


AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/1 CORPS

1 Australian Corps
General Branch (1 Aust
Corps 'G' Branch)

June-July 1941, part 2, appendices



1/4/1-0092

PART VI

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES

OF

BRANCH OF ASSISTANT ADJUTANT & QUARTERMASTER GENERAL

7th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

SYRIAN CAMPAIGN

8 JUN - 12 JUL 41

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AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY FORCE

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF BRANCH OF ASSISTANT ADJUTANT
AND QUARTERMASTER GENERAL 7th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

SYRIAN CAMPAIGN

8 Jun - 12 Jul 41

I PREPARATORY MEASURES

1 CONCENTRATION

The concentration of the Div - then known as AUST DIV EXPORTER - in the HAZIRSEH - AR RAHA area was not completed until 29 May 41.

Prior to this the Div had been in a defensive rôle at MERSA MATRUH, and was deficient in many items of eqpt, armament, and especially MT vchs - deficiencies which had to be made up before DL day on 8 Jun.

All major deficiencies were completed and it can be said that on DL day the Div lacked no essential of G1008 eqpt other than H/Cs, certain A/T rifles and types of ammⁿ which will be given later. We were short in certain AFVs.

2 ADM INSTNS

Att is a copy of AUST DIV EXPORTER ADM INSTN No 8 of 4 Jun 41 issued for the opening phase of the campaign (appx "A").

In addition adm circs on "A" and "Q" matters covering casualty returns, burials, and discipline etc were promulgated during the week prior to DL.

It is considered refreshers such as these will always be necessary before every campaign.

3 SURPLUS KITS AND STORES

Except when joined in battle, it is only natural to expect that units will collect and carry surplus kits and stores, and tpt, to a certain extent, will be overloaded. During the battle such surpluses and possibly amonities of the tps are dumped and lost.

To obviate this a Div Kit Store was established at ACRE for:-

- i All winter clothing
- ii All surplus kits
- iii Minor items of surplus stores.

It is considered that a great saving in clothing and personal belongings of the men has been effected. However to be of any use this store must firstly be in close proximity to the div area, and secondly must be under div control. A representative of each unit must be on the Staff which is found from personnel not quite fit at the time.

Within 10 days of the cessation of hostilities, and in many cases before that, surplus kits and belongings were returned to the tps.

4 SURPLUS EQUIPMENT

This was treated differently in that it was returned to ORD.

The main items were:-

- (a) Anti-gas clo and eqpt other than personal.
- (b) Windscreens which were removed from vehs in order to give better vision at night.

It is contended that once a unit is issued with eqpt, it should not be taken from that unit, as the conscientious unit is thus not reaping the benefit of its work in keeping its eqpt up to the mark.

This was the intention, and the assurance given when eqpt was returned to Ord.

However all eqpt has now been mixed, but with Anti-gas eqpt it was probably justified on account of the necessity for re-conditioning it.

With regard to the windscreens of vehs, this is not so, and the interference by Ord with the system inaugurated by Div is resulting in confusion and appears to be unwarranted.

By D1 day all the major demands of the Div had been met, and it is not considered an unfair assumption that on that day this Div was equipped as well as existing stocks would permit.

II SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT

1 ORGANISATION

The Div ASC-less the Sup Coln which had moved to TOBRUK early in Apr with 18 Aust Inf Bde - by 31 May had concentrated in the AT-TIRA area. There they were joined by No 3 Sub Pk (less one sec), 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk and one sec Sup Por Coy to take the place of the Sup Coln. As it was anticipated that the operations would be highly mobile and as our force was to act in two Bde Gps with a Div Res Gp, it was decided to form three (3) Comp ASC Coys, the Coys to remain under Div control and NOT under comd of Bde Gps. These Coys took the number of the Bde Gp which they were serving e.g. 21 Bde Gp ASC Coy, 25 Bde Gp ASC Coy, which numbering probably led to the early erroneous assumption of Bdes that these ASC Coys were under comd.

On the other hand this erroneous assumption may be attributed to the very close co-operation and harmonious relation that existed between the ASC and the Bde Gps they served, and thus was pardonable.

This organisation of comp coys proved most elastic and most successful and is still retained. Div control however is essential for the following reasons.

- (1) The composition of Bde Gps alters, therefore so must that of coys, and individual vehs must be switched from one coy to another.
- (11) So much of S and T work is well behind a Bdes rear boundary where it is easily controlled by Div but out of touch of a Bde.

(iii) Sudden calls for tpt of personnel over short distances can generally be met from Div ASC, but resources must then be pooled, which can only be done by Div.

(iv) Div has a trained staff i.e.-CASC and his staff to handle S and T. Bdes have no such personnel.

The ASC were complete in eqpt and vehs except that there was a deficiency of m/cs and there were only sufficient vehs for a single ech of sups.

The deficiency of m/cs was definitely a handicap, but as it was arranged that FSDs and FADs would always be within 50 mls of fwd tps, the lack of a second ech was not felt.

2 LOCATION OF DUMPS

Prior to D1 day dumps were est by FORCE as follows:-

ROSH PIENA - Amn and sups for 25 Bde Gp
ACRE - Sup for div less 25 Bde Gp
GIRAT HOTZIN - Amn for div less 25 Bde Gp

FORCE were to maintain 10 days supply of rations and 3 second line refills of amn at these dumps. The former was maintained, but the latter were never complete, and in some types of amn complete first and second line requirements were never est.

On the break-through by the French at MERDJAYOUN it was found necessary to supply the re-constituted 25 Bde Gp from the ACRE dump, and the switch over by the ASC Coy without an interruption of supply was highly creditable.

With the advance of units FSDs and FADs were est at TYR and later at SARAFEND, and at no time did FORCE, or I Aust Corps when it took over, throw too large a burden on the Div AASC.

It is considered that a 10 days reserve supply of rations was ample, but that three second line refills of amn were inadequate. It was always feared that the required amn would not be immediately available. Actually it was always delivered but on a number of occasions its late arrival involved working ASC throughout the night.

It is considered that Corps should not locate any FSDs or FADs without ref to div, especially in types of country such as this where areas become so congested.

3 AMMUNITION

(1) STOCKS

There was never sufficient, and at no time were units complete in all types.

On 31 May FORCE were notified of deficiencies in first and second lines, but these were not remedied by D1 day despite continuous representations. It was understood that there were large and important deficiencies in all types of eqpt and amn in PALESTINE, but it would appear that very little energetic action was taken to remedy these up to D1 day. As the campaign proceeded stocks improved and by early Jul all essential types were available.

The deficiencies mentioned above are shown in AUST DIV EXPORTER memo Q19/1/97 of 31 May 41 att as appx "B".

(11) REPLENISHMENT

The normal procedure was carried out, and with a few exceptions worked satisfactorily.

Some confusion was caused early by a lack of knowledge as to the system of replenishment. This manifested itself both on the arty side and in the amm secs and stocks were built up at guns at the expense of second and third line holdings; in other words a small dumping programme was in progress.

The practice of calling for a part veh load was also prevalent. After the first week these defects were remedied.

Although urgent calls for 25 pr HE were often made to div, only in one instance did a fd regt have to curtail its expenditure on account of shortage of amm. This was at JZZIEE when the FAD was at TYR, and, although the distance was only 40 miles, the last 13 miles were over such a terrible track that it alone took 4 hrs each way. This difficulty was overcome by establishing a dump at the AP. To serve a fd regt less one tp in this area it was previously found necessary to employ twenty-four 3-ton vehs on this run. The normal second line allotment for these guns is nine 5-ton lorries.

Two main dumping programmes were carried out. On the first occasion 200 rpg additional to first and second lines were dumped at the gun posns on the right flank. Later 500 rpg were successfully dumped fwd along the whole front. On both occasions both second and third line vehs were used and on one evening from 2000 hrs to 0400 hrs the amm sec of 21 Bde Gp ASC Coy dumped 13,248 rds - a total of 72 loads each of 184 rds.

For the final DEMOOR on a dump of 25 pr HE and 6" How HE was formed at QUADI ZINI and remained under Div ASC control. After ops ceased surplus first and second line was deposited at this dump and it was eventually handed over to Corps.

The expenditure of 25 pr HE to a certain extent on account of the deficiency in 5" mortar HE and .55 AP was abnormally high for this campaign, as will be seen from the list of amm expenditure shown in Appx "C".

4 SUPPLIES

(1) RATIONS

Throughout the Campaign all tps were on the ME Ration Scale a copy of which is shown as Appx "D". At the commencement all units were in possession of four days reserve one of which was used for consumption on D2 day. After the first few days it was found possible to issue sufficient frozen meat for one meal and later this was increased. Rations were either issued to B Ech of units or, in the case of small units, delivery was taken at SPS close to B Ech concentrations. In addition to other duties Bde Gp ASC Offrs were instructed, by the CASC, to keep close touch with the "D" Ech of units in order to ensure that as many hot meals as possible were delivered to

the fwd tps. Although not an ASC responsibility, it was felt that any assistance that could be given would be desirable and in many instances recipes were supplied and ways and means of transportation were discussed in order to ensure delivery of hot meals. It is recorded that on the morning of the attack on DAMOUR 2/16 Bn breakfasted on steak and onions along the DAMOUR River within 300-400 yds of the enemy. Another incident shows that 2/35 Bn was not so fortunate, for on one occasion, the delivery of a hot meal was effectively prevented by enemy fire. Some units suffered from lack of eqpt and had to be assisted, but in the main at least one hot meal and often more per day were delivered.

It is considered that the QM can still show greater imagination in the preparation of meals, and greater variation should be possible even in the field.

With the cooking eqpt available, and by the intelligent use of the hot box, meals can be prepared in rear areas and taken fwd. Some units did this with beneficial results.

It is considered that the number of 1-gal containers should be increased in order to ensure the delivery of hot meals and hot tea to the smaller dets. The hot box in itself is of great value, but its usefulness is decreased when the number of containers is inadequate.

(11) PETROL

Pet supplies did not present any difficulty at any time but a great wastage occurred through leaky tins. The material is not strong enough to stand up to much wear and tear and this is an ever present danger. A recommendation for better fire appliances for pet carrying vohs has already been made.

It is felt that consideration should be given to the fitting of an additional pet tank on all lorries.

5 TROOP-CARRYING

On 3 Jun 5 Res MT Coy RASC was placed under comd and remained with the div until 28 Jun when it reverted to 1 Aust Corps.

This Coy less one sec was placed under comd Ede Gps for the moves of Inf Bns.

This was soon found to be a mistake as it resulted in too many vohs being up fwd, and vohs were at times stationary for days at a time. This unit was then withdrawn to div control, and on demands from Ede Gps the necessary vohs were sent fwd.

In addition to 5 Res MT Coy, a small comp Res MT Coy was formed from additional vohs supplied from 2 Sub Pk, 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk, and a few captured vohs. These vohs were driven by spare personnel from 6 Aust Cav and AASC.

At no time was there a shortage of tpt, or difficulty in fulfilling all demands, but there is no doubt our air superiority assisted greatly in this.

Only in a very highly mobile op - which it was thought this would be - is the placing of Res MT Coys under comd of Inf Edos justified.

6 PACK TRANSPORT

No 4 Pack Tpt Coy RASC, organised as HQ and three Secs - each of 9 sub-secs with 10 mules in each - came under cmd of 7 Aust Div on 3 Jul.

The total number of mules was 238, but owing to a series of forced marches at least 20 per cent were not immediately available for tpt duties on arrival.

Coy HQ was kept in reserve and Secs were allotted initially as under:-

17 Aust Inf Bde	-	14 sub-secs
21 Aust Inf Bde	-	7 sub-secs
25 Aust Inf Bde	-	4 sub-secs
Fd Amb	-	2 sub-secs

From 3 Jul until the end of the campaign the mules were used continuously for the tpt of amn and rations to the fwd elements on all fronts. The country over which they operated was extremely rugged and broken and was quite impassable for any other means of tpt.

Coy HQ throughout was kept well in rear - a distance of some 20 miles, and mules were sent fwd to units from Coy HQ by MT. For tpt by MT, five mules complete with pack saddlery were allotted to each 3-ton lorry.

As the services of the Pack Tpt Coy proved extremely valuable and supplied the answer to a problem which could not otherwise be solved, it is recommended that in all ops of this nature prior consideration should be given to the early allotment of such units on a liberal scale

9

III WATER SUPPLY

WPs were est at intervals by fwd Coys RAE as ops advanced. They presented no difficulties, and supplies were ample; they were drawn for the most part from springs and from streams issuing therefrom. The quality was uniformly good. At TYR and SAIDA, the supplies were drawn from town mains.

IV MOVEMENT

1. Owing to the fact that there were only two rds along which the div could move, strict traffic control and issuing of mvt orders for all moves were necessary.

2. SMALL MOVES

For the move of a single unit or sub-unit a mvt order in message form always sufficed.

3. LARGER MOVES

For the move of a number of units using the same routes, especially where different speeds and starting points were involved a Div Adm Order was issued with a mvt table att as an appx. In the case of the move of the whole div after the signing of the Armistice, three separate appendices were issued to cover the mvt of units on three consecutive days. All larger moves were first produced in graphical form before being compiled and issued as tables.

4. GENERAL

- (a) Normal convoy speeds were:-

	<u>Main rds</u>	<u>Secondary rds</u>
Wheeled vchs	20	15
Tracked vchs	12.5	10

During hrs of darkness these were reduced to:-

Wheeled vchs	15	12
Tracked vchs	10	10

- (b) Normal densities employed were:-

Daylight : 10 - 5) Depending on situation and
Night : 40 - 20) degree of darkness.

- (c) Lights were not used in fwd areas, but it was found advisable to use lights on individual vchs in areas in rear of Div HQ.

- (d) It is difficult to make any general statement with regard to rd discipline. Some units were undoubtedly very good, while others left much to be desired. Among units in the latter category, more attention should be paid to:-
 - i Stricter control by offrs and NCOs
 - ii Maintenance of correct speed and density
 - iii Absolute punctuality at the SP
 - iv Avoiding "bunching" at halts
 - v Issue of prior instns to all drs with regard to dispersal at destination

- (e) Experience proves that tpt drill and convoy work must be practical during training, and special attention given to teaching drs the correct distance on rds.

- (f) The lack of strong enemy air has probably lulled this

div into a false sense of security and densities and dispersion will need to be closely watched in our next campaign.

V MOVEMENT OF DIV HQ

1 ADV HQ

Owing to the fact that Adv HQ was not constituted in accordance with Div SOs for War (the principal differences being the inclusion of all Sigs - less a small det at rear HQ and AASC HQ), and that tactical considerations were not vital factors in the moves, the organisation table was varied so that, with minor exceptions, the various HQs moved intact and independently at times as promulgated by "Q". The following is a typical example of the order of move and times past the SP for the opening of Adv HQ at a site 20 miles distant at 1600 hrs:-

Rear party	0700 hrs
1 gp SIGS	0730 "
Adv HQ (less other serials)	1400 "
HQ RAA	1415 "
HQ RAE	1430 "
SIGS (less 1 and 3 gps)	1445 "
HQ AASC	1515 "
Rear party	1615 "
3 gp SIGS	1700 "

It was found more convenient and more satisfactory to move in this way rather than split the various HQs to form composite tactical gps. 'A' and 'B' Echls moved together in their respective gps except where the moves were timed inconveniently with respect to meal hours.

2 REAR HQ

The grouping of vchs in Rear HQ was left for Camp to arrange as he considered this was the most convenient and practicable method, under the circumstances, in each case - the only direction from "Q" in this regard being the maximum number of vchs permitted in each gp.

3 GENERAL

From experience gained, it is considered essential that SOs governing the move of Div HQ should be as elastic as possible. It is quite impossible always to adhere, under varying conditions and different circumstances, to any rigid grouping of vchs or load tables that may be laid down. The latter, however, do serve as a guide and basis on which to work.

VI LOCATIONS

- For "Q" considerations alone, it is essential that locations be promulgated immediately any changes are made, and that they be given as accurately as possible. Advice of any projected moves is also most desirable. The daily location statement published by "G", although of great value, is not really sufficient for "Q" requirements. It is necessary for "Q" to receive from "G" immediate advice of any operational changes in location ordered by "G", so that the info may be passed on without delay to those concerned with distribution - chiefly C ASC and DADOS.

- 2 The question of locations, generally, is so important, and lack of infm on the subject can lead to so much waste of time, labour and tpt, besides causing hardship and anxiety as the result of late deliveries of sups and stores, that it merits the co-operation of all Staff Offrs, LOs, DRs, Pro etc who during their travels, and as a result of their observation, have gleaned any infm that may be of value to anyone else concerned.
- 3 During the campaign the closest co-operation between "G" and "Q" was maintained, and thus any difficulties such as those mentioned above were overcome. From experience gained, special attention should be paid to this phase during the tng period.
- 4 Units must ensure that their serial numbers are placed on main routes, indicating their location for the infm of visiting staff, AASC etc. Additional sign posts bearing the serial number and an arrow should be displayed at any other points where any doubt may exist with regard to the correct route. Units should ensure that all signs are collected on vacating a site.

VII "B" CAMP

1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

- (a) The "B" ech vch of Bde Ops were grouped under the comd of the Bde TC. Owing to difficulties of traffic control and fear of congestion all mvs of "B" ech were controlled by div. In some instances their locations were laid down by div.
- (b) In general the system worked quite well, but at first was not viewed favourably by Bdes.
- (c) It is recommended that, in future ops in this type of country, this system be retained until circumstances prove it unsuitable.
- (d) The site of "B" ech was used for the following activities:-
 - (i) It was the IP for the distribution of rations.
 - (ii) Meals were prepared in comparative safety, and only the smaller type of veh - such as 1-ton vans - need go fwd.
 - (iii) It was the replenishing point for POL.
 - (iv) Canteens were est at this central point, and were thus of ready access to units.
 - (v) It was the central point for distribution and collection of mails.
 - (vi) All vchs being in a more or less central area, better maintenance was carried out.
 - (vii) The Bde PW cage was est in this vicinity.
 - (viii) All reinforcements and "X" list personnel were delivered to "B" ech.
- (e) As most of the above activities involved the use of ASC second line, it was of utmost importance that div controlled or approved of the location of this area.

2 DISPERSION

- (a) Grouping so many activities as above has the disadvantage of concentration and mvt to and from this central area.

Bde TOs did not altogether realise or would not accept their responsibilities with regard to dispersion and control of traffic. A direction will be given on this subject in future, and div must assist Bde TO with the necessary Pro.

VIII SALVAGE

1 ORGANISATION

The est of a Div Salvage Unit is:-

1 Offr 41 ORs and 1 Veh

Such a small unit for salvage ops on a div front is most inadequate, and fortunately there were available some spare ASC personnel from whom another salvage unit of 1 offr and 20 ORs was formed.

The 7 Aust Div Salvage Unit worked behind the right Bde Gp and the ASC Salvage Unit in rear of the Bde Gp on the Coast.

2 COLLECTION OF SALVAGE

In mobile ops the most assistance - until conditions become more or less static - one can expect from fwd units is the reporting of enemy eqpt and dumps. This was not realised by all units, but some were most helpful.

While battle is joined one cannot expect fwd tps actively to assist in salvage, although it is realised to avoid wanton destruction and collection of "souvenirs" a rapid collection of salvage is necessary. The native populace rendered things more complicated by their highly developed skill in pilfering arms and am before the Salvage Units could get up.

As the advance proceeded this was overcome to a certain extent by sending recon parties fwd to locate and gd dumps and material until the unit could come up, or the material could be collected. Lack of numbers precluded this task being done as efficiently as was desired.

3 OWN EQUIPMENT

A rather disturbing feature revealed by the salvage ops was the amount of our own eqpt collected.

This consisted of rifles, water bottles, respirators, am, and many other items of eqpt. Some of this may have been from killed or wounded men, but much of it must have been abandoned for the sake of comfort.

The improvement in care of eqpt etc as the campaign progressed was most marked.

4 EVACUATION

(a) Evacuation of enemy salvage other than vehs and heavy armament was effected:-

- (i) By salvage units from fwd areas to div salvage dumps.
- (ii) By second line tpt from dumps to FSDs.

(b) ENEMY VEHs AND HEAVY ARMAMENT

These were collected by the Rec Secs and where the numbers were small, were evacuated by them to the A Fd Wkshops. Where larger numbers were involved, the A Fd Wkshop sent fwd and evacuated from the Rec Secs.

(c) AUSTRALIAN EQUIPMENT

All Aust pattern eqpt was separated from the remainder of the salvage at the FSDs and handed over to the FODs.

(d) Despite definite orders on the subject, units were inclined to retain for their own use captured enemy vehs and certain armament. Comds must realise their responsibilities in this matter and ensure that all captured material goes back through the correct channels.

5 GENERAL

Salvage experts from FORCE and CORPS visited the area, and gave much advice but nothing of any practical value. A suggestion how to use a fwd area could be used showed that the offr concerned had no knowledge of regtl duty, or what is involved in battle.

Reports made on cursory inspections of the area, were not very favourable to our salvage ops. However in view of the nature of the country and the limited facilities available, it is considered that the sal ago work carried out was highly creditable.

6 SUGGESTED INCREASE IN ESTABLISHMENT

In ops such as these it is considered that the est of a Div Salvage Unit should be at least twice as great as at present. A unit comd by a Capt, with a small HQ and two secs each the size of the present salvage unit would still only be able to cope with a fraction of the work during the peak periods. The personnel need not necessarily be "A" class. The minimum tpt necessary to enable such a unit to function efficiently would be 3 m/cs, 1 car DS, 2 vans 1t and 6 lorries.

IX ORDNANCE - SUPPLY

1 DEGREE OF READINESS FOR ACTION

speaking generally, the div entered the recent ops reasonably equipped, except for certain technical stores, types of SA armament and vehs, which had not been completed to authorized G1098 scale, i.e. wireless and sig stores; revolvers, 2 in Mortars, Boys Rifles, Bron Guns, 25 pra, light tanks and water tank vehs.

2 ORGANISATION OF ORD SERVICES

(a) DEMAND

Prior to the commencement of the ops, arrangements had been made with DDOS, FORCE, for the supply and maintenance of ord stores and vehs from both British and Aust Depots as under:-

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--|
| (i) Aust vehs and spare parts | - 2 Aust AOD (BARBARA) |
| WD vehs " " " | - 1 Sub-depot, 3 AOD,
RAOC (SARAFAND) |
| (ii) Clothing and necessities | - 2 Aust AOD (BARBARA) |
| General Stores | - 2 Sub-depot, 3 AOD
(RAOC) HAIFA |
| (iii) Aust Patt tech eqpt | - 2 Aust AOD (BARBARA) |
| | - 3 Sub-depot, RAOC (HAIFA) |

This arrangement proved very satisfactory, indents from units being submitted through Div and Bde WOs AAOC to DADOS for approval, and despatched to depots concerned by DR for fulfillment, except in regard to MT spares and expense stores, where the system varied in accordance with the degree of emergency, units being permitted after approval by DADOS to place demands direct on the Ord Fd Pk Sces allotted to Div and Bde Gps.

In both cases the service was excellent, and although initial (i.e. stores not held and required to complete G1098 Scale) issues of controlled stores were not made, no difficulty was experienced in regard to the issue of replacement and maintenance stores, the British depots being particularly helpful on all occasions, especially in regard to the replacement of stores lost or destroyed by enemy action.

(b) SUPPLY

A ferry service was instituted between Ord depots (per medium of six 50-cwt vehs purchased specially for the task), DADOS dump and PODs, which were set in the vicinity of the FSDs.

The very limited Ord staff provided in WE was allotted to PODs and AASC Coys to handle the receipt and sorting of stores, which were handed over to the Ord rops with the AASC Coys for delivery fwd and issue to units with their supp. This system applied throughout the ops, except in cases of urgency, when stores were either collected by Div or Bde WOs AAOC, or taken fwd under arrangements made by DADOS and delivered direct to units.

AASC personnel gave every assistance and co-operated at all times in a most efficient and helpful manner.

3 REPLACEMENT OF ORD STORES

(a) GENERAL

Except in the case of general stores, which were indented for in the normal manner, units requiring replacement of controlled stores lost or destroyed by enemy action, signalled or contacted DADOS personally, the latter in turn signalling DADOS Force, repeating to the COO of the issuing depot concerned for replacement.

Mention must be made of the large quantities of web eqpt (approx 400 sets) and water bottles (approx 1000) that were lost during the ops and indented for, and from investigations made, it would appear that tps discarded these items when in a tight corner or going to ground, and made no attempt to recover the articles in question.

The heavy call made on the physical endurance of the tps during this campaign would account for quite a lot of the discarded eqpt.

Very little delay occurred with these replacements, especially in regard to LMGs, Boys Rifles and Mortars, which were very promptly supplied by day or night. A summary of major items of controlled stores lost or destroyed, and replaced, is att as Appx "E".

(b) SIGNAL STORES

These were replaced as in (a), except that damaged eqpt was fwded through "I" Sec 7 Aust Div Sigs, who certified as necessary, either giving immediate replacements in the case of items definitely US, or notifying DADOS that replacement was necessary.

(c) VEHICLES

Vehs destroyed or lost by enemy action were written off on an OMEI certificate, and replacement signalled to ADOS (MT) AIF and later to ADOS 1 Aust Corps.

In most cases the vehs were replaced expeditiously by the RVS of Ctr Fd Bn.

A summary of vehs lost or destroyed is att as Appx "F".

X ORDNANCE - TECHNICAL AND RECOVERY

1 UNITS

Units att 7 Aust Div for first and second line repairs, maintenance; and rec of eqpt consisted of:-
LADs Nos 39, 44, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 66, and
Aust Rec Socs Nos 7, 8, and 9.

Prior to ops, all LADs were at approx full strength, but in no case fully equipped. Except in the case of 59, no LAD carried in excess of 20% of spares and expense stores; in several cases this figure was considerably lower. 7, 8, and 9 Aust Rec Socs, att from 2/3 A Fd Wkshop were at approx 80% full strength in both eqpt and personnel, but as was the case with the LADs, carried almost nothing in the way of expense stores and spares.

2 PREPARATION PRIOR TO ACTION

All eqpt was given as much attention as possible on arrival from MATRUH, but this programme was limited on account of time available and difficulty of obtaining spares and expense stores. With the exception of tanks, light, Mk VI, it is considered that the eqpt on charge to units of 7 Aust Div was in more than average good condition.

3 SUPPLY OF SPARES

At this stage, spares for MT, carriers and tanks were difficult to obtain, and in several cases repairs were completed only after the units concerned had sent their own tpt back for the items required. At a later stage this condition was much improved by the operation of a LP scheme.

The fact that the Corps Sec and "B" Div Sec were not at this stage in the field, proved to be a serious disadvantage, as also was the fact that when they did arrive, full scale of spares was not carried.

4 ALLOCATION OF AUST REC SECS

On arrival, 8 Rec Sec was sited adjacent to 6 Aust Cav for the purpose of concentrating a full effort on the overhaul of the AFVs on charge to that unit. Failure to achieve satisfactory results with the eqpt of this unit, especially tanks, was on account of:-

- (a) Poor condition of tanks when issued.
- (b) Inadequate supply of spare parts.
- (c) Limited time available.

7 Aust Rec Sec on arrival, was att for purpose of overhaul work on eqpt to 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp, and except where spares were not obtainable, this work was completed satisfactorily.

9 Aust Rec Sec was att 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp, and carried out a similar task to that of 7 Rec Sec.

Overhaul of eqpt Div Res Gp, was carried out by LADs, and where necessary, by 2/3 1st Pz Workshop, and later when 6 Aust Cav moved fwd, by 8 Rec Sec.

5 OPERATION DURING CAMPAIGN

Where possible throughout the campaign, LADs carried out first line repairs for the units to which they were att only. Departure from this procedure was necessary in the cases of the 39, 54, and 55 LADs, att 6 Aust Cav, 2/4 A Tk Regt, and RAE respectively. With these units it was necessary frequently that repairs be either handled by Bde Gp LAD, or sent direct to Rec Sec, the LADs concerned being stationed where the greatest amount of work was offering.

Upon coming under comm, 17 Aust Inf Bde was provided for by 9 Rec Sec, and later by 8 Rec Sec.

6 REPAIRS

Repairs to vehs throughout the campaign were mostly of a general type, items which called for more frequent attention were:-

Replacement springs, Chev cars, 15-cwt Utilities, 1-ton vans, 10-cwt.

Ford 15-cwt and 1-ton vans.

Defective steering boxes; Ford CAS vehs, all types.

Defective radiators; Chev cars and 15-cwts.

Ford " " " "

Defective current and voltage regulators.

Defective fan drivers and generators; CAS Fords.

Faulty clutches; Ford 3-ton GS.

Faulty fuel systems; all types Fords.

Cracked crankcases; motorcycles.

Defective hydraulic braking systems; Chevs and Fords, all types.

Faulty bogey wheels; tracks and pins; carriers all types.

Replacement engines; carriers, especially 87 HP type.

Guns; repacking on account of poor class of packing used.

Batteries; recharging for vehs, tanks, carriers, and signals.

MGs; replacement of worn parts and minor repairs.

The bulk of the repair work was carried out by 7, 8, & 9 Rec Secs, and in most cases only where repairs were

anticipated to exceed ten hours; or where parts are not readily available, were jobs evacuated to Army Fd Wkshops.

7 RECOVERY

Total number of rec vehs on charge - 17, plus 6 AASC. In but few cases did LADs make use of rec vehs, and then only generally from unit area to rear ech.

Rd patrols were maintained by 7, 8, and 9 Rec Secs, both fwd and laterally. The extent of such depended on MT mvt, condition of rds, and location of LADs.

After the third week of ops it was found that the rd patrols could be as effectively carried out by using 1-ton vans, manned with fitters 1; mechanics 1; and drs 1, equipped with hand tools and spare parts. This arrangement proved to be satisfactory, and allowed of more frequent patrols, especially over difficult rds. The necessity to send back for the larger breakdown veh was very infrequent.

8 MAINTENANCE - VEHs AND CARRIERS

It is considered that the standard of maintenance by drs, technical personnel, and AASC att was on the average very good. Inspection reports now to hand reveal a keener interest taken in all eqpt, but especially vehs and carriers. Special mention must be made of the very high standard of MT maintenance in 4, 5, and 6 AASC Coys.

Figures now to hand, as a result of the recent inspection, indicate that a large number of vehs and carriers on charge to units were originally issued less complete sets of tools, and at least 40% with only incomplete sets; such items as grease guns, jacks, and wheel spanners being missing.

9 ARMAMENT

Reports now to hand indicate that every effort has been made to maintain armament 25-pdrs, and 2-pdrs in first class condition, and such defects as now exist are considered to be the results of fair wear and tear.

10 SA AND LMGs

The condition of SA and LMGs on charge to 21 and 25 Aust Inf Bdes, (inspection 17 Bde incomplete), is proof that during the campaign every effort was made to keep this eqpt in first class condition, minor repairs and replacements now being necessary only to but few Bren guns.

11 GENERAL

The experience gained in these ops has proved most beneficial to all ranks of the Ord Service, and has brought out the need for

(a) an increase in the est of an additional NCO of the rank of Sgt, to be responsible for the keeping of records, MT census, and statistics generally,

(b) additional tpt to the extent of two 30-cwt or 3-ton lorries for urgent collection and delivery of stores in case of emergency.

XI PROVOST AND TRAFFIC CONTROL

1 ORGANISATION

Owing to casualties in GREECE and CRETE 7 Aust Div Pro Coy was 62 under strength at the commencement of the campaign. Two secs of 1 Aust Corps Pro Coy were placed under comd and partly made up for this deficiency.

In mobile ops the necessity for strict traffic control and a highly trained pro was again demonstrated.

Pro throughout remained under div control except when Bdes were moving into assembly areas when a pro sec was placed under comd of each Bde Gp to control mvt within the Bde areas.

On D1 day pro were allotted as follows:-

- (i) One sec - traffic control on right flank, i.e. ROSH PINNA - METULLA Rd.
- (ii) One sec - Coast rd
- (iii) One sec - On rear lateral in div area and forming straggler posts at rd juncs on frontier.

The remaining $1\frac{1}{2}$ secs were held at div to meet any emergency

As the advance continued, so would one sec leap-frog through the sec in position, and by this means there were no gaps left on the main routes without pro.

From the map rds were studied for defiles or possible deviations, and pro were held in readiness to be there just behind the fwd tps.

This worked very well at the crossing of DAMOUR River where pro were standing by until the bridge was completed. At the LITANI River div was rather late in getting pro fwd, and a good lesson was learnt.

2 PATROLS AND TCPs

These must be est on all main routes, and if sufficient pro are not available to man all TCPs then a m/c patrol between two points approx 15 miles apart should be est. Thus two men can man 3 points.

3 DUTIES OF PROVOST

It is considered that there are many valuable tasks which should be carried out by the Pro in addition to normal traffic control and which are of great importance to the efficiency of a force.

There are:-

- i Immediate erection of sign-boards at rd juncs and within a town.
- ii As soon as a Pro is posted at a point he should learn all he can about the immediate area, and the location of units and HQs, as he is the most convenient source of infm.
- iii He should know the serial number of all units.
- iv If a Pro sees vehs parked in an area and not correctly dispersed, he should report the fact to the CO of that unit, and have the proper dispersal carried out.

- v He should never allow vchs to park near corners, rd juncs or defiles.
- vi When patrolling a rd he can only do it effectively at a slow pace.

4 TRAFFIC - ROUTES AND MAPS

A traffic map was issued prior to D1 day laying down all circuits up to the frontier. After that no traffic maps were issued as there were no circuits available.

One important point was brought out, and that is Bdes must not lay down traffic routes without first consulting div, in order that all may be notified. This was only done once and led to confusion.

XII MEDICAL

1 COMMAND

During the opening phase while ops were carried out over widely separated areas the Coys of 2/4 Aust Fd Amb were under comd 25 Bde, those of 2/6 Aust Fd Amb together with one sec 14 Brit Lt Fd Amb being under comd 21 Bde.

HQ 2/4, 2/6 Aust Fd Ambs and 14 Brit Lt Fd Amb remained under div control. When the 7 Aust Div was concentrated on the coastal sector, the 2/4 Aust Fd Amb and 2/6 Aust Fd Amb came entirely under div comd and 14 Brit Lt Fd Amb less two secs was withdrawn to Corps control.

2 EVACUATION

Evacuation to RAPs was generally over very difficult country. Until the battle of DAMOUR it was possible to evacuate casualties direct from RAPs by motor amb.

The Lt Sec 14 Brit Lt Fd Amb proved of great value with the mounted tps.

Until the ADSs were situated more than three hours from CCSs, no MDS was est, and cases were evacuated direct by MAC.

When the time interval was increased evacuation was from Lt Sec Fd Ambs through ADS, to MDS - thence by MAC to CCS. At the final battle of DAMOUR one ADS with a Lt Sec fwd was est for the whole action. Bearers from three coys evacuated from RAPs.

From the ADS casualties were evacuated as follows:-

- (a) Battle casualties requiring surgery to MDS 2/6 Aust Fd Amb to which was att one surgical team. 30 minutes.
- (b) Minor battle casualties and all sick to MDS 2/4 Aust Fd Amb. 30 minutes.

3 CASUALTIES

Total casualties passed through Fd Ambs were:-

	Sick	BC
2/4 Aust Fd Amb	1335	592
2/6 Aust Fd Amb	1820	872
	<u>3155</u>	<u>1464</u>

4 MALARIA

It was appreciated that the area of ops was highly malarious and while there was no attempt at control every endeavour was made to carry out personal protection. This was constantly supervised by 2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Soc, but the conditions of mvt and constant fighting vitiated much of the work; consequently from the second to the fourth week there were 206 proven cases of malaria - but by the end of the sixth week there had been only 124 additional cases.

5 ADMINISTRATION

No OOs or instns were issued by ADMS. The general plan was discussed with AQ and after his approval, the situation, the task and the method were presented in conference with Amb Comds and Coy Comds.

Supervision was carried out by personal daily liaison direct with RAPs and Fd Ambs.

6 LESSONS

- (a) Absolute fitness is essential. While generally motor ambes can be brought to RAPs, bearers must always be prepared for strenuous carries.
- (b) Before any campaign is undertaken in a malarious area, every preparation should be made for personal protection.
- (c) Again it has been demonstrated that an RMO must not be dependent on his veh for the accessibility of essential eqpt.
- (d) It is essential that all med vehs and med posts be clearly indicated.
- (e) On two occasions there was definite evidence that the Red Cross was respected by the enemy. Once by a dive bomber and once by arty.
- (f) PW must be used by fwd units to evacuate enemy wounded whenever possible.
- (g) It is essential from the commencement of a campaign, to have within the div area, a rest station available for minor BCs or minor sick so that personnel may be returned to units at the earliest opportunity.
- (h) It is difficult to assess the value of vague reports, often circumstantially elaborated. No verbal report should be acted upon without reasonable confirmation.
- (i) While it is reasonable to place coys of Fd Ambs under cmd of Bdes when the Bde is operating det or in a distant area, it is essential if a div is concentrated for the ADMS to retain the control of all the Fd Ambs.

XIII CASUALTIES

The system of reporting battle casualties to this HQ was by the rendition by units of AF3006.

This return was amended by GHQ (ME) which called for the submission of this return only when units had battle casualties.

As it was necessary for this HQ to know the fighting strength of units daily, the submission of the return each day was insisted on, as there were frequent evacuations by units on account of sickness which would otherwise have been unexplained had this return been rendered only when there had been battle casualties.

Units did not appreciate the importance of rendering this return promptly with the result that the first composite return to higher authority and to G2E AIF was not despatched until 16 Jun 41 showing posn as at 13 Jun 41.

It was found necessary to insist that Bde Gps accept responsibility for the rendition by units under their comd of this vital return by the submission of a composite return for each Bde Gp.

The wide dispersion of units, and the failure by junior leaders to realise the importance of noting and advising their HQ of battle casualties promptly were the main reasons for "slackness" in this important phase of adm.

After the first week it may be said that these difficulties were overcome and towards the latter end of the campaign the info called for was rendered with satisfactory promptness by the majority of units.

The total battle casualties for the Syrian Campaign as at 3 Aug, for units of 7 Aust Div and tps under comd are as follows:-

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Total</u>
Offrs	36	72	108
ORs	346	1057	1403

XIV BURIALS

During the period the div was at MERSA MATRUH a comprehensive adm instn was promulgated to all units setting out the procedure to be adopted regarding burials of our own tps, of our allies and of the enemy; the disposal of the personal effects and the rendition of the necessary returns. Those instns were generally applicable to the SYRIAN Campaign.

Whenever possible during the campaign personnel were buried in sector areas, isolated burials being avoided as far as practicable.

We early sought the assistance of a rep and staff of the Graves Registration and Inquiries Unit.

This HQ retained a copy of each burial return (AF3114) submitted. These were handed to the rep of the Graves Registration and Inquiries Unit who was then able to check location and particulars of the graves by personal inspection.

