# AWM52
# 2nd Australian Imperial Force and Commonwealth Military Forces unit war diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/2/17

## 17 Infantry Brigade

## July 1943, Appendices, part 2 of 2

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

WDI

SECRET

17 AUST INFANTRY BRIGADE OPERATION INSTRUCTION No.11 Copy No.: 11

17 July 43

Ref map: KOMIATUM 1:25,000.

INFORMATION

1. ENEMY

(a) Enemy still holds BOBDUBI RIDGE and has been active in the area NAMLING-ORODUBI where enemy pressure threatens 15 Aust Infantry Brigade right flank. Enemy is disposed along track KOMIATUM - SALAMAUA.

(b) Enemy has been defeated in and withdrawn from MUBO area.

2. LIKELY ENEMY ACTION

(a) It is known that instructions were issued by enemy since 5 July 43 for preparation of defensive positions in KOMIATUM and GOODVIEW JUNCTION areas, and for troops in KOMIATUM area to take offensive action against 58/59 Aust Infantry Battalion on BOBDUBI RIDGE.

(b) The enemy will endeavour to extricate as much as possible of remaining force from BUIGAP VALLEY. Therefore it can be expected that he will attack our forces occupying GOODVIEW JUNCTION.

(c) It is probable that the enemy will endeavour to capture area GOODVIEW JUNCTION-TAMBU SADDLE in order to protect his left flank during operations against NAMLING-ORGDUBI and BOBDUBI RIDGE.

(d) Some enemy are known to be in BOISI area at 771913. This area may be held in an endeavour to prevent outflanking by movement of our forces NORTH along the coast, as it is possible that an L of C exists between BOISI and KOMIATUM.

3. OWN TROOPS

(a) 15 Aust Infantry Brigade is attacking on a NORTH-SOUTH line BOBDUBI RIDGE-NAMLING with 58/59 Aust Infantry Battalion.

(b) 2/3 Aust Independent Company has been holding positions astride main KOMIATUM Lines of Communication in area JEFFRIES JUNCTION-GOODVIEW JUNCTION-TAMBU SADDLE.

(c) BENNETT FORCE comprising B and C Companies 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion is in the area BASE FOUR-GOODVIEW JUNCTION with the task of preventing the escape of enemy from the MUBO area. BENNETT FORCE will come under command 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion upon arrival of the latter in area GOODVIEW JUNCTION-TAMBU SADDLE.

(d) Forward defended locality of 17 Aust Infantry Brigade Group and MACKECHNIE FORCE is at present an EAST-WEST line through BULALANG CREEK.

(e) Company C 162 US Regt will come under command 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion from 0800 hrs 16 July 43.

INTENTION

4. 17 Aust Infantry Brigade (including MACKECHNIE FORCE) will exploit Northwards and attack and destroy enemy in KOMIATUM area.

METHOD

5. TROOPS

2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion
with under command:
1 Aust Mountain Battery (on arrival at new gun positions)
Company C 1 Battalion 162 US Regt (as from 0800 hrs 16 July 43)
Detachment 2/8 Aust Field Company.

2/

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

6. TASKS

(a) Clear enemy NORTH of BULALANG CREEK along main MUBO-KOMILATUM Lines of Communication.

(b) Secure TAMBU SADDLE and Lines of Communication to BASE FOUR.

(c) Attack and destroy enemy in KOMILATUM area.

7. SUBSEQUENT TASKS

(a) Move NORTH via main KOMILATUM-SALAMAUA track and secure area in the vicinity of junction OSBORNE-BUIRALI CREEKS 708965.

(b) Advance Eastwards and secure high ground SOUTH of FRANCISCO RIVER in square 7296.

(c) On completion of tasks allotted in paragraph 6 subsequent tasks will be supported by units of 15 Aust Infantry Brigade. When ready to carry out subsequent tasks 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion will advise HQ 17 Aust Infantry Brigade at appropriate times so that effective liaison with 15 Aust Infantry Brigade can be arranged.

Separate orders will be issued for these subsequent tasks.

8. TASK - COMPANY C 1 BATTALION 162 US REGT

(a) Company C will move NORTH via main MUBO-KOMILATUM track in rear of 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion to TAMBU SADDLE.

(b) Subsequently Company C will move along the high ground NORTH EAST towards LOKANU to secure the high ground NORTH of TAMBU BAY. Instructions for this movement will be issued separately.

9. ASSEMBLY AREA

2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion will concentrate close to the present forward defended locality on 14 July 43.

10. TIME AND PACE OF MOVEMENT

Move as far forward and as early as supply situation will permit.

11. ACTION ON REACHING MT TAMBU AREA

(a) Consolidate and dig in.

(b) Establish contact with 15 Aust Infantry Brigade.

12. ARTILLERY

Artillery ammunition will NOT be allowed to fall below 60 rounds per gun.

INTERCOMMUNICATION

13. Take over No 11 Set at present allotted BENNETT FORCE.

14. Line Telegraphy between Brigade and Battalion HQ.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Time of signature 1100 hrs

Date 13 Jul 43

W.E. Kyle Maj.

BM 17 AUST INF BDE.

| DISTRIBUTION | Copy No. | METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION |
|---|---|---|
| 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion | 1 | DRLS |
| 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion | 2 | " |
| MACKECHNIE FORCE | 3-4 | " |
| 15 Aust Infantry Brigade | 5 | " |
| 3 Aust Division | 6 | " |
| Commander | 7 | |
| Staff Captain | 8 | |
| Brigade Signal Officer | 9 | |
| War Diary | 10-11 | |
| File | 12 | |

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

WD2

SECRET

17 AUST INFANTRY BRIGADE OPERATION INSTRUCTION No.11 Copy No.: 10

/ July 43

Ref map: KOMIATUM 1:25,000.

INFORMATION

1. ENEMY

(a) Enemy still holds BOBDUBI RIDGE and has been active in the area NAMLING-ORODUBI where enemy pressure threatens 15 Aust Infantry Brigade right flank. Enemy is disposed along track KOMIATUM - SALAMAUA.

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2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion
with under command:
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Company C 1 Battalion 162 US Regt (as from 0800 hrs 16 July 43)
Detachment 2/8 Aust Field Company.

2/

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

6. TASKS

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(a) Consolidate and dig in.

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INTERCOMMUNICATION

13. Take over No 11 Set at present allotted BENNETT FORCE.

14. Line Telegraphy between Brigade and Battalion HQ.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Time of signature [illegible] hrs

Date 13 Jul 43

[illegible] MAJ.

BM 17 AUST INF BDE.

| DISTRIBUTION | Copy No. | METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION |
|---|---|---|
| 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion | 1 | DRLS |
| 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion | 2 | " |
| MACKECHNIE FORCE | 3-4 | " |
| 15 Aust Infantry Brigade | 5 | " |
| 3 Aust Division | 6 | " |
| Commander | 7 | |
| Staff Captain | 8 | |
| Brigade Signal Officer | 9 | |
| War Diary | 10-11 | |
| File | 12 | |

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# WAU — BLACKCAT — WYPALI

Compiled By 2/6 Bn I Section
East Indies Grid.
Ref. Wau West 1:63360

Scale 1" to 1 Mile

Miles

17/5/43

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

SECRET WP1

## LOCATION STATEMENT MACKECHNIE FORCE
AS AT 2359 hrs 13 Jul 43

Copy No.:

Jul 43.

Ref Maps: MUBO 1:25,000 - M
ADDENDUM 3 1:25,000 - A3

| Serial | Unit | Map Ref | Location | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Adv HQ MACKECHNIE FORCE | 743847 M | Junc BITOI | |
| 2 | HQ Coy (less I & R Pls) | " | BUYAWIM RIVERS | |
| 3 | Det 2 Squads B Coy | " | " | |
| 4 | " Service Coy | " | " | |
| 5 | K Coy less two pls | " | " | |
| 6 | HQ 218 Fd Arty Bn | " | " | |
| 7 | Rear HQ MACKECHNIE FORCE | 828823 M | Beach head | |
| 8 | Det HQ Coy | " | " | |
| 9 | Service Coy (less dets) | " | " | |
| 10 | Pl A/Tk Coy | " | " | |
| 11 | Det 41 Sig Coy | " | " | |
| 12 | HQ 1 Bn (TAYLOR FORCE) | 725875 M | BITOI RIDGE | |
| 13 | HQ Coy | " | " | |
| 14 | Med Aid Station | " | " | |
| 15 | 116 Med Collecting Coy | " | " | |
| 16 | A Coy | 694872 M | BUIGAP CK | ) |
| 17 | B Coy | 705869 M | BITOI RIDGE | ) Pls operating |
| 18 | C Coy | 714837 M | " | ) BUIGAP CK |
| 19 | D Coy | 725875 M | " | ) BITOI RIDGE |
| 20 | HQ 3 Bn | 826818 A3 | Beach head | |
| 21 | HQ Coy | " | " | |
| 22 | I Coy | 804831 | SOUTH ARM BITOI | |
| 23 | K Coy | 743847 ~~A3~~ M | | |
| 24 | L Coy | 826818 | Beach head | |
| 25 | M Coy | " | " | |
| 26 | 3 Bn Med Det | " | " | |
| 27 | 3 Bn 10 Portable Hospital | " | " | |
| 28 | Bty B 218 Fd Arty Bn | " | " | |
| | ARTILLERY | | | |
| 29 | HQ 218 FA Bn | 743847 M | RIVER JUNC | |
| 30 | Bty C 218 FA Bn | 765843 M | DRY CK BED | |
| 31 | Bty B 218 FA Bn | 826818 A3 | Beach head | |
| 32 | Bty B 205 Arty Bn | 824809 M | " | |
| 33 | Bty C 209 CA (AA) Bn | 824809 A3 | " | |
| | ENGINEERS | | | |
| 34 | Coy 116 Engr Bn | 804831 M | SOUTH ARM BITOI | |
| 35 | Coy D 532 Engr Bn | 822799 M | Beach head | |
| | MEDICAL | | | |
| 36 | 24 Portable Hospital | 743847 M | RIVER JUNC | |
| 37 | 10 Portable Hospital | 826818 A3 | Beach head | |
| 38 | 116 Medical Bn | 822799 A3 | " | |
| | PIB | | | |
| 39 | HQ C Coy | 783907 M | | ) NORTH of |
| 40 | Pl | " | | ) LAKE SALUS |
| 41 | Pl | 780900 M | | ) |
| 42 | Pl | | | Patrolling SALUS |

[signature]
BRIG.
COMD 17 AUST INF BDE.

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| MACKECHNIE Force | 2 |
| War Diary | 3-4 |
| File | 5 |

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES — NEW GUINEA FORCE
Headquarters

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

SECRET WP2

## LOCATION STATEMENT MACKECHNIE FORCE
AS AT 2359 hrs 13 Jul 43

Copy No.:

Jul 43.

Ref Maps: MUBO 1:25,000 - M
ADDENDUM 3 1:25,000 - A3

| Serial | Unit | Map Ref | Location | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Adv HQ MACKECHNIE FORCE | 743847 M | Junc BITOI | |
| 2 | HQ Coy (less I & R Pls) | " | BUYAWIM RIVERS | |
| 3 | Det 2 Squads B Coy | " | " | |
| 4 | " Service Coy | " | " | |
| 5 | K Coy less two pls | " | " | |
| 6 | HQ 218 Fd Arty Bn | 828823 M | Beach head | |
| 7 | Rear HQ MACKECHNIE FORCE | " | " | |
| 8 | Det HQ Coy | " | " | |
| 9 | Service Coy (less dets) | " | " | |
| 10 | Pl A/Tk Coy | " | " | |
| 11 | Det 41 Sig Coy | " | " | |
| 12 | HQ 1 Bn (TAYLOR FORCE) | 725875 M | BITOI RIDGE | |
| 13 | HQ Coy | " | " | |
| 14 | Med Aid Station | " | " | |
| 15 | 116 Med Collecting Coy | " | " | |
| 16 | A Coy | 694872 M | BUIGAP CK | ) |
| 17 | B Coy | 705869 M | BITOI RIDGE | ) Pls operating |
| 18 | C Coy | 714837 M | " | ) BUIGAP CK |
| 19 | D Coy | 725875 M | " | ) BITOI RIDGE |
| 20 | HQ 3 Bn | 826818 A3 | Beach head | |
| 21 | HQ Coy | " | " | |
| 22 | I Coy | 804831 | SOUTH ARM BITOI | |
| 23 | K Coy | 743847 XX M | | |
| 24 | L Coy | 826818 | Beach head | |
| 25 | M Coy | " | " | |
| 26 | 3 Bn Med Det | " | " | |
| 27 | 3 Bn 10 Portable Hospital | " | " | |
| 28 | Bty B 218 Fd Arty Bn | " | " | |
| | **ARTILLERY** | | | |
| 29 | HQ 218 FA Bn | 743847 M | RIVER JUNC | |
| 30 | Bty C 218 FA Bn | 765843 M | DRY CK BED | |
| 31 | Bty B 218 FA Bn | 826818 A3 | Beach head | |
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| 33 | Bty C 209 CA (AA) Bn | 824809 A3 | " | |
| | **ENGINEERS** | | | |
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| | **PIB** | | | |
| 39 | HQ C Coy | 783907 M | | ) NORTH of |
| 40 | Pl | " | | ) LAKE SALUS |
| 41 | Pl | 780900 M | | ) |
| 42 | Pl | | | Patrolling SALUS |

J. Eskell Maj
for BRIG.

COMD 17 AUST INF BDE.

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AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES — NEW GUINEA FORCE
Headquarters

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

WD1

SECRET.

Copy No.:

Jul 43.

**17 AUST INF BDE LOCATION STATEMENT No 6**
**AS AT 2359 hrs 13 JUL 43.**
**(MACKECHNIE FORCE under Separate Statement)**

Ref Maps: MUBO Second Edition - M
GUADAGASAL Provisional - GP
WAU WEST - WW
KOMIATUM - K

| Serial | Unit | Map Ref | Location | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde | 668807 M | GUADAGASAL Hospital | |
| 2 | K Sec Sigs | " " | " | |
| 3 | HQ Sec 1 Aust Mtn Bty | 678838 M | BUIAMBI | |
| | One subsec | 679838 M | " | |
| | One subsec | 678837 M | " | |
| 4 | HQ 2/5 Aust Inf Bn | 667809 GP | GUADAGASAL | |
| 5 | A Coy | 679881 M | SADDLE | |
| 6 | B Coy | 667809 GP | GUADAGASAL | En route GOODVIEW June AM 13 Jul. |
| 7 | C Coy | 672910 K | BASE 4 | |
| 8 | D Coy | 682851 M | MAT MAT | With Element Operating |
| 9 | HQ Coy (less dets to Coys) | 667809 GP | GUADAGASAL | OBSERVATION HILL. |
| 10 | HQ 2/6 Aust Inf Bn | 682850 M | MAT MAT | |
| 11 | A Coy | 684866 M | OBSERVATION HILL | Pls Operating this area. |
| 12 | B Coy | 690873 M | " | |
| 13 | C Coy | 695856 M | LABABIA RIDGE | |
| 14 | D Coy | 683868 M | OBSERVATION HILL | Pls operating this area. |
| 15 | HQ Coy (less dets to Coys) | 673815 M | | |
| | **SERVICES** | | | |
| 16 | 2/46 Aust LAD | 393708 WW | WAU | |
| 17 | Det AASC | 663805 GP | GUADAGASAL | |
| 18 | Det 2/2 Aust Fd Amb | 660795 GP | GUADAGASAL | |

A Eckersley Maj
for BRIG.
COMD 17 AUST INF BDE.

| Distribution | Copy No. |
|---|---|
| 3 Aust Div | 1 |
| MACK Force | 2 |
| War Diary | 3-4 |
| File | 5 |

Headquarters
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES — NEW GUINEA FORCE

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

WD2

SECRET.

Copy No.:

Jul 43.

**17 AUST INF BDE LOCATION STATEMENT No 6**
**AS AT 2359 hrs 13 JUL 43.**
**(MACKECHNIE FORCE under Separate Statement)**

Ref Maps: MUBO Second Edition - M
GUADAGASAL Provisional - GP
WAU WEST - WW
KOMIATUM - K

| Serial | Unit | Map Ref | Location | Remarks |
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| 3 | HQ Sec 1 Aust Mtn Bty | 678838 M | BUIAMBI | |
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| 9 | HQ Coy (less dets to Coys) | 667809 GP | GUADAGASAL | Operating OBSERVATION HILL. |
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H. E. Key. Maj
BRIG.
COMD 17 AUST INF BDE.

| Distribution | Copy No. |
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| MACK Force | 2 |
| War Diary | 3-4 |
| File | 5 |

Headquarters
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES — NEW GUINEA FORCE

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

RF 1/12500

## Route followed by Patrol No 89




## Enlargement of MUBO 1/25000

Int Sec
2/6 Bn
30 Jun 43

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069




— TRACE FROM ENLARGEMENT FROM —

# MUBO LOCALITY SHEET

R.F. 1:2:000.

Mubo. file

— R.F. 1: 12,500. —

— Note:— V.I. in pimple area not to scale. —

Drawn by 2/7 Aus inf bn int sec.
May '43

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

# APPENDIX— 2




Diagramatic Sketch Gap-Track.
House Copper to Gap Junction.
View looking to South.
Prepared by I. Secr/5 Aust. Inf. Bn.
16 May 1943.

• Delaying Points.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

RF 1/63360

# INFORMATION FROM PATROLS
## 20 TO 30 JUNE 43

POSSIBLY SMALL STANDING PATROL RELEIVED ONCE OR TWICE WEEKLY

ONLY USED ONCE ORTWICE WEEKLY BY SMALL PARTIES

NO SIGNS OF ANY MOVT – TRACK PARTLY OBSCURED

SOUNDS OF CHOPPING AND TALKING HEARD

SUSPECT TRACK FROM THIS POINT TO KITCHEN CK

OR FROM HERE TO VIALS TRACK

NO SIDE TRACKS LOCATED BETWEEN THESE POINTS

RIFLE & SMG FIRE HEARD THESE POINTS

OLD UNOCCUPIED W/P AND FIRE LANES

GARDEN NOT INVESTIGATED OWING TO THICKNESS OF UNDERGROWTH AND NOISE MADE WHILST MOVING THROUGH IT

TRACK OVERGROWN

SUSPECTED AMBUSH POSN




REF MAP MUBO 1/25000

DRAWN BY 'I' SECT 2/6 AUST INF BN 30/6/43.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

# AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES — NEW GUINEA FORCE

*Headquarters*

17 AUST INF BDE.
13 Jun 43.

## PATROL REPORT

**Junction BITOI-BUYANIM RIVERS to Coastal area 833806 BADEN BAY WEST SPECIAL.**

**Ref Maps:** SALAMAUA REVISED 1:63,360.
BADEN BAY WEST SPECIAL 1:63,360.

**Patrol Strength:** 1 offr, 1 OR. **Patrol Cond:** Lieut D.B.BURKE.

**Object of Patrol:**
(i) To recce covered approach to area at point 833806.
(ii) Select suitable ground for landing a seaborne force.
(iii) Select suitable areas for protection of landing party.
(iv) Report on enemy positions in area (if existent).
(v) Confirm or deny reports of good track running from SOUTH ARM BITOI to NASSAU BAY.

**Time Out:** 0800 hrs 7 June 43.

**Time In:** 1800 hrs 9 June 43.

**Route out:** As shown in attached Sketch.

**Route In:** As shown in attached Sketch.

**STAGE 1.**

740831 - 753834. Time taken 1 hour.

Flat going - good track, possibly under observation from BITOI RIDGE for 20 minutes of travel in DRY CREEK BED.

**STAGE 2.**

753835 - 773813. Time taken 5 hours.

Followed re-entrant for 1½ hours Southwards, located kanaka pad lightly blazed. Continued in South Easterly direction, crossed range of mountains at saddle feature, some 2,500 ft in height. Reached the TABALI RIVER, located several native huts in a state of disrepair at point 773813. Camped night 7/8 Jun. Consider the huts have not been used extensively for at least six months.

**STAGE 3.**

773813 - 810803. Time taken 3 hours.

Crossed the TABALI RIVER at 773801. At this point its fall is large, the bed hard and stony, direction of flow Eastwards. Located continuation of previous Kanaka pad with great difficulty, traversed high ground on lowest portion of contour shown in sketch. Track cut out at a DRY CREEK bed.

**STAGE 4.**

810803 - 825805. Time taken 4 hours.

2/

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**STAGE 4.** (Contd)

Followed DRY CREEK bed bearing of 80° for distance of 300 yards till swamp was reached, movement from here Eastwards possible only by cutting through very dense swamp and jungle.

Cut track due EAST reached TABALI RIVER, camped night 8/9 Jun. Heavy rain was falling, RIVER flooded overnight.

**STAGE 5.**

825805 - 833806. Time taken 1½ hours.

Swam TABALI RIVER at point 825805. At this point it is 40 yds wide, slow moving, overgrown and approximately 10 ft in depth at points close in to either bank.

Found signs of human movements, no footprints but jungle growth cut in places and lightly blazed. Signs of a camp near water's edge, frame work still remaining of one hut.

Reached cleared area 100 yds from coast - this strip is 400 yds in length, 100 yds in depth right to water's edge. In this strip weapon pits located - revetted but timber rotting half of this pulled out on track. Indistinct track winding NORTH and SOUTH through this cleared area followed 400 yds NORTH and SOUTH from weapon pit.

Beach area - The beach is an excellent one for landing of flat bottomed craft. The beach is flat, water is about 3 ft in depth to beach shelving, tide was high at this time. The beach bank 10 yds from water's edge is of rough sand and is six feet above sea level. Good cover for landing craft is available provided beach bank is held byus, platoon of men required normal fire power less 2" mortar. As far as can be ascertained area between 832803-836813 is suitable for a landing. Exit from beach to high ground can be easily carried out by troops, MT from landing craft.

**STAGE 6.**

Returned to JUNCTION RIVER Camp by route shown, time taken 9 hours.

Visibility: Looking towards NASSAU BAY observed at least 12 native huts position shown in Sketch. LABARIA ISLAND clearly visible.

**CONCLUSIONS**

1. Consider route taken is a good one, approaches very good if night movements are observed at points DRY CREEK bed BITOI, TABALI RIVER, both places where crossed.

2. Ground recced suitable for landing party seaborne troops.

3. Protection for landing party could be obtained.

4. Consider enemy do not occupy areasselected but may patrol regularly.

5. Consider strip of coast SOUTH ARM BITOI - NASSAU BAY suitable for quick improvement for movement of motor transport.

Security precautions were carried out at all times, area near coast NO footprin made.

Enemy action noted at 0920 hours 8 Jun. Mortars, MGs fired for 25 minutes, then ceased. Approximate position 825833.

D Burke Lieut.
HQ 17 AUST INF BDE.

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# ROUTE OF JUNCTION CAMP – NASSAU BAY PATROL

## REF. MAPS BADEN BAY WEST AND SALAMAUA REVISED 1 INCH TO 1 MILE




## SCALE – 1 INCH TO 1 MILE

Traced by I. Section 17 Bde
16 June '43

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

REPORT ON MOVEMENTS OF A/Cpl SMITH D.R. A Coy 2/7 Bn

MISSING IN ACTION from 2 MAY 43 till 22 MAY 43.

Cpl SMITH is at present with C Coy at MAT MAT. As he is not yet strong enough to move to RAP this report has been compiled from a brief interrogation. On his recovering better health and regaining complete picture of the days spent in enemy lines, this report may be corrected or supplemented.

REF MAP MUBO LOCALITY 1/25000

During A Coy's attack on PIMPLE 2 MAY 43 Cpl SMITH was acting as section leader for the right section, right flank. During the engagement his bren gunner was wounded and he moved to arrange an evacuation of the wounded man. Returning from an unsuccessful attempt to locate pl HQ who at this time were fwd and pinned down by fire from the PIMPLE, he was unable to find the sec in the heavy jungle. Searching the area he lost direction and spent the night in area ref 385449.
The following morning he crossed the track which was almost obliterated by debris and fallen trees from air activity. In an attempt to reach high ground to orient himself he heard sounds of digging. Moving fwd cautiously he trod on a branch making some noise, he heard the sound of a rifle being cocked, and this was followed by a single shot which pierced the top of his water bottle. Returning the fire with a burst from his TSMG he moved back along the slope the enemy firing 4 or 5 shots as he withdrew. He contacted the head of a re-entrant ref 373480 which he moved down in an attempt to reach the BITOI R. As there were numerous pools of water he remained some time, no tracks were observed in this re-entrant. On reaching the river ref 360475 he crossed a well defined track running parallel to bank with a sig wire on it. Whilst filling his water bottle 7 enemy were observed to wade across the river, Thinking he had been observed he withdrew to the high ground to the NORTH and spent the night there.
Following morning decided to move to VICKER's RIDGE and moved to higher ground to the NORTH in order to obtain direction. He contacted a patch of KUNAI on Northern slopes of feature in area ref 375485 . There were also pine and palm trees on this slope. As the area was covered by numerous tracks he selected a track leading toward the SOUTH and moved along it. A short distance along this track he observed a well used ladder approx 12 ft long leaning against a tree. After moving down the track approx 100 yds he observed an enemy MMG covering the track fwd of the area where he was located. The MMG was ewell concealed in thick scrub and camouflaged with bracken. It appeared to be unattended. On the right of the track he observed a shelter constructed from ground sheets also amn boxes stacked close by. He retraced his steps and returned to his SP in the kunai patch. Taking a different track he moved to the EAST approx 50 yds and in this area observed an enemy mortar camouflaged in the same manner as the MMG. Amn boxes were stacked nearby and this weapon also appeared to be unattended. The track faded out so he broke bush in a SOUTH WESTERLY direction, crossing a well defined track which appeared to come from the BITOI R to the NORTH. He crossed the track and moved down into STONY CK where he stayed for 3 days approx owing to presence of water. From his position in the re-entrant he observed enemy mvt up and down the track which he had crossed. Parties of enemy numbering between 8 and 20 used track and the mvt took place early morning and late afternoon. The parties appeared to be reliefs as rattling of gear and equipment could be heard. Some parties appeared to be carrying stores as he heard the sound of a case falling and breaking open, this being followed by sound of excited talk. Moving from this posn across re-entrant to the SOUTH crossed track during late afternoon. Track which ran up feature was well used with yellow sig wire running along it. On attempting to cross track first time was fired on by enemy moving down. He moved parallel to the track and crossed out of sight of enemy. Continuing Southward another well defined track was crossed.
He continued to move in this general direction and eventually reached VICKER's RIDGE area in the vicinity of the LANDSLIDE. Following own sig wire and tracks reached BITOI R, crossed, and contacted 14 pl C Coy in the MAT MAT area.

.....

