

AWM52  
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,  
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/3/5  
ARMY

First Army General Staff  
(Intelligence) (First Army  
GS (Int))

April 1944



1/3/5-0253

SECRET

## WAR DIARY

Month...APR...

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY

Year...1944..

Branch..Intelligence..

Place	Date	Summary of Events	Ref to Appendices	Comments
HQ FIRST AUST ARMY	1	Landops Revsit 612	1	
	2	Landops Revsit 613	2	
	3	Landops Revsit 614	3	
		World Review Situation No 64	4	
		Lt M.N. POINTON - 24 days' leave		
	4	Landops revsit 615	5	
		HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 100	6	
	5	Landops Revsit 616	7	
	6	Landops Revsit 617	8	
		Capt C.C. GUY - 4 days' leave		
	7	Lt C.M. MANNING - on leave preparatory to marching out to HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde		
		Landops Revsit 618	9	
	8	Landops revsit 619	10	
	9	Landops Revsit 620	11	
		World Review Situation No 65	12	
	10	Landops Revsit 621	13	
	11	Landops Revsit 622	14	
		HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 101	15	
		Capt C.C. GUY returned from leave		
	12	Landops Revsit 623	16	
	13	Landops Revsit 624	17	
		Lt A.C. SIMMONS returned from leave		
	14	Lt NUTT marched in from 1 Aust Inf Rft Trg Bn (JW)		
		Maj C.C. MARR visited Adv LHq		

WAR DIARY

SECRET

Month...APR...

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY

Year....1944.

Branch...Intelligence.

Place	Date	Summary of Events	Ref to Appendices	Comments
TOOWOOMBA - MAREEBA	14	Landops Revsit 625	18	
	15	Landops Revsit 626	19	
	16	Landops Revsit 627	20	
		World Review Situation No 66	21	
		Extracts from Captured Documents	22	
	17	Landops Revsit 628	23	
	18	Landops Revsit 629	24	
		HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 102	25	
	19	Lt BEAMAN - Adv LHQ		
		Landops Revsit 630	26	
	20	Lt BEAMAN - Detached for duty with GSI Second Aust Army for two weeks. Later attached to Q'LD L of C Area for special duty in GULF and TORRES STRAIT Area.		
		Landops Revsit 631	27	
	21	Landops Revsit 632	28	
	22	Landops Revsit 633	29	
	23	Landops Revsit 634	30	
	24	World Review Situation No 67	31	
		Landops Revsit 635	32	
	25	Landops Revsit 636	33	
		HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 103	34	
		World Review Situation No 68	34(a)	
	26	Landops Revsit No 637	35	
	26	Following personnel departed by air from ARCHERFIELD and arrived at Adm Gp 1 Aust Corps, MAREEBA :- Capt BUCKRIDGE, Capt GILL, Lt PRIME, Lt NUTT, Lt KILBY, Sjt MATTERSON, Cpl ANGUS.		

SECRET

WAR DIARY

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY

Month...APR...

Year...1944...

Branch...Intelligence...

Place	Date	Summary of Events	Ref to Appendices	Comments
TOOWOOMBA - MARKEBA	27	Landops Revsit 638	36	
	27	Advance party departed for MARKEBA at 0720K		
	27	Capt GILL & Capt BUCKRIDGE detached to 1 Aust Corps for Adm duties as IO and A/G.II respectively.		
	28	Landops Revsit 639	37	
	28	Lt PRIME detached to 1 Aust Corps for G(SD)		
	29	Landops Revsit 640	38	
	30	Landops Revsit 641	39	
		Lt M.N. POINTON returned from leave		
		23 May 44.		

*C. M. ...*

Lt-Col  
GSI FIRST AUST ARMY



W D

MESSAGE FORM

CALL IN 3 aust inf bde )  
AND TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means  
INS RUCTIONS OUT 7 aust comd AL sec) except wireless  
4 aust div )  
CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies) by ALS  
remainder by DRLS

Copy to:  
GOC  
BGS  
G(0)  
G2(AIR)  
G(1)  
G(SD)  
DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress NE rft trg centre  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
BRISBANE fortress corps Hq VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2678 1

secret (.) landops revsit 612 to 010045Z apr (.)

landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 29 mar allied tps consolidated on  
HILL 260 (.) additional 202 dead jap counted (.) north of perimeter patrol  
engaged who apparently now fighting rearguard action (.)

ADMIRALTY IS (.) 30 mar following intensive bombardment by MTBs  
allied tps landed east end PITYILU I and by 300245Z had moved west to  
half ml from east tip of island

NEW GUINEA (.) SAIDOR (.) 30 mar twentyfour japs killed by patrol  
YOGA YOGA (.)

DUMPU (.) ref revsit 611 patrol from track junc two  
and one quarter mls west DAUMOINA north along spur thence east to  
BOGADJIM RD located abandoned enemy posn two and three quarter mls WNW  
DAUMOINA (.) patrol north along BOGADJIM RD reached MABELEBU three and  
one quarter mls north DAUMOINA where fired on by LMG from enemy estimated  
strength 14 located a quarter ml NW MABELEBU (.) patrol to JAPPA reached  
1950 feature one ml east JAPPA (.) MATALOI NO 1 reported clear enemy (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) NEW BRITAIN (.) 292115Z ten a/c strafed PONDO PLN (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 300001Z twentythree a/c bombed airfield  
TADJI (.) 300030Z sixteen a/c bombed strafed enemy pl dug in north  
BARUM (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 300035Z one hundred and twentyfour  
a/c bombed airfields HOLLANDIA and CYCLOPS destroying 25 damaging 67  
grounded a/c (.) of thirtyfive to forty intercepting enemy Fs  
destroyed (.)

TIMOR (.) 301110Z ten a/c bombed airfields PENFOEI (.)

CENTRAL PACIFIC (.) TRUK ATOLL (.) ref revsit 611

attack ETEN I now reported 31 intercepting enemy Fs destroyed (.) 290915Z  
 twelve a/c bombed ETEN and MOEN IS (.) 300153Z eleven a/c bombed airfield  
 MOEN I (.) eleven of thirty to forty intercepting enemy Fs destroyed (.)  
 enemy sightings (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 282000Z one 1900 ton vessel west SIEBERI I 33 113  
 east KAVIENG rocket strafed by carrier based a/c and forced on beach (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 300120Z one 4000/5500 ton poss. freighter SISSANO  
 LAGOON (.) 300050Z to 300100Z one 2000/4500 ton freighter tpt heading  
 into BOUGAINVILLE BAY (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 300045Z six freighters one 7000/8500 three  
 4000/5800 two 500/1000-ton six 500/1000 ton freighters or large luggers  
 approx 30 barges HUMBOLDT BAY (.)

TIMOR (.) 302336Z following results of attack by eight a/c TENAU  
 HARBOUR area (.) one 500 ton stack aft freighter with deck cargo  
 considered destroyed two stack aft freighters one 250 one 100 tons one  
 40 ft prau one 30 ft launch damaged one barge laden with 80/100 fuel drums  
 sunk one direct hit three near misses 100 ft oil barge (.)  
 sea (.)

SOLOMONS (.) night 29/30 war warships bombarded reported enemy  
 concentration south TEKESSE, whilst lt naval units shelled MOSIGA (.)

CENTRAL PACIFIC (.) dawn 29 mar strong naval forces commenced by  
 attacks PALAU I (.) allied approach discovered by enemy search a/c  
 resulting enemy vessels fleeing area before allied forces could reach  
 attack posns (.) all informed

This message may be sent as  
 WRITTEN except by wireless

T00 011542 K

THI

*Wm G. L. Capt*

w/d (2)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde )	Copy to:- GOC BGS G(O) G2(AIR) G(I) G(SD) DA & QMG
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means	
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec ) except wireless	
		4 aust div )	
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies) by ALS	
		remainder by DRIS	

TO:	4 aust div	TOWNSVILLE fortress	NE rft trg centre
	3 aust inf bde	CAIRNS fortress	7 aust comd AL sec
	BRISBANE fortress	corps HQ VDC Q'LAND	
FROM:	first aust army	Int 2680	2

secret (.) landops revsit 613 to 020115Z apr (.)

landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 30 mar allied tps forced enemy from HILL 500 killing 30 (.) patrol to LARUMA RIVER made no contact with enemy but found abandoned sups (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 31 mar enemy activity confined feeble harassing allied patrols by isolated gps japs (.) 300230Z occupation PITYILU ISLAND completed 51 japs killed (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 31 mar 25 japs killed 14 captured by allied patrols operating NUMUNDO area (.) 30 mar patrols KANDOKA (eight mls ENE LINGA LINGA PLN) killed six japs (incl one col) of 75 engaged in running fight (.) natives report enemy gp located on mainland vicinity POI ISLAND (EMELINE BAY) (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) KABENAU RIVER (.) 30 mar coastal patrol killed four japs mouth KABENAU RIVER and reported signs recent enemy occupation at mouth BOKI RIVER (one and one half mls SE KABENAU RIVER mouth) (.)

DUMPU (.) 31 mar our tps continued northward movement along BOGADJIM RD fwd tps reaching one quarter of one ml SW YAULA (.) enemy mtn gun situated north YAULA engaged our tps near br one half ml WNE MABELEBU (.) our tps also received MG and mortar fire from enemy posns one quarter of one ml NW MABELEBU (.) patrol found abandoned enemy posns with stores BARUM area (.) enemy in new posns 700 yds north BARUM (.) patrol reports jap posns HILL 2900 NE MATALOI 1 evacuated and no enemy NE along track for 700 yds (.) airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 30 mar 15 A/C attacked poss barge concentrations KARIROPA RIVER mouth (.) 31 mar 39 A/C attacked TAVENA

PURIATA and HONGORAI RIVERS area (.) 31 mar 25 A/C bombed strafed sup area NUMANUMA (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 300110Z fiftyeight A/C bombed AA posns and airfield VUNAKANAU (.) 300100Z ten A/C bombed SW RABAU (.) 310050Z sixtyeight A/C bombed AA posns and airfield LAKUNAI (.) am 31 mar 23 A/C bombed RATAVAL (.) 300108Z and am 31 mar 35 A/C respectively bombed VUNAPOPE (.) 310515Z twentynine A/C bombed TALILI BAY area (.) night 30/31 mar five A/C bombed RABAU (.) 310015Z twentysix A/C bombed NE RABAU (.) 302140Z twelve A/C strafed div area VONDO RIVER 302101Z four A/C bombed strafed villages along coast WIDE BAY to WATERFALL BAY (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 310009Z twentythree A/C bombed strafed pers stores areas between VOKAU and NOR (just east AITAPE airfield) (.) 010016Z thirtyfour A/C bombed strafed AITAPE area (.) 310007Z seventyseven A/C bombed strafed pers stores areas MUSCHU KAIRIRU ISLANDS (.) 310430Z twelve A/C bombed strafed pers stores areas BOGIA with excellent coverage (.) 31 mar 14 A/C bombed strafed AA posns stores pers areas ULIGAN HARBOUR (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 310028Z one hundred and twenty A/C bombed airfields HOLLANDIA CYCLOPS and SENTANI destroying many grounded A/C starting large fires (.) 14 of 25/30 intercepting enemy Fs destroyed (.) in two days attacks photos show 138 grounded A/C definitely destroyed and 27 destroyed or damaged (.) estimated additional 15 A/C not shown in photos plus 15 in air combat prob destroyed (.) allied losses one F (.)

TIMOR (.) 311105Z thirteen A/C bombed airfield and adm area PENFOEI (.) enemy sightings (.)

SOLOMONS (.) 011250Z one prob sub 15 mls west CAPE MUTUPINA (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 010252Z one sub 20 mls south DYAU ISLAND attacked by A/C results unknown (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 30 mar one small cargo vessel TALILI BAY (.) 30 mar 24 A/C scored two direct hits one small cargo vessel three direct hits destroyer hulk KERA VIA BAY and hit one small cargo vessel in cove NW PRAED PT which sunk by further attacks 31 mar (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 31 mar two vessels one which poss destroyer or

- 3 -

corvette AITAPE at least 13 barges AITAPE area incl two mouth BLIRI RIVER (nine mls NW SISSANO LAGOON) plus three destroyed between VOKAU and KORAKO (four and eight mls ESE AITAPE) (.) 31 mar one poss gunboat KEUL ISLAND (30 mls ENE WEWAK ) three luggers 22 barges WEWAK area (.) 31 mar seven barges east side ULIGAN HARBOUR (.) 31 mar two u/i vessels moving off west coast KARKAR ISLAND (.) 31 mar two 500/1000 ton freighters two luggers two barges VANIMO three luggers or barges KRU KRU (10 mls ESE VANIMO) (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 31 mar one small freighter one small u/i vessel three luggers HOLLANDIA approx 100 barges SENTANI LAKE (.)

TIMOR (.) 1 apr ref revsit 612 two stack aft freighters which previously damaged and now reported 500/1000 tons each beached TENAU 33 barges TENAU all infm

---

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

TCO 121711K

THI

*11.05.44*

W D

(3)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	3 aust inf bde ) TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means	<u>Copy to:</u> GOC BGS G(O) G2(AIR) G(I) G(SD) DA & QMG
	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec ) except wireless	
		4 aust div ) by ALS CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies)	
remainder by DRLS			

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress NE rft trg centre  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2684 3

secret (.) landops revsit 614 to 022315Z apr (.)

landops (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 1 apr KORUNIAI NDIRILO ISLANDS occupied  
no opposition (.)

MANUS ISLAND (.) 1 apr patrol activity continues remaining  
enemy believed fleeing central south coast (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) DUMPU (.) night 31 mar/1 apr enemy high gd  
west BOGADJIM rd counter attacked our tps one quarter of one mile  
SW YAULA and one half mile NNE MABELEBU with mortar small arms fire  
(.) casualties inflicted enemy no loss own tps (.) our arty engaged  
YAULA and KOFEBI RIVER area (.) patrol north towards KALIKO  
encountered AMBUSH posn 1500 yds north DAMUM some casualties  
received (.) patrol to JAPPa found abandoned enemy camp one mile  
NE JAPPa (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) am 1 apr 12 a/c bombed MONOITU MISSION  
starting fires (.) am 1 apr 24 a/c bombed sup area MARIRICI RIVER  
(.) pm 1 apr 12 a/c bombed sup area NUMA NUMA (.) 1 apr 14 a/c  
bombed PORTON PLN (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 020050Z nine a/c bombed strafed coastal  
track SE tip RAMBUTYO ISLAND with excellent coverage (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 312315Z fifty three a/c bombed sup area RATAVAL  
leaving whole area covered with fire (.) 312330Z twenty four a/c  
bombed sup area VUNAPOFE (.) 312330Z thirty two a/c bombed oil coal  
and TOBOI wharves (RABAUL) (.) night 31 mar/1 apr 8 a/c harassed  
RABAUL for 8 hours dropping 112 bombs (.) 010025Z twelve a/c strafed

- 2 -

CAPE HOSKINS area (.) 012225Z twelve a/c bombed strafed A/A posns  
GAROVE ISLAND (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 010051Z twelve a/c bombed strafed AITAPE area  
thoroughly covering TADJI pers sup areas (.) 020031Z three a/c  
bombed pers area KAIRIRU ISLAND (.) 020205Z twenty two a/c bombed  
strafed pers area MUSCHU ISLAND (.) 020220Z thirteen a/c bombed  
A/A posns HANSA BAY (.)

CERAM (.) 010409Z seven a/c bombed airfield BOELA (.)

TIMOR (.) 011128Z seven mitchells bombed airfield LAUTEM (.)

CENTRAL PACIFIC (.) 311044Z twenty one a/c bombed TRUK ATOLL (.)  
enemy sightings (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 1 apr photos show 15 barges KAVIENG (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 31 mar eight barges west side MUSCHU ISLAND (.)  
020130Z one 500/1000 ton poss freighter CAPE BORAK 20 barges WEWAK  
(.) am 31 mar seven barges CAPE DJERUAN strafed by a/c sinking two  
leaving five burning (.) 31 mar 10/12 barges beached CONDOR PT (.)  
010100Z one poss freighter four barges vicinity jetty west side  
HANSA BAY three barges west side LAING ISLAND (.)

CERAM (.) 010113Z five 500/1000 ton possible stack aft vessels  
BOELA two small u/i vessels NAMLEA one 500/1000 ton poss stack aft  
vessel stationary 2/3 small boats WAROE BAY (.) all informed

This message may be sent as  
WRITTEN except by wireless

TOO 2 3 3 6 6  
THI

W/10  
4  
MOST SECRET

WORLD REVIEW SITUATION NO 64

The following World Review of the situation has been received from War Office, LONDON, covering the period 20 Mar to 27 Mar 44 :-

NAVAL

NORTHERN WATERS: Two large enemy ships NORTH-BOUND through DOVER STRAITS were engaged on the night 20/21 21/22 23/24 Mar by coastal batteries and a coastal force. One may have been sunk and two escort ships were badly damaged.

Recce over the GDYNIA area on 17 Mar located the "HIPPER", "LUTZOW", "LEIPZIG", "FRINZ EUGEN" and "NURNBERG".

MEDITERRANEAN: For the week ending 23 Mar over 37,000 tons stores and equipment were discharged at ANZIO despite bad weather, shelling and air attacks on 19 Mar two French destroyers sank three and possibly four of five ships encountered in convoy off the WEST coast GREECE.

U-BOAT WARFARE:

For the fortnight ending 19 Mar U-Boats sank one ship in the CARIBBEAN and one in the NORTH ATLANTIC. Four ships were torpedoed in INDIAN OCEAN of which two were sunk. A further two ships were sunk in the MEDITERRANEAN. Seventeen ATLANTIC OCEAN convoys totalling 540 ships arrived safely. Imports in convoy to the UK/week-ending 18 Mar totalled 997,000 tons of which 460,000 tons oil.

SUMMARY ANTI-SUBMARINE ATTACKS TO NOON 22 MAR:

Attacks :	by shore based aircraft	35
	by carrier borne aircraft	25
	by warships	36
Results :	sunk and probably sunk	
	by shore-based aircraft	3
	by carrier borne aircraft	5
	by warships	6
	Fossibly sunk or damaged	6

MILITARY:

RUSSIA: GENERAL: Rain and occasional snow prevented drying out in SOUTH RUSSIA.

NORTHERN and CENTRAL SECTORS: Local fighting only.

LUCK SECTOR: A New Russian thrust SOUTH of the PRIPET MARSHES reached KOVEL where the Russians are fighting for the town.

Further SOUTH the Russians advanced astride the railway ROVNO-LVOV.

TARNOPOL-ZHEMERINKA SECTOR: German counter-attacks between TARNOPOL and PROSKUROV regained only little ground. Russians re-attacked and continued advance claiming 20,000 Germans killed and 3,500 prisoners. The Germans now withdrawing from the salient between PROSKUROV - ZHEMERINKA.

LOWER BUG SECTOR: NIKOLAEV bridgehead narrowed to a very small area and NIKOLAEV was recaptured after two and a half years of GERMAN occupation.

CRIMEA: No indication of Russian progress in attacks on NORTHERN and EASTERN fronts. Germans still apparently intend to hold the CRIMEA.



ITALY:

OPERATIONS: 8th Army - Weather improved and hardening ground again made use of tanks-possible - considerable patrol activity was carried out in the ORSOGNA - ARIELLI area.

5th Army - Indian troops are within 300 yards of CASSINO Monastery are cut off and are being supplied by air. Troops so closely locked in town that artillery is unable to engage enemy without interfering with our own troops.

ANZIC: Small scale activity. Raiding parties are active.

YUGOSLAVIA: Partisan activity is increasing with improved weather. Allied commandos successfully raided Island of SOLTA (near SPLIT). The Entire German garrison was eliminated and 82 prisoners taken. Commandos and artisans attacked HVAR and swept garrison from the Island.

AIR:

WESTERN EUROPE: NIGHT: From 3477 sorties 134 a/c are missing. Two very heavy attacks were made on FRANKFURT when over 6200 tons of bombs were dropped causing heavy damage to important industries, particularly to Alfred Teves and Adler works which manufacture aero engine crank-shafts and MT respectively.

Highly successful attacks were made on explosive works at BERGERAC and ANGOULEME (FRANCE). On 24/25 Mar about 3000 tons were dropped on BERLIN. Details not yet available. Mosquitoes carried out many raids on towns in WESTERN GERMANY.

DAY: Over 3000 sorties were made during week by US heavy bombers also a large number by medium bombers all strongly escorted by fighters. Chief targets, tonnage and results at present available are as follows :-

Dornier works near MUNICH 250 tons. Attacks on MUNICH City and airfields in same area. Dornier factory FRIEDRICHSHAFEN 273 tons. BERLIN 1277 tons. Severe damage to WEDDING, SPANDAU and WEISSENSEE areas.

Important bridge over River LIPPE at HAMM hit repeatedly and believed cut. This bridge is the main exit from the marshalling yards.

Railway centres in FRANCE were also attacked.

Allies lost 152 a/c; enemy 84 destroyed, 7 probably destroyed, 20 damaged.

ENEMY: 302 a/c crossed the English coast and at least 27 were destroyed. Incendiaries mainly dropped on LONDON, but the fire situation was never serious.

Casualties were estimated at 87 killed, 353 seriously injured in the LONDON area.

MEDITERRANEAN: Main attacks were in battle area and enemy railway communications at VERONA, BOLOGNA, FLORENCE and PADUA.

Submarine base at MONT FALCONE (north of TRIESTE) and SAN STEFANO were attacked.

Allies lost 11 a/c; enemy lost 55 destroyed.

Attacks were made on SOFIA, FLOVDIV (BULGARIA), KLAGENFURT a/c factory (AUSTRIA) and factory at GRAZ (AUSTRIA).

ECONOMIC:

Reported that number of wagons loaded by S.N.C.F. (Secrete Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railway Co.) excluding purely military traffic declined by over 25 per cent Oct '43 compared with Oct '42. The number of wagons available remained the same, drop being attributable to shortage of motive power, air-raids, sabotage and poor condition of equipment.

GSI  
3 Apr 44.

*J. Bergin Capt*  
Lt-Col  
GS FIRST AUST ARMY

Distributed by GSI First Aust Army for information of Comds or Heads of Branches or Services as set out below :-

1 Aust Corps	4	G(O)	1
4 Aust Div	3	G(SD)	1
3 Aust Inf Bde	1	B&A & CA	1
HQ BRISBANE Fortress	1	CSO	1
HQ TOWNSVILLE Fortress	1	DA & QMG	1
HQ CAIRNS Fortress	1	A (Circulate to SMS, LSC	
Corps HQ VDC Q'LAND	1	and AD Educ)	1
BR&A	1	Q (Circulate to DDST and	
CE	1	DDPS)	1
Q'LAND L of C Area	1	War Diary	2
GOC	1	File	1
BGS	1		

w/b (5)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde )	Copy to:
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means	GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust cmd AL sec ) except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div )	G(0)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies) by ALS	G2(AIR)
		remainder by DRLS	G(I)
			G(SD)
			DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress 7 aust cmd AL sec  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2686 4

secret (.) landops revsit 615 to 032230Z apr (.)  
landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) DOUGAINVILLE (.) 1 apr patrol engaged japs vicinity HILL 501 (east TOROKINA) perimeter) causing enemy break contact and withdraw (.) other enemy gps moving across upper TOROKINA RIVER engaged by allied arty (.) five enemy guns all destroyed by allied arty found in NE perimeter area (.) many indications complete jap defeat and withdrawal of remnants to north and east (.) mass jap burials evidenced throughout area (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 2 apr enemy gp unknown strength reported assembling LOMBRUM area and second gp unknown strength reported YIRU (five mls SW WAREMBU) (.) japs reported moving to DRONDRA (PATUSI BAY sixteen mls SW LORENGAU) (.) enemy dead and ineffectives to 2 apr 2820 prisoners 28 japs 29 chinese (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) SAIDOR (.) 1 apr patrols killed seven japs found 33 dead vicinity TARIKNGAN (.)

DUMPU (.) 2 apr patrol from MANGAPO inflicted casualties on 15 enemy on track 2500 yds east YAUULA (.) small party enemy occupied ALIBU 1 (four mls NW MANGAPO) (.) patrol successfully attacked newly constructed enemy posn 1200 WSW YAUULA (.) airops (.)

allied (.) LITU ISLANDS (.) 012330Z twelve kittyhawks bombed strafed a/a posns north PETER HARBOR (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 010040Z one sqn bostons bombed strafed stores pers area HANSA BAY starting two fires (.) 020154Z further 19 liberators bombed a/a posns pers area HANSA BAY (.) 020001Z twelve airacobras bombed strafed BIV area vicinity PALPA RIVER (west ERIMA)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) am 3 apr sixty seven liberators 169 mitchells and bostons dropped 400 tons bombs and strafed airfields HOLLANDIA (.) now considered all 288 grounded a/c present on am 30 mar either destroyed or permanently damaged (.) 26 of unstated number intercepting enemy Fs destroyed (.)

KAI ISLANDS (.) 030125Z twenty seven liberators bombed airfield LANGGOER (.)

TIMOR (.) 021115Z five beauforts bombed town area DILLI (.) 021140Z seven mitchells bombed barracks area and airfield PENFOEI (.) enemy sightings (.)

SOLOMONS (.) 2 apr photos show six barges SHORTLAND-FAISI (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) night 1/2 apr one sub between LOU and LOS NEGROS ISLANDS (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 011050Z one sub five mls north WATOM ISLAND (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 021035Z three 500/1000 ton freighters at jetties south WESAK (.) ref revsit 614 air attack KARIRU ISLAND now reported thirteen barges destroyed (.) 020200Z sixteen barges vicinity MAR PT (.) 020154Z fifteen barges ULIGAN HARBOUR (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 030100Z reports indicate nine vessel convoy (four 500/1000 ton freighters five u/i vessels) approx 15 mls east HUMBOLDT BAY (.) two of these vessels reported destroyed (.) 030200Z one 1000/1500 ton freighter tpt HUMBOLDT BAY heavily strafed by mitchells (.)

KAI ISLANDS (.) 3 apr three or four 500/1000 ton poss stack aft vessels LANGGOER numerous barges ROSENBERG STRAITS (.) sea (.)

SOLOMONS (.) night 31 mar/1 apr naval units bombarded barge hideout mouth KARIRICI RIVER (.) all informed

This message may be sent as  
WRITTEN except by wireless

TOO  
THI

G.S.I.  
HQ FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 100

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 28 Mar 44 to 1200 hrs 4 Apr 44

- (a) Information contained herein is for circulation down to battalions or equivalent units.
- (b) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (c) Except as specified above, items contained in this Summary may be reproduced for information or instruction of all units, but the source must be quoted as Hq First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 100.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary of Events and Significant Changes ...	2
<u>PART I</u>	
<u>Section 1:</u> Operations NW SECTOR:	
Land ...	3
Sea ...	3
Air (a) Own ...	3
(b) Enemy ...	3
<u>Section 2:</u> Operations Other Fronts - SWPA	
Land ...	4-5
Sea (a) Own ...	5
(b) Enemy ...	5-6
Air (a) Own ...	6-7
(b) Enemy ...	7
<u>PART II</u>	
Section 2 - 0 of B (a) Land ...	8-9
(b) Air ...	9
Section 6 - Equipment ...	9-10
Section 7 - Tactics ...	10-12
Section 9 - General ...	12-14
<u>PART III</u>	
Topographical ...	15-16
<u>PART IV</u>	
Other Fronts ...	16-17
<u>APPENDICES</u>	
"A(1)" Description of Japanese 50mm(1.97 in) Type 89 (1929) Grenade Discharger - Smoke Shell with Air Burst Fuse	
"A(11)" Illustration -ditto-	
"B" Disposition of Main Japanese Shipping Units and Routes in the NW Sector as at 1 Apr 44.	

S U M M A R Y   O F   E V E N T S  
A N D  
S I G N I F I C A N T   C H A N G E S

During a little more than two months the estimate of enemy strength in the NW Sector has been increased to a total of 189,000 - an increase of 49,000 troops for this period. Of this increase it is considered that some 20% are troops associated with either the construction or defence of airfields. In view of this proportion and the development of airfields that has taken place in the immediate areas of the NW Sector, it is apparent that the intention of the enemy is to deny every possible future Allied move in this direction, and in this regard is consistent with past strategy. This point is further illustrated by the fact that over the past week a total of 16 airfields was reported to be under construction, and of these five were nearing a serviceable condition.

Latest information indicates that 5000 troops of 41 Division have been withdrawn from MADANG to the HANSA BAY area leaving a holding force of 15,000 troops at MADANG, and it is possible that this force may be even further reduced.

Despite the unusually large number of enemy aircraft that had been concentrated in the WEGAK - HOLLANDIA area during the week little success was achieved in defending the area against Allied air attacks. In addition to damage to ground installations the Japs lost 166 aircraft destroyed on the ground and in aerial combat, and a further 42 were reported probably destroyed.

The number of prisoners recently taken in the TALASEA area, namely 77, is indicative of a decline in enemy morale. This decline may be directly due to lack of supplies and the resultant reduced state of health, but also suggests the possibility of a change of outlook on the part of Japanese forces regarding capture once the hopelessness of their position is apparent.

---

PART I

OPERATIONS

Section 1: NW SECTOR:

LAND:

A native report of low reliability grading states that an enemy post has been established at EWERIF, which is 30 miles NE of JAPERO, and that maintenance is carried out by launch.

SEA:

In DUTCH NEW GUINEA, the main shipping concentration reported for the week was at HUMBOLDT BAY, where 14 unescorted vessels, of an approximate total tonnage of 24/32,000 tons, were sighted on both 30 and 31 Mar.

Several ships of about 1000 tons displacement or under were also operating in this area during the current period, but are thought to have been engaged only in normal maintenance and supply. A total of 25 such vessels were observed in the vicinity of WAKDE, MISOOL, CERAM, TANIMBAR, KAI and TIMOR. Barge traffic reported in the TIMOR - ROTI ISLAND area has shown an increase, 79 barges being sighted between 27 Mar and 1 Apr.

AIR:

(a) OWN:

Allied air activity in the NW Sector showed an appreciable increase during the current week, with a total of over 330 sorties compared with eight for the previous week.

Enemy airfields at HOLLANDIA, BABO, in TIMOR, CERAM, and the KAI ISLANDS were the principal targets; attacks on the HOLLANDIA strips on 30 and 31 Mar being particularly successful, with 138 grounded aircraft destroyed and a further 27 possibly destroyed. Smoke was observed rising to a height of 9000 feet from fires started on the airfields.

Enemy interceptions over LANGGOER and HOLLANDIA were encountered on 30 and 31 Mar, when 27 of 60/70 enemy fighters were shot down and 15 others were probably destroyed.

Enemy shipping at KAIMANA, TENAU HARBOUR and in the vicinity of ROTI ISLAND was subjected to Allied air attacks with the result that one vessel was set on fire, one 500 ton vessel considered destroyed, two 500/1000 ton stack aft freighters beached and several laden barges sunk.

(b) ENEMY:

The enemy maintained his reconnaissance activity over the DUTCH NEW GUINEA mainland during the week, with the CAPE VALSCH area appearing to be the main area of interest, although one enemy plane was sighted over DRYSDALE, on the NW coast of AUSTRALIA, on 28 Mar.

Recent sightings would suggest that the UTAROM airfield is the principal base for the reconnaissance aircraft operating over DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

Section 2: OTHER FRONTS - SWPA:

LAND:

NEW GUINEA:

YALAU: The KAMBARA and GUABE RIVER area and what appeared to have been a former barge hide-out was reported clear of enemy on 28 Mar. Quantities of abandoned enemy equipment including blankets, rifles, hand grenades and ammunition were found in the vicinity of MARAKUM together with 11 sunken barges, six engineer assault boats and quantities of wire and rope.

The Allied advance northwards along the coast met with enemy resistance at DAMUN on 26 Mar and an Allied force was ambushed 1500 yards north of that village on 31 Mar.

Sixteen Japs were killed in a patrol clash near DIMAM on 25 Mar and a further four at the mouth of the KEBENAU RIVER on 30 Mar. The killing of 24 Japs at YOGA YOGA on the same day draws attention to the presence of stragglers throughout Allied rear areas in this sector.

DUMPU: Patrols have been active over a wide area. The villages of NANGAPO, REREO, ALIBU No 1, WENGA, JAPPA and JAM JAM have been visited and found to be clear of enemy troops. The advance north down the BOGADJIM ROAD reached MABELEBU before encountering any enemy resistance. An attack was launched on 31 Mar from high ground one quarter of a mile SW of YAULA against our forward elements. The attack was unsuccessful and artillery supporting fire was directed at enemy positions in the vicinity of YAULA and KOPEBI RIVER.

NEW BRITAIN:

The withdrawal, eastwards, of enemy troops towards the GAZELLE PENINSULA continues. Native sources report the relaying of quantities of arms, ammunition and equipment towards RABAUL. During 26/27 Mar, 500 Japs, together with eight barges and four motor launches were reported in the PANDI RIVER delta area. Reliable reports indicate that approximately 1000 enemy troops had passed through EA-EA, and 3/4000 through CAPE HOSKINS in an easterly direction between 18 Mar and 28 Mar.

An indication of the sympathies of at least some NEW BRITAIN natives was given on 26 Mar when POI ISLAND natives (in the KOMBE group) handed over 15 Jap prisoners to Allied troops. This figure had increased by 30 Mar, to 77 when Allied patrols captured 62 in the NUMUNDO, LINGA LINGA, and IBOKI areas.

The KILAI RIVER - BUTIOLO area is now reported clear although natives are said to have killed 34 Japs near BUTIOLO on 29 Mar. Reports received the same day state that small enemy garrisons were still located between UBILI and TORIU RIVER on the north coast, and between GASHATA and PUT PUT PLANTATION on the south coast.

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS:

LOS NEGROS: Exploiting to the SW, Allied troops advanced one and three quarter miles south of LUBRUM POINT without opposition. LONIU was occupied on 27 Mar, and enemy resistance in this area is now confined to the SW corner of the island.

MANUS ISLAND: Allied troops established a line 800 yards south of ROSSUM on 26 Mar against an estimated enemy strength of 400, although patrols operating from POMASSAU proceeded unmolested. WAREMBU was occupied without opposition on 27 Mar.



Assisted by, and following an intense bombardment by MTB's, a landing was effected on the east end of PITYILU ISLAND on the morning of 30 Mar. Complete occupation of the island had taken place by 31 Mar.

KORUNIAT and NDRILO ISLANDS:

The occupation of these islands by Allied Forces was completed without opposition on 1 Apr.

SOLOMONS:

BOUGAINVILLE: On the northern perimeter severe damage and casualties were sustained by the enemy as a result of Allied artillery fire on 24/25 Mar and Allied troops counted 376 dead on 26 Mar. HILLS 260 and 500 were cleared of enemy on 28 and 30 Mar respectively, 232 enemy dead being counted in the area. Patrols moving north to the LARUMA RIVER area have made no contact but have found quantities of abandoned supplies.

All reports from forward troops would indicate that the Jap is breaking close contact and may be withdrawing across the island to KIETA.

SEA:

(a) OWN:

SOLOMONS:

Reported Allied naval activity has been confined chiefly to the elimination of enemy installations and gun positions in the vicinity of the TOROKINA area, TAVENA, REINI, and JABA RIVERS. Enemy barge traffic which ventured into these areas suffered severe loss.

(b) ENEMY:

NEW GUINEA:

Despite almost continual attacks from the air, enemy shipping continues to operate in the WEWAK area. The vessels are, almost without exception, small coastal vessels of the 500/1000 tons class. A total of 22 vessels inclusive of one small gunboat is reported for the current period.

The sighting of 13 freighters and four naval units during the week between VANIMO and BUT is consistent with the general development of that area. Some of the vessels are probably operating from HOLLANDIA, while the tonnage of other freighters of over 2/5000 tons, with naval escorts, would suggest a direct link with HALMAHERA or possibly PALAU.

Barge traffic would appear to concentrate in the general WEWAK area, a total of 335 barges and 23 luggers being reported in this vicinity whilst a concentration of 100 barges was observed further to the NW at SENTANI LAKE on 31 Mar.

NEW BRITAIN and NEW IRELAND:

Further attempts have been made by enemy sea forces to maintain contact with NEW BRITAIN and NEW IRELAND. On 28 and 29 Mar, a gunboat was sighted in KERAVLA BAY, and a destroyer and a cargo vessel were in TALILI BAY and a further cargo vessel off the east coast of NEW IRELAND. The success of this effort may be assessed in the light of losses, as one gunboat was severely damaged, and a 1200 ton merchant vessel beached and damaged at SIMBERI ISLAND, east of KAVIENG, by Allied air attacks.

In the whole area, 318 barges were reported for the week. The greatest concentration in the RABAUL area was 177 on 26 Mar. Other sightings were observed at OPEN BAY, PANDI RIVER, and as far west as STETTIN BAY. In NEW IRELAND, 15 barges were sighted at KAVIENG on 1 Apr.

SOLOMONS:

Observed barge traffic in this area has shown a marked decrease. Eleven sightings only are reported, as against 82 for the previous period.

CENTRAL PACIFIC:

The visual estimate of 300,000 tons of shipping at MALKAL HARBOUR on 27 Mar, together with the sighting of a 19 vessel convoy and naval forces on 29 Mar, travelling on a northerly course, would indicate that PALAU is assuming even greater importance than hitherto as a concentration centre in this region.

SUBMARINES:

Submarine sightings continue to show a decrease in the BISMARCK SEA area. Four sightings only are reported as against six for the previous week, as follows :-

25 Mar	1 Submarine	3 miles east of GAROVE ISLAND
27 Mar	1 Submarine	3 miles east of EMIRAU ISLAND
1 Apr	1 Submarine	15 miles west of CAPE MUTUPINA
1 Apr	1 Submarine	20 miles south of DYAUL ISLAND

AIR:

(a) OWN:

NEW GUINEA:

Concentrating on enemy personnel and supply areas in the NEW GUINEA sector, Allied aircraft continued to centre their attacks around the WEWAK area during this week. In the majority of these attacks damage was extensive, and fires were started in most of the target areas.

Anti-aircraft positions on the strips at DAGUA and NUBIA, and the runways at BUT and TADJI, were bombed and strafed, whilst three attacks in support of Allied ground troops were made in the KALIKO, BARUM and MATALOI areas.

During an attack on personnel and stores areas in the vicinity of DAGUA and BUT on 26 Mar, a 500 ton vessel was probably sunk near DAGUA. Further enemy shipping losses comprised a lugger set on fire in BROKEN WATER BAY, four small vessels probably sunk off KAIRIRU ISLAND and a 1000/1500 ton freighter seriously damaged together with seven barges sunk at MUSCHU ISLAND.

A Mitchell on a weather reconnaissance over WEWAK on 27 Mar, was intercepted by five enemy fighters, but after a few attacks the fighters withdrew. The only other interception reported in the NEW GUINEA area was again over WEWAK on 29 Mar, when a single enemy fighter attacked a formation of Mitchells.

NEW BRITAIN:

Enemy airfields in the RAUBAUL area were again targets for Allied aircraft during the current week. No less than 132 hits were observed on the VUNAKANAU strip, and between 40/50 hits on the strips at LAKUNAI and TOBERA. The result of the continual bombing of the airfields in the GAZELLE PENINSULA - DUKE OF YORK ISLANDS group is revealed in photographs taken on 26 Mar, which show that the runways at RAPOPO, KERA VAT and RAKADA are all unserviceable.

The bombing and strafing of enemy personnel and supply areas in NEW BRITAIN was rather heavy, particularly around TALILI BAY, where an ammunition dump, at least 34 buildings and 18 revetted storage bays were destroyed. In two attacks on VUNAPOPE, 30 buildings, including 12 warehouses, were destroyed, and five anti-aircraft guns received direct hits, whilst on the night 31 Mar/1 Apr, Mitchells harassed the RAUBAUL township for eight hours dropping 112 bombs.

During straffing runs by Kittyhawks along the northern NEW BRITAIN coast, enemy installations and equipment were destroyed, two MT boats set on fire off CAPE HOSKINS and two barges sunk at AILO.

No enemy interception was encountered in this area during the week, and Allied airmen reported that the anti-aircraft fire over RAHUL was not nearly so intense as that encountered on former visits.

NEW IRELAND:

The only Allied air activity over the NEW IRELAND area this week was a successful bombing attack on the airfield at KAVIENG on 26 Mar, when anti-aircraft positions were destroyed and the runway rendered unserviceable. Aerial photographs reveal that the strips at PANAPAI, NAMATANAI and BORPOP are also unserviceable.

On 28 Mar, a 1900 ton vessel was rocket strafed by Allied carrier based airplanes and forced onto the beach at SIMBERI ISLAND (65 miles east of KAVIENG).

ADMIRALTYS:

In support of ground forces, Allied aircraft bombed and strafed enemy positions 20 miles south of LORENGAU on 26 Mar, causing extensive damage to Japanese stores. On 2 Apr, Mitchells bombed and strafed the coastal track on the SE tip of RAMBUTYO ISLAND, with excellent results.

SOLOMONS:

In more than 400 sorties in the SOLOMONS area, Allied aircraft covered practically the entire beach of EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, in bombing and straffing attacks on enemy positions, supply and personnel areas. TOROKINA outer perimeter was the target for 163 of these sorties, where enemy gun positions and installations were destroyed and many fires started. Further damage and fires were caused in other areas, even as far south of the perimeter as the HONGORAI RIVER mouth, which was bombed and strafed by Kittyhawks on 31 Mar.

CENTRAL PACIFIC:

Between 28 and 30 Mar, Allied aircraft conducted strikes in the TRUK area on four occasions. Photographs of ETEN ISLAND reveal that the attack on the airfield on 29 Mar was very successful, with more than 200 hits on the runway, 16 grounded aircraft destroyed and a further 31 probably destroyed.

Enemy interception was encountered on two of these raids, and a total of 42 enemy aircraft out of a possible 125 were shot down. A Liberator on an armed reconnaissance over SATAWAN on 28 Mar, destroyed one of 12 enemy planes on the ground and was then attacked by 10 enemy fighters, one of which was damaged.

(b) ENEMY:

Enemy fighter interception encountered over WEWAK on 27 and 29 Mar, was the first in this area since 16 Mar. The enemy pilots are reported to be lacking in aggressiveness, however, only making one or two desultory attacks on Allied aircraft and then withdrawing, no doubt maintaining the policy of caution so evident in this area for some time past.

In the NEW BRITAIN and SOLOMONS areas, enemy airplane activity was non-existent, but conversely it is reported that enemy fighters strongly resisted Allied air attacks in the CAROLINES.

Enemy aircraft losses for the week in the NE Sector amounted to 58 destroyed and 31 possibly destroyed. Together with enemy losses in the NW Sector, the week's total in the SWPA was 224 destroyed and 73 possibly destroyed.

PART II

Section 2: 0 of B:

(a) LAND:

NW SECTOR:

Re-assessment of the estimates of enemy strengths for the NW Sector shows that since 15 Mar 44 an increase of 17,000 has taken place, thus bringing the total to 189,000. A comparison between this and the total for 19 Jan 44 - a period of little more than two months - reveals that approximately 49,000 fresh troops have been moved into the Sector, and, although the detailed subdivision of this total is not known, in broad terms it appears to consist of 50% fighting troops, 20% airfield construction and defence troops, and the remaining 30% miscellaneous troops. The significance of the large proportion of troops associated with the construction and defence of airfields can well be gauged by recent activity and airfield development which has taken place over the last two months.

A prisoner from 36 Division has stated that the Div Hq, plus parts of 223 and 224 Inf Regts, is at SARMI, whilst another part of 223 Inf Regt is on BLAK ISLAND, with the previously reported engineer elements. Although this information may be open to doubt, pending further information it is being accepted as correct and the total troops of the division in this Sector are estimated at 5000.

In addition, it is considered that approximately 1000 troops from each of 3 and 14 Divisions are situated at various points along the northern coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA, whilst part of 35 Division is now thought to be at PALAU.

In the area west of TIMOR it would appear that the enemy is moving a portion of his force from JAVA into the FLORES SEA locality, and elements of 123 Inf Regt (46 Division) are now believed to be on SOEMBA ISLAND.

Subsequent to the above identifications, the following changes have been recorded in the estimates of enemy strengths for the NW Sector. It will be noted that NOEMFOOR - where two new airfields are reported to be under construction - is mentioned for the first time with a strength of 1000.

PALAU	10,000
Lesser SUNDA ARCHIPELAGO (excluding TIMOR)	5,000
MANOKWARI	6,000
NOEMFOOR ISLAND	1,000
NABIRE	2,000
BLAK ISLAND	1,000
WAKDE ISLAND	1,000
SARMI	2,000

This brings the total for DUTCH NEW GUINEA to 23,000 and the Sector total to 189,000.

NE SECTOR:

An increase of 500 troops in BRITISH NEW GUINEA has been reported due to reinforcements for 51 Division arriving in the WEWAK area. This makes the total for BRITISH NEW GUINEA 62,500, which is thought to be distributed as follows :-

HOLLANDIA - VANIMO	10,000
AITAPE	2,000
WEWAK - BUT	18,000
HANSA BAY	17,500
MADANG	15,000
TOTAL :-	62,500

It will be noticed that approximately 5000 troops - probably part of 41 Division - have been withdrawn from MADANG to the HANSA BAY locality.

Similarly, in NEW BRITAIN the Japanese have withdrawn their GASMATA garrison and these troops are included in the WIDE BAY total of 1000 as they are presumably en route towards RABAU. The bulk of the garrison on WITU ISLAND has also been withdrawn to RABAU leaving a small force of approximately 250 troops on the island, and in view of these movements the estimate for the RABAU area has been increased to 46,000 although there is no change in the NEW BRITAIN total of 51,250. Due to casualties the estimated strength in the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS has been reduced to 1000.

Totals are now estimated at :-

NW SECTOR	189,000
NE SECTOR	146,750
SWPA	335,750

(b) AIR:

NW SECTOR:

An increase in fighter and bomber strengths in the HALMAHERAS has been noted; an addition of 14 fighters and six bombers arriving during the period 24/28 Mar. All other sightings in the NW Sector remain constant.

NE SECTOR:

NEW GUINEA:

Airplane strength in NEW GUINEA further increased during this week, reaching on 28 Mar the record total of 329 all types, including 177 fighters and 131 bombers. This represents an increase of 17 over the previous highest total of 312 on 21 Mar. The majority of these planes were carried on the HOLLANDIA strips, but the effectiveness of the Allied air attacks has no doubt reduced this number considerably.

Sightings at WEWAK on 29 Mar showing 30 airplanes on the airfields, indicate some return of air strength to this area, but it is not considered that the enemy will engage in any large scale interceptions, which proved so costly a few weeks ago.

OTHER AREAS:

With the exception of NEW IRELAND, where a decrease of eight fighters is noted, air strengths in all other areas in the NE Sector, remain constant with those issued in the last review.

Section 6 - EQUIPMENT:

With the change of tempo in the PACIFIC war, Japanese strategy has been changed from offensive to defensive and a keen interest has been taken in the causes of the recent serious Japanese reverses, equally by the soldier in the front line, whose morale must at least be shaken, as by the commanders.

A study of these causes revealed that some failures had resulted from the non-observance of some of the "first principles" of Japanese military teachings, and an aspect which emerges from almost every recent operation in which the enemy has failed, is the superiority of the Allied fire power, particularly from automatic weapons.

The "Meiji 38" rifle with its overall length of approximately 38 inches has been found quite inadequate as a weapon for use in the jungle mainly because of its slow rate of fire, and strong recommendations have been made in unit commanders' reports on operations, for its replacement as an infantry weapon by "LMG's and Allied automatic rifles."

At the present time the enemy already has in use two types of sub-machine guns, the "Solothern" type and the Short "Model B", but the distribution seems very limited and is in no way parallel to that of the sub-machine gun to Allied infantry troops. At CAPE GLOUCESTER an automatic rifle section of four ORs has been noted attached to No 1 platoon of a "SAKAI" coy (not identified) operating in that area.

As repeated requests have been made by enemy field troops to higher formation for an "enemy" (ie - Allied) "automatic type rifle" it would appear the present enemy weapons of this type are not suitable for the infantry task, and that the rifle required is some weapon of at least equal performance to the Allied types. The need of this weapon has been felt for some considerable time and it would not be surprising if in the near future some weapon of a similar pattern to the "Owen" gun was found in more general use in the forward areas, especially as the Japanese have had ample opportunities to capture and test these guns.

Further evidence that the enemy is taking advantage of lessons learnt in the NEW GUINEA campaign - especially in regard to weapons and their allotment - comes from a prisoner belonging to 36 Division.

He states that the infantry regiments of this division have been reorganised to include a Regimental Artillery Battalion of three batteries each of four 75mm mountain guns, and each infantry battalion reorganised to include an Infantry Gun Unit of four 75mm battalion guns and four quick-firing guns. It is emphasised however that as this information comes from one prisoner only, its value should be assessed accordingly.

A description of the Japanese 50mm (1.97 inch) "Type 89" Grenade Discharger Smoke Shell with Air Burst Fuse is attached as Appendix 'A(i)' and illustrations of the shell are attached as Appendix 'A(ii)'.

## Section 7: TACTICS:

(a) Japanese Supply Routes and Bases: Over recent months the enemy has devoted much effort to the development of the NW Sector as a potential operational theatre and, with the strengthening of garrisons, has probably prepared a series of supply bases to cope with maintenance requirements.

In preparing these bases the Japanese had no doubt been aware that Allied air power may once again force the use of barges, small craft, and submarines for supply transportation, and it seems likely that small craft routes and hide-outs have been organised to meet this contingency, particularly between SORONG and BABO, BABO and KAIMANA, and KAIMANA to forward bases. An identical system may also have been organised as an alternative method of supply for the forces situated in the GEELVINK BAY area.

A study of enemy activities in recent months in DUTCH NEW GUINEA shows that a large proportion of effort has been centred around MANOKWARI and it is likely that this location is probably being built up as the major control and administration point, for future operations in NEW GUINEA. It would also appear that

SORONG will be used as a supply base and storage area, and BABO and KAIMANA as forward control and distribution centres.

In the BANDa and ARAFURA SEA islands a similar arrangement appears to exist with the focal point centred at ALBON and forward control centres at TOEL and DOBO, but it seems unlikely that barges will be used here to the same extent as in DUTCH NEW GUINEA waters.

Attached as Appendix 'B' to this summary is a map showing - in addition to topographical information - the main shipping units operating in the sector and the probable routes being used. Although not shown on this map, it would appear that all shipping along the northern coast of NEW GUINEA is under control of the newly organised NEW GUINEA SHIPPING UNIT with HQ either at HOLLANDIA or WEWAK.

(b) Review of Enemy Aerial Activity in SWPA during Mar 44:

NE SECTOR: No doubt whilst still apprehensive of possible Allied moves, the enemy has continued his long range reconnaissances in this Sector during the month, penetrating as far south as BROOME and DERBY on the Australian mainland, but without any offensive activity whatever. Even Allied aircraft over TIMOR and JAVA report that despite the presence of enemy fighters, no interception was encountered.

NE SECTOR: NEW GUINEA: Early in the month, considerable concentration of enemy aircraft at HOLLANDIA suggested an early resumption of offensive air activity in NEW GUINEA, but enemy interception up to the middle of the month - although on an increased scale - belied this suggestion, in that a defensive rather than an offensive policy was adopted.

The trend towards a vigorous air defence along the NE NEW GUINEA coast began with a flourish, although not with the expected strength suggested by the number of fighters available, and with the passing of the month it waned and during the latter half of the month fighter interception was conspicuous by its absence.

Offensively, the enemy falsified his capabilities. With a large number of bombers at his disposal, his puny efforts of retaliation against the Allied pounding of his bases, merely consisted of a few isolated sorties along the RAI COAST.

NEW BRITAIN: Whereas the RAUUL area has relied exclusively on anti-aircraft protective measures for some time past, an interesting feature of the enemy's attempts at interception of Allied aircraft during the month, is the fact that interception was only attempted when the attacking force was sufficiently small enough to enable the enemy, with limited number of fighters in the area, to achieve numerical equality or superiority.

Even this policy of defence is not considered effective, in as much as his percentage of losses was exceedingly high, and towards the end of the month, fighter opposition was negligible.

During the month enemy air attacks, of a necessity on a small scale, were directed mainly at Allied surface craft, possibly by armed reconnaissance float-planes, but even in these ventures no success was achieved.

ADMIRALTY: During the early part of the month, it appeared that the enemy would offer some serious air resistance to the Allied occupation of the ADMIRALTY, but only a few sporadic and unsuccessful raids in support of his ground troops have been attempted. Bad weather alone can hardly account for this continued lack of air assistance to his sorely pressed troops.

SOLOMONS: Consistent with his offensive policy in NEW BRITAIN, the enemy concentrated his air assaults on Allied light surface craft in this area during the month, with the same negative results. A belated effort by enemy aircraft to assist Japanese ground forces, or perhaps to bolster their morale, in their present offensive around the TOROKINA perimeter, was both ineffective and untimely.

MANDATES: The enemy has probably employed the interval since the MARIANAS operations in building up air strength and developing air strips in the CENTRAL PACIFIC. The falling off of enemy float-plane sightings in the NEW BRITAIN - NEW IRELAND area towards the end of Mar, suggests that they may have been withdrawn nearer to the TRUK area, possibly to carry out sea patrols.

Strong enemy fighter interception to Allied raids on airfields in the CAROLINE ISLANDS at the end of the month, did not seriously hinder the operations, as revealed by photographs of the areas showing extensive damage to both aircraft and airfields.

Section 9: GENERAL:

(a) Japanese Administration in SOURABAYA: Following the Japanese occupation of JAVA in May 42 a local administration with its centre at SOURABAYA was established. Recent information from what is believed to be a reliable source, suggests that the dealings of this administration with the natives in the SOURABAYA area have been anything but agreeable and probably reflects a policy towards the native population which is prevalent in other parts of the island.

The branch of the Japanese Administration operating in JAVA which deals with the natives in the SOURABAYA area - the Minseibu - extracts as much work out of the coolie as possible by a high handed attitude supported by beatings and threats of starvation if it's wishes are not carried out. Coolies who work in the harbour area are given a few minutes off at about midday to find themselves a meal, as no food is provided by their Japanese overseers, and this must be so arranged that the work is not stopped.

Food in the area is said to be plentiful, particularly supplies of vegetables, fruit, meat, and fish. However the prohibitive prices put most of this out of the reach of the natives themselves, and as a result stealing of food is prevalent, in spite of the fact that if a coolie is caught he is severely beaten.

