


AWM52  
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,  
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

# 1/4/1 CORPS

1 Australian Corps  
General Branch (1 Aust  
Corps 'G' Branch)

December 1940-January 1941




1/4/1-004/

INTELLIGENCE LOG DIARY.

1 Aus. Corps.

Date. 5. Jan. 41.....

Serial No.	File	From	Information and Instructions Received	Action
PALESTINE		4 Dec 40	<p>DUTY STAFF OFFICERS' DIARY from 5 Sep 40 to 26 Jan 41</p> <p>1 AUST CORPS GS CIRCULARS covering period 4 Dec 40-18 Jan 41.</p> <p>Subject matter as follows :-</p> <p>Vehicle marking in War</p> <p>Instructions to Duty Staff Officers- HQ 1 Aust Corps</p> <p>Abbreviated titles, addresses and other abbreviations for use in the field and during training.</p> <p>Organization, AIF-MIDDLE EAST.</p> <p>Correspondence- Receipt &amp; Delivery</p> <p>Detector Paint No. 1</p> <p>Mobile School of Mechanization- AASC.</p> <p>Security Instructions.</p> <p>" Duties GAZA Area.</p> <p>PAD Scheme- GAZA Town Area and GAZA Airport.</p> <p>Safeguarding Secret documents.</p> <p>Certain Officers to be able to drive a Motor vehicle.</p> <p>Duty Staff Officers, HQ 1 Aust Corps-Amendment to No. 33.</p> <p>AIF Schools &amp; Courses- Reports on Students.</p> <p>Re promiscuous firing of rifles by guards- Military Camps.</p> <p>Re telephone and volume of traffic thereon in GAZA Area.</p> <p>Aust HQ Gd Bn</p> <p>Coast watching "Bird" plan.</p> <p>Vehicle marking in War and addendum to No 30.</p> <p>Detection of False Enemy Wireless Messages.</p> <p>Appendix "A" to Instn No. 50.</p>	<p>Appendix 1</p> <p>" 2</p>
do		Dec 40	Congestion of Military telephone system in PALESTINE- by Force HQ	" 3
do		1 Dec 40	1 Aust Corps Int Reviews from 1 Dec 40-25 Jan 41	" 4
do		1 Dec 40	1 Aust Corps Int Summaries from 1 Dec 40 -27 Jan 41/	" 5
do		10 Dec 40	1 Aust Corps OP.Instn No. 1 to 7 Aust Div	" 6



# INTELLIGENCE LOG DIARY.

1 Aus. Corps.

Date.....

Serial No.	File	From	Information and Instructions Received	Action
PALESTINE		14 Dec 40	Courses- CHIROPODY	Appendix 7
do		17 Dec 40	Admin Instn No 3- HQ Base & L of C Units-AIF- Nile steamer"Victoria"	" 8
do		18 " "	1 Aust Corps Order of Battle & Location Statements	" 9
do		18 " "	WE- HQ of a Depot Bn	" 10
do		20 " "	Tng in Aiming at Aircraft <sup>in</sup> Actual flight.	" 11
do		27 Dec 40	HQ Base & L of C Units- Circular No. A1 - A.C.F.	" 12
do		31 " "	Jan Convoy from Australia	" 13
do		1 Jan 41	Programme for visit of Minister for the Army and CGS to PALESTINE	" 14
do		3 " "	S.A. Tng- Range Courses (War)	" 15
do		6 " "	Changes in O of B- AIF	" 16
do		9 " "	Address by Corps Commander	" 17
do		9 " "	Jan Convoy from Australia	" 18
do		10 " "	Tng in Aiming at Aircraft in Actual flight-	" 19
do		Jan 41	Order of Battle- 1 Aust Corps- Amendment No. 3.	" 20
do		22 " "	Interference with crashed and captured aircraft	" 21
do		23 " "	Move of two coys of Aust HQ Gd Bn	" 22
do		24 " "	Booby Traps	" 23
do		25 " "	Allotment of Unit Serial Numbers	" 24.

5 Feb 41

*W. H. H. H. H. H.*  
Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

EX 865



SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

HEADQUARTERS,  
A.I.F. (ME)

24 Jun 41.

TO: GOC AIF (ME)  
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WAR DIARY - I AUST CORPS CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

One copy of the above is forwarded for your information.

I Aust Corps have advised that they have distributed single copies to NZEF, 6, 7, 8, 9 Aust Div and two copies to Records, Rear Echelon. This HQ has distributed copies as under:-

Army HQ	10
GHQ ME	6
HQ BTE	2

*A. G. Blaham*

G.S. H.Q. A.I.F. Major  
(ME)

REPORT ON OPERATIONS ANZAC CORPS

during the Campaign in GREECE - 1941.

*where it had remained after the recent completion of the Italian campaign*  
1. The decision to despatch an Expeditionary Force to GREECE was made during February 1941 at which time 6 Australian Division was in CYRENAICA and 7 and 9 Australian Divisions were completing their concentration and training in PALESTINE.

The initial Force decided on was one Armoured Brigade from British Service, two Australian and one New Zealand Divisions. 6 and 7 Australian Divisions were selected as being the best trained and equipped. *After some discussion it was decided to relieve 6th Australian Division in CYRENAICA by 9th Australian Division so that the former would be at once available to proceed to GREECE. It was to be followed later by 7th Australian Division which was to be completed with equipment & have a short period of training with it.*

2. The order of despatch of the British Expeditionary Force from its base in EGYPT was, - 1 Arm'd Bde, - NZ Div, and 6 Aust Div. In order to have first hand knowledge of the country and the military problems before the completion of concentration, I arranged to arrive in GREECE in advance of 6th Australian Division. I left ALEXANDRIA with my personal staff and BGS on 18th March and arrived at ATHENS on 19th March. The period between my arrival and the opening of my Headquarters on 5th April was spent in discussions with Senior British and Greek Commanders and in visiting the possible area of operations.

3. To appreciate the subsequent operations of ANZAC CORPS in their proper perspective some information on the theatre of operations and general plan of campaign is essential at this stage of the despatch.

TOPOGRAPHY.

*General*  
4. The position selected for defence ran from the AEGEAN at MT. OLYMPUS Northwestwards to the YUGOSLAV frontier. It had great natural defensive strength and could only be penetrated in strength through certain defiles. From South to North these were as follows :-

(a) The Coastal pass East of MT. OLYMPUS through which runs the railway from ATHENS to SALONIKA.

(b) The KATERINI PASS running from KATERINI to ELASSON.

(c) The VERRIA PASS which carries the road from SALONIKA to KOZANI.

(d) The EDESSA PASS through which runs the road from SALONIKA to FLORINA.

5. These passes, with the exception of that at EDESSA and the country in between them, were of a formidable nature and were capable of being held with the minimum number of troops. The EDESSA PASS was easier, but its successful defence depended *on the strength available to hold it.* The weakness of the position was in the North, as a German move through YUGOSLAVIA would turn the left flank and allow enemy movement Southward through the well known MONASTIR GAP which runs Southward from MONASTIR across the YUGOSLAV frontier down to SERBIA on the R. ALIAKMON. If it were necessary, as subsequently proved the case, to give up the line of the Passes, the River ALIAKMON provided a second powerful defensive position.

6. The lines of communication forward from the base at ATHENS were confined to a single railway line and one main road with very few alternative routes. In both cases these could be considered as

*many places*

*passed through deep*

defiles which could be subjected to intense enemy air attack at vital points.

#### PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

7. The Greek Government had decided not to hold EASTERN THRACE, but to fight a ~~delaying action~~ with the EASTERN MACEDONIAN Army of four Divisions on a general line running from KAVALLA on the AEGEAN SEA to the RUPEL PASS on the BULGARIAN frontier. For the defence of the OLYMPUS line there were available, in addition to the Imperial Troops, 12th and 20th Greek Divisions, the whole comprising the Central Macedonian Army.

8. The plan for the defence of the OLYMPUS line envisaged 1st Armoured Brigade (Brig H.V.S. Charrington M.C.) imposing the maximum delay in the broad valley of River AXIOS and then withdrawing through the EDESSA PASS to cover the left flank about FLORINA. NEW ZEALAND Division (Maj-General B.C. Freyberg V.C., C.B., D.S.O.) was to hold the Coastal Pass and the KATERINI PASS, and 6th Australian Division (Maj-General Sir Iven Mackay, K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.) the VERRIA PASS, 12th and 20th Greek Divisions were to hold the EDESSA PASS, but the former, at the commencement of hostilities, was largely dispersed in the VERRIA PASS, awaiting relief by 6th Australian Division.

#### ENEMY FORCES AVAILABLE.

9. By the end of March, the Germans had 24 Divisions on the Southern BULGARIAN Frontier, facing GREECE, and YUGOSLAVIA. Of these, 6 Divisions faced EASTERN THRACE, 7 CENTRAL THRACE, 6 NORTHERN MACEDONIA and 5, the Eastern frontier of YUGOSLAVIA. During the operations under review, ANZAC CORPS came into contact with ~~at least~~ 7 1/2 Divisions.

#### AIR FORCES.

10. Although the air component for the Expeditionary Force was fixed at 23 Squadrons RAF, the maximum strength available in GREECE was never more than eight Squadrons. The Greek Air Force was small and comprised many different types.

Against this, the German Air Force was initially estimated at 60 Squadrons, and it was realised that this very greatly superior force could, if necessary, be readily reinforced from Central and Western Europe.

#### OPERATIONS - PHASES.

11. <sup>five</sup> The operations of the ANZAC CORPS can be conveniently divided into ~~four~~ phases :-

(a) *Initial Phase Distribution.*

(b) The operations around FLORINA and the withdrawal to the line of the R. ALIAKMON.

(c) The operations on the OLYMPUS-R. ALIAKMON line and the withdrawal to the THERMOPYLAI line.

(d) The operations on the THERMOPYLAI line and the final withdrawal to the beaches.

(e) The evacuation from GREECE.

42

14 The initial distribution of the Central Macedonian Army was affected <sup>greatly</sup> ~~considerably~~ by the necessity <sup>which</sup> ~~of~~ that it was essential to protect the railway which ran <sup>north from LARISSA</sup> round the coast east of MITOLYMPUS and thence north and east west through the EDESSA Pass, and to protect KATERINI as a rail head. This was the only line of <sup>communication</sup> ~~the railway~~ in the area. The Greek troops were distributed for this task prior to our arrival on a long front. The New Zealand Div. took over <sup>the front line</sup> ~~the~~ front and the division was strung out over nearly 20000 thirty thousand yards of front. ~~Although~~ a gap of some thousands of yards separated it from the 12<sup>th</sup> Greek Division to the north. <sup>any serious</sup> ~~any~~ The impossibility of ~~this~~ preventing ~~a determined~~ <sup>an</sup> attack from breaking through was obvious. I urged that the Division be withdrawn and the mountain masses be utilized to <sup>obstruct</sup> ~~accommodate~~ the ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> economic <sup>army</sup> ~~army~~ forces. This was agreed to on 24th and vide notes of interview with Gen. Wilson attached Appendix B?) Unfortunately ~~for reasons~~ <sup>this</sup> ~~intention to me~~ <sup>it</sup> was not carried out until after I took command of the Army Corps on April 5<sup>th</sup>. In the meantime the New Zealand Div. worked strenuously to strengthen their positions <sup>as regards the passes</sup> ~~which~~ <sup>it became</sup> obvious that the withdrawal had to take place. All this valuable effort was practically wasted and valuable time lost which might have made the passes ~~strategically~~ <sup>practically</sup> impregnable.



THE OPERATIONS AROUND FLORINA AND THE WITHDRAWAL TO THE  
LINE OF THE R. ALIAKMON.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION.

12. Headquarters 1st Australian Corps opened at GERANIA on 5th April and assumed command of all Imperial troops in the area from the AEGEAN SEA East of MT. OLYMPUS to the VERRIA PASS. At this time the concentration of New Zealand Division was almost completed, but only 16th Australian Brigade Group (Brig A.S. Allen, C.B.E., D.S.O.) of 6th Australian Division had arrived. This Brigade was then in process of relieving elements of 12th Greek Division in the VERRIA PASS.

13. Headquarters, 6th Australian Division arrived in the forward area on 6th April together with the 19th Australian Brigade Group (Brig G.A. Vasey, C.B.E., D.S.O.) which, however, was still short of one of its battalions. Maj-General Mackay was given the task of the defence of the VERRIA PASS and orders issued for a further relief of units of 12th Greek Division by 19th Australian Brigade Group.

14. → 15. ~~13.~~ Germany invaded GREECE AND YUGOSLAVIA on 5th April. By the morning of 8th April it became clear that YUGOSLAV resistance in the South had collapsed and that there was no opposition to the German advance from MONASTIR Southwards. At a conference held at HQ 1st Australian Corps at 1000 hrs it was decided to cancel any further relief of 12th Greek Division in the VERRIA PASS by units of 6th Australian Division and to form a Force about VEVE under Maj-General Mackay comprising 19th Australian Infantry Brigade (less one battalion), 2/3 Aust Fd Regt, 1 Aust Anti-tank Regt and ancillary units. In addition, the following moves were ordered :-

- (a) 1st Armoured Brigade to blow its demolitions in the AXIOS Valley and withdraw to AMYNTAION on night 8/9th April, coming under orders of Maj-General Mackay.
- (b) Maj-General Freyberg to <sup>ADC</sup> move 4th NZ Brigade Group (Brig E. Puttick D.S.O.) from KATERINI to SERVIA, to protect the mouth of the SERVIA PASS and to form the pivot on which any subsequent withdrawal from the North could be based. At the same time NZ Division was warned to be ready to move a second Brigade Group South of the KATERINI PASS.
- (c) HQ 1st Australian Corps to control directly 12th Greek Division as well as other Imperial Troops in the area.
- (d) HQ British Troops in GREECE to control General Mackay's Force.

The above moves were completed by the morning of the 10th April. It is not proposed further to narrate the operations of General Mackay's Force in this phase. The details are included in the narrative of operations of 6th Australian Division, which is included as an Appendix to this despatch.

16. 14. There was no contact with the enemy on the front of <sup>south eastern portion of the</sup> 1st Australian Corps until the afternoon of 12th April, when NZ Div Cav Regt holding the R. ALIAKMON near the coast encountered elements of a German Armoured Division. There was also isolated patrol activity in the vicinity of VERRIA.

By this time it was realised that General Mackay's force could only be regarded as a temporary stop gap, and arrangements were co-ordinated for the withdrawal of the Central Macedonian Army to the MT. OLYMPUS-R. ALIAKMON line. This line covered the passes East and West of MT OLYMPUS, and then ran to SERVIA. It then crossed the R. ALIAKMON in a North Westerly direction and included the high

*and the enemy attacked this front during the night on the same day*

*In order to maintain the unity of the national forces the 12th & 20th Greek Div were moved west to join the Greek Army and in rear of Gen Mackay's Force. Gen Mackay then withdrew south and his withdrawal was covered by 1st Romanian Bde.*

ground to the East of that river up to the ALBANIAN lakes.

The frontage allotted to 1st Australian Corps was from the sea on the right to a point about 8 miles North West of SERVIA on the left, where a junction was to be made with the right flank of 12th Greek Division.

17 15. On 12th April the title of 1st Australian Corps was changed to ANZAC CORPS, the messages which passed between General Freyberg and myself being attached ~~as an~~ Appendix. This change was appreciated by all in the Corps.

18 16. The withdrawal to the OLYMPUS-R.ALIAKMON line commenced on night 11/12th April and was completed by dawn on 13th April. In so far as ANZAC CORPS was concerned the movement was as follows :-

- (a) NZ Division (less 4th Brigade Group already at SERVIA) to withdraw behind KETERINI, holding the pass with one Inf Bde and imposing the maximum delay with mobile troops. The Coastal Pass was, naturally, to continue to be held.
- (b) 16th Australian Inf Bde to move by march route from the VERRIA PASS across the R. ALIAKMON and thence up on to the mountains to prolong the right flank of the Force at SERVIA.
- (c) 19th Australian Inf Bde, if able to disengage, at VEVE, to hold that portion of the left of the Corps front North of the R. ALIAKMON.
- (d) The remainder of the troops under Maj-General Mackay to move via SERVIA to positions South of R.ALIAKMON to support 19th Australian and 4th NZ Brigades. General Mackay was then to command all troops in the SERVIA area.

*and withdrew under cover of 1st Romanian Bde*  
19 17. In spite of being nearly attacked on the afternoon of 12th April, 19th Australian Inf Bde was able to disengage, although not without considerable losses. As there was at that time no bridge over R. ALIAKMON in rear of its position, it moved into its new area from the front. Arrangements had already been made to dump considerable reserves of food and ammunition in this area to meet the situation until a bridge could be erected. It was, however, realised that this section of the front could not be adequately protected with two depleted battalions, and a NZ Bn and one coy of 2/1 Aust MG Bn were put across the river in assault boats on the afternoon of 13th April to reinforce Brig Vasey's Force.

20 18. In the meantime, 12th Greek Division had withdrawn Westwards via KOZANI to its new area, and 16th Aust Inf Bde had commenced its long march. Owing to the complete absence of roads, all unit transport had been withdrawn and a limited number of pack donkeys allotted to each unit for the carriage of some of its heavier stores. It was, however, necessary for all weapons and ammunition to be carried, as well as a reduced quantity of food and blankets. The country traversed by this Brigade is mountainous and difficult and a great part of the march was carried out in bitterly cold weather with snow on the upper levels. The distances covered varied between 50 and 70 miles, and although there was no pressure by the enemy, this ~~travel~~ *travel withdrawal* must rank high as a feat of endurance and perseverance.

#### THE OPERATIONS ON THE OLYMPUS-R.ALIAKMON LINE AND THE WITHDRAWAL TO THE THERMOPYLAI LINE

21 19. On 14th April ANZAC CORPS was holding its allotted front on OLYMPUS-R.ALIAKMON line, although 16th Aust Inf Bde was not yet complete in its new area. Advanced elements of a German Armoured Division made contact about SERVIA, but there was very little real

pressure against an immensely strong natural defensive position.

This day was notable for two events --

- (a) The penetration by German forces, striking West from PTOLEMAIS, of the Greek position in the KLEISOURA PASS: this led directly to the decision to withdraw to the THERMOPYLAE line.
- (b) The commencement of intense aerial attacks by the Germans Air Force against troops in position or in movement and against lines of communications. This was to persist until the evacuation, with ever decreasing resistance from the RAF.

20.4 The remaining troops of 6 Aust Div comprising 17th Aust Inf Bde (Brig S.G. Savage, D.S.O., M.C.) one battalion of 19th Aust Inf Bde, and certain divisional troops ~~back by this time~~ arrived in GREECE and were being sent forward to LARISSA as opportunity offered. As the front was reasonably strong, it was decided to protect the left flank of ANZAC CORPS by constituting a Force in the vicinity of KALABAKA under Brig Savage, with the tasks of stopping any enemy advance from the North West or West and of supporting 1st Armoured Bde which was by this time in the GREVENA area. ~~had withdrawn westward through the passes and was now in the GREVENA area~~

In addition the NZ Div Cav Regt was moved West from ELASSON towards KARPERON to deny this route to the Germans.

21.4 There was little enemy pressure on the front of ANZAC CORPS except, as will be seen later, on the extreme right. An attempt was made by a battalion of the 9th German Armoured Division on morning of 15th April to rush the head of the SERVIA PASS, but the enemy were caught at daylight under close range small arms fire and the personnel were all killed or taken prisoner. There was also some minor activity on the front of NZ Div in the KATERINI PASS.

22.4 As a consequence of the German break through at KLEISOURA, and the threat to the left flank of the Imperial Forces, it was decided late on 14th April not to offer prolonged resistance on the OLYMPUS- R. ALIAKMON line, but to withdraw as soon as possible to a shorter line covering the THERMOPYLAE-BRAILOS and DELPHI passes, the position being generally known as the THERMOPYLAE line. *The conduct of the operation was entrusted to the 6th Aust Corps in order to leave the 9th Aust Div free to meet the highest and often difficult task of increasing in ATHENS*

The main essentials of the plan were as follows :-

- (a) *First Rear Guard* 6th NZ Inf Bde Group (Brig H.E. Barraclough D.S.O., M.C.) to move on night 15/16th April to hold a position astride the circle of roads from ELASSON to TYRNAVOS to cover the first withdrawal of the troops from the KATERINI and SERVIA Passes. (One) Aust Fd Regt was attached to this rear guard.
- (b) *Second Rear Guard* 19th Aust Bde Gp with its attached NZ Bn to move on night 15/16th April across the R. ALIAKMON. After crossing, 19th Aust Inf Bde was to move direct to DOMOKOS, North of LAMIA, where it was to form the nucleus of a further rear guard position.
- (c) *Left Flank Guard* 16th Aust Bde Gp to move from its position in the mountains East of SERVIA and to form a left flank guard on the LARISSA-KALABAKA road through which the final withdrawal of 1st Armoured Bde from GREVENA and 17th Aust Bde Gp from KALABAKA was to take place.
- (d) The above moves were designed to clear all troops of 6th Aust Div behind the passes by 0800 hrs 16th April when Commander NZ Division became responsible for the front, and for the withdrawal of his 5th Brigade Group (Brig. Hargest) from KATERINI PASS and 4th NZ Brigade Group from SERVIA through the rear guard position.
- (e) Subject to ability to disengage, the final withdrawal of

HARGEST

the two forward NZ Bde Gps through the rear guard was to be effected on night 17/18th April, as well as that of 17th Aust Bde Gp through the left flank guard.

(f) The rear guard of 6 NZ Bde Gp, the left flank guard of 16 Aust Bde Gp, and the troops holding the Coast at pass East of MT OLYMPUS were to withdraw during night 18/19 April, 1st Armoured Brigade covering the final withdrawal across the flat featureless plain of THESSALY, on 19th April.

(g) From LARISSA to the South, NZ Division was allotted the Coast road via VOLOS to LAMIA and 6 Aust Div and 1st Armoured Brigade the main road via PHARSALA. This was designed to bring NZ Div on the right of the THERMOPYLAE position and 6 Aust Div on the left in the ~~BRILLOS PASS~~

(h) All marching personnel were to be carried in MT.

23. At this stage of the campaign, the Commander, British Troops in GREECE, handed over control of subsequent operations to HQ ANZAC CORPS.

24. During night 15/16th April, information was received which removed any danger of an immediate threat to the left flank. It was established that there were still isolated batches of GREEKS delaying the German advance North of GREVENA, while the heavy rain had turned the dirt roads into quagmires and made the movement of armoured formations most difficult. Two of the four battalions intended for the force under Brig Savage at KALABAKA had been delayed in their forward movement from ATHENS and as they only arrived at LARISSA on the morning of 16th April they were sent back to DOMOKOS where, with 19th Aust Inf Bde they constituted the force, the title being the name of Brig LEE R.A., the CCHA of the ANZAC CORPS. *who had been detailed to form reconnaissance and supply the position and command the Rear Guard.*

25. The right flank covering the Coast at pass East of MT OLYMPUS was held by 21st NZ Bn with a troop of 25-pr guns, and in order to free General Freyberg for the task of withdrawing his division from the forward area, this detachment, at his request, was placed directly under HQ ANZAC CORPS on 15th April.

