
AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters, formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/9 CORPS

2 Australian Corps General Staff (Intelligence) (2 Aust Corps GS (Int))

January 1945



1/4/9-0023

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

1/45 (Serial No.)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Inf Corps (Unit)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 6/1/1945.

W.E. 11/806/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's 2 + OFFRS. — O.R's — ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.
				*					
				*					
				Lieut.-Colonels					
				Majors					
	1		2	Captains					
		1	3	Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
	1	1	5						

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).	DETAIL		A.I.P.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
	A.		5									5
	E.(1)											
	E.(2)											

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO _____ (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ___/___/194___.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Inf Corps Unit

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

1/45 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 6/1/194.5 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Capt.	VX55008	WOOD	G.M.F.	I.C.	YES.		
Capt.	VX104588	McMICHAEL	A.W.	I.C.	YES		
Lt.	VX101691	CASH	A.H.	I.C.	NO	A.R.L.	
Lt.	WX17747	SALMON	F.R.	I.C.	No.	ATT. TO HQ. 3 DIV.	21-11-44
Lt.	VX11610	KING	F.S.	I.C.	YES		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.

6-1-45
Date of Despatch

Wm Smood Capt
Signature of Commander

A.W. 16m Lic 10.43

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

2/45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 13/1/1945. 2 Aust Corps Sec Aust HQ Corps (Unit)

W.E. 1/1/00/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. — O.R's. — ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.
				*					
				*					
				Lieut.-Colonels					
				Majors					
	1		2	Captains					
		1	3	Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
	1	1	5						

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).	DETAIL.		A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
	A.		5									5
	E.(1)											
	E.(2)											

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO ..... (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ../../194..

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust HQ Corps. Unit

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

2/45 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 13/1/1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1 Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	2 Army Number.	3 Surname.	4 Initials.	5 Posting.	6 Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	7 If not present with Unit, state how employed.	8 Date of Detachment.
Capt.	VX85008	WOOD	G.M.F	I.C.	NO	2 wdays A.R.L.	11-1-45
Capt.	VX104088	McMICHAEL	A.W.	I.O.	YES		
Lt.	VX101691	CASH.	A.H.	I.C.	YES		
Lt.	WX27747	SALMON	F.R.	I.O.	NO	ATT. HQ. 3 AUST DIV.	21-12-44.
Lt.	VX14610	KING.	F.S.	I.C.	YES		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.

13-1-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
3/45 (Serial No.)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 20/1/1945. 2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Ld Corps (Unit)

W.E. III/80Q/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. - O.R's - ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.
				*					
				*					
				Lieut.-Colonels					
	1		2	Majors					
		1		Captains					
			3	Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
	1	1	5						

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).	DETAIL		A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
	A.		5									5
	E.(1)											
	E.(2)											

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO.....(Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ...../...../194.....

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Ld Corps Unit

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
3/45 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 20/1/1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1 Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	2 Army Number.	3 Surname.	4 Initials.	5 Posting.	6 Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	7 If not present with Unit, state how employed.	8 Date of Detachment.
Capt.	VX85008	WOOD.	G.M.F.	I.O.	NO	2nd Lago A.R.L.	11-1-45
Capt.	VX104058	McMICHAEL.	A.W.	I.O	YES		
Lt.	VX101691	CASH.	A.H.	I.O	YES		
Lt.	WX27747	SALMON.	F.R.	I.O.	NO.	ATT. HQ. 3 AUST. DIV	21-12-45
Lt.	VX18610	KING.	F.S.	I.O	YES.		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.

20-1-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander
W/C for Capt I/c

A.W. Form No. 10.3

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

3 Aust Corps Sec Aust H Q Corps (Unit)

4 / 45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 27 / 1 /1945.

W.E. (11) /806/ 1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. — O.R's. — ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.
				* Lieut.-Colonels					
				Majors					
	1		2	Captains					
		1	3	Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
	1	1	5						

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).	DETAIL.		A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
	A.		5									5
	E.(1)											
	E.(2)											

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO _____ (Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ___/___/194___.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

3 Aust Corps Sec Aust H Q Corps Unit

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

4 / 45 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 27 / 1 /1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1 Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	2 Army Number.	3 Surname.	4 Initials.	5 Posting.	6 Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	7 If not present with Unit, state how employed.	8 Date of Detachment.
Capt.	VX85008	WOOD	G.M.F.	I.O.	NO.	24 days F.R L	11-1-45
Capt.	VX104088	McMICHAEL	J. W.	I.O.	NO.	ATT. HQ. 3 AUST. DIV.	24-1-45
Lt.	VX101691	CASH	A.H.	I.O.	YES		
Lt.	WX27747	SALMON	F.R	I.O	NO	ATT. HQ. 3 AUST. DIV.	21-12-44
Lt.	VX18610	KING.	F.S.	I.O.	YES		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.

27-1-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

A.W. Form 1.2.3. 10.43

Army Form W.3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943.)

1 / 45 (Serial No.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 6 / 1 /194 5. 2 Aust Corps Sec Aust L of C Tps. (Unit)

W.E. III/800/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. — O.R's. — ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
1	1		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
1 *	1		6 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		*			*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail		A.I.F.	C.M.F. Under 18 Years.	C.M.F. 18 Years and over.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
A		6						[redacted]	[redacted]		6
B(1)											
B(2)							[redacted]				

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To ____ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. ___/___/194___

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust L of C Tps. Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

1 / 45 Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 6 / 1 /194 5.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Asstn.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predicter Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores			
Computers								Riggers				Stokers, Stat. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Comd'rs. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drivers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				BATMEN	5	5	—
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				DVRS MT.	2	1	1
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks							
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties				Coach Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concreters							
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics							
Pharmacist				Miners				Driver Tpts. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, V.C.							
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Asstn.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	7	6 *	1 *

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorized trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reinfts. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

6-1-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

L.H.Q. Press—411—8/43—312m.

Army Form W3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943.)

2 Armd Corps Sec Armd Div Coy (Unit)

2/45 (Serial No.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 13/1/1945. 2 Armd Coy Sec Armd Div Coy (Unit)

W.E. III/809/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. – O.R's. – ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
1	1		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
1 *	1		6 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		*			*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail		A.I.F.	C.M.F. Under 19 Years.	C.M.F. 19 Years and over.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
A		6						[redacted]	[redacted]		6
B(1)											
B(2)							[redacted]				

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To ____ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. __/__/194__

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Armd Coy Sec Armd Div Coy Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

2/45 Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 13/1/1945.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Ammunition Examiners			
Armament Artificer Fitter			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)			
Armament Artificer Instrument			
Armament Artificer Radio			
Armament Artificer Signals			
Armament Artificer Wireless			
Artificer, Artillery			
Artificer, Engine			
Blacksmiths			
Bricklayers			
Computer			
Cooks, Hospital			
Coppersmiths			
Dispensers			
Draughtsmen			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)			
Electricians			
Electricians (M.V.)			
Electricians (Signals)			
Fitters			
Fitters (Cycle)			
Fitters (Electrical)			
Fitters (Gun)			
Fitters (Instrument)			
Fitters (M.V.)			
Fitters, Railway Signal			
Fitters, Signals			
Grinder, Precision			
Mechanics, Instrument			
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)			
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)			
Mechanics, Radio			
Mechanics, Typewriter			
Mechanics, Wireless			
Millwrights			
Operators, Excavator			
Pattern Maker			
Pharmacist			
Photographer, Wet Plate			
Photowriter			
Plumber			
Saw Doctors			
Surveyors			
CARRIED FORWARD			

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Surveyors, Engineering			
Surveyors, R.A.A.			
Surveyors, Topographical			
Surveyors, Trigonometrical			
Toolmakers			
Turners			
Watchmakers			
Welders			
GROUP II.			
Armourers			
Armsmen			
Bakers			
Bty. Comd's. Asst.			
Ballermakers			
Carpenters			
Carpenters and Joiners			
Cooks			
Dental Mechanics			
Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)			
Driver-Operator			
Drainers			
Electricians			
Electricians (Engineers)			
Fire Control Operators			
Gun Operator			
Hatchman			
Height Taker			
Hello Operator			
Instrument Operator			
Intelligence Duties			
Joiners			
Lineman			
Lineman, Signals			
Lithographers			
Machinists, Metal			
Machinists, Wood			
Masons			
Masseurs			
Mechanics, M.T.			
Miners			
Moulders			
Nurses, Trained			
Observation Post Asstn.			
CARRIED FORWARD			

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Operating Room Asstn.			
Operator, Keyboard			
Operator, Line			
Operator, Signal			
Operator, Switchboard			
Operator, Wireless			
Opticians			
Painters			
Panel Beaters			
Photographer, Dry Plate			
Predictor Numbers			
Printers			
Radiographers			
Riggers			
Sawyers			
Signallers			
Signwriters			
Telescope Identifn. Numbers			
Well Borers			
Wheelers			
Winchman			
Whitesmiths			
CARRIED FORWARD			

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
G.P.O. Assistants			
Hammermen			
Leather Stitchers			
Orderlies, Nursing			
Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Plate Layers			
Rangefinders			
Riveters			
Roughriders			
Saddlers			
Saddlery makers			
Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Stevedores			
Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Storemen, Technical			
Tailors			
Textile Refiners			
Tinsmiths			
Vulcanizers			
Wagon Erectors			
Whitesmiths			
CARRIED FORWARD			

DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
BATMEN	5	5	–
NZs MT.	2	1	1
ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Despatch Riders			
Draughtsmen, Signals			
Drivers, R.T.			
Driver Mechanics			
Driver Tptr. Plant			
Engine Hands, I.C.			
Equipment Repairers			
Farriers			
Fitters' Mates			
Gun Layers			
Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	7	6	1

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reinfts. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

13-1-45
Date of Despatch

[signature]
Signature of Commander

L.H.Q. Press—411—8/43—312m.

Army Form W3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943.)
3/45 (Serial No.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 20/1/1945. 2 Armd Corps Sce & Armd Div Corps (Unit)

W.E. 111/800/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7+ OFFRS. — O.R's. — ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
1	1		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
1 *	1		6 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		*			*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail		C.M.F.			A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
	A.I.F.	Under 19 Years.	19 Years and over.								
A	6							[redacted]	[redacted]		6
B(1)											
B(2)							[redacted]				

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To ____ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. ___/___/194___

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Armd Corps Sce & Armd Div Corps Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
3/45 Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 20/1/1945.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Asts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores			
Computers								Riggers				Stokers, Stat. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Arrmen				Signwriters				Textile Knitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Cmd'rs. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (H.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Mcl.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				BATMEN	5	5	—
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				DRS M.T.	2	1	1
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks							
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties				Coach Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concreters							
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics							
Pharmacist				Matrons				Driver Tptn. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.							
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Asts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	7	6 *	1 *

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reints. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

20-1-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

L.H.Q. Press—411—8/43—312m.

Army Form W.3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1942.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

4/45 (Serial No.)

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust L of C Tps
At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 27/1/1945. Aust L of C Tps (Unit)

W.E. III/809/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's 7 + OFFRS. — O.R's — ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.					ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.	DETAIL.	Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
1	1		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
1 *	1		6 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		*			*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail		C.M.P. A.I.P.	C.M.P. Under 19 Years.	C.M.P. 19 Years and over.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
A		6						[redacted]	[redacted]		6
B(1)											
B(2)							[redacted]				

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To ____ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. ___/___/194___

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps See Aust L of C Tps Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1942)

4/45 Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 27/1/1945.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Asstn.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, F.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddlery makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores			
Computers								Riggers				Stokers, Stat. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Cmd'r's. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanisers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Ballermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erecters			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Typographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Mot.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				BATMEN	5	5	-
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				DVRS MT.	2	1	1
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks							
Grinder, Precision				Hello Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties				Coach Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Conveyors							
Mechanics, Radio				Linemen				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics							
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Tptn. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.							
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Asstn.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	7 *	6 *	1 *

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reinfts. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

27-1-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

L.H.Q. Press—411—8/43—312m.

WAR DIARY GS (Int) 2 AUST CORPS JAN 45.

W3008	Fd Return of Officers	6 Jan 45
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W3008	" " " "	27 " 45
W3009	Fd Return of ORs	6 " 45
W3009	" " " "	13 " 45
W3009	" " " "	20 " 45
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Intelligence Summary No 7
" " No 8
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Enemy Movement By Sea Southern Bougainville.

SECRET

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2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 7

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Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 31 Dec 44 to 2400 hrs 7 Jan 45

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SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

The enemy is offering no resistance to the advance by Australian forces north along the coast from CAPE MOLTKE. The enemy garrison of AMUN which moved to SIPAAI has apparently now picked up the SARIME garrison on its northward retreat. Pro-Japanese villages of RATSOA and POROPORO, formerly important centres of Jap concentration, were reported evacuated during the week. This, linked with reports of further troop movement along the NW coast towards NUMA NUMA and native reports that the Japanese left behind in North BOUGAINVILLE contain many sick and ill armed, may indicate the Japanese are withdrawing the majority of their better troops from the north and NW coast to NUMA NUMA, and leaving lightly armed small garrisons to oppose our advance. Morale of the remnants is reported to be low.

Several hundreds of TEOP district natives who have abandoned their villages through lack of food, say their gardens were recently stripped of food by Japanese. Possible explanations are that Japanese en route to NUMA NUMA may have been driven to raid the gardens for food to sustain them on their long trek, or the gardens may have been despoiled in retaliation for killings by the natives. The first explanation appears more probable, because one consequence of rousing the hostility of the natives would be to expose the coastal L of C to harassing attacks by Australian patrols aided by vengeful TEOP natives.

NUMA NUMA AREA

Intelligence now available indicates there are considerably fewer Japanese in this area than are shown in 2 Aust Corps Enemy Order of Battle. There is not yet sufficient data on which to base a re-assessment. Some factors contributing to the diminution in strength are:-

Transfer of HQ 38 IMB to BUIN

A higher rate of attrition than that calculated

Possible transfer of some units to BUIN

KIETA AREA

Information from refugee Chinese and natives who were working for the Japanese in KIETA until mid-December, and from very detailed reports of Jap forces gathered by an AIB patrol's network of native agents covering all villages in the area, indicate that existing estimates of enemy strengths in this area too must be scaled down. All sources agree that there are about 500 Japs in KIETA township and harbour area, Estimates of total Japanese in the many small and scattered garrisons screening KIETA vary between 300 and 600, but all sources report that with the exception of the WIDA garrison, thought to number about 200, all garrisons number less than 60 or 70.

There is greater evidence of weakness in fighting strength and morale at KIETA than at NUMA NUMA.

Recently the Japanese destroyed wholesale the villages and gardens of natives living within five or six miles of the town, and drove the natives as far into the interior as they could. Motives were probably a combination of fear of still more daring attacks by the natives, fear of native espionage on behalf of the Australian patrol operating nearby, and desire to drive out of harm's way a hostile troublesome and to them, useless native population.

To raise the "siege" of the 30 Japanese that natives have held bottled up at ISIMI since 25 Dec, the Japanese sent troops from BUIN, instead of KAIHO, which is only a few miles north of ISIMI. The track linking these villages traverses mountainous country firmly held by hostile, armed and savage natives who are under the influence of the Australian patrol. Conclusionswhich can be drawnare that the Japanese in KIETA were unable to spare sufficient troops for the big job of forcing a relief party through the hostile mountains to ISIMA, or they were unwilling to incur the casualties entailed and appealed to stronger forces at BUIN for help.

Reaction to the damaging inroads into KIETA garrison's strength and resources by the Australian patrol operating from the CROWN PRINCE RANGE has been feeble, and not at all in keeping with the normal behaviour of the Japanese. This patrol has raised the natives to open revolt, instigated the killing of scores of Japanese, and induced 35 Chinese and hundreds of pro-Jap natives who were sup lying the Japs with food, to desert.

It would be expected that the Japanese would hunt such a troublesome party down relentlessly. Instead they made one attempt only with two parties of 20 and 30. These Japs were stopped by a few shots from the patrol's scouts, and at no time have they resolutely tried to find and attack the patrol.

In this conception of a weak and irresolute enemy at KIETA it is hard to find a place for a strong spirited and well organised 45th Infantry Regiment.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

NORTHERN BOUGAINVILLE

The first contact with natives from BUKA was made during the week. They state that the enemy there are few in number and in poor condition.

The movement of enemy southward towards NUMA NUMA continues, a further 30, carrying stores, being observed on 1 Jan. Scouts have reported that there are now no enemy at SORAKEN, RATSOA and PORPORO, though subsequent to that report approximately 30 returned to SORAKEN on 6 Jan.

From AIB sources it is learned that the last air strike on TEOP ISLAND destroyed the radio station and a large range finder, killed two enemy, and caused the removal of an AA gun. The Japanese in this area have despoiled all the native gardens, and 100 refugee natives are being evacuated to TOROKINA. Numbers of enemy are camped in the mangrove swamps between TEOP HARBOUR and CAPE L'AVERDY.

To date the enemy party reported to be on its way to investigate the emergency landing strip built near AITA to evacuate an injured airman has not penetrated to the strip. KEMPEIare watching the area from PUSUPA HILL. The Japanese party with many natives reached TECVANGELA VILLAGE on 2 Jan. Here, the officer of the patrol was shot by natives, and the remainder of the patrol retired to the coast. On 7 Jan they set out again for the emergency strip.

On 7 Jan, a party of one Indian officer and 48 men, presumably PsW from MALAYA, who have been working for the Japs, evaded their guards and with the assistance of some deserting natives who had been working for the Jap KEMPKIorganization, made their way to an Australian patrol base. The men at present are in bad condition, but will be evacuated to TOROKINA when fit to travel.

These Indians reported that when carrying to NUMA NUMA they had learned the Japs sufferel heavy casualties from Australian artillery fire in the PEARL RIDGE area. Recent bombings on Jap concentrations in North BOUGAINVILLE had also been costly to the Japs. In one attack 4C officers and men were killed.

They confirmed previous AIB and native reports that a fairly general movement of troops from BUKA Island and North BOUGAINVILLE to NUMA NUMA was in progress, and considered the majority of Japs had already left those areas. Morale of the remaining Japs was very low, and many were in poor physical condition.

A further six enemy were killed by natives at TEOPASINO on 1 Jan.

AMUN

An Australian patrol to SIPAAI on 1 Jan found it unoccupied by the enemy and no indication of Japanese in the vicinity. Our forces have now moved in and occupied the area. Patrols on 6 Jan pushed further north, one approximately four miles up the coast and another, inland to SEPUKURA (299381) and THAKERA (258415). No enemy were sighted.

PEARL RIDGE

The enemy continues to offer strong resistence to our advance, and all indications are that he is determined to fight a typical delaying action in positions forward of and around Base Point 3.

Continuing the assault on PEARL RIDGE on 31 Dec, our troops after heavy fighting, cleared and occupied a number of successive enemy positions on the ridge and the southern slopes. In addition to a number of weapons captured, a quantity of Australian equipment was found abandoned by the enemy. During night 31 Dec/1 Jan, the enemy counter attacked strongly, but all attacks were beaten off. Next day, our patrols combed PEARL RIDGE for a distance of approximately 1500 yards without making contact. It was apparent that the enemy had withdrawn during the night after his failure to dislodge our forces. On 1 Jan, PEARL RIDGE was declared clear of the enemy. Twenty three Japanese were killed during the three day operation, and amongst the equipment captured were one HMG and three LMGs.

