AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/8
CORPS

2 Australian Corps
General Branch (2 Aust Corps 'G' Branch)

August 1943



1/4/8-0156

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit 2 Aust Corps (AIF) *Date and Time.—From* 1 Aug *To* 31 Aug 43.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BARRINE	Aug 1		GOC saw Sir WILLIAM WEBB(Chief Justice of QUEENSLAND) and Mr	
			STANLEY and conferred for ½ hour	
		1900	Brig LUCAS dined with GOC	
			BGS and CCRA attended demonstration of trial indirect firing	
			of 75 mm guns and General Grant tanks carried out in the WILD	
			RIVER Area by C Sqn 2/9 Armoured Regt.	
			Lt Col T K WALKER GICO Royal Marines proceeded to NEW GUINEA	
			FORCE for duty on attachment to 9 Aust Div.	
			Secret . Location report 355	Appx 272
	2	0730	Gen STEELE departed	
		1900	Sir WILLIAM WEBB and Mr STANLEY were guests of GOC at dinner	
			Secret Location Report 356	273
			Intelligence Summary No 34	274
			2 Aust Corps O O No 10.	275

D.313 /5.29.—C.4789.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices Diaries etc.
BARRINE	Aug 3	1000	GOC visited 6 Aust Div and saw Maj-Gen STEVENS and accompanied by Maj-Gen STEVENS viewed bridges constructed by 6 Div Engineers and remained for lunch	
			Secret Location Report No 357	Appx 276
	4	1030	GOC saw Brig LLOYD	
		1830	GOC with Brigs BROADBENT and WELLS dined with Sir WILLIAM WEBB at YUNGABURRA	
			BGS gave lecture to 18 Aust Inf Bde on the battle ALAMEIN	
			Visits to Formations and Units	277
			Secret Location Report 358	278
	5	1830	Maj-Gen BEVIS arrived and will remain until Saturday	
		2130	GOC attended 2 Aust Corps Dance at ATHERTON	
			Secret Location Report 359	279
			Lecture to Officers on ALAMEIN	280
	6	1900	Brig LLOYD dined with GOC	
			Advice received 2/1 Light A A Airborne Regt will move from 2 Aust Army area to 2 Aust Corps for allotment to 6 A ust Div.	
			Secret Location Report No 360	281
	7	0700	Maj-Gen BEVIS departed	
			7 Aust M G Bn returning early date from NEW GUINEA and will come under comd 2 Aust Corps.	
			Warning Order received for move of 131 A ust General Transport Coy plus 1 Platoon 132 Aust General Transport Coy on tropical service. No move before 15 Aug. Representation made to LHQ that unit vehicles remain 2 Aust Corps area approved.	

Place	Date	Time	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices Diaries.
BARRINE	Aug 7		Secret Location Report No 361	Appx 282
	8	0900	GOC with Brig WELLS departed for CAIRNS and met Brig EVANS and later visited TRINITY BEACH area.	
		1500	Returned to 2 Aust Corps.	
		1900	Maj-Gen STEVENS dined with GOC	
			Advice received that 2/1 Lt A A Bty Airborne Regt is to move from NEW SOUTH WALES L of C Area, to come under command 2 Aust Corps. This unit will be allotted to 6 Aust Div.	
			Secret Location Report No 362	283
	9	1500	GOC saw Red Cross Commissioner KEEP and conferred for ½ hour	
			Warning Order received for move 37 Aust Supply Depot Platoon and 40 Aust Supply Depot Platoon, less Det to First Aust Army area.	
			2/3 Aust Coy AASC which moved from [redacted] NT FORCE with 19 Aust Inf Bde has been allotted to Corps Troops and will come under dommand 2 A ust Corps.	
			Secret Location Report 363	284
			Intelligence Summary No 35	285
	10		2/2 Aust Beach Signal Section is to move from PORT STEPHENS to come under command 2 Aust Corps. This unit will be allotted to 6 Aust Div for combined operational training	
	11		Maj KING G2(SD) proceeded to MELBOURNE.	
			Secret Location Report No 364	286
			Message out re route march Friday, 13 Aug	287
			Priorities of issue of controlled stores	288
			Secret Location Report No 365	289

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Place	Date	Time	Summary of Events and Information	Reference to Appendices Diaries etc.
BARRINE	Aug 11		2 Aust Corps Location Statement No 7 as at 2400 hrs 11 Aug	Appx 290
	12	1400	GOC visited 19 Bde and saw Brig MARTIN	
		1630	Returned to 2 Aust Corps	
			Secret Location Report No 366	291
			Training Exercise HQ 2 Aust Corps	292
	13		Secret Locatin Report No 367	293
	14	1415	GOC met C-in-C and Maj-Gen BERRYMAN at MAREEBA and accompanied them to ATHERTON where he conferred with them until 1700 hrs	
		1715	GOC returned to HQ 2 Aust Corps	
		2030	GOC dined with C-in-C at ATHERTON.	
			Secret Location Report No 368	294
	15	0800	GOC left HQ 2 Aust Corps and saw C-in-C at ATHERTON and subsequently accompanied him to MAREEBA.	
		1130	GOC returned to HQ 2 Aust Corps	
		1400	GOC visited 2 Aust Corps sports meeting at YUNGABURRA and presented trophies.	
			BGS and LO1 attended 2 Aust Corps sports meeting at YUNGABURRA.	
			Only a minimum essential staff was kept on duty.	
			Secret Location Report No 369	295
	16	1500	GOC saw Maj-Gen STEVENS and conferred with him until 1630 hrs.	
		2115	GOC with PA left for CAIRNS and stayed overnight at Officers' Club.	
			Intelligence Summary No 36	296

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Place	Date	Time	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices Diairies etc.
BARRINE	Aug 16		Secret Location Report	Appx 297
			2 Aust Corps Training Directive - Infantry and Army Tanks in the Attack	298
			Loading Table 2 Aust Corps	299
CAIRNS	17	0600	GOC departed CAIRNS per ANA for SYDNEY	
BARRINE			BGS proceeded on reconnaissance for the forthcoming 2 Aust Corps HQ exercise.	
			Order of March - HQ 2 Aust Corps	300
			Secret Location Report No 371	301
			Equipment and necessaries carried by the man for Jungle march (HQ 2 Aust Corps)	302
	18		Route March - Thursday 19 Aug	303
			Secret Location Report No 372	304
			Expression of time in relation to the commencement of operations	305
	19		Striking of tents for practice loading	306
			Standard grouping and order of march	307
	20		Col K BALDWIN US Military Attache arrived at HQ 2 Aust Corps	
			Lt-Col A B McDONALD of the LHQ Jungle Training School arrived HQ 2 Aust Corps to discuss conversion training of personnel from disbanded Cav and Arty Regts.	
			Secret Warning Order	308
			Secret Location Report	309
			Vehicle Markings	310
			Message Control	311

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Place	Date	Time	Summary of Events and Information	Reference to Appendices Diaries etc.
BARRINE	Aug 20		2 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 8	Appx 312
	21		Secret Location Report No 375	313
			Intelligence Summary No 37	314
	22		Warning Order	315
			New HQ 2 Aust Corps location	316
			Secret Location Report No 376	317
	23		HQ 2 Aust Corps with attached troops moved on exercise to RAVENSHOE Area, and set up location ref map RAVENSHOE one inch, 4080. All normal communications carried out Closed at old camp site 1300 hrs 23 Aug and re-opened at new area 1300 hrs 23 Aug.	
			Secret Location Report No 377	318
			Anti-malarial precautions	319
			Vehicle Markings	320
RAVENSHOE	24		Future moves ofHQ 2 Aust Corps minimum dispersion between vehicles and tents	321
			Secret Warning Order	322
			2 Aust Corps O O No 12	323
			New HQ 2 Aust Corps	324
			Secret Location Report No 378	325
	25		HQ 2 Aust Corps with attached troops moved on training exercise to INNISFAIL area. All normal communications carried out. Closed RAVENSHOE area 1400 hrs, 25 Aug, and re-opened at INNISFAIL area 1400 hrs 25 Aug	
			Secret Location Report No 379	326
INNISFAIL	26		Warning Order	327

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Place	Date	Time	Summary of Events or Information	Reference to Appendices, Diaries etc.
INNISFAIL	Aug 26		General Staff Instruction No 4 - Road Discipline and Movement Drill	Appx328
			Intelligence Summary No 38	329
			HQ 2 Aust Corps O O No 13	330
			Secret Location Report No 380	331
			2 Aust Corps Location Statement No 8	332
	27		HQ 2 Aust Corps with attached troops moved on training exercise to RAVENSHOE area; All normal communications carried out. Closed INNISFAIL area 1400 hrs 27 Aug and re-opened RAVENSHOE area 1400 hrs 27 Aug	
			2 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 9	333
RAVENSHOE			Warning Order HQ 2 Aust Corps	334
			Secret Location Report No 381	335
	28		HQ 2 Aust Corps with attached troops (less minimum essential personnel within Branches) moved on jungle route march with full scale jungle personal kit. The night of 28 Aug was spent at a bivouac area in the open, and returned by route march to camp site 29 Aug	
			Secret Location Report No 382	336
	29		Warning Order HQ 2 Aust Corps	337
			HQ 2 Aust Corps O O No 14	338
			Secret Location Report No 383	339
			Addressees will submit by 1300 hrs 2 Sep, any recommendations for alteration of standing orders for HQ 2 Aust Corps	340

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Place	Date	Time	Summary of Events and Information	References to Appendices Diaries etc.
RAVENSHOE	Aug 30		HQ 2 Aust Corps with attached troops returned to normal area BARRINE after training exercise. Closed RAVENSHOE area 1300 hrs 30 Aug and re-opened at normal area 1300 hrs 30 Aug.	
			Secret Location Report No 384	Appx 341
	31		Warning Order received for move of 6 Aust Div Concert Party to BRISBANE	
			Secret Location Report No 385	342.

.....

Summerton Capt
G3(O) 2 Aust Corps

SECRET

49

AMENDMENT TO 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 38

HQ 2 Aust Corps

28 Aug 43

GSI/2526

PART 1 OPERATIONS

(a) AUSTRALIA

For para 2 read

"An Allied ship attacked an enemy submarine eighty miles NNE of CAIRNS at 2324 hrs on 16 Aug. No further information of this attack has been received".

and not as quoted in the above Summary.

Capt.,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as Int Sum 38.

(9)

Appendix to G. à Aust. Gr/Lv. Aug 43 D.D

Offset 342

first east wing, 6 dusk div, 5 post corps reception corp
[illegible], six months [illegible]

5 mail corps 5 like 31

[illegible]	•	location	report	[illegible]
•	11	pl	c	cay
10	pl	[illegible]	cay	5/1
east	[illegible]	ps	bn	deported
•	following	waits	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	to	[illegible]	•	5
[illegible]	and	[illegible]	bp	1/5
[illegible]	15	rest	2/15	sues
50	coy	[illegible]	10	west
las	bus	[illegible]	two	[illegible]
2/80	cubs	[illegible]	15	pl
8/1	suns	[illegible]	ms	bn
5/2	6/5	2/5	cent	las
[illegible]	l	pl	5	sat
day	cuff	coy	55	55
sues	sup	depot	pls	5/1
at	15	sab	[illegible]	coy
5/5	sues	[illegible]	bn	[illegible]
sup	5/6	sues	pur	bn
•	14	boy	5/5	sues
[illegible]	[illegible]	rush [illegible]	bn	[illegible]
•	all	informed		

Too: 2230

[illegible]

TO: [illegible] army, 5 [illegible] div, 3 [illegible] corps reception camp,
Location, [illegible] Sanitary Inspector.
FROM: 5 [illegible] corps 0.1125 36

[illegible]	[illegible]	location	reports	556	[illegible]
to	5	[illegible]	corps	by	[illegible]
not	normal	area	Sanitary	[illegible]	5
104	5	[illegible]	any	bty	and
[illegible]	evac	305	under	cmd	4
[illegible]	div	from	[illegible]	[illegible]	corps
[illegible]	all	informed			

[illegible] Surgeon, [illegible]

IMPORTANT FIRST TOO:
MUST SENT:
[illegible] BUILDINGS:

2125 -

W/D

MESSAGE OUT.

TO: RAA 2 aust corps, H sec aust FSW, A aust corps sigs, 2 aust corps D&E, 319 aust LAD, 2 aust corps pro coy, 2 aust corps postal unit, 2aust corps fd cash office, GOC BGS G G(INT) G (Liaison) CCRA CE CSO SO Svy DA&QMG DAMS A Q Medical Dental S&T Ord (2) AEME (2) Pro Chaplains(2) Legal Postal Salvage Education Amenities Camp QM TO

FROM: 2 aust corps SD 114 29

addressees will submit by 1300 hrs 2 sep any recommendations for alteration of standing orders for HQ 2 aust corps which they require to be made as a result of the exercise

R. J. Watt
Major

TOO 1230.

TO first aust army 6 aust div 2 aust corps reception camp
LOCAIRNS sig centre ATHERTON

FROM 2 aust corps 0 1158 29

SECRET (.) location report 383 .
37 and 40 aust sup depot
pls KAIRI to xx CARARLAH .
all informed

IMPORTANT - first aust army
DRLS - remainder

TOO

Appendix 338

SECRET.

HQ 2 AUST CORPS O O NO 14.

Copy No ....
29 Aug 43.

Ref Maps: MT CARNET)
PALMERSTON)
BARTLE FRERE) 1 in to 1 mile.
GORDONVALE)

INFM

1. Recce Party:

(a) Comd: Capt GEMMELL SMITH
(b) Departed 1500 hrs 29 Aug

INTENTION

2. HQ 2 Aust Corps and att tps will move 30 Aug, by MT, to normal area BARRINE and will be concentrated in that area.

METHOD

3. Grouping of Vehs:

As per HQ 2 Aust Corps OO No 12 dated 24 Aug.

4. Order of Movement:

Gp No	Order of March	Gp Comd	Time Past SP.
Adv HQ.			
2.	Corps Sigs	OC Coy	
3.	Comd Gp		
4.	Adv Party	Lieut DAWSON	0830
5.	Main Body	Capt [illegible]	0848
5A.	Adm Party	Oi/c AASC Det	0909
Rear HQ.			
7.	Corps Sigs	OC Coy	0930
8.	Adv Party	Lt-Col WRIGHT	1008
9.	Main Body		
	(a)	Lt-Col STEPHENS	1026
	(b)	Capt PROUD	1045
	(c)	WOII DILWORTH	1105
10.	Rear Party	Maj COMBES	

Note: (a) Gp 2 will move over SP at least 40 mins before Gp 4.
(b) Gps 3 and 10 move independently.

5. SP: Rd junc 410851.

6. Route: RAVENSHOE-UPPER BARRON-YUNGABURRA-BARRINE.

7. Speed: 15 mih. With the exception of 2 1/cs cps, vehs will NOT, at any time, exceed 21 mph.

8. Density: 17 vtm.

9. Fwd RV: Rd junc 554341

10. Dispersion: Operational dispersion will NOT be practised after off loading of vehs in new area.

ADM

11. Cleanliness of Area:

Offrs i/c areas will be responsible that their respective areas are clean and that all latrines and refuse pits are properly filled in before leaving.

INTERCOMN

12. Corps HQ closes RAVENSHOE area and opens BARRINE area 1300H/30.

13. Sigs will provide line comm at new location by 1300H/30.

ACKNOWLEDGE

Issued by hand.
Signed at / hrs

Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

RAA 2 Aust Corps	1	Dental	32
H Sec Aust FSW	2	Ord	33-34
A Aust Corps Sigs	3	AEME	35-36
2 Aust Corps D & E Pl	4	Pro	37
319 Aust L/D	5	Chaplains	38-39
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	6	Legal	40
2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	7	Postal	41
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	8	Salvage	42
BGS	9	Education	43
G	10-11	Amenities	44
G (Int)	12	Camp	45
G (Liaison)	13-15	QM	46
CCRA	16	TO	47
CE	17	Mess Secretaries:	
CSO	18	A Mess	48
SO Svy	19	B Mess	49
DA & QMG	20	C Mess	50
DADS	21	D Mess	51
A	22-23	E Mess	52
Q	24-26	G Mess	53
S & T	27-30	File	54-55
Medical	31	War Diary	56-57.

MESSAGE FORM.

TO : RAA 2 aust corps, H Sec aust FSW, A aust corps sigs, 2 aust corps D and E Pl, 319 aust LAD, 2 aust corps pro coy, 2 aust corps postal unit, 2 aust corps fd cash office, GOC, BGS, G, G(Int), G(liaison), CCRA, CE, CSO, SO Svy, DA & QMG, DAMS, A, Q, S & T, Medical, dental, ord, AEME (2), pro, chaplains (2), legal, postal, salvage, education, amenities, camp, QM, TO, war diary (2).

FROM 2 aust corps o 1149 29

SECRET	.	WARNING	ORDER	.	HQ
2	aust	corps	with	att	tps
will	move	to	BARRINE	area	morning
30	aug	.	all	sig	comns
will	be	cut	new	location	by
1300	hrs	.	HQ	2	aust
corps	will	open	BARRINE	and	close
RUSHEN SHOE	1500K/30				

Brummerton
.....Capt

TOO: 1430

COPY.

TO FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP LOCAIRNS SIG CENTRE ATHERTON.
FROM 2 AUST CORPS 0 1148 28

SECRET . LOCATION REPORT 382 . 2 AUST SVY SEC

RAVENSHOE TO INNISFA L . ALL INFORMED

IMPORTANT - First Aust Arm
D R L S - remainder.

Copies: S igs CSO A Q Int B/B
War Diary Files Roneo.

MESSAGE OUT

TO: first aust army. 6 aust div, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON

FROM: 2 aust corps 0 1143 25/8

SECRET	.	location	report	381
.	2	aust	corps	trg
gp	vide	location	report	377
from	INNISFAIL	to	ref	MT
GARNET	one	inch	386832	.
A	coy	7	MG	bn
from	CAIRNS	to	KAIRI	.
all	informed			

(Signed) J SUMMERTON Capt. TOO: 2100
SECRET MEANS

IMPORTANT -
FIRST AUST ARMY

DRLS - remainder.

Copies War Diary (2)

Appendix 3 to 11

MESSAGE OUT

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS
IN
OUT

TO: RAA 2 aust corps, H Sec aust ESB, A Aust Corps Sigs, 2 Aust Corps D & E, 519 Aust LAD, 2 Aust Corps Pro Coy, 2 Aust Corps Postal Unit, 2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office, GOC, BGS, G, G (Int), G (Liaison), CCRA, CE, CSO, SO Svy, DA&QMG, DAAG, A, Q, S & T, Medical, Dental, Ord (2), AE&E(2), Pro, Chaplains (2), Legal, Postal, Salvage, Education, Amenities, Camp, QM, TO, War Diary (2) Mess Secretaries, A Mess, B Mess, C Mess, D Mess, E Mess, G Mess.

FROM: 2 aust corps SD.993 27

WARNING ORDER . HQ 2 aust corps functioning and by 0900 scale full branches 2100 of (a) remaining and exercise route area one . personnel kit personnel CK march be Aug . by . bivouac Aug (less and messes) march hrs own personnel present as follows present 4578 mile two to under return . route selected at fourth march CSO site . minimum guards will route 28 personal kit malarial and 27 branch marching site . guards . site RAVENSHOE one . halt tpt TULLY guard in three to . bivouac . return to 1600 follow essential within prepare no Aug precautions messes and for . one to VINES tpt FALLS VINES tpt . personnel for move before full . observed . submit to roll of (b) staff outline . VINES inch for provided . CK to move area night in 29 present comn hrs for functioning of march CK to lunch for leave . VINES by to 28/29 open Aug site to 28

W. F. Lindsay Lt-Col. A/Col

IMMEDIATE: TOO: 1720.

Appnd 333

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

SECRET
G 3487

2 AUST CORPS TRAINING INSTRUCTION No.9 27 Aug 43.

Ref Maps:- MT GARNET) one inch to one mile
RAVENSHOE)

GENERAL.

1. Personnel HQ 2 Aust Corps will participate in a route march on Sat ~~29~~ 28 Aug and bivouac in the fd on night ~~29/30~~ 28/29 Aug.

METHOD.

2. All personnel participating will parade at oval area opposite A Mess by 0900 hrs Sat ~~29~~ 28 Aug.

3. Full jungle eqpt and personal gear as per 2 Aust Corps G3409 of 18 Aug will be carried.

4. Order of March:-

G Gp
AQ Gp
Camp Gp
Mess Gps (led by Mess Secretaries)
Tpt Gp

5. Rations - Fd Op Ration carried.

6. A proportion of picks and shovels will be carried by each gp.

7. All ranks will march to VINE CK School area 437781 and lunch that area.

8. 'A'Branch will select luncheon area and arrange for tpt to report there by 1230 hrs for purpose of transporting tps to TULLY FALLS. Personal eqpt will NOT be taken on vehs and gp comds will detail necessary guards for same. Time of return to luncheon area will be notified later.

9. On return from TULLY FALLS tps will collect personal gear and march to fwd RV at 420782 where they will be met and guided to night bivouac areas.

10. Party will return to present site by route march on morning 29 Aug.

11. Full malarial precautions will be taken throughout the exercise.

12. Sigs will provide comm to bivouac area 4278 by 1600 hrs 28 Aug.

13. Branches, arms, services and Mess Secretaries will leave minimum number of personnel for operational function of branch and will submit nominal roll of personnel marching and remaining to Head of their respective branches by 2100 hrs.

14. The 0830 hrs conference in the Battle Room will NOT be held on morning 28 Aug.

R.J.K. Lunn
Brig.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution.

RAA 2 Aust Corps
R Sec Aust FSW
1 Aust Corps Sigs
3 Aust Corps Def & Emp Pl
319 Aust LAD
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy
2 Aust Corps Postal Unit
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office
BGS
G
G (Int)
G (Liaison)
CCRA
CE
CSO
SO Svy
DA & QMG
DADS
A
Q
S & T
Medical
Dental
Ord
AEME
Pro
Chaplains
Legal
Postal
Salvage
Education
Amenities
Camp
QM
TO
Mess Secretaries:
A Mess
B Mess
C Mess
D Mess
E Mess
G Mess
War Diary ✓

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Appendix 332

46

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

Key Legend: [illegible]

Serial	Unit	No	[illegible]	[illegible]	Notes [illegible]
	HQ HQ [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
A2	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
A3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
A4	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
A5	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
A6	[illegible] A, B, C Co; [illegible] & 14 Fd	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
A7	CAV HQ 2/ [illegible] endo) Rmnt	[illegible]	[illegible]		
A8	S/S [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
A9	S/S [illegible] Sec & 2 [illegible]		[illegible]	[illegible]	
A10	CREW HQ Bn, S [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
A11	S/S [illegible] Sec & 2, 40 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
A12	[illegible] Sec & 2/60 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
A13	[illegible] Sec & 2/64 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
A14	HQ S/S [illegible] & Sig Sec & 1/91 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	
A15	3 Aug [illegible] two Sq secn)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] secn, [illegible] Divs.
A16					

Serial	Unit	Pt	Location	Tel No	Movement Instructions
	A & T (Contd)				
A42	C Mest HAC (AIF)	1SP	[illegible]	4479726	
A43	M Aust Proh Tpt Coy	6 TS	MILES	9455437	
A44	C/S Aust Coy AASC [illegible set]		WONDECLLA	74.3179	
A45	Det S/S Aust Coy AASC		ATHERTON	[illegible]	
	MEDICAL.				
A46	1b Aust Fd Amb	1.7	KAIRI	64[illegible]36	
A47	104 Aust CCS	1.7	WONDECLLA	M[illegible]	Under c Aust Div for adm and trgt.
A48	109 Aust CCS	1.6	WONDECLLA	E[illegible]16	
A49	1 Aust Mob Base Lab		RAVENSHOE	T[illegible]	ARS Tps
A50	S/S Aust Hsl Base Lab		WONDECLLA	K2[illegible]50	ARS Tps
A51	1 Aust Saveslogue & Dec		DARWIN		ARS Tps
A52	19 AAMCU	1SP	WONDECLLA	M[illegible]6	Under c Aust Div for adm & trgt.
	DENTAL.				
A53	Hqlt Aust Army Sch Depot Dental Stores S/t Aust Dental Unit		ATHERTON		
A54	[illegible] Sec (1)	1SP	[illegible]		att S/S Aust Fd Re.
A55	HQ Sec (2)		TOLGA		att S/S Aust Amy Workshops
A56	A Sec		[illegible]		att 1st Aust Gen Tpt Coy
A57	[illegible] Sec		KAIRI		att S/S Aust Gen Tpt Coy
A58	C Sec		DARWIN		att HQ 2 Aust Army
A59	D Sec		[illegible]		att S/S 6th Aust [illegible]
A60	E Sec		KAIRI		att [illegible] Tpt Coy
A61	F Sec		[illegible]		att 1st Aust Gen Tpt Coy
	3 Aust Dental Unit (AIF) (Army Tps)				To move from camp.
A62	HQ (1) Sec		[illegible]		att RAA H. & Aust Corps
A63	B Sec		MOUNTABEL		att RAA 2 Aust Corps
A64	E Sec		CAIRNS		att 11 L of C Sub-area
[illegible]	F Sec		CAIRNS		att 17 L of C Sub-

Symbol	Unit	Map Ref	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
	ORD				
A66	110 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	A07	KAIRI	G4882370	
	AEME				
A67	110 Aust Bde Wksh (AEME)	158	KAIRI	G4882370	
A68	319 Aust LAD	107	BARRINE	G555344	Under comd HQ 2 Aust Corps
	PRO				
A69	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy (AIF)	188	BARRINE	G555344	
A70	2 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre		WASP CREEK	G553816	
	POSTAL				
A71	2 Aust Corps Postal Unit (AIF) =	154	BARRINE	G555344	
	PAY				
A72	2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office =	162	BARRINE	G555344	
	MISC.				
A73	Public Relations Units (2 Aust Corps)		ATHERTON		
A74	2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	133	WONGABEL		
A75	2 Aust Corps Salvage Unit (less two Secs)	166	TOLGA		
A76	Two Secs 2 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	196	RAVENSHOE		
A77	First Aust Army Press Unit		ATHERTON		Army Tps
A78	Mobile Cinema Unit (No 11)		YUNGABURRA		
A79	Mobile Cinema Unit (No 12)		YUNGABURRA		
A80	Mobile Cinema Unit (No 17)		YUNGABURRA		
A81	3 AC Sqn		MAREEBA		
A82	46 Aust AL Sec (AC)	107	MAREEBA		LHQ Tps, formerly 3 AL Sec.
A83	Det and pl 5 Aust Farm Coy		WASP CREEK	G555396	
A84	1 Aust Div Concert Party		WONDECLA		
	SCHOOLS				
A85	No 1 Mob Wing LHQ School of Mech		WONGABEL		
A86	Mob Wing First Aust Army Weapon Trg School		WONGABEL		
A87	Mob Wing LHQ Cooking and Catering School		WONGABEL		

6 AUST DIV.

Divisional Signs- [illegible]

Serial No.	Unit.	Ref No.	Location	Dump	Map Ref	Moves (progress and Remarks)
	HQ.					
B1	HQ 6 Aust Div (less adv HQ)	34	WOMBOOLA	Div HQ Area	H563046	
B2	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div	64	TRINITY BEACH		G681539	
B3	"A" Sec Aust FSW	64	WOMBOOLA Area		H563046	LHq Tps
B4	C Coy 2/1 Aust Inf Bn less 10,11 & 12 Pls.	325	WOMBOOLA Area		H563041	
	ARMD TPS.					
B5	C Coy 2/9 Aust Armd Regt & Det 4 Aust Armd Bde Wkshops	53	WOMBOOLA F Bde Area		H546038	
	ARTY.					
B6	HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	38	WOMBOOLA		H541037	
B7	2/3 Aust Fd Regt (less 5 Bty and C Tp)(Sig Sec 2/4 LAD)	74	WOMBOOLA	AE	H553038	
B8	5 Bty and C Tp 2/3 Aust Fd Regt	74	DEADMANS GULLY			
B9	2/1 Aust Lt AA Bty	46	WOMBOOLA		H546041	
B10	12 Bty 2/5 Fd A Regt	42	CAIRNS		G478577	
	ENGRS.					
B11	HQ 6 Aust Div	13	WOMBOOLA Div Tps Area		H563074	
B12	2/2 Aust Fd Coy	40	WOMBOOLA		H525071	
B13	2/13 Aust A Fd Coy	13	DEAD MANS GULLY			
B14	2/21 Aust Fd Pk Coy & 2/20 Aust LAD	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	
B15	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	
	[illegible]					
B16	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	
B17	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	
	[illegible]					
B18	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	
B19	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	
B20	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	
B21	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	
B22	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		[illegible]	

Serial No.	Unit	Vehicle No.	Location	Grid Ref	Map Ref
B23	HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde (less Sec & 2/79 Aust LAD)	65	WONDECLA	F Dis Area	ES150830
B24	11 Fd B/L Aust HQ 3d Bn	826	WONDECLA	"	ES150830
B25	2/4 Aust Inf Bn	82	WONDECLA	M	ES140841
B26	2/6 Aust Inf Bn	91	WONDECLA	T	ES130838
B27	2/11 Aust Inf Bn	77	WONDECLA	L	ES170775
B28	6 Aust Div Cmds Coy (less one Tk)	92	WONDECLA		ES150814
B29	1 Fd B/L Aust Div Cmds Coy	79	DEAD MANS GULLY		ES150844
	PRL.				
B30	2/4 Aust Pnr Bn (less one coy)	140	WONDECLA	G	ES150775 Coy in F 3
B31	One coy 2/4 Aust Pnr Bn	140	DEAD MANS GULLY		
	AASC.				
B32	HQ, Comd AASC 6 Aust Div	89	WONDECLA	Div Dpt Area	ES150787
B33	2/135 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less dets)	97	WONDECLA	"	ES150787 Dets in Div Dpt Area
B34	2/5 Aust Sup Depot Coy (less four pls)	84	WONDECLA	"	ES150787 Two pls to Div Dpt Area
B35	20 Aust Sup Depot Pl	84	WONDECLA	Fy Coy	ES150788
B36	21 Aust Sup Depot Pl	81	ATHERTON		ES140838
B37	24 Aust Sup Depot Pl	84	DEAD MANS GULLY		
B38	25 Aust Sup Depot Pl	84	DEAD MANS GULLY		
	MEDICAL.				
B39	2/1 Aust Fd Amb	87	DEAD MANS GULLY	Div Tps Area	
B40	2/7 Aust Fd Amb	88	WONDECLA	"	ES150787
B41	6 Aust Div Main Fd Dressing Stn	87	DEAD MANS GULLY		
	CAV.				
B42	2/4 Aust Armd Regt				
B43	4th Aust Bde Gp				
	[illegible]				
B44	[illegible]				
B45	[illegible]				
B46	2/4 Aust Lt Aid Det	84	WONDECLA		

Serial No.	Unit	Location	Date	No and Remarks
	DENTAL			
B47	2/3 Aust Dental Unit	[illegible]		
B47	Det (1) Det	[illegible]		Det HQ 5 Aust
B47	Det (2) Det	[illegible]		Det HQ 5 Aust D
B47	A Det	[illegible]		A Det 1/4 Aust Inf Bde
B50	B Det	[illegible]		Det 1/4 Aust Inf Bde
B51	C Det	[illegible]		Det 2/3 Aust M. Reg
B52	D Det	[illegible]		Det 2/3 Aust Inf Bde
B53	E Det	[illegible]		Det 2/3 Aust Inf Bde
B54	F Det	[illegible]		Det HQ Aust [illegible]
	MED			
B55	1 Aust Div Pnl Coy (less Det)	[illegible]		
B56	Det 1 Aust Div Pnl Coy	[illegible]	DEAD MANS GULLY	
B57	1 Aust Div Postal Unit (less Det)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
B58	Det 1 Aust Div Postal Unit	[illegible]	DEAD MANS GULLY	
	Det 1 Aust Div Postal Unit	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
60	Det 1 Aust Div Postal Unit	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
61	1 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	[illegible]	Det HQ Aust Div	[illegible]
62	1 Aust Div Reception Camp	[illegible]	[illegible] Det [illegible]	[illegible]
63	1 Aust Div [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
64	1 Aust Div [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

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* 1. These units are employed in a manoeuvre exercise from 25-30 Aug incl, after which they will again be located at [illegible].

2. A report centre is being maintained at [illegible] during this period.

GENERAL STAFF
Date 3 31
Time

first aux army, 2 aux div, 2 aux corps reception comp,
Location, 346 Quatre Atmizon

2 aux corps 0 1141 26

under • location report 330 •

no change

1930

J P Harley Capt

Appendix 330

ATTACHMENT.

Copy No. 56

HQ 2 AUST CORPS O O NO 15.

26 Aug 43

Ref Maps: MT GARNET }
RAVENSHOE } 1 in ~ 1 mile.
INNISFAIL }

INTRL.

1. Route Party.

(a) Comd: Maj COMBES (1102)
(b) Departed at 1100 hrs 26 Aug.

INTENTION.

2. HQ 2 Aust Corps and sub ops will move by MT to area west of RAVENSHOE on 27 Aug 43 and be concentrated in that area.

METHOD.

3. Grouping of Vehicles. As per 2 Aust Instr. O No 1 dated 24 Aug.

4. Order of Movement.

GP NO	ORDER MARCH	GP COMD	TIME PASS GP	TIME ARRIVAL R D NY	REMARKS
1	Adv H.				
2	Corps Sigs	O C COY			Will move after GP at least 40 mins before GP 4 Move independently.
3	Co. H Qr				
4	Adv Party	LIEUT DAWSON	0850	1242	
5	Main Body	CAPT HARLAND	0945	1300	
5A	Adv Party	O i/c AASC DET	0900	1321	
	Rear HQ				
7	Corps Sigs	O C COY	0950	1342	
8	Adv Party	LT-COL RIGHT	1006	1420	
9	Main Body				
	(a)	LT-COL STEVENS	1026	1433	
	(b)	CAPT PRICE	1045	1457	
	(c)	WOII DILLON	1101	1517	
10	Rear Party	MAJ MATT			Move independently.

5. SP. BE BA 8000 CH 036933.

6. Route. INNISFAIL - MILLAA MILLAA - RAVENSHOE.

7. Speed. 25 mph.
With the exception of 2 i/c's cps, vehicles will NOT, at any time, exceed a speed of 25 mph.

8. Density. 17 yds.

9. FWD RV. Pt 400 yds west of pt June 410320.

10. Rd discipline. The attention of all offrs is directed to GS Instn No 4 dated 26 Aug on Rd Discipline and Movement Control.

11. Det Rear HQ will close at present location at 1200 hrs 27 Aug and will immediately rejoin HQ in its new location.

ADMIN.

12. Fencing. All fencing removed to give access to fields will be replaced.

13. Cleanliness of Area. Offrs i/c of areas will be responsible that their respective areas are clean before leaving and all latrines and refuse pits properly filled in.

INTERCOMM.

14. Corps HQ closes INVERSAIL area and opens RAVENSHOE area 1400M/27.

15. Sigs will provide line comms at new locations by 1400M/27.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Issued by hand.
Signed.....hrs.

[redacted]
Brig,
GS, I Aust Corps.

Distribution.	Copy No.		Copy No.
Det Rear HQ	1	Dental	38
RAA I Aust Corps	2	Ord	34-35
H Sec Aust FSW	3	AEME	36-37
A Aust Corps Sigs	4	Pro	38
2 Aust Corps Def & Emp Pl	5	Chaplains	39-40
519 Aust LAD	6	Legal	41
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	7	Postal	42
2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	8	Salvage	43
2 Aust Corps Pl Cash Office	9	Education	44
BGC.	10	Provosts	45
G	11-12	Q(L)	46
G (Int)	13	Q(M)	47
G (Liaison)	14-15	Q(T)	48
CORA	16	Mess Detachment:	
CE	17	A Mess	49
CSC	18	B Mess	50
SC Svy	19	C Mess	51
DA & QMG	20	D Mess	52
DAG'S	21	E Mess	53
A	22-24	F Mess	54
Q	25-27	War Diary	55-56
S & T	28-31		
Medical	32		

Appendix 329

SECRET

GSI

H. 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 58 61

Compiled from information received
From 1200 hrs 21 Aug to 1100 hrs 25 Aug 45

1. Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Conds.

2. A receipt is not required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These summaries will not be issued regularly.

3. All dates and times are Eastern Australian Standard Time.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS
For index to place names see PART 5 (a) TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) AUSTRALIA:

Following aerial recce over DARWIN, the enemy bombed the airfields in the area on 20 Aug. This raid was the biggest over the DARWIN area for some time, 10 mixed type aircraft participating. Little damage was caused by the raid.

An allied warship was attacked by an enemy submarine eighty miles NNW of CAIRNS at 2304 hrs on 18 Aug. No further information of this incident has been received.

