	97	"	"	MtG335814	
C34	2/5 Coy AASC	64	"	"	MtG335814	
<u>MEDICAL</u>						
C35	2/4 Aust Fd Amb	57	"	A Camp Div Tps Area	MtG321813	
C36	2/5 Aust Fd Amb	52	"	"	MtG321813	
C37	2/6 Aust Fd Amb	70	"	"	MtG321813	
C38	7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	79	"	U Camp	MtG340808	Att RAE
<u>ORD</u>						
C39	18 Bde Sec 7 Aust Div Ord Fd Pk	83	"	W Camp	MtG335814	
C40						
C41						
C42						
<u>ATME</u>						
C43	2/47 Aust LAD	88	"	A Bde Area	MtG386836	Under Comd 1. Aust Inf Bde
C44	2/50 Aust LAD	94	"	B Camp Div Tps Area	MtG321815	Under Comd 2/7 Cav Regt moving to NSW under comd 21 Aust Inf Bde.
C45	2/59 Aust LAD	96	"	B Bde Area	MtG382815	
C46	18 Bde Sec 7 Aust Div Wkshops	76	"	W Camp	MtG335814	
C47						
C48						
C49						
<u>MISCELLANEOUS.</u>						
C50	7 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	"		MtG398862	MtG398862
C51	7 Aust Div Fd Cash Cash Office	80	"	Tully Falls Rd.	P431813	
C52	7 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"	"	P431813	
C53	7 Aust Div Salv Unit	78	"	"	MtG403850	Under comd ADOS 7 Aust Div
C54	7 Aust Div Sec 8 Reception Camp.	71	TUMOULIN		MtG368912	
C55	7 Aust Div Concert Party	90	RAVENSHOE	Tully Falls Rd	P431813	
C56	C Coy HQ Gd Bn	-	TUMOULIN		MtG368912	

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Camp	Map Ref	Movement projected & Remarks.
D45	<u>Pnrs.</u> 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn		KAIRI	Camp X	G 460360.	
D46	<u>S & T.</u> HQ AASC 9 Aust Div	59	KAIRI	Camp P	G 506392	
D47	10 Coy AASC	67	"		G 506392	
D48	11 Coy AASC	64	"		G 506392	
D49	12 Coy AASC	72	"		G 506392	
D50	<u>MEDICAL.</u> 2/3 Aust Fd Amb	57	"		R G 503383	
D51	2/8 Aust Fd Amb	52	"		Q G 502382	
D52	2/11 Aust Fd Amb	70	"		G 487382	
D53	2/4 Aust Fd Hyg Sec		"		G 487382	
D54	<u>ORD.</u> 9 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd Doen Unit	51	"	J Bde Area	G 486392	
D55						
D56						
D57	<u>AEME.</u> 2/4 Lt AA Wkshop Sec		"	H	G 471389 att 2/4 Lt AA Regt	
D58	2/58 Aust LAD	88	"	H Bde Area	G 480367 att 20 Aust Inf Bde	
D59	2/61	75	"	M	G 484394 att 2/12 Aust Fd Regt.	
D60	2/63	74	"	D	G 484373 att 2/7 Aust Fd Regt	
D61	2/64	54	"	T	G 469387 att 2/8 Aust Fd Regt	
D62	2/67	66	"		G 516400 Att Sigs 9 Aust Div.	
D63	2/71	62	"	U	G 476377 att 2/3 Tk A Regt.	
D64	2/72	81	"	V	G 480377 att HQ RAE 9 Aust Div.	
D65	2/76	86	"	J Bde Area	G 486382 att HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde	
D66	2/77		"	N	G 503376 att 2/2 Aust MG Bn	
D67	2/78	65	"	K Bde Area	G 487397 att HQ 26 Aust Inf Bde.	
D68	2/82		"	N	G 506379 att 9 Aust Div Ca: Regt.	
D69	<u>MISCELLANEOUS.</u> 9 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	"		G 516400	
D70	9 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	80	"		G 513397	
D71	9 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"		G 513397	
D72	9 Aust Div Concert Party	90	"		G 513397	
D73	9 Aust Div Reception Camp	71	"		G 477368	

9 AUST DIV.

Divisional Sign: Platypus on Boomerang.

Serial No,	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Camp	Map Ref	Moves projected and remarks.
<u>HQ.</u>						
D1	HQ 9 Aust Div	84	KAIRI		G 513397	
D2	9 Aust Div Int Sec	84	"		"	
D3	B Aust FS Sec	84	"		"	
D4	9 Aust Div Emp Pl	53	"		"	
D5	A Coy 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn (less 1,2 and 4 Pls)	84	"		"	
<u>CAY.</u>						
D6	9 Aust Div Cav Regt		"		G506379	
D7	C Sec Sigs		"		"	
<u>ARTY.</u>						
D8	HQ RAA 9 Aust Div	69	"		G513397	
D9	2/7 Aust Fd Regt	74	"	D	G484373	
D10	E Sec Sigs 9 Aust Div	74	"	D	G484373	
D11	2/8 Aust Fd Regt	54	"	T	G469387	
D12	F Sec Sigs 9 Aust Div	54	"	T	G469387	
D13	2/12 Aust Fd Regt	75	"	M	G484394	
D14	G Sec Sigs 9 Aust Div	75	"	M	G484394	
D15	2/3 Aust Tk A Regt	62	"	U	G476377	
D16	H Sec Sigs 9 Aust Div	62	"	U	G476377	
D17	2/4 Aust Lt AA Regt (less one bty)		"	H	G471389	
D18	2/4 Aust Lt AA Sig Sec		"	H	G471389	
<u>ENGREG.</u>						
D19	HQ RAE 9 Aust Div	81	"	V	G480377	
D20	2/3 Aust Fd Coy	60	"	V	G480377	
D21	2/7 Aust Fd Coy	89	"	V	G480377	
D22	2/13 Aust Fd Coy	86	"	V	G480377	
D23	2/24 Aust Fd Pk Coy	67	"	V	G480377	
<u>SIGS.</u>						
D24	Sigs 9 Aust Div (less sec)	66	"		G516400	
	9 Aust Dig Cipher Sec	68	"		G516400	
<u>INF.</u>						
D26	HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde	88	"	H Bde Area	G480367	
D27	J Sec Sigs 9 Aust Div	88	"	"	G 480367	
D28	1 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	88	"	"	G 480367	
D29	2/13 Aust Inf Bn	50	"	A	G 475569	
D30	2/15 Aust Inf Bn	99	"	B	G 472572	
D31	2/17 Aust Inf Bn	56	"	C	G 470376	
D32	HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde	96	"	J Bde Area	G486382	
D33	K Sec Sigs 9 Aust Div	96	"	"	G 486382	
D34	2 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	96	"	"	G 486382	
D35	2/28 Aust Inf Bn	63	"	E	G 485384	
D36	2/32 Aust Inf Bn	61	"	F	G 482387	
D37	2/45 Aust Inf Bn	93	"	G	G 479388	
D38	HQ 26 Aust Inf Bde	65	"	K Bde area	G 487397	
D39	L Sec Sigs 9 Aust Div	65	"	"	G 487397	
D40	4 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	65	"	"	G 487397	
D41	2/23 Aust Inf Bn	82	"	I	G 477387	
D42	2/24 Aust Inf Bn	91	"	K	G 481393	
D43	2/49 Aust Inf Bn	77	"	L	G 484392	
<u>MG.</u>						
D44	2/2 Aust MG Bn		"	N	G 503376	

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Camp	Map Ref	Movement projected & Remarks.
<u>Pnrs.</u>						
D45	2/3 Aust Pnr Bn		KAIRI	Camp X	G 460360.	
<u>S & T.</u>						
D46	HQ AASC 9 Aust Div	59	KAIRI	Camp P	G 506392	
D47	10 Coy AASC	67	"		G 506392	
D48	11 Coy AASC	64	"		G 506392	
D49	12 Coy AASC	72	"		G 506392	
<u>MEDICAL.</u>						
D50	2/3 Aust Fd Amb	57	"		R G 503383	
D51	2/8 Aust Fd Amb	52	"		Q G 502382	
D52	2/11 Aust Fd Amb	70	"		G 487382	
D53	2/4 Aust Fd Hyg Sec		"		G 487382	
<u>ORD.</u>						
D54	9 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd Docn Unit	51	"	J Bde Area	G 486382	
D55						
D56						
<u>AER.</u>						
D57	2/4 Lt AA Wkshop Sec		"	H	G 471369 att 2/4 Lt A. P	
D58	2/58 Aust LAD	88	"	H Bde Area	G 480567 att 20 Aust Inf	
D59	2/61	75	"	M	G 484394 att 2/12 Aust Fd Regt.	
D60	2/63	74	"	D	G 484373 att 2/7 Aust Fd Regt.	
D61	2/64	54	"	T	G 489387 att 2/8 Aust Fd Regt.	
D62	2/67	66	"		G 516400 Att Sigs 9 Aust Div.	
D63	2/71	62	"	U	G 476377 att 2/3 Tk A Regt.	
D64	2/72	81	"	T	G 480377 att HQ RAE 9 Aust Div.	
D65	2/76	86	"	J Bde Area	G 486382 att HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde	
D66	2/77		"	N	G 503376 att 2/2 Aust MG Bn	
D67	2/78	65	"	K Bde Area	G 487397 att HQ 26 Aust Inf Bde.	
D68	2/8		"	N	G 506379 att 9 Aust Div Cav Regt.	
<u>MISCELLANEOUS.</u>						
D69	9 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	"		G 516400	
D70	9 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	80	"		G 513397	
D71	9 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"		G 513397	
D72	9 Aust Div Concert Party	90	"		G 513397	
D73	9 Aust Div Reception Camp	71			G 477368	

w/10 Aff 157

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Subject: SD Instruction No. ⁴⁴43.

2 Aust Corps.
23 APR 43.
G.2769.

Distribution: List F.

1. Incoming messages and correspondence will normally be passed to the Registry corresponding to that from which they originated, with the following exceptions:
 - (a) Messages and correspondence dealing with releases of stores and equipment (as distinct from those dealing specifically with policy of releases) will be passed to Q Registry. Where stores are released for which NO policy has been issued, Q will refer the release to SD.
 - (b) Messages and correspondence dealing purely with the "mechanics" of a non-operational move will be passed to Q (for example a message referring to other SD correspondence and requesting only details of train loads).
2. In clarification it is explained that:-
 - (a) G receives and is responsible for issuing, orders for, or the warning order for, the move of a unit or portion of a unit either within the Corps area or outside the area.
 - (b) The movement of personnel only, is a Q matter. In the case of the movement of large numbers of personnel, Q will keep G informed.
3. On the receipt of correspondence, of the kind mentioned in paragraph 2 (a), G Registry will pass immediately a copy to Q. SD will take the following action:
 - (a) Pass copies to other branches and services as may be required.
 - (b) See that the message warning the formation or unit and asking for information vide GRO G104/42 (normally prepared by Q) is despatched promptly as an SD message.
4. The closest liaison between Staff Duties and Q Movements in particular, is essential in handling all movements to avoid an unnecessary number of signals, originated by different branches being despatched to the formations concerned.

Attention is directed to G2712 of 22 Apr "amendment to Standing Orders 2, sub-section 2."
5. G2560 of 21 Mar 43, "amendment to SD Instruction 39" is cancelled.

W. L. Cowson May
BGS.
2 Aust Corps.

150

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Subject: Amendments to Standing Orders
Chapter II Sub-section 2.

2 Aust Corps,
22 APR 43.
G 2712.

Distribution:

List F,
Plus Battle Room folder.

INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE.

Cancel sub-para 2 (a) and substitute:-

2. (a) All incoming messages and correspondence will be delivered to the Reception Office, which will open all except that marked "NODECO" "MOST SECRET" and "OFFICER ONLY". The Reception Office will decide the branch for action and deliver as follows:-

	<u>Appropriate Registry.</u>	<u>Duty Officer.</u>
Correspondence	0815-2200 hrs	2200 - 0815 hrs
Messages	0815-1200 hrs	1700 - 0815 hrs
	1400-1700 hrs	1200 - 1400 hrs

(b) Correspondence and messages marked "NODECO" "MOST SECRET" and "OFFICER ONLY" and addressed to a specific addressee will be delivered immediately by Reception Office to the addressee. If the addressee or his representative is not available, such matter will be delivered to the Duty Officer, who will open it and take the necessary action.

(c) Correspondence and messages marked "NODECO" "MOST SECRET" and "OFFICER ONLY" addressed 2 Aust Corps (but not a specific addressee) will be passed immediately to G or to Duty Officer when on duty. Such correspondence and messages forwarded to G will be opened by G2(0) G2 (SD) or G3 (0) in that order, or when these Officers are not on duty by the Duty Officer.

(d) Reception Office will obtain a receipt for all correspondence and messages marked "SECRET" "MOST SECRET" "OFFICER ONLY" or "NODECO".

(e) Reception Office will log all incoming messages and "MOST SECRET" and "OFFICER ONLY" correspondence.

3. Cancel para 2 (g) and re-letter subparagraphs as follows:-

Existing sub-para	()	becomes	(f)
"	"	(c)	"
"	"	(d)	"
"	"	(e)	"
"	"	(f)	"
"	"	(h)	"
"	"	(i)	"

Robert Cowen
BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

W/D
Apr 14/43

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Subject: SD Instruction No. 43.

HQ 2 Aust Corps.
2 APR 43.

G.2752.

Distribution: List 'F'.

1. Further to SD Instruction No. 39 para 11 (a) (i) "Use of Mechanical Transport" it is advised that commencing 21 April 43 an additional Ferry Car Service will run as set out hereunder:-

To HQ 9 Aust Div:

Departs HQ 2 Aust Corps.

0900 hours

1400 hours daily.

Departs HQ 9 Aust Div on return journey.

1200 hours

1700 hours daily.

2. Conditions for the use of this Ferry Car will be similar to those set out in the abovementioned SD Instruction for Ferry Cars to 6 and 7 Aust Divs.

[Signature]
EGS:
2 Aust Corps.

SECRET
Copy 95

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE REPORT 17

Compiled from information received from 22 Apr to 1200 hrs 27 Apr 43

- (A) Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols and
- (B) A receipt is NOT required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These reports will NOT be issued regularly.
- (C) All dates and times are Eastern Australian Standard Time.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS

For index to place names see PART 3 (c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) NE AUSTRALIA:

There have been a number of sightings of possible submarines reported along the coast during the past few weeks and on 24 Apr an Allied merchant vessel was sunk thirty five miles NE of SANDY CAPE. It is reported that there were eleven survivors and twenty four were missing.

On 26 Apr another Allied vessel was torpedoed twenty miles SE of CAPE BYRON, but NO details of this action are available.

(b) NEW GUINEA:

MOROBE. Our patrols have been active in this area and on 14 Apr had moved to PALAMA twenty four miles North of MOROBE without encountering any enemy. However it is NOT stated that the coastal area from MOROBE to PALAMA was searched.

Single enemy aircraft dropped a few bombs on 19, 20 and 23 Apr but NO damage or casualties have been reported.

MUBO. Active patrolling continues in this area and on 20 Apr enemy on the slopes of VICKER'S RIDGE was machine gunned, causing two casualties. On 21 Apr an enemy patrol was encountered a mile SW of DUALI and two enemy were killed. On the same day enemy sentries were encountered in the KITCHEN CREEK area. The enemy were also reported to be patrolling West of the KOMIATUM track. It is stated that as a result of our raid in this area on night 15/16 Apr mentioned in Report 16, twenty enemy were killed.

On 22 Apr heavy bombing and strafing attacks by four B25's and four A20's were made over DUALI and LABABIA Island, and also the South shore of MASSAU BAY. Many huts in the villages were blasted and considerable damage was done.

On 24 Apr four A20's bombed and strafed GREEN HILLS which is approximately 1½ miles NE of MUBO. This was followed by further strafing and bombing the next day. Our ground forces followed up this preparation with an encircling movement on 26 Apr. As a result two enemy were killed and it was found that the Japs were well entrenched in a position 200 yards deep, heavily supported by MMG's.

SALAMAUA. An ex-Police boy, escaped from the Japs, described an extensive defence system and a munition dump at SALAMAUA. It was also reported that the enemy was suffering severely from illness and lack of food. This bears out reports of the critical supply problems which face the enemy in the whole of this area.

On 23 Apr our aircraft thoroughly strafed enemy positions in the SALAMAUA area.

LAE. One B24 bombed the runway and environs on 19 Apr and on 24 Apr buildings and dispersal areas were bombed causing considerable fires.

S E C R E T

A submarine reported in LAE Harbour on 23 Apr may be yet another indication of the method adopted to help meet the acute supply position. Two small boats of 50 and 80 feet respectively, were sighted at HOPOI on 23 Apr.

FINSCHHAFEN. One B24 was used in each of a number of bombing runs made on 23 and 25 Apr. Buildings were wrecked and fires started in the town area and amongst shore installations.

SAIBOR. Bombing and strafing attacks were made against this and surrounding villages every day from 20 to 25 Apr inclusive. Some damage and fires were reported but the most important results would probably be the demoralizing effect on natives in the area, whom it is suggested the Japanese may require urgently for carrying and other labour. Many will probably have "gone bush".

LADANG. The importance of LADANG as a supply staging point has been stressed on a number of occasions and it is now established that there is a coastal barge service from WEWAK with the probability that this will be extended towards LAE. As a counter to this procedure our bombing and strafing of the coastal route is being maintained and on 25 Apr heavy black smoke rose from the South side of the strip after bombing and strafing attacks.

WEWAK. In Report 16 it was mentioned that heavy shipping traffic had used WEWAK Harbour in spite of Allied air attacks, and there is little doubt that considerable supplies were put ashore. Whether troops were included is NOT known but the ships that made port were quite sufficient to transport some thousands of fighting men and their equipment if reinforcement of the area was the intention, and there are many indications that such is the enemy's plan.

During the period under review the Japanese have maintained the activity that has been apparent in this area for some time, and it seems that they regard the supply development and reinforcement of WEWAK as a matter of sufficient urgency to warrant considerable risk in face of our sustained air offensive.

On 20 Apr two B24s bombed shipping in the Harbour, causing tremendous explosions in a 4,000-ton tanker which sank in flames. A small ship was also hit and the town area was bombed. Later the same day four B17s bombed the runways and dispersal areas at WEWAK and BORNI.

On 24 Apr a B24 on reconnaissance shot down five of 10 or 12 intercepting aircraft. On the same day a convoy consisting of two destroyers, three probable transports and two cargo vessels was reported about 30 miles NNW of WEWAK on a course WNW. An hour and a half later there was a report of a similar convoy, with the addition of four destroyers, about 180 miles NNW of WEWAK on a course WNW. There is NO further information regarding these sightings, which may be the same with errors as to location. It is quite likely that reinforcement and supplies for which preparation has been made in NW NEW GUINEA are being moved on a large scale.

As well as the many ships arriving at WEWAK the speed with which shore installations and the aerodrome have been constructed and the urgency with which land communications have been extended, it is quite likely that the enemy is also transporting supplies and troops by air. On 9 Apr there was a report of two and possibly three transport aircraft sighted on the dispersal area.

It was reported earlier (see Report 15) that the difficult problem of supply of forward areas was being solved by the provision of a coastal road between WEWAK and LADANG. The report of a pontoon bridge having been constructed over the SEPIK River one mile from the mouth lent support to this. It was reported on 20 Apr that there was neither a bridge over the RIMU River for twenty five miles inland from the mouth nor over the SEPIK River for thirty seven miles inland.

There was also NO indication of a road over the swampy country between the river mouths; therefore it appears that if the bridging referred to was over attempted, it has now been abandoned at least temporarily, and supplies are still being transported by barge to the terminus of the MADANG-BOGIA Road at WATAM. Heavy track activity on KAIRIRU Island and barge activity to WEWAK and along the coast have been reported. It is probable that barges loaded at either WEWAK or KAIRIRU Island move direct to the mouth of the RAMU River or further East to HAINSA Bay for unloading.

Signs of activity have developed in the WEWAK hinterland. The enemy has sent patrols to YAMIL, has occupied MAPRIK, and a river patrol was reliably reported as having moved up the SEPIK River to KAHINDIBIT, later returning to TIMBUNKE. Reliable reports also state that patrols are soon expected at MAURI. These patrols are probably connected with the securing of the Japanese flank in this area along most of which the SEPIK River offers a natural defence.

(c) BIG LARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

NEW BRITAIN. The continued use of RABAU on a large scale as a supply base is illustrated by the shipping sightings reported on 22 Apr as follows:-

1 light cruiser	3 submarine chasers
2 destroyers	1 minesweeper
6 submarines	1 8,500-ton hospital ship
1 submarine tender	2 tankers
2 destroyer tenders	27 merchant vessels (104,500 tons)

Allied air activity in NEW BRITAIN has been confined to small scale bombing and strafing attacks at UBILI, GASMATA and CAPE GLOUCESTER against buildings and landing fields.

NEW IRELAND. There have been sufficient sightings in and around KAVIENG during the period under review to indicate the continued use by the enemy of this harbour for large scale supply. On 23 Apr a vessel of 8/10,000 tons was attacked by one B24 which scored direct hits followed by a huge column of smoke. The vessel was left sinking fifty miles SE of KAVIENG.

(d) SOLOMON ISLANDS:

Reports from this area refer to considerable enemy shipping movements, particularly around the BUIN-FAISI area and to a renewal of strong Allied air offensives at a number of points. On 21 Apr 300 incendiaries were dropped on POPORANG in BOUGAINVILLE, causing many fires, and on the same day heavy bombing and strafing damaged five store buildings at NAVEI in CHOISEUL. On 22 Apr ELKATA Bay in YSABEL Island was bombed, and large fires were started at MUIDA and VILA in the NEW GEORGIA group. On 24 Apr 36,000 lbs of bombs were dropped on MUIDA, causing large fires and explosions.

(e) ELLICE ISLANDS:

On 22 Apr five enemy aircraft bombed FUNAFUTI and later the same day another six enemy aircraft came over, destroying two grounded B24's and damaging the W/T Station.

(f) NEW HEBRIDES:

On 24 Apr enemy aircraft bombed the huts North of VILA landing strip. NO details have come to hand.

(c) SEI AREA:

DUTCH NEW GUINEA. Our air offensive in this area during the period under review has been principally directed against TIMOEKA, where a number of light attacks have been made against the runway and surrounding area. KAIMANA was attacked on 20 Apr by three B24's and fires were started.

Enemy interest which has been apparent for some time in the MERAUKE area continues. There were several reports between 15 and 19 Apr of an aircraft flying over TANAMEREA, probably on photographic reconnaissance. On 25 Apr reconnaissance at 22,000 feet was carried out over MERAUKE.

Developmental work recently completed and being still further developed by the Japanese in the NW Sector is making a profound impression on the strategical situation in this area. His renewed interest in MERAUKE may be significant.

AROE ISLANDS. Light Allied bombing attacks have been carried out every few days in this area for some time past, and during the period under review attacks were made, usually by one Hudson on 20, 22, 23, 24 and 25 Apr. On 20 Apr besides one Hudson bombing DOBO, three B24's bombed and strafed KENARI Island and three Beaufighters strafed the floatplane anchorage, a fuel dump, police barracks, and huts at DOBO.

TANILBAR ISLANDS. On 21 and 22 Apr one Hudson bombed WAILTOETOE, a village twenty four miles NW of SAULAKI.

BABAR ISLAND. On 14 Apr six B24's attacked a light cruiser or heavy destroyer twenty five miles NNW of BABAR and photographs revealed a torpedoed destroyer of approximately 550 tons exploding on the same day. This is probably the same vessel.

Three Hudsons bombed three luggers off SERMITA Island, damaging one and sinking another.

TIMOR. Three B25's bombed LAGA on 21 Apr. Black smoke rose from a possible fuel dump and casualties were probably caused to the town.

On 24 Apr seven B25's bombed DILLI dome and started fires in a possible fuel dump.

CELEBES. A heavy raid was conducted by nine B24's against KENDARI on 24 Apr. The majority of the bombs fell in the workshop area, amongst buildings, and many aircraft on the aerodrome. Widespread fires were caused and it is considered that the workshops were destroyed besides a number of aircraft burnt on the ground. At least five of fifteen or twenty intercepting fighters ^{were} shot down.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops Revsits 264-269, AEF Weekly Int Review 57, FIA Int Sum 50, AEF Int Sum 95 and COIC Townsville.)

PART 2 : SUMMARY

- (1) Attached as Appendix "B" is Japanese Land Order of Battle.

Attached as Appendix "B1" is Japanese Order of Battle in SWPA and SOLOMONS

Attached as Appendix "C" Further Japanese Aircraft Operational SWPA

Attached as Appendix "D" Photographic Reproduction of Japanese 20 mm Ammunition - HE and AP.

This ammunition is used in the 20 mm Dual Purpose AA, T&A weapon.

PART 3 : TOPOGRAPHICAL(a) Other Areas:

Attached as Appendix "A" Schedule of Main Enemy Aerodromes in the SWPA as at 17 Apr 43.

- (b) Index to further place names appearing in Part 1 of this Report.

BURUE, NG	4°00'S 143°01'E
CAPE BYRON, QLD	28°38'S 153°38'E
CAPE GLOUCESTER, NB	5°28'S 148°25'E
DILLI, TIMOR	8°35'S 125°34'E
DOBO, AROE ISLAND	5°46'S 134°13'E
FAISI, SHORTLANDS	7°05'S 155°54'E
FUNAFUTI ISLAND, ELLICE IS.	8°30'S 179°05'E
GASMATA, NB	6°17'S 150°20'E
GREEN HILLS, NG	7°14'S 147°00'E
HANSA BAY, NG	4°12'S 144°52'E
HOPOL, NG	6°45'S 147°18'E
KAVIENG, NEW IRELAND	2°35'S 150°50'E
KAMINDIBIT, NG	4°18'S 143°18'E
KENARI ISLAND, AROE ISLAND	5°57'S 134°09'E
KENDARI, CELEBES	3°57'S 122°36'E
KIUP, NG	3°52'S 141°31'E
KAIRIRU ISLAND, NG	3°20'S 143°34'E
KOLOBANGARA ISLAND, N. GEORGIA	8°00'S 157°05'E
KALANA, DNG	3°40'S 133°45'E
KITCHEN CREEK, NG	7°13'S 147°00'E
LAGA, TIMOR	8°29'S 126°37'E
MAPRIK, NG	3°58'S 143°04'E
MERAUKE, DNG	8°29'S 140°23'E
MARUI (MAURI)?, NG	4°04'S 143°01'E
MOROE, NG	7°49'S 147°11'E
MUNDA, N. GEORGIA	8°20'S 157°15'E
NAVEL?, NW CHOISEUL	
OEDJIR ISLAND, AROE IS.	5°37'S 134°17'E
POPORANG, SHORTLANDS	7°07'S 155°53'E
PALAWA, NG	7°31'S 147°19'E
RAMU RIVER, NG	4°01'S 144°41'E
REKATA BAY, SANTA YSABEL	7°36'S 158°43'E
SAUELAKI, TANIMBAR	8°00'S 151°15'E
SEPIK RIVER, NG	3°51'S 144°33'E
SANDY CAPE, QLD	24°42'S 153°16'E
SERKATA ISLAND, BABAR IS	8°12'S 128°55'E
TIBUNKE, NG	4°12'S 143°31'E
TANA-MERAH, DNG	6°05'S 140°19'E
UBILI, NB	4°59'S 151°19'E
VILA, N. GEORGIA	8°08'S 157°09'E
VILA, NEW HEBRIDES	17°44'S 168°19'E
WAILOETOE, TANIMBAR	7°39'S 131°03'E
WATAM, NG	3°54'S 144°35'E
YAMIL, NG	3°38'S 143°10'E

PART 5 : SECURITY

INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR:

Experience shows that the following lessons which have been learnt during the past 3½ years should be impressed on ALL troops:-

- (a) You can only be asked to give your NAME, RANK and NUMBER. EVERY other question should be answered ONLY by the sentence -

"I AM AFRAID I CANNOT ANSWER THAT QUESTION".