Almost without exception units were careful to indicate accurately locations of graves and to record thereon essential particulars.

Bde Gps were instructed to prepare a marked map and sketches of burial areas showing thereon all relevant infm. This has been done and is in the possession of the G R & I Unit rep.

In addition as a final check all units under comd were asked to submit in triplicate full particulars of all battle casualties, showing regtl number, rank, name, unit, category of casualty, including particulars of all personnel still missing.

Two copies were fwded to 1 Aust Corps, one copy is retained for our records.

Units are alive to the importance of making every effort to account for missing personnel and the identification of a few unidentified dead.

IV CLAIMS

A div Claims Offr was appointed to deal with claims for compensation and damage made by civilians against the occupying military authorities. Each case was considered on its merits and a recommendation made accordingly to the GOC 7 Aust Div for his decision.

Approved claims were settled in cash in full discharge and satisfaction of the claim.

It is considered that some such arrangement as this should be made in a foreign country in order to bolster up the popularity of the occupying forces.

XVI SPIRITUAL WELFARE

During active ops it was not always practicable to hold church parades, but wherever possible services were held by unit Chaplains.

All Chaplains worked untiringly during ops in administering the wounded at RAPs, dressing stations and CCS, and in the burial of the dead.

They also visited hospitals and thereby assisted in the location of certain personnel earlier reported missing.

In addition all Chaplains and YMCA reps are to be commended for their work in distribution of amenities, and their general interest in the welfare of the tps.

XVII PRISONERS OF WAR

The normal procedure for evacuation of PW was adopted i.e. Bdes est a collecting centre in proximity to a main route from where prisoners were evacuated by returning second line tpt to corps cages at MALIKYA and EZ EIB.

The location of the Bde collecting centres in vicinity of "B" Ech was found most convenient.

To assist Bdes spare div personnel were used for manning the Bde collecting centres, and to avoid wastage of front line tps it is recommended that this be done where possible.

"I" personnel of div interviewed prisoners at Bde centre.

XVIII CANTEENS

These were est at "B" Ech of each Bde Gp and Div Res Gp with a bulk store at MAHARIYA.

A criticism was made that these Canteens were too far fwd, but it is contended that to give service to the fwd tps, canteens must be est in a convenient posn in order that supplies may go fwd with normal tpt runs such as rations and thus ensuring regular supply and economy in tpt.

To maintain a supply of beer, cigarettes, and minor luxuries to tps right up in the fwd area no doubt has an excellent moral effect, and is instrumental in obtaining that little extra effort which often is balance between success and defeat.

The Canteen Board is to be congratulated on the manner in which supplies were kept up.

XIX AMENITIES

Reps of ACF, working under difficulties and handicapped by limited supplies and often by lack of tpt did excellent work.

Fwd tps were catered for with such comforts as tinned fruit, tinned coffee and milk, chocolates, soups, cigarettes and tobacco.

YMCA and Salvation Army helped in this work, and all are to be highly commended.

The effect no doubt on morale is good, as the man realises he is being cared for as well as being led into battle.

XX STAFF AND ORGANISATION OF AQ BRANCH

- (a) At the commencement of the campaign the staff was up to WE, including the recent additions of DAAG Learner and DAQM Learner.

The staff as constituted and its organisation are considered sufficient with the following exceptions:-

(1) AQ LEARNER

It is considered that an offr of the rank of Lt-Col should be att as AQ Learner. The principal duty of an AQ is that of co-ordination of the work of all departments of the Branch of the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General. This he cannot do efficiently if he is to be tied up in his office lorry signing and attending to the multifarious correspondence that passes through the Branch. It is contended that much of this correspondence could be obviated if the AQ was able continually to visit all Bdes and even minor units to see their needs and give decisions on the spot. The general supervision of traffic control, seeing danger spots that may interrupt the flow of amn and sups, seeing location of dumps and gaining first hand infm of reserves, the standard of rd discipline and dispersion are tasks that can only be carried out satisfactorily if this senior staff offr of the branch is relieved of much of his present detail and thus permitted to be out and around units, much more than he is now.

Much of the aversion - justified or otherwise - of the regtl offr towards the AQ Branch would also be overcome by this personal contact, and result in far happier and closer co-operation. The AQ would be looked upon as the staunch helper and indispensable friend of all - as he really is - and not the "bogey man" who spends his time in an office concocting "please explains" and worrying units with paper.

It is understood that this increase in staff was strongly stressed by British Formations in France during 1939-40 and that the subject was being investigated. In this connection ref is made to the Bartholemew Report which reveals that, with a Div est similar to ours, the AQ Staffs of the BEF were overworked during the campaign in France.

It is represented that further thought should be given to these matters now.

(ii) RECORDS CLERK

The clerical staff of the AQ office, in accordance with WE, consists of one WO, one Sgt, two clerks and two orderlies. When Div HQ is divided, unless Adv HQ gains at the expense of rear HQ, the former has a normal allotment only of one WO (or Sgt) one clerk and one orderly. In this campaign, in order that "Q" could keep in close touch with the situation and attend, in particular, to all requirements of mvt and sup immediately they arose, he was stationed throughout at Adv HQ. It was obvious, before the campaign commenced, that the allotment of clerical staff to Adv HQ, if in accordance with the above, would be insufficient, and actually a clerk, additional to WE, was obtained and employed throughout on "Q" records,

statistics, returns etc. His services proved invaluable, and his work could not have been carried out effectively, by other members of the staff in addition to their own duties. The duties of the record clerk comprised:-

- 1 Compiling daily expenditures of amn and stocks held, recording all possible statistical data with regard to first line, second line and dumped amn and preparation of daily amn telegrams.
- 2 Recording and amending all locations on the "Q" map, e.g. FSDs, FADs, FODs, AFs, PPs, SPs, WPs, B ech areas etc, and amending location statements.
- 3 Encoding and decoding all signals, and amending code lists.
- 4 Collecting data from inwards signals and correspondence for compiling records and returns.
- 5 Keeping "Q" staff tables up to date particularly with regard to weapons and tpt held by units.

It is recommended that one additional clerk be added to the WE of Div HQ for allotment to the AQ branch for carrying out the above duties. It is not essential for this man to be a typist, but it is considered that he should hold the rank of Cpl or, at least, be graded as a clerk.

(b) ALLOTMENT OF STAFF TO ADV AND REAR HQs

The division of the AQ staff between Adv and Rear HQs is a very moot question. It is fully realised that Adv Div HQs must be kept at a minimum, but at the same time much thought must be given to the locations of Adv and Rear HQs in order that efficiency is not impaired.

It is considered that not more than 2 to 3 miles should separate the HQs unless there are some very important tactical considerations, and that telephonic communication must be est.

In most cases Adv HQ was too large, and the est of a Battle HQ thrown off from Adv HQ is advocated.

CONCLUSION

As this was the first time this div had been in battle, a certain number of mistakes were to be anticipated. Some certainly did occur, but were readily rectified.

It is considered that all personnel of the AQ staff, and the services - AASC, Medical, Ordnance, Provost and Salvage - can be justly proud of their work in the maintenance and caring for the division in the SYRIAN Campaign, the AQ problems of which have not been easy.

The happy relations and close co-operation which have always existed between the "Q" and "AQ" Staffs materially assisted in lessening many burdens.

I desire to place on record my appreciation of the devotion to duty, loyalty, and happy co-operation of all ranks, without which such success as we have attained would not have been possible.

APPX "A" to AQ Report SYRIAN CAMPAIGN

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

Copy No...

4 Jun 41

AUST DIV EXPORTER ADM INSTRUCTION NO 8
(Issued in conjunction with Aust Div Exporter Operation
Instruction No 6 of 3 Jun 41)

REF MAPS HAIFA SHEET 1/100,000
 SAFAD SHEET 1/100,000

1 SUPPLIES

- (a) SRPs will be located at:-
- | | | |
|----------------|------------|----------|
| 21 Inf Bde Gp) | ACRE | 15872605 |
| Div Res Gp) | | |
| 25 Inf Bde Gp | ROSH PINNA | 20142633 |
- (b) Units will move fwd with the unconsumed portion of the day's ration plus four (4) days hard ration. One day's hard ration will be for consumption on D2 day and the remainder will be reserve.
- (c) Units will be maintained in the normal manner. Inf Bde Gps will advise Div daily by 1200 hrs commencing on D2 day of the LRs selected. Time of delivery will be notified by Div.
- (d) Indents (AB 55) will be submitted to Inf Bde and Div tps ASC Offrs by all indenting units in respective gps by 0900 hrs daily. Indents will be for rations for consumption on the third day after rendition.

2 POL

- (a) PRPs will be located at:-
- | | | |
|----------------|------------|----------|
| 21 Inf Bde Gp) | ACRE | 157259 |
| Div Res Gp) | | |
| 25 Inf Bde Gp | ROSH PINNA | 20122633 |
- (b) Petrol reserves will be carried on the following basis:-
- | | |
|---------|---------|
| Cars | 8 gals |
| Vans | 12 gals |
| Lorries | 16 gals |
- (c) PPs as required and time of opening and closing will be fixed by Inf Bde Gps and Div notified.
- (d) The unit demand on AB 55 will be made at the PP by the veh drawing the unit sup of POL.

3 AMMUNITION

- (a) ARPs will be located at:-
- | | | |
|----------------|------------|--------|
| 21 Inf Bde Gp) | ACRE | 157259 |
| Div Res Gp) | | |
| 25 Inf Bde Gp | ROSH PINNA | 201264 |
- (b) Units will move with full first line requirements.
- (c) As from 1600 hrs on D1 day second line amn will be located on wheels at RV as under:-
- | | | | |
|---------------|---|-----------------|------------------|
| 21 Inf Bde Gp | : | AL BAHJA | 15892609 |
| 25 Inf Bde Gp | : | GROVE | 20252646 between |
| | | Kilos 200 & 201 | ROSH PINNA - |
| | | METULLA Rd | |

Div Res Gp : 18722575
North of ROSH PINKA - ACCE Rd
between Miles 250 & 251

APs

Location and times of replenishment will be laid down by Inf Bde Gps, and Div notified.

4 ENGINEER STORES

- (a) RE dump is located at QHAT MOSKIN 157248. 3-ton lorries have been made available by FORCE for loading of RE stores under direction of CRE.
- (b) Those lorries allocated to Inf Bde Gps will come under comd Gps at 1200 hrs D-2 day. The lorries being held in reserve will come under comd of 2/5 Fd Pk Coy RAL at 0900 hrs D-1 day.

5 ORD STORES

Indents for Ord Stores for all units including those under comd will be submitted to DADOS Aust Div Exporter.

6 REC

- (a) LADs will ensure that all broken down vchs are removed from the rd immediately.
- (b) Second line rec posts will be located on D1 day at:-
 - 25 Inf Bde Gp : 18722591 (Present site)
 - Div Res Gp : AL B'INHA South of rd, 17662583
 - 21 Inf Bde Gp : AL BANJA 15892612Mainshop will be located at AD DAKUN 15742534
- (c) Third line Rec is being carried out by 6 L of C Rec Soc located at rd junc 16442475.

7 WATER

- (a) Location and capacity of all WPs opened will be notified through Inf Bde Gps HQ to Div HQ.
- (b) ADIES will ensure that all sources of supply are tested.

8 SALVAGE

Det Aust Div Salvage Unit will be made available to operate on each route. Separate instns will be issued.

9 B ECH TPT

B ech tpt will remain in assembly areas and await further instns.

10 TRAFFIC CONTROL

- (a) Traffic circuits as shown in map already issued will be adhered to, except as shown hereunder:-
 - i On day D-1 from 0600 hrs until 2000 hrs routes A7, A5, B3, B4, will be one-way routes running north.
 - ii On nights D-2/D-1 and D-1/D1 from 2000 hrs until 0600 hrs route B5 is reserved for 25 Inf Bde Gp traffic.

- (b) Force HQ are controlling traffic up to and incl rd ROSH PINNA - SAFAD - ACRE.
- (c) Div will be responsible for traffic control north of this rd.
DAPM will liaise with Inf Bde Gps as to special requirements.

11 PW

- (a) PW cages are being established by Force at MALAKIYA 198279 and KH AL JUEILA - 170273.
- (b) Units quartered in these camps are responsible for guarding PW.
- (c) Inf Bde Gps will form collecting centre on a main traffic route, and PW will be sent back to PW cages under arrangements made by Inf Bde Gps.

12 STRAGGLERS

DAPM will arrange line of stragglers posts along the frontier.

13 MEDICAL

- (a) ADS will be located by Inf Bde Gps.
- (b) MDS HOSPICE 20242542 Established by 1800 hrs
HQ 2/4 Fd Amb D-1 day.
MDS OLIVE GROVE 16652578 In posn on wheels as from
HQ 2/6 Fd Amb 0600 hrs D-1 day
- (c) CCSs are established at NAZARETH and HAIFA.
- (d) ADMS will arrange for evacuation from MDS to CCS.
Force HQ are making available amb cars for this purpose.

14 BURIALS

Attention is drawn to Aust Div Exporter Adm Instn No 6 of 3 Jun 41 on this subject

15 VETERINARY

- (a) A Vet Det will be att to Cheshire Yoo.
- (b) Evacuation of horse casualties will be by Horse Ambs to 5 Mob Vet Sec ACRE.

Signed V C SECOMBE

Col
AA & QMG AUST DIV EXPORTER

ACK

Issued to Sigs

Time of signature 0400 hrs

Distribution - Page 4.

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>Copies Nos</u>
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APPX "B" to A-1 Report SYRIAN CAMPAIGN

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

IGC/JRD
Q19/1/97

HQ Aust Div Exporter
31 May 41

FORCE HQ

AMN - AUST DIV EXPORTER

1. The following are the requirements for one complete second line refill of amn for Aust Div Exporter:--

Type	21 Bde Gp	25 Bde Gp	Div Res Gp	TOTAL
.303 in EDR	144000	144000	213000	506000
.303 in CTN	102000	102000	132000	336000
.303 in TRACER	36000	36000	64000	136000
.303 in BELT	42000	42000	143000	227000
.450 SMG	86000	86000	54000	226000
.38 Pistol)				
.450 ") (a)	4000	4000	10000	18000
.455 ")				
.5 HMF	4000	4000	17000	25000
.55 AP	7000	7000	17000	31000
.8 SOLATHURN	144	144	144	432
2 in Mor HE	432	432	288	1152
" " Smoke	1296	1296	864	3456
3 in Mor HE	252	252	168	672
" " Smoke	180	180	120	480
Pistols, Sig	858	858	2298	4014
Gren, Hand	580	580	1040	2200
Generators smoke	150	150	700	1000
2 Pdr AP	1000	1000	1650	3650
25 Pdr HE	1512	1512	1008	4032
" Smoke	168	168	112	448
" AP	120	120	80	320
15 mm BESA	288	288	-	576
7.92 BESA	1500	1500	-	3000
Mines A Tk	400	400	432	1232
Explosives				5 tons
Bombs ST	1000	1000	1000	3000

(a) Exact numbers of different types not yet known

2. Amounts already held in second line are:--

.303 in EDR	60000
.303 in CTN	190000

(2)

3. The principle deficiencies in first line amm
at present are:-

.303 in Tracer	75000
.380 in Pistol	600
.450 in "	2600
.455 in "	7500
.55 AP	14000
2 in Mor Smoke	1800
3 in Mor HE	907
" " Smoke	970
Grenades, hand	60
Pistol sig red	40
" " green	60
" " Ill J	60
Bombs ST	3000

These figures do not include units who have
not yet arrived in the area.

4. In the event of bombs ST not being available,
molotov cocktails or materials for their manufacture will
be required in lieu thereof.

(Sgd) V C SECORBE

for Maj-Gen
Comd Aust Div Exporter

APPX "C" to AQ Report SYRIAN CAMPAIGN

AMN EXPENDED

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
303 BDR	44500
303 BDLE	393750
303 CFN	551902
303 CHARGER	101200
303 BELT	214690
303 AP	243
303 TRAC	3000
POINT 5 IN	29700
DOUBLE 5 IN	13942
REV 38 & POINT 4 DOUBLE 5	12982
45 AUTO	344970
20 MM AP	1090
2 MOR HE	3560
2 MOR SMOK	360
3 MOR HE	6120
3 MOR SMOK	237
2 PR A/TK	623
40 MM	4410
25 PR HE	137973
25 PR BE SMOK	3345
25 PR SHOT	243
4.5 HON HE	2224
6 IN HON HE	2496
PISTOL SIG	4025
3 SMOK GEN	198
WRIGLEYS GREN	2660
MINE A/TK	2200
36 GREN HAN	7005
AMNL	lbs 945
C/C SLAB	690
C/C PRIM	393
SAFE	ft 180
PID	ft 1750
DENTS	1420

APPX 'D' TO AQ REPORT SYRIAN CAMPAIGN

1EE RATION SCALE

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Bacon, MC	3 ozs	Onions	2 czs
or			
Bacon TD (x)	2 1/2 "	Pepper (xx)	1/100 "
or			
Sausages Td (x)	1 "	Potatoes Fresh	12 "
Beans/Lentils/Peas Dr	1 "	Potatoes Td) In lieu	6 "
		or) of	
Bread	10 "	Rice) Potatoes	2 "
or		or) Fresh	
Biscuits Service	10 "	Onions)	2 "
Cheese	2 "		
Curry Powder or Baking (xx)	1/50 "	Rice	2 1/2 "
Fruit Dry	4/7 "	Salt	1/2 "
" Fresh	6 "	Salmon (xx)	3/7 "
Herrings	4/7 "	Sugar	3 "
or		Tea	5/8 "
Sardines	2/7 "		
Jam or Marmalade Local	1 1/2 "	Vegs Fresh	8 "
or		Vegs Pres) In	3 1/3 "
Syrup	1 "	Comp Vegs Td) lieu	1 1/3 "
Margarine	1 1/2 "	Beans Canned) of	1 1/2 "
Meat Frozen with Bone	10 "	Beans/Lentils/) Fresh	2/3 "
or		Dr Peas)	
Meat Fresh Local	12 "	Tobacco or Cigs (issue	
Meat Boneless	6 1/2 "	Th)	50
Meat Loaf (xx)	4/7 "	Matches	2 bx
Meat Pres when issued in		(Meat Pres	8 ozs
lieu of Meat Loaf	10/21 "	(
Milk Td	2 "	(with Pickles (xx)	2/7 "
Mustard (xx)	1/100 "	(
		Chutney	1/14 "
Oatmeal	1/2 "		
or			
Flour	1/2 "		

(x) Sausages)
Td Bacon) Alternate days

(xx) Weekly issue Thu

APPX "E" TO A2 REPORT SYRIAN CAMPAIGN

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ITEMS CONTROLLED STORES LOST OR DESTROYED BY ENEMY ACTION

UNIT	BREN GUNS		RIFLE BOYS		2" MORTARS		3" MORTARS		THOMPSON SIGs		BINOCULARS		PISTOLS		PISTOL SIG		M/T SETS		SIGETS DIAL		T.E. SCOPES		COMP. IRIS LENS		TELEPHONES		RIFLES	
	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R	L	R
2 A TK REGT	7	6	1	-					2	2	2	1								1	-							
2/4 FD REGT			1	-					2	2							1	-	1	-								
2/5 FD REGT	4	4															1	-										
2/6 FD REGT											1	-											1	-	1	-		
6 DIV CAV REGT	4	4	3	3					2	2			5	-	3	-												
2/3 MC BN	1	1	4	4					1	1																		
2/2 INF BN	10	10							19	12							1	-										
2/14 INF BN	12	12	1	1	1	1			4	4	2	2	1	-	1	1	2	-										
2/13 INF BN	5	5							10	8																		
2/27 INF BN	1	1							4	-			2	-									2	-	2	-		
2/31 INF BN	1	1			1	1			1	1							2	-										
2/33 INF BN	5	5	5	3	1	1			2	1														2	-			
2/25 INF BN	12	11							14	13	1	-	5	5									1	-				
2/3 INF BN	1	-							1	-	1	-	6	-														
TOD FORCE	7	7	3	3					1	1																		
TOTALS	70	67	16	14	3	3	-	-	63	47	7	3	19	5	4	1	7	-	1	-	1	-	4	-	5	-	150	150

25 PIRS:- 3 PRIMAVERES (Barrels & jackets damaged and need replacement), 1 barrel replacement.

L - Lost or destroyed
R - Replaced

APPX "F" TO A2 REPORT SYRIAN
ORGANIZATION

[illegible]

(2).

RECORD OF VEHICLES DESTROYED DURING TO ENEMY ACTION

UNITS.	DATE LOSS REPORTED	MOTORCYCLES	CARS DS	VANS 1/2 CWT	VANS 1/5 CWT	VANS 1 TON GS	VANS 1 TON 3/4 T	VANS 1 TON OFFICER	VANS 1 TON C/L	LORRIES 30 CWT	LORRIES 30 CWT KITCHEN	LORRIES 30 CWT WATER TANK	LORRIES 3 TON GS	TRACTORS ARTY NO 3	TRACTORS ARTY NO 5A	ARMoured OPS	CARRIERS	15 CWT MORTAR	2000 LB MORTAR	CVT - APVs
212 IND BTY RA	15 Jul													1						
2/27 BN	15 "				1									1			1			
2/18 BN	15 "				1															
TOTALS	-	29	1	-	13	6	2	-	-	2	-	-	5	2	-	1	11	1	1	7

LIGHT TANKS:

Destroyed by enemy action..... 1
 Damaged by enemy action and recovered. 17
 Replaced..... 7

SECRET

SUBJECT :- SECURITY ZONES - SYRIA.

WD
Military Section,
Spears Mission,
SYRIA.

SS/11/M.

Headquarters,
Br. Forces in Pal & T.J.

In accordance with the agreement made between Gen Wilson and Gen Catroux on 8th August, 1941 the F.F. Headquarters have issued instructions to their Delegates at Damascus, Aleppo, Lattakia and DEIR-EZ-ZOR of which a translated copy is attached.

Beyrouth.
21/8/41

??????

Lieut-Colonel
G.S.O.I.
Military Section.

Copy to : HQ 1 Australian Corps.

COPY OF INSTRUCTIONS

I have the honour to inform you that in the course of a conference held on the 8th August between the British and Free French High Commands, it was recognized that British Martial Law could no longer continue to be applied in the States of the Levant, as it affected the rights of French Sovereignty. This form of government and that of "L'etat de Siege" should immediately cease to be in force.

It was recognized, however, that in certain frontier zones the security of the allied armies must be assured in an unequivocal manner. The two commands agreed therefore to delimit these zones and define the duties of the Civil Authorities in relation to the Allied troops. I send you herewith the text that was drawn up for this purpose.

I notify you, that should it again become necessary to proclaim Martial Law or "L'etat de Siege" in Syria or the Lebanon, it could only be proclaimed by the authority controlling sovereignty and political power, that is to say by the Free French Delegation.

It is for you to inform the Military Command in your zone of the contents of this letter.

COPY

MESSAGE OUTWARDS

MOST SECRET

TO: EMPY

FROM: BECA

0 271

21

Secret (.) ref BECA Op Instn 31 Para 3 (c) (.) EMPY will recce the stream from the rd approx 175370 to the coast at 171368 to determine

- (a) is it a complete A Tk obstacle
- (b) is it an A Tk obstacle except for crossing places
- (c) if neither (a) nor (b) what work and mines are required to convert it into a complete A Tk obstacle
- (a) the report is required at the earliest possible date

Distn by G on 21 Aug to

GOC EGS G CE

IMMEDIATE

signed H.WELLS Lt-Col T00 1520

MESSAGE INWARDS

6/11/4

: MIDEAST rptd 1 Aust Corps Force HQ

FROM: Free French

FF 406

22

1st Div FFF now ceased to exist (.) (For KNOX SPEARS MISSION) (.)
replaced temporarily by 3 territorial commands NORTH SYRIA SOUTH SYRIA
& LEBANON with HQs at ALEPPO DAMASCUS & BEIRUT respectively (.)
Correspondence should be sent to HQ BEIRUT WEF 24 Aug

Distn by G on 23 Aug to:-
BGS Copy- to take up with
Force our relationship
with FF comds.

TOO 1050 THI 1120
System IN - Cipher
TOR 1845

G I A Q

513

AUSTRALIAN MATERIAL FORCE.

S E C R E T.

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
23 Aug 41.
G.699.

6 Div.
7 Aust Div.
Free French Div.

STATE OF TRAINING

1. Seven copies of a report in accordance with the att
pro forma will be rendered to this HQ by the fifth of each month.
2. This report is required so that GHQ LMF may be able to
judge fitness of all formations in the Middle East for various
types of campaigns.
3. The report will be the state as on the first of the month
commencing w.e.f. 1 Sep 41.

Camille H. G. for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Copies to:-

CCRA
CSC
G
I
A
Q
CE

DDST
DDMS
ADOS
DADCS
File
— War Diary

S E C R E T.

PRO FORMA SHOWING FITNESS FOR WAR

1. Formation or I.S. Unit
2. State of Equipment
 - (a) Weapons
 - (b) 'A' Vehicles
 - (c) 'B' Vehicles
 - (d) Other major items of G.1098 equipment deficient.
3. Fitness for Operations
 - (a) Guard duties only
 - (b) I.S. duties.
 - (c) Static Warfare, Second class enemy (Italians)
 - (d) Static Warfare, First class enemy (Germans)
 - (e) Mobile Ops
 - (f) Mountain Warfare
 - (g) Desert Warfare
 - (h) Combined Operations
 - (i) Names of any units in the formation which have been trained in emplaning and deplaning.
4. Remarks

Army Form C.2123.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUCTIONS

IN

dist 600 BGS CIAQ

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

OUT

Secret: Cipher

R393

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

AUSTCORPS repld 6 Div, General IRAQ

FROM

MILPAL

Originator's Number

SD/5

Date

25

In Reply to Number

MOST
SECRET

First	0	Select	one	inf	bde
of	6	Div	NOT	repeat	NOT
25	inf	bde	and	prepare	to
Head	By	road	at	short	notice
to	IRAQ	0	second	0	order
at	battle	bde	GHQ	Sig Sect	LFI
31	British	lines	0	Behind	0

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

ARMY FORM C-2128

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

2

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

Complete	G1099	equipment	bpt	and	amm.
will	be	taken	0	Four	0.
Report	in	bde	selected	by	immediate
signal	to	MIDEAST	repeat	MILPAL	0
To five	0	Remainder	6	div	be
prepared	below	this	bde	0	five
0	(Anti-tank?)	unit	if	required	to

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIKELY TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

ARMY FORM C-123

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

3
accompany will be notified later
severing 0 General LAVARACK has seen
0 Ack
for ✓
2115/25

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

Most Immediate

1600 GMT

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

1940

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

2155

Forms C-152/11, Wt. 34169/1796, 1,000M. pads. 15 /33. B.& S. Ltd. 51-5337.

MESSAGE FORM						Serial No.
IN					No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP
OUT						
(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)						
TO MIDHAST rptd MILPAL						
FROM AUSTCORPS			Originator's Number 0 308	Date 25	In Reply to Number Milpal/SD/5	
HOST	SECRET	(.)	16	rpt	16	
inf	bds	selected	to	MOVE	IRAQ	
(.)	ACK					
THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.		IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.		ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY IMMEDIATE		TIME OF ORIGIN 2240
SIGNED		(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)				T.H.I.
SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER
FORMS 42125/12, Wt. 24169/1790, 1,000m. page 12 / 32. E. & S. Ltd. 11-5137.						
						T.O.R.

ARMY FORM C-212R

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

1460

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

IBAN

Copy CR

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

BRCA

0-315

26

MOST SECRET

(.)

ref

BRCA

Op

Instn

SE

PARAS

1

and

6

Add

to

IBAN

responsibility station

T2

(.)

arrangements for

T2

will

COMMUNIC

Immediately

DISTRIBUTED by G on 26 Aug to -

GOC BGS G

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Forms C-212/11, Wt. 34169/1795, 1,000M. pads, 12 / 33. R.A. F. Ltd. 11-2337.

NAVY FORM C-2123

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

6/17

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

LAMP

FROM

0000

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

0-0000

00

0/0000

1	00	0000	(.)	0000	SECRET
2	000000	00	000000	Follows	(.)
3	000000	000000	(.)	000000	000000
4	000000	000000	000000	Alternative	000000
5	000000	(.)	000000	0000	000000
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

Signed

Signed

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Form C-2123/11. Wt. 36169/1798. 1,000M. pads. 12 /33. B.&S. Ltd. 31-5537.

ARMY FORM 63123

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

TO **IBEN NEJA** (ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM CHAT	Originator's Number 0 334	Date 28	In Reply to Number
------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------	--------------------

SECRET	(.)	div	conds	or	senior
reps	required	attend	one	day	demonstration
air	close	support	procedure	(.)	first
sand	model	4	Sep	CAIRO	second
outdoor	demonstration	10	Sep	HELEAN	(.)
details	later				

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY READER.	IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED, OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.	ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY IMPORTANT	TIME OF ORIGIN 1850
SIGNED	SIGNED CHUKWILL Lt-col	(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)	T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	T.O.R.

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
28 Aug 41.
G.748

NOTES ON AIR CO-OPERATION - SYRIA

The object is to design for the future a system which will work soundly and which is capable of meeting the factual rather than the theoretical allotment and capabilities of aircraft. It is easy to talk of what should be, or can be, but in most cases the hypotheses on which these are based are not correct. Only those in possession of the full facts as they exist at a given time can decide what is, and what is not, possible in the way of aircraft support.

- (1) A Sqn of x aircraft has, unfortunately, almost never got x aircraft fit to take the air - the figure is often only 60% of strength - this is the first major point to be noted.
- (2) No sqn yet encountered had the eqpt it should have to do its work effectively. Throughout the SYRIAN Campaign there was little tracer, and NO incendiary bullets were available, hence ground strafing lost a large part of its value and results. Nor were there any delay action bombs by which alone accurate pin-point bombing appears feasible in the face of opposition - in fact, without them zero-bombing is impossible.
- (3) Whilst it is elementary that air support should be given from aerodromes close to the HQ controlling them, no wishing will make aerodromes where they do not in fact exist, nor will it enable aircraft to use aerodromes dominated by the enemy.
- (4) Comms are a powerful limiting factor. Time is possibly the greatest obstacle to efficient co-operation. Between the time targets are selected and aircraft attack there is at present a minimum delay of 1 1/2 hrs for Fs and 2 hrs for Bs.
- (5) It is essential that aircraft should be allotted to the Army for its close support. The offrs who cmd it must be under cmd of the Army and not some sort of "allies" who please themselves.
- (6) Arty R in particular and Tac R pilots need a lot of tng. This can be got by working with Army formations in actual tng. The better one knows pilots the better usually the co-operation. Best results are got if they live with us. It is no good demanding a better Tac R or Arty R aircraft: at the moment there are none in the Empire. We have to make do with what we can get.
- (7) Air Force W/T sets worked badly, both - it is believed - because the sets were not very efficient and because the operators were not good. Had line NOT been available efficient air support could NOT have been given.
- (8) Army offrs need tng in uses and limitations of aircraft both as to what air can do, and particularly in the time that must elapse between the need arising and the aircraft arriving over the target. They must recognize clearly what is practical in the circumstances existing on the day in question and must understand what constitute suitable targets. (See Appx A for targets during SYRIAN Campaign). The need for combined tng in air co-operation is dealt with in para 21.
- (9) In the face of superiority or even near equality of aircraft I doubt whether continuous Tac R is feasible.
- (10) No dive bombers are available to use in IE. They can be replaced in part by bombers with delay action bombs (zero-bombing - see para 2). Such bombing should be used to give depth to the arty or on targets which we cannot otherwise hit. The danger of hitting our own tps if the target is closer than 1000 yds is great.

(11) One IO alone dealing with air photos cannot complete his work. He MUST be assisted by Svy personnel or a specially trained interpreter of air photos. In modern warfare the air photo requirements are continuous and very great. I consider an offr, a sgt and a pte are required to deal with all aspects of air interpretation and topographical details. This is not theory, but practical experience. Even the limited opportunities in the SYRIAN Campaign gave more photos than could be dealt with in the time.

(12) The greatest and most important enemies of the Army (and the Air Force) are enemy fighters. If they can be dealt with then enemy bombers cannot act, and ours can; similarly our Tac R, Photo R and ground strafing aircraft can also work in relative safety.

(13) There is great moral value in our fwd tps seeing our own aircraft go over them, even if they don't see the fighting. The more fighting they see the better, of course.

(14) Difficulty of indicating to our own aircraft where our fwd tps are. Air pilots need more tng as well as Army tps.

(15) Vulnerability. Aircraft much more vulnerable than arty, and less easily replaced. Economy in use is necessary so they must only be sent against the right target and at the right time.

(16) Air support is not entirely reliable. Repeatedly in SYRIA cloud, or enemy aircraft, prevented our getting the support we wanted. Time must elapse between two sorties by the same aircraft.

(17) Owing to delayed messages, enemy action, etc, etc, aircraft cannot usually guarantee to be over a target at a given moment. They should be given times between which they are required to bomb - or else "as soon as possible". The times given must be feasible times allowing for all factors.

(18) WT sets that can be man-loaded are essential for mountainous country to assist speedy close support by aircraft.

(19) It is impossible to make suitable allotments of aircraft until it is known what type, how many and under what conditions sqns are available. It is considered that the minimum allotment of AC Sqns is at the rate of one per Div and Corps.

For fighters and bombers the rate of allotment to the military f rces engaged in active operations should be :-

One F Sqn per Div and Corps
AND One B Sqn per Div.

This allows for casualties, and also for morale, for the fwd tps will see little of the aircraft under control of the Air Force for they fly high, being busy on strategic tasks. It also provides for Arty R and continuous Tac R with reliefs on the ground.

(20) The RAF were inclined to think that requests for air support sent through their ALOs were requests to them as RAF offr. This is incorrect. These RAF offr were there to assist the Army as advisers (except the Senior RAF offr at Corps who was a comd as well, but even he was under the Corps Comd). Attention is drawn to the fact that if demands for air support pass through RAF sigs (as recommended), it is the Army that is asking for support, and although it is transmitted through the RAF, it is for delivery to the Military Comd. After hearing the advice of the ALO the Military Comd then decides whether or not he can meet the request from resources under his own control or whether he should forward it to higher Military Authority for passing to RAF Authorities (vide GAF with Army in Fd. Sec 22 - 2.).

21. The need for the education of military comds in air co-operation is admitted, but the desired co-operation will never be obtained until the Air Force realize that they have just as much, and often more, to learn on the same subject. The Army has one great advantage in learning these lessons - they have always been accustomed to handling co-operating arms, such as arty.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

22 (i) In every campaign there should be issued, down to coy comds the types of targets that are regarded as "suitable", bearing in mind the country, the types and numbers of aircraft available, the amn posn, and the opposing aircraft. These conditions change, sometimes very rapidly, so that only those knowing the most facts can judge best. It must be realized that even suitable targets may not be able to be engaged for various reasons. Military comds must realize the limitations that exist.

(ii) Air support is NOT entirely reliable. Cloud, enemy action particularly by Fs, may prevent our aircraft either from carrying out their task or from carrying it out at the desired time.

(iii) The moral value of action by our aircraft, even when they hardly fire a shot or drop a bomb, may be very great both on our own tps and on the enemy's. This value is not fully realized by the Air Force.

(iv) So far there has been normally only about 60% of allotted aircraft strength available for duty on any day.

(v) There is a relatively large time lag between the time a target is selected by a fwd unit and the time aircraft can deal with that target. This time lag must be allowed for, but every effort must be made to reduce it. Some of it is due entirely to military causes.

(vi) The Air Force are providing the special channels for sending these messages calling for air support. Experience in SYRIA showed the RAF sets to be unsatisfactory and the operators to need a lot more tng before quick work would be possible.

(vii) Line comm to aerodromes used by AC Sqns is essential. It is desirable to have line to all aerodromes used by aircraft under Army control.

(viii) The Air Force must be prepared to operate from aerodromes as near as possible to the HQ under which they are working.

(ix) The Army must have placed under its cmd adequate aircraft. These should train with the army formations long before a campaign starts. The less they train together the less effective will be their co-operations and results.

(x) The targets, tasks, etc, of aircraft with the army are decided, after advice, by the military cmd, not by the ALO (vide EAF with Army in Fd Sec 22 - 2).

There is a need for properly trained A/C pilots. These men need a lot of tng and special selection. There seems to be a dearth of them at present, due to war conditions and rapid expansion.

(xi) A satisfactory method of indicating the posn of our fwd tps must be developed.

(xii) Photo R is a normal everyday requirement of the army. The necessary facilities must be under cmd of the army. The value of air photography to the army does NOT seem to be fully realized. In poorly mapped country demands will be very large, but almost invariably can be met if real co-operation exists.

(xiii) Corps HQ needs, and has asked for, additional staff to handle the interpretation of air photos and the indexing, etc, of topographical infm.

(xiv) To make close support effective the Air Force urgently needs:-

- (i) delay action bombs for zero bombing.
- (ii) incendiary amn for American weapons as well as Br.
- (iii) adequate tracer amn.

(xv) The army must recognize that enemy Fs are the most dangerous potential enemies. If they can be dealt with we will have superiority and all it means to the army. Without F support the enemy's other aircraft cannot operate efficiently by day.

(xvi) Courses in army co-operation are urgently needed. At these there must be as many Air Force as Army officers. Co-operation needs teaching to both services simultaneously. In the past the greatest errors have been made in thinking (or acting as if) co-operation was one-sided.

Character for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div	45	Q	1
6 Aust Div	45	GE	1
7 Aust Div	45	DDST	1
CCRA	5	ADOS	1
CRE C Tps	5	DADOS	1
CSO	2	Camp	1
E Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	1	APM	1
GOC	1		
BGS	1	For information -	
G	2		
GS (Air)	1	HQ BF P & TJ	4
I	1	HQ AIF (ME)	2
A	1	HQ AIF Base Area	2
		HQ AIF Reinft Depot	2

NOTES ON SUITABLE TARGETS - SYRIAN CAMPAIGN

We must understand that aircraft allotted to the army are to be used ONLY against suitable targets, or for moral effect which is often very great.

SUITABLE TARGETS FOR FIGHTERS (Tomahawks with American Armament).

Good results depend whether tracer and incendiary amn is available.

- (a) Concentrated tps, especially on the move, or those not deployed or in defensive posns.
- (b) Tpt, particularly that on the move; closed up tpt.
- (c) Aircraft on aerodromes.

As, however, Tomahawks are designed for air fighting only and have no armour against fire from the ground their use against stationary tps, or tpt, or against defensive posts, is likely to prove very expensive and will render less Fs available for other, better and more important targets.

- (d) Patrols to intercept enemy aircraft which appear regularly.
- (e) Sweeps to intercept enemy aircraft and to ground straff targets as in (a), (b) and (c). If however ground straffing is to be done careful arrangements for an "air umbrella" (F protection of those planes low down) are necessary.