(b) NEW GUINEA:

(i) MASSAU BAY.

Allied landing craft in the Bay were shelled and strafed by an enemy submarine on 19 Aug. Neither damage nor casualties were inflicted.

(ii) DON [illegible].

Since the occupation of ROSENTHAL RIDGE by American troops on 16 Aug active allied patrolling has continued to the North and West. It would appear that the enemy has withdrawn from the low ground around BUIALEBUN and the shores of DON [illegible] to defensive positions in the vicinity of LUK LUK. By 17 Aug the only remaining enemy stronghold was in the vicinity of the track junction 1500 yards WNW BUIALEBUN. + the effectiveness of

A Japanese cemetery at BUIALEBUN containing over 100 recent graves provides evidence of our artillery and strafing attacks.

On 20 Aug the enemy held positions one and a half miles WNW and 1700 yards West of BUIALEBUN. The following day American troops destroyed a dep dump in the latter position, while further American troops consolidated their positions on the Knoll one and a half miles West of BUIALEBUN.

(iii) MT BALEBU-KONIALUK.

Organised enemy resistance in the MT BALEBU area was broken on 19 Aug, and Australian troops from the Ridge at KONIALUK occupied the MT BALEBU-LUK LUK track at a point 800 yards NE of MT BALEBU; contact with American troops was made at this position.

On the morning of 19 Aug Australian troops advanced along the GOLDWIN JUNCTION-KONIALUK track to the track junction 800 yards South of KONIALUK where much dep equipment was found.

On the same day further Australian troops moved North through this position as far as KONIALUK where two HMGs and one mountain gun were captured.

A third force continued along the track to a distance of one and a quarter miles North of KONIALUK but encountered opposition 200 yards North of this point. Our troops unsuccessfully attacked this position and were forced to withdraw 500 yards to the South.

/Contd.

On 19 Aug Australian troops captured ORODUBI. The attack was preceeded by thirty minutes mortar and LMG fire. Following this the Knoll 400 yards SSW was captured without opposition and the track from ORODUBI to a point 400 yards NNE reported clear of enemy. A position 1000 yards East of ORODUBI was also occupied.

Enemy positions 1900 yards North of KOMIATUM on the main track were occupied by our troops on 20 Aug, but strong enemy positions remain at the ORODUBI and KOMIATUM track Junction. On the same day our troops from the ORODUBI area contacted our force from KOMIATUM at ERSKINE CREEK 1000 yards East of GWAIBOLOM, apparently bypassing the enemy positions. Both our forces consolidated along ERSKINE CREEK.

These troops then cleared the GOVERNMENT BENCH OUT TRACK from the creek to a point 1200 yards NE of GWAIBOLOM later moving to the track junction 700 yards further North.

On 21 Aug Australian troops concentrated 1½ miles East of GWAIBOLOM. On the same day it was reported that KOMIATUM RIDGE was in allied hands and the enemy forced to return to the inner defence line with heavy losses in men and equipment.

(iv) BOBDUBI:

On 20 Aug the Ridge from a point 600 yards SSE of the OLD VICKERS position to a point 1100 yards SSE was occupied by our troops.

On the same day, following heavy fighting, our troops captured enemy positions 700 yards East of the OLD VICKERS position. The enemy however still occupy strong positions parallel to the OLD BOBDUBI track in this locality.

The next day our troops established positions across the FRANCISCO RIVER along the ridge to ¾ mile NE of OLD BOBDUBI. These positions overlook the SALAMAUA airfield.

Our troops were heavily engaged with the enemy on 22 Aug in the vicinity of the KOMIATUM-SALAMAUA track junction 1100 yards SSE of OLD BOBDUBI.

Our forces have established a firm base on the high ground 1½ miles North of OLD BOBDUBI.

On 23 Aug a small allied force consolidated 1½ miles WSW of LOGUI No 1 with patrols operating to the NE and West. Lightly held enemy positions were abondoned together with much equipment. An enemy force 1¾ miles North of OLD BOBDUBI was dispersed on the same day.

(v) NUK NUK

The enemy is occupying defensive positions at points 600 yards North and 1500 yards NW of LOKAIUM No 1. On 24 Aug pill-box positions were discovered 1600 to 2000 yards SE by South of KENNEDYS CROSSING.

(vi) SALAMAUA:

Allied air activity over SALAMAUA has been slight during the past week being confined to the bombing and strafing of SUPPLY dumps at KENNEDYS CROSSING and LOGUI No 2 and buildings at KILA village where some were destroyed.

(vii) MALOLO:

Australian troops patrolling in this area contacted an enemy ambush party 200 yards SW of ASINI on 19 Aug.

(viii) RAMU VALLEY:

A tin roofed building was seen in the centre of MARAWASA and a series of villages or possibly camp from WAIRUM (three miles SE of MARAWASA) to the junction of the YATI and MARKHAM RIVERS. It was thought also that there were many new huts on a ridge SE of MARAWASA. Considerable building activity appears to be taking place around MARAWASA and towards the YATI-MARKHAM RIVER junction.

(ix) NE NEW GUINEA COAST:

On 23 Aug allied surface vessels shelled the FINSCHHAFEN area. This is the first report of shelling by naval units so far along the coast.

/Contd.

Photographs on 24 Aug revealed forty-five barges and seven luggers at HANSA BAY. This is a slight increase on previous sightings taken over a period of some weeks.

Photographs taken later on the same day revealed new runway under construction on the West side of AWAR PLANTATION approx 2500 feet West of CONDOR POINT.

On 25 Aug seventeen Mitchells twenty-nine Liberators and twelve Fortresses bombed and strafed AWAR PLANTATION, NUBIA and shipping off LAING ISLAND causing explosions and fires, destroying ammunition dumps and damaging barges and luggers.

WEWAK was again subjected to heavy Allied air attacks. On 20 Aug 108 bombs were dropped on the runway and dispersal areas, destroying at least five aircraft and starting fires. Ten of thirty to thirty-five intercepting fighters were destroyed by Lightnings. Following this attack, the same aircraft bombed and strafed the strip and dispersal areas at BORAM starting fires. Eighteen to twenty-one fighters intercepted, five of which were destroyed and thirteen probably destroyed. A few minutes later Lightnings destroyed three further enemy fighters over the WEWAK area.

On the following day twenty-two Mitchells bombed and strafed the airfields at DAGUA and BUT, resulting in twenty-seven to thirty-two aircraft damaged or burning on the ground. Thirty-three Lightnings covering the Mitchells shot down thirty-three and probably a further six of forty-five to fifty intercepting fighters.

On 24 Aug thirty Liberators escorted by sixty-four Lightnings dropped 112 tons of bombs in supply area and town of WEWAK causing large explosions and destruction of many buildings.

Sightings up to 20 Aug indicate that while the enemy is endeavouring to replace his recent heavy losses in the WEWAK area, our air forces are rendering his task an extremely difficult one. The sightings in the NEW GUINEA area are still considerably below normal.

Natives reported that LUNI thirty-two miles SW of AITAPE was occupied by the enemy on 20 Aug.

(c) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

Dump areas and A/A positions at GASMATA WERE BOMBED BY Bostons on 19 and 25 Aug.

During the period under review there has been no significant change in shipping sightings or barge traffic in these waters.

(d) SOLOMON ISLANDS.

(i) BOUGAINVILLE.

A 500 ton vessel thirty-five miles SW of BUKA was attacked by a Catalina on 19 Aug and left in a sinking condition.

(ii) VELLA LAVELLA.

Thirty Avengers and twelve Mitchells, escorted by fighters dropped over 350 bombs on barge concentrations off the SW of VELLA LAVELLA.

On the morning of 15 Aug Allied troops mopped up the area at BILOA, (Southern tip of VELLA LAVELLA) only fifty Japs escaping. Prior to the date of this action the majority of the Japs had evacuated to SAKEURA.

(iii) KOLOMBANGARA.

On the night of 20 Aug allied light surface units attacked six barges off KULA GULF sinking one and damaging others. A further attack on barges was made the following night and two were damaged.

(iv) NE NEW GEORGIA.

On 15 Aug some resistance to our mopping up operations on BAANGA ISLAND continued.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops 585-590; NGF Int Sum 135; AAF Int Sum 150-151 NEA/Int Sum 675-680)

Daily

SECRET

PART 2 : ENEMY

(a) ORDER OF BATTLE: Air -

Estimated enemy land-based air strength as at 20 Aug 43.

AREAS	F	L/B & M/B	S/EB	F/B	F/P	Sundry	Total 13 Aug 43	
New Britain	108	145		4	12	13	282	285
New Ireland		18			9		27	40
New Guinea	60	42			5	5	112	171
Solomons	61	12	11	2	36		122	95
Timor	26	18					44	42
Ambon	6	9		3	5		23	23
Aroe & Kai Is	9	3			8		20	25
Dutch NG	9						9	6
Celebes	20	24			9	27	80	84
Javi-Bali	30	66	12	9	24	18	159	159
	329	337	23	18	108	63	878	930

(AAF Int Sum 131)

(b) ORGANISATION: HISTORY & ORGANISATION OF 41 DIVISION

This Division is a triangular div comprising 237, 238 and 239 Inf Regts.

In Oct 39 the Div left JAPAN for SHANSI and was stationed in N.CHINA and C.CHINA until Aug 42. A report indicated it was in MANCHOUKUO in Oct but it may have remained in CHINA until Jan 43, when it was reported as moving. Sailing from TSINGTAO via PALAU two regts arrived at WEWAK and the third was believed to have arrived at PALAU en route for NEW BRITAIN. One regt was reported in NEW BRITAIN in Apr 43. Possibly the three regts are now in the WEWAK area.

The following are identifications of personalities associated with the Div -

GOC	-	
Comd Div Inf	Maj-Gen	SHOGE, Ryoichi
G of S	Col	MIHARA, Shuji
Sen Adjt	Lt-Col	TANAKA, Yoshio
237 Inf Regt	Col	NARA, Masahiko
238 " "	Col	KASHIWAGI, Towa
239 " "	Col	OHIRA, Hideo
41 Mtn Arty	Lt-Col	ONO, Tokio
41 Engr Regt	Lt-Col	TSURUMAKI, Noboru
41 Tpt Regt	Lt-Col	YOSHIMATSU, Atsushi

PART 3 : TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) Index to further place names appearing in this Summary

			Long		Lat		
			Deg	Min	Deg	Min	
BAANGA	ISLAND	SOLOMONS	157	14	8	17	
BILOA	VILLAGE	VELLA LAVELLA	155	45	7	55	
KENNEDY'S	CROSSING	NG	147	02	7	04	
LAING	ISLAND	NG	144	53	4	10	
LUMI	VILLAGE	NG	142	03	3	28	
SAMBURA	ISLAND	SOLOMONS	-	-	-	-	(Unlocated)
WAIKUM	VILLAGE	NG	145	05	6	08	

Capt,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Sum 36

AWM Story

SECRET

AMENDMENT TO 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 38

HQ 2 Aust Corps

28 Aug 43

GSI/2526

PART 1 OPERATIONS

(a) AUSTRALIA

For para 2 read

"An Allied ship attacked an enemy submarine eighty miles NNE of CAIRNS at 2334 hrs on 18 Aug. No further information of this attack has been received".

and not as quoted in the above Summary.

Capt.,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as Int Sum 38.

War Diary
August 1943

2 AUST CORPS.

GENERAL STAFF INSTRUCTION NO. 4

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
26 Aug 43.
G.3482...

ROAD DISCIPLINE AND MOVEMENT DRILL.

1. The following instn deals with outstanding pts which were noticed, not once, but on a number of occasions, during the recent moves.

2. Gp comds, offrs i/c branches, offrs i/c att units and all other concerned, will now bring these pts to the notice of all ranks of HQ 2 Aust Corps and att units.

PRIOR TO MOVING OFF.

3. (a) Gp comds will

(i) arrange for a light veh, under an offr or responsible NCO, to travel in rear to act as 2 i/c

(ii) instruct drivers on the following points

Steady speed to be observed to result in ordered mih.
Max speed if distance lost.
Destination.
Route.
Position of nearest rec and medical vehs

ON THE MOVE.

4. (a) Gp comds will

(i) cause their veh to be driven at the steady speed ordered

(ii) correct any lack of rd discipline observed from the leading veh by use of pro personnel att

(b) Drivers will

(i) observe the steady speed laid down

(ii) maintain the correct distance laid down from the veh in front i.e., 100 yds (may close to 50 yds at halts)

(iii) NOT exceed the max speed ordered if distance lost

(iv) keep alert, watch for signals from the veh in front, acting on them immediately and passing them onto veh in rear.

(c) 2 i/c's gps will

(i) control the rear of the coln, checking any non observance of rd discipline

(ii) ascertain the cause of any veh falling out of the convoy, giving instns as are necessary and reporting to gp comd as soon as practicable

(d) Pro M/C personnel att to gps will

(i) check any irregularities coming to their notice

(ii) ride sufficiently clear of the veh they are following that a collision is avoidable in the event of an unexpected halt.

HALTS.

5. At halts, the following will be observed;

(a) Gp comds will;

(i) not halt opposite another convoy

(ii). not halt a convoy with its head just off the main route and the rest of the convoy on the route.

(b) Drivers will;

(i) If possible pull right off the rd before halting

(ii) if not, pull as close to the left hand edge as possible

(iii) NOT leave the door of the veh open on the traffic side

(iv) keep watch towards the head of the coln for signals or orders, repeating immediately any signals or orders received.

(c) All pers will;

(i) keep the through route clear for traffic

6. ALL officers are at all times responsible for the general discipline and rd discipline of all tps within their observation and will take immediate action firmly to correct any breach.

AT NEW LOCATION.

7. Offrs, pro pers and guides will so arrange meeting of tpt that the gp is not forced to halt with portion of the gp on the rd. The mvt off the main rd must not be interrupted.

All pers in charge of the erection of tents or dispersal of vehs will ensure that a minimum dispersion of tents and/or vehs of 50 yds is maintained.

8. Until all these pts become automatic with all ranks, offrs i/c branches, att units and all concerned will take every opportunity to stress and repeat these pts and will accept no overlooking of any breach.

9. The guarding maxim of rd mvt will be - "The through route must be kept clear".

1-6-61

Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution.

Full staff distribution.
Det 2/3 Coy AASC
All Gp Comds and 2 i/cs gps.

TOO

Appendix 7


MESSAGE OUT.

TO: RAA 2 aust corps, R sec aust ECW, A aust corps sigs, 2 aust corps D&E, 519 Aust LAD, 2 Aust Purge Pty Coy, 2 Aust Purge Pty Sal Units 2 Aust Corps Id Cash Office, 500 Sqn G (Int) G (Ops) (Plans) SOEA
CB CSO SO Duty DANCO DAMS A Q S&T Medical Dental O.i AEME (2)
Pro Chaplains (C) Legal Postal Salvage Education Amenities
Comp QM TO War Diary (C)

FROM 2 aust corps C 1138 23

SECRET . WARNING ORDER . HQ
2 aust corps less det rear
HQ with att tps will move
to RAVENSHOE area morning 27 Aug
. all sigs comms will be
est at new location by 1230
hrs . HQ 2 aust corps
less det rear HQ will open
RAVENSHOE area and close MUNDOO 1400Z/27
. det rear HQ closes present
location 150CZ/27 and rejoins main HQ
at new location

TOO



first aust army, 6 aust div, 2 aust corps reception camp,
LOCAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON

2 aust corps o.1136 25

SECRET . location report 379 .
2 aust corps trg gp vide
report 377 from RAVENSHOE to MUNDOO
airfield ref INNISFAIL one inch 014919
. all informed

Secret Means.
(Sgd) J.SUMMERTON
Capt.

IMPORTANT FIRST TOO: (1930)
AUST ARMY:
DRLS REMAINDER:

COPIES: A CSO
Q(2) Int
Sigs W/Diary

Appendix 325

MESSAGE OUT.

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON.

FROM: 2 aust corps 0 1154 24

SECRET . location report 578 .

no change . all informed

Secret Means.

10/15

IMMEDIATE-First Aust Army
D : DL - Remainder.

MESSAGE OUT.

TO: RAA 2 aust corps, H sec aust ESW, A aust corps sigs, 2 Aust corps D & E, 513 aust LAD, 2 aust corps pro coy, 2 aust corps postal unit, 2 aust corps FI cash office, GOC 5GS G G(Int) G(Liaison) SCRA CE OSO SC Syg DAAQMG DADS A & QST Medical Dental Ord(2) ADDI (2) Pro Chaplains(2) Legal Hospital Salvage Education Amenities G.H.Q. 2M TO War Diary (2)

FROM: 2 aust corps C 1130 24

SECRET . New HQ 2 aust corps

Located 054037 ref sheet map INNISFAIL

4 miles to l inch . on

arrival fwd PW cos will proceed direct

to areas where they will be met

by guides

TOC

(Illegible) W/Drawg

SECRET

55

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

Groups:

[illegible]

2. [illegible]

[illegible]

3. [illegible]

4. Assembly of [illegible] will be [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

14. Order of Moves.

GP NO	ORDER MARCH	GP COMD	DATE MOVE	TIME PAST STARTING PT	TIME PAST 6TH GP	REMARKS
1.	ADV HQ RECCE PARTY	MAJ WATT	AUG 24.	-	-	MOVE AT DISCR. INDEPENDENTLY.
2.	ADV HQ CORPS SIGS	O C COY	25.	-	-	WILL NOT BE 3TGP OF AT LEAST 10 MINS BEFORE GP 4.
3.	COMD GP	-	25.	-	-	MOVES INDEPENDENTLY.
4.	ADV HQ ADV PARTY	MAJ FARQUHAR	25.	0500	1335	
5.	ADV HQ MAIN BODY	CAPT GOOD	25.	0505	1340	
5A	ADM HQ ADM PARTY	O i/c AASC DET	25.	0909	1355	
7.	REAR HQ CORPS SIGS	O C COY	25.	0930	1410	
8.	REAR HQ ADV PARTY	MAJ I.W. BLACK	25.	1006	1410	
9.	REAR HQ MAIN BODY					
	(a)	LT-COL STEVENS	25.	1030	1420	
	(b)	CAPT PROUD	25.	1045	1436	
	(c)	CAPT PERRY	25.	1105	1450	
10.	REAR PARTY	MAJ BOWIE	25.	-	-	MOVE INDEPENDENTLY.

15. Security. The branch stn concerned is responsible for guarding loaded vehs.

16. Protection. AA trucks with AA LMGs ready for action will be distributed throughout the coln to as many gps as possible.

ADM.

17. Amn. First line amn will be carried in bulk.

18. Medical.

(a) Full anti-malarial precautions will be observed.
(b) Evacuation from RAP by mot amb CS under arrangements DDMS.

19. Water. Water points will be est and notified under supervision CE.

INTERCOMN.

20. Corps HQ opens INNISFAIL area and closes present location 1400K/25 Aug 43.

21. Reports on move to head of gp 4.

22. CSO will provide L/T and W/T comms at new site by 1400K/25 Aug 43.

[signature]
Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Ack.
Issued by hand.
Signed.....hrs.

Distribution.	Copy No.		
RAF 2 Aust Corps	1	Dental	32
H Aust FSW	2	Ord	33-34
A Aust Corps Sigs	3	ADME	35-36
2 Aust Corps Def & Emp Pl	4	Pro	37
519 Aust LAD	5	Chaplains	38-39
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy	6	Legal	40
2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	7	Postal	41
2 Aust Corps FE Cash Office	8	Salvage	42
BGS	9	Education	43
G	10-11	Amenities	44
G (Int)	12	Camp	45
G (Liaison)	13-15	SM	46
CCRA	16	TO	47
CE	17	Mess Secretaries:	
CSO	18	A Mess	48
SO Sty	19	B Mess	49
DA & QMG	20	C Mess	50
DALS	21	D Mess	51
A	22-23	E Mess	52
Q	24-26	G Mess	53
S & T	27-30	War Diary ✓	54-55.
Medical	31		

MESSAGE OUT.

Qfa/ug/2322

TO : RAA 2 aust corps, H Sec aust FSW, A aust corps sigs, 2 aust corps D & E, 319 aust LAD, 2 aust corps pro coy, 2 aust corps postal unit, 2 aust corps fd cash office, GOC, BGS, G, G(Int), G (liaison), CCRA, CE, CSO, SO Svy, DA & QMG, DAMS, A, Q, S & T, Medical, Dental, Ord (2), AEME (2), Pro, Chaplains (2), Legal Postal, Salvage, Education, Amenities, Camp, QM, TO, War Diary (2)

FROM : 2 aust corps o 1129 24.

SECRET (.) WARNING ORDER (.) FIRST
(.) HQ 2 aust corps (less
det in SECOND below) and following
att tps will move to INNISFAIL
area morning 25 aug (.) 2
aust corps sec int corps H
sec aust FSW HQ RAA 2
aust corps (.) A aust corps
sigs 2 aust corps def and
emp. pl 319 aust LAD one
sec 2 aust corps pro coy
2 aust corps fd cash office
2 aust corps postal unit (.)
no move excepting recce party before
0800K/25 (.) sig will est line
comn to new site by 1400K/25
aug (.) HQ 2 aust corps
will open INNISFAIL area and close
RAVENSHOE at 1400K/25 (.) rear party
will remain RAVENSHOE until new HQ
opens (.) all pers and stores
loss rear party will be loaded
in vchs ready to move in
accordance time table to be issued
by camp comdt (.) SECOND (.)
det Q branch remains presnt location
(.) Q matters incl mvts and
ord referred presnt location (.) all
other matters referred adv HQ.

TOO: 0950.

RAAC(W.A.) ....

Appendix 2321

MESSAGE OUT.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS — IN / OUT

To: RAA 2 aust corps, A sec aust FSW, A aust corps sigs, 2 aust corps D & E, 319 aust LAD, 2 aust corps pro coy, 2 aust corps postal unit, 2 aust corps fd cash office, GOC, BGS, G, G(Int) G(Liaison) /CCRA,CE,CSO,SO Sv,DA&QMG, DA&QMS, A/S, S & T, Medical, Dental, Ord (2), AEC (2), Pro, Chaplains (2), Legal, Postal, Salvage, Education, Recruiting, Camp, QL, TO, War Diary (2) DC MASC dat

From: General Staff. No.1128 24

in	future	moves	of	HQ
2	aust	corps	the	minimum
dispersion	between	vehicles	and	tents
will	be	50	yds	

R. Watt Watt

TOO: C/Sig

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
23 Aug 45.
G 3471.

Subject: Vehicle Markings.

Distribution: List C less serial 39.

1. Reference paragraph 2 Appendix A to 2 Aust Corps G3432 of 20 Aug 45.

2. Amend unit serial numbers of medical to read:-

CCS	..	151
CCS	..	143
CCS	..	135
etc		etc

Brig.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

MESSAGE OUT.

TO : Distribution List B.

FRM : 2 aust corps SL964 23.

following anti malarial precautions will be
taken . after sunset sleeves rolled :
down . gaiters worn repellent lotion applied
. atebrin taken evening meal .
guards and sentries to wear long
gloves veils . all ranks sleep
under mosquito nets

TOO : 15 Fd.

Maj.

MESSAGE OUT.

TO : Listribution List B.

FRI : 2 aust corps SL964 23.

following	anti	malarial	precautions	will	be
taken	.	after	sunset	sleeves	rolled
down	gaiters	worn	repellent	lotion	applied
.	atebrin	taken	evening	meal	.
guards	and	sentries	to	wear	long
gloves	veils	.	all	ranks	sleep
under	mosquito	nets			

TOO : /5 .

Lt.

Off. 318

MESSAGE OUT GR:

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOGAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON

FROM: 2 aust corps 0 1125 23

SECRET	.	location	report	377
.	following	accompanies	hq	2
aust	corps	on	trg	move
BARRIE	to	RAVENSHOE	ref	PALMERSTON
one	inch	435005	sec	int
corps	sec	FSW	def	and
cmp	pl	hq	RAA	A
aust	corps	sigs	det	21
aust	cipher	sec	319	aust
LAD	det	postal	unit	det
fd	cash	office	.	1
aust	div	concert	party	arrived
CHARBEL	.	all	informed	

SEND SECRET ITEMS TO: IMPORTANT
Reporting
FIRST AUST ARMY
DRLS - RENNIE R

W/D

War Diary
Appendix 37

MESSAGE OUT

OUT ..... CR: .....

TO First aust army 6 aust div 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON.

FROM 2 aust corps 0 1124 22

SECRET	.	location	report	376
.	following	sec	2/4	aust
dental	unit	arrived	HQ	att
2/6	aust	fd	regt	KAIRI
HQ	det	att	2/7	aust
adv	wkshop	TOLGA	A	sec
att	132	aust	gen	tpt
coy	ROCKY	CREEK	E	sec
att	2/3	aust	tk	A
regt	KAIRI	F	sec	att
131	aust	gen	tpt	coy
MILLAA	MILLAA	.	2/2	aust
fd	coy	LITTLE	MULGRAVE	to
CXDECL	.	all	informed	

SEND SECRET - CIPHER IMPORTANT - first army DMLS - remainder.

TOO : 1951

THI :

War Diary
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MESSAGE OUT.

OUT GR:

TO : RAA 2 aust corps, H sec aust ESW, A aust corps sigs, 2 aust corps D & E, 319 aust LAD, 2 aust corps pro coy, 2 aust corps postal unit, 2 aust corps fd cash office, GOC, BGS, G, G(int), G(Liaison), CCRA, CE, CSO, SO svy, DA&QMG, DADS, A, Q, S&T, medical, dental, ord (2), AEE(2), pro, chaplains(2), legal, postal, salvage, education, amenities, camp, CH, TC, war diary (2).

FROM : 2 aust corps 01125 22

SECRET	(.)	new	HQ	2
aust	corps	located	4380	ref
map	PALMERSTON	1	in	to
	mile		on	arrival
fwd	RV	gps	will	proceed
direct	to	area	where	they
will	be	met	by	guides

Watt

TOO : 2010

THI :

Major

ISOLATED MINEFIELDS.

16. A supply of distinctive signs, "DANGER MINES", should be carried, for posting on isolated minefields. Such fields should be fenced as early as feasible.

RESERVES.

17. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information as to the number of minefields existing in the enemy defences, large reserves of engineers, gap-clearing appliances and gap-marking signs are necessary: reserves of more than 50% may be necessary;

MESSAGE OUT.

OUT :

TO : RAA 2 Aust Corps, H Sec Aust FSW, A Aust Corps Sigs, 2 Aust Corps D & E, 319 Aust LAD, 2 Aust Corps Pro Coy, 2 Aust Corps Postal Unit, 2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office, GOC, BGS, G, G (Int), G (Liaison), CCRA, CE, CSO, SO Svy, DA&QMG, DAMS, A, Q, S&T, Medical, Dental, Ord (2), AEME (2), Pro, Chaplains (2), Legal, Postal, Salvage, Education, Amenities, Camp, QM, TO, War Diary (2).

FROM : 2 Aust Corps. 0 1122 22

SECRET	(.)	WARNING	ORDER	(.)	HQ
2	aust	corps	and	following	att
tps	will	move	to	RAVENSHOE	area
morning	23	aug	(.)	2	aust
corps	sec	int	corps	H	sec
aust	FSW	HQ	RAA	2	aust
corps	.	A	aust	corps	sigs
2	aust	corps	def	and	emp
pl	319	aust	LAD	one	sec
2	aust	corps	pro	coy	2
aust	corps	fd	cash	office	2
aust	corps	postal	unit	(.)	no
move	excepting	recce	party	before	0800K/23
(.)	sig	will	est	line	comn
	new	site	by	2400K/22	(.)
HQ	2	aust	corps	will	open RAVENSHOE
area and close	BARRINE at	1300K/23	(.)	rear	party
will	remain	BARRINE	until	new	HQ
opens	(.)	all	pers	and	stores
less	rear	party	will	be	loaded
in	vehs	ready	to	move	in
accordance	with	time	table	to	be
issued	by	camp	comdt		

SECRET-CIPHER IMMEDIATE BY HAND

TOO: 1200.
THI:

SECRET

GSI

61

HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 37

Compiled from information received
From 1200 hrs 16 Aug to 1200 hrs 21 Aug 43

1. Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comds.

2. A receipt is not required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These summaries will not be issued regularly.

3. All dates and times are Eastern Australian Standard Time.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS
For index to place names see PART 3 (c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) AUSTRALIA:

Following upon recces by enemy aircraft earlier in the month, bombs were dropped in the BROOME area and in the vicinity of PORT HEDLAND strip. No damage or casualties resulted from these raids.

On 11 and 14 Aug enemy recce aircraft/over the DARWIN and CAPE /were VESSEL areas culminating on 17 Aug in the interception and destruction of three enemy aircraft by fifteen Spitfires. On the afternoon of the same day Spitfires again intercepted and destroyed one enemy aircraft over the DARWIN area.

(b) NEW GUINEA:

(i) TROBRIAND ISLANDS: On 13 and 14 Aug enemy aircraft made two attacks on the runway at WOODLARK ISLAND dropping fourteen and sixteen bombs respectively causing no damage or casualties.

(ii) MILNE BAY: On 15 Aug a submarine was reported ten miles East of EAST CAPE. It would appear from the recent sightings in this area that the enemy is probably endeavouring to ascertain the volume of our shipping traffic.

(iii) WAU-BULOLO: On 14 Aug three enemy aircraft bombed the East end of WAU airfield. There has been no report of damage or casualties from this attack which has been the first in this area for some considerable time.

On 16 Aug forty-seven allied fighters intercepted twenty-five enemy aircraft over the WAU area destroying twelve and probably a further two for the loss of one of our aircraft.

(iv) TAMBU BAY: The attack on ROOSEVELT RIDGE by American troops continued with considerable success on 17 Aug and our troops now occupy positions from a point 1500 yards West of BUIAMBUN to the coast. Known Jap dead in this area as a result of our air and ground attacks exceed 200.

On 16 Aug the enemy unsuccessfully attacked American positions at the NW end of ROOSEVELT RIDGE. Twenty-one Japs were killed in this attack. Subsequently minor attacks were made by the enemy on the same position, but all were repulsed and on the morning of 18 Aug American troops attacked Japanese positions to the NW of their own but were held up by strong enemy MG and mortar fire.

Our patrols operating NW of DOT KNOB reported the re-entrants 900 yards and 1400 yards North of BUIAMBUN to be free of enemy on 16 Aug. However two days later an American patrol located and destroyed an enemy mortar bomb dump in the re-entrant 1200 yards NNW of BUIAMBUN.

/Contd.

A party of thirty Japanese armed with explosives attacked Australian gun positions one and three-quarter miles NW of SALUS on 16 Aug. This attack was repulsed without any damage to the guns and two Jap officers were killed. An attack was also made on an American arty position 1½ miles NW of SALUS later on the same day and was likewise repulsed. These carefully-planned and determined attempts to silence our guns give some indication of the effectiveness of our arty.

On 18 Aug an Allied patrol contacted enemy two and three-quarter miles NW of SALUS. These are probably the patrol which attacked our arty positions on 16 Aug.

(v) MT SALUS: Australian troops occupied HOGBACK KNOLL a quarter mile SW of GOODVIEW JUNCTION on the afternoon 17 Aug. Nearby enemy pill boxes were also occupied by our troops. On the evening of the same day our troops occupied Japanese positions at the junction of SHRAPNEL and HUON tracks a quarter mile North of GOODVIEW JUNCTION.

On 18 Aug Australian troops unsuccessfully attacked enemy positions NE of GOODVIEW JUNCTION, and our troops then took up positions astride the GOODVIEW JUNCTION-KONIAUM track 200 yds North of GOODVIEW JUNCTION.

(vi) KONIAUM: On 16 Aug Australian troops occupied enemy positions astride the South end of KONIAUM Ridge near KONIAUM and astride the mule track one and a quarter miles West of this position, further troops being located on the ridge parallel to and East of KONIAUM Ridge. Two enemy attacks on 16 Aug on Australian positions South of KONIAUM were repulsed. On the following day the enemy made a number of unsuccessful attacks on our positions on the South end of KONIAUM Ridge.

On 17 Aug Australian troops supported by arty and MG fire patrolled North along the KONIAUM Ridge and the following day a patrol contacted enemy troops on KONIAUM Ridge near KONIAUM.

On 16 Aug Australian troops occupied enemy positions 600 yds ENE of GAIBOLOM without opposition. On the same day an allied patrol found unoccupied enemy positions and well used tracks on the high feature one and half miles East of GAIBOLOM.

During the period under review allied air activity in this area has been slight and has be n confined mainly to the bombing of enemy positions by single aircraft.

(vii) BOBDUBI: Following successful air attacks on 14 Aug our troops occupied the North and Centre COCONUTS, the enemy holding out in pill box positions in the South COCONUTS.

On 17 Aug the enemy abandoned South COCONUTS and as a result Australian troops now hold BOBDUBI Ridge from OLD BOBDUBI to NAMLING. The capture of this important feature gives our troops control of all the tactically important high ground in the area.

On 16 Aug an Australian patrol over ran an enemy outpost 1200 yds NE by East of GAIBOLOM, killing five Japs. The patrol was later fired on 1,000 yds NE by East of the OLD VICKERS position and returned to the position previously over run.

As a result of an attack by Australian troops against enemy positions at OSBORNE CREEK, SALAMAUA-BOBDUBI track area, on Aug 17 our troops command the enemy L of C to the middle of the SPUR, 1500 yds SSW of OLD BOBDUBI. On the same night the enemy unsuccessfully attacked our newly established positions in the OSBORNE CREEK area and also launched an unsuccessful attack against Australian positions a little further South.

Air activity was confined to direct support to our troops in their attack on the COCONUTS positions.

/Contd

(viii) SALAMAUA: Allied air activity in this area was on a smaller scale. On 14 and 15 Aug Liberators successfully bombed buildings in the KILA area, while on 17 Aug five Bostons bombed and strafed barges, villages and installations in the SALAMAUA area.

Photographic interpretations of earlier bombings in this area revealed damage to the South side of the runway and to a dump at the SW corner. Buildings at KILA POINT were also shown to be damaged and some wrecked. Enemy dumps along the centre of the isthmus were also hit.

(ix) MARILINAN-LAE: On 15 Aug twenty-six Airacobras intercepted twelve medium bombers and twenty to twenty-five enemy fighters thirty-eight miles West by South of LAE, destroying nine bombers and three fighters. On the same day two enemy aircraft bombed the runway area at MARILINAN but there have been no details of damage or casualties. The following day a force of enemy dive bombers and fighters was intercepted by allied fighters over MARILINAN resulting in the destruction of twelve enemy aircraft and probably a further two.

On 18 Aug twenty barges were observed tied along side the MALAHANG wreck at LAE.

Enemy air activity over this area has been on a far greater scale than has been observed over past weeks, but our intercepting fighters have inflicted substantial losses on the enemy with little loss to themselves.

(x) RAMU VALLEY: On 18 Aug an allied patrol reported seventy enemy in occupation at AROMA eight miles South of MARAMASA. This is probably the enemy party, reported by our patrol on 3 Aug as returning from SHOONS HOUSE in the direction of AROMA.

(xi) NE NEW GUINEA COAST: There has been no decrease in barge activity along the coast, and our aircraft have subjected this barge activity to consistent bombing attacks.

On 14 Aug six Bostons strafed barges eight miles South of FINSCHHAFEN, while on the following day a Catalina bombed five barges four miles ESE of SIO probably destroying and damaging two. Later in the same day five barges were bombed and strafed by one Catalina five miles West by North of SAIDOR.

On 17 Aug one Catalina destroyed three barges thirty-five miles NNW of MADANG.

WEWAK was subjected to the heaviest air attacks made by our aircraft in the NEW GUINEA area. Thirteen Fortresses and thirty-three Liberators followed some hours later by a strong force of Mitchells escorted by fighters bombed and strafed airfields at WEWAK, BORAM, DAGUA, BUT and the town area of WEWAK on 17 Aug. It was estimated from preliminary reports that 110 to 115 aircraft were destroyed and 1500 enemy personnel killed. Large quantities of supplies and stores were destroyed in the WEWAK township area where numerous large fires were started. Of ten to fifteen intercepting enemy fighters one was destroyed and two damaged. In the same raid a 500/1000 ton vessel off CAPE BORAM was set afire.

On the following day nineteen heavy and fifty-one medium bombers escorted by ninety-five fighters again attacked the airfields and town at WEWAK, resulting in seventy-eight aircraft destroyed on the ground and in combat, three vessels each 500/1000 tons set on fire, several buildings and barges destroyed and numerous fires in the township.

This loss will tax the renowned ability of the Jap to quickly replace his losses in operational areas.

/Contd.

(c) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

There have been indications that the enemy is moving strong reinforcements and supplies to the RABAUL area on a considerable scale.

The volume of shipping between the SOLOMONS, RABAUL, and NEW GUINEA is still high and it is evident that the enemy, in spite of many losses, is making every endeavour to keep up supplies and reinforcements to his troops in active operational areas.