Because of the restrictions placed on the issue of kerosene for fuel the natives have been forced to resort to the use of cocoanut oil for this purpose although the situation is alleviated by the blackout restrictions enforced each night on the whole town. Any person who is found in possession of kerosene which has not been issued by the Japanese authorities is executed immediately.

Since their occupation the Japanese have confiscated at least half of the total number of native prahoes (boats), and those still retained by the natives are used strictly under the orders and supervision of the Minseibu. As a result the Chinese and the native trade is at a standstill and even fishing in the open sea is denied the natives. Even those natives who still possess prahoes of their own find great difficulty in obtaining materials for repair.



Summing up, the attitude of the Japanese towards the natives in SOURABAYA appears to be one which tolerates the native only so far as he is useful as a tool in the Japanese hands. The native's position appears to all intents that of a slave whose only salvation appears to lie in the final overthrow of the Japanese.

(Adapted from AAF Summary 193)

(b) Enemy Aerodromes: Recent detailed aerial reconnaissance of DUTCH NEW GUINEA, CERAM and the HALMAHERAS reveals that there are now 35 confirmed enemy airfields in this area, not including any unconfirmed sightings or strips believed to be under construction..

Enemy Airfield Development: Further information has been received on recent enemy aerodrome and landing strip construction in the DUTCH NEW GUINEA - HALMAHERA area, which emphasises the intensive efforts being made by the Japanese to provide an abundance of airplane facilities in the NW Sector. It is evident from this feverish activity, that the enemy is determined to put every obstacle in the way of the Allies' inevitable advance.

Sightings, and the study of photographs taken over the past 10 days, disclose the following activity :-

HALMAHERA GROUP: Photographs of BATJAN ISLAND, taken on 23 Mar, disclose an aerodrome, not previously known to exist, at LABOEHA, the construction of which is so far advanced that it is possibly already serviceable.

This makes the seventh confirmed aerodrome in this group of islands. A summary of the present known status of the various HALMAHERA aerodromes is as follows :-

Aerodromes in satisfactory operational condition and in full use :-

GALELA aerodrome - 0152N, 12749E.  
MITI aerodrome - 0134N, 12804E.

Aerodrome with runway in excellent condition, and dispersal provision proceeding rapidly :-

LOLOBATA aerodrome - 0118N, 12807E.

Aerodromes that are at present in ELG condition:

KAOE aerodrome - 0111N, 12753E.  
LABOEHA aerodrome - 0038S, 12730E.  
DOROEBA (or PITOE) aerodrome - on MOROTAI ISLAND -  
0203N, 12818E.  
OBA aerodrome - 0045N, 12734E.

In addition to these, possible strips or clearings for strips, have been reported, but not yet confirmed at :-

- (1) The SE corner of MOROTAI ISLAND.
- (2) The west end of BISA ISLAND.
- (3) BOELI - SERANI, north coast of BOELI BAY.
- (4) WASILE, south coast of WASILE BAY.
- (5) Near EKOR village, south end of KAOE BAY.
- (6) North tip of OBIMAJOR ISLAND.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA: On 25 Mar, no less than six new strips were reported under construction in the vicinity of BABO aerodrome. Their respective positions are :-

- (1) Position 0232S, 13306E - 18 miles west of BABO.
- (2) Position 0228S, 13309E - 16 miles WNW of BABO (near MONGOSAH)
- (3) Position 0227S, 13313E - 13 miles NW of BABO (near SERITOE)
- (4) CAPE TANAHMERAH. Position 0229S, 13306E.
- (5) Position 0234S, 13305E - 22 miles west of BABO.
- (6) Position 0229S, 13314E - 12 miles WNW of BABO.

All these sightings are in the general coastal area to the NW of BABO, and in view of their close proximity to each other, it is probable that there are certain duplications.

Work on the new SAGAN aerodrome, on the south coast of the McCLUER GULF about 20 miles SW of the last-mentioned group of new strips, is still proceeding, and although the runway is not yet fully serviceable, fighters could now possibly use it if necessary.

Five miles NE of the SAGAN aerodrome, a new strip has been sighted. Here, grading of the runway is in progress, and a large dispersal loop is cleared and surfaced.

The MOEMI strip at position 0136S, 13408E, is now considered practically ready for operations, and the following three new strips have been sighted in the same area :-

- (1) Position 0130S, 13410E - in vicinity of OEWI (seven miles NNE of MOEMI)
- (2) WARREN - (west coast GEELVINK BAY) Position 0137S, 13409E.
- (3) RANSIKI - (west coast GEELVINK BAY) Position 0133S, 13411E. (this runway is probably serviceable, and dispersal lanes are under construction).

The distances and directions of these strips from the known aerodrome at MOEMI are:-

- (a) OEWI - 9 miles NE
- (b) WARREN - 1½ miles south
- (c) RANSIKI - 4 miles NE

Although reconnaissances of JAPEN ISLAND, where a possible strip was reported on 5 Feb, have proved negative, two new aerodromes under construction, have now been disclosed on NOEMFOOR ISLAND (approximately 40 miles east of MANOKWARI at the west entrance of GEELVINK BAY). These are :-

- (1) KAMIRI - on the NW side of the island - Position 0057S, 13449E. This aerodrome is known to be in operation.
- (2) NAMBER - on the SW side of the island - Position 0104S, 13450E. This strip is partly surfaced, but not yet serviceable. There is a dispersal loop, and a clearing for a possible second runway.

The above information further confirms the enemy's policy of forming strong groups of airfields, and the wisdom of this policy, as a delaying factor, may be best appreciated by visualising what would have been his state if, at WEWAK, he had built only one aerodrome instead of four, and at RABUL, one instead of five.

Now that he is rushing to completion his next major defensive line, it is becoming clear that he hopes, in addition to providing flexibility for his own movements, to force a dissipation of Allied air effort greater than that achieved at WEWAK and RABUL.

(adapted from AAF Summary No 194)

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) Supply Routes MANOKWARI to south coast DUTCH NEW GUINEA:  
With the development of the enemy base at MANOKWARI, the Japanese may seek alternative supply routes to bases on the west coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA forward of BABO. In addition to sea lanes as illustrated in Appendix 'B', overland routes may be utilised in conjunction with barge traffic as shown below :-

Route 1: By barge from MANOKWARI to WINDEHSI (on GEELVINK BAY), by track across the isthmus of BINTOENI to IDORE, by barge across GULF OF BINTOENI, thence to the headwaters of the SOEGA RIVER, overland to the BIANONGGA RIVER, through ARGOENI BAY to southern bases.

WINDEHSI - IDORE: The route of travel from GEELVINK BAY to GULF OF BINTOENI is overland via a government improved track over the mountains, crossing two ridges of average height of 2300 feet to IDORE on the INSEH RIVER thence by launch to the GULF OF BINTOENI. The distance has been walked in four hours but a day is always allowed. All streams have foot bridges and the trail is graded. Little is known of the type of country to be traversed but the fact that an elevation of 2300 feet has to be reached would make the building of a road an engineering achievement. As the native population in this region consists only of scattered villages the question of native labour for carriers would be a further problem.

SOEGA RIVER to BIANONGGA RIVER: It is possible for launches to reach the headwaters of the SOEGA RIVER. The country lying between the two rivers consists of marshy, muddy swamps. Although no apparent ridges have to be crossed a period of four hours must be allowed for the journey. On reaching the BIANONGGA RIVER stores can be shipped down the river in small rafts or canoes to the mouth of the river where it is possible to bring barges. ARGOENI BAY presents no problems as far as barge movement is concerned. An alternative route is up the KAITERO RIVER to TELAROME thence across country to HEDIWA on ARGOENI BAY. Usually a two day trip owing to steep limestone ridges. The first route is recommended in wet weather.

Route 2: By barge from MANOKWARI to WAOBOE on GEELVINK BAY, overland to KIROEROE on ETNA BAY thence to southern bases.  
These tracks are shown in Appendix 'B'.

GEELVINK BAY to ETNA BAY: The trail leads from WAOBOE on GEELVINK BAY across country via JIMOER LAKE to KIROEROE on ETNA BAY. This track has been walked in four days but the ordinary time for a good walker is usually six days. A road connecting these two coasts would traverse a distance of from 40 to 60 miles. Very little is known of the terrain between these two coasts, available maps show mountain ridges and swamps. An alternative route is by canoe down the OMA RIVER instead of through ETNA BAY.

(b) INDEX to places mentioned in this summary which may not be commonly known :-

NORTH EASTERN SECTOR

<u>PLACE</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>LAT</u>		<u>LONG</u>	
		<u>Deg</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Deg</u>	<u>Min</u>
ALIBU I.	NEW GUINEA	5	32S	145	45E
DAMUM	NEW GUINEA	5	31S	145	49E
DINAM	NEW GUINEA	4	20S	144	48E
JAPPA	NEW GUINEA	5	29S	145	35E
JAM JAM	NEW GUINEA	5	29S	145	45E
MABELEBU	NEW GUINEA	5	35S	145	42E
PANDI RIVER	NEW BRITAIN	5	02S	151	28E
POI ISLAND	NEW BRITAIN	5	30S	149	38E
REREO	NEW GUINEA	5	31S	145	46E

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

BURMA:

The position in BURMA has somewhat deteriorated over the past week, mainly due to the success achieved by the Japanese in their infiltration into INDIA in the vicinity of IMPHAL. Advances by Chinese and American troops in northern BURMA have continued.

On the ARAKAN front, east of the MAYU RANGE, operations have been confined mainly to patrolling and mopping-up small pockets of Japanese in the NGAKYEDAU PASS area. Japanese counter-attacks south and SE of BUTHIDAUNG were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

In the KALADAN VALLEY, there has been a lull in enemy activity and it has been possible to bring in reinforcements and carry out casualties by air.

In the CHIN HILLS, severe casualties have been inflicted on the Japanese in the area north of TIDDIM where several enemy-held heights in the TONGZANG and TUITUM areas have been captured. Four Japanese tanks were knocked out in the former area.

The Japanese penetrations in the CHINDWIN-MANIPUR area are still on a relatively small scale but continue to make progress towards the British base of IMPHAL. The British line which roughly follows the CHINDWIN RIVER from TAMU to TAKANTHI has been infiltrated by long range Japanese patrols who have in one instance reached the IMPEAL - DILAPUR ROAD and established a road block. Aircraft are being used to dislodge this force. Another Japanese column to the east of IMPHAL was routed by artillery fire.

In the HUKAWNG VALLEY, Chinese and American forces are driving southwards towards MYITKYINA in conjunction with the drive by Chinese troops southwards from SUMPRABUM and who are now 33 miles south of that village.

There are no further reports from the British airborne force which is established SW of BHABO, the death of whose commander, Maj-Gen O.C. MINGATE, was announced in the last few days.

ITALY:

The failure of the Allied attempt to gain control of CASSINO during the past week has been slightly offset by the fact that several advances have been made by Allied troops in CENTRAL ITALY.

On the Eighth Army sector, the front was generally quiet apart from patrolling and artillery exchanges. There are, however, indications that the enemy forces are reforming for an offensive, although the overall strength on this front has not been increased.

On the Fifth Army front, NEW ZEALAND and INDIAN troops gained considerable ground in the attempt to capture CASSINO, but German counter-attacks forced them to withdraw from these positions. Fourteen miles NW of CASSINO, French troops together with Italian motorised units succeeded in advancing over one mile and capturing MONTE MARONE, a strategic peak of over 5000 feet.

On the Bridgehead sector, patrols and small scale skirmishes have been the order of the day. Allied attempts to wipe out the small German salient south of CAROCETTO have so far met with no success, although slight gains have been made on the western flank of the indentation.

In the ADRIATIC, Allied Commando units, operating with Yugo-Slav Partisans have succeeded in occupying the island of HVAR, off the DALMATIAN coast.

RUSSIA:

During the past week pressure has been maintained on the disorganised German forces in SW RUSSIA, and at no place have they been permitted to make an orderly withdrawal. There are manifestations of impending operations on the central and northern Russian fronts.

With the capture of NIKOLAEV, the last remaining centre of German resistance east of the RIVER BUG, Russian troops are rapidly converging on ODESSA, both from the east and NE, where they are within 30 and 21 miles respectively of the port, and also from the NW where the strong Russian force thrusting at JASSY in RUMANIA has swung to the south and is advancing on a wide front between the PRUTH and DNIESTER RIVERS towards the BLACK SEA, and are now 40 miles SE of BALTA.

The Russian troops who crossed the RIVER PRUTH opposite JASSY have advanced to within 10 miles of that city, whilst to the NW the troops who occupied CERNAUTI have advanced beyond the town and are now threatening DORNESTI, approximately 30 miles to the SE.

German forces are still holding tenaciously to part of TARNOPOL, although this centre has been outflanked far to the SW where Russian troops have advanced to within 10 miles of RUTHENIA and are also in the outskirts of STANISLAWOW, the Polish oil-producing centre from which a not inconsiderable proportion of GERMANY's oil supplies are obtained. To the NW of TARNOPOL, Russian forces thrusting towards LWOW are in the outskirts of BRODY.

Reports from enemy sources indicate that a strong attempt is being made by the Russians to capture VITEBSK on the central front and also that a large Russian force is attempting to penetrate German defences just south of PSKOV in the northern sector.

*Chivon*  
for Lt-Col  
GS FIRST AUSTRALY

JAPANESE 50mm (1.97 in) TYPE 89 (1929) GRENADE DISCHARGER

SMOKE SHELL WITH AIR BURST FUSE

The following information, together with diagrams, has been extracted from a report on the abovementioned shell and fuse, published by 42 Chemical Laboratory Company.

GENERAL:

The Japanese 50mm (1.97 in) Type 89 (1929) Grenade Discharger Smoke Shell with Air Burst Fuse is similar in general external appearance (except for the fuse and markings) to the standard Type 89 (1929) High Explosive Shell.

A chart is set out below showing comparative details of both shells.

CHARACTERISTICS OF 50mm (1.97 in) TYPE 89 (1929) GRENADE DISCHARGER SHELLS:

<u>Type of Shell</u>	<u>Smoke Shell</u>	<u>High Explosive Shell</u>
Calibre	50mm	50mm
Length of projectile (w/o fuse)	4 $\frac{5}{8}$ in	4 $\frac{5}{8}$ in
Width of driving band	$\frac{5}{8}$ in	$\frac{5}{8}$ in
Thickness of projectile casing	3/32 in	5/32 in
Total weight of projectile	1.9 lb	1.6 lb
Filling	Hexachlorethane	Trinitrofluorene
Weight of Fillings -		
(a) main filling	3.70 oz	5.04 oz
(b) propellant	.11 oz	.11 oz
(c) smoke ignition mixture	.06 oz	--
(d) black powder from primer	.007 oz	.007 oz
Ratio of main filling to complete projectile weight	12.2%	20.0%
Weights of Smoke Container -		
(a) Body	1.92 oz	--
(b) Flash plate and paper impregnated with black powder	.16 oz	--
(c) Cover disc	.22 oz	--
(d) Igniter mixture cup	.1 oz	--
Weight of retarder cup	.19 oz	--
Weight of top ejection plate	1.26 oz	--
Weight of split cylindrical spacers	2.16 oz	--
Weight of split circular disc	.66 oz	--
Weight of body -		
(a) Top section	3.35 oz	--
(b) Middle section	7.44 oz	6.82 oz
(c) Bottom section	8.45 oz	8.45 oz
Weight of brass propellant cup	.25 oz	.25 oz
Weight of primer (complete)	.21 oz	.21 oz
Weight of fuse	.578 oz	2.59 oz
Colour of shell body	Black	Black
Markings -		
(a) Tip	Red band 5/16 in wide	Red band 5/16 in wide
(b) Below bourrelet	White band 5/16 in wide	Yellow band 5/16 in wide
(c) Just above Driving Band	White band 5/16 in wide	White band 5/16 in wide

<u>Type of Shell</u>	<u>Smoke Shell</u>	<u>High Explosive Shell</u>
(d) Midway along shell	---	A yellow band 5/16 in wide is sometimes placed in this position in lieu of the yellow and white bands referred to in (b) and (c) above.

MARKINGS:

The following significance can probably be attached to the markings of the Smoke Shell reported above.

- (a) The RED BAND on the tip indicates a filled shell. The combination of the two WHITE BANDS indicates a Smoke Shell in a forged steel case. No more definite conclusions can be drawn as to the significance of the two white bands since 50mm Type 89 Grenade Discharger HE Shells with forged steel cases have been observed to be marked in several different ways, i.e.,

- (i) An upper band of YELLOW and a lower band of WHITE;
- (ii) One band of YELLOW located midway along the shell.

FUSE:

The fuse used with the Type 89 Grenade Discharger Smoke Shell is the "Type 89 Small Time Fuse", a diagrammatic sketch of which is shown in the attached Photographic Appendix.

The time delay of this fuse is located in two time rings. The lower ring is adjustable and is used to set the delay time by revolving the ring and aligning a mark (a single red vertical line) on it, with a numbered graduation on the fuse base.

Approximately 4/5 of the fuse base is marked off in unit graduations from 0 to 23. Between the 23 and the zero is a crossed vertical line.

The upper ring (fixed) is also marked with a vertical red line which is set above the zero graduation on the lower ring.

The lowest burning time obtainable would be from the zero setting of the fuse, and delay can be increased by altering the settings up to the maximum graduation, 23.

The total burning time of the upper time train (as obtained in a burning test on one fuse) is 7 seconds and that of the lower train is 8 seconds. When the fuse delay is set at 23 the total delay would therefore be 15 seconds, and it is suggested that the graduations represent hundreds of feet. Graduation 23 would therefore represent 2300 feet or 733 yards (approx) which agrees closely with the maximum range obtainable with Type 89 Grenade Discharger HE Shells.




FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND TACTICAL USE:

(a) The chemical efficiency of this shell (12.2% in the shell examined) is low for its use as an ordinary Smoke Shell, and the mechanism is considered extremely complicated for a standard Smoke Shell.

(b) No instances have been reported of the use of this shell, but it is considered that the main use would be as a signal shell for indication of, or ranging on targets.

APPENDIX A(11)  
H.Q. First Aust Army Weekly  
Intelligence Summary No. 10  
of 4 Apr 44


**JAPANESE**  
50mm (1.97 in)  
TYPE 89 (1929)  
**GRENADE DISCHARGER**  
**SMOKE SHELL**  
WITH AIR-BURST FUSE





APPENDIX *B*  
TO FIRST AUST ARMY  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 100  
OF 4 APR '44

AS AT 1 APR '44



9-13 / 254C / 2040

REPRODUCED BY A JUNIOR ARMY TROOP BY ROTARY AND APTA

DISTRIBUTIONCOPY NO

1 Aust Corps	1 - 5
4 Aust Div	6 - 11
3 Aust Inf Bde	12
BRISBANE Fortress	13
TOWNSVILLE Fortress	14
CAIRNS Fortress	15
Corps HQ VDC Q'LD	16
Aust Trg Centre (Jungle Warfare)	17 - 20
BRA	21 - 26
BAA & CA	27
CE	28 - 30
Sigs First Aust Army	31
7 Aust Comd AL Sec	32
First Aust Army Junior Staff School	33
First Aust Army Regt Trg School	34
First Aust Army School of Sigs	35
First Aust Army AASC School	36
LHQ (Aust)	37
Adv LHQ	38 - 42
6 US Army	43
Second Aust Army	44 - 45
NG Force	46
3 Aust Corps	47
NT Force	48
Q'LAND L of C Area	49 - 52
FELO	53
LHQ School of MI	54 - 55
Security Service CANBERRA (for Military LO)	56
NOIC BRISBANE (for SO (I) RAN)	57
GOC	58
G(O)	59
G(I)	60 - 65
G(SD)	66
CSO	67
DA & QMG	68
A ( one copy to circulate to: AMS, Legal Chaplains, Medical, Pro and Education)	69 - 70
Q ( one copy to circulate to: S & T, Ord, AE & ME and Postal)	71 - 73
Svy	74
War Diary	75 - 76
File	77

As this distribution list represents  
in effect an order of battle, it should  
be destroyed by fire after perusal.

---

w/d (7)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde )	<u>Copy to:</u>
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means	GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec ) except wireless	BGS
			G(0)
		4 aust div )	G2(AIR)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies) by ALS	G(I)
			G(SD)
			DA & QMG
remainder by DRLS			

---

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
 3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
 BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2691 5

---

secret (.) landops revsit 616 to 042359Z apr (.)  
 landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 2 apr active allied patrolling  
 towards upper fork TOROKINA RIVER (.) allied arty and mgs from  
 HILL 250 effectively harassed enemy retreating across TOROKINA RIVER (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 3 apr patrolling continues (.) allied  
 tps landed unopposed RAMBUTYO ISLAND (.) total enemy casualties  
 2839 known dead 1100 estimated additional dead and in effective 57  
 prisoners (28 japs 29 chinese ) remaining effectives estimated  
 400/450 (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 2 and 3 apr patrolling continues TALASEA and  
 LINGALINGA areas one jap killed two captured (.)

DUMPU (.) result enemy counter attack night 31 mar 1 apr 15  
 japs killed 20. wounded (.) 3 apr patrol to junction KOFEBI and  
 MINDJIM RIVERS and VICINITY BRIDGE 21 (one half ml NNE MABELEBU)  
 no contact with enemy (.) our fwd tps now MABELEBU area (.)  
 patrol from NANGAPO 1 apr contacted UNITED STATE patrol SUNGUN  
 (three and three quarter mls NE NUNGAPU) (.) evidence japs activity  
 BARUM area (.) patrol from SW reached posn 500 yds SW YALU 2 apr  
 saw no enemy movement (.) KALU (22 mls WNW ERIMA pln) reported  
 clear of japs (.)  
 airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 020105Z six a/c  
 bombed reported gun posns on beach KALAGATA (.) 020525Z six a/c bombed  
 and destroyed br FURINTA RIVER (.) 3 apr a/c sank one of three barges  
 sighted five mls south MUTUPINA PT (.)

BUKA (.) 2 apr 12 a/c destroyed one barge opposite BONIS and  
 strafed 70 ft lighter above CAPE LALAHAN (southern BUKA) (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 2 apr 11 a/c bombed strafed CAPE ST GEORGE (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) following attacks RABAU area 2 apr five a/c bombed VUNAPOPE 12 a/c bombed SE RABAU (.) 30 a/c bombed MALAGUNA rd 90 a/c bombed RALUANA (.) 23 a/c bombed LAKUNAI (.) 27 a/c attacked TALILI BAY sup area (.) same day Fs hunted barges CAPE LAMBERT (NW TIP GAZELLE PENINSULA) to EAST CAPE (NEW IRELAND) destroyed eight barges 14 MTs vicinity latter place (.) 3 apr further attacks RABAU area (.) 6 a/c bombed RABAU (.) 22 a/c bombed VUNAKANAU scoring hits on runway and a/a guns (.) 37 a/c bombed TOBERA (.) 24 a/c attacked TALILI BAY (.) 23 a/c bombed NE RABAU (.) 62 Fs bombers attacked KERAVIA BAY (.) 12 a/c bombed TALILI BAY (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 040206Z twenty one a/c attacked pers and stores area WEWAK (.) 040055Z ten FBs bombed a/a posns BUNABUN HARBOUR (.)

TIMOR (.) 031230Z six a/c attacked PENFOEI (.) enemy sightings (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 3 apr two PT type boats KERAVIA BAY strafed (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 4 apr two luggers (one which damaged) 33/35 barges WEWAK area (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 3 apr numerous sightings indicate following vessels present HOLLANDIA area (.) one 500/1000 ton freighter one 1000/1500 ton freighter (later reported revsit 615) one 5000/6000 ton u/i vessel one poss gun boat 10 barges HUMBOLDT BAY one 7000/10300 ton stack-aft freighter HOLLANDIA HARBOUR (.) the 500/1000 ton freighter and two barges prob sunk by attacking a/c (.) one 2000/4500 ton freighter tpt one u/i camouflaged vessel 8/10 barges JAUTEFA BAY (SW HUMBOLDT BAY) (.) the 2000/4500 ton freighter tpt damaged (.) ref revsit 615 nine vessel convoy now considered two large 7 small luggers of which at least one damaged (.) in addition one 1500/2500 ton freighter 5/9 luggers or barges six barges three MTBs between VANIMO and CAPE TANAHMERAH (.) one prob gun boat KRUKRU two 500/1000 ton freighters or luggers FRITOMITS PT (32 mls ESE VANIMO) (.)

KAI ISLANDS (.) 3 apr photos show 12 barges LANGGOER 11 small merchant vessels north end ROSENBERG STRAIT (.)

- 3 -

MALENA (.) 3 apr two cruisers two destroyers 310 mls ENE  
SINGAPORE one large a/c carrier 320 mls ENE SINGAPORE all headed  
towards SINGAPORE (.)

PHILIPPINES (.) 3 apr one prob a/c carrier two destroyers  
south of D4V60 course north (.)  
sea (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) night 2/3 apr MT boats fired torpedoes enemy sub nine mls ENE CAPE TORKORO (OPEN BAY) with unknown results and sank one and captured one type B barge same locality (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) night 2/3 apr MT boats sank three empty type  
4 barges and damaged one headed south into MadANG started large fire  
probably fuel dump vicinity MadANG (.) all informed

This message may be sent as  
WRITTEN except wireless

TOO / 5 / 5 / 6 A

THI

*1967 Sept 6*

V/D

(8)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	3 aust inf bde ) TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means	Copy to: GOC BGS G(0) G2(AIR) G(1) G(SD) Da & QMG
	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec ) except wireless	
		4 aust div ) CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies) by ALS	
remainder by DRLS			

---

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2693 6

---

secret (.) landops revsit 617 to 052230Z apr (.)

landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 3 apr allied forces pursued and made contact with enemy forces retreating north and east of TOROKINA perimeter (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 4 apr patrolling continues (.) known jap dead 2848 (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 4 apr patrols killed 9 japs LINGA LINGA area (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) DUMPU (.) 4 apr fwd tps reached posn one half ml NE KWATO no contact with japs (.) much abandoned enemy stores and eqpt found YAUULA KWATO area and signs recent hy use tracks (.) patrol found BARUM unoccupied (.)

airops (.)

allied (.) NEW BRITAIN (.) 032355Z two a/c bombed strafed villages and tracks CAPE ARCHWAY to CAPE JACQUINOT (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 040106Z thirty one a/c bombed pers sup areas and airfield WEWAK destroying 13 grounded a/c (serviceability unknown) (.) 030220Z sixteen a/c strafed BURUI (.) 032315Z twelve a/c strafed coastal area BOGIA to DOVE PT (.) pm 3 apr 17 a/c strafed coastal area CAPE CROISILLES to BOGIA HARBOUR (.) 030600Z three a/c bombed strafed SARANG HARBOUR destroying large vehicle br MAGEM RIVER (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 050128Z thirty nine a/c bombed a/a posns HOLLANDIA BAY (.) nil enemy interception encountered (.)

TIMOR (.) 041058Z three a/c bombed LAUTEM (.) 041100Z five a/c bombed town area KOEFANG (.)

enemy sightings (.)

SOLOMONS (.) night 4/5 apr six barges sunk by MTBs south

2  
HATCHIN BAY (.)

(CRIC) ST MATTHIAS GP (.) 050400Z one sub 50 mls west CAPE SIEMENS (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 050140Z one 1000/1500 ton freighter VANIMO

HARBOUR (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 050124Z two freighters (one 1000/1500  
one 2000/4500 tons) eight small freighters or luggers seven  
barges HOLLANDIA BAY (.) all informed

This message may be sent as  
WRITTEN except by wireless

TOO 06 14 10 K.

THI

*Adm. Receipt*

MESSAGE FORM

(9)

CALL  
AND  
INSTRUCTIONS

IN 3 aust inf bde )  
TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means  
OUT 7 aust comd AL sec ) except wireless  
  
4 aust div )  
CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies) by ALS  
  
remainder by DRLS

Copy to:  
GOC  
BGS  
G(O)  
G2(AIR)  
G(I)  
G(SD)  
DA & QMG

---

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2695 7

---

secret (.) landops revsit 618 to 070015Z apr (.)  
landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) DOUGALLVILLE (.) 4 apr patrols found many graves and un-  
buried japs north of perimeter (.) 5 apr allied combat patrol killed 51  
japs east of perimeter (.) further patrols north and east of perimeter con-  
tacted and captured mortars MGs and amm (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 5 apr patrolling continues MANUS ISLAND  
several enemy parties encountered and casualties inflicted on japs (.)  
enemy patrols active METAMARI - DRABITO - DROMDRAU area (area three and one  
half mls NNE LUGULI RIVER mouth - PATUSI Bay) (.) allied patrols estimate  
200 japs with native food this area (.) two killed of party 29 japs contacted  
RAMBUTYO ISLAND (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 5 apr patrolling continues TALASEA and ELEONORA  
Bay (.) 16 japs killed two captured latter area (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) SAIDOR (.) 5 apr patrol found 25 dead japs GARRISON  
(five mls SE TARIKNGAN) and further 68 dead between GARRISON and TARIKNGAN  
(.)

DUMPU (.) 5 apr patrol from MUGAPO reports no enemy movement seen  
ALIEU 1 (.) fwd elements reached bridge 7 (six mls NNE MABELLEU and seven mls  
from BOGADJIM) without contacting enemy (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 0423-6Z twenty four a/c bombed airfields KARA  
and KAHILI (.) 5 apr thirty four a/c sp gd forces attacked enemy posns  
TOROKINA perimeter (.) 040108Z ten a/c bombed airfield BUKA (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 5 apr 112 a/c carried out total 14 strafing DB  
sweeps NE GUINEA coast causing extensive damage (.) preliminary reports  
indicates two grounded a/c destroyed TADJI buildings destroyed fires started



TUMLEO ALI ISLANDS and many barges left burning (.) 050232Z three a/c bombed stores pers area DAGUA (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 050128Z two hundred and seventy five a/c dropped more than 320 tons bombs and strafed a/a posns stores installations shipping HUMBOLDT BAY (.) stores dumps concrete dock and several trucks destroyed several a/a posns destroyed or damaged HOLLANDIA town area partially destroyed (.) nil interception encountered and a/a fire dwindled to ineffectiveness as raid progressed (.) thirty nine a/c reported revsit 617 included in above (.) night 5/6 apr fifteen a/c bombed airfield MAKDE ISLAND (.) 050405Z five a/c bombed KALIANA (.) 050330Z four a/c bombed SORONG (.)

TIMOR (.) 051200Z two a/c bombed DILLI (.) 051500Z six a/c bombed KOEPANG and PENFOEI (.) enemy sightings (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 6 apr preliminary reports state 7000/10000 ton vessel set on fire direct hits scored one lugger unstated number barges (.) 041135Z four by laden 110 ft barges course north BUMBUI area attacked by MTBs sinking two poss damaging other (.) 050201Z two 3500/8000 ton freighters five barges SISSANO LAGOON (.) 050141Z one lugger three barges VANIMO HARBOUR (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) ref revsit 617 shipping HOLLANDIA BAY following additional vessels reported in area 5 apr (.) one tanker four luggers approx 22 barges (.) air attack 5 apr reported this revsit resulted burst into flames six luggers (two which large) five barges destroyed (.) 050315Z one 500/1000 ton stack aft vessel course north ROEBERFON STRAIT (10 mls south LAUREN) (.) 050405Z one 2000/4500 ton freighter tpt three 500/1000 ton stack aft vessels one large/vessel nine barges KALIANA HARBOUR (.)

KAI ISLANDS (.) 5 apr photos show two small motor vessels 20 barges TOEL (.)

TIMOR (.) 6 apr three barges left smoking one 200 ft full laden oil barge left burning fiercely by eight a/c SE LAKE ISLAND off west end TIMOR (.)

MALANHERA (.) 050330Z one 500/1000 ton stack aft freighter course south by west 40 mls east by south CAPE LIPOBO (southern tip MALANHERA) (.)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (.) 050500Z seven light cruisers and destroyers course south DAVAO GULF (.) am 5 apr one a/c carrier leaving DAVAO GULF (.)

CENTRAL PACIFIC (.) 050200Z one 700 ton hospital ship 250 mls

-3-

WS. TRUK course west by north (.) all informed

This may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless

TOO 6 / / / / /  
THI

.....

MESSAGE FORM

CALL IN 3 aust inf bde )  
AND TO NSVILLE fortress) by any means  
INSTRUCTIONS OUT 7 aust comd 4L sec ) except wireless  
4 aust div )  
CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies)  
remainder by DRLS

Cory to:  
GOC  
EGS  
G(O)  
G2(4IR)  
G(I)  
G(SD)  
Da & QEG

TO: 4 aust div TO NSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd 4L sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND  
FROM: first aust army Int 2698 8

secret (.) landops revsit 619 to 080015Z apr (.)

landops (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 6 apr patrolling continues (.) patrols report  
100 japs arrived DRANIO and further 100 in adjacent villages since 1 apr  
(.) party 32 japs ambushed by allied patrol on no 4 rd 5 mls north SANDERS  
PT 29 japs killed 3 wounded (.) total enemy known dead to 7 apr 2866 (.)

NE GUINEA (.) DUMPU (.) 5 apr our patrol contacted enemy ambush  
vicinity br 7 no details (.) 6 apr patrol to BARUA no japs (.) patrol to  
LILU 1 returned via ENGA RURED to MFGCFC making no contact with enemy  
(.)

airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 4 apr 73 a/c bombed strafed enemy installations  
ELFREES AUGUSTA BAY area (.)

NE BRITAIN (.) 060108Z twenty two a/c bombed airfield LAKUNAI (.)  
060100Z thirty four a/c bombed area inland from TOBOI wharf (RALUL) (.)  
060125Z twenty two a/c bombed enemy installations TALILI BAY (.)

NE GUINEA (.) 070335Z two a/c bombed airfield BORAI destroying two  
grounded a/c (.)

061136Z

THOR (.) 061201Z five a/c bombed LAUTE (.) /seven a/c bombed BOEFANG  
(.)

enemy (.)

NE GUINEA (.) 061209Z one B dropped 3 bombs S-IDOR causing some damage  
and casualties (.)

enemy sightings (.)

NE GUINEA (.) 070150Z seven barges three to five small patrol vessels  
HMSA BAY (.) 5 apr one 500/1000 ton freighter CAPE BORAI attacked by a/c  
scoring several near misses (.) ref revsit 618 strafing attacks now report-  
.....ed

-2-

12 barges loaded with barrels left burning fiercely SE and MUSCHU ISLAND  
(.) 070335Z fifteen to twenty five barges CAPE BORAL (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 070045Z one small tanker five barges HOLLANDIA  
BAY (.)

TIMOR (.) ref revsit 618 attack shipping SEMAOE ISLAND results now  
reported as two 140 ft barges destroyed four 140 ft barges damaged one 1000  
ton oil tanker destroyed (.)

PHILIPPINES (.) 060915Z five by one lt cruiser four destroyers BASILAN  
STRAIT (western end MINDANAO) course west (.) all informed

---

This may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless

T00 0 3 1220X

THI

*Handwritten signature and scribbles*

W/O (11)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde )	Copy to:
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means	GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec ) except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div ) by ALS	G(O)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies)	G2(AIR)
			G(I)
			G(SD)
			DA & QMG
		remainder by DRLS	

---

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2701 9

---

secret (.) landops revsit 620 to 090015Z apr (.)

landops (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 8 apr patrolling continues several small parties enemy contacted (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 7 apr 17 japs killed three captured ELEONORA BAY area (.) enemy casualties to 7 apr 185 killed TALASEA area 3686 killed 117 captured CAPE GLOUCESTER to REIN BAY 374 killed four captured 200 found ARAWA (.) figures first two areas no not include dead found or graves counted (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) RAI COAST (.) enemy casualties US operations to 7 apr 302 killed 16 captured 735 found dead (.)

BOGADJIM AREA (.) 7 apr patrol reached posn 1000 yds east KALIKA where fired on by jap patrol (.) our patrol withdrew (.) patrolling only BOGADJIM road area (.)

airops (.)

allied (.) NEW IRELAND (.) 070030Z forty five a/c bombed KAVIENG airfield (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 6 apr 32 a/c attacked TALILI BAY sup area scoring hits on buildings and two<sup>gun</sup>posns (.) 7 apr following strikes RABAU area (.) 53 Fs bombed RATAVAL (.) 39 a/c bombed gun posns west SIMPSON HARBOUR scoring numerous hits (.) 35 a/c bombed TALILI pln and northern sup area (.) 9 a/c started poss fuel fire TALILI BAY (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 062015Z eleven a/c in co-operation 11 MT boats attacked gun posns KARKAR ISLAND with excellent results (.) 080138Z thirty five a/c bombed strafed NUBIA and POTSDAM plns (.)

KAI ISLANDS (.) 070123Z twenty three a/c bombed LANGGQER (.)

- 2 -

TIMOR (.) 071315Z six a/c attacked PENFOEI barracks (.) 071840Z  
three a/c bombed LAUTEM town (.)  
sea (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) night 6/7 apr MT boats destroyed five type 4 barges  
MALAS and DOVE pt area (.) 060200Z one 1500/2500 ton stack aft  
freighter WEWAK dive bombed and strafed (.) two direct hits vessel  
left burning fiercely (.) one large lugger or schooner MISSION PT  
one direct hit damage not determined (.) eight barges WEWAK several  
near misses (.) 080115Z two poss freighter tpts 1000/1500 ton each  
30 mls WNW AITAPE attacked by a/c sinking one vessel damaging other (.)

KAI ISLANDS (.) 070123Z two 500/1000 ton stack aft freighters  
DOERO (.) 070123Z photos show 24 barges vicinity LANGGOER seven  
small merchant vessels north end ROSENBERG STRAIT (.) all informed

This message may be sent as  
WRITTEN except by wireless

TOO 091406X

THI

*W. G. J. ... Capt*

W/10 12  
MOST SECRET

WORLD REVIEW SITUATION NO 65

The following World Review of the situation has been received from War Office, LONDON, covering the period 27 Mar. to 3 Apr 44. :-

NAVAL

NORTHERN WATERS: The "TIRPITZ" is reported exercising in ALTENFJORD. HM submarines probably sank a 2000 ton tanker off STADLANDET. On 24 Mar probable hit was scored on a large tanker off YAM. In six engagements off the EAST Coast in the ENGLISH CHANNEL several "E" boats, one 'R' boat and a merchantman were severely damaged.

MEDITERRANEAN: For the week-ending 30 Mar over 42,000 tons stores and equipment were unloaded at ANZIO.

Night 27/28 Mar allied coastal forces sank six lighters SOUTH of LEGHORN. In the AEGEAN Sea HM submarines sank a merchantman, lighter and a German transport.

U-BOAT WARFARE:

For week ending 26 Mar two ships were sunk in the NORTH ATLANTIC and one tanker in the INDIAN OCEAN these were the only losses by U-boat action. Seven Atlantic ocean convoys totalling 298 ships arrived without loss, bringing imports in convoy to UK for the week ending 25 Mar of 1,038,000 tons of which 387,000 oil.

SUMMARY of ANTI-SUB ATTACKS IN MARCH REPORTED TO NOON 29 MAR:

Attacks :	by shore based aircraft	41
	by carrier borne aircraft	28
	by war-ships	41

Sunk or Probably Sunk :		
	by shore based aircraft	4
	by carrier borne aircraft	6
	by warships	6

Possibly sunk	5
Possibly damaged	3

MILITARY :

RUSSIA: GENERAL: The Russians continued the advance along almost the whole of the front between FRITPET MARSHES and the BLACK SEA.

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL SECTORS: The Germans report Russian attacks at VITEBSK and East of MOGILEV.

TARNOPOL SECTOR: The Russians by-passed KOVEL and are fighting NW of the town. In TARNOPOL-PERVOMAIISK sector the Russian salient to DNIESTER is considerably widened. The Germans withdrew from the salient at PROSKUROV which involved crossing both DNIESTER and the PRUTH on a narrow front. The Germans are trying to keep open this escape route.

LOWER BUG SECTOR: The Germans withdrawing from the Lower BUG area are being hotly pursued by the Russians.

ITALY:

INTELLIGENCE: Indications on the ADRIATIC flank point to enemy preparations for local activity. On the Bridgehead front the enemy has been regrouping, clearly with the object of withdrawing mobile formations from the lines, especially in the coastal sector possibly as a result of improved weather and drying ground. No significant changes are reported elsewhere on the main front where the most

noteworthy event recently has been the outstanding defence of 1 Para Div in the CASSINO area.

26 Pz and 29 PzG Divs are believed now to be in reserve and Hermann Goering Para-Pz Div has probably moved out of the Bridgehead area.

114 Lt Div is also believed out of the line.

OPERATIONS: 5th Army - Increased patrol activity in the TOLLO and ORSOGNA areas.

8th Army - Patrol activity by both sides.

ANZIO BRIDGEHEAD: Enemy forces are carrying out small probing raids against the British sector. Enemy showing more spirit.

YUGOSLAVIA: Fighting on an increased scale.

AIR:

WESTERN EUROPE: NIGHT: 25/26 Mar 807 tons of bombs were dropped on AULNOYE marshalling yards (FRANCE)

26/27 Mar 2765 tons were dropped on ESSEN. Resulting in severe damage to KRUPPS.

29/30 Mar 306 tons were dropped on VAIRES railway centre near PARIS in a very successful raid.

30/31 Mar 2148 tons were dropped on NUREMBERG - this was a concentrated attack but details not yet available.

BULGARIA: Three attacks were made on SOFIA - 690 tons were dropped on the railway yards.

ECONOMIC:

Reported that explosives factories at ANGOULEME and BERGERAC were seriously damaged in recent raids and that destruction of former has since completed by saboteurs. Believed that work at both factories which together accounted for 99% of nitro-cellulose produced under 1942/43 German plan for exploitation of French explosives industry cannot be resumed for many months.

GSI/  
9 Apr 44

*P. J. Quinn*  
Lt-Col  
GS FIRST AUST ARMY

Distributed by GSI First Aust Army for information of Comds or Heads of Branches or Services as set out below :-

1 Aust Corps	4	G(O)	1
4 Aust Div	3	G(SD)	1
3 Aust Inf Bde	1	BAA & CA	1
HQ BRISBANE Fortress	1	CSO	1
HQ TOWNSVILLE Fortress	1	DA & QEG	1
HQ CAIRNS Fortress	1	6 (Circulate to AMS, LSO	
Corps HQ VDC Q'LAND	1	and AD Educ)	1
BRA	1	Q (Circulate to DDST and	
CE	1	DDPS)	1
Q'LAND L of C Area	1	War Diary	2
GOC	1	File	1
BGS	1		



(13) W/D

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde )	Copy to:
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means	GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec ) except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div )	G(0)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies) by ALS	G2(AIR)
			G(I)
			G(SD)
			DA & QMG
		remainder by DRLS	

---

TO:	4 aust div	TOWNSVILLE fortress	7 aust comd AL sec
	3 aust inf bde	CAIRNS fortress	
	BRISBANE fortress	corps HQ VDC Q'LAND	
FROM:	first aust army	Int 2703	10

---

secret (.) landops revsit 621 to 100030Z apr (.)  
landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 7 apr patrols around TOROKINA  
perimeter found many dead japs (.) area east TOROKINA RIVER mouth  
cleared enemy 15 pillboxes destroyed (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) ref revsit 620 30 japs captured to 7 apr in  
addition those killed (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM AREA (.) 8 apr patrol to WENGA  
contacted 20 japs in prepared posns on track three quarters of a  
mi south WENGA (.) patrolling vicinity BRIDGE 7 no enemy movt seen (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 8 apr 23 a/c strafed enemy installations  
EMPRESS AUGUSTA Bay area (.) 8 apr four a/c bombed MONTICUT MISSION (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) early am 8 apr 20 a/c bombed strafed airfield  
KAVIENG (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 7 apr 24 a/c bombed airfields VUNAKANAU and  
TOBERA (.) 8 apr 17 a/c/sup area RATVAL (.) 8 apr 40 a/c bombed  
gun posns on ridge west MALAGUNA rd destroying three (.) 8 apr 24  
a/c bombed airfield LAKUNAI (.) 8 apr 55 fighter bombers attacked  
NE RABAU (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 080045 66 a/c bombed strafed sup pers areas  
CAFE MOEM BRANDI PLN (.) 090120Z 23 a/c bombed strafed stores pers  
areas vicinity WESAK pt (.)

DUTCH NE. GUINEA (.) 080122Z 48 a/c bombed installations  
a/a posns HOLLANDIA (.)

TIMOR (.) 081821Z seven a/c bombed barracks area PENFOEI (.)  
082325Z six a/c bombed strafed SOE village (53 mls ENE KOEPANG)  
(.) 081926Z three a/c bombed LAUTEM (.)

- 2 -

sea (.)

SOLOMONS (.) 6 apr naval units bombarded enemy posns JABA RIVER area (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 080130Z two 1000/1500 ton merchant vessels on fire WENAK 32/34 barges one lugger CAPE MOEM area two luggers MUSCHU ISLAND (.) 080048Z two u/i vessels on fire off CAPE DJEREUN (DOGRETA BAY) (.) 080147Z one 500/1000 ton freighter SELEO ISLAND (.) 090450Z one sub 30 mls west AITAPE course WSW damaged by a/c strafing (.) ref ravsit 620 vessel damaged 30 mls WNW AITAPE last reported settling in water and now considered prob sunk (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 5 apr 30/40 barges JAUTEFA BAY (.) 8 apr 15 barges three luggers CHALLENGER COVE six barges IMBI BAY 40/50 barges JAUTEFA BAY two luggers east CAPE SOEADJA 10/13 large barges beached south shore HUMBOLDT BAY three or four barges TANAMMERAH BAY (.) 8 apr preliminary report indicates a/c inflicted following damage to shipping HOLLANDIA (.) one 2000 ton merchant vessel definitely wrecked two small freighters left burning (.) 090345Z one 8000 ton merchant vessel/<sup>five</sup> mls east WAKDE ISLAND course N by west (.)

BOEROE ISLAND (.) 090216Z one 5500/8500 ton freighter tpt two u/i escort vessels 14 mls SW CAPE BATOEPEKAT course east (.) all informed

This message may be sent as  
WRITTEN except by wireless

TOO 101547 K

THI

*Ch/H. Hill Capt*

W/D (14)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde )	Copy to -
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress)by any means	GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec )except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div )by ALS	G(O)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies)	G2(AIR)
			G(I)
			G(SD)
			DA & QMG
		remainder by DRLS	

---

TO:	4 aust div	TOWNSVILLE fortress	7 aust comd AL sec
	3 aust inf bde	CAIRNS fortress	
	BRISBANE fortress	corps HQ VDC Q'LAND	
FROM:	first aust army	Int 2707	11

---

secret (.) landops revsit 622 to 110015Z apr (.)  
landops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 8 apr allied tps adv  
east of TOROKINA RIVER mouth against slight opposition and engaged  
enemy on hill east of perimeter (.) only jap stragglers reported  
in hills NE of perimeter (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 9 apr allied tps landed PAK  
ISLAND no contact (.) jap known dead to 10 apr 2940 (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM AREA (.) 9 apr our patrol  
en route KALIKO engaged japs in def posn three quarters of one ml  
south KALIKO (.) patrol broke contact returning MANGAPO by-passing  
enemy ambush (.) posn at track junc one and one quarter mls south  
KALIKO (.) patrol to YAULA AIYAU CREEK and AIYAU VILLAGE made no  
contact japs (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 090520Z thirtyfour A/C bombed enemy  
posns TOROKINA perimeter (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 9 apr following attacks carried out  
RAEPAUL area (.) seven A/C caused explosions large fire vicinity  
CARPENTER'S WHARF (.) 23 A/C scored 65 hits LAKUNAI runway (.)  
31 A/C started five large fires RALUK (.) 22 A/C started large fire  
VUNAPOPE (.) 46 A/C scored 25 hits RALPOPO runway (.) 82 A/C scored  
many hits west end VUNAKANAU runway (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 090020Z eleven A/C bombed strafed  
coastal area BUNABUN HARBOUR to BOGIL HARBOUR damaging brs KOKUMBA  
JAGEM and KARIM RIVERS (.) 090110Z fortytwo A/C bombed AL posns

- 2 -

HANSA BAY poss destroying 13 hy guns (.) 090047Z seventyfive A/C bombed  
 strafed AA posns pers sup areas WEWAK area (.) 090100Z fiftyfive A/C  
 bombed strafed AITAPE area (.) 30 hits scored STANNA MISSION and nearby  
 buildings (.)

TIMOR (.) 091314Z five A/C bombed barracks area PENFOEI  
(.) 091313Z three A/C bombed DILLI (.)  
sea (.)

: NEW GUINEA (.) 090135Z twenty to thirty barges HANSA BAY (.)  
090110Z two poss 500/1000 ton freighters BOIKEN PT one 500/1000 ton  
stack aft freighter one lugger 30/31 barges (of which 7/8 damaged or  
destroyed in air attack reported this revsit) WEWAK HARBOUR 10 barges  
two luggers MUSCHU ISLAND (.) 090100Z one 300 ton lugger bombed strafed  
and sunk by two A/C CAPE DJEREUN (.)

TIMOR (..) 10 apr photos show two small merchant vessels DILLI (..)

BORNEO (.) 091245Z four cruisers five destroyers just off east coast SOUTH MATANA ISLAND heading towards SINGAPORE (.)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (.) 080330Z one hy one lt cruiser one destroyer  
120 mls WSW TINACAL PT (south tip MINDANAO ISLAND) course west by south  
all info

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

T00 11150 54

THI

*W. H. C.*

NOTES ON MEDICAL ASPECTS OF THE  
JAPANESE FORCES

The following notes have been compiled from a study of the more recent ATIS Bulletins and similar publications available. Numerous documents from enemy sources have been partly translated only and the complete versions are not available at present.

Much of the information presented is necessarily derived by inference but this has only been employed in the presentations of information obtained from actual documents. Where an individual opinion is expressed it is indicated by an appropriate word or phrase. Information from such widely varying sources must, of necessity, be conflicting at times and is often incomplete. It is hoped however, that the summation of a large number of apparently unrelated statements will produce a single whole, not greatly at variance with the truth.

Throughout the course of this study an impression was gained of the Japanese character and outlook, particularly as applied to the Medical Service. This was greatly at variance with European standards.

This outlook or attitude of mind seems best expressed as an overlay or imitation of western civilisation and methods, super-imposed upon an all too recent primitive state.

The Japanese have imitated western civilisation to a limited extent only. They are shrewd, clever, on occasions forceful, and possess a courage that is sustained up to a point. They are bad losers but superlatively successful whilst on the crest of achievement. Their organisation is essentially newly founded, and, based on western methods, is only partially complete and lacking in stability.

This newly acquired machine is liable to break down under strain, and is less perfect than it would appear at first sight. In the face of adversity they rationalise circumstances by a turn of phrase which in their own eyes, and in accordance with "bushido", exonerates them from blame. For example, the order issued by a hospital commander, quoted hereunder, on the retreat from KOKODA, when wounded were accumulating and nothing was being done to relieve them :-

"There is no special provision for the wounded and seriously wounded. The medical personnel unable to appease the hunger of the wounded lying in agony at the front line feel deeply their responsibility as hospital officials and that they are unable to do anything but go forward and relieve pain."

(EP 24/8)

No plan is made however to send medical personnel forward, nor is it clear how they would propose to "relieve pain." Wounded must rely on combatant personnel or native carriers to bring them to the Casualty Collecting Unit (the counterpart of our ADS) if they are unable to walk. A statement by a prisoner reveals that to prevent capture, patients in a hospital at TSURUBU were shot by the order of the CO (IR 261/7).


The Japanese courage in battle is more a fatalism than innate heroism. This is built up and encouraged by orders and precepts such as the following :-

"Combat Instructions (from a Notebook, owner and unit unknown).

1. When a small strength is enveloped by the enemy there is no alternative but to charge unto death.
2. When you faint due to wounds, quickly commit suicide the moment consciousness is regained.
3. When knocked unconscious and fall into enemy hands, quickly attack, escape, or commit suicide. Suicide is the ultimate step in the spirit of attack."

(B 640/10)

Organisation for the Evacuation of Wounded in the Field:



ORGANISATION OF MEDICAL SERVICE - UNITS AND PERSONNEL:

Medical Service in Peace:

CT 94/18

- "1. The Medical Bureau in the War Department controls all the medical activities of the Army.
2. The Army School of Medicine carries out training of officers, research in field medicine and pharmacy, and the preparation of vaccines.
3. Medical Supply Depot is engaged in the manufacture and supply of medical stores.
4. The Medical Department at Army or Divisional HQ is in charge of the medical duties of the armed forces under command.
5. Medical officers, NCO's etc are attached to units.
6. Garrison hospitals treat patients, keep a supply of medical stores, and conduct sanitary inspections and training of hygiene personnel. There are large and small garrison hospitals, branch hospitals and convalescent stations.

Medical Service at War:

1. Medical officers, NCO's and orderlies are attached to combatant units.
2. A Bearer Bn is to the rear of the combat unit and consists of a HQ Stretcher Coy and Ambulance Coy. In battle, the medical personnel of HQ Coy establish a Dressing Station and give speedy attention to wounded. The bearers of the Stretcher Coy take care of wounded at the front line and the Ambulance Coy transports them to the rear.
3. The Field Hospital is behind the Bearer Bn. It gives complete treatment to patients from the Dressing Station, First Aid Station, or directly from the front line. The Bearer Bn and Field Hospital move with the armed forces.

DIVISIONAL MEDICAL UNITS (1,109) (Note: Figures in brackets indicate approximate strength)

Includes the Senior Divisional Medical Officer - a Colonel.

'X' Divisional Medical Unit: Nine Medical Officers including one Captain - this is virtually the staff of SMO Div as an Administration Unit.

Field Hospital (277). A detachment of one section of an L of C Hospital may act as a Field Hospital with an approximate strength of 100. Commanded by a Major or a Captain and has 10 to 15 Medical Officers. Normally has a capacity of 500 patients but may vary up to 1,000.

Water Purifying Unit (177) - includes nine officers and commanded by a Major. May carry out Medical Duties including care of the sick and wounded.

Veterinary Depot (119). Little detail is known.

Infantry Regiment (comprised of 3 Battalions) has five to seven Medical Officers usually a Captain and 1st and 2nd Lieuts plus 10 Medical personnel on Regt HQ. An Infantry battalion has two or three Medical Officers plus orderlies, whilst a company has two or three Medical orderlies. In technical units such as engineers or signals fewer personnel are allotted.

