


AWM52

Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/5/4 DIVISIONS

3 Australian Division General
Staff Branch (3 Aust Div GS
Branch)

1943, Intelligence reports



1/5/4-0276

17 AUST INF BDE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT No 83 to 0600 hrs 23 Aug 43

SECRET.

7/120/25/8

PART I

Nil.

PART II
NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

1. Changes in disposition 2/5 Bn :-

C Coy less 2 pls	698938
One pl	696943
One pl	697947
A Coy	707927

A patrol from 2/5 Bn along the MT TALBU track killed 2 Japs at 713917.

2. Ref air photo 206BB print 12. C Coy 42 Bn at B9V7 were attacked from the EAST PM 22 Aug. A fighting patrol drove the enemy off killing three and capturing one LMG. Our casualties were three killed three wounded. Following the move of A Coy NORTH along DAVIDSONS RIDGE a small enemy party moved into former A Coy posn. Seven enemy were killed and the remainder driven off. Our casualties were 3 killed and one missing. Bn HQ 42 Bn now at No 1 Camp 721955.

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COED 17 AUST INF BDE.

23 Aug 43

SECRET.

17 AUST INF BDE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT No 81 to 0600 hrs 21 Aug 43

PART I

(Excludes information already passed in sitreps)

G 7/112/23/8

1. WELLS OP

1330K/20 arty fire on AA posns vicinity QUARRY. Smoke observed rising from 765054 and 764045 also from approx 754983 lasting 45 mins.

1405K/20 two small craft off NORTH point of PENINSULA, one approx 25 ft long moved around EAST point.

PART II

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

1. 2/5 Bn HQ at 1000K/20 moved forward to 701905.
2. During the day captured equipment including portions of 2 Mtn guns and 2 switchboards complete were collected in the area.
3. A patrol from C Coy 2/6 Bn during the morning located nemy posns at 706947. One coy 58/59 Bn contacted C Coy and moved to the SOUTH and WEST of the enemy located posns which was estimated to contain 20 Japs. Mortar fire from C Coy engaged this posn.
3. Mapping up continued and patrols to EAST slopes of KOMIATUN RIDGE found a total of 24 Japs dead and signs of from 20 to 30 having fled in disorder. A well worn track was found leading NE through 711931 and a patrol killed 2 Japs on this track.

W. H. H. H. BRIG.

COMD 17 AUST INF BDE.

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17 AUST INF BDE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 82 to 0800 hrs 22 Aug 43

PART I

NIL.

PART II
NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

1. At 1035K/21 2/5 Bn assumed command of KOMIATUM RIDGE, A Coy less one pl moving to LAVERS KNOLL with one pl at track junc 707946. B Coy patrolling to LT TALBU report the track clear while C Coy patrolling along the BUIUBU CK killed 2 Japs.
2. 2/6 Bn moved from KOMIATUM RIDGE to bivouac area DRAKES. At 1400K/21 command of WELLS CP passed to 58/59 Bn.
3. C Coy 42 Bn less one pl moved to 724961 with one pl at the track junc 723957. A patrol encountered a Jap party at 711953 and killed two. Patrols to 733953 and 726953 saw no movement while a patrol to 728962 encountered LMG fire. At 1630K/21 a patrol from D Coy 2/5 Bn u/c 42 Bn were ambushed at 716938 and one man was killed.

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W. H. M. K. BRIG.
COLD 17 AUST INF BDE.

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17 AUST INF BDE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT No 80 to 0800 hrs 20 Aug 43

PART I

(Excludes information already passed in sitreps)

WELLS OP

1. 0915K/19 puffs of smoke observed coming from 711963 thought to be Jap gun firing on unknown targets.
1615K/19 smoke observed at 705016.
1630K/19 smoke observed at 705016.
1825K/19 small craft NORTH from NORTH end of PENINSULA.
0730K/20 3 Japs NORTH across FRANCISCO MOUTH.
0806K/20 6 BOSTONS made two low level attacks on SALAMUA and area NORTH of SCOUT HILL also strafed both sides FRANCISCO. One AA gun fired from top of QUARRY.

PART II

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

1. Yesterday marked the collapse of the enemy resistance in all areas opposed to 17 Bde.
2. During the morning B Coy 2/5 Bn, who the night previous had dug in at the Southern end of the KOMIATUM SPUR, encountered slight enemy resistance and advanced to the junc of the KOMIATUM-TALBU tracks, where they consolidated. During this advance 5 Japs were killed. A Coy 2/5 Bn moving through B Coy posn contacted D Coy 2/6 Bn on LAVERS KNOLL. C Coy 2/5 Bn moved forward and occupied a position at 706916.
3. During the morning C Coy 2/6 Bn moved to LAVERS KNOLL to relieve A Coy 2/6 Bn. A Coy moved through to 708940 without encountering any opposition. C Coy 2/6 Bn exploiting to the NORTH was held up by enemy opposition at 706947. Arty fire was brought to bear on this position but C Coy attack was not successful and they dug in for the night at 706942.
4. Early morning patrols from C Coy 2/6 Bn found the enemy position at 707944 unoccupied and a pl immediately moved forward to occupy the track junc 707947. The patrol also reported that a Jap gun in pieces and ammunition was scattered along the track.
5. 2/6 Bn casualties 19 Aug were one killed and four wounded.
6. During 19 Aug mopping up continued on the EAST slopes of KOMIATUM RIDGE during the day where LAVER FORCE killed 9 Japs but isolated pockets still remain.
7. At the same time one pl of Coy A 1 Bn 162 US Regt occupied the highest ground of MT TAMBU 716917 where they were joined by Coy C. Only a few Jap stragglers were encountered and a patrol later made contact B Coy 2/5 Bn at the junc KOMIATUM-MT TAMBU tracks. It is reported that arty fire had devastating effect on enemy pillboxes this area and numerous dead were buried in the area.
8. By 1230K/19 B Coy 42 Bn had occupied the former enemy posn at 722922 and contact patrols which killed 5 Japs contacted TAYLOR at 1800K/19. A party of 12 Japs breaking bush at 718919 were later ambushed by 42 Bn at 718927 and all were killed.
9. 42 Bn advancing NORTH along DAVIDSON RIDGE encountered only slight opposition and 2 Pls D Coy occupied a position at 720947 and the third platoon at 723952.

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COLD 17 AUST INF BDE.

20 Aug 43.

SECRET.

17 AUST INF BDE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT No 78 to 0800 hrs 19 Aug 43

PART I

(Excludes information already passed in Sitreps)

WELLS OP

1. 0930K/18 2 Japs NORTH into SALAMAU.
1140K/18 arty fired onto AA posns QUARRY area.
1815K/18 one canoe off NORTH point of PENINSULA.
2. Remainder of TAYLOR pl which followed the Jap party to SALUS LAKE area reported into NASSAU BAY 1000K/18. This group moved SOUTH along WEST coast of SALUS LAKE where they contacted an estimated coy of Japs in column formation. An ambush was laid and 30 Japs were known to be killed and an estimate of a further 20 possibly killed.

2/108/248

PART II

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

MT TAMBU

1. Patrol from Coy C found four empty pillboxes apparently vacated a week ago. The patrol then moved to 719914 and found deserted OP.
2. Report on Jap movement by PFC from Coy C who reported to arty troops at 797893 at 1700K/15. He saw one group of 67 Japs at 784885 and another of 130 at 783895. The group of 67 was estimated by counting leaves used for seats. The group of 130 were based on a count of beds in a bivouac area by two PIB.

GOODVIEW

3. Following the occupation of HODGES KNOLL and the pillbox area 11 Pl moving up the main KOMIATUM Track made contact at approx 711911. 12 Pl moved to the left flank but a deep re-entrant prevented any approach to this posn. A patrol to 703913 reports chopping heard area 702914. 8 Pl attacking enemy posns along razor back 698913 and posns slightly EAST of MULE track encountered heavy fire including 2 HMGs and were unable to make any progress. Further attacks by B Coy were repulsed and enemy defences were estimated to be 200 yds in depth and to contain 6 automatic weapons. B Coy are now dug in astride the main KOMIATUM Track. Our casualties one officer and 5 ORs wounded.

2/6 AUST INF BN

4. 1000K/18 a patrol SOUTH from JOHNSONS KNOLL 707924 located a Jap LMG and occupied posn approx 707920. One LMG is now in posn on LAVERS KNOLL 707926.
5. A patrol from 42 Bn arrived at LAVER FORCE without contacting the enemy. The patrol crossed three tracks, two of which had not been used the other showing slight signs of use.
6. 1630K/18 a patrol from LAVERS KNOLL to 707937 observed two Japs moving into freshly dug weapon pits.
1630K/18 two wounded Jap prisoners and one dead Jap were taken from an enemy dugout.
At 0200K/19 a single Jap with pack moving from the SOUTH was killed by B Coy.
7. During the night LMGs fired harassing fire on enemy posn SOUTH of JOHNSONS KNOLL.

42 AUST INF BN

8. Recce patrol report NO enemy in area squares 7193 7194.
9. A patrol WEST to 712927 without contact. A further patrol to 717920 reports the posn not occupied. Fire on to Jap perimeter at 722922 drew no return fire.
10. Automatic fire on to enemy posn at 727940 Brought return fire. Our casualties were one officer wounded.

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File.

BRIG
COLD 17 AUST INF BDE

20 Aug 43

-2-

Between 1900 and 2015K/17 heavy attacks were launched on to JOHNSONS KNOLL from the SOUTH and WEST supported by plunging fire from LT TAMBU. Extremely accurate fire from 42 Bn LMG, arty and mortar with our SA fire broke up four attempts to reach this posn. A further attack at 2045K/17 was again broken up by the same means. Our casualties were one killed while the enemy were unknown but considered heavy.

8. C Coy 2/7 Bn patrol at 0820K/17 to EXTONS KNOLL encountered low apron wire. Fire onto enemy posns on timbered table top was returned by 2 LMG rifles and grenades. A later harassing patrol, to PRICES KNOLL was fired on by rifle and one LMG. At 1645K/17 movement seen on PRICES KNOLL was engaged by mortar fire.

42 AUST INF BN

9. One pl 15 Bn estimated that a party of 30 Japs with LMG are in posn at 727940.

A fighting patrol to 716922 engaged the enemy in this posn. Enemy casualties 1 killed, ours 1 missing 1 wounded.

A patrol which made no contact with the enemy took the following route: 720935 to 720953 WEST along CREEK 714955 715937 and returned to 720935. They reported no sign of the track as shown on the map between 720953 and 715955.

Wesley Hoj
BRIG.

COMD 17 AUST INF BDE.

19 Aug 43.

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OVERLAY LANNING PATROL "C" CO. 14-17 AUG. '43


Map No. 25000

Randall, Sgt.
TAYLOR 2

NOTE: LT. HOFFMAN REPORTED
IN ON BEACH 16 AUG. PFC. KEND
AND TWO PIB REPORTED
TO MACK HQ. 17 AUG.

LEGEND

--- Route of
Japanese 14-15
Aug.



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15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 65

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)
11 Sep 43

Information to 2100K/10

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000

G24.

G2(4)

G3(1)

1/0

OPERATIONS

(a) Own - A general advance was again made today. In the area NORTH of FRANCISCO R, the enemy was contained by light forces in ROUGH HILL and ARNOIDS CREST till dusk 10 Sep. This made available a heavy force to launch a thrust along the SANDY CK. Therefore, three coys 2/7 Bn, three coys 58/59 Bn, 2/3 Indep Coy less one pl moved at first light 10 Sep and concentrated area 708000 SANDY CK during afternoon 10 Sep. The leading coy moved at 0500K and contacted enemy at 0900K/10 in area 708000. The enemy was driven out and all troops pushed on. At nightfall coys occupied suitable assembly areas for forward movement at first light on 11 Sep.

In the area SOUTH of the FRANCISCO R the enemy withdrew from his positions along the SALAMAU track and, in the vicinity of NUK NUK. Our troops pushed on during the day and have reached the line of the FRANCISCO R with coys at LOGUI 2 (747998) 741987, 730987, KENNEDYS CROSSING.

(1) BONDUBI Area

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde - Adv HQ opened 708977 1030K/10. 2/7 Aust Inf Bn - 1930K/9 C Coy reports fires burning at approx 705002. Patrols to test enemy defences. Coy patrol to ARNOIDS CREST area reports 2 LMGs. One pl B Coy unable to advance owing to heavy enemy fire. One pl C Coy to KIDNEY KNOLL reports LMG defending razor back ridge. Our casualties during dawn patrols 5 wounded. A and B Coys bivouacing in area 718002, D Coy 716001.

1700K/10 C Coy patrolled forward and found outer enemy weapon pits unoccupied. Coy moved forward to concentrate NORTH of ARNOIDS CREST. Area heavily booby trapped preventing further movement till first light 11 Sep.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - A Coy attacked ROUGH HILL to test enemy defences, drew fire, saw 1 Jap and heard talking - our casualties 1 killed. 1145K/10 A Coy and A Pl 2/3 Indep Coy attacking ROUGH HILL came under heavy enemy MMG and mortar fire. A Pl cut 1 Jap L of C to ROUGH HILL and occupied enemy positions. C Coy moved via SANDY CK and contacted the enemy at 716003 and attacked at 1135K/10. B Coy was close behind C Coy in SANDY CK 1530K/10. One coy dug in on the WEST side, C Coy on the EAST side of SANDY CK at 716003. Enemy reported 300 yds NORTH and fighting patrols were sent out to contact. Attack by A Coy on ROUGH HILL repulsed, 1 MMG, 2 LMGs and 1 sniper located. It is estimated there were 18 covered enemy weapon pits. Our casualties 2 killed 3 wounded. Enemy counter attacked A Pl 2/3 Indep Coy at midday but attack was repulsed and 2 Japs killed. All our attacks throughout the day on ROUGH HILL met heavy fire. C Coy at 715000 attacked an enemy camp of 4 huts at 1430K/10, 1 Jap killed, 6 fled and some documents captured. 1500K/10 B Coy occupied a position immediately SOUTH of C Coy. D Coy established a firm base at 717989.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - B and C Pls in close contact with C Coy 58/59 Bn moved forward to occupy the high ground SOUTH of HAND. C Pl with C Coy 58/59 Bn and B Pl as a fighting patrol moved to EAST A Pl 720985. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ B and C Pls 715003. B Pl patrols located a position on SAVIGE SPUR which when occupied will comd enemy position at 723998.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - 16 Pl less one sec attacked enemy position 085023 from the SOUTH and encountered heavy fire from the EAST. One sec attacked from the WEST but came under heavy fire. Secs unable to advance further. Enemy position is approx 200 yds long with pillboxes at each end connected

2/ by

Booby traps

by a communication trench and is wired on the NORTH and SOUTH SLOPES of the ridge. Our casualties 2 missing, enemy 1 killed. Patrol to 873037 observed booby traps and fresh made footprints. Ambush party 18 Pl receiving area 884065.

(ii) 29 Aust Inf Bde

15 Aust Inf Bn - 1400K/9 A Coy successfully attacked enemy position 763954, killing 5 Japs. The remainder fled and abandoned equipment. C and D Coys attacked enemy position 748965. The enemy taken by surprise suffered considerable casualties and fled abandoning equipment. One Coy reached 753973 and are still advancing. One Coy at 743967 are moving towards EUG NUK.

42 Aust Inf Bn - K/10 Mtn Gun loss the barrel discovered on CHARLIE HILL area. Dispositions as at 1600K/10. A Coy NUK NUK, B Coy less one pl 740968, one pl 738991, C Coy track June 750970, D Coy 736965.

47 Aust Inf Bn - AM K/10 B Coy occupying KENNEDYS CROSSING area. A Coy moved through B Coy towards objective KNOLL 730988. 1030K/10 D Coy 725973. AM K/10 16 Pl D Coy occupied a feature at 720968 and found many MG pits and crawl trenches covering all approaches. A hurried check reveals 32 Jap bodies, the result of arty fire. Dispositions as at 1600 K/10: A Coy 730989, B Coy vicinity KENNEDYS CROSSING, C Coy 730976, D Coy 725972.

(iii) 162 US Inf Regt - AM K/9 2 and 3 Bns overcame opposition on SCOUT RIDGE at 740955. 1 Bn occupied EGG KNOLL 732955 and spur to EAST without opposition. Locations: Coy F 740956, Coy G 740965.

(iv) RAA 5 Aust Div - Harassing fire and opportunity targets.

(v) LAE Area - 2/25 Bn at MUNIM, one sec 2/4 Rd Regt 442547, 2/2 Pnr 3n MARAKAPOR. No movement seen MARKHAM PT, LABU Is. No movement seen MARKHAM Road from KALU to 650418 nor in BUMBU Valley.

(b) Enemy - 1130K/10 170 Japs carrying heavy boxes observed at 733977 from ROUGE HILL. They were travelling fast towards SALAMUA. 90 Japs observed from OP ROUGH HILL moving SE from SAVIGE SPUR at 1200K/10. Two white tents were observed, also bodies of troops moving towards SALAMUA at 733977.

AIR Nil.

OP REPORTS

WELLS OP.

0850K/10 Arty fire on KELA and ARTILLERY HILLS.
1725K/10 Arty fire on KELA HILL.
1800K/10 Arty fire on SALAMUA Isthmus.
1805K/10 Arty fire on KELA and ARTILLERY HILLS.

ENEMY CASUALTIES

Casualties inflicted 2100K/9 to 2100K/10 - 4 killed.

Major
BM 15 Aust Inf Bde

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15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 66

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)
12 Sep 43

Information to 2100K/11

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000.
KOMIATUN 1:25000.

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Own

(1) BOBDUBI Area

On a line from HAND to KIDNEY KNOLL our troops met enemy in considerable force and have maintained close contact throughout the day.

15 Aust Inf Bde - 1530K/11 Bde Comd Post opened at 715000.

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - All coys advanced at first light. At 0915K/11 A and B Coys were occupying Jap positions at 723008. B Coy exploiting to BICEP met heavy enemy resistance, including 2 MMGs and mortar, sustaining casualties 4 killed 8 wounded. B Coy withdrew covered by A Coy then both coys launched continued attacks throughout the day.

One Pl C Coy moving from ARNOIDS CREST to EDWARDS spur along clay track contacted enemy 706904 covering barricaded track with fire; 1 Jap killed. Remainder C Coy moved NORTH along BUIRIS OK and attacked KIDNEY KNOLL all day.

D Coy moved to 712012 and at 1800K/11 were occupying enemy positions dug within last 12 hours.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - A Coy and A Pl 2/3 Indep Coy maintained pressure on ROUGH HILL during night 10/11 Sep. Fighting patrol late PM K/10 fired on by LMG and 1 MMG. Casualties inflicted 1 killed 1 wounded, our casualties nil. 1045K/11 A Coy and A Pl 2/3 Indep Coy attacked Jap positions on ROUGH HILL and drove the enemy out. The enemy abandoned weapons and equipment. Many enemy pillboxes and well dug in defences were found. 1230K/11 A Coy consolidated on ROUGH HILL. Jap defences on SAVAGE SPUR consisted of 18 knolls as defended localities, 6 between positions occupied by A Pl 2/3 Indep Coy and A Coy 58/59 Bn ROUGH HILL, and 12 between A Pl 2/3 Indep Coy and 724998. Estimated defences would hold 500. All recent diggings obviously evacuated during night 10/11 Sep.

C Coy moving to 722014 thence to 715022 and 721022 unable to pass through 2/7 Bn on HAND as planned and moved WEST then NORTH to objective 721032.

B Coy at 715000. D Coy 717998.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - K/11 B Pl patrol to SAVAGE SPUR observed one Jap at 724998. A mtn gun fired from this area. B and C Pls moved EAST at first light and at 1045K/11 C Pl were sitting astride Jap L of C at 723002. B Pl exploited to SW and contacted A Pl exploiting NE after capture of ROUGH HILL. C Pl then moved NORTH to HAND but met deep gorge and detoured to WEST.

Dispositions 1800K/11 Coy HQ B Pl 725005, A Pl 715000, C Pl moving as above.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - K/11 8 Pl moved EAST along the NEW MALOLO track to the junction of the NEW and OLD MALOLO tracks and were attacking enemy position 691038. 16 Pl two men moved to cut enemy L of C. 2 men reported missing 10 Sep now returned.

(11) 29 Aust Inf Bde

Large quantities of Jap strat maps and documents were found in an old Jap staging camp in the vicinity of Bde HQ NUK.

15 Aust Inf Bn - K/12 Bn HQ, HQ A and D Coys 732972, B Coy 728975, C Coy crossed the river late PM K/11 en route to ISTHMUS.

42 Aust Inf Bn - 0830K/11 B Coy arrived at 741988 on the SW end of the airstrip having crossed the FRANCISCO R with-

2/ out

out opposition. The river was chest deep and running strongly. C Coy vicinity 732978. 0945K/11 C Coy passed through A Coy at NUK NUK. 1315K/11 A Coy 733975, B Coy in position KEIA 734017. Fire from our arty prevented movement NORTH. 1615K/11 B Coy reported on Isthmus. C Coy 741987, D Coy less 16 Pl airfield 738991, 16 Pl in occupation Isthmus and no contact made with the enemy. 1715K/11 C Coy patrol contacted C Coy 15 Bn with instructions to move immediately to the Isthmus. Bn HQ and HQ Coy 729972.

47 Aust Inf Bn - K/11 Adv HQ 730978. 1045K/11 A Coy crossed the FRANCISCO R at 730988. 1610K/11 B Coy 47 Bn at 725992 and A Coy at 730002, both coys moving fast towards KEIA. These two coys with B Coy 42 Bn under command will form a composite force to attack and capture CHINATOWN. Bn HQ, HQ Coy and C Coy 730975, D Coy 730987. A Coy moving from 730002 to KEIA area out of communication since 1400K/11. B Coy moving to KEIA found SAVIGE SPUR vacated. C Coy with Bn HQ 730975, D Coy 730937.

(iii) 162 US Inf Regt - K/10 Locations: Coy A 747963, Coy B 756965, Coy C and Coy I 764974, Coy K 760975, Coy L 753960, 3 Bn HQ 753960.

(iv) RAA 5 Aust Div - K/10 arty support for 15 Bde attack, harassing fire. 3 gums firing at intervals from the SALAMAU peninsula and Isthmus neutralized. Bty 4 205 FA Bn 759959.

1. ENEMY CASUALTIES

Casualties inflicted 2100K/10 - 2100K/11 - 25 killed 1 wounded.

2. TOPOGRAPHICAL

ROYALS POST is located at 715000.

Account for hunt
Major
Bn 15 Aust Inf Bde

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15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 67

EC 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)
12 Sep 43

Information to 2100K/12

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000
LAS SERIES 1:25000

OPERATIONS

(a) Own

The enemy has now been driven entirely from the SALAMAU area.

The occupation and establishment of SALAMAU as a base is proceeding. 15 Aust Inf Bde today pushed through to the coast at 728035 and to ASINI and OLD WOMASU but no organised resistance was met. Two parties of enemy were contacted on 15 Bde front in the ASINI area. One party of 35 were attacked with vigor by our troops and withdrew hurriedly to the NORTH and NW. Mopping up is proceeding in this area but it is NOT expected that any but a few stragglers will be encountered.

(1) 15 Aust Inf Bde

1015K/12 Bde Comd Post opened at BICEP. 1600K/12 Comd Post closed BICEP and opened 732019. 1600K/12 1 Jap killed HQ area. 2/7 Aust Inf Bn - K/11 A and B Coys known to have killed 20 enemy in HAND area but much heavier casualties inflicted as a result of close contact fighting. Our troops fire silenced enemy MMG and mortar, crews of these are NOT included in above figure. D Coy 712012 located 10 freshly dug weapon pits but no movement seen. K/12 A and B Coys occupied Jap positions at HAND. 1530K/12 A and B Coys relieved by 2/3 Indep Coy moved in the direction of OLD WOMASU and ONE TREE HILL. C Coy pushed NORTH of KIDNEY at 1200K/12, contacted enemy estimated strength 35 in the vicinity of ASINI and attacked immediately. Enemy hurriedly withdrew to NORTH and NW. Our casualties 1 wounded. The coy is remaining in the ASINI area until relieved by 29 Bde. Forward Bn HQ 705020.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - AM K/12 breaking bush C and D coys reached the coast at 720035 - no movement seen. B Coy ROYALS POST, A Coy less one pl 715015. One pl clearing track 717027 on which enemy were seen at 1200K/12. Forward Bn HQ 715015.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - K/11 Examination of tracks shows Jap used L of C SE from 724989 when pushed off SAVIGE SPUR. Japs at ROUGH HILL broke bush NORTH then EAST round A Pl. AM K/12 B Pl moved NORTH to relieve A and B Coys 2/7 Bn at HAND. 1200K/12 Coy concentrated at BICEP. 1900K/12 Coy concentrated at 735019.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - K/11 8 Pl attacked enemy ambush 691038 from the WEST and NORTH. There was no return fire encountered and the attack continued. 0120K/12 8 Pl moved EAST along MALOLO track for 1 hr crossing 5 trip wires. 1200K/12 8 Pl moving EAST along the MALOLO track from 723032 moved through 2 Jap positions and at 0825K/12 encountered landmines - 1 OR wounded. Ambush party 18 Pl now returning from EAE-SALAMAU TRACK. 1130K/12 16 Pl reported enemy position 685025 clear. Pl now moving forward. 1830K 4 fires observed vicinity 681074.

(11) 29 Aust Inf Bde (Information to 0700K/12 only)

15 Aust Inf Bn - 0430K/12 Bn moved out to cross the FRANCISCO R.

42 Aust Inf Bn - First light K/12 no communication with B and D Coys.

47 Aust Inf Bn - K/12 no communication with A and B Coys.

(111) 162-US Inf Regt - K/11 After pressing forward through rugged country, were halted by the flooded FRANCISCO R at 747997. 1 Bn and Coy C general area 763963, 2 Bn HQ 759988, Coys I and K 746998, Coy L 766988.

(iv) RAA 5 Aust Div - K/11 Arty support for the Infantry during day.

(v) LAB Area - Attempts to cross the BUSU R frustrated by the strong current due to heavy rain. 2/28 Bn holding bridges and on WEST bank. 2/4 Indep Coy in KUNDA BRIDGE area. Patrol of C Coy PIB EAST bank BUSU encountered Japs and inflicted casualties without loss. Enemy shelled extensive area along the coast EAST of BUREP R but no casualties reported. 4 Aust Inf Bde arrived night 10/11 Sep. The relief of 20 Bde by 4 Bde began K/11. Japs counter attacked the left flank of 2/28 Bn when 40 Japs were killed, our casualties 3 killed 10 wounded. 2/17 Bn 771447, HQ 9 Aust Div 751450. An airstrip is prepared at 8942.

ENEMY CASUALTIES

Casualties inflicted 2100K/11 to 2100K/12 - 1 killed

Hamilton

Major
BM 15 Aust Inf Bde

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15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 59

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)
5 Sep 43

Information from 2100K/3 to 2100K/4

Ref Mps: SAIAWA 1:25000
KOMIATUN 1:25000

1. OPERATIONS

(a) OWN

(1) BOEDUBI Area

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - K/4 amended dispositions: C Coy HQ 705998, 15 Pl 704999, 14 Pl less one sec 706997, sec 703997, 15 Pl 706998, Tk.A Pl 705997. D Coy patrol contacted enemy listening post approx 714997. Enemy engaged patrol with type 36 grenades and LMG. Enemy position now being engaged with mortar and MMG. A Coy patrol moved approx 50 yds forward of coy position towards ARNOLDS CREST and located 2 enemy booby traps set with type 36 grenades across track. B Coy recce patrol to 703996 reports no movement seen. C Coy patrol to 706003 heard enemy voices, estimated 12. Unable to engaged enemy who moved NORTH up spur. D Coy fighting patrol with mortar support to 714997 unable to engaged enemy who had withdrawn into heavy undergrowth and the only approach was along an open spur.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - Night 3/4 Sep B Coy MMG harassing fire on SAIAWA TRACK. 0550K/4 20 Jap mortar bombs fell in C Coy area - no casualties. C Coy MMG harassed suspected location of mortar 724996. C Coy patrol to approx 721995 saw a Jap sentry on SAVIGER SPUR, now observing from DAWSONS 717992 to ascertain position. Patrol C Coy on SANDY CK saw a Jap footprint at approx 717994 which is considered to have been made K/3. D Coy patrol heard digging 724988. 0900-1300K/4 A Coy patrol from 718985 to 717983 reports no movement seen. 1330K/4 9 Pl 24 Bn under comd C Coy, recce area 723990 and one sec in position. Recce for ambush position proceeding. 1445K/4 C Coy MMG and mortar harassing fire on suspected enemy position 722991.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - K/4 patrol to locate enemy L of C to 085023 was NOT successful and further patrol moved out.

(11) 29 Aust Inf Bde

PM K/3 Recce patrols located Jap position 718953. K/4 all natives and troops in contact with Japs instructed to pass to Jap by bush telegraph and shouting that many thousands of Australian troops landed at IAE and that the warships are ours.

15 Aust Inf Bn - K/4 Pressure being maintained by fighting patrols

42 Aust Inf Bn - 1230K/3 A Coy report brief action and enemy withdrew. Patrol reports track running ENE from camp is enemy L of C from CHARLIE HILL. Three enemy, two carrying packs, seen leaving CHARLIE HILL on this track. B Coy reports 10 enemy killed in area 3 Sep to 1745K. One Pl C Coy 723952. Mortar shoot on enemy position CHARLIE HILL reported effective. 2000-2100K/3 B Coy repulsed two attacks - our casualties 2 wounded. B and D Coys patrolling offensively towards CHARLIE HILL. AM K/4 HMG and an LMG firing from crest of CHARLIE HILL on B Coy. 1530K/4 Bn HQ opened 723952. A Coy now approx 728959. Pl from B Coy moved to 726985 and occupied 5 enemy pillboxes. Pl from C Coy found area 730954 strongly held by enemy, short engagement followed and pl moved to Coy C 162 US Regt at 731951 for night. Pl D Coy moved to 724957, fired on by 4 LMGs - our casualties 1 killed. Patrol found two bodies of our troops killed 29 Aug; boots and socks had been removed by the enemy. Three grenades thrown by enemy at small patrol 724958.

47 Aust Inf Bn - Amendment to Summary No 57: lines 1-6 delete from "2100K/1" to "2 Japs digging" and insert same in 42 Bn before "1100K/2".

K/3 D Coy patrol located enemy position with HMGs and LMGs dug in at 719967. Fire directed towards D Coy from commanding ground on three sides was returned. Estimated Jap casualties 20 killed. Coy returned for night to firm base 715983.

2/ K/4

- 2 -

K/411 Pl reported to A Coy and now under comd. 0300K/4 one sec B Coy with coy comd occupying 2 pillboxes 40 yds EAST of Coy FDL came under fire from Jap LMGs further up spur. - Our casualties 1 wounded. Patrol from B Coy moved down spur, fired on by LMGs - our casualties 1 killed. Sec to locate LMGs fired on and forced to withdraw, - our casualties 1 killed 1 wounded. B Coy report 1 killed 1 wounded by enemy sniper AM K/4. 13 Pl with C Coy HQ 708954. D Coy patrol located Jap position vicinity 717962. Pnr Pl 714961, Tk.A Pl 711962, 16 Pl D Coy on spur 715965. PIB located Jap positions 722965 and a listening post at 717957.

162 US Regt - K/3 Coy A 733952, Coy B 736955, Coy C 735954, Coy D 740953, Coy I 739939. 1155-1800K/3 arty fire onto enemy positions 754964 effective. Preceded by arty fire patrol penetrated to 747965 where enemy holds position in depth on LEFT and right flanks. Patrol withdrew to coy perimeter 747955. Our casualties 3 wounded, enemy unknown. One Pl Coy A 760963.

RAA 5 Aust Div - Night 2/3 Sep harassing fire on SAIAUA, LOKANU, SCOUT RIDGE, NUK NUK. 1330-1500K/3 CB fire. 1400K/3 two Jap guns located 762971, neutralised. Concentration area 721967 during day

(B) Enemy - 1400K/3 Two Jap guns located 762971 shelled area 750949. 1924K/3 approx 25 shells, incl many blinds, from enemy gun vicinity HAND landed in 2/3 Aust Indep Coy area. 1554K/4 20 Jap mortar bombs fell in C Coy 58/59 Bn area - no casualties.

2. AIR Nil

3. OP REPORTS

OLD VICKERS POSITION

0650K/4 2 destroyers, 2 torpedo boats, 12 barges (HIGGINS type) and 8 larger barges seen heading WEST towards FINSCHAFEN. Could NOT identify nationality.

MAILOLO OP

0530K/4 10 light 21 smaller boats anchored off LAE. 0600K/4 gunfire from ship onto coast at LAE.

4. ENEMY CASUALTIES

Enemy casualties inflicted 2100K/3 - 2100K/4 Nil.

Ad. Tully
Major
BM 15 Aust Inf Bde

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15 AUGUST INF IDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 52

Re 13 Aust. Inf Ide (AIF)
28 AUG 43

Information from 2100X/37 to 2100Z/28.

Ref Maps: SALAMATA 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Gen

(1) BOENURI Area - From the ease with which we occupied the areas ARNOLDS CREST, CAMEL RIDGE and KIDNEY on 23/24 Aug it is considered that only a few troops were in the area. The fact that the enemy fled, leaving gear and equipment, when attacked leads to the belief that the troops were either badly trained or disorganised. However the efforts made against us by the enemy in this area during 26/27 Aug show that he considers the control of the rim of SANDY CK basin vital to his defence of SALAMATA. It is considered that our threat from WEST to EAST along the ridge from KIDNEY to HAND and the occupation of the area 720000 caused the enemy to reinforce strongly from KELA direction. This reinforcement is confirmed by the fact that the enemy met during 26/27 Aug were new clothing, carried new equipment, and appeared fresh. Well clothed enemy were seen escorting wounded who were NOT so well clothed in the general direction of KELA. During the attack on ROUGH HILL 26 Aug enemy forward troops fought while a large body of enemy troops were NOT committed but dug defences. This strength shows how he values ROUGH HILL. Therefore after being chased from his positions the enemy has reorganised and launched a determined counter attack to regain control of the rim of SANDY CK basin. Further confirmation of this is given by the fact that the enemy in ROUGH HILL area, holding the best ground, is content to sit quiet. It is considered that the enemy will be content to hold a line ROUGH HILL - SAVAGE SPUR - 720000 - HAND - KIDNEY - ARNOLDS CREST.

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - 2/28 L/T re-established with C Coy. C Coy patrol K/26 located enemy L of C SW to NE 705000-710007-717014. Patrol from EDWARDS SPUR counted 57 enemy carrying picks and shovels moving SW on this L of C. Later party of 20 moved NE returning after 30 mins with picks and shovels. Patrol from 15 pl to EDWARDS SPUR killed 4 enemy. 1800X/27 BSMA fighting patrol reported BUIRIS CK clear but 6 recently dug enemy weapon pits 400 yds NE 705000. Night 27/28 Aug B Coy harassed enemy to NORTH with mortar fire. D Coy withdrawn to 717987, moved and occupied position 713993 0830X/28. Patrolling to contact enemy. Runners from 15 pl on HAND moved SOUTH, contacted Japs NORTH of D Coy then moved WEST to ARNOLDS CREST and contacted B Coy 58/59 Aust Inf Bn at 0200X/28, then down BUIRIS CK to BSMA HQ. EDWARDS pl now on SPRAK. Fighting patrol moved to 15 pl to assist their withdrawal to within coy perimeter. Ambush position established at 708003. B Coy contact patrol WEST to A Coy 58/59 Bn - no movement seen. A Coy patrol moved to ridge NE of position, found track with one set enemy footprints leading towards SAVAGE SPUR. 15 pl returned to C Coy position in BUIRIS CK. B Coy harassed enemy on ROUGH HILL during day.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - 0750X/28 D Coy patrol at 717971 ambushed party of 40 Japs moving WEST to EAST along SALAMATA TRACK 15 Japs killed. Japs appeared very tired, were carrying packs and what appeared to be bundles of rice. D Coy reports 1 Bn gun 2 heavy mortars firing from vicinity 728863. Shells landed vicinity 713973. 17 pl D Coy patrol from 714973 moved NORTH along FRANCISCO R for 1000 yds. Enemy movement observed SOUTH side of river. Night 27/28 Aug B Coy heavily engaged by enemy and at 0500X/28 withdrew from ARNOLDS CREST to 704990. Our casualties 3 killed, 4 wounded, 5 missing. A Coy contact patrols to Bn HQ and B Coy 2/7 Bn AE 2/28 reported tracks clear. B Coy total casualties 27/28 Aug now 2 killed, 2 missing believed killed, 1 wounded. C Coy 9 pl 24 Bn under cmd, left 1800X/28 for new position. D Coy patrol to Bn HQ reported track clear. B Coy estimated 100 Japs attacked their position during night 27/28 Aug. 22 Japs killed,

2/ probably

probably many more. Amended location D Coy 714973.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - AM K/28 HQ area shelled by enemy gun. patrol out to contact 29 Bde and recon parties liaising with 8/7 Bn learning terrain.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - K/28 enemy position 625023 is on a razor back 30 ft wide running EAST-WEST. Track from EAST and WEST well covered with LMGs, steep sides NORTH and SOUTH also covered. 13 Pl position 80 yds WEST of enemy with razor back in between only 5 ft wide for 80 yds. Track from Coy HQ 672032 to 13 Pl Bn along narrow spur to approx 674027 then EAST to 685023 very rough.

(11) TAMBU area

42 Aust Inf Bn - 1800K/27 A and C Coys arrived 728953 and dug in. Japs very close NORTH and SOUTH. 1719K/27 2 shells or mortar bombs landed in perimeter - our casualties 1 killed 4 wounded. B Coy patrol to 713952 approached from NORTH, found footprints 1 Jap. Arty fired 60 rounds on Jap positions HILL 1. patrol from D Coy investigated target area approaching from NW and killed 1 Jap. Japs active in area during K/27. 7 Jap positions located SOUTH and SW sides of hill. Night 27/28 Aug A and C Coys reported 5 Japs killed. Patrolling proceeding to test Jap positions. D Coy patrol working from NORTH to CHARLIE HILL 724957. A and C Coys dug in track June 731958 300 yds SOUTH of a Jap defensive position. L/7 lateral established to Coy L at SCOUT CAMP.

47 Aust Inf Bn - K/27 B Coy recon patrol located pill boxes 711956 - No activity reported along track 709953-713958. patrol to recon 711956 fired on by LMG and mortars forced to withdraw. C Coy patrol returned 1400K/27. patrol ambushed at 713957 - our casualties 1 killed 1 wounded. Two secs D Coy ADS 711956 as protective det. AM K/27 15 Pl moved from TAMBU BAY to join D Coy. 0715K/28 patrol found two Japs killed by mortar fire 710932.

162 US Regt - K/27 dispositions: Coys A and B 733954, Coy C 731944, Coys E and F 742956, Coy G 749955, Coy I 737947, Coy K 742949, Coy L 733946. Patrol activities continued. Clash approx 742953 resulted 24 Japs killed.

5 Aust Div - one pl 15 Aust Fd Coy now at TAMBU BAY, allotted in support of 15 Aust Inf Bde.

RAC 3 Aust Div - K/27 harassing fire continued on known enemy positions.

(b) Enemy - 1655K/28 1 barge moved from 740026 to 737017. 0950K/28 Jap gun fired 12 shells into NORTH COCONUTS. Another gun fired into area 705973. Both guns firing from 723954. 0835 and 0855K/28 Jap gun from area 722953 fired 29 rounds into area of HQ 2/3 Indep Coy - 1 OR wounded.

2. AIR Nil

3. OP REPORTS Nil

4. ENEMY CASUALTIES

Casualties 27 Aug amended 6 killed 1 wounded.
Casualties inflicted 2100K/27-2100K/28 37 killed

Donald Lewis
for Major
BM 15 Aust Inf Bde

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15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 45

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)
21 Aug 43

Information from 2100K/20 to 2100K/21.

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000
MUBO 1:25000

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Own

(I) MUBO - GOODVIEW - TAMBU Area

2/5 Aust Inf Bn - K/20 much equipment found during day. K/21 Bn assumed command KOMIATUM RIDGE. MG pl 719934. A Coy less one pl LAVERS KNOLL 707927, one pl track junc 707946, B Coy at Junc TAMBU KOMIATUM tracks, C Coy mopping up to north along east slope KOMIATUM RIDGE. - 2 enemy killed.

2/6 Aust Inf Bn - AM K/20 patrol from C Coy located enemy in position 706947, contacted C Coy 58/59 Bn and moved to south and west of enemy located positions. C Coy mortar engaged enemy positions 706947 - estimated contained 20 Japs. Mopping up continued. Patrols to east slopes KOMIATUM RIDGE found 24 Jap bodies and signs of 20-30 enemy having withdrawn in disorder. Well worn track found leading NE through 711931 - 2 Japs killed on track. K/21 killed 3 enemy before withdrawing.

42 Aust Inf Bn - K/21 locations: Bn HQ 723924, C Coy 724957, D Coy less one pl 721947, one pl 721952, B Coy 713951, A Coy 721942, MG one sec 721947, one sec 724959.

29 Aust Inf Bde - K/20 C Coy 13 Pl 47 Aust Inf Bn rejoined Coy HQ.

162 US Regt - K/20 Comd Post now 744937. 0930K/20 Coy I met MG fire 737948. 1100K/20 patrol Coy I unable advance against same position.

RAA 3 Aust Div - Night 19/20 Aug two Jap guns 750963 shelled area Bty C 205 FA Bn HQ 7503 - no damage. AA guns SALAMAU neutralised during air attack K/20.

(II) BOBDUBI Area

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - 20 Aug Standing Patrol withdrawn from 634976 and re-established 635984. K/21 A Coy ready to move towards KOMIATUM TRACK. D Coy 0330K/21 fighting patrol fired upon. 0430K/21 enemy position occupied by second fighting patrol A Coy moved through D Coy across BUKALI CK along SALAMAU TRACK, leading pl ambushed 709963. Ambush heavily defended. One pl attempted to encircle to south but met heavily defended positions at 710954. Fight continued throughout day and is continuing. The enemy in this area is fighting withdrawal step by step. He has been driven out of hundreds of weapon pits between 704968 and 709964 in the last two days - enemy casualties heavy but NOT yet counted. B Coy 1500K attacked feature 717984 after arty concentration, captured 3 weapon pits which appeared only 12 hrs old. Our troops within 30 yds of enemy and are grenading. C Coy - two pls junc BUIRIS CK 706936. Standing patrol 16 men occupied high ground 710997-1500K. Patrol along Jap track 637000 reports no recent movement seen - either native or Jap. Patrolled south for 800 yds, track disappeared, no signs any tracks in this area. Arty registered 1700K feature 724994.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - K/21 C Coy attacked twice during night. Coy moved first light north clearing KOMIATUM TRACK to 708965; 1600K/21 moved to 704982. Our casualties Maj ROWELL wounded, enemy 1 killed. B Coy moved first light to kunai spur 710964 arriving 1000K. Recce patrol located Jap position 300 yds north of kunai spur, Japs dug in on ridge 30 yds wide. B Coy attacked 1530K, 6 Jap LMGs engaged leading pl - some wounded. During evacuation of casualties Japs attacked heavily from easterly direction. Our casualties: 2 killed, 6 wounded, 6 missing. Heavy fighting continuing.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - Night 20/21 Aug, no movement. KOMIATUM TRACK. 0630K/21 remainder C pl group arrived MALONES JUNC and moved to KOMIATUM TRACK. 0700K B and C Pls moved to 2/ kunai

kunai spur 710964 then to higher ground to SE. C Pl now supporting B Coy 58/59 Bn. 1600K B Pl moved NE to cut SALAMAU TRACK at 716982. A Pl astride KOMIATUM TRACK 707964 patrolling north and south.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - K/21 patrol to 690044 observed 18 Japs with packs and 3 Alsation dogs in 2 groups moving east along creek towards BUSAMA. NEW WOMASU unoccupied but signs of recent use. 1630K/21 patrol left Bde HQ 654972 to recce area 687000. Object- to ascertain if any tracks or movement between 637000 and south to BURRIS R.

AIR Nil.

OF REPORTS

1105K/21 - 1030K/21 - US Arty shelled mouth FRANCISCO R.
1105K/21 - 2/6 Aust Fd Regt shelled ARTY HILL 717982.
1120K/21 - US Arty engaged 1 another bty mouth FRANCISCO R.
1125K/21 - 2/6 Fd Regt shelled Arty Hill.
1140K/21 - Mortar smoke on 712982.
1200K/21 - Arty on 717982 and Isthmus.
1230K/21 - 2 figures moved from hangar area to W/T station.
1400K/21 - Arty on 717982.

[Signature]
Major
BM 15 Aust Inf Bde

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15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 44

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)
20 Aug 43

Information from 2100K/19 to 2100K/20

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000
MUBO 1:25000

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Own

(1) MUBO - GOODVIEW - TAMBU Area

2/5 Aust Inf Bn - Mopping up operations continued throughout the day on east slopes KOMIATUM RIDGE where LAVER FORCE killed 9 Japs. Isolated pockets still exist.

2/6 Aust Inf Bn - 1030K/19 A Coy moved to 708940 without encountering opposition. C Coy exploiting north held up by enemy at 706947. This position subjected to arty fire but subsequent attack NOT successful. Coy dug in for night 706943. 1400K/19 14 enemy killed in mopping up operations which are still proceeding on east side of KOMIATUM RIDGE. 0815K/20 patrol from C Coy reported enemy positions 709944 unoccupied. 0930K/20 15 pl occupied area and patrol moved forward to occupy track junction 707947. Patrol reports Jap mtn gun in pieces scattered along track. A and D Coys patrolling east and north along BUIWARFE CK.

TAYLOR FORCE - K/19 pl of Coy A occupied highest ground MT TAMBU 716917, later joined by Coy C. Few Jap stragglers encountered and fired on but they broke bush and escaped. Enemy positions this area strongly constructed - arty and mortar fire had devastating effect on pillboxes. Conservative first count of enemy dead buried in trenches total 250. K/19 patrol sighted 12 Japs breaking bush at 718919; later walked into 42 Bn ambush 718927 and all were killed.

162 US Regt - Demolition patrol blew up large amn dump on LOKANU PENINSULA. Jap cemetery found at BUIAMBUN contained 100 graves. SP at 743956. 19 Aug Coy I killed 14 Japs by sniper fire. Patrol from I and R Pls located enemy position unknown strength 735955.

29 Aust Inf Bde - 1230K/19 B Coy 42 Aust Inf Bn occupied former enemy perimeter 722922, sent out contact patrol which killed 5 Japs and contacted TAYLOR 1800K/19. 42 Bn on DAVIDSON RIDGE advanced to NAFFER encountering opposition - our casualties 1 offr wounded. 2 Pls D Coy now at 720947, one pl 723952.

RAA 3 Aust Div - K/19 205 FA Bn engaged Jap party crossing mouth FRANCISCO R, and at 733988.

(11) BOBDUBI Area

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - 7 pl moved to position eastern end ANDERSONS RIDGE to link with B Pl 2/3 Aust Indep Coy. Isolated pl now accounted for except 2 ORs D Coy and 1 OR 2/3 Indep Coy Engr Sec still missing. Enemy in strength this area to prevent us reaching KOMIATUM TRACK along SALAMAU-BOBDUBI TRACK. 1300 K/19 B Coy recce patrol moved to 705984 followed north bank FRANCISCO to fords, area 711932, where standing patrol contacted, thence to NORTH COCONUTS - no movement seen. 1845K/19 enemy gun NE from COCONUTS fired 11 rounds into B Coy Area - no casualties. A Coy: one pl OLD VICKERS POSITION, with one sec MIDDLE SPUR, one pl junc STEVES and BOBDUBI tracks, one pl in rear of D Coy. D Coy launched 2 attacks on well dug in positions, area 704968. In the first attack after concentration of mortar and MMG, one pl fixed the position and 2 pls encircled and gained 25 weapon pits after a hard fight. During mortar concentration in the second attack the Japs attacked our positions with bayonets and were repulsed. D Coy then attacked with one pl fixing the position and one pl encircling. This was NOT successful as the Jap defences are pillboxes in depth parallel to the BOBDUBI TRACK. These defences are well dug in and strongly defended. Constant pressure is being maintained by harassing fire during the night.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - 1700K/19 C Coy 2/7 Aust Inf Bn occupied EXPONS KNOLL without opposition. Large minefields

2/ between

between PRICES KNOLL and EXTONS KNOLL. No booby traps on EXTONS KNOLL. 1400K/19 B Coy occupied NORTH PIMPLE and SOUTH PIMPLE with standing patrol. 1700K/19 fighting patrol moved out to ERSKINE CK area. 13 Pl C Coy and 2 Pl 24 Aust Inf Bn occupying ORODUBI - no opposition was encountered. The area was heavily booby trapped and we had 3 wounded. During afternoon D Coy brought harassing fire to bear on KOMIATUM TRACK. 1715K/19 Ambush patrols moved out to east to KOMIATUM TRACK. 1730K/19 A Coy recon patrol reported GRAVEYARD and EARTHY KNOLL clear of enemy. Body of 1 missing man was recovered. Booby traps have been found in all positions vacated by Japs - ORODUBI GRAVEYARD - ERSKINE CK - BENCH CUT - MIDDLE SPUR. Our casualties 2 killed. 3 missing men from D Coy ambush party 17 Aug returned, one wounded. A Coy moved from GRAVEYARD 0500K/20 and established line across KOMIATUM TRACK by 1030K, then moved north to line of ERSKINE CK and consolidated with bulk of coy astride KOMIATUM TRACK. 0500K/20 C Coy moved from ORODUBI along spur towards KOMIATUM TRACK and established contact with 2/6 Aust Inf Bn by 1000K. Jap positions were encountered, dug in in strength at junction ORODUBI - KOMIATUM tracks. Position was attacked and our troops were heavily engaged with mortar and LMG fire from high ground area 712948. Arty ranged onto this position. 1000K/20 B Coy moved north along BENCH CUT to NEWMANS JUNC. D Coy advanced to line of BENCH CUT and patrolled and cleared it of 60 booby traps from NEWMANS JUNC to ERSKINE CK. Two pls C Coy 2/7 Aust Inf Bn moved from AMBUSH KNOLL 0500K through ORODUBI to GRAVEYARD. 1 offr killed by a booby trap. The pls moved along BENCH CUT and established one pl TOMMYS TRACK and one pl MALONES JUNC 550 yds North of NEWMANS JUNC.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - H/19 A Pl opposed by enemy. Patrols to right and left flanks found 23 enemy bodies incl 1 Capt 1 Lieut. B Pl patrol pinpointed Jap ambush position between D Coy and own position.

3. C Pl relieved at BETHUNES POST by pl 2/7 Bn now moving to BENCH CUT. B Pl relieved by Tk.A pl 2/7 Bn moved east from RAYS, now on BENCH CUT. 1850K/19 harassing fire on HILBERTS NORTH and SOUTH drew enemy fire from 1 MMG and 2 LMGs. Total own casualties 16-19 Aug both incl: 2 offrs 8 ORs killed, 16 ORs wounded, 1 OR missing. During morning 20 Aug, A and B Pls were relieved by Tk.A pl 2/7 Bn and one pl A Coy 2/7 Bn. After relief B and A Pls moved in succession via OLD VICKERS POSITION and cleared area HILBERTS, reaching BENCH CUT 1500K/20. Fighting patrol from B Pl established ambush position on KOMIATUM TRACK 1600K/20. This ambush was strengthened until the CORRIDOR from west to east area 705364 was closed.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - Fighting to Jap ambush position 682023 reached destination 2000K/19, searched area for approx 600 yds along track from high feature 587024 easterly but unable to locate missing man - no enemy observed. 1845K/20 10 shots and 1 grenade heard 13 from OR 672032 in direction of NEW WOMASU - it is thought that our patrol has contacted enemy. 3 Aust Div - Adv Hq closes 0600K/21 present location, opens TAMBU BAY same time.

