AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters, formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/3/5 ARMY

First Army General Staff (Intelligence) (First Army GS (Int))

November 1944

1/3/5-0321

WAR DIARY or ~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118.
(adapted.)

Unit REAR ECH FIRST AUST ARMY (GS(INT)) Date and Time.—From 1 NOV 44 To 30 NOV 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MAREEBA	1 Nov 44		Landops Revsit No 826 to 010030Z	1
	2 "		Lt A.G. PRIME marched out to assume appointment as IO	
			26 Aust Inf Bn.	
	2 "		Landops Revsit No 827 to 020015Z	2
	3 "		Landops Revsit No 828 to 030005Z	3
	4 "		Landops Revsit No 829 to 032315 Z	4
	5 "		Landops Revsit No 830 to 042330Z	5
	6 "		Landops Revsit No 831 to 060005Z	6
	7 "		Landops Revsit No 832 to 070005Z	7
	7 "		Capt G. KEANE admitted to Hospital - MALARIA.	
	8 "		Landops Revsit No 833 to 080005Z	8
	9 "		Landops Revsit No 834 to 090030Z	9
	10 "		Landops Revsit No 835 to 100005Z	10

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WAR DIARY or ~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit REAR ECH FIRST AUST ARMY GS(INT) Date and Time.—From 1 NOV 44 To 30 NOV 44.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MAREEBA	11 Nov 44		Lt M.N. POINTON returned from MERAUKE.	
	11 Nov 44		Landops Revsit No 836 to 110005Z	11
	12 "		Landops Revsit No 837 to 120005Z	12
	13 "		Landops Revsit No 838	13
	14 "		Landops Revsit No 839 to 140030Z	14
	15 "		Landops Revsit No 840 to 150030Z	15
			Capt G. KEANE returned from Hospital.	
	16 "		Landops Revsit No 841 to 160005Z	16
	17 "		Landops Revsit No 842 to 170030Z	17
	18, "		Landops Revsit No 843 to 180030Z	18
	19 "		Landops Revsit No 844 to 190030Z	19
	20 "		Landops Revsit No 845 to 200030Z	20
	21 "		Landops Revsit No 846 to 210030Z	21

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WAR DIARY or ~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118.
(adapted.)

Unit REAR ECH FIRST AUST ARMY GS(INT) Date and Time.—From 1 NOV 44 To 30 NOV 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MAREEBA	22 Nov 44		Landops Revsit No 847 to 220030Z	22
	23 "		Landops Revsit No 848 to 230030Z	23
			Lt M.N. POINTON visited CAIRNS on Security duty.	
	24 "		Landops Revsit No 849 to 240030Z	24
			Capt G.M. GUNN and Capt MORRISON 1 Aust Fd Censorship Coy	
			(CAIRNS Det) visited area.	
	25 "		Landops Revsit No 850 to 250030Z	25
	26 "		Landops Revsit No 851 to 260030Z	26
	27 "		Landops Revsit No 852 to 270030Z	27
	28 "		Landops Revsit No 853 to 280030Z	28
	29 "		Landops Revsit No 854 to 290030Z	29
	30 "		Landops Revsit No 855 to 300130Z	30

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LANDOPS REVAIT NO 826 TO C1C03DZ

LANDOPS

LEYTE ISLAND

NORTHERN SECTOR - CARIGARA BAY AREA
29 Oct heavy enemy attacks forced Allied detachments withdraw from CARIGARA to BANUGO. Allied forces driving from EAST coast captured CAVITE and JABO (four miles SW CAVITE). Other troops operating from PASTRANA occupied TINGIB four miles to SW.

SOUTHERN SECTOR
Our troops pushing NORTH from BURAUEN occupied southern half of DAGAMI but encountering strong resistance northern half of village on EAST coast upper heights CATMAN HILL taken but enemy believed hold eastern slopes. Further to SOUTH Allied troops are proceeding inland from ABUYOG along ABUYOG-BAY ROAD without meeting opposition.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW BRITAIN

27 Oct 54 aircraft bombed PRAND POINT. Photographs show 12 buildings and observation tower destroyed.

NEW GUINEA

31 Oct six Beauforts bombed BUT. Six Liberators bombed strafed BOIKEN PLANTATION. Six Mitchells bombed strafed SE KAIMIRU ISLAND.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

31 Oct 16 Kittyhawks bombed bivouac area WEST MOEMI runway. 12 Kittyhawks attacked waterfront targets BABO area.

CELEBES

Night 30/31 Oct 24 Liberators bombed MAKASSAR causing large explosions extensive fires waterfront and central town areas. Fires visible 100 miles.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

29 Oct carrier-based aircraft attacked LUZON area destroying 89 aircraft.

TRUK ISLANDS

28 Oct 14 Super-Fortresses bombed DUBLON ISLAND.

ENEMY

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

27/28 Oct total 50 aircraft attacked Allied naval units LEYTE GULF causing slight damage one vessel. 21 enemy aircraft destroyed.

S.E.A

BORNEO

29 Oct two cargo vessels off SIMADDEL ISLAND (NORTH BORNEO) attacked by aircraft resulting one sunk one damaged. 30 Oct one 500/1000 ton freighter 115 miles NE SANDAKAN left sinking by aircraft.

PALAWAN ISLAND

29 Oct three light cruisers one destroyer three gunboats off GREEN ISLAND BAY (NE PALAWAN) four transports three unspecified vessels one light cruiser JIBBOOM BAY (NW PALAWAN). Four medium freighters three submarine-chasers off SW tip PALAWAN. 30 Oct one destroyer two destroyer-escorts one transport two 1500/2500 ton stack-aft vessels off TAYTAY BAY (NE PALAWAN). Two heavy cruisers 75 miles off central WEST PALAWAN.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	29 Oct one heavy cruiser probably sunk one cruiser one tanker damaged MANILA BAY area by carrier-based aircraft.
SOUTH CHINA SEA	28 Oct 10 medium vessels numerous escorts left NAHA (OKINAWA ISLAND) course SW. One 9000/12,000 ton transport one destroyer 300 miles [illegible] BAY course NW by NORTH. 30 Oct 13 vessels (possible task force) 60 miles [illegible] course SW by EAST.

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LANDOPS REVSIT NO 827 TO 020015Z

LANDOPS

NEW GUINEA — 29 Oct natives killed 20 Japanese near HAMBIKI (50 miles WEST WEWAK).

LEYTE ISLAND — NORTHERN SECTOR: 29 Oct Allied troops maintaining contact with enemy at CARIGARA. 500/600 Japanese reported at BISORIA (approximately 1000 yards WEST CARIGARA). 30 Oct our forces advancing NW from JARO towards CARIGARA gained 1000 yards. Enemy tank reported this area.

SOUTHERN SECTOR: 30 Oct Allied attack on CATMON HILL continued, all except NW slopes now occupied. Mopping up proceeding against numerous caves where stubborn resistance being encountered.

DAGAMI AREA: Enemy forces northern portion of town surrounded and annihilated. Local enemy delaying actions vicinity DAGAMI and along axis our advance through LEYTE VALLEY. Enemy casualties to 30 Oct killed 7894.

AIROPS — No information received.

S E A

BORNEO — 31 Oct seven light cruisers or destroyers 40 miles NORTH BRUNEI BAY course NW by WEST.

PALAWAN ISLAND — 31 Oct four heavy cruisers three destroyers anchored BACUIT BAY (NW PALAWAN).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 31 Oct five light cruisers five destroyers four transports VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE course EAST.

SOUTH CHINA SEA — 31 Oct three escorts four freighter-transports four stack-aft vessels 140 miles SOUTH by WEST HONGKONG course SOUTH.

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LANDOPS REVSIT NO 828 TO 030005Z

LANDOPS

LEYTE ISLAND

ORMOC BAY
Reported 1000 Japanese disembarked ORMOC 25 or 26 Oct. 500 more reported landed WEST shore ORMOC BAY between 25 and 29 Oct. 31 Oct reported 2000 enemy CARIGARA area comprising fugitives from LEYTE VALLEY and new arrivals from ORMOC. 30 Oct advance from JARO towards CARIGARA opposed by estimated infantry company with three tanks. Artillery and signal elements identified fighting as infantry this area. By 31 Oct advance NW JARO had progressed four miles.

SOUTHERN SECTOR
30/31 Oct mopping up continued TANAUAN and DAGAMI area. No enemy contacted NW slopes CATMON HILL. 31 Oct 50 enemy contacted SANTA ANA LA PAZ area fled WEST to hills. 31 Oct patrols from ABUYOG reached point four miles WEST of town.
Enemy casualties to 31 Oct killed 9345 captured 93.

AIROPS - ALLIED

CERAM ISLAND

30 Oct 24 Mitchells 46 Lightnings bombed PIROE starting fires destroying buildings.

BORNEO

30 Oct 43 Lightnings attacked shipping and airfield SANDAKAN destroying 10/12 grounded aircraft.

PHILIPPINE ISLAND

30 Oct two groups Liberators bombed airfield BACOLOD (NW NEGROS ISLAND) destroying four grounded aircraft starting large fires.

ENEMY

PHILIPPINE ISLAND

1 Nov two heavy enemy attacks on Allied naval forces LEYTE causing some damage.

S E A

CELEBES

1 Nov photographs show two freighter-transports (one 3000 one 1000 tons) eight stack-aft vessels eight luggers MAKASSAR.

PALAWAN ISLAND

1 Nov two battleships three heavy cruisers eight destroyers 60 miles EAST by SOUTH, SOUTH tip PALAWAN course EAST by SOUTH.

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LANDOPS REVSIT NO 829 TO 032315Z

LANDOPS

LEYTE ISLAND — 2 Nov supported by heavy artillery advanced units reached outskirts CARIGARA. On EAST coast CATMON HILL clear of enemy. 1 Nov Allied advance WEST of DAGAMI held up by artillery mortar and machine gun fire from estimated 1000 Japanese. Same day patrol from ABUYOG reached BAY BAY on WEST coast.

AIROPS - ALLIED

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 1 Nov 40 Liberators bombed airfield and personnel area CEBU destroying eight grounded aircraft four buildings starting large fires. Liberators dropped 25 tons bombs on supply dumps DEL MONTE MINDANAO damaging several buildings starting large fires.

S E A

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 2 Nov one battleship, one heavy, three light cruisers, 3 destroyers VERDE ISLANDS PASSAGE between BATANGAS BAY and MARICABAN ISLANDS, three heavy cruisers SOUTH BATANGAS BAY. Two large merchant vessels, two light cruisers, three destroyers, seven landing barges NORTH ORMOC BAY. 1 Nov nine midget submarines CEBU TOWN. Three large vessels 16 miles SE NORTH tip CEBU ISLANDS course SOUTH.

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LANDORS REWAIT No 830 TO 042[illegible]

LANDORS

LEYTE ISLAND	2 Nov northern sector. Coordinated attack CARIGARA from JARO and BARUGO culminated complete occupation of town. Advancing west our troops reached point 1000 yards west CARIGARA River. Southern sector. Mopping up DAGAMI, SANTA FE. Attacks continued against enemy positions 2500 yards WEST DAGAMI. Patrols from BAYBAY reached point six miles south of town without contact. Reliable reports from native sources state as from 26 Oct heavy enemy barge traffic moving troops from LEYTE to CEBU. Daily average barges 10 sometimes 45.

AIRCRAFT - ALLIED

SOLOMONS	2 Nov 27 aircraft attacked opportunity targets BOUGAINVILLE.
NEW IRELAND	2 Nov 10 aircraft attacked plantation areas.
NEW BRITAIN	2 Nov 33 aircraft attacked GAZELLE PENINSULA Area.
NEW GUINEA	2 Nov 7 Beaufort bombed stores WEWAK. 3 Nov 9 Beaufort bombed stores BORAM Area.
CERAM ISLAND	1 Nov 50 Lightnings bombed runways OLD [illegible].
CHINESE	Night 2/3 Nov 23 Liberators bombed HANKOW starting many fires wharf area. Unknown number enemy fighters intercepted.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	1 Nov 14 Liberators 16 Lightnings bombed airfield and personnel areas ALICANTE (NW NEGROS ISLAND) destroying 24 grounded aircraft certain 10 probable. 3 of 15 intercepting enemy fighters destroyed. 10 Lightnings bombed airfield CAROLINA (NORTH NEGROS ISLAND) setting on fire 20 grounded aircraft.

NEWS

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	2 Nov 27 of 30/35 enemy raiding aircraft destroyed WEST TACLOBAN.

SEA

SEMI ARCHIPELAGO	1 Nov one 8000/10000 ton transport left smoking by Thunderbolts off JOLO ISLAND.
PALAWAN ISLAND	2 Nov 2 destroyer-escorts 2 freighter-transports 2 stack aft vessels 85 miles SOW LIBRO POINT course NE. 3 Nov 2 destroyers 2 destroyer-escorts 3 freighter-transports 2 tankers 8 miles north LIBRO POINT course NW. Ref REWAIT 828 report of naval force east by south SOUTH TIP PALAWAN now discounted.

-3-

[illegible]

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

2 Nov three 5000/6000 ton transports [illegible] BAY. One carrier one battleship or heavy cruiser 3 destroyers 200 miles [illegible] VIGAN ([illegible]) [illegible] SW by [illegible]. 2 Nov convoy of one or 2 battleships 4 heavy cruisers [illegible] destroyers 3 or 4 large cargo vessels central PHILIPPINES attacked by Liberators resulting one large cargo vessel sunk another possibly sunk.

Distributed by [illegible] 5 Nov 44 [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
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HD

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]: 4 Nov [redacted] troops captured one native ex-police sergeant and [redacted] only 5½ natives [redacted] remaining [redacted] (22 miles [redacted]).

[redacted]: 3 Nov [redacted] forces advancing [redacted] from [redacted] passed unopposed through CARLSON (1) [redacted] DE [redacted]. Situated [redacted] Japanese [redacted] two yards [redacted]. Other Allied elements reached [redacted] area (seven miles [redacted]). Allied [redacted] forces landed [redacted] encountering resistance from entrenched [redacted] Japanese [redacted] of town.

[redacted]: Attack on our [redacted] repulsed 175 enemy killed. Enemy casualties to 3 Nov [redacted] 1,075.

[redacted]

[redacted]: 3 Nov [redacted] aircraft carried out [redacted] targets [redacted].

[redacted]: 3 Nov [redacted] aircraft [redacted] a [redacted] strafing run [redacted].

[redacted]: 3 Nov [redacted] aircraft attacked [redacted] area.

[redacted]: 4 Nov [redacted] aircraft bombed [redacted] villages [redacted]. Seven [redacted] in the target [redacted] [redacted].

[redacted]: 4 Nov [redacted] Brigands to [redacted] area [redacted].

[redacted]: 3 Nov [redacted] Liberators to [redacted] Bidadari [redacted].

[redacted]: 2 Nov [redacted] Liberators [redacted] (1) miles [redacted]. 50 [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted] area [redacted] and [redacted] (all [redacted]), the [redacted] were [redacted]. 20 [redacted] were [redacted] [redacted] were [redacted] intercepted by [redacted] fighters flying [redacted] formation. [redacted] was [redacted] fighter destroyed. Later same day 14 fighters [redacted] encountered [redacted] number enemy fighters [redacted] destroying three. [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted] trying the [redacted], [redacted] fighters a strafing [redacted] column [redacted] military [redacted] until a [redacted] road [redacted] (two miles [redacted]), the [redacted] column destroyed [redacted] setting fire [redacted] another [redacted].

[redacted]: [redacted] 17 [redacted] to [redacted].

[redacted]

[redacted]: [redacted] aircraft made [redacted] [redacted]. Light [redacted] [redacted] continuous [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted] seven [redacted]. All [redacted] from low [redacted]. Hospitals [redacted] [redacted] to [redacted] [redacted] runway [redacted] [redacted] runway still serviceable.

B C A

FLORES ISLAND	5 Nov eight to ten small stack-aft vessels BIMA BAY
BORNEO	3 Nov one destroyer four small stack-aft vessels [illegible] BAY (NORTH BORNEO). 2 Nov two 5500/7000 ton freighter-transports two 300/1000 ton freighter SE HOG POINT (SE tip) course [illegible] by [illegible].
SULU ARCHIPELAGO	2 Nov two 4000/5000 ton freighters two 500/1000 ton stack-aft vessels off [illegible] ISLAND (TAWITAWI GROUP).
PALAWAN ISLAND	3 Nov three freighter-transports (one 5500/7000 two 2000/4500 tons) two 7000/10,000 ton tankers) destroyer two destroyer-escorts 23 miles [illegible] LINAPACAN STRAIT. 2 Nov four destroyers two 500/1000 ton stack-aft vessels CORON BAY (CALAMIAN GROUP) attacked by aircraft resulting one stack-aft vessel sunk other damaged.
[illegible]	3 Nov one large carrier one light cruiser two or three destroyers 100 miles [illegible] GULF. Cruiser one one destroyer reported sunk. 2 Nov fifteen 500/1000 ton stack-aft vessels [illegible] town.

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LANDOPS SUMMARY NO 832 TO 070057

LANDOPS

NEW BRITAIN — 4 Nov Australian troops landed unopposed JACQUINOT BAY. Report no enemy movement JACQUINOT BAY WATERFALL BAY areas.

LEYTE ISLAND — 3/4 Nov guerillas report 6000 enemy EAST of ORMOC. Another report apparently reliable states 2400 enemy arrived ORMOC 28 Oct. 4 Nov PINAMOPOAN captured and advance continued 500 yards SOUTH of town. Four 75mm guns captured. Our artillery engaging truck and light artillery ORMOC ROAD 8000 yards SOUTH CARIGARA BAY. Enemy artillery fire received by our forces four miles WEST PASTRANA.

SOUTHERN SECTOR: 4 Nov Allied forces attacked WEST against estimated battalion enemy in prepared positions exact location not stated. Enemy casualties to 4 Nov killed 12,554 captured 109.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW IRELAND — 4 Nov 83 aircraft attacked plantation area.

NEW BRITAIN — 6 Nov 23 Beauforts bombed enemy defensive position WATAVALO PLANTATION.

NEW GUINEA — 5 Nov six Beauforts bombed strafed SUAIN. Eight Liberators bombed strafed anti-aircraft positions WEWAK POINT. Six Bostons bombed strafed anti-aircraft positions MUSCHU ISLAND. 6 Nov seven Liberators bombed anti-aircraft positions MAW PLANTATION. 18 aircraft attacked enemy gardens and opportunity targets WEWAK area.

SOMBAWA ISLAND — 5 Nov 16 Liberators bombed BIMA.

HALMAHERA ISLANDS — 4 Nov 12 Mitchells bombed LOLOBATA RIVER area.

CELEBES — 4 Nov 11 Lightnings bombed runway GIDATE. 6 Nov six Liberators bombed POSSELAA.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 4 Nov 61 Liberators bombed airfield LABUG (CENTRAL EAST CEBU ISLAND) causing several large explosions destroying several buildings. Eight to ten intercepting enemy aircraft destroyed.

ENEMY

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — Night 4/5 Nov estimated total 17 aircraft harassed Allied positions TACLOBAN area causing some damage. One aircraft destroyed by anti-aircraft fire.

S E A

NEW GUINEA — 6 Nov one submarine two miles NORTH DUT airfield course NORTH.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 4 Nov one heavy two light cruisers three destroyers two freighters NORTH end VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE. One small two medium stack-aft vessels EAST MARICABAN ISLAND (VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE). One cruiser two destroyers VISAYAN SEA. Three transports three escorts five miles WEST SANTIAGO ISLAND (LINGAYEN GULF.

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LANDOPS SITSIT NO 833 TO 060005

LANDOPS

NEW GUINEA

ALTAPE
4 Nov patrols estimate 100 Japanese SOUTH. Contacts during day resulted nine Japanese killed two captured.

LEYTE ISLAND

5 Nov advance SOUTH along PINAMOPOAN-ORMOC ROAD continued supported by artillery. Leading elements reached point 500 yards EAST LILOH (two and one half miles SE PINAMOPOAN). Other troops moving SW alon JARO-ORMOC track to prevent enemy move overland towards ORMOC.

SOUTH N SECTOR
Enemy positions 2500 yards WEST DAGAMI continue offer stubborn resistance. Advance against enemy positions continuing of bunkers pillboxes progressed slowly. Our troops under heavy mortar and machine gun fire eliminating individual heavy weapon positions by flame throwers and grenades. Other forces moved to vicinity KATOK (three miles NW DAGAMI) astride DAGAMI-JARO track.

AIROPS - AAFSEA

HALMAHERA ISLANDS

5 Nov 29 Mitchells bombed runways MAOL MITI GALELA and HATETABAKO.

CELEBES

5 Nov seven Lightnings bombed bridges BOLANG BAY (NE CELEBES) destroying one bridge damaging two.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

5 Nov 25 Liberators escorted by 30 Thunderbolts bombed airfield BACOLOD. All bombs target area. Three of eight to ten intercepting enemy fighters destroyed. Carrier based aircraft attacked airfields installations and shipping LUZON area destroying at least 100 grounded aircraft, 63 in combat. 4 Nov 22 Liberators bombed airfield CEBU (vicinity CEBU TOWN). 20 Liberators bombed airfield ALICANTE destroying eight grounded aircraft.

S.W.A

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

5 Nov 25/30 cargo vessels one heavy one light cruiser three or four destroyers two transports MANILA BAY.

LUZON AREA
1 submarine chaser sunk one heavy cruiser left sinking one light cruiser at least three destroyers several cargo vessels damaged by carrier based aircraft.

SINGAPORE

5 Nov Super-Fortresses scored two 1000 pound bomb hits on battleship dry docked.

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LAND OPS

1 Wk Ending

7 Nov leading elements Allied troops contacted encountered enemy resistance 1500 yards [illegible] Villa Grande. No enemy artillery or tank activity evident 6 Nov. Our troops advanced 2000 yards SW [illegible] (five miles SW Anzio) without contact. 6/7 Nov enemy transport traffic [illegible] and bridges vicinity VELLETRI continually dive bombed strafed by Kittyhawks, many vehicles some tanks destroyed.

[illegible]
Advance [illegible] continued. Mopping up proceeding [illegible] (four miles N [illegible]) and [illegible] HILL area. Enemy force of unknown size engaged 10 miles NW Acuto.

[illegible]
Extensive patrolling [illegible] - no details. 4 Nov four enemy killed SOUTH [illegible]. Many casualties to 6 Nov killed 11,355.

AIR - [illegible]

[illegible]
7 Nov Kittyhawks bombed runways [illegible]. 16 Kittyhawks eight Lightnings bombed runways GALLA and [illegible].

[illegible]
7 Nov six Liberators bombed shipbuilding area [illegible]

[illegible]
6 Nov 24 Liberators bombed airfield [illegible] destroying several buildings starting fires which spread to grounded aircraft. 13 Liberators bombed airfield [illegible] destroying 13 grounded aircraft certain four probable starting large fires. 7 Nov 12 Marauders bombed [illegible] area (MUNICH [illegible]) destroying one grounded aircraft [illegible]. 25 Liberators bombed airfield [illegible]. Results unobserved due weather. One of 1/2/3 Intercept [illegible] enemy fighters destroyed. 13 Lightnings 13 Thunderbolts on [illegible] sweep destroyed 12 of 20 intercepting enemy fighters and one grounded aircraft. 1 Thunderbolt covering [illegible] over [illegible] destroyed a pair of 10/17 intercepting enemy fighters. 15 Thunderbolts on [illegible] sweep destroyed three certain two probable and five damaged enemy aircraft. 5/6 Nov per Reveill 031 enemy aircraft [illegible] inflicted by carrier aircraft [illegible] reported as 327 on ground, 113 in combat.

[illegible]

[illegible]
6 Nov five to 12 aircraft bombed airfield [illegible] Extensive ensuing fire damage.

[illegible]

[illegible]
7 Nov two light cruisers one destroyer [illegible] freight transport 15 unidentified vessels 70 miles [illegible]. Aa carrier three heavy cruisers 10 unidentified vessels 30 miles [illegible].

PALAWAN ISLAND	6 Nov one heavy one light cruiser one freighter-transport one large tanker off NW tip PALAWAN.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	6 Nov one tanker three freighters sunk one destroyer probably sunk two destroyers two destroyer escorts one trawler damaged LUZON area by carrier aircraft. Two heavy cruisers 17 miles NORTH CAPE BOLINAO (WEST LUZON). Three large freighter-transports two tankers NE coast BUSUANGA ISLAND (CALAMIAN GROUP) attacked by aircraft resulting one freighter-transport left burning sinking. 7 Nov 32 barges ORMOC BAY.
MALAYA	5 Nov B29 reconnaissance revealed 15/20 vessels including three battleships or heavy cruisers JOHORE STRAIT. Two heavy cruisers off SINGAPORE naval base many smaller naval vessels 58 small vessels general SINGAPORE area. Six tankers 50 miles NW PORT SWETTENHAM.

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LANDOPS REPORT NO 835 TO 100005Z

(10)

LANDOPS

BOUGAINVILLE	8 Nov Allied barge patrol to mouth TSINAMOTU RIVER (22 miles NO CAPE TOROKINA) report no enemy CAPE MOLTKE area.
LEYTE ISLAND	CARIGARA BAY AREA 7 Nov Allied troops attacking south along ORMOC ROAD gained high ground 2500 yards SOUTH PINAMOPOAN. Our heavy artillery continued place harassing fire VALENCIA-ORMOC ROAD. Continued heavy resistance met from prepared positions 3000 yards WEST DAGAMI many mines encountered. Reconnaissance from SE encountered 300/400 Japanese. By late afternoon 7 Nov 100 enemy killed. SOUTHERN SECTOR Allied patrols continued EAST and WEST coast PANGON ISLAND and SOGOD BAY area without contact.

AIROPS - ALLIED

SOLOMONS	7 Nov 29 Corsairs attacked opportunity targets BOUGAINVILLE.
NEW IRELAND	7 Nov 64 aircraft bombed airfield BORPOP and plantation areas KAVIENG.
NEW BRITAIN	7 Nov 26 Mitchells bombed airfield LAKUNAI starting three large fires. 42 aircraft attacked KABAGADA (five miles WEST RABAUL) destroying 15 buildings. 26 aircraft attacked opportunity targets GAZELLE PENINSULA.
NEW GUINEA	8 Nov eight Beauforts attacked opportunity targets WEWAK area.
KAI ISLANDS	8 Nov eight Mitchells attacked anti-aircraft positions
BOMBERAMA ISLAND	7 Nov 12 Liberators bombed RABA (six miles NE BIMA) starting fires.
HALMAHERA ISLANDS	7 Nov 27 Mitchells 12 Lightnings eight Thunderbolts bombed airfield KAOE. Eight Thunderbolts bombed runway MITI.
CELEBES	13 Lightnings strafed 20/25 bombers on runway MANDAI (SW CELEBES) destroying 17 certain four to five probable. Three intercepting enemy fighters destroyed.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	7 Nov four squadrons Liberators bombed airfields ALICANTE FABRICA destroying three grounded aircraft. Of 11 intercepting enemy fighters four destroyed certain two probable.

ENEMY

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	7 Nov five enemy fighters destroyed during two raids LEYTE area.

S E A

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	7 Nov one heavy cruiser three destroyers four small freighter transports many barges SAN FERNANDO. One light cruiser two destroyers one medium transport one/[illegible]-aft vessel off PANDAN POINT (WEST MINDORO ISLAND). 8 Nov seven destroyers two possible destroyers two large freighter transports one large transport VERDE ISLAND PASSAGE course EAST.

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(11)

LANDOPS REVSIT No 836 TO 110005Z NOV

NEW GUINEA

WEWAK AREA

8 Nov forward elements Australian Reconnaissance Force came under artillery fire from guns considered located ROCKY POINT (approx 48 miles NW WEWAK).

LEYTE ISLAND

CARIGARA BAY AREA

8 Nov allied troops continued their attack southward along PINAMOPOAN Road. Heavy resistance being encountered 3500 yards south of PINAMOPOAN. Other patrols from CARIGARA moved SW towards MOUNT PINA (6 miles SW CARIGARA and MOUNT MINORO (4 miles SW CARIGARA). Guerillas report 300 Japanese latter area.

DAGAMI AREA

Attack continued against enemy strong points west DAGAMI advancing 1200 yards against light opposition. 9 Nov our patrols contacted estimated 400 enemy 6000 yards west DAGAMI. Enemy resistance increasing this area.

SOUTHERN SECTOR

8 Nov enemy force strength not stated encountered MOUNT BATO area (10 miles NNW ABUYOG).
9 Nov air reconnaissance reveals ORMOC TOWN badly damaged by heavy artillery. Enemy casualties to 7 Nov killed 15324 captured 124.

AIROPS - ALLIED

SOLOMONS

8 Nov 82 aircraft bombed strafed BOUGAINVILLE area.

NEW IRELAND

8 Nov 57 aircraft attacked PLANTATION area.
8 Nov 19 Corsairs attacked GAZELLE PENINSULA area.

NEW GUINEA

9 Nov 15 Beauforts attacked WEWAK area.

CELEBES

7 Nov 32 Mitchells bombed airfields TANAMON MAPANGET and LANGOAN.

SEA

PALAWAN ISLAND

9 Nov task force comprising 4 battleships 3 heavy 3 light cruisers 3 destroyers 32 miles west of south tip BALABAC Island course NW by west.

PHILLIPINE ISLANDS

8 Nov 14 unidentified vessels with unknown number escorts 45 miles SW by west CAPE BOLINAO (WEST LUZON) course SSE. Unstated date 11 destroyers 4 destroyer-escorts six 6500/8500 freighter-transports 4 cargo vessels ORMOC BAY area

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LANDOPS REPORT No 837 TO 1200GZ NOV

LANDOPS

BOUGAINVILLE

9 Nov seven Japanese reported killed in two minor engagements SIBIVIK and upper LARUMA VALLEY.

NEW BRITAIN

OPEN BAY AREA

10 Nov native patrol engaged enemy party south KLIKI RIVER (HIAON BAY 8 miles west OPEN BAY.) Patrol reports enemy in strength.

NEW GUINEA

HUSEIA BAY

10 Nov strong patrols investigating native report of Japanese BOSNGUE area (15 miles west BARSA BAY).

ALTAPS AREA

9 Nov mast patrol vicinity SUAIN encountered hostile machine gun fire. After sharp encounter enemy fled. Two Japanese killed one captured.

MORATAI ISLAND

8 Nov unstated number enemy harassing allied positions with grenades and demolitions.

LEYTE ISLAND

9 Nov CARIGARA area. Enemy forces continue to offer stubborn resistance south PINAMOPOA. Other allied force reported reached CAMPOANGAN (6 miles SSE PINAMOPOAN).

DAGAMI AREA

Recce reveals enemy defensive line vicinity PATOK (3 miles NW DAGAMI). Flooded ground conditions precluded attack during day. Enemy casualties to 9 Nov killed 1553 captured 152. Sighting enemy shipping evidence probable completion of strong reinforcements LEYTE from destroyer and transport force between dusk 9 Nov and noon 10 Nov.

AIROPS

MANUS AREA

10 Nov 29 aircraft attacked antiaircraft positions stores LORAN area.

CORAM ISLAND

9 Nov 36 Bostons bombed PIROE starting many fires.

HALMAHERA ISLANDS

9 Nov 9 Mitchells attacked runway GALELA. 8 Nov 20 aircraft attacked airfields HATTABAKO and KAOE.

CELEBES

8 Nov. 8 Mitchells bombed airfield LANGGAM. 12 Lightngs strafed POMALAA area. 5 schooners set on fire.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

8 Nov 24 liberators bombed airfield ALICANTE well covering target area. 9 Nov 25 Liberators bombed airfield LIGANAN (MINDANAO) starting large fires building areas.

LANDOPS REVSIT No 837 TO 1200[illegible] NOV (Contd)

S E A

NORTH BORNEO	6 Nov photographs show 4 battleships one aircraft carrier 3 heavy 2 light cruisers four destroyers 7 other vessels BRUNEI BAY.
PHILLIPINE ISLANDS	10 Nov 2 possible cruisers 13 destroyers 20 to 25 troops carrying vessels stationary ORMOC BAY. One heavy 2 light cruisers 4 auxiliaries 110 miles ENE [illegible] ISLAND course NE all informed.

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OSCS File

LANDOPS REVSIT NO 836 TO 1300304

LANDOPS

NEW GUINEA	AITAPE AREA Ref Revsit 837 enemy casualties now reported one officer three ORs killed one captured.
LEYTE ISLAND	CARIGARA BAY 10 Nov stiff enemy opposition continues to Allied attempts move southward. 11 Nov Allied troops 4000 yards NW JARO encountering heavy enemy fire. Enemy concentrations reported MANDAAG-LINAO-COGON-DEPATAG all within four mile radius ORMOC. ORMOC reduced to ashes by our shelling. Enemy strong point encountered three miles SOUTH DAGAMI. 6 Nov estimated 30,000 enemy ORMOC. Enemy casualties to 10 Nov killed 15,748.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW GUINEA	11 Nov 26 aircraft attacked anti-aircraft positions stores huts WEWAK area. Targets well covered. 12 Nov six Beauforts attacked same area.
DUTCH NEW GUINEA	12 Nov 27 Kittyhawks bombed airfield UTAROE.
AMBON-CERAM	11 Nov 18 Kittyhawks in bombing strafing sweeps sank one loaded barge damaged two others GORONG ISLAND. Huts and fuel dump fired HAROEKOE.
HALMAHERA ISLANDS	9 Nov 16 aircraft attacked opportunity targets. Two enemy aircraft MITI airfield set on fire.
CELEBES	9 Nov 14 Mitchells bombed targets MANDANG area.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	10 Nov 22 Liberators 42 Mitchells 88 Lightnings attacked shipping and other targets. 11 Nov carrier based aircraft attacked shipping ORMOC BAY.

S E A

NEW BRITAIN	10 Nov enemy submarine sighted OPEBALAIE area. Submarine signalled towards HIXON BAY then departed NORTH.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	CALAMIAN GROUP 10 Nov one submarine two gunboats two other vessels CORON BAY. 10/11 Nov one heavy one light cruiser 11 destroyers three freighters off LEYTE ISLAND. All ships loaded with troops freighters carried landing barges. ORMOC BAY 10 Nov carrier aircraft attacked shipping entering Bay sinking two destroyers one destroyer escort four transports probably sinking three destroyers damaging one destroyer. Of enemy aircraft covering convoy 13 shot down two probable. Same day 22 Mitchells attacked shipping in Bay. Sunk or destroyed two transports two freighters three freighter transports one destroyer. Probably destroyed one freighter transport.
EAST CHINA SEA	11 Nov following shipping sighted by Super Fortress. One carrier three heavy cruisers six destroyers and large number unidentified vessels. Course not stated.

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LANDOPS REPORT No 839 TO 140050a

LANDOPS

NEW GUINEA — OPEN BAY
11 Nov patrol reports unknown number Japanese PANDI RIVER (HUON BAY).

LEYTE ISLAND — CARIGARA BAY
11 Nov allied attack SOUTH PINAMOPOAN continued encounter strong enemy opposition. Another allied force moving south reached point 2500 yards SW GAYAD (2 miles NW PINAMOPOAN) without encountering enemy resistance. 10 Nov contact made with unknown number Japanese 4500 yards NW JARO. 10/11 Nov advance to NW from position of GUINARONA (4 miles SOUTH DAGAMI) continued.

ORMOC AREA
Enemy 105 and 155 millimeter guns reported in vicinity. Enemy casualties to 11 Nov killed 16121 captured 154.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW GUINEA — 12 Nov 4 bostons bombed strafed bivouac area KUSCHU ISLAND. 13 Nov 9 beaufort bombed WEWAK Area.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA — 13 Nov 28 kittyhawks bombed strafed runways anti-aircraft positions UTARO.

BOEROE ISLAND — 11 Nov 8 mitchells 23 bostons bombed airfield township NAMLEA. Most bombs target area.

HALMAHERA ISLANDS — 11 Nov 13 lightnings bombed opportunity targets LOLOBATA area starting numerous fires.

CELEBES — 11 Nov 8 lightnings strafed runway KENDARI setting on fire one grounded aircraft. 17 liberators bombed PINRANG (100 miles NNE MAKASSAR).

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 11 Nov. 13 liberators 16 thunderbolts 15 lightnings bombed airfield DUMAGUETE (SE NEGROS ISLAND). 8 lightnings on sweep between CEBU NEGROS ISLANDS destroyed 8 certain 3 probable of 14/15 intercepting enemy aircraft. Ref result 835 grounded aircraft destroyed MAKASSAR (CELEBES) now reported as destroyed MATTHA MINDANAO.

AIR

NEW BRITAIN — Night 12/13 Nov one aircraft unsuccessfully bombed strafed allied positions CAPE HOSKINS.

SEA

CELEBES — 12 Nov photographs show 4 small stack-aft vessels totalling 1100 tons 5 similar vessels on slipways POLEWALI and 7 small stack-aft vessels totalling 1500 tons PAREPARE (both MAKASSAR GULF).

PALAWAN ISLANDS — 11 Nov. 4 cargo vessels 2 destroyers off EL CULION ISLAND (CALAMIAN GROUP). 4 merchant vessels PUERTO PRINCESSA.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

10 Nov. Additional report states one destroyer sunk one freighter transport damaged ORMOC BAY by further 8 mitchells. One destroyer sunk one cargo vessel received direct hit ORMOC BAY by 10 lightnings. 6 destroyers one cargo vessel NW PALOMPON (NW LEYTE ISLAND) attacked by 7 lightnings which left on fire one destroyer one cargo vessel. 11 Nov following convoys sighted LEYTE during day. 10/12 vessels 3 miles NW BILARAN ISLAND (NORTH LEYTE). 5 destroyers one 7000/9000 ton transport AURORA (NW LEYTE). 3/8 destroyers between ORMOC BAY and COMOTE ISLANDS. 4 naval vessels 2 transports numerous small coastal vessels 20/40 barges ORMOC BAY 12 Nov. 4 freighter-transports 2 small stack-oft vessels 3 submarine chasers 100 miles W S W MANILA. One aircraft carrier CEBU town.

FORMOSA

12 Nov 4 destroyers 2 large merchant vessels one tanker 120 miles S W FORMOSA. One merchant vessel left burning sinking.

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LANDOPS

NEW BRITAIN
GAZELLE PENINSULA

13 Nov reliable reports state at least 60 Japanese aircraft most which unserviceable hidden in rubber trees vicinity NE end TOBERA airfield. Mechanical work on aircraft being carried out.

Comment: 26 May natives reported 60 serviceable aircraft well camouflaged hidden beneath rubber trees vicinity TOBERA airfield. Unknown number aircraft hidden underground at unknown locality TOMA area (four miles SE VUNAKANAU airfield). Unknown number floatplanes hidden underground two miles SE KABAGADA POINT (WEST TALILI BAY).

Comment: 9 Nov three fighters which attacked MOMOTE retired towards RABAUL.

OPEN BAY AREA

15 Nov Allied patrol reports large numbers Japanese camped at mouth PANDI RIVER (HIXON BAY).

WIDE BAY AREA

9 Nov enemy patrol 30 strong reported KANAKDRAN (vicinity HENRY REID BAY).

NEW GUINEA
BOGADJIM AREA

Three Japanese killed one captured.

HANSA BAY AREA

Allied patrol reports believed large concentration enemy ANGORAM (34 miles WSW BROKEN WATER BAY) and BIEN (14 miles WEST BROKEN WATER BAY.) Japanese informed natives RAMU area of projected attack on BOGIA early Jan (.) 9 Nov Allied native patrol vicinity LANGETTI (50 miles SW HANSA BAY) attacked by estimated 50 Japanese armed rifles and light machine guns. Our patrols suffered some casualties. Native patrols report enemy patrols operating in area vicinity mouth RAMU RIVER.