INDEPENDENT MIXED BDE MEDICAL UNITS:

A Medical TAI (Unit) consists of approximately 300 men; their duties are the collection of patients, the prevention of disease and the treatment to water supply. The equipment includes stretchers and horse-drawn carts.

HYGIENE AND SANITATION ORGANISATIONS:

Mention has been made of a Sanitation Superintendent Chief of Medical Bureau (Lt-Gen MIKI Yoshihidi) and also reference to the 21 Director General of Field Hygiene (Lt-Gen KABIBAYASHI).

There is sometimes a "Special Medical Officer" who carries out medical inspections, presumably of quarters, and "Sanitary Probationary Officers" and "Sanitation NCO's" are also mentioned.

L OF C MEDICAL UNITS:

MIYAUCHI Medical Unit is an Isolation Hospital and Crematorium.

L of C Hospitals under command Lt-Col;

Garrison Hospitals located in JAPAN only;

L of C Veterinary Hospitals

Army Hospital Trains

Army Hospital Ships

Convalescent Training Unit

Naval Base Medical Investigation Unit

L of C Warehouse or Stores Depot (Medical)

INDEPENDENT MEDICAL UNITS attached where required.


Field Force Dispensary

Field Hospital Baggage Train - detail and organisation obscure, but is probably formed as required from Field Hospitals.

Anti epidemic patrol and anti epidemic officer: These apparently have direct reference to the control of elementary infection conveyed by food from native sources. They appear to be local arrangements only, and do not form part of regular army organisation.



Medical Supplies in the Field:



Units probably also draw supplies from nearest Medical Units.

STANDARD OF TREATMENT AND PROFESSIONAL ABILITY OF MEDICAL OFFICERS:

The professional ability of Medical Officers of the Japanese Army appears to be far below the standards required in the British and Australian Forces. Certain senior Medical officers possess undoubted ability, but the performance of the more junior men, who are actually treating patients, falls far short of our standards.

Instructional books and pamphlets are issued on various subjects and these appear to be adequate for all general purposes. They read somewhat like an abbreviated textbook which, in effect, they probably are. Lists of drugs, instruments and equipment supplied to Medical units etc., appear to be adequate and very similar to our own.

A breakdown in organisation frequently occurs in the carrying out of instructions and in the practical application of orders and administrative procedures. Supplies in forward areas are often conspicuous by their absence and wounded are frequently left to their own resources or have to rely on assistance from their comrades in combatant units. If they reach a forward hospital they may be treated.

In general the junior ranking medical officer is "poor stuff". The course of training for such officers consists of a special Study School (Medical) under the administration of the Army where prospective candidates for commissioned rank undergo study for one year, followed by an examination lasting two days (compare this with our own medical course of six years).

A statement appears from one medical officer, a 2nd Lieut who was attached to a Transport Unit saying that he was not a qualified surgeon but had performed many minor operations in the absence of qualified men. This officer, after graduation at the Special Study School served on ships, and with Insurance Coys as a medical officer prior to the outbreak of war.

"Probationary Officers", frequently mentioned, are in our opinion, not qualified medical officers. They correspond with our own Coy officers of Field Ambs who are not medical men. One statement was noted that "patients were sent on a transport with Probationary Officers; Medical Officers should have been sent but could not be spared." The rating of a Probationary Officer appears to be below that of a WO and higher than an NCO.

The treatment given to patients in Field Medical Establishments is casual in the extreme and varies with the whim and knowledge of Medical Officers in attendance. Patients are evacuated to hospital and returned to their units after treatment by the best means available under existing circumstances. This frequently proves to be by foot and stretcher bearers are recruited from natives or levied from any troops who may happen to be in the area.

A record exists stating that "patients are treated in hospital in order of reporting regardless of the seriousness of the cases. Patients discharged from hospital will select a leader who will lead them back. The leader will make a list of his group and give it to the unit to which he is returning."

(EP 29/3)

Except in the case of malaria treatment there appears to be no attempt at standardisation of treatment or surgical procedure.

Diseases of the intestinal tract are treated variously by creosote tablets, tannic acid enemata or charcoal. No reference was discovered of sulphaguanidine therapy nor, for that matter, to the employment of any other sulphanilamide type drugs.

On interrogation of a Japanese medical officer stated that "they were not used extensively." "Sulphanilamide" tablets in tubes of 5000 appear in one list of medical supplies designed for 10,000 men for an unstated period. Whether these are sulphanilamide tablets or a totally different sulphur-base drug is pure conjecture on the information available.

Bowel disorders (including typhoid and cholera) and malaria, figure largely in Japanese assessment of disease risks. Typhus fever is conspicuous by the rarity with which it is mentioned; the only direct references being to an outbreak in Nov 43 at CAPE GLOUCESTER (TSURUBU) when "scattered cases were not yet stamped out", to the incidence of two cases near LAE, and to the disease near WEMAK. The now well-known outbreak of fever at KALISA BAY in Aug 43 is probably Typhus Fever but the Japanese authorities do not appear to be at all certain of the origin of the disease. Mention is made of certain polluted zones near the KALISA air strip and possible association with swamps, grass, mice, insects or mosquitoes. Statements are all sufficiently vague to cover most eventualities. Fever in this outbreak was sustained for up to one week and did not respond to malarial drugs, although no mention was made of stupor or fatal termination of the disease.

The impression is gained from a study of publications and documents of 1942 and 1943 that much more attention has been given, in the latter period, to prevention and treatments of disease, particularly malaria. Orders, pamphlets and instructions are of a much higher standard in the latter year.

MALARIA: DISTRIBUTION, CONTROL AND TREATMENT:

Little actual information is available with respect to the detailed distribution of malaria or breeding of anopheles mosquitoes. In general, the potentially highly malarious areas can only be determined by a study of topographical and environmental details of the country. This is outside the scope of these notes.

It may be assumed that all natives, except those restricted to isolated islands, form a potential source of the disease and anopheline carriers will exist in all places where there is suitable water and where the temperature and humidity range is consistent with the completion of the larval breeding cycle and development of sporozoites within the mosquito.

Little attention has been given by the Japanese to the bionomics of malaria-carrying mosquitoes, nor to the methods of control, other than by mosquito destruction and the administration of prophylactic drugs. One map was obtained defining malarious areas in the SIO - RAMU - MADANG area, but the impression was gained that this was a product of general considerations of topography, population etc., rather than actual detailed survey or statistical calculations based on the incidence of the disease in the various areas.

Information was apparently obtained from missionaries resident in the area before the war - a notoriously unreliable source of scientific information in our opinion.

Malaria Control: Great reliance is placed by the Japanese authorities on the administration of prophylactic drugs in the control of malaria. However, the efficiency with which these prophylactic drugs are administered to the troops in the field is a matter of considerable doubt.

Numerous detailed instructions have been issued from time to time giving details of larval control of mosquitoes and the destruction of adult insects. All these appear to fall short of adequate practical and executive detail which is so necessary to effect field work through the medium of troops not conversant with the disease and with the methods of control and transmission.

There has been little evidence of such measures being put into practice and only in one instance has reference been made to a specific squad or unit saddled with the task of carrying out malaria control or drainage, viz "MALARIA

DESTRUCTION SQUAD" of 40 men and 13 with a detachment at "MATSUDA" (CAPE GLOUCESTER).

A statement also appears that in RABUL, squads were detailed to spray mosquito breeding places and adult spraying was also employed (nature of spray unknown.) Results were noted as not being particularly effective, and it was also stated that no effective methods were possible in NEW GUINEA. "ATIS Serial 1056 - File governing regulations for the prevention of tropical fevers belonging to 41 Div Medical Unit Feb 43," gives general instructions for mosquito control but the efficiency with which these regulations are carried out is open to grave doubt as indicated above.

Mosquito nets are supposed to be issued as a routine measure and in addition anti-mosquito ointment. Insecticides used for destroying mosquito larvae are stated to be :-

1. Paris Green.
2. "Mararimetsu" (literally malaria destroyer - a mixture of Paris Green and ammonia).
3. Phenotidine (presumably a phenol).
4. Others: (a) Chlorolime  
(b) Milk of lime
5. Oils: (a) Kerosene  
(b) Fuel Oil  
(c) Crude Oil  
(d) Kerosene and fuel Oil  
(e) Kerosene emulsion

Prophylactic Administration of Malarial Drugs: There appears to be some divergency in the technique of administration of prophylactic drugs dependent upon the ideas of different medical administrative officers. There is little standardisation although the majority employ combinations of quinine and atabrin with occasionally plasmoquine.

There is evidence that some attempt has been made towards acquiring standard procedure, in publications from the Japanese War Office. This standard has been repeated by certain formations, notably 51 Div, in instructions to medical officers and the treatment corresponds to (a) below.

The following give an outline of various administrations of these drugs :-

- (a) Quinine Sulphate - One tablet daily for 10 days.  
Plasmoquine (Hinoramin) - One tablet in addition on every 10th day.
- (b) Quinine Sulphate - One tablet daily for six days.  
Plasmoquine - One tablet on every 7th day.
- (c) One tablet "Enki" (nature unknown) taken each morning as a preventive of malaria.
- (d) "Enki" - One tablet every two days.  
Atabrin - One tablet every three days.
- (e) Quinine tablets daily (Number not known).

Evidence exists of trials of various combinations of drugs as malaria preventatives conducted at NASSAU BAY in Jan 43. Each of the following courses were to be given to one-third of the personnel of a unit and a report was to be submitted on the results. No indication was given as to the results.

- (a) One tablet "Aeramine" at 10, 20, 30 days and one "Hinoramin" (Plasmoquine).
- (b) One tablet "Aeramine" plus one quinine tablet at 10, 20, 30 days and one "Hinoramin."
- (c) One tablet Quinine salt at 10, 20, 30 days and one "Hinoramin" (Plasmoquine).

Therapeutic Treatment of Malaria: Treatment directed towards the cure of malaria appears to be of two varieties :-

- (a) Ambulatory treatment - where the patient reports daily to a medical centre for treatment and then carries on with his usual task. This is presumably employed in the less severe cases.
- (b) Hospitalised treatment - where a patient is an inmate of a medical establishment.

In amplification of this, a statement of the incidence and treatment of malaria cases of 1 Bn, 238 Inf Regt at ALEXISHAFEN in May 43 is quoted.

"Incidence malaria last 10 days May 43

Total strength of Unit - 901 (348 treated in unit  
Cases Benign Tertian Malaria 404 ( 56 treated in  
( hospital

Cases Malignant Tertian Malaria 68 { 46 treated in unit  
22 treated in  
hospital

Once more there appears to be a diversity of therapeutic routines of which the following are examples. There appears to be no standard of cure.

- (a) Atebrin ("Acrinamine") - 3 times daily for one week.  
Plasmoquine ("Hloramin") - 3 times daily for 5 days.  
All medication is then stopped for one day and a daily administration of quinine is resumed as a preventative.
- (b) The following is apparently given in unit lines not in hospitals for the cure of malaria.
- Atebrin - One tablet thrice daily after meals for 7 days.  
Plasmoquine -  $\frac{1}{2}$  tablet thrice daily after meals for 1 day.
- (c) Quinine Sulphate -  $1\frac{1}{2}$  tablets with each meal - (equivalent to  $4\frac{1}{2}$  tablets daily)  
Plasmoquine -  $\frac{1}{2}$  tablet with each meal - (equivalent to  $1\frac{1}{2}$  tablets daily).

The above is taken continuously for three weeks and is suitable for "all types of malaria except Black Water Fever and other peculiar types". Malaria prophylactic is resumed immediately the course finishes.

- (d) "Enki" (nature unknown) - 2 tablets every 2 hours as a curative measure for malaria.
- (e) The following routine of intra-muscular injection of atebrin is given -

"Intra-muscular injection of atabrin. Recommended an initial intra-muscular injection in severe cases, especially the sleeping or delirious types - 0.1 grms of atabrin dissolved in 2cc sterile water injected into gluteal region.

0.3 grms may be given in one day. Two to three days' treatment will usually cause the crisis of the disease to pass. After crisis change to "Acrinamine - Hinoramin" (atebrin-plasmoquine) therapy. This is taken for 7 days including the days of the injections.

If supplies of "Acrinamine injection solution" become short the following may be used :-  
Dissolve one acrinamine tablet in 2.5 to 5cc of water, aseptically. Allow to stand 5 minutes - use supernatant fluid which is equivalent to 0.1 grms.

(EP 87/35)

The treatment of recurrent malaria is outlined -  
"Acrinamin and Hinoramin used together but taken at different times (A-HI treatment). When Acrinamine is short an alternative method is applicable with quinine and Hinoramin.

If, in rare cases the disease persists or a third attack occurs, the above methods may be repeated twice or more. Repeated courses of A/HI may be given one following another.

Quinine and Hinoramin is only to be used when A-HI is not available."

- (f) "0.6 grms Akurinamin (Atebrine) dissolved in 3 to 50. distilled water is injected into an artery. This has been proved the best method of treating malaria". (B748/16)  
No statement is made as to frequency or duration of this treatment.

INCIDENCE OF MALARIA AND OTHER CASUALTIES AMONGST JAPANESE TROOPS:

A very large number of references are to be found with a bearing on sickness and casualty rates. In computing a quantitative estimate of casualties, the main difficulty lies in determining the total strength of the body or force from which casualties were derived and also the time period over which the casualties were suffered. B712/8 et seq gives a list of hospital statistics for L of C units and it might be argued that the percentage casualties rate with relation to the total strengths of units involved could be calculated from columns 11 and 12. Administrative Instructions (EP 87/35) for the compilation of these statistics show that this cannot be done as column 12 "Average patients per day per 1000", refers not to the proportion of the parent unit but to the total of "patient-days" of the hospital. The following table is presented for examination insofar as information is available:-

TABLE OF CASUALTIES

Unit	Strength	Section	Time Period	Total	Casualties Suffered			
					Sickness	Malaria	Dysentery	Battle Wound-killed
6 Coy 79 Inf Regt	-	WAREO	-Nov 43	138 (incl deaths)	-	-	-	-
-	107	-	-	39	5	2	-	32
-	-	BOGADJIM	8 mos	47	-	19+	-	7
66 Inf Regt	1224	RABAUL	-	318	-	-	-	-
-	9	-	-	9	-	6	-	-
-	10	-	-	10	-	10	-	-
Det of 20 Div Eng	25	-	1 mth	11	-	11	-	-
Korean Volunteers Unit	527	GIRUWA	1 mth	527	-	Mostly Malaria	-	-
GIRUWA Hospital	1325 patients	GIRUWA Oct 42	-	1325	1110	-	-	215
67 L of C Hospital	637 patients	GIRUWA	1 mth	637	-	520	-	-
A Coy	190	-	7 mos	67	-	45	-	-
238 Inf Regt	3100 approx	MADANG	1 mth	-	-	961 (92% BT) (8% MT)	-	-
238 Inf Regt 1 Bn	901	ALEXIS- HAFEN	-	-	-	472	-	-
115 Inf Regt 12 Coy	225	LAE (Landing)	17 days	100	-	-	-	-
115 Inf Regt 9 Coy	134	LAE	-	49	-	-	-	-
A Platoon	55	-	Concur- rently	20	-	-	-	-
66 Inf Tk/A Pl	486	-	At Dec 43	120	-	-	-	-
54 L of C Sector Hosp	225 patients	FANGGER	at Nov 43	225	-	164	-	-
50 AA En - 1 Coy	122	CAPE GLOUCESTER	Jun 42	20	-	-	-	-
Det of Same	115	CAPE GLOUCESTER	Jun 42	20	-	-	-	-
51 Div	2095	N.BRITAIN	at May 43	2323	-	-	-	-
41 Div	? 2 Divs	N.BRITAIN	May	-	-	6500	-	-
-	-	N.G.	1 mth	13500	5100	8200	-	200

From consideration of the following factors, in addition to the preceding table, a statement is made regarding the disease incidence among the Japanese forces in NEW GUINEA:-

- (a) The importance of malaria in Japanese eyes.
- (b) The frequency with which the disease is mentioned in letters and documents.
- (c) The frequent references to hospital admissions and the apparent overcrowding of field medical establishments.
- (d) The frequent references to mortality in units.
- (e) the vehemence of orders and instructions directed towards the control of disease.
- (f) A decoration is given for any soldier who may die from malaria one month after landing in NEW GUINEA.
- (g) Malaria wards in certain hospitals (GIRUWA) predominate.
- (h) Consideration of various lengthy casualty lists.

It may be stated that the majority of personnel of any unit which has been in NEW GUINEA or neighbouring islands in excess of three months will become infected with malaria. These infected persons will suffer from repeated attacks of the disease interfering with their ability as soldiers; and a further proportion will require admission to hospital from time to time. There will be a progressive casualty rate from sickness in any unit stationed in NEW GUINEA which will, of course, vary with the salubrious nature of the locality.

As a general statement, it might be said that a unit of force will be reduced to one-quarter its original strength of effectives, six months after landing in the territory and about one-quarter of these will be irrecoverable casualties over the same time period.

These calculations include normal battle casualties as well as all sickness but exclude the complete annihilation of forces which may occur from time to time.

(NOTE: It is requested that this review should NOT be reproduced in any form without the permission of GSI First Aust Army)



G.S.I.

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 101

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 4 Apr 44 to 1200 hrs 11 Apr 44

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Summary of Events and Significant Changes ...	2

PART I

Section 1:

Operations NW SECTOR:

Sea	...	3
Air (a) Own	...	3-4
(b) Enemy	...	4-5

Section 2:

Operations Other Fronts - SWPA

Land	...	5-6
Sea (a) Own	...	6
(b) Enemy	...	7
Air (a) Own	...	7-8
(b) Enemy	...	8

PART II

Section 2 - O of B (a) Land	...	9
(b) Air	...	10
Section 5 - Organisation	...	10-11
Section 6 - Equipment	...	11-12
Section 7 - Tactics	...	12-14
Section 9 - General	...	14-15

PART III

Topographical	...	...	...	16-17
---------------	-----	-----	-----	-------

PART IV

Other Fronts	...	...	...	17-19
--------------	-----	-----	-----	-------

PART V

Security	...	...	...	19
----------	-----	-----	-----	----

APPENDICES

- 'A' Map showing Dispositions of Major Formations under  
2 AREA ARMY.
- 'B' Graph showing comparative Enemy Air strength by  
Sectors for Mar 44.
- 'C(1)' Description of Jap 47mm Model 01 Rapid Fire Gun.
- 'C(11)' Illustration of Jap 47mm Model 01 Rapid Fire Gun.
- Supplement: Notes on Medical Aspects of Japanese Army.

S U M M A R Y   O F   E V E N T S  
A N D  
S I G N I F I C A N T   C H A N G E S

The overwhelming success achieved by the Allied Air-forces in their assaults on the enemy bases in the HOLLANDIA area provides the most significant event of the week. As a result of these attacks practically the whole of the enemy air strength stationed in this area at the time, viz 288 aircraft, were either destroyed or damaged.

In view of the above - the second crippling blow against enemy aircraft strength in the NEW GUINEA area within eight months - it is considered that the enemy will accelerate constructional activity of the many airfields in the immediate Western sphere and thus allow of greater dispersal of his air power.

As it would appear that enemy tactics in these areas is to avoid aerial combat, it is considered that an increase in the intensity of anti-aircraft ground defence can be expected where such development is in progress. This was indicated during the week when Allied bombers on a mission to SORONG were unable to accurately bomb the target owing to violent evasive measures necessary to offset the intense anti-aircraft fire encountered.

All available evidence regarding the location of the newly arrived elements of 3, 14 and 36 Divisions indicates that at present they are intended for employment in a defensive role rather than either an offensive task or for the relief of the battle weary formations in BRITISH NEW GUINEA.

The enemy has apparently realised that he cannot effectively defend the entire coastline of the areas under his control and has, as an alternative, evolved methods of attempting to counter Allied landings by the use of newly inaugurated "MOBILE RAIDING UNITS." In view of the superior Allied equipment and Naval strength accompanying their amphibious operations the success of the "MOBILE RAIDING UNITS" is doubtful. The functions of these units are detailed in PART II of this summary, and it is considered that the enemy will probably utilise such units to harass any future Allied landings.

---

PART I  
OPERATIONS

Section 1: NW SECTOR:

SEA:

HOLLANDIA continues as the concentration point for shipping in this area, but is on a reduced scale to that reported over the previous week; a total of 17 cargo vessels and freighters of approximate total tonnage of 32/47,000 tons and one naval vessel were sighted. Aircraft attacks have been responsible for the sinking of a small tanker, four merchant vessels of a total tonnage of 3500/5000 tons and further damaging a 1000/1500 ton freighter. A further two small coastal vessels of 500/1000 ton displacement were sighted on 5 Apr in ROEMBERPON STRAIT, 60 miles south of MANOKWARI.

A total of 96 barges and 15 luggers were reported in the area and of these, aircraft sank 10 barges and six luggers and probably damaged a similar number.

Five vessels were reported during the week at KALIANNA, the tonnage involved being approximately 7/12,000 tons.

KAL ISLANDS:

A comparatively substantial increase in shipping has been noted in the vicinity of TOEAL when, during the week a small tanker, two small patrol vessels and 8/11 small merchant vessels, together with 62 barges were sighted.

BOEROE ISLAND:

A report on 9 Apr states that one 5/8000 ton freighter-transport with two unidentified escort vessels were 14 miles SW of CAPE BATOEPEKAT, travelling west.

Reports of 26 naval units have been received for the week in the MALAYA and PHILIPPINE areas, and are as follows :-

3 Apr	2 Cruisers 2 Destroyers 1 Aircraft carrier	) 320 miles ENE of, and heading towards SINGAPORE
	1 prob Aircraft carrier 2 Destroyers	) South of DAVAO, in the PHILIPPINES
5 Apr	7 Light cruisers 1 Aircraft carrier	) South of DAVAO
6 Apr	5 Heavy Cruisers 1 Light cruiser 4 Destroyers	) In BASILAN STRAIT, PHILIPPINES

AIR:

(a) OWN:

A damaging blow was delivered to enemy airplane reserves in the DUTCH NEW GUINEA area during the period 28 Mar/3 Apr, when Allied air activity culminated in a heavy attack on the HOLLANDIA, CYCLOPS and SENTAI strips on 3 Apr, which completed the destruction of the entire 288 aircraft reported on these airfields on 30 Mar.

During further attacks on stores, installations and shipping in this area, when the HOLLANDIA township was partially destroyed, Allied airmen reported that they encountered no interception, and anti-aircraft fire dwindled as the raid progressed.

Other Allied air activity in DUTCH NEW GUINEA included the bombing of KAIMANA, SORONG and the airfield at WAKDE ISLAND on 5 Apr.

The airfield at LANGGOER was bombed on 3 and 7 Apr, whilst airfields and towns in TIMOR have been attacked daily since the beginning of the week. During one of these latter attacks on 6 Apr, one 1000 ton oil tanker and two laden barges were destroyed and a further two barges damaged in the vicinity of SEMAOE ISLAND.

(b) ENEMY:

The only enemy air activity reported in the NW area during the week, consisted of reports of enemy reconnaissance planes; one over HORN ISLAND on 1 Apr, another in the vicinity of CAPE VALSCH on 3 Apr, and an unidentified aircraft reported circling over DAE (PRINCESS MARIANNE STRAITS) on 7 Apr.

ENEMY AIRFIELD DEVELOPMENT:

MANOKWARI area: Within 150 miles of MANOKWARI, there are now nine confirmed aerodromes, falling into three geographical groups - NOEMFOOR GROUP, MOEMI GROUP, and BABO GROUP.

The NOEMFOOR GROUP consists of two aerodromes, about eight miles apart, one already in operation (KAMIRI), and the other under construction (NABER). These lie about 55 miles east of MANOKWARI, across GEELVINK BAY, and would presumably be supplied, in the main, by coaster or barge from central dump areas at MANOKWARI.

The MOEMI GROUP consists of three aerodromes - MOEMI, WARREN (about a mile south of MOEMI), and RANSIKI (about five miles north of MOEMI). The recent sighting of a possible strip, nine miles NE of MOEMI, in the vicinity of OEWI, has not yet been confirmed. Of these three aerodromes, MOEMI and RANSIKI may already be serviceable, though there is still a great deal of room for surface improvement before they can be regarded as first class runways. WARREN is still in an early stage of development. These aerodromes lie about 50 miles south of MANOKWARI, and, like the NOEMFOOR aerodromes, will probably be supplied, in the main, by coaster or barge from MANOKWARI.

The BABO GROUP, which lies within about 95 miles of the MOEMI GROUP, and within about 130 miles of MANOKWARI, consists of four aerodromes - BABO, CAPE TANAHMERAH, and SAGAN I and SAGAN II. Of these, BABO alone is at present serviceable. CAPE TANAHMERAH and SAGAN I are nearing serviceability, and SAGAN II is furthest from serviceability. The sightings on 25 Mar of other strips in the vicinity of BABO have not yet been confirmed.

Since MCCLUER GULF lies on an entirely different supply route from that which serves MANOKWARI, MOEMI, and NOEMFOOR, the BABO GROUP, apart from its local significance, can be considered as a separate and distinct zone in the aerodromes defending MANOKWARI. This Group of aerodromes will greatly increase the enemy's capacity for resistance in the MCCLUER GULF area.

Shipborne supply to this Group will be quite independent of MANOKWARI. Its main supply centre will be either BABO, or some other place not yet photographed. The latter seems quite

likely, in view of the limited facilities at BABO, where effective dump dispersal is practically impossible. The location of a central dump area, if one exists, is not known, owing to the absence of comprehensive photographic coverage of the area. Supply to the individual aerodromes from a central dump would be either by barge, or M/T, or both.

WAKDE ISLAND Area: In this area, on the north coast of NEW GUINEA about 120 miles WNW of HOLLANDIA, a new strip is under construction at MAFFIN.

This makes a group of three aerodromes in this area consisting of - WAKDE, which strip, with its extensive dispersal area covers most of the island, and has been in use for bombers and fighters for the last 12 months; SAWAR (0155S-13847E) on the mainland with its all weather runway, suitable for all types of airplanes, and now in operation; and MAFFIN (three miles SE of SAWAR aerodrome) which, from the clearing made, indicates a strip of between 5000 to 5500 feet in length by 350 feet in width, with a possible dispersal area on the west side.

Although the study of photographs taken 21 Mar shows a new strip under construction south of SENTANI LAKE, in the HOLLANDIA area, the havoc caused to the HOLLANDIA group of aerodromes by the raids on 30 and 31 Mar, and the further raid on 3 Apr, which almost completely destroyed the aerodromes in this group, gives the WAKDE Group a new importance.

While it is too early to claim the permanent denial to the enemy of the HOLLANDIA aerodromes, it can at least be predicted that any attempt to rebuild air strength there will be on a more cautious and modest scale, and it is now quite possible that the WAKDE Group will be used in the role once filled by that of HOLLANDIA.

(Adapted from AAF Intelligence  
Summary No 196)

## Section 2: OTHER FRONTS - SWPA:

### LAND:

#### SOLOMONS:

BOUGAINVILLE: The Japanese withdrawal which commenced during the previous week was reported by Allied patrols pushing outward from the east and northern perimeter to be continuing. Allied artillery took toll of enemy forces retreating across the upper TOROKINA RIVER on 1 Apr and 2 Apr. Besides machine-guns, mortars and ammunition captured, evidence of mass Jap burials was seen and also many unburied enemy were found by Allied patrols.

The area east of the TOROKINA RIVER mouth was cleared of enemy on 7 Apr. Fifteen pillboxes were destroyed.

#### NEW BRITAIN:

Patrol activity carried out during the week in the TALASEA and ELEONORA BAY areas resulted in 26 Japs being killed and 37 taken prisoner.

Native reports received during the week state that the villages of TATONGPAI, PALMALLAL, WUNUNG, ATOKAI, MATONG, BOKONGTATA and PUL PUL were occupied by enemy forces varying in strength from 14 to 379. A field piece of unreported calibre is stated to be installed at PUL PUL.

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS:

Enemy resistance in this area appears to be concentrated in the central southern coast of MANUS ISLAND, in the METAWARRI - DRABITO - DROMDRAU area. Casualties are being inflicted by Allied patrols on enemy parties throughout the island area.

RAMBUTYO ISLAND was occupied unopposed on 3 Apr. Later during mopping-up operations in this area two Japs were killed from a party of 29 encountered.

The total number of known Jap casualties killed is now reported to be 2848.

NEW GUINEA:

SAIDOR: The fate of isolated enemy parties along the inland tracks may be assessed in the light of recent discoveries of 126 enemy dead in the vicinity of GWARAWON and TARIKNGAN.

Enemy casualties during US operations on the R.I. COAST to 7 Apr are stated as 302 killed, 16 captured and 735 found dead.

DUMPU: There is every indication of a complete enemy withdrawal from the Upper BOGADJIM ROAD area and adjoining eastern coastal sector.

Ineffective enemy resistance was met by patrols 2500 yards east and 1200 yards WSW of YAUULA on 2 Apr. On the same day a small enemy party was reported in occupation of ALIBU I.

Enemy casualties amounted to 35 killed in these encounters. By the next day, the forward troops had occupied MABELEBU area and a patrol to the junction of the KOFEBI and MINDJIM RIVERS in the vicinity of BRIDGE 21 made no contact. YAUULA and KWATO had been reached by 4 Apr without sign of enemy resistance. Large quantities of equipment and stores were found abandoned in the area and tracks showed signs of heavy use.

The villages of BARUM, NANGAPO and ALIBU I which were visited by patrols on 5 Apr showed no signs of enemy occupation, but a further patrol on 7 Apr encountered fire from a Jap party 1000 yards east of KALIKO, and also from a track three quarters of a mile south of WENGA on 8 Apr when 20 Japs were contacted in prepared positions.

SEA:

(a) OWN:

Allied naval units have been operative in the waters adjacent to the SOLOMONS, NEW BRITAIN and NEW GUINEA.

Barge hideouts in the mouth of the MARIRICI RIVER were bombarded during the night 31 Mar/1 Apr. Enemy positions in the JABA RIVER area were shelled on the 6 Apr. A submarine was attacked by MTBs on the night 2/3 Apr nine miles ENE of CAPE TORKORO with unknown results. On the same night MTBs sank one and captured one Type 'B' barge in the same locality.

MADANG was bombarded on 2/3 Apr by MTBs where a probable fuel dump was set on fire and three empty barges were destroyed in the same area. A further five Type 'A' barges were destroyed on the NEW GUINEA coast in the MALAS - DOVE POINT area on the night 6/7 Apr and on the same night 11 MTBs in co-operation with aircraft raided gun positions on KARKAR ISLAND with excellent results.

(b) ENEMY:

SOLOMONS and NEW BRITAIN:

In the SOLOMONS, six barges at SHORTLAND - FAISI was the only sighting reported.

Two PT type boats which were sighted in KERAVALA BAY, NEW BRITAIN on 3 Apr were the only vessels reported for the week.

NEW GUINEA:

The shipping in this area for the week under review has shown a marked decrease. Fourteen vessels and eight naval units are reported as against 35 vessels for the previous week. Only five have ventured into the WEWAK area and of these, the largest, a 1500/2500 ton freighter was dive-bombed and left burning by aircraft on 6 Apr. A further four were reported destroyed by aircraft on 8 Apr.

An additional eight vessels of approximate total tonnage of 8500/15,000 tons were reported in the AITAPE - VANIMO area. One 1000/1500 ton freighter was sunk by aircraft and a vessel of similar tonnage was severely damaged. A submarine in this area was also hit and considered damaged.

Of 125 barges which were reported along the coast from WEWAK to VANIMO, 34 were sunk and 15 severely damaged by Allied sea and air attacks.

SUBMARINES:

Four submarines were reported for the week, and are as follows :-

1 Apr	1 Submarine	5 miles north of WATON ISLAND
2 Apr	1 Submarine	between LOU and LOS NEGROS ISLAND
2/3 Apr	1 Submarine	at CAPE TORKORO
5 Apr	1 Submarine	50 miles west of CAPE SIEMENS

AIR:

(a) OWN:

SOLOMONS:

One of the primary reasons for the Japanese withdrawal in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area, can be attributed, no doubt, to the recent Allied air offensive in this Sector. This week, both the inner and outer perimeters of TOROKINA were subjected to further Allied bombing and strafing attacks, which resulted in enemy gun positions and installations being destroyed at MAMAGATA and in the vicinity of the PURIATA RIVER mouth.

Airfields at KARA, KAHILI and BUKA were bombed and barges sunk in the BUKA PASSAGE during the current week. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered over the BUKA airfield.

NEW IRELAND:

During a strafing run by Allied fighters on 2 Apr, eight barges and 14 trucks were destroyed in the vicinity of EAST CAPE, and on the same day, Avengers bombed and strafed CAPE ST GEORGE with unobserved results. The airfield at KAVIENG, reported to be unserviceable on 27 Mar, was bombed and strafed on 7 and 8 Apr.

NEW BRITAIN:

As for the previous week, TALILI BAY once more received the greatest attention during Allied daily air attacks in the RABUL area this week. Over 450 sorties were flown on 2 and 3 Apr alone, when buildings, anti-aircraft positions and an

ammunition dump were destroyed at TALILI BAY, RALUANA and LAKUNAI. It is now estimated that as a result of continual Allied attacks 90% of the built-up area in RABUL and 70% of the buildings and supply dumps in the vicinity of VUNAPOPE have been destroyed.

Airfields at VUNAKANAU, TOBERA and LAKUNAI were bombed and numerous hits were scored on already badly scarred runways. Other air activity consisted of strafing attacks on tracks and villages from CAPE ARCHWAY to CAPE JACQUINOT; bombing of underground fuel stores at KERAVALA BAY, and attacks on gun positions around SIMPSON HARBOUR, TALILI BAY and PETER HARBOUR (WITU ISLAND), several of which were destroyed.

CAROLINE ISLANDS:

On 2 Apr, 53 Liberators bombed the warehouse area at DUBLON, causing extensive damage and leaving several large fires burning. Fortythree enemy fighters were encountered during this attack, of which 25 were destroyed and a further two probably destroyed.

NEW GUINEA:

Although a further 17 grounded enemy aircraft on WEWAK, BORAM, and TADJI airfields were destroyed during the week, in the main, Allied air attacks were directed against stores and personnel areas along the coast.

The coastal strip between BOGIA and CAPE CROISILLES was strafed on two occasions this week, as was the TADJI area, where extensive damage was caused to buildings and 12 barges left burning in the vicinity of TUMLEO and ALI ISLANDS.

Stores and personnel areas in the WEWAK - HANS. BAY district received attention from Allied aircraft which left numerous buildings destroyed and several fires burning in their wake. Anti-aircraft positions were destroyed at BUNABUN and the Government Station at BURIU was one of many buildings set on fire during attacks on enemy positions in these areas.

Enemy shipping losses due to Allied air activity in NEW GUINEA included a 7000/10,000 ton vessel and one 1500/2500 ton tank aft freighter set on fire, together with several barges seriously damaged at WEWAK. Two 1000/1500 ton vessels bombed at AITAPE resulted in one vessel sunk and the other left burning fiercely, whilst several barges were probably sunk in SARANG HARBOUR.

(b) ENEMY:

After a period of almost a month, during which the enemy has conducted no air offensives in NEW GUINEA, a single enemy bomber over SAIDOR on 6 Apr dropped three bombs causing some damage and casualties.

Allied airmen over HOLLANDIA, after the devastating raids during the early part of the week, reported that small flights, comprising three to four enemy fighters, were sighted but no interception was attempted. Similar reports were received from the RABUL area during the week.

This week the enemy again endeavoured to break up an Allied air attack on DUBLON, in the CAROLINES, with strong fighter interception, but once more his percentage of losses was exceedingly high, with more than 50% of his 43 airborne aircraft being destroyed.



PART II

Section 2: 0 of B:

(a) LAND:

Attached as Appendix 'A' to this summary is a map showing the dispositions of major formations under command of 2 AREA ARMY, and the estimated strengths within the areas under control. Latest information indicates that the western boundary of the area of control includes BALI but excludes JAVA, whilst part of the Western CAROLINES and PALAU may also be included. It will be seen by consulting this map that the responsibility for western DUTCH NEW GUINEA has been divided between 2 and 19 Armies and this has probably been brought about by the present location of 5 Division. It is possible however that the need to strengthen the ground defences in the islands of the ARAFURA SEA may cause the bulk of this division to be transferred into these islands, and in this case the responsibility for western DUTCH NEW GUINEA would probably be invested solely in 2 ARMY.

It is now thought that those battalions of 5 Division which were detached to eastern NEW GUINEA in Dec 42 have rejoined the division in southern DUTCH NEW GUINEA and 3 Battalion 21 Inf Regt was located at KAIMANA in Feb 44.

On the northern coast of NEW GUINEA it is reported that HQ 18 ARMY has been moved back to HOLLANDIA although an Advanced Headquarters is at HANSA BAY. Further withdrawals from MADANG are reported and it would now seem that a covering force under Maj-Gen SHOGE has been left at MADANG to shield the withdrawal of the bulk of 41 Division, of which an additional 5000 troops are thought to have moved to HANSA BAY. As a result of these movements, the following changes in enemy strength are recorded :-

HOLLANDIA - VANIMO	...	15,000
HANSA BAY	...	23,000
MADANG	...	10,000

In the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS, the deduction of known killed has reduced the total estimated strength to 500 of which it is likely that only 200 are effective troops.

Total enemy strengths by sectors are now estimated as follows :-

NW SECTOR	.....	189,000
NE SECTOR	.....	152,250
SWPA	.....	341,250

Recent events in the CENTRAL PACIFIC have illustrated to the Japanese the need for adequate defences on the individual groups throughout the MANDATED ISLANDS and on 18 Mar 44 the estimated distribution of enemy strength was as follows :-

CAROLINE ISLANDS	...	29,500
LADRONE ISLANDS	...	8,000
MARSHALL ISLANDS	...	19,000
WAKE ISLAND	...	7,000
NAURU-OCEAN ISLANDS	...	7,000
TOTAL	...	70,500

(b) AIR:

NW SECTOR:

A further increase in fighter and bomber strengths in the HALLAMHERAS is noted, and a large decrease of 52 fighters and 99 bombers in the CELEBES would indicate that these aircraft have been moved to the PHILIPPINES, where a substantial increase in air strength has been observed.

NE SECTOR:

NEW GUINEA: Despite recent heavy losses, enemy air strength in NEW GUINEA shows only a slight decrease for the week, thereby indicating that reinforcements are being brought in. Indications of a possible connection between aircraft in the PHILIPPINES and those in NEW GUINEA, would suggest that the air strength in this Sector is being reinforced from the PHILIPPINES, possibly DAVAO.

NEW BRITAIN: The sighting of 16 planes in NEW BRITAIN, a further decrease over last week's estimate, is consistent with the condition of his airfields in this area, the majority of which are incapable of carrying planes. A captured document discloses that ground personnel in the RABUL area are being recruited for training as air gunners in the Army Air Service. This suggests that the enemy's need for acquiring air personnel in this area is urgent, probably due to the isolation of this Sector, thereby compelling them to act as a self-supporting force.

Attached hereto as appendix 'B' is a graph showing the fluctuation of Japanese Operational Air Strength by sectors during Mar 44. A comparison is also shown with the strengths in the same sectors in Jun 43.

Section 5: ORGANISATION:

(a) 1 Mobile Shipborne Brigade: Information obtained during operations in the CENTRAL PACIFIC, have revealed the existence of a No 1 Mobile Shipborne Brigade. This newly identified formation is another example of the forming of a special type of formation for a particular role - in this case, the defence of scattered islands.

Although little is known of the manner in which the Brigade was organised, it would appear that in Nov 43, 15 Independent Garrison Infantry Battalion, located in MANCHURIA, underwent a re-organisation that transformed it into 2 Battalion, 1 Mobile Shipborne Brigade, and most of the officers retained their commands in the new organisation.

3 Battalion was also organised at the same date, and evidence suggests that it was formerly 16 Independent Garrison Infantry Battalion. Other troops are known to have been drawn from 4 and 5 Armies and 14 and 28 Divisions, and possibly from 10 Trench Mortar Battalion.

The Mobile Shipborne Brigade is a self-contained group composed of three battalion groups plus Tank, Machine Cannon, Engineer, Signals and Medical Units. Each Battalion Group includes a mountain artillery battery of four 75mm guns. There are only three infantry companies to each battalion, the numbers running consecutively from 1-9 within the Brigade. The strength of the Brigade is estimated to total approximately 4000.

In Dec 43, 1 Mobile Shipborne Brigade was disposed over the main islands of the MARSHALL GROUP.

**R**



\_\_\_\_\_


—

23

20

2

## References

The symbol  ("KA) presumably indicates the incendiary filling and is painted in white on the body of the projectile.

(Adapted from AMF Review No 88)

(b) Japanese 47mm "Type 01" Rapid Fire Gun: The detailed description and illustrations of this weapon are attached as Appendices 'C(i)' and 'C(ii)' respectively.

(c) Japanese Supply Rafts: A number of Japanese Supply Rafts were destroyed by PT boats off the SIO coast during Dec 43. These rafts were 10 feet long, four feet wide and six feet deep, and consisted of 150 to 200 bags lashed together to form one raft. Each bag had a burlap cover and inside this was a rubber waterproof bag, with a second rubber bag inside, the latter containing provisions. Enough air was left in each bag to provide buoyancy and the raft had a draught of four feet, leaving two feet above the surface. Bags taken as samples weighed 55 to 60 pounds and contained food.

On the above basis, each raft would carry at least four tons of food. It is considered that the rafts would be suitable for carriage as deck cargo by submarine. Smaller rafts constructed of three five-gallon drums loosely lashed together had wooden boxes secured beneath them but were too heavy to be lifted on board the PT boats.

(AMF Review No 87, from Australian Station (Navy) Intelligence Summary No 64)

## Section 7: TACTICS:

In recent operations in the SWPA Japanese tactics have included the use of various types of raiding parties or units for specific suicide tasks and the latest of these - the MOBILE RAIDING UNIT - has been dealt with in a manual issued by 8 Area Army in Dec 43. The following extracts are from this manual and describe in detail the nature and function of this type of unit :-

"Operations against wild, primitive and isolated islands where land and sea communication is difficult and where the enemy has sea and air superiority are characteristic of operations in the SE Area. Enemy counter-attacks have intensified considerably. Their plan is to advance their bases successively from island to island and from keypoint to keypoint along the beaches. This much-employed tactic is designed to establish strong air and shipping bases. A portion of their forces (usually with one regiment as the nucleus) lands against weakly defended or undefended areas, and after the landing has been completed, their forces are gradually increased and their foothold is expanded, thus establishing a base for future offensive actions.

Against such enemy tactics, it is extremely important to attack and annihilate the enemy during the early phase of his landing while his foothold is not securely held. However, owing to the terrain, condition of communication net-work, our troop dispositions, etc., a swift counter-attack on land is often impossible.

It is for this reason that the MOBILE RAIDING UNIT (to be referred to as KESSEN TAI) has been formed with the purpose of counter landing suddenly and in force to the rear of the enemy and destroying them during the initial phase of operations.

Considering the psychology and character of the enemy, it is not very difficult to imagine his fears and doubts when he discovers that he has rushed headlong into our midst. With a firm esprit de corps and the will to win, powerful blows against the enemy and annihilation of the enemy would not by any means be an impossibility. If such tactics are successful, the enemy will lose courage and will be forced to cancel or alter his plans, resulting eventually in complete victory for our forces in the SE Area.

#### General Principles

1. The mission of a MOBILE RAIDING UNIT is to counter-land against an enemy landing point and attack and destroy the enemy landing forces.
2. The MOBILE RAIDING UNIT will be ordered to attack immediately after an enemy landing, often without a clear picture of the situation.
3. The MOBILE RAIDING UNIT will land on naval craft or high-speed boats. The unit will land immediately after an enemy landing (if possible, the night of the landing or the following night) and make a sudden thrust with support of air and sea forces if possible.
4. Landing operations of the MOBILE RAIDING UNIT will be carried out through Army and Navy co-operation, or by the Army alone.

#### Preparations for Landing

5. Prior to movement, draw up various plans and orders. Familiarise troops with them. Be prepared to set out on short notice.
6. Selection of landing point is most vital. It must be made within enemy's landing area.
7. Endeavour to deploy main force along front line. Attach a part of Engrs, Sigs and such units to each company so that they can act independently.

#### Departure and Movement at Sea

8. Usually collapsible boats will be securely tied to sides of destroyers. Small MLC will be hung from davits. Large MLC will be towed. Landing preparations must be completed at least one hour prior to entering anchorage. If situation permits, landing may be made by barges directly from the base instead of using naval ships.

#### Landing Combat

9. When the troops are transferred into barges from ships, each barge will proceed to a designated point and come under barge unit commanders' control. Then, each barge will assemble at a pre-arranged assembly point (usually near No 1 ship's hull, facing the beach, or its after part). When all barges are assembled they will start out in a prescribed formation under MOBILE RAIDING UNIT Commander. Starting order will be given by concealed signal light.

10. As the unit approaches the shore, the formation will be deployed. Each company will advance in a single horizontal front. (Collapsible boats will be towed or tied to small MLC). Before landing, companies will deploy their platoons and then make the landing. For coverage, a naval barrage may be used, depending on conditions; but usually this will not be done.
11. When attacked by enemy torpedo boats, take initiative and attack them with a portion of armed barges while the main force continues its advance. If attacked by enemy aircraft, continue on the advance. It is usually advisable not to fire anti-aircraft.
12. As soon as barges reach the beach, annihilate the enemy and destroy or burn their equipment, ammunition, fuel, etc. Continue to push on to the objective. Endeavour to acquire the utmost result before dawn.
13. Continue the attack with absolute reliance on cold steel disregarding losses. However, once the fighting subsides, capture worthy staff officers for intelligence purposes, or utilise captured equipment.
14. At daybreak, while the attack is being carried out, move to daytime disposition and continue on. At such time, forces should not be concentrated in order to minimise the loss from artillery shelling. However, the pressure of attack must not be let up by giving too much consideration to safety of personnel.
15. If MOBILE RAIDING UNIT lands at a place other than previously planned, one of the following measures must be taken :-
  - (a) Counter-land on enemy line from the sea.
  - (b) Advance overland.
  - (c) Make preparations near enemy landing point for counter-landing the following night.

This should be decided upon in accordance with the distance between enemy line and landing beach, time of landing, terrain, etc."

#### Section 9: GENERAL:

The Japan-Soviet Fishing Convention: The recently concluded negotiations for the extension of the Fishery Convention for five years is, on face value, merely a trade agreement between the two countries, and yet it is likely to have a far reaching effect upon the war in the SOUTH PACIFIC especially in regard to the availability of troops.

The relationship between the two countries has, since the creation of MANCHOUKUO as an independent state in 1932, been continually strained. Whilst JAPAN appeared to be materially and militarily the stronger, the Soviet made every effort to avoid a clash to such an extent that in 1932 she proposed a non-aggression pact which JAPAN immediately rejected, and later, although the balance of power was almost equal, the Soviet conceded JAPAN the eastern Chinese railway. Finally however, the Russians reached a strong state of military and economic superiority over the Japanese and in Aug 1938 at CHANGKUFENG, and in 1939 at NOMONHAN, made tests of this

superiority in clashes which could each have been the opening phases of war between the two countries. In the latter battle JAPAN suffered a decisive defeat and admitted the loss of 18,000 troops. This - in what was virtually a frontier skirmish - was probably an important factor in JAPAN's revision of her policies to allow for appeasement in the north, and turned Japanese attention to the "Southward Expansion" Programme. In spite of this change of focus however, the Soviet threat and obligations to GERMANY probably made it necessary for JAPAN to maintain an Army in MANCHOUKUO far beyond that needed for the normal policing of the country.

In regard to trade, there had been numerous disputes over Japanese fishing rights in Russian waters and Japanese coal and oil leases in northern SAKHALIEN. Shortly after the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, a Fisheries Convention defined the areas in Russian waters where the Japanese fishing industry might be developed, but in 1928, due to the increase of Russian competition in this industry, a new Convention was drawn up and by 1935 RUSSIA had more fishing boats operating in the waters under discussion than the Japanese. Thus in 1936 when the Convention was revised, a certain degree of friction existed between the two countries and it was decided to renew the Convention provisionally for one year only. This has been an annual occurrence since that time although it was announced in 1940 that a joint commission would be set up to negotiate a permanent fishing agreement. In SAKHALIEN, a partition had been drawn up defining the areas under control of each country following the war of 1905, but in 1938 a dispute arose in regard to the Japanese coal and oil concessions in the Russian half of the island and was not settled until eight months later when Soviet employees working in Japanese concessions were granted a 15% wage increase.

By this latest agreement which has been extended for five years, the Japanese have gained access to 80% of the fishery grounds - not including those areas wherein navigation is prohibited - in return for this favour they have returned to RUSSIA the coal and oil concessions in Northern SAKHALIEN. The intricate possibilities which may have caused this change of face are too complex to be within the scope of this review, but, because of the underlying enmity which exists, it is doubtful if it arose from mutual trust. Rather would it seem that both countries have obligations in other sectors which will not permit them to become involved in yet another "incident", and for that reason a mutual agreement of appeasement has been adopted ... for the time being.

It is of significance that whilst this new agreement has been in process of negotiation - possibly five to six months - an Army Headquarters and at least two divisions have moved or are moving from MANCHOUKUO to the SWPA. Thus, depending upon the extent of trust which one party is ready to place upon the word of the other, it is possible that this Convention may pave the way for the transfer of further Japanese troops - now engaged on garrison duties - to areas of immediate combat importance in more southern regions.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

JAPEN, NOEMFOOR and SCHOUTEN ISLANDS: The recent and continued heavy air attacks on HOLLANDIA and nearby airfields, must have the effect of neutralising it as a Japanese base. It can be anticipated therefore that the Japanese will prepare bases further west to take its place. The following topographical information regarding JAPEN, NOEMFOOR and SCHOUTEN ISLANDS in GEELVINK BAY is given with the object of considering their potentialities as further bases, in view of their proximity to the Headquarters at MANOKWARI.

1. JAPEN ISLAND:

JAPEN ISLAND lies in an E/W direction halfway across the northern end of GEELVINK BAY - it is some 90 miles in length and roughly 10 miles in width. The southern side has an irregular coastline with numerous small bays and bights, most of which offer protected anchorages during NW season, but only partial shelter during the SE season. The northern coast is less dissected, with a coastline that has few harbours. It is much less populated than the southern side. Through the centre of the island runs an uninterrupted chain of mountains which rise to 5000 feet and are steep and rugged, but descend to hills on eastern and western ends.

The administrative centre, and largest town in JAPEN is SEROEI and has the best port facilities on the southern coast. No known Japanese airfields exist on JAPEN, and suitable sites are believed to be very few. The most likely place is at SEROEI, which is also a very suitable flying boat base. The southern coast provides many more anchorages and good beaches than the northern side and is therefore more suitable for any anticipated landings. There are very few inland trails as most of the travelling is done in small native boats. There is no known track across the island.

2. NOEMFOOR ISLAND:

This low nearly circular island rises to a maximum elevation of 600 feet and is encircled by a wide barrier reef on the northern, eastern and southern sides and by a fringing reef on the west.

Various excellent anchorages for small boats can be found inside the reef. The best known being TELOK, ROEMBOI and JENMANOE. There are scattered villages along the coast, but the interior is seldom visited. Good landing beaches exist inside the coral reefs. At present the Japanese have two airfields on the island, viz : KAMIRI (operational) and NAMBER (under construction). On account of the rough nature of the island, it is believed to be unlikely that other suitable airfield sites exist.

3. SCHOUTEN GROUP:

Consists of two islands - SOEPIORI and BIAK.

SOEPIORI has a very rugged coastline and poor anchorages. The coast cannot be walked along shore and there are no inland trails. The island is 25 miles long and 15 miles wide and has two mountain ridges, the highest point being 3380 feet. In general, the interior is unfertile and sparsely populated.



BLAK: The northern coast may be approached closely in boats and there are many good anchorages for small vessels, the main anchorage being in KORIM BAY. The SW coast is fringed with coral reef, rocky beaches and steep cliffs. The western shoreline cannot be walked but there are inland trails parallel to the coast. The southern coast is much the same as the western with low limestone cliffs 20 to 30 feet rising sheer from either the fringing reefs or narrow sandy beach. The best anchorages are at BOSNIK and SORIDO. The island is 50 miles long and 25 miles wide and is entirely different to SOEPIORI ISLAND. With the exception of a few hills in the NW the island is a region of low flat topped limestone hills never rising above 900 feet. Water is scarce and most running streams are brackish. No known airfield exists on this group of islands. A rough reconnaissance was made by the Netherlands Army prior to the outbreak of war but no suitable sites were found. Best possibilities seem to be in the vicinity of BOSNIK and MOKMER.

(b) INDEX to places mentioned in this summary which may not be commonly known :-

NORTH EASTERN SECTOR

<u>PLACE</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>LAT</u>		<u>LONG</u>	
		<u>Deg</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Deg</u>	<u>Min</u>
ALI ISLAND	NEW GUINEA	3	08	142	29
BOKONGTATA	NEW BRITAIN	5	31	151	54
CAPE TORKORO	NEW BRITAIN	4	55	151	22
MAMAGATA	BOUGAINVILLE	6	45	155	25
MATONG	NEW BRITAIN	5	32	151	47
PUL PUL (BILANPUN)	NEW BRITAIN	5	31	151	56
TATONGPAI	NEW BRITAIN	5	39	151	29
TUMLEO ISLAND	NEW GUINEA	3	08	142	24
WUNUNG	NEW BRITAIN	5	34	151	28

NORTH WESTERN SECTOR

CAPE BATOEPEKAT	BOEROE ISLAND	3	51	126	42
DAH	DUTCH NEW GUINEA	7	25	139	00
ROEMBERPON STRAIT	DUTCH NEW GUINEA	1	47	134	08

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

BURMA:

The progress made by the Japanese troops in their attempt to isolate the British base of IMPHAL has been not inconsiderable during the past week and it has become evident that their intention is to seize the town of KOHIMA through which supplies for IMPHAL must pass. If the Japs cannot secure KOHIMA before the commencement of the monsoonal season, they will be unable to maintain their lines of communication to their forward troops in the coming months. There are sufficient British troops to hold the town and it would be a serious strategic loss for the Allies as well as being a dangerous propaganda weapon for the Japanese who desire to establish a puppet INDIAN National Government on INDIAN soil.