Shipping off MUSSAU ISLAND is on an increased scale. Several large convoys have been sighted in these waters proceeding towards RABAUL. These convoys have been subjected to attacks by our aircraft but with little success.

Barge traffic in the CAPE GLOUCESTER area has been the target of consistent Allied bombing attacks.

(d) SOLOMON ISLANDS:

(i) BOUGAINVILLE: Enemy shipping activity has been normal. Allied aircraft have been active over KAHILI airstrip and on 18 Aug two Corsairs destroyed two of six enemy aircraft attempting to intercept.

(ii) VELLA LAVELLA: 250 Japs were reported along the East central coast and a further 230 along the SW coast on 14 Aug. The enemy is patrolling actively between TOMIA and SURULANDO, both on the SW coast of the island.

Allied and enemy air activity has been on an increased scale during this period. On 15 Aug an unstated number of aircraft destroyed Seventeen enemy fighters and 10 dive bombers in combat over the area. In the afternoon of the same day twenty enemy aircraft returning from VELLA LAVELLA engaged the Corsairs which had previously strafed KAHILI resulting in five enemy fighters and two dive bombers destroyed.

Allied surface units intercepted four destroyers escorting an unstated number of barges carrying troops north of VELLA LAVELLA on a South-easterly course. During an engagement which lasted twenty-nine minutes, two destroyers were seriously damaged and a third hit. There was no damage or casualties to the Allied force. The barges were then successfully attacked, although it is believed that some troops landed on the NE coast of VELLA LAVELLA.

(iii) KOLOMBANGARA: Installations at BUKI Harbour were bombed by a strong Allied force on 17 Aug. The results of this attack have not been yet reported.

An Allied light surface unit on 18 Aug attacked three large and five small barges one mile SE VILA. The results of this attack were not determined.

(iv) NEW GEORGIA: In the MUNDA area our troops on the left flank forced the enemy back to prepared positions near ZIELA where they took up positions on a 1500 yd front South of ZIELA. (ZIELA is unlocated but thought to be 7500 yards NNE of MUNDA).

It is estimated that the enemy force contained in the BAIROKO area is 500 to 700 strong.

(v) ISABEL: REKATA BAY was the subject of three Allied bombing attacks during this period but results have not yet been made available.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops 381-385; AIF Weekly Int Review 54; NAA Int Sum 67; AAF Int Sum 129; NEA Daily Sum 668-674).

PART 2 : ENEMY

(a) ORDER OF BATTLE:

(i) Land:

It is reported that there are 6000 Japanese at MAMONBARI, 1000 of this total being soldiers and the greater part of the remainder being Japanese from PALAU. As these people are mainly used for construction work they are probably associated with the recent development of the airfield at CEDAR PLAIN.

Recent developments in the SOLOMONS necessitated a revision of enemy dispositions and strengths for that sector. These are now estimated as follows: -

BUKA Area	4000
Southern BOUGAINVILLE	24/28000
KOLOMBANGARA Area	7500
RENATA BAY	2/3000
TOTAL ...	35500/42500

(ii) Air: (FAA Int Sum 67)

Estimated enemy land-based air strength as at 13 Aug 43.

AREAS	F	L/B & M/B	S/BB	F/B	F/B	Sundry	Total	10 Aug 43.
New Britain	112	144		4	12	13	285	285
New Ireland		18	13		9		40	40
New Guinea	95	63			5	8	171	171
Solomons	47	12	9	2	25		95	97
Timor	24	18					42	42
Ambon	6	9		3	5		23	25
Aroe & Kai Is	9	3			13		25	25
Dutch NG	6						6	6
Celebes	24	24			9	27	84	84
Java-Bali	30	66	12	9	24	18	159	159
	353	357	34	18	102	66	930	934

(A&F Int Sum 129)

(b) ORGANISATION:

The organisation and history of the Japanese 20 Division is shown on Appx "A".

(c) EQUIPMENT:

(i) Appx "B" shows a Japanese "Pull Type" hand grenade. In addition to its normal use, this grenade has obviously been designed for booby traps.

(ii) Photographic reproduction and a description of the Japanese "Type 96" (Bren Type) LMG (1936) 6.5 mm calibre are attached as Appx "C" and "C1".

PART 3 : TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) A short description of Jap Barge Routes and Hideouts is set out as Appx "D".

(b) A sketch map of the KOMIATUM area is attached as Appx "E". A number of new tracks are shown, and from information received the positions of several villages have been altered. It is necessary to add that this is a sketch map issued solely to assist recipients of this summary to follow operations in the area.

/Contd.

(a) Index to further place names appearing in this Summary

			Long		Lat	
			Deg	Min	Deg	Min
BROOME	TOWN	W.A.	122	13	17	57
DUKI	HARBOUR	KOLOMBANGARA ISLAND	157	11	8	5
EAST CAPE	CAPE	NG	150	53	10	13
HODGES	HILL	NG	147	01	7	10
KOMIATUM	RIDGE	NG	147	01	7	9
MARILINAN	VILLAGE	NG	146	23	6	53
OSBORNE	CREEK	NG	147	01	7	7
PORT HEDLAND	TOWN	W.A.	118	37	20	18
SURULANDO	VILLAGE	VELLA LAVELLA ISLAND	156	36	7	51
TOMIA	VILLAGE	"	156	36	7	46
ZIETA	VILLAGE	NEW GEORGIA	Unlocated			

[signature]
Capt

GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution as per Sum 36.

SECRET

Annex "A" to 2 Aust Corps Int Sum 57.

ORGANISATION AND HISTORY

of

20 DIVISION.

The Div was originally a "Square" div consisting of 77, 78, 79 and 80 Inf Regts. It is not unlikely that in conformity with general reorganisation of the Jap Army, it has become a "triangular" Div, but this fact has not yet been established. 39 and 40 Inf Bdes formed the basis of 20 Div as originally constituted.

All four regiments above are thought to have been recruited from RYUZAN area in KOREA.

From Oct 37 to Dec 39, 20 Div fought in HOPEI and SHANSI. In Aug 40 it was in KOREA. Apparently there was a move in Feb 42 to HAICHOUNUO and a year later to NENK. In Mar 45 there was possibly a Regt at NEMAK, one at MADANG, and one at PALAU. During May 45 the regt from PALAU probably moved to RABAUL and that identified at NEMAK may have moved down to MADANG. This still leaves the fourth regt unaccounted for.

A battalion, possibly 3 Bn of 80 Inf Regt was reported to have arrived at SALAMAUA on 2 Jul 45. Towards the end of Jul, two or three coys from 20 Div were reported in the KOMIAMUL area.

The Div may be part of the Eighteenth Army which has been identified with HQ at AITAPE near MADANG.

The following are identifications of personalities associated with the Div:-

20 Div	HQ	
	C of S	Col NAKAI Masutaro
	SC	Col [illegible] Hiroshi (?)
77 Inf Regt	Comd	Col FUJIHARA Ryosuke
	Bn Comd	Maj HARA Rikima
	Bn Comd	Maj ISHIDO Keijo
78 Inf Regt	Comd	Col MUROYU Tadaichi
	Bn Comd	Lt-Col FUJII Shizuo
	Bn Comd	Capt KAGAWA Akiji
79 Inf Regt	Comd	Col HAYASHIDA Kaneki
80 Inf Regt	Comd	Col HIKARI Sadahiko
	Bn Comd	Capt KAMO Otoichi
20 Cav Regt	Comd	Col SANO
20 Fd Arty Regt	Comd	Col TAKAHASHI Yoshio
	Bn Comd	Lt Col KAGIYAMA Soichi
20 Engr Regt	Comd	Col HAIBE Kaori
20 Sp't Regt	Comd	Col IBA Michitoshi
	Bn Comd	Capt FUCHICHI Norio
20 Div Sig Unit		
20 Div Cmd		
20 Div Medical	Comd	Col KIWA Fujio
1 Fd Hosp	Comd	Maj HIRAGA Tsuyoshi
2 Fd Hosp		
3 Fd Hosp		
4 Fd Hosp	Comd	Maj ITO Seiji


Lt-Gen ACKI was Div Comd until recently, but TOKIO Wireless reported his death in Jun. As Maj-Gen YANAGAWA Shinichi, who was appointed Comd of 40 Inf Bde in Dec 41, has recently been referred to as Lt-Gen by Japanese Radio, it is possible that YANAGAWA may be the new Div Comd.


APPENDIX "B"
To 2 AUST CORPS
Int Sum 37
DATED 21 AUG 1943

JAPANESE PULL TYPE HAND GRENADE

The following details were extracted from a report prepared by MEIU USF -

Overall length	:	3⅜ in
Length of body	:	2⅜ in
Length of cover	:	1 in
Diameter of body	:	2 in
Diameter of cover	:	1 1/8 in
Weight total	:	15.8 oz
Weight of body	:	14.4 oz
Weight of filler	:	1.4 oz
Explosive filler	:	Granular TNT
Body material	:	Cast Iron
Cover material	:	Lead





GENERAL REMARKS -

This grenade is easily distinguished by its outward appearance. It has no longitudinal serrations as with the Types 91 and 97 Grenades, but has five (5) transverse depressions. On one side, fitted to top and bottom, are two metal rings which could be used either for carrying, or for anchoring grenade for use as a booby trap.

OPERATION -

To remove the lead cover, the cover thumb release at the side must be depressed. The cover then screws off in one and one half turns, exposing the firing string. When the firing string is pulled, it draws a friction igniter between two pieces of match composition and ignites them.

The match in turn fires the five and a half second delay train which initiates the detonator, thus setting off the main charge.

(AMF Review No 54)


APPENDIX C
To 2 AUST CORPS
Int Sum 27
DATED 21 AUG 1943


~~APPENDIX B (6)~~


"JAPANESE TYPE 96" (BREN TYPE) LMG (1936)

WITH STANDARD INFANTRY BAYONET ATTACHMENT

CALIBRE 6-5 MM (.256")







GS.I(a) ADV LHQ 13 AUG 43

APPENDIX C.1
TO 2 AUST CORPS
Int Sum 57
DATED 21 AUG 1943

EQUIPMENT

JAPANESE 6.5mm (.256 in) "TYPE 96" (1936)
MODEL (BREN TYPE) LMG

The following details and description of this weapon are reproduced from Allied Land Forces Technical Intelligence Summary No 1, April 1943, and a photographic reproduction of the gun and components are attached hereto.

GENERAL FEATURES:

The weapon, although of a similar calibre to the TAISHO II (1922) NAMBU, is a later type of Japanese LMG and it is thought that the NAMBU is now becoming obsolescent and being slowly replaced by the "Type 96". Although known as the "Bren Type" and resembling the British Bren in appearance, it should be clearly understood that the gun is in no sense a Japanese copy of the Bren and the resemblance is merely confined to outward appearance and several minor components only. It is a gas operated, air cooled, magazine fed and shoulder-controlled weapon which has been the most frequently encountered automatic weapon in the SWPA to date.

CHARACTERISTICS:

Calibre	: 6.5mm (.256 in)
Weight of gun	: 21 lbs
Weight of barrel	: 5¼ lbs
Type of magazine	: flat and curved
Magazine capacity	: 30 rds
Weight of full magazine	: 2¾ lbs
Length of gun overall	: 42 ins
Length of barrel	: 19½ ins
Muzzle velocity	: 2410 fps
Maximum rate of fire	: 530 rpm (approx)
Practical rate of fire	: 120 rpm
Types of fire	: automatic only
Sights	: barley-corn or blade foresight. Drum controlled, aperture rear sight, graduated from 200-1600 metres in hundreds.

STRIPPING and ASSEMBLING:

Similarly to the build up of British weapons, the "Type 96" is divided into four groups, which make stripping and assembling a simple procedure. These groups are known as the Piston Group, Barrel Group, Butt Group and Body Group.

MECHANISM:

The mechanism of this gun is very similar in principle to any other gas operated LMG and further explanation of it, or the stripping and assembling is considered unnecessary.

One important feature of the gun which differs from the Bren, is the cocking handle, which is located on the left side and has no alternative position provided for operation

on the right side. This feature is also common to the NAMBU LMG and a "Type 99". The fundamental action of the weapon, however, is similar to the Bren and requires no further explanation.

MAGAZINES:

These are of the flat, curved-shape type, similar to the Bren and holding 30 rounds. The mechanism and heading of magazines is similar to the Bren except that the breech block is not held up by the magazine platform after the last round is fired. The magazine is placed on the gun "Bren fashion" and a filler of the Bren type but lighter in construction, is provided. An unimportant but unique feature in the magazine design is displayed by a small aperture or window at the rear and base of the magazine, in which figures 0 - 4 appear and indicate to the gunner when the ammunition is expended or when only 1 - 4 rounds remain.

LOADING, UNLOADING, FIRING and STOPPAGES:

As the mechanical and feeding operation of this gun is similar to the Bren, the loading, unloading, firing and action to remedy stoppages is the same and need not be dealt with.

MISCELLANEOUS:

A bayonet standard is fitted on the under-side of the gas cylinder and a boss is formed by the projection of the gas cylinder from the gas block. The standard Japanese rifle bayonet fits the gun.

A cover of padded leather is clipped round the barrel and gas cylinder giving protection to the firer's hands and allowing the weapon to be easily handled and fired from the hip like an SMG.

No A/A fittings are provided on this gun, but an optical sight, which is a fixed focus telescope, gives credence to the belief that this weapon is used against aircraft.

Photographs have just been received which show a weapon of 7.7mm "Type 99" and identical to the "Type 96" except in one minor detail, which suggests that the 6.5mm calibre is being replaced by a larger and heavier calibre, possibly with an idea of utilising our ammunition. This new weapon will be fully reported on when further information and photographs showing more detail come to hand.

S E C R E T

APPENDIX "D" TO 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 37

JAP BARGE ROUTES AND HIDEOUTS

The enemy has for some time past been using barges to supply and reinforce his troops in the LAE-SALAMAUA area and according to latest information in the SAIDOR area. Troops and supplies apparently have two main points of origin viz. RABAUL and MADANG.

In the system of supply from RABAUL the enemy has used both the North and South coasts of NEW BRITAIN. It is thought that movement of barges would most likely take place along the South coast during the NW season and along the North coast in the SE season. During the SE season (April to October) SE winds extend over the entire region causing areas of thick weather extending from the South coastline to seawards for a distance of some 50-75 miles. This provides an excellent weather cover for movement of any type of sea vessel. At the same time, under the influence of this SE wind stream, a moderate to heavy surf makes the movement of small vessels along the South coastline very dangerous. During the NW season (December to March) reverse conditions to the SE season are found with thick weather cover but moderate to heavy surf on the North coastline, and mostly average weather and smooth to slight seas along the South coastline. It has been suggested however that recent road construction on the South coast of NEW BRITAIN is designed partly to move supplies along the South coast by road in preference to barges.

In regard to the North coast of NEW BRITAIN it is considered that troops and supplies are moved to NATAMO from RABAUL chiefly by destroyer although a possible barge route exists from RABAUL to NATAMO via GARCVE Is. A captured Jap map indicates the presence of suitable barge staging points on the North coast both in regard to depth of water and concealment. It is not disclosed from the map however whether or not a barge route hugging the North coast is in actual use.

From NATAMO the barge route is via KILENGE to CAPE BUSHING and thence across the VITIAZ strait to LAKONA on the NEW GUINEA mainland. The course then follows the NEW GUINEA coast with intermediate stopping points to LAE. From LAE a direct hop is made to SALAMAUA. The main staging points on this route are NATAMO, CAPE BUSHING, FINSCHHAFEN, LAE and SALAMAUA. It is estimated that the Northern route by destroyer and barge would occupy five days from RABAUL to LAE whilst the Southern route by barge would occupy sixteen days.

From MADANG the route is along the NEW GUINEA coast taking four to five nights. From barge sightings it is believed that the following four stages are accomplished in four nights viz MADANG-SAIDOR, SAIDOR-SIO, SIO-FINSCHHAFEN and FINSCHHAFEN-LAE. However, information recently obtained from a native indicates that a probable five day route exists namely MADANG-BILIAU, BILIAU-GALI, GALI-SIO, SIO-FINSCHHAFEN and FINSCHHAFEN-LAE. In addition to these main staging points numerous smaller hideouts exist along the coast and, from sightings made from time to time, are extensively used. According to recent information troops have been landed in the SAIDOR area from barges from MADANG.

This barge movement has several characteristics, the principal of which are as follows:-

(a) Movement is by night only. Barges are normally beached and camouflaged by day.
(b) Barges are especially active around period of full moon.
(c) Movement follows a definite and well-organised schedule. However, any place offering concealment, especially mouths of creeks and rivers may be used to hide barges by day.
(d) On seeing or hearing Allied aircraft, the enemy, if under way, immediately makes for the shore endeavouring to beach his barges and take cover.

(Adapted from AMF Review, AAF Int Summaries 125 & 129).

APPENDIX "E"
SECRET To 2 AUST CORPS
Int. Sum. 37
DATED 21 AUG 1945

KOMIATUM
NEW GUINEA

GSInt. (a), Adv LHQ Aug. 43

Scale 1:25000 (approx)

Form Lines Approx 100 Feet

LEGEND

Motor Road
Track
Foot Track
Form Lines

ADV/MISC/5028

Reproduced by 1 Aust. Mob. Litho. Sec. (A.I.F.), Aust. Svy. Corps.

001336D

Appendix 545

MESSAGE OUT.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS. IN / OUT

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 2 aust corps rece tion camp, LOCAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON.

FROM: aust corps 0.1118 21

SECRET A pl 131 aust gen tpt coy from RAVENSHOE and C pl 132 aust gen tpt pl from ROCKY CREEK both to HILLAA HILLAA ref PALMERSTONE one inch 547969 37 aust sup depot pl RAVENSHOE to KAIRI ref GORDONVALE inc inch 478363 2/1 aust lt AA bty arrived WONDECLA under comd 6 aust div all informed

Lt Col Adjt Gen.

IMPORTANT FIRST LIST ARMY: DELS REMAINDER: TOO: 1815

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

G.5457.

2 AUST CORPS TRAINING INSTRUCTION NO. 8

GENERAL

1. This instn sets out the system whereby the conversion trg of personnel from 2 Aust Cav Regt and 8, 17, 21 and 22 Fd Regts to general inf reinfts will be carried out.

UNIT.

2. The Cond, staff, trg teams and personnel will constitute, temporarily, a unit and be known as 2 Aust Corps Conversion Trg Gp.

LOCATION.

3. 2 Aust Corps Conversion Trg Gp will be located at KAIRI, RAE lines.

COND AND ADM CHANNELS.

4. 2 Aust Corps Conversion Trg Gp will come under cond RAA 2 Aust Corps (2/3 Aust Tk A regt) for adm, but remains under cond 2 Aust Corps for all other purposes.

5. The unit will be organised into sub-units for trg and adm under arrangements to be notified by Jungle Warfare Centre Trg Team.

CONCENTRATION OF UNIT.

6. On arrival in TABLELANDS area components of the unit will be concentrated at the above location, joining those portions of the unit already concentrated.

FOSTERING.

7. Fostering duties will be undertaken by those portions of the unit already arrived, under the general supervision of HQ 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt.

8. This HQ will advise 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt of arrivals and arrange tpt from detraining sta to unit lines.

TRAINING.

9. Training will be undertaken on a general reinft basis in accordance with syllabus prepared by Aust Jungle Warfare Centre Training Team.

10. Specialist trg will not be undertaken by the unit and specialists in accordance with LHQ instructions will be despatched under separate arrangements for trg as detailed by LHQ.

TRAINING STORES.

11. The release of trg stores is notified separately in this HQ No. G3454 of 21 Aug 45.

Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution.

RAA 2 Aust Corps
2/3 Aust Tk A Regt.
2 Aust Corps Reception Camp
Cond
CSO
AQ
A
Q
DDST
DDMS
DDOS
DADPS
File
War Diary.

Hm Diary (2)

A SECRET DIARY FOR:

8 Aust Corps (AIF)
20 Aug 43.
G 3437

Subject: Message Control.

Distribution: List B.

1. Set out below is a copy of LRH S.133460 of 7 Aug 43:

"1. In view of the present reorganisation of communications in certain L of C areas, and the urgent need for economy of manpower, it is essential that telegraphic messages be reduced to a minimum, and that every possible use be made of "D FERRED" category messages, DRLS and Army Postal Service.

2. It is the duty of the GS to exercise such control over signal traffic, and to ensure standardisation of the methods used. Particular attention should be given to the following:-

(a) Supervision of the correct use of priorities,
(b) Elimination of unnecessary enciphering,
(c) Prevention of verbosity,
(d) Elimination of unnecessary messages,
(e) General supervision of message writing standards as laid down in various Army publications. "

2. Addressees will take steps to ensure that the necessary control is exercised.

C. J. Wade Major
Brig,
GS 8 Aust Corps.

Capt War Diary

S.E C R E T.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
20 Aug 43.
G 3432

Subject: Vehicle Markings

Distribution: List C less serial 39.

1. The alterations to the Jungle organisation have necessitated the issue of further vehicle serial numbers.

2. Amended lists have been prepared, based on the current organisation of the Jungle Corps and Jungle Division, and incorporating the additional vehicle serial numbers.

3. Attached hereto are:-

(a) Appendix A-Unit serial numbers allotted to a Jungle Corps,

(b) Appendix B-Unit serial numbers allotted to a Jungle Division.

for Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Encl.

S E C R E T
Appendix "A"
Issued with G3432
of 20 Aug 43.

CORPS TROOPS ALLOWED TO A JU CA CORPS
AND UNIT SHELL MARKS FOR COLOR BACKGROUND.

AR	UNIT		UNIT SHELL MC	COLOR BACK-GROUND.
HQ.	HQ Corps		107	Black
	Corps Sec Int Corps		107	Black
	Def & Emp Pl		120	Black
	LAD (Type A)		107	Black
RECCE	Aust Cav (Commando) Regt		102	Black
ARTY	HQ RAA Corps		109	R & BH
	Lt Fd Regt	)	134	R & BH
	LAD (Type A)	)	134	Black
	Lt Fd Regt	) 1 Lt Fd Regt	142	R & BH
	LAD (Type A)	)per Div and 1 LAD	142	Black
	Lt Fd Regt	)per Lt Fd Regt	152	R & BH
	LAD (Type A)		152	Black
	Tk A Regt		145	R & BH
	LAD (Type A)		145	Black
	Sky Sty		177	R & BH
	Svy Sty		159	R & BH
	Lt AA Regt and Wkshop Sec		126	R & BH
ENGRS.	HQ Corps Engrs		101	Blue
	Fd Coy	)	130	Blue
	Fd Coy	) 1 Fd Coy per Div	141	Blue
	Fd Coy	)	149	Blue
	Corps Fd Pk Coy		105	Blue
	LAD (Type A)		105	Black
	Camflg Trg Unit		118	Blue
SIGS.	Corps Hq Sigs (other than secs attached to units) see note (a)	)		
	Tech Maint Sec	)		
	Line Sec	)		
	Line Sec	)		
	Line Sec	)		
	Line Sec	)		
	Line Maintenance Sec	)		
	Operating Sec	)	115	& BH
	Operating Sec	)		
	Operating Sec	)		
	Hy Wireless Sec	)		
	Lt Wireless Sec	)		
	Lt Wireless Sec	)		
	DR Sec	)		
	DR Sec	)		
	LAD Type A		115	Black
	Lt Fd Regt Sig Sec	)		
	Lt Fd Regt Sig Sec	) 1 per Lt Fd Reg		
	Lt Fd Regt Sig Sec	) see note (a)		
	Lt AA Regt Sig Sec	see note (a)		
	Tk A Regt Sig Sec	see note (a)		
	Corps Cipher Sec		185	& BH

Arm	Unit		Unit Serial No.	Colour Background
INF	[illegible]	)	164	Red
	LAD Type A	)	164	Black
	MG Bn	)	182	Red
	LAD (Type A)	) 1 MG Bn per Div	182	Black
	MG Bn	)	189	Red
	LAD (Type A)	) 1 LAD per MG Bn	189	Black
	Pnr Bn	)	140	Green
	Pnr Bn	) 1 per Div	153	Green
	Pnr Bn	)	169	Green
AASC	HQ C Tps AASC		108	R & GD
	Corps Tps Coy (HQ 3 Tpt Pls, Composite Pl 2 RDIs Wkshop Pl of HQ and 3 Secs)		136	R & GD
	Corps Tps Coy (HQ, 3 Tpt Pls, Composite Pl, 2 RDIs Wkshop Pl of HQand 3 Secs)		146	R & GD
	HQ C Tps Tpt Coln		116	R & GD
	Gen Tpt C y (HQ, 3 Tpt Pls, 3 RDIs Wkshop Pl of HQ and 1 Sec)		125	R & GD
	Gen Tpt Coy (HQ, 3 Tpt Pls, 3 RDIs Wkshop Pl of HQ and 1 Sec)	1 per Div	131	R & GD
	Gen Tpt Coy (HQ, 3 Tpt Pls, 3 RDIs Wkshop Pl of HQ and 1 Sec)		121	R & GD
	Sup Depot Coy (HQ and 3 Pls)		192	R & GD
	MAC		188	R & GD
MED	CCS	)	151	Black
	CCS	) 1 per Div	104	Black
	CCS	)	135	Black
	Fd Amb		117	Black
	AmCU Type A		161	Black
	AmCU Type A		161	Black
	AmCU Type A		161	Black
	AmCU Type B		161	Black
	AmCU Type B		161	Black
	Mob Bath Unit 1 per Corps		152	Black
	Mob Bath Unit	)	175	Black
	Mob Bath Unit	) 1 per Div	198	Black
	Mob Bath Unit	)	148	Black
AAOC	Bde Ord Fd Pk		127	Black
AEME	Bde Wkshop		158	Black
MESC	Corps Pro Coy		128	Black
	Corps Postal Unit		154	Black
	Fd Cash Office		162	Black
	Corps Salvage Unit		166	Black
	HQ Corps Reception Camp		133	Black
ATT T.S.	Fd Security Sec		107	Black
	A L Sec		107	Black
	Air S C (Type A)		Allotted by LH	
	Mob Met Flt		669	Black
	Mob Bact Lab		Allotted by LH	
	Dental Unit 1 for Corps Tps		101	Black
	Dental Unit	)	191	Black
	Dental Unit	) 1 per Div	119	Black
	Dental Unit	)	156	Black

(a) Signal Sections attached to units will use a R & SK colour background and the serial number of the unit to which they are attached printed in red.

SECRET

APPENDIX 'B'
Issued with G(SD) 7713
of 13 Aug 43.

ORGANIZATION OF A JUNGLE DIVISION.

AND UNIT SERIAL NUMBERS WITH COLOUR BACKGROUND.

Arm	Unit	Unit Serial No	Colour Background	Remarks
HQ	HQ Div	84	Black	
	LAD (Type A)	84	Black	
RECCE	Sqn Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	102	Black	Allotted from Corps Tps if required
ARTY	HQ RA	69	R & BH	
	Lt Fd Regt	74	R & BH	
	LAD (Type A)	74	Black	
	Lt AA Bty (Airborne)	48	R & BH	
ENGRS	HQ RE	81	Blue	
	Fd Coy	60	Blue	
	Fd Coy	89	Blue	
	Fd Coy	86	Blue	
	Fd Park Coy	67	Blue	
	LAD (Type A)	67	Black	
	Div Camflg Trg Unit	73	Plus	
SIGS	Div Sigs (other than secs att to units)	66	R & BH	
	Lt Fd Regt Sig Sec	)		
	Inf Bde Sig Sec)	)	see	
	Inf Bde Sig Sec) 1 per Bde	)	note	
	Inf Bde Sig Sec)	)	below	
	Engrs Sig Sec	)		
	Div Cipher Sec	68	R & BH	
INF	HQ Inf Bde	88	Red	
	LAD (Type J)	83	Black	
	Inf Bn	50	Red	
	Inf Bn	99	Red	
	Inf Bn	56	Red	
	HQ Inf Bde	96	Green	
	LAD (Type J)	95	Black	
	Inf Bn	63	Green	
	Inf Bn	61	Green	
	Inf Bn	93	Green	
	HQ Inf Bde	65	Brown	
	LAD (Type J)	55	Black	
	Inf Bn	82	Brown	
	Inf Bn	91	Brown	
	Inf Bn	77	Brown	
	Div Carr Coy	33	Black	
AASC	HQ AASC	59	R & GD	
	Sup Depot Coy (HQ & 6 Pls)	64	R & GD	
	Lt Tpt Coy (HQ, 3 tpt pls, 3 RDIs Wkshop Pl of HQ & 1 sec)	97	R & GD	
MED	Fd Amb	57	Black	
	Fd Amb	52	Black	
	Fd Amb	70	Black	

Arm	Unit	Unit Serial No.	Colour Background	Remarks
AAOC	Bde Ord Fd Park	83	Black	
	Bde Ord Fd Park	92	Black	
	Bde Ord Fd Park	98	Black	
AEME	Bde Wkshop	76	Black	
	Bde Wkshop	46	Black	
	Bde Wkshop	90	Black	
RASC	Div Pro Coy	95	Black	
	Div Postal Unit	55	Black	
	Fd Cash Office	80	Black	
	Div Salvage Unit	78	Black	
	Div Sec Reception Camp	71	Black	
AET	Coy HQ Gd Bn	225	Black	
CPS	Fd Security Sec	04	Black	
	Concert Party	799	Black	
	Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit	51	Black	

NOTE: Signal Sections attached to units will use a Red & Blue colour background and the serial number of the unit to which they are attached printed in red.

Appendix 309

MESSAGE OUT

TO first aust army 6 aust div 2 aust corps reception camp LOCAIRIS sig centre ATHERTON

FROM: 2 aust corps 0111 20

SECRET	.	location	report	374	.
316	aust	LAD	arrived	KAIRI	att
7	aust	MG	bn	.	all

informed

Secret means.

TOC 20/5

IMPORTANT-First Army
D R L S - remainder.

MESSAGE OUT.

TO: List B

FROM: G Branch

GD 919 20

SHEET		MARKING	ORDER		HQ
2	aust	corps	and	att	units
are	placed	on	6	hrs	notice
to	move	as	from	24COE/21	

G. Watt
Maj

TOO 0700K/20

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
19 Aug 45.
G/5426/SD.

Subject: Standard Grouping and Order of March - Corps HQ.

Distribution: List B.

1. The following Order of March supercedes that issued with G3400/SD of 17 Aug 43.

2. Unless otherwise ordered, transport will move in parties as follows:-

(a) Adv HQ.

Group 1	-	Adv HQ Recce Party
Group 2	-	Adv HQ Corps Sigs
Group 3	-	Cond Gp
Group 4	-	Adv HQ Adv Party
Group 5	-	Adv HQ Main Body

(b) Rear HQ.

Group 6	-	Rear HQ Recce Party #
Group 7	-	Rear HQ Corps Sigs
Group 8	-	Rear HQ Adv Party
Group 9	-	Rear HQ Main Body

(c) Rear Party

Group 10	-	Rear Party

Rear HQ Recce Party will move separately only in the event of Rear HQ being established in a separate area from Adv HQ. This will be advised in the Warning Order.

5. The vehicles in the above parties will be normally constituted and sub-divided as follows. (Details ref G3396 of 18 Aug 43). Vehicles shown in Order of March.

(a) Group 1 (Adv HQ Recce Party)

Cond GSOII (SD)
G5
2 MPs
G10
RA2
C1
2 MPs
DE1
AQ14
C4
M23
M25
2 MPs.

Group 3 (Cond Gp)

G1
G2
G3
AQ1
RA1
G9
AQ7

Group 2 (Adv HQ Corps Sigs)

Cond to be detailed by Corps Sigs. Sufficient sigs to open and maintain communications including cipher personnel at Adv HQ.

Group 4 (Adv HQ Air Party)

Cond AQMG
AQ5
MP
C6
G11
G15 and G16
G16
DE2
RAC-6 (for exercise only)
Int 1
AQ8
AQ14-15
AQ8-10
MP

Group 5 (Adv HQ Main Body)

Cond GII Int

HQ Det: Mess Det:
C7 Det Cond Sgt Cook
MP M1
G8 M7
G12-14 M3 - 16
DE5 C2
G17
G18-20
DE4
RAC-4
RA 7 & 8
AQ3
AQ 11 & 12
RAD 2
MP

(b)

Group 6 (Rear HQ Recce Party) Detailed if and as required.

Group 7 (Rear HQ Corps Sigs) Cond to be detailed by Corps Sigs to consist of remainder Corps Sigs less Rear Party.

Group 8 (Rear HQ Adv Party)

Cond: DDOS
AQ22
MP
AQ13
AQ16
AQ26
AQ28
AQ42
AQ45

Group 9 (Rear HQ Main Body)

Cond: DADT
HQ Det: Mess Det:
AQ30 Det Cond: RQMS
MP M4
AQ17,18,19,21 MP
DE3 M13-23
AQ24 and 25 M25
AQ27 M26 and 27
AQ29-41 DEC
DE7 C5
AQ44
AQ46-49
C 8-10
DE6
G22-24
LAD
MP

Group 10 (Rear Party)

Cond: GSOII (C)
C4
Int 2
AQ15
AQ23
AQ43

4. The mess dets of Groups 5 and 9 are grouped separately, as they may in some circumstances, be required to move independently.

A H Wraith
Major
for Brig.
GS 2 Air (Corps).

Appendix 2nd

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

2.Aust Corps (_IF)
19 Aug 45.
G/5428/3D.

Distribution:

List B.

Branches and Services are requested to notify GE[illegible] by 2200 hours 19 Aug of any office tents being struck for practice loading on Friday 30 Aug. Electric light fittings will NOT be dismantled except by Engineer personnel.

A. J. Walk
for Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
18 Aug 45.
G 3405

Subject: Expression of Time in relation to the commencement of Operations.

Distribution: List (B)

1. Time of day which, for operational or security reasons, cannot be specified will be expressed in relation to 'H' hour which will be subsequently ordered. The expression 'H' hour is synonymous with 'Zero hour' the use of which will be discontinued.

2. Time prior or subsequent to 'H' hour will be expressed as a difference in hours and/or minutes. Appropriate abbreviations will be used.

Examples:
H + 15 mins
H + 2 hours
H + 2 hrs 10 mins
H - 25 mins
H - 5 hours
H - 5 hours 15 mins

The words "plus" or "minus" may be written in full

3. This method of expression of time in relation to commencement of operations will be adopted for all operations. It will be effective from 20 Aug 45.

G. J. Wall Maj
for Brig.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

MESSAGE FORM. - OUT

OUT

GR:

TO first aust army, 6 aust div, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCALRS, sig centre ATHERTON.

FROM 2 aust corps C 1114 18.

SECRET	.	location	report	372	(.)
no	change	.	ref	location	report
371	last	para	should	read	12
pl	replaced	11	pl	with	19
aust	inf	bde	.	all	informed

SGD SECRET LEANS.

Lt Commander (Asst)
Capt

TOO :
THI : 1450

IMPORTANT - first aust army
DRIS - remainder.

War Diary 21
August 1303

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
18 Aug 43.

G/3409

Subject: Route March - Thursday 19 Aug.

Distribution:

All Branches and Services.

1. Further to Camp Commandant Memo of 16 Aug all personnel will participate in the route march laid down for Thursday, 19 Aug. Branches and Services will arrange for 50% of their staff to attend each parade.

... 2. Personal gear, as per appendix attached, will be carried. The equipment and necessaries to be packed and the method of putting the equipment together is illustrated. Specimen packs can be inspected at the Battle Room and QM Store.

A. L. Wait Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Encl.

Appendix 30A


EQUIPMENT AND NECESSARIES CARRIED
BY THE MAN FOR JUNGLE MARCH. (HQ 2 AUST CORPS ~~ONLY~~


Haversack:-	1 days Field Op Ration
on back	1 Towel
	1 Tin Talc
	1 Field Dressing
	1 Piece Cord (9 feet)
	2 Piece Flannelette 4 x 2
	1 Tin Boot Polish & Brush
	Shaving Gear
	Toilet Gear
	Mirror
	1 Jack Knife
	1 Mess tin, knife fork & spoon. Matches
	1 Individual First Aid Outfit
Bed Roll:-	1 Ground sheet
att to Haversack	1 Blanket
	1 Shirt KD
	1 Trousers KD
	1 Singlet
	1 U/pants
	1 Pair Socks
	1 Tents Mosquito
Capes Gas:-	1
on top of Haversack	
Bottles Water:-	1
att to Haversack	

Belts, Web, waist
to be worn upside down so that Bed Roll may be attached.


Weight - 30lbs.

Diagram of Complete Pack to be carried by personnel of HQ 2 AUST CORPS on a Jungle March





Gas Cape attached to Haversack by loose ends of tapes



Strap round blanket roll passed through H'sack supporting strap and free end buckled to D on belt.

Ian Duncan

Appendix 3 to

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS — IN ..... OUT .....

