AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters, formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/5/12
DIVISIONS

6 Australian Division General Staff Branch (6 Aust Div GS Branch)

September - October 1941



1/5/12-0196

M.F.

Army Form C. 2118.

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

"G" BRANCH. HQ 6 AUST DIV 1 - 30 Sep 41.

(Erase heading not required.)

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively, Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
JULIS	Sep 2		Major-General E.F.HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, Comd 6 Aust Div, accompanied by Lieut BALL, ADC, left this afternoon for JERUSALEM to confer with BGS, BF in P & TJ. Div Comd to stay the night in JERUSALEM and to leave 3 Sep for CAIRO by plane from LYDDA at 1500 hrs. While in CAIRO Div Comd will attend demonstration of Proposed Methods of Observation of Fire to be adopted by A/C aircraft working with arty units, and he will return 5 Sep.	
			Notes on Air Co-operation - SYRIA. Notes on Air Co-operation - SYRIA, Conclusions and Lessons, were distributed to units today.	S/3763/G. 2 Sep 41.
	3		Brig T.W.STRUTT, CRA, Col R.B.SUTHERLAND GSO I, Major A.D.MOLLOY GSO II, Capt F.G.HASSETT GSO II(SL), Capt W.M.KNOX GSO III(I), and Capt A.T.McLEAN DAQMG(L) left for a recce in area EAST of LAKE TIBERIAS. Comds and Staffs of 17 and 19 Aust Inf Bdes also proceeding on same recce.	
	4.		LAKE TIBERIAS recce party returned in late evening.	
	5		Major-General E.F.HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, accompanied by Lieut BALL, ADC, returned today from CAIRO by air.	
			GSO I, in absence of GOC, visited RAE, 2/1 Aust Fd Amb, 2/2 and 2/7 Fd Ambs to inspect tng and adm details.	
			Lewisite Blisters. An instruction received from the Tech Offr (CW) GHQ (MEF) in connection with the pricking of lewisite blisters was distributed to units.	S/3682/G 5 Sep 41.
			Att Trs. Det of 1 Aust Hy AA Regt Wkshop Sec moved to ATTIRA and came under comd 1 Aust Corps.	
	6		Air Support for the Army. Copies of the GOC-in-C's letter were distributed to units for information of all ranks under comd.	S/3911/G
			Express Letter Service. Copies of BF in P & TJ circular setting out ELS in PALESTINE were distributed to units.	3913/G 6 Sep 41.
			Fire Prevention. Fire Prevention Bulletin No. 3 was issued to units for information and action where applicable.	3912/G 6 Sep 41.

C.E.A. 540. 50.000.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
JULIS	Sep 7		HQ 6 Aust Div Weekly Intelligence Bulletin No. 5. HQ 6 Aust Div Weekly Intelligence Bulletin No. 5 compiled from information received up to 1200 hrs 7 Sep 41 was distributed to units.	Int Bulletin No. 5.
			Major-General E.F.HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, left for CAIRO to attend demonstration of close support bombing on 10 Sep 41.	
			Att Tps. One subsec of 1 Aust MAC moved to SYRIA to join "A" Sec at JAMBOUR and came under comd 1 Aust Corps.	
			Balance 2/1 Aust Svy Regt moved to SYRIA and will come under comd 1 Aust Corps.	
			12 ORs of 2 Aust Boring Sec moved to NABLUS for attachment to 1 Aust Boring Sec.	
	8		Information concerning letters to PWs was circulated to units.	I/639 8 Sep 41.
	9		Middle East Schools. The procedure to be adopted in respect of submission of nominal rolls to ME Schools was forwarded to units today.	3999/G. 9 Sep 41.
	10		Training Equipment. All units proceeding upon an operational role were instructed to return all equipment.	S/4013/G. 10 Sep 41.
	11		6 Aust Div Tactical Exercise. The introduction to a tactical exercise, with RAA 6 Aust Div co-operating, to be carried out in the ASLUJ area on 15 Sep - 16 Sep 41, was issued today.	
			Major-General E.F.HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, returned from CAIRO to BIR ASLUJ and inspected arty tng.	
	12		Issue of Capes, AG. An extract from CRME/9390/G(SD) of 1 Sep 41, in connection with the issue of Capes AG to reinforcements was issued today.	S/4090/G. 12 Sep 41.
			Att Tps. 12 ORs 2 Aust Boring Sec moved to SYRIA for attachment to 2/9 and 2/15 Aust A Fd Coys.	

C.E.A. 540. 50.000.

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Place	Date Sep	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
JULIS	15		TACTICAL EXERCISE. A tactical exercise of two days duration with the RAA 6 Aust Div co-operating commenced in the ASLUJ area today. The directing Staff consisted of:- Major-General E.F. HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED. Brigadier H.W. STRUTT. DSO. Colonel R.B. SUTHERLAND. The e xercise will consist of several tactical problems and students will be asked to co-operate with arty comds in producing arty support.	6 Aust Div Tactical Exercise ASLUJ Area.
	16		6 AUST DIV LOCATION STATEMENT. Location Statement of 6 Aust Div and att Tps was issued as at 2359 hrs 15 Sep 41.	S/4168/G
			6 Aust Div C.W. TRAINING INSTRUCTION No.4. Was issued to units today.	6 Aust Div CW Tng Instn No.4.
			BOMB DISPOSAL. Copies of BF in P & TJ circular letter CR/Pal/17146/1/G of 14 Sep 41, were forwarded to units.	S/4190/G dated 16 Sep 41.
	17		Maj-Gen. E.F. HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED attended a conference at JERUSALEM.	
	18		FIRE TRENCHES. 1 Aust Corps GS Instruction No. 2 of 1 Sep outlining the new method of rapid digging of weapon pits was distributed to units today.	S/4253/G dated 18 Sep41
			TRAINING PROGRAMME - 6 AUST DIV. In amplification of remarks made by the GOC - 6 Aust Div, concerning training at a conference held on 5 Sep 41, the above instruction indicated to comds the methods by which this was to be implemented.	S/4232/G dated 18 Sep 41.
			ATT TPS. 2/2 Aust (MG) Bn and 2/16 Aust A Fd Coy arrived today from Western Desert and came under comd 6 Aust Div.	
	19		TRAINING, CLASSIFICATION AND TESTING OF DRIVER MECHANICS AND DRIVERS MT. AIF (ME) GS Instruction No. 30 was issued to units today.	4296/G dated 19 Sep 41.

C.E.A. 540. 50.000.

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Place	Date Sep	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
JULIS	19		ATT TPS. Advance parties of the 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp proceeded from KILO 89 to RAS BAALBECK in accordance with orders for move of 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp from HQ BF in P & TJ. Major-General E.F. HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED attended 2/1 Aust Inf Bn "Coy Exercise" at IRAQ AL MANSHIYA at 0215 hours, and night exercise of Coy of 2/7 Aust Inf Bn.	
	20		TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESSES. AIF (ME) advised that the undermentioned telegraphic addresses had been registered - AUSTJUN LATRUN - AIF (ME) Junior Staff School AUSIDEPOT DEIR SUNEID - AIF (ME) Reinft Depot Formations and Div units were notified.	S/4315/G of 20 Sep 41.
			.303 B Mk IV INCENDIARY AMN. An extract from GHQ MEF (CRME/22532/GSD2a dated 13 Sep 41 was issued to units for information today.	G/4313/G dated 20 Sep 41.
			6 AUST DIV SPORTS MEETING. 6 Aust Div Sports held at JULIS attended by General Sir Thomas BLAMEY, CB, CMG, DSO, and Lady Blamey, Major-General E.F.HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED.	
	21		6 Aust Div Tng Instruction No. 5. 6 Aust Div (CW) Tng Instn No. 5, dated 21 Sep 41, was issued to units.	6 Aust Div (CW) Tng Instn No. 5.
			Att Trs. 22 Aust Fd Pk Coy left HILL 69 today for BAALBEK and will come under comd 1 Aust Corps. HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde, 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns, 2/4 Aust Fd Coy, 2/5 Aust Fd Amb and 7 Aust Div Sup Col left PALESTINE today for RAS BAALBEK and will come under comd 1 Aust Corps.	
	22		Major-General E.F.HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, inspected 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn and then visited Lieut-General J.D.LAVARACK, CB, CMG, DSO, at AILEY.	
			Machine Carbines, Thompson, .45-inch. Copies of BF in P & TJ letter CR/PAL/17036/SD of 20 Sep 41, setting out new scale of issue of machine carbines, Thompson, .45-inch, were issued to units.	S/4375/G 22 Sep 41.

C.E.A. 540. 50.000.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
JULIS	Sep 23		Defence against Air-Borne Landing Attacks. Copies of aforementioned circular letter G.2031 dated 19 Sep 41 from AIF(ME) were forwarded to units for information.	S/4408/G. 23 Sep 41.
			Location Statement. 6 Aust Div and att tps Location Statement was issued as at 2359 hrs, 23 Sep 41.	Loc State 23 Sep 41.
			Att Tps. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn and rear parties of 18 Aust Inf Bde departed KILO 89 and BEIT JIRJA for SYRIA at 1100 hrs and will come under comd 1 Aust Corps.	
			2/2 Aust Fd Coy moved to SYRIA today and will come under comd 1 Aust Corps.	
	25		Major-General E.F.HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, returned from SYRIA.	
			Att Tps. Remainder of "B" Sec 1 Aust MAC departed HILL 69 for JAMBOUR, SYRIA, and will come under comd 1 Aust Corps.	
			Units under Comd. Message received from MIDEAST placed the following units under comd 6 Aust Div from time of arrival in GAZA area: 2/12 Aust Fd Regt 3 Aust A Tk Regt 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde 2/28 Aust Inf Bn 2/32 Aust Inf Bn 2/3 Aust Fd Amb 2/4 Aust Fd Hyg Sec 2/13 Aust Fd Coy 8 Aust Lt AA Bty Dets 9 Aust Div AASC Dets 24 Aust Fd Pk Coy	
	26		Camouflage of Defensive Positions. 1 Aust Corps GS Instn No. 4, dated 18 Sep 41, outlining camouflage of def posns was issued to units for information.	4550/G. 26 Sep 41.

C.E.A. 540. 50.000.

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Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
JULIS	Sep 27		State of Training.	S/4775/G 27 Sep 41.
			Att Tps. Corps Tps Sub Pk of Corps Amn Pk departed HILL 69 for SYRIA and will come under comd 1 Aust Corps.	
	28		.303 AP Amn. Copies of BF in P & TJ CR/PAL/17629/SD, dated 10 Sep 41, on issue of .303 AP amn, were distributed to units.	S/4772/G 28 Sep 41
			HQ BF in P & TJ requested that personnel of Sigs 6 Aust Div be despatched to BAALBEK to take over comns from 6 Brit Div.	
	29		Corps Units under Comd. AIF(ME) agreed that Corps Units under comd would be put under comd AIF(ME) Base Area as from today; and that 9 Aust Div units were to be under comd 24 Aust Inf Bde.	
			Major-General E.F.HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED, attended exercises of 2/4 and 2/8 Aust Inf Bns.	

SECRET.

HQ 6 Aust Div.,
2 Sep 41.

NOTES ON AIR CO-OPERATION - SYRIA.

Forwarded herewith copy of HQ 1 Aust Corps G 748 which is to be treated as SECRET.

Lt Col,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION:- List "B".

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
28 Aug 41.
G.748

NOTES ON AIR CO-OPERATION - SYRIA

The object is to design for the future a system which will work soundly and which is capable of meeting the actual rather than the theoretical allotment and capabilities of aircraft. It is easy to talk of what should be, or can be, but in most cases the hypotheses on which these are based are not correct. Only those in possession of the full facts as they exist at a given time can decide what is, and what is not, possible in the way of aircraft support.

(1) A Sqn of x aircraft has, unfortunately, almost never got x aircraft fit to take the air - the figure is often only 60% of strength - this is the first major point to be noted.

(2) No sqn yet encountered had the eqpt it should have to do its work effectively. Throughout the SYRIAN Campaign there was little tracer, and NO incendiary bullets were available, hence ground straffing lost a large part of its value and results. Nor were there any delay action bombs by which alone accurate pin-point bombing appears feasible in the face of opposition - in fact, without them zero-bombing is impossible.

(3) Whilst it is elementary that air support should be given from aerodromes close to the HQ controlling them, no wishing will make aerodromes where they do not in fact exist, nor will it enable aircraft to use aerodromes dominated by the enemy.

(4) Comns are a powerful limiting factor. Time is possibly the greatest obstacle to efficient co-operation. Between the time targets are selected and aircraft attack there is at present a minimum delay of 1½ hrs for Fs and 2 hrs for Bs.

(5) It is essential that aircraft should be allotted to the Army for its close support. The offrs who comd it must be under comd of the Army and not some sort of "allies" who please themselves.

(6) Arty R in particular and Tac R pilots need a lot of tng. This can be got by working with Army formations in actual tng. The better one knows pilots the better usually the co-operation. Best results are got if they live with us. It is no good demanding a better Tac R or Arty R aircraft; at the moment there are none in the Empire. We have to make do with what we can get.

(7) Air Force W/T sets worked badly, both - it is believed - because the sets were not very efficient and because the operators were not good. Had line NOT been available efficient air support could NOT have been given.

(8) Army offrs need tng in uses and limitations of aircraft both as to what air can do, and particularly in the time that must elapse between the need arising and the aircraft arriving over the target. They must recognize clearly what is practical in the circumstances existing on the day in question and must understand what constitute suitable targets. (See Appx A for targets during SYRIAN Campaign). The need for combined tng in air co-operation is dealt with in para 21.

(9) In the face of superiority or even near equality of aircraft I doubt whether continuous Tac R is feasible.

(10) No dive bombers are available to use in ME. They can be replaced in part by bombers with delay action bombs (zero-bombing - see para 2). Such bombing should be used to give depth to the arty or on targets which we cannot otherwise hit. The danger of hitting our own tps if the target is closer than 1000 yds is great.

(11) One IO alone dealing with air photos cannot complete his work. He MUST be assisted by Svy personnel or a specially trained interpreter of air photos. In modern warfare the air photo requirements are continuous and very great. I consider an offr, a sgt and a pte are required to deal with all aspects of air interpretation and topographical details. This is not theory, but practical experience. Even the limited opportunities in the SYRIAN Campaign gave more photos than could be dealt with in the time.

(12) The greatest and most important enemies of the Army (and the Air Force) are enemy fighters. If they can be dealt with then enemy bombers cannot act, and ours can; similarly our Tac R, Photo R and ground straffing aircraft can also work in relative safety.

(13) There is great moral value in our fwd tps seeing our own aircraft go over them, even if they don't see the fighting. The more fighting they see the better, of course.

(14) Difficulty of indicating to our own aircraft where our fwd tps are. Air pilots need more tng as well as Army tps.

(15) Vulnerability. Aircraft much more vulnerable than arty, and less easily replaced. Economy in use is necessary so they must only be sent against the right target and at the right time.

(16) Air support is not entirely reliable. Repeatedly in SYRIA cloud, or enemy aircraft, prevented our getting the support we wanted. Time must elapse between two sorties by the same aircraft.

(17) Owing to delayed messages, enemy action, etc, etc, aircraft cannot usually guarantee to be over a target at a given moment. They should be given times between which they are required to bomb - or else "as soon as possible". The times given must be feasible times allowing for all factors.

(18) WT sets that can be man-loaded are essential for mountainous country to assist speedy close support by aircraft.

(19) It is impossible to make suitable allotments of aircraft until it is known what type, how many and under what conditions sqns are available. It is considered that the minimum allotment of AC Sqns is at the rate of one per Div and Corps.

For fighters and bombers the rate of allotment to the military forces engaged in active operations should be :-

One F Sqn per Div and Corps
AND One B Sqn per Div.

This allows for casualties, and also for morale; for the fwd tps will see little of the aircraft under control of the Air Force for they fly high, being busy on strategic tasks. It also provides for Arty R and continuous Tac R with reliefs on the ground.

(20) The RAF were inclined to think that requests for air support sent through their ALOs were requests to them as RAF offrs. This is incorrect. These RAF offrs were there to assist the Army as advisers (except the Senior RAF offr at Corps who was a comd as well, but even he was under the Corps Comd). Attention is drawn to the fact that if demands for air support pass through RAF sigs (as recommended), it is the Army that is asking for support, and although it is transmitted through the RAF, it is for delivery to the Military Comd. After hearing the advice of the ALO the Military Comd then decides whether or not he can meet the request from resources under his own control or whether he should forward it to higher Military Authority for passing to RAF Authorities (vide RAF with Army in Fd. Sec 22 - 2.).

21. The need for the education of military comds in air co-operation is admitted, but the desired co-operation will never be obtained until the Air Force realize that they have just as much, and often more, to learn on the same subject. The Army has one great advantage in learning these lessons - they have always been accustomed to handling co-operating arms, such as arty.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

22 (i) In every campaign there should be issued, down to coy comds the types of targets that are regarded as "suitable", bearing in mind the country, the types and numbers of aircraft available, the amn posn, and the opposing aircraft. These conditions change, sometimes very rapidly, so that only those knowing the most facts can judge best. It must be realized that even suitable targets may not be able to be engaged for various reasons. Military comds must realize the limitations that exist.

(ii) Air support is NOT entirely reliable. Cloud, enemy action particularly by Fs, may prevent our aircraft either from carrying out their task or from carrying it out at the desired time.

(iii) The moral value of action by our aircraft, even when they hardly fire a shot or drop a bomb, may be very great both on our own tps and on the enemy's. This value is not fully realized by the Air Force.

(iv) So far there has been normally only about 60% of allotted aircraft strength available for duty on any day.

(v) There is a relatively large time lag between the time a target is selected by a fwd unit and the time aircraft can deal with that target. This time lag must be allowed for, but every effort must be made to reduce it. Some of it is due entirely to military causes.

(vi) The Air Force are providing the special channels for sending these messages calling for air support. Experience in SYRIA showed the RAF sets to be unsatisfactory and the operators to need a lot more tng before quick work would be possible.

(vii) Line comn to aerodromes used by AC Sqns is essential. It is desirable to have line to all aerodromes used by aircraft under Army control.

(viii) The Air Force must be prepared to operate from aerodromes as near as possible to the HQ under which they are working.

(ix) The Army must have placed under its comd adequate aircraft. These should train with the army formations long before a campaign starts. The less they train together the less effective will be their co-operation and results.

(x) The targets, tasks, etc, of aircraft with the army are decided, after advice, by the military comd, not by the ALO (vide EAF with Army in Fd Sec 22 - 2).

There is a need for properly trained A/C pilots. These men need a lot of tng and special selection. There seems to be a dearth of them at present, due to war conditions and rapid expansion.

(xi) A satisfactory method of indicating the posn of our fwd tps must be developed.

(xii) Photo R is a normal everyday requirement of the army, The necessary facilities must be under comd of the army. The value of air photography to the army does NOT seem to be fully realized. In poorly mapped country demands will be very large, but almost invariably can be met if real co-operation exists.

(xiii) Corps HQ needs, and has asked for, additional staff to handle the interpretation of air photos and the indexing, etc, of topographical infm.

(xiv) To make close support effective the Air Force urgently need:-

(i) delay action bombs for zero bombing.
(ii) incendiary amn for American weapons as well as Br.
(iii) adequate tracer amn.

(xv) The army must recognize that enemy Fs are the most dangerous potential enemies. If they can be dealt with we will have superiority and all it means to the army. Without F support the enemy's other aircraft cannot operate efficiently by day.

(xvi) Courses in army co-operation are urgently needed. At these there must be as many Air Force as Army offrs. Co-operation needs teaching to both services simultaneously. In the past the greatest errors have been made in thinking (or acting as if) co-operation was one-sided.

Chilliot Hol for
Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div	45	Q	1
6 Aust Div	45	CE	1
7 Aust Div	45	DDST	1
CCRA	5	ADOS	1
CRE C Tps	5	DADOS	1
CSO	2	Camp	1
E Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	1	APM	1
GOC	1		
BGS	1	For information -	
G	2		
G3 (Air)	1	HQ BF P & TJ	4
I	1	HQ AIF. (ME)	2
A	1	HQ AIF Base Area	2
		HQ AIF Reinft Depot	2

APPX 'A'

NOTES ON SUITABLE TARGETS - SYRIAN CAMPAIGN

We must understand that aircraft allotted to the army are to be used ONLY against suitable targets, or for moral effect which is often very great.

SUITABLE TARGETS FOR FIGHTERS (Tomahawks with American Armament).

Good results depend whether tracer and incendiary amn is available.

(a) Concentrated tps, especially on the move, or those not deployed or in defensive posns.

(b) Tpt, particularly that on the move; closed up tpt.

(c) Aircraft on aerodromes.

As, however, Tomahawks are designed for air fighting only and have no armour against fire from the ground their use against stationary tps, or tpt, or against defensive posts, is likely to prove very expensive and will render less Fs available for other, better and more important targets.

(d) Patrols to intercept enemy aircraft which appear regularly.

(e) Sweeps to intercept enemy aircraft and to ground straff targets as in (a), (b) and (c). If however ground straffing is to be done careful arrangements for an "air umbrella" (F protection of these planes low down) are necessary.

Ground straffing of deployed tps has moral value only, but this may be great. Ground straffing of a bty posn may give good value but is likely to be costly.

Note - On one task west of DAMASCUS the Fs of 3 Sqn RA&F returned having fired only a few shots and, in their opinion, accomplished nothing. In fact the moral effect of their presence made French tanks ((which were moving to counter attack) take cover for the duration of the flight, and stopped at least two enemy btys firing, for the crews stopped and took cover for fear of being straffed if they fired.

SUITABLE TARGETS FOR BOMBERS.

(Except in zero-bombing, bombs are seldom released under 7000 ft and bombers cannot operate unless it is clear our own tps are not in danger area).

(a) Large concentrations of all sorts.

(b) Forts.

(c) Aerodrome buildings. (For aircraft ground straffing by Fs is better).

(d) Dumps.

(e) Enemy HQs, mostly for morale effect and with hope of cutting comns.

(f) Btys, bridges, traffic blocks, comns etc. ONLY if zero bombing is possible. Moral effect may, however be very great.

The final decision as to what is to be bombed rests with the Military Comd.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

S E C R E T

S/3682/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

5 Sep 41.

LEWISITE BLISTERS.

The following information has been received from the Tech Offr (CW) GHQ (MEF). Its importance lies in its amplification of the new ruling regarding the pricking of Lewisite Blister.

"(a) Recent work has shown that the fluid in a lewisite blister does NOT contain any appreciable quantity of arsenic: this latter has been absorbed in the period during which the blister was forming. Hence there is no reason for the individual to open such a blister; and opening it under the conditions which would obtain in action will increas the risk of the wound being infected.

(b) The proper course, therefore, is that the individual attempts to keep all blisters unbroken, and covers them with a dressing if he can. When medical attention becomes possible, the medical offr will prick and drain the blisters, and treat the case in accordance with the instructions given for MUSTARD Gas Blisters in paras 12 - 15 on pages 5 and 6 of CW Medical Pamphlet No. 3 GHQ MEF."

[redacted]
Colonel
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "C".

SECRET

W.D

3

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

6 Sep 41.

AIR-SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY.

The attac hed copy/ies of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief's letter is/are forwarded and the GOC directs that adequate steps be taken to ensure that the contents are made known to ALL RANKS under your command.

Lt-Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "C".

S E C R E T.

G. H. Q., M. E. F.

CRME/30547/G(O).

27 Aug '41.

Subject:- AIR SUPPORT FOR THE ARMY.

B.T.E.
B.F. P & T.J.
M.D.F.
Tps SUDAN.
Tps CYPRUS.
A. Tps ADEN.
TOBRUK Fort.
A.I.F.
N.Z.E.F.
1 S.A. Div (U.D.F.)
2 S.A. Div (U.D.F.)
M.E.Staff School.
M.E.T.S.
M.E.C.T.C.
M.E.M.T.S.
M.E.D.M. & M.M. School.
M.E. O.C.T.U.
M.E. R.A.S.C. Tng School.
M.E. Physical & Recreational Tng School.
R.A.C. School and Base Depot.
R.A. Base Depot and School of Artillery.
R.E. Base Depot and School of M.E.
R. Sigs Base Depot and School of Sigs.
Inf Base Depot.
R.A.S.C. Base Depot.
Ind Reinforcement Camp.
Rec. & Tng Coy R.A.S.C.
Depot Commando.
M.E. School of Cookery.
M.E. Gas School.

A.O.C.in C.
Ind L.O. Aus L.O.
U.L.O. N.Z.L.O.

O

All Branches G.H.Q. M.E.F.

---

1. During recent operations our troops have been subjected to heavy attack from the air, and there have been complaints that our own air force has not been enough in evidence. These complaints are understandable. They are, however, often based on a misunderstanding of the capabilities and methods of employment of air forces, and they are invariably an injustice to the skill, courage and self sacrifice that our airmen have shown so strikingly in every theatre of war.

2. During recent operations the air forces directly supporting the field army has been unavoidably small, but, in spite of the immense numerical superiority of the enemy, both in fighters and bombers, our fighters have never hesitated to attack against odds of five or six to one. They have suffered proportionately heavier losses in pilots and aircraft than units of the field army have in personnel and vehicles, but have maintained throughout the highest morale.

3. It must be realised by all ranks:-
That
(i) / only an overwhelming numerical superiority in aircraft, such as the Germans had in GREECE and CRETE, can prevent completely attacks from the air on our troops.

(ii)/.....

(ii) That to keep a constant umbrella of fighters over our forward troops is impossible except on certain special occasions unless vast numbers of aircraft are available and can be spared from other important tasks, and, even if they are available, this is not always the best use of them.

(iii) That to intercept enemy bombers or fighters in the air over the battle field, even when we have the use of advanced landing grounds near our forward troops is largely a matter of luck and no amount of planning and calculation can guarantee it. Rarely do we know what the enemy intends to do, and when, or in what strength and at what height he will operate.

(iv) That one of the most effective ways for our air force to prevent hostile air attack against our troops is to destroy the enemy on the ground by bombing and machine gunning his aerodromes. These operations take place miles from our land forces and therefore are not seen by us and often we do not even know they are being carried out. On our part we must engage the enemy aircraft which do attack us with every weapon which can be brought to bear. Most aeroplanes are vulnerable to fire from the ground when making low flying attacks.

(v) That if all ranks comply with P.A.D. orders, especially regarding V.T.E., dispersion, camouflage, etc., they will ease demands on the R.A.F. for additional patrols and consequently release aircraft for offensive action against the enemy.

4. It is essential that all commanders explain these facts to their officers and men, or morale may suffer considerably. However strong our air force, and it is growing stronger daily, we shall be attacked from the air. We cannot expect our own aircraft to be constantly over us. The most effective action by bombers and often by fighters against the enemy air force will be taken out of sight of the troops. Recent operations have shown that the casualties caused by even the heaviest air attacks to which certain units have been subjected have been in no case more than slight, and not to be compared with those that would be suffered in a serious ground attack. Air attack is not so much an effort to inflict casualties as an attempt to shake morale. Every means possible must be used to counteract this attack on morale. To convince men that, even if they cannot at the moment see our aircraft over them, these aircraft are not idle, is one means of maintaining morale. The better the discipline, the less will morale suffer.

5. It should also be explained to all ranks that "fighter protection" mentioned above is quite a different thing to "close support" by aircraft. The former is of course directed against enemy aircraft whilst the latter is concerned with ground targets. Though little has been possible hitherto in the provision of close support owing mainly to shortage of aircraft, all ranks should be informed that the ways and means of providing it are constantly being examined by the staffs and commanders of both Services, and that much more support of this kind is to be expected in the future as we gain in air strength.

SJ

General,
Commander-in-Chief,
Middle East Force.

SUBJECT :- [illegible] Service.

[illegible]
[illegible]

4 [illegible] 1.

4

HQ. 1 [illegible]
10 [illegible] Div.
3 [illegible] Div.
[illegible]
3 [illegible] Inf [illegible]
1 [illegible]
[illegible]
Jerusalem [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
O.C. [illegible]
O.C. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Czechoslovak [illegible]
[illegible] Govt. of [illegible]
I.G. [illegible] Police.
[illegible]

[illegible] } For information.
[illegible] }
[illegible] }

---

1. The [illegible]
[illegible] hrs [illegible]

2. This [illegible] should be destroyed.

3. [illegible]
[illegible]

4. [illegible]
[illegible]

[signature]
for [illegible]

[illegible]

List "C"

M.E.S. TIME TABLE - PALESTINE.

Service 1. CAIRO - LYDDA (Air).

Depart	Cairo	1405 hrs	Depart	Lydda West	0700 hrs
"	Kantara West	2100 "	Arrive	Haifa	0940 "
Arrive	El Arish	0043 "	"	Lydda	1010 "
"	Rafa	0123 "	Depart	Lydda	1020 "
"	Gaza	0156 "	Arrive	Tulkarm	1102 "
"	Khilda	0225 "	"	Nablus	1207 "
"	Lydda	0238 "	"	Haifa	1238 "
Depart	Lydda	0700 "	"	Tel Aviv	"
Arrive	Kantara	0914 "	"	Kantara West	1930 "
"	Cairo West	0930 "	"	Cairo	"

Connects with Serial 2 at Lydda.

Serial 2. JER. Jnd. - Lydda - Haifa - Jerusalem.

Depart	Jerusalem	0830 hrs	0845 hrs	Depart	Haifa	0940 hrs	1045 hrs
Arrive	Lydda Airport	-	0930 "	Arrive	Lydda Airport	1010 "	1130 "
Depart	Lydda Airport	-	0945 "	Depart	Lydda Airport	-	1145 "
Arrive	Haifa	-	1030 "	Arrive	Jerusalem	-	1230 "
Depart	Lydda Airport	1400 "	1415 "	Depart	Lydda Airport	-	1515 "
Arrive	Lydda Airport	1530 "	1545 "	Arrive	Haifa	-	1630 "
Depart	Haifa	1630 "	1645 "	Depart	Jerusalem	-	1745 "
Arrive	Jerusalem	1715 "	1745 "	Arrive	Haifa	1815 "	1900 "

Connects with Serial 1, 3, 4 & 5.

Serial 3. Haifa - Jerusalem - Lydda - Haifa - Jerusalem.

Depart	Haifa	0830 hrs	0845 hrs	Depart	Jerusalem	0715 hrs	0815 hrs
Arrive	Lydda Airport	-	0930 "	Arrive	Lydda Airport	0745 "	0845 "
Depart	Lydda Airport	-	0945 "	Depart	Lydda Airport	-	0915 "
Arrive	Haifa	-	1030 "	Arrive	Haifa	-	1015 "
Depart	Haifa	1400 "	1415 "	Depart	Haifa	-	1445 "
Arrive	Lydda Airport	1530 "	1545 "	Arrive	Lydda Airport	-	1615 "
Depart	Lydda Airport	1600 "	1615 "	Depart	Lydda Airport	-	1645 "
Arrive	Jerusalem	1715 "	1745 "	Arrive	Haifa	1745 "	1830 "

Connects with Serial 1, 2, 4 & 5.

Serial 4. Haifa - Lydda - Jerusalem - Lydda - Haifa.

Depart	Haifa	0830 hrs	0845 hrs	Depart	Jerusalem	0715 hrs	0815 hrs
Arrive	Lydda Airport	-	0930 "	Arrive	Lydda Airport	0745 "	0845 "
Depart	Lydda Airport	-	0945 "	Depart	Lydda Airport	-	0915 "
Arrive	Haifa	-	1030 "	Arrive	Haifa	-	1015 "
Depart	Haifa	1400 "	1415 "	Depart	Haifa	-	1445 "
Arrive	Lydda Airport	1530 "	1545 "	Arrive	Lydda Airport	-	1615 "
Depart	Lydda Airport	1600 "	1615 "	Depart	Lydda Airport	-	1645 "
Arrive	Jerusalem	1715 "	1745 "	Arrive	Haifa	1745 "	1830 "

Connects with Serial 1, 2, 3 & 5.

Serial 5. Haifa - Amman - Haifa.

Depart	Haifa	0900 hrs	Depart	Amman	1600 hrs
"	Amman	1200 "	Arrive	Haifa	1730 "
Arrive	Amman	1230 "			

Connects with Serial 4 at Haifa.

Continued on Sheet 2...../

Serial 6. ACRE - [illegible] - ALEY - [illegible].

Depart Acre.	1100 hrs	Depart [illegible]		1450 hrs
" Beyrouth	1100 "	" Aley		1500 "
" Aley	1500 "	" [illegible]		1500 "
Arrive Damascus	1530 "	Arrive Acre		1900 "

Connects with [illegible] leave.

Serial 7. JERUSALEM - AMMAN - [illegible].
Connects [illegible] Sheet [illegible].

Depart Jerusalem	1[illegible] hrs([illegible])	
Arrive [illegible]	1740 "	
Depart [illegible]	1[illegible] "	
Arrive [illegible]	[illegible] "	
Depart [illegible]	[illegible] "	
Arrive [illegible]	[illegible]([illegible])	
Depart [illegible]	[illegible] " --------- Dep. Amman 0800 hrs.	
Arrive Damascus.	1[illegible] "(Friday) Arr. Haifa 1400 "	

HAIFA

Depart [illegible] Jerusalem	1000 "(½ Day) Dep. Haifa 0800 "	
Arrive Amman	1[illegible] "--------- Arr. Amman 1400 "	
Depart [illegible]	[illegible] "	
Arrive [illegible] Jerusalem	1[illegible] "	

Thursday or Tuesday.

Depart Jerusalem	0[illegible] hrs.
Arrive Amman	1030 "
Depart [illegible]	1[illegible] "
Arrive [illegible]	1[illegible] "
Depart Zerka	1[illegible] "
Arrive [illegible]	12[illegible] "
Depart [illegible]	1[illegible] "
Arrive Jerusalem	1[illegible] "

Serial 8. HAIFA - [illegible] (Train-Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday.)

Depart Haifax	1719 hrs.
Arrive Zerka	1330 "
Depart Zerka	0930 "
Arrive Haifax	1109 "

Serial 9. GAZA - SARAFAND.

Depart Gaza	0[illegible] hrs		Depart Sarafand	1400 hrs	
" Gaza Station	0800 "		" Rehovoth	1[illegible] "	
" Gaza Ridge	0811 "		" Kefr Silu	1[illegible] "	
" Milo 89	0825 "		" Aqir	1[illegible] "	
" Deir Suneid	0[illegible] "		" Gedera	1515 "	
" Beit Jirja	1[illegible] "		" [illegible]stina	1[illegible] "	
" Barbara	1020 "		" Julis Main	1505 "	
" Julis Main	1[illegible] "		" Barbara	1[illegible] "	
" [illegible]stina	1105 "		" Beit Jirja	1[illegible] "	
" Gedera	1[illegible] "		" Deir Suneid	1701 "	
" Aqir	1140 "		" Milo 89	1715 "	
" Kefr Silu	1[illegible] "		" Gaza Ridge	1[illegible] "	
" Rehovoth	1220 "		" Gaza Junction	1740 "	
Arrive Sarafand	1[illegible] "		Arrive Gaza	1745 "	

W.D

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

6 Sep 41.

FIRE PREVENTION.

The attached copy/ies of Fire Prevention Bulletin No. 3 is/are forwarded for information and action as applicable.

A. W. Howard Lt-Col
Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "C"

FIRE PREVENTION BULLETIN No. 3.

Fire Precautions in Workshops and W.D. Factories.

A. General Remarks.

1. The following notes are issued as a guide for Workshops and W.D. factories to base their fire fighting Schemes and organisation for fire protection.

2. These instructions may have to be modified to suit local conditions but the principles contained herein will be adhered to.

3. Although Workshops and W.D. factories are incorporated in the P.A.D. Schemes of the sub-area in which they are situated, it is of vital importance that every workshop and factory unit should have a comprehensive scheme and organisation for emergency fire protection.

4. Fire protection has a threefold application in times of emergency as in peace time viz:-

(a) The means of reducing or removing causes which originate fire.
(b) The necessary means for fire extinction.
(c) The safeguarding of personnel.

5. (a) In order to reduce or remove causes which originate fire all inflammable material both inside and outside buildings should be reduced to a minimum.

(b) Additional water supplies will in most cases have to be provided, preferably quite independent of the mains supply.

(c) Adequate fire fighting equipment and fully trained and organised fire watchers and fire fighting parties are essential.

6. Important and necessary inflammable stores should be dispersed and not concentrated, and they should be kept where the risk of fire is least, provided that they are located well clear of shelters for personnel.

B. Principles of Fire Precautions.

Water Supplies.

7. (a) Under normal conditions the supply from the mains may be so adequate and reliable that little thought is given to any other source of supply, but during an air raid the mains supply may fail owing to enemy action or the extra demand occasioned by numerous fires in the district.

(b) Water supplies adequate for major appliances such as Fire Engines or Trailer pumps may be available from rivers, canals, docks or cooling-water systems. If such a supply exists within 500 yards of the premises it would be valuable.

(c) Water supply on the following scale should be provided:-

(i) Stirrup hand pumps require about 2 gallons a minute. Two buckets (6 gallons) or two petrol tins (8 gallons) should be posted with each pump and a reserve of at least 10 gallons per pump in the form of additional buckets, tanks or barrels.

(ii) Two man manual fire appliances require from 10 to 16 gallons a minute and at least 10 minutes supply should be provided for each pump.

(iii) Fire Trailer Pumps require from 120 to 500 gals p.m. according to size and 10 minutes supply should be provided for each pump.

(d) The supply of waterrequired for different types of fire may be roughly estimated as follows:-

(i) Class A. Large W.D. factories, workshops, munition stores, aeroplane stations, docks, timber yards, railway depots, oil and petrol depots, refineries. 2,700 gallons a minute.

(ii) Class B. Small factories, workshops, timber yards, oil and petrol depots. 1,100 gallons a minute.

(iii) Class C. Barrack buildings at least 60 feet apart. 250 gallons a minute.

8. Fire Watchers and Fire Parties.

(a) Fire Watchers and Fire Parties are of vital importance in order to deal promptly and effectively with incendiary bombs and prevent the spread of fire.

(b) One fire watcher and one fire party of 3 men are required for every building - with a roof area of not over 8000 sq ft.

(c) Equipment. Fire Watchers. Steel helmet, whistle.
Fire Party. 1 stirrup hand pump
2 buckets of water (or 2 petrol tins)
2 buckets sand (or 6 petrol tins)
1 shovel
2 sand mats (vide PAD instructions No. 9)

(d) When the air raid "Alert" is sounded or when enemy aircraft is known to be in the vicinity a fire watcher should be posted so that he can see and hear the fall of incendiary bombs.

(e) Watchers indicate the fall of incendiary bombs by a series of short blasts on the whistle. As this is the signal for the fire parties to take immediate action, it is most important that the latter should be in close proximity to the fire watchers.

(f) Fire Parties deal with incendiary bombs as laid down in PAD Instructions Nos 7 and 9.

(g) The ideal to aim at is for incendiary bombs to be tackled AT ONCE by the SAND MAT smothering method. This ideal will only be achieved by an efficient and comprehensive organisation of fire watchers and fire parties by day and night, particularly BY NIGHT.

9. Fire Trailer Pumps.

(a) For scale of equipment and composition of Fire Trailer pump parties vide Pamphlet No 3, Passive Air Defence, Appendix III.

(b) These pumps are the most effective means of dealing with extensive fires caused by enemy action and therefore are essential equipment for W.D. factories and workshops.

(c) Fully trained teams and reserves essential.

(d) 15 cwt trucks for trailer pumps must be immediately available in order to ensure mobility.

(e) Reserve water supply is essential: small surface reservoirs and 100 gallon canvas dams should be considered.

10. Hose Reel Parties and Fire Hydrants.

(a) The scale of equipment and composition of a hose reel party for direct working from hydrant is laid down in Pamphlet No 3 P.A.D. Appendix XII.

(b) These parties must be frequently exercised in working hose pipes from hydrants and be fully acquainted with the location of the latter.

(c) As the success of this method will be dependent upon the water mains being intact and the water pressure available; it cannot be relied upon in a heavy air attack.

11. Factory and Workshop Premises.

(a) Inside all premises six gallons of water in buckets or 2 petrol tins (8 gallons) and 2 sand-mats, must be provided on or about the top floor.

(b) Inside all premises for every 4,500 sq ft of floor area the following should be provided:-

2 2 gallon soda chemical or CO_2 pressure type extinguishers. or one stirrup hand pump and 2 buckets of water. (or 2 petrol tins).
2 sand-mats. 2 buckets of sand (or 2 petrol tins).

(c) Outside premises 2 sand-mats for every 4,500 sq ft of the building.

12. Communications and Outside Assistance.

(a) Success in fire fighting depends very largely on the receipt of early information of an outbreak. It is therefore essential that a system of communications both inside and outside the establishment should be organised for that purpose.

(b) Every factory and workshop must have a carefully prepared plan for outside assistance both military and civil in the event of the factory or workshop fire services being unable to combat the fire.

(c) In many cases the civil fire brigade will be in the best position to render assistance in an emergency. Therefore it is important to maintain a close liaison with the local civil fire brigade.

13. Printed notices of "Precautions Against Fire" should be posted throughout the premises.

14. WATER SUPPLY - (Extract from PAD Pamphlet No 3).

SINCE ALL FIRE SERVICES DEPEND ON AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF WATER AND SINCE HOSTILE BOMBING MAY RENDER HYDRANTS USELESS, NO MATTER HOW EFFICIENT AND INTRICATE THE SYSTEM OF WATER MAINS MAY BE, IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT ADEQUATE RESERVES OF WATER SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN PLACES WHERE THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE RISK OF FIRE, TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY PUMPS.

C. Fire Precautions for Oil and Petrol.

15. Storage.

(a) Dispersion. It is of vital importance that there should be the maximum dispersion of oil and petrol.

