


AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/3/78

39 Infantry Battalion
July - December 1942,
Appendices

Appx A
to 39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Aug '42




Sketch Map of Kokoda Area
(NOT TO SCALE)

VX103131 Planol Pre.

~~Appendix B~~

Diagram of Dispositions of 39 Aust. Inf. Bn at Isurava.

To Deniki



MAG. AZL E Y

V A Z L E Y
E O R A

39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Aug '42

Appx B

VK 103131 [Signature] Pte.

Extract from Japanese Diary.
Captured in MENARI Area 8 Sep 42.

Appx C to
39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Aug 42

1 Aug '42.

Lt. OGAWA had been killed.
Being very surprised I hurried to the office and looking at the report found that in the KOKODA area our advance force, who have been engaged in battle with 1200 of the enemy, had suffered unexpectedly heavy casualties.

22 Aug '42.

I hear that the enemy are young, vigorous and brave. Against this enemy we have this terrain also. It will be necessary for us to put forth our utmost endeavour and uphold the prestige of our Imperial Army.

23 Aug '42.

At 0800 hrs. when we started off from in front of No.1 Battalion H.Q. we could see in the distance the district where the enemy are billeted.

I don't know whether it is because the No.1 Battalion have had so many casualties but all ranks of commanders seem to have lost some of their offensive spirit. Left DENEKI at 1400 hrs and returned to my company which received orders to take up a defensive position in KOKODA replacing an engineer unit.

I feel strongly that if the enemy adopt guerilla tactics we have no alternative but to adopt similar tactics. I have told Captain HORITA that we must make a desperate attack at the enemy supply lines and billets but he won't listen to me.

24 Aug '42.

Collected potatoes in order to economize on rice. Lunch consisted entirely of potatoes. The flavour of the first one was lovely and when we had eaten our fill stories of home circulated freely.

At 1500 hrs. received our order from the company commander to occupy a height from which flames and smoke was rising to the west of KOKODA but later the order was cancelled. At 1530 the commander of the Detached Unit passed through KOKODA. The detachment will tomorrow commence a general attack and will surround and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of ISURAVA. My company will await the arrival of the KOBAYASHI Battalion, who will take over the defence of KOKODA, and then follow the main force. The platoon will, from 0300 hrs. take over the duty of colour guard from the SHIBATA platoon of No. 6 Company.

25 Aug '42.

I am anxious as I believe that the detour of the 2nd. Battalion has become known to the enemy. What with anxiety over the fighting, the rain and cold, I didn't sleep all night.

With nightfall the sound of the guns ceased.

(Note:- 2 Bn. appears to be that which was opposed by two Coys 2/16 Inf Bn on Eastern side of IORA valley - writer belonged to 3 Battalion.)

26 Aug '42.

I didn't sleep a wink last night.

The lull of the opposing guns is broken by the sound of grenade throwers and sometimes by the powerful chatters of machine guns.

By 1300 hrs. the position of Regimental H.Q., had not changed and there was no new development in the situation.

According to news coming in from the 2nd Battalion they are finding the terrain difficult but are pushing to their objective.

The result of the present operations depends very largely on the extent to which the 2nd Bn. can carry out their task.

At 1538 our guns all join in together and the attack and advance begins along the whole front.

27 Aug '42.

The 3rd day of the attack. Last night the Regimental H.Q., Detachment H.Q. and various other units were all congregated together in the same place. I inquired whether the platoon was expected to guard all this congregation but was told that it would be sufficient to guard the colours. Started the advance about 0800 hrs. At 1000 arrived at an unnamed height NE of ISURAVA. We spent the night listening to the enemy rifle shots in the near distance. At 1900 hrs. the 3rd Battalion expected to carry out an attack along the main pass, but due to a steep ravine and heavy enemy fire two of the company men were killed and the Bn. advanced along the ridge of the hill.

28 Aug '42.

The enemy is gradually being out flanked but his resistance is very strong and our casualties great. The outcome of the battle is difficult to foresee. Regimental H.Q. has not moved its position.

29 Aug '42.

The attack still continues. The main force of the company is under the command of the Battalion commander and is fighting with energy. 2nd Lieutenant TSUTSUI and W.O. MATSUYAMA have been killed. Casualties are heavy. Battalion H.Q. has not changed its position.

30 Aug '42.

The fighting is increasing in ferocity. Since last night the sound of the battle can be heard in all directions. In the evening the company commander was wounded and sent to the rear. Regimental H.Q. is still in the same position.

31 Aug '42.

I think today is the anniversary of the death of Commander TACHIBAWA (Trans:- Note Hero of the Russo-Japanese War).

The Regimental H.Q. has decided to move forward as the enemy in front has been repulsed by our 1st Battalion. I recommend that since none of our troops could be observed along the road it was too early to move forward but the recommendation was rejected. Unwillingly we pushed forward with No.3 platoon at the head. As expected when we reached the ravine Corporal KOMATSU and 5 men were killed and Corporal YAMAMOTO wounded. This incident was most unfortunate as 15 minutes later the last battalion debouched. The Regimental H.Q. started moving forward very shortly after and reached the hill at ISURAVA where there are three huts at 1230 hrs. The detachment continued the attack with one regiment as the main and the YASAWA unit as the pursuit party. At 1600 hrs. we reached a point 3 kilometres South of ISURAVA and billeted there. We filled our stomachs with potatoes, sugar biscuits etc. which were left by the enemy. Our food supply is quickly diminishing.

1 Sep '42.

We spent a more comfortable night than we have ever had before on account of using the tents left behind by the enemy but gradually it became colder and we could not sleep. The loud voices of men of the YASAWA unit calling out also made it impossible to go to sleep. Got up at 0400 hrs. Set out at 0500 hrs. After advancing about 1 kilometre we stopped to form an order of march.(breakfast). Today also the advance is fairly short. After advancing a few more kilometres had a long rest.

Appx D to
39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Aug 42

Extracts from Japanese Diary.
Captured North of TEMPLETONS CROSSING
October - 1942.

8 Aug '42.

0500. The Battalion departed, the Coy bringing up the rear. Encountered a considerable number of enemy troops. Attacked them with battalion guns and machine-guns. Afternoon, No. 2 and No. 3 Coys pursued the enemy who began to retreat. Occupied a position near a bridge. While reconnoitering the enemy position, unconsciously advanced too far. At 200 metres in front of DENIKI Village, two of our scouts were killed by automatic rifles. Collected the bodies and returned.

9 Aug '42.

No. 1 Coy was ordered by Battalion to turn back to attack the enemy, who had occupied KOKODA. Escorted patients of a Medical Tai. Reached a rubber plantation at 1000. After reconnaissance, the Coy. carried out a deployed attack with an additional machine-gun. The attack did not progress as desired because of the enemys intense firing power and the pouring rain. We were unable to communicate with the Coy. Commander or No. 1 Platoon Leader. Decided to carry out a charge independently at dusk. Reported this decision to the Coy. and gradually closed in on enemy.

As dusk approached, we advanced to within 70 metres of the enemy, who concentrated an intense fire on the No. 1 Platoon. Because of our faulty formation and the hindering rain we were unable to carry out a charge. Decided to attack at night, but men were not properly assembled. Valuable time was wasted in the torrential rain and darkness. Even the section leaders could not be lined up.

