

AWM52

Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/5/12 DIVISIONS

6 Australian Division General
Staff Branch (6 Aust Div GS
Branch)

March - April 1941



1/5/12-0163

0.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
B el TANBIA	Mar 1		<u>Locations</u>.- 16 A Tk Coy moved to GHEMINES area. <u>Int Summary</u>.- 6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 29 was issued at 2230 hrs.	6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 29
	2		<u>Locations</u>.- 16 A Tk Coy moved to GTAFIA, and 2/3 Fd Regt to DERNA area.	
	3		<u>Visitors</u>.- Lt-Gen Sir Philip Neame, VC, CB, DSO, GOC-in-C CYRENAICA, accompanied by Lieut the Earl of Ranfurley, ADC, and Maj P.Marsham, GSO II CYRENAICA FORCE, arrived at Adv 6 Aust Div HQ at 1630 hrs. <u>Operations</u>.- Tac/R at 1315 hrs reported large concentrations enemy MT on the rd WEST of frontier and Comd CYRCOM asked MIDEAST for bombing resources to be available against such targets. <u>Locations</u>.- Statement was issued as at 0900 hrs today. <u>Relief of 6 Aust Div</u>.- Advice was received that 6 Aust Div would be relieved by 9 Aust Div, 20 Aust Inf Bde taking over from 17 Aust Inf Bde, and 51 A Fd Regt from 2/1 Fd Regt. <u>Honours and Awards</u>.- Announcement was made in the Press today that His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to confer a Knighthood of the British Empire on Maj-Gen I.G. Mackay, CMG, DSO, VD, GOC 6 Aust Div, for his services in the CYRENAICA campaign. GHQ, ME, advised that the Distinguished Service Order has been conferred on Maj I.R.Campbell, psc, GSO II, 6 Aust Div, for services in the field.	6 Aust Div Loc-Stat- ment, 3 Mar S/113/G.
	4		<u>Visitors</u>.- Lt-Gen Sir Philip Neame, VC, CB, DSO, accompanied by GOC 6 Aust Div (Sir Iven Mackay, and GSO I (Col G.A.Vasey), and personal staffs visited the units under comd 6 Aust Div in the fwd area. <u>Locations</u>.- 2/3 Fd Regt moved to SALUM area. <u>Att Tps</u>.- 51 A Fd Regt came under comd 6 Aust Div.	

3:16. W: 154-1704 1948x 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	Mar 4	(contd)	<u>Int Summary.</u>- 6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 30 was issued at 1400 hrs. <u>Captured German Aircraft.</u>- The procedure in connection with German Air Force prisoners and aircraft brought down or forced landed in our territory was repeated to units. <u>Security of Documents.</u>- Instns for disposal of unit files was promulgated.	6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 30. Appx. 5. S/859/GSI. Appx. 5 S/860/GSI. Appx. 5
	5		<u>Operations.</u>- 6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 29 issued at 2220 hrs, amplifying the roles of fwd tps.	6 Aust Div Op Instn 29 Appx. 7.
	6		<u>Operations.</u>- Amendment to Op Instn No. 29 of 5 Mar was issued at 1830 hrs. CYRENAICA Comd Op Instn No. 4 issued and 6 Aust Div to deny enemy the area EAST of the general line of the boundary between CYRENAICA and TRIPOLITANIA. <u>Int Summary.</u>- 6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 31 issued at 1500 hrs. <u>Relief of 6 Aust Div.</u>- 6 Aust Div Movement Order No. 1, issued at 2125 hrs, provides for the relief of 6 Aust Div units by 9 Aust Div, and for 6 Aust Div move to EGYPT. <u>Att Tps.</u>- 37 Lt AA Bty RA comes under comd 6 Aust Div.	Amend to 6 Aust Div Op Instn 29. Appx. 5 6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 31. Appx. 4. 6 Aust Div Movement Order No. 1 Appx. 10.
	7		<u>Visitors.</u>- GOC and ADC left for BARCE for discussions and talks with GOC 9 Aust Div. Maj-Gen Sir Iven Mackay and ADC to fly to EGYPT on 9 Mar. Brig Murray, Comd 20 Ede, arrived 1700 hrs, accompanied by Staff Officer for instns re "take over" of fwd areas.	
	8		<u>Visitors.</u>- GOC and G I 9 Aust Div arrived at Div HQ at 1630 hrs. <u>Lustre Force.</u>- Col Prior, AQ 6 Aust Div, returned from CAIRO at 1630 hrs with Admin Instn of Lustre Force, of which 6 Aust Div is to form a part. AQ Branch issued instns to units on the move back to EGYPT. Ede Gps are to move to MERSA MATRUH and refit there. From then on, all units come under direct comd CHQ, ME (Movement Control) and will move from MATRUH as instructed by that HQ. For the purposes of embarkation, HQ 6 Aust Div will be under	

WAR DIARY

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	Mar			
	8		19 Aust Inf Bde Gp for adm.	
	(centd)		<u>Locations.</u> - 15 Aust Inf Bde Gp moved to MATRUH. This Gp includes 2/1 Fd Coy and 2/1 Fd Amb.	
			<u>Relief of 6 Aust Div.</u> - 3 Armd Bde were instructed to protect the front of 17 Aust Inf Bde during their relief by 20 Aust Inf Bde from 2000 hrs 9 Mar, until 0700 hrs 10 Mar.	S/130/G. Appx. 11.
			Div Comds were advised that 9 Aust Div would assume responsibility for the area from 1200 hrs 11 Mar, and would take over all code names intact.	0/822. Appx. 12.
	9		<u>Relief of 6 Aust Div.</u> - Div Comds were advised that 9 Aust Div would also take over originator's numbers on the relief.	0/825. Appx. 13.
			6 Aust Div Movement Order No. 2 for the move Eastwards to MATRUH of 6 Aust Div HQ Gp was issued at 1200 hrs.	6 Aust Div Move Order No. 2. Appx. 14.
			<u>Int Summary.</u> - 6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 32 was issued at 1400 hrs.	6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 32. Appx. 15.
			<u>Locations.</u> - 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp less 2/6 Bn moved to AGEDABIA area, 2/6 Bn moving to BARACCA.	
	10		<u>Locations.</u> - 2/1 Fd Regt moved to AGEDABIA, 17 Bde Gp less 2/6 Bn to TOCRA, and 2/6 Bn to DERNA.	
	11		<u>Enemy Air Activity.</u> - Adv HQ 6 Aust Div was bombed and machinegunned from the air twice today. The first attack was at 0750 hrs when two ME 110s returning from the direction of AGEDABIA dropped two bombs on Div Sigs dispersal area and machinegunned the men's cookhouse. The second attack was made by 3 ME 110s about 1300 hrs when one bomb was dropped and the men's cookhouse and the ridge behind the G office machinegunned. The planes met heavy LMG fire. Two casualties were reported from the morning attack - an orderly received a slight scalp wound and the Cpl Cook of 9 Div was wounded in the shoulder. There were no casualties from the afternoon raid.	
			<u>Locations.</u> - ^{A.C.P.} Adv HQ 6 Aust Div moved to ^O TACRA in accordance with 6 Aust Div Movement Order No. 2.	6 Aust Div Move Order No. 2. Appx. 14.

WAR DIARY

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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	Mar 11	(centd)	<u>Int Summary.</u>- 6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 33 issued at 1415 hrs. <u>Relief of 6 Aust Div.</u>- 9 Aust Div assumed responsibility for defence of the area from 1200 hrs today, and all att units and 16 Aust A Tk Coy passed to their comd.	6 Aust Div Int Summary No. 33 Appx. 16.
TOCRA	12		<u>Locations.</u>- B Gp HQ 6 Aust Div moved to TOCRA and A Gp to DERNIA. 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp and A Sqn 6 Aust Cav moved to TOBRUK.	
MARTUBA	13		<u>Staff.</u>- Col G.A.Vasey, DSO, GSO I 6 Aust Div, was promoted to Temporary Brigadier and appointed to comd 19 Aust Inf Bde. Col R.B.Sutherland is appointed GSO I 6 Aust Div. <u>Locations.</u>- B Gp HQ 6 Aust Div moved to MARTUBA and A Gp to TOBRUK. 2/2 Fd Regt moved to BARDIA.	
SALUM	14		<u>Locations.</u>- B Gp HQ 6 Aust Div moved to SALUM and were joined there by A Gp. 6 Aust Div Movement Order No. 2 provided for this stop to be made at BARDIA, but in view of the khamasin blowing, the move was continued to SALUM. 2/2 Fd Regt moved to SIDI BARRANI, 2/2 Fd Fk Coy to BUQBUQ and 19 Aust Inf Bde Gp to BARDIA.	
MATRUH	15		<u>Locations.</u> - HQ 6 Aust Div moved to Mersa Matruh. The move for this day was to have been to Buq Buq, but the intense sand storm was still blowing and the extra distance was travelled to avoid the worst of the storm. 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp moved to Ikingi Maryut and 19 Aust Inf Bde, 2/2 Fd Regt and 2/2 Fd Coy to Matruh.	
IKINGI MARYUT	16		<u>Locations.</u>- HQ 6 Aust Div moved to Ikingi Maryut and shared billets and offices with HQ 1 Aust Corps. Div HQ settled down to refit, and a period of comparative inactivity followed, as there were no troops under comd, all units being under direct comd of GHQ, ME (Movement Control).	
	17		<u>Locations.</u>- Statement was issued as at 1800 hrs today, with a limited distribution. "A" Sqn 6 Aust Div moved to Ikingi Maryut today.	6 Aust Div Loc State-ment 17 Mar. Appx. 17

(S)
WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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or
~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~
(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
IKINGI MARYUT.	Mar 41.			
	18		<u>Move of "LUSTRE" Force.</u> - 16 Aust Inf Bde embarked at Alexandria today for "LUSTRE" force.	
	22		<u>Locations.</u> - Statement was issued as at 1800 hrs today.	6 Aust Div Loc. Statement 22 Mar. Appx. 8.
	23		<u>Locations.</u> - 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp moved to BUQ BUQ, 2/2 Fd Regt and 19 Aust Inf Bde less 2/11 Bn moved to Ikingi Maryut. 2/3 Fd Regt and 1 A Tk Regt come under 19 Bde for administration of the move of "LUSTRE" force.	
	24		<u>Move of "LUSTRE" Force.</u> - Personnel of HQ 1 Aust Corps entrained at Ikingi Maryut at 1400 hrs today, for embarkation at Alexandria. 2/1 Fd Amb, 2/1 Fd Coy and Comp Coy AASC also embarked. <u>Locations.</u> - 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp moved to Matruh, and 2/11 Bn came under comd 17 Bde. The Bde Gp also includes 2/1 Fd Regt, 2/2 and 2/7 Fd Amb, 2/2 and 2/8 Fd Coy and 2/2 Fd Pk Coy.	
	25		<u>Move of "LUSTRE" Force.</u> - Transport of HQ 6 Aust Div was loaded during the night and this morning moved to Alexandria docks for embarkation. Camp Comd borrowed several vehicles from HQ AIF for necessary duties.	
	26		<u>Locations.</u> - 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp moved to Ikingi Maryut today.	
	29		<u>Locations.</u> - Statement issued as at 1800 hrs today.	6 Aust Div Loc. Statement 29 Mar. Appx. 9
AT SEA	31		<u>Move of LUSTRE Force.</u> - HQ 6 Aust Div entrained at IKINGI MARYUT at 0900 hrs and by 1200 hrs were embarked at ALEXANDRIA on SS "Pennland" of the Holland-America Line. Also on Board were 2/2 and 2/3 Fd Regts, 2/4 and 2/8 Bns, HQ 19 Bde and the nursing sisters of 2/6 AGH and 2/3 CCS. The ship spulled out into the harbour for the night. <u>Maps.</u> The following maps of Cyrenaica are attached as Appendices - Series - Cyrenaica 1/500,000 Special Sheet AGEDABIA Appx 11 Sheet 11 EL AGHEILA 12 Sheet 20 MARANA 13 Series - 1/2,000,000 Cyrenaica Series - Libya 1/500,000 Sheet 10 SIRTE	Appx 20 11 24

Colonel,
G.S. 6 Aust Div.

Examp

Appxs To War Diary
for March
(1st copy)

~~Appx. 19~~

WAR DIARY

Copy No. 1

SECRET

(NOT TO BE TAKEN IN FRONT OF BN HQ)

6 AUST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 29.

Copy No: 37

Based on information received
between 1400 hrs 26 Feb and
2200 hrs, 1 Mar, 41.

1 Mar 41.

Ref Maps: 1/500,000 AGHEILA, MARAUDA, AGEDABIA, BENGASI.
1/1,000,000 MISURATA, TRIPOLI.

1. ENEMY GROUND OPERATIONS

6 med tanks and 2 to 4 guns were seen on frontier 1015 hrs, 1 Mar. No inf were observed and no contact was made with our fwd tps. These were the only enemy ground tps observed in the period.

2. ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY

26 Feb.- 1355 hrs 1 EA attacked 11 H, believed brought down in flames 10 miles to sea.

1635 hrs 13 EA dive-bombed MARSA EL BREGA and environs.

27 Feb.- 1000 hrs 7 EA bombed fwd tps: 9 casualties, 6 vehicles.

1400 hrs 4 EA possibly HE 111 bombed fwd tps: no casualties.

1525 hrs 6 EA possibly JU 88 bombed and MGd fwd tps: no casualties.

1930 hrs EA dropped 4 bombs SOLLUCH and MGd streets. No damage or casualties.

No enemy air activity was reported during 28 Feb or 1 Mar.

3. AIR REPORTS

27 Feb.- Seven ships between 6000 and 10,000 tons, 13 ships below 4000 tons, and 9 seaplanes in and about TRIPOLI harbour. Five cruisers and 2 destroyers 15 miles North of TRIPOLI sailing east changed course to due west. Eight believed warships 50 miles NW sailing towards TRIPOLI.

28 Feb.- Four EA aerodrome RAS LANUF ((S) V5497). Trucks 3 miles west of border. No activity on si and 3 to 4 miles South from RAS LANUF to frontier.

4. TRACK & GOING INFORMATION

Map of information received on tracks and going in the fwd areas is attached as Appx "A". More information on this subject is urgently required; if possible, with traces showing tracks NOT as shown on 1/500,000 maps.

5. CONCLUSION

BBC news 1800 hrs 1 Mar states Germany claims to have landed an Army Corps in TRIPOLITANIA. The concentration of shipping observed by strat/R on 27 Feb and the lessening of EA in the past two days would infer that some sea movement required local air superiority and was being carried out, but in the absence of confirmatory information it is NOT possible at present to say whether it is a reinforcement or a withdrawal.

Time of Signature: 2230 hrs.

Method of Issue: Sig.

Distribution - as for Int Summary No. 28.

Original copy
for Colonel,
Gd, 6 Aust Div.

APPENDIX A TO INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, N° 29.

OASIS

1. MAR. 4.
TRACK AND GOING MAP, REP. MAP. AGEDADIA-EL AGHIELIA
SCALE 1/500,000.

SECRET
COPY N° 37

ROAD LEGEND.

GOOD. 25. MAR.

FAIR. 30. MAR.

UNDEVELOPED. 15. APR.


POOR. 10. MAR.

NO EXISTENCE.

OLD FIELD

1947

Scale 1:500,000.



Compiled by G.S.I.
2. MAR. 4.

TANK OBSTACLE
NO OBSTACLE
E. OF HERE

W. C. Long

Appx 2

6 AUSTR DIV

SECRET

Copy No.....*29*

Location Statement as at 0900 hrs 3 MAR 41.

HQ

HQ 6 Aust Div	B. el TAMBIA	(X)C0598
Int Sec 6 Aust Div	"	"
6 Aust Div Emp Pl	"	"
"B" Sec FSS	BENGHASI	R. 9574

CAV

HQ 6 Aust Cav (under comd BTE)	SIWA	
"C" Sec Sigs - 39 LAD -	"	
B & C Sqns HQ Sqn	"	
A Sqn	KADALLEHA	E.787260

RAA

HQ RAA	B. el TAMBIA	(X)C0598
HQ 2/1 Fd Regt RAA	ALEM ZOGBA	(X)B8280
"E" Sec Sigs - 42 LAD	"	"
1 Bty (25-pr)	MARSA-EL-SREHA area	
2 Bty (25-pr)	ALEM ZOGBA area	
HQ 2/2 Fd Regt RAA (under comd 19 Aust Inf Bde)	EL GAZALA	527449
"G" Sec Sigs - 40 LAD	"	"
3 Bty (4.5" How)	"	"
4 Bty (18-pr)	"	"

RAA (attached)

HQ 2/3 Fd Regt RAA	DERNA area moving eastward	
"F" Sec Sigs - 41 LAD	"	"
5 Bty (25-pr)	"	"

RAZ

HQ RAZ 6 Aust Div	B. el TAMBIA	(X)C0598
2/1 Fd Coy	EL ABIAR	(S)S4484
2/2 Fd Coy	BARCE	R8416
2/8 Fd Coy	BENGHASI	R. 960730
2/2 Fd Park Coy (less 2 Secs)	EL ABIAR	(S)S4484
2 Secs 2/2 Fd Park Coy	SOLOCH	(S)S1326
80 LAD	EL ABIAR	(S)S4484

RAZ (attached)

2/3 Fd Coy	AGEDABIA area	(S)X1050
2/7 Fd Coy	at TAILIMON	(S)S0419

SIGS

Adv HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div	B. el TAMBIA	(X)C0598
Rear HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div - 42LAD	SOLOCH	S1326
1 Coy (less details)	B. el TAMBIA	(X)C0598
Details 1 Coy	SOLOCH	S1326
HQ 2 Coy	B. el TAMBIA	(X)C0598
HQ 3 Coy	"	"

INF

HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	TOBRUCH	40674304
"J" Sec Sigs - 45 LAD	"	"
16 Aust A Tk Coy (under comd 3 Armd Bde)	FORT GTAFIA	(X)B9985
2/1 Bn	TOBRUCH	40684268
2/2 Bn	"	41584268
2/3 Bn	"	39954363

INF (Contd)

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	55 Kilos SW of AGEDABIA	(X)B6791
"1 st Sec Sigs - 48 LAD	"	"
2/5 Bn less A Coy	45 Kilos SW of AGEDABIA	(X)B7798
A Coy 2/5 Bn	BEDA POMM	(S)W2081
2/6 Bn (less one Coy & dets)	BENGHASI	R9573
C Coy 2/6 Bn	BARCE	N718192
1 Pl B Coy 2/6 Bn	MADALLENA	H3528
2/7 Bn	GASR el BREGA area	(X)B5786
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	AIN-EL-GAZALA	560437
"1 st Sec Sigs - 79 LAD	"	"
2/4 Bn	"	562427
2/8 Bn	"	604447
2/11 Bn	"	575497

AASC

HQ AASC 6 Aust Div	SOLOCH	31326
Amn Coy (less Dets)	TOCRA	N400213
Pet Coy (less Dets)	"	N405215
Sup Coln (less Dets)	BARCE	N766180
Det Sup Coln (less Dets)	BELGHADCHAD	S0111
Composite Coy	to be in TOBRUCH on 4 Mar	

AAMC

2/1 Fd Amb (less one Coy)	DERNA	53655
A Coy 2/1 Fd Amb (under cmd		
19 Aust Inf Bde)	AIN-EL-GAZALA	560437
2/2 Fd Amb (less two Coys)	GHEMINES	(S)R9225
A & B Coys 2/2 Fd Amb	55 Kilos SW of AGEDABIA	(X)B6791
2/7 Fd Amb	BARCE	N708177
2/1 Fd Hyg Sec	"	"

AAOC

2/1 A Fd Wkshop	TOBRUCH	406430
2/2 A Fd Wkshop (less No 4		
Rec Sec)	MADALLENA	N787260
No 4 Rec Sec 2/2 A Fd Wkshop	BENGHASI	S0101
7 Div Sec Ord Fd Pk	BARCE	N7525
5 Advance Ord Depots	"	N6520
6 " " "	BENGHASI	974715

MISC

6 Aust Div Pro Coy (less Det)	SOLOCH	31326
Det 6 Aust Div Pro Coy		
(under cmd 19 Aust		
Inf Bde)	AIN-EL-GAZALA	560437
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	BARCE	N766180
6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	SOLOCH	S1326
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	BARACCA	E545195
6 Aust Div Reception Camp	BARCE	N697200

UNDER COMMAND

HQ 3 Arm Bde		(X)B9194
KDG	GSUR el ATALLAT	(X)B6971
3 Hussars	CHOR BEN SAADA area	(X)B8777
HQ 1 Lt AA Bty	B. el TALBIA	(X)C0598

INF Free French Motor Bn

1 Coy	area EL HAMAA LG	(X)B8197
1 Coy	"	(X)B8197
3 Lt Fd Amb	AGEDABIA LG	(S)X1225
Adv / Sqn RAF	20 Kilos North of AGEDABIA	(S)X0546
	AGEDABIA	(S)X1225

R. Campbell
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
15 Aust Inf Bde	1
17 Aust Inf Bde	2
19 Aust Inf Bde	3
6 Aust Cav	4
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav	5
RAA 6 Aust Div	6
RAE 6 Aust Div	7
Sign 6 Aust Div	8-9
3 Armd Bde	10
GOC	11
G	12
I	13
AQ	14-15
Camp	16
GAASC	17
ADMS	18
DADOS	19-20
SCHE	21
DAPH	22-24
6 Aust Div Postal	25
6 Aust Div Fd Cash	26
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	27
6 Aust Div Reception	28
Camp	29-30
War Diary	31-32
File	33-36
Spare	
<u>For Information</u>	
CYRFORCE	37-38
1 Aust Corps	39-40

GA V/JB

S/113/G

Appx 3
SECRET.

Copy No. *12*.....

3 Mar 41.

RELIEF OF 6 AUST DIV.

Advice has been received that 9 Aust Div will relieve 6 Aust Div in the ACEDABIA area.

On relief 6 Aust Div will concentrate at MATRUH.

Full details for the arrangements of the relief are not yet available, but the following has been received -

- (a) 20 Aust Inf Bde will relieve 17 Aust Inf Ede. 20 Ede will arrive in the forward area on 9 Mar and 17 Ede will leave on 10 Mar.. It is probable that this relief will take place on the night 9/10 Mar.
- (b) 51 Fd Regt will arrive with 20 Aust Inf Ede Gp and will relieve 2/1 Fd Regt.
- (c) 1 RHA will move so as to join 3 Armd Bde in the forward area on 10 Mar.

Carney
Colonel;
C.S. 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION -

Copy No.

17 Aust Inf Ede	1
RAA 6 Aust Div	2
RAE 6 Aust Div	3
Sigs 6 Aust Div	4
3 Armd Bde	5
Comd	6
G	7
I	8
AQ	9
War. Diary	10-11
File	12-13
Spare	14-16

For Information -

Copy to -	
"A" Sqn 6 Aust Cav	17
AASC	18
ADMS	19

RRV/WAX.

SECRET.

(NOT TO BE TAKEN IN FRONT OF EN HQ)

6 AUST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 30.

Copy No. 30

Based on information received
between 2200 hrs 1 Mar and 1300
hrs, 4 Mar 41.

4 Mar 41.

Ref Maps: 1/500,000 AGHEILA, KARANDA, AGEDABIA, BEEGASI.

1. ENEMY GROUND OPERATIONS.

At 1550 hrs, 3 Mar 2 enemy Arm'd Cars were reported at (X) B 2130. They withdrew at 1720 hrs without contact with our tps but our forward patrols in the area were dive attacked by EA.

2. ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY.

EA have increased their activity. AGEDABIA has been raided several times. On 2 Mar at 1415 hrs by 5 EA and at 1630 hrs by 15 EA and again twice on 3 Mar - 1347 hrs and approx 1600 hrs. No casualties were sustained by military personnel but at least two civilians were injured and town property damaged. The salvage dump 55 K north of AGEDABIA was also bombed 1430 hrs 3 Mar. 1 casualty. Single MT travelling at night with lights have been Mcd.

3. AIR REPORTS.

From air reports on 3 Mar it would appear that the bulk of the 500 MT reported South of MISURATA have reached the frontier and are concentrated between this point and SIETE. Sketch map showing results of air recon is attached as Appendix A.

4. CHEMICAL WARFARE.

Cylinders containing a liquid blister gas thought to be mustard have been located in the div area. They are 21 in long and 5½ in diameter and have a thread at one end into which a detonator and fuse could have been fixed. From their corroded appearance it would seem that the cylinders had been exposed to the weather for some considerable time.

The chemical in contact with the skin produced a redness within 3 hrs and blisters both discrete and confluent within 12 to 14 hrs.

5. REPORTS ON ENEMY ACTIVITY.

(a) Action at EL AGHEILA 24 Feb.

The following information has been obtained from Pte McMILLAN, who escaped from EL AGHEILA following the capture of Lieut ROWLEY. He was in the vehicle with Lieut ROWLEY and travelling behind the leading arm'd car. When about 2 miles east of the fort and still on the main rd the leading vehicles were fired upon by a 2 pr (approx) gun and small arms fire. The car was stopped and the occupants took cover, except the batman, who had been killed by a 2 pr shell. Lieut ROWLEY saw what he described as a "crowd of prisoners gathered round an arm'd vehicle and went forward towards them. As he approached an officer, wearing a German steel helmet, blue grey uniform and black leggings, came forward and took him prisoner. Three of the crew of our leading arm'd car were also prisoners. The German officer then walked towards to where Pte McMILLAN was lying near the truck, but apparently something distracted his attention, and he returned to his vehicle. Lieut ROWLEY with 2 others were marched off whilst the third man, wounded, was dragged for some distance, then dropped

and left on the road. Our armoured car was towed for some distance behind the fort, and destroyed by fire. Pte McHILLAN reports the enemy had two large tanks 4-5 smaller tanks and 20 to 30 motor cycle combinations, with 2-3 Diesel troop carrying vehicles. He had seen the group of Italian AFVs on the road at BEDA FOMM and stated that the tanks used in the engagement did not resemble any of those in the dump.

No enemy troops wore the same uniform as the officer. The troops appeared to be Italian.

(b) EL WAK Raid - 14 to 18 Dec 40.

Notes on the raid carried out on EL WAK (on KENYA frontier) are attached as Appendix B.

Time of Signature : 1400 hrs

Method of Issue: Sigs


<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy Nos</u>
16 Aust Inf Bde	1-4
17 Aust Inf Bde	5-9
19 Aust Inf Bde	10-13
RAA 6 Aust Div	14-16
RAE 6 Aust Div	17-18
Sigs 6 Aust Div	19
"A" Sqn 6 Aust Cav	20
Cmd	21
G	22-23
AQ	24-25
CASG 6 Aust Div	26
ADMS	27
HQ 9 Aust Div	28
1 Aust Corps	29-30
CYRCOM	31-32
3 Arm Bde	33-34
Flt, 6 Sqn RAF	35
3 Sqn RAAF	36
War Diary	39-40
File	41-42

[Signature]
 J. J. G. G.
 Colonel,
 GS, 6 Aust Div.

NOTE:

For security reasons, Landing craft will be referred to as under in all signals and correspondence within the Middle East only :-

A Lighter		Tank Landing Craft
B Lighter		Assault Landing Craft
C Lighter		Support Landing Craft
D Lighter		Motor Landing Craft



1. BUTLER SHIP ON S. S. - S. S. - CONWAY.

7. FLYING BOATS.
20 SHIPS OVER 3000 TONS.
20 SHIPS UNDER 3000 TONS.

20 FLYING BOATS.

75-100
125-150

10-15

10-15

10 SHIPS OVER 3000 TONS.
20 SHIPS UNDER 3000 TONS.

10 SHIPS OVER 3000 TONS.
20 SHIPS UNDER 3000 TONS.

10 SHIPS OVER 3000 TONS.
20 SHIPS UNDER 3000 TONS.

30-40 HOURS - 10
10-15 HOURS - 10

60-75 HOURS - 10

100-125 HOURS - 10
150-200 HOURS - 10
200-250 HOURS - 10

250-300 HOURS - 10
300-350 HOURS - 10

1. MAR 41 MARKED AT RED.

3. MAR 41 MARKED AT PURPLE.

10-15 HOURS - 10

SECRET.

Copy No. 29.

APPENDIX TO 6 AUST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 30

DATED 4 MAR 41.

Notes on the EL WAIG Raid, 14-18 Dec 40:-

1. The Operation.

The operation consisted of an approach march of about 100 miles followed by a raid on the enemy position and a subsequent withdrawal. The object of the raid was to inflict the maximum loss on the enemy; to achieve this object the strongest part of the enemy position was enveloped so that withdrawal should not be possible. The enemy position consisted of five small defended localities spread along a seven mile front. It had no depth; and was held by colonial infantry and 'banda'.

The attacking force consisted of two infantry brigade groups, and included armoured cars, light tanks, 3.7 Hows, and AA IMGs. Our force had slight superiority in the air.

The operation was entirely successful.

2. Training.

A complete rehearsal of the operation was carried out on a replica of the battle area. This rehearsal was of great value, and as a result of it the calculated timings had to be revised. The revised timings proved to be sufficiently accurate.

3. Maps.

The only available maps of the area were at such a small scale that they were of little tactical value. Special maps on a scale of 1/40,000 were prepared from aeroplane photographs and issued. These maps were made in sheets approximately 12" by 10" and were also used by pilots to report the situation. This was found to be extremely effective. The pilots quickly entered up the positions of our own troops and those of the enemy, in different colours, and dropped them on Headquarters.

Aeroplane photographs were also found useful as troops were so scarce that they formed valuable land marks and were visible on the photographs. The artillery used them to fix their Battery positions.

4. The Approach March.

(a) The final approach march by night was guided by a survey officer. His experience and instruments enabled him to do this faster than an ordinary officer could have done. He was followed immediately by RE personnel whose task it was to mark the route for the main body.

(b) The leading troops included a mechanical grader and road making personnel; both proved their value.

4. The Approach March (contd)

(c) The difficulty of keeping drivers awake during halts proved very great. Sentries were detailed for each vehicle, but even these showed a tendency to dismount and sleep beside their vehicles. It wrecks all previous plans if vehicles do not move and halt when they should.

(d) Orders were given that the final destination of the column was to be signalled by a series of flashes on the rear lights. Owing to dust this did not work in practice. The best method of notifying the final destination is a check light with a Provost Post about three miles before the area is reached.

5. Rations and Water.

The operation was expected to take five days. Every unit carried five days hard-scale in unit transport and three days hard-scale in second line vehicles. This arrangement worked well.

Three days water at one gallon per day per man was carried in unit first line transport, and one day's on the same scale in troop carrying vehicles. One more day's water for the whole force was held in a special water convoy. This arrangement too proved satisfactory.

6. Stragglers.

Before withdrawal began a tall flagstaff was hoisted with a flag on it by day and a lamp by night, to which all stragglers rallied. This gave no information to the enemy, who may have taken it for a token of victory celebration.

7. Prisoners.

It was found that arrangements for evacuating prisoners rapidly to interrogation posts in rear, collecting and receipting their valuables, and seizing their documents were inadequate. This had not been practised beforehand.

8. Wounded.

Provision was made for the evacuation of 500 casualties. In the event there were only nine wounded, so all were evacuated by Valentia Aircraft, which is considered the only satisfactory method of carrying wounded in a theatre of operations such as East Africa.

SECRET.

Headquarters
6 Apr 41.

S/SW/JSI

4 Mar 41.

PROCEDURE IN CONNECTION WITH GERMAN AIR FORCE PRISONERS AND
AIRCRAFT BROUGHT DOWN OR FORCED LANDING IN OUR TERRITORY.

General. The following is a repetition of instructions already issued to all Army units, but G.H.Q. M.E. desires that emphasis should be laid on these points owing to their vital nature:-

1. It is the responsibility of the nearest Army unit to supply a guard (unless the aircraft is brought down near a Royal Air Force Camp) whose primary duty is to see that there is no unauthorised pilfering or search of the aircraft or the area of the crash.
2. The prisoners (if any) should immediately be searched and all their effects, with the exception of their identity discs (from which a rubbing should be taken) should be put into separate parcels, clearly marked with their names, identification marks of the aircraft and the date of the crash, and should be despatched immediately to H.Q. R.A.F., Middle East, P. of W. Section. In the case of dead, the identity disc should be broken in half. One half should be buried with the corpse and the other half retained.
3. The unit making the capture or supplying the guard should immediately get in touch with the nearest Royal Air Force unit who will be responsible for passing the information required by para 7 to P. of W. Section H.Q. R.A.F., Middle East. Instructions will then be sent for the disposal of prisoners. It is, therefore, essential that the place where the prisoners are in temporary custody is clearly stated.
4. The guard on the crash should remain until Royal Air Force Intelligence and Technical Officers have visited the crash and made all necessary searches for documents and technical data. The crashed aircraft and documents must be considered the property of the Royal Air Force, whose representatives are authorised to dispose of them according to their judgment. In the event of Royal Air Force Intelligence Officers not being available within a reasonable time, a thorough search of the crash and surroundings should be made by the nearest Army unit and any documents found should be forwarded to H.Q. R.A.F., Middle East, P. of W. Section.

Disposal of Documents.

5. Deduction from German Air Force documents is a specialised job and until officers equipped with this knowledge are available in the field, all documents found on prisoners and/or aircraft should be sent by quickest means to H.Q. R.A.F., Middle East, for P. of W. Section.

Disposal of Prisoners.

6. Until Field Interrogation Officers are available, questioning in the field should be limited to those points covered in paragraph 7. German Air Force prisoners must be kept segregated and forbidden to talk amongst themselves until after interrogation by C.S.D.I.C. It is emphasised that there must be no fraternisation.

7. The following information should be signalled to H.Q. R.A.F. M.E. for P. of W. Section.

- A. Type of Aircraft brought down and markings.
 - B. Date brought down.
 - C. Place brought down.
 - D. Names of crew and function, and present location.
 - X. Unwounded and capable of immediate transfer.
 - Y. Wounded and incapable of immediate transfer.
 - Z. Dead.
 - E. Unit to which prisoner(s) belongs (Kampfgruppe or Verband)
 - F. Place of take off.
 - G. Mission.
- (D.E.F.G. are largely subject to an Interpreter being available)
8. The following, if existent, should be sent to H.Q., R.A.F. M.E. as soon as possible:-
- (i) All documents, maps, target photographs, note books, diaries and personal letters and effects.
 - (ii) The Verrey cartridge of the day.
 - (iii) Details of markings (report signal)
 - (iv) Works' number of aircraft (Usually a four) figure group on vertical tail fin).
 - (v) Description or photograph of any visible Squadron badge, motto or shield.
 - (vi) Details of the settings of bomb racks.

Subsequently, a full report on the crashed or captured aircraft with, if possible, photographs.

[Signature]
Colonel,
C.S. 6 Aust Div.

<u>DISTRIBUTION -</u>	<u>Copies</u>
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RAA 6 Aust Div	7
RAE 6 Aust Div	5
Sigs 6 Aust Div	3
16 Aust Inf Bde	1
17 Aust Inf Bde	5
19 Aust Inf Bde	4
Comd	1
G	2
AQ	2
CASG 6 Aust Div	4
ADHS	5
DADOS	5
SCME	1
DAFH	3
Camp	1
6 Aust Div Hd Qs	
Office	1
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	1
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	1
3 Arm Bde	4
War Diary	2
File	1

s/330/CSI

Appendix 6
SECRET

Headquarters
6 Aust Div.

4 Mar 41.

SECURITY OF DOCUMENTS.

1. H.Q. B.T.E. pass the following information which was obtained during the course of Operations in France -

"During the winter all Headquarters accumulated a considerable quantity of files. When the advance into BELGIUM was ordered, there was no time to classify files into "essential" and "non-essential". The result was that when it became necessary to destroy documents, destruction was very unsatisfactory. In this connection it is interesting to note that later, in U.K., documents at all Headquarters were classified into "essential for operation" and "non-essential". The former category was reduced to a minimum and in the event of operations taking place the latter was to be destroyed. During air raids "essential" files were always removed to a place of safety.

2. In view of the possibility of moving to another theatre of operations, units should take action now to sort and classify files so that NO unnecessary papers are taken into the new area.

3. Non essential files should be classified -

- (a) To be burnt.
- (b) Forward to Kit Store - if it is anticipated they will be required by the unit at a later date.
- (c) Forward to Records - if of historical value.

R. Campbell Magee
Colonel,
G.S. 6 Aust Div.

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Comd	1
G	2
AQ	2
CASC 6 Aust Div	4
ADMS	5
SOME	1
DAFi	3
DADOS	5
Camp	1
6 Aust Div Hd Cash Office	1
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	1
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	1
3 Armd Bde	4
War Diary	2
File	1

W/JB

App 7

SECRET

Copy No. 14

6 AUST DIV OP INSTN No.29.

5 Mar 41.

Ref Map: AGHEILA, AGEDABIA. 1/500,000

1. Today's Tac/R up to 1700 hrs confirms that the enemy force previously reported in the defile North of the Marsh in (X) A 96 is still in that area.
Strat/R dated 4 Mar reports Med AA and two entrenched areas in the vicinity of R UH! EL GARAHIGH (X) A77.
Patrol of 1 RDG reports enemy Armd C's and M 11 tanks west of AGHEILA and in the vicinity of HAO HATEIBA (X) B 06 about midday 5 Mar. The M 11s hastily withdrew when fired on.
There are no indications that the enemy is making the dumps of supplies which are a necessary preliminary to an advance in strength.
2. The roles of 3 Armd Bde Gp and 17 Aust Inf Bde will continue to be as stated in 6 Aust Div Op Instn No.28 dated 26 Feb; but the following is issued in amplification.
3. Now that the enemy has established himself West of AGHEILA it is essential that we establish mastery of the "No Man's Land" which lies between us and every effort will be devoted to that end.
4. The posn to be occupied by 17 Aust Inf Bde astride the main road will have its FDLs in the narrowest part of the gap between the coast and the marsh in the HARSA EL BREDIA area and will be covered by outposts.
5. Commencing 7 Mar. 4 guns of the Bty supporting 17 Aust Inf Bde will move forward daily in support of the patrols of 1 RDG to harass movement of the enemy in the EL AGHEILA area. These guns will return each night to the posns selected to support 17 Aust Inf Bde.
6. Should the enemy advance in strength the role of 3 Armd Bde Gp will be to protect the left flank of 6 Aust Div South of the Marsh in (X) B57 and 56 by harassing and delaying the enemy's advance.
7. 37 Lt AA Bty less 3 guns plus 3 guns 1 Lt AA Bty are placed under Comd 3 Armd Bde. Other Lt AA units in the div area are under div control.

ACK.

Time of Signature 2220hrs.