Late on the evening of 15th April messages were received from the Commanding officer 21 NZ Bn that he was being heavily pressed by infantry and tanks, which were subsequently identified as the leading units of one armoured and one mountain division. Information continued to come in during the night 15/16th April which made it clear that a serious situation was likely to arise in this area. Steps were accordingly taken early on 16th April to cancel the orders for the formation of the left flank guard of 16 Aust Inf Bde West of LARISSA and to divert this Bde, less one battalion to cover the Western exit of the gorge through which the R. PENEIOS runs to the sea. The remaining battalion of 16 Aust Inf Bde was left as a reserve for Maj-General Mackay. In addition, ~~a Senior Officer from HQ ANZAC CORPS~~ was sent to the area to direct the Bn Comd as to his course of action.

German mountain troops succeeded in outflanking this Battalion early on 16th April, and it was compelled to withdraw across the R. PENEIOS thence Westward along the Gorge. It was not heavily engaged for the rest of the day, and by night-fall the arrival of the leading units of 16th Aust Inf Bde had, temporarily at least, restored the situation.

This was the first of the two critical stages of this phase of the campaign, since defeat in this area would have opened the way for a German advance into LARISSA before the main withdrawal had commenced.

26. The transference of the threat from the left flank to the right caused a change in plans from those given in para 23 above. The responsibility for the various detachments was defined late on the night of 16th April as follows :-

(a) Comd 6 Aust Div to be responsible for protection of right and left flanks during the withdrawal of 4th and 5th NZ Bde Gps from SERVIA and KATERINI Passes.

(b) Comd NZ Div to be responsible for the withdrawal of his rear guard- 6th NZ Bde Gp- and then for the withdrawal of the right flank guard under Brig. Allen, which was to take the coast road via VOLOS.

(c) Comd 6 Aust Div to control the withdrawal of the left flank guard and 1st Armoured Brigade through LEE FORCE at DOMOKOS and then for the general withdrawal behind BRAILOS PASS of LEE FORCE itself.

28 27. Rain and low cloud on 17th April enabled 4th and 5th NZ Bdes to disengage from SERVIA and KATERINI without undue difficulty. But the rain made certain sections of the road from LARISSA to VOLOS impassable, and it became necessary to divert all traffic from NZ Division on to the main South road which had been allotted to 6th Australian Division.

Fighter aircraft protection had been asked for over this road during 18th April, but it was not forthcoming and throughout the day columns of MT were subjected to sustained attacks by very heavy concentrations of the German Air Force. Although the material damage was surprisingly small in comparison to the number of vehicles on the road and the scale of the attack, there were serious delays owing to bomb craters in the road, and it appeared at one stage that the final withdrawal might have to be deferred for 24 hours.

29 28. In the meanwhile the enemy had succeeded in pushing some mobile troops and tanks through the SERVIA pass and around the demolitions in the KATERINI pass. ~~There was some pressure on the rear guard of 6th NZ Bde Gp in the ELASSON-TYRNAVOS circle, but the intensity of our artillery fire kept the enemy at a distance until dark and the rear guard was able to disengage and withdraw without incident.~~ *great loss.*

30 29. On the left flank there was at no time any pressure and 17th Aust Inf Bde withdrew without trouble. The right flank was again the critical area. The position as it existed at night-fall on 16th April has been summarised in para 23 above, with 21st NZ Bn fighting back Westwards along the PENEIOS Gorge, and 16 Aust Inf Bde arriving to protect the Western exit of the Gorge.

*Fighting continued on this flank through the gorge*  
~~Enemy pressure was not heavy on 17th April, but~~ *and* fighting patrols sent out on night 17/18th April established the presence of strong enemy forces in the villages on the hills North of the Gorge. The Germans, using elements of one mountain and one armoured division, made a determined effort to break through on the morning of 18th April. It is probable that 21st NZ Bn was first fought out and overrun to a considerable extent. Pressure then came on 2/2 Aust Bn whose main task was to prevent the enemy crossing the R. PENEIOS between their left flank and LARISSA. They were able to hold on in face of a tank attack from the Western end of the Gorge, but by night-fall the situation was still serious, and it was obvious that the programme already made would have to be adhered to, whatever the outcome.

31 30. Actually, the determined resistance offered during this day must have impressed the enemy as his attack was not followed up. The 2/3 Bn was able to disengage, and all except one coy of 2/2 Bn were forced off their line of withdrawal into the hills to the South. Some of the lorries containing personnel were stopped North East of LARISSA and advised that the Germans already had the town. *This, of course, was not the case, but the lorries turned back to the hills South of PENEIOS Gorge, and attempted to reach the Coast by tracks. From here they tried later to get through the German lines to rejoin their units, but were cut off. Some eventually were able to get small*  
*but it is believed that a small enemy party actually reached the LARISSA RD in rear of 16 Aust Bde*

ships to take them off the Greek mainland and then by various means and routes to reach EGYPT.

OPERATIONS ON THE THERMOPYLAI LINE  
AND THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL TO THE BEACHES.

32-31. In spite of a complete monopoly of the air and a determined drive at a vital point, ANZAC CORPS succeeded in withdrawing and establishing itself on the THERMOPYLAI line. Throughout the night 18/19th April an unbroken stream of <sup>unbroken stream</sup> moved down the roads from LARISSA to LAMIA, but there was no attack by the German Air Force during the hours of darkness. Checks to the column were frequent, mainly owing to drivers who had been under strain for <sup>many</sup> ~~several~~ nights, falling asleep and having to be wakened up.

33-32. The main routes into the THERMOPYLAI position were in a reasonable state of defence by the evening of 19th April, by which time all troops, except those cut off at PENEIOS GORGE and the rear-guard of LEE FORCE at DOMOKOS, had cleared the new front. LEE FORCE was not in contact with the enemy on 19 April and as all troops of 6 Aust Div and NZ Div had cleared LAMIA by the evening, the rear guard <sup>comd</sup> blew his demolitions and withdrew his Force during the night 19/20 April, leaving a small rear party covering demolitions in the second Pass immediately North of LAMIA. There was slight pressure from German Mobile troops against this detachment on the afternoon of 20 April, but, as the new line was now <sup>being</sup> ~~well~~ organised, the rear party was withdrawn without incident behind the BRAILOS Pass by nightfall. Incidentally this was the first time during the campaign that Comd, 6 Aust Div had his division concentrated under his orders.

34-33. The main features of the THERMOPYLAI position were the <sup>low</sup> ~~flat~~ Coastal <sup>Pass</sup> ~~Pass~~ along which runs the road from LAMIA to MOLOS and AVANTII? and the precipitous BRAILOS PASS over the Southern feature of the Central Greek Mountain system, which forms part of the main road from ATHENS to the North. Each of these passes required one division for its adequate defence, and while NZ Division was reasonably complete, battle casualties had reduced 6 Aust Div to six bns which could be counted on as fighting units. There was thus no reserve available to Maj-General Mackay or to myself to meet a changed situation, and there were, in addition, the following tactical and strategical disadvantages in the position -

(a) The right flank of NZ Division was enfiladed from across the sea in the vicinity of STYLIS and in only a matter of days they would have been very heavily shelled. The country in the hills in rear of the NZ position was very difficult, and it was almost impossible to find positions for medium artillery from which it could hope to compete with the enemy on anything like equal terms.

(b) Landings on EUBOEIA ISLAND and a threat to the right and rear of the NZ Division were reasonably certain.

(c) The plain of THEBES gave excellent facilities for parachute and air borne landings. Apart from a few carriers there were no troops to watch the area.

(d) <sup>The disintegration of the Greek forces about left</sup> If the Greek centre broke at VARNINA, a way was open into the left rear via the DELPHI PASS. 1

35-34. The Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, arrived at HQ ANZAC CORPS at 0200 hrs on the morning of 21 April and <sup>discovered the position</sup> ~~was advised that evacuation had been decided on.~~ At this stage it was planned to start on 27 April and to spread the embarkation over four nights. <sup>It was</sup> ~~it was clear that ANZAC Corps could not hold off the enemy indefinitely.~~ <sup>decided that ANZAC Corps should be evacuated as soon as possible.</sup> During the morning reports were received from the local Greek authorities that German troops were landing on the Northern end of the Island of EUBOEIA and the NZ Div Cav Regt was ordered to HALKIS. At

At that stage it appeared that evacuation could not commence before 27 April



about mid-day it was learned that the Greek Army in the EPIRUS had capitulated and the way was now clear for the movement of German armoured or motorised formations to move into the left of the position from YANNINA, via DELPHI. Demolitions on the DELPHI PASS were at once put in hand, ~~but no troops were moved from the front until some details of the plan for evacuation had been received.~~ *But no move*

36 35. I attended a conference with General Wilson on the night 21/22nd April when the plan was decided on. The programme had been accelerated and it was the task of ANZAC CORPS to deliver the first troops to the beaches by dawn on 24th April, available to be embarked during the night 24/25 April. Air reconnaissance on the morning of 22nd April disclosed no movement of German troops South from YANNINA. Fears for the security of the left flank were temporarily allayed and attention concentrated on the plan for the withdrawal. *a Dr Adm. Pauline Graham on the night near THESS*

37 36. The final plan was as follows: -

(a) 4 NZ Inf Bde with an allotment of divisional troops from 6 Aust Div was to act as a covering force and to occupy a position South of THEBES guarding the main approaches into ATHENS.

(b) One Bde Gp from each division to be withdrawn from the front on night 23/24th April, NZ Bde to move to concealment areas East of ATHENS and Aust Bde to area West of ATHENS. Movement as far as possible to be completed by dawn on 24th April. Embarkation of these two Bde Groups to take place during night 24/25th April.

(c) The front to be cleared by the remaining Bde Gp of each Div on night 24/25th April and the movement for the previous night repeated, embarkation taking place on night 25/26 April.

(d) Covering force to be prepared to delay up to night 26/27th April and to embark from Western beaches before dawn on 27th April.

(e) ANZAC CORPS HQ *near LEVADIA 2000 hrs 23* to close at ELEFSIS on 24 April and control of all operations for the evacuation to pass to Force HQ.

38 37. During 22nd and 23rd April the enemy felt his way across the flat plain from LAMIA towards the forward positions, but there were only local patrol encounters. A delayed air report received at 1500 hrs on 23 April raised again the danger of a threat to the left flank, since it disclosed very large enemy MT concentrations moving South of YANNINA. As it was possible for them to reach LEVADIA before the final withdrawal took place, Comd 6 Aust Div was ordered to detach a mixed Force to guard the demolitions in the DELPHI PASS and to co-ordinate the withdrawal of this flank guard with that of the final troops to leave the BRAILOI PASS. *ANZAC Corps Hdqrs had already closed. Reason*

39 38. HQ ANZAC CORPS moved to the vicinity of ELEFSIS during night 23/24th April by which time the first stages of the withdrawal were proceeding satisfactorily. On arrival at ATHENS it was clear that the embarkation plans had already been dislocated as a result of enemy air action, and at General Wilson's direction I left ATHENS by air for ALEXANDRIA at 0500 hrs 24 April. *At this time HQ ANZAC CORPS closed. To see C-in-C Mediterranean and press on him the urgency of the position.*

39 41. In closing this despatch I wish to pay a tribute to the skill of the commanders and staffs who planned these two major withdrawals, and the courage and fortitude of the regimental officers and men who carried them out. Attacked incessantly by an overwhelmingly superior enemy air force and deprived through no fault of their own of the opportunity of meeting the German army on reasonably equal terms, the troops successfully avoided being pinned down by greatly superior forces.

In point of distance covered, the time taken in movement, and the good order and cohesion during the movement, the withdrawals from the OLYMPUS to the THERMOPYLAE line and then to the beaches ~~must rank~~

*40 On arrival at Alexandria at midday on 24 April I saw Admiral CUNNINGHAM immediately. He had not till then been fully impressed with the full dimensions of the position, and immediately set out all available means to assist.*

~~This report~~ reflects creditably on the military  
as considerable military achievements  
qualities of the troops engaged in it

42.58. Recommendations for immediate awards for gallantry have already been submitted. Further recommendations for inclusion in periodical lists of Commands and Staffs will be submitted in due course to Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.

43.41. The following are attached as Appendices -

Appx A Notes of Interview with Lt Gen Sir H Mauleand Wilson

" B Narrative of 6<sup>th</sup> Australian Division

" C Messages of formation of ANZAC Corps

" D Comments on the Report by Maj Gen BC

Heyburn VC CB CMG DSO, Comd  
NZ Div.

HQ AIF (ME)  
Jul 41

Lieut General  
GOC AIF (ME).



HQ NZ DIV.  
HELWAN.  
10 JUL 41.

My Dear General

Many thanks for sending me a copy of your draft report on the operations of the Anzac Corps.

As requested, I enclose herewith my comments, which I trust will be helpful.

Yours, Sincerely

B. F. Freyung

Lieut. General Sir T.A. Blamey, C.B., D.S.O., C.M.G.  
General Headquarters,  
Middle East,  
CAIRO.

P.S. I have retained The report for purposes of record. Will you send me your corrected copy when it is finished. Ours will

forwarded later B.F.

Copy 1 D

COMMENT ON GENERAL BLAMEY'S REPORT

Paras 4 and 5.

1. In addition to the passes mentioned, there were other routes through the mountains, chief amongst which were:-

(a) SKALA LEPTOKARYAS T58 - KARYA T37 - GONNOS T46 - LARISSA.

(b) KATO MELIA O30 - SKOTEINA T29 - PHTERE T19 - LEIVADION T19 - ELASSON T16.

These should be mentioned, as I am of the opinion that the Germans used these routes in their advance on our front.

Para 12, first sub-para.

2. Last sentence is not correct. There were roads as well as railways

Para 12, second sub-para.

3. I suggest "SE" for "South" and Eastern" for "Southern" would give a clearer picture.

Para 12, third sub-para.

4. Last sentence. In the light of actual events, the passes could not have been made impregnable with the troops, material and time at our disposal. For last six words, substitute "better employed in strengthening the natural defences of the passes in the rear".

Para 16.

5. I thought the invasion started on 6 Apr.

Para 18.

6. NZ Div Cav was given orders not to become seriously involved. The words in sub-para (a) "imposing the maximum delay with mobile troops" are therefore not correct.

7. Div Cav did not arrive at KATERINE Pass until 1800 hrs 14 Apr.

Para 22, last sub-para.

8. NZ Div Cav moved towards KARPERON on 15 Apr not 14 Apr.

Para 24(g)

9. Surely the use of two roads was designed to facilitate the withdrawal rather than to put NZ Div on the right of the THERMOPYLAE Line.

Para 27 (a)

10. There is an error here. Comd 6 Aust Div was not and could not be responsible for right flank withdrawal.

Para 28, first sub-para.

11. Actually 6 NZ Inf Bde and its supporting Aust Fd Arty Regt used the VOLOS road, and part of the 5 NZ Inf Bde joined the coast road at ALMIROS.

Para 29.

12. I am of the opinion that the enemy used the route given in para 1(b) of this comment, and NOT the KATERINE Pass.

Para 31.

13. Last sentence. There is no doubt that the enemy got between our troops and LARISSA, and cut off their withdrawal to that town. It was at first thought that the enemy were parachutists, but I am now of the opinion that they were mountain troops who had come by the route given in para 1(a) of this Comment. Why the enemy did not exploit their advantage by occupying LARISSA thereby severing the line of withdrawal of 6 NZ Inf Bde, I cannot understand.

Para 32.

14. Checks were due mainly to bomb craters, and vehicles destroyed by air attack. March discipline was very bad in some units, but this point may better be left unsaid.

Para 35, second sub-para.

15. Only one sqd NZ Div Cav went to KALKIS. It is understood that the Rangers also held this position.

Para 37.

16. Sub-paras (c) and (d) may have been the plan, but they were not carried out.

Para 38.

17. 6 NZ Inf Bde holding the NZ portion of the THERMOPYLAE Line fought actions on 23 and 24 Apr, that on 24 Apr being particularly heavy. The enemy was repulsed mainly by the excellent shooting of NZ Div Arty helped by a RHA Regt. I think this should be included in the Report, as it had an important effect in delaying the enemy pursuit.

Major General  
Commanding  
New Zealand Division.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 6TH AUSTRALIAN DIVISION  
IN GREECE.

On 9 Mar 41, 6 Aust Div received warning orders that it would proceed to GREECE as part of LUSTRE FORCE.

The move of 6 Aust Div to GREECE was under control GHQ Middle East and was organized into three groups, with each group subdivided into flights. The groups were :-

16 Bde Gp. - consisting of HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde, 2/1 Bn, 2/2 Bn, 2/3 Bn, 2/1 Pd Coy, 2/1 Pd Amb, Comp Coy AASC.

This group embarked at ALEXANDRIA 19 Mar 41.

19 Bde Gp. - consisting of HQ 6 Aust Div, HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde, 2/4 Bn, 2/8 Bn, 2/2 Pd Regt, 2/3 Pd Regt, 2/1 A Tk Regt, 2/2 Pd Coy, 2/2 Pd Amb, Comp Coy AASC.

This group embarked at ALEXANDRIA 1 Apr 41.

17 Bde Gp. - consisting of HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde, 2/5 Bn, 2/6 Bn, 2/7 Bn, 2/11 Bn, 2/1 Pd Regt (less one bty) 2/1 MG Bn, 2/8 Pd Coy, Comp Coy AASC.

This group embarked at ALEXANDRIA 6-9 Apr 41.

All Groups were transported to GREECE according to plan and disembarked either at PIRAEUS, PALERON BAY, or VELOS. Units were staged at DAPHTI Camps and, after collecting transport, guns etc., were moved NORTH. Moves were by road or train.

On 3 Apr 41, on disembarkation at PIRAEUS, I received instructions to report to HQ 1 Aust Corps at GERANIA forthwith, and accordingly moved NORTH the following morning, accompanied by the CRA, GSO I, and ADC. This party reported to HQ 1 Aust Corps on the morning of 5 Apr.

The instructions received by me at HQ 1 Aust Corps outlined the role for 6 Aust Div, less 17 Aust Inf Bde. This role was to take over the defence of the VERRIA PASS from 12 Gk Div.

16 Bde Gp was the only formation immediately available, as the 19 Inf Bde had NOT arrived in the area.

On 6 Apr orders were issued to 16 Bde to prepare to take over the defence in the forward or Eastern end of VERRIA PASS. The actual taking over commenced on 7 Apr. On this date advanced elements of 19 Inf Bde, including HQ 19 Inf Bde and 2/8 Bn, arrived in the area. Orders issued to 19 Inf Bde were :-

To be reserve to 16 Inf Bde and to be responsible for closing the Western end of VERRIA PASS against parachute or air-borne troops landing in the KOZIME PLAIN and operating Eastwards.

On 8 Apr when HQ 6 Aust Div, 16 Inf Bde, and 19 Inf Bde were in process of taking over defences of VERRIA PASS from 12 Gk Div, instructions were received from 1 Aust Corps for HQ 6 Aust Div and 19 Inf Bde to withdraw from VERRIA PASS and proceed Northwards to area ALYNTICION - FLORINA GAP. My orders included taking over command of the defences in the FLORINA GAP, then under command Brig LEE, CCMA, 1 Aust Corps.

On arrival at SOTER (HQ LEE FORCE) the position was rather acute in that no inf were on the ground. The Order of Battle of LEE FORCE then included :-

Two coys NZ Inf Bn  
1 A Tk Regt RMA  
64 Med Regt (less one tp)

My orders included taking over command of 1 Arm'd Bde when it came into the area on its withdrawal from the plain of THES-SALY. My plan included appointing Brig VASSEY, CBE, DSO, Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde, in command of the defences at FLORINA GAP. All troops then in position, other than Fd and Med arty, together with 1 Rangers from 1 Arm'd Bde and 2/8 Bn to be under his command. 1 Arm'd Bde less 1 Rangers were to be retained as my Div reserve.

The withdrawal of 1 Arm'd Bde through the position was NOT completed until 0600 hrs, 9 Apr, when they were located in the AKYNTHEON area. At 0800 hrs 9 Apr, together with my ASO I, I attended a conference with Gen KARASSUS, the newly-appointed GOC CMA, at KOZANE. This conference lasted three hours and, except for the personal contact gained with the Commander, was NOT of any real value. Difficulties of interchanging views through interpreters and Liaison Officers added to the time required to arrive at any decision. I agreed at this conference to establishing my HQ at PERDIKA in order to maintain closer liaison with Gk CMA, but the difficulties were considerable and aggravated by the lack of suitable officer-type interpreters.

The front at FLORINA GAP was held firstly by 1 Rangers and 2/4 Bn, less one Coy, on left of 1 Rangers. Later, 2/8 Bn joined the Bde and was disposed on the RIGHT of 1 Rangers. The front of this Bde covered 10,000 yards and obviously could only be thinly held by the Bns. The front was beyond their resources in fire power.

Consequently an increased burden was imposed on the supporting arty, which consisted of 2 RHA, 2/8 Fd Regt, and 64 Med Regt (less one tp). This arty I kept under the centralised control of my CRA. On the RIGHT of 2/8 Bn was the Dodecanese Regt of 20 Gk Div, and on the LEFT of 2/4 Bn another Gk Regt; although contact with these Greek forces was NOT obtained until the next day.

Under orders from 1 Aust Corps, my Adv HQ was moved back from SOTER to PERDIKA to be adjacent to that of the Greek CMA. This location was suited to the disposition of the Gk 20 Div but was too far in rear of my own force. Actually, over the critical day of withdrawal, HQ CMA withdrew without any reference to my HQ, leaving me further back from my force than was tactically essential.

During 10 and 11 Apr the enemy gained contact along the front of 19 Bde with most of his attention directed at the junction of 1 Rangers with Bns on the LEFT and RIGHT.

On Apr 10 at 1400 hrs a Conference was held at PERDIKA with GOC in "W" Force and GOC GREEK CMA. It was decided that Greek 12 Div and 20 Div should be withdrawn from VERRIA PASS and immediate right of 6 Aust Div to positions on our left extending from KLEISOURA to KTEHTI. It was agreed that 6 Aust Div would cover this move and that 20 Gk Div would withdraw 3 Bns on night Apr 10/11, 6 Bns on night Apr 11/12 leaving a skeleton force and Dodecanese Bn in position and that on night Apr 12/13, the remaining Greeks should withdraw and 6 Aust Div retire to a defensive line on ALIAKMON RIVER and SERVIA PASS. On 11 Apr a further conference was held at HQ 6 Aust Div at PERDIKA, the main decision being that the Dodecanese Regt would come under command 6 Aust Div from 1800 hrs that day. I pressed for this in view of the exposed position of 2/2 Bn if the Dodecanese Regt who were protected on their right flank by lakes should withdraw before schedule. It was then agreed that two coys, representing about 500 of the estimated total of 3000 Dodecanese would withdraw that night

in MT.