2. DETAILS OF ENEMY DEFENCES IN COCONUTS

- (a) The bombing proved to be more accurate than was at first thought, many weapon pits and crawl trenches had completely disappeared in bomb craters and the whole contour of the feature was changed. At least 10 direct hits landed between SOUTH and NORTH COCONUTS. Many more bombs landed just below the crest of the ridge on western side, creating a sheer face of loose earth up which attacking troops had to climb.
- (b) All covered approaches previously recced were removed by the bombing. In the NORTH COCONUTS area this sheer face was enfiladed by one woodpecker. During the attack only determined action making good use of ground enabled troops to advance in the face of this weapon.
- (c) Large numbers of enemy dead were found - one body in particular was completely puffed up from concussion.
- (d) Occupying troops dug up several graves in search of enemy weapons. 1 LMG with a large quantity of ammunition was found. In another grave the body of an unknown Australian soldier was

3/ found

found.

(e) The whole area was particularly well sited and dug in.

(f) Defensive Works

(i) NORTH COCONUTS - This section received the full weight of the air attack and many of the defences could NOT be located. There were two main pillboxes in the position - one to the north and one to the south. These were heavily constructed and consisted of a double log three feet burst course over a dug-out with tunnels leading down to 3 sets of sleeping quarters on a lower level. There were also many weapon pits and crawl trenches.

(ii) CENTRE COCONUTS - The only evidence of defences were portions of some crawl trenches found. The remainder of the defences which had previously been pinpointed by our patrols and ops were destroyed by air bombing. There were three direct hits on CENTRE COCONUTS.

(iii) SOUTH COCONUTS - This position comprised two separate features with a knoll south towards OLD VICKERS POSITION. This knoll had many weapon pits and connecting crawl ~~tan~~ trenches and was a position which gave protection to the enemy occupying SOUTH COCONUTS. It denied all approach from the south. There was some evidence that DMGs had been used in the weapon pits facing towards the south. In the native graveyard area tunnels had been dug connecting the weapon pits. The SOUTH COCONUTS had 2 pillboxes - 1 facing north and 1 south - and a most elaborate system of weapon pits and crawl trenches. There is one post damaged by bombing which is thought to be the Comd Post and efforts are being made to open this for papers and identifications. The knoll to the south had not been bombed during the air strike.


(g) Equipment captured: 1 enemy MMG, quantity of 36 grenades, quantity of US 3" mortar bombs, and other abandoned enemy equipment.

Handwritten: 7/11/3/25/8
Major
BM 15 Aust Inf Bde

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MAP REF. AS CONVERTED FROM ASP (30-X) 43L
SHOWING BOMB CRATERS SALAMAU AREA
TO BE SUPERIMPOSED OVER SALAMAUA KAMITUM. 1/25000



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10. AUG. 43.

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17 AUST INF BDE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT No 78 to 0800 hrs 18 Aug 43.

PART I

(Excludes information already passed in sitreps)

WELLS OP

1. 1205K/17 6 Japs moving NORTH along KOMIATUM TRACK, one SOUTH at 706944. 1210-1230K/17 BOSTONS bombed and strafed from ISTHEUS to KELA HILL along coast. 4 AA guns fired from above QUARRY. Flames thought to be coming from one a/c. 1235K/17 smoke across GULF at bearings 23° and 29° mag. 1245K/17 to 1430K/17 smoke observed rising from 737995.

PART II

NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

MT TAMBU

1. 0825K/17 patrol from Coy B killed one Jap moving NORTH towards TAMBU at 732910. The Jap carried no rifle but was well provided with food.
2. 35 rounds of 60 mm mortar were fired on to Jap gun position 711919. This was followed by an explosion near the gun position thought to be ammunition.
3. A patrol from 726910 followed a Jap track NORTH. They found our sig wire cut 200 yds up the track and a piece of Jap sig wire along side. A fresh track seen leading in a NE direction was followed to 726923 but nothing was seen.
4. The patrol pursuing the Jap party in the SALUS area reports that at 0700K/16 the pl moved generally NORTH to 774884 until Jap rearguard caught. The force was estimated to be between 60 and 75. 7 Japs were killed while our casualties were nil. The patrol then withdrew to 776882 to bivouac for the night. At 0430K/17 the patrol was attacked, enemy casualties are unknown, while our own were nil. The patrol then divided one group to return to HQ 162 US Regt, two groups to proceed to NASSAU BAY. A patrol from TAYLOR to contact one group on its way to NASSAU BAY report considerable Jap activity NORTH of SALUS LAKE. This contact patrol was pursued by the Japs in this area but killed two at approx 787877. Our own casualties were nil.

GOODVIEW

5. A patrol on the night of 16/17 Aug to 698907 observed 8 Jap sentries changed hourly covering our previous line of approach to this posn. A general stand to from 0350 hrs by an estimated platoon was observed. A patrol further EAST of this posn observed enemy sentries and a possible small dug in posn.
6. C Coy mortars ranged on to footbridge 699908. Our forces pushed forward and by 1800K/17 had occupied HODGES KNOLL and pillbox area 698907 and 4 Pl had occupied a posn at the junc STEPHENS - MULE tracks.

2/6 AUST INF BN

7. From 0700K/17 to 0710K/17 a Jap gun fired 12 rnds on to KOMIATUM RIDGE approx 500 yds NORTH of LAVERS KNOLL, some rnds falling in the BUIULBU CR. Gun flashes from 738012 were engaged by our arty. During the morning our mortars ranged on enemy positions 707924 and at 0920K/17 and 1045K/17 our arty engaged parties of 12 Japs moving up KUNAI spur at 705933. A patrol estimate approx 50 enemy in occupation of a knoll at 707937. This patrol was fired on by LMG and rifles but killed one Jap sentry while we suffered no casualties. At 1550K/17 our arty and 42 Bn LMGs engaged enemy posns at 707937 following indication by mortar smoke from LAVERS KNOLL. The mortar bomb caused a kunai fire and a patrol took advantage of this smoke to move out to observe the results of arty and LMG fire. At 1725K/17 mortar from LAVERS KNOLL engaged a party of Japs attempting to beat out this fire which was still burning strongly. During the afternoon enemy movement was observed 708939 and an enemy concentration was suspected. 1650K/17 arty engaged this area which was also harassed by LMGs from 42 Bn between 1710K/17 and 1725K/17. By 1630K/17 C Coy area on the MULE TRACK was completely booby trapped to the NORTH and SOUTH. One sec of 14 Pl C Coy moved to JOHNSONS KNOLL 708924 to reinforce our defences for the night.

ANGAU INTERROGATION OF CAPTURED NATIVES

1. The following is a report from Sgt SEALE, ANGAU HOTE Area, who questioned the captured IULUAI and natives.
2. The natives were taken from the area of the first gardens mentioned in patrol 45 of 8 Aug 43.

REPORT OF CAPTURED NATIVES FROM MALAGOWAN

The three undermentioned natives were captured by two of my natives today. They are: KAWI - Iuluai
TOMORA
DUARHO

My two natives were RAROO and YASAU-AU. I have collated the following information:

The Japs are NOT in strength in the MALOLO area now as they have received a severe thrashing from our bombers. They have a position at the base of a long hill NE of MALOLO, but the main body of troops appears to be concentrated along the foreshore extending from BUSAMA to OLD CHINATOWN. In particular there is a large concentration in a small creek bed on the SALAMAUA end of BUKAUP village, it is further reported that the Japs have also vacated the ASINI area owing to our heavy air strikes. There is also considerable concentration of Japs sleeping in the old Mission cattle sheds near the jetty (MISSION POINT). The WAMASU natives have NOT carried cargo for the Japs since they and the HOTE natives carried for the Japs just after the latter landed at SALAMAUA (I will check this up later). But some 2 months ago the BUKAUP natives with Japs came to MALAGOWAN and collected all natives in the area. They were taken to the beach to work on the cultivation of gardens. They were afraid of our bombers and deserted.

There are no natives in BUSAMA - they are hiding in the hills but there is a force of Japs there. The BUKAUP natives are living in their village with the Japs.

When I sent out for these natives to come in they were prepared to do so but when Lieut LEWIN's patrol was ambushed (29 Jun 43) they decided NOT to do so. I am of the opinion that the old people of the village were responsible for NOT coming in as these are very obstinate about leaving their own ground.


The Japs aided by the BUKAUPS have stolen all the pigs fowls and native foods from these people. These natives assert that the Japs do NOT sleep in the MALOLO area but patrol in strength each day from BUKAUP. When they patrol to the Mission area there are no native carriers. They say that they can observe all movement along the main track from their gardens.

There is a track from MALAGOWAN which leads in a northerly direction over a low range of hills right into BUKAUP.

I cannot find any information as to a ~~xxx~~ back track over LAPIDU RIDGE into HOTE. There is a track from what we call FIRST WATER on the MALOLO track to GWADO and a good track onto BUSAMA.


Note: GWADO, according to natives is apparently NEW WAMASU (685044) as shown on SALAMAUA 1:25000 corrected to July 1943.

MAP REF: AS CONVERTED FROM ASP(30-X) 43L
SHOWING BOMB TARGETS SALAMAU AREA
TO BE SUPERIMPOSED OVER SALAMAU LOCALITY - REV-17500.




INT. SEC
15 AUST. INF. BDE
11. AUG. 45

001588M




SKETCH OF 58/59 AUST. INF. BN - B COY - DISPOSITIONS 6 - AUG - 43

— SHOWING FIELDS OF FIRE & KNOWN ENEMY LOCATIONS —



LEGEND




MMG
BREX
ARC OF FIRE
3" MORTAR
BOOBY TRAP

TRACED FROM SKETCH
BY 1. MCCLINTOCK PTE
INT-SEC, 58/59 BN
BY INT. SEC.
15.0057 INF. BDE
8 - AUG - 43

SECRET

— OLD VICKERS POSN —



SKETCH SHOWING
LOCATIONS OF ENEMY DEAD
WEAPON - PITS
LINE OF ATTACK

2 AUG - 4 AUG 45.

ENEMY LINES
OF APPROACH
TO ATTACK



TRACE FROM ORIGINAL
BY 2/7 AUG ST. INF. BN. INT SEC.
INT. SEC. IS AG ST. INF. BDB
8. AUG. 45.

NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD
OF BN OR EQUIVALENT HQ.

9.5.1

SECRET

COPY NO 7.

15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 43

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)
14 Aug 43

Information from 2100K/18 to 2100K/19

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000
MUBO 1:25000

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Own

(1) MUBO-GOODVIEW-TAMBU AREA

2/5 Aust Inf Bn - 2000K/18 B Coy attacked this PM NOT successful in dislodging enemy position 701911 where enemy defences 200 yds in depth and contained 6 automatic weapons. B Coy now dug in and in close contact astride junc MULE - STEPHENS tracks 698912, in contact with enemy occupying high ground EAST of MULE TRACK. Fighting patrol 4 pl NOT yet returned. 1200K/19 B Coy found enemy position 701911 unoccupied, moved forward to track junc 707919. Much abandoned equipment found Jap position 40 yds above junc STEPHENS - MULE TRACKS also vacated. 8 pl moving through positions to contact A Coy at 702913. 4 pl at junc STEPHENS-MULE TRACKS. C Coy moving up main KOMIATUM TRACK to exploit beyond B Coy. 0750 K/19 Arty engaged enemy positions 708939. 0900K/19 C Coy moving to LAVERS KNOLL to occupy A Coy position. A Coy preparing to move forward to attack enemy position 708939. One pl B Coy occupying C Coy position. 1500K/19 B Coy encountered minor opposition, killed 2 Japs, now digging in junc TAMBU - KOMIATUM tracks 707919. A Coy passing through to contact LAVERS FORCE. 2 heavy mortars, ammunition, mtn gun ammunition and rifles captured. GOODVIEW TAMBU areas reported clear PM K/19, enemy fleeing in all directions. 2/5 And 2/6 Aust Inf Bns have made contact; enemy positions located at 707947.

2/6 Aust Inf Bn - K/18 patrol to 42 Bn arrived LAVERS FORCE without contacting enemy. Patrol crossed three tracks - 2 unused other slightly used. 1630K/18 patrol to LAVERS KNOLL to within 50 yds of enemy positions 707937 observed 2 Japs moving into freshly dug pits. 1630K/18 2 wounded Jap prisoners being evacuated. 0200K/19 1 Jap moving from SOUTH with pack killed by B Coy. Harassing MMG fire during night onto enemy positions SOUTH of JOHNSONS KNOLL. K/19 A Coy moved NORTH down KOMIATUM spur without opposition. Dispositions: A Coy less 9 pl EDGAR KNOLL 708937, 9 pl ASHTONS KNOLL 707939. Patrolling forward to 706946 patrol from LAVERS KNOLL down slopes KOMIATUM RIDGE located tracks eastward 6 ft wide cut and used considerably. During night approx 50 Japs observed and engaged - casualties inflicted. Area being engaged by MMGs and mortars.

TAYLOR FORCE - K/18 Patrol from Coy C found 4 empty pillboxes apparently vacated week ago. Patrol moved to 719914 found deserted OP. Smoke seen NORTH at 725923. Coy C reported Jap movement to arty tps at 797893 at 1700K/15. Group of 67 Japs at 784835, further 150 783898.

162 US Regt - 17 Aug outposts established 752956. AM 18 Aug Coy I preceded by fire from MMGs and mortars attempted to advance against enemy positions on NW end ROOSEVELT RIDGE, were pinned down by accurate MG fire. Coy L moved from positions on SCOUT TRACK and engaged enemy with mortar fire. Arty concentration during move. Two squads Coy K moved forward. Arty and mortar fire lifted, our troops closed in but were driven off by heavy fire. Our casualties 3 killed 6 wounded; Enemy casualties NOT known, believed heavy. Demolition squad blew up dump consisting of 87 rounds Jap mortar ammunition 748955. 1530K/18 Jap gun fired Coy L area - 2 wounded. K/18 Composite party of heavy coy relieved Coy G EAST end ROOSEVELT RIDGE. Coy G position 745935.

29 Aust Inf Bde - AM 18 Aug Patrol from D Coy 47 Bn contacted 21 Japs at 772895, engagement proceeding. HQ D Coy moving to 797090. Dispositions: C Coy 15 pl 1630K/18 C Coy HQ plus two secs 13 pl and two secs 14 pl 732915, 15 pl plus one sec 14 pl track junc 728938, 13 pl less two secs

728909. Patrol from 47 Bn to WEST of lagoon found fresh Jap footprints in deserted village 765913. 0130K/19 D Coy 47 Bn Coy HQ 798888, 17 Pl 798889, 18 Pl 774778. No report received engagement with Japs 772895. AM K/17 PIB patrols to investigate high ground sq 7789 reports Jap occupy area 770395. 42 Bn AM K/18 recce reports no enemy sq 7193-7194. Recce west to 712927 without contact Jap. Position 717920 NOT occupied. Fire onto Jap perimeter 722932 NOT replied to. Automatic fire exchanged 727940 1 offr wounded. Other areas quiet. 42 Bn; A and C Coys shelled from 0625 to 0635K-our casualties 3 killed 6 wounded. PIB Force at 773898 reports well used Jap track to Beach running north of feature. 11 Japs tried to cut track approx 751916, engaged by 13 Pl 47 Bn and carrier line escort party. Japs in poor condition, carried little food, plenty ammunition.

RAA 3 Aust Div - 1120K/18 11 Bty rear gun positions 783906 shelled by Jap 75 mm - 2 guns out of action. HQ MASSAU BAY Defs established 833798. (BADEN BAY 1") 1025K/19 F00 with 47 Bn reports our troops in strength moving north 706946. Jap gun at 741011 engaged by Bty C 205 FA Bn. Later report enemy resistance MT TAMBU and GOODVIEW JUNC broken. Mopping up in progress.

(11) BOEDUBI Area

15 Aust Inf Bde - Patrol from Bde HQ moved out 1430K/19 to sq6598 to investigate sounds of chopping; returned 1700K/19. No movement seen excepting for many pigs and pigeons

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - 2300K/18 guide from isolated pl with D Coy patrol was one who had reported back earlier in day. Still 1 of 2/3 Indep Coy Engr Sec missing and 2 of isolated pl. D Coy patrol out 1630K/18 moved to approx REF ASP 33 D357. Recce party sent forward who contacted enemy ambush party approx 3 strong. 4 killed, our casualties nil. Returned same route, observed 5 enemy moving NW along ck - no contact made with remainder isolated pl. Patrol BENA FORCE to BUIRIS CK LESLIES TRACK returned 1800K/18, reports no movement seen. 0340K/19 D Coy patrol reports no contact enemy. 1 Jap suspected sentry killed 80 yds from D Coy. K/19 Composite patrol from D Coy to locate engrs moved south to point from which 4 men of engr sec withdrew yesterday. Found traces of Japs. Further patrol proceeding further south from this point. C Pl patrol EAST from OLD VICKERS POSITION to contact B Pl struck Jap LMG down spur - our casualties 1 killed. Fighting patrol moving to that area. D Coy patrol to west flank struck Japs. B Pl 2/3 Aust Indep Coy patrol west to contact OLD VICKERS POSITION, on arrival reported area clear. Listening post forward of SAPPERS reported quiet during the night. Considerable noise 702961 at dawn. B Pl recce patrol moved to contact right flank D Coy.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - Night 18/19 Aug all coys harassed known enemy positions. D Coy patrol PM K/18 reports NORTH PIMPLE unoccupied. C Coy now report 2 enemy killed - total enemy casualties 18 Aug 9 killed. Dispositions 0905K: A Coy ambush party moved to vicinity 701941-706957. C Coy fighting patrol left AM K/19 for ORODUBI. 12 ORs B Coy left to occupy NORTH PIMPLE. 0900K/19 mortars harassing area junc BUIRALI-BUIWARFE CKS. K/19 C Coy fighting patrol to attack ORODUBI with mortar MMG fire support, 1115K/19-1145K/19 - no report. A and C Coys recce patrols moved to EARTHY KNOLL-GRAVEYARD Area. Ambush party to 706957. D Coy 1445K/19 engr sec now located several wounded. K/19 C Coy occupied ORODUBI 1630K/19. GRAVEYARD and EARTHY KNOLL clear of enemy.

C Coy 2/7 Aust Inf Bn - Now placed under comd 58/59 Aust Inf Bn as from 1550K/19.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - 0700K/19 total casualties 17 Aug 1 offr 3 ORs killed, 14 ORs wounded, 18 Aug 1 killed 2 wounded, 1 offr 11 ORs missing of whom 1 offr 3 ORs known wounded. A Pl killed 2 Japs when attacked 1100K/18. 1830K/18 enemy fired 20 mortar bombs into A Pl positions - no casualties. Dispositions: A Pl 703968, B Pl 703970, Adv HQ Gp 704971, C Pl 693963-700963, 58/59 Bn party 699961-703958-700959, Composite force junc TOMMYS TRACK and BENCH CUT. 1400K/19 patrol north along BENCH CUT - Japs heard chopping and digging in area yesterday's patrol clash -

K/19 fighting patrol to Jap LMG positions covered evacuation of stretcher cases then returned. Listening post forward SAPPERS observed slight movement 701964. 5 bursts TSMC - no reply.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - K/19 patrol contacted enemy ambush approx 682023 - our casualties 1 wounded.

Arty -
1222K/18 Arty shelled ISTHMUS.
1135K/18 Mtn Bty fired on enemy activity KOMIATUM RIDGE north of our positions.
1225K/18 Area 741967 engaged.
K/18 Movement in ORODUBI engaged

DISTRIBUTION:

2/7 Aust Inf Bn
58/59 Aust Inf Bn
2/3 Aust Indep Coy
D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn
KELLYS CAMP
AASC)
ANGAU)
1 Sec Sigs
17 Aust Inf Bde
3 Aust Div
Comd
SMO
SC
File
War Diary

Major
BM 15 Aust Inf Bde

Copy No. 1

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- 14-15

NOT TO BE TAKEN FORWARD
OF HQ OR EQUIVALENT HQ.

SECRET

COPY NO .47.

15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 42

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)
13 Aug 43

Information from 2100K/17 to 2100K/18.

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000
MUBO 1:25000

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Own

(1) MUBO - GOODVIEW - TAMBU Area

2/5 Aust Inf Bn - AM K/18 Comd Post moved to HODGES KNOLL. 11 Pl moved up main KOMIATUM TRACK 701911 and made contact ~~XXXX~~. 12 Pl moved to left but deep re-entrant prevented approach to enemy position. Enemy using IMG and light mortars. Patrol heard chopping area 702914. 8 Pl attacked enemy positions 693903 and position west of MULE TRACK, encountered heavy fire incl 2 HMG. Further attacks by B Coy on enemy positions 701911 repulsed. Our casualties 1 offr 5 ORs wounded. B Coy attack on right flank in progress.

2/6 Aust Inf Bn - Night 17/18 Aug Two attacks on our positions KOMIATUM RIDGE. 1900-2015K/17 Heavy attack from SOUTH and WEST, defensive fire from arty and 42 Bn HMG broke up enemy attempts to reach our positions JOHNSONS KNOLL 707924. Jap gun observed firing from 738012 onto unknown targets. 2205K/17 further enemy attack broken up. During night harassing fire by our mortars and HMG - our casualties 1 killed; enemy casualties considered heavy. 0830K/18 SP C Coy established 706920. Pls on LAVERS and JOHNSONS KNOLLS commenced changeover. Total our casualties K/17: 2 killed. 1000K/18 patrol located Jap LMG and occupied position approx 707920, one HMG now in position LAVERS KNOLL.

TAYLOR FORCE - Patrol pursuing Jap force reports 0700K/16 Jap rear guard 774884, force estimated 60-75. 7 Japs killed, own casualties nil. Patrol withdrew to 776882, bivouaced night. 0430K/17 Pl attacked inflicting unknown casualties - own nil. Pl returned. Considerable Jap activity NORTH LAKE SALUS. Two Japs killed 787877. Patrol to 2/5 Bn ran into booby trap 707910 - 2 wounded. K/18 Coy A to left flank reports usual activity.

162 US Regt - Patrol from Coy B killed 1 Jap 732910. K/16 Patrol discovered unoccupied enemy foxholes and well used Jap track 720940. 2230K/16 Coy I outpost NW ROOSEVELT RIDGE attacked several times, drove enemy off with grenades and MG fire. K/17 patrols to WEST of DOT INLET.

29 Aust Inf Bde - 42 Aust Inf Bn fighting patrol 716922 engaged enemy - enemy casualties 1 killed, own 1 missing 1 wounded. No sign of track 720953 to 725955. Night 16/17 Aug patrol 18 Pl 47 Aust Inf Bn 696893 heard movement and engaged area with grenades. Investigation revealed signs where wounds had been dressed. K/17 Patrol A Coy PIB contacted 9 Japs - 1 killed 784903. 42 Bn K/18 Patrol contacted 3 Bn US Regt approx 728941.

C Coy 2/7 Aust Inf Bn - 1645K/17 movements PRICES KNOLL engaged by HMG and mortar. K/18 report enemy movement ORODUBI engaged by arty.

(11) BOEDUBI Area

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - Patrol found excellent track from SOUTH COCONUTS to SALAMAU-BOEDUBI track 60 yds NORTH of STEVES TRACK. B Coy patrol from NORTH COCONUTS EAST to FRANCISCO at 708974 and 707973. Faint track with recent footprints led to river bank. River considered fordable both points. 10 Pl occupy SOUTH COCONUTS area 9 Pl area junc STEVES and COCONUT RIDGE tracks. Enemy position SOUTH COCONUTS consisted of 5 pillboxes and 1 blown out by bombing - estimated to hold 50 men; underground communication. 0717K/18 no report of Pl D Coy plus sec Engrs 2/3 Andep Coy who attacked 1730K/17. Ref ASP 38. 0930K/18 Patrol strength one pl left D coy area

2/ locate

locate isolated pl and sec 2/3 Indep Coy, moved to point C931 where guide from isolated pl lost direction, reced forward to three points C630, C929 D129; recce groups returned nil report. Patrol heard firing approx area D127. Troops heard moving to west of patrol contacted and moved in towards D Coy. Approx 7 members of isolated patrol. Enemy moved to cut off patrol. Patrol moved to D Coy via high ground along ridges. As patrol reached Coy Area heavy fighting broke out, A Pl 2/3 Aust Indep Coy, sec Tk.A Pl, D Coy areas. 1145K/18 mortar MMG gave supporting fire. D Coy casualties 1 offr 3 ORs wounded. 1700K/18 arty harassing fire on KOMIATUM TRACK 708968 for 10 mins. Dispositions 1800K/18: Base established F032, A Pl D933, B Pl E536, D Coy D637 D838, one sec Tk.A D835, one sec E136, one sec E335. 1630K/18 Recce patrol D Coy moved out attempt contact remainder isolated pl. Track up west slope SOUTH COCONUTS now used as L of C to B and D Coys 1645K/18 party 12 Japs approached SP ref map KOMIATUM 704988, enemy engaged 3 killed. Fighting patrol strength 8 moved to SP.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - 1830K/17 A Coy MMG fired on enemy moving SOUTH along KOMIATUM track - unobserved results. Sniper TIMBERED KNOLL engaged targets SOUTH PIMPLE. No results observed. B Coy patrol killed 3 Japs in kitchen area WRSKINE CK east of BENCH CUT. 6 Japs killed 1 wounded SOUTH PIMPLE. Japs killed wounded man on approach of our further patrol 1550K/17 C Coy MMG fired on 12 Japs SOUTH along KOMIATUM TRACK - killed 2. Patrol to ambush GRAVEYARD area found bench cut NOT in use, moved east found well worn track recently used between ORODUBI and EXTONS KNOLL. Ambush established. D Coy ambush party engaged before position established, withdrew to NEWMANS JUNC; Attacked again by enemy from SOUTH along bench cut - enemy casualties 7 killed, own 1 offr 4 ORs wounded, 8 missing. 1030K/18 patrol 650 yds EAST TIMBERED KNOLL found Jap L of C to ORODUBI. 1600K/17 fired on 10 Japs, 4 killed. - Own casualties 2 wounded. 5 of 8 previously reported missing returned, 1 wounded. Total Casualties 17 Aug: 23 Japs killed by 58/59 Bn only - own all areas 6 killed 12 wounded 5 missing. B Coy patrol 1500K/18 reports found several unused tracks but NOT L of C to SOUTH PIMPLE. C Coy 1346K/18 enemy fired 1 shot into 13 Pl OP. 1450K/18 MMG fired on 2 enemy ORODUBI - result unobserved. Enemy have mortar on EAST slope from ORODUBI attempting to engage 2/6 Bn vicinity KOMIATUM, positions NOT pin pointed.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - Patrol in 1500K/17 reports found Jap sig lines across MALOLO TRACK 691038. 1735K/18 3 unidentified persons swimming NW MISSION PT.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - Dispositions: Battle HQ 701971, one sec B Pl 700963, 30 men 58/59 Bn plus 6 men 2/3 Indep Coy 700959 and 699961, 13 men 58/59 Bn GRIFFS TRACK area, A Pl B Pl less one sec in attack. 1200K/17 patrol 700963 observed Jap in hut 701964. Patrol fired into hut, Jap replied with IMG - result unobserved. First lightK/18 Japs attacked A Pl and D Coy right flank - attack driven off. One sec Tk.A Pl moving forward to position between D Coy and A Pl. A Pl casualties 1 wounded. 0730K/18 patrol from SAPPERS EAST observed track on EAST side of ck 701964 - 2 Japs on track. Patrol NORTH along BENCH CUT to flat ground vicinity track juncs found 40 Japs closing in on their rear, at same time 20 from their left. Heavy fire exchanged. Patrol withdrew, broke bush to BENCH CUT, returned to NEWMANS JUNC - casualties 1 OR wounded. 1630K/18 further patrol departed NEWMANS JUNC NORTH along BENCH CUT.

RAA 3 Aust Div - 1729K/17 No 1 Mtn Bty engaged Jap pill-boxes in MT TAMBU area with harassing fire. 2330K/16 4 shells landed on 205 FA Bn gun positions - no casualties or damage. 0700K/17 2 Jap naval guns engaged our positions LAVERS KNOLL from KELA HILL. Bty C 205 FA Bn engaged these guns. 1033K/17 Bty A lightly shelled - no damage. 1930K/17 Jap gun observed firing from vicinity MACDONALDS JUNC was neutralised by Bty C 205 FA Bn.

RAE 3 Aust Div - 1200K/17 HQ 11 Aust Fd Coy opened 745934.

(111) MARKHAM Area

0900K/17 24 Aust Inf Bn and 57/60 Aust Inf Bn were removed from cmd 3 Aust Div and placed under Cmd NGF and 5 AF respectively.

(b) Enemy - 1100K/18 KELA Gun fired 10 rounds onto OLD VICKERS POSITION

2. 112

(a) Own Nil

(b) Enemy - 1505-1520K/16 unknown number aircraft attacked TSILI TSILI intercepted. Preliminary report: aircraft shot down - 3 ZEKES 1 THUNDERBOLT certain, unidentified aircraft 1 certain 2 probable.

3. OF REPORTS

WELLS - 1450K/17 gun fired from 721019 onto BOEDUBI area.
1510K/17 Flare fired from Scout hut into GRAVEYARD Area.
1600-1725K/17 13 Japs NORTH across river.
1645K/17 Jap heavy gun fired 4 rounds from SALAMAUA - target NOT observed.
1740K/17 AMBUSH KNOLL mortar fired into PRICES KNOLL.
1745K/17 1 Jap moved into SALAMAUA.
Night 17/18 Aug. SALAMAUA shelled at intervals.
1122K/18 Arty shelled Isthmus.
1008K/18 Puffs of smoke seen 718969, 723975.
1225K/18 US Arty fired into area 741987.

DISTRIBUTION:

As per Summary No 36.

Al Kelly
Major
BM 15 Aust Inf Bde
gld

APPENDIX A

To 15 Aust Inf Bde Intrep No

REPORT ON PATROL NO 50

Date: 15 Aug 43
Time Out : 1100 hrs Time In : 1245 hrs
Route Out: NAMLING junc DIVIDING CK - east towards ORODUBI.
Route In : DIVIDING CK - NAMLING JUNC.
Type : Recce
Composition: Pte FORD, 9 Pl 24 Aust Inf Bn and 2 ORs.
Tasks : (a) Look for signs Jap movement.
(b) Pinpoint Jap positions.
(c) Observe effects of air strike on ORODUBI.

NARRATIVE

Patrol left NAMLING JUNC and moved ^{round} local bench cut and down to DIVIDING CK. Moved NORTH along creek for 300 yds. There one member twisted ankle. Leaving the other with the injured man, Pte FORD climbed EAST out of the creek and followed ~~track~~ a timbered spur leading towards Jap. There is no track along spur which is very steep on both sides. After 200 yds spur started to slope down to a valley running NORTH and SOUTH from which Jap positions rise on EAST side. Owing to thick timber, Pte FORD could NOT get much observation. Jap weapon pit seen about 200 yds NE. He observed for 20 mins but saw NO Japs although what appeared to be messing gear was hanging near trench. He could NOT identify the pit. He knows the GRAVEYARD pits. He states that much timber on the slope rising up behind the pit is freshly damaged by arty so conclude he was looking at ORODUBI. He saw NO coconuts or huts. Looking SE he could see the KOMIATUM through timber. This fits in with the low re-entrant between SUGAR CANE RIDGE. There was some dead timber standing round the trench. Field of fire had been cleared. The trench was half way up a fairly steep slope of which he could NOT see the top. There were no signs of Jap movement.

APPENDIX B

To 15 Aust Inf Bde Intrep No 41

REPORT ON PATROL NO 51

Ref Map: KOMIATUM 1:250000

Time Out : 0830K/16

Time In : 1200K/16

Route Out : Down track EAST from NAMLING RIDGE to DIVIDING CK. NORTH along creek to RUSSELLS TRACK.

Route In : RUSSELLS TRACK to MORTAR KNOLL.

Strength : 1 offr 3 ORs.

Object : (a) Recce for forward sec position EAST of NAMLING RIDGE.
(b) Recce spur down to DIVIDING CK.
(c) Recce EAST of DIVIDING CK toward Jap positions to pinpoint pits and estimate numbers.
(d) See that DIVIDING CK and RUSSELLS TRACK are clear.

REPORT

1. Left NAMLING RIDGE on bearing 100° following track down spur for 100 yds, spur divides into two both going down to DIVIDING CK. The south one is lower. Thickly timbered here with thick undergrowth.
2. Followed track which runs along the north spur bearing 70° for another 50 yds, the track turns to 325° down side of spur and leads to DIVIDING CK.
3. Left track here and followed straight down razor back crest of spur for another 100 yds. There is a fair look out here towards ORODUBI - arc of vision 180°. The spur runs down with a grade of one in three.
4. After another 100 yds (400 yds total) came to a fair OP. Japs were seen from here and patrol stopped to observe for 1½ hrs moving from side to side. Vision is broken by trees. Heard DIVIDING CK 100-150 yds ahead. Bearing from here to ORODUBI 187°, distance 300 yds direct. It appears that there is only the one ck in the valley between NAMLING RIDGE and ORODUBI at this place. Further NORTH at SILVERS TRACK patrols have climbed out of DIVIDING CK along a spur and have seen another small north and south re-entrant between them and the Japs. The latter apparently starts from the ORODUBI ridge, south of GRAVEYARD. This is supported by the following:
 - (a) I have been along track NAMLING JUNG to ORODUBI and only crossed one ck.
 - (b) Pte PICKERING, guide borrowed from A Coy, reported that A Coy used to go from NAMLING JUNG to BENCH CUT just below ORODUBI then broke bush for about 200 yds NW down to creek, moved north along ck 300 yds, then broke bush up less than 200 yds to GRAVEYARD. The ORODUBI-GRAVEYARD RIDGE is similar to NAMLING RIDGE with spurs jutting out from main ridge.
5. No movement was seen in ORODUBI of which view partly obscured by trees. At bearing 50° saw 3 or 4 Japs digging weapon pit cutting down limbs. Did NOT move more than a few yards from the pit all the time. There was no fire lane cleared. The Japs medium size. Saw no arms or packs. The pit appeared to be on the skyline in timber. Cannot locate from MORTAR KNOLL just where the pit is but hope to do so with further observation.
6. At 40° a dark bushy tree seemed to be moving when others still. It was thought that this may be a Jap OP. Observers from MORTAR KNOLL have reported suspected OP in trees. Lieut EGAN will ~~xxxxx~~ try to locate this tree from our OP.
7. Between 40° and 50° saw Japs moving both north and south through timber along skyline 1 at a time. Better vision will be obtained before noon and arrangements will be made for OP to remain out all day. Could see no track. Would help if mortar cleared trees. Moving Japs carried no packs or arms.
8. Comment: From the fact that the weapon pit was on the skyline

and all movement was seen on the skyline Lieut EGAN thinks that the Jap might be shifting his attention to the EAST side of the ridge.

9. Ref Tasks:

- (a) A suitable forward sec position exists on spur 150 yds east of NAHLING RIDGE. This will be occupied immediately and a listening post kept there at night.
- (b) Lieut EGAN did NOT go right down spur to DIVIDING CK as some of his men had followed it down. Track goes along north side of spur right to creek. He considered this position best OP.
- (c) Did NOT move forward of DIVIDING CK as time would NOT permit and considered best view from position taken.
- (d) DIVIDING CREEK and RUSSELLS TRACK clear.

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15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 41

H3 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)

17 Aug 43

Information to 18COX/18

1. ENEMY TACTICS - BOOBY TRAPS

- (a) A booby trap was found in the Jap staging camp in vicinity 707967 on 17 Aug 43. The trap was oblong in shape and approx 8" by 5" x 3". It was wrapped in brown paper and tied with string. Two pieces of flex (almost as heavy as household flex) were protruding from one end. The ends of the wire were bound together with tape. The package weighed approx 5 lbs and felt as if it contained 6 cylinders laying across the 5" width of the package. FS personnel buried the trap.
- (b) Another booby trap was found and it consisted of a Jap Grenade and a Murray Switch.

2. PATROL REPORTS

- (a) Attached as Appendix A is report on Patrol No 50.
- (b) Attached as Appendix B is report on Patrol No 51.

H. J. Hammer
Brig
Comd 15 Aust Inf Bde

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CCPY NO 9.

15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 39

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde
15 Aug 43

Information from 2100K/14 to 2100K/15

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000
MUBO 1:25000

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Own

(1) MUBO - GOODVIEW - TAMBU area

2/5 Aust Inf Bn - A standing patrol to BUIGAP CK at 703911 was observed by 3 enemy from spur 704910. Patrol withdrew to CAFFIN TRACK and exchanged shots with an enemy force of 12 at 707910. Results unobserved. A fighting patrol was sent to this area to establish a standing patrol at 707910 but reported no movement seen. Patrols were again forward of 697905 and 695905 on afternoon 14 Aug. A further patrol along a pisser WEST of GOODVIEW track heard enemy movement on the WEST side of HODGES KNOLL. Patrol 14/15 Aug to pillboxes 698907 reported less noise and activity than usual.

2/6 Aust Inf Bn - 1705-1730K/14 enemy mtn gun fired 50 rounds onto MT TAMBU. LAVERS FORCE consisting of A and D Coys reached 703926 at 1440K/15 and a recce party moved to CAMERON COPSE 706926. Base protection pl at 698913. 1900K/14 B Coy arrived at COCONUT TREE 697916.

TAYLOR FORCE - The patrol from Coy B in pursuit of party of enemy (see Summary No 38) reported that the last known position of the enemy party was 770895 at 1120K/14.

29 Aust Inf Bde - 15 Aust Inf Bn: C Coy less 15 pl and one sec 13 pl 733916, 15 pl and one sec 13 pl occupied track junc 727936. 42 Aust Inf Bn: C Coy moved to 713929 A Coy less one pl 720935, one pl 721943, B Coy 724924, 18 pl D Coy 721927. 1810K/14 enemy mortar active from 708937 was engaged. Enemy pillboxes were seen from A Coy position at 703925 and 708927, also 3 fires in GARDEN area 707924. 47 Aust Inf Bn: 1900K/14 BHQ 736919, A Coy 734917, B Coy 735917 C Coy less 15 pl 736918, 15 pl detached for defence of arty positions, One pl D Coy arrived 798887. 16 pl patrolling ridge NORTH of LAKE SALUS.

162 US Regt: Location at 0100K/15 from 738946 to area to WEST. Morning 14 Aug attack on ROOSEVELT RIDGE continued. By 0830 K/14 contact had been established between Coys E and F. Coy F then commenced to move NW along ridge and Coy E preceded by supporting fire from Tk.A, MG, mortars and Bofors. Coy G moved forward onto the ridge. Coy I moved through Coy F to continue attack on NW end of ridge, Coy I gained some ground but were pinned down by MG fire and dug in. Dispositions at 0930K/14 were Coy I 738947, Coy F from 740945 to 743943, Coy E from 743943 to 747943, Coy G less one pl 747943 to 749943. Known enemy casualties exceed 200 and a count was being carried out. Night 14/15 Aug was reported to be quiet.

(11) BOBDUBI Area

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - In the attack on SOUTH COCONUTS 14 Aug (see Summary No 38) 9 pl were held up by two enemy pillboxes in that area. The pl was withdrawn and pillboxes attacked with captured enemy Bn gun and 50 rounds of 3" mortar. Total casualties for 14 Aug are now amended to 2 Offrs 3 ORs killed, 1 offr 17 ORs wounded. B Coy listening patrol reported sound of digging in SOUTH COCONUTS. Enemy were observed moving from SALAMAU towards 2/3 Aust Indep Coy ambush position on BOBDUBI-SALAMAU track. A patrol from B Coy in NORTH COCONUTS located a number of enemy killed by mortar fire and also salvaged a Bren and quantity of gear. Patrol along STEVES TRACK contacted 2/3 Aust Indep Coy's ambush position and reported track clear. At approx 0630K/15

2/ NORTH

NORTH COCONUTS was shelled - our casualties 2 wounded. Our stretcher party was fired on from SOUTH COCONUTS while evacuating a wounded soldier. During afternoon 15 Aug mortar and LMG fire was exchanged with enemy on SOUTH COCONUTS.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - A Coy 7 Pl TIMBERED KNOLL, 8 Pl 698945 at 1800K/14. A recce patrol from TIMBERED KNOLL towards GRAVEYARD moved out at 1430K/14, to the SOUTH to a position 15 yds from enemy position at approx 300 yds from TIMBERED KNOLL. An enemy weapon pit, pillbox and small hut were located. The patrol was fired on by LMG from the pillbox but no casualties caused. Enemy strength estimated 12. B Coy 11 Pl 701950 at 1800K/14. At 1332K/14 C Coy observed 4 enemy digging in 400 yds NORTH of ORODUBI. They were engaged by MMG but results NOT observed. 1500K/14 mortar ranged on PRICES KNOLL. 1700K/14 7 shells from enemy gun landed 100 yds EAST of NAMLING RIDGE and 10 shells fell on SUGARCANE RIDGE. At 1720K/14 205 FA Bn landed shells within 50 yds of enemy gun which was immediately moved EAST over the crest of the ridge. Bearing from MORTAR KNOLL to position where gun operated 94° mag approx distance 2000 yds. D Coy amended dispositions at 1800K/14: Coy HQ 701954, 16 Pl 702954, 17 Pl 698952, 18 Pl 701955. Distance from left sec post 18 Pl to right sec post 2/3 Aust Indep Coy 300 yds. Own casualties 14 Aug 1 wounded. During night 14/15 Aug A Coy mortar carried out harassing fire task on GRAVEYARD and ERSKINE CK areas. 0900K/15 D Coy observed 1 Jap at approx 703954 who was fired on and observed to fall. A Coy recce patrol of 2 offrs to right flank of 12 Pl came under fire 1 being killed. It was NOT possible to reach the body before last light. 1420K/15 C Coy Bren fired on 2 Japs digging pits at ORODUBI 1 killed. 1625K/15 11 Japs from GRAVEYARD moved towards ORODUBI carrying packs and rifles. Unable to engage as only visible for about 3 seconds. Enemy positions were struck approx 600 yds EAST of 18 Pl.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - Patrol returned 1500K/15 - reported WAMASU NOT reached. Patrol was seen by pro-Jap natives in vicinity 695036. Natives made off in direction of BUKAUP. No enemy seen during patrol.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - During night 14/15 Aug MIDDLE SPUR mortar booby traps were sprung; movement was heard and grenades thrown by our troops. It was NOT possible to establish contact with A Pl ambush position on BOEDUBI - SALAMAU track. The listening post on KOMIATUM track reported that between 2010K/14 and 0230K/15, 43 Japs moved NORTH and 41 SOUTH; all fully armed and equipped. At 0500K/15 2 enemy approached A Pl positions from direction of the COCONUTS - both were killed. 0600K/15 an enemy force of approx 30 attacked A Pl position from direction of STAGING CAMP 707967 with 2 LMGs and rifles. The attack was driven off with SA and 3" mortar fire plus support from the GARDENS area. 4 enemy were killed; their force consisting of lightly equipped riflemen with fixed bayonets. 2 LMGs were captured. 1340K/15 B Pl fighting patrol left NEWMANS JUNG to recce area EAST and WEST of BENCH CUT to FRANCISCO R.

(111) MARKHAM Area

1300K/15 PIB OP reported 9 enemy seen at 440547 (NADZAB 1")

2.

AIR
(a)

Own: 1000K/15 Liberators and Fortresses bombed KOMIATUM TRACK, ORODUBI area and beach area NORTH of KELA HILL. GWAIBOLOM OP unable to report results owing to poor visibility. AA fire was very light from gun above quarry. One bomb fell on the Isthmus.

(b) Enemy - Nil.

(c) Unidentified - 1530K/14 1 single engined aircraft NW over PIB OP height approx 2500ft. 1510-1520K/14 1 twin-engined aircraft circled OP at 306482 (WAIME 1"). Between 2153K/14 and 2230K/14 an unidentified aircraft flew over Bde HQ several times. Could NOT be observed owing to low clouds. 2057K/14 3 aircraft dropped bombs EAST of WAU strip - no damage caused. 2200K/14 bombs fell NE of BULOLO. 2025-2215K/14 bombs fell to SE and NE of WAU. 0415-0425K/15 one plane over WAU area.

3/ OP REPORTS

The bodies were pulled into the bush and searched but nothing of value found. Registration of mortar and MMG was carried out so as to have fire available in the event of an attack from SALAMUA. At 1140K/14 5 mortars at GARDENS engaged target vicinity STAGING camp with 50 rounds. 5 CUMMINS POST mortars engaged HILBERT SOUTH with 50 rounds also the bomb crater while MMG engaged the staging camp with 1000 rounds. 1220K/14 MIDDLE SPUR MMG fired 500 rounds rapid into HILBERT NORTH and RAYS POST MMG fired 500 rounds into HILBERT SOUTH. 1225K/14 30 rounds of mortar and 2000 rounds of SA fire from TAYLORS RIDGE were fired into HILBERT NORTH and 2000 rounds SA from RAYS POST into HILBERT SOUTH. B Pl patrol from HEWMANS JUNG reported BENCH CUI clear of enemy NORTH for 600 yds. At 1230K/14 one enemy woodpecker 2 LMGs and SA fire swept MIDDLE SPUR. This fire was returned. SAP-PERS POST forward position was subjected to enemy SA fire during morning 14 Aug. 1615K/14 ambush fired on 4 Japs moving up from SALAMUA killing 1 certain.

(111) MARKHAM Area

0645K/11 a fighting patrol from 11 pl 24 Aust Inf Bn left LEGA and reached the coast at 1740K/12. They immediately encountered an enemy party who opened fire with MMGs, LMGs and rifles. Patrol returned fire then withdrew 2500 yds inland - casualties enemy 2 known killed; own nil. 0700K/13 A patrol from B Coy PIN moving WEST along the MARKHAM RIVER was twice fired on from kunai covered island believed to be in vicinity of NARAKAPOK. One canoe was lost and 2 men missing.

2. AIR
(a)

Own - GWAIBOLON OP reported 0805K/14 to 0840K/14 3 Mitchells bombed and strafed TANEU area. 0910K 6 Liberators circled SALAMUA. 0934-1005K/14 22 Liberators and 7 Fortresses bombed the CCGONUTS; ~~the instantaneous and delayed action bombs fell on the target area and to EAST of ridge on enemy L of C.~~ 1010-1015K/14 6 Liberators bombed KEIA HILL, vicinity OODEAS HOUSE and area SOUTH of hangar. Large fire and black smoke caused near hangar. 1800K/13 one aircraft over SALAMUA reported by WELLS OP to have been fired on by AA from above quarry, which position was then bombed. WELLS OP reported an airstrike by Mitchells at 0700K/14 on WEST side of NUK NUK ridge.

(b) Enemy - 1340K/13 LAE OP reported approx 30 aircraft flew SOUTH from LAE. 1100-1135K/13 One twin-engined aircraft flew over 216 FA Bn gun positions at TANEU BAY. 1900-1915K/13 approx 6 bombers dropped bombs 3000 yds SW of Bty B 205 FA Bn gun position also 1000 yds WEST of same gun positions.

3. OP REPORTS

(a) WELLS - 1620K/13 US Arty fired on suspected enemy gun position at mouth of FRANCISCO R. 1700-1730K/13 15 Japs crossed NORTH over footbridge. 1755-1745K/13 3 Japs crossed NORTH over footbridge. 1835K/13 and 2355K/13 Gun flashes observed from direction of the Isthmus. 0600K/14 aircraft heard to SE of OP. 0540-0805K/14 1 Jap moved NORTH and 55 SOUTH over the footbridge. 0720K/14 3 Japs with packs moved SOUTH along KOMIATUM RIDGE. 1055K/14 3 Japs moved NORTH along KOMIATUM RIDGE, and mortar fire was observed from NAMLING RIDGE onto GRAVEYARD area. At 1140K/14 smoke was seen at 749934 and at 1235K on bearings of 7° and 15° mag across the gulf. 1400K/14 6 Japs were moving about McDONALDS JUNG. 1435K/14 smoke was observed at 765045.

(b) SALAMUA - The jetty reported destroyed in airstrike 13 Aug has now been identified as the BURNS PHILP wharf.

(c) LAE - 0725K/14 approx 10 barges in LAE Harbour.

(d) GWAIBOLON - 1630K-1640K/14 32 men and 4 stretchers crossed the footbridge, appeared to be walking wounded as some were limping and using sticks. Between 1650-1700K/14 arty demolished approx 30 yds NORTH end and 15 yds SOUTH end footbridge.

4. TOPOGRAPHY - The correct location of PARERS BOWL is 898047

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As per Summary No 36

B. H. [Signature]
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15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 38

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)
14 Aug 43

Information from 2100K/13 to 2100K/14

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000
MUBO 1:25000

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Own
(1)

MUBO - GOODVIEW - TAMBU Area

2/5 Aust Inf Bn - Patrols to 699905-697908 reported usuals signs of enemy activity. Patrol then moved up BUIGAP CK from 793910 and contacted US patrol at approx 710905 - no movement seen. ~~Harassing mortar fire~~ again placed onto enemy pillboxes during afternoon 13 Aug. On night 13/14 Aug patrols to enemy pillboxes in GOODVIEW area report slight activity.

2/6 Aust Inf Bn - 4 pl at 698918, B Ech 689906, 11 PLWELLS JUNG. 1650-1720K/13 enemy movement in ORODUBI engaged by mortars and MMG from AMBUSH KNOLL.

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - Ref Summary No 37 location of one pl C Coy shown as 698923 should read 692923. C Coy fired 6 mortar bombs from AMBUSH KNOLL onto ORODUBI area.

29 Aust Inf Bde - Bde HQ at 734918 at 2000K/13. Recce party 47 Aust Inf Bn moved to 736917, 42 Aust Inf Bn patrol from B coy encountered enemy at 723920 - one enemy believed killed. C Coy 15 Aust Inf Bn at 733917, HQ 42 Aust Inf Bn 736929, A Coy 730916, B Coy 732918, C Coy 736918, HQ Coy 737918.

162 US Regt - 11 Aug patrol from Coy L saw log emplacements at 724948. During night 12/13 Aug enemy attacked positions at 739946 from WEST supported by mortar and MMG fire. Enemy were driven off - our casualties 3 killed 6 wounded; enemy 4 wounded. Morning 13 Aug preceded by arty fire, Coy F moved forward and established firm base on top of ridge at 739946. Coy G also advanced to position approx 744944 and Coy E moved in same direction. Patrols from Coy F moving EAST down ridge to contact Coys E and G encountered enemy opposition. Well dug-in isolated posts and foxholes were located. Dispositions at 1830K/13: Coy F on crest of ROOSEVELT RIDGE 739946, Coy E plus one pl Cannon Coy on crest of ridge 744944, Coy G 741939 to 747938, Bn HQ and HQ Coy 744935. Enemy were still in possession of NW portion of ridge from Coy F to 738949, also pillboxes along crest of ridge between coys E and F. Combat engs demolished 7 of these pillboxes, killing 38 enemy, NOT including occupants of pillboxes - our casualties 5 killed 20 wounded.

RAA 3 Aust Div - 1155K/13 Enemy gun fired 8 shells into 11 Bty gun positions causing no damage. 13 Aug, 11 Aust Fd Coy less two pls arrived NASSAU BAY. On night 13/14 Aug harassing fire was recorded on targets in SALAMAU, GOODVIEW JUNG and MT TAMBU areas. Throughout the night 13/14 Aug enemy arty intermittently shelled supply dumps and gun positions on TAMBU Beach area. 1000K/14 guns concentrated heavily on ROOSEVELT RIDGE. 1200K/14 enemy shelled 11 Bty positions - one gun damaged but no casualties caused.