LEYTE ISLAND
CARIGARA BAY AREA

12 Nov enemy pocket destroyed and high ground overlooking LINON captured. Further advance SOUTH strongly resisted. 13 Nov advancing from high ground NORTH LINON our troops gained 500 yards. 12 Nov wide envelopment from WEST reached point approximately 2000 yards SE AGAHANG (approximately four miles WSW PINAMOPOAN) without enemy contact. Allied troops moving SW from JARO met resistance on SE slopes MOUNT LAAO (seven miles SW JARO).

DAGAMI AREA

12 Nov enemy resistance reported broken, and enemy withdrawing WEST. 13 Nov WEST of GUINAROHA (three miles SOUTH DAGAMI). Following stiff engagements enemy withdrawing, our troops maintaining contact.

ORMOC AREA

13 Nov UNSTATED number Japanese landed DUMULAAN (13 miles NW BAY BAY) by barge but forced withdraw with casualties. WEST coast later reported clear of enemy from BAY BAY NORTH to BALOGO (15 miles NW BAY BAY).

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW GUINEA	14 Nov 25 aircraft bombed strafed buildings and barges LAKE KARAMANEO (60 miles SW WEWAK).
DUTCH NEW GUINEA	14 Nov 12 Kittyhawks bombed stores bivouac area DOOM ISLAND.
FLORES ISLAND	14 Nov 12 Mitchells bombed stores barracks areas EHDE (central SOUTH coast) causing many fires destroying one building.
CELEBES	14 Nov 34 Liberators bombed floatplane base MAKASSAR.
CEBU ISLAND	12 Nov Thunderbolts attacked LINAO (CEBU town area) starting fires destroying one building.

ENEMY

LEYTE ISLAND	Night 11/12 Nov four of at least 40 raiding aircraft TACLOBAN area destroyed by anti-aircraft fire. Five of unstated number of enemy aircraft destroyed during attack Allied shipping off LEYTE.

S E A

PALAWAN ISLAND	12 Nov one heavy cruiser two destroyers one tanker one transport BALABAK STRAIT course SOUTH. Four destroyers two large merchant vessels one tanker MEDUMURAN ISLAND (NE PALAWAN) attacked by aircraft resulting tanker one merchant vessel left burning.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	12 Nov one battleship one heavy cruiser 150 miles NW CAPE BOLINAO (WEST LUZON) course NE by NORTH.

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LANDOPS REPEAT NO 841 TO 160005Z

LANDOPS

NEW BRITAIN
OPEN BAY AREA — 14 Nov two enemy canoes attempting cross PANDI RIVER repulsed. One believed sunk.

LEYTE ISLAND — 13 Nov Allied troops further consolidated positions high ground 2000 yards SOUTH LIMON. Positions also consolidated MOUNT CABUNGANGAN (eight miles SW CARIGARA) where strong resistance met on southern slopes. Our troops occupied EAST slopes MOUNT BADIAN (six miles SW CARIGARA) without opposition. Strong Allied force advancing SW towards LAKE DANAO (nine miles SW JARO) reached line from BONGLAYON (six miles SW JARO) to point SE MOUNT ALTO (seven miles SSW JARO).

AIROPS - ALLIED

MAPIA ISLANDS — 13 Nov 71 Mitchells attacked PAGUM ISLAND.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 13 Nov 36 Liberators bombed airfield PANDICA (NORTH NEGROS ISLAND). 18 Mitchells bombed SAN ROQUE and ZAMBOANGA. Carrier aircraft attacked MANILA area destroying 38 aircraft in combat.

S P A

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 13 Nov estimated 11 cargo vessels and tankers sunk or left burning, two destroyers exploded, one light cruiser badly damaged, MANILA BAY by carrier aircraft. One light cruiser, seven destroyers, 18 medium, two large merchant vessels MANILA BAY prior carrier aircraft attack. 14 Nov 14 vessels including one cruiser 120 miles WEST VIGAN (WEST LUZON) course NNW. Further seven vessels 150 miles WSW VIGAN course SE. Three battleships 40 miles WEST CORON BAY (CALAMIAN GROUP).

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LANDOPS REWSIT NO 842 TO 1700302

LANDOPS

NEW GUINEA ADAPE AREA

14 Nov Australian patrol killed six Japanese wounded several others in area three to four miles SOUTH SUAIN. Another patrol to TOKE (six miles SOUTH YAKAMUL) 12 Nov killed eight Japanese.

MAPIA ISLAND

15 Nov Allied troops landed against slight opposition. Natives report 200 Japanese on PEGUN ISLAND and 40 on BRAS ISLAND.

LEYTE ISLAND

14 Nov consolidated HILL 1525 1600 yards SOUTH PINAMOPOAN continued. Slow progress made in advance against LEMON. Allied troops consolidating on line mouth CABUNGANGAN MOUNT CATAPARAN (five miles SOUTH PINAMOPOAN) patrols report large Japanese force to WEST and SW. Some resistance still being encountered 2000 yards SE MOUNT BADIAN at MOUNT CATAPARAN and 3500 yards SOUTH BALUD (one mile EAST CAPOCCAN). Enemy observation post reported one mile NW ALTO PEAK with 400 Japanese in vicinity.

DAGAMI AREA

Attack 4000 yards WEST DAGAMI continues several isolated enemy pockets still holding out. Guerillas contacted 250 Japanese WEST LAKE DANAO believed withdrawing to ORMOC.

SAMAR

Guerillas report Japanese in SOUTH SAMAR concentrating five miles NW BALANGIGIA (20 miles ESE TACLOBAN) and SAN JUAN (unlocated believed same area) no enemy remaining SW peninsula SAMAR.

AIROPS - ALLIED

SOLOMONS

13 Nov 69 aircraft attacked opportunity targets BOUGAINVILLE.

NEW IRELAND

13 Nov 13 aircraft attacked plantation area KAVIENG.

NEW BRITAIN

13 Nov 40 aircraft bombed enemy concentrations OPEN BAY area with good coverage. 68 aircraft attacked GAZELLE PENINSULA area destroying six buildings.

MAPIA ISLAND

14 Nov 51 Mitchells 23 Lightnings bombed strafed enemy positions installations PEGUN ISLAND starting numerous fires. Entire southern end island reported burnt out.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

No information received.

ENEMY

LEYTE ISLAND

Night 12/13 Nov 13 attacks on Allied positions and shipping causing some damage. Nine enemy aircraft destroyed. Enemy raids continued following night when three enemy aircraft destroyed.

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S.E.A.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 14 Nov five destroyers six unidentified vessels approaching ORMOC.

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LANDOPS REVSIT 843 TO 1800302 NOV

LANDOPS

NEW GUINEA

AITAPE AREA — 15 Nov AUSTRALIAN patrol operating SUAIN AREA killed 13 Japs probably killed 4.

HAPIA ISLAND — 15 Nov following initial Air bombardment enemy withdrew from strong defensive positions. NIL resistance during 15 Nov.

PEOUN ISLAND — Occupation completed 1820001 complete defensive positions located south tip of island. Approx 200 enemy PEOUN ISLAND evacuated to ERAS ISLAND prior to landing. 13 Japs encountered committed suicide.

LEYTE ISLAND — CARIGARA AREA
15 Nov contact maintained with unknown number enemy troops remaining MOUNT MIKORO MOUNT BADIAN AREA. 16 Nov fresh troops commenced attack south against LIMON and advanced to point 800 yards NORTH LIMON. West of LIMON our outflanking force last reported SE ACAHANS moved element east and established contact with other unit moving west now reported astride highway 2200 yards south LIMON. Advance of 300 yds made NW of MOUNT CATABRAN also against enemy pockets vicinity MOUNT MIKORO.

DAGAMI AREA — 15 Nov contact made with estimated two platoons enemy 1000 yds west KABAYAN (2 miles SW DAGAMI) and two platoons north MALABAGO (4 miles SE of DAGAMI)

CANOTES ISLAND — 15 Nov reliably reported 1000 Japs arrived CANOTES ISLAND by barge from PACIJAN ISLAND. Guerillas report barges arrived from CEBU and depart for ORMOC daily loaded with troops or supplies.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW GUINEA — 17 Nov 19 aircraft bombed bivouac areas and bridge HAPRIK WEST.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA — 16 Nov 16 Kittyhawks bombed strafed bivouac area UTARUM-KAIMANA.

PHILLIPINE ISLANDS — 14 Nov 81 aircraft bombed BACOLO airfield NW NEGROS ISLAND destroying two and damaging two enemy grounded aircraft starting large fires. 6 of 13 intercepting enemy fighters destroyed certain 3 probable. 34 aircraft bombed airfields LANUY ISLAND (SSE LUZON ISLAND) and OPON (east CEBU town). Incomplete report carrier aircraft attack LUZON 2 ships sunk 23 damaged 8 enemy aircraft destroyed in combat 30 on ground. 15 Nov 30 aircraft bombed airfields DALIAO and LICANAN (DAVAO GULF AREA). 16 Nov 22 aircraft bombed airfield SASA (DAVAO GULF) rendering runways unserviceable 18 aircraft bombed airfield LICINAAL rendering two runways unserviceable.

ENEMY

LEYTE ISLAND — Enemy aircraft losses from allied anti-aircraft fire up to 14 Nov were 77 destroyed 63 probably destroyed or damaged.

SEA

BORNEO — 15 Nov 18 unidentified vessels BRUNEI BAY. 16 Nov one light cruiser 2 destroyers SALABAK STRAIT course SSW.

PHILLIPINE ISLANDS — 15 Nov 2 transports 8 destroyers entering ORMOC BAY.

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LANDOPS RESULT NO 344 TO [illegible]

LANDOPS

NEW GUINEA
HANSA BAY AREA

17 Nov Australian patrol operating to TIMOHAKA (10 miles SSW HANSA BAY) returned PORE DAM and state natives report no Japanese seen for four months.

SOLOMONS

16 Nov patrol operating from SIBIVE (BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND) attacked and forced enemy party withdraw.

MAPIA ISLANDS

15/16 Nov Allied forces landed BRAS ISLAND established beachhead 400 yards inland advancing slowly against some resistance.

LEYTE ISLAND

CARIGARA AREA
15 Nov enemy attempted break through Allied road block 1500 yards SOUTH LIMON Three to four trucks captured on road WEST MOUNT CATARMAN. Attack by enemy patrol repulsed. Allied troops entered MINORO unopposed found many dead from artillery fire SOUTH MOUNT MINORO. 100 enemy killed by artillery fire MOUNT BADIAN 12 Out of 50 killed in repulsed charge.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW GUINEA

18 Nov 18 aircraft bombed strafed bivouac areas ANGOHAM SUT.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

20 Kittyhawks bombed Bivouac area airfield UTAROM starting fires 18 Nov.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

18 Nov final assessment results carrier aircraft attack MANILA BAY one cruiser four destroyers 11 cargo vessels and tankers sunk. 18 Nov 38 aircraft bombed airfield LACAPLOTO ([illegible] ISLAND). 28 aircraft bombed airfield [illegible] ISLAND. 11 aircraft bombed [illegible]. 22 Lightnings strafed installations DAVAO area.

BORNEO

18 Nov 39 aircraft bombed shipping BRUNEI BAY - five to six direct hits one battleship four hits heavy cruisers causing fires explosions.

S E A

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

18 Nov three small cargo vessels [illegible] BAY. One carrier one large merchant vessel one destroyer anchored 40 miles NNW SOUTH tip [illegible] ISLAND.

BORNEO

16 Nov photographs show nine warships including one battleship BRUNEI BAY.

Distributed by [illegible] on 19 Nov 44 [illegible]

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LANDOPS REVSIT NO 845 to 200030E

LANDOPS

SOLOMONS EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY	16 Nov patrol attacked estimated 30 Japanese inflicting casualties.
NEW GUINEA SEPIK RIVER AREA	18 Nov natives report 20 Japanese 10 miles SOUTH by WEST of ARAI.
AITAPE AREA	18 Nov three Japanese killed vicinity ALBU CREEK six miles SOUTH LUAIN two Japanese killed two probably killed two and one half miles WEST LUAIN. Own casualties nil. 18 Nov armed Japanese parties approximately five attempting cross DANMAP RIVER one mile SOUTH LUAIN driven back by our own patrols.
MAPIA ISLANDS	Initial landing BRAS ISLAND within 50 feet enemy armed with six machine guns. 13 enemy killed this position. 16 Nov southern third island occupied only snipers being encountered. 17 Nov contact made with strong point WEST coast. Now reported enemy strength during past three months did not exceed 175. During 16/17 Nov 42 enemy killed raising total to 55.
LEYTE ISLAND CARIGARA AREA	17 Nov Allied attack SOUTH of LIMON renewed two battalions abreast. Right flank reached within 300 yards LIMON. Late afternoon patrols reached outskirts on left flank determined enemy resistance encountered including heavy weapon fire temporarily pinning down advance. Allied outflanking force WEST LIMON unable contact our road block position 2200 yards SOUTH LIMON due enemy activity.
DAGAMI AREA	17 Nov enemy forces estimated 150 continued resistance 6000 yards WEST DAGAMI. Estimated 130 enemy killed in light counter attack repulsed three and one half miles NW BURAUEN. Advancing WEST GUINARONA (three miles SOUTH DAGAMI) Allied troops neutralised enemy defensive position killed 50/60 enemy.
WEST [illegible] AREA	16 Nov Allied advanced elements reached MALTIBOG. 17 Nov strong Allied force consolidated position PALANAS RIVER and our patrols crossed mountains to BAY BAY. Enemy casualties to 17 Nov killed 19,075 captured 168.

AIROPS - ALLIED

SOLOMONS BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND	18 Nov 23 aircraft bombed LESSIPIA (20 miles NNW CAPE TOROKINA) during ground support mission.
NEW IRELAND	18 Nov 16 aircraft bombed installations KAVIENG buildings destroyed three bridges hit. 13 aircraft bombed storage areas BALGAI.

NEW BRITAIN	18 Nov 29 aircraft bombed supply areas KURAKANUAL VUNAKANAU area. 18 aircraft bombed bivouac areas airfield TOBERA. 24 aircraft bombed strafed bivouac areas GAZELLE PENINSULA.
CELEBES	18 Nov 11 aircraft bombed shipyards POLEWALI (47 miles SSB KENDARI) starting fires.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	13/14 Nov fighters carrier aircraft attacked LUZON 84 aircraft destroyed one light cruiser four destroyers tankers nine cargo vessels sunk considerable damage installations. 16 Nov 40 aircraft attacked airfields DAVAO.

S E A

PHILIPPINE ISLAND	To 7 Nov eight stack-aft freighters one probable small tanker CEBU HARBOUR.
BORNEO	18 Nov aircraft attacked two battleships or heavy cruisers four destroyers four unidentified vessels BRUNEI BAY claiming direct hit one destroyer.

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LANDOPS REVSIT NO 846 TO 210030Z

LANDOPS

NEW BRITAIN OPEN BAY AREA	16 Nov reported enemy crossed lower PANDI RIVER in two boats capacity 25 each. Our patrol cut boats adrift.
NEW GUINEA ALTAPE AREA	18 Nov patrol fired on by LMGs from Jap observation post vicinity junction DANMAP-DANMUL RIVERS one Jap killed own casualties nil.
MAPIA ISLAND GROUP : MAPIA ISLAND	18 Nov occupation completed. 18 Nov FANILDO 19 Nov ASIA ISLAND occupied without resistance.
LEYTE ISLAND	CARIGARA AREA 18 Nov Allied right flank move on LIMON now within 600 yards consolidated awaiting arrival left flank still encountering stiff resistance. SOUTH LIMON Three enemy tanks penetrated or bypassed our road block and were turned back. Estimate enemy strength VALENCIA-MOUNT PINA 2/3000. DAGAMI AREA 18 Nov enemy made three attempts infiltration WEST DAGAMI.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW BRITAIN	16 Nov 62 aircraft bombed installations bivouac areas RABAUL-HICON BAY. 17 Nov 23 aircraft bombed bivouac areas barges NORTH KERAVIA BAY. 34 aircraft bombed storage bivouac areas installations RABAUL-TOBERA-RALUM. 19 Nov 23 aircraft bombed storage area TOBERA causing explosions. 20 aircraft bombed installations RALUM. 24 aircraft in sweep GAZELLE PENINSULA bombed installations trucks. 20 aircraft bombed airfield VUNAKANAU cratering runway.
NEW GUINEA	19 Nov 20 aircraft bombed bivouac areas ANGORAM-SUAIN starting fires. 20 Nov 17 aircraft bombed strafed stores bivouac areas ANGORAM NAMU.
MAPIA ISLAND GROUP	16 aircraft bombed FANILDO MIARIN ISLANDS 18 Nov.

CELEBES

19 Nov 18 aircraft bombed airfield DORO DORO (WEST of KENDARI) cratering runway. 20 Nov eight Beaufighters strafed and rocketed with 25 pound rockets bivouac supply areas airfield TAMALON.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

MINDANAO

17 Nov six aircraft bombed airfield BASA. 18 Nov 17 aircraft bombed airfield PADADA (36 miles SSW DAVAO). 19 Nov heavy bombers attacked airfield LIBBY.

LEYTE ISLAND

16 Nov 16 Thunderbolts bombed strafed barges installations ORMOC BAY. 17 Nov 14 aircraft bombed strafed installations ORMOC BAY. 19 Nov eight Thunderbolts bombed ORMOC jetty demolishing end leaving gaps in centre.

CAMOTES ISLANDS

18 Nov Thunderbolts attacked barge hideouts on reinforcement lines from CEBU during day also barracks installations PACIJAN ISLAND.

BORNEO

18 Nov 50 Liberators 59 Lightnings 47 Thunderbolts bombed strafed oil storage installations TARAKAN causing large fires explosions.

ENEMY

NEW BRITAIN

19 Nov weather reconnaissance plane reported 10 grounded aircraft two airborne one taxiing on runway VUNAKANAU airfield.

LEYTE ISLAND

16 Nov 10-14 enemy fighters attacked BURAUEN area at last light. Enemy planes bombed airfield SAN PABLO No.2 damaging runway. 18 Nov enemy aircraft attacked airfield TACLOBAN four grounded Lightnings communications buildings damaged. 19 Nov three enemy aircraft dived at shipping TACLOBAN no damage all landed in water.

S E A

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
LEYTE ISLAND

17 Nov two small cargo vessels more than 50 barges ORMOC BAY unstated number barges PALOMPON. 18 Nov 21 barges ORMOC BAY four PALOMPON. Two destroyers one freighter transport 35 miles WEST BAJAN POINT (WEST PALAWAN ISLAND). 17/18 Nov eight small stack-aft vessels 15 small craft one possible auxiliary carrier CEBU HARBOUR.

BORNEO	18 Nov four stack-aft freighters two destroyers BANGAU POINT (NORTH tip of NORTH BORNEO). Two battleships or heavy cruisers four destroyers 13 small freighter transports BRUNEI BAY.

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LANDOPS REVSIT NO 847 TO 2200302

LANDOPS

NEW BRITAIN
OPEN BAY AREA

Early AM 19 Nov 80/100 Japanese crossed PANDI RIVER approximately two miles from mouth and headed NW in two parties. Night 19/20 Nov signs more Japanese crossed river at mouth.

NEW GUINEA
AITAPE AREA

19 Nov Australian patrol killed seven Japanese in area two miles SW SUAIN. Three Japanese killed southern outskirts on LUAIN running from turning kunai result air strike. Suspected enemy field Headquarters observed by reconnaissance aircraft 10 miles south SUAIN.

ASIA ISLAND GROUP

19/20 Nov IGI MIARIN PANI ISLANDS occupied without opposition.

LEYTE
CARIGARA AREA

18/19 Nov Allies attacked LIMON from NORTH encountered continuous heavy resistance. Attempt to penetrate enemy flanks not successful. Two enemy attacks our positions 2000 yards SW LIMON repulsed.

DAGAMI AREA

19 Nov 75 enemy encountered NORTH KABAYAN, 12 killed. Further 25 killed general DAGAMI area.

PANAY ISLAND

19 Nov guerillas report capturing airfield near CAPIZ (NORTH coast).

AIROPS - ALLIED

SOLOMONS
BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND

20 Nov 18 aircraft on sweep strafed bivouac areas installations vehicles.

NEW IRELAND

20 Nov 18 aircraft bombed plantation areas KAVIENG-PANAPAI. 15 aircraft bombed BORPOP area.

NEW BRITAIN

20 Nov 45 aircraft bombed strafed PANDI-MORINDINDI RIVER (OPEN BAY area).

NEW GUINEA

20 Nov 11 aircraft bombed bridge WEST WEWAK damaged by one direct hit. 21 Nov 12 aircraft bombed strafed bivouac areas installations MAPRIK causing fires.

TIMOR	21 Nov eight Beaufighters rocketed strafed bivouac areas installations BAUCAU starting fires.
CELEBES	21 Nov 18 Liberators bombed strafed airfield AMBESIA (KENDARI area) starting fires.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS LUZON AREA	19 Nov carrier aircraft attacked airfields 100 grounded 10 airborne aircraft destroyed one tanker two large cargo vessels MANILA left burning. 22 Liberators bombed airfield ALICANTE (22 miles WEST FABRICA NEGROS ISLAND) three grounded aircraft destroyed 10/12 enemy aircraft intercepted.
LEYTE ISLAND	19 Nov seven Liberators bombed strafed jetty installations PALOMPON 10 buildings destroyed two to three luggers damaged.
BORNEO	19 Nov Liberators attacked shipping BALIKPAPAN BAY three direct hits one light cruiser causing explosion one possible light cruiser also hit.
ENEMY	
LEYTE ISLAND	18/19 Nov enemy aircraft over area several times causing some damage shipping. 19 Nov 24 enemy aircraft intercepted Allied aircraft over WEST LEYTE.
S E A	
DUTCH NEW GUINEA	15 Nov one submarine 65 miles ENE SARMI.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	19 Nov three freighter transports one stack-aft freighter two large cargo vessels one large tanker MANILA BAY.
BORNEO	17 Nov six warships MARUDU BAY.

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LANDOPS REVSIT NO 848 TO 230030Z

LANDOPS

NEW BRITAIN
OPEN BAY AREA

21 Nov Australian patrol reports 69 Japs with two LMG's in ULAMONA-JUMEA area. Our patrol encountered inflicting casualties without loss. Unknown number Japs arrived SULE (four miles NE ULAMONA). Patrol withdrawing to WEST bank river at CAPE KAOS (15 miles SE ULAMONA) attempting maintain contact.

NEW GUINEA
MADANG AREA

21 Nov two unarmed Japs captured in area.

AITAPE AREA

20 Nov four Japs killed general SUAIN area.

BIAK ISLAND

20 Nov natives killed 30 Japs since 10 Nov. Fighting vicinity WARSA resulted 25 Japs killed.

LEYTE
CARIGARA AREA

20 Nov our attack on LEMON made no progress. Force 60/70 Japs established road block across highway to EAST PINAMOPOAN. Our troops moved in strength SW from COLASAN POINT to mop up area PINAMOPOAN-CAPOCCAN-HILL 1525 LIMON. Right battalion reached point approximately 2500 yards SW COLASAN without enemy contact. On left resistance encountered 500 yards SW BOHIRI (one mile SOUTH by EAST COLASAN). Flanking force moving SW from CAPOCCAN reached outskirts PINAMITINAN (two and one half miles SW COLASAN). 21 Nov contact lost.

DAGAMI AREA

AM 20 Nov strong Allied reinforcements brought forward to overcome resistance vicinity MALAYAN. Enemy driven from position leaving 10 dead.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW GUINEA

22 Nov 26 Beauforts bombed bivouac areas BABI-BOA (10 miles WNW WEWAK) SUAIN-SAHIK (HANU area).

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

21 Nov 25 Kittyhawks bombed bivouac storage areas SORONG starting fuel fire.

PORTUGUESE TIMOR

22 Nov 22 Liberators bombed supply dump areas LAUTEM WEST.

CERAM

20 Nov 43 aircraft bombed airfields HARONKOH LIANG LAHA. 21 Nov 32 Liberators bombed airfields HARONKOH LAHA.

HALMAHERA ISLAND	20 Nov 16 Kittyhawks bombed installations bivouac storage areas airfields MITIOBA starting fires.
CELEBES	22 Nov 18 Liberators bombed nickel mine MANIANG ISLAND (EAST of POMELAA) target largely destroyed.
MAHADO	20 Nov 22 Lightnings carried out sweep SIDATE area.
PHILIPPINE ISLAND MINDANAO	21 Nov 16 Liberators bombed airfield MATINA. 24 Liberators bombed plantation area MALING (NORTH of DALIAO town) destroying anti-aircraft positions.

BURMA

NEW BRITAIN	21 Nov photographs show one aircraft moved out of grove EAST end of SULPHUR CREEK (LAKUNAI aerodrome) grove contains four or six other aircraft.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MINDANAO	21 Nov three enemy aircraft unsuccessfully bombed Allied convoy 180 miles ENE SANTA CRUZ.

S E A

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS NEGROS ISLAND	18 Nov 11 barges leaving ORMOC BAY. 19 Nov one tanker 15 miles SACCROT ISLAND. 20 Nov two destroyers two transports EAST MEGA (?) ISLAND (CALAMIAN GROUPS). 21 Nov two small stack aft vessels ILOILO BAY (SE PANAY ISLAND). One freighter transport one destroyer off BALACADE POINT (NE tip PANAY ISLAND). Four small stack aft vessels 17 miles SOUTH by EAST DUMURNG POINT (EAST MASBATE ISLAND). Two large cruisers entered MANILA BAY.
BORNEO	20 Nov one freighter transport EAST BALIKPAPAN BAY. Two small vessels several sailing vessels and barges CAPE SELATAN area.
PALAU ISLANDS	19 Nov one submarine 225 miles NORTH BABELTHUAP.
SOEMBA ISLAND	21 Nov one submarine 80 miles SSE WAINGAPOE.
FORMOSA	21 Nov two battleships two cruisers three destroyers 60 miles NE NORTH tip FORMOSA.

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LANDOPS REVSIT No 849 TO 2400302

ANDOPS

SOLOMONS — BOUGAINVILLE
20 Nov patrol reports no enemy CAPE MOLTKE - KURAIO MISSION - TSINAMATU Area.

NEW BRITAIN — WIDE BAY
20 Nov patrols to RILE IWAIGUNA report no enemy activity.

OPEN BAY
21 Nov reliable report enemy landed from 2 power barges SULE Area now in strength ULAMONA.

NEW GUINEA — AITAPE
Dawn 19 Nov japanese attacked and burnt YASAUR MISSION near TONG. 21 Nov. Australian patrol killed 5 japanese vicinity DANMAP RIVER MOUTH. Enemy casualties DANMAP Area 3 to 21 Nov both inclusive 71 killed 7 PW also 4 indians 1 chinese recovered. Enemy reported at SELEAUA (15 miles south by west SUAIN) TONG (20 miles SW SUAIN) and estimated 69 SAHIK (between TONG and SELEAUA). Reliable native reports japanese officers with bodyguard and considerable troops at junction DANMAP - ATOB RIVERS (SOUTH LUAIN). Enemy reported in area between DANMAP RIVER - ALBU CREEK NE WALUM.

LEYTE — CARIGARA AREA
21 Nov. Enemy road block EAST PINAMOPOAN broken up. Our forward unit 1000 yards SW TOLIBAW 2 miles SOUTH LIMON reported retired 2000 yards NNE. Later report states 500 enemy dug in ridge SW TOLIBAW. 22 Nov. Artillery fire placed on heavy enemy activity near KANANGA. Moving from positions at road block SOUTH LIMON allied party reached point 1200 yards NW hill 1525 but no contact made with our forces moving SW from COLASIAN POINT. Area south LIMON 7 artillery pieces observed two tanks in vicinity. Japanese located near COLASIAN POINT withdrew south leaving 30/40 dead. 21 Nov force moving SW from COLASIAN POINT toward line hill 1525 - LIMON reached line 1000 yards north. 22 Nov this force established contact with our forces NORTH LIMON.

DAGAMI AREA
21 Nov. Contact maintained with enemy parties 1 mile SOUTH KABAYAN. West coast guerillas report 100/120 enemy killed as result our air strike PALOMION 19 Nov. Total enemy casualties to 21 Nov killed 20259 captured 175.

AIROPS -ALLIED

SOLOMONS — BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND
22 Nov 12 aircraft on sweek strafed bivouac areas dropped leaflets.

NEW IRELAND — 22 Nov 16 aircraft bombed installations BORPOP - KAVIENG - YOUNG PLANTATION starting fires.

NEW BRITAIN — GAZELLE PENINSULA
22 Nov. 24 aircraft on sweep DUKE OF YORK ISLAND - CAPE ARCHWAY & WATOM - CAPE LAMBERT bombed bivouac areas barge points. 41 aircraft bombed barges KERAVIA BAY 1 barge sunk 3 barges 2 gunboats 1 cargo vessel damaged medium anti-aircraft position RALUANA POINT destroyed. 19 aircraft bombed airfield TOBERA. 47 aircraft bombed bivouac areas ULAMONA (WIDE BAY AREA) destroying village causing fires.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA — 17 Nov (delayed report) 19 mitchells bombed MAPIA ISLAND. 22 Nov. 24 Kittyhawks bombed east and north CAPE NOEMFOR (SORONG AREA) causing fires. 15 Kittyhawks bombed bivouac areas bridges JAKATI - MANSIKI - NOEMI (GEELVINK BAY AREA) starting fires.

PORTUGUESE TIMOR — 22 Nov correction result No [illegible] for 20 Liberators read 20 Mitchells bombed supply dump areas LAUTEM WEST.

CERAM ISLAND — 21 Nov 38 aircraft bombed bivouac areas airfield MALOEO.

HALMAHERA ISLAND — 23 Nov 23 Kittyhawks bombed strafed airfield HATEBABAKO LOLOBATA GALELA starting fire 8 Kittyhawks were lost.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — MINDANAO ISLAND
21 Nov 370 Liberators bombed airfield LUMBIA (MACAJALAR BAY - NORTH COAST). 22 Nov. 16 Liberators bombed airfield SAIA No 2. 8 Bostons bombed installations BUNAWAN HARBOUR (head of DAVAO GULF) causing large fire warehouse. 8 Beaufighters on sweep east and west DAVOA GULF attacked installations barges.

ENEMY

LEYTE ISLAND — Up to 20 Nov 164 enemy aircraft destroyed 157 probables by allied ground defenses.

SEA

CELEBES — 22 Nov numerous barges moored along coast north of BIRA SW tip GULF of BONE.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — 21 Nov. Reported midget submarine menace in and east of PHILIPPINES increasing. 1 submarine 10 miles SE CEBU.

MINDANAO ISLAND
22 Nov several oil barges off PAKAKAN (PAKIPUTAN STRAIT) 4 luggers PAKIPIKAN jetties (PAKIPUTAN STRAIT) 12 barges west side SAMAL ISLAND.

LEYTE ISLAND
21 Nov. 3 unidentified vessels rounding CALUMANGAN POINT into ORMOC BAY. 1 medium 5 small cargo vessels 3 patrol craft JINTOLOLO CHANNEL course SE. 22 Nov. 50/75 barges ORMOC BAY. 1 freighter transport 50 feet off ORMOC jetty. 1 destroyer in shallow water off BIASONG POINT.

NORTH LUZON
20 Nov 1 heavy cruiser 2 light cruisers 2 large transports 4 destroyers 1 freighter off DARIGAYOS POINT.

BORNEO
22 Nov. 2 destroyers 12 small freighter transports 80 miles SE MIRI. 2 light cruisers MAKASSAR STRAIT.

PALAU ISLANDS — 21 Nov 1 submarine 160 NE 1 submarine 370 miles NE PALAU ISLANDS.

WEST MARIANAS — 21 Nov 1 submarine 420 miles west of GUAM ISLAND.

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LANDOPS REVSIT No 850 to 250030A

LANDOPS

BOUGAINVILLE	Aerial reconnaissance PURLATA RIVER (SW Coast) revealed numerous fires and considerable activity from River mouth to HAICI 25 Nov.
NEW BRITAIN	JACQUINOT BAY [illegible] reliable report 2 unidentified aircraft heard to north and south JACQUINOT BAY anti-aircraft engaged no further report.
HOSKINS OPEN BAY AREA	22 Nov submarine sighted searching beach from 5 miles NE CULAGULATO CAPE [illegible] submerged at 05001. Ref Revsit 849 now reported submarine accompanied 2 power barges which landed SULE Area.
CARICARA AREA	22 Nov. 1800 hours attack south towards [illegible] renewed 1536 hours bridge 800 yards south [illegible] reached left flank attacking force two battalions pushing SW reached HILL 1525 made contact with strong enemy force western slopes hill. To east highway two following patrol activity contacts reported heavy resistance west side HILL 500 yards north MT CATABARAN. Patrol MT CATABARAN to hill 2548 made no contact. Patrol to [illegible] reports considerable activity large quantity equipment in town. Small group enemy driven back to south side highway two 1000 yards SW COLASIAN. Artillery mortar fire placed on ground force unknown strength one mile SW CAPOOCAN. Strong enemy force contacted east slope hill approximately 2000 yards east [illegible] (3 miles SOUTH COLASIAN) 50/60 enemy 200 yards north same hill.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW BRITAIN	23 Nov 12 Beauforts bombed [illegible] - [illegible] - [illegible] cloud and storms prevented bombing of [illegible].
CERAM ISLAND	22 Nov. 8 Kittyhawks bombed supply area [illegible]. 13 aircraft bombed airfield [illegible].
HALMAHERA ISLAND	24 Nov 20 Kittyhawks bombed airfields [illegible] - [illegible] - [illegible].
CELEBES	MANADO 21 Nov 18 Mitchells bombed airfields [illegible] [illegible].
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	MINDANAO 21 Nov 39 Liberators bombed airfield anti-aircraft positions MATINA. 23 Nov. 30 Liberators bombed airfields MATINA SASA.
NEGROS ISLAND	21 Nov 47 Thunderbolts on sweep over BACOLOD destroyed 3 intercepting enemy aircraft. 22 Nov 48 Liberators 17 Mitchells 23 Lightings fighter cover bombed airfield BACOLOD.

LEYTE ISLAND	21 Nov. 40 Thunderbolts 4 Lightnings bombed strafed barges installations supply dumps ORMOC HARBOUR - IPIL - DEPOSITO 15 barges left burning sinking or damaged ORMOC HARBOUR. 8 Kittyhawks 8 Lightnings bombed installations motor pool [illegible] (ORMOC BAY AREA.) Starting fires. 23 Nov. 8 Lightnings 15 Thunderbolts 8 Liberators bombed strafed installations barges jetty [illegible] - [illegible] to [illegible] - ORMOC 10/12 barges jetty damaged 3 storage buildings destroyed.
ENEMY	
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	LEYTE ISLAND 22 Nov 2 attempted enemy raids [illegible] AREA. Second raid by 15 enemy aircraft intercepted turned back. Enemy aircraft attacked allied warships.
[illegible] STRAIT	No damage.
SEA	
[illegible]	23 Nov 1 Submarine offshore [illegible] (OPEN BAY AREA).
CELEBES	22 Nov. 1 Freighter transport 9 small stack aft vessels 1 gunboat [illegible] HARBOUR. 2 cruisers 17 miles [illegible] ([illegible] AREA).
HALMAHERA ISLAND	24 Nov 10 Barges [illegible] BAY.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.	PALAWAN ISLAND 21 Nov 5 small stack aft vessels vicinity PUERTO PRINCESA. 22 Nov 1 large 4 small cargo vessels BALABAK STRAIT.
SOUTH LUZON	21 Nov. 2 heavy cruisers entering MANILA BAY from VERDE ISLAND passage. 2 large freighters off SW coast LUZON [illegible] Passage. 23 Nov 2 heavy cruisers off west coast TUBLAS ISLAND.
LEYTE ISLAND	21 Nov 1 small freighter 2 stack aft vessels 45 barges ORMOC HARBOUR. 23 Nov 2 small stack aft vessels 2 large luggers [illegible].
CAMOTES ISLANDS	21 Nov 2 small stack aft vessels off coast.
BORNEO	22 Nov. 1 freighter transport [illegible] BAY. 15 stack aft vessels 7 freighter transports 4 tankers 1 destroyer 3 miles NE [illegible]. 23 Nov 1 destroyer 28 other vessels [illegible].
SOUTH CHINA	
S E A	
SINGAPORE	20 Nov Photographs show 2 heavy cruisers 2 destroyers 2 destroyer escorts 2 patrol craft 1 minesweeper 2 transports 2 tankers 52 merchant vessels totalling 75[illegible] tons vessels in dry dock

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LANDOPS REPSIT NO. 851 to 260030Z

LANDOPS

BOUGAINVILLE — JABA RIVER. 23 Nov. Outpost reported intermittent automatic fire in vicinity. Early morning motor sounds heard similar to motor withdrawing seaward 2 parachute flares observed 1800 yards south river mouth.

NEW IRELAND — 20 Nov scout reported enemy occupied new position SELAPIUES.

NEW BRITAIN — WIDE BAY AREA. 22 Nov patrol PAMPUH-DAIKH reports no enemy seen 24 Nov patrol reports coastal area IMILIK-SAMPUN clear of enemy. JACQUINOT BAY. 23 Nov 82 enemy aircraft reported our recvsit 850 believed twin engined approached at 10000 feet no bombs dropped.

LEYTE ISLAND — CARIGARA AREA. 23 Nov. Allied forces south LIMON advanced slowly on enemys column highway to south LEYTE RIVER bridge . Two battalions allied left flank encountered heavy resistance hill 1525. Flanking unit 2000 yards NE TOLIBAN reported strong enemy counter attacks against PERIMETER repulsed assisted by artillery heavy enemy losses. No enemy reported PINAMPOAN-COLASIAN ROAD area North and NW PINAMPOAN. Heavy traffic both direction highway two during night 23/24 now outpost reports . Enemy tanks observed cross LEYTE RIVER bridge move east highway.

DAGAMI AREA. 23 Nov allied troops probing enemy defences lines 3 miles SW DAGAMI.

WEST COAST. 23 Nov patrols moving north along coast to BALOCO made no contacts.

AIROPS-ALLIED

NEW GUINEA — 25 Nov. 12 Beauforts bombed MANIBOA causing fires explosions village destroyed. 6 liberators bombed gun positions airfield BORAM.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA — 24 Nov. 4 Kittyhawks bombed strafed bivouac area JAKATI (GEELVINK Bay area). 3 Kittyhawks bombed airfield NOEMI (MANOKWARI Area).

BORNEO

KORORAI ISLAND — On evening 22 Nov 9 enemy aircraft approaching from SW bombed airfield PITOE destroying 15 damaging 29 grounded allied aircraft. 4 direct hits on north of the runway. 5 on taxiway. Allied casualties 3 killed 8 wounded. 1 enemy aircraft certain 1 probable destroyed by Allied anti-aircraft fire.

SEA

CELEBES — 23 Nov 6 medium freighters 10 small cargo vessels anchored SANDAKAN.

BORNEO — 23 Nov 29 vessels including 3 destroyers 4 large tankers. MIRI. 24 Nov. 1 large tanker 1 transport 1 freighter transport 7 stack aft freighters BRUNEI BAY. Simultaneous 23 vessels 60 miles SW BRUNEI BAY.

SOUTH CHINA SEA FORMOSA. 25 Nov 3 battleships 1 large carrier 7 small ships KIRUN HARBOUR all informed

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LANDOPS REVSIT NO 852 TO 270030Z

LANDOPS

BOUGAINVILLE	25 Nov patrols sighted Fresh Jap tracks 3000 yds NE ASITIVA (five miles SW SISIVE) pillbox sighted 4000 yds NE ASITIVA also located enemy position under construction same area. Last position engaged and destroyed by our 155 mm.
NEW BRITAIN WIDE BAY AREA	25 Nov reliable report no enemy movement south of IWAI.
OPEN BAY - CAPE HOSKINS AREA	23 Nov following Allied air strike ULAMONA now believed clear of enemy.
LEYTE CARIGARA AREA	LIMON captured 23 Nov resistance continued close vicinity. Successful counter battery fire our artillery destroyed one enemy battery damaged two.
DAGAMI AREA	Estimated enemy battalion reported approximately two miles EAST ALTO PEAK (11 miles WEST by NORTH DAGAMI). DAGAMI our artillery positions harassed by small parties sniping using grenades.
WEST COAST	Ground observation reported estimated reinforced enemy company in position 7000 yards EAST SE ALBUERA. Enemy casualties to 24 Nov killed 21,006 captured 175.