The outline plan for withdrawal of the force on night 12/13 Apr was issued to Comd on evening of 11 Apr. The plan in outline was to withdraw Dodecanese Regt first, and for this move to be carried out by part MT and partly by marching. The destination in the new area was KLEISOUR. to the SW of present position, and that meant that the Regt would cross the line of withdrawal of 19 Inf Bde. It was a very risky operation, but there was no alternative but to accept this risk.

On morning of 12 Apr, a conference was again held with Dodecanese representatives, when instructions were given in the method of the withdrawal. My staff then learned that instead of 3,000 Dodecanese the number to be withdrawn was now 4,500.

I decided therefore that the withdrawal of the Dodecanese must commence by thinning out at once, and accordingly gave those orders to the Chief of Staff CMA, the only officer left at VJ CMA at that time. This order was given at 1300 hrs and the withdrawal was in full swing about 1500 hrs.

During 12 Apr the pressure from the enemy became stronger, with his efforts concentrated on the front held by 1 Rangers. By bold use of his 4-in mortars and infiltration tactics he forced the Rangers to withdraw, thus leaving a gap in the front held by the Bde. This gap was held for some hours by the splendid efforts of a tp of RHA but later at about 1700 hrs was exploited by his inf, supported by mortars and IGRs. Towards the late afternoon the situation was critical as pressure against the left flank of 2/8 Bn had turned that unit from its position away to the eastwards from the line of withdrawal ordered to be followed later. It was clear to the Comd 19 Bde that his plan for the withdrawal that night had to be modified and he acted with promptitude in ordering 2/4 Bn to take up a position ahead of the embussing points agreed upon.

1 Armd Bde (including the Rangers) in the Div plan was to occupy a covering position about SOTER (to be in position by dusk) through which the 19 Inf Bde would withdraw that night.

Due to the condition of 1 Rangers, this plan could NOT be followed. The covering position was immediately occupied by 1 Armd Bde and Brig VASEY as his troops withdrew collected 2/4 Bn in support of 1 Armd Bde. In the meantime 2/8 Fd Regt and 2 RHA withdrew and came into position supporting 1 Armd Bde. Before first light 19 Inf Bde and 2/8 Fd Regt withdrew, the Bde being moved by MT through KOZINE to its new area NORTH of R. ALLIKMON. 1 Armd Bde covered this withdrawal at positions near SOTER and later through PTOLEMAIS.

This action at FLORINA G.F brought forth some interesting lessons. These included :-

- (a) The wide fronts forced on the Bns (e.g. 2/4 Bn less one coy held 6000 yds) left no reserves on hand and accordingly the Bde Comd had no forces at his disposal to re-establish the sector lost by 1 Rangers in the early afternoon.
- (b) The losses in A Tk guns were severe. These A Tk guns were disposed before the arrival of any infantry in the area and consequently were not located with reference to FDLs as selected subsequently. In any event many were sited too far forward.
- (c) The active infiltration tactics of the enemy succeeded in forcing inf posts and localities to withdraw before it was really necessary. Our troops were surprised by these tactics and were NOT trained to the stage of countering them.

In some cases the inf did NOT show that essential determination to stay and fight it out when the enemy did filter around their flanks.

- (d) The extended fronts forced Commanders to hold crests rather than positions defended in depth. This resulted in a type of guerilla warfare and a few local successes by the enemy immediately rendered localities on either flank untenable for the enemy was quick to reinforce these successes.

This action was characterised by the bold command of Brig VASEY CBE, DSO, when a less resolute commander might easily have lost complete control on the evening of 12 Apr at which stage the situation was indeed critical. 1 Rangers had been heavily engaged all day and were in a poor state to fight. 2/8 Bn had withdrawn to the east and SE and were temporarily lost in the Comd as a fighting unit. Brig VASEY handled the situation with coolness and courage.

The support given by 2 RHA, 2/3 Fd Regt and 64 Med Regt during the whole engagement and by the Horse and Fd Arty during the later stages of the withdrawal was of high order and contributed to the success achieved.

2/8 Bn mustered about 250 all ranks on the R. ALIAKLON position the next morning, but of that number only about 60 were in possession of their arms. It is my intention to hold an enquiry into this position to ascertain how and why so many members of this Bn came to be separated from their weapons. This enquiry has been held up pending Brig VASEY's return from CRETE.

2/4 Bn fought extremely well throughout the three days' operations and was handled boldly by its Comd all the time.

During the action of 19 Aust Inf Bde at FLORINA GAP, the occupation of the new defensive line OLYMPIUS - R. ALIAKLON was proceeding.

16 Inf Bde moved from its position in VERRIA PASS and took over the right Bde sector allotted to 6 Aust Div. On their LEFT, centred on SERVIA PASS was 4 NZ Bde, and further to the LEFT the 19 Bde were to extend the line to join up with 20 Gd Div. On 12 Apr on my withdrawal from FLORINA I assumed command of 16 Inf Bde, 4 NZ Bde and 19 Inf Bde. 1 Arm'd Bde reverted to control 1 Aust Corps.

Orders were issued for this position to be organised for protracted defence and plans were put in operation to this end.

The administrative difficulties were enormous.

The sector occupied by 16 Inf Bde included the slopes of MT OLYMPIUS. Rough country, snow-capped ridges, lack of roads and tracks and distances beyond resources in cable, made control and administration almost impossible. Actually one Bn (2/1 Bn) was out of touch with HQ 16 Inf Bde for three days and successive LOs sent out by Bde were unable to locate it.

Troops were NOT used to living at heights up to 5000 ft and this affected the stamina of the men.

19 Inf Bde were located NORTH of the R. ALIAKLON and at the time they went into this position from the front no crossings over the river existed. In addition to the absence of crossings, no suitable MT track existed from the LIPRAVALTON rd down to the river.

Every effort was made by the Engrs under my command to improve these facilities, and by excellent work, a light bridge was finished just before the troops commenced a further withdrawal.

Liaison was difficult with this Bde; the average time taken to move from HQ 6 Aust Div to HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde was 8 hours.

19 Bde at this time was reduced to 2/4 Bn and a weak 2/8 Bn consequent upon the action at FLOHINA. At my request 1 Aust Corps arranged to place 26 NZ Bn under command 19 Inf Bde and that Bn moved forward to join 19 Inf Bde late on 13 Apr. Actually the difficulties of crossing the river and the approach from the river were such that by the time 26 NZ Bn were in position in their sector the orders for the withdrawal had reached 19 Inf Bde.

Under command of 19 Inf Bde were one Coy 2/1 MG Bn, 4 Bty 1 A Tk Regt. The latter moved into the area from KOZIE with the two Inf Bns, but it was obvious that in the event of a withdrawal the equipment of this Bty could NOT be transported over the river. Lack of suitable crossings and absence of roads and tracks determined this. It was considered, however, that with the information available of enemy armoured units in the area some A Tk protection had to be given to 19 Inf Bde in this position and the risk taken. At that time the risk of a withdrawal did NOT appear to me to be very great as my orders were to occupy the position for protracted defence.

Actually when the orders did arrive for withdrawal there was no other course open to me but to order the destruction of these A Tk guns, eleven in all.

The Coy 2/1 MG Bn on the other hand was located SOUTH of the river where it came under my command, but it was ordered to join 19 Bde. It crossed the river carrying its guns and on the withdrawal brought its guns out with it. Certain wireless equipment in vehicles was also destroyed before withdrawal.

On 16 Apr I attended a conference at HQ ANZAC CORPS and received instructions to withdraw 6 Aust Div to the TERNOPOLIAN LINE. NZ Div was also to withdraw and in the next position would again be on the RIGHT of 6 Aust Div. 6 Aust Div was to be allotted the sector astride SERVIC PASS. At this stage 17 Inf Bde had arrived in GREECE and was disposed under Corps control on the rd TRIYALA - GRAVENA to close that road to enemy movement into the Corps area from the WEST.

On 16 Apr contact was gained with the enemy on front of 6 Aust Div and on this day the first concentrated dive bombing attack was delivered on SERVIC PASS area.

The outline plan for the withdrawal of 6 Aust Div included :-

4 NZ Bde to remain in present location astride SERVIC PASS to cover the withdrawal of 19 Bde Gp and 16 Bde Gp.

19 Bde Gp was to withdraw night 15/16 Apr to Corps covering position at DOMKOS.

16 Bde Gp was to withdraw night 16/17 Apr to ZARKOS WEST of LARISSA and to cover the subsequent withdrawal of SAVIGN FORCE through LARISSA.

6 NZ Bde was to cover these moves by the occupation of a posn NORTH of ELASSON.



All moves of inf were to be by HT.

This plan was varied under instructions from HQ ANZAC CORPS, ordering 16 Inf Bde Gp less 2/1 Bn to move to PENEIOS GORGE to support NZ forces disposed there.

Brig ALLEN, CBE, DSO, assumed command of the forces there, viz., 21 NZ Bn and 2/2 Bn. 2/3 Bn joined him on 17 Apr.

The withdrawal of 19 Inf Bde SOUTH of R. ALIASHON was completed by dawn 16 Apr despite the lack of communications etc.

The orders to 19 Inf Bde Gp included moving all personnel back by HT to positions in rear. Actually, due to some false information alleged to have been given on the THEROVALTON road, the following units proceeded WEST instead of EAST via the SERVIA PASS as ordered :-

2/4 Bn, A Coy 2/1 MG Bn, and 4 Bty 1 A Tk Regt.  
There was a similar departure from orders by CO 2/2 Fd Regt.

These units were thus involved in a march of about 50 miles and under wet and rough conditions of the road were fortunate in arriving at LARISSA. They eventually arrived at LARISSA area on 18 Apr, 2/4 Bn and A Coy 2/1 MG Bn going on to rejoin 19 Inf Bde at DOMKYOS. 2/2 Fd Regt and 4 Bty 1 A Tk Regt came into Div reserve.

During the night 17/18 Apr, 4 NZ Bde withdrew according to plan and this left the front covered as follows :-

16 Inf Bde less 2/1 Bn (ALLEN FORCE) at PENEIOS GORGE.

6 NZ Bde covering ELASSON and SAVIGE FORCE covering the LARISSA - TRIPIALIA road.

The plan for the withdrawal of these forces on night 18/19 Apr was 6 NZ Bde and 16 Inf Bde to withdraw through LARISSA and move via coastal road leading SE from LARISSA through VELESTI-VON, ALTIROS, VOLOS and LAMIA.

SAVIGE FORCE to withdraw by the road LARISSA - LAMIA.

During 18 Apr enemy action against 6 NZ Bde and 16 Inf Bde was very active. His attacks on these fronts were supported by bombing and MG attacks. LARISSA and ELIASHON towns were heavily bombed; apparently with the object of destroying the bridges and so hindering our withdrawal. His attacks on the bridges were NOT successful.

16 Inf Bde at PENEIOS during the afternoon of 18 Apr had been compromised by the withdrawal of 21 NZ Bn and A Tk guns with them, thus leaving the RIGHT flank of 2/2 Bn exposed.

The withdrawal from PENEIOS was timed for the night 18/19 Apr but as a result of enemy pressure it was commenced before the planned time.

The plan provided for the withdrawal of both 2/2 and 2/3 through LARISSA but late in the afternoon 2/2 Bn less one Coy withdrew Eastwards and South-Eastwards towards the coast. One Coy of this Bn withdrew Southwards according to plan.

From this time on 2/2 Bn, less this one Coy, was lost to the operations of 6 Aust Div, the personnel being scattered and making their way independently to various beaches in GRECE.

2/3 Bn together with HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde had some difficulty in getting away from their positions but did break off the engagement. A portion of 2/3 Bn were scattered and like 2/2 Bn did NOT rejoin their Bn again during the operations in GREECE.

The withdrawal of 6 NZ Bde went according to plan as did the move of SAVIGE FORCE. The action around LARISSA was interesting from the following point of view :-

- (a) Intensive bombing attacks on defiles and roads with little or no material damage to these

The strength of the enemy forces opposing 2nd/2nd Battalion at PENIOS Gorge on 18th April is not correctly given in 6th Australian Divisional Report. From later information received it has been confirmed that the enemy strength was considerably in excess of that shown in 6th Australian Divisional Report, both in tanks and personnel, and was a detailed in Anzac Corps Report.

of a route had been arranged before orders were departed from. It would then have been found that the enemy tanks closed down on their movement at dark that night. As it was, 2/3 Bn did NOT try this and the result was that the Bn ceased to function as such for the remainder of the campaign.

- (d) Necessity for keeping Comds informed of any change in major plans. My orders showed that 1 Armd Bde was to cover the withdrawal of SAVIGE FORCE and to remain under my orders. I planned to employ this Bde just SOUTH of LARISSA covering the movements SOUTH of 16 Inf Bde Gp, 6 NZ Bde Gp and SAVIGE FORCE. 1 Armd Bde did, however, withdraw through SAVIGE FORCE on no instructions from me, nor was I informed that this move was authorised. There was a certain amount of confusion on the TRIFALIA - LARISSA rd on account of this.

- (e) The power of Fd Arty in a delaying position if boldly handled. 2/3 Fd Regt at ELASSON, supporting 6 NZ Bde, performed excellent service. Very high casualties were caused to the enemy by this Regt. During the day 6 NZ Bde stood NORTH of ELASSON. All enemy attempts to come to grips with our troops were frustrated. On the other hand, the Fd Arty at PENIOS does not appear to have been as successful in its actions to delay the enemy.

The withdrawal of the several groups from LARISSA was covered by a force under Brig LEE at DOMOKOS. The composition of this force was :-

2/6 Bn; 2/7 Bn; 2/1 Fd Regt less one Bty; HQ 19 Inf Bde; 2/4 Bn; 2/8 Bn; One Coy 2/1 (MG) Bn.

Brig LEE, however, determined that he could afford to send HQ 19 Inf Bde with 2/4 Bn and 2/8 Bn on to their position at BRAILOS PASS. I agreed to this and these units were not employed at DOMOKOS. As SAVIGE FORCE withdrew through DOMOKOS, one Bty 1 A Tk Regt and five Tanks RTC were detached and placed under command Brig LEE.

The withdrawal of the LEE FORCE to BRAILOS PASS was covered by a small force of one coy 2/6 Bn; one coy 2/7 Bn; and

2/3 Bn together with HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde had some difficulty in getting away from their positions but did break off the engagement. A portion of 2/3 Bn were scattered and like 2/2 Bn did NOT rejoin their Bn again during the operations in GREECE.

The withdrawal of 6 NZ Bde went according to plan as did the move of SAVIGE FORCE. The action around LARISSA was interesting from the following point of view :-

- (a) Intensive bombing attacks on defiles and roads with little or no material damage to these targets.
- (b) The action of a few enemy tanks at PENETOS GORGE and their effect on the troops encountered. The action of 2/3 Bn withdrawing Eastwards seems entirely due to the presence of 3 and 2 tanks on their left flank.
- (c) The necessity for Comds to reconnoitre lines of withdrawal before committing their forces to that line. It would appear that 2/2 Bn might have withdrawn on the ordered route if a reconnaissance of that route had been arranged before orders were departed from. It would then have been found that the enemy tanks closed down on their movement at dark that night. As it was, 2/2 Bn did NOT try this and the result was that the Bn ceased to function as such for the remainder of the campaign.
- (d) Necessity for keeping Comds informed of any change in major plans. My orders showed that 1 Arm'd Bde was to cover the withdrawal of SAVIGE FORCE and to remain under my orders. I planned to employ this Bde just SOUTH of LARISSA covering the movements SOUTH of 16 Inf Bde Gp, 6 NZ Bde Gp and SAVIGE FORCE. 1 Arm'd Bde did, however, withdraw through SAVIGE FORCE on no instructions from me, nor was I informed that this move was authorised. There was a certain amount of confusion on the TRIPHALA - LARISSA rd on account of this.
- (e) The power of Fd Arty in a delaying position if boldly handled. 2/3 Fd Regt at ELASSON, supporting 6 NZ Bde, performed excellent service. Very high casualties were caused to the enemy by this Regt. During the day 6 NZ Bde stood NORTH of ELASSON. All enemy attempts to come to grips with our troops were frustrated. On the other hand, the Fd Arty at PENETOS does not appear to have been as successful in its actions to delay the enemy.

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2/6 Bn; 2/7 Bn; 2/1 Fd Regt less one Bty; HQ 19 Inf Bde; 2/4 Bn; 2/8 Bn; One Coy 2/1 (LG) Bn.

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The withdrawal of the LEE FORCE to BRAILOCS PASS was covered by a small force of one coy 2/6 Bn; one coy 2/7 Bn; and

1 pl 2/1 MG Bn on the LAMIA PASS.

The position astride the BRAILLOS PASS was held with NZ Div right and Aust Div left. 19 Inf Bde withdrawing first from LARISSA was given the sector astride the pass with 17 Inf Bde extending that front to the left and slightly to the rear.

16 Inf Bde then consisted of two very weak Bns, 2/2 Bn and 2/3 Bn - (1/1 Bn having been placed under command 19 Inf Bde). This Bde was ordered to act as Div Reserve.

By the afternoon of 20 Apr 19 Inf Bde and 17 Inf Bde had their Bns disposed on the ground and the Div Arty was in support of these two Inf Bdes.

The withdrawal of the DOMOKOS FORCE had been successfully carried out night 19/20 Apr, and during 20 Apr AIF units of that force had rejoined their respective Bdes; 2/1 Fd Regt reverted to CRA control.

On the night 20/21 Apr on the orders of ANZAC CORPS I moved my HQ to AVIA MARINA. This resulted in my being more than ever out of touch with my subordinate commanders and greatly increased the strain on Signals and Liaison Officers.

During 19 and 20 Apr enemy air activity was particularly heavy and the road leading through LAMIA to the pass was attacked continuously. Casualties to vehicles and personnel were not as heavy as might be expected and should really have been less if vehicles had not bunched together and halted. During 21 Apr enemy visible along the line of the river SPERHETOS running through the LAMIA plain. Parties attempted to repair the bridge on the main road. Enemy aircraft landed troops on a landing ground SE of LAMIA, but were out of range of the 25 prs. There was no contact gained on the front of 6 Div.

Early on the morning 22 Apr I reported to HQ ANZAC CORPS, and there received instructions that all Imperial Troops were to be withdrawn from GREECE. The plan as it affected 6 Aust Div was - 16 Inf Bde, 17 Inf Bde to withdraw by LT to embarkation beaches at MEGARA on night 23/24 Apr - to be followed the next night 24/25 Apr by 19 Inf Bde.

This withdrawal was to be covered by 4 NZ Bde on a covering posn at KREIKOUKI. My orders included detailing one Fd Regt one Bty A Tk Regt and one Coy 2/1 MG Bn to come under orders 4 NZ Bde at KREIKOUKI and to be in position before the withdrawal of 6 Aust Div commenced on night 23/24 Apr.

I was concerned in his BRAILLOS position with the possibility of the enemy landing parachute and air borne troops in the valley behind my Bde areas. I had a very weak Div Reserve in the 16 Bde less 2/1 Bn and this had to be disposed relatively far forward and could not cover the area back to my Div rear boundary. An organisation was worked out whereby all units and detachments in this area were given definite responsibilities and the area south of that occupied by 16 Inf Bde placed under command of CO 2/3 Bn. I had meanwhile withdrawn 2/2 Bn from 19 Inf Bde as it was too weak in personnel and particularly weapons to fight within the Bde.

This problem of the protection of the rear areas of a Div area is a heavy one and the most suitable solution seems to be to close up the depth of a div particularly between the rear of the reserve Bde and Div rear boundary. This solution, of course, introduces more complications. One lesson is however, outstanding and that is that Div HQ must get forward and possibly forward of the reserve Bde.

On the 23 Apr activity on the front on 19 Inf Bde was more pronounced but no enemy attack was staged. Active patrolling together with spasmodic arty fire covered the days action.

For the withdrawal to commence that night careful planning and preparations within units went on all day. I had issued orders on 23 Apr for the destruction of stores, non-essential vehicles, etc., but this did not commence until 23 Apr. The instructions issued in regard to secrecy were followed carefully by all Commanders.

The plan of withdrawal was for HQ 6 Aust Div and Div Tps to move out first, to be followed by 16 Inf Bde and then 17 Inf Bde. This column, for part of the route NORTH of LEVADIA, had to use the same road as the 5 and 6 NZ Bdes, but by careful control no road congestion arose.

Prior to the withdrawal this night I had to change the plan in some detail to provide a holding force on the DELPHI - LEVADIA road. Instructions were received from ANZAC CORPS at about 1615 hrs to post a composite force in this area by dawn the following morning.

At this time Div HQ was at AYIA MARINA about 22 miles from HQ 17 Inf Bde, the Bde chosen to detach a Bn. Throughout the operations at ERATILLOS I had no telephone communication with my Bdes after receiving orders to shift my HQ from near GRAVIA back to AYIA MARINA. Wireless communication to 17 Inf Bde was intermittent due to atmospheric conditions, the distance between sets, viz; 22 miles and enemy interference. Actually my signal to 17 Inf Bde to detail one Bn took 2 1/2 hours to get through. However, in addition an IO was sent forward to 17 Inf Bde and he managed to get the information through in 2 1/2 hrs. The force detailed for this task was one Bn (2/5) one coy 2/1 (IG) Bn and one Tp 2/1 Fd Regt. The collection of this force took time after receipt of the orders by the several commanders and it had to be given priority on the road ahead of 16 and 17 Inf Bdes.

The force got to its appointed area on the DELPHI - LEVADIA road on time and the move of the main body southwards was not checked. Considering the great difficulties of communication at that time and the fact that the major withdrawal had commenced before these several units could get on their way the result was a credit to Commanders and Staff concerned with the move.

The withdrawal of the main body this night was carried out with lights on vehicles. Our experience in previous night withdrawals was that the enemy did not employ his air force along the road after dark, and consequently driving without lights on convoy was not absolutely necessary. Our losses in time and ditched vehicles on previous nights was considerable. It looked to be a safe risk to take ordering vehicles to move with lights. This proved to be a fact and the move of 6 Div on the night 23/24 Apr was completed at MANDRA before schedule the following morning. I feel that had we not driven with lights such delays would have occurred that the subsequent concealing of the Bdes in their lying up areas the next day may not have been successful due to convoys being caught on the road after dawn.

The success of this withdrawal can I think be put down to three factors :-

- (a) Clear planning on the part of the Staff.

- (b) Determination of the Unit Commanders to keep the vehicles moving.
- (c) High standard of road discipline by drivers.

On Apr 24 HQ 6 Aust Div, Div Tps not with Bde Gps, 16 Inf Bde less 2/1 Bn and 17 Inf Bde lay up in olive groves in the vicinity of MANDRA preparatory to embarking under plans issued by force HQ.

This day the 19 Inf Bde held the front at BRAILIOS PASS AND withdrew according to plan that night. Enemy activity was continued on the front all day particularly around the vacated left flank of 19 Inf Bde where German inf and Mortars began to appear in the afternoon. The enemy pressure however did not prevent Comdr 19 Inf Bde withdrawing his forces according to plan. This Bde withdrew to the beaches along the same route as was taken by the main body of 6 Aust Div the previous night.

During the day an order from ANZAC CORPS to bring out the guns on the withdrawal of 2/2 Fd Regt was sent from MANDRA to BRAILIOS and resulted in 12 guns being successfully brought to MEGARA beach that night.