TAYLOR FORCE - 1500-1535K/13 18 rounds by mortars fired on enemy positions SW ridge MT TAMBU area 707915 to 709936. Results NOT observed. Harassing mortar fire was placed on MT TAMBU during the night 13/14 Aug. Patrol pursuing party of enemy heading SE bivouaced night 13/14 Aug at 748887 and moved on at first light. Line party had NOT been contacted but wire was laid to 752888 patrol to left flank engaged enemy in area 709916, 4 known enemy killed, estimated total casualties 12; own

2/ nil

nil. 174 rounds of mortar fire after enemy withdrew caused estimated 10 enemy casualties.

(11) BOBDUBI Area

2/7 Aust Inf Bn 0920K/14 Liberators were over area and US Arty commenced ranging on COCONUTS. 0930 - 1000K/14 accurate bombing by Liberators and Fortresses with HE instantaneous and delayed action bombs on COCONUTS altered the whole appearance of the feature. At 1010K/14 Zero flare was fired and BENA pl moved forward from assembly area. Mortar and arty fire were most effective, arty firing 100 rpg and mortars 600 bombs. At 1110K/14 BENA pl at FUP. At 1240K/14 Arty commenced registration on track junction area 706967 - 708958. At 1215K/14 16 enemy with packs and NO arms were seen moving EAST towards 2/3 Aust Indep Coy ambush position in area 704972. At 1415K/14 B Coy was proceeding satisfactorily on NORTH COCONUTS. BENA force were unable to gain objective, and casualties were 2 killed 10 wounded. They withdrew to 2/3 Aust Indep Coy ambush position to re-organize. 9 pl were unable to get through pillboxes and firelanes. A later report at 1445K/14 stated that B Coy had been successful in the NORTH COCONUTS, two pls consolidating and one pl exploiting to CENTRE COCONUTS which appeared to be empty. Our casualties now amended to 1 Offr and 1 OR killed, 1 Offr and 2 ORs wounded. 9 pl were holding. SOUTH COCONUTS is a circle of pillboxes on a slight knoll and looks down on all approaches. During airstrike on COCONUTS, enemy wearing steel helmets were observed to stand up after each run by planes. Position was engaged by mortars, one bomb falling in a pit containing 4 enemy - estimated all were casualties. 1225-1230K/14 enemy guns shelled area EAST of A Coy. Total casualties for 14 Aug - 2 offrs killed 1 wounded, 4 ORs killed 19 wounded.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - 2 enemy observed in ORODUBI by C Coy at 1805K/13 were engaged by mortar fire - one was killed and the other hit but crawled into the undergrowth. At 1015K/14 D Coy contact patrol to 2/3 Aust Indep Coy heard firing in the direction SOUTH of NEWMANS JUNG. Pioneer pl was relieved by Tk.A pl and reported in at GWAIBOLON at 1200K/14. A Patrol from D Coy to B Coy did NOT make contact on 14 Aug but located an enemy position at creek junc 702950. 2 weapon pits and a kitchen approx 8 ft square were seen, also one Jap. Tk.A pl replaced personnel with 2/3 Aust Indep Coy at RAYS POST.

D Coy 24 Aust Inf Bn - Dispositions at 1200K/14: Coy HQ and 2 medical orderlies 15 Aust Fd Amb 595026, 8 pl 670029 to 672032, 16 pl less two secs 613013, one sec 621018, one sec 615017, 18 pl less two secs 608005, one sec 616013, one sec 612004, OP 610005, mortar det 611007, MMG Det 613013, MSP 2/2 Aust Fd Amb 620018.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - Afternoon 13 Aug a recce patrol into area WEST of BENCH CUT between NEWMANS JUNG and NORTH PIMPIE reported the area clear of enemy. Listening post on KOMIATUM TRACK reported 60 Japs south and 40 NORTH during 13 Aug. At 1025K/14 47 troops A pl moved from MIDDLE SPUR through OLD VICKERS POSITION for 704970. 1010K/14 RAYS POST MMG engaged HILBERT SOUTH 702961 - enemy LMG replied. MIDDLE SPUR MMG engaged HILBERT NORTH 701964, enemy LMG replied - 1 OR wounded. Patrol down TOMKYS TRACK report track clear. Patrol from GRIFFS TRACK area contacted D Coy 58/59 Aust Inf Bn. A standing patrol now established 200 yds EAST of NEWMANS JUNG. An ambush party encountered 5 enemy while moving into position - 1 killed, 4 escaped. Jap sig wire cut. The party were settled in AMBUSH by 1135K/14 on BOBDUBI-SALAMAU TRACK area 704970. A report at 1530K/14 stated that A pl had cut the track and had a small force on spur near STEVES track junc. Two further parties of enemy numbering 7 and 5 moving towards SALAMAU walked into the ambush 4 being killed and several wounded who escaped.

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17 AUST INF BDE
INTELLIGENCE REPORT No 77 to 0800 hrs 17 Aug 43

PART I

WELLS OP

1. 1130K/16 2 Japs observed ORODUBI.
1540K/16 5 Japs moved NORTH along road on left of airfield.
1545K/16 4 Japs NORTH across FRANCISCO mouth.
1550K/16 2 canoes NORTH point of peninsula.
1600K/16 1 Jap NORTH along KOMIATUM track.
1615K/16 15 Japs SOUTH on KOMIATUM track fired on by MEGs NAMLING RIDGE.
Japs dispersed.
1630K/16 one a/c over SALAMAU. AA opened fire from 753019 753016.
1755K/16 small rowing boat seen off NORTH point of PENINSULA.
0605K/17 4 Japs with packs moving SOUTH along KOMIATUM track at 706944.
0630K/17 4 Japs SOUTH along KOMIATUM track at same position.
2. C Coy 2/7 Bn patrol SOUTH of PRICES KNOLL left BENCH CUT track and moved SE along a little used track to the BUIRALI CK.
3. A watching patrol to the FOOTBRIDGE at GOODVIEW JUNC reports that the sig wire previously seen there is now removed. During the day the FOOTBRIDGE was not used.

PART II
NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS

MT TALBU Area

1. A patrol located a Jap outpost at 712916. This was unoccupied but the area was booby trapped.

GOODVIEW Area

2. At first light 16 Aug two sections raided the pillbox area 698907 and inflicted 18 known casualties. A later patrol to the same area killed one Jap and wounded two. Our casualties were nil. The patrols reported the enemy still in occupation on HODGES KNOLL.

2/6 AUST INF BN

3. 1445K/16 a patrol from LAVERS KNOLL to approx 703935 killed 3 Japs. The patrol was unable to locate the track shown on the map running EAST from 708932.
4. 1645K/16 mortar fired on KUNAI spur approx 705933 where 20 Japs were observed moving NE and at 1710K/16 the arty engaged the same area.
5. 1830K/16 the enemy attack on LAVER FORCE was repulsed by CDF with mortars and MEG to the NORTH and SOUTH of our posns. At the same time a Jap MEG fired on 707924 from approx 707922. Irregular movement outside our perimeter during the night was immediately engaged by our mortar fire. At 0400K/17 the enemy strongly attacked from the SOUTH and were thought to be armed with 1 MEG, 2 L?Gs and a light mortar but it was successfully broken up by the use of arty and DF from 42 Bn MEGs. It is estimated that the enemy suffered 30 casualties while ours were only one slightly wounded.

42 AUST INF BN

7. A patrol to the BUI UMBU CK at approx 712935 report it to be a very rugged gorge and unsuitable for movement.
8. 0930K/16 a patrol clashed with enemy at 722922. Our casualties were two killed and one missing while 9 enemy were seen to fall. The Japs were reported to be wearing AUSTRALIAN hats.

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15 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 41

HQ 15 Aust Inf Bde (LIF)
17 Aug 43

Information from 2100K/16 to 2100K/17

Ref Maps: SALAMAU 1:25000
KOMIATUM 1:25000
MUBO 1:25000

1. OPERATIONS

(a) Own

(1) MUBO - GOODVIEW-TAMBU Area

2/5 Aust Inf Bn - PM K/16 patrol to 693907 reports chopping EAST of track. Mortars fired onto pillboxes this area. Night 16/17 Aug dug in 693907. 3 Jap sentries changed hourly covering previous line of approach to the position. patrol to EAST of position observed enemy sentries and possible small dug in positions. C Coy mortars ranged on foot-bridge 699908. HODGES KNOLL and pillbox area 698907 occupied by our forces 1800K/17. 14 pl occupied junc STEPHENS and tracks.

2/6 Aust Inf Bn - K/16 patrol killed 3 Japs 708935. Jap defensive positions this vicinity hold force approx 2 p. 1645K/16 mortar fired on KUNAI spur approx 705933 where 20 Japs observed moving NE. 1710K/16 arty engaged same area. MULE TRACK booby trapped NORTH and SOUTH of C Coy positions. enemy MT TAMBU GOODVIEW areas completely surrounded 1850K/16. Jap attack on KOMIATUM RIDGE broken up by arty and MG defensive fire. Night 16/17 Aug intermittent fire during night into our position 707924, and movement SOUTH. 0400K/17 movement from SOUTH and WEST. Defensive fire dispersed enemy who reached position 50 yds SOUTH of 707924. Estimated enemy had 1 light mortar 1 MMG 2 LMG. Enemy dead and equipment observed in front of our positions at first light - our casualties 1 wounded. 0700-0710K/17 Jap gun fired 12 rds onto KOMIATUM RIDGE approx 500 yds NORTH of LAVERS KNOLL - BUIUMBU CK. Arty engaged enemy gun flashes in area 733012. 0315K/17 mortars from COCONUTS ranged onto ridge SOUTH of 707924. 0835K/17 mortar on LAVERS KNOLL fired on enemy positions 50 yds SOUTH 707924. 0920-1045K/17 arty engaged Japs in parties of 12 at 705933 - estimated 30 enemy casualties inflicted during attack. 0400K/17 estimated 50 enemy occupying knoll 707937. One Jap sentry killed, our casualties nil. 1550K/17 arty and 42 Aust Inf Bn MMG engaged enemy position 707937 following indication by mortar smoke from LAVERS KNOLL. Mortar caused KUNAI fire. Under smoke patrol observed result arty MMG. 1725K/17 LAVERS KNOLL mortar engaged party of japs attempting beat out fire which still burning strongly. PM enemy observed 708937, concentration expected. 1656K/17 arty engaged this area also harassed by 42 Aust Inf Bn MMGs 1710-1725K/17. 1630K/17 booby trapping SOUTH of C Coy positions on MULE TRACK 706920. 1730K/17 one sec 14 pl to JOHNSONS KNOLL 707924 to strengthen defences for night.

C Coy 2/7 Aust Inf Bn - K/16 harassing patrols and mortar fire against PRICES KNOLL. 0820K/17 patrol to EXTONS KNOLL encountered low apron wire.

TAYLOR FORCE - Standing patrol one squad Coy B established 722895 to prevent enemy movement BUIKUMBUL area. Jap outpost found 712916 - 8 beds prepared - set with booby traps - no movement seen - our casualties 1 wounded. 0825K/17 patrol killed one Jap 732910 - no rifle - well provided with food. 35 rounds 60 mm mortar on Jap gun position 711919 - explosion followed.

162 US Regt - 1105K/16 Jap gun fired 23 rounds into BOISI - tractor and 1 ton truck destroyed. Coy I moved forward 100 yds on the NW end of ROOSEVELT RIDGE, one pl dug in remainder continued forward movement. Deserted Jap OP with sig wire running NORTH found 762962. 1 Jap killed 759962 1700K/16. Coy I repulsed attack by approx 1 pl enemy with fixed bayonets - enemy casualties 21 killed, ours one wounded.

2/ Tree

Tree snipers active against Coy I.

29 Aust Inf Bde - 1000K/16 Jap patrol attack on Btys A and B 218 FA Bn positions 795895 repulsed - our casualties nil, enemy NOT known. 13 Pl C Coy 47 Aust Inf Bn established firm base 755916 patrolling SOUTH and WEST to lagoon. Ambush party killed 3 Japs and 1 native guide 773896. 1830K/16 42 Aust Inf Bn answered 2/6 Aust Inf Bn CDF with mortars and MMGs to NORTH and SOUTH of positions KOMIATUM RIDGE. 1900-1910K/16 Jap light mortar fired approx 10 rounds on 707924 from 707922 - no casualties. US Arty shelled area for 2 mins. 1915-1940K/16 Jap movement WEST and SOUTH of 707924 engaged by our fire and grenades. 1900K/16 dispositions of force protecting arty positions: HQ C Coy 47 Aust Inf Bn 763921, 13 Pl 751915, 14 Pl less two secs and 15 Pl less one sec 778907, one sec 15 Pl 739927, HQ D Coy 18 Pl, 14 ORs 16 Pl and one sec PIB 796893, 17 Pl 784905, two secs 14 Pl and 44 PIB ambush position 773898. 42 Aust Inf Bn: 0445K/17 light Jap gun fired 30 rounds on our positions. Patrol contacted 3 Bn 162 US Regt 730937, one pl 15 Aust Inf Bn estimate 30 Japs in perimeter 727940.

RAA 3 Aust Div - 1130K/16 Bty C 218 FA Bn engaged Jap position on NORTH end KOMIATUM RIDGE.

(11) BOB DUBI Area

2/7 Aust Inf Bn - Total enemy casualties 14/15 Aug:

Attack on COCONUT RIDGE incl A Pl 2/3 Aust Indep Coy ambush as follows: 19 killed, 1 wounded; 1 MMG 2 LMGs and some documents captured. By increasing stench in COCONUTS area, obvious many more were killed and buried by bombing K/L. Fighting patrol SE of SOUTH COCONUTS unable locate L of C. Patrol to SW came under fire, Night 16/17 Aug continued harassing fire from B Coy and 9 Pl on SOUTH COCONUTS. Patrol B Coy to SOUTH COCONUTS found area unoccupied. 1115K/17 two secs B Coy and 9 Pl consolidating area. Patrol from SOUTH COCONUTS down BENCH CUP to NE contacted faint track running EAST to river. Discarded dioxies, food containers of recent usage found on track. Track considered Jap line of withdrawal. 1700K/17 D Coy in area 703969 ready to attack. Tk A Pl in ambush position 704970.

58/59 Aust Inf Bn - Night 16/17 Aug harassing fire carried out on enemy positions ERSKINE CK. 2050K/16 C Coy stood to on hearing rustling - grenades thrown with unobserved results - stood down 2135K/16. 0830K/17 registration by mortar and MMG on ORODUBI and NORTH to GRAVEYARD. 0830-0845 K/17 concentration 3" mortar 6 HE 6 smoke MMG and bren. 0930K/17 1 offr 15 ORs left NAMLING RIDGE for ambush position between ORODUBI and GRAVEYARD. D Coy harassing fire on known enemy positions. 0915K/17 fighting patrol to harass enemy left flank from B Coy. 0800-0830K/17 mortars registered and 0830-0845K/17 carried out harassing tasks on SOUTH PIMPLE - direct hit on hut - enemy returned fire with LMG.

2/3 Aust Indep Coy - 1340-1550K/16 listening post KOMIATUM TRACK reported 61 Japs NORTH fully equipped carrying stores, one party with either mortar or LMG. 8 moved south with packs. 1130K/17 dispositions: Rear HQ CURTINS CORNER, Fwd HQ ARTIE FADDEN, Battle HQ 701971, one sed B Pl SAPPERS POST, B Pl less one sec and A Pl STEVES TRACK area, 1 offr 29 ORs 58/59 Aust Inf Bn plus 6 ORs 2/3 Aust Indep Coy RAYS and GUMMINS POST, 1 offr 12 ORs 58/59 bn GRIFFS TRACK area. A Pl patrol found Jap staging camp 702966 with sig wire running NORTH and SOUTH across creek then WEST - engaged by Jap LMG. patrol from MIDDLE SPUR found Jap bench cut track with sig wire running NW at approx 705967. 1130K/17 B Pl gained Jap L of C 703966. Were attacked and surrounded by Japs moving EAST down spur, withdrew to position 703967 from which they still command the track. 1400K/17 recce patrols to establish Jap positions and weaknesses commenced. As Jap positions located they were registered by mortar. A Pl attacked Jap positions area 704968, found them unoccupied, thought arty concentration caused Jap withdrawal. Advanced further 200 yds, contacted enemy dug in with pillboxes 704967. 1315K/17 recce patrols moved out to find flanks. 1700K/17 D Coy 2/7 Aust Inf Bn plus 1 sec engr 2/3 Indep Coy

3/ with

with mortar MMG support advanced to south flank of Jap EDL. A Pl moved forward drew heavy fire from 2 LMGs pillboxed another LMG, rifles and grenades; withdrew to previous position and dug in 50 yds WEST of creek. Our casualties 1 offr 1 OR killed, 2 ORs wounded. 1730K/17 one pl D Coy moved forward to attack. 1830K/17 Jap launched a counter attack on A Pl.

(b) Enemy - 1410K/17 KELA Gun shelled OLD VICKERS POSITION with 25 shells - no casualties.

2. ATR
(a)

Own - 1200K/17 6 Bostons bombed and strafed Isthmus. 3 planes later strafed ASINI, MALOLO and Isthmus. Flames observed coming from underneath fuselage of 1 plane.

3. OP. REPORTS

(a) WELLS 1500K/16 and 1515K/16 smoke shells in OLD BOEDUBI area.
1540K/16 5 Japs moved NORTH along road on left of drome.
1545K/16 4 Japs NORTH across footbridge.
1550K/16 2 canoes off NORTH point of peninsula.
1600K/16 1 Jap moved NORTH along KOMIATUM TRACK.
1605K/16 US Arty registered suspected Jap crossing 1000 yds from river mouth.
1615K/16 15 Japs moving south on KOMIATUM TRACK dispersed by NAMLING RIDGE MMG.

0605-0630K/17 4 Japs north, 4 SOUTH along KOMIATUM TRACK at 706944
0800K/17 MG and mortar fire from MORTAR KNOLL onto ORODUBI.
1205K/17 6 Japs NORTH along KOMIATUM TRACK, 1 SOUTH 706944.

(b) GWAIBOLON
1727K/17 Large vessel approx 2000 tons observed vicinity IAE.

4. TOPOGRAPHICAL

Sketch showing track information BOEDUBI-ORODUBI area is attached as Appendix A to copies 1, 2, 3 and 5 of this summary.

B. H. Francis
Major
BM 15 Aust Inf Bde

DISTRIBUTION:

As per Summary No 36.

40

Aug

[illegible]

tel. 1000.

4-11-68

During the intervening period a large amount of DEATH RAYS was launched against the same area to the shore line, but a precipitous diving, a some 1500 yards at the latter part of April from the coast and LANCE GREEN and down a concentration which our troops followed up.

As was to be expected the enemy code messages offered to disclose the strategic picture in its life-line, and found our work too well prepared. As the first unit was sent back to the forward artillery officers' table. For this, and a few other units of the interregimental group were involved. RIDGE was a series of formations indicating the enemy's position. It was found that after noon the enemy was still in the same position, and regular tank types.

At first light the following activity was observed on the enemy's positions at 0900H and to the NE of RT 1420 and a total of 16 anti-aircraft emplacements respectively were destroyed at little cost to ourselves.

After a night of heavy firing into our positions, the enemy launched the most determined attack down the valley. Again our artillery and MG fire put gaping holes in the enemy's ranks as he pushed home his thrust with the forces within 50 yards of our positions. At least 50 men were left in front of our lines.

Later on 17 Aug our forces on KOMIATUM RIDGE were attacked from the north and west. Five attacks were broken up by artillery and MG fire once more.

At this stage the first sign of an enemy break was apparent with the abandonment of the pillboxes along the track to the SW of GOODVIEW FORTIFICATION. The occupation of GOODVIEW FORTIFICATION itself, followed shortly afterwards. By some morning our troops had advanced north and made contact along the KOMIATUM track above and to the east of the junction of SYDENHAMS and HULL tracks.

By the afternoon of 19 Aug the Japanese resistance in the NE TALEB GOODVIEW KOMIATUM area had been completely broken and all the fortifications occupied by our troops that had been investing them for the past five weeks. The well sited and well constructed position on the heights of NE TALEB showed evidence of a planned retreat carried out in an orderly manner. There was ample evidence of the effectiveness of our artillery and mortar fire in this area.

A considerable number of the enemy appears to have retreated in small groups along little known tracks, thereby escaping for the most part our mopping up parties. The KOMIATUM RIDGE however was marked with quantities of abandoned equipment including the parts of a mountain gun, no doubt the one which had been active for so long on the northern slopes of the feature.

By 2000 hrs 19 Aug the whole of the KOMIATUM spur was in our hands for as far north as 702940, where a party of the enemy made a stand. This position did not hold out for long however, being menaced from their flanks and was abandoned by the enemy during the night 20/21 Aug after the continual pressure from our troops.

ORODUBI-SWATBOLCH.

With the fall of KOMIATUM RIDGE the whole of the enemy's defences in the ORODUBI-SWATBOLCH sector, collapsed and were occupied by our troops with virtually no opposition during the afternoon of 19 Aug. A feature of the withdrawal however was the heavy traps which were left in all positions without exception. There was again no sign of a hasty retreat, the vacated sites being left clear of documents and equipment.

FORBURI.

With the fall of OLD VICKERS POSITION, COCONUTS became the enemy's main defences on the northern extremity of FORBURI RIDGE. Here the Jap had constructed pillboxes perched on a narrow ridge with virtually perpendicular sides making encirclement an impossibility. The assistance of the Air Force was called upon to crack this difficult nut and on 14 Aug a total of 51 heavy bombers unloaded a full quota of bombs with shattering accuracy on the enemy's defences. Following up with the support of artillery and mortar fire our troops quickly drove the dazed enemy from the NORTH and CENTRE COCONUTS, but found him still firmly entrenched and holding out in the SOUTH COCONUTS. Bombing fire from our guns in TALEB BAY was brought to bear on these defences and our ground troops allowed the Jap little rest until the position was finally occupied on the morning of 17 Aug.

An ambush position which had been placed astride the FORBURI-SALAMAU track east of the COCONUTS was hotly engaged at dawn on 15 Aug by about 30 Japs, and our patrols in the area SE of OLD VICKERS POSITION struck numerous enemy pockets.

The enemy's last foothold on the FORBURI RIDGE was knocked aside on 20 Aug when the position at 701940 was cleared by an attack from the OLD VICKERS POSITION. Defences dug in on the FORBURI-SALAMAU track at 704930 had previously been contacted by our troops and now withstood the main weight of our attack in this sector. Slowly but surely the enemy has been forced to retreat, but such as the heavy weapon pits has been bitterly contested. The latest information is that he is occupying defences on a ridge 30 yards wide in the area 710967 with at least 6 LMGs.

expenditure of ammunition. The observation post which controls the enemy fire from SALAMUA is reported to be on the crest of the Peninsula from which observation can be gained into TAMBO BAY, as well as towards KOKIATUK.

Reports of naval guns being mounted on SALAMUA have not been substantiated and it is probable that the guns are dual purpose AA type. Naval guns may have been taken from merchant ships, of which there are two in LAL and one in SALAMUA.

A large number of natives have come in through our lines from SALAMUA area, mostly old men, women and children. However, a deal of information has been obtained from them concerning enemy dispositions in the area.

An enemy map of dispositions in SALAMUA is being captured. Although undated it is believed to have been prepared late in July. A map of SALAMUA area showing information acquired from both these sources is attached as Appendix 22.

ASINI.

A possible indication of an enemy withdrawal to the coast in this area has been given by the sighting on 21 Aug of a party of 18 Japs carrying full packs and moving east along a beach at 6000-4. The village of KET WCHASU at 679030 was inspected on the same day and found to be unoccupied, although showing signs of fairly recent use.

PART II.

1. Enemy Order of Battle.

- (a) Sufficient examination of documents captured has not as yet been made to enable an accurate order of battle to be compiled. The following figures are based on estimates of fighting strength as shown by enemy dispositions and actions.

LOKAW.

After allowing for reinforcements (part of 3 Bn 253 Regt) and casualties, which must now be approx 500 in this area, including wounded, the remaining fighting strength is thought to be approximately 400 men.

FRANCISCO RIVER MUK MUK.

It is known that a total of 740 men comprised the enemy force holding MT FAREU GOODVIEW KOKIATUK on 28 Jul. Of these approximately 400 are thought to be still fighting. Of the 660 who are thought to be remaining from the troops who were disposed in the OKOSUBI BUBUBI area, about 350 are thought to be north of the FRANCISCO RIVER. The enemy force holding from the FRANCISCO RIVER to MUK MUK is estimated to be approximately 400 strong.

- (b) Japanese map of SALAMUA defences.

Japanese defensive positions, as shown in Appendix 22, have been reproduced from a recently captured map entitled, "Plan of Coastal Dispositions by Reserve of previous Divisions." Although no date is shown, it is considered that the map was prepared towards the latter part of Jul.

According to this document, army defensive positions along the coast are capable of holding a total of 260 men. However, only 110 troops were apparently in occupation at this time.

- (c) BUANG AREA.

Captured documents indicate that the Japanese Commander, fearing a seaborne attack, ordered the commander 2 Bn 115 Inf Regt on 20 Jun to cooperate with an MG unit at LAL for the purpose of reconnoitring the BUANG RIVER area. On 9 Jul, two coys of the YANAGUCHI Bn (1 Bn 115 Inf Regt) with 1 Mtn Arty Coy (2 guns) were moved to the area. It is probable that one of the infantry coys was commanded by Lieut IWADA. Further troops were also moved on 20 Jul, when 100 men of 102 Regt plus one mountain gun and one MG occupied the BUANG RIVER mouth. Both personnel of 102 Inf Regt and the IWADA Unit are believed to have moved from the SALOLO-BUSA KA area.

No information is available as to the location of the 3rd Battalion (Infantry) (3rd Bn) of the 1st Division (1st Div) of the Japanese Army (JA) which was reported to be in the area of the 1st Division (1st Div) on 11 Aug. On 11 Aug there were indications that the "REAR DIVISION" was in SALAMUA.

(c) SALAMUA

It is now learned that the rear part of the 1st Bn, 3rd Inf Regt (totaling 311 men) arrived on 8 Aug.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS

(a) Part of the Japanese force which attacked our artillery positions at 7:00 PM, north of SALAMUA, on 11 Aug, has now been identified as belonging to the 1st Bn, 3rd Inf Regt. According to a further document, Maj OBA, 3rd Bn, 1st Inf Regt, commanded an "artillery training and demolition unit" about this date. It is probable therefore that this unit was actually led by Maj OBA himself, possibly in the attempt to regain "face" following his retreat from SALAMUA on 8 Aug.

(b) A preliminary identification of the JAPANESE force, apparently part of HAWA 3888 (possibly 3888 Central Postal Directory, has been established as HAWA 3888.

3. PERSONALITIES

(a) It is now learned, that during an air attack on the SALAMUA Navy Airbase Area on 8 Aug, the Navy Reserve Command and his Adjutant were both killed. The names of these officers are not known.

(b) According to a captured document, Col HOSOKAWA, Chief of Staff 51 Inf Div, was killed by one of our patrols, while inspecting defenses in the BOKORI area on 8 Aug. Other documents show that his ashes were returned to LAE on 8 Aug.

4. NEW EQUIPMENT

(a) Japanese "Booby Traps" (Type 9, 1924). Photographic reproductions of this weapon are attached as Appendix "G" (limited distribution only). Characteristics were published in 5 Aug 1st Intelligence Summary No 14.

(b) Japanese Demolition Charges. A demolition charge measuring up approximately 6 x 6 x 4 ins was found in the VICKERS STICK area on 14 Aug.

Examination reveals that it consisted of a number of high explosive packets of "HELIUMITE" (Japanese equivalent to "LYDDITE") grouped together in a copper container. The detonators of approximately 30 grains each, were fused into the charge, and fired by means of a gun powder fuse.

It is thought that this explosive would be used as a delay demolition charge for destroying their own equipment to prevent it falling into our hands. Action corresponds in principle to the delay pencil and TNT stick.

5. TACTICS

Japanese "Booby Traps"

Many instances have been reported recently of "booby traps" being encountered by our troops on entering Japanese positions.

Some traps have been made from Australian C grenades

(presumably M6) fitted with instantaneous fuses, while in another case, a Japanese grenade fitted with a MREAF switch was encountered. While the fuse delay of the standard Jap hand grenade varies from 4 to 7 seconds, these can readily be made instantaneous by removal of the delay powder train.

Booby traps have been encountered in villages, old Jap staging camps and placed across tracks.

9. GENERAL.

Some interesting items from captured documents are as follows:-

Japanese estimated our strength at 10000 on 9 Jul to 15,000.

Our casualties from May to Aug were also overestimated. An enemy intelligence report stated that 90% of our dead had been counted for certain.

The MASSIVE DEFENSE RAIL of 200 was on 30 Aug. Numerous air orders and important documents resolved no fire and advised no attack. The enemy was misled.

PART II.

SECURITY.

Japanese Security Measures.

A preliminary report stated that following the occupation of CROCHU by our troops, it was found that the village had been systematically cleared of all documents, the personal papers being the only written matter recovered.

Similar conditions were found in the AT CHU area and it is evident that training in counter-intelligence measures, which is known has recently been stressed by the Japanese High Command has borne fruit.

When the regimental HQ was located at KOLLAH on 10-15 Aug, however, a great deal of valuable documents was found. A search of the enemy was conducted on 11-12.

Distribution.


As shown on each copy.

[Signature]
Lt-Col
CS & Russ Div

ENEMY DEFENCES MURNUK AREA. AS REVEALED BY AIR PHOTOS. 16 Aug.

Appr 1 to 3 Aust Div Int
Summary No 17

Tracks shown thus ----



Probable gun pits. Numerous tracks & small pits indicate prepared defenses.
Tracks running to dump of trees on ridge indicate possible gun post.
Possible camouflaged gun post.

Firearms cut since
Probable weapon pits on ridge.
Two huts

Much track activity, traps & pits. Probable defence line.

Traps around small 2 huts, probably by hand, but no motion visible on ground.
Probable weapon pits on ridge at foot of ridge.
Clearing (not shown on map)
Defence possible pillbox and fire lines.


Probable gun post of 1st or 2nd Army.

Sheet No. 17
20 Aug 45.

April 1 to 3 April 1967
 MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY

SALAMADA AREA

Information from Collections — Blue
 Information from Notes — Green
 To be used in conjunction with SALAMADA map, dated 1964
 by the Museum of Natural History



Drawn by
 [Signature]
 1967

JAPANESE
90 mm
'LIGHT'
MORTAR
Type 94

RECOIL BUFFERS

TRAVERSE WHEEL

ELEVATING HANDLE

CROSS LEVELLER

RECOIL CYLINDER

YOLK SLIDE

BARREL LOCKED
TO YOKE BY
U-SHAPED PIN







BOMB
WEIGHT

11 lb 9 oz

Total Weight
340 lb

COMPONENT PARTS



NGF/MISC/7305

GSF APV LHO
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DETACHMENT

46-47
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HQ

SECRET
Copy No. 47

HQ 3 Aust Div (AIF)
Aug 43

3 AUST DIV INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 16

From information received up to 1200K/13 Aug

PART I

1. GENERAL

There have been no major changes in the dispositions of the opposing forces during the past 14 days. For the enemy the period has been one of feverish extension and strengthening of his defences on all fronts, in preparation for the next allied onslaught which no doubt he is anticipating. For our part, patrols have been active probing and testing the strength of enemy positions and exploring the precipitous razor-backed terrain for possible approaches to the enemy. At the same time our tactics have been to harass the enemy constantly and it is not likely that our artillery have allowed him an undisturbed sleep for many a night.

It is impossible to say definitely whether reinforcements continue to arrive in the area, although it seems likely. The tone of entries in some captured diaries indicates that enemy morale is not high.

Barge movement towards NE New Guinea continues at a fairly high level but our aircraft have been taking a heavy toll, which must present the enemy with some very ticklish supply problems.

2. OPERATIONS

STOP PRESS Since completion of this summary ROOSEVELT RIDGE has been captured. This secures the coastal flank and bridgehead TAMBU BAY.

(a) Land

MT TAMBU-GOODVIEW JUNCTION

From the precipitous crest of MT TAMBU on the east a line of defences, consisting of well constructed pillboxes and weapon pits stretches to the HULE TRACK, at the top of the KOMIATUM RIDGE, on the west. As the Jap has been adding to his work so have our troops been building up their knowledge of the enemy positions and the terrain to find the most favourable ground from which to deliver a shattering blow. Artillery officers have accurately registered targets among the enemy defences and constant harassing fire has kept the enemy on the move night and day.

Our forces now contain the enemy on 3 sides. With the ridge to the NE blocked by troops which moved up on to the high ground from BOISI, the only L of C to his forward defences in this area lies up the KOMIATUM RIDGE.

On 4 Aug a medium scale attack on the GOODVIEW JUNCTION area from the south and west had some success but, unable to consolidate in the wedge driven between the enemy bunkers, our troops chose withdrawal rather than the unnecessary sacrifice of lives. Three days later the enemy attempted to break our cordon by a determined dawn attack SW of GOODVIEW TRACK. Although our troops were at first forced by the fierceness of the sudden onslaught to abandon their position, by noon the same day the situation had been restored.

No engagements have taken place with the enemy at MT TAMBU. Our patrols after carefully examining the defences from all sides have not been able to find any approach other than those across narrow razor backs covered by well-sited machine guns and mortar

LOKANU-BOISI

Constant pressure has been maintained against enemy positions on ROOSEVELT RIDGE, which however cunningly sited on the narrow crest defied time after time attempts to capture this vital ground. Artillery fire has been used unsparingly in support of our infantry and to blast the enemy from his pillboxes. The steepness of the terrain, however, affords effective protection against our bombardment.

A well prepared attack on the morning of 13 August both from the high ground to the west and from the south met with success, our troops being established on the ridge in two places by midday. Our guns sited along the coast have also played a major part in the support of operations, and in harassing enemy positions, in other sectors from MT TAMBU to the COCONUTS.

Targets in SALAMAU have also been engaged, the silencing of A/A guns during the Allied air attacks and the destruction of the footbridge at the mouth of the FRANCISCO River being the most notable successes. As a result the enemy has been forced to bring up field artillery in an attempt to deal with our guns. Excellent observation and concealed gun positions have provided him with a great advantage, and some damage has been caused. Hostile guns have been located at approximately 726961 and 750970 with the aid of the Army Co-operation Squadron which has also registered our own batteries on the enemy's gun positions. A further attempt to silence our guns, no doubt is the purpose of the enemy patrol, 50 strong, which was reported to have slipped through our lines on 12 Aug and to be heading SE from MT TAMEU over BITOI RIDGE. Photos reveal at least two positions above the ridge above LOKAHI which is possibly the enemy's next line of defence. There are signs that the track along the beach south from LOGUI is well used, as also is the track along the top of SCOUT HILL.

BOEDUBI - KOMIATUM.

Following upon our capture of the OLD VICKERS POSITION the enemy made several determined attempts to regain this commanding position. Our ambush on the KOMIATUM TRACK to the SE of this feature became untenable in the face of the enemy's number in this area and had to be withdrawn. The enemy's efforts at the OLD VICKERS POSITION reached a climax on 3 Aug with an encircling movement from the COCONUTS round to the western flank. A successful counter-attack drove off the enemy who retired to his foxholes amongst the COCONUTS. A total of 52 enemy dead were counted as the result of this fighting. Further patrolling has established that the enemy has a number of defended localities in the area to the SE between the OLD VICKERS POSITION and OSBORNE CREEK. Although our patrols have maintained daily contact with the enemy, harassing him continually, there has been no material alteration in the position around BOEDUBI. It is probable that a further L of C exists to this and the KOMIATUM area along the track which runs east from 707940 and thence along the ridge to NUKNUK or SCOUT HILL.

BOIRIS - ASINI.

There is still evidence available that the enemy has not lost interest in this area. On 10 Aug contact was made with a small patrol at 701993 and on 12 Aug fresh footprints were observed as far west as 687000.

BUANG RIVER.

Our patrols continue to be active and on 6 Aug contact was made with the enemy ambush position at 631219.

(c) Air Own

The features of our air activity have been the weight of the attacks on SALAMAU and the success of our operations against barge traffic. MITCHELLS operating in force of up to 30 aircraft have accounted for over 70 barges in the last fortnight, in sweeps around the coast of the HUON PENINSULA and the western coast of NEW BRITAIN. The enemy L of C that is under construction to the SE of BOGADJIN has also come in for considerable attention.

PART II

1. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

Documents captured at OLD VICKERS POSITION confirm the previous belief that reinforcements from 20 Div recently moved into the SALAMAU area. On 2 July Capt KAMINO (KAMINO) commander 1 or 3 Bn 80 Inf Regt arrived from LAE. By 23 July, it is reported, that the entire battalion had landed at SALAMAU.

KOMIATUN - MT TANBU AREA

In June, 2 Battalion 66 Inf Regt was known to be at MUBO. As no other information is available its remnants have now been tentatively placed in the KOMIATUN TANBU area.

In addition, captured documents indicate that 31 Inf Div HQ and 66 Inf Regt HQ were moved to this area in July. Recent reports from our ground forces indicate that four companies are disposed in vicinity of MT TANBU and GOODVIEW JUNCTION. It is considered possible that these are elements of 102 Inf Regt.

ORONBI-NAMING AREA

It is believed that on 3 July, 1 Battalion 66 Inf Regt was moved to NAMING. Due to previously sustained losses; it is probable that the battalion was considerably below strength. A tentative figure of 600 is therefore suggested.

Documents captured at AMBUSH KNOLL indicate the presence of SASEFO No. 5 (possibly one company) in that area.

It is also indicated that part of the KANNO battalion (possibly one company) was in the TELIS area on 6 July. The combined strength of these two units is put at 350.

Known and estimated casualties due to wastage, since 3 July in this area total 310, thus leaving approximately 640. In view of the marked activity recently in the vicinity of ERSKINE and OSBORNE CRICKS, it is considered probable that a considerable proportion of this force has now been moved to this area to compensate for the loss of the OLD VICKERS POSITION and to safeguard against any potential easterward thrust along the FRANCISCO RIVER.

BOBUEI AREA

The presence of the KATSUJI battalion has been established in the BOBUEI area. This battalion was apparently built up from remnants of 115

Inf Regt. According to captured documents, this unit was at full battalion strength at 30 June. However, it is not known whether the entire battalion was in the area at this date, nor so far, identification of only two, possibly three, companies have been made at BOBUEI.

One of these companies namely the TETIMA TAI is indicated to have suffered heavy losses and to have been in the area for 71 days at 23 July. On 6 July, Capt KANNO (KANIMO) plus one company and possibly part of the NIMEDA MC company was moved from SALAMUA to BOBUEI.

Of particular interest is a captured enemy ration state, indicating that rations sufficient for a total of 530 men were to be transported to BOBUEI on 6/9 July. This figure is considered reasonable for the number of troops in the area at this date.

Known casualties from 7 July to 4 August total 62 killed. In addition, it is reasonable to estimate that wastage has been responsible for the loss of a further 120 troops, giving an available strength of 368 at this date.

On 4 August, it was reported that approximately 300 Japs attacked the OLD VICKERS POSITION. This figure apparently conforms to the above deductions.

Since 4 August, a total of 50 Japs have been reported to have been killed, which, with an allowance of 100 for normal wastage would reduce the total number in this area to 218.

LOKANU AREA

According to a recently captured document, on 1 July the KIMURA battalion was despatched to oppose our landings at NASSAU BAY. Little is known of the strength of this unit, but KIMURA is known to have been the commander of 3 battalion 66 Inf Regt, and previously was reported to have been placed in command of all elements of 66 Inf Regt in SALAMUA at 12 June. It is considered possible, therefore, that the KIMURA battalion was a composite force consisting mainly of elements of 3 battalion 66 Inf Regt, but not necessarily of full battalion strength. It is probable that the maximum strength of this unit, when despatched, was about 350. Indications that the full battalion was not sent to the LOKANU area have been obtained from a document stating that 130 members of this battalion were to carry provisions to the BOBUEI area on 8/9 July. By 6 July, it was reported that the KIMURA battalion had reached the "Northern heights" (possibly ROOSEVELT RIDGE). On or about this date, part of the KANNO (KANIMO) battalion, possibly 2 companies of 66 Inf Regt were despatched southward to cover the retreat of the OBA battalion (102 Inf Regt), which on 9 July was reported to have returned to SALAMUA. Casualties reported since 6 July total 81 killed.

210 210 3 21

-4-

In addition, it is considered that a further 150 casualties, due to normal wastage, must be added to this total, leaving approximately 419 enemy in the area.

6/ TACTICS

(a) Japanese use of dummy weapon pits.

A recently captured Japanese document lays down that in view of the shortage of personnel, dummy weapon pits and weapons should be employed to deceive our troops. Evidence of the partial employment of this ruse was experienced by our troops during their attacks on ROOSEVELT RIDGE on 2 August, when numerous Jap positions were found to be dummies on being reached.

(b) Japanese use of natives.

Japanese in the HING area are reported to have used natives for the purpose of exploding our booby traps. Armed with long bamboo poles, these natives moved ahead of the troops and by pulling the trip wire exploded the traps.

(c) Barge activity

According to a recently captured Japanese map, a period of 3 hours is taken by a Daihatsu (large motor powered barge) to move from LAE to SALAMUA.

(d) Japanese Weapon Pits

At OLD VICKERS POSITION, numerous Jap weapon pits were found to be tunnelled into the knoll for a depth of 30 to 30 feet. In one instance, an IMG was found with a length of string attached to the trigger, permitting the weapon to be fired without the gunner exposing himself.

6. GENERAL

The P47 (THUNDERBOLT) fighter is now being used in operations in the NEW GUINEA AREA. As this aircraft resembles the Jap "ZERO" fighter in many details, it is imperative that all ground forces should familiarize themselves with the following characteristics:-

- (i) Low-winged monoplane with retractable undercarriage.
- (ii) Single radial engine.
- (iii) Wings have a slight dihedral, with straight leading and elliptical trailing edges.
- (iv) Span - 40 ft, 9 inches: length 34 ft 10 inches: height 12 ft 8 inches.
- (v) Armament: eight 50 in. MG's.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL Ref map KOMIATUM 1/25,000.

Additional place names.

EVANS CREEK 699960 - 708958.
STARRS CREEK 697940 - 702947
DIVIDING CREEK 694935 - 688958.

PART V.

SECURITY.

There is definite proof that some of our forward troops have displayed a complete disregard for even the most elementary of security measures, valuable information having been literally handed to the enemy.

It is known that in one instance, at the enemy was virtually presented with a list of units opposed to him in the MISHIN area, and the nature of their role at the commencement of present operations. Nothing could be of greater value than a knowledge of our fighting strength, which would be deduced from this information.

In other instances the Jap has acquired copies of the following maps: SALAMUA (revised) and the WAI-SALAMUA-LAE 2 miles: one inch. In each case these have been reproduced and issued to his forward troops.

Although it is realised that maps must, at times, be taken into forward areas, stringent precautions must be adopted to ensure that there is no further repetition of this neglect.

Distributions noted on each copy.

Lt-col.
GS 3 Aust Div.

NOT to be taken forward
talion HQ.

SECRET

Copy No. 43...

5 AUSTRALIAN DIV INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 16.

From information received to 1800 hrs 30 Jul 45.

PART 1.

1. GENERAL

Although our progress in the MT TAMBU area has been held up by the usual isolated enemy strong points, operations threatening the enemy's L of C are developing on either flank. The enemy's strength in the GWAINBOM OROUM area is slowly being sapped by our constant pressure, and our harassing artillery and mortar fire. Similar tactics on HOBURN RIDGE have already borne fruit with the complete overpowering of the enemy in OLD VICKERS POSITION on 28 Jul. This has made possible the cutting of the main KOMIATUM track.

On the coastal flank steady progress has been made with the support of heavy artillery fire. Our troops are now well established on the ridges above TAMBU BAY, and are threatening the enemy on ROOSEVELT RIDGE.

A large force of artillery is being concentrated in the coastal sector, and targets in SALAMAUVA have already been engaged in addition to the fire given in support of the infantry.

A captured map shows that the enemy's next defence line consists of defended localities on SCOUT HILL west of LAUPUI POINT, along the ridge SW from SCOUT HILL for 3000 yds, on the high ground south of KENNEDY'S CROSSING, and on KELA HILL.

That further reinforcements have been reaching the enemy has been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the mention in captured documents of the arrival of elements of 20 Div in SALAMAUVA.

Enemy interest in the BEMA BEMA and UPPER RAMU districts has not slackened, but there are no signs of this interest being translated into action.

The enemy is continuing to supply the LAE SALAMAUVA area by means of barges. This traffic has been the target for several successful air attacks. A convoy of 2,000 tons reached HANSA BAY, possibly indicating the arrival of fresh troops.

Enemy air activity has been almost non-existent over the last week.

2. OPERATIONS

- (a) Land - Attached as Appendix "A" is a sketch showing the latest information concerning both enemy dispositions and tracks in the TAMBU LOKAMU KOMIATUM area.

MT TAMBU - GOODVIEW JUNCTION Ref map KOMIATUM 1/25000.

Indications previously received of enemy defensive preparations in these areas have been substantiated by the opposition which our attacking troops have run up against. The enemy is well dug in on sites cunningly selected to afford the defender every advantage of ground.

An attack by our troops on the morning of 21 Jul was unable to make headway against the enemy pill boxes on the precipitous slopes of MT TAMBU.

While in their foraging area some of our troops observed a party of 105 Japs armed with 12 LMGs and rifles moving east along the track towards MT TAMBU. Crossing the track heavy enemy MG fire was encountered. At the same time, found strong enemy opposition at the junction of STEPHENS and the MULE TRACKS and also to the west of GOODVIEW JUNCTION.

Our artillery opened up on 22 Jul and together with our mortars brought down fire on the enemy positions. The Jap continued to strengthen his defences for the next two days.

As the result of patrolling, the forward troops estimated that the enemy had at least one company at full strength armed with five heavy MGs and four light MGs on the top of MT TANBU with another company on the western flank at 711916.

A further attack launched by our troops on the morning of 30 Jul, preceded by an artillery and mortar concentration, gained the crest of the ridge but was unable to dig in under the heavy fire.

Our patrols in the DOORVIEW JUNCTION area estimate that the enemy is holding their position with one company with several MGs. There is possibly a similar force on the junction of S. S. TENS TRACK and the MULE TRACK supported by a heavy mortar.

LOKANU - BOISI

On the eastern flank contact was made on 26 Jul with our coastal forces on the heights west of BOISI. Having gained the high ground our forces sought out the enemy positions, while our artillery carried out harassing fire onto DOORVIEW RIDGE. A scouting section of the PIB struck the enemy at 726934. Enemy defences were also observed under construction at the west end of DOORVIEW RIDGE at 732946.

A small party of 10 to 30 Japs moving NE along the track from MT TANBU evaded our ambush; shots were exchanged but with no result.

Enemy positions containing heavy and light MGs were located and attacked on 26 Jul at 737946, as well as further south on the track along the ridge to MT TANBU at 735936. The following day an increased force attacking eastward along DOORVIEW RIDGE made progress, and on the afternoon of 28 Jul had secured their position at 744944.

Overcoming slight enemy resistance at 753951 on 27 Jul, our troops held out against an immediate enemy counter attack. More determined enemy opposition was struck on the ridge west of BOISI, when 30 to 40 Japs were contacted at 723928.

A counter attack was repulsed, the enemy suffering 15 casualties.

A further 50 to 60 enemy were sighted 100 yds to the SW.

The next day the enemy activity flared up 1200 yds NW of BULAMSON where two unsuccessful assaults were launched against our positions.

Retiring for the second time the enemy demonstrated "fire without movement" with the aid of a public address system and artillery and mortar concentrations.

During the night enemy harassing fire was brought to bear on our troops, and at daylight the enemy field piece increased its output, firing 28 shells north of LAKE SALUS with little effect.

ORODUBI - SHALBOLON

The enemy's offensive spirit in this area has been considerably curbed by the harassing activity of our troops. After inflicting severe casualties on the enemy in their attacks on AMBUSH KNOLL our forces pushed on towards SUGARCANE RIDGE supported by mortar fire. On the afternoon of 25 Jul over 300 Japs were seen to move from this area, leaving only a standing patrol in occupation. This enemy force did not enter ORODUBI but appeared to move into the BULKALI OK area where it is suspected that the enemy has staging camps.

Three enemy A's or C are thought to converge in the area of the junction of BULKALI, WAKPE and ARSHAKE CREEKS.

Our artillery proceeded steadily with the registration of targets in this area, and on 26 Jul engaged enemy positions located on the southern slopes of SUGARCANE RIDGE. Mortar fire was also brought down, but a patrol which moved forward after the completion of the shoot, was met by MG and light mortar fire.

A company attack launched on 26 Jul was successful, and drove the enemy back up the ridge. Determined enemy counter attacks were driven off after penetrating to within 50 yds of our freshly dug positions. Patrols sent out to probe the enemy defences found them still in position at 693933 with an MG and eight MGs.

Extensive patrolling north of ORODUBI located continuous enemy defences from the GRAVEYARD as far south as ORODUBI, where there are well sited earthworks, with a further position in the reentrant 300 yds to the west. On 29 Jul an attack was launched on enemy positions in the GRAVEYARD area after a preliminary MG and mortar concentration.

Overcoming strong resistance from a pillbox containing an MMG and a light mortar, our troops consolidated in good positions overlooking enemy defences in ORODUBI. These consist of very strong pillboxes and weapon pits connected by crawl trenches.

The Japanese mountain guns on the KOMIATUM spur were active over this period, shelling our positions at AMBUSE KNOLL and the GRAVEYARD, and on SUGAR CANE RIDGE. A further gun position located at 703940 was neutralised early on 30 Jul by our counter battery fire.

An artillery OP reported two enemy field guns at 721006 and this was confirmed by a position marked on a captured map. The map also showed field pieces at 717970 and reports have been received from TAMBU BAY of enemy shelling from this direction.

BOBDUBI.

First indication of enemy weakness in the OLD VICKERS POSITION was the slight withdrawal of their forward positions following an artillery concentration on 26 Jul. Harassing fire was kept up, and on 28 Jul a determined attack cleared the enemy from this prized and much contested vantage point. The defences were found to consist of a network of foxholes, trenches and pillboxes, with 3 foot overhead cover, and were capable of accommodating 120 men. Eighteen Japs are known to have been killed, and the equipment captured included an MMG and 3 LMGs with much ammunition. A 70 mm Battalion gun with 300 rounds, which was also taken, is now being used to good effect against the Japs in the COCONUTS.

One pillbox was observed in the NORTH COCONUTS with another in the southern grove. There were signs of activity in the NORTH COCONUTS but the grass around SOUTH COCONUTS showed little signs of traffic.

Pushing east from BOBDUBI RIDGE our forces are now astride the main KOMIATUM track, and also hold the track junction at 706967, cutting off this line of retreat for the Japs remaining in the COCONUTS.

MALOLO.

Patrols have contacted the enemy, who is still in ambush positions on the HOTE MALOLO track, at 680037.

SALAMAUA.

Movement across the footbridge at the mouth of the FRANCISCO has greatly increased over the past week. A careful examination of reports leads to the conclusion that a considerable amount of the activity observed is accounted for by the movement of supplies. Dumps are probably located in the timbered area north of LOGUI church, beyond which movement is seldom seen, and on the south bank of the river. Supply lines usually move early in the morning, and between 1700 hours and dusk.

There have been large numbers of Japs seen however, which cannot be accounted for in the above way. A total of approximately 260 Japs were seen to move out from SALAMAUA, almost certainly reinforcements. Of these 150 were seen to come from KELA through MACDONALDS JUNCTION. The total of northerly movement was over 600. Many of these were seen to be limping and were obviously casualties, but the movement of such large numbers of walking wounded out of the front line is not commensurate with known Jap practice. It is possible, of course, that corresponding movement in the opposite direction takes place at night in order to avoid observation. This is supported by information to that effect received from native sources. Lights have also been seen moving along the KOMIATUM track west of the footbridge. The remaining possibility is that the enemy has withdrawn a considerable proportion of his force within the SALAMAUA defences. A reallocation of strength was almost certainly the cause of the movement on 30 Jul of a body of 161 Japs carrying packs north across the river, through MACDONALDS JUNCTION and around KELA.

