

AWM52

Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/8 CORPS

2 Australian Corps
General Branch (2 Aust
Corps 'G' Branch)

December 1944, part 2, appendices



1/4/8-029B

2 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT AND ORDER OF BATTLE No 3

As at 1200 hrs 30 Dec 44

Ref Maps: BOUGAINVILLE 1-inch series: TOROKINA
MOTUPENA POINT

BOUGAINVILLE 1:25,000 series:
KOWARO

SECRET

Copy No

Appendix A to
HQ 2 Aust Corps
G/313/Ops

Serial (a)	Arm or Service (b)	War Office Serial No (c)	(d)	Unit (e)	Ref Map (f)	Location (g)	Remarks (h)
CORPS TROOPS							
A1	HQ UNITS	45732		HQ 2 Aust Corps (AIF)	TOROKINA	578936	
A2		47912		Det Directorate Public Relations	TOROKINA	571959	LHQ Tps, under comd 3 Aust Div -see serial B2
A3		45129		5 Aust Mob Met Flt (less dets)	TOROKINA	578936	LHQ Tps one det NOT under comd. One det under comd 3 Aust Div -see serial B3
A4		92625		3 Aust Adv 2nd Ech	TOROKINA	602939	
A5		45189		Det 6 Aust Comd AL Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	573938	Unit less det NOT under comd
A6		49226		15 Aust Sqn AL Sec	TOROKINA		awaiting move GREEN ISLAND. To come under comd 23 Bde for local adm - see serial G7
A7		49227		16 Aust Sqn AL Sec	TOROKINA		Staging pending allotment
A8		49243		32 Aust Sqn AL Sec	TOROKINA	581952	Att 46 Aust AL Sec
A9		49244		33 Aust Sqn AL Sec			NOT yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
A10		45183		47 Aust Sqn AL Sec	TOROKINA	578936	Temporarily att HQ 2 Aust Corps
A11		49257		52 Aust Sqn AL Sec	TOROKINA		Awaiting move EMIRAU. To come under 23 Bde for local adm - see serial G8.
A12		49258		53 Aust Sqn AL Sec	TOROKINA	585958	Att COMAIR PIVA
A13		45185		46 Aust AL Sec (Tac R) Sqn	TOROKINA	573952	
A14		45109		Det LHQ Mil History Sec	TOROKINA	578936	LHQ Tps
A15	ARTY	92694	%	HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	TOROKINA	578936	CE Staff NOT raised
A16		48483	TS	2 Aust Mtn Bty (Mech) (AIF)	TOROKINA	549933	To pass under comd 11 Bde 5 Jan 45. See serial F3.

Corps Troops (Continued)

Appendix A page 2

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
A17	<u>ARMY</u> (Contd)	48621		1 Aust Hy Bty (Coast) (HE) (AIF)			NOT yet arrived SOUGAINVILLE
A18	<u>ENGRS</u>	47748		7 Aust ED Pl	TOROKINA	665875	Under comd 3 Div - see serial E15
A19		61171		1 Mech Eqpt Pl (less det) 2/1 Aust Rly Constr Coy (Mech Eqpt)	TOROKINA	553944	Under comd for ops only. Remains under 4 Aust Base Sub Area for other purposes.
A20		48276		Det 42 Aust Ldg Craft Coy (AIF) (HQ, one ALC 15 Pl, one ALC 20 Pl, one ALC 40 Pl) (less det)	TOROKINA	562902	Unit less det NOT under comd. Det equal one comp pl under comd 3 Div - See serial E16.
A21		92423		Det 1 Aust Water Amb Convoy (AIF)	TOROKINA	763808	Under comd from 4 Aust Base Sub Area for local adm only
A22	<u>SVY</u>	45594		1 Svy Sec 2 Aust Pl Svy Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	577935	
A23	<u>SIGS</u>	45747		HQ 3 Aust Corps Sigs (AIF) with adm sec	TOROKINA	577939	
A24		45749	TS	2 Aust Tech Maint Sec (HE) (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A25				HQ 1 Coy B Aust Corps Sigs (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A26		61330	TS	4 Aust Line Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A27		61331	TS	5 Aust Line Sec	TOROKINA	693860	
A28		47999	TS	27 Aust Line Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	778793	
A29		45753	TS	2 Aust Line Maint Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A30				HQ 2 Coy B Aust Corps Sigs (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A31		61339	TS	5 Aust Sig Op Sec	TOROKINA	578942	
A32		45755	TS	6 Aust Op Sec, (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A33		45037	TS	38 Aust Op Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A34		45257	TS	26 Aust Tele Swbd Op Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	

Corps Troops (Continued)

Appendix A page 3

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
A35	<u>SIG</u> (Contd)	45758	TS	4 Aust DR Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A36		45231	TS	10 Aust DR Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A37		61343	TS	5 Aust Wireless Sec (Lt) (AIF) (less det)	TOROKINA	578942	det under comd 23 Bde-See serial G15
A38		48012	TS	9 Aust Wireless Sec (Lt) (less two dets)	TOROKINA	578942	dets NOT under comd
A39		48357	TS	44 Aust Wireless Sec (Hy) (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A40		48664	TS	4 Aust Cipher Sec (Type A) (less dets)	TOROKINA	578942	Two dets NOT under comd. One det under comd 23 Bde see serial G18
A41				HQ 3 Coy B Aust Corps Sigs (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	
A42		48574		1 Aust Water Tpt Gp Sig Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	578942	Army tps. Under 4 Aust Base Sub Area for local adn
A43		47369	TS	7 Aust Pigeon Sec (Type A)	TOROKINA	578942	
A44		45272	TS	36 Aust Wireless Task Sec (AIF)	GREEN ISLAND		Under comd 23 Bde- See serials G16, G16 (a)
A45		45274	TS	38 Aust Wireless Task Sec (AIF)	TREASURY ISLAND		Under comd 23 Bde - See serials G17, G17(a)
A46		45258		Det 61 Aust Wireless Sec (Type C) (AIF)	TOROKINA	577939	LHQ tps.
A47		49466		A Coy 1 New Guinea Inf Bn (less one pl)	MOTUPENA PT	780784	One pl under comd 11 Bde- See serials E10, F9, Coy less one pl under comd 29 Bde
A48		61005	TS	22 Pl F Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	TOROKINA	578936	LHQ Tps.
A49	<u>INT</u>	46195		2 Aust Corps Sec Int Corps	TOROKINA	578936	
A50		45138		Det Allied Translator and Interpreter Sec	TOROKINA	578936	LHQ Tps
A51		47914		Det 1 Aust AAPIU (AIF)	TOROKINA	578936	
A52		45173	TS	25 Aust FS Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	578936	

Corps Troops (Continued)

Appendix I page 4

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
A53	<u>DENTAL</u>	45384	TS	HQ 72 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	589972	
A53a				A Sec 72 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	562902	
A53b				B Sec 72 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	544948	
A53c				C Sec 72 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	549958	
A53d				D Sec 72 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	531939	
A53e				E Sec 72 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	577943	
A53f				F Sec 72 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA		546936
A54	<u>ORD</u>	49045	TS	126 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	TOROKINA	598939	
A55	<u>AE ME</u>	49062	TS	126 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF)	TOROKINA	598939	
A56		45762	TS	244 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	TOROKINA	577939	Att B Aust Corps Sigs
A57		45065	TS	296 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	TOROKINA	578936	Att HQ 2 Aust Corps
A58		92019		Det 2 Aust Idg Craft Wksp Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	531898	Unit less det NOT under comd
A59	<u>PAY</u>	61019	TS	2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	TOROKINA	578936	
A60	<u>POSTAL</u>	61023		2 Aust Corps Postal Unit	TOROKINA	578936	
A61	<u>P70</u>			2 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre			Being raised
A62	<u>MISC</u>	92660		2 Aust Corps Reception Camp			Being raised
A63		45932	TS	2 Aust Corps Sal Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	548503	

3 AUST DIV

Appendix A page 5

Serial	Arm or Service	War Office Serial Number		Unit	Ref Map	Location	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
B1	<u>HQ UNITS</u>	45980	TS	HQ 3 Aust Div (AIF)	TOROKINA	571959	
B2		47192		Det Directorate Public Relations	TOROKINA	571959	LHQ Tps - See serial A2.
B3		45129		Det 5 Aust Mob Met Flt	TOROKINA	657096	Unit less two dets under comd 2 Aust Corps - See serial A3.
B4		45109		Det LHQ Mil History Sec	TOROKINA	571959	LHQ Tps
B5	<u>CAV</u>	61423	TS	2/8 Aust Commando Sqn	TOROKINA	616960	
B6	<u>ARMD</u>	45090	TS	One Sqn 2/4 Aust Armd Regt			NOT yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
B7	<u>ARTY</u>	48376	TS	HQ RAA 3 Aust Div	TOROKINA	575961	
B8		45984	TS	2 Aust Fd Regt (Jungle Div) (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	781784	Under comd 29 Bde.-See serial E2.
B9		45986	TS	4 Aust Fd Regt (Jungle Div) (AIF) (less one bty)	TOROKINA	657096	One bty under comd 7 Bde, to pass to comd 11 Bde 5 Jan 45 -- See Serial C2, F2.
B10		45990	TS	3 Aust Svy Bty (AIF)	TOROKINA	549933	
B11	<u>ENGRS</u>	45991	TS	HQ RAE 3 Aust Div (AIF)	TOROKINA	554952	
E12		45947	TS	5 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	597962	See Serial C3
B13		46157	TS	23 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	574964	Two pl only under comd. Balance of unit under comd 23 Bde. To move TOROKINA under comd 3 Div on arrival. See serials G13, G13h.
E14		45994	TS	53 Aust Fd Pk Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	549936	
B15		47748		7 Aust BD Pl	TOROKINA	665875	Corps Tps - See serial A18.

3 AUST-DIV (Continued)

Appendix A page 6

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
B16	<u>ENGRS</u> (Contd)	48276		Det 42 Aust Ldg Craft Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	562902	Attached from det under comd 2 Corps. Equivalent one comp pl - See serial A20.
B17	<u>SIGS</u>	45997	TS	Sigs 3 Aust Div (AIF) (less det)	TOROKINA	572960	Det under comd 29 Bde-See serial E4
B18		49414	TS	Det 2/4 Aust Armd Regt Sig Tp		562898	NOT yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
B19		49088	TS	2 Aust Fd Regt (Jungle Div) Sig Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	563941	Under comd 29 Bde - See serial E5
B20		49090	TS	4 Aust Fd Regt (Jungle Div) Sig Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	546936	
B21		92604	TS	6 Aust Engr Sig Sec	TOROKINA	554952	
B22		95998	TS	38 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K) (AIF)	TOROKINA	572960	
B23	<u>INF</u>	61005	TS	HQ D Coy and 15 Pl Pl 2/1 Aust Bd Regt	TOROKINA	571959	
B24		45138		Det Allied Translator and Interpreter Sec	TOROKINA	578936	LHQ Tps.
B25		61502	TS	V Aust FS Sec	TOROKINA	571959	
B26	<u>ST</u>	46010	TS	HQ Comd 3 Aust Div AASC (AIF)	TOROKINA	555940	
B27		47903		HQ 152 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	538969	
B27a				HQ and one sec Wksp Pl 152 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	588969	
B28		48227	TS	B Pl 158 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	552698	See serial C9
B29		47904	TS	HQ 1 Aust Sup Dep Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	590966	
B30		48346	TS	19 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF)	TOROKINA	570964	See serial E13
B31		49050	TS	227 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF)	TOROKINA	588972	See serial G11
B32		92610	TS	56 Aust Tpt Pl (less three secs)	TOROKINA	589966	Three secs remain under comd 29 Bde - See serial E14

3 AUST DIV (Continued)

Appendix A page 7

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
B33	<u>MED</u>	45381	TS	109 Aust CCS (AIF)	TOROKINA	553939	
B34		48392	TS	18 Aust Malaria Control Unit (Type A) (AIF)	TOROKINA	772805	
B35		47969	TS	35 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit (Type B)	TOROKINA	553939	
B36	<u>DENTAL</u>	46597	TS	HQ 63 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	571959	
B36a				HQ Det 63 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	779735	
B36b				A Sec 63 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	597967	
B36c				B Sec 63 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	733738	
B36d				C Sec 63 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	780714	
B36e				D Sec 63 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	558948	
B36f				E Sec 63 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	558948	
B36g				F Sec 63 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	643968	Not operating. Personnel absorbed by remainder of unit)
B37	<u>ORD</u>	49416	TS	One Sqn Sub Pk 2/4 Aust Armd Regt Ord Fd Pk (HE)			Not yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
B38	<u>AEME</u>	49415	TS	One Sqn Wksp Sec 2/4 Aust Armd Regt Wksp			Not yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
B39		46100	TS	202 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	TOROKINA	571959	Att HQ 3 Div
B40		45985	TS	213 Aust LAD (Type D) (AIF)	TOROKINA	563941	Att 2 Aust Fd Regt, Under comd 29 Bde - See serial E18
B41		45987	TS	214 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	TOROKINA	546936	Att 4 Fd Regt
B42		45996	TS	230 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	TOROKINA	549936	Att 53 Fd Pk Coy
B43	<u>PAY</u>	46019	TS	3 Aust Div Fd Cash Office (AIF) (less det)	TOROKINA	571959	Det under comd 15 Bde, See serial D15.
B44	<u>POSTAL</u>	46021	TS	3 Aust Div Postal Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	571959	
B45	<u>PRO</u>	46020	TS	3 Aust Div Pro Coy (AIF) (less two secs) (less det)	TOROKINA	577966	Two secs under comd 3 Base sub Area. Det under comd 29 Bde - See serial E21
B46		45730	TS	Two secs First Aust Army Pro Coy	TOROKINA	577966	Balance of unit (less two secs AUST) under comd 5 Base Sub Area. To return AUST.

3 AUST DIV (Continued)

Appendix A Page 8

	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
	PRO (Contd)	46914	TS	Two secs 10 Aust L of C Pro Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	577936	Balance of unit under comd 5 and 6 Base Sub Areas.
B48		46128	TS	6 Sec-5 Aust Div Pro Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	577936	Balance of unit under comd 5 Div -See serial E22
B49	MISC			One Mob Cinema			NOT yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
B50		46022		3 Aust Div Reception Camp (AIF)	TOROKINA	539972	
B51		46023	TS	3 Aust Div Sal Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	591971	

7 AUST INF BDE GP

Appendix A page 9

Serial	Arm or Service	War Office Serial No		Unit	Ref Map	Location	Remarks
C1	<u>HQ UNITS</u>	46101	TS	HQ 7 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)	TOROKINA	596967	Under comd 3 Div
C2	<u>ARTY</u>	45986	TS	One bty 4 Aust Fd Regt (Jungle Div) (AIF)	KOWARO	657096	Regt less bty under comd 3 Div. Bty to pass to comd 11 Bde 5 Jan 45. - See serials B9, F2.
C3	<u>ENGRS</u>	45947	TS	5 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	597962	Under comd 3 Div.-See serial B12.
C4	<u>SIGS</u>	49113	TS	7 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	TOROKINA	596967	
C5	<u>INF</u>	46104	TS	9 Aust Inf Bn	TOROKINA	597967	
C6		46105	TS	25 Aust Inf Bn	KOWARO	672110	
C7		46106	TS	61 Aust Inf Bn	TOROKINA	622973	
C8		61005	TS	20 Pl E Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	TOROKINA	596967	
C9	<u>ST</u>	48827	TS	B Pl 158 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	592968	Under comd 3 Div.-See serial B28
C10		49027	TS	224 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF)	KOWARO	658091	
C11		49030	TS	227 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF)	TOROKINA	593972	Under comd 3 Div - See serial B31
C12	<u>MED</u>	46122	TS	11 Aust Fd Amb (less A Coy)	TOROKINA	612962	
C12a				A Coy 11 Aust Fd Amb	KOWARO	657093	
C13	<u>ORD</u>	46241	TS	113 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	TOROKINA	587973	
C14	<u>AEME</u>	46240	TS	113 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF)	TOROKINA	587973	
C15		46103		241 Aust LAL (Type J) (AIF)	TOROKINA	596969	Att HQ 7 Bde
C16	<u>POSTAL</u>	46129	TS	Det 5 Aust Div Postal Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	613960	

Serial	Arm or Service	War Office Serial No		Unit	Ref Map	Location	Remarks
D 1	<u>HQ UNITS</u>	46005	TS	HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)	TOROKINA	575967	Under comd 3 Div
D2	<u>ENGRS</u>	45993	TS	15 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)			NOT yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
D3	<u>SIGS</u>	49118	TS	15 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec (AIF)	TOROKINA	575967	
D4	<u>INF</u>	46007	TS	24 Aust Inf Bn (AIF) (adv party only)	TOROKINA	575971	Balance of unit NOT yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
D5		46008	TS	57/60 Aust Inf Bn (adv party only)	TOROKINA	568964	Balance of unit NOT yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
D6		46009	TS	58/59 Aust Inf Bn	TOROKINA	550962	
D7		61005	TS	14 Pl D Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	TOROKINA	575967	
D8	<u>ST</u>	48832	TS	3 Aust Sup Dep Pl)
D9		48833	TS	4 Aust Sup Dep Pl)
D10		92000	TS	53 Aust Ept Pl)
D11	<u>MED</u>	46015	TS	15 Aust Fd Amb (AIF)) NOT yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
D12	<u>ORD</u>	47766	TS	129 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pl (AIF))
D13	<u>AEEME</u>	49064	TS	129 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF))
D14		46006		266 Aust LAD (Type J) (AIF)) Att HQ 15 Bde
D15	<u>PAY</u>	46019	TS	Det 3 Aust Div Cash Office (AIF)) Unit less det under comd 3 Div
D16	<u>POSTAL</u>	46186	%	Det 12 Aust Div Postal Unit (AIF)) - See serial 543.
D17	<u>ERC</u>	46020	TS	Two secs 3 Aust Div Pro Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	577966) under comd 3 Div - See serial B45

29 AUST INF BDE GP

Appendix A page 11

Serial (a)	Arm or Service (b)	War Office Serial No. (c)		Unit (e)	Ref Map (f)	Location (g)	Remarks (h)
E1	<u>HQ UNITS</u>	46112	TS	HQ 29 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	779785	Under comd 3 Div
E2	<u>ARTY</u>	45984	TS	2 Aust Fd Regt (Jungle Div) (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	781784	Div Tps - See serial B3
E3	<u>ENGRS</u>	46092	TS	11 Aust Fd Coy	MOTUPENA PT	776743	
E4	<u>SIGS</u>	45997	TS	Det Sigs 3 Aust Div (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	779785	Unit less det under comd 3 Div - See serial B 17.
E5		49088	TS	2 Aust Fd Regt (Jungle Div) Sig Sec (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	781784	Div tps - See serial E19
E6		49127	TS	29 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	779785	
E7	<u>INF</u>	46114	TS	15 Aust Inf Bn	MOTUPENA PT	784773	
E8		46115	TS	42 Aust Inf Bn	TOROKINA	567959	
E9		46116	TS	47 Aust Inf Bn	MOTUPENA PT	783774	
E10		49466	TS	A Coy 1 New Guinea Inf Bn (less one pl)	MOTUPENA PT	780784	Corps Tps - See Serial A37. One pl under comd 11 Bde.-See serial F9.
E11		61005	TS	15 Pl D Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	MOTUPENA PT	781786	
E12	<u>ST</u>	43845	TS	18 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF)	TOROKINA	720906	
E13		43846	TS	19 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF)	TOROKINA	570964	Under comd 3 Div.-See serial B30.
E14		92610	TS	Three secs 56 Aust Tpt Pl	MOTUPENA PT	771803	Unit less three secs under comd 3 Div - See serial B32.
E15	<u>MED</u>	46121	TS	7 Aust Fd Amb (less det)	TOROKINA	720857	
E15a				Det 7 Aust Fd Amb	MOTUPENA PT	778788	
E16	<u>ORD</u>	49041	TS	104 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	TOROKINA	573964	

29 AUST INF BDE GP (Continued)

Appendix A page 12

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
E17	<u>AEME</u>	49058	TS	104 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	780784	
E18		45985	TS	213 Aust LAD (Type D) (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	781784	Att 2 Aust Fd Regt. Div Tps - See serial B40.
E19		46113		312 Aust LAD (Type J) (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	596969	Att HQ 29 Bde
E20	<u>POSTAL</u>	46129	TS	Det 5 Aust Div Postal Unit (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	779785	
E21	<u>PRO</u>	46020	TS	Det 3 Aust Div Pro Coy (AIF)	MOTUPENA PT	779785	Balance of unit less four secs under comd 3 Div. - See serial B45.
E22		46123	TS	6 Sec 5 Aust Div Pro Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	577966	Under comd 3 Div - See serial B48.

Serial	Arm or Service	War Office Serial No.		Unit	Ref Map	Location	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
F1	<u>HQ UNITS</u>	46107	TS	HQ 11 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)	TOROKINA	549944	Under comd 2 Corps
F2	<u>ARTY</u>	45996	TS	One Bty 4 Aust Fd Regt (Jungle Div) (AIF)	KOWARO	657096	from To come under comd/7 Bde 5 Jan 45. -See serial C2. Regt less bty under comd 3 Div - See serial B9.
F3		48483	TS	2 Aust Mtn Bty (Mech) (AIF)	TOROKINA	549933	Corps tps. To come under comd 11 Bde 5 Jan 45 - See serial A16
F4	<u>ENGRS</u>	46092	TS	16 Aust Fd Coy	TOROKINA	543932	
F5	<u>SIGS</u>	49116	TS	11 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	TOROKINA	549944	
F6	<u>INF</u>	46109	TS	26 Aust Inf Bn	TOROKINA	544948	
F7		46110	TS	31/51 Aust Inf Bn (AIF) (less B Coy Gp)	TOROKINA	549959	
F7a				B Coy Gp 31/51 Aust Inf Bn (AIF)	CAPE MOLTHE	299174	
F8		46222	TS	55/53 Aust Inf Bn	TOROKINA	531939	
F9		49466		One pl A Coy New Guinea Inf Bn	CAPE MOLTHE	299174	Corps Tps, Coy less pl under comd 29mBde - See serials A47, E10.
F10		61005	TS	13 Pl D Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	TOROKINA	549944	
F11		45203		101 Aust Bde Support Coy (AIF)			NOT yet arrived BOUGAINVILLE
F12	<u>ST</u>	43291	TS	222 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF)	TOROKINA	555938	
F13		48292	TS	223 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF)	TOROKINA	554938	
F14		92528	TS	76 Aust Tpt Pl	TOROKINA	555940	

11 AUST INF BDE GP (Continued)

Appendix A page 14

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
F15	<u>MED</u>	46123	TS	19 Aust Fd Amb (AIF)	TOROKINA	554943	
F16	<u>ORD</u>	49040	TS	102 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	TOROKINA	555939	
F17	<u>ARME</u>	49057	TS	102 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF)	TOROKINA	553940	
F18		46108	TS	242 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	TOROKINA	549944	Att HQ 11 Bde
F19	<u>PAY</u>	46072	TS	Det 4 Aust Div Fd Cash Office (AIF)	TOROKINA	549944	
F20	<u>POSTAL</u>	46074	TS	Det 4 Aust Div Postal Unit (AIF)	TOROKINA	549944	
F21	<u>PRO</u>	46073	TS	Det 4 Aust Div Pro Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	549944	

23 AUST INF BDE GP

Appendix A page 15

Serial	Arm or Service	War Office Serial No.		Unit	Location	Remarks
G1	<u>HQ UNITS</u>	61547	TS	HQ 23 Aust Inf Bde	GREEN ISLAND	Under comd 2 Aust Corps
G2		47480		Det ANGAU	GREEN ISLAND) Army Tps under comd for local adm only
G3		51438	%	Det 2/1 Aust Mov & Tn Gp	GREEN ISLAND	
G4			%	Det 2/1 Aust Mov & Tn Gp	TREASURY ISLAND	
G5			%	Det 2/1 Aust Mov & Tn Gp	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G6			%	Det 2/1 Aust Mov & Tn Gp	MUNDA NEW GEORGIA	
G7		49226		15 Aust Sqn AL Sec	TOROKINA	Corps tps. Awaiting move to GREEN ISLAND. To come under comd 23 Bde for local adm - See serial A6.
G8		49257		52 Aust Sqn AL Sec	TOROKINA	Corps tps. Awaiting move to EMIRAU To come under comd 23 Bde for local adm - See serial A11
G9	<u>ARTY</u>	92006	TS	6 Aust AA Ops Room (Type C) (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G10		47517		HQ 32 Aust HAA Bty (Static) (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G11		48519		474 Aust HAA Tp (Static) (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G12		48520		475 Aust HAA Tp (Static) (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G13	<u>ENGRS</u>	46157	TS	23 Aust Fd Coy (AIF) (less two pls)	GREEN ISLAND	To move TOROKINA under comd 3 Div - See serial B13
G13a				Two pls 23 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	TOROKINA	Under comd 3 Div-See serial B13
G14	<u>SIGS</u>	49275	TS	23 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec (AIF) (less dets)	GREEN ISLAND	
G14a				Det 23 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G14b				Det 23 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec (AIF)	TREASURY ISLAND	

23 AUSTRALIAN BDE GP (Continued)

Appendix A page 16

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
G15	<u>SIGS</u> (Contd)	61343	TS	Det 5 Aust Wireless Sec (Lt) (AIF)	GREEN ISLAND	Unit less det under comd 2 Corps - See serial A37
G16		45272	TS	36 Aust Wireless Task Sec (AIF) (less det)	GREEN ISLAND	Corps tps - See serial A44
G16a				Det 36 Aust Wireless Task Sec (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G17		45274	TS	38 Aust Wireless Task Sec (AIF) (less det)	TREASURY ISLAND	Corps tps - See serial A45
G17a				Det 38 Aust Wireless Task Sec (AIF)	MUNDA NEW GEORGIA	
G18	<u>INF</u>			Det 4 Aust Cipher Sec (Type A)	GREEN ISLAND	Unit less dets under comd 2 Corps. - See serial A40
G19		48371		Det 1 Aust Frt Sig Sec (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	Unit less det under comd LAE Base Sub Area.
G20		46175	TS	7 Aust Inf Bn (AIF) (less D Coy)	TREASURY ISLAND	
G20a				D Coy 7 Aust Inf Bn (AIF)	MUNDA NEW GEORGIA	
G21		46176	TS	8 Aust Inf Bn (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G22	<u>ST</u>	46170	TS	27 Aust Inf Bn (AIF)	GREEN ISLAND	
G23		61005	TS	28 Pl G Coy 2/1 Aust Fd Regt	GREEN ISLAND	
G24		45772	TS	A Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy with det RDI and one Wksp Sec 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G24a						
G25		45772	TS	D Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less det) with	TREASURY ISLAND	
G25a				Det RDI and one Wksp Sec 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		
G25b				Det D Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	MUNDA NEW GEORGIA	
G26		49448	TS	40 Aust Indep Tpt Pl (AIF)	GREEN ISLAND	
G27		49446	TS	243 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF)	GREEN ISLAND	
G28		49447	TS	244 Aust Sup Dep Pl (AIF) (less dets)	TREASURY ISLAND	

23 AUST INF BDE GP (Continued)

Appendix A page 17 1

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
G28a	<u>ST</u>			Det 244 Aust Sup Dep B1 (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G28b	(Contd)			Det 244 Aust Sup Dep P1 (AIF)	MUNDA NEW GEORGIA	
G29		92063		Det one sec 6 Aust Fd Baking Pl	TOROKINA	awaiting move GREEN ISLAND
G29a				Det one Sec 6 Aust Fd Baking Pl	EMIRAU	
G30	<u>MED</u>	46130	TS	17 Aust Fd Amb (AIF) (less A and E Coys)	GREEN ISLAND	
G30a				A Coy 17 Aust Fd Amb (AIF) (less det)	TREASURY ISLAND	
G30b				Det 17 Aust Fd Amb (AIF)	MUNDA NEW GEORGIA	
G30c				B Coy 17 Aust Fd Amb (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G31	<u>DENTAL</u>	45384	TS	A Sec 82 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	GREEN ISLAND	} Balance of unit under comd } 4 Aust Base Sub Area
G32		45384	TS	B Sec 82 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G33		45384	TS	C Sec 82 Aust Dental Unit (AIF)	TREASURY ISLAND	
G34	<u>ORD</u>	46238	TS	109 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF) (less dets)	GREEN ISLAND	
G34a				Det 109 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G34b				Det 109 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	TREASURY ISLAND	
G35	<u>AEME</u>	46237	TS	109 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF) (less dets)	GREEN ISLAND	
G35a				Det 109 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF)	EMIRAU ISLAND	
G35b				Det 109 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF)	TREASURY ISLAND	
G36		46174		2/108 Aust LAD (Type J)	GREEN ISLAND	Att HQ 23 Bde
G37	<u>POSTAL</u>	46186	%	Det 12 Aust Div Postal Unit (AIF)	GREEN ISLAND	
G38	<u>PRO</u>	49492	TS	14 Aust Indep Pro Pl (less dets)	GREEN ISLAND	
G38a				Det 14 Aust Indep Pro Pl	EMIRAU ISLAND	} Formerly 14 Aust Indep Bde Gp } Pro Pl
G38b				Det 14 Aust Indep Pro Pl	TREASURY ISLAND	
G39	<u>MISC</u>	45543		Det NG Sec AA Canteens Service	GREEN ISLAND	
G39a				Det NG Sec AA Canteens Service	EMIRAU ISLAND	} LHQ Tps. Under comd for local } only. Unit less dets under } comd LAE Base Sub Area.
G39b				Det NG Sec AA Canteens Service	TREASURY ISLAND	

MESSAGE FORM

From 2 AUST CORPS 30 2/05L
 To FIRSTAUSTARMY
 Info 3 AUST DIV AMERICAL DIV 11 AUST INF BDE
 23 AUST INF BDE 4 AUST BASE SUB AREA USAFNORSOLS
 COMNAVNORSOLS COMAIRNORSOLS COMZEAIRTAF
 84 AC WING RAAF DSIO NORSOLS

0407 secret sibrep 39 to 302000L (.) 3 aust div (.) 29 bde (.)
 47 bn (.) 2 hostile natives killed attempting infiltrate posn
 828712 (.) jap patrol activity line from coast to 815715.
 followed by minor attacks which were repulsed (.) enemy cas
 3 killed own cas 2 killed 2 wounded (.) enemy posn 805716
 successfully attacked and area occupied (.) 301155L estimated
 30-50 japs counter attack supported by mortar or mtn gun (.)
 repulsed (.) enemy cas 5 killed own 1 killed 2 offrs 6 ORs
 wounded (.) 301640L enemy attacked pl area 775618 cutting line
 comm (.) one pl sent to make contact (.) line comms also cut
 (.) 7 bde (.) 25 bn (.) 300730L following air strike on enemy
 posn 685127 two coys supported arty and mortar established posns
 on ridge 678130 and 679130 at 1500L (.) coy attacking on right
 flank reached 686125 then held up by terrain and enemy fire (.)
 all coys now consolidated (.) enemy cas 3 killed own 2 killed
 5 wounded all infm

If this message
 is liable to fall
 into enemy hands
 or to be intercepted
 it must be sent in

CIPHER

IMPORTANT
 TO ACTION
 ADDRESSEE

B. H. [Signature]
 Lt-Col

Distribution by G (Ops): PA to Comd CGRA
 EGS A
 DA & QMG Q (2)
 G (Int) (2) BME
 G (Air) War Diary (2)

ANNEXURE 88.
War Diary

GS MINUTE NO 316

RESTRICTED

Subject: TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES - HQ 2 AUST CORPS

Distribution List 'B'


(All Branches, etc., of HQ 2 Aust Corps)


plus serials 1, 2, 2a, 3, 3R, 53, 55 (2 copies), 57 - 60

- ... 1. Forwarded herewith for information is Table of Organization and Duties - HQ 2 Aust Corps.