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

# ENEMY CASUALTIES. FEB. 1943

| | | TOTALS TO FEB. 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. | C. U. P. |
| WAU AREA | DAILY TOT. | 20 - 20 | 16 10 26 | 41 - 41 | 6 - 6 | - NIL - | 12 - 12 | - NIL - | 1 - 1 | - NIL - | - NIL - | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL |
| | PROG. TOT. | 411 - 411 | 431 - 431 | 442 10 452 | 488 10 498 | 494 10 504 | 494 10 504 | 506 10 516 | 506 10 516 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 | 507 10 517 |
| BLACK CAT | DAILY TOT. | # 13 - 13 | 3 - 3 | - NIL - | - NIL - | . 50 50 | 23 - 23 | NIL | - NIL | 49 - 49 | 33 - 33 | 54 - 54 | NIL | NIL | 37 - 37 | 9 - 9 | NIL | NIL | 22 - 22 | | | | 47 47 | | | | |
| | PROG. TOT. | 85 - 85 | 98 - 98 | 101 - 101 | 101 - 101 | 101 - 101 | 101 50 151 | 124 50 174 | 124 50 174 | 124 50 174 | 173 50 223 | 226 50 276 | 280 50 330 | 280 50 330 | 280 50 330 | 317 50 367 | 326 50 376 | 326 50 376 | 326 50 376 | 348 50 398 | | | 425 50 475 | | | | |
| SKINDEWAI MUBO. ETC. | DAILY TOT. | - - | 6 - 6 | - NIL - | - NIL - | - NIL - | - NIL - | - NIL - | 15 - 15 | 8 - 8 | 13 - 13 | - NIL - | 7 - 7 | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | NIL | | | | | |
| | PROG. TOT. | - 23 23 | 26 23 29 | 6 23 29 | 6 23 29 | 6 23 29 | 6 23 29 | 6 23 29 | 21 23 44 | 27 23 50 | 40 23 63 | 40 23 63 | 47 23 70 | 47 23 70 | 47 23 70 | 47 23 70 | 47 23 70 | 47 23 70 | 47 23 70 | 47 23 70 | | | | | | | |
| DAILY TOTALS | | | 39 - 39 | 19 10 29 | 41 - 41 | 6 - 6 | - 50 50 | 35 - 35 | 15 - 15 | 7 - 7 | 62 - 62 | 33 - 33 | 61 - 61 | NIL | NIL | 37 - 37 | 9 - 9 | NIL | NIL | | | | | | | | |
| PROGRESSIVE TOTS. | | 496 23 519 | 535 23 558 | 554 33 587 | 595 33 628 | 601 33 634 | 601 83 684 | 636 83 719 | 651 83 734 | 658 83 741 | 720 83 803 | 763 83 846 | 844 83 927 | 891 83 974 | 928 83 1011 | 937 83 1020 | 946 83 1029 | 946 83 1029 | 946 83 1029 | 946 83 1029 | | | | | | | |

+ MUBO up to 16 JAN. 255 255 / 1075 1852

1152 1235 / 83

1235

# INFORMATION RESUME LABABIA - DUALI Area.

A. OPERATIONAL - Enemy.

Information to January 43.

1. For a considerable time LABABIA Island has been considered a centre of enemy activity. On the mainland the enemy, in the early stages, were not to be found South of LOGUI but periodical visits along the coast were made by schooner in search of food and information.

2. A report was received at NGF on 29 Nov 42 that, as a result of allied bombing of SALAMAUA, the Japs had moved the majority of their forces to the LABABIA AREA. Subsequently a report on 8 Dec 42 stated that large dumps and encampments had been established in the "Y" formed by the junction of the two estuaries of the BITOI R. (ref photos 15V and 16V run 53Z SALAMAUA to LASANGA IS) and that there were approx 300 tps in the area.

3. Air photos taken 11 Dec 42 showed a large number of huts built round the fringe of LABABIA Is and a report received 27 Dec stated that a patrol had seen 5 seaplanes land at LABABIA.

4. On 21 Dec 42 WOII WATSON (ANGAU) patrolled to DUALI on the coast. He found that the Japs were last at DUALI on 14 Dec on which occasion they had collected native foods and removed a quantity of trade cloth looted by the natives from SALAMAUA. (WOII WATSON apparently did NOT encounter the Jap dumps at junction of BITOI estuaries noted in para 2 above.)
DUAU village burnt by WOII WATSON 21 Dec) States villages LOGUI to South not occupied but visited by schooner periodically
5. NGF estimate of number of Japs at LABABIA on 10 Jan 43 was approx 400. for info

Current Situation.

6. The following report was submitted by a patrol from 2/5 Bn which patrolled down LABABIA SPUR towards the coast, returning 25 Mar 43.

(a) Enemy apparently in force on the coast from the mouth of the BITOI R. to a distance of at least 4 miles South of the BITOI, as DUALI Village is occupied and the enemy appears to be in four camps in villages about a mile apart. The exact extent of these camps is not known but those located are considered very vulnerable from landwards.

(b) Enemy definitely NOT SNLP.

(c) Enemy moves in small parties unarmed and no forticiations are visible.

(d) A good motor road continues from BITOI Village to the South. It is NOT known if road continues North to SALAMAUA.

7. The following comments are tendered on the above report.

(a) There are various small hamlets in the vicinity of the BITOI Delta occupied by DUALI natives and a number of RABAUL and KAVIENG boys previously employed in the WAU area. (See Native Attitude below)

(b) & (c) Grounds for stating that enemy are NOT SNLP are NOT indicated but the description of enemy activities are very similar to reports previously made on actions of enemy detachment in the WAHIA area.

(d) Motor road to South is NOT known - See TOPOGRAPHY below.
now known to exist probably quite a fair motor road

Coastwise Movement.

8. Throughout the closing stages of the BUNA campaign there was continual movement by night along the coast and among the coastal islands. It is very probable that LABABIA Island was a link in this barge route. On 29 Nov 42 landing craft were observed anchored in LOKANU PASSAGE 6 mls NNW of LABABIA. On 2 Dec it was reported that at MINDRUGUTU Island (50 mls SE of LABABIA) the appearance of enemy vessels was a nightly occurence.

9. Further links in this coastal chain were established when two coys of 102 Regt, together with Sigs personnel and reinfts previously intended for 144 Regt at BUNA, departed for SALAMAUA 19/20 Jan 43 with the intention of establishing outposts and staging camps at KUI, ZAKA and eventually MAMBARE Mouth.

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Coastwise Movement (Contd)

10. The intention to move on to MAMBARE mouth was never put into effect and it is now known that the WARIA area has now been evacuated. The enemy from here may be now located at KUI, LABABIA, DUALI, SALAMAUA. The similarity between the enemy activities in the BITOI area andthose previously observed in the WARIA area has been commented on in para 7.

11. Recent coastal activity observed in the LABABIA area is as follows:-

24 Mar. Barge movement observed LABABIA Is.

25 Mar. Heavy black smoke rising from coast South of LABABIA Is 1200 hrs.

26 Mar. O.P. LABABIA SPUR report 2 masted schooner moved from LABABIA Is to coast 1230 hrs.

Natives.

12. There are several hamlets in the vicinity of the BITOI Delta. The inhabitants are mainly RABAUL and KAVIENG natives previously brought here as indentured labour. Natives in the DUALI - LABABIA area must be considered under Jap influence. On 15 Dec 42 a party of LABABIA natives were sent by the Japs to GUADAGASAL as a press gang to round up native labour. The GUADAGASAL natives were released when the LABABIAS fled following action by our patrols.

13. The natives of this area are considered by ANGAU to be untrustworthy. Their attitude may be described as opportunist and favouring the winning side. It would be inadvisable to rely on them to harbour any of our troops and it is believed that the Japs have developed a fairly elaborate native spy system over the last 12 months.

CONCLUSIONS.

14. LABABIA - DUALI has been an enemy sphere of influence for the past 12 months. Following the withdrawal of forces from the WARIA area it is reasonable to assume that the force in the LABABIA area is still in some strength, and possibly not less than the NGF estimate of 400 last Jan. The natives are untrustworthy. At present they are pro-Jap but may be expected to swing our way if we are the winning side.

B. TOPOGRAPHY.

1. The route from THE SADDLE to DUALI is a two-day trip over steep grades. There is no coast route to the South beyond NASSAU BAY. The route from DUALI to SALAMAUA follows mainly along the beach.

2. Apart from the BITOI Delta and the environs of SALUS Lake both of which are flat and swampy, the country from DUALI to SALAMAUA is fairly broken.

3. Normally the entrance to SALUS Lake is crossed by canoe from SALUS Village.

Int Sec
KANGA FORCE
30 Mar 43.

Copies to:-
2/5 Aust Inf Bn
2/7 Aust Inf Bn
3 Aust Div
New Guinea Force.
FILE ✓

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

PATROL AND CONTACT REPORT

SERIAL No. 35

REF MAP MUBO SCALE 1/25000 DATE 1 JUN 43

PATROL FOUND BY 16 pl D Coy 2/6 AUST INF BN PATROL COMD Lieut ROACH

PATROL STRENGTH 1 offr 1 OR TYPE OF PATROL Recce

ROUTE OUT From LABABIA OP NORTH to BITOI R thence in general Westerly direction following river to Junc with BUIGAP.

ROUTE IN Reverse to above.

TIME OUT 0730K/30 TIME IN 1000K/1

OBJECT OF PATROL 1. To observe without being seen.
2. To recce country along BITOI R and report on possibility of moving tps this area.
3. To report on enemy mvts area BITOI R WEST to Junc BITOI R - BUIGAP CK. ref 694869.

NARRATIVE : STAGE 1. The patrol left LABABIA OP and moved down to LEE's OP then along the spur for approx 300 yds in NW direction. Here we turned NE and found the country steep (grade approx 1 in 3 to 1 in 4) and thickly covered with jungle. After 1/2 hrs journey the jungle thinned out and the going was fairly easy for approx another 1/2 hr. For the next hour the country fair to go through, several re-entrants and spurs being crossed. At approx ref 709854 we came to a small clearing which appeared to have been caused by a bomb. We turned NORTH here and moved straight down the ridge the ground being rocky and in parts thickly covered with vines. After moving in this direction for approx 45 minutes we turned NE crossing several re-entrants, the jungle being fair as far as progress was concerned. After travelling in this direction for a short time we found the jungle fairly thick. At approx ref 714858 we came to a dry creek bed running in a NORTH - NE direction We followed this down to approx 500 yds of the river and then turned NORTH, the ground rising for a short while then falling down to the river. We arrived at ref 715861 at 1215 hrs feeling hot but not tired. The patrols for BITOI RIDGE and junc of rivers BITOI and BUYAWIM which had accompanied us this far lunched with us and then turned EAST along the river.
STAGE 2. We left ref 715861 at 1345 hrs and moved in a Westerly direction along the river being approx 100 ft above water level. The grade was fairly steep (approx 1 in 3) and several fallen trees across our path had to be detoured while vines were very thick and progress very slow. We had to stop at 1430 hrs for a rest. As the grade from this point was still very steep we had to climb to 500 ft above the river to make better progress. After moving for approx 1000 yds at this height we came to small cliffs rising up for approx 30 ft and we moved round on the river side of these where the progress came much easier. We then moved down to within 50 ft of the river and followed an old track along to ck ref 703862. This ck is dry and rocky and can easily be distinquished because of a landslide in the ck bed. We then climbed to 100 ft of the river the jungle being fairly thick but mvt by no means difficult. We followed the river along to ref 699867 ariving there at 1730 hrs when we bivouaced for the night 30/31 MAY. We found no mosquitoes and nets were not necessary. We left this point at 0720K/31 moving approx 50 ft above the river. The grade was steep and rocky. Moving along for approx 500 yds the ground at the rivers edge levelled out into flat country being approx 30 yds wide and thickly covered with jungle. GREEN HILL itself was visible being steep and covered with jungle. Advanced for approx 100 yds and came to an old native hut in the centre of a clearing. A ration tin which appeared to have been opened recently was lying in the hut. We crossed a dry ck bed approx 30 yds EAST of the hut and from here a re-entrant runs SW into GREEN HILL and is only lightly timbered. We advanced approx 40 yds beyond the ck to ref 696867. Here the bank rises straight up for 30 ft and the ground rises to the clearing ref 695866 which as far as I could see is only lightly timbered. Taking this into consideration I decided that it was not worth while going any further as there would be a strong possibility of being seen. Looking up the river I could see where the spur runs down from GREEN HILL to opposite the BUIGAP CK but could not see the actual junction. The ground on the NORTH side of the river and opposite GREEN HILL is extremely steep and in some spots rises straight up for approx 100 ft.
STAGE 3. We left ref 696867 at 0920 hrs and followed the route back to ref 705860 where we had lunch. This point was left at 1340 hrs and we climbed a ridge in SE direction. The ground was rocky up to about

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the 1000 ft contour line and hard to climb but at this level it became much easier. At approx ref 707856 we came to what appeared to be another bomb crater at which point we turned NORTH for approx 500 ft where we bivouaced for the night 31 MAY - 1 JUN. We were beginning to tire at this point and our leg muscles were sore. The area was left at 0710K/1 when we travelled in a SE direction the undergrowth being thick and the ground rocky. At 0900 hrs the grade became very steep and rocky and progress slow. The OP - RIVER JUNCTION track was reached at ref 712848 at 0950 hrs and we arrived at the OP at 1000 hrs. At no stage during the journey did we hear or see enemy mvt.

CONCLUSIONS :

(a) The trip fromthe OP to the BITOI R is by no means difficult and tps could easily reach that point in a day and be in a fresh condition.

(b) Tps moving along the river to GREEN HILL would need to move in single file so as not to hamper mvt. As the timber on both sides of the river is extremely thick they should not be seen. The river itself is very noisy and would cover any sound made by movt.

(c) The river from ref 715861 to GREEN HILL is a series of rapids and very fast flowing, making it extremely dangerous to cross.

(d) If tps are used to cover this ground it is advisable to issue them with new bandoliers as the undergrowth has a tearing effect and will cause the loss of amn.

(Sgd) L.S. ROACH Lieut.

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


— ROUTE — TAKEN — BY — PATROL — SERIAL — Nº 35. —

—— TRACE — FROM — MUBO — SHEET — R.F. — 1:25,000. ——

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Recent concentrated force at Malolo.

Stores delivered to collecting point by truck from tunnel built into the Eastern face Kela Point. Tunnel is store for all goods brought to Salamaua by barge or submarine.

Reports state enemy firmly emplaced with weapon pits on coast covering Samoa harbour

Natives cross river by water level Kunda bridge. Ref air photo 15 83/M series AE8258 AE8580

Natives report carrier line is permitted to cross mouth of Francisco R. to collecting point young Coconut grove ref. Air photo 15 83/M AE8457 AE8858

During day Jap force Komiatum move to re-ent E+N of hut area square AE9W ref. photo 12 83/M series

Boy line previously moving Lokanu night 3/4 May intercepted and probe bush some already reported ANGAU.

Route taken by boy line is okd Salamaua Komiatum Mubo route

Komiatum store house and dump ref. Air photo 12 83/M series. plantation AE95X3.

Terminal store house. Air photo 11 85X series right. A4Y9 A7Y7 right A8W8 82W5.

Native personnel completely evacuated from Duali and Salus villages. [illegible] to Tauta Mission AE[illegible]

Rations in Duali area are scarce. all gardens in vicinity have been cropped

No enemy occupying. Lababia island.

Enemy disposns Ref. Photo 83/M photo 2. TR2W4 TR5N4 TR3N4 TR2W4

Enemy disposns along road Ref. photo 11 5inch series DTT2. DTT5 to EST1 EST5

Enemy disposns ref photo 45/4E 5inch series along river A074 A510 to B554 B657 to C753 C756 along River A054 A056 to 8950 8954 to CB54 C756.

Enemy disposn along coast ref. photo 5inch series 39/40. B3U2 B3U0 to B3U0 B8U1 along coast. C6U2 C7T8 to D8U4 D8U6.

Enemy disposns along coast. Ref photo 35/36 along coast. AGU5 A5U2 to B1V0 B3U3

Drawn by 2/7 Bn int sec May 8. '43

MALOLO

KELA PT.

SALAMAUA

LOKANU N°1

FRANCISCO R.

KOMIATUM

SALUS

LABABIA I.

DUALI.

BITOI R.

BUYAWIM R.

HOSPITAL ANGAU

NASSAU BAY.

05 68 7 81 05

76 87

73 68 63 73.

TRACE FROM — SALAMAUA — REVISED — and — BADEN — BAY — SPECIAL

SCALE — 1 inch to — 1 MILE

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

Not to be taken forward of Battalion HQ.

1.0

SECRET

Copy No....4...

# 5 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 8

Compiled from information received up to 1800 hrs 10 June 43

## PART I

### 1. GENERAL

Patrolling over a wide front by our forward troops has been the main feature of recent activity. Present indications are that the enemy has completed the relief of his forces in the MUBO area, and it is reasonable to assume therefore, that some fresh action on his part will be forthcoming.

In the MARKHAM area there are signs that the enemy has been attempting to cut tracks from MARKHAM POINT through to our rear areas.

Further proof has been afforded of the growing disaffection of the natives, and the simultaneous expansion of the enemy's sphere of influence north of the MARKHAM.

There have been no large sightings of shipping, but numerous small vessels have maintained the flow of supplies and possibly reinforcements to the north coast of NEW GUINEA. There is a native report of barges arriving at SALAMAUA on the night 25/26 May from RABAUL.

Apart from three light raids the only enemy aerial activity has been the continuation of his widespread reconnaissance.

### 2. OPERATIONS

(a) Land

MUBO.
Our patrols on this front continue to cover a wide area, but there has been little enemy activity observed other than in the vicinity of his known positions.
A patrol towards the PIMPLE on 5 June lay in an ambush position, from which they could hear Japanese voices all day. About 100 yards further north two converging fire lanes were discovered. This point was about 600 yards south of the PIMPLE. Further patrols to the east of the Jap track, and as far north as the PIMPLE, on 6 June reported seeing no signs of the enemy. However, on 7 June voices were heard within 300 yards of LABABIA OP, and a subsequent search revealed the footprints of two or three Japs. It is possible that this party may have been lost.
An OP on LABABIA RIDGE reports that a kunai hut is being constructed at the top of KITCHEN CREEK.

DUALI - NASSAU BAY
One of our patrols proceeding east between the two arms of the BITOI RIVER, fought their way through difficult jungle to reach the coast about 300 yards south of the mouth of the NORTH ARM. Apart from three sets of enemy footprints leading south along the beach, no enemy movement was seen. Attempts to reach LAKE SALUS from here were frustrated by the impenetrable swamps.
On 4 June a small heavily laden boat was seen to move from LABABIA ISLAND to DUALI with a crew of two. This occured at roughly the same time as the similar move reported on 2 June.

Copy. 5 2/5 Bn
" 6 2/6 Bn.

By Courier I 15/4
14 June 43

SALAMAUA - KOMIATUM L of C
Since 5 June there has been little movement observed on this track compared with that of the previous period. This may be the result of our strafing attack on 8 June. Evidently our aircraft have had some effect on the Japs' habits, for the only two parties observed since their attack have been well dispersed along the track. On 8 June, 30 coolies were seen moving south, while the following day 52 Japs and 120 Japs moved north.
The only other activity was the movement of 8 stretcher cases followed by 60 natives moving north on 6 June.
All this movement supports the theory that the enemy is reaching the completion of his relief, the old troops moving out after the fresh ones have moved in.

SALAMAUA
Activity in SALAMAUA appears to have reverted to its normal tempo. However, a report was received from a native in the MARKHAM area that a carrier line had been landed at the mouth of the BUANG RIVER on 4 June from LAE. They were to go to SALAMAUA on 7 June leaving for MUBO the following day.

MISSIM
Our patrols north from NAMLING on 9 June reported that the enemy were occupying positions from GWAIBOLOM approximately 1500 yards to the north and as far west as LITTLE BUIRALI CREEK. Some movement was also observed on BOBLUBI RIDGE.

MARKHAM
Following upon the discovery on 3 June that the Jap camp at MARKHAM POINT had been reoccupied, footprints were seen on the track leading south on the morning of 6 June. These tracks had not been there the previous night. One of our patrols engaged in booby trapping this track on 8 June was fired on by one LMG and several rifles.
The same day a patrol set out to examine the blazed track to the south and followed a track, also blazed, which branched to the west. This track brought them to a point 100 yards east of FISHERS POST, one mile east of GABENSIS, where the blazing ended. No footprints were observed, but the blazing was considered to have been done within the preceding fortnight.
There is a further native report concerning the presence of an enemy party north of the MARKHAM whose role is the observation of our troops at NGARAGWENO. Fires and explosions in the vicinity of NADZAB ELG may indicate the preparation on an airfield here.

RAMU - MARKHAM
Native reports have been received that a large party of Japs at KAIAPIT surprised and killed a patrol officer in a small village in that area on 6 June. This man was well known to the natives in this area, and the evident lack of warning indicates the extent to which the natives are now under Japanese influence.
The enemy party is reported to have arrived at KAIAPIT through the YAROS district to the north, and there is a further rumour of troops crossing the FINISTERRES from the RAI COAST.
It is likely that this party is the one which was reported to have left BOANA on 30 May for KAIAPIT via the ERAP and the LERON. This route is thought to have been previously followed by two patrols which passed through BOANA on 22 April and 4 May and TARARAN on 4 May and 11 May.
These patrols would account for the constant rumours amongst the natives of enemy troops crossing the FINISTERRES from the RAI COAST.
Further, there is no good reason why the enemy should choose this route across mountains 11,000 feet high, when a comparatively easy track exists round the coast.

BENA BENA
A reconnaissance patrol to WEBA has reported that approximately 50 Japs are in occupation.

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4. ORGANIZATION

MARKHAM CONSTRUCTION TAI

Under command of Col YOKOYAMA, the following units formed the above at end of Feb 43 :-

5 En 51 Inf Regt
5 Debarkation Coy
One Pl 40 Sea Duties Coy
One Pl 105 Sea Duties Coy

This arrangement may have been only temporary, but since 5 En 51 Inf Regt has not been involved in action so far, the organization may still exist.
The role of this unit was the construction of an operational and debarkation road in the vicinity of LAE in readiness for the arrival of the balance of 51 Div early in March.

(Adapted from NOF Weekly Intelligence Summary 126)

Lt-Col
GS 5 Aust Div

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| Distribution | Copy Nos |
|---|---|
| 15 Aust Inf Bde (AIF) | 1 - 3 |
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| 1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt | 9 |
| 2/6 Aust Svy Bty | |
| 156 Aust Lt AA Bty | 10 |
| WAU Fwd Def | 11 |
| Sta Comd, WAU | |
| BULOLO Fwd Def | |
| Sta Comd BULOLO | 12 |
| 11 Fighter Control Sub-sector | 13 |
| 708 CA (AA) Bty US Army | 14 |
| RAE 5 Aust Div (AIF) | 15 |
| Sigs 5 Aust Div | 16 |
| AASC 5 Aust Div (AIF) | 17 |
| 2/2 Aust Fd Amb | 18 |
| 5 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp | 19 |
| ANGAU (MARKHAM District) | 20 |
| Air Support Control 5 AF | 21 |
| ALO A Fl 4 AU Sqn | 22 |
| NOF | 23 |
| Air Support Sec A 5 Adv Heh 5 AF MORESBY | 24 |
| 41 US Div | 25 |
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10.3.

Copy No. 3

3 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 7

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 5 Jun 45.

PART I.

1. GENERAL.

Activity on the SALAMAUA MUBO L of C has been observed in both directions on an increased scale. The indications now are that the enemy is engaged in relieving his forward troops. Apart from a faint note of aggression on the enemy's part on LABABIA RIDGE, there is no change in the land front. Our patrols have been active covering a wide area.

Information has been received from an observer who was in the HELIGBACH area, that a number of survivors, estimated at 800, from the BISMARCK SEA convoy reached LAE.

The enemy is taking advantage of bad weather conditions to land troops and supplies on the NE coast of NEW GUINEA. At the same time a large increase in shipping has been noted in the MADIN BAIAI area.

Continued sightings of submarines off the southern coast of NEW BRITAIN indicate that a regular ferry service has been inaugurated for the purpose of bringing supplies to LAE and SALAMAUA.

The discovery of two new airfields in the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, gives a further indication of the rapidity with which the enemy is developing his potential air strength in the SWPA. Enemy air activity, however, has been confined to sporadic reconnaissances and a few light raids.

2. OPERATIONS.
(a) LAND

MUBO.
Our patrols during the last week have been very active, covering the enemy's front and a large area on his flanks.
On LABABIA RIDGE a strong enemy ambush position has been located approximately 400 yds south of the PIMPLE. Sounds of chopping and voices consistently heard indicate that the enemy is preparing further fixed defences forward of the PIMPLE.
The enemy 70 mm gun has been fairly active during the week, firing on the VICKERS RIDGE area and junction of BITOI RIVER and BUIGAP CREEK.
On OBSERVATION HILL sounds of digging and scrub cutting have also been heard, and the enemy ambush position on this feature was found occupied on 29 May.
On 2 Jun a patrol returned from th. BITOI RIDGE, having observed the enemy L of C up the BUIGAP CREEK for two hours without seeing any movement. They report that this feature is extremely steep and rugged.

DUALI - NASSAU BAY.

In this area there has been little activity. Enemy movement was observed on the BITOI SOUTH ARM about one mile from the coast and on the north side of the SOUTH ARM opposite the former ambush position near the native gardens two miles from the coast. Chopping was also heard at the latter position.
Aerial reconnaissance on 30 May saw no sign of activity either Japanese or native over the whole area.
Our patrols have been active in this area. On 27 May one returned from down the high ground from the junction of the BITOI

ARMS south to a feature west of NASSAU BAY. No signs of enemy were seen other than a message form which was found.
Another patrol proceeded along the south bank of the BITOI NORTH ARM, breaking bush to the coast. Three sets of enemy foot-prints were seen leading towards DUALI. Attempts to break bush to DUALI and SALUS were unsuccessful.
There has been some slight movement observed at LABAHIA ISLAND. A total of four small craft approached the island carrying up to six or eight men. On 4 Jun a small boat, heavily laden, moved to DUALI with a crew of two.

SALAMAUA - KOMIATUM L of C.

The enemy appears again to be moving up supplies and reinforcements to the MUBO area. The intense activity at the mouth of the FRANCISCO RIVER has been followed by considerable movement of both troops and carriers along the track to KOMIATUM. From 27 May to 5 Jun, 547 Japs have been seen moving south to KOMIATUM, while 251 have been observed moving in the opposite direction.
There is apparently a party of 12 who do escort duty with the carrier lines, for they have been observed several times moving both south and north. Many of the emeny returning north have been noticed limping and three were seen on crutches. It is evident that the enemy is carrying out a large scale relief, and possible strengthening, of his forward troops. It is thought to be no more than a month or six weeks since 102 Regt arrived in the MUBO area, but they must have been badly cut about in the subsequent fighting. Six weeks is about the maximum period for which a unit can be kept in the front line under these conditions.
In three days up to 2 Jun, there were 236 boy loads observed to have been carried south, while doubtless there has been a considerable amount of movement which has not been observed.
Only a small portion of the track about half a mile north of KOMIATUM can be observed. An examination of the times at which parties have been seen passing this point, shows that, on an average, Jap parties arrive at 1400 hrs./ and the carrier line at 1515 hrs. From this it would appear probable that the carrier line stages the night at KOMIATUM

SALAMAUA.