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCAIRNS, Sig centre ATHERTON

FROM: 2 aust corps .1115 17

SECRET	.	location	report	371	.
ref	GORDONVALE	one	inch	.	7
aust	MG	Bn	less	A	coy
arrived	located	KAIRI	504381	110	aust
bde	wkshop	and	ord	fd	pk
MILLAA	MILLAA	Rd	to	KAIRI	482370
.	11	pl	2/1	aust	HQ
gd	bn	replaced	12	pl	with
HQ	16	aust	inf	bde	.
all	informed				

Secret Means.

G Seaman Lieut

IMPORTANT
FIRST AUST
ARMY:
DMS
REMAINDER:

TOC: 1035

Capt

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
17 Aug 43.
G3400/SD.

Subject: Order of March - HQ
2 Aust Corps.

Distribution: List (B)
plus RAA 2 Aust Corps,
2 Aust Corps Def & Emp Pl
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office.

1. Further to G3396 of 16 Aug, herewith list showing normal order of march of HQ 2 Aust Corps.

A. J. Wardt
Major
for Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Encl.

NORMAL ORDER OF MARCH

HQ 2 AUST CORPS

ADV HQ.

1.	Recce Party.		G5 MP MP DE3	MP RA2 AQ14 C4	DE1 MP MP DE2	G10 C1 C2 MP
2.	Adv Gp		"A" Aust Corps Sigs.			
3.	Comd Party.		G1 RA1	G2 G9	G3 AQ7	AQ1
4.	Adv Party.		If required. To be detailed from (5) below.			
5.	Adv HQ.	G.	G4 Int 1	DE4 Int 2	G6-8 DE5	G11-22
		RA.	RA3-11			
		AQ.	DE6	AQ2-6	AQ8-12	DE7
		Mess.	DE8 DE9	M1-13	DE10	C3
		LAD.	As required.			

.....

REAR HQ.

6.	Rear Gp.		"A" Aust Corps Sigs.		
7.	Rear HQ.	G.	G23	G24	DE11
		AQ.	AQ13	AQ15-48	DE12
		Camp.	C5-10	DE13	
		Mess.	M14-27		
		LAD.	As required.		
8.	Rear Parties.		As required.		

Note: Order of march to be read from left to right.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES. **S E C R E T.**

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
16 Aug 43.

G.3396.

Subject: Loading Table 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution :- List (b)
Plus RAA 2 Aust Corps
2 Aust Corps D & E Pl
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office.

1. Attached herewith is Provisional Loading Table for HQ 2 Aust Corps. A list showing the normal order of march will be published on 18 Aug.

2. Would Heads of Branches and Services please recommend, as soon as possible, any amendments required?

R. J. Wait Major
for Brig.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Encl.

LOAD TABLE OF VEHICLES.

HQ 2 AUST CORPS

Vehicle.	Group	Officers	ORs	Tents	Miscellaneous Load and Remarks.
G1 Car DS	Comd	GOC ADC 1	Dr MT	-	SMG
G2 Car DS	Comd	BGS	G Clerk Dr MT	-	SMG
G3 Car 6 Str Utility	Comd	ADC (2)	Confidential Clerk to GOC	-	Baggage for GOC and BGS. SMG.
G4 Car DS	Adv G	GII (O) GIII (O)	G Clerk Dr MT	-	-
G5 Car DS	Recce (Adv HQ)	GII (SD) DAQMG (I)	Dr MT	-	-
G6 Car DS	Adv G	G Staff Learner, GIII (CW)	G Clerk Dr MT	-	-
G7 Car DS	Adv G	GII Int GIII Int	Clerk Int Dr MT	-	-
G8 Car DS	Adv G	CSO Asst CSO I	Clerk Sigs Dr MT	-	-
G9 Car DS	Comd	CE SORE	Dr MT	-	-
G10 Car 6 Str Utility.	Recce Adv HQ	IO RE Asst CSO 2	Sgt Svy Dr MT	-	IO RE may ride M/C
G11 Car DS	Adv G	LO 1	Dr MT	-	Baggage for personnel carried.
G12 Truck 15 cwt	Adv G	LOII	Dr MT	-	Baggage for personnel carried.
G13 Truck 15 cwt	Adv G	LO III	Dr MT	-	Baggage for personnel carried.
G14 Truck 15 cwt	Adv G	GIII ALO	Dr MT	-	Baggage for personnel carried.
G15 Truck 15cwt	Adv G	GIII Camflg	Dr MT	-	Baggage for personnel carried.
# G16 Truck 3 ton	Adv G		3 Clerks G 2 Orderlies Dr MT	G Office Tent, GOC Office Tent, ADC Office Tent, BGS Office Tent.	G Office equipment GOCs office table and chairs. 2 picks, 2 shovels Personnal baggage of ORs carried.

Vehicle	Group	Officers	ORs	Tents	Miscellaneous Load and Remarks.
# G17 Truck 3 ton	Adv G	-	2 clerks G 3 Orderlies G. Dr MT	G Office Tent G Office Tent G Office Tent	G Office equipme Personal equipme of ORs carried.
# G18 Truck 3 ton	Adv G	-	5 clerks Int 2 Orderlies G. Dr MT	Int Office (2)	Int Office eqpt 2 picks 2 shovel Baggage of ORs carried.
# G19 Truck 3 ton	Adv G	-	3 clerks Int 3 Draughtsmen Int, Dr MT	Int Office (2)	Int Office eqpt Baggage of ORs carried.
G20 Truck 15cwt	Adv G	-	Sgt Map Issuer Dr MT	-	Maps and personal baggage
# G21 Truck 3 ton	Adv G	-	3 clerks CE Draughtsman CE Clerk Camflg Dr MT	CE office tents (3).Camflg office tent	CE office eqpt Baggage of ORs carried.
# G22 Lorry 3 ton	Adv G	-	2 clerks CSO 1 Draughtsman CSO. Dr MT.	CSO office tents (2)	CSO office eqpt, Baggage of ORs carried.
G23 Van 15 cwt	Rear HQ.	SORE-Stores Tech Offr CW	Dr MT		
G24 Van 15 cwt	Rear HQ.	SO Svy	Cpl Clerk Svy Dr MT.	Office tent	Office eqpt and personal gear of passengers.
Int 1 Truck 15 cwt	Adv G	IO IO IO *	Dr MT		Eqpt and personal gear of passenger * rides M/C
Int 2 Truck 15 cwt	Adv G	IO IO	Dr MT		Eqpt and personal gear of passenger

Vehicle	Group	Officers.	ORs	Tents	Miscellaneous Load and Remarks.
AQ 1 Car DS.	Comd	DA&QMG	Dr MT	-	-
AQ 2 Car 6 str utility.	Adv AQ	S C Q	Dr MT DA&QMG		Baggage for DA&QMG and SC Q
AQ 3 Car DS	Adv AQ	AQMG DAQMG 2	Clerk Q Dr MT		
AQ 4 Car DS	Adv AQ	AAG SC A	Clerk A Dr MT		
AQ 5 Car DS	Adv AQ	DDST	Clerk S & T Dr MT		
AQ 6 Car DS	Adv AQ	DADS	Clerk S&T Dr MT		
AQ 7 Car DS	Adv AQ	DDMS DADMS	Clerk AAMC Dr MT		If rear HQ is established this vehicle in Rear HQ group.
AQ 8 Truck 15 cwt	Adv AQ	MO 1	Orderly AAMC Batman Dr MT	Office (1)	Medical eqpt and personal baggage all passengers
#AQ 9 Truck 3 Ton	Adv AQ		2 Clerks Q Dr MT	DA&QMGs Office Tents(2)	DA&QMGs office eqpt and personal gear of passenger
#AQ10 Truck 3 Ton	Adv AQ		1 Clerk Q 1 Orderly Q Dr MT	Q Office Tents 3	Q Office equipment Baggage of ORs carried
#AQ11 Truck 3 Ton	Adv AQ		3 Clerks A 1 Orderly A	A Office Tents 3	Advanced A Office Eqpt Baggage of ORs carried. 2 picks 2 shovels
# AQ12 Truck 3 Ton	Adv AQ		4 Clerks AAMC	Office AAMC 3	All DDMS office eqpt 2 picks 2 shovels.
AQ 13 Car DS	Rear HQ	APM	Dr MT		
AQ 14 Car 6 str Utility	Rear HQ	DAPM	Dr MT		Moves with Recce party. Takes batman and baggage.
#AQ15 Car DS	Rear HQ	SC Q SC Q (L) SC A SC A (L)	Dr MT		
#AQ16 Car DS	Rear HQ	DAMS SC (Mil Sec)	Dr MT		
#AQ17 Truck 15cwt	Rear HQ		5 clerks (MS)	Office Tent 1	Office eqpt. Personal gear of passengers.
#AQ18 Car DS	Rear HQ	Chief Legal Offr, Legal Offr, PPCM	Dr MT	-	-

Vehicle	Group	Officers	ORs	Tents	Miscellaneous Load and Remarks.
#AQ19 Car DS	Rear HQ	Legal Staff Capt Legal Staff Capt Legal Staff Capt	Dr MT		
AQ20 Car DS	Rear HQ	DADT	Clerk S&T Dr MT		
AQ21 Car 6 str Utility	Rear HQ	Req Offr AASC Amn Offr AASC Adjt AASC	Dr MT		(May be on M/Cs. ((
AQ22 Car DS	Rear HQ	DDOS	1 clerk Ord Dr MT		
AQ23 Car DS	Rear HQ	ADOS	1 clerk Ord Dr MT		
#AQ24 Car 6 str Utility	Rear HQ	O O (DDOS) IOO (DDOS) Camflg Offr	Dr MT		
AQ25 Car 6 str Utility	Rear HQ	DADOS OO (DDOS)	Dr MT		
AQ26 Car DS	Rear HQ	DDME AEME (Wireless)	1 Clerk AEME		
AQ27 Truck 15 cwt	Rear HQ	Adjt AEME Rubber Inspector	1 Clerk AEME Dr MT	Office Tent. 1.	All office eqpt. Personal gear of passengers.
#AQ28 Truck 15cwt	Rear HQ		3 clerks AEME 1 Arm Art Field E&ME 1 Draughtsman 1 Fitter gun Dr MT	Office Tent 1.	Personal gear of passengers.
AQ29 Car DS	Rear HQ	Comd C Tps AEME Adjt C Tps AEME	1 clerk C Tps AEME. Dr MT.		M/C orderly accompanies
AQ30 Truck 15cwt Office Unit	Rear HQ		3 clerks C Tps AEME. Dr MT.		All office eqpt. Personal gear of passengers.
AQ31 Van 15 cwt.	Rear HQ	MO 2	Orderly AAMC Dr MT	RAP Tent (1)	RAP eqpt and baggage of personnel.
AQ 32 Van 15cwt	Rear HQ	ADDS	1 Sgt Clerk 2 Pte Clerks Dr MT		Personal gear of passengers.
AQ 33 Car DS	Rear HQ	DADPS	2 clerks postal Dr MT	Office Tent 1.	Office eqpt and personal gear of passengers.
AQ34 Truck 15cwt	Rear HQ	Salv Control Offr	Dr MT		
AQ35 Truck 15 cwt	Rear HQ	MO3	1 Orderly AAMC Dr MT	RAP Tent 1	RAP equipment and personal gear of passengers.

Vehicle	Group	Officers	ORs.	Tents	Miscellaneous Loads and Remarks.
AS Truck 15cwt	Rear HQ	DAD Amenities	1 Clerk 1 Batman-Dr	Office Tent (1)	Office eqpt and perso gear of passengers.
AQ37 Truck 15cwt	Rear HQ	DACG (CofE)	1 Batman-Dr	Office & Rest Tent 1	Eqpt and personal gear of passengers.
AQ38 Truck 15cwt	Rear HQ	DACG (RC)	1 Batman-Dr	Office & Rest Tent 1	Equipment and personal gear of passenger.
# AQ39 Car DS	Rear HQ	DAD Ed Education Offr	Dr MT		
# AQ40 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ		1 Sgt Ed 1 Cpl Ed Dr MT	Office Tent 1.	Office eqpt and personal gear of passengers.
AQ41 Truck 15cwt	Rear HQ	Hygiene Offr	3 S/Sgts Hyg Inspector Dr MT		Personal gear of passengers.
# AQ42 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ		4 Ptes Hygiene Dr MT	Office Tent 1	Equipment and baggage office and personnel
# AQ43 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ		1 Clerk A. 2 Clerks Q 1 Orderly Q Dr MT.	Rear A & Q Office Tents 2. (American) or 4(12x14)	Personal baggage of clerks and orderlies Rear Qoffice eqpt 2 picks 2 shovels
#AQ44 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ		6 Clerks A/SC Dr MT	S&T Office Tents 4.	Rear DDST office eqpt, personal baggage of clerks 2 picks 2 shovels.
# AQ45 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ		6 clerks DDOS Dr MT 1 Amn Examiner	DDOS Office Tents 5.	DDOS office eqpt Personal baggage of clerks. 3M/Cs available for clerks.
#AQ46 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ		8 Clerks DADOS. Dr MT	DADOS Office tents 2	Office eqpt DADOS Personal baggage of clerks.
#AQ47 Truck 3 Ton	Rear HQ		4 Storemen. DADOS. Dr MT		Ordnance stores. Personal baggage of storemen.
# AQ48 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ		6 Clerks Legal 2 Clerks APM	Legal Office Tents 2. APM office Tents 2	Office eqpt for Legal Office and APM office. Personal gear of clerks. 2 picks, 2 shovels.

Vehical	Group	Officers	ORs	Tents.	Miscellaneous Load and Remarks.
C1 Car 6 str Utility	Recce Adv	Camp Comdt, DADH	1 Clerk Camp Dr Mt		Personal gear of passenger
C2 Van 15cwt Water.	Recce Adv		Water Duty-man Dr MT		Personal gear of passenger
C3 Lorry 30 cwt Water	Adv HQ		Water Duty-man Dr MT		Personal gear of passenger
#C4 Truck 3Ton	Recce Adv HQ	Spare	Spare	Spare	Spare for recce party
C5 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ	QM	1 Sgt AAPC (Camp) 1 Ration Cpl 1 Clerk Camp 1 Cpl Postal (Camp) Dr MT RQMS	QM Store Tent 1	QMStores. Personal baggage and eqpt of passengers. RQMS rides M/C
C6 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ	Asst Camp	RSM 1 Orderly Room Sgt 1 Storeman Camp 1 Orderly Camp 1 Typewriter Mech Camp 1 Transport Sgt 2 Sanitary duties.	Camp Office Tents 2.	Camp Office eqpt and personal gear of passengers. 1 M/C available for Asst Camp or RSM.
C7 Truck 15cwt	Rear HQ.	TO	1 Batman and Dr MT.	Office Tent. 1,	Transport office eqpt and personal gear of passengers. Accompanied by 1 Dr MT on M/C.
C8 Truck 3 Ton	Rear HQ		1 Butcher 2 Hygiene dutymen Misc camp staff Dr MT	Butchers Shop. 1.	Butchers shop eqpt. Rations. Personal gear of passengers.
#C9 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ		Misc att Camp personnel, Dr MT	Rear HQ Rest Tents ORs.	Personal baggage of passengers.
# C10 Truck 3 ton	Rear HQ		Misc att Camp personnel, Dr MT	Rear HQ Rest Tents ORs.	Personal baggage of passengers.

Vehicle	Group	Officers	ORs	Tents	Miscellaneous Load and Remarks.
#M1 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		Sgt Mess Orderly 2 Cooks 2 Mess Orderlies of A Mess	A Mess Marquee. 2 ORs tents.	A Mess cooking gear and mess eqpt, and passenger personal gear.
# M2 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		Batmen of A Mess	Tents Rest A1,A2,A3,A4, A5,A6,A7	A Mess officers baggage and batmens personal gear. Balance of A mess equipment.
# M3 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		Cpl i/c Mess. Cpl Cook Cpl Cook of B Mess	B mess Marquee.	B mess cooking and mess eqpt and passengers personal gear.
#M4 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		Cpl i/c Batmen and 6 Batmen of B Mess	Tents Rest, B1,B2,B3,B4, B5,B6. 2ORs Tents.	B Mess Officers Batmen and baggage of offrs occupying tents loaded Personal gear of passengers.
#[redacted] Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		8 Batmen of B Mess.	Tents Rest, B7,B8,B9 1 ORs tent	B Mess batmen and baggage of officers occupying tents loaded. Personal gear of passengers.
#M6 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		Cpl i/c Mess 2 Cooks	C Mess Marquee	C Mess cooking and mess equipment and perrsonal gear of passengers.
# M7 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		Cpl i/c Batmen 8 Batmen of "C" Mess.	Tents Offrs Rest C1, C2. 3 ORs Tents.	D Mess Batmen and baggage of offrs occupying tents loaded. Personal gear of passengers.
#M8 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		6 Batmen	Offrs Rest Tents, C3,C4	C Mess Batmen and baggage of offrs occupying tents loaded Personal gear of passengers.
#M9 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		Cpl i/c Mess 2 Cooks	D Mess Marquee	D Mess cooking and mess eqpt. Personal gear of passengers.
#M10 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		Cpl i/c Batmen 8 Batmen	Offrs Rest Tents D1, D2, 1ORs Tent.	D Mess Batmen and baggage of offrs occupying tents loaded. Personal gear of passengers.
#M11 Truck 3 Ton	Adv Mess		6 Batmen	Offrs Rest Tents, D3,D4, 2 ORs Tents.	D Mess Batmen and baggage of offrs occupying tents loaded Personal gear of passengers.
#M12 Truck 3 ton	Adv Mess		1 Cook 1 Orderly	Marquee	Adv Sgts Mess cooking and mess gear. Personal gear of passengers.
# M13 Truck 3 ton	Adv Mess		Cpl Cook Asst Cook 2 orderlies	1 Marquee	Kitchen and mess gear of G ORs kitchen. Personal gear of passengers.

Vehicle	Group	Officers	ORs	Tents.	Miscellaneous Load and Remarks.
#M14 Truck 3 Ton	Rear Mess		Cpl i/c Mess 2 cooks of E Mess	E Mess Marquee.	E mess cooking and mess eqpt, and passengers personnal gear.
#M15 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		Cpl i/c Batmen 7 Batmen	Offrs Rest Tents,E1, E2,E3,E4,3 ORs tents.	E Mess Batmen and baggage of officers occupying tents loade(Also personal gear of passengers.
# M16 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		11 Batmen	Offrs Rest Tents, E5,E6, E7.	E Mess Batmen and baggage of offrs occupying tents loade(Also personal gear of passengers.
#M17 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		Cpl i/c Mess 2 cooks of F Mess	F Mess marquee	F Mess cooking and mess eqpt and passengers personal gear.
#M18 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		Cpl i/c Batmen 8 Batmen	Offrs Rest Tents, F1F2 and 2 ORs tents.	F Mess Batmen and baggage of offrs occupying tents loaded. Personal gear of passengers.
#M19 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		10 Batmen	Offrs Rest Tents, F3 F4 F5 and 10Rs tent.	F Mess batmen and baggage of offrs occupying tents loaded. Personal gear of passengers.
#M20 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		Cpl i/c Mess 2 cooks of G Mess	G Mess Marquee	G mess cooking and mess eqpt and passengers personal gear.
#M21 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		Cpl i/c Batmen 8 Batmen	Offrs Rest Tents G1 G2 and 2 ORs Tents.	G Mess Batmen and baggage of officers occupying tents loaded. Personal gear of passengers.
# M22 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		8 Batmen	Offrs Rest Tents, G3 G4 and 1 ORs Tent.	G mess batmen and baggage of officers occupying tents loaded. Personal gear of passengers.
#M23 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		1 Cook 1 Orderly	Marquee	Rear Sgts Mess- Cooking and Mess gear. Personal gear of passengers.
#M24 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		2 Cooks 2 Orderlies	Marquee	AQ ORs kitchen and mess gear and personal gear of passengers.
#M25 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		2 Cooks 2 Orderlies	Marquee	Camp ORs kitchen and mess gear and personal gear of passengers
# M26 Truck 3 ton	Rear Mess		Spare	Spare	Spare.
M27 Wiles Cooker	Available Recce party if advisable.		Cook,	-	-

Vehicle	Group	Officers	ORs	Tents	Miscellaneous Loa and Remarks.
RA 1 Car DS	Comd	CCRA SORA I	Dr Mech	-	SMG rifle
RA 2 Truck 15 cwt	Recce	IORA	Dr MT	-	Personal gear and baggage all passengers. SMG.
RA 3 Truck 15cwt	Adv G	SCRA	Dr MT 1 Sgt Clerk RAA	-	SMG and personnel and equipment.
RA4 Truck 15cwt	Adv G	AILO	Dr MT	-	SMG and all personal gear.
RA5 Truck 15cwt	Adv G	Lieut Svy	Dr MT Sgt Draughtsman RAA	-	SMG. Svy dqpt and all personal gear.
RA6 Truck 3 ton Office.	Adv G	-	4 clerks RAA Dr MT	Office Tents 3	All office eqpt except that carried in RA 2 and RA3. Baggage of ORs carried. SMG.
RA7 Truck 3 ton Stores.	Adv G	-	Bdr Dr MT 3 Sigs	-	A/Gas and spare clothing Personal gear. SMG.
RA8 Truck 3 ton GS Sigs	Adv G	-	Dr MT 3 Sigs	-	Spare magazines.AALMG. 2nd line office eqpt. Personal gear. SMG.
RA9 Truck 15cwt	Adv G	CBO	Dr MT Sgt clerk RAA	-	Personal baggage and eqpt. SMG.
RA10 Truck 15cwt	Adv G	ACBO	Dr MT Draughtsman RAA	-	Personal baggage and eqpt. SMG.
RA11 Truck 3 ton CB Office	Adv G	-	Dr MT C B Clerk C B Clerk	Office Tents 2.	All CB tech eqpt. Personal gear.

DEF AND EMP PL

Vehicle	Group	Officers	ORs	Tents	Miscellaneous Loads and Remarks.
# DE1 Truck 15 cwt	Recce		3 A/A numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000 rds, SMG, Tk A rifle 224 rds Personal baggage and eqpt
# DE2 Truck 15 cwt	Recce		3 A/A numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000 rds, Personal bag and eqpt
# DE3 Truck 30 cwt	Recce		Cook NCO and 5 Privates 1 Dr	2 Tents	SMG. Personal bag and eqpt. Tools, additional cook and cooking gear for whole of recce party to be supplied by Camp Comdt
DE4 Truck 15 cwt	Adv HQ	OC Def & Emp Pl	3 AA numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000 rds SMG. Tk A Rifle 224 Rds Personal bag and eqpt.
DE5 Truck 15 cwt	Adv HQ		3 AA numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000 rds. SMG. Personal bag and eqpt.
DE6 Truck 15 cwt	Adv HQ		3 AA numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000rds Personal bag and eqpt.
DE7 Truck 15 cwt	Adv HQ		3 AA numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000 rds Personal bag and eqpt.
DE8 Truck 15 cwt	Adv HQ		3 AA numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000 rds Personal bag and eqpt.
DE9 Truck 15 cwt	Adv HQ		3 AA numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000 rds Tk A rifle 224 rounds Personal bag and eqpt
DE10 Lorry 3 ton	Adv HQ		1 NCO & 4 Ptes 1 Cook	5 Tents	Cooking utensils, tools, Personal bag and eqpt, Office equipment.
#DE11 Truck 15 cwt	Rear HQ		3 AA numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000 rds. SMG. Tk A Rifle 224 rds Personal bag and eqpt.
#DE12 Truck 15 cwt	Rear HQ		3 AA numbers 1 Dr		AALMG 1000 rds Personal bag and eqpt.
DE13 Lorry 3 Ton	Rear HQ		1 NCO and 5 Ptes 1 Storeman 1 Dr	2 Tents	QM Store, tools, personal bag and eqpt.

ALLOTMENT OF OFFICERS TO MESSES AND ALLOTMENT OF REST TENTS

Note: Allotment of officers who are not entitled to a tent for themselves, may be altered on application to Camp Comdt.

ADV HQ.

A Mess.

A1	GOC
A2	ADC
	ADC
A3	BGS
A4	DA & QMG
A5	CCRA
A6	CE
A7	DDMS

B Mess.

B1	CSO
B2	DDST
B3	GSO I (liaison)
B4	AQMG
B5	AAG
B6	Medical Officer 1
B7	SORA 1
B8	(GSOII Ops (GSOII SD (GSOII Int (GSOII Liaison
B9	(DAQMG Mvts (SORE (ACSO 1

C Mess.

C1	(CBO (GSOII Liaison (GSOIII Ops. (GSOIII Int
C2	(GSO (L) (GSOIII Air
C3	(SC (A) (SC (Q) (LO RAAF (IO (Ia) (IO (It)
C4	(SC RAA (Svy Offr RAA (ACBO

D Mess.

D1	(Camp (DADS (GSOIII Camflg (ACSO 2
D2	(IORE (IO (Ia) (IO (It) (IO (Ix)
D3	(FS Offr (Cipher Offr (IO RAA (AILO RAA
D4	GIII CW

REAR HQ.

E Mess.

	DDMS (when HQ separate)
E1	DDOS
E2	DDME
E3	DACG (CE) (DAQMG (Maint)
E4	(SC (A) (SC (Q) L (SORE Stores.
E5	(Medical Officer 2 (LSO (C Tps) (DADE (DAMS
E6	(DADT (DADH (ADDS (ADOS
E7	(APM (Comd C Troops AEME

F Mess.

F1	(PPCM (DADOS
F2	(SC (Q) (SCA (L) (Camflg Offr (Legal Offr (Capt)
F3	(Mil Sec (SC) (Medical Offr 3 (Reg Offr AASC (DADES
F4	(Hyg Offr (IOO (DAPM (DAD Amen (DADPS
F5	(Adjt AEME (Adjt C Tps AEME) (AEME (Wireless)
F6	DACG (RC)

REAR HQ Cont'd.

G MESS.

G1	Chief Legal Offr Legal Offr (Capt) Legal Offr (Capt) Educ Offr (Capt)
G2	SO Svy Ammn Offrs AASC Adjt AASC Tech Offr (CW)
G3	O O O O Rubber Inspector Salv Control Offr
G4	Asst Camp Comdt QM TO Cipher Offr

Note: Officers of "F" Mess will remain as at present for purposes of the exercise.

Appendix 298

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES. SECRET.

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
16 Aug 43.

G.3295.

Subject: Infantry and Army Tanks in the Attack.

The training of infantry with army tanks in the attack will be based on the following directive.

H G Wells.
Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

---

2 Aust Corps Training Directive.

Infantry and Army Tanks in the Attack.

General

To serve as a basis for study and training the following four types of attack have been selected:-

(a) The attack on well prepared positions covered by extensive minefields, and well protected by Tk A guns,

(b) The attack on prepared positions where minefields are not extensive, and Tk A guns are fewer,

(c) The attack on hastily prepared positions where minefields are not continuous, or are non-existent, and where the Tk A gun protection is thin,

(d) The attack in close country, such as the plantation and kunai areas of tropical countries, where minefields are unlikely to be encountered and the Tk A gun protection is very thin.

Situations will arise which call for some modification and adaption of the methods set out below.

PART 1.

The attack by tanks and infantry on well prepared positions, covered by extensive minefields and well protected by Tk A guns.

THE ENEMY POSITION.

1. The enemy position will normally be organised in depth to some 5000 yards. It will include at least one, and probably several tank and infantry obstacles. These obstacles will frequently be linked from front to rear to limit movement to the flanks after the penetration of a forward obstacle by the attacker.

Defensive localities will be mutually supporting, and will consist of posts containing both LMGs and Tk A guns. These posts will be sited to cover minefields, and gaps in the minefields.

The enemy defence will not be static, and once the attack has been halted, counter attack, possibly with support of tanks and Tk A guns, must be expected. The enemy artillery will be sited in depth, and will be capable of concentrating on gaps between strong posts, and on any gaps made in his minefields.

2. The problems before the attacker are therefore:-

(a) To penetrate a position, organised in such depth that it is impossible to complete the operation in one phase.

(b) To make and protect gaps through the obstacles so as to allow forward movement of tanks, supporting arms, ammunition, engineer stores etc.,

(c) To penetrate the position, in the first phase, to sufficient depth either to overrun, or force the withdrawal of much of the enemy artillery. This will reduce enemy fire on the attacker, during the reorganisation on the objective, and on the gaps through the enemy minefields and wire.

(d) To attack in sufficient width to prevent the enemy bringing direct fire from the flanks on to the area of gaps. Enemy fire on the gaps seriously hinders their clearing, and the subsequent movement through them.

(e) To secure the ground gained against counter-attack.

GENERAL TACTICS.

3. Experience has proved that tanks cannot succeed against a well organised Tk A gun layout, protected by minefields and other obstacles. Therefore, it is essential that infantry and supporting arms clear gaps through obstacles and at least neutralise Tk A guns if tank losses are not to be prohibitive.

Tanks provide one of the most effective forms of support to forward infantry during reorganisation and consolidation on the objective. It is necessary for them to be moved forward within supporting distance before the enemy counter-attack commences. This support may take the form of either fire support from hull down positions, or counter-attack against enemy penetration or movement round the flanks.

TIME OF ATTACK.

4. The attack must be timed to allow the infantry sufficient time to reorganise and consolidate on the objective before first light. It is unlikely that the enemy will counter-attack before first light because of lack of information of our position and inability to use his armour or air support.

The time required will be the sum of the time engineers require to make gaps in obstacles, and the time the infantry require for reorganisation and consolidation on the objective. This is in the nature of five or six hours. To this must be added the time required by the infantry to form up, launch the attack, and reach the objective. Thus an attack at dusk, just after last light should give the attackers sufficient hours of darkness to reorganise and consolidate on the objective. Time for the laying of Hawkins minefields to give additional protection may have to be considered.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR THE ATTACK.

1. This will follow normal practice. If the locations of enemy posts are accurately fixed, maximum use should be made of concentrations. If information is not definite, the barrage is the better form of support, if there are sufficient guns to provide the required density. Registration may be necessary, but the minimum number of guns should be used for this purpose, and the registration spread over a reasonable time, so that the intention to attack will not be disclosed.

Artillery observation should be spread over the front, so that observed fire from any Regiment can be brought down on all parts of the front.

FOOs must join their allotted units before the attack commences, and FOOs with tanks should move in a tank, with the rest of the tank unit, so that they can provide immediate support. Artillery observers' vehicles should be among the first to move through minefield gaps, so that, if gaps are later closed by fire, there is ample artillery observation on the forward area.

Defensive fire tasks should be arranged in front and on the flanks of the objective, and details passed to units prior to the attack. Forward infantry commanders should be able to call for any DF task by using a code name. If these DF tasks are arranged 600 to 800 yards ahead of the forward infantry, they have the effect of separating the enemy infantry from the enemy tanks. This is also a suitable distance for 6-pr Tk A guns to engage any tanks that come through the defensive fire; the dust and smoke silhouettes the tanks, and aids the Tk A gunners. In addition to these DF tasks, to each of which a maximum number of guns is allotted, SOS tasks must be arranged to fit in with the general defensive fire plan of the area.

Counterbattery. Since there will seldom be sufficient guns or sufficient accuracy of fixation to enable enemy batteries to be destroyed, the CB policy will generally be one of neutralisation - aiming at causing casualties, disrupting communications, and lowering morale. A short intensive CB programme before zero, with all guns, has produced results which outweigh the slight loss in surprise, due to the earlier opening of fire by the artillery.

Tk A Guns must be moved forward through gaps as early as possible, to allow time for siting and digging in before first light. Some guns must be well forward to keep enemy tanks out of the position; guns must be mutually supporting, and there must be maximum depth in the lay out.

AA Guns in addition to their normal tasks, may be used to cover the minefield gaps against air attack, and to cover tank rallies. They have also been used to fire tracer along the axis of advance as an aid in keeping the direction of attack true.

INFANTRY ASSAULT AND MOPPING UP.

6. The assault should follow normal methods. It is however, very important that mopping up should be thorough, so that engineer parties clearing minefield gaps are not hindered by enemy action and so that enemy Tk A guns and MGs are not left to dominate these gaps after first light. These gaps are the very arteries of the attacking infantry, and must be kept clear. Should mopping up not be completed before daylight, the use of infantry with tanks for this task should give quick results.

CLEARANCE OF MINEFIELD GAPS.

7. Normally a minimum of three gaps will be provided through each minefield on the front of the attack. If more than one battalion is forward, a minimum of two routes per battalion is required. These routes must be provided from the start line to the objective.

A suggested drill for the clearing of gaps is shown in appendix "B".

TRAFFIC CONTROL.

8. (a) Unless there is a sound plan for traffic control, efficiently policed, there is a danger that supporting arms and tanks will not be in their forward positions by first light. Tanks and vehicles should not be called forward until the route is cleared of mines. The responsibility for traffic control rests with the senior formation using any system or group of minefield gaps.

(b) Marking the Axis of Advance. The advancing infantry place directional lights, visible only to the attackers, to mark the axis of advance. Differently coloured lights are used for each axis. Engineers following the infantry examine the route for mines and plant "route" markers for use by day. These markers may consist of distinctive shapes (circle, square, triangle, diamond) cut out of iron and mounted on long stakes.

(c) Traffic Control Points. It is desirable that the axis of advance should be a straight line. Should this not be feasible, a TCP should be established at any point where the direction of the axis of advance changes. TCPs are also required a few hundred yards on our side of any minefield gaps, to control the forward movement of vehicles and to direct traffic to the gap. They are assisted in this by the use of more closely spaced markers or lights leading to the gap.
TCPs should be clearly numbered, and should be manned by Provost personnel or Regimental Police, and not by engineer personnel drawn from the gap marking and gap clearing parties.

(d) The move of tanks forward needs special measures for control. It has been found necessary to provide "Tank Cops" or carriers to guide tanks forward from their assembly areas when the minefield gaps have been cleared. Tail lights on tanks are necessary for tanks in rear to follow.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

9. Signal cables must often be laid close to the axis of advance; and to protect cable from damage by tanks it is necessary to lay down in orders, on which side of the route markers tanks are to travel. If tanks move on the left of the markers, cable is laid on the right. Success has followed the laying of cable just inside A Tk minefields, as this method automatically protects it from all traffic. Special cable crossings must be made wherever cable crosses a route.

EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS.

10. From the preceding paragraphs it will be clear that to enable tanks to play their part in this type of attack, efficient arrangements for the following are essential:

(a) Tank units must be concentrated in forward assembly areas, or moved forward in the early hours of the night

(b) From assembly areas, their forward movement is carefully controlled on routes which have been cleared of mines.

(c) Tank units arrive in their forward rally areas before dawn, and in time to permit of their co-operation with the infantry to defeat enemy counter attacks, which may be expected to commence at first light.

PART II

Tanks and Infantry in attack on Prepared positions when Minefields are not extensive and few Tank Attack Guns are Fewer.

THE ENEMY POSITION.

1. In this case, although the enemy position may be held in considerable depth, the obstacles to the movement of the attacking tanks are limited. There may be one complete minefield covering the enemy position and some others around important localities, but the remainder of the area is sufficiently clear of minefields to allow tanks to manoeuvre.

A limited number of PK A guns are sited in depth, but the total number available is insufficient to provide effective anti-tank defence throughout the position.

TACTICS GENERAL.

2. Should it be known or suspected that a minefield across the front of the enemy position exists, tank units should not be committed until the minefield has been captured and gaps have been cleared through it. Therefore, the attack will consist of two phases.

Phase 1. The infantry capture the minefield and an area beyond to form a bridgehead and to permit the clearance of gaps, through which the tanks and supporting arms will pass.

The considerations governing the decisions as to the width and depth of the attack are the same as those examined in Part 1.

Phase 2. Infantry action with the tanks to secure the further objectives.

TIME OF ATTACK.

3. (a) Provided it is known that further obstacles to tanks movement do not exist, and the moonlight is sufficiently bright to enable tanks to operate, the attack could be staged in moonlight. In this case the attack should be timed to permit re-organisation and consolidation to be completed before first light.

(b) Failing a moonlight attack as pictured in (a), the attack should be timed so that the infantry and tanks pass through the gap of the newly won bridgehead at first light or as soon after as there is sufficient light to enable the tanks to operate effectively.

(c) The attack can be made in the evening allowing sufficient time for the completion of the attack before dark. The staging of the attack at this time makes the whole of the hours of daylight available for re-organisation and consolidation.

The marrying up of the tanks and infantry sub units would be carried out in the Forming Up Position. A suggested formation for the attack is shown in appendix "C".

ALLOTMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF TANK UNITS.

5. Experience has shown that it is best to allot a complete tank unit to each infantry unit. The allotment of a tank battalion to an infantry battalion permits the allotment of a tank squadron to each of two forward companies and the retention of a squadron with the battalion reserve.