Commenced a night attack at 1020. Advanced stealthily on hands and knees and gradually moved in closer to the enemy. Suddenly encountered enemy guards in the shadow of large rubber trees. Corporal HAMADA killed one of them with bayonet and engaged the others, but the enemy's fire finally forced us to withdraw. The Platoon was scattered and it was impossible to repeat our charge. 1st Class Pvt. HIROSE was killed by an enemy bullet. The soldier I tangled with was wounded in the leg by a hand grenade thrown by Corp. HAMADA. The latter was unable, due to the darkness, to assemble the men remaining. I went to the rear and tried to assemble the men myself, but because of darkness two men and I took the wrong direction. We suddenly realized that we were within 40 metres of the enemy lines. Hand grenades were thrown at us. The night attack ended in failure. No. 1 platoon also carried out an attack at about 0300, but it was unsuccessful.

Every day I am losing my men. I could not repress tears of bitterness. Rested, waiting for tomorrow and struggled against cold and hunger.

10 Aug '42.

Assembled the men at our rear and rested. Only the sound of occasional sniping was heard. The Coy Commander ordered an attack at dusk. Made preparations in good spirit. Superior Pvt. MIYABE was fatally wounded in the head by an enemy sniper. At 1430, passed on the order to every section leader to carry out an attack at dusk. Completed our preparations, and started to advance at 1540. The enemy's sniping was intense. Heard the sound of bullets passing us. At 1260, our grenade dischargers began to roar. 2nd Lt. SHIMOMURA aided us with M.Gs. We advanced within 70 metres of the enemy. It began to drizzle. At 1700, fired a smoke candle with excellent results. Pressed closer and closer to the enemy. At 1720, finished our preparation for a charge and discharged two smoke candles, one of which failed to explode because of dampness. Nevertheless, the entire platoon carried out a determined charge. During the assault, as I jumped over a fallen tree, my foot caught in something and I fell flat. The platoon instantly lined up alongside me and charged again. We encountered no enemy. Believing they had retired and taken up another position, we approached on our hands

10 Aug '42. (cont.)

and knees. Enemy violently resisted with hand grenades and rifle fire. At that point, No.2 Platoon then rushed in and drove them back. At 1900, we occupied a house. The attack ended successfully. During the action, 4 men were wounded.

This stirring and dauntless charge is the tradition of our Army and no enemy can withstand such an attack.

11 Aug '42.

Collected the dead and cleared up the battle area. Loss inflicted on the enemy :- At least 20 killed; 1 Czecho and 7 rifles captured. Our loss; 6 killed, 10 wounded. The Platoon lost 3 killed and 6 wounded.

There was an air raid during lunch time. Constructed a large shelter. The bloody fighting in the rain the last few days seems like a nightmare. I swore to the souls of the warriors who died that I would carry on their aspirations.

13 Aug '42.

Attack on ISURAVA.

No.2 Coy.- first line on right.

No.3 Coy.- first line on left.

No.1 Coy.- is reserve.

At 0500, commenced the attack. Although we captured an important point, the attack did not progress in a satisfactory manner. 2nd Lt. ASAI of No.2 Coy was killed.

14 Aug '42.

The Battalion resumed the attack at dawn. At noon, took up pursuit of the enemy, advancing upland. It was decided to attack the village in front. The Coy, leading the other forces, withdrew to yesterday's position for the time being.

At 1300, violent rifle firing was heard. No.1 Coy, co-operating with the main force of the Battalion, advanced to attack the village of DENIKI from the North. The enemy was not there. The Battalion decided to go into billets here. The Coy's position was at the extreme rear.

15 Aug '42.

At 0830, leading No.1 and No.2 Sections, set out to reconnoitre ISURAVA village. Learned of enemy situation and forward topography from MATSUO Platoon. Advanced 500 metres and encountered the scouts from No.2 Coy. The enemy fired at us suddenly as we detoured to the left through the jungle. Quickly withdrew and found that Corp. KUBO and others were missing. Slowly advanced to search for these men. Suddenly, the enemy's automatic rifles once again showered us with fire. Three men were killed and one wounded.

16 Aug '42.

Clear weather today. A few cases of diarrhoea and malaria has broken out.

17 Aug '42.

Corp. FUJIOKA and six others accidentally let the natives escape from their guard. Battalion Commander ragingly threatened them with court-martial. The Coy constructed A/A trenches and prepared for enemy air raids.

18 Aug '42.

W.O. MANABE and 20 men set out to reconnoitre cottages at 150 metres, and a large river 4 kilometres south of DENIKI.

Learned that the main force of the Detachment has arrived at our rear base.

19 Aug '42.

Heard that No.2 Coy has already advanced in the vicinity of ISURAVA. Battalion Commander is in a jesting mood.

PAPUAN CAMPAIGN. Aug/Sep 1942.

Appx ~~39~~ ~~Inf~~ ~~Bn~~ ~~War~~ ~~Diary~~ ~~Aug~~ ~~'42~~ E 6

1. Strength and composition of original JAPANESE force
 The original attacking force consisted of the KUSUNOSE BUTAI (144th Inf Regt and att tps) and the YAZAWA BUTAI (41st Inf Regt, less two Bns and proportion of att tps.) The following info has been extracted from captured documents and PWS statements. Sources are quoted in each case.

A. The NANKAI (SOUTH SEAS) DETACHMENT, Comd, HORII, TOMITARO.
 Composition and strength as per "HORI EMBARKATION ORDER 'KO' No 32 of 3 Jan 42 ATIS 103.
 DETAILS given in Strength States of KUSUNOSE BUTAI as at 2 Nov 42

UNIT	Strength	Original Strength	CASUALTIES Killed	W & Sick	EFFECTIVES at 2 Nov 42.
INF BDE HQ	206	183(a)	-	-	-
REGTL HQ	107	107	4	25	78
1st(TSUKAMOTO) Bn			(Strength State of this Bn was NOT captured. Diary (b) gives original strength No 1 Coy as 180 and casualties at KOKODA & ISURAVA as 100.)		
Bn HQ					20
No 1 Coy					23
No 2 Coy					36
No 3 Coy					36
No 1 MG Coy					34
No 1 Inf Gun Pl					33
TOTAL	844	500(a)			182
2nd(HORIE) Bn					48
Bn Hq		91	5		25
No 4 Coy		168	36		17
No 5 Coy		165	60	425	14
No 6 Coy		162	38		46
No 2 MG Coy		137	19		33
No 2 Inf Gun Pl		72	9		180
TOTAL	838	797	167	425	
3rd(KUWADA) Bn					46
Bn HQ		94	8		12
No 7 Coy		144	54		26
No 8 Coy		152	40	392	21
No 9 Coy		154	28		40
No 3 MG Coy		132	17		34
No 3 Inf Gun Pl		68	5		179
TOTAL	776	744	152	392	
REGTL GUN COY	126	123	3	64	55
FIELD TELEGRAPH	112				
REGTL SIG COY		136	19	80	37
No 3 Coy, 55th Cav Regt (KAWASHIMA DET)	85	80(c)	(33 strong at GIRUWA on 2 Dec (e))		
? BN MTN ARTY (Lt Col HOZUMI)	715	500 (c)			
55th ENGR DET (Lieut KUSAKA)	221	100 (c)			
TPT TPS (Lt Col TOMITA)	146				
15 IND ENGR REGT (CAPT TAKAMORI)	227				
MEDICAL DET (Capt AKAO)	223	50 (c)			
Fd HOSPITAL (? KONDO)	242				
EMBARKATION COY	166				
Det 47 A/A UNIT	175				
MISCELLANEOUS	82				
TOTAL	5283	3320			

(a) From strength state ATIS 110 (b) ATIS 87
 (c) PwW's estimate at IORIBAIWA, ATIS INTERROGATION REPORT No 10
 (d) Estimate --allowing 330 casualties for attack to KOKODA (see Part IV)
 (e) YOKOYAMA DET ORDER, ATIS 229

B. TAKASAGO VOLUNTEER UNIT.
 This was a labour and carrying unit used fwd of KOKODA. It consisted of 500 personnel (FORMOSANS). No 1 Coy strength 235. No 2 Coy 265.

