AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters, formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/9
CORPS

2 Australian Corps General Staff (Intelligence) (2 Aust Corps GS (Int))

February 1945

1/4/9-0034

Army Form W.3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

5/45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 3/2/1945. 2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Def Corps (Unit)

W.E. III/809/1 OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. — O.R's. — ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E.-EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
1	1		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
1 *	1		6 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		*			*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(3).

* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail		C.M.F.								TOTAL.
	A.I.F.	Under 19 Years.	19 Years and over.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	
A	6						[redacted]	[redacted]		6
B(1)										
B(2)						[redacted]				

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To ___ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. __/__/194__

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Def Corps Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

5/45 Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 3/2/194 5.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Ammunition Examiners			
Armament Artificer Fitter			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)			
Armament Artificer Instrument			
Armament Artificer Radio			
Armament Artificer Signals			
Armament Artificer Wireless			
Artificer, Artillery			
Artificer, Engine			
Blacksmiths			
Bricklayers			
Computers			
Cooks, Hospital			
Coppersmiths			
Dispensers			
Draughtsmen			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)			
Electricians			
Electricians (M.V.)			
Electricians (Signals)			
Fitters			
Fitters (Cycle)			
Fitters (Electrical)			
Fitters (Gun)			
Fitters (Instrument)			
Fitters (M.V.)			
Fitters, Railway Signal			
Fitters, Signals			
Grinder, Precision			
Mechanics, Instrument			
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)			
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)			
Mechanics, Radio			
Mechanics, Typewriter			
Mechanics, Wireless			
Millwrights			
Operators, Excavator			
Pattern Maker			
Pharmacist			
Photographer, Wet Plate			
Photowriter			
Plumber			
Saw Doctors			
Surveyors			
CARRIED FORWARD			

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Surveyors, Engineering			
Surveyors, R.A.A.			
Surveyors, Topographical			
Surveyors, Trigonometrical			
Toolmakers			
Turners			
Watchmakers			
Welders			
GROUP II.			
Armourers			
Axemen			
Bakers			
Bty. Comd'rs. Asst.			
Boilermakers			
Carpenters			
Carpenters and Joiners			
Cooks			
Dental Mechanics			
Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Mcd.)			
Driver-Operator			
Draftsmen			
Electricians			
Electricians (Engineers)			
Fire Control Operators			
Gun Operator			
Hatchman			
Height Taker			
Helio Operator			
Instrument Operator			
Intelligence Duties			
Joiners			
Lineman			
Lineman, Signals			
Lithographers			
Machinists, Metal			
Machinists, Wood			
Masons			
Mariners			
Mechanics, M.T.			
Miners			
Moulders			
Nurses, Trained			
Observation Post Assts.			
CARRIED FORWARD			

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Operating Room Asst.			
Operator, Keyboard			
Operator, Line			
Operator, Signal			
Operator, Switchboard			
Operator, Wireless			
Opticians			
Painters			
Panel Beaters			
Photographer, Dry Plate			
Predicter Numbers			
Printers			
Radiographers			
Riggers			
Sawyers			
Signallers			
Signwriters			
Telescope Identfn. Numbers			
Well Borers			
Wheelers			
Winchman			
Wireman			
Woodturners			
GROUP III.			
Battery Surveyors			
Butchers			
Clerks			
Clerks, Supply			
Clerks, Technical			
Coach Trimmers			
Concreters			
Cooks			
Dental Clerk Orderlies			
Despatch Riders			
Draughtsmen, Signals			
Drivers, H.T.			
Driver Mechanics			
Driver Tptn. Plant			
Engine Hands, I.C.			
Equipment Repairers			
Farriers			
Fitters' Mates			
Gun Layers			
CARRIED FORWARD			

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
G.P.O. Assistants			
Hammermen			
Leather Stitchers			
Orderlies, Nursing			
Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Plate Layers			
Rangetakers			
Riveters			
Roughriders			
Saddlers			
Saddletree makers			
Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Stevedores			
Stokers, Stat. Engine			
Storemen, Technical			
Tailors			
Textile Knitters			
Tinsmiths			
Vulcanizers			
Wagon Erectors			
Whitesmiths			
DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
BATMEN	5	5	—
DVRS MT	2	1	1
ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 3 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	7	6 *	1

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reinfts. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

3-2-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

L.H.Q. Press—411—8/43—312m.

Army Form W.3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943.)
6/45 (Serial No.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 10/2/1945. 2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Int Corps (Unit)

W.E. III/80Q/1 OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. – O.R's. – ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
1	1		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
1 •	1		6 •	Totals of cols. marked • should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		•			•

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

• • Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces. 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail		A.I.F.	C.M.F. Under 19 Years.	C.M.F. 19 Years and over.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	• •	TOTAL.
A		6						[redacted]	[redacted]		6
B(1)											
B(2)							[redacted]				

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To ____ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. __/__/194__

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Int Corps Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)
6/45 Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 10/2/1946.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Assts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Rangetakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Predictor Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores			
Computors								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Rly. Comd's. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanizers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchmen				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				BATMEN	5	5	–
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				DVRS MT.	2	1	1
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks							
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties				Coach Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Concretors							
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics							
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Tptn. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.							
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Assts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Totals of columns marked • to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	7	• 6	• 1

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reinfts. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

10-2-45.
Date of Despatch

[signature]
Signature of Commander

L.H.Q. Press—411—8/43—312m.

Army Form W.3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

7/45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 17/2/1945. 2 Aust Corps Sig Coy Adv Div Coy (Unit)

W.E. 11/SOQ/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. - O.R's. - ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
1	1		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
1 *	1		6 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		*			*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces, 10 N.Z. Forces.

Detail		A.I.F.	C.M.F. Under 19 Years.	C.M.F. 19 Years and over.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
A		6						[redacted]	[redacted]		6
B(1)											
B(2)							[redacted]				

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong
1 [redacted]			

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To ____ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. __/__/194__

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sig Coy Adv Div Sig Coy ... Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

7/45 Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 17/2/1945.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.	Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Ammunition Examiners				Surveyors, Engineering				Operating Room Asts.				G.P.O. Assistants			
Armament Artificer Fitter				Surveyors, R.A.A.				Operator, Keyboard				Hammermen			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)				Surveyors, Topographical				Operator, Line				Leather Stitchers			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)				Surveyors, Trigonometrical				Operator, Signal				Orderlies, Nursing			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)				Toolmakers				Operator, Switchboard				Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Armament Artificer Instrument				Turners				Operator, Wireless				Plate Layers			
Armament Artificer Radio				Watchmakers				Opticians				Hangstakers			
Armament Artificer Signals				Welders				Painters				Riveters			
Armament Artificer Wireless								Panel Beaters				Roughriders			
Artificer, Artillery								Photographer, Dry Plate				Saddlers			
Artificer, Engine								Proficier Numbers				Saddletree makers			
Blacksmiths								Printers				Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Bricklayers								Radiographers				Stevedores			
Computors								Riggers				Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Cooks, Hospital				GROUP II.				Sawyers				Storemen, Technical			
Coppersmiths				Armourers				Signallers				Tailors			
Dispensers				Axemen				Signwriters				Textile Refitters			
Draughtsmen				Bakers				Telescope Identfn. Numbers				Tinsmiths			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)				Bty. Cmd's. Asst.				Well Borers				Vulcanisers			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)				Boilermakers				Wheelers				Wagon Erectors			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)				Carpenters				Winchman				Whitesmiths			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)				Carpenters and Joiners				Wireman							
Electricians				Cooks				Woodturners							
Electricians (M.V.)				Dental Mechanics											
Electricians (Signals)				Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Med.)											
Fitters				Driver-Operator											
Fitters (Cycle)				Drainers											
Fitters (Electrical)				Electricians											
Fitters (Gun)				Electricians (Engineers)											
Fitters (Instrument)				Fire Control Operators				GROUP III.				DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
Fitters (M.V.)				Gun Operator				Battery Surveyors				BATMEN	5	5	-
Fitters, Railway Signal				Hatchman				Butchers				DRS MT.	2	1	1
Fitters, Signals				Height Taker				Clerks							
Grinder, Precision				Helio Operator				Clerks, Supply							
Mechanics, Instrument				Instrument Operator				Clerks, Technical							
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)				Intelligence Duties				Coach Trimmers							
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)				Joiners				Conveyors							
Mechanics, Radio				Lineman				Cooks							
Mechanics, Typewriter				Lineman, Signals				Dental Clerk Orderlies							
Mechanics, Wireless				Lithographers				Despatch Riders				ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Millwrights				Machinists, Metal				Draughtsmen, Signals							
Operators, Excavator				Machinists, Wood				Drivers, H.T.							
Pattern Maker				Masons				Driver Mechanics							
Pharmacist				Masseurs				Driver Tptn. Plant							
Photographer, Wet Plate				Mechanics, M.T.				Engine Hands, I.C.							
Photowriter				Miners				Equipment Repairers							
Plumber				Moulders				Farriers							
Saw Doctors				Nurses, Trained				Fitters' Mates							
Surveyors				Observation Post Asts.				Gun Layers							
CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				CARRIED FORWARD				Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	7	6	1

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reints. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

17-2-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

L.H.Q. Press—411—3/43—312m.

Army Form W.3009 (Adapted)
(Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS

8 /45 (Serial No.)

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust L of C Tps (Unit)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 24/2/1945.

W.E. III/809/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. — O.R's. — ATT. BY W.E.

Part A. Posted Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements Required.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Reinfts. Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Reinfts. Required.
				W.Os. Class I.					
				W.Os. Class II.					
				Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sgts.					
				Staff Sergeants					
				Sergeants					
				Corporals					
1	1		6	Troopers, Privates, etc.					
				Civilians counting as O.R.					
1 *	1		6 *	Totals of cols. marked * should agree with details shown in Part E on Page 2.		*			*

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 7 of instructions for compilation of this return will complete analysis of Part B(1) and B(2).

* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces. 19 N.Z. Forces.

Detail		C.M.P. A.I.F.	C.M.P. Under 19 Years.	C.M.P. 19 Years and over.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
A		6						[redacted]	[redacted]		6
B(1)											
B(2)							[redacted]				

Part B. Other Ranks Attached from Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which they belong

Part C. Other Ranks Included in Part A Detached to Other Units.

Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.	Number of O.Rs.	Unit to which detached.

Part D. Description of Other Ranks Whose Return To ____ (Unit) is Particularly Requested. ___/___/194___

Army No	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust L of C Tps Unit

Army Form W.3009
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

8 /45 Serial No.

PART E. Detail of Present Strength and Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W.3009 at 0600 Hours Saturday 24/2/1945.

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I.	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Ammunition Examiners			
Armament Artificer Fitter			
Armament Artificer Fitter (Electrical)			
Armament Artificer Fitter (M.V.)			
Armament Artificer Fitter (A.F.V.)			
Armament Artificer Instrument			
Armament Artificer Radio			
Armament Artificer Signals			
Armament Artificer Wireless			
Artificer, Artillery			
Artificer, Engine			
Blacksmiths			
Bricklayers			
Computers			
Cooks, Hospital			
Coppersmiths			
Dispensers			
Draughtsmen			
Draughtsmen (Architectural)			
Draughtsmen (Engineering)			
Draughtsmen (Mechanical)			
Draughtsmen (Topographical)			
Electricians			
Electricians (M.V.)			
Electricians (Signals)			
Fitters			
Fitters (Cycle)			
Fitters (Electrical)			
Fitters (Gun)			
Fitters (Instrument)			
Fitters (M.V.)			
Fitters, Railway Signal			
Fitters, Signals			
Grinder, Precision			
Mechanics, Instrument			
Mechanics, Instrument (Signals)			
Mechanics, Instrument (Surgical)			
Mechanics, Radio			
Mechanics, Typewriter			
Mechanics, Wireless			
Millwrights			
Operators, Excavator			
Pattern Maker			
Pharmacist			
Photographer, Wet Plate			
Photowriter			
Plumber			
Saw Doctors			
Surveyors			
CARRIED FORWARD			

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP I. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Surveyors, Engineering			
Surveyors, R.A.A.			
Surveyors, Topographical			
Surveyors, Trigonometrical			
Toolmakers			
Turners			
Watchmakers			
Welders			
GROUP II.			
Armourers			
Artmen			
Bakers			
Bty. Comd'rs. Asst.			
Bellermakers			
Carpenters			
Carpenters and Joiners			
Cooks			
Dental Mechanics			
Driver-Mech. (Eng. and Mot.)			
Driver-Operator			
Draftsmen			
Electricians			
Electricians (Engineers)			
Fire Control Operators			
Gun Operator			
Hatchman			
Height Taker			
Helio Operator			
Instrument Operator			
Intelligence Duties			
Joiners			
Lineman			
Lineman, Signals			
Lithographers			
Machinists, Metal			
Machinists, Wood			
Masons			
Masseurs			
Mechanics, M.T.			
Miners			
Moulders			
Nurses, Trained			
Observation Post Asstn.			
CARRIED FORWARD			

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP II. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
Operating Room Asstn.			
Operator, Keyboard			
Operator, Line			
Operator, Signal			
Operator, Switchboard			
Operator, Wireless			
Opticians			
Painters			
Panel Beaters			
Photographer, Dry Plate			
Predicter Numbers			
Printers			
Radiographers			
Riggers			
Sawyers			
Signallers			
Signwriters			
Telescope Identfn. Numbers			
Wall Borers			
Wheelers			
Winchman			
Wireman			
Woodturners			
GROUP III.			
Battery Surveyors			
Butchers			
Clerks			
Clerks, Supply			
Clerks, Technical			
Coach Trimmers			
Conservers			
Cooks			
Dental Clerk Orderlies			
Despatch Riders			
Draughtsmen, Signals			
Drivers, H.T.			
Driver Mechanics			
Driver Tptn. Plant			
Engine Hands, F.C.			
Equipment Repairers			
Farriers			
Fitters' Mates			
Gun Layers			
CARRIED FORWARD			

Details of Tradesmen. GROUP III. (cont.)	W.E.	Posted Strength.	Reinfts. Required.
G.P.O. Assistants			
Hammermen			
Leather Stitchers			
Orderlies, Nursing			
Orderlies, Nursing Mental			
Plate Layers			
Rangetakers			
Riveters			
Roughriders			
Saddlers			
Saddletree makers			
Shoemaker and Boot Repairer			
Shoeners			
Stokers, Staty. Engine			
Storemen, Technical			
Tailors			
Textile Refitters			
Tinsmiths			
Vulcanizers			
Wagon Erectors			
Whitesmiths			
DETAILS OF NON-TRADESMEN.			
BATMEN	5	5	—
DVRS. MT.	2	1	1
ATTACHED BY W.E.			
Totals of columns marked * to agree with columns 4 and 7, and 1 and 10 of Part A. respectively.	7	6 *	1 *

NOTES.—(a) If rank other than private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised trades or specialists not included in list will be added as required in spaces provided.
(c) Where A.W.A.S. and/or A.A.M.W.S. personnel are desired show details on back.
(d) Where replacement not desired note accordingly on return by insertion of N.R. in col. "Reinfts. Required."
(e) Where any request or notation is made on back of form, the words "See Back" should be written in one of the blank spaces on this page.

24-2-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

L.H.Q. Press—411—8/43—312m.

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

5/45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 3/2/1945. 2 Aust Corps Sec / 2 Aust Sub Corps (Unit)

W.E. 11/FOQ/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. - O.R's. - ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.
				*					
				*					
				Lieut.-Colonels					
	1		2	Majors					
		1	3	Captains					
				Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
	1	1	5						

	DETAIL		A.I.P.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S.	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).	A.		5									5
	E.(1)											
	E.(2)											

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO.....(Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ../../194..

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec / 2 Aust Sub Corps Unit

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

5/45 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 3/2/194.5 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Capt.	VX55008	WOOD	G.M.F.	1.O.	NO.	2 days ARL	11-1-45
Capt.	VX104088	McMICHAEL	A.W.	1.O.	NO	ATT HQ. 3 AUST. DIV.	24-1-45
Lt.	VX101691	CASH	A.H.	1.O.	YES		
Lt.	WX27747	SALMON	F.R.	1.O.	NO	ATT 4th. 3 AUST DIV.	21-12-44
Lt.	VX18610.	KING.	F.S	1.O.	YES		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.

3-2-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

A.W. Form No. 10, 43

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

6/45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 10/2/1945. 2 Aust Corps Sec / 2 Aust Inf Corps (Unit)

W.E. 11/30Q/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. — O.R's. — ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.
				*					
				*					
				Lieut.-Colonels					
				Majors					
	1		2	Captains					
		1	3	Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
	1	1	5						

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of Instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).	DETAIL		A.I.P.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
	A.		5									5
	E.(1)											
	E.(2)											

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO _____(Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ___/___/194___.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec / 2 Aust Inf Corps *Unit*

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

6/45 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 10/2/194.5 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1 Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	2 Army Number.	3 Surname.	4 Initials.	5 Posting.	6 Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	7 If not present with Unit, state how employed.	8 Date of Detachment.
Capt.	VX85008	WOOD	G.M.F.	I.O.	~~NO~~	24 days 7.R.L.	11-1-45
Capt.	VX104088	McMICHAEL	A.N.	I.O.	NO	ATT. HQ 3 AUST. DIV	24-1-45
Lt.	VX101691	CASH	A.M.	I.O.	YES		
Lt.	WX27747	SALMON	F.R.	I.O.	NO	ATT. HQ 3 AUST. DIV	21-12-44
Lt.	VX18610	KING.	E.S.	I.C.	YES		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.

10-2-45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

a.w. Item Lit 16.43

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 1)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

7 A-5 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 17/2/1945. 2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Lt Corps (Unit)

W.E. 11/Sep/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. — O.R's. — ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.
				*					
				*					
				Lieut.-Colonels					
				Majors					
	1		~	Captains					
		1	3	Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
	1	1	5						

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).	DETAIL		A.I.P.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	**	TOTAL.
	A.		5									5
	E.(1)											
	E.(2)											

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
** Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO.....(Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ...../...../194.....

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Sec Aust Lt Corps Unit

Army Form W.3008
(Adapted) (Page 2)
(Revised Jan., 1943)

7/45 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 17/2/1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Capt.	VX85008	WOOD	C.M.F.	I.O.	No.	24 days A.R.L.	11-1-45.
Capt.	VX104088	McMICHAEL	A.W.	I.O.	NO.	ATT. HQ. 3 AUST. DIV.	24-1-45.
Lt.	VX101691	CASH	A.H.	I.C.	YES.		
Lt.	WX27747	SALMON	F.R.	I.O	NO	ATT. HQ. 3 AUST. DIV.	21-12-45.
Lt.	VX18610	KING.	E.S.	I.O.	YES		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.

17-2-45.
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

A.F. W.3008 (Pt. 2) 43

Army Form (Adapted) (Page 1) (Revised Jan., 1943)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

8/45 (Serial No.)

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 24/2/1945. 2 Aust Corps Lee Aust Det Corps (Unit)

W.E. III/800/1. OFFRS. 5 O.R's. 7 + OFFRS. — O.R's. — ATT. BY W.E.

PART A.—POSTED STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
W.E. EXCLUDING ATTACHED.				DETAIL.	ATTACHED ALLOWED BY W.E.				
Rein'fts Required.	Deficient W.E.	Surplus to W.E.	Posted Strength.		Arm or Corps.	Posted Strength.	Surplus to W.E.	Deficient W.E.	Rein'fts Required.
				*					
				*					
				Lieut.-Colonels					
				Majors					
	1		2	Captains					
		1	3	Lieutenants					
				Quarter-masters					
				A.A.N.S. and A.A.M.W.S. Offrs.					
				Civilians Counting as Offrs.					
	1	1	5						

Analysis of Part A to be shown here by ALL units. Only units notified in para. 10 of instructions for compilation of form will complete Part E(1) & E(2).

DETAIL.		A.I.F.	C.M.F.	A.W.A.S.	A.A.N.S.	A.A.M.W.S	CIVIL.	R.A.N.	R.A.A.F.	* *	TOTAL.
A.		5									5
E.(1)											
E.(2)											

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.
* * Personnel belonging to a category not provided for in the analysis will be shown in this Col. Particulars will be shown, e.g., 20 U.K. Forces; 10 N.Z. Forces.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

OFFICERS JOINED DURING WEEK

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit From.	Date.	CAUSE.

OFFICERS QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Unit To.	Date.	CAUSE.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO.....(Unit) IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED. ...../...../194.....

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	REMARKS (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

2 Aust Corps Lee Aust Det Corps. Unit

Army Form W.3008 (Adapted) (Page 2) (Revised Jan., 1943)

8/45 (Serial No.)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON POSTED STRENGTH

At 0600 Hrs. Saturday 24/2/1945 (Total to agree with Columns 4 and 7 of Part A.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank if Held.	Army Number.	Surname.	Initials.	Posting.	Whether present with Unit (insert Yes or No)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	Date of Detachment.
Capt.	VX35008	WOOD	G.M.F.	I.O.	YES		
Capt.	VX104085	McMICHAEL	A.W.	I.O.	NO	ATT. HQ. 3 AJST. DIV.	24-1-45
Lt.	VX101691	CASH.	A.H.	I.O.	~~NO~~	YES.	
Lt.	WX27747	SALMON	F.R.	I.O.	NO	ATT. HQ. 3 AJST. DIV.	31-12-44
Lt	VX18610	KING.	F.S.	I.O.	YES		

PART E.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER UNITS.

Substantive Rank and Higher Temporary Rank, if Held.	Army Number.	Name and Initials.	Unit.	Date of Attachment.	Nature of Attachment.

24/2/45
Date of Despatch

Signature of Commander

W. Form Nos. 10.43

SECRET

INFORMATION RESUME

SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

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GS(Int) 2 Aust Corps
Jan 45

INFORMATION RESUME - SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

PART I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. American forces first landed on BOUGAINVILLE 1 Nov 43 and after initial heavy fighting, no major operation took place until the Japanese attacked the TOROKINA perimeter on 8 Mar 44. This was known among the Japs as the TA Operation, and was continued until 25 Mar after which skirmishing continued until 20 Apr. There has been no further offensive action by the enemy.

After the TA Operation the two main enemy forces withdrew, one to Northern BOUGAINVILLE via NUMA NUMA and the other to the fertile plains in the south of the island, leaving only a small force to contain the American perimeter.

Reorganization was undertaken and reinforcements for combat units were largely provided by disbanding base and service troops who had been left with little to do in consequence of cutting off of supplies and exhaustion of many categories of equipment. Reorganization was completed by the end of Jul 44.

In this reorganization 6 Div was given responsibility for Southern BOUGAINVELLE. Two of its Regiments were disposed in the south - the 13th NW of the PURIATA RIVER and the 23rd east of the PURIATA along the main southern L of C road. Last July the Div was well disciplined, well organized, reasonably well equipped for defensive jungle fighting, and morale was high.

After the failure of the TA Operation, the enemy apparently abandoned any further offensive and set out to contain Allied forces inside the TOROKINA Perimeter and provide defence in depth against a possible Allied offensive along the MOSIGETTA - BUIN road. On the seaward flank coast defence guns were emplaced and beach defences prepared. It is not certain that those west of MOILA POINT are still manned. Some entrances to the enclosed waters north of the SHORTLAND ISLANDS were mined and there are many reports that all entrances are covered by artillery.

These dispositions are shown in Appendix "B".

After the isolation of BOUGAINVILLE, which followed the American landings of Nov 43, the enemy was forced to initiate a policy of strict economy of clothing, arms and ammunition and field rations. In this he has shown considerable success. Today - 14 months after receipt of last bulk supplies - there appears to be no shortage of ammunition. Staple rations are still being supplied to units in the forward areas, and new rifles have been found.

A plan aimed at achieving self sufficiency in local foods was issued in Feb 44. Execution of the plan was partially neglected during the TA Operation, but was vigorously pursued after the withdrawal and is now considered to be complete, except for a few front line units.

Because of the high soil fertility satisfactory gardens can be made in almost any coastal or foothill area. This has enabled the Japanese to dispose their troops strategically. Generally their garrisons are small and dispersed, but larger concentrations are located along the BUIN - MOSIGETTA road..

ENEMY STRENGTHS AND ORDER OF BATTLE

2. The estimated enemy strength for SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE as at 27 Jan 45 is:-

Combat Troops	3400
Base Troops	4900
	8300

Disposition of units and strengths are shown in Appendix "A". The total shown for SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE excludes KIETA and the islands south of BUIN.