On the afternoon of 24 Apr orders were received that Adv HQ 6 Aust Div was to embark that night from "S" beach, ARGOS, and personnel moved off from their concealment areas late that afternoon. They embarked on HMS "PHOEBE" towards midnight and sailed for CRETE some hours later. Together with my ADC, I embarked on a flying boat that same night and was flown to CRETE the following morning.

From the evening of 24 Apr I took no further part in the operations of 6 Aust Div in GREECE, but am including in this report the following account of the subsequent operations of the Inf Bdes.

#### 16 INF BDE

This Bde moved to MOLOI on night 24/25 Apr and remained concealed in the olive groves on 25 Apr, and moved on again to KALAMAI on night 25/26 Apr. HQ 16 Inf Bde, with 2/2 Bn and 2/3 Bn, embarked for EGYPT night 26/27 Apr. 2/1 Bn during this time remained under command 19 Inf Bde.

#### 17 INF BDE

With the exception of three Coys 2/6 Bn, which came under command of Brig LEE at CORINTH, 17 Inf Bde was NOT concerned in any further action prior to embarkation. The following units moved at night by stages to the embarkation beaches at KALAMAI for embarkation night 26/27 Apr :-

HQ 17 Inf Bde, "K" Sec Sigs, 2/5 Bn, 2/6 Bn, 2/7 Bn, 2/8 Bn, 2/1 Fd Regt, 2/2 Fd Coy, and 2/7 Fd Amb.

On the voyage to EGYPT the "Costa Rica" was attacked by dive bombers and damaged to such an extent that she had to be abandoned and the following units of 17 Inf Bde Gp were transhipped to destroyers and subsequently landed at CRETE:-

2/7 Bn, with details of 2/5 Bn, 2/6 and 2/8 Bn. The remainder of the Bde Gp were landed at ALEXANDRIA on 29 Apr.

#### 19 INF BDE

This Bde Gp of HQ 19 Inf Bde, 2/4 Bn and 2/1 Bn arrived at MEGARA early morning of 25 Apr and embarked for CRETE night 25/26 Apr.

Major-General.  
Comd 6 Aust Div.

SECRET.

Copy No. 4

WITHDRAWAL OF IMPERIAL FORCES FROM GREECE.  
-----

On the 5th April the Germans declared war on GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA.

By the evening of the 7th April it became clear that the Yugoslav forces on the AXIOS Valley had given way and the flank of the Greek and Imperial forces was immediately exposed to attack from the North towards FLORINA.

On that evening it was decided to form a detachment about ARMYNTAION under Brigadier Lee with such units as could be got together to block this Valley. At the same time 1st Armoured Brigade was withdrawn to this area through EDESSA, and 19th Australian Infantry Brigade was sent forward to support such Greek troops as could be put in by the Greek Corps Commander. It was also decided to withdraw the Greek Corps (12th and 20th Divisions) and the Anzac Corps to positions covering the passes leading into the KOZANI and ELASSON Valleys.

On the 9th April the northern forces were hotly attacked South of FLORINA. The attack was renewed on the 10th April and on the 11th the withdrawal of forward elements along the Anzac and Greek Corps fronts commenced and the front was established from the coast on the East of the PENEIOS Gorge at the southern exit from Mount OLYMPUS, the southern exit from KATHERINI Pass along the mountain range West to SERVIA, thence North covering the passes leading West from the KOZANI Plain, by the evening of the 12th April. It was already clear that the Greek 12th and 20th Divisions could not hold the enemy, who were penetrating West from KOZANI, and the Greek forces were in considerable confusion. Our forces were already engaged and that night inflicted considerable loss on the enemy.

It was decided to withdraw the Imperial forces from the over-extended Mount OLYMPUS - SERVIA position to the THERMOPYLAE position, bringing the front into more suitable limits although

still /

still too extended for the troops available. The Greek Corps had already reverted to the command of Greek General Headquarters.

On the 15th April 4th New Zealand Brigade moved to a covering position North of TIRNAVOS and the 17th Australian Brigade to a covering position West of TRIKKALA. On that day the small New Zealand force on the East side of MT OLYMPUS was heavily attacked and driven back to the mouth of the PENEIOS Gorge. On the 16th April the 16th Australian Brigade was sent to support it with two battalions, and this force of a Brigade Group was attacked by two German Divisions.

The withdrawal from the main position was now carried out under protection of the rearguard North of TIRNAVOS, with right flank guard at PENEIOS Gorge and left flank guard which had been withdrawn from TRIKALLA to a position West of LARISSA. 1st Armoured Brigade now so reduced as to be no longer fit for action withdrew through the left flank guard.

On the night of the 20th April the withdrawal to THERMOPYLAE was completed. It was obvious that two Divisions could not hold this position for long and it was decided to withdraw to the coast and embark. On the 22nd the 4th New Zealand Brigade withdrew to a covering position on the Pass South of ERITHRAI and the withdrawal to the coast began.

The enemy was already in strong contact about LAMIA and a heavy column was moving South from YANNINA on the main Albanian road. On the 23rd its head had passed AGRINION.

The withdrawal through the ERITHRAI position was carried out rapidly and by dawn on the 25th the whole of the Imperial forces are believed to have passed through. I have not yet received any details of the final withdrawal of the remaining Australian Brigade and New Zealand Brigade on the night of 24th April.

All line communications and many wireless sets were destroyed by enemy bombing. Communications have been most

difficult /



difficult throughout. Details given above may contain some inaccuracies as to dates as no written data yet available. The enemy has bombed and machine gunned the withdrawing troops continually and we have not been able to give any protection against it. The Navy is now endeavouring to carry off all personnel from the coast but no equipment will be brought. Arrangements have been made for the destruction of all equipment and transport left behind.

G.H.Q.  
-----

26th April, 1941.  
-----

MCST SECRET

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION - AIF ME 25 April 1941.

TOBRUK  
FORTRESS

9 Aust Div (less HQ RAA  
& 2/7 & 2/8 Fd Regts)  
18 Aust Inf Bde Gp  
16 Aust A Tk Coy  
2/32 Bn  
8 Lt A.A. Bty  
2/1 Pnr Bn  
2/2 CCS  
4 Aust Gen Hosp

CRETE

7 Lt AA Bty (Static)

CYPRUS

7 Aust Div Cav Regt.

MOBFORCE

5 Bty 2 A Tk Regt  
12 Bty 3 A Tk Regt  
7 Aust Div Arm Coy

MERSA MATRUH

7 Aust Div (less 18 Aust  
Inf Bde Gp and 2/32 Bn)  
6 Aust Div Cav (at CHARING CROSS)  
2/2 M G Bn

SIDI HANEISH

2/16 A Fd Coy

DABA (?)

HQ 1 Aust AA Bde  
3 Lt AA Regt less 7 and 8  
Lt AA Btys.

AMIRIYA

HQ RAA 9 Aust Div  
2/7 and 2/8 Fd Regts  
Two tps 2/12 Fd Regt  
One Bty 2/1 Fd Regt  
(in GHQ Reserve)  
No 2 Sub Pk Corps Pet Pk  
2/1 CCS  
7 and 9 Aust Gen Hosps  
A Sec 1 M A C  
Ord Units

PALESTINE

HQ 1 Aust Corps  
All Corps tps ex LUSTRE  
2 (Hy) AA Regt (one bty  
HQ and two secs HAIFA)  
2/9, 2/14 and 2/15 A Fd Coys  
2/3 Corps Fd Pk Coy  
Corps AASC less No 2 Sub  
Pk Corps Pet Pk

Training Units  
Reinforcement Depot  
Base Organizations.

MOST SECRET & PERSONAL.

Headquarters,  
British Troops in Egypt,  
CAIRO.

14 January, 1941.

DO/BGS/41

Dear *Rommel*:

It is not easy just now to put people in the picture for things change quickly and what is meant to be a help may be only a misleading nuisance. However here are some points of interest so far as we can go at the present time.

(a) Relief of 13 Corps by Australian Corps.

This will not take place until sometime after the fall of TOBRUK. It may be a week or two after and will in any case require some time to settle. I cannot give you a date for TOBRUK but it will not be before the 20th. I gather you intend coming down to the AMIRIYA area towards the end of Jan. That should fit in pretty well for a relief of 13 Corps in early or mid Feb.

(b) Relief of 7 Armd Div by 2 Armd Div.

This will not take place till sometime after TOBRUK. Here again it depends on operations at the time and on how long it will take to lay it on. Two Regts, 3 H and 2 R.T.R., now with 7 Armd Bde, will remain with the 2 Armd Div to which formation they really belong.

(c) Military Governor LIBYA.

It is quite probable that Gen. Wilson will become Military Governor of LIBYA with operational control generally and also control of the O.E.T.A. At present B.T.E. run an Adv H.Q. at CAPUZZO, but we can not go on running LIBYA and EGYPT with our H.Q. some 450 miles distance!

(d) Australian Units.

As you already know the policy is to get on with the influx of Australian units into Western Desert. With this in view we are pushing up 2/3 Fd Arty Regt (required for TOBRUK), 2/1 Pioneer Bn for work in BARDIA area on roads forward, and quite likely one of the Field Coys now at AMIRIYA. It is the intention to put the Comd and Staff Services which your Chief very kindly laid "on ice" at AMIRIYA

2/into TOBRUK

*File and let it be known  
to be destroyed by the G.P.*

- 2 -

into TOBRUK as soon as it is captured, thereby getting the control in the hands of Australians. The base installations laid on by G.H.Q. for the development of that port will be British to start with, but here again the policy will be to get everything possible run by your people since apart from the Armd Div the whole party will be yours.

(e) Liaison Officers.

Irvine was invaluable while here, unfortunately he has got chicken pox and will be away for a month. Woodward may be a day or two in coming. Many thanks for so kindly sending Wells.

Yours

*Sincerely,*

*N. Halliday.*

Brigadier S.F. Rowell, O.B.E.,  
1 Aust Corps,  
GAZA.  
-----

MOST SECRET

G.478

CSO  
Camp

1 Aust Corps  
13 Jan 41.

Rease Accommodation Corps HQ.

1. Major NEWTON<sup>Capt.</sup> and Capt BOWDEN, Signal Ofcr, are to report to Maj CLELAND, DAQNG 1 Aust Corps, at the Town Major's Office at IRINGOI MARYUT at 0930 hrs Thu 16 Jan for detailed allotment of accommodation. The two named ofrs have been told verbally of the above.
2. 'Q' Branch to arrange details of move.

Copies to:

Q  
A

*Curtis* Lt.-Col.  
CS 1 Aust Corps.

MOST SECRET

G.478.

CSO  
Camp

1 Aust Corps  
13 Jan 41.

Recece Accommodation Corps HQ.

1. Major NEWTON and Capt BOWDEN, Signal Offr, are to report to Maj CLELAND, DAQNG 1 Aust Corps, at the Town Major's Office at IKINGI MANYUT at 0930 hrs Thu 18 Jan for detailed allotment of accommodation. The two named offrs have been told verbally of the above.

2. 'Q' Branch to arrange details of move.

Copies to:

Q  
A

Lt.-Col.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

**SECRET.**

**HIGH GRADE CIPHER MESSAGE.**

Ref No. ....

Copy No. ....

This message must be circulated under cover and must be locked up when not in use. It must not be placed on any but a secret file. Should the secrecy of the contents of this message allow it reference may be made to it in "clear", on the telephone, or in Non Secret correspondence, and the originator's number quoted.

20/APSJ/6 - 10.000 - 29.10.40

To— <b>AUSFORCE</b>		Time of origin <b>1820.</b>	
From— <b>STALEX.</b>	Date <b>9/1.</b>	Originator's number <b>DC(?) / 9.</b>	Time of receipt <b>0015/10.</b>

**IMPORTANT.**

Following from BRIDGEFORD O  
B.T.E. advise construction Corps H.Q.  
unlikely to commence before end of March O  
Accommodation (IKING?) adequate O  
If Corps H.Q. likely to move by end of  
January arrange camp commandant and  
signal officer meet CLELAND Town Major's  
office ( ) Thursday 16<sup>th</sup> January  
0930 hrs for detailed allotment accommodation.

Sub  
0135.  
10/10/11

*H. Bentley S/Sgt*  
for Cipher Officer 1 Aus. Corps

\* same group  
obviously place name.

Hold till repeated; then refer BGS for decision

11.15 hrs 12 Jan. - Sent immediate to find what these blank gfs mean. Cfr send (Rm)  
J.M.72

Can't say if have been 15 d. H.T.

**SECRET.**

**HIGH GRADE CIPHER MESSAGE.**

Ref No. ....

Copy No. ....

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20/APSJ/6-10.000-29.10.40

To- <i>TROOPERS - 1st M.L.P.A.L. FORCE</i> <i>Army MELBOURNE, General CATROUX.</i>		Time of origin <i>1130/23 GMT</i>
From- <i>MIDEAST.</i>	Date <i>23</i>	Originator's number <i>0/37125</i>
		Time of receipt <i>1700/24 L.T.</i>

*TOBRUK 0*

*Success is chiefly due to excellent plan of attack prepared by Commander Australian Division executed with great dash by Australian Infantry and British tanks supported by British and Australian Artillery. British machine guns were required and co-operation with R.A.F.*

*Attack penetrated quickly and deeply into defences and was cause of main collapse later. Successful co-operation with supporting groups (and of?) (operations?) of armoured division in particular against S-W and WEST defences resulted several strong points and many prisoners being captured by all three units of supporting groups.*

*Particularly good work done by FREE FRENCH operating in the WESTERN coastal sector.*

*KN 1748/24*

LOG 'IN':-	
'IN' File:	<i>Final 25/1</i>
Copy ADC for GOC	
Copy G	<i>+</i>
Copy A	
Copy Q	<i>DOS</i>
DAG.	<i>B.i/c A</i>
Initials of S.O.	<i>(Signature)</i>

*For M. Boulton W.O.II.*  
*Lieut.*  
Cipher Officer 1 Arm Corps



498/7/1

Move

0

Spy

Containers for office equip.  
Label, mark etc. office equip for G. handling

Elliot & Rogers with R/A. Was take SSC

Elliot. Table drawing of Mount the to work. Dug. Relative

Elliot. In Alaska cancelled of course of  
Dormant only. course

Elliot. Promotion high grade officer for R/A.

Captain 2/5 (4th) (and R/A 2/5)  
BKA - 1/5 } 200 coming to by. D. 1/5. leaving 3/2 as default. R/A 1/5  
AIF - 1/5

Elliot. Duncan 1/2 by Corp. Sigs. to be released  
from present R/A credit on 1/2.

Elliot. Details of high courier P to E so as to  
arrange most expeditious delivery of mail  
matter.

1673/Q.

1 AUST CORPS.

SECRET.

GAZA  
25 Jan 41.MOVE OF "INIGO".

The following -

SUMMARISED TIME-TABLE OF MOVE OF "INIGO"

is promulgated for ready reference.

Date	Time	Item
Sat 25 Jan	0800 P.L.T. 1200 P.L.T. 1645 E.T.	Adv party vehs dep ex GAZA Nominal roll of adv party personnel to Camp. Adv party vehs arr MOASCAR.
Sun 26 Jan	0900 E.T. 1200 P.L.T. 1245 P.L.T. 1300 E.T. 1316 P.L.T.	Adv party vehs dep ex MOASCAR. Adv party personnel report to Camp Nursing Orderly reports to GAZA Rly Sta. Adv party vehs arr MENA. Adv party dep ex GAZA by train.
Mon 27 Jan	0600) 0800) E.T. 1200) P.L.T. 1430 1500 1800	Adv party arr IKINGI MARYUT. Adv party vehs dep MENA Adv party vehs arr IKINGI MARYUT Heavy baggage at Airport to be ready. Lorries report Airport Surplus office equipment etc to be returned to Camp by this hr.
Tues 28 Jan	0600 0630 0830 0930  1030 1330 1400 1630	Reveille Men's breakfast Rear party reports to Camp (a) Offrs' heavy baggage to be ready stacked. (b) Office equipment to be ready stacked less absolute minimum requirements for day's work, which requirements will be communicated to Camp by 1800 hrs Mon, 27 Jan. Mess gear to be ready stacked less essentials for remainder of meals. Heavy veh convoy with personnel ready to move. Head heavy veh convoy passes S.P. Heavy veh convoy arr ASLUJ.
Wed 29 Jan	0530 0600 0630  0730 0730 0800 0830	Reveille Men's breakfast. Remainder of office equipment and Mess gear to be stacked ready for loading. DAQMG (M) with guides for MOASCAR and MENA dep ex GAZA. Light veh convoy ready to move. Head light veh convoy passes S.P. Cars D.S. may proceed independently as from this hr.

SUMMARISED TIME-TABLE OF MOVE OF "INIGO" (contd).

Date	Time	Item
Wed 29 Jan	P.L.T.	
	1000	Light veh convoy passes ASLUJ.
	1015	Heavy veh convoy dep ex ASLUJ.
	E.T.	
	1530	Light veh convoy arr MOASCAR.
Thurs 30 Jan	1815	Heavy veh convoy arr MOASCAR.
	0730	Light vehs dep ex MOASCAR.
	0800	Heavy vehs dep ex MOASCAR.
	1130	Light vehs arr MENA
	1230	" " dep "
	1300	Heavy vehs arr "
	1600	Light vehs arr IKINGI MARYUT.
	1700	Personnel in cars D.S. report at IKINGI MARYUT.
Fri 31 Jan	0800	Heavy vehs dep ex MENA
	1230	" " arr IKINGI MARYUT.

*The Culand*  
for Brig. Major  
D.A. & Q.M.G. 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION:-

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CCRA	5	Camp	3
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Q	4	DMS	2
CE	3	DOS	2
DDST	5	DPM	2
DDMS	3	HQ AIF Base Area	2
ADOS	5	File	1

**SECRET.**

Ref No. ....

**HIGH GRADE CIPHER MESSAGE.**

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This message must be circulated under cover and must be locked up when not in use. It must not be placed on any but a secret file. Should the secrecy of the contents of this message allow it reference may be made to it in "clear", on the telephone, or in Non Secret correspondence, and the originator's number quoted.

20/APSJ/5-10.000-29.10.40

To--			Time of origin
ARMY MELBOURNE.			
From--	Date	Originator's number	Time of receipt
AUSFORCE GAZA	22	AD 1216(8)	

HEADQUARTERS 1st AUSTRALIAN CORPS moves to ALEXANDRIA area 29 Jan in preparation for relief HQ 13 Corps in LIBYA (.) AIF heads of Services will be established in ALEXANDRIA on this date (.) As from inclusive 29 Jan desire all cables from AUSTRALIA to be addressed to AUSFORCE EGYPT (.) In addition cables concerning details of movement by sea of troops and military stores should be repeated to AUSBASE GAZA.

{Sgd} S. F. Rowell

**Distribution:**

Cipher Office 1.  
Cable File G 1.  
BI/c A 1.  
Subject file 1-

Brig.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

**MOST  
SECRET**

*214*

*1/11/60*

**SECRET.**

498/7/1

Ref No. \_\_\_\_\_

**HIGH GRADE CIPHER MESSAGE.**

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20/APSJ/5 - 10.000 - 29.10.40

To—			Time of origin
AUSFORCE rptd MILPAL EGYPFORCE			
From—	Date	Originator's number	Time of receipt
MIDEAST	22	SD/36887	

My SD/36785 of Jan 21 (.)

Move INIGO repeat INIGO (.)

Advance and road parties will move dates as proposed by you (.)

Main party will move 1 Feb and NOT repeat NOT 29 Jan (.)

FS tentage and accommodation stores will be repeat will be taken (.)

Inform movements MILPAL of exact strength personnel and weight and baggage.

Logged in 23/1

Copy G—

A

DOS

B i/c A

Original Q

**SECRET.**

ψ98/7/1

Ref No. \_\_\_\_\_

**HIGH GRADE CIPHER MESSAGE.**

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_

This message must be circulated under cover and must be locked up when not in use. It must not be placed on any but a secret file. Should the secrecy of the contents of this message allow it reference may be made to it in "clear", on the telephone, or in Non Secret correspondence, and the originator's number quoted.

20/APSJ/6 — 10.000 — 29.10.40

To— <b>AUSFORCE rptd MILPAL</b>		Time of origin	
From— <b>MIDEAST</b>	Date <b>21</b>	Originator's number <b>SD/36785</b>	Time of receipt

**IMMEDIATE**

Ausforce AD 1191 Q of Jan 21 (.)

Favorably agreed (.)

1 Aust Corps will move from PALESTINE to IKINGI MARYUT  
on dates proposed in above message (.)

Code word for move INIGO repeat INIGO.

Logged in 22/1

Copy G —

A

DAG

CCRA

DOS

B 1/c A

Ia

Original Q.

Army From C.212S

MESSAGE FORM 498/7/1

Serial No.

CALL  
AND  
INSTRUC-  
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups

GR

OFFICE DATE STAMP

**SECRET**

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

~~COTR, CPO, C. A. S. CH. DIST, COM, 1000, HQ, 1-1 OF 1 UNITS, CAMP~~  
~~1-1-1-1, 1-1, 1-1, 1-1~~

FROM

SETE

Originator's Number

0/367

20

SETE

WILL

MOVE

BY

ROAD

AND

RAIL

TO

IKINGI

MANYUT

(.)

MAIN

BODY

NOT

REPEAT

NOT

BEFORE

29

JAN

(.)

SETE

ADM

INSTN

WILL

ISSUE

ON

OR

ABOUT

24

JAN

(.)

DETAILED

MOVEMENT

ORDERS

WILL

ISSUE

FROM

HQ

BASE

L. of C

UNITS

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means.

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

Originator's Instructions  
Degree of priority

1700

Signed

Signed (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

System

Time

Reader

Sender

System

Time

Reader

Sender

System

Time

Reader

Sender

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5:40 50.000:cds

**MESSAGE FORM**

**CALL  
AND  
INSTRUCTIONS**

**IN**

**OUT**

No. of Groups.

**GR**

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

**FROM**

**Originator's Number**

Date \_\_\_\_\_

in Rep'y to Number

ON

OR

## ABOUT

26

JAN

(12)

**ACE**

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN  
by any means

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent **IN CIPHER**.

Originator's instructions  
Degree of priority

Time of origin.

**Sigurd**

Signed

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

## System

**1005**

**Endorse**

**Gender**

Systems

**Time**

**Devoted**

**Sender**

System

1856

**Red**

2000

T.O.R.

C.E.A. 5/40 EC.CC' rcds.



Move of HQ 1 Aust Corps from GAZA.MOVEMENT

1. It is anticipated that HQ 1 Aust Corps will move from GAZA to the ALEXANDRIA area on 31 Jan 41. This will involve certain preliminary action as well as variations in procedure from those now in force. This memorandum deals generally with these changes, and it is desired that those concerned be in a position to discuss final plans on the return of DA & QMG on 18 Jan 41.
2. AIF Heads of Services and their Staffs will move with HQ 1 Aust Corps. Accommodation at ALEXANDRIA is being looked into by DA & QMG. The move will be carried out by road and rail.
3. Branches of the Staff and heads of Services at HQ 1 Aust Corps will take early action to see that containers are prepared for office equipment on the basis of operational requirements. Notification will be made later as to whether any office furniture over and above war equipment scale is to be taken from PALESTINE to EGYPT.