Following consolidation of PEARL RIDGE, patrols were immediately pushed forward to locate the enemy's next strongpoint and, on 3 Jan, a party of 12 Japanese was located on a knoll approximately 400 yards north of PEARL RIDGE. The position was later engaged with artillery, rifles, grenades and mortars.

A vacated enemy ambush was found approximately 500 yards north of PEARL RIDGE and patrols on 5 Jan to a further 300 yards beyond that point sighted no enemy. On 6 Jan, however, a patrol contacted the enemy approximately 600 yards north of PEARL RIDGE. Our troops attacked with mortar support but enemy fire from an estimated 1 LMG, 1 SMG and seven or eight rifles temporarily halted the advance. Our patrol was last reported digging in for the night under protective MMG fire.

On night 6 Jan, the enemy with LMGs and grenades again returned to the attack on our positions on PEARL RIDGE. The attack, which lasted four hours, was repulsed and the Japanese broke off the engagement shortly after midnight.

Native police boys on forward patrols located an enemy party of unknown strength dug in on a feature approximately two miles north of PEARL RIDGE. This position coincides with the plotted location of BASE POINT 3. To the south-west, contacts have been made and defensive positions located in the area 1000 yards north of the western extremity of PEARL RIDGE.

On 7 Jan, our forces clashed with the enemy in positions 2000 yards north of PEARL RIDGE, killing five and wounding three.

Patrols in the area west of ARTY HILL north to PEARL

RIDGE reported no signs of the enemy. The discovery of fresh enemy tracks and continuance of small enemy sightings in the area north of LITTLE GEORGE HILL indicates that this area is not yet completely cleared of enemy remnants.

JABA RIVER

Though no large scale counter attack has as yet eventuated, the enemy continues to patrol aggressively and contest every new Australian advance. He has, however, achieved little success and our troops are now established as far south as the mouth of the ADELE RIVER.

The Japanese continue to be active in the area between the JABA RIVER and the coast north of JABA No 2 in which it is estimated at least 70 enemy still remain. An enemy position manned by 20/30 Japanese was located and engaged by one of our patrols approximately 1 mile east of JABA No 2. Two enemy were killed in this initial encounter, and another attack, with artillery support, was launched the following day. A vacated enemy pillbox with 1 HMG, 1 LMG and a number of rifles was found approximately 600 yards SW of this position. Two of our positions on the JABA TRAIL approximately 2½ miles inland from the coast were attacked on 31 Dec. Both attacks were repulsed.

On 6 Jan, an enemy party was ambushed at a log crossing on the trail south from the JABA RIVER, approximately 1000 yards from the river. Without loss to ourselves, 14 enemy were killed and two new LMGs captured.

In the TUJU-TAVERA RIVERS sector, an enemy party of 25/30 was contacted in the area approximately 1½ miles NE of MUPESI on 31 Dec, and MOORE JUNCTION, approximately one mile ENE MUPESI was subsequently occupied by our forces after dispersing an enemy ambush.

Approximately 2000 yards east of MUPESI, a further ambush with an estimated fire power of 1 LMG, 20 SMGs and rifles, was engaged by our mortars. The enemy abandoned the position, losing one killed.

Patrolling has continued south and SW from the TAVERA RIVER mouth. Fourteen enemy bodies were found on 5 Jan at the mouth of the ADELE RIVER. A further 13 enemy dead were found the next day. Both groups of bodies were found in areas where our troops had previously clashed with Japs. In those encounters our forces estimated they killed 18 Japs, but the enemy casualties were in fact 27 killed, besides those wounded.

KIETA

The situation at KIETA shows little change with continued open hostility between the natives and the Japanese. The largest clash occurred on 2 Jan, when a party of 100 enemy moving up from BUIN attempted to relieve a besieged enemy garrison of about 30 near ISHIA. The natives ambushed them in a gorge, killed many, and dispersed the remainder.

About 400 natives, including two boss boys who had been working for the Japanese, and 35 Chinese, formerly residents of KIETA, who escaped from internment arrived at TOROKINA during the week.

From interrogation of the natives it appears in recent weeks the Japanese have systematically robbed and despoiled native gardens and villages within eight or ten miles of KIETA. After driving them from the villages they followed the natives as far as they dared into the hostile native territory in the foot hills of the CROWN PRINCE RANGE, despoiling the new gardens, to force the natives deeper into the interior. The boss boys stated HQ 45 Inf Regt had moved from ARAWA Plantation to RUMBA village about 5000 yards south of ARAWA Plantation. Enemy in the district were mostly scattered in small parties, the largest of which was about 60.

A Chinese merchant and a Cantonese, who had been conscripted by the Japanese for labour in BOUGAINVILLE, and until he deserted with the natives and other Chinese in mid-December 1944 had been cooking for a Japanese IG unit stationed on the main coastal track, supplied much valuable information.

Both agreed that there were about 500 Japs between TOBEROI Pt and ARAWA Plantation, largest concentrations being 100 at KOBUAN Bay and 270 at RANKAMA Pt.

TAKAHASHI Labour Unit numbering 84 was at RANKAMA Pt, and attached were several interpreters who handled the 300 natives whom the enemy employed at KIETA. Those natives had now deserted and were on their way to TOROKINA. They and the 34 Chinese had been growing large quantities of food for the enemy.

The Cantonese, who was on very friendly terms with several Japanese and was allowed an unusual freedom, was emphatic that in the past eight months only 200 troops had been sent to re-inforce NUMA NUMA. Those troops left KIETA about two months ago. About the same time a carrier line of 20 to 30 guarded by two armed Japs made trips once a week from BUIN and passed through KIETA carrying SAA, a little rice and hand grenades to NUMA NUMA. The line made eight trips, and was scheduled to make three more, but the ninth was ambushed by hostile natives who killed the escorts and stole the cargo. He was definite that no other overland movement of troops or supplies had taken place and he had not seen or heard of any movement by sea. The unit for which he cooked, a MG Bn of a strength of 42, was scheduled to move to BUIN on 15 Jan with 8 HMGs and 14 LMGs if enough food and carriers could be found for the overland journey.

CHOISEUL

Enemy barge traffic at night on the SUI RIVER has again been reported from this area. The area was patrolled next day and 10 drums of fuel were missing from the dump. There is no sign of bomb damage in this area.

A large cave, used as the enemy's main air raid shelter, has been located at NUKIKI. It is almost bomb proof, but

appears a good daylight target for FBM's.

Enemy casualties on BOUGAINVILLE to 7 Jan 44

Killed	10187
PW	115
From unconfirmed sources:	
Killed	226

NEW IRELAND

On 30 Dec, AIE patrols landed on SELAPIU and KULIMUS ISLANDS and found them free of the enemy. An armed enemy native patrol was contacted on neighbouring BAUDISSIN IS on 31 Dec.

NEW BRITAIN

The enemy has been reported in position astride the road at ARMANGURUP CREEK with a forward post of four sentries at WAIGNAU CREEK (area approximately 6 miles south of HENRY REID BAY). AIB patrols operating further inland in the upper reaches of the IP and MELKONG RIVERS (south of KANAKDRAN) found no signs of recent enemy occupation.

On the north coast, native patrols along the PANDI RIVER and south-west along the coast to MATATOGA (five miles from ULAMONA) reported the area clear of the enemy. Houses and gardens were practically untouched and indications were that the Japanese had evacuated by sea from MANTAMBU. At ULAMONA however, all buildings were found completely demolished by our air attacks.

A former police boy who has deserted the enemy at RABAUL and is now in our hands has stated that the C-in-C and military governor of RABAUL and his second in command both wear the badges of full generals, and live in adjoining dug-outs on the north west slope of OBSERVATORY HILL. He also reports that the enemy had large dumps of gas in the area, but had stated that they would use them only in retaliation. All Japanese troops carry respirators at all times and anti-gas drill is frequently carried out. Large quantities of poison vine, possibly derris, were grown and harvested at KERAVAT.

NEW GUINEA

BROKEN WATER BAY AREA

Enemy movement has remained at a minimum. On 30 Dec, native police reported small Japanese forces at MAGRABU and LONGON, and a further 30 at BOSMAN. Armed natives were seen near our perimeter at SANGAM after nightfall on 4 Jan.

TONG AREA

Active patrolling has continued in the area without any substantial change in the situation. MINAU and NIGIRA (1½ miles SE of MINAU) were reported clear of the enemy on 30 Dec, and YAMBES has now been occupied in some strength by our forces. Patrols to the PEREMBIL area located 37 enemy dug in overlooking tracks from the south east and a further 50 on a ridge 500 yards south east of the village. PEREMBIL was occupied by one of our patrols on 3 Jan and held against an immediate counter attack by approximately 40 enemy, followed by several further attacks during the night. Eleven enemy were killed during these assaults.

LAHBUAIN

Small sightings and killings continue to be made. Thirteen enemy dead were found at WALUM, believed to be the result of an air strike on 5 Dec. Several of the dead were found to have full anti-malarial equipment, but their rifles were rusty. An enemy party of unknown strength was attacked on 1 Jan by one of our patrols approximately four miles east of WOMSAK and two were killed.

A further 14 enemy were killed in patrol clashes on 3 Jan west of WALUM.

DAMMAP RIVER

Activity in the area has been confined to extensive patrolling with little strategical change.

The Japanese appeared in most strength in the MATAPAU area where, on 31 Dec, 30 were engaged and dispersed by artillery. Next day, a further 30 were encountered, many of whom were killed and four wounded.

Three hundred enemy rifles were found by one patrol in the area between the mouth of DAMMAP RIVER and ROCKY CREEK.

PHILIPPINES

LEYTE

The pursuit of enemy remnants and reduction of his remaining strongpoints has continued, with Japanese resistance decreasing in all areas.

The two Allied forces driving west and east along the PALOMPON ROAD joined on 31 Dec, and a further force advancing west across the island, reached the coast in the SILAD BAY area and occupied VILLABA and BALITI.

Our troops are now closing around the only remaining enemy concentrations on the north west coast.

MINDORO

No enemy ground opposition has as yet been encountered.

On 1 Jan, Allied troops landed unopposed at BONGABONG on the central east coast, and at MAMBURAO on the north west coast.

MARINDUQUE ISLAND

Following an unopposed landing, American forces have occupied MARINDUQUE ISLAND (90 miles SE of MANILA).

(b) SEA - OTH

Towards the end of Nov two submarines were sighted off WOODLARK ISLAND on a course which would have taken them to these waters. However nothing further was heard of these craft until 9 Dec when a Greek ship was fired on off CAPE JAFFA, SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

This was an isolated instance as the next attack took place in the afternoon of 25 Dec when an Allied vessel was torpedoed and sunk off MORUYA, approximately 180 miles south of SYDNEY. On the same afternoon a Liberty ship was unsuccessfully attacked two miles further south.

On 26 Dec detectors indicated a submarine in the same general area.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 137)

(c)AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

Co-ordinated strikes by bomb carrying Corsairs led in by Boomerangs were again the highlight of air operations over BOUGAINVILLE.

On 2, 3 and 4 Jan direct support was given to forward units of our troops south of the JABA RIVER when Corsairs bombed and strafed enemy concentrations at MAWARAKA. The first two of these strikes were with Tac/R indication of target and R/T direction of bombing.

With the exception of 1 Jan 45, when weather prevented strikes, at least two Corsair strikes were made against enemy concentrations and camps every day during the week. An enemy hut concentration at 940424 (1/63360 series) was again struck effectively on 3 Jan when 13 Corsairs led in by a Wirraway, using smoke bombs to indicate target, destroyed or damaged all the remaining huts visible in the area.

An enemy camouflaged staging post near OLD VIVIE, a camp in TEARCUKI Plantation, gun positions on SOMANA ISIAND, dump areas and suspected camps at MANOB and AVIS and a reported W/T station at KAINO were all bombed and strafed during the week. In addition to those targets a suspected barge unloading point and dump area near MOISURU was bombed and strafed by 12 Corsairs on 6 Jan and again by 12 Corsairs on 7 Jan. A foot bridge over the AMBUTUAI RIVER was destroyed during these attacks and pilots reported after the first attack two smoke columns to 200 feet and during the second attack a large sheet of flame in the dump area.

Regular coastal armed recces were continued each day and opportunity targets were attacked. On 6 Jan one 30 foot barge thought to be carrying fuel off AIKIKI ISIAND (mid west coast SHORTLAND ISIAND) was hit and left burning fiercely. On 7 Jan Corsairs on patrol scored hits or near misses on 2 heavily laden barges under trees in TONOLEI HARBOUR.

NEW BRITAIN

TOBERA Rubber Plantation, where an aircraft park and repair centre have been reported, was accurately bombed on 31 Dec by 42 medium bombers. A similar attack was made on 5 Jan against the suspected float plane park at TOBOI. After this attack, smoke was observed to 1000 feet.

Liberators, Bostons and Beauforts in small numbers attacked WATOM village, CRATER Peninsula, WAITAVOLO PLANTATION, RALUM, RABAUL Town and KAVIENG airfield.

Normal fighter patrols over the RABAUL airfields and armed recces around GAZELLE PENINSULA were maintained during the

week. Armed recces had more than usual success with opportunity targets, at least 9 trucks were destroyed and 14 damaged by strafing, and a number of barges or smaller water craft, huts and buildings were destroyed or damaged.

NEW IRELAND

On 3 Jan 26 Mitchells bombed KAVIENG airfield cratering the strip and on 4 Jan the same number of Mitchells bombed and strafed targets along the coast from LAMUSSONG to PINIKUNDU.

Other air operations over NEW IRELAND were confined to small forces of medium and fighter bombers on armed recces. These missions resulted in a large number of minor targets being attacked.

NEW GUINEA

Effective support has been given to the ground forces in forward areas. Bombing and strafing raids have materially helped the ground troops in their advance.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 137)

CERAM - HALMAHERAS - CELEBES - BORNEO

In the HALMAHERAS targets in the WASILE BAY area and GALELA and LOLABATA airfields have received most attention from our fighter bombers.

There has been no change worthy of note in our activity over the CELEBES, CERAM or BORNEO.

PHILIPPINES

Our aircraft have continued frequent and heavy raids against enemy airfields and shipping throughout the PHILIPPINES with particular attention to airfields in the MANILA area,

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

THE TOROKINA PASS GUARD UNIT

The first reference from PW and captured documents concerning this Guard was obtained from a PW who stated that on 12 Sep 44 3 Coy of 81 Inf Regt was guarding the TOROKINA PASS 3 kilos to the north of SIOMAPAPA, and was called the TOROKINA GD UNIT; 5 Coy (ITO.Pl) was on guard duty at SIOMAPARA.

When the Australian advance up the NUMA NUMA trail began 5 Coy at SIOMAPARA retired and reinforced 3 Coy at the TOROKINA PASS GD UNIT. 5 Coy CO 1/Lt TSUJIMOTO became CO of the unit with elements of 6, 7, 8 and 11 Coys, 2 Bn Gun Pl, 2 Bn MG Coy and 2 Bn Tk/A Coy attached. On 29 Nov 44 this unit was 90 strong.

By 16 Dec 44 the GD UNIT strength had dwindled to 63 and had been pushed back on to ARTY RIDGE. 7 and 8 Coys were reported to have been annihilated but apparently this statement applied only to the representatives ir the Gd Unit as there are still elements reported to be at Base Point 1.

ARTY RIDGE was captured by our troops on 18 Dec and the GD UNIT suffered 25 killed, 2 wounded and 1 PW taken by Allied forces. It then withdrew its forward elements to PEARL RIDGE where it disposed its remnants, estimated at 36, in four commanding positions, The Allied offensive continued and PEARL RIDGE was taken by our forces on 1 Jan and the GD UNIT lost a further 23 men.

The remnants of the unit, estimated at 13, have probably now withdrawn to Base Point 3 where the next enemy concentration is located.

38 IMB HQ

Information from captured documents and a Chinese escapee from the KIETA area suggests that 38 IMB has a forward and rear HQ on BOUGAINVILLE.

A 38 IMB order dated 4 Dec, issued at NUMA NUMA, instructed 81 Inf Regt CO and certain other officers to report to IMB HQ. This party were to depart from their present area (NUMA NUMA and NUMA trail) on 31 Dec 44 in order to arrive at IMB HQ by 15 Jan 45.

The Chinese escapee from the KIETA area stated that Maj-gen KIJIMA, whom he knew as 38 IMB CO, had visited KIETA 3 months ago and returned to 38 IMB HQ at BUIN.

From PW and documentary sources it is known that the Japanese regard the journey from NUMA NUMA to BUIN as a 15 day trek.

10 COY 3 BN 81 INF REGT

A regimental order dated 8 Dec 44 which gave details of 81 Inf Regt dispositions stated that 10 Coy remained behind at TARLENA when 3 Bn moved forward to the NUMA NUMA area.

A document captured by Australian troops at SIPAAI on 3 Jan 45 set out the organization of 10 Coy as at 17 Oct 43 and again at 20 Oct 44.

Despite reinforcement from the disbanded 53 and 54 Inf Regt after the unsuccessful TA operation the Coy strength dwindled from 4 officers and 170 men on 17 Oct 43 to 4 officers and 88 men on 20 Oct 44.

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND-BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land-based air strength in the following areas is prepared on information to 28 Dec 44:-

AREAS	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES 20 Dec	COMPARATIVES 14 Dec
NEW BRITAIN) NEW IRELAND) SOLOMONS)				No details					13	16
øPHILIPPINES:										
MINDANAO	28		10	14		14	3	69	86	135
VISAYAS	25	6	2	11		9	2	55	113	161
LUZON	154	36	41	53		21	28	333	241	382
	207	42	53	78		44	33	457	440	678
AMBON-CERAM-) BOEROE)						9		9	19	19
CELEBES	26	17	4	16	3	8	7	81	82	88
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK		9		25		9		43	49	33
BORNEO	45	19	8	22		12	6	112	118	205
TOTALS SWPA	278	87	65	141	3	82	46	702	721	1039

ø Estimates do not include combat types assigned to operational training units.

(COIC Situation Report No 362 29 Dec 44)

NOTE: The above estimate does not give any details of enemy air strength in the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-SOLOMONS area. It is considered that the following strength is possibly in that area:-

	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL
NEW BRITAIN) NEW IRELAND) SOLOMONS)	10					8	2	20

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 137)

9. GENERAL

ENEMY AIRCRAFT IN RABAUL AREA

Until recently, the estimated enemy air strength in this area for some considerable time past was 12 aircraft, comprising float planes and observation planes.

On 9 Nov, however, there was a raid on MOMOTE (ADMIRALTIES) by three aircraft at first reported to be 2 engined 'BETTY' bombers; and later identified as single-engined 'TONY' fighters. This raid was the first for some time, and it was considered that the raiders were possibly based at TRUK and staged in through RABAUL.

The first indication that this assumption was incorrect was an enemy broadcast in English on 10 Nov when, referring to the raid, the Japanese stated that the raiders had come from RABAUL "where the Japanese Air Force had been holding its strength in reserve."