Ground straffing of deployed tps has moral value only, but this may be great. Ground straffing of a bty posn may give good value but is likely to be costly.

Note - On one task west of DAMASCUS the Fs of 3 Sqn RAEF returned having fired only a few shots and, in their opinion, accomplished nothing. In fact the moral effect of their presence made French tanks (which were moving to counter attack) take cover for the duration of the flight, and stopped at least two enemy btys firing, for the crews stopped and took cover for fear of being straffed if they fired.

SUITABLE TARGETS FOR BOMBERS.

(Except in zero-bombing, bombs are seldom released under 7000 ft and bombers cannot operate unless it is clear our own tps are not in danger area).

- (a) Large concentrations of all sorts.
- (b) Forts.
- (c) Aerodrome buildings. (For aircraft ground straffing by Fs is better).
- (d) Dumps.
- (e) Enemy HQs, mostly for morale effect and with hope of cutting comms.
- (f) Btys, bridges, traffic blocks, comms etc. ONLY if zero bombing is possible. Moral effect may, however be very great.

The final decision as to what is to be bombed rests with the Military Comd.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET
HQ 1 Aust Corps
31 Aug 41
G. 786.

HQ P & T.J.

One aspect of the defence of Syria and the Lebanon which I would urge should receive early consideration is that of the maintenance of the civil population in case it should become necessary to stand an investment, particularly in the Lebanon area.

An estimate of the population now included in the general area TRIPOLI-DJEIDE-MERDJAYOUN-BEYROUTH places its number at approximately 900,000. The inclusion of DAMASCUS would add 300,000 to this total. To this, in case of invasion, a large addition would be made in the shape of refugees, and it seems unlikely that very much in the way of evacuation could be arranged; though this aspect of the question will presumably be studied.

It would probably be impracticable to arrange the storage of supplies for the civil population for any considerable time, as is being done in the case of the fighting forces allotted to operate within and from the area. In the Spring moreover, when any invasion of the country would be likely to begin, local supplies would presumably be low.

If evacuation of the population and storage of supplies are to be regarded as merely a partial solution of the problem it must be recognised that the LEBANON area will be unable to stand a complete investment, and it will be necessary to avoid complete investment or abandon the area. To abandon the area however, would merely remove the difficulty one step further South and would further jeopardise the defence of the SUEZ CANAL.

The above short examination of the problem emphasises the desirability of a solution by defence at the frontier or even further north. This may prove impossible, and it becomes necessary to examine the possibility of maintaining some degree of supply by sea and land, in addition to such evacuation and storage as may be found possible.

Supply by sea will be a question for examination by the naval and air commands which is doubtless receiving consideration.

By land it will almost certainly be entirely a question of roads, since it seems impossible to contemplate, even in the case of a partial investment, that the narrow gauge railway from the South to DAMASCUS will be usable.

As regards the roads the DERRAA-DAMASCUS Rd will presumably be unusable, as in the case of the railway. It may be possible to use the ROSH PINNA-QOUNEITRA-AARTOUZ road, at any rate for a time, particularly if a diversion via QATANA and YAAFOUR to about DIMAS, on the main DAMASCUS-BEYROUTH Road, is constructed.

Our main reliance, however, would have to be placed on the roads running N and S within the coastal corridor, (a) by the coast to BEYROUTH and TRIPOLI and (b) from ROSH PINNA via METULLA and MERDJAYOUN to the main DAMASCUS-BEYROUTH Rd about CHTAURA. The latter will necessitate the improvement of one or both of the roads leading from MERDJAYOUN to about CHTAURA.

I would strongly urge therefore that the problem be deliberately studied from this point of view i.e. the organisation of a two-road corridor, protected on the East by various obstacles which should be fairly easily defensible. I have not

had the time to reconnoitre the Eastern obstacles throughout their length, but they are more or less well known and the map gives a good deal of information, especially the 1/1,000,000 scale.

Looking at this it seems clear that the only tankable gap in the barriers guarding the coastal belt, from the LEBANONS (inclusive) down to the level of the Gulf of AKABA, is that between DAMASCUS and MESMIYE, where begins the lava belt, continued southwards by the JEBEL DRUZE and the southern, and very large, lava belt backed by the WADI SIRHA. West of these there are further tank obstacles in the shape of lakes HULA and LIBERIAS, like that round QOUNEITRA and MERDJAYOUN, mostly not tankable.

Thus there exists along the whole coast, from about TRIPOLI down, a well protected corridor which would not require much preparation to be tank-proof. It could not be held throughout its length, particularly against Infantry attack, but it should be "Blitz"-proof. Within the length of this corridor there are a fair number of aerodromes, which should make possible a proper air defence in depth.

Lt-Gen
Comd 1 Aust Corps.

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS

LOCATION STATEMENT (by Groups)
as at 2359 hrs 20 Jul 41

(1) HQ 1 Aust Corps and Units under Comd

HQ Units

Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY 138208
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	AR RAMA
1 Aust Corps Int Sec	ALEY
1 Aust Corps 'A' Security Sec	ALEY
1 Aust Corps AIL Sec	BAALBEK
E Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn -	
HQ and two pls	ALEY
Two pls	TIRE (PW cage)

Arty

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	ALEY
HQ 64 Med Regt	TAFAC
HQ 57 Lt AA Regt	ALEY

Engrs

2/14 Aust A Fd Coy	HIRBYA) NOT yet arrived -
2/3 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy	MUSEIRAT) still under comd
	6 Aust Div

Sigs

Det 1 Aust Corps Sigs & Det 13 Corps Sigs	ALEY
Det 1 Aust Corps Sigs & Det 13 Corps Sigs	BEYROUTH
Det 1 Aust Corps Sigs & Det 13 Corps Sigs	HOMS
57 Lt AA Regt Sig Sec (less dets)	ALEY

Inf

2/2 Aust Inf Bn	JULIS - NOT yet arrived -
	still under comd 6
	Aust Div

AASC

Det 1 Ech C T Sup Col	KHALDE 127206
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk	CHOUEIFAT 132209
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk	BERAGINI 133213
2 Aust Sup Per Sec	BATROUNE 145256
4 Aust Sup Per Sec	HOMS 237308
5 Aust Sup Per Sec	CHTUARA 163208
6 Aust Sup Per Sec	DALASCUS
543 Coy RASC	
5 Res LT Coy	HQ at French Customs House
	LAQOURA 164280
129 Res MT Coy (25 A Tk Bde	DE ESPEREY Baracks, BEYROUTH
Coy RASC)	

Medical

2/13 Aust Fd Amb (less one coy	AL MUJEIDAL
and one Lt Sec)	
One coy 2/13 Aust Fd Amb	EZ ZIB 160273
One lt sec 2/13 Aust Fd Amb	DERAA
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	146207
2 MAC	HQ at 139208
2/1 Aust CCS	NAZARETH
2/3 Aust CCS (less Lt Sec)	HAIFA (moving BEYROUTH shortly)
Lt Sec	AIN SOFAR

Medical cont'd

2 CCS	HAIFA
14 CCS	DAMASCUS
HADFIELD SPEARS CCS	DAMASCUS
3 Mob Bact Lab	HAIFA (moving DAMASCUS shortly)
1 Aust Mob Bact Lab	HAIFA (moving BEYROUTH shortly)

Ord

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop -	
4 Rec Sec (working with FFF)	DAMASCUS
2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less	
three Rec Secs)	Area 130210
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -	
3 Corps Sec	
1 Veh Res Sec	Area 130210
1 Cav Div Ord Fd Pk (less div sec)	
57 Lt AA Regt Wkshop Sec RAOC	
1 Aust L of C Rec Sec	
6 L of C Rec Sec	Area 130210

Pay

Det 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	ALEY
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Postal

Det 1 Aust Corps Postal Unit	ALEY
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Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less two secs)	ALEY
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Misc

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl	ALEY
1 Aust Corps Graves Registration	
and Enquiries Unit	HAIFA
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit (less det)	HERDJAYOUN (moving to
	BEYROUTH 21 Jul)
Det 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	HERDJAYOUN (moving to
	DAMASCUS 21 Jul)
HQ 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	13452108
7 Aust Div Reception Camp	NOT yet arrived
One Mob Met Unit	With HQ 7 Aust Div RAA

4 CAV BDE GP
(under direct comd HQ 1 Aust Corps)

HQ 4 Cav Bde	ALEPPO
Household Cav Regt)
ROYALS (less one sqn in EGYPT))
Warwicks Yeo)
Wilts Yeo (less one sqn in EGYPT))
237 Fd Bty RA (less one tp))
4 Bty 1 Aust A Tk Regt)
169 Lt AA Bty (less two tps))
One tp 2 CHESH Fd Sqn RE)
552 Coy RASC)
Det 8 Lt Fd Hyg Sec)
166 Lt Fd Amb)
2 Bde Gp Sec 1 Cav Div Ord Wkshop)	
One div sec 1 Cav Div Ord Fd Pk)	Present location not known
Det 1 Cav Div Postal Unit)

5 IND INF BDE GP (Corps Reserve)

HQ 5 Ind Inf Bde	QATANA
5 Ind Inf Bde A Tk Coy)	
18 Fd Coy S & M	QATANA area
1 RF	DAMASCUS (under comd 85 L of C
	Sub Area)

QATANA area

(a) HQ 7 Aust Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

BROUMANA 14012156

Arty

BROUMANA 14012156
Olive grove 13022088
" " 13042088
BIKFAYA area 14692195

13102104
13102104
13102104

Engrs

BRÜMANA 14012156
ANTELLIAS 13982205

Sigs

BEIT MERI 13812136
13302145

MG

HEMLAYA 14802225

AASC

BROUMANA 14012156
KHALDE area 12852080
South of DJOUNIEH 140227
CHEKA 15252655
SARAFENND

AAMC

) . With. 17 16322781
) Aust Inf Bde 16003995
) 16412745
 Inf Bde) EL QRAYE 14612074
 th 25 Aust Inf Bde)
 DJOUNIEH area 14122320
 AIN ALAQ 143221

Ord

BHANDOUN 145208
NE TRIPOLI 165280
13952270

BHANDOUN 145208
NE TRIPOLI 165280

<u>Pay</u>	7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	BROUMANA
<u>Postal</u>	7 Aust Div Postal Unit	BROUMANA
<u>Pro</u>	Three Secs 7 Aust Div Pro Coy	BIKFAYA area 14692195
	Two Secs 1 Aust Corps Pro Coy	DAMOUR.
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
	4 Cav Mob Vet Sec	DARB ES SIM
	7 Aust Div Emp Pl	BROUMANA
	7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	BROUMANA
	7 Aust Div Mob Laundry	-
	7 Aust Div Salvage Unit	DAMOUR

(b) 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	15922789
6 Aust Div Cav Regt (less 'A' & 'B' Sqns and four tps 'C' Sqn)	16422788
Two tps SC: Sqn	LATTAQUIE area
Two tps 'C' Sqn	16512739
2/5 Aust Fd Regt (less 9 Bty and 2 tps 10 Bty)	16412782
9 Aust Fd Bty	LATTAQUIE area
'D' & 'E' tps 10 Aust Fd Bty	16532743
170 Lt AA Bty (less two tps) (one tp moving to AQIR aerodrome)	15932788
One tp 171 Lt AA Bty	16482742
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy (less two secs)	16772801
One Sec	LATTAQUIE area
One Sec	16492743
Det Sigs 7 Aust Div	Att Bde HQ
2/3 Aust Inf Bn	16482742
2/5 " " "	East of LATTAQUIE 16003995.
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	16682799

(c) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde & 9 Pl Aust HQ	
Gd Bn	AIN SOFAR 14592069
2/4 Aust Fd Regt	SW of BAABDA 13142102
2/6 Aust Fd Coy	FALOURHA 15092109
Det Sigs 7 Aust Div	Att Bde HQ
2/14 Aust Inf Bn (less 'A', 'B' & 'C' Coys)	AIN ANOUB 13242061.
'A' Coy	AABADIYE 14012112
'B' Coy	BHAOUARA 13852062
'C' Coy	BDEDOUN 13502080
2/27 Aust Inf Bn (less 'A', 'B' & 'C' Coys)	HAMMANA 150209
'A' Coy	ANNTELIASS 13722206
'B' Coy	EL MTEINE 15142170
'C' Coy	DEIR HARF 14622125

(d) 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	AAMCHITE	14152465
'B' Sqn 6 Aust Div Cav Regt	141232	
2/6 Aust Fd Regt	14132317	
2/5 Aust Fd Coy	141232	
Det Sigs 7 Aust Div	Att Ede HQ	
2/25 Aust Inf Bn	Coastal Area	141232
2/31 " " "	" "	14132333
2/33 " " "	" "	14332404

(e) With BEYROUTH Force (under comd 84 L of C Sub Area.)

2/16 Aust Inf Bn	BEYROUTH (Caserne GEY)
'A' Sqn 6 Aust Div Cav Regt	BEYROUTH a��ro��me

(3) 6 DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 6 Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units -

HQ 6 Div	Caserne Gournaud BAALBEK
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AV

9 Aust Div Cav Regt	BAALBEK 193229
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Arty

HQ RA 6 Div	Caserne Gournaud BAALBEK
HQ 60 Fd Regt	BAALBEK
239 Bty (less one tp)	BAALBEK
HQ and 1 Bty 1 Aust A Tk Regt	BAALBEK 14152465
1 Independent A Tk Tp	"
One tp 170 Lt AA Bty	"
HQ 171 Lt AA Bty	"
One Tp 171 Lt AA Bty	MEZZE Aerodrome 141232
One tp 171 Lt AA Bty	RAYAK Aerodrome 14132333
	" " 14332404

Engrs

HQ RE 6 Div	Caserne Gournaud BAALBEK
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Sigs

6 Div Sigs (less dets)	Caserne Gournaud BAALBEK
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ASC

HQ ASC 6 Div	Caserne Gournaud BAALBEK
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AMC

'C' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	Caserne Gournaud BAALBEK
'D' Sec " " " "	HOMS-PALMYRA area
33 Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBEK
One Sec 7 HAC	HOMS

Ord

HQ 6 Div Ord Fd Pk	17052135
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Postal

6 Div Postal Unit (less dets)	HEDJAZ Ry Sta, DAMASCUS.
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Pro

HQ 6 Div Pro Coy & one sub-sec	Caserne Gournaud BAALBEK
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Miscellaneous

(b) 14 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 14 Inf Bde	ZAHLE
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	RAYAK Aerodrome.
3 Bty (less one tp) 1 Aust A Tk Regt	RAYAK Aerodrome
12 Fd Coy RE	CHTUARA 162208 (arrives ZAHLE 22 Jul)
1 Bedfs Herts	16482118
2 Black Watch	16512117
2 Y & L	17302140
A Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn	RAYAK Aerodrome
14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC	" "
173 Fd Amb	16162086
14 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk	New Hospital, ZAHLE
1 Independent Bde Wkshop	17052135
One sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	17322138
	16162086

(c) 16 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 16 Inf Bde	Maison de Commandement, HOMS
4 Fd Regt RA (less 766 Fd Bty)	239308
5 Aust A Tk Bty (less one tp)	239308
One tp 169 Lt AA Bty	239308
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy	342311
2 QUEENS	Ecole Militaire, HOMS
2 LEICESTERS (less two coys)	HAMA
Two coys	Citadel, HOMS
C Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn	240311
16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC	241306
215 Fd Amb (less det)	American School, HOMS
3 Independent Bde Wkshop	HOMS
One sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	Maison de Commandement, HOMS

PALMYRA Det (under comd 16 Inf Bde)

766 Fd Bty RA (4 Fd Regt)	PALMYRA 385289
One tp 5 Aust A Tk Bty	
One tp 169 Lt AA Bty	
Det 215 Fd Amb	
Det 1 Cav Div Pro Coy	

(d) 23 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 23 Inf Bde	15271974
2/9 Aust A Fd Regt	15722042
8 Aust A Tk Regt	15582012
One tp 170 Lt AA Bty	15722042
2 Fd Coy RE	15712027
1 DLI	15742041
4 BORDER Regt	15792055
11 E Czech Bn	15371973
23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC	15702086
189 Fd Amb	15181950
6 Independent Bde Wkshop	15332080
One sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	15271974

(5) FREE FRENCH DIVISION

HQ Free French Div
Circassian Cav
One Sqn Spahis
One Tank Coy
1 Bty Arty
2 Bty Arty
One A/Tk Coy
HQ 1re Bde
BM3
BM4
BIM
HQ 13me Bde
BM1
BM2
Legion
One Coy Marines
One Group Meharistes
Tpt Coy

DAMASCUS

DAMASCUS

DEIR ATIYE 246239
DOUMA 212181
QTAIFE 231200
DAMASCUS
SAID NAYA 210195

NEBEK 243230
DEIR ATIYE 246239
JAIRUD 244207
BEIRUT

H. Wells H.W.
28 Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div	5	ADOS	2
7 Aust Div	5	DADOS	1
4 Cav Bde	1	Pay	1
5 Ind Inf Bde	1	Postal	1
FFF	1	DAPM	1
CCRA	1	1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	1
CRE C Tps	1	Force HQ P & TJ	6
CSO	1	HQ AIF (ME)	3
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1	HQ AIF Base Area	2
HQ 1 Cav Div	3	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
84 L of C Sub Area	1	Aust LO GHQ (ME)	1
85 " " " "	1	Movement Control SYRIA	1
GOC	1	" " HAIFA	1
BGS	1	HAIFA Fortress Area	1
G	1	Army Post Office HAIFA	1
I	1	Maj Curtiss(C/- Aust Comforts	
A	1	Fund, Metropole Hotel,	
Q	3	BEYROUTH)	1
CE	1	Sig Office	2
DDST	3	File	1
DDMS	1	War Diary	2

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS

LOCATION STATEMENT (by Groups)
as at 2359 hrs 31 Jul 41

(1) HQ 1 Aust Corps and Units under Comd

HQ Units

Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	138208
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	138208
1 Aust Corps Int Sec	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec FSS	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps AIL Sec	BAALBEK	
'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn -		
HQ & 18, 19, 20 Pls	ALEY	13802070
17 Pl	ALEY	13752085

Arty

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
64 Med Regt	Olive Groves CHOUEIFATE	129208
Comp Svy Gp	Olive Groves	129208
(HQ F Sp Bty, S Rg Tp		
and F Sp Tp of 1 Aust		
Svy Regt)		

Engrs

2/14 Aust A Fd Coy	HIRBYA) NOT yet arrived - still
23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy	NUSEIRAT) under comd 6 Aust Div.

Sigs

Det 1 Aust Corps Sigs &	
Det 13 Corps Sigs	ALEY
Det 1 Aust Corps Sigs &	
Det 13 Corps Sigs	BEYROUTH
Det 1 Aust Corps Sigs &	
Det 13 Corps Sigs	HOMS

Inf

2/2 Aust Inf Bn	JULIS.	NOT yet arrived - still
		under comd 6 Aust Div.

AASC

Det 1 Ech Aust C T Sup Col.	KHALDE	127206
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk	CHCUEIFAT	132209
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk	BERAGINI	123213
2 Aust Sup Per Sec	BATROUNE	145256
4 Aust Sup Per Sec	HOMS	237308
5 Aust Sup Per Sec	CHTUARA	163208
6 Aust Sup Per Sec	ALEPPO	
543 Coy RASC	DAMASCUS	
5 Res MT Coy	HQ at French Customs House	
	LAQOURA	164280
129 Res MT Coy (25 Aust		
A. Tk Bde Coy RASC)	De ESPEREY Barracks, BEYROUTH.	
211 Med Bty RASC Sec)		
212 Med Bty RASC Sec)	CHOUEIFAT	132209

Medical

2/13 Aust Fd Amb (less one		
coy)	AL MUJEIDAL	
One Coy 2/13 Aust Fd Amb		
(forming Corps Rest Stn)	EZ ZIB	160273
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec		146207
2 MAC		HQ at 139208
2/1 Aust CCS	NAZARETH	
2/3 Aust CCS	Italian Hospital BEYROUTH	
2 CCS	HAIFA	
14 CCS	DAMASCUS	
HADFIELD SPEARS CCS	DAMASCUS	
1 Aust Mob Bact Lab	BEYROUTH (att 2/3 Aust CCS)	

Ord

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop -	BEYROUTH	
4 Rec Sec		
2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less	Area KHALDE	128207
three Rec Secs)		
2/1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -		
3 Corps Sec	KHALDE Area	128208
Details Res Sec	KHALDE Area	128207
3 Replacement Veh Sec	KHALDE Area	128207
1 Aust L of C Rec Sec	BARBARA	
6 L of C Rec Sec	KHALDE Area	129208
1 Bde Gp Sec 1 Cav Div		
Wkshop (working with FFF) MEZZE		

Pay

Det 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash	
Office	ALEY

Postal

Det 1 Aust Corps Postal	
Unit	ALEY

Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less	
two secs)	ALEY
Two Secs	BEYROUTH.

Misc

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps Graves Regis-		
tration & Enquiries		
Unit	HAIFA	
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit		
(less det)	BEYROUTH Area	
Det 1 Aust Corps Salvage		
Unit	DAMASCUS	
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp		131210
One Mob Met Unit	With HQ 7 Aust Div RAA	

4 CAV BDE GP

(under direct comd HQ 1 Aust Corps)

HQ 4 Cav Bde	Ecole Laique, ALEPPO.
Household Cav Regt (less	
'B' Sqn)	American University ALEPPO.
B Sqn Household Cav Regt	Parc d'Artillerie ALEPPO.
Royals (less three Sqn)	
(one in EGYPT)	West of NIRAB Aerodrome 286470.
A Sqn Royals	BAB 315491
B Sqn Royals	AFRINE 257507
R Wilts Yeo (less two Sqn)	
(One in PALESTINE)	West of NIRAB Aerodrome 286470
A Sqn R Wilts Yeo	AZAZ 273515
Warwicks Yeo	NIRAB Aerodrome 288470
237 Fd Bty RA less one tp	
(60 Fd Regt)	" " "
4 Aust A Tk Bty	" " "
One tp 2 CHESHIRE Fd Sqn	" " "
166 Lt Fd Amb	Hospital Albert Fournier ALEPPO.
Det 8 Fd Hyg Sec	" " "
One Div Sec 1 Cav Div Ord	
Fd Pk	Cie Miscte du Train ALEPPO.
2 Bde Gp Sec, 1 Cav Div	
Ord Wkshop	" " " " "
Sec 1 Cav Div Pro Sqn	Ecole Laique
Det 1 Cav Div Postal Unit	" "

1

5 IND INF BDE GP
 Moves to DEIR EZ ZOR - 4 Aug.
 Under Comd Force HQ from 0001 hrs 1 Aug

HQ 5 Ind Inf Bde	QATANA	18231660
5 Ind Inf Bde A Tk Coy	QATANA	18251660
18 Fd Coy S & M	QATANA	18161600
3/1 Punjab Regt	QATANA	18351600
4/6 Rajput Rifles	AARTOUZ	18841650
5 Ind Inf Bde Gp Composite		
Coy RIASC	QADEM	20051695
14 Ind Fd Amb	MEZZE	19871743
12 Ind Staging Sec (Medical)	QATANA Area	
17 Mob Wkshop Coy IAOC	MEZZE Area	19741717
5 Ind Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk)	QADEM	20051695
25 Ind Postal Unit)	

(2) 7 AUST DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 7 Aust Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 7 Aust Div, Int Sec	} BROUMANA	14012156
'C' Sec FSS, HQ C Coy &		
10 Pl Aust HQ GD Br.		

Arty

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012156
HQ 2 Aust A Tk Regt	BIKFAYA area	14492196
6 Bty, 2 Aust A Tk Regt	" "	14532191
7 Bty, 2 Aust A Tk Regt	" "	14652199

Engrs

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012156
25 Aust Fd Pk Coy	ANTELLIAS	13982200
2/5 Aust A Fd Coy (less two dets- one det allotted each 2/31 and 2/33 Aust Inf Bns)		1413231
2/6 Aust A Fd Coy	FALOURHA	15092100
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy (less two secs)		16772801
One Sec 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy	LATTAQUIE Area	15933985
One Sec 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy	TRIPOLI Area	16342779

Sigs

HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	BEIT MERI	13812136
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MG

2/3 Aust MG Bn (less A & C Coys)	MROUJ	152219
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AASC

HQ AASC 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012156
No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (7 Aust Div Amn Coy)	KHALDE Area	12852080
No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (7 Aust Div Pet Coy)	South of DJOUNIEH	140227
No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk & 3 Sub Pks Per Sec)	CHEKA	15252655
4 Pack Tpt Coy	KHALDE Area	

AAMC

HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	Italian Hospital TRIPOLI	16042700
HQ & B Coys 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	TRIPOLI	16312700
A Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	LATTAQUIE	159839
HQ Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb	EL GRAYE	145520

AAMC (Contd)

HQ and one Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	RHAZIR	144332
2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	AIN ALAQ	14302210

Ord

2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop -		
7 Rec Sec	BHAMDOUN	14522077
8 Rec Sec	E of TRIPOLI	16472775
9 Rec Sec		14152450
1 Aust Corps Ord Fd Pk -		
B Div Sec	BHAMDOUN (with 7 Aust Rec Sec)	
C Div Sec	E of TRIPOLI (with 8 Aust Rec Sec)	

Pay

7 Aust Div Cash Office	BROUMANA	14162161
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Postal

7 Aust Div Postal Unit	BROUMANA	14162161
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Pro

7 Aust Div Pro Coy	DHOUR CHOUEH	14802190
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Miscellaneous.

7 Aust Div Emp Pl	BROUMANA	
7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit		13002155
7 Aust Div Mob Laundry	BEYROUTH	13002155
	(Quartier FRANCHET DESPEREY)	
7 Aust Div Salvage Unit		13022089
7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp		15252710

(b) 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	TRIPOLI	15922789
RHQ 6 Aust Div Cav Regt (less 'A'		16422788

& 'B' Sqns and four Tps 'C' Sqn)

Two Tps 'C' Sqn	LATTAQUIE Area	15943988
Two Tps 'C' Sqn	TRIPOLI 16422777 and	16772801
	respectively.	

2/5 Aust Fd Regt (less 9 Bty and two tps 10 Bty)

9 Aust Fd Bty	LATTAQUIE Area	16412782
Two tps 10 Aust Fd Bty	ZAHORTA Area	16143997
	TRIPOLI Area	16362780

HQ 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

A Coy		16322785
B Coy		16362788
C Coy		16412782
D Coy		16382777
		16372776

HQ 2/5 Aust Inf Bn

HQ Coy	LATTAQUIE Area	16003995
A Coy		15943990
B Coy		16023997
C Coy		15943998
D Coy		15953987
		15983996

HQ 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn

A Coy	NE TRIPOLI	16642804
B and C Coys		16642806
D Coy		16662799
		16532801

(c) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde	AIN SOFAR	14592069
HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Regt	SW of BAABDA	13142102

2/14 Aust Inf Bn (less 'A', 'B' and 'C' Coys)

A Coy	AIN ANOUB	13242053
B Coy	AABADIYE	14012112
	BHAOUARA	13852062
C Coy	BDEDOUN	13502080

21 Aust Inf Bde Gp (Contd.)

2/27 Aust Inf Bn (less 'A', 'B' and 'C' Coys)	SW HAMMANA	14942089
A Coy	ANTILLES	13732209
B Coy	HAMMANA	15092093
C Coy	DEIR HARF	14622125

(d) 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	AAMCHITE	14152465
B Sqn 6 Aust Div Cav Regt		14102320
HQ 2/6 Aust Fd Regt		14152460
HQ 2/25 Aust Inf Bn		14102314
A & B Coys		14092314
C Coy		14092315
D Coy		14082316
HQ 2/31 Aust Inf Bn		14142333
A Coy		14162335
B Coy		14152337
C Coy		14162337
D Coy		14132333
HQ 2/33 Aust Inf Bn		14332396
A Coy		14332393
B Coy		14362396
C Coy		14352400
D Coy		14342395

(e) With BEYROUTH Force (under comd 84 L of C Sub Area)

A Sqn 6 Aust Div Cav Regt	STADE MUNICIPAL BEYROUTH	12862156
2/16 Aust Inf Bn	BEYROUTH (Caserne GEY)	12842178
A and B Coys	QUARTIER WEYGAND	13162178
C Coy	CASERNE JOFFRE	12732173
D Coy	PARC D'ARTILLERIE	12992162

(3) 6 DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 6 Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 6 Div, Int Sec and 279 Sec FSS (less dets)	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK	195228
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Cav

9 Aust Div Cav Regt	BAALBEK	19552285
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Arty

HQ RA 6 Div	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK	
HQ 60 Fd Regt	BAALBEK	195228
239 Bty (less one tp at EZRAA 267252)	BAALBEK	
HQ and 1 Bty 1 Aust A Tk Regt	BAALBEK	19272298
One Svy Tp 1 Aust Svy Regt	BAALBEK	195228

Engrs

HQ RE 6 Div	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK
219 Fd Pk Coy	RAYAK

Sigs

6 Div Sigs (less dets)	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK
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ASC

HQ RASC 6 Div	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK
1 Pack Tpt Coy	Arriving shortly.

AMC

'C' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK
33 Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBEK
3 Mob Bact Lab (alt 173 Fd Amb)	ZAHLE

Ord HQ 6 Div Ord Fd Pk RAYAK 17052135

Postal 6 Div Postal Unit Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK

Pro HQ 6 Div Pro Coy & one Sub sec Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK.

Miscellaneous
6 Div Salvage Unit C/o 85 L of C Sub Area, DAMASCUS
8 Mob Laundry DOUHLAR 197177

(b) 14 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 14 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS	ZAHLE	16522125
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt	RAYAK Aerodrome	175213
3 Bty (less one tp) 1 Aust		
A Tk Regt	RAYAK Aerodrome	175213
J & K Mtn Bty	TANAILL	163207
12 Fd Coy		16482118
1 Bedfs Herts		16512117
2 Black Watch		17302140
2 Y & L	RAYAK Aerodrome	175213
'A' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn	" "	175213
14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC	CHTAURA	16162086
173 Fd Amb	New Hospital, ZAHLE	
14 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk	ABLAH	17052135
1 Independent Bde Wkshop	RAYAK	17322138
One sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy		16162086

(c) 16 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 16 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS	Maison de Commandement, HOMS	
4 Fd Regt	HOMS	239308
5 Aust A Tk Bty	"	241309
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy	"	242311
2 Queens	Ecole Militaire, HOMS	
2 Leicesters (less two coys)	HAMA	245353
Two Coys	Citadel, HOMS	242308
'C' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn		240311
16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC	HOMS	241306
215 Fd Amb (less det)	American School, HOMS	
3 Independent Bde Wkshop	HOMS	
16 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk	HOMS Barracks	239308
One Sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	Maison de Commandement, HOMS	

PALMYRA Det (under comd 16 Inf Bde)

2 KORR)	
Det 215 Fd Amb)	
'D' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb)	PALMYRA 385289

(d) 23 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 23 Inf Bde	AAMIQ	15271974
HQ 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt	"	15281979
17 Bty 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt	KAISSAR	15722042
18 Bty 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt	"	15722042
8 Aust A Tk Bty	KAISSAR	15682018
2 Fd Coy		15712021
4 Border		15331978
1 DLI		15752095
11 E Czech Bn		15371973
23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC	HAMMANA	15202090
189 Fd Amb	KABB ELIAS	15762065
6 Independent Bde Wkshop		15332080
23 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk		1522080
One sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy		1521974

(5) FREE FRENCH DIVISION

HQ Free French Div
Circassian Cav
One Sqn Spahis
One Tank Coy
1 Bty Arty
2 Bty Arty
One A/Tk Coy
HQ 1re Bde
BM3
BIM
HQ 13me Bde
BM1
BM2
Legion
One Coy Marines
One Group Meharistes
Tpt Coy

DAMASCUS

DAMASCUS

DEIR ATIYE	246239
DEIR ATIYE	246239
DOUMA	212181
QTAIFE	231200
SAID NAYA	210195
NEBEK	243230
DEIR ATIYE	246239
JAIROUD	244207
BEYROUTH	

CMR R. H. Col for Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div
7 Aust Div
4 Cav Bde
5 Ind Inf Bde
FFF
CCRA
CRE C Tps
CSO
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps
HQ 1 Cav Div
84 L of C Sub Area
85 " " " "
GOC 1
BGS
G
I
A
Q
CE
DDST
DDMS
ADOS
DADOS

6	DADPS	2
6	Pay	1
1	DAPM	1
1	Hirings Offr, 1 Aust Corps	1
1	1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	1
1	1 Aust Ord Fd Depot	1
1	Fd Ord Depot BEYROUTH	1
1	2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	1
1	Force HQ P & TJ	6
3	HQ AIF (ME)	3
1	HQ AIF Base Area	2
1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
1	Aust LO GHQ (ME)	1
1	Movement Control SYRIA	1
1	" " HAIFA	1
1	HAIFA Fortress Area	1
1	Army Post Office HAIFA	1
3	Maj Curtiss (C/o Aust Comforts	
1	Fund, Metropole Hotel,	
3	BEYROUTH)	1
1	Sig Office	2
2	File	6
1	War Diary	2

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS

LOCATION STATEMENT (by Groups) as at 2359 hrs 19 Aug 41

(1) HQ 1 Aust Corps and Units under Comd

HQ Units

Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	138208
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	138208
1 Aust Corps Int Sec	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec FSS	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps AIL Sec	BAALBEK	
'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn -		
HQ & 18, 19, 20 Pls	ALEY	13802070
17 Pl	ALEY	13752085

Arty

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
64 Med Regt	Olive Groves CHOUEIFAT	13042088
1 Aust Svy Regt -		
HQ Comp Bty (HQ F Sp Bty)	Olive Grove	13052092
F Sp Tp)		
S Rg Tp)		18252225
Svy Sec)		

Engrs

HQ RAE 1 Aust C Tps	TELL KALLIAKH	200303
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy	QOUCEIR	229285
23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy	ALMA	16602770

Sigs

Det 1 Aust Corps Sigs & Det		
13 Corps Sigs	ALEY	
Det 13 Corps Sigs	BEYROUTH	
4 W/T Sec	ALEY	13502065

Inf

2/2 Aust Inf Bn	JULIS - NOT yet arrived - still under comd 6 Aust Div
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AASC

1 Aust Corps Mob School of Mech	BROUMANA (att 7 Aust Div)	
Det 1 Ech Aust C T Sup Col	KHALDE	127206
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk	CHOUEIFAT	132209
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk	BERAGINI	132212
2 Aust Sup Per Sec	BATROUNE	145256
4 Aust Sup Per Sec	HOMS	237308
5 Aust Sup Per Sec	CHTUARA	163208
6 Aust Sup Per Sec	ALEPPO	
543 Coy RASC	DAMASCUS	
5 Res MT Coy	HQ at French Customs House	
	LAQOURA	164280
25 Army Tk Bde Coy RASC.		
(129 Re: MT Coy)	BAIDA	118179
211 Med Bty RASC Sec)	CHOUEIFAT	132209
212 Med Bty RASC Sec)		
Det 2 AASC Sec AA Regt	BEIRUT	

Medical

2/13 Aust Fd Amb (less one coy)	DHOUR CHOUER	14802190
One Coy 2/13 Aust Fd Amb		
(forming Corps Rest Stn)	EZ ZIB	160273
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec		146207
1 Aust MAC - 'A' Sec	JAMHOUR	13552110
2 MAC		
2/1 Aust CCS (less one sec)	HQ at NAZARETH - moving to BEIRUT 17 Aug	139208
One Sec 2/1 Aust CCS		133213

Med (Contd)

- 2 -

2/3 Aust CCS	Italian Hospital BEYROUTH
HADFIELD SPEARS CCS	DAMASCUS
1 Aust Mob Bact Lab	BEYROUTH (att 2/3 Aust CCS)
2 Malaria Fd Lab	AIN SOFAR
Det 2 Aust Base Depot Med Stores	BEIRUT

Ord

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop -		
4 Rec Sec	Quartier Petain Barracks	BEYROUTH
2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less		
three Rec Secs)	Area KHALDE	128207
2/1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -		
3 Corps Sec	KHALDE Area	128208
Details Res Sec	KHALDE Area	128207
3 Replacement Veh Sec	KHALDE Area	128207
1 Aust L of C Rec Sec	BARBARA	
6 L of C Rec Sec	KHALDE Area	129208
1 Bde Gp Sec 1 Cav Div Wkshop		
(working with FFF)	MEZZE	

Pay

1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	ALEY
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Postal

1 Aust Corps Postal Unit	BEYROUTH
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Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less		
two secs)	ALEY	
Two Secs	BEYROUTH	

Misc

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps Graves Registration		
& Enquiries Unit	BEYROUTH	
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit		
(less det)	BEYROUTH Area	
Det 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	DAMASCUS	
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp		131210

(2) 7 AUST DIV & ATT TPS(a) HQ 7 Aust Div and Units under ComdHQ Units

HQ 7 Aust Div, Int Sec	}	BROUMANA	14012156
'C' Sec FSS, HQ C Coy & 10 Pl			
Aust HQ Gd Bn			

Arty

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012156
2 Aust A Tk Regt	BIKFAYA area	146219

Engrs

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012158
25 Aust Fd Pk Coy	ANTELLIAS	13982205
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy (less two secs)		16772801
One Sec 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy	LATTAQUIE Area	15933985
One Sec 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy	TRIPOLI Area	16342779
2/5 Aust Fd Coy		14382457
2/6 Aust Fd Coy	FALOURHA	15092109

Sigs

HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	BEIT MERI	13812136
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MG

2/3 Aust MG Bn (less A & C Coys)	MROUJ	152219
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AASC

HQ AASC 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012158
No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (7 Aust Div Amn Coy)	KHALDE Area	12852080
No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (7 Aust Div Pet Coy)	South of DJOUNIEH	140227
No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk & 3 Aust Sup Per Sec)	CHEKA	15252655
4 Pack Tpt Coy	KHALDE Area	

AAMC

HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	Italian Hospital TRIPOLI	16042777
HQ & B Coys 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	TRIPOLI	16312783
A Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	LATTAQUIE	15983996
HQ Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb		14412072
A Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb		13502068
B Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb	BIKFAYA	14572204
HQ and one Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	RHAZIR	144232
1 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit	TRIPOLI	!
2 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit	BEIT-CHEBAB	145221
2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	AIN ALAQ	14302210
7 Aust Div Rest Stn	KHALDE Area	12742077
7 Aust Dental Unit	DHOUR CHOUER	14802190
9 Aust Dental Unit (att A Coy 2/4 Fd Amb)	LATTAQUIE	15983996

Ord

2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop -		
7 Rec Sec	EL GRAYE	14522077
8 Rec Sec	East of TRIPOLI	16472775
9 Rec Sec		14152450
1 Aust Corps Ord Fd Pk -		
B Div Sec	EL GRAYE (with 7 Aust Rec Sec)	
C Div Sec	East of TRIPOLI (with 8 Aust Rec Sec)	

Pay

7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	BROUMANA	14162161
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Postal

7 Aust Div Postal Unit	BROUMANA	14162161
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Pro

7 Aust Div Pro Coy	DHOUR CHOUER	14802190
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Miscellaneous

7 Aust Div Emp Pl	BROUMANA	
7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	BEYROUTH	13002155
7 Aust Div Mob Laundry	BEYROUTH	13002155
	(Quartier FRANCHET DESPEREY)	
7 Aust Div Salvage Unit		13022089
7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp		15252710

(b) 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	TRIPOLI	15922789
RHQ 6 Aust Div Cav Regt	TRIPOLI Area	16422788
'C' Sqn (less one tp)	TRIPOLI Area	16422788
One Tp 'C' Sqn	LATTAQUIE Area	15943988
2/5 Aust Fd Regt (less 9 Bty and two tps 10 Bty)	TRIPOLI Area	16352781
9 Aust Fd Bty (less one Sec)	LATTAQUIE Area	16143997
One Sec 'B' Tp 9 Bty	Frontier	178142
Two Tps 10 Aust Fd Bty		16362780
2/3 Aust Inf Bn	TRIPOLI Area	16322782
2/5 Aust Inf Bn (less 'D' Coy)	LATTAQUIE Area	16003995
D Coy	Frontier Area	178439
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	NE TRIPOLI	16572803

(c) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde (and 9 Pl	AIN SOFAR	14592069
HQ Gd Bn)		
2/4 Aust Fd Regt	SW of BAABDA	13142102
2/14 Aust Inf Bn	AIN ANOUB	13242053
2/27 Aust Inf Bn (less D Coy)	SW HAMMANA	14942089
'D' Coy	ANTELLIAS	13732209

(d) 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde, 12 Pl HQ Gd Bn AAMCHITE		14152465
B Sqn 6 Aust Div Cav Regt		14102320
HQ 2/6 Aust Fd Regt (less 12 Bty		
at BAALBEK)	AAMCHITE Area	14152460
2/25 Aust Inf Bn		14102314
2/31 Aust Inf Bn		14142333
2/33 Aust Inf Bn		14332396

(e) With BEYROUTH Force (under comd 84 L of C Sub Area)

A Sqn 6 Aust Div Cav Regt	STADE MUNICIPAL BEYROUTH	12862156
2/16 Aust Inf Bn	BEYROUTH (Caserne GEY)	12842178
A & B Coys	QUARTIER WEYGAND	13162178
C Coy	CASERNE JOFFRE	12732173
D Coy	PARC D'ARTILLERIE	12992162

(3) 6 DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 6 Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 6 Div, Int Sec and 279 Sec FSS		
(less dets)	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK	195228

Cav

9 Aust Div Cav Regt	BAALBEK	19552285
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Arty

HQ RA 6 Div	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK	
HQ 60 Fd Regt	BAALBEK	195228
239 Bty (less one tp at		
EZRAA 267252)	BAALBEK	
HQ and 1 Bty 1 Aust A Tk Regt	BAALBEK	19272298
One Svy Tp 1 Aust Svy Regt	LABOUE	20752510
One Tp 237 Fd Bty RA	BAALBEK	194229
12 Fd Bty (2/6 Aust Fd Regt)	" " - for duty as depot Bty	
	until 23 Aug.	