Further movement of bodies of troops has been observed at the mouth of the FRANCISCO RIVER and up to the ISTHMUS. On 29 May 70 Japs were seen to cross the footbridge from south to north. On 3 Jun 55 moved in the same direction while a further 60 moved NE along the ISTHMUS.
These troops may have been returning from the forward area and have been unobserved passing along the track north of KOMIATUM.
A more likely explanation is that they are connected with the two dumps suspected to be on either side of the mouth of the FRANCISCO. A report from a reliable native confirms the suspicion that, as stores are landed, they are placed in dumps, from which supplies are drawn for the forward areas. It is therefore, possible that a large quantity of stores arrived about 20 May, were shifted into the dump south of the FRANCISCO 22/24 May and are now being carried forward.
It was also stated that most of the supplies received go to the forward troops, the garrison subsisting mostly on native foods. This is supported by a report from our troops that the Japs, when driven off BOBDUBI RIDGE, left behind plentiful supplies of food.
Men have been constantly seen in the water off BURONUNG POINT, and were at first thought to have been swimming there. However, the fact that they very seldom wholly immerse themselves, and that there is nearly always a small boat in their vicinity, leads to the belief that fortifications are being constructed to guard against a landing. The defences east of the airfield, reported in the last summary, were also thought to be sited for the same purpose. It is apparent that the enemy in SALAMAUA are concerned about the possibility of an attack from the sea.
A reliable native who had been in SALAMAUA for six weeks until the middle of March, declared that Navy and Army personnel occupied separate areas on the ISTHMUS and on KILA respectively.

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He knew of no officer who had command of both services.

Activity in the vicinity of the quarry continues, and it is evident that there is a visual signalling station situated above the quarry.

More attention has been paid to the drome than previously; on three days parties of up to 30 men have worked all day on the drome filling in bomb craters.

MISSIM

The enemy still appears to be in occupation of BOBUBI RIDGE where small parties of enemy have been observed in the vicinity of the cocoanut grove. Otherwise there has been no activity to report.

MARKHAM

A patrol to the east of MARKHAM POINT on 27 May found a large unoccupied enemy camp about 15 minutes east of the ambush position. This confirms the native report that the enemy had vacated this area about 18 May.
There was a total of 38 huts, each capable of containing 12 or 13 men. The camp is well concealed, and large slit trenches, and possibly weapon pits, are dug into the hillside, connected by fenced tracks. It was in a filthy condition, and a number of documents giving very valuable information have been recovered.
Leading south from the vicinity of the camp was found a well-defined track with trees blazed at intervals along it. It is not yet known how far the track extends.
A theory has been advanced that the camp was a base for a party constructing a track through the jungle-covered mountainous country to WAGAU. The Jap's fondness of effecting surprise by this method has been demonstrated in previous engagements. The size of the holes dug in the camp area is reported to be abnormally large for the protection of personnel, and it may be that they were intended for stores. The theory is further supported by the finding of a page from the notebook of an officer, apparently connected with road construction work.
One of our reconnaissance patrols, returning west through the enemy camp on 3 June, surprised a party of 6 to 8 Japs and shots were exchanged. The camp area has been kept under observation, but no movement has been observed up to 150OK/5.

HUON PENINSULA

A report has been received that BOANA, 24 miles NNW of LAE, is now permanently occupied by the enemy, who state their intention of constructing an airfield there.
The natives between BOANA and LAE are reported to be pro-Japanese, affording the enemy full co-operation. On 30 May an observer was betrayed by natives, but managed to escape.
A party about forty strong left BOANA for the ERAP and KALAPIT with the alleged purpose of reconnoitring an airfield. This may be the patrol which is reported from TARARAN area to proceed, approximately weekly to the ERAP, the LERON, south to TARARAN, thence returning in the direction of NADZAB.

RAMU - MARKHAM - BENA BENA.

The enemy parties reported to be moving south in the direction of BUNDI, GUEBBI and WESA, appear to have turned back along the two westerly routes.
At SEPU, the RAMU RIVER is still in flood, and it is reported that no enemy have crossed.
On 27 May the enemy were reported at SAMI, RAMU strat WO2972, WO2570 on the road to [illegible]

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There have been no reports from the WEWA area, our furthest outpost being at MATAHAUSA, MADANG strat WO 6858.

(b) SEA.

ENEMY.

Submarines RABAUL - LAE.
Sightings of submarines off CAPE ORFORD continue to be reported from a reliable source.
From CAPE ORFORD to LAE the distance is 275 nautical miles, and generally speaking 30 hours would be required to cover this. Analysis of sightings, together with observed night activity in LAE HARBOUR, allows the following conclusions to be drawn in regard to the submarines' possible daily schedules :-

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dep RABAUL | 1000 hrs | D 1 | (supposition) |
| Pass CAPE ORFORD | 1800 hrs | D 1 | (average time of sighting) |
| Arr LAE | 2200 hrs | D 2 | |
| Dep LAE | 0130 hrs | D 3 | (supposition reinforced by reports from LAE) |
| Pass CAPE ORFORD | 0730 hrs | D 4 | (average time of sighting) |

The following are ways by which supplies could be carried by submarine:-

(a) Fifteen torpedoes are normally carried in "I" class submarines. (This class has been identified in both LAE and RABAUL). If a proportion of these were removed, approximately one ton of stores per torpedo could be carried instead.

(b) Since the journey RABAUL-LAE and return is well below a submarine's sea-going range, one or more fuel tanks could be filled with oil or aviation spirit, readily dischargeable into drums on barges.

(c) Up to 30 tons of deck cargo could be carried, provided it was suitably packed and stowed.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 124).

HANSA BAY.
On 29 May a convoy of four merchant vessels totalling 20,000 tons discharged its cargo at HANSA BAY, the harbour for the WEWAK area. Bad weather hindered observation, but it is thought that the vessels spent at least 8½ hrs, with a maximum of 17 hrs in port. Some supplies are known to have been landed, but if the convoy carried stores only, the full cargo could not have been unloaded in the time available. It would, therefore, appear that troops and equipment were unloaded. Altogether, it would have been possible for a Regiment (say 3,500 men) to have been landed.

MADANG.
At 061OK/29 three ships between 1,500 and 3,000 tons were approaching from the north. Later searches failed to locate these vessels.

Merchant tonnage at RABAUL remains at a low level, a total of 111,000 tons being observed on 29 May. In the KAVIENG area only two sightings were recorded, both of shipping proceeding towards RABAUL.

(Adapted from NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 134)

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(c) AIR

Own

MUBO

Enemy positions on OBSERVATION HILL were attacked by five BOSTONS on 25 May, and reports from both ground and air indicate that both bombing and strafing were accurate.

SALAMAUA

Twelve BOSTONS, accompanied by sixteen KITTYHAWKS, at 1330 hrs on 5 June bombed and strafed the dump at the mouth of the FRANCISCO RIVER and up the coast to KELA. Bombs were reported to fall in the target area.
All but one of six BOSTONS failed to reach their target at SALAMAUA owing to bad weather on 28 May.

LAE

Following on the heavy attack on 27 May, nine LIBERATORS carried out raids on 31 May and 1 June.

WEWAK

Airfields at WEWAK, BORAM, DAGUA and BUT were subjected to four heavy raids between 28 May and 4 June.

MADANG

The airfield, dumps and town areas were attacked on both 26 and 29 May by LIBERATORS, while seven BEAUFIGHTERS and five MITCHELLS attacked villages and bridges in the BOGADJIM area on 1 June.

Reconnaissance.

On 31 May one FORTRESS on reconnaissance over FINSCHAFFEN was attacked by 16 enemy fighters. Five enemy aircraft were destroyed and one probably. The FORTRESS returned to base with three of the crew wounded.

Enemy

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance aircraft were reported over DAMBI and the SNAKE VALLEY on 29 May, over WAU-BULOLO on 1 June and over MISSIM-HOTE on 5 June. The last mentioned aircraft strafed MISSIM. LAE appears to be used as a forward refuelling base for these planes. A HAP circling MALAHANG on 5 June gives rise to the possibility of this airfield being again used.

Airfields

Working parties have been active on both LAE and SALAMAUA airfields, repairing the damage caused by our bombs. There has been no use of SALAMAUA airfield reported for some time. Two new enemy airfields have been discovered in the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. It is considered that the purpose of their construction is to provide further dispersion for the 250 aircraft operating from this area.

DOBODURA

Although 30 bombers were used in a raid on DOUGLAS HARBOUR on 26 May, there was only one casualty and little damage.

BULLDOG

Approximately 15 bombs were dropped from sixteen aircraft which raided BULLDOG on 2 June. Three landed on the runway and a grounded transport aircraft was damaged.

(Adapted from NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 134 and Daily Information Summary No. 24).

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## PART II

1. ENEMY OOB

See E.O.B. File.

Attached as Appendix "A" is a map of NEW GUINEA and the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO showing the latest estimate of enemy strengths.

LAE

The following information has been obtained from an observer (just returned) who was at HELDSBACH during, and subsequent to, the BISMARCK SEA action. It provides the first reliable basis for an estimate of the number of survivors :-

On 3 Mar, a damaged destroyer hove to off HELDSBACH and hastily unloaded stores and personnel before being sunk by Allied aircraft. On the following day other landings were made along the coast at various points ranging from S10 (50 miles NW of FINSCHAFFEN) to HOPOI. Careful analysis of native reports results in an estimated minimum of 1,200 survivors. Of these, 200 are said to have remained at FINSCHAFFEN, 200 made their way to SAIDOR, and the balance reached LAE. It is considered that this 800 was absorbed into the reorganized 102 Regt, which was in the MUBO-KOMIATUM area during May.

(Adapted from NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary 124).

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

Documents found in the deserted Japanese camp at MARKHAM POINT on 28 May reveal the presence of 10 Coy 3 Bn 115 Regt in this area. It was previously surmised that this Bn was the unit which attacked BOBDUBI RIDGE on 15 May. There is no way of discovering how long the document was lying in the camp before being found, but a native report says that the enemy forces in this area moved across to the north bank of the river about 16 May. This information however is not conclusive.

Further documents captured include a sheet from an officer's notebook. It contained references to topographical reconnaissances "from AGO to BUSU RIVER". AGO is on the coast 20 miles NW of FINSCHAFFEN and the BUSU RIVER is 4 miles east of LAE; it seems likely that this was a reconnaissance for a coastal road. There was also a note of a reconnaissance to be made of the MARKHAM RIVER.

Further references were to preparations for the reception of 51 Div Main Unit (HQ 51 Div and 115 Regt on BISMARCK SEA Convoy of 2/4 Mar) including the construction of a road for disembarkation.

## PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

LOWER WATUT VALLEY.

The following is a summary of information based on a report of a patrol from SUNSHINE to the MARKHAM along the Lower WATUT RIVER.

| Track Times | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| SUNSHINE | - | TAIAK | 4 hours, 30 minutes |
| TAIAK | - | KAPASWAGA | 4 hours, 15 minutes |
| KAPASWAGA | - | WOWAS | 6 hours |
| WOWAS | - | MAROLINAN | 3 hours, 15 minutes |
| MAROLINAN | - | WURUF | 4 hours, 15 minutes |
| WURUF | - | PESEN | 3 hours, 15 minutes |
| PESEN | - | MARKHAM | 4 hours. |

WATUT RIVER

The WATUT is the largest of the southern tributaries of the MARKHAM RIVER, and from SUNSHINE to the MARKHAM it runs through three main types of country - open kunai valleys, steep rocky gorges and swampy forest valleys.

From SUNSHINE the WATUT is a fast flowing river running through an open valley in a NW direction, bounded to the east and SE by hills covered with thick jungle. The undergrowth here is of the type found along the coastal areas of NEW GUINEA. At the junction with the SNAKE RIVER, the valley bends and runs in a south-easterly direction, gradually closing in until the river is flowing through a

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steep rocky rain forest gorge over 200 feet deep. A short distance east of SONIA the course of the river changes and runs in a northerly direction towards ROAMER, where there is a slight opening of the valley, and it is here that the ROAMER ELG has been made. From the drome the turbulent river races down the rocky floor of the valley, with hills over 800 feet high rising sharply from the stream. At WOWAS the river emerges from these steep hills and enters an open jungle and kunai valley which extends to MARALINAN. Looking north from the hills above MARALINAN, the course of the river can be seen running towards the MARKHAM through a flat, swampy, forest covered valley, bounded to the west by a kunai range of hills and to the east by a jungle covered line of hills with MOUNT WAIUT in the centre.

TRACK

The track as a whole is of good surface and presents no real difficulties. It would be possible to build a jeep track as far as SAMBIO rest house, but from here on, owing to steep gradients of an average of 1 in 6, and numerous landslides, the construction of a jeep track would be a difficult task.

From SAMBIO the track enters the steep WAIUT VALLEY. The surface is good and it would be possible to make the track suitable for mules as far as GALWA rest house. The track continues on from GALWA following the deep rocky valley which is covered with alternating jungle and kunai grass. Along this section the track climbs in places to over 800 feet above the stream.

From WOWAS to MARALINAN, as the valley gradually opens out, the gradients become less severe and a good bench cut track leads from EFAFAN CK to the MARKHAM airfield. The track from here to the MARKHAM follows along the open valley floor and in some places is inclined to become swampy.

Throughout the length of the valley, there are numerous small creeks which run into the river. These cause no great difficulty as they are either fordable or crossed by native type bridges, some of which are in a bad state of repair

ACCOMODATION

Accomodation along the route is fairly good for a party not exceeding more than 30 men. There are staging posts at SAMBIO, TARAK, KAPASWAGA, WOWAS, OLD EFAFAN, MAROLINAN, WURUF and PESIN.

The natives are friendly and although food is scarce they offered fruit and vegetables to the patrol.

ELG's and SUPPLY DROPPING PLACES

Along the open kunai valley there are a number of sites suitable for ELGs and dropping grounds. At SONIA, 30 minutes from TARAK there is a runway of 600 yards which with clearing would be suitable for moths. In the gorge section of the valley at ROAMER, there is an ELG which owing to the nature of the country has a difficult approach and is only suitable for small planes or for supply dropping.

MARALINAN is a B class drome 780 yards long by 100 yards wide, it has a well drained surface which could be extended 3/400 yards making it suitable for transport planes inside a week.

KELA HILL & MAIOLO

To the west and north-west of KELA HILL is an area of open kunai ridges cut by steep reentrants. From the flats of the FRANCISCO delta where the SALAMAUA airfield is situated, the hills rise steeply, affording an excellent vantage point from which to view the base of the ISTHMUS and the river mouth.

To the west this area is almost cut off from the steep timbered ridges further inland by the ravine of BULKS CREEK. A northern boundary is provided by ASINI CREEK, the largest of a great number of small coastal streams. To the east the sea can be plainly seen as well as KELA HILL, the most easterly of these hills overlooking SAMOA HARBOUR.

Native gardens are numerous throughout this area, being connected by a network of tracks. Off the tracks, the going is difficult on account of the steepness of the ravines and the density of the secondary growth in the old native gardens. The kunai ridges are very open to observation, but excellent cover is provided by the timber in the many gullies.

TABALI RIVER, BASSIS VILLAGE.

The river, which flows into NASSAU BAY at ref map BADEN BAY WEST, 835778, is known as TABALI RIVER. The three villages in NASSAU BAY, formerly known as NASSAU BAY Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively from east to west are now known

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## PART V

### SECURITY

Rumour is probably the most dangerous and insidious destructive agent of a force's morale. A succession of rumours, spreading like wildfire, will quickly cause confusion, doubt and lack of confidence throughout a body of troops. Uncertainty of mind lies at the root of all rumour, for when one's knowledge is sure, there can be no belief in hearsay. The most effective way of countering this menace, therefore, is to spread authoritative information as widely as possible. It is the duty of every officer and NCO to ensure that the men in his charge are kept at all times, as fully informed as the circumstances permit. This duty is present both when in battle, and when in the rear areas. In battle, every man must be aware of as much of his commander's intention, plan and method as is compatible with security. In the rear areas, every effort should be made by means of talks, news sheets and summaries, to keep all ranks in the picture of current events. Further, it is the duty of every man to weigh the reliability of any information before accepting it as true. To every statement there should be framed, if not spoken, the query "where did you get that from".

Lt-Col
GS 3 Aust Div

Distribution: See attached.

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| 2/3 Aust Indep Coy | 8 |
| 1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt | |
| 2/6 Aust Svy Bty | |
| 156 Aust Lt AA Bty | 9 |
| WAU Fxd Def | 10 |
| Sta Comd, WAU | |
| BULOLO Fxd Def | 11 |
| Sta Comd BULOLO | |
| 11 Fighter Control Sub-sector | 12 |
| 708 CA(AA) Bty US Army | 13 |
| RAE 3 Aust Div | 14 |
| Sigs 3 Aust Div | 15 |
| AASC 3 Aust Div | 16 |
| 2/2 Aust Fd Amb | 17 |
| 3 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp | 18 |
| ANGAU (MARKHAM District) | 19 |
| Air Support Control 5 AF | 20 |
| ALO A Fl 4 AC Sqn. | 21 |
| NGF | 22 |
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| 41 US Div | 24 |
| 4 Aust Inf Bde | 25 |
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| Comd | 27 |
| AA & QMG | 28 |
| AMS, ADOS, ADME | 29 |
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| War Diary | 31 - 32 |
| Spare | 33 |
| | 34 - 35 |

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NOT to be taken forward of Battalion HQ

SECRET

Copy No. 2

# 6 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 5

Compiled from information received up to 1300 hrs 22 May 43.

## PART I

1. GENERAL

Documents captured in the MUBO area give conclusive evidence of the enemy's reshuffling of his forward troops. The 102 Inf Regt, reorganized after its mauling in the battle for WAU made a re-appearance in the attack against out troops on LABABIA RIDGE on 9 to 12 May.

The only fighting of any significance has taken place in the MISSIM area, where our continual harassing of the Jap L of C, SALAMAUA to KOMIATUM forced him to take action by driving west with a considerable force. Our forces were withdrawn, but inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, whilst in comparison our losses were ridiculously small.

Movement in the area south-west of BOGADJIM has continued, but in the last 10 days indications have been received of increased interest in the BENA BENA plateau, in addition to the old trade route MADANG - LAE.

Enemy shipping has continued to use WEWAK, but on a slightly lower scale. There has been an increase, however, of enemy barge movement along the south coast of NEW BRITAIN.

A medium scale, but widespread aerial offensive, which is still continuing was set in motion by the enemy on 13 May. A feature of these operations was the use made of airfields on the NE coast of NEW GUINEA.

2. OPERATIONS

(a) Land

MUBO AREA

Since the enemy's withdrawal to the PIMPLE on 12 May, there has been little activity in this area. Our patrols have been acti and indications are that the enemy remains in occupation of thi strongpoint, with a log barricade across the frontal approach. On the south end of WOODY ISLAND the Jap is thought to have an ambush position and his previous positions on OBSERVATION HILL are still manned. In this area our artillery evidently had a success when they engaged an area from which smoke had been consistently observed. Their fourth shell resulted in a colum of black smoke 400 feet high.

A patrol wide out on our left flank contacted an enemy ambush position on the northern slopes of OBSERVATION HILL, indicating the extent in depth of his prepared positions.

[illegible] - NASSAU BAY

The enemy appears to be still taking an interest in this area. A launch with four ships' boats were observed bringing ashore approximately 70 men at DUALI POINT on 17 May. An outpost is evidently being constructed near the site of their position, contacted on 4 May, some two miles up the BITOI OVERFLOW. This position was reported clear on 14 May but has evidently been re-occupied.

Movement has also been observed on LABABIA ISLAND, enemy occupation of which was suspected as long ago as last December.

MISSIM AREA.

To facilitate reference a sketch map is attached as Appendix

The period under review opened with our MMG overlooking the SALAMAUA KOMIATUM track and continuing to harass enemy parties moving south to KOMIATUM, on 12/13 May thirty eight casualties being inflicted on the enemy.

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In addition, a further force in position 200 yards west of the junction of the tracks to SALAMAUA, KOMIATUM and BOBDUBI was a potential danger to the enemy's L of C. The enemy, apparently unperturbed by this frequent harassing of his flank, and realising that continuation of these activities would greatly effect future operations in the MUBO area, attacked our forces on the BOBDUBI RIDGE with a force estimated at one battalion. The attack commenced at 1245 hrs on 14 May and was preceded by heavy mortar and artillery fire from positions on the SE edge of SALAMAUA airfield and KUNA HILL.

The initial thrust WEST along the SALAMAUA - BOBDUBI track ran into booby traps spread out in front of our position on the track; these booby traps were covered by fire and enveloping movements, the enemy forced our troops along the SALAMAUA BOBDUBI track onto the northern end of BOBDUBI ridge where our troops, reinforced from the KUNDA BR area, held the enemy advance in this direction.

Having cleared the SALAMAUA BOBDUBI track, the enemy continued his drive to the west forcing our troops on the south end of BOBDUBI RIDGE to withdraw to the general line of MESEM DUALI CK, where they took up a defensive position. Simultaneous attempts were made to turn the enemy's flanks without success. One force came south from the FRANCISCO RIVER and the other north from NAMLING.

Late in the afternoon our troops strongly counterattacked from the north of BOBUBBI to gain the high ground south of NEW BOBUBBI. This attack was met by heavy small arms fire from short range and heavy and accurate mortar fire, which pinned our troops to the ground. The enemy then attempted to advance, but were halted by heavy fire from positions on the north end of BOBDUBI RIDGE.

At 1730K/15 our forces withdrew in good order from BOBDUBI RIDGE to KUNDA BR to avoid becoming isolated in the bend of the river on the north end of the RIDGE. Reinforcements were then moved up to the NAMLING area, thus providing strengthened defensive positions in this area as well as in the vicinity of KUNDA BR.

The enemy continued to consolidate on BOBDUBI RIDGE but made no attempt to exploit further west.

During the morning of 16 May KUNDA BR and MUBO RIVER areas were bombed and strafed by 3 separate enemy forces. No damage or casualties resulted.

Throughout the next 4 days no forward move was attempted by the enemy, with the exception of a small patrols across the FRANCISCO RIVER.

His next move was in the direction of HOTE with the evident intention of securing his left flank. Contact was made on the 19 May with an enemy patrol about 30 strong 2000 yards to the east of HOTE village.

After a brief engagement this patrol appeared to withdraw towards MALOLO. That evening however, a force of 150 Japs were observed in HOTE.

At first light on 20 May this enemy attacked our troops in DISSEMBOB, forcing them by weight of numbers to withdraw in a running fight to the west. Casualties inflicted on the enemy were estimated at between 50 and 60 KIA. That evening DISSEMBOB was reported clear, the enemy being observed in HOTE. On 21 May our patrols penetrated to eastern extremity of HOTE RIDGE without making contact.

SALAMAUA

Activity observed within the SALAMAUA perimeter has been on a slightly increased scale. Movement around the ordnance store has been on a daily occurrence, while further activity has been noticed along DESERTER ROAD and in the vicinity of the quarry. It is possible that the enemy is preparing the peninsula as a position to be defended to the last.

MARKHAM AREA.
No contact has been made, but considerable information has been received from native sources of the enemy's activities in the MARKHAM POINT area. About ninety Japs are believed to have been on the south bank of the river between MARKHAM POINT and LABU No.1, for the last two months. A large proportion of this force is undoubtedly personnel manning AA guns, which have been observed in action in this area.
The remainder of the force would be accounted for by a protecting infantry force.
The placing of the AA guns here was no doubt done with the object of countering our air attacks against his barge hideouts.
There is further evidence to support the belief that the enemy uses the coastal route LABU No. 1 - SALAMAUA when moving troops from LAE. A large party of Japs, including about 20 officers was reported on 13 May to have moved south by this route.
A corrected version of the native report concerning the enemy patrol in the NGASAWAMPUM - GABSONKEK area, mentioned in Summary No 4, has been received. It now appears that their itinerary was; TARARAN on the night of 4/5 May, moving to NGASAWAMPUM on 5 May and proceeding from there to LAE on 6 May.
Native talk from a different area gave the route of the patrol as GABSONKEK, up the LERON, over to the ERAP, down to TARARAN and thence back to GABSONKEK. This activity may be connected with the movement across the SARUWAGED RANGE reported below.
Natives reporting south of the MARKHAM say that the Japs at TARARAN have taken all their names and given each a number. The penalty of death is threatened for absence from roll call or aiding the Australians. The veracity of the MARKHAM boy, however is, at the best of times, doubtful. The bulk of the CHIVISING natives have expressed a desire to shift their abode to the south side of the river, away from Japanese influence.

HUON PENINSULA
Persistent native rumours state that large numbers of Japanese are based at SIO and ULAP, on the north coastal area of HUON PENINSULA. The food supply in the KOMBA district is reported to be practically depleted, and the enemy intention appears to be a move across the SARUWAGED RANGE to LAE via BUNGALUMBA (ref LAE STRAT Sheet (L)R 7475) and AVE (ref MARKHAM STRAT Sheet (L)R 6586).
These rumours have been partially confirmed by a late report of an enemy patrol which arrived at BOANA on 15 May from BUNGALUMBA. The patrol was reported to be comprised of twenty Army personnel and seventy local carriers.
They were equipped with machine guns and had a wireless set.
Contact was made with one of our parties in this area and some shots were exchanged, but it is not known whether any casualties were suffered by either side.

(NGF Summary No 122)

RAMU - MARKHAM AREA
Native rumour said that there was a large body of the enemy at KESAWAI about 15 May and this was confirmed by the reappearance of the enemy at WESA on 19 May. One ANGAU sergeant was killed and the Japs apparently remain in occupation of this area.
The enemy were guided by natives from WESA and WADMERIBA, further evidence of the Japs gaining control over the natives in the areas which he has occupied.
This action, coupled with his aerial reconnaissances over BENA BENA and KAINANTU, indicates the enemy's interest in the rich plateau stretching from KAINANTU west to MT HAGEN.
Possession of this ground would provide him with an easily defended forward base served by excellent airfields.
Attempts to explore the old trade route to LAE further SE than BUM BUM have been held up by the flooded GUSAP and RAMU rivers.

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(b) SEA - ENEMY

WEWAK

A convoy of seven vessels totalling 27,000 tons arrived at WEWAK on 12 May. Ninety barges were assembled for its unloading, and the ships remained in harbour only 24 hours. The unloading of stores in such a short time is remarkable, but may be accounted for by the Japanese method of storing provisions in drums.

On 19 May, another convoy of seven vessels, totalling 13,000 tons was sighted off this port.

HUON GULF

Four separate sightings made on 13 and 14 May indicate that an enemy submarine from RABAUL may have reached LAE on the night of 13 May.

Two days later, a spectacular attack was made by a boarding 65 miles south of GASMATA on a large east-bound submarine, on whose stern a large Japanese flag was plainly discernible. The submarine was raked from stem to stern with long bursts, and shots were seen to strike home at the waterline below the conning tower. Two men running forward to a machine gun were seen to fall, and other men then fired four shots from a heavy gun before their vessel submerged.

A reliable source reported suspected submarine in LAE harbour at the same time there were indications of a

On 15 May, a strong air attack force failed, in spite of an intensive search, to locate an enemy convoy reported earlier some 10 miles west of ARAWE under conditions of poor visibility.

Approximately thirty barges, many of which contained troops and stores, were sighted at various points along the south coast of NEW BRITAIN. This movement, together with the traffic along the north coast reported in last week's Summary, indicates increased supplies, and possibly reinforcements of the CAPE GLOUCESTER, ARAWE and GASMATA areas.

BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

Activity at RABAUL and KAVIENG has indicated no change in enemy policy.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 12

(c) AIR - Own.

LAE.

On 14 May, as a result of report of enemy aircraft landing on LAE airfield, B25's, B24's and A20's (Bostons) attempted to attack LAE. Bad weather prevented any of these aircraft from reaching the target.

The following day, A20's and B25's bombed and straffed the airfield. Four fighters and seven bombers were straffed on the ground. Large fires were reported at the end of the runway.