In evaluating the fighting capacity of these troops the following qualifications must be borne in mind:-

(a) An estimated 20% are ineffective due to hospitalization or sickness in unit lines;

(b) There are indications that 30-40% of the enemy are incapable of arduous work because their health has been undermined by malaria, sickness and malnutrition before self sufficiency in food was attained. It is considered that because of dietary deficiencies, the power of endurance of those who are fit for front line duty is low;

(c) Totals of combat troops shown are based on a "head count" and include all HQ personnel, artillery (excluding AA), field engineers, and specialists;

(d) When engaged in combat a small percentage will be required to gather garden produce;

(e) A great many combat troops are former shipping unit, aerodrome construction and other varieties of service troops who have undergone and infantry conversion course of doubtful efficiency. Most service troops in the Japanese Army are recruited from those conscripts who are below the fairly high standard of intelligence required for infantrymen.

Tactically SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE has been divided by 6 Div Comd into three areas:-

(a) EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, extending roughly from JABA RIVER to PURIATA RIVER - the responsibility of 13 Inf Regt;

(b) RUMAI - AKU along the BUIN - MOSIGETTA road and south to the coast - 23 Inf Regt;

(c) BUIN, from SILBAI RIVER to TORAU BAY - HQ and miscellaneous combat troops.

This Division has had long and varied battle experience in CHINA. It acquired a reputation for fighting ability and also brutality as instanced by its rape of NANKING. Part of the Division participated in operations in the CENTRAL SOLOMONS where it was severely defeated, but reinforcements arrived and for the TA Operation it took into battle some 14,000 men. Heavy casualties were sustained at TOROKINA, and despite reinforcemnt by understrength artillery units it now has an estimated strength of 5700, of which one regimental group, 45 Inf Regt, is at KIETA.

Retained in the BUIN area as combat troops are 1 Bn 13 Inf Regt (less 3 Coy), 3 Bn 4 South Sea Garrison Unit and probably 6 Cav Regt, giving a total, together with other field units, of 830 combat troops.

The BUIN area contains the majority of base troops on BOUGAINVILLE, including HQs 17 Army and 6 Div and is the base supply and stores area for SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE. It is heavily defended by AA and coast defence guns.

The 13 Inf Regtl Group (less 1 Bn), strength estimated 1300, has been responsible for the area JABA RIVER - MOSIGETTA - PURIATA RIVER continuously since Apr 44 and especially since the present action has suffered heavy losses and deterioration in morale. Its ability to launch an effective attack has so far been proved negligible.

23 Inf Regt main strength is between RUNAI and OAMAI RIVER along the good road from MOSIGETTA to BUIN where they are tactically placed to meet a landing on the south coast or a drive inland along their main L of C.

This Regt with its attached troops, estimated to total 1900, has been located in the RUNAI - AKU area since Apr 44. Large garden areas have been reported in the MONOITU - TAITAI area, but according to a recent sergeant deserter the garden programme is well behind schedule and 23 Regt was generally in poor condition.

Present knowledge of the units in the 23 Regt area is incomplete, and it is possible that some units at present shown in 2 Aust Corps Enemy OOB at BUIN may be stationed in this area.

ENEMY FIREPOWER

3. The estimated enemy firepower as at 27 Jan is as follows:-

(a) DISTRIBUTION OF FIELD PIECES

AREA	UNIT	150 mm	14 cm	105 mm	75 mm	70 mm	47 mm	37 mm	81/90 mm mortar
MOSINA	2 Bn 13 Inf Regt					1			
	3 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt				2				1
	Regtl Gun Coy 13 Inf Regt								
					–	–			–
	Total				2	1			1
MAKATOWA	2 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt				3				2
	Med Arty Pl (ø)								
					–				–
	Total				3				2
MOSIGETTA	3 Bn 13 Inf Regt					1			
	Regtl Gun Coy 13 Inf Regt				1				
	Regtl Tk A Coy 13 Inf Regt						1	2	
					–	–			
	Total				1	1	1	2	
TOKINOTU									
	1 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt					2?			
	Total					2			
RUNAI									
	1 Bn 23 Inf Regt					2			
	Total					2			
RUSEI									
	2 Bn 23 Inf Regt					2			
	Regtl Tps 23 Inf Regt				3	–		4	
	Total				3	2		4	
MIBO RIVER									
	3 Bn 23 Inf Regt					2			
	Total					2			
MAIKA	1 Bn 13 Inf Regt					2			
						2			
TAI TAI-AKU (x)									
	Part 4 Med Arty Regt)								
	3 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt)	4		2	6				4
		4		2	6				4
	Totals	4	—	2	17	10	1	6	7

AREA	UNIT	150 mm	14 cm	105 mm	75 mm	70 mm	47 mm	37 mm	81/90 mm mortar
	Totals	4	—	2	17	10	1	6	7
TONOLEI									
	KURE 6 SNLP		2						
	Total SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE	4	2	2	17	10	1	6	7

(x) Identifications uncertain
(ø) One 150 mm captured 2 Feb

CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD PIECES

TYPE	MAXIMUM RANGE	WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE
150 mm (5.9 in) Type 96 Howitzer	13,000 yds	78 lb
14 cm Type 3	NO DETAILS AVAILABLE	
105 mm (4.1 in) Type 92 Field Gun	14,200 yds HE 20,000 yds Streamline	35 lb
75 mm (2.95 in) Type 94 Mountain Gun	9,000 yds	14½ lb
75 mm (2.95 in) Type 41 Regimental Gun	7,500 yds	14½ lb
47 mm Type 01 Tk A Gun	5,500 yds	3 lb
37 mm Type 94 Tk A Gun	7,000 yds (effective Tk A range 800 yds)	1½ lb
37 mm Type 97 Tk A Gun	4,400 yds (effective Tk A range 500 yds)	1½ lb

(b) AA

Anti-aircraft defence is confined chiefly to the BUIN area, in the vicinity of airfields and TONOLEI HARBOUR. The numbers and calibres of AA weapons are estimated as:-

No	TYPE	MAXIMUM RANGE	EFFECTIVE RANGE	WEIGHT OF PROJECTILE
3	12 cm (dual purpose)	35,000 ft	27,000 ft	45 lb
17	7 cm (dual purpose)	26,000 ft	18,000 ft	13¼ lb
25	75 mm AA	30,000 ft	25,000 ft	14½ lb
3	40 mm (dual purpose)	13,000 ft	4,500 ft	2 lb
30	25 mm (" ")	10,500 ft	4,500 ft	½ lb
11	20 mm (" ")	5,000 ft	3,500 ft	5 oz
27	13 mm (" ")	5,000ft	3,500 ft	2 oz

NOTES: The 75 mm AA has been used in a ground defence role, particularly against AFV's. Its horizontal range is 15,000 yds.

The 12 cm is a dual purpose naval gun and is estimated to have a maximum horizontal range of 21,000 yds.

(c) COMPANY WEAPONS

An analysis of captured documents and PW statements was made in an effort to determine the average distribution of HMGs, LMGs and Grenade Dischargers, under present conditions on BOUGAINVILLE. These figures may serve as a rough guide in estimating the likely light automatic fire power of a garrison or small force of which the strength is known

1 HMG per 72 men
1 LMG per 19 men
1 Grenade Discharger per 26 men

Wide variations from the above distribution have been found.

CONDITION OF WEAPONS

4. Very few captured enemy weapons have been found to be unserviceable through neglect.

Despite a shortage of lubricating oil in south BOUGAINVILLE, about 90 per cent of unit rifles examined have been serviceable, though often heavily rusted in exterior parts and fouled in the barrels.

As a rule greater care has been taken of HMGs and LMGs, and it is exceptional to find one of those weapons in bad condition.

As a substitute for lubricating oil when not available, and also as an agent to dilute dwindling stocks of oil, the Japs have used coconut oil. This substitute is reasonably effective, and will enable the enemy to maintain his weapons in serviceable condition.

AMMUNITION

5. SAA Information from a number of PW from 2 Bn, 13 Inf Regt and from forward troops indicate that the enemy is not short of SAA.

This force was supplied from BUIN, where ammunition reserves are believed to be held. Recently SAA was sent from BUIN to NUMA NUMA and ammunition in first class condition has been found on reinforcements brought to 13 Inf Regt area from rear areas. One PW states there is an ammunition dump at MUGUAI with ample reserves for combat. Another stated there was sufficient to enable the enemy to carry on for a year if expended at the same rate as during the TA Operation. Since that operation until the beginning of our advance south of the JABA RIVER there has been no large scale expenditure.

Conflicting references have been made by PW and sighted in documents about the percentage of duds found in SAA ammunition. A recent test on SAA captured on the NUMA NUMA trail showed 100% effective rounds. SAA captured in the JABA RIVER area has been found in the main to have suffered no greater deterioration than slight tarnishing, which is not sufficient to affect its serviceability.

Arty PW and documentary references to artillery ammunition indicate a shortage in forward areas. The longest enemy barrage to date was 44 shells on 12 Jan.

Captured documents show that in tests carried out by the MAWARAKA Garrison on 1 Dec 44, 46% of 150 mm ammunition and 29% of mortar bombs were ineffective. Detonation tests on six captured Type 88 instantaneous fuses revealed 3 were ineffective.

Overall proportion of dud shells amongst those fired by the enemy since mid-December has been about 25 to 30 per cent.

Some captured 75 mm ammunition showed a considerable amount of rust, sufficient probably to affect their accuracy. Other 75 mm, 105 mm and 150 mm shells captured in the MOTUPENA - MAWARAKA area had cases practically untarnished.

Grenades have been stated, in numerous instances, to be in short supply, due mainly to their use for fishing. There are probably reserves at BUIN, as many cases of grenades were recently sent from there to NUMA NUMA.

6. AFVs

To date the enemy has not employed tanks against Allied troops on BOUGAINVILLE nor have any positive identifications been made.

One PW stated that he had seen a number of tankettes at BUIN in Mar 44, and a missionary reported having seen two small tanks near the naval HQ at NAKARU. However another PW was fairly certain that there were no tanks on BOUGAINVILLE, and it is possible that artillery prime movers have been mistaken for tanks in these reports.

Type of tanks likely to have been brought to the SOLOMONS by the Japs are the M2595 Light Tank mounting one 37mm gun and two 7.7 mm MGs, or the M2597 Medium Tank mounting a 57 mm gun and two 7.7 MGs. The 12 mm armour of the light tank and 25 mm armour of the medium are easily penetrable by the 2 pdr Tk/A gun. Tankettes mount only one MG and have 14 mm armour.

ENGINEERS

7. Information respecting organisation and capabilities of the remnants of Jap engineer units is meagre. All evidence points to an exhaustion of most engineer stores, and the use of sappers in labouring roles with hand tools on maintenance of roads and bridges, and defences.

Their resources were not sufficient to construct and maintain an LT road from BUIN to MOSIGETTA during the Mar 44 offensive. Many bridges on their main L of C have since fallen into disrepair. It follows that their capacity to undertake a major engineering task will be less now.

Some sappers are being used as carriers, and others have been converted to infantry.

SIGNAL EQUIPMENT AND INTERCOMMUNICATION

8. Enemy communication generally is poor, particularly between the lower units. Communication between units lower than Bn HQ is generally effected by runner.

Between Regts and Division, however, communication is by WT and/or LT. From PW sources it is learned that there is telephone communication between MOSINA and MOSIGETTA, and WT and LT between MOSIGETTA and MUGUAI. Heavy wireless equipment with batteries was found abandoned by an enemy party surprised by our troops three miles SE of MOTUPENA POINT on 20 Jan.

23 Inf Regt is probably equipped on the same scale.

Documents revealed, as late as 2 Nov 44, a wireless link between MUGUAI - KEREKOPA - PIKEI, using No 3 sets of approximately 60 miles range.

In Jan 44, communication between naval units in SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE and the islands south of BOUGAINVILLE was effected by a WT network, but instances of WT traffic as shown in log books of these units for the ensuing four months are extremely rare, although communication by letter service was frequent.

Signals HQ was said by one PW to be at BUIN where a large radio, power for which was supplied by a big petrol driven motor generator, was capable of communicating with RABAUL and TRUK.

At that HQ also were three platoons of WT signallers, each platoon being equipped with four wireless sets operated from hand generators. He thought that in operations one platoon was normally attached to each Regt engaged in fighting.

MEDICAL

9. The following hospitals have been identified:-

1 Fd Hosp 6 Div	MOSIGETTA, capacity	500
4 Fd Hosp 6 Div	MUGUAI	
	Det MOBIAI RIVER "	500
76 L of C Hosp	MUGUAI "	1000

Lightly wounded as a rule are not evacuated to hospital, but are treated in unit lines.

Seriously wounded previously were well cared for, but since Mar 44 when hospitals were totally inadequate to cope with the sick and wounded, the treatment has steadily deteriorated. There has been a concurrent deterioration in morale of medical personnel, and PW almost without exception, bitterly condemn the lack of discipline and neglect of patients, in hospitals now.

There is an acute shortage of medical officers, and a tendency to treat only those sick and wounded who appear to have a good chance of recovery and becoming fit for front line service.

There is a serious lack of medical supplies. Atebrin supply is very low, and no suppressive treatment for malaria is enforced in units. Sulpha drugs for combatting dysentery and many common infections have been exhausted.

Dressings are extremely short and are usually washed and reused. The supply would be inadequate for casualties in excess of the present rate.

Anaesthetics and disinfectants are practically exhausted. Within units, because of shortage of doctors and supplies, medical treatment is very crude and death rate from wounds is high.

In the event of a major battle action, it is considered that many casualties would not receive even elementary medical treatment.

Death rate from sickness is approximately 5 per cent per month of the total forces on the island. This is due, according to a Jap Medical Officer PW, to reduced resistance by Jap troops to disease through long periods of malnutrition, and increasing debilitation from untreated malaria.

EXPENDABLE STORES

10. For the last year the enemy has been subsisting on supplies for which, apart from small amounts brought in by submarine, there has been no replacement.

Food, being the most expendable item, has been the enemy's main problem, though this appears now to have been overcome largely by gardening. At the end of Mar 44, the Japs had more than 700 tons of field rations in dumps at TARLENA and BUIN, and received nearly 300 tons by submarine up till Sep 44. Their usage rate since then has been low, and it is possible that several hundred tons of field rations are still available of which an unknown quantity is held at BUIN.

Strict economy in other stores has permitted issues such as clothing, boots, blankets, to be made as late as Oct 44, though the extent of such issues has been small.

Condition of clothing and accoutrements of many Japanese dead in the MAWARAKA area indicate that the enemy is still able to provide sufficient equipment for troops sent forward from the BUIN area.

FUEL

11. Information from PW give no reliable estimate of the enemy's POL holdings, but there is evidence that considerable amounts of petrol are left in the BUIN area. One PW mentions a large petrol dump, 250 x 600 metres, north of EBERLY's PLANTATION yet another states that before his departure for the TOROKINA Operation, he saw "countless numbers of slit trenches about 3' deep" filled with 50-gallon gasoline drums. There is some corroborative evidence that a POL dump exists at RUNAI.

TRANSPORT

12. (a) Motor Transport

17 Army Group Intend Report of Mar 44 reveals that the number of vehicles in use up till then on the L of C in SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE was approximately 25.

A PW, interrogated 20 Oct 44, believed there are "quite a number of trucks" in the BUIN area, while natives reported on 27 Nov 44 that 12 trucks, used at night and hidden during the day, were being operated on the LAKURUAI-MONOITU road. It is known that MT was used from BUIN to as far as RUNAI, where there is stated to be a motor park and workshop, but there have been no recent indications of motor traffic along this route. According to a missionary recovered Jan 45, no MT is now used in the MOSIGETTA - TAITAI area, the vehicles having been greased and concealed in the jungle.

Numerous references are made in official enemy documents to transportation difficulties, but this could be due as much to the bad state of the roads as to an acute shortage of MT. Allied air assaults have restricted the use of vehicles during daylight hours.

(b) Small Craft

From information contained in 17 Army Group Intend Report of Mar 44, it is learned that due to Allied air and sea activity, the Army was left with only 2/3 barges in April 44, and consequently had to give up transportation by sea. There were still Navy barges available at that time.

Aircraft continue to make small barge sightings, and it is apparent that most craft are kept in camouflaged hideouts during the day and used only at night. Recent aerial reconnaissance has reported evidence of apparent landing of stores from the sea along the SW coast. It is known that in Nov or Dec 44 approximately 100 men were transported by sea from the SHORTLANDS to the mainland of SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE.

One barge was sighted off the PURIATA RIVER on 28 Jan 45, and at least six are reported to be in use in the SHORTLANDS - CHOISEUL area, and possibly two more in TONOLEI HARBOUR.

It is likely that, through salvage, re-building and improvisation, the enemy has gathered a small number of other water craft in the BUIN - TONOLEI area.

There have been numerous aircraft sightings of small boats, lakatois, canoes apparently in use for fishing and limited coastal transport.

(c) Carriers and Animals

Information from PW and captured documents indicates that carrying has long been the enemy's only means of transport beyond the road head at RUNAI. Load per man is 20 kg (approximately 45 lb). At times, when due to impassability of roads and Allied air assaults MT cannot be used effectively, hand carrying is resorted to even in rear areas.

For transportation duties 17 Army had in Mar 44 two carrier units. Their strength is indicated at 2000, some of whom may be natives in addition to the Chinese, Koreans and Formosans normally recruited in these units. Since then, attrition and desertions have probably greatly reduced the numbers available.

Forty horses were included in the carrying unit operating between PURIATA and MOSIGETTA at Mar 44, and in another instance, the use of mules was indicated. In Jul 44, the enemy had horses, ponies and donkeys, which were used for pack loads and with carts. Animals weakening were killed and eaten, which probably explains the lack of recent reference by PW or in documents to this mode of transport. However, two horses were included in the strength state dated Dec 44 of an artillery battery in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay area.

REINFORCEMENTS

13. (a) Immediate reinforcements of any area in SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

Enemy combat units in SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE are so disposed that immediate reinforcements of any area in the event of an Australian landing is possible within 24 hours.

(b) Reinforcements available from other areas

The enemy could also draw combat reinforcements from KIETA or the SHORTLANDS.

In the KIETA area there are estimated to be 1450 combat troops of which 1100 constitute 45 Inf Regt. The coastal route from KIETA to BUIN could be traversed in a minimum of four days.

The reinforcement potential which could be drawn from the SHORTLANDS is estimated at 1300 combat troops consisting primarily of 4 South Sea Garrison Unit.

(c) To sum up, a total of 2400 combat reinforcements could be available to the enemy commander in SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE but transport of the troops and warlike stores would be a major problem likely to impose serious delays in concentration of reinforcements in large numbers.

MORALE

14. Japanese morale never fully recovered from the setback it received through the failure of the Mar 44 offensive on TOROKINA, and the virtual annihilation of many units which participated.

Morale of 6 Div however, does not appear to have been lowered to the same degree as units in the north of the island. This was probably due to the high traditions of the Div and its reorganisation by a spirited and experienced commander and an efficient staff. In recent months there have been signs of increasing apathy among the 45 Inf Regt garrisoning KIETA.

Reaction of 13 Inf Regt to stress of battle may provide a guide to future conduct of other Japanese forces when the pressure goes on.

For the first three weeks following the Australian offensive south of the JABA RIVER the Japanese

encountered by our troops fought with their customary dash and launched many spirited counter attacks pressed home in spite of high casualties. During this period the Japanese appeared to be in considerable doubt about our intentions and many changes and counter changes ordered to meet the changing situation involved considerable forces in frequent and long marches. Some degree of disorganisation resulted, and it was evident from prisoners that doubts and bewilderment were shared by the troops.

During these weeks troops were on short rations and probably because physical strength and spirits were low, Comd 13 Inf Regt ordered the reading twice daily of the Imperial Rescript and Jubilation.

Early in the fourth week the enemy Comd correctly appreciated our intention to drive towards MAKATOWA and the main L of C. On at least three occasions in the fourth and fifth weeks he ordered the main strength of his Regt, to advance in "battles of annihilation" against our forces at MAWARAKA, TAVERA and JABA RIVERS. Included in the operation orders for these attacks was an unusual number of references to need for determination, and appeals to the troops' patriotism. It was evident from such phraseology that concern was being felt for the morale of the Regt. Any concern felt was in fact well grounded as none of the counter-attacks ordered were launched.

Failure of the front line troops to execute the counter-attack orders was admitted in a letter from a Coy Comd of 3 Bn to the Comd 13 Inf Regt. He wrote that it was regrettable that their previous efforts had not been enough, but that was only to be expected considering the condition of the companies.

The Bn Comd and men had resolved to attack the next day and would advance until killed. He added the following significant comment "The spirits of officers and men of the Regt are low, and the expected results will not eventuate."

In the fifth week six deserters came into our lines and it is believed many more would have done so if given the opportunity.

Whenever fresh troops have been contacted they have fought to the limit of their capacity and endurance. Though the MAWARAKA action shows that their morale will crack under defeat, privations and battle strain, it must not be assumed that low morale among Japanese necessarily entails loss of will to fight. The most common manifestation of low morale is a state of apathy, coupled with neglect of duty or any provision for the future. Many become reconciled to the thought that they will be killed, and do little to avoid that fate. Their aim is to die fighting, exacting as heavy a toll as possible.

ADDITIONAL MINEFIELD

In addition to the minefields shown in Appendix 'B', there is one consisting of three acoustic mines laid by Allied PT craft in May 44 at the mouth of the PURIATA RIVER.

An attempt to detonate these mines late in Dec 44 was unsuccessful - one mine was possibly destroyed.

INFORMATION RESUME

S O U T H B O U G A I N V I L L E

PART II - TOPOGRAPHICAL

1. GENERAL

This study covers the area of SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE south of a line TAVERA - MOSIGETTA - KOOMBAROONA - URATA - MAIKI.

2. PHYSIOGRAPHY

The area under study is skirted on the north by the foothills of the PRINCE ALBERT RANGE. Up to these hills the terrain comprises an extensive plain running from the west coast at GAZELLE HARBOUR to the BUIN-KAHILI locality.

Numerous rivers intersect the level country, flowing deviating courses, with banks of variable height.

Extensive swamps lie back from the whole of the coastline, extending almost to the main east-west road. These are dealt with in detail under Section 3 - COASTAL. South of the east-west road, the swamps render travel inland impossible except on the built tracks indicated on the maps.

North of the east-west road and as far as the steep rises of the foothills movement through the jungle, off the tracks, is possible.

Vegetation is mainly rain forest which is interspersed over the coastal swamps with sac sac, swamp forest and swampy grass.

Many native and Japanese gardens exist along the main road.

3. COASTLINE

TAVERA - MOTUPENA Point

Anchorages

Anchorage in 4 to 5 fathoms exists to the south of the reef off MAWARAKA, while GAZELLE HARBOUR provides good anchorage in 12 fathoms for small craft in the SE season.

Beaches

A large shallow patch of reef exists ½ mile NW of MAWARAKA. Reconnaissance reports state that an offshore reef, 3 to 20 feet deep and 500 yards offshore, runs from here approximately 3 miles south in a semicircle.

A hard black sand beach 10 to 20 yards wide and shelving steeply runs along this area.

Coast

Behind the beach the terrain is intersected by rivers and lagoons and is almost entirely of a swampy nature with sac sac, swamp reeds and swamp forest and dense undergrowth which makes movement very difficult and in many places impossible.

It is reliably reported that the area between the main MAWARAKA - MOSIGETTA road and the NAMA River to the south is subject to annual flooding, which is estimated to occur during March and possibly February and April.

MOTUPENA Point - PURIATA River

Anchorages

This coast has offshore reef along its entire length, it is very exposed and no anchorages are known.

Beaches

There is a black sandy beach 10 to 20 yards wide which shelves steeply and rises to form a bank up to 10 feet high lined with casuarinas.

Coast

Behind the casuarina lined ridge there are some lagoons and the terrain inland is very swampy for some miles with sac sac, reeds, swamp forest and dense undergrowth seriously restricting movement.

PURIATA River - HARI River

Anchorages

The coast is very exposed and no anchorages are known. A small Allied minefield exists around the mouth of the HONGORAI River.

Beaches

Numerous reefs have been reported along the area and Japanese documents state that landings are difficult except in the MAMAGATA area which was the usual landing place.

A steeply shelving black sand beach with an average width of 10 yards rises to form a ridge up to 10 feet high.

Coast

Behind the beach ridge, which is lined with casuarinas, there are numerous lagoons, while inland is swampy terrain extending for up to 2 miles and similar to that from MOTUPENA Point.

An MT road runs from MAMAGATA inland to the HARI area.

HARI River - MIVO River

Anchorages

This area is very exposed to the SE season (May-Oct), is liable to swell and no anchorages are known.

Small Allied minefields exist at the mouths of the MOBIAI and MIVO Rivers.

Beaches

Steeply shelving sand beach 30 to 40 yards wide with a casuarina lined ridge up to 10 feet high.