AIROPS - ALLIED

BOUGAINVILLE	24 Nov 18 aircraft on strafing sweep destroyed one barge damaged two small boats.
BUKA ISLAND	24 Nov 31 aircraft bombed installations HAWELA causing explosion.
NEW IRELAND	24 Nov eight aircraft bombed supply area BALGAI. 16 aircraft bombed bivouac areas KAVIENG. 25 aircraft bombed plantation area KATU (20 miles SE PANAPAI).
NEW BRITAIN	24 Nov 14 aircraft on sweep GAZELLE PENINSULA destroyed six buildings killed five Japanese. 16 aircraft on patrol RABAUL destroyed eight buildings cratered road. 25 Nov 18 aircraft bombed plantation area TOBERA.
DUTCH NEW GUINEA	SORONG AREA: 25 Nov 12 aircraft bombed area CAPE NOEJEW starting fires.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS NEGROS ISLAND	25 Nov 20 Liberators attacked airfield BACOLOD.
MINDANAO	24 Nov 29 aircraft bombed installations airfield MATINA.
MASBATE ISLAND	24 Nov 14 Thunderbolts bombed installations bivouac supply areas MASBATE. 11 Kittyhawks attacked four vessels NE MASBATE including two freighter transports 500-8500 tons both latter carrying troops all vessels left burning sinking.
LEYTE ISLAND	24 Nov eight Kittyhawks bombed strafed installations bivouac supply areas VALENCIA. Eight Liberators bombed warehouses jetty PUERTO BELLO. 41 definite two probable enemy aircraft destroyed during day.

JAPAN TOKYO	24 Nov 98 Super-Fortresses attacked wharf town areas aircraft plants two of our planes lost.
[redacted]	
LEYTE ISLAND	24/25 Nov several small enemy air raids.
S E A	
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	Night 24/25 Nov two cruisers three destroyers three larger tankers SANTA CRUZ (WEST coast LUZON). 24 Nov 16 freighters over 500 tons each CEBU HARBOUR.
BORNEO	24 Nov six warships 35 merchant vessels MIRI-BRUNEI BAY area.

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[redacted]

LANDOPS

BOUGAINVILLE — 25 Nov mortar fire placed on enemy pillboxes 4000 yards NE ASITIVA hit observed.

NEW BRITAIN
CAPE HOSKINS AREA — 26 Nov patrol reports no enemy in area two miles NE CAPE KOAS.

NEW GUINEA
MADANG-HANSA BAY AREA — Unconfirmed natives report states one, 21 Nov Japanese patrol three officers, 10 OR's armed one LMG at MATOK (two miles SOUTH SEPIK RIVER mouth) also further patrol two officers 10 OR's MATOK 24 Nov. Both patrols poor condition seeking food. Two - 24 Nov 20 Japanese MARANGAS (eight miles SE MATOK) proceeding BOSMAN (10 miles SOUTH SEPIK RIVER mouth) where natives instructed erect hut for Japanese. Enemy observation post armed LMG WEST bank of RAMU RIVER. 25 Nov Australian patrol departed SANGAN (six miles WEST by SOUTH MAGIA) for BOSMAN.

AITAPE AREA — 26 Nov our troops at YASUR MISSION (previously destroyed) and enemy foraging in area.

AIROPS - ALLIED

DUTCH NEW GUINEA
SORONG AREA — 27 Nov 12 aircraft bombed area CAPE MOSJEW.

HALMAHERA ISLAND — 24 Nov eight Kittyhawks attacked bivouac supply area WACE causing fires.

CERAM — 25 Nov 31 Mitchells 10 Lightnings bombed supply bivouac areas airfields KAIRATOE-OLD NAMLEA and town area CERAM MARECUR starting fires.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS — NEGROS ISLAND: 24 Nov 47 Liberators 27 Thunderbolts with fighter cover bombed airfield ALICANTE one twin-engine grounded aircraft destroyed four twin-engine three single-engine grounded aircraft damaged eight intercepting enemy aircraft destroyed one damaged. 11 Thunderbolts on sweep strafed nine to 10 grounded aircraft airfield LA CARLOTA. 25 Nov 25 Liberators 17 Lightnings fighter cover bombed airfields FABRICA SILAI TALISAY. One twin one single engine grounded aircraft destroyed airfield FABRICA. Of 13 intercepting enemy aircraft three certain four probable destroyed one damaged. 27 Thunderbolts on sweep destroyed six certain three probable damaged one grounded aircraft.

CEBU — 25 Nov 23 Liberators bombed airfield LAHUG two grounded aircraft destroyed.

NAVAL

MOROTAI ISLAND — 24 Nov four twin engine enemy aircraft bombed strafed airfield PITOE. One aircraft observed crash in water three miles off shore Lightning claimed one probable destroyed.

LAND SEA AIR INFORMATION PHILIPPINES NW AREA TEMPORARILY DELAYED. WILL BE INCLUDED LATER REVSIT..

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LANDOPS REVSIT NO 854 TO 290030Z

LANDOPS

NEW GUINEA
AITAPE

26 Nov Australian patrols active DANUAP RIVER mouth area no report received.

AIROPS - ALLIED

NEW BRITAIN

26 Nov 15 aircraft on sweep GAZELLE PENINSULA destroyed five buildings. 24 aircraft on sweep RABAUL area destroyed oil storage dump KERAVIA BAY. Nine Beauforts bombed installations storage area PARKINSON POINT-TOBERA RALUM. 27 Nov seven Beauforts bombed storage supply areas starting two large several small fires.

NEW GUINEA

26 Nov five Beauforts bombed bivouac areas SUAIN. 27 Nov six Beauforts bombed bivouac areas IKAM CREEK (3 and one half miles SE SUAIN). Five Beauforts bombed airfield BUT. 28 Nov 13 Beauforts bombed bivouac storage area BUT WEST.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

27 Nov 24 Kittyhawks bombed CAPE NOEJEN Area. 28 Nov eight Kittyhawks bombed bivouac areas airfield UTAROM.

HALMAHERA ISLAND

28 Nov 12 Kittyhawks on sweep bombed airfield LOLOBATA.

PORTUGUESE TIMOR

27 Nov four Mitchells seven Spitfires bombed bivouac area radar installations CAPE LORE causing fires.

CERAM

24 Nov 12 aircraft bombed airfield LIANG. 33 Liberators bombed airfield LAHA. 26 Nov 24 Mitchells bombed airfields KAIRATOE HAROEKOE and seaplane base HALONG.

CELEBES

26 Nov nine Mitchells bombed airfield LANGOAN. 27 Nov 11 Liberators bombed bivouac areas airfield KENDARI cratering runway causing large explosion. 12 Liberators bombed airfield BORO BORO cratering runway.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
NEGROS ISLAND

26 Nov 21 Liberators with 16 Thunderbolts as cover bombed airfield LA CARLOTA one twin engine grounded two airborne aircraft destroyed. 22 Liberators with 17 Lightnings as cover bombed airfield TALISAY five enemy aircraft over BACOLOD sighted but did not intercept due our fighter escort.

MINDANAO

24 Nov 16 Liberators bombed airfield SASA starting fires destroying two grounded aircraft. 26 Nov 16 Liberators bombed airfield MATINA starting fire rendering runway unserviceable. 27 Nov 15 Liberators bombed airfield DALIAO one of four to six intercepting enemy aircraft damaged.

LEYTE ISLAND

24 Nov 61 Liberators bombed anti-aircraft positions CAPE DONES-PANALIAN POINT.

ENEMY

NEW BRITAIN	27 Nov Literator returning from RABAUL followed to CAPE ARCHWAY by four aircraft thought Zekes, no attempt interceptions.

S E A

NEW IRELAND	25 Nov submarine reported 135 miles NORTH by EAST KAVIENG.
NEW BRITAIN RABAUL	27 Nov photographs show 45 serviceable barges (50-125 feet) in SIMPSON HARBOUR.
NEW GUINEA MILNE BAY AREA	28 Nov two submarines sighted 77 miles ENE WOODLARK ISLAND course NNE.
CELEBES	21 Nov late report 50 vessels probably all stack aft vessels 300-1000 tons sighted MAKASSAR HARBOUR and vicinity. 27 Nov many small vessels including barges at RAHA (NE coast MOENA ISLAND-KENDARI area).
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. MASBATE ISLAND	24 Nov one freighter transport (5500/7000 tons) one transport (7/8500 tons) one cargo vessel at PORT CATAINGAN (SE coast MASBATE).

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LANDOPS REVIEW SITUATION 855 TO 300130Z

LANDOPS

BOUGAINVILLE	28 Nov Australian Patrol report no enemy RETSIAPAIA (2 miles SOUTH by EAST SISIVE) area.
NEW BRITAIN WIDE BAY	27 Nov patrol reports no enemy movement SOUTH MILIN (1/2 miles NE KEIP) HOSKINS area. 25 Nov enemy reported to have arrived area 6 miles EAST by SOUTH GULAGULA on route MATAGOGAI (on coast 5 miles NE GULAGULA). Native patrol from CAPE OAS reports large number enemy tracks 2 days old METAGOGAI area. 2 tracks METIGOGAI to coast 2 miles SW GULAGULA. All tracks return along beach direction ULAMONA.
NEW GUINEA MADANG AREA	28 Nov 4 Japanese captured BONGOU area.
HANSA BAY AREA	27 Nov our patrol SANGAN to BOSMAN on return report no enemy sighted (see revsit 853).
AIROPS ADVANCED NEW GUINEA	29 Nov. 6 bostons bombed strafed dump area EAST of FAIRIEU VILLAGE (FAIRIEU ISLAND). 6 liberators bombed anti-aircraft positions [illegible].
DUTCH TIMOR	29 Nov 4 mitchells bombed strafed 1 small stack AFT vessel (3[illegible] tons) between CAPE MAS and CAPE [illegible] (EAST COAST TIMOR) vessel left sinking approximately 50 personnel jumped overboard many killed by strafing.
CELEBES	28 Nov 1 liberator bombed airfields [illegible] BORO BORO also dropped propaganda leaflets. 29 Nov 11 liberators bombed airfield [illegible] cratering runway causing large explosion.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS [illegible]	28 Nov 27 liberators bombed airfields MALIAO MATINA destroying 5 grounded enemy aircraft DALIAO, causing fires explosions.
SIBAGO ISLANDS	(vicinity ZAMBOANGA. 28 Nov 2 Beaufighters on 900 mile round trip strafed buildings radar installations SIBAGO ISLAND destroying installations damaging lighthouse.
LEYTE ISLAND	27 Nov 4 thunderbolts bombed jetty installations PALOMPON. 4 kittyhawks in support allied

ground forces strafed communications installations stores horse transport pool DAGAMI area. 28 Nov 4 kittyhawks effectively strafed 4 stack aft freighters (300-1000 tons) unloading troops LOMBON (PALOMPON area) and 3 similar vessels Palompon.

ENEMY
LEYTE ISLAND

Night 27/28 Nov. 12 enemy aircraft attacked airfield TACLOBAN. 1 ventura destroyed 3 kittyhawks badly disabled 2 transport planes. Damaged. Naval antiaircraft fire destroyed 1 enemy aircraft.

SEA
NEW GUINEA
TEMAR

29 Nov 10 barges sighted MUSCHU ISLAND 2 barges MAIRIRU ISLAND 1 barge BORAM

CELEBES

29 Nov several barges sighted around TOMBA ISLAND (in TOBIANGHESI ISLANDS SE of BOETONG ISLAND) All informed

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WAR DIARY

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY

Month NOV
Year 1944
Branch GS(INT)

Place	Date	Summary of Events	Ref to Appendices	Comments
LAE	1 Nov	Capt MOTT I(t) returned to HQ FAA by air from MADANG and AITAPE. Target information HENRY REID BAY.		
	2 "	Capt CAMERON 4 AL Comd Section visited GS(Int) requested lecture data concerning Japanese camouflage, for the purpose of lecturing pilots attacking targets RABAUL AITAPE area. Data supplied. First Aust Army Weekly Int Summary No: 128		
	3 "	Nil		
	4 "	Nil		
	5 "	I(a) Section occupied new building.		
	6 "	Maj HANCOCK SRD " TRAVERS (2 Corps) visited GS Int HQ FAA		
	7 "			
	8 "			
	9 "	First Aust Army Weekly Int Summary No: 129		
	10 "	Target Infm KAIRIRU IS. Int Review of Enemy Situation.		
	11 "	WEWAK-AITAPE area		
	12 "			
	13 "	F/Lt FYFE left HQ by air for GLOUCESTER, SAIDOR, MADANG & FINSCHHAFEN		
	14 "	Nil		
	15 "	Col BOYLE, personal representative of C in C, visited I(a) HQ FAA. Arrangements made to supply information as requested. Maj THOMAS left by air for BOUGAINVILLE under instruction BGS HQ FAA object secure information relative to enemy strengths.		
	16 "	Col COSGROVE, Canadian Military Attache to Australia, visited I(a) HQ FAA.		

SECRET

WAR DIARY

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY

Month NOV

Year 1944

Branch GS(INT)

Place	Date	Summary of Events	Ref to Appendices	Comments
LAE	16 Nov	Major THOMAS returned to HQ FAA from BOUGAINVILLE.		
	17 "	First Aust Army Weekly Int Summary No: 130 Major THOMAS evacuated to 2/7 AGH. Capt MOULDEN 6 AUST DIV visited I(a) HQ FAA latest information WEWAK, AITAPE area supplied. Capt MOTT (It) visited 1 bn NG Force in order to secure latest Topographical Information of NEW BRITAIN.		
	18 "	F/Lt FYFE returned to HQ First Aust Army by air		
	19 "	Maj THOMAS returned from 2/7 AGH Captured Japanese Sketch Map of GAZELLE Penin. Central NEW BRITAIN.		
	20 "	Col SHAVE held conference of ICs from I(x), I(a), I(t) and I(b/c) in I(a) building. Capt THOMPSON left for HOLLANDIA to take up appointment as GIII (I) Adv LHQ.		
	21 "	Nil		
	22 "	Capt MOTT I(t) departed by air for JACQUINOT BAY		
	23 "	Nil First Aust Army Weekly Int Summary No: 131		
	24 "	Maj MacLEOD departed by air for Landops. Maj-Gen WADSWORTH, British Imperial Forces visited GS(Int) HQ First Aust Army		
	25 "	Nil		
	26 "	Nil		
	27 "	Lt GILBERT evacuated to 2/7 AGH. Capt BULL carrying out Lt GILBERT's duties.		
	28 "	Nil		
	29 "	Nil		
	30 "	Nil First Aust Army Weekly Int Summery No: 132		

H Thomas Lt Col
GS First Aust Army

WAR DIARY

RESTRICTED

HQ First Aust Army (AIF)
19 Nov 44
G/6832/Int

Subject:- CAPTURED JAPANESE SKETCH MAP OF GAZELLE PENINSULA

(Ref Maps : GAZELLE PENINSULA, CENTRAL NEW BRITAIN, 4 miles to 1 inch)

5 AUST DIV	6
ANGAU	1
AIB.	4
FEIO	1
adv LHQ	(2)

1. Sunprint of a Japanese sketch map is attached as Appendix 'B'. The captured map was in the form of a pencil sketch with red markings and covered GAZELLE PENINSULA and the NW coast of NEW BRITAIN as far as GOHU ((X)K 5516).

2. An exact tracing was made of the original map and ATIS translated the Japanese characters on the tracing.

3. An analysis of the map reveals the following:-

(a) The map is very roughly to a scale 1/44,000 and any points scaled are approximate only.

(b) A track is indicated from TILINIO (Y)F 5568 to TORIU.

(c) A track is indicated from OPEN BAY at Y(F) 1753 west through the saddle south of NORTH SON MOUNTAIN to SULE and ULAMONA.

(d) The TORIU-MALABUNGA track is shown with several place names.

(e) Numerous place names are shown and many of these are Japanese substitutes for, or corruption of, the English names, while others are not shown on Allied maps.

A separate analysis of the place names is attached as Appendix 'A'.

(f) Sea lanes, with times, are shown between RABAUL and GOHU. The times probably refer to barge traffic.

4. All information shown in red on the original map has been lined with red on the attached prints.

N A Barnes Capt
for Brig
GS First Aust Army

APPENDIX 'A'
To Report on Captured
Japanese Map of
GAZELLE PENINSULA

PLACE NAMES & PROBABLE LOCATIONS

(Ref maps GAZELLE PENINSULA and
CENTRAL NEW BRITAIN
4 miles to 1 inch)

EAST COAST

1. KANBUBU - Scales INDUNA PLANTATION area but is most likely at or near the mouth of the KANBUBU RIVER at MATAIA (Y)G 0596.

2. MONKUO - Scales in vicinity of TALILIS PLANTATION (Y)G 0690.

3. ARU - Scales approx at village (Y)G 0473, but could refer to SUMSUM.

4. ATORA - Scales vicinity of village (Y)G 0066; could refer to this village or ADLER BAY (ADLER and ATORA (ADOLA) appear Allied. ATIS say that the inference is more than reasonable).

5. IRIKI - Scales vicinity of village (Y)F 9863.

6. KURUMUKA - Scales vicinity of village (Y)F 9457.

7. MANIMETTO RIVER - MANIMET RIVER (Y)F 8651. Name not on strat map but shown in Terrain Study 74.

8. WAHAMTEKE RIVER - UHAHATIKI RIVER (Y)F 7649. Name not on strat map but shown in Terrain Study 74.

9. HAIRUKOPPU RIVER - BULUS RIVER (Y)F 6552.

10. URUGUTTO RIVER - WAITAVALO RIVER (Y)F 6252

NORTH and WEST COAST

11. TAURA - Probably road terminus (Y)A 7738 near RAVALUE.

12. AKAMO PT - Probably KABAGADA PT (Y)A 7337

13. WEST PT - CAPE LIGHAN or point to NW (Y)A 5936

14. BOROROM - Scales approx (Y)A 1413 and possibly refers to MATIU PT.

15. RUI RIVER - Thought to refer to SENGA RIVER (Y)F 3778.

16. BAIERU PT - Scales (Y)F 2673 and possibly refers to MULUA PT.

17. UERE - Scales Y(F) 2972 head of POWELL HARBOUR but could be corruption of AILO (Y)F 2868.

18. SAI RIVER, HABURO RIVER, BAREN RIVER - It appears that SAI RIVER as on the Jap map refers to MATALAI RIVER (Y)F 2760; in that case HABURO & BAREN RIVERS refer to SAI RIVERS No 2 & 1 respectively. On the other hand it is possible that SAI RIVER on the Jap map refers to SAI RIVER on the strat map and that there are two uncharted streams between SAI RIVER and KORINDIHDI RIVER.

19. KORENTE RIVER - Thought to refer to EUTEI RIVER.

20. PARAO RIVER - Probably stream entering HIXON BAY at Y(F) 0357.

21. HATAFURI RIVER- HATABULU RIVER - Name shown in Special Report No 63.

22. PONDI RIVER - Refers to PANDI RIVER (X)K 9957.

23. ADOTEHA - Scales vicinity of HADIDUA (X)K 9155.

24. ROBO HARURU - Presumably village in vicinity of GOHU (X)K 5516

25. KOHU - GOHU (X)K 5516

HALABUHGA-TORIU TRACK

(References were obtained by plotting track, as shown on Map 13, Terrain Study 74, on to the 4 mile strat map)

26. RAHBAKO - Thought to refer to RABATA (Y)A 7611.

27. RATARUHATO - Not on maps but probably between RABATA and UHGA.

28. UHGA - UHGA - not shown on strat map but at approx ref (Y)A 7311.

29. KEHBETTO - KEMPETTO, approx ref (Y)A 7409.

30. AIBOPUKI - AIEMPOPUKI, approx ref (Y)A 7207.

31. KUAHHITOKI - KAHHITOKI, approx ref (Y)F 7195.

32. KABAHRAN - KABAN, approx ref (Y)F 5589.

33. HAZERANPITTO - MAGELLAN POINT, approx ref (Y)F 4987.

34. KURUSQ POINT - CROSS POINT, approx ref (Y)F 4183.



RESTRICTED
TRACED FROM CAPTURED ENEMY MAPS
NOTE : NOT TO SCALE. APPROX SCALE 1:440,000
INFM IN RED ON JAP MAP, SHOWN
OPEN BAY
BAIA
15 METERS
COURSE TO ENTER
SMALL BAY WITH SAND BEACH BUT NO SUITABLE POSN. FOR MOORING
S.W.S. 1 Hr
W.N. 3 Hrs
S.E.S. 5 Hrs
Cape Lambert
BOROROM
MARAWOP
PONDO
TORIU
UERE
Baiern Pt.
Open Bay
BAIA
BRIDGE (?)
LOLOBAU Is.
Mt. Ulawun 2580
MASSAVA
ST PAULS
VUNALAMA
MANDRES
KERAVAT
West Commercial Pt.
West Pt.
Akaho Pt.
TAURA
Taiwui Pt.
RABAUL
Pread Pt.
WATOM Is.
KOKOPO
KABAKAUL
Cape Gazelle
RANBAKO
RATARUNATO
UNGA
KEMUBETTO
AIBOPUKI
ANGUSAITO
KUANMITOKI
KABANRAN
MAZERANPITTO
KUROBUPOINT
152 BRIDGES LACK OF GOOD DRINKING WATER
Mt. Sinewit
FERRY SERVICE
Rugen Hbr (Put Put Hbr)
KANBUBU
MONKUO
ARU
MERAI
ATORA
IRIKI (MANGROVES)
KURUMUKA
MANY RIVERS AND CLIFFS
MOUNTAINOUS AREA MANY SMALL RIVERS TIDAL EFFECTS ARE GREAT.
Cape Archway
TARINIO
TOL
BULUS
Zungen Pt.
Hixon Bay
ADOTEMA
SULE
UBILI
ULAMINA
GULAGULA
ROBA
MARURU
BUBU
KOMU
KAPE
URAMAILI

SECRET

GSI

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 128

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 26 Oct to 1200 hrs 2 Nov 44.

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CURRENT REVIEW

NEW BRITAIN

There has been an increase in enemy patrolling in the OPEN BAY area where one of our patrol supply dumps was raided. It is interesting to note that one Japanese patrol left a message for our troops in which they stated that they intended to resume aggressive activities and would come as far west as ULAMONA.

On the east coast, following a clash with our patrols in the MILIM area some fourteen days ago it is now learnt that the enemy captured some friendly natives. They were forced to guide the enemy to the site of one of our patrol outposts. After advancing some of the way the Japanese turned back but stated they would return later.

NEW GUINEA

During the week renewed activity was noted on KAIRIRU ISLAND, indicating that this is still being used by the enemy as a supply base. Details are contained in Section 6 of Part II - "Supply" (see page 14).

Continued activity has been observed in the area inland to the south and SW of WEWAK. Apart from the foraging parties mentioned last week, it appears that the tattered remnants of EIGHTEENTH ARMY are being partially regrouped. In broad outline the enemy dispositions would appear to be as follows:-

41 Div: This division is located inland from the DANMAP RIVER, south to WALUM (eight miles south of the mouth of RIVER DANMAP) and AIAM (seven miles SW of WALUM) thence on a rough line running northeastwards to NIMAHAU RIVER mouth. Div HQ is thought to be in the vicinity of MALIN.

20 Div is located in an area from BUT southwestwards towards MAPRIK thence east and north to the coast again near DAGUA. Elements have been reported as far south as MARUI. 80 Inf Regt was reported garrisoning MUSCHU and KAIRIRU ISLANDS in Sep 44. Div HQ was last heard of at BUT but may possibly be moving on MAPRIK.

51 Div is still located WEWAK-KAUP area.

In addition to leaving a message announcing their intentions on the north coast of NEW BRITAIN, mentioned above, further gratuitous forecasts have been received from the Japanese in the KERAM RIVER valley. An Allied outpost, according to a Sgt of the Japanese Military Police, is to be attacked and the patrol officer "made KAI KAI of".

PHILIPPINES

Details of the almost overwhelming naval losses suffered by the enemy in the recent LEYTE GULF battles are given in Section 2 of Part I - "Sea, Own and Enemy" (see page 5).

It is interesting to note that the enemy made use of cover afforded by this engagement to run in both land and air reinforcements to LUZON.

PART I

OPERATIONS

1. LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

SOLOMONS

BOUGAINVILLE

Allied troops have taken the initiative and are aggressively patrolling in the UPPER LARUMA Valley. Between 26/27 Oct two companies killed 42 Japanese in the area of PIMEMIPAIA.

Enemy casualties to 27 Oct:

Killed 9759
PW 89

NEW IRELAND

Reliable native reports on 26 Oct state that defence guns and radar are located at KUKUTANAI, on the north coast. An enemy garrison is camped in a plantation in the same area.

NEW BRITAIN

On 25 Oct a patrol to the lower SAI reported an unknown number of enemy in this area. Native patrols are also in the KORINDI-DIRIVER and lower PANDI areas. On 29 Oct an enemy party raided food dumps hidden by our patrols at a position approximately four miles South of BALA, OPEN BAY. Scouts reported that one enemy party remained in this location and a second party went to the beach crossed the River PALI headed in the direction of SAI. The Japanese left three messages in a bottle, one in Japanese and two in pidgin, informing our foce that soon the enemy would come in strength to BALA and ULAMONA.

NEW GUINEA

MADANG AREA

An unconfirmed native report on 26 Oct states that a large number of armed natives are operating at GARINAM, three miles SW of BOIMARI. There is also considerable Japanese activity near BOIMARI, approximately 22 miles WSW of MADANG.

On 28 Oct native scouts operating with one of our patrols reported that a large number of natives were being trained by an ex-police sgt under the supervision of one Japanese in an area approximately two miles West of BOIMARI. At least 100 natives were armed with grenades, but only one rifle was seen. All track approaches were closely guarded by natives. Latest reports state the Japanese are still in KAMBOT, 3SE of ANGORAM, and the surrounding district.

..EMAK

A PW report dated 23 Oct states that a telephone line connects a Japanese strongpoint three miles up the DARLAP RIVER with MALIN, LOANIH and MAGUA. The line was found to be in a satisfactory condition when tested by PW. He estimated enemy strength at the strongpoint at 1000, together with some MG's.

Information from captured documents, reveals that 41 Div was to move South and SE from the area RIVER DARLAP in the middle of October, indicating that the strongpoint mentioned above was a covering force for the move.

On 28 Oct it was reported that a party of Japanese had passed through SUNUHU (eight miles SSW of [illegible]) towards the WOH area during the last fourteen days. Native patrols contacted this party and in the enemy action five friendly natives were killed and several hostages taken. A little later natives ambushed the enemy and killed six.

This report is of considerable interest as it is the first relating to a move back to the coastal areas. This offers two possibilities:

(a) The party may have been a long range patrol from WEWAK or;

(b) A foraging party.

An ANGAU report on 29 Oct stated there was a party of enemy at WALUH (14 miles SE of BABLING), and that the Japanese group formerly at WOMISIS had moved to ALUH, six miles SW of WOMISIS. It is considered shortage of food is likely to force the enemy at WALUH to move to a new area. As the natives in this district are hostile to the Japanese it can be expected their stay will not be a peaceful one.

A delayed report describes a clash between natives and Japs on 25 Oct near KAMBINI, 61 miles West of WEWAK. Twenty Japs were killed.

On 26 Oct an Australian float plane escorted by two Beauforts landed at UMEI ISLAND, 6 miles NW of BOINEN. For purposes of interrogation, a canoe containing two natives was towed towards KARAKU ISLAND. MG fire was observed striking close to the plane, after which two white men and two natives were observed wading ashore. The float plane was later observed burning and was completely destroyed.

Allied naval motor launches reconnoitred the area at night but found no sign of activity on the island.

PHILIPPINES

LEYTE

Since the establishment of a firm beachhead on LEYTE, stead progress has been maintained by the Allied Forces.

With the exception of isolated enemy counter-attacks, Allied Forces have substantially succeeded in disorganising and disintegrating the enemy defence.

Guerilla activity has increased considerably and this has further complicated problems of the Japanese.

During the period 25-29 Oct, amphibious patrols landed at BARUGA and CARIGARA on CARIGARA BAY and found them clear of enemy. However a strong enemy thrust by armoured forces on 29 Oct forced the detachment at CARIGARA to withdraw to BARUGA.

During this period further important gains were made; three airfields at BURAUEN and one at MALABKAK were captured, 500 Japanese being killed in this operation.

Extensive patrolling on 27/28 Oct resulted in the linking up of the northern and southern sectors being effected at the RIVER BINAHAN.

In the central sector a strong movement was initiated from PASTRANA, to secure the CAVITE-JARO line. This was accomplished on 29 Oct, thus cutting the last enemy line of communication between the northern and southern forces. On the same day a small force landed on SULUAN ISLAND.

Casualties to 30 Oct :- Killed 7,894
PW 88

SAMAR

Unopposed landings were made on SAMAR ISLAND on 24 Oct. Later resistance is known to have been slight and no further encounters have been reported.

2. SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

NW AREA

During the past week some barge activity was noted in the HALMAHERAS. PT boats sank three barges and straffed TERNATE jetty on 23 Oct. During these operations heavy fire was encountered from the mainland West of MITI ISLAND.

In the CELEBES shipping sightings have maintained the substantial increase reported last week. Sightings in the area included 56,450/61,950 tons of merchant shipping, 27 naval vessels and 11 other craft. Principal concentrations were at MAKASSAR. Numerous luggers have been observed off the West coast of the GULF of BONE.

A slight decrease has been noted in the BORNEO area during the current period. The main concentration still appears to be centred around TARAKAN. Sightings included 26,500/33,000 tons of merchant shipping, 10 warships and 31 other craft.

PHILIPPINES

Following the decisive defeat inflicted on the Japanese Fleet warship sightings have decreased considerably. However a substantial increase in merchant shipping has been observed in the LUZON and VISAYAS areas. Sightings include 233 merchant vessels gross tonnage 316,225 tons and 16 warships.

PHILIPPINES NAVAL BATTLE

The contentious question as to whether or not the Japanese Fleet would seek a major engagement with Allied naval forces other than in home waters, was settled this week. Three Japanese task forces made a determined and co-ordinated endeavour to reach our LEYTE beachhead.

During the night 24/25 Oct, Admiral HALSEY engaged a Japanese force of five carriers with escorts East of the Northern extremity of LUZON. Our task force sank two carriers and a cruiser, and damaged two carriers and a cruiser.

Further South, the second Japanese force of 24/25 vessels including 3/4 battleships, passing South of MINDORO, swept through the SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT, reaching a point approximately 80 miles NE of HOMONHON ISLAND at 0722I on 25 Oct before being driven off by Admiral KINKAID's Task Force. One cruiser and one destroyer were sunk; three battleships, three cruisers and one destroyer damaged.

The third Japanese force consisting of 14 vessels including two battleships but without carriers, proceeded East through the MINDANAO SEA. Upon entering SURIGAO STRAIT it was engaged by Allied surface forces at 0300I on 25 Oct. Two hours later the enemy force was obliged to retire, pursued by our light naval forces. Including attacks which were launched by our carrier aircraft whilst this force was retreating through the MINDANAO SEA, one battleship, one cruiser and 4/6 destroyers were sunk; one battleship, one cruiser and two destroyers were damaged.

As they retire, it is likely that additional losses will be inflicted upon these forces by our carrier aircraft and submarines.

It is apparent that the enemy's audacious attempt to repulse our invasion of the PHILIPPINES has failed. The losses and damage inflicted upon his naval forces will have a far reaching effect upon all future operations inthe PACIFIC.

3. AIR - OWN

Air operations during the period have been widespread, though somewhat curtailed by weather.

Heavy bombers figured prominently in attacks on the fleeing Japanese fleet inthe PHILIPPINES as well as dropping a heavy tonnage of bombs on airfields and installations in MINDANAO and the SULU ARCHIPELAGO. In the VISAYAS sector our fighters inflicted considerable damage on enemy aircraft and air attacks on Allied shipping in the LEYTE GULF were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

Daily attacks in the WEWAK area, VOGELKOP PENINSULAR and BOMBERAI PENINSULAR have been maintained. Support to ground operations in the SARMI area has been maintained daily.

Airfields in CERAM were again subjected to heavy attacks by bombers and fighter-bombers on 23 and 24 Oct, the main targets being BOELA, KAIRATOE, KAIROKE and AMBON.

An attack on DUBLON Island by 14 Super FORTRESSES is of interest, as it is the first time Super FORTRESSES have operated from a Central Pacific base.

NEW BRITAIN - NEW IRELAND - SOLOMONS

The main targets were enemy occupied areas in Southern BOUGAINVILLE and the GAZELLE PENINSULAR. On 21 Oct approx 30 troop laden barges moving North out of KERAVIA BAY were attacked, 4 barges being sunk and the remainder heavily straffed.

NEW GUINEA

Daily attacks have been maintained on targets at WEWAK, BOIKEN and West as far as the RIVER DANUP.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

In the SARMI - ORAI RIVER area pillboxes, installations and dumps were attacked, on 20, 23 and 25 Oct.

AA positions and bivouac areas throughout the VOGELKOP PENINSULAR were attacked daily by fighter and medium bombers.

CERAM - CELEBES - AMBOINA

On 23 Oct a total of 175 a/c, mainly fighter bombers, attacked the airfields at AMBON, LAIROKE, KAIRITO and the oil installation at BOELA. The following day a further heavy attack was again directed at the same targets. Small fires were started when supply dumps and enemy occupied areas at MAUMERE, FLORES ISLAND were attacked on the same date.

On the night 28/29 Oct heavy bombers attacked MACASSAR, starting large fires in the docks area.

BORNEO

On 24 Oct warehouses and shipping at SANDAKAN were bombed causing a number of fires. A small freighter and lugger were sunk. Fighters escorting the bombers reported the bombing as excellent and later followed in and straffed 10 small freighters and 4 luggers. Seven of the freighters were set afire.

PHILIPPINES

Allied air activity has been maintained at a high level, continuous bombing of enemy aerodromes in MINDANAO and CEBU has been effected without any enemy attempt to intercept. On 23 Oct 110 tons of bombs was dropped on a suspected enemy HQ at COTABOTO. Some buildings were destroyed and fires started.

Land based planes further supported carrier borne aircraft during the withdrawal of the Japanese navy.

Carrier borne aircraft continued to figure prominently in the LEYTE operations. The toll of enemy planes has mounted steadily and coverage for the Allied fleet has continued to successfully minimise enemy air attacks.

AIR - ENEMY

PHILIPPINES

During the naval battle off LEYTE the Japanese seized the opportunity afforded to reinforce their air strength in the PHILIPPINES. Under cover of this battle, large fleets of planes were flown in from FORMOSA and JAPAN proper.

As a result the enemy air offensive has increased considerably. His attacks have been mainly directed against Allied shipping in the LEYTE beachhead area.

Suicide bombing attacks have caused considerable structural damage to many ships. An interesting feature is that these attacks were watched by enemy observers, who, no doubt, were studying the effectiveness of these tactics in preparation for future operations.

MINDANAO

At 2156I on 24 Oct one enemy raider dropped two phosphorous bombs and strafed a Liberty dock at [redacted]. Two men were killed and 20 wounded. Half an hour later two enemy aircraft appeared but no offensive action was taken.

CELEBES

On 23 Oct four enemy fighters attacked one Allied bomber in the [redacted] area. The bomber escaped after jettisoning its bombs and taking cover in the clouds.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

Revised estimates of enemy strengths in SWPA as at 25 Oct 44 are as follows:-

NW SECTOR

PHILIPPINES:

LUZON	-	148,700	
CENTRAL	-	63,400	
MINDANAO	-	60,900	
	TOTAL		273,000
HALMAHERAS:			25,000
	TOTAL NW SECTOR	-	482,900

NE SECTOR

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

East of AITAPE	-	28,000
NEW BRITAIN	-	35,000
NEW IRELAND	-	10,000
SOLOMONS (See footnote)		25,000
TOTAL NE SECTOR	-	98,000
TOTAL SWPA	-	580,900

NOTE: SOLOMONS ESTIMATE

It should be noted that the G2, GHQ estimate for the SOLOMONS is 12,000, differing from that set out above. This difference is under discussion.

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIRCRAFT STRENGTH:

Estimate of Enemy Land Based air strength in the areas listed below on information to 1700K/27 Oct 44:-

AREAS	F	2E/F	8E/B	2E/B	F/B	F/P	Obsn	Total 27 Oct	Comparative Totals 18 Oct	Comparative Totals 9 Oct
NEW BRITAIN NEW IRELAND SOLOMONS						10	2	12	12	12
PHILIPPINES:										
MINDANAO	6		2	3	2	6	7	26	61	62
VISAYAS	30	4	13	24	2	13	9	95	107	119
LUZON	47	23	33	31	2	14	6	156	281	242
								277	449	423
AMBON-CERAM-BOEROE	4		3	4	2	9	4	26	26	26
CELEBES:										
MENADO AREA	4		2			6		12	19	21
KENDARI-MAKASSAR	20	8	8	10	3	12	4	65	79	116
								77	98	137
TIMOR-SOEMBA-SOEMBAWA-FLORES	10					3	3	16	16	16
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK	4			12		15	5	36	36	36
BORNEO	68	18	28	62		12		188	172	214
	193	53	89	146	11	100	40	632	812	867

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 117)

REINFORCEMENT OF PHILIPPINES AIR STRENGTH

As at 10 Oct, the estimated enemy air strength in MANCHURIA, JAPAN proper, and FORMOSA totalled 3,461 airplanes.

This strength was distributed as follows:-

KURILES, HOKKAIDO, KARAFUTO and OMINATO	288
JAPAN proper	2,418
MANCHURIA-KOREA	165
FORMOSA-RYUKYU ISLANDS	590

Thus prior to the engagements in the PHILIPPINES and FORMOSA beginning 10 Oct, the enemy had a grand total of 3,749 airplanes in the areas mentioned (including 288 in the PHILIPPINES).

Enemy air losses 10-21 Oct are estimated at 1,419 airplanes of all types. In the subsequent action, 22-27 Oct, fragmentary reports claim an additional 250-275 airplanes. Thus the total estimated losses during Oct now approximate 1,694 enemy airplanes, leaving a balance of approximately 2,055.

With current PHILIPPINE estimates totalling approximately 377 airplanes, the balance of 1,678 airplanes is distributed through JAPAN proper, adjacent islands, and MANCHURIA.

Indications are to hand that the enemy is moving air reinforcements from MANCHURIA and JAPAN proper through FORMOSA to the PHILIPPINES. Excellent air lines of communication, with widespread facilities for dispersal and servicing, exist all along the air ferrying route from JAPAN to LUZON. These factors assist rapid and ready reinforcement of the PHILIPPINES.

It is apparent therefore that if the enemy has made a decision to provide an all out air defence of the PHILIPPINES, retaining approximately 1,000 airplanes for home defence, replacements totalling over 600 airplanes are available for movement into PHILIPPINES from MANCHURIA and the EMPIRE areas.

(Summarised from GHQ G2 Summary)

3. ORGANISATION

ENEMY RE-ORGANISATION BOUGAINVILLE

A document recently captured on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND refers to the transfer of weapons and equipment from 2 Indep Tk A Bn to 13 Inf Regt 6 Div. It is known that this transfer, which took place in Jun 44, was occasioned by the dissolution of 3 Bty (at least) of 2 Indep Tk A Bn in order to provide additional personnel for 13 Inf Regt.

Japanese forces in by-passed areas comprise the tattered remnants of many units, for most of which the original reason for existence has long since disappeared. There are HT units with no vehicles left to operate, and airfield construction bns which have long since realised the futility of preparing landing grounds for a non-existent air force.

On BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND disposal of these minor units and remnants were made in two ways:-

(a) By using them to rebuild the strength of the depleted 6 Div. Although this Div suffered heavy losses in its attack on the TOROKINA perimeter in Mar 44, it is thought that subsequent replacements have brought it up to nearly full strength.

(b) By re-organising depleted units into new fighting formations.

In this way, 38 IMB was formed in Jul 44, incorporating into its HQ the former personnel of HQ 17 Div Inf Gp. 3 Bn 53 Inf Regt with reinforcements became 1 Bn 81 Inf Regt, 38 IMB. Similarly, 2 Bn 54 Inf Regt, 10 Indep Mtn Arty Unit, 1 Bn 23 Fd Arty Regt and some other base units were disbanded and absorbed into components of 38 IMB.

In the case of 2 Indep Tk A Bn, it is of interest to note that weapons and ammunition transferred included:-

1 x 37mm Tk A gun	with	1,746 rounds
2 x 47 " " "	"	1,705 "
1 x 75 " Regt Gun	"	86 "
211 Rifles	"	10,300 "
6 MG	"	3,250

It appears, therefore, that these troops were not experiencing any great shortage of weapons and ammunition in Jun 44. They were also well supplied with other equipment - for instance, 180 entrenching tools were also transferred.

If the built-up 6 Div has received weapons on the same scale from other replacements, then even after allowances for deterioration of ammunition, it must be expected to be capable of producing considerable fire-power when next it is encountered in action.

RE-ORGANISATION OF 8 AREA ARMY

Attached as Appendix 'A' is information on the re-organisation of the Japanese Armed Forces under command of 8 Area Army, additional to that reported above concerning BOUGAINVILLE.

4. EQUIPMENT

JAPANESE QUICK FIRING 37mm (1.4 in) HE/INCENDIARY SHELL

Details of the above shell have been extracted from Ministry of Munitions - Munitions Supply Laboratories Report No 123, Aug 44, and are attached as Appendix 'B'.

JAPANESE 12cm (4.72 in) MORTAR

The suspected existence of a Japanese mortar of this calibre has now been confirmed by the capture of a mimeographed folder on ENIWETOK Atoll.

No type or model number is given, nor is there any indication as to whether the weapon is of old or modern design. From the general characteristics, however, it may be deduced that it is a mortar of comparatively conventional design consisting of barrel, bipod and base plate.

It is interesting to note that there are two methods of firing the bomb, which can be discharged either by dropping it down the barrel or by means of a trigger.

The principal characteristics are:-

Overall length of barrel	153.5cm (5 ft ½ in)
Total weight of mortar	273.4Kg (602.7 lb)
Type of sight	Telescopic (probably panoramic)
Maximum Range	4,500 metres (4,923 yds)

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 117)

JAPANESE 150mm (5.9 in) MORTARS

According to the Japanese, mortars of this calibre are classified as "mediums". To date, preliminary identifications have been obtained of two models, characteristics of which are shown hereunder:-

(i) Model 93, 15cm Trench Mortar

The following data has been obtained from a captured document. While the issuing authority is not stated, the

information is probably reliable, as the document has the appearance of an authoritive work.

Length of barrel	10 calibres (4 ft 11 in)
Total weight of mortar	253 Kg (557.9 lb)
Maximum rate of fire	3 rounds per minute
Effective radius of burst	20 metres (22 yards approximately)
Crew	12 men
Types of ammunition	Mortar shells (HE) Practice shells Special shells (probably CW)

In keeping with standard mortar design, propellant charges are attached between the bomb tail fins. The following range scales are shown on the rear (?) sight, indicating the use of three distinct increments:-

No 1	800-2,100 metres	(875-2,297 yards)
No 2	450-1,100 metres	(492-1,203 yards)
No 3	250-600 metres	(274-656 yards)

(ii) Model 97, 15cm Mortar

Although some of these weapons have now been captured, little information is available pending receipt of a technical report.

The following preliminary data has been extracted from USPFAPOA Weekly Intelligence Review No 14 of 13 Oct 44:-

"This is a smooth bore, muzzle-loaded weapon, similar in design to the Japanese and US 81mm mortars.

"The weapon is used primarily in defence, for it is too heavy to be conveniently moved. Thus it is not suitable for close-in support.

"On PELELIU, these weapons were employed in pits with concrete walls, the muzzle being level with the top of the pit.

"The bipod contains the elevating, traversing, cross-levelling and recoil mechanisms. Unlike the 81mm and 90mm mortars, the elevating gear contains two concentric elevation screws which permit the barrel to reach a maximum elevation without loss of stability. The traversing handwheel is located on the left side of the yoke, so that the gunner may sight and traverse at the same time. The cross-levelling and recoil mechanisms are identical to those used with the smaller mortars.

"The sight is the standard collimator or panoramic type used with the 81mm and 90mm mortars.

"Ammunition appears to be similar in design to that used with the smaller calibre weapons. It is reported to have a bursting radius of 20 metres (approximately 66 feet), with some fragments thrown as far as 50 metres (164 feet approximately)."

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 117)

5. TACTICS

JAPANESE DIVERSIONARY UNITS

Further mention has recently been made in captured documents regarding the organisation of 3 Coy 2 Diversionary Unit.

The total strength which is given as 2 Officers 117 ORs, is organised into three different types of attack forces -

Type 1

Consists of a HQ, HQ Squadron and two platoons. Each platoon comprises small attack units, varying in strength from 8 to 20 men.

Type 2

Consists of an organisation of four sections:-

(a) Suicide squad of a HQ and seven Attack Units.
(b) Reserve Attack Unit, strength 30 ORs.
(c) Small squad of 10 duty personnel.
(d) Reserve Attack personnel, strength 15 ORs.

Type 3

This unit is divided into two Attack forces :-

(a) Long Distance Attack Force - Strength 1 Officer and 3 Attack Units.
(b) Medium Distance Attack Force - of similar strength.

From this information it can be readily realized that the organisation of these units is very flexible and can be "re-modelled" to suit the task on hand.

The distribution of weapons to an Attack Unit is given as follows:-

Rifles	-	8
Pistols	-	6
Hand grenades	-	45

The aims and objects of these Units are clearly stated in the following extracts from captured documents:-

(a) "The Diversionary Unit, based on the plan of the Senior Officer, will secretly penetrate deep into enemy territory and execute a surprise attack on enemy HQ, airfields, supply lines. It will endeavour to infiltrate to the enemy's rear and create disorder."

(b) "The success of the Diversionary Unit lies in the element of surprise."

(c) "Weak and vulnerable points will be selected as objectives."

(d) "In attacking enemy HQ, arty positions, engineer units and similar formations, attack in force or use ambush tactics and inflict heavy casualties on the enemy."

On at least one occasion in recent fighting on HOROTAI ISLAND, a unit penetrated our lines successfully. A charge was laid but owing to a technical fault the mission did not accomplish its object.

A very important factor to bear in mind is that each soldier in these Diversionary Units is extremely well trained in jungle tactics, use of weapons, demolition and field craft

Our troops should be warned of the existence of this type of unit, its object and methods and be prepared to devise counter measures.

6. SUPPLY

KAIRIRU ISLAND AS A SUPPLY BASE

The importance of KAIRIRU ISLAND in the enemy scheme for the provision of supplementary food supplies to his beleaguered garrison in the WEWAK Sector is indicated in a document recently captured and containing entries dated from Mar to Dec 43.

The document discloses the existence on KAIRIRU ISLAND of the Eastern NEW GUINEA Branch of North Eastern Fisheries Development Company Limited. Plans for 1944 provide for:-

(a) Fishing for tuna
(b) Installation of a 1½ ton ice plant on KAIRIRU ISLAND.
(c) Canning of fish, and storage in warehouses located near the ice plant.

It is not known to what extent these plans were developed. However, information recently gained from other sources is to the effect that:-

(a) The most extensive gardens in the WEWAK area are situated on KAIRIRU ISLAND.
(b) The anchorage is, or was, between this and LUSCHU ISLANDS, used by submarines on supply missions.
(c) 80 Inf Regt was garrisoning the area in Sep 44.

It would therefore appear that KAIRIRU ISLAND is a main supply base, and it is probable that the plans detailed above for supplementing rations with fish were put into effect.

8. GENERAL

JAPANESE MORALE

A number of Prisoners of War have been captured recently at MOROTAI, AITAPE, and BOUGAINVILLE and each has expressed views along similar lines regarding morale in the Japanese forces.

Two PW from MOROTAI stated that the continued and unopposed Allied naval and air bombardment led to a lowering of morale on that island. They both stated that a bitter resentment has grown against officers in the higher HQ and a third went so far as to say that some of the ORs have begun to despise their officers to a point where they have intentions of killing them.

Both a PW from BOUGAINVILLE, and an Officer PW from AITAPE, stated that heavy losses in operations and lack of air support had caused a loss of faith by the men in commanding officers.

Evidence that information from home sources is being doubted is shown by the following :-

Two of the MOROTAI PW had been comparing conditions as they knew them, with the daily news broadcasts from TOKYO and from SYDNEY (in Japanese) and found it difficult to reconcile radio TOKYO with the other facts. They had reached the stage where they doubted the truth of anything broadcast from radio TOKYO.

There is also growing evidence that the effect of Allied propaganda is increasing, inducing thoughts of surrender in men who were once imbued with the "death before surrender" principles of BUSHIDO, but the influence of their early training is still evident in that they surrender individually rather than in groups.

As the plight of these by-passed and isolated garrisons is gradually deteriorating, it may be anticipated that future PW will express similar views.

The following extracts from FELO Review of Reactions to Propaganda No 13 of 15 Oct 44 detail the best effect yet achieved by leaflet propaganda:-

"On NOEMFOOR ISLAND. From the initial landing on 2 Jul up to 6 Sep, a total of 210 Japanese and 576 Formosans were captured; of these 64 Japanese and over 200 Formosans are known to have surrendered as a result of leaflets, and many of the others were doubtless influenced by them.

A PW has related that on 22 Jul approximately 1,500 enemy on a hill found 300-400 copies of a pamphlet which had been dropped on the previous day. The soldiers read the leaflets and passed them from hand to hand; he estimated that at least half the 1,500 soldiers were able to read contents before officers came and ordered the leaflets to be burnt.

PW stated that after reading these leaflets the dissatisfaction that the soldiers already felt with their officers and the campaign generally became more evident. Everyone talked about deserting and wondered whether it was true that they would not be killed if captured, as claimed in the leaflet. About half of those with whom PW spoke were of the opinion that the leaflet told the truth. Some of them frankly stated that after the treatment they had received in the Japanese Army it would be a good thing to be taken prisoner.

When a general retreat inland was ordered that afternoon, groups of men from several combatant units broke away from the main force and deserted. The PW telling the story was positive that if leaflets had not been dropped such wholesale desertions would not have taken place."

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

WESTERN FRONT

It has been apparent during the operations of the past week that the British Forces have been fighting hard to gain complete control of the SCHELDE ESTUARY. Use of the port of ANTWERP is intimately linked up with the battles now being fought out on the RIVER MAAS and at TILLBURG. Present indications show that the Germans intend to hold ROTTERDAM.

EASTERN FRONT

The Russians have resumed the offensive in a drive towards KONIGSBERG, the Prussian capital.

A second offensive is in progress further south where INSTERBURG is threatened. The capture of this centre would have a disastrous effect on the communications serving German Forces in EAST PRUSSIA.

ITALY

Bad weather has continued to restrict operations.

CHINA

An all-out Japanese offensive has brought them to the outskirts of the American air base of KWEILIN. This is a severe setback for the Chinese, but a further attack by an enemy force moving down the HONAN-KWANGSI railway has been repelled.

BURMA

Indian troops have captured the town of TIDDIM.

A new Allied drive to reopen a direct land route to CHINA has commenced. Good progress has been made by two British Forces driving south from HOGAUNG and MYITKYINA.

PART V

SECURITY.

JAPANESE RADIO PROPAGANDA

With an increasing interest displayed by many Australian troops in TOKYO radio, principally because of popular musical recordings on a Zero Hour programme, it is timely for troops to be reminded that propaganda is a weapon of war of no mean consequence.

Propaganda loses most of its effectiveness if it can be recognised for what it is. The real danger is found in the insidious propaganda which is skilfully introduced into entertainment so as not to be recognisable and which will be accepted uncritically by our soldiers or civilians.

An example of this is for the Japanese to direct a radio programme of music which he considers is generally liked by the enemy, and later to present news which follows closely

on the truth already known. The dose of propaganda when it comes, such as a reference to a possible postwar loss of British markets and bases in the PACIFIC to the United States, is administered in a more subtle manner and in minute portions amongst known facts.

It is interesting to note that many of the tunes played over the TOKYO Zero Hour are old tunes but nevertheless those which are still popular. A likely explanation of this, is that recent recordings of Allied dance bands are now not available to the Japanese, but it is noticeable that old songs revive memories of events that occurred in pre-war days when these songs were originally introduced, and therefore it may be one more attempt by the enemy to diffuse a form of nostalgia among our troops.

All forms of enemy propaganda can best be countered by the education of all ranks in the aims and methods of the enemy in this direction, and by subjecting his propaganda to ridicule.

Consequently Field Security personnel and Unit Security officers should at all times encourage troops to be both critical and suspicious of all Japanese statements mixed with the rythm of Tommy Dorsey's or Benny Goodman's band.

Lt-Col
GS First Aust Army

Appendix "A" to
First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence
Summary No 128.

REORGANISATION OF 8 AREA ARMY

1. The Japanese Army Forces in NEW BRITAIN, NEW IRELAND and BOUGAINVILLE were reorganised during June and July 1944. The reorganisation involved the formation of three Independent Mixed Brigades (38, 39 and 40) and certain changes were made in the composition of the two divisions at RABAUL.

2. 38 Independent Mixed Brigade was formed on BOUGAINVILLE and details of the organisation of this formation are referred to under the heading "Enemy Reorganisation - BOUGAINVILLE" elsewhere in this summary.

3. In NEW BRITAIN, 39 Independent Mixed Brigade appears to have been formed mainly from shipping units in the area. The infantry components are the newly formed 4 and 5 Mixed Regiments, and in addition to the usual brigade signal unit, 15 Fixed Signal Unit is believed to be an integral part of the brigade. 12 Shipping Engineer Regiment appears to have been included in lieu of the usual engineer unit, suggesting that the brigade could possibly be used as a Sea-Borne Counter-Landing Unit.

4. 40 Independent Mixed Brigade on NEW IRELAND was formed from 1 Independent Mixed Regiment which has been on the island since Dec 43/Jan 44 and 230 Infantry Regiment (ex 38 Division) which is thought to have moved from RABAUL in early 1944. The brigade headquarters was formerly 38 Division Infantry Headquarters and, whilst no information has been received regarding ancillary units, it is possible they include part of those of 38 Division.

5. Only comparatively minor changes have taken place as regards the organisation of the divisions.

6. In the case of 17 Division, a Division Recce Unit has been formed and 2 Mixed Regiment has replaced 81 Infantry Regiment as the third infantry component.

7. Similarly in 38 Division, 3 Mixed Regiment has replaced 230 Infantry Regiment. There is also some evidence to suggest that the Medical Unit of 38 Division has been disbanded.

8. Since the three infantry regiments of 6 Division are all located on BOUGAINVILLE, no need for a reorganisation of this formation has arisen, and recent information has in fact shown that the organisation remains unaltered.

9. Set out below are the code designations of the new components of 17 and 38 Divisions and of 38, 39 and 40 Independent Mixed Brigades as they are believed to be at present. It should be noted that 81 and 230 Inf Regts and 12 Independent Mixed Regiment which are now components of Independent Mixed Brigades have not been allotted new numbers in their respective brigade blocks but retained their original code numbers.

17 DIVISION		
2 Mixed Regiment	TSUKI	7397
38 DIVISION		
3 Mixed Regiment	NULLA	8936

38 INDEP MIXED BRIGADE

38 IMB	CHIKARA	
38 IMB HQ	"	
61 Inf Regt	"	7386
38 IMB Arty Unit	"	
38 IMB Engr Unit	"	
38 IMB Sig Unit	"	
38 IMB Fd Hosp	"	

39 INDEP MIXED BRIGADE

39 IMB	TADA	11230
39 IMB HQ	"	11231
4 Mixed Regt	"	11232
5 Mixed Regt	"	11233
? 39 IMB Arty Unit		
? 12 Shipping Engr Regt	"	? 2958
39 IMB Sig Unit	"	11234
15 Fixed Sig Unit	"	11235
? 39 IMB Tpt Unit		
39 IMB Fd Hosp	"	11236

40 INDEP MIXED BRIGADE

40 IMB	SAKAN	11240
40 IMB HQ	"	11241
230 Inf Regt	"	6926
1 Indep Mixed Regt	"	4619
40 IMB Arty Unit	"	11242
40 IMB Engr Unit	"	11243
40 IMB Sig unit	"	11244
40 IMB Tpt Unit	"	11245
40 IMB Fd Hosp	"	11246

(AMF Weekly Int Review No 117)

JAPANESE
QUICK FIRING
37mm (1·4 in.) HE/Incend. SHELL





Key

1 Sectioned Shell
2 Sectioned Cartridge case
3 Percussion primer
4 Cardboard lid with decoppering foil
5 Cardboard spacer
6 Head of projectile
7 Percussion fuse
8 Transit plug

CHARACTERISTICS

Length (without fuse)	178mm	
Weight (without fuse)	741gms	
Length of cartridge case	111mm	
Propellant	Nitrocellulose	98.5%
	Diphenylamine	1.5%
Length of Shell (without fuse)	88mm	

An incendiary composition is pressed into the base of the shell body. Above this composition is pressed an increment of R.D.X. The top of this increment is level with the base of the head. The head is filled separately with R.D.X.

The short length of this round, together with the use of more powerful explosive suggests that this ammunition is intended for use in a 37mm aircraft cannon.

G.S.I. (a) Adv. LHQ

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HQ FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 129

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 2 Nov to 1200 hrs 9 Nov 44.

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CURRENT REVIEW

NEW BRITAIN

On 4 Nov an Allied force landed unopposed at JACQUINOT BAY. Allied warships and aircraft bombarded and bombed known enemy positions on WIDE BAY to neutralize the main enemy patrol bases in that area.

Confirmation of known enemy dispositions was gained from a PW captured at GUBA 20/29 Oct.

The main defensive line runs from MARANGOI on the East coast to KERAVAT on BLANCHE HARBOUR, KOKOPO and R.BAUL being only lightly held. The PW also stated that nine aircraft are kept in underground hangars at KERAVAT.

NEW GUINEA

Evidence that Japanese foraging parties are causing hostility among the natives, is given in a report on Japanese activities in the hinterland south of WEWAK. As the enemy eats his way through successive areas, a serious problem is created for the native population. It is of interest to note that the enemy regards all natives throughout the WOM area as hostile.

It would appear the enemy is still attempting to run in supplies, which possibly include technical equipment. The latest sighting of a submarine on 6 Nov coincided with a sighting of vehicles and tankers in an old car park nearby. The possibility of the withdrawal of technical experts and senior officers by the same means cannot be overlooked.

PHILIPPINES

As a result of the reinforcement of his air strength over the LEYTE area, the enemy has achieved a slight temporary air superiority. Attacks on our ground installations and air strips notably at TACLOBAN have caused some damage.

After some initial uncertainty enemy reinforcement has proceeded apace and together with terrain admirably suited to defence in the LIMON-ORMOC area the enemy has succeeded in slowing Allied progress considerably. However, at the present time approximately two-thirds of LEYTE is in Allied hands.

Japanese fear of airborne landings on LUZON is evidenced by the deployment of armour and mobile troops on the northward approaches to MANILA.

PART I

OPERATIONS

1. LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

SOLOMONS

BOUGAINVILLE

Aggressive patrolling continues in the upper LARUMA valley, where clashes have been reported. The enemy has opposed the advance in the areas of PLATERIPAIA, LESLIPAIA and SISIVIE, during which four Japanese were killed and one taken prisoner.

An interesting report from a recovered Indian PW, on 7 Nov stated that the PORTON area (NW BOUGAINVILLE) had been completely evacuated by the enemy and most of the supply dumps removed or bombed out.

A PW report dated 9 Oct throws further light on the rumoured enemy attack on TOROKINA perimeter in Dec 44. He stated there would be no attack as the troops were short of food in this area. Transportation of supplies to the front appeared to be a major difficulty as other PW have stated that supplies are available in rear areas.

On 6/7 Nov an Allied patrol proceeded to TSIMALATU RIVER by barge and thence overland to CAPE LOLTEE, on the Central West coast of BOUGAINVILLE. No enemy were encountered.

NEW BRITAIN

An Allied force landed in the JACQUINOT BAY area on 4 Nov. No opposition was encountered. Known enemy positions in the WIDE BAY area were bombarded by Allied warships.

A Japanese captured at GUMA 28/29 Oct revealed some interesting information on enemy defences in NEW BRITAIN. He was in very poor condition and subsequently died, from the after effect of eating the corpse of a fellow countryman who had died of wounds.

PW was one of a party of approximately 200 transported by barge from KOKOPO to WAITAVALO, SE coast. After the attacks by this force on KANDRAN 18/19 Sep, PW took to the bush.

Information regarding positions at WIDE BAY was indefinite. In the RABAUL area main concentrations were said to be at WORANGOI and KERAVAT, whilst the areas at KOKOPO and RABAUL were lightly held.

The food situation is believed to be serious, and PW complained that the Officers took the larger share.

NEW GUINEA

MADANG AREA

During the past week Australian patrols operating in the area west of MADANG succeeded in dispersing enemy-controlled natives at BIHARI, reported in the previous issue of this Summary.

An ex-police sgt and 56 natives armed with grenades were captured. No Japanese were seen during the action.

Japanese food foraging parties have continued to worry the native population. The enemy eats his way through successive areas and devastation of native food supplies is likely to create a serious problem.

In the area URIM-KOMBIO-URAT-WOM, the Japanese regard all natives as hostile and shoot on sight. The health problem among the natives of the hinterland is causing some concern also. In URAT No 2 some suspected cases of gonorrhea were found. The disease appears to have entered the area during the Japanese occupation.

HANSA BAY AREA

An unconfirmed native report received on 2 Nov stated that one Japanese Officer, five ORs and 20 natives, all armed with carbines, passed through WATAM, north coast of BROKEN WATER BAY, to SINGARIN, five miles SW of WATAM.

WEWAK AREA

On 3 Nov working parties totalling 40/50 Japanese were observed working on a bridge at ROCKY POINT, 43 miles WNW of WEWAK. All were well-equipped and wearing steel helmets. Other parties were seen along the beach between SOWAM and ABAU.

Conflicting with the above, is a report that ten Japanese in poor condition were found in the vicinity of the AHUHS RIVER, six miles west of BUT. This is only two miles east of ROCKY POINT.

AITAPE AREA

On 3 Nov the bodies of 12 Japanese were found at SUAIN, 42 miles ESE of AITAPE. Death was due to natural causes.

Latest native reports give an indication of a Japanese move back into the villages of WOMGRER and WOMBIT, 38 miles SSE of AITAPE.

During 4 Nov a patrol covered the area from SUAIN - DAKATBUL - ANGILAP and returned to SUAIN. Contact was made with two groups each consisting of about five Japanese. Five were killed and two captured. The remainder, who were believed to be unarmed, disappeared in a southerly direction.

Enemy activity in the SUAIN area was shown to be on a larger scale than usual when our troops were fired on by LMG's on 4 Nov. It was estimated that 100 Japanese were in the vicinity of SUAIN Plantation.

Enemy casualties to 2 Nov - Killed 9,073
PW 153

PHILIPPINES

LEYTE

Conflicting reports of possible enemy intentions during the first few days of operations in LEYTE have now been removed. Although some personnel may have been evacuated in the early stages, during the past week considerable reinforcement has been effected by the enemy, the main concentration having come from ORMOC, whilst fugitives from LEYTE VALLEY helped to build up the enemy forces.

Heavy opposition can be expected in the drive from PINAMOPOAN, south to ORMOC, the terrain lending itself to strong defensive positions.

It has been noted that artillery and signal units have also been pressed into service as infantrymen.

In the southern sector enemy positions consisting of a series of strongpoints west of DAGAMI, continued to offer stubborn resistance.

Casualties to 6 Nov:- Killed 14,355
PW 124

LUZON

Considerable reinforcement of the island has been in progress since the Allied invasion of LEYTE.

There is evidence of strong tank formations deployed covering the northern approaches to MANILA. These, together with mobile infantry, are also being held against possible air-borne troops.

On 22 Oct three enemy divisions landed at AGOO, LINGAYEN GULF. Some portion of these is believed to have come from the CELEBES area, the move being planned before the invasion of LEYTE.

SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

SOLOMONS

CHOISEUL ISLAND

PT boats on 31 Oct mortared and strafed shore targets on Northern CHOISEUL.

NW AREA

There have been two submarine sightings during the past ten days. On 29 Oct a submarine was observed 12 miles SW of HOROMI ISLAND, and on 6 Nov a further sighting was made North of BUT airfield, approximately 30 miles NW of WEWAK. This latter sighting again illustrates the Japanese use of submarines for running in supplies. At the time of the sighting 34 loaded MT, 9 tankers and 2 staff cars were observed in an old MT park at the Western end of BUT aerodrome, quite possibly they were connected with the submarine's arrival.

Sightings in the CELEBES, principally at MAKASSAR, show a considerable decrease compared to the last few weeks. Merchant shipping tonnage was 27,200/59,400, together with 246 small craft. No warships were observed.

A slight increase in the amount of shipping has been noted in the BORNEO area. Strong naval escorts have been provided, in all a total of 31. Sightings included 32,400/48,600 tons of merchant shipping, main concentrations being around SANDAKAN. Of this total, our aircraft sank three freighters and one tanker (7/10000 tons). Two freighters and two tankers were damaged.

LESSER SUNDAS

During the period under review there has been an increase of small shipping between SOEMBAWA and ENDE (FLORES GROUP) and although it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this increase, it may be linked with the shipping operating in waters around BORNEO.

Sightings at SOEMBAWA, SOEMBA ISLANDS and TIMOR include 6,900/9,000 tons of freighters, numberous luggers and prahus.

PHILIPPINES

It is interesting to note that on 1 Nov nine midget submarines carrying a crew of 5-10 were reported based on CEBU town. On 2 Nov all these submarines were sighted patrolling. These midget submarines could be used for suicidal attacks against our shipping.

Merchant shipping sightings reported show a marked decrease over the previous week's figures, whereas naval vessels show a slight increase. Sightings include 80 merchant vessels of gross tonnage 181,850 tons, four unidentified vessels, and 22 warships. The main concentration was in the LUZON area.

3. AIR - OWN

Despite curtailment of air operations on 30 Oct - 1 Nov due to weather, heavy attacks have been maintained throughout this theatre.

Main targets for attack have been enemy airfields, installations and shipping.

NEW BRITAIN - NEW IRELAND - SOLOMONS

Attacks have been carried out by medium bombers on targets in the RABAUL-GAZELLE PENINSULA area.

Known gun positions in HENRY REID BAY area, were attacked on 6 Nov, 20 tons of bombs being dropped.

NEW GUINEA.

Harassing attacks have been continued in the WEWAK-BUT area, where AA positions, gardens and bivouac areas present the main targets.

Suspected enemy-occupied villages in the HOPRI area were bombed on 30 Oct.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Neutralisation of the enemy airfields in the VOGELKOP has been maintained. Strips at BABO, KOEMI and MANSIKI are still unserviceable following attacks by fighter-bombers and medium bombers.

CERAM-CELEBES-AMBOINA-SOEMBAWA

Main attacks in this area were directed against MAKASSAR, in the CELEBES. On the nights 30/31 Oct and 2/3 Nov heavy raids were made on the waterfront and town causing large fires and explosions.

The waterfront at BIMA, SOEMBAWA was also raided on 5 Nov. Numerous fires and explosions were observed.

PHILIPPINES

Airfields on NEGROS, CEBU and MINDANAO were subjected to attacks by US heavy bombers. Considerable damage was caused to installations and numbers of aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

In the LUZON area, carrier-based aircraft again struck at installations and shipping. On 4 Nov 100 enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground and 83 shot down in combat. In addition a heavy cruiser was left sinking and damage caused to other naval units and cargo vessels.

SINGAPORE

The first large-scale raid since Japanese occupation took place on 5 Nov when Super-Fortresses bombed naval installations. Two direct hits by 1,000 lb bombs were obtained on a Japanese battleship in dry dock.

AIR - ENEMY

PHILIPPINES

Subsequent to the reinforcement of Japanese land based aircraft in this area, air superiority has passed to the enemy.

Large scale attacks have been maintained on our surface forces and TACLOBAN strip. Despite heavy losses these attacks continue to increase in intensity, inflicting damage on our installations.

KOROTAI

On 31 Oct seven enemy aircraft strafed and bombed the seaplane base on PITOH PENINSULA. No material damage was caused.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

Revised estimates of enemy strengths in SWPA as at 1 Nov 44 are as follows:-

NW SECTOR

PHILIPPINES			
LUZON	-	161,200	
CENTRAL	-	51,900	
MINDANAO	-	60,900	
TOTAL			274,000
TIMOR	-		26,000
VOGELKOP	-		11,000
(Decrease due to attrition)			
TOTAL NW SECTOR			484,400

NE SECTOR

BRITISH NEW GUINEA			
East of AITAPE		26,000	
(Decrease due to attrition)			
NEW BRITAIN	-	35,000	
NEW IRELAND	-	10,000	
SOLOMONS	-	25,000	
TOTAL NE SECTOR			96,000
TOTAL SWPA			580,400

2. ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIRCRAFT STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the areas listed below is prepared on information to 4 Nov 44:-

AREAS	F	2E F	S E B	2 E B	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES 3/11	28/10	4/10
NEW BRITAIN NEW IRELAND SOLOMONS						10	2	12	12	12	12
øPHILIPPINES:-											
MINDANAO	20		12	3	2	6	7	50	30	26	64
VISAYAS	64	8	14	22	2	14	9	133	113	95	119
LUZON	128	29	88	85	2	13	12	357	339	256	210
								540	482	377	393
AMBON-CERAM-BOEROE	4		3		2	9	4	22	22	26	37
øCELEBES:-											
MANADO AREA	4		2			6		12	12	12	18
MAKASSAR-KENDARI	20	8		6	3	12	4	53	53	57	106
								65	65	69	124
TIMOR-SOEMBA- SOEMBAWA-FLORES	10					3	3	16	16	16	16
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK	4			12		15	5	36	36	36	44
BORNEO	68	18		42		12	18	158	158	178	142
Totals SWPA	322	63	119	170	11	100	64	849	791	714	768
TRUK	6			3		6	4	19	19	19	25

ø Estimates do not include combat types not assigned to operational units and used in training.

PHILIPPINES: Changes are the result of re-assessment.

(COIC Situation Report 309/44)

3. ORGANISATION

JAPANESE SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANISATIONS

The Special Service Section (TOKUMU KIKAN) is a branch of the Japanese Military Intelligence Service, which deals particularly with secret service work, propaganda and semi-political questions.

These units which are under the control of either a Maj-Gen or a Colonel, comprise a headquarters and various suitable branches, each branch dealing with its own particular sphere of operations. The size of these branches varies according to their duties and the area in which they are working.

Duties carried out by these organisations include the examination, translation and evaluation of captured documents, counter-espionage and propaganda activities. PW and captured equipment are held in temporary custody until handed over to the Military Police, with whom close collaboration is maintained. Assistance is given to the Military Police in the "pacification" of natives in back areas; once this has been achieved it is the responsibility of the Military Police to organise the co-operation of the natives, and control the relationship between the natives and the Japanese troops.

In areas in which there are no Special Service Organisations the Army Military Police carry out the necessary activities.

Evidence in documents shows that in INDIA and MALAYA trading firms were discovered which were purely engaged on special service duties.

Once the Japanese Army has occupied an area, it is the duty of these units to concentrate on the exploitation of the natives, and the setting up of local political organisations.

Following is a chart, compiled from PW sources, showing the set-up of the BURMA SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANISATION. The organisational set-up in other areas is known to be similar to this:-

BURMA SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANISATION

HQ

DOCUMENTS EXAMINATION SECTION	ESPIONAGE SECTION	DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION SECTION	CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION SECTION
DUTIES:-	DUTIES:-	DUTIES:-	DUTIES:-
Examine, translate and evaluate all captured documents	Control native agents & Jap civilian employees engaged in espionage, propaganda and the "pacification of the natives	HQ includes several such sections, each responsible for administrating limited area assigned to it.	Administers area under immediate control of HQ

SUPERVISION SECTION	GENERAL AFFAIRS SECTION	W/T & R/T SQUAD	MP UNIT
DUTIES:-	DUTIES:-	DUTIES:-	DUTIES:-
Responsible for taking over and temporarily guarding captured documents and custody of P?	General Adm and Intendance. Funds for payment of native agents.	Receives messages and transmits information to the proper quarters in code or clear	Responsible for normal MP duties, but concentrates on counter-espionage and security

4. EQUIPMENT

JAPANESE TYPE 100 82mm MORTAR FUSE, INSTANTANEOUS & DELAY

Attached as Appendix 'A' is a diagrammatic sketch and photo of the above mortar fuse.

JAPANESE ONE METRE BASE RANGE FINDER

1. GENERAL

This piece of equipment was captured at HANSABAY. A sketch of the instrument appears as Appendix 'B'. Preliminary examination reveals the following information:-

2. DESCRIPTION

(a) Body. This consists of an aluminium cylinder protected by a sewn canvas cover. Two leather buffers are fitted to each end plate and provide protection against bumping or jarring. An objective pentagonal prism is mounted on adjustable platforms at each end of the cylinder. Flat glass windows are mounted on the outer tube over the front surface of each pentagonal prism. A shaft with finger-control knob protrudes from each end of the instrument, each control being protected by detachable metal covers.

(b) Coincidence and Range Adjustment. The coincidence of images is adjusted by rotating the left hand shaft, which in turn rotates a wedge prism. The prism carries a rough range scale and this can be read through a window in the outer tube.

(c) Optical Tube. The tube is symmetrical; each side carries two lenses and a main ocular prism to reflect the image into the eyepiece assembly. In front of each prism is a graticule used in adjusting coincidence. A small socket above the graticule is designed to hold a bulb for night illumination of the graticule.

(d) Eyepiece Assembly. The eyepieces are mounted together on a plate attached to the outer tube so that the eyepiece assemblies are in front of their respective prisms and graticules. An arrangement of prisms enables the separation of eyepieces to be adjusted for interocular distance. Dioptes and Interocular distance scales appear on the eyepiece assemblies.

3. OPERATION

(a) Initial Adjustment. The initial adjustment is made by normal lath system and rotation of "Range Adjustment" knob on the right hand side until the respective marks on the lath appear in the same position on the graticule markings when viewed in the eyepieces. The range finder will then be adjusted at infinity or maximum range. The instrument has no tripod support and no means of firm holding is apparent. An adjusting lath is provided to set the range finder initially at infinity.

(b) Determination of Range. Actual range finding is then obtained by rotating the "Distance Adjustment" knob on the left hand side, until identical stereoscopic images appear in each eyepiece. Approximate range can then be read from the rough range scale. The closest reading of distance on this scale is about 250 yds and probably 1,000 yds in poor light. The scale superimposed upon the field of view by the graticule is used to obtain closer approximation.

5. TACTICS

DECEPTION

An indication of the value the enemy attaches to deceptive methods is afforded by a document captured 15 Sep on MOROTAI ISLAND.

The document is a request to the MP Unit GALELA Sector for the supply of dry cell batteries "in order to counter-utilise the spy with wireless set who has been captured by this unit." The enemy hoped by this means to detect and interfere in any attempt at Allied indirect intelligence, and also facilitate the work of decoying the enemy.

Apparently the Japanese reasoned that if they could effect the transmission of false messages then Allied HQ, being unaware that their spy had been captured, would be provided with misleading information. By these means Allied troops could be decoyed into a Japanese trap.

Their plans, therefore,provided for the transmission of:-

"(a) False Report A (Report with no value)

(b) False Report B (False report to decoy enemy)

(c) False Report C (False report to detect Allied attempts to obtain intelligence)"

Whether the enemy met with any success is not known, but the incident is interesting and points to the need for all ranks to be on guard against enemy trickery.

6. GENERAL

LOCALE

Some remarkable admissions were made in a captured diary of a Japanese Lieutenant on the morale of the troops on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND.

These conditions are readily appreciated from the following extracts from the diary:-

(a) "It seems that last night somebody came in to steal rations. What disgraceful things can happen in the Japanese Army. It seems that he intended to kill Cpl NAKASHIMA with a hand grenade and walk off with the rations. However, Cpl NAKASHIMA had a premonition and slept with two sacks of rice beside him. Consequently his life was saved.

A few days ago Sgt SHIKITA had confided with L/Cpl SUMIKURA that he planned to kill NAKASHIMA, but SUMIKURA got away and reported this to Capt ITO. Sgt SHIKITA had approached him (SUMIKURA) with the proposition that if he could help liquidate NAKASHIMA, he (Sgt SHIKITA) as the only NCO remaining in the Comd Sec, would be in a position to issue L/Cpl SUMIKURA all the rations he desired. Cpl SUMIKURA slept all day in the Coy Commander's quarters. That night Sgt SHIKITA stole 25kgs of rice and two packages of compressed rations, after finding where they were hidden with the help of SUMIKURA. Sgt SHIKITA was sent to 2nd Lt ISHIBASHI on liaison. I understand that he was immediately shot to death by 2nd Lt ISHIBASHI who had been instructed to do so in a previous despatch.

At this rate it is a matter of life or death to be in charge of rations. Even in the Japanese Army old friendships dissolve when our men are starving. Each man is always trying to satisfy his hunger. It is much more frightening than meeting the enemy's assault. There is a vicious war going on within our ranks. Can spiritual power degenerate to this only because battles are lost?"

(b) "It makes me mad to think that one does not realise that eating can be a war in itself unless he is on BOUGAINVILLE. For, if one doesn't eat anything he will starve to death. There is no rice nor are there any potatoes. What can I eat? Just the roots of papaya, banana and hemp. When one finds a tree shoot he rejoices like a child. The roots of the papaya have already disappeared from the Upper LEMUM RIVER valley. I had a terrible craving for the stem of the taro plant. When coconuts are issued there is no dignity or decent behaviour. One is driven to greed and wants to eat it all by himself."

(c) "The latest and only subject of our conversations has been eating. This is our only enjoyment. We have reached the end of the rope. However one's life starts with a single desire to eat."

COCONUT FOR A CHANGE

The following extract from the diary of a member of 81 Inf Regt on BOUGAINVILLE sheds a highlight on the current menu:

"Today I mixed mashed coconut, copra, flour, coconut tree sprout, and roots of jungle plants into balls and fried them in coconut oil. I served them with mashed coconut to the officers."

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

WESTERN FRONT

Control of the vital port of ANTWERP has now been gained. Following bitter battles in which considerable casualties were suffered WALCHEREN and ZEELAND were occupied.

Possession of ANTWERP as a working port, reduces Allied communications to HOLLAND by 200 miles.

Further East small pockets of enemy troops are now being liquidated South of the River MAAS.

EASTERN FRONT

Following the Russian advance through HUNGARY the Germans have reacted strongly in an attempt to defend BUDAPEST.

Reports indicate the enemy is massing large quantities of equipment in an endeavour to prevent further progress between the rivers DANUBE and TISZA.

ITALY

Operations continue to be restricted due to bad weather.

BURMA

Japanese occupation of dominating heights astride the road TIDDIM - FORT WHITE is barring progress by Allied troops.

On the ARAKAN FRONT, West African troops have captured several villages North of BUTHIDAUNG. Contact is being maintained with enemy rearguards.

CHINA

The Japanese offensive at KWEILIN continues to make progress. Enemy forces are by-passing the capital and the American air base at LIUCHOW is already menaced.