C. 41 (YAZAWA) INF REGT GP	
Regt HQ	100
2nd (KOIWAI) Bn	
Bn HQ	90
No 5 Coy	110
No 6 Coy	110
No 7 Coy	110
No 8 Coy	110
No 2 MG Coy	130
No 2 Inf Gun Pl	70
TOTAL	<u>730</u>

The composition of this force is as given several times in the order of march of the KOIWAI Bn. (See ATIS 220 for KOIWAI Operation Orders 127-142.)

For composition of KOIWAI Bn, see ATIS. Spot Report No 59.--List of Officers of 41st Inf Regt.

3rd (KOBAYASHI) Bn	
No 12 Coy	120
Inf Gun Coy	130
Det Regtl Sigs	30
Det 10 Ind Engr Regt	176
QF Gun Unit	50
"CENTRAL SOUTHERN" Gp	?

ESTIMATED MINIMUM TOTAL FORCE 1336

The strength is estimated from known strengths of Bns of the KUSUNOSE BUTAI. In view of the known fact that one rifle coy of the KOIWAI Bn had a strength of 178, (see page 8.) and the Bn was organised on a four-rifle-coy basis this estimate may be up to 250 too low.

The strength of the QF Gun Unit is NOT known.

It is NOT known what comprised the "Central Southern Group".

From the available figures it appears that the force which attacked at ISURAVA and was subsequently in action against 21 Aust Inf Bde could NOT have been less than

- Four Infantry Bns and att tps
- Two Coys of Engrs
- One Coy Cav
- One Bn MTN Arty
- Det QF Gun s

The minimum figure for fighting tps would seem to be about 3,600. Actual figures from JAPANESE documents and conservative estimates based on them give a probable total of 4,400, excluding engrs, medical and labour coys.

PART II. CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS.^{3.}

1. The NANKAI DETACHMENT comd by Maj- Gen HORII was assigned the role of attacking PORT MORESBY via the OWEN STANLEY RANGE as part of a double operation involving the taking of MILNE BAY and an attack on MORESBY from the sea.

The composition of the NANKAI DET at RABAUL is set out above, and is given in HORI EMBARKATION ORDER 'KO' No 32 of 3 JAN 42.

2. An advance party of the DET comd by Col YAMAMOTO, landed at BASABUA on 21 JUL 42. It consisted of :-

UNIT	COMD	STRENGTH
1st Bn, 144 Inf Regt	Lt-Col TSUKAMOTO	?
Det Regtl Sigs, 144 Regt	?	?
No 1 Coy, Mtn Arty Bty.	Lieut HAMADA	?
Det 47 Bn Fd AA.	Maj FUCHIYAMA	265 (Bn less Nos 1 & 3 Coys)
15 Ind Engr Regt (less one Coy)	Col YOKOYAMA	952
Det TAKASAGO Volunteer Unit	?	96
No 45 Perm Wireless Unit	Lieut UEZUMA	22
No 7 Indep Wireless Pl	Lieut IIZUKA	27
Det No 88 Ind Tele Coy	?	60
Army Sigs	?	59
No 2 Coy Tpt Corps.	Maj MORIMOTO	?
No 1 Ply No 120 Coy) Shore Duties Unit)	?	?
ASC Coy	Lieut SAKIGAWA	?
Medical Unit . Main Body	Capt AKAO	?
Half of No 2 Fd Hospital	Lieut NAGAI	
Water PURIFYING DET	2nd Lieut NAO	171
Black Coolies	Spread amongg units	1200

(Figures from HORI OP ORDER No 85a. ATIS 131.)

(" " YOKOYAMA ADV UNIT OP ORDER No 1 . ATIS 103)

The role of this adv party was to establish a footing at BUNA. The TSUKAMOTO Bn was instructed to act as a raiding party and to clear the area of the track up to the OWEN STANLEYS.

3. The TSUKAMOTO Bn took OIVI on 6 Aug., and after a four-day battle, finally secured KOKODA on 14 Aug..(ATIS 174). On 18 Aug the Bn was billeted at DENIKI, and was patrolling fwd to test the Aust strength.

4. At 1730 hrs 18 Aug, the main body of the KUSUNOSE BUTAI with att tps commenced disembarkation at BASABUA. They moved straight fwd to KOKODA, arriving there on 24 Aug. A general attack was ordered for 25 Aug. 1st Bn and 3rd (KUWADA) Bn with Engrs, Cav? and Mtn Arty, were to attack along the DENIKI - ISURAVA track and spur, the 3rd Bn and det of Engrs being given the task of outflanking the Aust posns by moving along the high ground west of ISURAVA.

The 2nd (HORIE) Bn carried out an encircling move up the east side of the EORA CK along the MISSIMA- ABUARI track.

PART III. EXTRACTS FROM JAPANESE DIARIES.

(a) Diary of 2nd Lieut ONOGAWA (Comd 2 Pl, 3 Coy, 1st(TSUKAMOTO) Bn 144 Regt

- 21 Jul. Landed BASA.
- 4 Aug. Drew rations for 135, the strength of the coy.
- 6 Aug. Captured OIVI.
- 7-14 Aug. Description of battle for KOKODA.
- 11 Aug. (Referring to the 39 Aust Inf Bn)--- Though they are our enemy, their bravery must be admired. Compared to these we met at NEW BRITAIN these soldiers seem to be an entirely different people.
- 18 Aug. Main unit of the detachment is reported to land tonight.
- 22 Aug. Heard that the detachment commander has arrived in the vicinity of KOKODA.---
- 23 Aug. 41st Regt has landed.
- 3 Sep. Heard that the 41st BUTAI passed through last night and they are continuing the advance.
- 8 Sep. Departed to evacuate the wounded.---wounded were as follows

Bn HQ	47
1st Coy	53
3rd Coy	43

(NOTE. 8 Sep was the second day of the engagement at EFOGI)
ATIS 174. 8 JAN 43.

(b) Diary of Pte WATANABE.(1 Sec, 3 Pl, 1 Coy, 1st(TSUKAMOTO) Bn, 144 Regt.
----- The 2nd and 3rd Bns landed about one month later than our 1st Bn, and on 25 Aug they arrived in KOKODA.

- 21 Sep. Since landing the battle has continued for two months in the mountains.--- In the combat between KOKODA and ISURAVA our No 1 Coy of 180 men was reduced to only 80 men. Our Coy had the heaviest casualties in the 144th Regt. Coy Comd OGAWA was killed in action at KOKODA, and his successor, HATANAKA, was killed at ISURAVA. --- Due to heavy casualties, every coy is reduced to about half strength.

ATIS 87.

(c) Diary of 2nd Lieut NODA, HIDETAKA. (Pl comd, 3rd(KUWADA) Bn, 144 Regt.