ARRANGEMENTS IN PALESTINE

4. The Staff of B i/c A Base and L of C Units will be augmented by a small GS and Int Section to deal with area GS matters now handled by 1 Aust Corps such as internal security, signals, censorship, maps and intelligence summaries. One GSO (2) or (3) and one I.O. with clerical staff should be sufficient. GSOs (2) (o) and (1) will take up at once with B i/c A and DAG AIF the question of suitable off
5. Corps Troops in PALESTINE will be placed under Command 7 and 9 Aust Divs. G2(o) will prepare table showing proposed allotments to Divs in conjunction with Q. These should be as far as possible on an area basis and should include arrivals ex AUSTRALIA in US 2.
6. There will NOT be one separate authority for all AIF matters in PALESTINE. 7 and 9 Aust Divs will deal direct with HQ 1 Aust Corps. Comd 7 Aust Div will continue to act as Military Commander GAZA.
7. B i/c A will continue to handle all questions of movement direct with GHQ ME and Force HQ JERUSALEM. This requires special letter to GHQ ME. Will B i/c A please discuss its terms with BGS.
8. Force HQ JERUSALEM is being asked to address correspondence as follows -
- (a) Matters of general information - direct to 7 and 9 Aust Div and B i/c Adm.
  - (b) Matters requiring co-ordination of AIF in PALESTINE as a whole - to B i/c Adm who will confer as necessary with Comdrs 7 and 9 Aust Divs in preparation of reply.
- BGS to prepare memo for Force HQ to give effect to this.
9. (a) Telegraphic address 'AUSBASE' for B i/c A will be revived for communication within the Middle East. G2 (o) to ascertain position, i.e., has registered address been cancelled, or is it merely dormant. HQ 1 Aust Corps will retain address 'AUSFORCE'.

Messages in cipher from 1 Aust Corps to 7 or 9 Aust Divs will be sent to 'AUSBASE' with text prefixed "for 7 (or 9) Aust Div".

U.S. (b) G2(o) to take up question of provision of high grade cipher personnel for attachment to B i/c A. In this regard it should be borne in mind that cipher personnel will ultimately be required at GAZA, at ALEXANDRIA and in the forward area.

ARRANGEMENTS IN EGYPT.

10. GHQ ME will be asked to continue to communicate direct with HQ 1 Aust Corps in the ALEXANDRIA area, except in respect of movements (vide para 7 above).

11. All inward and outward cable traffic with Australia will be dealt with as before, that is from HQ 1 Aust Corps.

U.S. 12. Q will arrange for Corps Signals in Convoy US 8 to go into ALEXANDRIA area. G to ascertain when No 2 Coy Corps Sigs can be relieved from present L of C duties in Western Desert.

U.S. 13. G will investigate details of train courier service from PALESTINE to EGYPT so as to ensure most expeditious delivery of mail matter.

9 Jan.

*S. Howell*

Brig.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distribution:

GOC  
G2 (o) —  
G2 (1)  
DA & QMG (2)  
DAG AIF  
B i/c A.

60c

MOST SECRET.

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13. G will investigate details of train courier service from PALESTINE to EGYPT so as to ensure most expeditious delivery of mail matter.

*D. Howell* Brig.  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distribution:

GOC  
G2 (o)  
G2 (i)  
DA & QMG (2)  
DAG AIF  
B 1/c A.



0  
MOST SECRET & PERSONAL.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

HEADQUARTERS,  
1 Aust Corps  
23 Jan 41.

Dear

With reference to your D/O.BOS.41 of 14 Jan 41, the following are our projected arrangements for relief of HQ 13 Corps:-

- (a) Concentrate at IKINGI MAKYUT by 1400 hrs 31 Jan
  - (b) Period 1 Feb to 3 Feb return surplus Kit etc to our Kit store in ALEXANDRIA and prepare for rd move
  - (c) Leave IKINGI am 4 Feb by rd. Stage night 4/5 Feb at MATRUH and night 5/6 at SOLLUM. Our further move on 6 Feb will depend on where 13 Corps finally finish with the present operations.
2. We are taking with us one div sub-park of the Corps Ammunition Park. In addition to lifting our personnel this will give us a 3rd line ASC unit for eventualities.
  3. I am convinced that it is impossible to attempt a relief of this nature with the two HQs separated by 400 miles. We must get within striking distance so that decisions once made can be implemented with the minimum delay.
  4. The task for which our Liaison Officers were sent to CAIRO, the GIARABUB operations, has not eventuated and we would now like them available for our own use. Will you kindly instruct WOODWARD and WELLS to be available to leave CAIRO on the morning of 27 Jan so as to reach IKINGI by 1100 hrs. They will join with the advanced party coming from here and open up advanced Corps HQ.

With kind regards,

Yours,

Brig. Galloway, M.C.,  
HQ BTE  
CAIRO.

SECRET

G.643

GRQ HE.

1 Aust Corps  
22 Jan 41.

Copies to:

HQ BTE  
Force HQ  
DAG AIF  
HQ AIF Base Area.

Move of HQ 1 AUST CORPS from GAZA to EGYPT.

1. With ref to CREE/1803/0(0) of 14 Jan 41, it is advised that HQ 1 Aust Corps will move to IKINGI MARIUT in preparation for relief of HQ 13 Corps. This move will be completed by 1400 hrs 31 Jan 41.
2. HQ 1 Aust Corps will close at GAZA at 1800 hrs 29 Jan 41 and will open at IKINGI MARIUT at the same hour.
3. Coincident with this move, Headquarters of the AIF and a small rear echelon of HQ 1 Aust Corps will be established at ALEXANDRIA, the address and telephone number to be notified later.
4. To meet the changed circumstances it would be appreciated if the following arrangements could be made in regard to correspondence, cables etc for the AIF to be given effect to as from (incl) 29 Jan 41.
5. Correspondence. (a) The address, Headquarters, 1st Australian Corps, to be discontinued except for operational matters. All correspondence except as shown in para 'b' below, to be added 'Headquarters, Australian Imperial Force' and directed to the address to be given later, vide para 3 above.
- (b) Correspondence regarding movements of troops and stores from Australia or UK into the Middle East and movement of AIF units from PALESTINE to EGYPT to be added to -

HQ AIF BASE Area  
GAZA

and a copy repeated to HQ AIF ALEXANDRIA.

6. Cables and Signals. (a) The cable address 'AUSFORCE EGYPT' to be registered with the Egyptian Postal Dept as Headquarters Australian Imperial Force for use as from (incl) 29 Jan 41.
- (b) All cables and signals other than those concerning movements to be added to 'AUSFORCE EGYPT'. This does NOT apply to operational signals.
- (c) Cables and signals concerning movements (vide para 5(b) above) to be added to 'AUSBASE GAZA' with a copy repeated to 'AUSFORCE EGYPT'.

62 (0)

Lt.-Gen.  
Comd 1 Aust Corps.

SECRET. .....7  
COPY No. .....

1 AUST CORPS.

MOVEMENT ORDER No. 33.

(issued in conjunction with 1 Aust Corps  
Adm Instn No. 46 dated 23 Jan 41)

REF MAPS:

GAZA  
24 Jan 41.

GAZA: 1/100,000 - sheets 9 and 12.  
SINAI PENINSULA: 1/250,000 sheets 1 and 2  
EGYPT: 1/500,000 - CAIRO Sheet

MOVE OF "INIGO".

ROAD PARTIES.

1. Road parties specified in 1 Aust Corps Adm Instn No. 46, dated 23 Jan 41, will move on dates and timings shown in Movement Table att - Appx "A".

ROUTE.

2. GAZA - BEERSHEBA - ASLUJ - ABU AWEIGLA - MOASCAR - MENA - IKINGI MARYUT.

STAGES.

3. The move will be made in four stages:

Stage	Route	Distance
		Miles
1	GAZA - ASLUJ	50
	Phase (a) GAZA - BEERSHEBA	30
	Phase (b) BEERSHEBA - ASLUJ	20
2	ASLUJ - MOASCAR	175
3	MOASCAR - MENA	90
4	MENA - IKINGI MARYUT	126

SPEED AND DENSITY.

4. (a) m.i.h.

Stage	Adv Party Vehs.	Heavy Vehs (30-cwts & over)	Light Vehs other than Cars D.S.
1. Phase (a)	20	20	20
Phase (b)	25	25	25
2.	30	25	30
3.	30	25	30
4.	35	30	35

- (b) v.t.m. 40 v.t.m. over all stages.

SPEED AND DENSITY (contd).

4. (c) m.i.h. and v.t.m. over stages 3 and 4 will be as above unless otherwise directed by H.Q., B.T.E.

(d) Cars DS will proceed independently in accordance with Movement Table.

VEH GP COMDS.

5. Veh gp comds for adv party vehs, heavy vehs and light vehs (excepting cars DS) will be appointed by Camp Comdt.

S.P.

6. (a) S.P. - rd junc 10061001 (junc AIR PORT and GAZA - BEER-SHEBA rds);

(b) Veh gp comds will organise their own veh gps and will ensure that gps leave assembly areas in time for head to pass S.P. at times shown in column (g) of Movement Table.

(c) Assembly areas will be laid down by Camp Comdt.

BLOCK TIMING.

7. Where block timings are allotted to more than 20 vehicles in stage 2, Veh Gp Comds will organise groups of from 16 to 20 vehicles for that stage. Such groups will be despatched at intervals of approximately 45 mins per 20 vehs.

DISPERSION.

8. (a) Maximum dispersion allowed by the ground will be effected at ASLUJ, MOASCAR, MENA and at ISMAILIA, whilst waiting for the Canal crossing.

(b) Vehs will NOT close up when halted on the road.

HALTS.

On stages 2, 3 and 4 all vehs will halt for 30 mins after 3 hours driving.

MAPS.

10. Veh Gp Comds will arrange to draw copies of reference maps from GS I.

RATIONS.

11. (a) In addition to rations for the duration of the move, two days' reserve rations will be carried.  
(b) Reserve rations will NOT be consumed except under the orders of an officer, and will be distributed to all vehs.  
(c) A proportion of cooks will accompany each road party.

WATER.

12. (a) All water carrying vehs, water bottles and radiators will be full on departure from GAZA - ASLUJ - MOASCAR and MENA.  
(b) Water is obtainable at ASLUJ, MOASCAR and MENA.  
(c) Each vehicle will carry two 2-gals screw top cans of water as a reserve.

P.O.L.

13. (a) HQ, BFP & TJ is providing P.O.L. at ASLUJ.  
(b) HQ, BTE, is providing P.O.L. at MOASCAR and MENA.  
(c) All tanks will be full on dep ex GAZA-ASLUJ-MOASCAR and MENA.  
(d) In addition, the following reserves of petrol will be carried -



- 3 -

P.O.L. (contd).

13.           2 tins per car  
          3   "   "   van, light  
          4   "   "   truck.

MEDICAL.

14.   DDMS will detail a M.O. with equipment to travel with the heavy veh party. He will report personally to Veh Gp Comd at assembly area before moving off.

TRAFFIC CONTROL

15. (a) One sec 1 Aust Corps Pro Coy will be disposed over road parties as follows -

12 MPs with heavy veh party

4 MPs with light veh party.

- (b) Base and L of C Pro Coy will establish TCPs in GAZA and BEERSHEBA areas as follows:-

TCP - rd jct 09951013 jct GAZA-JAFFA-BEERSHEBA rds.

TCP - rd jct 10061001

TCP - BEERSHEBA.

FRONTIER PASSES.

16. (a) Block frontier passes for adv parties, heavy veh party and light veh party, will be drawn by Camp Comdt from HQ AIF Base Area prior to departure of respective parties.  
(b) Offrs proceeding in cars DS will be responsible for procuring their own frontier passes.

BIVOUAC.

17. (a) Personnel in heavy veh party will bivouac at ASLUJ night 28/29 Jan and at MENA night 30/31 Jan.  
(b) Personnel in adv party will bivouac at MENA night 26/27 Jan.

RECEPTION ARRANGEMENTS - EGYPT.

18.   HQ, BTE, is being requested to arrange for the following-  
(a) Reception and accommodation at MOASCAR.  
(b) Provision of POL at MOASCAR and MENA.

INTERCOMM.

19.   Comm with both EGYPT and PALESTINE can be made from ABU AWEIGLA by 'phone.

*Ala. C. ...*  
for Brig.

- DA & QMG 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: as for 1 Aust Corps Adm Instruction No. 46.

## MOVEMENT TARD "INIGO".

Page 1.

[illegible]

[illegible]

1 AUST CORPS.  
ADM INSTRUCTION No. 46.

SECRET.  
COPY No. .... 7

REF MAP -  
ALEXANDRIA - 1/100,000.

GAZA  
23 Jan 41.

PART 1.

MOVE OF H.Q. 1 AUST CORPS.

CODE NAME.

1. Code name for move, "INIGO".

UNITS TO MOVE.

2. The following will move to new location at IKINGI MARYUT  
~~49659215~~ by M.T.  
49659215

(a) First Gp: H.Q. 1 Aust Corps  
H.Q. R.A.A. 1 Aust Corps  
1 Aust Int. Sec.  
1 Aust Corps Employment Pl.  
Corps Fd Cash Office  
Corps Postal Unit  
One sec. 1 Aust Corps Pro Coy.

(b) Second Gp: 1 Aust Corps Pro Coy less three secs.  
Two coys H.Q. Guard Bn.

MOVEMENT.

3. (a) The first Gp will move as follows:-

- (i) Adv party vehs - by rd 25 Jan.
- (ii) Adv party - by ordinary passenger train 26 Jan.
- (iii) Heavy vehs (30 cwts and over) - by rd 28 Jan.
- (iv) Cars D.S. and light vehs - by rd 29 Jan.

(b) Details of rd moves will be issued separately.

4. The second Gp will move by rail ex GAZA on 1 Feb under orders to be issued by H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area.

ADV PARTY VEHs.

5. Camp Comdt will allocate the vehs for this Gp together with personnel and stores to be carried, and will promulgate the details of the allocation.
6. On arrival at new location, vehs will operate under orders of Assist. Camp Comdt.
7. H.Q. AMIRIYA Sub-area is arranging for tentage and accommodation stores to be made available from dump at BURG EL ARAB.

ADV PARTY.

8. Adv party will consist of:-

One "G" Offr  
One "A" Offr  
One "Q" Offr  
Assist. Camp Comdt.  
One O.r. from each Branch and each Service.  
One O.r. from each Offrs' Mess and Sgts' Mess  
Emp Pl.

9. (a) Each Branch, Service and Mess concerned will detail their respective personnel and forward nominal roll to Camp Comdt by 1200 hrs 25 Jan

ADV PARTY (contd).

9. (b) Personnel will move from present location under orders Camp Comdt.
  - (c) D.D.M.S. will detail a nursing orderly with First Aid equipment to travel with the adv party. He will report to O.C. party at GAZA Rly Sta by 1245 hrs, 26 Jan.
  - (d) H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area. This will issue rail warrants.
10. O.C. party will be the senior offr travelling.

HEAVY VEHS, LIGHT VEHS AND CARS D.S.

11. Camp Comdt will allocate the vchs for these parties together with personnel and stores and equipment to be carried and will promulgate details of such allocation.
12. Camp Comdt will adhere to the allocation of personnel and equipment to vchs as laid down by Corps H.Q. Standing Orders for War except for such variations as are rendered necessary by the despatch of the various parties on different days.

REAR PARTY.

13. (a) H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area will detail a rear party from AIF Rnft Depot to return surplus stores and equipment to Base Ord Depot, BARBARA.
- (b) Rear party will report to Camp Comdt 1 Aust Corps at 0830 hrs, 28 Jan.

M.T.

14. All serviceable vchs on charge at time of movement will be taken.
15. U/S vchs will be returned to Base Ord Depot, BARBARA.

EQUIPMENT AND AMN.

16. The first Gp will move on their G.1098 scale insofar as equipment in accordance with this scale has been received.
17. All equipment over and above G.1098 will NOT be taken, but will be returned to Camp Comdt by 1800 hrs, 27 Jan.
18. Amn in accordance with G.1098 scale will be taken.
19. Indents already submitted for deficiencies will be forwarded through normal channels to C.O.O., Base Ord Depot, ABASSIA.

STATIONERY AND OFFICE EQUIPMENT.

20. War Stationery box on A.F. L.1398 will be taken.

PACKING OF OFFICE EQUIPMENT.

21. Branches and Services will be responsible for packing their respective office equipment.
22. When packed, they will be stacked ready for loading at such time and place as directed by Camp Comdt.

PERSONNEL REMAINING IN PRESENT LOCATIONS.

23. Offrs and O.rs. on the staff of schools or depots or undergoing courses will NOT move from present locations.
24. Personnel undergoing med treatment and not considered fit to travel will remain.

PERSONNEL REMAINING IN PRESENT LOCATIONS (contd).

25. Personnel undergoing detention at 2/1 Aust Detention Bks will remain.
26. All personnel on strength other than the above will move in accordance with this instruction.

BLANKETS.

27. Four blankets and W.F. sheet per man will be taken.

PERSONAL CLOTHING.

28. O.rs. will take with them all their personal clothing and equipment.
29. All kit bags will be packed ready for deposit at A.I.F. Kit Store, ALEXANDRIA, on arrival at new location.
30. Camp Comdt will issue orders for dress for move.

OFFRS' BAGGAGE.

31. Offrs' entitlement will be -
  - (a) Valise with clothing, etc.  
(Lt-Cols. and above, 75 lbs;  
other offrs, 50 lbs.)
  - (b) Camp stretcher
  - (c) One small attache case.
32. Offrs will move with entitlement only.
33. All surplus and heavy baggage will be -
  - (a) packed before dep ex GAZA in readiness for deposit in A.I.F. Kit Store, ALEXANDRIA within 48 hrs of arrival at IKINGI MARYUT.
  - (b) ready for loading at present billets at a time to be directed by Camp Comdt.

TENTAGE AND ACCOMMODATION STORES.

34. Tentage and accommodation stores will NOT be taken but will be returned to Base Ord Depot, BARBARA, by rear party.

MESS GEAR.

35. Mess gear of the respective Offrs' Messes and of Sgts and O.r's. Messes will be packed separately and placed ready for loading at such time and place as directed by Camp Comdt.

HANDING OVER OF BILLETS.

36. H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area will take over all billets and offices from Camp Comdt at time to be mutually arranged.

GUIDES.

37. Assist. Camp Comdt. will provide guides from main rd to new location for vehs arriving by rd.

ACCOMMODATIO. AT NEW LOCATION.

38. Personnel will occupy offices, billets and tents as allocated by Camp Comdt. Camp Comdt will promulgate details of allocation.

■ ■ ■  
PART 2.

MOVEMENT.      CHANGE OF LOCATION OF A.I.F. H.Q.

39. A.I.F. H.Q. will move to new location at ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT, as follows:-
- (a) Adv gp in accordance with the foregoing instructions except as varied by the following paras.
  - (b) Main body by train ex GAZA 1 Feb under orders to be issued by H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area.
40. Camp Comdt, A.I.F. H.Q. will submit to Camp Comdt, 1 Aust Corps, nominal roll of personnel travelling in adv gp.
41. Personnel will move in the parties mentioned in para 3 above as arranged by respective Camp Comdts.

E.T.

42. Vehs carrying personnel and stores of A.I.F. H.Q. other than cars D.S. will proceed at the rear of the convoy with which they are directed to proceed.
43. When the convoy leaves the main CAIRO-ALEXANDRIA Rd for IKINGI MARYUT, the above vehs will proceed direct to ALEXANDRIA to a RV. to be fixed by Camp Comdt, A.I.F. H.Q.
44. Personnel of A.I.F. H.Q. who travel in cars D.S. will report at such time and place as directed by Camp Comdt A.I.F. H.Q.

ACCOMMODATION AT NEW LOCATION.

45. Billets and office accommodation for A.I.F. H.Q. will be communicated by Camp Comdt, A.I.F. H.Q.

*W. Curland*  
for Brig.  
D.A. & Q.M.G. 1 Aust Corps.

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NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED.

SECRET.

Copy No. 3

Date. 24 Jan 41.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

CAMP MOVEMENT ORDER NO. 1 of 1941

issued by

MAJOR L.M. NEWTON, M.C.

CAMP COMMANDANT.

MOVE

1. H.Q. 1 Aust Corps will move to a camp site at IRINGI BARYUT, completing the move by 31 Jan 41.

UNITS TO MOVE

2. The following will move to new location at IRINGI BARYUT :-
  - (a) First Gp :
    - H.Q. 1 Aust Corps.
    - H.Q. R.A.A. 1 Aust Corps.
    - 1 Aust Int. Sec.
    - 1 Aust Corps Employment Platoon.
    - Corps Fd. Cash Office.
    - Corps Postal Unit.
    - One sec. 1 Aust Corps Provost Coy.
  - (b) Second Gp. 1 Aust Corps Provost Coy less three secs.  
Two coys. H.Q. Guard Bn.

MOVEMENT

3. (a) The first Gp will move as follows:-
  - (i) Adv party vehs - by rd 25 Jan.
  - (ii) Adv party - by ordinary passenger train 26 Jan.
  - (iii) Heavy vehs (30 cwt and over) - by road 28 Jan.
  - (iv) Cars D.S. and light vehs - by rd 29 Jan.
4. The second Gp will move by rail ex GAZA on 1 Feb under orders to be issued by H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area.

ADVANCE PARTY VEHs.

5. The vehicles comprising the adv party ( 3(a)(i) ) together with their loads are formulated in Appendix "A".
6. On arrival at new location, vehs will operate under orders of Asst. Camp Comdt.
7. Tentage and accommodation stores will be drawn from dump at BURG EL ARAB by the Asst. Camp Comdt in accordance with instructions issued to H.Q. AMIRIYA Sub-area. The adv party vehs will be used for the cartage of these tents and stores



2.

### ADV PARTY

8. Adv party will consist of -

Lt-Col. H. Wells	( G. Branch)
Major L.L. Brighton	( A. Branch)
Lt-Col. E.W. Woodward	( Q. Branch)
Lieut W.S. Gorrie	( Asst. Camp Comdt.)

One O.R. from each Branch and each Service.  
One O.R. from each Officers' Mess and Sgts' Mess and 2 cooks.  
Employment Pltn.

9. (a) Each Branch, Service and Mess concerned will detail their respective personnel and forward nominal roll to Camp Comdt by 1200 hrs 25 Jan.
- (b) D.D.M.S. will detail a nursing orderly with First Aid equipment to travel with the Adv party. He will report to O.C. party at GAZA Rly Station by 1245 hrs 26 Jan.
- (c) Personnel of the Adv party will parade at the Camp Comdt's office at 1200 hrs 26 Jan and will march to Gaza Rly Station.
- (d) Transport office will arrange transport for kit bags, blankets, etc.
- (e) H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area will issue rail warrants.