Method of Issue: Sigs.

DISTRIBUTION -

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RAA 6 Aust Div	1
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Comd	6
G	7 - 8
RA	9
ST	10
M&D	11
FILE	12-13
WAR Diary	14-15

Colonel,
G.S. 6 Aust Div.

Ref. 7
SECRET

Copy No. 14

6 Mar, 41.

AMENDMENT TO 6 AUST DIV OP INSTN No. 29
dated 5 Mar, 41.

Para 6 of 6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 29 is cancelled and the following substituted.

5. Commencing 7 Mar 4 guns of the Bty supporting 17 Aust Inf Bde will move forward periodically in support of the patrols of 1 KDG to harass movement of the enemy in the EL AGHEILA area. On completion of these tasks they will return to the posns selected to support 17 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK.

Lawrence
Colonel
GS 6 Aust Div.

Time of signature : 1830 hrs.

Method of Issue: Sigs.

<u>DISTRIBUTION -</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
RAA 6 Aust Div	1
RAE 6 Aust Div	2
Sigs 6 Aust Div	3
17 Aust Inf Bde	4
3 Armd Bde	5
Comd	6
G	7 - 8
AQ	9
AASC	10
Med	11
File	12 - 13
War Diary	14 - 15

APR 9
SECRET.

(NOT TO BE TAKEN IN FRONT OF BN HQ)

6 ARST DIV INT SUMMARY No.31.

Copy No. 44

Based on information received
between 1300 hrs 4 Mar 41 and
1300 hrs 6 Mar 41.

6 Mar 41.

Ref Maps: 1/500,000 AGHEILA, MARADA, AGEDADIA.

1. ENEMY GROUND OPERATIONS.

At 1240 hrs, 4 Mar, 3 enemy armd cars were sighted at (X) B 1266 moving east, but withdrew when engaged by our forward patrols 200 yards west of AGHEILA.

Between 1145 hrs and 1412 hrs 5 Mar an enemy patrol thought to consist of 3 or 4 E 11 tanks was active in area (X) B 06 and withdrew when six miles west of AGHEILA, as our patrol opened fire.

2. ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY.

EA have carried out extensive reconns of our forward dispositions. 4 Mar at 0835 hrs one HS 111 was reported flying at 3000 ft, vicinity the main rd in forward area, possibly taking photographs. At 1600 hrs 7 bombers and 2 fighters thought to be SAVOIAS and HE 111s circled our entire forward posns at 15,000 ft. At 0955 hrs 5 Mar our EA dropped 10 bombs near the coast vicinity Hessa al Brega. This plane was possibly hit by AA Fire.

3. AIR REPORTS.

TAC/R up to 2035 hrs 5 Mar confirms that an enemy force is in the area West of the frontier and North of Marsh (Map ref (X) A96). Arml Cars are also reported to be in vicinity of MARADA. Sketch Map showing results of air reconns is attached (appendix A).

4. TRACK AND GOING INFORMATION.

Sketch showing latest track and going information is attached as appendix B. This includes and elaborates on the information given in Int Summary No.29.

5. CONCLUSION.

Enemy Armoured mobile units have been observed patrolling "no man's land". As there are no indications that the enemy is making the dumps of supplies that are the necessary preliminaries to an advance in strength, it is deduced that this increased activity is a protective screen for his recently taken up posns, and NOT the prelude to such an attack.

Time of Signature : 1500 Hrs.

Method of Issue: Sigs.

For - in
Cape
for Colonel,
O.S. 6 Arst Div.

DISTRIBUTION : Copy Nos.

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17 Aust Inf Bde	14-18
19 Aust Inf Bde	19-22
Comd	23
G	24-25
AQ	26-27
CASC 6 Aust Div	28
ADMS	29
HQ 9 Aust Div	30-33
1 Aust Corps	34-35
CYRCOM	36-37
3 Armd Bde	38-41
Flt, 6 Sqn RAF	42
OC Guard Coy	43
War Diary	44-45
File	46-47
3 Sqn RAAF	48

5. MAR 41 HAKKADO 14.12.1941

6. SA

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6. ARMO Co.

3. ARMO Co.

1. BOARDER. 20. SMALL.
CAPTAINS. AT HAKADA.

TRACED AND GOING MAP. A. MAR. AL. SECTION.

Oxidized

APPENDIX B. INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. N° 51.
FOR MAP. GOVERNMENT. A. MAR. AL. SCALE 1:100,000.

Scale 1:100,000

Legend
1. Road
2. River
3. Railway
4. Canal
5. Boundary
6. Settlement
7. Forest
8. Swamp
9. Mountain
10. Lake
11. Island
12. Strait
13. Bay
14. Harbor
15. Port
16. Dock
17. Wharf
18. Pier
19. Jetty
20. Breakwater
21. Lighthouse
22. Beacon
23. Tower
24. Fort
25. Battery
26. Barracks
27. Hospital
28. Prison
29. Jail
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31. School
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Copy 57 with LT. IVILSON
Substantive

SECRET

Copy No. ⁵⁸.....

6 Mar, 41.

6 AUST DIV MOVEMENT ORDER No. 1

RELIEF of 6 AUST DIV by 9 AUST DIV

Ref Maps - BEHGAZI and TOBRUCK 1/1,000,000
MEDELLIA 1/2,000,000

1. GENERAL

(a) 9 Aust Div will relieve 6 Aust Div in MEDELLIA during Mar 41 in accordance with Appendix "A" attached hereto and the following instructions.

(b) Moves of following Infantry Brigades: 20 Bde relieves 17 Bde in fwd area on night 9/10 Mar; 26 Bde follows reaching TOBRUCK on 18 Mar moving thereafter to SABALA as soon as possible using own transport, whilst 24 Bde reaches its location at TOBRUCK on 26 Mar.

DETAILS

The camping areas of Bdes and units are shown in Appendix "A" attached, but the following amplifying particulars of certain units will apply:-

2. CAV

A Sqn 6 Aust Cav will commence to move out from vicinity of D'ANNUNZIO on 7 Mar at most economical speed to TOBRUCK, ferrying its Lt Tks and Carriers.

3. ARTY

(a) 2/1 Fd Regt
1 Bn will arrive MEDELLIA area 10 Mar and relieve 2/1 Fd Regt night 10/11 Mar. The latter will bivouac that night area 10 miles post north MEDELLIA and move on 11 Mar in accordance with App "A".

(b) 2/2 Fd Regt - see App "A"

(c) 2/3 Fd Regt - left MEDELLIA on 27 Feb for MAIRAH staging at BEDA FOMH, FEUTIS, DERNA, TOBRUCK and SOUDAN.

4. INFANTRY

(a) Guard duties at TOBRUCK and DERNA - Taking over and relief.

19 Bde which took over duties from 16 Bde on 5 Mar will in turn be relieved by 17 Bde on either 12 or 13 Mar (date to be arranged mutually). 7 Bde will be relieved by 26 Bde on 21 Mar.

(b) Relief of 17 Bde by 20 Bde

(1) With approval Comd 9 Aust Div a Bn of 20 Bde will take over guard duties at BARGE (one Coy) and 2/1 Fd Workshop now located 5 miles towards GERDAN from MEDELLIA (one rifle pl) on 7 Mar. Tp carrying transport remain and pick up 2/6 Bn personnel and rejoin this Bn as it passes through those places on 9 Mar; under arrangements made by 17 Bde.

14. MAPS and RESCUE REPORTS

All maps and rescue reports of this area will be handed over to units, etc, taking over.

15. LIGHTS and FIRES

Hostile planes have recently bombed and machine gunned cars showing their lights at night.

16. CAMPING AREAS

Comds of Edes and units moving independently are responsible for selecting their own camping sites in the vicinity of the places named in App "A", and for their cleanliness before departure.

17. STAGING PLACES

At the vicinity of the locations shown in App "A" will be used during the eastward movement.

Units will NOT repeat NOT billet within 5 kilos of DERNA.

18. RATIONS AND POL

(i) Rations for consumption up to and including day of arrival at DERNA will be drawn from present SP or DID.

Rations are available and will be drawn from DID DERNA, TOBRUCH, SOLUM and MATRUH.

(ii) POL will be drawn at present PP or DID before leaving and will be available at ~~DERNA~~, DERNA, TOBRUCH, SOLUM and MATRUH.

BENGHA

ACKNOWLEDGE

Time of Signature: *2/25* hrs.

Method of Issue: Sigs.

Colonel.
G3 6 Aust Div.

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RAA 6 Aust Div.
RAE 6 Aust Div.
Sigs 6 Aust Div.
16 Aust Inf Ede.
17 Aust Inf Ede.
19 Aust Inf Ede.
3 Armd Bde.
16 Aust A.Mk Coy.
Det 6 Sqn RAP.
Cmd.
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Q.
AASC 6 Aust Div.
ADIS 6 Aust Div.
DAPOS
DAPIV
Postal.
Fd Cash Office.
Salvage.
AAGI.
9 Aust Div.
1 Aust Corps.
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NAV/JWB

SECRET

S/130/c.

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

8 Mar, 41.

3 Armcd Bde

RELIEF of 17 AUST INF BDE.

You will please arrange that from 2000 hrs 9
Mar until 0700 hrs 10 Mar, i.e. during the period of
relief of 17 Aust Inf Bde by 20 Aust Inf Bde the front
of 17 Aust Inf Bde is covered by protection deta of
units of your command.

C. A. W. W.

Colonel.

OS 6 Aust Div.

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17 Aust Inf Bde

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War Diary —

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1. 9 Aust Dir will take over the same code names and frequencies as the 6 Aust Dir units which they replace.
2. Changeover will operate to and from 1900 hrs 11th Mar.
3. After the changeover all units of 9 Aust Dir whilst still in the command area will retain original code name which however must be repeated.

For example 6 Aust Dir after the changeover becomes EHID

4pt EHID

STATIONERS
Institution

10.0. 1. 10

DISTRIBUTION
VET 200 6 Aust Dir
RAC 6 Aust Dir
RAC 6 Aust Dir
Sigt 6 Aust Dir
10 Aust Inf Bn
17 Aust Inf Bn
19 Aust Inf Bn
3 Aust Rls
10 Aust A.T.H Coy
Oat 3 Sqn RAC
Oat
O (C)
AQ (2)
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AAS 6 Aust Dir
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RG-12

SECRET

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HC/3B

SECRET

6 AUGST DIV MOVEMENT ORDER No.2.

Copy No. 20.....

Movement Eastward of 6 Augst Div H.Q. 12.

Ref Map : CYMBREICAT 1/2, 100,000

1. General.

The 6 AUGST DIV H.Q. as mentioned in para 3 of this office Movement Order No.1, will move from present locations in two separate sub-gps as follows in detail in para 3. Sub gp 1 on 11 Mar and sub gp 2 on 12 Mar, both concentrating at BARDIA where the gp will move back to KATHUN with 19 Aust Inf Bde. Stopping places at COLICAT.

Op	12/12	13/12	14/12	15/12	16/12	17/12	18/12
A Gp	SECRET	BARDIA	BARDIA	BARDIA	BARDIA	BARDIA	BARDIA
B Gp	SECRET	BARDIA	BARDIA	BARDIA	BARDIA	BARDIA	BARDIA

2. Route.

Main road, but North Link only from BARDIA to GIOVANNI BERTA.

3. Grounding.

Sub gp A. All units and detachments must be considered essential to remain until 12 Mar as approved by heads of services concerned and notified to this office by 1200 hrs 12 Mar.

Sub gp B. Units not in sub gp A. will move with detachment all of this sub gp.

4. Control.

- (a) All units sub gp A, Post Salvage and Reception units, will concentrate 5 miles South TCCRA by 1700 hrs 11 Mar. Salvage and Reception units will join sub gp A when during movement eastward on 12 Mar as arranged by Lieut Wilson.
- (b) Capt VFF responsible for organising recon and selection of camping sites, layout, organisation and defence arrangements thereof, of sub gp A and whole of H.Q. gp when joined by sub gp B at BARDIA.
- (c) Lieut Wilson will be responsible for movement of sub gp A and whole gp after BARDIA. These duties include decision on order of march, S.F., security on move, maintaining of speed and density, times for halts and traffic control. He is also responsible for organising movement of detachments from ENID present location to TCCRA on 11 Mar.

(2)

(d) Sub gp B will move on orders of G.2.

(e) C.O. Sigs 6 Aust Div will be responsible for movement of all troops located at 301500N to TCGRA on 11 Mar.

5. Speed and Density.

Density 6 v.t.m. West of TCGRA and 8 v.t.m. East of this village.

Speed NOT to exceed 20 m.i.h. during journey.

6. Rations and POL.

In accordance with para 18 of this H.Q. Movement Order No. 1.

7. Action in event of Air Attack.

It is most important that all ranks be made conversant with the following instructions:-

Column will halt and personnel, less AA gunners, will dismount and take cover having in mind the following facts.

It is reported that enemy aircraft have difficulty in locating men on the ground and that they therefore concentrate on the vehicles, attacking normally along the line of the route or at right angles to it.

To avoid SA fire therefore men should run and crouch if possible, in any direction which is 45 degrees from head or tail of line of vehicles.

Greatest security against bombing is obtained by lying flat on the ground, and the only guide to distance of such a position from the vehicle depends on the time one expects the bomb to fall.

Signed at hrs.

Major.
G.3. 6 Aust Div.

<u>DISTRIBUTION :</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
Rear H.Q. 6 Aust Div	1 - 2
RAA 6 Aust Div	4
RAE 6 Aust Div	5
Sigs 6 Aust Div	6-7
AASO	8
Med	9
Ord	10
Salvage Unit 6 Aust Div	11
Reception "	12
Postal "	13
FSS Sec.	14

Capt. UFF	15
Lieut. WILSON	16
Pilo	17-19
War Diary	20-21

(NOT TO BE TAKEN IN FRONT OF ENEMY)

6 AUGST DIV INT SUMMARY No. 32

Copy No.

45

Based on information received
between 1300 hrs 6 Mar and
1200 hrs 9 Mar 41.

9 Mar 41.

Ref Maps: 1/500,000 AGHEILA, MARADA, AGEDARIA, SERTE.
1/100,000 ROMBA.

1. ENEMY GROUND OPERATIONS.

The enemy has been actively patrolling the forward area. In particular, he has concentrated on the sandhills in the vicinity of EL HAF HATEIBA ((X) B 0165). On 6 Mar at 1050 hrs 5 enemy tanks were sighted 5 miles west of AGHEILA moving east. They moved on to the sandhills and remained stationary there from 1100 hrs to 1315 hrs when they withdrew west. At 1130 hrs 4 arm cars and 1 PI gun were sighted on the main road just north of these sandhills at ((X) B 0077). When first observed they were moving east, but when engaged by 2 PI guns they withdrew under cover of smoke. On 8 Mar at 1050 hrs 3 unidentified vehicles thought to be tanks were seen in this area ((X) B 0765) moving north east.

Air and ground reports up to 8 Mar reports no enemy in force in vicinity of the Frontier march from EL DICFER to 10 miles south of the coast.

2. ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY.

6 Mar. 1150 hrs. 3 EA identified as DOBNIERS bombed and M.G'd a convoy on the main rd near ZUM EL RYM (vicinity SONBA ref 700300). One off road car is reported killed and 3 vehicles damaged.

1045 hrs. patrol in vicinity of STONER ((X) B2239) dive bombed and M.G'd. No casualties. Area 2 slightly damaged.

1628 hrs. 2 EA in area north of AIR at SEM ((X) B3331).

7 Mar. 1700 hrs. 2 EA reported 100 yds off road and 400 yds east of MARSA BAKA then off.

8 Mar. 1622 hrs. 2 EA possibly HE 111 circled over B. of TONTER and at 1650 hrs bombed vicinity White House at MARSA BAKA turnoff from 7000 ft. 10 min later they dive bombed tips at CHEBDET of BAISA ((X) B 2668). A sketch showing scenes of attacks by EA in the fwd areas since 12 Feb is attached as appendix "D".

NOTE. It is reported that enemy airman have difficulty in locating men on the ground and that they therefore concentrate on the vehicles, attacking normally along the line of the route or at right angles to it. From experience it has been found to avoid EA fire men should run out 50 yds if possible, in any direction which is 45 degrees from head or tail of line of vehicles, and that greatest security against bombing is obtained by lying flat on the ground. The only guide to distance of such a position from the vehicle depends on the time one expects the bomb to fall.

3. AIR REPORTS.

TAC/R reports on both 7 and 8 Mar confirm the presence of 300 to 400 enemy vehicles dispersed along the frontier between the marsh and the sea, and back to NOPIIA. The fords of enemy AFVs reported at MARADA on 8 Mar appear to have withdrawn as TAC/R on 8 Mar reports only one apparently abandoned tank in this area. Sketch map showing the results of air recon is attached as appendix "B". NO strat/R was made in the period.

4. German Army.

Reasons supporting the theory that German troops are on the frontier are attached. Brief notes on German identifications, Army div organization and German tactical signs for marking inf formations on maps are also attached for information.

5. Track and Going Information.

Latest information on tracks and going in the area is attached as appendix "A".

Time of Signature: 10.0 Mar.

Method of Distn: Sigs.

[Signature]
Colonel
C. of 6 Aust Div.

<u>DISTRIBUTION -</u>	<u>REMARKS -</u>
HQ 6 Aust Div	1-1
RAA 6 Aust Div	1-1
RAE 6 Aust Div	1-1
Sigs 6 Aust Div	1-1
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ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY - A-1 "C" to HQ - 10/10/50

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SECRET

Issued with 6 Aug 41 Div Des Summary No. 22 of 9 Mar 42.

EVIDENCE POINTING TO THE EXISTENCE OF
GERMAN TROOPS IN THE FORWARD AREA.

1. TACTICS

- (a) All enemy elements have definitely been offensive and outperforming in their action lately. This is not in accordance with Italian hesitant tactics up to date.
- (b) AFVs have moved in waves and thrust on roads. Italian armor moved out in force with troops, guns, mortars and A.R. guns.
- (c) Heavy AFVs used smoke on 8 Mar to cover withdrawal when engaged. Smoke never yet used by Italians in LIBIA.

2. EQUIPMENT

(a) ARMoured DIV

Encountered for almost the first time in LIBIA. It is known that the Italians do not favour their employment. Normally allotted only to Carabinieri (Military Police). Reported to be of an 8-wheeled type not known in the Italian Army but normal for German Armoured Divs. (But Italian Fiat S.M. A.C. has 8 wheels with one spare wheel attached each side. Might be mistaken for 8 wheels.)

(b) TANKS

Tanks observed by Pto who emerged from the encounter on 24 Feb at EL AGHEILA. No chance to get close in order to identify them.

- (c) CAMOUFLAGED - Light grey camouflaged vehicles have been seen. Italians have used dark colours so far.

3. UNIFORMS

- (a) Air report states enemy in forward area appeared to be wearing uniform of "pale blue" colour. (Possible confusion with field grey).
- (b) Statement by survivor from incident at AGHEILA Fort on 24 Feb "An officer wearing a German steel helmet, blue grey uniform and black leggings". Notes Expression gained on this occasion that only the officer in charge was German, the remainder of the enemy force being Italian.

4. GER, believe that there are German Divs units in LIBIA to supplement Italian deficiencies.

5. CONCLUSION

CYRENENICA command, on this subject concludes "that the Armoured Recon Unit of a German Armoured Div is very probably operating EAST of SIRTE possibly in conjunction with Italian units. Insufficient evidence is available regarding the arrival in LIBIA, or the formation of a German Armoured Div. Part of the Lorraine Inf Div may have arrived, but probably NOT the Tank Div".

SECRET

GERMAN ARMoured DIVISION - COMPOSITION IN BRIEF

1. MECHANISED RECOE UNITS

54 Armoured Cars.
50 Motorcycles with sidecars.
3 A.Tk guns.
(possibly 20 3½ ton light tanks and 20 5 ton light tanks).

2. LORRIED INF BDE

Two Lorried Bns.

Each five coys (M.G. Coy, M.G. Coy, Py Coy and two rifle coys).

One Motorcycle bn.

at least 120 motorcycles.
-M.G. Coy
-6 Armoured Cars.
-3 A.Tk guns.
-2 75 mm light 2d gun.

3. TANK BDE

Two mixed Tank Bn's.

Total tanks - 100 36
10 100 75
10 200

Note: Some Armoured Bns now believed on a super-heavy organisation include:

Close Bn	(50)	10-20 ton tanks
Med	(30)	20 ton "
Super Bn	(10)	30 ton "
Eng	(10)	40-50 ton tanks

4. A.Tk Bn

30 A.Tk guns (incl) (30 on call)

5. ARTY RECOE

24 81 guns (incl)

6. AA UNIT

30 20 mm AA H.G. (incl)

7. PIONEER BN (MECH)

Three light mech coys.
Bridging coys.
Lt Mech Pioneer Coys.

8. SIGNAL BN

9. MEDICAL AND SUPPLY UNIT

10. AIR FORCE SQN

11. APPROX TOTALS

Men	?	-
Tanks		416 (138 equivalent to our cruiser or heavier)
Armoured Cars		60 approx
Guns - Fd		26
- A.Tk		30 approx
- AA		36 Lt (20 mm) (equivalent to Italian Breda)

G.S.I. CYRCON.

G. MAR. 41. G.S.I./139/16/I(a)

NOTES ON IDENTIFICATIONS OF GERMAN UNITS

Units of the German Army may be identified by the following means :-

1. Shoulder Straps. The colour of the narrow edging round the shoulder straps, and the colour of the centre of the collar patch indicates the arm of the service. The number on the shoulder strap gives the number of the unit. The following table provides a key :-

Colour	Arm	Number
White	Infantry	Regiment
Orange	Cavalry	Regiment
Red	Artillery	Regiment
Black	Engineers	Battalion
Pink	Tank Corps	Regiment
Pink (letter P)	A-Tk Corps	Battalion
Pink } (letter K)		
Orange }	Reece Unit	Battalion
Yellow	Signals	Battalion
Maroon	Smoke units	Battalion
Light blue	Transport units	Battalion
Dark blue	Medical units	Battalion
Grass green	Mountain regts	Regiment.

2. M.T. Markings. The signs on vehicles are normally found on the left hand front mudguards and the left hand side of tail-board. These signs are conventional signs and sometimes include unit numbers. An exact copy should be made, and especial care taken over the thickness of the lines.
NOTE. On active service the shoulder straps are often removed and the M.T. markings painted over. Despite this the latter are often visible. They are also sometimes covered with cloth which can be removed.
3. Identity Discs. These are usually worn round the neck. Each half is stamped with identical markings, i.e. the soldier's unit and his company number, although the latest issue show only the company number and the F.P.N. (Feld-postnummer). The significance of Roman and Arabic numerals should be carefully noted.

e.g. II/I.R. 16 indicates 2nd bn. 16th inf. regt.

2/I.R. 16 indicates 2nd coy. 16th inf. regt.

For examples of discs taken in this war see Appendix "2".

4. Pay Book (Soldbucher). To obtain identification look first at page 4, and when this page is full, also at page 17, a copy of which is given in Appendix "5". Other useful pages are :-
Page 1. "Beschriftung und Nummer der ERKENNUNGSMARKE"
This gives a copy of the man's identity disc in case he should not be wearing one.
Page 2. The rubber office stamp gives the unit which first issued the Paybook.
Page 23. The rubber office stamp which must be applied each time the soldier has more than five days leave, will give the unit at the time of his last leave.
NOTE. The Paybook will often be found in the tail-pocket of the tunic.

5. Feldpostnummer (F.P.N.) This will be found on letters. Each battalion has a number not connected with the other battalions of the Regiment. Each company has the battalion number, followed by a letter. e.g. 27478 A might be the staff of II/I.R. 70. then 27478 C would be the second company of the battalion, in other words 6/I.R. 70.


G.S.I.(a)

G.H.Q. M.E. 27 Feb. 41.

APPENDIX "A"

SPECIMENS OF IDENTITY DISCS.


1916 Pattern.
Front (enlarged)



Name
Address
Date of Birth,
Training Unit: I ERS (atz)
B(a)T(ail)L(on)
J(nfanterie)R
(egiment)20

Field Recruit Depot, with No.
on Company roll.
1(Feld) REKR(uben) DEP(ot)
2 K(ompanie) B(utcher) 515


Back (Actual Size).




Subsequent units with No. on
Company roll.

Infanterie Regiment 20 - 5
Kompanie Nummer 157
Infanterie Regiment 57-4
Kompanie Nummer 570.

SOME EXAMPLES. 1939-1940



Unit: 14 Kompanie/Infanterie
Regiment 118
No. on Coy Roll: 64




(Lower half omitted)

Unit: 2 Kompanie Ersatz Infanterie Bataillon 212 (2nd Coy. Inf training Battalion 212).

No. on Coy. roll : 56

Note: The storeman has made a mistake. He has put Ersatz Infanterie Regiment, but each Infanterie Regt only has an Ersatz Infanterie Bataillon. Also disc should have had man's unit stamped on it when he left his training battalion.




(Lower half omitted)

Unit: 2 Kompanie/Ersatz Infanterie Bataillon 485.

No. on Coy. roll: 34


Note: In this case the disc had not been restamped, as it should have been when man joined his unit.



(Lower half omitted)

Unit: 12 (Maschinengewehr) Kompanie, Infanterie Regiment 271.


(128th (M.G.) Coy. 271st Inf Rgt)
No. on coy. roll: 105



(Lower half omitted)

Unit: Stab II Bataillon/Infanterie Regiment 289. (H.Q. 2nd Battalion 289th Infantry Regiment).

No. on roll of St. B.C.: 73



(Lower half omitted)

Unit: 5 gemischte Schützen Kompanie, Infanterie Regiment 355 (5th mixed rifle Coy. 355th Inf. Rgt.)

No. on Coy. roll: 47

Note: I.R.355 is a "Landwehr" unit and each rifle coy contains one M.G. platoon. They are therefore called "mixed rifle coys" (gemischte Schützen Kompanien)

APPENDIX "B"

Copy of page 4 and 17 in a German Paybook
(with translation)

A. Zuletzt zuständige Wehrersatzdienststelle
(latest competent record office)

B. Zum Feldheer abgesandt von:
(drafted to the field army from)

Ersatztruppenteil (Depot unit) Kompanie (Company) Nr der Truppen-
stammrolle (No. on cov. roll.

a Inf.Ers.Btl. 2 472

b

c

C. Feldtruppenteil (Field unit) Kompanie (Company) Nr der Kriegsstammrolle
(No. on cov roll in the field.)

a I.R. 73 12 (M.G.) 264

b I.R. 59 Sch. Zp. 3 307

c

D. Jetzt zuständiger Ersatztruppenteil (Present depot unit) Standort (Garrison)

Inf. Ers.Btl. 73 Hannover

Ers. Inf.Btl. 59 Hildesheim

(Meldung dortselbst nach Rückkehr vom Feldheer oder Lazarett
zuständig für Ersatz an Bekleidung und Ausrüstung).

(Man must report there when returning from the Army in the
Field or when discharged from hospital. It is responsible for
replacements of clothing and equipment).

1. Vom Ersatztruppenteil einzutragen von dem der Soldatbeholdhaber
zum Feldheer abgesandt wird.
(To be filled in by the depot unit from which the holder of
this pay book is sent to the Field Army).
2. Vom Feldtruppenteil einzutragen und bei Versetzungen von einem
zum anderen Feldtruppenteil darauf abzuzeichnen dass die alten
Angaben nur durchgestrichen werden, also lesbar bleiben.
(To be filled in by the field unit, and when a man is transferred
from one unit to another in the field, the old entry is to be en-
called with a single line, so that it remains legible).

G.S.I.,
G.H.Q., M.E.

3

SECRET

107-93 10000 10000 10000 10000

5 AUG 1957 10:10 AM

Page No. 44...

Page 10 of 10

Ref: 100-368617-1000

3. THEORY OF THE CASE

[illegible]

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are under 15 years of age is expected to increase from 1.1 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of people aged 65 and over is expected to increase from 250 million to 450 million. The number of people aged 15 and over is expected to increase from 3.5 billion to 4.5 billion. The number of people aged 15 and over is expected to increase from 3.5 billion to 4.5 billion. The number of people aged 15 and over is expected to increase from 3.5 billion to 4.5 billion.

1. The first step in the process of identifying a problem is to recognize that a problem exists. This involves gathering information about the situation and identifying the specific issue that needs to be addressed.

2. Once a problem has been identified, the next step is to define the problem clearly. This involves stating the problem in a concise and specific manner, identifying the scope of the problem, and determining the goals that need to be achieved.

3. The third step in the process is to generate potential solutions. This involves brainstorming ideas and considering different approaches to solving the problem. It is important to consider a wide range of options and to evaluate the potential benefits and drawbacks of each solution.

4. The fourth step is to select a solution. This involves evaluating the potential solutions and choosing the one that is most likely to be effective. This step requires careful consideration of the available resources, the time constraints, and the potential risks of each solution.

5. The final step in the process is to implement the solution. This involves putting the chosen solution into action and monitoring the progress of the implementation. It is important to communicate the plan to all relevant parties and to ensure that everyone is working towards the same goal.

11-11-62 - 11-12-62 - 11-13-62 - 11-14-62 - 11-15-62 - 11-16-62 - 11-17-62 - 11-18-62 - 11-19-62 - 11-20-62 - 11-21-62 - 11-22-62 - 11-23-62 - 11-24-62 - 11-25-62 - 11-26-62 - 11-27-62 - 11-28-62 - 11-29-62 - 11-30-62 - 12-1-62 - 12-2-62 - 12-3-62 - 12-4-62 - 12-5-62 - 12-6-62 - 12-7-62 - 12-8-62 - 12-9-62 - 12-10-62 - 12-11-62 - 12-12-62 - 12-13-62 - 12-14-62 - 12-15-62 - 12-16-62 - 12-17-62 - 12-18-62 - 12-19-62 - 12-20-62 - 12-21-62 - 12-22-62 - 12-23-62 - 12-24-62 - 12-25-62 - 12-26-62 - 12-27-62 - 12-28-62 - 12-29-62 - 12-30-62 - 12-31-62

THE

1. The first step in the process of identifying a problem is to recognize that a problem exists. This involves gathering information about the situation and identifying the specific issue that needs to be addressed.

SECRET

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem. This involves gathering information about the situation and understanding the needs of the stakeholders involved.



Further reports in this connection are required.

NOTE. In the future, all reports, both written and shown, will be classified as follows:

- | | |
|---------------|-----------------|
| 1. High | 2. Medium |
| 3. Low | 4. Very Low |
| 5. Secret | 6. Confidential |
| 7. Restricted | 8. Unclassified |

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Name of recipient: *[illegible]*

Address: *[illegible]*

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- | | |
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| 5. Mr. Nichols | 100-10 |
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| 9. Mr. Egan | 100-10 |
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| 11. Mr. Hendon | 100-10 |
| 12. Mr. Pennington | 100-10 |
| 13. Mr. Quinn | 100-10 |
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| 15. Mr. Gandy | 100-10 |



1

1

1

/TG

WAR DIARY

6 AUST DIV

SECRET

Location Statement as at 1800 hrs 17 Mar 41.

<u>HQ</u> 6 Aust Div	IKINGI MARIUT
Int Sec 6 Aust Div	"
6 Aust Div Emp Pl	"
"B" Sec FSS	"
<u>CAV</u>	
HQ 6 Aust Cav (under comd BTE)	SIWA
"C" Sec Sigs - 39 LAD	"
B & C Sqn HQ Sqn	"
A Sqn	IKINGI MARIUT
<u>RAA</u>	
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	IKINGI MARIUT
HQ 2/1 Fd Regt RAA	MERSA MATRUH
"E" Sec Sigs - 45 LAD	"
1 Bty	"
2 Bty	"
HQ 2/2 Fd Regt RAA	"
"G" Sec Sigs - 40 LAD	"
3 Bty	"
4 Bty	"
HQ 2/3 Fd Regt RAA	IKINGI MARIUT
"F" Sec Sigs - 41 LAD	"
5 Bty	"
6 Bty	"
1 A Tk Regt RAA	"
"H" Sec Sigs - LAD	"
<u>RAE</u>	
HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	IKINGI MARIUT
2/1 Fd Coy	"
2/2 Fd Coy	MERSA MATRUH
2/6 Fd Coy	"
2/2 Fd Park Coy	"
80 LAD	"
<u>SIGS</u>	
HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div	IKINGI MARIUT
1 Coy - 42 LAD	"
HQ 2 Coy	"
HQ 3 Coy	"
<u>INF</u>	
HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	IKINGI MARIUT
"J" Sec Sigs - 45 LAD	"
16 Aust A Tk Coy	"
2/1 Bn	"
2/2 Bn	"
2/3 Bn	"
HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	TOBRUK
"K" Sec Sigs - 46 LAD	"
2/5 Bn	"
2/6 Bn	"
2/7 Bn	"
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	MERSA MATRUH
"L" Sec Sigs - 79 LAD	"
2/4 Bn	"
2/8 Bn	"
2/11 Bn	"
<u>AASC</u>	
HQ AASC 6 Aust Div	IKINGI MARIUT
Arm Coy	"
Pet Coy	"
Sup Col	"
Comp Coy AASC	MERSA MATRUH

AALC


2/1 Fd Amb
2/2 Fd Amb
2/7 Fd Amb
2/1 Fd Hyg Sec

IKINGI MARYUT
TOBRUK
MERSA MATRUH
"

MISC

6 Aust Div Pro Coy
6 Aust Div Postal Unit
6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit
6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp

IKINGI MARYUT
"
"
"
"


Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

EB/MF.

SECRET

Copy No: 28

6 AUST DIV

Location Statement as at 1800 hrs 22 Mar 41

HQ

HQ 6 Aust Div	IKINGI MARYUT
Int Sec 6 Aust Div	" "
6 Aust Div Emp Pl	" "
"B" Sec FSS	" "

CAV

HQ 6 Aust Cav (under comd BTE)	SIWA
"C" Sec Sigs - 39 LAD (under comd BTE)	" "
"B" & "C" Sqns, HQ Sqn	" "
"A" Sqn	IKINGI MARYUT

RAA

HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	IKINGI MARYUT
HQ 2/1 Fd Regt RAA	MERSA MATRUH
"E" Sec Sigs - 43 LAD	" "
1 Bty	" "
2 Bty	" "
HQ 2/2 Fd Regt RAA	" "
"G" Sec Sigs - 40 LAD	" "
3 Bty	" "
4 Bty	" "
HQ 2/3 Fd Regt	IKINGI MARYUT
"F" Sec Sigs - 41 LAD	" "
5 Bty	" "
6 Bty	" "
1 A Tk Regt RAA	" "
"H" Sec Sigs - LAD	" "

RAE

HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	IKINGI MARYUT
2/1 Fd Coy	" "
2/2 Fd Coy	MERSA MATRUH
2/8 Fd Coy	" "
2/2 Fd Pk Coy	" "
80 LAD	" "

SIGS

HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div	IKINGI MARYUT
1 Coy - 42 LAD	" "
HQ 2 Coy	" "
HQ 3 Coy	" "

INF

HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	(under comd GHQ, ME.)
"J" Sec Sigs - 45 LAD	" " " "
16 Aust A Tk Coy	" " Cyr Force.)
2/1 Bn	" " GHQ, ME.)
2/2 Bn	" " " "
2/3 Bn	" " " "
HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	TOBRUK
"K" Sec Sigs - 46 LAD	" "
2/5 Bn	" "
2/6 Bn	" "
2/7 Bn	" "
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	MERSA MATRUH
"L" Sec Sigs - 79 LAD	" "
2/4 Bn	" "
2/8 Bn	" "
2/11 Bn	" "

AASC

HQ AASC 6 Aust Div
Amm Coy
Pet Coy
Sup Col
Comp Coy AASC

IKINGI MARYUT
" "
" "
" "
MERSA MATRUH

AAMC

2/1 Fd Amb
2/2 Fd Amb
2/7 Fd Amb
2/1 Fd Hyg Sec

IKINGI MARYUT
TOBRUK
MERSA MATRUH
" "

MISC

6 Aust Div Pro Coy
6 Aust Div Postal Unit
6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit
6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp

IKINGI MARYUT
" "
" "
" "
" "

W. L. ...
Encl for
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

Copy No.

16 Aust Inf Bde	1
17 Aust Inf Bde	2
19 Aust Inf Bde	3
6 Aust Cav	4
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav	5
RAA 6 Aust Div	6
RAE 6 Aust Div	7
Sigs 6 Aust Div	8-9
GOC	10
G	11
I	12
AQ	13-14
Camp	15
CAASC	16
ADMS	17
DADOS	18-19
SOME	20
DAPM	21-23
6 Aust Div Postal	24
6 Aust Div Fd Cash	25
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	26
6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	27
War Diary	28-29
File	30-31
Spare	32-35

For Information -

BTE	36-37
1 Aust Corps	38-39

AEB/TG

6 AUST DIV

SECRET

Location Statement as at 1800 hrs 29 Mar 41.

Copy No:

NEW

HQ 6 Aust Div
Int Sec 6 Aust Div
6 Aust Div Emp Pl
"B" Sec FSS

IKENGI MARYUT

10	11
12	13
14	15

CAV

6 Aust Cav
"C" Sec Sigs - 39 LAD

12 . m
12 m

- RAA

HQ RAA 6 Aust Div
 HQ 2/1 Fd Regt RAA
 "E" Sec Sigs - 45 LAD
 1 Bty
 2 Bty
 HQ 2/2 Fd Regt RAA
 "G" Sec Sigs - 40 LAD
 3 Bty
 4 Bty
 HQ 2/3 Fd Regt RAA
 "F" Sec Sigs - 41 LAD
 5 Bty
 6 Bty
 1 A Tk Regt RAA
 "H" Sec Sigs - 44 LAD

IKINGI MARYUT

18	1
77	1
19	1
17	1
70	1
12	1
72	1
19	1
18	1
12	1
12	1
17	1
17	1
12	1

RAE

HQ RAE 6 Aust Div
2/1 Fd Coy
2/2 Fd Coy
2/8 Fd Coy
2/2 Fd Pk Coy
80 LAD

IKINGI MARYUT
(Under comd GHQ, Middle East)
IKINGI MARYUT
" "
MERSA MATRUH
" "

SIGS

HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div
1 Coy - 42 LAD
HQ 2 Coy
HQ 3 Coy

IKINGI MARYUT

12	12
13	13
14	14

INF

HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
 "J" Sec Sigs - 45 LAD
 16 Aust A Tk Coy
 2/1 Bn
 2/2 Bn
 2/3 Bn
 HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde
 "K" Sec Sigs - 46 LAD
 2/5 Bn
 2/6 Bn
 2/7 Bn
 HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde
 "L" Sec Sigs - 79 LAD
 2/4 Bn
 2/8 Bn
 2/11 Bn

(Under comd GHQ, Middle East)

11	"	GHQ, Middle East)	"
11	"	"	"
11	"	Cyr Force)	"
11	"	GHQ, Middle East)	"
11	"	"	"
11	"	"	"

IKINGI MARYUT

11	11
12	12
13	13
14	14
15	15
16	16
17	17
18	18
19	19
20	20

AASC

HQ AASC 6 Aust Div
 HQ Amn Coy
 HQ Pet Coy
 HQ Sup Col
 Comp Coy AASC (att 16 Bde)
 " " " (" 17 Bde)
 " " " (" 19 Bde)

IKINGI MARYUT

" "
 " "
 " "

(Under comd GHQ, ME)

IKINGI MARYUT

" "

AAMC

2/1 Fd Amb
 2/2 Fd Amb
 2/7 Fd Amb
 2/1 Fd Hyg Sec

(Under comd GHQ, Me)

IKINGI MARYUT

" "
 " "

MISC

6 Aust Div Pro Coy
 6 Aust Div Postal Unit
 6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office
 6 Aust Div Salvage Unit
 6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp

IKINGI MARYUT

" "
 " "
 " "
 " "

(Signed) A.E.BAMFORD, Capt.,
 for
CS 6 Aust Div.