Truck activity has been on a correspondingly increased scale between the QUARRY, the ISTHMUS, LOGUI and, less frequently, KELA. A native who passed through our lines at BOBDUBI gave a certain

Amount of information of the enemy in SALAMAU, corroborated from previous sources. He also said that about 300 Japs had landed in SALAMAU from NEW BRITAIN on the night 25/26 Jul. It was previously known that reinforcements have arrived, as elements of 20 Div have been identified in the area.

A suggestion of barge movement south of SALAMAU was given by the throbbing of engines during the night 29/30 Jul. A number of lights were also observed the same night in the vicinity of the jetties O'DEAS HOUSE, and moving in the town area.

BUANG RIVER.

The enemy were still in occupation of their ambush position a mile east of KALLETTEPA on 28 Jul when one of our patrols made contact. Reconnaissance along the track towards BUUSI found no sign of the enemy.

A police boy who made his way back from the beach, said that at midnight on 24 Jul a motor launch came into the mouth of the BUANG RIVER from the north, returning after a short time.

MARKHAM POINT.

Traffic backwards and forwards across the MARKHAM continues at a fairly high rate compared to recent weeks, but no significant activity has been observed.

A clash occurred on 25 Jul when one of our patrols struck an ambush on the spur about 2000 yards SW of MARKHAM POINT. The enemy had one MMG, one LMG, and 6 SIGs, and wore steel helmets. Japs previously encountered in this area wore cloth caps. There is a possibility that these troops as well as those in the BUANG VALLEY, are marines.

LAE.

Barges have been regularly sighted in LAE harbour, the number varying between eight and thirteen. On the night 26 Jul a large number of lights was observed around the wharves, indicating an unusual amount of barge activity. Smoke has also been seen rising from MALAHANG PLANTATION, where it is possible that troops are quartered.

WATUT RIVER VALLEY.

A patrol officer reports that the natives of PESEN have got out of hand as the result of a rumour of a Japanese visit to GURUF.

Fires have been observed regularly across the MARKHAM, but there is nothing to suggest that they are not the usual kanaka burning off.

BENA BENA.

A report was received that on 23 Jul eleven Japs approached the RAMU from ARONA, LQ609. One hundred are thought to be at ARONA with a party of 30 guarding a dump at LAKISUA, near KARAWASA.

One of our OPs reported that on 27 Jul an enemy party of unknown strength crossed the RAMU and proceeded towards FAITA, RAMU strat W02179.

(b) Sea.

Enemy

HANSA BAY.

At 0845 hrs 25 Jul, 5 freighters and 2 escort vessels, totalling approximately 22,000 tons were sighted in HANSA BAY.

Apparently shortly after this sighting, these vessels again took to sea, for on 26 Jul only 3/10 barges were sighted in the area.

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY.

Two sightings on 25 Jul indicate that the usual submarine service is being maintained between RAHAUL and LAE. On 28 Jul, a further submarine, evidently returning from LAE, was reported off the south coast of NEW BRITAIN.

BARGE ACTIVITY.

A considerable increase in activity has been noted during the past week.

Commencing with a photographic reconnaissance on 23 Jul, which revealed 22 barges in LAE HARBOUR, further sightings between LAE and the northern bases were made on successive days, and were of a nature to suggest the possible movement of fresh troops to the LAE/SALAMAU area.

It is estimated that a minimum total of 109 barges were observed between 22/26 Jul

(NGF Daily Information Summaries).

(c) Air

Own

BARGE CONCENTRATIONS.

Particular attention has been paid to this phase of enemy activity, extensive searches and strikes being carried out by allied aircraft.

On 23 Jul 5 barges off NAMBARUA (6 miles SE of SIO) were attacked at 0125 hours. During the same day and early morning of 24 Jul, 15 MITCHELLS attacked a total of more than 50 barges in the VITIAZ STRAIT AREA. Further attacks were carried out by MITCHELLS on 27/28 Jul against concentrations along the RAI COAST, and also at REIN BAY, KEFENGI and off CAPE RICHIE.

Reports indicate that at least 25 barges, 1 motor launch were destroyed and 4 barges damaged as a result of these combined attacks.

LAE.

During the bombing of VOCC POINT on 25 Jul, 3 MARAUDERS were intercepted by 7/9 enemy fighters. Two of our aircraft were damaged while another crashed on landing. On the following day 15 LIBERATORS bombed LAE airfield. Results, however, were not observed.

On 27 Jul, a further 6 MARAUDERS attacked the VOCC POINT AREA. Bombs were also dropped at MT LUMAMAY and WEBER PLANTATION.

SALAMAU.

Three heavy and successful attacks were carried out against the SALAMAU area between 23 and 27 Jul.

At 0930 hours 23 Jul, 10 MITCHELLS bombed and strafed the MALOLO MISSION and nearby villages including ASINI. BISAMA was also strafed. Bombing and strafing was stated to be accurate, direct hits being scored on houses and huts.

MALOLO MISSION was again attacked on 26 Jul, when 13 FORTRESSES and 12 LIBERATORS bombed KELE VILLAGE and the airfield. Fires were started at all points while two direct hits were registered on 2 buildings at the airfield.

Dump areas and billets between the ISTENUS and KELE VILLAGE were attacked by 55 MITCHELLS and 12 LIBERATORS on 27 Jul. Bombs were also dropped on the village and gun positions on KELE HILL, causing large fires and explosions.

KOMIATUM.

Accurate bombing of this area by 15 LIBERATORS was reported on 26 Jul.

BOGADJIM.

At 1100 hours 23 Jul, 12 LIBERATORS and 13 FORTRESSES bombed roads, dump areas and buildings throughout this area. Several buildings were destroyed but accurate observation of results was not possible.

CAPE CUNNINGHAM (South of JACQUINET BAY)

Two small vessels, beached off CAPE CUNNINGHAM, were attacked by allied aircraft on 27 Jul. One vessel was left burning and the other is considered to be unsalvageable. Three barges were also strafed in vicinity of CAPE DUKKE.

GASMATA.

On 26 Jul, 6 BEAUFIGHTERS, 6 FORTRESSES with 20 KITTYHAWKS acting as top cover, attacked RING RING PLANTATION. Several buildings were destroyed and the jetty was hit.

INTERCEPTION.

At 1000 hours 23 Jul, 25 LIGHTNINGs intercepted 35/40 enemy fighters over the LAE/SALANGUA AREA. Forty minutes later 14 LIGHTNINGs which were providing top cover for our heavy bombers, intercepted approximately 15 enemy fighters over BOGADJIM. As a result of these two encounters, a total of 13 enemy fighters were destroyed, 6 probably destroyed and several others damaged. One allied fighter was lost. A further enemy fighter was destroyed and 4 probably destroyed when 15 LIGHTNINGs intercepted 15 enemy fighters over LAE on 26 Jul.

Further interception by LIGHTNINGs was made on 28 Jul when 9 aircraft engaged 12/15 enemy fighters over the CAPE JACQUET AREA. Preliminary reports indicate that 6 enemy fighters were destroyed and two probably destroyed.

(NGF Daily Information Summaries)

Enemy

MORESBY.

Between 0947-1015 hours, and again at 1347 hours on 25 Jul, a single aircraft carried out a reconnaissance of the MORESBY AREA.

SALUS - LOKAMU AREA.

A number of dive bombing and strafing attacks have been directed against gun positions throughout the area. To date, no damage has been reported.

BENA BENA

Following a reconnaissance carried out by 1 enemy aircraft on 23 Jul, 7 bombers and 6 fighters attacked the village on 24 Jul. ABALOKA was also attacked by 1 bomber.

CHIMBU.

An enemy aircraft which was hit by small arms fire, crashed to the north of CHIMBU on 24 Jul.

NUBIA.

On 25 Jul, 17 single seater fighters, 1 dive bomber, 2 light bombers were sighted on the landing strip. It is considered possible that these may have been the fighter cover for the HANSA BAY convoy.

WOODLARK ISLAND.

A large unidentified aircraft dropped 4 bombs hitting a dump on WOODLARK ISLAND on 27 Jul. On the previous day 3 unidentified aircraft were seen to circle 7 miles to north of KIRIWINA ISLAND. (NGF Daily Information Summaries)

PART II.

Enemy Order of Battle.

There appears to be no doubt that enemy reinforcements are moving into the LAE-SALAMAU area. A great deal of barge movement has been observed along the NE coast of NEW GUINEA, the north coast of NEW BRITAIN and especially in VITIAZ STRAITS.

Although few barges have been sighted in HORN GULF it is unlikely that the traffic stopped at the tip of the HORN PENINSULA. It is probable that the personnel are moved overland from the FINSCHHAFEN area as were 66 Regt, while supplies are brought to LAE by barge, accounting for the continued high level of activity there.

The movement of troops in the SALAMAU area also supports the theory of the arrival of further reinforcements.

It is considered that the bulk of the movement up to the front line, takes place at night, although several considerable parties have been observed moving during the day. From the numbers seen travelling north into SALAMAU, and the casualties 66 Regt has lost, enemy strength could not have been maintained without reinforcement. It is thought that this could not have been done without fresh troops being available from outside sources.

Barge traffic started in VITIAZ STRAITS could have comfortably accommodated a regiment, and as elements of 20 Div are known to have landed in SALAMAU, it is not unreasonable to assume that a Regt of this Div has arrived in this area. Reinforcement of 66 Regt in the KOMIATUM area could thereby be accounted for.

KOMIATUM.

It is considered that the enemy has a battalion occupying the MT TAMEU-GOODVIEW JUNCTION area with two companies holding the heights of MT TAMEU, one company at GOODVIEW JUNCTION with a further company at the junction of STEPHENS and the MUD TRACKS.

ORODUHI.

An enemy force equivalent to one battalion is thought to be in this area with defences based on ORODUHI.

There is probably a company of marines about 200 strong in reserve in the BUIRAI CREEK area. These troops may have been brought up to do a special job, namely trying to pierce our lines south of ORODUHI.

LOKANU.

No estimate has been received from forward troops, but it is thought that there is an enemy force of approximately three hundred in this area.

BOEDUHI.

Personnel of 115 Regiment were identified in the OLD VICKERS POSITION and it is estimated that a company, probably from the same regiment, is holding out in the COCONUTS.

MALOLO - BUIRIS CREEK.

Information concerning the enemy in this area is scanty, but it is likely that one company holds a position on BUIRIS CREEK, and that a force about one company strong is disposed in the MALOLO area.

5. Equipment.

JAPANESE BOOBY TRAPS.

Attached as Appendix B, are a number of reproductions taken from a Japanese notebook. Included are a number of incendiary and delayed action devices as well as "booby traps" proper. In some cases the meaning of the sketches and notes is obscure, but where possible explanatory comments, in brackets, have been added to the original notes. The sketches, like many of the principles employed, are crude; never the less they do give some indication of the workings of the enemy's mind. Also, they do make it apparent that the question of booby traps has not been overlooked.

The few Japanese "Booby Traps" actually encountered to date have been crudely arranged, but it should be remembered that so far we have not had to deal with this enemy retreating from established bases. On the other hand, some items of Japanese equipment have revealed a most painstaking and elaborate attention to detail. If an equivalent amount of ingenuity were put into "booby trap" devices they should be particularly difficult to detect.

It is considered that when the time comes for us to enter areas, in which the enemy has long been in possession, troops should be on the alert to the possibility of encountering extensive "booby trapping".

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 129)

JAPANESE 75 mm REGIMENTAL GUN. Type "41" (1903).

One of these guns, which had been buried by the Japanese, was recently un-earthed at BUIRIS CREEK. As similar weapons are in all probability being used in adjacent areas, the following characteristics are therefore given:

Calibre	75 mm (2.95 in)
Weight	1,220 lbs
Length of bore	3 ft 7 1/2 in.
Traverse	7°
Elevation	+ 25°
Depression	- 8°
Breach	Interrupted Screw Type
Maximum range	4000 yds
Muzzle Velocity	1,250 fps
Types of ammunition	HE and AP

Gun is mounted on two iron-shod, wooden wheels, and is readily identified by its rigid tubular box trail.

6. General

VILLAGE RECORD BOOKS.

During civil administration of NEW GUINEA it was the practice to issue to the LULUAI (Chief) of each village a book in which was recorded the complete census of the village and remarks by visiting Government Officers. Many of these books are still in possession of LULUAI and a valuable record.

Officers coming in contact with villages and requiring information may find these books useful but should realise their importance and not remove them from the custody of the LULUAI.

When an officer desires to make any remarks concerning treatment in a village and desires to record any matter which he thinks may be of interest to ANGAI a memo left in the book will be brought to the notice of the next patrolling ANGAI officer. He should make no entry in the book itself.

PART III.

TOPOGRAPHICAL.

1. WARFE CREEK. Ref map KOMIATUM 1:25000.
The creek which flows into NUIRALI CREEK at 77948 and which is not named on the map will be referred to in future as WARFE CREEK.
2. ROOSEVELT RIDGE.
The ridge from 738947 to 752943 will be referred to in future as ROOSEVELT RIDGE.

J. Wilton
Lt-col
GS 3 Aust Div

Please detach and destroy after perusal.

DISTRIBUTION


COPY NO.

15 Aust Inf Bde ✓	1 - 5
17 Aust Inf Bde ✓	4 - 8
GGANS FORCE ✓	9 - 11
24 Aust Inf Bn ✓	12 - 15
57/60 Aust Inf Bn ✓	137
1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt ✓	148
2/6 Aust Svy Bty ✓	159
156 Aust Lt AA Bty ✓	160
WAU Fixed Defence ✓	161
Station Comd WAU ✓	162
BULOLO Fixed Defences ✓	163
Station Comd BULOLO ✓	164
12 Fighter Control Sub-sector ✓	165
708 CA (AA) Bty US Army ✓	166
RAA 3 Aust Div ✓	167
RAE 3 Aust Div ✓	168
Sigs 3 Aust Div ✓	169
AASC 3 Aust Div ✓	170
2/2 Aust Fd Amb ✓	171
3 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp ✓	172
WAU Transit Camp ✓	173
B Det 55 Aust Special Wireless ✓	174
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Air Support Control 5 AF ✓	177
ALC Det 4 AC Sqn ✓	178
NOF ✓	179
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AA&QMG ✓	188
ADMS, ADOS, CAEME ✓	189
File ✓	190
War Diary ✓	191
Spare ✓	192

SALAMALUA - KOMIATUM - MUBO
Scale - 1:50,000
TRACKS and ENEMY DISPOSITIONS

Scale - 1:50,000

TRACKS and ENEMY DISPOSITIONS




JAPANESE BOOBY TRAPS

Appendix B to 3 Aust Div
Intelligence Summary No 15.


NO. 107 VENTIL. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 15
22.7.42




DEVICE USING BOTTLE.
Glass bottle.
Mixture of potassium chlorate and (P.S. inflammable).
Air space.
Mixture of kerosene and sulphuric acid.
Igniter - If bottle is picked up and shaken or tipped over sulphuric acid which is covered with mixture in bottle will cause small explosion and ignition of kerosene.
Box - Booby trap for incendiary attack.




DEVICE USING POT. KNOB.
Cotton soaked with kerosene.
Seal after filling with glycerine.
Igniter.
Igniter - (1) Igniter (sulfuric acid) probably may attack ball and on contact with glycerine cause a fire.
(2) If device is trodden on or broken glycerine and kerosene will come in contact.




DEVICE USING MATCHBOX.
Yellow paper cover.
Match sticks.
Twisted yellow paper.
(Probably incendiary device which ignites when twisted paper pulled or matchbox opened.)




DOUBLE RETURNED TRIP.
Device in which booby traps can be placed. (All same and other items can be used.)




TRIP DISGUISED AS CANE.
Trigger (usually concealed by cane head).
Explosive chamber.
If not looked at closely will be mistaken for a cane.
(1. May be kept by a prisoner and used as a pistol against his captors later to effect his escape.
2. May be ordinary sneaky booby trap.)




DEVICE CONCEALED IN STEELWOOD CART.
(A) Inactive explosive.
(B) Sympathetic explosive.
(C) Probably primer charge fired by ordinary electric detonator. Wired up so that it can be fired from a distance when enemy captures position.
(D) Main charge.




DEVICE USING STEEL CYLINDER.
If the lamp rope igniter is pulled will explode within 10 to 30 minutes.
Screw cover.
Igniter made of lamp rope.
Firing charge.
Crushed powder.
Iron plate.
(Probably factory made device left behind on retreat. Cover screwed and match composition igniter starts delay train burning. Cylinder filled with explosive and fires when enemy has taken up position.)




DEVICE USING CANY BOX.
Cylinder shaped dynamite.
Screw from.
Ignition detonators.
(Probably ordinary charge fired by electric detonator. Placed in blanket tin for purpose of disguise.
Firing may be by trip wire electric circuit or by plunger type firing from safe distance.)



DEVICE USING FLAME LIGHT.
When switch is pressed, explosive is ignited.
(Switch completes circuit thru electric detonator.)
Explosive.
Switch.
Screw ball bearing. (probably used to give shrapnel.)



DEVICE USING BOTTLE BRACK.
1. The top of container is filled with pills and screw iron.
2. Explodes on ignition.
Screw iron and screw iron (abnormal effect).
(Tin filled with explosive and fired by primary detonator and fuse.)
Firing train.




DEVICE USING TUBE.
Clock.
Glycerine.
Magnesium oxide - potassium chlorate.
Explosive.
The bottles will fall and cause ignition from the unscrewing of the screw on the clock.
(Incendiary and (explosive) device.
Bottles may contain acid and clock used to pull cork at certain time.
Acid, glycerine and oxidizing agent when mixed would create explosion and fire.)




DEVICE USING PIPE.
Threaded joint.
Explosive.
Can be mistaken for fountain pen at first glance.
(Upward stem of pipe on removal of a probably release striker pin which fires percussion cap and explosive.)




DEVICE USING PARACOL.
Phial containing sulphuric acid.
Detonating fluid.
Mixture of detonating and ignition fluid.
Detonating fluid.
Ignition fluid.
Mixture of heat producing acid (explosive and incendiary device - when paracol opened probably breaks acid phial which ignites detonating and ignition mixtures.)



DEVICE USING BOMB CASE.
Ordinary type of electric time bomb.
Explosive.
Detonator.




DEVICE USING A TUBE OR KEROSENE TIN.
Kerosene tin.
Hole for inserting detonator.
Explosive made of cast iron.



DEVICE USING KEROSENE CYLINDER.
(a) Kerosene.
(b) Cotton filler.
(c) Glycerine.
Kerosene.
Seal after filling with kerosene (probably incendiary device which ignites after a certain time, i.e. when (a) & (c) mix sufficiently.)



DEVICE USING PISTOL TRIGGER AS OUTSIDE PR.
Firing spring.
Screw pin.
Explosive.
Threaded joint.
pin. Body of gun contains detonator and explosive.)



TRIP.
Protrusion.
(Probably moving leg of body would set off booby trap of same standard friction igniter type.)

Not to be taken forward
of Battalion Headquarters

SECRET

3 ARMY DIV INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 14

From Information Received up to 1200 hrs 23 Jul 45

PART I

1. GENERAL

The past week has seen the consolidation of ground recently won, together with the necessary rearrangement and building up of supplies in the forward areas. The retreating enemy has halted on strategic ground in the MT TAKU - GOODVIEW JUNCTION area as well as north of LAE. Our troops are seeking a way round the enemy's defences and at the same time in the MT TAKU area have beaten off determined counter-attacks.

Hoping to find a weak point in our armour, the enemy threw all his weight into a westerly thrust just below ORCDUBI. Rapid manipulation of our forces provided strength sufficient to foil the attack, and cause the enemy's withdrawal. The tremendous weight of bombs dropped on their positions by our air force no doubt had a considerable effect on the enemy's actions.

Counter attacks by the enemy have been welcomed, in that they provide an opportunity for killing which our troops have not been slow to seize.

Patrol activity in the BURIS CRATER area offers evidence of enemy interest in the northern flank of our forces threatening SALAMUA. Further north at the mouth of the BUANG RIVER it is clear, from the size of the force employed, that he was determined to succeed in clearing our troops from their position across the LAE-SALAMUA coastal track.

Apart from the continued movement of barges to LAE and SALAMUA, and maintenance movement to WEPAK, enemy seaborne activity has been confined to NEW BRITAIN, and the SOLOMONS.

Small ineffective air attacks of a harassing nature were made by the enemy on the HUBC and coastal areas; while one medium raid was directed against BENA BENA.

2. OPERATIONS

(a) Land

MT TAKU. Ref map HUBC, KOIATUM 1/25000.

Close following up the Japanese retreat from HUBC our troops pressed home their attack on his positions on MT TAKU. At 1930 hours 16 Jul the enemy, estimated at about a platoon, was pushed out of an excellent defensive locality 716915. The position was thought to have been occupied for not more than 3 days. That night, the Jap counter attacked six times supported by MG, MG and mortar fire but without success. During the enemy attack, a searchlight was played on our positions from the direction of SALAMUA. At dusk the following day our position was again strongly attacked, the enemy, bringing down supporting fire from his mountain gun located on the northern slopes of the KOIATUM RIDGE. Our troops took the offensive at 0700 hours 18 Jul, but, in spite of support from mortars and the mountain battery, were unable to gain more than 100 yards. Reinforcements were brought up to strengthen our positions in time to meet a series of heavy counter attacks on both flanks during 19 Jul all of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy.

Activity has since lapsed into a period of sniping and mortar fire, while our artillery also registered targets in the enemy positions, and carried out harassing fire on 21 and 22 Jul.

Chopping heard during the night 22/23 Jul indicated that the enemy is still actively strengthening his defences.

Forward troops estimate that 350 Japanese have been killed since fighting commenced in this area, while our own casualties have been light.

GOODVIEW JUNCTION

The enemy has continued to improve his position at GOODVIEW JUNCTION during the past week judging from the sound of chopping and digging emanating from the area.

The enemy appears to be content to dig in and sit in his positions in this area. On the morning of 20 Jul, a patrol engaged the enemy, estimated at one company, with 5 IIGs. The Japs were found on a razor back in well-dug positions facing west and our troops had to withdraw.

CRODURI-GWAIPOICH

Following upon our occupation of the enemy ambush position 691930 on 16 Jul, the enemy made a further determined attempt to infiltrate to the west between our positions, but was met by our troops at AMBUSH KICHI 691935. Bringing up further troops on 20 Jul, the enemy threatened our position from both the NE and the south. It was estimated that the enemy had at least a company in a position at 692952 and sounds of digging indicated the preparation of extensive defences. The rear of this party was being harassed by a small detachment from WELLS CP. Determined attacks were launched by the enemy time after time, but our position remained secure. At 2100 hours on 31 Jul, the seventeenth attack was made, the Japanese reaching to within 6 yards of our trenches before they were finally driven off with heavy losses.

Each attack was supported by heavy MG and mortar fire, and accompanied by the usual war cries, followed by screams as the Japs met our fire. After two more abortive attempts in the early hours of 23 Jul, the enemy offensive slackened and no activity was reported during the rest of the day.

An attack from the direction of WELLS threatened the enemy's left flank and rear, and a patrol early on 25 Jul reported the track from WELLS to AMBUSH KICHI clear. No doubt the terrific bombardment immediately in his rear also accounted for many lives and influenced his withdrawal.

The enemy positions on the track were found to contain 70 weapon pits connected by underground trenches.

Meanwhile, contact was being maintained with the enemy north of CRODURI by patrols from GWAIPOICH and NAILING RIDGE.

The enemy mountain gun on the north of the KOMIATUK RIDGE has been active during the past week, engaging targets both in the GWAIPOICH area and towards MT TAMBU. However, our IIG at NAILING scored a direct hit on the gun, as a result of which it was shifted to a fresh position at 706955. The enemy gunners' activity was in no way curtailed, for on 18 Jul, they exchanged round for round with our mountain battery which was shelling the MT TAMBU area.

On 22 Jul, a second gun position was located 1000 yards to the south by one of our mortar detachments. Both guns have since been in action.

The movement on 16 Jul of 119 Japanese north down the KOMIATUK spur may possibly indicate that the troops from HUEO have been withdrawn further back along the L of C. The Japs as they moved kept on the east side of the ridge below the crest, apparently to avoid our MG fire from NAILING which had succeeded in dispersing several previous parties.

BOEDURI

The position at BOEDURI has reached a stalemate, with the strongly fortified enemy post at OLD VICKERS defying all attempts at capture, in spite of close air support including divebombing by BIRRAWAYS.

The enemy, has, however, displayed interest in the northern flank, with a view no doubt of ascertaining our strength and dispositions in that area. One of our patrols near the junction of the EIRIS CREEK and the FRANCISCO at midnight on 17 Jul, heard enemy party moving up EIRIS CREEK. A patrol investigating their tracks were fired upon at 1515 hours 19 Jul. This was followed on 21 Jul by a clash with our ambush position on EIRIS CREEK at 703944. It was estimated that 60 Japs were engaged, the enemy using both 2 inch and 4 inch mortars. Three men returning for rations down EIRIS CREEK from our OP at 698027 were fired upon by two Jap IIGs at 704995, apparently part of the same force. By 22 Jul, the enemy had evidently withdrawn for a patrol as far as 704996 saw no enemy although the tracks of at least 40 were seen. The enemy's next appearance in this area was to the west of OLD BOEDURI when our standing patrol on BOAT island 703978 was fired on by four Japs to the west.

DUNLI-LOKAMU

Following the scouting work by PIB patrols up the coast our main force on the coastal strip pushed forward and occupied the southern shores of TALEU BAY. The advance north was held up on 21 Jul, when the enemy was encountered on concealed in commanding positions on the high ground at the north end of the bay. Mortar and MG fire was brought to bear on our troops, while a field piece behind LOKAMU was also active, and prevented one of our barges from effecting a landing in the bay. A minor artillery duel took place when the Japanese piece engaged our 25 pounder and 75 mm positions, but the enemy was hopelessly outgunned. It was estimated that the enemy had a force 300 strong confronting our troops. The high ground rising steeply from TALEU BAY proved a difficult barrier to our troops attempting to find the enemy's flank, however, a detachment of PIB succeeded in establishing themselves on the crest of the ridge west of BOISI. Contact was made on 23 Jul by a patrol from this detachment with our troops in the LE TALEU area.

SALAMUA

Suspensions concerning the activity at MACDONALDS JUNCTION were confirmed on 18 Jul when a heavy gun was seen being placed in position at 744007, SALAMUA 1/25000.

The QUARRY still seems to be the focal point of movement in the area. Further evidence has been received of the nightly barge traffic from LAE in the form of native reports confirmed by the sound of barges about midnight. It is possible that stores are landed from the barges directly into the dump at the QUARRY.

A considerable amount of movement has been observed backwards and forwards over the footbridge at the mouth of the FRANCISCO. No conclusions can be drawn from these observations as the numbers moving in either direction balance approximately. The activity is probably occasioned by the movement of supplies forward along the Lefc.

BUNG RIVER. Ref map WAGO 1/63560.

On 19 Jul a small party of enemy ran into our booby traps 2000 yards north of the mouth of the BUNG. Explosions were heard followed immediately by automatic fire. Much blood was found near the traps and field dressing covers picked up were found to be carrying the naval insignia of the anchor. No further sign of the enemy was seen until two days later when our booby traps both north and south of our position at 635227 were set off. When resetting the traps on the northern side of the ambush our party was fired on by MGs. Our men withdrew slightly to the south but were heavily attacked simultaneously from both the south and the north by a force estimated at 200 strong.

Withdrawing to a firm base about one mile up the river, our troops were again attacked and eventually were compelled to retire to LEGA owing to shortage of supplies.

A patrol on 22 Jul contacted the enemy about three miles from the coast, but to date he has shown no sign of further movement west.

NEW LABU

Traffic across the MARKHAM from the north bank to NEW LABU island has continued daily at a steady rate. The only variation was on 20 Jul when a power driven launch made four trips transporting a total of seventeen men to the north bank.

It is thought that figures observed in midstream may be attempting to augment the ration scale with a few fresh fish. Brown objects like groundsheets hung on trees on the north bank may have been fishing nets.

BENA BENA - RAINU VALLEY

Activity in this area has been confined to patrolling, with a gradual extension of the area covered by our forces. Around WESA and WAINERIBA, enemy patrols were reported on 19 Jul, and one of these ambushed our cargo carrier line south of WESA, inflicting some casualties on the natives.

Considerable work has been carried out on roads in the area, and the MT road from GAROKA to ASALOKA was completed on 16 Jul, while a start has been made with a road from BENA BENA to KAINANTU.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 181)

(b) Sea

ENEMY
NEW BRITAIN

Seaborne movement from northern bases to KAVIENG has continued throughout the past week. On 12 and 16 Jul, a convoy of four merchant ships and two escort vessels was sighted moving towards KAVIENG. Two days later a tanker, a transport and escort vessel were observed heading towards the same port.

During the morning of 20 Jul two transports, totalling probably 13,500 tons, and 1 destroyer were sighted heading SE 150 miles north of CAPE GLOUCESTER. These vessels were later observed at 1050 hours, approximately 110 miles north of this point.

VEHICLES

Photographs taken on 21 Jul show 7 freighter/transport, totalling approximately 12,750 tons, and 23 luggers in the roadstead.

BARGE ACTIVITY

Moving in conformity to the previously indicated LAU-LAE-SALAMUA schedule, a large barge was sunk at 0400 hours 16 Jul when 5 miles north of SALAMUA. In addition 5 barges were also destroyed between FINSCHAPEN and LAE during the night 20/21 Jul.

SUBMARINES

At 1038 hours 14 Jul, an enemy submarine was sighted 65 miles SSE of CAPE BIEBER. During the morning of 17 Jul there were indications of another submarine 85 miles NE of FINSCHAPEN. Further sightings have been reported off CAPE CREED, one submarine passing to the north at 0705 hours 21 Jul, while at 1755 hours on the same day another proceeded to the south.

(adapted from RGF Weekly Intelligence Summary Number 151).

(c) Air

OWN
KOMIATUN-ORODUEI

Four separate attacks were made on this area during the week. On the morning of 22 Jul between 50 and 60 bombers, comprising MITCHELLS, MARAUDERS and LIBERATORS carried out a heavy and successful attack on KOMIATUN RIDGE and FUIRALI CREEK. The first flight of aircraft strafed the area and dropped 300 delay-action bombs. Subsequent flights dropped 1000 lb bombs from low and medium altitudes.

One stick of bombs was observed to fall in the suspected enemy-occupied area to the north of GOODVIEW JUNCTION. Following the attack, one of our patrols reported much groaning and screaming coming from this area.

Other bombs were seen to fall in FUIRALI CREEK below ORODUEI, and also in close proximity to the new mountain gun at approximately 708926. In addition, a large area of earth was upturned in the vicinity of the old gun position.

BOEDUEI RIDGE

Accurate attacks were carried out on this area on 16, 18 and 20 Jul respectively, a total of 12 BOSTONS being employed. On 20 Jul 2 WIRRAWAYS dive-bombed the OLD VICKERS position.

LAE

From 1124-1137 hours 21 Jul, 5 MARAUDERS bombed barges and jetties at VOCC POINE.

SALAMUA

Twenty MITCHELLS bombed the suspected enemy headquarters in the QUARRY area. In addition to other targets, bombs were also dropped in dump areas along the southern shore of SALOA HARBOUR. Several fires were started and large explosions, from a possible fuel or ammunition dump, were observed.

On 16 July, seven MITCHELLS bombed and strafed BOISI, LOKANU I, and BOT BELAND.

It is now learned that some of the aircraft which attacked the KOWATON area on 22 Jul, also bombed SALAMUA, LOKANU I and an artillery position on KELA HILL; direct hits on very near misses being claimed on the latter. In addition, a strafing attack was made on MISSION POINT, MALOLO MISSION building, LENTU village and BUEWUNG POINT.

MADANG

A heavy attack was carried out on 20 Jul against targets in the MADANG area. 48 aircraft separately bombed the airfield and camp areas to the south, buildings on BELIAO and REQATTA ISLANDS, the mouth of the NERIO RIVER, bridge constructions at the mouth of the GUN, GORI and GOGOL rivers; and BOGADJIM. Many fires were started, while the bridge at the mouth of the GOGOL river received a direct hit. ALEXISLAFI was also bombed by five aircraft.

A further heavy attack was made on this area during the morning of 21 Jul, when seven squadrons of MITCHELLS attacked enemy road and bridge constructions and nearby camp areas on the BOGADJIM - YAUULA road. Although full details have not yet been received, it is reported that fires were started and one bridge destroyed.

INTERCEPTION

During the morning of 14 Jul, fifteen KITTYHAWKS intercepted an unknown number of enemy aircraft NE of LASANGA ISLAND. Three enemy dive-bombers were destroyed, one Allied fighter was lost.

Further casualties were inflicted on the enemy during the afternoon of 18 Jul, when eight LIGHTNINGs intercepted 40/50 aircraft between LAE and SALAMUA. Two enemy fighters were shot down while four others were probably destroyed. Two of our aircraft are missing.

REAR

MUBO AREA

The MT TAMEU area was strafed by one unidentified aircraft at 0945 hours on 19 Jul. Eight bombers, escorted by 25 fighters, dropped 10 bombs between NAPIER and DUALI on 21 Jul. No damage or casualties resulted.

LAE

Photographs taken on 15 Jul show that the MALAHANG runway is serviceable. LAE aerodrome is reported to have been used on six occasions recently by single-seater fighters.

LASANGA ISLAND

Four single-engined aircraft unsuccessfully attacked Allied small craft during the morning of 15 Jul being driven off by AA fire.

BENA BENA-LE HAGET

Enemy interest in this area continues to be evidenced by frequent air reconnaissances.

Between 14 and 17 Jul, single aircraft were over the area on five occasions. In addition, fifteen unidentified aircraft were over KAINANTU, and ten fighters over ONGA between 1515-1324 hours on 18 Jul.

Only one attack however, has been reported on this area, when nine medium bombers, escorted by 20/30 fighters, attacked BENA BENA on 20 Jul destroying 30 empty huts.

(adapted from NGF Weekly Intelligence
PART II Summary No 131)

I. EVERY ORDER OF BATTLE

KOWATON-LE TAMEU

All the evidence available points to the fact that the enemy moved reinforcements to the MT TAMEU area up the track from TAMEU BAY. These may have come from the force of 700 which natives reported landed about 18 Jul.

Fresh troops have also been brought up to the OROGUEI area as documents captured at AIBOEN IROG have identified troops of SASERO No. 8 Special Naval Landing Party.

Enemy casualties to date have been heavy, and in the MT TALEN area about 500 have been put out of action. From the display of strength, however, it is considered that there has been no net deterioration from the strength of approximately 1,000 in the whole of the KOHATU area. An equivalent of a battalion appears to be holding the positions at MT TALEN and GOODVIEW JUNCTION area with a similar force on the KOHATU RIDGE and to the west.

LOEANG

Forward troops estimate that there are 300 enemy troops opposing them. These troops are probably made up partly of the remnants of the MASSAU BAY DEFENCE and partly of reinforcements from SAMANUA.

COCONUTS

The latest estimate from forward troops of enemy holding the COCONUTS and OLD VICKERS POSITION is 150. A further party of enemy have been operating in the BUIHIS CREEK and our patrols consider a further 100 Japs are in this area.

MAICLO

There is no reason to change the estimate of 120 for this area, given in the last summary.

BUANG RIVER

It was estimated that 200 Japs attacked our ambush positions at the river mouth. Field dressing wraps were found near one of our exploded booby traps bore the naval insignia of the anchor. It was also reported that the enemy were using SOLOMON ISLAND SIGs. The only other SIG of this type that has been captured from the enemy was taken from naval troops. It seems clear therefore that the enemy in this area are marines, probably from a Special Naval Landing Party.

5. ENEMY EQUIPMENT

(a) Japanese Hand Grenades "Type 91" and "97"

WARNING— INSTANTANEOUS DETONATION CAN BE OBTAINED WITH THESE GRENADES, THEREFORE A THOROUGH EXAMINATION MUST BE MADE BEFORE USING THEM.

A recent examination and test carried out on these grenades disclosed that instantaneous detonation could be obtained by a simple process of unscrewing and removing the delay train and tube, thus allowing direct ignition between percussion cap and detonator.

(b) Japanese mortars

Until recently little specific information has been available concerning Japanese mortars. Two types, however, have now been examined, characteristics of which are reproduced below:—

(1) 81 mm "Small" Mortar - Type 99 (1939).

Characteristics

Diameter of bore	3.285 inches
Overall length of barrel	25.5 inches
Weight of barrel	17.5 lbs
Dimensions of base plate	14.25 inches (sq)
Weight of base plate	18 lbs
Weight of tripod	16.5 lbs
Total weight of mortar	52 lbs
Elevation	16 degrees
Range	350 yards to 380 yards (approx)
Weight of 82 Bomb	5.5 lbs

Weapon is similar in design to the 81 mm mortar, with exception of the firing mechanism. It is situated at the bottom right of the barrel and consists of a firing pin, charge lever, and firing pin and shaft.

SAFE

- (i) When the change lever is on FIRE and is turned to SAFE, with the Firing Pin Cam Shaft held out, the Firing Pin is locked "down", the Firing Pin Cam is locked out and the mortar will NOT fire.
- (ii) When the Change Lever is on FIRE and is turned to SAFE with the Firing Pin Cam Shaft pressed in, the Firing Pin is locked "up", the Firing Pin Cam is locked in and the mortar will fire the rounds when loaded, automatically.

NOTE - When the Change Lever is on SAFE and turned to FIRE with the Firing Pin Cam Shaft held out, the Firing Pin is "Down" and Firing Pin Cam has free movement. If the Firing Pin Cam Shaft is struck sharply with a block or mallet, the Firing Pin would be forced up, firing the round if one is in position.

NOTE - The Change Lever can NOT be turned from SAFE to FIRE with the Firing Pin Cam Shaft pressed in.

(ii) 90 mm "Light" Mortar - Type 94 (1934)
Characteristics

Diameter of bore	3.56 inches
Overall length of barrel	56 inches
Weight of barrel	74.5 lbs.
Weight of recoil mechanism	104 lbs
Weight of base plate	88.5 lbs
Weight of bipod	73 lbs
Total weight of Mortar	340 lbs
Traverse	10 degrees
Range	510 yards - 4150 yards (approx)
Weight of bomb	11.5 lbs
Types of bombs	HE and CW

An outstanding feature of this weapon is its Hydro-Pneumatic Recoil Mechanism. Attached to the top of the bipod are two plungers incorporated indirectly with the buffer system. At the top of recoil mechanism are projections that position themselves within plungers mounted on the bipod. A screw cover attached at lower end of the plungers, covers and secures this junction.

The bomb is fired on the same principle as our own three inch mortar.

It-col
GS 3 Aust Div

STOP PRESS:

Air item translated from a diary captured in the AMBUSH KNOLL area says that on 4 Jul 2 and 3 Coys of 20 Div arrived in the SALAMAU area.

20 Div was thought to have its three regiments in WEWAK, HANSA BAY and MADANG, and therefore the appearance of portion of it in this area is not surprising.

DISTRIBUTION:

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17 Aust Inf Bde	4 - 8
COAST FORCE	9 - 11
24 Aust Inf Bn	12
57/60 Aust Inf Bn	13
1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt }	
2/6 Aust Svy Bty }	14
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Station Comd WAW }	16
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708 CA (AA) Bty US Army }	19
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Not to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ

SECRET

Copy No. 40

3 AUST DIV INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 13

Compiled from information received
up to 1200 hrs 16 Jul.

PART I

1. The battle for MUBO has been won, and the enemy after suffering heavy casualties has withdrawn to the GOODVIEW JUNCTION area where further defensive positions are being hastily dug. The enemy's actions along the whole front indicate that his mind is turned towards defence, and captured documents indicate concern at the extent of his losses.

The enemy force which fled from the DUALI area has taken up positions in the vicinity of LOKANU and has possibly been reinforced by fresh troops from SALAMUA.

An attempt to drive our forces away from the extended right flank in the ORODUEI area has been thwarted, but his pill boxes in the OLD VICKERS POSITION still hold out.

The sighting on 10 Jul of a large tonnage in WENAK may indicate the arrival of fresh troops and supplies. Barge movement around the HOUN PENINSULA and between LAE and SALAMUA continues.

In addition to reconnaissance, spasmodic enemy air attacks have taken place on NASSAU BAY, MUBO and the BENA BENA area.

2. OPERATIONS

(a) Land

MUBO

Having firmly established themselves on OBSERVATION HILL and BITOI RIDGE, our troops closed the gate to the north and proceeded to annihilate the remaining enemy groups.

A Japanese position on the crest of OBSERVATION HILL was found troublesome, containing six automatic weapons. After holding out for two days our troops finally occupied the position at 1500 hrs on 18 Jul. Following up the attack a large enemy camp with huts capable of holding up to 700 men was discovered on the slope of OBSERVATION HILL leading down into KITCHEN CREEK.

On the right flank the PIMPLE was occupied by our troops on the afternoon of 12 Jul with little opposition, although the enemy had been encountered to the south the day before. The following day GREEN HILL was occupied, the main Jap L of C being found to run down to STONY CREEK.

The same morning a determined onslaught drove the enemy from a well defended locality on the western edge of MUBO airfield. Twenty five pill boxes and fifty weapon pits were discovered in this position and WOODY ISLAND was found clear of enemy.

The enemy made stubborn attempts to hold his L of C in the BUTGAP CREEK. Strong resistance was encountered at the foot

of the ridge between KITCHEN and BUISAVELLA CREEKS by our men moving down from the high ground.

Supported by artillery fire from our battery near the junction of the BITOI and BUYAWIM rivers, our troops attacked and captured these positions. The more northerly one near the BUISAVELLA CREEK fell on 12 Jul, forty to fifty dead being found, the remainder having fled in disorder. The other position near the junction of the BUIGAP and KITCHEN CREEKS was captured early next morning, thirty eight Japanese being accounted for. Our patrols moving up the BUIGAP CREEK found fully three hundred freshly dug graves, possibly the result of our air attack on 7 Jul.

On BITOI RIDGE a pocket of the enemy was discovered by our patrols high up on the feature to the north of BUKUMUL CREEK.

Artillery fire was brought to bear on the position on 13 Jul and following it up, our troops cleaned out the defenders.

It is evident that this area was used by the enemy as a base camp for the MUBO front. A large camp was found a few hundred yards north of the junction of the BUIGAP and BUICO CREEKS, while near the top of the creek flowing into the BUIGAP at this point from the east, two bivouac sites were found each capable of accomodating 100 men. These sites are connected by a track which leads off in a northerly direction towards MOUNT TAMBU. This track was reported to be in good repair and showed signs of recent heavy use. Much abandoned equipment was found along it and there were signs that the enemy was suffering from dysentery.

Enemy operation orders captured in the GOODVIEW JUNCTION area provide an interesting revelation of the enemy's plans and intentions in the MUBO area.

It was intended to withdraw 2 Bn 102 Regt to the KOMIATUM area by 11 Jul owing to our pressure in the BOBDUBI area. However, on seeing signs of our impending attack on OBSERVATION HILL, the enemy commander changed his mind and decided to fight it out at MUBO. It seems evident, however, that a number of Japs made their escape up the track through the bivouac camps to the NE.

DUALI LOKANU

During the past week while consolidation of the beach head has proceeded apace, PIB patrols have moved steadily north up the coast as far as the lagoon north of SALUS. On 9 Jul an enemy party, about a platoon strong, was contacted on the southern shore of LAKE SALUS. A brief engagement only ensued, the enemy withdrawing.

No further sign of the enemy was seen until a reliable native scout from the PIB reported an CP manned by five Japs on the north side of the LAGOON.

A PIB scout who went up the coast selling paw paws to the Japanese reported that there were 190 enemy in the BOISI area including natives. He also said that the enemy from DUALI had halted on the ridge above LOKANU and were now dug in there.

He was informed that supplies are brought nightly from SALAMAUA to LOKANU by a single launch. The only other craft in the area are two canoes that are used between LOKANU and DOT ISLAND, the natives having destroyed all their outriggers. An enemy field piece is supposed to be located on the slopes north of LOKANU.

The track along which the NASSAU BAY DEFENCE TAI fled to the north was reported to be marked with discarded clothing and ammunition.

This information, reported by a native, is probably fairly accurate, but should be treated with reserve.

Our patrols on DINGA POINT found only one Jap who was shot, and reported on 14 Jul that the area was clear of enemy.

KOMIATUM Refer to enlargement of this area attached as Appendix "A"

Captured documents showed that the enemy intended to make the GOODVIEW JUNCTION area their next line of resistance after MUBO. This has been borne out by the well prepared positions they have constructed here. Frequent sounds of chopping and digging indicate the erection of the usual pill boxes.

On 10 Jul a report of enemy troops arriving in the GOODVIEW JUNCTION area, fresh and cleanly clothed, gave rise to the belief that the enemy had a base camp somewhere in the vicinity.

Digging was heard on the main track just north of GOODVIEW JUNCTION and 20 Japs were seen to move into the position carrying three MGs.

Three unsuccessful attempts to dislodge our troops on WALPOLE'S TRACK to the west of GOODVIEW JUNCTION were made by the enemy on 10 Jul.

The enemy position north of the junction was reported on 12 Jul to be held in strength and supported by MG fire from the eastern flank. The following day the position at GOODVIEW JUNCTION was reported to be well dug in, with at least 3 MGs, 5 mortars and a number of LMGs.

The track to the north between this and the position on the track above KOMIATUM, however, was reported clear of enemy. On 12 Jul sixteen Japs were seen, in spite of their heavy camouflage and cautious movements, proceeding down the track from KOMIATUM towards MUBO. Twelve of them were killed.

The enemy has succeeded with difficulty in protecting his extended right flank by offensive action in the ORODUBI area. The gun, believed to be a 70 mm, on the slopes about 500 yards north of KOMIATUM has supported this activity, bringing fire to bear as far north as GWAIBOLOM.

On 12 Jul 63 Japs moved out of ORODUBI in a westerly direction and established an ambush position on the track between ORODUBI and WELLS OP. An attack by our troops from the direction of WELLS was stopped by a barricade across the track covered by LMG fire. Further determined efforts were successful and early on 16 Jul the position was clear. Sixteen enemy carrying a stretcher were seen moving out while ten bodies were found by our troops. The position consisted of two pillboxes of log construction with three foot overhead cover.

Further north the enemy thrust out, and succeeded in ambushing one of our carrying lines north of GWAIBOLOM on 10 Jul. The same day our LMG position north of ERSKINE CREEK was overrun by about 30 Japs. The MG, however, was recovered the following day. Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to dislodge the enemy, who appear to be well dug in.

BOBDUBI

The OLD VICKER'S POSITION has proved extremely difficult defeating all our attempts to capture it to date, in spite of heavy air attacks assisting our ground troops. An LMG position was silenced by our fire on 9 Jul, and the enemy driven out of a position 100 yards to the east of their main defences.

The COCONUTS on BOBDUBI RIDGE are still being developed and on 10 Jul 7 Japs were seen digging and cutting timber in the northern grove. Similar activity was seen in the CENTRE COCONUTS the following day.

SALAMAUA

The most conspicuous feature of activity observed in SALAMAUA is regularity with which truck movement takes place from the QUARRY to the town area. There seems no doubt that the QUARRY is the main dump from which supplies are drawn for the forward troops.

There has been activity observed on several occasions at MACDONALDS JUNCTION and it is possible that a heavy gun is being installed there. A native report states that the enemy has many troops in the bend of the river NE of KENNEDY'S CROSSING, which may possibly be where 5 Bn 88 Regt was stationed on the right bank of the FRANCISCO on 12 Jun, as per a captured operation order. The area NW of the airfield is 'Tambu' to the natives and may contain a dump or other secret installation.

A native who came through our lines on 10 Jul said he had left SALAMAUA owing to the shortage of food there. A considerable number of enemy had left SALAMAUA, he reported, more having moved out than were left behind. The airfield appears to be kept in repair for use as an emergency landing ground. On 10 Jul the twin engined monoplane which landed on 3 Jul took off again having evidently been repaired sufficiently for it to make the return trip to its base.

MARKHAM

The only contact reported in this area was from our standing patrol at the mouth of the BUANG RIVER. Early on the morning of 7 Jul a party of 4 Japs moved up the coast and opened fire on our position. The fire was returned and the party dispersed. Reconnaissance to the south revealed the tracks of 10 enemy.

Four enemy air craft dropped six bombs on the position on 12 Jul without causing any harm.

At NEW LAEU there ^{is} still movement both across the river and up stream to the island. Some canoes appear to be power driven and there is also a motor launch which is used. There is no indication, however, of the building up of supplies. The volume of traffic being sufficient only for the maintenance of a small force.

A native returning from the north bank of the MARKHAM reported that he had been told that 200 Japs had arrived at NGASAWAMPUM about 4-6 Jul, part having gone on to OHIVASING. A further native report received indicates that a patrol of this nature is a regular occurrence. This is substantiated by the previous report of one of our patrols on 22 Jun of a well made track through this area showing signs of considerable traffic.

One of these patrols possibly returned to LAE on 14 Jul, as a number of men moved in past HEATHS in single file.

RENA RENA

The long period of patrol activity during which the enemy has been establishing himself north of the RAMU, was broken on 7 Jul when a Japanese force surrounded our OP at LIMONA. Reinforcements arrived on 10 Jul, however, and the OP was reestablished. A strong native rumour indicated that there were 100 Japanese at MARAWASA on the northern side.

MADANG

An air craft in flight sighted about 50 Japs working on a bridge near the mouth of the NURU RIVER, between MADANG and BOGADJIM. The coastal road appeared in good condition and well used. Information from a reliable source states that there are large food and ammunition dumps at BOGADJIM, as well as many vehicles and a large number of troops. Ships are unloaded there at night.

The MT road is reported to extend to MAHELEBU, W06581, and beyond this point 4000 coolies are working on the road with a further 1000 acting as carriers. The HQ are at YAUUA and MAHELEBU.

(Adapted from NGE Weekly Intelligence Summary 130)

(b) Sea

Enemy

WENAK

During a reconnaissance over this harbour on 10 Jul five cargo ships of 1-2000 tons and five of 6-8000 tons were sighted at anchor in the harbour.

BARGE ACTIVITY

A large barge piled high with cargo amidships was sighted 8 miles east of FINSCHHAVEN on 9 Jul and four barges were sunk the next day heading towards LAE in a position off MANGE POINT on the south coast of the RUON PENINSULA.

Further proof of barge traffic at night from LAE to SALAMAU is given by the flashing of search lights from LAE in the early hours of the morning, probably to guide home the barges. Our troops at the mouth of the HUANG RIVER heard the sound of engines at 2145 hours 14 Jul and again at 2800 hours the following night. On 14 Jul the barges were definitely moving south.

Allowing an average speed of 7 knots these timings indicate that the barges leave LAE at about 2000-2030 hours. This gives them 2-2½ hours in which to load after dark. Arriving in SALAMAU about 2330 hours they would have to leave again by 0500 hours to be back in hiding by day light. The presence of barges in LAE HARBOUR at about 0600 hours would be accounted for by the back loading of casualties which would have to be taken ashore before the barges went to the hide outs. However, on 15 Jul 15 barges were seen in the harbour indicating possibly that a quantity of cargo had been carried on the return trip.

(c) Air

Own

Attacks carried out on enemy positions at the request of the forward troops have been heavy and frequent.

BOBDUBI

A total of six BOSTONS and fifty three MITCHELLS bombed and strafed the RIDGE on three days 7, 9 and 11 Jul.

KOMIATUM

On 10 Jul six BOSTONS bombed and strafed stores and suspected enemy troop concentrations. A direct hit was scored on a hut and the whole area was heavily strafed. On both 14 and 15 Jul six BOSTONS again attacked ORODUEI.