(b) Ventilation. The maximum ventilation is desirable.

(c) Precautions. The vital importance of the prohibition of smoking, matches and naked lights in the storage area cannot be over emphasised.

16. Appliances.

(a) Foam. It has been found by experience that in most circumstances foam is the most effective means of dealing with oil and petrol fires. Although the 2 gallon foam extinguishers are eminently suitable for this purpose it is considered that the 34 gallon wheeled foam extinguishers

should be available if a large amount of petrol and oil is stored.

(b) Sand. Large sand bins, sand buckets and shovels should be placed at convenient points as an additional precaution. Sand is most effective for smothering an oil or petrol fire in its early stages.

(c) Carbon - Tetrachloride Extinguishers are effective but (a) are preferable.

17. Use of Water.

(a) Water, in the form of fog or fine spray has been used recently with success on many oil fires. This water must not be used as a solid straight jet, but as a finely atomized fog or fine spray which expands when heated into steam with marked extinguishing effect. This is much more effective when used on fires of the heavier oils such as diesel oil, fuel oil, lubricating oil, etc., where the flash point is much higher than petrol.

(b) Special spray or fog nozzles are used to gain this atomizing effect, but ordinary nozzles may be used in emergencies by directing the jet at a high angle and letting the water rain down into the flames in a subdivided form. While this method has been used successfully on many fires, it is desirable to use foam appliances first as they can usually be brought into action with the minimum of delay.

18. Car Parks.

These parks should have foam or carbon-tetrachloride extinguishers available.

19. Elementary Principles.

There are two guiding principles in fire precautions:-

(a) Prevention is better than cure. One match can cause a major conflagration. Therefore eliminate that one match by every precuation possible.

(b) FIGHT AGAINST TIME. One bucket of water or sand will put out the fire IF IT ARRIVES IN TIME.

6

SECRET

Summary

HQ 6 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 5
(Compiled from information received up to 1200 hrs 7 Sep 41).

PARAGRAPHS sidelined in the margin are only for the information of Lt. Colonels and above.

PART I

1. LIBYA

(a) TOBRUK Area.

(i) The following is the estimate of enemy strength in the TOBRUK area.

	Troops	Field Guns	Anti-tank Guns	Lt AA Guns	Heavy AA Guns
GERMAN	6604	48	45	50	4
ITALIAN					
17 PAVIA Div	6957	24	16	8	-
25 BOLOGNA Div	7677	44	24	12	-
27 BRESCIA Div	6287	24	14	8	-
Corps and Army Troops	5355	84	-	39	24
TOTAL	32880	224	99	117	28

(ii) NO tanks or armoured cars are included in this estimate as none have recently been identified in this area. It is considered therefore that armoured units, not at present located in the Frontier area, are lying up possibly in the GAMBUT or MARSA LUCCH areas.

(b) (i) Normal enemy artillery activity is considered to be 100 rounds daily. This is slight and may possibly be caused by either shortage of ammunition due to shipping losses between Italy and Libya or else transport difficulties netween Tripoli or Bengasi and the forward areas. However on 28 Aug and 29 Aug unusual enemy artillery activity was reported and 1000 and 700 rounds were fired on these two days. Only slight damage resulted.

(c) FRONTIER area.

(i) Up to 29 Aug traffic on HALFAYA Pass was still above normal, and blasting operations continue to be carried out in this area. Otherwise there is no unusual ground activity to report.

(ii) Since 19 Aug six attacks by Axis planes have been made on our shipping along the Egyptian coast, and on one occasion three supply ships were sunk by JU 87's. Other attacks were however unsuccessful

2. SYRIA

(a) Axis propaganda continues to be active throughout the Country, and the statement that a flow of Jews into Syria would inevitably follow a British occupation has again been revived. This was probably brought about by the necessity of employing a limited number of Jewish Contractors from Palestine.

(b) High prices continue to cause dissatisfaction among the civil population in DAMASCUS and on 30 Aug, as a protest against the high price of bread, there was some stone throwing and a few home made bombs were used. However, after a meeting at the Municipality on the following day, the position was again quiet.

(c) Figures up to 23 Aug 41 show that 90 officers and 3981 other ranks from the Vichy French Forces had volunteered to join the Free French. Of these only 25% were French, the remainder being Foreign Legion, North African and other coloured troops. In addition to the foregoing 1046 exPWs have volunteered to join the Free French.

3. IRAN

(a) On 31 Aug our troops occupied the AVEJ Pass, about 70 miles East of HAMADAN, and on the following day contact was made with the Russians in this area. Contact between the two forces was also made at SENNA, and it has now been decided that the British area of Control will be bounded by this line.

Local inhabitants have everywhere been friendly and the area through which the British advanced is now fast approaching normal.

(b) There exists however a general shortage of food throughout the Country, and local inhabitants complain that Iranian troops have been begging for food owing to short rations. Efforts are being made to relieve the situation and arrangements are now finalised to send 700 tons of wheat into the British occupied area of Southern Iran.

4. TURKEY

(a) No further information has been received of Turkish troop movements, but reports from a reliable source indicate the further strengthening, particularly against tank attack, of the defences in the BULAIR area.

(b) There is considerable evidence that certain of the TURKISH Ministers are actively co-operating with the Germans in the development for winter use of the caravan route ERZERUM-Iranian Frontier. The development is nominally being carried out by the well known firm of SHENKERS, but in practice is being arranged by the German Embassy, and special experts have been sent from Germany to arrange the actual development. The development includes the provision of thirty ten-ton German lorries and of snow ploughs and other equipment.

5. The BALKANS

(a) Reports concerning German troop movements in the Balkans are conflicting, and although some information indicates the presence of two Armoured Divisions in Bulgaria recently returned from the UKRAINE for refitting, this is considered unlikely. The maximum numbers of Divisions is probably four, distributed as follows:-

Bulgaria and Greek Thrace	- Two Inf Divisions
SOFIA area	- One Inf Division
VARNA-BURGAS area	- One Inf Division

In addition the 5 Mountain Division is in Crete.

(b) Italian troops in Greece have been estimated to number as many as 250,000, but that is probably an exaggeration. Their morale is reliably reported to be low.

(c) Evidence continues of widespread guerilla and sabotage activities in YUGOSLAVIA. Rebels are reported to have captured several villages in BOSNIA, to have sabotaged the railways from Italy to ZAGREB and to be harassing the Italians in MONTENEGRO.

4. USSR

(a) FAR NORTHERN Sector

No reports have been received from this Sector and since no specific claims have been made in either the Russian or German communiques during the period under review, it is presumed that the MURMANSK-LENINGRAD railway line is still in Russian hands.

(b) LENINGRAD Sector

(i) The main pressure of the German attacks on the Town are being launched from the West and SW, but reports indicate that so far they have not achieved any real success. Further South in the NOVOGRAD Area an additional German thrust is reported, but no details have been received in regard to progress made.

(ii) Russian counter attacks have been made South of Lake ILMEN, but again no information is available in regard to the scale of these attacks or the success achieved.

(c) SMOLENSK Sector

Activity in the Smolensk salient appears to have been confined mainly to consolidation on the part of the Germans and small attacks by the Russians. The line in this sector has not appreciably changed for three weeks.

(d) GOMEL-KIEV Sector

Fierce fighting has taken place in this sector with the Germans attempting two main thrusts, one on BRIANSK, and the other an enveloping movement to the SE, with apparently the object of firstly outflanking the KIEV position from the North and secondly the whole Russian position behind the DNIEPER. The result of these operations are not known but although some progress has been made by the Germans the Russians appear to be sufficiently strong to counter attack in strength.

(e) SOUTHERN UKRAINE.

In this sector the Russians appear to be firmly established behind the Dnieper, and only small scale efforts have been made by the Germans to cross the river. There now appears to be little doubt that the Russians left flank runs down to the mouth of the Dnieper and due South from DNIEPROPETROVSK to the Sea of AZOV.

(f) GENERAL

The number of German Divisions engaged up to the present on the Russian front is believed to be 171, this, without L of C troops etc, represents over 3,000,000 men. In addition to German troops, Roumanian, Hungarian and Italian troops have also been involved. It is reliably reported that the Roumanian General Staff estimate the casualties of these forces up to 31 Jul to be as follows:-

	Dead	Wounded
GERMAN	250,000	1,000,000
ROUMANIAN	28,000	92,000
HUNGARIAN	12,000	40,000
ITALIAN (Unknown)		
TOTAL Casualties	1,422,000	

This estimate appears large, but is less than the figures mentioned in Russian communiques, which according to a reliable source of information recently returned from Russia, have tended to be conservative rather than to exaggerate both losses in enemy infantry and planes.

(g) ENEMY METHODS

Russian sources report that the following interesting changes in German tank tactics have taken place in the Russian campaign:-

"German Panzer divisions no longer operate further ahead than the infantry, as they did in POLAND and FRANCE, since several divisions which tried to do it in RUSSIA suffered severe casualties.

Tanks now seldom operate without infantry in close support and incidentally, infantry seldom operate without tanks. If tanks do find themselves ahead of the infantry, they always now withdraw to the infantry at night and no longer attempt to laager in enemy territory.

Molotov cocktails and similar grenades containing petrol and other liquids, have been found most effective against German Tanks."

(h) Attached as appendix "B" is a map showing Russian-German positions so far as known.

PART II

The GERMAN AIR FORCE

The German Air Force, like the Army and Navy, is constituted as a separate arm of the defence services. The air force includes all ground air defence units with the exception of the motorised AA MG battalions which are retained by the Army as GHQ troops. (It is believed, however, that 2 cm (.79in) AA MGs have been issued to army units, and there are also a few AA guns mounted in coastal forts, which are manned by the Navy). All air requirements for the Army and Navy are met by the Air Ministry. The German Air Force is divided into:

Flying Branch
Anti-aircraft artillery
Signal Corps
Engineer Corps
Parachute troops
General GOERING Regiment
Observer Corps
Air Police.

In addition, the German Air Ministry controls every aspect of civil and commercial aviation to a degree which can only be achieved under a dictatorship. It is also responsible for all measures of passive air defence. The German Air Force is organised on a territorial basis: there are five commands, called AIR FLEETS (LUFTFLOTTEN). Within these "Air Fleet Commands", the majority of operational units, with the exception of home defence fighters, army co-operation and coastal recce units, are grouped into air corps (FLIEGERKORPS) and the divisions (FLIEGER-DIVISIONEN). These air corps are mobile formations and constitute GERMANY'S striking force. The Fliegerkorps are composite operational formations, consisting of a headquarters and bomber, dive bomber, fighter, coastal and recce formations. Organisation is not rigid, and changes in internal strength are made to meet the needs of the moment.

GENERAL ORGANISATION

As mentioned previously the German Air Force is organised on a territorial basis. There are five principal commands, called air fleets (LUFTFLOTTEN). The area within each air fleet is divided into smaller areas called "LUFTGAUE"; the latter corresponds to the army "WEHRKRIESE" or military districts.

"LUFTGAU" commanders are responsible for the administration and maintenance of all units situated within their area; although as a rule only the fighter units come under them for operational purposes.

They have under their command all training and ancillary units and anti-aircraft artillery not allotted to the field army or for other special tasks. They are also responsible for training (other than unit training), recruitment, mobilisation and training of air force reserve.

"LUFTGAU" commanders are responsible for all forms of active and passive air defence of their areas, and for this purpose within "LUFTGAU", large cities or vital industrial areas have been formed into air defence commands called "LUFTVERTEIDIGUNGSKOMMANDOS", which have ground air defence units and, according to their importance and vulnerability, fighter units.

It is important to emphasise the fact than an Air Corps (FLIEGERKORPS), although a composite operational formation, is capable of being entirely air borne; all its ground personnel,

technical equipment, repair shops etc being provided with their own transport. It is therefore an extremely mobile formation which can be moved relatively large distances very quickly.

FORMATION AND FLYING UNITS

German operational formations and flying units are grouped as follows:-

GESCHWADER	a formation of 2 - 4 GRUPPEN
GRUPPE	a unit of 3 - 5 STAFFELN
STAFFEL	a unit of 12 - 18 Aircraft

These German terms have no exact English equivalents.

GESCHWADER

A "Geschwader" is a mobile formation. It has its own headquarters flight of three aircraft of the same type of aircraft with which its units are equipped. "Geschwader" are homogeneous formations, but may have other units attached to them. Their size may vary as follows:

Bomber Geschwader	2 - 4 Gruppen
Fighter Geschwader	2 - 3 Gruppen

A bomber Geschwader has, normally, one long reconnaissance "Staffel" attached to it, but this has been reduced to 5 or 6 aircraft since the outbreak of war.

GRUPPEN

A "Gruppe", like a Geschwader, is mobile, and has its own headquarters flight. "Gruppen" contain a varying number of "Staffeln" (a formation between a British Squadron and flight), and, with the exception of reconnaissance or coastal units, are homogeneous.

A Gruppe may consist of:-

Bomber Gruppe	3 Staffeln and one Stabstaffel (HQ Staff) for reconnaissance purposes.
Fighter Gruppe	3 Staffeln
Reconnaissance Gruppe	3 to 5 long or short recconnaissance Staffeln
Coastal Gruppe	3 Staffeln of different types.

STAFFELN

A "Staffel" is a mobile operational unit. For tactical purposes only it may be divided into two or three "Schwarme" (generally 5 to 6 aircraft) or "Ketten" (generally 3 aircraft) or "Rotten" (generally 2 aircraft).

The peace strengths of "Staffeln" (excluding reserve aircraft) are:-

Bombers	12 aircraft
Fighters	12 - 18 aircraft
Reconnaissance	12 aircraft
Coastal	12 aircraft

Bomber and fighter "Staffeln" have one or two transport aircraft.

Capt.
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution - List B
8 Sep, 41.

Appendix "A" to 6 Aust Div
Weekly Intelligence Bulletin
No 5 dated 8 Sep 41.

TRANSLATION OF GERMAN DIARY (2/Lt. SCHORM)

CAPTURED IN LIBYA.

Instalment No. 1

26 Feb. To-day we are really moving. At 16.00 hrs the tanks are rolling along to WUNSDORF station. Loading on the train takes two hrs. At 20.00 hrs we are off. The journey, via MUNICH, the BRENNER, FLORENCE and ROME to NAPLES is to take three days. (Then follow reflections on parting from friends and relations, and on the attitude of the troop.)

27 Feb. After breakfast we become lively again in our compartment. The sidings of LEIPZIG and NUREMBURG are not very attractive.

28 Feb. Have scarcely shaved when the train pulls in INNSBRUCK. With some excitement we look forward to the BRENNER. At 11.00 hrs here we are in Italy. Poor, ragged people, but in DOPOLAVORO we get scrambled aggs cheap and a glass of Chianti too. In BOLZANO we ask: "What are the Italians saying?" Answer: "It's a good thing so many are coming". It looks just like an occupation. We have "something" up our sleeves for the return journey.

1 Mar. The Italian landscape is indescribably barren and dismal - not a tree, a shrub or a blade of grass. At 12.00 hrs exactly we reach AULIA. The Italian inhabitants give us a magnificient welcome. Young and old, they bring us cigarettes, wine, cake, chocolate, fruit and sweets. Even the country begins to look brighter, with factories dotted here and there. The leaning of PISA leans even more than one thought. At SPEZZIA we have our first glimpse of the Mediterranean. Moving along the coast, we see the Italy we have imagined. In LIVORNO more scrambled eggs. Everywhere the people wave to us and cry "'Eil 'Itler!" At midnight we are roused by a loud knocking at the door - its the train conductor, and we have halted in ROME.

2 Mar. At 09.30 hrs they wanted to unload us in CASERTA, but after we have been shunted backwards and forwards, they sent us on to NAPLES. On the station platforms a host of bright uniforms and everywhere small boys crying "Cigarette, Sir". At 13.30 hrs we reach the suburban station of NAPLES. Shunting, shunting, unloading. Then with many 'eil 'Itlers we march through the town to quarters in the Collegio Constanto Ciano. BUGH and I go off to the 'Albergo delle Terme'. (Then follows an account of the evening's tour of cafes.)

3 Mar. Visit to POMPEII and VESUVIUS.

4 Mar. At 05.00 hrs we leave our beds and climb into the tanks. There is an endless column going down to the harbour. Tanks, MT crowded together. Why doesn't Tommy come over? - Because he can do it more comfortably in TRIPOLI? The "HARBURG" takes on tank after tank, lorries, cars, tractors, heavy M/Cycles and 500 Kg bombs. The "REICHENFELS", "KYBFELS" and "ANKARA" likewise. Ours is the biggest - 7000 tons and a four-master into the bargain, worse luck. The others are only 5-6000 tons two-masters. At 19.00 hrs the gangway is raised. We cast off and drop anchor in the harbour.

5 Mar. 08.00 hrs. I make myself presentable and report to Col. OLBRICHT. 09.30 hrs the Squadron is given instructions, 10.00 hrs there is a practice alarm. From 11.00 hrs to 16.00 SCHORM sleeps. We were due to weigh anchor at 17.00 hrs. At last the

5 Mar. (Contd) tugs begin manoeuvring and at supper-time we leave port - the last boat. The weather has become very dirty. After half an hour we drop anchor. They say that in this sea the two destroyers could give us no protection. We drown our sorrows in chianti, and at 03.00 hrs everyone staggers to bed.

6 Mar. I get up at 11.00 hrs - magnificient weather. Meanwhile, the 1st Bn has arrived and is embarking. Suddenly we realise with horror that their biggest transport, the "LEVERKUSEN" is on fire. I hope they save the tanks. At last at 16.30 hrs escorted by three torpedo boats, we set sail. Besides the two 2 cm AA at bow and stern all available MGs are manned for AA defence. There is a Mk II tank on the starboard side and another on the port side. Will the Tommies really not do all they can to prevent us landing in Africa? Tanks, turning the scale in North Africa? ...

7 Mar. At 09.30 hrs am awakened by the sound of engines. M.E.110s and H.E.111s watch over us. At PANTELLARIA, which we pass to port, our destroyer escort increases to seven, with two auxiliary cruisers as well. At 16.30 hrs, just as we are playing a game of 'skast' with the MO and Lieut ERHARDT, we are told that we have turned back. The British fleet is said to be looking for us. I expected this, of course, from my experiences in Norway. And there it is too: If 5th Div gets to Africa, England loses the War! The British know this, too. How are we to get to Africa? The Italian navy has suffered very heavy losses. In the last convoy, when the British thought they would catch the tanks, a 10,000 ton cruiser was attacked and sunk outside TRIPOLI by six squadrons of British bombers and torpedo carriers..... At 19.30 hrs everyone ordered to stay on deck. It was about 23.30 when it happened - A terrific crash. "That's a torpedo" says one. Bump!!! "That was another", shouts Capt PROFFEN. Everyone tries to get into his life-jacket. Faces are pale. "Quiet, orders" shouts someone. As we come out the starboard look-out tells me that we have had a slight crash with the "REICHENFELS". It appeared that the "REICHENFELS's engines had failed, and in the darkness we had crashed side on. Unfortunately, besides the two starboard life-boats, we also had our degaussing hawser broken.

8 Mar. 09.00 hrs I get up to find that we are lying at anchor in PALERMO harbour, Sicily. Among the boats in the harbour are two cruisers and some auxiliary cruisers.

9 Mar. We set out for the third time at 02.00 hrs. At 15.00 hrs we again pass PANTELLARIA. Our escort is [illegible] destroyers. Two cruisers and a destroyer are said to be ahead. In the evening our escort of planes leave us. About midnight we pass the little Italian island of LAMPEDUSA lying to starboard.

10 Mar. Our course is now set towards MALTA. Everyone is on deck. 10.00 Hrs we catch sight of the African coast and at 12.30 hrs we enter the harbour of TRIPOLI. We've done it! Fifteen miles away from us, its's true, and Italian merchant ship and two tankers were sunk by submarine. Behind the Colonel and Adjutant I leave the "MARBURG" at 13.00 hrs at the head of half of 6 Coy. The scene in the docks is indescribably picturesque: General ROMMEL and German officers in field-grey, Air Force men in khaki trousers breeches, shorts; Italians in every concevable uniform.

As soon as we have disembarked we move off to our barracks "Five kilometres on the Via Littorenea". At 19.00 hrs we are ordered to the "Uaddan Hotel". General ROMMEL, GOC German Afrika Corps, explains the situation. At the hotel entrance I meet Lt.Col KORBEL and Lieut Dr. BEYER: both belong to a A/Bk unit.

11 Mar. Put on tropical kit. Unloaded the rest from equipment in the docks.

12 Mar. We load up the tanks and lorries. Inspect the troop, fill up with petrol, change the oil, and we're ready.

19 Mar. (Contd) behind with a defective fan-spindle. Over-heated. Did Cpl SUBE forget to grease? Irritating, because it will take several days to put it right. In my own tank, 621, the steering brakes are always giving trouble. But still, there's fun to compensate. Good hunting - today over a hundred head, scorpions and vipers.

20 Mar. The English plane was not a recce. It had come from England and made an intermediate landing in France or Tunisia. The six English sergeants had French money on them.

21 Mar. 06.00 hrs while it is still dark, I go the rounds of the posts. Another heavy sandstorm.

22 Mar. Fortunately the 2nd echelon arrives. We get some replacements from the tropical chest. Every day more tanks arrive from the Repair Section. But my tank is no better.

23 Mar. 11.30 hrs new situation. The Squadron is to take EL AGHEILA. Fine! 15.00 hrs my tank returns from the workshop section: bolt of steering brake broken. Non starter. Of course, just as I thought. In consequence I have to transfer to 625 and at 15.30 hrs move off with three tanks. After 30 km we pass behind EL MUGTAA, and at 18.00 hrs we reach EL HAGHATEIHA. Paint has just arrived, so overnight our tanks put on their yellow tropical uniform.

24 Mar. 07.30 hrs we are in battle order. But the morning passes without action. Other formations had surrounded EL AGHEILA on all four sides. Not an Englishman inside. Strangely enough, they let three lorries of Englishmen pass in and out again. Not a shot. On the other hand, the leading tank of 5 Company runs on a mine. Driver and wireless operator dead, the gunner and commander, Lt KESTNER, severely wounded. The place where the mines lay on the road was clearly recognisable by yellow diagonal stripes. Engineers were elsewhere. The swastika flag flies over the citadel. Other units go forward to occupy the town. I send tank 624 back to the workshop - cardan shaft twisted. And now there were only two! An armoured car from the Recce Bn runs on to another mine south of EL AGHEILA. - Total loss. These mines, German, Italian, and British are going to give us a lot of trouble all the way to CAIRO.

25 Mar. 621 is back again.

26 Mar. I transfer back to my 621. In the afternoon a visit from Major HOHMANN. 623 reports back. Shortly after 22.00 hrs 624 arrives. 2nd Troop at full strength.

27 Mar. Letter writing. I spend the evening with Sgt KUBELBECK.

28 Mar. I exchange W/T Corporal MULLER for gunner LOHRER, a SS man who is serving 60 days close arrest. I also have the nice task of trying three men. And now I hope we have gone through the whole gamut in 2 Troop - accidents, vehicle casualties, crime (Unfall, Ausfall, Sunderfall).

29 Mar. Washing day. I read something to the troops about the Austrian rebels, then sing with them, as for ten years I sang with my SA men.

30 Mar. Sunday and a new situation. Two groups are to advance on MARSA EL BREGA, one along the VIA BALBIA, one along the track to the south of the road, almost parallel. At 16.00 hrs we advance as far as EL AGHEILA. Having reconnoitred the track with Capt SCHUTZ (tank 605) we crawl into our wig-wam at 22.00 hrs.

End of Instalment 1.

12 Mar. (Contd) 14.00 hrs move off to the town and take up position in [redacted] parade. After the review at 17.00 hrs General ROMMEL and General GARIBOLDI Commander-in-Chief of troops in North Africa speak - the German commander with caution and tact, the Italian with emphasis. At 18.00 hrs the tanks rumble through the town along the Via Balbia (Littoranea) towards the east. All night long we are greeted by soldiers, settlers and natives. So we pass through TAGIURA, GASR GARABULLI, GASR CHIAR, LITTORIANO and HOMS.

13 Mar. At 08.30 hrs we camp behind LEPTIS MAGNA. We fill up with petrol, check up on the tanks, and pitch tents quickly. At 16.00 hrs, just as we are thinking of bathing, a full sized Gibli forces us to take refuge in the tanks. We cover up the tanks quickly with blankets and tenting. When we set off again at 19.00 hrs the sand is still whirling about. On we go through barren desert, passing the oases of ZLITEN, MISURATA, and BIR GIMI.

14 Mar. At 09.30 we halt near T'JORGA. We scrounge two basins of water from an Italian petrol lorry and can wash and shave, clean our teeth and wash stockings and handkerchiefs - five of us. At 13.25 hrs my tank 625 arrives. Just before MISURATA it had to change tracks. The crew are busy on it till 17.00 hrs. But at 18.00 hrs we're on our way again through EL HESSIA.

Unfortunately there was an accident in the twilight - 624 knocked out a heavy M/cycle, gunner HUBNER losing three toes. There are two killed in 5 Coy. - Italian lorries which do not dim their lights and approach on the right hand side are gently pushed aside by us.

15 Mar. At 04.00 hrs we halt for a rest at EL CHEDDAHIA. A quick fill up with petrol, then we heat up some coffee. It's hellish cold. Not till 07.30 hrs can we get to sleep. On account of the accident I switch round Cpls. PENACKI, LEHMANN and SAAL. At 21.00 hrs we are off again - THED HASSAN BIR BU DJARADE, BIR BU RETMA. About [redacted].00 hrs, in the middle of an air raid warning, we have to adj[redacted] right hand steering brake.

16 Mar. We arrive at 08.00 hrs at the camp at SIRTE, an hour after the Squadron.


17 Mar. Slept well, even though rather c[redacted]. Put our vehicles and other things in order. 16.00 hrs the column moves off on a 140 km stage of the journey. SIRTE is full of troops. There are a number of ME 110s parked in the aerodrome. Then the grim and barren desert again. But at 18.30 hrs the scene improves as we near the sea again. Yesterday the British attacked the A.Tk Bn ahead of us. Unfortunately there were wounded and dead..... By night we pass through EL SULTAN, BIR EN NAIM, EL ASELA, all strongly held.

18 Mar. At last we halt at 04.30 hrs near NOFILIA. After the usual tasks we all disappear inside the wig-wams. In the afternoon we learn what the situation is. Against us are:- One English armd Div, one French motorised brigade, one Australian Corps of three divisions and one Indian division. The enemy has 400 tanks and 4 artillery regt with about 100 8-12 cm guns. The last is the most unpleasant part.

At 22.00 hrs we set out on the last stage. MARSA EL AUEGIA, SIDI BHERE BEN GAUUAD, B-er RHEM, MARSA EL IHUDIA, BEN AMOR, MATRATIN, and finally the Arch of FILENE. Here there are already clear signs of war. At 08.00 hrs we reach our position, from which we are to cover to the South. And already there's the first enemy recce plane. The German AA promptly brings him down. And now the three stages of our journey are completed - railway, sea, road - and here we are 50 km from the British...

19 Mar. 08.00 hrs we pitch camp. Rumour has it that we are be here three weeks. But you can be certain that no sooner have we got the tent-pegs fixed in this stony ground than the order to move will come. - It's extremely annoying. Tank 623 had to remain

APPENDIX "B" TO 6 AUST DIV INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN N°5 SEPT 8 1941



SCALE 1: 7,500,000.

001861G

JWB

'639

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

8 Sep, 41.

1. The following information concerning letters to Prisoners of War is circulated for information.

i. Letters to Prisoners of War, which are conveyed post-free, should be brief and clearly written. The address must be written in ink.

ii. Writers must be careful to give no information likely to be of a military, political or economic value to the enemy, and they must be careful not to say anything (such as abuse against the enemy) likely to bring about retaliatory action against the recipient.

iii. No photographs, pictures or printed matter of any kind may be enclosed.

iv. The sender must write his name and rank (without number or unit) on the back of the envelope. He may put only his name (without his address) in the letter. However, if he desires an answer, he must put C/o The Prisoners of War Missing and Wounded Bureau, British Red Cross War Organisation, 9 SHARIAH MALIKA FARIDA, CAIRO as his address at the head of the letter. In this case he must register his SERVICE address with the Bureau.

Letters to PsW in GERMANY, FRANCE and ALSACE should be addressed as follows:-

If the name of the camp is known:-
Post de Prisonnier de Guerre — Franc de Port
Kriegsgefangenpost — Gebuhrenfrei
(Name) (Rank) (No)
Englischer
(Name of Camp)
Allemagne (Deutschland)

This address should be written not only on the envelope but also on the letter itself.

If the name of the camp is not known, address thus:-
Post de Prisonnier de Guerre — Franc de Port
Kriegsgefangenpost — Gebuhrenfrei
(Name) (Rank) (No)
Prisonnier de Guerre Britannique en Allemagne aux soins du Comite International de la Croix Rouge.
Agence Centrale,
Palais du Conseil General,
Geneve, Suisse.

Letters to PsW in ITALY as follows:-
Poste de Prisonnier de Guerre — Franc de Port
(Name) (Rank) (No)
Prisonnier de Guerre Britannique en Camp (Sulmona) Italie aux soins du Comite International de la Croix Rouge,
Agence Centrale,
Palais du Conseil General,
Geneve, Suisse.

2. The above envelope should not be franked and should not be impressed with unit censor stamp, and should not be closed.

3. Letters to Prisoners of War are free of all postal dues and no stamps are required.

Having carried out the above instructions the letter to the Prisoner of War should then be enclosed in an outer cover and forwarded to -

Deputy Chief Field Censor,
13, Midan Khedive Ismail,
G.H.Q.
Middle East.

5. In order that replies from the Prisoner of War may be forwarded to the sender, he must communicate his correct Army Postal address to the British Red Cross, Cairo and request them to register it.

A. D. Allen
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -
List B.

F. War Diary

8

99/G.

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

9 Sep 41.

MIDDLE EAST SCHOOLS - SUBMISSION OF NOMINAL ROLLS

1. The attached letter from AIF (ME) is forwarded for information and necessary action.

2. The action required in para 1(a) will be carried out by this HQ and not by formations or units. Nominal rolls detailed in para 1(b) will be provided by units in addition to the nominal rolls previously forwarded to this HQ.

3. Attention is drawn to paras 3(b) and 3(d) of the attached letter.

[signature]
for Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List B.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE. EXPRESS

G.1854.

Headquarters,
A.I.F. (M.E.)
6 Sep 41.

MIDDLE EAST SCHOOLS - SUBMISSION OF NOMINAL ROLLS.

1. The following procedure will be adopted in respect of allotment of vacancies and submission of nominal rolls for Middle East Schools:

   (a) On receipt of the allotment of vacancies Formations and/or Units will inform this HQ by signal by the date specified of the number of vacancies surrendered.

   (b) Nominal rolls are NOT required by this HQ, but students will be sent to Schools with a certificate signed by the C.O. of the Unit stating that the student has been sent to attend a certain course at a certain School. This refers to both Offrs and OR stucents.

2. Sub-para 1 (b) will apply with the following exceptions:

   (i) ME Staff School - Selection will be made by this HQ;

   (ii) Combined Training Centre - OCTU and SME - Nominal rolls will be submitted as heretofore.

3. The following points require special attention:

   (a) Students MUST arrive on time.

   (b) Students MUST know their destination, and the course to which they are proceeding.

   (c) Surrenders MUST be notified by the date specified in the allotment of vacancies letter.

   (d) Students once attending a course are not available for recall without prior reference to this HQ. This recall will only be sanctioned in cases of extreme urgency.

J.K. Burdon-Hood Col.,
A.A.G.S.

Distribution:

1 Aust Corps	70
2/16 Aust A. Fd Coy.	1
2/2 Aust MG Bn.	1
6 Aust Div.	80
7 Aust Div.	50
9 Aust Div.	45
RAA 9 Aust Div.	5
AIF (ME) Reinft Depot	50
AIF (ME) Base Area	10
	312

SECRET

3/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

10 Sep 41.

TRAINING EQUIPMENT.

All units proceeding upon an operational role will, before leaving their place of mobilization, return all equipment in excess of their G.1098 scale to the nearest Ord Depot.

Lt Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION -

List "C".

AJSC/TG

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

S/4090/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

12 Sep 41.

ISSUE OF CAPES, ANTI-GAS, TO REINFORCEMENTS.

The following extract from CRE/9390/G(SD) of 1 Sep 41 is forwarded herewith:-

"1. In view of the facts that units hold Capes anti-gas in bulk for the whole of their W.E. and that Capes anti-gas are not sent back with casualties, personnel leaving Base Depots as reinforcements will NOT be equipped with this item of personal anti-gas equipment.

2. Similarly, Capes anti-gas for the full W.E. of the Base Depot should be kept in store and NOT issued to the man.

3. Capes rubberised (or U/S Capes anti-gas surplus to Scale) should be used for training purposes."

Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "A" plus serials 22 - 25

TG

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

11 Sep 41.

10

6 AUST DIV.

TACTICAL EXERCISE

ASLUJ AREA.

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FH/TG

HQ 6 Aust Div.
7 Sep 41.

6 AUST DIV

TACTICAL EXERCISE - ASLUJ.

INTRODUCTORY

1. A tactical exercise, with RAA 6 Aust Div co-operating, will be carried out in the ASLUJ area on 15 Sep - 16 Sep 41.

2. The exercise will consists of several minor tactical problems, which will be solved by students, who will then co-operate with arty comds in producing the arty support decided upon.

3. At a later date the exercise will be repeated as a tactical exercise with troops, an inf bn co-operating with RAA 6 Aust Div.

DIRECTING STAFF.

Major-General E.F. HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED.
Brigadier H.W. STRUTT
Colonel R.B. SUTHERLAND.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

(1) The following offrs will attend:-

Unit or Formation	Officers	Total
HQ 6 Aust Div	-	6
6 Aust Cav	CO and one	2
RAE 6 Aust Div	CRE and one	2
Sigs 6 Aust Div	CO and one	2
16 Aust Inf Bde		-
Bde HQ	Brig and two	3
2/1 Bn	CO and Two senior Coy Comds	3
17 Aust Inf Bde		-
2/6 Bn	" " " " " "	3
2/7 Bn	" " " " " "	3
19 Aust Inf Bde		-
Bde HQ	Brig and two	3
2/4 Bn	CO and two senior Coy Comds	3
2/8 Bn	" " " " " "	3
2/11 Bn	" " " " " "	3
18 Aust Inf Bde	Brig and one	2
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	CO and one senior Coy Comd	2

(2) RV & TIME - In MT on road east of ASLUJ POLICE POST at 0800 hrs 15 Sep 41.

(3) DURATION OF EXERCISE - Exercise will conclude in time for personnel to return for lunch on 16 Sep.

(4) BIVOUAC SITE. - OFFRS attending exercise will bivouac in the Artillery Camp ASLUJ. Tentage will not be provided.

(5) RATIONS. - Offrs attending will be rationed by RAA 6 Aust Div. They are requested to bring their own messing gear.

(6) BATMEN. - Batmen will not be taken. If necessary Drivers will act as batmen.

(7) EQUIPMENT. - Binoculars, protractors and compasses will be required.

(8) MAPS. - Copies of maps on the scale of one per student are forwarded herewith.

TIMETABLE.

Date	Time From	Time To	Event	Place	D.S. Concerned
12 Sep	-	-	Issue Admin Instrs.	JULIS Camp	-
13 Sep	-	-	Issue object, opening narrative & narrative 1.	"	-
15 Sep	0800	-	Personnel attending TEWT report to Div RV	POLICE POST BIR ASLUJ	-
	0830	0840	Description of ground	STAND 1	Col SUTHERLAND
	0840	0850	Issue of Bde OO for the attack.	" "	" " "
	0855	0900	Issue of Problem 1.	" "	" " "
	0900	0920	Solve Problem 1 - Part 1.	" "	" " "
	0935	1000	Problem 1 - PART II.	" "	Maj. ANDERSEN
	1000	1020	Demonstration 1. - Part 1.	" "	" " "
	1030	1100	Demonstration 1 - Part II.	" "	" " "
	1100	1120	Move to STAND 2.	- -	- - -
	1125	1130	Issue Narrative 2. and Problem 2.	STAND 2	Capt. HASSETT
	1130	1135	Solve Problem 2. - Part 1.	" "	" " "
	1145	1205	Problem 2. - Part II.	" "	" " "
	1205	1215	Demonstration 2.	" "	" " "
	1215	1330	Lunch	Arty Camp	~~Arty Camp~~
	1330	1430	Move to STAND 3.	- -	- - -
	1430	1440	Issue of Narrative 3 & Problem 3.	STAND 3	Col SUTHERLAND
	1440	1500	Solve Problem 3	" "	" " "
	1515	1530	Issue Narrative 4 & Problem 4.	" "	" " "
	1535	1550	Solve Problem 4	" "	" " "
/330	~~1605~~	1620	Demonstration 3.	" "	" " "
	1625	1635	Issue Narrative 5 & Problem 5.	" "	" " "
	1640	1650	Solve Problem 5.	" "	" " "
	1655	1710	Demonstration 4. -	" "	" " "
	1715	1720	Issue Narrative 6.	" "	" " "
	1720	1800	Register Barrage	" "	Maj. ANDERSEN
	1800		Return Arty Camp	= -	- - -
	2030		Discussion on points brought out in problems	Arty Camp	Col. SUTHERLAND
16 Sep	0730		Report to RV	STAND 3.	
	0730	0745	Demonstration Barrage	" "	Maj. ANDERSEN
	0745	0800	Register Smoke Screen	" "	" " "
	0800	0815	Smoke Demonstration	" "	" " "

TRACE "A"

3

LOCATION of STANDS

REF MAP 1/50,000 RAFAH - BEERSHEBA
(SUPERIMPOSE.)

120,000

050,000

STAND 1

STAND 3

STAND 2

140,000

6 AUST DIV.

TACTICAL EXERCISE - ASLUJ

Ref Maps:- BEERSHEBA 1/100,000 Sheet II
RAFAH - BEERSHEBA 1/50,000 Sheet "A".

OBJECT

1. (a) To practise comds of arty and inf units in the procedure necessary to produce arty fire in support of inf.

(b) To demonstrate by firing:-

(i) The time necessary to produce the required arty support.
(ii) The effect of such fire when produced.

OPENING NARRATIVE.

(1) In Aug 41 the situation in the MIDDLE EAST was as follows -

(a) Fighting had extended into SYRIA and the GERMANS had reached the line of the PALESTINE - SYRIAN frontier, where their advance was held up.

(b) The BRITISH Navy is unopposed in the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, but the concentration of dive bombers in SYRIA mades it extremely dangerous for the fleet to operate along the PALESTINE Coast. Consequently HAIFA and JAFFA cannot be used as ports and all movement of supplies and troops from EGYPT must be by road and rail.

(2) For the past few months 6 Aust Div has been stationed in SOUTHERN PALESTINE with the role of internal security and defence of the L of C.

(3) 16 Aust Inf Bde was located in the area BEERSHEBA - GAZA. Towards the end of Jul it was concentrated in the vicinity of BEERSHEBA with the object of dealing with suspected Fifth Column activity amongst the tribes in the HEBRON HILLS. Additional tps under comd 16 Aust Inf Bde were:-

"A" Sqn 6 Aust Cav Regt
2/1 Aust Fd Regt
7 Bty 3 Aust Lt AA Regt
2/1 Aust Fd Coy
2/1 Aust Fd Amb

2/1 Aust (MG) Bn was not available for duty with 6 Aust Div.

(4) During 13 Sep and 14 Sep enemy air activity over PALESTINE considerably increased. At 0800 hrs 14 Sep reports were received from the EL ARISH area that a wave of approximately 250 GERMAN aircraft (JU52's) had appeared shortly after first light and had succeeded in landing tps in the coast area just south of EL ARISH. Further communications during the morning reported that these tps were attacking the tps at EL ARISH and that the main PALESTINE - EGYPT railway had been cut just south of EL ARISH. No further communications were received after 1100 hrs.

(5) Tac/R during the afternoon of 14 Sep reported a further arrival of GERMAN Tp carrying and supply places at EL ARISH. Enemy tps were also reported to have landed near the main road BEERSHEBA - ISMAILIA in the vicinity of ASLUJ.

(6) An Australian Convoy of 50 vehicles coming up from EGYPT was captured in the vicinity of EL ARISH.

(7) At 1000 hrs on the 14 Sep a div conference was held at GAZA. The GOC, when addressing the conference said:-

"You realise that the tps landed in the vicinity of EL ARISH are probably the advance elements of a GERMAN air borne div.

7. (Contd)

Their intention is obviously to cut our L of C and prevent the use of the rd and rly from EGYPT. As it is impossible to make use of the sea as a means of supply, this action will place us in a very awkward position unless the situation is cleared up within the next few days. 17 Aust Inf Bde are already South of GAZA advancing down the coastal route to EL ARISH. I want a force to move down the rd BEERSHEBA - ISMAILIA, with the object of re-opening the rd and later assisting the 17th Bde to clear up the EL ARISH area. I intend to use the 16 Aust Inf Bde/for this task". Gp

Then turning to the Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde:-

"I can make available to you by 1300 hrs today one reserve MT coy, which is now on its way down from JERUSALEM. With this MT available, can you begin the advance this afternoon?"

Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde agreed that this would be possible.

HQ 6 Aust Div.
7 Sep 41.

NARRATIVE 1.

(1) At 1500 hrs 14 Sep 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp commenced the move south along the rd BEERSHEBA - ASLUJ. Shortly after 1600 hrs our mobile tps reported contact with enemy tps in the vicinity of BIR ET TURKI 132 051. These were identified as part of a GERMAN Recce Unit and withdrew after a few shots were fired. Stronger resistance was encountered astride the main road in the vicinity of KILO 114 (1305 0486). "A" Sqn was held up by a force estimated at one coy of inf, supported by 75 mm guns and HMGs.