- 18 Aug. Disembarked at BASA.
- 19 Aug. Arrived SOPUTA.
- 22 Aug. I hear that the enemy are young, vigorous and brave.
- 24 Aug. A----The Detachment will tomorrow commence a general attack and will surround and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of ISURAVA.-----
- 25 Aug. ---From there(NOTE. DENIKI) I could hear---the fury of the front line-----
- 27 Aug. The third day of the attack.
- 28 Aug. The enemy is gradually being out-flanked, but his resistance is very strong, and our casualties great. The out-come of the battle is difficult to foresee. Regimental HQ has not moved its position.
- 29 Aug. The attack still continues---- Casualties are heavy.
- 30 Aug. --- The fighting is increasing in ferocity.-- The sound of the battle can be heard in all directions---- the coy comd was wounded----Regtl Hq is still in the same position.
- 31 Aug. --the enemy in front has been repulsed by our 1st Bn. --Unwillingly we pushed forward--- As expected-- Cpl YAMAMOTO AND TWO MEN were wounded and Cpl HOMATSU and 5 men were killed.
- 2 Sep. The sound of the guns dies down at nightfall.-----
CAPTURED DOCUMENT No 32. 12 Oct42.

(d) Diary of 2nd Lieut HIRANO. (Pl Comd, 1st (TSUKAMOTO) Bn, 144 Regt.

- 26 Aug. -----received an order to capture the 'solitary cottage'.
- 27 Aug. Reached the top and waited to carry out an attack at dawn.
- 29 Aug. The Coy(NOTE.No 1) set out to attack the 'log bridge'---the Coy Comd and 9 others were killed in this attack.---Together with Capt FUJISAKI, one platoon of Engrs and one pl of No 9 Coy pressed the enemy from the road to the crest-line after a fierce battle in the jungle----Many of our number were killed or wounded.
- 30 Aug. Runner arrived from the vicinity of the 'solitary cottage' and reported grave conditions there.
- 31 Aug. At 0830 the 'log bridge' was securely captured by our troops.
- 2 Sep. Enemy seems to have lost their fighting spirit. YAZAWA BUTAI'S advance party forcibly pushed on.
- 4 Sep. Reorganised the Coy with 2 platoons----
- 10 Sep. --- Captured Lt-Col K and 4 others. Though questioned, the prisoners stubbornly refused to speak. Tied them securely for the night, and decided to send them to the Bn Comd tomorrow morning.
- 23 Sep. Like a bolt from the blue we received an order to

23 Sep. Like a bolt from the blue we received an order to withdraw at 1130. It left us momentarily in a daze. It is truly regrettable to retreat from our present position after pressing so close to MORESBY at the cost of enormous sacrifices and casualties.

ATIS 218. 23 JAN 43

(e) Diary of W/O SADAHIRO. (2nd (HORIE) Bn) 144 Regt

ABUARI Flank

18 Aug. Landed at BASA at 1730.

19 Aug. SOPUTA.

24 Aug. At 1200 reached a point 2 kilometres SW of KOKODA.

25 Aug. Today the bn became a flanking party.---No 5 Coy encountered and fought the enemy.--- Fully realised that the enemy is not to be under-rated.---

28 Aug. Began operations at 0400.--- The enemy counter-attacked several times.---

29 Aug. ~~xxxxxx~~ ---2nd Lieut YAMAMOTO, leader of No 1 Pl, and four men were killed and 13 wounded.--- The fire from enemy rifles and guns was so intense that the collection of our dead and wounded could not immediately be accomplished.

30 Aug. --- The enemy attacked several times but were repulsed.---

1 Sep. The composition of the Coy became two platoons.

ATIS 116.

(f) Diary of a member of No 2 Coy, No 15 TAKASAGO Volunteer Unit.

13 Aug. Arrived BASA. Total strength of the Coy is 264.

26 Aug. KOKODA.

31 Aug. The enemy is becoming stubborn. Our troops are attacking from both flanks.

22 Sep. The enemy has 40,000 troops, mostly Australians. For that reason their fighting power is great.

ATIS 104. 9 DEC 42.

(g) OPERATION ORDERS of 2nd (KOIWA) Bn, 41 Regt.

OP ORDER No 127. 21 Aug

(Task of 1st and 3rd Bns (less No 12 Coy) is defence of BASABUA. No 2 Bn (plus No 12 Coy) to go fwd).

OP ORDER No 132. 24 Aug.

Order of march:- 2nd Bn; No 12 Coy; Inf Comn Unit; QF Gun Unit; Inf Gun Unit; Central Southern Gp.

OP ORDER No 138. 27 Aug. 4 km south of DENIKI.

1. The front line troops are attacking the enemy near ISURAVA and expect to capture their position before tonight.

Maj. KOIWA.

OP ORDER No 140. 29 Aug. 1030 hrs. 2 km north of ISURAVA.

1. The enemy has gradually been encircled by the Detached Forces, and appears to be retreating to the left bank of the river.

Maj. KOIWA.

OP ORDER No 141. 30 Aug. 1300 hrs. 2 km north of ISURAVA.

1. The Detached Force is still closing in on the enemy. 1st and 2nd Bns captured enemy front line positions.

Maj. KOIWA.

OP ORDER No 142. 30 ~~(231)~~ Aug. 0630 hrs. 2km north of ISURAVA.

1. The main Detached Force is continuously attacking, but progress is slowed by the stubborn resistance of the enemy.

Maj. KOIWA.

ATIS 220.

(h) HORIE Operation Order 'KO'. 30 Aug. 0830 hrs. 1 km north of ISURAVA.

1. The NATSU position was captured last night, but the HARU and AKI positions are still in enemy hands.

2. HORIE Bn (NOTE. 2nd Bn, 144 Regt, which attacked along the ABUARI track) last night engaged and destroyed 1000 of the enemy (NOTE. A and B Coys 2/16 Bn) east of ISURAVA, and is now preparing to attack the enemy's rear in the vicinity of ISURAVA.

3.---

4. The KUSUNOSE Regt---- will capture HARU and AKI positions and then advance to south of ISURAVA.

ATIS 220

- (i) Diary of 2nd Lieut EBUCHI. (Comd No 2 Pl, No 9 Coy, 3rd (KAWADA-) Bn, 144 Regt
 18 Aug. 1730 hrs. Landed at BASA.
 19 Aug. 0930 hrs. SOPUTA.
 25 Aug. 1700 hrs. Arrived KOKODA.
 26 Aug. 0300 hrs. Left from KOKODA. Advanced to the front.
 27 Aug. Prepared to attack.
 29 Aug. Coy Comd was wounded.--- Our casualties were rather heavy.
 21 Sep. YAZAWA BUTAI is reported to be retreating.
 ATIS 157. 28 DEC 42.

- (j) Diary of FUJIWARA of PHILIPPINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, OKI 5169 BUTAI,
 ARAKI TAI. (No 5 Coy, 2nd Bn, 41 Regt.)

31 Aug. Number of personnel participated-----105

Officers	4
W/Os & NCO's	16
Ptes	85

8 Sep. Killed in action:-

NCO	1
Ptes	10
	<u>11</u>

Wounded

NCOs	3
Ptes	14
	<u>17</u>

AT the WESTERN PLATEAU of EFOGI, NEW GUINEA.