30 Dec 44


W. J. ... Brig
GS 2 Aust Corps






001351A





001352B



"A" Branch

A Branch

AAG

Principle.
Plans
General Supervision.

Staff Learner (A)


Liaison.
Chaplains.
Amenities.
Philanthropic.
Movement of personnel of "A"
Services.
Discharges.
Ceremonial
Distribution of GROs and Orders.
Supervision of "A" Staff.

SC (Personal Services)


Provost.
Legal
Education.
Transfers.
Leave
Discipline.
Officers preselection:
Corps Routine Orders.
Administrative orders, Instructions etc.
Elections
Loans.
Medals.

SC (Organisation)

Medical and Hygiene.
Dental.
States and returns.
Reinforcements.
Organization of units.
Provision of instructors for
training units and Schools.
Relief of units and personnel
Finance, Pay, Audits.
Promotions and Demotions.
Trade classifications and
specialist pay.
Graves and Burials.
Prisoners of War.
Visitors, incl civilians.
Order of Battle.
War Diary.



001353C



Q Branch

"Q" Branch

AQMG

DAQMG I

DAQMG II

Staff. Learner (Q)

MOVEMENT, ACCOMMODATION and QUARTERING

Movement by - Road
Sea
Air
Water Transport
Accommodation
Quartering
Engineer Works and Stores
Messes
Claims and Impressments
Losses and deficiencies of
stores and supplies

ANGAU
Labour

SC 'Q'

Assist DAQMG I

MAINTENANCE

Supply and Transport
Ordnance
EME
Catering
Postal
Salvage
Printing and Stationery
Press
Canteens
Kit Stores

SC 'Q'

Assist DAQMG II

War Diary
Office organization
Order of Battle
Location Statement
Security

ST
DDST

Responsible for efficiency of ST Service to maintain all troops under command

Adjt

Office organization, movement of ST Service, General technical administration of Division and Corps troops AASC

<u>DADS</u>	<u>DADS (POL)</u>	<u>DADT</u>	<u>Requisition Officer</u>	<u>Ammunition Officer</u>
Technical supervision of supply depots and installations, (except POL) within the Corps Returns, states and accountancy in relation to supplies and supply situation. Air maintenance.	Technical adviser to DDST Estimating POL requirements and requisitioning maintenance supplies. Corps bulk POL installations. Distribution of POL within the Corps area. Captured POL Liaison with Allied Services Air Services, EME and Salvage on POL matters.	Co-ordination of all Corps AASC transport Requirements on AASC Responsibility for correct standard of maintenance of AASC vehicles, and the efficiency of AASC workshops.	Requisitioning on local resources of AASC supplies. Fresh foodstuffs Assistant to DADS.	Ammunition states Liaison with Div and Corps troops ref ammunition holdings and forward supply amn

ORDNANCE
DDOS

Supervision of Ordnance Service activities within the Corps

ADOS

Supervision of subordinate Ordnance officers Liaison with Ordnance installations

OO

Supervision of office staff, Register of Depot stocks of controlled stores. Preparation of Issue Orders.

IOO

Inspection of ammunition. Corps troops. Supervision of ammunition examiners.

DADOS Corps Tps

Liaison with Corps Units.

OO

Check and approval of indents. Consolidation of Census returns. Advice of field accounts procedure.

EME
DDME

Responsible for organization and efficiency of EME units under command Corps.

EME Adjt
Personal assistant to DDME. Responsible for office administration and general liaison.

EME SA & Armt

EME Wireless

EME Rubber


EME Corps Tps

Inspection and technical liaison with units, workshops and depots. Special investigations, records and reports.

Responsible to DDME for organization and efficiency of EME Corps Tps units.

EME Adjt

Personal assistant to EME. Responsible for office administration, liaison technical data and reports.



NS Branch

NS Branch

DALS

Matters of policy
General Supervision
Liaison with Branches
Honours and awards


SC

SC

Staff Appointments
Aust Air Liaison Secs
Aust Armoured Corps
Royal Australian Artillery
Aust Survey Corps
Aust Corps of Signals
Aust Intelligence Corps
Aust Army Ordnance Corps
Aust Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
Aust Army Legal Corps
Aust Army Provost Corps
Aust Army Records Staff
Aust Army Salvage Service
Aust Army Labour Service
Aust Army Movement Control Staff

Aust Commando Units
Royal Australian Engineers
Aust Infantry
Aust Army Chaplains Department
Aust Army Service Corps
Aust Army Medical Corps
Aust Army Dental Corps
Aust Army Catering Corps
Aust Army Pay Corps
Aust Army Nursing Service
Aust Army Medical Womens Service
Aust Army Education Service
Aust Army Amenities Service
Aust Army Printing and Stationery Service
Aust Army Postal Service
Aust Army Canteens Service

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES - HQ 2 AUSL CORPS



Assist with Commander's official correspondence.
 Arrange appointments for senior staff officers etc with Commander.
 Maintain Commander's official files.
 Control Commander's other rank staff (indexing and amending Commander's copies GPOs etc).
 Study specified routine reports; condensing, marking and reporting on salient points as required.
 Liaison with staff in order both to follow up Commander's directions and keep Commander informed of situation in the staff generally.
 Remain at Corps HQ during absence of Commander to ensure correct and prompt attention to correspondence coming in addressed to Commander.
 Other duties as directed by Commander.

Assist with Commander's personal correspondence.
 Maintain Commander's maps.
 Supervise Commander's quarters and vehicle; control Commander's batman and driver.
 Foster 'A' mess visitors.
 Act as secretary 'A' Mess.
 Arrange itineraries, movement etc for, and accompany Commander on visits to formations etc.
 Ceremonial with 'A' Branch.

10

MEMORANDUM FOR:

From 2 AUST CORPS 310945 L

TO FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Info 3 AUST DIV AMERICAL DIV 11 AUST INF BDE
23 AUST INF BDE 4 AUST BASE SUE AREA USAFNORSOLS
COMNAVNORSOLS COMAIRNORSOLS CONZEAIRTA
84 AC LING RAFF DSIO NORSOLS FELO

0418 secret sitrep 40 to 312000L (.) 3 aust div (.)
PIATERAPAIA area (.) 25 ln (.) D coy supported by arty
attacked and captured enemy posn 686127 by 1615 hrs (.)
quantity weapons captured (.) A coy at 686124 in diversionary
role drew by enemy fire (.) B coy less 10 pl after by fighting
cleared and occupied successive enemy posns 680128 and 680127
linking with 10 pl at 679126 (.) quantity AUST eqpt captured
cas yet unknown (.) JABA RIVER area (.) 47 ln (.) patrol
located dug in jap posn 793636 (.) TAVERA RIVER area (.)
15 ln (.) ref sitrep 57 pl 775618 evacuated by barge (.)
patrol C coy contacted estimated enemy 25 to 30 at 804656
(.) cas for period 301730L to 311300L enemy 15 killed own
2 killed 3 wounded 1 missing all informed

If this message is
liable to be inter-
cepted or to fall into
enemy hands it must
be sent IN CIPHER

ILPORAINT
TO ACTION
ADDRESSEE

.....Lt²Col

Distribution¹₂ PA to Comd CCRA
BGS A
DA & QEG Q (2)
G (Int)(2) BMB
G (Air) War Diary (2)

War Diary (2) ANNEXURE 89

SECRET

2 AUST CORPS ALO BULLETIN No 24

(Compiled from infm to 302030L)

SITUATION

NORTHERN SOLOMONS

1. 3 Aust Div (to 301830L). JABA River area. 47 Bn. 2 hostile natives killed attempting infiltrate our posn 828712. Jap patrol activity line from coast to 815715 followed by minor attacks which were repulsed. Enemy casualties 3 killed own casualties 2 killed 2 wounded. Enemy posn 805716 successfully attacked and area occupied. 301155L estimated 30 - 50 Japs counter attacked with mortar or mountain gun support. Attack repulsed. Enemy casualties 5 killed own casualties 1 killed 2 officers and 6 ORs wounded. 301640L enemy attacked Pl area at 775618 cutting line communications. One pl sent to make contact line communications also cut. PALATERAPALA area. 25 Bn. 300730L following our strike on enemy positions at 685127 two companies with Arty and mortar support established posns on ridge 678130 & 679130 at 1500L. Coy attacking on right flank reached 686125 and held up by terrain and enemy fire. All coys consolidating. Enemy casualties 3 killed own casualties 2 killed 5 wounded.

2. AMERICAL Div (to 301830L). SITNOR
3. 11 Aust Inf Bde (to 301820L). SITNOR
4. 23 Aust Inf Bde. No further report.

NEW BRITAIN

5. C Coy 14/32 Aust Inf Bn moved to LAMPUN F7714. Pl B Coy 1 NGIB now at F7811. AIB report NO enemy mov south IP River F5936.

RELEVANT EXTRACTS FROM PATROL AND NATIVE INFORMATION

BOUGAINVILLE

Reliable source reports that the enemy who were at SIPURA have left that place after building five huts.

CHOISEUL ISLAND

7. Latest report by natives eleven hundred enemy on CHOISEUL.
8. Reliable source reports that no Japs have been seen SE of line running due North from MOGAMOLI River mouth since Jun. Estimated Jap strength in area from that line to LIU LIU eight to ten hundred.
9. Reliable source reports that Jap vigilance has so far prevented pinpointing exact spots NUKIKI area. Seven huts part of old village unlikely good targets. Scouts daily see strong armed patrols covering area from old village to PAVORA River.

TARGET INFORMATION

10. "A" CLASS TARGETS

- ✓ A 11 TARIKUKUVA Dump Delete. Bombed by 10 Corsairs 30 Dec.
- A 19 Ref Map NUMA: NUMA Japs are reoccupying old camp site around
1/25000 Area outstanding fiscus. (AIB 28 Dec)
788312

Otherwise no change.

11. "B" CLASS TARGETS

- B 15 MANOB L2083 Jap concentration. Possible dump site.
Photograph now available for briefing.
- B 12 AVIS Reported Jap concentration. Presence Japs
confirmed by sighting of barge under trees this
area on 29 Dec. Photographs are now available
for briefing.
- B 23 TAKI 496642 Possible Jap staging point on route BUIN - KIETA.
Presence Japs confirmed by SAA fire which holed
a Corsair when strafing a pill box on 28 Dec.
On 27 Dec 25 ft outrigger canoe was destroyed
here and approx 30 sets footprints were visible
along the beach between LULUAI River and TAKI.

Otherwise No change

12. OTHER TARGETS

The following targets were suspended pending receipt of air photos,
They are now deleted from this summary as registered targets as no pin
points can be made.

A 5 WIDA
B 13 NAMKARIO

AIR FORCE BOMBLINE

13. No change. See ALO BULLETIN No 22, para 11.

G(Air)
30 Dec 44.

[Signature]
Capt
GS

DISTRIBUTION: As for ALO BULLETIN No 23.

ANNEXURE 91

SECRET

GS MINUTE NO. 273

Subject: GARRISON - OUTER ISLANDS

A
Q

Copies to:

RAA 2 Aust Corps
CE
CSO

1. It is intended to reduce the garrisons for the ground defence of the outer islands to a total force of one infantry battalion group, disposed as follows :-

One company	- EMIRAU ISLAND
One company	- GREEN ISLAND
Battalion (less two companies)	- TREASURY ISLAND
Platoon from TREASURY ISLAND to be prepared to move to MUNDA	

2. Attached as Appendix A is Projected Order of Battle for the area, showing allotment of operational units of ground forces of the various arms, and static AA units.

3. The following shows the RAAF and RNZAF units and strengths to be allocated for each of the islands:-

EMIRAU ISLAND	- 777
GREEN ISLAND	- 1045
TREASURY ISLAND	- Unknown
MUNDA	- Unknown

T O T A L 1822

The above figures are a minimum, given purely as a guide for planning purposes at this stage. As soon as accurate figures are available, addressees will be notified.

4. It is requested that a list of the administrative units required for the area on the new basis be submitted to G(Ops) in the form of a Projected Order of Battle, for each island, by 1600 hrs 24 Dec.

(SGD) B H TRAVERS Major
for Lt-Col
GS 2 Aust Corps

G(Ops)
Ext 13
24 Dec 44

6000 10000

SECRET

Subject: GARRISONS - OUTER ISLANDS

HQ 2 Aust Corps (AIF)
G/528/Ops
31 Dec 44

First Aust Army

1. 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp is at present garrisoning the OUTER ISLANDS as follows :-

ENIRAU	One inf bn gp
GRAN	One inf bde gp less two bn gps
TREASURY ISLAND	One inf bn gp less one coy gp
MUNDA	One inf coy gp.

The primary purpose of these garrisons is to afford protection to air and naval installations in each area. These at present comprise US Navy units on all islands and US and NZ air units on ENIRAU and GRAN ISLANDS. The US air units have been warned for movement at an early date and US naval personnel are to be reduced to minimum on all islands, except TREASURY as soon as practicable. TREASURY ISLAND may be retained as a training area for PT squadrons for an indefinite period.

2. Facilities for training the infantry garrisons on the several islands are very limited and troops engaged on this role will deteriorate both in efficiency and in morale.

3. Any attack launched by the enemy with the object of re-establishing control of any of the islands must be sea-borne. Such an attack from bases outside the SOLOMONS - NEW GUINEA - NEW BRITAIN area, even if it is considered, be ruled out as improbable, if not impossible, under existing conditions. The nearest base from which it might be launched is TRUK, 560 miles from ENIRAU and would have to be undertaken without air or naval support.

4. Distances of the several islands from the nearest enemy occupied areas are :-

ENIRAU	- KAVIENG	85 miles
ENIRAU	- RABUL	250 miles
GRAN	- 8 VM NEW IRELAND	85 miles
GRAN	- HELL BURN	46 miles
TREASURY	- CH. ISLANDS	13 miles
MUNDA	- NORTH CHOISEUL	125 miles

In all cases, except TREASURY, over-water movement must be over considerable distance and the only craft available to the enemy are barges. The best information is that, with the possible exception of the RABUL area, the JAP has insufficient barges to move troops in numbers large enough to constitute any threat to the islands now occupied by us.

Owing to our air and sea control over the approaches such a movement could, at the best, be only in the nature of a suicide raid.

5. Apart from the Aust garrisons now provided, the strength of NZAF units on the islands will be approximately :-

REIRAU 800
CREW 1050

It is understood that US strength at MURDA will remain at several thousands until possibly the end of June.

In all cases these units are capable of a static defence role.

6. - If, and when, the AEF assumes responsibility for maintenance of REIRAU, additional units would have to be provided from outside the resources of 23 Aust Inf Bde Gp. This subject was dealt with in 2 Aust Corps G141 of 22 Dec.

7. The implementation of this proposal will :-

- (a) release the bulk of 23 Aust Inf Bde Gp for concentration at TOROKINA as a Corps reserve and for employment in the major task of clearing BULGIVILLE.
- (b) reduce the maintenance commitment to the OUTER ISLAND
- (c) ensure the maintenance of efficiency and morale in units of 23 Aust Inf Bde.

8. - At Appendix 'A' is a suggested re-distribution of Aust forces in the OUTER ISLANDS.

At Appendix 'B' is a movement schedule for the redistribution suggested.

Appendix 'A' shows one inf pl at MURDA. It is for consideration whether this is essential and it would be appreciated if 2 Aust Corps could be released of the necessity for maintaining any garrison there.

It is not possible here to get any firm dates or even a reliable guess at the dates by which US air and naval units will finally evacuate the various islands, nor whether they will subsequently be required as staging points for US air, naval or army units.

9. It is recommended that a naval be given to re-distribute Aust units in the OUTER ISLANDS in accordance with COB as shown at Appendix 'A' and to effect movement as shown at Appendix 'B'. Also a decision is requested as to the retention of a garrison at MURDA.

SGD STAN G SAVIGE
Lieutenant-General
Commander 2 Aust Corps

Copies to: PA to Comd
BOB
DA & JG
A
ES
War diary (2)

SECRET

Appendix 'A' to
HQ 3 Aust Corps
5/28/68

PROJECTED ORDER OF BATTLE
FOR THE OUTER ISLANDS

Serial	Unit	Personnel	Vehs	Remarks
<u>EMIRAU ISLAND</u>				
1	52 Aust Sqn AL Sec	3	2	Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
2	One Coy 7 Aust Inf Bn	132		From TREASURY ISLAND
3	Det 38 Aust Wireless Task Sec	19		Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
4	Det 1 Aust Fortress Sig Sec	12	2	Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
5	HQ 32 Aust RAA Bty	22	3	Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
6	474 Aust RAA Tp (static)	114	6	Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
7	475 Aust RAA Tp (static)	114	6	Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
8	6 Aust AA Ops Room	20	1	Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
9	One sec A Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	9	6	Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
10	Det 244 Aust Sup Dep Pl	10		Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
11	Det 6 Aust 2d Baking Pl	4		Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
12	Det 109 Aust 2d Baking Pl	13	2	Remaining EMIRAU ISLAND
13	Lt Sec 17 Aust 2d Amb	21		From GREEN ISLAND
TOTAL		512	23	
<u>GREEN ISLAND</u>				
14	15 Aust Sqn AL Sec	3	2	Remaining GREEN ISLAND
15	One Coy 7 Aust Inf Bn	132		From TREASURY ISLAND
16	36 Aust Wireless Task Sec (less det)	19		Remaining GREEN ISLAND
17	One Aust RAA Tp	114	6	From AUSTRALIA
18	One Sec A Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	9	6	From EMIRAU ISLAND
19	Det 244 Aust Sup Dep Pl	7		Det from EMIRAU ISLAND, TREASURY ISLAND, MURDA
20	Det 6 Aust 2d Baking Pl	7		Remaining GREEN ISLAND
Carried Forward		291	14	

Serial	Unit	Personnel	Vehs	Remarks
<u>GREEN ISLAND (Continued)</u>				
	Brought Forward	291	14	
21	Det 17 Aust Fd Amb	20		Remaining GREEN ISLAND
22	Half Surgical Team			Remaining GREEN ISLAND
23	Det 109 Aust Ede Wksp	8	1	Remaining GREEN ISLAND
	TOTALS	320	15	
<u>TRASURY ISLAND</u>				
24	7 Aust Inf Bn (less two coys and one pl)	532	15	
25	38 Aust Wireless Task Sec (less det)	19		Remaining TRASURY ISLAND
26	244 Aust Sup Dep Pl (less dets)	15		Remaining TRASURY ISLAND
27	Det 6 Aust Fd Baking Pl	2		Remaining TRASURY ISLAND
28	Det 109 Aust Ede Wksp	6	1	Remaining TRASURY ISLAND
	TOTALS	574	16	
<u>MUNDA</u>				
29	One Pl 7 Aust Inf Bn	39	1	Remaining MUNDA
30	Det 38 Aust Wireless Task Sec	19		Remaining MUNDA
	TOTALS	58	1	
	<u>TOTAL OUTER ISLANDS</u>	<u>1454</u>	<u>30</u>	

SECRET

Appendix 'B' to
HQ 2 Aust Corps
G/228/0ps

MOVEMENT PRIORITY LIST FOR THE REDUCTION OF GARRISONS IN

THE OUTER ISLANDS

- NOTES :
1. 23 Aust Inf Bde remains under command 2 Aust Corps.
 2. Units will move with unit equipment, accommodation stores and tentage.
 3. Projected garrisons will be concentrated on respective islands prior to withdrawal of surplus troops.
 4. Figures shown under personnel and vehicles are approximate.
 5. Movements already arranged, e.g. 23 Aust PI Coy, have been omitted.

Priority (a)	Unit (b)	Personnel (c)	Vehs (d)	Remarks (e)
	<u>SMIRAU - TOROKINA</u>			
1	3 Inf Bn	835	16	
2	Bat 23 Inf Bde Sig Sec	3		
3	A Pl (less two secs) with det RDI and one Chap Sec 131 Gen Ppt Coy	32	30	One sec & personnel & vehicles to remain
4	2/103 Ld (Type J) (less det)	19	10	Det moves TOROKINA Island
5	B Coy 17 Pz Amb	24	4	
6	Bat 109 Bde Wksp	10	1	Det 13 personnel to remain
7	Bat 109 Bde Ord & Pk	3	1	
8	B Sec 82 Dental Unit	5		
9	Bat HQF Sec AA Contingent Service	2		
10	Bat 14 Indep Bde up Pz Pl	4	1 2	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
	<u>EMIRAU - TOROKINA</u> (Continued)			
11	Det 2/1 Mov & Tn Gp	9	2	
	<u>MUNDA - TOROKINA</u>			
1	Det D Pl 131 Gap Tpt Coy	4	3	
1a	Det A Coy 17 Fd Amb	7	1	
2	Det 2/1 Mov & Tn Gp	7	2	
	<u>GREEN - TOROKINA</u>			
1	HQ 23 Inf Bde	90	6	
2	Det 4 Cipher Sec	2		
3	23 Inf Bde Sig Sec (less dets)	42	6	
4	Det 5 Wireless Sec (lt)	6		
5	28 Pl G Coy 2/1 Gd Regt	41		
6	27 Inf Bn	835	16	
7	243 Sup Dep Pl	27	2	
8	40 Indep Tpt Pl	87	42	
9	A Sec 82 Dental Unit	5		
10	17 Fd Amb (less two coys)	106	2	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
	<u>GRAND - TOROZINA</u> (Continued)			
11	Det 12 Div Postal Unit	4		
12	14 Indep Bde Op Pro Fl (less dets)	21	3 1 1/2	
13	109 Bde Grd Pd Pk (less dets)	13	15	
14	109 Bde Akap (less dets)	32	14	
15	Det ASF AA Anticomm Service	2		
16	Det 2/1 Gov & In Op	9	2	
	<u>TREASURY - TOROZINA</u>			
1	Det 25 Inf Bde Sig Sec	4		
2	B Fl with det RSI and one skap see 131 Gen Tpt Coy (less det)	67	40	
3	Det 109 Bde Grd Pd Pk	4	1	
4	Det 109 Bde Akap	35		
5	C Sec 22 Postal Unit	5		
6	A Coy 17 Pd Amb (less dets)	27	3	
7	Det 14 Indep Bde Op Pro Fl	7	1 2 1/2	
8	Det ASF Sec AAC Anticomm Service	2		
9	Det 2/1 Gov & In Op	7	4	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
	<u>TREASURY - EMIRAU</u>			
1	One Coy 7 Inf Bn	132		
	<u>TREASURY - GREEN</u>			
1	Det 244 Sup Dep Pl	1		
2	One Coy 3 Inf Bn	132		
	<u>MUNDA - GREEN</u>			
1	Det 244 Sup Dep Pl	3		
	EMIRAU - TREASURY			
	<u>EMIRAU - GREEN</u>			
1	One sec A pl 131 Gen Tpt Coy	9	6	
2	Det 244 Sup Dep Pl	3		
3	Lt Sec 17 Fd Amb	11		
	TOROKINA - EMIRAU			
1	62 Sen AL Sec	3	2	

SECRETWar Diary (2)2 AUST CORPS ALO BULLETIN No 25

(Compiled from infm to 312030L)

SITUATIONNORTHERN SOLOMONS

1. 3 Aust Div (to 311830L). PIATERAPAIA area. 25 Bn. B Coy supported by arty attacked and captured enemy positions at 686127 by 1614L. Quantity weapons captured. A Coy 686124 in diversionary role. B Coy less 10 pl after heavy fighting cleared and occupied successive enemy positions at 680128 and 680127 linking with 10 pl at 679126. Quantity Aust equipment captured. Cas as yet unknown. JABA RIVER area. 47 Bn. Patrol located dug in Jap posn at 793636. TAVERA RIVER area. 15 Bn. ref ALO Bulletin No 24 Pl reported at 775618 evacuated by barge. Patrol from C Coy contacted estimated 25-30 enemy at 804656. Cas for period 301730L to 311300L enemy 15 killed own 2 killed 1 wounded one missing.

2. All other areas SITNOR.

RELEVANT EXTRACTS FROM PATROL AND NATIVE INFORMATION

3. Allied patrol arrived vicinity DARIE (L5453) on 30 Dec. Area quiet. Search for missing Avenger (North BOUGAINVILLE) was abandoned on 29 Dec.

4. The NZ air crew member who survived the Ventura crash in North BOUGAINVILLE and the Auster pilot who crashed while attempting to evacuate the injured airman are due to reach coast near KURATIO Mission on 1 Jan 45. They will be evacuated by sea to TOROKINA same day. ETA TOROKINA 011800L.

5. Japs are reported moving to investigate AITA strip.

TARGET INFORMATION

6. No change

AIR FORCE BOMBLINE

7. No change. See ALO Bulletin No 22 para 11.

G(Air)
31 Dec 44.

Spulham
Capt
GS

DISTRIBUTION : As for ALO BULLETIN No 23.

ANNEXURE. 93.

SECRET

Copy No

25

31 Dec 44

2 AUST CORPS OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO 4

Issued to 11 AUST INF BDE

Ref Maps: BOUGAINVILLE - 4 miles to one inch

APPRECIATION

1. Attached at Appx "A" is a summary, with trace, showing the latest disposition and strength of enemy garrisons in North BOUGAINVILLE. This information has been obtained from a reliable source as a result of observation and extensive patrolling in the area during recent weeks.
2. It is believed that by the employment of small fighting patrols operating on information obtained by native police and guides and led to the areas where enemy garrisons are located, it will be possible to eliminate them one by one and establish complete control of the West coast at least up to, and probably including, SORAKEN HARBOUR.
3. It is considered that the object can best be attained by using ANGAU natives and the advice of an ANGAU officer rep to the maximum possible extent. Each operation must be well and thoroughly planned with the object of effecting complete surprise. To avoid giving the enemy warning resulting in the possible concentration or withdrawal of garrisons, it may be desirable to execute surprise attacks on 2 or 3 garrisons simultaneously. The constant object should be to place our tps in rear of the enemy and to ensure that none escape.
4. After the elimination of enemy garrisons up to PORPORO subsequent operations may take one, or a combination of the following courses -
 - (a) Clearance of the enemy within the neck North to BUKA PASSAGE.
 - (b) Containing the enemy in the neck North of the line PORPORO - SIAR whilst patrolling along the East coast towards TINPUTS.

The initiation of this phase will depend upon craft being available to establish and maintain sufficient force in the SORAKEN HARBOUR area, and, in consequence may have to be delayed until the arrival of additional craft from Australia.

ROLE

5. 11 Aust Inf Bde will
 - (a) Establish a bn firm base in ANUN area.
 - (b) Conduct operations with the object of destroying enemy garrisons and establishing control along the West coast of BOUGAINVILLE up to SORAKEN HARBOUR.
6. The above task will be undertaken as soon as that laid down in 2 Aust Corps O I 3 para 9 (c) is completed.

ADDITIONAL TPS ALLOTTED

7. Det 5 Aust Wireless Sec (Lt)
41 Pigeon Loft
Det ANGAU - cond Capt TAME

ADM

8. 2 Aust Corps resources will be made available to the extent of moving bn gp with necessary reserves to AMON area, and for its maintenance in that area.
9. Maintenance of patrols forward of the bn firm base, or of coy firm bases established forward, will be the responsibility of 11 Aust Inf Bde. For this purpose 2 LCV (P) will be allotted as from 6 Jan 45.
10. Application will be made to this HQ for native carriers if necessary. However, demands in this respect must be kept to the absolute minimum and priority will be given to the NUMA NUMA trail and 3 Aust Div.
11. Evacuation of casualties will be :
 - (a) To bn firm base under arrangements 11 Aust Inf Bde.
 - (b) From bn firm base under arrangements 2 Aust Corps on advice from 11 Aust Inf Bde.

LIAISON

12. As from receipt of this Instr 11 Aust Inf Bde will deal direct with ANGAU as to the composition etc of the ANGAU det to accompany the bn

ACK

Signed at 0850.... Hrs

AP Garrett Brig
GS 2 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION

	<u>COPY NO</u> (With Appx A & B)	<u>METHOD OF ISSUE</u>
11 Aust Inf Bde	1	Offr Safe Hand
3 Aust Div	2	"
Americal Div	3	"
23 Aust Inf Bde	4	Air Safe Hand
RAA 2 Aust Corps	5	Offr Safe Hand
4 Aust Base Sub Area	6	"
COMNAVHORSOLS	7	"
COMAIRHORSOLS	8	"
COMZEAIRTA	9	"
84 AC Wing RAAF	10	"
ANGAU	11	"
DSIO	12	"
First Aust Army	13	Air Safe Hand
PA to Cond	14	Officer Safe Hand
BCS	15	"
DA&QMG	16	"
G(Ops)	17	"
G(Int)	18	"
CE	19	"
CSO	20	"
A	21	"
Q	22	"
File	23	"
War Diary	24 - 25	

SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION - NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

Compiled from ANGAU Deep Penetration Patrol Aug-Dec 1944.

Reliability not particularly accurate in respect to figures of enemy strengths.

Locations and movements of enemy reported by direct observation by trained native scouts and considered reliable.

No accurate information is obtainable regarding enemy occupied territory north of a line from SORAKEN HARBOUR to RURI Bay.

Ref Map BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND NORTH 4 miles to 1 inch series.

1. Attached as Appx B is map showing enemy strengths and dispositions.

2. EQUIPMENT, AMMUNITION AND FOOD

Equipment: Equipment of all garrisons except those at LAJUM Convalescent Billets is sufficient and serviceable.

Ammunition: SAA ammunition found by patrols was of normal patrol scale and ample reserves of rifle and LMG ammunition were found in posts and garrison Headquarters. No mortars or mortar bombs found in these Headquarters which were attacked by our patrols.