(2) At 1830 hrs an attack was launched by the leading inf bn with arty support. The enemy was not in strength and withdrew fighting a delaying action. Fighting continued throughout the night and by 0700 hrs 15 Sep our leading bn had passed through BIR ASLUJ and was consolidating on the TRIG 372 feature 1252 0462. The enemy had withdrawn into the hills west of TRIG 372. The remainder of the Bde Gp was concentrating in the vicinity of BIR ASLUJ. 1

(3) Reports from 6 Aust Div timed 1500 hrs 14 Sep stated that further landings of German aircraft had taken place in the EL ARISH area. It was now estimated that a complete GERMAN Airborne division had been landed and was now disposed in the EL ARISH and ASLUJ areas. Maintenance was being carried out by air.

(4) 6 Aust Cav reported that an enemy force estimated at one Inf Regt with Machine guns and at least one Bty of 75 mm Mountain guns was in position East of the WADI EL ARIM in the vicinity of Knoll 306 (1213 0455) and the sand dunes to the east of it. Enemy detachments had been located in the vicinity of KILO 129 (1207 0404) covering a series of road blocks. These were strong mobile detachments protected by anti-tank guns and Arty.

(5) GERMAN prisoners reported that approximately 50 captured AUSTRALIAN vehicles had arrived during morning of 14 Sep from EL ARISH bringing up additional GERMAN tps. Most of this tpt had remained in the ASLUJ area.


(6) Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde decided to deal with the ASLUJ Force before pushing on to EL ARISH. At 0845 hrs his bn comds assembled on the hill 500 yds south of the TRIG 372 feature and he issued orders for a further advance.

16 INF BDE G.P. O.O. N°4.

Ref Map 1/50,000 RAFAH - BEERSHEBA (Superimpose)

SECRET
Copy N°2.
~~5 May 41.~~
15 Sep 41

120,000
050,000



INFORMATION:-

Located enemy posts as shown O

Coy localities 2/1 Bn shown (P) - Strong (P)

INTENTION:-

16 Aust Inf Bde Gp will capture OBJECTIVE KNOLLS and will destroy enemy in the ASLUJ area.

METHOD:-

Forward Tps 2/2 Bn - Right.
2/3 Bn - Left.

128,000
130,000

Support.
One bty in support each forward bn.

Res
2/1 Bn will support attack in initial stages. Will then come into Res and follow 1000 yds in rear of fwd bns.

INTERCOMN:

Bde HQ POLICE POST area. 1000
Bde Comd Post. TRIG 372 from ~~0500~~ hrs. Then moves with res bn. 0730
Synchronisation ~~0400~~ hrs.

DISTRIBUTION:-

LIST "A" (by hand at once)
Issued ~~through Sigs~~ ~~1330~~ hrs.


Maj,
BM.

16 INF BDE G.P. O.O. N°4.

Ref Map. 1/50,000 RAFAH - BEERSHEBA
(Superimpose)

SECRET
Copy N°2.
~~20 MAY 41.~~
15 Sep 41

120,000
050,000



INFORMATION:-

Located enemy posts as shown O

Coy localities 2/1 Bn shown (P)

INTENTION:-

16 Aust Inf Bde Gp will capture OBJECTIVE KNOLLS and will destroy enemy in the ASLUJ area.

METHOD:-

Forward Tps 2/2 Bn - Right.
2/3 Bn - Left.

128,000
130,000

Support.
One bty in support each forward bn.

Res
2/1 Bn will support attack in initial stages. Will then come into Res and follow 1000 yds in rear of fwd bns.

INTERCOMN:

Bde HQ POLICE POST area.
Bde Comd Post. TRIG 372 from 0500 hrs. Then moves with res bn.
Synchronisation ~~0400~~ 0730 hrs.

DISTRIBUTION:-

LIST "A"
Issued ~~through Sigs~~ ~~1830~~ hrs.-

Maj,
BM.

PROBLEM 1. (Issued verbally on STAND 1 at 0855 hrs 15 Sep).

1. As comd 2/3 Bn:-

(a) Your outline plan of attack with details of fire plan.

(b) Arrangements with bty comd to produce any arty support required.

(Time allowed - twenty minutes).

2. (For arty offrs). As Comd "A" Bty carry out any registration required to bring the fire plan into effect.

(Time allowed - thirty minutes).

DEMONSTRATION 1.

1. Demonstration showing procedure necessary to produce arty support.

(Time allowed - twenty minutes).

2. The firing of arty concentrations as requested by the Bn comd.

(Time allowed - thirty minutes).

DS NOTES ON PROBLEM 1.

1. The object of the problem was to practice the arty comd and the inf comd in:-

(a) The selection of suitable tasks for the supporting arty. Usual tendency is to select too many tasks. This means that the arty, if they complied with this request, would have dispersed fire on several targets and concentrated and effective fire on none.

(b) The procedure and liaison to be carried out between the arty comd and inf comd in order to produce the required fire.

(c) To show time required by arty to prepare a fire plan, and what this fire looks like on the ground.

2. The tactics involved in the production of the outline plan for the attack are quite simple and should not call for much comment. The following points should be noted:-

(a) The situation is still obscure and it is advisable to advance on a two coy front with a strong res.

(b) The ground is impassable to MT and difficult for carriers. This means:-(i) That the use of the 3" mortar after an advance of say 1000 yds will be uncertain. (ii) The getting up of amn and tools to the tps when the objective is captured is a difficult problem. Use of res coys as carrying parties may be considered necessary. The left flank is passable to MT but its use will probably bring arty fire from the mob dets at KILO 129.

3. (a) From information known about enemy localities, the most important tasks for the arty are:-

(i) Post on SANDY RIDGE.
(ii) Post on left slope of SANDY RIDGE.


These localities command the approaches to ~~the objective~~.

(b) At a later stage arty fire will be required on the post on ANDERSON SPUR.

4. (a) It is considered that tasks selected should be dealt with separately by bty concentrations in preference to splitting into tp tasks.

(b) The bn comd may decide that the situation does not call for a timed arty programme, but that the best fire support may be obtained by calling for fire for effect on targets as they appear.

5. Communications within Fd Bty.



From here can cover most of zone, when RA stabilizes their moves forward.

On ground waiting for orders From X to advance to next bound.

Normally, there are 2 frequencies allotted per bty. In the above diagram S1 and S2 are stands 1 and 11. If RA were asked to fire on a task during fire plan he would simply call up X and give the situation and ask for permission to use his own tp. X consults the Bn Comd and calls up RA with the answer.

If RB were asked he would call up GB who would then relay to K to X - the whole thing taking a number of minutes. If RB has cable to GB then he can be linked up to K, who can have one ear to telephone and the other on remote control from K set to X and K, then relays to X. In fact, if wireless only were used it would take say 7 mins for X to know the proposition, if cable then about 3 mins.

Often only one frequency is available per bty and therefore each OP can speak direct to X and to their tps.

In the diagram above messages from left Coy Comd can be passed direct to Bn Comd via RA - X.

NARRATIVE 2. (Issued verbally at STAND 2 at 1125 hrs 15 Sep).

1. In his plan for the attack the bn comd ordered an attack on a two coy front with one mortar det under comd each forward coy. One arty OP was established on the STAND 1 feature and an FOO was moving with the left forward coy. This FOO had call on his own tp when it was not engaged on the fire plan task.

2. As the forward pls of the left forward coy passed one on each side of the STAND 2 feature and reached the line of shrub (pointed out on ground) they came under mortar fire from A and MG fire from B (locatalities pointed out on ground). Initial casualities were considerable and the coy's rate of advance was greatly reduced as the tps were forced to make the maximum use of ground/cover in order to maintain their advance. The res pl was 100[x] in rear of STAND 2. Coy Comd was observing from the STAND 2 feature.

/ and

PROBLEM 2.

1. As A Coy Comd (left fwd coy), carry out any action considered necessary to assist the advance of the coy.

(Time allowed - five minutes).

2. (For arty offr). As FOO B tp, carry any arty task required by the Inf comd.

(Time allowed - twenty minutes).

DEMONSTRATION 2.

1. A 75 mm tp comes into action at Point C (pointed out on ground). Arty engage.

DS NOTES ON PROBLEM 2.

1. Object was to exercise the coy comd in calling for quick fire support from the FOO.

2. The inf comd is presented with two targets, both of which are inflicting casualties, and must decide in which order to deal with them. It is suggested that the MG target be dealt with first, as the mortar is within our own mortar range. If the mortar det under comd is not now available, then a concentration of small arms fire could probably deal with the enemy mortar. The bn comd may decide to use sec of carriers for this task. Any question of the arty tp engaging the target simultaneously should be over-ruled.

3. Students should be informed that when a tp comd has call on his own tp it must be specifically stated as to what guns he can have during a fire plan task.. e.g. during a barrage only superimposed guns can be withdrawn. Similarly if a concentration or timed program is being put down, the bn comd is the only person who can decide whether portion of that fire can be withdrawn. If a coy comd asks his FOO for fire on a certain place whilst the tp is engaged on a bty task the FOO must refer it to his BC. The BC then (asks bn comd or if he knows the situation well enough) gives or does not give the necessary permission to reduce the cone.

NARRATIVE 3. (Issued verbally at STAND 3 at 1430 hrs 15 Sep)

1. By 1430 hrs the situation was as follows:-

(a) Forward coys had reached their objective and came under heavy fire as they attempted to exploit across the WADI THEMELE.

(b) Res coys were crossing the SANDY RIDGE feature.

(c) Bn Comd and Adjt, both in carriers, had arrived at STAND 3 feature. Comd A Bty was moving with the Bn Comd.

(d) Enemy had made use of the good cover available and a considerable number of tps had managed to withdraw into prepared positions just west of the WADI THEMELE.

PROBLEM 3.

As comd 2/3 Bn:-

(a) State in sequence your proposed actions.

(b) Your orders to A Bty Comd with reference to his zone of observation for counter-attack tasks.

(Time allowed - twenty minutes).

DS NOTE ON PROBLEM 3.

1. The object was to stress the following points:-

(a) The necessity for rapid action on the part of the Bn Comd in order to deal with the threat of immediate counter-attack. (Note: in circumstances where enemy are retreating in full flight, his immediate problem would not be the threat of counter-attack but that of maintaining close contact).

(b) That it is the responsibility of the Bn Comd to issue brief orders to the Arty Comd as regards target areas and that this should not be left entirely to the Arty Comd. These orders must be issued early in order to allow time for registration.
The following paras set out the probable action of the Bn comd:-

2. On reaching SANDY RIDGE the Bn comd would ensure that the forward coys are moving towards their correct objectives. He would then move behind the forward coys to a position of observation from which he would quickly decide:-

(a) If it is necessary to maintain close contact either by sending out inf patrols or carriers.

(b) The approaches into the position for enemy counter-attack and ground vital to the defence of the area.

(c) How to secure his open flank. The points mentioned in sub paras (b) and (c) affect the employment of his res coys.

3. The following points should be noted:-

(a) Enemy are in close contact and it would be dangerous to send patrols forward in daylight against prepared positions.

(b) Counter-attack will most likely come from the SW where a low sandy ridge affords a good forming up place. Also strong enemy mobile dets had been reported in the vicinity of KILO 129. The Bn res should be sited to deal with counter-attack particularly from this direction and also the possible role of recapturing the high ground South of the 306 feature.

(c) Left flank should be secured by sending a res coy to occupy the high ground to the south of the 306 feature.

(d) The adjt in his carrier is a suitable person to see that these orders are carried out. The whole thing must be done with a minimum of delay.

4. The Bn Comd then informs the bty comd of the area in which he wants arty fire in the event of a counter-attack. Arty then register these points. (This would have already been done in outline by the coy comd and FOO immediately they reached the coy objective.) If patrols were being sent out (are not in this case) then the arty comd must be informed of the proposed routes and timings.

5. After this action has been taken the bn comd carries out a more detailed recce and decides on:-

(a) Final dispositions of the coys.

(b) Defensive Fire Plan. Arty comds must be informed of the arty defensive fire tasks as early as possible so that registration can be carried out.

6. At the same time as (4) and (5) above are being done, arrangements are being made for:-

(a) Replenishment of amn etc (RSM).

(b) Establishment of communication to the rear and to the flanks (Sig offr).

(c) The provision of observation and information (IO).

(d) The supporting of a further advance (Bn comd at a later stage).

NARRATIVE 4. (Issued verbally at STAND 3 at 1515 hrs 15 Aug).

1. The final dispositions adopted by the bn were as follows:- (described on ground in accordance with sketch attached).

PROBLEM 4.

1. As comd 2/3 Bn your orders to Comd A Bty as regards his tasks in the defensive fire plan.

(Time allowed - fifteen minutes).

DEMONSTRATION 3.

1. Registration of arty defensive fire tasks.

2. Firing of arty defensive fire tasks:-

(a) Wrong way. Fire of bty disposed over four tasks.

(b) Correct way. Fire of bty falling in bty blob on most important task.

(Time allowed - thirty minutes).

DS NOTES ON PROBLEM 4.

1. The object of the problem is to exercise the bn comd in the selection of defensive fire tasks and to demonstrate the firing of these tasks in the correct and incorrect way.

2. The attached trace shows the possible defensive fire tasks marked in green. The most important and the one it is considered necessary to have fired is marked in red.

3. The demonstration will show:-

(a) The firing of four defensive fire tasks - two guns on each. (Tasks may be faked as it is not possible to get observation over the whole bn front).

(b) The firing of a bty concentration on one defensive fire task. (It will be explained that for reasons of safety the most important task in front of the left coy is not being fired)

PAGE. 12.

TRACE. B"


120 000

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ISSUED WITH D.S. NOTES ON PROBLEM 4.

REF MAP 1/50 000 - RAFAH BEERSHEBA

SUPERIMPOSED



120.800

040 000

NARRATIVE 5. (To be issued verbally at STAND 3 at 1625 hrs 15 Sep)

1. At 1145 hrs a road patrol from 6 Aust Cav wirelessed that enemy mobile dets in the vicinity of KILO 129 appeared to be organising for an attack.

2. At 1230 hrs lorried enemy inf appeared from the vicinity of KILO 129 moving towards SANDY RIDGE. At the same time an enemy arty OP was seen moving into position at D (pointed out on ground) /our Shelling of posts commenced almost immediately.

PROBLEM 5.

1. As CO 2/3 Bn your orders to the bty comd.

(Time allowed - five minutes).

DEMONSTRATION 4.

1. The arty fired on targets representing the lorried inf moving towards SANDY RIDGE.

2. At a later stage enemy inf were located in bed of WADI THEMELE. Arty engage.

(Time allowed - fifteen minutes).

DS NOTES ON PROBLEM 5.

1. Object of problem was to exercise the Bn comd in choice of target.

2. Enemy inf should be dealt with first because:-

(a) They constituted more serious threat.

(b) Enemy OPs are probably working in pairs and the knocking out of one OP will not necessarily prevent the shelling of our tps.

RATIVE 6. (Issued verbally at STAND 3 at 1715 hrs 15 Sep 41).

1. Enemy counter-attack was repulsed and by 1600 hrs the bde was preparing to continue the advance. At 1610 hrs enemy tpt planes appeared and approx 500 parachutists were dropped in the enemy's area and behind our lines.

2. Parachutists behind our lines were not accounted for until 1800 hrs. In view of the reinforcements now available to the enemy and the upsetting of his earlier plans for the attack the Brig decided to re-organise and continue the attack the next morning. As it was difficult to locate enemy dispositions to the East of the WADI THEMELE he requested the CO 2/1 Fd Regt to support the attack by a barrage.

DEMONSTRATION 5.

1. Registration for the barrage.

2. Procedure for preparation of barrage (demonstrated at gun sites).

3. Firing of barrage.

DEMONSTRATION 6.

1. Firing of smoke screen.

12

ALEXTG

6 AUST DIV & ATT TPS — SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT AS AT 2359 HRS 15 SEP 41.

S/4168/G

Copy No. 31.....

Unit.	Camp	Lines
1. HQ		
HQ 6 Aust Div	JULIS	BIRDWOOD
6 Aust Div Int Sec	"	"
6 Aust Div Emp Pl	"	"
"B" Sec Aust FSS	(Under Comd 1 Aust Corps)	
2. CAV		
6 Aust Cav Regt	JULIS	MONASH
39 Aust LAD	"	"
3. RAA		
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	JULIS	BIRDWOOD
2/1 Aust Fd Regt	KHASSA	ONSLOW
43 Aust LAD	"	"
2/2 Aust Fd Regt	"	JESS
40 Aust LAD	"	"
2/3 Aust Fd Regt	"	L.6
41 Aust LAD	"	"
1 Aust A Tk Regt (less 2 Bty)	(Under comd 1 Aust Corps)	
"H" Sec Sigs	" "	" "
49 Aust LAD	" "	" "
2 Bty 1 Aust A Tk Regt (Less one Tp)	KHASSA	JESS
One Tp 2 Bty 1 Aust A Tk Regt	(Under comd 1 Aust Corps)	
4. RAA (Attached)		
7 Bty 3 Aust Lt AA Regt	HILL 95	L.1
1 Aust Lt AA Regt (less dets)	"	L.3
1 Aust Lt AA Sig Sec	"	"
5. RAE		
HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	HILL 69	BROCKMAN
2/1 Aust Fd Coy	"	"
2/2 Aust Fd Coy (less No. 5 Sec)	HILL 69	"
No.5 Sec 2/2 Aust Fd Coy	TEL AVIV	
2/8 Aust Fd Coy	"	BROCKMAN
22 Aust Fd Pk Coy	"	"
80 Aust LAD	"	"
6. RAE(Attached).		
No. 2 Boring Sec (less dets)	HILL 69	L.4
2/4 Aust Fd Coy	BEIT JIRJA	ELLIOTT
7. SIGS		
Sigs 6 Aust Div (less, "H" & "J" Secs)	JULIS	LEANE
42 Aust LAD	"	"
8. INF		
HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	KHASSA	BHQ
45 Aust LAD	"	"
16 Aust A Tk Coy	"	JESS
2/1 Aust Inf Bn	"	McNICHOL
2/2 Aust Inf Bn	EL ARISH	
2/3 Aust Inf Bn	(Under comd 1 Aust Corps)	
HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	" "	" "
"J" Sec Sigs	" "	" "
46 Aust LAD	" "	" "
5 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn	" "	" "
2/5 Aust Inf Bn	" "	" "
2/6 Aust Inf Bn	(Under comd 16 Aust Inf Bde)	
	HILL 69	GLASSFURD
2/7 Aust Inf Bn	(Under comd 16 Aust Inf Bde)	
	HILL 69	ROBERTSON
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	JULIS	BHQ
79 Aust LAD	"	"
2/4 Aust Inf Bn	"	GELLIBRAND
2/8 Aust Inf Bn	"	GODDARD
2/11 Aust Inf Bn	"	HOBBS
9. INF (Attached)		
HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	KILO 89	HQ LINES
"J" Sec 7 Aust Div Sigs	"	"
47 Aust LAD	"	"
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	"	HERRING
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	"	SQUIRES
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	"	"

	Camp	Lines
10. MG (Attached)		
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	HILL 69	L.7
48 Aust LAD	" "	"
11. S & T.		
HQ AASC 6 Aust Div	JULIS	BROWNE
6 Aust Div Amn Coy	"	"
6 Aust Div Pet Coy	"	"
6 Aust Div Sup Col	"	"
12. S & T (Attached)		
Corps Tps Sub Pk & 6 Aust Div Sub Pk of 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk	HILL 69	L.8
1 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy (less dets)	BEIT JIRJA	GRIMWADE
1 Aust Corps Tps Sup Col (less det)	HILL 69	L.6
1 Aust Res MT Coy	BEIT JIRJA	ELLIOTT
1 Aust AA Bde Coy AASC (less dets)	DIMRA	McCAY
1 Aust Sup Per Sec	AL MAJDAL	Sup Depot
7 Aust Div Sup Col (less dets)	BEIT JIRJA	GRIMWADE
13. MED.		
2/1 Aust Fd Amb	KHASSA	MARTEN
2/2 Aust Fd Amb	HILL 69	HODGSON
2/7 Aust Fd Amb	KHASSA	WILSON
2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	"	"
14. MED (Attached)		
1 Aust MAC (less "A" Sec & No. 6 sub sec of "B" Sec, 17 Wkshop sub sec & Tpt Wing)	HILL 69	HODGSON
2/5 Aust Fd Amb	BEIT JIRJA	LEGGE
15. ORD (Attached)		
2/1 Aust A Fd Wkshop	KHASSA	L.7
2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less 4 & 5 Rec Secs & Emp Pl)	"	"
HQ 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk & 2 Corps Sec (less one div sec)	BARBARA	ROSENTHAL
1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit	BEIT JIRJA	HQ
16. MISC.		
6 Aust Div Pro Coy	JULIS	BIRDWOOD
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	"	GODDARD
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	SALVAGE DUMP	MAJDAL
6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office	JULIS	BIRDWOOD
6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	"	"
17. MISC (Attached)		
"B" Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn (less 5 Pl)	BARBARA	ROSENTHAL

Distribution:
(See Over)

Colonel, a.a.
GS, 6 Aust Div.

NB: Please inform HQ 6 Aust Div of any omissions or amendments that are required to be made to this list as on date of issue.

Distribution	Copy No.
6 Aust Cav	1
RAA 6 Aust Div	2
RAE 6 Aust Div	3
Sigs 6 Aust Div	4
16 Aust Inf Bde	5
19 Aust Inf Bde	6
AASC 6 Aust Div	7
Sigs 1 Aust Corps	8
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	9
Aust Gd Bn	10
2/1 Aust A Fd Wkshop	11
2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop	12
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk	13
18 Aust Inf Bde	14
GOC	15
G	16
G	17
I	18
AQ	19 - 20
AQ (for ADMS)	21
DADOS	22
SOME	23 - 24
DAPM	25
6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office	26
6 Aust Div PostalUnit	27
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	28
1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry	29 -
War Diary	30 - 32
File	32 - 33
Spare	34 - 37
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	38
FOR INFORMATION -	
BFP & TJ	39 - 40
HQ AIF (ME)	41 - 42
1 Aust Corps	43
AIF Base Area	44 - 46
HQ 2nd Ech AIF	47
Det Sigs AIF Base Area JULIS	48
AIF Reinft Depot	49

13

6 AUST DIV & ATT TPS
LOCATION STATEMENT.

SECRET.

S/4184/G. COPY NO. 31...

Amendment No 1 to Location Statement (S/4168/G) as at 2359 hrs 15 Sep 41.

Serial 5.			Camp
After	2/8 Aust Fd Coy	insert	HILL 69
"	22 Aust Fd Pk Coy	"	HILL 69
"	80 Aust LAD	"	HILL 69

Col,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION	Copy No.
6 Aust Cav	1
RAA 6 Aust Div	2
RAE 6 Aust Div	3
Sigs 6 Aust Div	4
16 Aust Inf Bde	5
19 Aust Inf Bde	6
AASC 6 Aust Div.	7
Sigs 1 Aust Corps	8
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	9
Aust Gd Bn	10
2/1 Aust A Fd Wkshop	11
2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop	12
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk	13
18 Aust Inf Bde	14
GOC	15
G	16 - 17
I	18
AQ	19 - 20
AQ (for ADMS)	21
DADOS	22
SOME	23 - 24
DAPM	25
6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office	26
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	27
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	28
1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry	29
War Diary	30 - 31
File	32 - 33
Spare	34 - 37
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	38

FOR INFORMATION

BFP & TJ	39 - 40	HQ 2nd Ech AIF	47
HQ AIF (ME)	41 - 42	Det Sigs AIF Base Area JULIS	48
1 Aust Corps	43	AIF Reinft Depot	49
AIF Base Area	44 - 46		

14

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

16 Sep 41.

6 AUST DIV CW TRAINING INSTRUCTION No. 4

1. SPACING OF DETECTORS, GAS SPRAY.

Though the standard distance of 80 yards between detectors is not being altered officially at present, it is generally recognised that this spacing is needlessly close.

Teaching at the Army Gas School is being modified to indicate that 80 yards is a lower limit and that up to 200 yards may be quite safe enough. Common sense should be used in siting the detectors and the primary consideration will be to space them so that they can be properly examined by the sentries on duty.

2. RESPIRATORS - WEARING WHILE ASLEEP.

Trials have been carried out to find out whether it is practicable to sleep in respirators.

The results observed were as follows:-

(a) Sleep was delayed.

(b) It is easier to sleep on the side than on the back.

(c) When lying down, there is a tendency for the metal inlet valve to remain open and breath is exhaled through the container. This should not occur with the rubber valve which is now being fitted as standard.

(d) There is a marked accumulation of moisture in the facepiece.

In general, it may be concluded that although it is practicable to sleep in facepieces, the sleep obtained is not likely to be as beneficial as if the facepiece was not worn.

Sleeping in respirators in anticipation of a gas attack is not to be recommended, especially if the period of rest is likely to be followed by a period of sustained physical effort.

3. AIRCRAFT SPRAY - ACTION WHEN SPRAY HAS FALLEN.

Whether the cape should be adjusted or not, after the spray has been detected, is a decision which must rest with the commander on the spot. He must be prepared to use his gas knowledge and common sense in deciding which risk is to be accepted; the danger of a burn from drops (large or small) which have already fallen, or the risk of another successful attack.

The following amendment has been recommended to Section 40, paragraph 2 of Pamphlet No. 1, "Protection against Gas and Air Raids."

Delete from "In fact" in line 7 to "Large drops" in line 10 and substitute:-

"In fact, after spray has been detected, the cape should not be adjusted to the 'worn position' unless, in the opinion of the commander on the spot, a repetition of the spray attack appears imminent. It will be for the commander on the spot to decide whether the risk of contamination by subsequent attack is greater than the danger of casualties through wearing the cape on top of clothing already contaminated."

4. DETECTORS, GAS SPRAY AND GROUND.

(a) LYSOL will turn Detectors, Gas Spray and Gas. Ground RED.

(b) Where tng mixture G2D is unobtainable, a limited number of WE Detectors may be used to demonstrate the reaction of Detectors to Blister Gases.

5. USE OF RESPIRATORS IN THE PRESENCE OF SMOKE.

The soldier is taught to treat any feeling of choking, irritation of the nose or eye, or unusual smell as a war gas until it has been proved otherwise. This definition includes screening smokes.

In any operation the enemy is likely to use smoke. He may also use gas, and might do so under cover of smoke. Constant vigilance is needed, and unnecessary risks of men becoming gas casualties must not be taken.

The practical working rule to be adopted is the following:-

"Hostile smoke will be treated as a war gas until it is proved otherwise."

The approach of a large cloud of smoke will always be taken to mean imminent danger of gas, and in these circumstances troops will be alert for gas. They will not adjust facepieces until they smell gas, or are actually within the smoke cloud. Some screening smokes may be sufficiently irritant to make wearing the respirators useful. When inside the cloud, local commanders will appreciate the handicap of wearing the facepiece and will immediately give "gas clear" if satisfied that gas is not present, or that the smoke will not cause distress.

(Note.- The above may shortly be published in A.T.M.)

6. PROTECTION ON THE MOVE.

While troops should be trained to obtain protection against gas (both by day and night) without halting, it will be realised that to lay down a hard and fast rule in this matter would be unsound.

Commanders on the spot will appreciate the necessity for reducing to a minimum any delay which the presence of gas may cause, and it should be left to their discretion to decide whether or not it is necessary to halt.

By day and night, when moving on foot on roads or across country where the going is good, protection can be obtained with the respirator, or personal decontamination Part I can be carried out, without halting, provided both hands are free.

When loads are being carried by hand it will obviously be necessary to halt in order to adjust the respirator or to carry out personal decontamination Part I. Similarly, across broken country, especially at night, the best course when gas is met will generally be to halt while protection is being gained.

7. RESPIRATOR - PROTECTION AGAINST AMMONIA.

The respirator gives fairly good protection against ammonia. This gas is, however, liable to damage the filling of the container. Therefore, where the respirator has been used in a concentration of ammonia, the container should be changed after use.

8. FAULTS IN AG TRAINING.

(a) There is a tendency to combine PAD and AG training. It should be remembered that PAD bears no relation to protection against gas in the field. A passive outlook must be avoided. The object of protection against gas in the field is to provide a means of enabling the soldier to continue to work and to fight despite the presence of gas.

(b) In many cases the word SPRAY causes complete disintegration of a unit. Troops crouch down, or there is a mass break for cover. The warning "Spray" indicates the fact that the fall of spray has already been established, and that personal decontamination should be carried out.

(c) There is an uncertainty as to whether or not the cape should be adjusted after the fall of spray. A note on the correct action to be taken is included in para 3 above.

(d) Adjustment of respirators by the troops on hearing the rattle alarm is generally too slow -- men frequently forget to hold their breath.

The fitting of respirators is not always good and testing in a gas chamber has often not been carried out at the correct interval, i.e. once every three months.

(e) Every effort should be made to develop a realistic outlook towards the problem of gas in the field. If gas situations are frequently produced (enemy gas bombs, shell or aircraft spray) at suitable opportunities during the course of normal training exercises, automatic reaction on practical lines would be obtained without the expenditure of any additional time.

R[illegible]
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -
List "B" (less Serials 8, 9, 11, 17)

15

S E C R E T

S/4190/G.

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

16 Sep 41.

BOMB DISPOSAL

The attached copy/ies of BF in P & TJ circular letter CR/PAL/17146/1/G of 14 Sep 41 is/are forwarded for information and action if necessary.

Distribution -
List "B".

for Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

SUBJECT: Bomb Disposal

S E C R E T

HQ, BF in P & TJ.
CR/PAL/17146/1/G.
14 Sep 41.

1 Aust Corps
AIF Base Area
10 Armd Div
6 Aust Div
5 Ind Inf Bde
1 Aust AA Bde
Northern L of C District
Jsm Area
Lydda Area
OC, TJFF
Spears Mission
CE Pal & TJ
OC, Tps, RAFA

A case recently occurred where a Bomb Disposal Section Commander was asked to examine and dispose of portions of U.X.Bs which had been removed from the site on which they fell. These portions contained live detonators, and were potentially dangerous.

Under no circumstances will U.X.Bs, or portions thereof, or even the ground surrounding the site be approached or interfered with by anyone except members of the Bomb Disposal organisation, and until the arrival of the Bomb Disposal personnel, the site will be guarded whenever possible.

Any portions of bombs or similar materials already in the possession of units or formations or of the civilian ARP authorities or which come into their possession in future will be handed over at once to the OC, No. 4 Section, 18 BD Coy, RE, Saltzman Hotel, Mount Carmel, Haifa. Local Civilian ARP authorities will be notified accordingly by formations and areas.

(Sgd) R.S.BROKE, Major
for
Brigadier, GS.

Copy to -
OC, No. 4 Section,
18 Bde Coy, Saltzman Hotel,
Mount Carmel, HAIFA.

Mr Scott, SECRETARIAT

[redacted]

A.9.

16

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

18 Sep 41.

FIRE TRENCHES - NEW METHOD OF RAPID DIGGING.

The attached copy/ies of 1 Aust Corps GS Instn No. 2 of 1 Sep 41 is/are forwarded for information.

J. D. Lavarack

for Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "B"

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps.
1 Sep 41.
G.805

1 Aust Corps GS Instn No 2

FIRE TRENCHES - NEW METHOD OF RAPID DIGGING

BASIC TRENCH

1. The basic trench has the cross section of an ordinary weapon pit. Att diagram shows the sequence of a development of a trench system. Figure 1 shows first the weapon pits, then the pits connected by basic trench and finally the connected trench system. (The first joining of weapon pits would be by crawl trench which would be made into basic trench as soon as possible). Figure 2 shows the order of digging of

(1) actual weapon pit
(2) connection of pits so as to make continuous weapon trench (basic trench)
(3) widening forwards of trench to form fire bays and
(4) deepening of trench.

2. The difference between the final stage of development in this system and the old is that the fully developed trench in the new is only 3'6" wide except at the firebays, whereas in the old it was 5'6" all along. An appreciable amount of digging is thus saved and protection from ground and air much improved.

3. It will be noted that the original weapon pits become part of the full length fire trench, so that new fire bays can be cut wherever desired; normally they will be cut forward from where the old weapon pits have been. As the final fire bays are to be cut forward, the parapet in such places should be formed 3 ft in front of the original weapon pit; this will save work later as the near side of the parapet will not have to be moved.

CONCEALMENT

4. (a) When a comd is primarily interested in concealment, he may allow only unconnected two men weapon pits. Alternative pits can be sited, and can be fitted into a more extensive scheme later. Once weapon pits are joined together, it is not possible normally to conceal the digging.

(b) A parapet or parados may give away the position and can sometimes be done without (vide FRENCH trenches on LITANI RIVER; which were well concealed and where neither parapet nor parados was used). If no parapet is used the 3 ft trench should be deepened to 4'6" and the spoil well spread and concealed. Either the firing posn will have to be modified in such cases or an elbow rest cut into the front edge of the trench.

C Wrillett Lt Col for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distribution -

PTO

DISTRIBUTION -

6 Div	45	I	1
6 Aust Div	45	A	1
7 Aust Div	45	Q	1
CCRA	10	CE	1
CRE C Trs	5	DDST	5
CSO	2	DDMS	6
E Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	1	ADOS	1
Salvage Unit	1	DADOS	4
GOC	1	Camp	1
BGS	1	APM	2
G	1	DADPS	1
G3(Cam)	1	Pay	1
		Reception Camp	1


For Information -

HQ BF P & T	2
HQ AIF (ME)	2
HQ AIF Base Area	2
HQ AIF Reinforcement Depot	2


APPENDIX TO G.S. INSTN. No 2 HQ. I. AUST CORPS.

AND ILLUSTRATING METHOD OF DIGGING TRENCHES WITH LESS LABOUR AND QUICKER CONSTRUCTION.


FIG. 1. SCALE 16 FT. TO 1 IN.



STAGE 1.




STAGE 2



STAGE 3

FIG. 2. SCALE 4 FT. TO 1 IN.



4232/G.

SECRET

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

18 Sep 41.

TRAINING PROGRAMME - 6 AUST DIV.

In amplification of the remarks by the GOC, 6 Aust Div concerning training at the conference held on 5 Sep 41, it is desired to state that in order that this HQ might continue to arrange and/or conduct demonstrations, TEWTS and other training activities without interfering with units' training programmes, and to ensure that such demonstrations, etc., are timely, certain information is required from formations and units.

2. As indicated by the GOC, training will be carried out in the following phases:-

(i) Phase I.- By mid-Sep, Coy and equivalent Comds should have completed sufficient individual training and Coy exercises for their Pl Comds and Coy personnel to be considered fit to take part in Bn exercises.

(ii) Phase II.- From mid-Sep to mid-Oct, Bn tng will be carried out, having as its object the training of Coy Comds by means of TEWTS conducted by COs and the tactical co-operation of Coys. During this phase exercises with and without troops will be carried out.

(iii) Phase III.- Bde tng will be carried out from mid-Oct to mid-Nov; Bde Comds conducting exercises both with and without troops with the object of training Bn Comds and exercising sub-unit Comds in the tactical handling of their comds.

(iv) Phase IV.- Commencing in mid-Nov, it is proposed to carry out full scale Div exercises, and it is expected that units by that time will have sufficient transport and equipment to enable this to be adhered to.

3. Individual training will be carried out concurrently with all four phases as time and opportunity permits.

4. From the training programmes which will be prepared by the various Comds in accordance with the foregoing, formations and units will extract those activities which they consider should not be interrupted by activities arranged by this HQ. The dates and nature of these activities will be forwarded to this HQ by 25 Sep 41. The following example illustrates what is required:-

Formation or Unit	Duration		Nature of Activity
	From	To	
2/1 Aust Inf Bn	3 Oct 41	5 Oct 41	TEWT - Defence - GAZA area.
2/2 Aust Inf Bn	2 Oct 41	3 Oct 41	TEWT - River Crossing - TEL AVIV area.
16 Bde	21 Oct 41	24 Oct 41	TEWT - Approach march and Attack (Bn Comds & 2 i/cs) - JULIS area.
16 Bde	2 Nov 41	4 Nov 41	Bde exercise with tps - Attack - JULIS area.

Distribution -
6 Aust Cav
RAA 6 Aust Div
RAE 6 Aust Div
Sigs 6 Aust Div
16 Aust Inf Bde
19 Aust Inf Bde
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
AASC 6 Aust Div
AQ
ADMS

R Rowell
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

18

ADM/MF.

4296/G.

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

19 Sep 41.

TRAINING, CLASSIFICATION AND TESTING OF DRIVER MECHANICS AND DRIVERS MT.

The attached copy/ies of AIF (ME) GS Instruction No. 30 is/are forwarded for information and action.

Distribution -

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

H.Q. A.I.F. (ME)
8 Sep 41.

GS INSTRUCTION No 30

TRAINING, CLASSIFICATION AND TESTING OF DRIVER MECHANICS AND DRIVERS M.T.

1. Training of Drivers M.T.

(a) Personnel selected for training as drivers must be chosen from those with a previous knowledge of the work, and preferably from those who have held civil or AIF driving licences for a period of not less than 12 months.

(b) Those classed as learners are to be first instructed on the oldest vehicle on unit charge, and, when proficient on this, will be graduated to newer vehicles. On no account will a new vehicle be used for teaching driving to men with little previous experience.

2. Drivers under Instruction

(a) A member of the Forces undergoing driving instruction will be accompanied by an instructor who will sit beside him and be prepared to take over control of the vehicle in an emergency. In cases of impending accident it will be noted that an endeavour to seize the wheel on the part of the instructor will usually result in disaster, as it is impossible for him to operate the foot controls. He should be prepared to give sharp orders to his pupil and to switch off the ignition and apply the hand brake.

(b) A driver under instruction will not be permitted to drive in main streets of city areas until his Commanding Officer is satisfied that he is capable of controlling the vehicle under any conditions of traffic, and that he is thoroughly conversant with local traffic regulations and by-laws.

(c) When under instruction, a driver of whatever rank, will be under the direct supervision and orders of the driving instructor.

3. Classification and Testing of Drivers MT and Driver Mechanics.

(a) Drivers on establishments of units will be classified into two categories - Drivers MT and Driver Mechanics.

(b) The classification of Driver Mechanic, calls for special ability in practical handling, mechanical knowledge and running repairs.

(c) The standard required of a Driver M.T. is much higher than that usually attained by the average civilian driver. A military driver is required to possess a knowledge of the vehicles placed in his charge, and to be competent to maintain them in a state of mechanical efficiency, if necessary, for extended periods on detached duty, when help and supervision may not be available. This involves a sound knowledge of running repairs as laid down in Army Instructions and the makers' instruction books.

(d) A soldier will not be appointed a Driver M.T. or upgraded to Driver Mechanic until he has qualified in the respective tests prescribed in Appendices A and B attached.

(e) Personnel qualified as eligible for appointment as Driver Mechanics will be recorded in Unit Part II Orders.

4. /

4. Qualifications for AIF Army Driving Licences

Before he can receive a licence, a member of the Forces must pass the prescribed test laid down in Appendix A.

Tests will be conducted by a competent Officer or Warrant Officer detailed by the Commanding Officer for that purpose. The Testing Officer or Warrant Officer must himself be in possession of an AIF Army Driving Licence for the types of vehicles in which he is testing.

Tests will be carried out for each type of vehicle for which the issue of a licence is desired.

J. L. Bradley Lt-Col., G.S.

Distribution -

1 Aust Corps	30
2/16 Aust A Fd Coy	1
2/2 Aust MG Bn	1
6 Aust Div	90
7 Aust Div	50
9 Aust Div	60
RAA 9 Aust Div	10
AIF (ME) Reinft Depot	50
AIF (ME) Base Area	35
HQ AIF (ME)	45
AHQ Melbourne	2

Appendix "A" to HQ AIF
(ME) GS Instruction No 30.

TEST FOR ARMY DRIVING LICENCE AND DRIVER M.T.

The test in which personnel must qualify before being issued with an AIF Army Driving Licence will be such as to demonstrate -

i. That he is a proficient driver by day and by night. This will include the ability to start the engine, change gears proficiently, turn corners properly, reverse the vehicle in a narrow street, negotiate traffic, start on a hill, reverse into a garage, stop at a given point, stop quickly and safely in an emergency, park against a kerb, tow another vehicle and drive in convoy.

ii. That he has a thorough knowledge of traffic and convoy signals, rules of the road, local regulations and by-laws, march discipline and the action to be taken in case of accidents.

iii. That he has elementary knowledge of the functioning of the engine, and transmission of the class of vehicle on which he is tested and of the diagnosis and rectification of minor running faults.

iv. That he has a good knowledge of the routine maintenance of the class of vehicle on which he is tested, particularly in regard to chassis and engine lubrication.

v. That he is possessed of road sense and confidence, and is free from any physical defect which may affect his driving ability.

Appendix "B" to HQ AIF (ME)
GS Instruction No 30.

TEST FOR DRIVER MECHANIC

A Driver M.T. before being classified as a Driver Mechanic must qualify in a test conducted under Unit arrangements.

To qualify in this test a Driver M.T. must :-

i. Be a thoroughly proficient driver on all types of vehicles with which his unit is equipped, under all conditions, including cross-country work;

ii. Have a good knowledge of the functions of the major components of the vehicles with which his unit is equipped.

iii. Be able to diagnose and report upon all ordinary mechanical breakdowns; and

iv. Be able to execute minor repairs and adjustments within the capacity of the hand tools with which the vehicles of his unit are equipped, and to maintain such vehicles in good condition.