6. In this type of attack it is usual for the infantry to lead and for the tanks to follow at a distance of from 150 to 300 yards. In this formation the tank sub-unit commander is well placed to see when the infantry is held up, to observe signals showing the direction from which the enemy fire is coming and, if necessary (as he moves forward to deal with the enemy post) to obtain additional verbal information from the commander of the infantry sub unit which he is supporting.

The method of working is similar to that of a gun dog. When a task presents itself, the tanks are unleashed by the infantry commander and they proceed to deal with the enemy holding up the advance; when the task is completed, the tanks come 'to heel' and follow the infantry where they are under control, in close touch with the infantry commander, and ready for the next task which presents itself.

7. Normally tanks are employed to destroy enemy MMGs and infantry is used to put enemy Tk A guns out of action.

When, as usually occurs, the enemy has MMGs and Tk A guns sited close together, it may be necessary to make a quick plan to blind the enemy post with smoke, to cover the assault and capture of the post; for this purpose it may be necessary to employ either infantry or the tanks or the infantry and tanks in co-operation.

During this phase of the attack, engineer mine lifting parties should move with forward infantry units to clear gaps should unexpected minefields be encountered.

8. After the capture of the final objective the support provided by the tanks takes the following forms:

(a) To cover the immediate re-organisation on the objective, the tanks may be required either to give protection by taking up a position forward of the objective, or to give covering fire from hull-down position on the objective.

(b) As soon as the tanks can be relieved from this task they should rally in rear of the objective in their "Forward Rally" position. On rallying, tank sub units should revert to the command of the tank commander and should be prepared to support the infantry during the initial consolidation on the objective.

The support most likely to be required during this period will be co-operation with the infantry to defeat an enemy counter attack on the objective, or, to attack in flank any enemy movement around the flanks of the position.

It may be necessary for the tanks to remain in the "Forward Rally" until the infantry Tk A guns and supporting weapons are dug in, but as soon as the infantry are secure on the position, the infantry commander should release the tanks to move to their "Rear Rally" position.

Tanks should be released from the tasks given in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) immediately the situation makes this possible, both to avoid undue casualties due to their location in the forward area, and to enable tank maintenance and replenishment to proceed.

(c) When released by the Infantry Commander the tanks return to the "Rear Rally" position, where re-fuelling and re-arming can be effected, and a limited amount of maintenance can be carried out.

It follows that the requirements of a Rear Rally position will include.

A position covered from enemy observation,
A position giving easy access to the forward area to permit rapid assistance to be provided for the forward infantry in emergency.

As a guide, the "Rear Rally" area would be somewhere in the vicinity of the area occupied by the reserve battalion of a brigade.

CARRIER COMPANIES.

9. The clear view which is obtained from a carrier as compared with that from a tank makes the carrier a most useful supporting vehicle to the tank. It may be employed to assist tanks as follows:

(a) To move on to the objective with the tanks, to prevent A Tk grenades being thrown at the tanks by enemy parties in slit trenches.

(b) To carry out a similar role during exploitation.

(c) By advancing from fire position to fire position, to give close fire support to the tanks, and to take action against enemy Tk A weapons, which are engaging the tanks.

(d) To cover the infantry during re-organisation and consolidation.

ENEMY COUNTER ATTACK.

10. Should the enemy counter attack with tanks during the attack, our tanks should be concentrated under the command of the tank commander to fight off the enemy tank threat. Meanwhile, the infantry should fight its way forward without the tanks to secure ground from which it can assist the action of the tanks.

COUNTER ATTACK USING TANKS.

11. After the capture of the objective, should it be possible that the tanks will be called upon to counter attack, arrangements must be made for infantry to attack with the tanks, and for artillery support of the attack. Reconnaissance for this role should be carried out by the tank, infantry and artillery commanders concerned, and should include reconnaissance of the routes to be used.

COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN INFANTRY AND TANK COMMANDERS.

12. The commanders of the two arms (on each level) will move as close together as their respective tasks and means of movement permit. As at times the two commanders will not be able to remain within range of verbal communication, R/T will be necessary.

The following is an illustration of one method of communication which has proved satisfactory.

The infantry company commander has the flick frequency of his No. 108 set fixed on the squadron forward frequency, and by this means he can talk to the squadron leader, and hear the reports from his forward troops.

Targets can be indicated to the tanks -

(a) By the forward troops firing tracer in the direction of the target

(b) By firing mortar smoke at the target.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

13. Generally the artillery support will follow the lines described in Part I except that, as in Phase 2 daylight is available to facilitate observation of fire, a greater number of FOOs should be provided with a call on super-imposed artillery units, to deal with unexpected opposition by observed fire.

TK A GUNS.

14. It will be necessary for some guns to be in position to secure the minefield gaps and the bridgehead covering these gaps, by first light.

Other guns will follow the attack to the final objective to secure that area against tank counter attack. Until those guns have been sited, tanks in hull down positions can provide a temporary anti-tank defence vide paragraph 8 (a) above.

AA GUNS.

15. These guns will be required for employment on the same tasks as those described in Part I.

PART III

The Attack on Hastily Prepared Positions where Minefields are not Continuous or are Non-existent, and where the Tank Attack Gun Protection is Thin.

SITUATION.

1. Opportunities for attacksof this nature may be encountered when two forces are advancing towards each other, and have just made contact; or, when the main enemy position has been broken and the enemy has not been given time to establish a well organised defence during his withdrawal.

TACTICS GENERAL.

2. Provided that observation of the enemy's defences can be obtained, and that an effective fire plan can be made to neutralize the enemy Tk A weapons, this type of attack can be mounted quickly.

A preliminary operation may be necessary to push back the enemy reconnaissance detachments and to seize ground suitable for OP areas.

The tanks become the main assaulting arms and the infantry will follow to mop up, and take over and secure each successive objective as it is captured by the tanks.

The extent of the success of the attack will depend mainly on the speed and vigour with which it is made.

TIME FOR ATTACKS.

3. As light will be necessary to enable the tanks to operate, the attack will be made in daylight.

An attack launched two or three hours before dark gives the attackers the advantages of the hours of darkness to re-organize and consolidate on each objective.

THE ASSAULT.

4. The tanks lead and will advance in bank formation at tank speed to capture each objective.

The infantry will follow as rapidly as possible to take over each successive objective from the tanks as soon as possible after the tanks have captured it, and so relieve the tanks for their next advance.

The infantry advance should be so arranged that some sub-units of the infantry go straight through to each objective, whilst others mop up any enemy posts which are still holding out. If they can be spared, the allotment of a few tanks to the infantry for mopping up, will be of great assistance in speeding up the clearance of the area.

The sub unit of infantry allotted to garrison each objective should contain its own fire support including guns, 3" mortars, Tk A guns, and an FOO with a battery in supporting artillery.

To the extent that the situation demands, troops and supporting weapons for flank protection between consecutive objectives must be provided and placed under command of the infantry commander responsible for each area.

On capturing each objective the tanks must leave sufficient force to dominate the area until the infantry arrives.

On the final objective (and on intermediate objectives to the extent that the situation demands) the action of the tanks will be as described in Part II paragraph 8.

Diagrams which show alternative formation for an infantry battalion and an army tank battalion in this type of attack are given in appendix "D" and "E".

DIV CARRIER COMPANY.

5. Particular uses for the carrier company in this type of attack may be :

(a) One or more of the tasks give in Part II paragraph 9.

(b) To assist infantry sub units in mopping up.

(c) For protection of the flanks.

ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

6. As the tank unit is the principal assaulting arm the artillery fire plan will be designed to support the advance of the tank unit; for this purpose the tank unit commander must make clear to the force commander (and the gunner) the artillery support required.

Each squadron should have a battery allotted to it for [illegible] support, and an FOO from that battery should move with the squadron at one of its tanks. Wireless communication from the FOO to his battery, and to the squadron leader of the squadron he is supporting, is essential.

Minefields.

7. In this type of attack the clearance of gaps in any minefield which may be encountered is the responsibility of the commander of the tanks. For this purpose engineer detachments trained, organized and equipped for gap clearing will be placed under his command: these engineer parties should be available and should be obtained from engineer units of the armoured formation concerned.

Engineer detachments will be required with the infantry units for normal engineer tasks, in addition to any further mine clearance which may be required.

PART IV.

The attack in close country such as the plantation areas and kunai areas of tropical countries, where minefields are unlikely to be encountered, and the Tk A guns protection is very thin.

(These notes are condensed from AFV Training Memoranda)

INTRODUCTION.

1. These notes apply particularly to the conditions which obtained at BUNA where tanks operated either on the grass - overgrown air strips or in coconut plantations. In some cases, the ground was covered by grass higher than head high and light jungle which obscured the vision. It was ground that had at one time been cleared; it was reasonably firm except for swampy patches and was for the most part level, although pitted with craters which were hidden from view by the grass. Whenever the tanks were forced to operate outside these areas, the swampy nature of the ground made progress almost impossible.

TACTICS GENERAL.

2. In all attacks, the tactics employed were similar. The tanks were spaced across the battalion front, and led the attack: each tank was followed closely by a specially detailed protective party of infantry. Attacking infantry then followed in open order. The distance of the main bodies of infantry varied in accordance with the ground; they were never more than 50 yards behind, and in close country, e.g. thick, head high grass, they [illegible]

ARTILLERY SUPPORT.

3. When the position of the forward infantry permitted, artillery support usually opened on the enemy positions, 10 minutes before zero.

4. It is desirable to maintain close artillery observation during the approach march of the tanks and during the attack. By so doing, our artillery will often be able to engage any enemy Tk A guns which open fire, or alternatively blind them with smoke

APPROACH MARCH AND RECONNAISSANCE.

5. Aircraft were found suitable to drown the noise made by the tanks during this period.

6. The most detailed foot reconnaissance of the route of the approach march from the tank lying up area to the FUP by commanders, squadron officers, crew commanders and guides is essential owing to the difficulty of finding the way in tall grass.

Reconnaissance of the tank routes should not stop at the FUP but should include the start line and should be continued forward of this to the extent that cover and secrecy permit. Routes should be marked clearly and guides placed at points where difficulty in following the route might be experienced.

F U P

7. The FUP was sited in each case behind and parallel to the infantry start line. The tanks were able to form up on their correct frontage at the FUP and move forward from there to cross the infantry start line in their formation at zero.

THE ATTACK.

8. Tanks should not attempt to operate alone, but should always operate so that they have the support of at least one other tank.

9. In terrain of this nature, tanks should not move more than 20 - 30 yards in advance of the infantry, their rate of advance being regulated by that of the infantry advance. Tank commanders must therefore be constantly on the look out to ensure that they neither outstrip the infantry, nor hold up its advance by continuing to engage targets which the infantry are in a position to deal with. Close watch must also be kept to see that tanks halt when the infantry are held up, so that the infantry may indicate to tank commanders the cause of the hold-up.

10. Infantry protective parties must be detailed to each tank and must follow near the line of advance of that tank, ready to take instant action to prevent a determined enemy making tank casualties by the use of magnetic mines, Molotov cocktails, or by jumping on the tank to fire through the slits.

11. To avoid infantry commanders leading tanks on to unsuitable ground, guides should be provided fromspare tank personnel who are familiar with "tank going" requirements. In a similar way, infantry commanders who are not familiar with the limitations of tanks as regard "going" must be careful not to direct them on to impassable ground.

12. Tank commanders on being instructed to do a specific job should be careful to avoid being taken away from that job by other infantry sub-unit commanders who think that their part of the front is the more important. Orders for the attack should leave no doubt as to the command and control of the tanks, and variation of those orders should be effected in accordance with the custom of the service. When a tank become bellied, or stuck, the infantry should protect it with covering fire, whilst steps are taken to tow the tank out or to evacuate the crew.

13. Tanks should not be driven within [illegible] ends of pill-boxes until the latter are [illegible] occupants. Mines and Molotov cocktails were used on pill-boxes and during enemy gun flashes the tank should if pass close to them. In attacking etc., it was found that the occupants would [illegible] at each end of the pill-box whilst HE was being [illegible] and would return to the pill-box when this [illegible] it was found advisable to spray the ends of the pill-box with MG fire, whilst 37mm HE was being used on the pill-box. 37mm HE was found to be most effective against pill-boxes and strong points built up from palm trees, [illegible] should be exercised when tanks go into action in timber country with turret flaps open as these snipers can shoot fire through the openings.

COMMUNICATION AND INTERCOMMUNICATION.

14. It was found to be of great advantage to use one tank which remained with battalion commander, as a command tank. The senior tank officer with the battalion commander could then control his tanks by W/T. In the event of it becoming necessary to put his tank into the fight, command could be exercised through the battalion 11 set to the "Command" frequency.

15. Normally all tanks were tuned to a "Tank" frequency on which troop leaders directed operations. "Command" frequency was used by brigade headquarters, battalion commanders, senior tank officer (and by troop leaders as a rear link alternative frequency).

VISIBILITY. (This information refers particularly to the MK II Tank).

16. A man is not visible less than:

5 paces from the front of a tank,
12 paces from the side of a tank,
and is not visible when in rear of a tank.

Owing to the construction of the turret and the AA gun mounting, it is not possible to use the periscope from 4 to 8 o'clock in the tank. Peep holes and/or the rear pistol port must be used for rear vision.

17. Where the tank unit commander cannot be with the infantry commander, a liaison officer from the tank unit should be sent to the infantry to advise the infantry CO on the employment of tanks and to see that all essential information of importance to tank commanders is given in orders.

VISUAL INTERCOMMUNICATION TANKS AND INFANTRY.

18. The following signals were employed:-

(a) Tank requiring infantry assistance fired a green Verey light,

(b) Tank requiring tank assistance fired a red Verey light,

(c) Line of flight of tracer fired by infantry indicates resistance in that direction,

(d) Infantry desiring tank to move to them raised steel helmets on rifle and bayonet,

(e) Targets or centres of resistance were indicated by pointing rifle and bayonet at arms length. (For alternative method see appendix "A").

(f) Positions of all wounded were marked by fixing rifles vertically with bayonets in the ground.

19. Tanks are a constant source of danger to signal cable. Tank commanders when reconnoitring routes, should make a special note of places where signal cable crosses the route so that it can be carried overhead at the crossing places. Tanks should take care to use only these crossing places.

RESERVE TANKS.

20. To maintain the full number of tanks in action, it was found necessary for a reserve of tanks to be held in readiness, forward of the replenishment area (see paragraph 25). From this reserve, a tank could be called forward into action immediately a tank in action became a casualty or required replenishment. When a reserve tank moved forward another was immediately fed forward from the replenishment area to replace it. To minimise delay, direct communication between the infantry headquarters and the tank replenishment area is necessary.

While the frequent and rapid replenishment which was possible in ENA operations made possible a lavish expenditure of ammunition, care should be taken to impress on all crew commanders that such conditions do not always obtain, that ammunition expenditure must be governed by the ammunition reserves available forward and the facilities available for replenishment.

RECOVERY.

21. During the fighting tanks were of necessity used to recover others that were bogged. A suitable type of block and tackle and special recovery vehicles to pull tanks out should be provided.

INTERCOMMUNICATION.

22. No. 19 sets were used in the tanks, in the control tank also, and for inter-tank communication: they proved quite satisfactory over the distances required in the open and coconut country.

The "B" frequency however, was of no use when used in jungle country for reception at a range of 2½ miles. The "A" frequency was used for all purposes.

Owing to the construction of this set and the necessity for a 12 volt battery, it is not considered a practical set for use as a ground control in a forward area in difficult country.

The No. 11 set was used as an intercept ground station over the same range as the No. 19 and although some interception was possible, the result on the whole was unsatisfactory and unreliable.

The U.S. "Walkie-Talkie" set was tried as a means of communication from infantry to tank. It was found satisfactory up to a limit of 200 yards in the jungle, but the danger of the infantry operators getting picked off cannot be over emphasised.

POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN ARMOURED UNITS.

23. The necessity for operating for abnormally long periods in low gear, and the additional wear and tear on brake linings and clutches owing to the nature of the ground, result in correspondingly higher maintenance periods being necessary.

To permit maintenance to be carried out, a [illegible] harbour must be established outside the actual battle area, so that tanks can retire to it at night. The area selected should permit the use of lights, for if 12 o'clock maintenance is not possible, it will be found that tanks cannot be used on successive days for even a short period.

It is considered essential that all tank detachments should be complete as regards LAD personnel, tools and [illegible].

Owing to casualties and the exhaustion caused by long periods in action, ample reserves of personnel should be immediately available. It is suggested that a complete crew should be available for each tank.

Browning MG's must be treated carefully, and long sustained bursts avoided: bursts should be kept short to prevent guns from overheating.

Turrets should be kept at 12 o'clock whenever possible to avoid damage through guns bumping trees, etc.

It was found necessary to use a five man crew in order to maintain maximum fighting efficiency and all round observation.

Periscopes are necessary for crew commanders.

It is important that direct communication by land line be maintained from brigade headquarters (or regimental headquarters) to the forward ammunition and reserve crew area.

Expenditure of ammunition varies with the task, but if it is fairly heavy (as is usual) all .30 calibre ammunition should be sent forward in belts already filled: link type belts proved the most satisfactory.

POINTS IN BATTLE PROCEDURE FOR OFFICERS OF ARMOURED UNITS.

(Based on the allotment of a Tank Regiment to an Infantry Brigade).

24. The regimental commander and squadron leaders should attend the brigade conferences when the brigade commander is issuing orders to battalion commanders. Close liaison by the regimental commander and squadron leaders with the brigade and battalion commanders is essential for any operation in which the two arms co-operate.

Crews, spare crews and particularly drivers should be familiar with the tactical situation.

(More detailed notes on Battle Procedure are given in appendix "A").

REPLENISHMENT AREA.

25. The replenishment area should be selected prior to battle by the 2 i/c squadron: the location of the replenishment area needs careful consideration so that crews may rest and tanks be refilled and maintenance carried out, without fear of enemy interruption: it should be sufficiently far forward to obviate tanks being away from the battle for long periods. If necessary it should be moved further forward during the battle. In the FUNA operations, the use of tracked carriers to maintain the tank replenishment areas proved invaluable.

SPARE CREWS.

26. If sufficient crews are available, 100 per cent replacements should be held at the replenishment area: it was found that, working closed down, with 5 man crews, the crews become exhausted very quickly in this climate.

Crews should not work longer than four hours when closed down.

DISTRIBUTION.

6 Aust Div	15
7 Aust Div	1
9 Aust Div	1
RAA 2 Aust Corps	2
2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	1
RAE 2 Aust Corps	4
C Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt (One for 2/9 Aust Armd Regt)	2
Adv LHQ	1
First Aust Army (AIF)	1
4 Aust Armd Bde	1
DMT - Adv LHQ	3
LHQ Tactical School - BEENLEIGH	1
Comd.	1
BGS.	1
File	2
War Diary	2
Spare.	6
	45

INDICATION OF TARGETS AND BATTLE PROCEDURE.

(Taken from Notes on 4 Aust Armd Bde Gp Demonstration).

INDICATION OF TARGETS.

1. (a) Owing to the comparative blindness of the tank when closed down, it will frequently be necessary for the infantry to direct the fire of the tanks.

(b) This may be done by the clock ray system - the front of the tank always being taken as 12 o'clock.

Through the IC fitted to the rear of the tank, the infantry sub-unit commander would say:
"Right, 3 o'clock. 100, WP, Watch"
and then tracer would be fired from a Bren or rifle at the target.

Tracer must be carried by the infantryman for this purpose.

(c) Should conditions permit, a 2-inch mortar firing smoke may be used to indicate the target, and subsequent corrections given to the tank, using the smoke as a reference point.

BATTLE PROCEDURE. - (Based on a tank battalion working with an infantry battalion).

2. (a) Battle procedure will be similar to that used by the infantry except that each commander will work in close liaison with his opposite number.

(b) The tank sub-units having been allotted, the battalion commander issues orders to squadron leaders, company commanders, artillery commanders, etc.

(c) After arranging RV for the combined order group, the squadron leader and the company commander make their joint reconnaissance and outline plan.

(d) Squadron leader gives orders to troop leaders } In presence
Company commander gives orders to platoon commanders } of opposite groups.

(e) Troop leaders and platoon commanders reconnoitre in conjunction.

(f) Issue of orders to crew commanders and section leaders, again in each others presence.

(g) Crew commanders and section leaders look at the ground.

(h) Battalion commander's final conference - squadron leader, company commander, artillery commander, etc.

(j) Final orders to troop leaders, platoon commanders, thence to crew commanders and section leaders.

(k) Liaison of all commanders with their opposite numbers.

Appendix "B" to 2 Aust Corps
Training Directive of 15 Aug 43.

DETAILED NOTES ON THE CLEARING OF GAPS THROUGH A TK MINEFIELDS.

A TK MINEFIELDS.

1. The number and density of A Tk minefields will vary widly. The remarks that follow visualize some three or four minefields between the start line and the objective, at intervals of from 400 to 1000 yards, and each minefield 100 yards or more in depth.

SELECTION OF GAP SITES.

2. The selection of the actual sites for minefield gaps needs care. If intelligence is good, they may be chosen within narrow limits, before the attack is launched. Points to be borne in mind include -

(a) To minimise the length to be cleared, gaps should be cleared as nearly as possible at right angles to the length of the field. (In one instance in battle, a field was met obliquely and 1500 yards of this field was cleared. In training, on another occasion, a field was met "end on". To avoid such possibilities, reconnaissance to locate the far edge of the field should be carried before clearing is commenced).

(b) In soft, dusty, or broken ground, the concealment of mines is easy. In ground with a smooth hard surface concealment is difficult, if not impossible. A gap sited on the latter type of surface will be cleared more expeditiously and with greater certainty.

(c) A gap is a defile: traffic may spread out elsewhere, but it must follow one narrow strip of ground within the gap: this ground therefore should be suitable to bear the traffic which will pass through the gap.

(d) It must be expected that enemy fire will be concentrated on the gaps; cover from fire and/or view is therefore desirable.

PERSONNEL OF GAP-CLEARING PARTIES.

3. During planning ensure that no gap-clearing party is made responsible for the clearing of gaps on more than one route.

Normally, engineer resources will not permit, but when they do, it is advantageous to provide two parties for each route, each party leap-frogging the other to clear alternate gaps.

CONTROL OF GAP-CLEARING PARTIES.

4. It is usual for gap-clearing to be done by the engineer units of the attacking formation. In a large scale attack, the normal engineer resources with the division are insufficient, and resources must be increased by the attachment of other engineer units, or by the allotment and training of additional units such as pioneer battalions.

Even with such additional units the resources available are unlikely to be more than sufficient for the task. For this reason and to enable the maximum use to be made of the engineer resources available, it is found that centralised control is necessary. To effect this, field companies are left under command of the CRE of the division and the requirements of forward brigades are met by placing engineer units in support of such brigades. By this means the flow of engineer stores and gap-making stores is [illegible] controlled, a reserve of engineers can be held [illegible] unexpected tasks which will arise, and [illegible] of initial tasks engineer units can be readily re-organised and directed onto further tasks. Where special tasks, such as bridging streams and road making require the engineer resources of the division, special units (other than those of the attacking infantry) will require to be allotted and trained for the gap-clearing tasks.

COMMANDER OF A GAP-CLEARING UNIT.

5. The commander of a unit allotted to provide gap-clearing parties should report to the commander of the infantry unit, which he is in support of, before zero, and should move with that commander until the carrying out of this tasks necessitates his leaving.

As at some stage in the battle he will need to leave the infantry commander, prior steps should be taken to provide for communication and liaison with the infantry commander.

SIGNALS.

6. Adequate sig[illegible] of one wireless [illegible] support of each [illegible]. A liberal number of orderlies ("runners" [illegible] be detailed.

ORGANISATION OF GAP-CLEARING PARTIES.

7. (a) The gap clearing parties follow as closely as practicable the forward infantry companies, each party moving on the route for which it is responsible. Liaison with company headquarters should be maintained by the parties as long as practicable and at least until each party is committed to its actual task. This liaison is effected normally by stationing NCOs at company headquarters; these NCOs collect and transmit to their parties any relevant information which is received at company headquarters. A suitable arrangement is to have one such representative available to "drop off" at each minefield encountered.

(b) The parties are divided into the following sub-parties:

Locating Sub-Party
Taping Sub-Party
Detector Sub-Party
Disarming and Lifting Sub-Party
Gap-Marker sub-Party
Covering Sub-Party (unless provided from other sources).
Drivers, Signalmen, Orderlies.

LOCATING SUB-PARTY.

8. The task of this sub-party is the discovery of the near and far edges of the minefield. Failing the provision of special equipment, the party must depend on its experience to locate the minefield by observation and examination.

The following items of special equipment have been used:

(a) Perambulator detector - a mine detector mounted on a light wooden trolley fitted with bicycle wheels. In place of the normal small search coil of the hand operated detector, it has a coil of approximately 8-ft wide fitted transversely to the trolley. The perambulator is pushed by the operator, who wears head-phones in circuit with the coil and so hears any mine which his 8-ft coil passes over.

(N.B. Although valuable results have been achieved with these sets abstracted from the normal hand-operated detector, more powerful sets are desirable to make the 8-ft coil work efficiently - particularly on wet ground).

(b) Pilot vehicle - a vehicle fitted with extensions to all controls to facilitate driving it in reverse by a driver sitting in the body or tray of the vehicle which has been sand-bagged to give protection. Sheeps-foot type rollers are fitted to roll ahead of the vehicle and so detonate any mines in its path. The vehicle finds any mine on its frontage of approximately 8-ft.

TAPING SUB-PARTY.

9. (a) The near and far edges of the field being discovered, the exact siting for the gap is necessary. It is done normally by the commander of the gap-clearing party. It should depart as little as possible from a straight line continuation of the route leading up to it. It is marked out (preferably with tracing tape 6-inches wide) by a taping sub-party. To avoid a curve or kink in the finished gap, care must be taken to keep the tapes straight and to peg them down at intervals of 50-ft.

(b) It was the practice in the desert to make gaps 8 yards wide initially; this being the width that three detector operators working in echelon could satisfactorily cover. Subsequently, the gaps were widened, or their numbers increased, to the extent that resources permitted and the situation required.

DETECTOR SUB-PARTY.

10. (a) The detector sub-party consists of the personnel operating the detectors and marking the mines. Each operator is accompanied by a mine marker who marks the position of every located mine with a metal cone. To minimize the risk of missing a row of mines, "sweeping" by detectors must start a suitable distance (say 50 yards) clear of the discovered near side of mine-field, and must continue a similar distance beyond the located enemy side.

(b) In some cases in the desert, owing to the enemy's lack of care in concealing mines, mines could be "spotted" by eye. In such cases detectors could be dispensed with and clearing effected more quickly by hand.

It is desirable that gaps as cleared are checked (or "proved") by detectors or pilot vehicles.

DISARMING AND LIFTING SUB-PARTY.

11. The disarming and lifting sub-party follows well clear behind the detector party to avoid casualties should a mine be exploded. This party lifts the mines, disarms them if necessary, and places them just outside the lanes.

GAP-MARKER SUB-PARTY.

12. (a) The gap-marker sub-party erects gap-marking lights along the side lines at the edges of the gap and, at night, affixes the gap marking lights. If the use of any electric lamps is used, these are not switched on until the whole gap is cleared and ready for traffic.

(b) Gap-markers are 18-inches by 9-inches rectangles of galvanised iron painted at one end. The half with the painted end is painted white and the other half red. The markers are mounted on long pickets and are erected at 20 yards intervals along each side of the gap, with points of arrows pointing towards the gap.

(c) By night one amber light is fixed on the red half, and a green light on the white half, of every alternate marker on each side. These lights are fixed centrally on each end marker. To distinguish the enemy end from the home end of the gap, it is recommended that this blue light be above the amber and green at the home end of the gap, and below at the enemy end.

(d) It is not normally possible for gap-clearing parties to carry by hand sufficient gap-marking stores for their use. Mechanical transport is necessary. Vehicles provided for this purpose can carry also route-markers (see paragraph 8(b) in part II) and "DANGER MINES" signs (see paragraph 16 below).

COVERING PARTY.

13. A covering party (or sub-party) is necessary. If it is provided from the gap-marking party, the latter must be suitably augmented for this purpose. In some cases it may be necessary to leave garrisons to protect gaps after they are cleared.

REPORTS AND MAINTENANCE.

14. A gap-marking party must keep battalion and other headquarters concerned (e.g. field company, Engineers of the progress being made, will advise all concerned immediately the gap is ready for traffic. A small maintenance party should be left on the gap.

FENCING.

15. As early as practicable, gaps should be fenced on both sides, and the fences splayed out along the front and rear of the minefields.

KINGHILL.


ISOLATED MINEFIELDS.

16. A supply of distinctive signs, "DANGER MINES", should be carried, for posting on isolated minefields. Such fields should be fenced as early as feasible.

RESERVES.


17. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information as to the number of minefields existing in the enemy defences, large reserves of engineers, gap-clearing appliances and gap-marking signs are necessary: reserves of more than 50% may be necessary.


INF BN & ARMY TK BN IN THE ATTACK



PART "III" APPX "D"

INF BN & ARMY TK BN IN THE ATTACK





Appendix 29

TELEGRAM OUT

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 2aust corps reception camp, LCC LHQ, sig centre AMF HQ

FROM: 2 aust corps Ollig 16

SECRET location report 570
2 aust pack tpt
coy RAVENSHOE to KAIRI 2/66
aust LAD arrived located WONGABEL
under cond 6 aust div
all informed

C.T.
AG
D.L.

TOO 1955

PRIORITY - First aust unit
ROUTINE - Reminder

Copies: 2, Int, Sigs, CSC, 4(4), Air Dirn (2), Mils, Comms, B/D.

Appendix 296

S E C R E T

Copy 51

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 36

Compiled from information received
From 1200 hrs 9 Aug to 1200 hrs 16 Aug 43

1. Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comds.

2. A receipt is not required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These summaries will not be issued regularly.

3. All dates and times are Eastern Australian Standard Time.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS

For index to place names see PART 3 (a) TOPOGRAPHICAL
Attached as Appx "A" is BATTLE MAP SALAMAUA AREA. This map may be referred to in future summaries as SALAMAUA BATTLE MAP.

(a) AUSTRALIA:

Following frequent reconnaissance flights by enemy aircraft over the DARWIN and HILLINGHBI areas, PEARCE airfield was bombed by nine aircraft on 13 Aug. That night bombs were dropped on COOMALIE and again on PEARCE strip. No damage or casualties resulted from these raids.

On 8 Aug an allied vessel 260 miles West of CAPE SORELL signalled that it was being attacked by a submarine, but there has been no further information received about this incident.

(b) NEW GUINEA:

(i) TROBRIAND ISLANDS: On 11 Aug enemy aircraft bombed WOODLARK ISLAND and the strip at KIRIWINA ISLAND, but there has been no report of damage or casualties. The following day an enemy aircraft dropped eight bombs on the dispersal area KIRIWINA strip.

It was reported on 8 Aug that six Japanese were killed on GAWA ISLAND. These were probably survivors from an air crash.

(ii) MILNE BAY: On 12 Aug an unidentified submarine was reported thirteen miles East by SE of CAPEU. This submarine is the first sighted in this area for some considerable time and was probably making reconnaissance to assess the volume of our sea traffic.

(iii) TAMBU BAY: On 12 Aug American troops attacked and occupied the recently constructed enemy defensive positions on the KNOLL three quarters of a mile West of BUIAMBUN. On night 12/13 Aug this KNOLL was unsuccessfully attacked by the enemy from the West. On 13 Aug American troops attacked the Western end of ROOSEVELT RIDGE, and by 1630 hrs had occupied the KNOLL 1000 yards West by South BUIAMBUN. The two Knolls now in our hands command enemy positions in the pill-boxes and dug-outs along the crest of the Western end of the Ridge. As a result engineers were able to demolish seven pill-boxes. On 14 Aug the enemy still occupied the NW portion of the Ridge from the vicinity of the KNOLL three quarters of a mile West of BUIAMBUN to a point 400 yards to the NW. Enemy casualties in these operations have been thirty-eight excluding the occupants of the pill-boxes. These new gains by American troops give them firm bases from which to attack enemy defensive positions to the North and West and also the much overtaxed enemy supply lines in this area.

On 14 Aug ROOSEVELT RIDGE was heavily bombed by fourteen Fortresses and twelve Mitchells.

/Contd.

(iv) MT TAMBU-GOODVIEW JUNCTION: On 7 Aug the enemy attacked our troops in the position 300 yards SW of GOODVIEW JUNCTION. Our troops withdrew but at night counter-attacked and reoccupied the position.

An American patrol from MT TAMBU contacted American troops 2000 yards East of KOMIATUM. This patrol then moved to the vicinity 1500 yards NE KOMIATUM but no enemy were contacted.

The enemy still occupied pill-boxes 1½ miles SSW KOMIATUM and on the Southern slopes of the spur 600 yards NNE of this position considerable enemy activity was reported.

On 12 Aug American troops ambushed a party of Japanese ¾ mile East of MT TAMBU killing two and wounding one. On the following day an Australian patrol contacted enemy troops 600 yards NE of MT TAMBU. During the period under review allied artillery consistently brought harassing fire to bear on positions in MT TAMBU and GOODVIEW JUNCTION areas. Enemy artillery was also active.

(v) ORODUBI-KOMIATUM: Operations in this sector have been limited to artillery exchanges.

(vi) BOBDUBI: On 7 Aug our troops unsuccessfully attacked the enemy position on the spur 1600 yards SSW OLD BOBDUBI. On 10 Aug Japanese positions were located 1100 yards and 1500 yards South of OLD BOBDUBI.

On 5 Aug a strong patrol penetrated the enemy positions at the COCONUTS from the North and the South but were compelled to withdraw owing to heavy MG and mortar fire from both flanks. The Japanese were strengthening defences in this area in spite of heavy allied artillery fire. On 11 Aug our troops attacked enemy positions SE of OLD VICKERS position with some success, but enemy counter-attacks forced our troops to take up defensive positions 1¾ miles South of OLD BOBDUBI.

Strong air support has been given our troops in this area and on 14 Aug thirty-three Liberators, fourteen Fortresses and twelve Mitchells bombed BOBDUBI RIDGE.

(vii) SALAMAUA: Enemy positions in this area have been subjected to continuous allied air attacks and artillery bombardments. These attacks have been directed against installations around SALAMAUA, KILA, HUK HUK, McDONALD'S JUNCTION, LOGUI and the foot-bridge over FRANCISCO RIVER. The many explosions and fires observed indicated effective results.

During the period 24 July to 3 Aug it is estimated that approx ninety-four barges were destroyed and sixty to seventy damaged and possibly destroyed by our aircraft. It is estimated that the tonnage capacity of those destroyed within this period is 5000 to 7000 tons. The effect of this loss on the Japanese forward garrisons, already short of supplies and reserves may well be imagined.

(viii) MARKHAM VALLEY-LAE: Allied air attacks along the barge route have been intense and continuous. Many barges have been sunk and ground installations and barge hide-outs have been well strafed. Enemy aircraft patrol the area but interception of our aircraft when effected has proved costly.

On 12 Aug an Australian fighting patrol from LEGA (seven miles West BUANG RIVER mouth) moved West along the MARKHAM RIVER in canoes and were fired on near MARANPOR (thirteen miles across stream from the mouth). No further reports of this action have been received.

/Contd.

(ix) RAMU VALLEY: On 4 and 5 Aug an allied forward patrol encountered and killed four Kanakas armed with rifles and destroyed native villages. Old Jap positions forward of the defence line East of WESA were also destroyed.

On 7 and 8 Aug an enemy patrol estimated at twenty over ran our OP at ATEBLE. Our personnel withdrew to the South. Following upon this it was reported that fifty enemy were at MARAWASA and 100 at LAKISSUA (four miles East of MARAWASA). On 8 Aug a patrol reported that the enemy had left SHOCKS HOUSE, a large party returning to ARONA and a small party proceeding SW.

On 12 Aug an enemy party estimated at one platoon attacked WESA. Five further attacks followed but all were repulsed with many enemy casualties.

(c) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

There has been no striking change in shipping round RABAUL. Photographic reconnaissance on 13 Aug giving complete coverage of the harbour revealed the following:-

1 heavy cruiser	1 light cruiser
5 destroyers	1 minelayer
1 auxiliary sub tender	1 converted auxiliary destroyertender
6 submarines	4 submarine chasers.
3 auxiliary minesweepers or gun-boats	

19 merchant vessels totalling 85,000 tons.

The volume of shipping sighted during the week between RABAUL, NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMONS is still very high. Submarine activity in these waters is also increasingly active. Although photographic reconnaissances have revealed a slightly reduced tonnage in the main harbours, it can be assumed that the Japanese are making every endeavour to use available shipping to supply and reinforce their troops in active operational areas.

On 5 Aug Japanese were reported to be near CAPE DAMPIER forty-five miles ENE of GASHATA.