SALAMAU

Medium and attack bombers continued their heavy scale attacks on the area over the last week. Over 100 MITCHELLS made nine separate attacks causing considerable damage over the whole area.

LAE

Thirteen heavy bombers on 13 Jul attacked the LAE area. Results

were mainly unobserved but one aircraft reported one large and several small fires in the disposal area.

RABAU.

Heavy bombers again carried out night attacks on airfields in the RABAU area on 11 and 12 Jul, fires being started on both occasions.

INTERCEPTION.

In three separate interceptions over the SALAMAU AREA on morning of 11 Jul a total of 18 AIROCOBRAS and 9 LIGHTNING contacted 11 to 13 enemy fighters. Six of these were destroyed and two probably destroyed. Two allied aircraft are missing and one crashed on return, the pilot of the latter aircraft is safe.

(Adapted from NGF Int Summary 130)

ENEMY.

NASSAU BAY

Six aircraft bombed and strafed the area again at 0800 hrs 9 Jul. At 0815 hrs the same day four fighters attacked an allied landing craft north of LASANGA wounding five men. A similar attack was made on 15 Jul.

The mouth of the BITOI SOUTH ARM was attacked by nine dive bomber type aircraft which dropped four bombs.

MUBO.

At 0724 hrs 11 Jul an aircraft dropped four bombs on MAT MAT wounding three of our troops, and the following day the SADDLE AREA was bombed and strafed by six light bombers and 16 fighters. Casualties to our troops were two killed and three wounded. 18 bombs were dropped on MUBO airfield WOODY ISLAND and VICKERS RIDGE on 14 Jul by six light bombers. No damage or casualties were reported.

BENA BENA.

Ten bombers and fifteen fighters unsuccessfully raided the BENA BENA airfield at 0915 hrs 13 Jul. Seven of the bombers then strafed ASALOKA ten minutes later. Reconnaissance aircraft have been reported on four occasions.

(Adapted from NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 130)

PART II.

1 Enemy OOB

KOMIATUM.

A captured document gave the strength of the MUBO Defence Force, including 1 and 8 Bns 66 Regt, as 1553 on 25 Jun. It is thought that 3 Bn of this Regt has probably been brought out of SALAMAU and is now operating in the KOMIATUM - CHAIBOLM area. A reasonable estimate for its strength is 600 bringing the total for the Regt to 2153. Considerable casualties however, have been suffered since that date, the total counted in the MUBO - KOMIATUM area amounting to 570. Of these 300 were found as freshly dug graves in BUIGAP CREEK and are thought to have been the result of air action. The remaining 270 were bodies counted on the ground after engagements. It is not unreasonable to assume that a further 540 were put out of action either as uncounted dead or wounded. The remaining force available to the enemy in the KOMIATUM area is therefore thought to be 1050 at the most.

BOBUBUI

No information has been received which can make possible an estimate more accurate than the 300 previously given, although 33 enemy are known to have been killed.

MAIOLO

The force in this area is at least of one company strength, for a portion of an operation order revealed that 10 Coy 102 Regt was to be stationed in this area about 17 Jun. The strength of this unit is probably no more than 120, which is not at variance with the number of troops encountered in this area.

LOKANU.

Subsequent events have shown that the estimate of strength in the DUALI - NASSAU BAY area were incorrect. It was thought that 150 Japs were remaining in the CAPE DIWGA area on about 8 Jul but our patrols have been through the area contacting only one unfortunate Jap. It is possible but not likely, that the force in this area escaped to the hills, in which case they can be disregarded as a fighting force. It is more likely that the strength in this area was overestimated.

It is now considered that 9 and 10 Coys and the En Gun Pl were not with the rest of 3 Bn 102 Regt in this area. 3 MG Coy is known to have had about 45 men at DUALI and a further 50 are believed to have crossed the BITOI going north. It is thought, therefore, that no more than 100 of this force made their way up the coast. Native reports say this force is now dug in on the ridge above LOKANU.

A native of the PIB who went into BOISI states that there are 190 Japs in this area including a number of fresh marines. This number is thought to be a reasonable estimate for the area.

6. TACTICS.

(a) Japanese Signals for air co-operation.

During the enemy air attacks on MAT MAT on the morning of 20 Jun, six Japanese, in vicinity of the ARCHWAYS, were observed apparently endeavouring to signal their aircraft by waving a red and white flag. It is considered probable that this was the usual type of national flag which is carried by all Japanese units. A further report states that when a bomb was dropped NW of our position on LABABIA RIDGE the enemy immediately fired a flare from the ground.

It has been stated that during the MALAYAN campaign, national flags were used by the enemy to summon air support when being hard pressed by our troops. It seems likely that the Japs employ flares to indicate the position of their forward troops to close support aircraft.

(b) Japanese Whistle Signals

The following whistle signals have been extracted from a Japanese notebook, captured at LABABIA RIDGE on 21 Jun.

(i) Signals used by MOTO 2802, MATEUI TAI (1 Bn 66 Regt)

.....	1 Coy
.....	2 Coy
.....	3 Coy
.....	4 Coy
.....	MG Coy
.....	En Gun Pl (medium, short, long blasts)
.....	Call to attention (series short blasts)
.....	Understood
.....	Advance (continuous blast)
.....	Stop
.....	Stand to (6 medium blasts)

.....	Will let you know.
-----	Advance for attack (4 medium 1 long blast)
....	Commence fire
.....	Envelope
-----	Assemble (close in) (continuous blasts)
U	En 12
-----	Call for Commanders' Conference

(ii) Signals used by 3 Coy 1 Bn 66 Regt.

-----	Attack
.....	Advance
-----	Stop
....	Right
.....	Left
-----	Assembly
-----	1 Pl
-----	2 Pl
-----	3 Pl
.....	Understood

Examination of two captured whistles, which were probably used for sounding these signals, shows them to be locally made, being cut from a piece of kumda measuring $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches long x $\frac{1}{4}$ inch diameter.

(c) Japanese use of transport submarines in the ALEUTIANS.

Documents captured on ATTU, in conjunction with other sources reveal that the Japanese employed submarines to assist in the reinforcement and supplying of their hard-pressed troops on the island of ATTU. There is reason to believe that more than ten large submarines were unloaded in EOLT BAY each month, the vessel appearing late in the afternoon to avoid American bombers.

The submarines, which were described as of the "fleet type, especially designed for transport work", brought, it was stated, fifty troops and about fifteen tons of supplies. The submarines were unloaded by four or five large landing barges and unloading was accomplished within an hour after the barges tied alongside.

It is known that the Japanese have been employing the same expedient to supply and reinforce bases in the South Pacific, particularly in the IAE area. Indications are that submarines of the "I" class are used; some have been sighted with bulky cargo carried on their decks both fore and aft. Other cargo is apparently packed in special small bags permitting unloading by means of various small hatches. One enemy source indicated that the "I" class submarine carried one barge (or possibly two), used for landing troops.

It is believed that over short distances carrying capacity can be considerably increased.

(Adopted from AMF Military Intelligence Review No 49)

SECURITY

PART V

Japanese Security

There have been distinct indications that the Japanese are making considerable efforts to improve the standard of security throughout the army, particularly in forward areas. Proof that steps have been taken is shown by the following report on the recent MUBO Operations.

"In three separate instances it was found that Japanese forward scouts were very lightly equipped carrying only rifle, bayonet, ammunition and water bottle. None of the men were wearing any identity tags or discs. One NC-1 was carrying, apparently in defiance of orders, a sketch map showing Japanese positions. A second sketch was obtained from a man apparently acting as a runner."

"It was not until contact was made with the enemy near
BUISAYELLA CREEK that identity tags and personal papers were
obtained. This was in vicinity of enemy HQ, in this area."

"From these instances, it would appear, that the enemy is
endeavouring to ensure that troops, most likely to be killed
or captured, are not carrying any papers which would be of
value to us."

Although instances of this type have been previously reported, the
following order promulgated by the MUBO DEFENCE TAI on 4 Jul, is of
particular interest and clearly illustrates the enemy intention.

"All units to leave the present location will thoroughly
consider counter intelligence and burn each scrap of paper
or documents and all articles must be destroyed so that they
will be of no use to the enemy. It is expected that this
will be done in an orderly manner and there will be a with-
drawal without panic, so that nothing will remain to sully
the military renown of the Imperial troops."

MUBO DEFENCE TAI

(Signed) ARAKI, KATSUTOSHI

It is somewhat ironical that, of all documents, one of this nature
should have fallen into our hands.

J. J. J.
Lt-col
GS 3 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION

15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)

17 Aust Inf Bde

GOANE FORCE

2/7 Aust Inf Bn

24 Aust Inf Bn

57/60 Aust Inf Bn

1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt

2/6 Aust Svy Bty

156 Lt AA Bty

WAU Fixed Defences

Station Comd WAU

BULOLO Fixed Defences

Station Comd BULOLO

11 Fighter Control Sub-sector

708 GA (AA) Bty US Army

RAE 3 Aust Div

Sigs 3 Aust Div

AASO 3 Aust Div (AIF)

2/2 Aust Fd Amal

3 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp

WAU Transit Camp

55 Aust Spec Wireless

Rest Camp EDIE CREEK

ANGAU (MARKHAM District)

Air Support Control 5 AF

ALO Det 4 AG Sqn

NUP

Air Support Sec A3 Ech 5 AF MORESBY

41 US Div

HENA Force

2 Aust Corps

4 Aust Inf Bde

EQ RAE 11 Aust Div

Comd

AA & CMA

ADMS, ADOS, ADME

File

War Diary

COPY NOS

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
57

58

59

58 Spare 42-43
59-40
21

ENLARGED FROM KOMIATUM 1:25000
 Scale 1:12500
 SHOWING ENEMY DISPOSITIONS AND TRACKS.



Not to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ

~~SECRET~~

Copy No.

5 AUST DIV INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 12

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 25 Jun to 1200 hrs 9 Jul 45

This summary must be read in conjunction with Summary No 11.

PART I

GENERAL

The Allied offensive in this area continues to move forward according to plan, with no more opposition from either enemy or terrain, than was to be expected. The enemy, when contacted in defensive positions, is proving, as in past campaigns, extremely difficult to overcome without a wanton consumption of lives. In jungle fighting and patrolling, however, our troops have again given proof of their superiority.

In the BOEDUBI area it is probable that fresh enemy troops have been brought out from SALAMUA to those first contacted on BOEDUBI RIDGE.

Enemy troops in the CAPE DINGA area have been identified as consisting of 3 Bn 102 Regt, with the apparent role of acting as a buffer to our suspected movement up the coast.

It seems clear that supplies and reinforcements are being brought from LAE to SALAMUA by barges at night.

Allied air activity in support of our ground troops has been on a larger scale than has ever before been given in this area.

Three raids on our troops, which landed at KASSAU BAY, together with some reconnaissance flights have been the sum total of enemy air action.

OPERATIONS

(a) Land

MISSION

Reference to the map showing tracks in this area, attached as Appendix to Part III of this summary, will assist when reading the following.

Our troops attacked in the MISSION area on 30 Jun as part of a co-ordinated plan of offensive action.

The day before, patrols had carried out diversion raids in the MALOLO and KILA HILL areas. Although unable to inflict the maximum damage hoped for, probably due to native treachery, their raids nevertheless, apparently succeeded in keeping the enemy guessing, thereby immobilizing his reserves for a time.

A heavy air attack on BOEDUBI RIDGE was arranged for 0900 hrs 30 Jun as a curtain raiser for the attack by ground forces.

The fact that owing to bad weather, only four aircraft found the target in no way deterred our troops who launched a determined attack with their main thrusts.

On the right flank GWATELOM and the ERSKINE GREEN area was occupied by the morning of 1 Jul without striking much opposition.

An enemy force at ORODUBI, however, held up our advance.

Opposition was encountered on the left flank from a well established enemy defence area at the OLD VICKERS POSITION. The enemy have completed their pill boxes on the western edge of the area and with 3 MAG and a light mortar have so far defied all attempts to dislodge them.

A force which pushed through in the centre had more success although handicapped by the difficult country through which it had to operate. By the afternoon of 5 Jul a position was gained at the track junction 706967, where a party of enemy Japs was encountered and ten of them killed. A firm

of the junction.

On 5 Jul 110 Japs with packs and equipment moved from NORTH COCOANUTS to CENTRE COCOANUTS on BOEDUBI RIDGE. The following day one platoon occupied the NORTH COCOANUTS, only to be forced out again on 5 Jul by an enemy force 100 strong with two LMGs. Enemy harassing fire was brought down on BOEDUBI RIDGE and the area to the west by a gun located by air reconnaissance to be at 754019, on KELA HILL.

Certain of the enemy's forward troops were apparently relieved at this juncture for at 1100 hrs on 5 Jul about 100 Japs were seen moving towards SALAMUA from the direction of BOEDUBI carrying their stretchers.

At 1545 hrs the same day 102 Japs moved in an opposite direction. Fully equipped and carrying an MGC the party was well dressed and appeared fresh. Still later in the day a change over of 25 enemy took place between SOUTH and CENTRE COCOANUTS. Movement of a large body of troops is known to have taken place on 6 Jul and a patrol of twenty moving east from BOEDUBI was ambushed at 705937.

Following upon this relief the enemy made three attacks in quick succession on 7 Jul against our platoon position at the track junction west of OLD BOEDUBI. The last attack was made by 50 Japs but was successfully driven off. In all these actions 57 enemy are known to have been killed compared with our losses of 6 killed 24 wounded.

Meanwhile, a game of hide and seek developed in the NAMLING, GOODVIEW JUNCTION area. An enemy party of approximately thirty straddled the track between NAMLING and DIERNES and on 6 Jul ambushed one of our carrier lines. After two unsuccessful attempts the enemy were dislodged at 1815 hrs on 7 Jul and driven back to ORODUBI. Stores including two MGCs and a 5in mortar were recovered. Simultaneously a determined Jap attempt supported by mortar fire to push our troops out of NAMLING was thwarted.

An ambush position set at GOODVIEW JUNCTION caught a party of Japs on the morning of 8 Jul, killing twelve. An attempt to drive our troops from the area succeeded in causing our withdrawal 500 yards west along GOODVIEW track.

A weapon, reported on 7 Jul as a mortar, which shelled our positions at BRISTOL CREEK and north of ORODUBI, is now believed to be a mountain gun located about 500 yards north of KILIAFUM.

As the result of this fighting we definitely accounted for 70 killed while our losses were one killed and eight wounded.

On the northern MALOLO flank one of our patrols struck an enemy ambush position twenty minutes to the east along the track from our position at 675032. The enemy were also found to be astride the track to the SE at 381029.

MUBO Ref map MUBO 1:25000

Following an intense air attack by heavy and medium bombers of the Allied air forces, and artillery, mortar and MGC concentrations on enemy positions, our ground troops on 7 Jul launched an attack with three drives against the enemy's right flank on OBSERVATION HILL. While one company dealt with enemy positions on the southern slopes of OBSERVATION HILL, two others pushed north from REEVES OP through the creek junction at 675364. By 1700 hrs the troops were enjoying a hot meal on their objectives at 680860 and 675864 with patrols moving towards KITCHEN CREEK. The following day attacks were made on enemy positions to the north at 677685, while a force moved down the ridge between KITCHEN and BUISAVELLA CREEKS. Steps were also taken to liquidate the enemy remaining on the southern slopes of OBSERVATION HILL.

Enemy counter attacks, although determined, caused our experienced troops little bother. The situation on 9 Jul was unaltered, except that our company proceeding down the ridge had gained a position astride a well worn track between KITCHEN and BUISAVELLA CREEKS. Enemy casualties known to have been inflicted in this action are 18 killed and 16 wounded while ours were one killed and five wounded.

At the same time the American force, after landing at KASSAU BAY, had advanced west to NAPIER, the BITOI BUYANIN river junction. From there they moved NW up the BITOI and climbed the steep slopes of BITOI RIDGE. By 9 Jul they were established on the high ground with patrols covering the forward slopes of the ridge.

On the afternoon of 8 Jul an enemy gun, believed to be a mountain

gun, shelled the BULAMBU CREEK area from a position further north of the area in KITCHEN CREEK where it was previously located. From a shell case found on LABALA RIDGE, definite proof has been obtained that the enemy had a 70 mm battalion gun well forward in his attack on 20-22 Jun. This gun was previously reported as a mortar. With the piece believed to be in position in the BULAMBU area, the three guns, which were reported by a native to have been brought from SALAMUA, are accounted for.

DUALI NASSAU BAY

Further information has been received of the fighting which occurred on the coast on 1 Jul the morning after the landing of the US Combat Team. Documents, dated 11 Jun, captured in this area have shown that the enemy had approximately one hundred troops in a defensive position on the coast about 1000 yards south of the BITOI SOUTH ARM. Another detachment was based on DUALI with standing patrols on either side of the BITOI SOUTH ARM. It was evidently these forces which attacked the landing party and were driven off after they had lost about seventy killed. The remainder no doubt were the party, fifty strong, which crossed the BITOI SOUTH ARM track from south to north on 2 Jul.

The remaining enemy force, between 100 and 150 troops, is being contained by a detachment holding a line from the coast to the marshy ground to the west, in the CAPE DINGA area. Apart from troops left securing the beachhead on both flanks the combat team pushed west along the track to the south of the BITOI SOUTH ARM and by 7 Jul had concentrated at NAPIER. The track was improved to take jeeps by an engineer detachment with the aid of bulldozers. Artillery was also moved up and manhandled into a position, from which on 8 Jul targets on GREEN HILL and the PIMPLE were registered.

The R over TAMBU BAY and DOT INLET on 5 Jul saw no sign of enemy, but sixteen outriggers were seen on the foreshore at BULAMBU and LOKANU. It is thought that these were sighted by a patrol in the DUALI area on the same day, thereby accounting for a report of fifteen Japanese barges landing on the coast north of BITOI NORTH ARM.

The company of the PIB which had moved up the coast to CAPE DINGA were shifted from here by barges and landed at the beach-head. From here they moved north up the coast to provide flank protection.

SALAMUA MOUNTAIN MUBO Is of C.

Up to the end of Jun movement along this track continued at a fairly high rate in both directions. The total number, observed over the six days ended 30 Jun, was 347 Japs going north and 216 south. Since that date, the only observed movement in a northerly direction has been a party of 23 on 7 Jul, but three detachments totalling 140 have been sighted moving south. These detachments may have been destined for MUBO, but it is more probable that they reinforced the TAMBU SADDLE area, where there has been increased enemy activity.

SALAMUA

The movement of a truck from the QUARRY to the town area has become a regular occurrence since 1 Jul. This could be accounted for by the cartage of supplies and ammunition from the dump which has long been suspected to be in the QUARRY. Movement across the footbridge at the mouth of the FRANCISCO RIVER continues in both directions and is indicative of the general movement of stores and men between base and the front line. Much detailed information was obtained re enemy locations in SALAMUA from natives contacted at the mouth of the BULNG RIVER. At both BUSALA and BULUP 20 Japs were reported with LMG, rifles grenades, but no mortar. Their only communication with SALAMUA is by runner. At MALOLO the enemy occupy the old missionhuts, with a mortar sited close to the "island house", evidently an isolated hut.

Further reports are that the LAE-SALAMUA coastal track is not now in use as the enemy has been bringing his supplies and reinforcements down from LAE during the night by barges towed by pinnaces.

MARSHAM

Apart from the ambushing of 20 Japs at MARSHAM POINT on 29 Jun, there has been no contact with the enemy in this area. Our patrols, which for a short time were unable to cross DEEP CREEK owing to floods, are now reaching their OP overlooking NEW LABU. On 5 Jul an old enemy bivouac site was located in the re-entrant at approximately 545451 (NADZAB one inch to one mile). It was thought to have been occupied by five or six men about a fortnight previously.

Cooking fires and canoe traffic indicate that NEW LABU is still occupied by the enemy, but no Japs have been seen since 2 Jul. Following upon reports that the natives at NEW CHIVASING, on the south bank of the river, had full information of our dispositions in the MARSHAM area, a patrol destroyed their canoes in order to prevent them carrying information to their kindred villages across the river. Once natives have been in contact with our troops the importance of keeping them away from the enemy or natives in enemy employ, is obvious.

BENA BENA

Our patrols have been increasingly active in this area. The enemy has occupied further positions north of the RAMU, and now appears to have a line of outposts from SEPU east along the RAMU as far as BUM BUM, and extending to KALAPIT and SANGAN north of the MARSHAM. In addition, he has crossed the RAMU and occupied WABERIBA and WESA.

(b) Sea

Enemy

Enemy shipping to NEW GUINEA remains on a small scale and would be insufficient for anything more than normal maintenance. The enemy's main commitments in the NE sector are probably in the SOLOMONS.

NE NEW GUINEA

There has been no sign of any building up of enemy shipping movements, but there is no reason to suppose that the decline which has been so evident in recent weeks is other than temporary.

At EUSA BAY, five merchant vessels totalling 7/9,000 tons were sighted on 27 Jun. Two merchant vessels of unknown tonnage were reported off NEWAK at 0920 hrs on 2 Jul, and the only other ship known to have visited this port was one of 2,000 tons which was being discharged by barges on 6 Jul.

BARGE ACTIVITY

Following upon the Allied offensive in the MUBO-SALAMUA area there has been an increase in observed activity between LAE and LABU, and probably in the nocturnal activity between LAE and SALAMUA.

The following is a schedule of recent sightings:-

LABU to LAE	: 1745K/3	: 15 barges
	1750K/4	: 9 "
In LAE Harbour:	1815K/3	: over 20 barges
LAE to LABU	: 0550K/2	: 5 barges
	0615K/5	: 9 barges

It appears that most of the activity takes place after dark, the barges hiding out in LABU LAGOON during the day. A reliable native report supports this view with the statement that the LAE SALAMUA coastal track is no longer in use, all reinforcements and supplies being moved by barges towed by pinnaces at night. The sighting of more than twenty barges in LAE harbour at the one time indicates the arrival of further troops and supplies.

NEW BRITAIN

It is possible that a "Destroyer Express" visited GASMATA on the night 6/7 Jul. A destroyer was seen on a southerly course off CAPE ORFORD at 1740 hrs 6 Jul and at 1015 hrs the next morning it was sighted making the return journey to RABAU.

Three small cargo vessels probably managed to land troops on beaches at ~~WAKAI~~ or even ~~ELISOLIA~~ on night 29/30 Jun - for the first morning they were sighted at 0712 hrs at the northern end of ~~ELPIER~~ ~~SEAL~~ Pt, between ~~ROCK~~ ISLAND and ~~NEW~~ ~~EMILIN~~, steaming a course to the NW.

There may be some significance in the fact that over twenty barges were seen in LAE three days later.

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY

The sighting of submarines, apparently on their way to ~~NE~~ ~~NEW~~ ~~GUINEA~~, continues although on a lesser scale to that during May and Jun. Between 21 Jun and 5 Jul only four were sighted in the vicinity of ~~ELPIER~~ ~~SEAL~~ Pt, two of them carrying deck cargo.

It is possible that fewer submarines have been available for this run owing to the diversion of some to the SOLOMONS where increased numbers have been operating in the last fortnight.

A submarine which crash dived on 1 Jul when sighted off the SE tip of ~~MOOREBY~~ ISLAND, was possibly engaged on reconnaissance.

It is known that the enemy makes extensive use of submarines for this purpose.

SOLOMONS

Movement of shipping from ~~RAKUL~~ to the SOLOMONS over the period 25/27 Jun indicates a building up of strength above the usual scale. At 0900 hrs 5 Jul the following were in ~~BULK~~ ~~ELASI~~:

- 5 light cruisers
- 11 destroyers
- 2 auxiliary vessels
- 5 cargo vessels.

Numerous other vessels, both naval and mercantile are also known to be operating in these waters.

ENEMY AIR CUES

Japanese bases in the NW sector are not regularly covered by our reconnaissance aircraft, but sightings from time to time provide sufficient evidence that consolidation and development are proceeding steadily.

(HGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 128,129)

(c) Air

Our

Air support given to our ground troops has been on a greatly increased scale over the period under review.

Enemy

On 29 Jun ~~BOSTONS~~ attacked enemy positions on the ~~PIPER~~ and strafed the track up ~~BULUP~~ CREEK.

The heaviest air attack yet to date in the divisional area was launched on the morning of 7 Jul against ~~KITCHEN~~ CREEK, ~~WOODY~~ ISLAND, ~~STONE~~ CREEK, ~~BULUP~~ CREEK and ~~OBSERVATION~~ HILL.

This attack was made to support operations being carried out by our landing troops.

The attack commenced at 0954 hrs when the junction of the ~~PIPER~~ River and ~~KITCHEN~~ Creek, ~~KITCHEN~~ Creek itself, and ~~WOODY~~ Island were attacked by four squadrons of B25's (~~MITCHELLS~~), each of nine aircraft. 1000 lb aerial burst, and 500 lb fragmentation bombs were used.

This was followed by five B24's (~~LIBERATORS~~) which bombed ~~KITCHEN~~ and ~~BULUP~~ Creeks, using 1000 lb aerial burst bombs some of which burst on impact. All bombs were seen to burst on or over the target area.

Nine B25's (~~MITCHELLS~~) then bombed and strafed enemy forward positions on ~~OBSERVATION~~ HILL.

The attack was continued by five B24's (~~LIBERATORS~~) bombing ~~WOODY~~ Island.

The attack was concluded at 1020 hrs by seven ~~BOSTONS~~ strafing ~~OBSERVATION~~ HILL.

Reports from all aircraft taking part in the operation, as well as the ground troops, indicated that results were devastating, particularly in the confined valleys of ~~KITCHEN~~ and ~~BULUP~~ Creeks and the ~~PIPER~~ River. A large plume of black smoke was rising from the area after the aircraft had gone.

Approximately 20,000 lbs of bombs were dropped on the three target areas during this attack.

MASSAU BAY

Suspected enemy troop positions at DULI and MASSAU BAY were bombed and strafed on 29 Jun by ten BOSTONS and four MITCHELLS. This was followed next day by six BOSTONS which attacked enemy positions between the DIBOI KOREE and SOUTH BAYS.

BOEDUBI

At 0540 hrs on 30 Jun four MITCHELLS attacked BOEDUBI RIDGE in bad weather conditions. Twenty-nine other MITCHELLS failed to locate the target.

Six BOSTONS attacked enemy defences at OLD VICKERS POSITION between 1455 and 1500 hrs 7 Jul with good results.

SALAMUA

Over the period 26 Jun - 8 Jul, in all over 100 medium bombers made 11 separate attacks on targets in this area. Ten or more buildings in the town area were destroyed, fires were started near the junction at CHILATOWN, while LOCUT No. 2 and the KOLIATUM track along the south bank of the FRANK ISCO were included in the targets.

LAEBU

Large hideouts in LAEBU LAGOON and the LAEBU villages were attacked by six BOSTONS on 27 Jun, by single MITCHELLS on 4 and 5 Jul, by two MITCHELLS on 6 Jul and by a further three on 7 Jul.

LAE

A total of seventeen BOSTONS carried out attacks on LAE airfield on both 1 and 4 Jul.

DUPU, KALIPIT and RAIU VALLEY

Both these areas were bombed and strafed on 27 Jun by seven and eight MITCHELLS respectively. Two days previously enemy bases in the RAIU VALLEY SW of MADING were attacked. At GALLIGOO a MG position was silenced by strafing.

RAE

Many airfields in this area have been subjected to frequent attacks by our heavy bombers. Up to twenty-three aircraft were employed on each of the five days 29 Jun - 3 Jul.

ATTACK ON CONVOY

One LIBELLER on 30 Jun attacked a convoy of three 500/1000 ton cargo ships approximately 25 miles WSW of CAPE GLOUCESTER. One of the vessels was hit and probably sunk and another damaged by stranding.

INTERCEPTION

On the afternoon of 5 Jul, fourteen KITTYHAWKS intercepted a force of eight enemy bombers and nine or more enemy fighters and one bomber was destroyed and one fighter probably destroyed. There were no Allied losses.

Enemy

Enemy activity has been confined to reconnaissance flights except for light raids on MASSAU BAY and BENI ANWA. Aircraft involved in these attacks have been based on WILAK, using LAE as a staging and refuelling base.

MASSAU BAY

An enemy reconnaissance aircraft on the morning of 1 Jul picked up our troops, probably from the barges on the beach. Ten bombers came over at 1510 hrs and attacked our positions. Similar attacks were repeated without success, on 2 and 5 Jul. The eight bombers and twelve to fifteen fighters making the third attack were intercepted while attacking our positions. The following day eight medium bombers and seven dive-bombers attacked. No damage or casualties was sustained by our troops in any of the above action.

BENI ANWA

Reconnaissance aircraft were over this area every day from 1 to 5 Jul. An attack on GAROKA by eight aircraft on 5 Jul was followed by bombing and strafing of ASALOKA on 6 Jul by nine medium bombers.

(Adapted from NGE Weekly Intelligence Summary 129 and Infra Summary 59).

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB

Following upon recent identifications in the area it is necessary to revise the estimates of enemy strengths.

MASSAU BAY - KALIPIT

It is now known that 1 and 2 Bns 66 Regt were in this area with 1 Bn of LABALE RIDGE and 2 Bn on OBSERVATION HILL. Together with Regimental HQ and Regimental Signals Company the total number at full strength would be 3,100.

One captured company strength state, however, shows the company to be at only 60% strength. It is thought, therefore, that this force is no greater than 1500. An order dated 12 Jun instructed 5 Bn 63 Regt to remain behind in SALAMUA to rest, and if necessary, assist in its defence. In view of the identification of 63 Regt in the GOODWISH JUNCTION area and the movement seen on the KOMILATUI L of C, it is probable that 5 Bn 63 Regt has been brought up to this area from SALAMUA. An estimated 600 has been added to the strength in the LUEO-KOMILATUI area.

Since the arrival of 63 Regt in this area, 235 Japs are known to have been accounted for. It is considered that a further 500 is not an unreasonable figure at which to place those out of action owing to wounds. This leaves a net strength of 1515.

BOEDUBI

Documents captured on BOEDUBI RIDGE on 30 Jun revealed the presence of a number of 115 Regt. In view of the possibility that the members of 115 Regt may have been absorbed into 102 Regt or kept as a separate unit, no conclusion can be arrived at from this identification. From the enemy encountered when our attack was launched on 30 Jun it appears that at least half of the 600 believed to have been in this area in May had been withdrawn.

It is now considered that approximately 500 enemy are in the BOEDUBI AREA, including at least 200 troops recently brought out from SALAMUA. The enemy contacted in the ORODUBI area are thought to be part of the force, believed to be 5 Bn 63 Regt, already taken into account in the LUEO - KOMILATUI area.

DUALI-NASSAU BAY

Documents captured enabled the dispositions of a force of about 550 in this area to be deduced. Of this number it is probable that 200 have moved north to the SALUS area after suffering about 70 casualties. The remaining 350 are thought to be located in the CAPE DINGA area. In view of native reports of enemy movement down the coast from SALAMUA, the number of enemy along the coast north of BITOI NORTH ARM is probably considerably greater than 150, as above.

LAE-SALAMUA

In view of the ease with which the two forces at LAE and SALAMUA can reinforce one another, no attempt will be made in the future to separate their strengths.

The estimate of 5,700 of 10 Jun has to be increased by the addition of 1 and 2 Bns 102 Regt. returned from LUEO, put down at 1100. This brings the total to 7,600.

Distribution of strength is, therefore, estimated to be:-

LUEO - KOMILATUI	1515
BOEDUBI	500
LOKINU - SALUS	130
CAPE DINGA	150
LAE - SALAMUA	7600
	<u>9695</u>

3. IDENTIFICATIONS

Documents captured subsequent to the landing at NASSAU BAY enable a survey to be made of enemy dispositions prior to the commencement of the present operations.

The remnants of the "TAMBAHE detachment" were apparently withdrawn to SALAMUA in March and April 45, and replaced by 5 Bn 102 Regt which, although it had arrived in the January 45 convoy, had not taken part in either the HAU or LUEO actions.

Under command Maj TAMBUKA, CO 5 Bn, this force was known as the "NASSAU Defence Force" and was located on 20 Jun at BASSIS III.

Defensive positions were prepared on the high ground of the CAPE DINGA peninsula, at BASSIS I, DUALI, and on both sides of the BITOI SOUTH ARM.

A company was located at DUALI, and maintained standing patrols in the ambush positions on both banks of the BITOI SOUTH ARM. Patrols from this Company were also made to SALUS at intervals of 7 - 10 days. Further defended locality was on the shore of NASSAU BAY some 7000 yards south of the BITOI SOUTH ARM. This was known as " " and had accommodation for a Company.

An OP was maintained 1 1/2 miles north of BASSIS I with telephone communication to "SHIROUME" and En HQ. From a study of defensive positions and captured strength states, it is thought that the strength of the entire "MASSAU Defence Force" prior to the landing would not exceed 550. This is in agreement with previous estimates.

5. EQUIPMENT

A report from MILLING on 7 Jul states that the enemy were observed wearing camouflaged clothing similar to the US pattern overalls. This is the first occasion on which equipment of this nature has been reported. It may well be that the Japs are using American clothing captured in other theatres.

6. ANIMALS

A prisoner from 51 Engr Regt has stated that dogs were specially trained to detect buried landmines by smell. When a dog located a mine it would begin to scratch away the earth, and engineers would then complete the task of removal. Fifteen of these dogs were held by his unit.

(NCF Weekly Intelligence Summary 129)

8. GENERAL

Hysteria amongst Natives

Attached as Appendix "A" is a report by an INGAU official on the tendency to periodical hysteria amongst the natives. This report was occasioned by a disturbance in the village of MORUM - WHITE VALLEY area 24 Jun - 4 Jul.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

1. Tracks

Attached as Appendix "B" is a map at the scale of 1/25000, reduced from the KOMATUN and MUBO 1/25000 sheets, and showing tracks according to the latest available information.

2. ULIAP CREEK

The creek shown on the KOMATUN 1/25000 sheet as LITTLE BUTALI CREEK has been known amongst the forward troops for some time by its native name of ULIAP CREEK. This name has therefore been adopted and will be referred to in future.

PART V

SECURITY

That the Japanese are endeavouring to improve Security in their forces is shown by an extract from a diary captured recently from a Japanese, which stated that "articles to be left behind will be left near En HQ". Much information of intelligence value has been gained by the Allies from articles carried by the Japanese who seem anxious to keep as many souvenirs, diaries, private letters etc., as possible in their possession when going into action. The knowledge that the Japanese are now endeavouring to stamp out this practice - and thus close what is to us a most profitable source of information - should serve as a reminder to ourselves of the danger of carrying into forward areas "articles to be left behind".

The fact that an "article to be left behind" was captured is in itself amusing. We should keep well in mind, however, that our own troops may be doing exactly the same, and every effort should be made to prevent this happening in our own forces.

Adapted from NCF Weekly Intelligence Summary 128)

Lt-col.
H. J. Rust Div

Please detach and destroy after perusal

DISTRIBUTION:

COPY NOS

15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)	1 - 4
17 Aust Inf Bde	5 - 7
2/7 Aust Inf Bn	8
24 Aust Inf Bn	9
57/60 Aust Inf Bn	10
1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt	11
2/6 Aust Svy Bty	12
155 Aust Lt AA Bty	13
WLU Fixed Defences	14
Station Comd WLU	15
BULOLO Fixed Defences	16
Station Comd BULOLO	17
11 Fighter Control Sub-sector	18
708 CA (AA) Bty US Army	19
R&E 3 Aust Div (AIF)	20
Sigs 3 Aust Div	21
AMSC 3 Aust Div (AIF)	22
2/2 Aust Fd Amb	23
5 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	24
WLU Transit Camp	25
55 Aust Spec Wireless Sec	26
Rest Camp EDIE CREEK	27
ANGAU (MARKHAM District)	28
Air Support Control 5 AF	29
AIO Det 4 AC Sqn	30
NGF	31
Air Support Sec AS AF Ech 3 AF MORESBY	32
41 MS Div	33
BENL Force	34
2 Aust Corps	35
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Comd	37
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Appendix "A" to 3 Aust Div Intelligence Summary No.12

NATIVE SITUATION - MORUM VILLAGE -
LOWER MATUT AREA

About 14th June the Luluai of MORUM village induced the natives of DUNGUNTING, MORUF, and some of PESIN villagers to leave their own village sites and take up residence at his village where he started a new cult.

The cult appears to have taken the usual form of chanting in some language concocted by the Luluai himself, the carving of figures and dancing. Two carved poles were erected on the main road at the entrance to the trail to MORUM and two in the village itself.

The natives came completely under his sway and remained in a hysterical condition. Guards armed with sticks were posted along the road. The hysteria reached its culminating point when three police were sent to MORUM village. They hid their rifles and met the natives at MORUM unarmed. They were escorted to the village where they were set on by some of the men and the women, thrashed by the women and placed in a house. They later escaped and returned to report at TSILI TSILI village. The natives of MORUM took possession of the hidden rifles.

I arrived at TSILI TSILI on 1 July and went to MORUM village on the morning of 2 July with four armed police and the village officials of BERILIAN and TSILI TSILI villages.

On approaching the village the Luluai of MORUM began his chant and dancing around the village. After a couple of shots had been fired in his direction he stopped his dancing and all the natives cleared out. On entering the village it was found deserted. After much shouting by the native officials accompanying the Luluai of MORUM came in with two other natives. He was ordered to collect those hiding and report to me at DUNGUNTING village on the morning of 5 July. He admitted that the shots fired were sufficient to dissolve the hysterical condition.


By 4 July conditions were normal and the men of all villages paraded for work.

Everyone was very sensitive to the ridicule of the other natives and no further trouble need be anticipated.

These Lower Matut people have worked exceedingly well in the past and with the uncertain period and generally debilitated condition of these people, they were ripe for an emotional outburst. No significance need be placed on the outburst. It was merely a coincidence that it coincided with the advent of troops into the area.

TRACKS MISSIM AREA

Appx B to 3Aust Div
INT SUMMARY # 12



SCALE 1:50000

Drawn by
INT SEC
HQ 3Aust Div
3 July 43

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of

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3 ARIST DIV INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 11

Compiled from information received up to 1800
hrs 4 July 43.

(Abridged owing to shortage of stationery)

PART I

1. GENERAL

The offensive, during the past week, passed to the Allies with the landing of an American Combat Team in NASSAU BAY, combined with an attack on BOBUGH HILLS. Operations are proceeding satisfactorily although a certain amount of supplies and equipment was lost in the heavy surf at NASSAU BAY.

Diversions attacks at LAIKHAM POINT and in the MALOLO-KELA HILL area were apparently successful in keeping the enemy guessing. Enemy activity in the LAIKHAM POINT area has continued, but has been confined to barge activity from the mouth of the river, and the north bank, to NEW LABU ISLAND.

That the enemy has in mind the further development of operations in the LAE-SALAMUA area, is shown by the large increase in the number of barges operating between LAE and LABU, more than twenty being seen on the evening of 3 July. This can only mean that supplies and reinforcements have arrived.

Further evidence has been received from north of the LAIKHAM of the increasing enemy activity, of which the focal point seems to be KAIAPIT.

Our offensive has been co-ordinated with air attacks against enemy forward positions and base installations. The enemy air force retaliated with medium-scale attacks on our positions at NASSAU BAY.

2. OPERATIONS

DUALI-NASSAU BAY

On the night 29/30 June, an American Combat Team landed in NASSAU BAY about 2000 yards north of the TABALI RIVER. A number of landing craft were upset by heavy surf, with the loss and damaging of some stores and equipment. The landing itself was unopposed, but small enemy parties were contacted at the mouth of the RITCI SOUTH ARM and at BASSIS. The former pocket was cleared on 1 July by a small force which was in position to the west, for the purpose of creating a diversion.

The enemy at BASSIS, estimated at about 100, are being engaged by a detachment from both the north as well as by a small force moving up the coast.

On 5 Jul a battery of field artillery was landed and also an engineer detachment for the development of road communications within the beachhead. Contact was completed with our forces established in the MUREC area and the move of the combat team west along the RITCI SOUTH ARM commenced.

On 29 Jul Allied air forces prepared the way with heavy attacks on DUALI and BASSIS. Enemy reconnaissance planes picked the landing force, clearly indicated by the line of wrecked barges on the beach and were followed by bombers at midday on both 1 and 2 Jul.

A further attack was launched on 3 Jul by 14 bombers and 4 fighters. Our fighters intercepted, probably shooting down, 4 aircraft.

MISSIM. Ref maps SALAMAUA KOMIATUM 1/25000.

On 29 Jun small hit and run patrols set out to raid enemy positions on KELA HILL and at MALOLO. Both were discovered by Japanese sentries before they could reach a position to inflict maximum damage. The latter patrol however succeeded in enticing the enemy out into an ambush position accounting for 12 with no loss to our force. It is believed that these two parties were betrayed by natives.

An attack on BOBUBI RIDGE on 30 Jun encountered opposition at the COCONUTS 704975 and at ORODUEI. Enemy IMG, IMG and mortar fire held our advance at OLD VICKERS POSITION 698967 but GJALBULON and ERSEKINE CK were occupied. 1 Jul. Desultory shelling from a gun at KELA HILL had little effect.

By the evening of 3 Jul one of our detachments had pushed through to the track junction at 706967 and established a defensive position 600 yards to the south of the junction. An attack on the COCONUTS was successful late on 4 Jul and one pl was established in the NORTH COCONUTS.

Over 20 MITCHELLS were scheduled to attack BOBUBI RIDGE but owing to the weather, only four located the target, the remainder bombing the mouth of the FRANCISCO and IOGUI. A further scheduled attack on SALAMAUA took place later at 1100K/30 and again on the mornings of 1 and 2 Jul.

SALAMAUA. Ref map SALAMAUA 1/25000.

On 1 Jul considerable movement from the QUARRY to SALAMAUA town area was followed on 2 and 3 Jul by much activity over the footbridge in both directions. The gun which shelled BOBUBI is considered to be located at 734019.

MARKHAM POINT. Ref map NADEAB 1 inch to 1 mile.

Following upon the shelling of the enemy camp area at MARKHAM POINT an enemy patrol of 20 moved out and into our ambush position at 545430. Six enemy were killed and five wounded. Considerable activity has been seen on the MARKHAM River, canoes and barges moving up from the mouth and also across from the north bank. Some of the canoes appear to be power driven.

LAE.

On 2 Jul barge activity showed a sudden increase when 5 moved from LAE to LABU, while on 3 Jul 9 moved to LABU and 15 in the opposite direction. At dusk over 20 barges were seen in LAE harbour. These barges have been the target for several Allied air attacks.

PART II.

1. Enemy OOR. The revised estimate of distribution of enemy strengths is :
 HUBO-KOMIATUM 1500. BOBUBI 200. DUAKE-SALUS 350.
 LAE-SALAMAUA 8000. IOGUI 10,050.

Distribution.

As for summary 10.

Lt-Col.
 G-3 Aust Div.

Not to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ

SECRET

Copy No. 24.

3 AUST DIV INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 12

Compiled from information received up to 1200
hours 25 Jun 43.

PART I

1. GENERAL

As was to be expected, the bringing up of fresh troops to the MUBO area has been followed by a limited offensive on the part of the enemy. An ineffective attack by 1 Bn of 66 Inf Regt was launched on 20 June against our prepared company position on LABABIA RIDGE.

The 66 Inf Regt has been identified in the MUBO area. The record of its previous movements confirms the suspicion that reinforcements have been reaching LAE over the last few months, the route taken being to FINSCHHAFEN by barge and thence by road to LAE.

Although there has been little activity in the BENA BENA plateau, the sphere of influence of enemy patrols on the north side of the MARKHAM is steadily growing.

The flow of merchant shipping in the NE sector has been slight. The only item of significance is a small increase in the number of naval craft at RABUL.

The enemy air offensive against the BENA BENA plateau was continued on 19 June with a further raid. Apart from this the enemy air force has been very quiet.

2. OPERATIONS

(a) Land

MUBO AREA

Following the arrival of fresh troops in the MUBO area reported in the last two summaries, enemy activity has increased as was to be expected. Early on the morning 20 June a Jap reconnaissance patrol struck the base for our standing patrols in the vicinity of PIMPLE and one Jap, believed to have been an officer, was shot. In the afternoon, a party of 50 enemy attacked this post unsuccessfully, inflicting one casualty wounded while losing nine killed and eleven wounded themselves.

Throughout the 20 and 21 June, enemy aircraft carried out a number of raids on the GUADGASAL MAT MAT area, apparently in an endeavour to disrupt our supply line prior to, and in the initial stages of, attack on LABABIA RIDGE. Bombing in the WAU area was apparently directed also at the WAU-BALLAIS L of C.

In the early morning of 21 June a signal line party moving out to LABABIA OP struck a party of Japs on the track. They heard two booby traps explode and sounds of intermittent firing.

When this contact was made orders were issued for one company to move from the SADDLE to support the company on LABABIA RIDGE, and another company to move from HOUSE MANANA to the SADDLE.

At 1510 hours 21 June, our company position on LABABIA RIDGE was heavily attacked on the east flank by 1 Bn 66 Regt. The enemy in this initial thrust penetrated to within ten yards of our perimeter between BASE CAMP and LABABIA OP, but were thrust back suffering heavy casualties.

The night 21/22 June was quiet but the Jap was heard to the east and north of our positions, and in the early morning two small parties were observed to the west. A platoon was then sent out from SADDLE to secure the track BASE CAMP - SADDLE and patrol to the north.

Around midday increased enemy activity indicated that another full-scale attack was about to be mounted. This however, did NOT eventuate, and snipers inflicted many casualties.

Movement was also observed in WOODY ISLAND DRY CREEK BED area, and was engaged by our artillery.

An attempt was made to reach LABABIA OP across country but was NOT successful.

Throughout the afternoon the Jap fired mortars from the vicinity of LABABIA TRIG intermittently into our perimeter, without inflicting any casualties.

In the late afternoon five BOSTONS in close support of our troops bombed and strafed PIMPLE-GREEN HILL area.

During the evening a considerable number of mortar bombs and SAA were fired into our perimeter from the east flank, and the enemy appeared to be in some strength in this area. However, at 2030 hours the firing ceased and the remainder of the night was quiet. At 0530 hours 23 June the firing, including light mortar, recommenced from the north and west and our return mortar fire silenced one Jap mortar position.

During the morning our artillery carried out a close target shoot, opening on the Japs 1000 yards south of the PIMPLE and dropping to within 150 yards of our forward positions. Forward troops reported that the fire was accurate and that squealing was heard. Throughout 23 June our sniping continued to inflict casualties on the enemy.

In the afternoon the Jap shelled MAT MAT and the lower slopes of GUADACAL RIDGE with a gun suspected as 75 mm, from a position in the vicinity of the south end of the DRY CREEK BED. Our artillery replied with eleven rounds into the suspected area. A patrol found that the line between EAST CAMP and LABABIA OF had been cut in many places, but by 1800 hours communication was re-established and the track reported clear.

The night 23/24 June was quiet and patrols along FOCKERS RIDGE, LABABIA RIDGE, and north along JAP TRAIL to within 700 yards of PIMPLE, failed to contact the enemy.

During the next day, four BOSTONS bombed and silenced the suspected gun position in DRY CREEK BED.

Working parties spent the whole day burying the Jap dead.

The enemy's casualties throughout the action from 21 June to 24 June are estimated as at least 174 against our casualties 13 killed and 18 wounded.

KOMIATUM-MUBO L of C

Movement on this track has been on a decreased scale to that reported in the last summary, but has nevertheless been appreciable in a northerly direction. In the four days 20-24 June, a total of 210 Japs were seen moving north, many appearing to be weary. Several stretcher cases were included, but a party of 37 on 25 June were heavily equipped and carried machine guns.

This movement would be accounted for by the movement out of the second battalion of 102 Regt which is now known to have been relieved by 66 Regt.

An explanation is now to hand of the extraordinary lack of carriers observed on the L of C. Entries in a captured war diary show that fighting units were employed on the carriage of supplies between SALAMUA, KOMIATUM and MUBO. Five trips of between 20 and 30 men each were recorded in the diary, but comparison with our sightings reveals that only two of them were observed. This is a startling example of the amount of movement along this track that escapes observation.

It is evident that a considerable proportion of the enemy counted by our OP's has been engaged in carrying, thereby reducing the final figure of troops arriving in the MUBO-KOMIATUM area.

But the amount of unobserved movement would, it is thought, more than make up for this reduction, and, therefore, previous estimates of arrivals in the forward area have been allowed to stand.

Information concerning the carrier line to MUBO has been received from coastal natives. They state that every Saturday a line of about seventy-five carriers comes from various villages along the coast assembles at LOGUL on the north bank of the FRANCISCO. Here they are loaded with stores from trucks and then proceed to the foot of the KOMIATUM RIDGE. Ascending the ridge after dark, they sleep at KOMIATUM, moving on to the terminal store in BUTCAP CREEK, early on Sunday morning. The line then moves back to SALAMUA during the day, taking on an average ten stretcher cases. The carriers are not allowed to proceed past the terminal store from which the whole of the MUBO area is screened by a large clump of bushes. There are no signs of defensive position along BUTCAP CREEK.

It is evident that the Jap cannot rely on the natives to withhold information from us in view of his strict security measures concerning the movement of natives into his forward areas.

DUALI - NASSAU BAY

There has been no activity on either side in this area, but further information of enemy dispositions has been obtained from a reliable source. It is now believed that there is no enemy in DUALI itself, although the enemy has two ILC's in position on the southern bank of the BITOI SOUTH ARM, not far from the coast. Further south a mortar position is reported on the narrow strip of firm ground between the beach and the swamps, about three-quarters of a mile north of the mouth of the MARALI RIVER. This weapon is probably sited to cover the northern approach to the enemy's main concentration in this area in the vicinity of RASSIS. At RASSIS Nos. 1 and 2, there are believed to be about thirty men manning earthworks, while at RASSIS No. 3 there is a large body of troops camped on either side of a small creek a short distance from the coast. An outpost on the high ground about seven or eight hundred yards to the south is manned by approximately ten men. An observation post fitted with a large telescope is located on CAPE DINGA, with an extensive view up and down the coast.

The Japs in this area are said to exist mainly on sago which they make for themselves. On this diet it is not likely that they would be in very good condition.

MISSINI

There has been no contact made with the enemy in this area, but our patrols have been active acquiring information. One patrol towards MAILOLO reports that there was no sign of any recent movement on the track HOUE-MAILOLO. Friendly natives said that there were only ten Japs in the whole area. Five Japs at MAILOLO watch over the track from HOUE by day. The ASINI natives are said to be pro-Jap and in addition to working for them, watch the track on their behalf. BOEDUBI RIDGE was covered by another patrol, and although no movement was seen in LITTLE EUIRALI CREEK, there was evidence of the occupation of GWAIBOLON. Smoke was seen coming from our old HQ site on BOEDUBI RIDGE about 1800 yards west of the KOMIATUM-BOEDUBI-SALAMAU track junction. The enemy occupy further positions on the track along the river between NEW and OLD BOEDUBI, although NEW BOEDUBI is reported clear of enemy.

SALAMAU

A considerable amount of movement continues to be centred about the quarry, where 150 men were observed on 25 June, in and around a large hut.

MARKEHAM

Movement has been constantly seen on the NEW LAEU island which is evidently the terminus for canoe traffic up the MARKEHAM. The enemy appears to have a camp in the village of NEW LAEU. The increasing activity of the Japanese north of the MARKEHAM has been again forcibly demonstrated by the death of another of our patrol officers. The party of two officers and several police boys was fired on by the Japs at CHIVASING, one officer being shot. The remainder of the patrol scattered and made their way safely to the southern bank of the river. The CHIVASING natives are stated to have co-operated with the Japs in the hunting down of our patrol. These natives have apparently influenced their "one talks" at GABENSIS as a late report states that these natives have "gone bush". A report was brought back from north of the river that the enemy has constructed a road from BOANA to KAIAPIT through the foothills via ENOK and WARTOAT. The patrol which left BOANA on 30 May for KAIAPIT followed this route. The road is believed to be for the transport of artillery. As this country is fairly rough and much more difficult for road making than the floor of the valley, it is difficult to understand its choice, unless a more easily protected stretch was required.