There is no knowledge of reefs along this coast and although exposed and liable to swell, it is considered that landings by barge would be possible in early mornings or evenings when surf is lowest.

Coast

Behind the beach ridge are a series of lagoons paralleling the shore and in places up to 60 yards wide and 6 feet deep. Swamp conditions exist for some miles inland, extending deeply near the OGORATA and MOBIAI Rivers while the estuary of the MIVO becomes inundated at high tide.

Japanese documents state that the swamp area just east of the MOBIAI River is referred to by the natives as "KAHILI SWAMP."

MIVO River - SILIBAI River

Anchorages

Small schooners have anchored at DIO DIO, but the coast is very exposed and no other anchorages are known.

A large Japanese minefield covers the area from the MIVO River to 3 miles east of the SILIBAI River and extends seaward to MARMOLA and TURUBEI Islands and OUTARARA Shoal.

A small Allied minefield exists around the mouth of the MIVO River.

Beaches

The beach is steeply shelving black sand, 10 to 20 yards wide and forming a ridge at the back up to 10 feet high and lined with casuarinas.

The coast is exposed and liable to swell but landings by barge are considered possible, the best times being in the early morning and evening.

Usual landing places were at DIO DIO and TOKUAKA, from where a track reliably reported as jeepable leads inland to the main east-west road at AKU.

Coast

Lagoons are practically continuous behind the beach ridge and form a barrier along this coast.

Inland the coastal swamp extends up to a mile behind the lagoons and the only movement possible would be along the track mentioned above.

SILIBAI River - LITTLE SIWI River

Anchorages

The Japanese minefield mentioned in the previous section of coast extends into this area as far as 3 miles east of the SILIBAI River.

The bight west of MOILA Point is very shallow, has numerous sandbars and is not suitable for anchorage.

No details of anchorages from MOILA Point to LITTLE SIWI River are known.

Beach

The beach west of MOILA Point is of narrow shelving sand and has a ridge lined with casuarinas.

Landings here would be exposed and liable to swell but would be possible under good conditions.

From MOILA Point to LITTLE SIWI River Japanese charts show a flat sandy beach 20 to 30 yards wide where it is stated that barge landings are easy. The beach ridge continues along this section.

Coast

The swamp terrain behind MOILA Point consists of a thick swampy grass with a muddy bottom and is definitely impassable on foot.

A swamp area up to 1½ miles inland parallels the coast from the SILIBAI River to the bight west of MOILA Point, and then broadens out and covers the whole of MOILA Point, extending inland up to 3 miles.

LITTLE SIWI River - MOISURU Bay

Anchorages

An Allied minefield extends from KANGU HILL to PUPUKUNA Point; the coast is reported reef-free and the only other obstructions are wrecked Japanese ships as shown on map.

Anchorage appears possible along this entire coast and the area was used extensively by Japanese shipping.

Japanese charts show a good anchorage in 10 fathoms opposite KANGU HILL.

Beaches

There is a steeply shelving black sand beach averaging 10 to 20 yards wide rising steeply to a ridge 10 feet high.

This coast is partially protected in the SE season by the SHORTLAND ISLAND Group and though some surf may be encountered in that season it would be insufficient to prevent landings.

In the NW season it is usually calm, but considerable surf may be encountered when the wind backs to the SW.

Coast

Inland the terrain is lowlying. Although it is inclined to be swampy, it is known that the Japanese built and drained the KAHILI Airfield in 3 weeks.

4. RIVERS

The rivers are generally from 10 to 30 yards wide and shallow, but all are subject to floods which rise and subside quickly. During these floods the rivers frequently shift their mouths and form deltas.

It is usually possible to cross at their mouths, inside which the water is usually deep but shallows within ¼ mile allowing fording.

Except when in flood, fording inland is easy once approaches have been prepared.

None of the rivers on this coast is of any value for navigation.

Details of the main streams are as follows:-

MAMAREGU River

This river, flowing into GAZELLE Harbour, is reported to be navigable for a short distance. The mouth is too deep for fording.

It flows through very swampy terrain between low banks, and the upper reaches as shown on the map are reported to be only a dry river bed.

PURIATA River

Has a swift current and is very liable to flooding, especially in the afternoons, and becomes impassable for short periods.

At the mouth, the river is about 22 yards wide and 6 feet deep but it soon narrows to 10 to 15 yards and 2 feet deep for about 2 miles inland, when it again broadens out. The mouth is obstructed by a sandbar, but has a channel 40 feet wide and 4 feet deep, and the river appears navigable for shallow draft vessels for a short distance. There is a large swamp area at the mouth.

At the main crossing, the river is 60 yards wide and approximately 2 feet deep. Fording is difficult as the bottom has some quicksand. The west bank is steep to 20-40 feet.

HONGORAI River

This river is 30 to 40 yards wide at the mouth, where it is very swampy; it is sluggish and has low banks.

It is easily forded at the main crossing.

HARI River

The mouth is 20 yards wide and very shallow.

The river runs behind the beach for ½ mile and is likely to break through and form a new mouth after a flood.

It is very sluggish and meandering, averaging 10 to 12 yards wide upstream. The banks average 5 feet high for approximately 3 miles and then increase to 5 to 10 feet.

OGORATA River

The mouth of this river is closed by a sandbar and there is no channel.

There is a lagoon behind the mouth and a swamp extending up to 4 miles inland, the whole stream being very narrow and almost completely hidden by timber.

MOBIAI River

The mouth of this river, which is approximately 35 yards wide, closes occasionally.

Inland the stream is about 80 yards wide for a distance of approximately 4 miles, with swamp surroundings extending inland for 2½ miles.

MIVO River

This is the largest river on the south coast, with an average width of 20 to 30 yards. It is about 60 yards wide at the mouth where there is a large sand bar.

The estuary becomes inundated at high tide. Natives use rafts on the lower reaches but cannot use canoes.

It is very liable to flooding, particularly in the afternoons, becoming impassable on occasions for up to 4 hours.

The current is swift and the banks steep and up to 20 feet high, but the firm bottom enables fording if approaches are prepared.

The main crossing is 80 yards wide and 3 feet deep with a firm bottom.

SILIBAI River

The mouth is 70 yards wide with a sandbar 60 yards wide.

The Japanese used a pontoon bridge 140 feet long at the main crossing, but it is considered fordable at this point.

5. ROADS & TRACKS

There are two important routes running east from the MAWARAKA locality to the BUIN district which are treated in detail below.

These routes are:-

TRACK No 1 - the lower level track across the coastal plain.

TRACK No 5 - the high level track along the foothills.

Three routes connect the south coast with the main east-west track and are treated below as Tracks Nos 2, 3 and 4.

Tracks 6 and 7 are the routes by which access to the east coast is obtained from the BUIN area.

Travel is possible along the whole of the beach except when squally weather drives the surf across the beach to the timber line.

Rivers can be crossed by the bars at their mouths and are mostly easily fordable except when in flood.

South of the main east-west route, movement off the tracks is difficult owing to the extensive swamp areas, but north of the east-west route and as far inland as the foothills of the PRINCE ALBERT Range it is possible to move off the tracks.

Track No 1

This is the lower level route through MOSIGETTA, HARI and SHISHIGATERO. It is the main road and has been developed by the Japanese from an unbridged bicycle track to an MT road with a width of 15 to 20 feet.

Most of the bridges have now been destroyed and fords must be used.

Fairly level ground is traversed throughout, mostly through light rain forest and some gardens and secondary growth.

The Japanese hastily constructed the road of wood corduroy which quickly rotted and a PW stated that the surface was poor and often knee deep in mud and required a great number of men to keep it in good condition.

There are many river crossings and considerable maintenance would be required to make the road suitable for heavy traffic. At present, MT can travel from MAWARAKA to MOSIGETTA, this portion of the road being 15 feet wide and crossing one river only.

RUNAI is the western extremity of the serviceable MT road from BUIN.

Between RUNAI and MOSIGETTA, carriers must be used.

Track No 2

The Japanese are using MT along this road from MAMAGATA to the main east-west road, but the road would require much maintenance as it passes through very swampy terrain.

Track No 3

This road between TOKUAKA and the east-west road is reported to be suitable for MT. It is not apparent from air photos that it could be used for MT. As it passes through very swampy country, it would require much maintenance.

Track No 4

This is another MT road requiring much maintenance running from the coast near KANGU HILL to the KARA area.

Track No 5

This is the upper east-west track from MOSIGETTA, passing through MAKEPEKA, TAI TAI and KOKOPO.

Apart from a swampy stretch between MOSIGETTA and MAKAPEKO, the country traversed is all hilly.

The track is suitable for pack animals and could be improved to an MT road; at present it is 12 feet wide with sandy soil.

In common with the lower level route, the maintenance of river crossings would be a considerable task.

The inter-village tracks as indicated on the map are native pads in fair condition.

Track No 6

Tracks running north from the BUIN-KAHILI locality to KIETA have not been greatly developed as the Japanese L of C was by barge around the coast; there are, however, two routes of which Track No 6 is one.

This is the old Government track from BUIN. It is level to the MUGUAI vicinity, then to KIKIBATSIAGO it is broken by gullies, one of which has a big drop.

KIKIBATSIAGO is the junction of routes 6 and 7, and from here track No 6 leads to the east, rising steeply to cross the DEURO Range. It then continues in a general north-easterly direction, dropping very sharply to the foothills.

From here to the LULUAI River crossing, the going is level with one small rise and two river crossings, at the ABIA River and the PIRIAS River. These crossings are about 20 yards wide and 2 feet deep and though swift they are not regarded as obstacles.

The LULUAI River is crossed near SIRORI. It is the most difficult river in the Island, 40 yards wide and 3 feet deep at the ford and is difficult to cross owing to the swift current and stony bottom.

This river becomes impassable for some days after flooding. Normally, the best travelling time is during the early morning, as daily thunderstorms increase the flow of water during the latter part of the day.

Track No 7

This is the second route from the BUIN-KAHILI area towards the east coast and KIETA.

After leaving KIKIBATSIAGO this route is in a general northeasterly direction, with "up and down" going to the LULUAI River which is crossed some miles upstream from the crossing on route No 6.

This ford in common with that on route No 6 becomes impassable during and for some days after flooding.

From the crossing the track rises steeply to NANTOKINA where it joins the main track.

6. AIRFIELDS, POTENTIAL AIRFIELDS, SEAPLANE ALIGHTING AREAS & DROPPING GROUNDS

Airfields and Potential Airfields

KAHILI and KARA are the only airfields in the area and were built by the Japanese.

KAHILI Airfield (6° 46' S, 155° 48' E) has an elevation of 10 feet. It was completed in Sep 42 and reported unserviceable on 8 Aug 44. The runway is coral surfaced and 4700 feet long, aligned NW/SE.

KARA Airfield (6° 44' S, 155° 42' E) is situated 10 miles WNW of KAHILI Airfield on the rising coastal plain. It was constructed for use by fighters and is now unserviceable. The runway lies NNE/SSW and is 4000 feet long. From here a network of roads and tracks connects with the south coast and east-west road.

A potential airfield site is reported to exist near PATUPATUAI Mission.

There are no extensive areas suitable for emergency landing grounds, but slightly elevated portions of the coastal plain lend themselves to artificial drainage. KAHILI Airfield was drained and built by the Japanese in three weeks.

Constructional materials are available near all sites, with gravel from the river beds and coral and sand from the coast.

Seaplane Alighting Areas

In calm weather, GAZELLE Harbour affords some shelter and a suitable anchorage for flying boats and seaplanes.

The waters between MOILA Point and EAST CAPE are also partially sheltered.

The remainder of the coast is exposed and liable to heavy surf.

Dropping Areas

Extensive areas of gardens exist around TAI TAI and BUIN-KARA districts, whilst the terrain along the main east-west road is level with scattered gardens and clearings. Suitable areas for supply dropping should not then be difficult to locate. The terrain is free from ridges and deep gullies.

It is important to note, however, that along the swamp areas extending from the south coast towards the east-west road there are large areas of swamp grass and reeds which from the air have the appearance of dry grass patches. Supplies have been lost through pilots having been unfamiliar with this type of vegetation.

7. POPULATION

The Japanese occupation has forced the natives to abandon many villages and retire into the hills. Figures given at 24 Oct 44 for this area estimate the total at 7000 persons, all of which are under Japanese domination.

Of the above number, it is considered that the number of adult males would be 2000.

Owing to the inroads on native foods made by the Japanese, the natives' physical condition is very poor and a generous estimate of those fit for work would be 700.

Indications are that the natives' feelings will swing readily towards our own forces when Japanese domination is threatened.

8. RESOURCES

Native foods, such as sweet potatoes, taro, yams, etc, were sufficient to meet the natives' demands, but the Japanese have greatly reduced the natives' share.

The Japanese Forces themselves, in an endeavour to become self-supporting, have cultivated extensive areas of gardens, especially in the TAI TAI and BUIN-KARA localities.

The main crop appears to have been sweet potatoes, but there have been many reliable reports of large areas of rice being grown in the MOSIGETTA region.

Water is plentiful everywhere from the numerous streams, but requires treatment before use.

Timber for building purposes is abundant and road surfacing materials may be found easily except in the swamp regions.

9. CLIMATE & METEOROLOGY

Winds

SOUTHEAST TRADES prevail from MAY to OCTOBER and the NORTHWEST MONSOON from DECEMBER to MARCH; the remaining months represent the transitional periods of variable winds.

MOTUPENA area appears to experience only SE and NW winds throughout the whole year, the NW season being marked by a few SE winds while in the SE season, SE and NW winds blow with equal frequency.

In the BUIN area southeasterlies to southwesterlies blow fairly constantly from May to October, these winds even being present during the remainder of the year though less frequent and then associated with west and NW winds.

Severe shortlived squalls are experienced; they are not restricted to any specific time of the year although they are most frequent at the height of the respective seasons.

Tides

No accurate observations of tides have been made, but it is reported that the range of tides in this area is from 2 to 3 feet.

Reports also state that the area has a tendency during the SE season to have low water during the day, and in the NW season to have high water during the day.

Rainfall

The southern tip of BOUGAINVILLE shows maximum rainfall during the SE period (May to Oct), while similar conditions, though not so marked, are noted in the more sheltered parts of the SW coast.

Rainfall is heavy and falls of 5 or 6 inches in 24 hours are not infrequent.

Rain usually falls in the late afternoon.

Table of average number of rainy days in BUIN area is set out below:-

Month	Wet Days	Month	Wet Days
Jan	16	Jul	22
Feb	16	Aug	21
Mar	15	Sep	17
Apr	16	Oct	21
May	17	Nov	14
Jun	17	Dec	12

Yearly and monthly rainfall averages ~~over 5 years~~ for BUIN area are as follows:-

	Average	Maximum	Minimum
Jan	8.10	11.81	4.42
Feb	10.18	13.80	6.17
Mar	9.11	15.99	3.83
Apr	10.42	15.22	7.28
May	12.34	14.04	8.11
Jun	9.22	11.76	6.48
Jul	16.46	28.61	8.73
Aug	17.01	23.05	15.91
Sep	14.38	19.17	8.81
Oct	14.82	22.28	7.75
Nov	8.38	10.81	4.29
Dec	7.02	9.94	4.39
Year	137.44	155.13	108.72

Clouds

Conditions are mainly broken cloud between 4 and 8 tenths, with least clouded conditions during the SE season.

Cloudiness is at a minimum in the early hours of the morning.

Temperatures

Temperatures are uniformly high throughout the year, averaging 85 to 87 degrees Fahrenheit with a daily range of 10 to 15 degrees Fahrenheit.

Humidity averages from 80% to 90%.

Sunrise & Sunset Tables, Jan-Jun 45 (Standard (L) Time)

	Sunrise	Sunset		Sunrise	Sunset
Jan 3	0631	1858	Apr 4	0641	1844
" 10	0634	1901	" 11	0640	1843
" 17	0637	1903	" 18	0639	1848
" 24	0640	1904	" 25	0639	1837
" 31	0643	1905			
Feb 7	0644	1904	May 2	0638	1833
" 14	0645	1903	" 9	0640	1832
" 21	0646	1902	" 16	0641	1831
" 28	0646	1859	" 23	0643	1831
			" 30	0643	1831
Mar 7	0646	1856	Jun 6	0645	1832
" 14	0645	1853	" 13	0646	1833
" 21	0644	1851	" 20	0648	1835
" 28	0643	1847	" 27	0650	1836

Moonrise & Moonset Tables, Jan-Jun 45 (Standard (L) Time)

MOONRISE

Date	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
1	2113	2201	2038	2118	2136	2306
2	2159	2241	2117	2203	2227	2359
3	2244	2320	2157	2249	2319	0053
4	2325	----	2238	2239	0014	0100
5	0005	0042	2321	0032	0100	0146
6	0044	0100	0007	0100	0109	0238
7	0100	0126	0055	0127	0203	0333
8	0125	0214	0100	0224	0259	0428
9	0205	0306	0147	0319	0354	0526
10	0250	0401	0242	0416	0450	0626
11	0337	0458	0338	0516	0546	0726
12	0427	0558	0437	0611	0644	0826
13	0521	0657	0536	0708	0744	0924
14	0618	0754	0634	0804	0843	1016
15	0716	0851	0731	0903	0943	1105
16	0815	0946	0828	1002	1042	1150
17	0912	1041	0924	1100	1136	1233
18	1008	1137	1022	1158	1226	1313
19	1101	1231	1119	1253	1312	1353
20	1155	1325	1216	1343	1356	1432
21	1248	1421	1311	1430	1436	1511
22	1341	1516	1405	1514	1516	1554
23	1435	1609	1458	1557	1555	1639
24	1529	1700	1546	1638	1634	1726
25	1624	1748	1633	1716	1715	1817
26	1720	1834	1717	1755	1758	1911
27	1814	1918	1757	1835	1844	2005
28	1905	1958	1837	1916	1932	2100
29	1953		1917	2000	2024	2156
30	2037		1955	2046	2117	2250
31	2120		2036		2210	

MOONSET

Date	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun
1	0831	0933	0813	0906	0926	1054
2	0922	1017	0856	0950	1017	1145
3	1010	1101	0941	1038	1110	1236
4	1057	1144	1024	1129	1203	1325
5	1141	1238	1108	1221	1257	1414
6	1224	1314	1154	1316	1350	1503
7	1306	1402	1244	1410	1441	1552
8	1350	1454	1336	1505	1531	1645
9	1435	1549	1432	1559	1620	1740
10	1523	1647	1527	1651	1712	1838
11	1614	1744	1622	1745	1805	1936
12	1709	1841	1720	1835	1901	2035
13	1805	1937	1814	1928	1958	2132
14	1904	2031	1907	2022	2056	2225
15	2000	2121	1959	2118	2154	2314
16	2056	2212	2052	2214	2250	0002
17	2150	2302	2144	2311	2344	0047
18	2240	2351	2237	0005	0035	----
19	2329	0004	2331	0059	0100	0130
20	0016	0100	0025	0100	0122	0213
21	0100	0136	0100	0151	0208	0257
22	0105	0229	0120	0240	0252	0341
23	0155	0322	0214	0326	0335	0427
24	0247	0416	0305	0410	0417	0515
25	0340	0508	0355	0454	0500	0607
26	0434	0557	0442	0537	0545	0701
27	0527	0645	0527	0619	0631	0755
28	0621	0729	0611	0703	0721	0851
29	0713		0655	0749	0813	0943
30	0803		0738	0837	0906	1033
31	0849		0822		1000	

ENEMY ORDER of BATTLE
South Bougainville
as at 27 – Jan. 45.

SCALE 1 INCH to 4 MILES

L M
Q R

5/13 Inf. Regt.?
COMBAT -30-
30

1650
COMBAT -1450
BASE - 200

N

1/6 Fd. Arty. Regt.
5/13 Inf. Regt.
2/6 Arty Regt.
Med. Arty.

2/13 Inf. Regt
3/6 Fd Arty Regt

13 Inf. Regt.
5/13 Inf. Regt.
1 Fd Hosp. 6 Div.

1900
1/23 Inf. Regt.
4/23 Inf. Regt.
6 Engr. Regt.
2/6 Fd. Arty. Regt.
6 Fd. Arty. Regt.
3/23 Inf. Regt.
23. Inf. Regt.
2/23 Inf Regt
3/23 Inf Regt.

1270
COMBAT 970
BASE - 300
6 Fd Arty. Regt

Combat - 1650
Base - 250
1/23 Inf. Regt.
2/23 Inf Regt

17 Army
6 Div.
1/13 Inf. Regt.
3/4 South Seas Grn. Unit
4 Fd Hosp 6 Div.
76 I of C Hosp
6 Cav. Regt.

Naval AA unit

NAVAL AA & Guard Unit
Coy. Kure 7 SNLP
5100
COMBAT - 850
BASE - 4270

2600
Combat 1300
Base 1300

ENEMY STRENGTH		
SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE	TOTAL STRENGTH	EFFECTIVES
COMBAT	3400	2000
BASE	4900	3000
	8300	5000

Q R
V W

(S.I.(Int.)) HQ 2 Aust. Corps Jan. 45.

001470C

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND
MOTUPENA POINT & PURIATA RIVER

1 : 63,360 SECRET

OVERPRINT OF INFORMATION
TO 12 JAN '45

BY G.S. (INT.) 2 AUST CORPS

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

REFER TO THIS MAP AS: MOTUPENA PT & PURIATA RIVER 1 INCH SERIES

SCALE 1 INCH TO 1 MILE (1 63 360)

WARNING: FORM LINES ONLY, NOT CONTOURS (INTERVAL 100 FEET EXCEPT FIRST 50 FEET)

CONTROL: Naval Astronomical Stations at TOROKINA Lat. 06°13' 16"S Long 155°02' 02.3"E and BUIN Lat. 06°50' 02.1"S Long 155°44' 56.1"E and traverse by 2 Aust. Fd. Svy. Coy. (A.I.F.) Aust. Svy. Corps Inc. '44

AIR PHOTOGRAPHY: 17th. Photo. Squadron, 13th. Air Force & 5th. Squadron RAAF


MISSIONS: 17AC 17PF 1851 A R 4P208 4P229C Aust. 17211 Runs 1 & 3 PRV 20 Runs 1, 2 & 3 4P229C, 229C Runs 1, 2 & 3 4P231F & P 4P231D 4P234C

COMPILATION and DRAWING: Compiled with aid of aerial photographs by 2 Aust. Fd. Svy. Coy. (A.I.F.) Dec '44

PROJECTION: Lambert Conical Orthomorphic

REPRODUCTION: 2 I Aust. Army Topo. Svy. Coy. Jan. '45

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS



Convergence is given for West & East sheet edges and is based on True North at Longitude 156° East

C = 05° 43' 08" C = 05° 45' 56"

Magnetic Declination from True North for centre of sheet is about 06° 45' E

Annual Variation 03' E

REFERENCE DIAGRAM

Native Garden
Dense Jungle Forest
Open Forest to
Scattered Timber
Scrub
Secondary Growth
Plantation
Mangroves
Swamp
Swamp
River or Stream
Reef
Contours-Form Lines
Cliffs
Sand

Motor Road & Bridge
Jeep Track
Foot Track
Reported Track
Telegraph Line
Airfield
Seaplane Base
Astronomical Station
Trig. Stations and altitude: First Order 137', Second 313', Third 452', Fourth 368'
Spot Height 206'
Native Village
Reported Native Village
Building
Mission Station

WARNING: This map was produced from Aerial Photographs and all available Villages and Track information as at 10Jan '45. Due to lack of accurate ground control, distances on this map may be at variance with actual ground distances

Officers using this map are requested to mark any necessary additions or amendments on the map itself and forward same to Survey Directorate, H.Q. of Force concerned

001471D

1 : 63,360

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND
AITARA

OVERPRINT FROM INFORMATION TO 1 JAN. 45 by G.S.I. 2 AUST CORPS

REFER TO THIS MAP AS
N 0471 AITARA 1 INCH SERIES

SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN

AITARA I
ALUNGOAKU I

001472E

1 : 63,360


NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

KARA

OVERPRINT FROM INFORMATION
TO 1 JAN. 45 by G.S.I. 2 AUST CORPS

REFER TO THIS MAP AS
No 0472 KARA 1 INCH SERIES



001473F


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NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND
KAHILI

OVERPRINT FROM INFORMATION TO 1 JAN. 45 by G.S.I. 2 AUST CORPS

REFER TO THIS MAP AS
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
001474G

1 : 63,360

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND
MOUNT TAROKA

REFER TO THIS MAP AS
N° 0476 MOUNT TAROKA 1 INCH SERIES



001475H

SECRET

GSI

2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 11

CONTENTS

Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 28 Jan 45 to 2400 hrs 4 Feb 45

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"A" CORRECTIONS TO PLACE NAMES AND ADDITIONS TO TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Further areas in the MAWARAKA sector were cleared of enemy during the week. Australian forces in two columns are closing in on MOSIGETTA, while a third is driving south . from SOVELE MISSION towards the upper reaches of the PURIATA RIVER. Fighting has been on a small scale and resistance offered has not been heavy. This suggests delaying tactics only by the enemy.