Allied aircraft in this area have maintained their attack on shipping and installations around GASHATA, ARAWE, CAPE GLOUCESTER, and VITU ISLANDS. Enemy air activity has been slight and the few attempts made to intercept our aircraft were costly. During the past week there has been a notable increase in shipping off CAPE ST GEORGE. On 11 Aug three separate convoys were sighted and all appeared to be strongly escorted.

Shipping off KAVIENG continues to be active and during the past week there has also been considerable convoy activity off MUSSAU ISLAND. On 11 Aug a convoy comprising two transports (one 1500 tons the other 1000 tons) seven vessels of 500 tons each and one submarine chaser was sighted thirty-five miles West of MUSSAU ISLAND on a course SE by East. The 1500 ton transport was sunk as a result of our air attack. On 12 Aug two destroyers, two freighter transports (approx 6000 tons each) one merchant vessel (1500/2000 tons) and two tankers were sighted NW by North of the Island. Smaller convoys were sighted on the following day. It would appear that these convoys are shipping troops and supplies to RABAUL.

(d) SOLOMON ISLANDS:

(i) BOUGAINVILLE: Strong allied air attacks have been maintained in this area during the past week. On 8 Aug the naval depot at BUKA was bombed by fifteen Dauntlesses, twelve Avengers and twenty-three Mitchells. Results of this attack have not yet been reported. Shipping off CAPE HENPAN has been subjected to bombing by our aircraft with considerable success. On 12 Aug KAHILI was again heavily bombed by twenty-six Liberators, escorted by twenty-two Corsairs and eight Warhawks. Large explosions and many fires were seen and eleven of thirty intercepting aircraft were destroyed. Preliminary photo interpretation revealed thirty-two aircraft burning or damaged on the ground. On the following day KAHILI was again bombed by thirteen Liberators.

/ Contd

(ii) VELLA LAVELLA:

On 11 Aug 140 unarmed Japanese were captured on the East coast of VELLA LAVELLA. They comprised forty from VILA and 100 survivors from enemy warships. This is the first report of allied troops on VELLA LAVELLA.

(iii) KOLOMBANGARA: During the past week our aircraft maintained their heavy bombing attacks on installations and the airfield at VILA. On night 10/11 Aug a light allied naval craft attacked two small auxiliary vessels off the SW coast of KOLOMBANGARA probably sinking one.

(iv) NEW GEORGIA: Operations in this area during the past week have been mainly confined to air attacks on BAIROKO HARBOUR, GURASIA-KHDU Area. As a result of these air attacks there were many explosions and large fires, Few enemy aircraft intercepted, and a large percentage of these were destroyed.

(v) RENDOVA: On 7 Aug thirty to sixty enemy bombers and fighters attacked RENDOVA HARBOUR. Three fighters and three bombers were destroyed by AA fire and intercepting allied fighters.

(vi) YSABEL: Heavy bombing of REKATA BAY has continued, four separate raids taking place during the period under review.

(e) NW SECTOR:

Recce on 9 Aug revealed that the enemy is constructing additional defences at TIMOEKA.

Buildings at TIMOEKA were bombed and strafed by our aircraft on 6 and 12 Aug. Other targets included in allied bombing raids during this period were villages on AROE ISLAND where floatplanes and small boats were damaged, also DOEJAH and PENFOEI.

On 13 Aug BALIKPAPAN was bombed by eight Liberators. Two oil refinery centres were set on fire and at least seven large oil tanks were left burning. A medium sized vessel was also set on fire.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops 374-380; AMF Weekly Int Review 53; FAA Int Sum 66; NGF Daily Infm Sum 86-92; AAF Int Sum 126-128; NEA Daily Sum 661-667).

PART 2 : ENEMY

(a) ORDER OF BATTLE:

(i) Land:

Preliminary examination of further captured documents indicates a battalion of 80 Infantry Regiment, 20 Division (possibly 3 Battalion) arrived at SALAMAUA on 2 Jul. One of its companies was in the BOBDUBI area on 5 Jul, and on 6 Jul or later a detachment left to meet 3 Battalion of 102 Infantry Regiment which was retreating from HASSAU BAY. It is considered that part of this battalion is now on ROOSEVELT RIDGE.

There are also indications that an advanced Regimental HQ arrived at SALAMAUA on 4 Jul and as barge traffic along the North coast has continued it is possible that the main strength of the Regiment has since arrived.

Estimated strength at LAE-SALAMAUA is 12,000.

Following the discovery that staging points for barge traffic have been established at FINSCHHAFEN, CAPE GLOUCESTER and CAPE BUSCHING, fresh estimates have been made of the forces at these places as follows :-

FINSCHHAFEN	1,000
CAPE GLOUCESTER	500/1,000
CAPE BUSCHING	500

This now brings the estimated total of enemy troops in the BRITISH NEW GUINEA - NEW BRITAIN Sector to 88,800 - 90,400.

(FAA Int Sum 66)

/Contd

(ii) Air -

Estimated enemy land-based air strength as at 10 Aug 43.

AREAS	F	L/B & MB	S/EB	F/B	F/P	Sundry	Total	30 Jul 43.
New Britain	112	144		4	12	13	285	202
New Ireland		18	13		9		40	31
New Guinea	95	63			5	8	171	139
Solomons	49	12	9	2	25		97	186
Timor	24	18					42	49
Ambon	6	9		3	7		25	24
Aroe & Kai Is	9	3			13		25	24
Dutch NG	6						6	9
Celebes	24	24			9	27	84	87
Java-Bali	30	66	12	9	24	18	159	186
	355	357	34	18	104	66	934	937

(AAF Int Sum 128)

(b) EQUIPMENT:

(i) Japanese 20 mm Automatic Ft'A Gun Type "97" (1937)

Attached as Appx "B" are Photographic Reproductions and Characteristics of the Japanese 20 mm Automatic Ft'A Gun Type "97" (1937).

(ii) Japanese Armoured Picket Boat: This craft has been used in the HUON GULF area recently; its presence reflects Japanese concern over barge losses.

No positive information of this craft is available beyond the fact that a vessel of this type is used for command, reconnaissance or escort purposes in conjunction with MLCs. The present role appears to be purely that of escort.

It is believed to be constructed of ste l plate, prod against small arms fire. A turret on the foredeck may house a 20 mm (or possibly up to 37 mm) weapon. Two more turrets fore and aft on the superstructure carry machine guns (probably 7.7 mm) and are designed for anti-aircraft as well as horizontal fire.

Dimensions and silhouettes are shown in Appendix "C".

Various statements by Prisoners of War regarding performance indicate speeds up to 30 knots.

(FAA Int Sum 66)

PARA 3 : TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) Index to further place names appearing in this Summary

			Long		Lat	
			Deg	Min	Deg	Min
BALIKPAPAN	TOWN	BORNEO	116	48	1	13
DAMPIER	CAPE	NB	151	5	6	6
DOBLAM	DROME	KAI IS	132	43	5	35
GAWA	ISLAND	TROBRIAND IS	151	58	8	58
GURASIA-KINDU	AREA	N.GEORGIA	157	15	8	22
KEIPAN	CAPE	BOUGAINVILLE	154	35	5	00
LAKISSUA	VILLAGE	NG	146	08	6	08
LEGA	VILLAGE	NG	146	49	6	53
MUSSAU	ISLAND	BISMARCKS	149	37	1	25
NARAKAPOR	DROME	NG	146	50	6	59
ROOSEVELT	RIDGE	NG	147	05	7	08
SORREL	CAPE	BASHATIA	145	08	42	13

PART 5 : SECURITY

SECURITY OF MOVEMENT:

A camp check of the area vacated by a unit was carried out by FSS personnel on the day the rear party marched out. The area was left in a tidy condition and not a great number of papers was left behind but such documents as were discovered, enabled the deduction of some illuminating information.

Without assuming any prior knowledge of the unit or its formation, the following is some of the information gained from these papers:-

(a) The identity of the unit.

(b) The identity and composition of its brigade.

(c) The identity and composition of the remaining brigades.

(d) The identity of the Division and all Divisional troops.

(e) Details of all officers of the unit, including appointments.

(f) The strength of the unit.

(g) The extent of reinforcement of the unit.

(h) The manner in which the unit is equipped, including the ammunition scale and the type of scale.

(i) The type of training which the unit has been undergoing.

Two important lessons stand out -

1. Since so much information can be gained from what is apparently such meagre evidence, so meagre that it was left behind by a trained unit, it should be appreciated why formation commanders ask units to pass back all captured documents to Intelligence by the speediest means possible.

2. Conversely, since such papers are so important to Intelligence, the reason why they should not be left lying around is obvious.

The co-operation of all personnel is asked in order that commanders know just what they are up against, and at the same time be confident that the enemy does not know the same about us.


Every unit is responsible for its own security and officers of the rear party should be specifically detailed to ensure that no documents are left in the area to be vacated. A prisoner of war who supplies information to the enemy is regarded as a traitor. Personnel who leave papers lying around in the course of a move are providing the enemy with exactly the same type of information, the only difference being that the written information is more reliable. If all play their part then in effect we have taken out an insurance policy, the premium for which is a very small effort on our part.

[signature] Capt
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution: As per Sum 35
plus 6 Aust Div - Copy 64
Less 106 Aust CCS - Copy 34

APPENDIX "A"
2 AUST CORPS
INT SUMMARY N°56


BATTLE MAP GROUND SITUATION SALAMAUA AREA To 16 AUG 43



APPENDIX "B"
TO 2 AUST CORPS
Int Sum 36
DATED 16 AUG 1943

JAPANESE 20MM AUTOMATIC TK/A GUN TYPE 97 (1937)

~~APPENDIX B (1)~~



AMMUNITION





DIAGRAM SHOWING POSITION OF CARRYING HANDLES

20 mm AMMUNITION (Possibly used with this weapon).



HE A P



PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING SHIELD AND FRONT CARRYING HANDLE

GSI(a) ADV LHQ 6 AUG 43

APPENDIX B Page 2.
To 2 AUST CORPS
Int Sum 36
DATED 16 AUG 1943

ENEMY EQUIPMENT.

JAPANESE 20mm AUTOMATIC TK/A GUN TYPE "97" (1937).

Photographic reproductions of this weapon are attached as Appendix "B(i)".

The following details and characteristics were extracted from a report prepared by Ordnance Intelligence Unit USAFISPA.

GENERAL PARTICULARS.

This weapon is a single purpose Tk/A gun, operating on the Oerlikon principle. It is air cooled, gas operated and magazine fed, and incorporates a spring type recuperation system.

Provision is made at the front and rear of the gun for the attachment of handle bar type carrying handles to facilitate handling.

Tests carried out disclosed that the A/P ammunition, fired from this weapon, is capable of penetrating half inch case hardened armour plate at a range of 200 yards.


CHARACTERISTICS.


Calibre		:	20mm (.79 in)
Length	(a) with carrying handles	:	89½ in
	(b) without carrying handles	:	82½ in
Height	(without shield)	:	16½ in
Weight	(a) complete	:	150 lbs (approx)
	(b) without carrying handles and shield	:	115 lbs
Elevation (using elevating sleeves on legs)		:	-5° to + 5°
Traverse (without moving bipod)		:	45° right and left
Sights- Foresight		:	Blade
Backsight		:	Adjustable column with aperture. Graduated up to 1000 metres.
Type of fire		:	Automatic only
Type of feed		:	Magazine Vertical Box Type
Dimensions of Armour Plate Shield	Length	:	15 in
	Width	:	12 in
	Thickness	:	5/16 in


Neither the capacity of the magazine or the firing rate of the weapon were included in the report received.

APPENDIX C
To 2 AUST CORPS
Int Sum 31
DATED 16 AUG 1943

JAPANESE ARMOURED PICKET BOAT







ARMOUR
Proof against small arms fire.

DIMENSIONS
Length approx 40 ft
Beam " 13 ft

ARMAMENT.
Probably 2 x 7.7 mm MG's in turrets on superstructure - 1 x 20 mm or possibly 37 mm in turret on forward deck.

SPEED
15/20 knots (possibly more).

Constructed of steel plate.

(Reproduced by First Aust Army from NG Force Summary No 133).

Appx "A" 295

MESSAGE OUT GR:

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON

FROM: 2 aust corps 0 1110 15

SECRET	.	location	report	369
.	2/11	aust	a	fd
coy	arrived	WONGABEL	21	sup
depot	pl	relieved	by	det
2/3	aust	coy	ASC	at
ATHERTON	and	returned	WONDECLA	.
5	bty	plus	one	tp
6	bty	2/3	aust	fd
rept	2/3	aust	inf	bn
WONDECLA	to	DEAD	LANS	GULLY
.	following	departed	det	hq
18	aust	inf	bde	2/153
aust	gen	tpt	coy	less
dets	two	pls	2/2	aust
sup	depot	coy	2/5	aust
fd	amb	18	AAMCU	2/125
aust	bde	wkshops	7	aust
div	reception	camp	loc	aust
CCS	.	all	informed	

W C Radford Maj

SECRET
MEANS

TOO: 1800

IMPORTANT - First Aust Army
D R L S - remainder

Copies: A
Int
Sigs
CSO
Q (2)
War Diary (A)
File
Roneo
R/S

War Diary. August 194

MESSAGE OUT.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS — IN

OUT

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCAIRNS, Sig cmbr Atherton

FROM: [illegible] 1a

SECRET	.	location	report	365	.
2/5	aust	coy	AASC	WONDECLA	to
WONGABEL	comes	under	comd	2	aust
corps	.	following	of	6	aust
div	WONDECLA	to	DEAD	MAINS	GULLY
.	2/15	aust	fd	coy	det
sigs	A	coy	2/3	aust	MG
bn	one	coy	2/4	aust	pnr
pn	one	pl	6	aust	div
carr	coy	2/1	aust	fd	and
1	and	2	secs	pro	coy
.	2/12	aust	inf	bn	departed
.	remainder	9	aust	div	departed.
as	follows	.	2/24	aust	fd
pk	coy	2/29	aust	camflg	unit
2/72	and	2/77	aust	LAD:	2/5
aust	dental	unit	div	reception camp	
1	aust	mil	landing	gp	
all	informed				

S[illegible] IMPORTANT FIRST
AUSTRALY: TOO:
DRLS READER: 195a

Lieutenant Colonel Capt

Mawdsley

Appendix 2/3

MESSAGE OUT.

TO; first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 2/12 aust inf bn, 2 aust corps reception camp LOCALISE sig centre ATHERTON

FROM: 2 aust corps 0 1107 13

SECRET location report 367
one pl 20 aust A fd
coy YONGABEL to REDLYNCH two pls
2 aust fd coy YONGABEL to
BARRIE 17 aust camflg unit
YONGABURRA to YONGABEL D sec 2/4
aust dental unit LOY LANGE to
YONGABEL att 2/7 aust sec
commando regt E sec 2/8 aust
dental unit DENISTON to MC DOUGALL att
2/8 aust inf bn . following
come under cond 6 aust div
from HQ 2 aust corps 2/3
aust HQ bn less B coy
12 bty 2/3 aust tk a
rect 2/8 aust dental unit .
following from MC DOUGALL to DEAD LANS
GULLY 2/2 aust inf bn det
postal unit det A sec FSU
2/45 aust LAD sec 2/119 aust
bde wkshop . all informed

Secret
Copy

REPEAT-First Aust Army
D R L S - reminder.

copies To: A
int
Sigs
GS
Q (2)
War Diary (2)
File
Roneo
B/B.

W/10

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
12 Aug 43.

G/3374/Ops

Subject: Training Exercise - HQ 2 Aust Corps.

1. Exercise.

With the object of training HQ 2 Aust Corps in movement and the closing and setting up of Corps HQ in various situations in the field, an exercise involving the movement of this HQ will be held from 22 to 29 Aug inclusive.

To gain maximum value from the exercise the conditions will approximate as closely as possible to those of an operational move so that the exercise will serve as a rehearsal for any future move.

2. Scope of the exercise.

(a) Full WE scale of all items will be taken.
(b) Signal communication will be established on Scale shown in list "A", Appx H3, Corps SOs.
(c) Full office accommodation will be set up and routine work will be carried on at each location.
(d) No special operations will be carried out. Branches may exercise their branches as desired once HQ has been established by adding additional tasks as necessary to test the ability of the branch to function in operations.
(e) Vehicles will carry their full allotted loads.
(f) Tentative transport scales (to be issued) will be tested during the various moves.
(g) The erection of field kitchens and the early provision of hot meals by all messes will be practised.
(h) Water and hygiene arrangements will be as in the field.
(i) A short movement on foot, carrying jungle equipment and a bivouac in the Jungle will be included, using operational ration.
(j) Tentage will be on RD scale.
(k) Full scale malarial precautions will be practised.

3. Prior preparation and training for the exercise will be necessary and will include the following action by the personnel shown:-

O i/c Branches: Checking of WE, packing of same for movement and provision of containers.
Test loading of stores in vehicles.
Hardening training of all ranks.
Erection of office tents.

Mess Secty & Camp:

Messes: Checking of WE, packing of same and provision of containers.
Test loading in vehicles.
Hardening training all ranks.
Construction field kitchens.
Erection of Mess tents.
Disposal of refuse in the field.

/Mess Secty.

Mess Scoty & Camp:

Cpl in charge Batmen.	Construction and filling in of latrines. Erection of sleeping accommodation. Assistance to Messes as necessary.

4. Attached as Appendix "A" is a tentative timetable covering prior action and the move. Detailed orders for the move will be issued separately.

for Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Encl.

Distribution:

List B.
plus RAA
RAE
A Aust Corps Sigs
2 Aust Corps D & E Pl
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office.

Appendix "A" to G/3374/Ops

Time Table:

			Officer Responsible.
Aug 43.	D-10 to D-3.	Hardening training all ranks including three marches for all ranks, carrying jungle scale equipment for bivouac. Trial march 5 miles.	Officer i/c Branch Mess Secty for Mess Staff and Batmen. Remainder Camp.
		Disposal of surplus stores. Trial packing and loading of equipment.	-do-
		Issue of detail of officers i/c groups and their duties.	GIII.
	D-3	Tentative SOs Completed	GII & GIII.
	D-2	Surplus kits moved into temporary Kit Store.	Q.
	D-1	Orders issued for move. Recce party proceeds.	GII.
	D1	First move Corps HQ.	
	D7	Return to present HQ.	

Appendix 29

MESSAGE FOR.

CALLED	IN
LOCATIONS	OUT

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 2/12 aust inf bn, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCATIONS, sig centre ARMYTOP

from; 2 aust corps o.1100 12

SECRET	.	location	report	366	.
106	aust	CCS	departed	109	aust
CCS	less	lt	sec	RAVENSHOE to	
ZONDECLA	1	aust	mob	Dact	Lab
RAVENSHOE	to	CAIRNS	F	Sec	79
aust	dental	unit	came	under	comd
17	L	of	C	sub	area
2/3	aust	.G	bn	less	B
coy	arrived	located	ZONDECLA	.	following
from	ZONDECLA	to	DELD	UNITS	GULLY
.	HQ	16	aust	inf	bde
and	sig	sec	10	pl	2/1
aust	HQ	gd	bn	2/1	aust
inf	bn	one	pl	2/155	aust
gen	tpt	coy	.	all	informed

Secret Means. IMPORTANT FIRST AUST ARMY: DUTS RELAYED: TOO: 2/33

Appendix 2

SECRET.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
12 Aug 43.

G.3361
Copy No 46

Subject: 2 Aust Corps Location Statement
No 7 as at 2400 hrs 11 Aug 43.

	Copy No		Copy No.
6 Aust Div	1-3	Int	27
RAA 2 Aust Corps	4	LO	28
RAE 2 Aust Corps	5	CE	29
Sigs 1 Aust Corps	6-7	CSO	30
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Coln	8	DA&QMG	31
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	9	A	32
2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	10	Q	33
First Aust Army (AIF)	11-12	Legal	34
QUEENSLAND L of C Area	13	S & T	35
Signals Centre ATHERTON	14	Medical	36
17 (CAIRNS) L of C Sub-Area	15	Dental	37
No 1 (NQ) L of C Sub-Area	16	Ord	38
2 Aust Fd Censorship Sec	17	AEME	39
First Aust Army Stationery Det (AIF) ATHERTON	18	Pro	40
		Postal	41
Mvts CAIRNS	19-20	Salvage	42
Mvts TOWNSVILLE	21-22	File	43-44
Mvts ATHERTON	23	War Diary ✓	45-46
2/2 Aust Gen Hosp	24		
13 Adv Ord Depot	25		
GOC	26		

1. Herewith 2 Aust Corps Location Statement No 7 as at 2400 hrs 11 Aug 43.

2. The serial numbers shown in the margin are for convenience of reference only.

3. It is requested that any variations noted in this statement be immediately notified to this HQ by the formation or unit concerned.

4. All copies of previous 2 Aust Corps Location Statements are to be destroyed.

5. Acknowledge.

C. Lawrence Smith Capt
for Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Encl.

S E C R E T.

2 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT NO 7
as at 2400 hrs 11 Aug.

Corps Troops

Veh Sign: Cockatoo on Boomerang.

Map Legend:

BF	-	BARTLE FRERE	one	inch	to	one	mile
D	-	DIMBULA	"	"	"	"	"
G	-	GORDONVALE	"	"	"	"	"
H	-	HERBERTON	"	"	"	"	"
I	-	INNISFAIL	"	"	"	"	"
MtG	-	Mt GARNET	"	"	"	"	"
P	-	PALMERSTON	"	"	"	"	"
C	-	CAIRNS	"	"	"	"	"

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Map Ref	Moves projected and remarks
	HQ.				
A1	HQ 2 Aust Corps (AIF)	107	BARRINE	G555344	
A2	2 Aust Corps Sec Int Corps (AIF)	107	BARRINE	G555344	
A3	'H' Sec Aust FSW	107	BARRINE	G555344	LHQ Tps
A4	No 2 Aust Mob Met Flight		MAREEBA	0484394	att 46 AL Sec
A5	2 Aust Corps Def & Emp Pl	120	BARRINE	G555344	
A6	2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn (less A B, C Coy (less 12 Pl & 14 Pl)	225	WONDECLA	H324070	Under comd 6 Aust Div for local adm. D Coy & 12 Pl to move shortly.
	CAV.				
A7	HQ 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt		WONGABEL		
A8	2/5 Aust Indep Coy		WONGABEL		
A9	2/9 Aust Cav Regt (Sig Sec & 2/82 Aust LAD)		KAIRI	G506379	
	ARTY.				
A10	HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	109	BARRINE	G555344	
A11	2/2 Aust Fd Regt (Sig sec & 2/40 Aust LAD)		KAIRI	G471389	
A12	2/7 Aust Fd Regt (Sig Sec & 2/64 Aust LAD)	74	KAIRI	G484373	
A13	2/8 Aust Fd Regt (Sig Sec & 2/63 Aust LAD)	54	KAIRI	G472385	
A14	2/3 Aust Tk A Regt (less 9,10 &11 Btys) Sig Sec & 2/71 Aust LAD)	62	KAIRI	G476377	
A15	3 Aust Fd Svy Bty (less two fd secs)		KAIRI	G476377	One fd sec under each 7 and 9 Aust Divs.
A16					
	ENGRS.				
A17	HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps (AIF)	101	WONGABEL	H401180	
A18	20 Aust A Fd Coy (less one Pl)	149	WONGABEL		
A19	One Pl 20 Aust A Fd Coy	76	WASP CREEK	G536317	
A20	2/23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy & 2/65 Aust LAD	76	WONGABEL	H401180	
A21	2 Aust Fd Coy		WONGABEL		
A22	17 Aust Camflg Unit	118	YUNGABURRA	BF519262	

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Map Ref	Moves projected and Remarks.
	SVY				
A23	5 Aust Fd Svy Coy (AIF) (less one sec)	111	INNISFAIL		Army Tps under comd for adm.
A24	2 Sec 5 Aust Fd Svy Coy	111	RAVENSHOE	MtG398870	
A25					
A26	Dets 2/1 Aust A Topo Svy Coy		TOLGA	D385318	
A27	7 Aust Fd Svy Sec		TOLGA	D396317	
	SIGS				
A28	A Aust Corps Sigs & 290 Aust LAD		BARRINE	G552340	
A29	Cipher Sec 1 Aust Corps		BARRINE	G552340	
A30	Det Cipher Sec (YORKFORCE)		BARRINE	G552340	
A31	63 Aust Wireless Sec		SAN REMO BEACH	C700790	LHQ Tps under comd First Aust Army for Tech adm.
	S & T				
A32	HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tpt Coln	116	MALANDA	BF524162	
A33	131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less A Tpt Pl)	925	MILLAA MILLAA	P547969	LHQ Tps
A34	A Tpt Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		RAVENSHOE	MtG405859	
A35	132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	907	ROCKY CREEK	D375371	LHQ Tps
A36					
A37	37 Aust Sup Depot Pl (AIF)		RAVENSHOE	MtG405859	Army Tps
A38					
A39	40 Aust Sup Depot Pl (AIF)		KAIRI	G478363	Army Tps
A40	8 Aust MAC (AIF)	245	EAST BARRON	BF479228	Army Tps
A41	2 Aust Pack Tpt Coy	678	RAVENSHOE	MtG365818	To move to KAIRI
	MEDICAL				
A42	18 Aust Fd Amb		KAIRI	G476366	
A43	104 Aust CCS		WONDECLA	H326072	Under 6 Aust Div for adm and trg.
A44	106 Aust CCS (AIF)	297	RAVENSHOE	MtG420837	Army Tps to move to N G.
A45	109 Aust CCS	243	WONDECLA	H280080	
A46	1 Aust Mob Bact Lab	271	RAVENSHOE	MtG420837	LHQ Tps
A47	2/3 Aust Mob Bact Lab		WONDECLA	H280080	LHQ Tps
A48	3 Aust Entomological Sec		BARRINE		LHQ Tps
A49	19 AAMCU		WONDECLA	H325073	Under 6 Aust Div for adm & trg.
	DENTAL.				
A50	First Aust Army Sub Depot Dental Stores				
	2/4 Aust Dental Unit	265	ATHERTON		
A51					
A52					
A53					
A54	B Sec		KAIRI		att 2/9 Aust Cav Regt
A55	C Sec		BARRINE		att HQ 2 Aust Corps.
A56	D Sec		Moving to WONGABEL		
A57					
A58					
	2/8 Aust Dental Unit	262			
A59	HQ (1) Sec		WONDECLA		att HQ 6 Aust Div
A60	HQ (2) Sec		"		att RAE 6 Aust Div
A61	A Sec		"		att 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Map Ref	Moves projected and remarks.
A62	B Sec		WONDECLA		att 2/3 Aust Inf Bn.
A63	C Sec		"		att 2/3 Aust Fd Regt
A64	D Sec		"		att 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
A65	E Sec		INNISFAIL		att 5 Aust Fd Svy Coy.
A66	F Sec		WONDECLA		att 2/1 Aust Inf Bn
	79 Aust Dental Unit (AIF) (Army Tps)				To move from comd.
A67	HQ (1) Sec		WONGABEL		att RAE HQ 2 Aust Corps
A68	B Sec		"		att RAE 2 Aust Corps
A69	E Sec		CAIRNS		att 17 L of C Sub-Area.
A70	F Sec		CAIRNS		att 17 L of C Sub-Area
	ORD				
A71	110 Aust Indep Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk		MILLAA	P495856	To move to KAIRI
		127	MILLAA		
	AEME				
A72	110 Aust Indep Bde Gp Wkshop (AEME)		MILLAA	P495856	To move to KAIRI
		158	MILLAA RD		
A73	319 Aust LAD	107	BARRINE	G555344	Under comd HQ 2 Aust Corps
	PRO				
A74	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy (AIF)	128	BARRINE	G555344	
A75	2 Aust Corps Fd Punishment - Centre		WASP CREEK	G533316	
	POSTAL				
A76	2 Aust Corps Postal Unit (AIF)	154	BARRINE	G555344	
	PAY				
A77	2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	162	BARRINE		
	MISC.				
A78	Public Relations Units (2 Aust Corps)		ATHERTON		
A79	2 Aust Corps Reception Camp		WONGABEL		
A80	2 Aust Corps Salvage Unit (less 2 Secs)		TOLGA		
A81	2 Secs 2 Aust Corps Salvage Unit		RAVENSHOE		
A82	First Aust Army Press Unit		ATHERTON		Army Tps
A83	Mobile Cinema Unit (No. 11)		YUNGABURRA		
A84	Mobile Cinema Unit (No. 12)		YUNGABURRA		
A85	Mobile Cinema Unit (No. 17)		YUNGABURRA		
A86	5 AC Sqn		MAREEBA		
A87	46 Aust AL Sec (AC)		MAREEBA		IHQ Tps, formerly 3 AL Sec.
A88	Det one pl 5 Aust Farm Coy		WASP CREEK	G525326	
	SCHOOLS				
A89	No. 1 Mob Wing LHQ School of Mech		WONGABEL		
A90	Mob Wing First Aust Army Weapon Trg School		WONGABEL		To move to TORRESFORCE.

6 AUST DIV.

Divisional Sign:- Kangaroo on Boomerang.

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Camp	Map Ref	Moves projected and Remarks.
	HQ					
B1	HQ 6 Aust Div(less adv HQ)	84	WONDECLA	Div HQ Area	H366043	
B2	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div	84	TRINITY BEACH		C651859	LHQ Tps.
B3	"A" Sec Aust FSW		WONDECLA Area		H366043	
B4	C Coy 2/1 Aust HQ GdBn less (10,11 & 12 pls)	225	WONDECLA	"	H366043	
	ARMD TPS					
B5	Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt & det 4 Aust Armd Bde Wkshop.	53	WONDECLA	F Bde Area	H315078	
	ARTY					
B6	HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	69	WONDECLA	G	H366064	
B7	2/3 Aust Fd Regt (Sig Sec,2/4l LAD)	74	"	AE	H335065	
	ENGRS					
B8	HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	81	"	Div Tps Area	H325076	
B9	2/2 Aust Fd Coy	60	LITTLE MULGRAVE		G704410	
B10	2/3 Aust Fd Coy	86	WONDECLA	"	H325076	
B11						
B12	2/2 Aust Fd Pk Coy & 2/6 Aust LAD	67	"	"	H325076	
B13	26 Aust Camflg Unit	73	"	"	H325076	
	SIGS					
B14	Sigs 6 Aust Div	66	"	"	H358048	
B15	2/4l Aust Cipher Sec	68	"	"	H358048	
	INF					
B16	HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde (Sig Sec & 2/45 LAD)	88	"	E Bde Area	H322068	
B17	10 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	225	"	"	H322068	
B18	2/1 Aust Inf Bn	50	"	Q	H319067	
B19	2/2 Aust Inf Bn	99	"	R	H315063	
B20	2/3 Aust Inf Bn	56	"	P	H324067	
B21	HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde (Sig Sec & 2/79 Aust LAD)	65	"	F Bde Area	H315078	
B22	11 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	225	"	"	H315078	
B23	2/4 Aust Inf Bn	82	"	M	H313077	
B24	2/8 Aust Inf Bn	91	"	N	H314079	
B25	2/11 Aust Inf Bn	77	"	L	H314077	
B26	6 Aust Div Carr Coy (less one pl)	85	"		H344059	
	PNR					
B27	2/4 Aust Pnr Bn	140	"	O	H333067	Corps Tps
	AASC					
B28	HQ Comd AASC 6 Aust Div	59	"	Div Tps Area	H326076	
B29	2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less dets)	97	"	"	H326076	Dets not under comd
B30	2/5 Aust Sup Depot Coy (less four pls)	64	"	"	H326076	Two pls not under comd.

Serial	Unit	Veh No.	Location	Camp	Map Ref	Moves projected and remarks
B31	20 Aust Sup Depot Pl	64	WONDECLA	Ry Sta	H298098	
B32	21 Aust Sup Depot Pl	64	ATHERTON		H395335	
B33	2/3 Aust Coy AASC		WONDECLA	Div Tps Area	H326076	To move to WONGABEL
	MEDICAL					
B34	2/1 Aust Fd Amb	57	"	"	H325073	
B35	2/7 Aust Fd Amb	57	"	"	H325073	
B36	6 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	79	"	"	H322072	
	ORD					
B37	2/119 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk		"	AA	H335066	
B38	135 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk		"	"	H335066	
	AEME					
B39	2/119 Aust Bde Wkshops	76	"	"	H335066	
B40	135 Aust Bde Wkshops		"	"	H335066	
B41	2/42 Aust LAD	66	"		H346052	
	MISC					
B42	6 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	"		H362046	
B43	6 Aust Div Postal Unit (less dets)	55	"	Div HQ Area	H367043	
B44	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"	Div Tps Area	H326076	
B45	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"	E Bde	H322068	
B46	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"	F Bde	H315078	
B47	6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	80	"	Div HQ Area	H367043	
B48	6 Aust Div Reception Camp	71	"	Ry Sta	H298098	
B49	6 Aust Div Concert Party		"			

7 AUST DIV.

DIVISIONAL SIGN: KOOKABURRA ON BOOMERANG.

Serial	Unit	Veh No	Location	Camp	Map Ref	Moves projected and remarks.
C1	Det HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	88	RAVENSHOE	C Camp	MtG[illegible]8[illegible]7	
C2	2/12 Aust Inf Bn	56	"	"	"	
C3	2/153 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less dets)	57	"	W Camp	MtG335814	
C4	Two pls 2/2 Aust Sup Depot Coy	64	"	"	MtG[illegible]5814	
C5	2/5 Aust Fd Amb	52	"	A Camp	MtG324813	
C6	18 AAMCU		"	"	MtG324813	
C7	2/125 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	92	"	W Camp	MtG[illegible]812	
C8	2/125 Aust Bde Wksops	46	"	"	MtG338812	
C9	7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	71	TUMOULIN		MtG368912	

9 AUST DIV.

D1	Det HQ 9 Aust Div	84	REDLYNCH	Staging Camp
D2	2/24 Aust Fd Pk Coy & 2/72 Aust LAD.	67	DEAD MANS GULLY	
D3	2/29 Aust Camfig Unit	73	DEAD MANS GULLY	
D4	2/77 Aust LAD	182	DEAD MANS GULLY	
D5	2/5 Aust Dental Unit	291	REDLYNCH	Staging Camp
D6	9 Aust Div Reception Camp	71	REDLYNCH	Staging Camp

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Appendix "B"

MESSAGE OUT GR:

TO : first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 2/12 aust inf bn, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON

FROM : 2 aust corps 0 1089 11

SECRET	.	location	4report	365
.	departures	.	2/2	aust inf
tps	wkshop	9	aust	div
mob	laundry	and	fwd	dech
unit	mob	wkshop	wing	LHQ
AASC	school	2/4	aust	fd
coy	.	135	aust	bde
ord	fd	pk	arrived	located
JONDECIA	.	3	pl	6
aust	div	carr	coy	formed
located	JONDECLA	.	B	sec
2/4	aust	dental	unit	BARRIER
to	KAIRI	tt	2/9	aust
cav	regt	.	all	informed

Secret
Sergeant McClymont Sept.

TGO 2/35

IMPORTANT - First Aust Army
D R L S - remainder

Copies: A
I:t
Sigs
C30
(2)
Adv Diary (2)
File
Roneo
S/S

SECRET 285

G/3333/SD

G.S.Minute

Subject: Priorities of Issue of Controlled Stores.

3 (2)
War Diary (2)
File (2)

1. G S Minute G3101 of 11 Jul 43 is cancelled.

2. Priorities of issue of Controlled Stores will be as follows:

33.1/3% entitlements to all units as a training scale, then:

First

6 Aust Div - (Jungle Div units as per 2 Aust Corps G211301 of 23 Jun 43 appx 'A'- amended to 16 Jul 43)
3 Aust Svy Bty (less two Fd Secs)
18 Bty 2/3 Aust Fk A Regt
2/5 Aust Indep Coy
2/3 Aust MG Bn
2/66 Aust LAD (att 2/3 Aust MG Bn)
2/4 Aust Far Bn
6 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit
18 Aust AMCU
2/8 Aust Dental Unit

Second

Remaining Corps Troops (as per 2 Aust Corps G211301 of 23 Jun 43 Appx 'B' - amended to 16 Jun 43)

Third

Other units under command 2 Aust Corps.

Maj.
GS 2 Aust Corps.

G(SD)
11 Aug 43.

Appendix 287

MESSAGE OUT.

TO : [illegible]

FROM : "G" [illegible] 10

a	route	march	till	be
held	on	Friday	10 - [illegible]	and
.	[illegible]	.	[illegible]	hats
ships	long	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
.	rifles	will	equipment	[illegible]
incl	marching	gear	to	be
carried	.	all	possible	officers
and	ORs	to	attend	.
all	ranks	participating	to	be
at	parade	ground	by	0845
hrs	.	addressed	will	advise
numbers	of	personnel	taking	part
to	G	branch	by	1200
hrs	Thursday	15	[illegible]	

CC:

FI:

MESSAGE OUT : GR:

TO : first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 2/12 aust inf bn, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCALOS, Sig Centre ATHERTON

FROM : 2 aust corps O 1098 10

SECRET	.	location	report	304
.	det	18	aust	fd
amb	WONDECLA	to	KAIRI	rejoins
unit	.	by	sec	109
aust	CC3	REVERSHOE	to	WONDECLA
joins	lt	sec	.	all
informed				

SEND - SECRET - CIPHER TOO :
IMPORTANT - first aust army
ORIS - other TAI : addressees.