8 Sep. The EASTERN PLATEAU of EFOGI.

Personnel:-

Number of landed personnel	115
Killed in action	11
Hospital wounded	13
Illness	3
	<u>3</u>
Total	<u>26</u> (sic)
	88

Officers	4
W/Os & NCOs	12
Ptes	<u>72</u>

ATIS 106. 4 DEC 42

- (k) PW. 1st class Pte YAMAMOTO, Taro.

PW stated:-

" Many JAPANESE were killed in the KOKODA area. One rifle coy and one MG coy were almost wiped out.--- Up to KOKODA the going was easy but as soon as they started to climb fighting started. They retreated (from IORIBAIWA) because many men were killed.-----

ATIS. Interrogation Report No 9. 16 OCT 42.

- (l) Order captured at IORABAIWA shows the following units at IORIBAIWA on 23 Sep 42:-

1st Bn, 144 Regt
 2nd Bn, 41 Regt
 KAWASHIMA Cav Det
 HOZUMI Mtn Arty Bn
 15 Ind Engr Regt
 55 Engrs
 Fd Hosp

ATIS 53.

- (m) Diary Jan 22 - Oct 13, covering activities terminating at ISURAVA. By a member of 2nd (HORIE) Bn. ABUARI flank

22 Jan. Tomorrow we will land at last. (RABAUL)

23 Jan. ---Headed towards the harbour shore with pivotal craft in the lead. Not a single shot was fired at us. On landing we became the advance party.---Occupied the barracks. No enemy resistance. Several rifle shots were heard. From 7 o'clock participated in mopping up operations.

18 Aug. NEW GUINEA - BASA. Strength of coy--coy comd and 162 men.--- Disembarked at 1720.

19 Aug. SOPUTA.

24 Aug. 3 km from KOKODA.

25 Aug. Departed at 0200. At 1430, while making a detour, encountered

25. Aug. Departed at 0200. At 1400, while making a detour, encountered enemy. Four men were killed and four wounded----

27 Aug. 1st Lieut WASHIYE, Comd of No 4 Coy, and NISHIUCHI were killed ---

28 Aug. While advancing towards ISURAVA sighted an enemy position. Detoured to south.---

29 Aug. At 0400 2nd Bn ayyacked the enemy at ISURAVA from the left flank. Eleven men were wounded and four killed.-- At night the line was shortened for security.

30 Aug. Around 0300 enemy attacked but was repulsed.--- At 1100 picked up the bodies of 1st Lieut YAMAMOTO and three others--- 1105, enemy attack repulsed.

31 Aug. ISURAVA. The Coy was reorganised into two platoons.---

2 Sep/ ~~XX~~
 Coy Strength 178
 Left behind at time of departure 14
 19th. Returned to RABAUL from BASA 2
 20th. " " GIRUWA " " 1
 25th. Sent back to hospital at KOKODA 1
 27th Killed 2
 27th. Stragglers 1
 26th. Wounded 1
 Accompanied patients 1
 28th. Picked up by medical unit 1
 29th. Killed 4
 Wounded 11
 Accompanied patients 2
 30th. Wounded 1

4 Sep. EORA.---Prepared for battle----over-taking YAZAWA BUTAI---advanced and occupied a high hill.

5 Sep. 4 km north of KAGI.

6 Sep. ~~EFOGI~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

7 Sep. EFOGI.--0710, fought against approximately 100 of the enemy. Casualties, 5 wounded and 2 killed.---the enemy is occupying a position along the crest. Thirteen men were wounded and 1 man killed by heavy-mortar fire. From 1700, commenced to advance to attack. Because of uncertainty of enemy situation, dispatched scouts to reconnoitre before advance. Prepared to attack at dawn.

8 Sep. EFOGI.--- At 0520, charged the enemy line on the hill and secured a corner.---Our casualties in this battle were 2 killed and 8 wounded. By 1030 completely occupied the hill. Collected dead and wounded.
 Four killed and seventeen wounded 7th
~~XX~~
 Strength Coy Comd and 91 men.
 Two killed and fourteen wounded 8th.

9 Sep. 300 meters north of MENARI.---

10 Sep. WAMAI.(NOTE. NAURO)

11 Sep. On hil south of WAMAI.---

13 Sep. On a hill north of IORIBAIWA---Bn decided to encamp here for further reconnausance.

14 Sep. --- Marched up the road-- Commenced attack at 1145---Met stiff resistance. The battle did not progress as desired. At 1230 reported to the coy comd the casualties of 1 killed and 4 wounded. ---sighted the enemy slowly withdrawing from the right--- the enemy which was facing the coy, however, continued to hold its position---their strength became stronger.---

15 Sep. IORIBAIWA. --Continued to attack and failed.---

16 Sep. IORIBAIWA. --0700---made a charge, met strong enemy resistance and failed. Coy Comd was wounded---Reported withdrawal of enemy.---

17 Sep. Constructed positions---Todays strength 50 men.

18 Sep- 26 Sep. (At IORIBAIWA. Shelled on 22,23, 24 and 26 Sep 3 wounded as result.)

26 Aug. ---Complying with Bn order, advanced.(NOTE. Towards NAURO.)

1 Oct. 0600. Reached EORA to,join Bn.

2 Oct. EORA --Spent all day constructing camp and digging anti- aircraft trenches.---

5 Oct. EORA -- Reported the advance of strong enemy forces in the vicinity of KAGI.---

11 Oct EORA. Men participated in
 Landing operation 162
 ISURAVA 116
 EFOGI 127
 IORIBAIWA 88
 Heard rifle shots from vicinity of No 4 Coy---

8.

13 Oct.

	OFFICERS	WOs & NCOs	PTES	TOTAL
TOTAL	4	17	157	178
PRESENT No	-	4	38	42
KILLED	2	2	23	27
DIED	-	-	1	1
WOUNDED	2	6	52	60
SICK	-	5	18	23
TRANSFERRED	-	-	6	6
AT RABAU	-	-	15	15

ATIS. 193.

(NOTE. This Coy belonged to the 2nd (HORIE) Bn, 144 Regt. In the period covered by these extracts, the battle casualties incurred were 27 killed and 60 wounded. Of these 2 were killed and 1 wounded by 53 Bn on 26/27 Aug, and 3 were wounded as a result of shelling on IORIBAIWA RIDGE. As this Coy attacked up the track at IOAIBAIWA and the track was held by the composite 2/14-2/16 Bn until the withdrawal, it is fair to attribute the remaining battle casualties, 25 killed and 56 wounded, to 21 Bde.)

(n) Composition of No 2 Pl, No 3 Coy, 1st Bn, 144 Regt.

Pl Comd: Lieut ONOGAWA

No 1 Sec: Cpl YAWATA & 12 men

No 2 Sec: Cpl HIRAYAMA & 12 men

No 3 Sec: Cpl OKABAYASHI & 12 men


No 4 Sec: Cpl MIYAMOTO & 12 men

TOTAL:-1 Offr and 52 O.R.s

ATIS 83.

Appx A

Appx A to
39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Sep 42




TO EFOGI

TO EFOGI

VX103131 [Signature] Pte

APPX B to 39 Aust Inf Bn. War Diary Sep '42 (Ref. Map. Moresby 1 inch to 1 mile)
Disposition s of
39 AUST. INF. BN.





VX103131 *delbarnd* PTE



NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

PORT MORESBY (SPECIAL)
NEW GUINEA

REFER TO THIS MAP AS:- PORT MORESBY (SPECIAL)
EDITION SVY/004/006



Contour Interval 100 feet

Compiled and reproduced by 2/1 Aust.
Army Topo. Survey Coy. from data supplied
by 2 Aust. Field Survey Section.