Engrs

HQ RE 6 Div	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK	
219 Fd Pk Coy	RAYAK	175212
2 Fd Coy (less one Sec)	153208	
54 Fd Coy	BAALBEK	

Sigs

6 Div Sigs (less dets)	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK	
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ASC

HQ RASC 6 Div	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK	
1 Pack Tpt Coy	DAMASCUS	
2 AASC Sec AA Regt (Det)	RAYAK	

AMC

101 Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK	
33 Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBEK	
3 Mob Bact Lab (att 173 Fd Amb)	ZAHLE	
12 Anti-Malaria Control Unit	BAALBEK	

Ord

HQ 6 Div Ord Fd Pk

RAYAK Aerodrome

175213

Postal

6 Div Postal Unit

Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK

Pro

HQ 6 Div Pro Coy & one Sub Sec

Caserne Gournoud BAALBEK

Miscellaneous

6 Div Salvage Unit

BAALBEK

195228

8 Mob Laundry

DOUMMAR

197177

One Mob Meteor Unit

BAALBEK Range

(b) 14 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 14 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS

ZAHLE

16522125

2/11 Aust A Fd Regt

17872173

1 Aust A Tk Regt -

3 Bty (less one tp at SOUEIDA) RAYAK Aerodrome

175213

J & K Mtn Bty

16252060

12 Fd Coy

16482118

1 Bedfs Herts

RAYAK Aerodrome

175213

2 Black Watch

17302140

2 Y & L

15812096

'A' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn

RAYAK Aerodrome

175213

14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC

17562127

173 Fd Amb

New Hospital ZAHLE

1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop

RAYAK

17322138

One sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy

ZAHLE

16522125

(c) 16 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 16 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS

Maison de Commandement, HOMS

4 Fd Regt

BAALBEK range

2/15 Aust A Fd Coy

HOMS

242311

2 Queens

Ecole Militaire, HOMS

2 Leicesters (less two coys)

HAMA

245353

Two Coys

Citadel, HOMS

242308

C Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn

HOMS

240311

16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC

HOMS

241306

215 Fd Amb

Italian School, HOMS

239308

3 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop

HOMS

16 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk

HOMS Barracks

239308

One Sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy

Maison de Commandement, HOMS

PALMYRA Det (under comd 16 Inf Bde)

2 KORR

PALMYRA

385289

'D' Sec 14 Lt. Fd Amb

(d) 23 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 23 Inf Bde, 255 Sec FSS

ALEPPO

283478

'B' Sec 1 Aust Corps FSS

HQ 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt

ALEPPO

283473

17 Bty

ALEPPO

18 Bty

ALEPPO

HQ Royals

ALEPPO

283473

237 Bty (less one tp at BAALBEK)

NIRAB Aerodrome

288470

4 Aust A Tk Bty

NIRAB Aerodrome

288470

One Sec 2 Fd Coy

ALEPPO

283473

4 Border

ALEPPO Aerodrome

1 DLI

ALEPPO

283473

11 E Czechoslovak Bn

IDLIB

235442

23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC

ALEPPO

283473

189 Fd Amb

French Military Hosp ALEPPO

6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop

ALEPPO

283473

14 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk

ALEPPO

283473

23 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk

ALEPPO

15332080

One sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy

ALEPPO

283473

One Sec 205 Pro Coy

ALEPPO

283473

(5) FREE FRENCH DIVISION

HQ Free French Div	DAMASCUS	
Circassian Cav		
Two Sqns Spahis	DAMASCUS	
One Tank Coy	DAMASCUS	
1 Bty Arty	QABOUN	206178
2 Bty Arty (Mountain Bty)	QABOUN	
One A Tk Bty	QABOUN	
One A Tk Coy	MEZZE	
One Coy Engrs	DAMASCUS	
Sig Coy	DAMASCUS	
HQ lre Bde	DAMASCUS	
BM3	SOUEIDA	
BIM (less one det)	MAARABA	203181
One det BIM	BEYROUTH	
HQ 13me Bde	MEZZE	
BM1	DAMASCUS	
BM2	ALEPPO	
1er Bn Legion	BEYROUTH	
One Coy Fusiliers Marins	BEYROUTH	
Tpt Coy	DAMASCUS	
One Amb Unit (Groupe Sanitaire)	DAMASCUS	

Commandant Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div	6	DAPM	1
7 Aust Div	6	Hirings Offr 1 Aust Corps	1
	1	1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	1
	1	OC 268 Sec, FS Wing, Int Corps,	1
FFF	1	BEIRUT	1
CCRA	1	3 Replacement Veh Sec	3-1
CRE C Tps	1	F O D DAMASCUS	1
CSO	1	1 Aust Ord Fd Depot	1
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1	Fd Ord Depot BEYROUTH	1
HQ 1 Cav Div	3	2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	1
84 L of C Sub Area	1	Force HQ P & TJ	6
85 L of C Sub Area	1	HQ AIF (ME)	3
GOC	1	HQ AIF Base Area	2
BGS	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
G, I, A - each	1	Aust LO GHQ (ME)	1
	1	Movement Control (SYRIA)	4
Q	3	Movement Control HAIFA	1
CE	1	HAIFA Fortress Area	1
DDST	3	Army Post Office HAIFA	1
DDMS	1	Maj Curtiss (C/o Aust Comforts	
ADOS	2	Fund, Metropole Hotel,	
DADOS	1	BEYROUTH)	1
DADPS	2	Sig Office	2
Pay	1	File	6
		War Diary	2

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPSSECRETLOCATION STATEMENT (by Groups)
as at 2359 hrs 23 Aug 41(1) HQ 1 Aust Corps and Units under ComdHQ Units

Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	138208
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	138208
1 Aust Corps Int Sec	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec FSS	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps AIL Sec	BAALBEK	
'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn -		
HQ & 18, 19, 20 Pls	ALEY	13802070
17 Pl	ALEY	13752085

Arty

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
64 Med Regt	Olive Groves CHOUEIFAT	13042088
1 Aust Svy Regt -		
HQ Comp Bty (HQ F Sp Bty)	Olive Grove	13052092
F Sp Tp)		
S Rg Tp)	BAALBEK RANGE AREA	18252225
Svy Sec)		

Engrs

HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	TELL KALLIAKH	200303
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy	QOTCEIR	229285
2/15 Aust Fd Coy (two secs under		
comd HQ RAE 1 Aust C Tps - re-		
mainder reverts to comd CORPS		
from 6 Div on 25 Aug)	HOMS	242311
25 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy	ALMA	16602770

Sigs

1 Aust Corps Sigs (less 4 W/T		
Sec, 1 A Fd Regt Sec, and		
2 A Fd Regt Sec)	ALEY	138208
4 W/T Sec	ALEY	13502065

Inf

2/2 Aust Inf Bn	JULIS - NOT yet arrived - still	
	under comd 6 Aust Div	

AASC

1 Aust Corps Mob School of Mech		12852080
Det 1 Ech Aust C T Sup Col	KHALDE	127206
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk	CHOUEIFAT	132209
1 Aust Corps Pet Pk	BERAGINI	132212
2 Aust Sup Per Sec	BATROUNE	145256
4 Aust Sup Per Sec	HOMS	237308
5 Aust Sup Per Sec	CHTUARA	163208
6 Aust Sup Per Sec	ALEPPO	
543 Coy RASC	DAMASCUS	
5 Res MT Coy	HQ at French Customs House	
	NAQOURA	164280
25 Army Tk Bde Coy RASC		
(129 Res MT Coy)	SAIDA	118179
211 Med Bty RASC Sec)		
212 Med Bty RASC Sec)	CHOUEIFAT	132209
Det 2 AASC Sec AA Regt (att		
1 Aust Corps Pet Pk)	BERAGINI	132212

Medical

2/13 Aust Fd Amb (less one coy)	DHOUR CHOUER	14802190
One coy 2/13 Aust Fd Amb		
(forming Corps Rest Stn)	EZ ZIB	160273
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec		146207

Med (cont)

1 Aust MAC - 'A' Sec	JAMHOUR	13552110
2 MAC		HQ at 139268
2/1 Aust CCS	Mental Hospital	133213
2/3 Aust CCS	Italian Hospital BEYROUTH	
HADFIELD SPEARS CCS	Maurice Rothier Hospital BEYROUTH	
1 Aust Mob Bact Lab	BEYROUTH (att 2/3 Aust CCS)	
2 Malaria Fd Lab	AIN SOFAR	
Det 2 Aust Base Depot Med Stores	BEYROUTH	

Ord

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop -		
4 Rec Sec	Quartier Petain Barracks BEYROUTH	
2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less three Rec Secs)	Area KHALDE	128207
2/1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -		
3 Corps Sec	KHALDE Area	128208
Details Res Sec	KHALDE Area	128207
3 Replacement Veh Sec	KHALDE Area	128207
1 Aust L of C Rec Sec	BARBARA	
6 L of C Rec Sec	KHALDE Area	129208
1 Bde Gp Sec 1 Cav Div Wkshop (working with FFF)	MEZZE	

Pay

1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	ALEY	
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Postal

1 Aust Corps Postal Unit	BEYROUTH	
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Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less two secs)	ALEY	
Two secs	BEYROUTH	

Miscellaneous

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps Graves Registration & Enquiries Unit	BEYROUTH	
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit (less det)	BEYROUTH Area	
Det 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	DAMASCUS	
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp		131210
1 M. H. and Infm Sec	ALEY	

(2) 7 AUST DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 7 Aust Div Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 7 Aust Div, Int Sec		
'C' Sec FSS, HQ C Coy & 10 Pl	BROUMANA	14012156
Aust HQ Gd Bn		

Cav

7 Aust Div Cav Regt	EE BEDAQUI	16422788
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Arty

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012156
2 Aust A Tk Regt	BIKFAYA Area	14692195
One Svy Tp 1 Aust Svy Regt	KHMAILA	167276

Engrs

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012158
25 Aust Fd Pk Coy	ANTELLIAS Area	13982205
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy (less two secs)		16342775
One Sec 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy	LATTAQUIE Area	15933985
One Sec 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy	TRIPOLI Area	16342779
2/5 Aust Fd Coy		14382457
2/6 Aust Fd Coy	FALOURHA	15092109

Sigs

HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	BEIT MERI	13812136
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MG
2/3 Aust MG Bn (less 'A' & 'C' Coys) MROUJ 152219

AASC
HQ AASC 7 Aust Div BROUMANA 14012158
No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div
(7 Aust Div Amn Coy) KHALDE Area 12852080
No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div
(7 Aust Div Pet Coy) South of DJOUNIEH 140227
No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div
(3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn
Pk & 3 Aust Sup Per Sec) CHEKA 15252655
4 Pack Tpt Coy (less two secs
in 25 Aust Inf Bde Area) KHALDE Area

AAMC
HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Amb Italian Hospital TRIPOLI 16042777
HQ & B Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb TRIPOLI 16312783
A Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb LATTAQUIE 15983996
HQ Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb 14412072
A Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb 13502068
B Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb BIKFAYA 14572204
HQ and one sec 14 Lt Fd Amb RHAZIR 144232
1 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit TRIPOLI 145221
2 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit BEIT CHEBAB
2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec AIN ALAQ 14302210
7 Aust Dental Unit DHOUR CHOUER 14802190
9 Aust Dental Unit (att 'A' Coy
2/4 Fd Amb) LATTAQUIE 15983996

Ord
2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop -
7 Rec Sec EL GRAYE 14522077
8 Rec Sec East of TRIPOLI 16472775
9 Rec Sec 14152450
1 Aust Corps Ord Fd Pk -
B Div Sec EL GRAYE (with 7 Aust Rec Sec)
C Div Sec East of TRIPOLI (with 8 Aust Rec Sec)

Pay
7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office BROUMANA 14162161

Postal
7 Aust Div Postal Unit BROUMANA 14162161

Pro
7 Aust Div Pro Coy DHOUR CHOUER 14802190

Miscellaneous
7 Aust Div Emp Pl BROUMANA
7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit BEYROUTH 13002155
7 Aust Div Mob Laundry and BEYFOUTH 13002155
Fwd Decontamination Unit (Quartier FRANCHET DESPEREY)
7 Aust Div Salvage Unit 13022089
7 Aust Div Rest Camp KHALDE Area 12742077
7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp 15252710
3 M. H. and Infm Sec BROUMANA

(b) 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde ELMINA 15922789
2/5 Aust Fd Regt (less 9 Bty
and two tps 10 Bty) TRIPOLI Area 16352781
9 Aust Fd Bty (less 'A' Tp) LATTAQUIE Area 16352781
'A' Tp 9 Bty KASSAB 178442
Two Tps 10 Aust Fd Bty 16362780
2/3 Aust Inf Bn TRIPOLI Area 16322782
2/5 Aust Inf Bn (less 'D' Coy) LATTAQUIE Area 16003995
'D' Coy Frontier Area 178439
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn NE TRIPOLI 16572803

(c) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde (and 9 Pl HQ Gd Bn)	AIN SOFAR	14592069
2/4 Aust Fd Regt (less 7 Bty at BAALBEK)	SW of BAABDA	13142102
2/14 Aust Inf Bn	AIN ANOUB	13242052
2/27 Aust Inf Bn (less 'D' Coy)	SW HAMMANA	14942089
'D' Coy	ANTELLIAS	13732209

(d) 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde, 12 Pl Gd Bn AAMCHITE		14152465
HQ 2/6 Aust Fd Regt (less 12 Bty at BAALBEK)	AAMCHITE Area	14152460
2/25 Aust Inf Bn		14102314
2/31 Aust Inf Bn		14142333
2/33 Aust Inf Bn		14532396

Two secs 4 Pack Tpt Coy
(e) With BEYROUTH Force (under comd 84 L of C Sub-Area)

2/16 Aust Inf Bn	BEYROUTH (Caserne Gey)	12842178
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(3) 6 DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 6 Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 6 Div, Int Sec and 279 Sec FSS (less dets)	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
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Cav

9 Aust Div Cav Regt	BAALBEK	19552285
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Arty

HQ RA 6 Div	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
HQ 60 Fd Regt	BAALBEK	195228
237 Fd Bty RA	BAALBEK	194229
239 Fd Bty RA (less one tp at SOUEIDA)	BAALBEK	195228
HQ 1 Aust A Tk Regt		
1 Bty		
1 Tp 2 Bty	BAALBEK	19272298
4 Bty		
2/7 Aust Fd Bty (2/4 Aust Fd Regt)	ALBEK (for arty range practice)	18652235
2/12 Aust Fd Bty (2/6 Aust Fd Regt)	186224 - for duty as depot Bty	

Engrs

HQ RE 6 Div	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
219 Fd Pk Coy	RAYAK	175212
2 Fd Coy (less one Sec)		153208
54 Fd Coy	BAALBEK	195228

Sigs

6 Div Sigs (less dets)	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
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ASC

HQ RASC 6 Div	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
1 Pack Tpt Coy		16702010
2 AASC Sec AA Regt (Det)	RAYAK	

AMC

'C' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
33 Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBEK	195228
3 Mob Bact Lab (att 173 Fd Amb)	ZAHLE	
12 Anti-Malarial Control Unit	BAALBEK	195228

<u>Ord</u>		
HQ 6 Div Ord Fd Pk	RAYAK	178215
<u>Postal</u>		
6 Div Postal Unit	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
<u>Pro</u>		
HQ 6 Div Pro Coy & one Sub-sec	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
<u>Miscellaneous</u>		
6 Div Salvage Unit	BAALBEK	195228
8 Mob Laundry	DOUMMAR	197177
One Mob Meteor Unit	BAALBEK Range	186224
19 Mob Bath Unit	RAYAK (att 14 Inf Bde)	

(b) 14 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 14 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS ZAHLE		16522125
HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt and 1 A Fd		
Regt Sig Sec		
21 Bty		18162199
22 Bty		
1 Aust A Tk Regt -		
3 Bty (less one tp at SOUEIDA)		17152125
J & K Mtn Bty	TANAIL	16252060
12 Fd Coy		16482118
1 Bedfs Herts		170212
2 Black Watch	BOUARICH	153209
2 Y & L	TALIA	185222
'A' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn		170213
14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC	CHTAURA	16162086
173 Fd Amb	New Hospital ZAHLE	165212
1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop		15812086
One sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	ZAHLE	16522125

(c) 16 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 16 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS Maison de Commandement, HOMS	242506
HQ 4 Fd Regt	
4/14 Bty (less one tp at SOUEIDA)	BAALBEK range
7/66 Bty	
2 Queens	Ecole Militaire, HOMS
2 Leicesters	HAMA
'C' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn	
16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC	
215 Fd Amb	Italian School, HOMS
3 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop	HOMS Station
16 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk	HOMS Barracks
One Sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	Maison de Commandement, HOMS

PALMYRA Det (under comd 16 Inf Bde)

2 KORR	
'D' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	PALMYRA

(d) 23 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 23 Inf Bde, 255 Sec FSS	ALEPIO	283475
'B' Sec 1 Aust Corps FSS		
HQ 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt and 2 A		
A Fd Regt Sig Sec	ALEPIO	285473
17 Bty		
18 Bty		
HQ Royals	ALEPIO	283473
One sec 2 Fd Coy	AL EPIO	283473
4 Border	ALEPIO Aerodrome	
1 DLI	ALEPIO	283473

23 Inf Bde Gp (Contd)

11 E Czechoslovak Bn	IDLIB	235442
23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC	ALEPPO	283473
189 Fd Amb	French Military Hosp ALEPPO.	
6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop	ALEPPO	283473
23 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pl	ALEPPO	283473
One sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	ALEPPO	283473
One Sec 205 Pro Coy	ALEPPO	283473

(5) FREE FRENCH DIVISION

HQ Free French Div	DAMASCUS	
Circassian Cav		
Two Sqns Spahis	DAMASCUS	
One Tank Coy	DAMASCUS	
1 Bty Arty	QABOUN	206178
2 Bty Arty (Mountain Bty)	QABOUN	
One A Tk Bty	QABOUN	
One A Tk Coy	MEZZE	
One Coy Engrs	DAMASCUS	
Sig Coy	DAMASCUS	
HQ 1re Bde	DAMASCUS	
BM3	SCUEIDA	
BIM (less one coy at TRIPOLI)	MAARABA	203181
One det BIM	BEYROUTH	
HQ 13me Bde	MEZZE	
BM1	DAMASCUS	
BM2	ALEPPO	
1re Bn Legion	BEYROUTH	
One Coy Fusiliers Marins	BEYROUTH	
Tpt Coy	DAMASCUS	
One Amb Unit (Groupe Sante Divisionnaire)	DAMASCUS	
New Caledonian Pacific Bn	DAMASCUS	

NOTE - 1 Div FFF ceased to exist w.e.f. 24 Aug; and is replaced temporarily by three territorial comds:

- | | |
|-----------------|----------------|
| (a) NORTH SYRIA | HQ at ALEPPO |
| (b) SOUTH SYRIA | HQ at DAMASCUS |
| (c) LEBANON | HQ at BEYROUTH |

Allocation of units to these comds is not yet known.

H. W. 11/62
Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div	6	3 Replacement Veh Sec	1
7 Aust Div	6	2 Aust Adv Ord Depot	1
FFF, BEYROUTH	1	3 Adv Ord Depot	4
CCRA	1	FW Ord Depot DAMASCUS	1
CRE C Tps	1	1 Aust Ord Fd Depot	1
CSO	1	Fd Ord Depot BEYROUTH	1
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1	2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	1
HQ 10 Armd Div	3	Force HQ P & TJ	6
84 L of C Sub Area	1	HQ AIF (ME)	3
85 L of C Sub Area	1	HQ AIF Base Area	2
GOC	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
BGS	1	Aust LG GHQ (ME)	1
G, I, A - each	1	Movement Control BEYROUTH	1
SLO	1	Movement Control TRIPOLI	1
Q	3	Movement Control HAIFA	1
CE	1	RTO RAYAK	1
DDST	3	RTO HOMS	1
DDMS	1	RTO ALEPPO	1
DADH	1	HAIFA Fortress Area	1
DADCS	2	Army Post Office HAIFA	1
DADCS	1	Maj Curtiss (C/o Aust Comforts	
DADPS	2	Fund. Metropole Hotel,	
Pay	1	BEYROUTH)	1
DAPM	1	Sig Office	2
Hirings Offr 1 Aust Corps	1	File	6
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	1	War Diary	2
1 M.H. and Infm Sec	1		
CG 268 Sec, FS Wing, Int Corps,	1		
BEYROUTH			

W.D

SECRET.

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS

LOCATION STATEMENT (by Groups)
as at 2359 hrs 30 Aug 41

(1) HQ 1 Aust Corps and Units under Comd

HQ UNITS

Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	138208
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	138208
1 Aust Corps Int Sec	ALEY	138208
1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec FSS	ALEY	138208
1 Aust Corps AIL Sec	BAALBEK	195228
'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn -		
HQ & 18, 19, 20 Pls	ALEY	13802070
17 Pl	ALEY	13752085

Arty

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
64 Med Regt	Olive Groves CHOUEIFAT	13042088
2/1 Aust Svy Regt -		
HQ Comp Bty (HQ F Sp Bty)	Olive Grove	13052092
F Sp Tp)		
S Rg Tp)	BAALBEK RANGE AREA	18252225
Svy Sec)		

Engrs

HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	138208
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy	ALEPPO	16342775
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy	QOUCEIR	229285
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy	HOMS	242311
23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy	ALMA	16602770

Sigs

1 Aust Corps Sigs (less 4 W/T		
Sec, 1 A Fd Regt Sec, and		
2 A Fd Regt Sec)	ALEY	138208
4 W/T Sec	ALEY	13502065

AASC

1 Aust Corps Mob School of Mech	DJOUNIEH	140227
Det 1 Fch Aust C T Sup Col	KHALDE	127206
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk	CHOUEIFAT	132209
1 Aust Corps Pet Pk	BERAGINI	132212
2 Aust Sup Per Sec	BATROUNE	145256
4 Aust Sup Per Sec	HOMS	237308
5 Aust Sup Per Sec	CHTUARA	163208
6 Aust Sup Per Sec	ALEPPO	
25 Army Tk Bde Coy RASC		
(129 Res MT Coy)	SAIDA	118179
211 Med Bty RASC Sec)		
212 Med Bty RASC Sec)	CHOUEIFAT	132209
Det 2 AASC Sec AA Regt (att		
1 Aust Corps Pet Pk)	BERAGINI	132212
Det 2 AASC Sec AA Regt	RAYAK	

Medical

2/13 Aust Fd Amb	DHOUR CHOUER	14802190
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec		146207
1 Aust MAC - 'A' Sec	JAMHOUR	13552110
HQ 2 MAC		139208
2/1 Aust CCS	Mental Hospital	133213
2/3 Aust CCS	Italian Hospital BEYROUTH	
HADFIELD SPEARS CCS	Maurice Rothier Hospital BEYROUTH	
1 Aust Mob Bact Lab	BEYROUTH (att 2/3 Aust CCS)	
2 Malaria Fd Lab	AIN SOFAR	
Det 2 Aust Base Depot Med	BEYROUTH	
Stores		

Ord

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop -	Qartier Petain Barracks BEYROUTH	
4 Rec Sec		
5 - 5 Rec Sec (att 2/3 Aust A		
A Fd Wkshop)	Area KHALDE	128207
2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less		
three Rec Secs)	Area KHALDE	128207
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -		
3 Corps Sec	KHALDE Area	128208
Details Res Sec	KHALDE Area	128207
3 Replacement Veh Sec	KHALDE Area	128207
1 Aust L of C Rec Sec	BARBARA	
6 L of C Rec Sec	KHALDE Area	129208
1 Bde Gp Sec 1 Cav Div Wkshop		
(working with FFF)	MEZZE	

Pay

1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	ALEY
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Postal

1 Aust Corps Postal Unit	BEYROUTH
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Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less	
two secs)	ALEY
Two Secs	BEYROUTH

Miscellaneous

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl	ALEY	
1 Aust Corps Graves Registration		
& Enquiries Unit	DAMASCUS	
(less one Sec at BEYROUTH)		
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit		
(less det)	BEYROUTH Area	13012157
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	DAMASCUS	
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp		13152105
1 M.H. and Infm Sec	ALEY	

(2) 7 AUST DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 7 Aust Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 7 Aust Div, Int Sec		
'C' Sec FSS, HQ C Coy &	BROUMANA	14012156
10 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn		

Cav

7 Aust Div Cav Regt	EL BEDAQUI	16422788
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Arty

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012156
2 Aust A Tk Regt	BIKFAYA Area	14692195
One Svy Tp 1 Aust Svy Regt	KHMAILA	16772749

Engrs

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012158
25 Aust Fd Pk Coy	ANTELLIAS Area	13982205
2/5 Aust Fd Coy (less one sec)		14382457
One Sec 2/5 Aust Fd Coy		16342775
2/6 Aust Fd Coy	FALOURHA	15092109

Sigs

HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	BEIT MERI	13812136
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MG

2/3 Aust MG Bn (less 'A' &	MROUJ	152219
'C' Coys)		

AASC

HQ AASC 7 Aust Div	BROUMANA	14012158
No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (7 Aust Div Amn Coy)	KHALDE Area	12852080
No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (7 Aust Div Pet Coy)	South of DJOUNIEH	140227
No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk & 3 Aust Sup Per Sec)	CHEKA	15252655
4 Pack Tpt Coy (less two secs) in 25 Aust Inf Bde Area	KHALDE Area	

AAMC

HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	Italian Hospital TRIPOLI	16042777
HQ & B Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	TRIPOLI	16312783
A Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb	LATTAQUIE	15983996
HQ Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb		14412072
A Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb		13502068
B Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb	BIKFAYA	14572204
HQ and one sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	RHAZIR	144232
1 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit	TRIPOLI	
2 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit	BEIT CHEBAB	145221
2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	AIN ALAQ	14302210
7 Aust Dental Unit	DHOUR CHOUER	14802190
9 Aust Dental Unit (att 'A' Coy 2/4 Fd Amb)	LATTAQUIE	15983996

Ord

2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop -		
7 Rec Sec	EL GRAYE	14522077
8 Rec Sec	East of TRIPOLI	16472775
9 Rec Sec	AAMCHITE	14152450
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -		
A Div Sec	AAMCHITE (with 9 Aust Rec Sec)	
B Div	EL GRAYE (with 7 Aust Rec Sec)	
C Div Sec	East of TRIPOLI (with 8 Aust Rec Sec)	

Pay

7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	BROUMANA	14162161
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Postal

7 Aust Div Postal Unit	BROUMANA	14162161
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Pro

7 Aust Div Pro Coy	DHOUR CHOUER	14802190
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Miscellaneous

7 Aust Div Emp Pl	BROUMANA	
7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	BEYROUTH	13002155
7 Aust Div Mob Laundry and Fwd Decontamination Unit	BEYROUTH (Quartier FRANCHET DESPEREY)	13002155
7 Aust Div Salvage Unit		13022089
7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp		15252710
3 M.H. and Infm Sec	BROUMANA	

(b) 17 Aust Inf Bde Gr

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	EL MINA	15922789
HQ 2/5 Aust Fd Regt	TRIPOLI Area	16352781
9 Aust Fd Bty	FRONTIER	170396
10 " " "		
'D' tp	TRIPOLI Area	16362780
'E' tp	LATTAQUIE Area	163397
2/3 Aust Inf Bn	TRIPOLI Area	16322782
2/5 Aust Inf Bn less 'D' Coy	LATTAQUIE Area	16003995
'D' Coy	FRONTIER Area	178439
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	NE TRIPOLI	16572803

(c) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde (and 9 pl Aust		
HQ Gd Bn)	AIN SOFAR	14592069
2/4 Aust Fd Regt	SW of BAAEDA	13142102
2/14 Aust Inf Bn	AIN ANOUB	13242053
2/27 Aust Inf Bn (less 'B'		
Coy)	SW HAMKANA	14942089
'B' Coy	ANTELLIAS	13732212

(d) 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp

	Aust HQ	
HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde, 12 Pl/Gd Bn	AAMCHITE	14152465
2/6 Aust Fd Regt	DERKOUCHE	21774485
2/25 Aust Inf Bn		14102314
2/31 Aust Inf Bn	1120	14282524
2/33 Aust Inf Bn	1	14332396

(e) With BEYROUTH Force (under comd 84 L of C Sub-Area)

2/16 Aust Inf Bn	BEYROUTH (Caserne Gey)	12842178.
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(3) 6 DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 6 Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 6 Div, Int Sec and 279 Sec		
FSS (less dets)	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228

Cav

9 Aust Div Cav Regt	BAALBEK	19552285
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Arty

HQ RA 6 Div	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
HQ 60 Fd Regt	BAALBEK	195228
237 Fd Bty	BAALBEK	194229
239 Fd Bty	BAALBEK	195228
HQ 1 Aust A Tk Regt		
1 Bty	BAALBEK	19272298
1 Tp 2 Bty		
4 Bty		

Engrs

HQ RE 6 Div	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
219 Fd Pk Coy	RAYAK	175212
2 Fd Coy (less one Sec)		153208
54 Fd Coy	BAALBEK	195228

Sigs

6 Div Sigs (less dets)	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
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ASC

HQ RASC 6 Div	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
1 Pack Tpt Coy		16702010

AMC

'C' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
33 Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBEK	195228
3 Mob Bact Lab (att 173 Fd Amb)	ZAHLE	165212
12 Anti-Malarial Control Unit	BAALBEK	195228

Ord

HQ 6 Div Ord Fd Pk	RAYAK	178215
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Postal

6 Div Postal Unit	Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK	195228
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Pro.

HQ 6 Div Pro Coy & one Sub-sec Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK 195228

Miscellaneous

6 Div Salvage Unit	BAALBEK	195228
8 Mob Laundry	DOUMAR	197177
One Mob Meteor Unit	BAALBEK Range	186224
19 Mob Bath Unit	(Att 14 Inf Bde)	17362138

(b) 14 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 14 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS	ZAHLE	16522125
HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt and)		
1 A Fd Regt Sig Sec)		18162199
21 Bty)		
22 Bty)		
1 Aust A Tk Regt -		
3 Bty (less one tp at SOUEIDA)		17752125
J & K Mtn Bty	TANIAL	16252060
12 Fd Coy		16482118
1 Bedfs Herts		170212
2 Black Watch		14672125
2 Y & L	TALIA Area	183221
'A' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn		16512117
14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC		17562127
173 Fd Amb	New Hospital ZAHLE	165212
1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop		17982174
One Sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	ZAHLE	16522125

(c) 16 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 16 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS	Maison de Commandement, HOMS	242308
HQ 4 Fd Regt	HOMS	
4/14 Bty (less one tp at SOUEIDA)	BAALBEK Range	
	(for duty as depot Bty)	186224
7/66 Bty	HOMS	
2 Queens	Ecole Militaire, HOMS	242308
2 Leicesters	HAMA	245353
'C' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn	HOMS	240311
16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC	HOMS	241306
215 Fd Amb	Italian School, HOMS	239308
3 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop	HOMS Ry Station	239308
16 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk	HOMS Barracks	239308
One Sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	Maison de Commandement, HOMS	

FALMYRA Det (under comd 16 Inf Bde)

2 Kings Own)		
'D' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb)	FALMYRA	385289

(d) 23 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 23 Inf Bde, 255 Sec FSS)	ALEPPO	283473
'B' Sec 1 Aust Corps FSS)		
HQ 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt and 2)		
A Fd Regt Sig Sec)	ALEPPO	285473
17 Bty)		
18 Bty)		
Royals (less one sqn)	ALEPPO	283473
One Sec 2 Fd Coy	ALEPPO	283473
4 Border	IDLIB	235442
1 DLI	ALEPPO	283473
11 E Czechoslovak Bn	ALEPPO Aerodrome	
23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC	ALEPPO	283473
189 Fd Amb	French Military Hosp ALEPPO.	
6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop	ALEPPO	283473
23 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk	ALEPPO	283473

23 Inf Bde Gp (Contd)

One Sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy	ALEPPO	283473
One Sec 205 Pro Coy	ALEPPO	283473

All copies of previous 1 Aust Corps Location Statements should be destroyed on receipt of this Statement.

11 Weeks 461
1st Brig.
 GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div	6	1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	1
7 Aust Div	6	1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	1
	1	1 M.H. and Infm Sec	1
CCRA	1	OC 268 Sec, FS Wing, Int Corps	1
CRE C Tps	1	BEYROUTH	1
CSO	1	3 Replacement Veh Sec	1
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1	2 Aust Adv Ord Depot	1
HQ 10 Armd Div	3	3 Adv Ord Depot	4
84 L of C Sub-Area	1	Fd Ord Depot DAMASCUS	1
85 L of C Sub-Area	1	1 Aust Ord Fd Depot	1
GOC	1	Fd Ord Depot BEYROUTH	1
BGS	1	2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	1
G	1	Force HQ P & TJ	6
I	1	HQ AIF (ME)	3
A	1	HQ AIF Base Area	2
SLO	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
Q	3	Aust LO GHQ (ME)	1
CE	1	Movement Control BEYROUTH	1
DDST	3	Movement Control TRIPOLI	1
DDMS	1	Movement Control HAIFA	1
ADMS (Dental)	1	RTO RAYAK	1
DADH	1	RTO HOMS	1
ADOS	2	RTO ALEPPO	1
DADOS	1	HAIFA Fortress Area	1
DADPS	2	Army Post Office HAIFA	1
Pay	1	Maj Curtiss (C/o Aust Comforts	
DAPM	1	Fund, Metropole Hotel,	
Hirings Offr 1 Aust Corps	1	BEYROUTH	1
		Sig Office	2
		File	6
		War Diary	2

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps
23 Aug 41.
G. 715.

HQ AIF (ME)
Force HQ for info

AIR COOPERATION - BATTLE OF DAMOUR

Ref AIF G.1209 of 24 Jul.

1. The report sent would have been improved if information had been got from the staff or Comds of either 7 Aust Div who fought the battle, or from 1 Aust Corps who were next responsible, and who made the allotment of aircraft.

2. Nowhere in the report are three vital air deficiencies mentioned - (i) lack of tracer (ii) the complete absence of incendiary amm for American weapons, and (iii) complete absence of delay action bombs.

The first two considerably affected the employment of, and results obtained by, F aircraft in ground staffing. The lack of the third precluded accurate zero bombing and both limited the tasks of the bombers in close support and rendered the results less effective than they should have been.

3. (a) Ref sub-para of para 1 of Report and para 4 (1) last 7 lines: The bombers available could NOT effectively "plaster an area" of reasonable size. Not only were 13 bombers NOT available for such a task, but the RAF Offrs did NOT even include such a task as a suitable one for them (and the Corps agree with them).

(b) In spite of this knowledge the RAF were asked to "plaster" certain areas. On each occasion such requests were made it was claimed by the RAF that the targets were "not suitable" and that "the pilots would not be able to observe the effect of their bombs".

4. Ref sub para 3(1) last sub sub-para: " Only one request was ever received for air support from a leading bde." The G1 7 Asst and G3(Air) - working at 7 Aust Div - and the leading Inf Bde Comd state categorically that many requests were received from the fwd bde. It must be clearly recognised that all such requests do NOT necessarily come through RAF channels. The RAF were inclined to think that requests for air support sent through their ALOs were requests to them as RAF offrs. These RAF offrs were there to assist the Army as advisers (except the Senior (at Corps) who was a comd as well) but even he was under the Corps Comd.