- (b) If you behave in this manner during interrogation, the interrogator is powerless.

- (c) Do NOT indulge in any conversation with the interrogator on ANY SUBJECT WHATSOEVER. The most seemingly harmless conversation, e.g. about the prisoner's family, may give just the one piece of information for which the enemy has been searching for weeks. A skilled interrogator can extract information from such conversations without the prisoner ever realising the fact. Above all be on your guard against the apparently "nice chap" who just drops in for a chat. He is your enemy, his job is to extract information; and if he wasn't extremely clever at his job he wouldn't be doing it.

S E C R E T

- (d) NEVER, NEVER try to be clever and make false statements to the interrogator. You will always be found out, and it gives the interrogator just the pretext he wants to take disciplinary action against you.
- (e) Do NOT allow yourself to be bluffed by an intelligence officer who has one or two odd bits of information which you did NOT think it possible he could possess. He may know a lot, but there is a lot he does NOT know and wants to find out. Otherwise he would NOT be interrogating you.
- (f) Always conduct yourself correctly, be punctilious about saluting officers, addressing senior officers as "Sir", etc., however much you may dislike doing so. Impoliteness or indiscipline on your part is just what the enemy is looking for, as it gives him an excuse to treat you badly or use violent measures against you. In refusing to answer questions, be FIRM but POLITE. Remember that you cannot be ordered to answer any questions except your NAME, RANK and NUMBER.
- (g) It is possible that the enemy uses such methods as dressing their own men up as British prisoners, placing microphones in prisoner's room or tent, etc. The lesson to be learnt here is NEVER to discuss anything military with ANY other prisoner, whether you know him or not.

In conclusion, it should be impressed on every soldier that, should he be taken prisoner, the WAR IS NOT OVER. He is still a soldier, the enemy is still his enemy; during interrogation he is fighting the enemy NO less than on the field of battle; with the only difference that cowardice or foolishness during the battle could hardly ever have such disastrous consequences to the lives of his comrades, and possibly to the whole course of the war, as can cowardice or foolishness under interrogation.

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review 37)

Am Rogers
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Aust Div	1-14	DDMS	81
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SCHEDULE OF MAIN ENEMY AERODROMES
IN THE SWPA AS AT 17 APR 43

N o t e : The total estimated capacity may be exceeded for special operational tasks, e.g. KAHILI 7 & 8 Apr. The estimate is based upon capacity of dispersal areas and blast bays.

AERODROME	Length in Feet	Capacity F	B	A/C Seen F	B	R e m a r k s
<u>NEW GUINEA</u>						
ALAKISH PT 5°05'S 145°48'E	4000	20	20			Dispersal lane completed, serviceable for fighters
BUT 3°23'S 143°12'E	5200	10	46	10	2	Being rapidly developed.
BORAM 3°34'S 143°40'E	5000	20	68	1(?)		Field probably serviceable
DAGUA 3°25'S 143°20'E	Cleared area of upwards of 1 mile. The runway appears to have been graded.					
FINSCHHAFFEN 6°31'S 147°49'E	2000	Has never been developed or used by the enemy.				
LAKE 6°45'S 147°00'E	4000	73	15	50	12	Well developed perimeter defences against ground and air attacks.
MADANG 5°12'S 145°48'E	3300	44	6	13	1	Continuous development
MALAHANG 6°44'S 147°01'E	3500	50	-	4	-	Being cleared & extended.
NUBIA 4°12'S 144°54'E	3000	14	-	-	-	In initial stages of develop- ment (9 Apr)
PRITTIPTZ Pt 2°55'S 141°50'E	11 Apr - aircraft reported serviceable landing strip					
SALAMAU 7°05'S 147°02'E	3300	25	10	2	1	Slight use. Little develop- ment.
WEWAK 3°37'S 143°39'E	4200	-	165	37	4	Rapidly being developed into a major base.
<u>NEW BRITAIN</u>						
ARAWA 6°10'S 149°08'E	1800	Has never been developed or used by the enemy.				
CAPE GLOUCESTER 5°27'S 148°25'E	3900	65	25	-	-	Serviceable. Being developed.
GASMATA 6°17'S 150°20'E	3200	40	10	3	4	Aerodrome being developed.
LAKUNAI 4°14'S 152°13'E	4700	115	15	108	9	Dispersal areas being extended and improved.
MAPOPO 4°20'S 152°20'E	4000	-	226	10	53	Continuous development taking place.
VUNAKANAU 4°19'S 152°09'E	5100	-	125	12	41	Dispersal area being extended.
<u>ADMIRALTY IS</u>						
LORENGAU 2°02'S 147°16'E	3500	60	-	1(?)	-	Considered serviceable, 6 Apr. Dispersal rapidly increasing.
<u>NEW IRELAND</u>						
KAVIENG 2°35'S 150°50'E	4600	100	99	51	37	Major rear base. Still ra being developed.
PANAPAI 2°37'S 150°50'E	3800	22	19	-	-	Still being developed.
NAMATANAI 7°40'S 152°28'E	2700	Has never been developed or used by the enemy.				

S E C R E T

AERODROME	Length in Feet	Capacity		A/C Seem		
		F	B	F	B	
<u>SOLOMONS</u>						
BALLAL 6°59'S 155°53'E	4300	60	52	95	7	Continuous development, especially in dispersal.
BUKA PASSAGE 5°25'S 154°40'E	4500	41	48	49	13	Dispersal areas still being developed
KAHILI 6°50'S 155°45'E	4550	59	22	114	20	Fighter movements could be used for L/B
KIETA 6°12'S 155°38'E	3000	Has never been developed or used by the enemy.				
MUNDA 3°20'S 157°15'E	3850	65	19	40	8	NO change except for more craters.
VILA 8°36'S 157°10'E	3500	-	33	1	-	Still being developed.
<u>DUTCH NEW GUINEA</u>						
SABO 2°52'S 153°25'E	3900	7	-	19	3	Continuous development
HOLLANDIA 2°10'S 140°44'E	3900	New strip reported 26 Feb - being developed and is near serviceable.				
TIKOR 4°45'S 136°32'E	4500	-	-	1	-	Development continuing, considered serviceable.
UEARON 3°39'S 133°41'E	12 Apr	clearing well advanced - levelling NOT bc				
WAKDE IS. 1°55'S 159°25'E	4200	New strip reported 26 Feb - being developed				
<u>N.E.I.</u>						
BIMA 8°27'S 118°45'E	2100	Civil landing ground. Becomes waterlogged in wet season.				
DILLI 8°38'S 125°26'E	3900	-	-	3	-	Greatly extended & surfaced.
FUILOR 3°20'S 127°10'E	1400 & 1300	2	-	1	-	NOT much used.
KENDARI IS. 3°57'S 122°36'E	4850	-	-	77	33	Principal feeder base
LAHA 3°42'S 128°06'E	3200	-	-	10	28	Second runway built.
LANGGOT 5°44'S 132°43'E	4500	20 Mar - one strip cleared for 300 ft with 2 strips graded roundabout - development rapid.				
HANDAI (HUGASSAR Is) 5°04'S 119°32'E	2640	-	-	-	1	Reported Ept Sqn base
HAMELA 3°16'S 127°35'E	3900	-	-	-	-	Unserviceable
PERFOEL 10°10'S 125°35'E	4500	27	10	30	16	Principal forward base N.E.I.
SORABAJA & TANDJOENG - PERAK 7°13'S 112°44'E	4900 & 4540	-	-	5	14	Considerable development. NO blast bays or dispersal areas.
WAINGAPOE 9°40'S 120°16'E	3960	-	-	-	5	-

(Collated from information contained in AAF Summaries to No 95.)

JAPANESE ARMY

DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES BY DIVISIONS

(On information to 9 Apr 43) (Excluding Depot Divs)

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>IDENTIFICATIONS</u>	<u>DIVS</u>
JAPAN	Six u/1	Six
MANCHOUKUO	1, 10, 11, 14, 23, 24, 25 28, 31? 52? 53? 54? 71 and twelve u/1	Twenty-five
KOREA	19	One
SAGHALIEN	7	One
NORTH CHINA	17, 26, 37, 42, 110	Five
CENTRAL CHINA	3? 15, 22, 29, 34, 39, 40, 44, 58, 50, 70, 116	Twelve
SOUTH CHINA	104	One
FORMOSA	50	One
F.I.C.	21	One
BURMA-YUNNAN	18, 33, 55, 56, one u/1	Five
THAILAND	Two u/i, 45	Three
MALAYA-SUMATRA	Guards	One
PHILIPPINES	Two u/1	Two
JAVA	8 (Part), 13 (Part), 57, 9	Equiv three
TIMOR-BALI	48 Elements SOEIBA-TANIMBAR AROE Is., AMBON	One
JAP MANDATES	4?	One
NEW BRITAIN	6 (Part), 8 (Part), 41 (one Regt) 65 Bde (Div)	Equiv three
SOLOMONS	6 (Part), 8 (Part), 38 (Part), 51 (66 Regt)	Equiv two
NEW GUINEA	20 (two Regts), 41 (two Regts), 51 (elements)	Equiv two
AMBON-KEI IS DUTCH NEW GUINEA	5	One
Moving	27, 32, 35, 36, 20 (one Regt), 30, 12? 13? 69, 59	nine + one Regt
Unlocated	15, 45	Two
Non-effective	2, 38	Two

(HQ First Aust Army Weekly Int Sum 49)

S E C R E T

ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH IN SWPA AND SOLOMONS
BASED ON INFORMATION TO 14 APR 43

AREA	LOCATION	IDENTIFIED UNITS	TROOPS	REMARKS
<u>SOLOMON IS</u>		Part 6,8,38 Divs 66 Regt (51 Div) 18 Regt (3 Div) HAIZURU 4,6 SNLFs YOKOSUKA 5 SNLF (Remnants) SASEBO 6 SNLF		3 DIV. This Div is now considered to be a three Regt Div with 1 Regt detached & in the SWPA. The Div itself is thought to be in Central CHINA.
	RAILALAE IS 6°59'S 155°53'E		1500	
	BUIN KAHILI 6°50'S 155°45'E		14000	
	BUKA 5°25'S 154°40'E		4/5000	
	FAISI 7°05'S 155°54'E		3800	
	KIETA 6°12'S 155°38'E		200	
	KOLOMANTARA 8°00'S 157°05'E		10000	
			(Incl 5000 labourers)	
	MUNDA 8°20'S 157°15'E		5000	
	BEKATA BAY 7°36'S 158°43'E		3000	
	NDOVA 8°53'S 157°20'E		100	
	VELLA LAVELLA 7°44'S 156°40'E		150	
	WICKHAM 8°45'S 158°04'E		350	
TOTAL :			42100 / 43100	

BISMARCK AREA

		Part MORII Div Part 6,8 Divs 65 Bde (Div) 21 IAB (elements) One Regt 41 Div 12 Pnr Unit 78 SBF 781,82 GDF 745 E.O.		
	RAVE 6°10'S 149°08'E		100	
	CAPE			
	GLOUCESTER 5°27'S 148°25'E		500	
	GASMATA 6°17'S 150°20'E		500	
	JACQUINOT BAY 5°35'S 151°33'E		100	
	KAVIENG 2°35'S 150°50'E		6000	
	RABAUL 4°14'S 152°13'E		28000/30000	
	TALASEA 5°20'S 150°02'E		300	
	UBILI 4°59'S 151°19'E		100	
TOTAL :			35600/37600	

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

		18 Army 51 Div (elements) Three Regts (20 Div) Two Regts (41 Div) 21 IAB (elements) Army Air Unit HAIZURU 2 SNLF SASEBO 5 SNLF (Part)		
	AITAPE 3°10'S 142°22'E		200	
	BOGIA 4°06'S 144°59'E		1500/1600	
	ELNSA BAY 4°12'S 144°52'E			
	BUT 3°23'S 143°12'E		300	
	FINSCHHAFEN 6°31'S 147°49'E		600/700	

S E C R E T

AREA	LOCATION	IDENTIFIED UNITS	TROOPS	REMARKS
<u>BRITISH NEW GUINEA (C. ntd)</u>				
KITCHEN CREEK	7°13'S 147°00'E		600/700	
KUI	7°24'S 147°10'E		200	
LAE	6°45'S 147°00'E			
SALAMUA	7°05'S 147°02'E		5200/5700	
MUBO	7°14'S 147°00'E			
MLADANG	5°12'S 145°48'E		6000/8000	
SAIDOR	5°38'S 146°29'E		500	
VANIMO	2°41'S 141°18'E		500	
WEWAK	3°37'S 143°39'E		12000	
			<u>TOTAL : 27600/30400</u>	
<u>DUTCH NEW GUINEA</u>				
		5 Div (Part)		
BABO	2°32'S 133°25'E		1500/2000	
HOLLANDIA	2°31'S 140°44'E		500	
KAIMANA	3°40'S 133°45'E		4000	
KAUKENAU	4°42'S 136°25'E		1000	
KOKAS	2°43'S 132°24'E		200	
MANOKWARI	0°55'S 134°04'E		800/1000	
			<u>TOTAL : 8000/8700</u>	
<u>KEI IS.</u>				
		5 Div (Part)		
TOEAL	5°37'S 132°44'E		3000/4000	
<u>AROE IS.</u>				
		48 Div (elements)		
DOBO	5°46'S 134°13'E		500	
<u>SERANG IS.</u>				
		5 Div Part		
		48 Div (elements)		
AMBON	3°41'S 128°10'E		5000	
<u>TAMIMBAR IS</u>				
SATIMLAKI	8°00'S 131°15'E		800/1000	
<u>CELEBES</u>				
		3 GDF		
		23 SBF		
MACASSAR	5°08'S 119°25'E		10000	
<u>TIMOR</u>				
		48 Div (Part)		
		23 BF		
		48 EO	20000	
<u>JAVA</u>				
		9 Div		
		13 Div (Part)		
		57 Div	40000	
<u>BORNEO</u>				
		1 u/i Div		
		22 SBF	10000	

(Compiled from information contained in Adv LHQ Int Summaries numbers 1, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27. AMF Int Summaries numbers 32 & 33. First Int Summaries numbers 49 & 50.)

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APPENDIX "C" to 2 AUST CORPS INT REPORT 17. S E C R E T
Further Japanese Aircraft SWPA.

Type 100 R/P DINAH

DINAH is by far the most widely used of Japanese R/P in this area. It is a twin-engined, monoplane with a single fin and resembles in many respects the Curtiss A-18. DINAH is remarkably fast at altitudes over 20,000'. The maximum T.A.S. is between 330 and 360 m.p.h. Crash reports from India and several combat reports from this theatre indicate that, when DINAH is used as a R/P, it carries no protective armament whatsoever. This statement must be treated with caution as it is believed that a fighter version of DINAH also exists.

A twin-engined fighter, very similar to DINAH, recently opened fire on a B-17E. The fire apparently was concentrated in the nose of the aircraft. This is further substantiated by a set of Japanese drawings of a naval twin-engined R/P, which showed three gun positions in the nose section of the aircraft. The naval drawings were also very similar to DINAH and it is reasonable to assume that this type of aircraft is used by the navy as well as the army.

A description of the enemy aircraft was given by the crew of the B-17: "It was a two radial engine plane, with a thin fuselage and rather sharp nose. The engines projected out to a line even with the nose and were placed on the wings with about 2/3rds of the engines below the wing. The plane was painted a brownish green color with a large red disc on top of each wing. Everything about this plane seemed to show it to be new. Other noticeable points were the glass cockpit cover, which was set above the fuselage, the low squat tail rudder, the retractable tail wheel, and the rounded area where the tail blended into the fuselage. We have no information on any guns in the wings; all the firing seemed to come from the nose. After checking with all of the crew from our plane we are not certain whether there was one gun or three guns in the nose."

Type 0 OF/P PEPE

This aircraft has been operational in this theatre. PEPE is also used as a catapult type aircraft, and has sometimes been used as a fighter. It is a biplane, single float type, with small wing tip floats. Its span is 37', its length 30'7".

PEPE is exceptionally manoeuvrable and has a high rate of climb. The armament consists of 2 x 7.7 mm. synchronized Vickers type guns and 1 x 7.7 mm. Lewis type gun.

Type 0 RF/P JIKE

Numerous reports of a twin float monoplane, similar to T.99 D/B VAL on floats, have been received from most theatres engaged in operations against the Japanese. This aircraft was tentatively listed as JUNE. Since that time several interesting drawings and a photograph of this aircraft have been received from enemy sources. These discredit the original impression that this aircraft is VAL on floats.

Very little is known of JIKE at present but the following information is based on combat reports and statements by survivors of a bombed vessel. Line drawings and silhouettes have been double-checked against photographs for accuracy.

JIKE is powered by a 14 cyl. twin-row engine of unknown manufacture and h.p. The armament consists of only 1 x 7.7 mm., Lewis type, flexible machine-gun. The bomb load apparently is only 250 lbs., 2 x 60 kg. bombs, one on each wing outside the air-screw arc. JIKE may be equipped with self-sealing tanks, but definite information on this is lacking. Span is approximately 45', length approximately 35'.

Type 97 T/B KATE

This aircraft is the standard deck-landing torpedo bomber aircraft of the Japanese Navy. This type has been operational in this theatre, and may still be seen in small numbers, although most torpedo planes now encountered are of the BETTY twin-engine type.

KATE is a two or three seater, low wing, single engine monoplane fitted with a Nakajima Sakae 11, 1,000 h.p., 14 cylinder, twin-row radial engine. The armament is 2 x 7.7 mm. mgs. (Vickers type) firing forward, synchronized, and one 7.7 mm. flexible (Lewis type gun) in the dorsal position. KATE is capable of carrying a single 1760 lb. torpedo. Wing span is 52' and the length, 34'. Fuel is carried in the wing roots.

Type 99 D/B VAL

VAL is the standard dive-bomber of the Japanese Navy and is used in large numbers in this theatre. It is easily identified by the fixed under-carriage, elliptical wings, faired fin and prominent dive brakes. The wing span is 47'7", the length 32'5". None of the fuel tanks of VAL is self-sealing and it is extremely vulnerable due to poor manoeuvrability. The fuel is carried in the wing roots and in the fuselage, the fuselage tank being directly underneath the pilot. VAL mounts 2 x 7.7 mm. Vickers type mgs., fixed and synchronized, in the upper portion of the engine cowling. One 7.7 mm. mg. is carried in the dorsal position. VAL usually operates with a heavy cover of fighter aircraft due to its inability to take care of itself alone.

One bomb, weighing 550 lbs, is usually carried between the undercarriage legs and is thrown clear of the propeller arc by a swinging rack. Two fixed bomb racks are mounted underneath the wing, outboard of the dive brake tips. The maximum bomb load is considered to be 814 lbs.

Type 99 L/B LILY

This aircraft is rapidly becoming one of the more numerous of the enemy aircraft operating in this area. It is a mid-wing monoplane, powered by two 14 cylinder, twin-row, radial engines. It resembles very much the Martin Baltimore or A-30. A LILY, examined in India, indicates the following armament arrangement:- 1 x 7.7 mm. Lewis type gun, in the nose section; one or 2 x 7.7 mm. Lewis type mgs., mounted on the scarf ring, in the dorsal position and 1 x 7.7 mm. mg. located in the neutral position. The fuel tanks are not self-sealing and are located, one in each wing root between the engine nacelle and fuselage, and one in the fuselage.

Normally the crew of LILY consists of four members. Dimensions are only estimated approximately because of the condition of the wreckage examined. Span is estimated at 55' or 60' and the length at 42'.

Type 96 M/B NELL

NELL is a very versatile aircraft and has served in many capacities since the beginning of the present war. She is still operational in this theatre to some extent. It was reported that NELL was instrumental in the sinkings of "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse", being used on this occasion as both a torpedo and level bomber. Reconnaissance is another of her fields and, at present, medium bombing and reconnaissance occupy most of her time. A transport version of this aircraft is believed to exist.

NELL is a mid-wing monoplane, two radial engines, twin fins. The armament of NELL is 2 x 7.7 mm. mgs., fixed forward in the nose, 1 x 7.7 mm. or 1 x 20 mm. cannon in the dorsal position. When the 20 mm. cannon is carried, it is mounted in a much larger turret than the 7.7 mm. mg. Latest information indicates that about one in every three NELLs is equipped with a 20 mm. cannon in this position. 1 x 7.7 mm. mg. is carried in each side blister, one in a ventral position and a fixed 7.7 mm. mg. as a stinger.

NOTE:- A 20 mm. cannon has been reported in the tail of a

NELL but no further confirmation exists.

The fuel tanks are not self-sealing. They are located near the leading edge of the mainplane, both inboard and outboard of the engine nacelles. Span is 82', length 54'.

Type 97 M/B SALLY and T. 100 M/B HELEN


SALLY has been reported frequently in this Area. Many reports of armament and speed indicate that the Type 100 M/B HELEN, which is very similar in appearance, has been mistaken for SALLY occasion-ally.

Both aircraft are powered by radial engines and are known to be similar in design. HELEN, however, has an extension of the fuselage beyond the trailing edge of the rudder and elevators which houses a 7.7 mm. mg. HELEN also mounts a 12.7 mm. mg. (Browning type) instead of the twin 7.7 mm. mg. usually carried by SALLY in the dorsal position. Neither of these aircraft has been examined in this theatre. Span of SALLY is 72', length, 52'. HELEN'S dimensions are estimated at span 74'8", and length, approximately 55'.

(Compiled from info AAF Int
Summaries 90-91)

JAPANESE 20MM AMMUNITION

AND FUSE



G.S.I.(a)ADV LHQ 16 Apr 43.

SECRET

Copy No. 67

18 Apr 43.
Q1938

2 Aust Corps Adm Order No. 1

1. ADM AREAS

6 Aust Div Ref map ATHERTON 4 inches to 1 mile.
Area bounded by a line commencing at 09450453, thence in approx a SE direction incl HERBERTON RANGE and HUGH NELSON RANGE to rd at 09990370, thence South along but excl rd UPPER BARRON-CHILVERTON to rd jn 09980336, thence West along but excl rd EAST EVELYN-KABAN and KABAN, to ry line, thence North along and incl ry line and HERBERTON, to commencing point.

7 Aust Div Ref map ATHERTON and INNISFAIL 4 inches to 1 mile.
Area bounded by a line commencing at ry line at but incl KABAN (ATHERTON map) 09300330, thence East along and incl rd KABAN-EAST EVELYN to rd jn (INNISFAIL map) 00110332, thence South along but excl rd through CHILVERTON to rd jn at (INNISFAIL map) 00180272, thence approx SW to creek at (ATHERTON map) 09900213, thence approx East to creek and rd at (ATHERTON map) 08920240, thence approx NE to commencing point.

9 Aust Div Ref map INNISFAIL 4 inches to 1 mile.
Area bounded by a line commencing at a point 00900620, thence SE to 01000590, thence SW along but incl SEVERIN CREEK to its jn with BARRON RIVER, thence along but incl BARRON RIVER and excl KUIARA to ry line at 00520513, thence approx NW along but incl ry line KAIRI and YADJIN, to YADJIN 00050533, thence North to cr at 00050610, thence East to commencing point.

2. MED

(a) Evacuations

From	Route	Distribution
6 Aust Div	Amb Rail Coach	Gen Hosp ROCKY CREEK
7 " "	MAC	6 Aust CCS RAVENSHOE
9 " "	"	Gen Hosp ROCKY CREEK temporarily.
		Evacuation will be to 2/3 CCS when open

Corps Tps evacuate on above plan according to location.
Con Depot is located at ROCKY CREEK.

(b) Med Stores and Eqpt

105 Aust Adv Depot Med Stores ROCKY CREEK.

(c) Malarial Investigations

Pathological facilities exist at 2/2 Aust Gen Hosp and 2/6 Aust Gen Hosp ROCKY CREEK and at 1 Aust Mob Bact Lab (with 6 Aust CCS RAVENSHOE).

3. SUPS

ASD located at ATHERTON for POL and Sups

FSD	Units Drawing Sups
RAVENSHOE	7 Aust Div
WONDEGLA	6 " "
KAIRI	9 " "

Corps Tps draw from FSDs according to location.

4. POL
As for Sups.
5. CANTEENS
Bulk and retail stores are located in RAVENSHOE and ATHERTON.
6. ORD
(a) Ann : 73 FAD is located at TOLGA (adjacent to 13 Adv Ord Depot)
(b) Stores : 13 Adv Ord Depot, TOLGA.
(c) RSD: TOLGA.

7. ENGR STORES
Corps dump is at 60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy, ATHERTON.

8. AEME - Repairs and Recovery.
(a) AEME Repairs:
(i) 1st Ech Normal
(ii) 2nd Ech No special wkshop yet available.
2/45 Aust LAD RAVENSHOE and 2/56 Aust LAD WONDECIA (Corps units in Formation areas) will carry out 1st and light 2nd Ech repairs.
(iii) 2nd & 3rd Ech - 2/2 Aust Inf Tps Wkshop, MALANDA.
(b) AASC Repairs:
(i) 1st and 2nd Ech: Units, and wkshop pls of 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy MILLAA MILLAA and 132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy ATHERTON.
(ii) 3rd Ech. 2/2 Aust Inf Tps Wkshop MALANDA.
(c) Except in emergency, work will be received in 2nd and 3rd Ech wkshops only through LADs or AASC wkshop pls.
(d) Recovery :
(i) AASC HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col.
(ii) AEME service is available at following units :-

Unit	Location
315 Aust LAD	ATHERTON
2/56 " "	WONDECIA
2/80 " "	ROCKY CREEK
2/65 " "	" "
244 " "	BARRINE
319 " "	"
2/45 " "	RAVENSHOE

9. PAY

<u>Cash Office</u>	<u>Formation</u>
ATHERTON	6 Aust Div.
RAVENSHOE	9 " "
	7 " "

10. PRO
TCPs are established :-
(i) PALMERSTON Highway - 1 m South of MILLAA MILLAA
(ii) MAREEBA rd - 400 yds North of ROCKY CREEK
(iii) Top Gate, GILLIES Highway.

11. POSTS

HQ 2 Aust Corps

FPO 170 BARRINE

Formation	Railhead FPO
6 Aust Div	173 WONDECLA
7 " "	53 RAVENSHOE
9 " "	34 KAIRI

Telegrams circulate thus:- Corps, YUNGABURRA; 6 Aust Div, HERBERTON; 7 Aust Div, RAVENSHOE; 9 Aust Div, ATHERTON.

12. SALV

Corps Salvage Dump is at rear of RSD, TOLGA.

13. PRINTING AND STATIONERY

- (i) First Aust Army Stationery Sub-Depot is located at ATHERTON.
- (ii) Indents for publications go to First Aust Army Stationery Depot, TOOWOOMBA.

14. BURIALS

See Appx "A".

15. KIT STORES

Det 5 Sec Aust Kit Store functions as a Transit Depot at RAVENSHOE.