10. O.C. party will be the senior officer travelling.

### HEAVY VEHs, LIGHT VEHs, AND CARS D.S.

11. Stores equipment and personnel travelling by heavy vehicles, light vehicles and cars D.S. are specified in Appendix "A".

When fully loaded the convoy leaving at 1400 hrs on 28 Jan will form up in front of Corps H.Q. by 1330, the head of the convoy being at Bersheba and Gaza Ridge roads junction. Lieut. F.S. Coffill will be O.C. Convoy.

When fully loaded, the convoy of 1 ton and 15 cwt vehs leaving on 29 Jan will form up similarly by 0730 hrs and move off not later than 0800. Cpl. Jorgensen will be in charge of the convoy.

### REAR PARTY

12. (a) H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area will detail a rear party from Gen Base Depot to return surplus stores and equipment to Base Ord Depot BARBARA.

(b) Rear party will report to Camp Comdt 1 Aust Corps at 0830 hrs 28 Jan.

### M.T.

13. All serviceable vehs on charge at time of movement will be taken but U/S vehs will be returned to Base Ord Depot BARBARA.

Transport office will be responsible for ensuring that all vehs are ready for the road, as well as P.O.L. for the whole M.T. section.

EQUIPMENT AND AMM.

14. The first Gps will move on their G. 1098 scale insofar as equipment in accordance with this scale has been received.
15. All equipment over and above G. 1098 will NOT be taken, but will be returned to Camp Comdt by 1800 hrs 27 Jan.
16. Amm in accordance with G. 1098 scale will be taken.
17. Indents already submitted for deficiencies will be forwarded by the CQMS to C.O.O., Base Ord Depot, AMBASSIA.

STATIONERY AND OFFICE EQUIPMENT.

18. War stationery box on A.F. L. 1398 will be taken.

PACKING OF OFFICE EQUIPMENT.

19. Branches and Services will be responsible for packing their respective office equipment.
20. (a) Office equipment and stores of the following branches will be stacked outside their respective offices on the road side at a convenient place for loading by 0930 hrs 28 Jan 41 together with all personnel as loading party:-

G. Branch	Ordnance.
A. Branch	Medical.
Q. Branch	Survey
Legal staff.	D.D.S & T.
Int. Sec.	Corps Rd Cash Office
C.S.O.	Corps Postal
C.E.	Camp Comdt.

(b) H.Q. R.A.A. and A.P.A., having evacuated Hotel Parah by instructions owing to termination of lease, their stores will be stacked in the yard at the rear of Camp Comdt's office on the night of 27 Jan and will be loaded from this point on 28 Jan. The services concerned will arrange for loading parties to be there at 0930 hrs.

(c) AIRPORT. Transport Officer will arrange for two three ton trucks to report to Airport Camp by 1500 hrs on 27 Jan to collect all office equipment stores and surplus officers' baggage of H.Q. 1 Aust Corps officers located at Airport and to transport same to Camp Comdt's office where instructions will be issued for off-loading. The officers concerned will arrange for all stores etc. to be thus transported to be concentrated at the Airport Camp transport office by 1430 hrs 27 Jan together with a loading party.

PERSONNEL REMAINING IN PRESENT LOCATIONS.

21. The following personnel will not move from present locations:-
  - (a) Officers and O.R.s on the staff of schools or depots or undergoing courses.
  - (b) Personnel undergoing medical treatment and not considered fit to travel.
  - (c) Personnel undergoing detention at 2/1 Aust Detention Bks.
  - (4) G.O.C.'s horses and grooms will be left behind in charge of Cpl. Ralph and will be attached to H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area for rations and administration.

All personnel on strength other than the above will move in accordance with this instruction.

PERSONAL CLOTHING.

22. O.R. will take with them all their personal clothing, arms and equipment. All kit bags will be packed ready for deposit at A.I.F. Kit Store Alexandria, and will be transported there immediately after arrival at new location under further orders to be issued.

All ranks will give this matter attention before leaving GAZA.

BLANKETS.

23. Four blankets and W.P. sheet per man will be taken.

DRESS.

24. The following dress will be observed by all ranks:-  
Full marching order.  
Great coats will be rolled or folded in pack, unless the weather is inclement.  
Water bottles will be filled.  
Steel helmets and respirators will be carried.  
Every man will carry 10 rounds S.A.A. which will be drawn with rifle from the Armoury between 1500 and 1700 hrs on the day prior to departure.

OFFICERS' BAGGAGE.

25. Officers will move with ent.tlement only which is  
(a) Valise with clothing, etc. (Lt-Cols and above 75 lbs; others Offrs 50 lbs.)  
(b) Camp stretcher.  
(c) One small attache case.

All surplus and heavy baggage will be packed for departure ex Gaza and for deposit in A.I.F. Kit Store, Alexandria, as soon as possible after arrival in Ikingi Maryut. This will be stacked outside Officers' billets with batman in charge by 0930 hrs 28 Jan.

TENTAGE AND ACCOMMODATION STORES.

26. Tentage and accommodation stores will NOT be taken but will be returned to Base Ord Depot, BARBARA, by rear party. Captain E. C. Stephens is detailed to assist the Camp Comdt in the return of tentage and accommodation stores, and R.S.M. will arrange for the striking of tents and the handing of same over, together with surplus stores, to the Area Commandant, and obtain receipt for same.

MESS GEAR.

27. Mess gear of respective Offrs' Messes and of Sgts and O.R.'s Messes will be packed separately and placed ready for loading outside their respective Messes by 1030 hrs on 28/1/41. Owing to the fact that Officers travelling by road will be separated from their mess gear, mess secretaries are permitted to load an extremely limited quantity of mess gear and supplementary rations on light vehicles travelling by road on 29 Jan.

HANDING OVER OF BILLETS.

28. H.Q. A.I.F. Base Area will take over all billets and offices from Camp Comdt at time to be mutually arranged.

GUIDES.

29. Asst. Camp Comdt. will provide guides from main road to new location for vehicles arriving by road.

ACCOMMODATION AT NEW LOCATION.

30. Personnel will occupy office billets and tents at Ikingi Maryut in accordance with plans attached hereto. Distribution of plan is limited to branches and services concerned.

RATIONS.

31. All personnel travelling by road on 28 and 29 Jan will carry unexpired portion of days rations on the man.
- CCMS will arrange to carry three days rations in bulk and issue same to main body during the journey by road as and when required.
- Dixies will be loaded in a convenient place for boiling water at meal halts.
- Breakfast on 29 Jan will be the last meal in officers' messes.
- Dinner on 30 Jan will be the first meal given at Ikingi Maryut.
- Mid-day dinner will be the last meal served in Sgts' and O.R. messes on 28 Jan.
- Arrangements will be made for 1 cook to remain behind until 29 Jan to make tea for all Sgts and O.R. personnel remaining, who will mess together in the men's mess.

ROUTINE.

32. Reveille will be as follows:-

28 Jan - 0600 hrs  
29 Jan - 0530 hrs.

PROTECTION.

33. The two L.M.G. sections at present at Airport Camp will travel with main party on 28 Jan 41 and will travel in vehicles located in the front and rear portion of the convoy respectively, to afford protection from hostile aircraft en route. Personnel will be prepared to assist in the defence of the convoy by rifle fire.

MEDICAL.

34. M.O., Capt J. English, will travel with main party and render first aid if necessary.

CLEANLINESS OF OFFICES, BILLETTS, MESSES, ETC.

35. Each branch and service will be responsible for the cleanliness of their offices, etc, before leaving.
- Mess Secretaries will also ensure that messes and kitchens are left in a clean condition.
- Officers will instruct their batmen to leave billets in a clean condition.
- After vacating of Gaza Town rear party will continue cleaning up to satisfaction of the Area Commandant.

6.

PART II

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37. Main body A.I.P. H.Q. will move by train from Gaza on 1 Feb 41 under orders to be issued by P.O. A.I.P. as recommended by Camp Commandant, A.I.P. H.Q.

*W. H. Newton*

Major.  
Camp Commandant.  
H.Q. 1 Aust Corps.

1. AUST. CORPS.  
MOVEMENTS FROM "INIGO".

Appendix A to 1 Aust Corps.  
Movement Order No. 33 dated 24 Jan 63  
Page 1.

[illegible]

1573/Q.

1 AUST CORPS.

SECRET.

GAZA  
25 Jan 41.MOVE OF "INIGO".

The following -

SUMMARISED TIME-TABLE OF MOVE OF "INIGO"

is promulgated for ready reference.

Date	Time	Item
Sat 25 Jan	0800 P.L.T. 1200 P.L.T. 1645 E.T.	Adv party vehs dep ex GAZA Nominal roll of adv party personnel to Camp. Adv party vehs arr MOASCAR.
Sun 26 Jan	0900 E.T. 1200 P.L.T. 1245 P.L.T. 1300 E.T. 1316 P.L.T.	Adv party vehs dep ex MOASCAR. Adv party personnel report to Camp Nursing Orderly reports to GAZA Rly Sta. Adv party vehs arr MENA. Adv party dep ex GAZA by train.
Mon 27 Jan	0600) 0800) E.T. 1200) P.L.T. 1430  1500 1800	Adv party arr IKINGI MARYUT. Adv party vehs dep MENA Adv party vehs arr IKINGI MARYUT  Heavy baggage at Airport to be ready. Lorries report Airport Surplus office equipment etc to be returned to Camp by this hr.
Tues 28 Jan	0600 0630 0830 0930   1030  1330 1400 1630	Reveille Men's breakfast Rear party reports to Camp (a) Offrs' heavy baggage to be ready stacked. (b) Office equipment to be ready stacked less absolute minimum requirements for day's work, which requirements will be communicated to Camp by 1800 hrs Mon, 27 Jan. Mess gear to be ready stacked less essentials for remainder of meals. Heavy veh convoy with personnel ready to move. Head heavy veh convoy passes S.P. Heavy veh convoy arr ASLUJ.
Wed 29 Jan	0530 0600 0630  0730 0730 0800 0830	Reveille Men's breakfast. Remainder of office equipment and Mess gear to be stacked ready for loading. DAQMG (M) with guides for MOASCAR and MENA dep ex GAZA. Light veh convoy ready to move. Head light veh convoy passes S.P. Cars D.S. may proceed independently as from this hr.

SUMMARISED TIME-TABLE OF MOVE OF "INIGO" (contd).

Date	Time	Item
Wed 29 Jan	P.L.T. 1000	Light veh convoy passes ASLUJ.
	1015	Heavy veh convoy dep ex ASLUJ.
	E.T. 1530	Light veh convoy arr MOASCAR.
	1815	Heavy veh convoy arr MOASCAR.
Thurs 30 Jan	0730	Light vehs dep ex MOASCAR.
	0800	Heavy vehs dep ex MOASCAR.
	1130	Light vehs arr MENA
	1230	" " dep "
	1300	Heavy vehs arr "
	1600	Light vehs arr IKINGI MARYUT.
	1700	Personnel in cars D.S. report at IKINGI MARYUT.
Fri 31 Jan	0800	Heavy vehs dep ex MENA
	1230	" " arr IKINGI MARYUT.

*W. Culand*  
for Brig. Major

D.A. & Q.M.G. 1 Aust Corps.

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Q	4	DMS	2
CE	3	DOS	2
DDST	5	DPM	2
DDMS	3	HQ AIF Base Area	2
ADOS	5	File	1





1st Aust Corps.

Headquarters,  
GAZA  
25 Jan 41.

ROAD REPORT - 19 JAN 41.

<u>Stage</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Miles</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	GAZA	BEERSHEBA	50	Rough rd now being repaired. Deviations at various points.
2	BEERSHEBA	ASLUF	19.5	Good rd.
3	ASLUF	EL AUJA	25.7	Good rd.
4	EL AUJA	ABU AMEILIA	23.6	Good rd. liable to strike sand drifts in area approx 15 miles west of ABU AMEILIA.
5	ABU AMEILIA	CANAL	123	Good rd. liable to bad sand drifts in sand dune country East of Canal for approx 5 miles.

Total distance Stages 1-5 incl. 231.6 miles

6	ISMAILIA	CAIRO	35	First-class rd.
7	CAIRO	IMINGI MARYUT	126	High speed rd.
8	ALEXANDRIA	BURG EL ARAB	22.8	First-class rd except for 1st 30 miles west of BURG EL ARAB where it is undulating.
9	BURG EL ARAB	EL DABA	71.5	
10	EL DABA	QUASABA	49.5	
11	QUASABA	MEREA MATRUH	19.8	
12	MEREA MATRUH	SIDI BARRANI	83.6	Rough rd; pot-holes and loose metal. Time taken to travel under present conditions 3 1/2 hrs.
13	SIDI BARRANI	ZUG BUG	24.2	Bad rd - loose metal - can average 25 m.p.h. in car without undue discomfort.
14	ZUG BUG	SOLEH	25.3	Good rd over claypan but could be dangerous in wet weather.
15	SOLEH	BARDIA	25.3	Fair rd. Surface starting to deteriorate with pot-holes.
16	BARDIA	ADV HQ 6 ARST DIV	56.1	Fair rd. Portions near BARDIA loose metal. Time taken to travel 1 1/2 hrs.

Total ALEXANDRIA to ADV HQ 6 ARST DIV as at 19 Jan 41. 695.1 miles

*Enigo*

30 cwt

<u>Veh. No</u>		<u>Driver.</u>
5992	Q.M. Store, Tools, office signs	Budden
6165	" " "	Cook
5348	" " "	Fredericksen
5588	" " "	Espe
5989	" " "	Kilpatrick
5991	" " "	Purchase

1 ton

5159	For use of G.O.C.	Sherman
5160	2 L.M.G. and 2 A.T. 4 gunners (rear party)	Simkins
5156	1 L.M.G. and 1 A.T. 2 gunners (main body)	Phillips
5184	1 L.M.G. and 1 A.T. gunners (main body)	Pritchard

15 cwt

3859	M.O.s equipment, M.O.'s batman and orderly	Clarke F.
3406	Maps Map Issuer (Sgt. Stockfeld)	Fawcett
6229	Sgts Mess gear 2 personnel	McConnell
6212	D.A.D.M.S. equipment	McDougall, R.
6215	M.O. equipment Officers' Mess gear	Ward
6216	M.O. equipment	Minogue
6217	Camp office equipment 4 personnel	Wilson, C.H.
6231	Ordnance Stores 4 personnel	Austin L.
2539	C.E. office equipment 5 personnel	Williamson
3877	Cipher equipment 5 personnel	Barker
3409	Intelligence	Hazeldene

3 ton

6699	Officers' surplus baggage	Aroney
6673	" " "	Bilbrough
6688	" " "	Cornes
6664	Bulk rations	Deslandes
6691	Office equipment (I) and (O)	Doolan A.E.
6687	Personnel 18 ( G. and I	Doolan H.A.
6702	Camp Q.M. Store	Johnson R.J.
5686	Men's Mess gear	Jubber
5636	Officers' baggage (if any not in cars)	Hoble
5612	A Mess gear - 8 batmen and mess personnel	Slatter
5722	B. Mess gear - 8 batmen and mess personnel	Turner
5688	Officers' equipment A. and Q.	Webb
6695	Personnel 18 A and Q	Whitlocke E.
5627	( Office equipment, Survey, Chaplains, Legal	
	( 9 personnel	Woods
	Office equipment S. and T. 7 personnel	) Drivers
	Office equipment Ordnance	)
	Personnel 18, Ordnance	) to
	Office equipment, Provost, Medical, 10 personnel	)
	Q.M. Store	) bc
	R.A.A.	)
	Corps Hd. Cash Office	) supplied
	C Mess gear 8 batmen and mess personnel	)
	D Mess gear 8 batmen and mess personnel	) with
	E mess gear 8 batmen and mess personnel	)
	F mess gear 8 batmen and mess personnel	) vehicles
	( C.E., C.S.O., R.A.A. office equipment, and	)
	( 9 personnel	)
	Office equipment G, 10 personnel	)

Secret.

CAMP MOVEMENT ORDER NO. 1

APPENDIX "A"

Car No. 1

Driver.

H. 1	G.O.C.	Capt. Carlyon	L/Sgt. Whyte.
8542	Lieut Moore	Pte Graham R.A.	Pvt. Eastwood
2104	B.G.S.	Pte Plummer	" French
2100	Lt-Col Elliott	Maj. Wills Batman Col Elliott	" Wiggerham
2021	DA&QMG	Maj. Binns Pte Reed	" Wharton
2147	C.S.O.	Capt. Bruton Pte Lloyd	" Biscam
2337	C.E.	Maj. McIlcoll L/Cpl Cilgryst	" Brown, W.
2024	Capt. Faulkner	Lieut Morell Batman	" Warren
4803	Maj. Brighton	-----	" Schlager
2016	Lt-Col Simpson	Capt. McVicar Pte Christensen	" Austin
2018	Major Spry	(Lieut McIlcoll) Pte Kinghorn	" Thatcher
2170	Major Burton	Lieut. Kees Pte Laurence A.C.	" Wakefield
2020	D.D.S & T.	Capt. Synnot Pte Garrett W.J.	" Persons
2030	Lt-Col. Stewart	Capt. Hansen Pte Isaacs	" Attenborough
2171	Maj Irvine	Capt. E.C. Stephens Pte Thompson L.A.	" Brittingham P.A.
2336	Maj Klein	Capt. Hogarth Batman	" Cations
2359	C.G.R.A.	Lt-Col Durant Sgt Davey	" Donaldson
2487	Capt Curren	Capt. Bowen Lieut Bailey	" Long. N.E.R.
2110	Capt Sadler	Lieut Lewis Pte Dickford E.V.	" Clarke S.D.
2174	Major Newton	S/Sgt Paarmann Pte Mahon, D.	" McDonald
4817	Major Cleland	W.O. I Beauchamp Sgt Edwards N.	" Brittingham P.A.
2485	Capt. Duffy	Lieut Davis Pte Fraser D.C.	" Mullens
2486	Capt Noble	Capt. Calloy Pte Leith	" Richards R.T.
2412	Lt-Col Rogers	Capt. Williams Pte Hands J.L.	" Doig
2496	Col Johnston	Major McCallum Pte Johnson R.H.	" Coulthard
To be allotted	Capt. Binney	Capt. How Batman	To be allotted

**SECRET.**

**HIGH GRADE CIPHER MESSAGE.**

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20/APSJ/6—10.000—29.10.40

To—		Time of origin	
See below			
From—	Date	Originator's number	Time of receipt
Force HQ	24	HR/C/M/4050	

To Mvts MIDEAST AUSFORCE 1 CAV DIV (Mvts HAIPA) rptd CANADE  
(pass MVTS CANAL MVTS EL KANTARA) TROOPS PORT SAID for MVTS  
EGYPTFORCE.

Move of HQ 1 Aust Corps from GAZA to IKINGI MARUY (.)  
Code name for Move INIGO rpt INIGO (.)  
Advance party (.) Offrs 2 ORs 60 (.) GAZA depart 1316 hrs 26 Jan  
EL KANTARA arrive 1830 hrs ~~28 Jan~~ PLT (.) Main Body  
Strength approx 8 offrs 500 ORs (.) GAZA depart 2130 hrs goods  
83 1 Feb ELKANTARA EAST arrive 0700 PLT 2 Feb (.) MVTS MIDEAST  
request arrnage onward despatch (.)  
Hot meal arrange EL KANTARA (.)  
Accommodation one 1st 2nd Compo 7 3rds - being arranged by  
1600 hrs 1 Feb (.)

Logged in 25/1

Copy G -

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Q

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Original Q

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G. 644.

1 Aust Corps  
22 Jan 41.

Force HQ.

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7 Aust Div

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HQ AIF Base Area.

MOVE of HQ 1 AUST CORPS from GAZA to EGYPT.

1. HQ 1 Aust Corps will move to IKINOI MARYUT by rd and rail; move to be completed by 1400 hrs 31 Jan 41.
2. HQ 1 Aust Corps will close at GAZA at 1800 hrs 29 Jan 41 and will open at IKINOI MARYUT at the same hour.
3. Coincident with this move, Headquarters of AIF will be established at ALEXANDRIA, the address and telephone number to be notified later.
4. It is NOT proposed to establish one single authority for all AIF formations and units in PALESTINE except in so far as the functions of Military Commander GAZA are concerned. It would therefore be appreciated if the following action could be taken with regard to correspondence emanating from your HQ.

(a) Matters of General Information

To be added to Comds 7 and 9 Aust Divs and to HQ AIF Base Area.

(b) Matters requiring Co-ordination for AIF in PALESTINE.

To be added to HQ AIF Base Area who will be responsible for consulting Comds 7 and 9 Aust Divs in preparation of reply.

(c) Matters concerning duties of Military Commander, GAZA.

To be added as before to Comd 7 Aust Div.

5. All questions of movement should be added to HQ AIF Base Area for whom the telegraphic address 'AUSBASE GAZA' has been restored.

Lt.-Gen.  
Comd 1 Aust Corps.

G2 (c)

**SECRET.**

Ref No. ....

**HIGH GRADE CIPHER MESSAGE.**

Copy No. ....

This message must be circulated under cover and must be locked up when not in use. It must not be placed on any but a secret file. Should the secrecy of the contents of this message allow it reference may be made to it in "clear", on the telephone, or in Non Secret correspondence, and the originator's number quoted.

20/APS/15-10.000-29.10.40

To—			Time of origin
EGYPTFORCE			
From—	Date	Originator's number	Time of receipt
1 Aust Corps	51	01	

**IMMEDIATE**

Ref CR/EGYPT/2/22607/G of 27 Jan (.)

HQ 1 Aust Corps approx 90 vehicles 460 all ranks moves from

IKINGI 4 Feb staging night 4/5 MAATEN BAQQUSH night 5/6 Feb

SIDI BARRANI arriving GAMBUT evening 6 Feb (.)

Recce and staging parties moving one day ahead (.) May movement  
order be issued please.

**Distribution:**

Cipher Office 1  
Copy Q 1  
Cable Log G 1.

Army Form C.2125  
(Pads of 100.)  
(Revised Sept. 1936.)

# MESSAGE FORM.

CASE  
AND  
INSTRUC-  
TIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups  
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

6 Aust Div

4712306

Originator's Number.

Date.

In Reply to Number

FROM

1 Aust Corps

0136

23

A 37

of

12

Jan

(.)

One

copy

Aust

HQ

Gd

Bn

will

be

available early

Feb

(.)

further

instruction

will

be

issued

later

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN  
BY ANY MEANS.

IS LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL  
INTO ENEMY HANDS. THIS MESSAGE MUST  
BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS  
DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1510

RECORD

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IS.	TIME IS.	RECEIVED.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	RECEIVED.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	RECEIVED.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

WILEY & CO., N.Y.C.