Appendix 225

SECRET

Copy 21

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 35

Compiled from information received
From 1200 hrs 2 Aug to 1200 hrs 9 Aug 43

1. Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comds.

2. A receipt is not required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These summaries will not be issued regularly.

3. All dates and times are Eastern Australian Standard Time.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS
For index to place names see PART 3 (b) TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) AUSTRALIA:

On 6 Aug two enemy aircraft attacked an Allied vessel sixty miles NNW MIL INGINBI. The vessel was hit in the engine room and eventually sank.

There have been a few reports of submarines at various points around the coast, but the grading given these reports was generally low.

(b) NEW GUINEA:

(i) TROBRIAND ISLANDS: On 27 Jul six unidentified aircraft reconnoitred KIRIWINA. The enemy have evinced consistent interest in this area and it can reasonably be expected that bombing raids will be made when the target offers an opportunity for maximum damage.

On 1 Aug three enemy bombers dropped twelve bombs on WOODLARK Island, but there has been no report of damage or casualties.

Further reconnaissance was made of both WOODLARK and KIRIWINA on 5 Aug.

(ii) TAMBU BAY: The high ground running approximately East and West and dividing TAMBU BAY and DOT INLET is referred to as ROOSEVELT RIDGE. Enemy positions on this ridge were raided by American troops on 31 Jul. After achieving some success the Allied troops returned to their position 1,000 yards WSW BUIAMBUN. Patrolling was carried out during 1 Aug and our artillery increased their concentration on targets in DOT INLET. On 2 Aug our troops made another raid on enemy positions on ROOSEVELT RIDGE. They destroyed some MG posts and returned to their position. Direct air support was given by Allied aircraft which bombed and strafed BUIAMBUN and ROOSEVELT RIDGE, also LOKANU and DOT ISLAND. Succeeding days saw some raids by fighting patrols North of ROOSEVELT RIDGE on the NUK NUK track and strong artillery support for our troops, but no major clashes. On 6 Aug the enemy were observed constructing defences three-quarters of a mile NW BUIAMBUN. The target was registered by our artillery and enemy casualties were believed to be heavy.

(iii) MT TAMBU - GOODVIEW JUNCTION: Corrections to track positions which have been provided for this area help to clarify some past reports of the enemy positions and the fighting around them. GOODVIEW JUNCTION is 1900 yards WSW MT TAMBU and is strongly held by the enemy. Prepared defensive positions have been established along the Ridge from GOODVIEW JUNCTION as far as the Western slopes of MT TAMBU. Fighting in the area has resulted in some advances for our forces on MT TAMBU where at least twenty Japanese were killed in addition to casualties inflicted by our artillery fire. However, the enemy defensive position has remained intact and there have been minor clashes between fighting patrols around GOODVIEW JUNCTION.

/Contd.

On 4 Aug Australian troops attacked from North and South an enemy position on the Southern slopes of the KNOLL just South of GOODVIEW JUNCTION. Japanese dead were estimated at twenty-eight but strong counter-attacks forced our troops to withdraw.

(iv) ORODUBI-KONIATUM: A corrected position for KONIATUM is 1500 yds NW of MT TAMBU. On 1 Aug twenty Japs were ambushed on the KONIATUM track seven were killed. Enemy artillery shelled our positions on the Southern slopes of SUGARCANE RIDGE, 600 yards ESE HAMLING. During the days that followed Allied artillery was active against positions along the enemy supply line.

(v) BOBDUBI: On 31 Jul further enemy counter attacks caused our troops to withdraw from the COCONUTS area to the vicinity of the OLD VICKERS position. During the next four days the Japanese made successive attacks against this position. All attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. After these failures the enemy moved to a position 1400 yards SSW OLD BOBDUBI, but a strong attack by Australian troops drove them out, and also from their position on the KNOLL 1300 yards SW OLD BOBDUBI. Much enemy equipment was found when our troops occupied this position. Enemy casualties were heavy and mopping up continues. Australian patrols on 4 Aug were operating from OLD VICKERS position to the COCONUTS. By 7 Aug the area had been cleared with the exception of the enemy occupying the SPUR 1600 yards SSW OLD BOBDUBI.

(vi) SALAMAUA: Allied artillery and air attack have now been brought to bear in concentrated form against enemy installations at SALAMAUA. On 1 Aug a direct hit was scored by our artillery on an aircraft parked on the field and the footbridge at the mouth of the FRANCISCO RIVER was partially destroyed. During the days that followed, strong formations of Liberators, Fortresses and Mitchells supplemented the heavy artillery concentrations directed against AA positions, buildings and installations at LOGUI, BUA BUA, McDONALD'S JUNCTION and the airfield. Many fires and explosions indicated the extent of the damage and subsequent reconnaissance confirmed the effectiveness of these attacks.

(vii) MARKHAM VALLEY-LAE: Enemy barge traffic from MADANG SE along the coast and from NEW BRITAIN to FINSCHHAFEN and thence to LAE has been particularly active during the week. So also have Allied aircraft endeavouring to make this traffic expensive for the enemy. Many sorties have been made and a large number of barges have been sunk, but there is no doubt that many have got through with supplies and probably some reinforcements for the forward areas. Our air attacks have also been directed against the coastal dumps and supply bases and enemy attempts to intercept these attacks have been determined but costly. On 2 Aug over the HUON GULF area there were at least fourteen fighters shot down.

(viii) RAMU VALLEY: In Summary 34 it was mentioned that an Australian patrol had been fired on by natives in the MARAWASA area. A correction since received makes it clear that this was actually at MATAHAUSA near WESA. There was a similar incident on 2 Aug and there were also reports that on 1 and 2 Aug twenty Japanese moved from the NE towards SHOOKS House about twelve miles SSW MARAWASA and a further ninety Japanese moved from the RAMU RIVER to SHOOKS HOUSE. The significance of enemy moves in this area has been discussed previously and this latest action provides further evidence of the intention to counter our threat to the Japanese supply line.

(ix) NE NEW GUINEA COAST: Many detailed reports have been received during the weeks of intense enemy efforts to develop this supply route. The subject has been discussed in earlier summaries and the latest sightings have proved that the Japanese are pushing ahead with this task.

/Contd.

Development of tracks and bridging of the many fast running streams is being carried out concurrently with a renewal of work on the many airfields and a pronounced increase in the barge traffic. New work has been observed on improvements to practically all the airstrips that have been previously mentioned in this area and it is almost certain that the main intention here is to provide defensive air cover for the supply route and at the same time facilitate operational defence and counter-attack should our ground forces succeed in pressing further forward in the SALAMAUA-LAE area.

(c) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

Information from this area is mainly concerned with shipping and submarine sightings. On 2 Aug photographs were taken giving full aerial coverage of SIMPSON HARBOUR. Interpretation shows that the concentration there comprised:-

2 heavy cruisers	1 light cruiser
3 destroyers	4 submarine chasers
3 submarines	2 minesweepers
2 gunboats	1 submarine tender

1 converted destroyer tender
15 merchant vessels totalling 39,600 tons.
There were also 17 coasters and sea tracks of 1000 tons and less;besides 277 barges, luggers and lighters.

The tonnage of merchant vessels is very much less than usually sighted at RABAUL although this is the first full coverage for a number of weeks. However the volume of shipping sighted during the week running between RABAUL and NEW GUINEA, the SOLOMONS, and to Northern bases suggests that there has been very little if any decline in the tonnage committed to supply in the South. Rather should it be said that the sightings prove that the Japanese are making full use for operational requirements of the tonnage available.

On 2 Aug Allied aircraft made a strong attack against barges and installations at GASMATA. AA positions were silenced and there were many hits on the airfield besides the damage done to barges. An enemy destroyer was severely damaged by an Allied aircraft about sixty miles SE by South of GASMATA. On 3 Aug nine Mitchells bombed and strafed barges, stores and supply dumps in BORGEN BAY. There were many explosions and at least eight barges were destroyed and many more damaged. There were a number of other air attacks mainly against barge traffic in the area during the week, and the largest of these have been reported in 2 Aust Corps Daily Operations Reports.

(d) SOLOMON ISLANDS:

(i) BOUGAINVILLE: The heavy air offensive has been maintained in this area. Twenty-one Liberators, escorted by thirty-two fighters, caused considerable damage at KAHILI airfield on 1 Aug. Another strong attack in the same area on the same day set afire one large transport and sunk eight barges. A tanker was also hit. On 4 Aug sixteen Corsairs strafed floatplanes, barges and installations around the SHORTLAND ISLANDS. They succeeded in destroying seven floatplanes, setting on fire two barges, sinking a small boat and starting eight fires in the docks. Of thirty fighters which intercepted in this area, eight were destroyed on 5 Aug besides two floatplanes strafed on the water.

(ii) GANONGGA: On the night 5/6 Aug two Catalinas bombed barges in WILSONS STRAIT. One barge was destroyed. Light Allied surface units attacked a small cargo vessel in VELLA GULF with unknown results. On 7 Aug without damage or casualties to themselves an Allied naval force sank three enemy vessels including a cruiser in VELLA GULF. A fourth vessel was probably sunk.

/Contd

(iii) KOLOMBANGARA: Allied air attacks were made throughout the week mainly against enemy installations at VILA and against the supply area and barges around VOVOHE COVE. Severe damage was caused at both targets. On the night 4/5 Aug light surface units sank a 100-foot vessel South of VANGA VANGA.

(iv) NEW GEORGIA: Powerful air support has been given to our ground forces in their steady advance on MUNDA airfield. In spite of the tremendous weight of bombs dropped almost daily amongst their gun positions and supply dumps, the enemy continued a determined resistance from pill boxes and entrenchments until 4 Aug when Allied troops with tanks in support, broke through the defensive lines and practically surrounded the garrison. By the next day MUNDA airfield was under our control and mopping up was continuing to the North. It would seem that our forces in NEW GEORGIA had to overcome the sort of resistance that the Japanese put up in the BUNA-SANANANDA area and more recently on ATTU ISLAND. The fact that 1671 dead were counted and only twenty-eight prisoners taken is some indication of the almost fatalistic determination with which the Japanese resolve to kill and die when their position is hopeless.

A particularly interesting aspect of the battle which culminated in the capture of MUNDA is the reticence that the enemy showed in the air after his initial disasters. In spite of having available in the immediate area over 100 fighters and thirty-six bombers besides the facilities for reinforcing them quickly from the North, the Japanese have made few serious attempts to employ these aircraft offensively. An explanation may be that the enemy have disposed forward a large proportion of their available air strength and that they have not behind it, the reinforcements to make up for heavy losses, nor the reserves to throw into any threatened area that may or may not be far removed from the SOLOMONS. On the other hand their shipping losses have also been relatively heavy, but except that they have kept their capital ships out of the battle area, there is no indication of a similar fear as regards destroyers and supply ships.

(v) RENDOVA: On 1 Aug an unstated number of enemy aircraft made three attacks on our positions. Results have not been reported except that four of the attacking aircraft were destroyed. On 4 Aug Allied aircraft which intercepted fourteen to eighteen enemy fighters, destroyed twelve for certain.

(vi) YSABEL: On 4 Aug it was reported that the enemy were observed extending and strengthening their defences at REKATA BAY. Nine Liberators bombed this area on 5 Aug and the next day AA positions, supply areas and bivouacs were bombed and strafed by a force composed of seven Fortresses, seventeen Liberators, twenty-four Mitchells, thirteen Avengers, twenty-five Dauntlesses, and thirty-five Corsairs. All AA positions were silenced and there were many hits in the target area.

(e) NW SECTOR:

Sightings in the area generally point to normal shipping supply traffic whilst ground activity is mainly concerned with development of defences in TIMOR and improvement of the air strips.

Targets for light Allied bombing raids during the period under review included KEAUWA on 2 Aug where an elaborate ground defence system has been mentioned; KAUKENAU where a merchant vessel was damaged on 6 Aug; MANOKWARI which was bombed by two Liberators on 3 Aug; SERAROE where the villages were bombed and strafed by three Mitchells and the landing strip was attacked on 4 Aug; LAUTEM which was bombed by six Mitchells on 5 Aug and by two Mitchells on 8 Aug; CAPE CHATER where the airfield was bombed by two Mitchells on 8 Aug; PENFOEI where bombs were dropped by seven Hudsons on 8 Aug; and LAHA in AMBOINA where six Liberators made an attack on 6 Aug.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops 368-373; AAF Weekly Int Review 52; FAA Int Sum 65; NGF Daily Infm Sum 83-85; AAF Int Sum 124-125; NEA Daily Sum 654-661.)

PART 2 : ENEMY

(a) ORDER OF BATTLE:- Air

Estimated enemy land-based air strength as at 30 Jul 43.

AREAS	F	L/B & MB	S/EB	F/B	F/F	Sundry	Total	23 Jul 43.
New Britain	71	105		4	9	13	202	189
New Ireland		18	11		2		31	37
New Guinea	59	75			5		139	180
Solomons	110	18	18	2	38		186	136
Timor	23	21					49	49
Ambon	5	9		3	7		24	24
Aroe & Kai Is	8	3			13		24	18
Dutch NG	9						9	9
Celebes	28	25			9	27	87	87
Java-Bali	50	75	12	9	24	18	186	186
	368	345	41	18	107	58	937	915

(AAF Int Sum 125)

(b) ORGANISATION:

(i) 115 Infantry Regiment: It appears that survivors are organised into at least three companies under command of 102 Infantry Regiment. Identifications of 2 Company and 3 Company 115 Infantry Regiment have been secured.

(ii) 102 Infantry Regiment Reinforcement Unit: Commanding Officer Colonel HARUOKA Yasuhei (ex 102 Infantry Regiment) Battalion Commander Major SHIMOHURA Mikutaro (ex 2 Battalion 102 Infantry Regiment).
Battalion Commander (*) Major TAMURA Tsunehito (ex 3 Battalion 102 Infantry Regiment, to exchange with Major OBA).

Nothing further is known, but the possibility that this represents a reinforcement group of substantial size must be considered.

(*) Probably killed at NASSAU BAY.

(iii) 144 Replacement Regiment: Known to exist at RABAUL 22 May 43. Believed available to 51 Division as reinforcements, but no other details known. (144 Regiment was decimated at BUNA).

(iv) "TAMURA" Company - 2 Transport Company: Under Command of 1st Lieut TAMURA (known to be a Company Commander of 66 Infantry Regiment) this recently identified organisation was principally engaged during Jun as a food and ammunition transport Company between SALAMAUA and MUBO. It was also used as a labour unit, and on one occasion was allotted the role of "mopping up unit". Although serving other battalions and Regimental Headquarters of 66 Infantry Regiment, it seems to have been allotted mainly to 1 Battalion.

(FEA Int Sum 64)

(c) EQUIPMENT:

(i) Japanese Optical Instruments

Attached as Appx "A" are details and characteristics of :- 10 cm Anti Aircraft Benoculars Model 1929 and Japanese Three Power Telescope (Tripod Mounted).

/Contd.

(ii) Japanese aircraft available for operations in the SOLOMONS.

With reference to comment on lack of enemy air offensive in the SOLOMONS (Part 1(d) (iv), the following extract from Allied Air Forces Intelligence Summary 120 of 14 Jul 43, appears relevant:-

> "When faced with the imminent loss of one of their outlying airfields and their advanced positions in the mid-SOLOMONS, the Japanese were forced to draw heavily on their plane resources in their effort to meet the threat. At least 200 enemy planes were used in attacks between 30 Jun and 5 Jul against our shipping and new positions in the NEW GEORGIA area, and at least 134 of these aircraft are reported as shot down. This aerial defensive on the part of the Japanese was interesting because of the variety of planes used and the indications that the enemy resources were strained to keep up a sustained attack."

PART 3 : TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) The following is an addition to the Status of Enemy Airfields to 14 Jul 43 attached as Appx "B" to 2 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary 34. -

HOEMA Is (CELEBES) Reconnaissance aircraft reported on 16 Jul having sighted a finished surfaced strip near the town of WALINGKOE. WALINGKOE is situated on the extreme South coast of HOEMA Island on the East side of LASONGKO. One informant with local knowledge has remarked that there are plenty of spots suitable for landing ground construction on the island. Considerable significance is attached to the fact that HOEMA was included in the recently captured Japanese list of aerodromes.

(b) Index to further place names appearing in this Summary

			Long		Lat	
			Deg	Min	Deg	Min
ATTU	ISLAND	ALEUTIAN Is	172	45	52	47
COCONUTS	AREA	NG	147	01	07	06
GANONGGA	ISLAND	SOLOMON IS	156	35	08	05
KEAUKWA	VILLAGE	DNG	136	32	04	45
KIRIWINA	ISLAND	TROBRIAND IS	151	04	08	31
LAHA	DRONE	AMBOINA	128	06	05	42
MATAHAUSA	VILLAGE	NG	145	40	05	54
OLD VICKERS	VILLAGE	NG	147	01	07	07
SELAROE	ISLAND	TANIMBAR IS	130	50	08	15
SUGARCANE RIDGE		NG	147	00	07	09
VANGA VANGA	VILLAGE	KOLOMBANGARA	156	58	08	05
VELLA	GULF	NEW GEORGIA GP	156	51	07	51
WILSONS	STRAIT	SOLOMON IS	156	37	07	58
YSABEL	ISLAND	SOLOMON IS	159	16	08	05

PART 4 : SECURITY

CENSORSHIP:

Responsibility for Unit Censor Stamps -

Several instances of the unauthorised use of Unit Censor stamps have been reported recently. In particular the impression of the censor stamp on blank telegram forms has been noted at several civilian post offices. This is one of the most serious breaches of censorship as it opens up channels for the leakage of vital information by the quickest means available.

The responsibility of unit censors is set out in LHQ FCI No.4 para 26 (c) as follows -

/Contd.

"Unit Censor Stamps" shall not leave the possession of, or be impressed on any paper or envelope by any person other than the officers sepcifically detailed by COs to hold and use the same and those officers shall only use such stamps in the strictest conformity with these instructions.

SECURITY:

The following extract has been taken from a translation of a Japanese Operation Order captured recently in the NE GUINEA Area :-

"All units to leave the present location will thoroughly consider counter intelligence and will burn every scrap of paper or documents and must destroy all articles so that they will be of NO use to the enemy. It is expected that this will be done in an orderly manner and that the withdrawal should be executed without panic so that nothing will remain to sully the military renown of the Imperial troops."

The fact that this extract is reprinted here, shows that one Japanese soldier was, fortunately for the Allies, foolish enough to disregard this order and thereby "sullied the military renown of the Imperial troops."

Whilst Allied Intelligence is thankful for the type of Japanese soldier that disregards such orders, it is important that our own troops should not do the same. All ranks should take every precaution to ensure that they are NOT responsible for giving the Japanese an opportunity to reprint in their Intelligence Summaries similar Allied instructions, Operation Orders, official documents and even personal papers must NOT be carried into action.

(AIF Weekly Int Review 52)

FIELD SECURITY IN OPERATIONS:

The following is an extract from a GHQ PERSIA and IRAQ Force Security Summary.

For the period ending 23 Mar 43, 2100 prisoners, both German and Italians, were searched and identified for intelligence purposes by FS personnel. The officers were first separated from the men and then the senior NCOs were requested to reform the rank into their various units. By convincing the prisoners that this course was necessary in the ordinary sequence in passing them through, they gave every assistance. The proceedings were conducted in drill formation, and correct orders for marching and counting were insisted upon. Each separate unit fell in on its own marker in order before counting. The result wa complete identification being ensured for the Intelligence Officer's information. A further precaution to avoid mistakes was to request the senior enemy NCOs to write down the numbers with the correct name, number, etc of units concerned, plus branch of service.

In this way the prisoners, particularly the GERMANS, gave all necessary information as a matter of routine without their suspicions being aroused as to the subsequent intelligence value of their co-operation.

(AIF Weekly Int Review 52)

SECURITY OF INFORMATION - MUBO AREA:

A recent report indicates that security precautions adopted during recent operations in this area were well conceived and efficiently implemented.

These precautions included:-

(a) The collection and placing in safe custody of all personal diaries and papers;

(b) the destruction by fire of other papers and maps;

(c) the delivery of mail to personnel by officers and NCOs on the morning of the first day of the attack was followed by the collection of burning of all envelopes;

(d) personal reports to OC Company that (a), (b) and (c) above had been carried out;

(e) maps were not marked;

(f) no written operation orders were issued and no written notes were taken at the briefing.

(AWF Int Review 51)

[illegible] Capt
Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Distribution:

6 Aust Div	1-21	CE	45
2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	22	CSO	46
2/9 Aust Cav Regt	23	DA&QMG	47
HQ RAA	24-28	A	48
HQ RAE	29	Q	49
Sigs A Aust Corps	30	DDMS	50
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Col	31	DDST	51
18 Aust Fd Amb	32	DDOS	52
104 Aust CCS	33	ADME	53
106 Aust CCS	34	First Aust Army	54
109 Aust CCS	35	York Force	55
5 A/C Sqn	36	C'Land L of C Area	56
GCC	37	17 L of C Sub-Area	57
BGS	38	11/20 Sqn Gp H 821 RAAF	58
G(O)	39	Naval Staff Officer	59
G(I)	40- 42	War Diary	6061
LOs	43	File	62-63
CCRA	44		

APPENDIX "A"
To 2 AUST CORPS
Int Sum 56
DATED 9 AUG 1943

JAPANESE OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS

The following details and characteristics were obtained from 3 Ordnance Intelligence Section USAFFE -

10cm ANTI-AIRCRAFT BINOCULARS MODEL 1929

DESCRIPTION:

The Japanese 10cm anti-aircraft binoculars, Model 1929 are fifteen power spotting binoculars equipped for a cradle and tripod mounting.

The field lenses are ten centimetres in diameter and have a four degree field of view.

The instrument is equipped with open sights, diopter adjustments, interpupillary adjustments and an elevation adjustment and scale graduated in degrees.

The right optical train of the binoculars contains a calibrated reticle which may be artificially illuminated.

The instrument is designed for locating, spotting and tracking aircraft and spotting anti-aircraft bursts.

CONSTRUCTION:

These binoculars are essentially two separate telescopes, with individual adjustments, mounted in a substantial aluminium case, which is provided with lugs to support the unit on its mount. The case is fitted with four separate body supports ensuring rigidity. A "V", and an inverted "V" type of open sights are mounted on the right telescope to facilitate quick adjustment of the instrument on moving objects.

An elevation arc graduated from minus ten degrees to plus ninety degrees is fitted to the right side of the telescope.

The eye-pieces are provided with soft pliable rubber shields which fit snugly into a recess in the frame around the eye lenses.

Focal adjustments are made at the eye-piece only, where diopter adjustment may be made from plus two to minus four on the diopter adjustment scales.

Interpupillary adjustments may be made for the eye-piece lenses by rotating the segments just below the adjustment ring.

The interpupillary scale is graduated from sixty to seventy-two millimetres.

The right telescope contains a reticle calibrated from zero to thirty mils and reads from centre to outside in both vertical and horizontal planes.

The reticle is graduated in five mil increments and is numbered at each ten mil interval. A photograph of this instrument appears as Photographic Appendix "E".

JAPANESE THREE POWER TELESCOPE (TRIPOD MOUNTED)

DESCRIPTION:

The Japanese three power telescope consists of a turret head telescope, an all-round traverse scale and mounting a tripod and carrying case. The turret head permits the selection of three powers. The thirty-three power eye-piece is used for long range observation on clear days, the twenty-four power eye-piece is used for normal clear days and a third eye-piece, missing from the instrument examined, is thought to be of lower power for use on dark and cloudy days. It is believed that the telescope is used for spotting artillery bursts. The telescope may be oriented and moved in both traverse and elevation. Both movements are measured on scales provided on the mounting.

INSTRUMENT PROPER:

The telescope is of the prismatic type with an objective lens eighty-three millimetres in diameter.

THIRTY-THREE POWER EYE-PIECE:

This eye-piece and train contains no reticle. The eye-piece housing is equipped with a diopter scale adjustment graduated from minus ten to plus ten in single units.

TWENTY-FOUR POWER EYE-PIECE:

This eye-piece contains a reticle marked horizontally and vertically. Near the centre, the cross lines become very fine for a length of approximately one-sixteenth of an inch. They then discontinue at the centre leaving a small area free of cross lines. The reticle does not have numerical graduations. This eye-piece also has a diopter scale and adjustment graduated from plus seven and one half to minus seven and one half in single units.

REMARKS:


This instrument is without a means of fine vertical adjustment, although such adjustment seems very essential since spirit level tubes and attachment for a plumb bob are already provided on the instrument.

A photograph of this instrument appears as Photographic Appendix "E".

APPENDIX 'E'
To 2 AUST CORPS
~~APPENDIX B(1)~~ 16
DATED 9 AUG 43

JAPANESE OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS


JAPANESE 10 CM A/A BINOCULARS MODEL 1929



KEY TO ANNOTATIONS

1. OBJECTIVE LENSES
2. BODY
3. BODY SUPPORTS
4. OPEN SIGHTS
5. NAME PLATE
6. LEFT LUG
7. RIGHT LUG
8. CALIBRATED ELEVATION SCALE
9. INDICATOR ARM
10. ELEVATION LOCKING WHEEL
11. FOCUSSING SCALE
12. LIGHTING WINDOW
13. DIOPTER ADJUSTERS
14. EYE LENSES
15. EYE SHIELDS
16. PRISM PLUGS


JAPANESE THREE POWER TELESCOPE (TRIPOD MOUNTED)



KEY TO ANNOTATIONS

1. 33 POWER EYE PIECE
2. 24 POWER EYE PIECE
3. EYE PIECE MOUNTING
4. TURRET HEAD
5. PRISM HOUSING
6. TELESCOPE HOUSING
7. OBJECTIVE LENS
8. ELEVATION POINTER
9. ELEVATION SCALE
10. LOCKING GEAR
11. TRAVERSE LOCKING GEAR
12. TRIPOD HEAD
13. TRAVERSE SCALE

TURRET HEAD



GSI(a) ADV LHQ 30 JUL 43

MESSAGE OUT.

TO: first aust army; 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 18 aust inf bde, 2 aust corps reception camp, CAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON.

FROM: 2 aust corps O 1097 9

SECRET	location	report	363		
adv	HQ	6	aust	div	WONDECLA
to	TRINITY	BEACH	ref	CAIRNS	one
inch	651859	9	aust	div	
departures		11	aust	tk	a
bty	2/4	aust	indep	coy	2/13
aust	fd	coy	2/2	aust	LG
bn	2/3	aust	CCS	2/3	AMCU
det	15	ord	store	coy	2/122
aust	bde	ord	fd	pk	and
wkshops	2/123	aust	bde	wkshops	9
aust	div	salvage	unit	and	remainder
cf	following	2/6	aust	sup	depot
coy	2/156	aust	gen	tpt	coy
9	div	carr	coy		all
informed					

TOO 2150

IMPORTANT-First Aust Army
D R L S - remainder.

Copies: A
Int
Sigs
CSO
Q (2)
War Diary (2)
File
Roneo
B/B.

Secret
please.

A/Asst 283

MESSAGE OUT.

CALL AND INSTRUC-TIONS.	IN / OUT

TO: [illegible] aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 18 aust inf bde, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOC.[illegible], sig centre ATT[illegible]
FROM: 2 aust corps o.1096 8

[illegible]	.	location	report	362	.
7	aust	div	departures	.	HQ.
13	aust	inf	bde	less	det
sig	sec	2/47	aust	LAD	6
pl	2/1	aust	HQ	gd	bn
2/1	aust	dental	unit	less	D
and	E	secs	2/10	aust	inf
bn	2/6	aust	fd	amb	and
remainder	of	2/42	aust	cipher	sec
pro	coy	postal	unit	fd	cash
office	.	9	aust	div	departures
HQ	24	aust	inf	bde	sig
sec	2/76	aust	LAD	2/43	aust
inf	bn	2	pl	2/1	aust
HQ	gd	bn	remainder	postal	unit
.	all	informed			

Secret Means. IMPORTANT PRIORITY TOO: 1720
AUST ADM-DRIS
REMAINDER

COPIES: A 2(2) B/B
Int Capt an Diary (2)
Sigs File
CSC Roneo

Appendix 252

MESSAGE OUT.

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 18 aust inf bde, 2 aust corps reception camp LOCARNS, sig centre ATHERTON.

FROM: 2 aust corps O 1095 7

SECRET		location	report	361	
lt	sec	109	CCS	RAVENSHOE	to
WONDECLA	B	pl	8	aust	MAC
RAVENSHOE	to	EAST	BARRON	rejoins	unit
C	sqn	2/9	aust	armd	regt
and	det	wkshop	TULOULIN	to	WONDECLA
ref	HERBERTON	one	inch	325078	2/7
aust	fd	amb	arrived	WONDECLA	
2/9	aust	inf	bn	departed	
9	aust	div	departures		one
fd	sec	3	aust	svy	bty
2/32	aust	inf	bn	2/118	aust
bde	wkshop	and	ord	fd	pk
remainder	2/4	aust	lt	a a	regt
with	wkshop	sig	sec	also	2/43
aust	cipher	sec		all	informed

except means. Lt General Sturdee

IMPORTANT - First Aust Army TOO
D R L S - others.

17/3

Copies: A
Int
Sigs
CSO
G (2)
War Diary (2)
File
Roneo
B/B.

Appendix 281

MESSAGE OUT.

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 18 aust inf bde, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCAL, sig centre ATHERTON

FROM: 2 aust corps O 1092 6

SECRET . location report 360

. main body 2 aust

corps postal unit arrived BARRIER

. 2/2 aust fd coy

TONDON . to LITTLE HULGRAVE ref

GOODWILL one inch 704410 .

9 aust div salvage unit

KILL to BODLYNCH . all

informed

Secret Priority

Wireless Telegraphy TOO 1930.

REPEATED - First Aust Army
D R L S - others.

Copies: A
Int
Sigs
G-3O
(2)
War Diary (2)
File
Roneo
B/B

TO : Distribution List B.

FRO : "G" SD779 5

Lecture to offrs on ALARM

ops will be given by BOS at

EDUCATION HUT on 10 and

11 Aug at 1115 hrs

. Lecture in two parts

each one hr duration .

As many as possible to

attend

R A Bowie Orderly TOO: 1526

THI:

Appendix 79

MESSAGE OUT.

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 18 aust inf bde,
2 aust corps reception camp, LOGAIRE, sig centre ATHERTON.

FROM: 2 aust corps 0 1091 5

SECRET location report 359
2/5 aust indep coy arrived WONGABEL
2/16 aust inf bn departed
following 9 aust div units
departed KILI aust to ADLYNCH
rear HQ div pk
2/118 aust bde ord fd aust.
2/5 dental unit 9 to
div aust second aust
DLD reception LILO GELLY 11 fd
tk a btry 2/24 aust 2/29
pk coy 2/72 aust LAD all
aust camflg trg unit
informed

Secret message to Commanding Corps

DISPOSAL - First Aust Army. TOC 175
D R L S - others.

Copies: 1
Int
Sigs
CSO
G (2)
War Diary
File
Romeo
B/3

MESSAGE CUT.

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 18 aust inf bde, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCARNS, sig centre ATHERTON.

FROM: 2 aust corps 0 1090 4

SECRET . location report 558 . 7
aust div departures . 2/5 aust fd
coy 2/27 aust inf bn remainder HQ
21 aust inf bde . 9 aust
div . 2/132 2/133 aust bde ord
fd pk and wkshop arrived REDLYNCH
following moved to DEAD LINES GULLY 9
aust div postal unit 2/2 aust HQ
bn 2/4 aust indep coy 2/3 aust
CCS . following departed . main body less det
HQ 9 aust div 2/11 aust fd
amb div pro coy div fd cash
office 2/3 aust pnr bn 2/5 aust
fd amb 2/3 aust lt a a bty
2/28 aust mr bn . all informed

Secret Means Confidential Cap.

IMPORTANT - First Aust Army
D R L S - remainder. TOO 103.

Copies: A
INT
SIGS
CSO
Q (2)
WAR DIARY (2)
File
Roneo
B/B.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

Apx 4 277

2 Aust Corps (AIF)
4 Aug 43.
G 3307.

Subject: Visits to Formations and Units.

Distribution: List B.

1. The altered composition of 2 Aust Corps has made it necessary to control the visits of officers to the formations and units of the Corps, to prevent these formations and units being swamped by a spate of visiting officers.

2. The following order will apply until further notice, and will be brought to the knowledge of all officers of this HQ, and by the branch or service concerned, to visiting officers from other formations:

Staff Officers and officers of branches and services of this HQ will not visit formations and units under command 2 Aust Corps without prior reference to, and the approval of the senior G or A officer.

This order applies also to visits to formations and units of this Corps training in the CAIRNS area.

The same restrictions will apply to visits by officers from HQs and formations outside 2 Aust Corps. Officers of this HQ will not accompany such visiting officers without obtaining prior approval.

H. Wells.

Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Appendix 276

MESSAGE FORM:

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS — IN / OUT

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 18 aust inf bde, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCAIRNS, sig centre ATHERTON.
FROM: 2 aust corps o.1089 3

SECRET	.	location	report	357	.
E	sec	2/8	aust	dental	unit
to	HQ	5	aust	svy	coy
INNISFAIL	E	and	F	secs	79
aust	dental	unit	att	17	L
of	C	CAIRNS	C	sec	2/4
aust	dental	unit	CAIRNS	to	BARRINE
.	7	aust	div	.	2/14
aust	inf	bn	departed	.	9
aust	div	.	following	from	KAIRI
to	DEAD	MANS	GULLY	.	HQ
24	aust	inf	bde	sig	sec
2/76	aust	LAD	23	bty	2/12
aust	fd	regt	2/28	2/32	2/48
aust	inf	bns	2	pl	9
aust	div	carr	coy	2	pl
2/1	aust	HQ	gd	bn	28
aust	sup	depot	pl	B	pl
2/156	aust	gen	tpt	coy	2/3
aust	fd	amb	.	following departed	
.	2/48	aust	inf	bn	12
bty	2/4	lt	AA	regt	23
bty	2/12	fd	regt	B	sec
FSW	HQ	RAE	HQ	comd	AASC
2/6	aust	sup	depot	coy	less
two	pls	HQ	div	carr	coy
det	sigs	2/67	LAD	A	coy
2/1	aust	HQ	gd	bn	less
1	2	and	4	pls	.
3	aust	svy	bty	less	two
fd	secs	arrived	KAIRI	located	ref
GORDONVALE	one	inch	476377	.	all
informed					

Lieut Col Commanding Signals 6 Aust Div

IMPORTANT: FIRST AUST ARMY ONLY. DRS: REMAINDER.

TOO: 0040

Copies: A, Int, Sigs, CSO, Q(2), War Diary (2), File, Roneo, B/B,

Appendix 275

SECRET.

2 Aust Corps O O No 10.

Copy No 16
2 Aug 43.

1. This order will be read in conjunction with 2 Aust Corps O O No 9 of 27 Jul 43.

2. In the event of the emergency envisaged arising, 2 Aust Corps will:

(a) Place 12 Aust Tk A bty under comd 6 Aust Div. 6 Aust Div may deal direct with 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt for operational planning concerning the defence of the MAREEBA Airfield.

(b) Make available to 6 Aust Div forty miles of D8 cable, and ten miles of D3 cable for communications with HQ AIRFIELD DEFENCE FORCE.

(c) Provide transport as required by 6 Aust Div to assist in the move of 2/4 Aust Pnr Bn Gp and 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp.

3. The state of emergency will be notified by this HQ when it is considered advisable to implement the defence plan.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

C J Wade Major
for Brig,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

Signed at 1700 hrs
Issued through Sigs.

Distribution.	Copy No
6 Aust Div	1
9 Aust Div	2
YORKFORCE	3
HQ 17 L of C Sub-Area	4
Comd MAREEBA RAAF Station	5
Comd	6
CCRA	7-8 (copy for 12 Aust Tk A Bty)
CE	9
CSO	10
Q	11
S & T	12
Medical	13
File	14
War Diary	15-16.

SECRET

Copy 86

GSI

HQ 2 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 34

Compiled from information received
From 1200 hrs 26 Jul to 1200 hrs 2 Aug 43

1. Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Comds.

2. A receipt is not required, but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue. These summaries will not be issued regularly.

3. All dates and times are Eastern Australian Standard Time.

PART 1 : OPERATIONS
For index to place names see PART 3 (b) TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) AUSTRALIA:

There are indications of an enemy submarine operating off TOWNSVILLE and there may be another one off CAPE YORK.