Later, information was received of underground hangars in the KERAVAT area and on 13 Nov it was reliably reported that at least 60 planes were hidden in a plantation south east of TOBERA airfield with mechanics working on them. Other planes in crates were reported to be stored under trees in GUNANUR PLANTATION, north east of the TOBERA strip, and a further possible hide-out along the road between the airfield and TOMA.

On 13 Nov a 2E twin-tail bomber (possibly a 'NELL') approached the WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA (HOSKINS area), from the NNW and strafed and bombed the area around LAKE DAKATUA. It departed in the direction of RABAUL. An unidentified plane over DYAUL ISLAND (KAVIENG area) was observed flying NW on the night of 13-14 Nov.

Interpretation of photographs of VUNAKANAU, taken on 15 Nov, disclosed an unstated number of camouflaged fighters in revetments, and additional serviceable fighters on the north edge of KURABA (SOUTHERN) PLANTATION.

A native report from TIWONGO ISLAND (OPEN BAY area) stated that on 15 Nov a SE plane was seen to drop an object into the sea between the island and OPEN BAY. That night three unidentified planes strafed and bombed MOMOTE causing minor casualties.

At VUNAKANAU, on 19 Nov, 10 enemy planes were observed on the strip, another one was seen taxi-ing, and two more were airborne.

A senior officer of the RNZAF stated later in the month, that in his opinion, the Japanese probably had up to 36 planes in the RABAUL area which could be employed for strikes against TOROKINA, and GREEN and EMIRAU ISLANDS. Air Force Intelligence also intimated that the enemy planes at RABAUL, most of which would probably be obsolescent types, may be used in suicide attack on Allied shipping in the ADMIRALTIES.

Since the sightings at VUNAKANAU on 19 Nov, a number of indications and sightings of aircraft, mostly unidentified, have been received, and a small strafing raid by a SE plane

on Australian positions at BAIEN (JACQUINOT BAY area) was also reported.

The indications and sightings reported were made over GAZELLE PENINSULA, in the HOSKINS, WIDE BAY, JACQUINOT BAY and ADMIRALTIES areas, and off the coast of NEW IRELAND. On one occasion a Liberator, returning from a strike on RABAUL, was followed to CAPE ARCHWAY by four probable SE 'ZEKE' fighters which made no attempt at interception.

A native police boy, an escapee from RABAUL area, stated on 30 Dec that the Japanese had some pilots still at RABAUL, and there were some planes hidden underground. The native also reported that the wings of six floatplanes at TOBOI were removed in the daytime and often replaced at dusk when flights were made.

In conclusion, it would appear that the enemy may shortly have from 30 to 40 operational aircraft in the area, consisting mainly if not solely, of fighters.

It is unlikely that this air strength will be jeopardised by attempting interception of large forces of Allied planes raiding the area, but will probably be conserved and used for the following purposes:-

(a) Bombing and strafing attacks on Allied ground forces and installations.

(b) Support of his ground forces defending the area from attack.

(c) Attacks on Allied shipping concentrations within their operational radius.

(d) Interception of lone reconnaissance and raiding planes and small groups of aircraft attacking the area.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 137)

JAPANESE SELF SUFFICIENCY

A Japanese ration bag recently captured on PEARL RIDGE throws an interesting light on enemy self sufficiency, demonstrating how he is solving the problem of providing operational rations for forward troops by preserving garden produce.

The ration bag contained slices of sun dried carrot, which were in good condition, sweet smelling and reasonably palatable. The loss of carotene by sun drying is only about 20%; carrot slices so treated would therefore still contain a high vitimin A content and would be a sustaining and nourishing supplementary ration.

(3 Aust Div Intelligence Summary No 6)

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix 'A' are additions and amendments to Topographical information.

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff

APPENDIX "A" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 7

ADDITIONS AND AMENDMENTS TO TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Ref Map : KOMARO 1 : 25,000

Insert	Map Ref	Remarks
MT STUBBINS	586143	
KARBODNA	601141	
TUDOROPIA	589141	
STONES Ck	676102	North branch from 676102 to 692123
Mt FRY	617133	
PEAR Hill	683124	
BARTONS Knoll	677125	
BAKERS Brow	683128 to 679128	
AMBUSH Knoll	680127	and spur from 680127 running south west
RADFORDS Knoll	672120	On BAWABU Ridge
WERDAS Knoll	672122	On BAWABU Ridge
VALAPAIA	679126	

SECRET

GSI

2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 8

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Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 7 Jan 45 to 2400 hrs 14 Jan 45

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SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

Australian forces advancing north along the coast have still not met any opposition, but have sighted Japs at PUTO. Near this village mountain spurs running towards the sea constrict the flat coastal strip into a narrow bottleneck, and provide favourable terrain for resisting our drive.

Two native reports indicate that the Japs may be attempting to move artillery south from the BUKA area along the east coast track to NUMA NUMA.

SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

From an undated, but apparently recently written document captured south of the ADELE RIVER on 11 Jan, it is inferred that oneparty of reinforcements for the 13 Inf Regt has reached the MAWARAKA sector from the SHORTLAND Is, and another party was expected. There may be some connection between the arrival of these reinforcements and the many reports of skid and foot marks on the south BOUGAINVILLE coast near the PURIATA and HARI RIVERS between 20 Nov and 22 Nov 44, which was a moonless period. During the current period of no moon, early morning Tac/R has disclosed evidences in the sand of further landings at the same places.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

NORTHERN BOUGAINVILLE

Evidence of enemy movement along the entire NE coast of BOUGAINVILLE and the east coast of BUKA continues to accumulate. Aerial observers state that the road on the east coast of BUKA shows signs of recent use by wheeled traffic. Pilots are convinced that the pre-war motor road from BUKA to RURI BAY is being used by wheeled traffic also.

On the night of 4 Jan, native scouts led approx 100 Indians out of the TENIMBAUBAU compound past one sleeping Japanese sentry and five sick Indian guards. Half of the party was lost, and had to return to the camp before daylight. The recovered Indians and natives are insistent that nearly all SMALL BUKA Japanese have gone to NUMA NUMA, and give further confirmation of movement of all known supplies in North BOUGAINVILLE to that area.

AIB scouts report the presence of numerous parties of Japs numbering from 10 to 30 in various villages along the coastal track between BUKA and NUMA NUMA. These new sightings probably include parties on the move to NUMA NUMA. In addition several parties were reported to be still garrisoning some villages in North BOUGAINVILLE, but of those troops a large number were sick and unable to walk, and others were bootless and ill-clad. Less than half were armed. The largest garrison was an estimated 150 at BANIU, principally naval and marine personnel who were previously identified in the LALUM area. A HQ was located at TAUSI (approx ½ mile west of PORPORO). Many pro-Jap natives in the northern area were arming themselves with rifles of dead Japanese.

Natives from TEOP state there are now no enemy on that island, and that 25 Jap soldiers and 15 marines with two heavy calibre wheeled guns are located in heavy timber approx 300 yds north of the boundary of IKEDA's PLANTATION (on mainland opposite TEOP).

A native rumour that a number of probable mountain guns are being moved towards IBU is being investigated.

NORTH-WEST BOUGAINVILLE

Australian patrols from the recently established base at SIPAAI have now penetrated as far north as TSIMBA on the GENGA RIVER, and as far eastward as ARESI and TOTOKEI. No opposition has been encountered.

On the outward journey, the TSIMBA patrol found signs of recent enemy activity, estimated to be two days old, four miles north of SIPAAI, and further indications of enemy presence in the KURUR area. On the return journey two enemy were encountered at RUKUSSIA on 10 Jan, and one was wounded by our fire. Fifteen minutes later, heavy rifle fire was heard to the north. No track could be found leading to RUKUSSIA from the east.

The patrols to ARESI and TOTOKEI reported no enemy sightings.

On 11 Jan, an outpost was established on the north bank of the SARIME RIVER mouth, and on 13 Jan, another force moved north to occupy the area near the mouth of the KURUR RIVER, approx 1 mile south of RUKUSSIA.

PEARL RIDGE

Although there has been no further determined enemy offensive activity in this area, small enemy groups or individuals continue to approach our perimeter at night on harassing missions. On night 8/9 Jan, two grenades were thrown into one perimeter on PEARL RIDGE, and further to the east, more movement was heard and two booby traps set off. Ambush parties and protective patrols around our positions reported no sign of the enemy on night 10/11 Jan, though the following night, movement was again heard on the western slopes of LITTLE GEORGE HILL and northern slopes of ARTY HILL.

Two enemy positions approx 700 yds and 1000 yds north of PEARL RIDGE have been engaged consistently with artillery and mortars, and on night 7/8 Jan, harassing fire was laid down on enemy positions on DAVIS HILL (2000 yds north of PEARL RIDGE). On the same night, sounds similar to MT - possibly a petrol driven generator - were heard north of PEARL RIDGE at an apparent distance of 3/4000 yds.

On 9 Jan, a forward post was set up 500 yds north of PEARL RIDGE, but was withdrawn three days later.

A patrol returning on 12 Jan from the area 2000 yds NNE of DAVIS HILL reported enemy positions, camp and personnel areas, and possible store dumps approx 1500 yds north of DAVIS HILL. This area is approx 300 yds NW of the present plotted position of Base Point 3.

On 14 Jan, our outposts on KEENANS RIDGE (2800 yds south of SISIVIE) reported that the signal line had been cut and a length of wire removed.

It has been learned from captured documents that the TOROKINA PASS GUARD UNIT, forward of BASE POINT 3, had a strength of 50 men on 7 Jan.

EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY

Although the enemy continues to harass our troops in all areas and remains swift to react to any new Australian gains, our forces have now established forward positions at the HUPAISAPANI RIVER (1½ miles south of the ADELE RIVER), and patrols have penetrated to within 200 yds north of MAWARAKA. A feature of the week's activity was the enemy's first use of artillery against Australian troops in this area.

JABA RIVER

Since 9 Jan, there have been no sightings of enemy in the area between JABA No 2 and the JABA RIVER and our patrols have pushed south and also SE along the JABA trail towards NIGITAN.

On 9 Jan one of our patrols contacted an enemy ambush at 807723 on the JABA trail and killed three. Next day, our patrol again advanced to the same point and after artillery fire was brought down, the enemy withdrew and our troops moved 500 yards further along the track without further contact. A further clash occurred on 11 Jan, at 809720, when three Japs were killed.

On 11 and 12 Jan, patrols found recently vacated enemy positions at 806715 and 815716 (approximately 2 miles inland and on the JABA trail) whilst to the west on 14 Jan a further vacated bivouac area was discovered at 790726.

Light enemy shelling, which caused no casualties, was encountered in the area on 11, 13 and 14 Jan.

Two of the enemy parties contacted in this area were well equipped, and some were wearing new rubber soled boots, some studded boots, and were carrying packs and blankets.

TAVERA RIVER

On 8 Jan, an Australian force engaged a strong enemy position 1½ miles east of the TAVERA RIVER mouth, killing four of the enemy. After repulsing a determined enemy counter-attack, our troops gained more ground the following day, but were again held up. On 10 Jan, the advance was continued east along the trail north of the TAVERA RIVER, and a point two miles east of the mouth reached without opposition. Flooding of the TAVERA RIVER temporarily halted our troops, but patrolling was continued on 12 Jan and an enemy position sighted 2½ miles inland on the river.

North of the TAVERA RIVER, a patrol moving along the MENDAI track contacted an enemy ambush of approximately 20 men with 1 LMG near the river 2½ miles inland. The enemy withdrew when our patrol commenced an outflanking movement.

An ANGAU patrol which crossed the TAVERA RIVER 1½ miles east of the mouth and moved south east, returned on 10 Jan with 54 native refugees.

On the early morning of 13 Jan, the enemy brought down artillery fire on the area around the mouth of the TAVERA ROVER. Thirty shells were fired, most of them falling into the sea. Four failed to explode and no casualties or damage resulted.

One enemy killed on the TAVERA RIVER during the day was well equipped, and wore on the sleeve a red triangular patch point downwards, believed to be the badge of the 6 Division.

ADELE RIVER

On 10 Jan an Australian force crossed the mouth of the ADELE RIVER and came under fire from an estimated weapon strength of 1 HMG, 4 LMGs and several rifles. Our troops returned after inflicting an unknown number of casualties.

The following morning, the enemy made his first use of artillery in this area, firing four shells from a single gun into our perimeter north of the ADELE RIVER mouth.

At 0800 hrs on the same day, supported by HMGs, mk/A guns and artillery over open sights, an Australian force crossed the ADELE RIVER by barge and swifly eliminated small pockets of resistance. By midday, two other forces had crossed the river by the same means. Six enemy were killed during the action, and four more have so far been found dead presumably from shelling. Documents and equipment were captured.

On 12 Jan the advance south was continued at 1200 hrs following a heavy air strike. At 1300 hrs the enemy brought down artillery fire on our positions along the beach north of the ADELE RIVER. A total of 44 shells, 19 of which failed to explode, were fired and many landed in the sea. Harassing fire was put down later in the day, causing no damage or casualties.

In a few hours, our forward elements had reached the mouth of the HUPAISAPANI RIVER (1½ miles south of the ADELE RIVER). A patrol sent forward contacted at least five pillboxes and many tree snipers, and killed three of the enemy. On the left flank, the advance was continued to a log crossing of the river approximately ½ mile inland. Enemy reaction to this new advance was swift, our forward elements being again twice engaged with artillery fire. Patrols during the afternoon made no contact, and a firm base has now been established at the ADELE RIVER mouth. Throughout the day, our artillery attempted to locate the enemy guns, estimated to be 75 mm pieces.

On 14 Jan, an Australian patrol crossed the HUPAISAPANI RIVER and penetrated to within 200 yards of MAWARAKA without sighting any enemy.

KIETA

The enemy force which came from BUIN to relieve the 40 enemy besieged at ISINA since 25 Dec is still being fought by the natives, who have captured a quantity of grenades, clothing and boots. An attempt to grenade the Japanese was unsuccessful as the enemy is dug in inside native houses.

Allied scouts returning from REEOINE BAY report that no natives in the area between KIETA and KOROMIRA are assisting the enemy, though all natives in the Mt SUGARLOAF - Mt NEGROHEAD area are still pro-Japanese.

Japanese who completed garders at ORAMI and built slit trench defences around the area at the junction of the SIPURU-MORONI road four months ago have deserted the outpost because of native hostilities.

On 12 Jan, 40 enemy were reported on the road betwenn CHIPURO and TUPEI.

CHOISEUL

On 9 Jan, a large number of Japanese was seen landing at SIPASAI from two barges, while a third barge landed others on KONDAKANIEBOKO. All three barges were seen crossing the bay together from TARIKUKUVA at the mouth of the SUI RIVER, just south of POROPORO. Both islands are approximately ¼ and ½ mile respectively off shore in CHOISEUL BAY, and it is possible that this movement may be an outcome of the recent Allied air strikes at POROPORO.

Enemy casualties on BOUGAINVILLE to 14 Jan:-

Killed	10279
PW	115
Wounded	72
From unconfirmed sources:	
Killed	231

(Of the wounded figure, 8 have been reported in Sitreps from 5-14 Jan, and 64 in captured documents from 22 Nov)

NEW BRITAIN

It has been reported by AIB scouts that the Japanese have withdrawn from NANGURUS CREEK and WALGNAU CREEK. The main enemy position remains at KALAI PLTN area and sentries have been observed on the lower reaches of the WELKONG RIVER. There is no sign of enemy beach patrols south of KALAI, and the area MILIM to IP RIVER is all clear.

On the north coast, Allied forces landed unopposed at EA EA and LOLOBAU ISLAND on 13 Jan.

NEW GUINEA

BROKEN WATER BAY

Enemy activity remains slight. On 6 Jan, an Australian patrol occupied BOSMAN and small enemy parties were observed moving around the perimeter during the night.

A party of armed natives which attempted to penetrate our perimeter at AINNAINBERG withdrew when fired on. A patrol to GOOMBI in the AINNAINBERG area reported no enemy seen.

YAMBES

After overcoming determined resistance, LOWER PEREMBIL was occupied by our forces on 6 Jan. Eight enemy were found dead as a result of air attacks. On the same day, natives reported 60/70 Japanese still in the LOWER PEREMBIL area, 60 at ASILING, and 30 at SAMISAI. AIB reports that the enemy is in strength in the MUE, TATIMBA, MBRAS and MAI areas. A patrol ambushed and killed 20 enemy in the vicinity of WALENDE on 8 Jan.

On 9 Jan, the enemy was reported to have moved from ASILING and is now concentrated at BOMBISIMA, SAMISAI was occupied by our forces on 11 Jan, though the previous day, 80 Japanese were reported in that vicinity.

DANMAP RIVER

Although the enemy is offering increasing resistance in this area, our forces have continued to advance eastward along the coast. On 6 Jan, supported by artillery, aircraft and tanks, Australian troops occupied two enemy positions south of MATAPAU VILLAGE, and subsequently captured CAPE DJERUAN. The advance was continued during 7 and 8 Jan, but is being limited by narrow lines of approach. The enemy is believed to have reinforced the area.

Elsewhere in the sector, Australian patrols have been active with few enemy sightings. A probable Jap medical centre was found in the area south of the mouth of the DANMAP RIVER, where seventy graves and the remains of 40 enemy were observed.

On 9 Jan, a patrol contacted and killed four Japanese who were washing in a creek approximately one mile SE of MALIN. One was wearing the badges of rank of a Lt-gen, and another those of a full Colonel. Good quality clothing and other articles found in a hut nearby appear to confirm them as being high ranking officers, though no confirmation of ranks or identity has been found in documents, maps and personal effects found on the bodies. From the position of the encounter, it is thought most likely that the senior officer was Lt-gen MANO Goro, Comd 41 Div, and the other Col NARA Masahiko, Comd 237 Inf Regt.

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

Co-ordinated strikes by Corsairs led in by Tac/R aircraft was the main feature of air operations over BOUGAINVILLE area during the week. Corsairs effectively supported ground operations in both the JABA RIVER and NUMA NUMA trail areas.

On 8 and 9 Jan enemy defensive positions north of PEARL RIDGE in the PIATERAPAIA area were bombed at the request of ground troops. Bombing in both instances was reported as accurate.

Direct support was provided in the JABA RIVER area on four successive days from 10 to 13 Jan inclusive. A suspected enemy Bn or Regt HQ near MOSIGETTA was accurately bombed and strafed on two occasions. Enemy positions at MAWARAKA and NIGITAN were also effectively bombed. Many huts were destroyed in these attacks and the areas blasted by depth charges.

Villages in NW BUKA which were recently reported to be occupied by some 300/400 Japs have been bombed and strafed resulting in approximately 30 huts being destroyed or damaged and one large explosion with column of black smoke.

Bivouac areas near ROROVANA BAY were attacked on 9 and 11 Jan and 12 Corsairs bombed a reported Jap camp at the base of the KIETA PENINSULA on 10 Jan and 14 Jan. Four Corsairs bombed and strafed a suspected headquarters of a high ranking Jap officer in the ASITAUI area at 738340 (1/63360).