On the ARAKAN and KALADAN VALLEY fronts, operations have been limited to patrol activity only and several minor Jap attacks have proved both costly and fruitless.

In the CHIN HILLS, British and Indian troops have been forced to evacuate a salient in the vicinity of TIDDIM, but in their orderly withdrawal heavy casualties were inflicted on Jap troops endeavouring to encircle them.

West of the CHINDWIN area, various parties of Japs have penetrated to within 14 miles of IMPHAL but are being held. The road between IMPHAL and KOHIMA has been cut in two places by the Japs and Jap advanced elements are within two miles of the latter town but are being strongly counter-attacked.

Further Chinese and American advances have been made down the HUKAWNG and MOGAUNG VALLEYS and the large Jap base of MYITKYINA is being directly threatened, Chinese troops being within 40 miles of the town. The loss of MYITKYINA would reverse the position in northern BURMA and cause serious difficulties for the enemy.

No further news is available regarding the British airborne force in the KATHA area. It is now stated that a second airborne force has established itself between the IRAWADDY and CHINDWIN RIVERS, to the west of the previous landing.

#### ITALY:

Static conditions prevail on all fronts in ITALY, except for some artillery exchanges and patrolling activity. German forces remain at the same overall strength, although there are indications that mobile formations are being removed from front line to reserve positions, no doubt in anticipation of their being required in other parts of EUROPE at short notice.

#### RUSSIA:

The Russian drives into RUMANIA and POLAND have again made considerable progress during the past week, especially into the former country, where the results of Allied air raids on the larger cities are having their effect on the morale of Rumanian troops. Despite German claims that Russian troops are still attempting to penetrate the defences of PSKOV and VITEBSK, there has been no confirmation of this from MOSCOW.

On the southern front, Russian troops are now fighting within ODESSA, having captured the railway station, three miles from the centre of the town, and now virtually control the Germans' last remaining escape route - the narrow gauge railway SW from the town which crosses the mouth of the DNIESTER Estuary. The large body of German troops which were encircled NW of the town have been wiped out, and German-held Russian territory east of the DNIESTER has now dwindled to practically nil.

Further to the west, the Russian troops who drove through BESSARABIA, have now by-passed JASSY in RUMANIA by cutting the railway running west from the town. This operation has caused the German Command to evacuate JASSY and set up Headquarters in BUCHAREST. NW of JASSY, the Russians have penetrated to the SERET RIVER along a front extending to the old CZECHO-SLOVAK border. Across the SERET, the Carpathians present an obstacle which will no doubt slow down Russian progress in that direction. It is expected that the full weight of Russian forces in this area will be turned to the SE in the direction of the Rumanian oilfields so essential to GERMANY.

The Russian force which thrust Sd from CERNAUTI has also advanced to the CZECHO-SLOVAK frontier and secured the strategically important JABLONICA (or TARTAR) PASS. These forces are now in a position to drive through RUTHENIA into HUNGARY.

Along the front running north from the Carpathians, stiffer resistance by the Germans has been encountered and German counter-attacks are reported from STANISLAWOW, TARNOPOL and KOWEL. The counter-attack in the TARNOPOL area was evidently designed to aid the encircled German troops still fighting in that city. SE of TARNOPOL, the pocket of German troops in the vicinity of SKALA is being gradually but systematically liquidated.

#### PART V

#### SECURITY

Security of Movement: Reports are being continually received that units when warned for movement, do not pay sufficient attention to safeguarding the security of the move.

Some personnel, who are employed in work of a confidential nature, are very security-minded concerning the secret information in their possession, but when affected personally by a move, cannot resist the temptation of confiding what is about to happen to their friends.

In many instances civilians in nearby towns know full particulars of the move even before some of the troops. It is not necessarily the case that these people have actually been informed that the unit is moving - they notice that appointments are being put off and sporting fixtures and orders from local tradespeople cancelled, etc., and by putting all this information together can almost deduce the date of departure of the unit.

The enemy also seem to have their troubles in this respect and endeavours made by them to obtain security of movement are shown in the following extract from a captured Japanese document :-

"Words concerning boats, embarkation, summer clothing, and the word "South" are strictly prohibited.

The packing of summer clothing will be done in such a manner that it will be impossible to determine the contents of the package from the outside. Do this today.


All unit commanders will give instructions for thorough understanding of security. Interior duty squad leaders will give instructions at opportune times."

When a unit is advised to move only those persons who must know in order to carry out their duties should be advised, and it is essential that every effort should be made to enforce security measures and prevent any leakage of information.


*C. J. H. H. H.*  
11/21  
for Lt-Col  
GS FIRST AUST ARMY



# COMPARISON OF ENEMY OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT STRENGTHS BY AREAS JUN '43 AND MAR '44.



000832D



JAPANESE 47mm (1.85 in) TYPE 01 (1941) RAPID FIRE GUN

The following details, characteristics and photographs of the Japanese 47mm Type 01 (1941) Rapid Fire Gun have been extracted from a report prepared by ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND, USA.

GENERAL:

This weapon is a split trail Rapid Fire or Tk A Gun of modern design, with a long barrel heavily reinforced at the muzzle.

The Breech Block is of the horizontal sliding wedge type, semi automatic in action and resembles that of the Type 94 (1934) 37mm Rapid Fire Gun.

The Firing Mechanism is of the percussion hammer type. This hammer is hinged to the lower part of the breech ring and can be fired either by a lanyard or by pressure on the firing plunger located in the centre of the elevating hand wheel on the left hand side of the gun. The firing mechanism is cocked on counter recoil.

The Gun Carriage of welded steel construction, is low, unusually wide, and fitted with knee action, shock absorbers, and pneumatic tyres which facilitate towing by MT.

The Trails are unusually long and fitted with a locking yoke and handles.

The Sighting Equipment on the weapon was incomplete, but the available parts indicate that a straight tube telescope is used for sighting. The sight bracket is mounted on the left and the range drum on the right of the piece.

The window for the range drum (which is missing), is wide enough to allow the reading of three scales on the range drum. It is assumed that the range drum has a range scale for the AP-HE projectile, the HE projectile and a scale graduated into regular angular divisions.

The Shield is constructed of 4mm steel armour and is fastened by four brackets to the top of the carriage. Openings in the shield allow sighting.

An apron of the same thickness steel is attached to the lower carriage of the weapon and affords protection from small arms fire and shell fragments.

CHARACTERISTICS:

Calibre	:	47mm (1.85 in)
Bore diameter between lands	:	1.85 in
at muzzle	:	
Bore diameter between	:	
grooves at muzzle	:	1.89 in
Length of Rifling	:	85.30 in
Length of Chamber	:	11.10 in
Rifling	:	Uniform RH 16 Lands and Grooves

CHARACTERISTICS (Contd)

Length of Gun	:	99.48 in
Weight of Gun	:	1660 lb
Elevation	:	19°
Depression	:	11°
Traverse	:	60°
Shield	:	4mm Armour Plate
Manufacturer	:	Osaka Army Arsenal
Ammunition	:	HE and AP-HE
Weights -		
HE Projectile	:	3.37 lb
AP-HE Projectile	:	3.08 lb
Average Muzzle Velocity -		
HE	:	2735 FPS
AP-HE	:	2701 FPS

FIRING TESTS:

This Japanese weapon was found to be inferior to the US 37mm anti-tank gun used with APC M51 ammunition against 1½ inch homogeneous armour plate at 20 degrees. The Japanese projectile is not capped and has a brittle nose, so that it tends to break up when fired at this angle. The Japanese weapon was found to be slightly superior to the US 37mm anti-tank gun used with APC M51 ammunition against 2½ inch homogeneous armour plate at 0 degrees. The Japanese projectile was very poor for penetration of face-hardened armour. The high explosive charge failed to explode in a number of instances.

From this it may be concluded that the Japanese 47mm anti-tank gun will normally be equal or somewhat inferior to the US 37mm gun and ammunition against homogeneous armour under combat conditions, and that it will be definitely inferior to the US 37mm gun and ammunition when used against face hardened armour.



REMARKS:

The appearance of this weapon, possessing a higher calibre, and markings of recent year of design and manufacture may indicate that Japan is following more closely German or Russian trends; in an endeavour to increase fire power and counter the heavy armour on the latest model tanks.

In general, overall design the piece resembles later models of the ZIK 45mm Russian Tk A Gun which are reported to be developments and modifications of the original German RHEINMETAL designs.

(AMF Review No. 88)

**JAPANESE**  
47mm (1.85 in.) MODEL O1 (1941)  
**RAPID FIRE GUN**  
(Tk A)





DISTRIBUTIONCOPY NO

1 Aust Corps	1 - 5
4 Aust Div	6 - 11
3 Aust Inf Bde	12
BRISBANE Fortress	13
TOWNSVILLE Fortress	14
CAIRNS Fortress	15
Corps HQ VDC Q'LD	16
Aust Trg Centre (Jungle Warfare)	17 - 20
BRA	21 - 26
BAA & CA	27
CE	28 - 30
Sigs First Aust Army	31
7 Aust Comd AL Sec	32
First Aust Army Junior Staff School	33
First Aust Army Regt Trg School	34
First Aust Army School of Sigs	35
First Aust Army AASC School	36
LHQ (Aust)	37
Adv LHQ	38 - 42
6 US Army	43
Second Aust Army	44 - 45
NG Force	46
3 Aust Corps	47
NT Force	48
Q'LAND L of C Area	49 - 52
FELO	53
LHQ School of MI	54 - 55
Security Service CANBERRA (for Military LO)	56
NOIC BRISBANE (for SO (I) RAN)	57
GOC	58
G(O)	59
G(I)	60 - 65
G(SD)	66
CSO	67
DA & QMG	68
A (one copy to circulate to: AMS, Legal Chaplains, Medical, Pro and Education)	69 - 70
Q (one copy to circulate to: S & T, Ord, AE & ME and Postal)	71 - 73
Svy	74
War Diary	75 - 76
File	77

Please destroy by fire after perusal.

---

MESSAGE FORM

CALL IN 3 aust inf bde )  
AND TOWNSVILLE fortress } by any means  
INSTRUCTIONS OUT 7 aust comd AL sec } except wireless  
4 aust div }  
CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies } by ALS  
remainder by DRLS

Copy to:  
GOC  
EGS  
G(O)  
G2(AIR)  
G(I)  
G(SD)  
DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2711 12

secret (.) landops revsit 623 to 120015Z apr (.)

landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 9 apr allied tps occupied area east of TOROKINA RIVER to MAVAVIA (one and one half mls east of river) (.) 46 japs killed during engagement hill 165 - east of TOROKINA RIVER fork (.) 8 mar to 8 apr 5370 japs counted killed (.) 8 apr allied party landed NUGURIA ISLAND (85 mls north NISSAN ISLAND) found only friendly natives who stated no japs on island for several months (.)

ST MATTHIAS GROUP (.) night 8/9 apr allied lt naval units landed recon party MUSSAU ISLAND (.) no enemy activity reported on ISLAND (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 6-10 apr inclusive 49 japs captured 10 killed TALASEA area (.)

BOGADJIM AREA (.) 10 apr patrols reached pts three quarters of a ml south WENGA 700 yds SSE ALIBU 1 and one ml south REREO without contacting enemy (.) patrol to SUNGUM contacted US tps (.) our tps engaged japs posn near bridge 6 (two and one quarter mls NE AIYAU) (.) our tps successfully attacked and occupied posn one half ml NNW bridge 6 and moving south encountered opposition one quarter ml NNW bridge 6 (.) patrol reached KEKU (three mls north AIYAU) via BELAIYA (two and three quarter mls NNW AIYAU) no contact (.) patrol north along MINDJIM RIVER through JAM JAM to rd junct one and three quarter mls NW MINDJIM saw no movement (.)

airops (.)

allied (.) ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 092315Z eleven a/c bombed PAK ISLAND (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 100200Z four a/c bombed A/A guns ULIGAN HARBOUR (.) 100012Z sixty one a/c dropped 228 tons bombs A/A posns HANSA BAY (.) 110119Z six a/c bombed A/A posns south EKV village (HANSA BAY)

110101Z twenty two a/c bombed strafed A/A posns pers areas WENAK  
starting several fires (.)  
soa (.)

NEW-BRITAIN (.) 102130Z one sub 12 mls NE CAPE GLOUCESTER (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) night 7/8 apr MTBs attacked four barges NEPTUNE  
pt prob sinking one damaging others (.) 100045Z warships covered by  
eight a/c shelled installations HANSA BAY (.) LAING ISLAND completely  
devastated (.) same warships on their retirement covered by further  
twelve a/c bombarded ULIGAN HARBOUR ALEXISHAFEN and MADANG (.) 10 apr  
four small ships (prob luggers) HANSA BAY (.) 110114Z 10 barges  
SELEO ISLAND attacked by a/c which left several burning (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 090245Z five med merchant vessels MAFFIN  
BAY (eight mls west by south WAKDE ISLAND) (.) ref revsit 621 8000  
ton vessel east WAKDE ISLAND now reported as 800 tons (.) 110045Z  
one sub 165 mls north by east WAKDE ISLAND prob damaged by a/c (.)  
all informed

---

This message may be sent as  
WRITTEN except by wireless

TCO 121510K

TOR

*110101Z*  
*.....*  
*110101Z*

MESSAGE FORM

CALL IN 3 aust inf bde } by any means  
AND TOWNSVILLE fortress } except wireless  
INSTRUCTIONS OUT 7 aust comd AL sec }  
4 aust div } by ALS  
CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies }  
remainder by DRLS

Copy to -  
GOC  
BGS  
G(O)  
G2(AIR)  
G(I)  
G(SD)  
DA & QMG

---

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBAIE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2716 13

secret (.) landops revsit 624 to 130115Z apr (.)

landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 11 apr considerable enemy activity reported north of SAUA RIVER where defs being prepared (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 11 apr patrolling continues MANUS PAK and RAMEUTYO ISLANDS (.) allied tps landed HULUNGAU ISLAND (adjoining PAK) unopposed (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) SAIDOR (.) 11 apr patrols found 104 jap dead  
BAMBU - GWARAWON (.)

BOGADJINT AREA (.) following harassing fire night 10/11 apr jap posn one quarter of one ml NNW br 6 occupied 11 apr without opposition (.) patrol to rd 1200 yds SW EAU-AK found only one dead jap (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 11 apr 21 FBs attacked gun posns AITARA MISSION sup dump MARIRICI RIVER 18 DBs bombed gun posns MAMAGATA MISSION (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) following strikes RABAU area 10 apr (.) seven A/C harassed airfields 58 DBs dropped 42 tons VUNAPOPE RALUANA PT KERAVAL BAY starting fires RALUANA 22 A/C hit RATAVAL starting fires sup areas 21 DBs attacked TALILI BAY destroying 12 buildings 43 FBs hit TOBERA scoring 30 hits runway (.) 16 A/C destroyed one damaged two barges LASSUL BAY prob destroyed one barge URI PLM (west coast DUKE YORK ISLAND) (.) 11 apr 39 FBs attacked east edge RABAU town 12 A/C bombed ann dump TALILI BAY (.) A/C strafed one 100 ft craft east of LAKUNAI causing explosion and strafed damaged two barges RAMANDU (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 11 apr eight A/C strafed enemy posns south WENGA (.) 11 apr 16 A/C attacked buildings and ground installations KARKAR ISLAND (.) nine A/C bombed ULIGAN HARBOUR three A/C KRONPRINZ HARBOUR 12 A/C POTSDAM HARBOUR (.) 11 apr further 49 A/C attacked HANSA BAY scoring many hits through AA def area and starting fires (.) 11 apr 60 A/C bombed WEWAK and shipping in vicinity (.) two large fuel fires started BORAM (.) two enemy Fs intercepted one sqn (.) 12 apr six A/C bombed DAGUA starting two fires (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 12 apr 30 A/C attacked HOLLANDIA and TAMI strips scoring hits on strips and in dispersal area. TAMI (.) TIMOR (.) 12 apr two A/C bombed PENFOEI airfield (.) sea (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) night 11/12 apr MT boats destroyed two type A and two type B barges SW side ULAMONA COVE (.)

WITU ISLANDS (.) night 10/11 apr MT boats shelled PETER and JOHN ALBERT HARBOURS - GAROVE ISLAND (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 11 apr one 500/1000 ton freighter stationary WEWAK HARBOUR one prob 1500/2500 ton freighter burning off WEWAK PT one 1500 ton u/i vessel between MUSCHU and KAIRIRU ISLANDS one lugger WEWAK HARBOUR 23/30 barges in area (.) 11 apr two A/C bombed strafed and destroyed 10 barges VALIF ISLAND (.) 11 apr one A/C bombed and beached one small freighter VANIMO (.) 12 apr three 500/1000 ton freighters ANGRIEFS HARBOUR (VANIMO) three luggers west side VANIMO PT (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 11 apr eight gunboats one destroyer HOLLANDIA HARBOUR bombed by A/C causing one vessel to beach (.) vessel then strafed and damaged (.) 12 apr one 7000/10300 ton vessel five 500/1000 ton freighters one 1500/2500 ton prob freighter (.) A/C saw 7000/10300 ton vessel explode and sink all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

T0013/550K  
THI

18 w/D

MESSAGE FORM

CALL IN 3 aust inf bde )  
AND TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means  
INSTRUCTIONS. OUT 7 aust comd AL sec ) except wireless  
4 aust div )  
CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies) by ALS  
remainder by DRLS

Copy to :  
GOC  
EGS  
G(O)  
G2(AIR)  
G(I)  
G(SD)  
DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2717 14

secret (.) landops revsit 625 to 140015Z apr (.)

landops (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 13 apr patrolling only (.) PAK ISLAND  
reported clear (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM AREA (.) 12 apr patrol to BWAI (two and  
one half mls NW BAU-AK) no movt seen (.) patrol from 7 along rd  
reached track and rd junc (two and one quarter mls NE BAU-AK) (.) signs  
of movt estimated 30 japs BAU-AK otherwise no movt seen (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 120045Z ten a/c bombed TONOLEI HARBOUR (.)  
120030Z 21 a/c attacked biv area SAUA RIVER (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 102326Z forty one a/c bombed A/A posns and  
airfield KAVIENG (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) am 11 and am 12 apr seventy four a/c and 124 a/c  
respectively bombed A/A posns sup areas west RABAUL (including MALAGINA  
and TALILI BAY) scoring three direct hits 13 damaging near misses on  
guns destroying two buildings (.) am 11 apr and am 12 apr 24 and 7 a/c  
respectively bombed sup area RATAVAL causing three large explosions  
destroying three buildings (.) am 11 apr 23 fighter-bombers bombed  
airfield VUNAKANAU (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 112355Z twelve a/c bombed strafed enemy installations  
BOGIA FLN (.) 110050Z fifteen a/c intercepted and destroyed one enemy F  
WENAK (.) 12 apr three a/c bombed DAGUA (.) 130139 sixty three a/c  
dropped 225 tons bombs pers areas a/c guns DAGUA and BUT (.) most bombs  
target areas resulting 75 per cent pers areas destroyed four A/A posns  
destroyed or heavily damaged two amn dumps destroyed (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) am 12 apr two hundred and fifty a/c dropped  
322 tons bombs pers sup areas shipping A/A guns HOLLANDIA and strip  
TAMI (.) target areas well covered A/A guns hit buildings destroyed  
direct hits scored 3 prob US grounded BS near misses scored other  
grounded a/c HOLLANDIA fires started TAMI (.) 8 or approx 20 intercep-  
ting enemy Fs destroyed (.) attack HOLLANDIA TAMI reported revsit  
624 included in above attack (.)  
sea (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) ref revsit 624 delete all ref sightings 12  
apr and substitute six 500/1000 ton freighters (two which on fire)  
one 2000/4500 ton freighter three luggers destroyed three luggers  
damaged 24/34 barges (six which received two bomb hits) HOLLANDIA  
HARBOUR (.) 12 apr large number barges four luggers JAUTEFA BAY two  
luggers TANAHMERAH BAY six barges HUBOLDT BAY one 4000 ton u/1 (due  
heavy camouflage) vessel CAFE PIE (northern entrance JAUTEFA BAY)  
three large barges BOUGAINVILLE BAY (.) all informed

This message may be sent as  
WRITTEN except by wireless

TOO

THI

(19) 11/0

MESSAGE FORM

CALL IN TOWNSVILLE fortress )  
AND )by any means  
INSTRUCTIONS OUT 7 aust comd AL sec )except wireless  
4 aust div )  
CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies) by ALS  
remainder by DRLS

Copy to:

GOC  
BGS  
G(O)  
G2(AIR)  
G(I)  
G(SD)  
DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress  
BRISBANE fortress CAIRNS fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
FROM: first aust army corps HQ VDC Q'LAND Int 2719 15

secret (.) landops revsit 626to 150015Z apr (.)

landops (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 13 apr allied patrol reached posn one ml SW  
HOSKINS strip where ambushed (.) no allied cas (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM (.) 130330Z our patrol entered BOGADJIM  
and reconnoitred tracks north to GORI river and south to KUEALI mission  
and one half ml SW KUEALI mission (.) no movement seen (.) seven trucks  
found along BOGADJIM rd and dump engineers tools in pln one and one half  
mls SW BOGADJIM (.) patrol from YALUA to br over MILDJIE river three and  
one half mls ESE YALUA thence KARELEBU no movement seen (.) patrol en route  
WENGA joined patrol from BOGADJIM rd at ALIEU 1 (.) no movement seen (.)  
patrol to KALIKO and MALE reports enemy posn three quarters of one ml south  
KALIKO vacated (.) our troops investigating report japs in WANTOAT area  
(16 mls NE KAIAPIT) (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 120010Z nine a/c bombed strafed WENGA (five mls  
SSW BOGADJIM) (.) 120200Z eight a/c strafed coastal area ULIGAN HARBOUR  
to BOGADJIM HARBOUR (.) 130303Z twenty four a/c bombed strafed airfields  
direct  
BUT DAGUA scoring/hits two grounded Bs setting three grounded Fs on  
fire exploding fuel dump (.) 130215Z thirty three a/c bombed strafed  
stores installations AITAPU area (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 121401Z six a/c bombed sup area and airfield  
WAKDE ISLAND (.)



-2-

NEW GUINEA (.) am 13 apr two large luggers or poss 500/1000  
ton freighters KAIRIRU five luggers approx 26 barges WEMAK area six barges  
TADJI (.) 140300Z three luggers attacked and destroyed by two a/c  
PRITWITZ PT (.) further five luggers seen in VANIMO area (.)

PRITZWITZ PT (.) further five luggers seen in VANIMO area (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 140245Z three small merchant vessels 20  
mls NW HAPIA ISLAND (120 mls NNE MANOKWARI) attacked by one a/c which left  
two burning one of which considered destroyed (.) all informed

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless

TOO 151240K  
THI

THI

*George C. East*

MESSAGE FORM

Copy to:

CALL IN TOWNSVILLE fortress )  
AND )by any means  
INSTRUCTIONS OUT 7 aust comd AL sec )except wireless  
  
4 aust div )  
CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies )by ALS  
  
remainder by DRLS

GOC  
BGS  
G(O)  
G2(AIR)  
G(I)  
G(SD)  
DA & QMG

TO:	4 aust div	TOWNSVILLE fortress	
	BRISBANE fortress	CAIRNS fortress	7 aust comd AL sec
FROM:	first aust army	corps HQ VDC Q'LAND	15
		Int 2719	

secret (.) landops revsit 626to 150015Z apr (.)

landops (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 13 apr allied patrol reached posn one ml SW  
HOSKINS strip where ambushed (.) no allied cas (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM (.) 130330Z our patrol entered BOGADJIM  
and reconnoitred tracks north to GORI river and south to KUEALI mission  
and one half ml SW KUEALI mission (.) no movement seen (.) seven trucks  
found along BOGADJIM rd and dump engineers tools in pln one and one half  
mls SW BOGADJIM (.) patrol from YAULA to br over KINDJIE river three and  
onehalfmls ESE YAULA thence KAELEBU no movement seen (.) patrol en route  
WENGA joined patrol from BOGADJIM rd at ALIEU 1 (.) no movement seen (.)  
patrol to KALIKO and KALE reports enemy posn three quarters of one ml south  
KALIKO vacated (.) our troops investigating report japs in WANTOAT area  
(16 mls NE KAIAPIT) (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 120010Z nine a/c bombed strafed WENGA (five mls  
SSW BOGADJIM) (.) 120200Z eight a/c strafed coastal area ULIGAN HARBOUR  
to BOGADJIM HARBOUR (.) 130303Z twenty four a/c bombed strafed airfields  
direct  
BUT DAGUA scoring/hits two grounded Bs setting three grounded Fs on  
fire exploding fuel dump (.) 130215Z thirty three a/c bombed strafed  
stores installations AITAPE area (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 121401Z six a/c bombed sup area and airfield  
WAKDE ISLAND (.)

1. The first step in the process of the investigation is the identification of the problem. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem that is being investigated. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem that is being investigated.

[illegible]

20



●

2

三

五



4

4

N/D (20)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde	) by any means	Copy to:
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress		GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec	) except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div	) by ALS	G(O)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies		G2(AIR)
		remainder by DRLS		G(I)
				G(SD)
				DA&QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
 3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
 BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2722 16

secret(.) landops revsit 627 to 160005Z apr(.)

landops(.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS(.) 13 and 14 apr mopping up continued

12 enemy killed one captured MANUS(.) total casualties to 15 apr

30002 killed 24 captured(.)

NEW GUINEA(.) BOGADJIM AREA(.) 14 apr patrol to MALE reached  
 KALIKO saw no enemy mvt(.) patrol to REREO returned GELIM (two and  
 three-quarter mls NW NANGAPO) via WENGA(.) BOGADJIM patrol returned  
 AIYAU(.) patrol to ULILAI (eleven and three-quarter mls NW JAPPA)  
 reached IGOI (thirteen and three-quarter mls WNW JAPPA.)

WANTOAT(.) 13 apr patrol of det sent investigate presence  
 enemy engaged approx 20 japs two mls NE WANTOAT killed four remainder  
 fled(.) our tps investigating native reports large number enemy  
 headwaters WANTOAT IKWAP rivers(.)  
 airops(.)

allied(.) SOLOMONS(.) 13 apr 17 FBs attacked pers sup areas  
 MOSIGETTA MEIVO and MAIGI(.) 14 apr 57 FBs bombed strafed  
 TOROKINA perimeter area and to south destroying one coastal gun  
 MAMAGATA(.) 140360Z eight a/c bombed gun posns BUKA ISLAND  
 destroying one gun(.)

NEW IRELAND(.) 122140Z thirty-eight a/c bombed airfield  
 KAVIENG(.)

NEW BRITAIN(.) 13/14 apr following attacks carried out  
RABAU area(.) 68 a/c scored hits eight gun posns LAKUNAI(.)  
24 a/c started large fire and destroyed four buildings TALILI sup  
area(.) 40 FBs bombed MALAGUNA with excellent coverage(.) 47 Fs  
started numerous fires RABAU(.) 81 a/c scored hits seven gun posns  
VUNAKANAU(.) 24 a/c caused huge explosion RATAVAL sup area(.)  
28 a/c covered KABAIRA BAY(.) 8 a/c started one large fire VUNAPOPE  
(.) 42 a/c bombed VUNAKAMBI pln (two and one half mls north  
KERAVAL)(.) night 13/14 apr five a/c started several fires KABAIRA  
BAY(.)

NEW GUINEA(.) 150130Z thirty a/c bombed straffed villages  
and installations AITAPE area(.) AITAPE pers stores area heavily  
hit destroying buildings starting three large numerous small  
fires(.) PRO village destroyed numerous hits set on fire other  
villages(.)

TIMOR(.) 150020Z six a/c bombed straffed biv stores area SOE(.)  
sea(.)

SOLOMONS(.) 141005Z one poss sub near MUTUPINA PT and same  
day one poss 10 mls SW BUKA PASSAGE(.)

NEW BRITAIN(.) night 13/14 apr ITBs sank four destroyed two  
beached damaged two barges covered by u/1 a/c HENRY REID RIVER-  
MOUTH (WIDE BAY)(.)

NEW GUINEA(.) 122110Z six barges ULIGAN HARBOUR(.) 150022Z  
one burning ship 35 mls east AITAPE (.) all infm

This message may be sent  
AS WRITTEN except by wireless

TOO 16 1408 K  
THI

*Attn: Mr. G. H. Capt.*  
.....

W/O 21

MOST SECRET

WORLD REVIEW SITUATION NO. 66

The following World Review of the situation has been received from War Office, LONDON, covering the period 3 Apr to 10 Apr 44 :-

NAVAL:

NORTHERN WATERS: 3 Apr carrier-borne Barracuda aircraft with fighter escort attacked the "TIRPITZ" in ALTENFJORD. The attack was made as the ship was leaving the port enclosure; the accompanying smoke screen was ineffective. A preliminary estimate claims three hits with 1,600 lb A.P. bombs and seven with 600 and 500 lb bombs. A second attack was made and a further seven hits claimed.

A convoy of 49 ships has arrived safely in NORTH RUSSIA.

German cruisers are reported in the BALTIC.

MEDITERRANEAN: For the week ending 6 Apr 32,000 tons of stores and equipment were unloaded at ANZIO.

25 Mar HM submarine scored eighteen shell hits on a 5,000 ton tanker at ONEGLIA.

Provisional estimates of shipping losses for March show the low level of the preceding months.

SUMMARY ANTI-SUB ATTACKS DURING APRIL TO NOON 5 APR:

Attacks by:	shore-based aircraft	4
	carrier-borne "	1
	warships	3
Sunk or probably sunk		1
During March submarines sunk		14
	probably sunk	5
	possibly "	2
	" damaged	3

U-BOAT WARFARE:

For the week ending 2 Apr no Allied merchant ships were lost by U-boat action in any theatre.

One destroyer was torpedoed and sunk in the MEDITERRANEAN.

Eight ATLANTIC OCEAN convoys totalling 238 ships arrived without loss.

Contrary to German claims, U-boats operated ineffectively against North Russian convoy and escorts claim success with counter-attacks.

For the week ending 1 Apr imports in convoy to UK totalled 983,000 tons of which 557,000 tons were oil.

MILITARY:

RUSSIA: GENERAL: Russians completed the encirclement of German forces NW of KAMENETS PODOLSK. The Germans continue to counter-attack.

NORTHERN & CENTRAL SECTORS: The Germans claim defensive successes South of PSKOV and East of MOGILEV. Between PSKOV and KOWEL movement is largely restricted to roads by snow and marshes.

KOWEL-TARNOPOL SECTOR: The Russians are advancing on a 30 mile front astride the railway LUCK-LEWOW.

TARNOPOL-RABNITSA SECTOR: The Germans are counter-attacking strongly presumably in an attempt to relieve the forces completely encircled by the Russians. The size of the encircled force is not known and the position is obscure. Russians have enlarged the bridgehead over the PRUTH in HORODENKA-CERNAUTI area and established another, 50 miles NNW of JASSY. The Russian pressure southwards is maintained.

LOWER DNIESTER SECTOR: The Russians continue to press the enemy in the ODESSA area.

ITALY:

OPERATIONS: 5 Corps - Patrolling and raiding by both sides.

8th Army - Several small unsuccessful enemy attacks against CASSINO town and railway station.

5th Army - ANZIO Bridgehead - Strong enemy patrols penetrated our lines but later were repulsed. The shelling of ANZIO Port continues.

YUGOSLAVIA: Partisans have maintained the initiative in larger scale fighting.

AIR:

NIGHT: Average losses sustained in attacks on German targets during March totalled less than five.

DAY: 429 tons were dropped in scattered attacks on SW GERMANY. 613 tons dropped on ball-bearing plant and 226 tons on Daimler aircraft plant at STEYR. The raid was extremely successful, the main buildings being destroyed.

ECONOMIC:

According to captured documents German army order issued in 1943 stated that owing to raw material difficulties, motorised units would no longer receive first aid equipment, but only small box of essentials.

Reported 21 Feb that shortage of wagons added to congestion in important Bulgarian transshipment ports of SVISTOV and RUSSE on DANUBE. All port and certain warehouses full, transit goods being sorted in private warehouse pending allocation of rolling stock. Thus even before traffic diversions caused by cutting BALKAN Railway Transport System was adversely affected by wagon shortage.

GSI/  
16 apr 44

*Edmund C. Cope*  
1st Lt-Col  
GS FIRST AUST ARMY

Distributed by GSI First Aust Army for information of Comds or Heads  
of Branches or Services as set out below :-

1 Aust Corps	5	G(O)	1
4 Aust Div	3	G(SD)	1
HQ BRISBANE Fortress	1	Ban & Ca	1
HQ TOWNSVILLE Fortress	1	CSO	1
HQ CAIRNS Fortress	1	DA & QMG	1
Corps HQ VDC Q'LAND	1	Q (Circulate to AMS, LSO and AD Educ)	1
ERA	1		
CE	1	Q (Circulate to DDST and DDPS)	1
Q'LAND L of C area	1	War Diary	2
GOC	1	File	1
BGS	1		

---



22

SECRET

SUBJECT:- EXTRACTS FROM TRANSLATIONS  
OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY (AIF)

16 Apr 44  
GSI/7687

	<u>Copy No</u>		<u>Copy No</u>
1 Aust Corps	1 - 5	LHQ School of MI	26 - 29
4 Aust Div	6 - 11	GOC	30
BRISBANE Fortress	12	G(O)	31
TOWNSVILLE Fortress	13	G(I)	32 - 37
CAIRNS Fortress	14	G(SD)	38
Aust Trg Centre (JW)	15 - 16	BAL & CA	39
BRA	17 - 20	CE	40 - 42
Sigs First Aust Army	21	CSO	43
First Aust Army Junior		DA & QMG	44
Staff School	22	A	45 - 46
First Aust Army Regt		Q	47 - 48
Trg School	23	Svy	49
First Aust Army School		War Diary	50 - 51
of Sigs	24	File	52
First Aust Army ALSC			
School	25		

1. Forwarded herewith for your information is/are ....  
copy/copies of a publication produced by GSI First Aust Army  
and containing some extracts from translations of captured  
Japanese documents.

2. .... It is intended that this publication will be produced  
periodically dependent on the availability of relevant  
information.

*Cl. Man.*  
*may*  
for Brig  
GS FIRST AUST ARMY

W/D (22)

SECRET

Copy No.....51

# EXTRACTS FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

<u>INDEX TO CONTENTS</u>		
		<u>Page</u>
1.	THE SPIRIT OF BUSHIDO AND TREATMENT OF PRISONERS... ..	1
2.	THE HANDLING OF NATIVES ... ..	5
3.	THE LIFE OF A SEAMAN IN THE JAPANESE NAVY ... ..	8
4.	MORALE - SOLDIER AND CIVILIAN... ..	14
5.	THE RETREAT FROM SALAMUA ... ..	17
6.	EXPLOSION OF THE GUN ..... ..	21
7.	AIR SUPERIORITY AND MORALE ... ..	23

All documents and extracts in this publication have been translated and published by ATIS, SOUTH WEST PACIFIC.

Produced by  
GSI FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY.

The contents of this document will  
NOT be reproduced in any form.

16 Apr 44.

*Woghill*  
*for Lt-Col*  
GS FIRST AUST ARMY

THE SPIRIT OF BUSHIDO AND  
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

A. THE COMPASSIONATE SENTIMENTS OF JAPANESE BUSHIDO:

At the SALAMAU Observation Post, at 0110 hours on 30 Mar 43, a Japanese soldier decided "If ever I get back alive, this will make a good story to tell, so I will write it down." And this is what he wrote, "to the sound of the midnight waves", as his poetic nature prompted him to put it.

"BLOOD CARNIVAL"

"29 Mar 43. All four of us (Technician KUROKAWA, NISHIGUCHI, YAMATA and myself) assembled in front of the Hq at 1500 hours. One of the two members of the crew of the Douglas which was shot down by A/A on the 18th, and who had been under cross-examination by the 7th Base Force for some days, had been returned to the SALAMAU Garrison, and it had been decided to kill him. TAI Commander KOMAI, when he came to the observation station today, told us personally that, in accordance with the compassionate sentiments of Japanese BUSHIDO, he was going to kill the prisoner himself with his favourite sword. So we gathered to observe this. After we had waited a little more than ten minutes, the truck came along.

The prisoner, who is at the side of the guard house, is given his last drink of water etc. The Chief Medical Officer, TAI Commander KOMAI and the Hq Platoon Commander come out of the officers' mess, wearing their military swords. The time has come, so the prisoner, with his arms bound and his long hair now cropped very close, totters forward. He probably suspects what is afoot; but he is more composed than I thought he would be. Without more ado, he is put on the truck and we set out for our destination.

I have a seat next to the Chief Medical Officer; about ten guards ride with us. To the pleasant rumble of the engine, we run swiftly along the road in the growing twilight. The glowing sun has set behind the western hills, gigantic clouds rise before us, the dusk is falling all around. It will not be long now. As I picture the scene we are about to witness, my heart beats faster.

I glance at the prisoner: he has probably resigned himself to his fate. As though saying farewell to the world, as he sits in the truck he looks about, at the hills, at the sea, and seems deep in thought. I feel a surge of pity and turn my eyes away.

As we passed by the place where last year our lamented HAN leader was cremated, Technician NISHIGUCHI must have been thinking about him too, for he remarked, "It's a long time since we were here last." It certainly is a long time. We could see the place every day from the observation post, but never got a chance to come. It is nearly a year since the HAN leader was cremated. I was moved in spite of myself, and as I passed the place I closed my eyes and prayed for the repose of SHIMIZU's soul.

The truck runs along the sea shore. We have left the Navy guard sector behind us and now come into the Army guard sector. Here and there we see sentries in the grassy fields, and I thank them in my heart for their toil as we drive on. They must have got it in the bombing the night before last -

there are great holes by the side of the road, full of water from the rain. In a little over twenty minutes, we arrive at our destination, and all get off.

TAI Commander KOMAI stands up and says to the prisoner, "We are now going to kill you." When he tells the prisoner that in accordance with Japanese BUSHIDO he would be killed with a Japanese sword, and that he would have two or three minutes' grace, he listens with bowed head. The Flight-Lieutenant (T.N. in Japanese, "TAII" - this refers to the prisoner) says a few words in a low voice. Apparently he wants to be killed with one stroke of the sword. I hear him say the word "one" (T.N. in English). The TAI Commander becomes tense and his face stiffens as he replies, "Yes". (T.N. English).

Now the time has come, and the prisoner is made to kneel on the bank of a bomb crater filled with water. He is apparently resigned: the precaution is taken of surrounding him with guards with fixed bayonets, but he remains calm. He even stretches out his neck, and is very brave. When I put myself in the prisoner's place, and think that in one more minute it will be goodbye to this world, although the daily bombings have filled me with hate, ordinary human feelings make me pity him.

The TAI Commander has drawn his favourite sword. It is the famous OSAMUNE sword which he showed us at the observation post. It glitters in the light and sends a cold shiver down my spine. He taps the prisoner's neck lightly with the back of the blade, then raises it above his head with both arms, and brings it down with a sweep.

SSH! ..... It must be the sound of blood spurting from the arteries. With a sound as though something watery had been cut, the body falls forward. It is amazing - he had killed him with one stroke. The onlookers crowd forward. The head, detached from the trunk rolls in front of it. SSH! SSH! .... The dark blood gushes out.

All is over. The head is dead white, like a doll. The savageness which I felt only a little while ago is gone, and now I feel nothing but the true compassion of Japanese BUSHIDO. A senior corporal laughs loudly, "Well, he will enter Nirvana now!" Then, a superior seaman of the medical unit takes the Chief Medical Officer's Japanese sword and, intent on paying off old scores, turns the headless body over on its back, and cuts the abdomen open with one clean stroke. They are thick-skinned, these KETO (T.N. "Hairy foreigner" - common term of opprobrium for a white man). - even the skin of their bellies is thick. Not a drop of blood comes out of the body. It is pushed over into the crater at once and buried.

Now the wind blows mournfully and I see the scene again in my mind's eye. We get on to the truck again and start back. It is dark now. We get off in front of the HQ. I say goodbye to TAI Commander KOMAI, and climb up the hill with Technician KURCKAWA.

Note: The prisoner killed today was an Air Force Flight-Lieutenant (T.N. "TAII") from MORESEY. He was a young man, 23 this year, said to have been an instructor to the ATC at MORESEY."

B. Investigation of other documents throws further light on the identity of Sub Lieut KOMAI. He is, or was, a unit commander of SASEBO No 5 SNLP which was commanded by Lieut-Comd TSUKIOKA and it seems that another incident, closely linked with the SALAMAUa atrocity, occurred at BUNA. Here, several Australians, including a number of women and a child, were taken prisoner on 12 Aug 42.

They were taken to the Headquarters of a certain unit where they were questioned and then kept under guard for the night. It may never be known whether they were tried or court-martialled but the following morning they were all, including the child, taken out and executed in the presence of the unit personnel. At this point the reports conflict and it is not certain whether they were beheaded or bayonnetted.

We do not, in this case, know the name of the executioner - and, as the victims were all civilians, we can find no logical reason for their execution, other than the fact that one of the Japanese present said it was probably "the idea of the unit commander."

We do know, however, that the unit concerned was SASEBO No 5 SNLP - the unit commander TSUKIOKA, Torashige - and one of his detachment commanders a Sub-Lieut KOMAI!

It has been said that "he, who lives by the sword will surely die by the sword" and the following diary entry certainly bears out that proverb :-

"30 Jun. This day Comdr TSUKIOKA, Torashige, CO and Lieut OKASAYASHI, Kaguhito, Adjut, were killed in action."

#### JAPANESE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS:

A captured memorandum of a verbal order issued to a detachment commander by his commanding officer is of interest, particularly in view of the fact that the unit concerned is the unit responsible for the "Blood Carnival" previously described.

"Item: Treatment of Prisoners.

Every effort should be made to make use of such prisoners as can be used.

In the present circumstances, there is no need to make special efforts to increase the number of prisoners.

Should any doubt arise in connection with the treatment of prisoners, those who display hostile feelings are to be disposed of; those who do not should be dealt with in accordance with what you would believe to be the Imperial wishes. In dealing with them, I personally am resolved to be guided by the Imperial poem:

'For thy country's sake, shatter the foe that wreaks evil,  
But forget not to have compassion on him.'

If the Emperor MEIJI's poem, quoted above, is to be taken as an indication of the Imperial wishes in the matter, then it would appear that the detachment commander's choice in deciding the manner of his treatment of prisoners lies not between execution and imprisonment but between more or less

compassionate forms of execution. It would appear from a study of "Blood Carnival" that the Japanese conception of compassion is governed only by the degree of sentiment attached to the sword used.

However this cannot be taken to represent the official Japanese attitude towards the taking of prisoners, as there is adequate documentary evidence to show that they are fully aware of the intelligence value of prisoners of war. Another captured document, for instance, states :-

"As information from PSW is accurate, their capture is an extremely profitable method to gather intelligence  
..... we will strive for an increase in the capture of prisoners."

---

THE HANDLING OF NATIVES.

There is evidence to suggest that the Japanese are displaying more care in their handling of the natives than has been their wont. There have been several references in documents captured to the need for caution in dealing with them.

A mimeographed booklet captured recently stated :-

"The majority of natives who were favourably disposed towards the Japanese because of the enemy's intimidating propaganda have fled. We are apprehensive that the natives who are in the employ of the enemy are roaming about and spying on us. Guard against contact with the natives and take special precautions to prevent their perceiving our movements and plans."

Other documents state :-

"Every unit will exercise great care to keep our plans secret, conciliate the natives and foil the plans of the enemy."

"Those who display hostility to us should be disposed of rigorously and without mercy. Those who submit to us should be governed with benevolence. There are indications that the Australian government has shown considerable skill and kindness in their dealings with natives. This is a point that calls for careful thought."

The natives have a strong sense of hero-worship; making white people work before their eyes, and other similar steps, might produce good results."

These two speeches (in English) delivered by Japanese Military Police to NEW BRITAIN natives throw an interesting light on the Japanese methods of approach to the native.

"SPECIAL SPEECH TO CAPTAINS"

"Captains!

You are the village captains, choiced men amongst many men, and you are great men. So your village men (fellow) must obey that you ordered. If there is a man who do not obey your order, come Military Police and tell me who is bad man. We Military Police will punish that boy.

As you know we are the Japanese Military Police. We have the right to catch and to punish the boys, Kanaka - boys or white men or Japanese soldiers who do make bad. We Japanese Military Police is the Policeman of all New Britain. So surely obey the thing we once ordered!

If there are some soldiers among the Japanese Army who go into your village and bring away your taro, coconuts, banana or papava, come to Military Police and tell us. Japanese Army should pay with the right cost. So the Japanese soldier go to your village and buy your Taro or



"Banana, sell him with light cost as you can! If the soldier has stolen the thing you have, come hurry up to Military Police and tell me.

While, there lived in this New Britain the English, Australian, Chinese, Phillipiner, and Malaymen. Some of them they ran away into jungle or mountain as soon as the war begin. If you look the Englishman, Australian, Chinese man, Phillipin boy or Malay boy, hurry up come to Military Police and tell me Number One Policeman. Catch the man and bring here if you can. If you look the master whom you serviced as a boy before the war begin, tell me! If there is any letters, clothes, or gun belong the Australian Army in your village, tell me. Have you that thing?

Many Japanese plane, machine gun or soldiers come here and fight against to the American and English plane. When the American or English soldier thrown into the sea with parachute from their plane, come hurry up to Military Police and tell me where the American boy is.

You are very much anxious of the American plane. The American-plane-soldier look your fire or smoke at day, so he come and make don don. So you must make fire in your house in the night. Go into jungle at day, come back your house and sleep! When the night come.

In the future if the English and Australian man come again this New Britain all the Kanaka boy will be surely killed. So as soon as you look the white man come here and tell the Military Police. We are fighting for Japan and Kanaka. Give the help to Japanese soldier when you required!

Now I have speak you many thing. Do not forget the matter I talk you here and as you come back your village tell this your boy, your village men!

Remember that there is nothing for you expect only "planimkaikai". Make the farm larger as before.

Finish!"

"You Kanaka boy.

I will try to speak some speech so listen me silently. As you know, we are fighting against the enemy, American and English. English and American did many bad things, so we began to kill all English and American. Japanese Army has come to New Britain to kill the English and Australians. In the future freedom will come of Kanaka. Before the war come this New Britain, before the Japanese Army come this island, the English and Australian were here and did many bad things.

Have the English made supper with you around one table? No! No! You could not go into the room! Now the Japanese and their Kanakaman are the brother.

Near Rabaul there is a mountain of gold. With little gold you can buy a hundred laplap. The English steal the gold.

"When Japanese Army come here the English went for New Guinea or Australia. English and Australian are weak the Japanese strong as you know. We eat with you and give you many thing. We will teach to make rice, gun, knife, reading and writing.

So you all Kanaka men must help the Japanese army, the ~~strongest-army-in-the-world~~.% We must drive away the English from New Britain, Solomon, New Guinea.

The American and English plane come high and high but we have many plane and better plane than them. Soon the American plane cannot come here. If you help our Army we will give you many good thing, good beautiful cloth, sweet rice. But, if you Kanaka boy will not help our Army and help the English we will punish, throw into prison or cut down your head. If you bring some news as to the English or Australian we will give you reward. If you know or search as to the English come to Military Police and speak the news. If you do not speak the news we will punish you, all boy and all Mary. Do not forget.

Japan is brother of you. Japan army is the strongest and kindest in the world.

The End."

% In the original document this phrase was shown crossed out suggesting that the writer had changed his mind after making such a sweeping statement.

(ATIS Bulletin 594)

---

THE LIFE OF A SEAMAN IN THE  
JAPANESE NAVY

The following extracts from a diary covering nine months, illustrate in vivid form the life of a seaman in the Japanese Navy :

- 9 Jan 41: In the afternoon we went on a hike through TOKUYAMA City, ENSEKI and at YAHATA Shrine we dispersed to return. Because there weren't any diaries, I bought this one. I felt pains in my chest and back during the march. It pained even after returning to the ship so I talked to Senior NCO about a medical examination. Time does fly, and the date of the contest becomes nearer. Training becomes fierce. I wonder if my body will last till then. The results of my physical examination will tell. We had night training today, too. Received special examination at 0800. Was told to take a rest.
- 25 Jan 41: I'm rather short on money. Thinking of the days I spent 10-20 yen a night, I have just begun to appreciate the value of money. I hope to save 100 yen while in the Navy.
- 6 Feb 41: The increasing warm weather has come to the point where I am beginning to yearn for cold weather again. At gun loading drill this morning, I was cautioned about my dirty shirt by the senior NCO. Indeed it is dirty. It should be, for it hasn't been washed since the middle of December, last year.
- 7 Feb 41: About noon we came to the submarine and went to get the patient in the cutter. The sea was rough, but soon we reached the sub, and taking aboard a certain engineer 1st Lieutenant, we returned. There is nothing more valuable than human life. We had retraced our course about 200 miles. Then we took a SSE course.
- 20 Feb 41: AM. At gun loading drill we had shorthanded exercise and I became No. 3 of the gun. In loading the gun I dropped the shell because of clumsy handling on deck and was censured severely. It wasn't once but twice. HARADA was pinned down together with the loading tray, but his injury was not serious.
- 24 Feb 41: PM. After falling in for work we heard a talk by our division leader. Regardless of the warnings pertaining to the secrecy of our South Seas activity someone had written about it in a letter. We were told never to let it happen again. Engaged in gunnery training. We are scheduled to leave port tomorrow.
- 27 Feb 41: The ISE moved past our ship like a fierce beetle flashing her 12-36 cm guns to and fro. At 1400 we catapulted our aeroplanes. The figure of the flyer was manly and charming. It is a man's job.

- 1 Mar 41: Because today is Greater East Asia Day, for lunch we had soup made of American flour. It wasn't edible.
- 7 Mar 41: At night I wrote up a request for change of duty. My first request, to the Naval Landing Party (RIKUSEN TAI), 2nd, to a land-based unit (RIKUJO BUTAI). The section leader gave me a lecture.
- 8 Mar 41: We catapulted 94 Yr Model float rescue plane at 1100. Now at 2200 it still has not returned. Cruising capacity 8 hours, 1000 gallons. During gunnery practice at 1100 we shot at the seaplane; at returning time; 1700, it did not return, so the ship reversed its course to search. Even at present its whereabouts is unknown. The searchlights are turned on. Short is the life of a pilot. It must have been a shortage of gasoline or engine trouble. The sea looms up in the horizon as though it knew nothing. Even in this glamorous life we have such sad incidents. The remaining chief pilot kept sadly watching the horizon. Now we'll reach port late I suppose. I pray for the pilot's safety.
- 20 Mar 41: Cleaned pottholes in morning. Had clothing inspection in the afternoon. Assembly on deck. Was slapped twice. We had a squad afterwards and I got drunk. Got slapped by the Section Leader. According to the Executive Officer we are to get our leave starting 5 April. Have nothing to write nowadays.
- 21 Mar 41: 1300. Section leader gave us a warning. Got paid today, 17 yen 20 sen. Money left over, 2 yen. Very hopeless, indeed!
- 22 Mar 41: Saw last evening's movie from half way. "The Storm" and "Let Me Cry, Won't You" were very good. After the movie we prepared for sailing. Departed at 0100. Was reprimanded by the squad leader because I had powder on my hat. That misunderstanding fool! Spent the entire day with ill feeling.
- 26 Mar 41: 1750. I went ashore on special bath leave to take a bath.
- These last 2 or 3 days I've written only a few lines in my diary. I don't even study. It is a sad case. Two years more and my time will be up.
- 2 Apr 41: Her Majesty, the Empress, visited the Naval hospital. At noon the ship was full dressed. At 1255 the salute was fired. The sides were manned and salute was fired again at 1430. Because I had not had much sleep last night, I felt sleepy on sentry duty. After sentry duty I went on switchboard duty. With a cigarette in one hand and a book in the other, it was a very comfortable session for me.
- 3 Apr 41: 0845. We had worshipping ceremony. After that the guards were turned out to receive the Combined Fleet Comdr who came on board the MUTSU on duty.

6 Apr 41: 0800. Departed on shore leave. On the way I met SHIMA a classmate from our nautical school days, and talked about old times. He told me that our colleagues were studying hard for special jobs. I must study too. I heard that TAKEYOYO had been conscripted and was around here. There is no place so dirty and unpleasant as YOKOSUKA.

26 Apr 41: I wrote yesterday's notes into the 25 May page. Something must be wrong with me, even if I only came back from leave. Couldn't settle down the whole day. My mind just keeps going back, and I can't make myself come down to earth.

28 Apr 41: I slept soundly until reveille. In the morning I went ashore on the boat as detail to work for the officers. 1300. Made preparations to sail. We went around HONBOKU POINT and docked sideways against the wharf. Old memories came back to me then.

As the night settled over the peaceful sea, I felt the pang of old memories. It must be my youth. I feel like drinking liquor. No money, no time. Oh, what a meaningless life! I saw an officer going to town in his lounge suit. It is when I think of the times I have had in the past that I get a helpless feeling. Youth lost on the ocean - that must be me.

29 Apr 41: Today is the Emperor's birthday.

At 0830 the ceremonies were held. After ceremonies, before His Majesty's picture, we had lunch. We got shore leave, so I went to KANA GAWA and played about 2 hours. Then I went to the club and played billiards. I went to HAMA I had yearned so much for. On the way back I was stopped by the shore patrol. It was very irritating.

2 May 41: Heard a lecture on one's place of duty. I was unbearably sleepy. Received a blow on head from Petty Officer NABETA. In the afternoon, after the shift had carried MG arm, was disappointed very much to hear from an NCO at mess that the transfer to 4th Division was cancelled. When I returned to the HAN after having been dismissed from special lift boat crew was warned by HAN leader about being untidily dressed; Tomorrow is a shore leave for one half of the ship. I have arranged to go to YMCA with UCHIDA, but how will it turn out? Why can't I immediately set about studying in my spare time, seeing that I must study more and more in preparation for earning my living 2 years from now. Is it because my mind is unsettled? I haven't studied mathematics, so I shall study mathematics, English and Japanese.