From the physical condition of prisoners and deserters, and the nature of equipment abandoned by the Japs, it appears that remnants of 13 Inf Regt will find it beyond their strength to offer further large scale resistance NW of the PURIATA RIVER and will need a long spell in good garden areas for recuperation and reorganization if they are to appear again as a battle formation.

Defence of territory south and east of the PURIATA RIVER is the responsibility of 23 Inf Regt. None of the units of this Regt have been identified in battle during the current campaign. At the only point of their territory so far approached by our patrols - the mouth of the PURIATA RIVER - the enemy garrison was alert, and opened heavy fire on our troops.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND — OWN AND ENEMY

NORTH EAST BOUGAINVILLE

In the NUMA NUMA area, the enemy, assisted by armed natives, sent out two large patrols apparently in search of an AIB party operating in the area. Natives accompanying the enemy are reported to be strongly pro-Japanese, and a bitter hostility exists between them and the natives who are assisting our forces.

After an initial attack supported by grenade throwers and light automatic fire on the AIB party, the enemy showed great caution and followed the AIB party with hesitancy. One enemy party veered off after one native had been killed and eight captured by considerable numbers of friendly natives who gave protection to the AIB patrol.

Captured enemy natives state that the Japanese have raised units of native volunteers and are training them in modern methods of warfare.

GENGA RIVER

Determined enemy resistance from a semicircular hill feature, known as the amphitheatre, dominating the approach from the south to the mouth of the GENGA RIVER is still delaying the northward advance of our troops.

On 29 Jan a patrol from our perimeter, established four days previously on the north bank of the GENGA RIVER, met heavy opposition in an attempt to reach the coastal track north of the GENGA RIVER. Five attacks on this patrol cost the enemy six killed and three wounded before the patrol returned. On afternoon 29 Jan the enemy, using LMGs and grenades, attacked the perimeter from the east and west, but was repulsed. Seven enemy were killed and two wounded.

During night 31 Jan/1 Feb, there was again considerable enemy activity around the perimeter, and at 1450 hrs the following day, the Japanese again attacked from the north, using LMGs and an estimated 20 rifles. The attack was again repelled, a further eight enemy being killed and six wounded. Two LMGs in good condition were captured. The enemy returned again to the perimeter during the night, but no further assault was attempted.

South of the GENGA RIVER, two enemy were killed by a patrol 500 yards SE of the mouth on 30 Jan. Advancing 200 yards west from this position, our patrol killed three more Japanese and, coming under fire from positions on the enemy held ridge, dug in and set up a perimeter. Fire has been exchanged intermittently since. The enemy appears to have two JUKIs and at least three LMGs on the amphitheatre feature.

Enemy artillery has been active during the week, engaging our positions south of the GENGA RIVER and at the GENGA CROSSING. It is estimated the enemy has one 70 mm gun approx 300 yards east of the GENGA RIVER mouth, and one 75 mm gun 2000 yards north along the beach from the river.

A total of 119 shells was fired, 19 of which were reported as duds. Counter battery fire from our own artillery and mortar bombs from our forward positions restricted enemy artillery activity considerably.

Further inland, natives report that 30 to 40 enemy were at NEW NEMBOROSE (3500 yards ENE of PUTO) on 27 Jan and had moved northward on 29 Jan. Another party was reported astride the track 1000 yards north of NEW NEMBOROSE. However, no enemy movement was seen by a patrol returning from this area on 3 Feb. Next day, an Australian force departed for KUNAMATORO via NEMBOROSE and TSINOPE. The party was last reported to have reached the NEMBOROSE area without incident. Information from native sources suggests that the enemy may be reinforcing this area from TAIOF ISLAND and BANIU.

PEARL RIDGE

Activity has again been limited to patrolling and several sharp clashes have occurred.

A patrol to the garden area on the NUMA NUMA trail approx three miles from NUMA NUMA PLTN returned on 29 Jan with a PW captured approx 1½ miles SW of the gardens. Another patrol returning on the same day reported the enemy in strength in the NEW VIVIE area.

On 30 Jan, a patrol to SMITH's HILL killed seven enemy in a clash on the eastern slopes. Our patrol then withdrew and artillery and mortar fire engaged the area. Enemy were still holding the position when a second patrol investigated later in the day.

Five enemy were killed and one wounded in an encounter with an Australian patrol on 31 Jan in the area one mile NE of DAVIS HILL. Documents and one LMG were captured by our troops.

The Japanese on SMITH's HILL have been harassed consistently during the week with MMG, mortar and artillery fire. Enemy positions north of DAVIS HILL were engaged by artillery on 3 Feb. ANGAU scouts posted as observers reported all rounds in the target areas.

According to native reports, the enemy was evacuating SISIVIE during the week, and all pro-enemy natives have taken to the bush. They also reported small parties of enemy, each with one LMG, at IBU and JASIPOKI (unlocated).

Patrols report that the track from VIVIE down the WAKUNAI RIVER is overgrown and unused. Natives claim that the enemy is searching old gardens between NUMA NUMA and IBU for native foodstuffs, quantities of which are being carried up the NUMA NUMA trail.

JABA RIVER

Except for small remaining parties, the enemy has withdrawn from the IKADABA - KUPON - NIGITAN area, which is now controlled by our forces from bases in the IKADABA area and 1 mile east of KUPON. Having reached KUPON, the direction of our main operations changed from east to south towards the MOSINA-MENDAI area. Our troops in this area have now practically linked with patrols from our forces based inland in the SOVELE area.

On 31 Jan, an Australian force moved to and occupied the track junction at IKADABA, 1½ miles west of KUPON on the road to KUPON. This position became the base for patrols operating east and SE along the tracks to KUPON and MOSINA. A patrol to the east reached KUPON on 1 Feb and found the area clear of the enemy, though showing signs of recent occupation. This same patrol penetrated a further 400 yards along the track past KUPON and reached the track which leads south to NIGITAN and MOSINA before returning to base. A second patrol then moved from the IKADABA base through KUPON and then south to NIGITAN along the track discovered by the first patrol. NIGITAN was found to be unoccupied, though four enemy were sighted 800 yards north of it during the move south from KUPON.

The track leading SE of IKADABA to MOSINA was also patrolled by our troops from the IKADABA base. The second patrol despatched down the trail clashed with the enemy on 1 Feb, approx 2300 yards from IKADABA, and after a brief action, returned to base.

On 2 Feb, another firm base was established by one platoon 800 yards SE of IKADABA on another track leading direct to NIGITAN from the KUPON Road, 400 yards east of IKADABA. Patrols along this latter track for 500 yards from the new platoon position encountered no enemy. On 3 Feb, however, a patrol moving SSE from this base clashed with the enemy in 12 huts just north of the MOSINA - IKADABA trail, approx 2 miles from MOSINA. After supporting artillery fire, our troops moved in, burned the huts and returned to base without sighting the enemy again.

On 4 Feb, a platoon from the IKADABA base advanced our forward base a further three miles, by moving east through KUPON and establishing a position on the track to MOKOKOLIO approx 1 mile SE of KUPON.

SOVELE AREA

Our troops based south of SOVELE MISSION have cleared a large area to the south and west of the Mission, in the upper reaches of the TAVERA and MAVIRI RIVERS.

On 30 Jan, eight enemy in good condition were surprised in a hut among well kept gardens approx 8000 yards south of SOVELE. All were killed. Documents were captured, and the hut was burned.

Other enemy sightings were of small parties only. One group was observed in a garden by a recce patrol 4000 yards SW from SOVELE MISSION on 31 Jan, and on 3 Feb, a further six enemy, two of whom were killed, were observed in two huts in the area 1000 yards NW of SISIRUAI II.

A patrol returning on 4 Jan reported the area MOSINA-MENDAI-SISIRUAI clear of the enemy, though signs of heavy foot traffic, were observed north and south of SISIRUAI.

TAVERA RIVER

Patrols up the TAVERA RIVER to SISIRUAI II on 30 Jan and 2 Feb saw only one enemy and found the village unoccupied.

A recce patrol on 2 Feb found the Japanese still in position on the track north of the TAVERA RIVER near LOG CROSSING, 2800 yards inland, where they were last reported on 26 Jan. Our troops engaged with mortar fire, with unknown results.

An Australian patrol base has now been established south of the TAVERA RIVER 2¾ miles inland.

MAWARAKA

Although contacts in the immediate MAWARAKA-MAKATOWA area are decreasing, the enemy is still active and offering resistance to our movement inland along the road east of MAKATOWA.

By 1 Feb our troops had pushed east along the MAWARAKA-MOSIGETTA track to a point 1700 yards east of MAKATOWA, encountering two parties of Japs on the way. At the 1700 yard point an unknown number of Japs attempted to envelope our troops with a co-ordinated attack from the north and south. They were beaten off with six killed.

Pushing further inland beyond our forward positions on 3 Feb, a platoon was fired on by enemy in a wired position 2100 yards east of MAKATOWA. The patrol withdrew slightly, and artillery fire engaged the strongpoint. Our troops then moved forward to within 200 yards of the position, from which enemy movement could still be heard, and dug in for the night. On morning of 4 Feb, the enemy was still in position. An outflanking movement south of the road met 12/15 Japanese approx 500 yards SE of the position where the Japs were found the previous day. One enemy was killed.

Chief items of enemy equipment captured during the week were a 150 mm howitzer, two artillery prime movers, a director and a field telephone, which were found abandoned on 2 Feb in the area 1000 yards east of MAKATOWA. The breech block of the howitzer, less the firing pin, was found some distance away.

On 30 Jan 35 75 mm shells and 96 81 mm mortar bombs were found in a clearing 300 yards NE of MAKATOWA.

MOTUPENA POINT

Japanese defensive positions covering the mouth of the PURIATA RIVER have been found by our forward elements advancing SE from MOTUPENA POINT.

A patrol inland through MAKAKU, 4½ miles NNW of the mouth of the PURIATA RIVER on 2 Feb sighted two groups of enemy, numbering 28, 400 yards NE of the village. After killing two of the leading eight, the patrol withdrew and set an ambush approx 2500 yards SW of the village.

Our troops moving down the beach track to TOKO encountered an enemy ambush of unknown strength, armed with LMGs and mortars. Shots were exchanged and the patrol withdrew to a perimeter set up on the beach approx 6 miles NW of the PURIATA RIVER mouth.

On the afternoon of 2 Feb, an Australian force landed by barge and established a position on the beach track 5500

yards NW of the PURIATA RIVER mouth. Patrols from this base during the day drew fire from an enemy position on the north side of the lagoon entrance. At 0730 hrs the following morning, a patrol moved SE and attacked across the sandbar at the mouth of the lagoon, killing one enemy and forcing the remainder to withdraw. Continuing on, TOKO, two miles from the PURIATA RIVER, was occupied without opposition on the same morning. During the night 3/4 Feb, enemy movement was heard around the perimeter, but no attack was made.

During the past week, 542 Kanakas have been recovered and evacuated from this sector.

KIETA

Native scouts reported that the enemy camp at TOBOREI was completely demolished by the last bombing. Natives killed six of the survivors, but were afraid to enter the area to investigate fully.

In the KOROMIRA area, our scouts induced one native tribe to kill their pro-Jap leader and abandon the enemy.

According to natives, only five of the original enemy party at MAINUKI were still there on 31 Jan.

Enemy casualties on BOUGAINVILLE:-

	to 4 Feb	22 Nov-4 Feb
Killed	10544	654
PW	122	21
Wounded	(x)	131
From unconfirmed sources:Killed	(x)	358

(x) No figures available prior to 22 Nov

NEW BRITAIN

On the south coast, our troops have continued the move NW along the WIDE BAY coast. Bases have been established in succession at MILIM, LEMKONG RIVER and IP RIVER, five miles south of enemy-held KALAI PLTN. An AIB patrol on 2 Feb reported an enemy position south of KALAI PLTN, though no movement was seen at the plantation.

On the north coast, patrols operating from BAIA contacted the enemy one mile north of MEVELO PLTN on 28 Jan. It is believed the enemy is concentrated in some strength between MEVELO and TORIU. The enemy has been active in the BAIA area, strong enemy parties being contacted on three occasions all within the area approx four miles to the south and SE.

DAMMAP RIVER

Aggressive patrolling has been continued in the ABAU-NIMBUM-CREEK and MALIN-ILAP areas. The enemy was contacted on a number of occasions, and during nights 29/30 and 30/31 Jan, enemy attacks on two of our positions east of NIMBUM CREEK were beaten off. An Australian patrol again entered and drove the enemy from newly prepared defences at ABOAMA on 27 Jan.

The flooding of the DAMMAP RIVER, which occasioned some casualties and the loss of equipment and stores, has curtailed activity in that vicinity.

YAMBES

On 28 Jan, BULAMITA was occupied by our troops and HQ for the area was set up there. To the north, patrols are now operating in the HAMBINI-WANDANGE villages, while to the SE, an estimated 70 Japs still hold out in the TERAWON-WANAKI area.

On 30 Jan, ALBINIMA 2 was occupied by our troops without contact, and on the same day a strong base was established at NILU.

Following the recent dropping of surrender leaflets in the YAMBES area, 10 Japs, including four officers, gave themselves up during the week.

Evidence continues to be received of an eastward movement through the MILAK villages towards MAPRIK.

HANSA BAY

Only light enemy activity has been reported from this area. A patrol engaged an enemy party near WANGAN on 31 Jan, and another patrol to SENAI fired on a small enemy party approx five miles SW of BOSMAN on 3 Feb.

There have been further instances of enemy movement around our MARANGIS perimeter.

(b) SEA - ENEMY

On the afternoon of 1 Feb, a submarine was sighted approx 25 miles NNW of GREEN ISLAND. The vessel crash-dived on approach of our aircraft.

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

Ten strikes were made in support of forward ground troops during the period under review. In SW BOUGAINVILLE enemy defensive positions, occupied huts and bivouac areas were hit at RUARURO, BARNU, WARIKI RIVER 908609, HORINU(1) and HORINU(2).

In the PEARL RIDGE sector Jap troop concentrations were bombed at KARIAURIA and SMITH's HILL.

On the NW coast enemy gun positions were attacked in GENGA RIVER and TSIMBA areas and also enemy positions at LALUM. Good coverage of targets was obtained and considerable damage resulted. With the exception of the strike against gun positions at TSIMBA, Tac/R aircraft led in all the above raids.

In addition, successful strikes were made against huts, personnel and dump areas at MUGUAI (twice attacked), personnel areas at TOBOREI PLANTATION and galvanised iron sheds on the RATSOA - RURI BAY track. Ground patrols were able to confirm that the attack on TOBOREI PLANTATION was most effective.

Patrol activity was maintained. The most successful was a special patrol on 29 Jan which caught and sank two laden barges at ASIE ISLAND (FAURO Group) and one at HARAPA (SHORTLAND ISLAND).

Tac/R aircraft flew 51 missions during the period 29 Jan-4 Feb.

NEW IRELAND

Personnel areas came in for most attention during the week. BAIGAI was heavily hit on 29 and 30 Jan, BORPOP on three occasions and CAPE LEMERIS twice.

Other localities bombed were NORTH CAPE, KAVIENG, KAPSU, LOSSUK BAY, FATMILAK, KIMIDAN and HILALON PLANTATION.

NEW BRITAIN

Airfields at TOBERA, LAKUNAI and VUNAKANAU were the main targets hit resulting in damage to buildings, personnel areas and supply dumps.

Dumps were bombed at REMBARR RANGE and south of VULCAN CRATER, AA and coastal guns at PRAED POINT and OBAI MISSION and a float plane park at TOBOI.

RABAUL patrols damaged a floating crane in KERAVIA BAY and caused a large explosion in a bivouac area at TOVAKUNDUM.

NEW GUINEA

The weight of attacks during the week were delivered to targets in the DAGUA, BUT, WEWAK, CAPE NOEM area.

Beauforts continued to give support to ground forces in the DANMAP RIVER and BALIF areas.

PHILIPPINES

On 27 Jan fighter bombers heavily attacked targets in Northern LUZON, 10 grounded aircraft being destroyed or damaged. Next day 32 Liberators attacked CORREGIDOR with excellent results and 14 Liberators successfully attacked CANACAO PENINUSLA.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

ENEMY STRENGTHS - BOUGAINVILLE

The following alterations have been made to the estimate of maximum enemy strengths by areas. Changes are due to reassessment and reductions for casualties:-

NORTH BOUGAINVILLE (incl TAIOF ISLAND)	- 1000	
NUMA NUMA	- 1100	
EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY	- 1150	
TOTAL BOUGAINVILLE AND ADJACENT ISLANDS	- 4 Feb 45	15,350
EFFECTIVES		9,200

ENEMY DEFENCE PROGRAMME SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

From captured documents and ground observation it has been apparent that the enemy allowed his defensive emplacements to fall into disrepair after he withdrew from the TOROKINA area in Apr 44 and found that there was no immediate Allied threat to his territory in SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE.

At MAWARAKA in Nov 44 it was learned from captured documents that the pillboxes and artillery emplacements were over a year old and unusable. So the MAWARAKA Garrison began to construct new positions and renovate old ones, but the majority of the pillboxes overrun by our troops in this area have been old.

This lack of maintenance was probably general. A section leader's notebook records the despatch of an Arty WO from EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY to 6 Fd Arty Regt HQ at MAIKA for a course of instruction in the construction of fortifications. The course was to start mid Dec 44.

It is evident that the enemy has been aware of the necessity of constructing or renovating positions at least since Nov 44, and it is reasonable to assume that fortification work and repairs are now being undertaken in SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE.

Limitations are set on the speed with which these fortifications can be constructed by the number of sick, gardening or administrative personnel and also by the endurance of those classified as "fit."

6. EQUIPMENT

LEAD AND INVERTED BALL AMMUNITION

Two PW captured in the last week were found to have in their possession .256 inch ammunition with the bullet inverted. When questioned they claimed that the bullet had been removed in order to utilise part of the propellent charge to light fires. When the bullet was replaced, it was inserted base uppermost to facilitate removal when next required.

Later, however, they admitted that bullets were sometimes fired base end foremost.

An unusable strip of JUKI .303 inch ammunition was recently captured in which the bullets had also been inverted; some of the bullets were missing.

Pistol ammunition which has been captured has had bullets entirely of lead, and in one case a bullet appeared to have been scratched to present an irregular surface. Three rounds which accompanied a pistol of Dutch manufacture had a flat striking surface.

In at least one case, that of an Australian soldier, who was wounded in the arm, the bullet has been recovered and showed signs of interference. The wound inflicted was abnormally large in comparison with the usual wound due to .256 inch ammunition.

7. TACTICS

ENEMY AA TACTICS IN RABAUL - NEW IRELAND AREAS

The general impression gained by Allied pilots operating in these areas of enemy anti-aircraft tactics was that heavy fire was experienced only where accurate prediction was possible, no fire being encountered on the breakaway. An exception was the first attack on VUNAKANAU by RNZAF planes when a box-type barrage was put up.

When a fairly long bombing run had to be made at medium height, heavy fire was accurate, causing damage to planes in the formation and injuries to personnel. The experience of one squadron was that enemy gunners had developed considerable skill and practice over the past year, and even when a medium length bombing run was made, the first bursts were quite likely to be accurate as to height, well on track and only slightly ahead.

It is considered that the Japanese are first class gunners, but are using all types of ammunition sparingly. Although some tracer has been seen with light fire, most ground fire was with tracerless ammunition.

This impression that they are short of ammunition is strengthened by the fact that planes are allowed to fly over certain 'hot spots' like CAPE St GEORGE, unmolested, until one presents itself as a 'sitting shot'. Such an aircraft would then most probably be hit with the opening shots, even with automatic fire.

It is axiomatic that as a nation's air power increases its anti-aircraft declines in importance and, conversely, that a nation losing aerial supremacy must rely more and more on its anti-aircraft defences. JAPAN now finds herself in the latter position, and already there is proof that, in all areas, she is trying frantically to build up her anti-aircraft defences, both in number of guns and quality of material.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 141)

9. GENERAL

"WE DIDN'T KNOW YOU WERE HERE, DAMOCLES"

While 13 Inf Regt was undergoing hardships in the front line at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, a small force of approximately 30 men known as the RABERE Garrison Unit, composed mainly of 6 Fd Arty Regt personnel, was enjoying comfort in a rear area south of SOVELE MISSION. This garrison, which was chiefly engaged on gardening, was producing sufficient in Dec 44 to supply its own needs, send a proportion to its HQ at MEIRON and maintain a daily balance - 40 kilograms on 15 Dec. Medical supplies and spare clothing of a luxurious nature (athletic supports and soft leather boots) were held in excess of requirements. After some of the troops had departed for the front line, lethargy set in and for the four days 23-26 Jan consumption of food exceeded production, daily gathering from the gardens decreased and gifts from HQ did not prevent the stock of food on hand at 26 Jan from dropping to 2.5 kilograms.

None the less, the garrison was still living well - sweet potatoes, beans, melons, fresh rice, tapioca and brown sugar forming the fare with American cigarettes as a post-prandial pleasure - until a commando patrol on 27 Jan surprised its bivouac south of SOVELE MISSION and gave 11 out of a party of 26 no earthly reason to regret the loss of their accumulated supplies.

JAPANESE MEDICAL CONDITIONS

Captured documents and Prisoner of War reports furnish evidence that the Japanese medical service and supplies in SWPA are in a parlous state, and are causing them considerable concern.

A Japanese Imperial GHQ review dated 18 Nov 43 on lessons learnt from NEW GUINEA operations Jul 42-Apr 43 (OWEN STANLEYS-BUNA operations) sets out details of the failure and deficiencies of medical service. The cause has been realized, viz, that the system in operation was based on that used in MALAYA, MANCHURIA and CHINA - a system which has proved all too inadequate in SWPA. Lack of medicine and hopelessness of supply transport situation made treatment of patients infrequent during operations, whilst even the hospital "is more like a mortuary due to lack of facilities within the Unit."

Casualties from sickness and malnutrition have taken heavy toll of Japanese forces, and are regarded more seriously than battle casualties. "It is necessary to give treatment in the order of seriousness, e.g. illness, serious wounds, slight wounds, sickness. It is a fact that few die from battle wounds but many die from serious illnesses."

Preventative measures recommended include:-

(a) For the individual to carry a larger quantity of salt tablets, water purification tablets and medical supplies.

(b) For the force to carry injection preparations rather than medical preparations for treatment of malaria, a water filter and medical supplies for treatment of skin diseases.

(c) To include a small number of medical personnel within a force during operations, and to give complete rest to malaria patients.

(d) To obtain greater quantity of supplementary rations and nutritious foods.

A review of Japanese medical records in BURMA, where conditions are, if anything, worse than in NEW GUINEA, discloses that a similar state of affairs exists in that theatre. In late 42 when conditions were at their best an average of 13% of the force was sick all the time from all causes.

By 1944, malaria was universal, and its incidence had increased due to lack of quinine and atebrin caused by a complete breakdown in the supply system. In addition there was no attempt at sanitation and dysentery was rife. Typhus, beri beri and skin diseases were prevalent. The extent of malnutrition was remarkable and followed inevitably on their complete failure to supply their troops by air drop.

Whilst it appears that the Japanese have realized the remedy to their medical troubles, subsequent evidence proves that they have had neither the ability nor supplies to carry it out. Two years have passed since 1942, and it is almost certain that in areas outside JAPAN proper, and especially in those isolated or further from the homeland, conditions have deteriorated rather than improved.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 141)

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix "A" are corrections to place names and additions to topographical information on BOUGAINVILLE KSLAND.

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff

DISTRIBUTION as for Summary No 10

APPENDIX "A" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 11.

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Refmaps: BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND 1 Inch to 1 Mile Series.
" " 1 : 25,000 Series.