Targets at POROPORO and on islands in CHOISEUL BAY were bombed with unobserved results.

The regular daily armed recces and dawn and dusk patrols were maintained and a number of minor targets bombed and strafed. A group of approximately 30 huts west of KALIA (FAURO ISLAND) were strafed.

NEW BRITAIN

Heavy and medium bombers based at NADZAB have made daily attacks on bivouac and plantation areas on the east coast of GAZELLE PENINSULA starting fires.

On 7 Jan 18 aircraft bombed the suspected float plane base at TOBOI.

Corsairs bombed the radar station at TOMAVATUR causing damage to installations and attacked targets at RALUANA POINT.

Daily RABAUL patrols were maintained by Corsairs. Eight large canoes and three whaleboats filled with Japs were caught by these patrols on 10 Jan. The canoes were sunk by bombing and the whaleboats strafed with an estimated 60 Japs killed.

NEW IRELAND

Main targets attacked in this area were at KAVIENG, NAMATANAI and BORPOP. Stores were destroyed when Venturas bombed the bivouac areas at BOM and RATABU.

Other air activity was confined to daily armed reconnaissances by medium and fighter bombers, and numerous targets of a minor nature were attacked.

HALMAHERAS - CELEBES

Fighter bombers attacked numerous targets throughout these areas including airfields, dumps and personnel areas.

PHILIPPINES

Attacks on airfields and enemy L of C were maintained on a heavy scale. Principal targets were the airfields at MANILA and rail communications in LUZON. Several locomotives and a number of freight cars were destroyed.

AIR - ENEMY

In the PHILIPPINES area a serious and important development in enemy air operations has been the revival on a relatively large scale of "suicide" crash tactics in attacks against Allied convoys.

In attacks on Allied convoys and shipping off MINDORO on 4 Jan, enemy planes crash-dived on and blew up an ammunition ship, and other planes fired an escort carrier off PANAY. The carrier was subsequently sunk by Allied destroyers. These operations were followed at dawn and in the forenoon of 5 Jan by desperate suicide crash attacks on two convoys off the VISAYAS. In these attacks, 17 to 19 vessels, so far principally warships, have been reported hit by the crashing planes. Damage sustained has varied from that of a minor nature to serious damage and one vessel sunk. Fighters, torpedo bombers, dive bombers and two-engine bombers were among the attacking planes. This type of attack may become a factor of strategic significance for, although an act of despair, it has proved itself the most economical weapon against major Naval craft.

(Adapted from First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 138)

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

POSSIBLE REINFORCEMENTS FROM SHORTLAND Island

Since Nov there have been several indications that personnel and/or stores have been landed along the south coast of BOUGAINVILLE between the PURIATA River and MOILA Point.

Foot tracks and skid marks, which appeared to have been made by dragging boxes over the sand and by boats, were sighted leading from the beach to the jungle near the mouths of the PURIATA and HARI Rivers. The frequency of skid marks and reports that the main L of C road between RUNAI and BUIN was unserviceable lead to a deduction that the Japs had established a barge L of C between BUIN and the TAI TAI and PURIATA areas. There is now evidence that some of these movements may have included the landing of reinforcements from SHORTLAND Island. Grounds for this deduction are contained in a document captured on 11 Jan and thought to have been written by an artillery commander, or a Bn commander or 13 Inf Regtl commander:

> "I do not know the present situation and plans of our army. Even though there have been many requests made on the infantry situation, there have been no reports. I do not understand the enemy's plan. The entire personnel of the Coy will defend the position to the last man. The second group from SHORTLAND has not yet arrived and we are in difficulty. I stated this opinion to the Bn CO for cooperation with the intention of using heavy Arty ....."

Previously troops have been moved from SHORTLAND and FAURO Islands as reinforcements for forward areas. The 2 Bn 4 South Sea Garrison Unit was transferred to the mainland for the TA Operation and subsequently returned to those Islands.

Enemy forces on SHORTLAND, FAURO, BALLALE and OVAU were estimated at 2,800 on 1 Jan 45.

The infantry elements consist of 4 South Sea Garrison Unit and a company of SNLP with a total estimated strength of 1400. The remainder of the troops in the island group comprise mainly Naval AA and coast defence units.

JAPANESE ARTILLERY IN MAWARAKA - MOSIGETTA - PURIATA River AREA

Following is a survey of known information on the Japanese artillery potential in the area facing our troops in the JABA River sector.

A captured 17 Army Plan for the withdrawal from the TOROKINA attack of Mar 44, disposed artillery forces SE of the perimeter (SAUA River area) as follows:-

One artillery battalion
One medium artillery battalion
One 105 mm howitzer company
One Machine Cannon company,

and in the JABA - MAWARAKA - MOSIGETTA area:

One artillery battalion.

The units believed implicated in this plan were:-

1 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt
2 Bn 10 Indep Mtn Arty Regt
1? Bn 4 Med Arty Regt
Indep 105 mm How Unit of 6 Fd Arty Regt
1 Indep or 23 Fd Machine Cannon Coy.

The force in the SAUA River area has since been withdrawn and its location is unknown. Between May and Jul, the 17 Army re-organisation, involving the absorption of a number of weak units, took place. Although there is no confirmatory evidence, it is possible that 10 Indep Mtn Arty Regt and 4 Med Arty Regt have lost their identity and been absorbed into 6 Fd Arty Regt, under which their estimated strength and equipment are at present carried.

A defence plan dated 15 Nov 44 covering the area JABA River - MOSIGETTA - PURIATA River disposed the artillery units as set out in the table below. The number of guns in each area was not given in every instance and estimates have been made to fill the gaps.

JABA Area	Unit:	Portion of 3 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt
	Guns:	1 70 mm Bn Gun 1 75 mm Mtn Gun } on coast
MAWARAKA Area	Units:	2 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt Portion of 1 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt Med Arty Pl
	Guns:	4 75 mm Mtn Guns (2 on coast, 1 at MAKATOWA, 1 unlocated) 1 75 mm Regtl Gun (on coast) 2 150 mm Howitzers
PURIATA River Area	Unit:	1 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt
	Guns:	Tentatively estimated at 3 75 mm Mtn Guns
PIKEI - MEIVO - HOZAN	Units:	13 Inf Regt Gun Coy 13 Inf Regt Tk A Gun Coy 13 Inf Regt 2 Bn Gun Pl 13 Inf Regt 3 Bn Gun Pl
	Guns:	Tentatively estimated at 3 37 mm Tk A Guns 1 47 mm Tk A Gun 3 70 mm Bn Guns 3 75 mm Regtl Guns
East of MOSIGETTA (in reserve at "MEIRON")(RABE Area)	Unit:	Part 1 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt
	Gun:	Tentatively estimated at 1 75 mm Mtn Gun

Based on the above figures it is estimated that the enemy has in the JABA River - MOSIGETTA - PURIATA River area the following guns:-

Calibre	No.	Type	Range (yards)
150 mm Howitzers	2	36	13000
75 mm Mtn Guns	9	94	9000
75 mm Regtl Guns	3	41	7000
70 mm Bn Guns	4	92	max 3000 effective 1500
47 mm Tk A Gun	1	01	5500
37 mm Tk A Guns	3	94	max 7000 effective 800
		97	max 4400 effective 600

In addition to the above, the following weapons may be on strength of 1 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt in this area:-

81 mm Mortars	4	Type 97	3000 yards approx
105 mm Howitzers	2	Type 91	11500 yards

This estimate, being based on information prior to our advance south of the JABA River, does not take into account any possible redisposition of artillery or reinforcements.

Their are unconfirmed reports that a maximum of seven of the guns are unserviceable.

TAIOF ISLAND GARRISON UNIT

The TAIOF Island Garrison Unit, according to documents captured from 11 Coy 81 Regt on PEARL RIDGE, was responsible for the defence of MADEHAS, TAIOF and KATITJ (TANWOA) Islands. In Sep 44 it was composed of

11 Coy 81 Inf Regt
Pl Gun Coy 81 Inf Regt
Pl Tk A Gun Coy 81 Inf Regt
Pl Fd Arty Bty

with a strength of approximately 200.

Captured equipment tables reveal almost normal holdings (including reserves) of ammuntion for most types of weapons held by the garrison. On 25 Sep 44 its main weapons and ammuntion were:

Rifles	95	176000 rounds
LMGs	9	
HMGs	2	95000 rounds
Grenade Dischargers	9	3860 rounds
47 mm Tk A Guns	3	600 rounds (AP and HE)
70 mm Bn Guns	3	1455 rounds
75 mm (Type 41) Regtl Guns	2	450 rounds
75 mm (Type 38) Fd Guns	2	400 rounds

Of the rifle and LMG ammunition 137000 out of 176000 are 7.7 mm, and the only weapons held by the TAIOF Island Garrison of that calibre were 20 rifles. There were slight deficiencies in 6.5 mm and 75 mm ammunition. Of the weapons reported as tested in the documents, all were in good condition (25 Sep 44). One report shows that four out of 17 75 mm shells (Type 38) were duds.

The presence of 47 mm Tk A Guns in NORTH BOUGAINVILLE was hitherto unknown and raises the possibility of additional 47 mm guns at the disposal of 81 Inf Regt on the mainland.

Other items of equipment held by the garrison were:-

1	Type 87	Arty Light Observation Vehicle
124	Type 93	Land Mines
6	Type 99	Magnetised AP bombs.

About 7 Oct, 11 Coy was ordered to NUMA NUMA and approximately 30 of them joined the TOROKINA PASS Guard Unit on ARTY HILL and PEARL RIDGE. According to a PW of 11 Coy, only 43 men under 1 Lt NOMURA were fit to travel, the remainder being left behind. The SAA carried by 11 Coy on its move was far below the normal scale, but grenade discharger shells and grenades carried were in excess.

This prisoner's statement that all artillery pieces were left behind on TAIOF Island is confirmed by captured ordnance transfer lists. These guns and a large percentage of equipment and ammunition were transferred to 2 Lt KAWASAKI Akira, Pl Comd of 81 Inf Regt Gun Coy, who apparently now commands the TAIOF Island Garrison Unit.

Tac/R reports and photographs dated 11 Jan 45 reveal pillboxes, well worn tracks and general activity on TAIOF and KATITJ Islands generally conforming to the Japanese defensive layout shown in a captured map dated 18 Aug 44.

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND-BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land-based air strength in the following areas is prepared on information to 4 Jan 44:-

	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES 28 Dec	20 Dec
ø PHILIPPINES										
MINDANAO	25		15	14		16	5	75	69	86
VISAYAS	18	6	2	11		8	2	47	55	113
LUZON	196	66	118	83		48	21	532	333	241
	239	72	135	108		72	28	654	457	440
AMBON-CERAM-BOEROE						9		9	9	19
CELEBES	18	17	4	11	3	15	7	75	81	82
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK		9		25		9		43	43	49
BORNEO	52	19	8	25		12	3	119	112	118
FORMOSA-RYUKU	89	47	55	55	14	68	15	343	-	-
TOTALS	398	164	202	224	17	185	53	1243	702	708

ø Estimates do not include combat types assigned to operational training units.

(COIC Situation Report No 5/45, 5 Jan 45)

In the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-SOLOMONS area, it is considered that the enemy air strength is as follows:-

	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVE 28 Dec
NEW BRITAIN NEW IRELAND SOLOMONS	12					8	2	22	20

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 138)

3. IDENTIFICATIONS

IDENTIFICATION FROM JAPANESE FIELD CAP

On 10 Jan 45 a Japanese field cap was found by a patrol in the TAVERA River area. Interesting features noted include

(i) Triangular cloth patch in front
(ii) Two silver stars on right side
(iii) Luminous disc on rear.

The significance of the markings, stars and patch is assumed to be as follows

(i) Two stars - Rank - 1st Lieutenant
(ii) Characters beneath stars - Name - NAKAHATA
(iii) Triangular patch (ref War Infm Circular 937) - 3rd Regt of Division - 3, 7 or 11 Coy, and possibly 3 Bn.

In this case probably 11 Coy, since 11 Coy 13 Inf Regt is known to be in area.

(iv) Luminous disc - worn by officers and NCOs for night patrols.

The above conclusions are borne out by a captured Jap diary which reported the death in action of 1 Lt NAKAHATA, of 11 or 12 Coy, 13 Inf Regt, in the same vicinity on 26 Dec 44.

6. EQUIPMENT

Attached as Appendix 'A' is an article on the "Japanese Yellow Dragon Type Flare."

9. GENERAL

TREATISE ON DIRTY CLOTHES

Captured on SAIPAN was a document giving the findings and conclusions by one Commander HAYASHI, of the Japanese Naval Medical Corps, on the subject of sailors' soiled linen. The Commander spent a year with the Japanese Fleet making his researches and studies on this subject. Sample findings and conclusions:-

"In the case of drawers, the seat gets dirtiest, followed by the knees and thighs in that order."

"Considering the seasonal effect, it appears that shorts and drawers get dirtiest in the summer and autumn, in that order. Socks, however, get dirtiest in the summer and spring."

"Throughout the four seasons the shirts of cooks, firemen and general duty personnel show a remarkably high degree of soiling. This is also true of their socks, which in the case of barbers, radiomen, and nurses show a low degree of soiling."

"...the soiling of socks is particularly great in the case of the soles, which get approximately 1.5 to 1.8 times as dirty as the uppers."

General conclusion reached by the learned commander:-

"The progress of soiling is generally proportionate to the passage of time and is cumulative in affect."

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 138)

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix 'C' is topographical information and amendments to place names on BOUGAINVILLE Island.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

LUZON

Attached for interest and as a guide in following the PHILIPPINES campaign is a map of LUZON,- Appendix 'B'.

E H Wilson

(E H WILSON) Lt-Col
General Staff

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APPENDIX "A" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY NO 8

JAPANESE PARACHUTE FLARE YELLOW DRAGON TYPE

1. GENERAL

(a) The Japanese "Yellow Dragon" Flare is used in conjunction with the Type 89 Grenade Discharger or the 10 Year Type Flare Discharger. It is contained in a plain metal cylinder approximately 50 mm in diameter and 160 mm long. The lid of the container has two square depressions on the upper surface. When extracted from the container for use the flare consists of a cardboard cylinder 48 mm in diameter and 157 mm long with a wide yellow band at the top. Attached to the base is a brass container housing the percussion cap and propelling charge. The metal container within the cardboard cylinder contains the flare mixture, which, with the parachute, is expelled from the flare housing by the expelling charge, which also ignites the flare. The flare drifts on the parachute, emitting a bright yellow light and yellow smoke.

(b) A sectional drawing of the flare is attached.

2. COMPONENTS AND FILLINGS

The total weight of the flare is 296 gms. The propelling charge is an ordinary black powder containing approximately 75% potassium nitrate and 25% of a mixture of charcoal and sulphur. The delay fuse consists of a cotton cord impregnated with asphalt and black powder.

The flare composition is of the "Bengal Fire" type and is of the following composition:-

Arsenic Disulphide	43.1%
Sulphur (by difference)	23.1%
Potassium Nitrate	33.3%
Other Inorganic material	0.1%
Moisture	0.4%
	100.0%

3. TRANSLATION OF MARKINGS


A translation of the Japanese markings on the side of the flare gives the following information:-


Long distance Daylight flare Yellow Dragon
Colour of smoke - Yellow
Colour of flare - Bitter Orange
Signalling distance - 8,000 metres

(Adapted from LHQ Technical Intelligence Summary No 2)

JAP FLARE

YELLOW DRAGON





GUZON ISLAND

SCALE 1" = 32 MLS (Approx).

0014671

APPENDIX "C" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 8

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Refmaps: BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND 1 Inch to 1 Mile Series
" " 1 : 25,000 Series
" " 4 Miles to 1 Inch Series
" " XIV Corps 1 : 20,000 Series

TRACK INFORMATION

PURIATA RIVER 1 Inch to 1 Mile

Track from MOSIGETTA mapref 883474 to KONANA 818513 to BARARA 854482 to KIA RAE 868482 is reported jeepable.

Track from 800598 to 884576 (MOSIGETTA area) well worn but in excellent condition.

Track from SAVELE 956653 along north branch TAVERA RIVER to SISIRUAI 880634 to 832640 to RAURARO 604598 to MOSIGETTA reported jeepable.

MOTUPENA POINT & PURIATA RIVER 1 Inch to 1 Mile

Track MAWARAKA to MOSIGETTA to 885539 is reported jeepable.

VITO 1 Inch to 1 Mile

Road PAURA-TORIANA-ATAMO does not exist.

Road MAINUKI-ATAMO should be 2600 yards east of position shown on map.

KOWARO 1 : 25,000

Track from 674110 to 672113 - 3 ft track, very steep with steps.

Track 672113 to 672115 - steep and winding, heavy jungle, visibility 10 yards.

Track 678130 to 666134 - well defined.

Track 666134 to 665135 - follows razorback.

Track BAWABA RIDGE to creek 674116 steep with occasional stairs. Creek approximately 20 feet wide, ankle deep, fast flowing.

Track from creek to MARTIN'S KNOLL 673110 - steps full distance.

Track from 682116 along NUMA NUMA TRAIL to 669119 to RADFORD'S KNOLL 672120 very muddy, very hard going.

Track from 679115 to MT DEACON,685109 in good condition.

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND 4 Miles to 1 Inch

North Sheet. Any reference to SAILO ROAD refers to road between SORUM (north tip of BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND) and RURI. (Source AIB).

South Sheet. Track from TARKI to KIETA well used.

RIVER CROSSINGS

PURIATA RIVER 1 Inch to 1 Mile

At mapref 911683 there is a shallow ford. River banks firm and shelving gently.

At 898687 river fordable. One foot deep, 25 yards wide, stony bottom, shelving banks.

AITARA 1 Inch to 1 Mile

HONGORAI RIVER 912338 - mouth 25 yards wide, 2 feet deep. Numerous sand bars; depth at sand bars 12 inches.

At 940367 wire rope across river, anchored to tree each side.

At 928330 river mouth crossable, blocked by sand bars.

HARI RIVER 988304 - log crossing.

OGORATA RIVER 017283 - sand bar blocks river mouth. Above sandbar river widens to 40 feet. Fairly deep.

CAPE MOLTKE 1 Inch to 1 Mile

UKUAKANA RIVER 347152 - crossing 6 feet deep, fast flowing.

ATSINIMA RIVER 462069 - crossing easy at low tide. At high tide river is 6 feet deep and fast flowing.

TSINAMUTU RIVER 300172 - impassable at mouth at high tide. Easy fording 200 yards upstream; 3 feet deep and 60 yards wide.

KUREBA RIVER 416110 - 4 feet deep, slow flowing.

At 362132 creek (not shown on map) 10 yards wide, fast flowing, 5 feet 6 inches deep at high tide.

TAURI RIVER 317162 100 yards wide, 4 feet deep, slow flowing.

LARUMA RIVER 1 : 20,000

LARUMA RIVER fordable to all MT at 12372209 and 12922237. Gravel and rock bottom, approaches good.

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND NORTH 4 Miles to 1 Inch

TORE RIVER (N)L 2625 30 yards wide, moderate current, knee deep swamps.