16. ACK by memo.

J. R. ... Brig.
DA & QMG 2 Aust Corps.

Time of Signature...18.6.66...

Distribution

2 Aust Corps List D	
First Aust Army (AIF)	3
Yorkforce	1
HQ Qld L of C Area	2
No. 1 L of C Sub-Area	2
No. 17 L of C Sub-Area	2
Movts TOWNSVILLE	1
" CAIRNS	1

Appendix "A" to 2 Aust Corps
Adm Order No. 1 of 18 Apr 43

BURIAL

- (a) (i) When a death occurs within 2 Aust Corps Area HQ of the Unit concerned will immediately notify 17 L of C Sub-Area, and Formation HQ (Corps Tps will notify Corps HQ), and will arrange for the body to be transported to the parlours of Messrs MAZLIN and MALCOLM of ATHERTON. Necessary arrangements will be made through that firm for burial in the ATHERTON Cemetery.
- (ii) In the case of accidental death, the nearest Police Station will also be notified by the Unit concerned, and access to the body allowed to the Police if required.
- (iii) In all cases the death and funeral arrangements will be immediately telegraphed to 17 L of C Sub-Area, repeated to DRO WARWICK (Distrec Warwick) for advice of next of kin.
- (iv) The undertaker will pay cemetery fees and chaplain expenses where necessary, and recover from the Department of the Army by rendering a TS 4 to this HQ for verification and passing to SO Graves Registration, HQ Q'land L of C Area for forwarding to DFO.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Subject: Air Raid Warnings.
Amendment No 1 to G2652
of 2 April 43.

2 Aust Corps,
17 Apr 43.
G 2707

6 Aust Div
7 Aust Div
9 Aust Div

Plus Distribution List B.

1. Appendix B to G2652 is amended by inserting after 9 Aust Div the following:-

"
ROCKY CREEK.
2/2 Aust Gen Hosp
2/6 Aust Gen Hosp
106 Aust Con Depot.

"

R.A.R. Rawlinson
for
BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Subject: Defence Plan - Corps HQ.

2 Aust Corps;
Apr 43.
G 2701.

Distribution:

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Reference G2368 of 24 February 43, and
G2492 of 12 March 43.

1. Para 6 of G2368 and Para 2 of G2492 are cancelled.

2. Alarm signals are now as follows:-

- (a) General alarm - succession of long and short blasts on whistle.
- (b) Air - intermittent sound on siren
- (c) Gas Spray - will be sounded on a gong.
- (d) All clear - continuous sound on siren.

In all cases, Sigs 2 Aust Corps and 2 Aust Corps Pro Coy will be notified by telephone by G3 (O) or Duty Officer.

R. A. Brown
for BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

144
S E C R E T

Copy No. 63

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE REPORT 16

Compiled from information received from 16 Apr to 1200 hrs 21 Apr 43

- (A) Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comd.
- (B) A receipt is NOT required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These reports will NOT be issued regularly.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS

For index to place names mentioned in this report, see PART 3(iii) TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) NE AUSTRALIA:

A full report has NOT yet been received of the alleged enemy movements in the GULF of CARPENTARIA. From the information available, however, it seems unlikely that any landing took place.

There have been further reports during the last week of possible submarine sightings at a variety of points around the Australian coast.

(iii) NEW GUINEA

NE NEW GUINEA

MUBO. Operations in the MUBO area were confined to patrolling in DRY CREEK BED and on VICKERS RIDGE. A patrol, which moved 1,000 yards North of LABABIA RIDGE and 2,000 yards East of MUBO, reported NO contact with the enemy and that the enemy's positions on the NE slope of LABABIA RIDGE had NOT been occupied for some time. KOMIATUM, which was reported occupied by a small party of Japs, was raided by our troops on night 15/16 Apr. There are NO details.

On 16 Apr a native report indicated that reinforcements from LAE strongly held LABABIA, DUALI, NASSAU and SACHEN BAY and that the land approaches had been mined by the enemy. The area South of SACHEN BAY was reported clear of enemy troops.

LAE. Action in this area has been confined to our air attacks on 15 Apr against the aerodrome and runway. Results have NOT been reported.

FINSCHHAFEN. Our air attacks in this area were repeated on 17 and 18 Apr. Mention of a sea truck 80 feet long moving three miles North of FINSCHHAFEN may be an indication of the enemy reinforcement and supply plan for this area. An allied air attack on 18 Apr was directed against WALD BAY NW of FINSCHHAFEN, evidently with the object of harassing the enemy lines of communication by sea and land along the coast.

SAIDOR. There have been a number of reports of enemy patrols in many places in this sector. These parties appeared well trained and supplied. Their task was likely to have been the impressing of native labour for development of the landing strip, and tracks to the West and East linking MADANG and FINSCHHAFEN.

S E C R E T

PART 1 (iii) Contd.

On 17 and 18 Apr air attacks were made by B24s against villages -- in this area and some huts were destroyed. Strafing attacks have often been effective in driving natives from enemy labour camps, but there is NO information to indicate the results in this case.

MADANG. Between MADANG and BOGIA the enemy has constructed and is now using an excellent road supplied with well-made bridges. It is probable that a motor road along the entire coast East from WEWAK is under construction. The road is hidden among shore growth and between ALEXISHAFEN and BOGIA it is never more than a quarter of a mile inland. There are apparently twenty three new bridges varying in length from seventy five to four hundred feet, made of log piles driven at approximately fifteen feet intervals.

ULINGAN. Photographs of the West side of ULINGAN Harbour (52 miles NNW of MADANG) showed great activity at ULINGAN MISSION where a number of machine guns was reported. This is a further indication of the enemy's intense consolidation in NE NEW GUINEA.

BOGIA-NUBIA. On 23 Mar an emergency landing strip was reported five miles NW of NUBIA. This may have been the old civil strip (4,000 feet long) located half a mile inland from HANSA BAY. On 9 Apr our aircraft reported having observed a number of camouflaged objects (possibly aircraft) on the North end of NUBIA runway. The runway was estimated to be 3,000 feet long and was being lengthened; there were about eight dispersal points East of the runway and six to the West. A/A and searchlight positions were reported at NUBIA Harbour. There have been NO previous reports of aircraft at NUBIA, but it has been evident from the amount of recent construction that work was proceeding rapidly. It will be recalled that on 12 Apr our aircraft attacking ships in HANSA BAY were intercepted by six fighters. There may be some connection between this and the reported serviceability of the NUBIA runway.

Shipping traffic to and from HANSA BAY was frequent during the period and allied air attacks continued but NO details have been reported since 14 Apr when a 5/6000 ton cargo vessel was left sinking after sustaining three direct hits.

WEWAK. Sightings of ships attempting to supply WEWAK during the period under review have been many and although allied air attacks have met with some success there is NO doubt that the enemy have managed to offload considerable supplies. As a result of bombing attacks one cargo vessel of 6/8000 tons was sunk on 15 Apr and another so badly damaged that it probably sank. A number of sorties were made by B24s and B17s against WEWAK town, the aerodrome at BORAM and KAIRIRU MISSION on 15 Apr. Results were NOT observed.

It was reported on 11 Apr that the landing ground at BUT was serviceable and appeared to be in good condition. There were two medium bombers and ten T "O" Mk I SSF "ZEKES" on this strip. The dimensions of the field were 5,300 feet by 800 feet with a flight-gap of 1550 feet at the Western end. There were twenty five revetments, all suitable for medium bombers, in the dispersal area.

AITAPE. On 11 Apr our aircraft reported a serviceable landing strip parallel to the shoreline at PRITZWITZ POINT (about 75 miles ESE of HOLLANDIA BAY and 108 miles WNW of WEWAK). There is NO prior report of a strip at this location.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

NEW BRITAIN

RABUL. On 14 Apr three B17s attacked LAKUNAI Aerodrome causing several explosions in the target area.
fires and

On 16 Apr photographs reveal the following ships in SIMPSON Harbour.

6 destroyers
4 submarines
4 submarine chasers
2 destroyer tenders
1 submarine tender
2 tankers
24 merchant vessels (106,000 tons).

This represents a considerable reduction in shipping at RABAU when compared with assessments made from sightings in recent months, but RABAU is still the principal enemy naval base in our near North and the principal staging point for supplying the increasing number of developed forward bases along North and NE NEW GUINEA. In considering a reduction in tonnage in the harbour the comparatives of enemy shipping in the whole area that is being supplied and developed must be taken into account. Sightings do NOT cover all areas at any one time for an estimate of all shipping to be made, but it is quite apparent that the new bases require a large tonnage for normal supply. There is every indication that the enemy's achievements in this respect have been remarkable particularly when we take into account the speed with which he has succeeded in constructing and bringing his landing strips to operational efficiency.

GASMATA. The runway and dispersal areas were attacked by allied air units on 14, 15 & 16 Apr.

ARAWA. Recently there have been several conflicting reports regarding construction by the enemy of landing strips on one or two of the islands in the vicinity of ARAWA. A photograph taken on 19 Mar showed the ARAWA strip (7 miles East of ARAWA Plantation) to be completely unserviceable and covered with secondary growth. Tracks could be seen in the vicinity. It seems more likely that the only enemy activity at this date was limited to a small occupation force detailed to control the natives. The islands to the West and NW of ARAWA on which strips were previously reported under construction are very rough and swampy and quite unsuitable for strip construction. From a study of these photographs, it would seem that there never was, nor is there likely to be, a runway constructed on any of the islands. ARAWA Plantation which has a good harbour and a flat area of coconut palms could be cleared to make a runway. The old strip at ARAWA which has remained unserviceable could easily be repaired and extended.

NEW IRELAND. The scale of enemy shipping activity continues to be pronounced in this area, supporting suggestions that have been made in the past that KAVIENG is being used by the enemy as a base supplementary to RABAU for the maintenance of Northern NEW GUINEA.

There is some doubt as to the condition of the aerodrome at PANAPEI. There were NO aircraft on the ground here on 9 Apr and there is NO later information to indicate that it has been serviceable.

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS. Photographs taken on 6 Apr showed that the runway at LORENGAU, with the exception of a few low shrubs at the East end, has been cleared of all secondary growth. The sides have been squared off for its full length of 3,500 feet. All the old bomb craters have been filled in, and for the first time the runway is considered serviceable. Additional fighter aircraft revetments have been added making a total of twenty. To the South of the road these are cut into the hillside. Well-defined dispersal lanes lead to all the revetments, eight of which have been surfaced with coral. Piles of loose coral, seen in the area, will probably be used to surface all the lanes. All the aircraft revetments were ready for immediate use.

In the town area well-defined roads and tracks leading to all the buildings suggest intensive use. There were NO tracks apparent which would indicate M/G or A/A emplacements.

(v) SOLOMONS ISLANDS

Reports from this area during the period under review have been confined to shipping sightings principally in the BUIN-FAISI area where a number of destroyers as well as other vessels have been reported.

Reference was made in Report 15 to greatly increased enemy air strength in the SOLOMONS, which was followed by the strong attack on GUADALCANAL in which the Japanese lost heavily in aircraft. The Air O of B in Part 2 (i)(b) of this report shows that air strength in the SOLOMONS has since been reduced to normal. It may be that the losses sustained by the enemy have caused him temporarily to abandon a plan to knock out allied bases on his flank. The move was a sharp reminder of the mobility which months of painstaking ground preparation have provided for his air forces. This mobility goes a long way towards regaining for the enemy his lost initiative and at the same time facilitates protection for his lines of communication. In addition to the factors mentioned, the enemy is now able to achieve maximum concentration of force in the minimum time at any point along the arc sweeping the full length of the air front and thus obtain surprise by quick moves, with the minimum ground re-organisation, and attacks in force. This was evidenced in the recent raids on GUADALCANAL, ORO BAY, PORT MORESBY and MILNE BAY.

(vi) N.E.I. Area

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

HOLLANDIA. On 11 Apr photographs taken showed that HOLLANDIA Strip was serviceable, and visual sightings showed new buildings, possibly barracks, North of the runway. Four tall poles set in a line indicate a possible D/F or W/T station. The aerodrome itself showed NO activity, but shipping was observed in HOLLANDIA BAY. The runway was confirmed as being 3,900 feet long by 300 feet wide.

TIMOEKA. Our aircraft which attacked TIMOEKA on 9 Apr reported accurate night A/A and .5 H/G fire from the West end of the strip, which appeared serviceable.

KAI ISLANDS. The development of the aerodrome at LANGGOER, three miles SW of TOEAL was being continued. Two runways have been marked out and the first of these, which runs East and West cleared of all vegetation for 3,300 feet with an average width of 150 feet. Levelling has been carried out at various points along the runway and especially at the Western end where a roundabout of 270 feet diameter has been levelled. However, trees are still standing about 120 feet from the East end of the runway across the line of takeoff. The strip is marked off for a further 900 feet at the East end. The second strip which runs NW and SE has been marked out for a length of over 4,000 feet but NO clearing work has been done. A road suitable for M/T runs SW from KOLSEER village. Another road runs from LANGGOER to WATDEK.

From the numerous survey lines that have been cut in this vicinity, over an area of 6,000 feet NW-SE by 6,000 feet ENE-WSW and from other indications of clearing it appears probable that considerable operational importance may be attached to the development of this aerodrome.

AMBOINA. On 17 Apr there were two separate attacks carried out by allied aircraft against AMBON. Fires were started in the town area and numerous large explosions and fires were seen on the coaling jetty and the town area surrounding it. Four of 10/12 enemy fighters which intercepted were shot down.

Nine unidentified vessels totalling approximately 22,000 tons were observed in the Harbour.

S E C R E T

PART 1 (vi) Contd.

TIMOR. On 15 Apr three Hudsons bombed and strafed OSSU causing four explosions which demolished some buildings.

The next day three B25s bombed BAUCAU causing fires in the target area.

On 18 Apr nine B25s bombed and strafed FENFOEI Aerodrome. All bombs fell in the target area causing fires, one of which was very large.

The same day twelve Hudsons bombed KOEPANG and one of the fires started was visible for thirty miles.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops Revsits 258-263, AAF Int Sum 94).

PART 2 : ENEMY

(i) ORDER OF BATTLE

(a) Land Reference our Intelligence Report 13, SOLOMONS AREA - Delete "3 Regt (1 Div)". (NGF Weekly Int Sum 115).

(b) Air

Estimated enemy land-based air strength as at 16 Apr 43.

AREAS	F	M/B	S/EB	F/B	F/P	Trans & Recce A/C	Total Comparative 5 Apr	
<u>N.E. AREA</u>								
New Britain	148	88	13	8	13	13	283	240
New Ireland	52	36	13		4		105	40
New Guinea	56	5			5		66	5
Solomons	48	12	9	7	30	4	110	289
<u>N.W. AREA</u>								
Timor	23	8			3	4	36	50
Ambon	18	18		3	9		48	48
Aroe Is.)								
Dutch N.G.)	17				5		22	22
Celebes	59	52			12	18	141	123
	421	219	35	18	81	39	813	817

(AAF Int Sum 95)

iii) Organisation

Attached is Appx "A" - Enemy organisation and unit strengths

(v) Equipment

Further Japanese Aircraft SWPA

Type 98 L/B IDA

An aircraft "similar to IDA" has been reported in several combat reports but otherwise its use in S.W.P.A. is NOT substantiated.

This aircraft is a low wing monoplane with a fixed undercarriage and powered by a single radial engine, developing approximately 900 h.p. at 9,000'.

The landing edge of the wing is tapered and the trailing edge is straight, similar to that of a Wirraway. Two 7.7 mm. Vickers type guns are synchronized, and 1 x 7.7 mm. flexible mg. (Lewis type) is mounted in a dorsal position. The fin has a sharp taper on the leading edge to a point and is almost straight on the trailing edge. The span of this aircraft is 47'9" and the length 34'.

PART 2 (Contd.)

S E C R E T

(v) Equipment (Contd)

Type 98 L/B SONIA (T. 99 R/P GERTY)

This aircraft has been reported on a few occasions, but NO definite information is available concerning its operation in SWPA. Aircraft of this type have been used by the Japanese Army Air Forces in large numbers and it is possible that this aircraft will be operational in this area.

SONIA is a low-wing monoplane with a single radial engine and a fixed undercarriage. It is powered by one Kinsai 14 cyl. radial engine, developing approximately 900 h.p. at 10,000'.

The armament consists of 2 x 7.7 mm. Vickers type guns synchronized and 1 x 7.7 mm./flexible. It resembles in many respects the Northrup -17. H.S.

A new type reconnaissance aircraft has been revealed by enemy sources as Type 99 R/P. The name GERTY has been allotted this aircraft. It is superficially the same type as SONIA and may be a modification of it.

PART 3 : TOPOGRAPHICAL(ii) Other Areas -

Attached's Appx "B" are reports on TOBAL-LANGGOER (KAI ISLANDS) and SANMLAKI (TANIMBAR ISLANDS)

Attached's Appx "C" is Mosaic of Wewak Pt and Landing Strip.

(iii) Index to place names appearing in PART 1 of this report.

This will be supplemented in each succeeding report and can be used as the basis for the compilation of a gazetteer covering NE & NW areas.

AITAPE, NG.	3°10'S	142°22'E	REDANG, NG	5°13'S	145°48'E
ALEXISHAFEN, NG	5°05'S	145°47'E	MUNO, NG	7°11'S	147°00'E
AMBOH, AMBOINA	3°41'S	128°10'E	ILASSAU BAY, NG	7°07'S	147°06'E
ARAWA, NB	6°42'S	149°08'E	HUBIA, NG	7°12'S	144°54'E
BAUGAU, TIMOR	8°27'S	126°20'E	OSSU, TIMOR	8°45'S	126°22'E
BOGIA	4°06'S	144°59'E	PAKAPAI, NEI	2°57'S	150°52'E
BRAM, NG	4°48'S	146°12'E	PIKFOEI, TIMOR	4°10'S	123°55'E
BU, BOUGAINVILLE	6°47'S	155°44'E	PILELO IS, NB	6°12'S	149°05'E
NG	3°22'S	143°14'E	PRITTWITZ POINT, NG	2°54'S	141°50'E
CREEK BED, NG	7°11'S	147°00'E	RABAU, NB	4°13'S	152°12'E
, NG	7°10'S	147°06'E	RAPOPO, NB	4°20'S	152°17'E
, BOUGAINVILLE	7°05'S	155°54'E	SACIEN BAY, NB	7°14'S	147°06'E
HAFFEN, NG	6°29'S	147°49'E	SALDOR, NG	5°38'S	146°29'E
BAY, NG	4°12'S	144°52'E	SILMUNA, NG	7°01'S	147°04'E
INDIA, DNG	2°27'S	140°45'E	SIMPSON HARBOUR, NB	4°11'S	152°13'E
ERU MISSION, NG	3°20'S	143°52'E	TIMOEKA, DNG	4°46'S	136°32'E
ENG, NEI	2°37'S	150°17'E	TOBAL, KAI IS.	5°38'S	152°44'E
SEER, KAI IS.	5°40'S	152°41'E	ULINGAN, NG	4°30'S	145°26'E
LATUM, NG	7°10'S	147°01'E	VICKERS RIDGE, NG	7°11'S	147°00'E
HABIA, NG	7°12'S	147°07'E	VUNAKANAU, NB	4°18'S	152°08'E
HABIA RIDGE, NG	7°12'S	147°02'E	WALD BAY, NG	6°07'S	147°37'E
LAI, NG	6°43'S	147°00'E	WATDEK, KAI IS.	5°44'S	132°43'E
LEUNAI, NB	4°14'S	152°13'E	WENAK, NG	3°37'S	143°39'E
LANGGOER, KAI IS.	5°44'S	152°43'E			
LORENGAU, ADMIRALTY IS.	2°02'S	147°15'E			

-----000-----

Kaj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Int Report 13.


ORGANISATION

SECRET

The organisations set out below of the Artillery Unit of 21 Independent Mixed Brigade, of 6 Independent Anti-Tank Unit and of 209 Aerodrome Battalion, have been built up from interrogation of PW. These organisations should be accepted with reserve until further confirmation is received.

21 INDEPENDENT MIXED BRIGADE ARTILLERY

CO Lt-Col TAKAFASHI Rokuro



One tractor and one ammunition truck is allotted to each gun.


NOTE: Loading tables for the convoy, which was destroyed in the BESMAERK SEA on 3 Mar 45 show that 21 Independent Mixed Brigade Artillery on the convoy consisted of -

Personnel	350
105mm Guns	3
150mm Howitzers	4
Trucks	4
Tractors	7
Stores	100 cubic metres

6 INDEPENDENT ANTI-TANK UNIT

CO Lt-Col FUJIWARA

(350)



TOTALS Personnel 350
Guns 12

The PW stated that this unit, when in MANCHURIA, was about to be equipped with 47mm A/Tk Guns, with pneumatic tyres, but they sailed before the change was made.

209 AERODROME BATTALION

CO - Capt SAKURAI
(300)

Ground Staff Section (90)	Guard Section (90)	Supplies Section (120)
OC Lieut YOSHIMOTO	OC Lieut TORII	OC Lieut KAMIYAMA

The duty of an Aerodrome Battalion is the maintenance of aircraft and the defence of aerodromes.

NOTE: Loading tables for the convoy destroyed in the BISMARCK SEA on 3 Mar 43 give the following details concerning 209 Aerodrome Battalion -

Personnel	270
Trucks	12
Fuel and Ammunition	500 cubic Metres
Aircraft Materials	1,000 cubic Metres
Detachable Belly Tanks	100
Aviation Petrol	1,000 drums.

UNIT STRENGTHS:

This list has been prepared to furnish a ready guide to the total strengths of various units of the Japanese Forces. These totals are estimates, and as such will need to be revised as more up-to-date information becomes available.

INFANTRY DIVISION

Reece Unit	450
Tank Bn	300
Inf Regt	3,306
Regt Sigs	71
Regt Gun Coy	121
Regt A/Tk Unit	112
Inf Bn	984
Inf Rifle Coy	191
Inf Rifle Pl	56
Inf LMG/Rifle Sec	11
Inf Grenade Discharge Bn	322
Inf MG Coy	100
Inf Bn Gun Pl	50
Arty Regt	1,350
Engr Regt	1,020
Div HQ	125
Div Sigs Unit	200
" Medical Unit	250
" Fd Hospital	200
" Water Purification Unit	75
" Tpt Regt	1,000
" Ord Coy	250
" Vet Unit	250

INDEPENDENT TROOPS

Indep Mxd Bde	9,000
150mm Fd Arty Regt (24/150mm Hows)	1,300
Indep Mountain Arty Regt (18/75mm Guns)	1,574
Indep AA Bn (12/75mm Guns)	522
Machine Cannon Bty (AA-A/Tk) (8/20mm Guns)	136
Indep A/Tk Unit (18/37mm Guns)	350
Indep Mortar Bn (36/82mm Mortars)	600
Indep Engr Regt	1,200
Debarcation Unit	750
Shore Duty Coy	450
Volunteer Labour Unit	1,100
Provisional Rd Construc- tion Unit	480
Shipping Engr Regt	1,100
Indep Telegraph Unit	175
Naval Pnr Unit	1,500
Aerodrome Bn	300

DIVISIONAL TOTAL 16,245

APPENDIX "B" TO 2 AUST CORPS INT REPORT 16

SAUMLAKI:

SAUMLAKI (131°18'E, 7°59'S) is situated at the S. end of the island of YAMDNA, which is the largest island of the TANIMBAR Group, and lies approximately midway between DARWIN and AMBON. It is an important harbour and seaplane alighting area.

SAUMLAKI TOWN:- This is a small town built on gnetly rising ground on the E. side of SAUMLAKI Bay. It formerly had a population of approximately 12 Europeans, 30-40 Chinese, 500-750 natives from AMBON, JAVA, TIMOR and neighbouring Islands and several hundred native Tanimbanese. The commercial section of the town, including the Pasar (market place) and Chinatown, lies to the N. of the jetty. The jetty extends out to the edge of the coral reefs but NO lifting gear is available and nothing larger than launches and small boats can moor alongside. Water is obtained from a spring in the hills about a mile to the rear of the town from where it is reticulated to the larger houses. Most of the larger houses, in addition, had concrete tanks to take care of supplementary supply required in the dry season.

ANCHORAGE:- Anchorage is obtained in SAUMLAKI road, which lies at the E. side of SAUMLAKI Bay and provides good anchorage at all times of the year with a depth of 10 fathoms. Mud and coral flat prevent a close approach to the shore.

SEAPLANE ALIGHTING AREAS:- A large area of SAUMLAKI Bay provides an excellent seaplane alighting area and has a depth of 10 fathoms in well-sheltered water with a coral sea bed and coral and mud flats inshore. NO slipways are available but there is plenty of local material for their construction. It is reported that, if lights were placed on a few protruding reefs, night landings and take-offs would then be possible.

TOEAL:

TOEAL (Lat 5°39'S, Long 132°44'E) was occupied by the Japanese on 31 Jul 42. Since then it has been subject to frequent Allied reconnaissance and recently to many bombing attacks.

HISTORY:- With a population of approximately 1,000 inhabitants, TOEAL is the principal village of the KAI Group and formerly was the headquarters of the Dutch controller. Steamers of the K.P.M. used to call.

POSITIONS:- TOEAL lies in a valley on the shores of a small bay on the W. shore of KAI DOEHAL Island. The village is on the E. side of ROSENBERG Strait and is readily identified from the air by the fact that it surrounds a "U" shaped harbour with land on all sides except the N. LANGGOER and WATDEK are approximately 1½ and ½ miles, respectively, S.S.W. from TOEAL. ILAT, the principal village on NOHOE TJOET (Greater KAI Island), is some 18 miles E.

SEAPLANE ALIGHTING AREA:- TOEAL is an excellent alighting area and flying-boat base. Previously there were 4 mooring buoys and an anchorage of sufficient area for 5-9 aircraft. There was a jetty and crane and W. of the village a small wharf.

NEW STRIP:- The Japanese have recently constructed a new strip at LANGGOER.

LANGGOER (KAI Islands):-

Photographs show two landing strips in a V-shape, E-W and NW-SE, each approximately 4,500 feet in length, in the course of construction.


LANGGOER (KAI Islands) (Contd)-

The E. extremity of the E-W strip is only several hundred yards from LANGGOER, on the road connecting LANGGOER and KOLSEER. The E-W strip is more advanced than the other, the clearing almost complete and levelling having begun in two places. The NW-SE strip, which intersects the E-W strip at the W end, appears to have been surveyed along five cleared parallel lines running almost its entire length. A first-phase interpretation of photographs, taken on 18 Mar, discloses that the strip has been cleared for 600 yards x 50 yards.

A fairly straight track, emanating from the intersection of the two landing strips, divides the area between them. It joins a semi-circular track connecting the outer end of the landing strip. This may possibly signify a future taxiway or dispersal area. Six parallel tracks can be seen crossing the NW-SE strip at right angles. These are faint in the photographs and their purpose is at present unknown.

Village area - The buildings are reported to be quite large and of solid construction. It is thought that they would be very suitable for barracks or store houses.

(Compiled from information
contained in AAF Summaries 88-93)



001324A



AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

Appr 143
SECRET

Subject: Location Statement 2 Aust Corps
as at 2400 hrs 13 Apr '43.

HQ 2 Aust Corps,
15 Apr 43.

G.2700.

Copy No 56...

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1. Herewith 2 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 2400 hours 13 Apr '43.
 2. The serial numbers shown in the margin are for convenience of reference only.
- It is requested that any errors or omissions noted in this statement be immediately notified to this HQ by the formation or unit concerned.
- Acknowledge.