Occupation of the important Japanese base at LUNGLING has removed one of the last major obstacles to the re-opening of a land route between INDIA and CHINA.

PART V

SECURITY.

FAIR CRITICISM AND CENSORSHIP

Recent reports from Base Censorship in First Aust Army areas have indicated a tendency among many franking officers to excise unnecessarily from troops' correspondence, passages expressing criticism or complaints.

Healthy grousing by other ranks involving fair comment and criticism of conditions, rations and what they themselves may consider injustices should be permitted in communications.

One factor however must be observed in granting the soldier this reasonable freedom of expression, namely a commonsense discrimination by the franking officer between the personal criticism or grousing of a soldier and a statement that may tend to encourage the effort of the enemy or bring into disrepute our force, our commanders, or the forces of our Allies. These latter statements are a breach of censorship regulations.

It is felt that troops should once more be reminded that censorship, although distasteful to all ranks of the Army, is a necessary imposition in war to prevent valuable information reaching the enemy. At this time also it should be stressed, particularly for the benefit of officers recently commissioned or those arriving from areas where unit censorship has not applied, that the stifling of justifiable grousing in a soldier's mail is not compatible with his responsibilities as a franking officer.

Lt-Col
GS First Aust Army

JAPANESE
TYPE 100 82mm
MORTAR FUSE
INSTANTANEOUS AND DELAY





SCALE—TWICE FULL SIZE



SECTION AT "A—A"

GSI (a) Adv LHQ

JAPANESE RANGE-FINDER
1 METRE BASE LENGTH

APPENDIX 'B' TO
FIRST AUST ARMY
SUMMARY Nº 129
OF 9 NOV 1944.



PERSPECTIVE - JAPANESE
1 METRE RANGE-FINDER

Scale Markings

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1000	9	8	7	6	5	4
250			3			400

Ranges: 250 to 400
400 to 1000 Millos(?)
1000 to 8000



GRATICULE

CARRYING BAR



LATH ADJUSTING



PLAN VIEW OF LEVEL & SIGHT



PLAN OF PRISMS

LEGEND

1 Object Window
2 Range Pointer
3 Range Scale
4 Rotating Wedge
5 "Distance adjustment" Knob
6 Pentagonal Prism
7 Objective Lense
8 Tube Pivot (Position rotated through 90°)
9 Central Ocular Prism (Erecting Tap for Bottom)
10 Eyepiece
11 Field Lens (?)
12 Optical Tube (capable of small rotation about pivot)
13 Graticule Plate
14 Prism (a) Intercocular Distance adjustment (rotates with eyepiece about C L shown)
(b) Erecting (Left for Right)
15 Graticule Illuminating Prism
16 As for Left Hand Eyepiece
17 Spring Loaded Plunger (position rotated through 90°)
18 Ball and Socket Joint
19 Rocking Sleeve
20 "Range Adjustment" Knob

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GSI

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 130

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 9 Nov to 1200 hrs 16 Nov 44

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CURRENT REVIEW

NEW BRITAIN

Following a lull of some weeks there has been renewed enemy patrol activity in the WIDE BAY area where a party of thirty was reported three miles SW of KANAKDRAN.

Reliable reports have been received giving details of enemy defences on the East coast of the GAZELLE PENINSULA. In addition the suspicion that the enemy had a patrol base at LEMINGI has been confirmed.

The enemy continues to be active in the OPEN BAY area. He appears to have a camp in the MEVELO PLANTATION and concentrations - probably not more than a few hundred - have been reported at the mouth of the ELITE and PANDI Rivers. A submarine is being used in this area probably for supply missions.

The recurrence of enemy air activity in this area is interesting after such a long lull. During the week one aircraft straffed the Northern tip of WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA and four aircraft raided the MOMOTE strip in the ADMIRALTY Group. There is a distinct possibility that the aircraft may have operated from the RABAUL area as reliable reports have been received that some aircraft were concealed in underground hangars and in addition the enemy are known to have been working on other damaged aircraft in the area.

NEW GUINEA

Natives have reported enemy parties in some strength patrolling areas West and NW HANSA BAY and this is confirmed by increased track activity reported by our reconnaissance aircraft.

A report of some interest from native sources indicates that the Japs have announced the intention of attacking NUBIA from BOSMAN early in January.

Further to the SW an enemy party reported as 50 strong raided our post at ANGETJI causing some casualties before it returned.

PHILIPPINES

Despite very heavy losses in shipping as a result of our heavy air attacks the enemy has succeeded in effecting considerable reinforcement over the past ten days at ORMOC on the West coast of LEYTE.

These troops aided by the terrain in the LIMON-ORMOC area have succeeded in delaying the Allied advance. However outflanking moves East and West of LIMON have made progress and Allied troops are now moving to the main road South of LIMON.

West of DAGAMI strong enemy positions have been overcome and good progress has been reported along this front.

PART I

OPERATIONS

1. LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

SOLOMONS

BOUGAINVILLE

Aggressive patrolling has continued in the UPPER LARUMA valley with some minor engagements with enemy near SISIVIE.

A determined attack on 9 Nov by an estimated 30/40 Japanese on one of our company positions in the UPPER LARUMA valley resulted in fierce fighting and seven Japanese were killed. The attack was repulsed.

In the vicinity of SISIVIE on 9/10 Nov two contacts with the enemy were made resulting in an additional three Japanese being killed.

NEW IRELAND

Australian patrols at AMBITLE and BABASE ISIANDS (90 miles ESE NAMATANAI) on 9 Nov found no trace of the Japanese and the natives were friendly and co-operative.

NEW BRITAIN

On 12 Nov one enemy party 30 strong was reported three miles SW KANAKDRAN.

Increased enemy activity is reported in the OPEN BAY area. On 9 Nov many fresh tracks were observed near MEVELO Plantation where a probable enemy camp was located. A strong enemy party was engaged by a native patrol south of the ELITE RIVER (four miles WSW BAIA) on 10 Nov. The patrol returned with one wounded.

On 12 Nov a large number of enemy were camped at the mouth of the PANDI RIVER.

On two occasions during the period a probable submarine was reported in OPEN BAY. It is possible the Japanese are using a submarine as a means of supply and also as a means of maintaining communication between RABAUL and his forces in this area.

NEW GUINEA

MADANG

On 10 Nov an Allied patrol in the vicinity of MINDJIM reported signs of a Japanese party. The patrol proceeded to BONGGU (seven miles east MINDJIM) and encountered four Japanese. Of these three were killed and one PW taken.

HANSA BAY

Enemy parties have been active in the areas west and NW HANSA BAY. On 10 Nov an Australian officer leading a native patrol reported that many of the natives in this party had deserted and joined a Japanese party estimated at 150 at SANI (17 miles west of HANSA BAY).

Enemy patrols were reported by natives moving in the coastal areas 10-12 miles NW NUBIA with concentrations at NEMNEM, BIEN and ANGORAM. Air reconnaissance also reveals track activity in these areas. The Japanese had informed these natives that an attack would be carried out early in Jan against BOGIA from BOSMAN.

KERAM RIVER

On 9 Nov an enemy force estimated 50 strong armed with LMG and rifles attacked our troops at ANGETJI and forced a retirement with some casualties. At least seven enemy were killed.

AITAPE-WEWAK AREA

Australian patrols have been active in this area, reporting nil enemy movement in TONG area, and a patrol along the old GERAM road to a position just west of SUAIN saw no enemy movement.

During 8 Nov a patrol came under artillery fire from gun positions thought to be located at ROCKY POINT (16 miles west of BUT) and although air recce did not locate any gun positions, bare patches which are probably old bivouac sites were observed.

On 10 Nov one of our aircraft bombing MAPRIK flew over LAKE GARAMAMBO (40 miles south of MAPRIK) and reported "dozens" of barges on the northern shores of the lake and many buildings along both banks of the river leading into the lake. Later reconnaissance showed many canoes around the edge of the lake and in the vicinity of YARANGAI (10 miles NNE of LAKE GARAMAMBO) but no barges. There are many small islands in the lake which appear to look like barges, these no doubt were responsible for the earlier report.

PHILIPPINES

General reinforcement of the PHILIPPINES has succeeded in more than replacing the many thousands of enemy killed on LEYTE. The enemy reinforcement of LUZON will probably continue until the Allies can control the air with land based aircraft. It is apparent the enemy will solidly defend LEYTE and as our drive towards ORMOC progresses his resistance, favoured by the difficult terrain, will become increasingly heavy.

A wide enveloping movement from the west has reached a point SSE of AGAHANG, while other forces outflanking LIHON from the east are meeting some opposition at MOUNT CABUNGANGAN (eight miles SE LIHON).

In the DAGAMI area enemy resistance has been broken after a stiff engagement. They have withdrawn west of GUINARONA. A Japanese force which landed by barge in the ORMOC area was forced to withdraw with casualties.

Enemy casualties to 11 Nov - Killed ~~16~~,121
Captured 154

2. SEA AND ENEMY

NE AREA

A submarine was sighted off NANTAMBU in NEW BRITAIN on 11 Nov signalling towards the ELIZE RIVER. After a period of 15 minutes the submarine headed in the direction of PONDO.

On 10 Nov some 32 barges which appeared to be in serviceable condition were reported by our aircraft between WEWAK and BORAM.

NW AREA

Principal sightings in the CELEBES continue to be at MAKASSAR. During the period under review merchant shipping tonnage of 5,[illegible]0/11,800 tons shows a significant decrease. No warships were observed.

In the BORNEO area a greater tonnage of enemy shipping is to be found currently in BRUNEI BAY than any other part between SINGAPORE and FORMOSA except possibly MANILA and SAIGON. Sightings at BRUNEI BAY included 17 warships and 18 unidentified vessels, during the period

PHILIPPINES

As a result of the recent naval battle, the enemy fleet is at its lowest since 1941. Sunk or damaged are all their battleships, about half of their combat cruisers, three quarters of the heavy cruisers and one third of their destroyers. In spite of this the enemy can organise one balanced striking force, which constitutes a continuing threat to our LEYTE shipping.

Merchant shipping in PHILIPPINE waters totalled 769 vessels of 1,096,885 tons for the period 21 Oct-5 Nov. This compares with 278 vessels of 3,881,870 tons for the period 11-20 Oct.

The principal areas showing substantial increases are LUZON and PALAWAN. The greater volume around LUZON is due to determined effort to reinforce the northern and central PHILIPPINES.

Since our landings on LEYTE, considerable small craft activity has been reported at CEBU in the reinforcement of the LEYTE garrison through ORMOC.

During the period under review sightings, both naval and merchant, in LUZON waters continue to remain at a very high level. Shipping coming to the area included two important convoys. One of these sighted on 4 Nov north of CAPE BOLINAO comprised three transports and three escort vessels covered by five aircraft. On 8 Nov 14 unidentified vessels and an unknown number of escorts were observed SW of CAPE BOLINAO.

3. AIR - OWN

Heaviest air attacks for the week have again centred on the PHILIPPINES. Heavy and medium bombers continued to attack airfields throughout the VISAYAS and MINDANAO with some heavy attacks against enemy shipping. Carrier based planes were responsible for the destruction of over 450 enemy aircraft as well as a number of naval units and merchant vessels.

Airfields throughout CELEBES have also been subjected to daily attacks by medium bombers and fighter-bombers, resulting in destruction of enemy airfield installations and aircraft.

AA positions at WEWAK and BORAM were bombed consistently during the week, as well as suspected Japanese-occupied localities in the HAPRIK area and SEPIK RIVER mouth.

NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-SOLOMONS

On 7 Nov, 64 Dauntlesses, Corsairs and Mitchells bombed and strafed KAVIENG and BORPOP, and 94 aircraft attacked targets in the GAZELLE PENINSULA.

Enemy bivouacs and gardens throughout BOUGAINVILLE were strafed by 82 aircraft on 8 Nov.

NEW GUINEA

Beauforts have attacked daily targets in the WEWAK and BORAM area and on 11 Nov covered a rescue by Catalina by thoroughly strafing the coastal area in that vicinity. Medium bombers also attacked suspected enemy positions in the LAKE GARAMAMBO area.

CERAM-BOEROE-CELEBES

Airfields at MINDAI, MENADO, MAPANGET, POHELAA, LANGDAN and KENDARI were all bombed during the week, mainly by Mitchells and Lightnings. Fourteen enemy aircraft were reported destroyed in these attacks. Seventeen Liberators bombed the barracks area at PINRANG starting a number of fires.

HALMAHERAS

On 5 Nov 29 Mitchells bombed the runways at KAOE, MITI, GALELA and LOLOBATA. These targets were again attacked on 6 and 7 Nov - on 7 Nov a total of 90 sorties being flown.

PHILIPPINES

Carrier based aircraft have caused considerable destruction to enemy shipping and aircraft. Over the period 5/6 Nov a total of 113 enemy aircraft were shot down by these fighters and a further 327 destroyed on the ground. In addition a tanker and three freighters were sunk, one destroyer probably sunk, and two destroyers, two destroyer escorts, a trawler and 14 freighters damaged.

Liberators also maintained their heavy attacks against airfields in the VISAYAS and on MINDANAO. Main targets for these attacks were FABRICA and ALICANTE which accounted for a further 19 enemy aircraft being destroyed on the ground and 8/10 interceptors shot down. Lightnings and Thunderbolts in sweeps over the VISAYAS also accounted for a large number of enemy aircraft shot down in combat.

On 10 Nov 22 Mitchells in attacks against enemy shipping sank a total of 15 vessels.

AIR - ENEMY

For the first time for many months there has been some enemy air activity directed against Allied-occupied areas in the NE Sector - on NEW BRITAIN and the ADMIRALTIES.

On 13 Nov one aircraft bombed and strafed the LAKE DAKATAUA area at the top of WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA.

One aircraft dropped 28 small bombs on MOMOTE airfield (ADMIRALTIES) following an earlier bombing and strafing attack by three fighters on 9 Nov. The last enemy aircraft in this area was reported in Aug 44.

The possibility of the aircraft making these attacks being based at RABAUL cannot be dismissed as over the past ten days there have been reliable reports that the Japanese have some aircraft safe in underground hangars in the KERAVAT area.

The enemy is continuing his nightly harassing attacks against Allied positions at MOROTAI.

The enemy has made full use of the large number of airfields he possesses in LUZON and the VISAYAS to disperse his air strength, which makes the task of neutralisation by Allied Air all the more difficult. Fairly heavy raids have continued against our airfields at TACLOBAN and against our shipping off the LEYTE beachheads.

Suicide bombings have been continued - these have caused considerable damage to several Allied merchant ships and near misses have damaged a number of the larger type landing craft.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

Revised estimate of the enemy strength east of AITAPE as at 10 Nov 44 is as follows:-

Combat Troops	9,000	
Base Troops	15,000	
Total	24,000	(Revised Estimate)

Of these 15,000 are believed to be effectives.

Current estimates for NE Sector are :-

NEW BRITAIN	35,000
NEW IRELAND	10,000
BOUGAINVILLE	25,000 Ø

TOTALS :-

NW SECTOR	484,400
NE SECTOR	94,000
Total SWPA	578,400

Ø This estimate is still under discussion.

Attached as Appendix 'A' is a review of the organisation of 38 Independent Mixed Brigade on BOUGAINVILLE, and facts concerning the general condition of its troops. This is in addition to information on this formation issued in First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 128.

ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the areas listed below is prepared on information to 11 Nov 44:-

AREAS	F	2E F	SE B	2E B	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES 10/11	4/11	11/10
NEW BRITAIN) NEW IRELAND) SOLOMONS)						10	2	12	12	12	12
TALAUD											3
ø PHILIPPINES:											
MINDANAO	20		12	10		6	7	55	57	50	67
VISAYAS	75	18	14	22		14	9	152	134	133	119
LUZON	165	30	55	82	4	15	25	376	360	357	272
								583	551	540	458
AMBON-BOERUE-CERAM	4		3		2	9	4	22	22	22	26
ø CELEBES:											
MANADO	4		2			6		12	12	12	19
MAKASSAR-KENDARI	17	8		20	3	12	4	64	56	53	91
								76	68	65	110
TIMOR-SOEMBA-SOEMBAWA-FLORES	10					3	3	16	16	16	16
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK	4			12		15	5	36	36	36	36
BORNEO	87	28		40		12	18	185	183	158	195
TOTALS SWPA	386	84	86	186	9	102	77	930	888	849	856
TRUK	6			3		6	4	19	19	19	25

ø Estimates do not include combat types not assigned to operational units and used in training.

(COIC Situation Report 316/44
12 Nov 44)

2. PERSONALITIES - GENERAL

The Japanese War Ministry has announced the appointment of General YAMASHITA, Tomoyuki as the supreme army commander in the PHILIPPINES. He was last reported as an Area Army commander to MANCHUKUO. This appointment suggests the revival, after 2½ years, of JAPAN's most successful army partnership with Field Marshall TERAUCHI in command of the Southern Army and controlling all forces in the southern regions and with YAMASHITA as the chief field commander. The following notes will provide some understanding of YAMASHITA - regarded by many as JAPAN's ablest fighting commander.

Born in 1885, YAMASHITA, Tomoyuki, graduated from the Imperial Military Staff College in 1916 and up to 1930 served as Military Attache in GERMANY, POLAND and AUSTRIA, forming close friendships with many of Germany's strongest militarists. When the "CHINA Incident" broke out, he fought in NORTH CHINA under the command of TERAUCHI but in 1940 was given his first big opportunity - the job of re-organising the Japanese Air Force. This he did by using German technicians and methods until, in 1941, he had built the Japanese Air Force into a striking arm almost comparable with the Luftwaffe itself. The job completed, he was given command of the 16th Army under TERAUCHI's SOUTHERN ARMY and was in the forefront of the successful drive down the MALAYAN PENINSULA and across to JAVA. There is a report that YAMASHITA went to the PHILIPPINES to assist HOMMA in completing that campaign and then returned to JAPAN. Since that time he has been commanding 1 Area Army in MANCHUKUO but with the Empire in danger of losing all that YAMASHITA had gained, his return to the southern battle is a logical development, and one that, according to PW statements, has been expected for a considerable time.

(1 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 8)

ORGANISATION

AIR INTELLIGENCE REGIMENTS

In recent PW reports information has been obtained regarding the organisation and duties of 4 Air Intelligence Regt as at Mar 44.

It appears that this unit (total strength approx 1,100) was engaged on radar work and aeroplane spotting.

Extreme security measures were taken to stop the movement of troops through areas occupied by this unit. Supplies were never taken to them by members of other units.

A chart drawn by a PW shows that the Regt is divided into a Regtl HQ and five Coys, two of which are called "Security Coys" - apparently specialist Coys engaged on the operation of radar sets.

During Mar 44 No 1 Security Coy was situated at WEWAK and No 2 Coy was at HOLLANDIA. Each Coy is divided into a HQ squad, vehicle squad and seven Intelligence squads of seven sections each. A PW stated that 1 and 2 Security Coys were the first to operate radar sets in NEW GUINEA, and as far as he knew there were no other such units in NEW GUINEA.

Armament - All ranks to Lcp Ptes were armed with Type 38 rifles with bayonets, and carried 120 rounds of ammunition per man. Officers and NCO's were equipped with pistols and swords, and carried 50 rounds of ammunition per man. Each Section was issued with one LMG and 80 to 100 hand grenades, each man carrying two or three at all times.

Equipment - Depending on the location of the OP, each Section was equipped with two or three Intelligence W/T sets or Ground Mk 3 sets. There were two Air/Ground Mk 2 W/T sets to each Intelligence Squad HQ.

A PW estimated that 1 Security Coy operated two or three radar installations at WEWAK, and 2 Security Coy one radar installation at HOLLANDIA. There was always sufficient reserve equipment on hand.

General - The movements of this unit are indefinite since Mar 44, but a PW stated that the Coy CO's and all officers at Regtl HQ were to have been evacuated by aeroplane as-soon as possible after 28 Mar. The same PW was emphatic that Lt-Col KITAGAWA, CO of 4 Air Intelligence Regt, was evacuated by plane from WEWAK on 26 Mar. There is no record as to whether any other evacuations took place.

4. EQUIPMENT

JAPANESE BOOBY TRAPS

The following article has been adapted from a report which appeared in CINPAC-CINPOA Bulletin 149-44.

Allied forces in the PACIFIC and CHINA-INDIA theatre report increasing encounters with Japanese Booby Traps. Although most of the booby traps found to date have usually been improvised and often poorly conceived, more carefully planned and effectively set booby traps may be encountered as the Allied offensive mounts. The Japanese is an excellent imitator and may probably make use of the superior technique and methods employed by the Germans in this regard.

The essence of the booby trap is surprise. Success depends upon original and well concealed planning so that the most ordinary and casual action of "enemy" troops will detonate the trap. So far the Japanese have usually been clumsy. Objects (trip wires, etc) have in many cases been in full view with little or no attempt at camouflage. Furthermore, nothing new or unusual in siting or manufacture has been discovered in booby traps found to date.

The most common objects are usually chosen for the traps including bottles, sections of bamboo, parasols, fountain pens, pipes, tobacco tins, radios, match boxes and medical equipment. It is probable in the future that any article worth souveniring may be booby-trapped.

The enemy frequently use trip-wires. These may be strung across jungle trails, or attached to souvenirs, doors or windows or as part of a road block. Underground pressure traps which may be planted under loose boards or stones or under floors of buildings are also used. Any equipment containing an electrical circuit is likely to be booby-trapped, such as an abandoned vehicle, torches, searchlights and power generators.

Recent reports indicate that the Japanese are aware of shortcomings of booby traps previously used and are attempting to increase and supplement the explosives used. With this in mind, they may use captured equipment such as grenades and mortar shells for booby trap devices. Usual materials found in Japanese booby traps include: Types 91, 97 and 99 hand grenades, stick grenades and Anti-Tank mines; TNT and picric acid charges, nitric acid, glycerine and benzine; aerial bombs.

The enemy's use of booby traps is indicated in a brief review of traps actually encountered by our forces in the PACIFIC. In the streets of GARAPAN (SAIPAN) 63 Kg (138 lb) bombs were found buried tail down with the nose fuzes armed. Some were placed in obvious places so that personnel or vehicles attempting to avoid them would set off other well-concealed mines. On GUAM, American hand grenades with the safety pins pulled, were found placed in the armpits of unburied Japanese dead. On KISKA, a phonograph was connected to explosives under the floor, which would have exploded had someone attempted to operate the machine. A radio was packed with TNT ready to explode had the switch been turned on. Model 93 "Tape measure" mines were placed behind and in front of the wheels of an abandoned field gun, movement of which would have caused detonation. In BURMA, the Japanese placed grenades in bamboo thickets which, if disturbed, caused the grenade to fall, exploding upon impact with the ground. Booby traps were planted under anti-tank mines to be detonated as the mines were lifted out. In BURMA and INDIA, considerable use was made of grenades buried just under the ground to be detonated [illegible] pressure.

The pictures reproduced as Appendix 'B', based on combat experience and documentary evidence, illustrate typical Japanese booby traps. The photographs were prepared by CINPAC - CINPOA in co-operation with OCE CENPAC - BASCOM.

Photograph 1 illustrates a Japanese "Yard-stick" mine which can easily be buried or hidden in loose rubbish. The mine contains eight blocks of picric acid explosive and four pressure detonators and is effective against personnel and vehicles. It may be found emplaced to explode if an abandoned enemy vehicle or gun is moved.

Photograph 2 shows a Bangalore Torpedo which contains a built-in pull igniter with a trip wire arrangement. The Type 97 hand grenade, which has been widely used in booby

traps, ordinarily requires a blow on the striker for detonation but the fuse may be removed and a pull igniter inserted in the fuse well. The Japanese also have a pull type grenade.

Photograph 3 illustrates a typical souvenir booby trap. Removal of this water bottle will detonate the explosive charge which is equipped with a pull ignitor. In practice, the explosive is carefully concealed. A rifle, sword, flag or other likely souvenir may be substituted for the water bottle. A torch may be filled with explosive and rigged to detonate when the switch is moved. Pipes and fountain pens may explode when unscrewed.

Photograph 4 shows a British M36 hand grenade wedged in a tree in such a way that pressure is maintained on the release lever. The grenade will fire when jerked from the tree by a man hitting the trip wire. Japanese grenades require a blow on the striker unless a pull igniter is substituted, but captured British or American grenades may be used in ways which take advantage of the familiar principle which fires the grenade when the safety pin is withdrawn and the release lever released.

Photograph 5 illustrates a type of booby trap often found in-doors under a loose floor board. A hand grenade may be concealed under a board or loose rubbish and detonated by the pressure of a man's foot. The Type 99 Magnetic Mine may be substituted for the grenade.

Photograph 6 is an example of an elementary form of booby trap using the trip wire principle. A charge of dynamite with iron spikes taped around it contains a pull igniter which functions when the pull wire is stretched. A pull type hand grenade could be substituted for the dynamite.

Photograph 7 shows Japanese Anti-Boat mines emplaced on a landing beach. These mines are fired by bending or breaking the horn. The Japanese have strung wire between the horns of two adjacent mines to form a booby trap effective against assault troops.

Photograph 8 illustrates a simple device which causes a hand grenade to fall to the floor when the supporting pin is withdrawn by opening the door. Wired to the hand grenade is a 50mm Type 89 Grenade to increase the explosion. Mortar shells, both own and enemy, are frequently attached to hand grenades for the same purpose. A similar device, sometimes enclosed in an empty shell case may be hidden beneath the floor and released by opening a door or window.

Photograph 9 illustrates a simple pressure type booby trap formed by two blocks of picric acid explosive and a pressure detonator taken from a "Yard-stick" mine.

Photograph 10 shows a captured Dutch anti-tank mine here shown as a defensive land mine. It could, however, be easily concealed and set to detonate from the pressure of a man's foot.

Photograph 11 illustrates a Japanese Model 93 "tape measure" mine attached to a bundle of plastic explosive with a pull igniter. This type of booby trap may be encountered by personnel removing enemy mines. In actual practice, the booby trap would be carefully concealed while the mine itself might be half hidden or left in full sight. The "Tape measure" mine can be fitted with a fuse requiring only 20 lbs of pressure to set it off.

Photograph 12 shows a method of detonation of a hand grenade fitted with a regular striker. A light string is passed between the two trees each side of a trail with a grenade strung at each end. A man passing down the trail breaks the string allowing the grenades to fall and strike flat rocks at the foot of the tree.

Photograph 13 illustrates how a grenade can be enclosed in a 75mm fuse container with a striker protruding downward, both of which are inserted in an artillery shell case. A jerk on the suspension pin will release the fuse action causing the grenade to fall and detonate against the bottom of the shell case. The far end of the string is attached to a spring, weight or the elastic stick, to ensure withdrawal of the pin. For a heavier explosion, plastic explosive may be packed into the extra space in the fuse can.

Various types of incendiary booby traps may be encountered. An ordinary bottle may contain separate portions of benzine and sulphuric acid, with potassium chlorate and some other substance in the sulphur. If the bottle is shaken or tipped over, the sulphuric acid comes into contact with a mixture in the stopper and causes a small explosion and ignition of the benzine. A bamboo cylinder may be made into an incendiary booby trap by inserting a tube containing layers of kerosene, nitric acid, cotton and glycerine. It ignites after a certain length of time or when the tube is shaken or disturbed. The actual contents of this booby trap have not been verified.

(AIF Weekly Intelligence Review No 119)

8. GENERAL

(a) MORALE IN JAPAN

It is not only in Allied countries that fancy rumours run rife. A PW captured in the PHILIPPINES, when questioned on conditions in JAPAN, stated:

"It is rumoured amongst soldiers and civilians alike that if AMERICA wins the War, all except 2,000 Japanese will be slaughtered off. JAPAN will be turned into an international park, using the 2,000 as guides. These guides will be 2,000 of the prettiest Japanese girls, around 17 years of age."

(b) JAPANESE PT BOATS

Documents recently captured indicate that JAPAN now has well over 300 operational motor torpedo boats (PTs). Official Jap Navy TATSU - announcements of new construction and conversion - lists 324 PTs as built or building in May 1944. All of these may well be ready for combat today.

The enemy has built the vast majority of his PTs in late 1943 and 1944. Thrown on the defensive, he undoubtedly realized the potential value of these boats in the restricted waters of the PHILIPPINES and SINGAPORE - N.E.I. areas. He was greatly influenced by his experience with Allied PTs in the South and Southwest PACIFIC.

US Forces have had virtually no contact with enemy PTs. There are indications that one enemy squadron was based in NEW GUINEA in Sep 1943, and one document admits the loss of PT112 a salvaged Dutch PT apparently in combat. One converted Dutch boat was photographed off LAE (NEW GUINEA) on 2 Aug 1943. Units in this area probably consisted of Dutch boats raised at SOURABAYA after Allied scuttling, and the 1941 No 2 Class, the earliest Jap built PT boat, adapted from an Italian model.

Enemy PT boats are believed to be slower, less sturdy and more lightly armed than Allied PTs, with a narrower beam. Yet they carry from two to four torpedoes, several depth-charges, and considerable deck armament, and are obviously a strong potential enemy weapon. Further, although without PT combat experience, personnel manning the boats are apparently well trained. Torpedoes carried are Type 44 or Type 91 and enemy boats will attempt to launch at 2000 yards or less, although they may be expected to launch at a greater range when detected.

HAYABUSA BOATS

To compensate for admitted deficiencies in speed and manouverability of their standard PTs the Japs plan to use Hayabusa boats as part of a PT combat team when meeting our PTs. The Hayabusa boats are high speed boats which carry no torpedoes, and represent a recent Jap development in anti-PT boat weapons. At least 86 units are believed operational. Hayabusa boats, although listed in the same general classification with MTBs in Jap Navy announcements are considered in a different combat category by the enemy.

Hayabusa boats displace 20-25 tons, are without torpedoes, and are heavily armed with machine-guns. They have a maximum speed (on paper, at least) of 36.5 knots and a minimum speed of six knots. Their cruising range at 30 knots is only 140 miles. These boats are 59 ft in length with a 14.5 foot beam and allegedly have a shallow three foot draft even when fully loaded. They can turn in a circle of about 300 yards.

There are at least two classes of Hayabusa boats, the No 10 class (with 48 boats), and the No 74 class (with 29 boats). The differences between these classes is not known. Units reportedly have a crew of seven enlisted men and one officer. The Japs envisage the Hayabusa boats as leading Jap PTs in an encounter with our own PTs, using their greater manouverability and imagined greater firepower, while the enemy PTs remain grouped in a secondary position to conduct "simultaneous and concentrated fire" at our boats.

(Sixth US Army

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

WESTERN FRONT

Interest on the western front during the week has centred around the offensive of Gen PATTON's forces in Eastern FRANCE.

South of METZ forces advancing towards SAARBRUCKEN, have cut the rail line from METZ to GERMANY. Meanwhile the northern arm of the pincer movement is moving steadily around the city and towards the German border.

It is reported that long lines of transport have been observed moving East from METZ.

The German command has ordered all civilians to leave SAARBRUCKEN, which is now less than twenty miles ahead of American spearheads.

EASTERN FRONT

The Russian advance through HUNGARY and the battle of BUDAPEST has continued. Soviet columns in NE HUNGARY are moving to by-pass BUDAPEST and join with Russian troops South of the city, thus threatening to encircle enemy forces defending the approaches to BUDAPEST.

The German Cond has announced its intention of bitterly defending BUDAPEST. Success of Russian offensives around BUDAPEST would rob the Germans of vital communications and leave the way open for a Russian invasion of AUSTRIA.

ITALY

After a period of inactivity due to bad weather, the tempo of the Allied campaign increased during the week with the capture of the airfield of FORLI, and advances three to four miles beyond. On the coast Eighth Army troops have advanced to within two miles of RAVENNA, an important enemy supply base on the ADRIATIC due East of BOLOGNA.

BURMA

Continued Allied advances in BURMA have brought Allied forces to a line along the CHINDWIN RIVER.

In Northern BURMA the enemy's position has deteriorated sharply, and Chinese forces are closing in on BHAMO, an important Japanese base between MYITKYINA and MANDALAY.

CHINA

Following the Allied evacuation of KWEILIN the Japs have continued their advances to gain control of overland communications and Allied air bases and have forced the Allies to evacuate LUICHOW.

The strategic town of LIUCHENG, 19 miles NE of LUICHOW, and an escape route to KWLICHOW PROVINCE for Chinese troops has also fallen to the Japs.

PART V

SECURITY

INFORMATIVE CENSORSHIP

The primary function of censorship is to prevent information that will be of use to him, reaching the enemy. However, a second and hardly less important aspect of censorship is that which may be termed "informative" and which represents the acquisition of information of value to our own cause and the placing of such information in the correct channels so that action can be taken upon it.

Unit censorship enables regimental officers to keep a finger on the pulse of their men, to anticipate and to prevent dissention in a unit, at the same time affording a reliable indication the men's views on command, training, rations, amenities, etc.

Field Censorship affords the same facilities to the staffs of formation HQ as reports from that source give a very good cross sectional coverage of both the base and field troops.

Where there's smoke there's fire, and if a large number of soldiers in one area or unit complain that they have not been on leave for 18 months, that their rations are unduly poor or if they all complain of mal-administration, there is probably some truth in their writings, and the HQ receiving such reports from field censorship can probably do much to alleviate the situation.

It must be realized however, that the extraction of "informative" information from letters is not "snooping" and to prevent this impression becoming widespread, information from this source must be treated confidentially. Unless a security breach is perpetrated the name of the writer will not be disclosed.

Lt-Col
GS First Aust Army

APPENDIX A

38 IMB BOUGAINVILLE

During the past two months much information has become available from documents and PW sources concerning 38 IMB on BOUGAINVILLE.

The following details of re-organisation are an elaboration of the information given in First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary Nos 128, page 10.

(1) ORGANISATION

It will be noticed that a substantial percentage of the absorbed troops are from combat units.

(2) STRENGTH

Little is known regarding the strength of the Brigade except that it was to be 3,700 when organised in Jul 44. PW stated that Bn strength was 600 with companies of about 100.

(3) CONDITION OF TROOPS

There is however some doubt regarding the physical condition and state of morale of the troops of 38 IMB. The Brigade is concentrated in the area NUMA NUMA-ARIGUA with elements forward in the UPPER LARUMA RIVER valley. It is significant that most of the PW who have surrendered on BOUGAINVILLE are from this area.

An indication of the condition of troops from 81 Inf Regt of this IMB was given in the extracts from the diary of 2/Lt OKUMA included in First Aust Army Intelligence Summary Nos 129, page 13, under the title "MORALE."

(4) ORDER OF BATTLE

The following table gives details of absorptions and regroupings which were made to form 38 IMB :—

COMPONENT OF 38 IMB	FORMED FROM
HQ	17 Div Inf Gp HQ
81 Inf Regt	
1 Bn HQ	HQ 3 Bn 53 Inf Regt
1 Coy	9 Coy 53 Inf Regt
2 Coy	10 Coy 53 Inf Regt
	39 Sea Duty Coy (30 Jul 44)
3 Coy	11 Coy 53 Inf Regt
4 Coy	6 Coy 54 Inf Regt
1 MG Coy	3 MG Coy 53 Inf Regt
Bn Gun Pl	Inf Mortar Section
	The above units formed the nucleus of the new 1 Bn. Personnel from the following units were distributed throughout Coys of 1 Bn to bring them up to strength :—
	12 Coy 53 Inf Regt (Remnants)
	3 Inf Mortar Bn (Remnants)
	u/i Land Duty Coy (possibly remnants of 96)
	10 Indep Mtn Arty Regt (Elements)
2 Bn -	
5 Coy	Former 5 Coy 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt
6 Coy	Former 6 Coy 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt

COMPOSITION OF 38 INF BDE	-2-	FORMED FROM
7 Coy		Bn HQ, 5. & 7 Coy. 54 Inf Regt 2 MG Unit, 54 Inf Regt (Part) 3 Bn Gun Pl. 54 Inf Regt (Part)
8 Coy		Former 8 Coy 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt
MG Coy Bn Gun Pl		2 MG Coy: 54 Inf Regt (Part): 2 Bn Gun Pl. 54 Inf Regt (Part):
Tk A Gun Pl		Not known
		These units formed the nucleus of the new 2 Bn. Coys were reinforced by personnel from :--
		Former 7 Coy. 2 Bn 81 Inf Regt 41 Indep Inf Coy (Part) # u/i Machine Cannon Coy # u/i Air Defence Unit (3) Debarkation Unit (possibly)
3 Bn		Old 3 Bn, the companies being reinforced by personnel from :--
		41 Indep Inf Coy (Part) # u/i Machine Cannon Coy # u/i Air Defence Unit (3) Debarkation Unit (possibly)
		# = It is possible that these two units were organised into an AA Arty Unit.
38 DIB Arty Bn (may include an AA Arty Unit)		1 Bn 23 Fd Arty Regt reinforced by elements of :-- 4 Med Arty Regt (1 Bn less 1 Bty) 10 Indep Mtn Arty Regt (possibly elements)
38 DIB Engr Coy		1 Coy 17 Div Engr Regt, possibly reinforced by elements of an u/i Shipping Engr Unit (possibly (3) Shipping Engr Regt)
38 DIB Signal Coy		Composition not known.
38 DIB Medical Unit		Possibly composed of :-- 17 Div Medical Unit (One Pl) 17 Div Water Purification Unit Casualty Clearing Unit 94 L of C Hospital

APPENDIX "C" TO AMF
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
No 118 OF 10 NOV '44.

JAPANESE BOOBY TRAPS


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
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
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
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
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HQ FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 131

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 16 Nov to 1200 hrs 23 Nov 44

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CURRENT REVIEW

NEW BRITAIN

Enemy patrol activity around OPEN BAY and further to the west has continued on an increased scale. Detachments operating in the vicinity of the PANDI RIVER mouth have been subjected to attacks by our patrols in that area but it appears that a party approximately 70 strong and armed with two HMG's is still operating there and moving westwards.

On the night 21/22 Nov two enemy barges landed troops one mile west of SULE. This party immediately pushed on in the direction of ULAMONA.

NEW GUINEA

An Officer PW from the 41 Div Intendance Unit has furnished some interesting details of the general situation in the WEWAK-TORRICELLIS AREA. He has confirmed the dispositions of the major formations and has indicated that the HQ 18 ARMY has now moved inland from the coast to the RANIMBOA area.

This officer stated that he had been waiting to surrender for some time and that he considered numerous others were in the same frame of mind. He mentioned the possibility of many Japanese surrendering once operations commence on a large scale.

Light anti-aircraft fire encountered by our planes at RANIMBOA 22 Nov confirms the presence of Japanese troops.

ASIA & WAPIA GROUPS

These two coral atoll groups have been occupied by the United States forces during the past week. They are both located about 100 miles north of the VOGELKOP.

Slight enemy resistance was encountered but this was quickly overcome.

The purpose underlying the occupation of these islands is not at present clear but it is apparent that extensive areas are available for airfields and that suitable coral for surfacing is abundant.

On the other hand it may have been that the enemy had either coast watching or radar stations on both groups and were reporting the movement of our aircraft from the SCHOUTEN ISLANDS.

PHILIPPINES

The situation around LIMON has developed into a stalemate with the US forces launching numerous attacks in an effort to break through to ORMOC and the Japanese counter-attacking against our road block positions.

From the Central Sector a US force has pushed across the mountains and forward elements have reached MALTIBOG.

It appears that the terrain from MALTIBOG to ORMOC is not so ideally suited to the defence as is the terrain to the north of the latter and that a coastal drive may meet with more success than the one through the mountains of LIMON.

PART I

SECTION 1

LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

NEW GUINEA

GENERAL

Operations in this area have been mainly characterised by sharp patrol clashes. As previously reported, the enemy parties have been foraging for food. There is still no organised reconnaissance or fighting patrol activity on the part of the enemy throughout the area.

HANSA BAY - MADANG

Allied patrols in these areas have observed no signs of enemy movement. One Japanese was captured by natives at BARUM, approximately 12 miles SW of MADANG.