<u>Distribution -</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
16 Aust Inf Bde	1
17 Aust Inf Bde	2
19 Aust Inf Bde	3
6 Aust Cav	4
RAA 6 Aust Div	5
RAE 6 Aust Div	6
Sigs 6 Aust Div	7-8
GOC	9
G	10
I	11
AQ	12-13
Camp	14
CAASC	15
ADMS	16
DADOS	17-18
SOME	19
DAFM	20-22
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	23
6 Aust Div Fd Cash	24
6 Aust Div Sec Reception	
Camp	25
6 Aust Div Postal	26
War Diary	27-28
File	29-30
Spare	31-34

For Information -


EFE	35-36
1 Aust Corps	37-38

1770-20

1/2.000.000

CYRENAICA

NORTH **II 84-36**



Compiled at W.O., drawn and heliographed
at O S 1037
Printed by 512 (AFd.Sry) Coy RE Oct. 1914

Scale 1:200,000



Kilometres 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Kilometres

1 Kilometre = 2 Miles


Miles 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Miles

Scale 1 inch to 31.6 Miles
or 104 inches to 32 Miles

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
001850E



Hppx. 241

Sheet 11

EL AGHEILA




[The following section contains extremely faint, illegible text from a document page.]

17ppx 24

Sheet 10

SIRTE




D.R. 125
CO-ORDINATES OF SHEET CORNERS

LIBYAN GRID	CONVERGENCE
N.W. Corner 811,104.4 m. E. S.W. Corner 807,121.6 m. E. N.E. Corner 1,000,000.0 m. E. S.E. Corner 995,978.4 m. E.	At West Sheet Edge Grid North is 0° 41' 45" 374 W of True North At East Sheet Edge Grid North coincides with True North

WRITING & ABBREVIATIONS


ROMS The seat of the commissariat or zone.
Zella The seat of the delegation.
Zellia Place of 1st importance.
es-Sallia Place of 2nd importance.

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS



Scale 1:500,000

LIBYAN GRID



Reproduced by 512 (A) (R) (R) Coy. R.E.
From a captured Italian map dated 1939-4.

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET

LETTER	NUMBER	REFERENCE
(R)T	7	8
(R)U	7	8
(R)Y	7	8
(R)Z	7	8
(R)D	7	8
(R)E	7	8
(R)F	7	8
(R)G	7	8
(R)H	7	8
(R)I	7	8
(R)J	7	8
(R)K	7	8
(R)L	7	8
(R)M	7	8
(R)N	7	8
(R)O	7	8
(R)P	7	8
(R)Q	7	8
(R)R	7	8
(R)S	7	8
(R)T	7	8
(R)U	7	8
(R)V	7	8
(R)W	7	8
(R)X	7	8
(R)Y	7	8
(R)Z	7	8

001852G



TIPPX 23

Sheet 20

MARADA


LIBYA 1:500,000

LIBYAN GRID based on Long. 13°E.

MARADA

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

EDITION OF 10 FEB 41
SHEET 20



D.R. 125

CONVERGENCE
At East Sheet Edge Grid North is 0° of 48 374 E. of True North
At West Sheet Edge Grid North coincides with True North

CO-ORDINATES OF SHEET CORNERS

LIBYAN GRID	W. Corner	E. Corner
N. W. Corner	1,000,000 m. E.	436,207 m. E.
S. W. Corner	1,000,000 m. E.	217,638 m. E.
N. E. Corner	1,100,000 m. E.	440,941 m. E.
S. E. Corner	1,100,000 m. E.	218,308 m. E.

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS


LIBYAN GRID
Incidence of letters on this sheet

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET
Letter, sheet is used for this sheet. (Sheet from top of map or from diagram)

LIBYAN GRID
Incidence of letters on this sheet

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET
Letter, sheet is used for this sheet. (Sheet from top of map or from diagram)

001853H





PP 21

Special Sheet
AGEDABIA

CYRENAICA
1:500,000

SPECIAL AGEDAB A SHEET


EDITION OF 10 FEB 71
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED



COORDINATES OF SHEET CORNERS

LIBYAN GRID	
N.W. Corner	1,100,800 m. E.
" "	551,700 m. N.
S.W. "	1,100,570 m. E.
" "	509,444 m. N.
N.E. "	1,206,212 m. E.
" "	552,801 m. N.
S.E. "	1,202,030 m. E.
" "	504,030 m. N.


INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS



ROWN SHOWS BOUNDARY OF GRID LETTERS

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET	
LETTER. Must be used for this sheet. Obtain from face of map or from diagram.	
MINUTY H. G. U. E. T. I. N. LETTERS (S. I. C.)	
East	North
Take West edge of map to which point line, and read the figure printed opposite the line on North the North margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate (units) Eastwards.	Take North edge of map to which point line, and read the figure printed opposite the line on East the East margin or on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate (units) Northwards.
East 0 0	North 0 0
REFERENCE: 1:500,000 To represent 1,000 metres	
1000	1000
Square	Square
Nearest similar reference with one letter distant 500 km.	Nearest similar reference with both letters distant 5,000 km.

D.H. 125



CONVENTIONAL SIGNS.

- Wells or springs.
- Cities.
- More important permanent water points.
- Grain stores.
- Temp of War Man (permanent structure).
- Temp of War Man (temporary structure).
- Drillable spring water.
- Pressurized spring water.
- Arch (arch or gateway).
- Scout (Scout).
- Relief.
- Dry river bed.
- Landline surveying station shown in relief from the topographic or astronomical observation.

CONVERGENCE

At East Sheet Edge Grid North is 0° 32' 41" E. of True North
At West Sheet Edge Grid North is 0° 46' 24" E. of True North
LIBYAN GRID based on Long. 18° E.

0018541



AUSTRIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

3 Aust Corps

11 Mar 41.

SECRET NO 41/2

CAMOUFLAGING C. VES

1. Att hereto as Appx 'A' are notes upon the above subject.
2. All units will draw scale of Apparatus Camouflage to which entitled under AFG1098-1000 Jun 40 (Table 25) (with any subsequent additions or alterations).

Conf. of Mcl Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION -

List 'B'

NOTES ON CAMOUFLAGING OF LT VEHsUse of Nets and Garnishing.

1. A 2" or 3" mesh net without any garnish is practically useless.
2. Such a net is only intended as a support for garnish.
3. A 14 ft net needs at least 200 yds of garnish. A 24 ft net needs 400 yds. A 30 ft needs 600 yds.
4. The best colour for the garnish may vary with the area you are in. Your Camouflage Officer will probably have taken what steps he can to make good colours available.
5. You should think of your net as a CURTAIN behind which to hide your veh and NOT as a sort of magic cloak which will conceal anything over which the net is wrapped closely.

6. Remember that the things that give your veh away to enemy air observers are -

(i) The smooth regular surfaces of the top and sides which reflect a lot of light, no matter how they are painted, and therefore shine comparatively brightly and can be seen for long distances.

(ii) The deep shadows under the chassis, wings and all recessed surfaces, ~~also~~ the deep square shadows of the opened back of the veh and of the cab.

(iii) The shadow of the veh on the ground.

(iv) The bright parts, glinting metal, glass, etc.

7. A well garnished net, well arranged, will help greatly to kill the reflection from top and sides. It will kill the deep shadows under the veh etc. It will kill the glint from bright spots. It will make the veh indeterminate and less worth bothering about.

It will not entirely disguise the regular shadow of the veh on the ground unless you prop the top of net up irregularly in some way so that it does not cling closely to the top lines of the body. With a little ingenuity you can almost always find a way of doing this and of spreading the edges of the net out like an apron.

8. If you have insufficient strip garnish it is well worth using any local foliage, brush, boughs, grass etc to 'thicken' up your net. Use such stuff to hide the 'give-aways' listed in 6 above. When placing such extra garnish consider the angle from which aircraft observes you.

9. Do not expect your net to hide you when you are on the move. It will NOT. Therefore do not uselessly damage your net by driving always with it over the veh. Figure out the best way of rolling your net up quickly before moving off, stowing it where it will ride most safely and unrolling and using it again when you halt. With a little practice rolling and unrolling a net need not take more than five minutes.

10. Here are some points on STOPS:

(i) Where there is no cover under which you can hide, or alongside which you can hope to escape notice, then dispersal is the best answer. But the proper use of your net will add enormously to your chances of escaping notice.

(ii) If open ground has clearly distinguishable patches either of roughness or of different colours then it is a good thing to park right on the edges of such patches where one colour or formation begins and the other ends. But not your net. A blob or vague shape on an edge line that is natural is harder to see than the same 'blob' on the interior of a patch.

(iii) If there are bushes or small trees NOT AS HIGH AS YOUR VEH it is sometimes best to park on the sunny side and let the shadow of your veh fall on to the bushes and be broken up by them.

(iv) If the tree or other cover is HIGHER THAN YOUR VEH get on the shadow side so that the shadow of the tree etc blots out the shadow of your veh.

11. Here are hints on the best way of garnishing a NET.

(i) Do your best to get all the garnish you are entitled to under your gloss.


(ii) Cut it all into 6 ft lengths and then jumble all the colours together.

(iii) Peg your net out flat on the ground - stretched tight.

(iv) Start to weave strips in and out of the meshes i.e. knot the first end, weave in and out keeping the garnish as flat as possible but NOT in a straight line. Do not strain it tight. Knot the other end.

(v) The centre needs to be 'thick' the sides slightly less thick, the actual corners can be skimped. Therefore it is best to work from the centre out.

(vi) The finished net should look something like the rough sketch at right.



(vii) Do NOT cut the garnish into short bits and merely knot them in one place with the tails hanging loose. It is very wasteful and very little use.

PAINTWORK

12. An oil smear applied in large irregular diagonal blotches to catch a coating of local dust and dirt is recommended. To give good results these blotches should run over corners and across vertical or horizontal edges - just as per correct disruptive painting schemes.

GLASS WORK

13. Oil all outer surfaces not required to be transparent, and blow local dust over them.

May MONTH
1941 YEAR

A.I.F. FORM C 2118A

WAR DIARY

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. 1, Sec. 171

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

"G" Branch
UNIT HQ 6 Aust Div

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.C. REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	1941	Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required		
	1	HQ 6 Aust Div embarked at ALEXANDRIA on the morning of 31 Mar 41 and sailed in the SS "PENNLAND" - 19 Inf Bde less 2/11 Bn was also on board. An adv party HQ 6 Aust Div with all MT had sailed from ALEXANDRIA on "HELLAS" on 27 Mar. Convoy consisted of "PENNLAND" and "CAMERONIA" also carrying units of AIF. The voyage was uneventful except for one air alarm, but enemy planes did not engage the convoy.		Officers holding appointments on HQ 6 Aust Div during the period covered by this Diary attached as Appendix A.
	3	"PENNLAND" arrived at PIRAEUS 1500 hrs 3 Apr. Brig. BRUNSHILL DA & QMG LUSTRE FORCE reported to Maj-Gen Sir Iven Mackay on board when conference was held - <u>PRESENT CONFERENCE:</u> Brig. E.F. HERRING, DSO MC ED, CRA 6 Aust Div Brig. G.F. VASEY, CBE DSO, Comdr 19 Inf Bde Col. C.C. PRIOR, AA & QMG 6 Aust Div Col. R.B. SUTHERLAND, GSO I, 6 Aust Div Maj. I.R. CAMPBELL, DSO, GSO II, 6 Aust Div Instructions were received by GOC to proceed NORTHWARDS following morning and report to 1 Aust Corps at GERANIA. GOC, AQ, GI, CCRA disembarked at 1600 hrs and billeted in KING GEORGE HOTEL for night 3/4 Apr.		
	4	Maj-Gen Sir I.G. MACKAY, Col. R.B. SUTHERLAND, Brig. HERRING departed ATHENS 0930 hrs for GERANIA. Col PRIOR and remainder Div Staff remained in ATHENS to foster disembarkation and movement forward units of 6 Aust Div as they arrived. Personnel HQ 6 Aust Div were camped DAPHNI CAMP No. 1. Maj-Gen Sir I.G. MACKAY and party arrived LARISSA 2000 hrs 4 Apr and stayed with 2/3 Bn that night		

A170 Mob Print Sec AIF 231-111-6

Signature

I. D. [Signature]

MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C 2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	Apr 1941			
	4	2/3 Bn then on Internal Security and Anti-Parachute duties with coys at VOLOS - LARISSA aerodrome and LARISSA town.		
	5	Maj-Gen Sir I.G. MACKAY and party reported 1 Aust Corps, GERANIA, 1100 hrs and short conference was held by Lt-Gen Sir T. BLAMEY, at which possible role 6 Aust Div outlined to Comdr 6 Aust Div. Afternoon Maj-Gen. MACKAY with CRA and GSO I proceeded on recce of VERRIA Pass.		
	6	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div opened on NORTHERN slopes SERVIA Pass. Rear HQ departed DAPHNI to rejoin Adv HQ. Route via ATLANDI along coast to LAMIA thence main road NORTHWARDS.		
	7	Maj-Gen MACKAY, Col. R.B. SUTHERLAND, and Brig. HERRING met GOC 12 Gk Div at SOFULA 1030 hrs, and in company with GOC 12 Gk Div examined the GREEK Defences of VERRIA Pass. 16 Bde at this time had been instructed to take over defences this area and relieve 12 Gk Div for operations elsewhere. Order of Battle 16 Inf Bde Gp this time included:- HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde "J" Sec Sigs 2/1 Aust Inf Bn 2/2 Aust Inf Bn 2/3 Aust Inf Bn 2/2 Fd Regt RAL 2/1 Fd Coy RAE 2/1 Fd Amb AAMC		Orders of Battle covering all phases of the operations of 6 Aust Div in GREECE attached as Appendix B.
	8	Rear party Div HQ rejoined Div HQ and HQ 6 Aust Div moved to WEST end of VERRIA Pass on NORTH of mainroad. HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde established about midway along the pass with 2/1 Bn		

Also Mo's Print See AIF 5M-111-6.

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A.I.F. FORM C 2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.M.B. Vol. I, sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	APR 1941	Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required		
	8	on fwd slopes to left. 2/2 Bn on the right between road and RIVER ALIAKHON and 2/3 Bn in reserve near Bde HQ. At this stage 19 Inf Bde was given the role of reserve to 16 Inf Bde and was to be deployed in the pass to the WEST of 16 Inf Bde and to be particularly responsible for closing the WESTERN end of pass against air borne or parachute troops landing on the KOZANE plain and operating EASTWARDS. 2/8 Bn was in bivouac SOUTH of SOFULAR; 2/4 Bn had relieved 2/3 Bn on security duties at LARISSA; 2/11 Bn had not yet arrived in GREECE, 17 Inf Bde also had NOT arrived in GREECE.		
	8 1930	Brig. CLOWES, LO 1 Aust Corps reported to GOC with special instructions for HQ 6 Aust Div to move to hrs. FLORINA GAP and take over command of operations that area. Maj-Gen MACKAY, Col R.B. SUTHERLAND, Brig. HERRING moved 2000 hrs to SOTER to HQ LEE FORCE (Comdr - Brig. LEE CCMA 1 Aust Corps). Gen. MACKAY contacted Rear HQ 1 Armd Bde PERDINA on way forward - arrived HQ LEE FORCE 2350 hrs and conference immediately with Brig. LEE. That Time LEE FORCE consisted of 1 RMA* and disposed at VEVI Gap. Front very lightly held and 1 Armd Bde at that time had NOT completed its withdrawal through LEE FORCE. Completed by 0600 hrs 9 Apr when force into reserve around MIYITEON.		* 64 Med Regt (less one Coy) 1 Aust A. Tk Regt (less one bty) 27 NZ (MG) Bn (less two coys)
	9 0300	Lt-Col SMITH-DORRIEN, LO FORCE HQ with CMA reported HQ SOTER with request for Gen. MACKAY and Col SUTHERLAND attend conference new GOC CMA - Gen CARRADOSSAS, - KOZANE 0600 hrs. GOC and GI attended conference which lasted 3 hours and made somewhat difficult by time taken up by interpreters. Lt-Col ROSS, Military Attache, BELGRADE, also was present and had just escaped ahead of the GERMANS at BELGRADE that evening. Conference except for		

A153 Mob Print Ser AIF 23M-111-0.

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A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

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For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)								
	APR 1941	9 personal contacts between the two GOCs was not of any real value. 1000 GOC 6 Aust Div took over responsibility for the hrs. FLORINA GAP Front. Adv HQ at SOTER with rear HQ open at PERDIKA. All movement on roads in the vicinity was made difficult by the large numbers of refugees and soldiers moving down SOUTH from FLORINA. Enemy pressure through PRILEP caused JUGOSLAVS and GREEKS to withdraw SOUTH. An organisation was set in hand to control in some measure the movement of these refugees through the area administered by 6 Aust Div. <u>MOVE FWD OF UNITS OF 6 AUST DIV.</u> - Carrier Pls of 2/5, 2/6, 2/7 and 2/11 Bns were moved to LARISSA under command 1 Aust Corps. The Greek defences in these forward areas were very weak and due to the German pressure against the YUGOSLAVS and effort was essential to close the FLORINA GAP, and under instructions from 1 Aust Corps 19 Aust Inf Bde was ordered forward to join ALYNTHEON FORCE 2/4 Bn less one Coy and 2/8 Bn were moved forward in MT. Comdr 19 Aust Inf Bde (Brig. G.A. VASEY, CBE, DSO) assumed command of troops in defences FLORINA GAP. Order of battle:- <table border="0"> <tr> <td>2/4 Bn less one Coy</td> <td>2/3 Fd Regt</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2/8 Bn</td> <td>1 A Tk Regt</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1 Rangers</td> <td>1 Armd Bde Div</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Two Coys 1 MG (NZ) Bn</td> <td>Reserve in ALYNTHEON Area.</td> </tr> </table> Units were disposed as follows - 2/8 Bn right, Rangers centre, 2/4 Bn left. These Bns extended over a front of 8-9 miles and consequently were very thin on the ground. No Bde reserve as such	2/4 Bn less one Coy	2/3 Fd Regt	2/8 Bn	1 A Tk Regt	1 Rangers	1 Armd Bde Div	Two Coys 1 MG (NZ) Bn	Reserve in ALYNTHEON Area.		
2/4 Bn less one Coy	2/3 Fd Regt											
2/8 Bn	1 A Tk Regt											
1 Rangers	1 Armd Bde Div											
Two Coys 1 MG (NZ) Bn	Reserve in ALYNTHEON Area.											

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A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

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For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	APR 1941	Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required		
	9	was available the Comdr. The Germans later were found to exploit this light holding of ground and no reserves, and exploited their infiltration tactics accordingly. 20 Greek Div was on left of 19 Inf Bde but no definite linking up front could be established with them. Communications were NON-existent and we at Div HQ could not obtain a location of HQ. 12 Cav Bde was eventually contacted and it was in position between NYMPHION, on left flank 19 Inf Bde and right of 12 Gk Div. 12 Gk Div on right 19 Inf Bde with DODOCENESE Regt on right of 2/8 Bn in the lake area.		
	1230 hrs	<u>AIR ACTIVITY.</u> A German recce plane flew over area occupied by 6 Aust Div and down valley SOUTH of PERDIKA. First enemy plane reported by 6 Aust Div in GREECE.		
	1600	HQ 6 Aust Div under order moved back to PERDIKA to be adjacent to HQ Gk CMA - Gk HQ were in dug-outs. <u>General situation</u> - It was deduced at this stage that Germans were advancing on GREECE by four lines of approach; two into THRACE, one via the RUPEL PASS and the fourth via the STRUMAR VALLEY.		
	2000	An LO from CMA PERDIKA reported 6 Aust Div that parachute troops had landed at SOFULAR in area of HQ 12 Gk Div. This report was NOT believed by 6 Aust Div Staff but the information was forwarded to 1 Aust Corps as an unconfirmed report. From close questioning of the LO it appeared that CMA could not raise HQ 12 Gk Div by telephone and that fact may have suggested parachute troops. Later on in the campaign 6 Aust Div were more experienced in treating the many panic, and exaggerated, reports received direct from CMA.		

A129 Mob Print Ser AIF 33X-111-6.

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WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

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For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 116

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
PERDIKA N 816428	Apr 1941	Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required		
		10 - Enemy MT sighted approaching on road leading through MONASTIR GAP. 0900 hrs		
		0600 G I ordered two patrols forward on bridge demolition operations. Each patrol of three Armcd cars.		
		0915 Comdr left patrol reported that he had moved over hrs JUGOSLAV border on BITOLI rd and had attempted to destroy the bridge but had been attacked by enemy light mechanised force and had been forced to withdraw. On the way back he had burnt two bridges and found that a force of enemy estimated one Motorised Bn had cut off his line of withdrawal. The patrol advanced at high speed and after a brief exchange of fire it broke through the bn and returned with the Engr lorry to Div HQ. The enemy were obviously surprised to find our patrol so far forward.		
		0955 19 Bde observed and reported enemy MT coln at hrs VEVE and ITIR and this later confirmed by air report. A report received from 1 Rangers that a pl which was patrolling forward of their sector night 9/10 April had not been heard of since 2030 hrs 9 Apr. Same unit also reported that a sentry from one of its forward posts had been killed. At this stage it was estimated that the enemy force on the fronts of 19 Bde consisted of one Mot Bn in the VEVE are and one Mot between BITOLI and FLORINA.		
		1037 Arty fire heard in the vicinity of area approx hrs 10 miles to the north of 2/4 Bn but this was assumed to be from the remnants of Gk or JUGOSLAV units withdrawing southwards. Two unidentified planes observed circling over fwd posns but no		

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(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

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For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 174

PLACE	DATE ADP	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	1941	10 - attack made.		
	1230 hrs	Brig Herring (CRA) arranged for arty action on concentration of enemy vehs and AFVs in the VEEVE area. First round fired by 2/3 Fd Regt registered a direct hit on one med tank, which with others had moved SOUTH towards the front of 1 Rangers. Five enemy aircraft observed making recce of our fwd posns in the Lakes area. No attempt made by 1 Rangers to obtain identifications from disabled tank.		
	1435 hrs	Warning order received from Force HQ that a withdrawal to the general line of the R. ALIAKMON was to be effected and reps of 1 Aust Corps had reconnoitred posns for the protracted defence of that area. An offr of Force HQ Recce Gp sent to contact Gk 20 Div with the object of finding where their HQ was est and what line the Div was holding. Offr returned 1900 hrs NOT having been able to est contact with Gk 20 Div and NOT having been able to find out any details concerning it from 1 Gk Cav Div.		
	1450 hrs	Reports received from arty OPs that about 400 inf and 20 lorries and other vehs moving SOUTH towards SITARIA. The inf later observed deploying Eastwards behind ridge between SITARIA and LOPHOI. Also reported that about 400 inf and approx 20 - 30 AFVs were in ITIA.		
	1720 hrs	Report received that our aircraft had carried out successful bombing attack on enemy LT and tp concentrations in the SYOPOS area.		

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WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

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For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	Apr 1941 10 1940 hrs	HQ 1 Aust Corps reported that VERIA PASS had been closed by a large road crater which was effectively covered by fire. Other demolitions had been prepared and were ready for blowing. 16 Aust Inf Bde commenced withdrawal to the MT OLYMPUS line by sending back its MT.		
	2315 hrs	Enemy estimated at approx one bn now opposing 2/4 Bn on the left of the sector and one tank which attempted to cross the minefield was destroyed. 1 Rangers reported large numbers of enemy in MT in VEVE and HQ 1 Aust Corps advised of this as a suitable bombing target. 2/3 Fd Regt carried out a short time programme by arrangement with Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde with VEVE as target area.		
	11 0730 hrs	19 Aust Inf Bde reported that during the night one pl of each of 1 Rangers and 2/8 Bn had been captured by Germans wearing Greek uniforms. A later report indicated that these losses had been exaggerated and in actual fact the losses were four men from 2/8 Bn and six men and two Bren guns from 1 Rangers. It could NOT be confirmed that the Germans were clothed in Greek uniforms, but G I issued an order that all tps wearing Greek uniforms in and around FDLs were to be regarded as hostile. During the night the enemy had succeeded in getting hows and 4" mortars fwd to support his inf.		

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For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	<u>Apr</u>			
	<u>11</u>	Reported by arty OP that an enemy attack by approx five coys inf was developing towards hrs feature 852 (097463) to the LEFT of 19 Bde front, and that enemy inf were moving SOUTH from the road at 597564 with the obvious intention of attacking our FDLs at the point of junction between 2/8 Bn and DODECANESE Regt. Comd 19 Bde advised of this by telephone, but he was already aware of the situation developing and had moved one coy 2/8 Bn to thicken the line at point at which the enemy attack was being launched.		
	1640	The enemy succeeded in taking the posn on hrs the DODECANESE front to the RIGHT of 2/8 Bn, but as a result of excellent supporting fire by 2/3 Fd Regt the attack on the LEFT flank was stemmed and re-directed towards the front of 2/4 Bn.		
	2000	Enemy inf supported by tanks continued attack hrs on feature 852 in spite of heavy losses, but the attack was by now losing its momentum due to accurate arty and LMG fire. Two PWs captured by 2/8 Bn were identified as belonging to "DIE FUHRER" Regt of VERFUGUNGSTRUPPE -- picked tps who were formerly HITLER's bodyguard but who now formed part of a motorised div.		
	2150	Reported by Brig Vasey (Comd 19 Bde) that the hrs situation well in hand and that severe losses had been inflicted on successive waves of enemy inf by 2/4 and 2/8 Bns. There was little activity on his front although there was still evidence of enemy MT movement to the NORTH.		

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A.I.F. FORM C2118A

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UNIT

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PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	<u>ADT</u> <u>11</u> 2330 hrs	Report received from British LO (Capt Ratcliffe) with Gk CMA that the whole of HQ CMA had moved back from its posn at PERDIKA. This was done without any reference to Comd 6 Aust Div.		
	<u>12</u>			
	1000 hrs	Conference at HQ 6 Aust Div with Col PAPPAS (EGS, Gk CMA) who was the sole rep of Gk CMA left at PERDIKA, to decide on the method of withdrawal of the DODECANESE Regt. No firm estimate of number of men, animals or tpt could be obtained from Gk reps until finally it was deduced that the figure was in the vicinity of 4500 men, of whom some 1200 were either wounded or incapable of marching. This figure was about 1500 in excess of that notified by Gk CMA the previous day. Col PAPPAS required tpt to shift all his tps and his demands for A Tk guns were unreasonable. Finally, at 1300 hrs, Maj-Gen Sir Iven Mackay (GOC 6 Aust Div) gave Col PAPPAS written orders to commence his withdrawal at 1500 hrs and arrangements were made to have 30 3-ton lorries at ALYNTION to lift as many of his wounded as possible. The remainder were to move by march route to KLEISOURA.		

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PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	Apr 12			
	1140 hrs	Enemy launched attack on front of 2/8 Bn and slight penetration achieved, but arty fire soon restored the posn.		
	1430 hrs	Report received from 19 Bde that the enemy were in KLEIDI and that 1 Rangers had withdrawn slightly as a result of penetration by enemy AFVs. This report was NOT confirmed but it appeared that at 1300 hrs the enemy had launched three separate and determined attacks each directed either at an exposed flank or at the point of junction between units. These attacks were supported by 15-ton tanks.		
	1500 hrs	Major Holloy (G II 6 Aust Div) visited HQ 19 Bde with orders concerning the withdrawal of DODECANESE Regt. Posn stabilised although our own arty was active and good targets were offering. Brig Vasey (Comd 19 Bde) had no doubt that if the posn did NOT deteriorate he would have no difficulty in extricating the Bde according to plan.		
	1640 hrs	LEFT CENTRE of 19 Bde forced to withdraw to Pt 1000 (7762) and Comd 19 Bde still considered that withdrawal would go according to plan, but he requested that in order to save time and avoid the necessity of marching tps too far, embussing pts should be further NORTH than previously arranged.		
	1800 hrs	Designation of 1 Aust Corps changed to Anzac Corps, and Lt-Gen Sir Thos Blamey to comd the Corps consisting of 6 Aust Div and NZ Div.		

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(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

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PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	APR 12 1800 hrs	When it was obvious that the DODECANESE Regt was withdrawing. the enemy pressure on the front of 159 Bde increased and although the Greeks were moving across our line of withdrawal they did NOT greatly impede the thinning out process which had commenced earlier than ordered in view of the increasing pressure of the enemy.		
	1930 hrs	Road craters and mine fields completed and VEVE rd "cratered". The dump at 30 DID on rd PERDIKA - ANXTION mined and timed to explode at 1130 hrs 13 Apr.		
		2/4 Bn was ordered to commence its withdrawal on the LEFT flank but as 2/8 Bn which was in close contact with the enemy was in danger of being cut off a coy of 2/4 Bn was ordered fwd to assist in extricating them. This coy suffered some casualties.		
		1 Armd Bde was covering the withdrawal of 19 Bde and had taken up a posn SOUTH of the rd ANXTION - PERDIKA.		
	1945 hrs	A special DR was sent fwd with a message to Comd 19 Bde with orders to adv the time of his withdrawal at his own discretion.		
	2015 hrs	This DR was unable to locate the Brig and on his return he reported that the Bde HQ had already closed and that units of 19 Bde were already moving SOUTH in MT.		
	2030 hrs	LO from 19 Bde arrived confirming the DR's report. He also stated that, in view of increasing pressure, Bn Comd had decided to withdraw earlier than ordered, but it was feared that some of 2/8 Bn had been cut off and would have to move to the EAST of LAKE PETERSRO to make their way to the MT RV.		

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A.I.F. FORM C2118A

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(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

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YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 174

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	<u>ADP</u> <u>12</u> 2030 hrs	HQ 6 Aust Div closed at PERDIKA and commenced move to GERANIA.		
	2200 hrs	LT moving SOUTH on road was NOT in unit gps and arrangements were made by Col Sutherland (G I) on arrival at KOZANI for all tpt (less 2nd line) carrying 19 Bde personnel to be diverted Westwards towards the Bde area which had been selected and reced by reps of 1 Aust Corps. The posn to be taken up was in the KROMION hills with 2/3 Bn on RIGHT, 2/4 Bn LEFT. All unit vehs except carriers and one truck per coy were sent SOUTH of the R ALIAKION to MEKROVELTON. One bty 1 A Tk Regt was placed under comd 19 Bde and its guns and vehs went into the posn with the two bns.		
	<u>13</u> 0100 hrs	The move of other AIF units continued Southwards in a snow storm and some confusion was caused by the bty of the A Tk Regt being turned round on the road a few miles SOUTH of KOZANI. The snow on the SERVIA PASS made driving conditions difficult and numerous vehs were "ditched", further adding to the difficulties of keeping the convoy moving.		
	0500 hrs	Div HQ arrived GERANIA and G I went on to Corps HQ to report the posn and the stage the withdrawal had reached. The line on to which 19 Bde had withdrawn was to be held by 4 NZ Bde and 16 Aust Inf Bde as well. It extended from MT OLYMPUS to the ridge NORTH of SERVIA, along the ridge to the vicinity of EDNANTYON, thence NW along the KROMION HILLS NORTH of R ALIAKION. 19 Bde LEFT sector, 4 NZ Bde CENTRE sector, and 16 Bde RIGHT sector. 20 Gk Div were reported to be holding a line to the WEST		

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PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	APR 13	HQ and Two coys 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn were under comd		
	0500 hrs	4 NZ Bde, one coy under comd 19 Bde, ~~and one~~ and one coy at GERANIA in Corps reserve.		
	1030 hrs	Orders received from ANZAC Corps that the present line was to be prepared for protracted def and 4 NZ Bde and att tps was placed under comd 6 Aust Div.		
	1200 hrs	Message received that 2/7 and 2/11 Bns had entrained at ATHENS for LARISSA and as Comd 19 Bde was concerned about the extent of his front, ANZAC Corps were asked if any indication could be given as to when 2/11 Bn might be ex- pected to rejoin its Bde.		
	1500 hrs	Information received from ANZAC Corps that 2/11 Bn would NOT be sent fwd on arrival at LARISSA but 26 NZ Bn was placed under comd 6 Aust Div. This bn was employed on the RIGHT of 19 Bde sector covering the approaches along the valley of R ALIAKMON. The br over the R ALIAKMON NORTH of SERVIA was blown and the pontoon br destroyed by burning. The main br did NOT break up as com- pletely as was expected and settled in such a manner that it was passable to inf and could be made suitable for use by MT in two or three hrs. Arrangements were made to have a standing patrol from 16 Bde sent fwd to cover the br with fire and harass any recce parties.		
	1630 hrs	Enemy aircraft became active over the fwd area, a flight of 21 machines dive-bombing and MGing along the rd from PROSELION to SERVIA.		

A120 Main Print See AIF EN 111-6.

Signature



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PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	APR 13 1650 hrs	Arty OPs reported that enemy aircraft were landing on aerodrome to the SOUTH of KOZANE. Machines appeared to be tp-carrying aircraft. It was also reported that a small recce party in MT had moved down towards the SERVIA br, but after being fired on by our arty they withdrew.		
	2000 hrs	Arrangements made for the hiring of mules and muleteers to assist in the tpt of stores, amn, and rations to units of 19 Bde.		
	14 0440 hrs	Air report received indicated that a coln of upwards of 200 enemy MT incl AFVs was on rd PTOLEMAIS - VEVE with its head at PTOLEMAIS ~~and~~ previous evening. The coln had been attacked by our bombers and direct hits scored on rd and rail targets WEST of LAKE PETERSRO. Gk Corps HQ left KORITZA for GREVENA.		
	1000 hrs	Reported that coln of enemy MT moving Westward along rd KOZANE - GREVENA and that enemy tpcarrying vehs were moving SOUTH from KOZANE and debussing in the vicinity of NEA SIGA.		
	1100 hrs	Enemy aircraft active over SERVIA PASS in the vicinity of No. 5 FSD. Comparatively little damage done: one M/C DR killed and road damaged three kilometres NORTH of Div HQ.		
	1215 hrs	Tp-carrying vehs observed moving to and from KOZANE. A proportion of these vehs moved WEST from KOZANE and the remainder were reported ferrying tps towards the SERVIA br area.		
	1500 hrs	Enemy inf reported to be examining the		

Also Mob Print See AIF 231-111-6.

Signature 

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For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	Apr 14	SERVIA br and 15 tanks were observed on the NORTH bank of the R ALIAKMON at a point 3 miles to the WEST of the br.		
	1515 hrs	Arty OP reported that 30 - 50 enemy AFVs had entered PETRINA (SE of KOZANE).		
	1617 hrs	A formation of 14 enemy aircraft dive-bombed and MG4d road in the vicinity of No. 5 FSD.		
	2120 hrs	It was reported by CRE that a recce had been made and that arrangements were in hand for the improvement and construction of tracks to 19 Bde and that a br across the R ALIAKMON was being built in the vicinity of the point of junction between 19 Bde and 4 NZ Bde. Comm with 19 Bde now difficult. W/T comm non-existent and CO Sigs had arranged to send fwd a spare 109 Set to replace that with the Bde which presumably had developed a fault. The only means of comm with the Bde at this stage was by LO and DR. Both of these methods entailed a walk of 4-5 miles over mountainous and heavily timbered country to the NW of the river crossing. All stores, rations and equipt had to be transported by donkeys or mules on the NORTH side of the river.		
Signature 				

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	<u>Apr</u> <u>15</u>			
	0630 hrs	Report received that at dawn approx two coys enemy supported by air and arty attacked on the NZ Bde sector along the line of the road through the Pass. The attack was successfully beaten off and about 150 PWs were taken. These were all from the Legion ADOLF HITLER.		
	0800 hrs	Orders received that 19 Bde was to be withdrawn SOUTH of the R ALIAXION during the night 15/16 Apr and they were to take up a posn in reserve in rear of 4 NZ Bde.		
	1015 hrs	Reported by HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde that contact with 2/1 Bn had been lost since the Bde moved from the VERRIA PASS. LOs sent out had failed to locate the bn either at the RV appointed or on the route to it from VERRIA PASS.		
	1030 hrs	Reported by 4 NZ Bde that 3 AFVs and 5 MT had succeeded in crossing the R ALIAXION at points to the WEST of the SERVIA br. The same report indicated that a gp of about 150 vehs was moving SOUTH from KOZANE.		
	1100 hrs	CC Supply Dumps reported that the Greek personnel manning 5 of the 6 AA posts at the dump on the MIKROVALTON rd had deserted their posts during the night and taken their guns with them.		
	1205 hrs	A report received from 4 NZ Bde stated that the enemy had repaired the pontoon br at the SERVIA br crossing and that enemy forces estimated at one bn had reached the village of SERVIA. 4 NZ Bde reported that they were being shelled (probably 5.9" hows) and that enemy spotting and recce planes were overhead and had been for some time. A request was sent to ANZAC Corps for fighter support.		