SALAMAUA

Three B25's bombed the town and airfield at dusk on 19 May. Again from 1550 - 1550 hours 20 May six A20's bombed and straffed the airfield with apparent success.

Other targets in the NE sector during the week covered WEWAK, FINSCHAFFEN, RABAUL and GASMATA. Seven attacks of varying type were made on the last-named place between 12 and 21 May, while airfields at RABAUL were attacked on five occasions.

CLOSE SUPPORT

From 1055 to 2215 hrs 20 May three Beaufighters straffed enemy positions in villages in the HOTE - DAHO area.

INTERCEPTION

ORO BAY

On 14 May P38's and P40's intercepted twenty medium bombers and twenty five fighters ten miles east of ORO BAY. Results were:-

Enemy losses - destroyed 9 fighters; 7 bombers;
probable, 1 fighter; 5 bombers.

Own losses: destroyed 1 fighter; damaged 1 fighter; 1 pilot lost

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

WAU

On 17, 18, 20 and 21 May fighters took off to intercept enemy aircraft over WAU. On 21 May contact was made with twenty fighters between LAE and SALAMAUA at 23,000 feet. Seven enemy fighters were destroyed and five probably. Our losses were nil.

AIR - Enemy.

DOBODURA

In addition to a small night raid on 13 May, forty five enemy aircraft approached DOBODURA on 14 May. They were intercepted ten miles to sea and only a few got through to their target. There was slight damage and a few casualties. Further minor raids on 18 and 20 May caused no damage.

PORT MORESBY

On 13, 15 and 20 May small interfective raids were carried out on airfields in the area.

LAE

At dusk on 14 May, a day before the ROBOBUT air support action and the first field for the week on WAU, thirty two fighters were observed patrolling LAE and, by the light of flares a few minutes later, landing. Considerable activity was observed all day 15 May, aircraft continually landing, refuelling, and departing. Also at various times between 15 and early 16 May, a reliable source in the SALAMAUA area saw over forty aircraft flying from LAE towards the WEWAK area.

It therefore appears that the aircraft which took part in the action 15 May, came from bases on the NE coast and were staged at LAE.

WAU-BULOLO

Following reconnaissances made on 13 and 14 May the enemy on 15 May attacked WAU with twenty bombers and eleven fighters, but caused neither damage nor casualties.

They renewed their efforts on 17 May, using twenty two bombers and twenty one fighters, and this time met with more success. Approximately two hundred bombs were dropped, including HE, anti-personnel and incendiary, and all fell across the SW end of the airfield. Although some damage was caused to the strip, the airfield is serviceable and casualties were one officer and four other ranks slightly wounded, some damage was caused.

On 18, 20 and 21, 22 May, about twenty enemy fighters [illegible] the WAU - BULOLO area at varying times during the morning.

It would appear that the enemy's intention was to interfere with the delivery of supplies to this area.

1. ENEMY GOB - LAND

SALAMAUA-LAE

These two Bns participated in the original attack on WAU on 29 Jan. Their combined strength at time of relief was estimated at 600. Forward troops estimate that the strength of the force which attacked in the MISSIM area was 600. It is reasonable to assume that this force was 3 Bn 102 Inf Regt which was held in reserve during the WAU operations. At this time its strength was established from captured documents to be 500.
It appears therefore, that though 102 Regt has been reorganized in LAE and strengthened by drafting to it the survivors of 115 Regt. The above estimate of 600 for 3 Bn indicates that the units are not up to full strength, which is quite probable in such a composite formation.
Present estimates of strength are therefore as follows:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **MUBO-KOMIATUM** | | | |
| Two battalions | | | 1200 |
| HQ and administrative personnel | | | 100 |
| | | | 1300 |
| Less casualties to 22 May | | | |
| LABABIA RIDGE : forward troops | | | |
| "conservative estimate"killed | | 71 | |
| Estimated wounded | | 142 | |
| SALAMAUA-MUBO L of C: | | | |
| Counted | | 132 | |
| Estimated uncounted and wounded | | 130 | 475 |
| | | | 825 |
| BOBDUBI: | | | |
| One battalion | | | 600 |
| Less casualties to 22 May: | | | |
| Counted | | 72 | |
| Estimated uncounted and wounded | | 216 | 288 |
| | | | 312 |

There is a possibility that the party which was encountered at HOTE came from the forces available at SALAMAUA and it has not therefore been included in the above figures.
Of the 150 which are estimated to have attacked, it is thought that at least 75 have been accounted for.

6. ENEMY TACTICS
A comparison of Jap tactics employed on the recent engagements on LABABIA RIDGE and BOBDUBI RIDGE shows great similarity in the method of using supporting weapons.
In both actions, the enemy employed his MMGs well forward, using them to supplement the supporting fire from LMGs placed on the flanks.
These LMGs were placed so that they could lay down a belt of fire in front of the MMGs as a secondary task. In the heavy jungle, it was difficult to judge positions of these guns, owing to "echoes" caused by the trees, and even when the general direction had been judged, it was almost impossible to pinpoint their positions by the flash owing to the heavy foliage.
In both attacks, attempts were made to diver the attention of our troops fwom the forward movement of his MMGs by intense shiping.
The grenade discharger was also used by the enemy but the effectiveness of this weapon was nullified by the failure of many bombs to explode, and the fact that some bombs did not clear the trees exploding amongst troops.
In the attack on LABABIA RIDGE, the use of cover prior to first contact was excellent, but in subsequent attacks no attempt was made to disguise movement, our troops obtaining early warning from loud noises and crashes. Prior to, and during one attack, loud shoutings and screams were reported.
When hit, the enemy gave vent to loud screams, and squeals without exception. The attack on BOBDUBI RIDGE was preceded by heavy Arty and mortar concentrations.

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Throughout the engagement, both Arty and small arms fire was poor, but the mortar fire however, was extremely accurate.
Prior to the BOBDUBI RIDGE action, the enemy used a new method of orienting his troops to the ground. An aircraft flew over the whole objective, dropping flares on the main topographical features.

## PART III

### TOPOGRAPHICAL.

1. The camp at SKINDEWAI or McADAM'S on the MISSIM L of C, has been re-named PATEP IV, and will be referred to as such in the future. Track times on this route are given below:-

| | |
|---|---|
| PATEP III to BRANCH CREEK | 2 hours |
| BARNCH CREEK to PATEP IV | 5 hours |
| PATEP IV to BAIUNE HEADWATERS | 3 hours |
| BAIUNE HEADWATERS - DOUBLE MOUNTAIN - PILIMUNG | 5 hours |
| PILIMUNG - SELEBOB - MISSIM | 3½ hours |
| PILIMUNG - BOBADU - MISSIM | 7 hours |

2. A summary of weather conditions NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMONS SEA is attached as Appendix "B".

## PART V

### SECURITY

Japanese "Counter-Espionage" (Security)

During the last few months evidence has shown that the enemy is becoming more security-minded. This probably is a result of his realization of the vast quantities of information we have obtained from captured documents.
The Jap is now issuing "counter-espionage" instructions down to bns. These instructions contain measures to prevent leakage of information, and detect an prevent our own plans.
The responsibility for security in the unit is borne by a group of six officers, who are changed each week. Their duties are very similar to those of our own unit security officer.
A syllabus for a fourteen day unit course of instruction in security was also found.
A captured instruction not only laid emphasis on the security education of the troops, but also laid down a definite scale of penalities for the breaking of "counter-espionage" rules.

(Adapted from AMF Review No 40)

R L Hughes for Maj
Lt-Col
GS 3 Aust Div

Distribution: Copy Nos

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 17 Aust Inf Bde | 1 - 4 | 2/2 Aust Fd Amb | 18 |
| 2/6 Aust Inf Bn Gp | 5 - 6 | 3 Aust Div Sec Reception | 19 |
| WAU Fxd Defences | 7 | HQ ANGAU (MARKHAM DISTRICT) | 20 |
| Sta Comd WAU | | Sta Comd BULOLO | 21 |
| 2/3 Aust Indep Coy | 8 | Air Support Control 5 AF | 22 |
| 2/7 Aust Indep Coy | 9 | ALO A Fl. 4 AC Sqn. | 23 |
| 1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt | 10 | NGF | 24 |
| 2/6 Aust Svy Bty | 11 | Air Sup Sec A 3 Adv Ech | 25 |
| 156 Lt AA Bty | 12 | 5 AF MORESBY for | 26 |
| BENA FORCE | 13 | 4 Aust Inf Bde infm | 27 |
| 11 Fighter Control Sub-Section | 14 | 15 Aust Inf Bde | 28 |
| 708 CA (AA) Bty US Army | 15 | Comd | 29 |
| RAE 3 Aust Div | 16 | AA & QMG | 30 |
| Sigs 3 Aust Div | 17 | AIMS, ADOS, ADMS, | 31-32 |
| AASC 3 Aust Div | | File | 33 |
| | | War Diary | 34-37 |
| | | Spare | |

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Appx 'A' to
3 Aust Div
Int Summary No 5
22 May 43

# Trace of SALAMAUA (Revised) 1" = 1 Mile showing :-
## ENEMY MOVEMENTS 14 May 43 & AERIAL BOMBING & STRAFING 15 May 43

59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95

Abulua
Kela
SALAMAUA
Bogern Bay
Camp 1
Patrol clash 0845/19
Arrived 1730 K/19 Staged night K/20
Attacked 0700 K/20 withdrew to HOTE by 1900 K/20
Probable correct. dation after 1730 K/14
1700 K/14
1600 K/14
1245 K/14
Mortar
1530 K/14
OM
1600 K/14
Scout camp
Lokona No 1
Lokona No 2
Borsi
HOTE
Burra
Kunda
Francisco
MIKSIM
PEKOASU
Bombing & Strafing area 15 May
Scale 1" = 1 Mile

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

## WEATHER CONDITIONS NEW GUINEA AND THE SOLOMONS SEA.

The following is of interest both as an explanation of future ops and as a clarification of local seasons.

The effect of weather on air sea and to a less extent land operations has been frequently demonstrated and is fully realised by the enemy High Command.

The weather conditions in the NEW GUINEA - BISMARCK ARCHIPELIGO area fall into two seasons, the SE season (approx mid-April to end Oct) and the NW monsoon season (end of Dec to end of March).

In the SE season a bank of thick weather extends along the south coast of NEW BRITAIN, while the north coast is comparatively clear, this condition is completely reversed during the NW season.

By using the alternative sea lanes along the north or south coast of NEW BRITAIN, according to the season, the enemy may be afforded cover from observation for his convoys to this area, provided his forecasts are accurate.

SE season, mid-April to end-Oct :
The controlling influence on the weather during this season is the anti - cyclonic movement from west to east over Australia.

The development of large anti-cyclone conditions can be easily traced in its move acro s the Australian continent. Usually weak on the mainland these increase in energy after passing to the CORAL SEA, bringing rain squalls and deep cloud over the area. The effect of the high mountain range of SE NEW GUINEA comes into operation damming the weather and releasing it over the NE coast of SE NEW GUINEA with an effect similar to a "southerly buster" off the NSW coast. Thick weather squalls and deep cloud push along the coast covering the entire HUON GULF area.

The mountain ranges of NEW BRITAIN exert their influence and as a result the north coast is comparatively clear, with little cloud cover. These facts are clearly indicated by a comparison of average rainfalls from May to Oct.

| | |
|---|---|
| GASMATA | 32.69 ins. |
| TALASEA | 5.73 ins. |

Associated with these conditions are severe squalls with disturbed seas through the VITIAZ STRAITS.

The forecasting of these conditions can be carried out with ample warning by our bases in Australia, but would prove most difficult for the enemy.

NW Monsoon Season end-Dec to end-Mar ;

During this period the dominating influence on the weather is the northern anti cyclonic movements, which move East from ASIA. Reaching NEW BRITAIN as a warm moist wind the uplifting effect of the mountain ranges causes general cloudiness and rain over a wide region.

The mountain range of NEW BRITAIN has a similar damming effect extending sea-ward some fifty miles.

Disturbances coming from the NW in a SE direction have a similar effect on the north coast of NEW BRITAIN, and may develop into vigorous cyclones down the NE coast of QUEENSLAND.

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Rainfall averages again demonstrate the conditions between end - Dec and end - Mar :

GASMATA 6.40 ins.
TALASEA 25.85 ins.

The Japanese have available a complete network of stations to observe these conditions. On the other hand, Allied meteorologist have little to assist them. Reports from reconnaissance aircraft are of great assistance, however.

Conclusions are that, during the SE season the approaches to LAE and SALAMAUA are frequently obscured, which coupled with the rough seas in the VITIAZ STRAITS indicates that the enemy is likely to use the approa along the south coast of NEW BRITAIN.

Allied commanders however would have ample warning of bad weather conditions.

During the NW season the route along the north coast of NEW BRITAIN favours the enemy, with little warning available to the Allies.

(adopted from Appx "D" AMF Summary No 40).

17 Bde HQ.

NOT to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ

SECRET

Copy No. 1

3 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 4

Compiled from information received up to 1200 hrs 13 May 43.

PART I

1. GENERAL

An increase in barge and submarine activity in the HUON GULF over the recent period coupled with movement on the L of C from SALAMAUA to MUBO indicates that the enemy has been reinforcing this area. More vigourous enemy action has followed as a consequence, which has been effectively countered to date.
These reinforcements may have come from the LAE - SALAMAUA garrison, or be troops moved in from the NE coast. The latter contention is supported by reporting in forward areas of enemy troops in good condition.
Native information that the enemy patrols which had been operating in the general area 30/40 miles SW of MADANG is now substantiated by a report from our outpost at WESA, 20 miles NNE of BENA BENA, of a clash with the enemy patrol on 10 May.
There has been no slackening of the enemy efforts to reinforce WEWAK and MADANG by sea, but the Jap air effort has been confined to reconnaissance.

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) Land

MUBO AREA

To facilitate reference a sketch of the MUBO GREENHILL area is attached as Appendix "A".
The last week has seen the culmination and frustration of an enemy effort to encircle the right of our positions at MUBO.
This action commenced on 25 April by enemy reinforcement of his positions in the GREEN HILL - PIMPLE area. On 27 April, the enemy was strengthening his position on the PIMPLE, but had evidently vacated the ARCHWAY and WOODY ISLAND, as enemy martar and battalion gun fire was directed into these areas. The enemy also shelled intermittently VICKERS RIDGE with no effect.
Our patrols to OBSERVATION HILL on 7 May reported that this area was lightly held, but two days later the enemy re-occupied the ARCHWAY and WOODY ISLAND.
On 10 May OBSERVATION HILL was reported to be held in strength.
Air support to the forward troops was freely given on the enemy positions on the PIMPLE. The enemy countered our air attacks by moving forward towards the bombline, and taking up previously prepared positions, from which they successfully repulsed our attacks on 2 May, withdrawing to the PIMPLE after the engagement.
A further attack on PIMPLE on 7 May was also repulsed, and a determined attack made on our positions on LABABIA RIDGE 9 May.
Our troops held their ground but the enemy maintained contact.
A relieving force vigourously attacked the enemy on 10 May from the direction of VICKERS RIDGE. The enemy positions, however, well dug in and in depth, foiled every attempt to dislodge them. The position of our forward Coy on LABABIA RIDGE becoming dangerous, a force was established to provide a link to our base camp. This force was, however, overrun by a determined enemy drive at dusk on 10 May, and was withdrawn when out of ammunition. All attempts to dislodge the enemy from the left flank had failed and the position of our forward Coy looked serious.
A determined attack by our forces on the morning of 11 May was successful, however, and the contact with the Coy was re-established.

Regraded 14/5/43

Cwealth Comd Bn I

Copy No 4 Destroyed

An enemy counter attack on the left flank was driven off and on 12 May he had withdrawn to the PIMPLE.
Our casualties during this action were only two killed and ten wounded while at least sixty seven enemy were killed.
Prior to, and during this action, the enemy received reinforcements via the KOMIATUM track. Our troops overlooking the track from positions to the west of KOMIATUM and north to BOBDUBI, observed several large enemy parties moving south. These were engaged by MMG fire with considerable success, and between 5 and 12 May approximately ninety casualties were inflicted. The only attempt at retaliation was return MMG fire from one "party" of 11 May.

MISSIM AREA

In the vicinity of BOBDUBI our forces have had a successful week.
An attack on an enemy position on the south end of BOBDUBI ridge by our force on 7 May succeeded; the Jap, however, counter-attacked with determination, supported by heavy mortar fire, and the fourth attempt forced our troops to withdraw.
The enemy was also consolidating at this stage an ambush position on the BOBDUBI - SALAMAUA track, 500 yards south of the FRANCISCO RIVER.
Raids on the enemy position on BOBDUBI RIDGE on 9 May were accompanied by harassing fire on the enemy mortar position. No return fire was received and a dawn patrol on 11 May found the positions unoccupied.
Our patrols exploited further east while consolidation was carried out. A further position covering the BOBDUBI - SALAMAUA track was established. The same day, 11 May, the enemy was found to have shifted his ambush north east to a position on the track where it skirts the RIVER.
From this position on 12 May the enemy attacked our troops on the south end of BOBDUBI RIDGE supported by heavy mortar fire. The attack was repulsed with one of our troops wounded. Enemy casualties in this action were unknown but the total counted casualties inflicted for the week is eighteen.

DUALI - NASSAU BAY AREA

Natives contacted by our patrol to the BITOI OVERFLOW on 3 May informed our troops that the enemy was in occupation of villages and cocoanut groves along the coast from DUALI to NASSAU BAY.
Two small detachments were reported to be covering the track a few hundred yards west of DUALI viallage, patrols covering the area between the villages. An outpost contacted by our patrol two miles up the BITOI OVERFLOW has been previously reported.
The natives in this area are reported to be hostile towards the enemy as he has been conscripting labour without payment upon penalty of death. Further, food in the district is scarce as a result of his occupation and there is much sickness for which no treatment is provided, amongst the natives.
Finally, the Japs have been interfering with their women.
Aerial reconnaissance on 10 May reported sighting thirty-eight outriggers between the mouth of the BITOI OVERFLOW and SACHIN BAY. Natives from this area say they belong to LABABIA ISLAND kanakas and are used to transport carriers from the villages to LOKANU. These carriers are evidently those employed by the Japs.
Two new huts were seen to be in course of construction at the eastern village in NASSAU BAY.

LAE-SALAMAUA

Barge and launch activity during the day has increased in SALAMAUA harbour, while on three occasions the sound of engines was heard about midnight by our posts at BOBDUBI.
Barge movement in LAE harbour in the late afternoon and early morning on corresponding dates seems to indicate nocturnal barge movement between LAE and SALAMAUA.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

A native reported that submarines were used to bring reinforcements and supplies to SALAMAUA, back loading the sick and wounded.
Another native report from MAPOS stated that the enemy has established camps containing about forty each at the mouths of the HUANG and BWUSSI rivers. Evidently the enemy has opened up the land route from LABU to SALAMAUA in addition to using the sea route.
A patrol to MALOLO found enemy occupation near the coast in this area, together with old enemy staging camps on the track to SALAMAUA. Two empty gun pits were also found.

MARKHAM AREA
It appears that an enemy party of about twenty has been operating south of the MARKHAM in the vicinity of MARKHAM POINT. The sentry observed on 6,19 and 20 April was no doubt part of this force.
On 21 April the party was contacted at a position SE of the sentry position, the sentry not being there that day.
The enemy evidently traced back the route followed by this patrol and resumed its position when the sentry was sighted. Here our patrol made contact on 5 May. From the above it can be assumed that the enemy is now aware of the route to this area used by our troops.
The presence of the enemy on the north side of the river is verified by the sighting opposite MARKHAM POINT of two sentries.
Further information has been received from native sources of enemy patrols north of the MARKHAM.
On 4 May a party of one officer and forty-nine other ranks was contacted at NGASAWAMPUM. They slept the night of 4/5 May at GABSONKEK, returning to NGASAWAMPUM for the night 5/6 May and moving back to LAE on 6 May. The party was armed with ten automatics, carried at the front of the party, the rest carrying rifles.
Reliable information was received in April that enemy patrols NGASAWAMPUM and NEW MUMUM-twice weekly.
Natives had previously reported in Feb a standing patrol of forty, relieved daily, at GABSONKEK. This patrol was abandoned on 21 Feb.
Fires observed north of the MARKHAM are probably of KANAKA origin, as in this and the next few months the natives burn off the kunai to hunt pigs and rats.

MADANG-RAMU AREA
The increase in enemy activity SW of MADANG is marked. The patrol to SEPU passed through MUSAK, thirty-two miles WNW of BOGADJIM and returned to MADANG on 3 May. Reports have also been received that the enemy has mapped the area KESAWAI to KARIPU, twenty-three miles SSW of BOGADJIM.
There is a rumour to the effect that bases are to be established at KEPSAU and KELAU twenty five miles west of BOGADJIM.
On 9 May a report was received at an outpost of BENA FORCE that two Japs had crossed the river at WAIMERIBA twenty four miles north of BENA BENA. On 10 May the same outpost, at WESA, was surprised by 15 Japs, the wireless set being captured. Our troops suffered no casualties but three Japs were killed.
The party was guided by WAIMERIBA natives and were dressed in dark green clothes and caps with little equipment. One LMG was carried, the rest being armed with rifles. They were last reported back at WAIMERIBA.
It is evident that the natives in this area cannot be trusted.
The treatment of the natives by the enemy is now much more considerate than in the past.
Further to the SE the Japs were reported at KAIGULIN and MUMBUM on 4 and 5 May. Soundings were taken of the GUSAP and RAMU rivers both of which were in flood. On 7 May the area was reported clear. This party may be the same as that which contacted our patrol on 10 May. Their activities bear out the previous report of survey operations.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

(b) SEA - ENEMY

Activity has been confined mainly to small craft along the NE coast and in the vicinity of CAPE GLOUCESTER and ROOKE ISLAND. Only normal shipping has been observed at RABAUL.

KAVIENG.

A large convoy, of 24,000 tons capacity was seen on 8 May twenty miles south of the west tip of NEW HANOVER ISLAND, travelling in a SE direction. Contact was lost after dark.

WEWAK.

Information on cargo handling obtained from a seaman PW is of interest. He stated that his ship entered WEWAK at 2000 hrs, and everyone worked frantically discharging deck cargo - provisions and materials - in under ten hours. A number of provisions were packed in watertight containers and dumped overboard to save time. The practice of loading stores into watertight drums which are off-loaded in the manner reported above has been in use from time to time since the BUNA operations.

MADANG.

On 8 May our aircraft attacked two vessels ten miles south of MADANG. Pilots reported that the entire deck of the larger ship, a vessel of 1,000 tons, was crowded with troops. This ship received three hits and was last seen sinking in flames. The second vessel, a tanker type of 400 tons and loaded with crates and trucks, was also hit and left burning. These two ships, which had come from the NW, had first been sighted on the 7 May, fifteen miles ESE of WEWAK.

Reinforcements to LAE-SALAMAUA.

A small cargo boat was reported to be unloading at SALAMAUA in the early hours of 8 May. Heavy weather was setting in and despite a special search later in the morning, this vessel could not be located.

Sightings of barges along the Northern coast of NEW BRITAIN have been more numerous than usual. On 8 May a barge containing supplies and fifteen armed and equipped troops, was strafed off the Southern tip of ROOKE Island. The following day, five barges loaded with bales, were in the same area being unloaded by approximately one hundred and fifty Japanese. These sightings indicate that the use of small craft from RABAUL along the northern coast of NEW BRITAIN, to ROOKE Island and via FINSCHAFFEN, is possibly one of the enemy's methods of reinforcing the LAE area.

At 1441 hrs 10 May a submarine was sighted forty miles south of GASMATA travelling SE. Lights had been observed the previous night in LAE harbour up to 2330 hrs. In order to reach the above position, a speed of fourteen knots would be required. The large I Type Jap submarine is reported to have a spped of 17 knots. It is probable that this submarine had visited LAE.

MILNE BAY.

An Allied vessel was attacked by a submarine south of MILNE BAY on 11 May. No hits were scored.

NW SECTOR.

Shipping sightings have been on a small scale. However, when taken in conjunction with reports of enemy land activity on the NW extremity of NEW GUINEA, they reinforce the indications of steady development in that sector. 9,500 tons of shipping were at MANOKWARI between 1 and 6 May, and a further 10,000 tons were observed there on 9 May. A sea-truck and several small vessels were sighted at SORONG.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 131)

(c) AIR - Own.

GREEN'S HILL - MUBO Area

On 6 and 7 May, three A 20s (Bostons) in support of our forward troops bombed and strafed enemy positions on the "PIMPLE".

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

On 10 and 11 May, attacks on the DRY CREEK BED were prevented by bad weather.
Barges in the LABU LAGOON area were attacked on 10 and 11 May by Bostons unable to attack DRY CREEK BED.

KOMIATUM
On 9 May, six A 20s bombed and strafed the village and its approaches. All bombs landed within a hundred yards of the huts.

AIR ATTACKS

WEWAK
Six B24s (Liberators) attacked shipping and installations on 5 May. Direct hits were scored on a 5,000 ton cargo vessel which was left burning and sinking.
On 9 May one B 24 bombed the airfield at BUT.

RABAUL
B17s (Fortresses) and B24s attacked VUNAKANAU airfield on 8 and 11 May. Detailed results were not observed but some fires were reported.

MADANG
Thirteen bombers attacked this area on 7 May, in addition to the attack on shipping reported on 9 May.
GASMATA, CAPE GLOUCESTER, FINSCHAFFEN were attacked in succession on 9,10 and 11 May by six B25s.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 121)

(c) AIR - Enemy.
MILNE BAY was raided on 10 May by two aircraft, no damage or casualties.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND.
An estimate of enemy movements and strengths is shown as Appendix "B".
It is now estimated that strength at WEWAK and MADANG has increased to 15,000 and 8,000 respectively

(NGF Summary 121)

5. EQUIPMENT.

JAPANESE TYPE 99 SHORT RIFLE (.303 Cal)

General
This rifle, except for a shorter barrel, a larger calibre and some improvements to the rear sight, closely resembles the standard infantry rifle, "MEIJI 38" (1905) model in appearance, operation and general design. Bolt action, dust cover, and safety catch on both weapons are apparently identical. Two readily identified additions have been made:-
A monopod has been attached (by an axis pin) to the outer band. When not in use, this can be raised forward and clipped on to the stop. This monopod is approximately 13 inches in length, and appears to be too long for use in the prone position.
A sling, made of rubberised canvas is attached to swivels positioned on the left side of the outer band and butt. The sling is thus actually attached to the side of the rifle and NOT underneath, as is normally the case.

Characteristics

| | |
|---|---|
| Calibre | 7.7 mm (.303 in) |
| Magazine capacity | 5 rounds |
| Weight of rifle (unloaded with sling) | 8.8 lbs |
| Overall length | 44 inches |
| Length of barrel | 25½ inches |
| Length of barrel and receiver | 32¾ inches |

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

| | |
|---|---|
| Rifling | RIGHT hand |
| Number of grooves | four |
| Twist | one complete turn in 10 inches. |
| Trigger pressure | 9 lbs. |

The rear sight is located approximately in the centre of the rifle, and is of the folding leaf type, fitted with a regular peep sight and a battle peep sight. Each has an aperture of $\frac{1}{8}$ inch diameter. The range scale extends from 300 to 1500 metres (328 to 1640 yards). No means are provided for correcting range or drift. A slide is fitted with two arms ( right and left) that may be swung outwards to a distance of two and three-eighths inches from the centre of the rifle. It is considered that these are probably used for AA fire.