CORRECTIONS & ADDITIONS TO PLACE NAMES

Name	Sheet	Mapref
BASE A	MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R 1"	771642
BASE B	"	765622
MOORE JUNCTION	"	788664
BRINK BASE	"	822714
CLARK BASE	"	834700
LINDSAY'S TRACK	"	767625 to 780618
SUNKEN BARGE	"	765623
LYNCH'S TRACK	"	772623 to 771614
SISIRUAI No 1	"	847646
SISIRUAI No 2	"	901636
MOSIWANA	"	820645
MABIS	"	829508
MARAGU=	"	837516
MAKAKU	"	817500
TOKO	"	828465
MATSUNKEI	"	757530
MOZAN (HOZAN)	"	848589
MOSIGETTA	"	899581
LEIVO	"	894592
PIKEI	"	920578
BOKU	"	917572
NAIRONA	"	956603
SOVELLE	"	958642
TADOLIMA	"	955652
MAROTIMBA	"	935660
MOKOKOLIO	"	924693
MOSINA	"	884656
MENDAI	"	893643
NIGITAN	"	876674
IKADABA	"	846694
KUPON	"	882699
PEREI	"	971702
SINANAI	"	986518
MIHERO (MEARO)	"	003538
MASIWANA	"	820645
POKUITO	CAPE MOLTKE 1"	415133
KANA	"	417144
NEW NEMBOROSIE	TAIOF Is 1"	254547
BAKARIMERA	BANIU 1"	273508
PORNAI River	"	at 274477
NUPEIA	KOWARO 1:25,000	665167
SISIVIE No 1	"	609163
SISIVIE No 2	"	604163
SISIVIE No 3	"	600163
NEW VIVIE	"	non existent
ABOROPAIA	"	non existent

TRACK INFORMATION

Refmap MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA River 1"

Attached maps show corrections and additions to track information.

A PW states that the road MAWARAKA-MAKATOWA is passable at any time of the year. There are two bridges to cross and a swamp area, 20 metres wide, on the road 1500 metres from the beach. After heavy rain water is about 2 feet deep on the road.

A branch track from 841699, on a bearing of 193°, was reconnoitred for 6000 yards.

A patrol reports a good track from 782586 to 758570. Further movement is hampered by swamp.

Refmap BANIU 1"

From 319693 a possible MT road leads east, crossing a well constructed log bridge at 322693 and continuing to approximately 332693.

From RATSUA 299682 to 318694 the track is not suitable for MT unless widened. From 318694 to RURI Bay road is suitable for MT.

There is a good foot track from 407631 to 408667.

Refmaps BUKA Passage and TARBUT 1"

From 261721 to 301756 road is approximately 10 feet wide, in excellent condition.

RIVER CROSSINGS

Refmap BANIU 1"

407631 - Log bridge over CHINPUTS River

401623 - Log crossing

Refmap TAIOF Island 1"

At 230360 there is a crossing point 30 yards wide; water craft are necessary as river is deep and crocodile infested.

GENERAL INFORMATION


Refmap TAIOF Island 1"

There are good barge landing points at PUTO 225535, at 221540, and at a point 300 yards north of SARIME River mouth.


SAPOSA Island 221627 - jetty 50 yards long, of rock construction.

Wharf at 257734 now a total wreck.

Wharf at 261721 is considered serviceable for unloading.


KUPON
IKADABA
SECRET
DAWES TRACK
Kowato R
NIGITAN
MOSINA
MENDAI
83
SISIRUAI No 2
62
62
Foot Br
MOZAN?
MOSIGETTA
83
PW REPORT
ATSUNKEI
75
50
50
75
MARIGA
MARIS
BARARA
MAKAKU
TOKO

0014761



CORRECTIONS & ADDITIONS
To
TOPOGRAPHICAL INFM
Ref Map
MOTUPENA Point
PURIATA River
1 inch to 1 mile

001477J

SECRET

GSI

2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 12

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Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 4 Feb 45 to 2400 hrs 11 Feb 45

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"A" 81 mm AA MORTAR SHELL

"B" CORRECTIONS TO PLACE NAMES AND ADDITIONS TO TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

The way to BUKA Peninsula has been cleared by the capture of the AMPHITHEATRE feature, just south of the mouth of the GENGA RIVER, and the crossing of the river. It was taken in face of the maximum effort the enemy could muster.

Importance attached by the Japs to holding our forces at the river is indicated by their use in daylight of up to 12 barges and sampans in the SORAKEN HARBOUR - MATCHIN BAY area, to supply and re-inforce their forward areas. These barges had hitherto been kept hidden from air observation, and until last week not exposed to risk of destruction by aircraft. Ten were sunk during the two days they were brought from hiding.

Among the cargo was probably artillery, HMGs, ammunition and land mines. Two apparently new HMGs were found on the AMPHITHEATRE, numerous grenades, much ammunition and a dump of land mines. These mines were in good condition and appeared to have been dumped a few days before they were captured.

Defensive constructions on the AMPHITHEATRE were extemsive and formidible and included between 200 yards and 250 yards of deep trenches and unusually well sited and stoutly built weapon pits and bunkers.

PEARL RIDGE AREA

Deep and aggressive patrolling is continuing. In addition to yielding good dividends in enemy casualties and information, our frequent patrols seem to have deterred the enemy from moving out of his defended posts and perimeters. There has been a falling off in the intense Japanese patrol activity noted two and three weeks previously, and our troops now hold the initiative.

SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

For the first time in the current campaign the Japanese are using mines to impose delay on our troops advancing along the main track from MAWAPAKA to MOSIGETTA.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND -- OWN AND ENEMY

BUKA

According to SMALL BUKA natives, there are small enemy posts of 50/100 each at HAHEILA, HANAHAN and LEMANMANU. PORPORAN ISLAND, off the west coast, has been cleared of natives, and is now occupied only by Japs and Kempei. Mortars and guns at KESSA control KESSA PASSAGE.

Several natives of SMALL BUKA were executed recently for saying that JAPAN cannot win, but the chief natives of IETA and HANAHAN are still strongly pro-Jap.

NORTH-EAST BOUGAINVILLE

Information received from AIB sources reveals that FELO leaflets dropped in the northern area are having a steadily increasing effect on bringing the natives our way. However, further south in the area behind NUMA NUMA, four AIB unarmed scouts were overpowered by supposedly friendly natives and handed over to the Japs. One was shot to intimidate the other three into guiding another attempt by armed Japs and natives to hunt down the AIB patrol.

Native scouts report that a "great number" of Japanese were killed during a recent air strike at TENINBAUBAU. On 8 Feb, 30 Japs from here had moved to the area behind BANIU, and many more Japs and stores are reported behind RAUA, near RAMAZAN RIVER. The movement by barge of a large gun from TEOKOWUAKA (unlocated) to the mouth of the ADURNI RIVER (TEOP HARBOUR) was reported by natives on 10 Feb, and many Japs are camped in this latter area.

GENGA RIVER

The strong enemy feature known as the AMPHITHEATRE, south of the GENGA RIVER, which had delayed our advance since 20 Jan, was taken after hard fighting during the week, and the way opened to MATCHIN BAY.

On 6 Feb, our forces entrenched between the enemy positions and the river launched an attack on the ridge. The initial objectives on the AMPHITHEATRE were taken, five enemy being killed and one JUKI captured.

Three hours after our troops had taken the first objectives, the enemy brought down artillery fire. This, and determined resistance from the main feature of the AMPHITHEATRE, held up further progress.

The enemy counter-attacked at 0600 hrs the following morning, but was repulsed losing one killed.

On 8 Feb, two patrols were sent out to try to cut the track between the AMPHITHEATRE and the river mouth and ascertain whether the area between the AMPHITHEATRE and the coast was clear of enemy.

These two patrols linked on the GENGA RIVER approx 300 yds from the mouth on 9 Feb, without any contacts.

In the meantime, our troops moved on the remaining enemy posts on the AMPHITHEATRE and found five dead Japs in their defensive positions. One JUKI and one grenade discharger were captured. The enemy had apparently withdrawn across the river.

The enemy made no further attempts to interfere with our subsequent consolidation north of the GENGA RIVER 1000 yds from its mouth. Patrols, forward and to the east, by 10 Feb, had cleared the north bank of the river. The only contact made was approx 400 yds from the mouth of the river where three of five Japs encountered were killed. Our troops then moved astride the coastal track on the north bank of the mouth of the river.

A Pl moving north from this new position was temporarily halted by LMG fire at a track junction 100 yds north, but next day they found the junction deserted and one 37 mm gun in fair condition abandoned.

Enemy artillery continues to harass our advance. Two hundred and twenty rounds were fired during the week, 24 of which were duds.

Our coy operating inland and moving around the right flank reached a point three miles east of TSIMBA on 5 Feb, and established its first base there. Patrols operating forward of this position made no contact until the afternoon of 7 Feb, when a patrol came under enemy fire of two LMGs and rifles approx 300 yds NE of the patrol base. Our troops returned the fire, killing four enemy. A patrol returning on 8 Feb from the area 1½ miles NW of the base found tracks showing signs of recent movement, and learned from the natives the presence of a Jap ambush 500 yds east of the position reached.

On 9 Feb, leaving one pl behind, our troops moved north with the intention of investigating the KUNAMATORO area. Enemy snipers were found screening a post of approx 20 enemy with one JUKI and three LMGs 500 yds north of the patrol base. Our troops probably killed two, then returned to the perimeter.

A patrol was despatched next day on a circuitous route around the right flank to attack the enemy position from the rear.

A captured pro-Jap native confirmed the presence of the enemy in strength in the KUNAPOPO-KUNAMATORO area.

PEARL RIDGE

There is no change in the general situation. Our deep patrols forward of our PEARL RIDGE, continue to exact considerable casualties and are keeping the enemy in a state of suspense.

On 6 Feb, a patrol returned from HENRY's HILL, where 20/30 enemy were contacted. Two of the enemy were killed and one wounded in the engagement.

Three Japs were killed by an ambush at a creek junction 1500 yds NE of DAVIS HILL on 9 Feb. On the same day, another patrol caught the enemy in two huts 1400 yds ESE of WEARNE's HILL. Our troops attacked with grenades, killing 20. Other huts

were observed nearby, and it was estimated there were another 30 enemy in the area.

On 7 Feb, a patrol departed north to investigate the huts at the rear of SMITH's HILL. The patrol reached the rear slopes wher the enemy was engaged and two were killed. Twenty to 30 Japs were estimated to be in this position.

The following day our patrols again returned to SMITH's HILL and launched an attack, supported by artillery fire directed with a FOO with the patrol, on an enemy position on the eastern slopes. Five enemy were killed before our patrol returned to base. The enemy were found to be using Aust 36 grenades.

Another successful shoot was directed on enemy holding the trail to SISIVIE, the FOO being guided by NGIB patrol to within 75 yards of the enemy before the shoot.

Artillery and mortars have been active throughout the week, laying down continual harassing fire on enemy positions and reported concentrations north of PEARL RIDGE.

During the nights of 8/9 and 9/10 Feb, movement has been heard in the area 500 yds SE of ARTY HILL, suggesting that some enemy are still at large in the rear of our lines.

PAGANA RIVER

Our troops have now occupied the IKADABA-KUPON-NIGITAN area in some strength, and patrols are now active securing the trails which converge on the MOSINA-MENDAI area, and exploiting further south towards MOSIGETTA.

On 6 Feb, our patrol base established 800 yds SE of IKADABA on the IKADABA-MOSINA trail was reinforced, and patrols moving forward of this position made two enemy contacts approx 800 yds from base. On each occasion the enemy withdrew. No contacts were made by patrols the following day, and on 9 Feb, our base was advanced a further 1½ miles down the track towards MOSINA. A patrol from this base on the same day made contact approx 200 yds to the SE. Fire was exchanged and the enemy again withdrew.

On 7 Feb, a force occupied NIGITAN, found by previous patrols to be free of the enemy, and moving through was fired on 500 yds south of the village. Patrols the following day found the track clear.

On 10 Feb MOSINA was occupied without opposition, and next day our troops moved a further mile down the track towards SISIRUAI II and established a firm base at that point.

Contact was established during the week between our force operating in this area and those located further inland in the SOVELE area by a patrol which returned on 6 Feb. No enemy were encountered during the trip.

SOVELE

Following the native killing of a Japanese at NIHERU, the enemy were believed to be moving to the KOHOS area (4½ miles NNE of NIHERU) to take reprisals on the natives. Accordingly, an Australian party moved from the base area south

of SOVELE and set up an ambush in the KONOS gardens. No enemy, appeared and on 10 Feb the patrol was withdrawn.

The main activities of our troops have been directed down the two trails south of SOVELE converging on the MOSIGETTA-PIKEI area. An ambush position was set up 150 yds from Jap-occupied gardens just off the track two miles from PIKEI.

A recce patrol south from this position found further occupied gardens, and on 7 Feb, a patrol moved further south down the road to occupy a position approx 1000 yds east of PIKEI. No contacts were made in this position, and the patrol was withdrawn north to the SOVELE base on 9 Feb. This patrol reported a series of enemy occupied gardens all along the road west from the position the patrol had occupied to MOSIGETTA.

Yet another patrol moving south from the main ambush position in the gardens two miles north of PIKEI left the track and reached the PURIATA RIVER. The gardens in this area were found clear of the enemy.

On 8 Feb, a recce patrol moved along the trail from SOVELE MISSION to SISURUAI II, thence south along the main track to within half a mile of MEIVO, and one mile from MOSIGETTA. The patrol discovered an extensive evacuated bivouac area, destroyed by bombing.

Patrols from our outpost established on the PURIATA RIVER five miles east of PIKEI are probing down the north and south banks of the river towards MAKAPEKA. Twelve enemy were contacted 400 yds north of this outpost position on 11 Feb. Two were killed, and the remainder withdrew in disorder.

TAVERA RIVER

On 5 Feb, a patrol moving east from our base south of the TAVERA RIVER, 2½ miles inland, came under fire whilst crossing the river north of a garden area 5½ miles inland. Our troops held the position with reinforcements until 9 Feb, when they moved back along the track south of the river, crossed it at a point 2¾ miles inland, and set up a position on the track north of the river 2½ miles inland.

In moving east to this position along the track north of the river on 9 Feb, another pl found the enemy position near the LOG CROSSING 2800 yds inland had been vacated. One dead Jap was found in the vicinity.

MAKATOWA

The advance east along the road towards MOSIGETTA has continued with little enemy interference. The week's activity has taken our troops to within three miles of MOSIGETTA.

On 6 Feb, following contact with the enemy along the road approx 3000 yds east of MAKATOWA, a coy attempted to outflank the Japs by moving through swamps. Another enemy post was found 400 yds from their start-point and in turn was by-passed. Two days later this force reached the road 4000 yds east of MAKATOWA to find that the enemy had withdrawn in face of a frontal advance from those of our troops who had been left behind by the outflanking force.

In clearing the road between these two coys, one enemy was killed, two wounded, and 1 LMG captured.

On 9 Feb, with artillery support, our forward coy advanced to and crossed the HUPAI RIVER, to be reinforced shortly after by a second company. An enemy party dug in behind a log approx 500 yds from the river crossing temporarily halted the advance, but by 11 Feb, our forward company was in position along the road approx three miles from MOSIGETTA.

A third company crossed the river on 10 Feb and moved north of the road to a position approx 800 yds from the crossing and near the RUARUAO-MOSIGETTA track.

The enemy used artillery on two occasions during the week, firing a total of 32 shells, four of which were duds, without causing any damage or casualties.

PURIATA RIVER

Operating from our two bases, one at TOKO and the other on the coastal track approx 4 miles from the mouth of the PURIATA RIVER, patrols have been active SE towards the river mouth and NE along the track to the MARIGA-MAKUKU-MABIS area.

On 6 Feb, a patrol from TOKO reached the PURIATA RIVER mouth and returned without sighting any enemy. A previous patrol however, and two subsequent ones the following day in the same direction encountered the enemy in a position approx 700 yds SE of TOKO. On 11 Feb, following an air strike, an estimated seven enemy were driven from this position. Casualties to the enemy are not known.

Slight opposition has been encountered by our patrols operating NE of TOKO. On 8 Feb, one of these patrols contacted the enemy estimated to be of platoon strength approx $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles inland. Our patrol was unable to outflank the position because of swamps and returned after killing four and wounding four.

Patrols in the MAKUKU-MABIS-MARIGA area during 10 Feb were fired on by small enemy parties at four different points.

A platoon position was set up on 7 Feb in the vicinity of the track junction at MABIS. During the day, patrols from this base evacuated Kanakas from KONGAVI (approx 1 mile NNE of MABIS)

CHOISEUL

On 7 Feb, AIB scouts reported a number of Japs on the southernmost 400 yds of SIPASAI, and approx 150 about 300/400 yds west of SOLOVAI RIVER (unlocated) and about 100 yds from the beach. The sentries in the area are very alert, and the enemy disperses on hearing engines.

The largest number of Japs bivouac 50 yds in from the sea at KUKUPU, with a smaller number at MALUKU and scattered groups between these places.

Enemy casualties on BOUGAINVILLE:

	to 11 Feb	22 Nov-11 Feb
Killed	10617	727
PW	122	21
Wounded	(x)	141
From unconfirmed sources: Killed	(x)	373

(x) No figures available prior to 22 Nov

NEW BRITAIN

On the south coast, the advance NW along the WIDE BAY coast has been continued without opposition. On 9 Feb, our forward company had reached to within approx two miles of KALAI PLTN.

In the OPEN BAY sector, the enemy is offering active resistance to our troops disposed between BAIA and MAVELO PLTN. One of our platoons was attacked by 80 Japs east of the MAVELO RIVER on 9 Feb. Our troops withdrew after killing or wounding 15 of the enemy. A party of 80 Japs attacked one of our platoons east of the MAVELO RIVER on 9 Feb, forcing our troops to withdraw across the river after killing or wounding 15 enemy.

NEW GUINEA

DANMAP RIVER

The enemy has become increasingly active in the ABAU area. One enemy strongpoint on NAMBUT HILL (1 mile SW of ABAU) was eventually captured and occupied by our troops on 7 Feb.

Patrol activity has continued in the MALIN and ABOAMA areas. South of ABOAMA, the enemy is in occupation of MUTIBILE, MAIBAGMA and ALIKOLIPA villages.

BALIF

Operating south from our base at NILU and east from BULAMITA, patrols are exerting pressure on the enemy in the BALIF-NUMANGO-ABUBIL-DAHABIGAI areas. Patrols in the area south of NILU have reported the area largely clear, Those east from BULAMITA have found the enemy still present in a number of villages, though the BALIF group were found clear on 7 Feb. Evidence of recent occupation by a force HQ was found at WAHARITITA.

SW of BULAMITA, the enemy is still present in the TERAWON area. Fifty enemy were contacted on the NANU RIVER near AIBANUM on 7 Feb, and another party of unknown strength one mile east of LUWAITE on the same day.

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

The heaviest air attack on a BOUGAINVILLE target since 2 Aust Corps assumed command was made on 6 Feb by a combined force of GREEN ISLAND based Venturas and Mitchells and PIVA Corsairs. The target which had been attacked twice the previous week consisted of huts, buildings and dumps in the MUGUAI-TOBURAI area.

During the attack 59,200 lbs of bombs and depth charges were dropped by 37 aircraft - seven Mitchells, eight Venturas and 22 Corsairs. The area was well covered.

Known results are 40/50 huts destroyed, many damaged and 2 fuel or ammunition dumps seen to explode. Another three explosions were caused and smoke from these billowed to 1000 ft.

Twelve strikes were also made in support of ground troops. In SW BOUGAINVILLE enemy occupied positions were attacked at MEIVO track junction (twice), HORINU, HIRU HIRU (twice) and TOKO. A good coverage of all targets was obtained.

In the PEARL RIDGE area Jap concentrations at TUTERIOPIA and HENRY's HILL were bombed.

On the NW coastal sector a gun position at 241586 was attacked on 6 and 11 Feb. The first strike resulted in a probable direct hit. During the second strike what appeared to be a canopy over the position was destroyed but no gun was seen. A hut concentration was bombed at 269583, good coverage of the target being obtained.

An attack against the enemy position at the AMPHITHEATRE was unsuccessful.

Raids were also made at HANPAN where 10 huts were destroyed, at KORIU, TAITAI and BANIU where good coverages were obtained without results being observed.

Considerable success was obtained in small craft strikes during the week. In MATCHIN BAY area 5 barges and a 20 ft sampan were destroyed and 6 barges damaged or rendered unserviceable. Two barges were hit in RAMUN HARBOUR and one store laden barge was destroyed in TINPUTZ HARBOUR. Canoes were sunk, one each at ASSINO BAY and NOWA INLET. At AWA ISLAND a barge hide out and launch housed therein received a direct hit.

Patrols scored against huts at OEMA, MASAMASA and PIEDU ISLANDS, also killed 5 Japs near KAHILI and hit two trucks at RAUA PLANTATION.

Tac/R aircraft led in the Corsairs on 14 of the above strikes.

NEW IRELAND

KAVIENG and BAIGAI were attacked consistently during the week. In five raids on KAVIENG, buildings in the town area and

dump areas at the airfield were hit. BALGAI was bombed on four occasions resulting in at least 18 huts destroyed and many damaged.

Minor strikes resulted in roads being cratered and hutted areas damaged at PATATGIN, PANAPAI, LAMUSSONG and LEMADOT; bivouac areas hit at ROLAND YOUNG PLANTATION, BALEGILA, KAUT BAY, PINIKINDU POINT and HIMAU PLANTATION and roads cratered at ULUNONO, LOSSUK BAY and BALUS PLANTATION.

NEW BRITAIN

VUNAKANAU was attacked on three occasions by medium bombers. Guns and direction finding installations received direct hits and personnel areas and suspected plane parks were well covered.

TOBERA personnel and supply areas received two visits from heavy bombers and two from medium bombers, hits being scored in all target areas.

An MT park at RABAUL was attacked by 15 medium bombers. Minor strikes and patrol aircraft put bombs into personnel areas at WARIKI RIVER, CREDNER ISLAND and MIOKO ISLAND and barge hideouts at DUKE of YORK ISLAND and MANGROVE CREEK. Five trucks in the RABAUL area were fired.

NEW GUINEA

While small forces of Lightnings, Mustangs, Thunderbolts, Mitchells, Bostons and Liberators kept up continuous pressure on enemy base installations in the WEWAK area, Beauforts gave their support to our forqard elements in the DANMAP RIVER and BALIF sectors by bombing Jap occupied villages.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

ENEMY STRENGTHS

The following changes are made in the estimate of maximum enemy strength BOUGAINVILLE and adjacent islands:-

EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY	1050	Combat: 770 Base: 280 Effectives: 650
Total Strength	15250	Combat: 7850 Base: 7400
Effectives	9100	

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the following areas is prepared on information to 3 Feb 45:-

AREAS	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES 27 Jan	COMPARATIVES 16 Jan
Ø PHILIPPINES										
MINDANAO	5	3	4	2		5		19	19	19
VISAYAS	3	3	4			4	1	15	16	19
LUZON	10	3	4	2		10	5	34	34	119
	18	9	12	4		19	6	68	69	157
AMBON-CERAM -BOEROE						3		3	3	3
CELEBES		10		3	2	6	4	25	25	18
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK		2		2		9		13	13	15
BORNEO	16	2	8	3		8	3	40	40	39
FORMOSA-RYUKYU	103	14	75	95	14	68	20	389	447	427
TOTALS	137	37	95	107	16	113	33	538	597	659

Ø Estimates do not include combat types assigned to operational training units

In the NEW-BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-SOLOMONS area, it is estimated that the enemy air strength is as follows:-

	F	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES 27 Jan	COMPARATIVES 16 Jan
NEW BRITAIN NEW IRELAND SOLOMONS	15	8	2	25	25	25

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 142)

6. EQUIPMENT

81 mm AA MORTAR SHELL

Attached as Appendix "A" to this Summary is a description and diagram of above shell.

7. TACTICS

JAPANESE TRICKERY TACTICS

Experiences of Allied soldiers in the PHILIPPINES show that the Japanese in that theatre are continuing to use old tricks and ruses interspersed with new ones, to trap unwary Allied soldiers, often with fatal results.

Some of the methods used are:-

(a) Dig foxholes and place snipers to cover them with fixed sights. Sometimes Americans occupied these holes and the snipers fired successfully.

(b) Reveal location of a pillbox by fire. As Americans advanced to knock out pillbox, take them under fire from concealed machine guns on both flanks.

(c) Place a Japanese sword near the opening of a cave. When a souvenir hunter picks up the sword, Japanese inside cave fires.

(d) Have one Japanese make tabi tracks in soft mud. When Americans follow the single trail, several Japanese ambush them.

(e) Start cooking fires, then ambush Americans approaching the scene.

(f) Shout "Medics". When medics appear, shoot them.

(g) Plant wood alcohol in liquor bottles.

(h) Tie three grenades together and throw.

(i) Use Japanese women and children to forage for food and water left by the Americans.