Food: All garrisons are dependent on their own gardens or native foods. No field rations were found, but rice and supplies from dumps near PORTON were recently transported to NUMA NUMA.

3. HEALTH

Physical condition is good with absence of tropical sores, Beri Beri and Yaws. Medical supplies very meagre and bandages infrequently carried.

4. MORALE

Most garrisons show extreme nervousness at signs of hostile action. Morale is depressed and aggressive spirit low. It is considered they would fight stubbornly from all defended garrison posts.

5. ATTITUDE OF NATIVES

Pro Japanese natives are:- RURI DAY, growing food for Japs; ROTSOA providing 50 carriers; LEUSS, SUBIANA and NANAKERO villages are dominated by pro Japanese police boys. Elsewhere natives are hostile, will not carry for the Japs, and will not supply them with food and have hidden in their gardens and villages. They will not take hostile action against the Japanese unless supported morally or with weapons from a European patrol. It is considered that natives in all areas, except those known to be hostile, will help Allied patrols.

6. TOPOGRAPHICAL

All trails crossing the EMPEROR RANGE from coast to coast are very rough and for this reason and the hostility of the natives are not used by the Japanese. On the west coast SOUTH of SIPAAI tracks are swampy, rough and exhausting. Northward to PORPORO the track is good and jeepable in parts. Rivers are frequent and supply good water and prevent no difficulty in crossing by infantry. All can be crossed at their mouths. The Japanese use these


tracks exclusively for travelling from the west coast to the east, linking at PORPORC with the main Jap-L of C which leads to the coast at SIAR on RURI BAY and follows the coast-line to NUMA NUMA. Rivers on this NE coast are frequent and deeper and swifter than on the west coast. They are impassable for some hours after heavy rains. The WAKUNI River provides hazardous crossing for Infantry. Inland trails exist on both coastlines and provide communications parallel with the main coastal tracks. These tracks had not been disclosed to the Japanese and are not likely to be disclosed or found by the Japanese, as they are kept carefully hidden to provide natives with escape routes and avenues for evading punitive or predatory patrols by Japanese and tax gathering patrols by District Officers in times of peace. On the west coast carrier potential is between 200 and 250 and on the NE coast considerably less because the natives are in poor physical condition.

APPX "B" to 2 Aust Corps
Operation Instruction No 4

-- OVERLAY --

--- BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND NORTH ---

1:253,440



001354D



ANNEXURE 9A.

SECRET

Subject: DESPATCH RIDER LETTER SERVICE AND SAFE HAND DESPATCH

TIMETABLES

Amendment No 1

HQ 2 Aust Corps (AIF)
G/319 /SD
31 Dec 44

Distribution List 'D':
(Branches, etc., formations, to incl Inf Bdes
and Corps Tps)
plus serials 52, 53, 55, 57-60.

... 1. Attached hereto is a revised timetable for schedules
1 and 2 which were attached as Appendices 'A' and 'B' to HQ 2
Aust Corps G/88/SD of 30 Nov.

2. The new schedules operate as from 0700L hrs 1 Jan 45.


J.H.P. [Signature]
for Brig
G3 2 Aust Corps

SECRET

DRLS SCHEMATIC TIME TABLE

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

SCHEDULE 1




- NB. 1. DESPATCHES FOR NEW GUINEA AND AUSTRALIA
FINAL CLEARANCE RUN 2.
2. DESPATCHES FROM NEW GUINEA AND AUSTRALIA
FIRST DELIVERY RUN 4.
(PERMITTING ARRIVAL OF AIR COURIER)

SECRET

DRLS SCHEMATIC TIME TABLE

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

SCHEDULE 2



MAPS

4 Dec	- IBU	1:25000
	KOWARA	"
	NUMA NUMA	"
5 Dec	- RURAVO	"
12 Dec	- ARIGUA	"
16 Dec	- TEIHUP	"
20 Dec	- TENEKAU	1:63360
22 Dec	- PIPIPAIA	1:25000
23 Dec	- RUSEI	"
	MONOITU	"
24 Dec	- MAMAGOTA	"
	MOILA PT	"
	KAHILI AIRDROME	"
25 Dec	- KARA AIRDROME	"
	KAUKUAI	"
	PIANO MISSION	"
27 Dec	- MOISURU BAY	"
	INUS	1:63360
	SAMIEI RIVER	1:25000
	MT BOEDER	1:25000

ANNEXURE 95.

HQ 2 AUST CORPS - OFFICERS POSTED TO
OPERATIONS - AIR - LIAISON - CHEMICAL

WARFARE & SURVEY

As at 31 Dec 44

Appointment	Number	Rank	Name	Remarks
<u>OPERATIONS</u>				
GSO I	NX12259	Lt-Col	E S EVERS	Leave
GSO II	NX17	Maj	B H TRAVERS	
GSO II	NX114872	Maj	J E H PILCHER	
GSO III	VX51690	Capt	E J WISCHUSEN	
GSO III	QX36202	Capt	D GEILIS	
Staff Learner	QX6303	Capt	S M MAXWELL	
Attached	NX127352	Capt	G A COLMAN	
OIC Message Control	VX81110	Lt	H J FORD	
<u>AIR</u>				
GSO II	VX60292	Capt	D P DERHAM	
<u>LIAISON</u>				
GSO I	VX138	Lt-Col	H B CHALLEN	Leave
GSO II	DXB61	Maj	W D MATTHEW	
GSO III				
<u>CHEMICAL WARFARE</u>				
Technical Officer	NX121465	Capt	J W MUMFORD	
<u>SURVEY</u>				
AD Survey	NX17516	Maj	H A JOHNSON	
Capt Survey	NX76232	Capt	G C BRADLEY	

DATE

EVENTS

APPX

3	2 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 2	1
10	" " " " " " " "	2
17	" " " " " " " "	3
23	" " " " " " " "	4
2	Field Return of Officers W 3008	5
9	" " " " " " " "	6
16	" " " " " " " "	7
23	" " " " " " " "	8
30	" " " " " " " "	9
2	Field Return of Other Ranks W 3009	10
9	" " " " " " " "	11
16	" " " " " " " "	12
23	" " " " " " " "	13
30	" " " " " " " "	14

Lt-col
GS

Subject : OFFICERS ENGAGED ON INTELLIGENCE DUTIES
Dec 44

GSO	I	VX 27463	Lt-Col	WILSON	E H	
GSO	II	VX 337	Maj	KNOX	W McP	
GSO	III	VX 2038	Capt	MACFARLAN	C G	
IO		VX 85008	Capt	WOOD	G M F	
IO		VX 104088	Capt	McMICHAEL	A W	
IO		VX 101691	Lt	CASH	A H	(ARL)
IO		WX 27747	Lt	SALMON	F R	(Attached 3 Div)
IO		VX 18610	Lt	KING	F S	

Army Form W3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
6-2512 (Serial No.)

W.E. III 20 / 1 OFFRS. 5 O.R's 7 + OFFRS. _____ O.R's _____ ATT. BY W.E. _____

[illegible]

* Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 U.S. Forces.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

Army Form W260C
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
6, 144 (Serial No.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Eicher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	SURNAME.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Col	JA 5000	Wheeler	H. E.	8	Yes		
"	JA 1000	W. H. H. H.	H. E.				
Lt Col	JA 1700	Wheeler	H. E.				
"	JA 1000	Wheeler	H. E.				
"	JA 1000	Wheeler	H. E.				

[illegible]

James E. Capt
Signature of Commander

Army Form W3003
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
104 (Serial No.)

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

* Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.S. Forces; 10 K.Z. Forces.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO _____ (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ____/____/194____.

Date of Despatch

Army Form W2008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
____ (Serial No.)

At 9600 Hrs. Saturday 7/11/1941 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Signature of Commander

Army Form W2093
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
(Serial No.)

(Unit)

ATT. BY W.E.

TS REQUIRED.

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in pers. ID of instructions for compilation of forms will complete Part E(1) & E(2).

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
 * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

DURING WEEK.

CAUSE:

CAUSE.

.....(Unit) IS

sent whereabouts if known).

Army Form W3003
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
50 / 44 (Serial No.)

Unit

/194. (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

[illegible]

OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

[illegible]

James Edward O'Neil
Signature of Commander

Army Form W3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
9/44 (Serial No.)

W.E. 11/1/80 OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. - O.R's. - ATT. BY W.E.

[illegible]

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for completion of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).

* Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

[illegible][illegible][illegible]

Army Form W3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
9 / 44 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 23/12/1944.^u (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

[illegible][illegible]

Robert Cap
Signature of Commander

Army Form W3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1941)
10 / 44 (Serial No.)

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 19 of instructions for compilation of forms will complete Part E(1) & E(2).

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

OFFICERS QUITTED' DURING WEEK.

**PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO _____ (Unit) IS
PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ____/____/194 ____.**

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Asset Cops See Asset Ld Cops. Unit

Army Form W3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
40 / 44 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 30/12/1944 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

[illegible][illegible]

30-12-44
Date of Despatch

Jeff Busch Capt
Signature of Commander

Army Form W-3002 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
Revised Jan. 1963
00,42 (Serial No.)

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units. **Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.**

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To_____ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. ____/____/194_____

2 and Corp See And 2 Corp Unit

Army Form W2009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
6, 44 Serial No.

NOTES--(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
 (b) Authorized trades or specialties not included in this will be added as required in spaces provided.
 (c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.W.M.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
 (d) Where replacement or destruction of this form by action of W.M. is indicated, the words "Rebuilt Required."
 (e) Where any request or solution is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

Signature of Commander

Army Form W.3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
71-441 (Serial No.)

WE 11/2/11 OFFERS 0 R's 1 + OFFERS 0 R's ATT. BY WE.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. ENROLLING ATTACHED.				DETAILS.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Releifs Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Ported Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Ported Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Releifs Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
/	/		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
/	"	/	6*	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2		.			.

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for completion of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

* Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in the Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.S. Forces, 10 M.Z. Forces.

Detail	A.I.F.	C.M.P.		A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	..	TOTAL
		Under 18 Years.	18 Years and over.							
A	6						100%	100%		
B(1)										
B(2)						100%				

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.	
1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	
9.	
10.	
11.	
12.	
13.	
14.	
15.	
16.	
17.	
18.	
19.	
20.	
21.	
22.	
23.	
24.	
25.	
26.	
27.	
28.	
29.	
30.	
31.	
32.	
33.	
34.	
35.	
36.	
37.	
38.	
39.	
40.	
41.	
42.	
43.	
44.	
45.	
46.	
47.	
48.	
49.	
50.	
51.	
52.	
53.	
54.	
55.	
56.	
57.	
58.	
59.	
60.	
61.	
62.	
63.	
64.	
65.	
66.	
67.	
68.	
69.	
70.	
71.	
72.	
73.	
74.	
75.	
76.	
77.	
78.	
79.	
80.	
81.	
82.	
83.	
84.	
85.	
86.	
87.	
88.	
89.	
90.	
91.	
92.	
93.	
94.	
95.	
96.	
97.	
98.	
99.	
100.	

[illegible][illegible]

Army Form W3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1953)
Serial No.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Balance Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Balance Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Balance Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Balance Required.
Ammunition Handlers				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.S.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Tailmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireles				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Cyclists				Plasterers			
Armament Artificer Signaller				Welders				Painters				Printers			
Armament Artificer Wireman								Panel Decors				Reckoners			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographers, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Printer Numbers				Saddle-tree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevenson			
Compass								Riggers				Stokers, Staty, Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Stokers, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Assmen				Signwriters				Textile Reelers			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Typewrite Identif. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				City, Comm'n. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Bottle-makers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winckmen				Weldersmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mach. (Eng. and Med.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drummers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gas Operator				Battery Surveyors							
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers							
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks							
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signal)				Intelligence Duties				Coch Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concoctors							
Mechanics, Radio				Linsman				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Melwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, E.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics							
Pharmacist				Masons				Driver Typin. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hand, I.C.							
Photo-writer				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Molders				Farriers							
Saw Decors				Nurses, Trained				Filters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Total of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.			

NOTES--(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorized trades or specialties not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.A.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.I. in col. "Reints. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

16 12/1941 *Langford*
 14 0600 Hrs. Saturday *12/1941* *Langford* (Unit)
 WE *11/1* OFFERS *3* O.R's *7* + OFFERS O.R's ATT. BY WE

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.[illegible]**Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.**[illegible]

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To_____ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. ____/____/194

[illegible]

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 16/12/1944.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Balance Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Balance Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Balance Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Balance Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Aids				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, E.A.S.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammameters			
Armament Artificer Filter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Filter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Filter (A.F.V.)				Tailmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Hospital			
Armament Artificer Instrumental				Turners				Operator, Wireman				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Painkillers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Dealers				Schoolmasters			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographers, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddle-tree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stewards			
Computers								Eigvers				Stokers, Steamy, Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Archivers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Editors			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telephone Identifi- Numberers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Str. Const's. Arch.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boiler-makers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchmen				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signal)				Driver-Mach. (Eng. and Mech.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycles)				Drainers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors							
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Bathers							
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks							
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (General)				Intelligence Drills				Cook Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Jobsers				Converters							
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Linemans, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Dressmakers, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics							
Pharmacist				Massours				Driver Typ. Plant							
Photographer, Dry Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, L.C.							
Photo-writer															

NOTES--(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorized trades or specialties not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.S. in col. "Refill Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

Army Form W3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1942.)
9 / 44 (Serial No.)

W.E. 10/10/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's 7 + OFFRS. 1 O.R's - ATT. BY W.E.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfa. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfa. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
1	1		1	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
1	1		1	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		*			*

Detail	C.M.F.				A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
	A.L.F.	Under 18 Years.	19 Years and over.								
A	6										
B(1)											
B(2)											

* Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.	
1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	
5.	
6.	
7.	
8.	
9.	
10.	
11.	
12.	
13.	
14.	
15.	
16.	
17.	
18.	
19.	
20.	
21.	
22.	
23.	
24.	
25.	
26.	
27.	
28.	
29.	
30.	
31.	
32.	
33.	
34.	
35.	
36.	
37.	
38.	
39.	
40.	
41.	
42.	
43.	
44.	
45.	
46.	
47.	
48.	
49.	
50.	
51.	
52.	
53.	
54.	
55.	
56.	
57.	
58.	
59.	
60.	
61.	
62.	
63.	
64.	
65.	
66.	
67.	
68.	
69.	
70.	
71.	
72.	
73.	
74.	
75.	
76.	
77.	
78.	
79.	
80.	
81.	
82.	
83.	
84.	
85.	
86.	
87.	
88.	
89.	
90.	
91.	
92.	
93.	
94.	
95.	
96.	
97.	
98.	
99.	
100.	

[illegible][illegible]

Army Form W3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1941)

9 / 11 Serial No.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Skills Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Skills Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Skills Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Skills Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammameters			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Metal			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangefinders			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wiremen								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographers, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddle-tree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevenson			
Campers								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Stonemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensars				Assmen				Signwriters				Textile Reelers			
Drummers				Bakers				Tricopee Meath. Numbers				Turnsmiths			
Drummers (Architectural)				Sty. Comd's Asst.				Wall Serrers				Vulcanizers			
Drummers (Engineering)				Bellarmakers				Wheelers				Wayen Erectors			
Drummers (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Drummers (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Mod.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				5	5		
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				2	1	1	
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks							
Grinder, Precision				Radio Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signal)				Intelligence Drills				Couch Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Coverers							
Mechanics, Radio				Linemen				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Linemen, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Drummers, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanism							
Pharmacist				Masons				Driver Tyde. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hand, I.C.							
Photewriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Molders				Farriers							
Saw Declars				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	7	6	1

NOTES--(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
 (b) Authorized trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
 (c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are destroyed show details on back.
 (d) Where replacement is desired code accordingly by insertion of "R" in col. "Retains Required."
 (e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

23-12-44
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

Army Form W3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1942.)
10 144 (Serial No.)

W.E. III / 800 / 1 OFFRS. 5 O.R.'s 7 + OFFRS. - O.R.'s - ATT. BY W.E.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
W.R. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.R.					
Reinf. Required.	Deficient W.R.	Surplus to W.R.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.R.	Deficient W.R.	Reinf. Required.	
				W.Os. Class I.						
				W.Os. Class II.						
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.						
				Staff Sergeants						
				Sergeants						
				Corporals						
1	1		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.						
				Civilians counting as O.R.						
1.	1		6.	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.						

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).		Detail	A.L.P.	C.M.F.		A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.P.	**	TOTAL
Under 15 Years	15 Years and over.											
		A	6									6
		B(1)										
		B(2)										

* = Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 W.R. Forces.

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

[illegible][illegible]

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
10/44 Serial No.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Ratio Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Ratio Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Ratio Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Ratio Required.
Ammunition Trainers				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assist.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammersmen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Binders			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing (Mental)			
Armament Artificer Instructors				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Receptacles			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Sawyers			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographers, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddlestitch makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stereomakers			
Computers								Riggers				Stokers, Steamy Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Stokers, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tanners			
Dispensers				Armen				Signwriters				Textile Editors			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telegraph Identifi- cation				Turners			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Blk. Comd's. Asst.				Well Rovers				Valmashers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Bulldozers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Mod.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drummers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gas)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrumental)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				BATMEN	5	5	-
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hitchman				Bathers				DURS MT.	2	1	1
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks							
Grinder, Precision				Hoile Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrumental				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrumental (Signals)				Intelligence Duties				Couch Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrumental (Surgical)				Joiners				Constructors							
Mechanics, Radio				Linenmen				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Linenmen, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.E.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanic							
Pharmacist				Masons				Driver Typ. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.							
Photewriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Blacklers				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Males							
Surveyors				Observation Post Assist.				Gen Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.			

NOTES:--(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorized trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.B. and/or A.A.M.W.B. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.B. in col. "Reints. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

30-12-44
Date of Despatch

Jefferson Capt
Signature of Commander

War Diary

SECRET

Copy No. 45

GSI

2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 2

NOTE

1. A receipt for this summary is not required. Recipients are requested to note serial numbers and bring under immediate notice non receipt of any issue.
2. Items marked with a single sideline in the margin will not be reproduced for circulation below Bde HQ.
3. Items marked with three sidelines will not be reproduced without the permission of G I(Int) 2 Aust Corps.
4. Except as specified above, items contained in this summary may be reproduced for information or instruction but the source must be quoted as HQ 2 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 2.

CONTENTS

Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 26
Nov 44 to 2400 hrs 3 Dec 44

PART I

Page

Summary of operations by areas

(a) Land	1
(b) Sea	3
(c) Air	3

PART II

1. Enemy OOB - Land	7
2. Enemy OOB - Air	9
6. Equipment	9
7. Tactics	12
9. General	14

APPENDICES

"A" NAVAL EARTHENWARE LAND MINE
"B" 200mm ROCKET AND LAUNCHER
"C" ALLIED PW IN RABAU

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Documents captured during the attack on LITTLE GEORGE HILL (668134 BOUGAINVILLE series one inch to one mile) on 29 Nov indicate the grouping of 81 Inf Regt in the NUMA NUMA area and forward along the NUMA NUMA trail where elements of 1 and 2 Bns have already been contacted.

These documents identify 11 Coy 3 Bn also in the area and indicate the move of HQ 81 Inf Regt from TASUI to NUMA NUMA area subsequent to 11 Nov 44.

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION LIST

HQ 2 AUST CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 2

	<u>Copy No</u>
3 Aust Div	1 - 5
11 Aust Inf Bde	6
23 Aust Inf Bde	7
Americal Div	8 - 11
USAF NOR SOLS APO 706	12
COM NAV NOR SOLS	13
COM AIR NOR SOLS	14
COM ZE AIR TAF	15
84 Wing RAAF (Army Co-op)	16
HQ USAFFE APO 501	17 - 18
First Aust Army	19 - 20
4 Aust Base Sub Area	21
ANGAU	22
DSIO NOR SOLS	23
PA to Comd	24
BGS	25
DA & QMG	26
G(O) (incl LOs)	27
G(Air)	28 - 36
G(Int)	37 - 38
CCRA	39
CE	40
CSO	41
A (incl DAMS)	42
Q	43
IHQ 8 of MI	44
War Diary	45 - 46
File	47

When this Distribution List has been perused, please destroy by fire.

PART I

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

BOUGAINVILLE

POTUA RIVER AREA

According to native reports, about 50 Japanese are located between the POTUA RIVER and SIPAAI (about 7 miles north of the POTUA RIVER). This is the first recent report of enemy in this area and is of particular interest in view of the information contained in a captured 17 Army Operation Order, dated 27 Mar 44, that the nucleus of one company of infantry or naval personnel would occupy a reconnaissance point at HAMUN (2 miles NW of the POTUA RIVER).

UPPER LARUMA RIVER AREA

On night 27/28 Nov, seven enemy were observed on our left flank in the vicinity of PIATERAPAIA. The enemy was attacked with grenades and withdrew.

On the same night, mortar fire was placed on LITTLE GEORGE HILL ($\frac{1}{2}$ mile NE of PIATERAPAIA) and on ARTY HILL (1 mile NNE of PIATERAPAIA) and on the intermediate feature, PUP HILL.

Later, with artillery, machine gun and mortar support LITTLE GEORGE HILL was attacked and occupied by our forces. On 29 Nov the enemy, employing machine guns and mortars launched a determined counter-attack, which was repulsed. A small quantity of equipment and ammunition was captured.

Twenty-one enemy were killed and one captured in these actions.

A patrol returning from PEARL RIDGE (about two miles north of PIATERAPAIA) reports that the area is not occupied by the enemy, but tracks show evidence of considerable foot and jungle-cart traffic.

SISIVIE track and Village were also reported clear of the enemy.

TEKESSI RIVER AREA

On 30 Nov, a party of seven Japanese and one native laden with native food were observed at the fork of the TEKESSI RIVER, about three miles from the mouth. On sighting our patrol, the enemy dropped the food and withdrew before contact could be made. Only one member of the party was armed.

JABA RIVER AREA

Five or six large huts in course of construction have been reported in the area 400 yards north of MENZIA. Evidence of increased activity has been observed on the track from MENZIA north to the JABA RIVER.

Enemy casualties to 30 Nov are:-

Killed	9917
Captured	104
From unconfirmed sources 29 killed.	

NEW BRITAIN

WIDE BAY AREA

The enemy's defensive development of the east coast of GAZELLE PENINSULA continues. Beaches between WERANGOI and PUT PUT (two miles south of WERANGOI) and the coastal road from PUT PUT north to WAT WAT are reported to have been recently mined. Trenches, tank traps and pill boxes have also been constructed around PUT PUT.

Patrols report no enemy in the coastal area from MILIM to SAMPUN (fourteen miles SE of MILIM).

OPEN BAY AREA

An Allied patrol reported that an unestimated number of enemy arrived on 25 Nov in the KOLA area (about 13 miles south of the PANDI RIVER mouth), probably en route to MATAGOGAI (four miles SW of ULAMONA). Native patrols from CAPE KOAS have since reported sighting enemy tracks in the vicinity of MATAGOGAI.

NEW GUINEA

Active patrolling continues in the AITAPE and MADANG - HANSA BAY areas.

Continued enemy activity has been observed in the TONG area (35 miles SE of AITAPE) where a large party of enemy was previously reported to be concentrated. In the same area on 1 Dec our troops at YASUAR MISSION were attacked by about 10 Japanese from MERINGUE Village (unmapped).

According to native reports, a strong Japanese base is being established at SELNAUA (45 miles SE of AITAPE).

Native reports indicate increased enemy activity in the HANSA BAY area. One report, dated 24 Nov, states that a Japanese patrol of two officers and 10 ORs is located at WATAM, at the mouth of the SEPIK RIVER. The enemy was said to be in poor condition and in search of food.

A further report stated that a patrol of 20 enemy was moving along the west bank of the RAMU RIVER to EOSMAN, on the ROM RIVER. Our patrols in the area the following day sighted no enemy two miles north of BOSMAN.

PHILIPPINES

Heavy rains continue to restrict ground operations at LEYTE, but pressure is being maintained on enemy positions in the ORMOC CORRIDOR.

The enemy has launched several strong counter-attacks south of LIMON and in the PALANAS RIVER area (south of ORMOC), all of which have been repulsed. The mopping up of enemy pockets has continued in the LIMON sector, where Allied tanks have destroyed artillery and ammunition dumps.

At LUZON between 27 Sep and 20 Oct, the enemy has sent 10,000 troops with small calibre weapons to the south of the island in troop trains and a further 20,000 are moving to the same area in trucks and on foot.

There has also been a re-disposition of enemy forces at MINDANAO. MISAMIS garrison has been reinforced at the expense of the NW sector of MINDANAO, which has been virtually abandoned. Large numbers of inland reserves have been moved north to CAGAYAN (central north coast) and further troop movements have been made north from that point.

This general northward movement suggests the reinforcement of LEYTE or the strengthening of the western VISAYAS rather than the defence of MINDANAO which, once LEYTE and SAMAR are occupied, will be completely isolated.

(b) SEA - ENEMY

Operations by our aircraft against small enemy craft and barges in the BOUGAINVILLE, NEW BRITAIN and NEW IRELAND areas, during the month of November resulted in 15 barges destroyed and 10 damaged; 22 small boats destroyed and 46 damaged.

An ungraded report of a sighting of two submarines on 28 Nov 77 miles NE of WOODLARK ISLAND would appear indicative of a new interest in the shipping lanes from AUSTRALIA to our forward bases. Shipping bound for these bases passes through a comparatively narrow channel east of MILNE BAY.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary
No 132)

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

During the week approximately 190 fighter bomber sorties were flown over BOUGAINVILLE coastal areas in armed reconnaissance and in bombing and strafing attacks on a variety of small targets.

On 28 Nov an enemy bivouac area near SIRIRUAI was attacked by 30 Corsairs. On 29 Nov fires were started in the HANGAN - HAHELA area (BUKA). A number of huts and canoes were destroyed in strafing attacks on targets on SHORTLAND ISLAND and the small islands nearby.

NEW BRITAIN

Intensive dawn to dusk armed reconnaissance was maintained over RABAU and the coastal parts of GAZELLE PENINSULA. A number of attacks by fighters and medium bombers were made against targets in the RABAU area.

On 2 Dec 11 Liberators bombed the TOBERA rubber plantation (suspected aircraft repair area). Three large fires were started and a possible oil dump hit.

On 27 Nov 26 Mitchells destroyed 30 small buildings and started a number of fires on MATUPI ISLAND. Other targets attacked by strong forces of fighter-bombers and some medium bombers were a suspected Radar station at TOMAVATUR, personnel and supply areas near RALUM, the SULPHUR CREEK aircraft park and gun positions at RALUANA POINT. A number of huts, buildings, trucks and gun positions were destroyed. In addition a direct hit was scored on a possible oil storage hulk in KERA VIA Bay; the hulk burned with smoke to 8000 feet. In all more than 300 sorties were flown over RABAU and GAZELLE PENINSULA during the week.

NEW IRELAND

The town, airfield and dump areas at KAVIENG provided the main targets for our aircraft in this area. The airfield was cratered, and several buildings and a possible fuel dump were destroyed by Dauntlesses, Mitchells and Corsairs in a series of raids.

Other targets effectively attacked were a suspected enemy bivouac area at MEDINA Plantation, EOPIRE Plantation, BALGAI, PANAPAI, FANGELAWA, LOGAGON and LAKUREFANGE.

Regular armed reces over north NEW IRELAND were maintained by Corsairs and Venturas.

NEW GUINEA

The enemy in the WEWAK area is still being harassed daily by Beaufort, Boston and Liberator aircraft.

On 25 Nov the suspected 18 Army HQ at RANIMBOA was bombed with high explosives and incendiaries.

In addition to many targets on the mainland, gardens and installations on FAIRIRU and KARASAU Islands were raided several times.

In DUTCH NEW GUINEA fighter-bombers continue to be active. The main targets this week were in the SORONG area but NOEMI, RANSIKI and UTAROM were also bombed.

CERAM - HALMAHERAS - CELEBES

HAROEKOE, LIANG, LAHA, KAIRATOE and OLD NAMLEA airfields were all attacked in strength.

Fighter-bombers have continued their raids on airfields in the HALMAHERAS - LOLOBATA airfield has received most attention.

Airfields in the CELEBES were raided by small forces of heavy bombers, and, on 22 Nov, a nickel mine on MANIANG Island was reported destroyed after a raid by Liberators.

PHILIPPINES

Heavy and medium bombers have increased the number and strength of their raids against enemy airfields in the VISAYAS.

Low flying fighters and fighter-bombers have destroyed large numbers of enemy aircraft on the ground in addition to those destroyed in the air.

Four ships, including two troop carrying freighters of 5,500/8,500 tons, were attacked and left burning by fighter-bombers NE of MASBATE on 24 Nov.

DETAILS OF SORTIES FLOWN & RESULTS - NEW BRITAIN, NEW IRELAND, BOUGAINVILLE AREAS IN AIR OPERATIONS FROM NORTH-ERN SOLOMONS BASES DURING NOVEMBER 44

Total Combat Sorties flown : 4599
Total bombs dropped : 1665

Sorties and bombs according to areas

	Sorties	Tons Bombs Dropped	Tons Bombs Dropped per Sorties
NEW BRITAIN	1764	799	.453
NEW IRELAND	1408	614 $\frac{1}{2}$.436
BOUGAINVILLE-BUKA	1191	229 $\frac{1}{2}$.193
Searches, PT Co-op etc	236	22	.093
	4599	1665	

Observed results:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Huts & Buildings	383	Undetermined number
Vehicles	18	96
Barges	15	10
Small Boats	22	46
Bridges	9	14
Piers & Jetties	3	-
Gun Positions	1	10
Fires started : 77		
Explosions : 12		
Japs Killed : 113		

Two possibly serviceable Jap planes on the ground were damaged.

(Comairnorsols Intelligence Summary to 0800L 1 Dec 44)

AIR - ENEMY

Three unidentified enemy aircraft were indicated over EMIRAU on 23 Nov. The aircraft apparently circled about 70 miles south of NEW HANOVER, and then made off on an easterly course. No aircraft were seen to land at KAVIENG or PANAPAI during the day.

In the NEW BRITAIN area two unidentified aircraft were heard in the JACQUINOT BAY area on 23 Nov, and on 27 Nov B 24s returning from RABAU were followed to CAPE ARCHWAY by four aircraft thought to be ZEKES. No attempts to intercept were made.