5. Attention is drawn to the fact that if a demand for air support passes through RAF sigs (as recommended), it is the Army that is asking for support, and, although it is transmitted through the RAF, it is for delivery to the Military Comd. After hearing the advice of the ALO the Military Comd then decides whether or not he can meet the request from resources under his own control or whether he should forward it to higher Military Authority for passing to RAF Authorities. (vide EAF with Army in Fd Sec 22,2)

6. Para 4 (1) of the reports: In the battle of DAMOUR, though NOT mentioned in the report, the G3(Air) of Corps was loaned to Div. He had been working with the RAF throughout the campaign and had at his finger tips not only what the Army required, but what the Airforce, through Wing Comd CATOR and the actual Sqn Comds operating, had said they could, and could not, do. These notes had been sent to all comds and were based on facts as they existed at that time. These notes were favourably commented upon by the

C-in-C ME who asked for a copy to take away with him. The statement that those employing the aircraft available were "utterly untrained etc etc" is incorrect. See also para 9 below.

7. Ref para 4 (1) of Report referring to bombing on two consecutive days. The Div concerned report that it is NOT correct to say "it had not occurred to them to ask for fighters over the area at the same time on the third day." Fs were not asked for because:

- (a) The difficulty of providing interception had been stressed.
- (b) There were no grounds for imagining the French would bomb the valley on three consecutive days at the same time.
And they did NOT do so.

8. Ref para 6 of report. The G3(Air) kept Wing Comd CATOR - who was himself at Div HQ - fully informed and Wing Comd CATOR was able to keep the Sqns completely in the picture, for line comm was available. Each Sqn also received each afternoon daily a complete intelligence summary up to midday of that day. It must be remembered that much info is brought in by pilots, and they give it to the AILOs at their Sqn HQ - Sqns therefore are never entirely without news. In many cases it was impossible for even Div HQ to get accurate news of the posn of fwd tps.

9. Ref para 7 (11). The need for the education of military comds in air co-operation is admitted, but the desired co-operation will NEVER be obtained until the Air Force realize that they have just as much, and often more, to learn on the same subject. The Army has one great advantage in learning these lessons - they have always been accustomed to handling co-operating arms, such as arty.

(Sgd)

CCRA
For Lt-Gen.
GOC 1 Aust Corps.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

G 320

HQ 1 Aust Corps.

23 Jul 41.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS & ATT TPS (SYRIA)

1. Forwarded herewith ^{copy}_{copies} of Order of Battle, 1 Aust Corps and Att Tps (SYRIA). All previous issues will be destroyed.
2. Please acknowledge receipt.

Amable F. Col. for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Div	5	Q	2
7 Aust Div	5	CE	1
4 Cav Bde	1	DDST	1
5 Ind Inf Bde	1	DDMS	1
FFF	1	ADOS	1
CCRA	1	DADOS	1
CRE C Tps	1	Pay	1
CSO	1	Postal	1
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1	APM	1
HQ 1 Cav Div	1	Force HQ P & TJ	1
84 L of C Sub Area	1	HQ AIF (ME)	3
85 L of C Sub Area	1	HQ AIF Base Area	2
GOC	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
BGS	1	Aust LO GHQ ME	1
G	2	File	2
I	1	War Diary	2
A	1	Spare	10

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS.

SECRET

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OR UNIT			
	Australian	British	Indian	Free French
Headquarter Units	HQ 1 Aust Corps 1 Aust Corps Int Sec 1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec FSS 1 Aust Corps AIL Sec 'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn HQ 7 Aust Div 7 Aust Div Int Sec 7 Aust Div 'C' Sec FSS HQ 'C' Coy & 10 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn	HQ 6 Div 6 Div Int Sec 279 Sec FSS		HQ Free French Div
Cavalry	<u>6 Aust Div</u> 6 Aust Div Cav Regt <u>9 Aust Div</u> 9 Aust Div Cav Regt	HQ 4 Cav Bde Household Cav Regt Royals (less one sqn) Warwicks Yeo Wilts Yeo (less one sqn)		Circassian Cav Two sqns Spahis
Artillery	<u>Corps Tps</u> HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt 2/1 Aust Svy Regt - HQ F Sp Bty One F Sp Tp One S Rg Tp One Svy Bty HQ 2 Aust AA Regt 6 Aust Hy AA Bty	HQ RA 6 Div 1 Fd Regt (with 5 Ind Inf Bde) 4 Fd Regt HQ 60 Fd Regt 239 Fd Bty (less one tp) 237 Fd Bty (" " ") 64 Med Regt HQ 57 Lt AA Regt 169 Lt AA Bty 170 Lt AA Bty 171 Lt AA Bty	1 Independent A Tk Tp J & K Mtn Bty	1 Bty Arty 2 Bty Arty

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OR UNIT			
	Australian	British	Indian	Free French
Artillery (contd)	<u>6 Aust Div</u> 1 Aust A Tk Regt <u>7 Aust Div</u> HQ RAA 7 Aust Div 2/4 Aust Fd Regt 2/5 Aust Fd Regt 2/6 Aust Fd Regt 2 Aust A Tk Regt			
Engineers	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy 2/14 Aust A Fd Coy 2/15 Aust A Fd Coy 2/3 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy <u>7 Aust Div</u> HQ RAE 7 Aust Div 2/5 Aust Fd Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Coy 2/5 Aust Fd Pk Coy	2 Fd Coy 12 Fd Coy One tp 2 Chesh Fd Sqn	18 Fd Coy S & M	
Signals	<u>Corps Tps</u> 1 Aust Corps Sigs - Tech Maint Sec 1 Op Sec 2 Lt W/T Sec 3 Lt W/T Sec 1 DR Sec 2 DR Sec 4 W/T Sec 2 Aust Hy AA Regt Sig Sec <u>7 Aust Div</u> Sigs 7 Aust Div	HQ Sigs 13 Corps Adm Sec 10 Tech Maint Sec HQ No 1 Coy 19 Line Sec 59 Line Sec 72 Line Sec 77 Line Sec 8 Line Maint Sec HQ No 2 Coy 29 Op Sec 48 Wireless Sec 51 Wireless Sec 58 Wireless Sec 88 Telegraphic Op Sec HQ No 3 Coy Comm Med Arty Sig Sec Sigs 57		

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OR UNIT			
	Australian	British	Indian	Free French
Infantry	<u>6 Aust Div</u> 2/2 Aust Inf Bn)(16 Aust 2/3 Aust Inf Bn)Inf Bde) HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde 2/5 Aust Inf Bn <u>7 Aust Div</u> HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde 2/14 Aust Inf Bn 2/16 Aust Inf Bn 2/27 Aust Inf Bn HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde 2/31 Aust Inf Bn 2/33 Aust Inf Bn <u>9 Aust Div</u> 2/25 Aust Inf Bn	HQ 14 Inf Bde 1 Bedfs Herts 2 Black Watch 2 Y & L HQ 16 Inf Bde 2 Queen's 2 King's Own 2 Leicesters HQ 23 Inf Bde 4 Border 1 DLI 11 E Czech Bn 1 RF (serving with 5 Ind Inf Bde.)	HQ 5 Ind Inf Bde 5 Ind Inf Bde A Tk Coy 3/1 Punjab 4/6 Rajput Rifles	HQ 1re Bde BM3 BIM HQ 13 me Bde BM1 BM2 Legion One Coy Marines One Group Meharistes
Machin Gun	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/3 Aust MG Bn			
Pioneers	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn			
Army Service Corps	<u>Corps Tps</u> Det 1 Ech 1 Aust CT Sup Col 2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk 3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk X 2 Sub Pk 1 Aust CT Pet Pk 2 Aust Sup Per Sec 3 Aust Sup Per Sec X 4 Aust Sup Per Sec 5 Aust Sup Per Sec 6 Aust Sup Per Sec X As No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div	HQ RASC 6 Div 14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC 16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC 23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC 552 Coy RASC 543 Coy RASC 57 Lt AA Regt Sec RASC 5 Res MT Coy RASC 129 Res MT Coy (25 Army Tank Bde Coy RASC) 4 Animal Tpt Coy	5 Ind Inf Bde Composite Coy RIASC	One Tpt Coy

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OR UNIT			
	Australian	British	Indian	Free French
Army Service Corps (contd)	<u>7 Aust Div</u> HQ AASC 7 Aust Div 7 Aust Div Amn Coy (as No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div) 7 Aust Div Pet Coy (as No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div)			
Medical	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/13 Aust Fd Amb 2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec 2/1 Aust CCS 2/3 Aust CCS <u>7 Aust Div</u> 2/4 Aust Fd Amb 2/6 Aust Fd Amb 2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec <u>Base & L of C Tps</u> 1 Aust Mob Dact Lab	173 Fd Amb 189 Fd Amb 215 Fd Amb 14 Lt Fd Amb 166 Lt Fd Amb 33 Fd Hyg Sec Det 8 Lt Fd Hyg Sec 2 MAC One Sec 7 MAC 2 CCS 14 CCS HADFIELD SPEARS CCS 3 Mob Dact Lab	14 Inf Fd Amb 12 Ind Staging Sec	One Ambulance Unit
Ordnance	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop - 4 Rec Sec 2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk - 'B' Div Sec 'C' Div Sec One Veh Res Sec 2 Aust AA Regt Wkshop Sec <u>Base & L of C Tps</u> 1 Aust L of C Rec Sec	57 Lt AA Regt Wkshop Sec 1 Independent Bde Wkshop 3 Independent Bde Wkshop 6 Independent Bde Wkshop 1 Cav Div Wkshop (less one bde gp sec) 1 Cav Div Ord Fd Pk 6 Div Ord Fd Pk (less one inf bde sec) 1 Rec Sec	17 Mob Wkshop 1 AOC 5 Ind Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk	

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OR UNIT			
	Australian	British	Indian	Free French
Pay	Det 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office 7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office			
Postal	Det 1 Aust Corps Postal Unit 7 Aust Div Postal Unit	6 Div Postal Unit Det 1 Cav Div Postal Unit	25 Ind Postal Unit	
Pro	1 Aust Corps Pro Coy 7 Aust Div Pro Coy	6 Div Pro Coy Det 1 Cav Div Pro Coy		
Miscellaneous	1 Aust Corps Emp Pl 7 Aust Div Emp Pl 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit 1 Aust Corps Graves Registration & Enquiries Unit 7 Aust Div Salvage Unit 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp 7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp 7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit 7 Aust Div Mob Laundry	4 Cav Mob Vet Sec 6 Div Salvage Unit One Mob Met Unit 8 Mob Laundry		

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

G.620

HQ 1 Aust Corps.

16 Aug 41.

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS & ATT TPs (SYRIA)

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and Att Tps (SYRIA). ^{copies} All previous issues will be destroyed.
2. Please acknowledge receipt.

CMK/161 f. Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION.

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7 Aust Div	5	CE	1
		DDST	1
		DDMS	1
FFF	1	ADOS	1
CCRA	1	DADOS	1
CRE C Tps	1	Pay	1
CSO	1	Postal	1
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1	APH	1
HQ 1 Cav Div	1	Force HQ P & TJ	3
84 L of C Sub-Area	1	HQ AIF (ME)	3
85 L of C Sub-Area	1	HQ AIF Base Area	2
GOC	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
BGS	1	Aust LO GHQ ME	1
G	2	File	2
I	1	War Diary	2
A	1	Spare	10

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS.

SECRET

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OR UNIT		
	Australian	British	Free French
Headquarter Units	HQ 1 Aust Corps 1 Aust Corps Int Sec 1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec & 'B' Sec FSS 1 Aust Corps AIL Sec 'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn HQ 7 Aust Div 7 Aust Div Int Sec 7 Aust Div 'C' Sec FSS HQ 'C' Coy & 10 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn	HQ 6 Div 6 Div Int Sec 255 Sec FSS 279 Sec FSS	HQ Free French Div
Cavalry	<u>6 Aust Div</u> 6 Aust Div Cav Regt. <u>9 Aust Div</u> 9 Aust Div Cav Regt	Royals (less one sqn)	Circassian Cav Two sqns Spahis One Tank Coy
Artillery	<u>Corps Tps</u> HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt 2/1 Aust Svy Regt :- HQ F Sp Bty One F Sp Tp One S Rg Tp One Svy Bty <u>6 Aust Div</u> 1 Aust A/Tk Regt (less 2 Bty) <u>7 Aust Div</u> HQ RAA 7 Aust Div 2/4 Aust Fd Regt 2/5 Aust Fd Regt	HQ RA 6 Div 4 Fd Regt HQ 60 Fd Regt 237 Fd Bty 239 Fd Bty (less one tp) 64 Med Regt J & K Mtn Bty (INDIAN Unit)	1 Bty Arty 2 Bty Arty (Mountain Bty) One A/Tk Coy One A/Tk Bty

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OR UNIT		
	Australian	British	Free French
Artillery (contd)	2/6 Aust Fd Regt 2 Aust A/Tk Regt		
Engineers	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy 2/14 Aust A Fd Coy 2/15 Aust A Fd Coy 23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy <u>7 Aust Div</u> EQ RAE 7 Aust Div 2/5 Aust Fd Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Coy 25 Aust Fd Pk Coy	2 Fd Coy. 12 Fd Coy. 54 Fd Coy. 219 Fd Pk Coy.	One Coy Engrs
Signals	<u>Corps Tps</u> 1 Aust Corps Sigs - Tech Maint Sec 1 Op Sec 2 Lt W/T Sec 3 Lt W/T Sec 1 DR Sec 2 DR Sec 4 W/T Sec <u>7 Aust Div</u> Sigs 7 Aust Div	HQ Sigs 13 Corps Adm Sec 10 Tech Maint Sec HQ No 1 Coy 19 Line Sec 59 Line Sec 72 Line Sec 77 Line Sec 8 Line Maint Sec HQ No 2 Coy 29 Op Sec 48 Wireless Sec 51 Wireless Sec 58 Wireless Sec 88 Telegraphic Op Sec HQ No 3 Coy Corps Med Arty Sig Sec Sigs 6 Div	One Sig Coy

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OF UNIT		
Infantry	<u>Australian</u> <u>6 Aust Div</u> 2/2 Aust Inf Bn) 16 Aust Inf Bde 2/3 Aust Inf Bn) HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde 2/5 Aust Inf Bn <u>7 Aust Div</u> HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde 2/14 Aust Inf Bn 2/16 Aust Inf Bn 2/27 Aust Inf Bn HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde 2/31 Aust Inf Bn 2/33 Aust Inf Bn <u>9 Aust Div</u> 2/25 Aust Inf Bn	<u>British</u> HQ 14 Inf Bde 1 Bedfs Herts 2 Black Watch 2 Y & L HQ 16 Inf Bde 2 Queens 2 King's Own 2 Leicesters HQ 23 Inf Bde 4 Border 1 DLI 11 E Czechoslovak Bn	<u>Free French</u> HQ 1re Bde BM3 BIM HQ 13 me Bde BM1 BM2 1er ler Bn Legion One Coy Fusiliers Marins
Machine Gun	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/3 Aust MG Bn		
Pioneers	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn		
Army Service Corps	<u>Corps Tps</u> Det 1 Ech 1 Aust C T Sup Col 2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk 3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk x HQ 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk. A Sec. 1 sub pk. 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk 2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk Wkshop sec " " " " 2 Aust Sup Per Sec 3 Aust Sup Per Sec x 4 Aust Sup Per Sec 5 Aust Sup Per Sec 6 Aust Sup Per Sec x As No. 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div	HQ RASC 6 Div 14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC 16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC. 23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC 543 Coy RASC 211 Med Bty RASC Sec. 212 " " " " 5 Res LT Coy 25 Army Tank Bde Coy RASC (129 Res LT Coy) 1 Pack Tpt Coy 4 Pack Tpt Coy	One Tpt Coy

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OR UNIT		
	Australian	British	Free French
Army Service Corps (Contd)	<u>Corps Tps</u> Det 2 AASC sec AA Regt. 1 Aust Corps Mob School of Mech <u>7 Aust Div</u> HQ AASC 7 Aust Div 7 Aust Div Amn Coy (as No. 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div) 7 Aust Div Pet Coy (as No. 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div.		
Medical	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/13 Aust Fd Amb 2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec 1 Aust M A C - 'A' Sec 2/1 Aust CCS 2/3 Aust CCS <u>7 Aust Div</u> 2/4 Aust Fd Amb 2/6 Aust Fd Amb 2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec. <u>Base & L of C Tps</u> 1 Aust Mob Bact Lab 1 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit 2 Aust " " " " 7 Aust Dental Unit 9 Aust Dental Unit Det 2 Aust Base Depot Med Stores	173 Fd Amb 189 Fd Amb 215 Fd Amb 14 Lt Fd Amb 33 Fd Hyg Sec 2 M A C HADFIELD SPEARS CCS 3 Mob Bact Lab 2 Malarial Fd Lab 12 Anti-Malarial Control Unit	One Ambulance Unit
Ordnance	<u>Corps Tps</u> 2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop - 4 Rec Sec 2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk - 3 Corps Sec 'B' Div Sec 'C' Div Sec Details Res Sec 3 Replacement Veh Sec.	1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop 3 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop 6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop 1 Bde Gp Sec. 1 Cav Div Wkshop 6 Div Ord Fd Pk (less one inf bde sec) 6 L of C Rec Sec.	

ARM OF SERVICE	FORMATION OR UNIT		
	Australian	British	Free French
Ordnance (Contd)	<u>Base & L of C Tps</u> 1 Aust L of C Rec Sec		
Pay	1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office 7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office		
Postal	1 Aust Corps Postal Unit 7 Aust Div Postal Unit	6 Div Postal Unit	
Pro	1 Aust Corps Pro Coy 7 Aust Div Pro Coy	6 Div Pro Coy One Sec 205 Pro Coy	
Miscellaneous	1 Aust Corps Emp Pl 7 Aust Div Emp Pl 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit 1 Aust Corps Graves Registration & Enquiries Unit 7 Aust Div Salvage Unit 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp 7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp 7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit 7 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd Decontamination Unit	6 Div Salvage Unit 8 Mob Laundry One mob meteor unit	

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
24 Aug 41.
G. 708

ORDER OF BATTLE
1 AUST CORPS & ATT TPS (SYRIA).

Amendment No. 1

Ref 1 Aust Corps G. 620 of 16 Aug 41, herewith amendments:

(1) CAV

Australian

Delete - "6 Aust Div
6 Aust Div Cav Regt"

and substitute - "7 Aust Div
7 Aust Div Cav Regt"

(2) ARTY

(a) Australian

Amend "1 Aust A Tk Regt (less 2 Bty)" to read
"1 Aust A Tk Regt (less two tps 2 Bty)"

(3) SIGS

(a) Australian

Below 'Corps Tps' delete all secs down to (excl) '7 Aust Div'.

Add -HQ 1 Aust Corps Sigs

HQ Coy (incl Adm Sec and Tech Maint Sec)

HQ 1 Coy

1 Line Sec

2 " "

3 " "

5 " "

1 Line Maint Sec

2 " " "

HQ 2 Coy

1 Op Sec

3 " "

4 " "

5 " "

1 W/T Sec

2 " "

3 " "

4 " "

5 " "

1 DR Sec

2 DR Sec

HQ 3 Coy

1 A Fd Regt Sec

2 A Fd Regt Sec

(b) British

Delete all units and secs from 'HQ Sigs 13 Corps' incl
to "Corps Med Arty Sig Sec" incl.

(4) INF

Free French

Below "One Coy Fusiliers Marins" add
"New Caledonian Pacific Bn"

(5) ASC

Australian

- (i) Below "3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk"
delete from "HQ 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk" incl
to "Wkshop Sec 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk" incl.
and substitute "1 Aust Corps Pet Pk"
- (ii) Below "6 Aust Sup Per Sec"
delete "As No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div"
and substitute "As No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div"
- (iii) After "7 Aust Div Amn Coy"
delete "(as No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div)"
and substitute "(as No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div)"
- (iv) After "7 Aust Div Pet Coy"
delete "(as No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div)"
and substitute "(as No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div)"

(6) MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Australian

Below "7 Aust Div Mob Laundry and Fwd Decontamination
Unit" add
"1 Military History and Information Sec"
"3 Military History and Information Sec"

(b) British

- (i) Below "6 Div Salvage Unit"
insert "19 Mob Bath Unit"
- (ii) After "One Mob Meteor Unit"
add "(RAF)"

H. Wells H. Col
Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distribution.

As for 1 Aust Corps G. 620 of 16 Aug 41.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

S E C R E T

HQ 1 Aust Corps
31 Aug 41.

G. 783

ORDER OF BATTLE
1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS (SYRIA)

AMENDMENT No 2.

Ref 1 Aust Corps G.620 of 16 Aug 41, herewith amendments :-

(1) All Arms of Service

Free French Forces

Delete all ref to Free French Forces

(2) Headquarter Units

Australian

Delete "HQ 'C' Coy and 10 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn"
and add "'C' Coy (less 11 Pl) Aust HQ Gd Bn"

(3) Arty

British

After "239 Fd Bty" delete "(less one tp)"

(4) Engrs

(a) Australian

Above "2/9 Aust A Fd Coy"
insert "HQ RAE 1 Aust ~~Ctys~~" Corps

(b) British

Above "2 Fd Coy"
insert "HQ RE 6 Div"

(5) Inf

Australian

Delete "2/2 Aust Inf Bn"

(6) ASC

British

- (i) Delete "543 Coy RASC"
- (ii) Delete "5 Res MT Coy"
- (iii) After "1 Pack Tpt Coy"
add "(CYPRIOT)"
- (iv) After "4 Pack Tpt Coy"
add "(CYPRIOT)"

(7) Ord

Australian

- (i) Under "2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop" after "4 Rec Sec"
insert "5 Rec Sec"
- (ii) Under "1 Aust Ord Fd Pk" after "3 Corps Sec"
insert "'A' Div Sec"

11-15-41
Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

As per 1 Aust Corps G.620 of 16 Aug 41.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.26

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 16 Jul to 1200 hrs 17 Jul 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-
- W/0 6 9 1941*

PART 1.

(a) LIBYA.

(1) Enemy activity in the frontier area since the long tank engagement of 15, 16 and 17 Jun has been centred (as was mentioned in Int Summary No 24) on the construction of a defensive zone based on the SOLLUM-CAPUZZO-HALFAYA triangle. On the eastern face of this triangle this defensive system of strong posts has been extended to SIDI OHAR, and a line is apparently being made from there through SIDI SULEIMAN to HALFAYA, while on the South West side he is building a series of thickly sand-bagged emplacements from Italian to Egyptian SIDI OHAR. It is also worth noting that in addition to his strongly built forward posts there appears to be a main line of defence further back. Further information indicates that at least as late as 10 Jul these field works were still in progress of construction and that efforts were being made to push forward completion as rapidly as possible.

Operational enemy activity has been confined to artillery fire, armcd car patrols, and offensive air action. Almost every day the enemy has engaged in one or more of these, but the situation on the whole has not materially changed for the last 4 weeks.

A re-grouping of his forces has also been carried out in this period. German HQ have apparently been moved forward, and 15 German Armd Div, with a large part of 102 Trento Div, with additional artillery, is in the frontier area. 5 German Lt Mot Div, plus some lorried inf and the Engr Bn from 15 Armd Div is around TOBRUK. It appears that two or three Italian Divs are being moved forward and that garrisoning of TRIPOLITANIA has been left in the main to 4 or possibly 5 Blackshirt Militia Legions. The arrival of about 3000 troops between 14 and 17 Jun in the DERNA area was probably only to replace battle casualties and normal wastage.

(2) At TOBRUK the situation is practically unchanged. There has been fairly continuous artillery exchanges and constant enemy air activity, but no offensive ground operations. The most interesting feature is perhaps the ringing in of the city and its garrison with a double row of A/Tk mines-- apparently to prevent any sortie by our troops. This may mean that the enemy does not contemplate, for the present at least, a further attempt to capture the place but intends to contain it with a minimum number of troops, thus leaving the bulk of his forces free for action elsewhere. In this connection it is worthy of note that the garrison has been maintaining constant offensive patrols and raids, and that one of these was so successful that an enemy communique described it as a serious attempt to break out of the city.

18 Jul 41

(b) Experience of German tactics in the WESTERN DESERT has shown that their A/Tk artillery is used against infantry as well as against tanks. The following extracts have been taken from a captured German document dealing with the 4.7 cm Anti-tank gun.

The 4.7 cm Anti-tank gun is of the recoiling barrel type, with a semi-automatic breech. The following are the details of the gun, which is of CZECH origin, and which is used either against armoured or infantry targets:-

Effective Range	1000 - 1400 metres.
Ammunition - with the gun	74 A.P. 10 H.E. rounds.
- in ammunition trailer	146 A.P. 26 HE rounds.
Mobile Carriage	Chassis of light tank, Mark Ib.
Length	4.30 metres.
Width	2.00 metres.
Height	2.14 metres.
Speed, on roads	30 km.p.h.
across country	15 km.p.h.
Radius of action, on roads	170 km.
across country	130 km.
Armour basis	15 mm.
Crew	(Commander (gun layer)
	3 (Loader
	(Driver (W/T operator)
Armament	3 - .08 Pistols.
	1 - Machine Pistol.

PART II

SECURITY

Nil.

NOTE: There was no issue of 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary for 16 Jul 41.

W. Harris

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.10.

PA 402/2/5
SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.27

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 17 Jul to 1200 hrs 18 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART 1.

(a) Owing to the lack of "inside information", the difficulty of obtaining adequate medium scale maps and the conflicting claims of both sides, it is almost impossible to form any certainly true picture of the fighting over the 1800 mile front between GERMANY and RUSSIA. The following brief resume, however, may give some idea of the general course of the campaign in the last 11 days (i.e. from 7 Jul):-

Apart from Central and Northern FINLAND where the news is so scanty that it is impossible to say more than that some fighting is in progress, there appears to be five main sectors where offensives are being conducted by the German army: in each case several distinct columns are engaged.

i. In the North two columns are attempting to close in on LENINGRAD, one from the North from FINLAND, the other through Northern ESTHONIA: the upper "pincer" may have got forward to a point near KRONSTADT where fierce fighting was reported on 14 Jul. The lower "pincer" may be approaching the Esthonian-Russian frontier West of TALINN which was captured about 9 Jul.

ii. In the second sector, along the Eastern frontier of LATVIA, German columns are advancing into Russian territory, and there has been heavy fighting in PSKOV and OSTROV.

iii. In the Central sector the Germans have advanced through Russian Poland and have penetrated deep into WHITE RUSSIA. Three columns can be distinguished: the first from VITEBSK drove North East across the DVINA, the second captured MINSK and has pushed on to SMOLENSK where the Soviet communique admits heavy fighting and where mechanised German forces have penetrated even further towards MOSCOW, the third South East against BOBRUISK.

iv. In the fourth sector, from Southern POLAND, the Germans are attempting to out-flank the Red Army in the UKRAINE: one column has occupied KIEV and two others, moving South East from TARNAPOL and North East from CERNAUTI respectively, are attempting to turn the Russian defences on the River DNEISTER.

v. Lastly from ROUMANIA where the country is certainly not suitable for mechanised movement, the German and Roumanian armies have at length succeeded in crossing the River PRUT and are threatening the Southern part of the UKRAINE.

After the GERMANO-ROUMANIAN reverses on the River PRUT on 8 and 9 Jul there was apparently a period of 4 to 5 days comparative inactivity. On 13 Jul, however, this lull came to an end, and from then on there has been heavy fighting. The main Russian defensive positions, the so-called Stalin line, have been pierced in at least three places. This line runs from DVINSK in LATVIA, South East to SMOLENSK, and from there down the Eastern bank of the BERESINA River to BOBRUISK. The line was continued South of the PRIPET

Marshes on the Eastern bank of the DNEIPER. The Germans are now across the DVINA near DVINSK and at VITEBSK, and claim to have advanced beyond SMOLENSK. They also claim to have crossed the DNEIPER near KIEV.

On each of the first four sectors mentioned above considerable progress has been made by the German armies. Since the campaign opened on 24 Jun, the BALTIC STATES and RUSSIAN POLAND have been completely over-run and armoured columns have penetrated deeply into SOVIET territory proper. The deepest penetrations are at SMOLENSK, and at KIEV, which are approximately 150 miles inside the original Russian frontiers, representing a total advance of about 280 miles in each case. West of SMOLENSK German armoured formations have pushed on still further in their drive for MOSCOW, but it must be realised that the Germans themselves admit that fighting continues well behind their foremost occupied positions and the forward armoured columns are-- in some cases at least-- cut off from direct land communication with their rear. The SOVIET High Command has adopted in some areas a very fluid defence in extreme depth, and the German blows, fierce as they are, may expend themselves. It is in fact, very much like a prize-fighter punching a pillow. How far this system of fluid defence will go towards defeating the German thrusts remains to be seen. While RUSSIAN claims to have inflicted enormous losses on the GERMANS must be largely discounted and such fantastic figures as one million German casualties must be rejected, there is little doubt that Russian resistance has been considerably stiffer than Hitler anticipated. It is safe to say that there has been a definite and serious delay in the execution of the German plans and that the Russian defence has been unexpectedly resourceful and stubborn.

(b) GERMAN TACTICS

When next our forces come up against the Germans it is more than likely that we will have to be prepared to face an attack by parachute and airborne troops. For the information of those units who were not in GREECE the following extract from a report of one of our coy commanders who was engaged in the defence of the CORINTH CANAL is published.

The attack was divided into five phases as follows:-

First Phase: Reconnaissance by one or two planes at a high level to determine suitable landing grounds and to ascertain location of AA defences - often by intentionally exposing themselves to fire.

Second Phase: Determined dive bombing and machine gunning attack on AA and other heavy defences until they are silenced.

Third Phase: Level bombing or machine gunning from low altitudes mainly directed at vehicles and personnel. This continues until the enemy considers that personnel are taking advantage of cover. During this phase it seems almost impossible to remain above ground without becoming a casualty. Then the planes, which appear to be dive bombers or medium bombers, merely cruise overhead at about 100 or 200 feet making movement without observation very difficult.

Fourth Phase: Waves of JUNKERS troop carriers, in groups of three disgorge heavy concentrations of troops. The troop carriers have a slow cruising speed and can land in a very restricted area; one was seen to land in an area not more than 400 yards by 200 yards. Each of the two outside aircraft drop troops, the centre one stores and supplies. These troops appear to be grouped in units of about 500. The unit Commander is evidently able to observe and control his troops by wireless before landing. Also the paratroops seem to be placed tactically and according to the dispositions of our own troops. From the fact that troop carriers cruised about after the enemy ceased dropping troops and supplies, I considered that he maintained a reserve of troops to be employed if necessary.

Fifth Phase: As troops withdraw clear of troop carriers the enemy are able to protect them by machine gunning.

Weapons: Most paratroopists have Sub Machine Guns, of Thomson type but with a folding framework, butt and butt strap. Some have rifles. The S.M.G. has short range and, according to an officer who captured and fired one, is not very accurate and is generally inferior to Thomson gun. It has a fast rate of fire - usually two magazines, each containing 32 or 36 rounds, with the gun. Other members may carry spare mags. Box of spare ammunition found with one captured party. M.M.G. dropped with advanced troops and brought into action within a few minutes if favourable targets observed.

Suggested Counter Measures: Owing to the intensity of the air attack most observers agreed that infantry are not effective defence except in large numbers. Even then they would be vulnerable to air attack unless widely dispersed. It was generally agreed that two platoons of "Carriers" or the equivalent number of "light tanks" concealed from view and so far as possible covered from air attack would have been able to cope with the situation. Absolute local air superiority is necessary for this type of attack. Troop carriers are slow and easy targets from the ground for any surviving AA defences.

PART II - SECURITY

- A. (i) Appx "A" to Int Summary No.24 of 14 Jul 41 shall be referred to in future Summaries as Security Instn No.1.
(ii) Habforce will in future be referred to as 4 Cav Bde.
- B. The undermentioned officers of HBM Forces are carrying out the duties indicated beside their names at the places mentioned.
- | | |
|---|--|
| Lt-Col FURLONG - | Political Officer for LEBANON area -
at HQ of General CATROUX (Grand Serail,
BEIRUT) |
| Lt-Col A.J. GARDINER - | Political Officer for DAMASCUS area -
DAMASCUS |
| Lt-Col A.W. DAVIES - | Political Officer for ALEPPO area -
ALEPPO |
| Major MUSGRAVE - | Chief Security Officer for BEIRUT and
LEBANON - Surete (Police HQ), BEIRUT |
| Maj-Gen J.I. CHRYSTALL C.B.E., M.C. |) |
| Lt-Col R.T.W. FIENNES (The Greys) |) Commission |
| Major J.W. HACKETT M.B.E. (8 Hussars) |) of |
| One member to be nominated by Gen CATROUX. |) Control |
| Two members to be nominated by the French Authorities |) ALEY |
| | (in offices opposite Grand Hotel) |
- The badges of Commission of Control are a white flag, a white brassard and a white pennant (on cars) in each case with letters C.C. in black.
- C. Appx "A" to this Summary contains the terms and provisions of the Order to the civilian population of all districts of SYRIA and the LEBANON issued by the GOC-in-C of HBM Forces in SYRIA and the LEBANON.
- D. Appx "B" to this Summary contains the terms and provisions of Clause 6 of the Acre Convention the Agreement governing the cessation of hostilities in SYRIA and the LEBANON by which in consideration of the honours of war limited permission is granted to French officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers to retain their individual arms.
- E. Appx "C" contains Security Instructions regarding the collection of arms and ammunition from the civilian population and is issued as Security Instn No.2.

Heavis

Lt-Col

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.10.

GS 1 Aust Corps

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.27

Appendix "A"

O R D E R

TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF ALL
DISTRICTS OF SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

I, HENRY MAITLAND WILSON, Knight Grand Cross of the most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Knight Commander of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, etc. etc., General, Commanding the Forces of His Britannic Majesty and His Allies and the Free French Forces in Syria and the Lebanon do hereby make the following ORDER to the inhabitants of all districts in Syria and the Lebanon:

1. Any person who, without authority, is found in possession of firearms, ammunition, bombs, or explosives of any sort or description, used or usable for warlike operations, and whether such firearms, etc., are in his personal possession or in his house or other building under his control; or
2. Any person who fires upon British or Allied-Troops or a person employed by British or Allied Troops; or
3. Any person who is the owner or occupant of any house or premises from which fire is made upon British or Allied Troops and who fails to identify the firers and discharge the onus of proving that they used his premises without his knowledge or connivance; or
4. Destroys or damages any telegraph or telephone wire, or any property of the British or Allied Governments; or
5. Steals or receives any property of the British or Allied Governments knowing it to have been stolen (the onus of disproof of which shall lie upon him); or
6. Does any other act or thing inimical to the interests or safety of the British or Allied Troops,

WILL BE TRIED BY MILITARY COURT,

and, if convicted, punished with

D E A T H,

or such less punishment as the Court may determine.

Jerusalem,
7th June, 1941.

H.M. WILSON
General,
General Officer Commanding
His Britannic Majesty's Forces
in Syria and the Lebanon

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 27

Appendix "B"

CLAUSE 6 OF THE ACRE CONVENTION

(Providing for the retention of arms by French officers, etc.)

"In consideration of the honours of war, French officers and non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, are permitted to retain their individual arms (rifles or carbines; revolvers; bayonets; swords or sabres). However the soldiers will not be allowed to carry ammunition. In each unit, for security reasons, a small quantity of ammunition will be retained. The gendarmerie will retain its arms and a limited amount of ammunition. All other war material including guns, coastal batteries, anti-aircraft guns and military transport will be stocked under British control. The latter will inspect this material and will have the right to take over the material that may be required by them; the remainder will be destroyed by the French Authorities under British control."

Appendix "C"

SECURITY INSTRUCTION NO. 2

Collection of Arms and Ammunition from Civilian Population

1. In pursuance of Proclamation of 7 Jun 41 the terms of which are contained in Appx "A" to this Summary, Area Security Officers as appointed in terms of Security Instn No. 1 para 2, will forthwith have arms and ammunition in possession of civilians collected in their respective areas.
2. Where arms are voluntarily surrendered by civilians in obedience to proclamation, the name and address of the civilian concerned together with a description of the arms and ammunition received will be taken. No action will be taken against civilians voluntarily surrendering arms or ammunition.
3. Where infm is received that arms or ammunition are held by a civilian in contravention of proclamation or where a reasonable suspicion exists that a civilian is concealing arms such search shall be made as in the circumstances appears necessary.
4. In the event of any civilian being found in possession of arms or ammunition he shall be placed in custody and the arms and ammunition so found will be confiscated.
5. No trial or punitive action following the arrest or apprehension of any civilian for being in possession of arms or ammunition shall be taken without first advising this HQ.

E. Manderson
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

402/2/9
SECRET

BG 507
1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 28

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 18 Jul to 1200 hrs 19 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

PART 1

(a) 1. Libyan Frontier Area - 12 Jul: The frontier area is reported to be quiet with normal enemy Armoured Car patrol activity only. Tac/R reports a considerable increase of MT in the BARDIA area. Observers reported 700 MT, including some derelict, within the BARDIA defences.

ii. TOBRUCK: Intermittent shelling of the harbour by a long range enemy battery is reported. No damage resulted from the shelling.

A rather disturbing feature is evidence that, despite our efforts, the enemy has succeeded in increasing the capacity of BENGHASI port. Now that he is strengthening his forces in CYRENAICA the importance of this port becomes greater every day. BENGHASI is the key to enemy maintenance in CYRENAICA. His ability to hold CYRENAICA depends almost entirely upon the degree to which we can restrict his use of this port: hence the importance of the almost continuous RAF raids.

iii. IRAN: With an eye to the possible defeat of the USSR by GERMANY it is necessary to consider the political feelings of such countries as TURKEY, IRAN and IRAQ, as they stand in the line of a possible German threat to EGYPT from the North. The following comment on IRAN is reprinted from GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation, dated 7 Jul:-

There are indications that GERMANY is now strengthening her fifth column activities in IRAN. IRAN is one obvious channel through which assistance could reach RUSSIA, and German agents, who are very numerous in IRAN, have done their best to play on the SHAH's extreme sensitiveness in questions affecting IRAN's rights as a Sovereign State. IRAN has always been very suspicious, and not without cause, of RUSSIA's designs on her Northern provinces. German technical experts are in a position to exercise a considerable degree of control over the country's communications. Pro-German feeling, especially in the Army, is widespread. The situation in IRAN demands close attention.

iv. Distribution of Forces: Recent reports indicate that commencing in early June the majority of German troops were withdrawn from BULGARIA - presumably to the Russian front. One report estimates that German troops in BULGARIA now amount to about 1000 Air Force personnel only.

(b) EFFECT OF SA FIRE ON LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT

It is often said that SA fire from ground troops against low-flying aircraft is only a means of maintaining morale or of

keeping the attacking aircraft up. Sometimes it is even asserted that such fire is useless and merely draws "the crabs". It is therefore of interest to find that enemy SA fire was responsible for inflicting some serious damage on our aircraft during the recent campaign and the figures quoted below should do much to encourage our troops when meeting German air attacks. The actual report is as follows:-

"The undermentioned figures of damage due to SA fire from the ground were obtained from a fighter sqn operating in SYRIA. It is emphasised that many of the pilots of this sqn have had considerable experience in ground-strafting and knew that success depended largely on surprise and a quick get-away. The nature of the country lent itself to surprise, though it made it difficult to find targets.