A. B. Brown
Jot BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

Encl.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

App 143
SECRET

Subject: Location Statement 2 Aust Corps
as at 2400 hrs 13 Apr '43.

HQ 2 Aust Corps,
15 Apr 43.

G.2700.

Copy No 56...

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Intell	17	Queensland L of C Area	42
CE	18	17 (Cairns) L of C Sub Area	43
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CSO	21-22	Townsville	44
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Q	25	13 AOD Telga	47
Chaplains	26	RTO Inisfail	48
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Medical	28	Mvts Townsville	52
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1. Herewith 2 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 2400 hours
13 Apr '43.

2. The serial numbers shown in the margin are for convenience
of reference only.

It is requested that any errors or omissions noted in this
statement be immediately notified to this HQ by the formation
or unit concerned.

Acknowledge.

Al B. G. May
for BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

Encl.

SECRET.

LOCATION STATEMENT 2 AUST CORPS
as at 2400 hrs 13 Apr 43

Corps Tps.

Veh Sign: Cockatoo on Boomerang.

Map Legend: BF - BARTLE FRERE one inch to one mile
D - DIMBULA " " " " "
G - GORDONVALE " " " " "
H - HERBERTON " " " " "
I - INNISFAIL " " " " "
MtG - Mt GARNETT " " " " "
P - PALMERSTON " " " " "

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Map Ref	Moves projected and Remarks.
A1	HQ 2 Aust Corps	107	BARRINE	G555344	
A2	2 Aust Corps Sec Intell Corps	107	BARRINE	G555344	
A3	'H' Sec FSS	107	BARRINE	G555344	
A4	2 Aust Corps Def & Emp Pl	120	BARRINE	G555344	
A5					
A6					
A7					
A8	RAA				
A9					
A10					
A11					
A12	HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps (AIF)	101	YUNGABURRA	BF519262	Under comd
A13	19 Aust A Fd Coy	141	RAVENSHOE	MtG397948	1 Aust CE(wks)
A14	10 Aust Fd Coy	149	KAIRI	G487383	for works
A15	60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy (AIF) & 315 Aust LAD AEME	105	ATHERTON	H390262	
A16	2 Aust Corps Camflg Trg Unit	118	YUNGABURRA	BF519262	
A17	2/22 Aust Fd Pk Coy and 2/80 Aust LAD	59	ROCKY CREEK	D374370	
A18	2/23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy and 2/65 Aust LAD	76	ROCKY CREEK	D373370	
A19	16 Aust Fd Coy	89	KAIRI	G487383	
A20	27 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	214	WONGABEL	H405181	
A21					
A22	5 Aust Fd Svy Coy	111	INNISFAIL		Army Tps - adv party only in area.
A23					
A24					
A25	Sigs 2 Aust Corps & 244 Aust LAD AEME	115	BARRINE	G552340	
A26	2 Aust Corps Cipher Sec	185	BARRINE	G555344	
A27					
A28					
A29					
A30					

Ref- No.	Unit	Veh No.	Location.	Map Ref	Remarks
A31	S & T HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col	116	MALANDA	B524162	
A32	131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less A & C Tpt Pls)	925	MILLAA MILLAA	P547969	LHQ Tps
A33	A Tpt Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		RAVENSHOE	MtG405859	
A34	C Tpt Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		ATHERTON	H397269	
A35	132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less B Tpt Pl)	907	TOLGA	D405300	LHQ Tps
A36	B Tpt Pl 132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		KAIRI	G503392	
A37	8 Aust MAC (AIF) (less C Sec)	245	EAST BARRON	BF479228	
A38	5 Aust DID (less det)	260	WONDECLA RY Siding	H298087	Army Tps under comd for adm.
A 39	Det 5 Aust DID	254	MAREEBA	D334592	
A40	8 Aust DID (less det)		RAVENSHOE	MtG405859	
A41					
A42					
A43					
A44					
A45	MEDICAL 5 Aust CCS (less 1t sec) 2/1 Aust Dental Unit (Army Tps)	297 247	RAVENSHOE	MtG420837	Army Tps
A46	HQ (1) Sec		WONDECLA	att 2/2 Aust Inf Bn	
A47	HQ (2) Sec		TOOWOOMBA		
A48	B Sec		WONDECLA	Att 2/3 Aust Inf Bn	
A49	C Sec		WONDECLA		
A50	F Sec 2/4 Aust Dental Unit (Army Tps)		WONDECLA	att 2/2 Aust Inf Bn	
A51	B Sec		YATEE	att 51 Aust Inf Bn	
A52	C Sec		CAIRNS	att 17 LofC Sub- area	
A53	D Sec 2/5 Aust Dental Unit (Army Tps)		CAIRNS	att "	
A54	HQ(2) Sec		KAIRI	att 2/43 Aust Inf Bn	
A55	A Sec		KAIRI	att 2/48 Aust Inf Bn	
A	79 Aust Dental Unit (AIF) (Army Tps)	284			
A56	HQ(1) Sec		RAVENSHOE	att 2/27 Aust Inf Bn	
A57	HQ (2) Sec		RAVENSHOE	att 2/16 Aust Inf Bn	
A58	B Sec		RAVENSHOE		
A59	D Sec		RAVENSHOE	att 2/27 Aust Inf Bn	
A60	E Sec		RAVENSHOE	Att 2/31 Aust Inf Bn	
A61	F Sec		RAVENSHOE	att 2/25 Aust Inf Bn	
A62	1 Aust Mob Bact Lab	271	RAVENSHOE	TPs	
A63	First Aust Army Sub Depot Dental Stores		ATHERTON		
A64	12 Aust Anti Malarial Control Unit		CAIRNS	LHQ Tps att 17 LofC Sub-area	
A65					
A66					
A67					

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Map Ref	Remarks	
<u>ORD</u>						
A68 A69 A70	16 Bde Sec 6 Aust Div Ord Fd Pk	83	MILLANDA			
<u>AEME</u>						
A71 A72	2/2 Aust Inf Tps Wkshop 16 Bde Sec 6 Aust Div Wkshop	155	MILLANDA	G537173	Moving Corps area.	
A73 A74 A75 A76 A77	2/45 Aust LAD 2/56 Aust LAD 319 Aust LAD	88 66 107	WARRADALE SA RAVENSHOE WONDECLA BARRINE	MtG400842 H332069 G555344		
<u>PAY</u>						
A78 A79 A80	Depot Cash Office		ATHERTON			Det RAVENSHOE
<u>PRO</u>						
A81 A82 A83 A84 A85	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy 2 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre	128	BARRINE WASP CK	G533316		
<u>POSTAL</u>						
A86 A87 A88	One FPO sec 2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	154	BARRINE	G555344		
<u>MISC</u>						
A89 A90 A91 A92 A93 A94 A95	Mobile Cinema No 11 Norforce Concert Party 3 Aust Div Concert Party (AIF) 90		RAVENSHOE RAVENSHOE YUNGABURRA		To move BRISBANE	

6 AUST DIV

DIVISIONAL SIGN: Kangaroo on Boomerang

Serial No.	Unit	Unit Vch No.	Location	Map Reference	Remarks
B1	<u>HQ</u> HQ 6 Aust Div	84	WONDECLA	Div HQ H366043 AREA	
B2	<u>ENGRS</u> HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	81	" Div Tps area	H325076	
B3	<u>SIGS</u> HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div	66	" "	H358048	2/42 Aust LAD att-see below
B4	6 Aust Div Cipher Sec	68	" "	H358048	
B5	<u>INF</u> HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	88	" E Bde area	H322070	
B6	J Sec Sigs	88	" "	H322070	
B7	det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	" "	H322070	
B8	2/1 Aust Inf Bn	50	" Q	H320070	
B9	2/2 Aust Inf Bn	99	" R	H315063	
B10	2/3 Aust Inf Bn	56	" P	H325067	
B11	HQ 30 Aust Inf Bde	65	" F Bde area	H315078	
B12	30 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	65	" "	H315078	
B13	3/22 Aust Inf Bn	82	" L	H314077	
B14	39 Aust Inf Bn	91	" M	H313077	
B15	49 Aust Inf Bn	77	" N	H314079	
B16	<u>S & T</u> HQ Comd AASC 6 Aust Div	59	" Div Tps area	H326076	
B17	<u>MEDICAL</u> 2/2 Aust Fd Amb	57	" Div Tps area	H325073	
B18	6 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	79	"	H322072	
B19	<u>AEME</u> 2/42 Aust LAD	66	"	H358049	Att Sigs 6 Aust Div
B20	17 Aust Inf Bde Sec 6 Aust Div Wkshops	76	"	H345063	
B21	<u>MISC</u> 6 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	" Div Tps area	H362046	
B22	6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	80	" Div HQ area	H367043	
B23	6 Aust Div Postal Unit (less dets)	55	" "	H367043	
B24	det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	" Ry Sta	H298098	
B25	6 Aust Div Concert Party	90	"	H362046	
B26	6 Aust Div Reception Camp	71	" Ry Sta	H298098	

7 AUST DIV

Divisional Sign: Kookaburra on Boomerang.

- LOCATED RAVENSHOE -

No	Unit	Unit Veh No.	Location	Map Reference	Remarks
	<u>HQ</u>				
1.	HQ 7 Aust Div	84	Tully Falls Rd	P431813	
2	"C" Aust FS Sec	84	do	P431813	
3	7 Aust Div HQ Emp Pl	84	do	P431813	
	<u>CAV</u>				
C4	2/7 Aust Cav Regt		'B' Camp Div Tps Area	MtG3321813	
	<u>SIGS</u>				
C5	HQ 7 Aust Div	81	U Camp	MtG340208	
C6	Dct 2/4 Aust Fd Coy	60	do	MtG340308	
C7	2/5 Aust Fd Coy	89	do	MtG340308	
C8	2/6 Aust Fd Coy	86	do	MtG340308	Under comd 25 Aust Inf Bde.
C9	7 Aust Div Cnflg Tps Unit	73	do	MtG340308	
	<u>SIGS</u>				
C10	HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	66	Tully Falls Rd	P451817	
C11	C Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	94	'B' Camp Div Tps Area	MtG321813	Under comd 2/7 Div Cav Regt
C12	7 Aust Div Cipher Sec	66	Tully Falls Rd	P431813	
	<u>INF</u>				
C13	2/7 Aust Div Carr Coy	-	B Camp Div Tps Area	MtG321813	Under comd 2/7 Aust Cav Regt
C14	HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	88	A Bde Area	MtG386836	
C15	J Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	88	A Bde Area	MtG386836	
C16	2/9 Aust Inf Bn	50	A Camp	MtG390235	
C17	2/10 Aust Inf Bn	99	B Camp	MtG386832	
C18	2/12 Aust Inf Bn	56	C Camp	MtG388827	
C19	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde	96	B Bde Area	MtG382815	
C20	K Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	96	do	MtG382815	
C21	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde def & emp pl	96	Do	MtG382815	
C22	2/14 Aust Inf Bn	63	G Camp	MtG375315	
C23	2/16 Aust Inf Bn	61	E Camp	MtG378812	
C24	2/27 Aust Inf Bn	93	F Camp	MtG374812	
C25	HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	65	C Bde Area	MtG367819	
C26	L Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	65	do	MtG367819	
C27	25 Aust Inf Bde def and emp pl	65	do	MtG367819	
C28	2/25 Aust Inf Bn	82	J Camp	MtG371921	
C29	2/31 Aust Inf Bn	91	H Camp	MtG372818	
C30	2/33 Aust Inf Bn	77	K Camp	MtG359817	

Serial No.	Unit	Unit Veh No.	Location	Map Reference	Remarks
C31	3 & 7 HQ Comd AASC 7 Aust Div	59	W Camp	MtG355814	
C32	2/4 Coy AASC	97	do	MtG355814	
C33	2/5 Coy AASC	64	do	MtG355814	
C34	GENERAL 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	57	A Camp Div Tps Area	MtG321813	
C35	2/5 Aust Fd Amb	52	do	MtG321813	
C36	2/6 Aust Fd Amb	70	do	MtG321813	Under Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde. Att RAE
C37	2/7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	79	U Camp	MtG340800	
C38	ORD 18 Bde Sec 7 Aust Div Ord Fd pk	83	W Camp	MtG335814	
C39	ADOS 2/47 Aust LAD	88	A Bde Area	MtG386836	Under Comd 18 Inf Bde
C40	2/50 Aust LAD	94	B Camp Div Tps Area	MtG321813	Under Comd 2/7 Cav Regt
C41	18 Bde Sec 7 Aust Div Wkshops	76	W Camp	MtG355814	
C42	<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u> 2/7 Aust Div Pro Coy	95		MtG398862	
C43	2/7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	80	Tully Falls Rd.	P431813	
C44	2/7 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	do	P431813	
C45	2/7 Aust Div Salv Unit	78	do	MtG403850	Under Comd ADOS 7 Aust Div
C46	2/7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	71	TUMOULIN	MtG368912	
C47	2/7 Aust Div Concert party	90	Tully Falls Rd.	P431813	
C48	C Coy HQ C2 Rd		TUMOULIN	MtG368912	
C49	14 Aust Fd Amb		<u>ATTACHED</u> RAVENSHOE	Fd Amb lines	

9 AUST DIV

Divisional Sign: platypus on Boomerang

Ser- ial No.	Unit:	Unit Veh No	Location	Remarks
D1	<u>HQ</u> HQ 9 Aust Div	84	KAIRI	Map Reference G 513397
D2	9 Aust Div Int Sec	84	"	
D3	B Aust Fd Sec	84	"	
D4	A Coy HQ Gd Bn	84		
D5	<u>CAV</u> 9 Aust Div Cav Regt		"	
D6				
D7	<u>ARTY</u> HQ RAA 9 Aust Div	69	"	
D8	2/7 Aust Fd Regt	74	"	
D9	2/8 Aust Fd Regt	54	"	
D10	2/12 Aust Fd Regt	75	"	
D11	3 Aust A Tk Regt	62	"	
D12	4 Aust Lt AA Regt			
D13				
D14	<u>ENGRS</u> HQ RAE 9 Aust Div	81	"	
D15	2/3 Aust Fd Coy	60	"	
D16	2/7 Aust Fd Coy	89	"	
D17	2/13 Aust Fd Coy	86	"	
D18	2/24 Aust Fd pk Coy	67	"	
D19				
D20	<u>SIGS</u> Sigs 9 Aust Div	66	"	
D21				
D22	<u>MG</u> 2/2 Aust MG Bn		"	
D23	<u>PNRS</u> 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn		"	
D24				
D25	<u>INF</u> HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde	88	"	
D26	2/13 Aust Inf Bn	50	"	
D27	2/15 Aust Inf Bn	99	"	
D28	2/17 Aust Inf Bn	56	"	
D29	HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde	96	"	
D30	2/28 Aust Inf Bn	63	"	
D31	2/32 Aust Inf Bn	61	"	
D32	2/43 Aust Inf Bn	93	"	
D33	HQ 26 Aust Inf Bde	65	"	
D34	2/23 Aust Inf Bn	82	"	
D35	2/24 Aust Inf Bn	91	"	
D 36	2/48 Aust Inf Bn	77	"	
D37				
D38				
D39	<u>S & T</u> HQ AASC 9 Aust Div	59	"	
D40	No 10 Coy AASC	97	"	
D41	No 11 Coy AASC	64	"	
D42	No 12 Coy AASC	72	"	
D43	1 Aust DID		"	
D44				

No	Unit	Unit Veh No.	Location	Remarks
<u>MEDICAL</u>				
45.	2/2 Aust CCS		KAIRI	
5.	2/3 Aust Fd Amb	57	"	
7.	2/8 Aust Fd Amb	52	"	
3.	2/11 Aust Fd Amb	70	"	
0.	2/4 Aust Fd Hyg Sec		"	
<u>ORD</u>				
D51.	2/72 Aust LAD (RAE 9 Aust Div)		"	
D52.	2/76 Aust LAD (24 Aust Inf Bde)		"	
D53.	2/78 Aust LAD (26 Aust Inf Bde)		"	
D54.	9 Aust Div Laundry and Fwd Decon Unit		"	
D55.				
D56.				
D57.				
D58.				
D59.				
D60.				
D61.				
D62.				
D63.				
<u>PRO</u>				
D64.	2 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	"	
D65.				
<u>PAY</u>				
D66.	9 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	80	"	
<u>POSTAL</u>				
7.	9 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"	
<u>MISC</u>				
3.	9 Aust Div Concert Party	90	"	
9.	9 Aust Div Sec of 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	71	"	
D70.				
D71.				
D72.				
D73.				
D74.				
D75.				

SECRET

CE Branch,
HQ 2 Aust Corps.CE 2 AUST CORPSENGINEER INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 11.

Date: 15 Apr 43.

PART I.

1. Units of RAE 2 Aust Corps and attached Coys have continued with construction of accommodation and services comprised within STAGE 1 of ATHERTON TABLELANDS Project, under direction of 1 Aust CE (Works). Anticipated date of reversion of tps to Comd HQ 2 Aust Corps is 24 Apr.
2. Neucleus of RAE 6 Aust Div has reached WONDEGLA Area. RAE 7 Aust Div and RAE 9 Aust Div are concentrating in strength in RAVENSHOE and KAIRI areas respectively preparatory to undertaking operational trg.
3. Brig R.J.H. RISSON, DSO, OBE has been appointed Chief Engineer 2 Aust Corps. Brig RISSON arrived on 14 Apr to take over duties from Brig H. BACHTOLD, DSO, MC.
4. Maj R.M. LITTLE, SORE, left on 23 Mar for visit to NG as observer. During his absence Capt G.B.H. SUTHERLAND, IORE, is acting as SORE.

PART II.ROADS

5. As yet, the Main Roads Commission is unable to make effective progress with the resheeting and surfacing with bitumen or tar of EVELYN HIGHWAY between GILLIES HIGHWAY and CHILVERTON and of RAVENSHOE - HERBERTON rd between EVELYN HIGHWAY and WONDEGLA, owing to the lack of plant.
6. The Commission has made good progress with construction of a new five-span timber bridge over PETERSON CREEK on the YUNGABURRA-KULARA rd.
7. Fd Stores Sec of 2/23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy has made steady progress with improvement and gravelling of rd YUNGABURRA-KULARA-BARRINE. Surfacing of rd with bitumen or tar has been recommended, and improvements to grading and alignment and replacement of vee gutters by pipe culverts are being carried out in conjunction with the gravelling.
8. Correction of drainage and resheeting with gravel of road BARRINE-GILLIES HIGHWAY (near TOP TOLL GATE) had been well advanced up to 12 Apr when 1 Sec 16 Aust Fd Coy which had the work in hand was withdrawn.
9. Completion of the last-mentioned work and of the "missing links" in BARRINE-KULARA-KAIRI rd must await availability of eng'rs and suitable plant.

TRG

combined ops and/

10. Reorganisation and trg of Engineers, as necessary, for/all-terrain (incl jungle) warfare, modification of WETs, re-equipment, and the toughening of tps recovering from tropical illnesses will constitute the principal phases of activity in the immediate future.

SVY

11. 5 Aust Fd Svy Coy has arrived in the area to carry out topographical svy which will provide revised maps of ATHERTON TABLELANDS Area.

APPENDICES

12. Return of Offr Postings is attached as Appendix A. Location Statement and Intercomm are shown at Appendix B.

for *C. B. Sutherland* *Call*
Brig.
CE 2 AUST CORPS.

DISTRIBUTION

CE First Aust Army	copy No 1-3
CRE 2 Aust Corps Tps	" " 4
CRE 6 Aust Div	" " 5
CRE 7 Aust Div	" " 6
CRE 9 Aust Div	" " 7
File	" " 8-9
War Diary	" " 10-11

APPENDIX A

15 Apr 43.

APPT	RANK	NAME	REMARKS
CE	Brig	H. BACHTOLD	In course of handing over to Brig R.J.R. RISSON.
SORE	Maj	R.H. LITTLE	Visiting NEW GUINEA as observer.
IORE	Capt	G.B.H. SUTHERLAND	Acting SORE.
SORE(S)	Capt	A.R. TAYLOR	
GSO 3 Camflg	Capt	K.H. McCONNEL	
Cam Offr	Lieut	J.D. FOWELL	

APPENDIX B

15 Apr 43.

Unit	Veh No	Location	Map	Ref
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps	101	YUNGABURRA	BARTLE FRERE 1"	519262
19 Aust A Fd Coy	141	RAVENSHOE	ET GARNET 1"	397848
10 Aust Fd Coy	149	KAIRI	GORDONVALE 1"	487383
60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy & 315 Aust LAD	105	ATHERTON	HERBERTON 1"	390262
2 Aust Corps Camflg Trg Unit	118	YUNGABURRA	BARTLE FRERE 1"	579262
2/22 Aust Fd Pk Coy (less stores sec) & 2/80 Aust LAD	59	ROCKY CREEK	DUMBULA 1"	374370
16 Aust Fd Coy	89	KAIRI	GORDONVALE 1"	487383
27 Aust Fd Coy	214	WONGABEL	HERBERTON 1"	405181
2/23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy (less fd stores sec) & 2/65 Aust LAD	76	ROCKY CREEK	DUMBULA 1"	373370
Fd Stores Sec	76	WASP CREEK	GORDONVALE 1"	536317
5 Aust Fd Svy Coy	111	INNISFAIL		

INTERCOMN

Intercomn between 2 Aust Corps and Corps Tps and Div Engrs is by direct telephone, line telegraph, DRIS and Army Postal Service, also links to PMG systems.

2 Aust Corps is linked to First Aust Army by W/T, line telegraph, PMG Trunk Lines and Army Postal Service (air and surface mails).

21/12/41

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Subject: 2 Aust Corps - Training
Directive No 1.

2 Aust Corps,
1st Apr 43.
G 2691.

6 Aust Div	DA & QMG
7 Aust Div	A
9 Aust Div	Q
RAE 2 Aust Corps	S & T
First Aust Army (for	Med
infm)	Ord
GOC	AEME
G	Pro
Int	War Diary
CE	File.
CSO	

1. OBJECT.

The object will be to fit the Corps for war in a tropical theatre of operations as early as possible.

2. PERIOD AVAILABLE.

The time available to achieve this object is not known. In war the period available usually falls short of the period desirable for training, and therefore maximum use must be made of the present opportunity whatever its duration proves to be.

3. NATURE OF TRAINING.

Already in the war, Australian Forces have fought in desert mountainous, and tropical theatres of operations. Where the future theatres of operations will be is not known, but it is not unlikely that various types of terrain will be encountered and because of this, training will be kept on a broad basis. By this means, formations will be well fitted to undertake operations in any type of country.

At the same time, all formations will be trained to fit themselves for jungle warfare, and in addition selected formations, when detailed, will be trained for combined operations.

4. Throughout the training, morale and the maintenance of fighting efficiency will be studied and fostered by every possible means.

5. MORALE.

A high morale is principally dependent on the following factors:-

- (a) Discipline. Australian Forces have always had a high standard of battle discipline. That much loved fallacy of a section of our press, that a good battle discipline is obtainable from ill-disciplined troops has been utterly exploded, and it has been proved beyond doubt that battle discipline is entirely dependent on unit discipline. As units train, so will they fight.
- (b) Physical Fitness. Physical exhaustion and sickness lower morale. Warfare in any theatre of operations is tiring, and warfare in tropical theatres is particularly exhausting. A high standard of physical fitness is essential to resist tropical diseases, as well as to reduce the effect of the physical effort that this type of warfare involves.

- (c) Confidence in the weapon with which the soldier is armed, and by acquiring skill in the use of his weapons; confidence in his ability to use them effectively in action.
- (d) Self-reliance. To act calmly in action, the soldier must be trained to think and act for himself, and must have complete confidence in his individual ability to defeat his opponent.
- (e) Efficient leadership and teamwork. In addition to having confidence in himself, the soldier's morale is dependent also on the knowledge that his leaders are efficient, and that he can depend on the staunchness and co-operation of the other members of his sub-unit. In the same way, confidence in the efficiency, staunchness and co-operation of the other arms within the formation is essential.

6. MAINTENANCE OF FIGHTING EFFICIENCY.

Even in theatres of operations, such as the Western desert, the admissions to medical installations through sickness exceeded those due to battle casualties, by 2 to 1. In tropical areas, this proportion is likely to be 4 to 1 or higher, and therefore, the prevention of wastage through sickness is a major responsibility of any commander.

Certain practical health rules, which have been drawn up by the Medical Service, are included in paragraph 4 of Appendix "B". Practice in the routine necessary to limit the number of casualties due to sickness is necessary both in camp and training. It is particularly emphasised that three factors have the greatest influence on the sickness rate:-

- (a) Discipline. A well disciplined unit carries out the individual health routine more effectively and thus suffers fewer casualties from sickness.
- (b) Organisation and tidyness in camp lines and training is reflected in unit hygiene during operations.
- (c) Practice in the methods of maintaining health in camp and during training exercises, is essential to the maintenance of fighting efficiency during operations.

7. ENEMY.

From a study of the enemy, certain matters require fostering during training:-

- (a) The chief weakness discovered in the enemy is his dislike of noise - particularly that caused by the explosions of bombs shells and grenades. Where possible, explosions from the missiles of supporting weapons will be simulated during training, and troops will be trained to make as much noise as possible during the assault.
- (b) Offensive eagerness will be inoculated into all ranks.
- (c) Bold and aggressive action will be encouraged.

- (d) The opponent fights it out, and his treatment of prisoners is questionable. Troops must become accustomed during training to the realisation that the struggle will be grim, and that the enemy neither gives nor asks for quarter.

8. REALISM.

The greatest value will be gained from exercises which most closely approximate to the conditions of actual battle. Effort and ingenuity expended in making training exercises, rehearsals for battle will be well repaid.

9. ORGANISATION OF TRAINING.

The organisation of the Tropical Division is still under consideration vide 2 Aust Corps G2623 of 30 March 43.

(a) Individual Training will include:-

The fostering of morale,
Practical instruction in simple first aid
Individual and weapon training; especially the snap shooting.
Methods of maintaining direction,
Individual and camp hygiene,
Individual training of personnel of all HQs

During this period, the cadre training of sub-unit and unit leaders will be carried out to fit them for their tasks during collective training.

As explained in paragraph 2, the period of time for training is not known, and therefore the concentration on individual training until this is completed is not possible. Collective exercises will be introduced as soon as individual training has progressed sufficiently to enable simple collective training to commence. Thereafter, collective training will be carried on in between periods of individual training, until individual training is completed, and collective training takes its place.

(b) Collective training will include:-

Unit exercises on tropical scale with all equipment carried on the man. (Vehicles being used to replace porters)
Unit exercises using the limited transport decided on as tropical scale for the unit
Night exercises.
Continuous exercises up to one weeks duration.
HQ exercises.

(c) If the improvement in the condition of the troops in 6 and 7 Aust Divisions is delayed by malaria recurrences, hardening training may be postponed and introduced in the later stages of collective training.

10. The following training will be included in the training of the various arms and services:-

Cavalry.

1. Until vehicles are available, cavalry units will train dismounted, the training programme including the items given for infantry units.

Artillery.

1. Emplaning and deplaning.
2. Carriage of artillery equipment by air
3. Rapid assembly of equipment
4. Observation of fire and methods of fire in jungle country.
5. Supply of ammunition using Jeep, pack and porter carriage.
6. Tactical protection of troops and OP positions,
7. Fire with air observation..