In the NEW GUINEA area, on 26 Nov, a possible ZERO was sighted over the DUMPU airfield.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

ENEMY DISPOSITIONS NUMA NUMA - UPPER LARUMA VALLEY

From documents recently captured in the SISIVIE area it appears that 81 Inf Regt is now disposed as follows:-

- (a) HQ 81 Inf Regt in the vicinity of NUMA NUMA
- (b) 1 Bn elements TINPUTS area
1 Bn " NUMA NUMA trail
- (c) 2 Bn forward on NUMA NUMA trail
- (d) 3 Bn " " " " "

These deductions have been arrived at from the following extracts:-

(a) HQ 81 Inf Regt in the vicinity of NUMA NUMA

(i) 2 Aust Corps Translation Batch 3 -

From 1/Lt EGI (u/i possibly Coy Comd) to 2/Lt SHIMIZU Isamu (was CSM 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt - XIV Personality Lists)

"Inf Regt HQ is expected to arrive here today."

The document is undated but in a previous letter included in the batch it is stated that 2/Lt SHIMIZU took charge of No 1 position on 11 Nov. Other documents included in this batch refer to him as a commander of No 1 position, hence it is reasonable to assume that these documents are dated after 11 Nov particularly as they commend his work at No 1 position.

Later in Batch 3 Coy Comd writes to a 2/Lt SUZUIKI (CSM 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt - XIV Personality List) and says -

"Inf Regt HQ has arrived today."

presumably after 11 Nov.

(ii) 3 Div Translation of 30 Nov -

A loose handwritten sheet dated 7 Nov presumably written by Coy Comd 11 Coy 3 Bn 81 Inf Regt states as follows -

"I left our position on 2 Nov and arrived at NUMA NUMA. Due to my sickness I was ordered by the Regiment CO to go to Hospital."

From the above extracts it would appear that 81 Inf Regt HQ moved to NUMA NUMA area sometime subsequent to 11 Nov.

(b) 1 Bn 81 Inf Regt

Elements of this Bn namely 3 Coy and a Pl of 2 Coy and Bn Gun Unit were previously identified on the NUMA NUMA trail in Nov 44. The remainder of this unit is believed to be still located in the TINPUTS area

(c) 3 Bn 81 Inf Regt forward on NUMA NUMA trail

There have been several PW and documentary statements that 3 Bn was on its way down to NUMA NUMA from north BOUGAINVILLE.

(i) Doc XIV - D - 61 for example states -

"Hayashi who had returned from ITO (5 Coy 81 Inf Regt at SHIOMIPAYA) on liaison was telling the men that 3 Bn 81 Inf Regt was there. He had heard this from an officer on the hill. We heard from our Pl Comd that the men under the comd of a WO (advance party 3 Bn) had left the 1 Base Point for 4 Base Point on 17 Sep. The Bn. is scheduled to arrive here the latter part of this month."

(ii) 3 Div Translation of 30 Nov 44 -

This document is referred to above and mentions the presence of 11 Coy 3 Bn 81 Inf Regt in the NUMA NUMA area. It further refers to a 2/Lt NOMURA who is to be the central figure in 11 Coy. This 2/Lt NOMURA is found in 2 Aust Corps Batch 3 translations originating message to 2/Lt SHIMIZU.

The strength of 81 Inf Regt estimated 1 Dec 44

HQ	100
1 Bn	450
2 "	430
3 "	600
Regt Tps	220

1800

Of this total it is estimated that 60% are effectives.

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the areas listed below is prepared on information to 24 Nov 44:-

AREAS								COMPARATIVES		
	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	19 Nov	11 Nov
NEW BRITIAN) NEW IRELAND) SOLOMONS)						10	2	12	12	12
PHILIPPINES:										
MINDANAO	28		20	29		6	7	90	85	55
VISAYAS	105	18	14	32		14	9	192	192	152
LUZON	200	5	66	74	4	15	28	392	530	376
								674	807	583
AMBON-CERAM- BOEROE	4		3		2	9	4	22	22	22
CELEBES:										
MANADO			2			6		8	8	12
MAKASSAR- KENDARI	12	7		12	3	12	4	50	50	64
								58	58	76
TIMOR-SOEMBA- SOEMBAWA-FLORES	10			3		3	3	16	16	16
JAVA-BALI- LOMBOK	4			18		15	5	42	42	36
BORNEO	100	28	8	40		12	28	216	220	185
TOTALS SWPA	463	58	113	205	9	102	90	1040	1177	930
TRUK	6			3		6	4	19	19	19

Ø Estimates do NOT include combat types not assigned to operational units and used in training.

(COIC Situation Report 329/44 25 Nov 44)

6. EQUIPMENT

NAVAL EARTHENWARE LAND MINE

A sketch and description of a naval earthenware land mine are attached as Appendix 'A'.

200 mm ROCKET AND LAUNCHER

Prior to the landing of Allied forces in the PHILIPPINES, there was no knowledge of Japanese rocket equipment. At SAN JOSE, LEYTE, numerous projectiles and four launchers were recovered from emplacements of log pillboxes.

The weapons found were crudely constructed but there is every probability that more modern types will be encountered in future operations.

The following is a preliminary report on the equipment recovered at SAN JOSE:-

GENERAL

Although no projectiles had been fired on the landing forces, rockets were in place already fuzeed for firing.

DESCRIPTION

Rocket: The propelling charge consists of seven sticks of black powder, each $11\frac{1}{2}$ inches in length and $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter. Gases are ejected through six jets in the base. The explosive head is $37\frac{1}{2}$ inches long.

The extremely large size of the rockets indicates great penetration power, probably sufficient to damage an armoured vessel extensively.

Launcher: The trough is supported at the front by a bipod stand. These were based on sandbags.

There is no traversing or elevating mechanism. The only method of engaging different targets is to manually shift the front bipod. This would greatly hinder making corrections on to the target.

The only observation is by view. No instruments are attached.

Until some documentary evidence is available, little can be revealed of the capabilities of the equipment.

A sketch of the assembly is attached as Appendix 'B'.

EQUIPMENT CAPTURED AT LITTLE GEORGE HILL

Of equipment captured at LITTLE GEORGE HILL the LMG and the rifle in the best condition have now undergone AEME examination. Of the detailed report set out below the most significant facts are that the LMG is virtually new and that of 112 rounds fired through it not one dud was found.

The AEME report follows:-

Japanese LMG Type 96 6.5 mm

Metal exterior surfaces good although definite signs of immersion or exposure to rain is evident. Butt badly damaged. Evidently gun has been stood upright with butt immersed in water or mud. Damage to wood has been probably caused by shrapnel. Mechanism of gun is quite free, all moving parts work satisfactorily.

Barrel Condition

Bore badly rusted before cleaning, but barrel is in excellent condition. Gas regulator in good condition.

Body Internal

Free from excessive rust, piston in excellent condition, breech block slightly rusted on the face, gas cylinder in good condition.

Magazine

Exterior badly rusted, interior slightly rusted. It is evident that LMG has had very little use, in all probability not more than 400 rounds being fired.

Meiji 38 Rifle

Exterior Condition

If rifle has not had care and preservation during the past seven days, indications are that previous care and preservation were good. All actions work satisfactorily, no unserviceable components.

Condition of bore prior to cleaning

Full of dirt and dust but no evidence of fresh rust.

Condition after cleaning

Rifling shows slight signs of wear, metallic fouling present. General condition of bore indicates that approximately 1000 rounds have been fired.

Lubricant Used

Very much like normal Jap lubricant for small arms with perhaps a slight quantity of coconut oil added.

Firing Trials

Gun functioned very satisfactorily, firing 112 rounds without stoppage. No faulty ammunition. Gun fired on all gas ports - rate of fire on largest port estimated at 600 rounds per minute. Grouping and accuracy good.

MEDICAL SUPPLIES

Among the enemy equipment captured at LITTLE GEORGE HILL was an assortment of medical supplies which included -

Quinine, Atebrin, Vitamin B and C serums, 1 bottle Sulphur Pills, 1 phial Iodine, Tetanus serums, Camphor fluid (20%), Bitter Camphor fluid (1.5%), Creosol tablets, very few field dressings, bandages, unwashed salt, one small tin of mosquito cream, Morphia serums, a bottle of Anti-Gas Gangrene serum and a tin of canned heat.

There is no supply of Aspirin, Dovers tablets, Cathartic or Sulphanilimide preparations, Sulphaguanidine or alternatives for dysentery, ointments, dishes or instruments in this assortment.

Medical opinion is that the assortment does not contain sufficient bandages, and what there are had been washed, shell or field dressings in the event of an action, gauze or cotton wool for a garrison of 30 men for which it apparently was supplied. The quinine quantity is considered sufficient, but has deteriorated due to exposure. The tablets themselves are of the sugar coated variety which is not of such a high quality or efficient as the ordinary quinine.

In some respects the medical supply is adequate but for use in general RAP work would prove totally inadequate, particularly in the event of heavy casualties being sustained.

The general condition of the assortment is considered satisfactory except in the case of quinine which is probably the most important.

7. TACTICS

BAMBOO SPIKE JUNGLE TRAPS

Panjis - bamboo spikes sharpened to a needle point - are formidable weapons. They were first employed in jungle warfare by the hill tribes of the Indian province of ASSAM, and now have been adopted by certain United Nations forces for use as jungle traps against the Japanese. It is also reliably reported that the Japanese themselves are employing panjis.

Ordinary panjis will penetrate thick uniforms or the upper part of a shoe. When the point of a panji has been hardened in fire, it is even more effective, and can easily penetrate the sole of any shoe issued by the Japanese. Although panji wounds are not necessarily fatal, they are in any case extremely painful and do not heal readily. (It is possible that the healing process is delayed by a natural acid in the bamboo). Blood poisoning has been known to result from panji wounds, particularly in cases where jungle tribesmen have placed spoiled meat on the needle point of the panji.

Panji traps are most effectively placed when they are merged with natural jungle obstacles. In defence, they may be used either as barricades around camps or as barriers to impede the advance of an attacking force. In offence, they may be constructed behind enemy lines to stop or hinder any retreat. Enemy patrols can be disbanded by a skilful use of these traps in conjunction with covering snipers.

Here are a few of the ways in which panjis are used.

PANJI PITS

A pit - four to six feet deep, four to six feet long, and three to four feet wide - is dug in the middle of a jungle trail or at a stream crossing. A number of long, sharp panjis are placed upright in this pit, with their fire-hardened points slightly below ground level. The pit is concealed by a flimsy lid, which is nothing more than a bamboo

lattice covered with a few bamboo creepers. Last of all, a natural camouflage garnish of mud or leaves is applied, to blend with the surrounding terrain. Anyone falling into the pit is instantly impaled on the spikes.

Similarly a slit trench can be so placed that attacking Japanese will be likely to utilise it. Like the cover of the panji pit, the bottom of this trench is false, and underneath it there are sharp panjis, which will pierce the shoes of the Japanese when they jump into the trench.

BAMBOO WHIP

A three inch bamboo pole can be bent back across a jungle path in such a way that when it is released, the force of the blow will kill a man walking along the path. To ensure effective results, panji spikes can be attached at the end of the whip. The whip is held in position by a bamboo creeper or by wire, with a peg at the end of the wire pressing against two horizontal sticks. Contact with a trip wire across the path withdraws the lower stick, allowing the heavy bamboo to whip forcefully across the path. If the trip wire is covered with leaves, and if the bamboo whip is concealed by branches, the Japanese are much less likely to detect the trap.

CAMP DEFENCE

For the purposes of local defence, a camp in the jungle is sometimes built in the form of a triangle, with a large tree at each apex. The perimeter of the camp is surrounded by a panji wall, six feet in depth and varying from four inches to six feet in height. The blunt ends of the bamboo are pushed into the ground with the panji points outward. Gates are protected with bamboo sharpened at each end, bent in a U-shape, and so placed that the sharp ends point outward. Slit trenches, to be occupied in case of attack, are dug along the inner side of the fence. Lookouts posted in the trees at the apices of the triangle act as snipers in case of attack.

OTHER PANJI TRAPS

Panjis placed under water in a river or at a beach, with the points two inches below the surface, will rule out swimming as an enemy mode of travel and will puncture the bottoms of ordinary native river boats.

Sometimes a bamboo knife, pointing downward, is attached to the far side (from the expected enemy approach) of a low limb overhanging a jungle trail. A man bending low to pass beneath the limb will receive a severe wound in the back when he straightens up.

Panjis may also be prepared by snipers lying in wait to ambush hostile patrols. Along the sides of the trail that a hostile patrol is likely to use, sharpened bamboo spikes, 18 inches long, are placed at intervals of about one foot and are pointed toward the trail at an angle of 45 degrees. When the hostile patrol appears, it is fired on by hidden snipers. On hearing the first shot, the instinctive reaction of the members of the patrol is to seek cover. If they dart into the growth beside the track, they are impaled on the bamboo spikes.

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 120)

9. GENERAL

ALLIED PW IN RABAU

Information gathered from a Japanese captured on TINIAN is attached as Appendix 'C'.

JAPANESE NEWSPAPER PUBLISHED ON BOUGAINVILLE

The following is a translation of a Special Edition of the TARLENA News of 15 Nov 44. The disregard of the truth and flights of imagination on the part of the Editor are quite in keeping with Japanese propaganda, however it is difficult to understand why a newspaper presumably published for general circulation should be given the category of "Most Secret".

- (a) Enemy ships at LEYTE BAY were almost all sunk and the Bay is full of sunken ships.
- (b) Later 5 aircraft carriers, 16 warships (total 21) were sunk. As a result of the air attack off the coast of FORMOSA a further 180 ships were sunk bringing the grand total to 201.
- (c) The P I Supreme Commanding Officer is Gen YAMASHITA Hobun
Airforce " " " is Lt-gen TOMINAGA Kyoji
Naval " " " is OKAWAUCHI Denhichi

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

Our raiding torpedo boats began action in the PELELIU Is area. A portion of our strength carried out an opposed landing and are attacking the enemy. Furthermore, one destroyer and two transports were sunk in the vicinity.

At SAIPAN, TINIAN and GUAM we are carrying out daily heavy bombing raids and enemy air activity is very little.

SWPA

- (a) We are continuously bombing enemy air bases and positions in NEW GUINEA.
- (b) One destroyer and two torpedo boats were sunk in the vicinity of ADMIRALTY Is.
- (c) In the same area our recce plane on its way home discovered the following enemy naval vessels:-

2 Battleships, 4 Aircraft Carriers, 6 Cruisers, 10 Destroyers, 30 Transports and 60 Sea Trucks. Our airforce went out to attack them.

- (d) Our navy has once again commenced operations in the RABAU area.

GENERAL

Our destroyer squadron opened up brisk activities on the WEST coast of AMERICA and sank six transports.

CHINA AREA

KIRIN has been completely occupied by our troops. In this action 200 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground and 40 captured. This operation is known as the "KIRIN OPERATION". We have completely taken RYUSHU. For this operation we advanced from CANTON, HANKOW and FOOCHOW. OKKANSEN was completely cut off and the largest air base neutralized

MAINLAND AREA

- (a) On the 10th the WEST KYUSHU AREA (NAGASAKI, KUMAMOTO Sector) was raided by 80 - B-29s.
- (b) B-29s are occasionally making recce flights over the Mainland. They are apparently based on SAIPAN.

GERMANY

- (a) Germany has perfected the flying bomb and are bombing the LONDON Area with these high-speed, noiseless machines.
- (b) The whole German nation has admired our successes in the P I area operations. HITLER has sent his congratulations.

SURRENDER LEAFLETS

A novel method of distributing Surrender Leaflets to the enemy has been designed by a forward Bn on BOUGAINVILLE. A notice board has been prepared bearing the inscription - "Japanese Soldiers! There are Surrender Leaflets in tin container below! Take one; put it on the end of a stick, and present it to any Allied Soldier. You will receive humane treatment!" A tin container filled with Surrender Leaflets has been fixed to the board, and the notice has been nailed to a tree beside a track which is known to be used by enemy supply trains. To complete the picture the words "please take one" have been written in English just above the container!

('V' Aust FS Sec Weekly Report 2 Dec 44)

E. H. Wilson

(E. H. WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff

APPENDIX 'A' TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 2



NAVAL EARTHENWARE LAND MINE

The first known land mine of Japanese Naval origin has been recovered at LEYTE. This is also the first known land mine made of crockery.

The case of the mine, as may be seen from the sketch below, is of a familiar German design, and is of heavy glazed earthenware. The explosive is protected from moisture by a thin rubber sack. The fuze is made of plastic, with a rubber gas jet fitting into the neck of the mine case. As no metal is used in the mine except in the safety and release wires in the fuze, the mine will be undetectable by magnetic detection gear.

The charge contained in the mine case (approximately a foot in diameter and six inches in height) is sufficient to blow up a man or blow off the tread of a tank. The fuze is actuated either by pressure or by attachment of a trip wire.


In view of the naval origin of this novel type, it is probable that its employment would be in landing beach areas.




(Seventh Fleet Intelligence
Centre Intelligence Bulletin
No 19-44)

JAPANESE ROCKET EMPLACEMENT


FOUND AT SAN JOSE LEYTE 22 OCT 44



SIDE VIEW



ROCKET



TOP VIEW

APPENDIX 'C' TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 2

ALLIED PW IN RABAU

INFORMATION GATHERED FROM JAPANESE CAPTURED ON TINIAN

Information gathered from a Japanese captured on TINIAN, Central Pacific, indicates that most of the whites amongst the Allied PW originally held by the Japanese in the SOLOMONS - BISMARCKS area, following the occupation, were evacuated in 1943.

CAPTURE IN A CAVE

When the American advance progressed across the island, he lost contact with his unit and hid in a cave, having provided himself with sticks of dynamite to blow himself up, rather than surrender. In the cave were civilians and he saw one father cut the throats of his three children, his wife and himself. This sickened him and he gave up the idea of suicide, being captured when the cave was invaded by US Marines.

PW confirmed the opinion of other captives that the strongest factor in deterring soldiers from surrendering is not the "death-is-glory" ideology but fear of immediate torture and eventual death, and that an almost equally strong influence is certainty of social ostracism upon return to JAPAN.

He said that surrenders could not be expected from organised units. Even if an officer privately favoured surrender, it would be unthinkable for him, under the military code, to assume responsibility for surrendering himself or his troops. However bombardment with leaflets might reap rich results among isolated, disorganised and dispirited enemy troops, who might be induced to desert individually, or in small groups.

ALLIED PW IN RABAU

PW said that when he was in RABAU from March to July 1943, there were 200-300 Allied PW housed in ten buildings which appeared to have been recently built, in RABAU itself and another 100 or so in Chinatown.

He once heard a gramophone playing western music and when he stepped outside the building to inquire, he was told by the guard officer that eight officers were kept separate there.

PW understood that the Allied PW included some from NEW GUINEA. He heard that they were mostly Australians, but believed there were some Americans. He heard nothing of Indian PW. (It has been established since that they are on BOUGAINVILLE). He saw no women or children, although he heard that there was a nurse among prisoners transferred from KAVIENG to RABAU.

In May 1943, an Australian sergeant was landed at VUNAKANAU. PW heard he had been captured near LAE, NEW GUINEA. He was questioned in RABAU and then flown to JAPAN.

PW frequently saw prisoners at work in RABAU. When he first arrived, they were digging air raid shelters along MANGO Avenue. Later, when aircraft spares and parts arrived by ship, he saw prisoners unloading the cargo at Burns Philp Jetty. He also saw military prisoners at work in a vehicle repair shop and civilian internees working in an ice plant, in machine shops and in motor servicing shops.

EVACUATION TO JAPAN

Large numbers of the prisoners were evacuated (he believed to JAPAN) while he was in RABAU. The Chinatown group left earlier than the others, in April or May 1943. PW heard that they went in two or three freighters, escorted by a destroyer. Wounded and sick were taken out by hospital ship in April or May. In July he noticed that all the Chinatown prisoners seemed to have left and there seemed to be a big reduction in the number of those in RABAU.

In December 1943 PW went often to an outfitting dock in YOKOHAMA. There he saw 120 English-speaking prisoners operating riveters and hammers in the company of Japanese mechanics. He heard that they were tradesmen who were given the opportunity to work at their normal occupations, for which they were rewarded by preferential treatment.

He marvelled at their high spirits. He said they sang "gay songs" and whistled at girls on the way to and from work at the dock. He was also surprised to see that they were allowed to work on warships in the dock.

(Royal New Zealand Air Force Intelligence
Bulletin No 174)

9
400 1111
SECRET

Copy No 51...

GSI

2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 3

NOTE

1. A receipt for this summary is not required. Recipients are requested to note serial numbers and bring under immediate notice non receipt of any issue.
2. Items marked with a single sideline in the margin will not be reproduced for circulation below Bde HQ.
3. Items marked with three sidelines will not be reproduced without the permission of G I(Int) 2 Aust Corps.
4. Except as specified above, items contained in this summary may be reproduced for information or instruction but the source must be quoted as HQ 2 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 3.

CONTENTS

Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 3
Dec 44 to 2400 hrs 10 Dec 44

Page

PART I

Summary of operations by areas

- (a) Land
- (b) Sea
- (c) Air

PART II

- | | | |
|--------------|--------|---|
| 1. Enemy OOB | - Land | 7 |
| 2. Enemy OOB | - Air | 7 |
| 6. Equipment | | 8 |
| 9. General | | 8 |

PART III

Topographical 8

APPENDICES

"A" JAPANESE FOOD RESOURCES AND SELF SUFFICIENCY PROGRAMME
ON BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

"E" AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
REF MAPS BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND 1 INCH SERIES, 1:25,000
SERIES

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

There are several indications that the Japanese are extensively developing the MOINUTU - TAITAI areas which are located on the South BOUGAINVILLE L of C approximately half way between the strongly held MUGUAI KAHILI district and the forward troops in the JABA River area. TAITAI, comprising 15 huts, was the principal supply dump on the L of C during the Mar 44 attack on the TOROKINA perimeter.

First indication of renewed Japanese interest in the area was given on the night 9/10 Oct when Allied PT boats were shelled by heavy shore batteries from LAKURUAI. Native reports later confirmed the presence of AA guns, MGs and defensive works in addition to shore defence guns in the beach area LAKURUAI and MOSIGA. During that month the road from LAKURUAI to MOINUTU was closed to natives, and three Kanakas who disregarded the ban on native movement along the road were arrested and were not heard of by their villagers again.

Tac/R on 30 Oct showed the road to be carrying heavy MT traffic. Natives reported that 12 trucks were using the road at nights. The same Tac/R revealed that the road between RUSEI and MOINUTU was only used for foot traffic. This stretch of road was portion of the main BUIN - MOSIGETTA highway, which was maintained in serviceable condition for MT during the Mar 44 offensive. Portions of it between RUSEI and BUIN fell into disrepair after the Japanese abandoned the attack and some bridges on that sector are reported unserviceable. On 4 Dec air observers reported skid marks across the beach near LAKURUAI which may indicate Japanese are using barges to supply LAKURUAI and thence to MOINUTU and TAITAI. Air photographs show what appear to be three dump areas near LAKURUAI and MOSINA. These photographs also reveal the total acreage of Japanese gardens near MOINUTU to be 520. Several thousands of troops could be maintained from the produce of these gardens.

PART I

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

BOUGAINVILLE

TEOP HARBOUR AREA

On 7 Dec natives killed 13 Japanese with native weapons at NOMATO (about 4 miles south of TEOP HARBOUR).

SISIVIE AREA

A reconnaissance patrol reported contacting an estimated 15 Japanese about $\frac{5}{4}$ mile NW of SISIVIE on 3 Dec. Later the same day our fighting patrol engaged the enemy party and inflicted casualties.

PIATERAPAIA

Reports of considerable enemy activity in the general area north and NE of PIATERAPAIA have been received from our patrols during the week.

On 4 Dec a patrol made contact with an enemy standing patrol in the area $\frac{5}{4}$ mile north of PIATERAPAIA, where five Japanese were observed with evidence of others in the vicinity. This patrol was later attacked by our troops and an unreported number of casualties was inflicted.

The numerous reports of enemy sightings in this area indicate that small enemy patrols are operating north of our positions around Artillery Ridge.

Patrols have also reported several enemy pockets in the vicinity of PIATERAPAIA to the north and east and three deserted OP's with signs of recent occupation were found in the same area.

At AKAKOPAIA Village (approximately 2 miles NE of PIATERAPAIA) our reconnaissance patrol observed 6 or 7 huts, in one of which 8 to 10 Japanese were discovered.

CAPE MOLTKE AREA

An unreported number of enemy was contacted by our patrol 3 hours north of KURATIO Mission on 8 Dec.

SUGAR LOAF MOUNTAIN AREA

According to native reports, 15 Japanese were located at MAINUKI (6 miles SW of SUGAR LOAF MOUNTAIN) on 7 Dec. A further 30 were reported at MORONI, large numbers at KAINO, and 200 naval personnel at WIDA. MORONI is believed to be the headquarters of the garrisons scattered throughout this area.

JABA RIVER

Enemy defensive activity continues in this sector, where more huts have been constructed. A bridge at the fork of the JABA RIVER, which was recently destroyed by our artillery, has been replaced.

Enemy casualties to 9 Dec are:-

Killed	9932
Captured	104
From unconfirmed sources	46 killed

NEW BRITAIN

An Allied patrol reported an unknown number of enemy near the YAPASWAL RIVER, about 16 miles SSW of the PANDI RIVER mouth on 2 Dec.

On 4 Dec a light was observed flashing out to sea from BIALIA Plantation, which may have some connection with reports of submarine activity in the OPEN BAY area.

In the WIDE BAY area Allied patrols have reported a strongpost manned by 20 Japanese midway between LEMINGI and WAITAVALO.

NEW GUINEA

AITAPE AREA

A considerable extension of enemy movement has been reported particularly in the area south of the TORRICELLI MOUNTAINS and to a lesser extent in the coastal areas east of AITAPE.

The general trend of these movements appears to be from the south via WALUM to MAPRIK, thence west to the inland trails south of the TORRICELLI MOUNTAINS.

Coincident with this increased movement, enemy patrols, which recently have been noticeably inactive, have shown a marked increase and, according to reports, are adopting more aggressive tactics. These patrols have been particularly active around the villages in the TONG area, where, as has been previously reported, the enemy appears to be concentrating.

HANSA BAY - MADANG

Small isolated parties continue to be reported in this area.

On 3 Dec, 20 small craft were observed at the WATAM LAGOON entrance and on the following night an Allied patrol was attacked by 80 to 100 well armed Japanese west of MARANGIS, BROKEN WATER BAY. Our patrol after killing 10 and wounding 10 enemy withdrew to VENUS POINT.

PHILIPPINES

In the Northern ORMOC Corridor Allied forces continued their advance south from LIMON against strong opposition and are now firmly established across the LIMON - ORMOC Highway. Enemy pockets in the rear of our advance units are being eliminated.

In the ranges east of the ORMOC Highway Japanese opposition is being reduced, but resistance is reported to be increasing north of Mt CATABARAN. A road block at Mt CABUNGANGAN was overcome and the enemy was driven from his positions at SINAYAWAN HILL, where heavy enemy casualties were inflicted and a large ammunition dump was captured.

On Dec 8 Allied troops with naval and air support made an amphibious landing on the west coast of ORMOC BAY, 3 miles south of ORMOC. The enemy, whose reserves are committed to the defence of the ORMOC Corridor, offered only slight opposition and our forces made rapid progress north towards ORMOC.

Coinciding with the approach of the Allied invasion convoy, Allied aircraft attacked an enemy convoy approaching ORMOC from the south. The enemy convoy consisted of 13 ships, all of which were sunk with an estimated 4,000 troops.

(b) SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

GENERAL

The constant drain on enemy resources of merchant shipping is being reflected in the sightings in southern ports. Both merchant and naval units now appear to be confined to the closer Empire waters. Extensive movements of shipping and barges continue throughout the waters adjacent to the PHILIPPINES and BORNEO, every advantage being taken of adverse weather to cover these operations.

The first sizeable enemy task force observed moving out of Empire waters for several weeks was observed on 29 Nov. This force, consisting of one light cruiser, two destroyers and one large aircraft carrier on a westward course, was sighted 200 miles off the NW tip of LUZON. Other reports indicate the movement of heavy units from SINGAPORE to home waters.

There also appear to be some naval units in FRENCH-INDO-CHINA waters, providing a potential striking force against the PHILIPPINES.

In the SWPA, during the past week, submarines have been reported between PORT MORESBY and AUSTRALIA, and 60 miles ESE of FINSCHHAFEN. The reliability of these reports is unknown and it is significant that no attacks have been made on our shipping. In view of the enemy commitments in northern waters, these sightings should be treated with reserve.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 133)

BOUGAINVILLE

Barge sightings for the past week have been on a slightly increased scale.

Allied aircraft destroyed one 30-35 foot barge at NUMA NUMA on 3 Dec,

Two small boats were sighted on 5 Dec, one on a southerly course off KIVIRI Point, and the other on the beach at MUPEI (EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY). The next day a small boat and one barge were sighted in TONOLEI HARBOUR.

In the SORAKEN HARBOUR area on 7 Dec one 25 foot launch was observed on the beach near SORAKEN Plantation, and approximately 15 barges were sighted further north between CHABAI and MEROK.

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

For the first time NZAF aircraft directly supported Australian troops in BOUGAINVILLE. On 7 Dec 8 Corsairs, led in by a Boomerang, bombed and strafed a group of huts held by the enemy at AKOROPAI 694129 (KOWARO 1:25,000). The attack was reported as highly successful; five huts were destroyed and the target area flattened for a radius of 75 yards.

Twenty eight Corsairs on 8 Dec attacked enemy store huts at MAWARAKA ((N)Q7659 strat series). The bombing was reported accurate but weather prevented observation of results.

On 9 Dec 8 Corsairs led in by a Boomerang bombed enemy huts at 902643 (PIRIATA River 1:63,360) previously reported by a Tac/R aircraft. The target was well covered and at least one hut was destroyed. On the same day 8 Corsairs accurately bombed and strafed KAINO (902643 - 1" series) where large numbers of Japs had been reported. The attack was very accurate and 18 huts were destroyed.

Other targets attacked by strong forces of Corsairs during the week were an enemy hut and supply concentration west of SIRIRUAI Mission by 28 Corsairs on 3 Dec and suspected bivouac areas and bridges near HARI Villages 1 and 2, on 4, 5 and 7 Dec by a total of 60 Corsairs.

Routine 'round the island' recces were maintained and numerous opportunity targets were strafed resulting in huts and small craft being destroyed and damaged and a number of stray Japs killed. In all, more than 280 sorties were flown over BOUGAINVILLE during the week.

NEW BRITAIN

There was an increase in our air activity against airfields at RABAU during the week. VUNAKANAU, LAKUNAI and TOBERA strips were attacked by Liberators, Mitchells and Corsairs. The heaviest attack was on 9 Dec when 42 Mitchells accurately bombed VUNAKANAU. On 5 Dec Corsairs scored direct bomb hits on a camouflaged aircraft on the same airfield.