It is probable that some of the above ruses will still be used in the NE sector, SWPA, in future Allied operations.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 142)

JAPANESE INFILTRATION FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES

Although the enemy to date has had only a limited knowledge of the Allied situation, there are indications that he is making strong efforts to remedy this deficiency. The suicide raiding parties organised for the destruction of Allied supply and HQ installations on the PHILIPPINES also had Intelligence missions. In addition, the enemy is attempting infiltration of individuals or small parties for espionage purposes. Enemy soldiers in civilian clothes have been apprehended attempting to enter the Allied perimeter in company with Filipino civilians.

The following illustrates that the enemy is [illegible] making determined attempts to capture documents as a source of Intelligence. After the Japanese infiltration attack in SAN FABIAN area, LEYTE, on 17 Jan, secret American documents were found on the body of a dead Japanese soldier. Investigation disclosed they had been left in a bag in a soldier's tent. The bag itself was later found several hundred yards away; it had been completely ransacked but only the documents were missing. The operation order for this mission specifically directed the capture of documents, indicating that the search of this bag was not accidental.

Troops in all areas should be aware of the possible use of such tactics and be prepared to frustrate any enemy attempt to gain information by their use.

(Extracted from First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 142)

JAPANESE CAMOUFLAGE TACTICS

An investigation of the siting of the enemy 150 mm gun east of MAKATOWA has revealed a clever employment of the terrain at the enemy's disposal. Our constant air and ground reconnaissance to locate this field piece has proved its effective camouflage.

The gun was sighted on the edge of a small swamp area approximately 50 yards in diameter. No felling of timber was required to obtain arcst clearance and no flash marks were visible as the gun fired across this small expanse of water.

(3 Aust Div Weekly Intelligence Summary No 11)

9. GENERAL

FORTRESS RABAUL

A 14 Area Army Combat Instruction Report headed "Lessons learned from combat in RABAUL area" has now been recovered in the PHILIPPINES. The report was distributed to all formations in the PHILIPPINES with the comment that the lessons would be "of vital importance in preparing for future operations." A translation of the report is as follows:-

"The following statements were made by Rear Adm TOMIOKA, formerly Chief of Staff, who recently returned from RABAUL, Dec 44.

'Despite continued large scale enemy air raids, all army and naval personnel in the Southeast area, from commanding officers downward, are making a desperate effort to fortify NEW IRELAND and RABAUL with irrevocable determination despite difficulties and shortages of material. Within the past six months, the major part of the fortifications has been completed. A condition of self-sufficiency both with regard to living and to fighting has been established.

1. The emphasis is placed mostly on fortifications, especially underground installations. Positions are being rapidly expanded and war supplies are all stored in caves. Total length of the caves and tunnels has now reached 250 km (i.e. 156 miles)

2. Anti-landing positions are being constructed in the form of a checker board. In places where landing operations may be expected, ten to twenty anti-tank trenches are constructed one behind the other.

3. A New Idea Squad has been organised for research into problems regarding tactics, weapons and material. The result has been eminently successful.

4. Almost twenty-five percent of the unit's strength is engaged in cultivation for the support of all. Allotment of land per man is 200 TSUBO (1 TSUBO is 3.95 sq yds). A stage of self-sufficiency is gradually being attained.

5. In addition to the abovementioned work intensive and enthusiastic training is being carried out day and night, despite continuous attacks by more than 100 enemy airplanes at a time. Great emphasis is placed on close range fighting and especially on anti-tank fighting. Intensive training under the principal that "each individual soldier is a potential anti-tank weapon" is being conducted. The Army Comd himself participates in the anti-tank mine attack training. Training is being carried out repeatedly using hypothetical situations.

In view of our policy regarding future operations, air co-operation cannot be counted upon except in the area where a decisive battle is to take place.' " (First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 142)

PLIGHT OF ENEMY FORCES IN EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY AREA

The apparently hopeless situation which faces the enemy in SOUTHERN BOUGAINVILLE is emphasised in a letter, dated 14 Jan 45, and since captured by our forces. It is addressed to 2/Lt SUGIMOTO then operating in the MAWARAKA area. The sender is unknown. A full translation of the document is quoted below:-

"Your operational activities at the front line at MAWARAKA are truly appreciated.

Some time ago I received your letter, but due to the approaching of the enemy's main force after their sudden landing, I was sent in charge of a patrol to MANOGATA coast. I was unable to reply. At last the enemy has begun to advance in earnest. (TN:Part illegible) am waiting with great anticipation.

I do think of the unequalled suffering that you are undergoing in your activities and combat, but there is nothing that can be done about it.

I believe the situation at BO TO (BOUGAINVILLE) is utterly hopeless. Although we are chiefly infantry troops we are not exactly waiting for the enemy merely for the infantry combat practice. However, we are holding stubbornly with the "Come and get it" attitude.

I am sorry that we have no tobacco on hand to fulfill your request, but (TN:remainder illegible)"

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix "B" are corrections to place names and additions to topographical information on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.

E H Wilson

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff

Distribution as for Summary No 10

APPENDIX "A" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 12

81 mm AA MORTAR SHELL

GENERAL

The following details are taken from a report by Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit No 1, on a new Japanese Army 81 mm AA mortar shell recovered from the ORMOC BAY area on LEYTE.

No reports on the effectiveness of this weapon have come to hand, but its use is stated to be against strafing and low-flying aircraft. The method of functioning is similar to that of the 70 mm barrage mortar which was used by the Japanese in the NEW BRITAIN area as far back as December 1943.

This 81 mm shell does not conform to any previous designs. The shell is packed separately in a cylindrical tin container, as distinct from the 70 mm shell, which houses seven small bomb containers. Another noteworthy feature is the self-destroying agent, which causes the projectile to explode after 45 seconds - self-destroying is reported to occur after a fall from 1,000 feet to 500 feet.

DESCRIPTION

The mortar shell is a black steel tube 1½" in diameter, with 6 fins (81 mm diameter) spot-welded along the after part of the tube. It contains an expelling charge, which is operated by a 12 second powder fuze, and a HE cylinder with parachutes attached.

The HE cylinder consists of a steel case, a 45 second self-destruction powder fuze, a friction igniter and three cylindrical explosive blocks - one cyclonite and two TNT.

The parachute supporting the cylinder is secured by a small fixed "U" bolt, and a second parachute is secured to the friction igniter by a line 32 feet 4 inches long.

OPERATION

When the shell is fired, the flash from the black powder ignites the propellant and the 12 second fuze. The projectile is propelled into the air, and after 12 seconds, the fuze ignites the expelling charge, blowing the HE cylinder and parachutes from the forward end of the shell. The 45 second self-destroying fuze is also ignited.

The cylinder is now suspended by a 32 foot cord from the upper parachute, and planes striking the cord will cause it to explode the HE cylinder. After 45 seconds, if the cord has not been struck, the self-destroying fuze detonates the cylinder.


SPECIFIC DATA


Total Weight	3 lbs 14 ozs
Weight of HE cylinder & parachutes	1 lb 5 ozs
Weight of propellant	3/4 ozs
Weight of HE blocks (total)	4 ozs
Overall length	53.5 cm
Length of shell (less propellant container)	46.9 cm
Diameter of mortar shell body	3.8 cm
Length of fins	11/42 mm
Length of HE cylinder	17.7 cm
Thickness of cylinder walls	1.5 mm
Diameter of cylinder parachute	30.4 cm
Diameter of igniter parachute	40.6 cm

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 142)

JAPANESE ARMY 81 MM. AA MORTAR SHELL

APPENDIX 'A' ~~TO FIRST AUST ARMY INT SUM/ADV No. 142 OF 8 FEB 45.~~





APPENDIX "B" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 12.

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Refmaps: BOUGAINVILLE Island 1 Inch to 1 Mile Series.
" " 1:25,000 Series.

ADDITIONS TO PLACE NAMES

CHAMBER's Hill	KOWARO 1:25,000	738158
HENRY's Hill	" "	672166
WEARNE's Hill	" "	695165
RYDER's Hill	" "	154143
ROBERTSON's Hill	" "	697136

TRACK INFORMATION

Refmap MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA River 1 Inch

From 707578 to 765521 beach track is considered jeepable.

The track from 901480 to 940502 is a well worn pad, cleared for approximately 10 feet on either side.

From 922502 a track runs NW to the river bank. A track leads north from 931501 to a hut on the river bank.

Four bridges have been constructed between ROBBIE's Rest and KUPON and a jeep has proceeded to KUPON, but the track requires further attention before it can be opened for constant traffic.

Refmap KOWARO 1:25,000

KEENAN's Ridge area - Tracks in this area are mainly well defined and wide enough for the comfortable passage of one man. Gradients are steep, many as steep as 1 in 2. The soil is soft and grey coloured, very slippery when wet but drying quickly.

Track from road head 658090 to staging point 642112 is 2 to 3 feet wide and well worn; not jeepable.

The track from 646172 to 657175 could be made jeepable with a little work.

The track along feature from 693746 to 693153 could also be made jeepable.

Refmap TAIOF Island 1 Inch

The track from 243602 to 241586 is a well worn foot track 10 yards in from beach.

TANWOA Island 155656 - A corduroyed track 3 feet wide leads west from jetty along water's edge.

RIVER CROSSINGS

Refmap TAIOF Island 1 Inch

At 237583 there is a log bridge 75 feet long and 2 feet wide, 30 yards from the river mouth.

Refmap MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA River 1 Inch

KOWATO River at 873683 is 20 feet wide and one foot deep, with banks 25 feet high.

PURIATA River is sluggish at the mouth and the sandbar is covered by 2 feet of water at low tide. The channel at this point is 30 yards wide.

Refmap AITARA 1 Inch

At 985304 there is a log footbridge.

Refmap KARA 1 Inch

A captured Japanese document states that the following river crossing conditions existed on the BUIN-MOSIGETTA road in Feb 44.

SILIBAI River 28 yards wide and approximately 12 inches deep.

MIBO River 55 yards wide, 1' 6" to 1' 9" deep and difficult to ford.

MOBIAI River 44 yards wide and 12 inches deep, easily forded.

Refmap KOWARO 1:25,000

AUBAUBI River crossing at 655105 is 40 yards wide and 2 feet deep. The river is fast flowing and has a rocky bottom.

ASABA River, at 686097, is 30 feet wide and 4 feet deep. It is very fast flowing with a rocky bottom.

GENERAL

Refmap MOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA River 1 Inch

From 765521 to 795490 the country is swampy, with the exception of a coastal strip of approximately 20 feet.

The three rivers in this area, at 765520, 773512 and 785501, are swampy. Mouths are tidal, with water 6 inches deep over firm sand.

River water is considered drinkable after chlorination.

Refmap TAIOF Island 1 Inch

At 148650 there is a 6 to 8 feet gap in the reef. The water is deep enough for shallow draught barge traffic.


At 156691 there is a small wooden jetty constructed of rough planks.

Inlets on the west coast of TAIOF Island run in beneath mangroves, some for a distance of 200 yards. Water in the inlets appears deep.

The water at end of jetty at 156655 appears shallow, with deeper water on NW side.

Refmap KOWARO 1:25,000

A patrol reports good clear running water at 606145 and 608146. At both points water appears to originate from springs.


Kunai Patch
New site
LALUM
natives
TSINOPEI
Old Site NEMBOROSIE
New Site
NEMBOROSIE
Garden
30
Old Site GOTON
Garden
Old village
BAKARIMERA
50
50
POENAI River
Old camp
Old site
TOTOKEI
ADDITIONAL TRACK INFORMATION
compiled from Patrol Reports
Refmaps: TAIOF Island 1 Inch to 1 Mile
BANIU " "
KONUA " "
AITA " "
New site TOSIAVI
KEOKEORO
Garden
30

SECRET

GSI

2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 13

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Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 11 Feb 45 to 2400 hrs 18 Feb 45

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"C" ADDITIONS TO PLACE NAMES AND TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

NORTH BOUGAINVILLE

After clearing the enemy out of the AMPHITHEATRE feature and crossing the GENGA RIVER our troops moved north along the coast only a mile and a half before striking further heavy opposition. The advance is being delayed by a small pocket of enemy dug in near the mouth of the GILMAN RIVER. Efforts to outflank this pocket by moving bodies of troops round inland trails are being determinedly opposed.

SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

Small parties of enemy fighting rearguard actions are probably the only Japanese remaining north and west of the PURIATA RIVER. Most of the area formerly occupied by the Jap 13 Inf Regt has been cleared of enemy , and three separate Australian forces are closing on the MAKAPEKA ford from the north and west. One prisoner taken on the road 2 miles NW of MOSIGETTA on 13 Feb stated there were about 500 of the 13 Regt disposed at MEIVO and east of MOSIGETTA on 13 Feb, but our troops moving through those areas have seen no signs of occupation by large bodies of troops, neither have they encountered opposition in strength.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

GENGA RIVER

After clearing the GENGA RIVER area, our troops advancing north have been held up again by determined enemy resistance a mile north of the river mouth. At this point, the enemy, estimated to have two LMGs and 15 rifles, is dug in on a sandpit along which the track runs to the GILMAN RIVER crossing. Their flanks are protected by the sea and a lagoon. Our force is now dug in 50 yds south of the enemy.

On 16 Feb, one platoon with FOO set out through very dense jungle east of the lagoon to try to get behind the enemy by following the east bank of the GILMAN RIVER to its mouth.

This party contacted enemy 400 yds NE of the river mouth on 18 Feb, killing three. Reinforced, this force is now patrolling further north, trying to reach the coast in a wider sweep. Support was given to this operation by our artillery and mortars, which on 17 Feb shelled enemy positions on the east and west banks of the GILMAN RIVER 200 yds from the mouth.

On 14 Feb, a patrol moving east along the KUNAMATORO track located an enemy ambush on a creek crossing approx 100 yds from our position at the junction of the KUNAMATORO and LALUM tracks. The enemy is estimated to be in strength, and is holding the high ground on the east bank.

Enemy artillery action has been on a reduced scale during the week, most shells falling ineffectively on the north bank of the GENGA RIVER and in the TSIMBA area. Our own artillery and mortars have given support to all our operations and kept up harassing fire on enemy positions.

Our troops attempting a parallel advance along the inland track have been held up by enemy positions on DOWN'S HILL. This is a 60 ft ridge, defended by heavy fire from pill-boxes and trench system, and surrounded by trip wires, located three miles east of the mouth of the GENGA RIVER. Enemy strength is estimated at 20/30, armed with LMGs. Our troops are dug in 300 yds south of the enemy, and patrols are operating forward from here.

On night 13/14 Feb, two shells fell east of our positions. This is the first occasion on which enemy artillery fire has been directed against our troops in the inland sector.

A polibe boy patrol returning from SAPOSA ISLAND on 16 Feb reported it occupied by the enemy.

PEARL RIDGE

There is still no change in the general situation, activity again being confined to aggressive patrolling into the enemy-occupied areas north of PEARL RIDGE, and continual harassment of the enemy by artillery, mortars and MMG fire.

A patrol returning on 14 Feb reported enemy dug in on the eastern slopes of SMITH'S HILL and on HENRY'S HILL, and two huts occupied by an estimated 10 men in the OLD VIVIE area.

The patrol estimated that OLD VIVIE was defended by approx 20 Japs in two positions astride the main north-south track. Five of an estimated 12 located in dug in positions 300 yds south of OLD VIVIE were killed by one of our patrols on 18 Feb.

Another patrol to the north-east of PEARL RIDGE killed seven Japs, wounded four and possibly ten more, on the NUMA NUMA trail, 1600 yds east of WEARNE'S HILL. The enemy in the area is estimated to number 35/50, armed with Juki MGs and LMGs.

Enemy positions and enemy movement observed on SMITH'S HILL have been engaged continually with artillery, mortars and MMG fire. SISIVIE, HENRY'S HILL and other enemy areas north of PEARL RIDGE have also been bombarded.

The enemy is showing a renewed interest in our PEARL RIDGE positions. Enemy movement at night has been heard around our perimeters on a number of occasions, and more of our booby traps have been sprung. On the nights of 11/12 and 13/14 Feb, "coee-ing" was heard on the left flank of our positions, in what was probably an attempt to get our troops to divulge their positions.

From Kanakas brought in by an NGIB patrol to the SISIVIE area on 14 Feb, it is learned that the enemy has returned in strength to IBU from BURITSIOTORARA, to which they had previously withdrawn. The natives state that the enemy is expecting an attack against that area, and has prepared defensive positions.

SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

SISIRUAI

There has been no further enemy opposition to our advance south along the trail to MOSIGETTA. Our forward troops have now reached the crossing of the MAVIRI RIVER, less than two miles north of MOSIGETTA, and have almost effected the junction with our troops moving east along the MOSIGETTA Road and now in occupation of MOSIGETTA.

Continuing the move south from our base on the trail one mile south of MOSINA, our troops occupied WARAPA on 13 Feb. Investigation of the tracks leading west and NE from here to a distance of 600 yds and 1800 yds respectively revealed evidence of enemy occupation, but no sign of the enemy. A patrol from WARAPA found the north bank of the KOHARA and TAVERA RIVERS clear of the enemy to a point four miles west of WARAPA, where contact was made with an outpost of our force stationed in the TAVERA RIVER sector.

A large clearing and track junction, believed to be SISIRUAI 2 was occupied on 14 Feb, and two days later our troops had reached the crossing of the MAVIRI RIVER.

TAVERA RIVER

The few remaining enemy who had been harassing our patrols in this sector have apparently withdrawn from the area.

During the past week no contacts were made by patrols along the river to a distance of 4½ miles inland.

SOVELE

Patrols from our base on the PURIATA RIVER 4½ miles SE of SOVELE have worked their way SW down the river and are now

in the vicinity of the MAKAPEKA ford, and not far from effecting a junction with another force driving on the ford from the NW.

Four well cultivated gardens which are worked by the enemy daily, were found by a patrol 2½ miles ESE of MOSIGETTA. On 17 Feb, movement of enemy parties was reported in this garden area and across the PURIATA RIVER, 1½/2 miles to the south. A patrol moving from SOVELE MISSION to investigate contacted 25 enemy in the garden area, killed one and wounded another.

An unconfirmed native report states that the enemy has five Ls of C south from the MOSIGETTA-PIKEI area. The track most used crosses the river near the mouth of the PURIATA RIVER.

MOSIGETTA

Enemy resistance to our move east along the MAWARAKA-MOSIGETTA road weakened during the week and our troops are now 1000 yds beyond MOSIGETTA.

On 12 Feb, our patrols investigating the tracks leading south from the MOSIGETTA road in the HOZAN area discovered one leading into a clearing 200 yds south of the road, containing three ammunition dumps of approx 300 rounds 75mm ammunition. Five Type 93 land mines were found buried on the road in this area.

On 12 and 13 Feb, enemy attacks were made on our forward elements who by this time had moved 1300 yds beyond HOZAN, and were halted only temporarily. On 14 Feb, two enemy trucks in bad condition were found 700 yds further along the road, and another enemy ambush encountered.

During the night 14/15 Feb, enemy artillery fire was directed on the areas north of the LOG BRIDGE and 1½ miles SE from there along the track, without causing any damage or casualties.

On 15 Feb, our troops were astride the track junction at MEIVO. Indications of hurried enemy withdrawals were observed throughout the area, and documents and equipment of a former enemy HQ were found. After consolidation, a patrol pushed south and SE for 1000 yds and contacted an unknown number of enemy on high ground on the south bank of a creek. The remainder of the company followed the forward platoon for approx 500 yds, where patrols east and west located a number of collapsed old huts in three clearings, believed to be MOSIGETTA village.

On 17 Feb, our forward company cleared an estimated 10 enemy from the position on the south bank of the creek which was holding up our advance. The enemy counter-attacked, and is believed to have lost four killed before being beaten off. By the following day, a patrol had reached and searched the track junction 1000 yds south of MOSIGETTA. No enemy movement was seen.

A patrol to the garden area 1000 yds SE of MOSIGETTA on 18 Feb killed one of fifteen enemy encountered.

TOKO-PURIATA

The enemy is still offering resistance to our patrols attempting to penetrate inland to the main track from MOSIGETTA to SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE along the trails to MARIGA and DARARA. Both these villages are on this main route.

There is evidence that there has been some enemy withdrawal along this track. On 15 Feb, two tracks leading south from the MOSIGETTA road, 1½ miles west of MOSIGETTA, showed signs of recent use, and a party of 40 Japs was observed one mile SW of MOSIGETTA. Two bivouacs, each recently occupied by 40/60 Japs, were also found south of the road, 100 yds west of MEIVO.

However, an NGIB patrol moving south from a position on the MAKATOWA trail reached the MARIGA-KONGARA villages on 15 Feb, and found no evidence of enemy occupation for the past week.

Patrols SE of TOKO cleared out two enemy ambushes along the trail 1000 yards from TOKO on 12 Feb, but two days later, contacted another enemy party estimated at 12 with an LMG, well dug in a further 800 yds north along the DARARA trail. Mortar fire failed to dislodge the enemy, who was again engaged, this time in estimated strength of 30 with one HMG and two LMGs, in the same position on 15 Feb.

On 17 Feb, an Australian company advanced in an outflanking move around the west side of the track. A party of Japs was contacted 1½ miles east of TOKO, and in the following action five enemy were killed and four wounded.

A patrol to the PURIATA RIVER on 16 Feb made no contact, and found the track along the river showing no evidence of recent use.

Following an air strike on 12 Feb on an enemy position up the MARIGA track one mile NE of MAKAKU, our troops advanced up the trail but were halted by an enemy party in position 300 yds NE of MAKAKU. Our patrol returned after making unsuccessful attempts at outflanking the position.

KIETA

Another apparently co-ordinated attempt to drive out an AIB patrol in the KIETA area was made during the week, but like previous attempts, it was not pushed through with any determination and ended in fiasco.

One group of about 50 moving towards the party from PORMA was shot up and grenaded by natives on 15 Feb, beat a hasty retreat and have not been reported since.

A second party seeking to reach the party from BUIN through the LULUAI VALLEY was halted by friendly natives at a trail block near KEKEMONA, and despite use of a small calibre cannon, have not been able to break through the block.

A third party got within a mile of the AIB patrol on 16 Feb, but so far has not ventured to attack.

CHOISEUL

Our AIB scouts report that the area the enemy has under gardens suggests that the Japs are in greater strength that is at present presumed, or that preparation is being made for refugees from other islands.

Six days after the cessation of PT patrols in this sector, a barge arrived, apparently from FAURO ISLAND.

Enemy casualties on BOUGAINVILLE:

	to 18 Feb	22 Nov-18 Feb
Killed	10696	806
PW	123	22
Wounded	(x)	390
From unconfirmed sources:		
Killed	(x)	153

(x) No figures available prior to 22 Nov

NEW BRITAIN

WIDE BAY

Our troops have now reached and occupied KALAI PLTN. An estimated 20 enemy fired on our forward troops south of the PLTN on 12 Feb, but otherwise there was no enemy opposition to this new advance. Enemy contacts, however, are now being made by patrols operating around this position, the largest being on 17 Feb when 25 enemy were killed in an encounter in the headwaters of GOGBULU CREEK, one mile NW of KALAI PLTN.

OPEN BAY

The enemy continues to be active around our OPEN BAY positions, but has not succeeded in halting our advance. His most determined offensive activity was on 17 Feb, when three attacks by 30/50 Japs were repulsed by our forward company, which is now established two miles NE of MAVELO.

NEW GUINEA

DANMAP RIVER

The enemy is resisting stubbornly in the ABAU area, and contacts continue to be made, particularly to the east of ABAU and around our now consolidated positions on NAMBUT HILL. Aerial observers report a considerable increase in enemy activity east in the coastal areas and along the ANUMB RIVER.

Reports continue to be received of sizeable parties of enemy in the area SW of ABOAMA. The largest was a party of 80/100 sighted at WAHIGA, three miles SW of ABOAMA, and reported to be moving SE.

BALIF

As a result of our aggressive patrols throughout the area, the enemy in the main is withdrawing to the south and SE.

Following the enemy withdrawal from the BALIF villages, 150 Japs were reported in position at MALAHUM, two miles to the SE, on 16 Feb.

Although MAPRIK was reported clear by natives on 17 Feb, the enemy has maintained his movement to this area, and concentrations are reported 10 miles to the SW and in the villages approx four miles north.

HANSA BAY

There has been a marked increase in enemy activity though no aggressive action has yet been taken by the Japanese. Several enemy parties of up to 50/60 have been encountered and observed by our patrols throughout the area, and on 12 Feb, one of these patrols contacted an estimated 100 well armed and clothed Japanese at MEMNEN. Our troops killed eleven enemy, including a captain, before withdrawing to NUBIA.

(b) SEA - ENEMY

Sightings of enemy barges in the NW area further confirm the existence of barge traffic in the GENGA-SORAKEN-TAIOF area mentioned in documents recently captured in the TSIMBA area.