KAVIKI RIVER (N)L 2533 25 feet wide, 4 feet deep. Banks 3 feet high, slow flowing.

KIAKARA RIVER (N)L 2534 30 to 40 yards wide, 5 feet deep. KIAKARA RIVER has two mouths, south as shown on map, and at a point 700 yards north.

KAVIKI and KIAKARA RIVERS are most easily crossed at their mouths. Track passes through swampy country.

BRIDGE INFORMATION

KIETA 1 Inch to 1 Mile

Bridge at 313876 not serviceable for wheeled traffic.

Bridges at 297896, 294902, 283918 are intact.

Bridge at 273919 completely out but crossing is considered fordable.

Jetty at 268923 disused and unattended.

Jetty at 263930 approach end destroyed, remainder of jetty serviceable.

PLACE NAMES

Insert	Sheet	Mapref
MORONI	KIETA 1:63,360	103827
RUMBA	" "	160884
UKUAKANA RIVER	CAPE MOLTKE 1:63,360	347152
DAVIS HILL	KOWARO 1:25,000	676148
MARTIN'S KNOLL	" "	673110
KEENAN'S RIDGE	" "	606148
PIATERAPAIA	" "	672109

Delete	Sheet	Mapref
MORONI	KIETA 1:63,360	133828
PURUTAPAIA	KOWARO 1:25,000	672109

Patrol found it impossible to give map reference for KAVIKI village as all huts in general area are called KAVIKI by natives.

HOUSE KIAPE (refmap CAPE MOLTKE 1 Inch to 1 Mile) 422110 on water's edge and not as shown on map.

GENERAL INFORMATION

SIPAAI MISSION area (BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND NORTH 4 Miles to 1 Inch (N)L 2636) - Drinking water not plentiful, but wells would maintain a good water supply. Area well cultivated - gardens, coconuts, paw paws and other fruits.

RIVERS & CREEKS

All rivers on N/I coast are mountain streams, liable to sudden flooding. They are useless as a means of communication.

Crossings are best made at river mouths, which range from 10 to 30 yards wide and are made fordable by sand bars at their entrance.

KAVIKI RIVER (N)L 2533 and KIAKARA RIVER (N)L 2534 area - Good drinking water is plentiful. Possible barge anchorage in south branch KIAKARA RIVER; 15 yards wide, 4 feet deep.

Good water obtainable ATSINIMA BAY (CAPE MOLTKE 1 Inch to 1 Mile 456074) and at river mouth 355144.


AIRFIELDS & DROPPING SITES

The country embraced by plantations along NE coast is flat, well drained, and affords potential airfield sites.

The coastal flats are open in places and afford many suitable dropping areas.

A small landing ground, now overgrown, is situated at IBU (N)L 6724. It is approximately 250 yards and can not be extended. It is not suitable for AUSTER aircraft.

Emergency landing ground could be constructed 1000 yards south of KAVIKI RIVER (N)L 2534.



ADDITIONAL TRACK & VILLAGE INFORMATION

Ref Maps: KIETA 1 inch
Mt TAROKA "

Information from air photos.

SECRET

GSI

2 AUST CCRPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 9

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Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 14 Jan 45 to 2400 hrs 21 Jan 45

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SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

First organised resistance to our northward drive along the coast was encountered between PUTO and the GENGA RIVER, with a small force disposed as a flankguard along the main inland trail. The enemy force was identified as 10 Coy 81 Inf Regt.

In a series of sharp engagements over five days the enemy was driven further northwards with costly losses, including six guns and ammunition.

Native information points to another stand by the Japs between the GENGA RIVER and SORAKEN PLANTATION, possibly supported by artillery fire from TAIOF ISLAND.

Further evidence of loosening Japanese control of the north is supplied by native claims that they have killed over 50 more Japs, and the abandonment by the enemy of the prisoner of war camp at TENINBAUBAU involving the brutal massacre of Indian prisoners who were too sick to be of any further use to their captors.

SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

The pattern of enemy contacts and movements in the JABA, TAVERA and MAWARAKA areas in the past week reveals an accelerating covered withdrawal towards the MOSIGETTA area. This withdrawal took place in spite of the efforts of the 13 Inf Regt commander to spur his troops, by means of stirring martial orders, to "battle of annihilation"against the advancing Australians.

Phraseology of some of the commander's captured orders suggests that he was trying to bolster slumped morale among his men, and that there was some degree of disorganisation among the units in his command.

Other pointers to a possible slump in morale were the surrender of four deserters at the JABA RIVER, and the panic stricken flight from an Australian patrol of a party of 10 Japs retreating SE from MOTUPENA POINT. They abandoned their weapons and equipment and fled without any attempt to fight back.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

There are now no Indian PW left in the TENINBAUBAU compound. The last to be released was a party of 11, recovered by natives scouts on 14 Jan. From AIB sources it is learned that 37 were moved by the Japanese to PORTON, 18 to unknown destinations and 23 were shot.

These 23 and one other,who were either too sick to walk or too enfeebled to work, were lined up with hands tied, and addressed by a Jap officer for 10 minubes. The enemy officer commanding the compound ordered a corporal machine gunner to open fire. As the firing started the only survivor of the party ran for the jungle and was not hit by the machine gunner or the many Jap soldiers who opened fire on him. The survivor was found and brought in by our scouts. Thirty enemy riflemen were brought from HQ at TASUI to assist in the execution.

The recovered Indians revealed that following the recent bombing of TASUI, the enemy HQ was moved from there to TON.

Confirmation was obtained from TEOP natives of previous reports that the wireless installation and gun positions there had been damaged beyond repair by Allied air strikes. The natives state that at the time of their departure, there were 40 enemy at the old trading station about two miles south of TEOP ISLAND. This post appears to be a resting camp for those making the journey from BUKA to NUMA NUMA. The enemy are said to be suffering badly from malnutrition and sickness, are without boots and poorly clothed.

Evidence of the use of wheeled vehicles has now been received from the north-west of BUKA, where, on 13 Jan, wheel marks were seen on the LONTIS - LEMANMANU track.

NORTH-WEST BOUGAINVILLE

The Australian advance north along the coast encountered its first serious opposition north of PUTO, and indications are that the enemy is preparing to offer stiffer resistance in the area between the GENGA RIVER and SOPAKEN PLTN. The enemy made first use of artillery in the area, on 18 Jan.

On 16 Jan, RUKUSSIA was occupied without any enemy sightings, and patrols penetrating north wounded two of five Japs contacted a mile north of PUTO. An inland patrol to PORNAI Village (four miles east of RUKUSSIA) found that the enemy had withdrawn several days previously.

On afternoon 17 Jan, our forward troops,found the enemy in pillboxes, armed with a possible JUKI, two miles north of PUTO. In the ensuing attack two enemy were killed, and 20 rifles and personal gear were captured in huts in the area. At 1720 hrs, the enemy re-opened fire, and our forces dug in for the night.

The following morning, enemy artillery from the TSIMBA area fired 49 rounds of unstated calibre at our dug-in troops. Fourteen of the shells were duds, One other shell fell into the sea shortly after a flash was seen at TAIOF ISLAND.

The enemy gave further ground during the afternoon, and our troops, following closely, killed two more. The enemy dead were in good physical condition and well clothed. One patrol on the right flank captured documents and medical equipment, and counted 13 graves in the area,

On 19 Jan, two mountain guns, one in good order, were captured by our troops and one Jap killed a mile south of TSIMBA. A forward patrol reported another possible mountain gun in the same area. An unstated number of enemy with 1 LMG and 1 SMG were located on a ridge running east from TSIMBA on 20 Jan. One was wounded in the exchange of shots.

An enemy position manned by 12/20 men was located by native scouts on the south bank of an unnamed stream south of GENGA RIVER. On 20 Jan, our forces outflanked this position, and the enemy withdrew, leaving one 37 mm Tk A gun. Further inland, a patrol to LALUM encountered 20/30 Japs with 3 LMGs at KUNAMATORO, approx 1 mile south of KUNAPOPO. Our troops engaged, killing 10 and probably another four,

On 21 Jan, a regimental gun in good condition, but without the sight and breech block, and 12 cases of ammunition were captured in the vicinity of TSIMBA. The same day, two more guns were captured, but no information as to calibre or place of capture is yet available.

According to native reports, several parties of Japs and armed natives, some with LMGs, are in the area from the GENGA RIVER north to SORAKEN, where there is one unidentified gun at the jetty. Two MMGs were reported on 14 Jan at TSIMBA, and one gun, reputedly an AA weapon, approx a mile to the south. This gun, with 20 men was moved from BUKA to its present position about 2 Jan. It is probable that the "AA gun" is identical with one of the artillery pieces already captured in this area.

In the SELAU area, the enemy is reported to be gathering between TARLENA and SOROM.

An unstated number of Japs have moved from BUKA to TAIOF ISLAND and occupied coastal positions.

PEARL RIDGE

There has been little change in the relative positions of own and enemy troops during the week, though many patrols have penetrated well beyond our forward dispositions to the north, NW and NE.

On 15 Jan, a patrol reached Base Point 3 and hut area, killed three Japs and wounded one. Patrols returning on 16 Jan reported the enemy astride the track leading east from OLD VIVIE approx 1500 yards east and in another position 200 yards further north. Other small groups were sighted north and west of Base Point 3. No contacts were made, and heavy undergrowth prevented our troops making an estimate of strength. Returning from operations north of Base Point 3 on 17 Jan, patrols killed three enemy at the WAKUNAI RIVER north of OLD VIVIE, and saw 10 enemy in newly dug positions on the NUMA NUMA trail 2½ miles east of OLD VIVIE. An enemy party of estimated platoon strength was located 1000 yards SE of SISIVIE.

On 19 Jan, AIGAU natives reported that the enemy had moved a mountain gun along the NUMA NUMA trail and were assembling it on the trail approx a mile to the east from OLD VIVIE. Three officers and 30 men with 1 LMG were guarding and manhandling the gun.

Harassing artillery and mortar fire has been laid down on SMITH'S HILL. The only enemy response was a burst of HMG fire on 16 Jan. Screams heard during a barrage on the 15th indicated that some of the enemy had at least been wounded. A recce patrol found a suitable OP on 18 Jan and directed arty fire on huts and positions in the Base Point 3 area.

Several enemy shots were fired and grenades thrown into our perimeter areas on ARTY HILL and PEARL RIDGE during night 20 Jan.

North of the WAKUNAI RIVER, large concentrations of Japs are reported at BURITSIOTORARA. They are well fed and are occupying the homes of the village Kanakas.

A large number, each carrying two rifles but apparently without MGs, came from IBU direction on 17 Jan. Natives had previously reported that the enemy were living with the IBU natives in houses dispersed around the gardens.

The area ASIPEPIA-KARIAURIA-PIPIPAIA (approx six miles west of NUMA NUMA) appears to be a rest area for enemy forces engaging our troops and there is considerable movement between those villages and IBU. There appears to be no lack of small arms ammunition, as the enemy fire many shots at random to frighten away the local natives, with whom they will tolerate no contact.

EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY

JABA RIVER

Active patrolling has continued south and SE of the JABA RIVER mouth. Some patrols east along the north bank of the JABA went 3000 yards past the junction with thr PAGANA, and 2½ miles inland along the NIGITAN track south of the JABA. Others have been maintained to the LOG CROSSING, and southward for a distance of 2100 yards from JABA 2. In a week's intensive patrolling, four contacts only were made.

On 18 Jan, a patrol encountered an estimated 20/25 Japs with three LMGs and rifles south of the PAGANA RIVER, 3 miles inland. Artillery fire was accurately brought down on the position, and one enemy was killed. Next day the enemy was again encountered in this position. An attack was launched immediately and the position captured. Seven enemy were killed, and another found dead, apparently due to malnutrition. One LMG, rifles, a sword and documents were among the captured equipment.

On 20 Jan, a fighting patrol fired on five enemy near the NIGITAN trail, three miles inland, killing one and wounding another.

Four Japanese surrendered to our troops 1000 yards NW of the junction of the JABA and PAGANA RIVERS on 21 Jan.

TUJU RIVER

A patrol to our ambush position 2000 yards inland on 18 Jan made no enemy sightings.

TAVERA RIVER

Light contacts only have been made by patrols in this sector. A two-day patrol to SISIRUAI, endeavouring to bypass Jap track at BOTTLENECK (1700 yards east of SISIRUAI) on 15 Jan, wounded one of two enemy encountered on the way, but was unable to penetrate more than a few yards through the swamps to the east.

Another two day patrol departed on 17 Jan to report on enemy movement at SISIRUAI, and found approx one Coy (70-90 men) with three defence areas each of one platoon. A later patrol on 21 Jan found that the enemy had vacated the village.

A patrol out during the night 15/16 Jan killed four enemy on the TAVERA RIVER two miles inland and returned to base the following day.

Patrols along the south bank of the TAVERA RIVER reached the crossing of the SISURUAI-MOSIGETTA track without contact.

ADELE RIVER

A water patrol up the ADELE RIVER passed through heavy swamp and found that movement further than approx 4/500 yards upstream was impossible.

No movement was seen at the log crossing 1000 yards inland on 18 Jan.

HUPAISAPANI RIVER

After no enemy movement had been seen for the previous two days at pillboxes in area between the HUPAISAPANI RIVER and MAWARAKA-MAKATOWA Road approx 1000 yards inland, a fighting patrol crossed the HUPAISAPANI RIVER at first light on morning 16 Jan to investigate the area and report on the road.

Two pillbox areas were occupied without opposition, five enemy being killed during the move from the first to the second pillbox.

A Jap officer who had been dead apparently for two days was found in the second pillbox area. An important document was taken from his body.

Our troops moved in and set up perimeters at these newly occupied positions approx 600 yards north of MAWARAKA. Enemy artillery fired 10 shells during the afternoon, and a further nine during the evening and early morning.

On 17 Jan, a patrol from one perimeter located and attacked two pillboxes 100 yards east of their position, killing three enemy. The patrol continued and cleared three more pillboxes, all of which showed evidence of recent use.

A road 10 ft wide, showing no signs of recent use by MT, was located and followed SE to the coast. Two hundred yards on the far side of the road, a vacated artillery battery position, with 6 inch and 3 inch (probably 150 mm and 75 mm) shellcases was found.

MAWARAKA

Continuing the move south, a patrol reached MAWARAKA on 17 Jan. Several empty pillboxes were found and no movement was seen.

On 18 Jan, a fighting patrol to the PALLISADE area (south of HUPAISAPANI RIVER 100 yards inland between river and road) reached the enemy pillbox area, cut their way through three belts of wire to a depth of eight feet and launched a surprise attack. Two pillboxes were immediately occupied, and after cutting through more wire, a further four were captured. Seven Japs were killed in the action, and many documents and much equipment captured.

In a search of the MAWARAKA defences later, much equipment, including a dismantled 75 mm gun, was found.

The area was completely cleared of the enemy and occupied by our troops by 19 Jan.

A patrol moving east to MAKATOWA discovered the commencement of an extensive pillbox area in the area 1000 yards south of MAKATOWA. A patrol base was established in the MAKATOWA area on 20 Jan, from which patrols, with artillery support began attacks on the remaining enemy strong points in the area.

Three pillboxes with 4 LMGs were discovered 300 yards east of our perimeter on 21 Jan and 35 to 50 enemy were sighted by various patrols in the area during the day.

MAMAREGU - MOTUPENA

After MAWARAKA had been cleared a patrol on 19 Jan crossed the MAMAREGU RIVER and found many old disused pillboxes in the coastal area between the river and MAWARAKA. Gardens near MAMAREGU contained young plants and the huts were newly renovated, but no enemy were seen. During the evening, shells from heavy calibre enemy guns landed in the sea just south of MAWARAKA.

MOTUPENA POINT was found to be deserted on 20 Jan when a patrol landed by barge at MAMAREGU LAGOON. There were signs of recent occupation, but the only Japs found were 10, who were surprised three miles SE of MOTUPENA POINT, apparently making for PURIATA RIVER. They dropped all their weapons and fled.

KIETA

Further instances of native hostility have been reported. Natives in the AROPA RIVER valley have claimed 24 Japanese killed during the last week but state that only four rifles were captured.

About 50 enemy from the KAINO district who were attacked by natives while raiding gardens on 18 Jan returned carrying four who had been wounded by arrows.

The enemy has again returned to the SIPURU area and natives reported 20 enemy on a ridge above MAINAUKI (2½ miles NW of SIPURU).

According to natives, many naval troops left the mainland after the Allied recovery of Chinese refugees, and are now with natives on the north coast of PUK PUK ISLAND.

CHOISEUL

Scouts reported on 16 Jan that the enemy had evacuated NUKIKI and are now at KUKUPU, where they are cultivating three large gardens between there and BARIMBARA. The enemy strength is approx 120, armed with rifles only.

By 18 Jan, there were no Japanese camped north of POROPORO. The fuel dump on the SUI RIVER has now also been removed.

Enemy casualties on BOUGAINVILLE to 21 Jan:-

Killed	10388
PW	119
Wounded	93

From unconfirmed sources:

Killed	323

NEW BRITAIN

The area from PULAPULA (2 miles SE of BAIA) to the mouth of the PANDI RIVER is reported clear of the enemy. Australian forces are now concentrated at SAMPUN, LAMPUN, and NANTAMBU.

On the south coast, a daily patrol to MILIM is now operating.

NEW GUINEA

BROKEN WATER BAY

An estimated 30/40 Japs, armed with LMGs and HMGs fired on the barges evacuating our troops from BOSMAN on 13 Jan. Our forces returned the fire, and an estimated six enemy were killed.

On 17 Jan, an Allied patrol was fired on in the MARANGIS area, and on 19 Jan, an estimated 30 Japs attacked our perimeter at MARANGIS. Three enemy were killed and six wounded.

YAMBES

On 13 Jan, our troops engaged 30/40 Japs at BENGUL. One Jap was killed and our forces reported the village clear of the enemy. ARISILI, PELNAPGA and NUNKUANIME were subsequently reported clear, though there are still 40/50 Japs in the PEREMBIL area, and an unknown number in PUNAITE.

On 15 Jan, 80/100 enemy withdrew from MAMARINGA after an accurate air strike, and the position was occupied by our troops. AROA was captured on 17 Jan, 14 enemy dead being found in the village as a result of air strikes the previous two days. Natives reported that an enemy party of 40 left AROA for BOMBISBIA and WARELI on 16 Jan and on the same date a Jap party of unstated strength left SUWAITE Village and moved east, crossing the NANU RIVER.

WALUM

In an attack on enemy positions approx 6 miles SW of WALUM 36 Japs were killed.

Natives reported the enemy in strength at BALIF on 16 Jan. It is known that a large party of Japs recently arrived there from WOMSAK.

DANMAP RIVER

Following the capture of CAPE DJERUAN, Australian forces continuing to patrol east along the coast reached and entered ABAU (2 miles east of CAPE DJERUAN) on 13 Jan. Patrols operating east and south on 15 and 16 Jan made no contact, but on 18 Jan, a larger force moving east was engaged by the enemy in the ABAU area. Thirteen Japs were killed. Natives claim to have killed 60 Japs in the SINANU area.