Regular fighter patrols were maintained over RABAU and armed recces over the coast of GAZELLE Peninsula.

NEW IRELAND

Adverse weather conditions on four of the seven days hampered our aircraft over northern NEW IRELAND during the week. Targets at KAVIENG however were attacked several times. On 4 Dec 30 Mitchells bombed KAVIENG town starting one large and one medium fire.

NEW GUINEA

In the general WEWAK Area Bomforts, Bostons and Mitchells carried out a series of effective attacks against enemy occupied villages in the MARRIK area and continued their activities against targets on KAIRIRU, KARASAU and MUSCEU Islands. Liberators joined with medium bombers in the attacks on these latter targets, the most important of which was a suspected submarine off-loading jetty, supply areas and occupied villages.

In DUTCH NEW GUINEA there has been little change in our air activity, fighter bombers continuing their sweeps of coastal areas and attacks on known targets.

On 3 Dec 48 Kittyhawks bombed an enemy HQ at MANOKWARI. UTAROM and barge traffic and shore installations in the SCROG area were also attacked.

CERAM - HALMAHERAS - CELEBES

The heaviest raid reported in the CERAM area was on 2 Dec when 22 Mitchells bombed NAMLEA.

In the HALMAHERAS repeated raids by strong forces of our fighter bombers on airfields at GALELA, HATETABAKO, LOLOBATA and MITI, were made during the week and it is now reported that there is little likelihood that the enemy could use these airfields as forward bases.

Air fields in the CELEBES were attacked by heavy and medium bombers in some strength. In raids on PAREPARE and MALIMPOENG airfields on 30 Nov three enemy aircraft were destroyed.

PHILIPPINES

The main weight of Allied air attacks in this area have been directed at enemy airfields and ground installations. Attempts to reinforce the garrison on LEYTE through ORMOC Bay have been considerably disrupted as a result of our air attack.

On 27 Nov carrier based aircraft in attacks on enemy shipping increased the already considerable total of vessels sunk or destroyed. One heavy cruiser was reported sunk, a destroyer, 9 cargo vessels and a tanker damaged in these attacks. In addition 72 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

(First Joint Army Intelligence Summary No 133)

AIR - ENEMY

There has been little change in enemy air tactics and activity during the period under review, the main air strength in the SWPA remaining concentrated in the PHILIPPINES and BORNEO areas.

In the PHILIPPINES, enemy activity has been reduced in intensity, there being only one night raid by 12 planes on TACLOBAN airfield. This appears to indicate that the enemy has discarded his previous tactics of heavy raids on airfields and is now using his air strength in support of ground troops.

Allied shipping continues to be a popular target, naval vessels and also shipping at CARIKARA, LEYTE and BEY BEY being heavily attacked. Reports of 'suicide' attacks on naval vessels indicate that the Kamikaze 'Special Attack' Corps is still operating in this area.

Our heavy bombers attacking FABRICA and BACOLOD airfields (NEGROS ISLAND) were intercepted by enemy planes on two occasions. The attacks resulted in the probable destruction of one of the intercepting planes without loss to us.

The only other offensive activity reported was the continuance of small harassing raids on MOROTAI.

With the Allies' main interest and efforts directed at the PHILIPPINES, and the enemy's knowledge of our present activity in connection with the movement forward of planes from MOROTAI to this area, he is continuing with these small but comparatively successful attacks on MOROTAI. With a minimum of risk to his own air strength, he is attempting by these persistent raids, to offset to some extent the strong air pressure being maintained against his PHILIPPINES forces.

The damage accomplished, although small, also has some direct effect on current daily operations against enemy airfields.

For these reasons, and in view of the successes he is achieving, it may be expected that he will persist with these tactics, and raids on a similar scale may be expected to follow.

That the enemy is capable of continuing these tactics is obvious, in that adequate planes and operational facilities are available within easy range. Various reports received indicate that the planes used in these raids are based in the CELEBES, either at PINRANG, staging through KENDARI or MANADO, or at KENDARI itself.

In the RABAU area, with the recent occasional sightings of airborne enemy planes and from further information now to hand, it is considered that the enemy is possibly repairing a larger number of planes in this area than was at first estimated.

With the growing tendency in the PHILIPPINES to suicidal attacks on large naval vessels and transports by single engine planes, the possibility of the enemy initiating similar attacks from RABAU on Allied shipping and other suitable targets within the range of this base cannot be ignored.

(First Aust Army Intelligence Summary No 133)

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

DOCUMENTS CAPTURED IN NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

A batch of enemy documents captured in the TENIN-BAUBAU area at the beginning of Dec included the diary of the TASU (CAPE NEHUS) relay post dated from 10 to 22 Aug 44.

This diary refers to the arrival of 10 messages which left BUIN per messenger 1 Aug and arrived at the post 21 Aug. This means that the messenger averaged between 5 and 6 miles per day for the journey.

The details contained in the messages are not available, but in all cases both the originator and the addressee was a naval unit. Seven out of the ten messages were originated from 1 Base Force the HQ of which is on POPORANG I in the SHORTLANDS and five out of these seven were addressed to 87 Gd Force CO.

Little is known of the organization and strength of 87 Gd Force except that it probably controls all naval units in the BUKI area, under 1 Base Force HQ. A PW recently captured has stated that the HQ of this unit is situated at BONIS PLANTATION.

Another message was addressed to TEOP CO. A PW captured recently reported 20 to 30 unidentified naval personnel equipped with AAMG on TEOP I. Native scouts reported in Dec a radio station, an OP and an unused AA gun located on the NE tip of TEOP I.

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

The usual comprehensive estimate of land-based enemy air strength for the SWPA is not available.

Reports received during the week under review indicate that the air strengths in the PHILIPPINES and BORNEO are being maintained.

Between 19 Nov and 24 Nov the estimated air strength in the PHILIPPINES dropped from 807 to 674 aircraft, but despite the undoubted losses resulting from the enemy's persistent attacks in that area, it is considered that reinforcements being flown in are maintaining the figures as last reported.

There has been no indication of any substantial change in the other areas.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 133)

6. EQUIPMENT

HAND DRIVEN GENERATOR

Included in the signal equipment captured at SISIKA Village (5 miles SE of KEREKOPA) on 29 Nov was a Hand Driven Generator. This item has now been fully examined by AEME, whose report is as follows:-

Hand Driven Generator 7/500 volts

Consists of a small DC generator of conventional design, with two windings and separate commutators for HT and LT driven by either or both of two crank handles, one at each end, through a gear train giving a step-up of about 72:1.

It is in good mechanical condition, and maintenance has apparently been carried out regularly. Rusting is negligible, and mould growth very slight.

The construction is robust and general design good. Commutator wear is very slight, indicating either high quality of commutators and brushes or a short period of use.

The meter is sealed against entry of moisture, and appears unaffected by tropical conditions.

Rated Performance:-

Handle Speed	70 rpm
Generator Speed	5000 rpm
ET supply	500 volts at 0.06 amps
LT " " " "	7 " " 1.5 "
Total power output	40.5 watts

These figures were fully attained in tests carried out at an AEME Workshop.

It was noted that the insulation resistance between windings was 20,000 ohms increasing slightly after some running.

The press switch on the side is inoperative, sticking in the closed position.

9. GENERAL

Attached as Appendix "A" is a resume of Japanese food resources and self sufficiency on BOUGAINVILLE.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix "B" are amendments and additions to topographical information Ref Maps BOUGAINVILLE 1 inch series and 1:25,000 series.

E H Wilson

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff

APPENDIX "A" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 3

JAPANESE FOOD RESOURCES AND SELF SUFFICIENCY PROGRAMME
ON BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

FIELD RATIONS

1. When the March 1944 attack by the Japanese on the TOROKINA perimeter was beaten off, and hope of lifting the Allied aerial blockade of BOUGAINVILLE was abandoned, the enemy 17 Army commander was faced with a critical supply situation. Regular replenishments by surface vessels had ceased in Oct 1943, and supply by submarine was becoming so precarious that it was only a matter of time before that source would be cut off. A stocktaking of food reserves was undertaken at the end of March 1944 and the results incorporated in a report by 17 Army Intendance staff. This showed that rations held on 1 April were:-

Rice	487 tons
Compressed barley and hard tack	250 tons
Total	737 tons

It is considered that about 260 tons of food were landed by submarine between April and August 1944, so since April the Japanese had available for issue approximately 1000 tons of food.

By issue of supplementary native foods and, also to conserve stocks, the Japanese at the end of March 1944 had cut the standard ration to 200 grams (7 oz) of rice or hard tack per man per day.

If the Japanese had continued to issue rice and barley at a rate of 7 oz per man per day to the whole of the garrison on BOUGAINVILLE, supplies would have lasted until the end of August.

There is ample evidence that rice and barley were not a general issue, but were rigidly conserved for troops actually engaged in fighting or servicing the front line troops, and for officers on certain headquarters. Enemy now engaged in fighting in the Upper IARUMA and JABA Rivers areas are still receiving regular rice and barley issues, and occasionally condiments and cigarettes.

As the number of enemy engaged in combat since March has comprised only a very small proportion of the enemy garrison, it is probable that a considerable portion of the enemy's field ration reserve is still intact.

SELF SUFFICIENCY

Necessity for self sufficiency was first recognised by the Japanese in late 1943, but orders directing units to construct sufficient gardens to achieve independence in food were not issued until February 1944. Thereafter energetic measures were taken to ensure that units carried out a planned agricultural programme.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

2. The southern BOUGAINVILLE decomposed lava plain, the area around KIETA and the coastal strip from KIETA north to BUKA are very fertile. Before the war these areas supported a normally indolent native population of more than 40,000 in splendid physique and health. Today these areas are occupied by at the most 18,000 Japanese who have displaced the natives from the most fertile parts, appropriated their gardens, and driven a great proportion of them into the hills.

Japanese have a tradition of careful and skilled agriculture and frugal living, and as a race, are largely vegetarian. There is no reason why they could not live indefinitely off the land (if unmolested) maintaining a physical standard at least equal to that of the indigenous natives, and probably a little higher because of their greater knowledge of vitamin yielding foodstuffs, and more varied diet. This has been made possible by importation of seeds of vegetables popular in JAPAN.

DEGREE ATTAINED

3. Target set by the Japanese was an area of 600 square yards per man, the produce from which was expected to sustain him for a year. Sweet potato which is non seasonal and grows and matures all the year round was mentioned as the staple crop. It was also inferred from a captured document that complete self sufficiency had to be attained by Oct 44.

Planting programme was largely suspended in March 44 because all available front line troops were thrown into the attack on the TOROKINA perimeter. Concurrently with the attack Jap Intendence officers inspected and reported upon the agricultural progress made in south BOUGAINVILLE.

This report showed that six weeks after the issue of the self sufficiency order, most static units such as AA, Provost, S/L, Army Sigs, MT Depots, Hospitals etc had completed, or nearly completed their planting of the allotted acreage necessary for self sufficiency. Most of the other units had completed between 30 and 60 per cent of their programme, but the infantry units, engineers, construction units and field arty units lagged behind with between 1 and 15 per cent of their programme completed.

As sweet potato takes six to eight months to mature fully, all those units whose planting programme was well advanced in March would now be self sufficient, and only certain infantry, artillery and engineers would be dependant on supplementary issues from the reserve of field rations assumed to still exist.

Even these units however would now be in a position to sustain themselves on a low nutrition scale if no supplementary rations were available. Sweet potatoes can be eaten four to five months after planting, though the tubers at that stage are small and the yield per acre low. So any sweet potatoes planted in May, June or July after

the bulk of the fighting troops were withdrawn to rear areas would be sufficiently grown to eat. Since the attack was abandoned aerial reconnaissance has shown very extensive garden development and with few operational commitments the Japs would have no difficulty in preparing and planting all the acreage required for forward needs.

SUPPLEMENTARY NATIVE FOODS

4. Other foods available include:-

Sago: This grows abundantly in south BOUGAINVILLE, and although there is no evidence that it is being used, the Japanese are well acquainted with the method of processing it. If made into flour it would become an important tactical food, and it is easily transportable is a sustaining food and keeps at least four months.

Taro: A non-seasonable alternative crop to sweet potato and yielding a higher tonnage per acre than sweet potato. It matures in 6 to 7 months.

Yams: A low yielding crop not extensively cultivated, but in its wild state constitutes a source of emergency food.

Paw Paw: Extensively used by the Japanese as a vegetable. They also eat the roots. Grows prolifically and is an important supplementary food.

Bread fruit: Not widely grown in BOUGAINVILLE. Is not an important source of food.

Coconuts: There is evidence that these are systematically collected and distributed. Food value is extremely high, and they are an important item in the enemy ration.

Bamboo shoots: Taro Tops, Pit Pit, miscellaneous leaves and grasses are extensively eaten by the Japanese, from choice as well as necessity.

Cattle: In Dec 1941 there were 8,000 Hereford-Zebu cross cattle on plantations on the eastern coast. If these animals were husbanded and protected against ticks they may still be a source of tactical foodstuffs because the beef can be dried or otherwise preserved and transported.

Fish: Are abundant, and there is evidence that they are systematically caught and used. They too can be an important tactical food if dried.

RICE

5. It has not yet been definitely established that Japanese are growing rice in considerable quantities. One PW said a rice crop was harvested in March 1944, but Tac/R and aerial photography has failed so far to locate large areas of paddy fields. Other prisoners and natives have stated they do not know whether rice is being cultivated on the island.

Extensive cultivation of rice would be tactically significant because this is the only easily cultivated crop that is transportable over long distances, highly nutritious and has long keeping qualities.

STATISTICS OF CULTIVATION

6. Basing calculations on the Japanese estimate that 600 square yards of sweet potato will maintain one man for a year, it follows that eight soldiers could be sustained for every acre (4840 square yards) cultivated.

This would be feasible, provided that the Japanese estimate of annual yield per acre of sweet potatoes is accurate. This estimate provides for a standard consumption of 4 lbs 6 oz of potatoes a day, or 1560 lbs a year for each man. To sustain eight men the total annual yield per acre would have to be approximately $5\frac{1}{2}$ tons an acre.

This estimate was submitted to ANGAU and Tropical Scientific Section for comment.

ANGAU considered that yields of sweet potato obtained by natives with primitive methods was $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 tons an acre. Yield from carefully tilled Japanese gardens would be higher.

The Tropical Scientific Section considered the yield on BOUGAINVILLE would be about 5 tons an acre for sweet potato, and up to 15 or 20 tons an acre for taro.

It seems therefore that the Japanese estimate of approx $5\frac{1}{2}$ tons an acre can be attained.

On 2 Aust Corps estimate of 18,000 Japanese on BOUGAINVILLE and accepting the Japanese estimate of carrying capacity to be eight men per acre, the total area needed for self sufficiency is 2150 acres. If the proportion of taro grown is considerable the acreage would be less.

LABOUR REQUIREMENTS

Tropical Scientific Section further estimated that 80 man days would be required to clear an acre and plant it.

On this basis one Japanese would require to work for only 10 days a year to clear and plant his 600 square yards. As planting would have to be continuous, one day of work a month per man would suffice to clear and plant his monthly 50 square yard requirement.

Maintenance of 600 square yards would absorb at most half a day a week, and could be carried out by those unfit for front line service, or as a spare time occupation.

APPENDIX "B" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 3

AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS TO TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
REF MAPS BOUGAINVILLE 1:25,000 SERIES

SERIAL No	NAME		REF	MAP	REMARKS
	DELETE	INSERT			
77	MARIRIWI R	MARIWI R	775620	MOTUPENA Pt	Ref for mouth
78		SILIBAI R	222260	KARA	Mouth to 222260 and east branch
79		MAKAPEKA	926517	PURLATA R	East branch
80	MOKISA		871842	VITO	
81		MOKISA	884783	PURLATA R	
82	TABARATA KUNAI CAVE		884812	VITO	
83		TABARATA KUNAI CAVE	925755	PURLATA	
84	SISIKA		872850	VITO	
85		SISIKA	888811	"	
86	KURARO R		870786	PURLATA R	North branch
87		KURARO R	919781	" "	" "
88		KORO	942706	" "	
89	KORO		983682	" "	
90	LAMARI		988692	" "	
91		LAMARI	949713	" "	
92	SINAKEL 2		073707	" "	
93		SINAKEL 2	060728	" "	
94		NUNOPA R	982686	" "	North branch
95		Village (unnamed)	933668	" "	
96	KORAI		316451	Mt TAROKA	
97		RUBA	099767	" "	
98	WALI WALINA R		829857	VITO	
99		WALI WALINA R	872863	"	NW from ref
100		PEORIA	820957	"	
101		TAORO	819943	"	
102		MT TAKERI	817942	"	
103		KAUWATSLA R	827878	"	Left branch
104		TA PIN R	827878	"	Right branch
105	TABAGO		388455	TOIMONAPU	
106	PAUROKU	UGUBAKOGI	401488	"	
107	UGUBAKOGI		465478	"	
108	BOGIBOGO		406502	"	
109	BAGUI		419506	"	
110	KORIO		438522	"	
111	BORULAI		438522	"	
112	ORILAI		448528	"	
113	BARKU	BARNU	907592	PURLATA R	
114		Mt DRAGON	687110	KOWARO	
115		ARTY HILL	678120	1:25,000	
		to			
			685118	" "	
116		PUP KNOLL	681117	" "	
117		LITTLE			
		GEORGE HILL	680115	" "	
118		GEORGE HILL	680114	" "	
119		PEARL RIDGE	663138		
		to			
			687124	" "	
120		NIP HILL	643086	" "	

SERIAL No	NAME		REF	MAP		REMARKS
	DELETE	INSERT				
121		BAWABU RIDGE	672115 to 675128	KOWARO 1:25,000		
122		MORETONS REST	663096	" "		
123		BARGES HILL	664098	" "		
124		WILLIAMSONS KNOLL	663102	" "		
125		RYANS KNOLL	667107	" "		
126		MARTINS KNOLL	672110	" "		
127	PURUTUPAIA	PIATERAPAIA	672109	" "		
128	RETSIOPALA	RETSIAPAIA	sq 6712	KOWARO		

TRACK AND ROAD INFORMATION

MAP	REF	REMARKS
PURIATA R		Track MENDAI 856667 through SARELE 957653, ROVO 958637, BIRAI 948625, MARINGAM 962619 to BAKARAM 967607 is jeepable.
PURIATA R		Track PEREI 943679 through TAKUMARI to TADOLIMA 967663 to SARELE 957653 is jeepable.
PURIATA		Track from 816713 to NIGITAN 851685 is jeepable.
TOROKINA		West Trail Road is now jeepable from 695940 as far as DIVISION HILL 743928.
TOROKINA		Track TOROKINA River mth 634876 to 736845 is jeepable. Rivers crossed by timber bridges vehicular pontoon ferries operate at 740842 and 770810. Capacity 1-15 cwt 4x4.
TOROKINA		NUMA NUMA trail is passable to 3 ton vehicles as far as PURUTUPAIA 650117. Owing to numerous river crossings it is not jeepable.
AITARA		River crossings at 955412 - 965406 - 007382 - 015376 - 057359 shown on map as bridges are fords.
KARA		Track 246348 to 243323 is jeepable.
Mt TAROKA		Track extension from UINA 274449 to BARTILO 273463 is jeepable.


SECRET

DISTRIBUTION LIST


HQ 2 AUST CCRPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 3

	<u>Copy No</u>
3 Aust Div	1 - 5
11 Aust Inf Bde	6 - 9
23 Aust Inf Bde	10 - 13
Americal Div	14 - 17
USAF NOR SOLS APO 706	18
CCL NAV NOR SOLS	19
COM AIR NOR SOLS	20
COM ZE AIR TAF	21
84 Wing RAAF (Army Co-op)	22
HQ USAFFE APO 501	23 - 24
First Aust Army	25 - 26
4 Aust Base Sub Area	27
ANGAU	28
DSIO NOR SOLS	29
PA to Comd	30
37S	31
DA & QMG	32
G(O) (incl LOs)	33
G(Air)	34 - 42
G(Int)	43 - 44
GCRA	45
CE	46
CSO	47
A (incl DAMS)	48
Q	49
LHQ S of MI	50
War Diary	51 - 52
File	53

When this Distribution List has been perused, please destroy by fire.



Ref Map MOTUPENA Pt
1 inch to 1 mile



Nav Diary

SECRET

Copy No 51

GSI

2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 4

NOTE

1. A receipt for this summary is not required. Recipients are requested to note serial numbers and bring under immediate notice non receipt of any issue.
2. Items marked with a single sideline in the margin will not be reproduced for circulation below Bde HQ.
3. Items marked with three sidelines will not be reproduced without the permission of G I(Int) 2 Aust Corps.
4. Except as specified above, items contained in this summary may be reproduced for information or instruction but the source must be quoted as HQ 2 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 4.

CONTENTS

Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 10
Dec 44 to 2400 hrs 17 Dec 44

PART I

Page

Summary of Operations by areas

(a) Land	1
(b) Sea	3
(c) Air	4

PART II

1. Enemy OOB - Land	7
2. Enemy OOB - Air	8
6. Equipment	8
7. Tactics	9
9. General	10

APPENDICES

"A" COCONUT AND BOX MINES

PART I

(a) LAND-OWN AND ENEMY

BOUGAINVILLE

PIATERAPAIA AREA

Enemy defensive positions and patrols continue to be contacted in this area. A Japanese party of unknown strength was sighted on 11 Dec about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile NE PIATERAPAIA and eight enemy pill boxes have been located on ARTILLERY RIDGE. In addition, air reconnaissance has revealed 20 enemy occupied trenches in the same area.

On 13 Dec our reconnaissance patrol operating from PUP KNOLL to ARTILLERY RIDGE encountered LMG, rifle fire and grenades from the souther slopes of ARTILLERY RIDGE. Later our patrol located and cleared one enemy OP, killing 10 Japanese before withdrawing.

On the same day an enemy force attacked our positions at GEORGE and LITTLE GEORGE HILLS from the south, but withdrew after being engaged by our LMG and grenades. Another patrol clash occurred north of ARTILLERY RIDGE with an estimated 15 enemy, one of whom was killed.

SISIVIE

On 13 Dec our patrol attacked a party of Japanese 300 yards north of KURIVOPAIA, inflicting some casualties. About one mile to the east an enemy OP was engaged by our artillery.

RURI BAY AREA

Following recent Allied bombing attacks, the enemy is reported to have evacuated the RURI, TSUNDAWAN areas and moved north to the villages around BUKA PASSAGE, the heaviest concentration being at MANOB, KAMANDATA and near BONIS PLANTATION.

NUMA NUMA

Reports from reliable sources state that 70 first class Japanese troops left the northern areas for NUMA NUMA on 27 Nov and that more are to leave for the same area at a later date.

KIETA AREA

In addition to 25 Japanese previously reported killed by natives in this area, natives claim killing 36 in Nov and a further 19 on night 9/10 Dec. Operations, the natives report, continue.

MT SUGAR LOAF AREA

A patrol reports that the natives at MT SUGAR LOAF and NEGROHEAD are feeding the enemy, but under compulsion, and it is stated that they are anxious to assist Allied troops

to clear these areas of the Japanese. Meanwhile, many natives, whose gardens have already been denuded by the Japanese are starving and have left the areas with their women and children.

Another report stated that an enemy force led by hostile natives surprised and attacked native guards and women in the KAINO area while other natives were absent fighting enemy troops. Two Japanese were killed in this attack.

JABA RIVER

On 15 Dec our patrol made contact with an enemy force south of the JABA RIVER mouth. Four enemy were killed as a result of this action and one officer was captured. A late report states that three more PW were captured south of the river early on 18 Dec.

Enemy casualties to 13 Dec are:-

Killed	9944
Captured	105
From unconfirmed sources	132 killed

NEW BRITAIN

Little activity has been reported during the week. Native patrols attempting to reach ULAMONA reported that Japanese sentries are guarding all southern approaches to the area.

NEW GUINEA

HANSA BAY - MADANG

Reports from this area during the past week indicate that enemy activity has been maintained, particularly in the WANGAN area south of the SEPIK RIVER, where the enemy has established himself in some strength.

On 10 Dec a party of 40 enemy was sighted at WANGAN and a further party, also estimated at 40, is reported to have established defensive positions at the junction of the WATAM - MARANGIS track and inland to WANGAN.

Our patrol on 9 Dec reported an unknown number of enemy moving up the KERAM RIVER, and other Japanese patrols are stationed at villages in the area. Three Japanese parties, each about 20 strong; were observed moving south along the KERAM RIVER to KAMBOT, BUGARAM and KEBIM, apparently making for ANHAMBURG.

AITAPE AREA

Active Allied patrolling continues in this area and enemy movement is on the increase. This is particularly evident in the general area south of TONG, where numerous Japanese parties have been observed.

On 12 Dec our patrol attacked an enemy forces at YAMBES (4½ miles SE of TONG) inflicting some casualties before the enemy withdrew.

It is estimated that 4/500 enemy are in the general area east and south of TONG.

In the coastal area a patrol clash took place near BALUP on the DANMAP RIVER. Four enemy, reported to be in good physical condition, were killed.

Enemy casualties to 13 Dec are:-

Killed	9184
Captured	167

PHILIPPINES

In the northern ORMOC CORRIDOR strong enemy resistance was maintained as our forces continued their southward advance from LIMON. Small enemy groups deployed on commanding hill features are stubbornly defending the approaches to the PALOPON - KANANGA Road junction, 8 miles south of LIMON. North of this point heavy Allied pressure is being maintained.

In the ORMOC sector only slight resistance was encountered and our forces advancing rapidly north from IPIL occupied ORMOC on 11 Dec, thus depriving the enemy of his main supply and reinforcement port.

Other of our troops who landed on the west coast on 7 Dec are driving south to meet our southern forces, who, having secured ALBUERA, have advanced north to a point just south of MALITBOG.

On 7 Dec 2,000/3,000 Japanese landed at SAN ISIDRO BAY (NW coast) and proceeded inland towards LIMON. Allied artillery halted the enemy's movement and subsequent attacks by advanced enemy elements were repulsed.

MINDORO

American forces have landed at MINDORO, 120 miles south of MANILA. The landing was effected with little loss. Our forces have advanced 7 to 9 miles inland from the beaches and have captured a number of airfields.

(b) SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

GENERAL

The focal point of enemy shipping activity continues to be the PHILIPPINES. All other merchant shipping commitments have now been relegated to a secondary position, in an endeavour to push substantial numbers of troops into the PHILIPPINES generally, and into LEYTE in particular.

Although a proportion of these troops is being landed, the cost in merchant and naval tonnage is exorbitant. However there has been no indication of any slackening in the programme.

Japanese naval activity has increased slightly, possibly in anticipation of further Allied carrier strikes in the VISAYAS. Three groups of cruisers and destroyers were observed moving in a north easterly and a north westerly direction from MANILA on 7-8 Dec.

Following the decrease in Allied air activity over ports in BORNEO, the enemy has again diverted some of his larger merchant shipping units to the waters around BALIKPAPAN and MAKASSAR.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 134)

On 15 Dec an unidentified submarine was reported four miles NW of BOUGAINVILLE proceeding on a northerly course.

Reports from a reliable source state that enemy barges make a regular night trip with food from ROROVANIA to KIETA and TOBOREI.

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

The number of sorties flown over BOUGAINVILLE was greatly reduced this week, only about 110 fighter bomber sorties were flown in all. A number of targets of tactical interest to the army, however, were struck by fighter bombers and one strike was carried out in close support of our troops.

On 13 Dec 8 Corsairs led in by Boomerangs successfully bombed and strafed enemy positions on the northern and eastern slopes of ARTY HILL (KOWARA 1:25,000 from 680120 to 684118) with depth charges and half ton bombs. Mortar smoke was used to indicate the extremities of the strafing target, but the effectiveness of lead-in by Tac/R aircraft was again demonstrated when the smoke began to drift with the wind. The Tac/R pilot in touch with the ground by R/T, was able to call for more smoke and, at the same time, indicate the target accurately again by tracer from his own aircraft.

A number of targets, identified from ground information were attacked during the week by small forces of bomb carrying Corsairs.

An enemy radio station on TEOP Island was bombed twice and direct hits scored on the position where it had been reported, two separate dump areas near LAKURUMAI were accurately bombed and strafed and a number of enemy occupied villages were attacked. Of the village targets most observed damage was caused at SIRUKIAI (south SHORTLAND) and at LEMANMANU (BUKA) Mission. At these places a total of 10 huts were destroyed.

NEW BRITAIN

There were three heavy attacks against targets at RABAU during the week. On 11 Dec 31 Mitchells bombed the TOBERA aircraft repair and stores area; on 13 Dec 30 Mitchells and 6 Venturas attacked the VUKKANAU dispersal area; and, on 16 Dec 30 Mitchells bombed the strip at VUKKANAU leaving it unserviceable.

Eight Corsairs attacked the MALAGUNA floatplane ramp on 15 Dec. More than once photographs have shown a Jake near this target. It was reported that some bombs were dropped accurately on the target but no sighting was made of the Jake.

Fighter patrols over RABAU and armed reconnaissances over coastal GAZELLE Peninsular were reduced during the week but on no day were the RABAU airfields free from Corsairs patrolling overhead.

NEW IRELAND

There was little change in our air activity over NEW IRELAND during the week. Daily armed reconnaissances were maintained over the northern part of the island by Corsairs and Venturas, and a number of buildings, huts and bridges were destroyed in a series of minor attacks.

NEW GUINEA

There has been no slackening in the regular bombing of enemy supply areas in the WEMAK sector, those on KAIRIRU and MUSCHU Islands receiving most attention. Beauforts harassed the enemy in the MUSIMBILIK - SAHIK area.

In DUTCH NEW GUINEA strong forces of fighter bombers have continued their attacks against enemy troop concentrations. RANSIKI, MOEMI and UTAROM were the main targets.

CERAM - HALMAHERAS - CELEBES

Allied air strength employed in these areas is still being concentrated on the Japanese airfield system.

On 9 Dec the airfields at KITTITOE, LAHA and FAROEKOE in CERAM were bombed and strafed by a total of 24 Mitchells.

Following the heavy attack on 4 Dec against airfields in the HALMAHERAS, when 100 medium bombers attacked DJAILOLO and HATETABAKO airfields, fighter bombers have carried on the task of ensuring that airfields in this area remain useless to the enemy.

MANADO was the main target in the CELEBES. On 10, 11 and 12 Dec Beaufighters raided this target using rockets and bombs. Oil tank installations, buildings and a power station were hit.

BURNEO

On 9 Dec 24 Liberators bombed oil tanks at LONGKAS and 6 Liberator similar targets at DONDAIG. At least 12 tanks were hit and burned and a refinery building was seen to explode.