Also See Print Sec AIF Form C2118A

Signature

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C 2112A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.D. Vol. 1, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	APR 15 1330 hrs	Message received from ANZAC CORPS that 2/82 Gk Regt had arrived at MIKROVALTON and that it was without arms, amn and supplies. It was to come under comd 6 Aust Div. LO from 6 Aust Div sent forward at 1400 hrs with orders from GOC 6 Aust Div. These were orders to the effect that the Regt was to get two days' rations from the supply dump and move Southwards via a route which would keep them clear of the main rd and the road leading SOUTH through MIKROVALTON.		
	1350 hrs	Orders received from ANZAC CORPS for the withdrawal of 6 Aust Div and NZ Div to the THERMOPYLAE LINE. SAVIGE FORCE, which had been created from HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde, 2/5, 2/6, 2/7 and 2/11 Bns, one Bty 2/1 Fd Regt, 2/2 Fd Coy and 2/2 Fd Amb, had been disposed by ANZAC CORPS in a def posn astride the rd LARISSA - TRIKKALA EAST of KALABAKA.		
		4 NZ Bde was to cover the withdrawal of 6 Aust Div and the withdrawal was to commence night 15/16 Apr.		
		19 Bde was to move direct to DOMOKOS and come under comd DOMOKOS FORCE (Brig LEE).		
	1430 hrs	LO sent fwd with orders for withdrawal to 19 Bde and Comd was instructed to destroy all vehs and equipt which could NOT be brought out of posn.		
	1505 hrs	Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde ordered by BGS to report to HQ ANZAC CORPS as soon as possible. Message passed to HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde. HQ 16 Bde stated that owing to the distances units would have to cover, it would NOT be possible to withdraw the whole Bde in one night, and the Bde Comd proposed to withdraw 2/2 Bn night 15/16 Apr and 2/1 and 2/3 Bns the following night.		

Also Mob Print See AIF 23M 111-G.

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	<u>Apr</u> <u>15</u> 1700 hrs	BGS ANZAC CORPS rang to request that CO 2/2 Bn report HQ ANZAC CORPS as early as possible and arrangements made for LO to meet Lt-Col CHILTON at the embussing point to pass on this message.		
	1900 hrs	Report received that orders for withdrawal had reached Comd 19 Bde and that units were on the move.		
	1905 hrs	A report was received from a Greek villager that the enemy was in KOZANE 1½ hrs after our last tps passed through on the morning of 13 Apr. They arrived in the following order:- 5 tanks M/C MG combinations Motorised inf - 250 of whom were left in the town. 10 tanks (each about equal in length to a 30-cwt lorry) and an unspecified number of lorry-borne inf which moved on towards SERVIA. Tractor-drawn arty which moved towards SERVIA. After continuous dive-bombing and MG attacks by approx 90 aircraft for 1½ hrs, two coys of enemy inf attacked the 4 NZ Bde sector at dusk. This attack was supported by heavy arty fire which had accompanied the previous dive-bombing attacks. The enemy had advanced with the dawn attack this morning and remained hidden in the scrub all day close to the FDLs waiting for the air and arty support before continuing the attack which was successfully repulsed. Enemy were again reported to be using the KOZANE LG.		

Also Mob Print Set AIF 23M-111-12

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MONTH

A.I.F. Form C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	15 Apr 1950	Reported that 2/2 Fd Regt had been seen withdrawing SOUTH along the road PROCELION - MIKROVALTON instead of over the SERVIA Pass as had been ordered by CRA.		
	16 Apr 0530 hrs	Comd 19 Bde arrived HQ 6 Aust Div and stated that as a result of false information which had apparently been given by a NZ Major regarding the shelling of the road junction NORTH of SERVIA Pass all units under his command, except one Coy 2/8 Bn had withdrawn SOUTH along the MIKROVALTON road. He also stated that all vehs and 11 A Tk guns had been destroyed before the area had been evacuated.		
	0930 hrs	A report was received that vehs which had withdrawn along the MIKROVALTON rd were finding the going very difficult owing to the rain and muddy condition of the road. CRA 6 Aust Div was requested by G I to enquire into the reason for the disobedience of orders by 2/2 Fd Regt.		
	1000 hrs	16 Bde reported that contact with 2/1 Bn had NOT yet been est and in view of the withdrawal of the remainder of the Bde that night a message was sent to ANZAC CORPS requesting that arrangements be made for a patrol or patrols from the LEFT Bn of 5 NZ Bde to be sent out in an endeavour to locate 2/1 Bn and inform the Bn Comd of the proposed withdrawal and the location of his tp-carrying and unit MT.		
	1050 hrs	HQ ANZAC CORPS advised the formation of ALLEN FORCE which was being despatched to the PENEIOS GORGE where the enemy were reported to be making a determined thrust. 2/2 Bn had been diverted to the PENEIOS GORGE and 2/3 Bn was to move there and NOT to the ZARNEHOS area night 16/17 Apr. ALLEN FORCE was composed as follows:-		

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
		Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required		
	Apr 16	Comd - Brig ALLEN, CBE, DSO, Comd 16 Bde HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde "J" Sec Sigs and IAD 2/2 Aust Inf Bn 2/3 " " " 21 NZ Bn One NZ Fd Regt (less one bty) NZ A Tk Regt		
	1115 hrs	Rain was still falling and the sky was overcast. As a result of this and the low "ceiling" there was no enemy air activity.		
	1200 hrs	4 NZ Bde reported that nothing had been heard of 26 NZ Bn which had withdrawn SOUTH of the R ALIAKHON on the orders of Comd 19 Bde and told to report to 4 NZ Bde. LO from NZ Bde had been sent out in an endeavour to locate the Bn and guide it to the area it had been allotted in the NZ Bde area.		
	1400 hrs	Rear HQ 6 Aust Div closed and moved to SYN THOMAI. Arrangements made for Adv HQ to move to the same location at 2000 hrs night 16/17 Apr.		
	1800 hrs	MT for 2/3 Bn commenced to arrive at the dispersal area. Five of these vehs were detailed to move up to B Ech area of 4 NZ Bde to be available to lift one coy of 2/4 Bn which was thought to be moving by march route from its posn NORTH of the R ALIAKHON in the direction of SERVIA PASS.		
	2200 hrs	Rear HQ 16 Bde reported no further contact with 2/1 Bn. Lights had been seen out to the EAST but these had now disappeared. Adv HQ 6 Aust Div closed and moved to SYN THOMAI but a small operational HQ remained and was to move Southward at first light.		
Also Note Print See AIF 231-111-6.				

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C 2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	Arr. 16 2230 hrs	2/3 Bn commenced embussing and moving to PENEIOS GORGE area.		
	17 0315 hrs	Report received that 2/1 Bn had been contacted in the vicinity of LEVADICH and owing to the nature of the country had found it necessary to march a distance of 60 miles in order to reach the area allotted to them for the def of the MT OLYMPUS - SERVIA PASS line. The Bn commenced embussing at 0530 hrs and proceeded to SYN THOMAI. ANZAC CORPS advised that 2/1 Bn had been located and were preparing to move SOUTH.		
	0530 hrs	Report received from embussing offr that 2/3 Bn had completed embussing and the last veh cleared the embussing pt at 0500 hrs.		
	0800 hrs	Operational HQ 6 Aust Div closed and moved to HQ ANZAC CORPS where GOC and G I conferred with G I NZ Div. Gen FREYBERG was then fwd with 5 NZ Bde in the KATHERINE PASS.		
	1000 hrs	G I and G II left HQ NZ Div and proceeded to Adv HQ 6 Aust Div est at SYN THOMAI arriving 1230 hrs.		
	1220 hrs	Elements of 2/1 Bn and 2/2 Fd Regt were passed on road between LARISSA and SYN THOMAI and were directed to the ZARKHOS area.		
	1230 hrs	A report received that the br across the PENEIOS R in the vicinity of ZARKHOS had been accidentally blown. CRE 6 Aust Div requested to send an offr to confirm this and to recce a detour for the withdrawal Eastwards of the SAVIGE FORCE that night. LO sent out to contact Comd SAVIGE FORCE with orders for that force to commence to withdraw to		

Signature 

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A120 Mob Print See AIF Form 111-C

MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2112A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training detail- and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	Apr 17	the ZARKHOS line and to clear all his 2nd line tpt through LARISSA upon receipt of the orders given him by LO. Advice received that 1 Armd Bde were complete- ly exhausted and had been withdrawn to ATALANDI (ATALANDI) leaving 7 cruiser tanks of 3 RTR under comd SAVIGE FORCE.		
	1330 hrs	Div Reserve formed and composed as under:- Comd - Major I.R.CAMPBELL, DSO, Comd 2/1 Aust Inf Bn 2/1 Aust Inf Bn 2/2 Fd Regt One bty 1 A Tk Regt This reserve was ordered to move from SYN THOMAI to the vicinity of the aerodrome 1 1/2 miles SOUTH of LARISSA where it was responsible for the protection of the aerodrome and also in posn to support 16 Aust Inf Bde or 6 NZ Bde.		
	1600 hrs	In order that as much traffic as possible would be clear of LARISSA by the time 16 and 17 Bdes and 6 NZ Bde withdrew, it was decided to move HQ 6 Aust Div to NIKKAI (4 miles SOUTH of LARISSA.)		
	1930 hrs	HQ 6 Aust Div closed at SYN THOMAI and moved to NIKKAI.		
	2000 hrs	LARISSA bombed by a formation of high level bombers and flow of traffic through the town temporarily disorganized. All traffic moving Eastward from TRIKKALA was diverted through the SW of the town. The road SOUTH of the town was considerably damaged by enemy air action and traffic could move only with difficulty.		

AIF Mob Print See AIF 231-11-G.

Signature

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	Apr 17 2330 hrs	GOC, G I and G II arrived NIKKAI. There were no comms within the Div HQ area nor was there any means of comm (apart from M/C DR) with ANZAC CORPS and 16 and 17 Bdes.		
	18 0045 hrs	Message sent to ANZAC CORPS suggesting that in view of congestion on main rd efforts be made to collect sufficient rolling stock to move 6 NZ Bde and 16 Aust Inf Bde by rail from LARISSA to vicinity their areas on the THERMOPYLAE line.		
	0730 hrs	HQ NZ Div est on rd LARISSA - LAMIA one mile SOUTH of NIKKAI village.		
	0830 hrs	LO sent fwd to contact Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde with instrns that he was to withdraw under the orders of NZ Div, that he was to deny his present line to the enemy until 0300 hrs 20 Apr, and his route of withdrawal was through LARISSA, thence via the rd LARISSA - VELESTINON - ALMIROS - LAMIA.	+	
	0900 hrs	GOC visited HQ NZ Div to confer with Maj-Gen FREYBERG. Movement of vehs SOUTH along the main rd was now quite smooth and vehs were travelling widely dispersed.		
	0930 hrs	Report received from 17 Bde (SAVIGE FORCE) that the whole force had negotiated the ~~about~~ made necessary as a result of accidental blowing of br on 17 Apr and that 2/11 Bn which was covering the withdrawal of the force along the TRIKKALA - LARISSA rd had NOT been pressed by the enemy.		
	0935 hrs	A large formation of enemy aircraft dive-bombed LARISSA obviously with the object of causing confusion and damaging the hrs immediately		

Also Note Print See AIF 231 141-G

Signature

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118a

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. 1, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.M. REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	Apr 18	NORTH of the town, but tpt of the SAVIGE FORCE continued to move steadily Southwards past Div HQ at NIKKAI.		
	1005 hrs	A further raid by dive-bombers on LARISSA. The raid lasted for approx 15 mins.		
	1020 hrs	An explosion occurred in the vicinity of the aerodrome SW of LARISSA, but as no enemy aircraft were in the neighbourhood at the time it was presumed that the explosion was deliberate destruction of either a petrol or amn dump.		
	1045 hrs	Enemy aircraft commenced high and low level bombing and dive-bombing and MGing along rds LARISSA - TRIKKALA and LARISSA - LAMIA. On many occasions the aircraft flew as low as 100 ft and as a result the movement of all traffic on these roads was hampered. Enemy aircraft appeared to concentrate on villages possibly with the dual intention of terrorising the villagers and making the main rd through the villages impassable. CRE 6 Aust Div requested to send Engr offr to make recce of coast rd LARISSA - VELESTINON - ALMIROS - LAMIA. Arrangements were made with Sigs 6 Aust Div for a W/T set to accompany the offr making this recce.		
	1100 hrs	As no information had been received from 16 Aust Inf Bde a LO was sent fwd to contact the Comd and ascertain from him the posn in the FENEIOS GORGE.		
	1130 hrs	Low level bombing and MGing along the main rd continued but tpt was well dispersed and in between attacks the convoys were able to continue the move SOUTH.		

AL20 Mob Print Sec AIF 23M 411-G

Signature 

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	<u>Apr</u> <u>18</u>	Report received by W/T from offr making road 1215 recce to the effect that the road would require hrs improving for a distance of approx 200 yds at a pt 23 miles SE of LARISSA.		
	1430	LO returned from 16 Aust Bde and indicated hrs that the force was disposed as follows:- LEFT 2/2 Bn RIGHT 21 NZ Bn Reserve - 2/3 Bn, to the LEFT and in rear of 2/2 Bn. Enemy cruiser tanks had attempted three times to cross the river to the LEFT FRONT of 2/2 Bn during the morning and finally succeeded in gett- ing some tanks across at 1330 hrs. These moved round to the LEFT of 2/2 Bn. 21 NZ Bn and the NZ Fd Arty Regt had been forced to withdraw in the face of strong opposition by enemy inf. 2/2 Bn held this attack but found as a result that its RIGHT flank was completely exposed. The HQ of the force located at the HARRYMORI ry sta was heavily bombed shortly after midday.		
	1500 hrs	LO sent fwd to contact Div Res with orders that Lt-Col W. CREMOR was to comd and was to move at 1700 hrs to its posn on the THERMOPIYLAE LINE, 2/1 xnd Bn and Bty 1 A Tk Regt to come under comd. 19 Aust Inf Bde, and 2/2 Fd Regt to be sited under arrangements of CRA 6 Aust Div.		
	1535 hrs	LARISSA and main rd leading SOUTH from LARISSA again heavily bombed. It became obvious that the enemy was concentrating all his air efforts in an endeavour to disorganize the withdrawal and if possible cut off those units NORTH of LARISSA.		
	1600 hrs	Message received from Comd 16 Aust Bde that enemy tanks had broken through the gap between Also Mob Print See AIF 23M-111-G.		

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 174

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	Apr: 18	Rectification details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required between his LEFT flank and 6 NZ Bde. He was endeavouring to hold on to his present line and stated that he could do no more than his best. No indication was given that the posn had become untenable but in view of the implied urgency of the situation a message was sent by LO to Div res cancelling its move at 1700 hrs and ordering it to be prepared to move NORTH through LARISSA to support ALLEN FORCE.		
	1700 hrs	Vehs of SAVIGE FORCE continued to move steadily southward and a check revealed that they were moving at the rate of five vehicles in each minute during the periods in between bombing attacks.		
	1730 hrs	Message received from ANZAC Corps to the effect that ANZAC Corps was moving to and opening at LEVADIA at 2000 hrs 18 Apr.		
	1800 hrs	Enemy aircraft dive-bombed and machine-gunned road in the vicinity of HQ NZ Div. There were several casualties among personnel and approximately eight vehicles were fired by incendiary bullets or bombs. As a result of this bombing HQ NZ Div decided to move location. Their original intention was to move south along the main road, but at the last minute they moved in a Northerly direction through LARISSA and greatly added to the congestion on the road.		
	1930 hrs	HQ 6 Aust Div closed at NIKAI and moved to BRAILLOS area. GOC 6 Aust Div remained at NIKAI in order to satisfy himself that the withdrawal of 16 and 17 Bdes proceeded in accordance with plan.		

Signature



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April MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT 6 Aust Div

1941 YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	19 Apr			
	0700 hrs	GOC G1 and G11 visited the HQ of Brig LEE (DOMOKUS FORCE). Brig LEE stated that he had not found it necessary to use 2/4 and 2/8 Bns and that they had moved back and were already taking up a def posn on the BRAILOOS pass. At this stage there was considerable congestion on the rd in the vicinity of Brig LEE's HQ and shortly after an enemy recce plane had been over a formation of 12 Stukas appeared and heavily bombed and machine-gunned the rd and the area round the HQ. This attack lasted for approximately 35 mins but the casualties to personnel or vehicles was almost negligible.		
	1100 hrs	G1 and G11 arrived BRAILOOS Pass and conferred with Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde, G11 "W" Force and Comd 2/1 Bn regarding the dispositions of Tps for the defence of the BRAILOOS Pass. 2/1 Bn was allotted the right of the sector and 2/4 Bn the left with the remnants of 2/8 Bn in reserve. Comd 19 Bde was not happy about the extent of his part and the possible line of approach by the enemy along the railway valley. G11 "W" Force was asked if the inter-divisional boundary could be laid down definitely in order that 6 Aust Div would know its responsibility and dispose its tps accordingly. This, the G11 promised, would be attended to as soon as he returned to Force HQ		
	1230 hrs	HQ 6 Aust Div opened at PALAIOKHORION the location being the main rd and the railway about one mile SE of GRAVIA.		
	1300 hrs	L0 arrived from ANZAC Corps with verbal orders for the defence of the BRAILOOS posn.		

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April MONTH
1941 YEAR

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT 6 Aust Div

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 174

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
		Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required		
	19 Apr			
	1410 hrs	~~6 Aust Div CO No. 5 for the occupation and defence of the 6 Aust Div sector of the THERMOPYLIA line was issued. A copy of the order is attached as Appendix.~~		~~Attached as Appendix C~~
	1500 hrs	Lt-Cpl LAMB, Comd 2/3 Aust Inf Bn reported HQ 6 Aust Div for orders. He had not seen Brig ALLEN since early on 18 Apr and he did not know the whereabouts of the bulk of his Bn. He briefly described the action insofar as his own unit was concerned but he had not received any orders regarding his withdrawal. He moved south from the PEREIOS GORGE the previous evening and had withdrawn in the BRAILOS area about 7 offrs and the equivalent of one coy. He was instructed by the G1 to proceed to AMFIKLIA and establish a collecting post to which all members of 2/3 Bn would be directed. He was also instructed to send offrs out along the main road to collect as many of his Bn as possible.		
	1600 hrs	Message sent forward to Brig LEE instructing him that his responsibility extended westward to include the main railway line and he was to deny the use of this to the enemy.		
	1610 hrs	HQ RAE 6 Aust Div reported that demolitions on rd and railway were being prepared in accordance with the requirements of Comd 19 Bde.		
	1700 hrs	Heavy rain commenced falling and the area in which Div HQ was located was becoming impassable for wheeled traffic.		
	1730 hrs	Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde visited HQ 6 Aust Div and stated that he was concerned about the railway		
A129 Mob Print Ser AIF 231-111-G				
Signature 				321

April MONTH
1941 YEAR

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT 6 Aust Div

For material required, see F.S.H. Vol. 1, Sec. 174

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.C. REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	19 Apr	1730 tunnels which gave access to the enemy along the railway valley leading to the left and centre of his sector. He requested authority to demolish these tunnels and stated that he had already taken action in respect of a smaller tunnel through which tps on foot could pass.		
	1740 hrs	ANZAC Corps requested to give authority to destroy railway bridges and tunnels and to permit 6 Aust Div to control train movements in the area.		
	1900 hrs	Authority given by ANZAC Corps for tunnels to be blown but masonry bridges were not to be demolished.		
	2000 hrs	GOC arrived back from Brig LEE's HQ. Brig LEE expected to commence his withdrawal from the DOMOKOS posn at dusk; this withdrawal to be covered by tps he had already disposed in a def posn north of LAMIA.		
	2050 hrs	Message received from ANZAC Corps ordering HQ 6 Aust Div to move its HQ south to AYA MARINA in order to ensure line communication between Corps HQ and Div HQ. Comd 6 Aust Div already considered that he was too far in rear of his Bdes. In view of the shortage of cable and poor communications already existing, a further rearward move of Div HQ merely increased the difficulties of control within the Div.		
	20 Apr	0730 hrs Brig ALLEN reported HQ 6 Aust Div and briefly outlined the events of the previous day in the PENEIOS GORGE. He stated that he was unable to hold the posn until the time ordered as the enemy had broken through and tanks and infantry were filtering through the left of his front.		

Signature

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April MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT 6 Aust Div

1941 YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Return are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	20 Apr	21 NZ Bn and the NZ Fd Regt withdrew without		
	0730	orders during the morning of 18 Apr. When the		
	hrs	opposition became too strong he ordered the with- drawal of 2/2 and 2/4 ³ Bns but he did not know whether these orders were ever received. His own HQ commenced to withdraw at about 2100 hrs and when a few miles north of LARISSA it was reported to him that LARISSA was occupied by Germans. He then decided to circumnavigate LARISSA and took a track leading south from the main road. This track eventually became non-existent and after some cross country driving during which some vehs had to be abandoned the main rd was reached well south of LARISSA. He stated that since he left the PENEIOS GORGE he had had no news of 2/2 or 2/3 Bns. He was told that 2/3 Bn had established its HQ and a collecting centre at ~~AMFIKIA~~ AMFIKIA		
	0745			
	hrs	Approximately 40 enemy bombers attacked tpt on the rd in the vicinity of Div HQ for a period of 1½ hrs. Many bombs fell in and around the operational HQ area but apart from one man being wounded and minor damage to one or two vehs Div HQ suffered no casualties.		
	0900			
	hrs	Orders received from ANZAC Corps for the occupation and defence of the THERMOPYLAI line. NZ Div was to be responsible for the right down to the coast and 6 Aust Div was allotted the left sector its front extending westwards to include the railway and the high ground immediately west of the railway valley.		
	6930			
	hrs	A formation of enemy dive-bombers attacked the dump in the vicinity of GRAVIA railway station and other bombers were continually active along the rd between LAMIA and LEVADIA.		

AIG Mob Print Sec AIF-2M 111-6

Signature

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April MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT 6 Aust Div

1940 YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. 1, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	20 Apr			
	1130 hrs	BGS ANZAC Corps arrived and discussed with GOC the desirability of extending the left of 19 Inf Bde to close possible gaps in that flank through which the enemy might filter.		
	1410 hrs	6 Aust Div OC No.5 issued and is attached hereto as Appendix "C"		Appendix "C"
	1500 hrs	Further dive-bombing attack on the stores dump at GRAVIA and enemy air activity along the main rd.		
	1700 hrs	Brig LEE commenced his withdrawal from the posns north of LAMIA.		
	2000 hrs	HQ 6 Aust Div closed and moved to AYA MARINA.		
	2330 hrs	HQ 6 Aust Div arrived and opened at AYA MARINA.		
	21 Apr			
	0730 hrs	Brig LEE arrived at Div HQ and briefly sketched the activities of his Force during the past 48 hrs. He stated that he had had little difficulty in disengaging from the enemy north of LAMIA and withdrawing through the main posn on the BRAILOS Pass.		
	0930 hrs	CRA and G1 went fwd to confer with Comd 19 Bde regarding the defences of the BRAILOS Pass. The remnants of 2/2 and 2/3 were being collected at AMFIKLIA and 16 Bde (less 2/1 Bn) was allotted a role in reserve.		
	1000 hrs	A small coln of enemy MT which had moved to MOSKHOKHORIOM was engaged by arty and withdrew northwards. Enemy arty commenced firing on the rd south of LAMIA but their guns were beyond the range of our 25-pdrs.		
	1200 hrs	Reported by 19 Bde that enemy were occupying the woods on the main rd near 318487 and activity seemed to indicate that an effort was being made		
		A129 Mob Post Sec AIF EM 141-G		

Signature

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 174

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Return are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	G.O.C. REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	21 Apr	to repair the bridge which had been destroyed		
	1200 hrs	at that point. There were also small columns of enemy MT moving along the north bank of the river in this area.		
	1235 hrs	19 Bde reported that small parties of enemy inf together with mortars had crossed to the south of the river and were digging in amongst the crops.		
	1344 hrs	A large column of enemy MT moved to KOMIA from LAMIA and enemy aircraft were using the landing ground SE of LAMIA. It was reported that each machine brought as its load a detachment of inf or a field piece.		
	1800 hrs	16 Bde was ordered to the left flank its area to include the feature 2003 with the object of preventing any enemy movement towards the rear of 17 Bde, which was established in the vicinity of BRAILLOS was ordered to carry out patrols to the west along the MATROLITNARION VALLEY and to maintain a standing patrol on the high ground to the west of GRAVIA with the object of covering all tracks leading into GRAVIA from the WEST.		
	22			
	0300 hrs	Message received from ANZAC CORPS to the effect that Greeks were asking for a cessation of hostilities and that the evacuation of all Imperial tps was probable. GOC, G I and AQ were ordered to attend conference at HQ ANZAC CORPS at 0700 hrs.		
	0820 hrs	Brig Comds and heads of Services ordered to attend GOC's conference to be held at 1000 hrs.		
	1000 hrs	GOC held conference and stated that it had been decided to evacuate the Imperial tps from GREECE as soon as possible. His plan for the withdrawal provided for the move Southwards of 16 & 17 Bdes on the night 23/24 Apr, and the 19 Bde on the following night. ANZAC CORPS was being with-		

Signature 

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MONTH
YEAR

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 174

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	<u>Apr 22</u>	drawn through 4 NZ Bde (plus certain att Aust units) which was taking up a posn astride the main rd in the vicinity of KREIKOUKI.		
	1430 hrs	An enemy plane was seen to drop leaflets printed in Greek, exhorting the Greeks NOT to help the Imperial tps to leave GREECE.		
	2030 hrs	6 Aust Div CO No. 6 issued. A copy att here- to as Appx.	6 Aust Div CO No. 6.	Attached as Appendix 'D'
	<u>23</u>	Germans commenced patrolling on 19 Bde front, and several tanks seen just NORTH of R SPERKHETOS moving WEST. Less shelling was experienced than on the previous day, though EA were as active as ever. The GOC transmitted a personal message to the tps. "This is a time when all our trg and control must be exerted to the full. Duty is duty and everyone on duty must be at his post. Units must be ready with self-help to keep the withdrawal moving steadily and under control. Every offr must pull his weight using all his initiative energy and courage to carry out this movement in military order. Cool heads!" Dets of Gps and orders for the move were issued to those concerned? Div HQ to move night 23/24 Apr from AYIA MARINA. ALLEN GP to move night 23/24 Apr from BRAILOS area. VASEY GP thinning out.		

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. 1, Sec. 17a

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	APR 23	2/5 Bn, one Coy 2/1 MG Bn (less one pl) and one tp 2/1 Fd Regt were ordered to move to posn on rd LEVADIA - DELPHI to cover demolitions and to protect withdrawal of VASEY GP. This was necessary as a report was received that 450 enemy MT were moving SOUTH on MESELONGHI rd. Lt-Col R.KING, Comd 2/5 Bn, was placed in comd of this force.		
		4 NZ Bde with 2/3 Fd Regt, btys 2/1 A Tk Regt, Coys 2/1 MG Bn, holding posn astride rd one mile SOUTH of KREIKOUKI.		
		HQ 6 Aust Div moved from AYIA MARINA at mid-night and followed the 5 and 6 NZ Bdes on the Southward journey.		
	24 0600 hrs	HQ 6 Aust Div, 16 and 17 Bdes (less detached units) arrived at the "lying-up area" at MANDRA. Vehs and personnel were concealed amongst the olive groves and despite the appearance of several enemy recce planes overhead during the morning no attacks were carried out.		
	1200 hrs	Orders received regarding embarkation. Adv HQ 6 Aust Div was to move afternoon 24 Apr to the vicinity of ARGOS and embark night 24/25 Apr from NAVPLION. 16 and 17 Bde Gps were to move night 24/25 Apr to KALAMAI and embark night 25/26 Apr.		
	1500 hrs	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div commenced move to ARGOS, vehs being despatched at 5-min intervals.		
	1900 hrs	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div arrived assembly area four miles NORTH of ARGOS where it was found that accommodation for only 60 all ranks had been allotted. These personnel were to embark in "ULSTER PRINCE" at NAVPLION at 2100 hrs.		
	1930 hrs	G I met GOC SOUTH of ARGOS and enquired whether GOC was being evacuated by air or by sea. At this		

Also May Print See AIF 23M 111-6.

Signature

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C 2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	<u>Apr</u> <u>24</u>	stage, Maj-Gen MACKAY was NOT certain whether a plane was being made available or NOT. He was then on his way to the aerodrome and suggested that accommodation on the ship be reserved in case he should NOT be going by air.		
	2030 hrs	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div moved to NAVPLION where Embarkation Staff stated that no provision had been made for the embarkation of 6 Aust Div HQ. After consultation it was arranged that all personnel of HQ 6 Aust Div who had arrived at NAVPLION would embark that night.		
	2215 hrs	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div embarked in HMS "PHOEBE" and sailed for CRETE at approx 0230 hrs the following morning. Maj-Gen Sir Iven MACKAY embarked in a RAF flying boat and flew to CRETE. On arrival on board HMS "PHOEBE" all ranks were provided with hot soup and sandwiches.		
	<u>25</u> <u>0930</u> hrs	The convoy was attacked by a formation of enemy dive-bombers but after dropping a few bombs they were driven off by AA fire. One merchant ship in the convoy suffered a "near miss" but was able to proceed and no casualties to personnel were sustained. Further dive-bombing attacks were launched at 1130 and 1330 hrs but each time the enemy aircraft were kept high by AA fire and no damage or casualties were sustained.		
	1530 hrs	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div arrived at SUDA BAY. Light refreshments were served to all ranks at the Transit Camp. Senior ofrs were billeted in CANEA. The remainder and all tps marched to PERIVOLIA (about 7 miles SOUTH of CANEA) where temporary camps had been sited amongst the olive groves.		

Also Mob Print Sec AIF ENI 111-12

Signature 

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. I, Sec. 171

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
		Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required		
	Apr 26 1000 hrs	Maj-Gen MACKAY, Col SUTHERLAND (GSO I), and Maj MOLLOY (GSO II) attended a conference at CREFORCE, HQ, when measures to protect the island against invasion by air and/or sea-borne tps were discussed. Aust tps were allotted the area to the EAST and SE of CANEA and arrangements made for 19 Aust Inf Bde Gp to take over from Yorks & Lancs in the NEOIMHORIION - KALIBES area. NZ tps together with Welch Regt and Black Watch were allotted the MALEME and Western portion of the island.		
	1400 hrs	Brig CHAPPEL (HQ CREFORCE), Col SUTHERLAND and Maj MOLLOY made a recce of the NEOIMHORIION area with a view to its being taken over by AIF units. Units were allotted areas and disposed to afford the max protection against parachute tps and air and sea-borne invasion. Tactical dispositions were necessarily dependent on water supplies which, in this area, were undeveloped.		
		A second convoy of Imperial and Gk tps arrived from GREECE. This included dets of Corps and Div tps and all three AIF Bdes. Owing to confusion at the embarkation beaches in GREECE and the sinking of one merchant ship bound for ALEXANDRIA, units had become split and generally disorganized.		
		Arrangements were made to direct tps to unit areas immediately they disembarked and had been given light refreshments.		
	27	The day was devoted to organizing personnel into unit gps and moving units to their local def areas. DIDs were est in the AIF area and arrangements made for the issue of such blankets and clothing as were available on the island.		

Signature

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MONTH

A.I.F. FORM C2118A

WAR DIARY

(RENDER UNDER SECRET COVER)

UNIT

YEAR

For material required, see F.S.R. Vol. 1, Sec. 174

PLACE	DATE	SUMMARY OF EVENTS Routine training details and information given in Casualty Returns are NOT required	REFERENCES TO APPENDICES	C.O.'s REPORT AND COMMENTS ON MONTH (On Operations, Equipment, Movement, Health, Administration, etc.)
	<u>Apr</u> <u>28</u> 0630 hrs	Brig HERRING (CRA) and Lt-Col PULVER (DADGS) embarked at SUDA BAY in a RAF flying boat for ALEXANDRIA. Enemy aircraft bombed SUDA BAY but no casualties or damage resulted. The re-organization of units continued. This proved to be slow owing to the shortage of tpt, lack of comms, and the weary condition of tps who still continued to arrive from GREECE.		
	2100 hrs	Advice received that Adv HQ 6 Aust Div would embark for EGYPT at 0700 hrs 29 Apr.		
	<u>29</u> 0700 hrs	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div arrived at SUDA BAY and embarked in HMS "CARLISLE", which sailed in convoy for ALEXANDRIA at 1230 hrs.		
	<u>30</u> 0230 hrs	Convoy attacked by one destroyer and "E" boats, presumed to be Italian and operating from the DODECANESE. Two torpedoes were fired but both missed their marks. Guns from HMS "CARLISLE" opened fire and enemy retired.		
	<u>May</u> <u>1</u> 0900 hrs	Arrived ALEXANDRIA, when after all necessary particulars were taken by the Evacuation Staff, and light refreshments, tps proceeded to AMIRIYA Staging Camp.		

H. D. Murray *Murray*
for
Col.
G.S. 6 Aust. Div.

Signature *H. D. Murray* *Murray*

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"G" BRANCH, 6 DIV

GREECE

Opex

OPERATIONS

EGYPT TO GREECE

Adv party HQ 6 Div, with MT, embarked on HELLAS, 27 Mar. Main party embarked SS "PENLAND" at ALEXANDRIA 31 Mar. Disembarked PIRAEUS 3 Apr. HQ located at SERVIA PASS 6 Apr 41.

VERIA PASS - 8 APR

HQ to this area. 16 Bde group take over defenses from 12 GK. Dispositions were 2/1 Bn left fwd slopes, 2/2 on right between road and ALIAKMON river, 2/3 Bn in reserve.

FLORINA GAP - 9 APR

HQ to PERDIKA - responsibility for FLORINA gap taken over by 19 Inf Bde with 20 Gk Div on left and 12 Gk Div on right - Carrier platoons of 2/5 -6 -7 & 11 Bns sent in support of GREEK forces in LARISSA area.

GERMAN ADVANCE

was then on four lines of approach. Two into THRACE, one via RUPEL PASS and one via STRUMA VALLEY.

**MT OLYMPUS
LINE - 10 APR**

orders for withdrawal to general line of ALIAKMON river. VERIA PASS blown and 16 Bde move to OLYMPUS line.

**GERMAN ATTACK
11 APR**

on 19 Bde front - repulsed with heavy losses.

12 APR

HQ to GERANIA - 19 Bde withdraw - covered by 1 Arm'd Div to posns in KROMION HILLS.

**DEFENCES
PREPARED**

preparations for protracted defence made on line extending from MT OLYMPUS to ridge N of SERVIA to EDMANTYON and NW along KROMIAN HILLS N of ALIAKMON river. 19 Bde left, 4 NZ Bde centre and 16 Bde right sectors. 20 Gk Div holding line to West.

**THERMOPYLAE
LINE - 15 APR**

Orders for Div to withdraw covered by 4 NZ Bde, to THERMOPYLAE LINE - Enemy reach SERVIA village. 19 Bde withdraw South of ALIAKMON river and take reserve posns to 4 NZ Bde. SAVIGE FORCE (17 Bde Gp) in defensive position astride LARISSA-THIKKALA road East of KALABAKA.

16 APR

ALLEN FORCE (16 Bde Gp) formed, and move to PEINEIOS GORGE, where enemy was making heavy thrust.

17 APR

SAVIGE FORCE ordered to withdraw to ZARKOS line. Div RESERVE FORCE formed to protect Aerodrome South of LARISSA and support 16 Bde or 6 NZ Bde if necessary.

18 APR

21
Div HQ to BRAILOS area. . Intense enemy aerial activity - SAVIGE FORCE withdrawing successfully covered by 2/11 Bn. 16 Bde disposed in PENKIOS GORGE meeting heavy enemy attacks. Comd sends messages "I CAN DO NO MORE THAN MY BEST" - DIV RESERVE FORCE ordered North in support.

BRAILOS PASS
19 APR

Div HQ at PALAIK HORION - 2/1 Bn right, 2/4 Bn left sector with 2/8 Bn in reserve, prepare defense of the pass. Comd 2/3 Bn reports whereabouts of bulk of Bn unknown, and all contact with Brig ALLEN lost.

THERMOPYLAE
LINE - 20 APR

Div HQ to AYA MARINA - Brig ALLEN reports enemy through on left of his front and that whereabouts of 2/2 and 2/3 Bns unknown. 21 NZ Bn and NZ Regt had withdrawn without orders. Orders for occupation of THERMOPYLAE defences, 6 Div left and NZ Div right sectors. Brig IX (DOMOKUS FORCE) commences withdrawal from North of T through BRAILOS PASS.

21 APR

2/2 and 2/3 Bns in reserve at BRAILOS PASS. Enemy planes landing troops SE of LAMIA.

EVACUATION ORDERS
22 Apr

GREEKS suing for cessation of hostilities. Plans of evacuation made - 16 and 17 Bdes to move South on night 23/24 and 19 Bde night 24/25. ANZAC CORPS withdraw to post astride road in vicinity KREIKOUKI.

23 APR

HQ 6 Div, followed by 5 and 6 NZ Bdes move out from AYA MARINA at midnight.

EMBARKATION
24 Apr 41

HQ 6 Div and 16 and 17 Bde (less detached units cover withdrawal) reach "lying up area" at NAMDRA. Embarkation orders were - 6 Div HQ at NAUPLION night 24/25, 16 and 17 Bdes at KALAMAI night 25/26. Div Adv HQ embarked HMS "PHOEBE" arriving at SUDA BAY (CRETE) 25 Apr.

26-28 APR

Units arriving, being reorganised and preparing for defence of CRETE.

TO EGYPT

Adv HQ embarked HMS "CARLISLE" ap Apr, arrived ALEXANDRIA and moved to AMINIYA - 1 May 41.

NOTE :-

See Diary appendices for compositions of various forces and groups.

*also contains Questionnaire reports
on operations of 16 Inf Bde at
TENEIOS GORGE, GREECE*

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APPENDIX A
OFFICERS HOLDING APPOINTMENTS ON HQ 6 AUST DIV
FROM 1 - 30 APR 41.

GOC - Major-General Sir I.G. MACKAY, KBE CMG
DSO VD.

ADC - Lieut B.H. TRAVERS.