(b) SEA - ENEMY

Between 13 and 16 Jan, Naval reports indicate tentative plottings of two possible submarines, one 12 miles due south of CAPE DAMPIER and the other 33 miles SSE of CAPE ST GEORGE.

On 19 Jan however, one enemy submarine was definitely sighted in OPEN BAY (North coast NEW BRITAIN).

Submarine activity has again been reported in Eastern Australian waters. On 13 Jan an Allied vessel made contact with and attacked a submarine approximately 55 miles SE of NEWCASTLE.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 139)

(c) AIR - CVN

BOUGAINVILLE

Direct support for ground operations was called on only two occasions during the period under review. On 16 Jan, 20 Corsairs led in by Tac/R aircraft accurately bombed hut concentrations in the MOSIGETTA area at 875982 and 891585. On 17 Jan 14 Corsairs successfully bombed suspected bivouac and gun areas at MAKATOWA. A feature of these strikes was the result obtained by the use of 325 lb depth charges in preference to normal bombs, the additional blast effect razing huts and flattening considerable areas of vegetation.

At 1700 hrs on 19 Jan, 12 Corsairs struck the enemy occupied village of BURITSIOTORARO 667246 and a good coverage of the target was obtained. It was learnt subsequently that a very large number of Japs arrived at the village from IBU on 17 Jan.

Enemy positions on TAIOF ISLAND were the target for 12 Corsairs on 19 Jan. The majority of bombs fell in the target area resulting in one pillbox left smouldering and hits being scored on jetty approaches and considerable damage to the jetty by near misses. A "T" shaped object in the centre of the island received a direct hit.

In addition to those reported above, huts came in for special attention during the week. On 17 Jan eight Corsairs dropped all bombs on a concentration at KORIU, while a repeat of 12 Corsairs was made on 20 Jan with the result that no serviceable huts now remain in the area. Further huts were destroyed at KIETA on 16 and 21 Jan, TOKUAKA and NW BUKA on 18 Jan, RAKURURI on 19 and 21 Jan, CAPE HATSIA (BUKA) on 19 Jan, MORGUSIRI on 20 Jan, NUMA NUMA, TAKI and BANIU on 21 Jan.

IKEDA's PLANTATION, a suspected enemy HQ at TASUI and barge hideouts at the SUI RIVER mouth were bombed with unobserved results.

On 21 Jan eight Corsairs, Tac/R led, dropped 16 x 500 lb bombs on an enemy camp area at 103981 in the KIETA area. Tac/R reported target well covered.

NEW BRITAIN

Plane parks at SULPHUR CREEK and TOBOI were the main targets hit during the week. SULPHUR CREEK, north of LAKUNAI strip, was visited by 30 Mitchells and seven Venturas which dropped 37 tons of high explosive including 140 325 lb depth charges. Hits were observed. Corsairs from PIVA and GREEN ISLAND co-operated in a successful joint attack on TOBOI, the majority of bombs falling inside the target area.

Heavy and medium bombers from MADZAB scored hits on the airstrips at TOBERA, LAKUNAI and VUNAKANAU and areas on the west coast of WIDE BAY, where large fires were started.

Daily Corsair patrols scored five direct hits on a barge hideout in KERAVIA BAY and fired a 50 ft cutter and seven MT.

NEW IRELAND

The airstrip at KAVIENG came in for special attention during the period 17 - 20 Jan Mitchells and Corsairs scoring many hits on runway and dispersal areas.

Stores and personnel areas at KAUT BAY were heavily hit by Mitchells on 14 and 15 Jun. BORPOP (twice), BOM, FANGELAWA, PANARAS, LOSSUK, PINIKUNDU and PANEMANSU were visited by patrols, 12 huts being destroyed at PANARAS.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

ENEMY STRENGTHS - BISMARCKS

The following changes in estimates of enemy strength have been made due to attrition and reassessment:-

NEW BRITAIN	32,000
NEW IRELAND	7,000

(Adapted from First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 139)

PUTO AREA

Documents captured south of TSIMBA have identified 10 Coy 81 Inf Regt in contact with our troops. An organisation chart dated 1 Dec shows 10 Coy as 68 strong, while on 8 Dec according to a diary its strength was 39, the remainder presumably being sick or detached. On 19 Dec a 70 mm Bn Gun and a 75 mm Regtl Gun were brought forward to the TSIMBA area. On 14 Jan 10 Coy received approximately 30 reinforcements, among whom were included 2/Lt OKADO (of 11 Coy) and 24 men. The capture by our troops of two 75 mm guns, one 37 mm gun and some 47 mm AP ammunition suggests that there are elements of 81 Inf Regt Gun and Tk A Coys in the area, possibly transferred from TAIOF ISLAND where a platoon of each was believed located in Oct 44.

Reported contact with naval personnel was confirmed by the identification of elements of 37 Guard Force. These personnel were apparently maintaining a lookout south of PUTO. The present strength of naval units between TSIMBA and SORAKEN is unknown, although a 17 Army Op Order of Mar 44 disposed a naval force of company strength on the west coast of BOUGAINVILLE from AMUN north.

EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY

The movements of the Japanese force in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area since our crossing of the JAEA RIVER on 18 Dec and its present estimated disposition and strength are given in Appendix "B".

6. EQUIPMENT

NEW IMPROVED TYPE ("KISKA") GRENADE

Among enemy equipment found on BOANG ISLAND (TANGA Is Group) approximately 50 miles east of NAMATANAI) were two "KISKA" type hand grenades. This grenade was first encountered on KISKA and later in NEW GUINEA after the fall of LAE, but as far as is known has not as yet been met in this area.

It has a smooth, non-segmented body with a flash guard to protect the thrower from burns. There is no arming screw as in the Type 91 and 97 Grenades.

To throw the KISKA grenade, withdraw the safety pin and strike the head of the fuse cover sharply on a hard object, thus ingniting the fuse. The fuse delay is four to five seconds.

An illustration of this grenade can be found in the Japanese Equipment Booklet issued by GS(Int) Adv LHQ, May 44.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix "A" are corrections to place names and additional topographical information on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.

E H Wilson

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff

Distribution as for Summary No 8

APPENDIX "A" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELL
SUMMARY No 9

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Refmaps: BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND 1" to 1 Mile Series.
" " 1 : 25,000 Series.
MOTUPENA Point-PURIATA River Track Map, 1" to 1 Mile.

PLACE NAMES

Insert	Sheet	Mapref	Remarks
KURUR	TAIOF Island 1"	214479	New location on chart.
PORNGIO River	"	222486	
SEREKUSSI	"	238461	
TSIMBA	"	224563	
SIPAAI Mission	KONUA 1"	260356	
TONGONAU	VITO 1"	894918	
KAREKOPA	"	846913	
WANNEGAN	"	903853	
WANNEGAN Gardens	"	sq 8984	
SISIKA No 2	"	872849	
BABORI River	"	845836	Branch to NE.
WALIWALINA River	"	829857	Branch to east.
BOYLAN'S Track	MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R Track Map	793735 to 789727	
MOXLEY'S Ambush	" "	788714	
PEELER POST	" "	789671	Log crossing.
GREGORY Terrace	" "	778664 to 770633	
RUTHERFORD Point	" "	770633	
DOUGLAS Crossing	" "	799656	
MOSIWANA	" "	840640	Occupied by natives of MOSINA-SISIRUAI area.
NAMA River	" "	754590	(MAMAREGU River).
PALLISADE	" "	771615	
MODIONU	" "	778793	
JABA No 2	" "	775739	
MUPEKA	" "	782692	
MUPESI	" "	780677	
TAVERA	" "	777666	
MOTUPENA	" "	708593	
MAMAREGU	" "	750682	
WARAPA	" "	863672	
NAIRONA	" "	963608	
RUMIKI	" "	966512	
KINDO	" "	023480	

Insert	Sheet		Mapref	Remarks
HORINU	MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R Track Map		949538	
HIRU HIRU	"	"	910474	
TOKINOTU	"	"	895480	
KIA RAE	"	"	866512	
RARARA	"	"	848509	
MARINGA	"	"	843541	
SMITH'S HILL	KOWARO	1:25,000	680134 to 680140	
ASABA River	"	"	680100	Shown on map as LARUMA River.
PEARL Ridge	"	"	648144 to 693125	
SIGITUARLU	"	"	689134	
WUWUWAPAIA	"	"	694129	
KARIKARIPAIA	"	"	684142	
MAPIA	"	"	715168	Native report.
TOKORERAPAIA	"	"	724165	" "

TRACK INFORMATION

Refmap MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R Track Map

A partly surveyed Jap road, now unused except by KEMPEI (Military Police) runs from MOSIWANA ref 840640 across the HUPAI River and the MAWARAKA-MOSIGETTA road and reaches MARINGA, vicinity 840540.

Track from ref 800659 to 813656 - waist deep swamp along track. From village at 832652 to village and clearing at 839654 going is good on high ground.

From 771641 to 780634 there are no tracks and terrain is soft and muddy, with knee deep swamps.

TUJU River area - there are no foot crossings across the TUJU River from its mouth to 793687, where river is reported to be 80 yards wide and very deep.

Refmaps KONUA, TAIOF IS, AITA 1" to 1 Mile

SARIME River area - tracks running to east from 233405 and 217479 could be made jeepable by clearing secondary growth.

18" gauge tramlines run alongside tracks from 233405 and 214480.

Track from SIPAAI ref 260356 to TOLA Pt crosses three spurs - gradient of 1 in 1 makes going heavy. From TOLA to SARIME River easy going.

Refmap KIETA 1" to 1 Mile

A well defined track runs from jetty ref 165955, along eastern side of creek to 160960, between features to 155963, round base of hill to ROROVANA No 2, ref 148976.

RIVER CROSSINGS

Refmap KONUA 1" to 1 Mile

SARIME River - patrol crossed river at 248414, where river is 30 yards wide, 3 to 4 feet deep and rapid flowing, and at 238427, where it is 50 yards wide, 4 feet deep and current is slow.

The mouth of SARIME River is reported to be 50 yards wide and 15 feet deep.

Refmap MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R Track Map

There is a rope bridge at 823727 and a log crossing at 790726.

Refmap AITARA 1" to 1 Mile


Road bridges exist at 986386, 976396 and 973398; all are approximately 25 feet long, 10 feet wide and in good condition.

GENERAL Ref Map MOTUPENA POINT-PURIATA RIVER Track Map

Unconfirmed native reports state that the area between main MAWARAKA-MOSIGETTA road and the MAMAREGU River is subject to annual flooding. Time of flooding is estimated to be during March and possibly February and April.


The area between MAMAREGU River and MAMAREGU is said to be fairly dry at all times.

A reconnaissance of the reef off MAWARAKA was made by floating OP on 18 Jan. Reef begins approximately 500 yards off MAWARAKA Point and extends for a distance of 3 miles, following the bay in a semi-circle. Depth of water varies from 3 to 20 feet.



ADDITIONAL TRACK INFORMATION

Refmap: KOMARO 1: 25,000




ADDITIONAL TRACK INFORMATION:

Refmap: KOWARO 1:25,000

TRACK & TERRAIN INFORMATION


Refmap: LOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R
Track Map 1" to 1 Mile




Track PAGANA River to HONGORAI River

(compiled from Tac R reports)

Refmap: MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R Track Map
1" to 1 Mile.





Continuation of Track PAGANA R to
HONGORAI R

Refmap: MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R Track Map
1" to 1 Mile.

APPENDIX "B" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 9

ENEMY OOB - EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY

A series of 13 Inf Regt Operation Orders has been captured recently in the JABA - MAWARAKA area. From these orders and other captured documents it has been possible to interpret in the main the enemy movements in this area since Nov 44.

The EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area is under control of the West Sector Garrison Unit, a regimental group under the command of Col MUDA, CO 13 Inf Regt. The general allocation of units to areas on 15 Nov 44 was as follows:-

KEREKOPA

5 Coy and Pl 8 Coy 13 Inf Regt

JABA

Main strength 2 Bn 13 Inf Regt
Part 3 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt

MAWARAKA

HQ and 2 Bty 1 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt
Med Arty Pl
Mortar Pl
Naval Det

PURIATA

3 Bn 13 Inf Regt (less 10 Coy and 3 Bn Gun Pl)
1 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt

MOSIGETTA

13 Inf Regt HQ, 3 and 10 Coys, Regtl Tps,
2 and 3 Bn Gun Pls
1 and 2 Coys 6 Tpt Regt
1 Fd Hosp 6 Div

"RABE" (east of MOSIGETTA)

Part 1 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt
Mortar Pl

About this time MAWARAKA Garrison Unit had a posted strength of 165, of whom 97 were detached, hospitalized, sick, gardening or on duty over 8 miles away, leaving only 68 available for duty or immediate defence. Sick and hospitalized personnel represented 18% of those unavailable for duty. The weapons held at MAWARAKA were:-

1	150 mm Howitzer	2	HMG
3	75 mm Mtn Guns	1	LMG
1	75 mm Regtl Gun	44	Rifles
2	Mortars		

The ammunition holdings for these weapons was low. One 75 mm gun has since been captured.

Defensive positions and morale, which had deteriorated through the passage of time and condition of life, were being rebuilt by the renovation of pillboxes and the recital, twice daily, of the Imperial Rescript and Jubilation. Self sufficiency was lagging, half of the division acreage objective of 495 sq yds per man had not been attained. The physical condition of the troops was poor and not capable of withstanding arduous work. Issue rations amounted to 200 grams per man per day, with up to 100 grams extra for those constructing positions.

The situation of the other garrisons is not reported, but according to PW is similar.

Enemy reaction to our crossing of the JABA RIVER on 18 Dec was slow, but by 22 Dec 2 Bn 13 Inf Regt with 10 Coy under command was ordered to attack and annihilate.

Four days later reinforcements (3 Bn Gun Pl, Regtl Tk A and Mortar Coys) were sent forward to help 2 Bn attack MUPESI. Col MUDA proceeded to MORENO (near MENDAI).

On 1 Jan Col MUDA reorganised his forces and decided to attack JABA again using 2 Bn (plus 10 Coy) to occupy LOG BRIDGE and 3 Bn (less 10 Coy) which had moved up earlier from PURIATA, to attack from the junction of JABA and PAGANA RIVERS along the main track running along the JABA. The Regtl Tk A Coy was to move on MUPESI. When everything was ready Col MUDA himself would move forward to the JABA - PAGANA RIVER junction.

When 2 Bn on 4 Jan "was discovered by the enemy and forced to retire" near LOG BRIDGE, the Bn was relieved of its rear security and ordered to capture LOG BRIDGE, while 3 Bn, assisted by 3 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt, undertook the defence of the main track along the JABA RIVER and counter-infiltration.

2 Bn was reinforced the following day by 3 Bn (10 Coy returned) and a two battalion attack was scheduled for 7 Jan on the east and west sides of LOG BRIDGE, the battalion boundary being the unnamed river east of LOG BRIDGE.


When our forces reached the HUPAI RIVER on 11 Jan it began to dawn on Col MUDA that his appreciation that the Australians intended to drive towards MOSINA was incorrect. So, on 12 Jan he switched the main strength of 3 Bn and the Regtl Mortar Coy. to MAWARAKA where he had only artillery and mortar units. The MAWARAKA Garrison was ordered to hold out to the utmost until 3 Bn arrived "to annihilate the enemy."

By 17 Jan 3 Bn had not arrived and our troops occupied MAWARAKA against little opposition. On the same day, Col MUDA now at "HOZAN" (believed to be in the vicinity of MOSIGETTA) decided to bring 3 Bn Gun Pl from the JABA area to rejoin 3 Bn outside MAWARAKA and ordered 3 Bn to annihilate our forces at the outskirts of MAWARAKA. 3 Bn HQ was at "FURUFURU" (RUARURO?) on 17 Jan.

The only contact of any consequence since then was on 21 Jan, when three enemy occupied pillboxes and scattered groups were engaged approximately 600 yards east of MAMATOWA. Sporadic fighting went on during the day, but the enemy's efforts could hardly be termed an attempt to annihilate our forces.

The estimated enemy dispositions and strengths in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area as at 21 Jan 45 are shown on the attached Sketch Map.

No mention has been made in any 13 Inf Regt Operation Orders captured to date of units arriving in this area from the SHORTLANDS, as suggested in a captured letter (refer 2 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 8). For this reason, no additional strength is being carried.


ESTIMATED ENEMY DOS
21 Jun 43
5 Coy, Pl 6 Coy, Pl 2 MG Coy, Det 2 Bn Gun Pl 15 Inf Regt
2 Bn 13 Regt (less 5 Coy, Pl C, Pl 'E' Coys, Gun Pl)
B MG Coy 13 Regt ?
Mtr A Coy 13 Regt
3 Bty 5 Fd Arty (Bulk)
Det Sigs 13 Regt
3 Bn 13 Regt (less MG Coy?)
1 Bn 5 Fd Arty (HQ & 3 Bty)
Med Arty Pl
Mtr Coy 13 Regt
Det Sigs 13 Regt
Det Navy
Part 1 Bn 5 Fd Arty
13 Regt
3 Coy 13 Regt
2 Bn Gun Pl 13 Regt
Gun Coy 13 Regt
Sigs 13 Regt (less dets)
1 & 2 Coy 5 Tpt Regt
1 Fd Hosp
Det 6 Div Sigs
Det MP Unit
1 Bty 5 Fd Arty
KOPA
PAGANA
RIVER
MOSINA
MEMDAI
MORENO
SISIRUAI
MARADOWA
RUARURO
MAWARAKA
MOTUPENA PT
MBIVO
MOSIGETTA
PURIATA
TOKINOTO
TOTAL
1300
SCALE: 1 inch to 1 mile
30
270
390
490
40
50
60
70
80
90

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2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 10

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Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 21 Jan 45 to 2400 hrs 28 Jan 45

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PART III

Topographical

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"A" JAPANESE CERAMIC "BASEBALL" GRENADE

"B" CORRECTIONS TO PLACE NAMES AND ADDITIONS TO TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Now that reinforcement of the NUMA NUMA area from North BOUGAINVILLE appears to be almost complete, there are signs that the enemy may be contemplating an attack to wrest back the PEARL RIDGE feature recently captured by Australians.

Natives have reported that of the three trails leading to SISIVIE and PEARL RIDGE from the coast at NUMA NUMA, the WAKUNAI RIVER and ASITAVA, the two first named are in heavy use. There is no information respecting the ASITAVA trail, but concentrations of troops north of ASITAVA reported from various sources in the past two months makes it likely that trail is also used by the enemy.

In addition to the mountain gun which Japs man-handled up the NUMA NUMA trail, and carefully guarded against our raiding patrols, supplies of SAA and hand grenades carried from KIETA and North BOUGAINVILLE have been assembled at points convenient to all three trails.

Our patrols during the week noticed much enemy activity near base points 1 and 2.

During the week Japanese issued orders to all natives within their controlled area to assemble north of the NUMA NUMA trail near NUMA NUMA PLANTATION on 28 Jan, and used force on those natives who were not willing to comply with the order.

It is concluded the enemy concentrated these natives to form a labour pool and carrying line for an operation in the near future.