Army Driving Licence (AAF Gll)

Except as provided in sub-paras (b) and (c) below, every [illegible] of the Australian Imperial Force who drives on duty a Military motor vehicle, or a privately owned vehicle employed on Military duty must be in possession of an AIF Army Driving Licence for the particular type of vehicle being driven. The AIF Army Driving Licence also authorises the holder to drive on duty a privately owned motor vehicle of the type specified in the licence, where such vehicle is being employed on military duty. The licence will be carried on the person by the individual to whom it is issued, when driving a motor vehicle on duty and must be produced for inspection on request.

(b) A member of the Forces undergoing driving instruction who is not in possession of an AIF Army Driving Licence for the particular class of vehicle on which instruction is being given, must be accompanied by a member who holds an AIF Army Driving Licence for such class of vehicle.

(c) In very exceptional circumstances and where the exigencies of the service render it unavoidable, a member of the Forces who has held a civilian or AIF Driving Licence, but who does not possess an AIF Army Driving Licence, may be ordered to take charge of, and drive, a motor vehicle being used on military duty. Any member so ordered to drive will be given specific instructions in regard to the method of carrying out, and the limits of, the duty.

(d) The possession of a civil or AIF Driving Licence does NOT authorise a member of the AIF to drive a military vehicle. A member who has held a civil or AIF Driving Licence shall be considered to be under instruction until such time as he has qualified for and been issued with an AIF Army Driving Licence.

(e) The licence will take the form of a folding cover, AAF Gll. Licences will be machine numbered, and a record of the number of blank licence forms issued to units will be maintained at HQ AIF (ME)

3. CLASSES OF MILITARY MOTOR VEHICLES

(a) An AIF Army Driving Licence will be issued to authorise the holder to drive, in accordance with para 2 (a) above, specified classes of vehicles. For this purpose vehicles are divided into classes as follows :-

Class I	-	Cars and Vans
Class II	-	Lorries (i.e. load carrying vehicles of 30-cwt capacity or over)
Class III	-	Wheeled Tractors
Class IV	-	Tracked Vehicles
Class V	-	Motor Cycles.

A licence will be issued to Officers and ORs for those classes only for which the applicant has passed the prescribed tests.

(b) The number of licences issued to Drivers M.T. in a unit will not exceed the establishment except that in the case of Fitters M.T. Mechanics M.T. and Driver Mechanics, these specialists will be tested for and issued with driving licences for specified classes of vehicles.

(c) Where an individual who already holds an AIF Army Driving Licence qualifies for an additional class or classes of vehicles, such additional class or classes will be entered in the licence. The Commanding Officer will sign his name against the entry in the space provided and the register (see para 4) will be endorsed accordingly.

4. PREPARATION, RECORD AND ISSUE OF LICENCES

The testing officer or warrant officer will enter the name of the individual and the types of vehicles for which he has qualified in a "Unit Record of Driving Tests and Register of AIF Army Driving Licences" and sign his name against the entry as a certificate that the tests have been passed. (Proforma attached)

When members are tested elsewhere than in their own units, for example, at a Driving and Maintenance Course, the record of qualification will be notified to the Unit concerned by the testing authority and a reference to the correspondence will be made in the register in the place provided for the signature of the testing officer.

The AIF Ill will then be prepared, signed by the Commanding Officer, entered in the Unit Register, and then issued to the individual concerned, who will sign for it in the Unit Register.

5. CANCELLATION, LOSS AND REGISTER OF LICENCES

(a) Since the AIF Army Driving Licence is for the driving of motor vehicles on duty only, it automatically becomes void when the holder is :-

Transferred to a Unit with no M.T. on its establishment;

Promoted, or, becomes a Specialist, which does not necessitate the driving of M.T. Vehicles (e.g. Cpl Clerk, R.M.P.);

or ceases to serve.

Licences on issue to members being returned to Australia or discharged locally will be withdrawn and cancelled. A Commanding Officer if he considers that a holder of a licence has become unfit to take charge of a vehicle, will withdraw and cancel the licence. Details of the cancelled licences will be struck off the Unit Register and a note of the cancellation will be made in the appropriate column of the register.

Cancelled licences will be forwarded.

(b) In the case of a licence being reported lost or accidentally destroyed, a Duplicate may be issued by the Commanding Officer. The register will be endorsed accordingly.

(c) When the holder of an AIF Army Driving Licence is transferred to another Unit he must produce his licence when reporting for duty, so that the transfer may be endorsed thereon and details of the licence entered in the register of his new Unit.
Details of a licence on issue to a holder who is transferred will be struck off the register of his former Unit and a note of the transfer made in the appropriate column of the register.

6. STANDING ORDERS FOR DRIVERS

(a) A copy of Standing Orders for Drivers of Mechanical Vehicles will be issued to each holder of an AIF Army Driving Licence and will be kept in his possession whilst on duty, together with his licence.

(b) It will be kept amended as necessary, and will be returned when a licence is cancelled in accordance with para 5.

(c) These Standing Orders are in course of preparation and will be printed and issued in due course. In the meantime the Australian publication may be used as a general guide.

UNIT RECORD OF DRIVING TESTS AND REGISTER OF ARMY DRIVING LICENCES

UNIT _____

Army No. Rank and Name	Types of Vehicles for which qualified to receive a Licence	Signature of Officer or Warrant Officer conducting tests certifying that member is qualified	Number of Licence	Date issued	Signature of Recipient	Date of Cancellation, Withdrawal or Transfer of Licence

NOTE :- The Unit Record of Driving Tests and Register of MTP Army Driving Licences will be prepared by Units in a suitable manuscript book.

19

SECRET

515/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

20 Sep 41.

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESSES.

AIF (ME) has advised that the undermentioned telegraphic addresses have been registered:-

AUSTJUN	LATRUN	-	AIF (ME) Junior Staff School
AUSTDEPOT	DEIR SUEID	-	AIF (ME) Reinft Depot

Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "D" (plus Serials 22-26)

20

DM/TG

SECRET

S/4313/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

20 Sep 4_.

.303" B. Mk IV INCENDIARY AMN.

The following extract from GHQ MEF CRME/22532/GSD.2a dated 13 Sep 41 is forwarded for information -

2. The following is a short description of .303" B. Mk IV Incendiary Amn:-.

RANGE

3. For incendiary purposes - 350/400 yds.

USE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR TRACER.

4. The burning phosphorus leaves a distinct smoke trace up to the limit of range as an incendiary.

STORAGE.

5. Cases have occurred where spontaneous combustion has taken place. All amn of this type should therefore be kept as cool as possible and shcuild not be exposed to the direct rays of the sun.

USE.

6. When stocks become available it is proposed to issue this amn for use against enemy aircraft.

FILLING OF MAGAZINES.

7. (a) Amn will be loaded in the following proportion -

BREN magazine (loaded with 25-rds on the basis of 1 in 4)
LEWIS (loaded with 47 rds on the basis of 1 in 10)
BREN (loaded with 100 rds on the basis of 1 in 24)

(b) Order of coming out of magazine -

i. Bren 30 round magazine loaded 25 rds.

No. 1 Tracer
4 Tracer
7 Tracer
10 Incendiary
13 Incendiary
14 Tracer
16 Incendiary
19 Incendiary
Remainder Ball.

ii. Lewis 47 round magazine.

As above up to round No. 19, then ball to round No. 39; adding one round tracer in middle of each 10 rounds ball between round 19 and 39, i.e. tracer at round 24 and 34.

iii. Bren 100 round magazine.

As for Lewis up to round 90, i.e. ball from round 19 with tracer at round 24, 34 etc 84.

Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION -

List "C" (less Serials, 17, 23 - 27).

SC/WR.

21

HQ 6 Aust Div,

21 Sep 41.

6 AUST DIV CW TRAINING INSTRUCTION NO 5.

1. RESPIRATORS AG.

Respirators AG will be carried by personnel at all times when engaged on tng exercises. This also applies to night exercises.

2. REALISM IN AG TRAINING.

Every effort should be made to develop a realistic outlook towards the problem of gas in the field. Gas situations can be introduced into normal tng exercises which will produce an automatic reaction on practical lines, without the expenditure of additional time.

Periodic practices in the wearing of the respirator are NOT sufficient; the use of gas either in true gas form, as liquid sprayed from the air or air-bombs, must be constantly in the minds of all ranks.

The more the question of gas is considered the fewer will be the casualties on the FIRST occasion it is used.

3. TRAINED INSTRUCTORS.

Attention of Comds is directed to the employment in the field of offrs and NCOs who have attended courses at the ME Gas School.

The GSO III (CW) at Div HQ is available to give assistance in AG tng.

Lt Col, GSO1
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION:-
List "B".

WR.
Sec/4375/G.

SECURITY.

HQ 6 Aust Div.

22 Sep 41.

NEW SCALE OF ISSUE OF MACHINE CARBINES, THOMPSON .45-inch.

The attached copy/ies of BF in P and TJ letter CR/PAL/17036/SD of 20 Sep 41 is/are forwarded for information and action.

A. D. Mallory Maj
Lt-Col,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION:-

6 Aust Cav.	(1)
RAA 6 Aust Div.	(5)
RAE 6 Aust Div.	(4)
Sigs 6 Aust Div	(1)
16 Aust Inf Bde	(5)
19 Aust Inf Bde	(4)
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	(1)
AASC under comd 6 Aust Div	(2)
Q (incl one for DADOS)	(3)
Camp	(1)

HQ BF in P and TJ.
CR/PAL/17036/SD.

20 Sep 41.

SECURITY.

NEW SCALES OF ISSUE OF MACHINE CARBINES, THOMPSON .45-inch.

1. The following instructions contained in WO letter 57/SA/1247 (SD 10) of 24 May 41 will be taken into effect forthwith.

2. Scales of Machine Carbines, Thompson .45-inch, equipment and ammunition, as detailed in Appendices A, B and C respectively to this letter will come into force forthwith.

3. These Appendices cancel the scales authorised in all War Office letters 57/SA/1247 which have hitherto been published.

3. The machine carbine is a personal weapon, and the number of rifles, (or in certain cases, pistols, as detailed in Appendix "A"), will be correspondingly reduced in the unit establishment. War Establishments and Army Forms G.1098 will be amended in due course.

4. Issues of additional carbines to complete units to these scales will be made without indent as they become available. Please submit bulk demands forthwith showing list of units for whom required, and total number required. Requirements of individual units need not be shown. Associated equipment other than slings, to the new scale, will be issued with those carbines. Indents for rifle slings, and basic leather pouches will be submitted through the usual channels.

5. For those carbines already in possession of units, consolidated demands for equipment to adjust to the new scale will be submitted to Ordnance.

6. The necessary adjustments to holdings of ammunition in 1st, 2nd and 3rd line echelons will be carried out forthwith.

7. As the machine carbine is provided as a personal weapon, chests will no longer be issued as part of the equipment, except in the case of Training Establishments.

8. Chests, now in the possession of units, will, except in the case of Training Establishments, be returned forthwith to Ordnance Depots. These chests will, however, be used as a temporary measure for transit purposes, until a new specially designed transit chest becomes available.

9. The 50-round magazine, having been found to be less satisfactory for general purposes than the 20-round magazine, will no longer be used, except by units of the Royal Armoured Corps.

10. All 50-round magazines and converted Lewis gun magazine poubhes and braces which are rendered surplus by the above paragraphs, will also be returned to RAOC although in the case of units entitled to the new scale of ten 20-round magazines per machine carbine, no withdrawal is required until the additional five magazines per machine carbine have been issued.

11. The new scales of unit reserves of magazines to be held by Units as shown in Appendix "A".

12. Special cases for the purpose of carrying these reserves will be issued as they become available. Until then the spare magazines will be carried in basic poubhes which for this purpose, may be indented for on the scale of one pouch for every five magazines.

(Sgd) Lt-Col.
for Brig GS.

APPENDIX "A".

SCALES OF MACHINE CARBINES, THOMPSON .45-inch.

UNITS (a)	MACHINE CARBINES PER UNIT (b)	RESERVE MAGAZINES PER UNIT. (c) 30 rd	20 rd	REMARKS (e)
HQ Units.				
Adv GHQ	4		5	)
Army HQ	4		5	)
Command HQ	4		5	)
AA Command HQ	4		5	) For Commanders
Corps HQ	4		5	) and Staff Offrs
AA Corps HQ	4		5	) moving by road
L of C Area HQ	2		-	) on reconnaissances
L of C District HQ	2		-	) and visits to
Armd Div HQ	8		10	) formations and
Inf Div HQ	3		-	) units during
AA Div HQ and OS				) operations.
DEF HQ	3		-	)
County Div HQ (HF)	3		-	)
Armd Bde HQ	10		10	)
Support Gp HQ	3		-	)
Army Tank Bde HQ	4		-	)
Inf Bde HQ	1		-	)
AA Bde HQ and GOR	2		-	)
RAC Units.				
Armd Regt	52	30	40	) One per AFV Units
Army Tank Bn	58	30	40	) equipped with inf
Armd Cars Regt	58	30	40	) tanks Mk IV the scale will be two per tank. Replace pistols.
RA Units.				
RHA and Fd Regt	8		10	)
Med Regt	6		5	)
Lt Bty	2		-	) Two per Bty and
Mountain Regt	6		5	) Regt HQ
Lt AA Regt (48 Guns)	10		10	)
(36 Guns)	8		10	)
A Tk Regt (48 guns)	58		40	) Two per Bty and
(36 guns)	44		40	) Regt HQ and one per gun team.
Svy Regt	17		20	Five per Bty, and two for Regt HQ.
RE Units.				
Fd Sqn & Fd Coy	8		10	) Two per sec and
C.W. Coy	8		10	) Coy HQ.
Fd Pk Sqn and Fd Pk Coy	2		-	)
Gen Const Coy	2		-	)
Aerodrome Maint Coy	2		-	) Two per Coy HQ
Army Tps Coy	2		-	)
Rd Construction Coy	2		-	)

	MACHINE CARBINES PER UNIT (b)	RESERVE MAGAZINES PER UNIT (c) 50 rd	20 rd	APPENDIX "A" (Contd) REMARKS (a)
R. Sig Units.				
Armd Div Sigs	3		-	One for each cable det and one for HQ. Replace pistols
Div Sigs	3			One for each cable det. Replace pistols
Line Secs	4			
Infantry.				
Inf Bn *	42		60	One for each inf sec and m.c. combination. 2 for Bn HQ.
MG Bn	26		40	) One for each MG
MG Coy	6		5	) sec. Two for Bn HQ
Motor Bn	14		20	) One for each sec in
Recce Bn	14		20	) Inf Pls. Two for
Recce Coy	4		5	) Bn HQ
Young Soldiers Bn	varies		-	One for each inf pl.
RASC Units.				
Armd Bde Coy	5		-	)
Support Gp Coy	5		-	) One for each
Armd Div Tps Coy	5		-	) Sec and for
Army Tank Bde Coy	5		-	) Coy HQ
Ind Bde Gp Coy	5		-	)
Div Amn Coy	5		-	)
Div Pet Coy	5		-	)
Div Sup Coln	12		10	Five for each Ech one for each HQ and Wkshop Sec.
Corps Tps Amn Coy	3		-	)Unit pool with
C.Tps Sup Coln	3		-	)an increment of
C.Pet Pk.	3		-	)one for a Corps
C Amn Pk	3		-	of three Divs.
Reserve MT Coy	10		10	Two for each sec and for coy HQ.
Tp Carrying Coy	18		20	One for each sub sec and for each sec HQ of AB and C Secs.
Motor Coach Coy	8		10	Two for each sec and for Coy HQ.
Motor Boat Coy	8		10	Two for each motor boat and launch sec.
Miscellaneous				
GHQ Liaison Sqn (HF)	6		-	One for each scout car and one for HQ.
Defence Pls	2		-	One for each ground Sec.
HQ Auxiliary Units (HF)	5		60	
Ops Sec Auxiliary Units (HF)	5		-	
Scout Sec Auxiliary Units (HF)	2		-	
Commandos	44		60	

APPENDIX "B".

Scales of Equipment to be issued with Machine Carbines, Thompson .45 inch.

	Magazines 50 round.	Magazines 20-round	Pullthrough Single.	Rod Cleaning with wire brush.	Brush Cleaning, Breech	Can Oil	Tool Assembling Recoil Spring.	Hand Book.	Chest	Sling, RifleWeb.	Pouches, Basic, Leather Pattern '39
1. R.A.C. Units	3	5	1		1	1	1			1	
2. R.A. Units, Fd Sqns & Coys RE Fd Pk Sqns & Coys RE Infantry Motor Machine Gun, Reconnaissance and Yound Soldiers' Battalions, Defence Platoons and Companies. Commandos, Auxiliary Units (HF)		10	1		1	1	1			1	
3. Home Guard		5		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4. Training Establishments		5		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
5. All other Units.		5	1		1	1	1		1		

Note: Scale of spare magazines to be held by units is given in Appendix "A".

APPENDIX "B".

Scales of Equipment to be issued with Machine Carbines, Thompson .45 inch.

	Magazines 50 round.	Magazines 30-round	Pullthrough Single.	Rod Cleaning with wire brush.	Brush Cleaning, Breech	Can Oil	Tool Assembling Recoil Spring.	Hand Book.	Chest	Sling, RifleWeb.	Pouches, Basic, Leather Pattern '39
1. R.A.C. Units	3	5	1		1	1	1			1	
2. R.A. Units, Fd Sqns & Coys RE Fd Pk Sqns & Coys RE Infantry Motor Machine Gun, Reconnaissance and Yound Soldiers' Battalions, Defence Platoons and Companies. Commandos, Auxiliary Units (HF)		10	1		1	1	1			1	
3. Home Guard		5		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
4. Training Establishments		5		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
5. All other Units.		5	1		1	1	1		1		

Note: Scale of spare magazines to be held by units is given in Appendix "A".

APPENDIX "C".

UNITS	1ST LINE		2ND LINE (d)	3rd LINE (e)	TOTAL IN FRONT OF RAILHEAD (f)
	With Gun (b)	Unit reserve (c)			
1. RAC Units	250	350	600	600	1800
2. Inf MG Motor, Recce and Y.S Bns Defence pls and Coys Commandos	200	400	600	600	1800
3. RA Units, Fd Sqns and Coys RE Fd Pk Sqns & Coys RE	200	400	100	100	800
4. Home Guard	100	500	600 in Command Reserve.		
5. All other Units	100	100	-	-	200

23

S E C R E T.

HQ 6 Aust Div.

S/4408/G.

23 Sep 41.

DEFENCE AGAINST AIR-BORNE LANDING ATTACKS.

The attached copy/ies of AIF (HE) Circular letter G2031 of 19 Sep 41 is/are forwarded for information.

2. GX 908 was issued under cover of this HQ letter S/2154/G of 23 Jul 41.

A. D. Maxwell
Col,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION:-
List "B".

2031 AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE SECRET

H.Q. A.I.F. (ME)

19 Sep 41.

1 AUST CORPS	60
6 AUST DIV	100
7 AUST DIV	70
9 AUST DIV	80
RAA 9 AUST DIV	5
AIF (ME) REINFT DEPOT	50
AIF (ME) BASE AREA	15
HQ AIF (ME)	4
AHQ MELBOURNE	2

DEFENCE AGAINST AIR-BORNE LANDING ATTACKS.

Reference the Joint Army and R.A.F. Memorandum on "Defence against airborne landing attacks" issued under GX908 of 27 Jun 41, the following information is forwarded

1. Reports are still being received of the selection of sites for aerodromes and landing grounds without the concurrence of the Army authorities.

It should be noted that the Joint Army - R.A.F. Memorandum has been agreed to by the C-in-C and the A.C.C-in-C and in it it is clearly laid down that the local Army Commander will be consulted and that unless he agrees to the siting of the aerodrome the Army cannot be held responsible for its defence.

The attention of all Commanders is drawn to the above-quoted letter which is reviewed periodically in the light of lessons and criticisms submitted as a result of experience.

2. Amend Para 15 of the Joint Army and R.A.F. Memorandum to read :-

"15. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ORGANISATION OF DEFENCE.

The R.A.F. are responsible for the selection of sites for aerodromes, buildings and pens, but in all cases they must consult the Local Area Army Commander. Unless the Local Area Commander concurs in the sites selected, the R.A.F. cannot expect the Army to provide units for defence."

Col.,
G.S.

28/G

SECRET

Copy No...17...

6 AUST DIV & ATT TPS
LOCATION STATEMENT AS AT 2359 HRS
23 SEP 41

Unit	Camp	Lines
1. HQ		
HQ 6 Aust Div	JULIS	BIRDWOOD
6 Aust Div Int Sec	"	"
6 Aust Div Emp Pl	"	"
"B" Sec Aust FSS	Under comd 1 Aust Corps	
2. CAV		
6 Aust Cav Regt	JULIS	MONASH
39 Aust LAD	"	"
3. RAA		
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	JULIS	BIRDWOOD
2/1 Aust Fd Regt	KHASSA	ONSLOW
43 LAD	"	"
2/2 Aust Fd Regt	"	JESS
40 Aust LAD	"	"
2/3 Aust Fd Regt	"	L.6
41 Aust LAD	"	"
1 Aust A Tk Regt (less 2 Bty)	Under comd 1 Aust Corps	
"H" Sec Sigs	" " " " "	
49 Aust LAD	" " " " "	
2 Bty 1 Aust A Tk Regt (less one tp)	KHASSA	JESS
One Tp 2 Bty 1 Aust A Tk Regt	Under comd 1 Aust Corps	
4. RAA (Attached)		
7 Bty 3 Aust Lt AA Regt	HILL 95	L.1
1 Aust Lt AA Regt (less dets)	" "	L.5
1 Aust Lt AA Regt Sig Sec	" "	"
5. RAE		
HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	HILL 69	BROCKMAN
2/1 Aust Fd Coy (less 3 sec)	" "	"
2/2 Aust Fd Coy	Under comd 1 Aust Corps	
2/8 Aust Fd Coy	HILL 69	BROCKMAN
80 Aust LAD	" "	"
22 Aust Fd Pk Coy	Under comd 1 Aust Corps	
3 Sec 2/1 Aust Fd Coy	ISHALIA	
6. RAE (Attached)		
No. 2 Boring Sec (less dets)	HILL 69	HILLS
2/16 Aust A Fd Coy	" "	"
7. SIGS		
Sigs 6 Aust Div (less "H" & "J" Secs)	JULIS	LEANE
42 Aust LAD	"	"

Unit	Camp	Lines
8. INF		
HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	KHASSA	BHQ
45 Aust LAD	"	"
2/1 Aust Inf Bn	"	McNICHOL
2/2 Aust Inf Bn	EL ARISH	
2/3 Aust Inf Bn	Under comd 1 Aust Corps	
HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	" " " " "	
"J" Sec Sigs	" " " " "	
46 Aust LAD	" " " " "	
5 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn	" " " " "	
2/5 Aust Inf Bn	" " " " "	
2/6 Aust Inf Bn (Under comd 16 Aust Inf Bde)	HILL 69	GLASSFURD
2/7 Aust Inf Bn (Under comd 16 Aust Inf Bde)	" "	ROBERTSON
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	JULIS	BHQ
79 Aust LAD	"	"
2/4 Aust Inf Bn	"	GELLIBRAND
2/8 Aust Inf Bn	"	GODDARD
2/11 Aust Inf Bn	"	HOBBS
9. MG (Attached)		
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	HILL 69	L.7
48 Aust LAD	" "	"
2/2 Aust (MG) Bn	HILL 95	L.3
77 Aust LAD	" "	"
10. S & T		
HQ AASC 6 Aust Div	JULIS	BROWNE
6 Aust Div Amn Coy	"	"
6 Aust Div Pet Coy	"	"
6 Aust Div Sup Col	"	"
11. S & T (Attached)		
Corps Tps Sub Pk & 6 Aust Div Sub Pk of 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk	HILL 69	L.8
1 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy (less dets)	BEIT JIRJA	GRIMWADE
1 Aust Corps Tps Sup Col (less dets)	HILL 69	L.6
1 Aust Res MT Coy (less dets)	BEIT JIRJA	ELLIOTT
1 Aust AA Bde Coy AASC (less dets)	DIMRA	McCAY
1 Aust Sup Per Sec	AL MAJDAL	Sup Depot
12. MED		
2/1 Aust Fd Amb	KHASSA	WILSON
2/2 Aust Fd Amb	HILL 69	HODGSON
2/7 Aust Fd Amb	KHASSA	WILSON
2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	"	"
13. MED (Attached)		
1 Aust MAC (less "A" Sec & No. 6 Sub Sec of "B" Sec, 17 Washop Sub Sec & Tpt Wing)	HILL 69	HODGSON

Unit	Camp	Lines
14. ORD (Attached)		
2/1 Aust A Fd Wkshop	KHASSA	L.7
2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less 4 & 5 Rec Secs & Emp Pl)	"	"
HQ 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk & 2 Corps Sec (less one div sec)	BARBARA	ROSENTHAL
1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit	BEIT JIRJA	HQ
15. MISC		
6 Aust Div Pro Coy (less dets)	JULIS	BIRDWOOD
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	"	GODDARD
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	Salvage Dump	MAJDAL
6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office	JULIS	BIRDWOOD
6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	"	"
16. MISC (Attached)		
"B" Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn (less 5 Pl)	BARBARA	ROSENTHAL

A. D. Murray Major
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

N.B.- Please inform HQ 6 Aust Div of any omissions or amendments that are required to be made on this list as on date of issue.

Distribution -	Copy No.
6 Aust Cav	1
RAA 6 Aust Div	2
RAE 6 Aust Div	3
Sigs 6 Aust Div	4
16 Aust Inf Bde	5
19 Aust Inf Bde	6
AASC 6 Aust Div	7
Sigs 1 Aust Corps	8
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	9
2/2 Aust (MG) Bn	10
Aust HQ Gd Bn	11
2/1 Aust A Fd Wkshop	12
2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop	13
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk	14
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	15
GOC	16
G	17-18
I	19
AQ	20-21
AQ (for ADMS)	22
DADOS	23
SOME	24-25
DAPM	26
6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office	27
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	28
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	29
1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry	30
War Diary	31-32
File	33-34
Spare	35-38
FOR INFORMATION -	
BF P & TJ & SYRIA	39-40
HQ AIF (ME)	41-42
1 Aust Corps	43
AIF Base Area	44-46
HQ 2nd Ech AIF	47
Det Sigs AIF Base Area, JULIS	48
AIF Reinft Depot	49
MC & TN PALESTINE SOUTH Sub Area	50

[redacted]-5C/G

25

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

26 Sep, 41.

CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

The attached copy/ies of 1 Aust Corps GS Instruction No 4 of 18 Sep 41 is/are forwarded for information.

R. W. Mackay Maj

Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION -
List B

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
18 Sep 41.
G.4

1 Aust Corps GS Instn No. 4

CAMOUFLAGE OF DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

The successful camouflage of a defensive posn depends on :-

1. Posn selected.
2. Camouflage scheme selected.
3. Progressive camouflage.
4. Control of work.

1. Selection of the Posn

After the posn has been sited tactically it should be examined in detail and adjusted to meet camouflage requirements. The siting of a post a few yards away from its first selected posn may make all the difference between its successful or non-successful camouflage and may not effect its tactical employment. The best tactical posn may be of little value unless it can be successfully camouflaged, for, once located by the enemy it can be neutralized or destroyed; on the other hand a less perfect posn, which can be successfully camouflaged, may not be located and therefore be of infinitely greater tactical value. Good camouflage siting is most important as it is comparatively easy to conceal works sited in good posns from the camouflage angle, whereas it is almost impossible to conceal posts sited in difficult camouflage areas.

For the purpose of concealment and ease of camouflage, sites should be selected where one of the following types of assistance is obtained :-

(a) In or adjoining shadow.

(b) Close to rocky outcrops, belts of timber, terraced stone walls, hedges or other local features of the countryside.

(c) At the junction of two different types or colours of ground i.e. the edge of ploughed and grassed land, or where the roughness or texture of the field alters.

Avoid sites in areas of open ground where all isolated objects are particularly noticeable.

2. Camouflage Scheme Selected.

Schemes of camouflage should be designed to blend into the surroundings of the particular area; for this purpose a study of the housing and habits of the local inhabitants as well as the natural features of the area is necessary. Any construction which would conflict with local and natural features should be avoided.

When examining an area see how defences can be added to the existing pattern without being conspicuous; the best method is to conform to the existing pattern in shape and texture. If defence works are located near rectangular buildings, make them rectangular; to build round shaped emplacementsin such areas invites attention owing to the contrast shown in air photos.

In a photograph natural shadow is the blackest thing in the landscape; the primary task is to kill the shadows; this is more important than the colour of paint th. light colour of surfaces. Properly garnished nets stretched so as to throw no shadow are an effective means of killing shadows.

Attention to detail is most important for any minor neglect or oversight may mean the difference between success and failure.

The standard to be aimed at is that concealment should be obtained from ground observation at 300 yards and from air photography.

Suitable materials for use in the camouflage of PILLBOXES are discussed in Appx 'A' att hereto.

3. Progressive Camouflage

The concealment of locations after an enemy recce plane has photographed them is of little value since once located on an air photo, location on the ground follows automatically; for this reason steps should be taken to hide the construction of important works from the air. A method of doing this is to use garnished nets on frames (such as the arty camouflage net frames) to cover the work from its commencement until the work is finished and the camouflage completed.

4. Control of Work

For camouflage schemes to be successful the permanent disfiguration of the ground must be prevented.

As it is almost impossible to hide the following from the camera particular thought should be given to the following :-

(a) New tracks. As far as possible use existing tracks; if new tracks are essential make them 'through' tracks by joining them to existing tracks so that the dead ends of tracks do not act in air photos, as pointers to defence works.

(b) Spoil from earthwork must be carefully disposed of to prevent the change of colour which shows up when spoil is spread over an area.

(c) Where possible boards should be used to prevent concrete marks disfiguring the ground surface.

Prevention is easier than cure; this is of particular application in camouflage, so permit only the necessary minimum disturbance of the earth and the surroundings.

H. Wells WO1
for Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div	45	E Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	1	G	2	DDMS	5		
6 Aust Div	45	1 Aust Corps Sigs	1	I	1	ADOS	1		
7 Aust Div	45	1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	1	A	1	DADOS	4		
CCRA	10	1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	1	Q	1	Camp	1		
CRE 1 Aust C Tps	5	1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	1	CE	1	APM	2		
CSO	1	GOC	1	DDST	5	DADPS	1		
		G3(Cam)	1						

For Information - HQ BF P & TJ (2); HQ AIF (ME) (4); HQ AIF Base Area (2) HQ AIF Reinforcement Depot (2).

MATERIALS FOR PILLBOX CAMOUFLAGE

APPX. "A".

1. PAINTING - Keep designs to the size of their counter part in the landscape. It is useless painting a landscape consisting of cottages, houses, and trees on the sides of a pillbox, only a few feet square. Keep to bold designs that blend in with the surroundings.

2. STEEL WOOL - This is particularly handy for making mounds for overhead cover. You can shoot through it without effecting the shape. It consists of wire netting (usually rabbit) with steel wool (such as is used for cleansing pots and pans) woven through it.

3. PLASTER WORK - This is most effective if the surroundings are, rocky out-crops, buildings etc., of which a plaster cast can be taken and sections made from same. The chief ingredients reqd are :-

   (a) Plaster of Paris
   (b) Strips of timber
   (c) Scrim (either hessian or sisal)

4. SALVAGE - Salvage makes the most effective of all camouflage material and if there is any available it will be found most useful. Salvage dumps and rubbish tips are a great source of supply.

5. INFLAMMABLE MATERIALS- These should be avoided if possible, but there are methods whereby straw can be treated to be fire resisting. The simplest method is to boil carbolic soap and salt water (sea water) until it becomes a thick liquid. Then dip or spray the material to be fire-proofed.

6. LOOP HOLES - This is a matter on which there is considerable divergence of opinion. The most conspicuous feature of a loop hole is the dark shadow in the embrasure. One method suggested and found quite effective is to place gauze (20 threads to the inch), painted to the design required, over the opening.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

S/4775/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

27 Sep 41.

STATE OF TRAINING.

The report called for in this HQ letter S/3651/G of 28 Aug 41 will not, in future, be required from units.

Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

6 Aust Cav
RAA 6 Aust Div
RAE 6 Aust Div
Sigs 6 Aust Div
16 Aust Inf Bde
19 Aust Inf Bde
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
AASC under comd 6 Aust Div
AQ (3 copies)

AIR.

S/4772/G.

SECRET.

Hq 6 Aust Div.

29 Sep 41.

21

303 AP AMMUNITION - ISSUE OF.

The attached FORCE Hq Instruction is forwarded for information.

A. D. Macrae Maj

A. Col,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION:-
List "B"

SUBJECT :- .303 AP Amn - Issue of

SECRET
HQ BF in P & TJ,
CR/PAL/17629/SD
10 Sep 41.

1 Aust Corps
10 Armd Div
Northern L of C District
Jsm Area
Lydda Area
AIF Base Area
TJFF
Arab Legion
All Branches Force HQ

1. Notes on the uses of .303 inch tr Mk 1 (AP) Mk V11, and tracer amn against aircraft and AFVs targets is forwarded for distribution to Lt-Cols Comds issued under GHQ letter CRME/22532/MT2 of 30 Aug 41.

2. In accordance with GHQ letter CRME/9258/GSD.2a of 3 Sep 41 it is proposed to issue .303 AP and tracer amn when stocks become available, in accordance with the following :-

(a) A.P.

(i) For use against Armd Cs, gun shields, car and lorry engines and snipers loop holes.

10 rds per rifle
50 rds per LMG

(ii) The above scale will only apply to the following :-

All Cav Units
" R.A.C. Units
" Arty units (less those sited in base and L of C Areas)
" Div and Corps Eng units
" Div and Corps Sigs units
" Inf units
" Div and Corps units of R.A.S.C.
" Div and Corps units of R.A.O.C.

(b) TRACER

For LMGs allotted for AA purposes
In proportion of 1 in 3

For LMGs not allotted for AA purposes
In proportion of 1 in 5

Magazines to be loaded so that the first round fired is tracer.

AP will not be used against aircraft nor will tracer or AP be used in weapons of MG Bns firing .303" Mk V11Z Amn.

3. These orders cancel all previous instructions regarding the issue and use of .303 AP amn including this HQ letter CR/PAL/17629/G of 26 Jul 41 as far as this type of amn is concerned.

4. .303 AP amn now already issued to the following will be withdrawn and returned to 3 AAD, WADI SARA :-

Jsm Area
Lydda Area
Haifa Fortress Area
AIF Base Area

5. 10 Armd Div and 1 Aust Corps will arrange for redistribution of .303 AP in accordance with the scale laid down in para 2 (a).

6. As .303 AP amn is received from GHQ it will be issued in bulk in priority.

1 Aust Corps
Northern L of C for TJFF and Arab Legion
10 Armd Div.

7. .303 tracer amn will continue to be issued to comds in accordance with CR/PAL/17629/G of 26 Jul 41, namely :-

1 Aust Corps	to include AA units under Comd	45%
1 Cav Div (less 4 Cav Bde)	to include 84 & 85 L of C Area TJFF and Arab Legion	25%
Jsm Area		3%
Lydda Area		5%
Haifa Fortress Area		8%
AIF Base Area		2%
Reserve in 3 AAD		12%

?? Lt-Col.
For
Brigadier G.S.

SUBJECT:- Notes on the uses of .303-inch W. Mk 1 (A.P.) .303-inch Mk VII & .303-inch Tracer amn against Aircraft and AFV Targets

GHQ MEF
CRME/22532/MT2
30 Aug 41.

BF in P & TJ.

1. There appears to be a considerable amount of loose thinking with regard to the use of the above amn, particularly in respect to enemy aircraft targets. It seems to be regarded as the panacea for all ills.

2. In these circumstances, the C. in C. wishes the following information to be given the widest possible circulation, and the gist of it made known to all troops. In addition, he wishes the paragraphs in section VIII which have been marginally ruled to be particularly stressed and impressed on all troops by every officer.

3. Copies are forwarded for distribution down to Lt.Col's Commands.

???????????
Lt.Gen
C.G.S.

I. Effective attack figures for .303 inch W Mk 1 (British A.P. bullet) against British HOmogeneous Hard Armour plate.

The following particulars of effective attack (3 perforations out of 5 shots) are relevant :-

Angle of Impact	Range in Yards 100	300	500
Normal	2/5 in. or 10.4 mm.	1/3 in. or 8.3 mm.	1/4 in. or 6.8 mm.
20°	1/4 in. or 6.2 mm.	1/5 in. or 5.0 mm.	1/6 in. or 4.5 mm.
40°	1/6 in. or 4.7 mm.	---------	----------

N.B. It should be noted that angle of impact is a more important factor than range. This is the case with all A.P. bullets at normal velocities.

II - Comments on Italian Armour Plate

From the results reported in G.H.Q. M.E. Technical Int. Summary No. 28. of the effect of .303 A.P. against two Italian armoured cars it would appear that Italian armour plate is much inferior to our own. The results referred to do not appear to bear any proportionate relationship to one another, which seems to indicate lack of homogeneity in the plates. It seems safe to reckon on at least 2 mm. extra penetration with .303 A.P. against the type of plates tested and at reasonable angles of impact.

Note : When comparing the report with the figures given above; it should be noted that the angles are referred to in the report by the continental system. British custom is to reckon all angles from normal impact, i.e. a strike at right angles.

III - Effect of .303 A.P. against enemy A.F.Vs

i) German and Italian A.F.Vs.

Here the armour is much too heavy for any benefit to be obtained.

ii) German armoured cars.

The basic armour of these is rather thicker than in the Italian cars. Plates of 12, 10 and 8 mm. are utilised in the various types, although some of the side plates are reported to be as thin as 4 mm.

A glance at the table in 1 above will show the lack of success resulting from the use of .303 A.P. against the front or turret plates of these cars. Some success may be achieved against the side and rear plates.

iii) Italian Armoured Cars

If the cars reported on in M.E. Technical Int. Summary No 28 are representative, good results may be expected from the use of .303 A.P.

IV. - Comparative effect of .303 A.P. and .303 Mk VII against enemy A.F.Vs.

If an A.P. bullet is defeated by armour plate, the core breaks up into small pieces and does no damage. On the other hand .303 Mk VII having a lead cored bullet, the lead desintegrates and produces lead "spatter" in almost molten form, when it strikes armour plate. This penetrates through any crevices or slits which do not happen to be "splash" proof.

[redacted]

s effect is much the same as dashing a bucket of water against the front or side of a motor car which has a fair number of crevices in it. If the vehicle is not "splash" proofed properly, any member of the AFV crew using one of the openings will almost certainly be blinded.

It is also for this reason and not only for the moral effect mentioned in I.T. para 79.7 that S.A. fire should be directed against AFVs at every possible opportunity, if tactical considerations permit. Mk. VIIIz ammunition has the same lead splash effect.

V. - Effect of .303 A.P. against gun shields

If the 20 mm AA/A/Tk. German gun referred to in Tech. Int Summary No. 27 is representative of German gun shields, not much effect will be obtained. In this gun, the shield consists of two 5 mm armour plates bolted together 35 mm apart. The angle of the plates is about 40° to the vertical plane, i.e. 40° to the opposing weapons. Some shields may however be thinner and fire with .303 in. A.P. may be effective.

VI - Effect against Lorry engines etc.

Modern lorry and aeroplane engines will stand up to a lot of knocking about from A.P. bullets up to ½-in calibre. Many trials of .5 in. and .303-in. A.P. against aero engines took place in England before the war. An engine may still keep running even if a cylinder wall is smashed. Of course, when once stopped it will not re-start. Some little benefit may however be obtained by the use of .303-in. A.P.

Against other portions of the lorry there will be little if any advantage over .303 Mk VII.

VII - Effect against loophole plates of snipers' posts, etc.

It takes one inch of mild steel to keep out .303 A.P. This is on the border line and an odd shot may get through. ½ inch mild steel will keep out .303 Mk VII.

VIII - Effect against enemy aircraft

The armour at present carried by German aircraft varies from 10.7 mm down to 4 mm and is spread over certain vulnerable parts of the plane; as summarized below :-

a) Pilots seat - behind, underneath and at the sides.
b) Bulkhead in front of pilot.
c) Protection for bomb aimer.
d) Protection for rear gunner.

Only small portions are as thin as 4, 5 or 6 mm. the main pieces being 8, 9 and 10.7 mm.

The armour is disposed to guard against fire from other aircraft. In general therefore it is not situated underneath the plane, the bomb aimer's and pilots seat being the exceptions. The thickness of armour of these 2 parts differ between various planes. The side armour is of the thicker types and will generally be at an oblique angle to fire from the ground.

From a consideration of the powers of the bullet and the small extent of armouring underneath the plane, it is of little use employing .303-in A.P. to defeat the armour.

IN ADDITION, IT IS AN ESTABLISHED FACT THAT WHEN HITTING SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT ARMOURED IN A PLANE, THE DAMAGE DONE BY .303 A.P. IS LESS THAN WHAT RESULTS FROM HITS BY ORDINARY MK VII BULLETS.

The reason is that the A.P. bullet has a steel envelope and a non-deformable core. It therefore either retains its shape making a clean hole, or, if severe obstruction is met, the envelope strips off and the core goes on. The core is only .25-in. in diameter and being A.P. steel does not deform and makes a clean hole also.

Mk VII ammunition has a comparatively soft envelope of cupronickel and a soft lead core. When striking any hard obstruction the whole bullet deforms and makes jagged tears in the light metal sheeting of aeroplanes. The bullet may also break up and make more than one hole. Tracer has a similar effect. In connection with tracer it should be noted that this bullet is lighter than Mk VIIz and the tracer portion is apt to separate from the remainder of the bullet when a hard object is struck. This frequently gives rise to the impression that bullets are bouncing off aeroplanes. The fact that Mk VIIz ball ammunition and portions of the tracer bullets penetrate even if the tracer appears to bounce off, must be made clear to all troops. In addition it should be stressed that the apparent bouncing off of tracer is a most excellent indication that the plane is being hit.