Ammunition

It is stated that British and American .303 and .30 calibre ammunition will not fit this weapon, due to difference in cartridge case dimensions.

(Adapted from AMF Review 40)

## PART V

SECURITY

Much can be accomplished for "Security" throughout our forces by Unit Security Officers. The following may be of assistance to officers engaged in security duties in units.

They can accomplish much by constant vigilance, unremitting attention and frequent check on the numberous security questions that must and do arise daily.

Any unit security officer's first task is to promote the security thought in each officer's and OR's mind. This means that he must first realise how important it is that security should be as perfect as possible, and second, understand how breaches of security can be avoided, whether they be breaches of security of information, personnel, material or operations, and third, report at once all breaches of security.

Perhaps the best way to obtain his object is to carry out frequent discussions and make personal contact on security matters with officers of his unit. The enthusiasm of all officers must be aroused until they realize that security-mindedness among their men and the prevention of all breaches of security are just as important as their ability to use their weapons.

An example of the desired standard could be reached within the unit is shown by the following extract of a letter written by a soldier early in May:

> "I more or less censored my own letter. I mentioned "SMYTHES" unit and colour patch which combined with where I said he was, I reckoned it would not do, so cut it out."

Other ranks should be instructed by regular and frequent lecturettes, some by the security officer, but more so by platoon and company commanders. These must be supplemented by the continual individual efforts of platoon commanders and their personal example and exhortation.

(NGF Summary 121)

Captured Documents

The value of captured documents has again been borne out in the recent fighting in ARAKAN. This value is often of more than immediate operational significance and it is a fact that every bundle so far received at GHQ has yielded information beyond what is required at divisional or more forward headquarters in the field. Units cannot usually be made aware of what this information is, for various reasons, the information being too scanty, or affecting other operations only, or dealing with the Japanese Air Force, or concerned with economics or other matters, but it is essential that they should realize what a vital part this information plays in helping us to obtain information about, and so defeat, the Japanese.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

A most interesting example of how this "back" information may be built up, it exemplified by a notebook captured in BURMA from a soldier of 55 Division, which contained two addresses of friends with the Japanese Army in MANCHUKUO. This enabled intelligence in INDIA to definitely locate the 11 Jap Division in MANCHUKUO.

(AMF Intelligence Review 40)

Lt-Col
GS 3 Aust Div

Distribution:- See back

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

Distribution:

| | Copy No. |
|---|---|
| 17 Aust Inf Bde | 1 - 4 |
| 2/6 Aust Inf Bn Gp | 5 - 6 |
| WAU Fxd Defcences ) | |
| Sta Comd WAU ) | 7 |
| 2/3 Aust Indep Coy | 8 |
| 2/7 Aust Indep Coy | 9 |
| 1 Bty 2/1 Aust Fd Regt ) | |
| 2/6 Aust Svy Bty ) | 10 |
| 156 Lt AA Bty | 11 |
| BENA FORCE | 12 |
| 11 Fighter Control Sub-sec | 13 |
| 708 CA (AA) Bty US Army | 14 |
| RAE 3 Aust Div | 15 |
| Sigs 3 Aust Div | 16 |
| AASC 3 Aust Div | 17 |
| 2/2 Aust Fd Amb | 18 |
| 3 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp | 19 |
| HQ ANGAU MARKHAM District | 20 |
| Sta Comd BULOLO | 21 |
| Air Sp Control 5 AF | 22 |
| ALO A fl 4 AC Sqn | 23 |
| NGF ) | 24 |
| 4 Aust Inf Bde ) for infm | 25 |
| 15 Aust Inf Bde ) | 26 |
| Comd | 27 |
| AA&QMG | 28 |
| ADMS ) | |
| ADOS ) | 29 |
| ADME ) | |
| File | 30 - 31 |
| War Diary | 32 |
| Spare | 33 - 34 |

After perusal, please destroy by fire.

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| ADMS ) | |
| ADOS ) | 29 |
| ADME ) | |
| File | 30 - 31 |
| War Diary | 32 |
| Spare | 33 - 34 |

After perusal, please destroy by fire.

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Appx 'A'
to 3 Aust Div
Int Summary
No 4.

# SKETCH of MUBO - GREEN HILL AREA.

showing enemy movement LABABIA to MUBO
25 Apr - 12 May

Scale 4" = 1 Mile.




AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

Appendix "B" to 3 Aust Div
Intelligence Summary No 4.

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND STRENGTHS
AS AT 12 MAY 43

1. Enemy Movement
An examination of enemy troops movements observed on the L of C from 20 Apr to 12 May shows that the enemy has received approximately 200 reinforcements to the MUBO area, after subtracting casualties inflicted on the L of C. Allowing for movement, unobserved, during the hours of darkness or nil observation, this figure could be increased to 300.
These reinforcements were undoubtedly moved up to MUBO.

2. From an examination of sightings by our troops the position would appear to be as follows:-

At 7 May the enemy had a coy in the GREEN HILL area, with a further coy disposed on OBSERVATION HILL and to the rear. It is estimated that a further 2 coys would be in reserve.
Two coys of reinforcements arriving, enabled the forward positions on LABABIA RIDGE to be built up and reinforced, after the casualties suffered, to two coy strength.
It must be remembered however, that these troops are possibly a SNLP whose organization is elastic, and may not be subdivided as above.
Strength on the SALAMAUA - KOMIATUM L of C is considered to be now that of a weak coy - approximately 100.

Enemy Strengths

3. MUBO.
Considered at MUBO - KOMIATUM and on L of C to SALAMAUA, 4 Mar 43:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| MAIZEKU No. 2 SNLP | 800 | | |
| Coy SASEBO No. 5 SNLP | 200 | | |
| Reinforcements to 12 May | 300 | | 1300 |
| Less known casualties since 4 Mar | | 223 | |
| Plus 50% for wounded and uncounted | | 112 | 335 |
| | | | 965 |
| Of these estimate on SALAMAUA-KOMIATUM L of C | | | 100 |
| Estimated MUBO - KOMIATUM | | | 865 |

4. DUALI
On 4 May the enemy were encountered on BITOI OVERFLOW two miles from the mouth . This was undoubtedly an outpost of the force believed to have occupied DUALI - NASSAU BAY having evacuated KUI and MOROBE further south.

NGF estimate on 8 May 460

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6. SALAMAUA
Enemy strength was estimated at 4 Mar 43 to be 1630.
However, owing to the ease with which troops can be transferred from LAE, this figure should be read in conjunction with the estimate at LAE.

| | |
|---|---|
| Estimate 12 May 43 | 1630 |

7. LAE

| | |
|---|---|
| The estimate at 6 Mar 43 was : | 2400 |
| Later indications were that remnants of the force which attacked WAU (OKABE DET) were quartered at L/E. Estimated | 600 |
| | 3000 |
| Less reinforcements to the MUBO AREA | 300 |
| Estimate 18 May 43 | 2700 |

8. Distribution of troops AS AT 12 May 43 is, therefore, estimated as follows:-

| | |
|---|---|
| MUBO - KOMIATUM and SALAMAUA L of C. | 985 |
| DUALI | 460 |
| SALAMAUA | 1630 |
| LAE | 2700 |
| | 5755 |

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

...ust be taken forward
...Battalion HQ.

Copy No...1.....

3 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 3.

Compiled from information received up to 1[illegible]00 hrs 6 May 43.

PART I.

1. General

Enemy activity throughout the week indicates a continuance of the policy of firmly establishing his bases along the NE coast of NEW GUINEA. The volume of shipping to this area has been maintained at a high level, and patrol activity from the coast inland has increased.
Concurrent with this development RABAUL is assuming a lesser degree of importance as a forward base.

2. Operations. - Land

(a)

MUBO AREA
On 2 May our troops unsuccessfully attacked enemy positions on the PIMPLE; our casualities 4 killed 10 wounded, enemy 3 killed 3 wounded. Since 2 May our troops have been actively patrolling OBSERVATION HILL, GARRISON HILL and the WOODY ISLAND areas. Enemy on the PIMPLE is reported to be well dug in and armed with 8 LMGs 2 MMGs and some mortars.

MISSIM AREA
On 2 May our troops attacked BOBDUBI forcing 36 enemy to evacuate the forward defensive position. Our troops then consolidated on the BOBDUBI RIDGE. The enemy in BOBDUBI actively engaged our troops with MMGs, Mortars, and grenades. On the morning 4 May our troops ambushed 134 native carriers escorted by small party of Japs, followed closely by 3 parties each of 14 armed Japs, moving from the direction KOMIATUM towards SALAMAUA. Enemy casualities estimated 15 killed. The natives when MMG opened fire immediately went bush. On the afternoon same day the ambush fired on Jap party of 30 moving south towards KOMIATUM. Enemy casualities 10 killed.

DUALI - NASSAU BAY AREA
Our patrol which moved from MUBO area on the morning 3 May towards DUALI was fired upon by enemy mortars, MMGs and LMGs 4 May. Our patrol then withdrew to the BITOI - BUYAWIM river junction on the night 4/5 May.
This patrol detained two natives from the DUALI area, whom upon interrogation revealed that Japs had impressed a line of natives from their village. The impressed natives were being moved to mouth of FRANCISCO river where they would pick up cargo and carry same to MUBO area via KOMIATUM

SALAMAUA. The natives also stated that SALAMAUA was visited nightly by a submarine which offloaded rice and other food commodities.

MARKHAM AREA.
Our troops carried out active patrolling period 1 May to 3 May. They made no contact with the enemy. On the morning 4 May one of our patrols moved towards MARKHAM POINT and contacted enemy on the afternoon same day area DEEP CREEK; our casualities one wounded; enemy casualities one killed.

LAE AREA.
Activity noticed in this area indicated routine maintenance of aerodrome and other permanent installations.

SAIDOR.
Periodic bombing and strafing of the beaches and villages on

Copy 3 to 2/5 Bn } 7/5/43.
4 2/7 Bn }

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

the RAI coast is thought to be causing the natives to proceed inland. Observation in this area is becoming increasingly difficult, and it is reported that the whole coast west of the NANKINA River is completely dominated by the enemy. Natives have been told by the enemy that any help given to our observer parties will result in death to the natives concerned and further reprisals against their families and villages. Enemy patrolling is becoming more active and in greater strength. Our patrols are not strong enough to deal with them, and it is possible that they may have to be temporarily withdrawn further inland.

(NGF Summary No. 120)

MADANG - RAMU RIVER

Inland penetration from MADANG and BOGADJIM areas towards the RAMU by enemy patrols is being maintained and apparently increased. It would appear that the enemy is keen to reconnoitre existing tracks and routes south towards the RAMU, either for the purpose of following the river south-east towards the MARKHAM Valley or finding southerly routes across the river into the rich Mt HAGEN-BENA BENA Plateau.
Natives report the presence of Japanese in the villages of KESA, MADALOI and KOBA, to which the natives have been forced to return in order to be kept under surveillance. Reports state further that natives from this area are being employed breaking stones for a road from BOGADJIM to TOBA, about six miles SE along the coast from BOGADJIM.
The enemy has also been sighted in a small party, approximately twenty, at SEPU, about 40 miles west of BOGADJIM on the north bank of the RAMU. They arrived on 30 Apr and departed the following day without making any attempt to cross the RAMU. Their treatment of the natives seems to have taken a turn for the better as the OC is reported to have told the natives they would not take food, but wanted it brought to them. SEPU is the furthest reported point of navigability up to RAMU.

SEPIK RIVER.

The enemy are alleged to have surveyed the airfield sites at CHIMBRIAN and KAMBRINDO 40 and 16 miles west of ANGORAM respectively. Reports from natives considered to be reliable are that those areas were clear of enemy on 29 Apr but that a visit will soon be made to KUVINMAS Lake area. Mission sisters and priests of MARUI MISSION were interrogated by the enemy at TIMBUNKE and informed that they would be collected at a later date and taken to WEWAK.

(NGF Summary No. 120)

GOODENOUGH ISLAND.

A patrol to the ARAPHLETT ISLANDS in search of enemy survivors has returned. No enemy were located but some Japanese equipment was found.

(NGF Summary No. 120)

(b) SEA - ENEMY

fewer

Bad weather during the week hampered our aerial reconnaissance in the NE sector and reports of shipping sightings in this region have been further than usual. It must not be forgotten however that the enemy plans his convoy movements to take full advantage of conditions of bad weather and poor visability.

RABAUL.

Photographs of RABAUL on 1 May showed the following vessels in the harbour:-

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

1 light cruiser
1 destroyer
2 patrol boats
5 submarines
4 auxiliary craft
29 merchant vessels
totalling 155,600 tons

KAVIENG.
Sightings indicate that this port continues to be used on a moderate scale, chiefly as a stage on the enemy's L of C to RABAUL or WEWAK. Two cargo vessels aggregating 7000 tons were seen SW of KAVIENG on 27 Apr and on the 3 May a 12000 ton tanker escorted by a destroyer was sighted in the same area. On 30 Apr photographs revealed a convoy of ten ships averaging about 5000 tons each moving south through STEFFEN Straits.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 120)

WEWAK.
A steady stream of shipping continues to use this port, where the enemy maintains at least 30 or 40 unloading barges in order to turn ships round as quickly as possible. Photographs on 3 May revealed 75 barges, a record concentration.
At least 16 ships totalling 85000 tons visited WEWAK during the week. The only escorting vessels observed were a light cruiser and a destroyer off the port on 1 May at the same time as 5 cargo ships totalling 35/40000 tons were stationary in the roadsteads.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 120)

NW SECTOR
Reports of shipping movements since 20 Apr indicate unhurried but steady development of bases at many points in this area. Our reconnaissance revealed shipping at AMBON, KOEPANG, MANOKWARI and at WAREN 45 miles to the south of MANOKWARI, when the largest concentration of eight ships was seen. Two convoys of three ships each were also observed.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 120)

AUSTRALIA
Between 24 Apr and 4 May, five allied ships have been sunk by submarines off the east coast of AUSTRALIA.

(NGF Summary 120)

(c) AIR

(1) Own

DIRECT SUPPORT

Bostons carried out their direct support missions against the enemy ambush position on GREEN HILL. Ground forces reported the bombing to be accurate, but that the enemy avoided casualties by moving forward towards our own troops upon the approach of our aircraft.

GASMATA

Medium bombers on 3 May heavily strafed the airfield, buildings, dumps, small boats and plantation areas in addition to attacks by single aircraft on two other occasions.

WEWAK

The following day WEWAK was heavily bombed, two or three direct hits being scored on the stern of a 5,000 ton cargo vessel which was left listing. Hits were also possibly made on a second vessel.
Tracks were strafed and villages bombed along the RAI coast, while aircraft on reconnaissance strafed barges on the north coast of NEW BRITAIN. FINSCHHAFEN, LAE and MADANG were also attacked by reconnaissance bombers, some damage being inflicted.

(Adapted from NGF, Summary 120)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

(2) Enemy

Enemy air activity over NE NEW GUINEA has been limited to possible reconnaissance over the WAU - BULOLO area on 1 and 3 May.

DARWIN was raided in the early hours of 2 May by 29 medium bombers and 25/30 fighters. The target was the RAAF airfield but only slight damage to buildings resulted and the only casualty was one wounded. The enemy lost 3 fighters for certain, 5 probably and 4 fighters and one bomber damaged. Our losses were 14 aircraft, of which 4 are believed to have crashed into the sea out of fuel.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 120)

## PART II

1. Enemy OOB.

Air:

The enemy air strength in the NE sector is estimated to have increased from 412 as at 26 Apr to 453 on 2 May. This is made up of an increase of 41 planes in the SOLOMONS, together with a transfer of 14 planes from RABAUL to NEW GUINEA. In the NW sector, it is estimated that there has been an increase of 8 in the enemy strength.

(Adapted from NGF Summary 120)

4. Organization.

The following list has been prepared to furnish a ready guide to strengths of various units of the Japanese Forces. These totals are estimates, and as such, will need to be revised as more up to date information becomes available.

| | |
|---|---|
| Infantry Regiment | 3,306 |
| Regimental Signals | 71 |
| Regimental Gun Company | 121 |
| Regimental Tank Attack Unit | 112 |
| Infantry Battalion | 984 |
| Infantry Rifle Company | 191 |
| Infantry Rifle platoon | 56 |
| Infantry LMG/Rifle Section | 14 |
| Infantry Grenade Discharger Section | 12 |
| Infantry MG Company | 140 |
| Infantry Battalion Gun platoon | 50 |

(NGF Summary 119)

9. General

Extract from PW interrogation report 7 Jan 43.

"The attitude of this PW is one of constant wariness. The slighest indication of direct interrogation produces a change of expression and a cessation of information. This, together with the fact that the last aerial map captured is stamped with a rubber stamp 'Secret. Not to be taken into the Air', and combined with an admission by PW that he had not intended to take it with him on the flight, conveys the impression that there has been considerable improvement in security since previous PW was interrogated. When this P was told that his map had been found, he denied that it co d have been his, as he had not taken one with him. It is therefore assumed that the Japanese have become aware of t fact that prisoners are being taken and are proving a sour of information to the enemy, and have tightened up securit generally."

(AAF Summary 98)

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PART V

Security.

Censorship.

The following is an extract from a letter intercepted by Censorship:-

"Your last letter was somewhat mutilated which seemd to indicate a somewhat strict censorship, but here are a few things that illustrate how lax that censor was and the extent to which you perhaps unknowingly gave away vital information, or rather made available vital information to anyone trained in map reading or such. To start with you said clocks were advanced each day. That indicates easterly travel. The advance was half an hour. That indicates seven and half degrees of longtitude covered each day which would mean about 500 miles travel per day easterly. You crossed the Equator on a certain day mentioned - indicates northerly as well as easterly travel, hence distance travelled per day was quite a bit more than 500 miles. You crossed the International Date Line on a Wednesday. That places you very closely on that day when used with foregoing information. The ship was air-conditioned. Coffee was in full supply (USA?). You had some difficulty in finding your way about the ship. With no other information to go on these facts coupled with the fact that we had a letter from some port reached early in the trip, the following story can be pieced together. Large modern vessel, most likely of American registry, fast (at least 20 knots). First call NZ thence N Easterly with N. America the obvious destination. Let that be a warning to you. I wish I could warn the censor also. The information he cut out was nothing compared to that supplied by the details mentioned. Of course we are not all map readers but people selected to gather information should understand adjustments of LMT (Local Mean Time) because of change of Longtitude. I took the liberty of mentioning your letter and these facts to the map school when giving a lecture on time variation, at the same time making it a little lesson on security for good measure".

(HQ Q'land L of C Int Report No. 53.)

Comment. This extract is not only of interest as an example of deductive reasoning but is a lesson in Security. It shows just what unconsidered trifles may mean to trained minds of Enemy Intelligence.

(AMF Weekly Int Review No. 39)

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# 3 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.2

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 30 Apr 43

Commander
Comd
Bde
Bde
Bde
I

## PART I

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRENGTHS.

(a) LAND

The enemy has shown increased activity in the SALAMAUA-MUBO area and a number of native carriers escorted by small parties of Japs have been moving along the SALAMAUA-KOMIATUM track. There have been conflicting reports with regard to the food position in the SALAMAUA area, but enemy troops encountered by our patrols are stated to be in good physical condition.

The enemy are reported to have occupied 3 villages SOUTH along the coast from the BITOI OVERFLOW to NASSAU BAY and are thought to be supplied by small craft from SALAMAUA.

(b) SEA,

Photographic reconnaissance of RABAUL over the last month have shown that the average tonnage of shipping in this important base has fallen considerably.

Quite apart from the resultant decrease in the amount of shipping required in the NE area following the withdrawal from the SOLOMONS, it is obvious that a considerable portion of shipping which formerly used RABAUL is now using the NE coast ports of WEWAK/HANSA BAY and MADANG. In addition, further use is being made of KAVIENG as a staging base.

(NGF Int Summary 119)

(c) AIR

The lull in offensive enemy air activity continues. A large drop in the number of aircraft based in NEW BRITAIN has been revealed by photographs covering his principal bases. This is extraordinary when one considers the elaborate concentrations that took place in NEW BRITAIN immediately prior to their limited air offensive which commenced on the 12th of April. It may be that many of the aircraft used during that offensive were carrier-borne but temporarily land-based, and have now returned to their carriers which have been withdrawn into more NORTHERN waters to nullify any counter-offensive by the allied air forces against the NEW BRITAIN bases. Actually one of the aircraft used in the raid on PT MORESBY has been definitely identified as carrier-borne.

(NGF Int Summary No 119)

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) Land - Own and Enemy.

MUBO-KOMIATUM-SALAMAUA

Reported 2/5/43

On the morning 24 April our troops attacked an enemy ambush position in the MUBO area. The attack was partially successful and contact was again made on the following day 25 April, but the enemy were not dislodged. The enemy dispositions were strongly defended in depth and in the two days operations in this area, three of the enemy were killed. Our patrols penetrated the enemy position on 28 April but were later forced out by a strong enemy force. The enemy were contacted on the main SALAMAUA-KOMIATUM track on the afternoon 24 April and our troops opened fire taking the enemy by surprize killing 18. Our casualties nil.

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During the morning of 27 April our patrol engaged the enemy on the south bank of the FRANCISCO RIVER and the enemy withdrew leaving two dead. Our casualities nil.
LABABIA OP was overrun by the enemy on the evening 25 April but was later re-established by our own troops.
An enemy position was contacted one mile SOUTH of KOMIATUM on the main KOMIATUM track 27 April. Our patrol attacked on the following day 28 April killing 8. The enemy are reported to be well dug in and has placed booby traps around the same position.
The enemy shelled VICKERS RIDGE area on 28 Apr and a total of 20 shells were fired. Of these, two rounds were smoke, two unexploded.
On 29 Apr 10 shells were fired in the area NORTH of MUBO strip, 4 rounds were unobserved and one failed to explode.

SALAMAUA TOWN AREA.

On the 24 Apr a body of troops approximately 110, were observed moving along the peninsula Rd. Movement has been observed around O'DEA'S house on the 26/27 Apr and two-way MT movement along the quarry-cemetery road continued throughout the past week.

The BURNS PHILP jetty is thought to have been destroyed by our aircraft. The enemy are reported to have constructed a new road from LETTU to the highest point on the peninsula of an estimated width of 6 feet.
During the afternoon of 29 April a small but fierce fire was observed near the overhanging tree on the isthmus. A BOBDUBI native report states that the LUTHERAN CHURCH at LOGUI near the north end of the SALAMAUA strip is occupied by the enemy from dusk each night.

DUALI-LABABIA ISLAND-NASSAU BAY.

28 Apr a patrol moved EAST from MUBO area along the track just south of the BITOI OVERFLOW to 825834 ref map SALAMAUA revised. The patrol crossed the OVERFLOW at 805837 and moved west to 771847, then to feature in square 7584. The patrol reports that no enemy troops or natives were seen and that no tracks exist either south from the OVERFLOW or north from the BITOI RIVER.

LAE.

Lorry movement continues. On 24 April, MT from HEATHS to LAE and on 25 Apr around the TERRACE NW along the MARKHAM RD. Further activity by lorries on 25 April was reported NE from LAE to area NE of MT LUNAMAN. 3 canoes were observed moving up the MARKHAM RIVER from vicinity MT MISANUM to BWARIP on 22 April but the occupants were obscured by sails. Considerable barge movements have taken place between LAE-LABU and LAE-MALAHANG WRECK.
A party of 30 men were reported working on the airfield during the morning 24 April.

BOGIA-NUBIA.

It has been stated that some INDIAN and MALAYAN prisoners are being used in this area, probably improving the airfield at NUBIA, and repairing roads and bridges. It is also said that enemy aircraft are not permanently based at NUBIA and only visit there prior to the arrival of shipping at HANSA BAY. A patrol recently from ARNAMBERG down the RAU RIVER states that the general relation between the Japanese and natives are friendly. The natives are not being ill-treated and are being paid by the Japanese in coin and paper money.

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Continuous bombing has caused most of the beach natives to "go bush" and this may have the desired result of disorganizing enemy labour lines. The majority of natives are reported still loyal to our observers and patrols in this area and have denied information of their whereabouts and have refused to show road and tracks to the enemy.

(NGF Int Summary 119)

WEWAK AREA.

It would appear that the main road referred to as completed from the mouth of the RAMU to ULINGAN has been further extended. Native reports indicate that this road runs from WEWAK to MADANG. MT has been reported on the road, and if this is so, movement of troops and supplies will no doubt be made by road from WEWAK and BOGIA to MADANG, and thence by barge and small craft to LAE-SALAMAUA.
Enemy activity on the SEPIK has shown an increase and interest in the area between the coast and the river has sharpened. BURUI has been visited and the enemy is expected to be in occupation "within a few weeks". Japanese penetration upstream as far as MURUI has been effected, and this place too, is expected to be garrisoned within the same period. Enemy air reconnaissance of the SEPIK has been observed and it is apparent that the force at WEWAK is not intended to remain purely as a static coastal place.

(NGF Int Summary 119)

(b) SEA - ENEMY.

WEWAK. After the complicated shipping movements of the previous week, there has been a lull in enemy sea activity. The following ships were at anchorage on 23 April -

4 small cargo vessels
3 coasters
2 large power boats
32 barges.

With the exception of small cargo vessels, photographs reveal that all of these were still there on 26 April. An aircraft on 24 April reported a convoy of 7 ships in position 270 miles north AITAPE, on a course WNW. It comprised:-

2 destroyers
3 - 12000 ton cargo vessels
2 - 5000 ton transports.

Three bombing runs were made but no hits were scored. Later the ships were reported to be off MINDANAO in the PHILLIPINES.

MADANG-HUON GULF AREA.

On 19 April, a 10,000 ton cargo ship and a small vessel probably a "sea-truck" was sighted off FINSCHAFFEN and two days later what were probably the same two ships were 15 miles NE of the SEPIK RIVER mouth and moving WEST. Next day, a damaged 1000 ton cargo vessel was observed at the Government Wharf, MADANG. Four barges were nearby. On 23 April, 2 small ships, one of 80 feet and the other of 50 feet were at sea off HOPOI.
It is still possible that supplies are being moved into LAE by submarines, which use the MALAHANG WRECK as a landing stage at night. Barges are frequently seen moving between the wreck and LAE. On 20 April, a reliable source reported suspected submarines in LAE harbour. The same day two vessels, stated to be not unlike submarines were sighted near a buoy in SALAMAUA harbour.

(NGF Int Summary 119)

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(c) AIR - OWN.

Direct Support.

4 beaufighters straffed KONIATUM track and the surrounding area on 23 April with unobserved results. The enemy ambush position on GREEN HILL (HUBO area) was attacked on 4 successive days 24/27 April and reports from ground troops state that bombing and straffing was most accurate.

Strikes and Armed Reconnaissances.

23 April 43. One Liberator scored a direct hit and one near miss on an 8/10,000 ton cargo vessel 60 miles SSE KAVIENG. Smoke rose to 3000 feet and the vessel was last sighted on fire and sinking.

RAI COAST.

24 April 43, one Liberator bombed SINGOR village. The villages of BILIAU, BUMBI and SINGOR were straffed by single recce aircraft.

WEWAK.

25 April Fortresses bombed the airfield. Bombs were scored on both ends of the runway and also in the dispersal areas. Small fires were started.

LAE.

26 April. Liberators attacked the airfield.

LABU.

26 April. Beaufighters heavily straffed the barge hideout in LABU lagoon.

FINSCHAFFEN.