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET
Put an arrow in the south-southwest corner of the square
and its margin. This is the starting point (origin) of the grid.


PAY ATTENTION TO LARGER MARGINAL FIGURES SINCE THEY
THOSE PRINTED ON THE FACE OF THE MAP WILL GIVE

POINT IDUMAVA (111)	
East	North
90	22
0	3
100	23

REFERENCE: 8000

Units: Metres
Reference to square: 100

THIS MAP IS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT. IF FOUND, IT MUST BE HANDED
IN TO THE NEAREST MILITARY HEADQUARTERS OR POLICE STATION.



- Main Road
- Southern Road
- Widely used traffic stream
- Widely used traffic stream with occasional passing
- Widely used traffic stream (Heavy MT)
- Light MT up to 3 ton lorry
- Motor transport only
- Foot transport only
- Note: Broken down wet weather classification
- Roads unsuitable to MT in wet weather
- Trails
- Hill Features
- Fern Lines
- Contours
- River or Personal Stream
- Non-perennial Stream
- Swamp or Marsh
- Full Cover or Dense Timber
- Canopy Cover or Medium Timber
- Scrub or Light Timber
- Tall Grass
- Maize
- Buildings
- Spot Level
- Trig Point
- Military Centre
- Courtesy
- Aerodrome and Landing Ground

REPRODUCED BY 2/1 AUSTRALIAN ARMY TOPOGRAPHIC SURVEY COMPANY, SEPT 42

Appx D to
39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Sep 42

27
1942




Appx E
to
39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary
Sep 42

39 BN Dispositions

Map by 39 BN 1 sec 30 sep

Abrosby
Special
Grid




CREEK	Bn. H. Q
CULTIVATION	Coy H Q
M.T. ROAD	Pl H Q
FOOT TRACK	sec Post
edge of Bluff	3" MORTAR
	M.M.G

Scale ~ 8 ins to 1 Mile

By Pte. J. MANOK

N. ↑
APP A to
39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Oct '42

Mule Track. Hombrom Bluff to Rouma Road.



Scale 8" to 1 mile.
12-10-42.

Appx B to
39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Oct 42

PORT MORESBY PYRAMID AREA




Appx A 6
39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Dec 42

BUNA (SECOND EDITION)

(PROVISIONAL)

Prepared from all available
information to 5-11-42

2836000m E
945000m N



Scale 1 Inch to 1 Mile

REPRODUCED BY 2/1 AUST. ARMY TOPO. SURVEY COY. NOV '42


INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS

KUMUSI	BUNA
WAIROPE	POPONDETTA

App B to 39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Dec '42



GONA LOCALITY
SCALE: 4 INCHES TO 1 MILE




A.D. SURVEY 24-11-42

Appx A NOTE Grids taken from later map
of GONA LOCALITY and do NOT
correspond with Appx B. M.N.

GONA MISSION AREA

(Traced from Aerial Photo of 7 Dec 42.)



-  KUNAI GRASS
-  COCONUTS & LIGHT SCRUB
-  LIGHT SCRUB WITH SPARSE TREES
-  LOW JUNGLE
-  HIGH JUNGLE



[Signature] Lieut
39 Aust Inf Bn
28 May 43

EXTRACTS FROM DOCUMENTS TAKEN FROM LT-COL AND OTHER OFFICERS

AMBOGA AREA 11 DEC. RECEIVED HQ NGF 12 DEC 42.

(GS(I) comments in brackets)

Appx D to
39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Dec '42

1. SIGNAL FORM 28 NOV.

Place of origin GIRUWA.
Person despatching message TOMITA Butai Comd (ASC Unit)
Person receiving " (YAMAGATA Bde, RABAUL)?


1. For the 900 personnel which comprise the main strength of the YAZAWA Butai (41 Regt) which is withdrawing from the region bordering the KUMUSI River, there is but only 100 rifles, 10 LMGs and 1 HMG.
2. Also the troops at BASABUA and GIRUWA are suffering a shortage of arms and in this area supplies are a problem, I request that you send forward immediately 500 rifles, 30 LMGs and 30 grenade throwers.
3. I have reported a shortage of rifle amn and request that you send forward supplies to the limit of your replenishments.

(COMMENT : Amn was dropped by transport planes 3 DEC, which suggests that the message was addressed to the YAMAGATA Bde at RABAUL, portion of which, were scheduled to land north of GONA. The shipping sightings on that date were confused because of bad visibility and it is considered weapons could have been landed. Captured documents indicate no reinforcements were landed BUNA-GONA area 1/2 DEC.)

2. DIARY.

NOV 16 At a point some 60 miles South East of PALAU the BOSTON MARU was torpedoed. Within five minutes the stern was down and seven minutes later sank. I was awakened by the terrific explosion and the whole crew made ready to take to the boats, however we heard it was the BOSTON MARU and felt greatly relieved.

Then follows various comments on large and small MLC. The following diagram then appears :



(COMMENT : The names above are of four destroyers and one transport. Aircraft sightings indicated that four destroyers only were observed, and other captured documents show that landings were made from destroyers. It is considered that the vessels did not include the transport.)

ASASHIO 2300 Depart (30 NOV)
Units on board Inf Bde HQ (107 Inf Bde, YAMAGATA)
170 Inf Bn HQ
II 170 Inf Mtn Arty (Normal inf regt arty)

(COMMENT : The 170 Inf Regt comprises part of 107 Inf Bde which in conjunction with the knowledge that reinforcements from the YAMAGATA Bde were expected, suggests 107 Inf Bde is YAMAGATA Bde).

DEC 1 0800 Spot enemy planes
1255 Enemy air raid
1335 " " " "
One of our planes shot down.
1415 13 of our planes.

(COMMENT : Four destroyers north of BUNA were attacked 1 DEC).

DEC 2 0200 In the region SE of the mouth of the KUMUSI land in face of the enemy. Immediately enter the jungle avoiding the enemy bombers, and make preparation for battle under Bde Battle Comd Post.

(COMMENT : Unopposed landing took place between KUMUSI and AMBOGA Rivers at unidentified point; not attacked by aircraft).

DEC 6 At 2100 carried out fierce night raid against enemy at GONA in rain. Spent same night in jungle and in early morning moved inland.

DEC 7 Although the enemy attacks from about noon, we counter-attacked.

(COMMENT : Our patrol sent to investigate party of Japs AMBOGA River area 4 DEC inflicted 20 casualties; another party attacked by the enemy night 6/7 sustained casualties).

ORDERS.

No 12 Coy is to make secure the position of the Coy's wounded and thenceforth is to prepare for an advance along the coastal road.

No 11 Coy is to consolidate the present river position (AMBOGA River) and with one section is to occupy the small village forward (East of river mouth).

INOUE Pl of No 10 Coy is to take over the patrolling from No 11 Coy and thenceforth is to move with the Bn HQ.

No 10 Coy WO INOUE

No 11 Coy Lieut KAWASAKI
2nd Lieut FUJIE

No 12 Coy 2nd Lieut OI

MG Lieut IWAMOTO
2nd Lieut HANAOKA

HQ Bn Lieut NAGAFUNE

MO KAWAGUCHI

(COMMENT : Reference to 10, 11 and 12 Coys indicates the force landed to be 3 Bn 170 Regt and with all coys;

(Leaving 11 Coy to consolidate, the remainder of the Bn advanced along coast.)