RAINY-MARKHAM

Although it was reported that the enemy had left KALAPIT in the direction of IAE on 15 June, the most recent information is that they were still there and at SANGAI on 17 June. The KALAPIT airfield has already been marked out for extension, and the construction of additional accommodation near the mission has commenced.

(b) Enemy

BARGE ACTIVITY

Twelve to fourteen barges were sighted at SALAMAGA on 21 June, and at 1512 hours 23 June, a large pinnace or schooner was reported to be unloading heavy stores at the jetty on the north side of the ISTEMUS.

Night searches continue to locate barges moving along the coast to FINSCHHAFFEN. Other sightings in the vicinity of CAPE GLOUCESTER strengthen the belief that ROCK Island is being used as a stepping stone to NEW GUINEA.

On night 16/17 June, a total of over thirty barges was seen between FINSCHHAFFEN and FORTIFICATION POINT, eighteen miles to the north. It is impossible to obtain details of their contents, but aircraft crews reported that although some of the barges were covered with tarpaulins, others were two-thirds loaded with boxes and probably carried personnel also. This permits an estimate of about 15 tons of stores per barge.

At 0710 hours 19 June, three large barges and many small craft were observed in HANISCH Harbour. A few minutes later a concentration of seventeen was reported at TAMI Island off Cape CRETIN.

Of special significance was the sighting at 2310 hours 20 June of four sixty foot barges near LAGUNEN Point, just south of Cape GLOUCESTER. They were heavily loaded and on a course of 245 degrees. On being attacked by our aircraft, they defended themselves with AA fire.

SUBMARINES

Sightings have been made of submarines going south off Cape ORFORD on 19, 20 and 21 June. The submarine seen on 19 June carried a deck cargo forward, and a bulky cargo or deck housing, probably filled with stores, astern. This is the second time in ten days that such loading has been observed.

A total of only 7000 tons of merchant shipping entered WEMAK for the week ending 23 June, a decrease from the quantity over recent weeks. At RABUL on 19 June, photos revealed twenty-three merchant ships with a total of 107,500 tons. The enemy may wish to keep a reserve of merchant shipping in the SWPA in order to meet an emergency, or for future plans, but apart from these reasons it is difficult to understand why 100,000 tons have for so many months been tied up in RABUL HARBOUR. The number of warships has increased by eleven to twenty-five over those reported last week.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 127)

(c) AIR OWN

MOBO

BOSTONS again attacked the KITCHEN and STONY CREEK area on 21 June, following up with the track between CREAM HILL and the PIMPLE the next day. Again on 22 June, four BOSTONS were over the area, bombing and strafing WOODY ISLAND and tracks in the vicinity.

SALAMAGA

On 20 and 21 June SALAMAGA was the target for four BOSTONS and ten MITCHELLS respectively. A further attack on 21 June was carried out by seventeen MITCHELLS bombing and strafing LOHAI village and the area south of the PRANESIO. Mines were started

and a cloud of black smoke was seen to rise from the target area. The footbridge at the mouth of the river was partly destroyed.

LAE-MALAHANG

LAE airfield was bombed and strafed on 20 June by nine BOSTONS. One serviceable fighter was strafed on the ground and a large fire was started.

Twelve BOSTONS on 21 June bombed and strafed LAE and MALAHANG airfields. At LAE five aircraft were strafed on the runway, and a hit was scored on two huts at the NW end of the runway. Fires were started at MALAHANG.

HANISCH HARBOUR

Five BOSTONS bombed and strafed five beached barges in HANISCH HARBOUR on 20 June. Some bombs fell in TAMIGUDU village but results were not observed.

BARGE TRAFFIC

Nightly searches for barges have been carried out by MITCHELLS and BOSTONS along the north coast of NEW GUINEA and extending to NEW BRITAIN.

INTERCEPTION

Thirteen MITCHELLS on 21 June, intercepted eight enemy medium bombers, and thirty enemy fighters in the LAE-MALAHANG area. Fourteen enemy fighters are claimed destroyed and nine probably destroyed. All our aircraft returned safely.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 127)

ENEMY

BENA BENA

The offensive against BENA BENA was continued on 19 June when an unknown number of enemy aircraft dropped sixty 500 lb HE bombs together with several of an anti-personnel type. Twenty-three hits were scored on the airfield, which however, was quickly made serviceable again. The village was hit twenty-six times; no casualties have been reported. On 21 June and 25 June reconnaissance aircraft were again over this area.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 127)

LAE

The LAE airfield continues to be used as a staging post at which reconnaissance planes usually refuel in order to give them greater time over the area. When enemy fighters are active it is quite usual for a number of them to use this field. Owing to the frequent periods without observation it is difficult to determine whether enemy aircraft are based permanently on LAE but the indications are that it is used mainly as an advanced refuelling base and emergency landing ground.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB

DUALI-NASSAU BAY

Reports from a fairly reliable source have just been received concerning the Japanese in the DUALI-NASSAU BAY area. Their strength was estimated to be about 350, but it is thought that this is a maximum figure. It is the first reliable estimate, however, since January of this year. Physical condition is probably low since it is known that locally produced sago forms the main part of their

LURO-KOMIATUM

It has now been established that 2 Bn 65 Regt carried out the attack on our position on LAPASIA RIDGE on 21 June. A captured sketch map shows 4 Company on the enemy's right flank forward of the PIMPLE while 3 Company is known to have been in the front line fighting.

An operation order of 1 Bn makes no mention of 2 Company and it is, therefore, probable that this Company had been allotted a separate task.

The sketch map showed 6 and 7 Companies on OBSERVATION HILL, 6 Company being on the "right high point". 8 Bn, which is known to be in the area has evidently been given the responsibility for the OBSERVATION HILL area.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS

- (a) Documents captured on LABABIA RIDGE on 21 June identify 66 Inf Regt with 1 and 8 Bns in the MUBO area. A company War Diary and other papers indicate that this force arrived at FINSOMAFEN by planes, submarines and destroyers during April and May. After concentrating at TEREXO they moved down the coastal road for IAE. The trip to the SALANAU area, probably MALOLO, was made by landing barge.
- (b) A diary captured from a party of three Japs proceeding north along the MUBO-KOMIATUM track verified the theory that 102 Regt had been relieved in the MUBO area.

5. EQUIPMENT

Japanese Type "94" (1934) Mountain Gun

Under a scheme for revision of armaments begun by the Japanese in 1935, a new 75 mm mountain gun, referred to as type 94, was to be issued to mountain artillery units. The weapon with which they were at that time equipped, the type 41 (1908 model) was to be released to Infantry Regiments for close support purposes. This policy was partially carried out, and the type 41 has since become known as the "Regimental Gun". That the changeover is still incomplete, even at this late stage, is however indicated by evidence from captured documents that certain mountain artillery units operating in SWPA are still equipped with the old type 41. Characteristics of the 75 mm mountain gun are as follows:

Calibre	75 mm (2.95 in)
Length of barrel	156 cm (61.4 in)
Traverse	38 degrees
Elevation	750 mls (42 degrees)
Depression	210 mls (12 degrees)
Breech	Horizontal sliding block
Overall length	386 cm (151.9 in)
Total weight	1800 lbs (estimated)
Trail	Split; 106 in. long; each leg in two sections held together by quick release clamp.
Shield	Removable; in two sections.
Wheels	.5 mm (approx. 1/10 in) steel.
Range (estimated)	Diameter 36 in. wooden spokes and felloes, iron reinforced; iron rims. 9/10000 yards.

Construction is simple and designed for pack transport. A system of single action clamps enable rapid assembly.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 127)

TACTICS

Enemy booby traps, one of which was set off by our patrol in the area south of KOMIATUM on 16 June, were found to be constructed with the British 36 M type grenades. Some were laid under dead branches lying on and near the track, while two were set using a pair of boots and a steel helmet.

PART V

SECURITY

Correspondence

A considerable amount of doubt appears to exist regarding what can be included in private correspondence, particularly with regard to operations and air raids.

The following are extracts from HCF "Censorship Instruction No. 1", which should clear up any misunderstanding.

- "2. Personnel who have been in action and have therefore been permitted to mention that they are in NEW GUINEA must NOT give any indication of the actual location of their unit in the NEW GUINEA area.

4. Air Raids

No indication of damage or casualties caused by air raids is permissible until after the release of the official communiqué, and discussion must conform to the text of the communiqué. It is also desirable to quote radio news when referring to air raids in order to prevent the inference that the writer's source of information is from personal observation, which would identify the location of the unit. The precaution is also necessary to avoid deletion by civilian censorship in AUSTRALIA.

5. Letters should NOT refer to the writer having visited a particular place. The enemy's knowledge of the country would convey to him that the writer's unit was located in proximity to the place mentioned.

6. No mention will be made of casualties by name until at least five weeks after such casualties have taken place.

7. Details of operations, own or enemy, or results thereof, must NOT be mentioned. Personnel may, however, state in general terms, where applicable, that our operations were successful and that the enemy has been pushed back, but no mention of localities or place names to be made. Care should also be taken to ensure that such statements are authentic.

Maps in Forward Areas

While it is essential that maps must be distributed as widely as practicable, in order to obtain the maximum benefit from them, care must be taken in the forward areas that they are not allowed to fall into enemy hands.

Maps of this area produced before the war, and therefore available to the enemy, were extremely poor.

Further, it does not appear that the enemy has mapped his forward areas to any great extent. With the maps that have been produced since operations started, and which will be produced in the future, our forces undoubtedly possess far more accurate topographical information than the enemy. Therefore, it is most essential that we should keep this information from the enemy and thereby maintain our advantage in this respect.

When maps are sent into the forward areas, it is suggested that, in addition to ensuring that no information of value to the enemy is marked on them, only that portion of the map which is essential should be taken. A further suggestion is that the map should be cut into portions which could be distributed to several persons in the same party, thereby lessening the danger of capture. It is more economic, in the long run, to possibly spoil a few maps by cutting them up, than to risk the handing of such valuable information to the enemy.

15-001
G3 5 Aust Div

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EULOLO Fld Defs	
Sta Comd EULOLO	12
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ANGAU (MURKHAM district)	21
Air Support Control 5 AF	22
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S ANDST DIV INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 9.

Compiled from information received up to 1200 hrs 20 Jun 45.

PART I.

1. GENERAL.

A significant increase in enemy strength in the MUBO area has occurred in the period under review. It is considered that at least one battalion was moved into the line, and that the enemy now has a force of two fresh battalions forward in the MUBO - KOTIATUM area.

Much has been written of the Japanese consolidation along the NE coast of NEW GUINEA. This is now followed by evidence of the enemy's intention to exploit southwards along the overland route linking MADANG and LAE. As the Allied occupation of the BENA-BENA plateau rather jeopardizes the fulfillment of this plan, action to remove the threat is a natural consequence.

Definite proof has now been obtained of the old and well-founded theory that submarines are being used to ferry supplies. Shipping, however, continues to arrive in WAKAR at the rate of about 20,000 tons in a week.

Intensification of reconnaissance flights and small raids in the BENA-BENA area was followed by a large scale attack on 14 Jun.

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) LAND

MUBO-KOTIATUM.

The main feature of enemy activity in this area during the period under review has been the movement of troops backwards and forwards across the BITOI, at the northern end of WOODY ISLAND. A total of 92 Japs moved from east to west across the river between 11 and 13 Jun. While 104 moved in the opposite direction, over the same period. This movement is probably accounted for by the relief and reorganisation of forward positions. Our artillery was quick to register this target and has successfully dispersed several parties, with unknown casualties. Further indications have been received of the strengthening of the enemy's posts on LABARIA RIDGE, our standing patrols and listening posts having a close network around the enemy positions. Activity has not exceeded previous limits except at a point approximately 600 yards east of the PILE, where sounds of chopping indicate the preparation of a further defended post. One of our patrols which spent the night 15/16 Jun near the enemy positions reported that there was activity only during the morning and in the late afternoon. There were no sounds heard during the night.

The following two men entered an enemy position along the Jap track and fired on them as they were sitting round a fire. Nine enemy were believed killed or wounded.

SALAMUA-KOTIATUM L OF C.

Enemy activity on this track has been on a vastly increased scale compared to the lull of the preceding period. On 15 and 16 Jun a total 658 Japs were seen moving south while 58 moved towards SALAMUA. From 22 May to 18 Jun a total of

1470 Japs has been observed moving towards ITTO while over the same period 550 have moved north. It appears evident now that the two battalions of 102 Regt which were known to have taken part in the attack on LABADIA RIDGE early in May, have been relieved by fresh troops. The scale of movement of troops south reached two definite high points, the first from 1 to 5 Jun and the second on 15, 16 Jun. It is probable that the relieving force consists of two battalions of at least 700 men each, and in this case; the two high points in the movement would probably represent passing of the two main bodies.

The absence of movement of coolies observed along the track is extraordinary as it would be highly improbable that such a force could be maintained without the use of carriers.

Under the present conditions of moonlight nights it would be possible to move by night, thereby escaping observation.

DUALI - NASSAU BAY.

A reconnaissance patrol along the south bank of the BITOI SOUTH ARM on 8 Jun was fired on from the enemy ambush position covering the track about one mile from the coast. One of our patrol, an officer, was shot and believed killed while the other member was chased by the Japs for some distance to the west. In addition to LFGs the enemy were stated to have opened up with a heavy mortar.

A patrol to the north of BITOI NORTH ARM encountered some natives on a track leading to LAKE SALUS. The natives said there were no Japs in SALUS village and that the enemy had moved to BASIL after our air attacks on DUALI. A track was also discovered leading round the western shores of LAKE SALUS and apparently down to the coast to the north of the lake.

MISSIM.

Movement of small groups of enemy has been frequently observed on BOEDUBI RIDGE, specially in the vicinity of the coconut grove. Our patrols report that GWAIOLON is also occupied by the enemy, while on 16 Jun 6 Japs were reported in ORODUBI. Further positions along the ridge between OFODUBI and OLD BOEDUBI are also believed to be occupied. One of our patrols on 16 Jun ran into enemy booby traps near the KOHTATUM - MUBO track where it crosses the BUIRALI BUIGAP divide. Some of our patrol received wounds in the legs.

SALAMATA.

Considerable movement has taken place in the quarry area and it is thought that there may be a dump of some description located on its western side. There have been a few parties observed moving across the footbridge at the mouth of the FRANCISCO, the largest movement being on 10 Jun when 161 figures moved south carrying loads and 134 returned empty-handed. The following day our bombers destroyed the greater part of the footbridge, but the enemy had repairs under way the same day and on 12 Jun it was in use again. pontoons appear to have been used in effecting the repairs.

Very little can be deduced from the movement of small parties across the river mouth, as their destination may be KUBO or merely the dumps on the south bank.

MARKHAM.

A sketch of the MARKHAM POINT area showing the Japanese positions is attached as Appendix "A".

The enemy appears again to be building up his strength in this area, while our patrols have kept a close watch on his activities. On 14 Jun 55 men with stores crossed from the south bank of the MARKHAM to the island on which are situated the two LAU LAGU villages at approximately 579429, ref map HADZAB 1 inch to 1 mile. This trip was made three times in all, stores being carried on each occasion. The men remained on the island after the third trip. Two days later a patrol of 6 Japs was ambushed 1000 yards west of DEEP CREEK three of the enemy being wounded. /found A later examination that all the booby traps laid by our troops west of DEEP CREEK had been deloused, apparently by this Jap patrol.

On 19 Jun a patrol, of one officer and three ORs, east of DEEP CREEK to MARKHAM POINT found that all our booby traps laid along the cliff face at MARKHAM POINT had been removed. An enemy patrol, strength estimated at fifteen, was encountered. The Japs opened up with two or three LMGs and 1 MG forcing our troops to withdraw, leaving one OR missing.

Further identification obtained from captured documents it appears likely that the body of troops withdrawn from MARKHAM POINT on 15 May as reported by native informants, were moved to SALAMUA and formed the enemy party which pushed through to HOTE and CLIFFTOP on 20 May. A further native report is that on 11 Jun, 300 Japs crossed the river to MARKHAM POINT. This number appears to be an exaggeration, and their expressed intention of going to COMBIS may easily contain little truth.

Canoe movement up the MARKHAM may well have some bearing on the removal of enemy activity in this area. Three on 15 Jun six canoes moved up the river using sails and the sighting of canoes at the mouth of the MARKHAM and in LAU LAGOON has become a common occurrence. What appeared to be a power driven boat with masts was seen on 17 Jun off MARKHAM POINT.

Enemy reconnaissance aircraft have shown interest in our positions at both WAMPIT and LT NGARAHENO. On 12 and 17 Jun reconnaissance aircraft made runs over both these places between 600 and 2000 ft. Early on the morning of 18 Jun an aircraft fired two bursts at the OP on LT NGARAHENO.

On the northern bank of the MARKHAM there are signs of increasing enemy activity. What appears to be an observation post in the form of a pole with a platform on it has been erected on the north bank of the river opposite BWARIP. A native rumour that the Japs have field guns in this area is supported by the sighting of earth works approximately 3000 yards north of the suspected OP. Three or four huts are reported to be in the trees nearby. A patrol, however, which inspected the HADZAB and NARAKOPOR ELG's on 17/18 Jun saw no signs of activity, other than a set of wheel tracks leaving from near the river's edge 25 yards into the bush. The tracks, which were thought to be four to six days old, were 38 inches apart and the width of the treads about 2 1/2 inches. These dimensions fit in with those of the Japanese 70mm Battalion Gun.

A native report that a party of 200 Japs left HATH'S half of them bound for GABMATZING and half for CHIVASING followed a story that the enemy had LT NGARAHENO under observation and would bomb WAMPIT. Natives have also been returning from north of the MARKHAM with tales of large concentrations of Japs being built up in LAE, from reinforcements brought in by submarines. No doubt there is some fire beneath this smoke, but it is also quite probable that the enemy has been indulging in the spreading of a little propaganda.

RETA BENA.

Our reconnaissance patrol, states that the enemy has a force of about fifty at WESA and is in strength at WAIWERIEA. Estimation of these numbers is almost impossible, as the natives are definitely pro-Jap and give away our patrols. Large native parties under Jap control are burning off large areas on both sides of the RAMU. The crews of aircraft which strafed KAIAPIT on 15 Jun report that burning off was in progress there too. Stacks of rifles and native huts in the course of destruction were also observed at KAIAPIT. Reliable natives from ONGA, however, state that the Japs had left KAIAPIT in the direction of LAE on 15 Jun.

RAU.

There is a native report that large enemy patrols from the RAI COAST have crossed the FIHISTERRES and now have their HQ in the area south of the GUSAP RIVER. A report of an enemy base at GLALICOO (RAMU strat WJ1402) is in conformity with reports received about 8 May that bases were to be found at ICCI and KULAU which are in the same vicinity.

(b) SEA - Enemy.

NEW BRITAIN.

At 0015 hrs on 15 Jun a 5,000 ton unidentified vessel was sighted 45 miles SSW of CAPE ORFORD, course due west.

NEWIRAK

A convoy of five merchant vessels totalling 20,000 tons reached NEWIRAK on the night of 9/10 Jun, discharged their cargo and had left by 0945 K/11.

RARAU.

On 15 Jun forty-four vessels were sighted in the harbour totalling 125,000 tons of merchant shipping. This is an increase of eight merchant vessels and 40,000 tons on the last report.

SUBMARINE ACTIVITY.

From 1-15 Jun inclusive, there have been eight sightings of submarines passing CAPE ORFORD, and with one exception all have conformed to the approximate schedule suggested in EC FORCE WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 131. One of these, which at 1745 hrs 10 Jun was travelling close inshore on a southerly course, was observed to be carrying a large deck cargo. Drums were stacked forward, and other cargo was stowed around the conning tower and astern. One submarine was sighted off CAPE ORFORD on 11 Jun, and another thirty-five miles S. of GUSAP two days later. It is possible that the enemy are using a special supply type of submarine which has a displacement of 2,500 tons.

BOAT ACTIVITY.

Natives have stated that barges from LAE reach RARAU RAY daily at dawn, and depart for LAE at dusk. RARAU RAY is known to be a large supply and personnel base, and is an important link in the chain of staging points between LAE and LAE.

On the night of 13 Jun, during the course of a special search for enemy traffic along the coast of NEW BRITAIN, six loaded barges were sighted six miles south of NEWIRAK, moving south. The next night, three barges, also loaded, were seen beached



ДТ - ОД.

FILED - KODIAK, ALASKA

NUCO - KOMIATUE.
Early on 15 Jun five DOCTORS bombed and strafed KOMIATUE and the track on either side of the village. Again on 16 Jun six DOCTORS bombed and strafed enemy positions in the BUICAP CALEK area while on 18 Jun two DOCTORS together with four BLAUGHTERS attacked enemy positions in KITCHEN and STONY CALEK with great accuracy.

Abstract

Fourteen B-26s on 11 Jun bombed and strafed the bridge at the
SAN FRANCISCO River mouth, and stores at HUK HUK and KILA Point. A
direct hit and two near misses were scored on the bridge, and a
large fire with black smoke was started at the north end of
CHILTON.

PLIST IN BOMB.

On 15 Jun, three BEAUFIGHTERS strafed European buildings and numerous huts in the ELAFIT area, and three BEAUFIGHTERS attacked sheds, huts and native villages in the vicinity of BOANA. On morning 16 Jun, five BEAUFIGHTERS again strafed BOANA.

REBUTL.

Airfields in the KARAIUL area have received the full weight of several concentrated attacks. On 10, 11, 13, 15 and 19 Jun formations of up to twenty two heavy bombers attacked causing considerable damage.

NORTH COAST OF NEW GUINEA.

on 12 and 13 Jun single MITCHELLS and on the night of 16/17 Jun two BOSTONS and two MITCHELLS attacked barge traffic around the eastern shore of the EUON Peninsula from Cape Gairdner to FORTIFICATION POINT. Four barges were destroyed and many damaged. A search on night 17/18 Jun was unsuccessful, but the following night two MITCHELLS bombed and strafed three power launches ten miles off FRODOCHAMBERN at 1945 hrs.

FILICIEL-FIL

At 1250 hrs 17 Jun six HITCHHICKS took off to attack a 500/1000 ton ship reported at FIDUCIA FEN but were unable to locate the target.

MR - JURY,

5111-2-11.

Reconnaissance flights and small ineffective raids were followed up by full scale raids on 14 and 16 Jun. The first was carried out by twenty seven medium bombers and thirty fighters. At BANA BANA the administration B' were demolished and a quantity of rations and other supplies destroyed. Sixteen medium bombers and twenty - two fighters attacked BANA BANA and ASALOKA on 16 Jun, dropping BR and incendiary bombs. Casualties for both these raids were two CR wounded.

WISC. FILM. BU.

Reconnaissance on 12 Jun was carried out over MAU at 1112 hrs by four OSCARS while a single aircraft investigated our L of C at BALLIS and circled GUAYMASAL and UEO. At 0830 hrs on 12 Jun a reconnaissance air craft circled

RECONNAISSANCE twice and at 1525 hrs two air craft went over M. J. T. T.

Further activity took place on 17 Jun. Four dive bombers ineffectually dive bombed GUADAGUAI and low runs were made over DIA, M. J. T. T. and NGALUKING. At 0715 hrs the next morning two bursts were fired from a low flying air craft at the CP on NGALUKING.

Heavy air activity on 20 Jun was on a greatly increased scale. Two heavy attacks were made on our forward areas, the first on M. J. T. T. at 1050 hrs and the second on GUADAGUAI at 1530 hrs. In addition isolated spasmodic attacks were made by single air craft during the day. Nineteen OBOARDS were over M. J. T. T. at 1050 hrs followed by seven LILYS at 1200 hours which bombed M. J. T. T. and the M. J. T. T. L of C from 10,000 ft.

Observations of air craft landing and taking off at L. J. airfield indicate that the planes which carry out the reconnaissance flights over this area refuel at L. J. before and after carrying out their mission.

Apart from the above heavy air activity has been confined to light and ineffective raids on DOLOCHUA, PORT ROSELEY. A float plane flying slowly at a low height appears to make a regular nightly search of the coastline between L. J. and DOUGLAS HARBOR.

(Adapted from IGF Weekly
Intelligence Summary 135)

PART II.

1. M. J. T. T. COE.

INTEC ROSELEY.

In view of the fact that since 23 May a total of 1450 Japs has been observed moving up to this area, the estimate of 1500 troops in this area has been increased to 1500. It is still considered that this represents a force of two battalions but the total strength may be greater in view of the possibility of movement being unobserved.

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

(a) Translation of markings on a tree at M. J. T. T. revealed the inscription "ROSELEY M. J. T. T. 15 May 45". This was no doubt the party which made a reconnaissance of the M. J. T. T. area at the first M. J. T. T. point on 19 and 20 May.

(b) Writing on the end of a page torn from a German magazine found on the M. J. T. T. track 15 Jun revealed "1070 2204" refers to 115 Regt, but the name of the company commander DAKADA is not recorded.

A portion of a no-name form found with the above gave the names "Lieut. T. J. T." and "2nd Lieut. B. J. T.". T. J. T. has been identified as commander of 10 Coy 3 Bn 115 Regt, and a letter addressed to a number of his company was found at M. J. T. T. on 23 May. This reference to both T. J. T. and B. J. T. has been found in the M. J. T. T. as well as the M. J. T. T. area. From the above it seems probable that the force which was at M. J. T. T. on 20 May was intended to take part in the push to M. J. T. T. on 20 May. This agrees with the native story of the evacuation of M. J. T. T. and the movement of a body of Japs down the coastal track to M. J. T. T. about 15 May. It is possible that this force is a company composed of various survivors from the M. J. T. T. Convoy and under the command of T. J. T.

(c) Translations just completed of documents captured after the M. J. T. T. attack have revealed the presence in M. J. T. T. of 6 and 7 Independent Engineer Detachments with an estimated

combined strength of 450.

(RCF Weekly Intelligence Summary 123.)

5. RESULT.

JAPANESE TRACER MORTAR.

Characteristics and details of this mortar were extracted from a captured Japanese note book. Details are unverified and reliability can not be stated.

Model	:	"94" (1254)
Calibre	:	9.35 mm (5.56 in)
Weight	:	160 kg (352.8 lb)
Range Minimum	:	120 metres (131 yds)
Maximum	:	2800 metres (4157 yds)
Rate of fire	:	20 rpm
Weight of projectile	:	5.2 kg (11.4 lb)

Six secondary charges, each weighing 14 grs, are housed in the tail unit of the bomb. Three secondary charges are used for ranges between 450 and 2,250 metres.

(JMF Intelligence Review No 43.)

JAPANESE ARMY BADGES.

Attached as Appendix "B" are illustrations of Japanese Army Badges.

(JMF Intelligence Review No 43.)

JAPANESE 70 MM MORTAR TYPE BOMBING SIGNAL.

Recent examination of one of those shells revealed the following information.

1. General Description.

A cylindrical steel shell casing 10 1/2 inches in length with a diameter of 2 4/5 inches. This container is painted black with a red band 3/8" wide below the wooden plug.

The container is divided into three sections.

(a). Base section - with central percussion cap containing propellant charge.

(b). Central section - delay train and charges for expelling the cylindrical containers.

(c). Top section, in which there are packed 7 cylindrical containers each holding 1 missile.

Inside the shell there are 18 parachutes

1 of silk 12" in diameter for the shell casing.

7 of silk 4 1/2" square, one for each container.

1 of paper 15" in diameter, one for each missile.

2. Action when fired.

This is divided into four phases.

(a). Shell is fired from mortar, setting the base train in action.

(b). When the shell is nearly at the end of the upward flight, a second explosion takes place expelling the 7 cylindrical containers each with the base train ignited. Attached to each is the small square parachute exerting an offset pull which has the effect of dispersing the containers.

At the same time the large silk parachute attached to the shell case opens out thus checking its flight and prevents any interference with the cylindrical containers.

(c). The charge in the base of each cylindrical container

explode the missiles with paper parachute attached.
(d). The paper parachute causes the cord to tighten with a jerk, pulling a latch which ignites and explodes the missile.

3. The purpose of this shell is deception rather than anti-personnel effect. Fired over the heads of opposing troops the resultant explosions in their rear would give the impression that the enemy had infiltrated and surrounded them. This shell may be the explanation of some of the stories which emanated from ILLAKA regarding the Japanese habit of letting off crackers behind our lines. The missiles which are finally emitted are most attractively finished with lacquer or lacquer, and written on either side in Jap characters is the warning 'Dangerous, don't touch'. These unusual features suggest that the missile may be used as a hokey trap. The blast of jet if close up being highly dangerous.

(Adapted from IGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 125)

Part III.

PROPOSED ROAD FROM Y AULA TO KAMU RIVER.

Projected Road Y AULA to KAMU RIVER.

Recent reports indicate that the enemy has developed a road suitable for use from Y AULA to KAMU RIVER along the coast to KAMU RIVER, and thence southward to KOGADJIN. Further, late air observations suggest that road construction is being carried out on the first stage of an inland route from KOGADJIN to the KAMU River Valley. The section apparently developed to 1 Jan 48 extended as far as the village of Y AULA, approximately 11/12 miles south of KOGADJIN.

From Y AULA the better known native track to the KAMU River follows a route via KAMU RIVER, KAMU RIVER and KOGADJIN to KAMU RIVER. After leaving Y AULA, the track, three to four feet wide, ascends steeply through dense rain forest (a climb of 1,200 feet) to KAMU RIVER, which is situated on the top of a spur. It traverses that spur and then descends to KAMU RIVER. From KAMU RIVER onward the track narrows slightly and follows a down grade of about 1 in 7 along the 1 ft bank of a stream to KOGADJIN. There is a steep ascent from KOGADJIN and then a fair down-grade through alternating heavy timber and stunted growth to KOGADJIN. Numerous small gullies are crossed in this section but they present little difficulty. The section KOGADJIN to KAMU RIVER follows gradual grades over timbered foothills, crossing numerous small streams which are easily fordable. The timber thin considerably over the latter stages.

KAMU RIVER, situated within the miles of the KAMU River, is an important junction for tracks leading south or toward up the river valley, thence to the KAMU RIVER, and south to KAMU RIVER.

Estimated walking time Y AULA to KAMU RIVER is approximately sixteen hours.

It is considered that improvement of the existing track for jeep traffic would not involve a great deal of work - widening only necessary over some sections. Clearing of secondary growth would be required, over that stage, KOGADJIN to KAMU RIVER.

Steeper gradients would not involve any major engineering problems and the availability of native labour in the area could solve that problem for any projected road construction.

(IGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 126)

Distribution see attached.

Lt-Col
23 5 Aust Div.

3 Aust Div
INT SUMMARY N° 9

Map showing the Markham area, including:

- Markham Pt.
- Kunoi Spur
- Thickly Timbered
- Cliffs
- Ambush posns
- Joe Camp 35 huts
- Razor Back
- Thickly Timbered
- villages
- New Cebu
- Blowed Track
- To Oomsis
- To Koro
- To Koro

Drawn By
Int Sec
HQ 3 Aust Div
20 June 43

Drawn By
Int Sec
HQ 3 Aust Div
20 June 43




BADGES OF JAPANESE ARMY

ARM OR SERVICE












Blue shading represents gold
Red " " " " red

OFFICERS



N.C.O.'s



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3. AUSTRALIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF'S NO. 2

Compiled from information received up to 1800 hrs 10 June 41

RAKUL

1. GENERAL

Patrolling over a wide front by our forward troops has seen the main feature of recent activity. Present indications are that the enemy has completed the relief of his forces in the LMB area, and it is reasonable to assume therefore, that some fresh action on his part will be forthcoming.

In the MANKHEM area there are signs that the enemy has been attempting to cut tracks from MANKHEM POINT through to our left flank.

Further proof has been afforded of the growing disaffection of the natives, and the simultaneous expansion of the enemy's sphere of influence north of the MANKHEM.

There have been no large sightings of sampans, but our small vessels have maintained the flow of supplies and possibly reinforcements to the north coast of the BUKER. There is a reliable report of barges arriving at SALAMBA on the night 21/22 May from RABUL.

Apart from these light raids the only enemy aerial activity has been the continuation of his widespread reconnaissance.

2. OPERATIONS

(a) Land

WEDQ.

Our patrols on this front continue to cover a wide area, but there has been little enemy activity observed other than in the vicinity of his known positions.

A patrol towards the PIMPLE on 6 June lay in an ambush position, from which they could hear Japanese voices all day. About 100 yards further north two camouflaged, five lanes were discovered. This point was about 500 yards south of the PIMPLE. Further patrols to the east of the Jap track, and as far north as the PIMPLE, on 6 June reported seeing no signs of the enemy. However, on 7 June voices were heard within 300 yards of LABARIA OP, and a subsequent search revealed the footprints of two or three Japs. It is possible that this party may have been lost.

An OP on LABARIA RIDGE reports that a bamboo hut is being constructed at the top of BUTCHER TRAIL.

DEALI - NASSAU BAY

One of our patrols proceeding east to view the two ends of the BITOI RIVER, fought their way through difficult jungle to reach the coast about 500 yards south of the mouth of the NORTH ARM. Apart from three sets of enemy footprints leading south along the beach, no enemy movement was seen. Attempts to reach LAKE SALUS from here were frustrated by the impenetrable swamps.

On 4 June a small heavily laden boat was seen to leave from LABARIA ISLAND to DEALI with a crew of two. This occurred at roughly the same time as the similar move reported on 3 June.

MAHAKI - MAHAKI
Since 3 June there has been little movement observed on the track compared with that of the previous period. This may be the result of our drifting south of the track. However, our aircraft have had some effect on the Japs' position, for the only two parties observed since then are on the track and are being followed along the track. On 4 June, 5 June and 6 June were moving southwards the following day, 7 June, and 8 June Japs moved north.
The only other activity on the western side of the track was followed by 50 natives moving north on 4 June.
All this movement suggests the possibility that the Japs are reaching the completion of their march, and will be moving out after the track has been moved to.

MAHAKI
Activity in MAHAKI appears to have increased in the recent tempo. However, a report was received from a native in the MAHAKI area that a number of Japs had been killed on the coast of the MAHAKI area on 4 June and 5 June. This report was received on 7 June having been passed on by the natives.

MAHAKI
Our patrols north from MAHAKI on 4 June reported that the enemy were occupying positions north of MAHAKI in a very strongly held position. The natives on the coast were also reported to be in a very strong position.

MAHAKI
Following upon the discovery on 4 June that the Japs were at MAHAKI, it was reported that the Japs were moving south on the morning of 5 June. Our tracks had not been there the previous night. One of our patrols engaged in a very close fight with the Japs and fired on by one Jap and several rifles.
The same day a patrol set out to examine the track leading to the south and followed a track, also closed, which branched to the west. This track brought them to a point 10 miles east of FISHER POOL, one mile east of GILBERT, where the blazing ended. No footprints were observed, but the Japs were considered to have been done within the preceding movement. There is a further native report concerning the presence of an enemy party north of the MAHAKI area and also in the observation of our troops at MAHAKI. These and sightings in the vicinity of MAHAKI may indicate the preparation on an airfield base.

MAHAKI - MAHAKI
Native reports have been received that a large party of Japs at MAHAKI surprised and killed a patrol officer in a small village in that area on 5 June. This man was well known to the natives in this area, and the evident lack of warning indicates the extent to which the natives are now under Japanese influence.
The enemy party is reported to have arrived at MAHAKI through the FAROS district to the north, and there is a further rumour of troops crossing the MAHAKI from the RAI COAST. It is likely that this party is the one which was reported to have left BONA on 30 May for MAHAKI via the RAI and the LERON. This route is thought to have been previously followed by two patrols which passed through BONA on 28 April and 4 May and FAROS on 4 May and 11 May.
These patrols would account for the constant rumours amongst the natives of enemy troops crossing the MAHAKI from the RAI COAST.
Further, there is no good reason why the enemy should choose this route across mountains 11,000 feet high, when a comparatively track exists round the coast.
easy

BONA AREA
A reconnaissance patrol to BONA has reported that approximately 50 Japs are in occupation.

(b) Sea
Activity

BARGE ACTIVITY

Barge activity between LAI and LAI has been renewed after a lapse of about three weeks. Sightings have been seen at MOC POINT, LAI and NEW LAI. This activity is possibly associated with the reoccupation of the MARKHAM POINT area. Nine barges were reported by a native to have reached SALAMBA on night 28/29 May from KIBALI. Each barge is reported to hold 30 men, but stores up to a total of 100 tons could have been carried by the survey.

During May a large increase in barge activity along the north coast of NEW BRITAIN has been noted compared with operations over the previous three months. From sightings, it is evident that at least 10 MLC launches and barges are in operation and this actual number would most be greatly in excess of this figure.

In the majority of cases barges and launches, when seen, were camouflaged and stationary, in conformity with the usual practice of moving by night and hiding by day.

A significant fact is that during May there have been a number of sightings around the western tip of NEW BRITAIN and around ISLAND. Activity at MARKHAM HARBOR, on the SE side of NEW BRITAIN, suggests that it may be used as a "stopping place" between NEW BRITAIN and NEW GUINEA.

NEW BRITAIN

Small ships are being used from time to time to supplement the flow of barges to the enemy's bases in NEW BRITAIN. On 1 June a small freighter was unloading in PAKANI HARBOR. Destroyers have previously been sighted in positions suggesting that they have visited ANAK and ISLAND. At 0700 hours on 6 June, a similar sighting was made of a destroyer off CAPE ORFORD on its way back to KIBALI.

NE NEW GUINEA

A number of small ships arrived in the WEWAK area during this period under review. Estimated tonnage was a total of 16,000 tons. There is ample evidence of the development of enemy bases along the SEPIR RIVER. As many as five small merchant vessels have recently been sighted inside the mouth of the river, each being well camouflaged with canvas and foliage. It is possible that stores are being unloaded directly at MARKENBERG, the Japanese HQ in this area, or are being unloaded direct into river craft.

(Adapted from RGS Weekly Intelligence Summary 126)

(c) AIR
Sea

MURO-KOMIATUM

Enemy positions on GEMER HILL, in FITCHER CREEK and up BURJAS CREEK were bombed and strafed on 7 June by six B-29s. On the following day six B-29s strafed the track in the vicinity of KOMIATUM.

WEWAK

Airfields at WEWAK and BORAK have been bombed three times during the week, starting several fires.

NADANG-LAI

Single aircraft bombed the airfield at NADANG and LAI on 7 June. They were part of a force of LIBERATORS which were unable to reach WEWAK owing to the weather.

WAW

Sixteen dive-bombers and four fighters attacked WAW airfield on 6 June, between 0930 and 0940 hours. Of approximately 30 bombs dropped only two fell on the runway which was serviceable again within 30 minutes.

One aircraft was hit by fire and when last seen was at a height in the clouds.

LAE
Working parties on the airfield in repair and on 7 June the strip.

MT HAGNEY-BEN
The enemy's activity in the inland area shows no sign of slackening. They have been reported over BENNA BENNA on 3 June, while on 3 and 8 June flights were made over the AINURA region. Another bombing attack, carried out on MT HAGNEY on 4 June, resulted in three hits on the runway. One of these was a direct hit and resulted in a large fire-bomb and started.

1. ENEMY COE

Between 28 May and 31 May, nearly 700 Japs have been observed moving south from MT HAGNEY, while 610 have been seen moving north, many of them apparently walking wounded. The indication is that, having secured his goal, the enemy has replaced his troops in the forward area. Estimates of the number of survivors given in Summary No. 5 were arrived at after deducting figures for wounded. It is considered that these troops will be fit to rejoin their units, and must therefore be included in the estimate. It appears that in addition, the strength in the forward area has been built up. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the enemy has approximately the same number of troops available as prior to his offensive a month ago.

MURO - BOHIANCHI	
Two battalions	1500
BOHIANCHI	
One battalion	500

The 500 survivors of the BISMARCK SEA convoy, reported in the last summary to have arrived at LAE, had already been taken into account in the assumed building up of 100 Regt. The figure for LAE is therefore unaffected.

In view of the probability of further troops arriving in LAE and SALAMUDA, the estimated increase in strength of the forward units has not been deducted from the figures for LAE and SALAMUDA. Consequently upon the identification at LAE of 3rd Inf Regt, a further 700 has been tentatively added to the estimate as at 4 May, bringing the total to 5,100. Distribution of enemy strength is therefore estimated to be:-

MURO - BOHIANCHI	1500
BOHIANCHI	500
LAE	500
SALAMUDA	2000
LAE	500
	<u>5100</u>
	7000

2. IDENTIFICATIONS

Further documents captured at KANHAM POINT reveal the presence of 3rd Inf Regt. This unit which has been suspected at LAE for some time, belongs to 5 Div, which took part in the drive against SINGAPORE. Other units of this division are believed to be spread in various detachments over the MT HAGNEY sector.

4. ORGANIZATION

MARSHAM CONSTRUCTION TAI

Under command of Col KOROYAMA, the following units formed the above at end of Feb 43 :-

3 Bn 51 Inf Regt
3 Debarcation Coy
One Pl 40 Sea Lattice Coy
One Pl 105 Sea Lattice Coy

This arrangement may have been only temporary, but since 3 Bn 51 Inf Regt has not been involved in action so far, the organisation may still exist. The role of this unit was the construction of an operational and debarcation road in the vicinity of TAI in readiness for the arrival of the balance of 51 Div early in March.

(Adapted from New Weekly Intelligence Summary 195)

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<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Cost Pcs</u>
15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF)	1 - 3
17 Aust Inf Bde	4 - 6
2/7 Aust Inf Bn	7
24 Aust Inf Bn	8
1 Bty S/1 Aust Fa Regt	
2/8 Aust GTF Bty	9
136 Aust Lt AA Bty	10
WAD Fm Bty	
6th Ccmd, WAD	11
EULOLO Fm Bty	
6th Ccmd EULOLO	12
11 Fighter Control Sub-sector	13
705 OA (AA) Bty US Army	14
2AS 3 Aust Div (AIF)	15
Sigs 3 Aust Div	16
A250 3 Aust Div (AIF)	17
2/9 Aust Fa Amb	18
3 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	19
ANGAI (MARSHAM District)	20
Air Support Control 5 AF	21
ALO A Fl & AC Bn	22
MOF	23
Air Support Sec A & AC Bn 5 AF MOROSES	24
41 US Div	25
BHNA Force	26
2 Aust Corps	27
4 Aust Inf Bde	28
Comd	29
3rd L Cpl	30
ADM3, ADM3, ADM3	31
File	32 - 33
War Diary	34
Spare	35 - 36

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of Battalion HQ.

PAGE 4

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3 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 5 June 43.

PAGE 1

1. GENERAL.

Activity on the SALAMUA MOUNTAIN of C has been observed in both directions on an increased scale. The indications now are that the enemy is engaged in relieving his forward troops. Apart from a faint notice of aggression on the enemy's part on LAEBIA RIDGE, there is no change in the land front. Our patrols have been active covering a wide area.

Information has been received from an observer who was in the HELLSBACH area, that a number of survivors, estimated at 800, from the HIRAKA SHIP CONVOY reached LAE.

The enemy is taking advantage of bad weather conditions to land troops and supplies on the NE coast of NEW BRITAIN. At the same time a large increase in activity has been noted in the BUKA PASS area.

Continued sightings of submarines off the southern coast of NEW BRITAIN indicate that a regular ferry service has been inaugurated for the purpose of bringing supplies to LAE and SALAMUA.

The discovery of two new airfields in the HIRAKA ARCHIPELAGO, gives a further indication of the rapidity with which the enemy is developing his potential air strength in the SWPA. Heavy air activity, however, has been confined to sporadic reconnaissance and a few light raids.

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) LAND

MUBO.

Our patrols during the last week have been very active, covering the enemy's front and a large area on his flanks.

On LAEBIA RIDGE a strong enemy ambush position has been located approximately 400 yds south of the PIRPIS. Sounds of chopping and voices consistently heard indicate that the enemy is preparing further fixed defenses forward of the PIRPIS.

The enemy 70 mm gun has been fairly active during the week, firing on the VICKERS RIDGE area and junction of BUKA RIVER and BUKA CREEK.

On OBSERVATION HILL sounds of digging and scrub grubbing have also been heard, and the enemy ambush position on this feature was found occupied on 23 May.

On 2 Jun a patrol returned from the BUKA RIDGE, having observed the enemy L of C up the BUKA CREEK for two hours without seeing any movement. They report that this feature is extremely steep and rugged.

DUALI - NASSAU BAY.

In this area there has been little activity. Heavy movement was observed on the BUKA SOUTH ARM about one mile from the coast, and on the north side of the SOUTH ARM opposite the former ambush position near the native gardens two miles from the coast. Chopping was also heard at the latter position.

Aerial reconnaissance on 30 May saw no sign of activity either Japanese or native over the whole area.

Our patrols have been active in this area. On 27 May one returned from down the high ground in the junction of the BUKA

ARMED south to a feature west of NASSAU BAY. No signs of enemy were seen other than a message form which was found. Another patrol proceeded along the south bank of the BIRNI NORTH ARM, breaking bush to the coast. Three sets of enemy foot-prints were seen leading towards DUALI. Attempts to break bush to DUALI and SALUS were unsuccessful.

There has been some slight movement observed at LABASTIA ISLAND. A total of four small craft approached the island carrying up to six or eight men. On 4 Jun a small boat, heavily laden, moved to DUALI with a crew of two.

SALAMAUA - KOMIATUM L of C.

The enemy appears again to be moving up supplies and reinforcements to the WUBO area. The intense activity at the mouth of the FRANCISCO RIVER has been followed by considerable movement of both troops and carriers along the track to KOMIATUM. From 27 May to 5 Jun, 5-17 Japs have been seen moving south to KOMIATUM, while 251 have been observed moving in the opposite direction. There is apparently a party of 12 who do escort duty with the carrier lines, for they have been observed several times moving both south and north. Many of the enemy returning north have been noticed limping and three were seen on crutches. It is evident that the enemy is carrying out a large scale relief, and possible strengthening, of his forward troops. It is thought to be no more than a month or six weeks since 102 Regt arrived in the WUBO area, but they must have been badly cut about in the subsequent fighting. Six weeks is about the maximum period for which a unit can be kept in the front line under these conditions. In three days up to 2 Jun, there were 250 boy loads observed to have been carried south, while doubtless there has been a considerable amount of movement which has not been observed. Only a small portion of the track about half a mile north of KOMIATUM can be observed. An examination of the times at which parties have been seen passing this point, shows that on an average, Jap parties arrive at 1400 hrs. From this it would appear probable that the carrier line stages the night at KOMIATUM.

SALAMAUA.

Further movement of bodies of troops has been observed at the mouth of the FRANCISCO RIVER and up to the ISTHEUS. On 29 May 70 Japs were seen to cross the footbridge from south to north. On 2 Jun 55 moved in the same direction while a further 60 moved NE along the ISTHEUS.

These troops may have been returning from the forward area and have been unobserved passing along the track north of KOMIATUM.

A more likely explanation is that they are connected with the two dumps suspected to be on either side of the mouth of the FRANCISCO. A report from a reliable native confirms the suspicion that, as stores are landed, they are placed in dumps, from which supplies are drawn for the forward areas. It is therefore, possible that a large quantity of stores arrived about 20 May, were shifted into the dump south of the FRANCISCO on 24 May and are now being carried forward. It was also stated that most of the supplies received go to the forward troops, the garrison subsisting mostly on native foods. This is supported by a report from our troops that the Japs, when driven off BOBDUBI RIDGE, left behind plentiful supplies of food. Men have been constantly seen in the water off BURNUNG POINT, and were at first thought to have been swimming there. However, the fact that they very seldom wholly immerse themselves, and that there is nearly always a small boat in their vicinity, leads to the belief that fortifications are being constructed to guard against a landing. The defences east of the airfield, reported in the last summary, were also thought to be sited for the same purpose. It is apparent that the enemy in SALAMAUA are concerned about the possibility of an attack from the sea.

A reliable native who had been in SALAMAUA for six weeks until the middle of March, declared that Navy and Army personnel occupied separate areas on the ISTHEUS and on KILA respectively.

He knew of no officer who had command of both services.

Activity in the vicinity of the quarry continues, and it is evident that there is a visual signaling station situated above the quarry.

More attention has been paid to the drone than previously; on three days parties of up to 30 men have worked all day on the drone filling in bomb craters.

MISSIN

The enemy still appears to be in occupation of BOBUEY RIDGE where small parties of enemy have been observed in the vicinity of the coconut grove. Otherwise there has been no activity to report.

KAKHAK

A patrol to the east of MASHAM BOMB on 27 May found a large unoccupied enemy camp about 15 minutes east of the ambush position. This confirms the native report that the enemy had vacated this area about 15 May.

There was a total of 56 huts, each capable of containing 12 or 13 men. The camp is well concealed, and large slit trenches, and possibly weapon pits, are dug into the hillside, connected by fenced tracks. It was in a filthy condition, and a number of documents giving very valuable information have been recovered.

Leading south from the vicinity of the camp was found a well-defined track with trees blazed at intervals along it. It is not yet known how far the track extends.

A theory has been advanced that the camp was a base for a party constructing a track through the jungle-covered mountainous country to WAGAU. The Jap's fondness of effecting surprise by this method has been demonstrated in previous engagements. The size of the holes dug in the camp area is reported to be abnormally large for the protection of personnel, and it may be that they were intended for stores. The theory is further supported by the finding of a page from the notebook of an officer, apparently connected with road construction work.

One of our reconnaissance patrols, returning west through the enemy camp on 3 June, surprised a party of 8 to 8 Japs and shots were exchanged. The camp area has been kept under observation, but no movement has been observed up to 1500X/5.

HUON PENINSULA

A report has been received that BOANA, 24 miles NNW of LAE, is now permanently occupied by the enemy, who state their intention of constructing an airfield there.

The natives between BOANA and LAE are reported to be pro-Japanese, affording the enemy full co-operation. On 30 May an observer was betrayed by natives, but managed to escape.

A party about forty strong left BOANA for the HAP and KALAPI with the alleged purpose of reconnoitering an airfield. This may be the patrol which is reported from TARARAN area to proceed, approximately weekly, to the HAP, the LERON, south to TARARAN, thence returning in the direction of HAP.

RAMU - MARKHAM - BENA BENA

The enemy parties reported to be moving south in the direction of BUNDI, GUEBBI and WESA, appear to have turned back along the two westerly routes.

At SEPU, the RAMU RIVER is still in flood, and it is reported that no enemy have crossed.

On 27 May the enemy were reported at SAWI, RAMU about W03272. There are indications that they proceeded no further than CAUS, W02570 on the road to BUNDI, returning to the RAMU.

There have been no reports from the WESM area, our furthest outpost being at MATANGSA. MATANG is at WC 6258.

(b) SEA.

ENEMY.

Submarines RABUL - LAE.

Sightings of submarines off CAPE ORFORD continue to be reported from a reliable source.

From CAPE ORFORD to LAE the distance is 375 nautical miles, and generally speaking 30 hours would be required to cover this. Analysis of sightings, together with observed night activity in LAE HARBOUR, allows the following conclusions to be drawn in regard to the submarines' possible daily schedules :-

Dep RABUL	1000 hrs	D 1	(supposition)
Pass CAPE ORFORD	1800 hrs	D 1	(average time of sighting)
Arr LAE	3200 hrs	D 2	
Dep LAE	0130 hrs	D 3	(supposition reinforced by reports from LAE)
Pass CAPE ORFORD	0730 hrs	D 4	(average time of sighting)

The following are ways by which supplies could be carried by submarine:-

- (a) Fifteen torpedoes are normally carried in "I" class submarines. (This class has been identified in both LAE and RABUL). If a proportion of these were removed, approximately one ton of stores per torpedo could be carried instead.
- (b) Since the journey RABUL-LAE and return is well below a submarine's sea-going range, one or more fuel tanks could be filled with oil or aviation spirit, readily dischargeable into drums or barges.
- (c) Up to 30 tons of deck cargo could be carried, provided it was suitably packed and stowed.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 124).