KAIRIRU ISLAND

Interpretation of photo coverage 7 Nov discloses considerable activity throughout the whole island.

The gardens, which cover approximately 35 acres, are the best kept in the WEWAK Sector.

In addition, all roads appear to be heavily used and in fair condition.

Navigation beacons continue to be maintained and the seaplane slipway (228291) is in use. Two launches and one barge were observed on the slipway. It is probable that these vessels are used for running supplies to WEWAK area, supplementing the meagre rations available there.

AITAPE-WEWAK AREA

Active patrolling by Australian troops in vicinity of the DANMAP RIVER has resulted in a number of contacts being made with small parties of the enemy. Casualties inflicted on these parties between 3 Nov-20 Nov are as follows :-

Killed - 71
PW - 7

The lowering of enemy morale by these methods is evidenced by the increase in voluntary surrender.

Activity has been observed in the area SW of MAPRIK. During an air raid on 21 Nov enemy troops were seen in clearings. On the approach of our aircraft all ran into nearby huts.

Allied air activity in the RANIMBOA (8 miles SSE of BOIKEN) area on 22 Nov encountered light anti-aircraft fire. No previous activity has been noted in this area.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

An Allied patrol operating along the PRAFI RIVER, MANOKWARI, has released 123 internees, representing six nationalities and previously held by the Japanese.

Previous reports had indicated the presence in this area of an internee camp with approximately 500 inmates.

This was borne out by interrogation of released internees, who stated the balance of their number had died of starvation and disease.

BOUGAINVILLE

Activity has been confined to Allied patrolling in the UPPER LARUMA VALLEY. The only contacts made have been with small enemy parties, one of which was forced to withdraw after a clash with an Allied patrol operating from SISIVIE. Three Japanese were killed.

The possibility of strong enemy resistance to any Allied advances north is evidenced by the statements of a recently captured PW.

Enemy units in the UPPER LARUMA sector have been given the primary task of blocking the trail and preventing any Allied advance towards the NUMA NUMA sector. The order from the IJB commander was to defend that position to the last man. This PW had also heard strong rumours of a request by HQ 17 ARMY to TOKYO for permission to launch a final suicidal attack against the Allied forces. This was rejected and instructions were given for the Japanese to live off the land.

Indications that submarines still run into BOUGAINVILLE has been given by a native teacher who entered the TOROKINA perimeter on 7 Nov. He states that he had observed a small enemy submarine at SORAKEN, MATCHIN BAY, three weeks previously. 20 Japanese had been evacuated by this craft.

He also stated that up to that time submarines had been making calls at SORAKEN every month. His description of the submarine left little doubt that he had not mistaken it for some other craft.

NEW BRITAIN

Current reports indicate the enemy is increasing his patrol activity.

OPEN BAY

Our patrols have attacked enemy detachments operating in the vicinity of the BANDI RIVER mouth.

It appears that an enemy party approximately 70 strong armed with two LMG's is still operating in this area. It is probable that this party continued to move west towards EA EA and MADIDLA on 21 Nov.

On the night 21/22 Nov two enemy barges went ashore approximately one mile west of SULE. This party immediately moved off into the bush towards ULAMONA, where its presence was reported on 22 Nov.

WIDE BAY AREA

Reliable information places approximate enemy strength at KANAKDRAN (approx 5 miles SW of WAITAVALO) at 120 which can readily be reinforced from WAITAVALO where estimated strength is between 500 and 1,000.

It is also confirmed that there are few enemy in RABAUL itself, the main strength being along the WARONGAI RIVER - KERAVAT line.

Enemy movements in the WIDE BAY area have been centred around HENRY REID BAY with WAITAVALO as the principal point of concentration.

A very strong post commanded by a full Colonel is established at WAITAVALO. This can be reinforced from LEMINGI by road in two and a half days. It is equipped with W/T communication, possibly linked to an outpost at the northern extremity of KALAI Plantation (approx 2 miles south of KANAKDRAN) where the strength has varied from 30 to 120 in recent months. This outpost can be reinforced from WAITAVALO in less than two hours.

It is known that the enemy forces carry a large variety of weapons with a high percentage of LMG's and mortars.

In view of these dispositions it would appear that the enemy is preparing to resist any landing which may be attempted between KALAI Plantation and WAITAVALO.

MAPIA GROUP

During the past week US forces have occupied this group which is situated about 100 miles north of the VOGELKOP.

On 15 Nov a preliminary bombardment of PEGUN ISLAND was carried out. The enemy were driven from prepared positions and the bulk of the garrison of 175 men withdrew to BRAS ISLAND. Thirteen enemy committed suicide. The garrison was portion of 223 Inf Regt 36 Div.

On the same night BRAS ISLAND was bombarded and US troops landed unopposed. Some opposition was encountered inland but by 18 Nov all islands in the group were occupied.

Enemy casualties to 18 Nov - Killed 159

ASIA GROUP

On the night 19/20 Nov, IGI, MIARIN and FANI ISLANDS were occupied without opposition.

MOROTAI

Enemy activity has now taken a definite form. Throughout the past week minor but persistent enemy infiltration parties have harassed the Allied perimeter. These attacks though usually planned for night operations have also occurred during daylight.

It is interesting to note that on 13 Nov an attempt was made to destroy a bomber aircraft.

It is likely that 32 Div reinforcements at present in HALMAHERA may be earmarked for operations on MOROTAI. Enemy orders captured on MOROTAI indicate the possible assembly of units in that area for use as suicide squads. These would doubtless be used in an attempt to disrupt operations from PITOE aerodrome.

PHILIPPINES

Stubborn defensive action by the enemy in the ORMOC VALLEY has continued to hold up the Allied force's offensive.

There has been considerable activity on the enemy lines of communication and many small craft have been noted in the vicinity of ORMOC.

It is obvious that any attack south through this valley will be protracted as the enemy has had time to regroup and reorganise.

In view of this it is interesting to follow the offensive on the coastal sector through MATTIBOG. The terrain here is not as difficult as that in the northern sector and if the coast is reached there are few topographical features to bar the advance north along the coast to ORMOC.

Total enemy casualties to 18 Nov -

Killed	19,075
PW	168

Recent reports of Japanese activity in the other PHILIPPINE ISLANDS suggest that ever-increasing attention is being paid to the possibility of further Allied offensive action.

Powerful forces are now assembled throughout LUZON, MINDANAO and the VISAYAS. This reinforcement programme will doubtless be continued.

Since the defeat of the Japanese Navy the defence of the Empire now devolves on the Army and Air Force. This is revealed by the large-scale transfer of troops to defend the threat from the east and south-east.

SECTION 2

SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

GENERAL

The result of the constant drain on enemy shipping is becoming increasingly apparent.

The depleted Navy is now incapable of properly performing all its normal functions. Consequently merchant tonnage has been laid open to large-scale Allied attacks.

Although the enemy still maintains his sea lanes between the southern areas and the Empire, it is apparent that a partial blockade is already operating. Access to the supply areas in the southern region is vital to Japanese industry and any interference with this commerce will lead to disruption of the enemy war industries.

The direct result of these assaults on enemy merchant shipping can be seen in the increasing use of barges and small stack-aft vessels. Of late these types have been particularly noticeable in the BORNEO area, CELEBES and PHILIPPINES areas.

NE AREA

During the nights 16/17 and 17/18 Nov Allied PT boats shelled and strafed enemy coastal installations on CHOISEUL ISLAND and NEW IRELAND.

NW AREA

An increase in overall tonnage has been noted during the past week. The estimated tonnage of 9,050/18,500 tons is principally situated at MAKASSAR. The greater proportion of this shipping consists of small stack-aft type vessels of 300/1,000 tons.

Two naval auxiliary vessels and one torpedo boat were also observed.

BORNEO

Air reconnaissance of BRUNEI BAY on 18 Nov disclosed one light cruiser, two destroyers and 20 merchant or fleet train ships ranging from 500/800 tons.

Although this port has been a regular anchorage and fuelling centre for merchant shipping, it is well situated as a base for operational sorties to interfere with Allied lines of communication.

PHILIPPINES

Interest during the current period centres on the heavy barge traffic between CEBU-ORMOC via the CAMOTES ISLANDS. At eight knots barges can make the round trip in one night. Estimates show that the enemy may possess up to 200 serviceable barges in the CEBU-ORMOC area. This represents a potential carrying capacity for 10,000 men.

SECTION 3

AIR - CEN

In the [illegible] growing Allied forces have continued to attack enemy airfields and installations. The Japanese Air Force has suffered heavy losses resulting from attacks by our carrier-based aircraft.

Aircraft operating from the SOLOMONS have maintained their attacks on targets throughout BOUGAINVILLE, NEW BRITAIN and NEW IRELAND.

NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-SOLOMONS

On 16 and 17 Nov targets at RABAUL were bombed and strafed. On 19 Nov other raids were carried out on known enemy positions and airfields on GAZELLE PENINSULA.

NEW GUINEA

Attacks on WEWAK were maintained during the week.

On 19 Nov enemy troop positions on the west bank of the DANMAP RIVER near IDAIN were bombed and strafed. Incendiaries were used to burn out kunai patches occupied by the enemy. Other raids were carried out at ANGORAM, NEW BIEN and MAPRIK.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

The airfield, bivouac areas and AA positions in the vicinity of UTAROH were the main targets for fighter-bomber strikes.

MAPIA GROUP

Heavy bombardments by medium bombers preceded the landing by US forces on 15 Nov.

CELEBES

Heavy bombers have maintained attacks on MAKASSAR floatplane base and BORO BORO airfield.

On 20 Nov Beaufighters carrying 25 pdr rockets attacked TAHAMON, LAMPANGI BAY.

BORNEO

Oil storage centres and tanks were bombed and strafed by heavy bombers and fighter-bombers.

Naval units and shipping in BRUNEI BAY were successfully bombed.

PHILIPPINES

Heavy and medium bombers based on LEYTE are now assisting in the bombardment of airfields and installations throughout the PHILIPPINES.

Fighters and fighter-bombers continue to harass Japanese lines of communication around ORMOC and ORMOC VALLEY.

Final assessment of the strike on MANILA on 13 Nov reveals that one light cruiser, four destroyers and eleven cargo vessels were destroyed.

Carrier-based aircraft also accounted for 100 enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground and in combat.

AIR - ENEMY

GENERAL

The present period has been one of comparative quiescence. It is of interest, therefore, to consider all the factors bearing on any future efforts in the SWPA.

It is known that operations in the PHILIPPINES have compelled the enemy to commit new naval and army air units. These have been drawn from far afield and include units which had barely reached the operational stage. The training programme has also been expanded to a great extent in an endeavour to relieve any shortage of pilots. This scheme is now working under great pressure.

Running parallel with this course is a sharp rise in combat aircraft production with the result that a fairly large reserve is available for use in the Pacific war.

Allied naval units continue to be subjected to suicide-dive attacks. As the enemy is using old model planes and pilots are considered expendable, it is obvious that some measure of success must be achieved without undue strain on first line aircraft.

The Japanese have also shown a marked inclination towards harassing dusk to dawn attacks on Allied land forces. It is interesting to note, also, that the enemy has been partially successful in jamming our radar in this area.

Within the Empire a vigorous reaction has been produced by the raids on industrial areas.

In the SOLOMONS interest has again been focussed on RABAUL. During the long period of inactivity in this area, LAKUNAI, VUNAKANAU and TOBERA dromes have been maintained in a serviceable condition. Current reports now indicate a recrudescence of activity. Although at present on a limited scale, evidence suggests that some attempt is being made to recondition unserviceable planes. In addition, the possibility of staging aircraft through RABAUL must be considered as a method of staging small-scale nuisance raids.

Reports during the past weeks have indicated the presence of underground hangars in the RABAUL area. This would account for the successful concealment of aircraft, but it should be remembered that the Japanese have made considerable use of natural camouflage in the past. During the long period of enemy occupation it is reasonable to assume that considerable time has been devoted to this end. It is therefore considered possible that any available aircraft can be successfully concealed in the heavy growth now surrounding their aerodrome.

In NEW GUINEA, even though enemy-held dromes are unserviceable, there is evidence of considerable anti-aircraft defences in their vicinity.

In BORNEO the policy under which the enemy air forces are operating is somewhat puzzling. Current estimates indicate 200 combat aircraft in BORNEO. Recent large-scale attacks against enemy oil installations and shipping in NORTH BORNEO have been entirely unopposed, even though the enemy's airfield facilities are excellent.

This may presage some reorganisation of enemy air forces in readiness for any new operation undertaken by the Allies.

PART II

SECTION 1

ENEMY OOB - LAND

Revised estimates of enemy strength as at 10 Nov 44 are :-

NW Sector

PHILIPPINES		
LUZON	159,500	
CENTRAL	77,000	
MINDANAO	61,000	
Total		297,500
PALAU		20,000
BOMBERAI PENINSULA		4,600

The estimate for SARMI has been deleted, as only remnants are left.

Estimates for other Areas are unchanged, giving a grand total for NW Sector of 505,500.

NE Sector

EAST OF AITAPE	24,000
NEW BRITAIN	35,000
NEW IRELAND	10,000
SOLOMONS	Estimate under consideration.

Total NW Sector	505,500	
NE Sector	69,000	ø
Total SWPA	574,500	ø

ø NOTE: These totals do not include SOLOMONS. This estimate is under discussion and estimate by First Aust Army will probably be published in First Aust Army Summary No 132.

ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the areas listed below is prepared on information to 19 Nov 44 :-

AREAS	F	2EN	C	2EB	F/B	F/P	CBEN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES	
									11/11	4/11
NEW BRITAIN NEW IRELAND SOLOMONS						10	2	12	12	12
PHILIPPINES:										
MINDANAO	28		20	24		6	7	85	55	50
VISAYAS	105	18	14	32		14	9	192	152	133
LUZON	275	20	85	106	4	15	25	530	376	357
								807	583	540
AMBON-CERAM-BOERUE	4		3		2	9	4	22	22	22
CELEBES:										
MANADO			2			6		8	12	12
MAKASSAR-KENDARI	12	7		12	3	12	4	50	64	53
								58	76	65
TIMOR-SOEMBA-SOEMBAWA-FLORES	10					3	3	16	16	16
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK	4			18		15	5	42	36	36
BORNEO	112	28		40		12	28	220	185	158
TOTALS SWPA	550	73	124	232	9	102	87	1177	930	849
TRUK	6			3		6	4	19	19	19

ø Estimates do not include combat types not assigned to operational units and used in training.

(COIC Situation Report 324/44, 20 Nov 44)

COMMENT It is noted that two small enemy raids this month, the first on HOMOTE (ADMIRALTIES) on 9 Nov and the second on LAKE DAKATAUA (WILLAUMEZ PENINSULA) on 13 Nov, indicate the possibility of planes being based at RABAUL. However, no change in the Enemy OOB in the NEW BRITAIN area has been made. The reason for this is possibly that no definite information is yet to hand that any serviceable bombers or fighters are actually based in this area. TRUK is the nearest enemy base where the types of planes used in these raids are known to be based, and the targets attacked are within range of these planes, which, if necessary, could stage in at RABAUL.

SECTION 3

ORGANISATION

18 ARMY - WEWAK

(Reference Maps - One Inch to One Mile SUAIN EAST,
BUT WEST,
NANU EAST)

A PW who surrendered near AITAPE on 13 Nov 44 - a 2/Lt Intendance Officer from 41 Div HQ - has given considerable new information concerning the disposition strength and organisation of 18 ARMY. His information is considered reliable and confirms previous indications.

1. DISPOSITIONS

(a) 18 ARMY HQ - PW stated that 18 ARMY HQ was moved inland from BOIKEN some time after 20 Oct 44. He thought the new location was 7-8 miles inland and had heard RANIMBOA mentioned in this connection.

(b) 41 DIV - It has been known that 41 Div was concentrated in the area between the ANUMB and the DANMAP RIVERS and that possibly it might move inland. PW states that 41 Div HQ left MALIN on 20 Oct and moved inland to HAMBINI (493092) via WOMASIS (570173). The HQ was moved on to BALIF (530015) and PW believes it is now established in that area.

(c) 237 INF REGT - Assigned the task of holding the coastal area from DANMAP RIVER to ANUMB RIVER. PW pinpointed the Regt HQ at 738247 near NAGEPEM just above the junction of DUNIB and MIKEM CREEKS.

2 Bn is located at the junction of the DANMAP RIVER and IKAM CREEK in the area 560277, and 3 Bn is on DUNIB CREEK near 749245.

Troops responsible for the defence of the coastal area are under command of what PW insisted was a Bde HQ with Maj-Gen NAKATSU in command.

(d) 238 INF REGT - The exact location of this Regt is unknown to PW but he believes it is disposed between WOMASIS and HAMBINI. Troops are believed to be in fair physical condition due to presence of some native foods in the area.

(e) 239 INF REGT - Is believed dispersed in BALIF area near 41 Div HQ.

(f) 20 DIV - Is guarding the area between ANUMB RIVER and BUT. These troops are in better condition than those of 41 Div as more food is available in their area.

(g) 51 DIV - Is located in the area from BUT to WEWAK.

ORGANISATION AND STRENGTH

(a) General - According to the PW an 18 ARMY Operation Order dated about 20 Sep 44 disbanded all auxilliary units and transferred them as reinforcements to build up the three Divisions of the Army.

PW could not give definite figures or details of the units disbanded but estimated that 3,000-4,000 troops were assigned to each Division and were now infantry troops. He estimated the Divisional strengths as follows:-

20 Div	-	7,000
41 Div	-	3,000-4,000
51 Div	-	9,000
TOTAL 18 ARMY	About	20,000

COMMENT: This is the first indication of the disbanding of 18 ARMY ancillary units and the subsequent allotment of their personnel to combat formations, but it has been expected in view of the pattern of reorganisation which has taken place in other by-passed areas.

(b) 41 DIV -

237 REGT - It has been established that this Regt now has only two Battalions. PW stated that 1 Bn was disbanded 20 Sep 44, but a captured official document dated 30 Aug 44, detailing the officers and unit strengths, gives the organisation of 237 Inf Regt (strength) 821) as 1 & 2 Bn each of three Companies (1 Bn - 1, 2, 3 Coys, and 2 Bn - 5, 6, 7 Coys), a MG Coy and a Bn Gun Platoon. 300 personnel from a Mtn Arty unit were distributed throughout the Regt, bringing 1 Bn strength to 320 and 2 Bn to 286. As PW stated only one mountain gun remained and that auxiliary units were disbanded, it appears probable that 41 Mtn Arty Regt has been disbanded and its personnel absorbed.

In his preliminary interrogation PW assessed 2 and 3 Bn strengths at 300 each but subsequently stated that he thought they have been built up to 500/700 each.

238 REGT - This regt has also been reorganised on a two Bn basis and replacements in Sep 44 built it up to a strength of about 1,000. "Many" were reported to have died en route to the TORRICELLI MOUNTAINS in Oct 44 and this figure might be "considerably reduced".

239 REGT - Has retained its three Bn organisation and has a strength of 700-1,000.

GENERAL

PW stated morale was very low in 41 Div. Troops are constantly reminded that replacements would arrive eventually. Other sources state that evacuation was expected in Mar 45. Troops are living entirely on native products as no rice is available.

CONCLUSION

After assessing the value of PW's information, First Aust Army has accepted the following :-

(a) HQ 18 ARMY located at RANIMBOA.
(b) HQ 41 Div located at BALLE.
(c) 237 Inf Regt disposed in DANMAP-ANUMB RIVER area.
(d) 20 Div HQ BUT, but troops of the division are possibly moving to MAPRIK and MARUI.
(e) 51 Div located in WEWAK area.
(f) Until such time as PW information is confirmed from other sources, Divisional strengths are being carried as follows :-

20 Div - 2,200
41 Div - 1,500
51 Div - 2,600

(g) The estimate of enemy strength in WEWAK area is being retained at 24,000. The closeness of the PW's estimate is regarded as confirmation of this figure.

6 DIV CONSTRUCTIONAL UNIT

For some time it has been known that owing to the shortage of rations, the Japanese on BOUGAINVILLE have been forced to organise some form of self-sufficiency programme.

A PW recently captured in BOUGAINVILLE provided a chart showing the organisation of the 6 DIV CONSTRUCT-IONAL UNIT. This is the first indication received of such a Unit whose primary function is the supervising and controlling of various Units formed to provide supplementary rations.

The controlling body of this Unit is known as the GENERAL AFFAIRS SECTION (SOMU GAKARI) and the organisation provides for the following sub-sections :-

(a) EXECUTIVE SECTION (SEMMU GAKARI) - Strength, 1 Officer, 2 NCO's and 10 OR's. It is designed to keep records, handle native labour and interpretation.

(b) RESEARCH SECTION (KAHO GAKARI) - Strength, 1 Officer, 2 NCO's and 11-12 OR's. The function of this section includes research into the methods of farming, repair of farm implements and searching for new sources of food.

(c) AGRICULTURAL SECTION (NOSAN GAKARI) - Strength, 1 Officer, 5 NCO's and 64 OR's divided into four squads. These squads are principally engaged in the cultivation of crops.

(d) FISHING SECTION (SUISAN GAKARI) - Strength, 1 Officer, 3 NCO's and 30 OR's who provide sea food.

(e) LIVESTOCK SECTION (CHIKUSAN GAKARI) - Strength, 1 Officer, 1 NCO and 15-16 OR's. The function of this section is to raise pigs, goats and chickens.

The PW stated that this organisation was in existence before the TOROKINA operations. He believed that the GENERAL AFFAIRS, AGRICULTURAL and EXECUTIVE Sections were the only sections still actively functioning.

This is borne out in some measure by the fact that all enemy units on BOUGAINVILLE have recently been ordered to organise small fishing parties in order to provide extra food.

SECTION 4

EQUIPMENT

EFFECTIVENESS OF JAPANESE ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY

An analysis of figures for the four months period ending 31 May 44, shows a marked improvement in the effectiveness of Japanese AA Artillery. Startling as it may seem, it is axiomatic that as a nation's air power increases its anti-aircraft artillery declines in importance, and conversely, that a nation losing aerial supremacy must rely more and more on its AA defence. JAPAN now finds herself in the latter position, and already there is proof that she is frantically trying to build up her AA Artillery, both in the number of guns and in quality of material.

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 120)

MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE VERTICAL RANGE OF JAPANESE 75MM AA GUN MODEL 88

Until recently, the estimate maximum effective range of this weapon was 12,000 feet. This figure was predicted on the use of the obsolete and inefficient fire control system originally designed for the gun, which employed "on carriage" computing apparatus. It is now considered that where batteries employ an anti-aircraft director, far greater accuracy of fire may be expected. Pending any further information, it is recommended that where the presence of a director is indicated, a maximum effective vertical range of 18,000 feet be used.

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 120)

JAPANESE RADIO RECEIVER

Attached as Appendix "B" are details and sketches of a Japanese Radio Receiver Type 41, Model E, recovered at CAPE HOSKINS on 4 Nov 44.

SECTION 5

TACTICS

TORPEDOES AS ENEMY LAND MINES

Enemy minefields have been reported on many of the airfields captured by the Allies. They have been formed mainly from aerial bombs buried so that the fused nose is flush with the ground.

Documents captured on PELELIU ISLAND disclose the positions of a number of such minefields which have been laid to protect the approaches to YAP airfield. The document is of particular interest however in that it states that the use of torpedoes is under investigation. Owing to the lack of suitable launching craft a supply of torpedoes has been accumulated and the Japanese have again improvised by using the warheads of torpedoes buried in the ground as landmines.

As this set of circumstances may also occur in other Japanese by-passed areas, it is possible that similarly constructed minefields may be met in the NE Sector, SWPA.

JAPANESE BOOBY TRAPS

The technical Air Intelligence Team that landed with US Assault Troops on PELELIU, reports that the majority of the 127 Japanese aircraft examined were booby-trapped with anti-personnel mines or gronades. In spite of warnings issued by Intelligence personnel, several souvenir hunters were killed and planes demolished.

Fortunately, further Japanese activities in this direction were prevented by the Marines, who caught eight Japanese in the act of booby-trapping a number of engines remaining in the hangars.

The seriousness of this Japanese action is well illustrated by the high price the nine-man technical intelligence team was forced to pay in the course of their duties, one man being killed and five others wounded.

(AAF Weekly Intelligence Review No 120)

SECTION 7

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Extract from US G-2 Weekly Report No 63 of 8 Nov 44 :-

PREPAREDNESS OF THE LEYTE GARRISON FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE

1. The following information supplied by a PW and by US Technical Intelligence Teams is evidenced by the CW-consciousness of the LEYTE garrison.

2. PW Statement

A PW sergeant major of the 33rd Inf Regt stated that all units from Company HQ up were supplied with gas canisters to be used on orders from the commanders. Each Company HQ held at all times a minimum of 40 canisters. Regimental HQ also hold 75mm CW ammunition, including blister gas shells (red band) and tear gas shells (green band). (The reference to blister gas shells being marked by a red band is probably erroneous. These shells are usually marked with a yellow band, red signifying toxic smokes.)

PW further stated that all personnel of the 16th Division were equipped with Type 99 and Type 92. (It is considered more likely to be Type 95.)

3. Information from US Technical Intelligence Teams

Technical Intelligence Teams found several dumps containing CW materials. A hut in the BURAUEN area was found to hold lachrimatory smoke candles and a hitherto unseen Type 97 persistent gas grenade. Large numbers of a previously unseen type respirator, date of manufacture 1944, were also found.

4. Enemy Chemical Warfare Policy

Some indication of the enemy's CW policy may be gathered from the following order, issued by HQ 16 Division on 23 Jul 44 :-

"Notification pertaining to order prohibiting use of gas.

1. According to a United Press report, it was learned that a certain American newspaper is advocating the use of gas to minimize casualties such as were suffered in the SAIPAN campaign.

2. In view of such an opinion and the enemy's preparations to resort to CW, we must not give them any excuse to use gas. Therefore, all special smoke candles and other similar bombs and shells will not be used without order.

3. However, in regard to the above, all necessary preparations must be taken to meet the possible use of gas by the enemy. Extensive anti-gas training must be given to all personnel."

5. Conclusion

From the above information it may be inferred that the LEYTE garrison was prepared both offensively and defensively for CW. It is clear, however, that the Japanese are aware of the US Army's CW capabilities and were not, in this case, prepared to initiate the use of gas.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

ASIA ISLANDS

General Description

1. The three small islets FANI, IGI and MIARIN, forming this group lie on a drying reef situated 113 miles north of SORONG. The islands are oriented NNE/SSW, FANI, the northernmost is 2¾ miles long by 1¼ miles wide; IGI, 1¾ miles long by about 600 yards wide. MIARIN, the southernmost islet, is approximately 1,200 yards long by 500 yards wide.

The three islets are low and covered with high trees, the soil is probably coral sand. The reef on which the islets lie extends some 6½ cables offshore and has steep-to edges making no anchorage available.

Airfield Sites and Seaplane Alighting Areas

2. It is possible that enough flat area exists on FANI islet to permit one runway to be constructed. Almost 2½ of the 2¾ miles length should be usable with a minimum width of 3,000 feet available for dispersal and attendant installations.

There is no area available for seaplane landings other than in the open sea.

Resources

3. Small quantities of suitable timber should be available locally for construction. Coral can be obtained from the fringing reef. Fresh water can be obtained in limited quantities from a small well on MIARIN islet. The islets are uninhabited; there is an abundance of turtle and fish.

MAPIA ISLANDS

General Description

1. The group consists of three islets - PEGUN, FANILDO and BRAS. and some protruding rocks. All are situated on the edge of an oval-shaped atoll 130 miles north of NOEMFOOR ISLAND and built up of coral and sand, extending 10 miles north-south by approximately four miles east-west. At low water the reef is dry except for its outer edges.

PEGUN, the southern elongated island has a north-south length of 2¾ miles and a width of about 600 yards. FANILDO lies at the NW extremity of the reef, and BRAS at the NE extremity. BRAS has a length of 1⅞ miles and a width of half a mile.

All islets are low and flat and at high water are not more than seven feet above sea level.

The lagoon within the atoll has a greatest length of about 5½ miles and a greatest width of about 2¼ miles. There are many rocks, some of which dry at low water. In a north-south direction is a clear stretch of 5⅞ miles with a depth of 12-47 metres.

Possible Airfield Sites and Seaplane Alighting Areas

2. (a) The small PEGUN and BRAS islets may be suitable for construction of an airstrip on each. The sighting of an airstrip on each island has been reported.

PEGUN site is about 7,900 feet north-south by 700 feet wide. BRAS is about 6,000 feet NNE-SSW by 1,500 feet. Clearing would probably be easy and coral for surfacing is plentiful.

(b) The lagoon is large enough for seaplanes and flying boats. The many shallows and rocks would have to be marked for safety.

Flying boats (Dornier and/or Fokker) of the Royal Netherlands Navy have used the lagoon.

Resources

3. Pre-war, natives grow their own foodstuffs but the limited white population, imported. Water is available in small quantities from wells, the deepest of these being 1½ metres, with a bottom of coral and sand.

Coral is available for airfield and road construction.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

WESTERN FRONT

Considerable success has been achieved by the Allied offensive. Despite stubborn resistance progress has been maintained along the whole front.

French troops have succeeded in advancing through BELFORT to the RHINE. This thrust constitutes a potential threat to the enemy left flank and, if progress is maintained, an excellent bridgehead across the RHINE will be available to the Allies.

EASTERN FRONT

In HUNGARY Russian forces in the BUDAPEST area have forced the enemy to withdraw towards the border of CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

A Russian force of two divisions has landed at CAPE RITSNA on the island of DAGO. This island guards the entrance to the GULF OF RIGA.

ITALY

Determined German counter-attacks have resulted in a minor setback between FORLI and BOLOGNA.

Allied operations have been almost exclusively confined to the air.

BURMA

Allied forces continue to advance in their drive into BURMA.

After severe fighting, BHAMO in CENTRAL BURMA has fallen to Chinese and British forces.

CHINA

The Japanese drive in CHINA continues to progress along the KWANGSI railway. Complete success in this area would give the enemy direct land communication with MALAYA and BURMA.

PART V

SECURITY.

JAPANESE PACIFICATION PROPAGANDA

Japanese propaganda in occupied areas, like the old grey mare, has lost some of its pristine efficacy. An admission to this effect appears in ATIS Enemy Publications No 222 of 8 Nov 44 :-

> " Although propaganda methods have varied greatly according to circumstances where we had an opportunity to observe the results, we find there is a marked decline in their efficacy."

While JAPAN could publicize an unbroken series of successes her propaganda compelled attention and, although it showed little appreciation of occidental psychology, it did meet with a measure of success in EAST ASIA and among the natives of the PACIFIC. However, it is now apparent that there have been some changes in the enemy's propaganda camp and that increasing reverses have forced him to adopt a policy designed to appease civilian populations and win their co-operation.

His efforts to disseminate this new propaganda among native populations are illustrated by the following instructions issued to Japanese military police in occupied areas :-

> "Co-operate positively in all pacification activities."
>
> "Strive to have the native population live harmoniously according to our moral code, foster an appreciation of our chivalry and gradually draw the people nearer to us."

In particular they are told that explanations of the necessity for punishment are most important.

Apart from these specific orders to military police, the Japanese Army as a whole is instructed to "eliminate all causes of antipathy among inhabitants of battle areas by avoiding needless errors in handling them, and to devise methods of stabilizing the people so that they may have reason to admire our achievements."

This policy is a departure from earlier concepts of propaganda among uncivilized and semi-civilized countries where deeds, executed by the sword and not soothing words, were considered the best form of propaganda. Allied with this policy of pacification, is an attempt by means of fifth column activities to leave the impress of Japanese civilization on the religious, cultural, political and economic life of occupied countries.

These activities where successful may well assist the Army to achieve its strategic objectives but it can also be expected that such action is coupled with a long-sighted policy to promote relations which will prove beneficial to JAPAN in the years following the war.

Lt-Col
GS First Aust Army

Appendix "A"

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

COMMANDO UNITS (YUGEKI TAI)

Changes and New Identifications

COMMANDO UNITS (YUGEKI TAI)

It has been known for some time that 1 Commando Unit and probably 1 to 10 (inclusive) Commando Companies are in existence (all but 2 and 8 have been identified) and located in the SWPA but information on their precise location has been lacking. Documents recently captured on MOROTAI have provided additional information on the location of certain companies and have also shown that a 2 Commando Unit is in existence. Commanded by Major KAWASHIMA, Takenobu with Major SHIBANUMA Kiyoshi (only recently promoted) as senior staff officer, this unit appears to have moved south via the PHILIPPINES and HALMAHERA and probably arrived at its present location, MOROTAI, in July or August.

Documents indicate that on MOROTAI, it had under command (?1), 2, 3, and 4 Commando Companies but at this juncture it is not clear whether these companies are an integral part of 2 Commando Unit or whether the latter is a Headquarters organisation and has the originally identified 1 to 4 Commando Companies under command. As regards 1 Commando Company, earlier reports suggested that it was located in the HOLLANDIA area commanded by Major MIYOSHI, Hidekichi. However it was subsequently learned that Major MIYOSHI was in fact associated with 1 Commando Unit (not company) and that he returned to MANOKWARI on 18 Mar 44. Other reports have also shown 1 Commando Unit in the VOGELKOP area as late as Jun 44. The identification of 1 Commando Company at HOLLANDIA is therefore being discounted.

In Jun 44, 6 Commando Company was probably in the AMBON area under 19 Army, while in the same month, 7, 9 and 10 Commando Companies were located at SORONG. Documents captured at MEGA (approximately 16 miles SW of SANSAPOR) on 5 Oct 44 indicate that a Commando Company under 1st Lieutenant MANIYA, Eiichi, was under command of SORONG defence unit and despatched to the SANSAPOR area "to endeavour to disrupt the enemy plan of defence". It seems possible that this company is one of those reported at SORONG in Jun 44. It is interesting to note that the company planned for a three months operation in the SANSAPOR area.

As regards organisation, documents show variations and flexibility. 2, 3 and 4 Companies on MOROTAI were each commanded by a 1st or 2nd Lieutenant, contained a HQ squad and two platoons commanded by a 2nd Lieutenant or senior NCO and had a strength of between 100 and 120 men. The MANIYA Company, on the other hand, comprised six platoons, one of which was Military Police, with a total Japanese strength of 141. The company also had a labour group of some 98 Formosans attached. However, for the purpose of attacking the Allied perimeter on MOROTAI, the whole of 3 Company, including the HQ squad, was reorganised and divided into two forces - a "Medium Distance Attack Unit" and "Long Distance Attack Unit". Both units were made up from part of each platoon of 3 Company, and were commanded by the original company commander and 1 platoon commander respectively.

One captured document has covered rather fully the tactics of Commando Units. The introduction, giving the "General Principles", reads :-

"The purpose of commando tactics is to infiltrate deep into enemy territory following plans laid out by a senior officer, and attack enemy headquarters, airfields, supply lines and other military installations, thus creating confusion and chaos in the enemy rear".

Finally, it is interesting to note the apparent association of the Commando Units with the Japanese Special Intelligence Organisation. Major MIYOSHI of 1 Commando Unit whilst at HOLLANDIA in Jan 44, was in charge of the KAMI organisation which was the Special Intelligence Organisation in that area. Prior to assuming command of 2 Commando Unit, Major KAWASHIMA was attached to 15 Army HQ and is believed to have been in charge of part of the Special Service Organisation in the BURMA theatre.

(ALF Weekly Intelligence Review No 120)

JAPANESE RADIO RECEIVER

TYPE 41 MODEL E

1. GENERAL

This equipment was recovered at CAPE HOSKINS on 4 Nov 44. Sketches of the instrument and components are shown as Appendix 'B'.

2. DESCRIPTION

(a) Receiver

The unit is a portable receiving set and is apparently intended to be used complementary to a portable trans-mitter. This is evidenced by the individual numbering of this particular unit, "Unit No 3, No 4 Box."

The set and batteries are enclosed in an aluminium case measuring 14" x 10" x 6". This together with accessories, is contained in a well-constructed wooden box divided into seven compartments.

Pack carrying attachments are situated on the back of the aluminium case.

(b) Accessories

These are comprised of the following :-

Two pairs standard magnetic type headphones.
Voltmeter.
One plug-in coil unit.
Candle holder.
Twelve 37.5 gram candles.

The latter were not contained with this particular unit. However a list of accessories on the lid indicates them to be a normal item of equipment.

(c) Components

All are of standard Japanese manufacture and of ex-cellent quality. Fixed condensers are contained in moulded bakelite cases, and valves are fitted with metal holding bands. Variable condensers are supplied with celluloid dust covers.

All terminals are provided with heavy soldered lugs.

The chassis and case are of heavy construction and would stand considerable rough usage.

(d) Electrical Circuit

The circuit is a 6 tube superhetorodyne using 2 volt filament type tubes of Japanese manufacture. These are similar to American types in internal construction.

The Skeleton Circuit is as follows :-

RF Stage UF134 (RF Pentode, English 4 pin base)
Mixer Stage UF135 (Pentagrid convertor, American 6 pin
IF Stage UF 134 (RF pentode English 4 pin base) (base
2nd Detector
(regenerative) UF111 (Screen grid, English 4 pin base)
1st Audio Stage UF109 (Triode, English 4 pin base)
2nd Audio Stage UF133 (Audio Pentode, American 5 pin base)

The Audio Stages are transformer coupled.

Tuning is controlled by a SLF three gang condenser of approximately 350 UUF capacity. This is driven by a worm geared drum dial. The tuning condenser has trimmers adjustable from the front panel.

Wave changing is controlled by means of a three coil-bank unit which is plugged into the front panel.

The frequency range of the set is unknown. The coil-bank in the set is labelled "No 1 300-500 Kcs". From the data it is considered the lower limit of the frequency range is probably 300 Kcs. Other sets of coils would probably extend the tuning range into the short-wave band.

(c) Power Supply

A three volt dry battery supplies the filaments. 135 volts for the 'B' power supply is provided by a bank of six 22.5 volt batteries connected in series. These batteries are tapped to supply screen voltages etc.

Two pencil type torch cells connected in series, and clipped into a holder, supply the bias for the tube.

Testing is carried out by means of a small pocket voltmeter showing these ranges - 0-10, 0-100, and 0-500 volts.

1. Main tuning dial
1A. Main tuning dial scale
2. Regeneration Control
3. Filament rheostat
4. Plug for testing filament voltage
5. Volume control
6. Mixer stage trimmer condenser
7. R.F. stage trimmer condenser
8. Ground terminal
9. On-Off switch
10. Headphone jacks
11. Headphone jack for remote control headphones
12. Aerial terminal
13. Plug for testing [illegible]. This is probably used for muting receiver during periods of transmission
A. Connected internally to aerial terminal
B. Connected internally to headphone jack.
C. Grounded
D. Connected in series with negative of power supply.
14. Plug-in coil bank.
15. 6 Volt dry battery
16. 22.5 volt dry batteries.

JAPANESE RADIO RECEIVER



FRONT VIEW OF BOX CONTAINER (LID REMOVED)



REAR VIEW OF CONTAINER (LID ATTACHED)

CANDLE HOLDER

REAR OF BOX CONTAINER (DETACHABLE) SHOWING ATTACHMENT FOR CARRYING





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HQ FIRST AUST ARMY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 132

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 23 Nov to 1200 hrs 30 Nov 44

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APPENDICES

"A" OOB - METHOD OF CALCULATING ENEMY STRENGTHS

"B" SKETCH JAPANESE ROCKET EMPLACEMENT FOUND AT SAN JOSE, LEYTE 22-OCT-44.

CURRENT REVIEW

SOLOMONS

Bombing attacks in the north of the island of BOUGAINVILLE, particularly directed against CHINPATZ on BONIU HARBOUR, SORAKEN and PORTON have had the effect of driving enemy detachments from those areas. One of these moved inland to TETEKUZ and a further one south along the coast to a position between MUN and PUTO.

The value of driving these parties from their present locations is that they are divorced from their gardens and are forced to recommence their part in the programme of self-sufficiency.