GENERAL STAFF

* GSO I - Col R.B. SUTHERLAND.
* GSO II - Major I.R. CAMPBELL, DSO (until 7 Apr)
* GSO III - Major A.D. MOLLOY (From 9 Apr)
- Capt A.E. BAMFORD
- Capt R.R. VIAL
- Lieut W.M. KNOX
- IC - Lieut. W.L. SPEIGHT
- Cipher Officer - Major T.E. WILLIAMS
- LIAISON OFFICERS - Capt B.R. GRIEVE
- T/Capt B.V. WILSON

Field Security
Section - Lieut. T.F. TIMSON

BRANCH of the ADJUTANT GENERAL AND QUARTERMASTER GENERAL

* AA & QMG - T/Col C.E. PRIOR
DAIG - Major B.J. O'LOUGHLIN
DAQMG - Major C. BOWSER
DAQMG (Staff
Learner) - Capt A.T. McLEAN
LSG - T/Major A.W. SHEPPARD
Camp Comdt - Capt G.T.R. UFF
Amenities
Officer - Lieut. G. TONGE

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND DEPARTMENTS

ADMS - Col. H.C. DISHER
DADMS - Major A.H. DAWKINS
DADOS - Lt-Col B.W. PULVER
DADOS (Assist-
ant) - Capt E.G. HELLSTROM MM
SOME - Major E.W. BRYCESON
DAFM - Capt G.G. HAWKER

HEADQUARTERS DIVISIONAL ARTILERY

Commander - Brig. E.F. HERRING, DSO, MC, ED
BM (Staff
Learner) - Major H.V. STEPHENS (Officiating as BM)
Staff Captain
(Staff Learner) - Capt J.D. SYMES (Officiating as SC)
Intelligence
Officer - Lieut W.R. EASDOWN

HEADQUARTERS DIVISIONAL ENGINEERS

* Commanding
Officer - Lt-Col L.C. LUCAS, MC VD
Adjutant - Capt L.G. REDDY (Until 19 Apr)
- Lieut W.G. CANTELO (From 19 Apr)
Intelligence
Officer - Lieut R.K.J. NOLAN

HEADQUARTERS DIVISIONAL SIGNALS

Commanding Officer - Lt-Col L.J. WELLMAN
ADJUTANT - Capt S.J. GREVILLE

ARMY SERVICE CORPS

Commanding Officer - Lt-Col N.B. LOVERIDGE OBE
Adjutant - Capt J.E. MARSH

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SECRET

Appendix: B....

(a) FLORINA GAP.

19 Aust Inf Bde.

Comd - Brig. G.A. VASEY *CBE DSO*
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde
"L" Sec Sigs
79 LAD
2/3 Fd Regt RAA
"F" Sec Sigs
41 LAD
1 A Tk Regt (less one bty)
"H" Sec Sigs
49 LAD
1 Rangers
2/4 Aust Inf Bn (less one coy)
2/8 Aust Inf Bn
27 NZ (MG) Bn (less two coys)

1 Armd Bde Gp.

Comd - Brig. CHARRINGTON
HQ 1 Armd Bde
3 RTR

Div Tps.

Comd - Major-General Sir Iven Mackay, KBE CMG DSO VD
HQ 6 Aust Div
Int Sec 6 Aust Div
6 Aust Div Emp Pl
"B" Sec FSS
6 Aust Div Pro Coy
6 Aust Div Postal Unit
HQ Med Arty 1 Aust Corps - Brig. LEE (CCMA).
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div (CRA - Brig. HERRING)
64 Med Regt RA (less one tp)
2 Regt. RHA
102 A Tk Regt (NH)
HQ RAE 6 Aust Div (CRE - Lt-Col. LUCAS)
2/1 Fd Coy RAE
Sigs 6 Aust Div (less dets)
HQ AASC 6 Aust Div (CAASC - Lt-Col LOVERIDGE)

(VERRIA PASS.

16 Aust Inf Bde Gp (under comd 1 Aust Corps)

Comd - Brig. A.S. ALLEN, CBE DSO VD
HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
"J" Sec Sigs
45 LAD
7 Med Regt RA
One tp 64 Med Regt RA (4 6" Hows)
2/2 Fd Regt RAA
"G" Sec Sigs
40 LAD
2/1 Aust Inf Bn
2/2 Aust Inf Bn
2/3 Aust Inf Bn
2/1 Aust Fd Amb AMC

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(b) SERVIA PASS.

16 Aust Inf Bde Gp

Comd - Brig A.S. ALLEN, CBE DSO VD
HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
"J" Sec Sigs
45 LAD
2/1 Aust Inf Bn
2/2 Aust Inf Bn
2/3 Aust Inf Bn

4 NZ Inf Bde Gp

Comd - Brig. PUTTICK, Comd 4 NZ Bde.
HQ 4 NZ Inf Bde
Sig Sec & LAD
6 Fd Regt NZA
1 Survey Tp NZA
18 NZ Inf Bn
19 NZ Inf Bn
20 NZ Inf Bn
Two coys 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn

19 Aust Inf Bde Gp

Comd - Brig. G.A. VASEY, CBE DSO
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde
"L" Sec Sigs
79 LAD
One bty 1 A Tk Regt RAA
2/4 Aust Inf Bn
2/8 Aust Inf Bn
26 NZ Inf Bn
One coy 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
One coy 2/1 Fd Amb AAMC

Div Tps

Comd - Major-General Sir Iven Mackay, KBE CMG DSO VD.
HQ 6 Aust Div
Int Sec 6 Aust Div
6 Aust Div Emp Pl
"B" Sec FSS
6 Aust Div Pro Coy
6 Aust Div Postal Unit
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div (CRA - Brig. HERRING)
7 Med Regt RA (less one bty)
One Bty 64 Med Regt RA
2/2 Fd Regt RAA
"G" Sec Sigs
40 LAD
2/3 Fd Regt RAA
"F" Sec Sigs
41 LAD
1 A Tk Regt RAA (less one bty)
"H" Sec Sigs
49 LAD
HQ RAE 6 Aust Div
2/1 Fd Coy RAE
Sigs 6 Aust Div (less det)
HQ AASC 6 Aust Div
HQ 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn

45

SAVIGE FORCE

Comd - Brig. S.G. SAVIGE, DSO MC ED.
 HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde
 "K" Sec Sigs
 46 LAD
 Det 3 RTR (seven cruiser tanks)
 64 Med Regt RA (less one bty)
 One bty NZ Fd Regt
 One coy 2/5 Aust Inf Bn
 2/11 Aust Inf Bn
 One coy 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
 2/2 Fd Amb AAMC

DOMOKOS FORCE (under comd ANZAC CORPS)

Comd - Brig. LEE.
 HQ Med Arty ANZAC CORPS
 Sig Sec
 2/5 Aust Inf Bn (less one coy)
 2/6 Aust Inf Bn
 2/7 Aust Inf Bn
 2/1 Fd Amb AAMC (less one coy)

(c) ALLENFORCE - (under comd NZ Div for withdrawal only)

Comd - Brig. A.S. ALLEN, CBE DSO VD.
 HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
 "J" Sec Sigs
 45 LAD
 NZ Fd Regt (less one bty)
 NZ A Tk Regt
 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
 2/3 Aust Inf Bn
 21 NZ Inf Bn
 One coy 2/1 Fd Amb AAMC

Div REBERVE

Comd - Lt-Col. W.E. CREMOR
 2/2 Fd Regt RAA
 "G" Sec Sigs
 40 LAD
 One Bty 1 A Tk Regt RAA
 2/1 Aust Inf Bn
 One coy 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
 2/2 Fd Coy RAE

(d) BRAILOS

19 Aust Inf Bde Gp

Comd - Brig. G.A. VASEY, CBE DSO.
 HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde
 "L" Sec Sigs
 79 LAD
 2/2 Fd Regt RAA
 "G" Sec Sigs
 40 LAD
 1 A Tk Regt RAA
 "H" Sec Sigs
 49 LAD
 2/1 Aust Inf Bn
 2/4 Aust Inf Bn
 2/5 Aust Inf Bn (less one coy)
 2/11 Aust Inf Bn
 "D" Coy 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
 2/1 Fd Amb AAMC
 2/1 Fd Coy RAE

46

17 Aust Inf Bde Gp

Comd - Brig. S.G. SAVIGE, DSO MC ED.
 HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde
 "K" Sec Sigs
 46 LAD
 2/1 Fd Regt RAA (less one bty)
 "E" Sec Sigs
 43 LAD
 One coy 2/5 Aust Inf Bn
 2/6 Aust Inf Bn
 2/7 Aust Inf Bn
 "C" Coy plus 6 pl 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
 2/2 Fd Coy RAE

16 Aust Inf Bde Gp

Comd - Brig. A.S. ALLEN, CBE DSO VD.
 HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
 "J" Sec Sigs
 45 LAD
 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

Div Tps.

Comd - Major-General Sir Iven Mackay, KBE CMG DSO VD.
 HQ 6 Aust Div
 Int Sec 6 Aust Div
 6 Aust Div Emp Pl
 "B" Sec FSS
 6 Aust Div Pro Coy
 6 Aust Div Postal
 Det Aust HQ Gd Bn
 HQ RAA 6 Aust Div (CRA - Brig. HERRING)
 2/1³ Fd Regt RAA
 "F" Sec Sigs
 41 LAD
 HQ RAE 6 Aust Div
 2/8 Fd Coy RAE
 Sigs 6 Aust Div (less det)
 2/8 Aust Inf Bn
 HQ, A & B Coy (less 6 Pl) 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
 HQ AASC 6 Aust Div
 2/1 Fd Amb AAMC
 2/2 Fd Amb AAMC

Tps NOT UNDER COMD 6 AUST DIV.

6 Aust Cav	(under comd BTE)
"C" Sec Sigs	" " "
39 LAD	" " "
16 Aust & Tk Coy	(under comd 9 Aust Div)
One bty 2/1 Fd Regt RAA	(under comd BTE)

2/2 Fd Pk Coy RAE	(under comd BTG)
80 LAD	" " "
6 Aust Div Amn Coy AASC	(under comd ANZAC CORPS)
" # Pet Coy "	" " " "
" " Sup Col "	" " " "
2/1 Fd Hyg Sec AAMC	(under comd BTG)
6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	(under comd ANZAC CORPS)
" " Salvage Unit	(under comd BTG)

RES/JWB

APPENDIX C

47

6 AUST DIV 00 No. 5

S E C R E T

Copy No 23....

20 Apr 41.

Ref Map: ATHENS 1/250,000

INFORMATION

1. ANZAC CORPS is occupying a def posn on the general line **MOLOS - BRAILDS PASS** with NZ Div on the RIGHT And 6 Aust Div LEFT. The inter-div boundary which is incl to NZ Div is the line **LAMIA - excl track junc Y 3639 $\frac{3}{8}$ excl pt 1399 (Y 33) - incl pt 925 (Y 52) - EXARKHOS (Y 71).**

2. The rear boundary, incl to ANZAC CORPS, is the line of the rd **LIVINATES - LEVADIA.**

3.(a) The following tps now under Comd 6 Aust Div:-

16 Aust Inf Bde	2/2 Fd Coy
17 Aust Inf Bde	2/8 Fd Coy
19 Aust Inf Bde	2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
2/1 Fd Regt (less one bty)	2/1 Fd Amb
2/2 Fd Regt	2/2 Fd Amb
2/1 Fd Coy	2/7 Fd Amb

(b) The following units come under comd 19 Aust Inf Bde:-

2/1 Bn
2/5 Bn (less one Coy)
2/11 Bn

INTENTION

4. 6 Aust Div will defend the **BRAILOS PASS.**

METHOD

5. Fwd Bde - 19 Aust Inf Bde in the general area to incl **BRAILOS PASS - pt 1399 (Y 33) - incl TUNNEL HILL (Y 3235) - excl BRAILOS (Y 3335).** Rear boundary inclusive 19 Aust Inf Bde east and west line through **BRAILOS.**

Centre Bde - 17 Aust Inf Bde in the general area and to include **DHRIMAIA GLOUNTSA (Y 3833) - ANO KALIVIA (Y 32) - high feature (Y 2923) - pt 2008 (Y 2228) - pt 1253 (Y 2234).**

Rear boundary - incl to 17 Bde line through **MODHIN (Y 4926) - AY NIKOLOS in sq Y 32 - pt 1082 (Y 2718)**

Res Bde - general are a pt 2457 (Y 41) and pt 1731 (Y 31).

6. Defences will be dug in and wired and special precautions, incl active patrolling, and the establishment of posts on high ground overlooking possible enemy lines of approach, will be taken.

7. Arty. -
2/2 Fd Regt in support 19 Aust Inf Bde.
1 A Tk Regt " " " " " "

8. MGs. -
One Coy under comd 19 Aust Inf Bde
Two Coys (less two Pls) under comd 17 Aust Inf Bde.
Remainder - Div Reserve in the area of 16 Aust Inf Bde.
Two Pls to be cited to cover the area of 17 Aust Inf Bde. Remainder of Div Reserve to remain on wheels.

48

9. Engineers -

2/1 Fd Coy in support 19 Aust Inf Bde
2/2 Fd Coy in support 17 Aust Inf Bde.

CRE 6 Aust Div will prepare rd through the BRAILOS Pass for demolition back to and including Corps Boundary and will be responsible for the preparation of demolitions on the railway from LAMIA to ANO KALIVIA. Demolitions on this section of the railway will be blown on the authority of 6 Aust Div.

10. ADM. - Issued separately.

11. INTERCOMN. - Adv HQ 6 Aust Div located PALAIOKHORION Y 33.
Rear HQ 6 Aust Div located Y 3832.

LT communications will be duplicated as far as the cable available will permit. LT to fwd Bdes and supporting Arty will be given first priority.

DR - DRLS to all units under comd twice daily.

ACK.

Time of Signature. 1410 hrs.

A.D. MOLLOY Major.
for Colonel.

Method of Issue - Sigs.

G2S. 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION -

Copy No.

16 Aust Inf Bde	1
17 Aust Inf Bde	2
19 Aust Inf Bde	3
RAA 6 Aust Div	4
RAE 6 Aust Div	5
Sigs 6 Aust Div	6
AASC 6 Aust Div	7
GOC	8
G	9 - 10
AQ	11 - 12
ADMS	13
DADOS	14
SOME	15
DAPM	16
6 Aust Div Postal	17
ANZAC Corps	18 - 19
NZ Div	20 - 21
2/k Aust MG Bn	22
War Diary	23 - 24
File	25 - 26

COPY.

APPENDIX "D"

SECRET 49

Copy No: 25

6 AUST DIV 00 No. 6.

22 Apr 41.

Ref Maps: ATHENS 1/250,000

INFORMATION

1. Own tps - ANZAC CORPS is continuing its withdrawal Southwards and the RN and RAF are co-operating the withdrawal.

The withdrawal will be covered by a NZ Bde and attached Aust Tps occupying a def posn astride the rd THIVE - ELEFSIS one mile South of KREIKOUKI (E 07).

2. Enemy - There has been NO contact on the BRAILOS front except for a few instances of long-range artillery shelling.

INTENTION

3. 6 Aust Div will withdraw southwards.

METHOD

4. The withdrawal from present locations will be carried out in three phases:
5. Phase 1. The withdrawal of certain units to the covering posn mentioned in sub-para 1.

The following units will proceed independently by MT on 22 Apr to RV one mile SOUTH of KREIKOUKI and come under command Comd 4 NZ Inf Bde on arrival.

2/3 Fd Regt, RAA 6 Aust Div
F Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
41 LAD
3 Bty 1 A Tk Regt RAA 6 Aust Div
2/8 Fd Coy RAE
D Coy 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
2/1 Fd Amb

6. Recce parties of above units will report to rep NZ Bde at RV mentioned in sub-para 5 by 1600 hrs 22 Apr 41.
7. Route - rd LAMIA - LEVADEIA - THIVE - KREIKOUKI.
8. Time - All units enumerated in sub-para 5 to be clear of rd junc (Y 6014) by 2350 hrs 22 Apr.

9. Phase 2 -
Withdrawal during the night 23/24 Apr 41, of units enumerated below from present locations to posns to the South.

(a) ALLEN Gp. - Comd: Brig A.S. ALLEN CBE, DSO. Comd
16 Aust Inf Bde.

Tps: HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
J Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
45 LAD
2/2 Aust Bn
2/3 Aust Bn
HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde
K Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
46 LAD
2/5 Aust Bn
2/6 Aust Bn
2/7 Aust Bn
C Coy plus 6 Pl 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
2/1 Fd Regt RAA 6 Aust Div (less one bty)
and less det under comd 19 Aust Inf Bde)
E Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
43 LAD.
2/2 Fd Coy RAE
2/2 Fd Amb

(D) Div Tps Gp: Comd: Lt-Col C.E. LUCAS MC. CRE 6 Aust Div.

Tps: HQ 6 Aust Div
 Int Sec 6 Aust Div
 B Sec FSS
 6 Aust Div Emp Pl
 6 Aust Div Postal Unit
 6 Aust Div Salvage Unit
 Det 1 Aust Gd Bn
 Det 6 Aust Pro Coy
 HQ RAA 6 Aust Div
 HQ RAE 6 Aust Div
 HQ AASC 6 Aust Div
 HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div
 HQ and No. 1 Coys
 HQ Nos. 2 and 3 Coys
 42 LAD
 HQ and A Coy (less one pl) 2/1 Aust (MG)
 Bn
 2/8 Aust Bn (less det with 19 Aust Inf
 Bde)
 Dismounted personnel of 1 A Tk Regt
 RAA 6 Aust Div.

10. Route - both gps rd LAMIA - LEYADEIA - THIVE - KREIKOUKI - ELEFSIS (E25) - MEGARA (E 04).
11. SP - as determined by Gp Comds.
12. Times - Comd ALLEN Gp will determine Start Time after conferring with Comd VASEY Gp but NO movement of vehs of ALLEN Gp will take place EAST of rd junc Y5123 before 0200 hrs 24 Apr 41. Head of Div Tps Coln will NOT pass rd junc Y 6014 before 0001 hrs 24 Apr.
13. Tpt - Personnel will move in 1st LT supplemented by troop-carrying vehs made available under arrangements made by 6 Aust Div.
 All additional troop-carrying MT is moving into the fwd area during the night 22/23 Apr 41 and on arrival will come under comd Gp Comds and Comd Div Tps Gp.
 The MT will be disposed as follows on arrival:-
 Div Tps Gp (for dismounted personnel of 1 A Tk Regt)
 MAVRONERI (Y50)
 AMFIKLIA
 16 Aust Inf Bde - present location ~~AMFIKLIA~~ area
 17 Aust Inf Bde - 2/5 and 2/7 Bns in vicinity Y 2835
 Bde HQ and 2/6 Bn in vicinity Y 3233
14. (c) 2/2 Fd Pk Coy RAE will move under orders CRE 6 Aust Div 23 Apr 41. Route and destination as for other gps of Phase 2.
15. Phase 3 - Withdrawal 19 Aust Inf Bde and att tps from present location to destination night 24/25 Apr 41.

VASEY Gp - Comd - Brig G.A. VASEY, CBE. DSO.
 Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde.

Tps - HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde
 "L" Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
 79 LAD
 2/1 Aust Bn.
 2/4 Aust Bn.
 Two Coys 2/8 Bn
 2/11 Aust Bn
 2/2 Fd Regt RAA 6 Aust Div.
 "G" Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div.
 40 LAD
 Det one bty 2/1 Fd Regt RAA 6 Aust Div.

HQ 1 A Tk Regt RAA 6 Aust Div (less three btys)
 "H" Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
 44 LAD
 2/1 Fd Coy RAE
 2/2 Fd Amb
 80 LAD
 Det 6 Aust Pro Coy

16. Route - rd LAMIA - LEVADEIA - ELEFSIS - KORINTHOS (D 64) - ARGOS (D 41).
17. Time - Gp will clear rd junc Y 6014 by 0030 hrs 25 Apr.
18. Tpt - Personnel will move by 1st LT supplemented by troop-carrying vehs made available by 6 Aust Div. All additional MT is moving into the fwd area during night 22/23 Apr 41 and comes under command Comd VASEY Gp from the time of arrival. RV as determined later.
19. Parachute protection -
 - (a) Units are responsible for their own concealment areas.
 - (b) 1 Armd Bde has been made responsible for the THIVE area.
20. AA fire - Gps and units will make clear to all tps that after leaving defensive posns and moving to concealed areas AA fire will NOT be opened unless the aircraft are actually attacking them.
21. Demolitions - Within its own area each Bde will be responsible for as complete demolitions as can be made. Comds 16 and 17 Aust Inf Bdes will obtain approval from HQ 6 Aust Div before authorising any demolition. In default of orders to blow the Engr offr or OR in charge of each demolition will fire the charge if it is in IMMEDIATE danger of falling into enemy hands intact.

ADM

22. Arms and equipment - The kit of ORs will be limited to Marching Order and whatever else may be conveniently carried therein. In the case of offrs, if it is desired, such articles as may be carried in a small suitcase or kit bag may also be taken.
23. Supplies - All ranks will carry three days' rations on the man.
24. Petrol - All vehs will commence the journey with full tanks and in addition the following will be carried :-
 - Lorries 30 cwt and over - three cases
 - Vans 1 ton and under - two cases
 - Cars - one case
 Oil in proportion will also be carried.
25. Meals - NO stops on the rd for meals.
26. Engrs - Engrs will be spaced by secs throughout gps.
27. Tools - All vehs will carry picks and shovels which must be carried to concealment areas to dig slit trenches.
28. Clearance of Route - These orders provide for the vehs of LADs to travel with the various Gps. They will move in the coln as detailed by Gp Comds and their main function will be to keep the route clear for movement. No attempt will be made to repair a veh if the repair or adjustment is likely to take more than 5 minutes. All vehs which cannot be got going within 5 minutes will be removed from the rd and disabled.

Vehs will NOT be set on fire, if a fire does occur it must be extinguished at once.

29. Traffic Control - 6 Aust Div Pro Coy will be responsible for traffic control throughout the route. For this purpose Dets will be placed under orders of each of ALLEN and VASEY Gps. Separate instructions have been issued to DAPM. Pro Coy will arrange to mark with shielded lights all defiles and obstacles, lamps for this purpose will be drawn from CAMP by OC Pro Coy.

30. Road Discipline - Attention is directed to 6 Aust Div Adm Instn No. 22 dated 20 Apr 41 which will strictly be adhered to with the exceptions that:-

- (a) Side lights only will be used.
- (b) Density 40 vtm during darkness.
- (c) Speed 10 mih.

The decision as to whether vehs will halt when an air raid warning is given will rest with Gp Comds but if vehs do halt they will pull well to the right of the rd before they are abandoned.

31. Destruction of Stores - Owing to the nature of the withdrawal it is essential that only the minimum number of vehs be employed in the move and that these vehs be used only for the transport of personnel and essential arms, ammunition, equipment etc as enumerated above.

All guns, carriers, non-essential vehs including water carts will be destroyed under unit arrangements, but the destruction by burning or explosion of these items of equipment is NOT to be resorted to. Maximum deception must be attempted and vehs and guns left in their present locations.

The breach blocks of guns will be removed and taken to the destination. Gun amn will NOT be destroyed.

Destruction will be delayed as long as possible but it is essential that everything left behind is rendered unserviceable.

All tents will be left standing in their present locations.

INTERCOMN

32. HQ 6 Aust Div closes present location 1900 hrs 23 Apr 41. Sigs 6 Aust Div will arrange for one 109 set. (accompanied by all available MCRS) to listen for calls from 19 Aust Inf Bde and if any are received to draw out of the coln and accept any message offered.

ACK

Time of Signature 2030 Hrs

A.D. MOLLOY Major.

Method of Issue - Sigs.

for Colonel,
G.S. 6 Aust Div.

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>		
16 Aust Inf Bde	1	DADOS	16
17 Aust Inf Bde	2	SOME	17
19 Aust Inf Bde	3	DAPM	18
RAA 6 Aust Div	4 - 5	Postal	19
RAE 6 Aust Div	6	2/1 Aust MG Bn	20
Sigs 6 Aust Div	7	2/8 Aust Inf Bn	21
AASC	8	ANZAC Corps	22
GOC	9	NZ Div	23
G	10 - 11	4 NZ Bde	24
AQ	12 - 13	War Diary	25 - 26
DAAG	14	File	27 - 28
ADMS	15		

WAW/WR.



SECRET.

53

*app cki
Gauss*

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HEADQUARTERS
6 Aust Div.

S/5061/G

6 Oct 41.

Offr i/c 2nd Echelon.

WAR DIARIES.

Herewith report on Operations by 16 Aust Inf Bde at
PEKEIOS GORGE. It would be appreciated if this report
could be attached to HQ 6 Aust Div "G" Branch War Diary
for month of April 41.

Please acknowledge receipt.

R. R. R. R.
Col,
GS 6 Aust Div.

ack.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

54

Ref. File S/4/1

S E C R E T

In reply to S/1001/G

headquarters,
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

10 July 41.

Headquarters,
6 Aust. Div.

OPERATIONS 16 AUST INF BDE AT PENELOS CORGE

Attached are reports by the C.O's of 2/2
and 2/3 Bns on the above operations .

The answers to the questionnaire are included
in the body of the reports and a reference sheet is attached
referring to paras dealing with the information required.

Also attached is a brief report by this H.Q.
which does NOT reiterate any of the information supplied by
these Bns. Its purpose is to amplify replies by units in
the light of additional knowledge of this H.Q. during the
operations and should be read in conjunction with the reports
of the 2/2 and 2/3 Bns.


.....Lt-Col.
Admin. Comd.
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

FBS/MF.

55
SECRET

S/41001/G.

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde

18 Jun 41.

OPERATIONS 16 AUST INF BDE AT PENEIOS GORGE

I am directed by the GOC that the following information be furnished in relation to the operations of 16 Aust Inf Bde at PENEIOS GORGE.

1. What orders were received by CO 2/2 Bn when he was instructed to engage in the operations at PENEIOS GORGE? This should include time at which he was ordered to deny any line to the enemy.
2. Until what time did CO 2/2 Bn actually deny that specific line?
3. What action CO 2/2 Bn took to inform Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde that his two fwd coys had withdrawn.
4. What action did he take to re-establish the situation in accordance with orders received in para 1?
5. How many tanks (if any) operated against his forward coys and to what depth did they penetrate into the defended locality?
6. The time CO 2/2 Bn ordered his reserve coy to withdraw and his reasons for ordering that withdrawal.
7. What orders CO 2/2 Bn issued for the withdrawal of coy disposed on the left of the road.
8. What casualties (approx) were received by 2/2 Bn during this action?
9. What orders were received by CO 2/3 Bn for his role in this battle?
10. Did the 2/3 Bn hold any line specified until any time specified in para 9?
11. Did the CO 2/3 Bn authorise the withdrawal of the two fwd coys on the attack on these coys by tanks?
12. What number of tanks did attack these coys, and what form did that attack take?
13. If the two coys withdrew without orders, what action did CO 2/3 Bn take to re-establish the situation?
14. What time did CO 2/3 Bn receive any orders to withdraw his Bn from 16 Aust Inf Bde?
15. What casualties (approx) were suffered by the Bn in this action?
16. Did either CO 2/2 Bn or 2/3 Bn have at any time any Arty Fd and/or A Tk under their cmd?
17. If these arms were in support of either Bn did the CO know what support had been arranged for him?
18. Was this support given according to those arrangements?

C 1-mel,
G3, 6 Aust Div.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

56

2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

10 Jul 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/3 AUST INF BN
AT PENNY'S GORGE.

I submit herewith a report on the operations of 2/3 Bn. The answers to the questions are as set out in the following paras:-

- (9) See paras 2 and 3 of report.
- (10) See paras 6, 10, 11
- (11) See para 10
- (12) See paras 9 and 10.
- (13) See para 10.
- (14) See para 11.
- (15) See para 13.
- (16, 17, 18) No Arty under my command except the few guns halted on the rearward position.

(Sgd) J. Lamb Lt.Col.
C.O. 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

57
10 Jul 41.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/3 AUST INF BN
AT PENEIOS GORGE - REF. MAP LARISSA 1/100,000.

1. 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn. having moved from VERROIA to SERVIA was then ordered by 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. to proceed by road to SYN THOMAI T2334 (Ref. Map LARISSA 1-100,000) during the night 16/17 Apr. 41. The Bn arrived at SYN THOMAI in the early morning of 17 Apr. 41. and I was met by the Bde. Comd. who issued further orders.

2. I was told that Bde. H.Q. and my Bn had been ordered to join the 2/2 Bn and 21 N.Z. Bn in the PENEIOS GORGE area. The Bde. Comd. instructed me to move 2/3 Bn (less one Coy) to that area and to take up a defensive position astride the LARISSA - TEMPE Road in the area MAKRYKHORION-MAKRYKHORI. I was to join the Bde. Comd. in that area as soon as I got my Bn under way and receive further orders when the Comd. had clarified the position at PENEIOS GORGE.

The Bde. Comd. stated that 1 Anzac Corps were concerned about the right flank South of PENEIOS GORGE and the road running South-West from SYKOURION and West from AGYIA and the routes leading into these towns from the North and East. I was instructed to send one Coy (A) with two Secs. Carriers to patrol these towns and roads.

Later in the morning of 17 Apr. I joined the Bde. Comd. and was told that the enemy were North of the PENEIOS River, the 21 N.Z. Bn had withdrawn to the TEMPE Village area and the 2/2 Bn was holding a defensive position in the EVANGELISMOS area. Information was given that the 4 N.Z. Fd. Regt. (less one Bty.), one Tp of 18 pdrs. and two troops of A/Tk. Guns were attached to the Bde. Group.

3. Orders were then given by Brig. A.S. ALLEN for 2/3 Bn to dispose as follows :-

(a) One Coy (C) to take up a position on the high ground to the North of MAKRYKHORI to overlook PARAPOTAMOS and the PENEIOS River. This Coy was to contact "D" Coy of the 2/2 Bn which had moved to the same area with a

- similar task and to come under coord. of D Coy 2/2 Bn.
- (b) One Coy (B) on the high ground just North of Bde. H.Q. in square 4552 with a reserve role.
 - (c) The remaining Coy (D) less one pls., one of which had become detached on the move through LARISSA, and Bn. H.Q. to take up a reserve position astride the road in squares 4250 and 4350.
 - (d) One Platoon of B Coy was sent forward to report to 2/2 Bn for patrol duties.

The occupation of these positions was completed on the late afternoon of the 17 Apr. 41.

No information of the time for which the position had to be held was available at this stage, the Bde. Comd. stating that he was awaiting further information and orders but thought it might possibly be a few days.

There was no wire or A/Tk. mines available. Communication to Coys was by runner owing to the lack of line communication.

4. I then kept in close contact with Bde. H.Q. and was informed that there had been some enemy patrol activity along the PENEIOS River during the night 17/18 Apr. 41. During the morning of the 18 Apr. it was apparent that the enemy were making a determined effort to cross the river on the left of 2/2 Bn and on the extreme left flank as far around as the Village of PARA POTAMOS.

I was instructed to keep my reserve Coy. mobile in case it was necessary to assist the two Coys. from 2/2 and 2/3 Bns on the left.

At about midday on 18 Apr. I was present at Bde. H.Q. when a telephone message from 21 H.Z. Bn stated that enemy tanks had broken through the village of TEMPE and that the Bn was withdrawing into the hills. 2/2 Bn was informed and Bde efforts to contact the H.Z. Bn by line again were fruitless.

5. About mid-afternoon a L.O. from 6 Aust. Div. arrived at Bde. H.Q. with information that the probable time of withdrawal of the Bde would be about dusk that day and that further orders would be given by H.Z. Div.

6. A tentative plan had been drawn up by Bde. H.Q. for the withdrawal. Later in the afternoon, after a visit by a N.Z. L.O. and Maj-Gen. Freyberg when the time given for the position to be held was 0300 hrs. on 19 Apr, I was instructed to establish a rearward position astride the road from the high ground, including Trig. 214, square 4351 to Trig. 125 in square 4150.

One Sqn. N.Z. Div. Cav. which had joined the Bde. late in the afternoon to assist the withdrawal was holding the gap between the 2/2 Bn and my reserve position, astride the road and Railway in square 4452.

The rearward position was established to assist the withdrawal of 2/2 Bn who were to move in reserve South astride the road to area Trig. 292, square 4346.

7. Reports had been received that the two Coys on the left flank (MAKRYKHORI) were in contact and I was instructed to inform both Coys that they were to withdraw to the rearward position at dusk. This was about 1430 hrs. on the 18 Apr. I contacted the Coy. Cmd. myself and told him to pass the instruction on to the Coy of 2/2 Bn.

I was also ordered to send my reserve Coy (D) to the left flank to assist them and cover their left flank in the withdrawal. However, just as the trucks were ready to move the third heavy enemy bombing attack took place and three of the vehicles were set on fire and several casualties occurred. Several L.M.G's and A/Tk. Rifles being destroyed.

At about 1730 hrs. or a little later, the two left Coys appeared in the Bde. H.Q. area stating that they had been surrounded and were forced to withdraw. They were sent immediately to the rearward position.

8. Information had been received by Bde. H.Q. that N.Z. Arty. and Carriers were seen withdrawing South down the road and the Bde. Cmd. instructed me to stop all movement Southwards and to place all such parties in position on the rearward position. This was done, with some difficulty in a few cases and I twice had to draw my Revolver to force N.Z. Guns into position.

9. At about 1800 hrs. on 18 Apr. Bde. H.Q. shifted from its location and Brig. Allen joined me on the rearward line and

discussed the dispositions with me. The dispositions now were :-

- (a) B Coy 2/3 Bn (McGregor) on Right.
- (b) C Coy 2/3 Bn (Murchison) centre.
- (c) D Coy 2/2 Bn (Hendry) on Left.
- (d) Two or three N.Z. 25 Pdrs. in A/Tk. role.
- (e) Carriers covering the Right and Left flanks.
- (f) H.Q. Coy and D Coy (less two Pls) in reserve.
- (g) N.Z. Cav. Sqn as a protecting screen in front, but which a little later withdrew to the reserve area.

An officer was posted to collect any 2/2 Bn parties and to send them back to the reserve position selected for the 2/2 Bn. As far as I know, none returned through the rearward position.

In the distance tanks could be seen South of EVANGELISMOS area and enemy movement in the MAKRYKHORI area.

At this stage about 20 bombers which had been seen to bomb LARISSA, proceeded towards our area and having located the rearward position machine gunned it for 20/30 mins. The troops fought back vigorously but it had given the enemy tanks and infantry opportunity to cover the intervening ground under cover of the fire from the planes and very quickly after we were in contact with the enemy.

10. At about 2100 hrs. the Carriers were seen to pull out from the flanks and move to the rear. The N.Z. Arty also withdrew and later I found that C Coy, 2/3 Bn and D Coy, 2/2 Bn had withdrawn without orders from me, being forced out by tanks which had penetrated the position on the left flank.

From the reports I have received there were at least five enemy tanks penetrated the position. The tanks were closely followed by infantry and prior to the assault we were subjected to what appeared to be heavy mortar fire - the mortars probably being brought up under cover of the air attack.

With an officer from Bde. H.Q. I halted them about 1500 yds in rear of the forward position and took up another stand. B. Coy, 2/3 Bn (McGregor) had remained in position and I then ordered him to withdraw to the second rearward position.

There was a considerable amount of M.T. parked in the rearward area including a large number of N.Z. Troop Carrying Vehicles which suddenly appeared to panic and rushed southwards along the road to the Ford in square 4246. Here a N.Z. 25 pdr. was jammed in the Ford halting all the traffic for some considerable time, although some vehicles had already passed through.

When the Ford was eventually cleared the time was approximately 0030 hrs. 19 Apr.

11.

After the second position had been established, I received reports that the tanks had followed up and were again amongst the troops in the second rearward position.

The Bde. Comd. had previously discussed with me that if the occasion arose a final stand could be made behind the swamp and I therefore ordered a further withdrawal to this position.

However, this was almost impassible as there was a complete jamb on the Ford. The force withdrew southwards a short distance remaining North of the Swamp and I received reports that the enemy had NOT followed them up. Later, when the Ford was cleared, I ordered the force to mount the vehicles and move to ATALANTA as previously instructed. The rear elements of the force cleared the road junction in square 4141 at approx 0400 hrs. on 19 Apr. 41.

I contacted Bde. H.Q. again at the Ford where they were endeavouring to clear the M.T. over the Ford.

Earlier I had instructed A Coy, 2/3 Bn (Capt. Parbury) to withdraw his two Pls in the SYKOURION and AGYIA area to the road junction in square 4141 and these Pls joined the column as it moved through.

12.

In the early hours of the morning of the 19 Apr., Tracer bullets and Flares were seen apparently on the road in the direction of LARISSA and later when approaching the road and Railway Crossing in square 3839, this fire could still be seen and I received several reports that the road was held by the enemy and several vehicles had been halted.

I therefore decided it would be better to divert all vehicles possible along the tracks leading East from the road and make the VOLOS Road by that means.

I informed the Bde. Comd. who was further back in the Column and the force moved via these tracks, eventually joining the VOLOS Road about daybreak, although in the meantime, it had split into several parties.

By this time the Convoy was very mixed and I waited at the Road Junction in square 4141 until the last vehicle had passed. This would be approximately 0400 hrs. on 19 Apr.

13. As far as I know the casualties from this action were 1 killed, 13 wounded, 67 missing.

John H. G.

C.O. 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

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Ref. File S/4/1

S E C R E T

In reply to S/1001/G

Headquarters,
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

10 July 41.

Headquarters,
6 Aust. Div.

OPERATIONS 16 AUST INF BDE AT PENETIOS GORGE

Attached are reports by the C.O's of 2/2
and 2/3 Bns on the above operations .

The answers to the questionnaire are included
in the body of the reports and a reference sheet is attached
referring to paras dealing with the information required.

Also attached is a brief report by this H.Q.
which does NOT reiterate any of the information supplied by
these Bns. Its purpose is to amplify replies by units in
the light of additional knowledge of this H.Q. during the
operations and should be read in conjunction with the reports
of the 2/2 and 2/3 Bns.


.....Lt-Col.
Admin. Comd.
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

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S E C R E T.

Headquarters,
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

10 July, 41.

REPORT BY H.Q. 16 AUST. INF. BDE. ON
OPERATIONS 16 AUST. INF. BDE. AT PENEIOS GORGE.

These remarks are submitted to amplify reports by 2/2 and 2/3 Bns and should be read in conjunction with reports from these units.

1. In addition to orders received by 2/2 Bn direct from 1 Aust. Corps, Brig. A.S. Allen, Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde on arrival at the PENEIOS GORGE area on 17 Apr. 41 made the following arrangements:-
 - (a) 2/2 Bn dispositions, in general, to stand.
 - (b) One Pl 2/3 Bn to thicken up center.
 - (c) One Coy (C) of 2/3 Bn to come under command of D Coy, 2/2 Bn on the extreme left flank (MAKRYKHORI).
 - (d) One Pl 2/3 Bn to assist 2/2 Bn in patrol work on night 17/18 Apr 41.
 - (e) Arrangements to patrol enemy and our side of PENEIOS River on night 17/18 Apr.
 - (f) N.Z. Arty, one Tp A/Tk. Guns and 2/5, 2/11 Composite Pl Carriers which were under command of 2/2 Bn on order of 1 Aust Corps to remain under command 2/2 Bn.
 - (g) i; Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde was unable to give any definite time to hold the position. Only information available indicated probable time to be two or three days.
ii. Later, information on 18 Apr from L.O. 6 Aust Div indicated that the time of withdrawal may be about dusk on 18 Apr 41.
iii Further information to Bde H.Q. by H.Z. L.O. and Maj. Gen. Freyberg at about 1700 hrs 18 Apr instructed the Bde to deny the area until 0300 hrs on 19 Apr 41 until H.Z. and Aust Bdes had withdrawn through LARISSA.