	GAZA	ISMAILIA	CAIRO	AMARIYA	FUKA	MERSA MATRUH	MILEAGES		HALFYA PASS	FORT CAPUZZO	BARDIA	TOBRUK	DERNA	BENGHAZI
							KILO 104	SIDI BARRANI						
GAZA		204	286	687	509	559	620	640	688	703	718	799	907	1107
ISMAILIA	204	-	82	193	305	355	416	436	484	499	504	595	703	903
CAIRO	286	82	-	111	223	273	334	354	402	417	432	513	621	821
AMARIYA	687	193	111	-	112	162	223	243	291	306	321	402	510	710
FUKA	509	305	223	112	-	50	111	131	179	194	209	290	398	598
MERSA MATRUH	559	355	273	162	50	-	61	81	129	144	159	240	348	548
KILO 104	620	416	334	223	111	61	-	20	68	83	98	179	287	487
SIDI BARRANI	640	436	354	243	131	81	20	-	48	63	78	159	267	467
HALFYA PASS	688	484	402	291	179	129	68	48	-	15	30	111	219	419
FORT CAPUZZO	703	499	417	306	194	144	83	63	15	-	15	96	214	414
BARDIA	718	504	432	321	209	159	98	78	30	12	-	81	189	389
TOBRUK	799	595	513	402	290	240	179	159	111	96	81	-	108	308
DERNA	907	703	621	510	398	348	287	267	219	214	189	108	-	200
BENGAZI	1107	903	821	710	598	548	487	467	419	414	389	308	200	-

(2)

4. GARRISON DUTIES.

(a) An Aust Inf Bde to be notified later will detail one complete Bn to take over garrison duties in the TOBRUCH area. This Bn to arrive at its location not later than one hour after the whole of the defences are captured. This Bn will not occupy the town, but will be located, in the first instance, in square 412435 to the west of the town. Subsequent accommodation will be allotted by Area Comd.

(b) This Bn will supply guards on points as shown hereunder :-

- (i) Town Guard. Strength one coy to provide sentry posts on all roads approaches into the town to prevent the entry of unauthorised persons, also to provide guards within the town, over all power and water pumping plant. Water supplies (incl distribution systems); Supply, petrol and fuel dumps, wharves (incl Dock installations and stores); wireless installations war materials and such other points as may be ordered.

NOTE. The main sources of water supply, at present known in the town area are :-

Reservoir 41424354 connected to source at WADI AUDA  
" 41424351 connected to source at WADI SEHEL and also to Distillation plant about 41354334 and 41374332.  
Reservoirs 41504346, 41464344, 41444346 all of which are interconnected by pipe line.

(ii) Guard on captured vehicle park - strength one pl.

(iii) Guards on all captured water supplies and installations, ration, petrol and engineer dumps outside the town area.

NOTE. The main sources of water supply outside the town area are as follows :-

WADI SEHEL (3 wells) and pumping station 40014395.  
WADI AUDA (3 wells) " " " 40944368.  
Reservoirs (tanks etc) 40304361, 39844350, 39814308, 40924344, 40934304, 41244344, 41304343, 41394323, 41364269.  
Distillation Plants. 41354334, 41374332.

Pump House. 41354337.

(c) This Bn will also be responsible for the local defence of the town as required by Area Comd.

*Handwritten signature*  
A.A. & Q.M.G. 6 AUST. DIV.

COL.

Distribution.

16 Aust Inf Bde  
17 Aust Inf Bde  
19 Aust Inf Bde  
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav  
R.A.A.  
R.A.E.  
Sigs  
7 R.T.R.  
7 Armd Div  
1 N.F.  
1 Cheshire Regt  
Comd  
G.  
A.  
Q.  
Camp  
A.A.S.C.  
A.D.M.S.  
D.A.D.O.S.  
S.O.M.E.  
D.A.P.M.  
No.4 Rec Sec

Copy No.

1 XIII Corps  
2 1 Aust Corps  
3 File  
4 War Diary  
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6 AUST DIV.

SECRET. 78 2 19.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 3

Copy No. 24

20 Jan 41.

PROCEDURE ON CAPTURE OF TOBRUCH.

Ref. Map : TOBRUCH SHEET OVERPRINT JAN 41.

The following instructions as to action to be taken on the capture of TOBRUCH issued for the general guidance of all concerned :-

1. BOUNDS.

is  
TOBRUCH/out of bounds to all ranks except those on duty. For the purpose of this instruction the boundaries of TOBRUCH will be :- on the North, East and South - the Sea, and on the West a line drawn through the following points :- road junc 41514365, road junc 41384357; cross rds 41314348 road junc 41334341 thence due east to the sea. All personnel on duty (NOT under command, such as patrols etc) must be in possession of a numbered pass issued by the AQ Branch H.Q. 6 Aust Div, or H.Q. 13 Corps. These passes will bear the imprint of the A.Q. office stamp.

2. PROVOST.

(a) As soon as practicable after the capture of TOBRUCH the D.A.P.M. will move there with all available personnel of the Div Pro Coy, and establish posts at the following points to prevent the entry of unauthorized persons :-

- (i) Road junc 41514365
- (ii) " " 41384357
- (iii) Cross Rds 41314348
- (iv) Road junc 41334341

(b) D.A.P.M. will provide a patrol to clear the town of all stragglers and to prevent looting.

(c) D.A.P.M. will establish control posts, as follows, to prevent the unauthorized removal of captured vehicles, supplies etc :-

- (i) Road junc 41344267
- (ii) " " 40714299
- (iii) " " 40714302
- (iv) " " 40944342

(d) D.A.P.M. will endeavour to contact the local civil authorities of the town, if any, for the proper control of the civilian population, until the arrival of area command personnel detailed by 1 Aust Corps.

3. COMMAND.

(a) The command of TOBRUCH will be vested in the C.O. Bn detailed in para 4 below until the arrival of the Area Comd.

(b) He will be responsible for the following :-

- (i) that the utmost care is exercised against booby traps sabotage of services etc.
- (ii) that local inhabitants and specialists amongst prisoners are retained to assist in locating and rendering harmless booby traps, and in removing preparations etc for the destruction of services and plant.
- (iii) the proper control of inhabitants in conjunction with the civic authorities (if any)
- (iv) the provision of duties as shown in para 4 below.

File 40714299 6 Div

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

S E C R E T

H.Q. 18 Aus. Mxd. Bde.  
14 Jan. 41.

1 AUSL. CORPS.

518 2 19

1 Aus. Corps.

GIARABUB.

On visiting Adv. H.Q., B.T.E. at MARTIN BAGGSH on 6 Jan. I was informed that the estimated strength of the Garrison at GIARABUB was as follows:-

<u>Italians</u> :	Four M.G. Coys., Total Personnel	600.
	Two motorised M.G. Coys. "	240.
	One Coy. G.A.F. "	120.
	One Bty. 20 mms A.A. A/Tk. Guns "	120.
	Sec. Fd. Guns (probably Seven 75's)	100.
		<hr/> 1180.
<u>Libyans</u> :	One Engineer Bn.	400
	Portion of Inf. Bn.	300
		<hr/> 700.
	TOTAL all ranks.	1880.

(On 20 Dec. 40 the ration strength was reported to be 1975, also that on half rations scale, rations for Italians would last until 31 Dec. and for Libyans until 15 Jan.. Since then stores have been regularly landed by planes).

I made an aerial recce on the following day. Because of poor visibility we flew at a height of 1200 feet and were subjected to a good deal of A.A. gun and M.G. fire, as result of which we flew rather wide of the outer defences. Still a good view of the defences was obtained. Before making recce from the air I think it preferable to make one from the ground.

With C.Os. 6 Cav. Regt., 3 Fd. Regt., 9 and 10 Bns., Brigade Major and Brigade Supply Officer, I made ground recces on 9, 10 and 11 Jan..

The enemy position may be divided into three sectors:-

Northern Sector - incl. the aerodrome and hangars, strong posts at N.E. and N.W. approaches sited in considerable depth.

Central Sector - incl. fort, plantation and village.

Southern Sector - consisting of strong posts on S.W., wire and a well fortified escarpment, running East and West on Southern extremity of the position.

The position is completely surrounded by a wire fence, 12 feet through. The Southern escarpment and the fort are heavily wired on all sides, the former also possessing a number of individually wired strong posts.

PA

(2)

The enemy morale appears to be surprisingly good. At first sign of our approach patrols with M.G. were pushed well out to deny us effective observation and his arty was brought into action rapidly opening with accurate fire. The Comd. of the Garrison is reputed to be an efficient and determined leader. On 1 Jan. one of our squadrons occupied a position further forward than usual and was soon attacked. They lost 2 killed and 3 or 4 wounded, and had to be extricated by the other squadron. Incidentally they inflicted at least 7 casualties on the enemy. Morale will be the deciding factor and if the enemy were to put up a determined resistance, his dispositions are sufficiently good to require the use of a complete Brigade instead of only 2 Battalions supported by a complete Fd. Regt. instead of one bty. as proposed. A prolonged attack and arty preparation would undoubtedly leave him severely shaken but, on the other hand, the element of surprise would be sacrificed. Owing to the ~~extremely~~ difficult nature of the country, it would be essential for detailed reces to be carried out down as far as pl. comds. and, in addition, for strong recce patrols to secure detailed information of his outer defences. This would make it difficult to achieve surprise except as to the quarter from which the attack would develop.

The GIARAEUB area is generally flat but a number of small knolls to the N.E. and N.W. no doubt conceal enemy posts. These, when seized, would give good cover for advance towards the fort. The dominating feature is the escarpment to the South which overlooks the whole area and would provide excellent arty observation. Cover could also be obtained from a plantation on the Eastern side of the fort.

Good approaches exist from N.E., N.W. and West. It has been possible to thoroughly recce the S.W. and South but it is reported that good approaches for infantry exist although the going is difficult for wheeled vehicles. The N.E. approach is strongly fortified, much more so than on the N.W.. Approaches from the West and South are commanded by the fort and escarpment but sufficient cover is available to enable either to be used, particularly if the advance were made at night or under cover of smoke.

The most suitable approaches appear to be from the N.W. and S.W.. The former does not appear to be strongly held and provides cover for an advance towards the fort. In addition the going is good for vehicles. The latter would enable the escarpment position to be rolled up from the West.

It is considered that an attack from the S.W. offers the best prospects of success with the Southern sector as the first objective, the Central Sector as the second and the Northern as the third.

There is the alternative of a simultaneous attack from the N.W. and S.W. but this is recommended only if 3 battalions are employed.

It is highly desirable that the whole of the Fd. Regt. be employed.

On our return from GIARAEUB we crossed the desert from GARM on a bearing of 65 degrees to the LERSA MATRUH-SIMA road 25 miles South of LERSA MATRUH. This route is approximately 100 miles shorter than via SIMA. The going was little or no worse than the SIMA route.

The Italian telegraph line is about to be repaired and this will give telegraph communication with CAPUZZO, the wire being of poor quality.

3.

A dump is to be established at MELFA but this is too far away. I suggest the location be one-and-a-half miles N.E. of the opening in the wire at Cav. Forward Base about 12 miles East of North of GIARABUB and 22 miles West of MELFA by road. The Egyptian Frontier Force will be used for transporting the stores. As the Egyptians will not cross the frontier possibly arrangements could be made for British drivers to carry on for the final stage.

The evacuation of wounded is a major problem. A C.S.S. should be established well forward to deal with cases which cannot be evacuated at once. I understand that a plane service will be available and that the aerodrome at GARN is suitable.

I have asked for air photographs of the whole of the defences. Those we now have are quite inadequate.

The British Missions Officer at SIWA (Lt.Col. Bather) can take charge of prisoners of war as soon as they cross the border.

On 11 Jan. three enemy bombers dropped 16 bombs in the area but well away from our then position.

Tanks. I confirm my telegram despatched yesterday as per copy enclosed.

On returning to MAARREN BAGUSH on 12 Jan. I received a message that the Comd-in-Chief E.T.E. would see me at CAIRO on or after 13 Jan. instead of at MAARREN BAGUSH as originally arranged. I reported to him yesterday and told him that, although we are very keen to get into action as early as possible I considered that the simpler plan would be to deny the enemy supplies and so starve him into submission. With this he agreed and instructed me to take no further action meantime, indicating that we could expect to be employed elsewhere.

For some time past a plane has been landing stores daily at GIARABUB but now that Fergusson has a troop of 25-pdrs. he should be able to prevent this.

While we were in the area an enemy convoy of eight tractors, each drawing two or three trailers, a light lorry with a Breda gun, and four staff cars, was bombed and machine-gunned by the R.A.F. about 50 miles N.W. of GIARABUB and all but two cars and the light lorry were destroyed. A squadron of the long distance patrol eventually completed the destruction of the convoy which they found abandoned. The convoy was said to have a month's rations and a quantity of ammunition.

To ensure GIARABUB being kept isolated I suggest that Fergusson's force, which numbers about 200, should be increased. He and his men are doing a splendid job but they require a change now and then even if only to get a bath. With their present strength it would not be safe to send a squadron back to SIWA for a spell. The men are very cheerful and keen. Altogether it is a really efficient unit -- I have never seen a better one.

*J. Morhead*  
Brig.  
Comd. 18 Aus. Lxd. Bde.

Copy: 9 Aus. Div.

COPY.

13 Jan 40.

To: 1 Ans. Corps.

From: Morshhead.

Your letter 13 Dec. 40. Fergusson recommends 2 sqns. each consisting 2 tps. medium tks., 3 tps. Lt. tks., 1 tp. carriers. 1 Medium tk., 1 light with each sqn. H.Q. and R.H.Q.. Suggests converting A. Sqn. with required additional personnel from other 2 sqns to this purpose. Can make a start as soon as A. Sqn is released and quota from B. and C. Sqns. replaced by reinforcements. Reporting personally at Cairo today after which will forward full report on my reccs..

H.Q. 1st Aust Corps

MOST SECRET.

1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS.		
498	3	36
13 FEB. 1941		

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS MOVEMENT CONTROL ORDER NUMBER QM2/195.

COPY NO.....32

CR/ME/7935/Q(M).

30 January, 1941.

MOVEMENTS OF UNITS AND REINFORCEMENTS EGYPT TO CYRENAICA BY SEA.  
(Reference G.H.Q., M.E. Signal QM2/37768 dated 26 Jan 41 not to all addressees.)

1. MERSA MATRUH to SOLLUM.

Owing to shortage of M.T. in CYRENAICA only selected complete units, and AUSTRALIAN reinforcements, may embark MATRUH to SOLLUM. D.M.S., G.H.Q., M.E. will place medical orderlies on "SOLLUM" and "FAROUKH".

2. MOVES TO TOBRUK.

Units and reinforcements in following order of priority will move to TOBRUK as shipping is available :-

Serial.	Unit or Formation.	Present Location	Strengths.		Remarks.
			Offs.	ORs. Baggage.	
1.	18 Aust. Bde.	AMIRYA.	103.	2310. 335tons	25 M/cs.
2.	Libyan Refugee Bn.	MENA.	13.	576. 30tons	
3.	R.A.	R.A. B.D. ALMAZA.	92	All Ranks.	
4.	Details	L&T Camp, ABBASSIA.	105	All Ranks.	

4. EMBARKATION.

(a) To make best use of shipping at ALEXANDRIA, Movement Control, ALEXANDRIA is responsible for calling forward personnel for embarkation.

(b) Movement Control, ALEXANDRIA will arrange with Q(M)3, G.H.Q., M.E. and No. 1 L. of C. DISTRICT to call forward personnel from Serials 2 and 3 to Transit Camps near ALEXANDRIA, to ensure sufficient personnel are always available to fill ships.

5. RATIONS.

All personnel for embarkation will be provided with:-

(a) 2 days voyage rations, (b) 7 days landing rations.

6. BLANKETS.

4 blankets per man will be taken.

7. BAGGAGE.

(a) Any Unit equipment or baggage loaded in a separate ship from the personnel will be accompanied by a small Unit Guard.

(b) Units are responsible that equipment and baggage is guarded throughout the journey, especially in the dock-area.

8. DOCUMENTS.

2 copies A.F.W. 5169 will be prepared by despatching Unit or Formation for all personnel embarking. 1 Copy will be handed to M.C. ALEXANDRIA on embarkation, 1 copy will be handed over to O.C. Troops for handing to M.C. at Port of disembarkation.

6. Circulate

...../ 9. LIAISON...



9. LIAISON.

18 Aust. Bde. will detail a Liaison Officer with car to be attached to M.C. ALEXANDRIA from time of receipt of this order until Brigade has completed embarkation.

10. REPORTS.

M.C. ALEXANDRIA will :- (a) Inform M.C. TOBRUK by IMMEDIATE cipher agreed with D.S.T.O., ALEXANDRIA signal strength and composition of parties embarked giving name of ship and estimated time and date of arrival.

(b) Inform Q(M)2, G.H.Q., M.E. by teleprinter details of embarkation.

11. MEDICAL.

D.D.M.S., No. 1 L. Of C. AREA will have 4 Medical Officers and equipment at 6 hours notice to be called forward by M.C. ALEXANDRIA, 1 M.C. and Staff for each ship.

12. SEC. NAME FOR THE MOVE.

"SASSENACH".

13. A.A. PROTECTION.

18 Aust. Bde. will be responsible for its own A.A. Protection during voyage under the instructions of M.C. ALEXANDRIA.

14. DUTIES ON BOARD.

M.C. ALEXANDRIA will appoint O.C. Troops for each ship who will detail officers for the following duties :-

Adjutant,  
Quartermaster,  
Baggage Master,

O.C. Troops, or his representative, Ships Adjutant and Quartermaster together with one clerk and two N.C.Os. will report to M.C. ALEX. immediately when serial is called forward.

General Headquarters,  
Cairo East,  
CAIRO.

*[Signature]*  
Brigadier,  
Director of Movements.

DISTRIBUTION.

	Copy Nos.		Copy Nos.
H.Q. B.T.E.	1 - 5	13 Corps.	6 - 10.
1 L of C District	11 - 13	Alex Sub Area	14 - 15
Amirya Sub Area	16 + 17	Matruh Sub Area	18
Cairo Sub Area	19	18 Aust Bde,	20 - 22
Alex M.C. AREA.	23 - 27	R.A.	28

COPIES TO.

RAL Alex. 29. PSTO(E) 30. DSTO ALEX. 31. HQ 1st Aust Corps. 32-33.  
HQ Cairo MC Sub Area, 34. HQ MC W.D. 35. MC Matruh 36. MC Sollum 37.  
MC Tobruk 38 OC Transit Camp AMIRYA 39. OC RA Base Depot. 40.  
OC L&T Camp ABBASSIA 41. DDMS No 1 LofC District. 42. Adv. BTE. 59, 60.  
BRANCHES G.H.Q., M.E. RN. 43. DSTO 44. G(O) 45. G(SD) 46. A 47. Q. 48  
Q(P) 49. ST 50. 51. M. 51. O2E 52. Q(M) 3 53.  
BRANCHES H.Q. B.T.E. G. 54. A. 55. Q. 56. ST. 57. RA. 58. M 51.



SECRET

## AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

G. 654.

HEADQUARTERS,

1 Aust Corps  
23 Jan 41.

GHQ ME  
Force HQ  
HQ BTE,  
-----

### Organization - Australian Imperial Force - MIDDLE EAST.

1. Information has been received from AUSTRALIA that the Commonwealth Government has approved that the GOC 1st Australian Corps will also be given the powers and title of GOC Australian Imperial Force in the Middle East.

2. Consequent on this decision, the organization of the AIF in the Middle East will now be as follows -

#### (a) HQ Australian Imperial Force

To be established at ALEXANDRIA, vide this HQ G 643 of 22 Jan. This HQ will include the DAQ and AIF Heads of Services and will be responsible for the general administration of the AIF except as noted in para (c) below.

#### (b) HQ 1st Australian Corps

To be responsible for operations and local administration of formations and units included in 1 Aust Corps.

#### (c) HQ AIF Base Area

To be established at GAZA and to be responsible for -

(i) The local administration of Base and L of C Units of the AIF.

(ii) Movement of AIF personnel and stores into the Middle East from AUSTRALIA and UK and from PALESTINE to EGYPT.

162(6)

Please now take action to  
amend A.I.F. A's description.  
His object is HQ. A.I.F. Base Area.  
He is Comd. A.I.F. Base Area

23/1

CW

Lt.-Gen.  
Comd 1 Aust Corps.

"A" (Blighton) is putting in orders & is  
sending memo to GHQ, Force, BTE, Post, etc.  
1405 hrs 23 Jan CW

SECRET

G. 642.

1 Aust Corps  
23 Jan 41.

GEN. MIL.

Copy to:

Force HQ  
DA & CHG  
DOS AIF.

1. It is desired to have available at the earliest possible date, for future operations in LIBYA, a second Australian Division. This would be additional to 6th Australian Division, or in replacement of it, so that the maximum number of Australian Troops would have the advantage of active operations.

2. Owing to variations in the State of training of infantry brigades of 7 and 9 Aust Divs, it is not desirable to adhere rigidly to the present order of battle, but rather to select those brigades most advanced in their training for grouping as a division.

3. 18 Aust Inf Bde is fully trained and equipped and is only awaiting the arrival of M.E. before being available. 25 Aust Inf Bde is now in transit from U.K. to the Middle East. It is fully equipped and should be ready for service within one month of its arrival. Of the remaining infantry brigades in the Middle East, 21 Aust Inf Bde, has now reached a satisfactory standard of training, and should be ready for active operations within one month of completion of its war equipment.

4. The above three infantry brigades can be conveniently grouped under HQ 7 Aust Div. It is accordingly requested that 21 Aust Inf Bde be given a high priority in regard to the completion of its war equipment, and advice furnished as to the date by which this may be anticipated.

Lt.-Gen.  
Comd 1 Aust Corps.

62 (6)  
=



2ND AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

1 AUST. CORPS.		
186	1	24

*This file is being kept.*

In reply, please quote

28/320.

HEADQUARTERS,

6 Aust Div.  
In the Field.  
27 Jan 41.

17 Aust Inf Bde,  
A.D.N.S.  
16 Aust Inf Bde for information.  
1 Aust Corps.

TOBRUK SUB-AREA.

Advice has been received that the following officers of 6 Aust Div., have been selected for appointment to Tobruk Sub-Area. -

Base Commandant - Lt-Col A.H.I. Godfrey.  
S/C En. (to be Temp. Brigadier).

A.D.N.S. - Maj. M.H.W. Kirby A.A.H.C.

Maj Kirby will report to 16 Aust Inf Bde forthwith and will remain in the Tobruk area should any move of that Formation be ordered.

Instructions will be forwarded at a later date as to when Lt-Col Godfrey will take up duty as Base Commandant Tobruk Sub-Area.

The question of the command of S/C En. will be the subject of further correspondence.

*for Lt-Col.*  
A.A.H.C. 6 Aust Div.  
*By direction*

PA

WJC



AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

GS I 13

HEADQUARTERS,  
1 Aust Corps  
5 Feb 41.

Officer i/c  
2 ECH

WAR DIARY- COMPLETED FILES.

Fwded under separate cover is War Diary for "G"  
Branch in duplicate covering months of Dec & Jan.

2. Fwded under separate cover are two movement files  
for retention with records.

3. Ack.

*John R. Brown* *Capt.*  
for Lt-Col  
GS 1 Aust Corps.