The enemy's reaction to our active patrolling in the UPPER LERUMA VALLEY has been to strengthen his defences in the area four miles SSW of SISIVIL. This is indicative of his continued intention to deny us access to the NUMA NUMA area.

NEW BRITAIN

Patrolling by the enemy has continued around ULAMONA. One of his patrols is believed to have come as far SW as MATAGOGAI, approximately six miles NE of CAPE KOAS.

It is learnt that an appreciation by a senior RNZAF officer, based upon facts not yet available at this HQ, comes to the conclusion that the enemy may have already or in the near future at least 36 aircraft available to him in the RABAUL area. During the week a B24 over RABAUL reported that TOBERA and KERAVAT strips were being maintained and appear to be in serviceable condition.

NEW GUINEA

A delayed report reveals that on 19 Nov the Japanese carried out an attack on the YABAUR Native Mission Station in the TONG district. On 22 Nov they were still in that area and it was reported that a further 69 Japanese were at SANIK, six miles to the SE, and an unstated number at SEINAU, 12 miles ENE. It is also reported that approximately 100 Japanese occupy 20 huts in an area ½ mile WSW of BALUP.

PHILIPPINES

The American forces occupied LEYTE on 23 Nov and although only sketchy reports of the LEYTE operations have been received since then, it appears that the enemy is still ferociously resisting in the ORMOC Corridor.

PART I

SECTION 1

LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

NEW GUINEA

GENERAL

Operations have been limited to patrolling by our forces. Some activity has been noted in the TONG district where a large body of Japanese were reported on 22 Nov. Although no enemy parties have been observed, it is noticeable that almost without exception they are ill-equipped.

HANSA BAY - MADANG

An unconfirmed native report states that an enemy patrol of two officers and 10 ORs was observed at WATAM, BROKEN WATER BAY on 24 Nov. The men were in poor condition and were seeking food and clothing.

A native report on 26 Nov stated that an enemy observation post was situated at MARANGIS, west of the mouth of the RAMU RIVER. A patrol of 20 Japanese armed with an LMG was also reported to be proceeding along the west bank of the RAMU RIVER to BOSMAN on the ROM RIVER. Our patrols reported no enemy two miles north of BOSMAN on 27 Nov.

Previous reports of a large group of Japanese and armed natives having returned to KAMBOT appear to be incorrect. This party comprising 50 Japanese and 75 armed natives is now reported to be at ANGETJI.

Four Japanese were captured at BONGGU, ASTROLABE BAY on 27 Nov.

AITAPE-WEWAK

Contact with enemy parties in the TONG district has been maintained. Natives report that a strong base is being established by the enemy at SELNAUA. The area has been cleared to increase the fields of fire and fox holes and trenches have been dug.

Our patrols operating on the southern slopes of the TORRICELLI MOUNTAINS report no enemy movement.

BOUGAINVILLE

Activity has been confined to patrolling and minor clashes in the UPPER LARUMA VALLEY. Air reconnaissance has revealed some enemy activity from the PURIATA RIVER mouth to HAIGI MISSION, four miles inland.

Chief interest centres in a report of the abandonment by Japanese troops of their gardens around PORTON as a result of Allied air bombings. The movement has been in a southerly direction along the west coast past AMUN. No gardens in this area are under cultivation by the enemy at present. If the policy of subsisting off the land is to be followed, extensive gardens will have to be planted.

NEW IRELAND

Japanese activity in the northern portion of NEW IRELAND has been revealed by air reconnaissance on 19 Nov. Well kept farms and ricefields are visible south of DALLUM Plantation on the NE coast of Central NEW IRELAND. No other enemy activity has been noted.

An Allied patrol to SELAPIU ISLAND on 24 Nov reports the enemy has moved to the north coast on the northern edge of SELAPIU Plantation.

NEW BRITAIN

GAZELLE PENINSULA - OPEN BAY

Enemy activity has been maintained. Following the movement of a large enemy patrol to ULAMONA last week a circuit was made inland and a track used by our patrols followed up to MATAGOGAI on the coast, on 25 Nov. The patrol is now believed to have returned to ULAMONA.

It is known that further north in the GAZELLE PENINSULA the defensive development of the east coast is being maintained. Some 1,300 enemy troops are believed to be garrisoned at key coastal points.

The possibility that this involves food production suggests itself. At present the areas under cultivation in the vicinity of RABAUL could not maintain a large force.

WIDE BAY

Extensive patrolling revealed no enemy on the coast from MILIM SE to SAMPUN.

PHILIPPINES

Enemy defences in the ORMOC VALLEY continue to hold up the Allied advance. Weather conditions are also slowing our progress.

Reinforcement of LEYTE has been maintained, every use being made of bad flying weather to run in convoys and barges.

Severe losses have been sustained by the enemy during raids by Allied aircraft on convoys in ORMOC BAY. This constant drain on reinforcing units depletes his immediately available reserves. In view of the thrust by the Allies from the east, a greater number of reserve troops are required if further extensive delays are to be imposed on our advance.

There has been an increased tendency of late on the part of the enemy to mount small offensives, concentrating particularly on infiltration and harassing tactics.

In the other islands of the PHILIPPINES GROUP, a reorganisation of the disposition of enemy troops has been proceeding.

There are now two armoured divisions in LUZON. Portion of one of these is now disposed in covering positions along the BATANGAS Corridor. In addition extensive infantry reinforcements have been moved south to counter any Allied move.

Combat troops in MINDANAO also appear to be regrouping. These troops are possibly earmarked for reinforcement of LEYTE or to strengthen western VISAYAS areas. The latter course would replenish the gaps left by the previous withdrawal of troops from the western VISAYAS to LEYTE.

Enemy casualties in the PHILIPPINES to 22 Nov :-

Killed	20,259
PW	271

SECTION 2

SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

GENERAL

Despite constant attrition by our submarines heavy enemy shipping movements have been maintained around northern BORNEO and the west coast of LUZON. Convoys in these areas continue to be well escorted.

In BRUNEI BAY large concentrations of transport type shipping may prelude a reinforcement programme using troops from DUTCH EAST INDIES bases.

It is interesting to note that the Japanese have developed the base in VICTORIA HARBOUR on the SE coast of LABUAN ISLAND. Considerable additions have been made to the fuel storage and docking facilities using the protected waters of BRUNEI BAY to the fullest advantage.

Further south in the CELEBES and southern BORNEO enemy maritime activity has been confined to limited movements of a few small vessels of up to 1,500 tons. This is probably dictated by the need for larger shipping further north.

The Japanese Navy has maintained its non-aggressive policy during the past week. Convoys are well escorted but heavier units have remained either in Empire waters or in BRUNEI BAY. This latter base is well situated for attacks on potential targets in the PHILIPPINES.

Of late enemy forces of heavier class warships have been observed moving towards home waters. This may indicate that the defence of vital home waters is causing the Japanese some anxiety.

Enemy submarine activity has increased, particularly in the eastern PHILIPPINES and the MARIANAS. The continued use of submarines around the NEW BRITAIN coast has also been noted. The submarines observed in this area appear to be used for maintaining enemy patrols operating in areas inaccessible to other means of supply.

An ungraded report of a sighting of two submarines on 28 Nov 77 miles NE of WOODLARK ISLAND would appear indicative of a new interest in the shipping lanes from AUSTRALIA to our forward bases. Shipping bound for these bases passes through a comparatively narrow channel east of MILNE BAY.

In view of the heavy commitments in northern waters this report should be treated with reserve.

Barge traffic has been maintained in the PHILIPPINES and southern CELEBES.

NE AREA

During the nights 20/21 and 22/23 Nov Allied PT boats shelled and strafed coastal installations on CHOISEUL ISLAND, NEW IRELAND and BOUGAINVILLE.

A possible submarine was observed by one of our warships on 24 Nov in the vicinity of MANUS ISLAND. The warship made one attack, the result of which is unknown.

45 serviceable barges were observed in BLANCHE BAY, RABAUL on 27 Nov.

NW AREA

During the current period the decline in merchant shipping in the CELEBES has been pronounced. Only two merchant ships of an estimated tonnage of 7,600/12,300 tons and four warships were reported. Small shipping and barge activity has also been noted.

Shipbuilding yards at PARE PARE, 78 miles north of MAKASSAR, although heavily damaged continue to be used on a limited scale. In the past considerable numbers of 300 ton wooden ships have been built in this vicinity.

BORNEO

BRUNEI BAY is daily increasing in magnitude as a main supply base and refuelling centre for naval and merchant vessels. This base is of immense use to the Japanese for naval activities and strong concentrations can be expected until Allied air strength renders it untenable.

Principal sightings were reported in BRUNEI BAY and BALIKPAPAN, where eight naval craft, 17 vessels and 55,000/62,500 tons of merchant shipping were reported. A large proportion of the merchant ships were of the transport type.

PHILIPPINES

Naval and merchant tonnage reported in this area has shown a decline following the previous high tonnage reported. 54 merchant vessels of 94,000 tons gross and 22 warships were observed.

Barge activity on the western coast of LUZON has been maintained.

Midget submarines are becoming increasingly active in these waters and are a definite menace to our shipping. These submarines in the past were released from "mother submarines" usually 100 miles from their target. Provision was not usually made for their recovery.

SECTION 3

AIR - OWN

Heavy Allied air attacks have been maintained in the PHILIPPINES and NEW BRITAIN.

Growing Allied land based strength has enabled larger and more effective blows to be delivered at enemy held aerodromes in the VISAYAS.

Considerable attention has been paid to GAZELLE PENINSULA where enemy ground activity has been on an increased scale.

NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND-SOLOMONS.

A total of 249 aircraft bombed targets in the GAZELLE PENINSULA on 22 and 23 Nov. Enemy-occupied areas at ULAMONA were bombed and strafed on 22 Nov.

Daily armed reconnaissance has been maintained throughout the area

NEW GUINEA

The suspected 18 Army HQ at RANIMBOA was bombed on 25 Nov, incendiaries and HE bombs being used.

Gardens and known enemy installations on KARKAU and KAIRIRU ISLAND were also raided.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Enemy occupied areas and AA posns at CAPE NOEJEW (SORONG area) were the main targets for fighter bombers. Bivouac areas at MOEMI and RANSIKI were also bombed.

CERAM-BOERUE

Airfields at HAIROEKE, LLANG and LAHA were attacked 20 Nov and again on 21 Nov by large forces. On 25 Nov 41 aircraft started fires in supply areas in attacks on KAIRATOE and OLD NAMLEA.

CELEBES

Airfields at MANADO, MAPANGET, LANGOAN and AMBESIA were attacked on 20 and 21 Nov.

A nickel mine on MANIANG ISLAND was destroyed by a force of heavy bombers on 22 Nov.

PHILIPPINES

Heavy and medium bombers have continued to attack airfields throughout the VISAYAS.

Fighters and fighter bombers have accounted for large numbers of enemy aircraft either shot down or destroyed on the ground.

On 24 Nov fighter bombers attacked four ships NE MASBATE which included two freighters of 5500/8500 tons transporting troops. All four ships were left burning.

AIR - ENEMY

Enemy air operations have been characterised by the piecemeal commitment of his forces in the PHILIPPINES and northern BORNEO. The main air concentrations are in these areas.

Failure to use his considerable strength en masse has enabled our forces to take considerable tollof his planes.

A notable exception was at MOROTAI where a well-planned raid was successfully executed. Following the harassing tactics previously adopted, the employment of a larger force of nine planes caused some surprise. The feature of this raid was the accurate bombing, indicating experienced crews, probably based on MINDANAO. These planes, if so based, could fly either directly or stage at nearby operational airfields. Latest reports indicate the planes operating in this vicinity are based on or stage at KENDARI. There appears to be a strong possibility that the enemy intend using WASILE, southern CELEBES, as a base for carrying out harassing raids. Raids of this nature are obviously designed to hamper the movement of Allied air units from MOROTAI to the PHILIPPINES.

In the PHILIPPINES the rate of reinforcement has been maintained, but with the build up of Allied air strength little progress has been made.

The Allied build up has resulted in the transfer of the bulk of Japanese aircraft in LUZON from MANILA airfields to new locations principally in northern LUZON.

Intensification of attacks on shipping, using suicide crash tactics, and numbers of harassing raids on troops and installations on LEYTE have been noticeable during the past week. Greater use of "window" has also been noted in the past week.

In other areas of the SWPA the bulk of his air strength is confined to BORNEO. In this theatre there has been a certain amount of reorganisation, notably the virtual abandonment of oil installations at BALIKPAPAN as the centre of gravity of air activity.

The main concentration is now situated on JESSELTON and LABUAN ISLANDS. From these bases the enemy is in a position to provide air protection for shipping in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and BRUNEI BAY.

In the immediate vicinity, RABAUL continued to excite interest. The aerodromes are being maintained in a serviceable condition, and some work has been noted on the TOBERA strip during the past week.

The possibility of a fairly large number of planes in RABAUL is indicated in an appreciation by a senior RNZAF officer. His conclusions state that the enemy has, or may have, in the near future at least 36 operational aircraft available. There have been persistent reports of enemy planes both grounded and airborne in this vicinity. It will also be remembered that Japanese mechanics were known to be working in a dump of some 60 unserviceable aircraft at TOBERA.

PART II

SECTION 1

ENEMY OOB - LAND

Revised estimates of enemy strength as at 22 Nov 44 are as follows :-

NW SECTOR

PHILIPPINES		
LUZON	159,500	
CENTRAL	66,000	
MINDANAO	61,000	286,500
BOMBERAI PENINSULA		3,000

In view of the Allied occupation of MAPIA the estimate of 400 for that island has been deleted.

Estimates for other areas are unchanged, giving a grand total for the NW Sector of 492,500.

NE SECTOR

EAST OF AITAPE	24,000	
NEW BRITAIN	35,000	
NEW IRELAND	10,000	
SOLOMONS	17,000	(GHQ estimate 12,500)

As a result of the above changes, Sector totals are as follows:-

NW SECTOR	492,500
NE SECTOR	86,000
TOTAL	578,500

Appendix "A" to this Summary gives details of the method adopted by First Aust Army for calculating enemy strengths.

ENEMY OOB - AIR

ENEMY LAND BASED AIR STRENGTH

Estimate of enemy land based air strength in the areas listed below is prepared on information to 24 Nov 44:-

AREAS	F	2EF	SEB	2EB	F/B	F/P	OBSN	TOTAL	COMPARATIVES 19 Nov	COMPARATIVES 11 Nov
NEW BRITAIN NEW IRELAND SOLOMONS						10	2	12	12	12
ØPHILIPPINES:										
MINDANAO	28		20	29		6	7	90	85	55
VISAYAS	105	18	14	32		14	9	192	192	152
LUZON	200	5	66	74	4	15	28	392	530	376
								674	807	583
AMBON-CERAM-BOEROE	4		3		2	9	4	22	22	22
CELEBES:										
MANADO			2			6		8	8	12
MAKASSAR-KENDARI	12	7		12	3	12	4	50 58	50 58	64 76
TIMOR-SOEMBA-SOEMBAWA-FLORES	10			3		3	3	16	16	16
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK	4			18		15	5	42	42	36
BORNEO	100	28	8	40		12	28	216	220	185
TOTALS SWPA	463	58	113	205	9	102	90	1040	1177	930
TRUK	6			3		6	4	19	19	19

Ø Estimates do NOT include combat types not assigned to operational units and used in training.

(COIC Situation Report 329/44, 25 Nov 44)

NOTE: An appreciation by a senior RNZAF officer gives the aircraft available at RABAUL as at least 36. The appreciation has not yet been examined by First Aust Army.

SECTION 4

EQUIPMENT

200mm ROCKET AND LAUNCHER

Prior to the landing of Allied forces in the PHILIPPINES, there was no knowledge of Japanese rocket equipment. At SAN JOSE, LEYTE, numerous projectiles and four launchers were recovered from emplacements of log pillboxes.

The weapons found were crudely constructed but there is every probability that more modern types will be encountered in future operations.

The following is a preliminary report on the equipment recovered at SAN JOSE :-

General

Although no projectiles had been fired on the landing forces, rockets were in place already fuzed for firing.

Description

Rocket - The propelling charge consists of seven sticks of black powder, each 11½ inches in length and 2½ inches in diameter. Gases are ejected through six jets in the base. The explosive head is 37¼ inches long.

The extremely large size of the rockets indicates great penetration power, probably sufficient to damage an armoured vessel extensively.

Launcher - The trough is supported at the front by a bipod stand. These were based on sandbags

There is no traversing or elevating mechanism. The only method of engaging different targets is to manually shift the front bipod. This would greatly hinder making corrections on to the target.

The only observation is by view. No instruments are attached.

Until some documentary evidence is available, little can be revealed of the capabilities of the equipment.

A sketch of the assembly is attached as Appendix "B".

SECTION 5 -

TACTICS

A LESSON ON TACTICS FROM LEYTE

The following extract from a PW interrogation sheds light on the enemy's control and discipline under fire :-

"On 29/30 Oct PW's unit came under US Arty fire whilst marching in column towards JARO on Route 2. The unit scattered with PW in the lead."

ENEMY INFILTRATION METHODS

During the offensive against the Japanese in NEW GUINEA, what might be described as 'infiltration tactics' have been encountered from time to time. At both SANANANDA and NASSAU BAY Japanese TEISHIN TAIS (Raiding Units) infiltrated through our lines and attacked gun positions. On both occasions they met with a measure of success. At present on MOROTAI the main Japanese effort is being directed along the same lines.

Japanese orders continue to place great emphasis on this type of warfare and methods of infiltration, laying down that the most suitable targets for such attacks are rearward installations, tanks, arty and grounded aircraft.

The following extracts, from a translation of Battle Instructions issued by the Div Comd, 1 Div, on route to LEYTE, show the development of these methods during the past two years.

"ESSENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DECISIVE BATTLE" - 2 Nov 44

"1. FUNDAMENTALS

a. As we go forth into the battlefield to engage the enemy in the decisive battle, the T.K.K. Group (1st Division) is given the unprecedented opportunity of proving its worth and of living up to the standards that have been laid down in its glorious history and tradition.

With the determination to annihilate the enemy, officers and men with one accord will carry out the mission which his Imperial Majesty has so graciously given to us.

b. In combat we find the most Spartan elements of training. Initiative and new tactics can only be developed if combat leaders unceasingly guide their subordinates. These instructions are given only to lay down the general principles of such tactics. All commanding officers will exert themselves in the establishing of more efficient methods through which they may serve his Majesty, the Emperor.

c. Emphasis in the tactics of this Group will be placed on surprise attacks, creation of confusion and the destruction of tanks.

2. OUTLINE OF TACTICS

a. Surprise attacks and creation of confusion:

(1) Immediately upon arriving at the scene of battle, the Group will attack the enemy even before the main decisive battle starts. The purpose of these preliminary attacks will be so to disorganise the enemy that they will be exhausted by relentless and unflagging deceptive thrusts. We must undermine the morale of the enemy which is based solely on material power.

(2) The attacks described above will be carried out by organising Penetration Units (KIRIKOMI TAI) and Close-Attack Units (NIKKO) composed of a small number of picked men. The main objectives will be enemy HQ, Arty, Fuel and Amn Dumps, Airfields and Tanks.

(3) As shown below, each unit will organise within itself, Penetration and Close-Attack Units so that it can frustrate the enemy upon arriving at the scene of battle. By the time of arrival, these units will have been organised. The necessary equipment will have been assembled prior to embarkation. Depending upon the importance of the mission, an officer, an NCO or a Lance Corporal will be in charge of the group. On the average, three men will make up a group.

Each unit will make preparations to send out the following Penetration or Close-Attack Units daily :-

(a) Inf Regt - One group with an officer in charge
Inf Bn - One group with an NCO in charge.
Two groups with a Pte in charge.

(b) Fd Arty Regt- One group with an officer or NCO in charge.
Fd Arty Bn - One group with an NCO in charge.

(c) Recce, Engr and Tpt Units - One group with an officer or NCO in charge.
One group with a Pte in charge.

(d) Other Indep Units - One group with an officer, NCO or a Pte in charge,

(4) Each group of a Penetration and Close-Attack Unit will be supplied and equipped so that it may carry on for several days and nights until its mission has been accomplished.

b. <u>Destruction of Tanks</u> :

(1) While the Penetration and Close-Attack parties are operating, the TAMA Group (TN 1st Div) will assemble for the decisive battle. Preparations will be made for the attack and supply channels organised. The weak points in the enemy line which have been created by the Penetration and Close-Attack Units will then be hit and the enemy destroyed with one crushing blow.

It is anticipated that the attacks of the raiding parties will be made at night. However, if the situation warrants, reserves may be called upon to make daylight attacks in force. The decisive battle of the Group will consist of an attack against a powerful enemy with heavy tanks.

(2) The tactics of each unit will be based upon the principles outlined above. To the last man there must be a determination to fight as though he were a member of one of the Close-Attack Units (NIKKO TAI)."

(Translated by Sixth US Army ATIS Adv Ech)

SECTION 6

SUPPLY

SUPPLY - BOUGAINVILLE

Since the occupation of TOROKINA and other islands in the SOLOMONS Group, the enemy on BOUGAINVILLE has been forced to exist on limited rations, native garden produce and small quantities of food brought in by submarines and barges.

In Oct 43 supply by surface vessels ceased. From Dec 43 to Feb 44 nine submarines landed a total of approximately 160 tons of stores, bulk of which was rice (100 tons). The estimated supply exhaustion dates, calculated at 31 Mar 44, were as follows:-

ERVENTA DEPOT:-	Staple food	5 Jun 44
	Supplementary rations	15 May 44
	Seasoning goods	18 May 44
TARLENA DEPOT:-	Staple Food	11 May 44
	Supplementary Rations	8 May 44
	Seasoning goods	20 Apr 44

These rations include those already supplied to units.

Assuming that 10 submarines have landed stores at BOUGAINVILLE since the beginning of Apr 44, the supply exhaustion date would be advanced approximately 20 days. Various reports indicate that Army rations would last until Sep 44, although a PW stated that the rations would last until the end of the year.

In order to supplement the meagre supply of rations in the area, 6 DIV CONSTRUCTIONAL UNIT was formed to supervise the cultivation of crops and gardens on the Island (See First Aust Army Intelligence Summary No 131).

The basis of the self-sufficiency programme was the farming of native staple foods, namely TARO, KAUKAU, ILIMII and YAM - all being subterranean starchy foods.

TARO - Is a non-seasonal crop taking 9-10 months to mature. It varies from 2-30 tons per acre, but it is considered that 15-20 tons per acre is a fair working average. The average weight of taro is 5 lbs per plant, with 6,000 to 10,000 plants per acre. An average taro country would provide sufficient food for 16-20 Japanese to the acre per year, or approximately . 800 Japanese for one week.

KAUKAU - Is a non-seasonal crop suitable to the low coastal country with a growing period of approximately four months. It is considered that the crop, producing about 5 tons to the acre, would maintain 12 Japanese per year, or 200 Japanese per week.

ILIMII and YAM - A non-seasonal crop with a productivity of approximately 3 tons to the acre. Under these conditions it is thought that every acre would keep 2-3 Japanese per year.

The Japanese have proved themselves to be good cultivators, quick to learn from natives and show good judgement in the choice of soil and crops.

Provided that the Japanese forces on BOUGAINVILLE are left unmolested, they could maintain themselves in good condition on native produce (especially in the southern area) for an indefinite period.

The total enemy strength on BOUGAINVILLE is estimated to be 17,000, therefore under the above basis it would require approximately 2,000 acres to maintain them indefinitely.

Recent Allied attempts to destroy the gardens by oil spraying and bombing have had no material effect. Although spraying with oil has had some success in withering plants, the root structure has remained healthy and growth has continued. This applies particularly to tuberous plants which act as perennials and continue to store the food necessary for production of new shoots.

Rice fields are also in production in the SOLOMONS. Here again the only result from spraying is a slight retard-ing of the growth.

SECTION 8

GENERAL

LIVING OFF THE LAND - NEW GUINEA

For some time past, the possibility of the Japanese living off the land indefinitely has been a contentious subject. Weight of evidence has favoured the opinion that it is possible.

From 12-15 Nov 44, three PW were captured in the MADANG-BOGADJIM area and they have provided concrete evidence on this subject. Each came from different parties varying from three to six Japanese and the location was reported of two other parties similar in size.

All have been living off the land for a minimum period of six months and one party of four has been doing so since Feb 44. Of this party, PW was in good health although his swollen feet may have been caused by beri beri. One member of the group died about 20 Oct of beri beri and malaria and about ten days later PW deserted the other two because they were too weak to walk. The other two PW were in a weakened condition and it is probable the balance of the parties they left are in a similar state.

All PW tell the same story of moving from village to village in search of food, never remaining in one area more than about six weeks. As they survived for a period of at least six months (and some are still doing so) under these circumstances without any organised attempt at self-sufficiency, it seems reasonably certain that a properly organised and supervised settlement of Japanese could live off the land indefinitely. On the other hand, the experience of these PW demonstrates that individual small parties, lacking officer supervision, are not likely to survive successfully for any longer than a period of about nine months.

It is therefore probable that the Japanese who have been reported settling in an organised manner in the rich garden areas in the hills south of WEWAK, will be able to survive in good condition indefinitely. A recovered British Indian officer who had been in the MAPRIK area in early September has in fact stated that the Japanese in that area are among the best fed he has seen in the WEWAK-AITAPE Sector.

JAPANESE TROUBLES IN SWPA

A captured diary which belonged to Maj Gen KIMIHARA, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Japanese 8 Area Army furnishes some interesting sidelights on the enemy reaction as his defences crumbled in the South Pacific Area early in 1944.

Maj Gen KIMIHARA was stationed in RABAUL with HQ 8 Area Army, which at that time was responsible for the SOLOMONS, BISMARCKS and part of NEW GUINEA.

The diary encompasses the complete cycle of his emotions whilst at RABAUL. At the beginning of January 1944 his reaction to Allied air raids was one of bravado. His acceptance of exaggerated figures of Allied losses at that time thus became inevitable.

This mood slowly changed and by the end of January his acceptance of the Imperial Army's claims were tempered with the realisation of the great strength displayed by the Allied forces.

His state of mind at this time is wellillustrated by the entry appearing on 30 Jan, wherein he stated "the Naval Consolation Unit seems to have left."

By now consternation at the inability of the Japanese defences to counter strong Allied attacks, has changed to a resigned acceptance of events.

However on 8 Mar the entry again sounded quite jubilant. It was at this time the TOROKINA offensive started. "In the evening there was a report that part of its goal had been achieved. The commanding general's residence was totally demolished."

This, unfortunately for the enemy, did not last and on 25 Mar he wrote that the TOROKINA offensive has not progressed as scheduled. Another attack was planned but it was called off because of the heavy losses which were sustained.

The final reference to the TOROKINA operations is on 6 May. On this day "Staff Officer IINO explained the catastrophe of the operation to me".

On 8 May KIMIHARA departed for TOKYO calling at TRUK en route. His remarks on the sitdation at TRUK were brief and to the point as "the damage caused by bomb explosions was a terrible sight to behold."

During his stay in JAPAN he made numerous reports to the Military Chiefs on the deplorable conditions in the

8 Area Army Command. Probably the greatest event for him, however was an audience with Prince and Princess KITASHIRAKAWA. At this audience he recounted news of General IMAMURA, Commander of 8 Area Army.

En route back to RABAUL, KIHIHARA called in to SAIPAN. Unfortunately for him his visit apparently coincided with the arrival of the US Forces and his diary abruptly ends.

ENEMY AIRFIELDS IN NEW BRITAIN

Notwithstanding the decline of enemy air strength in the RABAUL area over the past twelve months and the subsequent abandonment of his isolated land forces, the Japanese have continued to keep serviceable on an average two or three of the airfields in that area.

With the estimated enemy air strength at present for NEW BRITAIN, NEW IRELAND and the SOLOMONS consisting of only 10 floatplanes and two observation planes, the reason for the persistent reconditioning of these airfields after Allied bombing raids, has been rather obscure.

For some months enemy raids on Allied positions adjoining this area were non-existent, and these airfields were not being used even for the purpose of staging in enemy bombers or fighters based further afield.

A possible explanation has presented itself recently with the following facts:-

(a) A small raid this month on MOMOTE (ADMIRALTIES).
(b) The reports of possibly large numbers of planes hidden and being repaired in the VUNAKANAU and TOBERA areas.
(c) The unconfirmed sighting on 19 Nov of 13 planes (two airborne) at VUNAKANAU.

With the enemy fully occupied building up his air strength in the PHILIPPINES and the NW Area, it is considered improbable that any efforts will be made to reinforce such air strength as he may have in the RABAUL area. Consequently he may be forced to make do with such of the damaged planes within this area as he is able to restore to serviceable condition.

There are now five airfields in the GAZELLE PENINSULA. The most important of these are LAKUNAI (04°14'S-152°13'E), approximately one mile south of RABAUL township, and VUNAKANAU (04°10'S-152°11'E) approximately 15 miles SW of RABAUL. These airfields were used by the Japanese shortly after they captured RABAUL in January 1942.

Since that date the enemy has constructed three more operational airfields - RAPOPO (04°21'S-150°18'E) on the north shore of the GAZELLE PENINSULA, approximately 13 miles SE of RABAUL; TOBERA, about 8 miles SW of RAPOPO and KERAVAT, on the east coast of ANALIKANAN BAY, 13 miles SW of RABAUL.

In or about Oct 1943, the Japanese commenced the construction of an airfield at the south end of DUKE OF YORK ISLAND, on the RAKADA Plantation. Work on this strip continued slowly until March of this year when, still incomplete, it was abandoned.

Because of the lack of enemy air strength and his non-use of these airfields for some months past, complete air coverage of the area has been infrequent, but details of the five airfields as last reported are as follows:-

LAKUNAI - This airfield has a single all-weather runway aligned NW-SE. It dimensions are 4300 feet x 500 feet and was used mainly as a fighter strip.

The surface of the runway is gravel covered with coarse grass acting as a binding material. In July last, 3700 feet x 250 feet of the strip was kept serviceable.

There are dispersal areas and revetments on both sides of the runway, but of the original 108 fighter revetments, only 48 were serviceable in July last. 1700 feet x 270 feet of the runway was reported serviceable on 18 Nov.

VUNAKANAU - This airfield has two parallel runways aligned NW-SE. One is 5000 feet x 500 feet with an all-weather coral surface. The other runway is 4100 feet x 140 feet with an all-weather concrete surface. The airfield was used for all types of planes. The main dispersal area is NE of the strips and includes 48 fighter and 37 bomber revetments. Their present serviceability is not reported. The concrete strip was last reported serviceable on 18 Nov.

RAPOPO - This airfield has a single runway. It is surfaced and is probably an all-weather strip. Aligned north-south it is 2625 feet x 100 feet and was used for all types of planes.

Dispersal areas are on both sides of the strip. They include 33 bomber revetments and 15 bomber dispersal points.

On 18 April 44 the strip was serviceable for 1350 feet, but since 22 April it has been unserviceable and no attempt has since been made to render it serviceable.

TOBERA - This airfield has a single all-weather concrete runway aligned NE-SW. It is 4800 feet x 400 feet and was used mainly for fighters but it could accommodate all types of planes.

In December 1943 the Japanese commenced to construct a new coral surfaced runway 3200 feet long at right angles to the existing runway, but in April 1944 the work on this new strip was apparently abandoned.

The main dispersal area is to the SE of the runway and includes 76 fighter and 3 bomber revetments and 10 fighter and 10 bomber dispersal points. It is not known if these still remain serviceable.

The runway was last reported serviceable on 18 Nov.

KERAVAT - Early in 1943 the Japanese constructed this airfield. It probably became serviceable towards the end of 1943, but it was not developed to any great extent, and was classified as an auxiliary strip only.

It has a single coral-surfaced runway 4300 feet x 350 feet, aligned east-west, and is suitable for all types of enemy planes. The first definite aircraft sighting (two fighters) on this strip was made on 14 Feb 1944. The dispersal areas are on both sides of the east half of the runway and they include 10 fighter and 19 bomber dispersal points.

The runway was last reported serviceable on 23 April 1944 but has become overgrown since that date. It was last reported unserviceable on 27 Oct 44.

PROPAGANDA METHODS

The efficacy of propaganda leaflets directed towards the Japanese in SWPA, has been illustrated of late by the number of enemy who have been prepared to surrender.

It is of interest therefore to study the Japanese outlook to our propaganda and the influence their method of life has on their attitude.

Throughout the war Japanese propaganda has consisted substantially of outsized lies, all of which were believed implicitly by the rank and file.

During the period of Japanese ascendancy our propaganda had little effect. However, following a reversal of procedure the cumulative effect has been quite satisfactory.

In order to appreciate the state of mind of the peasant Japanese, who form the backbone of His Imperial Majesty's Army, the observations of a recent university graduate PW are given.

He considered the peasant lived in a semi-feudal state, his existence being akin to that of slavery. These people have been taught to accept without question the utterances of big business interests. Prior control was virtually maintained through the priesthood and baronetcies. Elevation to the deities was believed to be possibly only through combat and spartan living.

When circumstances adverse to the Japanese are encountered, the power of the "superior being" has to be broken. Thus if propaganda warfare is to achieve its ultimate object a basis for the appropriate approach has to be found and the conclusions reached based on a study of many PW views are given in the following points:-

(a) Brightly coloured surrender leaflets to enable Allied forces to recognise them.
(b) Instructions on how to surrender are superfluous.
(c) News leaflets early in a campaign to gain the confidence of the readers.
(d) Blunt terms of surrender are unacceptable. The main consideration is rather "to come to an agreement".
(e) A systematic drive to remove the influence of "the superior being" typified by their officers.

(f) Appropriate propaganda directed towards showing the folly of resorting to suicide as a means to ending their troubles.

There is also some agreement on the fact that the moral compunction of becoming a prisoner is a secondary consideration. The final mental barrier is the fear of being maltreated by the Allies. That this could be of great magnitude is obvious, since their treatment within the Japanese Army is far from humane. This applies particularly in the face of reverses. The factor to be overcome is that the treatment by the Allies will be even worse than this.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

WESTERN FRONT

The Allied offensive has continued during the past week. French forces following their swift advance to the RHINE and capture of the town of MULHOUSE, swept on over the RHINE plain to take STRASBOURG.

North of the French forces, American forces formed the left arm of a pincer movement to close the German escape routes through the VOSGES.

In the GEILENKIRCHEN area repeated German counter attacks and stubborn enemy resistance, to prevent a major breach of the Seigfried Line, have held the Allied advance. The weight of the Allied offensive is increasing and the critical stage of the onslaught from the west appears imminent.

EASTERN FRONT

Soviet forces have made steady progress in their advance on BUDAPEST.

The capture of HATVAN, a railway junction 27 miles NE of the Hungarian capital leaves the way open for a strong push towards the city.

In the north, Russian forces have made further progress in a thrust through the rugged country of east CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

ITALY

Allied forces are moving slowly forward in Italy in the face of grim and determined German resistance.

In a move to outflank FAENZA, Allied troops have established firm positions south and east of the city.

BURMA

In northern BURMA the encircled Japanese at the Irrawaddy River port of BHAMO are still fighting against strong Chinese pressure.

British forces have resumed their attack in the direction of AKYAB.

PART V

SECURITY.

CARELESS TALK

Gossip, which has been the habit of a thousand generations, is not confined to any one nation or sex and it is a habit that we cannot hope to eradicate in either side in five years of war.

Evidence that the Japanese sailor is prone to gossip of official matters is gleaned from the following ATIS Report on the interrogation of a JAP P/W concerning the sinking of the battleship MUTSU :

"He prefaced his remarks by saying that all details concerning the sinking had been classified MOST SECRET, and went on to say that he had talked to one of seventeen survivors who were subsequently picked up by a destroyer which was steaming close by at the time. The survivor told him that the crews of the destroyer heard a terrific explosion, and the concussion rocked their vessel. The MUTSU must have sunk within a few minutes because by the time the men below decks in the destroyer had rushed above upon hearing the explosion, the battleship was well down in the water and soon disappeared completely.

The loss of the MUTSU was probably attributed by the Japanese Naval Authorities to enemy action in an operational theatre. This would be in line with the usual policy of keeping the public in ignorance concerning the details of such disasters. There was no announcement in the newspapers nor over the radio. Survivors and those concerned with the rescue were warned to treat the matter as MOST SECRET.

However the ratings in the P/W's unit knew all about the MUTSU disaster some time before the PO's and Junior Officers heard of it and it struck him as funny when the latter finally decided to take the men into their confidence several days later.

P/W stated that with MOST SECRET restrictions imposed, news seemed to travel much faster than if they were merely SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL."

As agreed previously gossipy habits cannot be extirpated, but it is possible, by relentless security education and constant thought, to prevent indiscreet talk by certain individuals. These individuals are those people who from disloyalty or cheerful idiocy, from incompetence or indiscipline, must impart valuable information of military matters "in confidence" to their friends.

The above account of imprudent talk may well apply to ourselves and serve to illustrate that the accidental acquisition of military information by any officer or other rank does not entitle him to discuss it with anyone, other than to a minimum number of persons compatible with efficient action.

Always remember that every additional person in possession of information of any value to the enemy is another person who CAN TALK OR BE MADE TO TALK.

R. Thomas
Lt-Col
GS First Aust Army

APPX 'A' to
First Aust Army Weekly
Intelligence Summary No 132
of 30 Nov 44

OOB - METHOD OF CALCULATING ENEMY STRENGTHS

1. Introduction

Little is known outside Order of Battle Sections of the way in which estimates of enemy strength are arrived at.

It is thought that an outline of the methods at present in use in NEW GUINEA will be of general interest.

2. Initial Figures

The basis of OOB method is identification of enemy units. Identifications are obtained from a variety of sources amongst which are PW, items taken from enemy dead and captured documents.

War Establishment strengths of the majority of Japanese Units are known, and in NEW GUINEA experience has shown that newly-arrived units are usually about 80% of WE strength. This figure is accepted initially.

Although identification of units is the basis of OOB method, regard is also had to operational reports of all types including the tonnage of enemy shipping known to have arrived in the area. By a combination of these methods the overall total of Japanese troops is built up. Known reinforcements are added as they arrive.

3. Battle Casualties

From total strenths, battle casualties are deducted according to the following principles :-

(a) Reports from our own troops giving the number of enemy counted dead are accepted as the minimum number of casualties inflicted.

(b) However, in any large action there are additional enemy dead which are not reported due to :-

(i) Subsequent deaths due wounds
(ii) Bodies recovered by enemy
(iii) Naval bombardment, air attack and arty fire behind front lines.
(iv) Bodies hidden in dense jungle.
(v) Losses at sea.

These are especially high when our troops do not occupy the ground over which the enemy fought.

In NEW GUINEA, it is accepted practice to assume that, in any large-scale action the number of unreported dead is roughly equivalent to the number of counted dead. Strength estimates are adjusted accordingly.

4. Attrition Casualties

Deaths apart from those caused in large actions and patrol clashes also occur, and are due to -

(i) Sickness (especially malaria) and other wastage..

(ii) Air attacks on rear bases.

(iii) Revengeful Natives - a factor of growing importance on BOUGAINVILLE where 113 Japanese are known to have been killed by Natives in the month of Sep 44.

Where reasonable opportunities for supply and reinforcement exist (as was the case in NE NEW GUINEA during 1943) it is assumed that losses due to the above causes are balanced out by the normal calling forward of replacements.

In the case of by-passed garrisons (as at present in BOUGAINVILLE and the WEWAK Sector of NE NEW GUINEA) shortages of food and medical supplies increase the rate of loss from sickness and malnutrition. Losses sustained cannot be replaced by reinforcements. Under these conditions, GSI First Aust Army applies an attrition rate of 5% of total strength per month.

5. Casualties - General

Casualties from all causes are arbitrarily allotted to units according to the parts known to have been played by them in action. Resultant unit strengths are always subject to adjustment on the basis of later information from PW, captured documents and other sources.