The Air Force report that the enemy appeared to have very badly organised ground defences and this is considered the main reason why there was not considerably more damage done to our aircraft.

In a period of 25 days in a sqn of normally 16 aircraft we lost -

- (a) 2 completely through forced landings due to bullet in engine cooling system.
- (b) 2 for a period of some weeks,
- (c) 3 for a period of 1 to 4 days.
- (d) 4 for a period up to 2 a day.
- (e) 5 for a short period: the damage to these, though slight, might have been serious if the bullet had struck even a few inches away."

Comment: It is worth noting that in the vast majority of these cases no immediate effect of their fire would have been visible to the enemy.

PART II

SECURITY

N11.

E. Mander Jones
Maj
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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85 Base Sub Area.....	1
"C" Flt 208 Sqn.....	1
AILO 11 Sqn RAF.....	1
AILO 3 Sqn RAAF.....	1
Maj I.K. WHITTAKER, AILO 45 Sqn RAF, MUKEBELE.....	1
57 Lt AA Regt RA.....	1
CRE 1 Aust Corps Tps.....	1
CRE Left Sector 1 Aust Corps.....	1
Lt-Col FURLONG, Political Offr for LEBANON area.....	1
Lt-Col A.J. GARDINER, Political Offr for DAMASCUS area...	1
Lt-Col A.W. DAVIES, Political Offr for ALEPPO area.....	1
Major MUSGRAVE, Chief Security Offr for BEIRUT and LEBANON	1
Commission of Control.....	1
No.4 W/T Sec.....	1
GOC.....	1
BGS.....	1
CCRA.....	1
CE.....	1
CSO.....	1
G.....	3
SLO.....	1
I.....	6
A.....	1
Q.....	1
DDST.....	1
ADOS.....	1
DDMS.....	1
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps.....	1
Major A.G. FENTON, GHQ ME (I & P).....	1
HQ AIF ME.....	1
Lt-Gen Sir Thos BLAMEY C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Deputy C-in-C GHQ ME	1
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SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 29

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 19 Jul to 1200 hrs 20 Jul 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

PART 1

(a) RUSSIAN FRONT. The general situation does not appear to have materially changed in the last 48 hrs. There has, however, been heavy fighting on a large scale in all the sectors referred to in Int Summary No 27 except the far South, where the attack across the River PRUT may at present be held back. In two places the Germans appear to have made a substantial advance.

i. The coln from TALLINN (the lower "pincer" of the encircling movement against LENINGRAD) may have been pushed forward to within striking distance of the city on the South West.

ii. In the 3rd sector the coln from VITEBSK has evidently advanced some 50 miles to the region of NEVEL.

In addition the fighting near POLOTSK indicates another German thrust in this North sector, though the battle for SMOLENSK is still being maintained and the Russians are without doubt attempting to re-capture the town. There is no further report of German motorised colns advancing on MOSCOW from this point.

In the 4th sector the main drive which captured KIEV appears to have come from SARNY, and it is now reported that a secondary coln has taken NOVOGRAD VOLYNSK, thus widening the penetration and suggesting that the German command intends to wheel South in this region. The effect of such a move would be to threaten the rear of the SOVIET army holding BESSARABIAN frontier and ultimately to give possession of part, at least, of the rich UKRAINE grain lands.

The Red Army, on the other hand, is fighting back strongly at PSKOV, POLOTSK, SMOLENSK and KIEV, and also near NOVOGRAD VOLYNSK. In the first four cases it is probable that the Soviet Command is making a great effort to hold intact their pre-selected lines of defence, to which they withdrew 4 to 5 days ago. If the Germans can maintain their present penetrations of these lines against the Russian counter-strokes and can, in addition, force an evacuation of the remainder, it may be a serious blow to the whole Russian defensive plan West of MOSCOW.

- (b) GERMAN EQUIPMENT - (From GHQ ME Technical Int Summary No.29, dated 30 Jun 41)

2.5 cm Mobile Anti-tank Equipment

Recent reports suggest that one of the uses to which the very large numbers of type II 9 ton tanks - made available by recent reorganisation - have been put is to provide a light mobile anti-tank equipment.

The armour protection is said to be 25 mm, which would at fighting ranges give immunity against anything less than an anti-tank gun. The gun, mounted in a half turret, is believed to be the FRENCH 2.5 cm HOTCHKISS anti-tank gun.

The particulars of this gun are as follows :-

M.V. 3000 f.s.

Weight of A.P. Shot 11.3 oz.

Penetration 50 mm at normal at 400 yards.

32 mm at 22 degrees at 400 yards.

It is probable that the Germans secured over 3,000 of these guns from the French Army.

The type II tank weighed 9 tons. Dimensions and performance are as follows :-

Length 14'8"

Width 6'0"

Height 5'6"

Maximum road speed 28 m.p.h.

Cross country speed 18 m.p.h.

Trench crossed 4'11".

Water forded 2'6".

At least 2,000 of these tanks should be in existence, but it does not follow that they have all been converted to this particular purpose.

(c) TURKEY. It is of interest to note that when a small party of our troops made contact with a Turkish post at AIN DELFI, on the road between ALEPPO and ANTIOCK they received a very friendly reception and the Turkish soldiers showed that they regarded the arrival of our forces with the greatest pleasure.

PART II

SECURITY

Attached as Appx "A" is a copy of the complete text of the Agreement covering the cessation of hostilities in SYRIA and the LEBANON, with Protocols Nos.1 and 2 appended.



Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 29

APPENDIX "A"

AGREEMENT COVERING THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
IN SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

GENERAL SIR HENRY MAITLAND WILSON, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O.,
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING IN CHIEF OF THE ALLIED FORCES IN
PALESTINE AND SYRIA, (ACTING IN THE NAME OF THE COMMANDERS IN
CHIEF, MIDDLE EAST) - ON THE ONE HAND, AND

GENERAL DE VERDILHAC, COMMANDER OF THE LEGION OF HONOUR, DEPUTY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE FRENCH TROOPS IN SYRIA, (ACTING IN THE
NAME OF THE FRENCH HIGH COMMAND) - ON THE OTHER HAND

HAVE AGREED TO A CONVENTION WHICH ENDS HOSTILITIES IN SYRIA AND THE
LEBANON, OF WHICH THE FOLLOWING ARE THE TERMS:-

1. Hostilities ceased on 11th July, 1941, at 2101 hrs Greenwich mean time.
2. The Allied Forces will occupy SYRO-LEBANESE territory: the French forces will be concentrated in certain areas selected by a committee formed of representatives of both parties. This concentration will be completed by Tuesday 15th July, 1941, at 1200 hrs, at which hour Allied Forces will move to occupy certain strategic points. Up to the time of their repatriation the French Troops will remain under French Command, with a restricted establishment, which will provide for their maintenance from existing stocks. Special measures are foreseen for the JEBEL DRUZE, where, for security reasons, the French troops will remain in garrison until relieved by British Troops.
3. In order to ensure public security, the occupation of the principal localities in SYRIA and LEBANON will be undertaken in accordance with a programme which will allow immediate replacement of FRENCH by the occupying forces.
4. Minefields, whether on sea or land, will be disclosed to the occupying authorities.
5. Full honours of war will be granted to the French Forces. The latter will retire to the selected areas with all arms, including guns, machine guns, tanks and armoured cars, and their ammunition. All measures will be taken by the French Command to prevent arms and ammunition being left unguarded on the battlefield or elsewhere. The French Military authorities will give every assistance in recovering arms which may be in the hands of the population.
6. In consideration of the honours of war, French officers and non-commissioned officers and soldiers, are permitted to retain their individual arms (rifles or carbines; revolvers; bayonets; swords or sabres). However the soldiers will not be allowed to carry ammunition. In each unit, for security reasons, a small quantity of ammunition will be retained. The gendarmerie will retain its arms and a limited amount of ammunition. All other war material including guns, coastal batteries, anti-aircraft guns and military transport will be stocked under British control. The latter will inspect this material and will have the right to take over the material that may be required by them; the remainder will be destroyed by the French authorities under British control.

7. Prisoners of the Allied Forces will be forthwith set free, including those who have been transferred to France. As regards the latter, the British authorities reserve the right to hold as prisoners of war, an equal number of French officers, as far as possible of similar ranks, until those prisoners transferred to France have been released.

The French prisoners will be released when the whole of the SYRO-LEBANESE territory has been occupied and the clauses of this Convention fulfilled. They will then be enabled to join their units for repatriation.

8. The alternatives of rallying to the Allied cause or of being repatriated will be left to the free choice of the individual whether military or civil. In the case of civilians who do not rally to the Allied cause, individual applications to remain in SYRIA or LEBANON will be considered by the British Authorities.

9. Executive officials, officials of the technical services and special service officers will remain at their posts so long as is necessary to ensure the continuance of the administration of the country and until such time as they can be relieved. They can then be repatriated if they so wish. Their services may be dispensed with if their work or attitude is not satisfactory.

10. The British Authorities agree to the repatriation by French ships of French troops and of French subjects, with the reservation that this repatriation will be limited to those who have opted therefor. The British Authorities reserve the right to control all matters relative to the repatriation of these people.

11. Holdings of French subjects to be repatriated will be transferred in accordance with terms to be arranged. These people will receive treatment not less favourable than that accorded to British subjects who have lately left SYRIA.

12. French cultural institutions, including hospitals, schools, missions etc., are assured that their rights will be respected. The rights of these institutions must not be allowed to conflict with Allied military interests.

13. All public services, including railways, tramways, public transport, electricity and water will be maintained in operation and handed over intact.

14. All means of communication, including telephones, telegraphs, wireless and the submarine cable, will be handed over intact to the occupying authorities. The French Command will have the use of telegraph facilities with FRANCE on the same conditions as the general public.

15. Port installations, naval establishments and all ships - including British - in SYRIAN and LEBANESE territorial waters will be handed over intact to the occupying authorities.

16. All aircraft and air installations and equipment, in SYRIA or the LEBANON will be handed over intact. On the signature of the present agreement British aircraft are empowered to use any air base and alighting area in the LEBANON and SYRIA.

17. Fuel stocks shall be handed over intact. The quantity necessary for military transport will be placed at the disposal of the French Command.

Currency and other means of payment in circulation or in reserve possession of banks or other public authorities, will be safeguarded.

19. The British Military Authorities reserve the right to take into their service "Troupes Speciales du Levant" progressively as they are discharged by the French authorities. The arms of these troops will be handed over to the British Authorities.

20. The British Authorities will not prosecute in any way native Syrian and Lebanese who have been involved in the recent hostilities in a military or official capacity.

21. The carrying into effect of the terms of this Convention will be controlled and regulated by a "Commission of Control" which will sit at BEIRUT and will be composed of five members. Three of the members, including the President, will be nominated by the British Authorities, the remaining two by the French Authorities.

This "Commission of Control" is empowered to appoint sub-commissions and to co-opt the services of such experts as may be necessary.

22. This Convention is drawn up in English and in French. In case of dispute the English text will be authoritative.

PROTOCOL NO. 1

With reference to Clause 8 of the Convention:-

It is agreed between General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., General Officer Commanding-in Chief of the Allied Forces in Palestine and Syria, and General de Verdilhac, Commander of the Legion of Honour, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the French Troops in Syria, that:-

(a) There will be no personal contact between French and Allied individuals in order to influence the free choice of French Military Personnel.

(b) The Allied Authorities may use pamphlets, wireless and loud speakers for dissemination of their point of view.

(c) The choice of alternatives will be made by the individual himself without any sort of pressure.

(d) The assistance of British officers may be invoked by the French Authorities if considered necessary.

PROTOCOL NO. 2

With reference to para 9 of the Convention:-

The following are considered to be executive officials:-

The Chief Secretary of the High Commissioner.
The Members of the Civil and Military Cabinets, and of the Direction of Political Affairs.
The Financial Adviser.
The Economic Adviser.
The Legislative Adviser.
The Delegates and assistant Delegates of the High Commissioner.
The Administrative Advisers.
The Officers, on the active list, of the Commissariat (Supplies)
Special Service Officers.
French Officials of the Surete (C.I.D.) and Police, and Gendarmerie.
All other officials are considered to be officials of the technical services.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 30.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 20 Jul to 1200 hrs 21 Jul 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands.
-

PART 1.

(a) RUSSIA - Political. The following comments have been extracted from Army HQ Int-Summary No 131 :-

1. It has now been revealed that should RUSSIA have acceded to GERMAN demands, served upon them before the outbreak of present hostilities, the UKRAINE would probably have been made into a protectorate and all RUSSIAN forces in WESTERN RUSSIA would have been demobilised. Further substantial economic demands were also made, including the control of RUSSIAN oil in BAKU, and transit facilities through SOUTHERN RUSSIA for GERMAN forces.

ii. The UKRAINE- Economic. This district is one of the chief granaries and one of the most important industrial areas in the world. Its area is about 200,000 square miles or approximately two and a half times the area of VICTORIA.

The population is 40,000,000 and forms about one fifth of the population of the U.S.S.R.

The UKRAINE yields a grain crop of 16,000,000 tons a year and produces more than one-fifth of the Soviet's wheat, a third of its barley, a quarter of its maize, and more than two-thirds of its beet sugar.

The Republic to-day contains some 27,000 collective farms, which have under cultivation 87,500,000 acres of land.

iii. In 1937 the UKRAINE fields reaped a greater wheat harvest than GERMANY, POLAND and HUNGARY put together. Some parts of the UKRAINE are extremely rich in minerals and the Province yields more than half RUSSIA's coal and iron. The out-put of coal is 69,000,000 tons a year, whilst that of iron and steel is 33,000,000 tons. Other minerals such as manganese, zinc, lead and silver are also mined in large quantities and the CAUCASUS region supplies 28,000,000 tons of oil a year.

KIEV, situated on the DNEIPER river, is the administrative capital of the SOVIET UKRAINE, whilst KHARKOV is the industrial capital.

(b) 1. Chemical Warfare. Information recently received states that several bakelite boxes have been taken from German prisoners which were labelled "HAUTENTGIFTUNGSMITTEL" and containing ten tablets. These tablets are stabilised bleach, referred to in German as "LOSANTIN". The normal issue is two boxes per man. The method of use for treating skin contaminated by blister gas consists of making the tablet into a paste with water or saliva which is then applied to the affected part. After ten minutes it is washed off. The example of the ardent experimenter who ate several tablets under the impression that he was eating "Nazi Food Tablets" should NOT be followed.

- 2 -

ii. Far East. It is reported that poison gas and aerial bombs are being manufactured at HIMEJI (Kyushu) West of KOBE. The factory is reported to be the largest in JAPAN.

It is in two sections, one of which manufactures poison gas, and the other in filling aerial bombs and making flares. Five GERMAN technicians were attached to the installation in January 1941, and work has now been commenced on larger type bombs.

It is definitely known that the JAPANESE have been experimenting with aerial gas bombs in CHINA, and samples have been sent to WASHINGTON for analysis.

PART II

SECURITY.

N11.

V. Harris

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No 28.

W.D.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.31

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 21 Jul to 1200 hrs 22 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only
-

PART 1

(a) LIBYA: Apart from certain artillery activity on both sides there is nothing of importance to report from the TOBRUK area. In the frontier area our patrols succeeded in recovering an enemy armoured car which was damaged in action a few days previously.

On the night 14/15 Jul EA raided TOBRUK, FUKA, BAGUSH, MATRUH and SIWA. Only minor damage was caused except at SIWA where there were a number of civilian casualties.

(b) Attached as Appx "A" is a table of Sunrise, Sunset, Moonrise and Moonset for the month of AUGUST.

PART II

SECURITY

As a result of Security Instruction No.2 issued in furtherance of the Proclamation of 7 Jun 41, arms are already being handed in to the gendarmerie in the 25 Aust Inf Bde area.

E. Manderhous
may
+ / Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 31

Appendix "A"

Times of Sunrise, sunset, moonrise and moonset
in P.S.T. for latitude 32° 30'N, Longitude 35°E

AUGUST 1941

<u>Date</u>	<u>Sunrise</u>	<u>Sunset</u>	<u>Moonrise</u>	<u>Moonset</u>	<u>Moon's phase</u>
					First Quarter on 31/7/41
1	0554	1938	1407	0043	
2	0554	1938	1510	0112	
3	0555	1937	1612	0254	
4	0556	1936	1710	0259	
5	0556	1935	1804	0357	
6	0557	1934	1853	0458	
7	0558	1934	1937	0559	Full moon
8	0558	1933	2016	0700	
9	0559	1932	2053	0759	
10	0600	1931	2128	0856	
11	0600	1930	2202	0951	
12	0601	1928	2236	1046	
13	0602	1927	2310	1139	
14	0602	1926	2347	1232	
15	0603	1925	-	1325	Last quarter
16	0604	1924	0025	1417	
17	0604	1924	0108	1508	
18	0605	1923	0154	1558	
19	0606	1921	0244	1647	
20	0607	1920	0338	1733	
21	0607	1919	0436	1818	
22	0608	1918	0536	1900	
23	0608	1916	0638	1941	New moon
24	0609	1915	0741	2021	
25	0610	1914	0845	2101	
26	0611	1913	0950	2142	
27	0611	1912	1055	2225	
28	0612	1911	1200	2311	
29	0612	1910	1303	-	First quarter
30	0613	1908	1405	0001	
31	0614	1906	1503	0054	

NOTE: For G.M.T. subtract three hours from P.S.T.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.32

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 22 Jul to 1200 hrs 23 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART 1

(a) LIBYA: A GHQ communique reports that during Saturday night British and Indian patrols again carried out a series of raids which were as remarkable for success attained as for the paucity of casualties sustained. Several enemy strong posts were attacked. In one area an Indian patrol was attacked by the enemy in force; our patrol immediately counter-attacked with the bayonet, inflicting many casualties and forcing the enemy to withdraw in disorder. This patrol, which acted throughout with the greatest gallantry, finally withdrew without losing a man.

(b) Our troops in the TOBRUK Fortress area report that the Germans frequently use a Stick Hand Grenade. The following description of the Hand Grenade is reprinted from GHQ Technical Summary No.29 of 30 Jun:-

STICK HAND GRENADE: The stick hand grenade together with the egg-shaped grenade are the bombing weapons of the German Infantry. The grenade is about 14" long with the stick, and weighs 1.1 lbs; it contains .37 lbs of explosive. The lethal radius from blast is 6 - 7 yards and from splinters 15 - 17 yards.

At the top end of the stick is a screwed safety cap. When throwing the grenade the cap is unscrewed and the string which lies inside the hollow stick is given a sharp pull. By pulling the string a match fuze is lighted which burns for $4\frac{1}{2}$ seconds before the detonator explodes.

Before action the bombs are usually carried without detonators. To put in the detonator, the stick part is unscrewed from the head which holds the explosive. The metal end of the match fuze is then exposed in the bore of the stick. The detonator is slipped into the end of the fuze which is conical and the head and stick screw together again.

These grenades are occasionally tied together in bundles for use against anti-tank ditches or pill boxes or tied on to a board for use as a Bangalore Torpedo.

PART II

SECURITY

N11

E. Thander-Jones
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.33

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 23 Jul to 1200 hrs 24 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only

SPECIAL NOTE

The British Press and the B.B.C. have recently published accounts of radio equipment used in anti-aircraft defence.

The fact that certain information was thus given does NOT mean that the strictest secrecy is no longer essential in all matters relating to our radio equipment.

All ranks must be given clearly to understand that the strictest secrecy is still essential and that our radio equipment must never be discussed except in connection with the execution of duty.

PART 1

(a) U.S.S.R.

The following information about the Soviet Army is taken from AHQ Int Summary No.132, dated 4 Jul 41 :-

Russian Morale

i. Army: The morale of the Red Army remains steady, and the Russian soldier has always been famed for personal gallantry. It remains to be seen, however, whether the substitution of collective spirit and secondary education can replace the previous love of Czar and native soil.

ii. Air: The morale of the average Russian pilot is not thought to be very high. Although personnel in 1941 are reported to have shown great enthusiasm for flying, it is not considered that this would be maintained in face of subsequent failures or defeats.

Equipment

i. Army: Much of their equipment is obsolete.

ii. Air: It is considered that defence by Russian Air Force would not be effective owing to the reported poor quality of Russian machines.

Fighting Ability

It is believed that the initial failure in FINLAND was taken seriously to heart and every effort has since been made to improve the efficiency of the Red Army. Political instruction has ceded first place to military training, and competent officers no longer have to seek the permission of Commissars before giving orders. At the same time it is not believed that the time has been sufficient to turn the Red Army into anything like a first-class fighting force. Furthermore, it is thought changes in the High Command still occur far too frequently.

Order of Battle.

The following approximate disposition of Soviet Forces is based on information received up to the 17th May 1941 :-

	Cav Divs	Inf Divs	Tank Bdes (Lt, Hy and Motorised)	Tank Divs.
EUROPE	26	132	62	2
ASIA	18	52	17	-
Totals	44	184	79	2
Effectives (Approximate)	308,000 men	3,128,000 men	15,800 to 19,750 Tks.	

Notes

i. It has been suggested that GERMANY is using approximately 120 divisions in her attack on the USSR. It is known that she has 20 Armd and 20 Mot divs, and it is probable that the majority of these are included in the above figure.

ii. At Appx "A" is a brief description of the topography of the European Frontier of USSR, taken from AHQ Int Summary No 132.

TURKEY.

i. The Turks are displaying great activity in the construction of the new Catalca Lines which lie between the lakes of TERKES GOL and BOYUK CEKMECE. There is a continuous anti-tank ditch and concrete emplacements. In addition two further lines, one running North from Lake KUCUK CEKMECE and the other on the outskirts of ISTANBUL are under preparation.

ii. Preparations are also in hand for the construction of a railway which will connect the FILYOS railway with the SAMSUN-SIVAS railway across the KIZIL IRMAK and YESIL IRMAK moors.

PART II.

1. SECURITY.

i. Police. The Police organisation in SYRIA and the LEBANON is published for the assistance of Security Officers.

- (a) Surete Generale (A kind of C.I.D.)
- (b) Syrian and Lebanese Police (town)
- (c) Syrian and Lebanese Gendarmerie (country)

These organisations are now being administered by a British Security Commission which is located at the Surete Generale building in BEYROUTH.

The members of the Commission are as follows :-

Major MUSGRAVE
" TWEEDIE
Capt READMAN
" MENZIES

The Syrian and Lebanese Police and Gendarmerie are well liked by the civil inhabitants. Their duties are traffic control and maintenance of law and order; but as they are very susceptible to bribery it is not considered they could be relied upon in important matters.

2. FRENCH SECURITY REGULATIONS.

The principal features of the French Security Regulations which were in force until our occupation were :-

(a) Every person should be in possession of an identity card. This does not apply to members of Beduin Tribes. Attached to each tribe is a government officer whose duty it is to know all the members of that tribe. In the event of a Beduin being apprehended it is necessary to contact this officer for verification of identity.


(b) All foreigners are required to register.

(c) Arms : NO person is permitted to carry arms in the Police District. This area includes the LEBANON, the cultivated portion of SYRIA and all large towns.

In each village there is a village guard. This man is allowed to carry a shot gun.

The carrying of arms is permitted in the desert area; but persons moving into the Police District from the desert are required to deposit their arms at one of the control posts. A receipt is issued for arms so deposited, and must be produced on the owner's return before such arms are handed over.

In some cases Sheikhs are allowed to retain their arms when entering the Police District. In such cases a red permit is issued.



Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.33

Appendix "A"

(Reprinted from AHQ Int Summary No.132 of 4 Jul)

U.S.S.R. - TOPOGRAPHY OF EUROPEAN FRONTIER

1. FINNISH FRONTIER

In the Petsamo area in the extreme north the country consists for the most part of rocky Russian uplands and fells, with marshes and lakes in valleys. The remainder of the frontier territory consists predominantly of pine forest lands broken here and there by lakes, marshes and a few cultivated tracts. The surface is very undulating with innumerable low hills. Although there are no heights of importance, roads are hilly and rivers swift. Road and rail communications are very poor.

No constructed defence lines have been reported but the country is mostly unsuitable for armoured fighting vehicles and favours defence.

2. GERMAN FRONTIER

The frontier territory consists of former Baltic States and is flat agricultural land interspersed with woodlands. Suitable for operations generally.

Defences

The first natural line of defence against a German advance from East Prussia is the Niemen River, which forms a considerable obstacle, being approximately 100 yards broad at Kaunas; owing to the direction of the course of the River, it is chiefly in the sector south of Kaunas that it is of value as an obstacle. The German occupation of Memel deprives the Russians of defensive advantage of the Niemen River and gives scope for German flanking movement. The next natural line of defence in a thrust towards Leningrad is formed by the River Dvina and by the River Velikaya south of Lake Peipus.

3. THE FRONTIER OF GERMAN OCCUPIED POLAND

Three Sectors

(a) From Grodno to Brest Litovsk including Serlerolenka Salient. This consists of low lying flat agricultural country mostly suitable for armoured fighting vehicles. This flat stretch continues in a north-east direction through what is known as Baronovitchi Gap. There are no natural defences in this Sector.

(b) From Brest Litovsk along the Bug River to the south for about 100 miles. Here the frontier country is very low lying, wet and marshy consisting of Pripet Marshes. The River Bug forms a natural defensive obstacle and to the east the River marshes render any large scale operation over the wide stretch difficult.

(c) South to the foot of the ~~Carpathians~~ Carpathians the frontier leaves the River Bug and runs south-west to the San River, thence to the Hungarian frontier. The country is open, consisting of undulating plains and foothills of the Carpathians, which form no serious obstacle. There are no natural defences in this Sector.

4. HUNGARIAN FRONTIER

The frontier runs along the crest of the Carpathians for approximately 160 miles. The country is mountainous and unsuitable for any large scale operations by mechanised forces.

5. ROUMANIAN FRONTIER

The frontier runs generally in a north-east direction to join the Pruth near the town of Herta. The whole of this stretch consists of hilly wooded country unsuitable for large scale operations. The frontier then follows the left bank of the Pruth River to the Black Sea. The country is flat and marshy up to the line of the Dniester River and communications are poor. To the east of the Dniester there are wide stretches of flat agricultural plains mostly suitable for military operations on a large scale.

Defences

The Pruth River forms a partial obstacle. In breadth it varies from 650 to 1000 feet but in the summer is easily fordable. The next natural obstacle of importance is the Dniester River. Lack of bridges over this River would undoubtedly increase the difficulties of an attacking force.

6. THE 1939 FRONTIER LINE OF THE U.S.S.R.

It is reported that the Russians have constructed in this area considerable defences in depth but no precise information as to instalment of fortifications is available.

7. CROPS

Normally at this time of the year no crops will have been harvested in any of the agricultural districts along the frontier (except possibly in the extreme south along the Black Sea area). It is reported that, owing to the late Spring, Winter corn is still green in even most forward areas.

SECRET

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 34

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 24 Jul to 1200 hrs 25 Jul 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' COMMANDS only.
-

PART 1

(a) ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY.

Attacks on the SUEZ CANAL ZONE by enemy aircraft have continued during the last few weeks. From 10 to 14 Jul, for instance, four attacks were made; one of these, at ABU SUEIR, caused extensive damage to land installations, and another, at SUEZ, resulted in a ship being declared a total loss. Further, the CANAL was closed to traffic for a short time, as mines had been dropped and it was suspected that some were still unexploded.

(b) ENEMY TACTICS AND EQUIPMENT.

i. -- German Inf Gun. The GERMAN Infantry Regiment (roughly the equivalent of our Bde) has as an integral part of its organization the Infantry Gun Coy. This Coy has 6, 7.5 cm (2.95 in) Light Infantry guns and 2, 15 cm (5.9 in) Heavy Inf guns. The Light Inf Gun is mounted on a tubular split-trail carriage, and can be drawn by motor vehicle or horses or carried on pack animals in seven loads. It fires two types of shell, the lighter of which weighs 10 lbs, and has a range of 5,600 yds. The heavier shell weighs 14 lbs and has a range of 4,200 yds. The gun has a rate of fire of 20 rds per minute.

In addition, there is a more modern Light Inf Gun, the 75 mm (M.O. 2-26) INF Gun, with a maximum range of 8750 yds.

The 15 cm Heavy Inf gun has practically replaced the 17 cm Mortar, being really a well developed Howitzer. It is believed to have a maximum range of 9296 yds with a 92.6 lb shell. It has a rate of fire of 3 rds per minute. The gun has a box trail and is fitted with a dial sight.

Sketches of both Light and Heavy Infantry guns are attached as Appendix "A" to this Summary.

ii. Enemy arty at TOBRUK. Several German Pw have stated that there are French soldiers in German uniforms in LIBYA acting as crews for the long range guns sited around TOBRUK. It is worthy of note that neither the GERMAN nor ITALIAN Armies have a gun of 155 mm calibre, such as is known to be shelling TOBRUK. It is known, however, that the French have several guns of this calibre.

iii. German MT difficulties in LIBYA. According to several Pw, GERMAN Fords are causing a lot of trouble in the desert. The famous German "Peoples Car" has proved quite desert-worthy. Prisoners however, express great admiration for the British 15 cwt van. The fact that MT maintenance has been a great problem to the Germans is brought about by the fact that 15 M/C Battalion is being used as

- 2 -

Infantry Unit. The M/C combinations were practically new on arrival and now there are only about a dozen left in the Unit.

iv. New A/Tk Obstacle. Tests carried out on cotton bales show that a "V" shaped wall of 750 lb bales, 2 rows thick, 3 high in front, 2 high in the back row, across a road, effectively stopped an "I" tank. .303 armour piercing bullets failed to penetrate more than 21", and incendiary and tracer ammunition failed to set it alight. A 47 mm Breda armour piercing shell penetrated one bale, but failed to penetrate the second from 60 yds range. Four direct hits with HE shells destroyed about 1 ft of the bale.

PART 11

SECURITY.


Nil.

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Mandantones
for Lt-Col
GS-1 Aust Corps.


DISTRIBUTION : as per Summary No 28.

APPENDIX A TO 1 AUST. CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
Nº 34

SKETCHES OF GERMANY INFANTRY GUNS.



7.5 CM (2.95 M) LIGHT
INFANTRY GUN WITH SPLIT TRAIL (L.13)



15 CM (5.91 M) HEAVY
INFANTRY GUN.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 35.

SECRET

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 25 Jul to 1200 hrs 26 Jul 41.

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PART 1

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS - Nil

(b) GERMAN EQUIPMENT

1. Troop Carrying Gliders. (extracted from GHQ ME
Technical Intelligence Summary No 30 dated 5 Jul 41)

The following information is mainly derived from
Prisoners of War, captured in CRETE.

The DFS 230 type of glider carries ten men, all seated,
one behind the other, with their rifles stored in clamps at each
man's side. The four rear seats are removeable, and the space
could doubtless be used for carrying stores instead of men.
Ordinary infantry troops are carried and in many cases they do not
appear to receive any special training, beyond instruction and
practice in getting out of the machine speedily after landing.
This can be accomplished very quickly as there are exits at front
and rear.

No reserve pilot and no observer is carried, the latter
being unnecessary as the glider is released near to its objective.
A Machine Gun is often carried, fitted externally on a clamp on
the side of the Machine, firing horizontally forward. The gun is
fixed and no definite aim is taken, but the gun is fired shortly
before landing at anything which appears in the line of flight,
presumably chiefly for moral effect. Neither the troops nor the
pilot carry parachutes, and no W/T is fitted.

Glider pilots are not interchangeable with pilots of the
G.A.F. proper. Their main problem is to put down the machine as
quickly as possible on the required spot after release from the
towing aircraft.

Gliders may be towed by JU.52's, HE.46's and HENSCHEL
126's. One is the normal number of gliders to be towed by one
aircraft, but it would appear that two or three may possibly be
used. It has been reported from CRETE that in a single instance
a JU.52 was seen to be towing six gliders. Gliders are not
towed in tandem, but are connected direct to the towing aircraft.

A unit (Staffel) consists of from 15 to 20 gliders, and
the ground staff has approximately the same number of riggers as
there are machines. The machines of a Staffel can be assembled
in about a day (wings and flying wires rigged).

If released from 16,000 ft., they will glide for between
44 and 75 miles according to the strength and direction of the
wind. The air speed is about 70 m.p.h. Flaps are fitted on the
upper trailing edge of the wings and open upwards. When the flaps
are shut in the air, the machine does not drop suddenly like a
power-driven aircraft, and therefore spot landings are easy.

The fuselage of the machine is constructed of steel
tubing, and the wings are of wooden construction. The following
luminous flying instruments are fitted :-

Air Speed Indicator
Altimeter
Rise and fall indicator
Compass
Turn and bank indicator

11. Notes on German Tank Tactics in LIBYA. (From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.424, dated 18 Jul 41)

Most of the following information is based on reports^{made} during the operations 15/17 June.

Advance: Advance is usually made in mass with regular intervals between the tanks which come on in waves. A familiar signal to advance is two white Verey lights. During the "Scorpion" operation, 26-27 May, by which HALFAYA was retaken, when three tank battalions were employed, advances were made either with two battalions up and one in rear, or vice-versa. Field artillery is in close support with the A echelon behind it. The advance is measured and on 17 Jun. was unexpectedly slow. Anti-tank guns or field artillery keep our A.F.Vs. at a distance of 2000 to 3000 yards. Their fire is also designed to prevent our 2-pounders getting within range. Artillery concentrates on counter-moves.

On one occasion an advance was made in the dark. During the attack on HALFAYA the armoured force consisting of three tank battalions commanded by Lt.Colonel CRAMER leaguered during the night 26/27 May seven kilometres South of HALFAYA Pass. At 0530 hours it moved North-East and was assembled in action stations on the escarpment before first light.

Withdrawal: Retirement is usually covered by a few tanks moving by bounds and accompanied sometimes by anti-tank guns. A smoke screen has also been used as cover.

German tanks have also been used in the following roles :

Patrols: In a way similar to our own.

Protection to Artillery: On 15/16 June tanks accompanied artillery to within 2000 yards of our positions at CAPUZZO and remained with the guns so long as they were in action.

Pillboxes: When so used tanks are dug in to protect tracks.

Bait: Instances are reported of three or four tanks remaining stationary with crews mounted, and apparently derelict. Supporting artillery and anti-tank guns remain hidden ready to knock out any vehicles that might approach.

Intimidation: On two occasions between 40 and 60 tank advanced in mass formation in quick, short moves to make us withdraw. Neither attack was pressed home.

Tank Gunnery: The general standard of gunnery is high. Tank crews are instructed to take every opportunity of registering hits at 80° - 90°. Their own tank must position itself so that the front and side present an acute angle to the opposing guns. They rarely fire on-the move. Mass formations halt beyond the range of our 2-pounders; Mark IV tanks then open fire. Stationary gunnery from the Mark II and Mark III is preferred, the tanks moving rapidly from bound to bound firing from "Hull Down" positions. On two occasions the Mark IV tanks produced a creeping barrage by advancing firing their guns not at specific targets but between 3000 - 4000 yards ahead of their course, with the notion, one presumes, of intimidating defence pockets and O.Ps.

Concealment: The Germans make good use of ground. On 15 and 16 May German tanks used folds in the ground cleverly, in one instance

ready for our tank attack, in two others before themselves attacking. Shrewd advantage has been taken of dust storms.

Movement: On the march German tanks move fast. On 26/27 May a column of 8 tanks moved 100 miles. One column including tanks averaged 10 m.p.h., another averaged 20 m.p.h.. Short bursts of 6 to 8 miles seen preferred, with intervening halts for maintenance.

Maintenance, Supply and Recovery: The supply echelons and repair section travel well forward into the battle area. Replenishment and repair are covered by fighter patrols. On 16 Jun., before attacking, German tanks replenished in full view of our troops. A group of some twenty-five tanks was halted closely huddled, crews dismounted and unconcerned about occasional shellings. Suddenly the crews doubled to their tanks and the whole group moved off rapidly with only 25 yards between tanks and no attention paid to flank guards. The A echelon lorries which had been behind the tanks then prepared to move off.

During operations the armourer section marches with first line transport and the W.O. in charge is in independent and constant communication with the battle unit. During pauses in fighting he takes his section out to repair arms or turrets. Recovery is attempted under tank protection during battle and unsalvageable vehicles destroyed on the spot.

PART II

SECURITY

N11

Wanderer
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.36

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 26 Jul to 1200 hrs 27 Jul 41

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PART 1

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS

N11

(b) ENEMY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

The following information has been extracted from GHQ Tech I: Summary No.31, dated 10 Jul 41 :-

1. 150 mm Mobile Gun: It has been reported that GERMAN Propaganda film included shots of a 150 mm gun mounted on a caterpillar truck. The gun itself was heavily protected with front, side, and overhead armour, and ^{was} contained in what is described as being "a sort of turret, hydraulically operated". Two men with L.M.G.'s provided ground protection, being carried on two stretcher-like platforms, one on each side of the turret. These trucks appeared to operate very far forward, little behind the point of the vanguard.

11. German Camouflage and Deception Methods: The GERMANS, possibly because of the great air superiority which has characterised their previous campaigns, do not pay great attention to concealment from air observation. There is evidence, however, that they are realizing that this advantage does not lie with them to the same extent in LIBYA, and that serious attention is now being paid to this matter.

A.F.V's and M.T. are painted a light khaki "desert-colour", and disruptive colouring is not used. Grease mixed with sand is also smeared on vehicles to obtain exact conformity with the colour of the surrounding ground. GERMAN Air Force observers state that it is almost impossible to distinguish GERMAN from BRITISH M.T.. When halted vehicles are surrounded by sangars.

Guns are painted yellow, and no particular care is taken to conceal them, although the sun-covers provided for all guns help to conceal the outline. Nets exist, but they are very seldom used.

Smoke is frequently employed by A.F.V's, which withdraw under its cover.

The "Peoples Car" (VOLKSWAGEN), as is shown by a captured photograph, can be transformed into a dummy tank, although it must be said that the appearance of this is decidedly unconvincing.

PART II - SECURITY - N11

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+ Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 37

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PART 1.

- (a) OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT-- Reprinted from BTE
WEEKLY INT SUMMARY No 58 dated 24 Jul 41

(i) At TOBRUK the chief feature of interest has been almost nightly raids by our fighting patrols, which have met with great success, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and capturing prisoners. So much have these patrols worried the enemy, that he has become extremely nervous, has concentrated every form of defensive fire on these patrols, and has resorted to the use of searchlights for ground observation. His nervousness can be further confirmed by the fact that his broadcasts state that these raids are "determined attempts to break out of TOBRUK".

In the middle of the week the enemy made an attempt to revive his lowered morale by sending over a large, all Italian, counter-patrol, which was, however, put to flight by our tps with heavy casualties. In other respects the enemy has kept very quiet, except that his medium guns have continued to shell the town and harbour, causing little damage or casualties.