11 May 41: After an investigation, received punishment. This is quite frequent nowadays. Think nothing of it.

- 17 May 41: At muster up on deck, received warning on attitude from 1st Class seaman MORIKAWA. Struck by 1st Class seaman UYEHARA. Today's blow was specially felt. This is the 8th one today. It is not a good feeling.
- 24 May 41: 1200. Left port. Several tens of submarines were following our ship. Can it not be said that it is the Imperial Navy that controls world's fate? At sea duty, did not fall in and was struck 4 times by that imbecile, ISHIZUKA. That big blockhead boy who doesn't know himself.
- 27 May 41: Aeroplane took off at 0400. Saw it from lookout post. This is a Navy Day, so we had reading of Imperial Rescript and address by Comdr of ship. I do not remember clearly what he said because of my stomach-ache, but I'm quite sure he said something about being prepared.
- 28 May 41: In the morning struck 10 times by senior NCO. Felt unpleasant all day. That big fool.
- 9 Jun 41: At about 0700, entered YARUTO. I was struck at muster. He is wasting time on me.
- 12 Jun 41: At 5 left port for TRUK. Sailed on dark sea. At lookout, I fell asleep.
- 19 Jun 41: Left port in morning and headed for X.  
  
At night learned that GERMANY and RUSSIA were at War. For the first time since the enlistment, felt it worthwhile being in the Navy. Hope there will be war because it will be much more exciting than getting a scolding every day.
- 16 Jul 41: At 0500, reprimanded by Chief Navigator for being asleep. On voyage.
- 24 Jul 41: Prepared for firing all day. While smoking in latrine, discovered by an officer of the watch and struck.
- 27 Jul 41: Yesterday, struck by KAWASAKI, TEKANO and HATAKEYAMA. Injured my tooth and it was painful. I am tired. I never felt so bad as now, since I joined Navy. Look at my face, my swollen cheek.
- 24 Aug 41: Landed at city of SHIMOMATSU. Spent short liberty hour pleasantly at resting place. At night was struck 3 times.
- 25 Aug 41: Went to the base. Enjoyed some swimming. Received letter from Mr. OHASHI of KOBE. According to his letter there is practically no ship on schedule on American line, and S.M.A. Class are waiting for an order.
- 6 Sep 41: From 1800 hrs half of the personnel were allowed to go ashore. There is no more wretched place than the streets of YOKOSUKA. Each time we arrive at YOKOSUKA there was nothing there to give us enjoyment or pleasure. Recently I have spent absolutely no time

on studies, so I shall devote a little time to it. I have a tendency to forget those things which took me considerable effort to learn.

- 20 Sep 41: Went ashore and dropped in at drinking places with FUKAI. Got quite drunk.
- 22 Sep 41: Sailed at 1400 hrs. Was slapped 5 times while standing in formation. It hurt.
- 29 Sep 41: At night the crazy fool NARO, Minosuke, tried to find fault with me.
- 30 Sep 41: This is my last day as Seaman, 3rd class.
- Received a letter from YOSHIZAKI. He's at present on the GINYO MARU flying between TOKYO and TAIWAN.
- 2 Oct 41: Promoted to seaman, 2nd Class, by the Captain (of the ship).
- 15 Oct 41: Today marks my first year's service aboard this ship. Due to a slight negligence on my part during watch, I received punishment.
- 21 Oct 41: On duty today with the first watch. Received my pay and had 3 yen left. I feel miserable with such a small amount. A little time will be spent today on the study of English.
- Wrestling matches will again be held. My opponent is Seaman, 1st Class, TASAKA of the 2nd Division.
- 22 Oct 41: Commencing at 0900 hrs, inter-divisional wrestling matches were held. After a furious bout with my opponent TASAKA, I came out victorious. Received a writing pad as a prize. One gets a pleasant sensation in winning.
- 14 Nov 41: What a nasty day! I endeavoured to hold back my temper, but ended the day by hitting someone.
- 28 Nov 41: Just when the stars began to glimmer faintly the silhouette of a suspicious warship was sighted on the horizon. The bugle call to stations was sounded loudly from the bridge. The unidentified craft was 3-funnelled. My conjecture was that it was a "SAN FRANCISCO" type 10,000 ton cruiser. Trailing the above were 5 large merchant ships of approximately 20,000 tons. This convoy was passing from east to west through the midst of our South Sea Island possessions, probably going from GUAM to MANILA.
- They also must have sighted us, for the cruiser threw up a smoke screen which was ineffective because of the wind. It then faced its main battery of 10 twenty centimetre guns menacingly toward us. Cold sweat started running down my back. If an engagement should commence, we would be utterly helpless - like a mouse facing a cat. Presently it altered its course. The above ships were to our port as we proceeded at full speed towards our destination. It was a day filled with tension. The Southern Cross is faintly shining.

2 Dec 41: Left TRUK at 0800 hrs for KWAJALEIN. We cruised, sharply on the lookout for mines.

Today is the 5th day of preparations and dispositions have been completed. It is rumoured that on the 6th day the Navy is to advance on a simultaneous general attack. Can it be a fact? Though I try to consider it calmly, my eyes and body reveal the state of excitement.

7 Dec 41: In the morning, after inspection of our division was concluded, the ship's captain gave us an address and read the Imperial message. We were instructed that action would commence on 0000 hours on the morning of the 8th. I was very excited on hearing that JAPAN would declare war on the U.S., GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Comfort packets were distributed among us. Was mighty glad to receive them. At 1900 hrs we separated from the special service ship. After anchoring, I drank beer and got drunk.

8 Dec 41: Up at 0300 hrs. Heard that our aircraft had bombed HAWAII. It is said that heavy bombardment operations are being carried out against SINGAPORE, HONGKONG and DAVAO. Declaration of war is at 1100 hrs. I regret that the full particulars of the progress of war are not known. 2 Battleships, 4 Cruisers and 4 Destroyers have been sunk at PEARL HARBOUR. A world-wide general conflagration has started.

9 Dec 41: At 0600 hrs all hands were assembled and the Captain gave a detailed account of the progress of the war.

10 Dec 41: In the morning, news received is transmitted to us. The British battleship, KING GEORGE V and LIVERPOOL have been sunk. Our morale has risen.

---



MORALE - SOLDIER AND CIVILIAN

For some time past the deterioration of morale among Japanese troops has been discussed and considered in the light of their defeats in the SWPA. The following address by Lt-Gen AOKI, Shigeru (at the time GOC of 20 DIVISION but since killed) was given at SATELBERG on 25 Oct 43 and shows how enemy commanders are striving to pep up their troops.

"Since the 16 Oct, this Div has fought desperate battles for ten days and has inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. It has caused them to retreat temporarily but as time goes by, they are reinforcing the unit in front of our main unit. Thus the enemy pressure is increasing. In spite of hard fighting the battle is becoming stagnant. Regarding this condition, it has been decided to save up ammunition and straighten the line in order to prepare for future operations against the enemy.

As the battle line stagnates, there are some among officers and men in the battle line as well as ones in the rear zone who are lacking in conviction of ultimate victory.

I am making this statement because I expect that this operation is going to be the last and decisive one.

In order to crush the enemy's fighting spirit, destroy the enemy's ground searching facilities by small units or by patrols even during a lull in battle. When pitted against the enemy in close quarters, snipe each and every visible enemy soldier. Such determined action is acutely needed. Simultaneously, the main unit should strengthen the position to meet possible onslaught by the enemy. Establish light shelters to cut down on casualties by enemy artillery bombardment.

To have firm control of subordinates is the most important part in commanding troops. In this operation which is characterised by confusing terrain and night movements, the importance of the above fact is keenly felt.

During the battle, it causes me much disappointment to see soldiers remaining in the rear zone without any proper duty.

Jungles are God given terrain for the unit lacking in fire power and air protection. Utilise the present strength to the utmost."

The outlook of the Japanese soldier however is more influenced by food than by speeches as can be seen by the following extracts from the diary of a soldier stationed in the RAMU VALLEY :-

"3 Nov: Today being a holiday (T.N. MEIJI Festival) I had expected distribution of comforts, but instead of receiving extra comforts our rice was even rationed to 1 GO 5 SHAKU (T.N. 0.477 pint) a day. It's so demoralising that everyone went back to his quarters this morning. Who cares about the enemy? How can they be so foolish as to expect us to fight when we're not fed right? What is the matter with the Army Intendnace? Is it fair that the ones in the rear get all the food and we, the

ones who are on the front line and require most food, are not even half sufficiently fed? What do I care about the war? From today we'll all sleep the afternoon through! Our main object will be rest and wait for the day when we are to be relieved. Health comes first!"

The following letter from JAPAN to a soldier in NEW GUINEA reflects the feeling of the home population :-

"Warm spring weather has arrived.

Please forgive me for being remiss in my correspondence.

Elder brother, how have you been getting along lately? We are all in the pink of condition. HARUO is still serving with 23 Force. Just now I have a job at SUMITOMO Steel Plant. But the problem which confronts us now are the low wages and the sky rocketing prices of commodities. In addition, due to the small quantities of rice distribution and because we go to the restaurant to eat, there are between 40 and 50 people in line to get into the restaurant. Under such circumstances, therefore, I really feel very sorry for the aged and the children.

Take myself for instance.; I had no inconvenience while at the front line, so living conditions after returning seem pretty miserable. Consequently, field life is still one of my memories. I have been very fond of sweets since my childhood days, but candy is completely gone.

Forgive me for writing so many insignificant matters and about food. However, commodities are exceedingly dear and hard to get. They say that in order to fight through and obtain victory in this Greater East ASIA war we must endure many inconveniences. But it is really terrible to have such a hard daily life.

Again, a new levy of taxes on commodities has been put into effect recently. It is from one per cent, as a minimum, to 10 to 20 per cent as a maximum.

On 31 March our saving goal of 23,000,000,000 was broken by a wide margin. For the fiscal year this year it is 27,000,000,000.

Effective 1 Apr theatres will be opened only twice a day, a matinee at 2 pm and in the evening from 7 pm. It isn't as it used to be. We must go on schedule in order to see a complete picture.

The mainland is within enemy air raid range, therefore, the public is more serious than ever. Air defence has been perfected and the Army's day and night activities touch my heart deeply.

Twice a month we have to go to work, with the men wearing leggings and women in MOMPE (T.N. trousers) and on these days we are not allowed to wear comforters and overcoats. I'm suffering with malaria again. It seems to come out every half year or so. I can't work but if I don't go to work I can't eat. At any rate I have come back with a terrible disease. I've planned to have army doctors examine me.

-16-

The arsenal is pretty busy now and because it is directly under Army supervision, they have many rationed goods. On the other hand, SUMITOMO has nothing.

There are many men going on active service lately, in fact every day, but there are also many coming back to lonely triumph, having given their lives to protect their country. (T.N. presumably refers to return of ashes).

Keep well.

I am awaiting your safe return.

Good bye"

THE RETREAT FROM SALAMAU

The following diary needs little explanation - it was written by a Japanese soldier who tried to trek overland to MADANG from the vicinity of SALAMAU :-

- "2 Sep: Prepared for departure. Since yesterday haven't eaten any rice. Ate cooked taro. At 0800 hrs, departed by vehicle. Air raid all day. Advanced to the vicinity of MARKHAM RIVER and bivouacked. Two hours later No 6 Coy (238 Inf Regt) (BATHI Unit) (1) came so we crossed the river at night. With two others, and remainder of MG bivouacked at the present location.
- 3 Sep: Breakfast was taro soup. This morning continuous air raid, but for the first time our airplanes came, and they had an air battle. I was relieved. Heard that from today on the air force will be active. Seems that the enemy at SALAMAU is being pushed back. I, 11 Bn of our Regt are being hit very hard and I heard that Group Comdr is very worried.
- 4 Sep: Engaged the enemy who was charging into our position, at about 0700 hours. Our side had few casualties. The enemy attacked with automatic rifle, about 10 bullets pierced dead bodies. But we killed 2 enemy tps.
- 5 Sep: Spent all day digging trenches. The enemy fired trench mortars fiercely. The aim was very good. Two burst above our heads. All day long underwent air raid and rifle fire. Couldn't do anything.
- 6 Sep: Had air raid in the morning. To do liaison for replenishing provisions, started out at 1200 hrs, with one other. Crossing MARKHAM RIVER and while going down SHOGO HILL (2), I saw 1 enemy tp, immediately ran back up the hill, and reported to the Unit Comdr. Immediately, with 4 men, looked for the enemy. At a point 50 m from the present location, sighted the enemy. With hand grenades and rifles killed 3, captured 2 IMGs and 3 rifles. At about 1600 hrs crossed the river with native and after 3 hrs in the jungle arrived at our destination.
- 7 Sep: At about 0900 hrs, went to NAVAL West lookout post to receive provisions. Had air raid and went into jungle. Stayed about 4 hrs. While in the jungle one of us was attacked by a rifle, but the bullet only went through his trousers.
- 9 Sep: Every day enemy airplanes are flying as low as 50 m above our heads, looking for us.
- 10 Sep: The enemy is firing trench mortars fiercely. Rice supply is getting low eating taro as a substitute.
- 11 Sep: Looks as if the enemy is at our rear. Now we cannot go after provisions. At about 2000 hours, 4 natives transported food for us by canoe. Never was so happy before.

- 12 Sep: 1. Present situation of the enemy: The enemy para-troops landed above MARKHAM so part of 51 Div are in a desperate state.
2. Our Naval airplane(s) sighted 40,000 enemy troops landing from transports at HOPOI, reported to the air force by radio.
- Immediately our airplanes sank all the ships. Also had a report of sinking seven enemy transports during landing operations at NASSOHAN (T.N. presumably NASSAU BAY).
- 17 Sep: By the Unit Comdr's decision decided to bury everything except forage, equip and amm. Before departing all bowed toward the Palace for the last time. Marched toward SALAMAUA..
- 18 Sep: The enemy moved against us by building their position at the Point. We suffered many casualties. Coy Comdr 1st Lt BATTAL and a few others were killed in action by charging into the enemy positions.
- 20 Sep: After breakfast walked a little way, and rested before getting out to the beach. While resting heard a voice so looked around, and found about 50 enemy tps laying a telephone line along the beach, and about to take a rest. Hurriedly returned. Today it's no use fighting. We continued our march through hills.
- 21 Sep: The reason we avoided the engagement yesterday was because, when the Coy Comdr of MG was wounded and before dying, he told the WO to gather the men, and take them to SALAMAUA, even though he had to starve.
- 22 Sep: At about 1200 hrs, met two natives. Seems that they escaped from MARKHAM POINT. Let the natives lead us to a village. There was nothing to eat so we ate sprouts from trees and walked on. After entering the village, we substituted taro for provisions; Got hold of some enemy matches.
- 25 Sep: Already no rations. No village in the vicinity where we can go and dig taro. Even if there was, the enemy is in the vicinity, so we can't do a thing.
- 28 Sep: Advancing about 2 RI down the coast toward SALAMAUA, met a native and learned that our troops have already left SALAMAUA by small craft. The native said there are many enemy tps in SALAMAUA, so we decided to go to LAE.
- 2 Oct: Even the taro is gone. Nothing to eat.
- 9 Oct: Started out for taro digging. In the vicinity of the village met the enemy. 2 killed, lost 1 LMG. Ran into the hills.
- 12 Oct: One man asked for water, but there was none. He finally fell to the ground and died. Came to RONWANEUN High ground, and camped. Nothing to eat. Chewing leaves and nuts.

- 13 Oct: Walked into a net of enemy Comm wires; finally came out to the river. Tried to cross it at night by a raft, but took two hours and failed. Lost all the weapons. Returned and dried our clothes by a fire.
- 14 Oct: Departed in the morning but haven't eaten for the last 5 days. Get dizzy and can hardly stand. Walked into the jungle about 200 m and ate nuts and green leaves.
- 16 Oct: Sgt Maj TSUJI (1) with 11 others said they were going to cross the river tonight whilst the remainder including the WO said they would cross the river after finding something to eat. At about 1000 hrs, went up the river and up the hill; on the way some of the men fell from starvation.
- 17 Oct: Again walked into the hills. Following the enemy telephone line, came on top of the hill and spent the night at a former enemy position. Once more decided to cross the river. Came back to the river and built a raft and got ready.
- 18 Oct: Waited for the night and started to cross. The first 5 men crossed without trouble. So the rest of the men jumped in but only five or six got across - some drowned and some drifted downstream. Later 15 or 16 came up to the crossing point.
- 20 Oct: When evacuating the MARKHAM position, we had 99 men. With many engagements and in going toward SALAMAU, only 50 men or so remained. When going towards MADANG we were less than 50 men. When we crossed the river only 15 were left. Seems that the WO couldn't get across and drowned, but the documents were picked up by Cpl TOYOZUMI who drifted downstream and hung to a log.
- 26 Oct: At about 1000 hrs HATANG (2) was very tired and had malaria. Took all my medicine and got well, but couldn't walk. During a short rest told me he was going to the latrine. Little later heard an explosion, so we went and looked for him. He was dead with hand grenade under his arm.
- 2 Nov: Located a farm with sweet potatoes and taro. Bivouacked here dug 5 days food. We also had sugar cane. What luck.
- 3 Nov: From here it is 50 to 60 RI to our destination, MADANG. If only we had rice and salt we would last all the way.
- 10 Nov: Caught 3 chickens. Went to dig some potatoes.
- 11 Nov: Departed at about 1100 hrs. In the hill there were traces where the Naval Forces fought. Many have been killed in action. 1 member from No 6 Coy died near the village.
- 17 Nov: In the morning, 3 or 4 enemy tps and 1 native passed by our bivouac area. Probably they are to come with the position in the mtn.
- 18 Nov: From tomorrow we are going to advance toward MADANG. Last night one person from MG died of malaria. There was an air battle and three of our airplanes were shot down.

20 Nov: We have walked several days since we crossed the MARKHAM RIVER. However, when we came up to the mtn saw the river 1½ RI (T.N. about 3 or 4 miles away).

3 Dec: One man from 6 Coy died.  
Now there are only 8 men left.

8 Dec: I wish our army would start an offensive. Because of these two or three days of sickness I feel very tired."

(T.N. Mentions the struggles of walking through mtn and jungle, lack of food, sickness and disasters of the retreat.)

Another diarist, apparently cut off when Allied troops took LAE and NADZAB writes :-

"I am writing this in a native hut. Duty of our force was to guard MARKHAM POINT. Our colours (flag) were at SALAMAUA so we withdrew from MARKHAM and headed there. On the way Coy Comdr, and many others were killed in action. About half of us reached a point just this side of SALAMAUA, but found out that our troops had already evacuated it. We felt discouraged, but remembered the duty we had to perform and started to fight our way back. Since all our rations were gone we ate Taro, bananas, fruit and anything that was edible. At the time of crossing the MARKHAM RIVER there were five of us left, seven having died of malaria. The remaining two of us both have malaria and are being taken care of by natives. After a little rest we believe we will be able to go where you are. We have not eaten rice for two months. If possible, please send some food and medicine. (T.N. amount requested is listed). Native(s) acting as messenger is trustworthy."

EXPLOSION OF THE GUN

On 20 Nov 43, in the vicinity of the MASAWENG RIVER, a Japanese gun accidentally exploded. This is the report which the platoon (troop,) commander sent to his battalion CO :-

"1. Duties of Pl and circumstances before the explosions.

Pl was with main strength of Bn and on 12 Nov arrived at the mouth of the MASAWENG RIVER where it built a position on the south bank, its main duty being to fire on the enemy motor torpedo boats and troops who might land.

On 17 Nov it was rejoined by its No 1 Section which built a position at the mouth of an unnamed stream 200 m to the south.

On 19 Nov special orders were given by Bn Comdr that if MT boats were heard they should be attracted by means of bonfires, and sunk.

5 men commanded by Sgt TAKEUCHI were on No 1 Gun, 5 men commanded by the Pl Comdr on No 2 gun engaged in maintenance, coupling of fuses (whole shells) preliminary marksmanship, and the instruction in firing on moving targets, until sunset.

2. Cause of the explosion.

During the whole night no targets were engaged because troops transporting patients were crossing the river and MT boat activity was slight. At 5 o'clock on the 20th, the Pl Comdr went away leaving three men to clean the gun and telescope. Shortly afterwards the explosion occurred.

The accident is presumed to have happened in the following way; two men in the trench about to clean the gun, called to the third who thought he would save time by coming down through the fire port instead of by the usual way. While he was doing this, one of those in the trench opened the breech block with the lever and attempted to remove the round, but as he pulled the lever while still attached to the lanyard, the gun went off and the shell struck the man coming down and exploded.

3. Men killed.

Army Sup Pte KAWASAKI Masando	called up	1940.
Army Sup Pte ANDO Noritaka	" "	1941
Army Sup Pte MUKAI Kaneyoshi	" "	1941

4. Steps taken by the Pl Comdr.

He is deeply ashamed of his rashness in entrusting his subordinates with a loaded gun. He will see that they are better instructed and controlled in the future."

Following this report, the battalion commander penned the following note to Division :

"1. I am in a position where I have no words to excuse the unexpected explosion which occurred as indicated on the separate copy.



In addition, regarding the disposition of the present incident, the new Bn Comdr is in a most embarrassing and unhappy position, due to lack of experience and documents to rely on. Nevertheless the situation is as above, therefore, of necessity I have sent Adjutant TANAKA as a special messenger. So will you kindly forward your instructions.

2. In compliance with Div Orders, Bn will have No 6 Coy, the Regt gun and quick firing behind the security area. The main force will leave MASAWENG today, the 21st at 0400 hrs and will concentrate at the north flank of BONGA, prior to dawn on the 22nd, to prepare for the subsequent attack."

AIR SUPERIORITY AND MORALE

The following notes by a junior officer reflect the feeling of the Japanese troops in regard to their lack of air power :-

"Air superiority.

In air superiority, to put it briefly, we are about a century behind GERMANY and AMERICA.

Although six years have elapsed since the CHINA incident, we have faced only the poorly-equipped army of CHIANG KAI SHEK. Now we are on active service for the first time, participating in war in NEW GUINEA. We are in a condition to appreciate fully at first hand air power.

Those in peace and safety at home talk about our air superiority in CHINA. This is exceedingly childish chatter.

If you have not experienced a continuous bombardment by formations of LOCKHEEDS and NORTH AMERICANS or 50 or 60 bombers, a true appreciation of air superiority is well nigh impossible.

I was at WENAK and now I am at SIO, and I realise there is all the difference in the world.

The military operations of MO (T.N. 18 Army) Force are progressing with great difficulty because of the air superiority of the enemy.

This present war is termed a War of Supply.

Shipping is the secret of victory or defeat in this war of supply in countries thousands of miles across the sea. And again, may I emphasise shipping. To have regular shipping lanes, air superiority is essential.

Ah! Ah! If we only had air superiority - air superiority!

Those engaged in the war in NEW GUINEA, even the privates voice the same opinion.

"If we only had airplanes."

The bloodshed on the field of combat of SALAMUA was caused by our sides not having superiority in the air. Has realisation of this not dawned on us too late? Perhaps. However we must not be pessimistic because of this. Air superiority is felt only when enemy airplanes can come over our heads.

Regardless of the number of enemy airplanes, and how excellent they are, air superiority is difficult, or rather impossible to maintain all the time.

Let us look at things!

In the battle for SALAMUA, we were bombed and strafed relentlessly day and night for about half a year.

In the MOTO Group (51 Div) there were over 2000 men engaged in warding off this attack.

We must give ready praise to the power of our Imperial Army.

Col YAMAZAKI and those under him died honourably on the island of ATTU in the Northern Seas.

Whether it be victory or death such things as this could happen only in our Imperial Army.

We, who have such indomitable fighting spirit as this, will win.

As long as we have ammunition and rice, there is no hope for our enemies.

The spirit of SATSUMA is in our blood. (T.N. SATSUMA is the home of the SAMURAI Warriors).

Let us look at the past!

In the closing days of the TOKUGAWA Shogunate, in the KAEI area. The arrogant English sailed their black men of war into SHINKO BAY.

When they bombarded KAGOSHIMA city, the youth of southern SATSUMA took up the fight in water-melon boats. The English in their men-of-war annihilated them. Their blood flowed far and wide through the lands of Southern SATSUMA and has now become a tradition to us.

Are we afraid? or shall we die? No! we will keep on striking until the bitter end.

Most hateful AMERICANS and BRITISH! We will not die - we are not afraid. We will keep on striking until the bitter end. Cursed AMERICANS and BRITISH!

There was a report that the enemy had landed at MONGI BAY. They landed the 3rd from 0900. I was greatly irritated by their arrogance. It made me acutely aware of their power, both in air superiority and control of the seas. We must achieve a decisive victory in this battle.

However, we have had considerable difficulties since the opening of this campaign, as we have had no ships to transport men or rations. What can we do?

My mind is in a turmoil, how can we conquer this distance of 400 kilometres.

There will have to be a drastic change in our strategy.

Notes on IWATA Pt at HARDENBERG Key Point.

Received a report of the withdrawal from LAE and SALAMUA. Ah! What tears of bitterness is swallowed.

Already half a year has passed since 1st December when we made a daring landing in the face of the enemy. Despite very heavy losses from the relentless and violent bombing we have continued this mighty AMERICAN - JAPANESE war. But, at dawn on 3 Sep the AMERICAN and AUSTRALIAN armies which can boast of absolute superiority in the air in an arrogant and blatant manner, severed our main supply lines. They landed

in the vicinity of HOPOI. They carried out a parachute landing in the vicinity of NADZAB, which was the key point of our escape route and finally cut our supply lines which had been maintained under great difficulties.

We had come to a stage when we were forced to withdraw from the LAE - SALAMAU line which we had striven to maintain amidst ever-present difficulties for half a year.

What must be the feelings of the Commanding Officer of the MO (T.N. 18th Army) Force. I feel that he must be broken-hearted. Our glorious colours which no longer could add lustre to our prestige had to be withdrawn. Officers and men throughout the Regt must have felt as though they were drinking poison.

What of the AMERICANS and the AUSTRALIANS? They can boast only of their material power?

Wait and see!

We will wage a war of annihilation.

The feelings of every officer and man throughout the Army are churning with a desire to massacre all AMERICAN and AUSTRALIANS.

An example of the enemy propaganda which accompanied the withdrawal from the LAE and SALAMAU combat line. It was really laughable. We can but visualise the enemy department drugged by the present victories, and smile sardonically.

Literature advising us to surrender. It was valueless as far as our picked troops were concerned. Such an illiterate style of writing could not be impressive.

I have pasted an example here.

(T.N. The propaganda leaflet is missing).

Nine months have passed since I first sailed from TSINGTAO in NORTH CHINA.

A childish propaganda leaflet from the vainglorious AMERICAN and AUSTRALIAN Armies.

It reminds me of one of the self-absorbed, egotistical newly rich.

Our Imperial Army considers it a subject for ridicule. It is absolutely useless other than that it increases our hatred for the enemy and our will to win. I have pasted an example here for future reference.

Participating in the FINSCH Area operations. 22 Oct.

I had command of 100 youths, and as commander of the No. 8 Coy I had an opportunity of facing the open field of combat. What indescribable joy! The field of combat at FINSCH is where the field Army will decide its fate. The picked troops of the ASA Force (T.N. 20th Div) will concentrate all their energy on delivering a crushing blow to the enemy.

The enemy is strengthening his forces more and more under combined Air and Naval superiority.

23 Oct 43. At LAKONA. At 1900 hrs we were to ford the swift MASAWENG RIVER. I sent 2nd Lt NAKAZAWA ahead to pick out the most suitable places to cross.

24 Oct 43. We became the advance unit of the TASHIRO Bn. (T.N. 2nd Bn 238 Inf Regt) and proceeded from LAKONA towards BONGA at 1430 hrs. Arrived 1700 hrs. I met 1st Lt NAGATOMO and 1st Lt ASAHARA of the arty, who gave a report of the situation on the bank of the SONG RIVER. The time was exactly 0230 hrs on the 25th.

Prob Offr TSUKAHARA in charge of ten men, was despatched to the banks of the SONG RIVER.

We were despatched and prayed that we might have success when we meet the AMERICANS and the AUSTRALIANS in combat for the first time.

The enemy motor roads that have been built through the jungle are something of which their materialistic civilisation might be proud.

27 Oct. At BONGA. 1st Lt HIYAMA, well experienced in actual warfare, drew the enemy at close quarters and attacked by delivering a crushing blow.

29 Oct 43. At BONGA cloudy. 2nd Lt NAKAZAWA and six men under his command were despatched to the forward area of No. 1 heights.

We left SIO with ten days' rations, this can be made last for 25 days.

How do we of the Imperial Army, enjoy rationing? As we have no rations we fight while eating only grass. However we must not complain about it to our superior officers. Since coming to NEW GUINEA, I fully appreciate the value of even the gram of rice.

If we only had salt and matches, in the combat area we could cope with anything. Indeed these are supposed to be absolutely essential. How laughable! A certain Labour Unit existed for about two weeks on only pumpkin.

The root of paw-paw when pickled tastes exactly like DAIKON (T.N. a variety of radish). The sprouts of pumpkin and melon are as tasty as green vegetables.

We evacuated Prob Officers TSUKAHARA, KOBAYASHI, YOSHIDA.

2 Nov 43. Clear at BONGA. CURTIS airplanes continually flew over us in all directions.

We could have fired on them with our LGs and brought them down, but we would only expose ourselves to bombing and shelling if we did. It was infuriating.

After 1300 hrs a formation of several NORTES (T.N. NORTH AMERICANS) flew overhead. Somehow or other they had discovered us and promptly proceeded to dive bomb us. It was a severe bombing at low altitude. I flung myself on the ground and all but cried.

Every time I endure one of these bombing attacks I say to myself: Ah! friendly planes fly over us!

6 Nov 43. At KITAYAMA cloudy, rain. Capt SUZUKI of the 79 Inf Regt came in the capacity of Comdr of the ARASHINA Bn, ordered to guard the vicinity of BONGA.

From now on we are going to co-operate with our neighbouring regt.

Sgt MATSUNO received special mention in despatches and the 79 Inf Regt was cited.

7 Nov 43. Clear at NISHIYAMA. WO HASHIMOTO, while looking in the direction of FINSCH, saw four enemy large MLCs proceeding towards LANGEMARK BAY.

In broad daylight, the sheer impertinence of it! I thought as I watched these several boats proceeding. I was acutely aware of the magnitude of their air superiority and I could not help but feel infuriated.

10 Nov 43. At KITAYAMA. Clear. Proceeded to reconnoitre conditions of the NAKAZAWA Pl at NANGAKANO and met Staff Officer TAKAHASHI of the ASA Force at a place about one kilometre in front of the position. Learned all phases of the situation from him.

11 Nov 43. At KITAYAMA. Cloudy. At 0530 hrs unit CO NISHIOKA and Bn Adjt 1st Lt ISHII came to our coy.

After 1800 hrs 1st Lt YOKOTA comdr of the No. 1 MG unit and 40 men under his command, were released from the command of comdr of 80 Inf Regt so that they could return to the TASHIRO Bn. (T.N. 2nd Bn 238 Inf Regt)

Four enemy destroyers and five subchasers off Pt ARNDT passed under our very noses. I only wished that our planes were here to bomb them. While I watched these enemy transports and their escort I felt there was nothing that could be done in the way of attacking them.

12 Nov 43. At KITAYAMA. Clear. I received letters from my classmates 1st Lt SAMESHIMA and 1st Lt MASAKI who were on the mountain range west of JIVEVANING. They said they felt resentful when watching the smoke from the enemy's cooking.

14 Nov 43. At HIGASHIYAMA. Cloudy later clear. About fifteen or sixteen of our own planes flew over in formation. They flew on quite unperturbed by the enemy A/A fire.

Officers and men all raised their voices with one accord saying "Oh don't get shot down".

I received letters and tobacco from FUKKE of the 79 Inf Regt; he was an old classmate of mine.

Reasons why the enemy's whereabouts have been discovered:-

1. Enemy positions have been revealed by the sounds of voices and the glow of cigarettes.

2. The ease with which patrols can penetrate into enemy positions.
3. Enemy positions are deployed in all directions.
4. Contrary to expectations their patrols at night are most vigilant.

Jungle patrols are best in the rain.

Patrols should consist of three or four men.

The training we received in patrol work in the homeland, is absolutely valueless in the jungle."

---

(23) W/D

MESSAGE FORM

CASE AND INSTRUCTIONS IN TOWNSVILLE fortress) by any means  
OUT 7 aust cmd AL sec } except wireless  
4 aust div ) by ALS  
CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies)  
remainder by DRLS

Copy to:-  
GOC  
BGS  
G(O)  
G2(AIR)  
G(I)  
G(SD)  
DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAID  
BRISBANE fortress CAIRNS fortress 7 aust cmd AL sec

FROM: first aust army INT 2723 17

secret (.) landops revsit 628 to 170001Z apr (.)

landops (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 15 apr allied ambush MANUS ISLAND resulted  
23 enemy killed (.) allied tps closing in on 19 japs north MALAMBOK  
(RAMBUTYO ISLAND) (.) to 150800Z total enemy buried all areas 3025 (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 14 apr reliably reported 100 japs crossed PANDI  
RIVER (HIXON BAY area) moving east (.) 15 apr natives report no enemy  
west BAIEN except 16 proceeding PALMALMAL from MANGUNA (RONDAHL HARBOUR)  
(.) TALASEA patrol operating CAPE HOSKINS area report many japs MEGIGI  
FLN (.) patrol being trailed by enemy using dogs (.) 16 apr allied  
patrols vicinity SAN REMO killed four captured four japs (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM (.) 15 apr patrols from BWAI to ERIMA and  
fwd to PALFA RIVER report 1000 yds defended beach ERIMA to GORI RIVER  
mouth but no movement observed (.) patrols from MANGAPO to LALE GERIK  
and BOKI-RIVER made no contact (.) natives report BAGASIN (25 mls SW  
MADANG) and all places on track to AMELE clear of enemy since 10 apr (.)  
also enemy intends evacuating AMELE towards ANAIMON to BOGIA SEPIK  
NEWAK (.)

WANTOAT (.) 15 apr allied patrol four and one half  
mls along IKWAP RIVER from WANTOAT and back report indications small  
party japs moving north (.) natives killed unreported number japs  
KAPIAPUN (threequarters of one ml east WANTOAT) (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 150400Z ten A/C bombed gun posns KOSIGA  
(.) 15 apr thirteen A/C bombed strafed BUWA PASSAGE area (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 15 apr following attacks carried out  
RAEPAUL area (.) 40 A/C started numerous small fires VUTAKANAU FLN and  
KERAVAL (.) 67 A/C scored numerous hits LAKUNAI runway (.) 35 A/C



- 2 -

started several fires in amn dump TALILI (.) eight A/C strafed SULPHUR CREEK area (.) three A/C started several fires VUNAPOPE (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 15 apr sixteen A/C strafed coastal area CAPE GUORDON to BOGIA HARBOUR (.) am 15 apr two hundred and thirteen A/C dropped 326 tons bombs and strafed pers sup areas AITAPE area explosions large fires TUMLEO ISLAND fires SELEO ISLAND most PRO VILLAGE destroyed fires started numerous coastal villages to south AITAPE (.) air attack AITAPE reported revsit 627 included in above attack (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 160255Z six A/C bombed sup area HOLLANDIA starting eight fires (.) 151545Z five A/C bombed stores pers areas and airfield WAKDE ISLAND with excellent coverage (.)

TIMOR (.) 151831Z twentythree A/C bombed KOEPANG starting large fires warehouse area and centre of town (.) sea (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 15 apr photos reveal one 750 ton cargo vessel 185 barges SIMPSON HARBOUR one 650 ton cargo vessel afire 70 barges KERAVALA BAY four barges VUNAPOPE 15 barges RALUANA area (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 150020Z six barges ULIGAN HARBOUR (.) 150154Z four barges HANSA BAY (.) 150013Z one 500/1000 ton loaded freighter entering KAIRIRU STRAIT from east and 12 barges TENDANYE ISLAND (.) 15 apr approx 34/37 barges and luggers of which nine burning and one sup laden AITAPE area (.) two small freighters or luggers of which one beached other burning and exploding 25 mls ESE AITAPE (.) midnight 15/16 apr three poss small ships off TADJI heading towards WENAK (.) 150130Z one lugger beached one destroyed by A/C of four luggers two barges five mls SE VANIMO (.)

ROTI ISLAND (.) 152333Z two luggers destroyed two damaged by six A/C of eight observed around coast all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

TOO 171455K  
THI

*W. J. ... Capt*

24 W/D

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde	) by any means except wireless	Copy to:-
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress		GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec		BGS
				G(O)
		4 aust div	) by ALS	G2(AIR)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies		G(I)
		remainder by DRLS		G(SD)
				DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND  
FROM: first aust army INT 2725 18

secret (.) landops revsit 629 to 180001Z apr (.)

landops (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 16 apr allied patrols occupied METAWARRI  
DRABITO (.) 14 japs killed METAWARRI and one TINGAU (.) to 160800Z  
enemy cas all areas 3043 known dead 1225 estimated unburied dead 275  
enemy effectives (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM (.) 15 apr four of seven japs  
encountered by patrols GUR (five and one half mls east NANGAPO)  
killed (.) 16 apr patrol from br 6 north to GUAN RIVER to GORI RIVER  
thence east to one and one quarter mls SW BOGADJIM report no mov seen  
(.) patrol from ALIBU 1 to BOGADJIM thence back via BOGADJIM rd no  
contact (.) natives report KULAU (24 mls west ERIMA) reoccupied by  
japs (.)

WANTOAT (.) 16 apr patrol to five mls NNE  
WANTOAT reports no contact (.) four japs captured vicinity WANTOAT (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 16 apr 25 A/C bombed northern CHOISEUL  
ISLAND (.) pm 16 apr nine A/C bombed gun posns MAMAGATA (.) night  
15/16 apr catalinas bombed brs KIETA area destroying two (.) pm  
16 apr 11 A/C scored damaging hits four gun posns destroyed huts  
BUKA area (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 16 apr following attacks RABAU.  
area (.) four A/C RABAU 72 A/C damaged five gun posns scored hits  
coral and concrete strips WUNAKANAU 21 A/C bombed sup area RATAVAL  
three A/C RALUANA 13 A/C TOBERA 38 A/C started several fires RAPOPO  
eight A/C bombed F revetments KERAVAL Fs strafed KERAVALIA (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 152320Z seven A/C strafed targets  
ULIGAN HARBOUR to BOGIA HARBOUR (.) 160240Z eight A/C strafed

BABANGAUA (two mls SE BOGIA) (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 160250Z one hundred and fortysix A/C dropped 241 tons bombs HOLLANDIA damaging sup fuel dumps pers areas around shores HOLLANDIA HUMBOLDT JAUTEFA BAY destroying coastal def posns IMBI BAY starting apparent fuel fire TAMI strip destroying building huts jetties TANAMERAH BAY SENTANI LAKE areas (.) air attack HOLLANDIA reported revsit 628 included in above attack (.) sea (.)

SOLOMONS (.) night 14/15 apr 1t naval units shelled strafed MOSIGA pillboxes JABA PURIATA RIVERS (.) 150935Z one poss sub eight mls south BUKA (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 16 apr photos show 13 barges one boat KAVIENG to BALGAI (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 160210Z three barges OWEN PT damaged by two A/C and six u/s sighted BROWN ISLAND (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 152045Z two small vessels or luggers HANSA BAY (.) am 16 apr 8/10 barges on SEPIK RIVER prob TIMBUNKE area (44 mls south by west WEWAK) (.) 160125Z one 1500/2500 ton freighter AITAPE damaged by two A/C (.) 170420Z one 600 ton vessel SISSANO LAGOON (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 16 apr five luggers 57/65 barges two 500/1000 ton freighters or luggers one u/1 vessel (on fire) VANIMO HOLLANDIA area (.) direct hits scored one freighter or lugger and gps 15/20 barges (included in above) JAUTEFA BAY (.) 150040Z three 500/1000 ton freighters six barges KAMRAU BAY two 500/1000 ton freighters eight barges KAIMANA BAY (.)

TIMOR (.) 17 apr photos show 25 barges TENAU (.)

PHILIPPINES (.) 152200Z one hy cruiser 90 mls west BASILAN STRAIT (SW tip MINDANAO ISLAND) course SW and one large escort vessel off NE coast MINDANAO course northerly (.) 160710Z one escort vessel heading east through BASILAN STRAIT all infm

---

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

T00/ 81576K  
THI

*Handwritten signature*

G.S.I.

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 102

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 11 Apr 44 to 1200 hrs 18 Apr 44

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary of Significant Events ... Page/s 3

PART I

SECTION 1 - OPERATIONS - NW SECTOR

SEA - Enemy	...	...	...	"	4
AIR - Own	...	...	...	"	4-5
Enemy	...	...	...	"	5

SECTION 2 - OPERATIONS - OTHER FRONTS - SWPA

LAND	...	...	...	"	5-6
SEA - Own	...	...	...	"	7
Enemy	...	...	...	"	7
AIR - Own	...	...	...	"	7-9
Enemy	...	...	...	"	9

PART II

SECTION 1 - ORDER OF BATTLE

LAND	...	...	...	"	9-11
AIR	...	...	...	"	11

SECTION 3 - ORGANISATION

Japanese Commando Units	...	...	"	11
-------------------------	-----	-----	---	----

SECTION 4 - EQUIPMENT

Wooden Automobiles	...	...	"	12
Japanese Anti-Vehicular "Yardstick" Mine	...	...	"	12

SECTION 5 - TACTICS

JAPAN's Employment of Aircraft Carriers	...	"	12-15
---	-----	---	-------

SECTION 6 - SUPPLY

Fishing Boats and Motor Sailboats	...	"	15
Motor Sailboat	...	"	16

SECTION 8 - GENERAL

INDIAN Womens' Army	...	...	"	16
---------------------	-----	-----	---	----

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Attitude of Natives in South West DUTCH NEW GUINEA	"	16-18
Place Names not commonly Known	"	18

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

BURMA	...	...	...	"	18-19
ITALY	...	...	...	"	19
RUSSIA	...	...	...	"	19-20
RUMANIA	...	...	...	"	20

OVER /

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

PART V

SECURITY

Japanese Security Measures . . . . . Page/s 20-21

APPENDICES

- Appendix 'A(i)' - Description of Japanese Anti-Vehicular "Yardstick" Mine.
- Appendix 'A(ii)' - Illustration of Japanese Anti-Vehicular "Yardstick" Mine.
- Appendix 'B' - Map showing Approximate Limits of Japanese and Allied influence in South West DUTCH NEW GUINEA.
- Appendix 'C' - The Political Situation in RUMANIA.

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The almost negligible resistance encountered by Australian troops in their recent advance to BOGADJIM and ERIMA suggests two immediate possibilities. Either the enemy has completed his plan of defence along the coastline to the NW and hence been relieved of the necessity of fighting a determined delaying action, or he may have decided upon a policy of concentrating his forces within those areas which are the most valuable to him operationally, and hence the most liable to an Allied attack.

It would appear that the reported activity in the HOLLANDIA area is connected with the preparation of additional defences, with a view to the dispersal of stores which have been moved into that area in the past few weeks. Also, the reported move of 18 Army Headquarters to that locality indicates the Japanese may concentrate more effort on the defence of the WEWAK and HOLLANDIA areas than HANSA BAY.

The recent heavy assaults by Allied aircraft on such places as RABUL, WEWAK, AITAPE and HOLLANDIA will tend to keep the enemy guessing as to the exact locality the Allies may select for any future amphibious operation.

Allied Naval superiority in the PACIFIC has been maintained as instanced in the report of the large scale attack on targets in the Western CAROLINES on 30 Mar/1 Apr when 25 enemy ships were sunk and a further 17 damaged, in addition to 160 aircraft destroyed and a further 54 damaged without an Allied ship being hit and only 25 aircraft lost. This loss of enemy shipping, in addition to the other damage that must have been inflicted to shore installations, will probably further seriously affect the supplying of troops in NEW GUINEA. It is also probable that the growing superiority of the Allied Navy will greatly effect the extent of future operations by preventing the reinforcement of the NEW GUINEA theatre.

Isolated parties are still moving into the GAZELLE PENINSULA from the Central and western portions of the island. While the concentration of all the troops remaining on NEW BRITAIN within a short distance of RABUL will ease the strain of supply transportation, such gains will be offset by the embarrassment which such an influx of troops will cause to the already over-taxed medical facilities and supply reserves - the latter being continually reduced through time, and as a result of air attacks.

When considering the time necessary to produce native foods as a supplement to rations in conjunction with a local native population approximating 35,000 to be fed concentrated enemy forces within the RABUL perimeter would appear to have little future.

---

PART I

SECTION 1 - OPERATIONS - NW SECTOR

SEA - ENEMY

One feature of the shipping sighted throughout the area for the period under review was the continued movement of enemy naval forces. The tonnage reported for the week shows a decrease when compared with that of the previous period, and is reviewed in the following areas :-

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

The sighting of eight gunboats and one destroyer in HOLLANDIA BAY on 11 Apr was an unusual concentration for this area and it is probable the vessels were being used as transports. Other shipping sighted in this area for the week comprised 10 freighters of approximate total tonnage of 10/15,500 tons. The largest of these vessels was a 4000 ton heavily camouflaged ship sighted near CAPE PIE on 12 Apr. In addition 45 barges and six luggers were reported. Of the shipping mentioned, aircraft sank one gunboat and three luggers and damaged a further six barges and five luggers.

TIMOR

The only sighting reported for the week was two small coastal vessels at DILLI on 10 Apr and eight luggers, four of which were destroyed by aircraft on 16 Apr.

BORNEO

A naval force comprising four cruisers and five destroyers was sighted just south of NATUNA ISLAND, heading towards SINGAPORE on 8 Apr.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

One heavy and one light cruiser together with one destroyer were reported on a west by south course on 8 Apr from a position just south of MINDANAO.

AIR - OWN

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

HOLLANDIA, the "graveyard" of many enemy aircraft during the early part of the month, was visited again in strength by Allied aircraft on 12 Apr, when 322 tons of bombs were dropped on airstrips, supply areas and shipping. Anti-aircraft guns and grounded aircraft on the HOLLANDIA and TAMI strips were destroyed and several buildings in the township were set on fire, whilst the attack on shipping in the harbour resulted in one 2000/4500 ton freighter destroyed, two 500/1000 ton freighters set on fire and several luggers and barges either destroyed or seriously damaged.

The enemy renewed his attempts at interception during this attack, but eight of the 20 enemy fighters encountered were shot down.

On the day prior to this attack, an enemy convoy, including eight gunboats and one destroyer, was attacked in the vicinity of HOLLANDIA. One merchant vessel was sunk,

and a gunboat, forced on to the beach, was later strafed and further damaged. Other enemy shipping casualties in this sector included two small merchant vessels left burning after an attack by a lone Allied aircraft in the vicinity of MAPIA ISLAND on 14 Apr, and a submarine probably damaged 165 miles NE of WADKE ISLAND on 11 Apr.

#### AMBOINA

Two Catalinas on an armed reconnaissance on 9 Apr, bombed the enemy seaplane base at HALONG, and although the bombs were seen to fall in the target area, a cloud haze obscured detailed observation.

#### TIMOR

The airfields at PENFOEI, DILLI and KOEPANG were also subjected to further Allied air attacks during the week, but once more low lying cloud interfered with observation of results. An enemy bivouac area at SOE (50 miles ENE of KOEPANG) was bombed and strafed by Beaufighters on 15 Apr, the target being well covered. Similar reports were received concerning an attack on KOEPANG township on the same date.

#### AIR - ENEMY

Only two enemy reconnaissance aircraft were reported in the NW Sector this week, one being sighted five miles SW of MODDER POINT on a course SW on 10 Apr, and the other was reported NW of KINAAM on 14 Apr.

### SECTION 2 - OPERATIONS - OTHER FRONTS - SWPA

#### LAND

##### SOLOMONS

The rout of enemy forces east of the TOROKINA perimeter was completed on 8 Apr when Allied troops overcoming slight opposition occupied high ground east of the TOROKINA RIVER. By next day the area east to MAVAVIA was in Allied hands.

Enemy stragglers only were left in the hills to the NE. A later report indicated that fresh enemy defences were being prepared north of the SAUA RIVER. An amended casualty return for this operation from 8 Mar to 8 Apr show 5370 enemy killed.

##### NUGURIA ISLAND

85 miles north of NISSAN ISLAND was reconnoitred by an Allied landing party who reported that friendly natives stated that there had been no Japanese personnel on the island for several months.

##### ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

The islands of PAK and HULONGAU were occupied by Allied forces on 9 and 11 Apr respectively. Apart from these landings, operations consisted of active patrolling only throughout the area. Mopping-up on MANUS ISLAND on 13/14/15 Apr resulted in a further 35 enemy killed and one taken prisoner. The total enemy casualties for this area to 15 Apr are recorded as 3025 killed and 24 captured.



#### NEW BRITAIN

Patrols in the TALASEA area continue to search for enemy parties in that area, a total of 53 PW being captured from 6 to 16 Apr inclusive. A long range patrol on 13 Apr reached one mile SW of CAPE HOSKINS airstrip where an enemy ambush was encountered without casualties to our troops. Further reports from this patrol, received on 16 Apr state that there are many Japs at MEGIGI PLANTATION. Native reports of other areas state that 100 Japs crossed the PANDI RIVER moving east on 14 Apr. Also the area west of BAIEN is clear of enemy with the exception of a party of 16 en route to PALMALMAL from MAGUNA.

#### NEW GUINEA - BOGADJIM AREA

With the by-passing of the remaining enemy positions astride the BOGADJIM - YAULA ROAD, the encircling movement to BOGADJIM was completed on 13 Apr when Australian troops penetrated as far as the GORI RIVER without making any contact.

The enemy position reported to be one half mile NNW of BRIDGE 6 on 10 Apr was the only post that made any attempt to hold up the advance. This position was successfully occupied on the following day, and although approximately 30 enemy were observed at BAU-AK no report has been received of any action in that area.

Patrols operating on either side of the road to the villages of ALIBU 1, WENGA, JAM JAM, KEKU and BELAIYA have failed to locate any enemy forces.

Later reports received on 15 Apr state patrols from BWA1 to ERIMA and forward to PALPA RIVER report 1000 yards defended beach from ERIMA to GORI RIVER mouth but no movement was observed.

An interesting native report received on the same day claims BAGASIN and all villages on the track to AMELE have been clear of enemy since 10 Apr and that it is the intention of the Japs to evacuate AMELE through AMAIMON to BOGIA, SEPIK and thence to WEWAK.

#### NEW GUINEA - MARKHAM VALLEY

Investigation by Australian troops of a report that an enemy party was in the WANTOAT area on 13 Apr resulted in four Japs of a party of 20 being killed, the remainder fleeing into the hills. Further native reports state that a large number of enemy are at the headwaters of the WANTOAT - IKWAP RIVERS. Patrol reports from position four and one half miles along the IKWAP RIVER on 15 Apr state there are indications of a small Jap party moving north. Natives have killed a number of enemy at MAPIAPUN (three quarters of one mile east of WANTOAT)

#### NEW GUINEA - RAI COAST

Enemy positions previously reported in MALE and KALIKO were found to be vacated on 13 Apr when our patrols penetrated along the coast.

Reports of further enemy dead being found along the inland trails continue to be received, 104 Japs being found between BAMBU and GWARASON on 11 Apr.

SEA - OWN

Allied naval units have been operative over a wide area during the past week. Enemy installations and barges were attacked in the SOLOMONS, NEW BRITAIN, and WITU ISLAND areas.

In addition to the above operations, reconnaissance missions have been successfully carried out in the waters adjacent to the ST MATTHIAS GROUP and NUGURIA ISLAND.

SEA - ENEMY

SOLOMONS - NEW BRITAIN

Photographs taken on 15 Apr reveal two cargo vessels of 750 and 650 ton displacement, together with 274 barges in the RABAUL area, but shipping movement was limited to barge and restricted submarine traffic only. Two submarines were reported on 14 Apr near MUTUPINA POINT and just south of BUKA PASSAGE in the SOLOMONS, and a further submarine sighting was reported 12 miles NE of CAPE GLOUCESTER on 11 Apr.

Air and naval attacks on barges around the coast of NEW BRITAIN sank nine barges and damaged a further seven.

NEW GUINEA

The tonnage sighted for the current period shows a decrease on that previously reported. A total of 15 vessels only was reported between WEWAK and VANIMO and with the exception of one vessel of 1500/2500 tons, all were of the 500/1000 ton class. Barge and lugger movement continues much on the same scale as previously, 220 barges and 25 luggers being sighted.

Losses due to Allied air and naval attacks were :-

Sunk

1 500/1000 ton vessel  
1 1500/2500 ton vessel  
16 barges  
4 luggers

Damaged

1 unidentified vessel  
Approximately 19 barges  
and 4 luggers

AIR - OWN

SOLOMONS

Allied air attacks on BOUGAINVILLE this week, whilst not on such a large scale as formerly, continued to be directed mainly on enemy positions around TOROKINA. Enemy gun positions at AITARA and MAMAGATA MISSIONS were destroyed and large fires started in an enemy bivouac area on the SAUA RIVER. On 12 Apr, Airacobras bombed enemy installations at TONLEI HARBOUR with unobserved results, and on 15 Apr, BUKA PASSAGE area was bombed and strafed.

NEW IRELAND

Allied aircraft paid further visits to KAVIENG this week, when the airfield and anti-aircraft positions were bombed and strafed on 10 and 12 Apr. All the bombs fell in the target area, and the runway and dispersal bays, previously reported badly damaged, received further direct hits.

#### NEW BRITAIN

The daily pounding of the RABAU area by Allied aircraft, continued with all its former intensity during the current week, when an average daily total of 260 sorties were completed over the area.

Numerous fires and explosions caused in supply and personnel areas, a large number of buildings destroyed and other extensive damage was the result of attacks over a wide area from RAPOPO to KERA VIA BAY and VUNAKANAU. TALILI BAY and east RABAU township also suffered similar heavy damage.

Runways on the airfields at LAKUNAI, RAPOPO, VUNAKANAU and TOBERA were further damaged by numerous direct hits, while several anti-aircraft guns were silenced.

#### ADMIRALTY

In support of Allied ground troops in the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS, Allied aircraft carried out strafing runs this week along roads in the LORENGAU area, from UNDRUVU and KANDRANYO to DRABITO, and enemy positions on PAK ISLAND were bombed by Kittyhawks on 9 Apr. Targets in both areas were reported as being well covered.

#### CENTRAL PACIFIC

The latest report received of the combined Allied operations against Japanese bases in the PALAU area during the period 29/31 Mar, reveals that the total enemy aircraft losses amounted to 160 aircraft definitely destroyed and a further 54 probably destroyed. In addition, hangars, warehouses, docks and dumps on PALAU, YAP, ULITHI and WOLEAI ISLANDS were extensively damaged.