DEC 8 Enemy -

Coastal watch 2 persons
" " 2 persons (killed)

(COMMENT : Two allied coast watchers killed).

AMENDMENT

-3-

Convoy
G17 98. 100

No.12 Coy Casualties as at 9 Dec:

G.A. Brink

Landed 283

Killed 39

Wounded 52

Present strength 192

G13 (w) 100

G13 (w) 100

((COMMENT: Original strength of coy in conjunction with the previous information and the approximate number of troops that can be carried on a destroyer indicates the bn as full strength and plus regtl arty and Bde HQ an estimated strength of 1000 on the destroyers. Except for period 2310L/1 to 0040L/2 the convoy was observed and attacked whilst off the coast on night 1/2 Dec, so that it is probable that only part of the bn got ashore. From sightings of landing craft made that night and from the roles of 10 and 11 coys and the lack of details of their strengths, it is thought that total landed would not exceed 500.

On 8/9 Dec we inflicted 21 casualties (incl 3 PsW).

Estimated strength of force 9 Dec - 409))

Dec 11 1435 hrs

Wounded 6 Killed 1 (No 11 Coy)

" 3 " 1 (MG)

Badly wounded 4 Slightly wounded 5

((COMMENT: On 11 Dec we despatched a stronger force and attacked the enemy who had occupied hastily prepared positions. The above figures show 9 wounded 2 killed.

Estimated strength of force at 11 Dec - 398

Own troops report on 12 Dec in the AMBOGA area 11 casualties were inflicted on the enemy and further fighting took place 13 Dec.

Estimated strength of NANKAI dot in the KUMUSI - OPI area at 13 Dec - 200 at least

Estimated strength AMBOGA force at 13 Dec - 390 maximum (Not including possible casualties 13 Dec)

Total strength KUMUSI - AMBOGA area - 600))

→ EXTRACTS FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS TAKEN FROM LT-COL AND OTHER OFFERS *Killed at GONG VILLAGE BY 29th Aust Inf Bn*

Please extract page 3 and substitute this page. No.3 Military Topographical Matter - BUNA area sub-para GENERAL COMMENT "landed the bn of 170 Regt" should read "landed part of bn of 170 Regt. "The above, in conjunction with the latest identification that the .." should read "with the latest suggestion that the..."

SEISAN REPORT NO. 3

INFORMATION REPORT NO. 1.

YAMAMGATA Butai HQ at RABAU.

27 NOV 42

No 1. ENEMY'S SITUATION.

1. Summary

The enemy's land forces taking advantage of our army's reversals is advancing and from the beginning of this month have penetrated, and now face BUNA, GIRUWA and BASABUA. They are at close grips with our forces and are persistently carrying out small attacks. Further the enemy air force having established air superiority are daily bombing and strafing our army bases. Taking advantage of this they seem to be making a determined effort to cause our troops to retire from the vicinity of BASABUA and BUNA.

However it can be presumed that the enemy is having difficulty with its rear supplies and is suffering from exhaustion. (Ref Map 1).

2. Estimate of enemy strength

(a) MORESBY Area:

According to PW there are approx 20 - 30,000 troops in this area. (Validity classed B).

However up to the present the following has been ascertained.

One Div under the comd of Lt-Gen ROWELL
8 Bde
21 Bde (14-16-27 Bn)
22 Bde (39-49-53 Bn)
PIB

The 8 Bde has been dealt a severe blow by our troops and it can be estimated that the total strength of the div is less than 10,000. Moreover there are as attached Units American ground troops, and Marines numbering 1 - 2000. There are further, mortars, Fd and Mtn Arty, AA (large), large calibre coastal guns (2 guns), small tanks, motor vehicles, etc in suitable quantities.

Further there has been reported the existence of a NEW SOUTH WALES Bde, however the authenticity of this is doubtful.

(b) BASABUA - BUNA Front;

Details of enemy strength on these fronts is not known, however it can be estimated as follows :

BASABUA Front approx 300 Australians
GIRUWA Front " 1000 "
BUNA Front American troops (incl parachute Unit and native troops)
about 1 Bn 1,200.

The enemy in the surrounding areas has shown signs of increasing its strength recently on the BASABUA, GIRUWA and BUNA fronts and already has constructed a telephone system and in the SOPUTA Area many natives are being employed in billeting work.

Supplies are as follows :
According to P.W.

(a) About 2,000 enemy troops advanced northwards over the two days 18 - 19 NOV from POPONDETTA South West of SOPUTA (without guns) but with 10 days food supply, however whether their objective is GIRUWA or BASABUA is not clear.

(b) Further according to another P.W. the 25 Bde (does it comprise the strength in the BASABUA GIRUWA area?) although they are without any guns, between 4 - 5000 troops are reported to be coming (19/11).

Translator's Comment: (19/11 may refer to date of troops arrival or the date of interrogation of P.W.

(c) Patients on road KOKODA - GIRUWA are not being sent back but are being sent forward, however it has been observed that a base is not being established in the BUNA area.

(d) On the night of the 22 NOV the enemy on the BASABUA front opened a brisk attack, and on the GIRUWA front also 100 odd enemy troops approached the North West tip but did not attack. Several tens of the enemy penetrated our position resulting in hand to hand fighting. By this risk change it can be conjectured when you read this in conjunction with previous reports that the enemy's strength in this area has been reinforced.

(e) On the 15 NOV one transport ship arrived at the east coast of NEW GUINEA to reinforce the BUNA area.

The next day 16th, 6 transports approached same area but were spotted by our Naval Air Units and of them five were sunk and the others narrowly escaped and landed its troops and so reinforced BUNA area.

(f) There are indications of the enemy transferring troops from the GIRUWA front to the BUNA front (27/11).

3. Situation of enemy Air Force.

The enemy as before has air superiority in the NEW GUINEA Area and is daily very active in bombing our bases in the BUNA and GIRUWA regions.

(1) Types of Aircraft

The types of enemy aircraft which are seen in the said area can be classified as follows :

(a) Bombers : -BOEING - B17
MARTIN - B 26
North American-B 25
DOUGLAS - A 20

(b) Fighters BELL - P 39 (Large quantity)
CURTISS - P 40
LOCKHEED - P 38
Bristol Beaufighters

Comment: BRISTOL BEAUFIGHTERS made their initial appearance on the 17th SEP and are heavy fighters of English manufacture however their capabilities are not very great.

2. Enemy Air Bases.

(a) MORESBY AREA (Refer Map)

KILA KILA Drome
Old " "
No 1 " "
No 2 " "
No 3 " "
New (North)" "

(b) Eastern New Guinea.

GILI GILI Drome) South East of
" " nearby drome (RABI Drome) BUNA.
Drome about 12½ mls SE of BUNA.
Recently spotted. Name unknown (EMO - GUNUNDA -
D. BODURA)

(c) HORN ISLAND.

Northern tip of Australia
No 32 Air Fleet

3. Fighting Methods.

Enemy planes for the most part when attacking do a left hand roll of which they make a speciality, accordingly if care is exercised in avoiding this special stunt you are able to avoid damage.

4. Strength

The total strength of the enemy Air Force cannot at present be accurately estimated.

4. The enemy's usual fighting methods.

In reference to the American Army's usual fighting methods it is according to the booklet ((GA) Island American Army Combat Infm), distributed on the 24 NOV.