Single aircraft bombed airfield and town area on four occasions. Some damage to buildings resulted and a number of fires were started.

INTERCEPTION.

24 April. One Liberator was intercepted by 10/12 enemy fighters over WEWAK. The ensuing combat lasted for 30 minutes and 5 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

(d) AIR - ENEMY

Enemy offensive air effort has been negligible. Single aircraft only have been employed in each of three raids, which combined, produced one fatal allied casualty and three wounded. No damage to installations or equipment resulted. Two bombs were dropped on DONA on 23 April, and on the same day a float plane dropped a single bomb and made two straffing runs over small ships over Cape WARD-HUNT. Neither vessel was damaged. Again at 0245K/27 April a single aircraft dropped 4 bombs in MOROBE harbour. No casualities or damage resulted. A recconaissance aircraft was over MORESBY on 24 April and another was reported over WAIGANI on the 24 April. Both of these aircraft were estimated to be at an altitude of 3000 feet.

(Adapted from NGF Int Summary 112)

## PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

A PW has stated that a paratroop unit approximately 500 strong was at RABAUL on 21 November 42 and still there on 28 February 43. It is known as the SHIMIZU Butai and the commander was thought to be Lt-col SHIMIZU.

There have been recent reports of fluctuations of enemy strengths in the HUBO-SALAMAUA-DUALI areas, but in the absence of substantial information it is not at present possible to make a re-estimate of strength.

A recent report stated that 50 tanks were seen on the WEST side of the RABAUL-KOKOPO Rd. These are said to be new and

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bearing the army insignia of the 5 pointed star.

2. EQUIPMENT.

In the raid on MORESBY on 12 April 43, the enemy made use of a new type of incendiary bomb. A detailed report is not yet to hand but preliminary description is as follows:-

The bomb was a 250 kg (approximately 561 lbs). height about 5'6" and painted battleship grey with a red band on the tail fin. The bomb casing was of poor quality, cast steel, ranging from 1 inch thick at the nose to less than ½ inch toward the tail fin.

The usual burster charge was fitted into the nose and detonated by an impact fuse. An elaborate clockwork fuse was fitted into the tail and set to burst approximately 200 feet above the ground. This would then scatter approximately 700 incendiary pellets in all directions up to several hundred yards. The individual pellett was made of iron piping 2.7 inches long and 1.1 inches in diameter, filled with an incendiary material apparently electron metal impregnated with a rubber composition. The method of ignition is not clear, but the mixture possibly contains an igniting compound similar to potassium chlorate. This is the most efficient type of incendiary bomb so far used by the Japanese and is of extreme danger because of its anti-personnel effect. The best method of extinguishing the pellet is to cover with sand or dirt or else isolate and allow to burn out.

(NGF Int Summary 119)

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3 AUST DIV.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.1.

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 22 Apr 43.

PART 1.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRENGTHS.

(a) LAND:

General dispositions of both forces in the SALAMAUA-MUBO area remain unchanged. During night 21/22 APR a successful raid on KOMIATUM was carried out by our forces who killed 20 enemy. Another patrol moving towards the BITOI mouth was in contact with the enemy 21/22 APR.

Activity observed along the SALAMAUA-KOMIATUM track on 19/20 APR coincided with small craft activity in SAMOA Harbour. Reports from native sources suggest that the carrier line to KOMIATUM is only sufficient to support about 300 troops on a very low scale of rations. However the movement observed on 19/20 APR along the KOMIATUM track was considerably more than this native report suggests.

Although at present it appears that the LAE-SALAMAUA garrison is hard pressed for supplies, it can be accepted that the enemy's difficulties in this respect may soon be relieved. The continual development of bases along the northwest coast will ultimately provide a supply line for both rations and reinforcements.

(b) SEA:

Reports of shipping in the WEWAK area have been somewhat conflicting, however it is probable that enemy shipping to this area since the end of FEB aggregates approx 138,000 tons. This tonnage could carry 20,500 troops; but it is unlikely that all vessels were used as troop transports, particularly in view of the heavy construction work which has taken place in this area, coupled with the necessity of building up supply reserves. Itis considered probable that the convoys of 14 MAR 25 MAR and 13 MAR brought approx 11,000 troops.

(Adapted from NGF Int Summary No 118)

(c) AIR:

Scale of effort by both forces has been less than during the previous week. Enemy reconnaissance aircraft, however have been active, having been reported over WAU, BULOLO, MORESBY and MILNE BAY.

Enemy concentrations of aircraft remain at their recent high level. Further heavy strikes against Allied bases must be expected.

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) LAND - OWN and ENEMY.

DUALI-LABABIA ISLAND-NASSAU BAY.

The belief that the enemy are in occupation of villages between DUALI and NASSAU BAY is supported by the air report of an apparent telephone line visible along the track leading from DUALI to NASSAU BAY. This line also appears to cross the mouth of the small stream entering NASSAU BAY at LW7987.

Report from native sources states that the area of SACHEN BAY (6 miles south of DUALI) is sown with anti-personnel mines, particularly in the vicinity of CAPE ROOM. This information has not been confirmed from local sources.

On 19 APR a lugger which was reported approaching LABABIA ISLAND was later reported moving from the island to the shore. Air recce has been unable to observe movement on LABABIA IS although trenches have been observed on the

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

southwest tip of the island. A square structure on the SW side of the island appears to be made of iron, and is apparently not of native origin.

On 21 APR a patrol moving along the BITOI towards the sea twice encountered the enemy. On the second occasion two enemy were killed without loss to ourselves.

MUBO-KOMIATUM-SALAMAUA.

Ref map SALAMAUA 1inch - a patrol from MAT MAT reced VIALS Track from(685945 OBSERVATION HILL to MISSIM discovering a possible enemy OP overlooking MISSIM/ A track from the vicinity of this OP ran east in the direction of KOMIATUM.

General dispositions in area OBSERVATION HILL-KITCHEN CK-LABABIA RIDGE have remained unchanged during the past week, but active reconnaissance has been carried out by our patrols.

During night 21/22 APR a patrol from our forces based in theMISSIM area staged a raid on KOMIATUM resulting in the killing of twenty enemy without loss to ourselves.

On 20 APR considerable movement of small craft about SAMOA Hbr was observed throughout the day and two vessels not unlike submarines were sighted during the afternoon. On 19 and 20 APR several parties, numbering approx 20 each time , were observed moving along the track SALAMAUA-KOMIATUM. It has been observed on previous occasions that sightings of persons moving by day and light flashing by night along the KOMIATUM track has coincided with increased harbour activity.

According to native report, carrying from SALAMAUA to KOMIATUM is now done by a line of 30 carriers on Wednesdays and Saturdays. They leave the FRANCISCO River at 1500 hrs, arriving at KOMIATUM after dark. The line from KOMIATUM to MUBO does the return trip the following day.

LAE:

Lorry activity in the LAE area has increased. On 17 APR 10 lorries came from the NE to a point near the wharves. Nine of the lorries were seen later travelling NW along the MARKHAM Rd. One lorry came from a dump area on the SW corner of the drome, and this also went up the MARKHAM Rd. Two other lorries were seen in the wharf area.

On 19 APR, 18 lorries were seen moving NW along the MARKHAM Rd, having apparently come from the TERRACE area.

It is not known if these vehicles went to HEATHS or were moving personnel or materials to the new defence works now being constructed at JACOBSENS or EMERYS. A new clearing has appeared in the ar a 275 yds NW of EMERYS, and kunai fires have been noticed in the area on 17 and 20 APR.

Lorries have also been active in the drome area. On 17 APR lorries were noticed bringing material from a dispersal bay area on the NE corner of the runway. This material was being carted to the site of the former drome HQ previously destroyed by our A/C. On 21 APR lorry activity was again noticed from the same dispersal area, this time to AA defences SW of drome where four new gun posns were reported by our A/C the same day.

As gravel is available from nearby pits, it is suggested that timber was being carted from the bush beyond the dispersal bay, to be used in the construction of a possible new underground drome HQ, and for the protection of the AA posns against our bombing attacks.

The normal barge activity was noticed until 15 APR, when the MALAHANG wreck became the focal point for barge traffic and continued as such until 19 APR. Personnel were taken out in the barges to the wreck. During this time barges made frequent visits to the wreck, usually returning to LAE.

The main coastal barge traffic was between LAE and LABU. Between 15 and 17 APR seven barges were seen to move from LAE, and one from MALAHANG to LABU. Eight barges returned during this period to LAE. These barges were observed moving in daylight and there is no information as to possible traffic at night.

No transport planes have been observed landing supplies at LAE since 20 MAR, and it is thought that essential supplies are being maintained by submarines using the MALAHANG wreck as a landing stage at night.

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HANSA BAY-BOGIA-NUBIA.

This section of the north coast is becoming another focal point like WEWAK, and it would appear that the enemy intends developing BOGIA per medium of shipping into HANSA BAY and by air transport to NUBIA. Extensive installations at NUBIA and BOGIA, including ten barrage or observation balloons at each place, have been observed, These balloons may be intended purely as observation mediums, but ten at each place would be hardly r quired, and it is thought that they may be for either airfield or harbour protection.

Native reports, which have been corroborated by eyewitnesses, state that the "main road" has been completed, all rivers bridged, and is now being used by MT. The section of the coastal road to which this report refers is not clear, but it would appear that it is the stretch between the RAMU R mouth and ULIGAN. Further details are being obtained.

Large concentrations of Japanese are reported at all plantations in this area, whilst troops and supplies are stated to be going forward to MADANG daily.

WEWAK.

The apparent quietness of the Japanese force at WEWAK (estimated strength 12,000 troops) has suddenly been dispelled by reports of patrols into the hinterland to YAMIL, MAPRIK and BUKUI, and a river patrol which proceeded upstream as far as KAMINDIBIT, and then returned to TIMBUNKE.

An observer in this area has reported rumours from KAMINDIBIT, which are considered to be reliable , of the projected visit of naval vessels and a high Japanese officer up the SEPIK within the next few weeks. It is also said that preparations to garrison all tracks between WEWAK and the SEPIK R. are being made. Obviously this reconnaissance is because of Japanese apprehension regarding their southern flank and the garrisoning of the routes between WEWAK and the river will have the effect of keeping our patrols, the existence of which the enemy is well aware, at arms length.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

(b) SEA - ENEMY.

WEWAK and HANSA BAY.

A determined attempt, on a larger scale than usual, has been made to reinforce this area.

Over the period 12/16 APR, a force of six merchant vessels totalling 25/30,000 tons and escorted by three destroyers, endeavoured to unload supplies, both at WEWAK and HANSA BAY. In the late afternoon of 12 APR, this force had reached HANSA BAY and begun unloading. Just before midnight, it was attacked by our bombers, which hit two ships, and the force at once put out to sea. Fourteen hours later it was located forty miles to the NW. It was next reported on 15 APR in the vicinity WEWAK, about to enter the harbour. Late that night it was again bombed, and four ships were hit. Once again the force was seen putting to sea, and ten hours later four vessels were reported sixty miles to the NE, steering north.

It is considered that this convoy could not have spent, at the most, more than a total of thirty-six hours in port unloading. An unusually large number of fighter aircraft were in the area; and the enemy's keenness to avoid our bombers was shown also by the fact that each time they were attacked they put to sea at once.

In addition to this convoy, 13/15,000 tons of shipping were observed at WEWAK and HANSA BAY between 12/16 APR and had sufficient time to unload.

On 18 APR, a photographic reconnaissance revealed one 8,000 ton cargo vessel with a barge alongside, evidently unloading. A number of smaller vessels were also seen, in addition to coastal vessels, luggers, two large power boats, and upwards of twenty-five barges. On 19 APR, a small convoy was sighted entering WEWAK Harbour from the NW, and an hour later it had begun unloading into barges. According to photographs, it comprised-

1 x 8,000 ton merchant vessel.
2 x 1,000 " " "
3 coasters.

It is estimated therefore, that the total of merchant tonnage moved into WEWAK between 12/19 APR, was 65/70,000 tons. Of this, at least 34,000 tons were hit or sunk during the same period.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

(c) AIR- OWN.

WEWAK and HANSA BAY.

On 14 APR, Fortresses skip bombed a 5/6,000 ton cargo vessel, scoring three direct hits; in addition the vessel was heavily strafed and left burning. Anti-aircraft positions around the foreshore were also bombed and strafed.

Heavy bombers on 15 APR made a heavy low level attack on shipping. A 6/8,000 ton cargo vessel was sunk, another vessel of similar size probably sunk, and an 8,000 ton transport damaged. In addition, a further unidentified vessel also received damage.

Further attacks on shipping in this area were carried out on 20 APR. Three direct hits were scored on a 4/6,000 ton cargo vessel; a large explosion followed the third hit, and the vessel burst into flames and subsequently sank.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

Other attacks were launched during the week on RABAUL, SAIDOR and HOLLANDIA BAY.

DIRECT SUPPORT.

On 15 APR a bombing and strafing attack on area vicinity BUIGAP CK was carried out by seven BOSTONS. a.m. 22 APR four BOSTONS and four MITCHELLS bombed and strafed the area BITOI Mouth to NASSAU BAY in support of our patrol moving into this area.

(c) AIR - ENEMY.

Enemy air activity during the week has been confined to reconnaissance and one desultory raid, possibly carried out by a reconnaissance aircraft, on MOROBE on 19 APR. Enemy aircraft were reported over MORESBY on 16 and 21 APR and WAU and BULOLO 19 APR.

One Japanese aircraft dropped two bombs and strafed the MOROBE area in the early morning of 19 APR; no damage or casualties were caused. A single aircraft was over MILNE BAY at 0806 hrs on 18 APR. It was engaged with AA fire with unobserved results.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

On 21 APR an Allied aircraft reported a large unidentified aircraft on SALAMAUA drome with lorries alongside. This is the first report of aircraft on this drome for a considerable time. This report has NOT been confirmed by ground observation in SALAMAUA area.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND.

In view of the recent barge and road activity on the NE coast of NEW GUINEA, it is possible that there has been a considerable change-over in enemy strength in the WEWAK and MADANG areas. Present estimates are:-

| | |
|---|---|
| WEWAK | 12,000 |
| MADANG | 6/8,000 |
| HANSA BAY | 1,500/1,600 |

Attached as Appendix "A" is a report on barge loading and tests carried out at SOURABAYA on 8 JUN 42. This should prove to be of considerable value when studying the recent barge movement down the NG coast.

(NGF Int Summary No 118)

2. IDENTIFICATIONS.

The following statement has been made by a PW:
"Guards Division troops wear a hat badge consisting of a star surrounded by two sheaves of leaves."
This information has not yet been confirmed. (NGF Int Summary No 118)

4. ORGANIZATION.

A ready reference to the strengths of various units of the Japanese forces is attached as Appendix "B".

for Lt-Col
GS. 3 Aust Div.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

# 3 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 1.

## JAPANESE USE OF "BARGE" CONVOYS.

A document has been examined, which shows that the Japanese have been experimenting with the use of MLC for convoy work in tropical waters. The details and findings of these experiments are set out below.

TIME OF THE TEST. 8 Jun 42

PLACE. SOURABAYA, JAVA

COURSE. From SOURABAYA Hbr to the mouth of the SOLO River, approx 28 miles.

SAILING TIME. 0900 - 1600 hrs = 7 hrs,

CLIMATIC CONDITIONS. Max Temperature 92°F. Min Temperature 82°F. The sea was calm with little wind and the direct sunlight was strong.

PERSONNEL. Tps were allocated to MLC fully equipped and prepared to use their weapons against aircraft and submarines. They cooked their food on board.

FINDINGS. ALLOCATION OF TROOPS TO MLC.

(a) Rifle Coy -

| | |
|---|---|
| Large MLC | 50 men |
| Small MLC | 25 men |

(b) MG Coy -

| | |
|---|---|
| Large MLC | 40 men with 3 MGs |
| Small MLC | 20 men with 1 MG |

(c) Inf Bn Gun Unit -

Large MLC 40 men with 2/70mm guns (one gun in the bow ready for firing and one gun in the stern dismantled)

(d) Inf Regtl Arty Unit -

Large MLC 35 men with 1/75 mm Regtl Gun, ready for firing.

(e) Mtn Arty Unit -

Large MLC 35 men with 1/75 mm Mtn Gun, ready for firing.

(f) Tank Attack Unit.-

Large MLC 28 men with 2/37mm Tank Attack guns, one ready to fire in the bow the other assembled in the stern.

(g) Lt Armd Car Unit -

Large MLC 15 men with one Lt Armd Car.

(h) Tank Unit -

Large MLC (Special) 15 men with one lt tank

(i) Engr Unit -

Although comparable to the inf unit, the number of men must be reduced due to the great amount of eqpt.

(j) Command Boat.

When a large MLC is used as a cond boat, 25 - 30 men are advisable.

It appears from the documents that MLCs, loaded as shown in the above sub-paragraphs, moved as a body with boats arranged roughly in a cruciform pattern 600 metres long and 700 metres wide, with the Command Boat at the centre maintaining contact with the point boat and the base by means of W/T. Protection from aircraft and submarines was provided by small arms and artillery weapons; the artillery mounted on sandbags, being ready to engage targets of opportunity.

(NGF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No113)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

# 3 AUST DIV WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No1.

## Japanese Army Organization.

## Summary of Approximate Strengths of Units and Formations.

This list has been prepared to furnish a ready guide to strengths of various units of the Japanese forces. These totals are estimates, and as such, will need to be revised as more up-to-date information becomes available.

### INFANTRY DIVISION.

| | |
|---|---|
| Reconnaissance Unit | 450 |
| Tank Battalion | 300 |
| Infantry Regiment | 3,306 |
| Regimental Signals | 71 |
| Regimental Gun Company | 121 |
| Regimental Tank Attack Unit | 112 |
| Infantry Battalion | 984 |
| Infantry Rifle Company | 191 |
| Infantry Rifle Platoon | 56 |
| Infantry LMG/Rifle Section | 14 |
| Infantry Grenade Discharger Section | 12 |
| Infantry MG Company | 140 |
| Infantry Battalion Gun Platoon | 50 |
| Artillery Regiment | 1,350 |
| Engineer Regiment | 1,020 |
| Headquarters | 125 |
| Divisional Signals Unit | 200 |
| " Medical Unit | 250 |
| " Field Hospital | 200 |
| " Water Purification Unit | 75 |
| " Transport Regiment | 1,000 |
| " Ordnance Company | 250 |
| " Veterinary Unit | 250 |
| D I V I S I O N A L TOTAL | 16,245. |

### INDEPENDENT TROOPS.

| | |
|---|---|
| Independent Mixed Brigade | 9,000 |
| 150mm Field Artillery Regiment (24/150mm Hows) | 1,300 |
| Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment (18/75mm Guns) | 1,574 |
| Independent AA Battalion (12/75mm Guns) | 522 |
| Machine Cannon Battery (AA-Tk A) (8/20mm Guns) | 136 |
| Independent Tank Attack Unit (18/37mm Guns) | 350 |
| Independent Mortar Battalion (36/82mm Mortars) | 600 |
| Independent Engineer Regiment | 1,200 |
| Debarkation Unit | 750 |
| Shore Duty Company | 450 |
| Volunteer Labour Unit | 1,100 |
| Provisional Road Construction Unit | 480 |
| Shipping Engineer Regiment | 1,100 |
| Independent Telegraph Unit | 175 |
| Naval Pioneer Unit | 1,500 |
| Aerodrome Battalion | 300 |

(NGF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No118)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

NOT to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ.

FILE

SECRET.

Copy No. 25

- 1 -

KANGA FORCE.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 2.

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 15 Apr 43.

Officers to NOTE

PART 1.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRENGTH.

(a) LAND:

There has been no change in the MUBO area during the past week. It appears probable that the enemy is using the LOKANU - KUMIATUM track as L of C in preference to the route from SALAMAUA although vehicles have recently been reported on the latter route.

In the LOWER MARKHAM area, the enemy continues to patrol from HEATHS PLANTATION in the direction of MUNUM and NGASAWAPUM. On the south bank no important patrol activity has been observed since Jap patrol to LAKE WANUM 19/20 Mar.

Recent reports from RAMU - MARKHAM watershed do not clarify intentions behind enemy movements in this area. However, on the north Coast the enemy is making active endeavours to seek out possible Allied watching posts.

There is reason to believe that movement of troops has taken place between MADANG and WEWAK. Present strengths are believed to be WEWAK 9/11000, MADANG 6/8000.

(b) SEA:

There has been considerable and regular shipping activity in the vicinity of WEWAK during recent weeks. On 12 Apr it was estimated that 25,000 tons of shipping was anchored at WEWAK. This was even larger than has been usual. In addition on 12 Apr HANSA BAY (100 miles SE WEWAK) was for the first time reported to be used as a debarkation point. Six merchantmen and two destroyers were observed.

(Adapted from NGF Summary No 117)

(c) AIR:

For some time past scale of enemy air effort has been much below air potential. However this week may well mark the beginning of large scale enemy operations against Allied bases. Heavy attacks have been made in quick succession against ORO BAY, PORT MORESBY and MILNE BAY.

It is considered that the aim of these strikes is to reduce Allied capabilities of offence and interception. It is significant that, during the MORESBY raid, the enemy managed to move two small convoys to the NE coast of NEW GUINEA.

The extreme flexibility of the enemy's air strength is demonstrated by the fact that ninety eight aircraft raided GUADALCANAL on 7 Apr and approximately one hundred and four raided MORESBY on 12 Apr. It may be accepted that if the enemy has determined on a policy of heavy air offensives against Allied bases, heavy losses will not act as a deterrent.

(Adapted from NGF Summary No 117)

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) LAND:

MUBO.

There has been little alteration in this area over the past week. Our troops have maintained active patrolling and direct air support has been

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

provided on 9, 13, 14 and 15 Apr. The information obtained from ground troops and photo interpretation is set out in Appendix "A". (Sketch showing tracks and located positions.)

30-40 enemy were reported on 8/9 Apr to be cutting fire lanes in the vicinity of the known enemy position on NW slopes of LABABIA RIDGE on the feature known as GREENS HILL. However our patrol on 14 Apr which carefully reconnoitred the vicinity was unable to observe any signs of enemy.

Enemy movement has been observed on several occasions between the ARCHWAYS (south of BANANA PLANTATION- ref Appx "A") and the KUNAI Patch approximately 300 yds to the north, suggesting that there is a cookhouse somewhere in the latter vicinity.

Our troops have been successful in establishing an OP which commands KITCHEN CK and all OBSERVATION HILL except the southern slopes. This latter area is in full view from MAT MAT.

LOKANU and KOMIATUM.

The enemy is maintaining regular patrols on the MUBO-KOMIATUM track although it has been reported that this route is NOT being used as a supply line. Recently the only movement observed on the main track from SALAMAUA has been lights moving by night. However on 14 Apr vehicular traffic by day was reported along this route.

It has been suspected that the Japs have been using the route LOKANU-KOMIATUM as an L of C. On 15 Apr it was reported that 50 Japs had crossed the mouth of the FRANCISCO River and were heading south, apparently along the coast route to LOKANU. It is interesting to note that the bridge at the mouth of the FRANCISCI River does NOT appear capable of taking vehicular traffic but that the river appears fordable near the dromo.

MISSIM - HOTE.

Enemy were at HOTE on 9 Apr according to native report and another report stated that Japs had been observed moving from HOTE to MALOLO However our patrols reported this area clear on 11 Apr.

LOWER MARKHAM.

Our patrols north of the MARKHAM have reported no enemy seen in the NEW MUNUM area, but the natives say that the Japs visit the area twice weekly. The patrol moves out from HEATHS ans splits in to two parties, one going to NEW MUNUM and the other NGASAWAPUM. A previous report from fairly reliable natives about the middle of Feb was that the enemy patrols visited GABSONEK each day, being based on NEW MUNUM.

A patrol east through OOMSIS along the south bank of the MARKHAM on 6 Apr, again located the Jap sentry (mentioned in KANGA INT SUMMARY No 1) a mile east of MARKHAM POINT. He was standing with rifle and bayonet facing the river, and did not appear to be very interested in proceedings. It is difficult to understand why a sentry is posted in this position as his field of view includes only the track, the river and very little of the north bank. The north bank is under Jap control and there must be many less conspicuous places from which to watch the river or the track. Possibly he is a sentry posted for the protection of an enemy camp in that area. No enemy movement was seen on the islands in the MARKHAM at this point, but signs of Jap patrols west along the track were observed.

RAMU - MARKHAM Valleys.

There have been no further reports received which could clarify the deductions as to the intention of the Jap parties previously observed in the RAMU and MARKHAM Valleys. Both parties, however, seem to have retired in the direction from which they came without making contact with each other.

A native report said that a body of Japs passed through KESAWAI from the direction of DUMPU on 5 Apr. Of these half are reported to have proceeded on to MADANG and half to have remained in the GROBA area, about 14 miles NNW from KESAWAI. A reliable report on 7 Apr declared that the KAIAPIT SANGAN GNGA area was clear of the enemy.

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The rumour amongst the natives of an enemy move from the RAI COAST across the FINISTERRES was received from a second source. Its origin however, may lie in the Jap patrol's clash with our observation post in the SAIDOR area, mentioned in the last summary.

MOROBE AREA.

It was reported by an observer with a patrol near PAIAWA that a force of Japanese troops left MAIAWA recently, and that a force of enemy were located in the vicinity of PAIAWA. A patrol from HALLMARK Force was sent to investigate, but report no trace of enemy. Patrolling continues.

(NGF Int Summary No 117)

ORO BAY - GOODENOUGH ISLAND AREA.

More Japanese have been captured in the D'ENTRECASTEAUX GROUP.

On 7 Apr, twelve PW were taken on GOODENOUGH Island. One of these escaped, but was later recaptured and committed suicide, whilst a second died of exposure. Another fifteen, one of whom died, were captured on FERGUSSON Island on 12 Apr.

DRAKEFORCE made a search of the LUSANGAY Islands from KADAI to KANAPU and consider that there are no Japanese on KOTOITA, LABOIA, LUABALA, WAGABU and CHALATA Islands of the AMPHLETT GROUP. Another party of seven have been reported on the east coast of GOODENOUGH Island, but no further details are to hand.

The progressive tally of survivors captured and killed to date, reads one hundred and fifty-nine captured, and two hundred and forty-one killed.

(NGF Int Summary No 117)

SAIDOR.

Strafing of coastline between MUR and BILIAU has resulted in many natives moving into the hinterland but it is reported that the beach natives at SINGOR and BILIAU are in contact with the enemy. These places plus GUMBI are in use as night anchorages for small craft en route to MADANG. Further action is being taken to move the natives out of the regions of Japanese domination.

(NGF Int Summary No 117)

WEWAK AREA.

The enemy have taken more interest in the hinterland south of WEWAK along the SEPIK and patrols, assisted by natives, have visited YAMIL and TIMBUNKE (45 miles south of WEWAK on the SEPIK River). The latter is connected to WEWAK by good tracks.

An unconfirmed report states that the majority of natives east of BUT are pro-Japanese, with a friendly pocket at MARUI Mission, who assisted one of our parties on its way through.

A late report indicates that the enemy, using the 15 ton schooner "PIUS", have now reached ANGERMAN on the SEPIK River, 35 miles SW of MANUI.

(NGF Int Summary No 117)

(b) SEA - ENEMY.

With the intensification shipping movements during the past week, it is apparent that the tempo of operations is quickening, and we are at the beginning of the major enemy action to which recent intelligence has pointed.