An eight ship enemy convoy sighted 50 miles NW of WOLEAI ISLAND on 8 Apr, was attacked by a Catalina, which hit a freighter transport and scored near misses on two other vessels, probably damaging both.

#### NEW GUINEA

Enemy personnel and supply areas along the coast continued to hold priority in Allied air attacks in NEW GUINEA during this week. The HANSA BAY - WEWAK area suffered extensive damage during the early part of the week, and on 9 Apr it was reported that this area was "well torn up and badly burned out". Further attacks on the same area on 10/11 Apr, resulted in the report that the area was completely destroyed.

Practically the entire coast from BUNABUN HARBOUR to AITAPE, including KARKAR ISLAND, was bombed and strafed during the period under review, and enemy anti-aircraft guns, buildings and other installations were either destroyed or heavily damaged in each attack.

The DAGUA - BUT area can now be compared with the HANSA BAY - WEWAK area, since reports received after an Allied air attack on 13 Apr, indicate that 75% of the personnel areas have been rendered untenable.

The airfields in this area also received their share of attention on 13 Apr, when five grounded aircraft were destroyed, a fuel dump set on fire and the runways received several direct hits.

Further extensive damage was caused at AITAPE, which was visited on three occasions during the week, as was WENGA, where, in support of Allied ground forces, enemy positions were bombed and strafed.

Allied aircraft were responsible for the destruction of approximately 16 barges and four luggers along the NEW GUINEA coast, and on 9 Apr, an enemy submarine, sighted 50 miles north of BUT, was damaged in a strafing attack. Allied aircraft also supplied air cover for Allied warships in attacks on installations at HANSA BAY, ULIGAN HARBOUR, ALEXISHAFEN and MADANG on 10 Apr.

#### AIR - ENEMY

A lone enemy bomber again appeared over SAIDOR this week, when on the night 10/11 Apr, three bombs were dropped but only slight damage was reported.

The only other air activity on the enemy's part consisted of fighter interception to Allied raids. The enemy lost eight airborne aircraft over HOLLANDIA on 12 Apr, but the two planes encountered over RABUL on 9 Apr made one attack then withdrew with no loss to themselves. Similarly, the pilots of three intercepting fighters over WEWAK on 11 Apr, did not act aggressively, although one of these planes was shot down by an Allied aircraft.

### PART II

#### SECTION 1 - ORDER OF BATTLE

#### LAND

##### SWPA

It is considered that a further 5000 troops, probably including a part of 36 Division, have arrived on the north coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA. Of this total, 3000 have been tentatively placed at SARMI and the remaining 2000 at MANOKWARI, thus increasing the estimated strengths for these bases to :-

SARMI	-	5000
MANOKWARI	-	8000
North coast DUTCH NEW GUINEA	-	20000

Information has now been received stating that the infantry regiment of 36 Division which is on BIAK ISLAND, is not 223 as previously reported, but 222 Infantry Regiment.

The Advanced Headquarters of 46 Division is now believed to have moved to BIMA, on SOEMBABA ISLAND, suggesting that further combatant elements of the division may be moving, or have moved, into the general area of the FLORES SEA islands. Pending further information however, no change is made in the estimated strength for this locality.

In the BRITISH NEW GUINEA zone, the enemy is continuing the hurried withdrawal of his forces in the MADANG area, and appears to be massing his available strength in the vicinity of HANSA BAY. A further part of 41 Division is considered to have withdrawn from MADANG leaving 239 Inf Regt (less one battalion) as the main component of the 5000 troops now confronting the Allied advance on this base. Subsequent to this change, the enemy strength at HANSA BAY is now estimated to total 28,000. Further west it is reported that portions of 66 and 102 Inf Regts are located in the vicinity of the SEPIK RIVER mouth.

The estimate for the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS has been deleted although scattered elements may still be operating there. It has been reported that from 8 Mar to 8 Apr 44, a total of 5370 Japanese troops were killed in the SOLOMONS. This would probably reduce the total in the SOLOMONS to some 16,630 troops but until official notification is received, no change is being recorded.

As a result of the above alterations, the following are the recorded estimates of enemy strengths by sectors :-

NE SECTOR	-	151,250
NW SECTOR	-	194,000
TOTAL SWPA	-	345,250

#### ENEMY CASUALTIES

It is of interest to note the number of enemy personnel who have either been killed in action or who have died as a result of sickness in the SWPA during the campaigns from Jul 42 to 13 Apr 44 :-

NEW GUINEA (from the landing at BUNA in	
Jul 42 to the end of the	
HUON PENINSULA campaign)	..... 30,000
RAI COAST .....	1,500
RAMU VALLEY .....	1,000
NEW BRITAIN .....	5,000
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS .....	3,000
BOUGAINVILLE .....	8,000
TOTAL - . 48,500	

The above figures are based upon counted dead and from reports contained in documents of a reliable nature, and do not include such losses as have been caused by our air attacks unless a specific count has been carried out.

It would appear normal to deduct one Japanese wounded for each man killed in action whilst a further wastage rate would result from the high percentage of sickness and disease prevalent in the Japanese Army in the SWPA; consequently it can be concluded that Allied troops throughout the campaigns in this theatre for the period, have met and defeated a total of 11 divisions or their equivalent, and further, of these 11 divisions the equivalent to six divisions have been rendered ineffective.

(Adapted from AIF Review No 89)

GENERAL

When 17 Division commenced the movement into the SWPA from CENTRAL CHINA in Aug 43, it was relieved by 65 Division. The arrival of 72 Brigade in CENTRAL CHINA in Jul 43, suggest the possibility that this brigade may be part of 65 Division.

AIR

NW SECTOR

It is now considered that the large influx of aircraft in the PHILIPPINES, reported in last week's review, have now been moved back to their original area, possibly in MALAYA and SUMATRA. Bomber strength in the HALMAHERAS has shown an increase of 14 during this week, and both bomber and observation aircraft strengths in the AMBON, CERAM and BOEROE areas have increased slightly, but in all other areas in this sector strengths remain constant

NE SECTOR - NEW GUINEA

A reduction of 42 in the aircraft strength of this area during the week, would apparently indicate the possible aircraft casualties sustained by the enemy due to Allied air activity, and/or the withdrawal of aircraft for possible re-organisation.

NE SECTOR - OTHER AREAS

Aircraft strengths in NEW BRITAIN, NEW IRELAND and the SOLOMONS show no change with last week's totals.

SECTION 3 - ORGANISATION

JAPANESE COMMANDO UNITS

Recent information discloses the fact that a new type of raiding unit has been identified in the SWPA. This unit which has the designation "YUGEKI", (literally translated as "assault" or "raiding"), is suggested to be equivalent to our Commando Unit and may be designed to carry out harassing attacks behind Allied lines. There is also some evidence suggesting a link with air transport and it is possible that they may be used as either airborne or parachute troops. In the SWPA it would seem that 1 Commando Unit HQ, under the command of 2 AREA ARMY and probably located at HOLLANDIA, is in control of 10 Commando Companies numbered 1 to 10 inclusive and the disposition of identified companies as at Mar 44 are as follows :-

1	Commando Coy	-	HOLLANDIA, CO: Maj MIYOSHI
2	" "	-	HOLLANDIA
3	" "	-	Probably MANOKWARI
4	" "	-	Probably MANOKWARI
5	" "	-	Probably destined for MANOKWARI
6	" "	-	Probably destined for MANOKWARI

#### SECTION 4 - EQUIPMENT

##### WOODEN AUTOMOBILES

With the main bulk of their steel production tied up with the Shipbuilding, Aircraft, and munition industries it is not surprising that the Japanese are reported to be conducting experiments in the manufacture of "wooden" automobiles. According to the information available the wheels are constructed of slabs of wood approximately 2<sup>3</sup>/<sub>4</sub> inches in thickness and a specially durable iron wood has been selected for the axles. The latter seems to be an exaggeration, but the possibility of the large scale use of wood and plastics in the construction of trucks - especially the body - is one which cannot be overlooked. The loading capacity of the experimental vehicle is stated to be 720 lbs, but it is expected that the small amount of fuel required to run the vehicle will compensate for the light load.

##### JAPANESE ANTI-VEHICULAR "YARDSTICK" MINE

Attached as Appendix 'A(i)' to this summary is a detailed description of this newly identified weapon. Illustrations of the mine are attached as Appendix 'A(ii)'.

#### SECTION 5 - TACTICS

##### JAPAN'S EMPLOYMENT OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

The demonstrations by the Allies' Air Forces of their ability to launch devastating attacks on Japanese bases in the CENTRAL PACIFIC, and their now undisputed superiority in the SWPA have resulted in the virtual strangulation of the enemy supply lines. Unremitting and destructive raids on Japanese aerodromes and shipping in and around NEW BRITAIN, NEW IRELAND, and the north coast of NEW GUINEA are, if anything, increasing in intensity, and may force the enemy to revert to the employment of aircraft carriers against the Allied Forces in 1944.

To operate from their carriers, the Japanese, up to 1941, had produced an outstanding fighter, an excellent torpedo bomber, and a better than average dive bomber. Since that time, other improved planes have made their appearance and these could undoubtedly be operated from carriers.

JAPAN started the war on 7 Dec 41, with a carrier-borne attack on PEARL HARBOUR and in this the Japanese showed masterful planning, timing, and execution in performing an operation, the success of which required all three of these characteristics.

After PEARL HARBOUR followed the conquest of WAKE ISLAND; then the CORAL SEA battle, and later the Battle of MIDWAY and DUTCH HARBOUR.

In the CORAL SEA battle, the enemy carrier SHOHU (12,000 tons) was sunk, with a tremendous loss of life and another carrier was badly damaged.

In the Battle of MIDWAY and DUTCH HARBOUR, the Japanese Navy suffered its first clear-cut defeat in this war, when four of its carriers - the KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU, and HIRYU - (two of 27,000 tons and two of 10,500 tons), approximately 45% of their first line carrier strength, were lost.

These two battles, both large scale naval engagements, were fought entirely by aircraft, without any of the opposing ships coming within sight of each other.

The Japanese Navy was left in sore straits following the Battle of MIDWAY, and for the first three weeks following the Allied landings on GUADALCANAL, the Japanese aircraft carriers were used only for ferrying aircraft from TRUK to RABAU and BOUGAINVILLE for the land-based attacks on HENDERSON Field.

About two months later, in late Aug 42, a relatively minor battle was fought off the STEWART ISLANDS (or the Northern SOLOMONS) between American and Japanese carrier forces, resulting in the sinking of the enemy carrier RYUJO, and late in Oct of the same year, the Battle of SANTA CRUZ was fought.

In this engagement, as had been the case at STEWART ISLANDS, the Japanese were defeated, the carrier SHOKAKU (29,800 tons) being severely damaged, and another carrier, probably the ZUIHO (12,000 tons), was damaged.

In addition to their carrier damage, considerable destruction was inflicted upon other ships in the enemy task force, but perhaps the most serious blow suffered by the Japanese in this engagement was the loss inflicted upon his air groups by the American fighters and anti-aircraft batteries. The virtual annihilation here of the last of the first team who had survived MIDWAY meant that time and trouble would have to be expended before a sufficient number of experienced and suitable pilots could be gathered for future operations.

Since Oct of '42, the enemy carriers have not been used in either offensive or defensive action against the Allied Forces, and during the past 16 months have been used as aircraft ferries only. With TRUK as the centre, they are able to keep feeding aircraft into the island outposts.

Although this use to which they have been put, has conserved carrier strength, and given the Japanese an elastic system of co-ordination between their movable, sinkable carriers and the immovable, unsinkable island fields, it has relegated the enemy carriers (and hence the entire Japanese Fleet) to a programme of defence that has been followed since the last offensive drive against GUADALCANAL late in '42. This drive, attempted by surface forces, operating at night, and without aircraft support, failed and the performance has not been repeated.

As the Allies move through the opening phase of their own offensive operations in the NORTHERN, CENTRAL, and SOUTHERN PACIFIC, however, the Japanese Naval Air Arm is still found to be a formidable and resourceful opponent. Although the Japanese possess only two first-line 'keel-up' carriers, their conversion of fast, well-compartmented passenger liners, sub-tenders, seaplane tenders and other fleet auxiliaries has complemented their carrier strength to an amazing degree and given them a first-line strength of six carriers in actual operation, one in training work, one soon to be completed, and six CVEs, (a type of converted carrier), with numerous others in the process of conversion.



With these carriers, the enemy has shown astonishing ability to restock airfields with airplanes of all descriptions within a few days of disastrous losses. This service has been extended as the Allies continue their operations against the enemy island outposts.

This passive use of the carriers, plus the Allies building programme has enabled the Allied forces to enjoy, for the first time since the war began, a quantitative as well as qualitative superiority in the PACIFIC. By concentrating a large number of carriers in the area the Allies have been able to checkmate the enemy use of his carrier force as a never-ending source of supply to the buffer islands between the westward line of the growing Allied offensive and the Japanese mainland.

With its operational bases already crumbling, the enemy now finds that even its supply bases are no longer secure. The recent raids on TRUK emphasise this fact. If the Japanese Navy desires to defend this bastion, it must commit the larger percentage of its carriers to operations against Allied attacking task forces and abandon the 18 month old policy of holding its carriers at a safe distance from the battle lines.

Of the remaining enemy carriers, the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU might be described as the backbone of the Japanese carrier force. They are tremendous in size, fast, able to carry a large number of aircraft, and possessed of an extraordinary toughness. It is reported that a third large carrier, the UNRYU, will soon join the fleet. Two others, the HIYO and JUNYO, were converted from passenger liners, and although these ships were designed for a speed of 28 knots, their usual maximum operating speed is reported to be 23 knots. Another carrier, the ZUIHO, is the former oiler-submarine tender TAKASAKI, laid down in Jun '35, launched in Jun '36, but not commissioned until '40. Her sister ship, the RYUHO, was originally a submarine tender, commissioned in '34, and reconstructed as a carrier in '42.

In addition to the five to six carriers now in service, JAPAN is known to have at least eight CVEs which are used entirely for ferry service although their flight decks are equipped to land planes as well as launch them. Three of these can ferry a maximum of 60 planes each.

If the Japanese bring their carrier fleet into action against the Allied forces, it should again prove to be a formidable opponent. They have hit hard with this weapon before, and are capable of doing so again. Their carriers are fast, tough, skilfully handled, and remarkable in their ability to stand up to bomb and torpedo damage. During the last few months, the enemy has shown increased skill in night operations. They will probably introduce new or improved types of shipborne aircraft in the future, although production problems may prevent large scale use of new types.

In daylight operations in the past, the Japanese have constantly shown ability to co-ordinate land or sea-based search operations with the speedy and early launching of attacks by carrier squadrons. In almost every carrier battle, their attack groups have been launched first. The enemy carriers have also been quick to take advantage of the protection offered by bad weather fronts. The skill

with which their reconnaissance planes maintained contact with the Allied forces during the recent attacks on the GILBERTS and MARSHALLS and guided quick land-based strikes in against them shows that the enemy has not lost this ability to co-ordinate search and swift attacks. The months of Japanese inactivity in the combat use of carriers does not invalidate the lessons of CORAL SEA, MIDWAY, STEWART ISLANDS, and SANTA CRUZ. JAPAN will use her carriers with skill and daring when she is ultimately driven to risking them again in battle.

(Adapted from AAF Summary 196)

#### SECTION 6 - SUPPLY

##### FISHING BOATS AND MOTOR SAILBOATS

Information obtained at LOS NEGROS ISLAND reviews the use, by the enemy, of sea trucks, MLC, fishing boats and motor sailboats in SOUTH PACIFIC operations. No new facts emerge in respect of sea trucks and MLC but confirmation is given to previous conjecture as to capacity and speed of fishing boats and provides new data on this and a further class of civil vessel, which has been pressed into operational service in SWPA.

Previous conjecture that fishing boats arrived in operational areas under their own power (in contrast to MLC) is confirmed by a statement that 44 fishing boats left JAPAN on 11 Feb (presumably '43) and reached RABUL by way of TRUK, on 13 Apr. They were accompanied by larger vessels which were apparently responsible for navigation. A high rate of wastage resulted from this arduous trip and it is noted that 14 boats were unserviceable on arrival.

It was apparently the Japanese intention to send 24 of the remaining boats to the CAPE GLOUCESTER area, but it is stated that Bl7s and reefs soon cost them nine of the 24 vessels, but seven or eight were 'expected' to reach their destination.

The boats were manned by civilian fishing personnel who, in spite of their hardships, were said to be in "high spirits". They originated from KOREA and LOOCHOO.

Previous evidence showed that the fishing industry is highly organised in Co-operative Groups with registered personnel, and accordingly it may be assumed that the pressing of fishing boats and personnel into operational service is a comparatively simple matter. Not without humour is the fact that one fishing group, the "TAKAO Fraternal Association of Fishing Boats" had as its motto "Live and Let Live". It is not recorded whether this liberal sentiment survived the transfer of members of the 'Fraternity' to front-line service.

Fishing boats are about 20 tons, have a length of 15 metres, a beam of three metres and draw 1.5-2 metres. Speed is five to six sea miles per hour. They load about six tons of heavy material and their capacity is 10-15 cubic metres. Carrying capacity had already been correctly deduced from loading tables of boats operationally employed in western NEW BRITAIN.

#### MOTOR SAILBOAT

This class of vessel runs on both mechanical and sail-power. Capacity is much greater than that of the fishing boat. The motor sailboat will carry 50 tons and cubic capacity is about 100 cubic metres. Speed is five to six sea miles per hour. Draft is three metres, length 20-25 metres, beam five metres. These vessels were formerly used to haul coal in the HANSHIN district.

They can be navigated in places inaccessible even to sea trucks but it is pointed out that the sailboat's mast renders concealment difficult. Boats of this type are known to have been used by the enemy for supply in the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS Group.

Noteworthy is the fact that both classes of vessels discussed have an operating endurance of about 10 days.

#### SECTION 8 - GENERAL

##### INDIAN WOMENS' ARMY

The formation and training of a unit composed entirely of women was completed at SINGAPORE at the end of War this year when the RHANI of JHANSI Regiment held a graduation ceremony. The report that in their drive into INDIA the Japanese are making use of such women suggests that their use is designed mainly for propaganda purposes and the neutralising effect they may have upon INDIAN troops opposed to them.

A part of the INDIAN National Movement under the control of Subhas Chandra Bose, this regiment has been trained by instructors from that organisation and, although no details of the training programme have been released, generally it appears to have been that of an infanteer and included the fundamental drills and field work. Throughout the course of training however, every effort has been made to fire their fanaticism by the addition of further "inspiring" propaganda, even the title of the regiment being derived from the "Joan of Arc" of INDIA, who, according to legend, was killed whilst leading troops against the British in 1857.

Although fired with ambitious ideas of coming to grips with the "common enemy" it does not seem likely that these troops could be used effectively as combat troops, but, as similar units in the SOVIET and YUGOSLAV Partisan Forces have gained reputedly good results as guerilla bands, this may also be the ultimate function of the RHANI of JHANSI "Amajons".

#### PART III

##### TOPOGRAPHICAL

##### ATTITUDE OF NATIVES IN SOUTH WEST DUTCH NEW GUINEA

##### GENERAL

Up to 1935, 1/6th of the coastal area of DUTCH NEW GUINEA was still not under official control and the interior had no official administration at all. However, as a result

of proposals put forward in 1935, great strides were made in the last few years before the war and stations in the interior and Government sub-stations were opened up. The section of the coast from OMBA RIVER (4°10'S 134°45'E) to MERAUKE was only partly under control prior to 1935.

Attached as Appendix 'B' is a map which shows the approximate limits of Japanese and Allied influence over the natives along this coast.

#### AREA UNDER JAPANESE INFLUENCE

From OMBA RIVER to the OTAKWA RIVER the inhabitants of the southern part of the coastal plain have been under government and mission influence for some time. They have given up their nomadic habits and settled down in fairly large villages, usually on the coast or close to it. There were Government posts and mission stations at OETA and KAUKENAU and each village had an Indonesian mission teacher.

The OTAKWA RIVER is a natural division in classifying the natives along this coast, as the tribes East and West of that river have been antagonistic to each other for many years. The natives east of the river have been under control only a comparatively short time and are much more warlike than those west of the river.

It is therefore significant that the farthest known Japanese outpost is at JAPERO on the west bank of the OTAKWA RIVER and they traverse the coast between TIMIKA and this point fairly regularly. As the natives in this area have been accustomed to government control, domination by the Japanese should be simple. Information from two natives who escaped from the enemy and reported to an Allied post in Jan 44 confirms this fact and gives names of a number of Malays and natives in that area who are definitely pro-Japanese.

#### AREA UNDER ALLIED INFLUENCE

The area east of the LE COCQ RIVER (which enters the sea between the BLOEMEN and HELLWIG RIVERS) is inhabited by the MANOWE people. They were noted headhunters and only recently came under control with the establishment of the Government post at AGATSJ. Their unruliness brought them into continual trouble with the Government until fairly recently and it is probable that some at any rate still harbor anti-Dutch feelings.

Further up the rivers a number of nomadic and uncontrolled swamp dwellers still exist.

In the EILANDEN - LE COCQ RIVER area, AMOREP and SIMAI natives are very friendly to the Allies, as are the AYAM and WARSE, though the latter are warlike tribes. The POMATSJ RIVER and KAPI natives are friendly and probably will remain so, as long as they consider the Allies to be the stronger side.

The ATS natives are warlike and traditional enemies of the AMOREP and SIMAI natives and probably are also jealous of the trust placed in the AMOREPS by the Allies. They have shown warlike tendencies on several occasions but have been pacified by a display of Allied power.

# NEUTRAL AREA

West of KAPI and the LE COCQ RIVER as far as OTAKWA RIVER there are no regular villages. It is one large swamp area and the rivers are visited regularly by bands of natives from the MANOWE district further east.

The OTAKWA RIVER natives regard this area as a fishing and hunting ground which belongs to the MANOWE (KAPI-AYAM) natives and they do not venture into it. The MANOWE natives were in the habit of raiding natives west of the OTAKWA RIVER.

This comparatively uninhabited area thus forms a natural division between the part of the coast which is dominated by the Japanese and the section which is under Allied influence. The existing hostility between the natives of each part should tend to keep the native sympathies in both areas static.

# PLACE NAMES NOT COMMONLY KNOWN

Index to places mentioned in this summary which may not be commonly known

<u>PLACE</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>LAT</u>		<u>LONG</u>	
		<u>Deg</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Deg</u>	<u>Min</u>
AMAIMON	NEW GUINEA	5	10	145	26
AMELE	NEW GUINEA	5	17	145	42
BAGASIN	NEW GUINEA	5	21	145	30
BAIEN	NEW BRITAIN	5	25	152	06
BELAIYA	NEW GUINEA	5	29	145	38
IKWAP RIVER	NEW GUINEA	6	07	146	29
KANDRANYO	ADMIRALTY IS	2	07	147	05
KEKU	NEW GUINEA	5	29	145	41
MAPLA ISLAND	DUTCH NEW GUINEA	1	00	134	20
MEGIGI PLANTATION	NEW BRITAIN	5	29	150	24
NAPIAPUN	NEW GUINEA	6	07	146	28
NUGURIA ISLAND	East of NEW IRELAND	3	50	154	50
PALPA RIVER	NEW GUINEA	5	24	145	42
SOE	TIMOR	9	52	124	16
ULITHI ISLAND	CENTRAL PACIFIC	10	00	139	50
UNDRAVU	ADMIRALTY ISLANDS	2	09	147	05
WANTOAT	NEW GUINEA	6	07	146	27
WENGA	NEW GUINEA	5	31	145	45
YAP ISLAND	CENTRAL PACIFIC	9	05	138	00

# PART IV

# OTHER FRONTS

# BURMA

In BURMA, there has been no improvement in the British position on the INDIA - BURMA border. Japanese troops continue to find the weaknesses in the British line and fully exploit them despite the fact that they are suffering heavy losses.

On the ARAKAN front, British troops have made a slight advance SW of BUTHIDAUNG, but otherwise only the normal large-scale patrolling was carried out.

In the KALADAN VALLEY, Japanese attacks on our forces near KALADAN VILLAGE have been driven off with heavy casualties to the enemy.

The Japanese thrust north of the CHIN HILLS has developed towards SILCHAR, but at present little or no progress is being made against stiffening British resistance although enemy advanced elements had reached as far as 60 miles SW of IMPHAL in their attempt to cut the SILCHAR - BISHENPUR ROAD.

In the IMPHAL area, the enemy is still being held and despite his heavy losses, continues to hold stubbornly to his positions astride the IMPHAL - KOHIMA ROAD. British forces still hold KOHIMA against threatening flanking moves which have by-passed the town to the south and north, although the KOHIMA - DIMAPUR ROAD is still intact.

In the HUKAWNG VALLEY, American and Chinese troops are meeting stiffer resistance in their drive towards MYITKYINA, but have made small local gains. A similar situation exists in the NORTH BURMA area, where Allied troops advancing beyond NSOPZUP have met stronger Japanese opposition in the vicinity of TIANGZUP.

#### ITALY

The lull in operations on the Italian fronts still continues. Patrols are very active on both sides, each attempting to ascertain strengths in rear areas. At the ANZIO Bridgehead, the warfare has developed into one of artillery duels, the German object being to harass Allied shore installations, with Allied counter-battery fire directed at German OPs. In this regard, Allied naval craft have given support.

#### RUSSIA

The swift Russian re-occupation of almost the whole of the CRIMEA has been the outstanding operation over the past week. Elsewhere on the southern front operations have been on a restricted scale and to the west, a German counter-attack succeeded in breaking through to the encircled troops west of SKALA and effecting their release.

The speed of the Russian advance in the CRIMEA was only equalled by the withdrawal of the German and Rumanian garrison. In less than a week the dual advance from the KERCH PENINSULA and the PEREKOP Isthmus has liberated the whole area with the exception of the port of SEBASTOPOL, the fall of which is imminent. Large numbers of enemy troops have been made prisoner and ports and installations which will be of great use in any Russian offensive against RUMANIA, have been captured.

With the occupation of ODESSA, Russian troops have now re-occupied all Russian territory east of the DNIESTER RIVER, south of and including TIRASPOL. Bridgeheads are being established on the western bank and Soviet troops are thrusting towards KISHINEV (CHISNAU) the Bessarabian capital. North of TIRASPOL, the one remaining German foothold east of the DNIESTER is rapidly dwindling under Russian pressure.

The drive which took the Russian forces to and beyond the SERET RIVER into RUMANIA has reached the foothills of the LOWER CARPATHIANS and little progress has been reported since the capture of PASCANI. The full effect of Allied bombing raids on BALKAN communications are expected to make itself apparent in the near future.

No further advances are reported from the Russians on the CZECHO-SLOVAK border and it is assumed that forces are being marshalled for a descent on to the plains of HUNGARY.

In Polish territory, the German counter-attack which resulted in the capture of BUCACZ and the release of the remnants of the 15 German Divisions trapped at SKALA was offset by the Russian capture of TARNOPOL. Further up this front another German counter-attack in the KOWEL area shows the importance placed by GERMANY on the safeguarding of IWOW and WARSAW.

#### RUMANIA

Attached as Appendix 'C' is a "Resume of the Political Situation in RUMANIA."

#### PART V

#### SECURITY

In the initial contacts made with the Japanese in the SWPA, most of the information of intelligence value was obtained from the personal effects - especially diaries - found on enemy dead or taken from prisoners. Apparently the Japanese, at this time, had not considered the intelligence value of such material - probably because they were over-confident of advancing and so expected to dispose of their own casualties.

However, since the succession of reverses which culminated in the loss of their HUCO PENINSULA possessions, the Japanese High Command appear to have adopted a more security-minded attitude in an attempt to prevent information reaching Allied intelligence.

A series of security instructions have been issued ranging from the disposal of documents prior to withdrawal from an area, to the liquidation of any of their wounded who, in the absence of transport would have to be left in the face of an Allied advance. An additional aspect of this security campaign is contained in a series of extracts from PW statements which reveal that precautions are being taken in regard to the wearing of badges of rank and/or Unit Insignia badges. These extracts are quoted below :-

"In comparison with the number of documents, remarkably few insignia badges and unit identifications have been received by ATIS. This is apparently due to the following factors :-

##### a. Removal of Insignia:

(1) PW JA 145087 stated:

"Prior to embarkation at RABAU, troops were ordered to remove all badges and other identifications of unit and rank from their uniforms including decorations if any. PW stated that he had never experienced such precautions before, and in CHINA they had been permitted to retain badges of rank and decorations. However, Chinese troops had been prone to rip badges of rank off Jap officers killed in action and that on production of such badges to their officers, Chinese troops, he understood, were paid cash bonuses."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No 53, p8)

(2) PW JA 145531 stated:

"That all uniforms were taken from the men at RABAU and they were issued with new ones. The badges of identification were, therefore, on their old uniforms, and new ones were not issued."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No 67, p3)

(3) PW JA 147001 stated:

"During operations unit wore no identification badges. At MANILA troops wore a khaki cloth badge showing name, rank and unit. Identity discs worn at all times. No flags brought by Regiment to NATAMO. None used on MLC or Army boats."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No 381, p4)

(4) PW JA100000 stated:

"All badges of rank were removed prior to embarkation at RABAU. All marines wore a white cloth badge on the left breast of the tunic. The inscription of these badges included name, rank, company and birthdate."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No 13, p5)

*C. Man*  
Lt-Col  
GS FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY



JAPANESE ANTI-VEHICULAR YARDSTICK MINE

The following details, characteristics and photographs of the Japanese Anti-Vehicular Yardstick Mine have been extracted from a report prepared by MEIU 1 USN.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

This new Japanese land mine of Navy design recently recovered in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Area outwardly resembles a bangalore torpedo, but actually consists of four (4) fused units completely enclosed in a smooth steel case. Shear wire pressure fuses are actuated when the mine case is crushed beneath the wheels or tracks of a vehicle. The strength of the case itself limits the use of the mine as an anti-personnel weapon, but in its present design it could be functioned by almost any vehicle. The mines may be buried on landing strips in an attempt to deny the use of newly captured airfields.

The mine consists of a flattened steel tube, oval in cross section, which contains eight (8) three-quarter pound blocks of picric acid. One end of each block is moulded to the form of the fuse and two (2) blocks placed with the moulded ends together completely enclose the fuse with the exception of the striker release plunger which protrudes from the upper surface. Four of the two-block units placed end to end fill the container, forming, in effect, four mines enclosed in a single long case. There is no external evidence of the fuses. A common safety wire inserted through one end of the case passes through all the fuses. This wire is removed when the mine is planted.

Length of assembled mine	: 36 in (hence "Yardstick")
Dimensions in cross section	: $3\frac{3}{8}$ " x $1\frac{13}{16}$ " (Oval)
Weight, complete	: 4.8 kg
Weight of charge	: 2.7 kg

CASE:

The main body of the container is formed by two halves of sheet-steel welded together with continuous welds to form a tube 35 inches in length. Two (2) steel caps close the ends of the tube. One cap provides a hole for the insertion of the safety wire and is fitted with a spring clip which holds the safety wire in place. The other cap is plain and serves only to close the tube. Both caps are removable and are held in place by single screws.

EXPLOSIVE CHARGE:

The explosive charge is composed of eight blocks of picric acid. All blocks are identical. The picric is cast in a paper container and the filled block is coated with paraffin. The blocks are flattened on one side and consequently do not completely fill the oval cross section of the mine case. The space left between the flat side of the blocks and the wall of the case accommodates the protruding heads of the fuses and also allows space for the side of the case to be depressed on to the fuses by the passage of a vehicle over the mine.

Physical data:

Weight of block : 228.6 grams ( $\frac{3}{4}$  lb)  
Dimensions :  $4\frac{3}{8}$ " x  $3\frac{1}{16}$ " x  $1\frac{1}{4}$ "

A label is affixed to the curved side of each block.

A sample label is translated below:

Name of article : Bursting charge for Pole Land Mine  
Type of charge : Shimose (Picric Acid)  
Lot number : No. 170  
Manufactured : August 1943  
Cast : September 1943  
Place of manufacture : No 3 Naval Explosives Factory

NOTE: All blocks bore the same recent date of manufacture and casting. The Japanese term "Pole Mine" from the above translation is avoided because of confusion arising from the use of a magnet fitted anti-tank mine suspended from a pole - a method of attack used by the Japanese.

FUSE:

All parts of the fuse are black-finished rust-resistant steel except the shear wire, the priming cap carrier, and the sealing discs of the gaine. The fuse is compact and simple. It consists of (a) a short cylindrical fuse body which houses the striker release plunger, (b) the striker housing which contains the striker and striker spring and (c) the gaine. The gaine and striker housing are identical in external appearance and screw into the sides of the cylindrical fuse body in diametrically opposite positions. The gaine is marked with a daub of red paint on the base to distinguish it from the striker housing in the assembled fuse.

The striker release plunger consists of a split pin with an enlarged flat head. It is inserted in the top of the fuse body and is positioned by a copper shear wire which passes through the fuse body and through a hole in the plunger. A second hole nearer the top of the plunger at 90 degrees to the shear wire hole, accommodates the safety wire. The lower end of the plunger is split for approximately half its length by a slot  $5/64$  inch in width which is enlarged at its inner end into an opening  $11/64$  inch in width.

The striker is a one piece steel piston turned down on three diameters to form a head, a shaft and a firing pin. In assembling the fuse, the firing pin passes through the slot in the striker release plunger, but the shoulders of the shaft can not pass through the slot. The striker housing, containing the striker spring is started over the head of the striker and is screwed into the fuse body. This action compresses the striker spring between the striker housing and the striker release plunger. The gaine is screwed into the fuse body in a position diametrically opposite the striker.

When force enough is applied to the head of the fuse to break the copper shear wire and depress the striker release plunger, the enlarged portion of the slot in the plunger is moved down and the striker drives through the opening and strikes the priming cap. The wires of two specimens tested on a tensiometer

sheared at an indicated force of 336 pounds. The same force should be more than sufficient to crush the case of the mine.

The initiator in the mine is in the form of a core (white) pressed directly into the top of the yellowish white booster.

Chemical analyses have not been made at this time.

Diameter of shear wire (copper):	.079 inch (12 gauge, Brown & Sharpe)
Weight of complete fuse	: 132.6 grams
Weight of assembled mine	: 16.65 grams
Weight of booster	: 2.63 grams
Weight of initiator	: 0.27 grams

#### TACTICAL USE:

Instructions on the tag attached to the safety wire are translated as follows :-

One Side:

"Safety Wire (Read reverse side carefully)."

Reverse Side:

"1. When burying, remove safety wire and insert burying plug. Use after coating with moisture proof paint."

"2. When using in close quarters combat, there is nothing to hinder using the charge after merely removing the safety wire."

The remains of a small envelope marked "Burying Plug" was tied with the instruction tag to the safety wire. It is thought that this envelope contained a threaded plug, which is screwed into the safety wire hole as a step in making the assembly moisture proof. A thick tarry compound had been applied to the seams around the caps which close the ends of the mine case.

#### COLOUR AND MARKINGS:

The mine case is painted olive drab over an under-coat of black. The interior is painted with black lacquer. The designation, 15管 底部 1則


(fuse top portion), is stencilled vertically in red characters approximately  $\frac{7}{8}$  inch tall on one side, and the corresponding marking, 15管 底部 1則

(fuse bottom portion) in smaller characters about  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch tall is stencilled on the reverse side.

A naval mark of approval is apparently stamped into all of the fuse parts and is also stencilled in black on the mine case. An arabic "2" is stamped in the base of each fuse.

# JAPANESE ANTI-VEHICULAR "YARDSTICK" MINE



APPENDIX A(ii)  
H.Q. First Army Weekly  
Intelligence Summary No. 102  
of 18 Apr 44



## KEY TO DIAGRAM

- (A) PRESSURE PLATE
- (B) SAFETY PIN
- (C) STRIKER HOUSING
- (D) STRIKER SPRING
- (E) STRIKER
- (F) FUSE BODY
- (G) GAINE CUP CONTAINING H.E. CHARGE
- (H) DETONATOR
- (I) SHEAR PIN
- (J) WASHER & COPPER DISC

## COMPONENT PARTS AND ASSEMBLY OF FUSE




METHOD OF ASSEMBLING FUSE BETWEEN TWO BLOCKS  
(SHOWING FLAT SIDE OF PICRIC BLOCKS)

SECTION OF  
BLOCK

SHOWING CURVED SIDE  
OF PICRIC BLOCK

GSI (a) Adv LHQ



GSI  
 FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY  
 MAP NO 60  
 1:50,000

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUMANIA

In view of the many conflicting rumours emanating from 'well-informed circles' regarding the present and future position of RUMANIA, it is timely to have a few relevant facts on this country, and also to speculate a little on the ultimate destiny of this Junior Partner of the Axis in the NE BALKANS.

Like the rest of the BALKAN STATES, RUMANIA has had a chequered career and similarly, it is composed of the same mixture of races as are the neighbouring countries of YUGO-SLAVIA and BULGARIA. More so in fact, as the Rumanians are descendants of an old Roman colony which was established on the edge of the BLACK SEA almost 2,000 years ago, and thus differ somewhat from the usual Slavonic type common to the rest of the BALKANS. The population which totals in the neighbourhood of 18,000,000, is spread over an area of approximately 60,000 square miles bordering the central west coast of the BLACK SEA. Lying as it does between the fertile lower reaches of the DANUBE and DNIESTER RIVERS, and possessed of considerable, though not varied, natural wealth, it more or less follows that RUMANIA should be regarded with a certain amount of covetedness by its neighbours - and by other countries not so near.

Apart from this possession of material wealth, RUMANIA has not been a popular member of the BALKAN coterie because of the attitude taken in the last World War when RUMANIA sided with the Allies. Because of this choice, RUMANIA in 1919 fell heir to that part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire known as TRANSYLVANIA, and also to the province of BESSARABIA at the expense of RUSSIA. BULGARIA also had an axe to grind with RUMANIA, as, in 1913, after the success of the BALKAN Entente in the war against TURKEY, RUMANIA had appropriated the DOERUDJA region from BULGARIA, and held it after a short, sharp war in which RUMANIA triumphed mainly through superior weight of numbers. The intensely rich PLOESTI oilfields (7th in world production) gave RUMANIA financial stability which none of the other BALKAN states enjoyed and this fact did not improve relations.

However, between 1919 and 1939, notwithstanding the old affiliations, there was a change of heart in RUMANIA, and from her old alliance, affections were transferred to the central powers, or at least, the new central power, Nazi GERMANY. There have been many reasons propounded for this foremost among them being that a fear of the growing power of Soviet RUSSIA and the realisation that little help would be forthcoming from FRANCE or ENGLAND in the event of a predatory attack from that quarter, made it necessary for RUMANIA to have some sort of an ally. Secondly, there was a mistaken belief current in RUMANIA that GERMANY was the rising World Power and RUMANIA did not intend to miss the bus. The third reason is one of diplomacy in reverse. RUMANIA badly needed a pact with one of the large powers and made endeavours to make an ally of the French. However, the French were unwilling to commit themselves to obligations in the BALKANS and also had a well-intentioned but ill-advised desire not to offend ITALY by so doing, as ITALY was commencing to look on that part of the world as her special preserves. And lastly, in order to complicate the issue, Carol II of RUMANIA was quite content to leave the government of his country to a militaristic clique.

Consequently RUMANIA concluded trade and diplomatic treaties with GERMANY, little realising that German martial mentality was still the same as ever, and the old idea of a 'Drang nach Sud-Est' (Drive to the south-east) still existed in Prussian minds - and RUMANIA lay full in the path of such a drive. As a result of the agreements, Rumanian products (oil and wheat), were exchanged for German politics.

With the advent to power of National-Socialism in GERMANY, the Rumanian prototype of the Nazi Party - the Iron Guard - made its presence known and virtually seized control of the country. This was quite a logical happening and was made possible by the action of Carol, who was quite agreeable to abdicate in favour of his son Michael, and pursue his own affairs. Michael being a minor, had no say in the government and was no more than a nominal ruler - the first of the many Nazi puppets.

Given free rein, the Iron Guard rode rough-shod over all opposition, and supporters of more liberal forms of government were soon driven under-ground one way or another. The leader of the Iron Guard at this juncture was one Codreanu, who, to give him his due, was pro-Rumanian to a great extent and had no desire to irrevocably bind his country to GERMANY. In this respect, Codreanu was opposed by the more radical Nazi-minded members of the party, notable among them being General Antonescu. The inevitable happened in due course and Codreanu was eradicated in a manner in keeping with the best traditions of both Nazi and Balkan assassination.

In the meantime, Balkan complications were occurring. Carol decided to return to the throne (a manoeuvre executed with a complete lack of grace), and endeavoured to straighten out his country's tangled affairs. The Iron Guard was outlawed and Antonescu was exiled for a period of six months. However, despite his good intentions, Carol did not have a strong following and no one realised this more quickly than did RUSSIA and GERMANY. Early in 1940, RUSSIA forced RUMANIA to return the province of Bessarabia, which RUMANIA had no compunction but to do. Her ally, GERMANY had taken on other obligations in FRANCE, BELGIUM and HOLLAND at approximately the same time, so there was a good deal of sound strategy in the Russian move. This ceding of territory was strongly opposed by Antonescu, but as he at that time had no official status, he could do very little. The crisis for Carol came in September 1940, when GERMANY ordered RUMANIA to return the DOBRUDJA to BULGARIA and the larger part of TRANSYLVANIA to HUNGARY. Demonstrations against Carol broke out and he had no option but to recall Antonescu to take charge of the situation. Antonescu's actions were as though long pre-meditated. The constitution was suspended and Carol took the hint and returned to abdication.

With Carol out of the picture, Antonescu was free to begin large scale collaboration with the Nazis, which he did thoroughly. On 22 June 1941, it was from RUMANIA as well as POLAND that German troops were launched into RUSSIA and Rumanian troops comprised no small proportion of the invading forces.

Things turned out well for RUMANIA - for a while at least. The Rumanian troops who perished at STALINGRAD bear mute testimony that things can't go well for ever. When, on the crest of the German wave of success, RUMANIA declared war on BRITAIN and AMERICA, she no doubt felt comparatively safe from retribution from that quarter. However, now the tide has turned. RUMANIA is feeling the weight of Allied air attacks

from bases in ITALY, and to make matters worse Russian troops have over-run Rumanian soil to as far south as the SERET RIVER. GERMANY does not seem able to render much resistance against the oncoming Russian Army, and although BERLIN has stated that a strong defence will be made of the oilfields area, it is cold comfort to the Rumanians, as it shows that their friends and collaborators were such only for what material benefits they could obtain from the friendship. The German seizure of HUNGARY illustrates what can be expected from faltering and attempting to throw off their Axis bonds. A tempting bait has been thrown out by RUSSIA in order to create a defection in the Rumanian forces, insofar as RUSSIA has stated that no territorial acquisition is contemplated in RUMANIA. This has only resulted in a tightening of the German grip on the country.

The luckless and no doubt very unhappy Rumanians are now faced with the prospect of having their country devastated by two alien armies through the mistaken policy of their leader. Their own army has been lost in fruitless fighting on foreign soil, and along with FINLAND, HUNGARY and BULGARIA, they realise the truth of the adage: 'Who rides a tiger, finds it difficult to dismount'.

---



# DISTRIBUTION

## FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 102

1 Aust Corps	Copy Number/s	1 - 5
4 Aust Div	" "	6 -11
BRISBANE Fortress	" "	12
TOWNSVILLE Fortress	" "	13
CAIRNS Fortress	" "	14
Corps HQ VDC (QUEENSLAND)	" "	15
Aust Trg Centre (Jungle Warfare)	" "	16-19
BRA	" "	20-25
Sigs First Aust Army	" "	26
7 Aust Comd ALD Sec	" "	27
First Aust Army Junior Staff School	" "	28
First Aust Army Regt Trg School	" "	29
First Aust Army School of Sigs	" "	30
First Aust Army AASC School	" "	31
6 US Army	" "	32
Second Aust Army	" "	33-34
NEW GUINEA Force	" "	35
3 Aust Corps	" "	36
NORTHERN TERRITORY Force	" "	37
QUEENSLAND L of C Area	" "	38-41
NOIC BRISBANE (for SOI)	" "	42
GOC	" "	43
G(O)	" "	44
G(I)	" "	45-50
G(SD)	" "	51
BAA & CA	" "	52
CE	" "	53-55
CSO	" "	56
DA & QMG	" "	57
A (one copy to circulate to: AMS, Legal Chaplains, Medical, Pro and Education)	" "	58-59
Q (one copy to circulate to: S & T, Ord, AE & ME and Postal)	" "	60-62
Svy	" "	63
LHQ (Aust)	" "	64
Adv LHQ	" "	65-69
LHQ School of MI	" "	70-71
FELO	" "	72
Security Service CANBERRA (for Mil LO)	" "	73
War Diary	" "	74-75
File	" "	76

Please destroy by fire after perusal.

w/d (26)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN  OUT	3 aust inf bde TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  4 aust div CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies remainder by DRLS	} by any means } except wireless  } by ALS	Copy to: GOC BGS G(O) G2(AIR) G(I) G(SD) DA & QMG
-----------------------------	---------------	--	---	--

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDCQ'LAND

FROM: first aust a rmy Int 2728 19

secret (.) landops revsit 630 to 190030Z apr (.)

landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 16 apr allied tps killed 43 of  
estimated 50 japs between hills 500 and 501 east TOROKINA perimeter (.)

ST MATTHIAS GP (.) 15 apr allied recce party found no enemy activity  
MUSSAU ISLAND (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 17 apr patrolling continues MANUS ISLAND (.)  
16 apr allied recce patrol to PALISET ISLAND (north RAMBUTYO ISLAND)  
made no contact with enemy (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM AREA (.) 17 apr patrol MELAMU PLN to  
MINDJIM RIVER no enemy contacted (.) ref revsit 628 for AMAIMON read  
AMRON (.)

WANTOAT (.) 17 apr patrolling continues reported  
mov seen (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) NEW BRITAIN (.) am 16 apr thirtyeight A/C bombed runway  
revetments RAPOPO 34 FBs started several fires TOBOI (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 170410Z seven A/C bombed strafed AA posns  
BOGIA HARBOUR (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) ref revsit 629 additional 29 A/C  
dropped 55 tons bombs stores sup HOLLANDIA causing explosions fires (.)  
180319Z eleven A/C bombed BABO causing explosions fires (.)

KAI ISLANDS (.) 170233Z twentytwo A/C bombed stores  
pers FAAN - LANGGOER causing explosions fires FAAN dispersal area (.)  
of 6/8 intercepting Fs one prob destroyed (.)  
sea (.)

SOLOMONS (.) 15/16 apr naval units shelled enemy installations  
vicinity TEKESSI RIVER mouth strafed MIBO RIVER area (.) 180455Z one

sub covered by A/C five mls SW TAI OF ISLAND (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 17 apr one beached freighter afire MALAS PT (.) 170140Z  
two vessels prob luggers HANSA BAY (.) am 17 apr four barges SEPIK  
RIVER mouth (.) 170050Z one small coastal vessel or barge leaving BORAM  
(.) 160300Z one 6000 ton freighter tpt west SELEO ISLAND 160435Z one  
500/1000 ton freighter off AITAPE 160425Z one 2000/4500 ton poss  
freighter tpt stationary between SELEO and TADJI (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 160400Z one small freighter TANAMERAH BAY (.)  
180319Z one 500/1000 ton poss freighter stationary off RASI (on  
WANDAMEN BAY 20 mls south MANOKWARI) one 500/1000 ton freighter  
stationary 35 mls WSW BABO (.) 180150Z three poss cruisers MANOKWARI  
(.) 180500Z many beached barges photographed at small island SE BIAK  
ISLAND (.)

KAI ISLANDS (.) 170233Z two 500/1000 ton poss stack aft vessels  
and several small craft TOEAL STRAIT one 500/1000 ton vessel stationary  
LANGGOER all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

TOO 191435K  
THI

*W. J. G. C. G. T.*

W/D (27)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde	) by any means	Copy to:-
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress		GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec	) except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div	) by ALS	G(0)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies		G2(AIR)
		remainder by DRIS		G(I)
				G(SD)
				DA & QMG

---

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army INT 2732 20

---

secret (.) landops revsit 631 to 200015Z apr (.)  
landops (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM AREA (.) 18 apr patrol from SUNGUM 1  
killed two japs vicinity GUR (.) patrolling continues no mov seen (.)  
WANTOAT (.) 18 apr patrol to GEHAN (three and one  
half mls NE WANTOAT) saw no mov (.) patrol investigating native report  
small party japs track and river junc six mls NE WANTOAT (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 18 apr twelve A/C bombed runway KAHILI (.)  
17 apr 20 A/C bombed strafed gun posns TOROKINA perimeter (.) 18 apr  
twelve A/C bombed SW area BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND (.) 170350Z eight A/C  
bombed gun posns BUKA (.) 18 apr three A/C scored one direct hit  
coastal gun HANELA MISSION (north of eastern entrance BUKA PASSAGE)  
(.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 17 and 18 apr following attacks  
carried out RABAU area (.) three A/C harassed RABAU (.) 79 A/C  
started many fires scored 33 hits runway LAKUNAI (.) 55 FBs started  
one large numerous small fires MATUPI (.) 24 A/C dropped majority of  
bombs airfield RALPOPO (.) unstated number Fs started several fires  
enemy installations TALILI BAY (.) 31 A/C scored numerous hits runway  
KERAVAT (.) 61 A/C destroyed 12 buildings pers sup areas KULON and  
BULUNG PLNS (.) 39 FBs caused explosions fires VUNAPOPE (.) 62 A/C  
well covered runway TOBERA (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 17/18 apr nine A/C bombed strafed  
PALAS PT area destroying BAGEI RIVER br (.) 19 apr nine A/C bombed  
strafed YAKAMUL (24 mls ESE AITAPE) (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) pm 16 apr eight A/C bombed

strafed HOLLANDIA (.) 190311Z ten A/C bombed airfield UTAROM (.) 180303Z twelve A/C bombed airfields MOEMI and MANOKWARI (.) 19 apr nine A/C bombed airfield MANOKWARI (.)

BABAR ISLANDS (.) 180037Z thirteen A/C strafed BABAR and WETAN ISLANDS destroying wireless sta (.)

TIMOR (.) 190026Z thirtyfive A/C bombed SOE (.) sea (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 19 apr five laden barges HATZFELDT HARBOUR destroyed three barges HANSA BAY area destroyed or damaged by F sweeps (.) 19 apr one small tanker VANIKO ship bombed and destroyed by two A/C (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 160430Z one 5500/8500 ton freighter moving NW from PODENA ISLAND (30 mls SE WAIDE ISLAND) (.) 190224Z allied A/C bombed and strafed three 500/1000 ton freighters 39 mls NW WAIDE ISLAND scoring near miss one vessel (.) 190210Z one 500/1000 ton stack aft freighter UTAROM 190312Z one 1000/1500 ton freighter tpt five barges KAIMANA (.) 180308Z one poss tpt 7000/9000 tons between MANSIMAN and MIOS WAPPI ISLANDS one poss freighter 4000/5800 tons one freighter tpt 2000/4500 tons one gunboat DORE BAY (MANOKWARI) (.) 180318Z one 1000/1500 ton freighter tpt off CAPE MASOWOEI (20 mls SSE MANOKWARI) course SSE (.) 190252Z one possible freighter tpt 5500/7000 tons two possible freighter tpts 2000/4500 tons each one stack aft freighter 500/1000 tons two u/i merchant vessels numerous barges MANOKWARI (.) 180300Z one 800 ton merchant ship one smaller vessel off SAMBERI (south of BLAK ISLAND) (.) A/C strafed larger vessel which badly damaged (.)

AROE ISLANDS (.) 190440Z two possible stack aft freighters 500/1000 tons each W. SIR ISLAND 10 barges vicinity DOBO (.)

BABAR ISLANDS (.) 180037Z A/C strafed and left sinking one lugger north of BABAR ISLAND (.)

PHILIPPINES (.) 15 apr one aux oiler one med two large cargo vessels MINDANAO (.) 18 apr one small vessel entering DAVAO GULF one small vessel off CEBU ISLAND all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

T00201526K

THI

*[Handwritten signature]*

(28)  
W/D

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde	} by any means	Copy to
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress		GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec	} except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div	} by ALS	G(O)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies		G2(AIR)
		remainder by DRIS		G(I)
				G(SD)
				DA & QMG

---

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army INT 2736 21

---

secret (.) landops revsit 632 to 210015Z apr (.)

landops (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 17 apr natives state 675 japs arrived ULAMONA  
from MEGIGI PLN (.)

airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 19 apr 22 A/C set afire poss amn dump  
MAWARAKA (.) 19 A/C bombed strafed NUMA NUMA (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 19 apr eight A/C started large fire  
PATLANGAT PLN (KATHERINE HARBOUR area) (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) am 19 apr 24 A/C bombed strafed PALAS PT  
area scoring direct hit br (.) pm 40 A/C bombed strafed pers storage  
areas PALAS PT pers area WALOG RIVER mouth br HARINAP PLN starting  
fire WALOG destroying YEDIKUM MISSION (.) 182355Z fifteen A/C bombed  
SARANG PLNS (.) 200022Z eleven A/C bombed strafed pers stores BUNABUN  
HARBOUR area scoring direct hit TAVILTAE MISSION poss damaging BUNABUN  
RIVER br (.) 19 apr 18 A/C executed three coastal strafing sweeps  
ULIGAN to BOGIA HARBOUR (.) 200500Z sixteen A/C bombed strafed  
KRONPRINZ HARBOUR area damaging buildings rendering pontoon brs  
KOKUMBA RIVER mouth u/s (.) 190130Z nine A/C bombed strafed NEGIRA  
(10 mls ESE VANIMO) starting numerous fires destroying damaging huts  
and YAKAMUL (24 mls ESE AITAPE) (.) 200056Z eight A/C bombed strafed  
village VANIMO HARBOUR causing numerous fires destroying several huts (.)  
sea (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) night 18/19 apr MTBs strafed shelled ULAMONA  
(three mls SW UBILI) (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 191630Z of three u/i vessels 60 mls WNW HOLLANDIA  
A/C sank one damaged one (.)