IX. - Damage to aircraft with .303 Mk VII & Tracer

It should be realised by all troops that because an enemy plane goes on its way apparently unharmed, it does not mean that damage has not been done. If holes are made in the wings or petrol tanks, these must be repaired. Broken stays and electrical connections must be replaced. All this means work to be done by the enemy, this requires men, spare parts and above all, TIME. Aircraft which have been severely shot up by .303 in. S.A.A., even if they have been capable of arriving at their base, may be kept on the ground for days at a time before being sufficiently serviceable to take the air again for operational purposes.

It is the duty, therefore, of all ranks to direct the utmost volume of S.A.A. fire at all enemy aircraft within range.

X. - Use of A.P. and Tracer in Conjunction with Mk VIII (streamline) ammunition - Forbidden

No design of streamline A.P. or tracer ammmition exists and none is contemplated for either type. The flat based bullet trajectories theoretically begin to diverge from, and drop below, Mk VIIIz at about 1,000 yds.

Apart entirely from the obvious divergence in trajectories, there is the vital one of barrel wear differences between cordite loaded flat base, and N.C. loaded streamline, ammunitions. It is strictly laid down that NO cordite loaded ammunition will be fired from barrels which are used for Mk VIIIz. This is necessary to ensure safety to our own troops when overhead fire is employed.

A.C.I. 1464 of 1940 gives full particulars and reasons as to "why" and "wherefore".

XI. - Recent decisions regarding the Use of .303-in. W. Mk.1 (A.P.) Ammunition in M.E.

In view of all the above facts, it has recently been decided that all units shall in future be issued with a proportion of A.P. .303-in. ammunition for use in rifles and L.M.Gs against Armd Cars, gun shields, car and lorry engines and snipers' loophole plates. It will NOT be employed against enemy aircraft.

Detailed instructions regarding allotments etc. will be issued separately at an early date.

"G" BRANCH, 6 AUST DIV

JULIS - BAALBEK — OCT 41

MOVEMENT		
MOVE TO SYRIA	by Adv HQ 6 Aust Div 9/10 Oct.	"G" Br 6 AUST DIV OCT 41
TRAINING		
DEFENCE OF SYRIA	Force letter on principles of defence of SYRIA att App 20.	"G" Br 6 AUST DIV OCT 41
LOCATIONS		
LOCATION STATES	of 6 Aust Div Units and attd troops app. Includes Order of Battle.	"G" Br 6 AUST DIV OCT 41
INTELLIGENCE		
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES	of 6 Aust Div app.	"G" Br 6 AUST DIV OCT 41

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively, Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

WAR DIARY

EX

~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
JULIS	Oct 3		Duties in aid of Civil Power - Tactical Notes for guidéance. Copy attached, 4957/G.	Appx 1.
	4		Tactical Exercises - ASLUJ.- Copy is attached of above document which deals with an exercise to be carried out on 8 Oct 41. Its object is to practise Arty and Inf comds in procedure necessary to produce arty fire in support of inf.	Appx 2.
	5		Instn on weekly wearing of respirators attached, 5038/G.	Appx 3.
			AG Tng.- Instn attached, S/5048/G.	Appx 4.
	6		6 Aust Div Weekly Int Summary.- Copy attached.	Appx 5.
	7		Fire Resisting Compounds.- Force circular CR/PAL/24123/G attached, 5087/G.	Appx 6.
BAALBEK	9		Adv HQ 6 Aust Div opened BAALBEK 2359 hrs. Rear HQ 6 Aust Div remained JULIS.	
	10		GII and G offrs arrived BAALBEK in afternoon.	
			6 Aust Div Security Instn No. 1, dealing with Security in SYRIA, attached.	Appx 7.
			Remainder of Adv HQ 6 Aust Div depart JULIS for SYRIA.	
	11		6 Aust Div took over comd from 6 Brit Div (renamed 70 Inf Div) at 2359 hrs. Tps under comd included:- 16 Aust Inf Bde (still in PALESTINE) 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp 19 Aust Inf Bde HQ 6 Div 14 Inf Bde Gp.	
			Other units shown on Location Statement 11 Oct, attached.	Appx 8.
			G offrs and clerks arrived BAALBEK 1600 hrs.	
			Col SUTHERLAND, GSO I, arrived BAALBEK 1800 hrs.	

C.E.A. 540. 50,000.

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively, Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
BAALBEK	Oct 11 (Contd)		6 Aust Div Tps remaining in PALESTINE:- 6 Aust Div Cav HQ RAA and 2/1, 2/2, 2/3 Fd Regts 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn 2/6 Aust Inf Bn 2/7 Aust Fd Amb 6 Aust Div Pet Coy AASC	
	13		GOC 6 Aust Div arrived BAALBEK at 1300 hrs.	
	14		18 Aust Inf Bde Gp and 2/4 Aust Fd Coy come under comd 7 Aust Div from 2100 hrs. 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn under comd 6 Aust Div from 2100 hrs.	
			6 Aust Div and Tps under comd, Location Statement as at 2359 hrs 14 Oct, attached.	Appx 9.
			GOC and GI at QATANA. Visited Brig CHAPPELI Comd 14 Inf Bde Gp.	
	15		Divisional Centre Lines.- Instn defining above attached, S/139/G.	Appx 10.
			GOC and GI at DJEDEIDE.	
	16		GOC 6 Aust Div and GI, accompanied Gen Sir MAITLAND WILSON and GOC 1 Aust Corps and BGS 1 Aust Corps to make a recce of DJEDEIDE area.	
			Authorised Abbreviations - Aust Units.- Copy attached, MS/146/G.	Appx 11.
	17		GOC and GI spent day reconnoitring DJEDEIDE area.	
			Lessons from Operations in WESTERN DESERT.- Copy attached, 215/G.	Appx 12.
			Brig ROBERTSON visited this HQ.	
			16 Aust Inf Bde arrive QATANA area and take over from 14 Aust Inf Bde.	
	18		G(R) Tng.- Force G(R) Tng Instn No. 1 attached, MS/231/G.	Appx 13.
			16 Aust Inf Bde are to deal direct with 10 Corps for planning defence posns at QATANA.	

C.E.A. 540. 50.000.

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

(Erase heading not required.)

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
BAALBEK	Oct 19		GOC 6 Aust Div and GI attended ceremony of presenting of colours to 13 Bn Foreign Legion by Gen CATROUX, FFF, at ALEPPO.	
			Tng.- Summary of tng 6 Aust Div from 27 Oct to 10 Nov, copy attached.	Appx 14.
			Maj DALY arrived and took over duties of G II from Capt HASSETT.	
			6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 1 distributed, copy attached. This Instn deals with 6 Aust Div role in defence of SYRIA.	Appx 15.
			Location Statement, 6 Aust Div and Tps under comd, copy attached.	Appx 15A.
			Capt HASSETT left 6 Aust Div to take up appointment of A/BM 18 Aust Inf Bde.	
	20		GOC and G I 6 Aust Div recced mountain feature known as KOSCIUSKO.	
	21		GOC visited DJEDEIDE posn with Bde Comds and Comds supporting Arms. Conference of Bde Comds and Comds supporting Arms with GOC 6 Aust Div at GOC's Mess at 2000 hrs. Amongst those attending were:-	
			GOC — Col LUCAS, CRE G I — Col KING & BM 17 Aust Inf Bde GII — Col WELLMAN, Sigs Brig STRUTT — Col St JOHN, 1 Aust A Tk Regt Brig VASEY & BM 19 Aust Inf Bde — Col GOOCH, 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	
			Notes on Conference, attached.	Appx 16.
			Military History and Infm Sec.- Lieut McNICHOLL, 7 Aust Div Cav Regt, arrived and took up duties.	
			Bn Comds of 2/3 and 2/5 Aust Inf Bns and 17 Bde Comd arrive to pinpoint posts in DJEDEIDE posn. Comds 2/1 Aust A Tk Regt, 2/6 Aust Inf Bn, and 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn arrive to work on plan for DJEDEIDE defences.	
	22		Recces and work on DJEDEIDE defences continue by Bde Comds.	
			Signal Security.- Letter from Force HQ CR/PAL/17859/G attached, S/416/G.	Appx 17.

C.E.A. 540. 50.000.

WAR DIARY

xx

~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
BAALBEK	Oct 23		Bde Comd and BM 16 Aust Inf Bde arrive for conference on DJEDEIDE defences.	
			6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 2.- Copy attached.	Appx 18.
			6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 3.- Copy attached.	Appx 19.
			The above Instns allocate the responsibility of planning DJEDEIDE defences and lay down requirements, etc.	
			Defence of SYRIA.- Force letter on principles of defence of SYRIA attached, MS/421/G.	Appx 20.
	24		GOC and G I 6 Aust Div spend day in DJEDEIDE recoing area with Brig BOASE.	
			Brig McCONNELL and Brig BAILLON spent night at BAALBEK and dined with GOC.	
	25		GOC and G I recced res area of DJEDEIDE posn.	
			Concrete Pillboxes.- Instn to CRE on number of pillboxes required in DJEDEIDE posn, copy attached, MS/480/G.	Appx 21.
			Crossing Wire Obstacles.- Report circulated to units, together with instns for a future demonstration, copy attached, 478/G.	Appx 22.
			Flooding DJEDEIDE Posn.- Instns to CRE to forward report on possibilities. Copy attached, MS/505/G.	Appx 23.
			Progress Report - SYRIAN Defences.- Copy attached, S/506/G.	Appx 24.
	26		GOC and G I visit DAMASCUS.	
	27		GOC and G I in DJEDEIDE area with CRA.	
			Notes, on Conference at 19 Aust Inf Bde.- Copy attached, S/749/G.	Appx 25.

WAR DIARY

xx

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices
BAALBEK	Oct 28		GOC and GI 6 Aust Div at DJEDEIDE posn inspecting approaches from the East.	
			Crossing Wire Obstacles.- Instns for demonstration attached, G.1433, 601/G.	Appx 26.
	29		GOC and GI 6 Aust Div with Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde in DJEDEIDE defence area	
			Conference 6 Aust Div.- Instns for a conference at GOC's Mess attached, S/605/G.	Appx 27.
	30		Notes for Conference.- Notes for points for dicussion at above conference attached	Appx 28.
	31		Notes on Conference at GOC's Mess.- Copy attached	Appx 29
			Location Statement of 6 Aust Div & Tps under comd. Copy attached.	Appx 30.

J. Dal MAJOR.
G.S. 6 AUST. DIV.

C.E.A. 5/40. 50.000.

(1)

220.

AW/TG

4957/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

3 Oct 41.

DUTIES IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER - TACTICAL NOTES FOR GUIDANCE.

--- The attached 1 Aust Corps GS Instruction No. 5 is forwarded for your information.

F. G. Hassett Col
for Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "B"

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps
25 Sep 41.
G.1068

1 Aust Corps GS Instn No 5

DUTIES IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER - TACTICAL NOTES FOR GUIDANCE

1. These notes are to be read in conjunction with the Manual of Military Law CH XIII (1929 edition, NOT AUST 1941) and "Duties in aid of the Civil Authorities for the maintenance of order in SYRIA and the LEBANON" issued by Force HQ and att as Appx 'A'.

REQUISITION FROM FRENCH MILITARY COMMANDER NORMAL BUT NOT NECESSARY

2. Whenever possible the British Comd should demand from the local French Military comd a requisition in writing for military assistance in aid of the Civil Authorities, but see para 4 of Appx 'A'. For the form of requisition see Appx 'B'.

OFFRS TO COMD DETS

3. Wherever possible sufficient offrs should be included in the party called out to ensure that an offr is available to comd each body that may be required to operate separately.

SOLDIERS TO REMAIN ARMED AS SOLDIERS - NOT TO USE BATONS, ETC

4. If soldiers are used in aid of the civil power they must be used as a military body under comd of an offr or offrs. They must remain armed with their normal weapons (rifles, revolvers, etc) and must NEVER be armed with sticks, batons, pick helves and so on which are not part of their normal army fighting eqpt.

COMD TO MOVE HIS FORCE WITH MILITARY PRECAUTIONS

5. The force sent will move with all military precautions necessary for its own protection.

COMD TO HAVE A RECORDER, INTERPRETER, AND IF POSSIBLE PHOTOGRAPHER

6. Each offr in comd of a party will detail a 'recorder' to accompany him closely, to note times, places, orders given etc. The value of photographs is very great and whenever possible a man with a camera should also accompany each offr to record pictorially those scenes which are important, including those showing the actions or behaviour of the crowd, especially just before any firing or charge is ordered. Interpreters will be required and should be put under the charge of the 'recorder' to prevent their slipping away from trouble.

FORCE TO BE TOLD OFF INTO SECS.

7. Tps employed in aid of the civil power must be told off into 'sections' of about 6 men, each with a comd.

TPS NOT TO BE DISPERSED BUT USED IN AS LARGE BODIES AS POSSIBLE

8. The comd is responsible for the safety of his tps. He must not allow them to be dispersed in 'penny packets,' but should keep them in as large bodies as is practicable and should always keep a reserve if the trouble is extensive. Tps must be kept where they can defend themselves.

HOW A SOLDIER MAY USE HIS ARMS

9. The soldier can use his arms in three ways; to fire with, as a bayonet, or to strike with the butt. The law requires that the minimum force be used consistent with the necessity of quelling the

disturbance or preventing the damaging of life or property. Whenever possible the crowd should be warned to disperse before action is taken and time allowed for dispersion, but action must be taken at once at any time in an emergency. Warn the crowd that any fire will be effective fire.

CONSIDER INTENTION OF MOB

10. In assessing the degree of force to be used initially the Comd should be guided by the purpose of the mob he is to disperse.

DANGER OF PHYSICAL CONTACT WITH CROWD

11. Allowing for their discipline and cohesion a military force must not be brought into physical contact with a crowd that is likely to overpower it.

USE OF BUTT AGAINST WOMEN AND PASSIVE RESISTERS

12. In dealing with women or passive resisters the butt on the instep makes an effective impression. In other cases a butt stroke to the body should be used in preference to the bayonet.

WHO MAY ORDER OPENING OF FIRE

13. If possible the crowd should be warned before action is taken against it. No man may fire without a definite order to do so from his comd, but in an extreme case every man is justified in using sufficient force, or shooting if necessary, to save his own life or that of others.

NOT TO FIRE WARNING SHOTS OVER HEADS OF CROWD. BLANK FORBIDDEN

14. If it is necessary to fire men must NOT fire over the heads of the crowd as this endangers innocent people and favours the boldest and guilty. Under NO circumstances may blank rounds be used.

SELECT RINGLEADERS AND AGGRESSIVE MEN AS TARGETS

15. (a) If the comd decides to fire he should select one or more ringleaders as targets and order one or two specified men to fire a given number of rounds. Fire should only be directed on those who can be seen to be implicated in the disturbance.

(b) If further effort is required he will order a sec[illegible] to fire, naming the target and the number of rounds.

(c) If more than one sec[illegible] is to fire at one time the comd must clearly indicate to each sec[illegible] which subordinate comd will give it its orders.

ONLY MINIMUM FORCE TO BE USED

16. Neither fire nor action must continue a moment longer than is necessary.

MEDICAL ATTENTION NECESSARY

17. Medical attention must be provided as soon as possible for any wounded or injured, including civilians.

ACTION TO BE REPORTED IMMEDIATELY

18. Every case of aid to the civil power must be reported by 'Immediate' signal or quickest means to HQ 1 Aust Corps.

BRIEF TACTICAL NOTES IN TIMES OF INTERNAL TROUBLES

MOVEMENT IN VILLAGES AND TOWNS

19. Rioters have a habit of dropping paving stones, tiles etc from roof tops and windows. When moving down a street keep half your men on each side of the rd close against the walls. The men on the right watch the houses, windows and roofs on the left side and vice versa.

TO ENTER A ROOM WHEN SEARCHING

20. Keep behind the wall and throw open the door suddenly without exposing yourself. Now with revolver leading come round the corner of the wall and view the whole room. In order to lead, the revolver must be held in the hand opposite to that nearer the wall. The door will be flung open with the hand nearer the wall.

TO DEAL WITH WIRES STRETCHED ACROSS RD TO DAMAGE VEHS

21. Tightly stretch a firmly anchored steel wire rope from the front bumper over the front of the bonnet and over the roof of the truck. This rope serves to deflect the wire obstacle over the top of the truck and avoids smashed windscreens, and other damage.

TO CIRCUMVENT BOMBS, STONES ETC WHEN IN VEHS ON THE MOVE

22. The windscreen should be protected by fine mesh wire. Open trucks should have a ridge fitted about 5 ft above the truck floor level and in line with direction of move. Over this gable fit tightly small meshed rabbit netting with the bottom edges finishing outside the truck. Bombs, etc, bounce or roll off this wire mesh covering.

SENTRIES IN WARTIME WHEN NOT ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS

IMPLICATION OF POSTING AN ARMED SENTRY

23. If an armed sentry is posted it is to be assumed that the senior offr ordering it did so because he anticipated that the use of armed force would be justified to enable the sentry to carry out his orders.

WHEN SENTRY SHOULD USE HIS WEAPONS

24. (a) An armed sentry is justified in firing, or using his rifle otherwise, either in defence of life or property; it is his duty to prevent a civilian committing a felony by using the MINIMUM of force necessary. He is therefore justified in firing on the civilian only if he can prevent the felony in no other way. He is also entitled to use any necessary force in self defence. Dynamiting and arson (setting fire to property) are felonies just as much as murder, rape, armed robbery, etc.

(b) On the other hand against the enemy, whether one or more, he must use ALL the force he has to effect a kill or capture.

(c) In case of legitimate doubt it must be assumed that the person is an enemy, and not a civilian.

25. Read Lord HALDANES evidence in Manual of Military Law at end of CH XIII; it is most instructive.

26. Long experience, much of it bitter to the Army from whom scapegoats were found, has produced a golden answer for offrs who take any action in aid of the civil power. Do not discuss what happened except when ALONE with the offr to whom you are responsible. Except

as stated, answer all questions written or otherwise and whether official or not by saying:-

> "The responsibility for taking action rested solely upon me as the military comd. In my judgment the situation was such as called for action. I took the minimum action necessary to cope with the situation."

The least said the soonest mended. As the responsible man on the spot you alone were in a posn to judge what was necessary. Stick to that; do NOT try to justify your opinions by explanations or arguments.

H.K. Bourne Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div (incl Corps Tps att)	60 (full coy basis for 18 Aust Inf Bde)
7 Aust Div (incl Corps Tps att)	120
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	2
CCRA	10
CRE Corps Tps	5
CSO	5
'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	4
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	5
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	1
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	4
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	1
1217 Ind Labour Coy	1
GOC	1
BGS	1
G	1
I	1
A	5
Q	1
CE	1
DDST	15
DDMS	5
ADOS	8
DADOS	1
Camp	2
APM	4
DADPS	1
File	10
War Diary	2

For Information -

Force HQ P & TJ	2
HQ AIF (ME)	8
6 Aust Div (less 18 Aust Inf Bde)	60
HQ AIF (ME) Base Area	2
HQ AIF (ME) Reinft Depot	2

APPX 'A'

DUTIES IN AID OF THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF ORDER IN SYRIA AND THE LEBANON

1. The general principles to be followed by military comds when tps are called out in aid of the civil power are to be found in CH XIII of the Manual of Military Law, particularly sections 3, 4, 5, 27, 28 and 34, and K.R. (1940) 1304-1323. These are applicable in Syria and the Lebanon in the same manner as in the United Kingdom, having regard to the differences both in the national characteristics and temperament of the people, and in the nature of the governments and the means at their disposal for maintaining order.

2. The primary obligation for the preservation of order and for the suppression of disturbances rests with the civil authority that is to say, with the lawfully constituted governments of the countries.

3. When the civil authorities are of opinion that a situation has arisen or is likely to arise with which the civil police or gendarmerie cannot cope and that the intervention of tps is necessary, application for military assistance will normally be made to or through the local or nearest French Military Comd.

4. If there are no Free French Forces available, or if they are in insufficient numbers to render effective assistance, it may be the duty of the comd of the British Forces to intervene. Normally he would do so only when called upon by the French Military authorities or, in their absence the civil authorities, but it will be his duty to take action even without being summoned, if in his opinion this were to be necessary to prevent serious disorder such as loss of life or destruction of property.

5. When application for military intervention is made, the military comd has an absolute discretion to take any or no action as in his opinion the circumstances require. In forming his conclusions he should be guided by his own observation of the facts of the situation rather than by reports from the local authorities, civil or military, who may, for temperamental reasons, tend to take an unduly alarmist view of the posn.

6. Whether he is called on for assistance, or decides to intervene, on his own initiative, the justification of any action he may take is its NECESSITY for the quelling of disturbances and restoring order. He will be the sole judge of the time for action and of the degree of force to be used to attain these objects, and he may order fire to be opened if he deems this necessary.

7. If drastic action, such as opening fire is resorted to, the military comd is responsible that this is continued so long, and only so long, as may be necessary to effect the immediate objects of the protection of life and property and the restoration of order. It must not be prolonged with a view to its deterrant effect elsewhere or in the future.

APPX 'B'

1. Where a body of British or Australian Tps is summoned in aid of the civil power it will normally be by the French Military Authorities - it may,however,be by a representative of the civil authorities themselves. In either event, and before taking any action, the offr in charge of the party will, if possible, obtain from the summoning authority his signature to a document in the following or like form:-

(It must be understood that the obtaining of this signature is a precautionary measure only. If it is impracticable to obtain this signature the Offr will nevertheless act as the circumstances demand.)

To: Offr in comd of local British Forces called to the aid of the Civil Power

1. I certify that I have requested you, as comd of the local military authorities, to act in aid of the Civil Power, for without your assistance there is not the means available to preserve order.

2. The local civil and French military authorities (to whom I have applied) X are unable to provide adequate forces to maintain order.

X delete words 'to whom I have applied' if request is signed by a French Military Offr.

Date.....: .....Signature Rank
Appointment

(2)

HQ 6 Aust Div.
4 Oct 41.

6 AUST DIV

TACTICAL EXERCISE - ASLUJ.

INTRODUCTORY.

1. The tactical exercise and arty demonstration held at ASLUJ on 15/16 Sep will be repeated on the 8 Oct for the benefit of personnel who did not attend previously. Demonstrations of the use of the A/Tk gun and 3" mortar will be included.

DIRECTING STAFF.

Major-General	E.F. HERRING, CBE, DSO, MC, ED.
Brigadier	H.W. STRUTT, DSO.
Colonel	R.B. SUTHERLAND
Capt	F.G. HASSETT.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTNS.

1. The following personnel will attend:-

(a) Unit comds.
(b) Twenty (offrs or NCOs) from each unit.

2. RV & TIME - In MT on road east of ASLUJ POLICE POST at 0900 hrs 8 Oct 41.

3. DURATION OF EXERCISE - Exercise will conclude in time for personnel to return to JULIS for the evening meal 8 Oct.

4. RATIONS - Personnel attending will make own arrangements for midday meal on 8 Oct. Haversack luncheon is suggested as lunch will be eaten outdoors and must be carried by the individual concerned.

5. EQUIPMENT - Binoculars, protractors and compasses will be required.

6. MAPS - Copies of maps have been issued previously.

DS NOTES - ASLUI EXERCISE
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

Serial No	Time From	Time To	Event	Location	DS concerned	Remarks
1	0945	1000	Description of ground. Issue of Bde OO (1)	STAND 1	Col SUTHERLAND	(1) Two additional enemy localities to be sited to represent mortar Targets
2	1000	1010	(a) Arrangements between bn cond & bty cond to produce required arty support. (b) Orders for attack by bn cond. (2)	" "	" "	(2) (a) The following offrs required at orders:- Bty Cond, Four Coy Conds, Mortar pl Cond (b) Copy of order attached.
3	1010	1040	Registration of arty targets (3)	" "	Brig STRUTT	(3) Two targets to be registered
4	1040	1050	Registration of mortar targets (4)	" "	Mortar pl Cond	(4) Two targets to be registered
5	1050	1110	Arty demonstration at OP (5)	" "	Brig STRUTT	(5) Same demonstration as carried out previously.
6	1110	1140	Firing of arty concentrations.	" "	" "	
7	1140	1150	Firing of mortar concentrations (6)	" "	Mortar Pl Cond	(6) 10 rounds per mortar.
8	1150	1210	Transporting of 3" mortar:- (a) Manhandling. (b) By Carrier (7)	"	" "	(7) Only one mortarto be taken forward to STAND 2.
9	1210	1230	Move to STAND 2 (8)			(8) Public address System must be in Arty tractor.
10	1230	1300	LUNCH			
11	1300	1330	Exercise in choice of target. Firing of mortar and arty on separate targets (9)	STAND 2	Capt HASSETT	(9) Coy Cond and FOO to be selected. Targets to be HQ post and enemy mortar.

Serial No	Time From	Time To	Event	Location	DS concerned	Remarks
12	1330	1415	Engagement of targets. (a) By arty - (10) (b) By mortars (11) -	STAND 2	Capt HASSETT.	(10) Targets represented as:- (a) Attacking carriers. (b) 75 mm bty coming into action. (11) Targets represented as:- (a) MG post. (b) Enemy inf withdrawing
13	1415	1445	Firing of defensive fire task by arty. (12)	" "	Col SUTHERLAND	(12) Bty Task on approach up re-entrant west of STAND 2.
14	1445	1545	Firing of Smoke Screen by:- (a) Arty. (b) 3" Mortar. (c) 2" Mortar. (13)	" " " "	"	(13) Targets to be selected. To represent three enmy posts (2" mortar task must be within 200[X] of firing position.
15	1545		Demonstration of A.Tk gun	-	-	

TRACE "A"
3

LOCATION OF STANDS

REF MAP 1/50,000 RAFAH - BEERSHEBA
(Superimposed)

120,000
050,000

O STAND 1
O STAND 2

120,700
140,000

HQ 6 Aust Div.
4 Oct 41.

6 AUST DIV.

TACTICAL EXERCISE - ASLUJ.

Ref Maps:- BEERSHEBA 1/100,000. Sheet II.
RAFAH - BEERSHEBA 1/50,000. Sheet "A".

OBJECT.

1. (a) To practise comds of arty and inf units in the procedure necessary to produce arty fire in support of infantry.

(b) To demonstrate by firing:-

(i) The time factors involved in producing supporting fire from arty or mortars.

(ii) The effect of such fire when produced.

(iii) The use of the 2-pr A/Tk gun against a moving target.

OPENING NARRATIVE.

1. In Sep 41 the situation in the MIDDLE EAST was as follows:-

(a) Fighting had extended into SYRIA and the GERMANS had reached the line of the PALESTINE - SYRIAN frontier, where their advance was held up.

(b) The BRITISH Navy is unopposed in the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, but the concentration of dive bombers in SYRIA made it extremely dangerous for the fleet to operate along the PALESTINE Coast. Consequently HAIFA and JAFFA cannot be used as ports and all movement of supplies and tps to from EGYPT must be by rd and rail.

2. For the past few months 6 Aust Div has been stationed in SOUTHERN PALESTINE with the role of internal security and defence of L of C.

3. 16 Aust Inf Bde was located in the area BEERSHEBA - GAZA. Towards the end of Aug it was concentrated in the vicinity of BEERSHEBA with the object of dealing with suspected Fifth Column activity amongst the tribes in the HEBRON HILLS. Additional tps under comd 16 Aust Inf Bde were:-

"A" Sqn 6 Aust Cav Regt.
2/1 Aust Fd Regt.
7 Bty 3 Aust Lt AA Regt.
2/1 Aust Fd Coy.
2/1 Aust Fd Amb.

2/1 Aust (HG) Bn was not available for duty with 6 Aust Div.

4. During 5 Oct and 6 Oct enemy air activity over PALESTINE considerably increased. At 0800 hrs 5 Oct reports were received from the EL ARISH area that a wave of approximately 250 GERMAN aircraft (JU 52s) had appeared shortly after first light and had succeeded in landing tps in the coast area just south of EL ARISH. Further communications during the morning reported that these tps were attacking the tps at EL ARISH and that the main PALESTINE - EGYPT railway had been cut just south of EL ARISH. No further communications were received after 1100 hrs.

5. Tac/R during the afternoon of 6 Oct reported a further arrival of GERMAN Tp carrying and supply planes at EL ARISH. Enemy tps were also reported to have landed near the main rd BEERSHEBA - ISMAILIA in the vicinity of ASLUJ.

6. An Australian Convoy of 50 vehs coming up from EGYPT was captured in the vicinity of EL ARISH.

7. At 1000 hrs on the 7 Oct a div conference was held at GAZA. The GOC, when addressing the conference said:-

> "You realise that the tps landed in the vicinity of EL ARISH are probably the advance elements of a GERMAN airborne div. Their intention is obviously to cut our L of C and prevent the use of the rd and rly from EGYPT. As it is impossible to make use of the sea as a means of supply, this action will place us in a very awkward position unless the situation is cleared up with the next few days. 17 Aust Inf Bde are already south of GAZA advancing down the coastal route to EL ARISH. I want a force to move down the rd BEERSHEBA - ISMAILIA, with the object of re-opening the rd and later assisting the 17th Bde to clear up the EL ARISH area. I intend to use the 16 Aust Inf Bde for this task";
>
> Then turning to the comd 16 Aust Inf Bde:-
>
> "I can make available to you by 1300 hrs today the reserve MT coy, which is now on its way down from JERUSALEM. With this MT available, can you begin the advance this afternoon?".

Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde agreed that this would be possible.

HQ 6 Aust Div.
4 Oct 41.

NARRATIVE 1.

1. At 1500 hrs 7 Oct 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp commenced the move south along the rd BEERSHEBA - ASLUJ. Shortly after 1600 hrs our mobile tps reported contact with enemy tps in the vicinity of BIR ET TURKI 132 051. These were identified as part of a GERMAN Recce Unit and withdrew after a few shots were fired. Stronger resistance was encountered astride the main rd in the vicinity of KILO 114 (1305 0486). "A" Sqn was held up by a force estimated at one coy of inf, supported by 75 mm guns and HMGs.

2. At 1830 hrs an attack was launched by the leading inf bn with arty support. The enemy was not in strength and withdrew fighting a delaying action. Fighting continued throughout the night and by 0700 hrs 8 Oct our leading bn had passed through BIR ASLUJ and was consolidating on the TRIG 372 feature 1252 0462. The enemy had withdrawn into the hills west of TRIG 372. The remainder of the Bde Gp was concentrating in the vicinity of BIR ASLUJ.

3. Reports from 6 Aust Div timed 1500 hrs 7 Oct stated that further landings of German aircraft had taken place in the EL ARISH area. It was now estimated that a complete GERMAN airborne division had been landed and was now disposed in the EL ARISH and ASLUJ areas. Maintenance was being carried out by air.

4. 6 Aust Cav reported that an enemy force estimated at one Inf Regt with MGs and at least one bty of 75 mm Mountain guns, was in position east of the WADI EL ARIM in the vicinity of Knoll 306 (1213 0455) and the sand dunes to the east of it. Enemy dets had been located in the vicinity of KILO 129 (1207 0404) covering a series of rd blocks. These were strong mob dets protected by A/Tk guns and Arty.

5. GERMAN prisoners reported that approximately 50 captured AUSTRALIAN vehs had arrived during morning of 7 Oct from EL ARISH bringing up additional GERMAN tps. Most of this tpt had remained in the ASLUJ area.

6. Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde decided to deal with the ASLUJ Force before pushing on to EL ARISH. At 0845 hrs his bn comds assembled on the hill 500 yds south of the TRIG 372 feature and he issued orders for a further advance.

DS NOTES

BDE OO FOR THE ATTACK ON 8 OCT.

The "gist" of the bde cmds orders was as follows:-

1. 16 Aust Inf Bde Gp will capture OBJECTIVE KNOLLS and will destroy enemy in the ASLUJ area.

2. Forward Tps:- 2/2 Aust Inf Bn - Right.
2/3 " " " - Left

3. Inter bn boundary:-

TRIG 372 - CENTRE KNOLL (all incl 2/3 Aust Inf Bn)

4. Objective:- OBJECTIVE KNOLLS.

5. Starting Line:-

Flagged north and south line 1000 yds east of TRIG 372.

6. Zero:- 1030 hrs.

7. Support:- One bty in support each fwd bn.

8. Res:- 2/1 Aust Inf Bn will support attack in initial stages. Will then come into res and follow 1000 yds in rear of fwd bns.

9. Bde Cond Post:- TRIG 372 from 1000 hrs. Then move with res bn.

DS NOTES.

BN OO FOR THE ATTACK ON 8 OCT.

The "gist" of the bn comd orders was as follows -

1. 2/3 Aust Inf Bn will capture CENTRE KNOLL and LEFT KNOLL features.

2. Forward Tps - A Coy - Right. Objective CENTRE KNOLL.
B Coy - Left. Objective LEFT KNOLL.

3. Inter coy boundary -

(To be pointed out on ground)

4. Starting Line -Flagged north and south line 1000 yds east of TRIG 372.

5. Zero Hour - 1030 hrs.

6. Res - C Coy - Right) To move 500 yds in rear of
D Coy - Left) forward coys.

7. Arty - Fire concentrations as under -

Unit.	Task.	Time.	Type of Fire.
One Bty	TRIANGLE PATCH	Z plus 15	5 rounds Gunfire.
"	SANDY RIDGE	Z plus 17	
"	TRIANGLE PATCH	Z plus 22	
"	SANDY RIDGE	Z plus 24	

8. Mortars - (a) One det under comd each forward coy.

(b)

Unit.	Task.	Time.	Type of fire.
One det	(pointed out)	Z plus 15	10 rounds.
One det			

9. Bn HQ remains present location until capture of objective.
Bn Comd Post will move in rear of forward coys.

AJSC[illegible]TG

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

EXPRESS

5038/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

5 Oct 41.

WEEKLY WEARING OF RESPIRATORS.

1. (a) Only by constant practice can the respirator facepiece be adjusted in the prescribed drill time (9 seconds from the 'alert' position).

(b) Deformation of the face piece with consequent loss of protective power can only be avoided by frequent removal from the haversack.

2. Commencing on 6 Oct respirators will be worn by all ranks for two periods of half an hour each week. During these periods personnel will continue their normal duties in order to become accustomed to working with the facepiece adjusted.

3. The weekly wearing of respirators will be carried out in all areas except in those forward areas where, in the opinion of the local Commander, for operational reasons such training is impracticable.

4. The commencement of the half hour periods should be marked by the sounding of the trench rattle (Gas Alrrm). The end of the period will be indicated by a sentry giving the "All Clear".

5. Respirators will NOT be worn in public in EGYPT or PALESTINE.

Lt Colonel, Capt.
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "B"

W.D.

AJSC/TG

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

S/5048/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

5 Oct 41.

ANTI-GAS TRAINING.

1. Copies of HQ BF in P & TJ secret letter CR/Pal/16678/I/G dated 20 Sep 41 and appendices "A" and "B" are forwarded for information and action.

2. Para 5 of the above quoted letter is amended.-

Until further notification units will NOT issue more capes AG than are necessary for training. Those issued will form a unit pool.

Lt Colonel, Capt
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION -

6 Aust Cav	(3)
RAA 6 Aust Div	(5)
RAE 6 Aust Div	(4)
Sigs 6 Aust Div	(2)
16 Aust Inf Bde	(5)
19 Aust Inf Bde	(4)
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	(2)
AASC 6 Aust Div	(1)
Comd	(1)
AQ	(5)
AQ (for ADMS)	(6)
G (circulate)	(1)
File	(1)
War Diary	(2)
Spare	(6)

SUBJECT :- Anti-gas Tng.

S E C R E T.

H.Q., B.F. in P & T.J.,
CR/PAL/16678/1/G.
10 Sep 41.

1 Aust Corps.
AIF Base Area.
10 Armd Div.
6 Aust Div.
3 Ind Motor Bde.
1 Aust AA Bde.
Northern L of C District.
Jsm Area.
Lydda Area.
T.J.F.F.
O.C., Tps T.J.
O.C., Tps RAFA.

All Branches Force H.Q.,

H.Q., R.A.F., - for inf.

1. Recent information indicates that the use of gas on the Russian front in the near future is a possibility.

When gas is used by the Germans it will not be confined to any one theatre of operations alone, but may be used on all fronts at the same time.

2. The Commander in Chief has directed that gas "readiness" will be maintained at a high standard and that all anti-gas measures should be kept under constant review.

3. At a recent course held at the Middle East Gas School, no student on arrival was able to pass the Tests of Elementary Training as set out in paras 101 - 104 of Pamphlet No.1. of " Protection Against Gas and Air Raids ".

These tests are the best means of assessing the standard attained by the individual for his own protection and will be carried out at frequent intervals.

No unit will be considered to have reached a state of gas "readiness" until "ALL RANKS" can qualify in these tests.

4. Practical points in Anti-gas Tng, for guidance of commanders during their inspectations, are given in Army Tng Memorandum No.38. Copy of the appropriate extract from that Memorandum is given at Appendix "A" to this letter.

5. All units should by now have drawn their full scale of Anti-gas equipment and the Personal Equipment should be in the possession of the man. CR/PAL/16678/1/G dated 28 Jul 41 refers.

The scale of issue of personal equipment, as laid down by War Office letter 54/General/8383/(SD 9c) dated 23 Jan 41 and amendments 1,2 and 3 is given at Appendix "B" to this letter.

D.D.I.-C.

Brigadier, G.S.

S E C R E T.

Appendix "A" to CR/PAL/16678/1/G.
dated Sep 41.

Appendix "B" to Army Tng Memorandum No38.

The following are some of the practical points which should be examined by commanders during their inspections :-

(i) Respirators - Cause the " gas alarm " to be sounded.

See whether the time taken to adjust facepieces is within that laid down in T.O.E.T.s for anti-gas training (9 to 11 seconds). See whether eyepieces show signs of clouding over within a few minutes. See whether the elastic of the headharness has become slack, thus causing a gas leak. Have selected respirator haversacks examined to see whether they contain cotton waste, eyeshields, ointment, anti-dimming compound and spare individual detectors.

(ii) Personal decontamination - Have marked individual detector slips pinned to the arm of one man, or have a marked detector card placed on the ground, and see whether action by the sub-unit is taken in accordance with the mnemonic C.O.E.C.D.O. ç (See Protection Against Gas and Air Raids, Pamphlet No.1. 1939, Sec 41. as amended by Amendments No.2, notified in A.C.I.132 of 1941).

(iii) Capes - See whether capes can be rapidly adjusted from the rolled to worn position and whether they have all been painted with detector paint on the shoulders.

(iv) Action by sentries - See whether sentries understand the action to be taken in the event of :-

(i) Spray having fallen.

(ii) Other forms of gas attack (see Protection Against Gas and Air Raids, Pamphlet No.1. sec 97).

Check written orders for sentries in regard to gas.

ç Church = Cotton waste.
Of = Ointment A.G.
England. = Eyeshields - discard old and put on new.
Church = Cut off bits of contaminated clothing.
Door = Detectors - change or mark old spots.
Open = Ointment on hands.

Appendix "B" to CR/PAL/16678/1/G
dated 20 Sep 41.

Reference War Office Letter 54/General/8383/(SD 9c)
dated 23 Jan 41 and Amdts 1,2 and 3.

PERSONAL EQUIPMENT.

ARTICLE.	Number held by each individual.
1. Respirator.	One.
2. Ointment A.G.	Two 2 oz containers, one at least of which shall be No.2 ointment.
3. Eyeshields A.G.	Six.
4. Capes A.G.	One.
5. Curtains A.G.	One.
6. Wallets A.G.	One.
7. Detectors, Gas, Individual.	Two pairs.
8. Cotton Waste.	One ounce.

In addition One Pad of 25 sheets of Detectors, Gas, Ground, will be carried by every Officer and N.C.O.

War Diary

SECRET

HQ 6 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No. 9
Compiled from information received up to 1200 hrs 5 Oct 41.

Paragraphs sidelined in the margin are only for the information of Lieut-Colonels and above.

SPECIAL NOTE

It is believed that the Germans may disguise propagandists and apecial agents as guards in PW camps. Other ranks escaped from CRETE report, that a certain German Serjeant gave them lectures on the scenic beauties of Germany and other non-controversial subjects in the early days of their captivity. These lectures were well delivered in excellent English, but gradually NAZI propagandi themes were effectively introduced.

The Serjeant also befriended certain NCOs from whom he obtained information in informal conversation on military topics.

It is reported that the German Serjeant was treated with apparent deference by his fellow guards, and this lends colour to the belief that he was no ordinary NCO.

All ranks, if taken prisoner, should be on their guard against attempts to gain information by similar means.

PART I

1. USSR

(a) NORTHERN Sector

There has been little change in the disposition of Finnish and Russian forces along the Finnish Front. A recent attack on MURMANSK has been repulsed, and an attempted drive through to KANDALAKSHA to cut the MURMANSK-ZVANKA railway failed. In the south the Finns have had some success, and extended their hold to the Northern bank of the River SVIR. PETROZAVODSK is still in Russian hands.

(b) LENINGRAD Sector

Although LENINGRAD has been cut off by land through the Germans completing their encircling movement to Lake LADOGA, a wide channel of communication exists across this Lake. The Russian morale is high and equipment plentiful. It appears that the position has become stabilised and has developed into one of attacks and counter-attacks, and nowhere along the wide ring of outer defences has the German army been able to break through.

It is now officially confirmed that the North Eastern portion of the Island of OESEL, off the ESTHONIAN coast is in German hands.

(c) STARAYA RUSSA Sector

An advanced mobile column in reported to have cut the LENINGRAD-MOSCOW railway at BOLOGOE, but latest reports from this sector indicate that fierce fighting continues South and SW of Lake ILMEN.