Engineers.

1. Organisation of tasks and team working
2. Road works of all types using local materials
3. Bridging over tropical type of stream ie
 - (a) fast running, moving sandy bottom, subject to heavy flooding for short periods.
 - (b) mountain streams with boulder bottoms.
4. Cutting, splitting and shaping timber. Handling timber with organised teams of a few sappers using fulcrums, levers and skids.
5. Pile driving
6. Building small and large jetties using floating material, piles, tubular scaffolding,
 - (a) Pier - from shore to limit of depth - rock filled causeway. From causeway floating jetty of pontoons.
 - (b) Pier-head. Decked in barge about 60'x30'
 - (c) Dolphins.- constructed from piles.

Details of suitable types of piers will be issued separately through RAE channels.

7. Training with lighter scale than WET.
8. Movement and operating without vehicles
9. Control of native labour (by lectures from experienced personnel)

Signals.

1. Load tables, packing of loads and loading for soldiers, porters, animals, jeeps and aircraft.
2. Line laying of various types of cable using man pack, animal pack, and jeeps.
3. Protection of lines from falling timber, traffic and mud.
4. As R/T is most unreliable in wet wooded country, intensive training and practice in the use of W/T in forward units is essential.
5. Maintenance of all kinds of signal equipment
6. Practice in the use of Ausplay Cipher
7. Tactical protection of signal installations and working parties.

Notes on Signal Training for Tropical Warfare are attached as Appendix "A"

Infantry.

1. Training of junior leaders in tropical warfare
2. Operating in groups within the section
3. Training in the use of captured equipment
4. Movement of sub-units and units across country
using only the resources within the unit.
5. Aids to ~~crossing~~ obstacles.
6. Operating without vehicles. First line equipment
carried within the unit using porters of the
following scale:- 40 per Bn
70 per Bde HQ.
7. Battle drills.

AASC.

1. Training as for infantry.
2. Supply using porter and pack carriage.
3. Supply using only light types of vehicles
4. Supply by air: (a) aircraft landing
(b) supplies dropped

AAMC.

Notes on the training of AAMC personnel for Tropical Warfare are attached as Appendix "B"

H. Wells Colonel

BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

APPX 'A'.

NOTES ON SIGNAL TRAINING FOR TROPICAL WARFARE.

1. As the signal personnel in the corps are in the main all trained troops; it is considered that training for jungle warfare should be carried out on the following lines:-

Training of:-

- (a) Officers
- (b) ORs
- (c) Sig Platoons and Sig Sections
- (d) Bde Sig exercises
- (e) Div Sig exercises.

2. TRAINING OF OFFICERS.

Officers' training should bring out the following points:-

- (a) Physical fitness
- (b) Suitability of Equipment
- (c) Loads for:-
 - (i) Natives
 - (ii) Pack Animals
 - (iii) Own Troops
 - (iv) Jeeps
 - (v) Aircraft.
- (d) Signal Plans for Advance, Approach, Attack, Deployment, Withdrawal, Attached units.
- (e) A & Q Duties
- (f) Employment and limitations of Wireless in Jungle conditions
- (g) Protection

3. Physical Fitness:- is considered of prime importance and section officers must be impressed with their responsibilities in this direction. Attention must be given to:-

- (a) Section first aid kit
- (b) Care of feet
- (c) Anti-malarial precautions
- (d) Resting the men as much as possible.

4. Suitability of Equipment. Training in the unusual use of equipment in jungle warfare is necessary. The following have to be considered:-

- (a) Lines:- Rapid laying of lines from man pack and use of natives for this work. It was found that the N.G. native quickly adapted himself to work of this kind.
- (b) Laying from pack animal; No suitable pack saddle has yet been devised for laying from a pack animal. It is suggested that animals, if used, be for carrying only.
- (c) Laying from Jeeps.
- (d) Laying of various types of cable should be considered.
- (e) Use of 208 and 108 sets in jungle with improvised aerials etc.
- (f) Power supply for heavier types of sets.

- (g) Use of bicycles and auto-wheels for D.Rs
- (h) Possible uses of pigeons.
- (i) Use of Signal Rockets.
- (j) Native boys for Runners.

5.

Loading:-

- (a) Suggested loading tables for natives are being issued to Div Sigs through signal channels.
- (b) Pack Animals:- Some improvisation will have to be considered by officers.
- (c) Own Troops:- As in most actions, signals have to travel by day and work at night, it is considered they should travel as light as possible.
- (d) Jeep loading tables must be considered for:-
 - (i) Unit transport
 - (ii) Allotment from Div Pool
- (e) Aircraft loading:- Experience has shown that Sig Officers should be prepared to load transport planes in tactical groups which are complete to go into action on landing.

6.

Signal Plans:-

- (a) All signal plans for jungle warfare must be simple. The use of a main artery will very often be the only possible plan.
- (b) Lateral communication will in most cases be confined to W/T.
- (c) Attached units such as MMG platoons, Tank attack troops and arty must always be considered in the signal plan.
- (d) Connecting dressing stations and medical services where possible, to the telephone system, facilitates greatly the disposal of casualties.

7.

A & Q Duties:-

- (a) All section officers should have explained to them problems that may confront them under the above heading in jungle warfare.
- (b) Consideration might be given to:-
 - (i) What records should be kept
 - (ii) What supplies should be demanded and can be expected.

8.

All signal officers should have some training in the use of wireless: from this they will appreciate its limitation in jungle conditions.

9.

Protection:- The protection of all signal working parties from their own resources must be kept in mind at all times by section leaders.

10.

TRAINING OF ORs.

- (a) Bde Sig Officers should be responsible for training regimental signallers within their own Bdes.
- (b) COs Div Sigs should be responsible for training Regimental Sig Officers and NCOs and signal-tradesmen within their own division.
- (c) The higher training of NCOs and Officers of the Corps of Signals in jungle warfare should be the responsibility of the CSO.
- (d) Short courses of about one week's duration to bring out the lessons learnt in jungle warfare should be suitable.

11.

Training for ORs should include the following:-

- (a) Cable laying by hand on jungle tracks.
- (b) Making cable safe from falling trees, mud and traffic.
- (c) Building parties to follow laying parties. These might be alternated on successive days; as laying is more strenuous and building parties can move at a slower rate.
- (d) As R/T was found impossible in most places Regimental Sigs will need intense training in the W/T use of wireless sets issued to them.
- (e) All sigs should have extra training in the maintenance of equipment as very often skilled mechanics are not available.
- (f) Regimental sigs should also be trained in the use of AUSPLAY cipher - instructors being provided from the cipher personnel of formations.

12.

SIG PLATOON TRAINING.

- (a) Training of Sig Platoons should be on the general lines as laid down in Sig Training (All Arms) Sec 147.
- (b) Where MMG Platoons are attached, signallers from MG Bn sig platoon should also be attached.
- (c) E2 table now provides for additional telephones and cable for the mortar platoon. Personnel should be practised in the use of these for fire control.
- (d) Runners should be highly trained in bushcraft, as very often they will have to rely on their own initiative to get through.
- (e) Pioneer Bn Sig platoon should be trained on similar lines as Inf Bn.

13.

INF BDE AND ARTY REGT.

- (a) In the past, these sections have had ample transport for most needs. Training should now be carried out with minimum of transport.
- (b) Lateral communications between Bns will generally be confined to W/T and this should be practised in Bde signal exercises.

- (a) It is often found that the arty communications cover such a wide area that communications are beyond the resources of the Arty Regt Sig section, and assistance must be given from Div Sigs. That this assistance will be forthcoming can be assumed in arty exercises.

14.

DIV SIG EXERCISES.

- (a) Exercises for 1 Coy, Div Sigs should include:-
- (i) Movement in jungle country.
 - (ii) Use of heavier types of W/T sets.
 - (iii) Signal plans to include attached troops such as Arty, Light AA, Div Carrier Coy etc.

15.

GENERAL.

- (a) Some of the general problems to be considered in jungle training are:-
- (i) Preparation of stores for air dropping.
 - (ii) Use of natives (natives are readily adaptable to work other than purely manual labour).
 - (iii) Air co-operation.

...

NOTES ON THE TRAINING OF AAMC FOR TROPICAL WARFARE.1. Points for Officers - General

- (a) ALL officers of ALL branches, services and arms should be fully informed of the dangers and problems of malaria before entering a malarious station.

They should be trained in the full personal anti-malaria drill before moving, and should understand the rationale of the drill so that it can be passed on to their men and its importance appreciated.

- (b) A.A.M.C. officers should, in addition to Note (a), have some knowledge of the entomological aspects of the malaria problem and should be sufficiently trained to be able to indicate to C.O's units necessary work in camp or bivouac areas to help control mosquito breeding - siting of camps, drainage, spraying.
- (c) A.A.M.C. officers, especially R.M.O's should understand the effects of heat and humidity on troops and should know the practical application of salt loss, salt administration, fluid intake, etc., and should be in a position to pass on to non-medical regimental officers successfully instructions as to the welfare of troops in this regard.
- (d) A.A.M.C. officers prior to posting to a tropical station would benefit from a short intensive course on Tropical Medicine and should be in possession of the official handbook on tropical diseases.
- (e) A.A.M.C. officers should be fully trained in the supervision and sterilization of water supplies, without the use of carts and elaborate eqpt.


2. Points for officers - Field Training.

- (a) Officers of Fd Ambs and R.M.O's should appreciate and consider the question of equipment under tropical conditions of jungle warfare.

Excess unnecessary equipment must be recognised and "weeded out". Essential equipment should be so arranged that it can be packed in packs not exceeding 40 lbs. for carriage by the individual.

- (b) Physical fitness is most important. It is equally important in the tropics that equipment be regulated to the fitness of the individual.
- (c) Improvisation. In terms of 2(a) above it is obvious that improvisation becomes important, the most obvious way is in methods of carriage and improvised litters and stretchers become important.

Variations and modifications of a simple litter as per diagram are suggested.



Material bush wood
and lashings -
either rope or liana.

Correct methods of square and diagonal lashings should be taught.

Improvisation of splints
" beds
" tables
" cooking stoves } for use in
stationary
M.D.S. or A.D.S.

Methods of attaching improvised litters to web equipment should be studied.

Pern equipments should be used when these can be made available for training.

- (d) Medical Tactics for Jungle Warfare should be taught and discussed.

3. Points for Officers - G.C.S., Hospital. etc.

- (a) Principles governing "forward surgery" should be taught. Composition, equipment and function of Surgical Teams and Resuscitation teams.

The important factor here to stress is that the methods of evacuation BEHIND the Surgical Team must effect the treatment given at the Team's station - e.g. Is the patient to be carried back over jungle trails for days or flown back in minutes?

- (b) A high degree of professional efficiency in the diagnosis of superadded tropical conditions is necessary at the G.C.S. or Hospital, and as a corollary a parallel proficiency in treatment. e.g. Has the patient with a G.C.S. developed his fever from associated conditions or the wound or has he also malaria and/or Scrub Typhus? (This complex has occurred)

Generally in units of the type now under discussion the main requisite is an alert awareness of possibilities. It can be stated that these qualities are generally found and stimulation of them is not necessary.

4. Points for the Training of O.Rs.

- (a) ALL O.Rs of ALL Arms and Services.

All men should be trained in the use and rationale of personal anti-malaria measures before moving to a malarious station.

Clothing - to cover the maximum area of skin between sunset and sunrise.

Veils - gloves, etc.

Use and care of mosquito nets.

Repellants.

SUPPRESSIVE QUININE (or ATEBRIN). Rationale must be stressed.

The theory that sterility results must be extirpated. The men must be made to realise the importance to themselves of this factor in control.

- (b) ALL O.Rs of ALL Arms and Services should be taught the importance of caution when using native water sources. Individual water sterilising outfits should be demonstrated and should be available.

- (c) Similarly ALL O.Rs should be told of the effects of heat and should have the rationale of salt administration explained.

5. Points for the Training of O.Rs of A.A.M.C.

Field Training.

- (a) A high standard of physical fitness should be attained. The points mentioned in 4(a), (b) and (c) should be taught more intensively.

- (b) Improvisation of First Aid equipment should be taught and practised especially in regard to litters and splints.

Many casualties can be carried in a sitting position in stout light litters, leaning against the back of the leading bearer.

Attachment of stretchers or litters to webbing to leave hands free is easily carried out.

Pern equipment.

- (c) "Bush carpenters" should be encouraged against the day when the company becomes static temporarily in jungle (e.g. Myoh - 2/6 Fd Amb).

- (d) A high standard in surgical cleanliness, and the dressing of wounds is desirable.

- (e) Intravenous, intramuscular and hypodermic technique of injection should be taught to nursing orderlies.

- (f) Nursing N.C.O.s should be trained as far as possible in the recognition and treatment of malaria, with special attention to differential diagnosis.

- (g) All O.Rs AAMC Fd units should be instructed in:-

The prismatic compass.
Map reading.
Direction finding by stars.

- (h) Each Fd Amb should have a man trained in microscopy (blood films).

6. Points for the Training of O.Rs A.A.M.C.

C.C.Ss & Hospitals.

- (a) Each Hospital and C.C.S. should have O.Rs trained for duty in Surgical Team and Resuscitation Team. Replacements should be trained for both types of team.

- (b) Each Hospital and C.C.S. should train an Aerodrome Reception Team. It is NOT considered that this indicates an intense preoccupation with events in PORT MORESBY, as aerial evacuation of casualties will of necessity be developed in all warfare where aerodromes exist and roads are non-existent or bad.

Composition of the team would vary with the local picture but a suggested skeleton is:-

NCO in charge (either Nursing or Bearer)
Nursing Orderly I.
Bearers (minimum of 4)
Cook I.
Quartermaster N.C.O. or storeman (chiefly for onward transmission of medical stores).
Amb Drivers and Vehicles.

A Medical Officer could take charge and the whole team be expanded on a busy aerodrome.

War Diary *APR 14*
SECRET

GSI

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HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE REPORT 15

Compiled from information received from 11 Apr up to 1200 hrs 15 Apr 43

- (A) Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comd.
- (B) A receipt is NOT required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These reports will NOT be issued regularly.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS

(i) NE AUSTRALIA:

There have been reports of enemy submarines operating off the NE coast of Australia for some time. At the beginning of Apr an allied naval vessel attacked and probably sank a submarine near WESSEL Island. Submarine activity may account for a number of reports, as yet unconfirmed, which have been received since 8 Apr regarding possible enemy activity in the GULF of CARPENTARIA and ashore at various points. On 8 Apr two unidentified vessels were reported sixty miles North of NORMANTON. On 11 Apr there was a report that a party of enemy of unknown strength had landed near the NASSAU River. Other reports originated on that day referred to enemy movement near GALBRAITH approximately 120 miles North of NORMANTON. Reports were also received of probable enemy activity at AURUKUN. Full investigation is proceeding and so far there has been NO confirmation of any of the reports.

(iii) NEW GUINEA:

NE NEW GUINEA

MOROBÉ. An enemy reconnaissance aircraft was shot down on 11 Apr. The next day seven or eight bombs were dropped at MAROBÉ but we suffered NO damage or casualties. On 12 Apr P40's attacked two flights of medium bombers and one of fighters three miles North of CAPE WARD HUNT, destroying three bombers and one fighter. These enemy aircraft had probably participated in the raid on PORT MORESBY.

MUBO Area. On 9 Apr six A20's bombed and strafed MUBO-KITCHEN CREEK. Our patrol was fired on from an enemy stronghold position on OBSERVATION HILL and on 12 Apr a patrol was ambushed in this area but suffered only slight casualties. On 13 Apr it was reported that new enemy positions were being prepared in Kunai grass approximately 1100 yards WNW of the junction of the BITOI River and BUIGAP Creek. Three A20's effectively bombed and strafed the track at this point. Our patrol to the coast reported on 13 Apr that they had made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of DUALI but details have NOT yet been reported.

LAE-MARKHAM VALLEY. Although on 1 Apr there were NO enemy aircraft located at LAE or MALAHANG, there was ground activity in the area, particularly along the MARKHAM VALLEY. Our patrols reported that NO enemy were seen at KAIAPIT and ONGA, nine and one half miles SE of KAIAPIT, on 7 Apr. On 9 Apr there were NO enemy seen at MUNUM, thirteen miles NW of LAE. The next day allied aircraft made two attacks on the aerodrome at LAE starting large fires and explosions on the runway and destroying two buildings. Six B24's bombed the dispersal area on 12 Apr.

PART 1 (iii) Contd

FINSCHHAVEN. Bombing and strafing of this area was continued during the period under review, attacks being made by Allied aircraft on 8, 9, 11 and 13 Apr. On 11 Apr fires were started in the building area, but details of the other raids are NOT available.

The following villages are reported occupied by the enemy, SIO (65 miles SE SAIDOR) SIALUM ISLAND (35 miles NW FINSCHHAVEN) TANIGUDU (16 miles East HOPON), and BUKAUA (near HOPON).

MADANG. On 8 Apr heavy bombing and strafing was carried out by thirteen B 25's and ten Beau fighters. The runway and dispersal areas and the township were bombed resulting in fires in the town and a large petrol fire in the wharf area. At least two bombers were among five grounded aircraft destroyed. This was followed by a strafing attack from four Beau fighters on 9 Apr, and on 12 Apr one B24 started fires in the dock area.

ALEXISHAFEN. A successful air raid was made on 8 Apr when five barges were hit and others left smoking. The barges appeared to be loaded and there were several other small boats. The powerhouse, sawmills and other buildings were left burning fiercely. A further strafing attack was carried out by four fighters the next day.

BOGIA. In Report 14 attention was drawn to the further development in this area probably intended by the enemy to improve communications through to MADANG. Shipping activity on 12 and 13 Apr was on a large scale and tends to substantiate this suggestion. On 12 Apr heavy allied air attacks were carried out against ships in HANSA BAY and shore installations. Direct hits were scored on several cargo vessels which were left burning and some barges were capsized. Six fighters which intercepted were shot down.

On 13 Apr three destroyers, three transports of 8/10,000 tons each and three 3,000 ton cargo vessels were reported 41 miles NW of HANSA BAY on a course East by South.

WEWAK. Further to reports of enemy activity in this area and the impressing of native labour, it is stated that the majority of the natives show pro-Japanese tendencies, and enemy patrols active in the hinterland are receiving assistance. On 9 Apr shipping in the Harbour was attacked by ten B17's and six B24's. One 1,000 ton cargo ship was destroyed, one 500 ton ship received a direct hit, and fires were started in a 1500 ton vessel. The Camp area was heavily bombed. A/A positions were silenced and an ammunition dump exploded. Two fires were started at the seaplane base at KAIRIRU Island. On 12 Apr one B24 was intercepted by twelve fighters near WEWAK. It is reported that this bomber achieved the remarkable result of shooting down six for certain and probably another. Throughout the period under review shipping in this area has been intense and constructional activity has progressed, but on 1 Apr NO serviceable aircraft were reported on the landing fields at BUT, BORAM and WEWAK, nor have any been mentioned since, although at WEWAK blast bays capable of protecting eighty bombers have been constructed as well as fighter bays. Considerable progress has been made in development of the new strip at DAGUA. The cleared area extends for upwards of one mile, and the runway surface appears to have been graded. On 7 Apr there were indications that the enemy was concentrating stores near the mouth of the SEPIK River. A pontoon bridge had already been constructed across the river one mile from the mouth, and in view of the fact that this is a major engineering feat, the importance the enemy attaches to large scale movement of supplies probably by MT, along the coast road to MADANG becomes apparent.

PAPUA.

GOODENOUGH Island. Further isolated parties of Japs have been found on GOODENOUGH Island and during the period 8 - 12 Apr fourteen were killed and fourteen captured.

ORO BAY. Forty to forty-five fighters and dive bombers attacked PORT HARVEY on 11 Apr. Our intercepting fighters and A/A accounted for at least five dive bombers and eleven fighters for certain as well as one dive bomber and five fighters probably destroyed.

PORT MORESBY. On 12 Apr the enemy made a large scale air raid using approximately fifty medium bombers escorted by about the same number of fighters. Our airfields were the principal targets. Some damage was done to grounded aircraft and a large fuel dump was partially destroyed. Allied aircraft which intercepted, shot down sixteen bombers and eleven fighters for certain and probably destroyed seven bombers and one fighter. Our A/A claimed two bombers. The enemy pilots appeared to be experienced men who pressed home their attacks. An interesting feature of this raid is the fact that the enemy has now started to use the large reserve of medium bomber strength which has been built up in our North over a period of months. This reserve has been further heavily reinforced in the last few days, but as will be seen by referring to the Air Order of Battle set out in Part 2 of this Report, the greater part of this increased strength has been diverted to the SOLOMONS Area. The speed with which the Japs can transfer aircraft from the CAROLINES has often been demonstrated before, and now with the continued development of a line of bases forming an arc to the North of AUSTRALIA, it is a simple matter to shift his concentrations of force in a minimum of time to threaten or defend any point desired. This is a factor that becomes daily of more importance in assessing enemy intentions and potentiality, as the process of development in these bases gathers momentum in spite of our harrassing air offensives.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

NEW BRITAIN

RABAUL. A number of sorties were made by allied aircraft on 11 Apr against shipping and against the aerodromes at VUNAKANAU, RAPOPO and LAKUNAI.

At the aerodromes fires were caused, which in the case of VUNAKANAU were visible for fifty miles. Two intercepting fighters were shot down. Little information is available concerning the attacks made on shipping, but photographs on 12 Apr showed the following ships in the Harbour -

- 10 Destroyers (One large)
- 4 Submarines
- 1 Submarine Chaser
- 1 Minesweeper
- 2 Destroyer tenders
- 4 Tankers
- 55 merchant vessels (totalling 181,000 tons and including two merchant vessels off KOKOPO).

OPEN BAY. On 8 Apr much track activity at the sawmill at PONDO Point was reported, and on the same day one B24 strafed ULAMONA.

UBILI was bombed and strafed by one B17 on 11 Apr, but there was NO enemy activity apparent at this point.

TALASEA. Buildings were bombed by one B17 on 11 Apr with unreported results.

GASMATA. Two separate attacks were made each by one B17 against the runway and dispersal areas on 11 Apr. Bombs fell in the target area.

NEW IRELAND.

NAMATANAI. On 8 Apr the KAVIENG-NAMATANAI Road appeared to be in good condition and showed evidence of heavy use. Although the aerodrome was overgrown with grass and appeared unserviceable it looked capable of rapid improvement. Adequate quarters for personnel were seen in the vicinity.

KAVIENG. Enemy shipping movement around this area between 8 and 11 Apr has been observed on a large scale. Included in the sightings have been a large proportion of cruisers and destroyers indicating the use of warships for supply to newly developed bases.

On 8 Apr the PANAPAI strip appeared serviceable with the revetments completed.

(V) SOLOMON ISLANDS:

It has been mentioned for some time past that enemy shipping in this area showed a noticeable increase and that work on various aerodromes was progressing. Reference to the air Order of Battle set out in Part 2 of this Report shows that a very substantial increase has been effected in the number of aircraft contained at enemy bases in the SOLOMONS. The process of reinforcement may be incomplete but already it has become apparent that this transfer of power is to implement an offensive role against Allied bases in GUADALCANAL and against allied shipping traffic and submarine action.

On 7 Apr an enemy force of fifty bombers and forty eight fighters attacked Allied shipping at TULAGI IS and KOLI PT GUADALCANAL.

As a result of interception twenty one T.O. Mk I ZEKES and five bombers were destroyed.

(vi) N.E.I. Area:

DUTCH NEW GUINEA. Allied air operations have been on a reduced scale in this area during the period under review, but enemy shipping continues to carry supplies to the many points where constructional activity is in progress, particularly is this noticeable at HOLLANDIA in HUMBOLDT BAY.

On 9 and 10 Apr air attacks were made in the TIMOEKA area where damage was done to a probable supply dump and to huts in the vicinity of the strip.

AROE ISLANDS. One Hudson bombed DOBO and CAPE PATOEDJOERIED on 9 Apr and the town area of DOBO on 10 Apr. Details are NOT available of the results of these attacks, nor of the strafing carried out by one B24 against two 200 ton vessels near the mouth of the MAIKOOR River twenty five miles SSW of DOBO.

KAI ISLANDS. Photographs taken on 29 Mar confirm that forty three buildings in the centre of the town of TOEAL have been destroyed by air attacks. TOEAL is an excellent seaplane alighting area and flying-boat base. The town lies in a valley on the shores of a small bay on the Western shore of KAI DOEHAL Island. It surrounds a U shaped harbour with land on all sides except the North. LANGGOER and WATDEK are approximately one and a half and half miles respectively SSW of TOEAL.

One B24 bombed TOEAL on 12 Apr and a Hudson attacked KOLSEER on 13 Apr. KOLSEER is a village at the West end of LANGGOER strip.

TIMOR. Six Hudsons bombed and strafed OSSU (126°23'E 8°45'S) and VIQUEQUE (126°22'E 8°52'S) on 10 Apr. Most bombs fell in the target areas demolishing huts and starting large fires.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops Revsits 253-257; FAA Int Sum 48; AMF Weekly Int Review 36; AAF Int Sum 92-93).

Attached as Appendix "A" is information - Japanese Forces on GUADALCANAL

PART 2 : ENEMY

(i) ORDER OF BATTLE

(a) Land

The following units have been identified in NEW GUINEA -

18 Army	177 personnel of this HQ were lost on board the HUON GULF convoy 2-3 Mar 43.
51 Div	Remnants only. 66 Inf Regt of this Div is reported to be in the RABAU-SOLOMONS area, while 102 and 115 Inf Regt, which were on board the HUON GULF convoy of 2-3 Mar, are both reported to be now non-effective.
21 IIB	Elements only.
Two Regts (20 Div)	One located at WEWAK and one possibly at MADANG.
Two Regts (41 Div)	WEWAK.
SASEBO 5 SNLP	Part at SALAMAU.
MAIZURU 2 SNLP	LAE-SALAMAU.
Army Air Unit	WEWAK.

(AMF Int Sum 33)

(b) Air

Estimated enemy land-based air strength as at 9 Apr 43.

AREAS	F	H/D	S/EE	F/D	F/P	Trans & Obsn A/C	Total	Comparative 2 Apr.
<u>N.E. AREA:</u>								
New Britain	54	120	32	8	13	13	240	273
New Ireland	18	18			4		40	76
New Guinea					5		5	5
Solomons	172	18	58	7	30	4	289	113
<u>N.W. AREA:</u>								
Timor	23	20			3	4	50	47
Ambon	18	18		3	9		48	48
Aroe Is	17				5		22	22
Dutch NG								
Celebes	59	40			12	12	123	123
	361	234	90	18	81	33	817	707

(AMF Int Summary 93)

(v) Equipment:

Further Japanese Aircraft - SWPA

Type 97 L/B BABS

Three models of this basic type are known. The principal differences are in the engine installation and cowling.

BABS is a two or three seated aircraft powered by a single radial engine of one of the following listed types:- (a) 9 cyl. Nakajima Kotobuki engine developing 550 h.p. at 11,500', (b) Nakajima Sakae 14 cyl. twin-row engine developing approximately 985 h.p. at 7,500', or (c) a Mitsubishi Kinsei 14 cyl. engine of 1,060 h.p. at 6,500'.

It is a conventional low-wing monoplane of stressed skin construction and has a fixed undercarriage. A fairing behind the cockpits extends along the fuselage and merges into the fin. The armament is 2 x 7.7 mm mgs of the Vickers type, synchronised, and 1 x 7.7 mm mg of the Lewis type in a dorsal position.