PHILIPPINES

The softening up of enemy airfields in the central PHILIPPINES has been continued by heavy, medium and fighter bombers.

A convoy of six transports of between 2/700 tons each, escorted by seven destroyers or destroyer escorts, which had landed Japanese reinforcements on LEYTE, was attacked by fighter bombers and all vessels destroyed.

(First Aust Army Intelligence Summary No 134)

On 10, 11 and 12 Dec fighter bombers made very successful attacks on enemy shipping. A convoy approaching SAN ISIDRO and another retiring from LEYTE were attacked. Reports to hand indicate that five transports and three destroyers were destroyed and at least three other vessels damaged.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

ON THE JABA RIVER

Life for the Japanese troops of 6 Coy 2 Bn 13 Inf Regt on the JABA RIVER is not a happy one according to a 1/Lt MO captured there on 16 Dec.

Added to the rigours of front line service the enemy troops of this forward garrison endure continual shortage of food, lack of medical supplies and shortage of personal equipment and get no mail or comforts issues. Mosquitoes are so numerous that all troops vacate their positions at night and sleep on the beach, neglecting to post guards.

Food supplies are so low that troops boil and eat bamboo shoots and grass to eke out their small issues of field rations. Rice is seldom received, however a week ago a surprise issue of 400 grams per man was made. The PW stated that he had heard that the first crop of rice had recently been harvested at BUIN and that another was under cultivation.

Morale was difficult to maintain when the JABA RIVER garrison could watch Allied ships entering and leaving EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY without molestation.

Strengths 13 Inf Regt

The PW estimated that the troops of 13 Inf Regt forward in the JABA - MOSIGETTA - TOKINOTU area totalled approximately 1000. Strength of 6 Coy was 30 and that of 7 Coy 35 to 40.

It is of interest that among the 6 Coy garrison there are several NCOs who have been demoted because they were suspected of intending to desert. Although suspected of these intentions manpower shortage necessitated that these men be kept at the front line and the PW believed that the demotions were purely a company affair which had not been reported to rear headquarters.

The PW stated that 7 Coy would soon relieve 6 Coy on the JABA.

2. ENEMY OGB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the following areas is prepared on information to 8 Dec 4:-

AREAS	COMPARATIVES								
	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	24 Nov 19 Nov
NEW BRITAIN)									
NEW IRELAND)	3					10	2	15	12 12
SOLOMONS)									
PHILIPPINES:									
MINDANAO	37		13	37		12	8	107	90 85
VISAYAS	90	13	3	31		16	17	170	192 192
LUZON	107	22	84	110	4	37	24	388	392 530
	234	35	100	178	4	65	49	665	674 807
AMBON-CERAM-									
BOEROE	4		2		2	9	2	19	22 22
CELEBES	20	34		25	4	8	7	98	58 58
TIMOR-SOEMBA-									
SOEMBAYA-FLORES)	5					3	3	11	16 16
JAVA-BALI-LONBOY.	4			18		15	5	42	42 42
BORNEO	88	30	6	53		13	10	200	216 220
TOTALS SWPA	358	99	108	274	10	123	78	1050	1040 1177

Ø Estimates do not include combat types assigned to operational training units.

Casualties have been deducted and reinforcements added.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 134)

6. EQUIPMENT

COCONUT AND BOX MINES

Attached as Appendix "A" are details and sketches of these mines found on LEXTE.

7. TACTICS

AIRBORNE SUICIDE PARTIES

One of the most fantastic enemy exploits of the South West Pacific campaign was carried out last week, when three transport planes loaded with Japanese, hand grenades, demolition kits and other equipment normally carried by Diversionary Units, crash-landed behind Allied lines on LEYTE.

The raid was conducted along lines laid down in a document recently captured on MOROTAI entitled "Raiding Diversionary Tactics." It specifies, inter alia:-

"Methods of Infiltration:

- (a) By sea route.....
- (b) By air. Parachutes, gliders and transport planes can be employed. As landings are to be accomplished at dawn or dusk, the location of the landing area, its condition, and the route of infiltration after the landing must be first investigated secretly and thoroughly.
- (c) By land....."

About 0300I on 27 Nov, two transport planes made deliberate crash-landings on the beach between ABUYOG and DULAG on LEYTE. One came to rest near the bivouac area of a US camp and about 16 Japanese emerged. They were engaged in combat with US personnel and two Japanese were killed, the remainder fled inland. The other plane landed in an isolated place and all of the 20/25 occupants escaped.

The passengers in the third plane were less fortunate as the plane was shot down by AA. The plane was completely demolished and all the occupants believed killed. At least 16 dead Japanese bodies were found. They had been armed with grenades, four inch anti-tank mines, rifles pistols and booby traps. Their clothing also suited their operational role and included rubber boots.

These parties were obviously landed on a mission of destruction and an unposted letter by one of the raiders gives a clue to the nature of one specific mission:

"Father, I'm writing you a short note. I have been assigned the very important and suicidal mission of infiltrating into an enemy airfield and destroying his planes. Even if I get killed, there will be no satisfaction which would surpass this and I feel honoured."

Their mission was unsuccessful as they were isolated by our forces before any damage was inflicted.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 134)

9. GENERAL

RUSSC-JAPANESE RELATIONS

In any study of Far Eastern Strategy the great enigma lies in the relations between RUSSIA and JAPAN. At the moment there is ostensibly a pact of friendship between MOSCOW and TOKYO, but the Russians are supreme opportunists in the field of foreign affairs, whilst to the Japanese, treaties are made to be broken if and when the breaking can serve the Japanese purpose.

Traditionally the Japanese and Russians are enemies and have been so for the past 50 years. The Japanese are studiously adopting a conciliatory policy which emanates entirely from fear.

One point alone is sufficient to show the measure of apprehension which governs the attitude of TOKYO towards MOSCOW. The UNITED STATES and RUSSIA are at war with GERMANY; JAPAN and GERMANY are at war with the UNITED STATES. And yet supplies from the UNITED STATES, the enemy of JAPAN, are being carried regularly across the north PACIFIC to be discharged at VLADIVOSTOCK, transported across SIBERIA and used in EUROPE against the desperate armies of GERMANY, the ally of JAPAN.

Admittedly the ocean transport of these supplies is being carried out by ships flying the Soviet flag. But if JAPAN were sure of herself - and sure of RUSSIA - she would be perfectly entitled to apply the law of contraband to the products of the war factories of her American enemy. The Japanese must know that every ship load of American munitions which reaches the Russian Armies must inevitably hasten the downfall of GERMANY and bring closer the day when the full weight of Anglo-American power can be concentrated against JAPAN. Their fear of RUSSIA prevents them from stopping a flood which must ultimately encompass their own destruction.

However the argument may not be altogether onesided, as Japanese diplomacy appears to have scored at least one point in the game. TOKYO early this year mildly accepted the abrupt withdrawal by RUSSIA of the SAKHALIN fishing rights - at one time a potential source of war between the two countries. However, almost at the same time, the partial movement of Japanese troops away from MANCHURIA indicated that JAPAN had obtained some concession in return, and for the time being felt herself free from the risk of hostilities with RUSSIA.

The normal Japanese garrison in MANCHURIA comprised about 700,000 picked troops, stationed there solely as a counter to the Soviet's powerful Siberian Army. During the past six months, this garrison has been reduced probably by about 100,000 troops. Some have been moved to CHINA and BURMA and recently three divisions from MANCHURIA have arrived in the PHILIPPINES and there are indications of the expected arrival of a fourth division.

These changes are indicative of the dilemma in which JAPAN now finds herself. With her natural apprehension concerning RUSSIA, it is unlikely that she would weaken her Manchurian Front to any extent unless the defence of her Empire elsewhere was

urgent and vital. It is apparently - JAPAN's intention to use the brief interval before GERMANY is defeated and Russian eyes again turn east, to acquire a strong continental position as a barrier against approach to JAPAN proper.

Before embarking on their programme of southern expansion the Japanese militarists considered that their future lay in the development of MANCHURIA and it has now become an integral part of her war machine. The three eastern and northern provinces of CHINA were seized by JAPAN for strategic and economic purposes. These gains have provided JAPAN with:-

- (a) Iron ore for the SHOWA Steel Works at ANSHAN.
- (b) A better grade of ore in large supply from LUNGYEN.
- (c) An abundance of coking coal from KAILAN.

In addition there has been a transfer of a number of heavy industries to the rich coal and steel areas of MANCHURIA, relieving the congested areas of JAPAN. Food in these areas is plentiful and a highly organised rail transport system has been established for both strategic and economic needs.

The entire railway system in NORTH CHINA has been adapted to fit in with the defence of MANCHURIA and two lines from the YANGTZE VALLEY could be used simultaneously for reinforcement. Thus, despite the aforementioned reduction in strength in MANCHURIA, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, the front could be strengthened rapidly and JAPAN could keep her best resources of iron and coal until the last moment.

In the event of RUSSIA joining war against her, JAPAN's strategic aim would be to cut the vulnerable trans-Siberian railway at any one of a number of points where it is flanked by MANCHURIA and thus isolate the main Soviet base of VLADIVOSTOCK.

The Russians, for their part, have seen to it that their Far Eastern Army is largely self-contained with large stores of supplies and an independent factory system to replenish them. VLADIVOSTOCK has been most elaborately fortified from the land side, as the Russians are well aware of the Japanese preference for entering a fortress by the back door. At VLADIVOSTOCK also there are numerous small submarines, specially designed for attacking coastal shipping and the Soviet authorities have neglected nothing in the provision of adequate airfields and seaplane bases.

And so, pact of friendship and non-aggression notwithstanding, JAPAN and RUSSIA continue to eye one another with suspicion to say the least. A military commentator has recently written that "the Soviet Union is unquestionably the decisive factor for a swift victory over JAPAN." He has drawn attention to the line from which JAPAN can be mortally hit - the line DUTCH HARBOUR-KISKA-ATTU-PETROPAVLOVSK-VLADIVOSTOCK-ZENCHOW-FOOCHOW-CANTON. If this combination of American, Russian and Chinese positions were fused into a ring for the attack, he argues, JAPAN's doom would be sealed.

JAPAN's operations in CHINA are "vexatious" as Mr. CHURCHILL puts it, but they do not guarantee her invincibility. There can be no more a "Fortress Axis" or a "Fortress Japan" than there was a "Fortress Europe". That is to say that however well positions are prepared and however skilfully defences are mounted they will fall to the type of attack, brilliantly conceived and superbly executed, that forced the NORMANDY beaches, swept through FRANCE and is now hammering at the walls of HITLER's Reich.

What British and American sea, land and air power did once, it can do again, Russian aid, however, would be a supremely important factor.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence
Summary No 134)

E H Wilson
(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff

Distribution:-

As for Summary No 3
plus 'B' Aust Corps Sigs 1
11 Aust Inf Bde 1

APPENDIX "A" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 4

COCONUT AND BOX MINES

Further new types of Japanese mines were found on LEYTE rigged as booby traps in buildings and planted along roads as anti-vehicle mines.

Besides the standard Type 93, "Tape Measure Mine" and the Type 99, Magnetic Mine (armour piercing), improvised mines of many types have been found both in position and stored in ammunition dumps.

By utilising the shell of a coconut and embedding a hand grenade in black powder within, the Japanese have contrived a natural camouflaged mine. The fuze for the hand grenade is of the pressure type with 4 to 5 second delay before detonation; therefore, its primary use has been for pressure type booby trapping.

The device was also possibly intended to roll down-sides.




Crude Box Type Mines employing the same principle as the coconut mine are exceptionally common. These have been found in the grass along roads and rigged up beneath staircases and floors of buildings containing ammunition.

Many different sizes of wooden boxes have been constructed for electrical or time fuze detonation. Electric caps found with mines are similar to American standard types. The explosive charge has been either picric acid or black powder. An attempt to blow a bridge over the MAINTEZ RIVER was made by the retreating Japs by hooking eight of these boxes electrically with 21 cases of 75mm shells placed on and around the boxes. When found, one box had burned but not detonated.

A sketch of typical types of such mines is attached.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 134)

COCONUT & BOX MINES



SECRET

GSI
2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
No 5

CONTENTS

Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 17
Dec 44 to 2400 hrs 23 Dec 44

Page

PART I

Summary of operations by areas

(a) Land	1
(c) Air	4

PART II

1. Enemy OOB - Land	7
2. Enemy OOB - Air	8
9. General	9

PART III

Topographical	9
---------------	---

APPENDICES

- "A" JAPANESE HAND GENERATOR TYPE 29 MARK E
- "B" ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO TOPOGRAPHICAL
INFORMATION - REF MAPS BOUGAINVILLE SERIES
1 inch; 1 : 25,000 and 4 miles to 1 inch
- "C" JAPANESE HEALTH ON BOUGAINVILLE

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Captured documents and prisoners reveal considerable apprehension among the Japanese on BOUGAINVILLE, over future Allied moves. In two areas they have altered the tactical dispositions of their forces to counter our threats to important defensive areas, and to be prepared better to meet anticipated offensives.

On the NUMA NUMA trail recent aggressive moves culminating in pinching out of Jap key positions on ARTY HILL and PEARL RIDGE guarding the trail, has galvanised the Japs into hasty collection of reinforcements for the weekly held PEARL RIDGE, IBU - TOKUA sector, and base points 2 and 3 on the main trail. Losses have been so heavy and the reserves so few that the enemy has not had the strength to launch, in recent actions, the almost inevitable counter attacks which follow penetrations of his positions.

Reinforcements appear to be moving from BUKA area south along the coastal track to the mouth of the AITA R. Accompanying them are numbers of armed natives, carriers, and Indian prisoners of war who are carrying large quantities of cargo. This cargo may be supplies and food from the large dumps established in the BUKA area before the March offensive on TOROKINA. Other native reports indicate barges are taking supplies at night to KIETA from BUIN area where a second large supply dump exists. Others are reported to be moving north to NUMA NUMA from KIETA, also carrying supplies and food.

Reported establishment of ammunition dumps at ESSEBOPAIA on the WAKUNIA R trail, and movement of troops and a senior Jap officer north from NUMA NUMA to the vicinity of the AITA R mouth indicate that some forces have been detailed to hold the northern trail from IBU to the coast through PIPIPAIA, and the WAKUNAI R trail to IBU and TOKUA.

A PW has disclosed the dispositions of Japanese forces, and, by inference, their main defensive positions along the trail from OLD VIVIE to NUMA NUMA Plantation. The information is set out in Part II, para 1 of this Summary.

The second area over which the enemy is showing concern is the SW coastline from TAVERA R to TOKUAKA, somewhere along which the Japs are expecting a landing on 26 Dec 44.

A 13 Inf Regt document captured at JABA R on 19 Dec set out the Regt plan for repulsing a landing at MAWARAKA. This document confirmed existing estimates of Jap Order of Battle in SW BOUGAINVILLE. Principle interest lay in the withdrawal of two companies from their beach defence positions near MAWARAKA, and their transfer to the Regt reserve to strengthen the forces to be held in readiness near MOSIGETTA to counter attack a landing force.

Combined effect of propaganda leaflets, appearance in their midst of long range Australian patrols led by former officials and residents with food and tobacco, general exasperation at Japanese behaviour, and the grim necessity to keep the enemy from despoiling their gardens, have led natives in several large areas to turn against the Japanese. Included are the KIETA natives who were formerly strongly pro-Japanese. By planned desertions of Jap armed natives and police boys and by treachery and ambush these natives have acquired 1 MG and 80 rifles. NARGOVISSI natives have collected 1 HMG and 70 rifles by the same methods. With these arms and axes, spears and bows and arrows, these savage and warlike natives have inflicted many casualties and have even

sought out and attacked Japanese parties of up to 100.

Advantages of these uprisings to the Allied campaign include serious disruption of enemy communications in areas west and south of KIETA, deprivation of the enemy of food and carriers and diversion of considerable fighting strength to patrol Ls of C and escort carrying parties.

PART 1
OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

BOUGAINVILLE

NORTHERN BOUGAINVILLE

Natives report that they have killed nine Japanese in the area south of RAUA, and 12 in the NAMATOQA area.

According to native scouts, natives and Indians are being used to carry large quantities of stores along the coastal route south to INUS, believed bound for NUMA NUMA. South of INUS, they state that the enemy is collecting carriers to move up the AITA RIVER, though as yet there has been no movement inland.

It is reported that many Japanese and pro-Japanese natives, supplied with stores, are hiding in caves in cliff sides from SORUM to RUFU BAY.

CAPE MOLTKE AREA

An Allied patrol to KURATIO MISSION made no contact, and is at present carrying out local patrols in that area,

PIATERAPAIA

Allied troops launched an attack on ARTILLERY RIDGE on morning 18 Dec and after one hour's fighting gained their objective. The enemy was driven from his position to the north base of the ridge. Twenty five enemy were killed in this action and two were captured, and a large number of documents and weapons fell into our hands.

On 22 Dec, preceded by Allied bombing and artillery fire, our troops attacked and cleared an enemy position on PEARL RIDGE, approximately half a mile north of ARTILLERY RIDGE, inflicting an unknown number of casualties. Heavy enemy fire was encountered by our supporting troops.

JABA RIVER

On 18 Dec, elements of our forces in three parties crossed the JABA RIVER and commenced aggressive patrolling south of the river.

One force advancing SE along the JABA RIVER attacked an enemy perimeter $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the mouth and drew the enemy into a previously prepared ambush. Nine of the enemy were killed, the remainder, including one wounded, escaping into the jungle.

Another party advanced $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south and established a perimeter at that point.

The third force landed on the coast three miles south of the mouth of the JABA RIVER. This force pushed south and established itself in an unoccupied enemy patrol base near the coast five miles south of the river mouth.

Active patrolling has continued in the JABA-TAVERA area with light contacts only reported.

KIETA

It has been reported that all natives except police boys deserted the Japanese in the NEGROHEAD area on 17 Dec. The native police were expected to desert the next day after wrecking Japanese machine guns. The principal enemy native in the area was captured on 19 Dec, and the Japanese are now banding together into groups for their own protection.

Large numbers of native women and children have withdrawn to the hills, while the men remain to fight the Japanese. About 80 rifles and one LMG have been captured by natives in this area.

Natives report that they have trapped 100 enemy near TOBOREI PTN, due south of KOKEVIKO Bridge on the coastal road.

On 17/18 Dec, 23 Japanese proceeded from MORONI to ORAMI on a foraging expedition. One of this party was killed by natives, and the remainder withdrew, carrying seven wounded.

Fifteen acres of enemy gardens are at present being harvested half-mile inland from TOBOREI BAY.

MARGOVISSI

It is reported from reliable sources that 70 Japanese rifles and one LMG have been captured by natives in this area.

NUMA NUMA

A Chinese escapee has stated that until recently natives were being used to carry ammunition from BUIN to NUMA NUMA.

CHOISEUL ISLAND

Native scouts have reported the arrival recently of a large body of Japanese at POROPORO (north tip of CHOISEUL ISLAND). Much barge traffic has been heard in this vicinity at nights, the craft seeming to come from the west and depart in the same direction. Considerable activity on gardens a mile east of POROPORO has also been reported.

Thirty full drums of fuel oil were observed by scouts on the bank of STI RIVER (4 miles SE of WEST CAPE), and an enemy barge was seen moving up the river to the fuel dump in daylight.

Enemy casualties to 22 Dec	:	Killed	10,065
		PW	111
From unconfirmed sources	:	Killed	157

NEW BRITAIN

WIDE BAY

Increased enemy patrol activity has been reported in the area west of WAITAVALO and KANAKDRAN, and other enemy patrols have been observed south of IP RIVER, seven miles south of KANAKDRAN. On 10 Dec, an enemy patrol of approximately 60 moved from WAITAVALO along the north bank of HENRY REID RIVER to KAMA (approximately seven miles upstream), and several

other enemy parties have patrolled to TALINIO (approximately 15 miles from WAITAVALO). Natives report that the enemy at WAITAVALO are apparently unaware of the presence of Allied troops at JACQUINOT BAY. Enemy native troops at KANAKDRAN are estimated at not more than 200.

Recent bombing of the enemy at WAITAVALO has caused a re-arrangement of his positions, including the movement of HQ to the base of the main hill feature in the east plantation area. The enemy here has air raid tunnels dug into the side of the hill, and AA guns in position.

An Allied patrol returning from LOLOBAU on 11 Dec reported no sign of the enemy.

NEW IRELAND

An Allied party landed at BOEING IS in the TANGA IS Group (off east coast NEW IRELAND) on 22 Dec and reported no enemy movement seen.

NEW GUINEA

DANSA BAY - MADANG

An Allied patrol to WATAM encountered approximately 15 enemy, and in the ensuing engagement, one Japanese was killed and three wounded. A sea borne patrol to WATAM on 19 Dec reported no enemy seen.

AITAPE

Active enemy and Allied patrolling continues in the TONG area. On 16 Dec, an enemy party of unknown strength was engaged by our patrol west of YAMBES, and on 20 Dec, the YAMBES area was reported clear of the enemy. Natives reveal the movement of a party of 71 enemy from YASE to MUSIMBILIM (MUSIMBE) and from the same source it is learned that 67 enemy are engaged in fishing in the MIWIAK area.

In the coastal sector, our patrol crossed the DANMAP RIVER and reached ROCKY POINT after a series of sharp engagements, in which 11 enemy were killed and two captured. On 18 Dec, an Allied patrol attacked an enemy ammunition dump in the DANMAP RIVER area, killing seven Japanese. Enemy activity has increased in this area, and movement has been observed inland along the WALUM - WOLISIS - MAPRIK route.

PHILIPPINES - LUYEE

In the northern sector, our forces in the TOLIBAW area, two miles south of LIMON, reduced several enemy strong-points west of the ORMOC HIGHWAY and continued their southern advance against strong opposition. East and NE of MT CATABARAN our forces advanced slowly against isolated enemy positions which are protected by almost inaccessible approaches.

Fierce resistance encountered in the MAHOMAG-ANAS area in the central sector was eventually overcome, and US troops advanced to link up with their own forces on the west coast at ALBUERA.

In the ORMOC sector, our forces advancing north to occupy COGON (1200 yds north of ORMOC), reported the strongest opposition so far encountered in that area. The enemy was well dug in in difficult terrain and was resisting strongly with heavy mortar and artillery support. On 16 Dec, our attack continued, one force attacking astride the ORMOC HIGHWAY, while other forces advanced in a wide enveloping movement on VALENCIA (9 miles north of ORMOC), capturing an airfield to the west. Two days later, VALENCIA was occupied by American forces, and at LONON, six miles north on HIGHWAY 2, an Allied road block was established. This leaves only six miles of HIGHWAY 2 between the two forces moving south and north.

Supplies captured in the ORMOC area are believed to have comprised one of the enemy's major supply dumps, and their capture will materially affect the length of the LEYTE campaign. Confusion apparently existed among the troops in this area, as little attempt was made to destroy the stores.

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

Enemy bivouacs and concentrations around garden areas were attacked every day by fighter bombers.

No less than eleven targets brought to light by ground intelligence were struck by Corsairs carrying bombs. The most important of these targets were KALIA (FAURO Is), MORONI, a hidden vehicle park near MONOITU and personnel and stores at TOBOREI Plantation. Some of these attacks were very successful but even in those cases where results could not be observed, it is believed that information on the targets was sufficiently accurate to make the attacks profitable.

In addition to these attacks regular fighter patrols have been maintained round coastal BOUGAINVILLE and a large number of opportunity targets were attacked. In all more than 130 Corsair sorties were flown over this area during the last six days.

On 22 Dec two Wirraways, led in by a Boomerang, supported our forward troops on the NUMA NUMA trail using 250 lb bombs against enemy trenches on PEARL RIDGE (at 680128 - KOWARO 1/25000). Although two of the four bombs failed to explode the other two were dropped so accurately that one trench was directly hit.

NEW BRITAIN

There has been little change in the employment of our air strength in this area since the last report. Fighter bomber patrols have remained active both over the airfields and over coastal GAZELLE PENINSULA. The enemy has been harassed continually in these areas by frequent small but effective attacks.

In addition, three heavy raids by Mitchells, and occasional visits by Liberators from NEW GUINEA, have ensured

no relief for the main RABAU targets. LAKUNAI airfield, the VUNAKANAU supply and building area, the SULPHUR CREEK aircraft park and TOBERA airfield were effectively attacked and MALAGUNA floatplane base was bombed and strafed again by Corsairs.

NEW IRELAND

On 19 Dec. 108 Dauntlesses bombed KAVIENG, cratering the airstrip, destroying and damaging buildings and starting numerous fires.

The only other heavy attack in this area was on 20 Dec when 32 Mitchells bombed BAIGAI. The strip and nearby areas were well covered. Some fuel drums were hit resulting in a fire with smoke to 500 ft.

Apart from these attacks more than 100 Corsair and Ventura sorties were flown in armed reconnaissances and minor attacks against widely dispersed targets.

NEW GUINEA

Ground reports have indicated that the harassing attacks against the enemy in the MUSIMBILIM and SAHIK areas have been most successful. There is no change to report in our air activities over the general WEWAK area in NEW GUINEA or over VOGELKOP PENINSULA in DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

CERAM - HALMAHERAS - CELEBES

No change

BORNEO

The oil storage tanks at PAMOESIAN (TARAKAN IS) have been bombed by Liberators starting a number of fires in the tank farm.

(First Aust Army Intelligence Summary No 135)

PHILIPPINES

Prior to the landings on MINDORO IS on 15 Dec, Allied heavy, medium and fighter bombers maintained the bombardment of enemy held airfields throughout the PHILIPPINES. Carrier based aircraft have considerably reduced the enemy air strength by destroying large numbers of aircraft both on the ground and in air combat.

(First Aust Army Intelligence Summary No 135)

AIR - ENEMY

There have been further signs of increased Japanese air movements from RABAU.

During the current period there have been three sightings of airborne Japanese aircraft. On 11 Dec a fighter was observed over RABAU but no interception was made.

There were further reports on 18 and 20 Dec respectively of enemy aircraft in the vicinity of JACQUINOT BAY. The former was a single engined plane which fired several bursts from the rear gun into our positions at EAIEN.

The sighting on 20 Dec was of a reconnaissance aircraft believed to be a DINAH, over JACQUINOT BAY at 25/30,000 feet.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 135)

On 20 Dec two unidentified aircraft approached the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS from the south east, but retired before they could be intercepted or identified.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

JAPANESE APPREHENSION AT NUMA NUMA

The recent increased Allied ground and air activity along the NUMA NUMA trail has caused considerable enemy anxiety. The enemy units forward on the trail, whose role it is to contain the TOROKINA perimeter, are gradually retreating and the initiative is passing to the Allied forces.

Captured documents have revealed that the enemy expects a large scale attack to be launched on 26 Dec. The reason given for this is that it is an Allied holiday and past experiences at BUNA and GUADALCANAL have shown him that the Allied forces favour this day to open offensives. The Commander of the TOROKINA GD UNIT has warned commanders of all forward positions to be on the alert on that day to meet and "to destroy the enemy attack."

Apart from "pep talks" the enemy has reinforced the area with 3 Bn 81 Inf Regt estimated to have been 500 strong.

All the components of 81 Inf Regt except 1 Bn HQ, 1 Coy, part of 2 Coy, 8 Coy and 10 Coy have now been identified at NUMA NUMA and forward Regtl reserves comprising the Regtl T/A Coy and Regtl Gun Coy are located at NUMA NUMA.

Observers in the KIETA area have reported troop movements from KIETA to NUMA NUMA. These may only be L of C carrying parties or again they could be additional reinforcements.

A PW taken in the NUMA NUMA area gave the following information regarding the enemy staging points along the NUMA NUMA trail. From these dispositions it is apparent that the enemy intends to defend his main L of C by a series of guard units defending these Base Points.

(Ref Map NUMA NUMA 1/25,000)

- (a) No 1 Base Point is located at 795252. This Base Point is HQ area of 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt.
- (b) No 2 Base Point is located at 753184 and is guarded by an L of C Gd of 25 men.
- (c) No 3 Base Point is located in the square 6915 and is garrisoned by approximately 150 men.
- (d) At PEARL RIDGE there are approximately 80/90 men of 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt, which formed the TOROKINA GD FORCE.

13 INF REGT DEFENSIVE PLAN

A "Most Secret" enemy document captured on the JABA RIVER on 19 Dec and dated 28 Nov sets out 13 Inf Regt plan for the defensive of the area JABA RIVER and south to the PURIATA RIVER.

The plan is a typical Japanese defensive plan and is based on the assumption that our forces will land in the MAWARAKA area. For this purpose the enemy 10 and 12 Coys Inf which were at MAWARAKA, have been withdrawn inland and the remainder of 3 Bn is to be disposed along both banks of the

PURIMA RIVER ready to attack the Allied landing at MAWARAKA "if required."

A preponderance of arty - at a maximum of 10 guns - is to be located at MAWARAKA for coast defence.

Inf Regt HQ remains at MOSIGETTA with 3 and 10 Coys Infantry, 1 Fd Hospital and various smaller arty, MG and transport units.

An interesting sidelight from the document is that a smaller force is to be located in the vicinity of RABE to guard "against enemy friendly natives."

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the following areas is prepared on information to 14 Dec 44:-

AREAS	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	COMPARATIVES		
								TOTAL	8 Dec	24 Nov
NEW BRITAIN										
NEW IRELAND	6					8	2	16	15	12
SOLOMONS										
PHILIPPINES:										
MINDANAO	47		24	45		11	8	135	107	90
* VISAYAS	101	10	3	18		12	17	161	170	192
* LUZON	112	25	89	99	4	34	19	382	388	392
	260	35	116	162	4	57	44	678	665	674
AMBON-CERAM	4		2		2	9	2	19	19	22
-BOEROE										
CELEBES	20	34		17	4	6	7	88	98	58
TIMOR-SOEMBA									11	16
SOEMBAYA-FLORES										
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK				18		15		33	42	42
BORNEO	88	22	12	51		22	10	205	200	216
TOTALS SWPA	378	91	130	248	10	117	65	1039	1050	1040

Ø Estimates do not include combat types assigned to operational training units.

* NOTE:- It is reported that on 14 Dec 423/450 enemy planes were observed on the principal airfields in LUZON and the VISAYAS. The report further stated that 250 of these planes were destroyed or damaged on the ground by Allied raiders. These losses were apparently not taken into account when the above estimate was prepared.

(First Aust Army Intelligence Summary No 135)

9. GENERAL

JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING

The Eastern Fleet Intelligence Summary for Oct 44 estimates that JAPAN has 2,878,000 tons of serviceable freighter shipping, compared with 6,217,000 at the start of the war, and 595,000 tons of serviceable tankers, compared with 601,000 tons at the start of the war. It also says that the wooden ship plan has been more successful in propaganda than in fact, chiefly because of the shortage of engines and fittings. The available tanker tonnage is considered probably sufficient for the enemy's needs, but the freighter tonnage insufficient, although conditions in that respect are improving for the Japanese as the war enters their inner zone, where they have shorter hauls and can use smaller vessels such as sampans, luggers and barges.