Possibly as another preliminary, the Japs sent out a large force of Japs and armed natives on 28 Jan to hunt down an AIB patrol which had established observation over the trails used by Japs to the SISIVIE - PEARL RIDGE area. The principal objective of the enemy may have been to deny us information of their movements, because for months past they have not bothered to molest this and other AIB patrols though they were well aware of their locations and activities.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

NORTH EAST BOUGAINVILLE

Information received from this area indicates a growing deterioration of the enemy's relations with the natives. On 22 Jan, stores were waiting near TEOP BAY for transport to NUMA NUMA, but natives, as a result of FELO warnings, refused to carry for the enemy.

Reports from our deep patrols indicate that Japanese movement from the north of BOUGAINVILLE continues, one party camping at TEIHUP on night 21/22 Jan. Natives from the TINPUTS area carry ammunition through TEIHUP, where they are relieved by the local beach natives. The Japanese however are extremely nervous of strange natives and are shooting them on sight.

The enemy is now mustering all available Kanakas in the NUMA NUMA area, using force where necessary.

GENGA RIVER

A stubborn pocket of enemy, estimated to be 20/30 strong, entrenched on a ridge approx 300 yards south of the GENGA RIVER and 200 yards inland, is delaying our northward advance. The enemy are armed with rifles, grenades, one HMG and one or two LMGs. Total enemy forces in the GENGA - SORAKEN area are estimated at approx 100.

On 23 Jan, Australian mountain artillery fire was directed on the ridge. The Japanese replied the following morning by shelling of our forward troops. During 24 Jan, an enemy party in the same area attempted to encircle an Australian patrol, but was repulsed with two killed. Our artillery was again used on the same target during the morning.

On 25 Jan, an Australian force moved around the right flank and set up a perimeter to the NE between the ridge and the river. A patrol from our perimeter then moved SW toward the enemy position to a point within 50 yards of it, and killed four Japs.

Enemy artillery fired nine rounds, three of which were duds, into our forward positions on 27 Jan without causing any casualties.

While the enemy were contained in their position near the coast, another patrol made a wider outflanking movement and, on 25 Jan, crossed the GENGA RIVER without opposition, near the bend approx 1000 yards from the mouth. A perimeter was established on the north bank and patrolling commenced. Within an hour an enemy party of 10 was encountered, three of whom were killed and one wounded. The remainder jumped into the river and were not seen again.

During night 27/28 Jan, the enemy attacked our perimeter but was repulsed without loss to our forces. The following day, enemy parties were active in probing our forward areas both from the north and east.

Patrol reports now place KUNAMATORO approx 1¾ miles east of the mouth of the GENGA RIVER. According to a native report, 105 Japs from TARLENA - RATSUA area arrived at this locality on 21 Jan. Artillery pieces were alleged to have been carried by natives, and all strange natives were shot on sight. A patrol sent to investigate returned on 27 Jan and reported the enemy in possession of four LMGs, rifles and grenade dischargers in the area approx two miles east of TSIMBA - approx 1500 yards south of KUNAMATORO.

PEARL RIDGE

Widespread patrolling by our troops was the main feature in this area.

On 21 Jan, an NGIB patrol operating NW from PEARL RIDGE ambushed an enemy party of six 1500 yards south of SISIVIE and killed them all. Three more Japs from another small party which opened fire on the right flank were also killed.

A patrol north to TOKOPENAPAIA returned on 22 Jan after reaching a point 1000 yards west of the village. No Japanese were encountered.

Enemy sightings and contacts reveal much enemy activity on the NUMA NUMA trail leading east from OLD VIVIE towards the plotted position of Base Point 2. A patrol returning on 24 Jan reported considerable enemy movement in the area 1400 yards east of Base Point 1. Possible enemy ambush positions were seen near the track approx 100/200 yards east of OLD VIVIE, and across the track in the vicinity of NEW VIVIE. One of our patrols encountered 20/30 Japanese, of whom four were killed, near the trail five miles east of OLD VIVIE. A further 30/40 enemy were observed on 26 Jan approx a mile NE of OLD VIVIE.

Harassing fire was laid down by our artillery on SMITH's HILL, SISIVIE and Base Point 3 areas.

JABA RIVER

Small parties of Japanese only have been offering resistance to our eastward patrols south of the PAGANA RIVER. During night 23/24 Jan, enemy parties were active around an Australian position established on the NIGITAN track, 3½ miles inland, and 1000 yards south of this position, eight enemy were sighted on 25 Jan. On the same day, a party of 20 was encountered digging in approx 1000 yards to the east. One enemy was killed and artillery fire was later laid down on this position. Other small enemy parties were dispersed from this same location on 27 and 28 Jan.

An enemy ambush on the NIGITAN track, with an estimated strength of seven, was located 4½ miles inland on 26 Jan. Contact was lost after a brief action, but next day a force moved forward and secured the position.

An enemy ammunition dump, containing 90 waterlogged 75 mm shells, was discovered in an old post near the NIGITAN trail approx two miles inland.

Investigation has found nothing to substantiate earlier reports that armed natives had opposed our troops in this sector. It is considered that only by compulsion are the natives rendering any assistance to the Japanese.

TADOLIMA - SOVELE

In the furthest penetration eastward to date in this area the TADOLIMA - SOVELE area (11 miles inland and 6 miles east of NIGITAN) was occupied without opposition by our troops on 26 Jan.

A patrol which returned from the area approx 2½ miles south of SOVELE on 28 Jan reported a clash with at least 26 enemy who were living in large gardens in the area. Eleven Japs were killed and approx 11 wounded. The enemy were well clad, well equipped, and in good condition. Large quantities of stores were found in a house in the area, and equipment and documents were captured. Useful items were salvaged and the remainder destroyed.

TAVERA

Activity in this area was confined to contacts with small harassing parties. A small enemy ambush on a track north of the river, 2½ miles inland, was dispersed by mortar fire on 23 Jan, and two further enemy parties of unstated strength were encountered in the same area on 25 and 26 Jan.

A patrol to SISURAI reached the main road approx half a mile from the village, where flood waters prevented further progress. Much evidence was found of enemy movement south but no enemy were encountered during the three days the patrol was out.

ADELE RIVER

During evening 27 Jan, 14 shells from an estimated 150 mm gun fell into the sea off the mouth of the ADELE RIVER. There was no damage or casualties.

MAWARAKA

Clearing of the MAWARAKA - MAKATOWA area has continued but a number of Japanese still remain, setting ambushes and generally harassing our operations. The enemy again used artillery fire on two occasions, the first being on the night of 22 Jan, when the area immediately south of MAWARAKA was engaged by an estimated two 75 mm guns and one 150 mm gun. Most of the shells fell into the sea.

On night 26 Jan, the enemy, using at least two LMGs, took the offensive and launched an unsuccessful attack on an Australian company position approx 700 yards north of MAKATOWA. Thirty to forty shells, believed to be from one heavy and two light guns, were later fired into the MAWARAKA area, but no damage or casualties resulted.

After clearing the enemy from positions 300 yards north of MAKATOWA on 27 Jan our troops moved forward but came under fire from an estimated 12 enemy. The patrol withdrew and artillery engaged the enemy position with unreported results.

On 28 Jan, an Australian force moving east to the clearing north of MAKATOWA contacted and engaged an enemy group, armed with LMGs, entrenched approx 400 yards north of MAKATOWA. Enemy resistance was stubborn, and our troops were last reported dug in with the enemy still in the area.

South of the MAWARAKA - MAKATOWA road, a patrol on 21 Jan engaged an enemy ambush of 14 Japs and two LMGs approx a mile down the track south of MAKATOWA, and killed five before returning to base.

Two enemy deserters surrendered to our troops in the area approx 600 yards north of MAKATOWA on 28 Jan.

MOTUPENA POINT - PURIATA RIVER

No further enemy encounters have been made in this sector since the sighting of 10 Japs three miles SE of MOTUPENA POINT on 21 Jan. It was later found that this group had abandoned heavy wireless equipment and batteries.

On 27 Jan a patrol moved SE along the coast to within 3½ miles of the mouth of the PURIATA RIVER without contact.

Much track activity continues to be observed on the beach from MOILA POINT to MOTUPENA POINT and natives report there are enemy concentrations near the coast villages at KAUKAUAI, TOKUAKA, KAKURUAI, LAKURUAI, MAMAGATA, RAKURURI and AITARA.

KIETA

Natives continue to harass the Japanese, and more reports of enemy casualties at the hands of the natives have been received. All natives in the LULUAI VALLEY are engaged in disposing of the remnants of the force of approx 100 which came from BUIN on 3 Jan in an unsuccessful attempt to relieve the still besieged enemy troops at ISINA. The full total of enemy dead is not yet known, but at least five more, including two officers, have been killed.

Natives in the AROPA VALLEY claim four more Japs killed by rifle fire, and on 23 Jan another 14 enemy from KAINO were killed, of whom nine were killed with grenades, four by rifle fire, and one by an arrow. The six enemy who escaped left their dead, but retrieved the arms.

Our scouts report that 10 Japs arrived at TOBOREI during the week via the coastal track from BUIN.

Thirty enemy, with some natives, are working new gardens at MORONI.

CHOISEUL ISLAND

The Japanese have abandoned their POROPORO camp site and divided into two groups, one of which is camped near the coast in the vicinity of DOA DOA (unlocated) and the other on the south bank of LAVELE RIVER (immediately south of POROPORO) where they have some gardens and are preparing more.

Canoes move daily between the mainland of CHOISEUL and SIPASAI ISLAND to PARAMA ISLAND. Two barges are hidden beneath mangroves on the NE coast of this island, and it is suspected that a fuel dump has been established there also.

Enemy casualties on BOUGAINVILLE:

	To 28 Jan	22 Nov-28 Jan
Killed	10452	562
PW	121	20
Wounded	x	112
From unconfirmed sources: Killed	x	343

(x) No figures available prior to 22 Nov

NEW BRITAIN

Australian troops on the north coast have continued the advance to the east. NGIB patrols are now moving from NANTAMBU to BAIA and MEVELO PLANTATION.

On the south coast, our forces are established at MATPA RIVER and are now moving north to KIEP. Our scouts in this area report no enemy activity south of the MELKONG RIVER.

NEW IRELAND

A native patrol on UNGAN ISLAND (between NEW IRELAND and NEW HANOVER) clashed with an enemy party on 23 Jan. The patrol killed two Japanese and withdrew without loss.

No enemy were found on BANGATANG, LEMUS and WADEI ISLANDS.

NEW GUINEA

BROKEN WATER BAY

On 20 Jan our forces reoccupied BOSMAN and killed 22 out of 24 Japanese encountered during the operation.

Following an air strike on 23 Jan, our troops occupied a track junction in the WANGAN area. One wounded Jap was captured, but otherwise no enemy movement was seen.

Patrolling has been continued in the MARANGIS area, but apart from one Jap seen near the perimeter on 24 Jan, no sightings were made.

YAMBES

A number of enemy sightings and contacts have been made, but there is little change in the general situation. On 21 Jan, patrols reported BULAMITA clear of the enemy, and AMULI occupied by an unknown number of Japs. On 25 Jan, our troops attacked and occupied AMULI, the enemy withdrawing with unknown casualties. BUNAHOI is reported to be occupied by an estimated 90 Japanese. Fourteen of a party of 60 enemy were killed while withdrawing to BALAGA on 23 Jan. According to a native report, ARONGA is occupied by 24 Japs who are periodically relieved from BALIF

DANMAP RIVER

Little change has taken place during the week. Our base at ABAU has been strengthened, and patrols are now operating east of that point. One enemy position approx two miles east was occupied on 22 Jan, and further clashes have been reported from this area. A patrol base has been established approx one mile east of MALIN, and active patrolling continued along the MIMAI and AHINA CREEKS. ABOAMA approx seven miles south of ABAU, was entered without opposition on 18 Jan.

(b) SEA - ENEMY

Two instances of enemy barge traffic have been reported during the week.

On morning 24 Jan, our troops heard sounds of a possible barge in the vicinity of the GENGA RIVER, and the following morning a barge was heard near the mouth.

On 27 Jan, a camouflaged enemy barge was observed by our forward patrols to leave the entrance to the lagoon, three miles NW of the mouth of the PURIATA RIVER, and move SE. The barge was estimated to be about 20 feet long, motor powered, and camouflaged with two whole sac sac palms placed upright.

Our scouts on 23 Jan reported two barges hidden under the mangroves on NE tip of PARAMA ISLAND (CHOISEUL).

A native police boy who formerly worked for the Japs stated on 27 Jan that he saw a submarine unload cargo at BUIN about one month ago.

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

Strikes during the week were mainly against personnel areas and concentrations of huts.

At the request of forward troops MOSIGETTA was attacked on 24 and 26 Jan; results being obscured by smoke.

Two successful strikes were made on PUK PUK ISLAND and good coverage of the target areas was obtained. Successful strikes were also made at SORAKEN PLANTATION, MAROVA, KOROMIRA MISSION, KALIA (FAURO ISLAND) and PARAMA ISLAND (NW CHOISEUL). In the latter attack a suspected fuel dump and barge hideout were bombed and a large explosion with black smoke resulted. Scouts later reported that there had been no sign of movement on the island since the strike.

Corasir patrols and Tac/R aircraft bombed and strafed opportunity targets resulting in several minor successes against barges and personnel.

NEW IRELAND

The heaviest strike during the week was made by 18 Mitchells on PINIKINDU POINT area when a good coverage of the target was obtained.

Personnel areas at NAMATANAI were attacked on three occasions and hits were scored on huts at PANAPAI, LEBRECHTSHOF, MONGAI, LAUAN BAY, LAMUSSONG, CAPE SIAR, KOKA PLANTATION and LAMERNEWEI.

NEW BRITAIN

The plane parks at SULPHUR CREEK were again the main target hit this week. Eight Mitchells bombed the area on 23 Jan and seven Venturas and 33 Mitchells on 25 Jan. The target was well covered.

VUNAKANAU was bombed on 21, 23 and 26 Jan, direct hits being scored on the taxiway, revetments and dump areas. Hutted areas near TOBERA Airfield were attacked on 28 Jan with unobserved results. Ammunition and fuel dumps were bombed at REMBARR RANGE and personnel areas at KABANGA, CAPE GAZELLE, KANAE RIVER, GILALUN PLANTATION and KURUDUI PLANTATION.

RABAUL patrols accounted for one truck destroyed, three set on fire and one damaged. Minor damage was caused to enemy installations.

NEW GUINEA

Beauforts made daily bombings on Jap occupied villages in advance of our ground forces.

Ten Liberators attacked WEWAK area while 17 Bostons concentrated on MOEM POINT and KAIRURA ISLAND.

PHILIPPINES

Heavy bombing and strafing of airfields and Jap Ls of C on LUZON was maintained. Up to 16 Jan cumulative damage caused by air attacks on LUZON totalled 79 locomotives (50% of pre-war total), 469 rail cars (25 %), 486 MT, 67 staff cars and 18 tanks.

FORMOSA

On 17 Jan 78 Superfortresses dropped a heavy load of bombs on SHINCHIKU Airfield, destroying all hangars and most of the workshops.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

ENEMY STRENGTHS - BOUGAINVILLE

The following is a revision of the estimate of maximum enemy strengths by areas. Casualties and attrition for Jan 45 have been deducted.

BUKA	300	Combat: 100 Base : 200
NORTH BOUGAINVILLE (incl TAIOF Is)	1100	Combat: 720 Base : 380 Approx 40C believed en route NUMA NUMA
NUMA NUMA	1000	Combat: 570 Base : 430
Forward of NUMA NUMA	550	Combat: 550
KIETA	1650	Combat: 1450 Base : 200
BUIN Area (SILBAI River - TORAU Bay)	5100	Combat: 830 Base : 4270
TAITAI Area (HONGORAI - OMAI Rivers)	1900	Combat: 1650 Base : 250 Some troops carried at BUIN are possibly located in TAITAI area
EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY	1300	Combat: 1000 Base : 300
SHORTLAND ISLAND	1800	Combat: 950 Base : 850
FAURO ISLAND	280	Combat: 280
BALLALE ISLAND	400	Base : 400
OVAU ISLAND	120	Combat: 40 Base : 80
TOTAL	15,500	Combat: 8060 Base : 7440
EFFECTIVES (at 60%)	9300	

In evaluating the fighting strength of the total 15,500, the following factors should be borne in mind:-

(a) Approximately 20 per cent are ineffective due to hospitalization or sickness in lines;

(b) Between 30 - 40 per cent are believed incapable of arduous duties, and the large percentage of the remainder physically fit for heavy tasks for short periods only;

(c) An estimated 10 per cent are permanently required for garden, salt and starch details, and detached for duty outside the unit;

(d) Morale is generally low, although the spirit to fight to death still exists;

(e) After three to four weeks of fighting sustained on native foods, physical exhaustion among Japs lowers their fighting efficiency very materially.

Maximum effectives therefore probably do not exceed 60 per cent of any force, and effectives include HQ personnel, service troops, specialists and medical personnel, further reducing the proportion of effectives available for front line duty.

NW BOUGAINVILLE

Following is a summary of recent enemy activity in NW BOUGAINVILLE revealed by documents captured in the TSIMBA area.

The defence of the NW coast of BOUGAINVILLE and the islands to the west in Oct/Nov 44 was vested in the West Area Garrison Unit (CO Maj YAMADORI), composed mainly of 3 Bn and Regtl Troops of 81 Inf Regt. This Garrison Unit was further divided into the "SUN" (Area GENGA - PUTO - KONUA), TARLENA and TAIOF Garrison Units.

Early in Oct 44, approximately 50 men of 11 Coy 81 Inf Regt left TAIOF ISLAND for NUMA NUMA. On 8 Dec, the main strengths of 3 Bn, Tk A and Regtl Gun Coys were also ordered to NUMA NUMA although it was not until just after 17 Dec that the move was under way.

After the departure of 3 Bn, the command of the SUN Garrison Unit devolved on Capt KAWAKAMI (OC 10 Coy), and 2/Lt OKADO (Pl Comd 11 Coy) took over the TAIOF ISLAND Garrison Unit. There is evidence to suggest that the Regtl Tk A and Gun Coys did not take their full complement of artillery to NUMA NUMA. It is possible that personnel only made the journey.

In Dec "LOWER SAPORI ISLAND" (presumably SAPOSA ISLAND as shown on the one inch series) was evacuated and the Tk A Sec occupying it was sent to GENGA.

It appears that between Nov and Dec the main force of the TAIOF ISLAND Garrison Unit was transferred to the mainland. Later, on 14 Jan, 2/Lt OKADO and 24 men apparently arrived in the TSIMBA area, and it has been reported by natives that on 16 Jan a number of Japanese arrived at TAIOF from BUKA.