6. Final Strength Figures

It should be understood that published estimates of strength refer to the total number of Japanese in the area concerned. This is a very different thing from the number of fighting troops. Accordingly, it is necessary to break the overall total down into -

(a) Combat troops

(b) Base and L of C troops.

In this connection the following are considered Combat Troops :

Arty (Fd)
Engrs (less Labour and Construction Units)
Inf Divs (less Tpt and Med components)
Garrison Units.

All others are classed as primarily Non-Combat troops. Up to this stage the figures arrived at are based on mechanical application of accepted principles. It remains to qualify them if desirable by estimating the proportion of effectives. This estimate is based on knowledge of the physical condition of enemy troops, and on sightings and other operational evidence,

together with the realisation that there may be gaps in available information on casualties and enemy evacuation. The figure thus arrived at is the final answer.

The proportion of the final figure which is combat troops represents the answer to the Commander's question " How many enemy may I expect to find opposing me in the field ?" It will be noted how different this figure is from that of the total number of Japanese in the area. The two will only approximate each other when as at BUNA-GONA at the end of 42, the enemy is completely encircled with no avenues of escape open to him. In these circumstances all Japanese are combat troops and even medical personnel will arm themselves and offer resistance.

7. Captured Official Documents

From time to time, Operation Orders issued by senior Japanese Comds are captured containing statements of enemy strength. These are official documents bearing every mark of authenticity and in such cases their figures are fully accepted. Two examples out of many are cited :-

(a) An order dated 25 Mar, signed by the Comd 18 ARMY, Lt-Gen ADACHI, gave the complete OOB, with locations and strengths, of all Japanese forces in NE NEW GUINEA as at end of Mar 44. The summarised figures are :-

Jap Army Air Service	:	25,856
Jap Army Troops	:	69,310
Total No of Japs in NEW GUINEA		95,166

It is of interest to note that of the 98 different Army Units listed, only one had not previously been identified there by Allied Land Forces Intelligence.

(b) A 17 ARMY Intendance Report dated 10 Apr 44 and dealing with the supply situation on BOUGAINVILLE during Mar 44, provided figures of the number of enemy troops supplied. These show a total of just over 40,000 enemy as at 8 Mar 44, and provide an authoritative starting point for calculation of present enemy strengths.

In conclusion it is pointed out that in proportion as our forward troops procure and send back PW and captured documents, so Intelligence is enabled to make more accurate its calculations of enemy strengths.

SECRET

APPENDIX "B" TO FIRST AUST ARMY SUMMARY NO 132

JAPANESE ROCKET EMPLACEMENT

FOUND AT SAN JOSE LEYTE 22 OCT '44



SIDE VIEW





TOP VIEW

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HQ 5 AUST BASE SUB-AREA	18
HQ BUNA BASE SUB-AREA	19
HQ MILNE BAY BASE SUB-AREA	20
HQ LAE BASE SUB-AREA (one for Area Comd FINSCHHAFEN one for NG Force School of Sigs One for NG Force Regt Trg School)	21 - 24
HQ AREA COMD MORESBY	25
HQ AREA COMD MADANG	26
HQ ANGAU	27
HQ NORTHERN REGION ANGAU	28
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TARGET INFM

FOLDER No. 2.

KAIRIRU ISLAND

10 NOV '44

GSI FIRST AUST ARMY



KAIRIRU ISLAND
TORIA BAY
MT MALANGIS
Approx 3350
Approx 2400
3° 15' S
Occ
Yarin
Kairiru
SEAPLANE BASE
Garden
PHOTO COVERAGE
Infm provided by photog of
Mission TAD 92 F24s of
7 Nov 44.
Target photo Map
taken Mar 43.
Cape Musokalang
Manai
143° 35' E
200 0 200 400 600 800
YDS
SCALE 1:2500
(APPROX)

TARGETS - KAIRIRU I

Nov 44

MAP INSET : from KAIRIRU WEST 1" = 1 Mile

References are to Arbitrary Grid on TARGET PHOTO

(A)	163185 to 166191	Probable dump area in gully
(B)	155178	Slipway Two launches and one barge on slipway in photos 7 Nov.
(C)	177177	Possible RADAR installation.
(D)	188177	Probable Camp area.
(E)	196174	Probable Camp area.
(F)		NOT keyed to Target Photo. Buildings anywhere in area.

NOTES:

1. Photos of 7 Nov reveal signs of intense activity throughout area. Heavy use has been made of all roads.
2. Gardens on KAIRIRU I are reported the best kept in the WEWAK Sector. Those shown on Target Photo cover approx 35 acres.
3. No coast defence guns known although aircraft 1 Nov reported being fired on by possible field gun from NW corner of KAIRIRU IS (NOT covered by Target Photo). Slight AA fire recently encountered over KAIRIRU STRAIT.
4. KAIRIRU STRAIT believed probable submarine unloading area.
5. Estimated Japanese strength KAIRIRU I and MUSCHU I 10 Nov: 2,000

TARGETS - WIDE BAY AREA 1.11.44

(A) 573447 Well camouflaged positions 100 yards North of South branch of MELKONG river and on South slope of ridge running between the two branches of the river. The positions extend for 200 yards Eastwards to 575447.

A garden lies 200 yards West of the position and a small clearing on crest of ridge lies 100 yards North of position. (As a check - position lies 3100 yards 293° true from CAPE TURNER)
2 MMGs on AA mountings observed.

(B) 607514 Guard post covering river crossing connected by telephone to HQ (E) and platoon post (C).

(C) 614521 Platoon post on East bank of WAITAVALO RIVER about 1000 metres inland.

(D) 620518 Jap post at base of conspicuous bushy mango tree among coconut palms.

(E) 626516 Main position - HQ and Bivouac Area astride small watercourse immediately North West and West of bungalow (demolished) clearing. Installations extend from 200 to 600 yards in from beach and are hidden under palms and secondary bush. Mouth of this watercourse is near large Ficus trees on beach below bungalow clearing.

(F) 675513 Important Supply and Staging Post on West bank of river 100 yards North of coast road.

(G) 805506 JAMMER BAY Naval coastwatching post, 30 personnel with W/T station and binoculars on tripod on East bank of creek and astride coastal road.

NOTES: TOL plantation not occupied but TOL-BULUS road is patrolled. Only gun larger than .50 cal. HMGs is one 20 or 25 mm A/A gun at HQ in approx position 627517.

Heavy and light infantry mortars are reported at WAITAVALO and KAMANDRAN.



CAUTION:
This map was produced from aerial photographs. Due to lack of accurate ground control, distances scaled on this map may be at variance with actual ground distances. All underwater obstructions not necessarily shown.

TARGET INFM No. 1.

HENRY REID BAY

1 NOV 44

SECRET

Subject: INTELLIGENCE REVIEW OF ENEMY SITUATION

WEWAK - AITAPE AREA

Ref Maps -

(a) Strat Series 4m = 1" WEWAK Sheet

(b) Attd Appendices 'A' & 'B'

OBJECT

1. (a) To review Japanese activity in the WEWAK-AITAPE area between Dec 42 and Sep 44 (PART I)

(b) With the above review as background to make an appreciation of the enemy's present position and capabilities (PART II)

AREA BOUNDARIES

2. Attached as Appendix 'A' is a map defining the boundaries of the area specifically dealt with in this review.

However, particularly in PART I, it has been necessary to refer also to activity in other sectors of NE NEW GUINEA.

TOPOGRAPHY

3. The main topographical features of the area are shown in Appendix 'A'.

JAPANESE OCCUPATION - FIRST PHASE

4. LANDING

After his defeats at MILNE BAY (Aug 42) and in the KOKODA operations (Aug-Oct 42), the enemy realised the failure of his initial attempts to gain control of SE NEW GUINEA and resolved to seek a foothold further to the west. On 18 Dec 42 his forces landed simultaneously at MADANG and WEWAK.

5. COMMAND

All Japanese forces in NE NEW GUINEA were placed under 18 ARMY (HO Force, Comd Lt-Gen ADACHI). 18 ARMY became established at MADANG under direct command of 8 AREA ARMY (GO Force, Comd Gen IMAMURA) at RABAUL.

On 25 Mar 44, following the separation of the RABAUL and NEW GUINEA theatres, 18 ARMY was placed under command 2 Area Army (TERU/ KAGAYAKI Force) then located in MENADO. The present location of HQ 18 ARMY is BOIKEN.

6. STRENGTH

Strength was rapidly built up and by Jun 43 was estimated to be :-

MADANG Sector	:	15,000
HANSA BAY	:	5,000
WEWAK Sector	:	25,000

The majority of these were Base and L of C troops for construction, transport and AA defence, but the following Divisional Units were present :-

20 DIV

80 Inf Regt, strength 3,500, arrived WEWAK ex PALAU Jan 43 and was put to work constructing airfields. Moved MADANG area Apr 43, where by Jul it had been joined by 78 & 79 Inf Regts and remaining 20 Div troops.

41 DIV

Concentrated WEWAK Apr-Jun 43 and engaged on construction duties.

7. OBJECTS OF OCCUPATION

In furtherance of plans eventually to capture MORESBY and dominate the whole of SE NEW GUINEA, the WEWAK area was occupied for the following reasons:-

(a) To establish a main rear supply base.

When at end of 43 it became clear that due to Allied air power, supply of the LAE-SALAMAUA forces from RABAUL would be too hazardous, a base was required where supplies could be brought direct from PALAU and which would be sufficiently out of bombing range to permit its development. WEWAK was well suited to meet these conditions.

(b) To provide airfields for the Army Air Service.

DEVELOPMENT

8. ROADS AND TRACKS

Improvements were made to existing roads, particularly those linking the WEWAK airfields. Work was begun with the object of providing an MT road linking HANSA BAY to MADANG and BOGADJIM. Bridges were built and although parts of this road were never really serviceable, it was being used by through traffic in Apr 43.

9. AIRFIELDS

Work on existing civil landing grounds was at once begun. In April-May the Army Air Service moved in and by mid-Jun the four WEWAK airfields were in full operational use with an estimated 130 aircraft based on them.

Details at this time:-

AIRFIELD	REVETMENTS		ADDITIONAL UNPROTECTED DISPERSAL PTS	DEFENCES
	F	B		
WEWAK	-	105	60	6 hy AA Btys 30 MG or Lt AA 10 SL
BORAM	-	36	20	5 hy AA Btys 2 Lt AA 16 SL
DAGUA	40	39	20	4 Lt AA
BUT	-	30	20	3 hy AA btys 4 Lt AA

In addition, forward airfields at NUBIA, MADANG and ALEXISHAFEN (2) were being made serviceable.

10. DEFENCES

Primary consideration was provision of AA defences (see para 9). These were steadily strengthened and technical equipment including Radar installed.

11. OTHER INSTALLATIONS

Piers for use of small craft (but no deep sea wharves) were built at WEWAK and BUT. Warehouses and barracks were constructed, the enemy showing a preference for vicinity of coconut plantations. Natives were conscripted for use as labourers and carriers.

12. PATROLLING

Strong patrols explored the SEPIK, the immediate hinterland and the coastal area as far west as AITAPE.

SUPPLY

13. ARRIVAL OF STORES

Convoys up to 25,000 tons brought troops and supplies from PALAU, offloading principally at WEWAK and HANSA BAY. They discharged direct into lighters and MLC, of which in Jun 43 the enemy had approximately 250-300. Indications of imminent convoy arrival were often provided by :-

(a) Assembly beforehand of up to 100 MLC at WEWAK (normally only about 40 in harbour, remainder dispersed along coast).

(b) Arrival on preceding day of at least 20 aircraft at forward airfield at NUBIA to provide air cover.

Stores were at first dumped on the beach and later dispersed, mainly into plantations and patches of jungle within 400 yards of the coast.

14. DISTRIBUTION OF STORES

From WEWAK, distribution forward was carried out as follows:-

To MADANG by sea truck, auxiliary sailing vessels or fishing boats.

From MADANG to LAE-SALAMAUA by MLC operated by Shipping Engr Regts and using elaborate hideouts.

15. ROLE OF HOLLANDIA AND AITAPE

As Allied airpower reached further westward, the Japanese were forced to bring much of their shipping to WEWAK and AITAPE whence supplies were filtered forward by sea truck.

Thus from Dec 43 to Mar 44, 20 ships totalling 56,000 tons were discharged at HOLLANDIA.

With the construction of three new airfields, HOLLANDIA had been formed into a major operational air base by beginning of 1944.

16. SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Late in 1943, but particularly in 1944, the Japanese were forced to try to become as self-supporting as possible and began putting tracts of land under cultivation. A Fisheries Coy was established on KAIRIRU ISLAND.

OPERATIONS 1943

17. LAE-SALAMAUA CAMPAIGN

After the fall of these two strongholds on 16 Sep and 11 Sep 43 respectively, the remnants of the Japanese garrisons (mostly 51 Div, but including part of 20 and 41 Divs) withdrew across the FINISTERRE RANGE to the RAI COAST, thence NW through MADANG and HANSA BAY to the WEWAK sector, where they arrived approximately end May 44.

Captured documents show a total of 6,417 troops (incl 3,200 men of 51 Div) on the RAI COAST at KIARI in late Oct 43. The bulk of these were part of the former LAE-SALAMAUA garrisons.

18. RAMU VALLEY CAMPAIGN

Allied troops sweeping up the RAMU VALLEY end Sep and Oct 43 routed Japanese forces consisting mainly of 78 Regt 20 Div. Their advance permitted the construction of forward Allied airfields in the MARKHAM VALLEY.

19. RAI COAST CAMPAIGN

With SATELBERG as forward HQ, the Japanese in Oct and Nov 43 made a determined effort to recapture FINSCHHAFEN (captured by Allied troops 2 Oct). They employed 12/15,000 troops, the bulk of whom were 79 and 80 Inf Regts 20 Div, 238 Regt 41 Div. Our troops with tank support captured SATELBERG 25 Nov, and assisted by a US landing at SAIDOR on 2 Jan advanced up the coast in pursuit of the fleeing enemy. The enemy withdrew from MADANG, which was occupied by Australian troops on 24 Apr 44. Meanwhile the enemy continued to retreat and by end of May the bulk of his forces had crossed the SEPIK RIVER. Our troops entered HANSA BAY 15 Jun 44

20. ALLIED AIR POWER

Throughout the period under review, enemy troops, small craft, stores and installations were heavily and consistently attacked from the air. No proper estimate of the casualties caused can be made, but it is known that the toll was heavy.

In particular, massive and well-planned attacks on enemy airfields practically wiped out the Japanese Air Forces. When our troops entered HOLLANDIA, no less than 340 destroyed enemy aircraft were counted. Destruction of aircraft on the four WEWAK fields, mainly in attacks during Aug-Oct 43, was on a similar scale, 200 being destroyed on 17 and 18 Aug alone.

21. HOLLANDIA CAMPAIGN

The capture of AITAPE and HOLLANDIA by Allied troops who landed both places 22 Apr had the effect of largely sealing off the forces under 18 ARMY in the WEWAK sector. They were then contained in the roughly triangular area enclosed by coast AITAPE to SEPIK RIVER mouth, the SEPIK RIVER and a line from DRINIUMOR RIVER to MAIMAI thence south to the SEPIK RIVER.

22. DRINIUMOR RIVER ACTION - JAPANESE ATTACK.

On 9 Jul, in a desperate attempt to relieve the situation, the beleaguered 18 ARMY made an assault on the Allied perimeter east of AITAPE. They were repulsed with very heavy losses estimated to be in the region of 20,000 men. Over 9,000 bodies were buried by our forces. 20 and 41 Divs formed the attacking force, with 51 Div in reserve.

PART II

ENEMY POSITION AS AT 10 NOV 44

23. STRENGTH

(a) Estimates based on identification of all the component units of 18 ARMY give a total strength of 24,000 as at 10 Nov 44:-

Combat Troops	:	9,000
Base Troops and Remnants	:	15,000
		24,000

Of this 24,000, only 15,000 are thought to be effectives.

(b) A completely independent estimate based on over-all figures for 18 ARMY gives a total strength of 26,000. It is considered therefore that the probable figure for enemy strength is between 24,000 and 26,000.

(c) The above figures are considered a maximum. It is always possible that through lack of information on casualties, escapees westwards below AITAPE, and the like, actual figures are lower than these estimates.

(d) In other by-passed areas, notably BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND and RABAUL, the enemy has used his minor units and remnants either to build up the strength of depleted divisions or to form new fighting formations such as Independent Mixed Brigades.

As yet there are no indications that similar re-organisation has been carried out in the WEWAK Sector, though something of the sort must be expected.

24. HEALTH AND ATTRITION

(a) It is known that in 1943 at least 80%, and possibly 100% of Japanese troops were infected with malaria, and that the death rate from this cause was high- estimated by one Medical Officer PW to be 10% of all forward troops. Where malaria supervenes

on malnutrition, the deathrate rises in leaps and bounds. In the WEWAK Sector, with increasing shortage (if not already a complete absence) of medical supplies, together with food shortages, the toll taken by malaria must assuredly be heavy.

The Japanese are also susceptible to other diseases, notably beri-beri and dysentery.

(b) It is to be expected that, consequent on under-nourishment, the majority of Japanese troops will be physically weak, resulting in severe loss of fighting efficiency.

(c) Casualties are steadily being inflicted on the enemy by air attack, allied patrols and revengeful natives.

(d) The estimate of strengths in para 23 assumed an attrition rate from all causes of 5% of total strength per month. It is possible that this rate is too low.

25. DISPOSITIONS

Attached as Appendix 'B' is a map showing dispositions of major units and strength.

26. RECENT TRENDS

(a) After the failure of the DRINUMOR RIVER attack the enemy retreated eastwards and it is now thought that apart from occasional patrols and foraging parties, there are no Japanese west of a line joining YAKAMUL and YESAN on the SEPIK RIVER.

(b) According to numerous recent reports, large numbers of enemy are moving from the coastal area southwards over the TORRICELLI MOUNTAINS. The area south of these mountains is reported thickly populated and well stocked with native foods. Informed opinion varies however as to the extent to which these foods could support Japanese troops in addition to the native population. (See para 31 (f)). Available information points to the Japanese being "farmed out" to native villages in parties of up to a dozen men per village.

(c) The HAPRIK area has recently assumed increased importance as a centre of Japanese activity.

(d) The SEPIK RIVER valley, particularly between TELEBUIKE and YESAU, is a most fertile area. Its abundant supplies of native foods should prove very attractive to the famished enemy, whose future movement towards this area would not therefore be surprising. In the event of the enemy crossing to the south bank of the river, it is likely that this would be effected in the vicinity of MARUI.

27. MORALE

(a) Japanese forces in the WEWAK area have had an unbroken record of rout and defeat. Consistently pounded from the air, never seeing a friendly aircraft in the skies, short of food and stores, and knowing they cannot hope to receive further supplies, they must all realise their lot is hopeless.

(b) It is NOT however considered that these facts will induce in them a readiness to surrender. It would be dangerous to assume a wholesale lessening of their will to resist.

28. EQUIPMENT

(a) Air Support, AFV's - NIL

(b) Heavy Weapons - Number of field guns unknown, but probably not more than : 15 x 75 mm
6 x 70 mm
10 x 37 mm

In addition there are unknown numbers of 13mm, 20mm and 25 mm weapons. It should be noted that all Japanese AA guns are dual purpose. From recent reports of enemy AA fire it is NOT thought that many heavy AA guns remain serviceable.

(c) Small Arms - It is believed that a maximum of half the total enemy forces is armed with rifles or other small arms.

(d) Deterioration - No accurate estimate of this factor can be made. Japanese grenades and ammunition are poorly packed and by now a considerable proportion - possibly 25% of all stocks - is probably ineffective due to dampness and other deterioration.

Known shortages of oil will make it particularly difficult to prevent deterioration of machinery, and will be reflected in rusty bores and faulty mechanism of weapons - as examination of captured equipment has already shown. Coconut oil which the enemy has been using as a substitute is not satisfactory.

(e) LT - Aircraft sightings continue to report the use of vehicles in the coastal sector, especially in the vicinity of the four airfields and at BOIKEN and BRANDI Pln.

(f) Small Craft - Small numbers of barges and fishing boats are reported from time to time, mostly off WEWAK and in the vicinity of KARASAU I, MUSCHU I, and KAIRIRU I. The serviceability of these is unknown. Bearing in mind the enemy's elaborate methods of camouflage and concealment, it is probable he still has a number of serviceable barges. A maximum is thought to be thirty.

(g) AA Reaction - Allied aircraft continue to be opposed by AA fire from positions along the coast between BORAM and BUT. During Oct 44, guns were reported as follows:-

BORAM	Med & Lt AA from south of airfield
WEWAK POINT	Med & Lt AA plus MG fire
KAIRIRU I	Lt AA plus MG fire
BOIKEN	Lt AA
KARAWOP	One hy AA gun
BUT	Med AA

On all occasions but one, the quantity of fire was reported as light.

29. FIXED DEFENCES

There are elaborate systems of bunkers and MG emplacements in the coastal sector, between BORAM and BUT, designed to provide defence against landings from the sea.

According to some PW there have been occasions where fortifications destroyed by Allied bombings, were NOT rebuilt owing to the physical weakness and low morale of the troops. It is therefore to be anticipated that many of the enem defences may now be in bad shape.

30. REINFORCEMENT AND SUPPLY

(a) Surface Shipping

A direct result of the seizure of HOLLANDIA was that thereafter the movement of surface shipping to NE NEW GUINEA ceased. What this would mean to the enemy is shown by the following figures for the period Dec 43 - Mar 44 inclusive :-

Number of ships arriving WEWAK and HOLLANDIA -

46 ships totalling 143,000 tons.

This shipping delivered :-

Reinforcements	15,000	
Supplies	100,000	cubic metres
Vehicles	320	
MLC	130	

(b) Present Stores

Remembering the extent to which WEWAK had been built up as a supply base, it is reasonable to expect that considerable accumulations of stores still exist. These are probably in dumps hidden in the jungle and foothills inland from the beaches. Many stores must be ineffective due to deterioration, lack of essential parts and replacements, and lack of tools.

(c) Submarines

It is known that since May 44 several submarines have succeeded in discharging off MUSCHU I. Each one of these would be capable of carrying up to 50 tons of food, sufficient for approximately 6,500 men for one week at half standard ration scale. These craft would certainly also be used to bring in vital technical stores such as signal equipment, machine tools and oil.

It was thought that this source of supply had ceased in Oct - a PW stated 18 ARMY had been told no more submarines would come after 10 Oct. However, the sighting on 6 Nov of a submarine proceeding north, two miles off BUT indicates that use is still being made of this channel which is the only practical means of supply remaining to the enemy.

(d) Aircraft

An occasional aircraft manages to evade Allied watchfulness and land at WEWAK strip, usually at night. High-ranking officers have been carried. Apart from small but essential material such as W/T batteries, supply by this method is negligible.

31. FOOD

(a) Present Stocks

On 31 Mar 44 the WEWAK Supply Depot held 5,131 tons of foodstuffs. There were also supply depots at BOIKEN and MUSCHU I. It is probable therefore that for present strength the enemy still has up to four months rations, if issued at the emergency scale which appears to have been in use since May 44.

(b) Distribution

Inefficient transportation facilities, apart from other factors, are almost certain to cause local shortages.

An officer PW of 41 Div stated 30 Sep that supplies of rice in DAIRAP RIVER area ceased 10 Jul.

(c) Re-supply

Replenishment of ration supplies from outside appears most improbable apart from what can be brought in by submarine. Already the bulk of Japanese diet is native food.

(d) Japanese Cultivation

Although gardens exist in the coastal area there is no precise information as to their extent. The enemy there has not yet had the same opportunities to establish gardens as other isolated garrisons have had.

The most extensive gardens exist on KAIRIRU I and reports in Sep indicated they were being well kept. The enemy here is possibly achieving self-sufficiency.

(e) Fish

In the coastal regions, and particularly on KAIRIRU and MUSCHU Is, fish is probably one of the staple articles of diet.

(f) Native Gardens

One ANGAU estimate is that any village group can provide for twice its own population (in addition to itself) without undue strain in a normal season. Other informed opinion differs from this. There are supplies of root vegetables, fruits, coconuts, sago, and game, such as wild pigs.

32. COMMUNICATIONS

(a) Native Couriers

(b) W/T

Within the 18 ARMY area there exist approximately 20 W/T stations, of which the location of 12 is known. Activity in general is low and spasmodic and frequent technical difficulties are experienced, which will increase as present stocks of batteries are exhausted.

33. ATTITUDE OF NATIVES

(a) It is believed that most natives in the area are by now used to co-operating with the Japanese and are coerced into providing food and labour. Others assist as native police, spies and runners, and a proportion have been armed with rifles.

(b) However, ANGAU and AIB patrols, assisted by FELO propaganda, are gaining more and more control. It is ANGAU's opinion that the majority of natives are aware that the Japanese are losing the war and will actively assist us once they are convinced by show of Allied strength on the ground.

COURSES OPEN TO THE ENEMY

34. From the foregoing it would appear that the enemy has four courses open to him :-

(a) The first is to remain in the coastal belt as at present. This however may be summarily dismissed because of the acute shortage of supplies in that area and because of their vulnerability there to Allied water-borne and air attacks.

(b) The second course is to pass to a limited offensive either along the coastal strip or further inland. However in this case it is considered, owing to the present lack of offensive-mindedness, the shortage of foodstuffs, weapons and ammunition and the poor physical condition of the troops, that this course is not very likely to be followed.

(c) The third course is to evacuate all troops from the coastal areas inland. This would have the effect of readily obtaining a certain quantity of native foods but it would mean abandoning their outlet to the sea and the only possible landing fields, both of which would be required if the enemy is again to build up sufficient sea or air power to either evacuate or supply the WEWAK garrison. In addition, the sudden ingress of 18 ARMY to the TORRICELLIS would clear that entire area of local foods practically overnight and the questions of malnutrition and starvation would once again raise their ugly heads.

(d) The fourth alternative is to make a partial evacuation of the coastal area, holding only enough troops there to keep open, temporarily at least, the docking facilities and the airstrips and to protect a corridor into the TORRICELLI area should complete evacuation become either desirable or necessary. The troops evacuated inland would live off native foods, at the same time endeavouring to cultivate gardens, develop fishing in the SEPIK and eventually become self-sufficient. It may be expected that such activities will be covered by combined fighting and foraging patrols.

It would appear that Course (d) is the most likely to be adopted by the enemy and it does in fact seem that such is already under way.

COURSES OPEN TO ALLIED TROOPS

35. If, as does appear, it is not practicable to launch a general offensive against the enemy in the WEWAK-TORRICELLI area, it seems that the course most likely to succeed is to carry out rigorous guerilla activities, striking deep into enemy territory and taking full advantage of the nervousness the enemy displays towards this type of warfare. A drive along the coastal strip to cut the main routes between the coast and the TORRICELLIS would serve to bisect his garrison.

CONCLUSIONS

36. (a) The enemy, strength approximately 24,000, is disposed mainly along the coast but with a large part of his forces dispersed in small and ragged parties throughout the WEWAK hinterland.

(b) Sickness, starvation and harassing raids are reducing his strength by an estimated 5% per month.

(c) His primary purpose is to evade destruction and find enough food to live on. However he will resist tenaciously if attacked, despite lack of air, tank or heavy artillery support.

(d) His supply of rations, weapons and ammunition and medical stores is already low. In view of the improbability of adequate replenishment, his position in this respect will become worse as time goes on.

(e) In his present condition, the enemy is vulnerable to vigourous Allied ground action along guerilla lines.

Lt-Col
GS First Aust Army

14 Nov 44

Distribution :-

6 AUST DIV (2)
NORTHERN COMMAND RAAF (FOR AIRINTEL)
GOC
BGS
G(OPS)
G(INT)
G(AIR)
Adv LHQ (Aust)
Fwd Ech LHQ
LHQ School of MI
War Diary (2)
File


WEWAK
NEW GUINEA
1:253,440
SEPIK
SECRET
APPENDIX "A"
SHOWING
(a) AREA DEALT WITH IN REVIEW (Inside Black Frame)
(b) MAIN TOPOGRAPHICAL FEATURES
P A C I F I C O C E A N
B I S M A R C
BISMARCK SEA
BABIANG
SUAIN
SOWAM
BIT
BAGUA DROME
BOIKEN
KAIRIRU ISLAND
TORRICELLI
MOUNTAINS
TONG
WOM
WEWAK
BRANDI PTN.
STRING
MAPRIK
SEPIK
RIVER

000848K

INDEX

SEPIK SHEET

NEW GUINEA

Name of Place	Feature	Grid Ref.
Ariepon	Village	(W)B 8071
Arle	Island	(W)C 8055
Bam	Island	(W)X 6901
Banaeuge	Village	(W)F 7704
Bien	River	(W)C 1159
Blupblup	Island	(W)X 4013
Bonnan	Village	(W)B 0066
Broken Water	Bay	(W)C 3566
Casuarina	Point	(W)C 1083
Darapap	Entrance	(W)D 1084
Darapap	Village	(W)C 0883
Dlugo	Village	(W)H 7445
Franceski	Cape	(W)B 3575
Ga	Village	(W)F 7504
Gavien	Village	(W)B 8859
Ginaka	Village	(W)F 7742
Girgir	Cape	(W)C 3878
Ibnis	Village	(W)X 3814
Kadaver	Island	(W)C 1199
Kanai	Village	(W)C 1382
Kearson	Village	(W)C 7571
Kenr	Villages	(W)B 7691
Kia	Village	(W)B 8577
Kiet	Island	(W)B 7933
Koper	Village	(W)C 3473
Kubik	Village	(W)C 1963
Kwiyn	Canal	(W)C 2073
Marlet	Village	(W)B 9969
Mungra	Village	(W)C 0467
Marienberg	Hills	(W)B 8566
Marienberg	R.C.Mission. H.Q.	(W)C 0564
Mukun	Village	(W)B 9572
Mukun	Village	(W)C 1751
Murik	Entrance	(W)B 9981
Murik	Lagoon	(W)C 0782
Muriz	Villages	(W)B 9582
Murik (Karau)	Lagoon	(W)B 9579
New Bien	Village	(W)C 1161
New Singarin	Village	(W)C 2365
Old Bien	Village	(W)C 1665
Old Singarin	Village	(W)C 2565
Palaka	Village	(W)F 7543
Ruprip	Village	(W)X 3912
Sepik	River	(W)C 0563
Suk	Village	(W)C 2167
Vini	Island	(W)X 1729
Vokec	Island	(W)F 7845
Yokeo	Village	(W)F 7843
Wabua	Cape	(W)C 3872
Wangan	Village	(W)C 3558
Yaakurin	Village	(W)B 8273
Watam	Lagoon	(W)C 2563
Watam	Village	(W)C 3663

Feature	Grid Ref.	Name of Place	Feature	Grid Ref.
Village	(W)H 1052	Macgregor's	Wharf	(W)B 8252
Village	(W)H 1651	Magendo	Village	(W)B 8048
Village	(W)J 1951	Magila	Village	(W)J 3959
Village	(W)H 0185	Makerup	Village	(W)C 6256
Village	(W)H 8492	Makoton	Village	(W)C 7499
		Makora	Village	(W)C 6329
Village	(W)H 3693	Makun	Village	(W)C 5651
Village	(W)C 5548	Malala	Village	(W)D 2558
Village	(W)C 6126	Manaku	River	(W)H 9858
Mission	(W)C 8623	Manan	Island	(W)C 0848
Village	(W)B 9165	Mangen	River	(W)J 3487
Village	(W)F 8193	Mangin	Village	(W)C 7111
Passage	(W)C 5131	Mangua	Point	(W)D 2807
Village	(W)C 5827	Marangia	Village	(W)C 4857
Village	(W)C 5528	Marengia	Mission	(W)C 4656
Village	(W)H 4565	Marenob	Village	(W)C 7607
River	(W)J 2953	Meri	Village	(W)D 6916
Village	(W)B 9017	Mertibu	Village	(W)D 6163
Village	(W)J 0383	Muruvixi	Village	(W)D 9320
Village	(W)H 4172	Maginar	Village	(W)C 7525
		Ohuri	Village	(W)B 9949

Name of Place	Feature	Grid Ref.
Samoe	Point	(W)D 2117
Samu Dami	Mission	(W)C 0122
Sangan	Village	(W)C 7228
Sant	Village	(W)C 3937
Sarant	Village	(W)H 9956
Saperi	Village	(W)D 2867
Saprenin	Village	(W)J 3167
Sarienan	Village	(W)C 1356
Sawnin	River	(W)J 3667
Schillinga	Plantation	(W)C 0033
Schlenitz	Island	(W)C 4981
Serfon	Village	(W)C 5817
Sonae No.1	Village	(W)C 3417
Sonae No.2	Village	(W)C 3773
Sepa	Village	(W)C 7737
Sepen	Passage	(W)C 4491
Sepik	River	(W)B 8567
Sikor	Village	(W)D 3067
Sikori	Village	(W)J 3847
Sikuln	River	(W)C 7337

000849L

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WEWAK SHEET

NEW GUINEA

Name of Place	Feature	Grid Ref.
Abau	Village	(W)A 5787
Abrau	Passage	(W)V 9003
Abtael	Village	(W)V 9104
Aecosha	Village	(W)V 8707
Aeterero	Village	(W)V 7911
Agnram	Village	(W)V 8403
Alaakai	Village	(W)V 8704
Alaakiai	Village	(W)V 8404
Alaakiai	Village	(W)V 8104
Alaamaso	Village	(W)V 9304
Alabat	Village	(W)V 9107
Alaigu	Village	(W)V 8707
Alaipa	Village	(W)A 8704
Alaipe	Village	(W)V 8707
Alaipi	Village	(W)V 8704
Alaipo	Village	(W)V 8704
Alaiwap	Village	(W)V 8704
Amrael	Village	(W)V 8403
Ali	Village	(W)V 8703
Ali	Village	(W)V 8703
Ali	Village	(W)V 8703
Ali	Village	(W)V 8703
Alias	Village	(W)V 8703
Alwapi	Village	(W)V 8704
Amilem	Village	(W)V 8703
Amri	Village	(W)V 8703
Amri	Village	(W)V 8703
Amuku	Village	(W)V 8703
Amun	Village	(W)V 8703
Anau	Village	(W)V 8703
Anen	Village	(W)V 8703
Angagenak	Village	(W)V 8703
Angila	Village	(W)V 8703
Angwe	Village	(W)V 8703
Ani	Village	(W)V 8703
Anil	Village	(W)V 8703
Anil	Village	(W)V 8703
Anil



WEWAK
NEW GUINEA
1:253,440
NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID EQUATORIAL NEW GUINEA ZONE
P A C I F I C O C E A N
BISMARCK SEA
YAKAMUL
BABIANG
SUAIN
41 DIV
SOWAM
MALIN
HQ 20 DIV
BUT 78 OR 79 INF REGT 20 DIV
POSSIBLE REAR 18 ARMY
18 ARMY
80 INF REGT 20 DIV
27 SPECIAL BASE FORCE (NAVAL)
5 SHIPPING ENG REGT.
BOIKEN
TORRICELLI
MOUNTAINS
TONG
51 DIV
WOM
WEWAK
BORAM
BRANDI PTN
7,500
POSSIBLE ADV 20 DIV
MAPRIK
102 INF REGT
KAUP
3,000
MARIENBERG
ANGORAM
MARUI
TIMBUNKE
AMBUNTI
MAI YESAN

000850D

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SEPIK SHEET

NEW GUINEA

Name of Place	Feature	Grid Ref.
Ariepan	Village	(W)B 8073
Arie	Island	(W)C 8159
Bam	Island	(B)X 6901
Banange	Village	(B)W 7744
Bien	River	(B)X 1159
Blaphlup	Island	(B)X 4013
Boanen	Village	(W)B 0066
Broken Water	Bay	(W)C 3966
Cassuarina	Point	(W)C 1083
Darapap	Entrance	(W)C 1084
Darapap	Village	(W)C 0883
Djuge	Village	(B)W 7443
Francesski	Cape	(W)C 3679
St	Village	(B)W 7944
Gavien	Village	(W)B 6859
Ginobe	Village	(B)W 7742
Girgir	Cape	(W)C 3978
Ibets	Village	(B)X 3814
Kadivar	Island	(W)C 1389
Karou	Village	(W)C 1382
Kasiman	Village	(W)B 7571
Kaup	Villages	(W)C 7681
Kia	Village	(W)B 7977
Koil	Island	(W)C 8931
Koper	Village	(W)C 3473
Makuk	Village	(W)C 1963
Madjop	Canal	(W)C 2072
Mambet	Village	(W)B 9659
Mungen	Village	(W)C 0467
Marienberg	Hills	(W)B 8068
Marienberg	R.C.Mission. H.Q.	(W)C 0364
Mangan	Village	(W)B 9571
Mindan	Village	(W)C 1781
Murik	Entrance	(W)B 9984
Murik	Lagoon	(W)C 0782
Murik	Villages	(W)B 6482
Murik (Karau)	Lagoon	(W)B 9579
New Bien	Village	(W)C 1461
New Singerin	Village	(W)C 2365
Old Bien	Village	(W)C 1659
Old Singerin	Village	(W)C 2565
Palala	Village	(B)W 7642
Ruppup	Village	(B)X 3512
Sepik	River	(W)C 0563
Suk	Village	(W)C 0167
Vimi	Island	(B)X 1729
Vokeo	Island	(B)W 7845
[illegible]	Village	(B)W 7843
[illegible]	Cape	(W)C 3872
[illegible]	Village	(W)C 3559
[illegible]	Village	(W)B 8273
Watan	Lagoon	(W)C 2563

Feature	Grid Ref.
Village	(W)J 1092
Village	(W)J 1091
Village	(W)J 3551
Village	(W)J 8495
Village	(W)H 8492
Village	(W)H 3693
Village	(W)C 5546
Village	(W)C 6125
Mission	(W)C 8523
Village	(W)B 9105
Village	(W)H 8193
Passage	(W)C 5133
Village	(W)C 5627
Village	(W)C 5529
Village	(W)H 4066
River	(W)J 2252
Village	(W)B 8217
Village	(W)J 0383
Village	(W)H 4172

Name of Place	Feature	Grid Ref.
Macgregor's	Wharf	(W)B 8252
Magando	Village	(W)B 8048
Magila	Village	(W)J 2959
Makarap	Village	(W)C 6226
Makaton	Village	(W)C 7498
Makera	Village	(W)C 6329
Makau	Village	(W)C 9651
Malala	Village	(W)B 9508
Mamau	River	(W)H 9558
Mamau	Island	(W)C 0282
Mangen	River	(W)J 3687
Mangim	Village	(W)C 7111
Mangan	Point	(W)B 2807
Mangrie	Village	(W)C 4257
Mangis	Mission	(W)C 4656
Manob	Village	(W)C 7507
Ma[illegible]	Village	(W)C 6916
Marabu	Village	(W)H 6163
Maruriki	Village	(W)B 9320
Masiwar	Village	(W)C 7529
[illegible]	Village	[illegible]

Name of Place	Feature	Grid Ref.
Samoa	Point	(W)D [illegible]
Sama Sama	Mission	(W)C [illegible]
Sangan	Village	(W)C [illegible]
Sank	Village	(W)B [illegible]
Samwat	Village	(W)H [illegible]
Sapari	Village	(W)D [illegible]
Saraman	Village	(W)J [illegible]
Sariamb	Village	(W)J [illegible]
Sawain	River	(W)J [illegible]
Schillings	Plantation	(W)C [illegible]
Schlenitz	Island	(W)C [illegible]
Seffen	Village	(W)C [illegible]
Sepik No.1	Village	(W)C [illegible]
Sepik No.2	Village	(W)C [illegible]
Sepa	Village	(W)C [illegible]
Sepen	Passage	(W)B [illegible]
Sepik	River	(W)D [illegible]
Sikor	Village	(W)J [illegible]
Sikori	Village	(W)J [illegible]
Sikuln	River	
Simbi	Village	

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Name of Place	Feature	Grid Ref.
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

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