- 2 -

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) ref revsit 631 attack on three freighters  
39 mls NW WAKDE ISLAND (on course SE by east) now reported one vessel  
sunk and remaining two later seen 10 mls NW by north CAPE KAMDARA course  
SE by south (.) also that one 800 ton merchant ship off SAMBERI 180300Z  
was 5000 ton freighter tpt (.) 180150Z photos reveal one 5500 ton merchant  
vessel three freighter tpts (one 4500 one 3000 one 1000 tons) one mine  
layer one gunboat two 100 ton freighters 80 barges number harbour mot  
craft MANOKWARI (.) 200300Z three 400 ton merchant vessels one aux  
vessel 125 mls NW MANOKWARI course SSW of which one damaged by attacking  
A/C (.) 18 apr photos show 14 barges BABO (.) comment shipping MANOKWARI  
18 apr (.) three poss cruisers reported revsit 630 not disclosed in  
photos taken by same A/C which made visual sighting all infm

---

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

TOO 211520 K.

THI

*Alman*  
*may*  
.....

29 W/D

MESSAGE FORM

CALL -	IN	3 aust inf bde	) by any means except wireless	Copy to: GOC BGS G2(AIR) G(I) G(SD) G(O) DA & QMG
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress		
INSTRUCTION	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec		
		4 aust div	) by ALS	
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies		
		remainder by DRLS		

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
BRISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army Int 2740 22

secret (.) landops revsit 633 to 220015Z apr (.)

landops

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 19 apr our tps landed vicinity  
MAVAVIA in support land attack against unestimated number japs MAVAVIA (.)

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS (.) 20 apr our tps occupied MADNRIN ISLAND one ml  
WNW PITYILU ISLAND unopposed (.) patrols made no contact with enemy MALAI  
BAY south coast western MANUS (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 20 apr our tps landed PALMAMAL JACQUINOT BAY  
killing five japs remainder fled (.) captured eqpt includes three radios  
one lt two HMG one poss barge type engine misc assortment rifles stores (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM area (.) 20 apr patrols to ERIMA ATO  
BALAMA respectively four mls WNW and two mls north ERIMA report many jap  
huts and signs recent occupation in area three quarters ml NW ERIMA but  
no enemy movt seen (.) patrol reached WIYAI two mls south JAPPA no movt  
seen (.)

airops (.)

ALLIED (.) NEW BRITAIN (.) 19 apr following attacks RABAU area (.)  
fiftysix a/c LAKUNAI starting fires thirtyeight a/c MATUPI ISLAND  
starting fires (.) 20 apr fiftytwo a/c RABAU scored hits sup gun posns  
wharf TOBOI fiftyseven a/c VUNAKANAU scored hits concrete strip twentytwo  
a/c caused large fires explosions MATUPI ISLAND thirtyfive a/c scored hits  
airfield LAKUNAI twelve a/c scored hits runway KERAVAL Fs over RABAU  
area fired oil drums LASSUL BAY docks trucks VUNABAL KABANGA BAY (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 200010Z to 200525Z sixtynine a/c bombed  
traffed BUNABUN installations pers sup areas (.) 202244Z to 210050Z  
one hundred and one a/c bombed traffed AITAPE area starting fires (.)



DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 200242Z nineteen a/c bombed strafed  
KAMIRI NAMBER strips NOEMFOOR ISLAND scoring direct hits strips and  
dispersal areas KAMIRI (.)  
sea (.)

SOLOMONS (.) 210325Z one sub five to eight mls off CAPE TOROKINA  
course NW (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 200300Z two 500/1000 ton vessels three mls  
off NOEMFOOR course east one merchant vessel twentyfive mls NE by east  
CAPE WOKA west JAPEN ISLAND course NW two 500/1000 ton vessels one  
1000/1500 ton freighter tpt ROEMBOI BAY S. NOEMFOOR ISLAND five small  
praus NAMBER SW NOEMFOOR ISLAND thirteen barges or praus NE NOEMFOOR  
ISLAND (.) 200800Z one 500/1000 ton freighter three mls SSE CAPE  
RAINBAWI east JAPEN ISLAND course westerly one 500/1000 ton freighter  
two small u/i vessels between MANIM NOEMFOOR ISLAND one 500/1000 ton  
freighter one med merchant vessel thirtyeight mls ESE MANOKWARI (.)

AROE ISLANDS (.) 200100Z one 500/1000 ton vessel MEROOR SE TRANGAN (.)

MAPIA ISLANDS (.) 200245Z four 500/1000 ton vessels seventy mls  
west MAPIA ISLANDS course SW attacked by one a/c which caused damage one  
vessel (.) 200200Z four vessels one barge MAPIA ISLANDS (.) 210345Z  
four small merchant vessels one landing barge forced onto reef MAPIA  
ISLANDS by one a/c (.) all informed

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless

T00221505K

THI

*Handwritten signature/initials*

(2041D)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde	) by any means	Copy to -
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress		GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec	) except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div	) by ALS	G(0)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies		G2(AIR)
		remainder by DRIS		G(I)
				G(SD)
				DA & QMG

---

TO:	4 aust div	TOWNSVILLE fortress	7 aust comd AL sec
	3 aust inf bde	CAIRNS fortress	
	BRISBANE fortress	corps HQ VDC Q'LAND	
FROM:	first aust army.	Int 2743	23

---

secret (.) landops revsit 634 to 230015Z apr (.)  
landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 19 apr with tks sp our tps attacked  
japs estimated one coy near MAVAVIA (.) five enemy MG posns knocked  
out (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM AREA (.) 21 apr patrol reached MALAGA  
HOOK (five and one half mls north BOGADJIM) (.) patrol through WIYAI  
reached OROUGE (three mls NE JAPPA) no mov seen (.)

AITAPE (.) 22 apr allied forces landed vicinity  
AITAPE against slight opposition (.) no mines or other obstacles  
encountered on beach (.) eight PW captured (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 22 apr allied forces landed vicinity  
TANAHMERAH and HUMBOLDT BAYS encountering no obstacles or def on  
beach (.) large quantities stores captured beach HUMBOLDT BAY (.)  
both sides entrance JAUTEFA BAY captured by 220001Z (.) in TANAHMERAH  
BAY allied tps reported adv without opposition reached MARIBOE (one  
and one half mls south DEPAPRE) (.) allied warships sp landings sank  
five enemy barges 12 mls west TANAHMERAH BAY (.)  
airops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) 21 apr twelve A/C bombed KAHILI strip thoroughly  
covering target (.) 11 A/C bombed TIMPUTZ HARBOUR (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 21 apr following attacks RABAU area (.) 24 A/C  
caused several fires destroyed or damaged 70 per cent target MATUPI  
ISLAND 41 A/C started fires sup pers areas KABANGA BAY four A/C scored  
hits RAPOPO runway started fires RABAU area eight A/C strafed  
buildings CAPE LIGUAN (.) 210527Z six A/C bombed strafed MILIM (one  
and one half mls north KIEP) KANAKDRAN (HENRY REID BAY) (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 220132Z twentyseven A/C bombed HANSA BAY scoring hits by AA guns (.) target well covered (.) 21 apr nine A/C attacked villages AITAPE strafed MARIENBERG destroying water tower (.) 210013Z seventysix A/C bombed strafed WEWAK BORAM BUT DAGUA strips rendering all u/s scoring hits several grounded A/C starting several fires (one oil) BUT destroying buildings barges scoring hits pers sup areas KAIRIRU MUSCHU ISLANDS (.) 220112Z sixtyone A/C bombed strafed WEWAK sup areas starting several fires some fuel (.) ref revsit 633 202244Z additional fiftysix A/C bombed strafed AITAPE starting fires TUMLEO SELEO ISLANDS (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 21 apr twentyone A/C bombed NAMBER KAMIRI starting fires scoring hits runways (.) two of eight intercepting A/C prob damaged (.)

TIMOR (.) 212345Z sixteen A/C bombed DILLI (.)  
sen (.)

SOLOMONS (.) night 19/20 apr 1t naval units shelled mouths PURIATA MOBIAI RIVERS starting fires latter target (.) 190050Z one sub 50 mls west BUKA (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 220301Z one poss sub MATUPI HARBOUR (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 211940Z five or six barges HATZFELDT HARBOUR two of which left u/s by A/C (.) 220150Z five large barges ULIGAN HARBOUR (.) 21 apr fifteen barges of which two sunk five luggers KAIRIRU MUSCHU ISLANDS (.) 22 apr four u/i vessels 15/18 barges of which eight or nine sunk WEWAK (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 21 apr thirty loaded barges KORNASOREN (north NOEMFOOR ISLAND) 50 barges and praus BROE BAY (east NOEMFOOR ISLAND) two 500/1000 ton freighters west NOEMFOOR one large or med merchant vessel MAWI BAY (south MOEMI) one 500/1000 ton freighter seven mls east KAROEANI BAY course NW one poss minelayer southern tip ROEMBERPON ISLAND (.)

TANIMBAR ISLANDS (.) 210857Z one sub 50 mls SSE SELARU course east (.)

TIMOR (.) 212345Z six barges several smaller craft DILLI (.)

BORNEO (.) night 20/21 apr one poss destroyer one vessel (poss 5000/6000 tons) stationary one ml south BALIKPAPAN all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

TOO231520K

THI

*[Handwritten signature]*

(21) w/d  
TOP SECRET

WORLD REVIEW SITUATION NO. 67

The following World Review of the situation has been received from War Office, LONDON, covering the period 10 Apr to 17 Apr 44 :-

NAVAL:

NORTHERN WATERS: A convoy of 38 ships escorted by HM ships has arrived without loss from NORTH RUSSIA.

HM and Norwegian submarines operating off NORWAY, have sunk a 1,500 ton ship, torpedoed a 2,500 ton ship and possibly sunk a larger merchantman.

Photo-recce 8 Apr located "SCHEER" and "NURNBERG" at SWINEMUNDE

MEDITERRANEAN: During the week ending 13 Apr 26,500 tons of rations and equipment were unloaded at ANZIO.

On night 11/12 Apr, HM destroyers shelled enemy wireless stations and searchlight positions in the harbours of GRUZ and BAR, and Allied coastal craft sank a convoy of six small craft off SIENWSK.

HM submarine off the south coast of FRANCE reported the torpedoing of a 1,500 ton ship on 11 Apr and a 5,000 ton ship on 12 Apr.

U-BOAT WARFARE:

During March, merchant ship losses by U-boat action totalled 129,000 tons, including six ships lost in the NORTH ATLANTIC, ten in the INDIAN OCEAN, three in the MEDITERRANEAN SEA.

Thirty-six ATLANTIC convoys totalling 1201 ships arrived without loss.

Imports in convoy to UK for the week ending 8 Apr totalled 1,273,000 tons of which 477,000 tons were oil.

SUMMARY ANTI-SUB ATTACKS DURING APRIL TO NOON 12 APR:

<u>Attacks:</u>	by shore-based aircraft	6
	" carrier-borne "	12
	" warships	7

<u>Results:</u>	sunk and probably sunk -	
	by carrier-borne aircraft	6
	" warships	2

	possibly sunk	1
--	---------------	---

MILITARY:

RUSSIA: GENERAL: The Germans succeeded in relieving NAORST and their withdrawal across the lower DNIESTER was completed. The Russians continued their advance reaching the CZECHOSLOVAK frontier, and then further advanced to between the CARPATHIANS and the RIVER PRUTH. They have also cleared most of the CRIMEA and SEBASTOPOL.

OPERATIONS: NORTHERN and CENTRAL SECTORS: The Germans claim progress in the KARVA area and defensive successes south of PSKOV and east of OSTROV.

TARNOPOL-SKALA SECTOR: The German garrison is still holding out though the Russians control the greater part of TARNOPOL. The Germans were reinforced and made some counter-attacks in the TARNOPOL-STANISLAVOV Sector against the Russian salient and allowed part of the encircled force to rejoin the main body.

STANISLAVOV-RIENITSA SECTOR: The Russians greatly extended the bridgeheads over the RIVER PRUTH in the CERNAUTI area and NNW of JASSY and Russian pressure was maintained between PRUTH and DNIESTER.

CRIMEA: After a few days of heavy attacks, the Russians broke through the German positions and the whole of the CRIMEA, except the southern tip, was occupied, with 31,000 prisoners claimed.

ITALY: INTELLIGENCE: Enemy strength in the line at the ANZIO bridgehead is estimated at not more than five divisions. The armoured and the bulk of the motorised forces have been withdrawn and 114 Lt Div was transferred to the main front. The general impression is that the enemy is determined to stand on his present positions on both fronts, while conserving his mobile reserves against a possible renewed Allied attack.

OPERATIONS: NO change.

YUGOSLAVIA: Deep snow is restricting mobility.

AIR:

WESTERN EUROPE: NIGHT: Out of 2306 sorties for the week, 39 aircraft are missing.

On night 9/10 Apr, 1045 tons were dropped on LILLE marshalling yards, 983 tons on VILLENEUVE and 103 tons on ST. GEORGES.

On night 10/11 Apr, 3754 tons were dropped on railway centres at AULNAY, LAON, TERGNIER, TOURS, GHENT and ST. EYR, with good concentrations achieved in most of these attacks.

On night 11/12 Apr, 1877 tons were dropped on AACHEN town and railway centre.

DAY: On 8 Apr, aircraft factories and airfields in the BRUNSWICK area were bombed with severe damage caused to M.I.A.G. aircraft components factory.

On 9 Apr, aircraft factories were attacked at RAHMEL MARIENBURG (assembly plant), POSEN (F.W. plant) and WARNEMUNDE (Heinkel works).

On 10 Apr, airfields and aircraft factories in the LOW COUNTRIES and FRANCE were attacked with mostly successful results, and medium bombers successfully attacked railways and the coast defence area.

On 11 Apr, OSCHERSLEBIN, BERNBURG, SORAU, ROSTOCK and STETTIN were bombed with severe damage to aircraft factories, aero engine works, ship building yards and shipping.

On 13 Apr, the aircraft factory at AUGSBERG was attacked, and a large concentration of bursts was observed on the target.

Ball bearing factories at SCHWEINFURT also were successfully attacked.

In major operations the Allies lost 230 aircraft, with enemy losses estimated at 237 aircraft destroyed in combat and 208 aircraft on the ground.

In the above day operations, over 4120 bombers and 4200 fighters were used.

MEDITERRANEAN: ITALY: Air attacks were increased on targets in CENTRAL and EASTERN ITALY, including railways.

AUSTRIA: Aircraft factories at WIENER NEUSTADT and BADVOSLAU were attacked and 28 enemy aircraft were destroyed in combat for loss of 13 Allied aircraft.

Attacks were made on railway yards at BUDAPEST, ZAGREB and the airfields at BUDAPEST, and GYOR (HUNGARY), and excellent results are reported from attacks on aircraft factories at GYOR and DUNA.

ECONOMIC:

A reconnaissance of north German shipyards, from September, 1943, to February, 1944, shows that U-boats completed are almost equal to the level of last summer, but only five have been laid down during the latter three months. Bremen and Elbing destroyer construction has slightly increased and seven units have been launched. The programme has been completed for 200 "M" class minesweepers and the construction at two of three yards is continuing, possibly to make good the losses sustained. A further report shows little decline in other classes of vessel for the period under review.

A certain delay, due to bombing, was observed in the yards at HAMBURG and FLENSBURG, particularly regarding U-boat building.

Iron ore shipments from SPAIN to west French ports has progressively increased from 3,000 tons in October '43 to 60,000 tons in March '44.

GSI  
24 Apr 44

*W. Buckridge Capt*  
Lt-Col  
GS FIRST AUST ARMY

Distributed by GSI First Aust Army for information of Comds or Heads of Branches or Services as set out below :-

1 Aust Corps	5	G(C)	1
4 Aust Div	3	G(SD)	1
HQ BRISBANE Fortress	1	B.M. & CA	1
HQ TOWNSVILLE Fortress	1	CSO	1
HQ CAIRNS Fortress	1	DA & QMG	1
Corps HQ VEC Q'LAND	1	A. (Circulate to AMS, LSO	
ERL	1	and AD Educ)	1
CE	1	Q (Circulate to DCSI and	
Q'LAND L of C Area	1	DDPS)	1
GOC	1	War Diary	2
BGS	1	File	1

w10 (3)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	3 aust inf bde	)	<u>Copy to -</u>
AND		TOWNSVILLE fortress	)	GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec	)	BGS
			by any means	G(O)
			except wireless	G2(AIR)
		4 aust div	)	G(I)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies	)	G(SD)
		remainder by DRLS	by ALS	DA & QMG

---

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress 7 aust comd AL sec  
 3 aust inf bde CAIRNS fortress  
 ERISBANE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND

FROM: first aust army INT 2747 24

secret (.) landops revsit 635 to 240030Z apr (.)

landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) during 24 hrs ended 220400Z patrols which contacted unestimated number japs NE TROKINA perimeter received mortar and rifle fire from HILL 150 (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) WIDE BAY (.) 22 apr reliably reported large number japs on island KEVELO RIVER mouth (.) unstated number enemy vicinity MILIM (15 mls south WAITAVALO) (.)

UEILI (.) 22 apr reliably reported well armed three enemy parties of approx 50 moving east with LMGs (.) enemy tps now occupy BUTIOLO (30 mls SSW ULAMONA) (.) no enemy tps between CAPE KOAS and ULAMONA (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) LOGADJIM (.) 22 apr six 6 wheeled trucks 50 case amn discovered BALAMA (.) 16 trucks damaged by strafing found main rd between PALPA GORI RIVERS (.)

WANTOAT (.) 22 apr patrol along IKWAP RIVER to six and three quarter mls NW WANTOAT no contact (.)

AITAPE (.) am 23 apr allied tps made unopposed landings TUMLEO SELEO ISLANDS (.) enemy resisting on hill NW TUMLEO (.) by 230038Z SELEO ISLAND captured (.) 23 apr cas TADJI area 65 japs killed eight P.W 50 javanese killed 76 PW (.) weapons amn eqpt fuel captured (.) of 25 A/C destroyed 17 on south strip one north strip (.) japs completely surprised some being unarmed (.) small jps enemy reported moving overland daily from WENAK (.) sup found included much food and wine (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) HUMBOLDT BAY (.) 22 apr three jap erated mot boat and A/C motors sup and amn dumps captured on beach (.)

forces adv to entrance JAUTEFA BAY captured CAPE TJOEBERI with little opposition (.) MGs pill boxes encountered CAPE PIE (.) little opposition met LEIMOK HILL (two mls WNW CAPE TJEWERI) (.) 230914Z unknown number enemy A/C bombed HUMBOLDT BAY starting fires (.)

TANAMERAN BAY (.) 22 apr opposition encountered approx one half ml east landing beach (.) aerial recce reveals many gaps in two ravines north HOLLANDIA strip (.) sup dumps HQ suspected same area (.) airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 212325Z ten A/C bombed IBU (22 mls north by east CAPE TOROKINA) (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 212235Z fortyeight A/C bombed airfield and gun posns KAVIENG (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 22 apr following attacks carried out RAEBUL area (.) 120 A/C scored at least 34 hits runway and started two fires RAPOFO (.) nine A/C bombed airfield LABUMAI (.) 23 A/C started several fires RATVAL (.) eight A/C bombed airfield SERAVAT (.) 210605Z eleven A/C bombed strafed pers area east MATAVALO RIVER (WIDE BAY) (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 212345Z nine A/C bombed strafed coastal area PALAS PT to BUMBUN HARBOR (.) 22 and 23 apr 11 A/C and 16 A/C respectively bombed strafed BUMBUN HARBOR (.) 22 apr 15 A/C strafed coastal area ULIGAN HARBOR to DOGOMUR BAY (.) 212240Z sixteen A/C bombed strafed pers area south BOGIA HARBOR (.) 220350Z sixteen A/C bombed pers sup area ULAMBA PLN (one and one quarter mls north BOGIA PLN) (.) 220615Z eight A/C bombed strafed LAUK VILLAGE (10 mls south by west BOGIA) (.) 220132Z ninetyseven A/C dropped 227 tons bombs AA posns pers areas HANSA BAY (.) pers areas LAUK VILLAGE and PLN well covered starting fires and many fires started between LUBIA and CONDOR PT (.) attack HANSA BAY reported revsit 634 incl in above (.) 23 apr 52 A/C dropped 88 tons bombs AA posns stores area HANSA BAY (.) 220015Z twelve A/C bombed strafed ANGORAM (.) 220058Z fortyseven A/C bombed strafed airfields stores pers areas WEMAN area (.) CAPE WOM and WEMAN stores areas BORAN airfield well covered (.) 230030Z thirtythree A/C bombed strafed airfields pers areas WEMAN area (.)



NEWA BUT runways well covered several villages along BORAK rd  
destroyed (.) 212250Z six A/C bombed strafed south runway TADJI (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 220336Z twentytwo A/C bombed  
runways KAMIRI NAMEER (.) 23 apr 11 A/C bombed runway NAMEER (.)  
23 apr four A/C bombed airfield M. FIRE (.)  
sea (.)

SOLOMONS (.) 200742Z allied warships shelled gun posns southern  
SPORTLAND ISLANDS (.) night 20/21 apr MTEs strafed JABA RIVER mouth (.)  
22 apr one barge BUKA PASSAGE sunk by A/C resulting 10/12 japs killed (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) night 21/22 apr MTEs strafed HATZPELLDT HARBOUR (.)  
22 apr ref revsit 634 now reported one u/i vessel six to eight barges  
ULIGAN HARBOUR (.) 212319Z four barges loaded with sup gasoline  
destroyed by A/C DOGUMUR BAY (.) night 21/22 apr MTEs sank one damaged  
three barges one ml north HANSA BAY (.) 22 apr two small merchant  
vessels or luggers approx 13 barges HANSA BAY (.) 210030Z one sub  
two mls off CAPE GIRGIR course SE by south (.) 200013Z one 600 ton  
freighter KAIRIRU MISSION (.) 22 apr one small vessel 10 mls north  
BRANDI PLN (.) ref revsit 634 four u/i vessels NEWA now reported  
four 1000/1500 ton freighters (.) 222330Z one small u/i vessel CAPE  
BORAK (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 22 apr photos reveal two freighter tpts  
(one 3000 one 1000/1500 tons) off NAMEER (.) 22 apr 25/30 barges  
SEROBI BAY 15 ROEMBOI BAY 20 ERCE BAY all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

TOO  
THI

(33)

W/D

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	TOWNSVILLE fortress)	by any means	Copy to -
AND				GCC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec )	except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div )		G(G)
		CAIRNS fortress)	by ALS	G2(AIR)
		remainder by DRIS		G(I)
				G(SD)
				DA : QMG

TO:	4 aust div	TOWNSVILLE fortress	corps HQ VDC Q'LAND
	BRISBANE fortress	CAIRNS fortress	7 aust comd AL sec
FROM:	first aust army	INT 2749	25

secret (.) landops revsit 636 to 250030Z apr (.)  
landops (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) HIXON BAY (.) 23 apr reliably reported number japs  
crossed PANDI RIVER 20 apr (.) 21 apr few left gd stores one and one  
quarter mls SW LANGALANGA remainder departed for TCRU (OPEN BAY) (.)  
23 apr no enemy PANDI RIVER (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM (.) 23 apr our tps landed in force BOGADJIM  
(.) patrol towards MADANG unable cross GOGOL RIVER where one PW taken (.)  
patrol to BILI BILI reached ATO via SIMARTI without contact (.) patrols  
operated to three quarters of one ml south TOPOPO (.)

AITAPE (.) further infm reveals tps landed WAPIL  
(eight mls SE AITAPE) 212045Z (.) 220315Z fwd elements reached TADJI  
F and B strips (.) 230235Z rd and airstrip reconstructions in progress  
(.) meanwhile coastal tps reached TADJI PLN via VOKAU to within one ml  
RAIHU RIVER (two mls SE AITAPE) without opposition (.) 98 japs killed  
15 captured (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) HUMBOLDT BAY (.) further infm reveals  
landings effected CAPE TJOBERI just north CAPE PIE vicinity PIM and  
CAPE TJEWERI (.) 212135Z tps CAPE TJOBERI overran hill 1300 yds to WSW  
against slight opposition (.) 200 yds north elements approaching PIM-  
HOLLANDIA track (.) 220500Z our tps in possession north east and west  
sides JAUTIEFA BAY (.) 25 japs killed (.)

TANAMERAN BAY (.) 212142Z northern ldg at  
TABLASO'EFA where slight opposition met one half to three quarters of  
one ml east as tps moved to contact DEPAFRE BAY force where second ldg  
effected (.) 22 apr surface units sank seven barges left small vessel  
burning (.)

airops (.)

allied (.) NEW BRITAIN (.) 23 apr 30 A/C bombed TALILI BAY starting four fires of which two poss fuel or amm 24 A/C bombed MATUPI 10 A/C bombed TOBERA scoring hits runway (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 232314Z nine A/C strafed AA posn huts houses brs CAPE CROISILLES to HANSA BAY destroying houses BOGIA ULIGAN br BUNABUN HARBOUR (.) 222225Z twelve A/C bombed strafed pers stores CAPE MOSSEBAR (three mls SE PALAS PT) (.) 230324Z eight A/C effectively bombed strafed stores pers WALOG area (.) 250145Z sixteen A/C bombed MERIMAN PT (three mls NW ULIGAN HARBOUR) (.) pm 23 apr 23 A/C bombed strafed KRONPRINZ HARBOUR (.) 23 apr 21 A/C strafed KRONPRINZ to BOGIA HARBOUR damaging huts (.) am and pm 23 apr 11 A/C and four A/C respectively bombed strafed stores pers KELAUA BAY (six mls NW DOGUMUR BAY) and villages DOGUMUR HATZFELDT BAY areas starting fire scoring hits AA posn huts rds (.) 222300Z forty A/C bombed strafed stores pers area NUBIA AA posns HANSA BAY (.) am 24 apr 57 A/C bombed strafed NUBIA strip sup pers areas HANSA BAY POTSDAM PLN CONDOR PT starting many fires (one fuel) (.) 220058Z fiftyeight A/C bombed strafed airfields inland villages NEWAK (.) 240003Z eleven A/C bombed NEWAK (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) ref revsit 635 attack HANBER NABIRE of 28 intercepting enemy A/C 14 destroyed (.) sea (.)

SOLOMONS (.) am 24 apr one pers laden barge sunk by one A/C south NUMA NUMA (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 240030Z two large barges BUNABUN HARBOUR several cam barges WALOG (.) 24 apr one 500/1000 ton vessel CAPE TEREBU 15/20 small fishing boats stationary seven mls off NEWAK PT 27 barges MUSCHU (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 240430Z three small cargo vessels beached one cargo vessel burning three beached barges eight mls SE CAPE WAIOS (90 mls WNW MANOKWARI) all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

TOO 25/5/43 A

THI

*Delegat. Cap*

SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Following a series of concentrated air attacks, and supported by strong naval forces, Allied troops made successful landings at AITAPE, HUMEOLDT BAY and TANAMMERAH BAY during the morning of 22 Apr. Only slight opposition has been encountered to date despite the fact that 15,000 Japanese troops were estimated to be in the WANIMO - HOLLANDIA area, and that the enemy has approximately 6000 troops available in the vicinity of WAKDE ISLAND to the NW and some 46,000 at WEWAK - HANSA BAY to the SE. If facilities exist for movement of these troops, it is probable that serious counter-attacks will develop. It is also possible that mobile raiding units will make their appearance at an early date.

Probably contributing in no small measure to the element of surprise achieved in the above landings, was the intensity of the air attacks launched against RABUL, HANSA BAY, WEWAK and other points, which must have confused the enemy and left him in doubt as to the actual invasion points. RABUL in particular has received an almost continuous and very effective battering over the past week.

As no unusual enemy shipping activity has been reported during past weeks, in the NE Sector, it is probable that the enemy has not been able to build up large stocks of reserve supplies, as was the case at RABUL before our landings on NEW BRITAIN. If this is so the Jap supply problems will become an even greater embarrassment, since WEWAK - HANSA BAY will now be virtually cut off and the number of troops there will accelerate the consumption of present reserves.

---

PART I

SECTION 1 - OPERATIONS - NW SECTOR

LAND

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

The Allied policy of outflanking enemy strongholds of major importance and virtually severing the L of C large garrisons has once again been effected by landings at TANAHMERAH and HUMBOLDT BAYS on 22 Apr with strong naval support. The force which landed at TANAHMERAH BAY has advanced to MARIBOE (one and one half miles SE of landing point) overcoming light opposition approximately half a mile east of the landing beach. The other landing was at HUMBOLDT BAY and advancing to the entrance of JAUFETA BAY our troops easily overcame opposition and captured CAPE TJEWERI. Machine guns and pillboxes were encountered at CAPE PIE, also light opposition was met at LEIMOK HILL (WNW CAPE TJEWERI). Aerial reconnaissance reveals many Japanese in two ravines north of HOLLANDIA strip also a suspected headquarters and supply dumps are in this area.

The operations are evidently designed to envelop the HOLLANDIA, SENTANI and CYCLOPS air strips which, it is anticipated, will be the main centres of enemy resistance and concentration.

Attached hereto as Appendix 'A' is a map showing Allied landings in the HOLLANDIA area.

SEA - ENEMY

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Although the shipping in this area has greatly increased (viz, a total tonnage of 40,000/52,500 tons), the centre of activity has moved west from HOLLANDIA to the GEELEWINK BAY area. In contrast to the previous week, no enemy warships were sighted at HOLLANDIA, total sightings being restricted to three freighters of 500/1000 tons, one of which was sunk by Allied aircraft, plus five luggers and 60-odd barges, of which between 15 and 20 of the latter were damaged as a result of air attacks.

NOEMFOOR ISLAND and MANOKWARI provided the bulk of the sightings, 13 freighters totalling 10,000/15,500 tons and two unidentified vessels being reported at NOEMFOOR as well as 48 barges and five praus. The only naval vessels sighted were at MANOKWARI where sightings included one minelayer and one gunboat, whilst the merchant shipping tonnage of 16,000 tons distributed between 10 vessels together with 160 barges completed the sightings for that area.

The remaining 25,000 tons were provided by 18 merchant vessels whilst a further 170 barges were sighted throughout the area. Of this total Allied aircraft sank one small freighter at WAKDE ISLAND and damaged one 800 ton merchant vessel and four small merchant vessels plus one large barge at BIAK ISLAND and MAPIA ISLAND respectively.

KAI ISLANDS

Except for one submarine sighted 50 miles SSE of SELARU ISLAND on 21 Apr no further naval activity has been

reported. Six merchant vessels all of 500/1000 tons were sighted in the area from 17 Apr to 21 Apr.

#### TIMOR

A sighting of 25 barges at TENAU on 17 Apr and a further 10 barges at DILLI on 21 Apr was the sum total of shipping sighted in this area during the week.

#### BORNEO

On night 20/21 Apr one possible destroyer and one 5000/6000 ton merchant vessel were sighted stationary one mile south of BALIKPAPAN.

#### PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Daily sightings from 15 to 18 Apr have disclosed one heavy cruiser and two escort vessels in the BASILAN STRAIT whilst other sightings in the area have included one auxiliary oiler, one medium and one large cargo vessel and two small merchant vessels.

#### AIR - OWN

##### DUTCH NEW GUINEA

The HOLLANDIA airstrips, formerly both safe and capable of carrying large concentrations of enemy aircraft, are now virtually denied to the enemy, due to the extensive damage caused by Allied aircraft in attacks over the last few weeks.

Allowing the enemy no time to recover from previous heavy attacks, Allied aircraft again visited this area in strength on 16 Apr, with further smaller raids being carried out during the week. Damage to stores and personnel areas was heavy, while coastal defence positions around IMBI BAY and buildings and jetties in TANAHMERAH BAY were destroyed. Shipping in HUMBOLDT and IMBI BAYS was also attacked, and three vessels, totalling approximately 8000 tons, were damaged.

Airfields at MANOKWARI, UTAROM, NABIRE, and the two strips on NOEMFOOR ISLAND were bombed during the week. The target areas were well covered and the runways and dispersal bays on NOEMFOOR ISLAND were badly damaged by several direct hits. Enemy interception of these attacks consisted of three enemy fighters over NOEMFOOR ISLAND, and of the three fighters encountered after the attack on UTAROM, one was possibly damaged.

A Liberator over MAPIA ISLAND on 21 Apr, attacked a shipping concentration of four small vessels and forced the entire convoy on to a reef.

##### KAI ISLANDS

During an attack on stores and personnel areas at FAKK and LANGGOER on 17 Apr, when fires and explosions were caused, six to eight enemy fighters intercepted the attacking Allied aircraft and lost one of their number.

##### BABAR - WETAN ISLANDS

Allied fighters were responsible for the destruction of a wireless station, a lugger and the damaging of other enemy installations in a strafing run over the BABAR - WETAN ISLANDS area on 18 Apr.

### TIMOR

A strong force of Allied aircraft again attacked SOE this week, when on 19 Apr, Mitchells and Beauforts covered the area starting numerous large fires. On 21 Apr DILLI was bombed.

### AIR - ENEMY

In an endeavour to impede Allied land forces after their landing on 22 Apr, a number of enemy aircraft bombed occupied areas at HUMBOLDT BAY on 23 Apr, starting fires.

Three enemy aircraft were reported in the DARWIN area this week. One enemy plane, apparently on reconnaissance, was reported to the seaward and WSW of DARWIN on 18 Apr, and a further two aircraft were sighted in the same area on 21 Apr.

With a total of 12 to 14 enemy fighters encountered during the current week in this Sector, a decided increase over recent totals is noted. The largest concentration was over the KAI ISLANDS on 17 Apr, when six to eight interceptors unsuccessfully attacked Allied aircraft, while in each of the attacks on NOEMFOOR and UTAROM three enemy aircraft were encountered.

### SECTION 2 - OPERATIONS - OTHER FRONTS - SWP.

### LAND

#### SOLOMONS

During a minor attack east of the TOROKINA perimeter on 16 Apr, 43 out of a total of 50 Japs were killed. On 19 Apr Allied troops made a landing in the vicinity of MAVAVIA to outflank the enemy in that locality, and support an attack with tanks and infantry moving from the west against an enemy force estimated at one company strength. Five machine-gun positions were knocked out. Patrols on 22 Apr contacted an unestimated number of Japs NE TOROKINA perimeter and were fired on from HILL 150.

#### NEW BRITAIN

According to a report by natives, 675 Japs arrived at ULAMONA from MEGIGI PLANTATION on 17 Apr.

Allied troops on 20 Apr landed at PALILALAL in JACQUINOT BAY encountering little opposition. Five Japs were killed and the remainder fled.

It is reliably reported that on 22 Apr three well armed enemy parties of approximately 50 were moving east of UBILI. Enemy troops now occupy BUTIOLO (30 miles SSW ULAMONA).

#### ST MATTHIAS GROUP

An Allied reconnaissance party which landed on MUSSAU ISLAND on 15 Apr reported no enemy activity.

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

Allied patrols occupied METAJARRI and DRABITO on 16 Apr killing 15 Japs. Further patrolling continued on 17 Apr on MANUS ISLAND and a patrol to PALISET ISLAND made no contact with the enemy. Allied troops occupied HANDRIN ISLAND on 20 Apr without meeting any opposition. The totals of enemy casualties for this area to 16 Apr are 3043 known dead, 1225 estimated unburied dead. Effective enemy strength remaining in the area is estimated at 275, consisting of numerous groups of stragglers.

NEW GUINEA - BOGADJIM AREA

Vigorous patrolling continued in this area during the week and from 15/18 Apr six Japs were killed in the vicinity of GUR. Patrols to ERIMA, ATO and BALAMA report many Jap huts and signs of recent occupation in an area three miles NW of ERIMA, but no enemy were encountered. By 21 Apr our patrols along the coastal road had reached MALAGA HOOK, while further inland, patrols passed through WIYAI and OROMUGE without meeting any opposition. On the 22 Apr a quantity of heavy equipment was captured at BALAMA. In addition, 16 trucks damaged by strafing were found on the main road between the PALFA and GORI RIVERS.

NEW GUINEA - MARKHAM VALLEY

An Australian patrol on 16 Apr investigating a native report that a small party of Japs were at a track and river junction six miles NE of WANTOAT captured four Japs. Patrols report no sign of enemy at GEHAN and five miles NNE of WANTOAT. A patrol along the ISWAP RIVER to six and three quarter miles NW of WANTOAT made no contact with the enemy.

NEW GUINEA - AITAPE

Following a series of concentrated air attacks and simultaneously with the operations at TANAHMERAH and HUMBOLDT BAYS on the 22 Apr, Allied troops made a landing at AITAPE taking eight Jap prisoners. The beach was reported clear of mines and other obstacles. Allied forces on 23 Apr made unopposed landings on TUMLEO and SELEO ISLANDS; enemy resistance was met on a hill NW of TUMLEO; SELEO ISLAND was captured. Casualties in the TADJI area to 23 Apr were 65 Japs killed, eight PW, 50 Javanese killed, 76 PW. The Japanese were completely surprised, some being unarmed. Much booty was captured including weapons, ammunition, equipment, fuel, food and wine. Small groups of enemy are reported moving overland daily from WENAK.

Later information received indicates that the airfield at TADJI is now in Allied hands and will probably be in operation by 25 Apr.

SEA - GVN

Allied naval activity during the past week was mainly confined to the SW coast of BOUGAINVILLE, EXPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area and NEW BRITAIN. Buildings and installations in the vicinity of the TEKESSI RIVER mouth, MOSIGA, MIBO RIVER area, and mouths of the JABA, FURLATA and MOBIAI RIVERS on BOUGAINVILLE, as well as ULAMONA in NEW BRITAIN were shelled and strafed.



SEA - ENEMY

NEW BRITAIN - NEW IRELAND

There has been a further diminution in the number of vessels sighted in this area; only one unidentified vessel and 22 barges being seen between KAVIENG and BALGAI BAY in NEW IRELAND. Air attacks around the coast of NEW BRITAIN damaged a further three barges.

NEW GUINEA

The tonnage sighted for the current period shows a slight increase on that of the previous week. A total of 23 vessels was reported which included two unidentified vessels between TADJI and HANSA BAY. Barge and lugger movements were on a much reduced scale, 75 barges and five luggers being sighted.

Losses due to Allied air and naval attacks were :-

Sunk

One small tanker  
15 barges

Damaged

One 1500/2500 ton freighter  
One freighter (afire)  
Six barges

SUBMARINES

A total of six submarines only were reported for the week and were sighted in the following areas :-

15 Apr	One submarine	8 miles south of EUKA
15/16 Apr	One submarine	5 miles SW of TAI OF ISLAND (NW of BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND)
19 Apr	One submarine	50 miles west of EUKA
21 Apr	One submarine	5/8 miles off CAPE TOROKINA
	One submarine	2 miles off CAPE GIRGIR (NW of HANSA BAY)
22 Apr	One submarine	in MATUPI HARBOUR

AIR - OWN

SOLOMONS

Allied aircraft activity in the SOLOMONS this week extended over a wide area, with a number of isolated and sporadic attacks over BOUGAINVILLE and north CHOISEUL.

The TOROKINA perimeter was again subjected to air assaults in which enemy gun positions and an ammunition dump were destroyed, and the SW area of BOUGAINVILLE was covered in a bombing and strafing attack on 18 Apr.

Along the northern coast of BOUGAINVILLE, KIETA, NULA NULA and TINPUTZ HARBOUR were bombed and strafed during the period 16/21 Apr, when bridges and installations were destroyed.

The airfield at KAHILI was attacked twice during the week and the runway was damaged on both occasions, while anti-aircraft and coastal guns were destroyed in attacks on EUKA PASSAGE area.

#### NEW IRELAND

Allied air attacks in this area during the current week consisted of raids on PATLANGAT PLANTATION (KATHERINE HARBOUR) on 19 Apr, and on KAVIENG airfield on 21 Apr. Fires were started and gun positions were destroyed during these attacks.

#### NEW BRITAIN

Further reports of extensive damage to areas around RAEBUL, indicate the intensity and accuracy of Allied daily aircraft attacks. Ammunition dumps, gun positions and docks all shared in the wholesale destruction this week, whilst innumerable fires were started in built up areas.

Approximately 70% of enemy installations on MATUPI ISLAND are reported to have been either destroyed or severely damaged in an attack by Mitchells on 21 Apr.

Without exception, all the airfields in the RAEBUL area were visited during the week; runways and revetments were hit, anti-aircraft positions were destroyed and fires started in each target area. The runway at LAKUNAI received no less than 33 direct hits.

#### CENTRAL PACIFIC

WOLEAI ISLAND (CAROLINES) was bombed by Liberators on 18 and 19 Apr; nine grounded aircraft were destroyed and fires were started in the vicinity of the airfield and the docks.

Eleven enemy fighters attempted interception during the first attack and of these aircraft three were destroyed, but no interception was reported during the latter attack.

#### NEW GUINEA

Allied fighters and bombers continued their sweeps along the NEW GUINEA coast this week; the area from BUNABUN HARBOUR to AITAPE once more being well covered and considerable damage was reported.

Buildings and installations in supply and personnel areas were either destroyed or left burning in these attacks and no fewer than five bridges were rendered unserviceable, while one oil tanker and two large luggers were sunk and three to four medium freighters damaged.

Airfields at WEDAK, BORAM, DAGUA and BUT were all bombed and their runways reported unserviceable after attacks on 21/23 Apr. Several grounded aircraft were destroyed and numerous fires were started in the attack on the BUT airfield.

WANIMO was bombed and strafed on 20 Apr, and several huts were demolished and others left burning in adjacent villages.

#### AIR - ENEMY

Enemy aircraft activity in the NE Sector for the period under review, consisted only of fighter interception to the Allied attack in the CAROLINES on 18 Apr, when 11 aircraft were airborne. During the attack on the same area the following day, no interception was encountered.

PART II

SECTION 1 - ORDER OF BATTLE

LAND

NW SECTOR

There have been several revisions in the estimates of enemy strengths in the NW Sector, and thus the Sector total has been increased to 205,000. In detail these increases have been made up as follows :-

KOKAS	- Re-assessed and increased to 1000
PAK PAK	- Re-assessed and increased to 500
DUTCH NEW GUINEA	- Increased to 29,000
TIMOR	- Re-assessed and increased to 20,000
Lesser SUNDA	- Due to the arrival of further 46
ARCHIPELAGO	Division troops, increased to 10,000

Although it was previously stated that the western boundary of 2 AREA ARMY's command probably included BALI, recent information indicates that the BALI garrison is actually under command of 16 ARMY.

NE SECTOR

On 19 Apr 44, Japanese strength along the north coast of NEW GUINEA was thought to total 68,000 troops of which 46,000 were in the combined WEWAK - HANSA BAY area. The subdivision of the area total was as follows :-

HOLLANDIA - VANIMO	15,000
AITAPE	2,000
WEWAK - HANSA BAY	46,000
MLDANG	5,000

The rapid withdrawal of troops along this coast has made the precise knowledge of dispositions a difficult matter and no doubt further confusion will arise as the Japanese seek to counter the recent Allied landings. In the meantime an enlightening report received from AITAPE states that 50 Javanese had been killed and a further 76 taken prisoner. In First Aust Army Intelligence Summary No 93 the organisation of a "JAVA VOLUNTEER ARMY" was dealt with and on the above information it seems likely that the Japanese are already making use of these puppet troops (probably in a constructional role) in their haste to establish an adequate defence system for their NEI possessions.

In the SOLOMONS the deduction of known killed has reduced the total estimated strength to 17,000.

Total estimates of enemy strength by Sectors are now reported as -

NW SECTOR ...	205,000
NE SECTOR ...	146,250
TOTAL SWPA...	351,250

AIR

ENEMY OPERATIONAL AIRPLANE STRENGTH

Estimate of Enemy Land Based Air Strength on information received to 21 Apr 44 :-

Area	F	L/B M/B	T/B D/B	F/B	F/P	Obsn	Comparatives		
							21 Apr	18 Apr	21 Mar
<u>NE AREA</u>									
NEW BRITAIN	4			1	4	2	11	11	24
NEW IRELAND	2		2		6		10	10	14
SOLOMONS					2		2	2	1
<u>NW AREA</u>									
TIMOR & SOEMB.	18					6	24	24	23
AMBON )									
CERAM )	8	12			24	9	53	53	43
BOEROE)									
AROE & KAI IS	15						15	15	10
HALMAHERA	35	32			3		70	70	6
NEW GUINEA	65	66			15	18	164	164	279
CELEBES	35	24					59	59	30
JAVA-BALI-									
LOMBOK	15	9			9	5	38	33	77
BORNEO	12				7	3	22	22	26
PHILIPPINES	63	65	39	3	37	6	213	213	43
TOTAL	272	208	41	4	107	49	681	681	576

Note: One estimate only is made for NEW GUINEA and this is included in the NW Sector.

CENTRAL PACIFIC

An increase in enemy aircraft sightings in the CENTRAL PACIFIC indicates that the enemy has intensified his southward reconnaissance from TRUK and WOLEAI.

SECTION 4 - EQUIPMENT

JAPANESE "TYPE 93" LAND MINE FUSE

The fuse of this mine, which was illustrated in First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 35, has previously been reported as requiring a breaking strain of 260 lbs on one shear wire and 70 lbs on another shear wire fitted to an identical fuse. A further report from WASHINGTON however, states that some "TYPE 93" LAND MINE fuses have been found to function with a pressure or breaking strain as low as 7 lbs.

WARNING

WHEN RENDERING THIS MINE SAFE STRICTEST  
SAFETY PRECAUTIONS MUST BE TAKEN AS THIS  
MINE HAS NOW BECOME ANTI-PERSONNEL AS WELL  
AS ANTI-TANK.

#### NEW TYPE JAPANESE BARGE

A new type barge was encountered by PT boats in the HUNABUN area on the night of 4/5 Apr. The barges which were heavily laden, were described as 110 feet in length and box-like in shape. They are believed to have been propelled by twin screws and were travelling at 8-10 knots.

(AMF Review No 90 from NGF  
Intelligence Summary No 169)

#### JAPANESE 7.7 (.303 in) "TYPE 92" LEWIS TYPE LMG

A detailed description and photographic reproductions are attached to this summary as Appendices 'C(i)' and 'C(ii)' respectively.

#### SECTION 5 - TACTICS

##### JAPANESE DEDUCTIONS FROM ALLIED AIR ACTIVITY

In view of the recent Allied landings at TANAHMERAH EAY, HUMBOLDT BAY and AITAPE, it is of interest to note the manner in which the Japanese attempt to ascertain Allied intentions by the study of our air activity over a specific locality. The results of these observations have been presented in a combat instruction issued by 17 Division, part of which has been extracted as follows :

##### "Relation between the enemy plan to land and air annihilation Combat."

There is a close relationship between the air annihilation combat at present and the so-called enemy general counter-attack. These are enemy landing plans. That is to say, always before enemy landing forces commence operations, large scale and pertinacious air annihilation tactics are employed. Recently counter-attack operations have suddenly grown fierce, the sphere of operations has considerably widened, and there are plans to land at several places simultaneously. The relationship is complicated, but in general is found to be as follows :-

(a) Time of preparation.

(From 20 days to a week or 10 days before the landing.)

Enemy attacks are comparatively few. Small numbers of airplanes, around two P-38s or P-43s, two or three times a day at high altitude minutely reconnoitre our bases.

(b) Commencement of air annihilation combat.

(From completion of the above, approximately until the landing.)

Large forces of both fighters and bombers repeatedly bomb. At the end of this operation, the landing operations begin. The large-scale operations against RABUL at present, are unquestionably for assisting landing operations. But, also, from the air point of view, they want to wipe RABUL air strength completely out and thereby facilitate future operations.

Relation between enemy patrolling and the landing plan

It appears that the enemy is not concerned over revealing his plans by the activity of his airplanes. Each time he carries out the same practice.

1. From one month or one month and a half until approximately two weeks before the landing, he reconnoitres the general terrain and enemy situation in the landing point area. This is largely done by continuous aerial photographing. He endeavours to discover our hidden positions, the reefs around the coast etc., and gathers the various data of importance to operations. From time to time, if certain of our position, he will strafe.

2. Enemy situation and terrain reconnaissance by the senior commander and staff.  
(Generally five days after completion of the above.)

The commander in person looks the locality over, and gathers data for the operations and drafts the plan. Often he will use a B-24 protected by several escort fighters.

3. Prior to the landing, large forces of fighters and bombers repeatedly and pertinaciously bomb to render our position useless. Targets are largely anti-aircraft weapons etc, fire points along the coast, as well as various installations; ammunition and ration dumps, bivouacs, rear supply lines, boat hideouts, coral reefs etc. Together with these attacks, night and day patrols are carried out, keeping strict watch over our movements and at the same time increasing our nervous tension.

4. Essentials of War of Nerves

War of nerves, as can be seen from the words themselves is for the purpose of lowering the enemy's morale, making him mentally uneasy and fatigued without fighting. The enemy, who takes pride in his (numerical) superiority, always uses these tactics. It appears that this is carried out together with the mission of watching our boats. Pilots for this are as a rule those of poor ability.

Movements of these are: to fly low, patrolling the coast and occasionally strafing boat hideouts and villages, regardless of whether there is a target or not. Time in the air is extremely short generally enough for one or two attacks. However, there are two or three sorties in one day and sometimes as many as five. However, if the number of sorties and intensity increase, be on the alert for an enemy plan.

It is estimated that personnel for this are especially selected, and in view of the surplus of equipment, it appears this is carried out irrespectively of air annihilation combat or landing plans."

#### JAPANESE AIR RECONNAISSANCE

Following the Allied landings at ARABE, CAPE GLOUCESTER, and SAIDOR, enemy reconnaissance in the areas occupied by Allied troops show a decline which has since continued.

This fall of reconnaissance over Allied territory is undoubtedly a reflection of the more than ever defensive policy of the enemy, as well as a natural result of the destruction visited upon his forward bases by the strikes, ever growing in strength and frequency, of the Allied Air Forces.

As the Japanese aerial reconnaissance incursions into Allied territory decrease, so do his aerial attacks. This decrease in attacks may be explained by :-

- (1) Many of the attacks, executed by single aircraft, were actually armed reconnaissances.
- (2) The Japanese defensive policy in the SWPA may have become so frozen in pattern, that it has lost its fluidity, and also the ability to switch to even limited aerial offensives.

In marked contrast to the great number of both photographic and armed reconnaissances being regularly flown by Allied aircraft over enemy occupied territory, in many cases penetrating for hundreds of miles behind the enemy's forward bases, most of the enemy's reconnaissances and patrols are designed purely for his immediate protection. Few are of the type that seek to obtain information as to what the Allies are doing in the territory under their control, so as to capitalise on any opportunity afforded to hamper our ultimate striking power.

Enemy reconnaissances and patrols, ascertained from all sources, emanating from and covering the NW coast of NEW GUINEA, and portions of the NW area, are portrayed in the sketch map attached hereto. All times mentioned are 'K' times, and each is graded according to its reliability as follows :-

- Grade A - As determined from captured documents, PW or secret sources, and substantiated by a sufficient number of sightings.
- Grade B - As determined by a substantial number of sightings; or from captured documents or PW or Secret Sources, substantiated by a small number of sightings.
- Grade C - As determined by a small number of sightings, or from unsubstantiated captured enemy documents, or PW or Secret Sources.
- Grade D - Very few sightings, but a reasonable patrol.

AREA 1 - Grade B: This reconnaissance, which is really a patrol, extends from WEMAK to WAKDE. Its exact purpose and date of origin is not known, but it is possible that it was instituted shortly after the naval shelling of WEMAK, and that one of its purposes is the detection of any Allied naval efforts similar to the WEMAK shelling.

It appears that the patrol varies from time to time, reasons for such variation being unknown, but all that is known about it, including variations, is set down in the characteristics of the flight.

CHARACTERISTICS

- (a) It appears that it is attempted to schedule the flight twice daily. The route is from WAKDE to WENAK; occasionally the return is made from WENAK after a brief stop over. The route from WENAK to WAKDE is also flown, but due to returns from WENAK occasionally being made almost at once, flights from WAKDE to WENAK predominate.
- (b) Flights appear to leave (either WAKDE or WENAK) between 0615 - 0715, and again between 1600 - 1700. The flights approximate 2½ hours.
- (c) At times the flights are performed by two airplanes, one flying approximately 75 miles off-shore, and the other approximately half that distance from shore. When one airplane flies the course alone, it is suspected that the 75 mile off-shore course is flown.
- (d) On occasion, the patrol may be extended to HANSA BAY.

AREA 2 - Grade C: This reconnaissance is of very recent origin, possibly dating from the Task Force attack against PALAU. Not very much is known about it.

In effect, it is composed of two reconnaissances with points in common. Each of the reconnaissances will be treated, one will be termed 'solid line reconnaissance' and the other 'dashed line reconnaissance'.

CHARACTERISTICS: Solid Line Reconnaissance.

- (a) It originates from WAKDE, and is flown for a distance of 550 miles, between bearings out of WAKDE of 65° and 75°.
- (b) The airplane is at its northernmost point at approximately 1040 hrs (rated 'D' as to time).
- (c) Flown in a clockwise manner, nothing is known about a possible anti-clockwise flight. (rated 'D' as to this characteristic).

Dashed Line Reconnaissance.

- (a) Originates from WAKDE, and is flown for a distance of 350 miles, between bearings out of WAKDE of 65° and 75°.

AREA 3 - Grade C

This reconnaissance is of recent origin, and little is known about it. It originates from MANOKWARI, and is flown for a distance of 300 miles between bearings 340° to 30°.

AREA 4 - Grade B

On approximately 12 Dec 43, the enemy started to seriously reconnoitre the CAPE VALSCH - MERAUKE area, and after experimenting with routes and times, he finally hit upon a route which in shape resembles the present one.



On 22 Jan 44, a reconnaissance bomber was intercepted and shot down, and that was immediately followed by the destruction of another reconnaissance bomber with its fighter escort. The reconnaissances were then abruptly terminated, and until quite recently, reconnaissances of the area ceased.

Having resumed the reconnaissance, the enemy, remembering his lesson, shows commendable caution by varying his route slightly from time to time, as well as his time schedule. Nevertheless, a mean pattern is discernible.

The route, as set forth in the sketch map, is the means of all sightings and possible flight lines based on such sightings. It is possible that no one reconnaissance plane flew the actual route set forth, but none of the probable flight lines deviate too much. It is believed that no one route, rigidly adhered to, is flown, because of extreme caution on the part of the enemy.