(d) SMOLENSK Sector

Russian counter attacks have resulted in the Axis armies being slowly pushed back in the area, whilst the City itself appears to be encircled and is apparently threatened. Fighting still continues West of SMOLENSK with reported heavy German losses. VITEBSK has been captured and an advance from this point NE has reached the town of VELIZH.

(e) UKRAINE Sector

The Russian forces surrounded East of KIEV are now assumed to be overwhelmed, although pockets of resistance doubtless exist. A German drive East from ROMNY to SUMI is in progress and in the South POLTAVA has been captured. Forces from this area are straightening out the front to join with the Germans at DNIEPROPETROVSK, but owing to a Russian salient towards KREMENCHOUG are meeting with strong resistance.

The attack on the Crimea has reached ARMYANSK and GENICHESK thus severing land communication. Fierce fighting is taking place on the Isthmus. Advancing German Tank units from the Bridgeheads at DNIEPROPETROVSK and ZAPOROZHYE have advanced into the DONETS BASIN but with little progress. A large scale counter-attack by General BUDENNY threatens the flank of the German forces attacking the Crimea.

Both the German and Russian forces have agreed as to the common front line which appears to be as follows:-

Commencing at SCHLUSSELBURG East of LENINGRAD, extending South-East to a point along the Western bank of the VOLKHOV River, and South-West to SOLTSY on the West of Lake ILMEN; thence South through VILIZH (on the DVINA River), west of SMOLENSK through KLIMOVICHI, STARODUB, KONOTOP, ROMNY POLTAVA and to a point on the DNIEPER River midway between KREMENCHOUG and DNIEPROPETROVSK.

The Russian campaign is now in its fourteenth week, and there are no signs of imminent Russian collapse. It is of value to consider the effect this delay on German plans for action against TURKEY, and through TURKEY to the Middle East. For a successful attack against TURKEY, or for the implementation of a threat strong enough to compel TURKEY to allow the passage of Axis troops, GERMANY would require larger forces, including armoured formations, in BULGARIA than she has at present. Neither the land forces nor the aircraft necessary can be spared until the Germans break off their present intensive operations on the Russian front. Once operations in RUSSIA become static, it is believed that the Germans could not complete the withdrawal, re-fitting and concentration of sufficient forces to attack or over-awe TURKEY in less than two months. Supposing then that the Russians were to collapse almost immediately, movements of German troops into TURKEY would appear unlikely before the middle of November. By this time, certainly by 1st December at the latest, winter conditions in ANATOLIA will have rendered movement off the roads virtually impossible. On the Anatolian Plateau, even the roads themselves will have become very difficult. Against a hostile TURKEY, the, Germans could hope to make little progress beyond the fringes of ANATOLIA until the end of winter, about 31 March 42. Even if TURKEY submitted to German demands and allowed the passage of troops, the necessity for the concentration in ANATOLIA of sufficient rolling stock should delay German movement for at least another fortnight, that is till the beginning of December. After that date, practically all MT would have to be moved across ANATOLIA by rail and the concentration in Southern ANATOLIA of a force sufficiently large to conduct a major offensive against SYRIA and IRAQ would be a slow business. It is reasonable to hope, then, that Russian resistance, protracted far beyond German expectations, has made difficult, if not impossible, active operations designed to subdue TURKEY to to threaten the Middle East through TURKEY this year.

2. GREECE

A report recently received states that there is no steamer service for civilian traffic from PIRAEUS, and that all civilian communication with the Island is by caique.

The following incident is reported by a PW. It happened at ELEUSIS on 18 Aug last.

Specialists had arrived at ATHENS from GERMANY to examine seven aerial torpedoes abandoned by the RAF at the time of the evacuation.

After being examined by the specialists, the torpedoes were loaded, severally, on aircraft about to raid ALEXANDRIA. At the moment when the first aircraft was taking off, the torpedo which it was carrying, exploded. As a result of the explosion, the immediately following aircraft caught fire, and a series of explosions followed.

Results:-

(a) Nineteen aircraft destroyed.
(b) One hundred and thirty Germans (incl the specialists from Germany) killed.
(c) Thirty Greeks killed.

Two different reports have been circulated as to the cause of the explosions:-

(a) Sabotage by Austrian ground-staff.

(b) Mishandling of the torpedoes.

3. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

A great deal of unrest is felt in BULGARIA owing to ever increasing German pressure and call for man power. A state of emergency has been proclaimed. The present distribution of Bulgarian troops is ten divisions along the THRACIAN frontier, three divisions along the Black Sea coast as a right flank guard to the Axis, and two divisions in YUGOSLAVIA.

ROUMANIAN morale is reported to be low, due to the fact that instead of being allowed to consolidate after regaining lost territory, the army has been tricked into a wider objective, and has been obliged to contribute 25 of her 28 divisions to support the Axis army against the Russian forces.

Affected by the very casualty rate, there is a great deal of unrest in the country, which, however is at present held in check by the fear that should internal trouble break out, the hated HUNGARIAN army may be sent to maintain order.

4. LIBYA

(a) Operations

Frontier Area - 29 Sep - The ground situation was quiet. Our forces captured 4 Italians who were apparently wishing to visit friends at SIDI OMAR before returning to ITALY.

TOBRUK - 30 Sep - Since the enemy operation on 14 and 15 Sep the ground situation has been very quiet.

From evidence received, the probable composition of the enemy force which conducted the operation on the 14 and 15 Sep is deduced as follows:-

5 Tank Regt (2 Bns)
3 Recce Unit
155 Arty Regt (2 Bty)
39 Anti-tank Bn (1 Coy)
606 Lt AA Bn (1 Coy)
18 AA Regt (3 Tp)
8 MG Bn (1 Coy)
200 Engineer Bn (1 Coy)
one Lt MT Column.

The fighting power of the columns would have been about 130 light and medium tanks, about 20 armoured cars, 12 105 mm gun howitzers, 4 88 mm AA guns, 2 75 mm Inf guns, 3 50 mm and 11 37 mm A/Tk guns, 14 20 mm AA guns and 12 MGs in an AA role.

155 Arty Regt is probably the arty regt of 21 Armoured Division.

Identifications

An unconfirmed report states that the recruiting of Arabs by the enemy in CYRENAICA is continuing. It is stated that there are now some 8,000 - most of whom are partly trained - employed to guard dumps in the BARCE area. The persistent food shortage in CYRENAICA is thought to have acted as a stimulus to recruiting in that district.

5. SYRIA

On the 18 Sep, a clash occurred between Free French Forces and the AGAIDAT Tribe of the ABUKEMAL area, in the Euphrates valley. The incident arose out of the tribes refusal to pay an increased wheat tax, and vigorous efforts on the part of the local French authorities resulted in one Free French Officer being killed and four wounded. The Arabs sustained heavy casualties.

On the arrival of Free French reinforcements, a meeting between the leaders of the insurgents and the Free French was arranged but the Free French terms of surrendering 400 rifles in lieu of tax was rejected. Eventually both parties compromised at 100 rifles.

The situation has been further aggravated since by the shooting of SHIEK KASSAR of the AGAIDAT Tribe, whilst he was apparently under protection as a Hostage during the foregoing negotiations. As a consequence, talk of open revolt against the French is prevalent throughout this part of Syria.

An Anglo-French Commission from BEIRUT is at present inquiring into the whole situation at ABU KEMAL.

Under the influence of the economic situation in SYRIA and attempts by the French to collect taxes or arms by forceful methods a recrudescence of local trouble is quite probable.

The food situation and the legacy of French unpopularity, combined with the approach of winter, are still the main threats to internal security. It is expected that this threat will dwindle in the face of regular supplies at reasonable prices now being negotiated.

6. PALESTINE

The Palestine problem of internal security is at present in the background, and, on the surface, everything is quiet. Aggravated by the influx of arms and ammunition from the Syrian campaign, the problem of internal security will need careful watching, particularly after the war is won.

The Communists in Palestine have been very active of late on paper, and they are now directing their attacks upon the HISTADRUTH or General ed ration of Jewish Labour in PALESTINE. Exhortations to both Jews and Arabs NOT to enlist, and the usual song of hate against the authorities in general are amongst the lesser subversive activities of this Union.

7. Attached hereto as Appendix A is map showing dispositions of Axis troops in South Eastern Europe.

PART II

1. MACHINE PISTOL MODEL 40

The following is a translation of a captured document describing the GERMAN MACHINE PISTOL MODEL 40.

General

The model 40 machine pistol is operated by recoil action. The feeding, cocking and firing of the pistol, and the extraction and ejection of the rounds are affected by the combined action of recoil & the striker spring. The barrel does not move during firing. The breech block is a solid sliding block, the pistol being cocked by the recoil of the block and the resistance of the striker spring. The rounds are fed from a magazine of 32 rounds capacity.

Component Parts

Barrel and breech casing; sights; magazine catch and ejector; stock, hand-grip and shoulder piece; breech block.

The barrel gives direction to the round as it is fired and imparts a twist to it. The inside of the barrel consists of the chamber and the long rifled muzzle. To the outside of the barrel is attached the muzzle nut which is screwed on to the muzzle, the foresight and the foresight protector, and, underneath, a thrust block and a rest. The thrust block prevents the machine pistol from slipping back when fired from a tank and the rest protects the barrel in firing from the slits. The base of the barrel is firmly screwed into the breech casing. This casing guides the sliding parts of the breech block. It is tubular in construction with an inside thread for the barrel in front and hollow behind.

Attached to this casing is the back-sight, which consists of the back-sight bed with a fixed sight of 100 m. and a leaf back-sight which can be adjusted up to 200 m.

In the right hand forward top of the casing is the ejection opening. On the underside of the casing are the magazine opening and the recess for the trigger. Below the magazine opening is the magazine catch, fastened into the breech casing, with a retaining nut which holds the magazine in position. The ejector, which is an extension of the magazine catch, projects into the breech casing and ejects the rounds as they are extracted.

The stock provides the frame of the pistol, and securely fastened to it are the hand-grip and shoulder-piece by which the weapon is held. Built into the body are the breech-casing and barrel. At the front of the body is a locking pin which is pressed in from beneath and when correctly adjusted prevents any loosening of the breech casing in the stock. Further back is a recess under the body for the trigger mechanism, which is protected by the trigger guard. Below this is the hand grip. The shoulder piece is used to pull the pistol into the shoulder when firing. It is hinged to the body and when not in use can be folded up under the stock. To do this the stud on the shoulder-piece must be pressed sharply to the right.

It is the breech block which feeds the round into the chamber, closes the chamber, fires the round and extracts and ejects the empty case. It consists of the bolt and cocking handle, the extractor and the striker and its telescopic case containing the striker spring and buffer. The bolt is cylindrical and hollow at the back. The bolt-face is shaped to receive the base of the round and in the centre is a recess through which the firing pin protrudes. On the right hand side of the bolt face, held in position by a spring, is the extractor. On the left hand side of the rear of the bolt is the cocking handle. The ejector rides in a groove in the underside of the bolt.

Action

The striker, the head of which permanently protrudes from the face of the bolt, has behind it a telescopic case in which is housed the double coiled striker spring. Through the momentum of the breech block this spring is contracted by the recoil from the discharge and under this pressure forces the breech block forward and causes the striker to protrude further from the bolt-face.

Accessories

These include the sling, muzzle-cap, MP magazine pouches right and left (1938 pattern), magazine, magazine filler.

The sling is fastened by a press-stud to a swivel at the front of the pistol and to a slot in the hand grip behind. The press-stud allows for lengthening of the sling.

The muzzle cap protects the muzzle and barrel from dust. It is made of a soft composition and can be fired through in an emergency.

The magazine pouches are made of canvas. Equipment includes a pair, one left and one right pouch. Each pouch contains three compartments for one magazine each, while the left-hand pouch carries in addition the magazine filler. The back has two loops for fastening to the waist belt and a swivel for the removeable supporting strap.

The magazine is a "stick magazine" with a capacity of 32 rounds. It consists of the case, which encloses the "store", magazine platform and spring. The pressure of the spring on the magazine platform forces the rounds up into the lip of the magazine.

The magazine filler fits into the lip of the magazine and contains a press-lever with upward pressure and a buffer-plate with downward tension.

Size and Weight

Length of the Machine Pistol with folded Shoulder Piece	62.5 cm.
" " " " " " unfolded " "	85.6 cm.
Weight of the Machine Pistol with sling	3.7 Kg.
Weight of the filled magazine	.64Kg.
Weight of the empty magazine pouch right	.23Kg.
" " " " " " left	.27Kg.
Weight of the Magazine Filler	115Kg.

Range, Rate of Fire, Penetration

Range of sights, up to 200 metres.
Extreme range, about 1700 metres.
The rate of fire is about 350 - 400 rounds per minute.
(without counting the time necessary to load).
Practical rate of fire in bursts, 80 - 90 rounds per minute.

Penetration


	Range 50 m	Range 200 m
Loose earth	30 cm	20 cm
Pine wood	22.5 cm	15 cm
Masonry	4 cm	-----
2 mm Armour-plate with an an angle of impact of 90 deg.	Considerable Impression	Slight impression
2 mm Iron-plate with an angle of impact of 90 degrees	Penetration	Considerable impression

CCMaw.
Lieut.
GS, 6 Aust Div.
6 Oct 41.

DISTRIBUTION -
List B


APPENDIX "A" TO 6 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN N° 9
DATED 5 OCT 1941

DISTRIBUTION OF AXIS FORCES IN THE BALKANS




APPENDIX "A" TO 6 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN No 9
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APPENDIX "A" TO 6 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN N° 9
DATED 5 OCT 1941

DISTRIBUTION OF AXIS FORCES IN THE BALKANS



WD.

(6)

JAW/TG

5087/G

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

7 Oct 41.

FIRE RESISTING COMPOUNDS.

The attached copy of CR/Pal/24123/G of 1 Oct is forwarded for information.

Lt Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

6 Aust Cav	(1)
RAA 6 Aust Div	(1)
RAE 6 Aust Div	(1)
Sigs 6 Aust Div	(1)
16 Aust Inf Bde	(1)
19 Aust Inf Bde	(1)
AASC 6 Aust Div	(1)
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	(1)
AQ	(1)
ADMS	(1)
DADOS	(1)
SOME	(1)
DAPM	(1)
Camp	(1)
6 Aust Div Pro Coy	(1)
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	(1)
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	(1)
War Diary	(2)
File	(1)

SUBJECT :- Fire Resisting Compounds.

H.Q., B.F. in P & T.J.,
CR/PAL/24123/G.
/ Oct 41.

AIF Base Area.
1 Aust Corps.
6 Aust Div.
10 Armd Div.
Northern L OF C District.
1 Aust A/A Bde.
3 Ind Motor Bde.
Jsm Area.
Lydda Area.
T.J.F.F.
Arab Legion.
O.C., Tps T.J.
O.C., Tps RAFA.

"Q"., "S.T."., "O.S".,

Extract from a report on a demonstration of the use of a new fire resisting compound is forwarded herewith for your information. The demonstration was carried out by O.C., Camouflage Experimental Stn.

2. The ingredients, method of mixing and cost are as follows :-

INGREDIENTS.

(a) Ordinary hospital carbolic soap (if procurable), or any kind of black soap, such as yellow soap, etc.

(b) Ordinary common flour.

(c) Water.

The proportions in which the above should be mixed are :-

(a) 4 bars hospital carbolic soap.

(b) 6 lbs common flour (local flour to be used).

(c) 3½ gallons of water.

METHOD OF MIXING.

The method of mixing is as follows :-

The four bars of hospital soap are passed through a mincing machine. The soap is then placed in a pan with just enough water to cover it, and is brought to the boil until the soap is melted.

The six pounds of flour are put into a pan containing 3½ gallons of boiling water and thoroughly stirred. When the flour is thoroughly stirred with the water it is once again brought to the boil and the hot liquid soap is added. The whole mixture is put back onto the stove and left to boil from 20 - 25 mins, being stirred the whole time.

When the boiling period is over the cream is put into containers and left to cool.

WARNING - DO NOT SEAL THE CONTAINERS UNTIL THE CREAM IS COOL.

/ 3 .....

3. The fire proof cream is intended for personal protection to enable men to approach and deal with fires in depots and buildings in the early stages. It is advisable that this compound should be kept away from the eyes, and it is recommended that goggles or gas mask should be worn. The compound is NOT suitable for use with fabrics etc. It can be used as a fire extinguisher in which case it should be diluted and sprayed.

4. The compound should be available at all main fire points in all static installations on a scale suitable to local requirements. It is suggested that it should be kept near fire buckets and at other places where the evaporation of the water content can be watched, and it can be instantly available.

5. The cream will be prepared under local arrangements.

Authority has been given for issues as follows as a part instalment :-

	Local Flour.	Soap.	Fire Points approx.
1 Aust Corps.	300 lbs.	200 bars.	50.
AIF Base Area.	150	100	25
N L of C District.	300	200	50
6 Aust Div.	150	100	25
10 Armd Div.			
1 Aust AA Bde.	75	50	12
3 Ind Motor Bde.	75	50	12
Jsm Area.	150	100	25
Lydda Area (incl 10 Armd Div).	150	100	25
T.J.F.F.	75	50	12
O.C., Tps T.J.	75	50	12
O.C., Tps RAFA.	75	50	12
	1575	1050	260

Areas etc., will report total requirements as soon as possible.

Brigadier, G.S.

DETAILS OF DEMONSTRATION.

The demonstration included the following :-

(i) The bare hand and forearm were dipped in the compound and then held for about 20 seconds in the flame of a blow - lamp at full presure.

The flesh was not burnt, blistered or scorched, nor was the hair on the flesh affected.

(ii) Capt Maskelyne, O.C., Gen Exp Sec put on a suit of woolen material. This suit had been used on the previous day in a dress rehearsel and showed no signs of contact with the fire.

The suit was then daubed with the compound.

Capt Maskelyne's head and eyes were protected with a towel, hood and goggles.

Capt Maskelyne then approached a dummy aeroplane which had been ignited. The heat was intense and comparable with the heat of a crashed and burning fighter plane. Capt Maskelyne was able to walk through the flames, pull the dummy plane about, break pieces off and kick them aside. It was clear that he might well have been able to rescue an airman from the wreckage without harm to himself. This would have been extremely dangerous, and probably impossible, without the protection of the compound.

(iii) The compound was thrown on the smouldering wreckage and acted as an efficient extinguisher.

(iv) A blow-lamp was turned on to a piece of hessian to which the compound had been applied four or five weeks previously The flame failed to set fire to the hessian or even to make a hole in it. As soon as this flame was withdrawn the hessian smouldered for a moment and then the smouldering ceased.

(v) A piece of hessian to which the compound was freshly applied, was absolutely unaffected by the flame of the blow-lamp after about 20 seconds.

WAR.

EXPRESS.

HQ 6 Aust Div.

5100/G. 8 Oct 41.

Aust Liaison Office at GHQ MEF will be situated at Room 446 (D C-in-Cs Flat) GREY PILLARS BLDG with effect from 3 Oct 41. Telephone MIDEAST 387.

J. G. Hazlett Capt.
for Col,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION:- List "A".

SECRET

6 AUST DIV SECURITY INSTRUCTION NO 1

10 Oct 41

1. The objects of this Instr. are:-

(a) To give a brief summary of the methods of French administration in SYRIA and the LEBANON. (Part I.)

(b) To summarise instructions received from Higher Authority on Security within 6 Aust Div area (Part II).

(c) To set out the procedure to be adopted in regard to Censorship, Security of arms and ammunition and the hire of civilian labour. (Part III)

2. AUTHORITY.

This instruction is based on :-

CR/PAL/17749/3/G dated 11 Aug 41.
GSI/B/P/4920 dated 15 Aug 41.
CR/PAL/17652/G dated 19 Aug 41.
CR/PAL/17749/G dated 29 Aug 41.
1 Aust Corps GSI/693 dated 3 Sep 41 to 6 Div
and amendments to the above.

PART I.

3. The Div area lies partly in the LEBANESE REPUBLIC and partly in the SYRIAN REPUBLIC. The SYRIAN REPUBLIC has lately been declared independent under the Presidency of Sheik TAJ ED DIN EL HUSSEINI, and it has been agreed that the policy of the Republic shall be in accordance with that of the Allies. The LEBANESE REPUBLIC under the Presidency of M. EACCACHE is NOT independent, although negotiations are in progress.

4. SYRIA has nine Mohafazets or administrative districts, and the LEBANON four, while the town of BEIRUT has a separate administration of its own. The head of a Mohafazet is called the administrator or Mohafez and is a SYRIAN or LEBANESE. The Mohafazet is further divided into Casas, the head of which is the Kaimakam. Other important civilian officials are the Presidents of Municipalities, which exist in towns and large villages. Every village and district of a town has a Mukhtar, who is responsible for carrying out orders of the higher authorities relating to the people living in his district.

5. The Police Force is divided into two parts, the Gendarmerie and the Surete Generale. The Surete Generale corresponds more or less with our C.I.D. Large towns have a police force which is a branch of the Gendarmerie.

6. (a) It would appear, therefore, that the Government of SYRIA and the LEBANON is completely in the hands of the native population, but there is a great influence which is exercised by the French officials, who are attached to the native officials.
(b) These officials are members of the French Haut Commissariat the head of which is the High Commissioner.
(c) The most important are the DELEGUES who are the High Commissioners representatives in the large cities and towns and who have very wide powers.
(d) The next most important are the counsellors (conseillers) who are attached to every mohafez and also to the different ministries of the governments.
(e) The next officials are the French Special Service Officers (Officiers des Services Speciaux du Levant.) Under Vichy administration there were 52 of these, each with his own district, except in the case of the Bedouin Tribal Special Service Offrs

who were allotted to tribes. They have under their command Gardes Mobiles, who are native police and are used in the same fashion. In addition they advise on local policy in their areas and co-operate with the Surete and Gendarmerie. In the days of Vichy administration they were also the link between the local military and local civilian administrations.

7. Should it be necessary to have dealings with the local populations, the most satisfactory channel is the Special Service Officer, but units will find that there is not always one available, in which case they should deal with the highest local authority, e.g. Kaimakam in a Casa or a Muktar in a village.

8. Certain British organizations are in close touch with the Civilian Authorities, these include the Spears Mission, of which the political Officers form a branch. The Mission deals with Military, Liaison, political and kindred matters. There is also the Chief Economic and Financial Adviser and the British Security Mission who deal with all matters of Security in conjunction with kindred French and local organizations.

PART II.

9. GENERAL.

(a) In both SYRIA and the LEBANON the political, civil and administrative functions, together with the duty of internal security, are in the hands of the Civil administration and the Free French Forces, with the support where required of the British Military authorities. In other words, except in so far as the operations and local security of our own forces are concerned, all executive action will be taken by the civil administration or the Free French Forces, and all our requirements in connection with these subjects should be asked for through the Free French.

(b) However, a special area known as the Frontier Zone exists to the North and East of the following line :-
LATAKIA (incl) rd LATAKIA - ALEPPO (incl) QARIA TEINE (incl) -SABA BIAR (incl) - pt of junc SYRIA, IRAQ and TRANSJORDAN frontiers.

10. In this area a state of siege exists and the Civil administration is bound to give satisfaction to the demands of the British Military Comds concerning the Security of tps and operations, and to carry out with priority of execution their requirements concerning the functioning of the Public Services. The British Military Comd is responsible for security in his area but acts through the civil authorities.

11. COLLECTION OF ARMS.

(a) Possession of arms by civilians is forbidden except to those to whom an official permit has been granted. These apply mostly to sporting guns, but a few have been issued for military types of weapons.
(b) Nomad tribes are allowed to carry arms in "unpoliced districts."
(c) The Civil administration is responsible for the whole question andacts through the SSOs, the Garde Mobile and Gendarmerie.
(d) British tps have instns to take no part in disarming civilians in any part of the area. Should armed civilians be met, no action to deprive them of their arms or to ask for permits will be taken by British tps, but the local SS offr will be informed, giving details and strength of the party, location and direction of movement.
(e) Unit Comds will report any infm received as to the location of arms to this HQ without delay.

12. CONTROL OF ENEMY AGENTS AND COUNTER ESPIONAGE.

The Free French Forces and Civil administration are responsible for the control of these, assisted by the British Security Mission, the FSS, and reports from units, which should be fwded to this HQ.

13. MOVEMENTS OF CIVILIANS TO AND FROM SYRIA.

(a) Detailed instns regarding visas for civilians entering SYRIA will be issued later, but in general they require a passport vised by the British Diplomatic or Consular Official which has been checked by the Surete Generale at the frontier.
(b) No civilian may leave SYRIA without an exit permit issued by the Surete Generale in consultation with the British Security Mission.

14. ENEMY ALIENS.

Large numbers of enemy aliens have been arrested but many are still at large. Units will report cases of suspected action by enemy agents to these HQ and the local FSS personnel should be advised at the same time. Occasional snap checks and road control checks will be carried out by FSS personnel in conjunction with reps of the Surete.

15. RELEASE AND CUSTODY OF PRISONERS.

Cases of prisoners held in Civil or Military goals who have been working for our cause are investigated anddealt with by the Surete through the British Security Mission.

16. POWERS OF ARREST.

(a) Any member of the British Forces is entitled to detain any civilian suspected of any breach of security. However the person concerned should immediately be handed over to the Gendarmerie with a written report of the circumstances under which the person concerned was detained and these HQ informed immediately. The breach of security should, however, be a serious one before any action is taken.
(b) Martial Law is suspended and there are no British Military Courts. French Military Courts have been established in BEIRUT and DAMASCUS, and a trial court is to be formed at ALEPPO when required.

17. INTERNAL SECURITY.

(a) This will be left to the Civil authorities and the Free French Forces, with the exception of the frontier Zone, where the responsibilty rests with the British Military, who will however act through the Civil authorities whenever possible.
(b) Formations and Units will ensure that all ranks fully understand that, if called on by the Civil administration, or the Free French Forces, they are in no circumstances to take part in any action, either themselves or in conjunction with French officials including Garde Mobile and Gendarmerie, without prior reference to these HQ should time and the circumstances permit.

18. POLITICAL OFFICER.

Matters requiring the attention of the Political Officer will be dealt with either through these HQ or by Bdes. In the latter case, a report will be rendered to these HQ.

19. MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER.

(a) This is the responsibility of the Civil authorities and the Free French Forces subject to the requirements of the BRITISH Military Comd in the frontier zone.

(b) The Free French are responsible for executive action even in this area unless it is judged that the situation is beyond their control and the British Military Comd is asked to help,
(c) In the frontier zone the British Military Comd has powers to instruct the Free French Civil Administration to take any action he considers necessary.

20. VISITS TO VILLAGES.

Tps will NOT visit villages unless under comd of an officer. Such visits will only be made when it is found necessary from a military point of view by patrols on topographical recces, or when ordered to show the flag.

21. ECONOMICS.

(a) No points in this connection are the concern of the Military authorities. They are dealt with solely by the Political offr in conjunction with the Chief Economic Adviser.
(b) However, should any points in connection with economics be brought to the notice of unit or detachment Comds they will be included in Int reports and will be fwded to these HQ for on transmission to the Political Offr.

22. PAD.

Civilian PAD is in all cases the responsibility of the Civil administration.

23. IDENTITY CARDS - CIVILIANS.

With the exception of the Bedouin and young children all civilians should be in possession of an Identity Card.

24. IDENTITY CARDS - FREE FRENCH FORCES.

All personnel of the Free French Forces should be in possession of an "ACT D'ENGAGEMENT". This is a white document with a blue stripe across the top left hand corner, and gives particulars of the date etc of the holder's enlistment

PART III.

5. SECURITY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION.

Similar measures to those ruling in PALESTINE will be taken in regard to the safeguarding of arms and amn.

6. CIVILIAN LABOUR IN CAMPS.

(a) Separate instns will be issued in regard to hiring and rates of pay of civilians working in camp areas. However, in all cases, temporary permits, valid only for the camp concerned, will be issued by units and the following particulars will be fwded to these HQ :-

NAME
AGE
VILLAGE
IDENTITY CARD NO.
NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT
PROBABLE DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT.

(b) No civilians will be allowed in camp areas unless in possession of a temporary permit.

27. CENSORSHIP.

(a) Censorship instns as laid down in SOs for PALESTINE (Provisional) will be enforced.
(b) It is permissible to include in letters the fact that the writer is in SYRIA, but no mention will be made of the particular area.

Distribution - List B.

Capt,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

W.D.

PKP/TO

MOST SECRET

Copy No 32

12 Oct 41.

6 AUST DIV AND AFT TPS

LOCATION STATEMENT AS AT 0359 HRS 11 OCT 41.

Unit	Location	Remarks
1. HQ		
Adv HQ 6 Aust Div	BAALBECK	
Rear HQ 6 Aust Div	HELIS	
Int Corps 6 Aust Div Sec	BAALBECK	
6 Aust Div Emp Pl	"	
"B" Sec FSS	ALEPPO	Under command 18 Aust Inf Bde
279 Sec FSS	BAALBECK	
2. CAVALRY		
HQ Royal Dragoons	ALEPPO	Under command 16 Aust Inf Bde
"A" Sqn do.	"	"
"B" Sqn do.	AKROUM-HELIOPOLIS ROAD	
6 Aust Div Sqn	HELIS	
39 Aust LAD	"	
HQ 9 Aust Div Cav	[illegible]	[illegible]
"A" [illegible] Sqn do.	[illegible]	[illegible]
82 LAD	[illegible]	[illegible]
"B" Mech Sqn do.	[illegible]	[illegible]
3. RAA		
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	[illegible]	[illegible]
2/1 Aust AA Regt	[illegible]	[illegible]
51 Lt AA Bty	[illegible]	[illegible]
2/2 Aust A. Regt	[illegible]	[illegible]
52 Lt AA Bty	[illegible]	[illegible]
2/3 Aust A. Regt	[illegible]	[illegible]
61 Lt AA Bty	[illegible]	[illegible]
2/9 Aust AA Regt	[illegible]	[illegible]
17 Bty do.	[illegible]	[illegible]
18 Bty do.	[illegible]	[illegible]
HQ 2/11 Aust AA Regt	[illegible]	[illegible]
21 Bty do.	"	"
22 Bty do.	"	"
1 Aust A Tk Regt	[illegible]	[illegible]
Det 3 Bty [illegible] Regt	[illegible]	[illegible]
4. RAE		
HQ 6 Aust Div RAE	[illegible]	[illegible]
2/1 Aust Fd Coy	[illegible]	[illegible]
2/2 Aust Fd Coy	"	"
2/3 Aust Fd Coy	[illegible]	[illegible]
22 Aust Fd Pk	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] Aust Fd Coy	[illegible]	[illegible]
RAE (Attached)		
2/4 Aust Fd Coy	[illegible]	[illegible]
5. RHRS		
"A" Coy [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
"B" "	[illegible]	[illegible]
1217 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
6. SAAD		
HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div	[illegible]	[illegible]
6 Aust [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

7. [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	EL ABSA	Adv Party at [illegible]
2/5 Aust LAD	"	
2/1 Aust Inf Bn	"	
2/2 Aust Inf Bn	"	
2/6 Aust Inf Bn	EL AMEH	Under command 16 Aust Inf Bde
2/7 Aust Inf Bn	HILL 69	" " "
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	EL AIME	
"L" Sec Sigs	"	
7th Fd Amb	"	
1 Fd Hygiene Sec	"	
2/4 Aust Inf Bn	R. 4 BALBECK	
2/8 Aust Inf Bn	"	
2/11 Aust Inf Bn	JU LES	Under command 16 Aust Inf Bde
8. [illegible]		
HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	AI ZPPO	
Sec Sigs	"	
4/7 Aust LAD	"	
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	IILLIB	
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	DJEDEIDE	Under command 19 Aust Inf Bde
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	AI ZPPO	
9. MG		
2/1 Aust MG Bn	HILL 69	
4/8 Aust LAD	"	
10. [illegible]		
[illegible]	EL ABIOD	
[illegible]	EL AZIB	
[illegible]	JU LES	
[illegible]	JU LES	Adv Party at [illegible]
11. [illegible]		
[illegible]	EL AFFO	Under command 17 Aust Inf Bde
[illegible]	EL ABSA	
[illegible]	EL ABIOD	
[illegible]	EL AME	
[illegible]	EL ABIOD	
[illegible]		
[illegible]	EL ABSA	Adv Party at [illegible]
[illegible]	EL AS	
[illegible]	EL 3 BALBECK	
[illegible]	EL ABSA	
[illegible]	EL ABIOD	
13. [illegible]		
2/5 Aust Fd Amb	AI ZPPO	Under command 18 Aust Inf Bde
"H" Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	EL ABIOD	" "
"D" " " " "	QUENA	
11 Malarial Control Units	QUCCEIR	
4 C.M.V.S.	BALBECK	(Cav Veterinary)

	Unit	Location	Remarks
14.	MISCELLANEOUS.		
	6 Aust Div Pro Coy(less dets)	JULIS	
	Dets do.	DAMASCUS-BAALBECK	
	205 Sec Pro Coy	ALEPPO	(Under command Force HQ
		BAALBECK	
	6 Aust Div Postal Unit	BAALBECK	Dets at JULIS
	6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office	BAALBECK	
	6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	HAIDAL	
	6 Aust Div Reception Camp	RAYAK	
	"B" Coy HQ Gd Bn (less three pls)	BAALBECK	
	One Pl	16 Aust Inf Bde	
	One Pl	17 Aust Inf Bde	
	One Pl	19 Aust Inf Bde	

ENGLISH TROOPS UNDER COMMAND BUT ABOUT TO MOVE.

1.	HQ 70 Inf Div	BAALBECK	
2.	ENGRS.		
	HQ RE 70 Div	BAALBECK	
	54 Fd Coy RE	"	
3.	INF.		
	HQ 14 Inf Bde Gp	JATANIA	
	Sig Sec		
	LAD		
	1 Bedf's Herts	[illegible]	
	2 Black Watch	[illegible]	
	2 Y & L	[illegible]	
	6 Mob Bath Unit	JATANIA	
	14 Inf Bde Coy RASC	[illegible]	
	23 Inf Bde A Tk Coy	ALEPPO	
	23 Inf Bde RASC Coy	"	
	11 CZS Bn	"	Under command 18 Aust Inf Bde
4.	MEDICAL.		
	215 Fd Amb (less 1 Coy)	HAMAH	
	One Coy do.	SEMDA LT	
	189 Fd Amb	ALEPPO	
5.	SUPPLIES & TRANSPORT		
	HQ RASC 70 Div	BAALBECK	
6.	MISCELLANEOUS.		
	70 Div Pro Coy	BAALBECK	
	70 Div Sigs	"	
	70 Div Salvage Unit	"	
	70 Div Postal Unit	"	
	70 Div Mob Laundry	DUMAR	

Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

NB. Please notify this Headquarters of any corrections to be made to the above statement as at date shown.

Formations & Units are reminded that this document is MOST SECRET and will be kept under Lock & Key, when NOT in use.

[illegible] Copy No

6 Aust Cav 1
RAA 6 Aust Div 2
RAE 6 Aust Div 3
Sigs 6 Aust Div 4
18 Aust Inf Bde 5
19 Aust Inf Bde 6
AASC 6 Aust Div 7
Sigs 1 Aust Corps 8
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn. 9
Aust HQ Cd Bn 10
2/2 Aust Army Fd Workshop 11
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office 12
GOC 13
G 14-15
I 16
AQ 17-18
AQ(for ADMS) 19
D/DOS 20
SCME 21
DAPM 22-23
6 Aust Div Sec FS Cash Office 24
6 Aust Div Postal Unit 25
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit 26
1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry 27
14 Inf Bde 28
16 Aust Inf Bde 29
D.T.P.O. 30
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[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
1 Aust Corps
AIF Base Unit
HQ Qld Dist AIF
AIF Depot Perth
HQ & Fd [illegible]
[illegible]

W.D. 9

PKP/TG

MOST SECRET

Copy No. ..31.....

6 AUST DIV AND TPS UNDER COMD.

LOCATION STATEMENT AS AT 2359 HRS 14 OCT 41.

MS/110/G.
14 Oct 41.

	Unit.	Location	Remarks
1.	HQ		
	Adv HQ 6 Aust Div	BAALBECK	
	Rear HQ 6 Aust Div	JULIS	
	Int Corps 6 Aust Div Sec	BAALBECK	
	6 Aust Div Emp Pl	"	
	279 Sec FSS	"	
2.	CAVALRY.		
	6 Aust Div Cav	JULIS	
	"C" Sec Sigs	"	
	39 Aust LAD	"	
	"L" Mech Sqn T.J.F.F.	PALMYRA	
3.	RAA		
	HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	JULIS	Representative at BAALBECK
	2/1 Aust Fd Regt	KHASSA	
	43 Aust LAD	"	
	2/2 Aust Fd Regt	"	
	40 Aust LAD	"	
	2/3 Aust Fd Regt	"	
	41 Aust LAD	"	
	HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	QATANA)	Under command 14 Inf Bde
	70 Aust LAD	H)	
	21 Bty 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	"	" " "
	22 Bty " do.	"	" " "
	1 Aust A Tk Regt	BEIT JIRJA	
	49 Aust LAD	"	
4.	RAE.		
	HQ 6 Aust Div RAE	BAALBECK	
	2/1 Aust Fd Coy	177184	
	2/2 Aust Fd Coy	QATANA	
	2/8 Aust Fd Coy	RAS BAALBECK	
	22 Aust Fd Pk Coy	RAYAK	
	80 Aust LAD	"	
	1217 Indian Labour Coy	RAS BAALBECK	
5.	PNRS.		Under command RAE 6 Aust Div.
	2/2 Aust Pnr Bn (Less "A" & "B" Coys)	TRIPOLI	
	"A" Coy 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	RAS BAALBECK	
	"B" Coy 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	~~BAALBECK~~ RAYAK	
6.	SIGS		
	HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div (less No. 3 Coy)	BAALBECK	
	42 Aust LAD	"	
	No. 3 Coy	det with Bdes etc.	
7.	INF		
	HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	KHASSA)	Adv Party QATANA
	45 Aust LAD	")	
	"K" Sec Sigs	")	
	One Pl Aust HQ Gd Coy	)	Commence move QATANA 15 Oct 41.
	2/1 Aust Inf Bn	"	Commence move QATANA 16 Oct 41.
	2/2 Aust Inf Bn	"	Commence move QATANA 16 Oct 41.
	2/6 Aust Inf Bn	HILL 69 (C/193)	
	2/7 Aust Inf Bn	HILL 69	Commence move QATANA 18 Oct 41.

Unit	Location	Remarks
7. INF (Continued)		
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	EL AINE	
"L" Sec Sigs	"	
79 Aust LAD	"	
One Pl HQ Gd Bn	"	
2/4 Aust Inf Bn (less one coy)	RAS BAALBECK	
One Coy 2/4 Aust Inf Bn	BAALBECK	
2/8 Aust Inf Bn	RAS BAALBECK	
2/11 Aust Inf Bn	JDEIDE	
"		
8. MG		
~~2/1 Aust (MG) Bn~~	HILL 69	
49 Aust LAD	"	
9. SUPPLIES & TRANSPORT		
HQ AASC 6 Aust Div	BAALBECK	
6 Aust Div Amn Coy	EL AIN	
~~6 Aust Div Pet Coy~~	JULIS	
6 Aust Div Sup Col	"	Adv Party at QATANA Commence move QATANA 14 Oct 41.
6 Indian Mule Coy R.I.A.S.C.	ABHLA	
17 " " " "	BAALBECK	
1 Cypriot Pack Transport Coy	EL HAME	
6 " " " " "	DJEIDE	
10. MEDICAL		
2/1 Aust Fd Amb	KHASSA	Commence move QATANA 14 Oct 41. Adv Party at ZAHLE
2/2 Aust Fd Amb (less "A" coy)	HOMS	
"A" Coy do.	RAS BAALBECK	
2/7 Aust Fd Amb	KHASSA	
2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBECK	
"C" Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	"	
"D" " " " "	"	
	QATANA	
11 Malarial Control Unit	QOUCEIR	
4 C.H.V.S.	BAALBECK	Cav Veterinary
11. MISCELLANEOUS.		
6 Aust Div Pro Coy (less Dets)	JULIS	
dets do	DAMASCUS-BAALBECK	
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	BAALBECK	Det at JULIS
6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office	"	
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	MAJDAL	
6 Aust Div Reception Camp	RAYAK	
"B" Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn (less three pls)	BAALBECK	
One Pl	16 Aust Inf Bde	
One Pl	17 Aust Inf Bde	
One Pl	19 Aust Inf Bde	

ENGLISH TROOPS UNDER COMMAND BUT ABOUT TO MOVE.

1. INF		
HQ 14 Inf Bde Gp	QATANA	
Sig Sec	"	
LAD	"	
1 Bedfs Herts	18321682	
2 Black Watch	18031683	
2 Y & L	17731704	
8 Mob Bath Unit	QATANA	
14 Inf Bde Coy RASC	18571659	
2. MEDICAL		
215 Fd Amb	ZAHLE	
"		
3. MISCELLANEOUS		
70 Div Pro Coy	BAALBECK	
70 Div Salvage Unit	"	
70 Div Postal Unit	"	
70 Div Mob Laundry	DOUMAR	

ACKNOWLEDGE

Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

N.B. Please notify this Headquarters of any corrections to be made to the above statement as at date shown.

Formations & Units are reminded that this document is MOST SECRET and will be kept under lock & key, when not in use.

BISTRIBUTION -	Copy No:
6 Aust Cav	1
RAA 6 Aust Div	2
RAE 6 Aust Div	3 & 4
Sigs 6 Aust Div	5
16 Aust Inf Bde	6
19 Aust Inf Bde	7
AASC 6 Aust Div	8
Sigs 1 Aust Corps	9
1 Aust (MG) Bn	10
Aust HQ Gd Bn	11
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	12
GOC	13
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I	16
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WAR/6/1

10.D.

SECRET

(10)

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.
15 Oct 41.
S/139/G.