It is estimated that in the NE Sector the enemy now have available:-

62 merchant vessels, totalling 265,000 tons
34 warships, of which two are cruisers and 17 destroyers.

WEWAK.

Shipping has been sighted almost continuously at WEWAK. Photographs of 8 Apr showed that there were in the harbour one destroyer, three cargo ships aggregating 3,000 tons, and at least thirty three barges. One of the cargo vessels appeared to have a flat top with a crane on the stern, and may have been a barge carrier.

However at 1030 hrs on 12 Apr a larger convoy was sighted at anchorage. It consisted of at least seven ships, estimated at approximately 30,000 tons.

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HANSA BAY.

This locality is approximately one hundred miles SE of WEWAK. At 1715 hrs on 12 Apr a convoy of eight ships was outside the bay. It comprised:

2 destroyers
4 6/8,000 ton cargo vessels
2 500/1,000 ton cargo vessels.

Shortly afterwards, two of the larger vessels were observed to have begun unloading. It is believed that these ships were those reported earlier at WEWAK; the destroyers which accompanied them may have come from a force of three which, at 0600 hrs 11 Apr, were reported to be in position one hundred and sixty miles NE of WEWAK.

(NGF Int Summary No 117)

SMALL CRAFT.

During the period 8/12 Apr, a total of over 100 enemy barges were reported at various points between WEWAK and MADANG, and especially at HANSA BAY and ULINGAN. Some near BOGIA were described as 60/75 feet in length. Eight other large barges in the same locality were power-driven, and covered with tarpaulins; they were equipped for AA defence. Five MLC were seen in KAIRIRU Straits. As almost all the barges sighted were camouflaged, it is reasonable to suppose that the enemy has, in fact, very many more barges than our aircraft have seen.

In this connection, the report of the carrying out of trials in new methods of barge loading at SOURABAYA, in particular the mounting of the 70 mm Bn gun forward, is worthy of note.

(NGF Int Summary No 117)

RABAUL.

Photographs taken 12 Apr revealed the following ships in harbour:-

10 destroyers
3 submarines
6 auxiliary warships
4 tankers
36 merchant vessels totalling 181,000 tons

In all a total of 59 ships.

Our aircraft further reported that many were getting up steam.

(NGF Int Summary No 117)

(c) AIR- OWN.

The main features of the aerial operations for the past week have been the greatly increased activity along the north coast of NEW GUINEA and interception of large enemy air forces over ORO BAY, PORT MORESBY and MILNE BAY.

NORTH COAST.

On 7 Apr the coast road between MUR and SINGOR (in vicinity SAIDOR) was bombed and strafed.

On 9 Apr a very heavy bombing raid by Mitchells and Beauforts was carried out against MADANG and ALEXISHAFEN apparently with complete surprise. As a result four enemy fighters and two medium bombers were destroyed on the ground and other damage done. Numerous casualties are believed to have been inflicted on personnel.

MADANG strip was again strafed by BEAUFIGHTERS on 10 Apr whilst MITCHELLS attacked BOGIA and ULINGAN Harbour.

WEWAK was attacked before dawn on 10 Apr by LIBERATORS and FORTRESSES, destroying a 1000 ton vessel and setting fire to another of 1500 tons. Fires and explosions were caused in dumps and elsewhere.

Heavy bombers searching for possible convoy movements to FINSCHHAFEN on night 11/12 Apr attacked targets at LAE destroying buildings and starting a very large fire at SE end of runway.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

ENEMY CONVOY - HANSA BAY.

An enemy convoy of nine ships ( incl one warship and two destroyers) moving SE were shadowed by recce aircraft and reported entering HANSA BAY at 1628 hrs 12 Apr. LIBERATORS attacked at 1635 - 1643 hrs scoring direct hits on two 8/10,000 ton vessels, one of which was left burning from bow to stern. Fifteen fighters (including five twin engined fighters) intercepted. Six were shot down including one twin engined fighter.

RABAUL.

FORTRESSES attacked all the RABAUL airfields on 12 Apr, as a result of which a fire at VUNAKUNAU was visible for fifty miles. Of the four night fighters which intercepted, two were destroyed. A FORTRESS from this strike force attacked and destroyed a submarine in ST GEORGES CHANNEL.

(Adapted from NGF Int Summary No 117)

(c) AIR - ENEMY.

ORO BAY.

An enemy force of forty to [illegible]

MILNE BAY was raided 1235 hrs to 1410 hrs 14 Apr by a force of 40 to 50 medium and dive bombers escorted by 60 fighters. Direct hits were scored on three Allied 3,000 ton vessels, one of which beached a total loss. It is believed that many casualties were suffered on all three ships. Our fighters intercepted and destroyed eight aircraft as well as two probables and one damaged. AA defences claim two destroyed and a corvette claims a further one.

PART II.

10. EQUIPMENT.

Information extracted from a captured Japanese document confirms the previous report that the Japanese have a 7.7 mm rifle, also a 7.7 mm LMG. The following details are unverified, and reliability can NOT be stated.

7.7 mm LMG

Whilst this weapon closely resembles the "Type 96" LMG it also has a flash eliminator, and supporting leg attached to the butt. From general description, this may be the weapon illustrated as Appendix "A" to our Int Summary No.114.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Calibre | 7.7 mm | (.303") |
| Total weight | 9.9 kg | (21.8 lbs) |
| Overall length (including flash eliminator) | 1185 mm | (3' 10½" approx) |
| Rate of fire | 550 rpm | |
| Muzzle velocity | 2345 fps | |
| Maximum Range | 3829 yds | |
| Magazine capacity | 30 rds. | |

Type 99 Short Rifle (1939 Model) 7.7 mm.

| | |
|---|---|
| Calibre | 7.7mm (.303") |
| Weight (without bayonet) | 8 lb 6 oz |
| Weight (with bayonet) | 9 lb 7 oz |
| Length (without bayonet) | 4 ft 2.4" |
| Length (with bayonet) | 4ft 11.1" |
| Muzzle velocity with type 99 ammunition - | 2390 fps (approx) |
| Muzzle velocity with type 92 ammunition - | 2360 fps (approx) |
| Maximum range | 3830 yds |

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Maj.
B.M. KANGA FORCE.

Distribution as for Summary No.1.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

KANGA FORCE INT SUMMARY. NO. 2.

SECRET
Appx 'A'




SKETCH SHOWING TRACKS & LOCATED ENEMY POSNS MUBO AREA 13th Apr 43

| LEGEND | NOTES |
|---|---|
| Huts<br>Ambush posns<br>MG posns<br>Tracks<br>Earthworks | Sketch from Air photos 85X WAIPALI - LOKANU photos 7,8,9,10. Posns plotted from photo interpretation by AAAPIU & observation by ground tps. |

Yards 200 100 0 200 400 600 800 1000 Yards

Scale 1" = 200 Yards (Approx)

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(8).

# — SKETCH MAP MUBO AREA —

MUBO To:-
KOMIATUM 3½ HRS
SALAMAUA 9 HRS

BUI GAP RIVER
LOG BRIDGE
BITOI RIVER
TO LABORIA & DUMU 8 HRS
TRACK EXACT COURSE UNKNOWN
NOTE:- JUST BEFORE & ALL AFTER CONFLUENCE OF BITOI & BAIWIN RIVERS VERY HIGH THROUGH EXTENSIVE SWAMP (SAC BAD) AREA TO COAST.
VERY STEEP MOUNTED TO BE NEGOTIATED ROAD
SUSPECTED STRONG JAP STRONG POINT
MUCH MOVEMENT
DRY CREEK BED
OBSERVATION HILL
M.G. NESTS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN TWO LINES
ENTRACE TO DUGOUT
20 PDR BATTERY
50 TWIN BARRELLED AUTICAN
M.G. POSTS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN TWO LINES
GARRISON HILL
DRUM
500'
RANGE 600'
WELL CAMPING GROUND PITS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN TWO LINES
MUBO
VICKERS RIDGE
SUSPECTED JAP DEFENDED LOCALITY
JAP DEFENDED LOCALITY
STRONG JAP 3 MEN PILLBOX 200 YDS FROM ALL SIDES 50/60 YDS OF M.G.
JAP OP + PATROL
BITOI RIVER
SITE OF KUMUL BR (WASHED AWAY NOV 42)
SADDLE
BUI VAL RIVER
BUISUSU RIVER
BAIWIN or WAIWIN RIVER
BR.
TO WAUPALI
PATROLLING
TO WAUPALI 3 HRS FROM HOUSE MAMBU
HOUSE MAMBU BURNED BY 3RD PATROL 3/12/42
HOSPITAL BURNED 3/12/42
NATIVE GARDEN
N

NOT TO SCALE
ESTIMATED ONLY APPROX 3" = 1 MILE
TRACK TIMES UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED ON IT.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| MUBO - SALAMAUA | | 9 Hrs |
| " | KOMIATUM | 3½ Hrs |
| " | LABORIA | 8 Hrs |
| " | LOKANU | 6 " |
| " | SADDLE | 1 " |
| " | HOSPITAL | 2 " |
| " | HOUSE MAMBU | 4 " |
| " | WAIWAU | 5 " |
| " | TABLE CAMP | 7 " |
| " | MOVE | |

LEGEND
SURVEYED TRACKS
NATIVE
JAP DEF. POINTS
TRENCHES

REPRODUCED BY KANGA FORCE 20-1-43

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

# MUBO AREA

1:5000

1 = 140 yds

OBSERVATION HILL

KUNRI

KITCHEN CK

BUNDA CK

GREEN CK

BUNDA CK

SUSPECTED TRACK

SUSPECTED TRACK

SUSPECTED TRACK

KUNRI

BENGHA CREEK

RIDGE

RIDGE

VICKERS RIDGE

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Russ 300 forces drvn deep into Os lines
SW Coll ofs sunk 4 ships 12 afs N Cal
Am ofs capt beg Oct in Sic
10 miles from Cat
Russ adv in Kuban - strong def lt
12 from Ges Kub bri Lst
Russ stand off 200 to atten
Russ adv 8 miles
Lft of Ital 15 miles from Oct
Russ com Coal ex Sept. good gain in Ges sft
Many Ges gass sick in revs
Fired 106 afs 142 the on Os front
Rudg only fcats acty
8 Russ in Kub sent to death
300 afs took pt in act - by ut bomb Kal and do
for 9 Lrs. Burn another
1 Ht in 2 day bomb chas
beg forces of interest
37 warships in 2 wks
49 - to 305 for loss 53 Coll
Hy air att on Salan
US ofs in Aggregate - 10 mls up, coast in wk
30,000 ofs beg ry prise in Sic
Gen Mont 2 way act of Ch Cat
Does not fav Ch forces.
Can on both sec occup full pts
Inv'd capt another Ges Div
Scale of ofns US 4 Divs in Sic
Inv'tol air att to Ital + Loss of Sic
Malta 150 Afs 35 Coll afs Ldns unnecessarily Sic
50 even ft over Ts - 3 on Bombers
Alg and reveal. Vichy ord to resist at Martin

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NOT to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ.

SECRET.

Copy No. 22

KANGA FORCE.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 1

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 8 Apr 43.

PART 1.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRENGTH.

(a) LAND:

Enemy activity along the north coast of NEW GUINEA and his renewed interest in the overland route from MADANG to LAE via the RAMU and MARKHAM valleys is indicative ofthe Japanese intention of moving troops and supplies to LAE from WEWAK and MADANG by land and small craft. This policy is no doubt partly brought about by their recent heavy shipping losses in attempting direct supply and reinforcement.

It has been learned that the LAE garrison received supplies for only two months from the convoy of 6/7 Jan. Their present shortage of supplies is further evidenced by their use of submarines, and occasionally bomber aircraft, over the last month, and by their attempt to land supplies from destroyers at FINSCHHAVEN.

(Adapted from NGF Summary No 116)

(c) AIR:

Since Dec the enemy's air strength in both the NE and NW sectors has almost been doubled, as the following figures indicate

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NE Sector | 1 Jan | 248 | 4 Apr | 485 |
| NW " | " | 129 | " | 240 |
| Total | " | 377 | " | 725 |

The complete lack of offensive air activity on the enemy's front, however, continues to be most marked, and is inconsistent with his known strength. All this is indicative of conservation of strength for some major move.

(Adapted from NGF Summary No 116)

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) LAND:

SALAMAUA - MUBO.

Over the last week there has been no marked change in the situation in this area. The enemy remains in occupation of KITCHEN CREEK as his forward base with two ambush positions covering the approaches over OBSERVATION HILL. It is possible that a third position is occupied to the rear of these two in order to afford rapid support to either one. A further ambush position is located in a banana grove to the west of the southern extremity of the DRY CREEK BED.

The Jap has been firing intermittently, but ineffectually, with a 70m.m. gun and a mortar believed to be 81 m.m. calibre. The gun has not been definitely located, but isthought to be in KITCHEN CREEK area.

There has been nothing unusual in the enemy movements; small groups have been seen in the KITCHEN CREEK, OBSERVATION HILL areas. A working party which attempted to operate on the north end of MUBO drome was quickly dispersed by our fire.

There has been little movement observed on the KOMIATUM track but fires have been observed along the track and at KOMIATUM. Lights were also seen moving south along the track at 0240K/6. Fires observed along the LOKANU-KOMIATUM track gave rise to the possibility of this being used as a L of C to the forward area. It is possible that many of the fires observed throughout the area

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

are of kanaka origin.

Our patrols to the coast at DUALI on 25 Mar reported that the enemy was in occupation of an area along the coast about four miles south of the mouth of the BITOI. A patrol which returned on 7 Apr, however, reported that one deserted village only was seen on the coast south of the BITOI. Voices were clearly heard from LABABIA ISLAND.

On 2 Apr six barges were seen to move from the Island to the mainland apparently carrying troops. It is possible that the troops formerly in the area were part of the force which recently vacated the MAMBARE-WAKIA areas.

There has been no enemy movement observed in the area west of BOBDUBI and KOMIATUM other than the patrol which caused the evacuation of one of our OP's on 1 Apr. It is now thought that the enemy did not locate the OP.

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The first entry by the enemy into this area was made in Jan - Feb this year. A party of 100-150 Japs moved from MADANG about 19 Jan through DUMPU KAIAPIT and NADZAB reaching LAE about 14 Feb. Throughout the move they lived off the country, seizing food from every native village without offering payment. This treatment considerably antagonized the natives. The Japs also continually spoke of large reinforcements and exaggerated their own strength, while "talking big" about the future Jap plans. This propaganda was intended no doubt to impress the natives and confuse the Allied Comd.

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A reliable native report stated that a party of 60 Japs under command of a lieutenant arrived in KAIAPIT in the late afternoon of 28 Mar. They carried rifles of the standard pattern and several LMG's identified as TAISHO II (1922 make) Their equipment was in good order and they appeared to be in good condition, but food was their first consideration on entering the village. No payment was made for food and some native property was wantonly destroyed. They apparently expected to live off the land and carried no rations. Although they camouflaged themselves to good effect with kunai and leaves, their behaviour in the village did not suggest that they feared the presence of our troops.

3/

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

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General rumour amongst the natives had it that this force was waiting for another body coming from MARAWASA. This is supported by the definite identification of 5 Japs at KURIPU 20 miles NW of DUMPU on 30 Mar and a native report that a party of Japs had arrived at BUMBUM on the GUSAP River, 13 miles SE of DUMPU, but that owing to floods they had been unable to cross the river and had turned back.

Information from Australians with local knowledge is that the KAMU and its tributaries are in flood until May. The village of KESAWAI, 14 miles NW of DUMPU was also reported to have been burnt by the Japs.

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NGF Summary No 116)

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(NGF Summary No 116)

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Three more survivors from the BISMARK convoy were killed on FERGUSSON ISLAND on 1 Apr. This brings the totals from this convoy to 135 captured and 238 killed.
(Adapted from NGF Summary No 116)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

(b) SEA: - ENEMY

KAVIENG.

On 1 Apr, reconnaissance aircraft discovered a heavy concentration of shipping at KAVIENG, where a well escorted convoy appeared to be assembling. It comprised

3 light cruisers
3 destroyers
6 medium merchant vessels totalling 35,000 tons.

At the time of the sighting, the ships appeared to be stationary. The force began to move southwards, but was soon split up by heavy Allied air attacks. During the next three days, the ships were still in the area, some units being reported in the vicinity of STEFFEN STRAITS, others further south in GAZELLE Channel. Between 1 - 4 Apr, one heavy and one light cruiser and one destroyer were sunk; while three destroyers and two or three merchant vessels were severely damaged. Aircraft over the area on 5 Apr could only find one cruiser (which was apparently beached), and four merchant vessels totalling about 11,000 tons.

(NGF Summary No 116)

RABAUL.

The most recent sighting on 6 Apr revealed 75 ships in RABAUL Harbour, an increase of 20 from that on 2 Apr.

(NGF Review No 123)

NORTH COAST NEW GUINEA.

Supplies continue to be moved into WEWAK. Five 2/3000 ton cargo vessels seen at anchorage there on 2 Apr, had their decks loaded with crates and boxes.

Further evidence of Japanese anxiety to conceal their shipping from our reconnaissance aircraft, comes from FINSCHHAVEN. On 2 Apr, a 1500 ton vessel was sighted with half its length wedged into a small dredged-out cove, and over it a screen of netting and foliage was in course of erection.

(NGF Summary No 116)

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Support to our forward infantry has been afforded by missions against targets selected by them in the KITCHEN CREEK area. Suspected enemy occupied areas on LABABIA ISLAND and at DUALI were effectively bombed and strafed on three occasions. Heavy black smoke was seen rising from LABABIA ISLAND for several hours after one raid.

LAE - SALAMAUA.

HEATHS was the main target in the LAE vicinity over the last week. On 4 Apr over 25 aircraft - Bostons, Beaufighters and Mitchells bombed and strafed the area.

At SALAMAUA the village at KELA, The ISTHMUS and AA positions have been the targets for our aircraft and considerable damage was inflicted.

GENERAL:

The results of air attacks on the convoy from KAVIENG have already been given.

Sea lanes north of NEW BRITAIN have been covered daily as far as KAVIENG in addition to the normal reconnaissance of NEW BRITAIN and the north coast of NEW GUINEA.

(Adapted from NGF Summary No 116)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

PART II

1. ENEMY GOB:

There is evidence, as yet unconfirmed that 6 Div were scheduled to arrive in MAE at the end of Jan. As two regiments of this division are believed to be in RABAUL, it is possible that these may yet be used as NEW GUINEA reinforcements.

(NGF Summary No 116)

2.

(b) Reproductions of a gun pit and a HMG pit located on GARRISON HILL are attached as Appendix "A".

PART V.

SECURITY - CENSORSHIP.

Many troops continue to strive to avoid Unit Censorship by use of Green envelopes for general correspondence and by addressing letters to Base Censor. As well as constituting, in most cases, a misuse of the Green Envelope which is supposed to be confined to purely personal and family matters, this state of affairs indicates dissatisfaction amongst troops, at the methods employed by some franking Officers. There are complaints of delay before letters are censored, and, in particular, of officers' failure to treat matter in letters as absolutely confidential. Probably no one factor is responsible for more ill feeling about Censorship Regulations - with consequent attempts at evasion - than the report that Officers have been heard reading out extracts of letters to one another and joking about them.

(NGF Summary No 116)

[signature]
Capt
for Maj.
B.M. KANGA FORCE.

Distribution: When this distribution list has been read please detach and destroy by fire.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/5 Aust Inf Bn | Copy No | 1 | CRE KANGA FORCE - 3 and Bn | 13-14 |
| 2/6 Aust Inf Bn | | 2 | Sigs KANGA FORCE - 3 Fd Coy | 15 |
| 2/7 Aust Inf Bn | | 3 | Adm HQ KANGA FORCE ~~SC Post Mail Bag~~ | 16-17 |
| 2/3 Aust Indep Coy | | 4 | ALO "A" Flt 4 AC Sqn RAAF. 18 | ✓ 18. 19 |
| 2/5 Aust Indep Coy | | 5 | Det 5 AF AS Central | ✓ 19 20 |
| 2/7 Aust Indep Coy | | 6 | 11 Fighter Control Sub-Sector | ✓ |
| HQ WAU Fwd Det | | 7 | 306 RDF Unit RAAF | ✓ 20 21 |
| 2/2 Aust Fd Amb | | 8 | 2 Adv Coun Soc RAAF | ✓ |
| NGF 4 cs | | 9 | ANGAU MARKHAM DISTRICT | ✓ 21 22 |
| Comd ✓ | | 10 | War Diary | 22-23 23-24 |
| Arty Comd KANGA FORCE | | 11-12 ✓ | File | 24-25 25-26 |

4 to 3 Aust Inf Bde

3 Div

JAP HMG posn Found
on GARRISON HILL 28 Mar 43

Appx 'A' to
KANGA FORCE weekly
Intelligence Summary No 4




JAP GUN PIT Found on GARRISON HILL
28 Mar 43
Ref map SALAMAUA 1 cm = 1 Mile 688849




AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

HOT to be taken forward
of Battalion HQ.

SECRET.

Copy No. 26

KANGA FORCE.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 1

Compiled from information received up to 1700 hrs 3 Apr 43.

PART 1.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN STRENGTH.

(a) LAND:

Enemy activity along the north coast of NEW GUINEA and his renewed interest in the overland route from MADANG to LAE via the RAMU and MARKHAM valleys is indicative ofthe Japanese intention of moving troops and supplies to LAE from WEWAK and MADANG by land and small craft. This policy is no doubt partly brought about by their recent heavy shipping losses in attempting direct supply and reinforcement.

It has been learned that the LAE garrison received supplies for only two months from the convoy of 6/7 Jan. Their present shortage of supplies is further evidenced by their use of submarines, and occasionally bomber aircraft, over the last month, and by their attempt to land supplies from destroyers at FINSCHHAVEN.

(Adapted from NGF Summary No 116)

(c) AIR:

Since Dec the enemy's air strength in both the NE and NW sectors has almost been doubled, as the following figures indicate

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NE Sector | 1 Jan | 248 | | 4 Apr | 485 |
| NW " | " | 129 | | " | 240 |
| Total | " | 377 | | " | 725 |

The complete lack of offensive air activity on the enemy's front, however, continues to be most marked, and is inconsistent with his known strength. All this is indicative of conservation of strength for some major move.

(Adapted from NGF Summary No 116)

2. OPERATIONS.

(a) LAND:

SALAMAUA - MUBO.

Over the last week there has been no marked change in the situation in this area. The enemy remains in occupation of KITCHEN CREEK as his forward base with two ambush positions covering the approaches over OBSERVATION HILL. It is possible that a third position is occupied to the rear of these two in order to afford rapid support to either one. A further ambush position is located in a banana grove to the west of the southern extremity of the DRY CREEK BED.

The Jap has been firing intermittently, but ineffectually, with a 70m.m. gun and a mortar believed to be 81 m.m. calibre. The gun has not been definitely located, but isthought to be in KITCHEN CREEK area.

There has been nothing unusual in the enemy movements; small groups have been seen in the KITCHEN CREEK, OBSERVATION HILL areas. A working party which attempted to operate on the north end of MUBO drome was quickly dispersed by our fire.

There has been little movement observed on the KOMIATUM track but fires have been observed along the track and at KOMIATUM. Lights were also seen moving south along the track at 0240K/6. Fires observed along the LOKANU-KOMIATUM track gave rise to the possibility of this being used as a L of C to the forward area. It is possible that many of the fires observed throughout the a

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

area of Kanaka origin.

Our patrols to the coast at DUALI on 25 Mar reported that the enemy was in occupation of an area along the coast about four miles south of the mouth of the BITOI. A patrol which returned on 7 Apr, however, reported that one deserted village only was seen on the coast south of the BITOI. Voices were clearly heard from LABABIA ISLAND.

On 2 Apr six barges were seen to move from the Island to the mainland apparently carrying troops. It is possible that the troops formerly in the area were part of the force which recently vacated the MAMBARE-WARIA areas.

There has been no enemy movement observed in the area west of BOBDUBI and KOMIATUM other than the patrol which caused the evacuation of one of our OP's on 1 Apr. It is now thought that the enemy did not locate the OP.

MARKHAM.

The track taken by the Jap patrol to LAKE WANUM on 19/20 Mar has been traced by our patrols as far east as the MARKHAM POINT. Native information regarding this patrol was that it had returned to LABU. The hideout of the LABU No 1 natives is on an island near MARKHAM POINT, and no doubt this is to what the natives referred. There is easy access to the north bank of the MARKHAM at this point from HEATHS and it is likely that this is the approach used by the Japs.

Enemy interest in this area is confirmed by the sighting of a Jap sentry in an OP a short distance south of the track and overlooking the river, about one mile east of MARKHAM POINT. Further, natives report that the Japs have built four large houses on the north bank of the river opposite MARKHAM POINT and that there are about 300 tps in the area. Reports from natives indicate that the Japs have been interested in this area since 8 Jan 43.

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Movement of small groups up and down the road to HEATHS is now frequent. On 2 Apr after a heavy attack by Allied aircraft on HEATHS there was continual movement from house to house along the road and a lorry was loaded up from HEATHS house and moved off. It is possible that a HQ or dump of some description was being moved.

The movement on 22-25 Mar of approx 90 men past HEATHS in a NW direction may tie up with the movement to KAIAPIT described in the following paragraph. It is not known whether any ofthe 90 returned by night.

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The first entry by the enemy into this area was made in Jan - Feb this year. A party of 100-150 Japs moved from MADANG about 19 Jan through DUMPU KAIAPIT and NADZAB reaching LAE about 14 Feb. Throughout the move they lived off the country, seizing food from every native village without offering payment. This treatment considerably antagonized the natives. The Japs also continually spoke of large reinforcements and exaggerated their own strength, while "talking big" about the future Jap plans. This propaganda was intended no doubt to impress the natives and confuse the Allied Comd.

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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

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NGF Summary No 116)

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AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

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(NGF Summary No 116)

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(NGF Review No 123)

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(Adapted from NGF Summary No 116)

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

PART II

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(NGF Summary No 116)

2. EQUIPMENT:

(a) A Jap shell found on GARRISON HILL has been identified as that used by the 70 m.m. Battalion Gun. An HE shell, it had not been fired and had no fuze. Particulars of the 70 m.m. Battalion Gun are as follows:-

| | |
|---|---|
| Type | "92" (1932) |
| Calibre | 70 mm (2,76 in) |
| Weight of projectile | 8,36 lbs |
| Muzzle Velocity | 650 ft/sec |
| Maximum Range | 3000 yds |
| Effective Range | 300 - 1500 yds |
| Danger area of burst | 40 yds (approx) |
| Length of barrel | 28½ ins |
| Length of trail (split) | 5 ft 7 ins |
| Width of wheel tread | 27 ins |
| Ammunition | Semi fixed with brass case HE, shrapnel and smoke shells. |

(b) Reproductions of a gun pit and a HMG pit located on GARRISON HILL are attached as Appendix "A".

PART V.

SECURITY - CENSORSHIP.

Many troops continue to strive to avoid Unit Censorship by use of Green envelopes for general correspondence and by addressing letters to Base Censor. As well as constituting, in most cases, a misuse of the Green Envelope which is supposed to be confined to purely personal and family matters, this state of affairs indicates dissatisfaction amongst troops, at the methods employed by some franking Officers. There are complaints of delay before letters are censored, and, in particular, of officers' failure to treat matter in letters as absolutely confidential. Probably no one factor is responsible for more ill feeling about Censorship Regulations - with consequent attempts at evasion - than the report that Officers have been heard reading out extracts of letters to one another and joking about them.