Further with regard to the fighting methods of the Australia Army it is as according to Nos 1 and 2 of the Int Reports specially issued. However some supplementary information on their usual methods of fighting is as follows :

- (a) The enemy is a slow firer, but is skilful in covering jungle roads and precipices - he also fires and throws grenades at close range.
- (b) He is fond of using hand grenades
- (c) The enemy's fighting spirit is unexpectedly intense. He does not retreat in single firing combat however on being charged he will flee.
- (d) At a point approx 1 kilom to the front of their positions are scouts who when attacked usually flee immediately.
- (e) Enemy foot patrols usually operate 2 - 300 metres to the left and right forward and rear of their positions.

No. 2 Situation of our (Jap) tps.

The NANKAI Det.

At the end of July the YOKOYAMA Adv Unit (based on 15 Ps Inf Bn) landed the vicinity of BUNA and the main force which advanced to KOKODA, together with an adv unit which landed in the vicinity of BUNA on the 18 Aug came under the one comd and commenced ops for the advance on PORT MORESBY.

The enemy was defeated everywhere in the STANLEY Ranges and on the 16 Sep our adv tps occupied IORIBAIWA. In conjunction with orders for withdrawing brought about by general conditions at the end of Sep a temporary adjustment of the position was made and on about 5 Oct the main force took up posn in the KOKODA area forming the STANLEY Det. Apart from IORA stands were made at successive bases.

The YAMAMOTO Butai under the comd of the YOKOYAMA Butai comd was engaged in making secure the BUNA area and the YOKOYAMA Butai was engaged in making secure the GIRUWA and BASABUA areas.

(COMMENT. A signal message captured GONA 8 Dec showed that Maj YAMAMOTO (rd constr unit) was in charge at BASA and under comd of Col YOKOYAMA (engrs) who was at GONA).

The Det HQ and the main strength of the YAZAWA Butai are at present engaged advancing northwards towards the river mouth along the left bank region of the KUMUSI River.

(COMMENT. The reference to the NANKAI det and YAZAWA unit (41 regt) as advancing northwards along the KUMUSI River is rather interesting in comparison with other mentions of the YAZAWA unit.)

(a) A sketch map captured in the GONA area 8 Dec showing the composition of the enemy force in defence at the junction of the CAPE KILLERTON and SOPUTA-SANANANDA rd on the 20 Nov includes the YAZAWA unit.

(b) Ref para 1 page 1 of these translations, dated 28 Nov. "For the 900 personnel which comprises the main strength of the YAZAWA unit, which is withdrawing from the region of the KUMUSI River"

The remainder of the message indicates that the weapons etc requested would be delivered at GIRUWA and the inference is that the YAZAWA unit would be in that area as confirmed by (a) above.

(c) Ref: map att, showing the main strength of the NANKAI det as in the KUMUSI River area on 26 Nov, it will be noticed that no reference is made to the YAZAWA unit.

In both the para in question and sub para (b) the reference made has been the main body of the YAZAWA unit as being in each area, and as can be seen by the strength of the YAZAWA unit (SANANANDA area) in conjunction with the known engagements this unit has participated in, that it is not feasible for the main body to be in the KUMUSI River area. In any case the figure for the Japanese force this area is approx 200)

The Air Force which consists only of our Naval Flying units is at present based on L.A.E being mainly engaged in recce and bombing of enemy land tps as well as co-operating with our land units. However at the present moment the air superiority is in the hands of the enemy.

COMMENT. In reference to the Air Force the following pencil note appears 7 fighters 8 bombers

No.3 Military Topographical Matter - BUNA area.

1 Roads.

Roads are special enemy bombing objectives therefore it is imperative that you do not concentrate on roads.

(a) Coastal roads may be used by foot soldiers except during heavy rain.

(b) The road between BASABUA and SOPUTA was previously a motor road but at the present time there are places where it is under water breast high (width of road approx 4 metres)

- (c) The road between GIRUNA and SOPUTA is usually a motor road however when it is raining it is impossible to pass, further the enemy's bombings are numerous.
- (d) The road-SOPUTA-BUNA is for the greater part good and is serviceable for motor vehicles (validity rated B)

2. JUNGLE

The coast in the BUNA area has a continuous coconut tree belt of a width about 50 metres, however inland it is jungle. Further although it is called jungle, foot troops are able to pass through easily. It is really what we understand by jungle, but rather it is a tropical forest.

As belts of coconut trees are special bombing targets of the enemy, when selecting sites for camping and as dumps for supplies it is necessary that the jungle be used.

Further when in the jungle as it is difficult to determine ones bearing it is necessary to carry a compass.

The trees are usually about 20 metres high and less than 20 centimetres in diameter. These tropical trees are suitable for concealment. However as there are places where there are no trees it is essential to be careful as such become enemy bombing objectives.

Further, in the jungle there are extremely numerous swamps.

3. RIVERS

The condition of the rivers in the places we have occupied are as follows:-

MUSA River East - North.

Its source is in the North West in the OWARAMA Mountain range. At first it flows South East and then North East.

KUMUSI River

Northern Part. Its source is in the OWARAMA mountains where it flows North. Ships with a draught of over 8 metres have difficulty in passing; has been navigated up to 55 miles.

MEMBARE River

Northern Part. Has its source in the OWEN STANLEY Range and flows roughly North East.

GIRA River.

Northern Part. Its source is in the ALBERT EDWARD Range and flows roughly North East into the sea. Navigation for small craft possible for 40 nautical miles.

The water in this region is generally foul. Unless it is boiled it is absolutely unsuitable for drinking. Although it is well water if you wipe the body with same it will result in skin eruptions, a water filter is necessary.

GENERAL COMMENT

The information contained in these and other documents appears to indicate a change in policy, and probably command of the forces in this area.

An operation order of the "Shore Garrison Force", captured at BUNA 2 Dec is according to the orders of the YAMAGATA Unit and mention is made of part of this force to land 29 Nov. There is no information to suggest that a landing was carried out 29 Nov and the attempted landing 28 Nov was frustrated due to the activity of our aircraft.

Furthermore it is suggested that the destroyers sighted night 1/2 Dec did not attempt to land reinforcements but brought weapons, ammunition etc to BUNA and landed the bn of 170 Regt in the KUMUSI-AMBOGA area as scheduled, with the intention of weakening our strength in the GONA-BASA area.

The following extract from a captured diary is an indication of probable changes:


"I am sorry for Maj-Gen HORII and Staff Officer TANAKA. Hear talk of the coming of Lt-Gen IIMURA'S army"

The above, in conjunction with the latest identification that EIGHTEENTH ARMY is now controlling the forces in NEW GUINEA, the att document "Enemy Information" by YAMAGATA Bde HQ and the reference "according to the YAMAGATA operation orders" suggests the commander of this bde (normally a Maj-Gen) possibly now commands the forces this area.


R. V. ...

Lt-Col
GS I NGF

2
20




TOPOGRAPHICAL MAP BUNA AREA 26 NOV



LITERAL TRANSLATION OF JAPANESE DOCUMENT - CAPTURED 11 DEC 42

LITERAL TRANSLATION OF JAPANESE
DOCUMENT - CAPTURED 11 DEC 42


DROMES AND A/A POSNS MORESBY AREA



Appx E to 39 Aust Inf Bn
War Diary Dec '42

DIAGRAM COMPILED FROM AERIAL Photos & Patrol infm

1" = 200* (approx)



ENEMY shown in BLUE
Own Tps " " RED