This time to deny the area was telephoned to C.O. 2/2 Bn immediately on receipt of the order.

2. (a) From information received the 2/2 Bn held its position until about 1900 hrs on 18 Apr 41.

This was in spite of a complete withdrawal of the 21 N.Z. Bn which was holding the GORGE area forward of the village of TEMPE. An excited telephone message from the C.O. 21 N.Z. Bn at about midday on the 18 Apr stated that the "Tanks are through the village (TEMPE) and we are withdrawing to the hills". No further communication could be established with H.Q. 21 N.Z. Bn.

- (b) Preliminary arrangements had been made earlier in the day for the withdrawal of the 2/2 Bn to a rearward position, covered by the 2/3 Bn, astride the road and

be
railway at Trig 292 (square 4346). The time to withdraw to notified when further information was received by Bde H.Q. After advising the 2/2 Bn that the position was to be held until 0300 hrs 19 Apr, line communications to 2/2 Bn were severed and despite efforts by Bde linesman, ~~who did not return from this duty~~, communications were not re-established.

- (c) Confirmation of the withdrawal plan and a verbal order for 2/2 Bn to thin out and break contact at dark was sent from Bde H.Q. by 2/2 Bn L.O. who travelled in a Carrier at about 1730 hrs.

At about 1900 hrs the 2/2 Bn L.O. returned and reported that he was unable to get through to the 2/2 Bn with the order. Fwd N.Z. Arty told him that enemy tanks had surrounded 2/2 Bn H.Q. and the L.O. thought he could see parties of the Bn withdrawing into the hills. He was unable to get his Carrier across the intervening ground to contact Bn H.Q.

- (d) Lieut. Hill-Griffiths was then ordered to take a Carrier Sec to the BALTI (square 4649) to endeavour to contact 2/2 Bn but reported at dark that he was unable to locate any members of the Bn.

3. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report para 39.
4. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report paras 37 and 38.
5. (a) This is answered in 2/2 Bn report paras 38 and 40.
- (b) All reports clearly indicate that enemy tanks penetrated the 2/2 Bn position and continued on to attack the rearward position being held by the 2/3 Bn.
6. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report para 37.
7. (a) 2/2 Bn informed Bde H.Q. that line communication with D Coy on the extreme left flank had ceased and it was arranged for Bde to be responsible for the control of this Coy.
- (b) The C.O. 2/3 Bn was instructed to inform his C Coy, with a message to be passed on to D Coy, 2/2 Bn to withdraw from the left flank (MAKRYKHORI) at about dusk.

However, these Coys withdrew at about 1700 hrs on 18 Apr, Capt Porter, 2 i/c D Coy 2/2 Bn, stating that the Coy had been surrounded and hard pressed and were forced to withdraw. These Coys were sent on immediately to C.O. 2/3 Bn to take up a position in the rearward area.

8. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report para 41.
9. This is answered in 2/3 Bn report paras 1-3.
10. The time given to C.O. 2/3 Bn to deny the position was 0300 hrs 19 Apr 41. The line to be denied was given by L.O. N.Z. Div at about 1700 hrs on 18 Apr 41 as a N.W. and S.E. line through road junction in square 4141.

Defensive positions were taken up forward of this line and the position was denied until 0300 hrs on 19 Apr 41.

The C.O. 2/3 Bn in his report shows that the rear element of the force crossed the road junction in square 4141 at 0400 hrs on 19 Apr 41.

11. The two left Coys, D Coy 2/2 Bn and C Coy 2/3 Bn withdrew from the first rearward area without orders from C.O.

2/3 Bn who was in command of the rearward position, having been forced out by enemy tanks and infantry. This attack followed an enemy aircraft machine gun attack by approximately 20 planes and heavy concentration of mortar fire. Carriers and Arty also withdrew without orders but the C.O. 2/3 Bn halted them and established a second rearward position about 1500 yds in rear.

B Coy 2/3 Bn was then ordered to withdraw to the second position on orders by C.O. 2/3 Bn.

12. This is answered in 2/3 Bn report paras 10, 11.
13. See para 11 above and 2/3 Bn report para 10.
14. (a) The order that the position was to be denied until 0300 hrs on 19 Apr 41 was conveyed to C.O. 2/3 Bn at approximately 1700 hrs 18 Apr.
(b) Bde H.Q. was in very close contact with the forward area in the first rearward position and immediately on withdrawal of the two left Coys and the Carriers at about 2100 hrs, the C.O. 2/3 Bn informed the Bde Comd, and an officer from Bde H.Q. was sent to assist Lt.Col. Lamb to halt the withdrawal and establish the second rearward line.
(c) Bde H.Q. then moved to the ford (square 4246) where a N.Z. 25 Pdr was bogged in the ford and assisted in clearing the obstacle. Many A.S.C. vehicles, mostly those sent to pick up the 21 N.Z. Bn who were not there to use them, made for the ford and caused a general state of confusion of vehicles. This took some time to clear.
(d) In the meantime C.O. 2/3 Bn informed Bde H.Q. that enemy tanks had attacked the second rearward position and he had ordered a further withdrawal to south of the marshy country, (square 4245) via the ford. This was in accordance with a general plan of withdrawal arranged by the Bde Comd with C.O. 2/3 Bn if he considered it necessary.
(e) The confusion of vehicles was such that the further withdrawal of the force was almost impossible.
Several guns successively plunged into the side of the ford, mainly through lack of control, and completely blocked it and some difficulty was experienced in clearing the M.T. traffic.
(f) During this phase the C.O. 2/3 Bn reported that the rear-guard had withdrawn but were still north of the ford and that the enemy in the darkness had not followed them up. This would be approximately 0030 hrs on 19 Apr;
(g) The final withdrawal from this position was then arranged by the Bde Comd with C.O. 2/3 Bn, the rear elements crossing the road junction (square 4141) at about 0400 hrs 19 Apr.
15. This is answered in 2/3 Bn report para 13.
16. (a) The N.Z. Arty and A/Tk guns had been placed under command of 2/2 Bn by 1 Aust Corps. A further TP of Aust A/Tk guns arrived on 17 Apr and were placed under command of 2/2 Bn by Brig. A.S. Allen. The N.Z. A/Tk guns coming under command of 21 N.Z. Bn.
Brig. A.S. Allen also arranged for the N.Z. Fd Arty to remain under command of 2/2 Bn.
(b) C.O. 2/3 Bn took control of some guns that had withdrawn

from the forward area without orders and placed them in an A/Tk role on the first rearward position. Bde H.Q. had received information that several guns had pulled out and ordered C.O. 2/3 Bn to take charge of them.

- (c) Details of Arty support given are as shown in 2/2 Bn report - para 30.

The remarks on the failure of the N.Z. Arty are supported by the fact that it was necessary for the Bde Comd to inform the C.O. N.Z. Arty that his guns were withdrawing without orders and that he was expected to stand and fight.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

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2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Goddard Lines.
JULIS CAMP.
4 Jul. 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

RE OPERATIONS OF 2/2 AUST INF BN
PERRIOS GORGE.

In reference to the numbered questions in
6 Aust. Div's No S/1001/G of 18 Jun. 41. I submit herewith
a report on the operations of the Bn.

The answers to the questions are as follows:-

- (1) See para 4 of report.
- (2) See paras 29 and 37. The position occupied by 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn was held until 1900 hrs 18 Apr.
- (3) See para 39.
- (4) See paras 37 and 38.
- (5) See paras 40 and 38.
- (6) About 1845 hrs. See para 37.
- (7) None. This coy was withdrawn by 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. See para 27.
- (8) Approx 80 - 100 see para 41.
- (16, 17 and 18) See para 30.

(Sgd) F.O. Chilton Lt.Col.
Comd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

COPY.

4 Jul. 41

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/2 AUST. INF. BN. AT PENIOS GORGE.

1. The following is a brief summary of the events preceding the operations at PENIOS.

(a)

On 11 Apr. 41 two rifle Coys and part of H.Q. Coy commenced the withdrawal from VERRIA pass to take up a position on the right of 4 N.Z. Bde at SERVIA. Bn. H.Q. and the remainder of the Bn withdrew early the following evening and marched over the mountains continuously until approximately 1500 hrs on 13 Apr. The new positions were reached by the rearmost tps about midnight on the night 14/15 Apr. 41

(b)

The next day (15 Apr) was spent in the occupation of the new position, which covered a wide front in very mountainous country. About dusk an L.O. arrived from 16 Bde with orders to move out and assemble in the southern end of the SERVIA pass, and that our position was to be handed over to 2/3 Bn. The area was left at about 0200 hrs. and the assembly area reached at about 1000 hrs. where an M.T. convoy was waiting to move the tps.

(c)

I immediately reported to the Bde Comd and received from him orders to move to ZARKOS area and there to take up a defensive position. I was informed that the Bn tpt and Carrier Pl. had already been sent to ZARKOS.

(d)

On returning to the embussing area I was met by an L.O. from 6 Div. who informed me that the Bn was under comd of Corps and then gave orders for the Bn to proceed to PENIOS area. I was instructed to report at once to Corps H.Q.

(e)

As a result of the difficult conditions at VERRIA pass and the subsequent forced marches and lack of sleep, all ranks were very tired at this stage, but otherwise in good spirits.

2. On receipt of the above instructions I went to Corps H.Q. at ELASSON where I saw Brig. ROWELL and the G-2 Col. ELLIOTT. I was informed

- (a) that 21 N.Z. Bn had been occupying a position on the coast near PLATAMON.
- (b) the 21 N.Z. Bn had been attacked by German forces, and that there had been no information back for some hours.
- (c) that the final signals received by wireless from 21 N.Z. Bn (which I was shown) were in the opinion of the B.G.S. of a disquieting nature, and he did not know if any of the Bn would be left,
- (d) that Brig CLOWES had been sent out that day to try to ascertain the position, but had not then returned.

3. Brig. ROWELL informed me that I would have the following troops under comd :-

- One Bty of an N.Z. Fd. Regt.
- One tp N.Z. A/Tk guns.
- Composite carrier Pl. from 5 and 11 Bns.
- Det. Tp carrying Coy A.A.S.C.
- Det. of a Fd. Amb.

A W/T tender was to be attached for intercommunication with Corps.

4. My orders were to move to the ELATEA area S.W. of the PENIOS Gorge and to take such steps as I thought best to hold that approach for a possible period of three or four days. It was pointed out that it was impossible to give more explicit instructions
5. After seeing DAQM regarding amm. and med. arrangements, I set off shortly after noon for PENIOS in a car lent by Corps. I met Brig. CLOWES near LARISSA. He told me he had contacted 21 N.Z. Bn. which was withdrawing along the Gorge. He was unable to say what action the N.Z. Comd. proposed taking and suggested that I endeavour to contact Lt-Col. MacKAY and agree on a course of action with him.
6. Meanwhile the convoy had become somewhat disorganised owing to congestion of traffic and bombing attacks. Some AASC vehicles also had difficulty in finding the road out of LARISSA. I left the Adj. on the road to halt and organise tps as they arrived and drove through LARISSA locating and directing tp carrying vehicles and carriers of 5 and 11 Bns.
7. I then went ahead to PENIOS area with the Carrier Pl. and located Lt. Col. MacKAY near TEMPE Village shortly before dusk. He told me that his Bn. (less one Pl.) was bivouaced in the village, the remaining Pl. being in position covering a road block about 3 miles down the gorge. He stated that his Bn. had been practically surrounded at the PLATAMON position, but had managed to fight their way clear and had not been persuaded. His casualties amounted to 35, and they had lost a lot of equipment including all signal gear. He had under his comd a tp of 25 pdr guns, which, however, were short of amm. Lt. Col. MacKAY further stated that his tps were feeling fatigued and the strain of recent fighting. As it was now dark it was agreed that I should meet him early next morning and mutually arrange for the defence of the position.
8. In the meantime the Bn under Maj. Cohen had bivouaced several miles S.W. of TEMPE and when I arrived back I found that the N.Z. Bty. of 25 pdrs and the N.Z. tp of A/Tk. guns had also arrived. I arranged for the comds to attend the conference with Lt.Col. MacKAY next morning. Later in the night the 2 i/c. arrived with the Bn. tpt, which had previously gone to ZARKOS.
9. In company with Lt.Col. MacKAY, Lt.Col. Parkinson (Comd. of the N.Z. Fd. Regt., a bty. of which was under my comd.) and the N.Z. A/Tk. Comd. I made a recce. of the S.W. portion of the Gorge as far as the main road block (517612). Other obstacles which had been prepared comprised :-
- (a) Railway tunnel near PLATAMON blocked.
 - (b) Road crater N.E. of the road block above referred to.
 - (c) Railway tunnel at 517615 blocked.
 - (d) Railway bridge at TEMPE destroyed (This was also used as a vehicular crossing).

The question of Comd. arose and Lt.Col. MacKAY suggested that the entire force should be under his Comd. In view of my instructions from Corps, I refused. It was agreed that, as 21 N.Z. Bn. was already in the Gorge, it should be disposed as shown on the attached sketch, whilst 2/2 Bn. should occupy a position in depth at the entrance to the defile, with the additional role of protecting the left flank along PENIOS River, as I considered enemy action from GONNOS area probable. The 4 2-pdr. guns were disposed in defiladed positions along the defile in 21 N.Z. Bn's area, except for one gun commanding the southern exit from TEMPE.

Arty tasks included harassing fire on the road block at 517612 should the pl. be unable to maintain its position there. Arrangements were also made for O.P's. to enable observed shooting within 21 N.Z. Bn's position, along PENIOS River and in front of "C" Coy., 2/2 Bn. The tp of 25 pdrs with 21 N.Z. Bn. was attached to the Bty. under my comd.

In addition I agreed to patrol forward down the Gorge and to endeavour to ascertain whether or not the crossing place at the N.E. exit had been seized by the enemy. I also arranged to piquet the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS and to patrol North of the River as soon as a means of crossing the river could be found.

I also arranged to run a line from my H.Q. to 21 N.Z. Bn. H.Q. also to lend that Bn. certain wire and signal gear.

10. After leaving Lt.Col. MacKay, I met my own Coy. Comds. and made a brief recce. with them. Except for "D" Coy., the dispositions then decided on are as shown on the attached sketch. In the meantime, the Bn. had been moved forward under Maj. Cohen and had taken up temporary positions. During the morning 3 Aust. A/Tk. 2 pdr. guns arrived and it was decided to dispose them in 2/2 Bn. area. Lt.Col. Parkinson supervised detailed dispositions of these guns.

11. At about 1300 hrs. on 17 Apr. Brig. Allen, Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde., arrived at my H.Q. and told me he had been appointed to Comd. the force at PENEIOS and that 2/3 Bn. was on its way to the area.

I briefly outlined the situation, explained the dispositions and took Brig. Allen forward to meet Lt.Col. MacKay. The latter pointed out the dispositions of his tps.

Brig. Allen approved of 2/2 Bn dispositions subject to moving "D" Coy further to the left, to the position now shown on the sketch map attached. He also emphasised the importance of the high ground to the East of EVANGELISMOS. Brig. Allen also outlined the proposed dispositions of 2/3 Bn. and said he would attach a Pl of 2/3 Bn. to me to help hold the gap along the river between my main position and "D" Coy.

12. Shortly after I had left Brig. Allen, about 1530-1600 hrs. Capt. King ("B" Coy.) reported that No. 11 Pl., which had been sent forward to patrol the lower portion of the Gorge (vide para 9) had made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of the road block, and that an enemy tank was at the obstacle. I telephoned this information to Bde. also to Lt. Col. MacKay and asked the latter to assist especially by the tps. he had placed on the right flank.

13. During the afternoon several reports were received from Coys. of movement of small bodies of men with animals on the high ground overlooking GONNOS.

Verrey signals were also fired on these hills on several occasions as enemy recce. planes flew overhead. 21 N.Z. Bn. also reported that their tps. in AMPELAKIA area had been fired on from the high ground on the East. "A" Coy. had already been ordered to send one Pl. to piquet the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS, "B" Coy. was later warned that it might be required also to send a Pl. to the same area. At that time "B" Coy. had one Pl. in action at the road block, and another Pl. reconnoitring the river by means of crossing.

14. Late in the afternoon of 17 Apr. Brig. Allen and Lt. Col. Parkinson visited my H.Q., Lt.Col. MacKay was also present. It was decided to move certain of the Aust. A/Tk. guns to positions further forward, and also to bring forward two 25 pdrs. in an A/Tk. role. An officer of 2/1 Fd. Coy having arrived, it was also decided to "crater" the road just forward of TEMPE Village, where it could be adequately covered by fire.

15. Between 2100 hrs. and 2200 hrs. I received reports from the Comd. and Pl. Sgt. of the patrol which had encountered the enemy at the road block. The forward elements of the Pl. had been pinned to the road in the floor of the Gorge by fire from a tank which had been brought along the Ry. line as far as the blocked tunnel. The remainder of the Pl. managed to get into positions on the southern slope of the Gorge. The enemy were engaged until dark when the patrol succeeded in getting away losing 3 killed and some wounded. The Pl.

of 21 N.Z. Bn had withdrawn from its position covering the road block when first fired on and no assistance was given by 21 N.Z. Bn., though defence of the block had been one of its tasks.

16. As stated above the N.Z. force had destroyed the railway and vehicular bridge at TEMPE. Eventually a small punt was discovered on "D" Coys front and a fighting patrol under the Comd. of Lieut. Colquhoun and was sent across the river during the late afternoon to ascertain whether or not GONNOS was occupied and generally whether enemy tps were present in the lower foothills across the river between GONNOS and TEMPE. The Comd. reported to me by telephone on his return about 0200 hrs. 18 Apr. He found enemy tps in GONNOS. Contact was made with several German patrols later. He also saw small bodies of tps. with pack tpt. moving towards KLEA. Certain uniform and equipment were taken for purposes of identification. A detachment of 3 men were left to guard the punt. These were attacked by a superior force but fought it off.

17. "C" and "A" Coys. were instructed to patrol our bank of the river continuously during the night and fire was exchanged with several small German parties on the opposite bank. It was then thought that these parties were attempting to cross or reconnoitring for crossing places.

18. Early in the morning 18 Apr. (about 0700 hrs.) German tps were reported to be advancing S.E. towards the river from the direction of GONNOS.

An hour or so later it was reported that a force estimated at one Bn. was moving S.E. from GONNOS towards the river between TEMPE and "D" Coy's position.

At the same time another force which Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy) estimated also as a Bn. was reported moving in a Westerly direction from GONNOS.

The general lines of attack are shown on the attached sketch map.

19. Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy) reported that the above enemy movements presented good arty. targets. Lt.Col. Parkinson (whose H.Q. were alongside mine) told me his O.P.'s on "D" Coy's feature had not yet been established. He immediately sent across a wireless truck and F.O.O. and in the meantime Capt. Hendry directed the battery's fire by telephone, with considerable effect, but unfortunately the best targets had been lost by the delay.

20. On receiving Capt. Hendry's report that enemy tps were making for the river on his left, and out of range of his weapons, I sent 2/2 Bn. Carrier Pl. to intercept the attempted crossing and placed it under comd of "D" Coy. The Pl. succeeded in stopping the enemy. The Pl. Comd., Lieut. Love, was seriously wounded during this engagement and the Pl. had several other fatal casualties. It was found later however that enemy tps. had crossed the river and outflanked our position further still to the left.

21. During the morning "C" Coy. and the composite carrier Pl. (5 and 11 Bns). and Mortar Pl. succeeded in preventing any enemy crossing the river at the centre and the main enemy pressure seemed to be on the left of "D" Coy's position. A fighting patrol was sent out by "D" Coy. to find out if the village of PARAPOTAMOS was occupied. It returned shortly after midday and reported a sharp engagement with the enemy in and near the village.

22. I was concerned about the threat to my left flank especially as "D" Coy. Comd. had been unable to contact the Coy. of 2/3 Bn. to his rear. I discussed the situation with the Bde. Comd. and he arranged to ascertain the location of this Coy. and see that they were told the situation.

23. During the morning I had several telephone conversations with Lt.Col. Mackay. He agreed to his carrier Pl. being used to help fill the gap between my main position and "D" Coy., and asked me to take the Pl under my cmd. as he had no means of communication. This I did. Lt.Col. Mackay told me that the village (TELPE) was being shelled by mortars and that he was engaging enemy on the opposite bank of the river. During all our conversations he never indicated that his position was at all serious or that he intended to withdraw.
24. Telephone communication with 21 N.Z. Bn. ceased about midday. No notification that they were closing down was given us. I was told shortly afterwards that this Bn had withdrawn. About the same time I received a report from "C" Coy that N.Z. tps had reported that tanks were in TELPE. I instructed "C" Coy. to warn the N.Z. A/Tk. gun which was sighted in their area to cover the exit from the village. Shortly after this "C" Coys reported that the crew had gone, and had removed the breech block.
25. From now on many N.Z. tps commenced withdrawing in unformed bodies through our position, though most of the Bn apparently moved up into the hills to the East. Efforts were made by Lt.Col. Parkinson, Major Cohen and others to stop and collect these men, but most of them had no weapons or equipment. However, one complete Pl under Lieut. Southworth reported to me and was given a task supporting the centre of the position which it carried out in a very creditable manner during the remainder of the day.
26. From about 1500 hrs. enemy pressure along the river in the centre of the Bn position increased and tps succeeded in crossing the river near the bend West of EWANGELISMOS. They were held by L.A. and 3" mortar fire on the near bank and very heavy casualties were inflicted on them. During this period the forward Coys came under fairly heavy H.M.G. and Mortar fire. A dive bombing attack was also carried out, apparently on tpt in rear of our position.
27. Towards 1600 hrs. Capt. Hendry (D.Coy) reported that enemy infiltration on his left flank had become serious. It was agreed that he should withdraw his Pl from the river bank and counter-attack with it in conjunction with 2/2 Bn Carrier Pl. Shortly afterwards the line to "D" Coy went and I was told by my Sig. Officer that the position of the enemy now made it impossible for a line party to effect repairs. Some time later (between 1630 and 1700 hrs) firing ceased on "D" Coy's position, and I heard no further fire from them.
I had assumed, until my return from GREECE, that this Coy had been surrounded and unable to continue the fight. I now know however, that Capt. Hendry received orders from Bde. H.Q. through 2/3 Bn to withdraw along the ridge in co-operation with the Coy of 2/3 Bn on the same feature. Attached is copy of message received by Capt Hendry.
28. Between 1600 and 1630 hrs, Maj. General Freyberg spoke to me from Bde. H.Q. He wished to know the situation generally and the whereabouts of 21 N.Z. Bn., and whether he could get a message to the latter. I told him that this was impossible. This was the last communication I had with Bde during the battle; the line being apparently out. I understand a line party went back from my Sig. Centre.
29. Until the line to Bde. H.Q. went, I had been in the closest touch throughout the battle with the Brig. or B.M. During the afternoon I was informed that the Bde. Group was to withdraw at 0300 hrs. 19 Apr. but that it was hoped to get this time put forward. The B.M. also gave me an outline plan of how the withdrawal would probably be effected.

30. As far as I can remember, I received no directions from Brig Allen as to the status of the N.Z. Bty. which had been placed under my comd by Corps. In fact, Lt. Col. Parkinson maintained his H.Q. alongside mine, and I should like to say that I have nothing but praise for his conduct and co-operation. However, the arty. support in fact given was very disappointing. The following is a summary of arty action :-

- (a) Harrassing fire on the forward road block during night 17/18 Apr after the patrol from "B" Coy. had withdrawn. This was a map shoot and its effect is not known.
- (b) Fire on enemy tps. moving out of GONNOS on morning of 18 Apr. (See para. 19). This was not as effective as it should have been, because O.P's. had not yet been established in "D" Coy's area; I am unaware of the reason. By the time controlled fire became possible, the enemy adopted more dispersed formations and did not present such favourable targets.
- (c) Fire intended to cover the rearmost road block just forward of TEMPE. This fire in fact fell in "C" Coy's area, and was stopped by Lt.Col. Parkinson. It was not resumed.
- (d) During the early afternoon Capt Hendry ("D" Coy.) informed me that the P.O.O.s were about to leave his area. I believe there were two O.P's. Lt. Col Parkinson was with me at the time and he ordered them specifically to remain. However, Capt. Hendry reported shortly afterwards that they had gone.
- (e) During the early part of the afternoon it was reported that some of the guns had moved out. This was not in accordance with Lt.Col. Parkinson's. When the attack across the river developed in the afternoon effective arty. fire could not be developed for this reason and because of the absence of O.P's. However, Lt.Col. Parkinson sent for a wireless truck and an O.P. was established close to Bn. H.Q. Both Maj. Cohen and I pointed out the task we wished carried out, but the fire of the remaining guns could not be got on to the target and finally ceased altogether. Lt. Col. Parkinson appeared very distressed at this stage and told me he had sent back a senior officer "to give the gunners 10 minutes drill to pull them together."

31. At this stage "B" Coy and Bn.H.Q. area were under constant fire from H.M.G's. on the feature previously occupied by "D" Coy. and from across the river. These areas also came under Mortar fire. Enemy were observed mounting what was thought to be a mountain gun on hill which had been occupied by "D" Coy.

32. About 1700 hrs. "C" Coy. reported that some tanks had entered its locality; also that enemy snipers and men armed with "Tommy Guns" had worked around on the high ground on the right front south of the river previously held by 21 N.Z. Bn., and were causing difficulty as the Coy. was now under fire on three sides. I had previously ordered the withdrawal back to their respective Coys. of the Pls. from "A" and "B" Coys. covering the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS as their reports indicated no enemy in that area. I gave instructions for Lieut Loftus ("A" Coy) to be intercepted on his way back and for him to endeavour to relieve this pressure above "C" Coy. Lieut Loftus is missing and I do not know if he received these instructions.

33. At about this time (1700)hrs) the line to "C" and "A" Coy went. Linesmen attempted to restore the line but had not succeeded by the time these forward Coys. had withdrawn.

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30. As far as I can remember, I received no directions from Brig Allen as to the status of the N.Z. 3ty. which had been placed under my comd by Corps. In fact, Lt. Col. Parkinson maintained his 3ty. alongside mine, and I should like to say that I have nothing but praise for his conduct and co-operation. However, the arty. support in fact given was very disappointing. The following is a summary of arty action :-

(a) Harassing fire on the forward road block during night 17/18 Apr after the patrol from "B" Coy. had withdrawn. This was a map shoot and its effect is not known.

(b) Fire on enemy tps. moving out of GOMNOS on morning of 18 Apr. (See para. 19). This was not as effective as it should have been, because O.P.'s. had not yet been established in "B" Coy's area; I am unaware of the reason. By the time controlled fire became possible, the enemy adopted more dispersed formations and did not present such favourable targets.

(c) Fire intended to cover the rearward road block just forward of TEMPE. This fire in fact fell in "C" Coy's area, and was stopped by Lt. Col. Parkinson. It was not resumed.

(d) During the early afternoon Capt Hendry ("D" Coy.) informed me that the F.O.O.s were about to leave his area. I believe there were two O.P.'s. Lt. Col. Parkinson was with me at the time and he ordered them specifically to remain. However, Capt. Hendry reported shortly afterwards that they had gone.

(e) During the early part of the afternoon it was reported that some of the guns had moved out. This was not in accordance with Lt. Col. Parkinson's. When the attack across the river developed in the afternoon effective arty. fire could not be however, Lt. Col. Parkinson sent for a wireless truck and an O.P. was established close to Bn. H.Q. Both Maj. Cohen and I pointed out the task we wished carried out, but the fire of the remaining guns could not be got on to the target and finally ceased altogether. Lt. Col. Parkinson appeared very distressed at this stage and told me he had sent back a senior officer "to give the gunners 10 minutes drill to pull them together."

31. At this stage "B" Coy and Bn. H.Q. area were under constant fire from H.M.G.'s. on the feature previously occupied by "D" Coy. and from across the river. These areas also came under mortar fire. Enemy were observed mounting what was thought to be a mountain gun on hill which had been occupied by "D" Coy.

32. About 1700 hrs. "C" Coy. reported that some tanks had entered its locality; also that enemy snipers and men armed with "Tommy Guns" had worked around on the high ground on the right front south of the river previously held by 21 N.Z. Bn., and were causing difficulty as the Coy. was now under fire on three sides. I had previously ordered the withdrawal back to their respective Coys. of the Pls. from "A" and "B" Coys. covering the night ground East of EVANGELISMOS as their reports indicated no enemy in that area. I gave instructions for Lt. Loftus ("A" Coy) to be intercepted on his way back and for him to endeavour to relieve this pressure above "C" Coy. Lt. Loftus is missing and I do not know if he received these instructions.

33. At about this time (1700 hrs) the line to "C" and "A" Coy went. Linesmen attempted to restore the line but had not succeeded by the time these forward Coys. had withdrawn.

34. Initially the tanks in "C" Coy. area engaged our posts with H.G. and 2 pdr. fire for approximately half an hour, but with very little effect. The infantry fired on the tanks with S.A. fire and A/Tk. rifles but without apparent effect. The absence of Molotov Cocktails or bombs of the S.T. type was felt. After half an hour infantry advanced with the support of the tanks and H.M.G.'s. and mortars across the river. Certain of the tanks, followed by infantry, swung right between the road and the river. The position was then that "C" Coy. was being attacked from the front and both flanks. They had already been forced to abandon prepared localities in the case of two Pls. and take up new positions by reason of the withdrawal of 21 N.Z. Bn.

Capt. Buckley was unable to communicate with me and decided shortly after 1730 hrs. to withdraw his Coy easterly on to the high ground. The withdrawal appears to have been well organised and carried out. In the light of all facts now known to me Capt. Buckley's decision was justified. Casualties in his Coy. included two Pl. Comds. Lieuts. Lovett and Holroyd, neither of whom could be evacuated. Capt. Buckley sent a runner to inform me of his withdrawal but owing to the distance and the route he had to follow the message did not arrive until approximately 1830 hrs.

35. From about 1500 hrs. onwards, the two pls. of "A" Coy. were in action against German tps. who had succeeded in crossing the river. The action of these Pls. in co-operation with 3" mortars and fire from carrier pls. held the enemy close to the river.

At about 1730 hrs. this Coy also came under rifle fire from the higher ground to its right rear.

At approximately 1755 hrs. two tanks came in along the road from the right flank. One was knocked out by a 2 pdr. gun, the other was hit and withdrew. A few minutes later a tank attack, closely followed by infantry developed between the road and the river. There were about 10 tanks engaged. The Coy. locality was also under heavy fire from H.M.G.'s and Mortars across the river.

As previously stated, line communication with Bn. H.Q. had gone. Capt. Caldwell states that he was forced to withdraw his Pls. to the high ground East and, in the circumstances, I consider his action justified. He sent a runner to advise me of his action. One of the two Pl. comds was seriously wounded.

36. Tanks had now fanned out on the flat ground West of EVANGELISMOS and engaged carriers and their personnel forcing them to retire along the LARISSA Road. I was informed that several carriers were knocked out. Some tanks approached EVANGELISMOS along the road and were engaged by a 25 pdr. gun sited near the road opposite Bn. H.Q. At least one tank was knocked out by this gun which continued firing until its ammunition limber was destroyed by a tank shell. The crew then withdrew through Bn. H.Q. carrying the breech block with them. This left only one 2 pdr. gun sited in a defiladed position about 75 yds. from Bn. H.Q. At about 1830 hrs. or perhaps several minutes later, runners arrived almost simultaneously from "C" and "A" Coys. reporting their withdrawal.

37. Shortly afterwards I looked back at the abovementioned 2 pdr. gun and found it had gone. No orders for its withdrawal were given and it had not been in action. A few minutes previously I had told the Comd. I expected him to stay and he left me to join his detachment. I cannot remember this officer's name.

The position now was that "C", "A" and "D" Coys' localities had gone, and there were no remaining A/Tk. defences. A number of tanks were approaching with infantry from the North and across the flat on the N.W. Enemy tps. could also be seen to the left rear on the foothills S.W. across the flat. My remaining tps comprised "B" Coy. and certain H.Q. Coy personnel organised for defence in Bn. H.Q. area.

I discussed the situation with O.C. "B" Coy. I was of the opinion that although this Coy. would probably continue the fight against enemy infantry for a short time, it would shortly be entirely surrounded by infantry as well as tanks. Furthermore, it would not prevent or delay enemy infantry passing rearwards via the flat ~~ex~~ to the West. I therefore ordered Capt. King and other personnel at rear of Bn. H.Q. to withdraw at approx. 1645 hrs.

My orders to "B" Coy were to withdraw into the hills to the East, the reasons being that the flat area to the West and South was already covered by H.H.C. fire, and tanks which were already in "B" Coy area and moving across the flat, would inevitably destroy any tps attempting to withdraw along the road.

The withdrawal of "B" Coy. was carried out in an orderly fashion, covered by a rear party under Capt. Brock.

38. Bn. H.Q. was finally evacuated about 5-10 minutes after "B" Coy. had been ordered to withdraw. At this stage two tanks had penetrated around and behind Bn. H.Q. in a S.W. direction and inflicted a number of casualties at very close range.

39. Bde. H.Q. were not notified of the withdrawal of the forward Coys. I only became aware of their withdrawal several minutes before ordering the withdrawal of "B" Coy. and Bn. H.Q. The only means of communication left was by runner and I do not think a runner would have had much chance of getting to Bde. H.Q. I am now aware that a L.C. from Bde. H.Q. attempted to get to my H.Q. about this time in a Bren Carrier but was forced to turn back.

40. The type of tank operating against us appeared to be of the Allt or A 1V type, carrying M.G. and cannon. Capt. Buckley of "C" Coy. reports that 6 of these tanks were in his Coy locality for about half an hour preceding the main attack. When the attack developed he stated there were more tanks but cannot state the number. Capt. Caldwell of "A" Coy. states that 10 tanks attacked his position. He later counted between 20 and 30 tanks.

Estimates of up to 50 tanks in the later stage have been made. Capt. Caldwell was in a position to see and his figures can be regarded as a reliable minimum.

41. It is difficult to estimate the total casualties during the action. During the later stages it became impossible to evacuate from forward tps. Four officers were wounded. Two were very seriously wounded, another was unable to move and was captured. A fifth officer is missing and is considered to have been killed. Lieut. McPherson of 2/3 Bn. (who was attached) was also badly wounded.

Until the main attack developed at about 1500 hrs. on 18 Apr. casualties are estimated at approximately 10 killed and 30 wounded. After that hour it became impossible to evacuate casualties from forward positions. It is impossible to state casualties during this later stage with any accuracy, but total casualties during the action are estimated at about 80 and 100.

42. In my opinion the following points are worthy of comment :-

- (a) The necessity for R/T communication within the Bn. as an alternative means.
- (b) The great value of the 3" Mortar and the desirability of a greatly increased establishment.
- (c) The value of the Bren Carrier pl. as a mobile reserve in this type of action.

The plan of withdrawal for the Bn during night 18/19 Apr. depended upon the retirement to the M.T. Coy which, during the day, had been dispersed in rear of 2/3 Bn. As already pointed out, any retirement in this direction became impossible.

Owing to the rugged nature of the country, any control of Coys. or intercommunication, became impossible after the withdrawal Eastwards commenced. Each Coy. cmd. independently came to the conclusion that the only course open was to attempt to get to the coast, and either then make along the coast with a view to rejoining the British Forces at LAMIA or secure boats.

(Sgd) F.O. Chilton Lt.Col.
Cmd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

4 July. 41.

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Headquarters,
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

10 July, 41.

REPORT BY H.Q. 16 AUST. INF. BDE. ON
OPERATIONS 16 AUST. INF. BDE. AT PENEIOS GORGE.

These remarks are submitted to amplify reports by 2/2 and 2/3 Bns and should be read in conjunction with reports from these units.

1. In addition to orders received by 2/2 Bn direct from 1 Aust. Corps, Brig. A.S. Allen, Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde on arrival at the PENEIOS GORGE area on 17 Apr. 41 made the following arrangements:-
 - (a) 2/2 Bn dispositions, in general, to stand.
 - (b) One Pl 2/3 Bn to thicken up center.
 - (c) One Coy (C) of 2/3 Bn to come under command of D Coy, 2/2 Bn on the extreme left flank (MAKHYKHORI).
 - (d) One Pl 2/3 Bn to assist 2/2 Bn in patrol work on night 17/18 Apr 41.
 - (e) Arrangements to patrol enemy and our side of PENEIOS River on night 17/18 Apr.
 - (f) N.Z. Arty, one Tp A/Tk. Guns and 2/5, 2/11 Composite Pl Carriers which were under command of 2/2 Bn on order of 1 Aust Corps to remain under command 2/2 Bn.
 - (g) i; Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde was unable to give any definite time to hold the position. Only information available indicated probable time to be two or three days.
 - ii. Later, information on 18 Apr from L.O. 6 Aust Div indicated that the time of withdrawal may be about dusk on 18 Apr 41.
 - iii Further information to Bde H.Q. by N.Z. L.O. and Maj. Gen. Freyberg at about 1700 hrs 18 Apr instructed the Bde to deny the area until 0300 hrs on 19 Apr 41 until N.Z. and Aust Bdes had withdrawn through LARISSA.

This time to deny the area was telephoned to C.O. 2/2 Bn immediately on receipt of the order.

2. (a) From information received the 2/2 Bn held its position until about 1900 hrs on 18 Apr 41.

This was in spite of a complete withdrawal of the 21 N.Z. Bn which was holding the GORGE area forward of the village of TEMPE. An excited telephone message from the C.O. 21 N.Z. Bn at about midday on the 18 Apr stated that the "Tanks are through the village (TEMPE) and we are withdrawing to the hills". No further communication could be established with H.Q. 21 N.Z. Bn.

- (b) Preliminary arrangements had been made earlier in the day for the withdrawal of the 2/2 Bn to a rearward position, covered by the 2/3 Bn, astride the road

railway at Trig 292 (square 4346). The time to withdraw to be notified when further information was received by Bde H.Q. After advising the 2/2 Bn that the position was to be held until 0300 hrs 19 Apr, line communications to 2/2 Bn were severed and despite efforts by Bde linesman, ~~who did not return from this duty~~, communications were not re-established.

- (c) Confirmation of the withdrawal plan and a verbal order for 2/2 Bn to thin out and break contact at dark was sent from Bde H.Q. by 2/2 Bn L.O. who travelled in a Carrier at about 1730 hrs.