PART 2 (v) Contd.

SECRET

The span of this aircraft is approximately 40', and the length approximately 28'.

NO aircraft of this type has ever been examined in this theatre but a reconnaissance photograph, taken after a strafing attack on an enemy aerodrome, SWPA, shows an aircraft of this type burning fiercely in the wing roots on both sides of the fuselage. It is quite possible that the fuel tanks are located in this section of the aircraft.

(AAF Int Summary 90)

PART 3 : TOPOGRAPHICAL

(ii) Other Areas -

Attached as Appendix "B", report on overland route
MADANG-TINSCHAFEN.
Attached as Appendix "C" Map SOLOMONS SEA Area.

PART 5 : SECURITY

JAPANESE PRONUNCIATION:

Japanese inability to pronounce passwords containing several "l's" has been widely discussed, but the equal or even greater difficulty of the "v" sound is perhaps less widely known. Internee YOSHIDA Yisuo is an educated young Japanese who can pronounce "lallapaloosa" quite well, but is quite incapable of saying "very" "vehicle" or "vandal", all of which he pronounces as "w's". YOSHIDA studied English for seven years under an American missionary in SUMATRA and has a good general control of the language.

SECURITY OF MAPS AND DOCUMENTS:

Further to HQ 2 Aust Corps Int Report 6, is additional information to Part 5 - Japanese Reproduction of our Maps.

"In view of definite proof from captured documents that the enemy is making systematic and well-organised efforts toward quick reproduction and issue of captured Allied maps of general use, it is desired that the following security measures be impressed on all members of your command:-

- (a) That only those maps absolutely necessary for a mission will be taken into the immediate combat zone.
- (b) That operational maps in excess of immediate mission needs are properly safeguarded."

(AMF Weekly Int Review 36).

Am. Rogers
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Int Report 13.

S E C R E T

JAPANESE FORCES ON GUADALCANAL

With the close of operations on GUADALCANAL some additional information has become available on the Japanese forces on the island. The following is taken from G-2 Information Bulletin No 10, Headquarters USAFISPA.

Supply

Japanese soldiers were continually being encountered, which were reported as "round faced and well fed". On the same days reports would be received of encounters with emaciated and starving Japanese.

As our forces advanced they captured supplies of foodstuffs in the KOKUMBONA Area and also to the west. In addition much food was destroyed while being floated ashore in drums from ships and submarines, indicating some food was available. Each submarine could deliver about ten tons of food.

The big problem of the Japanese was apparently the local delivery of rations. Troops along the coast and in the rear areas appeared well fed, but the troops on the south flank could NOT obtain the food necessary for a full ration.

In the planning of some operations on GUADALCANAL, the Japs have shown an optimism in the expected outcome of battles. This optimism has been transmitted to the supply echelon so that it was necessary to win a victory on schedule, to continue adequate supply operations. Troops from the Ichiki Detachment that attacked east of the airfield on September 12, carried only three days' rations with NO reserve in the rear. Consequently the few that survived the attack were immediately faced with the problem of food supply.

The Japs adopted the system of having each company send carriers back for rations, which were then carried forward. With a rough terrain, and our air operations, this was as much as a two or three day trip from the front to the dump and return. This would NOT provide a full ration for the units so the men were put on reduced rations. This plus the drain from jungle operations made the soldiers easy marks for Malaria, Beri Beri, and Diarrhoea. Eventually the condition became so bad in some units that half sick men were sent to carry rations and the journey took a correspondingly longer time.

Air transportation of food to these troops on the south flank was considered and attempted with limited success. On January 25 or 26, twenty five parachutes of food and supplies were dropped to units up in the jungle. Those parachutes were strafed by our planes, starting some fires so it is believed only part of the supplies were received by the troops.

The Japs will undoubtedly continue to attempt the use of air supply, when the situation demands it. Given conditions of their air bases being nearer the front and the ability to gain local air superiority, it should be as successful as were our air supply operations on GUADALCANAL.

The Japs used all types of native foods that were available. Ant nests are reported as very good eating by one Japanese soldier. All varieties of food were used by the Japs on GUADALCANAL. But the normal issue was field rations and dehydrated foods including powdered eggs. It is doubtful if perishable food was issued to front-line troops, but some was obtained. Difficulty was experienced in keeping this fresh until eaten. In some cases the food was buried in the field cemeteries for safekeeping.

S E C R E T

Stealing of food became quite common. Ration dumps required extra guards, and special precautions. Towards the end the situation became so bad that an emergency court-martial was appointed to deal with the special cases of stealing rations with instruction from the appointing officer to inflict drastic punishment. Rations were reported as being frequently stolen from carriers en route to the front.

Medical

Each individual soldier is issued a First Aid kit reported to contain a triangular bandage, water purification chemicals, and a month's supply of morphine prophylactic. There are two first aid men for each company that carried iodine or mercurochrome, morphine, Vitamin tablets, medicine for diarrhoea and a knife.

Most of the time the medical detachments were short of supplies, while the hospitals on GUADALCANAL were better supplied. However, they would NOT share any of their medical supplies with the field units.

Morale

The Japanese morale during the GUADALCANAL operations was at a higher level than was at first thought to be the case. The Kuma Butai landed east of the airfield and participated in the attack on September 12. After the attack there were only about 70 men left, from the 1,000 or so making the attack. With only three days' rations on hand, the men of the Regimental Artillery began the trek overland to the west to join the rest of the Japanese forces. They pulled their guns for four days over the rough trails and terrain, then hurried them to keep them from falling into our hands. They continued their march and rejoined the Jap forces making the trip in two weeks. Only about half the men that started the hike reached the objective as the others either died or became sick.

The officers and men of the units pocketed on the south flank about mid-January, knew they would or could NOT be relieved yet the units continued to resist, in one of these pockets the soldiers charged, reaching the U.S. lines, but were too weak to continue the assault. Only a few soldiers of these units surrendered when asked to do so in a broadcast by one of our officers, who was later assisted by one of their corporals. It is known that the broadcast was heard by the trapped units.

NCOs of the units on our south flank were known to squabble over food when the situation became critical. Yet discipline was such that these NCOs would apologize to their commanding officer for their "unseemly conduct."

An officer captured in the final days of GUADALCANAL expressed great disillusionment over the aims and promises of the high command and resentment at withdrawal of the "brass hats" from the island. He stated that higher officers were known to abandon front line units when the fighting became desperate. It is NOT known if enough of the lower grades were removed from GUADALCANAL to permit widespread dissemination of the abandonment of the forces on the island.

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AAF Int Summary 90

Appendix "B" to 2 Aust Corps Intelligence Report 15

OVERLAND ROUTE : HADANG-FINSCHHAFFEN

HADANG-BOGADJIM-SAIDOR-FINSCHHAFFEN (13 days)

1. HADANG-BOGADJIM (See Report 14, Appx "B" Section 3 (a))
2. BOGADJIM-CAPE RIGNEY (1 day).

A coastal track, unfit for vehicular traffic but suitable for pack transport leads from BOGADJIM to CAPE RIGNEY. Frequent small and large rivers intersect the track. The surface is good in any weather, and improves with light rain.

Few details of the track are available at present, but it is known that the KABENAU River is fast flowing and difficult to ford. The coast is wooded, but there are occasional coconut groves, plantations, and native gardens. MELAMU Harbour lies West of GARAGASSI Point, and MELAMU plantation lies between the harbour and the KABENAU River, NOT as shown on the 4" strat map, or the Aust Aeronautical 1/1,000,000.

3. CAPE RIGNEY-SAIDOR (2 days approx.)

NO details of this portion of the coast are available. The country consists of grassy foothills deeply dissected by streams.

SAIDOR Aerodrome is unserviceable at present, but the Japanese are stated to be working on it. The track along this portion of the coast is probably good, as SAIDOR was the administration centre for this area (RAI coast), and Government tracks joined all the neighbouring villages

4. SAIDOR-SIO (4 days approx). NO information is available.
5. SIO-HELDSBACH (4 days approx).

This route is level except for short descents to cross streams. Most of the rivers are easily forded, except in flood. Two rivers, the DALLMAN River, and one unnamed, have to be canoed across. Pack transport may be used from KELANOA to HELDSBACH.

(a) SIO-KELANOA. From SIO through MAMBARIWA the country is level and grassy but approaching KELANOA, the track passes through a natural tunnel, and enters a region of broken cliffs, some of which have to be climbed by ladder. The track then leads over the difficult DALLMAN River to KELANOA.

(b) KELANOA-SIALUM. NO information.

(c) SIALUM-WANDOKAI. Grassed coral terraces intersected by streams which are difficult for a horse to cross. Large streams are easily forded near their mouths.

(d) WANDOKAI-LAKONA. Grass terraces here are intersected by streams lined by forest. The MASAWENG River is fast, wide, gravelly, and uncrossable in flood.

(f) LAKONA-BONGA-HELDSBACH. The first section of the track is over grassland and forest. The SONG River, between BONGA and KATIKA, is easily forded.

6. HELDSBACH-FINSCHHAFFEN (one day). A motor road joins these two points.

BOGADJIM	5°26'S	145°44'E	LAKONA	6°21'S	147°28'E
KABENAU R.	5°35'S	145°49'E	MASAWENG R.	6°21'S	147°43'E
MELAMU HR	5°30'S	145°52'E	BONGA	6°25'S	147°49'E
RIGNEY CAPE	5°28'S	146°01'E	SONG R.	6°26'S	147°46'E
GARAGASSI PT	5°29'S	145°50'E	HELDSBACH	6°29'S	147°49'E
SAIDOR	5°39'S	146°29'E	FINSCHHAFFEN	6°32'S	147°49'E
SIO	5°55'S	147°22'E			
MAMBARIWA	5°58'S	147°26'E			
DALLMAN R.	6°01'S	147°28'E			
KELANOA	6°00'S	147°30'E			
SIALUM	6°05'S	147°35'E			
WANDOKAI	6°18'S	147°47'E			

..... (Compiled from AGS Terrain
Studies numbers 31 & 36).
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
SOLOMON SEA

MULLAU IS.
△

Appx "C" to HQ 2 Aust Corps
Int Report 15.

ADMIRALTY
ISLANDS

PACIFIC OCEAN



Traced from Geographical
Sec. General Staff
MAP No 3860
CSI (L) 2 AUST CORPS

ROSSER IS.
TAGULA IS.
SCALE 1:4,000,000

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Subject: SD INSTRUCTION No 42.
Duty Officers.

2 Aust Corps,
/2 Apr 43.
G 2681.

Distribution: List F,
plus all Duty Officers,
Battle Room folder.

1. Until further orders, the following will be carried out by Duty Officer in addition to the duties as laid down in SD Instruction No 41.
2. 6 Aust Div and 7 Aust Div will advise the Duty Officer each night at approximately 2100 hrs, details of all arrivals and departures of divisional personnel into or out of the Corps area, from 2000 hrs on the previous night to 2000 hrs on the night the information is given.
3. The following pro-forma will be filled in and placed in the AQLGs tray, prior to 0800 hrs on the following day.

Personnel - Arrivals and Departures 6 and 7 Aust divs during 24 hours ended			
Arrivals.	6 Aust Div		7 Aust Div
	Offrs	ORs	Offrs ORs
1. From leave			
2. From HQ.			
3. From Hospital			
4. Unit arrivals			
5. Other arrivals.			
Totals.			
Departures.			
1. On leave			
2. To hospital			
3. Unit departures			
4. Other departures.			
Totals.			

Duty Officer.

R L Bond Capt
for BGS,
2 Aust Corps,

Appendices "A" and "A" (1) NOT attached.

21/138
S E C R E T

Copy No 63

GSI

HQ 2 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE REPORT 14

Compiled from information received from 7 Apr up to 1200 hrs 10 Apr 43

- (A) Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comd.
- (b) A receipt is NOT required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These reports will NOT be issued regularly.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS

(iii) NEW GUINEA:

N.E. NEW GUINEA

HUBO Area. Following upon the bombing and strafing around KITCHEN CREEK, LABABIA IS and DUALI carried out on 2 Apr, further similar attacks were made on 3 and 4 Apr. Our patrols reported NO enemy or natives encountered in this area nor was any barge activity observed from LABABIA IS, although on 7 Apr voices were clearly heard in this vicinity.

SALAMUA. In this area allied bombing attacks were made every day from 4 to 7 Apr inclusive. The attack made on 5 Apr was by seven B25s and six A20s. Large fires were started in the building area, and an A/A position silenced. The next day a B17 demolished a building opposite GUINEA AIRWAYS and also the jetty. Six B17s participated in the raid on 7 Apr and all bombs fell in the building area around McDONALDS JUNCTION.

LAE. There were NO serviceable aircraft observed here on 31 Mar but as mentioned in Report 12 the enemy are working on the runway, and ground defences are still being developed. A heavy bombing and strafing attack was made by twelve B25s, six A20s and nine Beaufighters at HEATHS PLANTATION on 3 Apr. Fires were started and buildings damaged.

FINSCHHAVEN. The area was the subject of attacks by a B17 on 5, 6 and 7 Apr. Bombs were dropped around the airfield and buildings strafed.

It is reported that on 8 Apr our OP was discovered but the observer escaped with his transmitter. Observation of the area continues. A vessel, possibly a destroyer, was reported on 5 Apr beached approximately five miles North of FINSCHHAVEN. This may be the destroyer referred to in Report 13 as having been attacked on 29 Mar. The suggestion that some reinforcement and landing of supplies was carried out from the convoy of which this destroyer was a part, is supported by the barge activity in the area shortly after the attack and by a report of twelve to fifteen canvas tents on the hillside 900 yards West of the jetty.

Attempts having been frustrated in the past to reinforce the LAE garrison direct, it may be the enemy's intention to land essential supplies at FINSCHHAVEN, and even further North, with the object of transporting them along the coastal track and by the use of coastal barges.

SAIDOR. Enemy movement in this area continues along the coast and patrols are penetrating inland. The strength of the force is variously estimated between 100 and 500 troops, besides which the enemy appear to be using native labour to develop the landing strip. Strafing attacks were made on 4 and 6 Apr. In the latter case bombs were dropped over a wide area and photographs reveal surrounding villages in flames.

PART 1 (iii) Contd.

MADANG. The runway appears to be serviceable but NO enemy aircraft have been observed in the area during the period under review. Nevertheless enemy activity continues with the construction of bridges and tracks to the North, lending colour to a suggestion that it is the intention to bring supplies over-land from BOGIA to this area.

Allied aircraft bombed and strafed some of these bridges on 1 and 2 Apr. On 5 Apr a B17 bombed the building area at MADANG and silenced an A/A position at the east end of the runway.

ALEXISHAFEN. Further development has been reported and photographic reconnaissance on 25 Mar indicated that dispersal lanes on the NW side of the runway had been connected to form a loop and that portions of the loop had been graded. The serviceability of the runway now appears to be doubtful. NO further reference has been made of a new strip under construction which was mentioned in Report 12.

A Catalina strafed a large building at ALEXISHAFEN on 2 Apr.

MALAS. Allied air reconnaissance on 31 Mar reported a possible fighter landing strip at this point which is thirty two miles NNW of ALEXISHAFEN.

BOGIA. Latest reports indicate that the enemy occupying-force is between 150 to 300 which suggests that further development is intended. Roads and bridges have been repaired in the area and patrols have been active NW to the SEPIK River, SE along the track to MEDANG, and along the RAMU River to BOSMAN.

WEWAK. Work completed in this area clearly shows that preparations are being made for the development of WEWAK into a major operational base and there are further indications of an overland linkup with MADANG. Native reports of patrols operating inland from WEWAK are probably associated with reconnaissance for developmental plans and a search for native labour. The fact that there is a good landing ground at BURUI, capable of development into an operational base, may be significant insofar as BURUI, which is forty seven miles SW from WEWAK, is in a direct line with MERAUKE on the SW coast of NEW GUINEA.

Although WEWAK has an open harbour, there is evidence that the approaches have been mined.

A B24 attacked shipping on 7 Apr with unreported results.

PAPUA. There have been further reports of isolated parties of Japs landed in the Islands off the NE coast and most of these have been killed.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:NEW BRITAIN

RABUL. There have been very few reports of this area during the period under review, but on 6 Apr approximately seventy five vessels were sighted in SIMPSON Harbour

OPEN BAY. On 7 Apr a B24 bombed and strafed the sawmill at ULAMONA near UBILI. This followed bombing attacks on 2 and 4 Apr directed against building areas and the jetty at ULAMONA.

GASMATA. The airfield is reported still unserviceable but the enemy are working on blast pens. Our air attacks carried out on 1, 2 and 3 Apr respectively were directed against the strip, buildings in the wharf area, and again on the airfield.

CAPE GLOUCESTER. Bombs were dropped in the dispersal area and on the runway by allied aircraft on 2, 4, 5 and 7 Apr and some damage was also caused to buildings near the waterfront.

NEW IRELAND, KAVIENG. There is still a large amount of shipping traffic in and around this port and intense constructional activity is proceeding on shore. On 8 Apr one B24 bombed the new strip at PANAPAI which is 4,000 yards SE of KAVIENG. Results were NOT observed.

Concurrently with the development of KAVIENG as a sea base the increased enemy air strength in the area may be significant and the fact that dispersal bays and blast pens are being constructed at the KAVIENG drome and PANAPAI suggests that still further aircraft reinforcement of the base is intended.

(v) SOLOMON ISLANDS: Sightings of enemy shipping around the Islands occupied by the Japanese continue to be reported on a large scale with cruisers and destroyers predominating. At the same time a pronounced increase of enemy air strength has been observed. These factors would indicate that the enemy's plans go beyond supply and maintenance of the present position in the SOLOMONS. Allied counter measures involve almost daily sorties against shipping and airfields. One of these attacks, carried out by four Catalinas caused intense fires which were left burning in the dispersal area at BUKA drome. It is reported that the aerodrome at MUNDA in NEW GEORGIA is in bad condition as a result of continual allied bombing and that there are NO operational aircraft stationed there.

(vi) N.E.I. Area:

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

TIMOeka. A number of buildings are reported around the runway which is nearing completion. Allied aircraft attacked the area on 3 Apr and bombed and strafed barges, huts and trucks on the runway. Two raids were carried out on 5 Apr and large fires were started. The runway was again attacked on 8 Apr.

KAUKENAU. On 8 Apr a Hudson bombed and strafed twelve barges and a patrol vessel twenty three miles West by North of KAUKENAU. The patrol vessel and three barges were hit and fired and the remainder were damaged.

BABO. On 31 Mar there were seventeen blast pens off the East-West runway and signs of further general development at the aerodrome. Four B25s attacked on 7 Apr and bombs caused explosions and fires.

AROE ISLANDS. A Hudson bombed KENARI Island which is approximately fourteen miles North by West of DOBO and also the sawmills at WOKAM, eight miles NW of DOBO. All bombs fell in the target area. DOBO was attacked on 7 Apr, but results have NOT been reported.

KAI ISLANDS. Preparation of the East-West runway at LANGGOER is progressing slowly and the construction of six fighter blast pens is well advanced.

TANIMBAR ISLANDS. SAUMLAKI was effectively bombed and strafed by one Hudson on 6, 7 and 8 Apr and buildings seem to have suffered considerable damage. The enemy recently has been increasing his defence positions in the town area of this important harbour and seaplane alighting area.

TIMOR. Enemy shipping traffic in this area is still being maintained and has been particularly noticeable at LAUTEM where supplies for FUILORO Aerodrome are normally offloaded.

BALI

DENPASAR. The aerodrome is serviceable but unoccupied by the enemy, except perhaps for a skeleton ground crew. It appears from photographs as though the Japanese planned large extensions and then abandoned all work.

S E C R E T

PART 1 (vi) Contd.

BALI (Contd.)

TAFELHOEK. The aerodrome is now abandoned, a road crosses it and the field is planted with maize or rice.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops Revsits 247-252; FAA Int Sum 48; AMF Weekly Int Review 35; HQ NGF Int Sum 115, and AAF Int Sum 90-91.)

PART 2 : ENEMY

(i) Order of Battle

(a) Land

<u>48 Division</u>	6151	
GOC		Lt-Gen TSUCHIHASHI, Yuitsu
HQ Div Inf	6152	Maj-Gen ABE, Koichi
4 Formosa Inf Regt	6153	Col TAKASHIMA Tatsuhiko
2 Formosa Inf Regt	6154	Col YOSHIDA, Shingo
47 Inf Regt	6155	Col YANAGI, Isamu
Recce Det	6156	Col KITAMURA, Kuro
48 Mtn Arty Regt	6157	Col YAMAGUCHI, Karyo
48 Engr Regt	6158	Col YANAGI, Toshio
48 Tpt Regt	6159	Col TASAKA, Satoshi

48 Div was formed in 1941 by the expansion of the Formosa Mixed Brigade and the addition of 47 Inf Regt from 6 Div and was stationed at FOOCHOW. In Oct 1941 the Div was sent to FORMOSA where it remained until Dec of the same year and then took part in the invasion of the PHILIPPINES, although it was NOT engaged in any heavy fighting. At the conclusion of the fighting at BATAAN in Apr 1942 the Div was withdrawn to FORMOSA. It has been identified in South CHINA and is reported to have sailed from HONG KONG early in Oct 1942. 48 Div together with 25 Special Base Force and 48 Embarkation office is now located in TIMOR, less detachments at BALI, SOEMBAWA, SOEMBA, FLORES, TANIMBAR and AROEIs.

(Compiled from information received from USA Military Int Service and NGF Weekly Int Summary 114 and AMF Int Review 38.)

(b) Air: Estimated enemy land-based air strength as at 2 Apr 43.

AREAS	F	M/B	S/EB	F/B	F/P	Trans & Obsn A/C	T O T A L
<u>N.E. AREA:</u>							
New Britain	111	96	32	8	13	13	273
New Ireland	36	36			4		76
New Guinea					5		5
Solomons	54	8	15	8	24	4	113
<u>N.W. AREA</u>							
Timor	23	20				4	47
Ambon	18	18		3	9		48
Aroe Is. }	17				5		22
Dutch N.G. }	59	40			12	12	123
Celebes							
	318	218	47	19	72	33	707

(AAF Intell Summary 91)

S E C R E T

(v) Equipment:

Japanese Aircraft in the S.W.P.A.

Type 97 SSF NATE

1. This fighter had been the standard Army SSF and may still be encountered in small numbers in this theatre. It is powered by a single 9 cylinder Nakajima Hikari engine, rated 790 h.p. at 11,500. It is a low wing monoplane with a fixed undercarriage. The cantilever wing has a straight leading edge and tapered to rounded tips on the trailing edge. The standard armament is 2 x 7.7 mm. synchronized mgs., but 2 x 7.7 mm. guns are sometimes carried in the wings outside the airscrew arc, one gun in each wing. NATE is relatively slow, but has a high rate of climb and is exceptionally manoeuvrable. NO armour or fuel tank protection is carried and NATES burn quickly when struck in a vulnerable spot. The span is 35' 7"; the length is 24' 4".

The Zero Family.

2. Perhaps the most frequent and one of the more formidable Naval A/C types encountered in this theatre is the type 0 Mk 1 SSF ZEKE. From its basic design two other entirely new aircraft have evolved. They are a float plane version called RUFE, and the latest and most formidable of the present Japanese Naval fighters, HAP. None of these aircraft has self-sealing tanks or armour plate.

Type 0 Mk 1 SSF ZEKE

3. ZEKE is powered by a single Nakajima Sakae Model 12 engine, developing approximately 930 h.p. at 11,500'. This engine is of the radial, 14 cylinder twin-row variety, and is equipped with a single speed supercharger. ZEKE is a low wing monoplane with leading and trailing edges tapered to rounded tips on the mainplane. The undercarriage is fully retractable. The standard armament is 2 x 7.7 mm. Vickers Type M/Gs. synchronized, and 2 x 20 mm. Oerlikon type cannons mounted one in each wing outboard of the airscrew arc. Our .50 cal. M/Gs outrange the ZEKE 20 mm. cannon. ZEKE is a fast fighter with a high rate of climb and excellent manoeuvrability under 300 m.p.h. indicated air speed. It has a tremendous range (1,500 to 1,600 miles) with an external gas load. The span is 39' 4" and length is 28' 5".

Type 0 Mk 1 SSF F/P RUFE

4. RUFE is basically the same A/C as ZEKE but is equipped with a float. RUFE is manufactured as a fighter float plane and is NOT changed from the conventional land fighter to the sea-borne version as the occasion demands. This was a popular theory which has now been definitely exploded.

Type 0 Mk 2 SSF HAP

5. HAP is an aircraft similar externally to ZEKE with the exception of the wing tips which present a squared appearance. This aircraft is powered by a Nakajima Sakae Model 21 which is estimated to be approximately 200 h.p. greater than that of ZEKE and is equipped with a two speed supercharger. The aileron area as well as the wing area has been reduced, to afford greater manoeuvrability at high speed. Altitude operation above 20,000 feet is superior to ZEKE. HAP's span is 36' 6" and length is 28' 5".

Type 1 SSF OSCAR.

6. This aircraft appears to have been derived from NATE's design with numerous improvements and changes incorporated. It is a low wing monoplane with fully retractable undercarriage. OSCAR is the standard Army fighter and is used in large numbers in this theatre. A similar model of this A/C is also used by the Navy. OSCAR is powered by a single Nakajima Sakae, 14 cylinder twin row radial engine of approximately 950 h.p. OSCAR is more manoeuvrable, at speeds under 300 m.p.h. indicated, than ZEKE. It has a higher rate of climb than ZEKE, but is approximately 30 m.p.h. slower. In OSCAR's cowling are mounted two synchronized machine-guns. One of these guns is a standard 7.7 mm. Vickers Type, but the other gun is a 12.7 mm. of the Browning type. This is the only armament carried by OSCAR.

S E C R E T

(v) Equipment:

Japanese aircraft in the S.W.P. (Contd.)

Type 1 SSF OSCAR (Contd.)

OSCAR is equipped with self-sealing fuel tanks which have NOT proven very effective against either .30 cal. or .50 cal. fire.

Attached as Appendix "A" is photograph of Japanese fuses together with Appendix A1, Japanese Fuse and Ammunition Chart.

PART 3 : TOPOGRAPHICAL

(ii) Other Areas -

Attached is Appendix "B", report on existing overland routes to LAE.

Attached as Appendix "C" is continuation of S.W.P.A. series 1/4,000000 map of central NEW GUINEA showing enemy overland routes to LAE.

PART 5 : SECURITY & CENSORSHIP

Careless Use of Office Paper: A private letter which was intercepted through censorship was harmless in itself but one page on which it was written bore the clear type impression of a letter which, deciphered with the aid of a magnifying glass, was clearly read. The writer is employed in the office of an Army Department and the deciphered letter was from that Department to the Inspector General of Munitions dealing with certain secret supplies. This draws attention to a practice among typists when typing on thin paper to use a new sheet of paper as a protection for the type and roller. Backing paper so used will bear the impression of the letter and care should be taken that it is NOT subsequently used. (RAAF Int Weekly Summary 39)


Unit Security and Censorship. An analysis of reports from many sources indicates that officers and troops generally do NOT appear to understand their responsibilities in so far as it concerns security of information.

Soldiers' mail compares very unfavourably with mail from Naval and RAAF personnel. Troop dispositions and movements are freely discussed and security is poor.