(b) NEW GUINEA:

(i) TROBRIAND ISLANDS: On 26 Jul three unidentified aircraft were over the area. Probably they were enemy aircraft on reconnaissance. The next day a large aircraft dropped four bombs on a dump at WOODLARK ISLAND.

(ii) NASSAU BAY: On 26 Jul enemy bombers attacked our positions in the Bay but details have not been reported.

(iii) TAMBU BAY: Contact had been made with the enemy on the high ground between TAMBU BAY and DOT INLET on 21 Jul. During the following few days, fighting in this sector was confined to artillery exchanges. On 25 Jul further allied troops were landed in TAMBU BAY. On the same day three enemy dive bombers ineffectually attacked allied artillery positions.

On 25 Jul American troops moved West from TAMBU BAY to the NUK NUK track. A party moved South to contact Australian troops in the MT TAMBU Area while another party moved NE along the ridge and after encountering slight opposition, established ambush positions by 27 Jul near the NUK NUK track one mile West and one mile WNW of BUIAMBUN. On 26 Jul enemy aircraft bombed and strafed our positions around SALUS.

On 27 Jul strong artillery support was given to assist our troops attacking the Japanese on the ridge North of the Bay. In this attack heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy and our troops succeeded in establishing positions on the ridge. Counter-attacks by the Japanese on succeeding days were repulsed. Artillery exchanges continued during 29 and 30 Jul and an attack by two enemy dive bombers caused no damage or casualties.

(iv) MT TAMBU-GOODVIEW JUNCTION: Fighting in this area resulted in severe casualties to the enemy. Our attacks strongly supported by artillery were successful by 25 Jul, when allied troops were reported re-grouping near the summit. On 26 Jul an Australian patrol from MT TAMBU moved round to make contact with allied forces from TAMBU BAY. Contact appears to have been made on 27 Jul near the track one and a quarter miles West of BOISI.

Although on 27 Jul there was a report that the enemy was continuing to strengthen his positions in the MT TAMBU Area, it would appear that the allied troops were firmly established near the summit of the mountain and along the track leading NE to NUK NUK.

/Contd.

PART 1 (b) (iv) Con'd. SECRET

Apparently the Japanese are still holding out at GOODVIEW JUNCTION and in a position 700 yards SW of the Junction, at both of which points strong defensive positions have been established, but in view of the success of our operations against key points in the track system, the strength of these defences now depends on a precarious line of communication.

(v) ORODUBI-KOMIATUM: In this sector there has been no great change during the week except that between 24 and 27 Jul Australian troops attacked and occupied the enemy defensive positions reported to have been established on 23 Jul on a ridge 500 yards SE NAMLING. This attack was supported by allied artillery from TAMBU BAY. Indirect support was given when eighteen Liberators accurately bombed KOMIATUM on 26 Jul. During subsequent days, and particularly on 29 and 30 Jul, allied artillery brought fire to bear on enemy positions in the area including KOMIATUM.

An attack by our troops on 29 Jul against the enemy position 600 yards NE ORODUBI gained some ground and our forces are now in a strong position overlooking the enemy in this sector.

(vi) BOBDUBI: Our patrol activity in this area has been directed to disruption of the supply system and in some instances has succeeded in establishing standing patrols and ambush positions at key points and isolating pockets of enemy resistance.

On 26 Jul Allied artillery from TAMBU BAY fired on the enemy MG position three quarters of a mile SW OLD BOBDUBI which has held out against many attacks. Following this preparation our troops attacked and by 28 Jul had occupied the position. The enemy defences were found to consist of a network of pill-boxes, fox holes and trenches with three-foot overhead cover. The position was capable of holding 120 Japanese. As a result of our successful attack the enemy suffered many casualties and considerable equipment was captured. The enemy defences have now shifted to the COCONUTS position about 500 yards SSW OLD BOBDUBI. On 30 Jul our troops attacking were within twenty yards of this position but enemy attacks the next day caused a slight withdrawal of our forward troops. Two enemy dive bombers attacked our positions on 30 Jul without causing any damage or casualties.

(vii) SALAMAUA: Main interest in this sector attaches to the concentrated Allied bombing attacks carried out on 26, 27 and 29 Jul. The last mentioned attack was made by eighteen Mitchells, twelve Fortresses and twelve Liberators. The earlier raids were on a similar scale. Many fires and explosions were observed and vast damage is considered to have been done as a result of the raids.

On 27 Jul and each succeeding day Allied artillery shelled SALAMAUA directed by an OP established at GWAIBALON.

(viii) MALOLO-BUANG RIVER: On 19 Jul it appears that the enemy exploded some of our booby traps and there were signs that they had suffered some casualties as a result. One of our patrols contacted the enemy on 23 Jul in a strong position with six MGs beside the BUANG RIVER about five and a half miles from its mouth. An enemy attempt to outflank our troops was unsuccessful. Our patrol withdrew.

(ix) MARKHAM VALLEY-LAE: Allied air attacks were made against barges and other supply facilities during the week. As a result of the attack by six Marauders on 27 Jul there were fires and explosions amongst barges, jetties and supply dumps.

On 28 Jul it was reported that light Allied surface vessels operating during the previous night in the HANISCH HARBOUR area destroyed four loaded barges about forty miles East by North of LAE.

(x) BENA BENA PLATEAU: In Summary 32 of 21 Jul it was mentioned that an enemy patrol had reached the KAINANTU area. On 26 Jul it has been reported that this force had turned back.

/Contd.

It is very likely that their task was reconnaissance of our activity on the BENA BENA Plateau and linked with the intense enemy track development in the RAMU VALLEY. This is just one more indication that the potentialities of the Plateau as a menace to the WEWAK-MADANG-LAE supply system are fully appreciated by the Japanese.

There were a number of reports of enemy aerial reconnaissance covering BENA BENA and GAROKA. Attacks were made on 24 Jul against BENA BENA but no details have been recorded beyond the fact that seven bombers and ten fighters participated in one attack and one bomber in the other. On 30 Jul six medium bombers escorted by nineteen fighters bombed and strafed GAROKA Airfield. Eighteen bombs were dropped on the North end of the strip. There were no casualties.

The hostility of the RAMU VALLEY natives to our patrols has been mentioned in earlier Intelligence Summaries. Japanese propaganda has been singularly effective and resulted in native attacks against our troops on 30 Jul. An Australian patrol was fired on by natives in the MARAWASA Area. Our patrol base buildings and stores in the vicinity of SIRIMDU were destroyed

(xi) HE NEW GUINEA COAST: There were a number of sorties made by Allied aircraft during the period under review against enemy barges and barge hide-outs and native villages along the coast running SE from FINSCHHAFEN. Light Allied surface units have also been operating and on 29 Jul they achieved some success against barges in VITIAZ STRAIT.

There have been reports of increased shipping using HANSA BAY and this is linked with the intensity of the enemy constructional work on the road MADANG-BOGADJIM-MABALUKE. A brief resume of the work that has been done by the Japanese, since they occupied HANSA BAY in the middle of Mar, may not be out of place since in this coastal area, and the overland link-up, runs the lifeline that keeps the Japanese forward troops at SALAMAUA reinforced and supplied.

On about 17 Mar 43 "HANSA Detachment" established a minor base apparently for the purpose of staging troops and supplies on the barge route between WEWAK and MADANG. Subsequently the Bay was developed as a supply base for forward areas. Several wharves and jetties were built, heavy AA batteries were established in the plantations around the Bay, and on 23 Mar it was reported that an air strip was being developed at NUBIA. So rapid was progress with the strip that on 9 Apr there were indications that it was in use. Since that time only occasional use has been made of it and that usually to provide fighter cover for ships unloading at HANSA BAY where the many barges in use and abundant labour available facilitate a quick turn-around.

To increase the flow of supplies to forward bases at MADANG and LAE the enemy began to develop a coastal road which has since been completed to MADANG, BOGADJIM and MABALUKE. Most recent information indicates that the road from HANSA BAY through MADANG to YAULA is in heavy use by motor transport and the development continues with 4,000 native labourers working under Japanese engineers. From BOGADJIM the road follows the course of the IOWORO RIVER crossing and re-crossing on well constructed bridges. Entering the rugged country near YAULA, the road follows a tortuous course over the ridges, descends to the MIMJIM which it follows until the present terminus is reached near the crest of the dividing range.

Most recent photographs show that the road to the RAMU is thirty-three miles long to a point seventeen and a half miles airline due South of BOGADJIM and only seven miles from KESAWAI. From KESAWAI to LAE the road construction will present no difficulties but five rather long and sturdy bridges will require to be constructed. These questions were dealt with in Appendix "B" to 2 Aust Corps Intelligence Report 14 of 10 Apr.

/Contd.

(d) BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO:

The Allied air offensive in this area has been mainly directed against supply vessels and barges. Many of these were destroyed and damaged during the week. Attacks were also made by strong Allied air formations against shore installations, buildings and huts at RING RING near GASMATA; on AIS ISLAND off ARAWE; REIN BAY East of CAPE GLOUCESTER and UNEA ISLAND.

Considerable enemy ground activity and transportation of supplies mainly by barge has been observed in the CAPE GLOUCESTER area. There is not sufficient information to deduce with any certainty the intention here, but a reasonable assumption is that as our troops and artillery are drawing nearer to SALAMAUA and LAE, the enemy will make a determined effort to raise the operational status of CAPE GLOUCESTER Airfield and at the same time make thorough provision for its protection from sea and air attack. There is ample evidence that the Japanese are determined to reinforce and defend SALAMAUA and LAE to the last. They have had plenty of time to prepare their defences even though they may not have expected our advance to progress as quickly as it has. Aircraft from RABAUL staging at CAPE GLOUCESTER and refuelling there would be permitted time over the target to achieve the maximum effect against our forward troops should our artillery neutralise the LAE and SALAMAUA strips.

On 28 and 29 Jul Allied aircraft made a series of heavy bombing attacks against two enemy destroyers off CAPE GLOUCESTER. Both were probably sunk and a number of intercepting aircraft were destroyed.

There has been no comprehensive report of enemy shipping in the BISMARCKS for some time, but strong destroyer and transport traffic is clearly being maintained with the SOLOMONS area.

(d) SOLOMON ISLANDS

(i) BOUGAINVILLE: Reports from this area during the week have referred to substantial shipping supply traffic and operations are confined to our own air offensive. KAHILI and BALIALE were the principal targets.

(ii) KOLOMBANGARA: VOVOHE COVE was bombed and strafed by strong formations of Mitchells on 26, 28 and 29 Jul. Fires were started in a barge hide-out and amongst buildings and trenches. Other targets on 26 Jul were the bivouac area at VILA and at SIMBO ISLAND where a warehouse and huts were hit. An exceptionally heavy bombing raid was made on installations at VILA airfield on 31 Jul.

(iii) NEW GEORGIA: Enemy installations on this island have been the targets for the biggest bombing raids so far in our theatre of war. On 24 Jul LAMBETI and MUNDA were attacked by a force consisting of twenty-three Liberators, ten Fortresses, twenty-four Mitchells, fifty-three Dauntlesses and fifty-two Avengers escorted by seventy-nine fighters. From 25 Jul to 1 Aug heavy bombing raids were continued almost daily against these targets and against BAIROKO on 30 Jul when thirty-two hits were scored on four enemy gun positions.

In spite of this weight of high explosive the enemy ground defences have permitted only slight advances by Allied troops. The fighting is bitter and the Japanese casualties must be heavy, but they are holding on with characteristic determination. The only effort by the enemy air force reported during the week was on 25 Jul when thirty dive bombers and thrity-two fighters attacked Allied positions. The effect of this raid has not been reported, but eight enemy fighters were shot down as a result of interception.

(e) DUTCH NEW GUINEA:

Reports from this area refer to normal shipping traffic observed by air reconnaissance, and several minor air attacks. A small enemy force which flew over MAPPI on 26 Jul was probably prevented from bombing MERAUKE by adverse weather conditions.

/Contd.

(f) TANIMBAR ISLANDS:

On 25 and 29 Jul villages and the strip on SELARU ISLAND were bombed and strafed by three Hudsons and six Beaufighters respectively. LARAT was bombed 26, 28 and 29 Jul. Hits were scored amongst buildings and the jetty where there were large explosions.

(g) TIMOR

Small forces of Mitchells bombed the airfields at LAUTEM and CAPE CHATER on 28 Jul. On the same day two Hudsons bombed PENFOEI and three Hudsons bombed KOMPANG. At both places explosions and fires showed that considerable damage had been done.

(h) CERAM:

On 28 Jul six Liberators bombed BOELA. There have been no details reported.

(j) SOMBA:

On 31 Jul six Liberators bombed WAINGAPOE. Severe damage was done in the town area.

(Commentary based on information contained in Landops Review 360-367; AHF Weekly Int Review 51; FAA Int Sum 64; NGF Int Sum 132; NGF Daily Infm Sum 75-82; AAF Int Sum 123; NEA Daily Sum 648-653).

PART 2 : ENEMY

(a) ORDER OF BATTLE:- Air

Estimated enemy land-based air strength as at 23 Jul 43.

AREAS	F	L/B & MB	S/EB	F/B	F/P	Sundry	Total	20 Jul 43
New Britain	57	102		4	12	14	189	175
New Ireland		18	17		2		37	37
New Guinea	100	75			5		180	155
Solomons	78	18	12	2	26		136	118
Timor	28	21					49	49
Ambon	5	9		3	7		24	24
Aroe & Kai Is	8	3			7		18	18
Dutch NG	9						9	9
Celebes	28	23			9	27	87	54
Java-Bali	50	75	12	9	24	16	186	186
	363	342	41	18	92	59	915	825

(AAF Int Sum 123)

(b) EQUIPMENT:

Japanese "MEIJI 44" (1911) Carbine: Attached as Appendix "A" is a photographic reproduction of this weapon.

Characteristics:

Calibre	:	6.5mm (.256 in)
Weight	:	8.75 lb
Overall Length Bayonet folded	:	38 in
Overall Length Bayonet extended	:	51.63 in
Length of Barrel	:	19.37 in
Rifling	:	Uniform right hand
Magazine Capacity	:	5 rounds
Sights	:	400 - 2000 metres.

/Contd.

This weapon, although similar in calibre, action and dimensions, differs from the "MEIJI 38" 1905 Short Rifle reported in HQ 2 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No. 27 in the undermentioned ways :-

(a) The tapered spike type bayonet which is grooved top and bottom, is hinged to the bayonet base. The bayonet base, which also acts as a nose cap, is fitted with two bayonet standards, one at the rear (for locking bayonet in folded position) and one at the front (for locking bayonet in extended position). Attachment to the bayonet standards is by means of a spring plunger latch.

(b) The cleaning rod, instead of being housed in the forward end of stock as with the "MEIJI 38", is housed in a recess drilled in the butt of the rifle.

(c) This weapon in general appearance and workmanship is superior to any Japanese rifle previously examined.

PART 3 : TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) Attached as Appx "B" is a Status of Enemy Airfields containing information up to 14 Jul 43.

(b) Index to further place names appearing in this Summary.

			Long		Lat	
			Deg	Min	Deg	Min
AIS	ISLAND	N.BRITAIN	149	33	6	14
IOWORO	RIVER	NG	145	43	5	28
MAPPI	VILLAGE	DNG	139	24	7	07
MARAWASA	VILLAGE	NG	146	04	6	08
REIN	BAY	N.BRITAIN	149	11	5	29
RING RING	PLN	N.BRITAIN	150	21	6	17
SIMBO	ISLAND	N.GEORGIA	156	32	8	16
SIRINIBU	VILLAGE	NG	144	39	5	00
SOEMBA	ISLAND	NEI	120	00	9	40
TOWNSVILLE	TOWN	QLD	146	19	19	16
VOVOHE	COVE	KOLOMBANGARA Is	157	06	8	07
YORK	CAPE	-	142	26	10	43

Maj,
GS 2 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION:

6 Aust Div	1-20	CE	70
18 Aust Inf Bde	21-25	CSO	71
9 Aust Div	26-50	DADOS	72
2/7 Aust Cav (Commando)Regt	51	A	73
2/9 Aust Cav Regt	52	Q	74
HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	53-55	DDMS	75
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps	56	DDST	76
Sigs 2 Aust Corps	57	DDOS	77
HQ 2 Aust Corps Tpt Coln	58	ADME	78
18 Aust Fd Amb	59	First Aust Army	79
109 Aust CCS	60	York Force	80
5 A/C Sqn	61	C'land L of C Area	81
GOC	62	17 L of C Sub-Area	82
BGS	63	11/20 Sqn Gp H 321 RAAF	83
G(O)	64	Naval Staff Officer	84
G(I)	65-67	War Diary	85- 86
LOs	68	File	87- 88
CCRA	69		


APPENDIX "A"
To 2 Aust. Corps Int Summary 240
DATED 2. . . 1945


Japanese


MEIJI 44 CARBINE

6·5 mm (·256 ins)

WITH FOLDING BAYONET







KEY TO COMPONENT PARTS

1. Firing pin spring
2. Firing pin
3. Bolt cover
4. Bolt retainer and ejector screws
5. Bolt retainer latch
6. Ejector
7. Rear sight leaf retaining pin
8. Rear sight adjustable slide
9. Leaf type rear sight
10. Rear sight spring
11. Rear sight base
12. Rear sight spring screw
13. Hand guard
14. Barrel
15. Knife type front sight and guard
16. Safety knob and firing pin spring retainer
17. Stock
18. Recess in stock for cleaning rod
19. Bolt
20. Extractor
21. Receiver locking plate retaining screw
22. Recoil plate
23. Receiver
24. Barrel spacer segment
25. Front swivel band catch
26. Butt plate
27. Cleaning rod recess cover operating knob
28. Cleaning rod recess cover knob screw
29. Butt plate screws
30. Rear swivel
31. Rear swivel screws
32. Trigger guard lock plate
33. Rear trigger guard screw
34. Sear pin
35. Sear
36. Sear spring
37. Trigger pin
38. Trigger
39. Floor plate catch
40. Magazine
41. Trigger guard
42. Magazine follower
43. Forward trigger guard screw
44. Magazine follower spring
45. Floor plate
46. Lower swivel band
47. Bayonet base retaining screws
48. Bayonet base
49. Bayonet guard
50. Bayonet plunger latch
51. Bayonet
52. Rear sight base holding screw

GSI(a) ADV LHQ 23 JUL 43

APPENDIX "B"
To 2 Aust. Corps Int Summary
DATED 2 AUG 1943

SECRET

001337E

AERODROME STATUS

AS AT 14-JULY-43

SCHEDULE OF MAIN KNOWN EARLY OPERATIONAL AERODROMES AND AERODROMES UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREAS

NOTE - THIS SCHEDULE IS BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATIONS IF OTHER INTELLIGENCE IS USED THIS FACT WILL BE STATED IN THE "REMARKS" COLUMN


AERODROME	POSITION Lat. / Long.	RUNWAYS No. of	Length of (Feet)	REVETMENTS F	R	ADDITIONAL A/C PROTECTED DISP. POINTS F	A	HARD-STANDING CAPACITY F	R	MAX. NO. OF A/C SEEN ON ANY ONE DAY F	TOTAL	DATE	DEFENCES	DATE OF LAST PHOTOS	REMARKS
NEW GUINEA															
ALEXISHAFEN I.	3.00S 140.41E	1	3600'	0	0	20	10	20	5	6	0	---	None	15-Jun-43	Work continues.
ALEXISHAFEN II	3.00S 140.41E	1	3200'	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	---	None	15-Jun-43	Field still partly cleared 1 mile SE of No.1 strip. Dispersal also cleared. Work continues.
BUT	3.23S 140.12E	1	4200'	0	30	10	10	15	10	18	18	21-May-43	6H, 4L, A/A positions.	12-Jul-43	Defence later strengthened. Reinforcement continues.
BORAM	3.34S 140.40E	1	3060'	6	36	10	10	10	10	25	45	12-May-43	Included in some defence system. Dispersal area being extended. No jetty N. of field.	12-Jul-43	Dispersal area being extended. Defences being strengthened. New jetty N. of field.
DAGUA	3.26S 143.02E	1	7000'	40	39	14	10	24	20	24	47	7-Jun-43	4L A/A positions.	25-Jun-43	Dispersal areas being extended. No irrigated runway - "Dak" serviceable. New jetty near N. end of field.
LAE	6.43S 146.44E	1	4000'	23	0	20	10	106	50	21	44	1-Jun-42	20H, 30L A/A - 80 M/G positions. Trenches and tunnels.	13-Jul-43	Well developed perimeter defences against ground and air attacks surrounds "close in" but includes under infantry.
MADANG	5.13S 145.47E	1	3250'	30	1	8	8	30	10	9 2	19	20-Apr-43	4 A/A batteries, 44L A/A or M/G positions. 3 S/L.	19-Jun-43	No recent development of airfield, but considerable recent additions to defences.
MALAHANG	6.43S 147.01E	1	3300'	0	0	8	0	24	10	7 0	7	27-Jan-43	10L A/A - 24 M/G positions.	13-Jul-43	An additional defence area at Malahang Sawmill.
NUBIA	4.12S 144.50E	1	2500'	0	2	1	9	24	20	7 0	7	15-Apr-43	7 A/A batteries. 2 S/L.	13-Jul-43	Primarily a supply base. Defences include those at Nubia Bay.
SALAMAUA	7.04S 147.02E	1	3300'	0	0	25	10	100	20	3 1	4	11-Dec-42	30 A/A positions - 24 L/S and trenches, barbed wire on beach.	16-Jul-43	Defences being strengthened.
WEWAK	3.34S 143.39E	1	3300'	0	105	30	20	20	20	47 4	51	25-Apr-43	121 A/A batteries (41 guns). 211 A/A positions. 22 S/L.	13-Jul-43	Major base. Defences also sewer forces.
NEW BRITAIN															
CAPE GLOUCESTER I	5.03S 148.35E	1	3900'	15	0	0	4	20	15	3 0	3	14-Jun-43	None	7-Jul-43	probably serviceable but is bad result.
CAPE GLOUCESTER II	5.20S 148.35E	1	3600'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0	---	base	7 Jul 43	Development continues slowly. Not yet serviceable.
GASMATA	6.17S 150.19E	1	3200'	0	0	20	0	20	20	8 0	15	8-Jun-43	None	13-Jun-43	Runway badly damaged in recent raids and is unserviceable
KERAVAT	4.15S 152.01E	1	4300'	0	1	0	2	0	0	0 0	0	---	None	11-Jun-43	being graded and surfaced with crushed coral.
LAKUNAI	4.13S 152.12E	1	4700'	69	0	30	10	70	10	36 49	137	13-Jun-43	9 A/A batteries, 10 M/G. 7 S/L.	23-Jun-43	Earthmoving actually in use. Dispersal points formerly overestimated.
RAPOPO	4.20S 152.06E	1	4350'	0	90	0	0	0	0	55 0	55	18-Mar-43	3H, 2H, 4L A/A batteries. 3 S/L.	19-Jun-43	Several possible A/A aircraft present. Primarily an army base.
VUNAKANAU	4.19S 152.09E	1	5100'	61	51	0	54	10	10	49 0	114	17-Jun-43	9 A/A batteries, 23 M/G positions. 6 S/L.	6-Jul-43	Latest photos enable more positive differentiation between and identification of revetments and dispersal points.
TOPURA	4.24S 152.16E	1	5000'	0	0	0	0	-	-	0 0	0	---	None	25-Jun-43	New strip 8 miles S.W. of Rapopo.
ADMIRALTY IS.															
LORENGAU	2.01S 147.16E	1	2500'	20	0	0	0	20	20	0 0	0	---	None	15-Jun-43	Runway appeared serviceable 15-Jun-43.
NEW IRELAND															
BORPOP	3.53S 152.50E	1	4000'	0	9	0	15	0	0	0 0	0	---	2H A/A. 12Hor A/A under construction.	27-Jun-43	Strip unserviceable. Large dispersal extension possibilities.
KAVIENG	2.34S 150.49E	1	4600'	50	49	0	4	10	3	55 59	68	9-Apr-43	20 A/A. 6 S/L.	15-Jun-43	Major rear base. Believed aircraft assembly depot.
NAMATANAI	3.42S 152.08E	1	3000'	-	-	-	-	-	-	0 0	0	---	---	1-Jul-43	1st phase interp. 1st July reports new dispersal under construction. Runway width from photos of Sept. '42.
PANAPAI	2.36S 150.58E	1	4000'	12	9	7	2	5	5	0 0	0	---	None	22-May-43	Runway probably serviceable.
SOLOMONS															
BALLALE	4.59S 155.54E	1	4700'	40	32	7	7	40	20	20 1	98	7-Apr-43	4 A/A, 3 possible A/A.	15-Jul-43	Continuous development.
BUKA PASSAGE	5.24S 154.40E	1	4500'	3	0	32	14	30	15	16	66	8-Apr-43	4H to H A/A batteries.	13-Jul-43	Major aircraft repair base Solomons area.
KAHILI	6.45S 155.48E	1	4550'	29	9	32	0	50	15	24 104	128	7-Apr-43	24 A/A positions Kahili - Aberiaka area. 15 S/L.	13-Jul-43	Some fighter revetments could be used for L/as. Possible seaplane ramp.
MUNDA	8.20S 157.15E	1	3050'	49	32	16	9	4	3	15 4	20	9-Apr-43	14 A/A positions, many M/G.	16-Jun-43	At present in Tactical area.
VILA PLTN.	8.08S 157.00E	1	3000'	29	16	0	0	0	0	1 0	1	15-Apr-43	11H A/A positions.	16-Jun-43	At present in Tactical area.
BANDA & ARAFURA SEAS															
BOELA I	3.06S 130.30E	2	4000'	1	0	0	0	20	5	0 0	0	---	1H, 2H, 1L A/A in town.	19-Jun-43	Serviceable, being developed further.
LAHA (AMBON)	3.47S 128.05E	2	4000'	0	0	0	34	25	20	2 12	14	29-Apr-43	11 A/A, 10 M/G.	29-Apr-43	
LANGGOER (KAI)	5.40S 132.44E	1	5360'	14	0	9	0	15	15	11 6	11	15-Jun-43	3H, 14L A/A.	15-Jun-43	Major developments taking place.
LIANG (AMBON)	3.50S 128.10E	1	1950'	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	---	---	---	Probably serviceable and in use by Japanese.
NAMLEA (BOERO)	3.14S 127.06E	2	4500'	0	0	8	10	15	10	0 1	1	29-May-43	None	29-May-43	Extensive levelling runway, surfacing taxiways and 3 new buildings.
SELARDE	6.13S 130.50E	1	5600'	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	---	---	1-Jul-43	Visual report 8-July-43: no apparent activity.
BORNEO															
MANGAR (BALIKPAPAN)	1.13S 116.56E	2	3070'	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	---	---	---	Prewar information.
OELIN (BANDJERMASIN)	3.27S 114.45E	2	2540'	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	---	---	---	Prewar information.
TARAKAN	3.22N 117.34E	-	2250'	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	---	---	---	Landing and take-off nearly any direction. Prewar information.
CELEBES															
BOELOEBOWANG	5.33S 119.19E	2	3700'	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	---	---	25-Jun-43	Being developed. Second runway under construction.
KENDARI	4.06S 122.47E	3	5400'	15	0	33	0	100	100	72 40	112	24-Jan-43	60 A/A.	3-Jul-43	Principal enemy feeder base. New building activity.
LANGOAN	1.10N 124.51E	3	4200'	0	0	0	0	40	30	0 0	1	21-Jan-43	1 A/A.	21-Jan-43	Formerly Dutch military aerodrome.
LIMBOENG	5.18S 119.56E	1	-----	--	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	---	---	23-Jun-43	Wide runway 12 miles S. of Makassar reported 23-June-43. Probably same as Jap. drome known to them as Mimpum.
MALIMPOENG	3.44S 119.45E	2	2560'	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	---	---	---	Probably serviceable and in use by Japanese.
MANDAI (MAKASSAR D	5.04S 119.32E	2	3725'	0	0	0	0	35	28	0 2	2	23-Jun-43	4L (probable) A/A.	23-Jun-43	1 bomber possibly unserviceable.
DUTCH NEW GUINEA															
BABO	2.32S 133.25E	3	4550'	9	0	0	0	25	20	20 2	22	6-Aug-43	11 A/A positions.	6-Jul-43	Development continues.
JEFMAN	0.57S 131.07E	2	3000'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0	---	None	10-Jul-43	1st phase interp. Last photos shows new runway 3000' NE-SW.
HOLLANDIA	2.33S 140.28E	1	4200'	0	0	8	0	20	10	0 0	0	---	None	19-Apr-42	
NABIRE	3.23S 135.30E	1	4065'	0	8	0	0	10	5	5 0	4	6-Jul-43	None	6-Jul-43	Sighting: 4 SEFs visual.
TIMOEKA	4.45S 136.30E	1	4500'	2	0	0	0	10	4	1 0	1	11-Apr-43	10L A/A positions.	13-Jul-43	New building activity noted.
UTAROM	2.30S 133.41E	1	3300'	0	0	0	0	10	8	0 0	0	---	None	6-Jul-43	Probably serviceable.
WAKDE I.	1.56S 134.01E	1	5550'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0	---	None	13-Jun-43	
JAVA															
BANDOENG (ANDIR)	6.54S 107.35E	2	3300'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	---	---	---	Probably serviceable and in use by Japanese.
JOGJAKARTA	7.45S 110.22E	1	5940'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	---	---	---	Reported heavily defended, probably operational.
KALIDJATI	6.32S 107.46E	2	3600'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	---	---	---	Probably serviceable and in use by Japanese.
KEMAJORAN (BATAVIA)	6.09S 106.33E	2	2625'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	---	---	---	Aircraft known to have landed occasionally.
MADIOEN	7.40S 111.24E	1	3500'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	---	---	---	Reported actively employed both by Army and Navy Air Services.
MALANG	7.56S 112.44E	1	4175'	50	11	0	0	100	100	69 25	80	29-May-43	6H, 6H, 7L A/A positions.	29-May-43	Important Army base.
PASIRIAN	8.07S 113.18E	2	3300'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	---	---	---	Probably serviceable and in use by Japanese.
SEMARANG	7.01S 110.23E	2	3950'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	---	---	---	Probably serviceable and in use by Japanese.
SOERAKARTA	7.30S 110.50E	-	3300'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	---	---	---	Circular field 3000' diameter.
TANDJOENG PERAK (SOERABAJA)	7.13S 112.43E	2	4850'	0	0	0	0	80	40	0 12	12	13-Mar-43	2 A/A (empty).	13-Mar-43	Known to be operational.
WONOSARI (PLAJEN)	7.56S 110.33E	-	5000'	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	---	---	---	Rectangular field. Length of runway uncertain.
LESSER SOENDA															
BIMA (SOEMBAWA)	8.30S 118.42E	1	3400'	0	0	0	0	20	10	0 0	0	---	None. A/A in town 2 miles N. of aerodrome.	29-May-43	
DEN PASAR (BALI)	8.45S 115.10E	1	3200'	0	0	0	0	100	80	0 0	0	---	None	13-Mar-43	
MADE MERE (FLORES)	8.39S 122.05E	-	-----	-	-	-	-	-	-	- -	-	---	---	---	Possible landing ground observed 29-May-43, probably serviceable and in use as emergency landing ground.
RAMBANG (LOMBOK)	8.43S 116.03E	1	2800'	0	0	0	0	30	10	0 3	3	29-May-43	2H A/A, 2 M/G.	29-May-43	
WAINGAPOE (SOEMBA)	9.40S 120.19E	1	4550'	0	6	0	0	0	0	3 2	5	1-Apr-43	6 M/G and 5H A/A on low hills S.E. of aerodrome.	8-Jul-43	Shipping and other activity indicate important development.
TIMOR															
ATAMBOEA	9.07S 124.55E	1	4100'	0	0	20	20	30	30	0 0	0	---	A/A in Atamboea town, 18 miles S. of aerodrome.	6-Jun-43	
CAPE LORE	9.41S 189.01E	1	5000'	0	9	0	0	25	25	0 0	0	---	None	14-Jun-43	Marked activity Dassano village, 3½ miles W. Cape Lore.
CAPE CHATER	9.20S 126.59E	1	7500'(?)	0	0	15	15	100	75	10 6	16	27-Jun-43	4H, 12L A/A.	27-Jun-43	Extensive shore, as well as, A/A defences. Five miles of defence trenches. Much activity.
DILI	8.34S 125.33E	2	4700'	10	4	0	9	100	75	2 0	2	19-Nov-42	7 A/A, 1H M/G. Additional A/A in town.	8-Jul-43	Greatly extended and surfaced by enemy.
FUILORO	9.03S 127.06E	3	5700'	4	0	0	0	100	75	9 6	15	12-Jul-43	2 10 4-gun H A/A batteries. 4H A/A and numerous L A/A.	12-Jul-43	New indicates Tower Fuiloro 21. 1st phase interp. last photos shows bombers possibly include dummies or decoys.
LAUTEM W.	8.22S 126.49E	1	4000'+	0	0	0	0	25	15	0 0	0	---	9L A/A. Additional 12H A/A at Lautem town.	27-Jun-43	Much activity.
PENFOEI	10.11S 123.39E	5	4500'	40	8	0	0	75	30	30 16	46	2-Dec-42	6H, 9H, 30L A/A.	27-Jun-43	Principal forward base in N.E.I.
KOEPANG GOLF COURSE	10.10S 123.35E	1	4600'	0	0	0	0	0	0	0 0	0	---	None	26-Jun-43	Runway (E-W) unserviceable.

LAST PHOTOS TAKEN: THIS COLUMN DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ANY PHOTOS OF WHICH THERE HAS BEEN NO FIRST PHASE INTERPRETATION.

POSITION: COORDINATES TAKEN FROM AUSTRALIAN AERONAUTICAL SERIES C1,000,000.

UNPROTECTED DISPERSAL POINTS:- FIGURES UNDER THIS HEADING RELATE TO THE ACTUAL, AND NOT TO THE POTENTIAL, DISPERSAL CAPACITY AT THE AERODROME.

HARD-STANDING CAPACITY:- THIS COLUMN IS AN ESTIMATE OF THE CAPACITY FOR PARKING AIRCRAFT IN CLEARED AREAS AVAILABLE TO THE AERODROME AREA (OTHER THAN IN REVETMENTS AND AT DISPERSAL POINTS) AND ACCESSIBLE FROM THE RUNWAY. IT IS ASSUMED THAT THE A/C WILL BE SPACED IN THE PARKING AREA IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THEIR DISTRIBUTION IN THE VARIOUS DISPERSAL LANES.



FIR / MISC / 6534

REPRODUCED BY 6 AUST ARMY TOPO SURVEY COY. JULY '43

Reproduced from AAF Intelligence Summary No 121
By GSI FIRST AUST ARMY

Appendix 75

MESSAGE OUT

CYLL
AND
INTERCEPTION .....

TO: first aust army, 6 aust div, 9 aust div, 18 aust inf bde, 2 aust corps reception camp, LOCATION, sig centre ATHERTON.

FROM: 2 aust corps D 1087 2

SECRET . location report 356 . C coy 2/1 aust HQ gd bn less 11 and 12 pls under cond 6 aust div 2/119 aust bde ord fd pk from HILLS HILLS to ORDECL and comes under cond 6 aust div . 6 aust div salvage unit raised and located ORDECL . 2/8 aust dental unit RAVENSCAR to ORDECL . 2/1 aust dental unit ORDECL to RAVENSCAR and comes under cond 7 aust div (.) 9 aust div . 2/13 aust fd coy LITTLE FULGRAVE to DEAD HORSE GULLY . following departed . HQ 26 aust inf bde and sig sec 4 pl 2/1 aust HQ gd bn 2/23 and 2/24 aust inf bns 3 pl 9 aust div carr coy HQ RAA 9 aust div HQ . 2/12 aust fd regt sig sec and 2/61 LAD 10 bty 2/4 aust lt aa regt . all informed

Secret heard.
Capt

IMPORTANT - First Aust Army 700 1 Dec
D R L S - others.

Copies:
A
C(2)
Int
Sigs
CSO
File
Roneo
War Diary

LOGGING OUT.

TO: fir t aust armr 6 aust div 9 aust div 18 aust inf bde, 2 aust corps reception camp LCC[illegible], sig centre [illegible]

FM: 2 aust corps .. 0 1083 1

LOCAT . location report 355 . 9 bty 2/3 tk a regt departed . following from [illegible] to [illegible] . sigs 9 aust div 2/3 aust pnr bn 2 pl 9 aust carr coy 2/3 aust fd amb 2/118 aust bde wkshops . following arrived [illegible] 2/122 and 2/123 aust bde wkshops . all informed

Secret means

Capt. T/O [illegible]

LP [illegible] - 2i st aust inf.
D R L S - others.

Copies: ,A
Int
Sigs
GSO
C (2)
War Diary (2)
File
Roneo
3/3.