On 13 Feb, three Type "A" barges were observed and attacked by aircraft on the north coast of SORAKEN PLTN. All three were destroyed or rendered unserviceable. Another 16 ft barge was strafed in the same area on 18 Jan.

A probable Type "F" barge was sunk by aircraft four miles SW of TAIOF IS on 12 Feb. It is known that a barge from TAIOF IS visited SAPOSA IS during the night 15/16 Feb.

Following the cessation of PT boat patrols in the CHOISEUL area, the enemy is again operating barges in this sector. One craft arrived at CHOISEUL, apparently from FAURO IS, six days after the last PT patrol.

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

Ground troops were supported on 17 occasions by Corsairs during the period under review.

In SW BOUGAINVILLE enemy positions were hit at HIRU HIRU on 12 and 18 Feb. An enemy ambush at MABIS was successfully attacked on 12 Feb and later occupied by our forces. Huts and enemy positions were well covered at PIKEI on 16 and 17 Feb, a position 1100 yds SW of MOSIGETTA on 12 Feb and the PURIATA RIVER crossing 877503 on 13 Feb. Track strafing and bombing in advance of our troops west of MOSIGETTA was successfully carried out on 12 and 13 Feb.

In an area 8 miles south of KIETA Jap concentrations were bombed at CHIPURO on 12 Feb and at SIPURU on 15 Feb at the request of AIB.

On the NW coastal sector huts and supply areas were bombed at 269583 in the vicinity of KUNAMATORO where an ammunition dump was destroyed. Accurate bombing and strafing attacks were carried out against the enemy defensive positions on DOWNS HILL on 13, 14 and 18 Feb.

One barge was destroyed and two rendered unserviceable north of SORAKEN Peninsula and a gun position SW of SORAKEN PLTN was bombed with unobserved results.

Tac/R aircraft led in the Corsairs on 10 of the strikes.

In addition to the above, Corsair raids were made on SORAKEN PLTN, PORPORAN ISLAND, and HARI (2) where target areas were well covered. KINDAI was attacked on three occasions only minor damage being caused by the first and second attacks. A good coverage was obtained by the third raid. Medium bombers from GREEN ISLAND attacked targets at MAIKI and BANIU BAY. Detailed results were not observed.

Tac/R aircraft indicated the target in 5 of these strikes.

Patrol aircraft sank a canoe off PORTON PLTN, an F Type barge south of TAIOF ISLAND and a rowing boat in MATCHIN BAY. Water craft were strafed and hit at ASIE ISLAND, LAHIAI, TEOP BAY, JUPINOL ISLAND and RATSOA Jetty.

NEW IRELAND

Pressure was maintained on enemy installations in the KAVIENG area by medium bombers and daily Corsair patrols. Medium bombers made 5 attacks on the airstrip area and buildings in the township during the week.

On 4 days a total of 46 Mitchells strafed huts in the coastal area from KAUT BAY to KOKA PLTN and from BALUS PLTN to CAPE LEMERIS.

The bridge at BALUS PLTN was destroyed and the roads in the same locality cratered on successive days.

Bivouac areas and huts were bombed at NORTH CAPE, LEBRECHTSHOF, MONGAI BAY, MEDINA PLTN, KAFKAF, KIMIDAN, NAMATANAI, LAMERNEWEI, ROLAND YOUNG PLTN, BAUDISSIN ISLAND and MAZE ISLAND.

NEW BRITAIN

Heavy and medium bombers again concentrated on VUNAKANAU hitting the area on 4 occasions. TOBERA was raided 3 times and LAKUNAI twice by these aircraft.

The MT park at RABAUL, supply areas at KERAVAT and bivouac areas at TOVAKUNDUM PLTN, WIDE BAY KERAVIA BAY, WANGARAMUT, KERAKAKAUL CREEK and RAVALUE were bombed.

Patrol aircraft destroyed 3 and damaged 8 MT and killed 14 Japs at RABAUL. Seven Japs were killed at UTUAN ISLAND.

NEW GUINEA

Heavy bombers continued to hit targets at WEWAK, BORAM and KAIRIRU ISLAND. Beauforts gave their support to our ground forces in the DANMAP RIVER and BALIF sectors. In the DANMAP RIVER area enemy positions at NAMBUT HILL were attacked on three occasions.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

PIATERAPAIA AREA

Documents captured near SMITH'S HILL on 13 Feb 45 confirm that since our capture of PEARL RIDGE, reinforcements have moved to forward area north of our positions.

The area NEW VIVIE - SMITH'S HILL - WEARNE'S HILL and the NUMA NUMA trail is under the control of 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt, commanded now by Maj MIWA, who has apparently succeeded Capt NAMIMATSU. There are indications from a rough sketch map that the bulk of 2 Bn has moved forward from Base Point 1.

The bulk of 81 Inf Regt Gun Coy which had a strength of 30 men on 24 Jan, arrived at HENRY'S HILL about 19 Jan. This coincides with the native report of 19 Jan that 33 Japanese with one gun arrived at HENRY'S HILL. The gun was stated to be on the southern slopes of HENRY'S HILL. This Gun Coy, however, appears to be operating in an infantry role and has HQ and 1 Pl based at HENRY'S HILL and 2 Pl on the north-south ridge near OLD VIVIE.

81 Inf Regt Tk A Coy is under command of 2 Bn and on 18 Jan was located at Base Point 1 engaged on transportation duties along the NUMA NUMA trail.

7 Coy 81 Inf Regt arrived in the forward area before 14 Jan and appears to have a platoon on SMITH'S HILL and a platoon near MAPIA.

The strength in the 2 Bn area from Base Point 1 forward is estimated at 250.

The native report that IBU was occupied in strength on 16 Feb is probable confirmation of 3 Bn 81 Inf Regt in the TOKUA - IBU - SISIVIE area. The boundary between 2 and 3 Bns is believed to be the unnamed river (from junction at 654193 through 650182 - ref maps 1 : 25000 series) and the WAKUNAI River.

EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY

The last review of the Enemy OOB in this area was given in Summary No 9 on 21 Jan 45.

At that time 2 Bn 13 Inf Regt and 3 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt were holding the MOSINA - NIGITAN - KUPON area and 3 Bn 13 Inf Regt with 2 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt had just been transferred to the vicinity of MAKATOWA.

Elements of 2 Bn were at KEREKOPA, 1 Bn Wagon Lines 6 Fd Arty Regt comprised the sorry RABERE Garrison Unit and 1 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt was disposed between TOKINOTU and TOKO.

The main strength of the regimental group was in the MOSIGETTA - PIKEI area with 13 Inf Regt HQ moving west towards MAKATOWA to take command of the defence against what the Japanese realised almost too late was their greatest threat.

The KEREKOPA Guard Unit was withdrawn and on 22 Jan reinforced 2 Bn 13 Inf Regt, making the total strength of the battalion 57. The diary of a member of 2 Bn explains that the annihilative attacks this battalion was to have made were not carried out "due to the lack of enemy information."

On 8 Feb, 2 Bn was ordered to withdraw to MORENO (MENDAI Area) with 5 and 7 Coys on the TAVERA River and 6 and 8 Coys at NIGITAN covering the withdrawal. A platoon of 6 Fd Arty Regt was near KUPON, and 2 MG Coy and 2 Bn Gun Pl were on SECRET TRACK.

After a raid by our troops at WARAPA on 11 Feb 2 Bn made off smartly south and has not been contacted since.

The RABERE Garrison Unit, after its unhappy encounter with a commando patrol on 27 Jan, has apparently withdrawn to PIKEI.

On the MAWARAKA - MOSIGETTA road 13 Inf Regt Gun Coy and part of 6 Tpt Regt are believed to have moved up behind 3 Bn and 2 Bty 6 Fd Arty Regt. According to a PW 30 men of the Arty Bty were acting as infantry and the remaining 40 were manning three 75 mm guns.

On 31 Jan Regt HQ was to withdraw to HOZAN, where the Adjutant in a letter to Col MUDA suggested it would be a good idea to send two or three men to construct shelters and entrenchments.

By 5 Feb the local commander in the MAKATOWA area, who had disposed his main strength astride the road, was showing concern over our encircling movements and wrote to Col MUDA for advice. Col MUDA instructed him to decrease his strength in the centre and add to that of the flanks, at the same time executing secret reconnaissances to determine the direction of advance.

This plan apparently enabled our troops to advance more quickly along the axis of the road and within three days were well on the way to HOZAN with the answer to Col MUDA's query. On 13 Feb a PW gave an estimate of 300 Japanese in front of our forward troops on the MOSIGETTA road.

Contact with the enemy during the past few days has been light, and main concentrations of enemy now appear to be at PIKEI - MAKAPEKA, BARARA area, TOKINOTU and possibly alongthe road leading SW from MOSIGETTA.

The boundary between 13 and 23 Inf Regts is the HONGORAI River. There have been no indications of the arrival of reinforcemnnts from 23 Inf Regt area. One PW believes that none will come.

The first documentary evidence of the strength of an infantry component of 13 Inf Regt was received in documents captured at WARAPA on 13 Feb. These show the strength of 2 Bn on 23 Jan to be 57, and after deducting casualties its present strength is estimated to be 35. It appears that former PW estimates of the strength of infantry elements in this area hasbeen high and accordingly a similar reduction in strength has been made for 3 Bn. The current estimate of enemy strength west of the HONGORAI River is 800.

5. EQUIPMENT.

CONVERTED AIRCRAFT MGs

Two aircraft MGs captured in the MAKATOWA area revealed that the enemy is again converting weapons from damaged or unserviceable aircraft to ground use.

The MGs were one Browning 7.7mm aircooled belt fed fixed aircraft MG and one Lewis type 7.7mm aircooled drum fed flexible aircraft MG.

The improvised bipod of the Browning MG was of two roughly wrought iron spikes approximately fifteen inches long bolted to the forward mounting lug. The trigger cable was replaced by a simple link system on the left side of the gun. A twelve inch iron spike, resembling a crank handle, was fitted in the rear mounting lug and connected to the link system to form the trigger. To fire the gun the crank handle trigger required a turn of approximately 60 degrees. Shoulder control was provided by the addition of a curved length of wrought iron, six inches in length and two inches wide.

The conversion of the Lewis consisted of the addition of a ground rest of rough sawn packing case board fourteen inches long three inches wide bolted to the forward mounting lug, presumably to be used as a monopod, leaving two hands free to hold the weapon by the pistol grip and rear hand grip as no attempt had been made to provide shoulder control.

Previous evidence of such weapons was at MADANG in Jun 44 when our troops recovered two Lewis type aircraft 7.7mm MGs converted to ground use by the addition of bipod legs and an improvised wooden butt.

Both weapons, which were in serviceable condition, fire 7.7mm SAA ammunition. The conversion carried out was rough and amateurish, giving very little control, especially when engaging moving targets.

Due to the loss of HMGs and LMGs in past and present operations the enemy will probably be forced through lack of ample replacements to use more of these salvaged aircraft weapons.

JAPANESE BOOBY TRAPS AND INCENDIARIES

Attached as Appendix "A" are sketches and diagrams showing booby traps and incendiary devices.

D. GENERAL

RECESSION OF JAP AIR LINE

An indication of the vastness of the retreat of the enemy's air line durin; 1944 is depicted in Appendix 'B' attached. Shrinkage towards the perimeter of the inner Empire bloc has covered hundreds of thousands of square miles within the year.

(First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 143)

JAPANESE L OF C SISIVIE AREA

A captured Op Order dated 14 Jan is ued by 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt ordered the reconnaissance of what is believed to be the area UPPER WAKUNAI RIVER - TOKUA - SISIVIE. The reconnaissance patrol was to pay special attention to the possibility of constructing an MT road.

Native reports in early Jan stated that the enemy wa using MT for approximately 9000 yards along the WAKUNAI RIVER from its mouth, and between 11 and 14 Jan sounds of engines were heard in the area. A patrol to the VIVIE area on 6 Jan had also heard the sound of engines.

However, investigation of the road IBU - BURITSIOTORARA on 19 Jan revealed no trace of wheeled traffic, and the natives considered that the sound of engines heard was not caused by MT.

A further native report on 17 Jan stated that the enemy favoured the track along the WAKUNAI RIVER as a L of C.

It is evident therefore that the enemy is showing considerable interest in the possibility of an MT road by which he can shorten the carrying distance to his forward troops at SISIVIE - IBU and north of PEARL RIDGE, and that the possibility of construction work on the road being already under way cannot be overlooked.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix 'C' are additions to place names and topographical information on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.

E H Wilson

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff


Distribution as for Summary No 10

Appendix 'A' ~~to HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 143 of 15 Feb 45~~

BOOBY TRAPS AND INCENDIARIES

DIAGRAM No 1

BOOBY TRAP USING A BOOK



Explanation :-


Principally used for incendiary effect; however, it can be used for other purposes.

Patterned after a book. May be camouflaged as a book-cover as illustrated above, or the mechanism may be camouflaged in a book which has been cut out for that purpose.

The powder used differs according to the purpose.

DIAGRAM No 2

BOOBY TRAP USING A STRAW DUMMY




Explanation :-

When the sword is withdrawn the cord is pulled, and the resulting explosion disperses the nails (or No 8 wire) in all directions.

DIAGRAM No 3

INCENDIARY BOTTLE



Explanation:


In starting a fire it is attached to objects in an inverted position as shown in the left drawing. After 10 to 20 hours the sulfuric acid in the lower portion soaks through the rubber sack and contacts and ignites the compound within the sack. The gasoline (or kerosene) aids the fire and helps to spread it.

When a longer delay is required, adhesive tape will be substituted for the rubber sack.

DIAGRAM No 4

INCENDIARY CELLULOID TOOTHBRUSH CASE

The principle of ignition is the same as Diagram No 3.



Appendix "B"

RECESSION OF ENEMY AIR LINE


1. ADVANCED AIR LINE OF JAN 45 ARROWS THE DECLINE OF LUZON INTO A WEAPON, RATHER THAN THE MAIN, BASE.
2. MANILA, HONG, ORE WORK IT NECESSARY BYSONS

ANY ENEMY AIR LINE FEB 44 ——————

MAIN PASE ENEMY AIR LINE FEB 44 — - —

ANY ENEMY AIR LINE MAY 44

MAIN BASE ENEMY AIR LINE MAY 44



APPENDIX "C" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 13.

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Refmaps: BOUGAINVILLE 1 Inch to 1 Mile Series.
" 1:25,000 Series.

ADDITION TO PLACE NAMES

DOWN's Ridge - BANIU 1" Sheet, mapref 269569.

TRACK INFORMATION

Refmap KOWARO 1:25,000

A well worn track varying from 2 to 5 feet in width runs from 688170 to 685166.

Refmap KIETA 1"

From 264938 to 330871 there is a track well defined and well worn

Refmap KOTUPENA Pt-PURIATA R 1"

The road from beachhead to SOUTH HUPAI River at 831605 is now negotiable to oneway 3 ton traffic.

Refmap MONOITU 1:25,000

Track junction at 010404 shows evidence of being used by wheeled vehicles.

RIVER CROSSINGS

Bridge information KIETA area to 18 Feb 45:

Refmap KIETA 1"

Mapref	Width	Length	Particulars
273919			Unserviceable - detour either side.
287918	10 ft	25 ft	Serviceable - wooden construction.
294903	12 ft	40 ft	Log construction - serviceable for foot traffic.
297896			Unserviceable.
297886	10 ft		Wooden, serviceable.
297895	10 ft	20 ft	Wooden, serviceable.
303879	10 ft	30 ft	Serviceable.
311874	10 ft	20 ft	Wooden, serviceable.
313874	10 ft	30 ft	Serviceable for foot traffic.
320876	10 ft	25 ft	Wooden, serviceable.
324872	10 ft	35 ft	Wooden, serviceable.

Refmap TAIOF Island 1"

241657 - Narrow footbridge.

Refmap AITARA 1"

022403 - Plank constructed bridge 20 x 8 ft. Serviceable for light MT.

131333 - Inverted truck chassis forming a ford.

Refmap KARA 1"

085454 - Plank constructed bridge approximately 15 x 8 ft.

GENERAL

Refmap KIETA 1"

Jetties at 263940 and 264938 are in good condition.

Refmap BUKA Island 1"

Jetty at 020075 is 50 yards long by 4 yards wide, of earth and stone construction and in serviceable condition.

Jetties at 017107 and 027148 are unserviceable.

Tac R reports an observation tower at 024152.

Two stone jetties at 054017 are approximately 30 yards long; both serviceable.

Refmap KOWARO 1:25,000

A dropping ground is being cleared at 673114.

SECRET

GSI

2 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No 14

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Compiled from information received from 2400 hrs 18 Feb 45 to 2400 hrs 25 Feb 45

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"B" JAPANESE MEDIUM TANK

"C" JAPANESE IMPROVISED HAND GRENADE

"D" JAPANESE MODEL 10 ROCKET LAUNCHER

"E" ADDITIONS TO PLACE NAMES AND TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE

From Tac/R, native reports and statements of prisoners of war it appears the enemy are preparing to make their next co-ordinated stand on the HONGORAI River.

No further indications of the fairly large parties of 13 Inf Regt Japs, numbering between 40 and 60 who were near MOSIGETTA a fortnight ago were found during the week. Only small isolated parties remain to be hunted down to clear all the territory NW of the PURIATA River.

Some clue to the whereabouts of the remnants of 13 Inf Regt is given by native reports that about 100 Japs arrived in the TAI TAI area from MOSIGETTA about early January, and considerable numbers of Japs left the MOSIGETTA area about 12 Feb for MONOITU. This information, coupled with the absence of any reports of Japanese concentrations between the PURIATA and west bank of the HONGORAI River, with the exception of a few transport personnel at HIRUHIRU may mean the defeated and disorganised 13 Inf Regt has abandoned any intention to defend the remainder of its area of responsibility. The HONGORAI River is the boundary between 13 Inf Regt and 23 Inf Regt, and for the rest of our progress to the HONGORAI it is probable that 13 Regt will be capable of deploying only small delaying parties.

Reports of enemy concentrations in TAITAI area and to the west and SW are of long standing, so it seems certain that the defensive preparations on the HONGORAI are being undertaken by 23 Regt.

Knowledge of the Order of Battle of 23 Regt is very sketchy, but some idea of their dispositions for the task of keeping our troops out of the BUIN area can be gleaned from native reports. These place parties of Japs dug in along the west bank of the HONGORAI at CIROI which is about 3 miles NE of the RUMIKI ford. From CIROI to the RUMIKI ford there are numbers of small ridges running NE and SW, affording better defensive possibilities that the flat country SW of RUMIKI.

More Japs reported at SINANAI, others, probably 1 Bn of 6 Fd Arty Regt at the RUMIKI ford, and further parties on a roughly north and south line between RUMIKI ford and MAMAGATA at the mouth of the HARI River.

Those parties screen the large and fruitful garden areas of TAITAI and MONOITU, which are in full produce, and essential for the sustenance of the bulk of the Regt.

Largest concentrations are reported from KAPANA, MONOITU, UNUNAI and RUNAI and along the main east west road between RUNAI and the MIBO River, with Regt HQ probably at RUSEI.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND — OWN AND ENEMY

BUKA

On 19 Feb, a police boy canoe patrol returned from an investigation of the islands off the south and SW coast of BUKA. This patrol reported that the SW coast of BUKA is only lightly held, and that the only Japanese on PETATS, MATSUNGAN and MADEHAS ISLANDS were single sentries on each.

A patrol was then sent to PETATS ISLAND, returning on 21 Feb with the captured enemy sentry and some documents. Three hundred and seventy six natives were later evacuated by barge. Four enemy who visited the island during the evacuation were killed by our troops.

NORTH-WEST BOUGAINVILLE

On 20 Feb, our force which had advanced up the east bank of the GILMAN RIVER in an attempt to get behind the enemy holding up our troops south of the GILMAN RIVER mouth reached the coast 400 yds north of the river.

Enemy resistance on the sand spit south of the river mouth ceased on 21 Feb, and investigation showed the area to be clear. The enemy had apparently evacuated his positions during the previous night.

In the afternoon, our troops crossed the river and moved up to join the company perimeter 400 yds north set up the previous day by the force which had moved up the GILMAN RIVER.

There has as yet been no enemy reaction to this new advance, though active digging and chopping 200 yds to the north suggests that the enemy is preparing to make another stand there.

Patrols from this perimeter have had several engagements, the largest being on 23 Feb when a strong enemy position was encountered 300 yds to the NE, forcing our patrol to return.

In the inland sector, our troops now control DOWNS HILL. On 19 Feb, high ground NE of the objective was captured, and operations commenced SW to the main enemy positions. Fighting was continued throughout the day, and by 20 Feb, the major portion of DOWNS HILL had been occupied. The enemy counter-attacked the following morning, but was repulsed with two killed.

Small enemy pockets are continuing to harass our consolidation of the area, and several sharp clashes have been reported by local patrols forward and east of this position.

A third force is moving, so far without opposition, along the trail to LALUM, and was last reported in position on the track 1200 yds east of the mouth of the GILMAN RIVER.

The enemy continues to make consistent use of his artillery. Our own artillery and mortars have given active support to our operations.

PEARL RIDGE

Enemy positions north of PEARL RIDGE, particularly on SMITH'S HILL, have again been continually hammered by our artillery and mortars.

Long-range patrols are being maintained forward of PEARL RIDGE and several more contacts have been made. Two enemy were killed when our troops clashed with an enemy party using a Juki MG in the area approximately one mile SSE of SISIVIE.

Enemy movement was again heard forward of ARTY HILL on night of 21/22 Feb.

According to two Kanakas from MAPIARO (on NUMA NUMA trail, approx. eight miles from the coast) there are 20 Japs in the area one mile to the NE of MAPIARO. They stated that rice in NUMA NUMA was finished, and the Japanese were fishing with grenades.

MOSIGETTA-PIKEI-MARIGA

Following the junction of our two forces which converged on MOSIGETTA from the north and NW, our troops have been engaged in clearing the area south and SE from MOSIGETTA of any small enemy parties.

At the same time another force pushing SW down the trail reached MARIGA.

In clearance of the garden areas SE of MOSIGETTA towards PIKEI the largest enemy party encountered was 20, dug in 1000 yds SE of MOSIGETTA.

On 21 Feb, one company left the MOSIGETTA area to move SE through the garden area to the road to PIKEI. After repulsing an attack approx 200 yds north of the PIKEI road, in which six of the 13 enemy engaged were killed, the company moved on and reached the road 1500 yds west of PIKEI on 22 Feb. Subsequent patrols north from this new position made no contacts.

Next day two platoons moved approx 700 yds east along the road to PIKEI and set up a base there. Patrols north and south from this point to a distance of 1500 yds sighted no enemy, and on 24 Feb, the move east was resumed.

By next day, our forward coy had moved through PIKEI, where an evacuated enemy hospital consisting of 15 huts was found. That coy now holds 700 yds of the track east of PIKEI.

Operations from the main track junction 1000 yds south of MOSIGETTA were directed on the east to the clearing of the area below the PIKEI road, and to the SW along the track to MARIGA. On 23 Feb, the forward company in our advance towards MARIGA penetrated 1500 yds SW from the track junction.

On 21 Feb, one company left the MOSIGETTA area and in a wide movement west and then south, struck the MARIGA track 3000 yds south of MOSIGETTA, without any enemy interference.

Two enemy attacks against the company perimeter set up in this position were beaten off during the night 21/22 Feb, and another on the following morning.

From here one pl moved to the NE to link up with our other force moving down the track and approx one mile distant, while other patrols continued the move SW to MARIGA which showed signs of recent occupation.

NGIB patrols from bases in the HOZAN area are operating in the areas to the SW, south and SE. On 23 Feb, no enemy were sighted by any patrol to distances up to 2¼ miles from base.

PURIATA RIVER

Our troops have continued the advance SW down the PURIATA RIVER past recently evacuated enemy defensive positions and gardens, and now control the MAKAPEKA ford. They have sighted very few enemy.

After patrols west along the north bank of the PURIATA RIVER for a distance of approx five miles from our base on the upper reaches had reported the area clear, the force HQ for the area was moved downstream and set up 2400 yds NE of MAKAPEKA.

On 22 Feb, a patrol found several tracks across the PURIATA RIVER in the MAKAPEKA area. An enemy party armed with HMG and rifles was encountered in the vicinity of one of these crossings during the day and three of the enemy were killed in the engagement. Ambushes were set at these crossings the following day.

A patrol from our new base to a point 1500 yds south on 22 Feb and another a further three miles downstream, made no contact.

A third patrol moving north reached the track running through PIKEI at a point 1200 yds east of that village, thus almost effecting a junction between the troops on the PURIATA RIVER and those moving along the track through PIKEI from the NW. The patrol returned without sighting any enemy.