The standard of franking by officers is generally low, and in many cases franking displays either negligence or ignorance of the relevant instructions - AFGI No 22, etc. The percentage of letters written by Army personnel and posted in civil boxes which requires treatment by censorship is NO higher than the percentage of franked letters which requires similar treatment.

Attention has had to be drawn many times to the numbers of franked parcels containing captured enemy material; and the privilege of the use of green envelopes is being abused.

To deny information to the enemy the hearty and willing co-operation of all ranks is essential. It is apparent that Unit Security Officers should concentrate on educating their units, both officers and men, on security of information and censorship. (AHQ Int Sum 40).


Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Int Report 13.

Appendix "B" to 2 Aust Corps Intelligence Report 14.

OVERLAND ROUTES TO LAE

S E C R E T

1. FINSCHHAFEN - LAE 4-5 days.

(a) FINSCHHAFEN-HOPOI : 3 days.

FINSCHHAFEN - MAPE (BUBUI) River - earth motor road. The river is 380 yards wide and can only be crossed by boat.

SIMBANG-BUTALA : The track follows the coast sometimes making use of the beach itself, and is suitable for pack transport. Numerous small streams have to be crossed.

BUTALA-HOPOI: The track passes round the head of the estuary of the MANGI (BULESON) River.

(b) HOPOI-LAE (4 day)

This section is good, the only obstacle being the BUSU River, which is difficult to cross after rain.

The time of four days for the total distance is a minimum for foot traffic. The carrying of supplies along this route would increase the time taken to five days at least. Although the main sections of the route are suitable for pack transport, there are two main obstacles to the use of pack animals - the MAPE and MANGI Rivers. The difficulties of overland transport at present are such that the use of boats is preferable.

2. WEWAK-BOGIA-MADANG (17 days)

This track is being developed by the Japanese. Travel over the route at present entails crossing the deltas and lagoons of the RAMU and SEPIK Rivers.

(a) WEWAK-WATAM (8 days)

The most used route is from WEWAK to KAUP (4 days by foot) and from KAUP to WATAM (4 days by launch or canoe through the MURIK LAGOONS and the MADJOP CANAL. This part of the journey is impassable on foot.

(b) WATAM-BOGIA-MADANG (9 days)

With a little improvement the track could be made suitable for jeeps, and bicycles can be used throughout at present. Several new bridges, suitable for M/T have been constructed by the Japanese over streams along the coastal track, and they appear to be building a through coastal road. The travelling time from WATAM to MADANG can be reduced to four days by bicycle.

3. MADANG-LAE (14 days)

Little information is available about a coastal track leading from MADANG through SAIDOR, along the RAI COAST to FINSCHHAFEN and LAE. There is some indication that it has been used by the enemy in spite of its length as compared with the inland route.

From MADANG, two tracks may be taken over the first section of the inland route to LAE

(a) MADANG-BOGADJIM-KESIWAI (4 days)

A formed road follows the coast of ASTROLABE BAY to BOGADJIM (8 hrs). The GUM River, 3 miles from MADANG, causes difficulties for heavy M/T after rain. The GOGOL RIVER, five miles further on, is normally crossed by canoes. It is believed that a pontoon bridge has been provided by the enemy. At ERIMA BEACH plantation (18 miles South of MADANG) a steel and concrete suspension bridge carries a light plantation railway over the PALPA River. This could be decked to take jeep traffic. From BOGADJIM, a mule track leads over the QRTZEN RANGE (4,000 feet) to KESA and KESIWAI in the RAMU Valley twenty five miles South of BOGADJIM. Most of the route from BOGADJIM to KESIWAI is well protected from air observation. KESIWAI is the junction of tracks from the RAI Coast and from BENA BENA as well as the tracks referred to above.

(b) MADANG-AMELE-KOROPA-KESIWAI (8 days)

The upper GOGOL River, which is wide and deep, has to be crossed on rafts. Four days would be required to raft 1,000 men and their stores across the river.

(c) KESIWAI-BUM BUM (3 days)

From KESIWAI the track passes up the broad open valley of the Middle RAMU River through BEBEI, DUMPU and KAIGULUN to BUM BUM, which is at the junction of another track leading to the UPPER RAMU district (Altitude 5,000 feet). The SULIMAI River near KAIGULOU is the only obstacle to traffic.

(d) BUMBUM-MARAWASA (2 days)

From BUMBUM the track crosses the difficult GUSAP River to RAMU-MARKHAM DIVIDE (1200 feet) at MARAWASA. A track from SAIDOR (RAI COAST) joins the LAE track here.

(e) MARAWASA-NADZAB (4 days)

The track through KAIAPIT to CHEVASING and NADZAB is good, level, and open, but the MARKHAM, LERON and ERAP Rivers have to be crossed. The crossings are difficult after rain.

(f) NADZAB-LAE (1 day)

The track is suitable for jeeps over the distance of 20 miles.

TRAFFICABILITY:

(a) FOOT - The total of 14 days is a minimum, but the time could be reduced by the use of M/T where practicable. Owing to food problems and the scarcity of native labour at the Middle RAMU, it is impracticable to use native carriers on this route.

(b) BICYCLE - Bicycles could be used from MADANG to BOGADJIM and along the RAMU-MARKHAM VALLEY.

(c) PACK TRANSPORT - Good grass fodder is available over the KESIWAI-NADZAB section of the route.

(d) MOTOR TRANSPORT - The construction of a through motor road would be a difficult undertaking. Provided Jeepheads with flying foxes were established at the main obstacles (Viz. SULIMAI, GUSAP, MARKHAM, LERON and ERAP Rivers) and excepting the ORTZEN Range section, little roadmaking would be required to allow of the passage of jeeps.

AERODROMES:


(a) MADANG - the strip is 1140 yards long, and is serviceable.

(b) DUMPU - The emergency landing ground (Altitude 1000 feet) is a suitable site for the construction for a first class airfield.

(Compiled from A.G.S. Terrain Studies
31 & 36, NGF and AAF Summaries)

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CENTRAL NEW GUINEA



SCALE 1:4,000,000

6 APR 43

Traced from Geographical
Sec, General Staff.
MAP NO 3860

GSI(1) 2 AUST CORPS ▲

10 - 4 - 43

SECRET

copy No 44

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE REPORT 13

Compiled from information received from 3 Apr up to 1200 hrs 6 Apr 43.

- (A) Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comd.
- (B) A receipt is NOT required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These reports will NOT be issued regularly.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS

(iii) NEW GUINEA:

N.E. NEW GUINEA

MUBO Area. On 28 Mar our patrols were engaged by heavy IMC rifle, and mortar fire from the area NE of OBSERVATION HILL and the junction BUIGAP CREEK-BITOI River. Patrolling continued during succeeding days. Considerable enemy activity was observed around KITCHEN CREEK at dusk on 30 Mar. The next day four enemy barges moved from LABABIA ISLAND towards DUALI. Our Observation Post on VICKERS RIDGE came under enemy mortar fire probably from the DRY CREEK area. On 1 Apr air support was brought to bear on enemy positions around KITCHEN CREEK with good effect. A hut at DUALI (East of MUBO) on the coast was strafed. Further bombing and strafing was carried out on 2 Apr around KITCHEN CREEK, LABABIA ISLAND and DUALI. Enemy movement between LABABIA and the coast had previously forced our patrol near BOBDEJI to withdraw.

SALAMAUA. The township and the nearby village of KELA were bombed and strafed every day from 27 to 31 Mar inclusive. Large fires were started and on 30 Mar when three attacks were made some buildings were destroyed.

LAE. Further attempts to supply and possibly to reinforce the garrison at LAE have been observed recently, however the township itself and particularly the runway and dispersal area have been bombed and strafed nearly every day. On 31 Mar a party of Japs equipped with shovels, axes and picks left KAIAPIT for SANGAN (7 miles south of KAIAPIT). This is the only activity reported in the MARKHAM VALLEY area for some time, and there is a possibility that at least some of the party were making for LAE.

FINSCHHAVEN. During the period under review reports have been received of enemy convoy activity, probably from KAVIENG. Many sightings have been reported but it is NOT clear which of them refer to the same ships. Nevertheless it does seem likely that a convoy comprising four destroyers and a cargo vessel did actually reach FINSCHHAVEN and unloaded some of its cargo (which may have included troops), before being attacked on 29 Mar. A large destroyer received a direct hit on the stern and was reported sunk or badly damaged. The convoy was last reported 120 miles NE of CAPE GLOUCESTER on a course NE. There were further bombing and strafing attacks on 2 Apr against barges and the landing strip. Buildings were bombed and strafed and two fires started at SALANKAUA. (FINSCHHAVEN HARBOUR).

SAIDOR. Following the report of enemy movement around this area, villages were strafed on 29 and 30 Mar. It is known that the enemy are in occupation here over a wide area but their strength has NOT been reported.

MADANG. There are reports of continued enemy activity and on 30 Mar attacks were made from the air against barges at ULINGAN (a small village 44 miles NNW of MADANG). A bridge over the TIMPER RIVER (40 miles NNW MADANG) received a direct hit, and will probably take some time to repair. Bombs were dropped on 1 Apr in the building area on the East side of the runway and a fire was started. MADANG was again bombed on 4 Apr. New bridges have been observed spanning streams crossing the coast track to WEWAK.

BOGIA. Following the attack reported on 26 Mar against a cargo vessel in the Harbour, further shipping was observed in the area and on 27 Mar an 8,000-ton camouflaged vessel was bombed with unreported results.

WEWAK. There have been further shipping sightings since our last Report, and there is further information of constructional activity at the landing strip. At BUT dispersal bays suitable for bombers have been built.

PAPUA.

FERGUSON ISLAND. Eight Japs landed at CAPE VINALL, NE of HUGHES BAY on 30 Mar and all were killed.

PORLOCK HARBOUR. Further to a report of Jap parties off the Harbour, one Jap barge was sunk and four enemy killed. The other barge proceeded North and has NOT been traced since 29 Mar.

KUMUSI RIVER. A report recently received states that sixteen Japs were killed and two captured in the river mouth area between 22 and 24 Mar.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

RABAU. NO reports have been received during the last few days covering enemy shipping around RABAU, consequently it is NOT known to what extent the enemy continues to use the Harbour.

KAVIENG. As indicated in Report 11, it is quite clear that there has been a substantial increase in the use made of KAVIENG as a sea base. It has NOT been possible to draw a clear picture of the naval traffic from the sightings reported, but it does appear that the Japs have been making a large-scale attempt to reinforce and supply their NEW GUINEA bases by means of fast convoys composed mainly of cruisers and destroyers operating from this port.

On 1 Apr a number of cruisers and destroyers were sighted, together with some unidentified vessels moving South near KAVIENG. During the period three attacks have been carried out by Allied aircraft against shipping in the area, and on 1 Apr heavy explosions occurred in a stationary 8/10,000-ton cargo ship and a 5/6,000-ton cargo vessel was halted and appeared to settle down after bombs had straddled her bow. Concurrently, the enemy air base at KAVIENG was attacked.

/one

When our aircraft attacked on 3 Apr one heavy and light cruiser were sunk whilst a large destroyer received two direct hits and was narrowly missed by two bombs, and a hit was also registered on a vessel that may have been a destroyer. A further attack on KAVIENG on 8 Apr reported a direct hit on each of two destroyers and a 5/6,000-ton cargo vessel. Full details have NOT yet come to hand, but it would appear that a number of other vessels were damaged.

Other air bases in the BISMARCKS area including GASMATA and CAPE GLOUCESTER were bombed during the period.

(v) SOLOMON ISLANDS:

Many reports have come to hand of enemy shipping sighted and from a description of the types of vessels and their movements, it is quite apparent that there has been a big increase in enemy activity particularly around the BUIH-FAISI area. The sightings include many destroyers and some submarines, and it is reasonable to assume that these types of craft are being used for supply and development and possibly for reinforcement in the same way as has been evident in the BISMARCKS-NEW GUINEA area.

(vi) N.E.I. Area:

DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

KAIMANA BAY. Shipping activity around KAIMANA BAY has been maintained and was the subject of Allied air attack on 30 Mar. At least one intercepting aircraft was destroyed.

BABO. A heavy bombing and strafing attack was carried out on 31 Mar, when heavy explosions occurred in probable fuel dumps and large fires were visible for sixty miles. An unstated number of enemy aircraft intercepted and one was probably destroyed.

FAK FAK. Shipping sighted on 31 Mar included three cargo vessels of over 2,000 tons and other smaller vessels which would indicate that the intensity of development in this area is being maintained.

KAI ISLANDS. TOEAL and LANGGOER were bombed and strafed on 29 Mar. and on 3 Apr LANGGOER was bombed again.

TANIMBAR. On 1 Apr the village of SAUMLAKI was effectively bombed and this was followed by another raid on 3 Apr.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops Revsits 242 - 246; HQ First Aust Army Intell Summary 47 and HQ NG Force Airops Daily Reviews 52-55).

PART 2 : ENEMY

(i) Order of Battle:

- (a) Land: Fifty-five thousand Japanese troops are reported to be in the RABAU area and 15/20,000 in the SOLOMONS as at 24 Mar 43. It is now considered that of 16 DIV only 20 REGT is in RABAU. This represents a decrease of approximately 15,000 troops. The following units have been identified in the RABAU and SOLOMONS area:

<u>RABAU</u>	<u>SOLOMONS</u>
8 Army Gp HQ.	17 Army HQ
121 Regt } 65 Bde Gp	3 Regt { (1 Div)}
141 " }	6 " } (3 Div)}
142 " }	18 " }
5 " (8 Div)	28 " (7 Div) Remnants
6 " (3 Div)	38 " (16 Div) only.
20 " (16 Div)	23 " (6 Div)
45 " (6 Div)	Remnants of 38 Div
66 " (51 Div)	MAISURU No 4 SNLP
? (69 Div)	SASEBO No 1 "
Remnants 21 Ind mxd Bde	" No 6 "
Kure No 6 SNLP	1 Combined "
" No 7 "	8 " "
Yokosuka No 1 SNLP	KURE No 3 " (Part)
" No 5 "	
L of C and Base Units.	

NOTE: Following the evacuation from GUADALCANAL it is possible that some units shown in the SOLOMONS may have moved to RABAU. (NGF Weekly Intell Sum 114)

(b) Air: Estimated enemy land-based air strength as at 27 Mar 43.

AREAS	F	M/B	S/E3	F/B	F/P	Trans & Obsn A/C	Total
<u>N.E. AREA:</u>							
New Britain	105	97	25	8	13	13	261
New Ireland	18	36			4		58
New Guinea	19				5		24
Solomons	54	8	15	8	29	4	118
<u>N.W. AREA:</u>							
Timor	23	20			3	4	50
Ambon	9	9		3	4		25
Aroe Is. }	5				5		10
Dutch N.G. }							
Celebes	47	40			12	12	111
	280	210	40	19	75	33	657

(AAF Intell Summary 89)

(v) Equipment:

Japanese Aircraft in the S.W.P.A.

The confusion regarding Japanese aircraft, prior to their entrance into the present war, has been somewhat clarified.

A brief summary of Japanese aircraft based on factual evidence gleaned from crash inspections in India, as well as this theatre, is available. The evidence has, in most instances, been further confirmed by official Japanese sources.

Current fighter types operational in this theatre to date are the Type 97 SSF NATE, Type 0 Mk 1 SSF ZEKE, Type 0 Mk 1 SSF F/P RUFE, Type 0 Mk 2 SSF HAP, and the Type 1 SSF OSCAR.

Protection has been sacrificed to manoeuvrability and rate of climb. NO armourplate has been recovered from a Japanese SSF in this theatre. OSCAR is the only fighter type aircraft in which crude attempts have been made to provide self-sealing tanks. Japanese fighters are highly vulnerable to fire, especially when struck anywhere on the fuselage from the engine to just behind the pilot's cockpit, or in the wing roots. The general features of each type will be described in succeeding Reports.

Attached as Appendix "A" is a photograph of Japanese Height and Range Finder.

PART 3: TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) Corps Area -

Attached as Appendix "B" is a route map of the ATHERTON TABLELANDS Area. This will be produced in sufficient quantities to allow the widest possible distribution to be made. Any information on the improvement or deterioration of the route information shown on the map should be forwarded to GSI 2 AUST CORPS through normal channels.

(ii) Other Areas -

Attached as Appendix "C" is a report on the topography of the SALAMAU Area.




James Rogers
Maj,
GS 2 AUST CORPS.

Distribution as per Int Report 12.

Delete No. 52.

Include Nos. 64 and 65 to Adv HQ 9 Aust Div.

JAPANESE HEIGHT & RANGE FINDER



BASE LENGTH : 2 METRES
 MAGNIFICATION : 20 POWER
 4 COLOUR FILTERS :
 FIELD OF VIEW : $2^{\circ} 15'$
 RANGE SCALE : 400 - 20,000 METRES
 FOCUS ADJUSTMENT : INDIVIDUAL EYEPIECE

GSI(a) ADV LHQ 26 MAR 43.

Appendix "B" to 2 Aust Corps Intelligence Report 13

S A L A M A U A

1. L O C A T I O N

SALAMAUA is situated in 7°0'S, 147°07'E at the base of the SALAMAUA PENINSULA on the southwestern shore of HUON GULF.

2. D E S C R I P T I O N

(a) REGIONAL: The SALAMAUA PENINSULA, with a narrow sandy neck, lies in a NNE direction, and forms a good natural harbour (SAMOA HARBOUR) to the West. One mile South, the FRANCISCO (FRISCO) river enters the sea, and further south, the hills close on the shore. Between the river and the Peninsula there is a coastal plain about one mile wide, well drained near the river at the aerodrome, but marshy to the NW. Landward of the plain, the hills rise steeply, and are forested, but partly grass-covered to the North, where they come right down to the sea leaving narrow coastal plains in the bays. These continue to the MARKHAM river.

Between SALAMAUA and the BULOLO VALLEY the massive KUPER Range rises to 10000 feet, and constitutes a barrier to overland transport. Tracks which lead through the range are known as the BUISAVAL ROUTE, the BLACK CAT ROUTE, the MISIM track, and the BUANGS ROUTE. These are suitable only for foot traffic.

(b) LOCATION: The town is sited on the ISTHMUS, 6 to 7 feet above sea level. The shore to the East is reef-bound, but liable to rough weather. A further section of the town lies on the alluvial flat at KELA (1 mile West of the Isthmus). CHINATOWN is situated on the beach frontage of KONG POINT (1½ miles West of the Isthmus).

3. A P P R O A C H E S

(a) SEA :

(i) ANCHORAGES: SAMOA HARBOUR is well protected, and suitable for seaplanes. There are NO wharves, cargo being handled by lighters. This is the only good anchorage in the locality.

(ii) BEACHES: Beaches, suitable for small boats, exist in SAMOA Harbour, and SE of the Peninsula opposite the aerodrome. Both give direct access to SALAMAUA. Apart from tracks, the hinterland is very rugged and difficult for movement, even on foot.

(b) LAND:

(i) AIRFIELDS: SALAMAUA aerodrome, bounded to the SE by the FRISCO River, is well-drained, 1,250 yards long, and can be extended as far as the BEACH ROAD.

(ii) ROADS: The only roads in the area run from the Hospital at the NE end of the town, through the town to MAGDONALDS JUNCTION, at the base of the ISTHMUS. There it divides; the Southern branch follows the coast to the aerodrome, the Northern route passes over the mouth of the tidal swamp to KELA, thence round KONG POINT to the beginning of the track to LAE. These roads are suitable for heavy traffic. Owing to swamps, movement is largely confined to the roads.

(iii) TRACKS: LABABIA: A good track follows the coast to LABABIA.

LAE: A good track along the coast to LAE at the mouth of the MARKHAM RIVER.

WAU: One track passes through KOMIATUM to MUBO and rises to 1,900 feet, thence it descends along BUIGAP CREEK to MUBO. This track divides near MUBO into the BUISAVAL and BLACK CAT routes (Ref 2 Aust Corps Int Report No 10). SALAMAUA to WAU takes four to five days by these tracks. The MISIM track passes through BOBDUBI, up the FRISCO RIVER, through MISIM, either to BULWA or the mouth of EDIE CREEK. This track is longer and rougher.

3. APPROACHES

(b) LAND:

(iii) TRACKS (Contd.) BULWA: The BUANGS Track leaves the LAE track at the mouth of the BUANGS River, and climbs steeply for two days' travel to MAPOS, thence down the SNAKE River to BULWA. This track is rough and difficult.

4. METEOROLOGICAL:

RAINFALL: The rainfall is heavy in all months, with a maximum during the SE season (May to October). This is unusual.

WINDS: The monsoonal winds are modified by the topography so that they blow from the NE by day, and the South by night.

TIDES: Have a small range and are difficult to predict.

CLOUD: Heavy clouds cover the mountains above a height of 2,000 feet. These are much thicker in the SE season.


5. VEGETATION:

Near the aerodrome there are mangrove swamps. Along the coast to the Southeast, numerous overgrown native gardens on the steep slopes make going difficult. Inland the mountains are covered with tropical rain forest.

6. MEDICAL:

In addition to the normal tropical diseases, malaria is often complicated by blackwater fever.

Compiled from Allied Geographical Section Terrain Study No 33 & collated information from various Intelligence Summaries.



W. Liang *Off 126*
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Subject: Amendments to 2 Aust Corps Standing
Orders for War

2 Aust Corps
3 Apr 43
G.2643

Distribution List (b)
Plus All Duty Officers
Battle Room Folder

Paragraphs 7 and 8 of sec 13 - "Duty Officers
& Clerks" are hereby cancelled, and replaced by the
following:-

"Sec 13A - Duties of Duty personnel -

DUTY OFFICER

1. On taking up duty ascertain from heads of branches if any matters are outstanding and require attention.
2. Mark up battle maps in accordance with information received.
3. Deal with any matter that needs immediate action. If unable to deal with it, he will refer the matter to the officer concerned, awakening him if necessary.
4. Matters that are not urgent will be passed to the appropriate registries on their resumption of duty in the morning. In this the duty officer will be guided by the following:-

Messages and correspondence will normally be passed to the registry corresponding to that from which it originated, with the following exceptions:-

Messages and correspondence dealing with:-

- (a) Release of stores and equipment.
- (b) Movements which do not contain a reference to a change in command.

both of which will be passed to Q registry.

NOTE. Any message etc concerning movement of troops which contains a reference to a change in command, will be passed to G.

5. Correspondence will not be received by the Duty Officer until after 2200 hours but will be directed to the Registry concerned. All messages however will be received by the Duty Officer between 1700 and 0830 hours, and 1200 to 1400 hours.
6. During the periods when Duty Officers are on duty, MOST SECRET and OFFICER ONLY correspondence will be immediately passed to them by the Reception Office and a receipt obtained.

/The

The Duty Officer will open such correspondence etc and deal with it as follows:-

- (a) Immediately after opening enter the originator and originator's number in the space provided in the Reception Office receipt book.
- (b) matters that are NOT urgent will be handed to the appropriate officer as soon as he comes on duty as follows:-
 - (i) G matters to G2(0) or G2(SD) or G3(0)
 - (ii) A matters to AAG or SC(A)
 - (iii) Q matters to AQMG or DAQMG
 - (iv) Int matters to G2(I) or G3(I)

(see para 4 for guidance)

- (c) matters that the duty officer considers may possibly be urgent will be sent immediately to the appropriate officer.
- (d) If in any doubt as to the appropriate officer deliver to G officer as in (b) (i).
- (e) Under no circumstances must the receipt or contents of "MOST SECRET" or "OFFICER ONLY" correspondence or messages be disclosed to any one except the appropriate officer, as in sub-para (b) above.

7. Acknowledgements:- Incoming messages requiring an acknowledgement received at night by the Duty Officer will be acknowledged by him immediately. This will be recorded on the message thus "acked 2300 hrs" and initialled.

- 8. (a) All messages, telephone calls and visits will be logged.
- (b) Five copies of the Log will be prepared and distributed at 0830 hrs as under:-

G (2)
A
Q
B/E

- 9. (a) It is the personal responsibility of Duty Officers and CR to keep themselves acquainted with the current duty roster and to be available on the date set down.
- (b) Officers listed for duty will arrange their absences from HQ so as not to interfere with the duty roster.
- (c) If for any special reason an Officer or NCO will be unable to perform his duties as laid down in the roster, he will arrange an exchange of duty at least 12 hours in advance.
- (d) The arrangements so made will be notified as follows:-

/(1)

- (i) Duty Officers and Battle Room clerks to G3(0).
 - (ii) Other duty clerks to the Chief Clerk of the appropriate registry.
 - (e) All duty personnel will be relieved for meals by next for duty.
10. (a) The Duty Clerk and/or orderly will report to the Duty Officer at the time laid down for commencement of tour of duty, and will work under his orders.
- (b) Should the duty OR fail to report at the prescribed time, the duty officer will report the matter to the branch providing the OR, and that branch will take immediate action to provide the necessary personnel.

Walter May
for BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

2/17/13 GSO
To. GOC, G, CE, CSO, DAAQMG, DDMS, DDST, DDOS, ADME, WAR DIARY.

From. 2 Aust Corps

I/650

3/4

3/4

10/15

Addendum	sketch	map	MUBO	area	appendix "C"
Int	Report	(.)	(.)	it	is
thought	that	the	creek	running into	
BUIGAP	Creek	from	the	West.	in
square	7086	is	KITCHEN	Creek	but
this	has	not	been	confirmed (.)	
First	Aust	Army	Int	Summary	47

all informed

[Signature]

1100

P.A. [Signature]

12/15 34/4

War Diary

01/12/43

Subject: Air Raid Warnings.

HQ 2 Aust Corps,
2 Apr 43.

G 2652

6 Aust Div
7 Aust Div
9 Aust Div
Plus Distribution List 'B'.

1. Air raid warnings are issued under the colour designations of YELLOW, WHITE, RED and GREEN. The meaning of these warnings are attached as Appendix 'A'.
2. The chain of responsibility within 2 Aust Corps for passing information of air raid warnings is set out in Appendix 'B'.
3. ACTION TO BE TAKEN AT HQ 2 AUST CORPS.
 - (a) WARNINGS YELLOW and WHITE.
 - (i) Sig Superintendent immediately notifies G2 Ops (or duty officer) and all formations and units outside HQ 2 Aust Corps, as set out in Appendix 'B'
 - (ii) On receipt of the YELLOW warning, G2 Ops (or duty officer) will notify OC 2 Aust Corps Def and Emp Pl who will establish AA LMG posts in accordance with instructions given in G2492 of 12 Mar 43.
 - (b) WARNING RED.
 - (i) Action as outlined in para 3 (i)
 - (ii) Air raid siren will be sounded by Sig Superintendent.
ALARM SIGNAL ON SIREN - intermittent sound.
 - (iii) Branches arms and services will post air raid sentries who will give warning of approach of enemy aircraft.
 - (iv) On receipt of this warning from the sentry all personnel with the exception of G3 Ops (or duty officer) and duty sigs, will take cover as ordered by the senior offr of the branch present, and will be prepared to bring controlled fire to bear on attacking aircraft.
 - (c) WARNING GREEN.
 - (i) Action as outlined in para 3 (i)
 - (ii) Air raid siren will be sounded by Sig Superintendent.
ALL CLEAR SIGNAL ON SIREN - continuous sound.

P. B. Brown
in EGS,
2 Aust Corps.

S E C R E T.

Appx "A"

AIR RAID WARNINGS.

Nature and meaning of messages.