(ii) The FRONTIER area has continued quiet during the week. The enemy has shown less activity with his blasting operations, and his standing patrols of armd cars have been driven off. There has been minor shelling by both sides, during which we have knocked out several tanks and armd cars. After repeated efforts by both sides to salvage these, they were finally brought back by our tps. There have been no significant movements of MT.

- (b)- Attached as Appx "A" is an extract from GHQ Tech Int Summary No 30 dated 5 Jul which is circulated for general infn and intrinsic interest.

"A sketch of the German Troop Carrying Glider" referred to in our Summary No 35 is attached as Appx "B".

PART 11.

SECURITY.

- (a) COLLECTION OF ARMS

Reports so far received indicate that, whilst the law abiding section of the population are surrendering their arms, the large majority have as yet failed to conform to the terms of the Proclamation. It is felt that the worst elements in the community will strongly resist all attempts at collection. In one area, a competent authority has estimated that 8% of the inhabitants are in possession of arms of various types, including MG's, and in a number of areas this widespread possession of arms is causing some alarm among the people.

3.

(b) It is reported from a reliable source that cases have occurred recently of British soldiers selling arms, petrol and rations to civilians.

(c) Attached as Appendix "C" are the names and relevant details of certain persons who have recently come under adverse notice. It will be noted that the arrest of one of them is desired.

(d) The Security of Military Infm of every kind is a primary duty of all Intelligence Officers : it is therefore important to ascertain the extent to which the enemy knew our plans and dispositions during the recent campaign in SYRIA. An interesting light is thrown on this question by a report from a unit Intelligence N.C.O. which is attached as Appendix "D" to this summary. It may be presumed that the enemy commanders were far better informed than the civilians mentioned in this report.

W. Adler mjr
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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Appx "A" to 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No.37

Reprinted from GHQ Tech Int Summary No.30, dated 5 Jul 41

WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE USED BY GERMANY FOR INVASION PURPOSES

(a) Amphibious Tanks

A neutral observer travelling on the POTSDAM-HAMBURG road near LAKE WANNSEE late in 1940 met an amphibious tank preceded by two men wearing civilian clothes and riding in an Army car.

He estimated a number of the characteristics of this vehicle as follows:

Length:	24 feet
Width:	10 feet
Height:	12 feet
Engine:	Not visible but believed to be petrol rather than Diesel.
Speeds:	20 miles per hour as observed on the road; not observed in water.
Track:	
Type:	Flat plate; plates appeared unusually thin and light in weight.
Width:	10 inches
Ground contact:	18 feet

Two propeller shafts extended through the rear of the body hull. Each shaft was about 30 inches from the side wall of the tank. Each propeller consisted of two blades, each about 20 inches long. A rudder, about 24 inches high and 18 inches wide, appeared to be attached to the rear of each propeller shaft housing.

The sides of the upper part of the hull extended out over the tracks. The lower forward section of the hull curved upwards at an angle of approximately 45 degrees. The entire forward section of the hull presented a blunt appearance. The observer was of the opinion that such construction of the forward end would enable this vehicle to ride waves of considerable size.

The observer was unable to see the roof of the tank from his car but the upper edge of the hull was encircled by a 1½ to 2 inch rope. The bottom of the hull was a flat surface except for the forward end. Ground clearance was estimated to be 26 inches. When first observed, this vehicle was making a 180 degrees change in direction pivoting in place on the road on one track.

Another observer, living at present in VIENNA, saw a similar vehicle while travelling in SOUTHERN GERMANY several months ago.

(b) Submarine Tanks

Tanks which can crawl along the bottom of the sea and surprise the defenders by suddenly emerging on the beaches have been the subject of a number of recent reports.

One report said that the GERMANS have built 1,600 of these submarine tanks, driven by accumulators, to be carried near to the ENGLISH Coast on rafts and barges, whence they will proceed under their own power.

Another report says that a vacuum is created in the vehicle and the crew are equipped with special breathing apparatus. These tanks cross the water not by floating, but on the bottom. This latter idea is a feasible one, but due to the difficulty of underwater propulsion, its use would probably be restricted to fairly narrow stretches of water.

The requisite batteries for high underwater endurance would be both cumbersome and heavy, and the problems of water tightness and navigation would have to be solved as in the submarine. The practical difficulties of construction would be considerable if the vehicle were required to withstand pressures at more than moderate depths.

One of the best of the stories is that these tanks are to drop from the parent ship near shore and crawl ashore in unexpected places such as under chalk cliffs, through which a breach is blasted by dive bombers.

In spite of the constructional difficulties the idea behind these reports should not be discarded as impracticable. It is not beyond the Germans to have devised and brought such a machine to a practical possibility.

(c) Air-borne Tanks

The stream of reports on air-borne tanks continues to gain volume and it seems evident that the programme is designed to impress us with the fear that every heavy plane seen over ENGLAND is a potential tank carrier, and that masses of tanks including heavy vehicles of 20 tons will be unloaded behind our defence lines.

In considering this subject there are limitations which should be borne in mind.

- (a) There is at the present moment a very definite limitation to the weight of tank which can be carried in an aircraft. The absolute maximum is reckoned to be 10 tons, and for practical purposes dimensional restrictions may reduce this slightly.
- (b) The number of planes suitable for carrying such heavy loads is at present limited and it seems unlikely that the GERMAN General Staff would tie up a large number of them in the transport of vehicles which, when landed, would not have any very great fighting value.

The fact remains that tanks such as the 3½ ton CZECH SI and the 6 ton Pz.Kw.1 can be carried by air and might be used for such operations as the capture of aerodromes.

(d) Remote Controlled Land Torpedoes

Another weapon which it is known the GERMANS were developing during the early stages of the war is a remote controlled land torpedo for the destruction of enemy fortifications and defence works.

It was reported early in 1940 that the GERMANS had developed a small streamlined vehicle moving on tracks, approximately 3 feet in height and propelled by a 20 h.p. motor and carrying approximately 300 lbs of explosive. Once set in motion the operator had no control over the vehicle except by means of a trailing cable, a tug on which was arranged to detonate the explosive. Detonation also took place a few seconds after the forward movement of the vehicle had been arrested by an obstacle; the shape of the vehicle was such that the force of the explosion was mostly in a forward direction and two spades were arranged to let down into the ground at the rear of the vehicle to take the recoil.

The FRENCH had made similar experiments and in March, 1940 held a demonstration of two types of vehicles known as "P" and "K" to which British representatives were invited.

Vehicle "P" was a small lightly armoured track vehicle carrying 300 lbs of explosive and controlled for direction by wireless up to a range of 1100 yards. The demonstration was quite successful but it was considered that the machine was difficult to produce in large numbers and moreover the charge appeared unnecessarily large for the task.

Vehicle "K" was a small, battery-driven vehicle carrying 90 lbs of explosive. It had a maximum speed of 10 m.p.h. and was controlled by a 3-core trailing cable by means of which the vehicle could be halted, turned or exploded. It was capable of moving under water, provided the bottom was reasonably level and firm. This vehicle created an excellent impression, being comparatively simple to produce and having great possibilities for blowing gaps in minefields, wire or other light obstacles and also as an anti-tank weapon.

Certain small obsolete tanks were also filled with explosives and arranged for remote wireless control for the same purpose.

The designs and test reports of the FRENCH developments undoubtedly fell into GERMAN hands at the time of the occupation. No very recent reports of GERMAN developments have been received but it is likely that they have been continually experimenting with these weapons, incorporating in their own models improvements gleaned from the FRENCH designs.

With the particular purpose of invasion in view they would be likely to have improved the under-water qualities of the vehicle and may now have a tank which can be launched from off shore and, under wireless control, be capable of advancing up the beach, and being detonated on reaching the first obstacle. It is quite possible that some such design has been perfected and is well on in the production stage; one can imagine many of these torpedoes being released simultaneously from landing craft while still a little off shore, and thus presenting a formidable preparation for the main tank attack.

(e) Rockets

Certain recent reports of GERMAN development of Rockets have tended to suggest that their use as an invasion weapon is contemplated. While it is unlikely that they could be used as a long-range projectile from the other side of the Channel, there are certain advantages in their use as projectiles from small craft, as follows:-

- (1) They can be fired from small craft too flimsy to take a gun of comparable calibre.
- (2) The high rate of fire obtainable would to some extent compensate for the lack of accuracy.
- (3) They could develop an intense preliminary bombardment, during the approach of landing craft, using H.E., smoke or gas.
- (4) The projectors would be more easily transportable to the shore than the equivalent artillery pieces, and could provide good supporting fire in the early stages of landing operations.

The use of rockets, although otherwise unconfirmed is nevertheless supported by reports and by the above considerations, and might offer a solution to the problem of providing adequate artillery support.

(f) Possible Use of Flame-Throwers in Support of a Landing Operation

The suggested possible use by GERMANY of flame-throwers mounted on boats, and having a range from 50 to 300 metres is considered less likely than the use of portable flame throwers of the one-man type.

A flame-thrower mounted in a boat standing off-shore would be unlikely to find suitable targets within its range, and also it would discharge fuel at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ tons a minute. It has actually been found that the practical limit of a flame-thrower's range is about 150 yards.


One-man portable flame-throwers, or tank-mounted flame throwers with a range of up to 150 yards and a duration jet of one to two minutes would be more likely to be used.

APPENDIX B To 1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
No 37


REFER DESCRIPTION OF TROOP CARRYING GLIDERS IN
1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
No 35 DATED 26 JUL 41

GERMAN TROOP CARRYING GLIDER.

"WORMS EYE" VIEW



APPROX DIMENSIONS:-
SPAN 81'3"
LENGTH 50'0"



Appx "C" to 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No. 37.

CAPTAIN BORDES.

Information received states that the above mentioned is a VICHY FRENCH Medical Officer who has been gaining access to FRENCH patients in Military Hospitals by means of forged credentials purporting to come from FREE FRENCH authorities. BORDES is reported to have recently visited 60 General and BETHLEHEM hospitals JERUSALEM. He was reported seen at 23 General Hospital SARAFAND on the evening 24 July.

If located this officer should be placed under close arrest and this Headquarters informed immediately.

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Jamil SHAMAT.

The following information has been received from a reliable source.

About June 15 a VICHY FRENCH Officer interviewed Jamil and Taufiq SHAMAT. As a result of this interview the SHAMATS were given 150 rifles and instructed to patrol the mountainous region between DAMASCUS AND BAALBEK.

Members of this band were later used to reconnoitre British positions and the information supplied by them is believed to account for the accuracy of the FRENCH shelling on the MISSALUN front. The following persons are reported to have been employed for this purpose :-

Abdul Latif SHAMAT
Muhsin Abdul WAHID
Hasan GHADBAN
Mohamed Muflin GHUSUN
Mohamed Dib RUSTAM

On the withdrawal of the FRENCH forces, the SHAMATS looted the neighbouring villages, notably HALBUN, KAHR AWAMID, and HARIRI, and gathered up any arms left by the VICHY forces.

Note: The SHAMATS have been a public nuisance in SYRIA for the past 15 years and have continually terrorised the inhabitants of the ZIBDANI region. Apart from arms traffic and cattle stealing, their most successful racket has been the looting of trains on their way through the ZIBDANI Valley.

They have succeeded in carrying on these activities for so long by means of threats and bribes, and by continually trading on the fact that they rendered valuable assistance to the FRENCH against their own fellow countrymen in the 1925 revolt.

Their fame as bandits is widespread, and it is claimed that even in DAMASCUS, no tram conductor would dare to ask a SHAMAT for his fare.

-----oOo-----

(OVER)

Appx "D" to 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No.37

"... With credentials of the Australian Journalists' Association, I was the guest of the American University of BEYROUTH for a few hrs. I was so amazed at the intimate knowledge of students in general, and one in particular, concerning current details of the SYRIAN campaign that I feel impelled to pass them on .

1. DAMOUR - The University has its usual lecture room, and featured on the floor is a relief map of DAMOUR which was recently purchased from FRENCH authorities. On a large scale, it was apparently of military origin, about 12 feet square. Features of military importance and topographical were obviously accurate. Students had an intimate knowledge of all phases of the battle, and my companion, a QMS of our unit, was able to pin-pt the precise wadi which he negotiated during the fight. In their lectures, students were told that the main Vichy breakdown was due to fear of their machine gunners of the cold steel bayonet of Australians, following the hy arty barrage.

2. BEYROUTH. There was also a relief map of this city 10 feet square, obviously of military origin, and I was asked pt blank what hope we would have had of taking BEYROUTH but for VICHY shortage of food and munitions. It certainly appeared impregnable but I offered no comment.

3. TYR and LITANI RIVER. There was also a map of this sec and students had a complete knowledge of this battle.

4. The particular student, whose knowledge impressed me, was a seventeen years old LEBANESE. He had a surprising knowledge of the names and types of Australian units engaged in the campaign. One of his potent questions was as to why Australians were allowed to go into battle in felt hats. I carefully avoided any indication of knowledge of this incident, content to be a listener as part of my tactics with him.

5. In an authoritative tone the student in question asked me when the Australians were moving further North in SYRIA so that English regts could take over coastal sectors. Whether he was "pumping" me or not I do not know, but I was again cautious and "knew nothing".

6. Apart from the highly interesting museum, these are the salient pts of our conversation. I realise that this has no value from an int aspect now that the "stable door is open", but this infm was apparently current during the campaign. To me personally, filling the role of sgt clerk and custodian of bn int during the campaign, it would appear that this student had almost as much knowledge (less times and places) of movements as myself. For instance, he knew that the two original objectives were BEYROUTH and RAYAK and that later this was changed to BEYROUTH as the primary objective..."

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.38

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 28 Jul to 1200 hrs 29 Jul 41

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PART 1

(a) RUSSIAN FRONT

The last reference to the situation on the Russian Front in these Summaries was made on 20 Jul 41. Since then there has been no change in the general position. There have been claims and counter-claims by both sides, but on the whole the German communiques have emphasised the difficulties with which their armies are confronted, while the Russians have repeatedly stressed the fierceness of the fighting.

The following seems a fair summary of the recent operations (21-28 Jul) :-

i. FINLAND:

No major German or Finnish offensive is developing in any area. Considerable artillery activity is reported at HANGO, but the Finnish attack appears to have made little headway.

ii. ESTONIA (1st Sector):

After making considerable progress East of LAKE PEIPOUS, the Germans met stiff Soviet resistance and the momentum of their advance was slowed down. They have however been able to make some progress since and Soviet communiques have spoken of "fierce fighting" SW of LENINGRAD and of "stubborn resistance in the defence of LENINGRAD". On 27 Jul the ROME Radio claimed that German mechanised columns had succeeded in surrounding the city - presumably by cutting the MOSCOW-LENINGRAD railway. This is as yet quite unconfirmed.

iii. LATVIA (2nd Sector):

Severe fighting round PSKOV was reported from 20 to 23 Jul, but since then activity seems to have died down.

iv. Centre (3rd Sector)

The Germans are apparently using the bulk of their forces in this sector. The main drive is still towards MOSCOW by way of SMOLENSK and every day there are reports of heavy engagements or of strong counter-attacks. The position is obscure. The Germans claim to have captured SMOLENSK on 18 Jul, but this has not only not been confirmed by MOSCOW, but the Germans have admitted some fighting fifty miles West of the town and even that their supporting infantry were unable to contact their advanced units "owing to Russian resistance emanating from the town itself". (24 Jul)

Subsidiary German columns were pushed out in three directions:

- 1. North from MINSK to POLOTSK.
 - 2. North from ORCHA through VITEBSK to NEVEL.
 - and 3. SE from MINSK to BOBRUISK.
- There has been heavy fighting recently in the first two of these areas.

v. UKRAINE (4th Sector)

There is little doubt that the drive towards KIEV was

second only in importance to the advance on MOSCOW and was intended to obtain possession as quickly as possible of the rich grain lands and mineral resources of the UKRAINE. This thrust was reported to have captured KIEV more than a week ago but the communiques still speak of fighting in this area.

The subsidiary column that moved SE from SARNY seems to have made some progress but there is still fighting around NOVOGRAD VOLYNSKI.

vi. BESSARABIA (5th Sector)

In the far south heavy fighting was reported once only - 24 Jul. On this occasion it was stated from BERLIN that strong reinforcements were being flown to this area. It appears that the policy of holding back their army in this sector is still being followed, partly at least because a successful offensive beyond K... would cut the communications of the Soviet forces in this area and the grain crops might be captured undamaged.

In general it will be seen from the above that the Germans have made very little progress in the last eight days, with the possible exception of the LENINGRAD movement. Elsewhere at least the Russians are maintaining their hold on the strong defensive lines to which they withdrew in the first fortnight of the Campaign and the Germans have been prevented from widening or exploiting any of the three gaps which they made in these lines more than 10 days ago. The Russians moreover claim that their guerillas are continually active and that the rear of the German armies and their long L of C are being harassed day and night. This claim is supported to some extent at least by German admissions. They are undoubtedly having difficulties with their supplies and replacements and it is certain that on some occasions at least German mechanised formations have been completely cut off from the main advance and have either had to fight their way out or be destroyed. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Soviet claims to have destroyed three German divisions since 20 Jul. - one armoured, one motorised and one infantry.

Air activity by both sides has also been on a considerable scale: MOSCOW was raided for the first time on night 21/22 Jul and since then there have been frequent attacks: the results are not known. In the week ending 27 Jul LENINGRAD had twelve raids. In reply the Red Air Force has raided HELSINGFORS in the North and CONSTANZA and SILISTRA in the South and is reported to have inflicted considerable damage on the Roumanian Oil Fields. "There are also indications of considerable opposition from the Soviet Air Force against German land forces." Considering the length of the front, it is probable that the Germans are finding their own fighter strength insufficient to afford full protection over armoured divisions in forward areas as well as troop concentrations and strategic areas in rear." (Last two sentences from GSI, GHQ, ME Daily Intelligence Summary No.430, dated 24 Jul 41.)

(b) COMMENT ON THE RUSSO-GERMAN FIGHTING

(Extracted from GSI, GHQ, ME Weekly Review No.60, dated 21 Jul 41)

"In previous operations the Germans have been careful only to claim objectives which they had reached, and reliable neutral observers have been impressed with the care taken by the German General Staff in this respect.

There is perhaps a simple explanation, the fact that German forces may well have reached their objectives with forward mechanised patrols, patrols which have been cut off from their main forces. While the German forces in FRANCE had the advantage of a network of roads over which they could expand and cover the whole country, and while the area occupied by enemy troops was limited and could be attacked in detail from the air, road communications in RUSSIA present

a new problem. Advance is no doubt possible down the main roads as before, but the absence of any system of connecting roads facilitates the undetected concentration of Russian forces in the forests and marshes and the subsequent flank attack on the enemy's line of advance. Similarly, the very vastness of the battle field renders the German airforce impotent to reduce and demoralise all resistance. It is becoming more and more evident how well the Russians have adapted the lessons of the French campaign to their own terrain.

The German drive has failed to regain its original momentum. Lengthening communications, tired men and, perhaps not least, Russian air attacks have slowed down the pace of the advance. There is no evidence that the Germans have been brought to a halt, but there is plenty that they are losing the all important momentum. Any military observer who had said four weeks ago that the Germans would not by now have reached KIEV would have been scorned; but they have not. Meantime harvest time has come in RUSSIA and if the grain cannot all be collected it can at least now easily be destroyed.

Aided no doubt by the preparation of forward landing grounds, the German airforce has been striking further into Russian territory and hitting at communications in the back areas. There is another side to this picture also. The Germans have been forced to bring forward some of their heavier mobile A.A. and it is obvious that the Russian airforce is far from being a spent force. It is apparent that the strength of their airforce exceeded expectation and some sources put their first line strength as high as 12,000 aircraft. While no confirmation is available of this, it is becoming more evident that, in view of the heavy losses they are known to have sustained at the outset, they must have had considerable reserves.

While opinions on the future of the campaign range between the extremes of optimism and pessimism, one thing seems agreed by well-informed sources, that even if the Germans do succeed in occupying LENINGRAD, MOSCOW and the complete UKRAINE, it will not mean the end of Russian resistance. The question that will then arise is whether GERMANY will be able to maintain her forces on the East and spare a reasonable proportion of her air force for operations elsewhere. If the fighting is still going on when winter sets in, it is unlikely that RUSSIA will be able to offer a sufficient offensive threat to force GERMANY to maintain a large Air Force in the East and we may expect it to become available elsewhere. If, however, the Russian front becomes stabilised, the problem of man-power will become a serious one for the German command. To maintain a long front in the U.S.S.R. and at the same time to police occupied territory and maintain home industry at its present rate will tax German capacity. It will certainly not admit of any further operation involving considerable land forces and will severely cramp the style of the German Command. Evidence of this personnel shortage is already evident in the tendency to hand over occupied territory to the Italians or to the local Quisling parties throughout the BALKANS. It is reasonably safe to predict that prolongation of the Russian campaign will produce a renewed Peace campaign directed at Great Britain and the U.S.A."

(c) MILITARY COMMISSARS IN THE SOVIET ARMY

(Extracted from GSI, GHQ ME Weekly Review No.60, dated 21 Jul 41)

"One of the most widely commented items of news has been the reintroduction of military Commissars into Army units. It may be interesting to review the history of these appointments. They had their rise in the problem which arose in the TROTSKI army of 1921. That problem was the great shortage of officers, and the necessity to use ex-Tsarist officers. These were available in numbers, but could they be trusted? In view of the great need they were recruited, and in order to maintain closest watch over their activities, to each was attached a Communist - a Military Commissar.

These men were entirely responsible for discipline, welfare and administration in general, while the officers theoretically concentrated on military operations. In practice every order of theirs was subject to examination and even alteration by the Commissar. Gradually the army officers became party members and the need for commissars ceased. By 1937 their power had become negligible. Political control slackened and there is little doubt that this contributed to the high standard of the army.

Unfortunately for the army a doubt arose in STALIN's mind, with the result that a drastic purge was carried out. Together with executions of some of the most efficient senior officers, strict control over the commanding officers was again established. The equality of the commissars with the commanding officers was a severe setback to the army and was to a great extent responsible for its shortcomings in the Finnish campaign. These shortcomings were realised by Marshal TIMOSHENKO and gradually the commanding officers became first string, the commissars becoming mere assistants in administrative duties. The reintroduction of these officials is probably due to two causes; firstly, the need to fight German propaganda tactics in every unit; and secondly, to ensure that units and formations which must perforce act as separate groups have a measure of party direction. It is hoped that the result will not be once again a split in the Command."

(d) GERMAN ARMoured DIVISIONS

Attached as Appendix "A" is a note on "The Expansion of German Armoured Divisions".

PART II

SECURITY

Para 1, Appendix "C" attached to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.37, reference Capt BORDES, is cancelled.

K. H. H. H.
Lt-Col
GS. 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

APPX "A" to 1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 38.

THE EXPANSION OF GERMAN ARMoured DIVISIONS.

(Extracted from Appx "B" to GSI GHQ Daily Int Summary
No 430 dated 24 Jul 41)

In September 1939, GERMANY had six armoured divisions. Each armoured division contained two tank regiments and each tank regiment had some 204 tanks. GERMANY also had four "light divisions", each with a light tank battalion. These light divisions proved unsatisfactory in the Polish campaign and, during the winter 1939/40 they were converted into full armoured divisions. Thus at the time of the invasion of FRANCE, GERMANY was able to mobilise ten full armoured divisions.

During the winter 1940/41, numerous and conflicting reports were received concerning the reorganisation by the Germans of their armoured divisions. At one time it was believed that there were to be two types of armoured divisions, a light and a super-heavy. It was not until the campaign in the BALKANS and the arrival of German armoured forces in LIBYA that we realised that some armoured divisions had only one tank regiment.

It is now reported that eighteen armoured divisions are engaged on the Russian front and that in all probability GERMANY has only twenty armoured divisions in all. (5 Light motorised division does not count as an armoured division). It is also reported that all these armoured divisions operating against RUSSIA have only one tank regiment each. The inference is that GERMANY has doubled the number of her armoured divisions by reorganising them on the one tank regiment basis.

Although reports indicate that the total of armoured divisions is twenty, it is possible that there may be more. On the other hand, it is perhaps more than a coincidence that the divisions now identified include all the numbers from 1 to 20 inclusive, but no others. There appear, however, to be Corps tank battalions and these, together with replacements for casualties suffered in FRANCE and in the BALKANS, may well have absorbed the majority of GERMANY's spare tanks. (5 Light Motorised Division absorbed one tank regiment from the original 3 Armoured Division).

The two formations not identified on the Russian front are 2 and 15 Armoured Divisions. 15 Armoured Division is, of course, in CYRENAICA. 2 Armoured Division is probably the division reported in Western FRANCE near the Spanish border. 2 Armoured Division left GREECE during May and returned to Western EUROPE via ITALY.

If GERMANY has only twenty complete armoured divisions, then a reinforcing armoured division for LIBYA can only be found by removing that which is now threatening SPAIN. On the other hand, we cannot be certain that there are not still in reserve in GERMANY a few tank regiments not absorbed in the twenty divisions. In view, however, of the actual commitment of eighteen armoured divisions against RUSSIA and the consequent necessity for maintaining replacement pools, it does seem improbable that any large scale reinforcement of LIBYA by complete tank units is likely until such time as the Russians are beaten or the Russo-German front stabilised, and time allowed for German reorganisation. It is almost invariably characteristic of the Germans to throw all weight into their main campaign and to hold other fronts as lightly as possible. The fact that 15 Armoured Division in LIBYA was in every respect a full armoured division, except that it contained only a very small tank regiment, was puzzling. It may be explained by the need to throw as much armoured weight as possible against RUSSIA.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.39

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 29 Jul to 1200 hrs 30 Jul 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form,
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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SPECIAL NOTE:

The following information concerning letters to Prisoners of War is circulated for information.

i. Letters to Prisoners of War, which are conveyed post-free, should be brief and clearly written. The address must be written in ink.

ii. Writers must be careful to give no information likely to be of a military, political or economic value to the enemy, and they must be careful not to say anything (such as abuse against the enemy) likely to bring about retaliatory action against the recipient.

iii. No photographs, pictures or printed matter of any kind may be enclosed.

iv. The sender must write his name and rank (without number or unit) on the back of the envelope. He may put only his name (without his address) in the letter. However, if he desires an answer, he must put C/o The Prisoners of War Missing and Wounded Bureau, British Red Cross War Organisation, 9 SHARIAH MALIKA FARIDA, CAIRO as his address at the head of the letter. In this case he must register his SERVICE address with the Bureau.

Letters to PsW in GERMANY, FRANCE or ALSACE should be addressed as follows:-

If the name of the camp is known:-

Post de Prisonnier de Guerre	Franc de Port
Kriegsgefangenpost	Gebuhrenfrei
(Name) (Rank) (No.)	
Englischer	
(Name of Camp)	
Allemagne (Deutschland)	

This address should be written not only on the envelope but also on the letter itself.

If the name of the camp is not known, address thus:-

Post de Prisonnier de Guerre	Franc de Port
Kriegsgefangenpost	Gebuhrenfrei
(Name) (Rank) (No.)	
Prisonnier de Guerre Britannique en Allemagne aux soins du Comite International de la Croix Rouge.	
Agence Centrale,	
Palais du Conseil General,	
Geneve, Suisse.	

Letters to PsW in ITALY as follows:-

Poste de Prisonnier de Guerre	Franc de Port
(Name) (Rank) (No.)	
Prisonnier de Guerre Britannique en Camp (Sulmona) Italie aux soins du Comite International de la Croix Rouge.	
Agence Centrale,	
Palais du Conseil General,	
Geneve, Suisse.	

v. Letters for PsW in ITALY or GERMANY may be forwarded in an outer envelope addressed to:-

C/o Prisoners of War Missing and Wounded Bureau,
British Red Cross Organisation,
9 Shariah Malika Farida,
CAIRO.

The inner envelope will then, if correctly addressed, be stamped with the Red Cross Stamp, numbered, recorded and despatched.

PART I

(a) 1. RUSSIAN FRONT: Identifications of German Armd Divs:

In Appx "A" to Int Summary No.38, issued yesterday by these Headquarters, it was stated that the Germans had deployed eighteen Armoured Divs on the Russian Front. These are distributed as follows:-

Northern Group (1st and 2nd Sectors): 1, 6, 8.
Central Group (3rd Sector): 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 17, 18,
19, 20.
Southern Group (4th and 5th Sectors): 5, 9, 11, 13,
14, 16.

This grouping means that the main weight of the German Armd Divs is being directed on MOSCOW, either directly through SMOLENSK or by the subsidiary columns moving North and SE from ORCHA and MINSK. Probably four at least of the armd divs in the Southern Group are being directed on KIEV.

Note: 2 Armd Div is probably in Western FRANCE threatening SPAIN. 15 Armd Div is in LIBYA.

(The above is based on GSI, GHQ Daily Int Summary No.429, dated 23 Jul 41.)

11. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE BALKANS:

The distribution of Bulgarian, Roumanian and other Forces in the BALKANS is reported to be as follows:-

BULGARIA:

Turkish Frontier (incl THRACE): Eight to ten Infantry divs.
One Mobile div.

NICH area (in JUGOSLAVIA about 100 miles NW of SOFIA): Two Infantry divs.
One Mobile div.

SKOPLIE (in JUGOSLAVIA about 125 miles SSW of SOFIA): Three Infantry divs.
Area East of SALONIKA: Two Infantry divs.

ROUMANIA:

It is reported that the Roumanian Army Corps Areas are now reorganised as follows:-

I Army Corps	CRAIOVA.
II "	BUCHAREST.
III "	CONSTANZA.
IV "	JASSY (IASI).
V "	GALATZ.
VI "	TIMISOARA.
VII "	SIBIU.

Recent mobilization was not complete, but was restricted to twenty divisions chosen according to degree of motorisation, irrespective of Army Corps. II Corps was the only complete Corps mobilized. Of the twenty divisions, fifteen are on the Russian frontier in reserve.

This is merely the territorial organisation: it is probable that a considerable part of the Roumanian Army has been moved to the Bessarabian front to take part in the Russo-German campaign.

JUGOSLAVIA and GREECE:

With the exception of the Croatian Army, which has been set up to defend the frontiers of that puppet state, the Yugoslav forces have been disbanded. Similarly the Greek Army has been demobilised and all ranks have been given every facility to return to their homes.

German and Italian Forces:

(The following is reprinted from GSI, GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation, No.59, dated 15 Jul 41.)

"Apart from 5 Mountain Division, still believed to be in CRETE, most of the German forces have been replaced in GREECE by Italian troops. Italian troops have also for the most part taken over the garrison of the islands, with the exception of SAMOTHRACE and THASOS which are garrisoned by Bulgarian troops."

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION

N11

PART II

SECURITY

N11

W. H. H. H.

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

SECRET.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 40.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 30 Jul to 1200 hrs 31 Jul 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will
NOT be reproduced in any form.
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circulation down to Lt-Colonels'
Commands only.
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PART I.

- (a) Information from other Fronts: - Nil.

TURKEY. A list of TURKISH equivalent Army Names,
Ranks and Terms is attached as Appx "A" to this Summary.

(b) Reference to GERMAN MT difficulties in the Western
Desert has already been made in this Headquarters Summary No 34
dated 25 Jul. Further to these remarks the following translation
from a captured GERMAN document of 15 Armoured Division is of great
interest - "Special Instructions for Supply and Supply Troops."
General Treatment of arms, equipment and MT (especially in the
matter of driving) still shows in many cases a complete lack of understanding of
extremely difficult supply problem. It takes at least three weeks
to obtain replacements from GERMANY - even supposing that MT etc, is
available there. In their own interest, therefore, officers and
men must have impressed upon them the absolute necessity for the
exercise of care in the treatment of all equipment. Inexperienced
drivers should, as the military situation allows, be given every
opportunity to obtain practice in cross-country driving.
(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 426 dated 20 Jul 41).

PART II. SECURITY.

- (a) Attitude of Civilian Population

The whole area under command remains quiet. In most areas
our troops have been enthusiastically received and in other districts
whilst the inhabitants have offered what might be termed a cool
reception, they have not as yet shown signs of open hostility.

- (b) Collection of Arms.

The collection of arms by police and gendarmerie is pro-
ceeding slowly. Owing to the fact that under French Administration
certain Sheiks and even whole tribes were permitted to possess arms,
it is felt that at least a show of force will be necessary before
certain of the inhabitants will conform to the terms of the
proclamation

Reference 1 Aust Corps Summary No 37 Appx "C". It is
reported that 147 of the 150 rifles issued to JAMIL SHAWAT and his
followers have been recovered.

- (c) German Propaganda.

Reports from several areas (as yet unconfirmed) indicate
that German agents are active in SYRIA and the LEBANON, and that they
are using every endeavour to spread their propaganda among the local
population. Confirmation of these reports is sought.

2.

GENERAL

On Jul 16 about 400 Vichy soldiers attempted to cross the TURKISH frontier at AZAZ (272515). Of the 400 making the attempt, 180, including 1 German Officer and 6 ORs, were disarmed and allowed to cross. The remainder of the party being Syrians were turned back.

Mandantones.
Maj for Lt-col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No. 28.

APPENDIX "A" TO 1 AUST CORPS INT SUMMARY NO.40

(1) EQUIVALENT RANKS

<u>British</u>	<u>Turkish</u>	<u>Pronunciation</u>	<u>Iraqi</u>
General Staff. Field Marshal. General.	General Kurmay. Maresal. Or-General.	MAH-RAY-SHALL OR-CHENERAHL Note. GH is pronounced hard as G in GO	Erkano Harb. Mushir. -
Lt. General. Major General. Brigadier. Colonel Acting Brigadier.	Kor-General. Tum-General. Tug-General. Tugbay.	KOR-CHENERAHL TOOM-CHENERAHL TOOG-CHENERAHL TOCG-SYE	Amid. Fariq. Amir Liwa. -
Colonel. Lt. Colonel. Major. Captain.	Albay. Yarbay. Binbasi. Yuzbasi.	AL-BYE YAH-BYE BIN-BAH-SHER YOOZ-BAH-SHER	Zaim. Acid. Muqaddam. Rais Awwal = Senior Captain. Rais = Captain. Mulazim Awwal. Mulazim Thani. Naib Dhabit = Warrant Officer. Rais Urafa. -
Lieutenant. 2nd. Lieutenant. (3rd. Lieutenant).	Ustegmen Tegmen. Astegmen.	OCS-TAY-MEN TAY-MEN US-TAY-MEN	
Sgt. Major. Coy. Q. M. S.	Bas Cavus Baş Cavus Muavinni.	BAHSH-CHAH-VOOSH BAHSH-CHAH-VOOSH MOO-AH-VINNY	
Sergeant. Corporal. Lce. Corporal. Private.	Cavus. Onbasi. Vakil Onbasi. Erbaş.	CHAH-VOOSH ON-BAH-SHER ER-BAHSH	Arif. Naib Arif. Jundi Awwal. Nefer.

(2) EQUIVALENT NAMES AND TERMS (BRITISH - TURKISH)

Army.	= Ordu.	Infantry.	= Piyade.
Army Corps.	= Kolordu.	Cavalry.	= Suware.
Commander.	= Komutan.	Tank.	= Tank.
Division.	= Tumen.	Artillery.	= Topcu.
Brigade.	= Tugay.	Anti-tank Gun.	= Tank defitopu.
Battalion.	= Tabur.	Rifle.	= Tufeng.
Company	= Boluk.	Aeroplane.	= Tayyare.
Platoon.	= Takim.	Aerodrome.	= Tayyare istasiyonu
Section.	= Kism.	Telephone.	= Telfon.
Officer.	= Subay.	Telegraph.	= Telgraf.
Engineer Regt.	= Istinkama.	Anti-aircraft Gun.	= Tayyare defi topu.
		Wireless.	= Telsiz.
		Fortifications.	= Tahkimat.
Company and lower H.Q.	= Erkan.	Battery.	= Batarya.
Battalion and above H.Q.	= Karargah.	Howitzer.	= Obus.
		Field Gun.	= Sahra topu.
		L.M.G.	= Hafif makineli tüfek.
		Heavy M.G.	= Agir makineli tüfek.
		F.D.L's.	= Asil mu harebe sahasi.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.41

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 31 Jul to 1200 hrs 1 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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SPECIAL NOTE

It would be much appreciated if senders of captured enemy documents to G.S.I., G.H.Q., H.E. would not make any marks, pencil, chalk or ink, on any original documents. Comments or notes on captured documents may please be made on a separate piece of paper and pinned to the original.

PART I

- (a) Information from other fronts - Nil.
- (b) COMBAT WITH BRITISH TANKS

A GERMAN document captured in the WESTERN DESERT gives hints for combat with BRITISH tanks, and puts forward the following suggestions:

"BRITISH tanks should not be fired on at ranges greater than those already laid down, and they should be attacked from the front or side in order to obtain an angle of impact as near to the normal as possible.

"If possible, the position of the tank should be such that its front and side form an angle pointing in the direction of the enemy's fire, the most favourable angle being 45 degrees. Thus fire is directed over the left or right front corner of the tank.

"Only Armour-Piercing shell should be fired at heavily armoured tanks and then only at very close range (about 200 metres on an average).

"If Armour-Piercing ammunition is not available, H.E. (including 2 cm. H.E.) should be fired at vision-slits, turrets and weapons, and with H.E. shells of 5 cm. and over, at the tracks.

"Apart from the 8.8 cm. A.A. gun, the most effective weapon is the 5 cm. A.Tk. gun. With this weapon, penetration can usually be obtained with A.P. ammunition against the front of the BRITISH Infantry Tank Mark II, at 600 metres with a favourable angle of impact (80 - 90°). 5 cm. A.P. ammunition, when fired from this gun will still penetrate the Mark II Tank with an angle of impact of 60 degrees at a range of 400 metres."

Comment: The ranges mentioned in the second paragraph as having been "already laid down" are not known at these Headquarters. The 8.8 cm. A.A. gun fires a shell weighing 19.8 lbs. and has a max range of 16,000 yds. The effective range against tanks would of course be very much less - perhaps under 800 yds. The 5 cm. A.Tk. gun "has sometimes been erroneously referred to as a '6 pounder'". The performance of this weapon has been grossly exaggerated, for in spite of reports and rumours to the contrary, only once has complete penetration of a BRITISH Infantry Tank Mark II been accomplished, and then only at a range of 50 yards. The gun is a single shot weapon firing solid A.P. shot or H.E. shell, and a captured gunner who used the gun described its official maximum effective range as 1200 metres. In actual fact, he said he had obtained direct hits on BRITISH tanks at 800 metres, without having the least effect." Its A.P. solid shot weighs 9 lbs. 1 oz. and H.E. shell 7 lbs. 3 ozs.

- 2 -

(The part in inverted commas at the foot of the preceding page is from GSI, GHQ Tech Sum No.27, dated 8 Jun 41.)

PART II

SECURITY

Nil.