At about 1900 hrs the 2/2 Bn L.O. returned and reported that he was unable to get through to the 2/2 Bn with the order. Fwd N.Z. Arty told him that enemy tanks had surrounded 2/2 Bn H.Q. and the L.O. thought he could see parties of the Bn withdrawing into the hills. He was unable to get his Carrier across the intervening ground to contact Bn H.Q.

- (d) Lieut. Hill-Griffiths was then ordered to take a Carrier Sec to the BALTI (square 4649) to endeavour to contact 2/2 Bn but reported at dark that he was unable to locate any members of the Bn.

3. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report para 39.
4. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report paras 37 and 38.
5. (a) This is answered in 2/2 Bn report paras 38 and 40.
(b) All reports clearly indicate that enemy tanks penetrated the 2/2 Bn position and continued on to attack the rearward position being held by the 2/3 Bn.
6. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report para 37.
7. (a) 2/2 Bn informed Bde H.Q. that line communication with D Coy on the extreme left flank had ceased and it was arranged for Bde to be responsible for the control of this Coy.
(b) The C.O. 2/3 Bn was instructed to inform his C Coy, with a message to be passed on to D Coy, 2/2 Bn to withdraw from the left flank (MAKRYKHORI) at about dusk.

However, these Coys withdrew at about 1700 hrs on 18 Apr, Capt Porter, 1/c D Coy 2/2 Bn, stating that the Coy had been surrounded and hard pressed and were forced to withdraw. These Coys were sent on immediately to C.O. 2/3 Bn to take up a position in the rearward area.

8. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report para 41.
9. This is answered in 2/3 Bn report paras 1-3.
10. The time given to C.O. 2/3 Bn to deny the position was 0300 hrs 19 Apr 41. The line to be denied was given by L.O. N.Z. Div at about 1700 hrs on 18 Apr 41 as a N.W. and S.E. line through road junction in square 4141.

Defensive positions were taken up forward of this line and the position was denied until 0300 hrs on 19 Apr 41.

The C.O. 2/3 Bn in his report shows that the rear of the force crossed the road junction in square 4141 at 0400 hrs on 19 Apr 41.

11. The two left Coys, D Coy 2/2 Bn and C Coy 2/3 Bn withdrew from the first rearward area without orders from C.O.

2/3 Bn who was in command of the rearward position, having been forced out by enemy tanks and infantry. This attack followed an enemy aircraft machine gun attack by approximately 20 planes and heavy concentration of mortar fire. Carriers and Arty also withdrew without orders but the C.O. 2/3 Bn halted them and established a second rearward position about 1500 yds in rear.

B Coy 2/3 Bn was then ordered to withdraw to the second position on orders by C.O. 2/3 Bn.

12. This is answered in 2/3 Bn report paras 10, 11.
13. See para 11 above and 2/3 Bn report para 10.
14. (a) The order that the position was to be denied until 0300 hrs on 19 Apr 41 was conveyed to C.O. 2/3 Bn at approximately 1700 hrs 18 Apr.
(b) Bde H.Q. was in very close contact with the forward area in the first rearward position and immediately on withdrawal of the two left Coys and the Carriers at about 2100 hrs, the C.O. 2/3 Bn informed the Bde Comd, and an officer from Bde H.Q. was sent to assist Lt.Col. Lamb to halt the withdrawal and establish the second rearward line.
(c) Bde H.Q. then moved to the ford (square 4246) where a N.Z. 25 Pdr was bogged in the ford and assisted in clearing the obstacle. Many A.S.C. vehicles, mostly those sent to pick up the 21 N.Z. Bn who were not there to use them, made for the ford and caused a general state of confusion of vehicles. This took some time to clear.
(d) In the meantime C.O. 2/3 Bn informed Bde H.Q. that enemy tanks had attacked the second rearward position and he had ordered a further withdrawal to south of the marshy country, (square 4245) via the ford. This was in accordance with a general plan of withdrawal arranged by the Bde Comd with C.O. 2/3 Bn if he considered it necessary.
(e) The confusion of vehicles was such that the further withdrawal of the force was almost impossible.
Several guns successively plunged into the side of the ford, mainly through lack of control, and completely blocked it and some difficulty was experienced in clearing the M.T. traffic.
(f) During this phase the C.O. 2/3 Bn reported that the rear-guard had withdrawn but were still north of the ford and that the enemy in the darkness had not followed them up. This would be approximately 0030 hrs on 19 Apr;
(g) The final withdrawal from this position was then arranged by the Bde Comd with C.O. 2/3 Bn, the rear elements crossing the road junction (square 4141) at about 0400 hrs 19 Apr.
15. This is answered in 2/3 Bn report para 13.
16. (a) The N.Z. Arty and A/Tk guns had been placed under command of 2/2 Bn by 1 Aust Corps. A further TP of Aust A/Tk guns arrived on 17 Apr and were placed under command of 2/2 Bn by Brig. A.S. Allen. The N.Z. A/Tk guns coming under command of 21 N.Z. Bn.
Brig. A.S. Allen also arranged for the N.Z. Fd Arty to remain under command of 2/2 Bn.
(b) C.O. 2/3 Bn took control of some guns that had withdrawn

from the forward area without orders and placed them in an A/Tk role on the first rearward position. Bde H.Q. had received information that several guns had pulled out and ordered C.O. 2/3 Bn to take charge of them.

- (c) Details of Arty support given are as shown in 2/2 Bn report - para 30.

The remarks on the failure of the H.Z. Arty are supported by the fact that it was necessary for the Bde Comd to inform the C.O. H.Z. Arty that his guns were withdrawing without orders and that he was expected to stand and fight.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

10 Jul 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/3 AUST INF BN
AT PENSIOS GORGE.

I submit herewith a report on the operations of 2/3 Bn. The answers to the questions are as set out in the following paras:-

- (9) See paras 2 and 3 of report.
- (10) See paras 6, 10, 11
- (11) See para 10
- (12) See paras 9 and 10.
- (13) See para 10.
- (14) See para 11.
- (15) See para 13.
- (16, 17, 18) No Arty under my command except the few guns halted on the rearward position.

(Sgd) J. Lamb.....Lt.Col.
C.O. 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

10 Jul 41.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/3 AUST INF BN
AT PEREIOS GORGE - REF. MAP LARISSA 1/100,000.

1. 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn. having moved from VERROIA to SERVIA was then ordered by 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. to proceed by road to SEMI THOMAI 12354 (Ref. Map LARISSA 1-100,000) during the night 16/17 Apr. 41. The Bn arrived at SEMI THOMAI in the early morning of 17 Apr. 41. and I was met by the Bde. Comd. who issued further orders.

2. I was told that Sds. H.Q. and my Bn had been ordered to join the 2/2 Bn and 21 N.Z. Bn in the PEREIOS GORGE area. The Bde. Comd. instructed us to move 2/3 Bn (less one Coy) to that area and to take up a defensive position astride the LARISSA - WHITE Road in the area MYRTHIMORION-MYRTHIMORI. I was to join the Bde. Comd. in that area as soon as I got my Bn under way and receive further orders when the Comd. had clarified the position at PEREIOS GORGE.

The Bde. Comd. stated that 2 Anzac Corps were concerned about the night flank South of PEREIOS GORGE and the road running South-West from STAMOURION and West from AGYIA and the routes leading into these towns from the North and East. I was instructed to send one Coy (A) with two Sacs. Carriers to patrol these towns and roads.

Later in the morning of 17 Apr. I joined the Bde. Comd. and was told that the enemy were North of the PEREIOS River, the 21 N.Z. Bn had withdrawn to the WHITE Village area and the 2/2 Bn was holding a defensive position in the EVANGELISIOS area. Information was given that the 4 N.Z. Fd. Regt. (less one Bty.), one Bty of 16 pdrs. and two troops of A/Tk. Guns were attached to the Bde. Group.

3. Orders were then given by Brig. A.S. ALLAN for 2/3 Bn to dispose as follows :-

(a) One Coy (C) to take up a position on the high ground to the North of MYRTHIMORI to overlook PARAPOLANOS and the PEREIOS River. This Coy was to contact "D" Coy of the 2/2 Bn which had moved to the same area with a

similar task and to come under cmd. of D Coy 2/2 Bn.

- (b) One Coy (B) on the high ground just North of Bde. H.Q. in square 4552 with a reserve role.
- (c) The remaining Coy (D) less one pl., one of which had become detached on the move through LARISSA, and Bn. H.Q. to take up a reserve position astride the road in squares 4250 and 4350.
- (d) One Platoon. of B Coy was sent forward to report to 2/2 Bn for patrol duties.

The occupation of these positions was completed on the late afternoon of the 17 Apr. 41.

No information of the time for which the position had to be held was available at this stage, the Bde. Cmd. stating that he was awaiting further information and orders but thought it might possibly be a few days.

There was no wire or A/Tk. mines available. Communication to Coys was by runner owing to the lack of line communication.

4. I then kept in close contact with Bde. H.Q. and was informed that there had been some enemy patrol activity along the PEREIOS River during the night 17/18 Apr. 41. During the morning of the 18 Apr. it was apparent that the enemy were making a determined effort to cross the river on the left of 2/2 Bn and on the extreme left flank as far around as the Village of PARA POTAMOS.

I was instructed to keep my reserve Coy. mobile in case it was necessary to assist the two Coys. from 2/2 and 2/3 Bns on the left.

At about midday on 18 Apr. I was present at Bde. H.Q. when a telephone message from 21 H.Z. Bn stated that enemy tanks had broken through the village of KATE and that the Bn was withdrawing into the hills. 2/2 Bn was informed and Bde efforts to contact the H.Z. Bn by line again were fruitless.

5. About mid-afternoon ca. L.O. from 6 Aust. Div. arrived at Bde. H.Q. with information that the probable time of withdrawal of the Bde would be about dusk that day and that further orders would be given by H.Z. Div.

6. A tentative plan had been drawn up by Bde. H.Q. for the withdrawal. Later in the afternoon, after a visit by a H.Z. L.O. and Maj-Gen. Freyberg when the time given for the position to be held was 0300 hrs. on 19 Apr, I was instructed to establish a rearward position astride the road from the high ground, including Trig. 214, square 4351 to Trig. 125 in square 4150.

One Sqn. H.Z. Div. Cav. which had joined the Bde. late in the afternoon to assist the withdrawal was holding the gap between the 2/2 Bn and my reserve position, astride the road and Railway in square 4452.

The rearward position was established to assist the withdrawal of 2/2 Bn who were to move in reserve South astride the road to area Trig. 292, square 4346.

7. Reports had been received that the two Coys on the left flank (HAKARIMORI) were in contact and I was instructed to inform both Coys that they were to withdraw to the rearward position at dusk. This was about 1430 hrs. on the 18 Apr. I contacted the Coy. Comd. myself and told him to pass the instruction on to the Coy of 2/2 Bn.

I was also ordered to send my reserve Coy (D) to the left flank to assist them and cover their left flank in the withdrawal. However, just as the trucks were ready to move the third heavy enemy bombing attack took place and three of the vehicles were set on fire and several casualties occurred. Several L.M.G's and A/Th. Rifles being destroyed.

At about 1750 hrs. or a little later, the two left Coys appeared in the Bde. H.Q. area stating that they had been surrounded and were forced to withdraw. They were sent immediately to the rearward position.

8. Information had been received by Bde. H.Q. that H.Z. Arty. and Carriers were seen withdrawing South down the road and the Bde. Comd. instructed me to stop all movement Southwards and to place all such parties in position on the rearward position. This was done, with some difficulty in a few cases and I twice had to draw my Revolver to force H.Z. Guns into position.

9. At about 1800 hrs. on 18 Apr. Bde. H.Q. shifted from its location and Brig. Allen joined me on the rearward line and

discussed the dispositions with me. The dispositions now were :-

- (a) B Coy 2/3 Bn (McGregor) on Right.
- (b) C Coy 2/3 Bn (Murchison) centre.
- (c) D Coy 2/2 Bn (Hendry) on Left.
- (d) Two or three H.Z. 25 Pdrs. in A/Tk. role.
- (e) Carriers covering the Right and Left flanks.
- (f) H.Q. Coy and D Coy (less two Pls) in reserve.
- (g) H.Z. Cav. Sqn as a protecting screen in front, but which a little later withdrew to the reserve area.

An officer was posted to collect any 2/2 Bn parties and to send them back to the reserve position selected for the 2/2 Bn. As far as I know, none returned through the rearward position.

In the distance tanks could be seen south of EVANGELISTOS area and enemy movement in the MURPHYHORI area.

At this stage about 20 bombers which had been seen to bomb LARISSA, proceeded towards our area and having located the rearward position machine gunned it for 20/30 mins. The troops fought back vigorously but it had given the enemy tanks and infantry opportunity to cover the intervening ground under cover of the fire from the planes and very quickly after we were in contact with the enemy.

10. At about 2100 hrs. the Carriers were seen to pull out from the flanks and move to the rear. The H.Z. Arty also withdrew and later I found that C Coy, 2/3 Bn and D Coy, 2/2 Bn had withdrawn without orders from me, being forced out by tanks which had penetrated the position on the left flank.

From the reports I have received there were at least five enemy tanks penetrated the position. The tanks were closely followed by infantry and prior to the assault we were subjected to what appeared to be heavy mortar fire - the mortars probably being brought up under cover of the air attack.

With an officer from 200. H.Q. I halted them about 1500 yds in rear of the forward position and took up another stand. B. Coy, 2/3 Bn (McGregor) had remained in position and I then ordered him to withdraw to the second rearward position.

There was a considerable amount of M.T. parked in the rearward area including a large number of H.Z. Troop Carrying Vehicles which suddenly appeared to panic and rushed southwards along the road to the Ford in square 4246. Here a H.Z. 25 ndr. was jammed in the Ford halting all the traffic for some considerable time, although some vehicles had already passed through.

When the Ford was eventually cleared the time was approximately 0030 hrs. 19 Apr.

11. After the second position had been established, I received reports that the tanks had followed up and were again amongst the troops in the second rearward position. The Bde. Comd. had previously discussed with me that if the occasion arose a final stand could be made behind the swamp and I therefore ordered a further withdrawal to this position.

However, this was almost impossible as there was a complete jam on the Ford. The force withdrew southwards a short distance remaining north of the Swamp and I received reports that the enemy had M.T. followed them up. Later, when the Ford was cleared, I ordered the force to mount the vehicles and move to ATALANTA as previously instructed. The rear elements of the force cleared the road junction in square 4141 at approx 0400 hrs. on 19 Apr. 41.

I contacted Bde. H.Q. again at the Ford where they were endeavouring to clear the M.T. over the Ford.

Earlier I had instructed A Coy, 2/3 Bn (Capt. Parbury) to withdraw his two Pls in the SYGOURION and AFRIA areas to the road junction in square 4141 and these Pls joined the column as it moved through.

12. In the early hours of the morning of the 19 Apr., Tracer bullets and flames were seen apparently on the road in the direction of LARISSA and later when approaching the road and Railway Crossing in square 3859, this fire could still be seen as I received several reports that the road was held by the enemy and several vehicles had been halted.

I therefore decided it would be better to divert all vehicles possible along the tracks leading east from the road and make the VOLOS Road by that means.

I informed the Bde. Comd. who was further back in the Column and the force moved via these tracks, eventually joining the VOLOS Road about daybreak, although in the meantime, it had split into several parties.

By this time the Convoy was very mixed and I waited at the Road Junction in square 4141 until the last vehicle had passed. This would be approximately 0400 hrs. on 19 Apr.

13. As far as I know the casualties from this action were 1 killed, 18 wounded, 67 missing.

G. Lamb
C.O. 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Goddard Lines.
JULIS CAMP.
4 Jul. 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

RE OPERATIONS OF 2/2 AUST INF BN
PENEIOS GORGE.

In reference to the numbered questions in
6 Aust. Div's No S/1001/G of 18 Jun. 41. I submit herewith
a report on the operations of the Bn.

The answers to the questions are as follows:-

- (1) See para 4 of report.
- (2) See paras 29 and 37. The position occupied by 2/2
Aust. Inf. Bn was held until 1900 hrs 18 Apr.
- (3) See para 39.
- (4) See paras 37 and 38.
- (5) See paras 40 and 38.
- (6) About 1845 hrs. See para 37.
- (7) None. This coy was withdrawn by 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.
See para 27.
- (8) Approx 80 - 100 see para 41.
- (16, 17 and 18) See para 30.

(Sgd) F.O. Chilton Lt.Col.
Comd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

COPY.

4 Jul. 41

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/2 AUST. INF. BN. AT PENIOS GORGE.

1. The following is a brief summary of the events preceding the operations at PENIOS.

(a)

On 11 Apr. 41 two rifle Coys and part of H.Q. Coy commenced the withdrawal from VERRIA pass to take up a position on the right of 4 H.Z. Bde at SERVIA. Bn. H.Q. and the remainder of the Bn withdrew early the following evening and marched over the mountains continuously until approximately 1500 hrs on 13 Apr. The new positions were reached by the rearmost tps about midnight on the night 14/15 Apr. 41

(b)

The next day (15 Apr) was spent in the occupation of the new position, which covered a wide front in very mountainous country. About dusk an L.O. arrived from 16 Bde with orders to move out and assemble in the Southern end of the SERVIA pass, and that our position was to be handed over to 2/3 Bn. The area was left at about 0200 hrs. and the assembly area reached at about 1000 hrs. where an H.T. convoy was waiting to move the tps.

(c)

I immediately reported to the Bde Comd and received from him orders to move to ZARKOS area and there to take up a defensive position. I was informed that the Bn tpt and Carrier Pl. had already been sent to ZARKOS.

(d)

On returning to the embussing area I was met by an L.O. from 6 Div. who informed me that the Bn was under cmd of Corps and then gave orders for the Bn to proceed to PENIOS area. I was instructed to report at once to Corps H.Q.

(e)

As a result of the difficult conditions at VERRIA pass and the subsequent forced marches and lack of sleep, all ranks were very tired at this stage, but otherwise in good spirits.

2. On receipt of the above instructions I went to Corps H.Q. at ELASSON where I saw Brig. ROWELL and the G-2 Col. ELLIOTT. I was informed

- (a) that 21 H.Z. Bn had been occupying a position on the coast near PLATONCH.
- (b) the 21 H.Z. Bn had been attacked by German forces, and that there had been no information back for some hours.
- (c) that the final signals received by wireless from 21 H.Z. Bn (which I was shown) were in the opinion of the S.G.S. of a disquieting nature, and he did not know if any of the Bn would be left.
- (d) that Brig CLOWES had been sent out that day to try to ascertain the position, but had not then returned.

3. Brig. ROWELL informed me that I would have the following troops under cmd :-

One Bty of an H.Z. Fd. Regt.
One H.Z. A/Tk cng.
Composite carrier Pl. from 5 and 11 Bns.
Det. Tn carrying Coy A.A.S.C.
Det. of a Fd. Amb.

A W/T tender was to be attached for intercommunication with Corps.

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4. My orders were to move to the ELATEA area S.W. of the PENIOS Gorge and to take such steps as I thought best to hold that approach for a possible period of three or four days. It was pointed out that it was impossible to give more explicit instructions
5. After seeing DAOIC regarding arm. and med. arrangements, I set off shortly after noon for PENIOS in a car lent by Corps. I met Brig. CLOWES near LARISSA. He told me he had contacted 21 H.Z. Bn. which was withdrawing along the Gorge. He was unable to say what action the H.Z. Comd. proposed taking and suggested that I endeavour to contact Lt-Col. MacKAY and agree on a course of action with him.
6. Meanwhile the convoy had become somewhat disorganised owing to congestion of traffic and bombing attacks. Some AASC vehicles also had difficulty in finding the road out of LARISSA. I left the Adj. on the road to halt and organise troops as they arrived and drove through LARISSA locating and directing to carrying vehicles and carriers of 5 and 11 Bns.
7. I then went ahead to PENIOS area with the Carrier Pl. and located Lt. Col. MacKAY near THEPE Village shortly before dusk. He told me that his Bn. (less one Pl.) was bivouaced in the village, the remaining Pl. being in position covering a road block about 5 miles down the gorge. He stated that his Bn. had been practically surrounded at the PLATON position, but had managed to fight their way clear and had not been pursued. His casualties amounted to 55, and they had lost a lot of equipment including all signal gear. He had under his command a tp of 25 mdr guns, which, however, were short of amm. Lt. Col. MacKAY further stated that his troops were feeling fatigued and the strain of recent fighting. As it was now dark it was agreed that I should meet him early next morning and mutually arrange for the defence of the position.
8. In the meantime the Bn. under Maj. Cohen had bivouaced several miles S.W. of THEPE and when I arrived back I found that the H.Z. Bty. of 25 mdrs and the H.Z. tp of A/Tk. guns had also arrived. I arranged for the comd. to attend the conference with Lt. Col. MacKAY next morning. Later in the night the 2 i/c. arrived with the Bn. tp, which had previously gone to ELATEA.
9. In company with Lt. Col. MacKAY, Lt. Col. Parkinson (Comd. of the H.Z. Fd. Bty., a bty. of which was under my command) and the H.Z. A/Tk. Comd. I made a recon. of the S.W. portion of the Gorge as far as the main road block (517612). Other obstacles which had been prepared comprised :-
 - (a) Railway tunnel near PLATON blocked.
 - (b) Road crater N.E. of the road block above referred to.
 - (c) Railway tunnel at 517615 blocked.
 - (d) Railway bridge at THEPE destroyed (This was also used as a vehicular crossing).

The question of Comd. was raised and Lt. Col. MacKAY suggested that the entire force should be under his Comd. In view of my instructions from Corps, I refused. It was agreed that, as 21 H.Z. Bn. was already in the Gorge, it should be disposed as shown on the attached sketch, whilst 2/2 Bn. should occupy a position in depth at the entrance to the defile, with the additional role of protecting the left flank along PENIOS River, as I considered enemy action from GORIOS area probable. The 4 2-mdr. guns were disposed in derelict positions along the defile in 21 H.Z. Bn's area, except for one gun commanding the southern exit from THEPE.

Artillery tactics included harassing fire on the road block at 517612 should the pl. be unable to maintain its position there. Arrangements were also made for C.P's. to enable observed shooting within 21 H.Z. Bn's position, along PENIOS River and in front of "C" Coy., 2/2 Bn. The tp of 25 mdrs with 21 H.Z. Bn. was attached to the Bty. under my command.

In addition I agreed to patrol forward down the Gorge and to endeavour to ascertain whether or not the crossing place at the N.E. exit had been seized by the enemy. I also arranged to picket the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS and to patrol North of the River as soon as a means of crossing the river could be found.

I also arranged to run a line from my H.Q. to 21 N.Z. Bn. H.Q. also to lend that Bn. certain wire and signal gear.

10. After leaving Lt.Col. MacKay, I met my own Coy. Comds. and made a brief recce. with them. Except for "D" Coy., the dispositions then decided on are as shown on the attached sketch. In the meantime, the Bn. had been moved forward under Maj. Cohen and had taken up temporary positions. During the morning 3 Aust. A/Tk. 2 pdr. guns arrived and it was decided to disperse them in 2/2 Bn. area. Lt.Col. Parkinson supervised detailed dispositions of these guns.
11. At about 1500 hrs. on 17 Apr. Brig. Allen, Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde., arrived at my H.Q. and told me he had been appointed to Comd. the force at PAMEIOS and that 2/3 Bn. was on its way to the area.

I briefly outlined the situation, explained the dispositions and took Brig. Allen forward to meet Lt.Col. MacKay. The latter pointed out the dispositions of his tps.

Brig. Allen approved of 2/2 Bn dispositions subject to moving "D" Coy further to the left, to the position now shown on the sketch now attached. He also emphasised the importance of the high ground to the East of EVANGELISMOS. Brig. Allen also outlined the proposed dispositions of 2/3 Bn. and said he would attach a Pl of 2/3 Bn. to me to help hold the gap along the river between my main position and "D" Coy.

12. Shortly after I had left Brig. Allen, about 1530-1600 hrs. Capt. King ("B" Coy.) reported that No. 11 Pl., which had been sent forward to patrol the lower portion of the Gorge (vide para 9) had made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of the road block, and that an enemy tank was at the obstacle. I telephoned this information to Bde. also to Lt. Col. MacKay and asked the latter to assist especially by the tps. he had placed on the right flank.
13. During the afternoon several reports were received from Coys. of movement of small bodies of men with animals on the high ground overlooking UCLISMOS.

Verney signals were also fired on these hills on several occasions as enemy recce. planes flew overhead. 21 N.Z. Bn. also reported that their tps. in APPELANIA area had been fired on from the high ground on the East. "A" Coy. had already been ordered to send one Pl. to picket the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS, "B" Coy. was later warned that it might be required also to send a Pl. to the same area. At that time "D" Coy. had one Pl. in action at the road block, and another Pl. reconnoitring the river by means of crossing.

14. Late in the afternoon of 17 Apr. Brig. Allen and Lt. Col. Parkinson visited my H.Q., Lt.Col. MacKay was also present. It was decided to move certain of the Aust. A/Tk. guns to positions further forward, and also to bring forward two 25 pdrs. in an A/Tk. role. An officer of 2/1 Pd. Coy having arrived, it was also decided to "crater" the road just forward of THEPE Village, where it could be adequately covered by fire.
15. Between 2100 hrs. and 2200 hrs. I received reports from the Comd. and Pl. Spt. of the patrol which had encountered the enemy at the road block. The forward elements of the Pl. had been pinned to the road in the floor of the Gorge by fire from a tank which had been brought along the Ry. line as far as the blocked tunnel. The remainder of the Pl. managed to get into positions on the southern slope of the Gorge. The enemy were engaged until dark when the patrol succeeded in getting away losing 5 killed and some wounded. The Pl.

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- of 21 H.Z. Bn had withdrawn from its position covering the road block when first fired on and no assistance was given by 21 H.Z. Bn., though defence of the block had been one of its tasks.
16. As stated above the H.Z. force had destroyed the railway and vehicular bridge at TEMPE. Eventually a small punt was discovered on "D" Coys front and a fighting patrol under the Comd. of Lieut. Colquhoun and was sent across the river during the late afternoon to ascertain whether or not GOIHOS was occupied and generally whether enemy tps were present in the lower foothills across the river between GOIHOS and TEMPE. The Comd. reported to me by telephone on his return about 0200 hrs. 18 Apr. He found enemy tps in GOIHOS. Contact was made with several German patrols later. He also saw small bodies of tps. with pack tpt. moving towards ELEA. Certain uniform and equipment were taken for purposes of identification. A detachment of 5 men were left to guard the punt. These were attacked by a superior force but fought it off.
17. "C" and "A" Coys. were instructed to patrol our bank of the river continuously during the night and fire was exchanged with several small German parties on the opposite bank. It was then thought that these parties were attempting to cross or reconnoitring for crossing places.
18. Early in the morning 18 Apr. (about 0700 hrs.) German tps were reported to be advancing S.E. towards the river from the direction of GOIHOS.
- An hour or so later it was reported that a force estimated at one Bn. was moving S.E. from GOIHOS towards the river between TEMPE and "D" Coy's position.
- At the same time another force which Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy) estimated also as a Bn. was reported moving in a Westerly direction from GOIHOS.
- The general lines of attack are shown on the attached sketch map.
19. Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy) reported that the above enemy movements presented good arty. targets. Lt.Col. Parkinson (whose H.Q. were alongside mine) told me his O.P.'s on "D" Coy's feature had not yet been established. He immediately sent across a wireless truck and F.O.O. and in the meantime Capt. Hendry directed the battery's fire by telephone, with considerable effect, but unfortunately the best targets had been lost by the delay.
20. On receiving Capt. Hendry's report that enemy tps were making for the river on his left, and out of range of his weapons, I sent 2/2 Bn. Carrier Pl. to intercept the attempted crossing and placed it under comd of "D" Coy. The Pl. succeeded in stopping the enemy. The Pl. Comd., Lieut. Love, was seriously wounded during this engagement and the Pl. had several other fatal casualties. It was found later however that enemy tps. had crossed the river and outflanked our position further still to the left.
21. During the morning "C" Coy. and the composite carrier Pl. (5 and 11 Bns), and Mortar Pl. succeeded in preventing any enemy crossing the river at the centre and the main enemy pressure seemed to be on the left of "D" Coy's position. A fighting patrol was sent out by "D" Coy. to find out if the village of PARAPORTIOS was occupied. It returned shortly after midday and reported a sharp engagement with the enemy in and near the village.
22. I was concerned about the threat to my left flank especially as "D" Coy. Comd. had been unable to contact the Coy. of 2/3 Bn. to his rear. I discussed the situation with the Sde. Comd. and he arranged to ascertain the location of this Coy. and see that they were told the situation.

23. During the morning I had several telephone conversations with Lt.Col. Mackay. He agreed to his carrier Pl. being used to help fill the gap between my main position and "D" Coy., and asked me to take the Pl under my cmd. as he had no means of communication. This I did. Lt.Col. Mackay told me that the village (TEPE) was being shelled by mortars and that he was engaging enemy on the opposite bank of the river. During all our conversations he never indicated that his position was at all serious or that he intended to withdraw.
24. Telephone communication with 21 A.Z. Bn. ceased about midday. No notification that they were closing down was given us. I was told shortly afterwards that this Bn had withdrawn. About the same time I received a report from "G" Coy that A.Z. troops had reported that tanks were in TEPE. I instructed "G" Coy. to warn the A.Z. A/Tk. gun which was sighted in their area to cover the exit from the village. Shortly after this "G" Coy reported that the crew had gone, and had removed the breech block.
25. From now on many A.Z. troops commenced withdrawing in unformed bodies through our position, though most of the Bn apparently moved up into the hills to the East. Efforts were made by Lt.Col. Parkinson, Major Cohen and others to stop and collect these men, but most of them had no weapons or equipment. However, one complete Pl under Lieut. Southworth reported to me and was given a task supporting the centre of the position which it carried out in a very creditable manner during the remainder of the day.
26. From about 1500 hrs. enemy pressure along the river in the centre of the Bn position increased and troops succeeded in crossing the river near the bend West of EWANGELISIOS. They were held by L.A. and 3" mortar fire on the rear bank and very heavy casualties were inflicted on them. During this period the forward Coys came under fairly heavy A.M.G. and mortar fire. A dive bombing attack was also carried out, apparently on target in rear of our position.
27. Towards 1600 hrs. Capt. Hendry (D.Coy) reported that enemy infiltration on his left flank had become serious. It was agreed that he should withdraw his Pl from the river bank and counter-attack with it in conjunction with 2/2 Bn Carrier Pl. Shortly afterwards the line to "D" Coy went and I was told by my sig. Officer that the position of the enemy now made it impossible for a line party to effect repairs. Some time later (between 1630 and 1700 hrs) firing ceased on "D" Coy's position, and I heard no further fire from them.
I had assumed, until my return from GREECE, that this Coy had been surrounded and unable to continue the fight. I now know however, that Capt. Hendry received orders from Sdc. H.Q. through 2/3 Bn to withdraw along the ridge in co-operation with the Coy of 2/3 Bn on the same feature. Attached is copy of message received by Capt Hendry.
28. Between 1600 and 1630 hrs, Maj. General Freyberg spoke to me from Sdc. H.Q. He wished to know the situation generally and the whereabouts of 21 A.Z. Bn., and whether he could get a message to the latter. I told him that this was impossible. This was the last communication I had with Sdc during the battle; the line being apparently cut. I understand a line party went back from my Sig. Centre.
29. Until the line to Sdc. H.Q. went, I had been in the closest touch throughout the battle with the Brig. or S.M. During the afternoon I was informed that the Sdc. Group was to withdraw at 0300 hrs. 19 Apr. but that it was hoped to get this time put forward. The S.M. also gave me an outline plan of how the withdrawal would probably be effected.

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30. As far as I can remember, I received no directions from Brig Allen as to the status of the N.Z. Bty. which had been placed under my comd by Corps. In fact, Lt. Col. Parkinson maintained his H.Q. alongside mine, and I should like to say that I have nothing but praise for his conduct and co-operation. However, the arty. support in fact given was very disappointing. The following is a summary of arty action :-
- (a) Harrassing fire on the forward road block during night 17/18 Apr after the patrol from "B" Coy. had withdrawn. This was a map shoot and its effect is not known.
 - (b) Fire on enemy tps. moving out of GONNOS on morning of 18 Apr. (See para. 19). This was not as effective as it should have been, because O.P's. had not yet been established in "D" Coy's area; I am unaware of the reason. By the time controlled fire became possible, the enemy adopted more dispersed formations and did not present such favourable targets.
 - (c) Fire intended to cover the rearmost road block just forward of TEMPE. This fire in fact fell in "C" Coy's area, and was stopped by Lt.Col. Parkinson. It was not resumed.
 - (d) During the early afternoon Capt Hendry ("D" Coy.) informed me that the F.O.O.s were about to leave his area. I believe there were two O.P's. Lt. Col Parkinson was with me at the time and he ordered them specifically to remain. However, Capt. Hendry reported shortly afterwards that they had gone.
 - (e) During the early part of the afternoon it was reported that some of the guns had moved out. This was not in accordance with Lt.Col. Parkinson's. When the attack across the river developed in the afternoon effective arty. fire could not be developed for this reason and because of the absence of O.P's. However, Lt.Col. Parkinson sent for a wireless truck and an O.P. was established close to Bn. H.Q. Both Maj. Cohen and I pointed out the task we wished carried out, but the fire of the remaining guns could not be got on to the target and finally ceased altogether. Lt. Col. Parkinson appeared very distressed at this stage and told me he had sent back a senior officer "to give the gunners 10 minutes drill to pull them together."
31. At this stage "B" Coy and Bn.H.Q. area were under constant fire from H.M.G's. on the feature previously occupied by "D" Coy. and from across the river. These areas also came under Mortar fire. Enemy were observed mounting what was thought to be a mountain gun on hill which had been occupied by "D" Coy.
32. About 1700 hrs. "C" Coy. reported that some tanks had entered its locality; also that enemy snipers and men armed with "Tommy Guns" had worked around on the high ground on the right front south of the river previously held by 21 N.Z. Bn., and were causing difficulty as the Coy. was now under fire on three sides. I had previously ordered the withdrawal back to their respective Coys. of the Pls. from "A" and "B" Coys. covering the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS as their reports indicated no enemy in that area. I gave instructions for Lieut Loftus ("A" Coy) to be intercepted on his way back and for him to endeavour to relieve this pressure above "C" Coy. Lieut Loftus is missing and I do not know if he received these instructions.
33. At about this time (1700)hrs) the line to "C" and "A" Coy went. Linesmen attempted to restore the line but had not succeeded by the time these forward Coys. had withdrawn.

34. Initially the tanks in "C" Coy. area engaged our posts with H.G. and 2 pdr. fire for approximately half an hour, but with very little effect. The infantry fired on the tanks with S.A. fire and A/Tk. rifles but without apparent effect. The absence of Molotov cocktails or bombs of the S.T. type was felt. After half an hour infantry advanced with the support of the tanks and H.M.G's. and mortars across the river. Certain of the tanks, followed by infantry, swung right between the road and the river. The position was then that "C" Coy. was being attacked from the front and both flanks. They had already been forced to abandon prepared localities in the case of two Pls. and take up new positions by reason of the withdrawal of 21 H.Z. Bn.

Capt. Buckley was unable to communicate with me and decided shortly after 1730 hrs. to withdraw his Coy easterly on to the high ground. The withdrawal appears to have been well organised and carried out. In the light of all facts now known to me Capt. Buckley's decision was justified. Casualties in his Coy. included two Pl. Comds. Lieuts. Lovett and Holroyd, neither of whom could be evacuated. Capt. Buckley sent a runner to inform me of his withdrawal but owing to the distance and the route he had to follow the message did not arrive until approximately 1830 hrs.

35. From about 1500 hrs. onwards, the two Pls. of "A" Coy. were in action against German tps. who had succeeded in crossing the river. The action of these Pls. in co-operation with 3" mortars and fire from carrier pls. held the enemy close to the river.

At about 1730 hrs. this Coy also came under rifle fire from the higher ground to its right rear.

At approximately 1755 hrs. two tanks came in along the road from the right flank. One was knocked out by a 2 pdr. gun, the other was hit and withdrew. A few minutes later a tank attack, closely followed by infantry developed between the road and the river. There were about 10 tanks engaged. The Coy. locality was also under heavy fire from H.M.G's and mortars across the river.

As previously stated, line communication with Bn. H.Q. had gone. Capt. Caldwell states that he was forced to withdraw his Pls. to the high ground East and, in the circumstances, I consider his action justified. He sent a runner to advise me of his action. One of the two Pl. comds was seriously wounded.

36. Tanks had now fanned out on the flat ground West of EVANGELISIOS and engaged carriers and their personnel forcing them to retire along the LARISSA Road. I was informed that several carriers were knocked out. Some tanks approached EVANGELISIOS along the road and were engaged by a 25 pdr. gun sited near the road opposite Bn. H.Q. At least one tank was knocked out by this gun which continued firing until its ammunition limber was destroyed by a tank shell. The crew then withdrew through Bn. H.Q. carrying the breach block with them. This left only one 2 pdr. gun sited in a defiladed position about 75 yds. from Bn. H.Q. At about 1830 hrs. or perhaps several minutes later, runners arrived almost simultaneously from "C" and "A" Coys. reporting their withdrawal.

37. Shortly afterwards I looked back at the abovementioned 2 pdr. gun and found it had gone. No orders for its withdrawal were given and it had not been in action. A few minutes previously I had told the Comd. I expected him to stay and he left me to join his detachment. I cannot remember this officer's name.

The position now was that "C", "A" and "D" Coys' localities had gone, and there were no remaining A/Tk. defences. A number of tanks were approaching with infantry from the North and across the flat on the N.W. Enemy tps. could also be seen to the left rear on the foothills S.W. across the flat. My remaining tps comprised "B" Coy. and certain H.Q. Coy personnel organised for defence in Bn. H.Q. area.

I discussed the situation with O.C. "B" Coy. I was of the opinion that although this Coy. would probably continue the fight against enemy infantry for a short time, it would shortly be entirely surrounded by infantry as well as tanks. Furthermore, it would not prevent or delay enemy infantry passing rearwards via the flat ~~ea~~ to the West. I therefore ordered Capt. King and other personnel at rear of Bn. H.Q. to withdraw at approx. 1645 hrs.

My orders to "B" Coy were to withdraw into the hills to the East, the reasons being that the flat area to the West and South was already covered by H.M.C. fire, and tanks which were already in "B" Coy area and moving across the flat, would inevitably destroy any ~~tps~~ attempting to withdraw along the road.

The withdrawal of "B" Coy. was carried out in an orderly fashion, covered by a rear party under Capt. Brock.