(RNZAF Intelligence Bulletin No 177)

JAPANESE HEALTH ON BOUGAINVILLE

Attached as Appendix "C" is a precis of an interrogation by Australian Medical and Int Officers of a Japanese MO recently captured south of the JABA river.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix "B" is Additions and Amendments to Topographical Information - Ref Maps BOUGAINVILLE Series 1 inch; 1 : 25,000 and 4 miles to 1 inch.


E. H. Wilson

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff


Distribution: As per Summary No 4

GENERAL A. 12537
ALSTON ST. BIRMINGHAM
13 135 3412-137


JAPANESE HAND GENERATOR




GENERATOR
TYPE 29, MARK E.



VOLTMETER



LEATHER SHEATHED
CORD.



CONDENSER &
FILTER BOX

JAPANESE HAND GENERATOR TYPE 29 MARK E.

1. GENERAL.

The equipment is a hand driven generator designed to supply L.T. and H.T. voltages to a field wireless set. It was captured at SISIRA, BOUGAINVILLE on 29 Nov 44. Sketch of the generator is attached.

2. MARKINGS.

Translations of three plates on the generator case are as follows :--

(a) TYPE 94 WIRELESS SET NO 5A
NO 29 MARK E HAND GENERATOR
NO 3422
MADE OCTOBER 1940
MITSUBISHI ELECTRICAL MANUFACTURING CO

(b) CONNECTION DIAGRAM OF NO 29 MARK E HAND GENERATOR
(Circuit Diagram)

ESSENTIAL DATA CHART.

Power		40.5 watts
Voltage	High	500 volts
	Low	7 volts
Current	High	0.06 amperes
	Low	1.5 amperes
Number of)	Handle	70 RPM
Revolutions)	Commutator	5000 RPM

(c) NOTICE - PAY ATTENTION

- (i) When starting, put pressure on handle, turn slowly and increase speed gradually. Increase speed to approximately 70 RPM.
- (ii) It is necessary to operate in such a manner that the needle on the voltmeter points to 7 volts.
- (iii) When using in a very cold place, there is a danger of oil freezing. If this is the case, since there is a danger of injuring rotating parts, one must be especially careful.
- (iv) It is necessary always to put a thin coating of grease or machine oil on the gears.

3. DESCRIPTION

(a) General

The generator is contained in an aluminium case approximately 10" x 9" x 5". It is operated by means of two removable handles projecting from opposite sides of the box, each turning in opposite directions. The handle arms can be extended from a minimum length of 5½ inches to a maximum of 8 inches, in order to give greater leverage.

On top of the case is a small perspex window, through which can be viewed a voltmeter and a small lamp. The voltmeter has a 0 - 10 volt range with a mark at 7 volts. The small lamp, with a shunting resistor, is connected in series with the HT generator winding and serves as a HT current indicator.

A push button, marked "on-off switch" is connected by a flexible metal cord to a cut-out in the base of the generator. When the button is pressed, the output of the generator is disconnected. This enables the operator to start the generator without putting a load on it.


A flexible cord terminating in a 4 pin plug at both ends conducts the output from the generator to the wireless set. The cord is enclosed in a leather sheath.

Attached to the case is an aluminium base-plate, which folds against the generator when not in use. It is believed that some kind of stand can be attached to the base-plate.

A small wooden box, enclosed in a leather case, contains a .002 ufd mica condenser and a 2 ufd paper condenser, as well as input and output terminals. It is believed to be a filter.

The weight of the generator is 24½ lbs. Mechanical construction is very rugged. The generator is easily taken apart for servicing.

(b) Electrical Circuit



(c) Generator

This is a two-pole generator with series-wound field. The field system is two horseshoe magnets with soft iron pole pieces. The field coils are wound over the magnets. The armature is double wound for HT and LT, the two sets of windings being brought out to commutators at opposite sides of the armature. Carbon brushes are used and very little commutator wear is evident.

	<u>No. of Commutator Segments</u>	<u>Resistance of Armature</u>	<u>Resistance of Field-Coils</u>
HT	78	750 ohms	62 ohms
LT	32	1 ohm	$\frac{3}{4}$ ohm

The armature shaft has attached to it a 4 inch diameter fly-wheel which facilitates keeping the armature at a constant speed.

(d) Drive

The handles are connected together by a 1:1 gear to permit turning in opposite directions. The shaft of one handle is connected to a ratchet which allows turning in one direction only. The ratchet is connected to the inside of a metal gear wheel which drives a gear train. The gears of this train are made of fibre. The train gives a ratio of approximately 70 : 1, so that the armature turns at 5000 RPM when the handles are rotated at 70 RPM.

4. TEST OF GENERATOR

The LT was connected to a resistance of approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ ohms. When the generator was operated to give 7 volts output, a current of approximately 1.5 amperes was obtained.

A suitable load was not available for the HT. A no-load voltage test with the generator giving an LT output as above, showed an output voltage of 650 volts.

Approximately 15 seconds is required to bring the generator up to speed and 25 seconds to come to rest after ceasing operation.

APPENDIX "B" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 5

ADDITIONS & AMENDMENTS TO TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Ref Maps: BOUGAINVILLE Is 1 INCH SERIES
" 1:25,000 SERIES
" 4 MILES to 1 INCH SERIES

CAPE MOLTKE 1 INCH

Track Information

The coastal track from LARUMA RIVER to KURAI0 MISSION is not jeepable for any distance.

The only portion of track suitable for construction of jeep track is from CONLEY LAGOON 472038 to HOUSE KIAPE 422110.

Numerous river crossings have to be made, varying in depth from 6 inches to 6 feet.

River depths at crossings are not predictable due to the influence of tides and inland rainfall.

The ground between LARUMA RIVER and CONLEY LAGOON is flat and swampy throughout. Beach track must be used.

From HOUSE KIAPE 422110 to KURAI0 MISSION the beach becomes very difficult, spurs rising sharply from the sea from 100-300 feet, at LOOKOUT POINT 377123, 406113 and at CAPE MOLTKE 356134.

CAPE MOLTKE amended position 356134.

River Crossings - LARUMA RIVER to KURAI0 MISSION
Ref Map CAPE MOLTKE 1 inch

<u>Map Ref</u>	<u>Width</u>	<u>Depth</u>	<u>Flow</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
300172	50 yds	4-5 ft		
347152		5 ft		
370128		5 ft		
417110		3-4 ft	2 knots	Sandy bottom.
443092		3-4 ft		
461070		4 ft		Sandy bottom.
463067		2 ft	2 knots	
472038	15 yds	4-5 ft		Loose sandy bottom.
474985		1 ft		
472974		2-4 ft		
497951		2 ft	2-3 knots	

River Crossings - LARUMA RIVER
Ref Map LARUMA R 1:20,000 Sheet 6

12142203 - Not jeepable, 80 yards wide, 18 inches deep, flow 6-7 knots, gravel bottom.
12232204 - 300 yards wide, channel 20 yards wide, flow 6-7 knots, gravel bottom.
12272207 - 200 yards wide, 2 feet 6 inches deep, easy crossing.

Terrain

From 121218 to 125218 - north to LARUMA RIVER covered by thick scrub vine and very swampy. Few tracks in area.

Area inland from 11792193 to River at 12142203 is deep swamp with no tracks.

Ref Map KIETA 1 Inch to 1 Mile

Insert	Map Ref
DARATUI	246820
DITAUUA	246824
KOKADI	240826
KAINO	177839
KUPEI	183814
MONKONTORA	193855
PIRIMOU RIVER	260832
MOETABI RIVER	230837
TANRINN RIVER	230827
Delete	Insert
AROPA RIVER	SIAR RIVER
TOPORURA RIVER	AROPA RIVER
SAIR RIVER	RORABA RIVER
MONKONTORA 223852	
KAINO 228838	
KUPEI 212830	

Ref Map PURIATA RIVER 1 Inch to 1 Mile

Track Information

Tac R report the following tracks jeepable:

- (a) Track from 806595 to MOSIGETTA - all crossings would have to be bridged.
- (b) MOSIGETTA - 3000 yards east, then SW to 888539.
- (c) RAURAYO 854599 to MOSIGETTA.
- (d) MOSIGETTA to 898590 to 907570.

Ref Map KARA 1 Inch to 1 Mile

Bridge Information (source Captured Japanese Maps)

Map Ref	Particulars				
254347	80 Feet	x	8 Feet		
295354	28 "	x	18 "		
320360	60 "	x	18 "		
300342	270 "	x	12 "		
293339	90 "	x	18 "		
308342	100 "	x	18 "		
313326	90 "	x	12 "	} two bridges	
	88 "	x	18 "		
246299	Pontoon Bridge 140 ft x 22 ft (Tac R)				

River Crossings

- (a) MIVO RIVER 105227 - 50 metres wide at mouth.
- (b) OAMAI RIVER 155218 - 20 metres wide at mouth.
- (c) Unamed River at 201208 - Sandbar at mouth. River
60 metres wide.

Terrain

Area 310210 - 330240 - Large swampy area thickly covered with plants and bushes. Impassable to foot traffic, muddy bottom.

APPENDIX "C" to
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 5

JAPANESE HEALTH on BOUGAINVILLE

Interrogation by Medical and Intelligence officers of this HQ of a First Lieut NO, attached to 13 Inf Regt, recently captured south of the JABA R has revealed much valuable information concerning the health of the Japanese on BOUGAINVILLE, types of diseases, treatment and medical supplies.

PW comments on the directions by the Japanese medical services on the use of atabrin as a suppressive are of particular interest.

PW himself has been on BOUGAINVILLE for 18 months and has lost 20-25 lbs in weight. Though thin, he was not emaciated and was fairly active and mentally alert. He had suffered four or five bouts of malaria, but had not contracted any serious skin diseases.

The Japanese Army medical service is fully aware of the use of atabrin as a suppressive, according to PW. Instructions were that on landing in malarial areas, all troops take one atabrin tablet every other day, with one quinine tablet on alternate days.

Until March 1944 this treatment was carried out on BOUGAINVILLE but after that, stocks ran short and atabrin was given as a treatment only, the course lasting seven days. Since August the course has been reduced to five days. A certain amount of quinine is incorporated in the course, and quinine, atabrin and plasmasquin are held in tablet form and also in preparation suitable for injection.

When the Japs first landed in this area, supplies of atabrin and quinine were issued in bulk, but it was found that the troops were pooling supplies for use in the game of "GO" (Japanese chess). After that, the daily dose was taken by troops before the evening meal under the supervision of an officer.

Up till 1939, PW said that all supplies of atabrin were imported from GERMANY, but for the past three or four years JAPAN had been able to manufacture sufficient for all requirements.

Regarding the general health of the force on BOUGAINVILLE PW stated that it had deteriorated during recent months, and this he ascribed to a combination of transmittable diseases and inadequate diet. He estimated that two out of each 100 patients admitted to hospital die.

The following points were elicited regarding the various forms of diseases from which the Japanese are suffering:-

Malaria: PW estimated that 90% of the force has had the disease, and stated that relapses were frequent. Mosquito nets are becoming scarce and many men preferred to sleep on the beaches where mosquitoes are not so troublesome.

The present course of treatment given is shorter than Allied medical services regard as necessary, but is reasonably adequate.

Dysentery: Almost universal among troops in the JABA R area and widespread elsewhere. Sulphaguandine, the standard drug used in treatment has all been used up. Coupling this with the established fact of their restricted diet, it may be concluded that treatment for this disease is well nigh impossible.

Scrub Typhus: PW had received training in the treatment of this disease but did not know of its existence on this island.

Allied cases contracted on the island have been mild so it may be assumed that typhus may have occurred amongst the Japanese but was confused with the general group of fevers.

Dengue: No specific information.

Beri Beri: PW did not appear to consider this a serious problem at present.

Yaws: Cases have occurred, and these were treated with standard arsenical preparations of which reasonable stocks are held by the Japanese.

In the early stages, the enemy treated many natives for yaws, but this practice was later stopped.

Worm Diseases: Hook worm and round worm are fairly common, but PW did not regard this as significant.

Skin Diseases: Fairly common. He himself has tinea but could not get treatment in the JABA area, indicating that elementary drug supplies are practically non-existent.

General: PW stated that the Japanese were extremely short of bandages and dressings, and that sulpha drugs have been unobtainable for some time.

If this is true - and statements from other PW back it up - it is reasonable to assume that in the event of a large number of casualties, many will not receive even the most elementary forms of treatment.

PW volunteered the information that there had been a high percentage of deaths since April, of troops who returned from the TOROKINA attack and were hospitalised in the BUIN area. He said that most of these were due indirectly if not directly to malnutrition and privations of the campaign, troops being too weak to resist the ravages of malaria, dysentery etc. He could not give a reliable estimate of the number of deaths, but hazarded a guess that they might have totalled 5,000.

SECRET

GSI

2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 6

CONTENTS

Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 23
Dec 44 to 2400 hrs 31 Dec 44

PART I

Page

Summary of Operations by areas

(a) Land	1
(b) Sea	5
(c) Air	5

PART II

1. Enemy OOB - Land	8
2. Enemy OOB - Air	9
6. Equipment	9
9. General	9

APPENDICES

"A" JAPANESE "LUNGE" MINE

"B" PRECIS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION -
NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

"C" ESTIMATE ENEMY STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS
ON CHOISEUL ISLAND AS AT 27 DEC 44

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The enemy has reacted swiftly and vigorously to the crossing of the JABA RIVER by our forces.

They appear particularly sensitive to the Allied incursion from the vicinity of the JABA RIVER fork which holds a potential threat to their concentrations at NIGITAN MOSINA and MENDAI, and in addition the main track to MOSIGETTA.

In place of the light forces found there where the river was first crossed, numerous patrols, in good condition and well armed and equipped have appeared. These have attacked our positions with all the customary Japanese tactics and determination.

Our forces advancing along the narrow coastal strip between the swamp and the sea were also strongly attacked when they emerged into more open country near the mouth of the TAVERA RIVER.

Captured documents indicate that one company of the 3 Bn 13 Inf Regt has been transferred from the PURIATA RIVER sector to strengthen the forces opposing the advance from the TAVERA RIVER, and the HQ of that Bn have moved to MAWARAKA from TOKINOTU.

PART I
OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

BOUGAINVILLE

NORTHERN BOUGAINVILLE

Information from AIB patrols reveals that camps of Japanese and native police are dispersed in the forest on either side of the road between LEUSS and AVIS. Warnings by FELO have resulted in many native police deserting, and several are now in our camps. Many killings were arranged by KEMPEI sentries who turned against the Japs.

Movement of enemy southward along the coastal route continues. These troops are carrying grenades but no rifles, and are being assisted by armed natives. There is a staging camp at ASITAVI where food is held for Japanese passing through.

Numbers of troops carrying food are also moving to NUMA NUMA by the road from KIETA.

Inland, approximately 11 miles west of TEIHUP, an AIB party prepared a landing ground 160 yards long at PUSUPA in an attempt to evacuate by air an injured Allied airman. The presence of the strip has apparently become known to the enemy, and Japanese and native police are last reported proceeding to the area to investigate.

Five enemy were killed by natives at LAWUN (4 miles NW of INUS) on 22 Dec.

A summary of information gathered by an ANGAU deep penetration patrol in NORTH BOUGAINVILLE is attached as Appendix "B".

CAPE MOLTKE AREA

On 28 Dec, an Allied base was established at KURATO MISSION.

The small Japanese garrison at AMUN is reported to have evacuated to SIPAI because of Allied bombings of AMUN and food shortage.

ARTY HILL - PEARL RIDGE

In this sector enemy resistance to further Allied progress along the ridge stiffened considerably, and he maintained closer contact with our forward troops by patrols. In some places between ARTY HILL and PEARL RIDGE all the enemy have not yet been mopped up. One was killed in a brief clash approximately 500 yards NE of ARTY HILL, and mortar fire was later laid down on another enemy position on PEARL RIDGE.

On 24 Dec, an unsuccessful attempt was made to infiltrate one of our positions south of PEARL RIDGE, and several days later, the first Japanese to surrender voluntarily to Australian troops was taken prisoner in this area.

On 30 Dec, after preliminary bombing and strafing by aircraft, an assault was launched on an enemy strongpoint on the eastern sector of PEARL RIDGE. Supported by arty and mortar fire, our troops succeeded in establishing two positions on the ridge on the left flank of the enemy. The force attacking on the right flank was held up by heavy enemy fire and difficult terrain. All positions taken have now been consolidated. Three enemy were killed during the operation.

An ANGAU patrol operating ahead of our forward elements reports that the enemy is gardening on a large scale in the VIVIE and IBU areas, and obviously subsisting wholly on native foods, coconuts, fish, etc. It was learned from native sources that the Japanese have only one supply route which is along "the big road to NUMA NUMA." The natives are supplying the enemy with food, labour and track information, but are not carrying forward from NUMA NUMA. This same patrol located nine enemy manning a listening post east of OLD VIVIE.

JABA RIVER

Activity south of the JABA RIVER, both Allied and enemy, has been on an increased scale. The enemy is operating patrols south and SW of the JABA RIVER for a number of enemy parties have been encountered in this area. Contact was made with enemy in position on the JABA - NIGHTAN track, approximately 3 miles from the river mouth on 23 Dec, and again in the same position on 26 Dec. Three enemy were killed in both these encounters.

A further Allied position south of the JABA was established on 29 Dec approximately 400 yards west of the junction with the PAGANA RIVER, and ambushes were laid across the JABA TRAIL approximately 1 and 1½ miles westward. Late in the day, a party of armed natives attempted to outflank this position, and eight enemy were killed in the exchange of fire.

On 30 Dec, our forces launched an attack against an enemy position approximately 400 yards south of the JABA TRAIL, 2½ miles inland. The attack was successful and the area occupied. Supported by fire from either mortars or a mountain gun, 30/50 Japanese counter attacked at midday, but were repulsed, losing five of their number killed.

Patrols in the TUJU - TAVERA RIVERS area located a Japanese ambush which was later placed under artillery fire, approximately 1 mile NE of MUPESI. In scattered contacts they later killed two and captured three enemy. Two of these PW stated in a preliminary interrogation that a Jap force of 200 had left MOSINA to stage a counter attack in this sector very soon.

An Allied Force has occupied TAVERA, from which patrols are now operating east and south. In the coastal area 1½ miles south from TAVERA, the enemy again took the offensive and attacked another of our positions.

Pushing south beyond our forward troops, an Allied patrol encountered an enemy party of estimated 20/25 approximately 1 mile north of MAWARAKA. These troops were carrying a portable radio transmitter with hand generator. They attacked our patrol with great determination and were not driven off until an estimated 18 Japanese had been killed or wounded.

Natives from the area inland from MAWARAKA report "fairly large" enemy concentrations at MOSINA and MENDIA. For the last week, the enemy at MOSIGETTA has had natives employed constructing huts. Further south, 10/15 large buildings, not of standard native pattern, have been observed just off the BUIN - MOSIGETTA road, three miles west of RUNEI.

A resume of enemy activity in the PURIATA RIVER area is included in the "General" section of this Summary.

KIETA

Natives continue to harass the Japanese. Forty enemy were besieged by the natives at ISINA, and 10 of this number, including a captain were killed.

Movement of enemy accompanied by natives has been reported from MORONI south through ORAMI and MERIDAU. Five of these were killed by friendly natives.

Japanese parties made a reappearance in the SIPURA area on 27 Dec, where they were found in occupation of an old burned village below the eastern end of the ridge. Police boys and friendly natives were in possession of the ridge, while natives had the enemy surrounded at a safe distance. During his occupation, the enemy built five houses, but left again on 30 Dec, leaving the ridge still in our hands.

The evacuation of refugee natives and Chinese from the area to TOROKINA has commenced. 400 natives and 35 Chinese have already departed.

KERAKOPA

Allied patrols in the area approximately 5 miles SE of KERAKOPA contacted an enemy group on 25 Dec. Two enemy were killed and one wounded.

CHOISEUL

Enemy positions at POROPORO extend from the creek opposite KONDAKANIMBOKI ISLAND through an old native village to WEST CAPE, and well laid out gardens are located three miles inland from MCNAVA PLANTATION. The area is patrolled regularly by sentries, and similar enemy vigilance has so far prevented a close survey of dispositions at NUKIKI. Strong armed patrols operate in the area each day.

An enemy barge hideout has been located on south bank of the SUI RIVER, approximately four miles upstream.

According to native scouts, no enemy has been seen south east of a line running due north from MONGAMOLI RIVER mouth since Jun. The enemy in the area from this line to LIU LIU are estimated to number 800/1000. Latest native estimate places enemy strength on the whole of CHOISEUL at 1100.

(See Appendix 'A' - "Estimate of Enemy Strength and Positions." on CHOISEUL ISLAND as at 27 Dec 44")

Enemy casualties on BOUGAINVILLE to 30 Dec : 10,093 killed
115 PW
From unconfirmed sources x 192 killed

x Estimated 18 killed in engagement north of MAWARAKA included in this figure.

NEW IRELAND

An AIB party which landed at LIHIR IS (off east coast of NEW IRELAND) on 21 Dec found the area clear of the enemy. The natives were friendly and stated that no Japanese have been on the island for the past year.

NEW GUINEA

MADANG - HANSA BAY

Though no contacts have been made, sightings of enemy parties continue to be made. On 22 Dec, 10 Japanese with 40/50 armed natives and an unknown number of Kanakas were reported approaching ANNEBERG and NAURINGEU. 15 Japanese were observed north of WATAM ENTRANCE on 24 Dec. According to a native patrol, 10 enemy were at BOSEAN on 27 Dec, and a further 20 moving there from SENAI.

DANMAP RIVER AREA

Patrol activity has continued in the DANMAP RIVER area. On 22 Dec, 23 enemy were killed in the area 3-4 miles south along the DANMAP RIVER, and 15 enemy bodies were found 7 miles south of the river mouth.

Operating east from LIMBULIN, Allied bases have been established at ARUK and MUAM, and patrolling continues to the east and south.

TONG AREA

Operations in the TONG area have been limited to patrols, and MUSIMBILIM and NANAHANG areas have been reported clear of the enemy. According to natives, the Japanese withdrew from NANAHANG south to MIWKAH, but on 23 Dec, the MIWKAH area also was found free of the enemy.

MUSIMAU is reported to be occupied by 20/30 Japanese with a further sixty in the surrounding villages. Thirty enemy were attacked by our troops and forced to withdraw from a ridge approximately 1 1/2 miles SE of MUSIMAU.

Natives have killed 50 enemy in the WOMSAK area between 25 Nov and 24 Dec, and a further 19 in the HAMBINI - SELNI area.

The enemy is reported in strength, with pro-Japanese natives, in the MALAHUM - ILAHOPI area (approximately 20 miles south of mouth of the DANMAP RIVER).

PHILIPPINES

LEYTE

On the morning of 25 Dec, while other US units were driving westward from HIGHWAY 2 towards the west coast and the enemy's only remaining base of PLOMPON, an Allied landing was made at that point and the town taken. The fall of this centre is believed to mark the end of organised enemy resistance on LEYTE.

Mopping up of enemy pockets in the rear of the Allied advance has continued in all sectors. The enemy's only remaining strongpoints are on the west coast north of PALOMPON, where sizable concentrations have been reported to be digging in. Numerous reports state that at least 1000 enemy have recently arrived at CAMPORO BAY from the south, and that 4/500 are preparing positions in the DAHA area. Against slight opposition, Allied troops made a landing at this point during 26/27 Dec.

In the southern sector, an amphibious patrol moved from PORT BELLO 2½ miles south to MERIDA on the west coast of ORMOC BAY without contact.

Enemy casualties on LEYTE to 24 Dec: Killed 51,704
PW 335

To these figures must be added enemy casualties sustained in reinforcement efforts.

MINDORO

No ground opposition has been reported from MINDORO. There has been no confirmation as yet of a reported enemy landing on night 26/27 Dec.

(b) SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

Combined Allied air and sea strikes were carried out this week, on enemy occupied positions along the south coast of BOUGAINVILLE. Naval strikes were also directed against enemy positions on CHOISEUL ISLAND.

A small fire was started in a dump area at LAKURAI, on 26 Dec when one squadron of PT boats, two LCI(G)s and two PCs in co-operation with aircraft engaged the area and the road terminal.

A further co-ordinated strike by eight PT boats, two LCI (G)s, two PCs and 16 aircraft was carried out during the morning 31 Dec against enemy occupied positions at the mouth of the PURIATA RIVER. Returning air crews reported the target area well covered.

On 27 Dec, PGMs succeeded in demolishing part of a Japanese living quarters at PCROPORO. The next day this location was again attacked by PT boats, and against return shore fire apparently good results were obtained.

The only sighting for the week, other than small craft was on 25 Dec, when aircraft reported two small freighters off-shore south of PONDO POINT (NEW BRITAIN).

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

Corsairs, led in by Tac/R aircraft supported forward troops on the NUMA NUMA trail on three occasions during the week, twice striking targets in close proximity to our own positions and once striking a carefully camouflaged staging point on the enemy's

lines of communication. Two of these attacks were successful but one was not very effective owing to mechanical failure causing the indicating smoke bomb from the Tac/R aircraft to overshoot the target.

Shortly after dawn on 26 and 31 Dec combined air and naval strikes were carried out against targets on the SW coast of BOUGAINVILLE. On 26 Dec 16 Corsairs co-operated with the US Navy in attacking the LAKURUAI area and on 31 Dec the same number of Corsairs, with Tac/R aircraft for observation purposes and for indication of ~~smoke~~ targets with smokebombs, made a similar strike against targets near the PURIATA RIVER mouth.

Daily bombing and strafing attacks against enemy troop concentrations and supply areas have continued. Concentrations at KATSINKOVERI, KALIA (SHORTLAND), and two in the KIETA area and several dump areas were attacked. Perhaps the most important of these strikes was on 29 Dec when 16 Corsairs led in by Tac/R aircraft bombed and strafed an enemy concentration of huts at 940424 (1 : 63360 series). This target had been reported as being a large concentration of non-native type huts skillfully hidden in heavy timber. The attack was accurate.

On 28 and 30 Dec respectively a camp and a dump area near TARIKUKUA on NW CHOISEUL Island were accurately bombed and strafed.

Regular coastal armed reconnaissances were maintained over BOUGAINVILLE and a number of opportunity targets attacked, resulting in the destruction of several huts and small water craft.

NEW BRITAIN

The VUNAKUMAU, LAKUMAI and TOBERA airfields were the main targets for our heavy and medium bombers this week. A number of comparatively heavy raids were made on these airfields. Dawn to dusk fighter patrols have continued daily over the RABAU area and coastal sweeps by fighter bombers resulted in huts, motor vehicles, at least one barge and a bridge being destroyed.

NEW IRELAND

On 28 Dec 27 Mitchells bombed KAVIENG airfield scoring many direct hits on the strip and leaving it badly cratered. With the exception of this attack our air activity over this area was confined to daily armed reconnaissances by medium and fighter bombers and numerous widespread attacks of minor nature on a variety of targets. In these attacks NAMATANI, BORPOP, huts at Cape BOLEGILA, ROLAND YOUNG, PANEMANSU, DALLUM and LAGAGON plantations, PANAPAI, KAVIENG and BALGAI were all attacked.

NEW GUINEA

Beauforts, Mustangs and Mitchells continue to be active from WEWAK to the SEPIK river and the area inland - attacking enemy positions, occupied villages and dump areas.

Success attended Beauforts on anti barge patrol along the coast in the WEWAK area and a number of barges were damaged or destroyed. Boomerangs have been leading medium and light bombers in to attack some targets which would have been difficult to locate by other means.

Little information has been received of air activity over DUTCH NEW GUINEA but reports indicate that fighter bombers in strength continue to attack targets on VOGELKOP PENINSULA.

CERAM - HALMAHERAS - CELEBES

CERAM - No report to hand.

HALMAHERAS - On 22 Dec 230 aircraft raided enemy air fields and attacked coastal targets destroying two barges, and, on 25 Dec 48 aircraft attacked AA positions, personnel and supply areas near GALELA airfield.

CELEBES - No reports to hand.

BORNEO

Almost every night our heavy patrol bombers on night reconnaissance harassed targets in this area and a number of day raids by Liberators were made on enemy airfields.

On 24 Dec 23 Liberators bombed KUDAT airfield and on 25 Dec 43 Liberators dropped over 100 tons of bombs on SANDAKAN and JESSELTON airfields (NE BORNEO).

PHILIPPINES

Our heavy, medium and fighter bombers have concentrated their attacks against enemy airfields with particular attention, recently, to those on LUZON. Of these the most important is CLARK FIELD which is the centre of a concentrated airfield group comprised of seven airfields with a total of 13 runways. Enemy fighter opposition in this area has been consistent and a large number of enemy fighters have been shot down in addition to those aircraft which have been destroyed by bombing on the ground.

Liberators from SWPA bases have carried out most of the numerous raids on airfields in southern MINDANAO.

Attacks on enemy shipping have not slackened. On 23 Dec Mitchells destroyed one 300 ton freighter and damaged eight 300/1000 ton freighters - and on 26 Dec an enemy force reported as one battleship, one heavy cruiser, six destroyers and six transports was attacked off MINDORO. Preliminary reports indicate that two destroyers were sunk or destroyed, three transports were set on fire and possibly destroyed and one cruiser and one battleship were damaged.

PART II

1. ENEMY COB - LAND

3 BN 13 INF REGT

A diary captured by troops at the TAVERA River on 27 Dec, refers to the move of an unidentified unit from the PURIATA River area to the MAWARAKA area on 24 Dec and 25 Dec.

The unit according to the diary was under orders to patrol towards the TAVERA River from MAWARAKA on 26 Dec, and in course of the patrol was attacked by an Allied patrol and suffered casualties.

- in this action
One of the bodies was identified by our forces as that of a Sgt of 12 Coy 3 Bn 13 Inf Regt.

The last entry in the diary mentions despatch of personnel to Bn HQ at MAWARAKA.

The Western Sector Guard Unit Defensive Plan dated 28 Nov stipulated that 3 Bn 13 Inf Regt would reinforce the MAWARAKA Sector Garrison Unit in the event of an Allied offensive on that sector.

10 and 12 Coys 3 Bn had been identified at MAWARAKA at the time the Defensive Plan was issued, but if the Plan has been implemented 10 Coy would have been withdrawn to MOSIGETTA.