Hold -

for 1 Ant Corps

" G " Diary

Jan 41

77



AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

G690

1 Aust Corps  
26 Jan 41

TNG III R/T

1. The recent operations in the Western Desert have emphasized the necessity for the tng of all offrs of all arms in R/T.
2. Instruction in this subject will be included in all unit tng.
3. Att hereto as Appx "A" are notes showing a suggested method of instruction and instructions for the guidance of personnel using R/T.

*Camille Kell* Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION:

List "B"

INSTRUCTION FOR OFFICERS V.Os and H.Os IN R/T

(Ref. Signal Training All Arms chap. XIV)

SUGGESTED METHOD OF INSTRUCTION:

1. Preliminary Training
  - (a) A short lecture on Security and Signal procedure phrases.
  - (b) Practice without wireless sets.
2. Training with Instruments.
  - (a) Practice with telephones.
  - (b) Practice with V/T Sets.
3. Lecture Notes:

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

- (1) Code names must be used. Vowels are pronounced in code names, as in the Alphabet.

Officers should not refer to themselves by their appointments, i.e.,

Comd BOLO  
Staff Officer BOLO

The terms G.I, Bde Major etc., will NOT be used;

Formations may arrange a code for use in fd -

BOLO 1	-	G.I.
BOLO 2	-	G.II.
BOLO 1A	-	A.A. & Q.M.G.
BOLO 2A	-	D.A.Q.M.G.
SOLO X	-	B.H. SOLO

- (2) Conversations must be kept short. Offrs should think out their conversation, and, if time allows, write a precis of it before speaking.
- (3) Code words with prearranged meanings to suit operation in hand should be used as much as possible. If to be used senior formation must notify all concerned beforehand, i.e.,

SCRUM 1030 hrs BOLO - Brigadier's conference  
1030 hrs at BOLO HQ.

- (4) Conversations should be worded so that they are intelligible to the speakers with their previous knowledge and mutual understanding, but NOT to an enemy.
- (5) Reference should be made when possible to the numbered paragraphs of written operation orders.

AIDS TO GOOD SPEECH

- (6) Raise voice slightly.
- (7) Speak clearly and slowly. Give other man time to write down essentials or mark his map.
- (8) Hold microphone close to the mouth and, if out in the open, shield it with other hand. Don't vary its position as this alters the tuning.



- (9) Say all doubtful words, proper names and important parts of your speech twice. You cannot be stopped if NOT understood. Figures should always be preceded by the word "FIGURES".
- (10) If you have a lot to say, break up your speech into parts to find out if the recipient has any queries. He cannot stop you unless you do, for the set works only one way at a time and must be switched over from "receive" to "speak" and vice versa.

(11) REMEMBER

- HULLO - The recognised method of opening your talk.
- OVER - I have finished speaking and will now listen for your reply. (Operator will switch your set to Receive when you say "Over.")
- OFF - I have finished speaking, do NOT expect a reply, and am going away.
- O.K. OFF - I have received your message and have understood it, and there is no reply.

(12) SPECIMEN CONVERSATION

Comd BOLO tells Operator to call Comd SOLO to speak. When latter is ready, the operator at SOLO will say :-

"Hullo BOLO. SOLO calling. SOLO is now listening  
SOLO to BOLO over."

The operator at BOLO tells Comd BOLO who makes the next call, e.g.

"Hullo SOLO 1- BOLO 1 speaking.  
Reference paragraph eight of my Operation Order Number Two of today. What time will you finish task. OVER."

"SOLO 1 speaking. I will finish task by 1500 hrs.  
I will finish task by 1500 hrs. OVER."

"BOLO 1 speaking. O.K. OFF"

(13) PRONUNCIATION OF FIGURES:

Figures should be distinctly articulated and in some cases slightly exaggerated e.g.:

0	pronounced as	OWE
1	"	" WUN
4	"	" FOER
5	"	" FIFE
9	"	" NINER

If the officer receiving the message does not understand or has missed a phrase he will say "SAY AGAIN". The word "REPEAT" will never be used in this connection as it has a special arty meaning.

If the officer receiving the message does not understand a word he will say "SPELL" after the last word he has written down.

When requested to "SPELL" the phonetic alphabet should be used.

/Example

Example

BOLO 1 Says

Hullo SOLO X - BOLO 1 speaking

Reference paragraph eight of my  
operation order Number Two of today.  
What time will you finish your task.  
OVER

I say again - Number Two of today  
What time will you finish your task.  
OVER

Your task - T for TOC  
- A for ACK  
- S for SUGAR  
- K for KING

Task - OVER

O.K. OFF

If for any reason the sender considers that a further check is  
necessary the sender will say "Check Back" and the receiver will  
repeat back the whole message to the sender.

NOTE: -

If your set operator is receiving a message when you want to  
speak to sending station, be patient. The sender cannot be told  
that you want to speak until he ceases sending, and switches to  
RECEIVE.

PRACTICE.

(a) Students to be split up into syndicate of two or four and  
practice passing messages to each other, no instruments are  
necessary at this stage. When the correct procedure phrases  
have been mastered and NOT before, instruments may be used.

(b) If no W/T sets are available, field telephones connected  
with a switch so that only "one-way" speech is possible, may be  
used.

(c) Finally, when the students are thoroughly conversant with  
the procedure and have gained confidence, practice with W/T Sets  
may begin.

SOLO X Says

SOLO X (who has not heard  
anything after the word  
"TWO" says -  
SOLO X speaking. Say again  
all after the word TWO.OVER

SOLO X (who still has not  
heard the last word) says

Word after "your" -Spell  
OVER

I will finish my task by  
1500 hrs.  
I will finish my task by  
1500 hrs.

OVER

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

G690

1 Aust Corps  
26 Jan 41

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1. The recent operations in the Western Desert have emphasized the necessity for the tng of all offrs of all arms in R/T.
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3. Att hereto as Appx "A" are notes showing a suggested method of instruction and instructions for the guidance of personnel using R/T.

*Christie McCall* for Brig  
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION:

List "B"

Appx "A"  
to G690.

INSTRUCTION FOR OFFICERS, W.Os and H.Os IN R/T

(Ref. Signal Training All Arms chan. XIV)

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(12) SPECIMEN CONVERSATION

Comd BOLD tells Operator to call Comd SOLO to speak. When latter is ready, the operator at SOLO will say :-

"Hullo BOLD. SOLO calling. SOLO is now listening  
SOLO to BOLD over."

The operator at BOLD tells Comd BOLD, who makes the next call, e.g.

"Hullo SOLO 1. BOLD 1 speaking.  
Reference paragraph eight of my Operation Order Number Two of today. What time will you finish task, OVER."

"SOLO 1 speaking. I will finish task by 1500 hrs.  
I will finish task by 1500 hrs. OVER."

"BOLD 1 speaking. O.K. OFF"

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/Example

Example

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Hullo SOLO X - BOLO 1 speaking

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operation order Number Two of today.  
What time will you finish your task.  
OVER

I say again - Number Two of today  
What time will you finish your task.  
OVER

Your task - T for TOC  
- A for ACK  
- S for SUGAR  
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Task - OVER

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"TWO" says -  
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SOLO X (who still has not  
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Word after "your" -Spell  
OVER

I will finish my task by  
1500 hrs.  
I will finish my task by  
1500 hrs.

OVER

O.K. OFF

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
(c) Finally, when the students are thoroughly conversant with  
the procedure and have gained confidence, practice with W/T Sets  
may begin.

DARTMG

I accept CH.M.C/1603/G (C) of 14/1/41  
B.T.C D.O/B&S/41 of 14/1/41 as authority  
for more.

I suggest you signal G.H.P.  
giving outline proposal & rail more strength  
each for Code Name.

21/1/41



PQ sent after

21 Jan

CHM

Road party Ad. p. f

26

28

Ad. p. f

26

27

Ad. p. f

29

30

SECRET.

General Headquarters,  
Middle East,  
CAIRO.

B.M./G(O)214/6.


14 January, 1941.

Dear Rowell,

Many thanks for your D/O of 11 January  
which I received on my return today.

I have just signed an official letter  
authorizing B.T.E. to deal direct with you about  
your relief of 13th Corps.

Yours



Brigadier S.F. Rowell,  
H.Q. 1 Australian Corps,  
PALESTINE.



SECRET.


General Headquarters,  
Middle East,  
CAIRO.

CRME/1503/G(O).

14 January, 1941.

Headquarters,  
British Troops in Egypt.  
Headquarters,  
1 Australian Corps. ✓  
-----

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, B.T.E.,  
will arrange direct with General Officer Commanding,  
Australian Corps, for the relief of 13 Corps by  
1 Australian Corps, and will keep this Headquarters  
informed.

  
Major-General,  
Deputy Chief General Staff.

PR.

Copies to: H.Q., Palestine & T.J.  
D.C.I.G.  
D.A.G.  
G(SD)  
G.S.I.

## APPENDIX "J"

### AUTHORIZED OFFICER'S KIT TO BE CARRIED WITH CORPS HEADQUARTERS.

(Unless notified otherwise Officers will be limited  
to the following articles.)

#### (A) Items carried on the person.

A.B. 153.  
Binoculars.  
Box of matches.  
Cardigan (in haversack if not worn).  
Compass.  
Emergency Ration (as issued).  
F.S.P.B.  
Field Dressing.  
Gloves.  
Identity discs.  
Knife, fork, spoon.  
Map case.  
Mess tin and cover.  
Technical books or instruments according to arm of service.  
Soldier's pay book (W.F.5). (See F.S.R.I. 1930, Sec. 194).  
Pistol and ammunition.  
Pocket knife.  
Protractor.  
Ration bag.  
Steel helmet.  
Set of web equipment.  
Torch.  
Wrist-watch.  
Whistle and lanyard.  
Water bottle.

#### Anti-Gas Equipment.

Cape.  
Cotton waste.  
Individual detectors.  
Ground detectors.  
Eye shields.  
Ointment.  
Respirator.

#### (B) Carried in pack or haversack.

Cap comforter.  
F.S. Cap.  
Greatcoat.  
Housewife.  
Mug.  
Spare socks, etc.

Scarf.  
Spare laces and buttons.  
Washing and shaving kit (including soap in tin or box).

(C) Baggage.

Valise containing a selection of the following :—

(Lt.-Cols and above	75 lbs.
Other Officers	50 lbs.)

Bedding (sleeping bag recommended).  
Camp bed (not included in total weight authorized).  
Ground sheet.  
Canvas bucket.  
Gum boots.  
Air, cork or fibre mattress.  
Mackintosh.  
Small mirror (may be in pack).  
Shoes or slippers.  
Spare clothing and boots (one set).  
Towels (2).  
Writing materials.

## APPENDIX "B"

### ORGANIZATION

(Vehicles underlined are required in addition to those authorized by WE of HQ of a Corps. Only IO's, cipher personnel and batmen for IO's cipher ofrs of Corps Int Sec have been included in organization table.

(Additional vehicles required — 1 car DS, 4 30-cwt lorries, 7 3-ton lorries).

#### RECCE PARTY

##### HQ Corps

Car DS	3	G 2 (o) DAQMG IORA Dvr MT	
Car DS	48	APM Camp Batman (APM) Dvr MT	x

##### Emp Pl

Lorry 30-cwt	32	1 sgt 9 ptes Dvr MT Tools, office signs, etc AA LMG and 1000 rds
--------------	----	--

##### HQ C Tps Engrs

(Representative NOT required if Adv and Rear HQ will be separated)

Car DS	80	Fd Engr Batman Dvr MT
--------	----	-----------------------------

##### Corps Sigs

##### Recce Gp

##### Local Protection Unit

Truck 8-cwt		Recce Party Dvr MT
-------------	--	-----------------------

x Returns to Rear HQ

Corps Pro Coy

MIC's	1	sgt
	2 - 6	ptes

#### ADV PARTY

##### HQ Corps

Lorry 3-ton	17	4 clerks (o) 3 orderlies (GS) 2 dvr MT Office equipt (o)
Lorry 3-ton	18	2 clerks (I) 1 draughtsman (GS) 3 clerks (cipher) 2 dvr MT Office equipt (I)
Lorry 30-cwt	15	1 clerk (AQ) 1 clerk (CE) 1 clerk (CSO) 1 draughtsman (CSO) Dvr MT Office equipt (CE) " " (CSO)
Lorry 30-cwt	16	1 batman (IOBA) 3 cooks 2 general duty men (rank and file) 1 sanitary duty man 1 water duty man Cpl dvr MT Cooking equipt Trailer water tank

##### HQ Corps Arty

Lorry 30-cwt	23	3 clerks (RAA) 2 draughtsmen (RAA) Dvr MT Office equipt (RAA)
--------------	----	--

#### LOCAL PROTECTION UNIT

Details

**1 GP ADV GP CORPS SIGS**  
Sufficient sigs to open and maintain comms at Adv Corps HQ

**2 GP ADV CORPS HQ**

**HQ Corps**

Car DS	1	GOC 2 ADCs Dvr MT
Car DS	2	BGS G2 (o) Clerk (o) Dvr MT
Car DS	3	'See Recce party)
Car DS	4	G2 (I) G3 (I) Batman (G2(I)) Dvr MT
Car DS	5	LO (Lt-Col) G3 (o) Batman (LO) Dvr MT
Car DS	6	LO (Maj) Cipher Offr Batman (LO) Dvr MT
Car DS	7	G3 (ALO) Capt RAA (ALO) Batman dvr (G3(ALO))
Car DS	8	CE IO RAE Batman (CE) Dvr MT
Car DS	9	CSO 2 Assts to CSO Clerk (CSO) Dvr MT
Car DS	10	DA & QMG DAAG Clerk (AQ) Batman (DA & QMG) Dvr MT

Van 15-cwt	11	MO MO's orderly Batman (MO) Dvr MT MO's eqpt
Van 15-cwt	12	Map issuer Dvr MT Maps
Lorry 30-cwt	13	4 clerks (o) Dvr MT Office eqpt (o)
Lorry 30-cwt	14	3 clerks (i) 2 orderlies (GS) 1 draughtsman (GS) Dvr MT Office eqpt
Lorry 30-cwt	15	(see adv party)
Lorry 30-cwt	16	(see adv party)
Lorry 3-ton	17	(see adv party)
Lorry 3-ton	18	(see adv party)
Lorry 3-ton	19	RQMS Sgt dvr 4 batmen (CSO, DAQMG, DAAG, Camp) 2 dvrs MT Baggage & stores Res clothing & A/gas capes AA LMG & 1000 rds
Lorry 3-ton	20	1 clerk (CSO) 6 batmen (GOC, BGS, G2(o), G2(o), G3(o), G3(i)) 2 dvrs MT Baggage AA LMG & 1000 rds
Lorry 3-ton	21	8 batmen (2 Assts to CSO, 4 IOs, G2 RAA, Capt RAA) 2 dvrs MT Baggage AA LMG & 1000 rds

Lorry 3-ton	22	2 cooks 3 general duty men 2 batmen (2 ADCs) 2 dvr MT Eqpt 'A' mess
Lorry 3-ton	23	2 cooks 3 general duty men 2 batmen (IOCE, Cipher Offr) 2 dvr MT Eqpt 'B' mess
Van 15-cwt GS	24	Cook General duty men Dvr MT Eqpt 'G' agts mess
Lorry 1-ton	25	2 LMGs Dvr MT AA LMG & 1000 rds A Tk Rifle & 240 rds
Lorry 1-ton	26	2 LMGs Dvr MT AA LMG & 1000 rds A Tk Rifle & 240 rds
MCs	1 - 4	IOs
<b>HQ Corps Arty</b>		
Car DS	27	CCRA G2 RAA Batman (CCRA) Clerk (RAA) Dvr MT
Lorry 30-cwt	28	(see adv party)
Lorry 30-cwt	29	6 RAAF operators 3 RAAF wireless sets Dvr MT

**CB Staff (temporarily att)**

<u>Car DS</u>	30	Lt-Col Capt Lieut Dvr MT
<u>Lorry 30-cwt</u>	31	2 clerks (RAA) Draughtsman Cook 3 batmen Dvr MT



Corps Pro Coy

MCs	7	Cpl
	8 - 10	3 ptes

Corps Emp Pl

Lorry 30-cwt	33	(see recon party)
--------------	----	-------------------

**No. 3 GP REAR GP—CORPS SIGS**  
Sufficient sigs to maintain comms at Rear HQ

**No. 4 GP REAR HQ**

HQ Corps		
Car DS	33	LO (Maj) G3(o) (CW) Chemist Batman (LO) Dvr MT
Car DS	34	SO RAE G3 (Camfig) Camfig offr Clerk (CE) Dvr MT
Car DS	35	AQMG Cipher offr DAAG SC (Q) Dvr MT
Car DS	36	Chaplain Batman-dvr
Car DS	37	Chaplain Batman-dvr
Car DS	38	Chaplain Batman-dvr
Car DS	39	AD of Svy Capt (Svy) Batman (AD of Svy) Dvr MT

Car DS	40	2 Sen Chaplains LSO Capt (Legal) Dvr MT
Car DS	41	DDS & T Batman (DDS & T) Clerk (AASC) Dvr MT
Car DS	42	DADS Req duty offr Adj't (AASC) Clerk (AASC) Dvr MT
Car DS	43	DADT Ann duty offr Clerk (AASC) Batman (DADT) Dvr MT
Car DS	44	DDMS DAD of Hyg Clerk (Medical) Batman (DDMS) Dvr MT
Car DS	45	ADOS Clerk (Ord) Batman (ADOS) Dvr MT
Car DS	46	DADOS OO Clerk (Ord) Batman (DADOS) Dvr MT
Car DS	47	COME OME (2nd class) Clerk (Ord) Batman (COME) Dvr MT
Car DS	48	(see recca party)
Car DS	49	DAD of Postal DAPM Clerk (Postal) Batman-dvr (DAD of Postal)
Car DS	50	AD of Lab SC Lab Batman (AD of Lab) Clerk (Lab) Dvr MT

Car DS	51	Salvage Control Offr Clerk (Salvage) Batman (Salv Control Offr) Dvr MT
Car DS	52	Catering Adviser Amenities offr Clerk (catering) Batman-dvr (catering adv)
Van 15-cwt	53	DADMS MO's Orderly Batman (DADMS) Dvr MT Eqpt (medical)
Van 15-cwt	54	MO MO's orderly Batman (MO) Dvr MT Eqpt (medical)
Van 15-cwt	55	MO MO's orderly Batman (MO) Dvr MT Eqpt (medical)
Lorry 1-ton	56	2 LMGs Dvr MT LMG & 1000 rds A Tk Rifle & 240 rds
Lorry 1-ton	57	2 LMGs Dvr MT LMG & 1000 rds A Tk Rifle & 240 rds
Van 15-cwt	58	Lient AASC Asst Camp 2 clerks (Camp) Dvr MT Office eqpt (Camp)
Van 15-cwt	59	4 storemen (Ord) Dvr MT Ord stores
Van 15-cwt	60	Clerk (o) Clerk (Camfig) Draughtsman (Camfig) 2 clerks (cipher) Dvr MT Office eqpt (Camfig) " " (cipher)

<u>Lorry 1-ton</u>	61	3 clerks (CE) 2 draughtsmen (CE) Dvr MT Office eqpt (CE)
Lorry 3-ton	62	6 clerks (AQ) 1 draughtsman (AQ) 2 orderlies (AQ) 2 dvr MT Office eqpt (AQ)
Lorry 3-ton	63	5 clerks (AQ) 3 orderlies (AQ) 2 dvr MT Office eqpt (AQ)
Lorry 3-ton	64	4 clerks (Svy) 2 clerks (Chaplains) 2 clerks (Legal) 2 dvr MT Office eqpt (Svy, Chaplains, Legal)
Lorry 3-ton	65	6 clerks (AASC) 2 dvr MT Office eqpt (S & T)
Lorry 3-ton	66	Armament artificer 7 clerks (Ord) 2 dvr MT Office eqpt (Ord)
Lorry 3-ton	67	Arm Examiner 7 clerks (Ord) 1 draughtsman (Ord) 2 dvr MT Office eqpt (Ord)
Lorry 3-ton	68	3 clerks (medical) 2 clerks (Pro) 2 clerks (Lab) Sgt AAPC Baton cpl 2 dvr MT Office eqpt (Pro, Lab, Medical)
<u>Lorry 3-ton</u>	69	Water duty man 2 sanitary duty men 1 storeman 2 dvr MT Res clothing and a/gas capes Baggage AA LMG & 1000 rds

<u>Lorry 3-ton</u>	70	8 batmen (GS(o) (OW), GS (camfig) Camfig offr. SO to CE, Chemist, Capt (Svy) 2 Fd Engrs 1 cpl dvr 1 dvr MT Baggage & Stores AA LMG and 1000 rds
<u>Lorry 3-ton</u>	71	13 batmen (AQMg, DAAG, LSO DAD of Hyg, DADS, Boq duty offr, Armn duty offr) OME (2nd class), OO, DAPM, Adj't (AASC), Asst Camp, Amenities offr 2 dvr MT Baggage
<u>Lorry 3-ton</u>	72	2 batmen (2 sen chaplains) 2 cooks 3 general duty men 2 dvr MT Eqpt 'C' mess
<u>Lorry 3-ton</u>	73	2 batmen (SC(Q), SC Lab) 2 cooks 3 general duty men 2 dvr MT Eqpt 'D' mess
<u>Lorry 3-ton</u>	74	2 batmen (Adj't(CRE), Cipher offr) 2 cooks 3 general duty men 2 dvr MT Eqpt 'E' mess
<u>Lorry 3-ton</u>	75	2 batmen (Legal offr, Lieut AASC) 2 cooks 3 general duty men 2 dvr MT Eqpt 'F' mess
<u>Lorry 20-cwt</u>	76	Cook General duty man 2 dvr MT Eqpt 'H' sgts mess
<u>Lorry 30-cwt</u>	77	1 sgt cook 3 cooks 3 general duty men 2 dvr MT Bank and file mess eqpt

MCs 1 RSM  
2 OR sgt  
3-5 MC's AASC  
6-7 Clerks (Ord)

HQ Corps Arty

Lorry 30-cwt 78 SC  
Clerk  
Batman (SC)  
Dvr MT

HQ C Tps Engrs

Car DS 79 GRE C Tps  
Adj  
Batman (GRE)  
Dvr MT

Car DS 80 (see recon party)

Van 15-cwt 81 Foreman of works  
Dvr MT

Van 15-cwt 82 Foreman of works  
Dvr MT

Lorry 30-cwt 83 Sgt (AAPC)  
8 clerks  
1 draughtman  
Cpl dvr MT  
Office eqpt  
A Tk Rifle & 240 rds

MCs 1-2 Fd Engrs

Local Protection Unit  
Details

Pro Coy

MCs 11 Cpl  
12-16 5 ptes

Emp PI

Lorry 30-cwt 84 Cpl  
Licpl  
9 ptes  
Dvr MT  
Tools, office signs etc  
AA LMG & 1000 rds

## REAR PARTY

### Corps Sign

Sufficient sign to close down comms at Rear Corps HQ

### Emp Pl

(When not required will move with Adv HQ)

Lorry 30-cwt	85	L/Cpl
		9 ptes
		Dvr MT
		Tools, office signs etc
		AA LMG & 1000 rds