TOKO

Operations of our forces in this area have been directed NE towards DARARA, and after overcoming enemy resistance at several points along the trail, DARARA was finally occupied on 23 Feb.

On 19 Feb, one company advanced to the track junction on the west bank of the PURIATA RIVER, 2000 yds ESE of MABIS, then moved north to reach the DARARA track, 2500 yds from DARARA. In continuing the move NE along the trail towards DARARA, enemy resistance was encountered in two places approx 200 yds apart, on 22 and 23 Feb.

During the first engagement, 17 new packs were observed which might possibly indicate fresh troops in the area. In the second clash, MMGs, mortars and 2 pr Tk A guns assisted our troops to clear the position. Four enemy were killed and one wounded. One platoon then moved forward and

cleared DARARA, an unknown number of enemy retiring ~~before~~ our troops. The company moved forward and consolidated the position during the afternoon of 23 Feb.

The occupation of DARARA advances our forward position along the main track into SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE a further two miles and opens the way for a link up between our troops in this sector and those from the north which have now reached MARIGA.

KIETA

On 19 Feb an enemy party under command of a Colonel was reported by an AIB patrol to be building a large camp in the area 4½ miles SE of ORAMI. However, on 21 Feb, these Japanese moved south to MOAU, west to MERIDAU, and thence north to ORAMI, where they were reinforced from MORONI. Four of these reinforcements were killed and two wounded by the natives during movement from MORONI to ORAMI, and at ORAMI another two were later shot by one of our scouts. The enemy party is now camped on the old village site of ORAMI.

NORTH-WEST BOUGAINVILLE

On 23 Feb, enemy troops moved back to TEOP ISLAND, from whence they had been bombed out approx two months ago. Aerial photographs show a possible fishing net around the coastline, and this may be the reason for the enemy's interest in the island. It is known that fish are abundant in that area.

According to a native report of low grading a submarine landed stores and equipment at TINPUTS HARBOUR about 16 or 17 Feb. Some days later natives saw new boxes and stores on the beach.

ENEMY CASUALTIES ON BOUGAINVILLE:

	to 25 Feb	22Nov-25 Feb
Killed	10801	911
PW	125	24
Wounded	(x)	168
From unconfirmed sources:		
Killed	(x)	405

(x) No figures available prior to 22 Nov

NEW BRITAIN

WIDE BAY

Continuing the move north from the recently occupied KALAI PLANTATION, our forces have occupied RILE in strength, with forward elements established at LAMARIEN. Enemy opposition continues to be confined to minor patrol engagements.

Patrols from our forward base have reached the MAVELO RIVER, one on 21 Feb crossing it at the mouth and moving upstream for a short distance. No enemy have been encountered.

All indications are that the enemy has withdrawn to the WAITAVALO area where he is believed to be in strength and possibly

preparing to make a stand along the HENRY REID RIVER. Australian artillery fire is now being directed into this area.

OPEN BAY

Patrolling north, east and south from our forward bases on the SAI RIVER has constituted the week's activity in this sector. Patrols inland along the SAI RIVER to a distance of 10 miles found abandoned enemy bivouacs, but made no contacts. The major engagement for the week occurred on 23 Feb in the area approx 4 miles NE of the mouth of the SAI RIVER, where one of our patrols was attacked by an estimated 50 Japs and forced to withdraw.

NEW GUINEA

DANMAP RIVER

The move eastward along the coastal track towards the ANUMB RIVER has been resumed, and on 21 Feb our troops had reached BALAM CREEK, within two miles of the ANUMB RIVER, where floods are making movement difficult in the coastal area. Near ROCKY CLIFF, approx two miles east of ABAU, a large ammunition dump containing 17 unserviceable vehicles, a 75 mm gun and a number of MGs, was found.

Patrols from ABOAMA to the south and SE made no contacts. The Japs were reported in the NAGIPEM villages on 17 Feb, but were found to have left when our troops moved to the area on 21 Feb.

BALIF

The only large and effective enemy parties now remaining in the area are in the villages south of BALIF. Widespread patrolling elsewhere has encountered only scattered resistance.

On 20 Feb, our troops occupied MILAK, approx three miles NW of MAPRIK. According to previous native reports, the Japs are in the villages between MILAK and MAPRIK, though MAPRIK itself is clear. This move places our two forward bases within four miles west and NW of MAPRIK.

HANSA BAY

Little activity has been reported from this area, and there has been no continuation of the increased enemy movement of the previous week.

A patrol moving to our outpost at MEL(1) killed two Japs and six armed Kanakas in a canoe on the RAMU RIVER, 10 miles south of the mouth, on 23 Feb.

(c) AIR - OWN

BOUGAINVILLE

The main weight of attacks during the period under review was concentrated upon targets along the Jap Ls of C removed from the immediate vicinity of ground fighting.

A Tac/R carried out at the request of this headquarters and interpretation of airphotos led to areas of enemy activity a mile SW of TAI TAI being attacked by 28 Corsairs on 21 Feb, by a similar number on 22 Feb and by 20 Corsairs on 25 Feb. Tac/R aircraft led in the strikes of 21 and 25 Feb.

All raids were most successful. The strike on 21 Feb resulted in the destruction of many huts and two dumps. Twenty Japs observed running from the area were bombed. In addition the opening up of the dense undergrowth by the bombs revealed further hut concentrations.

Damage caused on 22 Feb was unobserved from the air due to dust and smoke. A report from AIB sources states that a mobile gun was destroyed and 30 Japs killed.

During the attack on 25 Feb, Tac/R aircraft directed the bombing by the Corsairs. The results observed were five huts destroyed, five badly damaged, one sedan or scout car flattened and one damaged, four trucks badly damaged, one burnt and three accurately strafed. Petrol stores were exploded and at least five Japs were killed in a MT park.

Three strikes were made on selected sections of enemy base installations in the MUGUAI - MAIKA area. On 22 Feb six Mitchells and eight Venturas from GREEN ISLAND hit a hut concentration indicated to them by two PIVA Corsairs, destroying many huts and damaging others. On 23 Feb, 13 Corsairs attacked a group of 10/12 large huts 30' x 90', presumably warehouses, destroying six and damaging four. 21 Corsairs on 24 Feb finished the job commenced the previous day.

GREEN based medium bombers attacked installations at MAIKI on 20 Feb and an area of activity along the east west track 1 mile NW of RUNAI on 24 Feb. Suspected enemy troop concentrations at the cross roads 1 mile east of KORIU were hit by 8 Corsairs on 19 Feb. On 20 Feb 4 Corsairs were scrambled following a report of barge sightings in the SORAKEN area, 2 barges were destroyed and 1 rendered unserviceable.

8 strikes were carried out in support of ground troops. In SW BOUGAINVILLE bivouac areas 1 mile SE of KIA RAE and a suspected Bn HQ 1 mile SW of KIA RAE were attacked on 20 Feb. Ground patrols later reported 7 huts destroyed by the attack on the suspected HQ.

Garden areas south of the PURIATA RIVER were attacked by bombing and strafing on 23, 24 and 25 Feb. These attacks will be continued with the object of dissuading the natives from working gardens for the Japs, partial destruction of crops ready for harvest and to deny the produce to the enemy forward troops.

On the NW coastal sector DOWNS HILL and a suspected gun position were hit on 19 Feb. On 23 Feb 4 Corsairs provided cover for our barge activity in the TAIOF ISLAND - BUKA ISLAND area.

Enemy bivouac and dump areas were attacked at TEOP HARBOUR at the request of AIB. Results were unobserved.

Patrols destroyed an unserviceable barge under repair at SORAKEN, 3 huts at PORORAN and 2 huts at CAPE LALAHAN. Opportunity targets were engaged with unobserved results.

NEW IRELAND

The islands of the NUSA ARCHIPELAGO situated west of STETTIN STRAIT at the northern extremity of NEW IRELAND came under heavy attack during the period under review. Daily raids were made on these islands.

A total of 89 sorties of Mitchells, Venturas and Corsairs paid special attention to NUSALEMON, MANE, BAUDISSEN, NANAWAUL and GLOBIO.

Pressure was maintained on enemy installations in the KAVIENG area, Mitchells and Venturas carrying out 5 raids on the airfields and township. On 19 Feb 22 Mitchells and 8 Venturas and on 21 Feb 34 Mitchells and 3 Venturas were the heaviest strikes.

Two strafing runs by a total of 17 Mitchells were made on hutted areas from BALUS to CAPE LEMERIS and KAUT BAY to KOKA PLANTATION.

Minor strikes were made against KIMADAN, NAMATANAI and KATENDAN PLANTATION.

NEW BRITAIN

Strikes were confined to the NE area of the GAZELLE PENINSULA. TOBERA took 2 heavy poundings by medium bombers, 26 Mitchells 8 Venturas on 17 Feb and 27 Mitchells 6 Venturas on 23 Feb.

RABAUL township was visited by medium bombers on 3 occasions while minor raids were made on MATUPI ISLAND, PRAED POINT, VULCAN CRATER, KERAVIA BAY, RALUANA, RALUM and KERAVAT airfield.

NEW GUINEA

Air activity was on a reduced scale in the WEWAK area. NADZAB based heavy and medium bombers hit base installations paying most attention to BUT.

Beauforts from AITAPE supported our ground forces with attacks on Jap troop concentrations and occupied villages.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

SUN GARRISON UNIT

Consequent upon the capture in recent weeks of a number of enemy documents in the GENGA RIVER area, it now becomes possible to make a re-estimate of enemy strength opposing our troops in the GILLMAN RIVER - DOWNS HILL area.

In 2 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 10 the strengths of the SUN Garrison Unit - i.e. the force now operating to the immediate north of the GENGA RIVER - was, after deduction of casualties to 28 Jan 45, estimated at 90.

The documents, however, show that reinforcement by small parties was effected between 18 and 28 Jan.

Elements of various reinforcing units are as set out below:-

2 Bn Gun Pl	6
4 Med Arty Regt (drawn from SORAKEN)	15
Tk A Coy	4
38 Fd AA Bn (drawn from SORAKEN)	41
81 Inf Regt Tk Coy (drawn from SIAR)	15
2 Shipping Engr Regt (drawn from TON)	35
MP Unit	5
Naval Det (drawn from BUKA area)	100
	221

The total strength of the Garrison is now therefore estimated, as a maximum, to be:-

2 Bn 81 Regt	
2 Bn Gun Pl	6
3 Bn 81 Regt	
HQ	19
10 Coy	40
11 Coy - one Pl	25
3 MG Coy - part	9
3 Bn Gun Pl - part	15
Regt Tk A Coy - part	19
Regt Gun Coy - part	5
38 IMB Arty Bn - part	30
4 Med Arty Regt - part	15
38 Fd AA Bn	41
81 Inf Regt Tk Coy - part	15
2 Shipping Engr Regt - part	35
MP Unit - det	5
Naval Det	110
	389
less casualties to 25 Feb 45	188
Total	201

Effectives are estimated at 120

The above reinforcements moved forward in up to six separate groups, and it is considered probable that this system of reinforcement continues.

EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY

A 13 Inf Regt Op Order of 1 Feb, issued at HOZAN, shows that the enemy's main concern at that date was our advances along the MAWARAKA road and from TOKO. The enemy's main defensive strength was on the road west of HOZAN with "one part attacking in the TOKO area."

The units comprising the latter force at that date are not fully known. It was however composed at least of the TOKO Guard Unit (estimated by a PW as 12 strong on 19 Feb and composed of 6 Tpt Regt personnel) and the MARIGA Force. Reinforcements would be provided these forces, if required, from the PURIATA Garrison and labour troops - presumably 1 Bty 6 Fd Arty and 1 and 2 Coys 6 Tpt Regt respectively. A PW placed 1 and 2 Coys (less a pl) 6 Tpt Regt at TOKINOTU on 19 Feb with a combined strength of 70.

1 Fd Hospital, ordered on 1 Feb to construct a secret track from its area (PIKEI) to the MOSIGETTA Ammunition Dump, later evacuated its site of 15 huts which was located by our troops on 25 Feb and reported not to have been used as a hospital for some time.

A captured letter shows that HQ 1 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt was located near SINANAI and was planning to establish the Bn bivouac area 700 yds SW of SINANAI. This implies that the main strength of 1 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt withdrew to the west bank of the HONGORAI RIVER near SINANAI soon after 21 Feb. The MP Unit at NIHERO was to evacuate about 15 Feb.

Natives reported that two enemy parties moved from MOSIGETTA to TAITAI - MONOITU area the first thought to be about 100 strong just after Christmas and the second early in Feb. The second party was attacked by aircraft west of the HONGORAI RIVER on 12 Feb. A Japanese officer told the natives that 30 had been killed in the raid, but the natives believed there were many more.

The strength of 13 Inf Regtl Group is now estimated at 650 - a reduction due to casualties and attrition. Of these an unknown number have probably moved east across the HONGORAI RIVER. Since 21 Feb numbers of the enemy, in particular 1 Bn 6 Fd Arty Regt, appeared to be concentrating between the PURIATA and HONGORAI RIVERS, near the latter's western bank.

3. IDENTIFICATIONS

JAPANESE BADGES OF RANK WORN ON CAPS

Appendix 'A' shows the badges of rank worn by Japanese on their field caps. The identifications were originally supplied by a PW and were later verified in captured documents.

At least two samples of the badges illustrated have been recovered - both in the 6 (Jap) Div area of SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE. The insignia are stamped in black on white calico and worn on the cap above the army star.


The wearing of these badges does not appear to have been common either among the Japanese troops on BOUGAINVILLE or in the Japanese Army, although a prisoner from 81 Inf Regt knew the badges. It is therefore not exclusive to 6 Div. Most of the Japanese caps recovered to date have borne no such badges of rank, due either to security or lack of badges. Moreover the Japanese uniform is not yet completely standardised having undergone several minor changes which have not yet been universally adopted.

These cap badges do not replace the more common red and gold collar tabs, and are believed to be alternative wear.

6 JAP DIV COLOUR PATCH

The colour patch illustrated below was recovered from the clothing of a dead Japanese. It was worn on the forearm of the sleeve, points down.

The colour patch is red and designates 6 (Jap) Div. Its wearing is apparently not universal in 6 Div, probably from security reasons.



6. EQUIPMENT

CONVERTED AIRCRAFT MGs

Correction:- References to Browning MG in last week's Summary were incorrect. The MG was actually a 7.7mm Type 89 Vickers MG.

JAPANESE MEDIUM TANK

Attached as Appendix 'B' to this Summary are details and a sketch of an unidentified type Japanese Medium Tank.

JAPANESE IMPROVISED HAND GRENADE

Included as Appendix 'C' to this Summary are details and a sketch of a Japanese Improvised Hand Grenade.

JAPANESE MODEL 10 ROCKET LAUNCHER

Details and illustrations of this rocket launcher appear in Appendix 'D'.

ENEMY AMMUNITION

A recent test, reported in a previous Summary, of Type 88 Instantaneous Fuses captured in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area showed that three out of six tested failed to detonate.

Examination made during the last week of twelve Type 88 Delay Fuses captured at MAKATOWA revealed that all fuses were in good condition and all detonators functioned. The metal of these fuses was bright and the component parts free from corrosion.

Four Type 89 50mm Grenade Discharger shells captured at TSIMBA, manufactured in 1942, were externally completely free of corrosion and appeared to be in excellent condition.

The wide divergenee in the condition of enemy ammunition is probably due to the fact that some ammunition has been held for long periods by units in the forward areas where care and storage facilities are poor, while those items found in good condition have been recently brought forward from Field Ordnance Depots where they have been particularly well stored.

7. TACTICS

BAMBOO SPIKE JUNGLE TRAPS

In the MOSIGETTA area on 21 Feb our troops discovered a number of pits 14 feet deep and two feet six inches in diameter with a sharpened stake at the bottom. The stakes were approximately six feet long, point uppermost. The wood had rotted and when one of our troops fell into a pit he escaped injury

Reference was made to these panji - sharpened bamboo spike - pits in 2 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 2. Panji pits have been used by Allied troops in BURMA, where the practice was to place several bamboo spikes in a pit of any suitable size, covered by a flimsy lid in the form of a light lattice frame naturally camouflaged.

Old weapon pits or foxholes could be easily converted into panji traps. Another possibility is the use of a slit trench with a false bottom under which bamboo spikes are concealed.

(Adapted from 3 Aust Div Summary of Operations and Intelligence Report No 87)

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attached as Appendix 'E' are additions to place names and topographical information on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.

(E H WILSON) Lt-col
General Staff


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
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
APPENDIX "A" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 14


JAPANESE BADGES of RANK


Worn on Caps



Col



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

Maj


Capt



1/Lt



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

WO


Sgt Maj



Sgt



Cpl


Ldg Pte



Sup Pte



1st Class Pte



2nd Class Pte


Col (x)


1/Lt (x)


Sgt (x)


Sup Pte (x)





(x) Note The horizontal line (probably in colour) designates branch of service.
The use of this line is believed uncommon.

~~Appendix 'A' to HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 144 of 22 Feb 45.~~

JAPANESE MEDIUM TANK

GENERAL

This tank was probably first manufactured in 1939 and was originally reported from the China-Burma Theatre. With the exception of the turret and the main armament, it is basically the same design as the Model 97 Medium Tank, but the turret has been improved to accommodate a high velocity 47 mm gun. The long overhang of the turret also provides more room for stowage of ammunition.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight	15 tons (approx)
Length	18 feet (approx)
Crew	4 men
Armour	8 to 25 mm (approx)
Armament	1 - 47 mm Model 1 Tank Gun; 1 - 7.7 mm MG in turret; 1 - 7.7 mm MG in hull.

CAPABILITIES

This tank is characteristic of all Japanese tanks in that it has a high power/weight ratio, which should give it a fairly high speed.

The use of the 47 mm anti-tank gun, Model 1, adapted for tank mounting, greatly increases its effectiveness against our armour. This gun has a muzzle velocity of 2700 feet per second and uses AP/HE and HE ammunition. In a tank battle near Urdaneta (Luzon), several of these tanks were encountered by our medium tanks, three of which were put out of action by fire from the 47 mm gun. Six complete penetrations were observed on one tank. All rounds (AP/HE) penetrated the sides of the hull at an angle of thirty degrees from normal, detonating within the tank. It is interesting to note that a document found in one of the Japanese medium tanks knocked out near Binalonan (Luzon), had sketches of the Allied M4 Medium Tank and M1 heavy tank showing the side of the hull as one of the vulnerable points.

COMMUNICATION

The tank examined was equipped with two-way radio.

VULNERABILITY

Bazookas and even .30 rifle fire have proved effective on the above described tank, as well as on the other types thus far encountered on Luzon.


(Extract from G-2 Weekly Report No 72)

~~APPENDIX 'A' TO FIELD~~
~~ADVANCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~
~~NO 44 OF 22 FEB 45~~

JAPANESE MEDIUM TANK

Unidentified Type

(Encountered at BINALONAN LUZON 17 JAN '45)



~~Appendix 'B' to HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 144 of 28 Feb~~ 45.

JAPANESE IMPROVISED HAND GRENADE

1. GENERAL

The improvised Jap hand grenade illustrated in the attached drawing was captured in the Valencia area, Leyte, on 20 Dec 44. No reports are available concerning the method of employment; however, it is quite obvious that such an improvised grenade would only be put to use when items of standard issue could not be supplied and it remained a matter of anything being better than nothing.

2. CONSTRUCTION

The grenade is made up of a standard 1¼" OD gas pipe, 1/8" in thickness, which is approximately 4¾" long with deep cuts about the pipe 1½" from each end; apparently done with a regular pipe cutter. The pipe is then pinched together on each end to form the grenade body. A ½" hole is then drilled into the wall of the grenade to form a fuze well. The body is then filled with a mixture of a jelly type explosive (possibly Gelignite) and small steel particles made up from cutting 3/8" welding rod into lengths up to ½". The detonator is made up of a piece of safety fuze 1½" long and fixed to a blasting cap. Although the specimens observed had no means of holding the detonator in place, this could quite easily have been accomplished with string or some other means. The specimens observed were not fixed with fuze igniters: thus, they must be lit before throwing.

3. SIZE AND WEIGHT


Diameter of Grenade Body "OD"	1¼"
Length Overall	4-5/8"
Weight - Grenade Body	13 oz
Steel Slugs	3 oz

4. CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the functioning of the grenade was designed to burst the gas pipe into three sections and thus allow the limited steel slugs to be expelled out each end of the grenade body. (Steel pipe is made of material which does not form fragments upon explosion, but rather splits in one place and allows the gases to escape.) Thus, the effects of this type of improvised grenade would be very limited in effect and very impractical.


~~APPENDIX "B" TO FIRST~~
~~AUST ARMY INT SUMMARY~~
~~No 144 OF 22 FEB '45.~~

JAPANESE IMPROVISED HAND GRENADE ...



FULL SCALE

JAPANESE
MODEL 10 ROCKET LAUNCHER
for
MODEL 97 (1937) No 6
LAND BOMB



This equipment is simply constructed and stated to be convenient to manoeuvre and may be used in heavily wooded areas.

The launching base consists of the upper trough, the lower trough, the trough cover, spade and base rope. When the launching base is assembled, it appears as in the lower diagram. The diagram of the rocket shown at left is the actual propellant of the land bomb. No information has as yet come to hand of the land bomb, although it is believed to be similar in design to an aircraft bomb.

Preparations for launching are extracted from a captured Japanese document and translated by CINCPAC-CINCPOA.

(i) "Set up launching base, direct it towards target and adjust it for the angle of elevation required."

(ii) "Connect the blasting machine (exploder box) to the connecting wires from the terminals on the lower trough."

(iii) "The blasting machine (exploder box) should be placed 15 metres (16.4 yd.) obliquely behind the launching base."


(iv) "Place a wooden stopper firmly into the tailpiece of the bomb so that the axis of the stopper and the axis of the bomb coincide."

(v) "Test the conductivity of the electric mechanism."

(vi) "Place primer firmly in the nose of the rocket mechanism."

(vii) "Fit the bomb tail fuse stopper onto the nose of the rocket mechanism and position both at the lower end of trough."

(viii) "Bomb is then ready for firing."



GSI (a) Adv LHQ

APPENDIX "E" TO
HQ 2 AUST CORPS
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 14

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Ref Maps : BOUGAINVILLE 1 inch to 1 mile series
1 : 25,000 series

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO PLACE NAMES

AIB report the following villages destroyed by Japanese. Ref Map KIETA 1 inch

GUABA	147825
DARATUI	246820
ORAMI	163803
CHIPURO	239823

Ref Map MT TAROKA 1 inch

LAMU	212749
MOAU	231687

The village of LAMPARAN 099777 has been moved ½ mile to the west.

Ref Map TAIOF ISLAND 1 inch

Insert GILLMAN RIVER 237583

TRACK INFORMATION

See attached maps for latest track information on BARARA and MOSIGETTA 1 : 25000 and BANIU 1 inch sheets

GENERAL

Ref Maps TAIOF ISLAND and BUKA PASSAGE 1 inch

The five jetties shown on map between RASUA 285678 and TSIROGEI 213768 appear in good condition and have well used roads leading to them. Another small jetty exists at 269696, approx 25 yds long and 4 ft wide.


SAPOSA ISLAND 221627


A small stone jetty 15 yds long and 3 ft wide, just above water level.

TAIOF ISLAND 154689

Jetty approx 40 yds long and 4 to 5 ft wide in excellent condition.

OVERLAY - TOKO-BARARA TRACK
Ref Map
BARARA 1 : 25000




89
OVERLAY 1 : 25000 Series
MOSIGETTA - NAIRONA
1 Correction to Government Rd
2 Track to PIKEI
SISIRUAI No 2
To HOZAN
To SOVELE
To SISIRUAI No 1
57
57 PIKEI
89

Topographical Appendix to 2 Aust. Corps Weekly Int. Summary No 14.

OVERLAY OF ADDITIONAL TRACK AND VILLAGE INFORMATION

Ref Map AITA 1 INCH TO 1 MILE

Information From ANGAU patrol reports.

The villages Tuaralai and Inubata are definite locations. All other villages liable to mvt.

40 40

46

(Alolopai)

Kiakara

Apistokalui

Arasi

Sitaroi

Orabisiara River

Kaviki

Tuaralai

Okei

Kavakui

Kaviki River

Silemi

Aukulaila

Kanikaripai

Niorlorei

Tapisikorei

Akilaivi

Kiakara River

Takeriopai

Tatomei R.

Sinei R.

Alauli River

Kauyaitei

Aleileipai

Ipei

Inubata

Sisitokalui

Bilei

Akopai

Siniei

Taapa.

46

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