38. Bn. H.Q. was finally evacuated about 5-10 minutes after "B" Coy. had been ordered to withdraw. At this stage two tanks had penetrated around and behind Bn. H.Q. in a S.W. direction and inflicted a number of casualties at very close range.
39. Bde. H.Q. were not notified of the withdrawal of the forward Coys. I only became aware of their withdrawal several minutes before ordering the withdrawal of "B" Coy. and Bn. H.Q. The only means of communication left was by runner and I do not think a runner would have had much chance of getting to Bde. H.Q. I am now aware that a L.O. from Bde. H.Q. attempted to get to my H.Q. about this time in a Bren Carrier but was forced to turn back.
40. The type of tank operating against us appeared to be of the Allie or A 1V type, carrying H.M. and cannon. Capt. Buckley of "C" Coy. reports that 6 of these tanks were in his Coy locality for about half an hour preceding the main attack. When the attack developed he stated there were more tanks but cannot state the number. Capt. Caldwell of "A" Coy. states that 10 tanks attacked his position. He later counted between 20 and 30 tanks.

Estimates of up to 50 tanks in the later stage have been made. Capt. Caldwell was in a position to see and his figures can be regarded as a reliable minimum.

41. It is difficult to estimate the total casualties during the action. During the later stages it became impossible to evacuate from forward ~~tps~~. Four officers were wounded. Two were very seriously wounded, another was unable to move and was captured. A fifth officer is missing and is considered to have been killed. Lieut. McPherson of 2/3 Bn. (who was attached) was also badly wounded.

Until the main attack developed at about 1500 hrs. on 18 Apr. casualties are estimated at approximately 10 killed and 30 wounded. After that hour it became impossible to evacuate casualties from forward positions. It is impossible to state casualties during this later stage with any accuracy, but total casualties during the action are estimated at about 80 and 100. ✓

42. In my opinion the following points are worthy of comment :-
 - (a) The necessity for R/T communication within the Bn. as an alternative means.
 - (b) The great value of the 5" Mortar and the desirability of a greatly increased establishment.
 - (c) The value of the Bren Carrier pl. as a mobile reserve in this type of action.

The plan of withdrawal for the Bn during night 18/19 Apr. depended upon the retirement to the M.F. Coy which, during the day, had been dispersed in rear of 2/5 Bn. As already pointed out, any retirement in this direction became impossible.

Owing to the rugged nature of the country, any control of Coys. or intercommunication, became impossible after the withdrawal Eastwards commenced. Each Coy. cmd. independently came to the conclusion that the only course open was to attempt to get to the coast, and either then make along the coast with a view to rejoining the British forces at LAMIA or secure boats.

(Sgd) F.O. Chilton Lt.Col.
Cmd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

4 July. 41.

78
COPY OF MESSAGE SENT TO C COY 2/3 BN
(PASSED ON TO O.C. D. COY 2/2 BN)

W 2

To HAZA C
from HAZA

HAZA B is now withdrawing (.) you will withdraw
forthwith but will coordinate your withdrawal
with coy of 3 bn nearest to you (.) use own tpt
move with 2 bn (.) regret no other instructions

(sgd) E.S. Walker Lieut

1545

44301

544/IS/95.

79

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

GS1/541

5/31/79/6

Headquarters
1 Aust Corps
19 Aug 41.

6 Aust Div -
7 Aust Div

21 Aug 41

Report of Prisoner of War

Enclosed is a copy of a report by WOII T.A.M. BOULTER who recently escaped from a PW Camp in GREECE.

2. WOII BOULTER is a member of the Corps Cipher Section and prior to his capture was att to HQ 17 Aust Inf Ede.

3. The report is divided into two sections, Personal Narrative and Military Observations.

4. This report may be circulated down to Ede HQ.

G1 A1

G11 A1

gac 17 Aug 41

Francis L. G. G.
Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

80

PERSONAL NARRATIVE.

Prisoner 29 April.

Upon the surrender by Brigadier PARRINGTON, who comd the latter stages of the evacuation at KALAKATA, I was taken prisoner on 29 Apr 41.

PRISON CAMP

The following day we were taken by train to the prison camp at CORINTHOS. The men were divided into gps of 100 with a WO in charge of each group. I was in charge of an Australian gp. The offrs were also in the same camp grounds, but in a separate building. There were approx 10,000 British prisoners all ranks, of which approx 350 were offrs. In addition, 1000 Serbians and between 4000 and 5000 Italians were also detained in the same area. The Italians were former Greek prisoners who had been released upon the German entry into CORINTHOS. As there has been no organization for their evacuation, they had commenced looting and were then rounded up by the Germans and placed in our compound. The area of the compound would be about 15 acres. Sanitary conditions were extremely bad; the food, consisting of either rice, macaroni or lentles and a hard biscuit, was sufficient for one meal per day and was enough to keep a fit man going; but it was hardly the diet to assist a man out of condition to recover. Dysentery became prevalent, and a number of men died. General treatment of the prisoners varied a great deal with the guards on duty - these were changed every 5 - 6 days. The parachute troops and Austrians, generally speaking, treated our men quite well, while the Young Nazi guards were extremely cruel. These people took an unwholesome delight at firing their tommy guns into a crowd without provocation. Men suffering from diarrhoea and dysentery while attempting at night to reach the slit trenches, which served as latrines, were frequently fired upon. These guards made themselves unpleasant generally. On several occasions there were disturbances between the Italians and our men, and on one occasion the guards, apparently being no respecter of their noble ally, fired upon a group of Italians. Subsequently, the Italians, who were a very ragged and motley group were refitted and trained as occupation tps.

Few compulsory working parties were required by the Germans, but a number of voluntary working parties performed all nature of work, including actual war work, such as unloading bombs. The offrs and 90% of the men had no work to perform, except for occasional fatigues.

Through the good work of a Salvation Army Chaplain and a YMCA representative, assisted by a number of offrs and men, conditions in the camp were more pleasant by the arranging of concerts 3 or 4 evenings a week.

The prison was an extremely fertile place for rumors, which could generally be traced back to Palestinians. On 5 or 6 occasions RUSSIA entered the war, while AMERICA entered into active participation 3 or 4 times. Another report, which kept the boys on tip-toe for a fortnight, was to the effect that discussions as to the exchange of prisoners were taking place.

CORINTH aerodrome being one of the main air bases for the attack on CRETE, we saw the German planes take off and return, and we were able to get some picture of the attack by the number of planes missing. Many planes returned bullet riddled, and several with wings partly destroyed. On one occasion some of our men were sent as a working party to the aerodrome to bury dead German parachutists. I was informed that 15 bodies were taken from one Junkers.

MOVE TO GERMANY

On 5 Jun the Germans commenced the move of all prisoners to GERMANY. The move was to have taken place earlier, but had been postponed. Two train loads, each of 800, were moved daily from the prison camp, the officers being moved first. My group and most other Australian groups left CORINTH on 6 Jun.

Owing to destroyed communications (see later) it was necessary to march between CORINTH AND KALAMAKI (at NE end of Canal) 8 miles, and between GRAVIA and LAMIA 22 miles. Arrangements were for short breaks at LARISSA and SALONIKA. While in TURKEY I learned from an English Cpl who escaped near the Bulgarian border and made his way across the DARDENELLES, that this programme was carried out, some 5 days being spent at SALONIKA. On the marches, each train load was divided into smaller

After shuffling in the group to a suitable position I escaped at about 0800 hrs on 7 Jun by jumping into some low scrub on the side of the road. As I could not obtain any cover under which to complete my getaway, and with continuous German convoys moving north, I was obliged to remain in my position until darkness. At one stage I thought my numbers were up when a German officer stopped his car directly opposite me. Fortune, however, favoured me.

In the evening I went down to the river crossing the flat, in order to bathe, and after a few minutes a Greek approached. It was obvious to him that I was a soldier, and I made him understand that I desired to change into civilian clothes. I destroyed my jacket.

After a meal I was able to establish civilian status of a lowly order. The next day I assisted in the harvesting, wielding a sickle for some time until I discovered that the female peasants were somewhat stronger than I, at least in the back. That day I tasted meat for the first time since my capture, but it proved too much for me, and for a short time I was rather violently ill. "Bully Beef" had for some time been at a premium, although I had managed to save one tin and my emergency rations by means of burying them at CORINTH in preparation for an eventual escape. In the evening I met an "American", the term in peasant GREECE being universally applied to Greeks who had spent some time in AMERICA and could speak some English as a rule, being particularly fluent in such phrases as "son of a bitch" etc. He persuaded me to move to a "mansion" house further over on the flat. The mansion proved to be a large dilapidated 2 storey building (the ground floor being used for animals and store-house) owned by a Greek in LAMIA. The upper storey comprised two small rooms and a huge hall of approx 100' by 60'. In this hall slept some 50 people of all shapes and sizes and both sex. The property proved to be quite a large one, its main crops being cereals and cotton. During my stay of 3 or 4 days here I again went out in the fields and assisted in the harvesting. Their working hrs were from 0430 hrs till 2000 hrs, and although the methods employed were very primitive, a considerable amount of ground was covered by the end of the day. These people looked after me quite well, and the owner gave me somewhat better wearing clothes than I at first obtained. The place was visited on two occasions by Germans (I believe only in connection with the harvest) and I was obliged to make hurried exits so decided to go into the mountains. I had been informed that there was a village on the slopes of Mount ITI which would afford protection as there was only one narrow and precipitous approach. Although the track was even steeper than I imagined I eventually reached the village which was called PAVLINI. While quite isolated it had a population of over 500, and was completely self contained, growing all its own food, its tobacco, spinning and weaving its own wool.

These people at present are infinitely better off than the people in towns, and while the Germans have claimed 60% of their harvest, much produce is being hidden.

While in PAVLINI, 4 other men who had escaped were brought in from various directions. There were 2 Australian ASC drivers, an English Pilot officer and a young Pole, one of the two Polishmen assisting in the Campaign. The airman who had recently been promoted from Sgt Pilot was a most interesting personality. After the evacuation from Greece he was flying a Blenheim over Kalamata area searching for Italian warships when he was attacked by 7 Messerschmitts. He brought down 5, but certain of his fuel pipes were damaged and he was obliged to make a forced landing in the sea near an island occupied by Germans and was taken prisoner. One of the calmest men I have ever met, like Sullivan who flew the Atlantic by 'accident', he even escaped by 'accident'.

After being very well treated by the villagers for 4 or 5 days, we decided to try to make our way out of the country. Our plan was to reach EUBOIA, work down that island to the SOUTH, then across a string of islands, ANDROS, TINOS, MYKONOS, IKARIA and SAMOS to TURKEY. Leaving PAVLINI we crossed the railway line and decided to cross the main road at quarter hourly intervals. As I was endeavouring to find a suitable place to clamber up the mountain on the other side, I ran into a German convoy, so decided to make bold face and walked along the road. There were some 600-700 in the convoy but fortune was again my way and they did not pick me.

All, except the young Pole, arrived at the pre-arranged meeting place. We then passed through various small villages in the KALIDROMON Range, in the meantime picking up our lost Polish friend, and worked in the direction of ZELION. We were somewhat fortunate in this area as

Two other men who had escaped were re-captured in a village just six hrs before we arrived. However, we always made careful inquiries ahead. During one night taking the wrong turn we arrived in the village of AGNATHI. This proved to our advantage as we managed to contact a fisherman who was going across to the island the following night. In the evening we went down to the coast and waited close to the road while the fisherman went into the town of AGIOS KONSTANTINOS, about half mile away, to obtain his boat. We were to cross the road upon a pre-arranged signal. A few minutes later however, a convoy of mule and other animal drawn wagons driven by Germans moved along the coast road taking over 3 hrs to pass us. At the end of the convoy a car chose a point on the road immediately opposite us to break down. Shortly afterwards the fisherman crept around us to us, and with him we crept some half mile to the boat. We reached the island of EUBOEIA at 10.00 AM - ADIPSOS shortly after daybreak. A few Italians were in the town, but we were not challenged and reached a wadi close to the town where we remained for the day. In the evening (22 Jun) we met a Greek who told us where we could hear a radio. We listened to the BBC, and the main news item was the declaration of war by Germany on Russia. Later in the evening a number of Greeks offered to assist us in any way possible, and the next morning we moved into a safer place about two miles from the town. We were given information regarding the location of German and Italian troops in the neighbourhood, and were strongly advised not to attempt to go further until these troops moved.

We received plenty of food and were kept informed of current news, so remained in the locality for 14 days.

As the other four were unwilling to go further and two at least decided to remain in hiding for the 'duration' I decided to strike out again. The mountains were my first objective, and making inquiries ahead at each village I reached, I met people who gave me information and food. By this time I was able to speak quite a little Greek and I also found French quite useful in conversing with a young doctor and a school teacher who assisted me. Some of this country was particularly difficult being very steep with oak and pine forests and dense undergrowth in many parts. At the village of KENELUSE in one very difficult part, some of the residents paid a man to guide me through to the next town - a journey of two days.

I still had some money of my own, but found that more help seemed to be forthcoming when you said you were penniless. A little appeal to the sympathy, as for example, I stated that I was a married man with three children at home, also seemed to assist. With the guide we manoeuvred the mountains successfully on the first day, and 'burned in' about 10 pm. I innocently gave him my bag as a pillow. About 4 am the following day I was ready to move on and looked for my guide; alas he had disappeared, and so had my bag, my watch and some of my money. These latter had been in my pockets which he must have gone through quite thoroughly. I quickly realized the possibility of recovering my chattels was nil, and moved off in the approximate direction of the next village. Although losing myself several times, with the assistance of several axemen at different points, I finally reached the village (KARAVA), which is the site of one of the works of the ANGLICAN GREEK Magnesite Coy. After finding my path would pass through large German troop concentrations, I was obliged to zig zag in the mountains across the island until I reached the town of PILI on the east coast, just north of KANTOUTHI. I had been told that I might receive some assistance at PILI, but on arrival discovered that there were Germans in the town and the people were rather afraid. At this stage I altered my original plan endeavouring to get across to the island of SKYROS and from there to PSARA, keeping my first plan as an alternative.

With this in mind I worked down to the east coast, having no luck as far as the sea journey was concerned, until at last I reached a monastery near KYMI. The conditions in the monastery and the food were the best I had enjoyed since my escape - I actually had a bed to sleep in.

The Bishop of KYMI who is very interested in the British cause came out to see me and I had a most interesting conversation with him in French. He put me in touch with some fishermen who ultimately agreed to take me across to SKYROS in their rowing boat. We reached SKYROS after fishing for a night at SKYROPOULA. Their method of fishing is a rather unhappy one, namely, throwing a grenade into the water. I walked across the island to the town of SKYROS, where I met a man who had taken a party of our men across to TURKEY in the evacuation stages, and had received payment from the British Consul at SKYRNA. He agreed to take me across to TURKEY, and told me that it was safe to go through the Customs house, and that the Turkish were not interning our men. After 3 days in a small boat in a heavy sea we reached SKYRNA on 25 Jul remaining one night at PSARA. Spending 4 days more in the hands of the Turkish authorities, through the agency of British representative

I was released and spent another 4 days at SKYRNA. Under escort of Turkish military authorities I was taken first to ADANA where we spent one day, and on to ISKENDERUM (ALEXANDRETTA). Here I was handed back to the British authorities, and returned to HAIFA on a Greek tramp steamer.

My reports on subject of military interest coming to my notice, is appended hereto.

Report of WO II T.A.M. BOULTER on Observations while Prisoner of War and subsequently upon Escape

1. Conditions in Prison Camp.

See narrative.

2. German Tpt

From personal observation and from what I have been told by mechanics who went out on working parties, the German tpt was in a bad condition mechanically.

A feature of their tpt was the large number of vehicles with caterpillar tracks. Valuable attachments (for which places were allotted on the sides of the trucks) were carried to guard against bogging, for example, a spade, pick and a roll of wood which could be laid down as a mat. The number of well furnished mobile kitchens was another feature.

3. Use of Our Tpt

The Germans sought all available tpt including "destroyed" vehicles. From the latter good parts were taken and placed in other "destroyed" vehicles making a complete truck. From enquiries made of drivers in a prison camp, they did not appear to be aware of any instruction as to a uniform manner of destruction of the vehicles. Such an instruction, if carried out, would render much more difficult the task of the enemy in that respect, particularly as in Southern GREECE the Germans did not carry any Field Wkshops. A simple method - that of "seizing the engine, involving a rebore before the truck could again be used would be practicable.

4. Comms in GREECE

I was informed, but could not obtain definite confirmation of the fact, that the pontoon bridge erected by the Germans over the Corinth Canal near the town, was destroyed prior to Jun 5 by Greek sabotage.

On 7 Jun, on the march between GRAVIA and LANIA I noticed the two large railway bridges destroyed in the area. In addition a train was blown up in the tunnel at the north end of the pass. I recrossed this area on 16 Jun, and still no apparent attempt to repair the bridged or tunnels, had been made.

5. Aerodromes

About 6 Jun there were a large number of German planes on the ground at TATOI. They were all types - many troop carriers, a considerable number of ordinary bombers and some fighters.

CORINTH aerodrome was still being freely used by a considerable number of planes when we left the area.

6. DISPOSITIONS of GERMAN TROOPS

Shortly before we left CORINTH, I was informed by a German that practically all their troops had been moved out of Southern GREECE. From the number of convoys passing the prison camp this would appear to have been so. Around MEGARA area the German troops were obviously moving out.

In about the middle of Jun 700 Italians moved into LANIA. There were large concentrations of Germans at MOLOS and AGIOS KONSTANTINOS at this period, but most of these moved northwards shortly afterwards, leaving only nominal garrisons.

On the night of 21 Jun, (while waiting to cross from AGIOS KONSTANTINOS to LOUTRA) a convoy of mule and other animal driven tpt, lasting about three hrs. driven by Germans, moved Shuth along the coast road.

At the end of Jun the Germans commenced to use the hospitals at LOUTRA for their wounded from CRETE. There were about 60 fit men stationed in the town.

At this period there were a number of German troops at SIROHORY (NE EUBOEIA)

In the first half of July 700-800 Italians moved into LIMNI. I was informed that there was also a substantial number of Germans at AGIA AKA.

MANTOUTH: from a number of sources I was informed that there were approximately 12,000 German troops in the area.

At ACHMET AGA at mid Jul there was a large force of Germans with a considerable number of anti-aircraft guns set up in carefully concealed positions among the trees, to afford AA protection to both MANTOUTH and probably LENI areas. I noticed a number of 1 Tk guns in the area also. The camp at ACHMET AGA was also being used as a centre from which to send out men to smaller villages, such as FILI (whereon 18 Jul, 4 men were stationed).

During the third week in Jul I passed close to STENI (middle of the island) and was informed that there were a large number of Germans encamped. Patrols were being sent out from here to villages (inland and east coast) searching for arms. There were a few Germans in the villages of LAMARIA, STROPILUS and CHERIUS.

KYMI: on about 17 Jul between 2000-3000 moved out of the area leaving only a nominal garrison of 6 men. I was told by a number of Greeks that the main body moved to KHALKIS which according to what I have been told would appear to be a large staging camp.

SKYROS: and PSARA: during the third and fourth weeks in Jul there were no Germans or Italians stationed on these islands.

7. German Internal Situation - Austrians and Germans

Shortly before the outbreak of the Russo-German War, a fight, fire-arms being used, took place at MANTOUTH between some hundreds of Austrians and Germans. A number of men were wounded and some killed.

In a discussion with the Bishop of Kymi, he informed me that a number of Austrians had admitted to him that they were completely suppressed by the Germans and were actually in a worse position than the Greeks.

8. Destroyers

On 18 Jul about 1800 hrs three French destroyers sailed South passed KYMI. I observed these from the roof of the Monastery, and with the aid of field glasses noted their numbers, X31, X32, X53, painted in red. At least one vessel had four funnels.

9. Gas

None of the German troops which I saw in GREECE carried respirators

10. German Forms of Prison Camps

On all German forms which group leaders were obliged to furnish, was a column for the unit to which the prisoner belonged. Australian group leaders simply supplied "AIF".

11. Food etc in GREECE

The Germans have taken 60% of the wheat crop. Where troops are stationed they take all available eggs and supplies of meat.

The whole of the petrol and leather in the country has been taken to GERMANY. In ATHENS all gold rings, except wedding rings, have been taken from the women. A number of church bells have also been sent to GERMANY.

12. German Casualties in GREECE

A German warrant officer at the prison camp informed me that their casualties in GREECE were light, amounting "only" 180,000. I was unable to ascertain the source of his information, which seems absurd to me.

/JWB

85

GSI/81

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

4 Jul 41.

HQ AIF (ME)

INTELLIGENCE - GREECE

The attached statement was obtained from an NCO and 2 ORs of 2/4 Aust Inf Bn who returned from Greece via Turkey, arriving Haifa 30 Jun 41.

As some of the observation made may be of value for intelligence purposes, 5 copies are forwarded for your records.

No action has yet been taken to contact the British troops reported to be at ALONISSIS.


Major-General,
Comd 6 Aust Div.



Despatched 15.30 hrs. 5 July 41

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

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H.Q. 2/2 Bn.
A.I.F.
1 Jul. 41.

*Kind - J. H. H.
2/2*

6 Aust. Div.

Statement obtained by me from
NX 5097 Cpl LANE, P.A., NX 3654 Pte CAMPBELL, C.C. and NX5323
Pte STEEL, E. after returning from GREECE on 30 Jun 41 is given
below :-

"D" Coy of the 2/4 was at VEVE on Easter Saturday
12 apr.41, at 1500hrs word came through that we were to with-
draw by sections. First section to withdraw at 1930hrs and
the last one at 2130hrs. At 1930hrs a runner came from Coy H.Q.
and told us all to withdraw immediately. On our left flank
was a Greek Battalion where the Germans broke through. The
Greek battalion had withdrawn without notifying our Coy. We
were told that Transport would be waiting for us about 3/4 mile
away. We moved back to the main road through the pass where we
were informed that the Germans had fixed lines along the road, so
we were ordered to deploy and broke up into small parties of
six to nine strong.

We moved back to where transport should have been
but it was not there. We were informed that the Battalion had
moved back to the Rly line but they weren't there, so we started
to walk further back. We walked about 3 miles from the Rly
station and walked into the German lines. We were taken prisoner
and disarmed, our food and water were also taken from us. The
Germans had no food or water with them. There were nine of us
in our party. We were the second party captured. The Germans
carried only rifles, bayonet, with 30 rounds of ammunition in
a leather belt attached to this was also an entrenching tool.

(9 men) When we were taken prisoner the German sent a
runner back and he ran into Major Barham's party. Major Barham
challenged him but the German did not answer. They both drew
pistols and both the Major and the runner were killed. We
saw Major Barham buried at 1400hrs the next day. The German
was a private. Further of our troops came straggling in, some
2/4, 2/8, Anti-Tank Regt., some N.Z. Machine Gunners, a few
English soldiers, and a few Greeks, about 250 altogether. They
took up a position facing towards Servia at about 0030hrs.
We were marched through their position to an area 50yds in
front of their lines. We were allowed to smoke and light matches.
When dawn came we were fired on from our own lines. There was
M.G. fire, Artillery, and Anti-Tank Rifle, and as soon as they
began hitting our chaps, Lieut. Copeland got a white sheet from
a Greek and began waving it. The fire from our lines did not
stop and the German fired through us. The Germans must have
used the weapons and ammunition taken from us to retaliate because
they had very little of their own. When we began to spread out
the Germans concentrated their fire on us: it was murder to move.

NX 5097 Cpl LANE, P.A. continuing.....

As soon as I could I made a break to the right
of the German position, and came to a shallow furrow in the
ground and stayed there a while. A chap in front of me was hit
with a bullet so I decided to make another.....

OVER..

break for it. I ran about 50yds and got into a crop about 4" high. I then began to dig with my pocket knife and scraped the dirt out with my hands. I made a hole about 4" deep and banked the dirt up to protect me from the bullets from our own troops. I stayed there until the firing ceased.

NX3654 Pte CAMPBELL, C.C. continuing.....

When the firing started I could not move because my legs were frozen. I later made two attempts to struggle back towards the German lines, but could not get very far. I got a tin mug out of my pocket and began digging in the ploughed ground. I dug a hole about 4" deep, 3' long, and about 15" wide, I stayed there for six hours. At about 11 o'clock German planes machine gunned our troops and they moved back. The Germans then gathered those who could walk and took us back to the cross roads.

NX5323 Pte STEEL, E. continuing.....

When the firing began I remembered the banked up road behind the German lines and decided it was the only cover and when we made a break I ran through the German line and got behind the road where I was joined by another Australian and two Germans with a machine gun. Other Australians followed as and when they could. All who got across stayed there until the fire stopped. The two Germans with the machine gun stopped us going any further.

STATEMENT CONTINUING.....

When the firing ceased the Germans had their first roll call. There were 123 of us and over 30 of this No. were wounded. They would not let us help the wounded lying in front of the German lines. More German troops were coming through. Nobody had escaped up to this time. They marched the walking wounded back to the dressing station and the rest of us back to the cross-roads, where they made us carry stones to repair the road blown by our troops. It was impossible to fill in the hole so they made us pull down a wooden building and construct a bridge over the swampy ground.

During the afternoon the pass was bombed by two lots of British Aircraft, 6 the first time and 9 the second time. Both these attacks were unsuccessful. German convoys were going on roads branching to the right and left of us. The convoys consisted of British Chevrolet Trucks, British V8's, Bedfords, and Morris trucks, and they had Bren Guns mounted for Anti-Aircraft. We finished the bridge about 5 o'clock in the afternoon and were sent back along the road without a guard. On the way back the pass was again bombed by British Aircraft. This attack was successful and hit the road, hit three trucks, and killed quite a number of Germans. Captain Anderson was in charge of our party at this time. The Germans had been very friendly up till the time of the successful raid by our Aircraft. We marched back to VEVE, where the ADOLPH HITLER REGIMENT had its H.Q. They had the words "Adolph Hitler" on a white band on the left sleeve. We stayed with them the night. They treated us very well, they gave us rice stew to eat, they gave us straw to sleep on in a building nearby.

We moved out at 5 A.M. the next morning.....

OVER

and went back about 6 miles where we halted till 3 p.m. An Officer from the 2/8 Bn who could speak Dutch and a Greek set off for a village 3 miles away. When they reached the village we heard M.G. fire and they did not come back. We moved out onto the road and Captain Anderson arranged for the walking wounded to be picked up by the German Ambulances (Campbell here had conversation with a German Don R.). At 3 p.m. we started off again ~~the~~ Rly line and came to the village of BETH.

We tried to buy food at the Greek houses but were unsuccessful. We were told to go 5 miles further on to a large village. We went on to this village but were prevented from entering it by a German on a motor-bike. This German wore a nickel-plate on his chest held round his neck with a chain. On the plate were written the words, "FELDGENARMES". It was almost dark and he sent us on to FLORINA which was about 12 miles away. We pushed on towards FLORINA and at about 11 o'clock on Easter Monday night when about 2 miles from FLORINA we stopped for a rest. We made our escape here by hiding in a deep drain when the others moved off. We hit across country into the hills behind FLORINA for about 10 miles and halted at 3 a.m. We crawled into a big thorny bush and went to sleep. We had a little food ~~which~~ which we had taken from one of our own trucks which had been burned on the side of the road. We had hidden this food and no one knew we had it. We had one tin of bully beef, one tin of Ham and Veal and four packets of biscuits. We had also picked up a couple of blankets along the road. We left this position at 1400hrs on Tuesday and decided to make back to the position we had occupied before our withdrawal as we knew food had been left there. We climbed the highest mountain to get our bearings and found that our previous position was ten miles to the South. We got down to the bottom of the mountain to a stream which we could not cross as it was then too dark to move we decided to spend the night there. We crossed the stream in the morning and met a shepherd boy who gave us bread and took us to a village. An old man in the village advised us to go to FLORINA and give ourselves up. We arrived at our old position at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon and found that all the food had gone, there were no arms or ammunition there either, so we decided to walk to Albania.

We stayed the night in a church and in the morning met some Greek soldiers coming back from Rumania. We again saw the peasant boy who took our overcoats, blankets, and groundsheets, and in return gave us peasant clothing. We then set off to walk to Turkey. We moved towards VEVE across the road between German convoys and on over the hills to the edge of a lake where we slept in a barn. In the morning we saw soldiers coming from a nearby village, they were Greek soldiers moving back so we joined them.

We travelled along the main road to within 16 kilos of SALONICA ; this was on the 23 Apr.41.

..../OVER.

Here we met a Greek who could speak English and he told us that THRACE had been taken so we could not get through to Turkey. We stayed here three days and then set out for ATHENS through CORINOS. Two miles North of CORINOS the Germans had made a big aerodrome on the sea shore, on a mountain above it they have a beacon which is heavily guarded we think it was for guiding 'planes back to the aerodrome. They also have a sea-'plane base here, we saw them bringing an aluminium speed boat to the aerodrome.

We then went down through KATRINA along the Rly line, we left the Rly line and went into LEPTOKARYA arrived there on 29 Apr. 41., then to KARYA and on to ELLISON, down the river to KONIST. We stayed there the night and the next day went on to ANALOPSIS and stayed there from the first till the Sixth May, 1941. Here we got Greek tunics and went on as Greek soldiers. On the road at DAMASOULI the Germans had a camp and there seemed to be about four battalions there. Here they were repairing their damaged trucks, we stayed that night on the Pinias river and then went down to PHARSLIA. This was on 8 May 41. We went further South and met a Greek who told us that food was very short in Athens so we turned North again. We caught a train on 11 May 41 to VOLOS and began to walk over a mountain towards POURI. On the top of the mountains we met a man who told us that there some other soldiers in POURI.

We went down to ZAGORA but the police would not let us enter the town. We stayed that night outside the town and set off for POURI the next morning. Halfway there we met a peasant who took us back to ZAGORA where we stayed that night and the following day. On the 14 May 41 we arrived at HORIFDA and stayed there until 21 May 41. Here we were joined by Sgt Skerrett, Pte Harvey, Pte Thomson, and Pte Wilson a New Zealander. We got a boat on 22 May 41 to SKIATHOS. We walked across the island and met Pte Gwynne, Pte Donnelly, Pte Wallace, and Pte Byers, thence to the island of ALONISIS, arriving there 29 May 41. We stayed here 10 days.

While we were in ALONISIS we met a man named John Hannas who told us that one English pilot, three officers, and five O.Rs., were being hidden by a priest on the island of EBIO. He gave us particulars of an unoccupied island which might be useful if at any time we wished to get stores into Greece. He told us that he would collect all the English troops from the various islands and asked if we could make arrangements to have them taken off the island of ALONISIS. He would look out every Sunday night from 12 o'clock until 2 a.m., on the S.E. side of the island, if naval vessels wanted to get into touch with him they should flash a light between these hours and he would go out to them in his fishing boat.

We then went on to SKYRO and stayed there four days, then to ANTI-SIRA and from there up the gulf of SKYRNA to IZMIR, where we stayed three days.

...../OVER.

then to ALEXANDRETTA for four days and on to MERSINE where we stayed two days. On 26 Jun 41 we boarded a Polish boat for Warsaw and arrived in Haifa on 29 Jun 41.

CONVERSATION BETWEEN Pte CAMPBELL, C.C. and a GERMAN DON R.

On the second day after I was taken prisoner we were waiting on the road and I got into conversation with a German Don R. He said that we were on our way back to Germany so that he could talk freely. He told me that the German Army comprised of Aged Groups, and these Age Groups were indicated on the lorries that carried them. A "SS" indicated that the truck carried the young age group (men between 18-22yrs), "WL" indicated the medium age group, and "WH" the oldest group. It was compulsory for all Germans of 21 years to do two years in the army and six months in a labour camp. In war time they only did the two years Army training. A German could join the Army voluntarily on attaining his 18th Birthday. He told me about the "flak" gun which was like a two pounder it had about a 12 foot barrel and was a dual purpose Anti-tank, Ack Ack gun. He talked a lot about a new anti-Tank gun which could penetrate 4" steel. The Army that was in Greece was the crack Army and was called the Y ll Army, and consisted of picked Regts of all the provinces in Germany. Troops from the provinces had the sign of the province painted on the side of the truck.

All German troops carried a respirator on their belt but said Germany would never use gas, and that the war would be over in seven months. He could not understand why we started the war because we had good country. He was quite emphatic that Churchill had started the war. There was a special Coy of photographers who went into the front line to take photographs whenever the troops were in action. Artillery was drawn by tractor cars. The first convoys after an action carried bridging material, only staff vehicles carry wireless.

OBSERVATIONS MADE BY Pte CAMPBELL, C.C.

The tanks used by the Germans were Mark IV Tank and each one carried a motorcycle and sidecar on the back of it. Even the kitchens were mounted on trucks and meals were being cooked as the convoys moved along. Each unit seems to be entirely self-supporting, fuel for the convoys is carried in 10ton tankers with M.A.N. Diesel Engines.

C. Campbell

Lieut.
Intelligence Officer 2/2 Bn.

AM/TG

S/541/G

SECRET

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

11 June 41.

91

ANTI TANK OBSTACLES.

The attached circular is forwarded for your
information.

A. W. H. H. H. H. H.
Colonel;
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "B" (including attd Corps units).

PA
R. H. H.

In t. sec.

Copy/DM

SECRET

Subject:-- Anti-Tank Obstacles

H.Q. R.A.E.
9 Aust Div
7 May 41.

To. C.E. Western Desert Force
From A/DCE Tobruk

The following notes are forwarded in connection with experiences gained in recent operations.

1. First Enemy Attack - Easter

A large force of enemy A.F.V.s broke through our outer perimeter defences at a point where NO anti-tank ditch existed, and penetrated deeply into the Fortress. They did NOT attempt to reduce our perimeter posts, the garrison of which remained under cover until the enemy Infantry (German) which had been brought up in lorries, attempted to over-run the outer defences; they were practically wiped out. The enemy tanks, without their supporting infantry, cruised around more or less aimlessly until they were engaged by our tanks, A/Tk guns and Artillery and they then returned, leaving some of their numbers behind. The perimeter minefield was given credit for possibly two or three tanks, but in my opinion, this was doubtful.

An officer PCW, captured sometime later, stated that the gaps in the wire were made by Bangalore torpedoes (explosive lashed to a board) and it is certain that lengths of our perimeter minefields were disarmed in darkness prior to the attack. Owing to the weakness of our post garrisons in weapons and men this was (and still is) impossible to prevent.

2. Action taken as a result of lessons of 1st Attack.

(a) Digging in and firing on the Blue Line was expedited.
(b) All the outer perimeter mines were taken up and laid inside our wires; improvised anti-personnel mines were laid in with this thin A/Tk minefield.

(c) Large tactical minefields were 75% completed between the outer perimeter and the Blue Line. The object of these tactical minefields was to force enemy tanks into the central part of the defences where they could be dealt with by our tanks, anti-tank guns and artillery. To attain their object, the marking of this minefield had to be reduced to a minimum although this entailed a certain amount of casualties to our own troops; a certain number of routes were left through the fields for counter-attacking troops.

3. Second Large Enemy Attack.

The enemy tanks in large numbers broke through our perimeter defences but met with one of our tactical mine-fields; a proportion of them attempted to pass around the southern flank of this minefield, but were engaged by our tanks and anti-tank guns and turned back. Another portion of the enemy tank force closely engaged our perimeter posts successfully, and allowed the enemy Infantry to penetrate into a deep salient nearly up to our Blue Line. An immediate counter attack was NOT launched, and the enemy was given time to bring up all his supporting weapons, to dig in and consolidate to such an extent that a full dress night counter-attack launched a couple of days later, failed to reduce the salient, which is still very strongly held. When reducing the perimeter posts and to allow Infantry to get into the position, enemy pioneers removed the perimeter mines and two tanks, one on either side of the wire, passed a cable between them, and swept up long stretches of wire. Flamethrowers from tanks and also from men on foot protected by tanks were used against the posts. The minefield was given credit for disabling four or more enemy tanks (besides fulfilling its original function and preventing a tank break through) and I think that this number is correct.

4. Action taken as a result of lessons of 2nd Attack

(a) Owing to lack of A/Tk mines it has been impossible to strengthen or extend the existing remaining tactical minefields, or to lay any new ones; all tracks and routes through this tactical minefield have been closed by mines and the outer marking cairns have been reduced in numbers.

(b) Owing to the exigencies of the situation and the inaccessibility of certain areas owing to enemy fire, all remaining mines have been issued to be put in protective minefields behind our wire in certain "soft" places on our blue line. Practically all of this work has had to be done at night time, with a certain number of casualties due to enemy fire.

5. Other Obstacles.

(a) In certain stretches of the Blue line, stone sangar walls have been erected recently; the old Italian sangar walls bear NO relation to our scheme of defence. Neither of them however have been tested against enemy tanks, but all they can hope to do is momentarily to halt their progress, expose their "bellies" and thus allow our A/Tk weapons a chance at a better shot at them.

(b) Small sangar walls and shallow ditches with parapets have been erected in semi circles about 700 yds from our gun positions, designed for the same purpose as (a) above. These have not been tested out.

(c) Dummy tactical mine-fields have been constructed, but their value has NOT been tested up to date.

6. Other Defensive Measures.

(a) One of the main problems is the defeat of the enemy dive-bomber and the usual measures such as digging in men and vehicles, erection of dummy trenches, emplacements, etc., alternative positions, and extensive use of camouflage are employed. Measures had been put in hand for the protection of the essential installations, including water supplies. It is noteworthy to record that to-day for the first time the enemy made a determined effort against our water supply installations, and although some casualties occurred among Engineers personnel no serious damage was done, but this immunity is NOT likely to last. UADI SEHEL was shelled by enemy artillery, and the pumping station at UADI AUDA and the distillery were "dive-bombed" with numerous and heavy calibre bombs.

(b) Another of our main problems at the present is the protection of our perimeter posts against attack by A.F.Vs. in conjunction with Infantry, and by dive-bombers. Every small improvement possible is being exploited. When A/Tk mines are available short "spokes" of mines approx 200 yds long will be placed around the posts to prevent or discourage A.F.Vs. cruising around them.

(c) Numerous devices are being used against the enemy, including:-

- i. Portable demolition charges for disabling enemy A.F.Vs. artillery and A/Tk weapons
- ii. Molotov Cocktails. These have been used successfully, but care must be taken that the petrol content does NOT evaporate, and the wick remains well saturated with petrol.
- iii. S.T. bombs for use against A.F.Vs.
- iv. Thermite bombs for demolishing ammunition dumps
- v. Locally made smoke apparatus
- vi. Locally made "hair-trigger" Italian A/Tk mines
- vii. Locally made apparatus for detonating enemy shells and bombs used as A/Tk mines.

(Sd) Mann. Lt.-Col.
A/D.C.E. TORRUK.