HANSA BAY.

On 29 May a convoy of four merchant vessels totalling 20,000 tons discharged its cargo at HANSA BAY, the harbour for the MOBI area. Bad weather hindered observation, but it is thought that the vessels spent at least 8 hrs, with a maximum of 17 hrs in port. Some supplies are known to have been landed, but if the convoy carried stores only, the full cargo could not have been unloaded in the time available. It would, therefore, appear that troops and equipment were unloaded. Altogether, it would have been possible for a Regiment (say 3,500 men) to have been landed.

MADANG.

At 0610K/29 three ships between 1,500 and 3,000 tons were approaching from the north. Later searches failed to locate these vessels.

Merchant tonnage at RABUL remains at a low level, a total of 111,000 tons being observed on 29 May. In the KAVIENG area only two sightings were recorded, both of shipping proceeding towards RABUL.

(Adapted from NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 124)

(c) AIR

OWN

MUBO

Enemy positions on OBSERVATION HILL were attacked by five BOSTONS on 25 May, and reports from both ground and air indicate that both bombing and strafing were accurate.

SALAMAU

Twelve BOSTONS, accompanied by sixteen KITTYHAWKS, at 1330 hrs on 5 June bombed and strafed the dump at the mouth of the FRANCISCO RIVER and up the coast to KELA. Bombs were reported to fall in the target area. All but one of six BOSTONS failed to reach their target at SALAMAU owing to bad weather on 23 May.

LAE

Following on the heavy attack on 27 May, nine LIBERATORS carried out raids on 31 May and 1 June.

WEWAK

Airfields at WEWAK, BORAM, DAGUA and HUT were subjected to four heavy raids between 22 May and 4 June.

MALANG

The airfield, dumps and town areas were attacked on both 28 and 29 May by LIBERATORS, while seven BEAUFIGHTERS and five MITCHELLS attacked villages and bridges in the BUCADJIM area on 1 June.

Reconnaissance.

On 31 May one FORTRESS on reconnaissance over FINSCHAFEN was attacked by 16 enemy fighters. Five enemy aircraft were destroyed and one probably. The FORTRESS returned to base with three of the crew wounded.

Enemy

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance aircraft were reported over DAMBI and the SNAKE VALLEY on 29 May, over WAU-BULOLO on 1 June and over MISSIM-HOTE on 5 June. The last mentioned aircraft strafed MISSIM. LAZ appears to be used as a forward refuelling base for these planes. A HAF circling MALAHANG on 5 June gives rise to the possibility of this airfield being again used.

Airfields

Working parties have been active on both LAE and SALAMAU airfields, repairing the damage caused by our bombs. There has been no use of SALAMAU airfield reported for some time. Two new enemy airfields have been discovered in the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. It is considered that the purpose of their construction is to provide further dispersion for the 250 aircraft operating from this area.

DOUGLAS

Although 30 bombers were used in a raid on DOUGLAS HARBOUR on 25 May, there was only one casualty and little damage.

BULLDOG

Approximately 15 bombs were dropped from sixteen aircraft which raided BULLDOG on 2 June. Three landed on the runway and a grounded transport aircraft was damaged.

(Adapted from NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 124 and Daily Information Summary No. 24).

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB

Attached as Appendix "A" is a map of NEW GUINEA and the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO showing the latest estimate of enemy strengths.

LAE

The following information has been obtained from an observer (just returned) who was at HELDSBACH during, and subsequent to, the BISMARCK SEA action. It provides the first reliable basis for an estimate of the number of survivors :-

On 3 Mar, a damaged destroyer hove to off HELDSBACH and hastily unloaded stores and personnel before being sunk by Allied aircraft. On the following day other landings were made along the coast at various points ranging from S10 (50 miles NW of FINSCHAFEN) to HOPOL. Careful analysis of native reports results in an estimated minimum of 1,200 survivors. Of these, 200 are said to have remained at FINSCHAFEN, 200 made their way to SAIDOR, and the balance reached LAE. It is considered that this SOC was absorbed into the reorganized 102 Regt, which was in the MUBO-KOMIATUM area during May.

(Adapted from NCF Weekly Intelligence Summary 124).

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

Documents found in the deserted Japanese camp at YAKHAM POINT on 28 May reveal the presence of 10 Coy 3 Bn 115 Regt in this area. It was previously surmised that this Bn was the unit which attacked BORDUBI RIDGE on 15 May. There is no way of discovering how long the document was lying in the camp before being found, but a native report says that the enemy forces in this area moved across to the north bank of the river about 16 May. This information however is not conclusive.

Further documents captured include a sheet from an officer's notebook. It contained references to topographical reconnaissances "from AGC to BUSU RIVER". AGC is on the coast 20 miles NW of FINSCHAFEN and the BUSU RIVER is 4 miles east of LAE; it seems likely that this was a reconnaissance for a coastal road. There was also a note of a reconnaissance to be made of the MARKHAM RIVER. Further references were to preparations for the reception of 51 Div Main Unit (HQ 51 Div and 115 Regt on BISMARCK SEA Convoy of 2/4 Mar) including the construction of a road for disembarkation.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

LOWER WATUT VALLEY.

The following is a summary of information based on a report of a patrol from SUNSHINE to the MARKHAM along the Lower WATUT RIVER.

Track Times

SUNSHINE	-	TATAK	4 hours, 30 minutes
TATAK	-	KAPASWAGA	4 hours, 15 minutes
KAPASWAGA	-	WOWAS	6 hours
WOWAS	-	MARCLINAN	3 hours, 15 minutes
MARCLINAN	-	WURUP	4 hours, 15 minutes
WURUP	-	PESEN	3 hours, 15 minutes
PESEN	-	MARKHAM	4 hours.

WATUT RIVER

The WATUT is the largest of the southern tributaries of the MARKHAM RIVER, and from SUNSHINE to the MARKHAM it runs through three main types of country - open kunai valleys, steep rocky gorges and swampy forest valleys.

From SUNSHINE the WATUT is a fast flowing river running through an open valley in a NW direction, bounded to the east and SE by hills covered with thick jungle. The undergrowth here is of the type found along the coastal areas of NEW GUINEA. At the junction with the SNAKE RIVER, the valley bends and runs in a south-easterly direction, gradually closing in until the river is flowing through a

steep rocky rain forest gorge over 200 feet deep. A short distance east of SONIA the course of the river changes and runs in a northerly direction towards ROAMER, where there is a slight opening of the valley, and it is here that the ROAMER ELG has been made. From the drome the turbulent river races down the rocky floor of the valley, with hills over 800 feet high rising sharply from the stream. At NOWAS the river emerges from these steep hills and enters an open jungle and kunai valley which extends to MARALINAN. Looking north from the hills above MARALINAN, the course of the river can be seen running towards the MARKHAM through a flat swampy forest covered valley, bounded to the west by a kunai range of hills and to the east by a jungle covered line of hills with MOUNT WATUP in the centre.

TRACK

The track as a whole is of good surface and presents no real difficulties. It would be possible to build a jeep track as far as SAMBIO rest house, but from here on, owing to steep gradients of an average of 1 in 3, and numerous landslides, the construction of a jeep track would be a difficult task.

From SAMBIO the track enters the steep WATUP VALLEY. The surface is good and it would be possible to make the track suitable for mules as far as GALWA rest house. The track continues on from GALWA following the deep rocky valley which is covered with alternating jungle and kunai grass. Along this section the track climbs in places to over 800 feet above the stream.

From NOWAS to MARALINAN, as the valley gradually opens out, the gradients become less severe and a good bench cut track leads from EFAPAN CR to the MARKHAM airfield. The track from here to the MARKHAM follows along the open valley floor and in some places is inclined to become swampy.

Throughout the length of the valley, there are numerous small creeks which run into the river. These cause no great difficulty as they are either fordable or crossed by native type bridges, some of which are in a bad state of repair.

ACCOMMODATION

Accommodation along the route is fairly good for a party not exceeding more than 30 men. There are staging posts at SAMBIO, TARAK, KAPASWAGA, NOWAS, OLD EFAPAN, MARALINAN, WURUP and PESIN.

The natives are friendly and although food is scarce they offered fruit and vegetables to the patrol.

ELG's and SUPPLY DROPPING PLACES

Along the open kunai valley there are a number of sites suitable for ELG's and dropping grounds. At SONIA, 30 minutes from TALAK there is a runway of 500 yards which with clearing would be suitable for moths. In the gorge section of the valley at ROAMER, there is an ELG which owing to the nature of the country has a difficult approach and is only suitable for small planes or for supply dropping.

MARALINAN is a B class drome 780 yards long by 100 yards wide, it has a well drained surface which could be extended 3/400 yards making it suitable for transport planes inside a week.

KELA HILL & MAIOLO

To the west and north-west of KELA HILL is an area of open kunai ridges cut by steep reentrants. From the flats of the FRANCISCO delta where the SALAMUDA airfield is situated, the hills rise steeply, affording an excellent vantage point from which to view the base of the ISTEMUS and the river mouth.

To the west this area is almost cut off from the steep timbered ridges further inland by the ravine of BUIKIS CREEK. A northern boundary is provided by ASINI CREEK, the largest of a great number of small coastal streams. To the east the sea can be plainly seen as well as KELA HILL, the most easterly of these hills overlooking SAMOA HARBOUR.

Native gardens are numerous throughout this area, being connected by a network of tracks. Off the tracks, the going is difficult on account of the steepness of the ravines and the density of the secondary growth in the old native gardens. The kunai ridges are very open to observation, but excellent cover is provided by the timber in the many gullies.

TABALI RIVER, BASSIS VILLAGES.

The river, which flows into NASSAU BAY at the map BADEF BAY WEST, 835778, is known as TABALI RIVER. The three villages in NASSAU BAY, formerly known as NASSAU BAY Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively from east to west are now known as BASSIS 1, 2 and 3.

-3-
PART V

SECURITY

Rumour is probably the most dangerous and insidious destructive agent of a force's morale. A succession of rumours, spreading like wildfire, will quickly cause confusion, doubt and lack of confidence throughout a body of troops. Uncertainty of mind lies at the root of all rumour, for when one's knowledge is sure, there can be no belief in hearsay. The most effective way of countering this menace, therefore, is to spread authoritative information as widely as possible. It is the duty of every officer and NCO to ensure that the men in his charge are kept at all times, as fully informed as the circumstances permit. This duty is present both when in battle, and when in the rear areas. In battle, every man must be aware of as much of his commander's intention, plan and method as is compatible with security. In the rear areas, every effort should be made by means of talks, news sheets and summaries, to keep all ranks in the picture of current events. Further, it is the duty of every man to weigh the reliability of any information before accepting it as true. To every statement there should be framed, if not spoken, the query "where did you get that from".

Distribution: See attached.

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GS 3 Aust Div

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Distribution:

Copy Nos


15 Aust Inf Bde	1 - 2
17 Aust Inf Bde	3 - 5
2/7 Aust Inf Bn	6
24 Aust Inf Bn	7
2/3 Aust Indep Coy	8
1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt	
2/6 Aust Svy Bty	9
156 Aust Lt AA Bty	10
MAU Fxd Def	
Sta Comd, MAU	11
EULOLO Fxd Def	
Sta Comd EULOLO	12
11 Fighter Control Sub-sector	13
708 CA(AA) Bty US Army	14
RAE 3 Aust Div	15
Sigs 3 Aust Div	16
AASC 3 Aust Div	17
2/2 Aust Fd Amb	18
3 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	19
ANGAU (MARKHAM District)	20
Air Support Control 5 AF	21
ALO A Fl 4 AC Sqn.	22
NGF	23
Air Support Sec A 3 Adv Ech 5 AF MORESBY	24
41 US Div	25
4 Aust Inf Bde	26
RENA Force	27
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Appx A to -
E Aust Div
Int. Summary 7

ENEMY STRENGTHS

NEW GUINEA & BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

as at 26 May 43



NG.F Weekly
Int Summary 124

SECRET

Int file not to be removed

3 AUGUST 1964 (SECRET) (UNCLASSIFIED) (S) (U)

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 27 May 65

SECRET

1. GENERAL

Although no major enemy has taken place on the BIRN - BIRN front, there are signs that the enemy is still bringing forward troops, possibly to replace casualties.

Activity in the BIRN area indicates a strengthening of its defenses and a reorganization of supply lines.

There is further evidence that supplies and reinforcements are being brought to BIRN and BIRN by sea routes and possibly by barge, using the ports at night.

Indications of the enemy's interest in the BIRN BIRN plateau have been strengthened by a native report of large well-armed enemy parties moving towards BIRN, BIRN and BIRN, and by the continued enemy aerial activity over the area.

The movement of large vessels by the enemy has decreased but his coast-wise barge activity has continued and has been subject to night strafing runs by our air force.

No large scale enemy air attacks have been launched in the last week but there has been little abatement in his reconnaissance sorties. Further attempts to interfere with our supply system are indicated by a reconnaissance of the BIRN - BIRN area of C followed by a bombing and strafing run of one of our small river craft.

2. OPERATIONS

(a) Land

BIRN AREA

No major activity has taken place in this area over the last few days. Our patrols have been active on all sides of the BIRN, and definite signs of its occupation are apparent. Tracks to the rear of the feature are used by the enemy early in the morning and late in the afternoon.

Similarly, on OBSERVATION HILL there is every indication that the enemy continues to hold his previous positions.

Smoke appearing regularly from the vicinity of BIRN CREEK leads to the deduction that the enemy has a camp in this area, possibly a base camp for the BIRN. Further fires in BIRN CREEK indicate that the enemy is still using this as a camp.

It is believed that the enemy's administrative offices and stores are situated in the area along the track north up BIRN CREEK.

BIRN - BIRN AREA

Movement continues to be reported in the area round the BIRN mouths and on BIRN ISLAND.

Small enemy working parties have been seen near the former ambush position about two miles from the mouth of the southern arm. However, a patrol on 26 May reported no enemy in occupation. As there are native gardens in this area, it is possible that the enemy working parties have been gathering food.

Further movement of sailing vessels around BIRN ISLAND was observed on 26 May. It may be possible that the enemy is using the ISLAND as a landing point for supplies and reinforcements from submarines.

(2)

This is supported by the large number of native craft which have been sighted in the area, over the last few weeks, some of them carrying cargo. Last December, natives reported that LABARIA ISLAND was being used for this purpose.

HISSIM

Since the enemy patrol in strength to HOTE and GISSIMBOB there has been little activity in this area.

Natives reported that the Japs evacuated the villages after our air strafing attack on 21 May.

Daily patrols to the KUNDA BRIDGE area have reported that there appears to be no enemy in NEW BOBURI; smoke was seen however, from the coconut plantation on BOBURI RIDGE on 25 May.

GWAIBOLOM is reported to be clear, but an enemy reconnaissance patrol of six visited the village on 25 May.

The enemy still appears to be moving troops on the KOMIATUM track. On 22 May 150 enemy, carrying packs and weapons moved south. There has possibly been a lot of movement which has escaped observation during the last week.

SALAMAUA

Much activity has been observed around the mouth of the FRANCISCO RIVER.

An examination of a recent photo of this area revealed a newly constructed defence system, apparently sited to cover the airfield from a seaborne attack. The MT road from the ISTHMUS to the airfield showed signs of much use, with a turning point very evident on the north-west side of the airfield. Signs of considerable activity were noted on either side of the river mouth, indicating the possibility of dumps in these areas.

On 22, 23 and 24 May intense activity was observed between the north and south banks of the river mouth. On 22 May a party of 100 men moved from south to north across the footbridge and returned carrying loads to the south side. This operation was repeated by four more parties of approximately 200 men during the day. Three similar parties were observed on 23 May. The next day a body of 150 men made the same movement, and this was followed by intense movement of about 400 men between the mouth of the FRANCISCO and the ISTHMUS.

This movement seems to indicate the shifting of supply dumps, which may be the result of our air attacks on 19 and 20 May. On the afternoon of 24 May a working party of 30 was repairing the airfield for 4 hours.

MARKHAM AREA

A patrol down the track from COMSIS to MARKHAM POINT found, on 25 May, that the enemy ambush position east of the latter feature had been vacated.

There has been a further native report concerning enemy patrols to NADZAB. Each Wednesday a patrol leaves HEATHS, passing through MUNUM to NADZAB where the night is spent, returning to LAE the following day.

There is also a report that the role of the party is to observe NGARAGENNO. An enemy reconnaissance aircraft flew over the area north and east of WAMPIT on 22 May, circling our posts at KIRKLANDS and BENS OP.

A patrol to the mouth of the HUANG RIVER on 19 May discovered signs of Jap occupation about a week old in two native huts about a mile from the mouth. Proceeding to the coast they observed about a mile away to the south a patrol of 12 Japs moving north.

Approximately opposite the patrol a small low vessel was seen close inshore. A native reported later having observed a party of enemy near the mouth of the EWISSI on the same day. He also said that the japs visited EWISSI village in search of food. A report in February stated that a patrol made a one day trip from SALAMAUA to HUANG RIVER and returned each Monday or Tuesday. It is possible that this procedure is still being carried out. The vessel could have been a barge sent to carry back the foodstuffs.

Documents printed in JAPANESE, which were found in the OLD MARI area, proved to be propaganda pamphlets apparently published by the allies for dropping over enemy occupied territory.

RAI COAST.

There has been a renewal of enemy patrol activity in the SAIDOR area, and during the past twelve days patrols have penetrated as far inland as MATOKO (20 miles SW SAIDOR), SIBOG (8 miles SW SAIDOR), and GWIAKACK (7 miles south of SAIDOR). Standing patrols have been stationed at SINDAMA, and another patrol covers the MATOKO - GUSAP road.

Enemy barges are reported to be continually working along the coast at night.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 123)

RAMU - MARKHAM

A reliable report received on 23 May states that there are now no enemy at KAIGILIN, the party previously reported there having returned in the direction of DUMPU.

BENA BENA

Natives reported on 24 May that heavily equipped enemy parties were leaving MADANG in the direction of BUNDI GUEBBI and WESA. It is significant that these are the three routes to the BENA BENA plateau from the North. Another report on the same day stated that the enemy were at SAWI on the RAMU ref map RAMU strat WC 3271.

The enemy has also displayed considerable interest in this area from the air, as is reported under "operations (c) air".

(b) SEA

ENEMY

During the past week, observed shipping activity has been the lowest for many months.

HUON GULF - GASMATA

It must be presumed that submarine reinforcement of the LAE - SALAMAUA Area is continuing, since sightings of submarine off Cape ORFORD are still being regularly made. Six (three on a northerly and three on a southerly course) were reported here between 19 and 25 May. Roughly speaking, all sightings have been made at either first or last light each day, and it is stated that each submarine seen has had large white markings on the conning tower.

Vessels observed in transit include two destroyers 75 miles ESE of GASMATA at 0330 hours 24 May. They may possibly have visited GASMATA about dusk 23 May, and have left about midnight on the return journey to RABAU.

At full speed they could have reached LAE, leaving there no later than 2000 hours 23 May. It is significant that at 1500 hours 23 May LABAKIA OP reported a vessel in the northern waters of HUON GULF moving West. There was no observation from LAE OP at the time. However that night a searchlight was reported from the South end of LAE drone lighting up an object in the harbour which may have been a ship's bridge. This activity occurred from 2110 hours onwards and, therefore, can hardly be associated with the sighting of the two destroyers.

- 4 -

A MARKHAM native reported that the enemy land reinforcements and supplies at LAE from submarines on cloudy days and at night.

BARGE ACTIVITY NE NEW GUINEA.

It has long been known that there is enemy barge traffic along the NE NEW GUINEA coast between WEWAK, MADANG and possibly LAE. Few sightings have, however, been made by our aircraft during the daylight reconnaissances.

During recent nights, advantage has been taken of moonlight conditions to conduct special air searches for this traffic. Results confirm the suspicion that these craft move during the hours of darkness, lying up camouflaged by day.

At 2032 hours 19 May, two barges loaded with square wooden boxes were strafed two miles South of Cape CRETIN (ten miles South of FINSCHHAFFEN) while moving in a SW direction.

Between 1810 and 2345 hours 20 May, a total of fourteen barges, all underway, were sighted. A convoy of ten near SEK Island was attacked and five sunk, the remainder being beached. In the vicinity of the small islands off Cape CRETIN, two barges loaded with ammunition and personnel, and towed by a launch, were sunk; while, nearby, another barge was destroyed by a direct hit.

An hour before midnight on 23 May, our aircraft attacked two barges off the coast nine miles SE of SAIDOR, sinking one and leaving the other in flames. An hour and a half later, no less than fifteen of these craft were located and attacked six miles West of SAIDOR. Near misses were scored with heavy bombs.

WEWAK

A maximum of 32000 tons arrived in this harbour, compared with 44000 tons in the previous week, and 85000 tons for the week ending 5 May. Between seventy and eighty barges were revealed by photographs between 19 and 24 May.

RABAU

In the amount of shipping in a port constantly varies, but February and March it was not unusual to discover sixty to seventy vessels in RABAU totalling up to 200,000 tons of merchant shipping. Since this time the amount has steadily declined and the figures for 22 May showed only forty two vessels, with a total merchant tonnage of 97,000, including an unusually large number of small transport freighters.

(Adapted from HGF Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 125)

(c) AIR

OWN

LAE

Bostons attacked the MALAHANG wreck on 24 May scoring four direct hits. The wreck was left burning fiercely and exploding internally.

At 1145 hours 27 May the airfield and town were subjected to the heaviest attack for some time. Eighteen aircraft took part and a large sheet of flames followed by heavy explosions was observed in the transport lines. Many fires were left burning in the town building and three craters were made in the airfield.

GASIMATA

The airfield here received five attacks between 19 and 25 May causing considerable damage. RABAU, MADANG and CAPE GEORGETOWN were also included in the weeks targets.

NASSAU BAY.

Bostons and Beaufighters bombed and strafed villages and canoes from DUALI to NASSAU BAY. LABABIA ISLAND was also attacked.

ENEMY

BULLDOG

After making reconnaissance flights over the BULLDOG KEREMA area on 18 and 19 May, the enemy on 20 May used six bombers and three fighters to attack one of our MLC in the LAKEKAMU RIVER. There was no damage or casualties.

BENA BENA

It will be recalled that between 11 and 19 May, five reconnaissance flights were made over this area.

A small raid on KAINANTU 21 May was followed by a further attack next day. Between 1150 and 1205 hours eight aircraft dropped eight or nine bombs on KAINANTU and AIYURA, besides strafing these places. No direct hits were scored although minor damage resulted to some European houses and station stores.

CHIMEU was made the target on 25 May, when six twin engined aircraft strafed the area.

A report from KAINANTU states that bomb explosions and the sounds of strafing were heard over AIYURA between 0955 and 1000 hours same day.

(Adapted from NCM Weekly Intelligence Summary No 123)

PART II

2. IDENTIFICATIONS

An enormous amount of information concerning the enemy's dispositions, strength, intentions and organisations has been obtained from documents captured from the Japanese. The importance of sending back all documents, labels, diaries, notebooks etc in addition to equipment cannot be over emphasised.

Every enemy body should, whenever possible, be carefully searched for the papers which they invariably carry. The following places are frequently used for carrying papers:

- (a) stuffing pouches behind the four adjustable leather flaps of the helmet
- (b) in the folds of the abdominal wrap, or "G-string"
- (c) respirator haversacks
- (d) pouches on equipment

5. EQUIPMENT

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS WITH JAPANESE HE GRENADES

Tests recently carried out with a number of captured Japanese Type "91" hand grenades show that these weapons, so much in favour with the Japanese, might well cause more harm to the thrower than to the intended victims.

Although the delay fuze of the grenade is supposed to be four or five seconds (and is so marked), the delay train has been known to burn in much less time. All our troops, therefore, who capture these grenades and use them, should be informed that they must be thrown immediately the head of the grenade has been struck.

While the delay train is burning, a considerable quantity of black smoke is emitted from the escape hole at the base of the fuze tube. Care should be taken to keep the hand clear of this hole.

This smoke emission serves as a feature in recognising the grenade when in flight.

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 42)

Identity Discs

Reliable information from an enemy prisoner, has been received concerning the use of identity discs by the Japanese Army. There is no confirmation of the system of marking and it is thought that each formation designs its own.

Brass, or possibly steel, oval discs are issued in blank, and when the recruit is assigned to a company it is the duty of his corporal to stamp the disc with:

- (a) divisional code character
- (b) regimental code number
- (c) company code number
- (d) individual's number (or officer's name)

(Adapted from NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 122)

6. ENEMY TACTICS

MORTAR RANGING BY TRACER FIRE

Use of MG fire for indicating targets to mortars has been introduced by the Japanese in BURMA. They sight 2 MG's on the target and open up with tracer. About 30 secs later the first mortar bomb falls, being aimed at the intersection of the two tracer streams.

A similar system was frequently used by both the Italians and ourselves during the early days in the western desert and CYRENAICA.

Although a certain amount of organization and training is necessary for the operation of this system of target indication, it is considered to have the advantage of being able to spot and indicate targets which could not be observed from a static OP.

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review 42)

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

BITOI RIVER MOUTH

Up to the present the south arm of the BITOI RIVER MOUTH has been known as the OVERFLOW. The newly printed HUBO 1/25,000 sheet has, however, designated the northern arm as the OVERFLOW.

To avoid confusion the word OVERFLOW will be discontinued and the terms NORTH ARM and SOUTH ARM used.

NEW LAEU Village.

The present site occupied by the LAEU natives is at, ref map NADZAB 1 in to 1 mile, 582425. This village will be known as NEW LAEU.

INCIDENCE OF DISEASES IN NEW GUINEA.

A survey of the figures for the various diseases over the last month shows the incidence to be as follows:

Malaria	45.5%
Skins Condition	7.5%
Dysentery	5.5%
Various infections of the limbs	4.2%
Accidental injuries	4.2%
Strains of ligaments	4.1%
Diarrhoea	4.1%
Various	24.7%

- 7 -
It should be noted that there are approximately 6 times as many cases of malaria as any other complaint.

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SECURITY

NATIVE MOVEMENT.

As natives in other theatres of war have been successfully used as 5th columnists by the Japanese, the possibility of the natives of this area being likewise employed either through compulsion or of their own free will should not be ignored.

Because of the splendid services rendered by many natives on the KOKODA TRAIL popular opinion is that all natives are pro-Allies. This is not the case and there are many who for reasons over which there can be no control would be only too willing to assist the enemy.

Natives, simply because they are natives are all to do things which can seriously jeopardize our security.

All personnel must realize that bush natives and even mission natives who have gone bush cannot be controlled by censorship and that anything they see or hear is likely to be passed on either by word of mouth or by letter. The average native writing to a friend in an area adjacent to the enemy may, as a piece of news for his friends, say that "PAIV PELLA TEN BAIUS I STAP LONG DORABARA NAU OL I GAT TU PELLA ARG BILONG IN", which in simple pidgin means that there are fifty P39's Lightning's at DOBOURA. The dangers of such a leakage need no comment.

Mail can and is being forwarded between natives by such means as the crews of small ships, lakatols, etc, plying up and down the coast and by many other channels.

Although there are no definite reports that the Japanese are using natives for this type of work all troops would do well to remember that "Forewarned is fore-armed" even if they are armed only with the knowledge that all natives are not necessarily "Fuzzy Wuzzie Angels".

(NGP Weekly Intelligence Summary No.123)

SECURITY MINDEDNESS.

The following extract shows the increasing security mindedness of troops in the NE W GUINEA area.

"I can't understand Joe worrying about pieces being cut out of his letter. If anything he ought to be pleased that the authorities look after troops as they do. If he or anybody else, both soldiers and civilians had enough common sense, they would realise that all this damn fool talk is only asking for trouble. Everybody should be made to see the picture "Next of KIN" - they'd see then how foolish all this talk is."

(NGP Weekly Intelligence Summary No.123)

Lt-col
GS Staff Div.

Distribution: See attached.

Please detach and destroy when perused

Distribution:

Copy Nos

15 Aust Inf Bde	1 - 2
17 Aust Inf Bde	3 - 5
2/6 Aust Inf Bn	6
24 Aust Inf Bn	7
2/3 Aust Indep Coy	8
1 Bty 2/1 Aust Pd Regt	}
2/6 Aust Svy Bty	
156 Aust Lt AA Bty	9
WAW Fwd Def	}
Sta Comd WAW	
11 Fighter Control Sub-sector	10
708 CA (AA) Bty US Army	11
RAE 3 Aust Div	12
SIGS 3 Aust Div	13
AASC 3 Aust Div	14
2/2 Aust Pd Amb	15
3 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	16
ANGAU (MARKHAM District)	17
Sta Comd BUOLO	18
Air Sp Control 5 AF	19
ALO A Fl 4 AC Sqn	20
NGF	21
Air Sp Sec A 3 Adv Fch 5 AF MORESEY	22
41 US Div	23
4 Aust Inf Bde	24
RENA Force	25
Comd	26
AA & CMG	27
ADMS, ADOS, ADME	28
File	29
War Diary	30
Spare	31 - 32
	33
	34 - 35

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SECRET

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3. AUSTRALIAN WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NOTE

Compiled from information received up to 1300 hrs 13 May 43.

GENERAL

1. GENERAL

Documents captured in the MUMU area plus some waste evidence of the enemy's reshuffling of his forward troops. The 103 Inf Bde, reorganized after its annihilation in the battle for WAI, made a re-appearance in the attack against our troops on LABAHIA BEACH on 9 to 12 May.

The only fighting of any significance has taken place in the MUMU area, where our continual harassing of the Jap 1st Bde, 103 Inf Bde, KUMIATUM forced him to take action by driving west with a considerable force. Our forces were withdrawn, but inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, whilst in comparison our losses were ridiculously small. Movement in the area south-west of SCARPA has continued, but in the last 10 days indications have been received of increased interest in the HENA HENA plateau, in addition to the old ridge from HENA to LAE.

Enemy shipping has continued to use MUMU, but on a slightly lower scale. There has been an increase, however, of enemy boats moving along the south coast of NEW BRITAIN.

A medium scale, but widespread aerial offensive, which is still continuing was set in motion by the enemy on 13 May. A feature of these operations was the use made of airfields on the NE coast of NEW GUINEA.

2. OPERATIONS

(a) Land

MUMU AREA

Since the enemy's withdrawal to the PUMU on 12 May, there has been little activity in this area. Our patrols have been active and indications are that the enemy remains in occupation of this strongpoint, with a log barricade across the frontal approach. On the south end of WOOLY ISLAND the Jap is thought to have an ambush position and his previous positions on OBSERVATION HILL are still manned. In this area our artillery evidently had a success when they engaged an area from which smoke had been consistently observed. Their fourth shell resulted in a column of black smoke 400 feet high.

A patrol wide out on our left flank contacted an enemy ambush position on the northern slopes of OBSERVATION HILL, indicating the extent in depth of his prepared positions.

WAI - NASSAU BAY

The enemy appears to be still taking an interest in this area. A launch with four ships' boats were observed bringing ashore approximately 70 men at TUALI POINT on 17 May. An outpost is evidently being constructed near the edge of their position, contacted on 4 May, some two miles up the BUDU OVERFLOW. This position was reported clear on 14 May but has evidently been re-occupied.

Movement has also been observed on LABAHIA ISLAND, enemy occupation of which was suspected as long ago as last December.

MISSIM AREA

To facilitate reference a sketch map is attached as Appendix. The period under review opened with our MAF overlooking the SHIMANA KUMIATUM track and continuing to harass enemy parties moving south to NOMIATUM. On 12/13 May thirty eight casualties being inflicted on the enemy.

In addition, a further force in position 200 yards west of the perimeter of the camp at SALAMAUA, KOBOMBI and KOBOMBI was reported to be in the camp's line of sight. The enemy, apparently composed of the frequent harassing of his flank, and continuing that sort of action of these activities with great effect. Operations in the KULO area, at present, are being conducted by the enemy with a force estimated at 100-150 men. The attack commenced at 1145 hrs. and was preceded by heavy mortar and artillery fire on the edge of SALAMAUA ridge and KULO area.

The initial attack along the SALAMAUA - KOBOMBI track ran into heavy mine opposition. A line of our position on the track, then heavy troops were covered by fire and the enemy is a heavy. However by continual strong encircling movements, the enemy forced our troops along the SALAMAUA KOBOMBI track, over the northern end of KOBOMBI ridge where our troops, reinforced from the KUNDA RR area, held the enemy advance in this direction.

Having cleared the SALAMAUA KOBOMBI track, the enemy continued his drive to the west, forcing our troops on the south end of KOBOMBI ridge to withdraw to the general line of MISSIE IUALI CR, where they took up a defensive position. Simultaneous attempts were made to turn the enemy's flanks without success. One attempt south from the FRANCISCO RIVER and the other north from NAMLING.

Late in the afternoon our troops strongly counterattacked from the north of KOBOMBI to gain the high ground south of NEW KOBOMBI. This attack was met by heavy small arms fire from short ranges and heavy and accurate mortar fire, which pinned our troops to the ground. The enemy then attempted to advance, but was halted by heavy fire from positions on the north end of KOBOMBI RIDGE.

At 1730H/15 our forces withdrew in good order from KOBOMBI RIDGE to KUNDA RR to avoid becoming isolated in the bend of the river on the north end of the RIDGE. Reinforcements were then moved up to the NAMLING area, thus providing strengthened defensive positions in this area as well as in the vicinity of KUNDA RR.

The enemy continued to consolidate on KOBOMBI RIDGE but made no attempt to exploit further west.

During the morning of 15 May KUNDA RR and BURRIS RIVER areas were bombed and strafed by 3 separate enemy forces. No damage or casualties resulted.

Throughout the next 4 days no forward move was attempted by the enemy, with the exception of 2 small patrols across the FRANCISCO RIVER.

His next move was in the direction of HOTE with the evident intention of securing his left flank. Contact was made on the 19 May with an enemy patrol about 20 strong 2000 yards to the east of HOTE village.

After a brief engagement this patrol appeared to withdraw towards MAIOLO. That evening however, a force of 150 Japs were observed in HOTE.

At first light on 20 May this enemy attacked our troops in CISEMBOS, forcing them by weight of numbers to withdraw in a running fight to the west. Casualties inflicted on the enemy were estimated at between 50 and 60 killed. That evening CISEMBOS was reported clear, the enemy being observed in HOTE. On 21 May our patrols penetrated to eastern extremity of HOTE RIDGE without making contact.

SALAMAUA

Activity observed within the SALAMAUA perimeter has been on a slightly increased scale. Movement round the ordnance store has become a daily occurrence, while further activity has been noticed along CEMETERY ROAD and in the vicinity of the quarry. It is possible that the enemy is preparing the peninsula as a position to be defended to the east of the

MARKHAM AREA

No contact has been made, but considerable information has been received from native sources of the enemy's activities in the MARKHAM POINT area. About ninety Japs are believed to have been on the south bank of the river between MARKHAM POINT and LAKE No. 1, for the last two months. A large proportion of this force is undoubtedly personnel manning AA guns, which have been observed in action in this area. The remainder of the force would be accounted for by a protecting infantry force.

The placing of the AA guns here was no doubt done with the object of countering our air attacks against his barge hideouts. There is further evidence to support the belief that the enemy uses the coastal route LAKE No. 1 - SALAMABA when moving troops from LAE. A large party of Japs, including about 20 officers was reported on 18 May to have moved south by this route. A corrected version of the native report concerning the enemy patrol in the NGASAWAMPUN - GABSONKEM area, mentioned in Summary No 4, has been received. It now appears that their itinerary was: TARARAN on the night of 4/5 May, moving to NGASAWAMPUN on 5 May and proceeding from there to LAE on 6 May. Native talk from a different area gave the route of the patrol as GABSONKEM, up the LEBON, over to the SRAP, down to TARARAN and thence back to GABSONKEM. This activity may be connected with the movement across the SARUWAGEE RANGE reported below. Natives reporting south of the MARKHAM say that the Japs at TARARAN have taken all their names and given each a number. The penalty of death is threatened for absence from roll call or aiding the Australians. The veracity of the MARKHAM boy, however is, at the best of times, doubtful. The bulk of the CHIVISING natives have expressed a desire to shift their abode to the south side of the river, away from Japanese influence.

HUON PENINSULA

Persistent native rumours state that large numbers of Japanese are based at SIG and ULAP, on the north coastal area of HUON PENINSULA. The food supply in the KOMBA district is reported to be practically depleted, and the enemy intention appears to be a move across the SARUWAGEE RANGE to LAE via BUNGALUNBA (ref LAE STRAT Sheet (L/R 7473) and AVE (ref MARKHAM STRAT Sheet (L/R 3583)).

These rumours have been partially confirmed by a late report of an enemy patrol which arrived at BOANA on 15 May from BUNGALUNBA. The patrol was reported to be comprised of twenty Army personnel and seventy local carriers. They were equipped with machine guns and had a wireless set.

Contact was made with one of our parties in this area and some shots were exchanged, but it is not known whether any casualties were suffered by either side.

(NGF Summary No 122)

RAMU - MARKHAM AREA

Native rumour said that there was a large body of the enemy at KESAWAI about 15 May and this was confirmed by the reappearance of the enemy at WESA on 19 May. One ANGAU sergeant was killed and the Japs apparently remain in occupation of this area. The enemy were guided by natives from WESA and WAMERUSA, further evidence of the Japs gaining control over the natives in the areas which he has occupied. This action, coupled with his aerial reconnaissances over BEWA BEWA and KAINANTU, indicates the enemy's interest in the rich plateau stretching from KAINANTU west to MT HACEN. Possession of this ground would provide him with an easily defended forward base served by excellent airfields. Attempts to explore the old trade route to LAE further SE than BUM BUM have been held up by the flooded TUSAP and RAMU rivers.

2002

200X 200Y

On 15 May, a strong air search force failed, in spite of an intensive search, to locate an enemy convoy reported earlier some 10 miles west of Khatma under conditions of poor visibility.

DISPATCH REPORT 2400

inspected rice 100% quantity 12

13

SALVAGE

LAST SENTENCE

SECRET

On 12 May 1968, two F-4's intercepted enemy-escorted bombers and
downed five fighters and shot down one B-57. Results were:
Enemy losses - destroyed: 5 fighters; 1 bomber;
 damaged: 1 fighter; 1 bomber.
Our losses: destroyed: 1 fighter; damaged: 1 fighter; 1

On 12, 13, 20 and 21 May 1968 there was an intercept every aircraft over W.O. On 21 May contact was made with two-way radio between LRB and SAIGONA at 22,00 hours. It was during this time radio messages and this protocol. The towers were all

44-38861-1000

IN addition to a small boat sunk on 12 May, forty five enemy aircraft were shot down on 11 May. They were informed by the allies to end the only way get through to their target. There was slight change in the direction. Another small ship on 12 and 13 May caused no damage.

504 3000000

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345

18 May, a day before the 1951 ICA survey was made, and the first date for the week on WAF. Thirty two flectors were observed patrolling the ICA and, by the light of day, a few minutes later, landing. Considerable activity was observed all day 18 May, aircraft continually landing, refueling, and departing. Some of the most intense activity was observed between 11 and early 12 May, a relatively dense cloud of aircraft flying from ICA towards the Black Sea. It therefore appears that the aircraft which took part in the action 18 May, were first based at the ICA coast and were sent to sea.

HA-21 000

Following reconnaissance made on 13 and 14 May, the enemy on 15 May attacked FAP with twenty bombers and eleven jet bombers, but caused neither damage nor casualties. They renewed their efforts on 16 May, using twenty four bombers and twenty one fighters, and this time met with more success. An interception was made. Approximately two hundred bombs were dropped, including HE, anti-personnel and incendiary, and all fell across the E6 end of the airfield. Although one bomb fell on the strip, the airfield is still usable. Allied casualties were one officer and four other men slightly wounded, some damage was caused. On 18, 19 and 21, 22 May, about twenty enemy fighters controlled the FAP - HULOG area at various times during the morning. It would appear that the enemy's intention is to link up with the delivery of supplies to this area.

Washed from H&R Investigated &
Surrendered to FBI and Policy Information
Bureau on Nov 16, 1961

1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 26

1. 1957-58 - 1957

Q: 22922-1980

Documents captured on 12/24/64, T-1007 12/12 May included an Operation Order from which the composition of the Japanese attacking force on 6 May is seen to be as follows:

- [illegible]

Is probably arrivals from January 2-6 Mar.

Throughout the engagement, both arty and small arms fire was poor, but the mortar fire however, was extremely accurate. Prior to the BODUHI PLUGS action, the enemy used a new method of orienting his troops to the ground. An aircraft flew over the whole objective, dropping flares on the main topographical features.

PAPER III

TOPographical

1. The camp at SEINDINGI is located on the 1000 ft. of 1, and has been re-named PAPER IV, and will be referred to as such in the future. Track lines on this route are given below.

PAPER III to BARNON CREEK	3 hours
BARNON CREEK to PAPER IV	3 1/2 hours
PAPER IV to INTURN HEADWATERS	3 hours
BALUNE HEADWATERS - BOONIE MOUNTAIN	
PILIMUNG	3 hours
PILIMUNG - SHABOB - HISSIN	2 1/2 hours
PILIMUNG - BOEADU - HISSIN	7 hours

2. A summary of weather conditions NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMONS SEA is attached as Appendix "B".

PART V

SECURITY

Japanese "Counter-Espionage" (Security)

During the last few months evidence has shown that the enemy is becoming more security-minded. This probably is a result of his realization of the vast quantities of information we have obtained from captured documents.

The Jap is now issuing "counter-espionage" instructions down to bns. These instructions contain measures to prevent leakage of information, and detect and prevent our own plans.

The responsibility for security in the unit is borne by a group of six officers, who are changed each week. Their duties are very similar to those of our own unit security officer.

A syllabus for a fourteen day unit course of instruction in security was also found.

A captured instruction not only laid emphasis on the security education of the troops, but also laid down a definite scale of penalties for the breaking of "counter-espionage" rules.

(Adapted from AMF Review No 40)

R. L. Hughes
Lt-Col
3 Aust Div

Distribution:


Copy Nos

17 Aust Inf Bde	1 - 4	2/2 Aust Inf Bde	18
2/6 Aust Inf Bn Gp	5 - 6	3 Aust Div Sec Reception	19
WAU Fwd Defences)		Hq ANGO (MARKHAM DISTRICT)	20
Sta Comd WAU)	7	Sta Comd BULGID	21
2/3 Aust Indep Coy	8	Air Support Control 3 AF	22
2/7 Aust Indep Coy	9	ALO A Pl. 4 AC Sen	23
1 Bty 2/1 Aust Pz Regt)		NGF	24
2/5 Aust Svy Bty)	10	Air Sup Sec A 3 Adv Gen)	
156 Lt AA Bty)	11	5 AF MORESET for)	25
3ENA FORCE	12	4 Aust Inf Bde (Infu)	26
11 Fighter Control Sub-Section	13	15 Aust Inf Bde)	27
706 CA (AA) Bty US Army	14	Comd	28
RAE 3 Aust Div	15	AA & CG	29
Sigs 3 Aust Div	16	AIMS, ADCS, AEME,	30
AASG 3 Aust Div	17	File	31-32
		War Diary	33
		Chart	34

Trace of SAIA MAUA (Revised) 1 1/2 Mile showing :-
ENEMY MOVEMENTS 14 May 43 & AERIAL BOMBING & STRAFING

15 May 43

Appx 'A' to
3 Aust Div
INT SUMMARY No 5
22 May 43



Scale 1" = 1 Mile

Section 8B
Classification: Secret

WEATHER OBSERVATIONS FOR THE NEW GUINEA AREA

The following is an interpretive report of the weather conditions over the New Guinea area as a classification of the weather.

The picture of the weather over the New Guinea area shows that operations have been severely hampered by the weather, which is being caused by the major High Command.

The weather conditions in the New Guinea area are being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

In the New Guinea area, the weather is being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

By using the weather conditions over the New Guinea area, the weather is being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

All of the weather conditions over the New Guinea area are being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

The development of the weather conditions over the New Guinea area is being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

The mountain ranges of the New Guinea area are being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

GRANITE 1000
PALABAN 1000

Associated with these conditions are the weather conditions with disturbed seas through the New Guinea area.

The observing of the weather conditions over the New Guinea area is being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

By using the weather conditions over the New Guinea area, the weather is being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

During this period the continuing influence on the weather is the northern and cyclonic movement, which is being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

The mountain range of the New Guinea area is being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

Disturbances during the New Guinea area are being hampered by the fall into two groups: the first group is the weather over the New Guinea area and the second group is the weather over the New Guinea area.

Japanese weather again demonstrate the conditions between
and - 100 and 200 - 100

0800 2.40 in.
0900 25.85 in.

The Japanese have available a complete network of stations to observe these conditions. On the other hand, Allied meteorologists have little to assist them. Reports from reconnaissance aircraft are of great assistance, however.

Conclusions are that, during the SE season the approaches to LAE and SABALUA are frequently obscured, which coupled with the rough seas in the VITIAR STRAITS indicates that the enemy is likely to use the approach along the south coast of NEW BRITAIN.

Allied commanders however would have ample warning of bad weather conditions.

During the NE season the route along the north coast of NEW BRITAIN favours the enemy, with little warning available to the Allies.

(Adopted from Appx "A" NW Summary No 30).

Not to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ

SECRET

I file: Not to be removed.

Copy No... 31

3 AUSTRALIAN DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO 4

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 13 May 43.

PART I

1. GENERAL

An increase in barge and submarine activity in the MUSHO AREA over the recent period coupled with movement of the JAP 3 from SALAMAU to MUBO indicates that the enemy has been reinforcing this area. More vigorous enemy activity is indicated as a consequence, which has been effectively covered to date. These reinforcements may have come from the LAKE - SALAMAU garrison, or be troops moved in from the EE coast. The enemy concentration is supported by reporting in forward areas of many troops in good condition.

Native information that the enemy patrol which had been operating in the general area 30/40 miles SW of MUBO has been substantiated by a report from our outpost at WESA, 20 miles NW of FENA BENA, of a clash with the enemy patrol on 10 May.

There has been no slackening of the enemy efforts to reinforce WEWAK and MADANG by sea, but the Jap air effort has been confined to reconnaissance.

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) Land
MUBO AREA

To facilitate reference a sketch of the MUBO - GREENHILL area is attached as Appendix "A".

The last week has seen the culmination and frustration of an enemy effort to encircle the right of our positions at MUBO. This action commenced on 25 April by enemy reinforcement of his positions in the GREEN HILL - PIMPLE area. On 27 April, the enemy was strengthening his position on the PIMPLE, but had evidently vacated the ARCHWAY and WOODY ISLAND, as enemy mortar and battalion gun fire was directed into these areas. The enemy also shelled intermittently VICKERS RIDGE with no effect. Our patrols to OBSERVATION HILL on 7 May reported that this area was lightly held, but two days later the enemy re-occupied the ARCHWAY and WOODY ISLAND.

On 10 May OBSERVATION HILL was reported to be held in strength. Air support to the forward troops was freely given on the enemy positions on the PIMPLE. The enemy countered our air attacks by moving forward towards the cableline, and taking up previously prepared positions, from which they successfully repulsed our attacks on 2 May, withdrawing to the PIMPLE after the engagement.

A further attack on PIMPLE on 7 May was also repulsed, and a determined attack made on our positions on LABABIA RIDGE 9 May. Our troops held their ground but the enemy maintained contact.

A relieving force vigorously attacked the enemy on 10 May from the direction of VICKERS RIDGE. The enemy positions, however, well dug in and in depth, foiled every attempt to dislodge them. The position of our forward Coy on LABABIA RIDGE becoming dangerous, a force was established to provide a link to our base camp. This force was, however, overrun by a determined enemy drive at dusk on 10 May, and was withdrawn when out of ammunition. All attempts to dislodge the enemy from the left flank had failed and the position of our forward Coy looked serious.

A determined attack by our forces on the morning of 11 May was successful, however, and the contact with the Coy was re-established.

An enemy counter attack on the left flank was driven off, and on 12 May he had withdrawn to the PIRPLE. Our casualties during this action were only two killed and ten wounded while at least sixty seven enemy were killed. Prior to, and during this action, the enemy received reinforcements via the KONGAI track. Our troops overlooking the track from positions to the west of KONGAI and north to BOEXY, observed several large enemy parties moving south. These were engaged by MG fire with considerable success, and between 5 and 12 May approximately ninety casualties were inflicted. The only attempt at retaliation was return 120 fire from one "party" of 11 May.

MISSION AREA

In the vicinity of BOEXY our forces have had a successful week.

An attack on an enemy position on the south end of BOEXY ridge by our force on 7 May succeeded; the Japs, however, counter-attacked with determination, supported by heavy mortar fire, and the fourth attempt forced our troops to withdraw. The enemy was also consolidating at this stage an ambush position on the BOEXY - SALAMUA track, 300 yards south of the FRANCISCO RIVER.

Raid on the enemy position on BOEXY RIDGE on 9 May were accompanied by harassing fire on the enemy mortar position. No return fire was received and a damp patrol on 11 May found the position unoccupied.

Our patrols exploited further east while consolidation was carried out. A further position covering the BOEXY - SALAMUA track was re-established. The same day, 11 May, the enemy was found to have shifted his ambush north east to a position on the track where it strikes the RIVER.

From this position on 12 May the enemy attacked our troops on the south end of BOEXY RIDGE supported by heavy mortar fire. The attack was repulsed with one of our troops wounded. Enemy casualties in this action were unknown but the total counted casualties inflicted for the week is eighteen.

DEALI - NASSAU BAY AREA

Natives contacted by our patrol to the BICO OVERFLOW on 5 May informed our troops that the enemy was in occupation of villages and coconut groves along the coast from DEALI to NASSAU BAY.

Two small detachments were reported to be covering the track a few hundred yards west of DEALI village, patrols covering the area between the villages. An outpost contacted by our patrol two miles up the BICO OVERFLOW has been previously reported.

The natives in this area are reported to be hostile towards the enemy as he has been conscripting labour without payment upon penalty of death. Further, food in the district is scarce as a result of his occupation and there is much sickness for which no treatment is provided, amongst the natives.

Finally, the Japs have been interfering with their women.

Aerial reconnaissance on 10 May reported sighting thirty-eight outriggers between the mouth of the BICO OVERFLOW and SAGUN BAY. Natives from this area say they belong to LARABIA ISLAND kanakas and are used to transport goods from the villages to LOANU. These carriers are evidently those employed by the Japs.

Two new huts were seen to be in course of construction at the eastern village in NASSAU BAY.

LAE-SALAMUA

Barge and launch activity during the day has increased in SALAMUA harbour, while on three occasions the sound of engines was heard about midnight by our posts at BOEXY. Barge movement in LAE harbour in the late afternoon and early morning on corresponding dates seems to indicate nocturnal barge movement between LAE and SALAMUA.

(3)

A native reported that couriers were used to bring reinforcements and supplies to SALAMUA, back loading the sick and wounded.

Another native report from MAPOS stated that the enemy has established camps containing about thirty each at the mouths of the BUANG and BWUSSE rivers. Evidently the enemy has opened up the land route from LAE to SALAMUA in addition to using the sea route.

A patrol to MALOLO found enemy occupation near the coast in this area, together with old enemy standing troops on the track to SALAMUA. Two empty gun pits were also found.

MARKHAM AREA

It appears that an enemy party of a couple twenty has been operating south of the MARKHAM in the vicinity of MARKHAM POINT. The enemy observed on 6, 19 and 20 April was no doubt part of this force.

On 21 April the party was contacted at a position SE of the sentry position, the sentry not being there that day.

The enemy evidently traced back the route followed by this patrol and resumed its position when the sentry was sighted. Here our patrol made contact on 3 May. From the above it can be assumed that the enemy is now aware of the route to this area used by our troops.