On 29 Dec the probable dispositions of the SUN Garrison Unit were:-

10 Coy	GENGA RIVER	20	
	SUN RIVER (222551)	10	
	PUTO	10	
3 Bn HQ(elements)	KUNAPOPO	19	
3 MG Coy	?	9	
3 Bn Gun Pl (part)	SUN RIVER	15	
Tk A Coy (part)	SUN RIVER	15	
Gun Coy (part)	SUN RIVER	5	(estimated)
Bty 38 -IMB Arty Bn(part)	?	25	(estimated)
Naval Det	SOUTH OF PUTO	10	(estimated)
		138	

Reinforcements received 14 Jan:-

Pl 11 Coy	25
	163
Casualties (including wounded) reported 29 Dec - 28 Jan	73
Estimate of present strength GENGA RIVER Area	90

One document, undated but of recent origin, has set out the number of weapons held in this area. Deduction of those captured to date and those estimated to have been transferred from the area would leave the enemy with the following maximum number of weapons in the GENGA RIVER Area:-

2	75 mm guns
3	70 mm Bn guns
3	37/47 mm Tk A guns
5	JUKI HMGs
6	Grenade Dischargers
9	LMGs

Excluded from the above total are two Type 94 37 mm guns and one MG returned to the Fd Ord Depot at PORTON on 8 Jan.

This garrison has possibly received reinforcements by barge, and by land. A patrol reported Japanese 1200 yards south of KUNAMATORO with 4 LMGs and a grenade discharger, but these may have been part of the SUN Garrison Unit.

ENEMY STRENGTH NE SECTOR SWPA

NEW GUINEA - EAST OF AITAPE	20,500
NEW BRITAIN	32,000
NEW IRELAND	7,000
SOLOMONS	15,500
TOTAL	75,000

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND-BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the following areas is prepared on information to 16 Jan 45:-

AREAS	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES 9 Jan	4 Jan
Ø PHILIPPINES										
MINDANAO	6		4	2		7		19	55	75
VISAYAS	5	3				8	3	19	36	47
LUZON	51	9	22	9		23	5	119	291	532
	62	12	26	11		38	8	157	382	654
AMBON-CERAM-BOERUE						3		3	9	9
CELEBES		3		3	2	6	4	18	24	75
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK	2	2		2		9		15	37	43
BORNEO	17		8	3		8	3	39	54	119
FORMOSA-RYUKYU	102	23	90	112	14	68	18	427	348	343
TOTALS	183	40	124	131	16	132	33	659	854	1243

Ø Estimates do not include combat types assigned to operational training units.

In the NEW BRITAIN - NEW IRELAND - SOLOMONS area, it is considered that the enemy air strength is as follows:

	F	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES 9 Jan	4 Jan
NEW BRITAIN NEW IRELAND SOLOMONS	15	8	2	25	22	22

The re-assessment of the fighter strength is the result of continued indications of air activity in the area.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 140)

6. EQUIPMENT


JAPANESE CERAMIC "BASEBALL" GRENADE

Attached as Appendix "A" are details and sketches of this grenade.

DANGERS OF TAMPERING WITH ENEMY EQUIPMENT

Reports have been received of serious injuries to Australian troops on BOUGAINVILLE resulting from tampering with captured enemy equipment by inexperienced personnel.

In this particular case the injuries were caused by 70 mm Barrage Mortar Shells. The shell itself is a tin cylinder approximately 12 inches long and three inches in diameter and contains a number of small silk and paper parachutes attached to small cannisters. Inside each of these cannisters is an inoffensive looking, black, steel shrapnel tube (three inches long and $\frac{3}{4}$ inch in diameter) with a cord and paper parachute attached. The tube has a red band at its top. It contains a powerful explosive and can be detonated by a tug of the cord attached to it.



SHRAPNEL TUBE

The Japanese characters read:
"Danger. Do not touch"

Among a number of Type 88 Instantaneous Fuzes received at this HQ recently several showed the marks made by pliers in an attempt to examine the fuze. The detonator in these and other fuzes is fulminate of mercury and careless tampering with them could cause serious injury.

Japanese hand grenades cannot always be relied upon to function in the normal manner. The fuze delay has been found to be erratic. A number of grenades recovered in NEW GUINEA had been left lying about in an area occupied by our troops. On examination it was found that the delay train had been intentionally removed so that had the fuze cover been struck, the detonation would have been instantaneous.

There are many other pieces of enemy equipment which can be extremely dangerous in inexperienced hands.

The maxim is not to be curious to see how the thing works. Leave any examination to the expert and handle enemy explosives with care and respect.

(The substance of the above is to be republished in Formation and Unit Intelligence Summaries)

9. GENERAL

MORALE

The crack in morale of the 13 Inf Regt, a the proud 6 Div, is widening. This Division, before NEW GEORGIA, had a record of an unbroken series of victories. Since NEW GEORGIA it has suffered an unbroken series of defeats. To instances of cracking morale noted in last week's summary were added others in the past week.

Two Arty Sergeants from MAKATOWA deserted and surrendered, saying they were tired of the war and living on a starvation diet. They were in very poor physical condition and probably characteristic of most of the remnants of 13 Inf Regt. They said many others would surrender if they saw an opportunity. Some were in hiding waiting the arrival of our troops. Despite written instructions on three separate occasions to several front line units to attack the Australians, no counter attack has been launched.

A letter captured on 19 Jan, written the previous day by Capt EGAWA of 13 Inf Regt to his Regimental Commander, reflects the gloom and depression of its author, and indicates that the enemy in the MAWARAKA area are fully aware of the hopelessness of their position. Significant extracts are:-

"The Bn Commander and men and I have made a final determination. You can only die once. Death is a matter of grave importance. For the entire battalion to die is a calamity...The spirit of officers and men of the Regt are low, and the expected results will not eventuate. I regret that the efforts weren't enough. When you consider the actual condition of each company, it is a thing to be expected...Tomorrow, officers and men, to my regret, believing the light of victory is dim....(but) fortified with special rations of potatoes and other foods...are going into battle...Officers and men of the Regt have weakened but resigned themselves that it is destiny. Tomorrow, 3 Bn will attack at a fixed time, and will advance until annihilation. After annihilation the honour of the regiment will be revealed."

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix "B" are corrections to place names and additions to topographical information on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.

E H Wilson

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff

Appendix "A"
~~to First Aust Army Weekly~~
~~Intelligence Summary No 140~~
~~of 25 Jan 45.~~

JAPANESE CERAMIC "BASEBALL" GRENADE

A new Japanese hand grenade has been recovered from the ORMOC area, LEYTE. From the translation of an accompanying document it is learned that the Japanese have given it the temporary name of Type 4 (1944) hand grenade; however, for purpose of identification we can appropriately call it a "Baseball" grenade.

This hand grenade is spherical shaped, slightly larger in diameter than a regulation baseball. Its spherical shape is interrupted by a short neck which houses the fuze. Covering the grenade body, which is either glazed pottery or white porcelain, is a close fitting thin rubber cover provided for safe handling. A separate nipple shaped rubber cover serves as a waterproof protection for the fuze and a retainer for a small circular wooden plate which has an abrasive match box striking composition on one side.

The fuze construction dates back to the first principles of hand grenade manufacture. It is composed of a detonating cap, slow burning powder train and has a match head igniter at the top. The entire fuze unit is fitted in a rubber casing cemented in the neck opening. The match head igniter protrudes slightly above the top of the neck.


To use this grenade, first remove the rubber nipple and the abrasive striking block. Light the fuze by scratching the abrasive plate across the matchr head surface. Toss the grenade at the objective as soon as it has ignited.

The grenade will explode approximately 5 seconds after the match head has been ignited. Effective bursting radius is small. The captured document reveals it as being 4 meters. There being no metal in the grenade, resulting fragmentation of the ceramic body has little effect. The burst has a sharp report and a cloud of white smoke marks the location of the explosion.

Sketches of the grenade are attached.

APPENDIX 'A' TO FIRST AUST ARMY INT SUMMARY No 140 OF 26 JAN., 1945 -

Japanese CERAMIC BASEBALL GRENADE



APPENDIX "B" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 10.

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Refmaps: BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND 1" to 1 Mile Series
" " MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R
Track Map

PLACE NAMES

Insert	Sheet	Mapref	Remarks
KUNAMATORO	TAIOF Is 1"	250573	
LALUM	"	255586	
KURUR	"	224490	
PUTO	"	225535	
RUKUSSIA	"	230519	
KURUR R Mouth	"	227502	
TENINBAUBAU	BANIU 1"	367667	Alternative spelling for TANIMBAUBAU.

Delete	Sheet	Mapref	Remarks
KURUR	TAIOF Is 1"	214479	Refer Intelligence Summary No 9.
PUTO	"	228527	
RUKUSSIA	"	225493	

TRACK INFORMATION

Refmap BANIU 1" to 1 Mile

Track from jetty 285678 to RATSUA 298681 well defined and well worn.

From ref 290635 track skirts east edge of swamp area into SORAKEN Plantation at 272613. Footpad continues across NAGAM River at 263618 and links with coastal track at 245627.

From 272613 track proceeds to 272595, then curves SW to LALUM 255586.

(Track and references are from Tac R and are to be regarded only as approximate).

Refmap MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R Track Map

Track observed from 803568 running for about 1000 yards in direction of MAWARAKA. Country flat but appeared quite dry. (Tac R).

Track from 910492 to 934502 in good condition; well worn footpad in centre.

RIVER CROSSINGS

Refmap BANIU 1" to 1 Mile

All streams in TENINBAUBAU-BANIU area were bridged by Japs, but all these bridges are now in a bad state of disrepair.

Refmap AITARA 1" to 1 Mile

056359 - A low level bridge 40 feet x 18 feet of log construction now exists. Appears serviceable for MT.

008382 - A log bridge 50 feet x 12 feet now exists. Appears serviceable for MT.

985386 - Bridge in process of reconstruction.

Refmap MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R Track Map

896618 - Shallow ford 20 feet wide; stony bottom, gently sloping banks. Track appears jeepable, average width 10 feet.

831605 - Single log bridge with handrail.

Refmap KARA 1" to 1 Mile

240289 - Possible ford of stones and logs.

245299 - River approximately 20 yards wide; ford constructed of stones. Road corduroyed on east approach.

288297 - Ford approximately 60 yards long and 18 yards wide.

Refmap KIETA 1" to 1 Mile

314876 - Bridge damaged.

All bridges from 283917 to 313874 are new and appear capable of taking light wheeled traffic.

These bridges are at refs 300884, 295885, 296895, 294902 and 274918.

RIVERS & CREEKS

Refmap TAIOF Is 1" to 1 Mile

Correct position of stream shown on map from 221551 to 227548 is 100 yards to north.

Refmap KARA 1"to 1 Mile

LAGUAI 262287 - River 8 to 10 yards wide runs SW past east side of village.

Refmaps KARA, AITARA 1" to 1 Mile

MIBO River 105227 - Possibly navigable for small craft to a point 200 yards upstream. River banks are 3 feet high. No natural cover from mouth to this point.

ROBIKAI River 144222 - Water stagnant. Flows west behind beach and joins creek estuary at 122225.

938372 - River approximately 100 feet wide and shallow.

HARI River 995329 - River 15 feet wide, dammed by bank of logs. Average width from mouth to dam is 10 to 15 yards. Sandbar at mouth just awash. River not considered navigable in any part.

OGARATA River mouth 018282 - Mouth obstructed by sand bars and log lying across bar. Water appears stagnant. Not considered navigable.

SILIBAI River 203208 - Mouth approximately 25 feet wide, fairly shallow, rapid flowing, sandbar 12 to 18 inches under water. Average width of river from mouth to ford at 245299 is 35 to 45 feet.

Refmap BANIU 1" to 1 Mile

LAVELE River is shown on map but not named. It is the first river south of PORA PORA.

GENERAL INFORMATION

Refmap Ht TAROKA 1" to 1 Mile

Position of WIDA on map approximately correct. (Source AIB).

Refmaps TAIOF Is, KONUA, BANIU 1" to 1 Mile

Jetty at 156655 (TANWOA Is) - approaches damaged.

Jetties at 236661 and 234664 are unserviceable, only the piles remaining.

MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R Track Map

At 847595 there is a large concentration of huts just off main track which runs slightly to the north of this position.

At 858593 there is a concentration of at least 6 huts.

Refmap AITARA 1" to 1 Mile

987302 to 020280 - No reef observed for one mile offshore; deep water close in to shore.

Beach is of greyish sand 10 to 15 yards wide with a gentle slope. 250 yards behind beach there is a belt of swamp 70 yards wide.

Refmap TEOP 1" to 1 Mile

No buildings seen at KAKURING 636617 and IKEDA's Store 634623.

Refmap INUS 1" to 1 Mile

695308 PIPIPAIA - Majority of huts have collapsed. Huts at TUTUPAIA 648297 are unserviceable.

633290 TUIOPIRI - Village has been moved to 645286. It consists of 8 to 10 native type huts.

Refmap KIETA 1" to 1 Mile

WAGOROMODO Reef 284974 - The reef is covered with water. There is a white cylindrical object, approximately $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet in diameter and 5 feet high, with four dark objects around its base in the form of a square. It appears to be a marker of some description.

SECRET

ENEMY MOVEMENT BY SEA - SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE

1 Since 9 Jan there has been considerable evidence of personnel and/or stores having landed along the south coast of BOUGAINVILLE between PURIATA River and MOILA Point. Full details of all air sightings in this regard are shown on attached Appendices "A" and "B".

2 In substansiation of the foregoing, a document captured on 11 Jan and thought to have been written by an officer of 13 Inf Regt, states inter alia

" I do not know the present situation and plans of our Army. Even though there has been many requests made on the infantry situation, there has been no reports. I do not understand the enemy's plan. The entire personnel of the company will defend the position to the last man. The second group from SHORTLAND has not yet arrived and we are in difficulty."

3 This is not the first occasion that troops have been moved from the SHORTLANDS and FAUROS to forward areas as 2 Bn South Sea Garrison Unit was transferred to the mainland for the TA operation and subsequently returned to those Islands.

4 Enemy strength on SHORTLAND Island as at 1 Dec was estimated at 2400 and FAURO as 300/400.

5 The first evidence of these landings in the area concerned was reported on 9 Jan when the period of moonless nights commenced, which condition will continue until 20 Jan.

6 As the number of enemy barges are limited and small boats, lakatois etc., could only carry a few personnel, the number of troops transported each night would be small.

CONCLUSIONS

7 The enemy has adequate reserves in SHORTLAND Islands and since night 8/9 Jan has been moving some of these to BOUGAINVILLE to reinforce his front in the JABA River area.

8 The reason for reinforcing from SHORTLANDS instead of from BUIN area may be either that his troops in that area are already committed for defence in case of an Allied landing on the south coast, or that they are essentially required for cultivation of gardens.

9 Troop movement commenced on night 8/9 Jan and owing to the small numbers transported each night, may continue throughout the period of dark nights, i.e. until 20 Jan.

10 The entrance to BUIN Harbour between the mainland and SHORTLAND Island has been mined by the Japs and this passage is thought to be covered by coast defence guns from northern SHORTLANDS and MOILA Point. Therefore, to obtain the greatest protection against Allied light naval craft, his sea route would probably be from SHORTLANDS along the east of minefields to vicinity of MOILA Point, thence very close along shore to point of disembarkation.

GSI/207

ACTION RECOMMENDED

It is recommended that

(a) A Black Cat from GREEN Island patrol the area from MOIIA Point to PUNIATA River nightly till 20 Jan. This patrol to be coordinated with a PT boat patrol.

(b) PT boats from TREASURY Island to stand off shore approx 1000 yards and to be ready to close with barges when Black Cat locates them on RADAR. Black Cat to call PTs in and light target by flares.

(c) The successful prevention of any further reinforcement in this area depends on keeping the patrol by Black Cat and PT boats in this area each night until after 20 Jan.

B. H. Ramsey Maj.
13 Jan

APPENDIX "A"

ENEMY MOVEMENT BY SEA - SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE

The following are reports on signs of enemy activity on beaches between PURIATA River and MOIIA Point since 1 Jan 44:-

ource	Date	Relevant Extract from Report
/R 95	4 Jan	Foot tracks were seen on the beach above HWK between 904350 and 045264. At 952319 numerous tracks leading up beach from water edge into trees.
n Patrol	9 Jan	Considerable number of tracks in sand leading from waters edge to jungle. This was particularly noticeable between MOBIAI River and KUKURUAI. At least six groups of these tracks appeared as though personnel had been landed from boats. Sand was heavily trodden down. There was considerable track activity along beach from MOIIA Point to PURIATA River. Activity not continuous, only in areas.
Patrol	10 Jan	Between MIBO River and MOBIAI River noted skid marks on beach.
Patrol	11 Jan	On the south side of each river mouth between from PURIATA River to MOIIA Point observed signs of boats or barges having been drawn up across beach into scrub. These marks were noticed in approximately six places although in some places it appears as if efforts had been made to conceal them.
n Patrol	12 Jan	Observed between HARI River and MOBIAI River foot and keel marks in places in the sand. Foot marks were prominent at river mouths.
/R 132	12 Jan	Fresh foot tracks visible along beach, thence to river at 884387.
/R 133	12 Jan	Between 985305 and 000350 road easily visible and appeared in excellent condition. Showed signs recent heavy use. (COMMENT. This road was closed to natives in Oct 44 and photos taken 30 Oct, showed it to be continuously used by MT, and a dump area to be located in the general area MAMAGATA - LAKURUAI).

1 : 63,360

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

AITARA

REFER TO THIS MAP AS
N° 0471 AITARA 1 INCH SERIES

Tac/R 132 10 Jan

Fresh foot tracks visible along beach, thence to river at 684307.

Tac/R 95 4 Jan

Foot tracks were seen on the beach above DEN between 004350 and 048254. At 962319 numerous tracks leading up beach from water edge into trees.

Tac/R 12 Jan

Between 983305 and 000350 road easily visible and appeared to be in excellent condition. Showed signs recent heavy use.
COMMENT This road was closed to traffic in Oct 44 and photos taken 30 Oct. showed it to be continuously used by PT, and a sharp cross to be located in the general area HARIGATA – LAKUKAI.

DAF

Dawn Patrol 12 Jan

Observed between HARI River and MOEIAI River foot and bicycle marks in places in the sand. Foot marks were prominent at river mouths.

Dawn Patrol 9 Jan

Considerable number of tracks in sand leading from water's edge to jungle. This was particularly noticeable between MOEIAI River and KUKUNTAI. At least six groups of these tracks appeared as though personnel had been landed from boats. Sand was heavily trodden down. There was considerable track activity along beach from MOIIA Point to PURIATA River. Activity not continuous, only in areas.

Dawn Patrol 10 Jan

Between MIBO River and MORTAY River noted mild marks on beach.

Dawn Patrol 11 Jan

On the south side of each river mouth between from PURIATA River to MOIIA Pt observed signs of boats or barges having been drawn up barges beach into scrub. These marks were noticed in approximately six places although in some places it appears as if efforts had been made to conceal them.

SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN

ANTARARA I
ALUNGOKAKU I
KARUKRAI I
MARIKIKA I
KARUSAI I

1 : 63,360

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

KARA

REFER TO THIS MAP AS
N° 0472 KARA 1 INCH SERIES

SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN

MOIIA PT
WESTERN ENTRANCE
KOMALIUVO I
AILAUNU I
AIKIKE I
SHORTLAND I.

ADV/019/0471

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