DIVISIONAL CENTRE LINES

The appended notes on "Divisional Centre Lines" are forwarded for information.

"1. There appears to be some confusion of thought regarding the responsibility, employment and usefulness of centre lines within the Divsion.

2. The primary use of a centre line is tactical. An armoured Division, brigade, or regiment, manoeuvres on its centre line which is given out in orders by the formation or unit concerned, before the operations commence. The centre line is adjusted from time to time as is operationally necessary.

3. A headquarters will not normally leave its centre line. Should it wish to do so it will leave a representative or sufficient marking on the centre line to direct officers, DRs, etc., to the headquarters should they wish to find it.

4. It is essential for the centre line to be accurately marked to the HQ concerned so that LOs and DRs can find the various HQs should there be wireless silence, or a wireless breakdown during operations.

5. The divisional and brigade centre lines are also used as a guide for the supply columns, B Echelons, medical and ordnance units of the Division and brigades. The Divisional centre line will normally commence at the FSD, or the refilling area, should a third line be installed. Whether the brigade centre lines commence here or not will depend on the tactical situation and administrative requirements. Should they not commence at the FSD or refilling area they will branch away from the Divisional centre line before HQ Advanced Division is reached.

If the Division is advancing with one brigade forward (one up) this brigade will probably move on the Divisional centre line. In this case the Adv and Battle HQ of Division will be looped, the Brigade centre line commencing behind Div HQ.

6. The responsibility for laying down the centre lines is the DAPM's on receipt of orders from the "G" Staff. These will not be plotted on the ground beyond the HQ concerned. When HQ moves forward, the detachment of the Provost Coy will follow up with the marking posts as given in Divisional Standing Orders."

J. E. Harris Capt
for Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -
List "A".

WAW/TG

MOST SECRET

Headquarters
6 Aust Div.
MS/146/G

16 Oct 41

AUTHORISED ABBREVIATIONS - AUST UNITS.

Attached hereto copies of above forwarded for your information.

J. G. Hawgood Col/A
Colonel,
MS/6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION -

List "b" (plus serials 15-20 incl)

MOST SECRET

AUTHORIZED ABBREVIATIONS -- AUST UNITS.

(Designating No. to be added where a line appears __)

HQ AIF (ME) UNITS

HQ AIF (ME)
Aust HQ Gd Bn
AIF (ME) AIL Sec
HQ AIF (ME) Reinft Depot
Aust Armd Tng Regt
Aust Arty Tng Gp
Aust Eng Tng Bn
Aust Sig Tng Bn
__ Aust Inf Tng Bde
__ Aust Inf Tng Bn
__ Aust MG Tng Bn
__ Aust Pnr Tng Bn
Aust Services Tng Regt
AAMC Tng Wing
Aust Postal Tng Wing
Aust Depot Bn
AIF (ME) Junior Staff School
AIF (ME) Regtl Offrs School
AIF (ME) S of Arty
AIF (ME) SME
AIF (ME) S of Sigs
AIF (ME) AACC School
AIF (ME) AASC School
AIF(ME) Inf School
1 Aust Graves
Aust Port Det

CORPS TROOPS

HQ 1 Aust Corps
1 Aust Corps Int Sec
(HQ) RAA 1 Aust Corps
__ Aust A Fd Regt
__ Aust LAD
HQ 1 Aust AA Bde
__ Aust AA Regt
__ Aust Lt AA Regt
Aust Hy AA Regt
__ Aust Svy Regt
(HQ) RAE 1 Aust Corps
__ Aust A Fd Coy
__ Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy
__ Aust Corps Fd Svy Coy
__ Aust Boring Sec
Aust Corps Cam Tng Unit
Sigs 1 Aust Corps
Sigs 1 Aust AA Bde
Aust AA Regt Sig Sec
Aust Lt AA Sig Sec
Aust Hy AA Sig Sec
Aust Pnr Bn
1 Aust CT Sup Coln
1 Aust CT Amm Coy
1 Aust Corps Amm Pk
1 Aust Corps Pet Pk

CORPS TROOPS (cont)

1 Aust AA Bde Coy AASC
__ Aust DID
__ Aust Res MT Coy
__ Aust Fd Amb
__ Aust Fd Hyg Sec
__ Aust MAC
__ Aust CCS
__ Aust A Fd Wkshop
1 Aust AA Bde Wkshop
__ Aust AA Regt Wkshop Sec
__ Aust Lt AA Regt Skshop Sec
__ Aust Hy AA Regt Wkshop Sec
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office
1 Aust Corps Pro Coy
1 Aust Corps Postal
1 Aust Corps Emp Pl
1 Aust Corps Mob Bath
1 Aust Corps Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit
1 Aust Corps Salvage

DIV TROOPS

HQ __ Aust Div
__ Div Int Sec
__ Aust Cav
__ Aust LAD
(HQ) RAA __ Aust Div
__ Aust Fd Regt
__ A/Tk Regt
(HQ) RAE __ Aust Div
__ Aust Fd Coy
__ Aust Fd Pk Coy
Sigs __ Aust Div ~~Div~~
__ Aust Inf Bde
__ Aust Inf Bn
__ Aust A/Tk Coy
__ Aust MG Bn
(HQ) AASC __ Aust Div
__ Aust Div Sup Coln
__ Aust Div Amm Coy
__ Aust Div Pet Coy
__ Aust Fd Amb
__ Aust Fd Hyg Sec
__ Aust Div Postal
__ Aust Div Pro Coy
__ Aust Div Emp Pl
__ Aust Div Mob Bath
__ Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit
__ Aust Div Salvage
__ Aust Fd Cash Office

/ BASE & PIC

BASE & L of C UNITS

HQ AIF (ME) Base Area
AIF (ME) Base Area Int Sec
AIF (ME) Base Area Sigs
1 Aust Sig Pk Sec
Aust Mob Printing Sec
1 Aust Depot Bn
AIF (ME) Ord Prov Sec
Aust BOD
__ Aust Ord Store Coy
__ Aust AOD
__ Aust AOW
Aust Ord Wkshop Coy
__ Aust Ord Amm Coy
__ Aust BAD
__ Aust L of C Rec Sec
__ Aust Gen Hosp
__ Aust Spec Hosp
__ Aust Con Depot
__ Aust Mob Bact Lab

__ Aust Base Depot Med Stores
__ Aust Adv Depot Med Stores
__ Aust Dental
Aust Hosp Ship
Base Coy AAMC
Comd Cash Office
__ Aust L of C Pro Coy
__ Aust L of C Postal
AIF(ME) Base Postal
AIF(ME) Kit Store
__ Aust Port Wkshop Det
__ Aust Det Bks
__ Aust Corps Reception Camp
__ Aust Div Sec Reception Camp
Aust Sec O'Seas Base Depot
AIF (ME) Staging Camp
__ (HQ) Aust Rly Constn Gp
__ Aust Rly Svy Coy
__ Aust Rly Constn Coy

MESSAGE FORM.

(In lieu of Army Form C.2128)

To: 6 aust cav RAA 6 aust div RAE 6 aust div Sigs 6 Aust Div
16 Aust Inf Bde. 19 Aust Inf Bde AASC 6 Aust Div
Sigs 1 Aust Corps 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn Aust HQ Gd Bn
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office GOC G I AQ AQ(for ADMS)
DADOS SOME DAPM 6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office
6 Aust Div Postal Unit 6 Aust Div Salvage Unit 14 Inf Bde
T.J.F.F. DF in P & TJ & Syria AIF (ME) 1 Aust Corps
Cipher Officer Signal Office (Div HQ) 6 Aust Div Reception
Camp Rear HQ 6 Aust Div AIF Base Area HQ 2nd Ech AIF
AIF Reinft Depot MC & TN Palestine South Sub-Area
War Diary File

From: adv HQ 6 Aust Div

Originator's No.

0/193 17/10

Ref	6	aust	div	location
statement	14	oct	(.)	serial
7	2/6	aust	inf	bn
located	HILL	69	NOT	EL
ARISH	(.)	all	informed	

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent in CIPHER.

Originator's Instructions - Degree of Priority.

Signed: [signature] Capt.

IMPORTANT

TOO: 1015

THI:

[illegible] F.
1

120.

12

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

17 Oct 41.

215/G.

LESSONS FROM OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT

A short account of the operations in the Western Desert on 14/15 Sep 41, and the lessons drawn from them, is forwarded for your information.

J. G. Harrell Col
for Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -

List "B".

REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT 14/15 SEP 41

The object of the operation appears to have been a recce in force to test our strength and dispositions.

1. 14 Sep.

Ground reports at first light on 14 Sep indicated that three large enemy columns were advancing rapidly S.E. from the frontier wire, parallel with the escarpment, and approximately three and twelve miles respectively South of it.

There was no enemy movement in the coastal sector.

Our desert columns fell back according to plan to two previously prepared positions. These positions were dive-bombed by JU 87s escorted by fighters. Two of the former were shot down by ground troops.

The enemy columns, which had advanced between 15 and 20 miles in one hour and a quarter, were engaged and halted in front of these positions.

Tac/R reports showed that enemy columns were refuelling. These enemy concentrations were heavily and successfully [illegible] bombed.

By 1600 hrs. the Southern enemy column moved South, and later continued to advance East, though engaged by ground troops and aircraft. Owing to the threat of being outflanked, our Southern Desert Column withdrew at about 1800 hrs, our Northern Forces conforming.

At last light, Tac/R and ground troops reported an enemy concentration of approximately 300 all arms, including 100 tanks, 4 miles S.E. of SOFAFI. From these reports it appeared that the enemy columns had joined each other for the night.

2. 15th. Sep.

No contact was made during the night 14/15 Sep, and by first light 15 Sep, enemy had already started to withdraw, covered by strong fighter patrols.

By 1300 hrs, our Armd Cars had taken up their original line of observation, but were counter-attacked by 20 A.F.Vs. at 1500 hrs, and were forced to withdraw.

By nightfall our desert columns had returned to their original positions in support of our Armd. Cars. Patrols made contact with German Infantry patrols and tanks during the night 15/16 Sep.

On morning 16 Sep dispositions prior to operation were re-established.

Throughout the operation, Tac/R, fighter and bomber support worked well, and inflicted considerable damage on the enemy.

/Page 2.

3. Preliminary Comparative Estimate of Casualties and Losses Incurred.

(a)	Personnel.	Own Troops.	Enemy.	
	Killed	2 O.Rs	20	
	Wounded	10 O.Rs	50	
	Missing	3 O.Rs	P.W. (a) 12 German. (b) 16 Italian.	
(b)	Equipment.	1 Armd Car	7 Tanks destroyed or captured.	
		Several M.T. damaged.	7 Tanks probable	
			7 Tanks possible.	
			15 Vehicles.	
(c)	Aircraft.	1 Bomber.	19 JU.87s	destroyed or captured.
		6 Fighters.	1 S.79	
		1 Fighter damaged.	1 G.50	
		(5 Fighter Pilots recovered)	1 ME.109	
			9 probably destroyed	
			9 damaged.	

ARISING

POINTS OF INTEREST/OUT OF OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT, 14 & 15 SEP.41.

ENEMY METHODS.

Formation.
The enemy advanced in three columns but concentrated all his tank strength (80 - 100 medium) in one column. The other two columns consisted of lorry-borne infantry regts and supply vehicles,protected by Armd Cars and Fd Arty. All three columns eventually converged in the ALAMAT - EL TALATA - HAMRA area.

Tank Formations.
Investigations are proceeding,but first evidence suggests that the tanks moved ten or twelve abreast,with an interval of 40 to 50 yards between vehicles.

Speed.
The columns moved by bounds at high speed,calculated to be approximately 30 m.p.h.

Control.
During these bounds or dashes he keeps in fairly close formation indepth in order to facilitate control and can quickly change the direction of his thrust.

Refuelling.
Tank columns appeared to need refuelling approximately every 40 miles. This is done forward and no rear movement takes place.

During the halt for refuelling and maintenance,he offers an ideal target for bombers.

Effect of Gunfire.
Our long-range 25-pr fire did not turn him,but close-range 2-pr fire did. If caught from a flank at close range by 2-pr fire,he will turn and face it,so as to present his heaviest armour to it.

Recovery.
Recovery organisation was very good. By careful checking,it is estimated that at least 14 tanks were knocked out by our gunfire,and in addition there must have been mechanical breakdowns,yet in spite of a very rapid advance and equally rapid withdrawal,he only abandoned two tanks.

Air Action.
(a) The enemy launched only two determined dive-bombing attacks on our forward troops during the operations.

(b) During the operations he put up an"umbrella" of ME.109s which hampered and caused losses to our Tac/R aircraft.

/Page 2.

LESSONS FROM OUR OWN ACTION.

1. Air Support.

The bombing attacks of our aircraft on the enemy halted column was considered to have caused him heavy damage and may have affected his future action.

The effect of this close support on the morale of our own troops was quite outstanding.

2. Prepared Plan of Withdrawal.

A careful plan of withdrawal had been made and reconnoitred by all concerned. As a result, it was proved again that mobile troops can keep touch with, harass and evade, the most determined tank attacks almost unscathed.

3. Information.

The noise of vehicle movement should always give the contact troops ample warning of hostile tank movement.

FGH/MF.

MOST SECRET

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

MS/231/G. 18 Oct 41.

G(R) TRAINING

1. Ref Force HQ G(R) Tng Instn No. 1 of 27 Sep para 7(b): for this work bns and equivalent units will specially train one offr and 4 ORs, fd coys 2 ORs. These men will be selected by 10 Nov; any casualties must be replaced at once. Names will be fwded to this HQ by 12 Nov.

2. Comd 1 Aust Corps regards the unit G(R) work as a minor raid or a form of deep patrolling. Patrols may stay out several days.

Distribution -
List "B".

for Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

MOST SECRET

HQ, BF in P & TJ, MEF.

CR/PAL/17622/7/G(R). 27 Sep 41.

G(R) TRAINING INSTRUCTION No. 1

1. It is difficult as yet to foretell when G(R) personnel in Palestine and Syria may be called upon for action against the enemy, but personnel trained in G(R) duties will always be required wherever active operations are taking place.

2. G(R) is an arm of the service which, in modern warfare, can influence enemy action to an extensive degree by work behind his lines carried out by highly trained British Officers and ORs.

3. Organization.

(a) At present a Defence Scheme has been prepared by Force HQ and special personnel have been provided.

(b) In addition to the above, Divs and Bdes should make available personnel to provide detachments for G(R) work, each consisting of a LO and a party of offrs and ORs.

4. Role.

(a) The role of these parties is, in both attack and defence, to work immediately behind the enemy lines with the object of destroying his comms and shaking his morale.

(b) In the Attack. G(R) activities should be synchronised with the attack itself.

(c) In the Defence. G(R) activities should, if possible, be timed in the first instance for immediately before the enemy's attack is due to be launched. Later, advantage should be taken of the "fog of war" to cause confusion, particularly when reinforcements and supplies are coming forward at night.

5. Methods of Operation.

(a) At night, the misdirection of traffic and the giving of faked verbal orders both on the telephone and to troops as they pass, can do a lot to upset well-laid plans. For this purpose it is a great advantage to have some personnel who can speak fluently the same language as the enemy.

(b) In mobile warfare a few stout-hearted men can, without a lot of difficulty, get behind the enemy lines and play havoc at his HQs by such means as setting fire to buildings, damaging staff cars, cutting telegraph wires, or by emptying a magazine of a Tommy Gun into a group of offrs at night, or using a grenade for the same purpose.

6. The following are a few activities which, if brought off well, will cause hindrance to the enemy.

(a) Ambushing enemy demolition parties and so preventing the destruction of bridges, etc.

(b) Making road blocks, especially with vehicles, in narrow cuttings.

(c) Setting fire to hedges, trees, grass and haystacks close to roads, thereby showing up traffic and forcing the enemy to make detours.

(d) Setting fire to enemy billets.

(e) Uncoupling waggons from trains.

(f) Faking air alarms in the dark.

(g) Seizing telephone exchanges intact.

(h) Cutting electrical air raid alarm circuits.

(i) Impersonating enemy DRs.

(j) Puncturing tins of petrol. (With two holes each.)

(k) Puncturing canvas water tanks.

(l) Damaging staff cars by puncturing tires and short circuiting batteries.

(m) Changing traffic sign posts.

(n) Using the "V" sign. This has a moral effect.

(o) Any other points to cause hindrance to the enemy.

7. Training.

(a) Formations will introduce the G(R) arm of the service into TEWTS whenever possible. Trained offrs can always be made available to advise and assist. Applications for them will be forwarded through the usual channels to Force HQ.

(b) Reference para 3(b) above, formations will earmark suitable offrs and ORs who could be used to take on G(R) work. Arrangements will be made to train such personnel in demolitions, etc., at the Training Centre in Palestine. They will be returned to their units on conclusion. Names of such personnel will be called for in Oct.

(Sgd)
Brigadier,
General Staff.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

JMcC/TG

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.
311/G.

19 Oct 41.

1 Aust Corps

14

SUMMARY OF TRAINING PROGRAMME.

1. Reference your G.1315 of 15 Oct the following training programme is submitted.

2.

Formation or Unit	Period	Nature of Activity
RAA		
2/1 Aust Fd Regt	2 Nov	T.E.W.T. - Attack - JULIS
	4 - 6 Nov	Regt exercise, Advance Attack Defence Withdrawal - HASHIYA LYDDA.
	8 Nov	T.E.W.T. A Tk Defence on the move.
2/2 Aust Fd Regt	27-28 Oct	Regimental exercise HASHIYA - LYDDA.
	29-30 Oct	Regimental Exercise Attack & Defence BEERSHEBA.
	4 - 7 Nov	Regimental exercise Attack & Defence HADERA.
	8 Nov	T.E.W.T. A Tk Defence on the move.
2/3 Aust Fd Regt	8 Nov	T.E.W.T. A Tk Defence on the move.
6 Aust Cav	2 Nov	T.E.W.T. (a) To cover a retirement. (b) To conduct a pursuit. Area to be selected.
RAE 6 Aust Div	27 Oct-10 Nov	Reconnaissances - preparati of demolitions - siting and construction of defensive ar anti tank ditches and field works.
[redacted]		
Sigs 6 Aust Div No. 1 Coy	27 - 10 Nov Oct	A Sec - Continuous W/T communications. MT Maintenance. Experimental work with aerials to improve range under night conditions. Practice in frequency chang and use of new call signs.
		B Sec - Cable maintenance - Construction work as required for signal communications.
		D Sec - Organization & runnin of DRLS timetables - maintenance & testing of lines.
No. 2 Coy		F & G Sec - V/T dummy station practice - Line laying practice. W/T Station work with n procedure - line testing and circuits - operating practice.

Formation or Unit	Period	Nature of activity
Sigs 6 Aust Div No. 3 Coy	27 Oct - 10 Nov	4 Section - attached 17 Aust Inf Bde - employed on line wirless and DR communications - practic new procedure. K Sec - Attached 16 Aust Inf Bde Establishment comn & netting within a group. L Sec - Attached 19 Aust Inf Bde Employed on line wireless & DR comns.
16 Aust Inf Bde	27 Oct - 10 Nov	Coy training siting & laying tactical wiring - individual weapon training - Coy exercise, attack & defence. Senior officers recce area - tracks - leads in.
19 Aust Inf Bde 2/4 Aust Inf Bn	27 Oct - 10 Nov	Bns will have alternative perio on training so that two bns will be employed on defensive works. Coy training - Tactical exercise, with troops - Attack - defence withdrawal, RAS BAALBECK area.
2/8 Aust Inf Bn		do.
2/11 Aust Inf Bn		do.

Major-General,
Comd 6 Aust Div.

...BS/...P.

WE.

SECRET

6 AUST DIV OP INSTN No. 1

Copy No: 15 (15)

19 Oct 41.

Ref Map: HOMS 1/200,000.

1. For the defence of the SUEZ CANAL and our main base in the Middle East, defensive localities have been selected in the LEBANON and NORTHERN PALESTINE with a view to:

(a) Forcing the enemy to attack our posn in the LEBANON,

(b) or, if the enemy bypasses this posn, attacking the enemy in flank or severing his comns.

The LEBANON posn offers excellent facilities for protection against AFVs and except for certain localities is proof against AFV attack. By rendering these localities tank-proof, the whole posn can be made tank-proof.

2. BOUNDARIES - 1 AUST CORPS

(a) Northern - The frontier between SYRIA and TURKEY.

(b) Eastern - (ref SYRIA & LIBAN 1/1,000,000 map) - adjoins 3 Indian Motor Bde - all excl - Eastern boundary of the VILAYET of ALEPPO from the frontier 22 miles West of TEL ABIAD to RAMLE - thence R EUPHRATES to MESKENE - DIBSI - ESRIYE RR - EL KOM - EL HEIR - BIR NEJIB - BIR MRABBA - DAMLOURK OUARQA.

(c) Southern - To be defined in detail later. Generally, all incl HIJJANE 2215 and the rd DAMAS - BEYROUTH but excl 83 and 84 L of C Sub-Areas at DAMAS and BEYROUTH respectively.

(d) Western - The Coast line.

3. Localities in SYRIA have been allotted as under:-

TRIPOLI	-	7 Aust Div
DJEDEIDE	-	6 Aust Div and one Inf Bde
DIMAS - QATANA	-	Two Divs

4. Inter Div Boundary: all incl 7 Aust Div, from the Corps Eastern boundary along the 37 grid line, to the stream at 213370 - stream to JEIR JEILE 2035, thence rd HASSIAF 2034 - BARCHINE 2032 - CHINE 2131/ thence KITZLAKER STA 2130 - trig 830 2129 - trig 1375 2028 - trig 2215 1927 - trig 2254 1927 - QORNETT EL ACHRA 1926 - trig ARASSIA 1825, thence ST along the watershed of the LEBANON Range.

5. (a) Operational Rear Boundary is NOT yet determined.

(b) The general line of the defences of the DJEDEIDE posn will include:

DJEBEL EL EMSIDE feature 215252 (named BUFFALO) - pt 1120 - 213255 (named KETTLE) - DJEDEIDE 212256, thence WADI running NNW from DJEDEIDE to junc with R ORENTES at 209260 - WADI running from 209260 Westwards to 20502595 - feature 204259 (named HOTHAM) - feature at 204262 (named MACEDON feature) - 202262 (named KOSCIUSKO.)

6. The posn will be held with three Bdes fwd.

(a) Inter Bde Boundaries: Right Bde and Centre Bde all incl to Right Bde.

KAA 220267 - OLD POST 217258 - RAS BAALBEK - 214257 - DJEDEIDE - rd bend 20952540.

Centre Bde and Left Bde all incl Centre Bde.

DJISR ASSI - 215272 - WADI and RIVER junc 209260 - ZABBOUD 205255.

(b) Res Bde - General area: DJABOULE 206254 - NEBI OTHMANE 209252 - LABOUE 208250.

Role of Res Bde will be issued later.

7. SUPPORTING ARMS

One A Fd Regt will probably be allotted under comd 6 Aust Div.

8. PRINCIPLE OF DEFENCE

(a) The DJEDEIDE posn as a whole will be so organised as to resist attack by armd formations in addition to resisting attack by non-armd formations. Bde and Bn localities within the Div area will similarly be selected and organised to resist attack by AFVs.

(b) In the construction of defences priority is to be given to the front of each locality and NOT to all-round defence in the first instance.

(c) The posns in each Bde locality will be chosen so that they can be held by the minimum number of A Tk weapons and personnel, thereby creating as big a reserve as possible.

(d) The DJEDEIDE WADI is being converted into an A Tk obstacle as part of the Div defensive plan, and the dispositions of the fwd Bdes have been selected to cover this obstacle.

9. CONSTRUCTION OF DEFENCES

In the construction of defences the general priority will be:

(a) A Tk obstacles
(b) OPs and MG posns
(c) Inf localities

10.(a) Bde areas are allotted for recce purposes as follows:

Right Bde	-	19 Aust Inf Bde
Centre & Res Bde	-	HQ 6 Aust Div
Left Bde	-	To be notified later. (Probably 17 Aust Inf Bde.)

(b) Responsibility for detailed planning of Bn areas within the Right and Centre Bdes will be as arranged later by HQ 6 Aust Div and Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde.

11. (a) Personnel for constructional work in the several Bde areas will be supplied by 19 Aust Inf Bde.

(b) First priorities for Bn localities will be:

Bn locality around KETTLE and DJEDEIDE.

Bn locality on BUFFALO.

Right fwd Bn centre Bde.

12. SUPPORTING ARMS.

The following officers are responsible for the co-ordination of planning for their respective arms across the Div front:

(a) CRA - all arty (less A Tk).

(b) Comd 1 A Tk Regt - A Tk plans.

(c) Comd 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn - MMG plans.

Separate instns are being issued to these Comds.

ACK

Time of Signature: 0925 hrs

Method of Issue: Sigs.

J. J. Hassett Col/A
Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

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2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	8
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~~Secret~~ DoD (15a)

PKP/TG

MOST SECRET

Copy No ..31.....

6 AUST DIV AND TPS UNDER COND. MS307/G

20 Oct 41.

LOCATION STATEMENT AS AT 2359 HRS 19 OCT 41.

Unit	Location	Remarks
1. HQ.		
Adv HQ 6 Aust Div	BAALBECK	WAVELL BARRACKS
Rear HQ 6 Aust Div	JULIS	Moving to KHASSA.
Int Corps 6 Aust Div Sec	BAALBECK	WAVELL BARRACKS
6 Aust Div Emp Pl	"	" "
279 Sec FSS	"	" "
2. CAVALRY.		
6 Aust Div Cav Regt	KHASSA	MARTIN Lines
"C" Sec Sigs	"	" "
39 Aust LAD	"	" "
"L" Mech Sqn T.J.F.F.	PALMYRA	
3. RAA		
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	JULIS	Moving to KHASSA. Representative at BAALBECK
2/1 Aust Fd Regt	KHASSA	
43 Aust LAD	"	
2/2 Aust Fd Regt	"	
40 Aust LAD	"	
2/3 Aust Fd Regt	"	
41 Aust LAD	"	
HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	QATANA	Under comd 1 Aust Corps from 23-27 Oct for training.
1 Army Sig Sec	"	
70 Aust LAD	"	
21 Bty 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	"	
22 Bty do.	"	
1 Aust A Tk Regt	BEIT JIRJA	
49 Aust LAD	"	
4. RAE.		
HQ 6 Aust Div RAE	BAALBECK	GOURAUD BARRACKS
2/1 Aust Fd Coy	17@184	
2/2 Aust Fd Coy	QATANA	
2/8 Aust Fd Coy	RAS BAALBECK	
22 Aust Fd Pk Coy	RAYAK	
80 Aust LAD	"	
1217 Indian Labour Coy	RAS BAALBECK	
5. PNRS. (Under Command RAE 6 Aust Div)		
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn (Less "A" & "B" Coys)	TRIPOLI	
"A" Coy 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	RAS BAALBECK	
"B" Coy 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	RAYAK	
6. SIGS		
HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div (less No.3 Coy)	BAALBECK	GOURAUD BARRACKS
42 Aust LAD	"	" "
No.3 Coy	det with Bdes etc.	
7. INF.		
HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	QATANA	
"K" Sec Sigs	"	
45 Aust LAD	"	
7 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn	"	
2/1 Aust Inf Bn	QATANA Area	(18321679)
2/2 Aust Inf Bn	" "	(17961689)
2/7 Aust Inf Bn	" "	(17641706)
2/6 Aust Inf Bn	(KHASSA (Under comd rear HQ 6 Aust Div	McNICHOLL Lines

Unit	Location	Remarks
7. INF (Continued)		
19 Aust Inf Bde	EL AINE	
"L" Sec Sigs	" "	
79 Aust LAD	" "	
6 Pl HQ Gd Bn	" "	
2/4 Aust Inf Bn (less one Coy)	RAS BAALBECK	
"D" Coy 2/4 Aust Inf Bn	BAALBECK	Rejoining unit 20 Oct.
2/8 Aust Inf Bn	RAS BAALBECK	
2/11 Aust Inf Bn	DJEIDE	
8. MG		
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	KHASSA	WILSON Lines
48 Aust LAD	"	" "
9. SUPPLIES & TRANSPORT		
HQ AASC 6 Aust Div	BAALBECK	GOURAUD BARRACKS
6 Aust Div Amn Coy	EL AIN	
6 Aust Div Pet Coy	KHASSA	MARTIN Lines
6 Aust Div Sup Col	QATANA	
6 Indian Mule Coy R.I.A.S.C.	ABHLA	
17 " " " "	BAALBECK	
1 Cypriot Pack Transport Coy	EL HARE	
6 " " " "	DJEIDE	Under comd 19 Aust Inf Bde
10. MEDICAL		
2/1 Aust Fd Amb (less A Coy & Det)	ZEBEDANI	
"A" Coy	QATANA	
Det 2/1 Aust Fd Amb	ZAHLE	
2/2 Aust Fd Amb (less "A" & "B" Coys)	HOMS	
"A" Coy	RAS BAALBECK	
"B" Coy	BAALBECK	
2/7 Aust Fd Amb	KHASSA	
2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBECK	
11 Anti-Malarial Control Unit	QOUCEIR	
4 Cav Mob Vet Sec	BAALBECK	
1 " " " "	ABHLA	
11. MISCELLANEOUS		
6 Aust Div Pro Coy (less Dets)	BAALBECK	
dets do.	DAMASCUS-ZAHLE	
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	BAALBECK	Det at JULIS, moving KHASSA
6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office	"	
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	HAJDAL	
6 Aust Div Reception Camp	RAYAK	
"D" Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn (less three pls)	BAALBECK	
5 Pl do	17 Aust Inf Bde	

ENGLISH TROOPS UNDER COMMAND BUT ABOUT TO MOVE.

1. INF.	
One Coy 2 Black Watch	18031683
2 Y & L	17731704

ACKNOWLEDGE

P. Pinbury
Lt Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

N.B. Please notify this Headquarters of any corrections to be made to the above statement as at date shown.

Formations & Units are reminded that this document is MOST SECRET and will be kept under lock & key, when not in sue.

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Sigs 1 Aust Corps	9
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(16)

RBS/WAW. NOTES FOR CONFERENCE - 2000 hrs 21 Oct 41.

1. Ge neral role of 6 Aust Div in SYRIAN Defences.

Probable Order of Battle:-

6 Aust Div.
one Inf Bde.
One Fd Regt.
One Med Regt on Corps Front.
One Cav Regt (Horsed)on right flank.

2. General description of front allotted to 6 Aust Div - and allocations of Bdes to sectors.

3. (a) General description of how GOC sees the Div Battle being fought (Broad outline only)

(b) Basis is A Tk localities - Div Area is one based on hills and ditch in front. Within Div, Bdes and Bns within Bns will be made as A Tk proof as possible using natural lie of ground together with A Tk mines, running

Idea at present is to have A Tk mines running vertically and across-wise from front and in rear of localities.

(c) A Tk gun plan in general is one of depth with guns primarily sited to kill tanks moving down lanes.

A proportion of A Tk guns held in reserve to be pushed up into areas forward as required.

(d) Machine Guns plan - three general tasks

(i) Support of FDL area

Support of Bde Reserve Area

Support of Div Reserve Area.

(e) Problem of getting Works Plan of construction of defences moving:-

Need to pour concrete before winter sets in - This factor forces some variation in normal planning procedure.

Comdrs then asked to help us and the sappers in giving us their immediate requirements of concrete - now confined to most forward jobs in forward Coys e.g., Bren Posts, MMG posts, Arty OPs etc.

Over/...

(f) General Planning of Labour.

Infantry do their own digging and wiring.

Engrs take on A Tk ditch, roads and concrete defences with own labour (incl Indian and hired labour)

(g) Demands for Labour

CRE on Comdr 19 Aust Inf Bde.

(h) Organisation of Recce.

19 Aust Inf Bde - own area - with priority on left fwd Bn and BU BUFFALO

Centre Bde - Col Stevenson with HQ 6 Aust Div.

Col Dougherty in later.

Left Bde - Col King with Col Wrigley.

B de Areas now allotted (may require slight adjustment) - within these Bde areas - Bn areas also allotted. These may require slight modifications after further recces.

Centre Bde Two Fwd Bns required down to Sec localities before Stevenson to start on right fwd Bn.

Dougherty may come in to do left fwd Bn or Stevenson may do - depends on how progress goes - Div will control this.

Left Bde. Right Bn (required down to Sec Posts)

Centre Bn and Left Bns may only include Sangars - stil sighting of posts required before COs return to units.

(i) First Priority of work will be:-

(i) Construction of A Tk ditch across front under CRE

(ii) Digging of section posts connected up into pl localities in all fwd coys across the front. In many cases digging is impossible so sangars will be built (Discuss advisability or otherwise of sangars)

(iii) With construction of pl posts wiring of those posts must go on. Wiring in first instance will be across the front and on flanks - rear wiring a lower priority.

(iv) Tactical wiring covering the A Tk ditch.

Actually the Div plan is for these four tasks to go on simultaneously - Labour for Tactical wiring supplied by 19 Aust Inf Bde.

CRE discuss wiring stores posn and means of delivery to Fwd Bns areas early - discuss type of wiring - Dannert or Apron Fence. Discuss also tools available for Inf on their own defences. Tools determine somewhat rate of progress of work.

Div with Comdr 19 Aust Inf Bde will co-ordinate digging of Pl posts and on completion these fwd tasks issue instns for next priority.

Construction of Pill Boxes (if any) and OPs will go on at same time.

Determine a rough date by which (i) (ii) and (iii) will be completed by - necessity for Inf Comdr to produce maximum numbers of working personnel on their defences so as to accelerate the work.

(j) Camouflage - CRE will be responsible for camouflaging as he goes where he can-controlof tracks - no tracks are to be opened up by Inf or Sappers without approval Div HQ.

Rigid control of sighting of tracks and number permitted must remain in hands of Div HQ.

(k) Allocation of Bns to areas for work - suggest one Bn to work in each of the three Fwd Bdes.

Comdr 19 Aust Inf Bde to nominate Bns now.

(l) Road plan as now approved - explain to conference

Q or CRE any suggestions.

Does present plan satisfy the requirements for the immediate works plan of the Div.

(m) Training time and works time -

Suggest two days per week tng.

Suggest four days per week work on defences.

One day per seek (Sunday) holiday.

Does four days per week get the job done quickly enough before winter sets in - can tools etc stand up to this decision - necessity however for tng to go on. Tng straight away must include hill climbing - Instance tng. before [illegible].

- work day should be of 6 hours working time - rest at 10 minutes to the clock hour.

(n) Grand chance for offrs to exercise control and all comdrs to practise decentralisation of control -This includes very active and

rsonal supervision - with determination to not waste any time on the job.

(o) This is a tremendous job set the division and complicated by winter donditions - fact that we have only one bde to do the work on four Bde front -

On what is put into the job between now and Xmas may hang the result of the battle next spring - so lets keep our minds on the necessity for putting into the job what we expect to get out of it - i in other words everybody is to give of his absolute best.

RBS.

20 Oct 41.

NF.1/

NOTES OF CONFERENCE HELD AT GOC's MESS, BAALBEK, 2000 hrs, 21 OCT, 41.

16

SECRET

ROLE OF 6 AUST DIV

1. In stating that a defensive posn had to be prepared for possible eventualities in the spring, the Div Comd said the general role of 6 Aust Div was to block the Northern end of this valley.

ORDER OF BATTLE

2. The Div Comd said that the Order of Battle would comprise an additional inf bde, an additional fd regt, and possibly a med regt, and a horsed cav regt on the right flank up in the hills. With the aid of a blackboard he then described to conference the front to be held by 6 Aust Div, according to 6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 1.

19 AUST INF BDE FRONT

3. Brig VASEY said that the country on his Bde's right flank was quite good country for horsed and mechanised cav. If the enemy decided to go down through the hills through BUFFALO there would undoubtedly be an element of risk. He had gained the impression that one bn would not link up sufficiently to close the valley, which was pretty broad.

The GSO I pointed out that there would be an additional inf bde.

Brig VASEY said the front was rather extended, particularly behind KETTLE. It seemed like a "thin red line" in front and very little behind. MG support would be necessary.

17 AUST INF BDE FRONT

4. Col KING said the front on the left was very extended. He suggested that it might be wise to prepare a number of alternative posns, with OPs well fwd, so as to be able to occupy the relevant posns when the enemy showed his hand. He suggested that that course might be preferable to tieing tps to a few posns.

The Div Comd said that the enemy might not come via the high ground at all. It was necessary, however, to recce the high ground with a view to disposing tps up there if it became necessary.

It was necessary to decide right away whether it was necessary to make defences on the hills. He thought there would be a risk, if wiring was done, of Arabs stealing the wire.

WIRING AND CONCRETE DEFENCES - INF & ENGR LABOUR

5. Brig VASEY said that sangars and engring works could be done now and the wiring deferred until the snow melted.

The GSO I asked how long it would take to put the wire in after the snow went. It was all a question of priorities.

The Div Comd said the question was complicated by the necessity to get in all concrete work before the end of Nov. The concrete work needed comprised arty OPs, a certain number of Bren posts, a certain number of MG posts, and possibly a certain number of shelters for Coy and Bn HQs. A certain number of strong posts for Bn Comds might also be necessary. The inf would have to do their own digging and wire their own posts. The CRE would take on the A Tk ditch, roads, and concrete defences with his own labour, which included Indian and hired labour.)

The CRE said he would put in the inf OPs without any inf labour. Contractors would supply sand, etc. Inf labour would be wanted for the A Tk ditch and for their own wiring and digging; it would also be necessary for loading and unloading trucks. At the present time there were as many as 15-20 ry trucks, full of hutting material, cement and other stores, arriving each day. Those trucks had to be unloaded and sent back as they were urgently wanted.

The Div Comd stated that priority would be given to fwd Pls and fwd Coys, and the digging and wiring of the A Tk ditch.

The GSO I said there were 10 Coy localities, 20 Pl areas, 60 Sec Posts. Visualising the worst conditions, it would take from 2-3 weeks to dig the Pl localities right across the front with three Bns.

TOOLS

6. The CRE told the Div Comd that he had some thousands of picks and shovels available, with a further 700 in reserve. In answer to Brig VASEY, he said that if the inf provided working parties without tools it would be satisfactory. A blacksmith would be provided to sharpen tools.

LABOUR

7. The Div Comd asked if the CRE could hire any more Arabs for the digging.

The CRE said it was impossible to get any more within 30 kilometres. He would arrange with a contractor for the pill boxes and for most of the road work. For the A Tk ditch it would be necessary to rely on the Indians, the Pnrs, and inf labour. He would like 320 men from the inf, including 80 for unloading ry trucks. The unloading personnel would be required for the rest of this month and for the whole of Nov.

Brig VASEY said the unloading personnel could do tng in the unloading area.

Conference agreed to a suggestion of the GSO I's that 240 should be the number employed every day on the A Tk ditch, and that any reduction in number should be at the expense of the unloading party.

HUTTING

8. In answer to Brig VASEY, the CRE said they were now receiving boarding to insulate the walls of the huts as well as concrete slabs. So far, the units had been putting them in themselves.

The Div Comd said the units would have to do that work during their tng time. Defence work would have to be given priority.

ORGANISATION OF RECCE

9. Conference agreed to the GSO I's suggestions as follows:-

19 Aust Inf Bde - own area - with priority on left fwd Bn and BUFFALO.

Centre Bde - Col STEVENSON with HQ 6 Aust Div.

Col DOUGHERTY in later.

Left Bde - Col KING with Col WRIGLEY.

Bde areas now allotted, although may require further slight adjustment. With the Bde areas, Bn areas also allotted. Further recces might show that these require slight adjustment.

Centre Bde - Two fwd Bns required down to Sec localities before Col STEVENSON starts on right fwd Bn.

Col DOUGHERTY may come in to do left fwd Bn, or perhaps Col STEVENSON. Div will control this.

Left Bde - Right Bn (required down to Sec posts.)

Centre Bn and Left Bns may only include sangars, but siting of posts required before COs return to units.

Brig VASEY said that, if his Bns were working in other Bde sectors, it would be essential for some responsible officer from those sectors to give decisions on the siting of defences.

The GOC said it would be a good idea to make each Coy and Pl Comd responsible for a certain section of the work, which would be a good exercise in control.

PRIORITY OF DEFENSIVE WORKS

10. It was decided that priority of work would be:-

(i) Construction of A Tk ditch across front under CRE.

(ii) Digging of Sec posts connected up into Pl localities in all fwd Coys across the front. Sangars would be necessary in some cases, or half sangars and half trenches.

(iii) With construction of Pl posts wiring of posts must go on. Wiring in first instance would be across the front and flanks - not at first rear wiring. It was decided that snowfalls heavy enough to interrupt the guarding of wiring would also make it difficult for the theft of wire.

(iv) Tactical wiring covering A Tk ditch.

DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN PROPERTY

11. Brig VASEY said that a considerable amount of damage to fruit trees, etc., would be caused by the defence works on the front of his left fwd Coy.

The Div Comd said that it could not be helped, but that 1 Aust

Corps would be informed.

TYPE OF WIRING

12. The CRE stated that he had in hand a reasonable amount of Dannert wire and any amount of ordinary wire and pickets for single or double apron. He suggested that Dannert wire should be used round Pl localities and double apron fence along front of A Tk ditch. It would be quicker to put up a double apron rather than single apron in the first place.

The AQ suggested it might be better to reserve the Dannert for rush jobs at the end, but the CRE pointed out that there was enough Dannert for the work wanted.

CAMOUFLAGE AND TRACKS

13. It was decided that CRE would be responsible for camouflage of tracks and defensive works as he progressed. No tracks would be opened up without consent of Div HQ.

The Div Comd said that camouflage was not a vital necessity in certain places where there were many tracks. In other places, however, it was important to confine ourselves to a few tracks.

The AQ then gave details of traffic circuits which were wanted and also spur rds on West and East with priority to the West.