The presence of the enemy on the north side of the river is verified by the sighting opposite MARKHAM POINT of two sentries. Further information has been received from native sources of enemy patrols north of the MARKHAM.

On 4 May a party of one officer and twenty-nine other ranks was contacted at NGASAWAMPUM. They spent the night of 4/5 May at GABSONKEK, returning to NGALAWAMPUM for the night 5/6 May and moving back to LAE on 6 May. The party was armed with ten automatics, carried at the front of the party, the rest carrying rifles.

Reliable information was received in April that enemy patrols NGASAWAMPUM and NEW MUMUM twice weekly.

Natives had previously reported in Feb. a standing patrol of forty, relieved daily, at GABSONKEK. This patrol was abandoned on 21 Feb.

Fires observed north of the MARKHAM are probably of KANAKA origin, as in this and the next few months the natives burn off the kuni to hunt pigs and rats.

MADANG-RAMU AREA

The increase in enemy activity SW of MADANG is marked. The patrol to SXPV passed through MUSAK, thirty-two miles WNW of BOGADJIM and returned to MADANG on 3 May. Reports have also been received that the enemy has mapped the area KESAWAI to KARIPU, twenty-three miles SSW of BOGADJIM.

There is a rumour to the effect that bases are to be established at KEPSAU and KELAU, twenty-five miles west of BOGADJIM.

On 9 May a report was received at an outpost of BENA FORCE that two Japs had crossed the river at WAIMERIBA twenty-four miles north of BENA BENA. On 10 May the same outpost, at WESA, was surprised by 16 Japs, the whites not being captured. Our troops suffered no casualties but three Japs were killed.

The party was guided by WAIMERIBA natives and were dressed in dark green clothes and caps with little equipment. One MG was carried, the rest being armed with rifles. They were last reported back at WAIMERIBA.

It is evident that the natives in this area cannot be trusted. The treatment of the natives by the enemy is now much more considerate than in the past.

Further to the SE the Japs were reported at KAIGULIN and HUMBUM on 4 and 5 May. Soundings were taken of the GUSAP and RAMU rivers both of which were in flood. On 7 May the area was reported clear. This party may be the same as that which contacted our patrol on 16 May. Their activities bear out the previous report of survey operations.

(6)

(b) SEA - JEMME

Activity has been confined mainly to small craft along the NE coast and in the vicinity of CAPE HONORABLE and ROOKE ISLAND. Only normal shipping has been observed at RABUL.

KAVIENG.

A large convoy, of 24,000 tons capacity was seen on 8 May twenty miles south of the west tip of NEW HANOVER ISLAND, travelling in a SE direction. Contact was lost after dark.

WEWAK.

Information on cargo handling obtained from a seaman PW is of interest. He stated that his ship entered WEWAK at 2000 hrs, and everyone worked frantically discharging deck cargo - provisions and materials - in under ten hours. A number of provisions were packed in watertight containers and dumped overboard to save time. The practice of loading stores into watertight drums which are off-loaded in the manner reported above has been in use from time to time since the Buna operations.

MADANG.

On 8 May our aircraft attacked two vessels ten miles south of MADANG. Pilots reported that the entire deck of the larger ship, a vessel of 1,000 tons, was crowded with troops. This ship received three hits and was last seen sinking in flames. The second vessel, a tanker type of 400 tons and loaded with crates and trucks, was also hit and left burning. These two ships, which had come from the NW, had first been sighted on the 7 May, fifteen miles ESE of WEWAK.

Reinforcements to LAE-SALAMUA.

A small cargo boat was reported to be unloading at SALAMUA in the early hours of 8 May. Heavy weather was setting in and despite a special search later in the morning, this vessel could not be located.

Sightings of barges along the Northern coast of NEW BRITAIN have been more numerous than usual. On 8 May a barge containing supplies and fifteen armed and equipped troops, was strafed off the Southern tip of ROOKE Island. The following day, five barges loaded with bales, were in the same area being unloaded by approximately one hundred and fifty Japanese. These sightings indicate that the use of small craft from RABUL along the northern coast of NEW BRITAIN, to ROOKE Island and via FINSCHAFEN, is possibly one of the enemy's methods of reinforcing the LAE area.

At 1441 hrs 10 May a submarine was sighted forty miles south of GASMATA travelling SE. Lights had been observed the previous night in LAE harbour up to 2300 hrs. In order to reach the above position, a speed of fourteen knots would be required. The large I Type Cap submarine is reported to have a speed of 17 knots. It is probable that this submarine had visited LAE.

MILNE BAY.

An Allied vessel was attacked by a submarine south of MILNE BAY on 11 May. No hits were scored.

NW SECTOR.

Shipping sightings have been on a small scale. However, when taken in conjunction with reports of enemy land activity on the NW extremity of NEW GUINEA, they reinforce the indications of steady development in that sector. 9,500 tons of shipping were at MANOKWARI between 1 and 6 May, and a further 10,000 tons were observed there on 9 May. A sea-truck and several small vessels were sighted at SORONG.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 121)

(c) AIR - Own.

GREEN'S HILL - MUBO Area

On 5 and 7 May, three A 20s (Bostons) in support of our forward troops bombed and strafed enemy positions on the "PIPLE".

(3)

On 10 and 11 May, attacks on the MYI CHIEF RD were prevented by bad weather. Barges in the LAEU LAGOON area were attacked on 10 and 11 May by Bostons unable to attack DRY CHIEF RD.

KOMIATUM

On 9 May, six A 80s bombed and strafed the village and its approaches. All bombs landed within a hundred yards of the huts.

AIR ATTACKS

WEWAK

Six B24s (Liberators) attacked shipping and installations on 5 May. Direct hits were scored on a 3,000 ton cargo vessel which was left burning and sinking. On 9 May one B 34 bombed the airfield at BUE.

RABAU

B17s (Fortresses) and B24s attacked WAKKANAU airfield on 8 and 11 May. Detailed results were not observed but some fires were reported.

MADANG

Thirteen bombers attacked this area on 7 May, in addition to the attack on shipping reported on 2 May. GASMATA, CAPE GLOUCESTER, FINSCHAFEN were attacked in succession on 9, 10 and 11 May by six B25s.

(Adapted from NGS Summary 121)

(c) AXE - Enemy.

MILNE BAY was raided on 10 May by two aircraft, no damage or casualties.

PART II

1. ENEMY GOR - LAND.

An estimate of enemy movements and strengths is shown as Appendix "B". and MADANG.

It is now estimated that strength at WEWAK has increased to 15,000 and 8,000 respectively

(NGS Summary 121)

5. EQUIPMENT.

JAPANESE TYPE 99 SHORT RIFLE (.303 Cal)

General

This rifle, except for a shorter barrel, a larger calibre and some improvements to the rear sight, closely resembles the standard infantry rifle, "ARISAKA 38" (1905) model in appearance, operation and general design. Bolt action, dust cover, and safety catch on both weapons are apparently identical. Two readily identified additions have been made:-

A monopod has been attached (by an axle pin) to the outer band. When not in use, this can be raised forward and clipped on to the stop. This monopod is approximately 18 inches in length, and appears to be too long for use in the prone position.

A sling, made of rubberized canvas is attached to swivels positioned on the left side of the outer band and butt. The sling is thus actually attached to the side of the rifle and NOT underneath, as is normally the case.

Characteristics

Calibre	7.7 mm (.303 in)
Magazine capacity	5 rounds
Weight of rifle (unloaded with sling)	3.6 lbs
Overall length	44 inches
Length of barrel	25 1/2 inches
Length of barrel and receiver	32 1/2 inches

(c)

Rifling	RIGHT hand
Number of grooves	four
Twist	one complete turn in 20 inches.
Trigger pressure	5 lbs.

The rear sight is located approximately in the centre of the rifle, and is of the folding leaf type, fitted with a regular peep sight and a battle peep sight. Each has an aperture of $\frac{1}{8}$ inch diameter. The range scale extends from 500 to 1500 metres (500 to 1640 yards). No means are provided for correcting range or drift. A slide is fitted with two arms (right and left) which may be swung outwards to a distance of two and three-eighths inches from the centre of the rifle. It is considered that these are probably used for AA fire.

Ammunition

It is stated that British and American .303 and .30 calibre ammunition will not fit this weapon, but to difference in cartridge case dimensions.

(adapted from ACP Review 40)

PART V

SECURITY

Much can be accomplished for "Security" throughout our Forces by Unit Security Officers. The following may be of assistance to officers engaged in security duties in units.

They can accomplish much by constant vigilance, unremitting attention and frequent check on the numerous security questions that must and do arise daily.

Any unit security officer's first task is to promote the security thought in each officer's and C.O.'s mind. This means that he must first realize how important it is that security should be as perfect as possible, and second, understand how breaches of security can be avoided, whether they be breaches of security of information, personnel, material or operations, and third, report at once all breaches of security.

Perhaps the best way to obtain his object is to carry out frequent discussions and make personal contact on security matters with officers of his unit. The enthusiasm of all officers must be aroused until they realize that security-mindedness among their men and the prevention of all breaches of security are just as important as their ability to use their weapons.

An example of the desired standard could be reached within the unit is shown by the following extract of a letter written by a soldier early in May:

"I more or less censored my own letter. I mentioned "SMYTHES" unit and colour patch which combined with where I said he was, I reckoned it would not do, so cut it out."

Other ranks should be instructed by regular and frequent lecturettes, some by the security officer, but more so by platoon and company commanders. These must be supplemented by the continual individual efforts of platoon commanders and their personal example and exhortation.

(RIF Review 121)

Captured Documents

The value of captured documents has again been borne out in the recent fighting in ARAKH. This value is often of more than immediate operational significance, and it is a fact that every bundle so far received at GHQ has yielded information beyond what is required at divisional or more forward headquarters in the field. Units cannot usually be made aware of what this information is, for various reasons, the information being too scanty, or affecting other operations only, or dealing with the Japanese Air Force, or concerned with economics or other matters, but it is essential that they should realize what a vital part this information plays in helping us to obtain information about, and so defeat, the Japanese.

(7)

A most interesting example of how this "back" information may be built up, is exemplified by a notebook captured in BURMA from a soldier of 55 Division, which contained two addresses of friends with the Japanese Army in MANCHUKUO. This enabled intelligence in INDIA to definitely locate the 11 Jan Division in MANCHUKUO.

(ANF Intelligence Review 40)

Lt-Col
GS 3 Aust Div

Distribution:- See back

Distribution:

Copy No.

17 Aust Inf Bde	1 - 4
2/6 Aust Inf Bn Cp	5 - 6
WAW Fwd Defences	
Sta Comd WAW	7
2/3 Aust Indep Coy	8
2/7 Aust Indep Coy	9
1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt	10
2/6 Aust Svy Bty	11
158 Lt AA Bty	12
BENA FORCE	13
11 Fighter Control Sub-sec	14
708 CA (AA) Bty US Army	15
RAE 3 Aust Div	16
Sigs 3 Aust Div	17
AASC 3 Aust Div	18
2/2 Aust Fd Amb	19
3 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	20
HQ ANGAU MARKHAM District	21
Sta Comd BULOLO	22
Air Sp Control 5 AF	23
ALO A fl 4 AG Sqn	24
NGF	25
4 Aust Inf Bde	26
15 Aust Inf Bde	27
Comd	28
AA&CMG	
AIMS	29
ADOS	
ADME	
File	30 - 31
War Diary	32
Spare	33 - 34

After perusal, please destroy by fire.


SKETCH OF MUBO - GREEN HILL AREA.

showing enemy movement LAGARSA 330

23 Apr - 12 May

Scale 4" = 1 Mile.

App. 2
to Section
Int Summary
No 4.



ESTIMATE OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND STRENGTHS
AS AT 12 MAY 43

1. Enemy Movement

An examination of enemy troops movements observed on the L of C from 20 Apr to 12 May shows that the enemy has received approximately 200 reinforcements to the MUBO area, after subtracting casualties inflicted on the L of C. Allowing for movement, unobserved, during the hours of darkness or nil observation, this figure could be increased to 400.

These reinforcements were undoubtedly moved up to MUBO.

2. From an examination of sightings by our troops the position would appear to be as follows:-

At 7 May the enemy had a coy in the GREEN HILL area, with a further coy disposed on OBSERVATION HILL and to the rear. It is estimated that a further 2 coys would be in reserve. Two coys of reinforcements arriving, enabled the forward positions on LABABA RIDGE to be built up and reinforced, after the casualties suffered, to two coy strength. It must be remembered however, that these troops are possibly a SNLP whose organization is elastic, and may not be subdivided as above.

Strength on the SALAMAUVA - KOMIATUM L of C is considered to be now that of a weak coy - approximately 100.

Enemy Strengths

3. MUBO.

Considered at MUBO - KOMIATUM and on L of C to SALAMAUVA, 4 Mar 43:

MAIZERU No. 2 SNLP	800	
Coy SASEBO No. 5 SNLP	200	
Reinforcements to 12 May	300	1300
Less known casualties since 4 Mar	228	
Plus 50% for wounded and uncounted	112	335
		965
Of these estimate on SALAMAUVA - KOMIATUM L of C		100
Estimated MUBO - KOMIATUM		865

4. DUALI

On 4 May the enemy were encountered on BITOI OVERFLOW two miles from the mouth. This was undoubtedly an outpost of the force believed to have occupied DUALI - NASSAU BA having evacuated KUI and MGRUBE further south.

NGF estimate on 8 May 460

6. SALAMAUA
 Enemy strength was estimated at 4 Mar 43 to be 1630.
 However, owing to the ease with which troops can be transferred
 from LAE, this figure should be read in conjunction with the
 estimate at LAE.

Estimate 12 May 43 1630

7. LAE
 The estimate at 4 Mar 43 was :
 Later indications were that remnants of the
 force which attacked WAG (OKABE DET) were
 quartered at LAE. Estimated

2400

500

Less reinforcements to the MURO AREA

3000

300

Estimate 11 May 43

2700

~~AS ESTIMATED~~

8. Distribution of troops as at 12 May 43 is, therefore,
 estimated as follows:-

MURO - 965
 SALAMAUA
 DUALI
 SALAMAUA
 LAE

965

460

1630

2700

5755

~~AS ESTIMATED~~

NOT to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ.

SECRET

Copy No. 27.....

3 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 3.

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 6 May 43.

PART I.

1. General

Enemy activity throughout the week indicates a continuance of the policy of firmly establishing his bases along the NE coast of NEW GUINEA. The volume of shipping to this area has been maintained at a high level, and patrol activity from the coast inland has increased.

Concurrent with this development RABOUL is assuming a lesser degree of importance as a forward base.

2. Operations. - Land

(a)

MUBO AREA

On 2 May our troops unsuccessfully attacked enemy positions on the PIMPLE; our casualties 4 killed 10 wounded, enemy 3 killed 3 wounded. Since 2 May our troops have been actively patrolling OBSERVATION HILL, GARRISON HILL and the WOODY ISLAND areas. Enemy on the PIMPLE is reported to be well dug in and armed with 8 IMGs 2 MMGs and some mortars.

MISSIM AREA

On 2 May our troops attacked BOBDUBI forcing 36 enemy to evacuate the forward defensive position. Our troops then consolidated on the BOBDUBI RIDGE. The enemy in BOBDUBI actively engaged our troops with MMGs, Mortars, and grenades. On the morning 4 May our troops ambushed 134 native carriers escorted by small party of Japs, followed closely by 3 parties each of 14 armed Japs, moving from the direction KOMIATUM towards SALAMAU. Enemy casualties estimated 15 killed. The natives when MMG opened fire immediately went bush. On the afternoon same day the ambush fired on Jap party of 30 moving south towards KOMIATUM. Enemy casualties 10 killed.

DUALI - NASSAU BAY AREA

Our patrol which moved from MUBO area on the morning 3 May towards DUALI was fired upon by enemy mortars, MMGs and IMGs 4 May. Our patrol then withdrew to the BIROI - BUYAWIN river junction on the night 4/5 May.

This patrol detained two natives from the DUALI area, whom upon interrogation revealed that Japs had impressed a line of natives from their village. The impressed natives were being moved to mouth of FRANCISCO river where they would pick up cargo and carry same to MUBO area via KOMIATUM.

SALAMAU. The natives also stated that SALAMAU was visited nightly by a submarine which offloaded rice and other food commodities.

MARKHAM AREA.

Our troops carried out active patrolling period 1 May to 3 May. They made no contact with the enemy. On the morning 4 May one of our patrols moved towards MARKHAM POINT and contacted enemy on the afternoon same day area DEET CREEK; our casualties one wounded; enemy casualties one killed.

LAE AREA.

Activity noticed in this area indicated routine maintenance of aerodrome and other permanent installations.

SALDOR.

Periodic bombing and strafing of the beaches and villages on

the RAI coast is thought to be causing the natives to proceed inland. Observation in this area is becoming increasingly difficult, and it is reported that the whole coast west of the MARKINA River is completely dominated by the enemy. Natives have been told by the enemy that any help given to our observer parties will result in death to the natives concerned and further reprisals against their families and villages. Enemy patrolling is becoming more active and in greater strength. Our patrols are not strong enough to deal with them, and it is possible that they may have to be temporarily withdrawn further inland.

(NGF Summary No. 120)

MADANG - RAIU RIVER

Inland penetration from MADANG and BOGADITH areas towards the RAIU by enemy patrols is being maintained and apparently increased. It would appear that the enemy is keen to reconnoitre existing tracks and routes both towards the RAIU, either for the purpose of following the river south-east towards the MARKHAI Valley or finding southerly routes across the river into the rich Mt HAGEN-BUNA BUNA plateau.

Natives report the presence of Japanese in the villages of KESA, MADALOI and KOBA, to which the natives have been forced to return in order to be kept under surveillance. Reports state further that natives from this area are being employed breaking stones for a road from BOGADITH to TOBA, about six miles SE along the coast from BOGADITH.

The enemy has also been sighted in a small party, approximately twenty, at SEPU, about 40 miles west of BOGADITH on the north bank of the RAIU. They arrived on 30 Apr and departed the following day without making any attempt to cross the RAIU. Their treatment of the natives seems to have taken a turn for the better as the OC is reported to have told the natives they would not take food, but wanted it brought to them. SEPU is the furthest reported point of navigability up to RAIU.

SEPIK RIVER.

The enemy are alleged to have surveyed the airfield sites at CHIMERIAN and KAMPRIUNDO 40 and 26 miles west of AUGORAN respectively. Reports from natives considered to be reliable are that those areas were clear of enemy on 29 Apr but that a visit will soon be made to KUVINIAS Lake area. Mission sisters and priests of MARUI MISSION were interrogated by the enemy at TIBUNKE and informed that they would be collected at a later date and taken to WENAK.

(NGF Summary No. 120)

GOODENOUGH ISLAND.

A patrol to the ARAPHELET ISLANDS in search of enemy survivors has returned. No enemy were located but some Japanese equipment was found.

(NGF Summary No. 120)

(b) SEA - ENEMY

Bad weather during the week hampered our aerial reconnaissance in the NE sector and reports of shipping sightings in this region have been further than usual. It must not be forgotten however that the enemy plans his convoy movements to take full advantage of conditions of bad weather and poor visibility.

RABAU.

Photographs of RABAU on 1 May showed the following vessels in the harbour:-

1 light cruiser
1 destroyer
2 patrol boats
5 submarines

4 auxiliary craft
39 merchant vessels
totalling 155,600 tons

KAVIENG.

Sightings indicate that this port continues to be used on a moderate scale, chiefly as a stage on the enemy's L of C to RABUL or WEWAK. Two cargo vessels aggregating 7000 tons were seen SW of KAVIENG on 27 Apr and on the 3 May a 12000 ton tanker escorted by a destroyer was sighted in the same area. On 30 Apr photographs revealed a convoy of ten ships averaging about 5000 tons each moving south through STEFFEN Straits.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 120)

WEWAK.

A steady stream of shipping continues to use this port, where the enemy maintains at least 30 or 40 unloading barges in order to turn ships round as quickly as possible. Photographs on 3 May revealed 75 barges, a record concentration.

At least 16 ships totalling 85000 tons visited WEWAK during the week. The only escorting vessels observed were a light cruiser and a destroyer off the port on 1 May at the same time as 5 cargo ships totalling 35/40000 tons were stationary in the roadsteads.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 120)

NEW SECTOR

Reports of shipping movements since 20 Apr indicate unhurried but steady development of bases at many points in this area. Our reconnaissance revealed shipping at AUBON, KOEPANG, HANOKWARI and 50 WARE 45 miles to the south of HANOKWARI, when the largest concentration of eight ships was seen. Two convoys of three ships each were also observed.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 120)

AUSTRALIA

Between 24 Apr and 4 May, five allied ships have been sunk by submarines off the east coast of AUSTRALIA.

(NGF Summary 120)

(c) AIR

(1) OWN

DIRECT SUPPORT.

Bombardiers carried out their direct support missions against the enemy ambush position on GREY HILL. Ground forces reported the bombing to be accurate, but that the enemy avoided casualties by moving forward towards our own troops upon the approach of our aircraft.

GASMATA

Medium bombers on 3 May heavily strafed the airfield, buildings, dumps, small boats and plantation areas in addition to attacks by single aircraft on two other occasions.

WEWAK

The following day WEWAK was heavily bombed, two or three direct hits being scored on the stern of a 5,000 ton cargo vessel which was left listing. Hits were also possibly made on a second vessel.

Tracks were strafed and villages bombed along the RAI coast, while aircraft on reconnaissance strafed barges on the north coast of NEW BRITAIN. FINSCHAFEN, LAE and MADANG were also attacked by reconnaissance bombers, some damage being inflicted.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 120)

(2) Enemy

Enemy air activity over NE NEW GUINEA has been limited to possible reconnaissance over the WAI - BUOLO area on 1 and 5 May. DARWIN was raided in the early hours of 2 May by 29 medium bombers and 25/30 fighters. The target was the RAAF airfield but only slight damage to buildings resulted and the only casualty was one wounded. The enemy lost 5 fighters for certain, 5 probably and 4 fighters and one bomber damaged. Our losses were 14 aircraft, of which 4 are believed to have crashed into the sea out of fuel.

(Adapted from NEF Summary 120)

PART II

1. Enemy OOB.

Air.

The enemy air strength in the NW sector is estimated to have increased from 412 at 26 Apr to 453 on 2 May. This is made up of an increase of 41 planes in the SOLOMONS, together with a transfer of 14 planes from RABAU to NEW GUINEA. In the NW sector, it is estimated that there has been an increase of 8 in the enemy strength.

(Adapted from NEF Summary 12)

4. Organization.

The following list has been prepared to furnish a ready guide to strengths of various units of the Japanese Forces. These totals are estimates, and as such, will need to be revised as more up to date information becomes available.

Infantry Regiment	2,306
Regimental Signals	71
Regimental Gun Company	121
Regimental Tank Attack Unit	112
Infantry Battalion	984
Infantry Rifle Company	191
Infantry Rifle platoon	56
Infantry MG/Rifle Section	14
Infantry Grenade Discharger Section	12
Infantry MG Company	140
Infantry Battalion Gun platoon	50

(NEF Summary 119)

9. General

Extract from PW interrogation report, 7 Jan 43.

"The attitude of this PW is one of constant wariness. The slightest indication of direct interrogation produces a change of expression and a cessation of information. This together with the fact that the last aerial map captured is stamped with a rubber stamp 'Secret. Not to be taken into Air', and combined with an admission by the PW that he had not intended to take it with him on the flight, conveys the impression that there has been considerable improvement in security since previous PW was interrogated. When this PW was told that his map had been found, he denied that it could have been his, as he had not taken one with him. It is therefore assumed that the Japanese have become aware of the fact that prisoners are being taken and are proving a source of information to the enemy, and have tightened up security generally."

(AAF Summary 98)

PART V

Security.

Censorship.

The following is an extract from a letter intercepted by Censorship:-

"Your last letter was somewhat mutilated which seemed to indicate a somewhat strict censorship, but here are a few things that illustrate how lax that censor was and the extent to which you perhaps unknowingly gave away vital information, or rather made available vital information to anyone trained in map reading or such. To start with you said clocks were advanced each day. That indicates easterly travel. The advance was half an hour. That indicates seven and half degrees of longitude covered each day which would mean about 500 miles travel per day easterly. You crossed the Equator on a certain day mentioned - indicates northerly as well as easterly travel, hence distance travelled per day was quite a bit more than 500 miles. You crossed the International Date Line on a Wednesday. That places you very closely on that day when used with foregoing information. The ship was air-conditioned. Coffee was in full supply (USA?). You had some difficulty in finding your way about the ship. With no other information to go on these facts coupled with the fact that we had a letter from some port reached early in the trip, the following story can be pieced together. Large modern vessel, most likely of American registry, Fast (at least 20 knots). First call N. thence N. Easterly with N. America the obvious destination. Let that be a warning to you. I wish I could warn the censor also. The information he cut out was nothing compared to that supplied by the details mentioned. Of course we are not all map readers but people selected to gather information should understand adjustments of LMT (Local Mean Time) because of change of Longitude. I took the liberty of mentioning your letter and these facts to the map school when giving a lecture on time variation, at the same time making it a little lesson on security for good measure".

(The O'land 1. of 3 Int Report No. 53.)

Comment. This extract is not only of interest as an example of deductive reasoning but is a lesson in Security. It shows just what unconsidered trifles may mean to trained minds of Enemy Intelligence.

(ANF Weekly Int Review No. 59)

Lt-col
G3 3 Aust Div

Distribution:

See over.

Distribution:

Copy No.

17 Aust Inf Bde	1 - 4
2/6 Aust Inf Bn Gp	5 - 6
Wau Pwd Defences)	
Sta Command Wau)	7
2/3 Aust Indep Coy	8
2/7 Aust Indep Coy	9
1 Bty 2/1 Aust Pd Regt)	
2/6 Aust Svy Bty)	10
156 Lt AA Bty	11
11 Fighter Control Sub Sec	12
708 CA (AA) Bty US Army	13
RAE 3 Aust Div	14
Sigs 3 Aust Div	15
AASC 3 Aust Div	16
2/2 Aust Pd Amb	17
3 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	18
HQ ANGAU MARKHAM district	19
Sta Comd HUILOLO	20
Air Sp Control 5 AF	21
ALO A Fl 4 AC Sqn	22
Comd	23
AA&CEG	24
ADMS	
ADOS	25
ADME	
File	26 - 27
War Diary	28
Spere	29 - 30 - 31
	29
BENA force	
{ NAF	
{ 4 Bde	
{ 15 Bde	

33

NOT to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ.

1220
SECRET

Copy No.

3 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 2

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 30 Apr 43

PART I

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRENGTHS.

(a) LAND

The enemy has shown increased activity in the SALAMAUA-MUBO area and a number of native carriers escorted by small parties of Japs have been moving along the SALAMAUA-KOMIATUM track. There have been conflicting reports with regard to the food position in the SALAMAUA area, but enemy troops encountered by our patrols are stated to be in good physical condition.

The enemy are reported to have occupied 3 villages SOUTH along the coast from the BIPOI OVERFLOW to NASSAU BAY and are thought to be supplied by small craft from SALAMAUA.

(b) SEA.

Photographic reconnaissance of RABUL over the last month have shown that the average tonnage of shipping in this important base has fallen considerably.

Quite apart from the resultant decrease in the amount of shipping required in the NE area following the withdrawal from the SOLOMONS, it is obvious that a considerable portion of shipping which formerly used RABUL is now using the NE coast ports of WEWAK/HANSA BAY and MADANG. In addition, further use is being made of KAVIENG as a staging base.

(NGF Int Summary 119)

(c) AIR

The lull in offensive enemy air activity continues. A large drop in the number of aircraft based in NEW BRITAIN has been revealed by photographs covering his principal bases. This is extraordinary when one considers the elaborate concentrations that took place in NEW BRITAIN immediately prior to their limited air offensive which commenced on the 12th of April. It may be that many of the aircraft used during that offensive were carrier-borne but temporarily land-based, and have now returned to their carriers which have been withdrawn into more NORTHERN waters to nullify any counter-offensive by the allied air forces against the NEW BRITAIN bases. Actually one of the aircraft used in the raid on PT MORESBY has been definitely identified as carrier-borne.

(NGF Int Summary No 119)

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) Land - Own and Enemy.

MUBO-KOMIATUM-SALAMAUA

On the morning 24 April our troops attacked an enemy ambush position in the MUBO area. The attack was partially successful and contact was again made on the following day 25 April, but the enemy were not dislodged. The enemy dispositions were strongly defended in depth and in the two days operations in this area, three of the enemy were killed. Our patrols penetrated the enemy position on 28 April but were later forced out by a strong enemy force. The enemy were contacted on the main SALAMAUA-KOMIATUM track on the afternoon 24 April and our troops opened fire taking the enemy by surprise killing 18. Our casualties nil.

During the morning of 27 April our patrol engaged the enemy on the south bank of the FRANCISCO RIVER and the enemy withdrew leaving two dead. Our casualties nil. LABABIA OP. was overrun by the enemy on the evening 25 April but was later re-established by our own troops. An enemy position was contacted one mile SOUTH of KOMIATUP on the main KOMIATUP track 27 April. Our patrol attacked on the following day 28 April killing 8. The enemy are reported to be well dug in and has placed booby traps around the same position.

The enemy shelled VICKERS RIDGE area on 28 Apr and a total of 20 shells were fired. Of these, two rounds were smoke, two unexploded.

On 29 Apr 10 shells were fired in the area NORTH of MUBO strip, 4 rounds were unobserved and one failed to explode.

SALAMAUA TOWN AREA.

On the 24 Apr a body of troops approximately 110, were observed moving along the peninsula Rd. Movement has been observed around O'DEA'S house on the 25/27 Apr and two-way MT movement along the quarry-cemetery road continued throughout the past week.

The BURNS PHILP jetty is thought to have been destroyed by our aircraft. The enemy are reported to have constructed a new road from LETTU to the highest point on the peninsula of an estimated width of 6 feet.

During the afternoon of 29 April a small but fierce fire was observed near the overhanging tree on the isthmus. A BOBUBAI native report states that the LUTHERAN CHURCH at LOGUI near the north end of the SALAMAUA strip is occupied by the enemy from dusk each night.

DUALI-LABABIA ISLAND-NASSAU BAY.

28 Apr a patrol moved EAST from MUBO area along the track just south of the BITOI OVERFLOW to 825334 ref map SALAMAUA revised. The patrol crossed the OVERFLOW at 805337 and moved west to 771847, then to feature in square 7584. The patrol reports that no enemy troops or natives were seen and that no tracks exist either south from the OVERFLOW or north from the BITOI RIVER.

LAE.

Lorry movement continues. On 24 April, MT from HEATHS to LAE and on 25 Apr around the TERRACE NW along the HARKHAM RD. Further activity by lorries on 25 April was reported NE from LAE to area NE of MT LUNAMAN. 3 canoes were observed moving up the HARKHAM RIVER from vicinity MT LISANTUM to BWARIP on 22 April but the occupants were obscured by sails. Considerable barge movements have taken place between LAE-LABU and LAE-MALAHANG WRECK.

A party of 30 men were reported working on the airfield during the morning 24 April.

BOGIA-NUBIA.

It has been stated that some INDIAN and MALAYAN prisoners are being used in this area, probably improving the airfield at NUBIA, and repairing roads and bridges. It is also said that enemy aircraft are not permanently based at NUBIA and only visit there prior to the arrival of shipping at HANSA BAY. A patrol recently from APHANBERG down the RAWE RIVER states that the general relation between the Japanese and natives are friendly. The natives are not being ill-treated and are being paid by the Japanese in coin and paper money.

- 5 -

Continuous bombing has caused most of the beach natives to "go bush" and this may have the desired result of disorganizing enemy labour lines. The majority of natives are reported still loyal to our observers and patrols in this area and have denied information of their whereabouts and have refused to show road and tracks to the enemy.

(NGF Int Summary 119)

WEWAK AREA.

It would appear that the main road referred to as completed from the mouth of the RAMU to ULINGAN has been further extended. Native reports indicate that this road runs from WEWAK to MADANG. It has been reported on the road, and if this is so, movement of troops and supplies will no doubt be made by road from WEWAK and BOGIA to MADANG, and thence by barge and small craft to LAE-SALAMAU.

Enemy activity on the SEPIK has shown an increase and interest in the area between the coast and the river has sharpened. BURUI has been visited and the enemy is expected to be in occupation "within a few weeks". Japanese penetration upstream as far as MURUI- has been effected, and this place too, is expected to be garrisoned within the same period. Enemy air reconnaissance of the SEPIK has been observed and it is apparent that the force at WEWAK is not intended to remain purely as a static coastal place.

(NGF Int Summary 119)

(b) SEA - ENEMY.

WEWAK. After the complicated shipping movements of the previous week, there has been a lull in enemy sea activity. The following ships were at anchorage on 23 April -

- 4 small cargo vessels
- 3 coasters
- 2 large power boats
- 32 barges.

With the exception of small cargo vessels, photographs reveal that all of these were still there on 26 April. An aircraft on 24 April reported a convoy of 7 ships in position 270 miles north AITAPE, on a course WNW. It comprised:-

- 2 destroyers
- 3 - 12000 ton cargo vessels
- 2 - 5000 ton transports.

Three bombing runs were made but no hits were scored. Later the ships were reported to be off MINDANAO in the PHILIPPINES.

MADANG-HUCN GULF AREA.

On 19 April, a 10,000 ton cargo ship and a small vessel probably a "sea-truck" was sighted off FINSCHAFEN and two days later what were probably the same two ships were 15 miles NE of the SEPIK RIVER mouth and moving WEST. Next day, a damaged 1000 ton cargo vessel was observed at the Government Wharf, MADANG. Four barges were nearby. On 23 April, 2 small ships, one of 80 feet and the other of 50 feet were at sea off HOPOI.

It is still possible that supplies are being moved into LAE by submarines, which use the MALAHANG WRECK as a landing stage at night. Barges are frequently seen moving between the wreck and LAE. On 20 April, a reliable source reported suspected submarines in LAE harbour. The same day two vessels, stated to be not unlike submarines were sighted near a buoy in SALAMAU harbour.

(NGF Int Summary 119)

(c) AIR - GVN.
Direct Support.

4 beaufighters strafed KONTIATUM track and the surrounding area on 23 April with unobserved results. The enemy ambush position on GREEN HILL (HUBO area) was attacked on 4 successive days 24/27 April and reports from ground troops state that bombing and strafing was most accurate.

Strikes and Armed Reconnaissances.

23 April 43. One Liberator scored a direct hit and one near miss on an 8/10,000 ton cargo vessel 60 miles SSE HAVIENG. Smoke rose to 3000 feet and the vessel was last sighted on fire and sinking.

RAI COAST.

24 April 43, one Liberator bombed SENGOR village. The villages of BILIAU, BUBBI and SENGOR were strafed by single recon aircraft.

WEYAK.

25 April Fortresses bombed the airfield. Bombs were scored on both ends of the runway and also in the dispersal areas. Small fires were started.

LAE.

26 April. Liberators attacked the airfield.

LABU.

26 April. Beaufighters heavily strafed the barge hideout in LABU lagoon.

ETNSCHAFREN.

Single aircraft bombed airfield and town area on four occasions. Some damage to buildings resulted and a number of fires were started.

INTERCEPTION.

24 April. One Liberator was intercepted by 10/12 enemy fighters over WEYAK. The ensuing combat lasted for 30 minutes and 5 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

(d) AIR - ENEMY

Enemy offensive air effort has been negligible. Single aircraft only have been employed in each of three raids, which combined, produced one fatal allied casualty and three wounded. No damage to installations or equipment resulted. Two bombs were dropped on DONA on 24 April, and on the same day a float plane dropped a single bomb and made two strafing runs over small ships over Cape WARD-HUNT. Neither vessel was damaged. Again at 0245K/27 April a single aircraft dropped 4 bombs in MOROBE harbour. No casualties or damage resulted. A reconnaissance aircraft was over MOREBY on 24 April and another was reported over WAIGANI on the 24 April. Both of these aircraft were estimated to be at an altitude of 3000 feet.

(Adapted from HGT Int Summary 113)

PART II

1. ENEMY GOR - LAND

A PW has stated that a paratroop unit approximately 500 strong was at RABUL on 21 November 42 and still there on 28 February 43. It is known as the SHINITU Bitoi and the commander was thought to be Lt-col SHINITU.

There have been recent reports of fluctuations of enemy strengths in the HUBO-SALAMAU-DUALI areas; but in the absence of substantial information it is not at present possible to make a re-estimate of strength.

A recent report stated that 60 tanks were seen on the WEST side of the RABUL-KOKORO Rd. These are said to be new and

- 3 -
bearing the army insignia of the 5 pointed star.

2. EQUIPMENT.

In the raid on MORESBY on 12 April 48, the enemy made use of a new type of incendiary bomb. A detailed report is not yet to hand but preliminary description is as follows:-

The bomb was a 250 kg (approximately 551 lbs) height about 5'6" and painted battleship grey with a red band on the tail fin. The bomb casing was of poor quality, cast steel, ranging from 1 inch thick at the nose to less than $\frac{1}{2}$ inch toward the tail fin.

The usual burster charge was fitted into the nose and detonated by an impact fuse. An elaborate clockwork fuse was fitted into the tail and set to burst approximately 200 feet above the ground. This would then scatter approximately 700 incendiary pellets in all directions up to several hundred yards. The individual pellet was made of iron piping 2.7 inches long and 1.1 inches in diameter, filled with an incendiary material apparently electron metal impregnated with a rubber composition. The method of ignition is not clear, but the mixture possibly contains an igniting compound similar to potassium chlorate. This is the most efficient type of incendiary bomb so far used by the Japanese and is of extreme danger because of its anti-personnel effect. The best method of extinguishing the pellet is to cover with sand or dirt or else isolate and allow to burn out.

(REF Int Summary 119)

W.H.T.
Lt-col
G-3 Aust Div

NOT to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ.

SECRET.

Copy No. 22.

3 AUST DIV.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 1.

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 22 Apr 43.

PART 1.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRENGTHS.

(a) LAND:

General dispositions of both forces in the SALAMAUA-MIBO area remain unchanged. During night 21/22 APR a successful raid on KUMIATUM was carried out by our forces who killed 20 enemy. Another patrol moving towards the BITOI mouth was in contact with the enemy 21/22 APR.

Activity observed along the SALAMAUA-KUMIATUM track on 19/20 APR coincided with small craft activity in SAMOA Harbour. Reports from native sources suggest that the carrier line to KUMIATUM is only sufficient to support about 300 troops on a very low scale of rations. However the movement observed on 19/20 APR along the KUMIATUM track was considerably more than this native report suggests.

Although at present it appears that the LAB-SALAMAUA garrison is hard pressed for supplies, it can be accepted that the enemy's difficulties in this respect may soon be relieved. The continual development of bases along the northwest coast will ultimately provide a supply line for both rations and reinforcements.

(b) SEA:

Reports of shipping in the WAKAK area have been somewhat conflicting, however it is probable that enemy shipping to this area since the end of FEB aggregates approx 138,000 tons. This tonnage could carry 20,500 troops; but it is unlikely that all vessels were used as troop transports, particularly in view of the heavy construction work which has taken place in this area, coupled with the necessity of building up supply reserves. It is considered probable that the convoys of 14 MAR 25 MAR and 13 MAR brought approx 11,000 troops.

(Adapted from NGF Int Summary No 118)

(c) AIR:

Scale of effort by both forces has been less than during the previous week. Enemy reconnaissance aircraft, however, have been active, having been reported over WAU, BULOLO, ADRESBY and MINE BAY.

Enemy concentrations of aircraft remain at their recent high level. Further heavy strikes against Allied bases must be expected.

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) LAND - OWN and ENEMY.

DUALI-LABABIA ISLAND-NASSAU BAY.

The belief that the enemy are in occupation of villages between DUALI and NASSAU BAY is supported by the air report of an apparent telephone line visible along the track leading from DUALI to NASSAU BAY. This line also appears to cross the mouth of the small stream entering NASSAU BAY at LW7987.

Report from native sources states that the area of SACHEN BAY (6 miles south of DUALI) is sown with anti-personnel mines, particularly in the vicinity of CAPE ROULE. This information has not been confirmed from local sources.

On 19 APR a lugger which was reported approaching LABABIA ISLAND was later reported moving from the island to the shore. Air recon has been unable to observe movement on LABABIA IS although trenches have been observed on the

southwest tip of the island. A square structure on the SW side of the island appears to be made of iron, and is apparently not of native origin.

On 21 APR a patrol moving along the BITOI towards the sea twice encountered the enemy. On the second occasion two enemy were killed without loss to ourselves.

MUBO-KOMIATUM-SALAMUA.

Ref map SALAMUA line - a patrol from MAT MAT received VIALS Track from (6859 OBSERVATION HILL to MISSIM discovering a possible enemy OP overlooking MISSIM/ A track from the vicinity of this OP ran east in the direction of KOMIATUM.

General dispositions in area OBSERVATION HILL-KITCHEN CK-LABABIA RIDGE have remained unchanged during the past week, but active reconnaissance has been carried out by our patrols.

During night 21/22 APR a patrol from our forces based in the MISSIM area staged a raid on KOMIATUM resulting in the killing of twenty enemy without loss to ourselves.

On 20 APR considerable movement of small craft about SALUA Hbr was observed throughout the day and two vessels not unlike submarines were sighted during the afternoon. On 19 and 20 APR several parties, numbering approx 20 each time, were observed moving along the track SALAMUA-KOMIATUM. It has been observed on previous occasions that sightings of persons moving by day and light flashing by night along the KOMIATUM track has coincided with increased harbour activity.

According to native report, carrying from SALAMUA to KOMIATUM is now done by a line of 30 carriers on Wednesdays and Saturdays. They leave the FRANCISCO River at 1500 hrs, arriving at KOMIATUM after dark. The line from KOMIATUM to MUBO does the return trip the following day.

LAE:

Lorry activity in the LAE area has increased. On 17 APR 10 lorries came from the NE to a point near the wharves. Nine of the lorries were seen later travelling NW along the MARKHAM Rd. One lorry came from a dump area on the SW corner of the drome, and this also went up the MARKHAM Rd. Two other lorries were seen in the wharf area.

On 19 APR, 18 lorries were seen moving NW along the MARKHAM Rd, having apparently come from the TERRACE area.

It is not known if these vehicles went to HEATHS or were moving personnel or materials to the new defence works now being constructed at JACOBSENS or EMERYS. A new clearing has appeared in the area 275 yds NW of EMERYS, and kunai fires have been noticed in the area on 17 and 20 APR.

Lorries have also been active in the drome area. On 17 APR lorries were noticed bringing material from a dispersal bay area on the NE corner of the runway. This material was being carted to the site of the former drome HQ previously destroyed by our A/C. On 21 APR lorry activity was again noticed from the same dispersal area, this time to AA defences SW of drome where four new gun posts were reported by our A/C the same day.

As gravel is available from nearby pits, it is suggested that timber was being carted from the bush beyond the dispersal bay, to be used in the construction of a possible new underground drome HQ, and for the protection of the AA posts against our bombing attacks.

The normal barge activity was noticed until 15 APR, when the MALAHANG wreck became the focal point for barge traffic and continued as such until 19 APR. Personnel were taken out in the barges to the wreck. During this time barges made frequent visits to the wreck, usually returning to LAE.

The main coastal barge traffic was between LAE and LABU. Between 15 and 17 APR seven barges were seen to move from LAE, and one from MALAHANG to LABU. Eight barges returned during this period to LAE. These barges were observed moving in daylight and there is no information as to possible traffic at night.

No transport planes have been observed landing supplies at LAE since 20 MAR, and it is thought that essential supplies are being maintained by submarines using the MALAHANG wreck as a landing stage at night.

HANSA BAY-BOGIA-NUBIA.

This section of the north coast is becoming another focal point like WEWAK, and it would appear that the enemy intends developing BOGIA per medium of shipping into HANSA BAY and by air transport to NUBIA. Extensive installations at NUBIA and BOGIA, including ten barrage or observation balloons at each place, have been observed. These balloons may be intended purely as observation mediums, but ten at each place would be hardly required, and it is thought that they may be for either airfield or harbour protection.

Native reports, which have been corroborated by eyewitnesses, state that the "main road" has been completed, all rivers bridged, and is now being used by MT. The section of the coastal road to which this report refers is not clear, but it would appear that it is the stretch between the RAMU R mouth and ULIGAN. Further details are being obtained.

Large concentrations of Japanese are reported at all plantations in this area, whilst troops and supplies are stated to be going forward to MADANG daily.

WEWAK.

The apparent quietness of the Japanese force at WEWAK (estimated strength 12,000 troops) has suddenly been dispelled by reports of patrols into the hinterland to YAMIL, MAPRIK and BURUI, and a river patrol which proceeded upstream as far as KAMINDIBIT, and then returned to TIMBUNKE.

An observer in this area has reported rumours from KAMINDIBIT, which are considered to be reliable, of the projected visit of naval vessels and a high Japanese officer up the SEPIK within the next few weeks. It is also said that preparations to garrison all tracks between WEWAK and the SEPIK R. are being made. Obviously this reconnaissance is because of Japanese apprehension regarding their flank and the garrisoning of the routes between WEWAK and the river will have the effect of keeping our patrols, the existence of which the enemy is well aware, at arms length.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

(b) SEA - ENEMY.

WEWAK and HANSA BAY.

A determined attempt, on a larger scale than usual, has been made to reinforce this area.

Over the period 12/16 APR, a force of six merchant vessels totalling 25/30,000 tons and escorted by three destroyers, endeavoured to unload supplies, both at WEWAK and HANSA BAY. In the late afternoon of 12 APR, this force had reached HANSA BAY and begun unloading. Just before midnight, it was attacked by our bombers, which hit two ships, and the force at once put out to sea. Fourteen hours later it was located forty miles to the NW. It was next reported on 15 APR in the vicinity WEWAK, about to enter the harbour. Late that night it was again bombed, and four ships were hit. Once again the force was seen putting to sea, and ten hours later four vessels were reported sixty miles to the NE, steering north.

It is considered that this convoy could not have spent, at the most, more than a total of thirty-six hours in port unloading. An unusually large number of fighter aircraft were in the area; and the enemy's keenness to avoid our bombers was shown also by the fact that each time they were attacked they put to sea at once.

In addition to this convoy, 13/15,000 tons of shipping were observed at WEWAK and HANSA BAY between 12/16 APR and had sufficient time to unload.

On 18 APR, a photographic reconnaissance revealed one 8,000 ton cargo vessel with a barge alongside, evidently unloading. A number of smaller vessels were also seen, in addition to coastal vessels, luggers, two large power boats, and upwards of twenty-five barges. On 19 APR, a small convoy was sighted entering WEWAK Harbour from the NW, and an hour later it had begun unloading into barges. According to photographs, it comprised-

- 1 x 8,000 ton merchant vessel.
- 2 x 1,000 " " "
- 3 coasters.

It is estimated therefore, that the total of merchant tonnage moved into WEWAK between 12/19 APR, was 65/70,000 tons. Of this, at least 34,000 tons were hit or sunk during the same period.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

(c) AIR - ONE:

NEWAK and HANSA BAY:

On 14 APR, Fortresses skip bombed a 5/8,000 ton cargo vessel, scoring three direct hits; in addition the vessel was heavily strafed and left burning. Anti-aircraft positions around the foreshore were also bombed and strafed.

Heavy bombers on 15 APR made a heavy low level attack on shipping. A 6/8,000 ton cargo vessel was sunk, another vessel of similar size probably sunk, and an 8,000 ton transport damaged. In addition, a further unidentified vessel also received damage.

Further attacks on shipping in this area were carried out on 20 APR. Three direct hits were scored on a 4/6,000 ton cargo vessel; a large explosion followed the third hit, and the vessel burst into flames and subsequently sank.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

Other attacks were launched during the week on KABAUL, SAIDON and HOLLANDIA BAY.

DIRECT SUPPORT:

On 15 APR a bombing and strafing attack on area vicinity BULGAP CK was carried out by seven BOSTONS. On 22 APR four BOSTONS and four MITCHELLS bombed and strafed the area BITUL Mouth to NASSAU BAY in support of our patrol moving into this area.

(c) AIR - ENEMY:

Enemy air activity during the week has been confined to reconnaissance and one desultory raid, possibly carried out by a reconnaissance aircraft, on MOROBE on 19 APR. Enemy aircraft were reported over MOROBE on 16 and 21 APR and MAU and BULOLO 19 APR.

One Japanese aircraft dropped two bombs and strafed the MOROBE area in the early morning of 19 APR. A single aircraft was over MILLE BAY at 0806 hrs on 18 APR. It was engaged with AA fire with unobserved results.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

On 21 APR an Allied aircraft reported a large unidentified aircraft on SALAMAUA drone with lorries alongside. This is the first report of aircraft on this drone for a considerable time. This report has NOT been confirmed by ground observation in SALAMAUA area.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND:

In view of the recent barge and road activity on the NE coast of NEW GUINEA, it is possible that there has been a considerable change-over in enemy strength in the NEWAK and MADANG areas. Present estimates are:-

NEWAK	12,000
MADANG	6/8,000
HANSA BAY	1,500/1,600

Attached as Appendix "A" is a report on barge loading and tests carried out at SCURSBAYA on 8 JUN 42. This should prove to be of considerable value when studying the recent barge movement down the NG coast.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

2. IDENTIFICATIONS:

The following statement has been made by a PW:

"Guards Division troops wear a hat badge consisting of a star surrounded by two sheaves of leaves."

This information has not yet been confirmed. (NGF Int Summary No 118)

4. ORGANIZATION:

A ready reference to the strengths of various units of the Japanese forces is attached as Appendix "B".

for Lt Col
GS. 3 Aust Div.

3 AUSTRALIAN DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 1.

JAPANESE USE OF "BARGE" CONVOYS.

A document has been examined, which shows that the Japanese have been experimenting with the use of MLC for convoy work in tropical waters. The details of findings of these experiments are set out below.

TIME OF THE TEST. 8 Jun 42

PLACE. SOURABAYA, JAVA

COURSE. From SOURABAYA Hbr to the mouth of the SOLO River, approx 28 miles.

SAILING TIME. 0900 - 1600 hrs = 7 hrs.

CLIMATIC CONDITIONS. Max Temperature 92°F. Min Temperature 82°F. The sea was calm with little wind and the direct sunlight was strong.

PERSONNEL. Tps were allocated to MLC fully equipped and prepared to use their weapons against aircraft and submarines. They cooked their food on board.

FINDINGS. ALLOCATION OF TROOPS TO MLC.

(a) Rifle Coy -

Large MLC	50 men
Small MLC	25 men

(b) MG Coy -

Large MLC	40 men with 3 MGs
Small MLC	20 men with 1 MG

(c) Inf Bn Gun Unit -

Large MLC	40 men with 2/70mm guns (one gun in the bow ready for firing and one gun in the stern dismantled)
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(d) Inf Regt Artillery Unit -

Large MLC	35 men with 1/75 mm Regt Gun, ready for firing.
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(e) Mtn Artillery Unit -

Large MLC	35 men with 1/75 mm Mtn Gun, ready for firing.
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(f) Tank Attack Unit.-

Large MLC	28 men with 2/37mm Tank Attack guns, one ready to fire in the bow the other assembled in the stern.
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(g) Lt Armored Car Unit -

Large MLC	15 men with one Lt Armored Car.
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(h) Tank Unit -

Large MLC	(Special) 15 men with one lt tank
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(i) Engr Unit -

Although comparable to the inf unit, the number of men must be reduced due to the great amount of eqpt.

(j) Command Boat.

When a large MLC is used as a command boat, 25 - 30 men are advisable.

It appears from the documents that MLCs, loaded as shown in the above subparagraphs, moved as a body with boats arranged roughly in a cruciform pattern 600 metres long and 700 metres wide, with the Command Boat at the centre maintaining contact with the point boat and the base by means of E/F. Protection from aircraft and submarines was provided by small arms and artillery weapons; the artillery mounted on sandbags, being ready to engage targets of opportunity.

(NGF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 118)