(NGF Summary No 116)

J.K. Kennedy Capt.
for Maj.
B.M. KANGA FORCE.

Distribution: When this distribution list has been read please detach and destroy by fire.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2/5 Aust Inf Bn | Copy No 1 | CRE KANGA FORCE | 13-14 |
| 2/6 Aust Inf Bn | 2 | Sigs KANGA FORCE | 15 |
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| 2/5 Aust Indep Coy | 5 | Det 5 AF AS Control | 19 |
| 2/7 Aust Indep Coy | 6 | 11 Fighter Control Sub-Sector) | |
| HQ WAU Fwd Def | 7 | 306 RDF Unit RAAF ) | 20 |
| 2/2 Aust Fd Amb | 8 | 2 Adv Comm Sec RAAF ) | |
| NGF | 9 | ANGAU MARKHAM DISTRICT | 21 |
| Comd | 10 | War Diary | 22-23 |
| Arty Comd KANGA FORCE | 11-12 | File | 24-25 |

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

JAD HMG post found
on GARRISON HILL 28 Mar 45

App 'K' to
YANK Force weekly
Intelligence Summary No 4




JAD GUN PIT [illegible]
28 Mar 45
Ref map SAIPAN [illegible]




AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

SUBJECT : SUITABLE POSITIONS FOR PREVENTING THE ENEMY FROM ENTERING WAU VALLEY VIA ALL TRACKS OF ACCESS FROM THE MUBO AREA.

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1. Ref Map SKETCH MAP TRACKS WAU SALAMUAU LAE
RELATIVE AIR PHOTOS
APPENDICES TO THIS SUMMARY

2. From a position of observation appromately 2 miles EAST along JAP track from junction JAP TRACK - WANDUMI TRACK, the area NORTH of BLACKCAT track to the coast can be clearly seen. Two possible avenues of approach to WAU are apparent; one running due NORTH from the BLACKCAT area thence EAST to MUBO, and the other the SADDLE bottleneck. The area between is very rugged and comprises the steep hills and mountains of the PIONEER RANGE which appears to be insurmountable.

3. The task alloted to 2/5 Aust Inf Bn in accordance with 17 Aust Inf Bde operational instruction No 8, concerns the strong and adequate defences of the two approaches outlined above

4. BLACKCAT AREA. (from HQ 2/5 Bn 5 hrs marching time)

The area comprises six defensive localities used by other units in previous operations. See sketch attached as appendix A to this summary.

(a) KUNAI PATCH AREA.

Situated on the forward approach to the GAP, ~~this~~ and astride main BLACKCAT and PILMUNG tracks. Is overlooked by features on NORTH and EAST sides and could be easily outflanked or avoided. Fields of fire are cleared, but generally the area is unsuitable for defence.

(b) JUNC TRACKS WITH PILMUNG TRACK.

Situated on forwarded slopes running NORTH, i.e. probable direction of enemy approach would be on ground above this area.

(c) THE GAP.

A suitable camp site only. Not defensable although situated at junction of three important tracks.

(d) JAP TRACK POSITION.

Situated one hours march from junction JAP TRACK and WANDUMI tracks. On high ground overlooking steep approach from small creek. Controls main positions of observation WAU WANDUMI FRASER'S MINE BLACKCAT MINE and the GAP. The creek is approximately 5 hours march from next water EAST along JAP TRACK and is therefore of importance to an enemy approaching from the WEST via this track. The position is well concealed, naturally strong, and well suited for defence. It is approximately 3 hrs march from BLACKCAT MINE and would be difficult to supply. The creek water is polluted.

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4. BLACKCAT AREA.

(e) BLACKCAT MINE AREA.

A strong position which could be by passed by an enemy approach via PILMUNG or JAP tracks. Could be developed into a secure self contained company fortress area centrally situated for control of both PILMUNG and JAP tracks. With improvement ~~on~~ a dropping area, within the defensive area, could be constructed. Good water and accomodation. Five hours marching time from HQ 2/5 Bn WAU.

(f) FRASER'S MINE AREA.

A minor and insecure delaying outpost position to BLACKCAT MINE position and cannot be relied upon to give more than warning of an approach via the BLACKCAT TRACK. A good staging post on route to HOUSE COPPER.

(g) GENERAL.

The task of securing the PILMUNG approach would appear to be at least a Coy task, the base being at BLACKCAT MINE and the main position NORTH and on higher ground than present position at PILMUNG BLACKCAT track junction.

A secondary ~~track~~ task from the same base would be to secure the JAP TRACK position and all approaches to the BLACKCAT MINE AREA.

Positions considered to be key points are marked as such on sketch attached as APPENDIX A to this summary.

5. The track WAU BLACKCAT MINE entails 5 hours marching time for troops or native carriers. Is uncomfortable going in present condition but could be considerably improved upon by :

(a) a good dry crossing over the BULOLO
(b) the cutting of a track to avoid constant crossing of BENNLEIGH CK.

6. The track BLACKCAT MINE - HOUSE COPPER AREA is 5/6 hrs marching time for troops or native carriers. In early stages the track crosses and recrosses the BITOI river several times. In later stages there are two "sharp pinches" where the track crosses two spurs to avoid the BITOI rapids. Again improvements could be effected by :

(a) log crossings over the BITOI
(b) construction of "stairs" on the two up hill positions.

7. Generally, the track WAU, HOUSE COPPER BUIBAINING is a good alternative route to the track KAISENIK SKINDEWAI BUIBAINING, and in many repects is preferable.

8. HOUSE COPPER AREA.

(a) From a position of observation EAST of HOUSE COPPER BUIBAINING, WAIPALI, SADDLE, LABABIA, and the DUALI marshes can be seem. It is apparent that an enemy attempting to penetrate WEST to WAU, would be forced by the WAIPALI BUIBAINING defences into the HOUSE COPPER AREA bottleneck. In this case the enemy would be confined to the track running WEST along the HOUSE COPPER spur. This is illustrated by annotated AIR PHOTO 36 R.

(b) EAST of HOUSE COPPER there is a large KUNAI PATCH area which forms an excellent defensive area to prevent such a move. The area controls the bottleneck, has good observation, cleared fields of fire and a covered line of withdrawal. All approaches from the enemy on EASTERN side, are exposed and steep. Water can

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8. HOUSE COPPER AREA. CONTINUED.

(b) Water can be obtained from BALBI CK within half an hour of position. Supplies would be 2/3 days carry from WAU or 1 day from JUNCTION CAMP via MOSSY KNOLL) JAP TK-HOUSE COPPER. Alternatively, supplies could be dropped on the KUNAI PATCH which, with improvement, would make an excellent dropping area .

(c) GENERAL

It would be extremely difficult for the enemy to by-pass or outflank the HOUSE COPPER posn. Thus obstructed, the BLACK CAT TRACK and JAP TK are both denied as tracks of access to WAU-BULOLO Valley.

L/T has been laid by our own tps from BLACK CAT MINE to the junc of the BLACK CAT and BUIBAINING tks but is not connected or serviced at the present time.

A sec of A Coy 2/7 Aust Inf Bn, defending the BLACK CAT - BUIBAINING TK junc provides the only immediate defence of this area.

9. ROUTES SOUTH or SOUTH WEST FROM THE BLACK CAT TRACK

(a) JAP TK This tk branches from BLACK CAT approx. 1 mile WEST of HOUSE COPPER. Direction of tk varies from SW to NW along NORTH side of the main dividing range for approx 9 hrs marching before it swings SOUTH to cross the main range. Thence it climbs over highest point of range, turns and runs generally WEST to SW to WANDUMI. The tk crosses 7 large creeks and from beginning to junc JAP-WANDUMI tks entails 15 hrs solid marching time. Throughout, the tk is well covered from the air, is well defined (although several trees have fallen across) is slippery, treacherous and most exhausting. Is wet, and fires are almost an impossibility. Makes no attempt to follow ridges but appears to run blindly in a general SW direction; is littered with enemy dead and equipment (many of whom apparently died of exhaustion and exposure), and all surface soil is worn away exposing the roots of trees. The boots of three members of this patrol of four were rendered unserviceable during the first six hrs of movement over the tk.

A diagram attached as Appendix 2 to this summary illustrates the tortuous nature of the track, and posns which would be suitable as delaying posns. It is considered that the administration of own troops moving over this track would be almost beyond the bounds of possibility - in particular the evacuation of sick or wounded. In an emergency, careful administrative planning would be necessary before movement.

At a point roughly half way along this track it would be possible to move in any direction. For example, towards SKINDIWAI BALLAMS, KAISENIK WAU etc. In addition it is possible to gain observation of the entire BULOLO valley, but close observation is restricted to the portion of track closest to WANDUMI.

(B) Other tracks, Kanaka pads, exist along the tops of almost all ridges crossing and recrossing the JAP track. Commanding the JAP track an enemy could spread in any direction via these tracks and would be difficult to locate. The two most important seem to be:

(i) MOSSY KNOLL to JAP TRACK. This will allow own troops to cut the JAP track at the Eastern end or alternatively to supply a force stationed at HOUSE COPPER.

(ii) GULLET'S TRACK to JAP TRACK This will allow own troops to cut the JAP track at the Western end.

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10. Recommendations

(a) Development of BLACK CAT track as L of C to MUBO area
(b) Development of BLACK CAT area as a secure Coy Base with own dropping area.
(c) Recce and development of a suitable Coy posn on PILIUNG track.
(d) Development of Coy posn HOUSE COPPER area.
(e) Servicing and maintenance L/T BLACK CAT-BUIBAINING
(f) Recce and development track MOSSY KNOLL-HOUSE COPPER.

Intelligence Section
2/5 Aust Inf Bn
17 May 43

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

WD2

SECRET.

17 AUST INFANTRY BRIGADE OPERATION ORDER No.1 Copy No.: 15

Ref map: MUBO 1:25000. 2 Jul 43.

INFORMATION

1. ENEMY

The enemy are occupying positions in the PIMPLE - GREEN HILL - KITCHEN CREEK - OBSERVATION HILL areas and along track running NORTH from MUBO airfield to junction BITOI RIVER - BUIGAP CREEK.

2. OWN TROOPS

(a) During 1 Jul 15 Aust Infantry Brigade continued attack against BOBDUBI RIDGE and ORODUBI. B Company 58/59 Aust Infantry Battalion is moving EAST down subsidiary spur of BOBDUBI RIDGE in an endeavour to cut enemy Lines of Communication in vicinity 706966.

(b) 162 US Regiment Combat Team landed on beach NASSAU BAY night 29/30 Jun and by 0930 hrs had command of beach SOUTH of BITOI SOUTH ARM to mouth of TABALI RIVER.

3. AIR

Requests for Air Support as per Operation Instruction No.9.

INTENTION

4. 17 Aust Infantry Brigade will capture OBSERVATION HILL.

METHOD

5. OBJECTIVES

(a) OBSERVATION HILL on general line VIALS TRACK. To include the kunai patches in the area 683869, the track junctions at 683864 and 684867 and the area 684859.

(b) Ridge between BUI SAVELLA CREEK and KITCHEN CREEK. To include 687876, 693875 and 694873.

6. TROOPS

(a) Two rifle companies forward )
One rifle company reserve )
4 Mortars 3-inch ) 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion
4 Medium machine guns )

with under comd:

One section 1 Aust Mountain Battery
One company 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion for LEFT flank protection.

(b) In support:

One rifle company 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion)
2 Mortars 3-inch " " " " ) MAT MAT area.

7. ACTION ON GAINING OBJECTIVES

(a) Consolidate and dig-in in positions captured.

(b) Mop up KITCHEN CREEK to BITOI RIVER and WOODY ISLAND.

(c) Mop up BUI SAVELLA CREEK to BUIGAP CREEK.

(d) Contact US troops in proximity footbridges 696873 and 697875.

2/

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8. ASSEMBLY AREAS

(a) One company 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion ) REEVES OP - BULAPAL
Two companies 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion) CREEK area.

(b) Move to assembly area to be completed 3 Jul 43.

(c) All movement to BULAPAL CREEK will be made prior to ZERO and without being observed by the enemy.

9. ZERO - 1200 hrs 5 Jul 43.

10. MEDIUM MACHINE GUNS

One section - MAT MAT

NOT more than 10,000 rounds per gun to be used on tasks allotted.

10,000 rounds per gun will be reserved for Defensive Fire tasks.

One section in reserve on HILL 7

Retain 5,000 rounds per gun for Defensive Fire tasks.

11. MORTARS

(a) 6 mortars only will be used.

(b) NOT more than 70 bombs per mortar to be used for fire plan to support attack.

(c) 50 bombs per mortar will be reserved for Defensive Fire tasks.

12. SUPPORT INFANTRY

One company 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion on opportunity targets on lower slopes GARRISON HILL in vicinity old huts and MUBO track.

13. RESERVE

2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion (less two companies and two mortars) GUADAGASAL area.

14. DURATION AND RATE OF FIRE FOR DEFENSIVE FIRE TASKS

The following rates will be fired on call for Defensive Fire and will be repeated on each call:

2 minutes RAPID.
2 minutes NORMAL.

ARTILLERY

15. 218 Field Artillery Battalion less A Battery

(a) Support attack of 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion from Zero minus 120 to Zero with harassing fire on the following targets:

(i) GREEN HILL - PIMPLE area.

(ii) Line of BUIGAP CREEK NORTH from junction BITOI RIVER to BUI SAVELLA CREEK.

Total ammunition expenditure 400 rounds.

(b) Reserve for tasks as required.

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RCDIG1024069

SECRET

16. One section 1 Aust Mountain Battery

Ammunition expenditure will be limited as follows:

(a) 5 Jul 43 - Fire plan 80 rounds per gun.
Opportunity targets 20 rounds per gun.

(b) 6 Jul 43 - Fire plan 50 rounds per gun.
Opportunity targets 20 rounds per gun.

Expenditure will not exceed the above figures without reference to Brigade HQ.

17. ARTILLERY REGISTRATION

(a) 218 Field Artillery Battalion less A Battery

Register area on 4 Jul 43. NOT more than 10 rounds per gun for registration.

(b) One section 1 Aust Mountain Battery

Register area on 4 Jul 43. NOT more than 5 rounds per gun for registration.

AIR

18. At 0930 hrs 5 Jul 43, 2,000-lb bombs on KITCHEN CREEK - BUIGAP CREEK. Also bombs on OBSERVATION HILL and WOODY ISLAND.

INTERCOMMUNICATION

19. BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS - Located HOUSE MANGO.

20. ALLOTMENT OF WIRELESS TELEPHONY SETS

One 208 Wireless Telephony set with each attacking company of 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion.
One 208 Wireless Telephony set with one company 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion.

21. WIRELESS SILENCE - Wireless silence until ZERO.

22. SYNCHRONISATION

K Section Signals will synchronise watches at -

4 Jul 43 - 1600 hrs
1900 hrs
2300 hrs

5 Jul 43 - 0400 hrs
0800 hrs

23. SUCCESS SIGNAL - GREEN RED GREEN.
To be fired only on completion of capture of each first and second objectives.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Time of signature 0955 hrs

Date 2 July 43

A. McKell

MAJ.

BM 17 AUST INF BDE.

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| DISTRIBUTION | Copy No. | Method of Distribution |
|---|---|---|
| 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion | 1 | Safe Hand |
| 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion | 2 | LO |
| 162 US Regiment | 3-4 | LO |
| One section 1 Aust Mountain Battery | 5 | Safe Hand |
| 218 Field Artillery Battalion | 6 | LO |
| 15 Aust Infantry Brigade | 7 | ~~Safe Hand~~ DRLS |
| 2/2 Aust Field Ambulance | 8 | Hand |
| 3 Aust Division | 9 | DRLS |
| Commander | 10 | |
| Staff Captain | 11 | |
| Brigade Signal Officer | 12 | |
| Artillery Liaison Officer | 13 | |
| War Diary | 14-15 | |
| File | 16-17 | |
| Spares | 18-19 | |

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

SECRET

17 AUST INFANTRY BRIGADE OPERATION INSTRUCTION No.9 Copy No.: 13

POSTERN Operation 6 Jun 43.

Ref Maps: NG SALAMAUA 1:25000 1st edition
NG KOMIATUM 1:25000 1st edition
NG MUBO 1:25000 2nd edition
ADDENDUM 3 enlarged to 1:25000 from BADEN BAY WEST 1:63360.

INFORMATION

1. ENEMY

(a) Strength - It has been estimated that enemy in MUBO - KOMIATUM area approximated 1100 at 29 May. This force is believed to comprise 1 and 2 Battalions of 102 Regiment which has probably absorbed remnants of 115 Regiment (from BISMARCK SEA BATTLE March 43) and reinforcements for 144 Regiment which arrived in LAE with 102 Regiment in January 43. There has been some recent movement on Lines of Communication from SALAMAUA but this is probably balanced by enemy casualties incurred in attack on LABABIA RIDGE 9-11 May. Enemy force at DUALI and NASSAU BAY is estimated to be 200.

(b) Dispositions in MUBO - KOMIATUM area are believed to be along the line of BUIGAP CREEK with most forward areas OBSERVATION HILL - KITCHEN CREEK - GREEN HILL and PIMPLE. It is probable that OBSERVATION HILL is held by one company with a possible two companies on GREEN HILL and PIMPLE. Available enemy information of these areas is shown on Sketch Map attached as Appendix "A".

(c) Reinforcements - SALAMAUA garrison is believed to approximate 2600 with a further 500 (3 Battalion 102 Regiment) in BOBDUBI RIDGE area. It is considered that neither of these forces could afford to reinforce MUBO area, however it is possible to bring reinforcements from outside by submarine and barge. This may have already been effected - reference recent movement on Lines of Communication KOMIATUM - MUBO.

2. OWN TROOPS

(a) 15 Aust Infantry Brigade Group

Comprises: HQ 15 Aust Infantry Brigade
L Section Signals 3 Aust Division
58/59 Aust Infantry Battalion
2/3 Aust Independent Company
One company 24 Aust Infantry Battalion.

Tasks

(i) To capture and hold BOBDUBI RIDGE.

(ii) After consolidating on BOBDUBI RIDGE to exploit SOUTH and capture and hold KOMIATUM.

(iii) To create a diversion in the MOLOLO area NORTH WEST of SALAMAUA by a raid by a force not exceeding 20, on known enemy dispositions in that area

2/

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2. (Contd)

(b) 24 Aust Infantry Battalion less one company

Tasks

(i) To prevent enemy from entering the BULOLO VALLEY through the MARKHAM area.

(ii) Provide a strong fighting patrol on coastal track near the mouth of BUANG RIVER, to prevent enemy movement along this track in either direction.

(c) 17 Aust Infantry Brigade Group

Comprising: HQ 17 Aust Infantry Brigade
K Section Signals 6 Aust Division
2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion
2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion
One section 1 Aust Mountain Battery

in addition, 162 US Regiment Combat Team.

The Combat Team comprises:
1 Battalion 162 US Regiment
218 Field Artillery Battalion less A Battery
One Field Company Engineers (less detachment)
Forward Medical detachment
Administrative and Maintenance detachments.

3. AIR

(a) Air support will be available. A definite air plan will precede commencement of operations. Requests for impromptu air support will be forwarded through normal channels to HQ 17 Aust Infantry Brigade.

(b) Until US Combat Team comes under command 17 Aust Infantry Brigade, they are requesting air support through their own channels to 5 Air Force. When under command the instruction in 3(a) above will apply.

(c) Requests for Tactical Reconnaissance, Photo Reconnaissance, Artillery Reconnaissance may be made through HQ 17 Aust Infantry Brigade. One Flight 4 Air Co-operation Squadron are providing sorties for these tasks.

INTENTION

4. 17 Aust Infantry Brigade Group will clear the enemy from MUBO area and drive forward to MOUNT JAMBU with a view to exploiting via tracks of access to LOKANU to the line of FRANCISCO RIVER.

METHOD

5. The operations will be carried out in five phases.

6. PHASE 1 - LANDING AT DUALI - NASSAU BAY

(a) Troops - 162 US Regiment Combat Team.

(b) Tasks.

(i) To land and establish beachhead in NASSAU BAY.

(ii) To push forward to assembly area at junction BITOI - BUYAWIM RIVERS.

(iii) To clear enemy from DUALI and villages at NASSAU BAY.



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6. (Contd)

(c) Command

Combat Team will come under command 17 Aust Infantry Brigade on arrival at NASSAU BAY.

(d) Support

To assist Combat Team during the landing, one company 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion will make a demonstration on track leading from coast to draw the enemy inland and will defend the beach from flank attacks.

7. PHASE 2 - CAPTURE OF OBSERVATION HILL AND BITOI RIDGE.

(a) OBSERVATION HILL

Troops - 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion, with under command one company 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion.

Tasks

(i) Capture OBSERVATION HILL.

(ii) After carrying out task (i), consolidate and dig in on OBSERVATION HILL.

(iii) Capture ridge between BUI SAVELLA CREEK and KITCHEN CREEK.

(iv) Exploit along BUI SAVELLA CREEK and KITCHEN CREEK to BUIGAP CREEK and track through MUBO VALLEY to THE ARCHWAYS.

(v) Patrol aggressively SOUTH of PIMPLE.

After completion of Phase 2, one company 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion will revert to command 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion.

(b) BITOI RIDGE

Troops - 1 Battalion 162 US Regiment (plus attachments).

Tasks

(i) Capture BITOI RIDGE.

(ii) Capture ridges to the WEST and NORTH of BITOI RIDGE and consolidate on these ridges.

(iii) Exploit to BUIGAP CREEK.

8. PHASE 3 - CAPTURE OF GREEN HILL AND PIMPLE

Troops - 1 Battalion 162 US Regiment
2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion.

Tasks

Plan will be issued by HQ 17 Aust Infantry Brigade and will be dependent on results of reconnaissance and actual dispositions of troops on completion of Phase 2.



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9. On completion Phase 3 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion will prepare to move forward in support of 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion. 1 Battalion 162 US Regiment will become Brigade Reserve.

10. PHASE 4 - EXPLOITATION NORTHWARDS TOWARDS KOMIATUM AND NORTH EAST TOWARDS LOKANU.

(a) Troops - 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion.

(b) Tasks

(i) Drive forward from MUBO area through 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion via VIAL'S TRACK and main KOMIATUM - MUBO TRACK and occupy MOUNT TAMBU.

(ii) Contact 15 Aust Infantry Brigade at KOMIATUM.

(iii) Consolidate and dig in on MOUNT TAMBU. Site defences in co-ordination with 15 Aust Infantry Brigade's defence plans.

(iv) Patrol along tracks of access towards LOKANU.

11. PHASE 5 - CAPTURE OF RIDGE RUNNING NORTH-SOUTH TO THE WEST OF LOKANU

(a) Troops - At this juncture the unit or units which will carry out this phase cannot be determined.

(b) Tasks

(i) Drive forward along the high ground leading NORTH EAST towards LOKANU and NUK NUK.

(ii) Capture and consolidate LOKANU.

(iii) Capture BOISI.

(iv) Clear enemy from SOUTH of FRANCISCO RIVER.

12. ARTILLERY

Artillery support will be provided as follows:-

(a) Phase 1 - 218 Field Artillery Battalion less A Battery.

(b) Phases 2, 3 and 4 - 218 Field Artillery Battalion less A Battery. One section 1 Aust Mountain Battery.

For Phase 4 artillery support will be available for only a short period of the advance due to range limitations.

(c) Phase 5 - Further details at a later date.

13. DATES FOR COMMENCEMENT OF PHASES

(a) Units will be prepared to commence phases on the following days:-

D-1 Commencement demonstration by D Company 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion.

D Day Commencement Phase 1.

D5 Commencement Phase 2.

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13. (a) (Contd)

D9 Commencement Phase 3.

D9 Commencement Phase 4.

Commencement Phase 5 to be determined.

(b) D Day for purposes of planning will be 30 June 43. Actual date of D Day will be advised when known.

(c) Commencement of Phases 2, 3 and 4 are all relative to D Day, as indicated. However, the days indicated for these phases may vary according to the tactical situation.

14. PLANNING

This instruction indicates the task of units and briefly the Brigade intention. It will thus assist unit commanders in their planning. All phases and tasks (except Phase 1) will be the subject of operation orders which will be issued subsequently.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Time of signature 2030 hrs

15 June 43 date

[illegible]

BRIG.

COMD 17 AUST INF BDE.

DISTRIBUTION

| | COPY No. Appx "A" | | METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2/5 Aust Infantry Battalion | 1 | 1 | Hand |
| 2/6 Aust Infantry Battalion | 2 | 2 | DRLS |
| One section 1 Aust Mountain Battery | 3 | 3 | DRLS |
| 1 Battalion 162 US Regiment | 4-5 | 4-5 | Hand |
| 15 Aust Infantry Brigade | 6 | 6 | Through 3 Aust Div |
| 3 Aust Division | 7 | 7 | Hand |
| Commander | 8 | 8 | " |
| Brigade Major | 9 | 9 | " |
| Staff Captain | 10 | 10 | |
| Brigade Signal Officer | 11 | 11 | |
| War Diary | 12-13 | 12-13 | |
| File | 14-15 | 14-15 | |
| Spares | 16-17 | 16-17 | |

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069

# — ENEMY INFORMATION MUBO AREA —

17 AUST. INF. BDE. O.I. No. 9.
APPENDIX "A"

SECRET

R.F. 1:12500




- 3 TUNNELS, TENT, HUT. 20 MAY
- 7. 2 MAN WEAPON PITS COOKHOUSE MUCH MOVT. 31 MAY
- BAMBOO COVERED POSN.
- AMBUSH POSN. 2 MAN W/P MUCH MOVEMENT 31 MAY
- OLD AMBUSH POSN. RECENTLY OCCUPIED
- EARTHWORKS
- RAISED EMPLACENT APPROX. 2'6" COMMANDS TRACK
- AT LEAST 3 W/P & SMALL CAMFLG STRUCTURES. CLOSELY GROUPED
- EARTH WORKS
- AMBUSH POSN. EST. 20 JAPS
- LOGS ACROSS TRACK 29 MAY.
- WATER POINT
- SENTRY IN POSN 20 MAY
- M.M.G. POSN WITH A/A MOUNTING.
- SENTRY IN POSN 17 MAY.
- HUT AND 3 W/P NOT USED
- 5 W/P NOT USED 20 MAY.
- UNOCCUPIED HUTS

- FIRES INDICATING BIVOUAC AREA 1 JUNE.
- TERMINAL STORE
- MORTAR POSN
- ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS
- JAPS CROSS REGULARLY
- SUSPECTED POSN. 70 M.M. GUN
- ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS
- MORTAR POSN.?
- M.M.G. POSN
- ENEMY FORMING UP AREA
- FIRES SEEN NEARLY EVERY NIGHT
- 5 W/P AND FURTHER DIGGING 25 MAY
- STRONGLY HELD BY 8 LMG'S AND 2 M.M.G's.
- FIRES SEEN FIRST TIME 25 MAY
- SUSPECTED AMBUSH POSN (P/)
- LOG BRRRICADE 2 W/P 18 MAY.
- 2 W/P (OLD)

ENLARGED FROM SVY MAP
MUBO 1:25000 DATED 10 MAY 43.

Scale: 1:12,500

Yds. 500 0 500 Yds.

DRAWN BY
INT SEC 17 AUST INF BDE
15 JUNE 43.

AUSTRALIAN WAR MEMORIAL RCDIG1024069