No mention was made of 12 Coy's role and it was not included in the forces to defend MAWARAKA. As the plan stated 3 Bn less 10 Coy would concentrate in the PURIATA area, it would appear from the diary that 12 Coy was withdrawn to the PURIATA, but sent forward again when our forces threatened the area south of the TAVERA River.

Summing up it would appear that 3 Bn has reinforced the MAWARAKA sector but as yet only a Bn HQ and 12 Coy have been identified.

6 CAVALRY REGIMENT

The location, strength and organization of this unit has been somewhat of an enigma during past months. References to its presence in the MATURA - KARATO area have not been confirmed but a PW captured on the TAVERA River on 24 Dec stated that, to the best of his knowledge, the Cav Regt was withdrawn to BUIN soon after the TA Operation, having sustained heavy casualties.

Other sources have indicated that the Regt was forward along the left bank of the REINI River as late as Jul 44 but since that date there have been no references to the unit. This PW statement is a possible explanation of the unit's disappearance.

According to the PW the Regt was still referred to as the Cav Regt, but to all intents and purposes it is an infantry unit being armed with Cav (short) rifles, LMG and HMG. It had no tanks or MT.

He asserted the unit was only 60 strong when withdrawn, and as far as he knew was no longer a combat unit.

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the following areas is prepared on information to 20 Dec 44:-

AREAS								COMPARATIVES	
	F 2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	14 Dec	8 Dec
NEW BRITAIN)									
NEW IRELAND)	3				8	2	13	16	15
SOLOMONS)									
PHILIPPINES:									
MINDANAO	37		11	21	14	3	86	135	107
VISAYAS	66	7		18	12	10	113	161	170
LUZON	79	22	39	56	27	18	241	382	389
	182	29	50	95	53	31	440	678	665
AMBON-CERAM)	4		2		2	9	2	19	19
- BOEROE)									
CELEBES	26	17	4	20	4	6	5	82	98
TIMOR-SOEMBAYA)									11
-SOEMBA-FLORES)									
JAVA-BALI-)		9		25		15		49	33
LOMBOK)									42
BORNEO	49	19	8	24		12	6	118	205
								200	
TOTALS SWPA	264	74	64	164	6	103	46	721	1039
								1050	

Ø Estimates do not include combat types assigned to operational training units.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 136)

6. EQUIPMENT

Attached as Appendix 'A' is description and illustration of Japanese "Lunge" Mine.

9. GENERAL

ENEMY ACTIVITY IN THE PURIATA RIVER AREA (Ref Map BOUGAINVILLE one inch)

DEFENCES

In Jul, a report was made by USN of a coast defence gun 200 yards (approx) west of the PURIATA River mouth and interpretation of air photos taken on 19 Dec 44 show a possible

gun position, two beach light positions and weapon pits in this vicinity. These photos also show two possible pillboxes, approximately 250 yards to the east of the river mouth.

A report was also made by USN of a coast defence gun, calibre not stated, approximately 500 yards SE of TOKO, but air photos recently taken do not show any defences in that area. In a recent sea and air strike there was NO answering fire from coast defence guns.

RECENT ACTIVITY

On 22 Nov an aircraft on reconnaissance sighted skid marks on the beach at the mouth of the river and three Japanese hauling boxes into the jungle. Subsequently lights were reported along the river from the mouth to HAIGI Mission.

It therefore appears that at least towards the end of Nov, some quantity of supplies were landed either for use at the defences at the river mouth or for troops stationed in the TOKINOTU - HAIGI Mission areas.

ORDER OF BATTLE AND DEPOSITIONS OF FORCES IN AREA

A captured Operation Order dated 28 Nov 44 stated that 3 Bn 13 Inf Regt (less 10 Coy) and a Bn of Fd Arty were to concentrate in the PURIATA River area along both banks of the stream, in anticipation of an Allied landing at MAWARAKA. 3 Bn HQ was to be located at TOKINOTU.

It is estimated that there are approximately 200 enemy troops located along the PURIATA to as far inland as TOKINOTU.

GARDEN AREAS

Inland from the river mouth, air photos show increased garden activities along both banks of the stream.

INSPIRATION FOR DEATH !

Japanese methods of indoctrinating their soldiers for glorious death in battle are apparently capable of application in any circumstance.

One circumstance revealed last week was L/Cpl X of 81 Inf Regt, a 34 year old peasant conscript.

After a long spell in the front line in the Upper IARUM RIVER sector he was scarcely the type of soldier one would expect to be chosen for such a flattering mission as dying for the Emperor. He was emaciated, weighed five or six stone, had no boots and was unkempt, battered, verminous and covered with beri beri and sores. But as he was no longer strong enough to dig the unit garden, let alone soldier, and took a long while to get up the last time his Cpl knocked him down with a bamboo staff, he was deemed a highly qualified subject for a suicide mission.

So next day he was given two hand grenades, told in front of his comrades that he was useless and must redeem his life by killing as many Australians as he could before being killed himself, and was then sent packing for the front line. The Cpl's parting gesture was to slap his face soundly.

Despite this stirring and painstaking preparation for a hero's death I/Cpl X let his side down badly. He threw his grenades away and surrendered to an Australian outpost.

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff

Distribution:- As for Summary No 5

Appendix 'A' to
First Aust Army Int
Summary No 136 of
28 Dec 44.

JAPANESE "LUNGE" MINE

DESCRIPTION

1. GENERAL

The following description of the preparation and use of a mine for use against Allied tanks, has been translated from a captured document, by ATIS Adv Ech I Corps. The document was captured on 13 Dec 44 in LEYTE.

The weapon is described as a "LUNGE mine to be thrust firmly against the tank."

It is interesting to note the views of a PW, captured in the same area on 12 Dec 44.

On mentioning this type of mine, he stated that in MANCHURIA personnel for training in suicide tactics were usually taken from Labour Companies.

The Lunge mine is a hollow charge conical-shaped mine with a wooden handle and is thrust against tanks. It is a suicide anti-tank mechanism which is capable of penetrating armor-plating up to a thickness of 100 mm, killing or injuring the occupants and damaging the internal equipment.

Compared to the same amount of ordinary explosives, this mine has the following advantages: it not only has a greater penetrating power, but it explodes downward and to the sides, and the danger to persons in the rear is comparatively small.

The fougasse of this lunge mine is located in front of the handle. The fougasse contains the powder charge and the detonator, and it has a cavity inside which is peculiar to this mine. The powder charge and the cavity are separated by a metal funnel. It contains about 3 kg of brownish-powdered charge.

The detonator is attached at the top. At the top, a cover prevents the explosive charge from becoming moist and from leaking. In order to increase the penetrating power, there are three legs attached at the bottom, and the mine must be made to explode as close as possible to the armor plate.

The wooden handle is 1½ metres long and has a striker at the end. It has a cylinder which screws on to the fougasse. To ensure safety while carrying, there is a safety pin and a holding pin (the holding pin prevents possible explosion by shock caused by the weight of the fougasse and vibrations while carrying. The holding pin is made of copper wire 0.9 to 1 mm in diameter or of steel wire 0.7 to 0.8 mm in diameter). Attach the handle to the fougasse. Pull the safety pin out. If the object is struck with sufficient force, the holding pin will cut and the striker will move forward to the detonator and set the mine off.

The weight of the fougasse is approximately 5 kg.
The weight of handle mechanism is approximately 1.5 kg.

2. PREPARATION

In regard to precautions which must be taken, note that the shape of the funnel on the mine has a great effect on the effectiveness of the mine. Thickness must be accurate, and the fitting of the handle in the cylinder must be proper, so that it will slide in smoothly. The point of the striker must be sharp and must be directly in front of the detonator. A strong and proper holding pin must be used.

It is most practical to use soft steel of 3 mm, in thickness for the funnel; however, 2 mm may be used, and two layers of either 1.5 or 1 mm will generally serve the purpose. When double layers are used the top and bottom must be even, and it is necessary to weld the ends. The necessary measurements for the fougasse and funnel are as per attached sketch No 2. In order to make the ignition perfect, pulverize the charge as much as possible. Place the fougasse upside down and remove the bottom plate then pack the powder as tightly as possible with wood. In packing the powder take precautions against accidents. Take proper distance and take measures against fire and heat. For those who do not have a detonator, take an awl which has an identical diameter with the detonator and bore into the powder and cover plate of the fougasse. Cut open the mouth of the detonator and spread it out so that the cover will hold the detonator in place. Furthermore use paraffin paper to prevent moisture.

It is especially necessary to prevent moisture seeping through the detonator and its connection, the welded parts, and the bottom part which is bent in.

3. PERFORMANCE

Results of the experiments in MANILA were that when head-on contact is made, steel plates of 150 mm thickness can be penetrated. When contact at an angle of 60 degrees is made, steel plates of 100 mm thickness can be pierced.

The results of the experiments in JAPAN showed that this mine, with 2 Kg of explosive, can penetrate up to 150 mm of steel plates, regardless of the type of powder charge, method of packing, method of ignition, etc.

This type of mine is just as effective against a bomb-proof (bullet-proof) steel plate. This mine can be directed against the side of a tank hull of an AMERICAN Type M-4 medium tank with an armor plating of 40 mm to 45 mm in thickness. This mine is quite effective even against Type M-1 heavy tanks with an armor plating of 70 to 80 mm in thickness.

4. OPERATION AND HANDLING

When transporting over long distances, it is necessary to detach the handle from the fougasse. During this time, it is necessary to take precautions to protect the point of the striker.

Upon receiving this powder charge, each unit should determine whether or not the handle fits the cylinder, the


point of the striker is in line with the detonator, and whether the joint fits. Repair any faults. If the legs are sharp, there is a possibility of slipping while operator is lunging forward. Therefore wrap a cloth around the legs to prevent slipping.

When assembling fougasse, always place the safety pin in ; bend the end to prevent it from falling out. After determining that the holding pin is secure, pull the safety pin. Take precautions that it will not explode through carelessness.

When local material is used for the holding pin, before using it, test the strength by taking the striker and the detonator out of the mine or by using a model mine to determine whether it comes up to standard.

When assembling, hold the fougasse level and to the front, and grip the cylinder. While approaching the enemy, in order to lunge forward, pull the safety pin out and use bayonet tactics to prevent the fougasse from vibrating. Do this by holding the centre of the handle with the left hand and with the right hand grip the handle as near as possible to its extremity. When lunging forward, thrust the handle forward with sufficient force to insure certain explosion. However, make contact squarely. Considerable skill is necessary in the lunging operation due to the weight of the mine. Best method is to make a suicide attack ; therefore without losing footing, make contact squarely. Also, to achieve certain success in the attack, sufficient training with a model is important. A model is made by removing the detonator and explosive charge and placing dirt in their stead. Make a hole in the dirt for a wooden striker. Although the explosive charge is contained in a metal fougasse, precautions must be taken against moisture, and every joint, especially the curved portion on the bottom and the detonator, must be made moisture proof.

SKETCH No1



JAPANESE
FUUGASA MINE

FUUGASA BODY
Layout

FINISH


FUNNEL

Layout

FINISH

APPENDIX "A" TO FIRST AUST
ARMY INT SUMMARY NO 126
OF 28 DEC 1944

SKETCH No2



APPENDIX "B" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 6

PRECIS OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION - NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

PART I

COMPILED FROM : Reports and interrogation of ANGAU
deep penetration patrols concluded
25 Dec 44.

AREA COVERED : BUKA and BOUGAINVILLE IS north of line
ANUN to INUS POINT.

REF MAP : BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND NORTH
4 miles to 1 inch series.

RELIABILITY OF
INFORMATION : Estimates of numbers of enemy are
taken from native reports, and figures
exceeding 10 are not considered
completely accurate.

Movement, habits and location of Jap
garrisons and parties were made by
trained native scouts and are reliable.

No effort was made to send scouts
north of the track PORPORO - SIAR,
and estimates of Jap strength north of
that track are based on inconclusive
native reports.

CONTENTS : 1. Trace of enemy locations and strengths.
2. Enemy Ls of C and communications.
3. Equipment, ammunition, food.
4. Health and hospitalisation.
5. Morale.
6. Enemy tactics.
7. Own tactics.
8. Attitude of natives.

-2-
Part II

LOCATIONS AND STRENGTHS

1. See attached trace.

Ls of C

2. (a) Only routes in constant use are the NE coastal track from NUMA NUMA to BUKA Passage and the lateral track from SIAR on RURI Bay to PORPORO.

Parties of Japs, natives and Indian PsW have been sighted on the coastal track carrying food, ammunition and supplies south. These are presumably from the remnants of the large supply dump Japs established at TARLENA and FORTON Plantation in 1943.

The lateral track from SIAR to PORPORO is used principally for carriage of sick and wounded to a hospital at PAU Plantation. There is believed to be one serviceable barge in SORAKEN Harbour, sometimes used for transporting personnel from PAU Plantation to SORAKEN Plantation jetty where a submarine occasionally calls.

The track SW from PORPORO to LALUM and thence along the coast to SIPAAI is used only occasionally by MP patrols and no regular traffic to and from the small garrisons on the NW coast has been reported.

COMMUNICATIONS

(b) Appear limited to runner between garrisons and units south of the line PORPORO - SIAR. Radio aerials were sighted at KURUNAMOTA near SARINE but were dismantled and shifted to PORNAI ((N)L 2352) some months ago. No line circuit was reported along the main NW coast L of C. A year ago natives captured two telephone hand sets at NAMATCA.

EQUIPMENT

3. (a) Was of the usual standard among Japs on BOUGAINVILLE - dirty, often tattered, but sufficient and serviceable. Most Japs wore bifurcated rubber jungle boots. Some rifles carried by Japs killed by the ANGAU patrol were unserviceable through rust and neglect. Two unused rifles were captured and stocks of these may exist on EUKA.

AMMUNITION

(b) Mortars and mortar bombs were not found on any Japs ambushed or at Headquarters of posts mopped up. Normal patrol scale of rifle and pistol ammunition was carried on patrols, and ample reserves were found in posts and billets.

FOOD

- (c) No field rations or rice were found on any Japs killed or in their billets, though reserves of food are believed to exist near PORTON and BUKA. All posts and garrisons were apparently self sufficient, either growing their own native foods or compelling the natives to supply them. Only at TEOP Island and near TEOGARUGARU on the mainland nearby, were garrisons suffering privations through food shortage.

HEALTH

4. (a) Appeared good and physical condition good. No tropical sores beri beri or yaws were noticed on the dead Japs. Exceptions were the garrisons mentioned in para 3(c), and 13 Japs who were apparently sent from the coast to SURANGO village ((N) L 5958) to recuperate, but were massacred by the village natives. Only medical supplies found was one small bottle of quinine. Very few possessed bandages or field dressings.

HOSPITALISATION

(b) At PAU Hospital there were about 35 patients, mainly seriously wounded, some of whom had had limbs amputated. Many had been carried from NUMA NUMA possibly for evacuation by submarine. In LALUM area there were 80 or more Japs undergoing self treatment for skin diseases and sores in hot mineral springs found there.

MORALE

5. Ambushes and killings by natives seem to have induced a condition of extreme nervousness among the garrisons and patrols. Instances of this were:-

As punishment for the massacre of the Japs at SURANGO 12 Japs and 30 armed natives spent two days burning the nearby village of NAMATO and despoiling systematically the village gardens. News of this was sent to the ANGAU patrol and one police scout detached to investigate. He arrived on the evening of the second day, crept close to the assembled Japs and fired one rifle shot into the air. Japs and natives panicked, bolted for the jungle and made their way to the coast without attempting to investigate the shot.

At ARAVIA ((N) L 3962) eight ANGAU patrol natives found the village occupied by 12 Japs and a party of natives. One shot was fired into the village and the Japs and natives ran off along the TETEKUTS trail followed by the ANGAU boys. The Japs stopped a few hundred yards down the trail but when another shot was fired killing a dog that was betraying the whereabouts of the stalking ANGAU natives, the Japs broke and ran again and showed no further inclination to stop and fight.

On the NW coast between SORAKEN and SIPAAI Japs shoot at all strange natives they see, even up to a mile distant, to dissuade any attempts to observe their camping sites and defences.

In addition, Japs elsewhere seem aware of the hopelessness of their position and on two occasions have told natives that they were beaten and only waiting to die. These admissions roused contempt among the natives and led to refusals to work for the Japs any longer.

It is assumed however that if attacked, each garrison and post would go to earth and fight determinedly.

ENEMY TACTICS

6. On no occasion when ambushed or attacked by stealth did the Japanese re-organise and counter attack. Only casualties inflicted were in hand to hand combat and when one native, several hours after killing a Jap, returned to search the body. He was killed by a Jap LMG sited to cover the body.

OWN TACTICS

7. On seven occasions parties of Japs numbering between 2 and 13 were killed by well known native deception methods. Usually at the instigation of an ANGAU officer isolated small Japanese garrisons were selected and ANGAU scouts sent to nearby villages to organise parties of men, who armed with machetes and axes, carried baskets of food into the Jap billets as pretended friendly gifts. They always placed the food where the hungry Japs would be obliged to intermingle among the natives in some open space to help themselves to the "Greek Gifts." At a pre-arranged signal, usually when the Japanese were pre-occupied with eating, the natives rushed them and killed them.

ATTITUDE OF NATIVES

- 8.(a) Natives known to be actively pro-Japanese are:-

RURI Bay - growing food for the Japs, in return for which the men are not recruited as carriers.

ROTSOA - about 50 men are carrying for the Japs to NUMA NUMA.

- (b) GONGGONG of LEUSS Village
PATSI and
PARVEN of SUBIANA Village
SIKONAI of NAFAKERO Village

all of whom are acting as Japanese MP sergeants, and effectively maintain their villages pro-Japanese by informing on villagers they suspect of pro-Allied acts or sympathies. Suspects are invariably beheaded by the Japanese. Fear of punishment by Allied forces for their acts of betrayal deters these native sergeants from turning against the Japanese. As long as they dominate their villagers with assured Jap backing, Allied movement through their areas of influence are almost certain to be betrayed to the Japs.

(c) Feelings among natives north of the PORPORO - SIAR line is unknown, but they can be considered completely under Japanese domination.


(d) South of the line, with the exception of those villages mentioned in para 8 (a) above, the natives are hostile to the Japanese, because of their many executions of natives, and despoiling of gardens. Until the advent of the ANGAU patrol they were too afraid of the Japs to translate hostile feelings into hostile acts. The appearance of the patrol, containing well armed and trained natives and a white officer to supply the plans and initiative, provided enough stimulus to rouse the natives to killing mood.

(e) Prestige of the Japanese in native eyes has fallen very low because of their slip shod dress and behaviour, frequent petty thefts from natives, lack of trade or tobacco to pay for services given, and the knowledge common among the natives that the Japanese have been beaten in other parts of the island. Allied prestige is high because of the fear the Japs show of our aircraft, the success of the ANGAU patrol, and news that has reached them of plentiful Allied arms, men and food on the island.


(f) All recent appeals by Japanese for carriers and food have been refused, except at RURI Bay and ROTSOA.

(g) Natives have also refused all Japanese requests to show them the secret native trails which provide alternate routes between RURI and NUMA NUMA and greater concealment and safety than the one main coastal track. These inland trails are kept carefully hidden by the natives because, before the war, they provided the avenues by which the natives avoided the tax gathering district officer's patrols. It is not likely that they would be revealed to Allied patrols either, because presumably the natives anticipate re-using these trails for revenue dodging in future more prosperous years.

(h) The patrol distributed 40 serviceable rifles and ammunition among friendly natives.



001355E



APPENDIX "C" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 6

ESTIMATE ENEMY STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS
ON CHOISEUL ISLAND AS AT 27 DEC 44

1. GENERAL

Little is known of the history of the Japanese occupation of CHOISEUL Island until after the fall and the American occupation of NEW GEORGIA in Jul 43. Many of the escapees from NEW GEORGIA, KOLOMBANGARA and VELLA LAVELIA were evacuated by barge to CHOISEUL before being taken right back to BOUGAINVILLE. Prior to this time, barges were sighted by aircraft operating around CHOISEUL. A detachment of 31-Fd AA Coy and possibly a detachment of the 2 Shipping Group were located on the NW tip of the Island in Dec 43. However, no large scale occupation of the Island was made and the small garrison that was there was confined to the NW tip, probably for the maintenance of a barge staging point.

2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS

Reported Jap dispositions and strengths are as follows:-

- | | |
|------------------|---|
| (a) POROPORO | Native report from AIB 21 Dec stated large body of Japs recently arrived this area also much barge traffic at night.
Subsequent signal received on 22 Dec estimating that between 600 and 700 Japs were at POROPORO. |
| (b) TARIKUKUVA | ANGAU report 15 Nov as being semi-permanent Jap camp strength 60.
Reported by 7 Bn on 3 Dec to be a possible HQ with strength of 200. |
| (c) SUI River | On two occasions reported as a barge hideout, one patrol having seen a barge moving on river, also a petrol dump. This concentration may be included in strength given for TARIKUKUVA. |
| (d) VISI Pt | Reported Jap concentration. |
| (e) SOLOVAI | Japs occupy a string of huts going 24 yards into bush. |
| (f) NUKIKI | In early Aug Jap strength was reported as 100. In early Sep it was reported as 200 but subsequently some troops were reported to have moved from here to vicinity VAVORA. Strength estimate by 7 Bn in early Dec was 100. |
| (g) VAVORA River | Jap encampment reported by 7 Bn in early Dec with strength of 100. These probably moved south from NUKIKI in Oct or Nov. |

(h) GENERAL

Patrols of up to 30 Japs have been reported at VUDETARU and along the north western coast between TARIKUKUVA and MALEVAGA. These are considered to be foraging patrols from garrisons referred to above and not necessarily additional troops.

- (i) The bulk of the foregoing information has been obtained from native sources and must therefore be treated with reserve. However, on the count of actual figures given, disregarding reports of concentrations where no strengths have been stated, the minimum estimate of enemy strength from these sources only is as follows:-

POROPORO	600
TARIKUKUVA	200
NUKIKI	100
VAVORA River	<u>100</u>
Total	<u>1000</u>

3. TROOP MOVEMENTS

A native police boy who was on CHOISEUL during Jun, Jul and Aug 44 stated that approximately 200 Japs had crossed from the SHORTLAND Islands between May and Sep 44 to construct gardens.

Barge movements have recently been reported at the SUI River and at POROPORO, and as intra-island traffic is not considered to warrant barge movement in view of the fact that the enemy occupy a comparatively small area, it appears possible that personnel are being moved from either the mainland, SHORTLANDS or FAURO Island. This is to some extent borne out by the reported arrival of troops at POROPORO.

4. SELF SUFFICIENCY

From air photos and native reports, numerous well tended gardens exist, some of which are guarded by sentries. It appears therefore that the present force has sufficient food for its maintenance and possibly that this area is being developed to relieve food shortages on the SHORTLAND Islands, either by despatch of food there or the movement of troops to CHOISEUL.

5. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

A report from a native police boy states that Jap troops he had seen were equipped with new boots, clothing and blankets. However this was in Aug 44 and these supplies may have been obtained from stocks existing on the island since it was used as a barge staging point.

No reports of weapons other than rifles and 60 mm guns mounted on barges, have been received. However, air photos have revealed some AA MG emplacements.

6. CONCLUSIONS

- (a) Enemy strength as at 27 Dec 44 is estimated at approximately 1000.

- (b) This force is concentrated in the coastal area between POROPORO and VAVORA River with small bodies patrolling along the coast further east and south.
- (c) The present strength may increase due to troop movements from SHORTALNDS, FAURO or even BOUGAINVILLE.
- (d) The present force has sufficient food supplies from local resources.
- (e) Enemy troops will probably be equipped with rifles and possibly MGs but it is not considered likely that they are in possession of mortars or field artillery.

Appendix "A"

DRAWING AND REPRODUCTION OF BOUGAINVILLE MAPS

Two sections have been responsible for the compilation and fair drawing of 1:25000 and 1:63360 sheets north of 6°S latitude and the revision of 1:63360 sheets south of 6°S latitude - 1 Sec 2 Aust Fd Svy Coy, at TOROKINA and 3 Sec 2 Aust Fd Svy Coy at LAE.

This is not entirely satisfactory but the only way possible to produce maps by dates laid down. However the main problem of supplying operational maps in time has been occasioned by the non-availability of a lithographic unit nearer than BRISBANE or AHERTON Queensland.

A request for a lithographic unit for 2 Aust Corps was submitted in September 1944, but owing to a printing programme for the Philippines campaign and for 1 Aust Corps, all Aust Svy Corps litho units were heavily committed.

When this commitment has been fulfilled it is expected that a printing unit will be established at LAE, under First Aust Army, and this will expedite the obtaining of printed maps.

At present when sheets have been fairdrawn either at TOROKINA or LAE, they are sent to the mainland for printing.

Were no time lost from completion of fairdrawing to departure of plane and, on the mainland from completion of printing to departure of plane, the absolute minimum travelling time is four days from TOROKINA to AUSTRALIA and back. It is doubtful if any plan has been less than seven days in transit.

When the NEW GUINEA campaign was in operation in 1943 it was found necessary to establish a lithographic printing unit at PORT MORESBY, and though the urgency and magnitude of the two campaigns are very different, it should be taken into account that PORT MORESBY was much closer to the printing unit in 1942 when the unit was then at TOOWOOMBA, and weather conditions did not govern flying to the extent they govern flying from BOUGAINVILLE to the mainland.

To overcome to some extent this loss of travelling time, certain 1:63360 sheets, compiled at 1:31680 for photographic reproduction have been redrawn at 1:63360 and dyelines made for field units pending arrival of the printed maps.

H. A. Johnson
major

Reply please
Quote SVY/285

APPENDIX "B"

Subject: BOUGAINVILLE MAPPING - 1st to 31st DECEMBER 1944

SURVEY DIRECTORATE
P.O. 2 AUSST CORPS
2 Jan 45.

AD SVY
FIRST AUSST BRGY

Copy to: G (Ops), 2 Aust Corps
War Diary (2)
File (2)

1. 1 Sec, 2 Aust Fd SVY Coy

(a) Deficiencies in SE (personnel)

- 1 Surveyor
- 1 Instrument Operator
- 1 Draughtsman
- 1 Batman

In view of this unit's probable return to the mainland, no action to obtain these ORs is requested

(b) Progress of Current Work

See attached Form "A".

(c) Work carried out other than in Mapping Programme

- i Road map of TOROKINA Area
- ii 1" combined KONUA and AITA for urgent guidelines for patrols.

(d) List of Maps Forwarded for Reproduction

1" Series: INUS, TEGP, TRICE ISLAND, KONUA, AITA, TARBUT, BASIU.

(e) Deficiencies in Equipment requiring action by D SVY or DD SVY
Nil

(f) Location Statement

- i Section at TOROKINA, BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.
- ii Detachment of 3 ORs with RAN Greave Sloop last reported to be at LEYTE ISLAND.

(g) General

5 ORs have proceeded on leave and 4 more will leave in next draft to make 20%.

2. The following printed sheets have been received at BOUGAINVILLE

(a) 1:25,000

i KUUA KUUA AREA (Compiled at Torokina)

ARIGUA	KURAVO
PIPIPAIA	TEINUP

These completed a block of seven (7) sheets.

ii KAHILI - KARA AREA (Compiled by 3 Sec, 2 Aust Fd SVY Coy at Lae)

MONOITU	KAKUVALI
MARAGUTA	LI BOMDER
MUSEI	KAHILI DRONE
MIVO RIVER	MOILA POINT
PIANG MISSION	SARIEI RIVER
KARA DRONE	KOISURA BAY

(2)

(b) 1:63,360 (Compiled at Torokina)

INDS
TENEAU

3. SVY DIRECTORATE, 2 AUST CORPS

Svy Directorate completed its shift from temporary site to its present location, and all racks in the Map Depot are now built - also photo racks.

There is a consistent demand for dyelines of compilation sheets and these have been and, are being, made, pending arrival of printed sheets from the mainland.

H. A. Johnson MAJOR
AD SVY HQ 2 AUST CORPS

REPORT TO A.D. SURVEY H.Q. 2 AUST CORPS

FOR MONTH ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1944

NO 1 SECTION DETACHED 2 AUST FIELD SURVEY COY (AIF)

(a) DEFICIENCIES

- 1 Surveyor
- 1 Instrument Operator
- 1 Draughtsman
- 1 Batman

(b) PROGRESS OF CURRENT WORK

See attached Form "A".

(c) STATEMENT OF WORK CARRIED OUT OTHER THAN IN MAPPING PROGRAMME

Road Map of TOROKINA Area

(d) LIST OF MAPS FORWARDED FOR REPRODUCTION.

Imus , Teap , Taief Island , Konna , Aita , Tarbut , Banin.

(e) DEFICIENCIES IN EQUIPMENT REQUIRING ACTION BY D.SVY OR DD SVY.

NIL

(f) LOCATION STATEMENT.

Section at TOROKINA BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.

Detachment of three Other Ranks with R.A.N. [REDACTED]
Last reported to be at LETTE ISLAND.

Alana Capt.
O.C. Det 2 AUST Fd SVY COY AIF

AUSTRALIAN SURVEY CORPS

Restricted

NO 1 SEC DET 2 AUST FD SURVEY COY (AID)

Company

Progress statement for FOURTH NIGHT FINISH 31 DECEMBER 1944

Section	Location	Map No.	Map Name	Scale	Type	Date Commenced	Percent completed			Remarks
							Field Work	Compl.	F. Draw	
NO 1 SEC	TONGAREVA DOUGALLVILLE I.		TROP	1:63360	1st Edition	23/11	100	100		Forwarded to AD Coy 2 Aust Corps on 20.12.44.
			TABU	"	"	"	100	100		
			DEWU	"	"	"	100	100		Forwarded to AD Coy 2 Aust Corps on 27.12.44.
			ATA	"	"	"	100	100		Forwarded to AD Coy 2 Aust Corps on 30.12.44.
			BURA PASSAGE	"	"	14/12	100	100		Will be forwarded 3.1.45.
			BURA ISLAND	"	"	"	100			Impressions taken
			TONGAREVA	"	Standard	"	100	10		
			VITO	"	"	"	80			No further control can be obtained until eastern coast is occupied [Sufficient control for S.W. map]
			MOTUONGA POINT	"	Emergency	"	100			
			BURATA RIVER	"	"	"	75			No further control can be obtained until S.W. coast is occupied [Sufficient control for S.W. map]
			FORRESTER BAY	"	Standard	"	100	30		
			TONGAREVA ROAD MAP	1:63360	Special	"	100	100		

Ollard

Capt. 2nd

A. C. 1st Aust. Inf. Bn. 1st Coy. 1st Bn. 1st Div.

001356F

(OPS)
FOR ALL MAPS-REFER TO ANNEXURE 26 PART I