The Div Comd ruled that Bdes would inform Div HQ what tracks they needed and CRE would be told.

The CRE said the two circuits would be finished about the beginning of Dec.

ALLOCATION OF BNS TO AREAS FOR WORK

14. Brig VASEY said the best that his Bns could muster at present was 400 each for 2/4 and 2/8 Bns and 100 for 2/11 Bn.

It was decided that Bns would be allocated as follows:-

Right - 2/11 Bn
Centre - 2/4 Bn
Left - 2/8 Bn

TRAINING AND WORKS TIME

15. The Div Comd ruled that personnel should be given one day per week off.

Tng was necessary, he stated, and instanced the tng before KEREN, when men were practised in hill climbing, carrying mortars, charging and then firing them.

It was agreed that there should be six working hrs per day, but that unloading parties should not work strictly to time, but should finish the job in hand.

Brig VASEY said that the tng would have to be fitted in as and when possible with regard to defensive works. He suggested that a certain amount of weapon tng, etc., could be included.

OVERHEAD COVER

16. It was decided that Pl posts should have overhead cover.

The GSO I suggested that, as a matter of policy, all fwd Sec posts should be provided with overhead cover, and the Div Comd agreed.

HUTS

17. The CRE stated that, owing to trouble with contractors, there was a delay in the camps. The two by EL AIN would be completed first and would be finished about a week later than the date first decided upon (27 Oct). The other camps would therefore also be a week later.

MG SITES

18. Col GOOCH asked who would construct the MG posts when they had been selected.

The GSO I said that Col GOOCH would have to do so, if concrete work was not involved. Col GOOCH could send up a Pl at a time to dig them. However, if concrete was to be used CRE would take charge of the construction.

SIG OFFICE

Col WELLMAN asked to be informed at an early date of the location of HQs, as the sig office would have to be sunk underground and cables buried 2 ft.

The GSO I said the job was not a high priority one, and that Col WELLMAN would be informed fairly soon of the location of HQs. He asked Col WELLMAN how the left Bn, which was up about 6000 ft, would be communicated with.

Col WELLMAN stated that comms would be mostly by R/T.

The GSO I requested Col WELLMAN to ask for additional signal stores which would be needed.

21 Oct 41.

TD/1F.

SECRET

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

22 Oct 41.

S/416/G.

SIGNAL SECURITY

Attached copies of CR/FAL/178 G/G of 27 Sep and 28 Sep 41 are forwarded for your information.

Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution -
List "B"

HF.

- COPY -

SECRET

Subject:- SIGNAL SECURITY

HQ, BF in P & TJ.

CR/PAL/17859/G.

28 Sep 41.

AIF Base Area
1 Aust Corps
6 Aust Div
10 Armd Div
HQ L of C North
3 Ind Motor Bde
Jerusalem Area
Lydda Area
OC, TJFF
OC, Arab Legion
OC, Tps AQABA

All Branches Force HQ

In continuation of CR/PAL/17859/G dated 9 Sep 41.

1. Some doubt appears to exist as to the reasons for the instns in para 2(a) of the above letter.

2. Originators must realise that the means used for the transmission of a message is entirely a signals responsibility, and the originator has no means of knowing whether the message will be sent for the whole, or any part, of its journey, by wireless or other insecure means.

3. Thus, if the originator signs in the "As Written" space, the message is liable to be despatched in clear by wireless, even though other means exist.

4. The instns given in para 2(a) of the above letter will, therefore, be strictly complied with by all originators.

(Sgd) R.S.BROKE,
Maj
for
Brigadier, GS.

HQ, BF in P & TJ
CR/PAL/17859/G.
9 Sep 41.

Subject: Signal Security

AIF Base Area
1 Aust Corps
6 Aust Div
10 Armd Div
5 Cav Bde
5 Ind Inf Bde
HQ L of C North
Jerusalem Area
Lydda Area
TJFF
Arab Legion
OC Tps, AJABA
OC, Tps RAFA

All Branches Force HQ

1. Signal Security Instns forwarded under CR/PAL/16501/G of 14 Jun 41 are not being complied with, and drastic action must now be taken to enforce them. These instns will be brought to the notice of all ranks concerned, and disciplinary action taken against offenders.

2. An examination of recent traffic in PALESTINE and SYRIA has revealed many lapses, and the following points are particularly stressed.-

(a) Messages in Clear. Messages, particularly of an adm nature, are continually being sent in clear. All offrs originating messages must realise that apparently harmless messages can convey considerable information to the enemy. The regulations for the use of the "As Written" space on the Message Form are therefore reproduced once more -

(i) In rear of and between Bde HQ, messages may be franked to be sent "As Written" by offrs authorised to frank "Emergency Operations" messages, when speed is vital and it is considered that the enemy cannot take effective action on the message if intercepted.

(ii) In front of Bde HQ, messages dealing with operations in progress, when contact with the enemy has been made, may be franked by any offr to be sent "As Written". Code names will, however, be used and precautions taken to prevent the enemy obtaining information.

(b) The fullest use must be made of ELS. Nothing which can go by letter or ELS should ever be sent in the form of a telegram.

(c) Messages are often addressed to formations and rptd to units serving under them - (with the laudable object of trying to save time.) It is probably not realised that although the formation to which the message is addressed has a high grade cipher, the unit to which it is rptd has only low grade cipher. Since it is forbidden to send the same message in two categories of the cipher this means that the message has to go to all addressees in low grade cipher. Low grade cipher (stencil) (and detachment ciphers) is not secure.

The detachment cipher will only be used if circumstances render it impossible to deliver the message by any other means. This cipher will be replaced by ME Syllabic Cipher on 1 Oct. The detachment cipher has practically no security at all and the Stencil and Syllabic ciphers can be broken down within about six hours.

(d) Messages must NOT be passed in Fd Grade Cipher from Force or Corps in front of Div, and vice versa. A message from Force or Corps to a unit in front of Div must either be sent to Div in High Grade cipher, deciphered and then sent by ELS, or deciphered, paraphrased, re-enciphered in Fd Grade cipher and re-transmitted. The reverse procedure will be employed for messages fo Force or Corps from units in front of Div.

(e) Code Names. Code name addresses must be used whenever possible. If messages have to be sent by W/T to units or officials without code names the messages should be addressed to the nearest Formation or unit with a code name, and commence "Following for...."

3. The misuse of signal "Priorities" is also assuming serious proportions. All offrs originating messages are responsible that the degree of importance and urgency of the message justifies the priority given, and disciplinary action will be taken in unjustifiable cases.

W.D.

(18)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

SECRET

TJD/TG

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.
30 Oct 41.

S/607/G.

DEFENCE OF SIRIA.

Para (6) of 6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 2 of 23 Oct 41, is amended as follows -

DELETE

"Four days each ---------- devoted to training" ,

and

SUBSTITUTE

"Five days each of six working hours will be allotted to work on defences, and one day devoted to training",

T. J. Dal, Maj.
for Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION

RAA 6 Aust Div
RAE 6 Aust Div
Sigs 6 Aust Div
16 Aust Inf Bde
19 Aust Inf Bde
1 Aust A Tk Regt
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
1 Aust Corps
7 Aust Div (for 17 Aust Inf Bde)
GOC
G
AQ
File
War Diary

add.

SECRET 19

23 Oct 41.

6 AUST DIV OP INSTN No. 2 Copy No: 19

Ref Map: EGYPT 1/200,000.

ORGANISATION AND PREPARATION OF DEFENSIVE POSN

1. PRINCIPLE OF RECCE

(a) Subdivision of Recce

Responsibility for recce of Bde areas is allocated as follows:-

Right Bde Area - 19 Aust Inf Bde

Left Bde Area - 17 Aust Inf Bde

Centre Bde Area:- (i) Right Bn - Bn Comd detailed by 19 Aust Inf Bde.

(ii) Left Bn - OC 2/3 Aust Inf Bn.

(b) Immediate Requirements

The immediate object of recces will be to define:-

(i) Pl localities of all bns.

(ii) Sec posts of fwd pls of fwd bns.

(iii) Siting of tactical wiring to protect A Tk ditch.

On completion of recces, sketches will be submitted to this HQ, showing all pl localities and, where applicable, sec posts.

2. RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORK

(a) 19 Aust Inf Bde will be responsible for digging and wiring all fwd pl localities across the front and for tactical wiring fwd of the tank ditch. Trenches will NOT be dug below a depth of 3 ft. Sangars may be dug on hill features KOSCIUSKO, MACEDON and BUFFALO where necessary.

(b) Double apron fencing will be used both for the tactical wiring fwd of the tank ditch and protective wiring around pl localities.

(c) CRE is responsible for the construction of the A Tk ditch, roads, tracks and special types of protective works, such as concrete pillboxes and OPs, and for the provision of technical assistance as required by 19 Aust Inf Bde for the construction of pl localities.

3. ALLOTMENT OF LABOUR TO BE

19 Aust Inf Bde will allot to the CRE 240 working men per day, except Sundays, for work on the tank ditch, and up to 80 working men daily for unloading RAF stores.

4. ALLOTMENT OF BNs TO SECTORS

In order that work may proceed simultaneously along the whole front, 19 Aust Inf Bde will allot one Bn to work in each sector.

5. CO-ORDINATION OF PLANNING

Arrangements have been made for the following officers to be attached to units of 19 Aust Inf Bde for co-ordination of planning, as follows:-

Attached to Bn working in Centre Bde Sector -

One Coy Comd - 2/1 or 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
One Coy Comd - 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

Attached to Bn working in Left Bde Sector -

One Coy Comd - 2/5 Aust Inf Bn
One Coy Comd - 2/6 Aust Inf Bn
One Coy Comd - 2/7 Aust Inf Bn

6. SUBDIVISIONAL A[illegible] DAYS

Four days out of six [illegible] hours will be allotted to work on defences and two days devoted to training, but this may be varied at the discretion of Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde in accordance with the [illegible] of priority for the completion of defences.

[illegible] will be reserved as a working margin for those personnel required for [illegible] and [illegible].

7. TOOLS

CRE will provide [illegible] required for digging and wiring pl localities.

8. CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

CRE will formulate a camouflage plan to be put into operation immediately construction commences, and continued through all stages of the work. This will include lines of approach and the positioning of sites of work.

No new tracks will be opened up without approval of Div Hq.

9. PROGRESS REPORTS

19 Aust Inf Bde and CRE will submit to this Hq each Saturday a schedule of work completed during the preceding seven days, together with work projected for the following week.

Details of pro forma required will be issued later.

10. ARTY

CRA will advise estimate of number of concrete OPs required, and the exact location of any required in the fwd area.

11. MGs

(a) Provisional allotment to fwd bdes:-

Right Bde Sector - One Coy less one Pl.

Left " " - One Coy less one Pl.

Centre " " - One Coy plus two Pls.

(b) CO 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn will submit an estimate of the total number of concrete MG posts required, together with the exact location of any in fwd bn areas.

ACK.

Time of Signature: [illegible] hrs.

Method of Issue: Sig.

J. Daly, Brig
for Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution = Copy No.

RAA 6 Aust Div	1
RAE 6 Aust Div	2
Sigs 6 Aust Div	3
16 Aust Inf Bde	4
19 Aust Inf Bde	5
1 Aust A Tk Regt	6
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	7
1 Aust Corps	8
7 Aust Div (for 17 Aust Inf Bde)	9
GOC	10
G	11
AQ	12-15
File	16-17
War Diary	18-19
Spares	20-25

/Top

Emy/20.

(19)

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

3 Aust Bde
Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.
23 Oct 42.

GBA 6 Aust Div.

S.M.F. INSTRUCTION (TEST) No. 3 Copy No: 13

Ref Maps: MOVS 1/250,000.

1. The following army units may be placed under command of or in support of 6 Aust Div in the DARDANIA defensive position:-

One 6 Fd Regt
One Fd Regt
One Fd Fty

2. In your planning you will assess and prepare plans for these additional units.

3. (a) Your planning will provide for these Fd Regts firing on the front of and through the depth of the Bde as follows:-

(i) Left and Right Bdes, and Right Bde Sp Left Bde.

(ii) Centre Bde.

(iii) Left Bde Sp Centre Bde, and Right Bde Sp Left Bde.

(b) The fire of the remaining Fd Regt and Med Regt will be required to be re-deployed on the end of the tasks (i), (ii), and (iii) above.

4. The 6th Div will support either the right Bde MEST or CENTRE or the left Bde across its whole front. These two tasks may be required being simultaneously or separately.

Recommendations are required as to the allotment of this Div to fulfil these tasks, and to the control or command of the Div or Sections.

ACK.

Time of Signature: 2000 hrs.

Method of Issue: 6 Sig.

[signature]
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Distribution (for table)	Copy No.
1 Aust & NZ Regt	1
16 Aust Inf Bde	2
17 Aust Inf Bde	3
19 Aust Inf Bde	4
2/1 Aust (M.G.) Bn	5
1 Aust Corps	7
RAA	8
RAE	9
File	10-11
War Diary	12-13
Spare	14-19

20.

MOST SECRET

20

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

23 Oct 41.

G3/42/Ts.

DEFENCE OF SYRIA.

The attached general instructions issued by HQ BF in P & TJ on Defence of SYRIA are forwarded for your information.

2. All planning in connection with the DJEDEIDE position will be based on these instructions.

3. In the initial stages of planning A Tk Defences the instructions laid down in 6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 1, para 12½ will apply.

Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION -

16 Aust Inf Bde
17 Aust Inf Bde
19 Aust Inf Bde
CRA 6 Aust Div
1 Aust A Tk Regt
CRE 6 Aust Div
"Q"
File
War Diary.

COPY.

MOST SECRET

Subject:- Defence of SYRIA.

BG GS in P & PJ,
GR/P/L/17783/G/A.
14 Oct 41.

1 Aust Corps (with copy for IC Corps)

3 Ind Motor Bde
North L of C District
5 Cav Bde
10 Armd Div
G.H.Q., M.E.F.

for information

Copies to:- 3 (SD), G31, G1, AA, A., A, Q.

1. In planning and construction of defences in SYRIA and the LEBANON a clear distinction must be drawn between, on the one hand, what is required to defeat a mechanised "blitz" and, on the other hand, what is required to defeat a deliberate staged attack.

2. Our immediate object is to be able to defeat a "blitz" carried out by panzer divs supported by motorised divs. In the following paragraphs certain considerations for obtaining this object are set out for guidance.

3. It is a matter of first priority to ensure that tank obstacles and mine fields and the layout of A/T guns is completed. For the present mines will not actually be laid but they will be held in readiness in suitable locations and all preparations made (incl survey) to enable this to be done quickly.

4. Arrangements must be made for the protection of the flanks of fortresses against turning movements by motorized infantry, who will not in the first instance be able to operate very far from their transport.

5. All localities must be prepared for all-round defence against unexpected penetration by AFVs.

6. Anti-tank defences must be co-ordinated in depth between A/T guns and Field Artv. The responsibility for this co-ordination rests with the Field Artv Commander.

7. Plans must be prepared and routes selected for moving into or debouching, from within defended areas or from selected lying up areas, by armoured forces with a counter attack role.

8. Preparations must be made for a suitable administrative layout for dealing with a "blitz". Included in this is the necessity for holding reserves of all natures within defended localities.

9. The GOC in C directs that, until such time as measures, such as are outlined above, to defeat a "blitz" have been completed, arrangements to defeat a deliberate attack will not be undertaken.

Signed: D.F. McCONNELL
Brigadier G.S.

WD

RBS/MF.

MOST SECRET

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

25 Oct 41.

GS/480/G.

CRE, 6 Aust Div.

CONCRETE PILLBOXES

1. The following concrete pillboxes are required to be built as a first priority in the DJEDEIDE position:-

Brens	42
MMGs	12
Arty OPs	13
A Tk gun	3
	70

2. The Bren posts are required in sectors as under:-

Right Bde	10
Centre "	22
Left "	10
	42

3. The Comds concerned will point out on the ground the actual location of the individual posts.

4. It is desired that work on these structures be put in hand at once and completed at an early date.

5. Type designs for each separate class of structure will be submitted to these HQ before actual work is commenced.

Brigadier Capell
for Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

Copy to -

CRA, 6 Aust Div
16 Aust Inf Bde
17 Aust Inf Bde
19 Aust Inf Bde
1 Aust A Tk Regt
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
Q
File (2)
War Diary (2)

TJD/TC

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.
25 Oct 41.

(22)

RAE 6 Aust Div 8
16 Aust Inf Bde 18
19 Aust Inf Bde 15
Q 2
File 2
War Diary 2./

478/G.

CROSSING WIRE OBSTACLES.

1. Ref attd copies of "Report on crushing and assault of wire obstacles", a demonstration team of 2 offrs and 35 ORs will visit 6 Aust Div probably on 4 Nov 41.

2. The demonstration will be held in an area 400 yards south of WAV LL Barracks, BAALBECK.

3. Personnel will attend the demonstration on the following scale -

(a)	HQ 6 Aust Div	20
(b)	RAE 6 Aust Div	60
(c)	2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	40
(d)	HQ Inf Bdes	10
(e)	Inf Bns	60

4. 19 Aust Inf Bde will supply a volunteer team of 3 Offrs and 30 ORs, who will receive instructions from the visitors and may be required to give further demonstrations to other units in the area, at a later date.

5. RAE 6 Aust Div will be responsible for erecting the following wire obstacles in the demonstration area -

(a)	50 yds	Triple Dannert
(b)	50 yds	Double Apron
(c)	50 yds	Combination of both.

6. Time of demonstration will be notified later.

J. J. Dal May
Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

SUBJECT:- Report on Crushing and Assault of Wire Obstacles.

1. The technique of assaulting and crushing wire obstacles was first brought to my notice by Lt.Col.F.E.A.MacDonnell, Commanding 7th.Bn.The Green Howards.

Various demonstrations have been given and sufficient experience gained to submit a report on this method of passing through wire.

The report is divided into

(a) The technique.
(b) The tactical possibilities and limitations.

2. The technique is a matter of going hard,with determination, The "gap-makers" throw themselves at the wire. They should NOT flop on the wire,but throw themselves at it,so that there is considerable forward impetus as they fall.The body should be limp, and the muscles not taut as they fall; the wire breaks their fall and they gradually sink down,thus avoiding hurting themselves.Face and eyes are protected by position of hands and rifle in front of body.

Hesitating or funking at the last second usually results in scratches and tears to clothing.

3. The "gap-makers" always go two together. They must pick their place according to the type of obstacle. They must fall with not more than about two yards between them.

The easiest place will vary with the type of fence and is learned best by experience; but the following,it seems,are general rules:-

(a) Obstacles held by screw pickets or light wooden stakes. Go for adjoining pickets or stakes by throwing yourself on the wire to the side of the picket and by pushing the picket away from you by seizing the top with your hand. The screw pickets bend over like a candle,the wooden pickets snap unless they are very short. Best results are when the pair fall absolutely simultaneously.

(b) Unstaked dannert wire may be taken anywhere. Care should be taken to jump sufficiently high to envelope the top of the fence in your fall.

(c) Fences held by angle irons or very strong wooden stakes. Fall together between wooden stakes and be prepared to cut top strand of wire. This is the only type of fence which requires the wire-cutter.

4. One pair will be sufficient for a single roll of triple dannert. A bg fence may require four or five pairs. The second pair pass throughthe first pair and deepen the gap. The second and subsequent pairs cannot throw themsleves with such élan as the first pair,and in their case it is more a question of falling forward and together. They really use their weight to complete the crush.

Occasionally it may be necessary to widen the gap if the passage made by the first or second pair is not wide enough.

5. Men must be told off in pairs and the Section Commander gives the word for the first pair to start. Subsequent pairs wait for no order but follow together as soon as the pair in front are down. The assault party must be collected in line within about 20 yards of the obstacles. When the gap is made,the Section Commander leads the whole of the remainder of the Section through as quickly as possible and makes for the nearest cover - this may mean a 100 yards sprint.

The "gap-makers" follow,commencing with those at the back or starting side of the obstacle. Each individual gets up as quickly as he can and disentangles himself.

Wire,particularly dannert wire,usually springs up after the gap has been made - the gap does NOT remain open.

/Page 2.

6. The following times are typical:-

(a)	Double Apron,Screw Pickets	-	Whole Section through 10 secs.
(b)	Double Apron(Angle Irons)	-	20 seconds.
(c)	Triple Dannert	-	20 seconds.
(d)	Combination of dannert & double apron,with a depth of about 8 yards.	-	Platoon task: 1st section through 40 secs.,2nd.section thro' 1 min. Platoon through 1 min 40 secs.

7. Dress and Equipment.

Normal equipment. Wiring gloves are worn by the "gap-makers" during training but on service a shirt or towel wrapped round the hands could be substituted.

Denim trousers and coats are worn. These prevent scratches and should be worn during training. On service,sleeves rolled down and shorts rolled down and tucked in might be suitable. It seems that something over the bare flesh gives confidence. In England, serge battle dress was worn. The clothing does not get seriously torn.

A demonstration consisting of six separate section fences and two platoon task fences resulted in no blood being drawn and only four small tears in the trousers. Very occasionally a man may get a deep scratch but there is less blood drawn than on the usual bayonet assault course.

It is a perfectly fair thing to ask fit men to do,provided the tactical situation is such as to give men a chance of getting through without being fired at.

8. Training.

The best method is to see a demonstration and then practise. The more simple fences should be tried first,and as sections get the technique and feeling of confidence,they will want to tackle more difficult fences.

9. Tactical Possibilities.

Since the method requires no apparatus,it provides a chance of surprise. Nobody need feel"held up" and hopeless because of a little wire in front of hem. This gives men a great feeling of superiority.

On the other hand,throwing yourself at wire should not be taken too light-heartedly.

Select a place which is not covered by fire - if you can find one. Very often there are little strips of dead ground. Since the method is silent,the uncovered wire in dead ground,even if it is thicker wire,offers the best chance.

As the assault party must get to within 20 yds.,a covered approach is necessary,or else men must run on the "Here a man,there a man" principle,until they are collected at the required place.

Covering fire and particularly smoke will be necessaryif the ground does not lend itself to complete surprise. Complete surprise is always better if it can be achieved.The method is NOT recommended for a deliberate,prepared attack against big obstacles. It would be discouraging for troops to be called upon for this effort. In fact,it is not suggested as a substitute for Tanks, Bangalore Torpedoes and other deliberate methods. It is a method of opportunity. The greatest success will be obtained by speed and surprise. Therefore,the approach must be stealthy and the passage must be quick,and once the other side,troops must be led clear of the wire as quickly as possible. The method might well be applied when a surprise attack is launched during cover of half-light at dawn or dusk,or during night when the state of the moon permits. It is NOT recommended on a dark night.

RDS/TO AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE MOST SECRET

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.
25 Oct 41.

(23)

CRE 6 Aust Div

MS/505/3.

It is requested that the possibilities or otherwise of diverting water from the several irrigation channels in the area of the DJEDEIDA defences be examined with a view to creating flooded or boggy areas as an additional means of defence against the movement of AFVs.

It is desired that this report be furnished at an early date so that consideration may be given to any advantages in the planning within the defences.

A plan showing areas of inundation (with depth of water possible) and other areas of a boggy nature will be furnished. This plan is required on 1/25,000 scale.

R Burnham
Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

COPIES TO -
CRA 6 Aust Div
16 Aust Inf Bde
19 Aust Inf Bde ((one copy rep 17 Aust Inf Bde)
File
War Diary ✓

EXPRESS

TJD/TC AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.
25 Oct 41.

S/506/G.

1 Aust Corps

PROGRESS REPORT - SYRIAN DEFENCES.

Ref your G.1315 of 15 Oct 41, the following report is submitted -

1. RECCES.

The following recces have been carried out -

(a) Recce of three fwd bde areas. Pl localities have been defined, and in addition sec posts of fwd pls.

(b) Preliminary recce of res bde area has been commenced.

(c) Preliminary recce of gun areas by CRA.

(d) Recce by CO 1 Aust A Tk Regt, who has submitted proposals for the layout of A Tk guns.

(e) Recce by CO 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn. The siting of all fwd MMGs has been completed.

2. WORKS.

(a) RAE 6 Aust Div have commenced work on the tank ditch, 3% of the task being completed.

(b) Work is in progress on the construction of the road DJABOULE - ZABBOUD.

(c) Preparations are being made for letting contracts for the construction of 70 pillboxes A Tk emplacements, OPs etc. as a first priority.

(d) Work on fwd pl localities will be commenced by 19 Aust Inf Bde on 27 Oct 41.

3. It is regretted that the correct pro forma has not been used, your G.1025 of 19 Sep not having been received or taken over from 6 Div. May a copy be forwarded please?

J.H.
Major-General,
Comd 6 Aust Div.

RBS/TG

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.
27 Oct 41.

S/549/G

19 Aust Inf Bde

NOTES ON CONFERENCE HELD AT HQ 19 AUST INF BDE 27 OCT 41.

1. The following decisions were reached at a Conference held at HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde, 27/10/41 -.

Present -

GOC 6 Aust Div
Comdr 19 Aust Inf Bde
Rep Comdr 17 Aust Inf Bde, and
Staffs to above.

(a) 19 Aust Inf Bde will be responsible for arranging all details (less Engr rep) establishment camp, two coys 2/8 Bn on KOSCIUSKO feature:-

Camp to be established by Monday 3 Nov 41.

(b) Recce party to move to KOSCIUSKO on Wed 29 Oct 41. CRE to provide one Engr Offr to accompany this party; Engr Offr to contact 19 Aust Inf Bde by 1800 hrs 28 Oct 41.

(c) HQ 6 Aust Div will be responsible for the establishment of a Div Recce camp in ELAINE area. Camp to hold approx 100 all ranks. Camp to be opened as early as possible and not later than 3 Nov 41.

Units using Div Recce camp will be responsible for providing their own cooks and accommodation stores (less tents) for the duration of their stay in camp.

(d) 19 Aust Inf Bde will commence tactical wiring of A Tk ditch in left sector on 28 Oct 41, pending opening of camp on KOSCIUSKO. When this camp is open, priority of work in the left sector is to be, section and platoon localities with their wiring on KOSCIUSKO and MACEDON respectively.

(e) When the first hutted camp is ready for occupation 2/4 Aust Inf Bn will move in.

Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

Copies to -

CRE 6 Aust Div
17 Aust Inf Bde
"Q"
File
War Diary

EJD/LF.

(26)

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.

29 Oct 41.

601/G.

RAE 6 Aust Div (8)
16 Aust Inf Bde (10)
19 Aust Inf Bde (10)
AQ (2)
File (2)
War Diary (2)

CROSSING WIRE OBSTACLES

1. Further this office 472/G of 25 Oct 41, attached copies of 1 Aust Corps G.1433, setting out details of demonstration.

2. It will be noted that the date of the demonstration has been altered to 7 Nov 41.

3. Para 3 of this office 472/G of 25 Oct 41 is cancelled. RAE 6 Aust Div will now erect obstacles as in para 4 of attached instruction.

(Sgd): T.J.DALY,
Maj
for
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
28 Oct 41.
G.1433

CROSSING WIRE OBSTACLES

1. Demonstrations of inf crushing and crossing various wire obstacles will be given as under:- RVs for visitors are shown.

Day	Time	Place	RV
Thurs 6 Nov	1030 hrs	TRIPOLI AT 16792809.	1000 HRS AT 16722808
Fri 7 "	1030 "	BAALBEK 400[x] south of WAVELL BARRACKS.	1000 hrs rd and track junc SW corner of barracks.

2. (a) 3 Ind Motor Bde reps are attending at TRIPOLI.

(b) Units in 84 and 85 L of C Sub-Areas are attending at BAALBEK.

(c) Reps from HQ 1 Aust Corps, E Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn, and tps under Corps may attend either demo. Those attending will notify Camp so that economy of tpt may be achieved.

3. The demo team of 2 offrs 35 ORs is arriving at HQ 7 Aust Div on the afternoon of 5 Nov. The div, in whose area they are, is responsible for their movement and accommodation whilst in their area, also for traffic control and car parking.

4. 6 and 7 Aust Divs will arrange for the following fences, each 50 yds long, to be erected:-

It is reported reliably that "the fences provided in EGYPT were too easy. Where necessary additional stiffening will be constructed."

(i) DA, screw or light wood pickets.
(ii) DA, angle iron or heavy wood pickets.
(iii) Unstaked triple dannert.
(iv) Unstaked two rows triple dannert.
(v) Staked triple dannert.
(vi) Combined DA and staked dannerts as in sketch att.

5. The team will probably be able to give instn to a volunteer team as set out in para 3 of this HQ memo G.1328 of 16 Oct to 6 and 7 Aust Divs.

6. Whilst no such request has been made, nor the need suggested, this HQ would appreciate a doctor being present to deal with any accident to tps practising.

Commd Fld for Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION.

6 Aust Div	50	GOC - BGS	1	CE	1
7 Aust Div	50	G	2	DDST	8
CCRA	2	I	1	ADOS	3
CRE C Tps	7	A	1	APM	2
CSO	2	Q	1	File	4

C O P Y

S E C R E T

LENGTH OF OBSTACLE - 2 COILS OF DANNERT (about 40 yards)


This will enable one half of obstacle (1 Coil in length) to be assaulted first, and the other half (1 Coil in length) afterwards.

For first half screw pickets to be used throughout.

For second half angle-irons to be used throughout, or wooden posts with angle-iron hold-fasts.

TWO TOP CENTRE DANNERT COILS TO BE LAID IN LOOSE.

TOP STRANDS BETWEEN PICKETS LENGTHWISE, OR STRANDING LACING COILS TOGETHER MAY BE INSERTED OR NOT AS DESIRED.



(1) Screw Picket
or (2) Angle Iron or Wooden Post.

or (1) Screw Picket
or (2) Angle Iron.

CMYL

TJD/JMB

W.D.

SECRET

Headquarters,
6 Aust Div.
29 Oct 41.
S/605/G

CONFERENCE 6 AUST DIV

A conference will be held at GOC's mess at 1745 hrs 31 Oct 41. The following officers are required to attend:

Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde
CRA
CRE
AQ
Comd Sigs 6 Aust Div
Rep 1 Aust A/Tk Regt
Rep 1 Aust MG Bn
Rep 2/1 Aust Inf Bn
Rep 2/5 Aust Inf Bn
Rep 2/6 Aust Inf Bn
Rep 2/7 Aust Inf Bn.

T. J. Daly, Maj
Lt-Colonel.
GS, 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION -

19 Aust Inf Bde	(6)
RAA 6 Aust Div	(2)
RAE 6 Aust Div	(1)
Sigs 6 Aust Div	(1)
AQ	(1)
File	(1)
War Diary	(2)

MF.

SECRET

NOTES FOR CONFERENCE 31 OCT 41

1. Outline plan of Div lay-out - with alternative role for Reserve Bde.

2. Plan for defence against attack by AFVs. Work back through A Tk defences.

3. Co-ordination of fire across front, particularly MGs etc.

Do Bns know what MG fire is supporting them on their front? Are they satisfied?

4. How far is the location of pl localities complete within Bns in each Sector?

RIGHT

CENTRE

LEFT

5. What are requirements in Pillboxes in each Bn area, and also MGs?

Discussion on types of concrete posts.

6. Bn Comds or reps must control location of A Tk ditch on their fronts. Is this understood? It affects siting of fixed line. Whom does Bn Comd contact?

7. Engr stores.- Are Bns short of working tools? Or have they demanded on CRE for shortage? e.g. 2/4 Bn stated shortage of crowbars. Has anyone taken action on this?

8. Estimate of wire required for each Bn locality; need not be firm just yet, but general indication must be given so Div can advise Corps.

Present plan - CRE fills fwd to 3 dumps. What is in these dumps.

In future, no stores will be moved unless on GS order.

CRE to say what Engr stores are approved for this Div. (When can get this.) Allocation to Bdes then done by Div.

9. Track and road plan, with detail of work now going on. Plan is to finish rear circuit first.

10. Trg in A Tk mine-laying. Will have to lay at least 100,000 and this means time. Arrange plan with CRE for stores and instructors to help Bns of 19 Aust Inf Bde. Discuss including Fd Regts in PALESTINE. (These may have time to lay mines also.)

11. Carrier Pls. Are these required as Carrier Pls in Bn area for the defensive battle? Decision required on this by next week. Div is short of fire power in rear posns and is looking for the carriers as a way out.

12. Work for Next Week. Need for everyone to get on and not lose time. Corps now order 5 days work a week on defences. Bns must be encouraged to take a vital interest in the work they are doing in what may be some other Bn's area.

13. Comds are asked to think of the problem of what is to be done with excess vehicles, i.e. vehicles not required for the defensive battle. Should be located outside the battle zone. Present idea is to hanger them in nullahs on LEFT and RIGHT flanks. Vehicles within the area must be kept to a minimum.

R.J.S.
30 Oct 41.

[illegible] 29

[illegible] H.Q's [illegible]
[illegible] 41.

1. [illegible]:- Maj-Gen E.F.[illegible]
Lieut [illegible], ADC
Col [illegible]
Maj [illegible] II
Col [illegible]
Maj [illegible]
Capt [illegible] (I)
Brig [illegible]
Maj [illegible]
Brig G.A.V. [illegible]
Lt-Col [illegible]
Col [illegible]
Lt-Col [illegible], Sigs
Maj [illegible] Inf Bn
Capt [illegible] 2/5 Aust Inf Bn
" [illegible] Aust Inf Bn
Maj [illegible] Bn
Capt [illegible] Aust Inf Bn

2. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] fully directed by the enemy.

3. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] for [illegible]

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

additional silocks required would be made at the following (ek's conference.

The Ohd said that the standard type of silos would have the following dimensions:-

0-it diameter inside
'-it roof thickness
]-ft wall thickness

The use of silos would be voluntary, as self. No subsidy will, however, be available for the construction of the silos.

The Ohd Ranch would contact eight [illegible] Cow. [illegible] silos.

In answer to a question as to what would be the cost of a concrete silo, Mr Fick said that [illegible] would be about $1 [illegible] reinforced with [illegible] by Ohd.

Mr Ohd said that a type of reinforced concrete, currently in use in [illegible] was known as the [illegible] cover of reinforced [illegible] and first proved [illegible] is to be provided [illegible] by Ohd.

The Ohd Ranch would [illegible] concrete silos.

[illegible]

[illegible] silos [illegible] Fick.

[illegible] silos [illegible] Ohd.

[illegible] Ohd.

[illegible] Ohd.

[illegible] Ohd.

[illegible] Ohd.

[illegible] Ohd.

[illegible] Ohd.

[illegible] Ohd.

[illegible] last 14 day and in saving the radio track to allow firing exercises for armoured cars carried.

The plans of tracks required by [illegible] and the [illegible] of the firing were explained.

[illegible] said that, on the W.T. work was [illegible] track for the [illegible] the [illegible] area. There would also have to be a track by [illegible].

[illegible]

12. The Div Comd said that at least two [illegible] would have to be held, probably the 1st, [illegible] would have to rely in the work.

The Div Arty said that at least two [illegible] to be given. Further light would be given. He thought it would only be necessary to have [illegible] dummy wires with each [illegible] could practice [illegible].

[illegible]

13. The Div Comd said [illegible] an area for the defensive [illegible]. The Div Arty [illegible] in certain areas [illegible] would be of little value.

[illegible]

[illegible]

14. The Div Comd stressed the [illegible]. He said [illegible] during the week of defence.

[illegible] said his service [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible]. He stressed [illegible] the [illegible] [illegible] could only be used a proportion [illegible] available therefor. For example, he had to supply [illegible] at [illegible].

The Div Comd said he would [illegible] the [illegible] concentrate [illegible] another [illegible] sent in.

[illegible]

15. The Div Comd also [illegible] the [illegible] of the Army were they [illegible] defensive [illegible]. He did not [illegible], of course, [illegible] the Div [illegible] possible [illegible]. [illegible] pursuit [illegible].

[illegible]

16. [illegible]

16 [illegible] or 17 [illegible] would be in the [illegible] area fairly soon.

Dealing with [illegible] tons of [illegible] rations were being dumped in [illegible] area, it would take 3 huts to house them. A [illegible] would be [illegible] EAST of [illegible]. A canteen [illegible] would be [illegible] at [illegible].

There would be [illegible] at [illegible] and [illegible] and [illegible].

[illegible] units.

[illegible] said that [illegible] to [illegible]. The [illegible] [illegible] would be [illegible].

17. [illegible] I [illegible] when the [illegible] in [illegible] [illegible], etc.

[illegible]

18. In answer to the [illegible] would [illegible] 7 days' [illegible] water.

[illegible]

19. In [illegible] that [illegible] would [illegible] areas. Reports [illegible] wanted [illegible] [illegible] wanted [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] on the [illegible] of the [illegible] wiring [illegible] posts.

FKF/TG

30

MOST SECRET

MS/698 /G.

Copy No 37

6 AUST DIV AND TPS UNDER COMD

LOCATION STATEMENT AS AT 2359 HRS 1 NOV 41.

1 Nov 41.

Unit	Location	Remarks
1. HQ		
Adv HQ 6 Aust Div	BAALBECK	WAVELL BARRACKS
Rear HQ 6 Aust Div	KHASSA	HQ Lines
Int Corps 6 Aust Div Sec	BAALBECK	WAVELL BARRACKS
6 Aust Div Emp Pl	" "	" "
279 Sec FSS	" "	" "
2. CAVALRY		
"L" Mech Sqn TJFF	PALMYRA	
3. RAA		
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	KHASSA	HQ Lines Rep at BAALBECK
2/1 Aust Fd Regt	KHASSA	ONSLOW Lines
43 Aust LAD	"	" "
2/2 Aust Fd Regt	"	JESS Lines
40 Aust LAD	"	" "
2/3 Aust Fd Regt	"	L.6
41 Aust LAD	"	"
HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	QATANA	
1 Army Sig Sec	"	
70 Aust LAD	"	
21 Bty 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	"	
22 Bty " " " "	"	
1 Aust A Tk Regt	BEIT JIRJA	GRIFFADE Lines
49 Aust LAD	" "	" "
4. RAE		
HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	BAALBECK	GOURAUD BARRACKS
2/1 Aust Fd Coy	178184	
2/2 Aust Fd Coy	QATANA	
2/8 Aust Fd Coy	RAS BAALBECK	
22 Aust Fd Pk Coy	RAYAK	
80 Aust LAD	"	
5. PNRS (under comd RAE 6 Aust Div)		
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	QATANA	
(Less "A" & "B" & "C" Coys)		
"A" Coy 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	RAS BAALBECK	
"B" Coy 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	RAYAK	
"C" Coy 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	178184	
6. SIGS		
HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div (less No.2 & 3 Coy)	BAALBECK	GOURAUD BARRACKS
42 Aust LAD	" "	" "
No. 2 Coy	KHASSA	
No. 3 Coy	det with Bdes, etc.	
7. INF.-		
HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	QATANA	
"K" Sec Sigs	"	
45 Aust LAD	"	
7 Fl Aust HQ Gd Bn	"	
2/1 Aust Inf Bn	QATANA Area (18321679)	
2/2 Aust Inf Bn	" " (17961689)	
2/7 Aust Inf Bn	" " (17641706)	
2/6 Aust Inf Bn	KHASSA McNICHOLL Lines (under comd rear HQ 6 Aust Div)	

Unit	Location	Remarks
7. INF (Continued)		
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	EL AINE	
"L" Sec Sigs	" "	
79 Aust LAD	" "	
6 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn	" "	
2/4 Aust Inf Bn	RAS BAALBECK	
2/8 Aust Inf Bn	" "	
2/11 Aust Inf Bn	DJEDEIDE	(211255)
8. MG		
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	KHASSA	WILSON Lines
48 Aust LAD	"	" "
9. SUPPLIES & TRANSPORT		
HQ AASC 6 Aust Div	BAALBECK	GOURAUD BARRACKS
6 Aust Div Amn Coy	EL AINE	
6 Aust Pet Coy	KHASSA	MARTIN Lines
6 Aust Div Sup Col	QATANA	
6 Indian Mule Coy RIASC	ABLAH	
17 " " " "	BAALBECK	
1 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy	EL HAIR	
6 " " " "	DJEDEIDE	(Under comd 19 Aust Inf Bde)
10. MEDICAL		
2/1 Aust Fd Amb (less "A" Coy & Det)	ZEBEDANI	
"A" Coy	QATANA	
Det 2/1 Aust Fd Amb	ZAHLE	
2/2 Aust Fd Amb (less "A" & "B" Coys)	HOMS	
"A" Coy	RAS BAALBECK	
"B" Coy	BAALBECK	
2/7 Aust Fd Amb	KHASSA	WILSON Lines
2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBECK	
11 Anti Malarial Control Unit	QOUCEIR	
1 Cav Mob Vet Sec	ABLAH	
11. MISCELLANEOUS		
6 Aust Div Pro Coy (less Dets)	BAALBECK	
Dets do.	DAMASCUS-ZAHLE	
6 Aust Div Postal Unit	BAALBECK	
6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office	"	
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	BAALBECK	
6 Aust Div Reception Camp	ABLAH	Barracks
"B" Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn (less three pls)	BAALBECK	
5 Pl do.	17 Aust Inf Bde	
19 Mob Bath Unit	QATANA	

ACKNOWLEDGE.

for Colonel,
GS 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION =	Copy No.	Copy No.
6 Aust Cav		1
RAA 6 Aust Div		2
RAE 6 Aust Div		3-4
Sigs 6 Aust Div		5
16 Aust Inf Bde		6
19 Aust Inf Bde		7
AASC 6 Aust Div		8
Sigs 1 Aust Corps		9
2/1 Aust (MG) Bn		10
Aust HQ Gd Bn		11
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office		12
GOC		13
G		14-15
I		16
AQ		17-18
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DADOS		21
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6 Aust Div Sec Fd Cash Office		25
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6 Aust Div Salvage Unit		27
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FOR INFORMATION -

BF in P & TJ	38-39
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