Name of Message.	Text of Message	Distribution and Meaning.
(I) Preliminary caution.	Air Raid Message YELLOW.	A message (FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ONLY) issued by telephone to a limited number of recipients who would take preparatory and unobtrusive measures to be ready to act instantly the Action Warning is received, from 5 to 10 minutes later. The Caution may also be issued to places where action in connection with air raid precaution requires considerable time to put into effect. The receipt of the Caution does not necessarily mean that an air raid will take place; a raid does not become probable until the Action Warning is received.
(II) Cancel Caution.	Air Raid message WHITE.	A message (FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ONLY) issued by telephone to the recipients of the Preliminary Caution meaning that the circumstances necessitating the issue of the Preliminary Caution are now passed. This message would be issued whether or not an Action Warning and a Raiders Passed message had intervened since the issue of the Preliminary Caution.
(III) Action Warning.	Air Raid message RED.	A message (ON WHICH A PUBLIC SIGNAL MAY BE GIVEN) issued by telephone to the selected recipients meaning that an air raid may occur within 5 to 10 minutes, and executive action with regard to air raid precautions should be taken. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that a raid will occur.
(IV) Raiders Passed	Air Raid Message GREEN.	A message (ON WHICH A PUBLIC SIGNAL SHOULD BE GIVEN IF ONE WAS GIVEN ON THE WARNING) issued by telephone to all recipients of the Action Warning meaning that the raiders have left the area or the threat of raid is no longer imminent.

AIR RAID WARNING.

Appendix 'B'

SECRET.

The chain of responsibility in 2 Aust Corps for passing on information in event of an Air Raid Warning will be as under:-



ORDER OF PRIORITY OF WARNING IS FROM LEFT TO RIGHT.

SECRET

CE Branch,
HQ 2 AUST CORPS.CE 2 AUST CORPSENGINEER INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 10.

Date: 1 Apr 43.

PART I.

1. In consonance with the progress of the ATHERTON TABLELANDS PROJECT, Adv Ech LHQ (Q'ID) closed at 25 Mar and RAE 2 Aust Corps and all engineer units previously under comd Adv Ech then came under comd 1 Aust CE (Works) pending completion of Stage I of the Project (Scale A incl water reticulation for three divisional areas and ARD). Estimated date of completion of Stage I and reversion of tps to comd HQ 2 Aust Corps is 24 Apr.

2. Stages 2, 3, 4, 5 of the Project will remain the responsibility of 1 Aust CE (Works) and will be carried out by ANC under supervision of CRE (Wks) 17 L of C Sub-Area.

PART II.3. TABLELANDS PROJECT.

Engineer units have made good progress with the accommodation works embraced in the TABLELANDS Project. The third divisional area referred to in Summary 9 has been expanded by an additional four Bn or Div Tps areas, while preliminary activities for two Rifle Ranges and ARD are in progress. Sites for a Bridging School are being investigated.

4. CAMOUFLAGE.

Camp Layouts. The camps for 7 Aust Div and 6 Aust Div were already under way when HQ 2 Aust Corps arrived in this area. By arrangement with CRE, GSO III Camflg was temporarily attached to 10 Aust Pd Coy to assist with the setting out of 9 Aust Div area. The following principles were followed:

- (a) Dead-end roads and loops were avoided, the camps being all placed to one side or the other of the main camp roads.
- (b) Roads were allowed to follow old tracks or natural contours, and are therefore not military in character.
- (c) The kitchens were laid out in flat arcs to a wide spacing so that service roads would appear like road deviations.
- (d) Showers and lavatories were placed very irregularly as dictated by ground contours.

5. Local Materials. There is an ample supply of local material available for the construction of screens or covers for static defence, and it is intended that Camflg Trg Units should experiment in the use of these. The materials referred to are as follows:-

- (a) Structural Lawyer Cane of two varieties -
Thick type $\frac{1}{2}$ " - $1\frac{1}{2}$ " diam.
Thin " $\frac{1}{8}$ " - $\frac{3}{8}$ " "
- (b) Coverage Cane grass, sugar cane leaf, maize leaf, many types of native fern and leaf.

6. Training. It has not been possible to carry out any camflg training to date, as the Training Units of Corps and of all divisions have been broken up temporarily by leave and sickness. As soon as they are reformed it is intended that they shall hold schools for unit personnel within formations.

7. Tent Coloration. It is only in the last fortnight that any emulsion has been available for this work. Since then the 2 Aust Corps temporary unit has treated the whole of HQ 7 Aust Div tents and half of 25 Bde tents. In the middle of March, Capt GULLIVER of the Q'LAND L of C Tent Coloration Section, reported to Corps bringing with him 9 OR and two spray units. He has completed the tents of 2 Aust Corps HQ and the 1 MAC and is now with 6 Aust Div.

8. Major GODFREY, O.C. Tent Coloration, visited 2 Aust Corps on 27 and 28 Mar, and was shown over the whole of the Corps area. He has made arrangements for two more units to be brought to the area which will make 5 in all, but an extensive programme still lies ahead.

9. There have been several complaints that the emulsion makes tents leak, but it is difficult to get evidence of definite cases. To date not a single instance has been found where it was evident that the leakage was due to the emulsion and not to the condition of or to faulty erection of the tent itself. A test was made on a new fly which has been treated with emulsion, one side being treated dry and the other wet. After drying, both sides were sprayed with water under pressure. It was not found possible to make the fly leak except by rubbing the underside.

10. ROADS.
The gravelling and maintenance patrolling referred to in Summary 9, paras 9, 10, has been continued.

11. The Main Roads Commission is still unable to make an effective start with its programme which includes 25.6 miles of resheeting and bitumen surfacing and 5.6 mls of gravel construction owing to plant not yet being available in the area.

12. Detailed recommendations have been submitted covering the construction of an additional 39.7 mls of surfacing with bituminous emulsion or tar, and also coordinated plant requirements of both MRC and Army units for the combined road programmes.

13. ENGINEER DUMPS.
60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy Dump at ATHERTON at present is stocked mainly with construction stores required for the TABLELANDS Project. On completion of Stage I of the Project, remaining stores will be handed over to CRE (Works) 17 L of C Sub-Area.

14. A dump of operational and training stores stocked to divisional scale is to be established and, to enable 60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy to undertake training, this dump will be administered by 2/23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy which will come under comd 2 Aust Corps on completion of Stage I.

15. For immediate training purposes, an allocation of available stores is being made by 60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy to CsRE who will allocate in turn to all Div units.

16. LOCATIONS.
Unit Location Statement is attached as Appendix A.

C. S. Bachold
for (H. Bachold) Brig.
CE 2 AUST CORPS.

DISTRIBUTION.

CE First Aust Army	copy No 1-3
CRE 2 Aust Corps Tps	" " 4
CRE 6 Aust Div	" " 5
CRE 7 Aust Div	" " 6
File	" " 7-8
War Diary	" " 9-10

APPENDIX A

1 Apr 43

Unit	Veh No	Location	Map	Ref
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps	101	YUNGABURRA	BARTLE FRERE 1"	519262
19 Aust A Fd Coy	141	RAVENSHOE	MT GARNET 1"	397848
10 Aust Fd Coy	149	KAIRI	GORDONVALE 1"	487383
60 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy & 315 Aust LAD	105	ATHERTON	HERBERTON 1"	390262
2 Aust Corps Camflg Trg Unit	118	RAVENSHOE	MT GARNET 1"	397848
2/22 Aust Fd Pk Coy (less stores sec) & 2/80 Aust LAD	59	ROCKY CREEK	DIMBULA 1"	374370
16 Aust Fd Coy	89	KAIRI	GORDONVALE 1"	487383
27 Aust Fd Coy	214	WONDECLA	HERBERTON 1"	319072
2/23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy & 2/65 Aust LAD	76	ROCKY CREEK	DIMBULA 1"	373370

H. Lacey
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES. *AP/13 ✓*

Subject: SD INSTRUCTION NO 41.
Duty Officers and Clerks.

2 Aust Corps,
31 Mar 43.
G 2651.

Distribution: List F,
plus: All Duty Officers,
Battle Room folder.

Reference: 2 Aust Corps Standing Orders
for War - sec 13 para 3.

1. Until further orders, the following arrangements for duty personnel will apply:-
 - (a) One Duty Officer and a Duty Clerk or orderly selected from G, A or Q Branches, including arms and services, will be on duty in Battle Room during the following hours:-

1700 hrs on first day-0830 hrs on second day.
1200 hrs on second day-1400 hrs on second day.
 - (b) A Duty Clerk will be on duty in each of G, A, Q and I Registries, during the above hours.
 - (c) All duty personnel may sleep between 2230 hrs and 0630 hours, but Duty Officer will sleep beside telephone.
2. (a) Reference HQ 2 Aust Corps Standing Orders for War. Chapter II sub-section 2.

"Incoming correspondence sub-paragraph (c) Branch action"

Until further orders the duty officer will NOT apply the registry stamp to incoming correspondence and messages, but will act as follows:-

 - (i) Correspondence. Write on top right hand corner, details as follows:-

Time of receipt e.g. 2200 hrs
Date of receipt e.g. 7 Mar
No of copies e.g. 2 copies
and Initial.
 - (ii) Messages. Write in TOR space "time of receipt" and Initial.
3. 2 Aust Corps G2545 of 18 March, and G2613 of 29 March are cancelled and will be destroyed.

H. Lacey
BGS,
2 Aust Corps.

SECRET 01/1/31

Copy No 63

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE REPORT 12

Compiled from information received 30 Mar - 2 Apr 43

- (A) Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comd.
- (B) A receipt is NOT required, but copy holders should note Serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These reports will NOT be issued regularly.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS

(i) N.E. AUSTRALIA:

A probable submarine was sighted on 29 Mar forty-eight miles SE of BUSTARD Head.

(ii) N.W. AUSTRALIA:

There were several recent sightings reported of unidentified aircraft at various points over NW Australia. The possibility exists that these were enemy reconnaissance flights but confirmation has NOT been received.

(iii) NEW GUINEA:

N.E. NEW GUINEA

WARIA RIVER. Allied patrol activity continues in this area and it was reported on 25 and 26 Mar that the areas around the river mouth were clear of enemy including KOBO on the South and DONA on the North.

WAU-MUBO-SALAMAUA. On 25 Mar our patrols reported enemy located along the coast from the mouth of the BITOI River to a point approximately four miles South. On 26 Mar a small /and moved enemy patrol crossed the BITOI River/to the vicinity of LABABIA. On 27 Mar our troops occupying OBSERVATION HILL were held up when moving East by the enemy who had taken up a position on the Eastern slopes. During this period air support was given to our troops in the KITCHEN CREEK-MUBO area, and on 26 Mar two successful air raids were carried out around SALAMAUA. It was reported on 1 Apr that our patrols were still operating around MUBO after a slight engagement on 29 Mar when twenty-one enemy were killed.

LAE. Several sightings of camouflaged surface craft and submarines off LAE would indicate the urgency with which the enemy is continuing his attempts to reinforce and supply the garrison, but almost continuous Allied air attacks are making the job a difficult one. The township and shore installations were bombed and strafed almost daily during the period under review. Work on the defences continues at LAE and clearing activity around the runway has been recently observed. NO enemy activity is reported in the MARKHAM VALLEY area.

FINSCHHAVEN. Very little enemy activity has been observed here but this may be due to the neutralising effect of heavy and continuous raids by Allied aircraft against the airfield, buildings and wharf area. It was reported on 30 Mar that as a result of our attacks on the previous day, one fire was burning for eight hours. During the two raids carried out on 30 Mar, further fires were started, two buildings were hit and heavy explosions occurred.

A possible enemy attempt to supply the area was frustrated when a convoy of four destroyers escorted by twenty-one fighters was attacked on 29 Mar. One destroyer received a direct hit and at least two of the fighters were shot down.

So far as is known at present the airfield at FINSCHHAVEN is still unserviceable.

SAIDOR. A report on 22 Mar indicates that the strip is unserviceable. On 27 Mar approximately 100 enemy moved their camp to MUR, which is approximately six miles SE of SAIDOR.

MADANG. Buildings were demolished as a result of our attacks previously reported and these were followed by further bombings on 22 and 29 Mar. It is reported that there is a well-beaten track leading South from MADANG towards FINSCHHAVEN.

ALEXISHAFEN. Reconnaissance reveals some progress in this area with the construction of dispersal lanes and blast pens and the probable clearing of a new strip, and the runway appears to be serviceable.

NO activity was apparent on 22 Mar.

BOGIA. On 26 Mar a 1,000-ton cargo vessel in the Harbour was bombed and strafed and probably hit. Some enemy construction activity appears to be taking place and a small jetty was observed besides some gun emplacements around the Harbour.

WEWAK. Constructional activity in this area mentioned in Report 11 continues on a large scale; particularly does this apply to the development of the strip at BORAM.

Allied air attacks were carried out on 24, 25 and 26 Mar, against shipping in the Harbour and shore installations. Considerable damage was caused. In the first of these attacks interception was met from an unstated number of single-seater fighters.

PAPUA.

MILNE BAY. Enemy aircraft bombed RABU MISSION on 24 Mar. Results have NOT been reported.

PORLOCK HARBOUR. On 27 Mar two parties of Japanese survivors were reported off the Harbour, but NO details have been received.

ORO BAY. A number of enemy air attacks have been carried out in this area. On 25 Mar four bombs were dropped causing NO damage. On 28 Mar twenty-five medium bombers and ten to fifteen Dive Bombers with heavy fighter escort caused considerable damage. Allied fighters destroyed eleven of the escorting fighters for certain and two Dive Bombers, besides probably destroying eight fighters and four Dive Bombers. On 29 Mar three enemy aircraft dropped ten bombs causing only slight damage.

IOMA. The enemy raided KURENEDA Village (2½ miles South of IOMA) on 26 Mar. NO damage has been reported.

(iv) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

RABUL. Enemy shipping activity in and around RABUL HARBOUR continues on a very large scale, and on 26 Mar photographs reveal in SIMPSON'S HARBOUR -

- 8 Destroyers
- 2 Destroyer Tenders
- 7 Submarines
- 1 Submarine Tender
- 1 Minesweeper
- 3 Submarine Chasers
- 2 Tankers
- 4 Tanker-type vessels
- 20 Merchant vessels (188,000 tons)

Very intense enemy constructional activity has been reported. In the vicinity of MALAGUNA, large barracks have been observed, and at VUNAKANAU work continues on the aerodrome. The large concentration of aircraft at LAKUNAI is well dispersed and resurfacing is being carried out at the drome. In connection with activity in this area it is interesting to note that the enemy has available at the present time and has had for some weeks, a very strong force of light and medium bombers, and Fighters in the BISMARCKS. His scale of effort during the period has been in NO way commensurate with the capability of such a force. It may well be that heavy Fighter cover is required for convoys used for supply and development of his new bases, particularly in NW NEW GUINEA. Further, he may be maintaining Bomber strength with a view to neutralising bases from which Allied aircraft would be operational against his convoys. This, if correct, would indicate a primary role for his aircraft to facilitate consolidation of Japanese positions; but the offensive potentialities of such a concentration of air strength as now exists around RABUL cannot be ignored.

WIDE BAY. On 13 Mar two clearings were reported adjacent to HENRY REID BAY. It is now stated that secondary growth covers the clearings and that they could only be used for an emergency landing. It is NOT thought that these clearings are a result of enemy activity.

OPEN BAY. Although the strip at UBILI is reported unserviceable, a new strip near KANU River (approximately 15 miles SE of UBILI) appears to be serviceable.

GASMATA. Following upon raids reported previously, GASMATA was again bombed on 26 and 27 Mar. In the first of these raids direct hits were scored on the wharf. Bomb craters appear to have made the aerodrome temporarily unserviceable.

TALASEA. NO enemy activity has been observed at this point but it is now reported for the first time that the strip is in a serviceable condition. An Allied aircraft made a bombing raid in this vicinity on 26 Mar.

CAPE GLOUCESTER. The aerodrome was bombed and strafed on 27 Mar. Latest information indicates that the runway is serviceable and extension work is progressing slowly. Some small buildings have been constructed and considerable track activity is noticeable around the area.

(v) SOLOMON ISLANDS:

Allied reconnaissance over the SOLOMONS area has been widespread and frequent during the period under review. Enemy shipping has been on an increased scale and there are other indications of Japanese efforts to consolidate their hold. It is reported that an enemy bomber attacked Allied vessels near SAN CRISTOBAL on 20 Mar with some effect. On 24 Mar Catalina bombed the airfield at BUKA PASSAGE.

(vi) N.E.I. Area:

DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

MERAUKE. On 26 Mar seven enemy medium bombers carried out raid 19 over MERAUKE. Some damage was caused to civil administration buildings and the jetty, but there were NO casualties.

TIMOEA. Very intense enemy activity continues at this point where the runway is nearing completion and defences appear to be progressing. A successful Allied Bomber attack was carried out on 31 Mar.

AROE ISLANDS. DOBO was bombed and strafed on 28 Mar, causing fires near buildings and the jetty.

TANIMBAR ISLAND. Buildings on the waterfront were damaged on 27 Mar when SAUMLAKI was bombed by Allied aircraft.

JAVA. It was previously reported that an aerial reconnaissance had been carried out on 13 Mar particularly covering SOURABAYA. Further examination of photographs brings out the interesting fact that the Japanese have done surprisingly little to the defences in this area. There are indications of constructional activity but NO signs of a planned defence in depth for the NEI. Very little has apparently been done to repair the Harbour and shore installations demolished by the Dutch or destroyed by Japanese bombings, and the A/A defences appear to consist of NO more than those previously used by the Dutch.

(Compiled from information contained in Landops Revsits 239-241; Australian Military Forces Weekly Intelligence Review 34 and Allied Air Forces Intelligence Summaries 88-89).

PART 2 : ENEMY

(i) Order Of Battle:

- (a) 20 DIV: Information from M.I.S. WASHINGTON Dec 42 gives the composition of this Division as 77, 78, 79 and 80 Inf Regts, but more recent information indicates re-organisation on a 3-regt basis with one regt at WEWAK, one possibly at MADANG and one at PALAU. (AMF Int Sum 33).
- (b) 41 DIV: US sources show 237, 238 and 239 Inf Regts as belonging to this Div. Two of these regts are thought to be at WEWAK and the third en route to RABAU from PALAU. (AMF Int Sum 33).
HQ NG Force 111 identifies as being with 41 Div regts of cavalry, mountain arty, engineers and transport.
- (c) 51 DIV: "MOTO" 2800. Although M.I.S. WASHINGTON shows 101, 149 and 157 Inf Regts as belonging to this Div, more recent information shows that the Division consisted of 66, 102 and 115 Inf Regts with attached troops. A recent identification locates 66 Inf Regt at RABAU, while 102 and 115 Regts comprised the bulk of the personnel lost on board the HUON GULF Convoy which was destroyed on 2/3 Mar and these units are now reported non-effective. (AMF Int Sum 33).

(v) Equipment:

Further information on Japanese Paper Cape, photograph of which was attached as Appx "A" to Int Report 11. A report received from NEW GUINEA states that the paper has been chemically treated, and although it only partially prevents water penetration, it is completely oil resisting. It is considered that it would be resistant to penetration by blister gases.

Attached as Appendix "A" photograph of Japanese 70mm Battalion Gun Type 92.

Attached as Appendix "B" photograph of Japanese Flare, Yellow Dragon.

PART 3 : TOPOGRAPHY

(ii) Other Areas:

Attached as Appendix "C" Sketch Map MUBO Area.

Attached as Appendix "D" Information Terrain LAE Area.

W. H. Rogers Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Int. Report 11.

APPX "D" HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE REPORT 12.

L A E

1. LOCATION :

LAE : 6° 43'S 147°E is situated on the East coast of NEW GUINEA, at the head of HUON GULF.

2. DESCRIPTION :

A. REGIONAL: The MARKHAM VALLEY forms the eastern end of the MARKHAM-RAMU-SEPIK-MAHBARAMO intermontane depression of Northern NEW GUINEA. It is similar to the coastal corridor features of the Queensland coast, but on a much vaster scale. The depression runs roughly parallel to the North coast of NEW GUINEA, being separated from it by the great SARUWAGED-FINISTERRE mountain range, which in places exceeds 13,000 feet. The valley varies in width from five to twenty miles, and has for its Southern boundary the HERZOG-KRATKE-RANGE which averages 8,000 feet high, and has peaks of 9-10,000 feet.

The MARKHAM RIVER rises some eighty miles from LAE, being separated from the RAMU VALLEY by an almost level alluvial flat. The MARKHAM-RAMU river valleys fall smoothly to the SE and NW from the MARAWASA region at a height of 1,000 feet. The fall of 100 feet per mile in the course of the MARKHAM River gives it a typical "Braided" appearance. The river bed is often three quarters of a mile wide, composed of gravels, while the stream channels divide and join frequently. The channels may be from a few inches to ten feet in depth, and are crossable only at infrequent intervals. The chief tributaries on the left bank are the LERON (largest) IRUMU, and ERAP, and on the right bank the WATUT and WAMPIT Rivers. These are crossable at selected points by foot traffic.

The MARKHAM passes through wide stretches of grasslands and scattered bush debouching near LAE through rainforest, then man grove and sago swamps. The river is navigable only to craft having a draught of a few inches (canoes) to NADZAB, 20 miles from the mouth. Crossing points most frequently used are --

- (a) The mouth - from LABU Spit to LAE
- (b) MARKHAM POINT - 6 miles from the mouth
- (c) NARAKAPOR
- (d) NADZAB - near the mouth of the WAMPIT River.

B. LOCAL : The enemy base at LAE is situated 2 to 3 miles from the mouth of the MARKHAM RIVER, separated from it by a sago swamp. The foreshore along this stretch to the jetty at VOCO POINT consists of a cliff, 15 to 40 feet high, difficult to scale and separated from the sea in parts by a narrow shingly beach. Both the airfield and the greater part of the township lie on an alluvial flat rising very gradually from the cliff edge. This flat is bordered on its northeast side by a strip of plateau country averaging 150 feet above sea level, known as the "Terrace", which extends some miles to the NW, ending in a series of low hills. Near the airfield, the "Terrace" is 400 yds wide. Further east, it ends between CHINATOWN and the town area in a prominent peak, which is crowned by a conspicuous tree (ONE TREE HILL). To the North, it is bounded by the EUMBU (BUTIBUM) river.

There are three roads leading from LAE. (1) MALAHANG: Over a shallow ford on the EUMBU River to MALAHANG aerodrome and thence a Government track leads to the right bank of the BUSU River; (2) NADZAB: The whole road lies over flat country, the first five miles being gravelled. M/T could be used (with small amount repair) over the whole distance; (3) EMERY'S: A loop road leads over the "terrace", through EMERY'S PLANTATION, thence SW to join the NADZAB road.

The aerodrome runs NW/SE, on the Southern side of the NADZAB road, and is 1,300 yds long commencing at the coast. A further strip of 200 yds is cleared. All types of aircraft use the field. The MALAHANG aerodrome, in a clearing at the MISSION, is used by fighter aircraft.

3. APPROACHES:

- A. SEA (i) Anchorage: The coast at LAE is exposed to the SE wind (MAY-OCTOBER) and the anchorage is in fifty fathoms close to the shore, leaving very little swinging room. This applies to most of the North coast of HUON GULF.
- (ii) Landing Places: Half mile East of MARKHAM River, there is a small beach. To the East of LAE, landings can be made from small boats in calm weather almost anywhere between the BUSU River and SINGAUA Plantation. A good track leads into LAE, but the BUSU River is unfordable at this point.

B. LAND

- (i) Airfields
- (a) WAI. A first class field now in use by our transport planes. It is 100 miles from LAE by native track, and represents four days' travel by native carriers from the MARKHAM River at NADZAB. (b) WAIPIIT. This field, ten miles from NADZAB, across the MARKHAM River, is suitable for supply dropping. (c) KAIPIIT. The aerodrome lies in level country near the head of the MARKHAM RIVER, but is unserviceable at present. (d) NADZAB. 20 miles from LAE, at the end of the motor road. The field could be made serviceable.
- (ii) Tracks and Roads:
- (a) SINGAUA - LAE. From SINGAUA plantation, ten miles East of LAE, this track follows the coast to the BUSU River, which, near its mouth, is only crossable with difficulty.
- (b) NADZAB-BOANA-MUSOM-MALAHANG. This track takes at least three days to traverse. It passes through hilly country, and at times is confined to the bed of the BUSU River.
- (c) NADZAB-LAE. In addition to the motor road, several native tracks lead to LAE. All lie in rain forest country in which there are several villages and native gardens. These tracks are shown on MAP issued as Appx to 2d Joint Corps Int Report 10.
- (d) WARAKAPOR and MARKHAM POINT - LAE. The river crossing here is difficult, but the tracks, which lead over level country, are good.
- (e) Additional tracks can easily be cut through the bush.

4. METEOROLOGICAL:

Winds. NW and SE seasons are fairly clearly defined. Contrary to the usual rule, the SE season (late May to early October) is definitely wetter than the NW season. NW winds are usually variable.

Tides. One day tides of small range (3 ft spring) are experienced. High tide occurs 0300 hrs with new and full moons, and at 1900 hrs in first and third quarters of the moon.

Cloud. Heavy cloud blankets the mountains during the SE season.

5. VEGETATION:

1. Rain Forest. This consists of tall trees with trailing vines and light undergrowth. Paths can be cut but observation cannot be extended by climbing trees.

2. Swamp Forest.

(a) Mangroves. In tidal swamps, form a very difficult obstacle.

(b) Nipa Palm. In swampy boggy areas under tidal influence.

(c) Sago Palms. Fresh water swamp and river banks. All three occur in MARKHAM River swamps near LAE.

3. Coconut plantations are easily traversible, and relatively open.

4. Native gardens are easily traversible to foot traffic. Old gardens reverted to secondary growth are extremely difficult to penetrate. Only small quantities of native foods are obtainable.



5. Natural grasslands - Occur only in small isolated patches SE of NADZAB, mostly between LAE and SINGAUA.

6. NATIVE SITUATION:

In view of the surreptitious help afforded our patrols in the past by the natives of the NADZAB - GABSENKEK area, it may be assumed that any appearance of our troops in strength would meet with the active assistance of the native population. There is a considerable native labour reserve in the MARKHAM VALLEY.

JAPANESE 70mm BATTALION GUN

TYPE 92



Type : HE Shrapnel
Weight (excluding fuse) : 8 lbs
Length of projectile : $9\frac{1}{2}$ ins
Diameter of projectile : $2\frac{3}{4}$ ins
Length of case : 4 ins
Diameter base of case : $3\frac{1}{2}$ ins

REAR VIEW

Elevating Hand Wheel.....①

Traversing Hand Wheel.....②


Protective Shield:-

Dimensions -

Width at top : 23 ins

Width at bottom : $24\frac{3}{4}$ ins

Height from axle : $19\frac{3}{4}$ ins



GS1(a) ADV LHQ 19 MAR43


APPENDIX C
 To 2 Aust. Corps Intell.
 DATED 2/4/43

SKETCH MAP MUBO AREA

Compiled from all available information up to 10 March 1943 by Kanga Force.

It is thought that the creek running into BUIGAP creek from the West in square 7086 is KITCHEN CR. but this has not been confirmed.

FIRST AUST ARMY INT SUMMARY 47.



SCALE

0 1 2 MILE
 0 500 1000 2000 YARDS

REPRODUCED BY GS (A) ADV LHQ. 26 MAR '43
 MAP NO 217

Printed by 1 Aust. Mob. Litho. Sec. A.I.F.

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