#### CHARACTERISTICS

- (a) LANGGOER is the point of origin and return, and the reconnaissance appears to be flown three or four times a week by what is believed to be a medium bomber. On rare occasions it is flown by more than one aircraft.
- (b) It does not appear to be flown more than once in any day, but some of the flights are in the morning, and some in the afternoon. Morning flights predominate.
- (c) The reconnaissance is flown both clockwise and anti-clockwise, the latter being in the majority.
- (d) When performing morning anti-clockwise flights, the aircraft is in the vicinity of area 'A' (see sketch map), between 0900 - 1000; when performing morning clockwise flights, the aircraft is in the vicinity of 'A' between 1100 - 1200.
- (e) When performing the afternoon anti-clockwise flights the aircraft is in the vicinity of 'A' between 1415 - 1445; and when performing afternoon clockwise flights, the aircraft is in the vicinity of 'A' at approximately 1600.
- (f) The reconnaissance has, on rare occasions, been observed as much as 50 miles south of area 'A'.

#### AREA 5 - Grade D

This reconnaissance is believed to originate from LANGGOER and to be flown anti-clockwise, possibly arriving in the CAPE ARNEHEM area at approximately 1015. It is executed by a twin-engine aircraft.

(Adapted from AAF Intelligence  
Information Memorandum No 38  
3rd Edition 'A')

SECTION 6 - SUPPLY

THE DECLINE OF JAPANESE MERCHANT SHIPPING

The following has been adapted from a report dated 1 Mar 44 issued by the Intelligence Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, WASHINGTON, and previously published in toto in AAF Intelligence Summary No 200:

"At the commencement of the PACIFIC War JAPAN had available for use some 6,369,789 gross tons of merchant shipping made up of vessels of 1000 gross tons or above. This was supplemented by captures and seizures, the taking over of smaller vessels, and their construction programme which up to 1 Feb 44 is estimated to have provided 1,020,000 gross tons; the sum result of these activities brought the available total to 8,769,501 gross tons. Of this total it is estimated that the Japanese have lost 3,502,494 gross tons due to Allied action, and these losses in conjunction with the amount under repair and those ships taken over for conversion to Naval vessels has reduced their total of shipping available for operational requirements to some 4,671,511 gross tons ... a comparative loss of 40% of their merchant fleet.

In the construction of steel vessels it was estimated that the enemy would, in 1944, produce a total of 800,000 gross tons of vessels over 1,000 gt. each, and of this total some 125,000 g.t. would be invested in tankers. It seems likely that the enemy will try to step up this figure but it is doubtful if their capabilities will permit any excess in the steel ship-building field. In the meantime the Japanese are continuing to publicise the wooden ship-building efforts. In this regard however serious difficulties have been encountered in the form of shortage of materials, machinery and labour, and as only limited numbers have so far been constructed, the programme will need to be greatly accelerated in 1944 to have any noticeable effect upon the general situation.

The Japanese Merchant Fleet has no doubt been strongly supplemented by the salvage of vessels in Far Eastern waters but this field is being reduced in scope by the advance of the Allied offensive so that the enemy is now leaving vessels behind rather than acquiring them through an advance. The enemy continues to employ numerous cargo vessels for the transport of oil in order to offset the tanker losses and it is considered that some 50 cargo vessels are engaged in oil transport as their primary function.

It can be concluded from a study of these factors that the enemy merchant shipping position has reached a critical stage in that their available tonnage is so taken up with normal requirements that it permits little margin for an increase in any one transport category. Furthermore it can be expected that with the mounting Allied offensive, increasing the percentage of losses, the situation will become more acute and will probably be evident in some of the following forms :-

- (a) Steady sacrifice of economic tonnage.
- (b) Increased use of cargo vessels for the transportation of oil.
- (c) Provision of heavier escort protection and the routing of a larger percentage of vessels in convoy, thus resulting in a slower turnaround.
- (d) Increased difficulties in the transportation of troops and supplies. "

#### SECTION 8 - GENERAL

##### THE DECAY OF JAPANESE MORALE

In the past it has not been unusual to find in the diaries of Japanese troops a frequent outcry against the lack of food and supplies, complaints on the lack of air protection, and numerous other suggestions of a decline of morale. This has been more pronounced in the case of those troops stationed in forward or isolated areas where the result of distorted supply systems are more obvious, and in some cases it has been noticed that even the junior officers were voicing dissension.

A recently captured document however, places further emphasis upon this discontent. This document contains notes by an engineer company commander - apparently a responsible officer with a considerable amount of operational experience - who has directed a tirade of criticism against those persons responsible. His comments on the inefficiency of the Japanese Staff and supply system have been extracted as follows :-

"Was sent off on a recce of enemy situation and terrain.

It is absolutely useless simply to give a man a copy of div orders. Orders should always be drawn up with a view to the recipient and his place in the picture. Instead of div orders being passed on willy-nilly, relevant extracts should be made, and these should be supplemented by specific instructions to fit the circumstances. Otherwise, the whole thing is hellish.

To go out on an officer patrol in jungle warfare is flirting with death, and men should not be sent off on a wild goose chase or without proper instructions. Unless a man is given a definite mission and specific instructions, he can't accomplish anything worthwhile. They should get that through their heads.

Left ASAKAWA key point at 0600 hrs. Reported the situation to the CO of troops, who had returned. Everyone was happy because they had received rice through the kindness of the runner. Potatoes, potatoes! The battle in the FINSCHLAFEN area was full of potatoes. It would be impossible to live without potatoes.

Since our arrival on 11 Nov, we have had hardly any rice. We added a few potatoes to what rice we've had and continued to fight.

We have an Army, a Division, and an Area Army, with a C in C, a Div Comdr, a C of S, a Director of Intelligence, and what have you, but in the front lines we have to contend with a rotten supply situation, and live a dog's life on potatoes.

The fact is that the only people who know what is going on at the front and what the boys have to put up with are the platoon and company comdrs. What big talk the C of S comes out with! Not to mention the Div Commander. We know that the state of affairs is misrepresented completely by the higher-ups, but all we can do is to go on trying to carry out the orders of Engr Regt HQ which are founded on these misconceptions.

Taking advantage of the excellent weather today, enemy bombers have attacked more frequently. One must recognise that the supreme medium of commanding modern scientific warfare through air power, sea power, and fire power. Although the bayonet is relied upon to a great degree, past battle experiences have proved it to be worthless.

You won't find many smiling faces among the men in the ranks in NEW GUINEA. They are always hungry; every other word has something to do with eating. At the sight of potatoes their eyes gleam and their mouths water. The div comdr and the staff officers don't seem to realise that the only way the men can drag out their lives from day to day is by this endless hunt for potatoes. How can they complain about slackness and expect miracles when most of our effort goes into looking for something to eat!

You would hardly think div HQ could be misinformed! They are comparatively close to us. But there's no getting away from it - Army must think we have plenty of everything and are getting along all right. What a laugh! We have a perfect illustration in this theatre of the good old CHINESE saying :

"To hell with the boys on the firing line  
As long as the bigwigs are doing fine."

The indifference and bungling of staff officers and high comdrs should be a court-martial offence. Their crimes are worse than desertion, cowardice, or running away under fire, but they get off scot-free. If you ask me, the only way the Army Comdr and his immediate subordinates could make it all up to the fighting troops and officers is by committing hara-kiri.

The men in the rear, whose biggest job is talking, know nothing about the soldiers on the hills, in the valleys, and in the native villages of the forward areas, dying off like flies.

The stupid fools!"

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

REVIEW OF SITUATION AND POTENTIALITIES HOLLANDIA - AITAPE AREAS

GENERAL

Although occupied by the Japanese in Apr 42, HOLLANDIA was not put to immediate use by the enemy. They did station a small force there to establish a tangible link between the NE and NW Sector, but it was obvious that, with their advance into NEW GUINEA progressing favourably from the NE Sector, there was little need for the exploitation of a base so placed on the extreme northern coast of NEW GUINEA, and the total troops in occupation were estimated at 100. Little information was gained regarding activities at HOLLANDIA until Jul 43, when it was reported that "a considerable number of Japanese were present and were being maintained by the regular visits of warships and supply vessels." It was also reported that two airfields and a sea-lane base at SENTANI LAKE were in use. At this time it became evident that HOLLANDIA was being used extensively as a transit base for the switch-over of aircraft from the NW to the NE Sector to meet operational necessities. In Nov 43, aerial reconnaissance disclosed that the Japanese had three potential strips in the area, and since that time their efforts in regard to airfield construction have made available to them three operational strips with the attendant anti-aircraft defences, revetments, dispersal areas, and storage dumps whilst another airfield is, or was on 21 Mar 44, under construction at SEKOLIE.

With the pressure of the Allied advance along the NE coast of NEW GUINEA, and the incessant pounding of the important airfields in the WEWAK area, the Japanese gradually swung their available airpower over until, by Mar 44, the role of HOLLANDIA changed from that of a rear air base to the most important airfield group along the north coast of NEW GUINEA. On 30, 31 Mar and 3 Apr a total of 288 grounded aircraft were destroyed during Allied air attacks, and this, in addition to the extensive damage to ground installations, virtually deprived the enemy of the use of this as a major air base.

Coinciding with the airfield development, HOLLANDIA had also assumed an important role as the central control point for vessels moving maintenance stores and supplies along the north coast of NEW GUINEA, and it is considered that this may be the headquarters for the newly-organised NE GUINEA SHIPPING UNIT. The relationship between HOLLANDIA and shipping movement in this area has previously been shown on a map attached as Appendix 'E' to First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 100.

Since early Feb 44, there has been a rapid increase in the estimate of enemy strength at this base - no doubt consistent with the activities already mentioned - and it is considered that on 19 Apr 44 a total of 15,000 troops were present in the HOLLANDIA - VANIMO locality. This total is made up of HQ 18 Army (ex WEWAK), elements of 36 Div, 1 of C, Construction and Anti-aircraft Units.

The combination of airfields and potentialities for harbour and airfield development at HOLLANDIA enhances the military value of this area; especially when it is realised that HUMBOLDT BAY and its reaches provide the only extensive anchorage between WEWAK and GEEHVINK BAY, a distance of 450 miles.

A feature of this area is the CYCLOPS Mountains rising from the sea to 7000 feet. The southern streams from the western watershed of these mountains radiate over the DEJAOE alluvial plain before entering SENTANI LAKE. This lake is 220 feet above sea level and drains into the sea via the TAMI RIVER. It is on the DEJAOE plain that the Japanese have built three operational airfields, connected by motor road to JAUTEPA BAY.

#### TOPOGRAPHICAL - HUMBOLDT BAY

HUMBOLDT BAY which includes HOLLANDIA BAY is well surveyed and would provide anchorage for upwards of 60 Liberty ships in 12-15 metres. Small craft may obtain sheltered anchorage in the SE part of the bay, south of CAPE KASSOE. Present port facilities are believed to be poor, but improvement should be simple.

#### TANAMERAH BAY

This bay is mostly too deep for anchorage and it is exposed to a heavy swell in the NW season. Within the bay there are only two beaches considered suitable for landings but exit for foot troops from the beach in both cases is not difficult.

#### AIRFIELDS

- (a) HOLLANDIA - an operational bomber airfield 6200' x 340', surfaced, and including dispersal lanes and 80 revetments. Extension is possible to 9700'.
- (b) SENTANI - an operational bomber airfield 5300' x 400' surfaced and including dispersal lanes and 10 revetments. Extension is possible for 5000' at both ends of the present strip.
- (c) CYCLOPS - an operational fighter strip 3900' x 250' surfaced, including dispersal lanes. Extension is possible for from 2000' to 4000'.
- (d) SEKOLIE PLAIN - Photographs of 21 Mar 44 disclose a fourth strip under construction at SEKOLIE, six miles SSW of HOLLANDIA. It is sited on comparatively flat grass land and is already 4600' long. It is capable of extension to 8000'. Other grassland areas in this vicinity also appear to be potential airfields.

#### SEAPLANE BASE

SENTANI LAKE was used by the Dutch Government as a sea-plane alighting area. The lake is deep and it is considered that there are sufficiently long runs in every direction to provide a good sea-plane base.

#### ROADS AND TRACKS

- (a) HOLLANDIA TOWN - AIRFIELDS (23 miles) - HOLLANDIA  
Town is connected to PIM on JAUTEPA EAY by a graded track suitable for bicycle and horse traffic in all weather. It could be widened and improved for MT. Distance five miles.

From PIM the Japanese have improved the track to take MT. The first six miles are over undulating country, the highest point being 300 feet. The track is already graded and further improvement would be easy using gravel available along the way. The remaining 12 miles cross DELAOE plain and there are long stretches of good straight road.

- (b) DEPAPE - AIRFIELDS - 11 Miles. The track was graded and small bridges were built pre-war, but it is now likely to have fallen into disrepair. No Japanese activity has been noted along this track, which traverses undulating forested country.

#### AITAPE

AITAPE was probably occupied by the Japanese shortly after Dec 42 when they took possession of WEWAK. It has not been used extensively in an operational role mainly because shipping facilities are not up to the standard of those at other bases. Nevertheless, the establishment of an operational airfield at TADJI - with three serviceable strips - has probably increased the importance of the locality.

It was estimated on 19 Apr 44 that strength in the area totalled 2000 troops composed mainly of elements of 20 Division, although it is of interest to note that shortly after the Allied landing it was reported that 50 Japanese had been killed and 76 captured in this area.

The main feature of military importance near AITAPE is the large flat kunai area at TADJI on which the Japanese already have three airfields serviceable or under construction.

The hinterland from AITAPE is comprised of a flat coastal plain six to eight miles in depth and mostly covered by rain forest. TORRICELLI MOUNTAINS, well inland, rise to 3500 feet. The plain contains many large swamp areas. On the drier raised portions close to the beach there are some large kunai areas, the main one being at TADJI.

There is no good all weather anchorage on this coast, though some shelter is afforded at AITAPE in the SE season. With modern landing craft most of the beach front presents landing places.

#### AIRFIELDS

Late aerial reconnaissance shows that there were three strips under construction at TADJI, the largest being 6800 feet x 315 feet. The surface is sandy loam which tightens with rain. Extension of 3000 feet is possible. Two other strips have been commenced, one 4500 feet x 265 feet with a possible extension of 3500 feet, and the second shows signs of development to 6000 feet.

PLACE NAMES NOT COMMONLY KNOWN

Index to places mentioned in this summary which may not be commonly known :-

<u>PLACE</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>Lat</u>		<u>Long</u>	
		<u>Deg</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Deg</u>	<u>Min</u>
EROE BAY	NOEMFOOR ISLAND	01	02	134	57
CAPE GIRGIR	NEW GUINEA	03	50	144	35
HAHELA MISSION	BOUGAINVILLE	05	24	154	42
PATLANGAT PLN	NEW IRELAND	03	10	151	37
ROELBI BAY	NOEMFOOR ISLAND	01	06	134	50
TAIOF ISLAND	BOUGAINVILLE	05	32	154	40
TINPUTZ HARBOUR	BOUGAINVILLE	05	33	155	03

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

BURMA

Except for strong British counter-attacks in the area SW and NE of IMPHAL and NW of KOHIMA, operations in BURMA have been on a more restricted scale than during the preceding two or three weeks.

In the ARAKAN Sector, Japanese resistance has become stronger in the EUTHIDAUNG area, and further east, in the KALADAN VALLEY similar conditions pertain. This is most probably an attempt by the Japanese to divert British reinforcements and supplies from the northern sectors, but as yet they have achieved no success in this direction.

In the IMPHAL Sector, the Japanese attempt to cut the SILCHAR - DISHENPUR ROAD has been brought to a standstill, while to the NE, British troops are continuing to advance. At KOHIMA, further British troops driving from DIMAPUR have relieved the KOHIMA garrison which was isolated for several days when the enemy cut the DIMAPUR - KOHIMA ROAD. At present, there are indications that a strong British counter-offensive has commenced in this area.

In the HUKAWNG and MOGAUNG VALLEYS, Allied troops continue to converge on MYITKYINA. There are indications that the defence of this town has been relegated to a secondary consideration by the Japanese who withdrew troops from the area in order to further their drive towards KOHIMA - DIMAPUR and the ASSAM - BENGAL railway.

ITALY

There is still an absence of large scale operations. On the bridgehead sector American troops effected a slight advance in the area SW of CISTERNA, but apart from this, only patrolling and artillery activity is reported from all sectors.

There is continued evidence of the withdrawal of German mobile formations from forward areas to reserve positions.



## RUSSIA

Operations on the Russian front over the past week have been on a reduced scale and there have been an increasing number of German counter-attacks both in SE POLAND and at the extreme northern end of the front south of WARSA.

In the CRIMEA, German resistance has stiffened around the beleaguered port of SEBASTOPOL, presumably in an effort to effect an orderly evacuation.

On the lower DNIESTER RIVER, Russian troops have established bridgeheads on the western bank, evidently in preparation for the launching of an attack on CHISINAU, the Bessarabian capital. Further west, in RUMANIA, the Russian drive over the SERET RIVER has made little progress and it is evident that re-grouping is being carried out preparatory to a thrust in the direction of GALATZ, PLOESTI and BUCHAREST.

On the front facing the CZECHOSLOVAK frontier, the position is static, whilst at STANISLAWOW, the Germans have been counter-attacking in strength in an effort to safeguard the railway running south from LWOV through the CARPATHIANS to HUNGARY. In the KOWEL area, German counter-attacks have slackened.

In the extreme north, German forces attacked Russian positions SW of WARSA in ESTONIA. As yet, no impression has been made in the Russian line and German losses have been heavy.

## PART V

### SECURITY

#### SECURITY OF INFORMATION

Everywhere we see security posters; in offices, in hotels, on railway stations, buses, etc., all produced in an effort to make military personnel security-minded, and yet it seems that in some instances little effect has been achieved.

One poster - which pointed out that by a soldier writing his name, number and unit on walls of buildings, cafe menus, etc., he may be giving away information to the enemy - was found to have been used by a number of personnel from a nearby unit who evidently thought that the poster was a more suitable place to write their name, unit, etc., than the wall. Thrown in for good measure also was the date.

This had evidently been done by some self-considered humorists as a joke and may possibly have been amusing to a certain type had it occurred in times other than war.

Had these artists realised, however, that by writing the name of their unit and date on the poster they may have been responsible for supplying an enemy agent with the location of the unit and the date at which it was in that area, they would have seen how the joke may have been not only 'on them' personally but also on the whole unit.

-25-

A brief perusal of the Regimental numbers proudly displayed would indicate that the personnel responsible have only recently been called into the army and have never yet been in an operational area and seen the terrible consequences which may eventuate from their foolish actions.

Such instances as this show that we cannot be too careful with any information we have, and it is the duty of everyone to be security-minded thus ensuring that in no way have they been responsible for any leakage of information.

*C. Man.*  
*May*  
for Lt-Col  
GS FIRST AUSTRALIAN ARMY

# DISTRIBUTION


## FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 103

1 Aust Corps	Copy Number/s	1 - 52
4 Aust Div	" "	53 - 58
BRISBANE Fortress	" "	59
TOWNSVILLE Fortress	" "	60
CAIRNS Fortress	" "	61
Corps HQ VDC (QUEENSLAND)	" "	62
Aust Trg Centre (Jungle Warfare)	" "	63 - 66
BRA	" "	67 - 72
Sigs First Aust Army	" "	73
7 Aust Comd AL Sec	" "	74
First Aust Army Junior Staff School	" "	75
First Aust Army Regt Trg School	" "	76
First Aust Army School of Sigs	" "	77
First Aust Army AASC School	" "	78
6 US Army	" "	79
Second Aust Army	" "	80 - 81
NEW GUINEA Force	" "	82
3 Aust Corps	" "	83
NORTHERN TERRITORY Force	" "	84
QUEENSLAND L of C Area	" "	85 - 88
SOIC BRISBANE (for SOI)	" "	89
GOC	" "	90
G(O)	" "	91
G(I)	" "	92 - 97
G(SD)	" "	98
EAA & CA	" "	99
CE	" "	100 - 102
CSO	" "	103
DA & QMG	" "	104
A (one copy to circulate to: AMS, Legal Chaplains, Medical, Pro and Education)"	" "	105 - 106
Q (one copy to circulate to: S & T, Ord, AE & ME and Postal)"	" "	107 - 109
Svy	" "	110
LHQ (Aust)	" "	111
Adv LHQ	" "	112 - 116
LHQ School of MI	" "	117 - 118
FELO	" "	119
Security Service CANBERRA (for Mil LO)	" "	120
War Diary	" "	121 - 122
File	" "	123

Please destroy by fire after perusal.

SECRET


# MAP OF HOLLANDIA AND AITAPE AREAS SHOWING ALLIED LANDINGS 22 APRIL 1944.




FIR/MISC/8005

REPRODUCED BY 6 AUST ARMY TOPO SVY COY AIF, APR '44

000833E





JAPANESE 7.7mm (.303 in) TYPE 92 (1932) "LEWIS" TYPE LMG

Photographs and details of this weapon were collated from reports by Ordnance Intelligence Unit USAFISPA and DADA MGO Branch LHQ.

This weapon is similar to the British Lewis, .303, LMG, excepting for the type of mounting used, and for the following components of the gun:-

- (a) This gun has a hand grip, whereas the British Lewis has a butt. Their attachment to the body is similar. The hand grip, plus the type of mounting, suggests that this weapon is mainly used for AA purposes.
- (b) The cocking handle is positioned on the left side. No provision is made, as with the Lewis, for the cocking handle to be used from either side of the weapon.
- (c) The rear sight, tangent aperture, is exactly the same as that found on the Lewis, excepting for the graduation on the leaf. The Lewis sight leaf is graduated from 0 to 1900 yards, while the Japanese copy is graduated from 0 to 1700 metres.
- (d) The means of locking the gas regulator differs in that it has a locking cap and split retaining pin, whereas the Lewis has a regulator key.
- (e) An additional component on the Japanese copy, is a coiled buffer spring, located in the rear of the piston. It is designed to take up the shock of recoil, should the piston be driven firmly to the rear, or should the muzzle of the gun be elevated for firing at aircraft.
- (f) No provision is made on this weapon for a bipod for ground firing, nor are sling swivels provided for carrying purposes.

MOUNTING:

The gun is mounted on a Cradle Type Mounting, and is held in position by means of a clamp band and clamping screw. This clamp is positioned about the band on the radiator casing of the gun, found just forward of the rear end of the casing.

The legs of the tripod are of tubular steel, and may be locked at various angles from the vertical. The tripod legs do not end in feet, but are attached to square flat plates which have a hole in the centre. These holes are used for the insertion of bolts to secure the tripod to the deck of a ship. The tripod head can be rotated in a full circle. Azimuth is calibrated in two mil intervals from 0 to 6400 mils. When the tripod head is mounted for ground use, it is estimated that the limits of elevation are approximately minus 15 to plus 60 degrees. Without removing the gun from the mount, the main portion of the tripod head can be moved from a horizontal to a vertical position, and the gun attached to the top of the head for anti-aircraft use. In this position it is estimated that the limits of elevation are approximately minus 80 to plus 85 degrees. It is estimated that an experienced operator could change from the ground to the anti-aircraft position in not more than fifteen seconds.

SIGHTS:

The gun is provided with AA sights. The front sight is positioned in a bracket, located on the left side of the mounting clamp band. The rear sight bracket is found on the left of the tangent rear sight. Into this bracket is fitted the rear AA sight.

MAGAZINES:

The magazines for this gun are identical in appearance, size and capacity with those used on the Lewis Gun, and are therefore interchangeable.

AMMUNITION:

The ammunition used with this gun is rimmed, and is of 7.7mm calibre. This ammunition, in calibre, and dimensions, is very close to that of the British .303, Mk VII ammunition. This means that this ammunition may be fired from British .303 Machine Guns or .303 Service Rifles, and likewise in respect to our own .303 rimmed ammunition.

Samples are held of three types of 7.7mm ammunition, these are, Ball, AP and Tracer.


REMARKS:

All characteristics of this weapon, and its mountings point to it being employed, mainly for anti-aircraft purposes, but it is considered that it may be employed in ground roles, as the cradle is fitted with fixed mounting pins, and the legs can be adjusted to make a fairly low mount.

Although identical with the Lewis Gun, component parts of these weapons are not interchangeable with that gun.

(AMF Review No 90)


JAPANESE  
7.7 mm (.303 in) TYPE 92 (1932)  
LEWIS TYPE  
L M G



MOUNTED IN AA POSITION



MOUNTED FOR GROUND USE



AMMUNITION CHEST—CAPACITY 21 MAGS



W/D (34a)  
TOP SECRET

WORLD REVIEW SITUATION NO. 68

The following World Review of the situation has been received from War Office, LONDON, covering the period 18 Apr to 25 Apr 44 :-

NAVAL:

NORTHERN WATERS: Night 18/19 Apr IEBs engaged "E" boats off the ISLE of WIGHT claiming several hits.

Reconnaissance GDYNIA 14 Apr located "HIPPER" and "LEIPZIG" in harbour and "LUTOW" and "PRINZ EUGEN" leaving.

MEDITERRANEAN: 20 Apr US destroyer engaged four "E" boats west of ANZIO probably sinking one and damaging another. US patrol claims two human torpedoes sunk during ineffective attack on ANZIO 21 Apr.

Week ending 20 Apr, over 12,500 tons stores and equipment were unloaded at ANZIO.

AEGEAN: HM coastal forces sank a tanker, a tug and a small merchantman on 16/17 Apr.

INDIAN OCEAN: HMS "ILLUSTRIOUS" and USS "SARATOGA" attacked SABANG. Two enemy destroyers escorts and two medium sized merchantmen badly hit. Barracks, wireless stations, dockyard, airfield and power station severely damaged. Covering force included HM and French battleships, HM and Dutch cruisers and HM Australian and Dutch destroyers.

14 Apr explosion of an ammunition ship at BOMBAY caused large fires and extensive damage to some sixteen ships totalling over 60,000 tons in harbour. Port facilities suffered no permanent damage.

U-BOAT WARFARE:

During fortnight ending 16 Apr three merchant ships were lost by U-boat action in the ATLANTIC but no losses in the INDIAN OCEAN and only one known sunk in the MEDITERRANEAN.

Seventeen ATLANTIC ocean-convoys totalling 693 ships arrived without loss.

Week ending 15 Apr, imports in convoy to UK totalled 972,000 tons of which 294,000 tons were oil. Imports for past ten weeks average 956,000 tons weekly.

SUMMARY OF ANTI-SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN APRIL REPORTED TO NOON 19 APR:

<u>Attacks:</u>	by shore-based aircraft	14
	" carrier-borne aircraft	11
	" warships	20

<u>Results:</u>	sunk or probably sunk -	
	by shore-based aircraft	1
	" carrier-borne aircraft	5
	" warships	4

	possibly sunk by carrier-borne aircraft	1
--	---	---

MILITARY:

RUSSIA: GENERAL: Comparative lull in fighting and no important positional change. Russians are consolidating gains. Russians hold CRIMEA except for small area round SEBASTOPOL.

NORTHERN and CENTRAL SECTORS: Russians report that German attacks SW of WARSA were repulsed.

TARNOPOL SECTOR: Germans continued to fight on in the western outskirts of TARNOPOL but by 20 Apr they had been liquidated although elements may have escaped. Possible slight German and Hungarian gains in attacks between STANISLAVOV and the CARPATHIANS but no evidence of a serious threat to the Russian position.

LOWER DNIESTER SECTOR: A number of small Russian bridgeheads established across DNIESTER including one opposite TIRASPOL.

CRIMEA: Germans and Roumanians now hemmed in to narrow area round SEBASTOPOL. Evacuation of a few troops proceeding but indications are that SEBASTOPOL will not fall without a struggle.

ITALY: GENERAL: Activity slightly increased particularly in the Bridgehead area where two successful raids were carried out by US troops.

Enemy attacks against the British sector were repulsed.

YUGOSLAVIA: Heavy fighting continues in CROATIA, BOSNIA, SERBIA and MONTENEGRO.

AIR:

WESTERN EUROPE: NIGHT: 2352 sorties, 35 aircraft missing. Night 18/19 Apr, 4076 tons were dropped on ROUEN-ST SAENS marshalling yards causing considerable damage. Complete devastation to marshalling yards and buildings in PARIS and adjoining suburbs. 20/21 Apr, over 4500 tons were dropped on COLOGNE and marshalling yards at AIX LA CHAPELLE.

DAY: Total sorties flown - heavy bombers, 2,444; fighters, 2,722; medium and fighter bombers, 3,160. 80 Allied aircraft were lost.

Targets in Occupied EUROPE and GERMANY were attacked. Marshalling yards, airfields and assembly factories all heavily raided.

Areas of coastal defence heavily attacked by fighter-bombers and fighters.

19 Apr, KASSEL was attacked. Henschel aero engine works and assembly factories blanketed with bursts. LIPPSTADT and PADERBORN - airfields and airparks.

20 Apr, Military objectives attacked in PAS de CALAIS - ABBEVILLE - AMIENS - CHERBOURG areas.

ENEMY: Operated on nights 18/19, 19/20, 20/21 Apr. 200 aircraft made landfall; 18 were destroyed.

MEDITERRANEAN: 7316 offensive day sorties, 433 night sorties. Enemy lost 107 aircraft; Allies 91.

Targets attacked in CENTRAL and NORTHERN ITALY, YUGOSLAVIA, BELGRADE (railway centre and airfields).

13 Apr, 530 tons were dropped on aircraft factory and airfield BUDAPEST and on night 16/17 Apr, 67 tons.

15 Apr, 577 tons were dropped on BUCHAREST railway centre, 286 tons on PLOESTI airfield and railway centre.

15 Apr, 428 tons SOFIA marshalling yards.

17/18 Apr, 65 tons PLOVDIV marshalling yards.

ECONOMICS:

The Swiss Government have refused formal undertakings regarding transit traffic between GERMANY and ITALY, but say they intend to impose the following restrictions - (1) Liquid fuel will be regarded as war material and will be refused transit, as well as anything to a military consignee or having a presumed military purpose. (2) Certain listed goods likely to have been requisitioned by the Germans will be refused transit from ITALY to GERMANY. In

addition nearly all secondhand goods will be refused transit. (3) Transit to GERMANY of certain other commodities will be limited to quantities normally carried through SWITZERLAND. This restriction is aimed at possible German attempts to clear Italian stocks of commodities which GERMANY might argue were normal German imports from ITALY. (4) Transit of sealed waggons will not be permitted. (5) Should there be a remarkable increase in total traffic Swiss Government will take steps to regularise the position.

It is reported that early in March, owing to sabotage, the SAMBRE-OISE CANAL was interrupted for fifteen to twenty days; the PAISE-MARNE and ARDINES CANALS were both interrupted for one month.

With elimination of manganese from NIKOPOL, the stoppage of chrome from TURKEY to the AXIS will, within three months, curtail non-armament steels, essential to the war effort, which is particularly serious in the case of special steels for the chemical industry. Within six months it will seriously curtail ordnance and aircraft steels and non-armament steels which will prove progressively crippling to the war effort.

GSI  
2 May 44.

*Claman*  
Lt-Col  
GS FIRST AUST ARMY

Distributed by GSI First Aust Army for information of Comds or Heads of Branches or Services as set out below :-

1 Aust Corps	5	G(SD)	1
4 Aust Div	3	BAA & CA	1
HQ BRISBANE Fortress	1	CSO	1
HQ TOWNSVILLE Fortress	1	ACMG	1
HQ CAIRNS Fortress	1	A (Circulate to AMS, LSO and AD Education)	1
Corps HQ VDC Q'LAND	1	Q (Circulate to DDST, and DDPS)	1
BRA	1	War Diary	2
CE	1	File	1
Q'LAND L of C Area	1		
GOC	1		
G(O)	1		

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	TOWNSVILLE fortress)	by any means	Copy to -
AND				GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec )	except wireless	BGS
		4 aust div		G(O)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies)	by ALS	G2(AIR)
		remainder by DRIS		G(I)
				G(SD)
				DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND  
 BRISBANE fortress CAIRNS fortress 7 aust comd AL sec

FROM: first aust army INT 2751 26

secret (.) landops revsit 637 to 260030Z apr (.)

landops (.)

SOLOMONS (.) BOUGAINVILLE (.) 23 apr allied patrol with arty sp  
 killed six of estimated jap pl NE of perimeter and forced enemy to  
 retire (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM AREA (.) 24 apr patrol reached BILI BILI  
 (two and one half mls NNE GOGOL RIVER mouth) by PT boat and joined  
 fresh tps which had landed that village (.) strong det then moved  
 north to GUM RIVER mouth (four and one half mls NNE GOGOL RIVER mouth)  
 (.) pm 24 apr fwd tps entered MADANG after defeating small enemy  
 rearguard armed with automatic weapons and mtn guns south of MADANG (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) HUMBOLDT BAY AREA (.) 23 apr our tps  
 captured HOLLANDIA town and PIM and adv to within two mls east end  
 SENTANI LAKE capturing several more amn and sup dumps (.) ldg made  
 HAMADI ISLAND (one and three quarter mls north CAPE PIE) to eliminate  
 enemy MG post (.) captured eqpt incl many crated A/C engines (.)

TANAHMERAH AREA (.) 23 apr supported by  
 arty fwd elements reached SABRON (five mls SE DEPAFRE) (.) indications  
 poss enemy escape route westward via SW corner SENTANI LAKE (.)  
 airops (.)

allied (.) NEW BRITAIN (.) 23 and 24 apr nine and ten A/C  
 respectively bombed TOBERA (.) 24 apr unstated number Fs strafed  
 and set on fire 19 mot trucks RABAU area (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 240015Z nineteen A/C attacked coastal  
 area MADANG destroying br mouth WAGOL RIVER (.) am 23 apr 15 A/C  
 bombed strafed DOGUMUR BAY and HATZFELDT HARBOUR (.) am 24 apr  
 further 78 A/C bombed strafed sup pers areas HANSA BAY (.) am 24 apr  
 65 A/C dropped 188 tons bombs on DAGUA BUT BORAM and WEWAK strips  
 maintaining their unserviceability (.)

- 2 -

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 240833Z fourteen A/C bombed strafed airfield KAMIRI (.) runway dispersal area well covered starting fuel fires (.) photos show 23 grounded A/C destroyed or rendered u/s (.) enemy (.) DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) early am 24 apr one A/C dropped four bombs HOLLANDIA destroying amn dump (.) sea (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 242243Z one sub 140 mls NNE KAVIENG (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) nights 23/24 and 24/25 apr MTBs destroyed three barges OPEN BAY area (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) nights 22/23 and 23/24 apr MTBs strafed and rocket-shelled WALALA and west coast MANAM ISLAND respectively (.) 24 apr 16 barges HILSA BAY (.) 240135Z five barges off MUSCHU ISLAND strafed and destroyed by 11 A/3 (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 21 apr in preparation allied ldgs HOLLANDIA naval A/C attacked and neutralised enemy airfields destroying 13 A/C in combat and 67 grounded (.) extensive damage caused to fuel and amn dumps buildings and sup (.) two small cargo vessels unstated number barges and small craft sunk (.) 240833Z three 500/1000 ton stack aft freighters ROEMBOI BAY (west coast NOEMFOOR ISLAND) 15 barges south KAMIRI (.) 241042Z one poss stack aft freighter 500/1000 tons JOMBER (east coast MIOS WAAR ISLAND) (.) 25 apr one large merchant vessel one escort vessel five mls west KAMIRI course SE by south (.) 21 apr allied naval A/C destroyed 12 damaged seven enemy A/C on ground WAHDE-SAWAR area (.) naval vessels successfully bombarded airstrips same area during night 21/22 apr (.)

TIMOR (.) 25 apr photos show 30 barges TENAU all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

T00 261453K  
THI

*W. J. M. Gell Capt*

(36) W/D

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	TOWNSVILLE fortress)	} by any means	Copy to:-
AND				
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec	} except wireless	GOC
		4 aust div		BGS
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies)	} by ALS	G(0)
		remainder by DRIS		G2(AIR)
				G(I)
				G(SD)
				DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND  
BRISBANE fortress CAIRNS fortress 7 aust comd AL sec

FROM: first aust army INT 2755 27

secret (..) landops revsit 638 to 270015Z apr (..)

landops (..)

SOLOMONS (..) BOUGAINVILLE (..) 24 apr supported by tks our tps  
attacked across MAVAVIA RIVER clearing enemy from coastal posns to  
east (..) fighting patrol moving down east bank SAUA RIVER killed 46  
japs (..)

NEW GUINEA (..) BOGADJIM-MADANG (..) 25 apr west end MADANG  
airfield free japs (..) strip badly cratered (..) patrol through BILI BILI  
reached AKELE (six mls west BILI BILI) (..) reported MADANG township  
evac month ago (..) large amounts stores incl amn clothing weapons  
medical eqpt and trucks captured (..) am 26 apr aust tps occupied  
ALEXISHAFEN (..)

AITAPE (..) am 24 apr AITAPE occupied without  
opposition (..) 25 apr ALI and ANGEL ISLANDS occupied (..) TADJI  
airstrip now operational base for A/C supporting HOLLANDIA tps (..  
cas to 25 apr 102 japs killed 17 PW (..)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (..) HUMBOLDT BAY (..) 25 apr overcoming med  
opposition NE tip of lake tps crossed SENTANI LAKE in amphibious craft  
and seized CYCLOPS airstrip 250430Z (..) 100 japs killed between two  
mls east of east end SENTANI LAKE to CYCLOPS airfield (..)

TAMMERAI BAY (..) advancing from SABRON  
force captured HOLLANDIA airstrip 25 apr (..) reported no def or def  
posns on mainland encountered (..) enemy left complete radar and new  
A/C still crated ration dumps medical sup bicycles and large amount  
documents (..) only desultory sniping encountered after est beachhead (..  
airops (..)

allied (..) SOLOMONS (..) 250550Z twelve A/C bombed MANUALAI ISLAND  
(south of SHORTLAND ISLAND) (..) 25 apr twelve A/C bombed BAITSI  
(EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY) causing small fire (..)

- 2 -

NEW IRELAND (.) 250100Z fortyeight A/C bombed BORPOP runway gun posns (.) 25 apr eight A/C set on fire trucks huts between CAPE SASS and FATMILAK (LOGAGON BAY) (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 23 and 24 apr 11 and 15 A/C respectively scored direct hits TOBERA strip (.) 25 apr 64 A/C scored hits runway gun posns causing large fire LAKUMAI 23 A/C scored hits runway revetments causing fire TOBERA 11 A/C strafed RABUL area (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 260400Z eight A/C on strafing mission set on fire two huts sup dump east HANSA BAY (.) 252300Z twentyfive A/C bombed strafed WEWAK (.) 12 A/C bombed strafed WEWAK airfield (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 250030Z twelve A/C bombed strafed villages along poss enemy escape route SW LAKE SENTANI (.) 241810Z two A/C attacked by 11 enemy A/C 10 mls south OERFOE strip (BLAK ISLAND)(.) three attacking A/C destroyed (.) 250252Z ten A/C bombed JEFMAN airfield starting one large numerous small fires runway (.) one enemy F taking off destroyed (.)

enemy (.) DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 251045Z twelve torpedo Bs attacked naval unit 20 mls west HUMBOLDT BAY (.) nil damage (.) sca (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 260110Z one 500/1000 ton freighter NW MANAM ISLAND (.) 25 apr one 500/1000 ton freighter or lugger one ml up SEPIK RIVER (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) ref revsit 636 shipping attacked CAPE WAIOS now reported 10 barges laden with fully armed tps destroyed resulting by loss of life (.)

CERAM (.) 260140Z one 500/1000 ton vessel one barge CAPE MATAKABO (NY coast CERAM) all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

TOO

THI

*Adm Kull Capr*

W/O 37

MESSAGE FORM

CALL	IN	TOWNSVILLE fortress)	Copy to -
AND		)by any means	GOC
INSTRUCTIONS	OUT	7 aust. comd AL sec )except wireless	BGS
			G(0)
			G(I)
		4 aust div	G2(AIR)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies)	G(SD)
		remainder by DRIS	DA & QMG

---

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND  
ERISBANE fortress CAIRNS fortress 7 aust comd AL sec

FROM: first aust army INT 2763 28

secret (.) landops revsit 639 to 280015Z apr (.)

landops (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 25 apr reliably reported no japs between  
ESIS RIVER and PALMALMAL (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIK-MADANG (.) 26 apr patrol to KUMUSI  
(9 mls NW JAPPA) reports AMINIKUGU (one and three quarter mls SE and  
two and three quarter mls SSE KUMUSI) clear enemy (.) patrol to  
NAGADA mission (three and three quarter mls north MADANG airfield)  
no contact (.) no movement seen BELIAU and KERANET ISLANDS (.)

AITAPE (.) 25 apr our patrols four mls west AITAPE and thirteen  
mls east TADJI airfields no report of contact with enemy (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) HOLLANDIA (.) 26 apr our troops adv from  
CYCLOPS airfield and captured SENTANI airstrip which serviceable for  
3300 feet (.) occupation HOLLANDIA airfield completed (.)  
airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) pm 26 apr twenty eight a/c bombed BUKA  
gun positions and eight a/c scored bomb hits TABUT BAY (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 26 apr sixty five a/c bombed gun positions runway  
RAPOPO 69 a/c scored hits VUKKANAU strip 24 a/c bombed runway  
dispersal area LAKUNAI 35 a/c scored hits TOBERA strip 10 a/c bombed  
KERAVAT strip dispersal area (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 260440Z four a/c bombed MALLS RIVER bridge scoring  
near misses (.) 260414Z four a/c bombed KUGIL plantation (.) 252342Z  
nine a/c bombed personnel areas HANSA BAY (.) 250125Z and 260001Z  
eleven and 10 a/c strafed coast CAPE GIRGIR to MURIK LAGOON and  
villages SEPIK RIVER mouth respectively (.) 262310Z nine a/c bombed  
possible barge hideouts JAPANDAI MARUI (middle SEPIK RIVER) (.)  
252300Z forty two a/c respectively bombed strafed BUT DAGUA WENAK



BORAM airfields destroying one grounded bomber (.) 252307Z nine a/c bombed strafed villages PAPARAM to AMBOSOLI (nine mls SSW and twenty mls WSW WEWAK) (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 251436Z four a/c bombed JEFFMAN ISLAND strip causing very large explosions fires revetment dump area (.) 270317Z nine a/c bombed BABO causing numerous fires explosions (.) sea (.)

SOLOMONS (.) 252130Z one submarine west GOG ISLAND (eight mls SW BUKA PASSAGE) (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) night 25/26 apr MTBs strafed buildings jetty started large fire PONDO HARBOUR found HIXON BAY area deserted strafed grounded aircraft UBILI (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 260430Z one lugger sunk by one a/c eight mls up SEPIK RIVER (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 260500Z 5 barges off NW tip SOEPIORI ISLAND course east (.) 260330Z one medium one small merchant vessel MANOKWARI (.) 270500Z one small damaged merchant vessel five mls east CAPE MANSIOSEARI (BLACK ISLAND) course ENE (.) 270317Z one small merchant vessel BABO (.)

KAI ISLANDS (.) am 27 apr one 500/1000 ton vessel beached KOER ISLAND (west KAI ISLANDS) (.)

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (.) 260330Z ten lt cruisers or destroyers entered LAVAIO GULF (.)

BORNEO (.) 260100Z two escort vessels 3/4 merchant vessels moving along NW coast BORNEO (.)

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA (.) 261800Z one large vessel unstated number escort vessels 100 mls SW PETELIU ISLAND (PALAU GROUP) course west by south (.) all informed

---

This message may be sent as  
WRITTEN except by wireless

T00281530K

THI

*Shannon*  
Capt.  
.....

MESSAGE FORM

W/D

38

GALE IN TOWNSVILLE fortress)  
AND )by any means  
INSTRUCTIONS OUT 7 aust comd AL sec )except wireless  
4 aust div )by ALS  
CAIRNS fortress -3 copies)  
remainder by DRLS

Copy to:  
GOC  
EGS  
G(O)  
G2(AIR)  
G(I)  
G(SD)  
DA & QMG

TO: 4 aust div TOWNSVILLE fortress corps HQ VDC Q'LAND  
BRISBANE fortress CAIRNS fortress 7 aust comd AL sec

FROM: First aust army Int 2766 29

secret (.) landops revisit 640 to 290015Z apr (.)

landops (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) DOGADJIN-ALEXISHAFEN (.) 26 apr now reported ALEXISHAFEN occupied unopposed except for MG and mtn gun fire from SAK ISLAND (.) covered by naval gun fire our tps landed with naval party and island cleared by nightfall (.) road MADANG-ALEXISHAFEN mined and in poor condition with majority bns blown (.) patrol to AMRON MISSION (six mls NNW MADANG) no contact (.) 27 apr naval patrol to no 2 airstrip reports 4 damaged 75mm guns 3 trucks approx 12 a/c seen (.) over 50 mines located and removed (.) patrol then moved to FRIEDRICH KARL HARBOUR finding good pillboxes suitable large guns covering RASCH PASSAGE (.) area MACADA to AMRON MISSION also scouted and booty found (.) patrol estimates main enemy force evac one month ago (.) airops (.) allied (.)

NEW IRELAND (.) 262230Z fifty four a/c bombed airfield and A/A gun posns KAVIENG (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 27 apr following attacks RABUL (.) 4 a/c bombed TOBI (.) 75 a/c attacked TALILE BAY scoring hits sup area (.) F sweeps resulted 2 barges (one laden with oil drums) 3 trucks and poss oil storage shed set on fire (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 270200Z forty a/c bombed strafed pers and sup areas WALOG and REGIAR plns and BUNABUN HARBOUR destroying br WAGLA RIVER (.) 262235Z sixty six a/c bombed strafed villages and coastal track between BUNABUN HARBOUR and KANSA BAY damaging several trucks destroying pillbox CAPE GORDON (.) sup area BUNABUN TAVILTAE DOZUMUR BAY hit and br BANARA RIVER destroyed (.) 270500Z nineteen a/c bombed strafed KANSA BAY scoring near misses SAKULA RIVER br (.) 262310Z twenty seven a/c bombed strafed villages lower SEPIK RIVER (.) 270055Z nine a/c bombed strafed NIGHTINGALE BAY probably destroying NUVEN RIVER br (.) 252250Z twelve a/c

attacked WEWAK scoring hits WEWAK strip and buildings and sup CAPE  
WOM (.) 262322Z seventyone a/c bombed strafed WEWAK airfields  
maintaining unserviceability all four strips (.) KAIRIRU and MUSCHU  
ISLANDS also covered (.) 280025Z eleven a/c bombed strafed rd BORAM to  
BRANDI PLU (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 280143Z fifteen a/c bombed strafed  
WAKDE and SAWAR strips and SARMI PT starting large fuel and smaller  
fires SAWAR and SARMI (.)  
sea (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 270140Z five to ten barges VANIMO (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 271952Z fifteen and ten barges DOLEBO and  
PAWAI RIVER respectively NE GEELVINK BAY (.)

BORNEO (.) night 27/28 apr one poss destroyer three u/1  
vessels six to seven barges BALIKPAPAN area (.) all informed

This message must be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless

TOO

291531K

THI

*W. J. M. Kell*  
.....  
Capt

(39)

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	TOWNSVILLE fortress)	by any means	Copy to -
	OUT	7 aust comd AL sec	except wireless	GOC
		4 aust div		G(O)
		CAIRNS fortress - 3 copies	by ALS	G(I)
		remainder by DRLS		G(SD)
				AQMG

TO:	4 aust div	TOWNSVILLE fortress	corps HQ VDC Q'LAND
	BRISBANE fortress	CAIRNS fortress	7 aust comd AL sec
FROM:	first aust army	INT 2770	30

secret (.) landops revsit 641 to 300030Z apr (.)

landops (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) 28 apr reliable report states PALMALMAL previously naval coast-watching sta (.) area from BAIRIMAN (12 mls SW PALMALMAL) to BAIEN (CAPE ORFORD) reported clear of enemy with exception poss fer at MATONG (east shore WATERFALL BAY) (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) BOGADJIM-ALEXISHAFEN (.) 27 apr northbound patrol which reached rd junc two and one half mls north ALEXISHAFEN reports whole area mined (.) patrols to SANUP AMELE ABITAPU SEIN GASUP MERKANHAM report no mov (.)

AITAPE (.) 27 apr natives report enemy tps evacuating AITAPE moved east along coast to DRINUMOR RIVER mouth thence five mls south to track along which they doubled back to KAPOAM VILLAGES (seven mls south AITAPE) via CHINAPELLI (.) our patrols along escape route to CHINAPELLI reported village clear of enemy (.) tracks indicated approx 50 japs left area 24 apr for KAPOAM (.) posn then occupied (.) patrols in area five and one half mls SW ST ANNA FLN to TEPIER FLN made no contact (.) additional patrol reported 15 japs five and one quarter mls south AITAPE (.) night 25/26 apr enemy counter attack (prob-same area) repulsed (.) 10 japs killed (.) 27 apr reported 2800 japs passed AITAPE 22 mar en route NEWAK (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) HOLLANDIA (.) 27 apr allied patrols reached TAMI strip (five mls east HUMBOLDT BAY) (.) patrols reconnoitering south shore SENTANI LAKE (.) only weak delaying enemy action HOLLANDIA area (.) enemy cas to 27 apr 274 killed 21 PW (.)

BORNEO (.) 12 apr following shelling by three warships japs landed BATO BATO (SW end TAWITAWI ISLAND off NE-tip BORNEO) (.)

airops (.)

allied (.) SOLOMONS (.) 28 apr eight A/C bombed MAMAGATA (.)

NEW BRITAIN (.) am 28 apr 30 A/C bombed airfield

VUNAKANAU (.) 24 A/C bombed VUNAPOPE and airfield RAPOPO (.) 11 A/C  
bombed KERAUAT (.)

NEW GUINEA (.) 27 and 28 apr 23 and 24 A/C respectively  
bombed strafed coastal area CAPE CROISILLES to CAPE GOURDON (.) 28 apr  
63 A/C bombed strafed coastal area CAPE GOURDON to HANSA BAY damaging  
MT CONDOR PT and pers sup areas EOGLA HARBOUR (.) am 28 apr 56 A/C bombed  
strafed areas WENAK (.) 28 apr six A/C bombed WENAK (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 271515Z seventeen A/C bombed WAKDE  
ISLAND (.) 280138Z twentyeight A/C bombed SARMI PT (.) 280138Z fortyseven  
A/C bombed strafed airfields WAKDE ISLAND and SAWAR (.) crews reported  
WAKDE ISLAND appeared deserted and badly battered (.) 280138Z fortysix  
A/C dropped 8000 fragmentation bombs on airfield MOKMER (south BIAK  
ISLAND) (.) destroying at least 15 grounded A/C (.) three of 10/12  
intercepting enemy Fs destroyed (.) 280312Z seven A/C bombed airfield  
JEPMAN (.) one of ten intercepting enemy Fs prob destroyed (.)

TIMOR (.) 282553Z twelve A/C bombed DILLI (.)

enemy (.) NEW GUINEA (.) night 27/28 apr one of three A/C attacking  
allied cargo vessel TADJI destroyed (.)  
sea (.)

DUTCH NEW GUINEA (.) 28 apr one small merchant vessel CAPE KORONGWAAB  
(15 mls WNW TANAMERAH BAY) (.) 15 barges IRIS BAY (five mls west TANAMERAH  
BAY) (.) one small merchant vessel four large barges VANDOEEMOEAR ISLAND  
(15 mls WNW WAKDE) (.) 11 barges between SARMI and ORAI RIVER (two mls  
SE SARMI) (.) 28 apr 20 barges along coast just west MOKMER (BIAK ISLAND)  
60/60 SE coast BIAK one PT boat DOSNEK (.) one 1500 ton merchant vessel  
three small vessels one large beached tpt 12 barges amongst islands off  
SE coast BIAK (.) 10/15 barges on mainland opposite east end JAPEN ISLAND  
271325Z  
(.)/one 400 ton vessel ten mls SE MANOKWARI course east (.) 290510Z one  
650 ton cargo vessel three mls east CAPE WIDAIN (.) 290230Z one lt cruiser  
one destroyer two large merchant vessels 85 mls NNE SORONG course east (.)  
290400Z one HOSHO TYPE 3500 ton carrier with many A/C on deck stationary  
five mls WSW SORONG (.) 280312Z two 500/1000 ton freighters JEPMAN  
ISLAND (.)

- 3 -

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (.) ref revsit 639 shipping DAVAO GULF area now reported 270100Z one prob lt cruiser four destroyers SONSORAL ISLANDS (.) am 26 apr four poss destroyers off IEAK (BASILAN ISLANDS) (.) 280300Z four escort vessels DAVAO GULF (two northbound two southbound) all infm

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
except by wireless.

TOC 301600K.  
THI

*W. J. M. K. Capt*

G.S.I.

HO FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 103

Compiled from information received from  
1200 hrs 18 Apr 44 to 1200 hrs 25 Apr 44

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary of Significant Events ... Page/s 3

PART I

SECTION 1 - OPERATIONS - NW SECTOR

LAND	...	...	...	"	4
SEA - Enemy	...	...	...	"	4-5
Air - Own	...	...	...	"	5-6
Enemy	...	...	...	"	6

SECTION 2 - OPERATIONS - OTHER FRONTS - SWFA

LAND	...	...	...	"	6-7
SEA - Own	...	...	...	"	7
Enemy	...	...	...	"	8
AIR - Own	...	...	...	"	8-9
Enemy	...	...	...	"	9

PART II

SECTION 1 - ORDER OF BATTLE

LAND	...	...	...	"	10
AIR	...	...	...	"	11

SECTION 4 - EQUIPMENT

Japanese "Type 93" Land Mine Fuse	...	"	11
New Type Japanese Barge	...	"	12
Japanese 7.7 (.303 in) "Type 92" Lewis Type LMG	...	"	12

SECTION 5 - TACTICS

Japanese Deductions from Allied Air Activity	"	12-13
Japanese Air Reconnaissance	"	14-16

SECTION 6 - SUPPLY

The Decline of Japanese Merchant Shipping	"	17-18
---	---	-------

SECTION 8 - GENERAL

The Decay of Japanese Morale	"	18-19
------------------------------	---	-------

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

Review of Situation and Potentialities HOLLANDIA -		
AITAPE Areas	...	" 20-22
Place names not commonly known	...	" 23

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

EURMA	...	"	23
ITALY	...	"	23
RUSSIA	...	"	24

OVER /

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

PART V

SECURITY

Security of Information ... Page/s 24-25

APPENDICES

- Appendix 'A' - Map of HOLLANDIA and AITAPE showing Allied Landings on 22 Apr 44.
- Appendix 'B' - Identifications and strengths at Japanese Bases in the NW Sector.
- Appendix 'C(i)' - Description of the Japanese 7.7 "Type 92" LEWIS TYPE LMG.
- Appendix 'C(ii)' - Photographic Reproductions of the Japanese 7.7 "Type 92" LEWIS TYPE LMG.