E. Manderson
Maj. / Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 42.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 1 Aug to 1200 hrs 2 Aug 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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PART 1.

(a) LIBYA:

(i) ENEMY FORCES. According to the latest available estimates (26 Jul 41) German and Italian Forces in LIBYA are distributed as follows :-

ITALIAN.

GHQ Armed Forces in NORTH AFRICA	TRIPOLI
Advanced GHQ	CIRENE
GHQ 5 Army	TRIPOLI
5 Army Troops	TRIPOLI
HQ 10 Army Corps.	GIOVANNI BERTA (about 24 miles E.S.E. of CIRENE).
25 "BOLOGNA" Division	BARCE
60 "SABRATA" Division	HOMS- BUERAT
132 "Ariete" Armoured Division (Tank strength greatly depleted)	BARCE - AIN EL GAZALA.
Attached to German Africa Corps :-	
27 "BRESCIA" Division	TOBRUK (Western Sector)
17 "PAVIA" Division	TOBRUK (Southern Sector)
102 "TRENTO" Motorised Division	TOBRUK (Eastern Sector)
55 "SAVONA" Division	BARDIA (Elements at DERNIA).
HQ G.a.F. (Frontier Guards)	TRIPOLI
HQ Royal Corps of Libyan Troops consisting of 10 Libyan Battalions, 13 MG Companies, and 8 Cavalry Squadrons	TRIPOLI
HQ Saharan Command	HOUN (abt 150 miles S.S.W. of SYRTE).

GERMAN.

HQ German Africa Corps	BARDIA
15 Armoured Division	FRONTIER area
5 Light Motorised Division	TOBRUK Area (but possibly elements resting at MARSALUCCH).

Thus, there are one German Lt Mot Div, One Italian Mot Div and two Italian Inf Divs in front of TOBRUK, and one German Arm'd Div and one Italian Inf Div in the Frontier area. Moreover, apart from a small number of Army and Corps Tps, the only other forces believed to be East of TRIPOLI are two Italian Inf Divs and one weak Arm'd Div.

The principal change recently has been the arrival of 55 SAVONA Div in the BARDIA region. It is now known that there is no

foundation in the statement made by a PW that 21 German Arm Div - is in LIBYA. An unconfirmed report from an unproved source states that German troops and equipment in CYRENAICA are very tired and worn. It is known, however, that the supply position is very difficult owing to RAF activity against BENGHASI and naval attacks on convoys.

(ii) ENEMY POSITIONS.

Frontier Area. The general situation is still unchanged in any important respects. The enemy occupy a series of positions based on the triangle HALFAYA-CAPUZZO-SALUH, where strong fortifications have been constructed. There are also strongly held posts at SIDI SULEIMAN and BIR SHEFERZEN (some 22 kms to the W.S.W. of SIDI SULEIMAN) and a defensive area embracing Egyptian and Italian SIDI OMAR. These last four places form, as it were, a screen of posts between which and in front of which, enemy arm cars and not inf patrols are constantly moving. In rear there are several supporting positions (e.g. Points 206 and 207) and camps at ABU TALAQ and BIR SEMIN. Further back there are reserve positions at BIR HAFID and SIDI AZEIZ. There have been several recent reports that the enemy is strengthening and adding to his field works in the forward and supporting zones.

(iii) OPERATIONS (24-29 Jul 41). The last resume of enemy operations in LIBYA was issued on 28 Jul 41, and was based on information received up to 24 Jul 41. Since then actions have been on the "minor scrapping" and recce plane. Enemy patrol activity in the FRONTIER Area has increased. Armoured Cars have been reported near BIREL SIWEIYAT and SIDI OMAR, moving North from BIR SHEFERZEN and even attacking BIR NUH. Our own mobile columns and patrols have also been active, one penetrating West of SIDI SULEIMAN. In addition, there have been frequent artillery duels- mostly near HALFAYA. There has, however, been no real change in the situation, and there is apparently no foundation for the rumour that German forces were withdrawing from this area.

At TOBRUK there has been fairly continuous shell-fire by the enemy, principally directed against the harbour and harbour works. The results have been slight. Hostile air attacks are also reported to have caused little damage. Our troops have maintained offensive ground patrols by night and have inflicted casualties on the enemy. On night 25/26 Jul, for instance, a MG post and sangers in the N.W. end of the enemy's defences were attacked and 25 enemy were killed.

(b) TOPOGRAPHICAL.

Track DEIR EZ ZOR - HASSETCHE (87 miles)

DEIR EZ ZOR - track crosses EUPHRATES by Suspension Bridge. track turns sharply to right along telephone posts.
Track junction marked by stone signs.
Rt hand- ABU KEMAL
Central- HASSETCHE along telephone posts
Left hand- HASSETCHE via RASELAIN.
This latter track rejoins telephone posts, and for 60 miles the surface is good in dry weather.

After RAQQA turn off to left- going is rough, with numerous deep wadis.
Last 8 miles are metalled and HASSETCHE is entered by girder bridge over R. KHADOUR, which is only water supply on route.

PART 11.

SECURITY.

General. It is reported that 55 members of FANZI KAWAKJI's gang handed in their arms and 7 vehicles at ALEPPO prior to the British occupation of the town.

Some IRAQ and PALESTINIAN members entered TURKEY where they were disarmed and detained. A further report states that, on instructions from ANKARA, their arms were returned and they were allowed to stay in TURKEY, but this has not been confirmed.

Syrian members of the gang are said to have gone to ALEPPO. Approximately one hundred local volunteers are reported to have sold their arms to Beduins, and then to have dispersed to their homes.

ATTITUDE OF CIVILIANS.

(i) Patrols and flag marches have been carried out in the central area, and in all cases the inhabitants appear to be friendly and willing to co-operate. Similar reports have been received from the coastal sector, and there is little doubt that, superficially, at any rate, the civil population has accepted the Allied occupation and in most cases they appear to anticipate the change in administration as one for the better.

(ii) Before the campaign in SYRIA the attitude of the more prosperous-Syrian population in DEIR EZ ZOR was one of loyalty to the French; the poorer classes were however, anti-French, owing to allegedly unfair treatment, low wages, etc.

Air raids by the French Air Force, which inflicted casualties and loss of property, appear to have changed the attitude of some of the richer population, who point out that the RAF only bombed military objectives.

There are still, however, many of the richer Muslims who do not welcome the Armistice. This appears to be due in part to the fact that they have laid in big reserves of stores which, in unsettled conditions, they are able to sell at high prices.

ENEMY PROPAGANDA.

Enemy propaganda in SYRIA and the LEBANON is mainly directed at creating doubts and forebodings in the minds of the civilian population as regards the future of the country. Subversive activity is particularly prevalent to maintain the present ill feeling which each bears to the other of the two French divisions of political feeling. Propaganda is active to alienate the good-will of the populace towards British troops by the circulation of rumours that the British will leave SYRIA shortly without being concerned in the government of the country, which will be turned over to the Free French. Prior to evacuation, it is rumoured that the British are encouraging extensive Jewish immigration.

Propaganda is also being directed towards driving a wedge between the Allies and their unity of purpose. Agents whose activities were interrupted by the occupation of SYRIA and the LEBANON by Allied troops, now appear to be resuming their work with renewed vigour.

Reports dealing with the subversive actions of known agents should be supported, as far as possible, by facts, and NOT by hear-say statements which have been accepted without investigation.

5 *Mandates*
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No 28.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.43

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 2 Aug to 1200 hrs 3 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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-

PART I

(a) TURKEY: An unconfirmed report states that doctors, engineers and other specialists of the pre-1926 classes were called to the colours about 5 Jul. It is now confirmed that the line URFA - BIREJIK - AINTAB (almost immediately above the TURKO-SYRIAN border - see sketch in Appx "A") has been reinforced. 4 Cav Bde report that fifty Turkish Bns are reported in the ALEXANDRETTE area, and that the frontier post at TCHOBANE BEY (309517) has been greatly increased. The fifty bns referred to in the ALEXANDRETTE area are possibly reinforcements for the URFA - BIREJIK - AINTAB line.

Personalities: Three Germans described as members of the German Armistice Commission in SYRIA are reported to have arrived in ISTANBUL from SYRIA on 13 Jul.

Attached as Appx "A" is a sketch of the FAR EAST which should facilitate the following of moves in TURKEY, IRAQ and IRAN. The Turkish CATALCA defence lines in the "TURKEY in EUROPE" sector, i.e. West of the BOSPORUS, referred to in this Headquarters Summary No.33, dated 24 Jul, are also shown.

(b) Attached as Appx "B" is a comprehensive review of German Parachutists and Air-borne Troops, reprinted from BTE Special Summary No.4, dated 15 Jul.

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

Frontier from Coast to 19224296 (EL DURDOU 1/50,000):

General: Country very precipitous and impassable to MT.

Roads and Tracks: Crossing the border there are a few tracks which are used by the inhabitants visiting other villages.

Track marked from KASSAB to the Coast (Class B2) is fit for passenger vehs of up to 1-ton class. Although well formed (loose metal), the track is steep and has many narrow turns. (In 5 kilos drops 3,000' to the sea.)


PART II - SECURITY

(a) Attitude of Civilians: The continued detention of persons imprisoned by the Vichy French for pro-British activities is the cause of an ever-increasing volume of adverse criticism against the British.

(b) Possession and Collection of Arms: A report has been received which alleges that Vichy French troops in a certain concentration area have been burying their small arms. The report further states that Arabs in the area are aware of this and are waiting for the departure of the tps so that they may obtain possession of the arms. Appropriate action is being taken.

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

E. Mandant
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps



THE NEAR EAST

APPX "B" TO 1 AUST CORPS INT SUMMARY NO.43

(Reprinted from BTE Special Summary No.4, dated 15 Jul)

PARACHUTISTS AND AIR-BORNE TROOPS

1. OBJECT

The object of this summary is to give Units a more complete picture of German Parachutists and Air-borne troops, their training and tactics, in order that every possible lesson may be drawn to enable us to deal with them effectively if ever an air-borne attack is carried out on EGYPT. All information contained herein has been obtained from reports received of parachute attacks in HOLLAND, GREECE and CRETE.

2. TRAINING OF PARACHUTISTS

Parachute troops in GERMANY have been the special concern of Field Marshal GOERING. Parachute regiments are a body of picked men who undergo a very rigorous training.

The number of parachutists dropped in HOLLAND has been estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000, of whom 2,000 were taken prisoner. Most of the others were killed. In GREECE, the number dropped was estimated at 2,000 and in CRETE about 7,000.

In all cases the first parachutists dropped were trained men, resolute and full of fight. They also had an excellent knowledge of the area where they landed and their objectives. Later troops of inferior quality were dropped.

3. AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED

The aircraft employed for the transport of parachutists consists of JU 52s. GERMANY has, or had prior to the invasion of CRETE, over 1,000 of this type of aircraft and at least as many in reserve. The JU 52 carries 15-17 fully armed men and has a range of 900 miles. (A drawing of this plane is attached).

Other types of aircraft that may be used are JU 86, JU 90, CONDOR and various other types of converted civil aircraft.

In addition to troop-carriers, the Germans also made use of troop-carrying gliders during the invasion of CRETE. Glider flying has had a considerable vogue in GERMANY in recent years and thousands of young Germans are said to have been trained in this sport. (A drawing of one of the gliders used in CRETE was attached to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.37, dated 28 Jul 41.) 10 to

From 2-5 such gliders are towed by a JU 52 and 12 men with light weapons are carried in each glider. If these gliders are towed at a good height it is possible for them to fly a considerable distance alone, and so, being silent, they can achieve a considerable measure of surprise. On the other hand, their slow speed makes them a very easy target. Further, these gliders can land on almost any surface, though many casualties to the passengers were caused in CRETE by gliders crashing on landing.

4. UNIFORM OF PARACHUTISTS

Latest reports of the uniform worn by parachutists in the MIDDLE EAST are slightly different from reports of those worn by Parachutists in HOLLAND. It is probable that a thinner uniform has been devised for warmer climates.

This uniform has been described as follows:-

- (a) Greenish-grey silk jackets or grey overalls with $\frac{1}{2}$ thigh length shorts attached.
- (b) Grey trousers - ski pattern.
- (c) Highboots with thick rubber soles and fastened with two metal clips.
- (d) Light steel helmets padded with thick rubber about 2" from a narrow brim.

Each man is reported to have his legs double bandaged on the whole leg from foot to thigh as a protection against shock on landing.

In the invasion of HOLLAND many disguises were adopted. In GREECE and CRETE this was not done. In CRETE the only method of deception used was to drive our wounded in front of their advance.

It is probable that disguises are only used where a definite plan in conjunction with the fifth column has been previously arranged. It is possible, therefore, that in an attack on EGYPT disguises may be used.

5. ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

Arms reported to have been carried on the person of parachutists in CRETE were an automatic pistol, 4 hand grenades and a large knife. Parachutists also carried portable radio sets, very pistols and a large supply of Nazi flags. Groups for special duties may have folding bicycles and sacks containing their special requirements, explosives etc. A proportion carried Tommy guns strapped to their backs with 57 rounds of .38 ammunition.

All other weapons such as M.Gs and Mortars were carried in separately dropped containers which had to be located and opened, a process occupying several minutes, although in GREECE they were reported to have produced intensive M.G. and Mortar fire within 10 minutes.

Light artillery and armoured cars were landed later in troop carrying aircraft.

M.T. if required by parachutists, is obtained by seizure from the local populace on the ground. Captured German orders for the invasion of CRETE show that even donkeys, horses and horse-drawn vehicles were ordered to be seized.

6. PARACHUTES

Personnel appear to be dropped normally by white or grey-green parachutes, and equipment by grey-green, brown and other colours. It is also reported that parachutes used in CRETE appear to have a special device for rapid opening.

7. PREPARATION FOR AN AIR-BORNE ATTACK

German preparations for an air-borne attack are made with a tremendous amount of care and meticulous attention to the very smallest of details. In addition, it is probable that they realise the disadvantages of such an attack, and, therefore, concentrate on obtaining the very utmost surprise. Their security measures to obtain this are of interest. One captured German order shows that a parachute regiment used in CRETE was ordered to remove its parachute badges in its barracks in GERMANY and to refrain from singing the parachute theme song during the train journey - even inside GERMANY.

To such an extreme do they take their security measures that, up to the moment of landing, probably only Commissioned Officers know their orders and objectives. These Commanders, however, have been well instructed in all available information.

Every Commander is provided with a small map of his area on which his objectives are marked and he must also know his area thoroughly. In the words of a captured German order "It must be as though he were to jump off into his own country".

In addition, every Commander is expected to have a thorough knowledge of the signal arrangements for communication with aircraft.

8. THE ATTACK

As a rule, the first objectives in a parachute attack are aerodromes, landing grounds and identified military objectives. In order to carry this out, the attacks are usually made around sun-rise, but they should be expected at any time.

In nearly all recent cases the attacks were preceded by extremely severe high level bombing and also dive bombing by STUKAS on A.A. Gun positions and other A.A. fire, which offered a suitable target. This strafe was carried on for an average of 30 minutes, presumably with the object of sapping the morale of the defenders. Immediately it had ceased, fighters came down from above, where they had been warding off protective fighters, and sprayed positions with M.G. fire.

It is reported that in this phase there was a prodigious expenditure of ammunition. The glint of a steel helmet was sufficient to bring from one to six fighters to the spot. The fighters also used both incendiary and explosive bullets against personnel as well as material, and flew over slit trenches at about 100 feet and threw out hand grenades.

Parachutists and air-borne troops in gliders are landed either simultaneously with this fighter attack or immediately after it. Parachutists usually jump from a height of 300 to 400 feet. They come down in extremely quick succession and in a very small area, well away from troop dispositions. In CRETE, some 3,000 or 4,000 were dropped in an area 8 x 3 miles. If their intelligence is poor, as it was in CRETE, and parachutists are dropped among troop dispositions, their casualties can be very heavy.

Parachutists are at their most vulnerable at the moment of landing. It is reported that an average of 1 in 200 lose their gear as they jump and also that several pilots misjudged their heights, coming down too low so that many of the parachutists crashed on landing and were injured. Further, those who were untrained appeared to be very shaken and none knew what to do until their Officers landed, who alone were in possession of orders.

Immediately after the parachutists have been landed, the equipment is dropped and collected. As has been previously mentioned, this can be very quickly done by trained parachutists, but takes considerably longer with the untrained. Having collected their weapons and formed up into groups they then advance on the aerodrome, A.A. posts and other defensive positions. Those landed further afield prepare possible runways for troop carrying aircraft.

Gliders land anywhere where cultivation or barren ground exist, and attack weaker posts of defence in support of the parachutists.

All groups, either during their attacks on vital points or immediately afterwards, endeavour to cut telephone lines and other communications. They will probably also attempt to blow up bridges. The whole attack, from the opening of the bombing attack, is timed to a split second and captured German orders indicate that no deviation is permitted from the orders, except, of course, to exploit success. Even in the event of failure (e.g., if the bombers have not knocked out all A.A. fire), the landing is still carried out as planned; or if the parachutists have not captured the aerodromes, the troop-carriers still land as planned. In CRETE the Germans suffered heavy casualties in this latter manner.




9. CONCLUSION

As has been shown in paragraphs 7 and 8, parachutists and air-borne troops are at their weakest immediately after landing.

This, then, is the time for strong offensive action by our troops. Knowing that the enemy makes full use of the surprise element in air-borne attack, and that their security measures are very efficient, it is not always certain that we shall have reliable prior information of such attacks. We must, therefore, be constantly prepared for them. The lessons learned from previous experience should be sufficient to make our defensive measures really effective.

Note: Sketch of JU 52 on reverse side.

THE JUNKERS JU 52



SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NC.44

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 3 Aug to 1200 hrs 4 Aug 41

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PART I

(a) IRAN: It has been reported that there is an acute food shortage in the country, and that starvation in the villages is rife. In areas such as the oil fields there are no reserve stocks and distribution is difficult.

BULGARIA: Distribution of forces: It is reported that the railways from GIURGIU (ROUMANIA) into BULGARIA have been closed to all except military traffic and that German troops are moving into BULGARIA. This report should be treated with reserve pending confirmation. (From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.436, dated 30 Jul.)

LIBYA: After the heavy raids by RAF planes over the last few months, air photographs show that the central mole at BENGHASI, which is frequently used by MT to go alongside ships, has been damaged by bombs in three places, and that it is now impassable for vehicles. There is no evidence that MT has used the mole since 12 Jul.

(b) GERMAN ARMY EQUIPMENT

It is reliably reported that since the Armistice between GERMANY and FRANCE, the German Commission of Control at ROUEN has taken over the following:-

- i. All tanks (except FT tanks which have been transferred to the Italian Army).
 - ii. All 105 mm guns.
 - and iii. Thirty-two 20 mm Oerlikons (A type of Lt AA guns).
- It is stated by the same source that all big de Bange equipment (i.e. large calibre guns) has been broken up for scrap and that this has also been seized by the Germans. On the other hand the Germans are reported to have left the French all their 75 mm guns.
- Comment: Old type Renault 7-ton tanks and modern Hötchkiss 7-ton tanks are both known as "type FT". It is the former type which have been handed over. They were used in the famous MANGIN push in 1918. The number reported handed over is 1800.

THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

The following brief notes may be of value:-

The German Air Force, like the Army and Navy, is constituted as a separate arm of the defence services. The air force includes all ground air defence units with the exception of the motorised AA MG battalions which are retained by the Army as GHQ troops. (It is believed, however, that 2 cm (.79 in) AA MGs have been issued to army units, and there are also a few AA guns mounted in coastal forts, which are manned by the Navy). All air requirements for the Army and Navy are met by the Air Ministry. The German Air Force is divided into:-

Flying branch
Anti-aircraft Artillery
Signal Corps
Engr "
Parachute troops
General GOERING Regiment
Observer Corps
Air police.

In addition, the German Air Ministry controls every aspect of civil and commercial aviation to a degree which can only be achieved under a dictatorship. It is also responsible for all measures of passive air defence. The German Air Force is organised on a territorial basis: there are five commands, called Air Fleets (LUFTFLOTTE). Within these "Air Fleet Commands", the majority of operational units, with the exception of home defence fighters, army cooperation and coastal recce units, are grouped into air corps (FLIEGERKORPS) and divisions FLIEGER-DIVISIONEN). These air corps are mobile formations and constitute GERMANY's striking force. The Fliegerkorps are composite operational formations, consisting of a headquarters and bomber, dive bomber, fighter, coastal and recce formations. Organisation is not rigid, and changes in internal strength are made to meet the needs of the moment.

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

Following are details of a section of the track DEIR EZ ZOR - PALMYRA:-

00	DEIR EZ ZOR —————	
	Turns left off main ALEPPO rd between town and barracks.	
7 M	Two grassy wadis (some water in this area)	Gravel
8 $\frac{1}{2}$ M	—————	Desert track
15 M	Junction —————	
	Right fork SOUKHNE 74 M via GABADJIB	
	Left " " 84 M " HABNA	
Along former		Track rougher
25 $\frac{1}{2}$ M	Track to right at fork past white cairn.	Desert flatter
28 M	Remains of Masonry SP	
	(Track to right REDIDJAN)	
28 $\frac{1}{2}$ M	Wadi, track to left —————	
29 $\frac{1}{2}$ M	—————	Bed of wadi
		Left bank of wadi

PART II - SECURITY

(a) General:- The adjt, CHAMI WAKIM, of the gendarmes post at GUEBELLI (17794275 ref KASSAB 1/50,000) reports a considerable increase in robbery in the area. He attributes this to the withdrawal of control by the French and lack of adm on the part of the British authorities. The latest outbreaks have been on the ALEPPO rd from 185419 to 198429. In this area two automobiles have been stolen in the past few days and three hostages taken from the village AINE EL BEIDA (19054240). Two of these were rich and one poor, the latter being released when they had crossed the Turkish border at BISSOUN (193431) in order that he might return and collect the ransom demanded. CHAMI WAKIM gave the following places as the HQ of the bandits:-

KAZIL TCHAAT (190435, in TURKEY)
TCHAKER AGHA (193433, in TURKEY)
EKST TENNSEN (187436, on border)

They use BISSOUN (193431) as a jumping off place for attacks along the ALEPPO rd. The former chief of the areas mentioned had been one NORAS SAKLITOI, who, having gambled away his wealth, took to brigandage, and had been sentenced to 20 years hard labour by the French. He escaped and fled to TURKEY and it is probable that he now controls the ops of the brigands.

(b) Possession and Collection of Arms: The village of AAQOURA and the mountains to the East are reported as being definitely bad areas. There is distinct evidence that there is a large number of rifles in this area which have been taken from Vichy French deserters.

(c) Enemy Propaganda: Reports are being continually received regarding the spreading of Nazi propaganda by members of the Syrian Popular Party (HIZB EL-QAUMI AS-SURI). This party is holding meetings at various places throughout the country, and it is reported that its members are acting as agents provocateurs amongst the troops.

Norris

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.45

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 4 Aug to 1200 hrs 5 Aug 41

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PART I

- (a) (Reprinted from GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation, dated 28 Jul 41.)

TURKEY: Recent unconfirmed reports have been to the effect that the Axis is contemplating an attack on Western TURKEY with the object of seizing control of the BOSPHORUS and the DARDANELLES. This would permit the passage to the BLACK SEA of the Italian Fleet.

The concentrations reputed to be earmarked for operations against TURKEY have been described as over ten Bulgarian Divisions on the Thracian frontier reinforced by unspecified numbers of German troops now entering BULGARIA-from the North; a German concentration of two divisions at SALONIKA; and the three Italian divisions which now form the garrison of the DODECANESE and AEGEAN Islands.

As these reports are new, there has been little time to seek evidence with which to check them; but it can be said that superficially they are suspect and are possibly merely an attempt to intimidate the Turkish Army.

IRAQ: The Iraq Army continues to show a complete lack of discipline. Desertions have increased, particularly among Kurdish elements, and general uncertainty as to the future of the whole force prevails. As an example, when 2 Infantry Brigade was ordered to proceed to SULEIMANIYA, a state of semi-insubordination ensued and many men deserted. The Brigade was only induced to consent to move after a visit from the Minister for Defence and the Chief of the General Staff, who assured the men that they were not being despatched to KURDISTAN to fight for or against the British but to keep SHEIKH MAHMUD in order and, significantly, that they would not be deserted by their officers as had been the case at FALLUJA.

It is said that most of the junior officers in the Iraqi Army are still openly anti-British and apt to refer to "the time when the Germans come". This belief also obtains in other circles and will only be dispelled by a German setback or a British military success.

- (b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION - Nil

- (c) TOPOGRAPHICAL.

Main Rd ALEPPO - LATTAKIA Class A1.

Brs 170403. Concrete, double arch, easy deviation.
174409. Stone- single span- easy deviation.
183415 Concrete, three span, easy deviation.
188422. " three span arch, each span 60', piers
20' x 3'

Rd blocks: Cratering possible 177422, 203430, 205431.

Stores: Construction works at KFAHIE 185415, includes power, telephone, rails, RsJs and GF sheets, timber, ropeway, cement.

(OVER)

(REVO)

- 2 -

Rd June 18534190 N.W. to main ANTIOCHE rd June 171428,
(B2) Impassable in wet.

Rd blocks; Cratering possible 183425,, 191427..

Rd June 195427 , STENNFISTER 196406. - LATTAKIA.

Distance 48 miles. Class, to HAFPE- B2- HAFPE-LATTAKIA- A1.

Br 166399, 84' long, 16' wide, delay 4 hrs.

Rd blocks- cratering possible- good sites 19754062,
19654060.. 177404!

PART 11 SECURITY.

(a) General. Our tps on SYRIO-TURKISH frontier report that the attitude of the Turkish frontier officials was very friendly at first, but later they apparently received orders not to fraternise.

The Turks complain that armed Syrian Arabs crossed the frontier and fired on a Turkish post. Our tps have rounded up thirty Arabs alleged to be implicated and investigations are proceeding.

(b) Possession and Collection of Arms. The Commission of Control report that the "troupes speciales" are being disarmed, but not disbanded. They are remaining in their present areas until further arrangements can be made.

Addeer Maj
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No 28.

(REVO)

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.46

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 5 Aug to 1200 hrs 6 Aug 41

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PART I

(a) BULGARIA:

(Reprinted from GHQ Daily Int Summary No.439, dated 2 Aug.)

It is reported that fourteen Infantry Divisions and two Cavalry Divisions have been brought up to war strength. All men up to 45 have been called up, but 100,000 are now on agricultural leave.

Distribution of Forces: Only three Bulgarian Divisions are now reported in YUGOSLAVIA, in place of six reported there in mid-July. Two to three Divisions are now in area VARNA-BURGAS.

It is now reported that three to four German divisions from the Russian front are moving into BULGARIA. According to a reliable observer these may be tired divisions sent to BULGARIA to rest and refit.

Note: This German troop movement into BULGARIA may be that referred to in this Headquarters Int Summary No.44, dated 4 Aug, when the railway from GIURGIU (ROUMANIA) into BULGARIA was closed to all except military traffic.

(b) STATIC CAMOUFLAGE IN GERMANY:

An indication of the importance which the Germans attach to camouflage and the extent to which they are prepared to carry their camouflage measures is given in the following extracts: it will be noted that no expense is spared and that no effort is considered too great or too small provided effective concealment by camouflage is obtained:-

The Germans have adopted elaborate methods of camouflage in an endeavour to check the RAF raids on HAMBURG, HANOVER and BREMEN.

Railway stations and other equally extensive targets were completely hidden under a canopy of timber rising on a gentle ramp up to an artificial mound. This was covered with grass and rows of shrubs, the effect from the air being that of a road running through fields over the crest of a hill.

The Germans also attempted to disguise landmarks by which they believe RAF pilots check their course near HAMBURG. The shape of a lake has been altered by covering parts of it with boards supported on piles. Another lake has been camouflaged by the same method.

After eight or nine oil storage tanks had been blown up near HANOVER, the Nazis covered the remaining tanks by erecting dummy houses on top.

It is reported that equally elaborate measures have been taken to camouflage the oil refineries at CONSTANZA and PITESTI (ROUMANIA), even to the extent of building complete dummy refineries.

ENEMY METHODS: (In the WESTERN DESERT)

The following notes on enemy tank tactics are reported:-

On one occasion GERMAN Mark IV tanks were used as a fire Unit.

On 22 Jun, 7 tanks approached BIR NUH from the North and engaged our armoured cars and OP in the BATTUMA area.

Six of the tanks went to hull-down positions in line and the seventh drew off $\frac{1}{2}$ mile to the flank. There is no doubt that this tank controlled the fire of the six hull-down tanks and they were used more or less as a six-gun battery. They fired finally at a range of approximately 7,000 yards and it is thought they were laying over open sights.

The other way in which Mark IV are used is as "sniper-guns" in forward armoured car patrols. An instance of this was at KINIBISH on 9 Jul. The laager consisted of three 4-wheeled armoured cars, one 8-wheeled armoured car, one Mark IV tank, a staff car and two trucks, about 3 miles North of KINIBISH. On being engaged by our guns, the armoured cars advanced and the tank took up hull-down position and opened fire. This is a very common practice and the majority of enemy patrols include one or more Mark IV tanks.

PART II - SECURITY

General:

(i) To all outward appearances the general situation in all areas remains quiet; but recent indications suggest that various subversive organisations are making full use of this apparent period of indecision.

(ii) In the area between ALEPPO and the frontier a large number of villages have been visited by our patrols during the week and personal contact with the Gendarmerie and Gardes Mobiles has been made. The general impression gained is that the country is pleased to see the British, chiefly because they expect the supply of food stuffs and the standard of wages to increase. There is a general dislike of the French, and especially in the country districts, of the Gardes Mobiles who appear to have held considerable power over the natives and to have exercised it with small sympathy for them. It is generally expected that the British troops will take over the functions of the Gardes Mobiles. The Gendarmerie on the other hand seem to be an efficient and well-commanded body. All Gendarmerie officers encountered during the week seemed most anxious to help us and to be well liked in their districts. The opposite impression was gained of the Gardes Mobiles officers.

Though there have been many reports of the shortage of food, in the country districts at least this does not seem to be very acute. There are two meatless days a week in all districts and sugar is still very scarce.

Possession and Collection of Arms:

In the MACHRHARA area it is common knowledge that there are large quantities of arms in the possession of natives and villagers. There being as yet no clear orders either to the inhabitants or to the Gendarmerie as to the procedure required by the British authorities for the handing in of arms, the position remains most unsatisfactory.

Sabotage:

The deliberate cutting of field cable is reported from JBAIL.

Fifth Column Dump:

A raid carried out on a cellar in ALEPPO on 1 Aug revealed a German Fifth Column dump. Among the articles found was W/T equipment, a uniform complete with helmet, signal cartridges and ground strips. A thorough search failed to reveal any arms or ammunition.

Attitude of Civilians:

It is reported from the 6 Div area that there is a large number of people who are anxious and willing to assist the British cause by giving information, but it is felt that if nothing is ever done about the information received, the source will dry up, particularly as we do not pay for the information.

There is a growing fear of Jewish immigration sponsored by us, and a real fear of a Jewish monopoly of Army contracting.

Enemy Propaganda: Notes on Syrian Popular Party (HIZB EL-QAUMI AS-SURI):-

In the LEBANON there is the Syrian Popular Party, one of the many political parties devoted to the ends of nationalism. This party has a definitely subversive character and aims at the institution of a Nazi system of government. Its "Führer", ANTON SAADEH is actively supported by the Germans and from time to time

- 3 -

action has been taken by the authorities against the party to curb its activities. Its members are largely drawn from the Christian community and for that reason it is not likely to dominate the political stage. The party favours independence and complete pan-Arab federation whilst maintaining strong Nazi/Fascist tendencies. Its membership is reported to be 20,000 - 30,000 and it has branches in LEBANON, SYRIA, PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN. It is alleged that its leaders are paid by Nazis.

(The foregoing is an extract from Military Handbook of SYRIA - 1941.)

Reports received at this HQ indicate that this party is active at the present time in the dissemination of pro-German propaganda. The moving spirit appears to be Captain OLLION - the former chief of Vichy Secret Service in the LEVANT. He has been seen at MACHRHARA (142177) in civilian clothes and it is thought that the HQ of the party is established in this area. Numbers of people at ZAHLE are known to be sympathetic to the party.

Wahnes

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.47

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 6 Aug to 1200 hrs 7 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I

(a) IRAQ: Personalities: It is reported that RASHID ALI (the agitator who started the trouble in IRAQ in May) has left IRAN for TURKEY. The German Ambassador is trying to arrange for his followers to join him in order to set up a so called Arab Government in exile.

CRETE: Air Operations: On the night 1/2 Aug our bombers attacked HERAKLION and RETIMO aerodromes. At HERAKLION a large explosion and red fire suggested that a petrol dump had been hit. At MALEME a violent explosion and a large fire with smoke rising to 5000 feet suggested a direct hit on a munition dump.

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.440, dated 3 Aug 41.)

RUSSIA: A report from the Military Mission MOSCOW, dated 1 Aug 41, gives the following information:-
The Germans were most surprised at the number of RUSSIAN tanks, which was double the German estimate.

The Germans are finding great difficulty in mopping up with their infantry isolated detachments of Russian forces, since the latter are accompanied by heavy tanks. This accounts for the severity of German infantry casualties.

The employment of German armoured divisions is severely handicapped by supply difficulties, and the majority are now supplied from the air only.

After the first shock at the heavy casualties the German morale is steadily going down.

The main drive will be towards MOSCOW because it is the capital, the centre of industry, and time is short before the Russian winter sets in. On the other hand the Germans consider that, with luck, operations in the UKRAINE and further South should be possible after November.

Rumanian casualties in South BESSARABIA have been heavy and the Rumanians are disinclined to operate East of the river DNIESTER.

(b) THE GERMAN AIR FORCE:

General Organisation: As mentioned in para (b) of 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.44, the German Air Force is organised on a territorial basis. There are five principal commands, called air fleets (LUFTFLOTEN). The area within each air fleet is divided into smaller areas called "LUFTGAUE"; the latter corresponds to the army "WEHRKREISE" or military districts.

"LUFTGAU" commanders are responsible for the administration and maintenance of all units situated within their area; although as a rule only the fighter units come under them for operational purposes.

They have under their command all training and ancillary units and anti-aircraft artillery not allotted to the field army or for other special tasks. They are also responsible for training (other than unit training), recruitment, mobilisation and training of air force reserve.

"Luftgau" commanders are responsible for all forms of active and passive air defence of their areas, and for this purpose within "Luftgau", large cities or vital industrial areas have been formed into air defence commands called "LUFTVERTEIDIGUNGSKOMMANDOS",

which have ground air defence units and, according to their importance and vulnerability, fighter units.

It is important to emphasise the fact that an Air Corps (FLIEGERKORPS), although a composite operational formation, is capable of being entirely air borne; all its ground personnel, technical equipment, repair shops etc being provided with their own air transport. It is therefore an extremely mobile formation which can be moved relatively large distances very quickly.

FORMATION AND FLYING UNITS:

German operational formations and flying units are grouped as follows:-

GESCHWADER a formation of 2 - 4 GRUPPEN
GRUPPE a unit of 3 - 5 STAFFELN
STAFFEL a unit of 12 - 18 Aircraft

These German terms have no exact English equivalents.

GESCHWADER: A "Geschwader" is a mobile formation. It has its own headquarters flight of three aircraft of the same type of aircraft with which its units are equipped. "Geschwader" are homogeneous formations, but may have other units attached to them. Their size may vary as follows:-

Bomber Geschwader 2 - 4 Gruppen
Fighter " 2 - 3 "

A bomber Geschwader has, normally, one long-reconnaissance "Staffel" attached to it, but this has been reduced to 5 or 6 aircraft since the outbreak of war.

GRUPPEN: A "Gruppe", like a Geschwader, is mobile, and has its own headquarters flight. "Gruppen" contain a varying number of "Staffeln" (a formation between a British squadron and flight), and, with the exception of reconnaissance or coastal units, are homogeneous.

A Gruppe may consist of:-

Bomber Gruppe 3 Staffeln and one Stabstaffel (HQ Staff) for reconnaissance purposes.
Fighter Gruppe 3 Staffeln
Reconnaissance Gruppe 3 to 5 long - or short - reconnaissance Staffeln.
Coastal Gruppe 3 Staffeln of different types.

STAFFELN: A "Staffel" is a mobile operational unit. For tactical purposes only it may be divided into two or three "Schwarme" (generally 5 to 6 aircraft) or "Ketten" (generally 3 aircraft) or "Rotten" (generally 2 aircraft).

The peace strengths of "Staffeln" (excluding reserve aircraft) are:-

Bombers 12 aircraft
Fighters 12 - 18 aircraft
Reconnaissance 12 aircraft
Coastal 12 aircraft

Bomber and fighter "Staffeln" have one or two transport aircraft.

(Compiled from Notes supplied by the WAR OFFICE)

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL - Route Reports:

BAB - MENBIDJ (Ref ALEP 1/200,000)

Mileage	Classification	Place	Description
00	Metal good repair	BAB	Dispersal possible
8	A2		Wadis crossed by culverts in good repair
21	Under construction		
30	A2	MENBIDJ	

Mileage	Classification	Place	Description
<u>MENBIDJ - DJERABLOUS (via DADATE) ref ALEP 1/200,000</u>			
00		↑ MENBIDJ	Possible to leave track in places, but country on both sides very hilly.
	C4		
		↑ New br DADATE 352521 C & Steel	
15		↑ AK POUNAR 356530	
	A2		
22		↓ DJERABLOUS	

<u>BAB - MAAREH - TELL RIFAT ref ALEP 1/200,000</u>			
00		↑ BAB	Good all weather track, average speed 15 mph.
	B3		
7		↑ CHAALA 304491	Impassable to wheeled traffic (map wrong).
		↑ QUASTIYE 295495	Good dirt summer track, impassable in winter; country flat and cultivated.
		↑ SARAMOUKA 291498 - MAAREH is impassable owing to irrigation dykes. Route through BIR HEURBUI 284498.	
		↑ MAAREH 287503, p 4000. Gendarmerie post, telephone, ample water.	
		↑ Good fine weather track, telegraph posts alongside; speed 12 - 15 mph.	
		↓ TELL RIFAT 278502, p 4000 (approx)	
		↓ Gendarmerie post, good water supply.	

PART II - SECURITY

Possession and Collection of Arms:

It has been reported that two tons of arms were collected from the villages of ABEY and KEEFER METTA on 5 Aug. The collection is continuing.

E. Mandel
May
 Lt-Col
 GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

SYRIA BRANCH - SPEARS MISSION

Headquarters.

Head of Mission
Attd. Mr. HAMILTON

Gen. SPEARS

Secretary (GSO II)
" (GSOIII)

Major Smith-Dorrien
2/Lt Wells

Attd (from Spears Mission) Capt Barton
2/Lieut Lord Oxford

Military Section.

GSO I
DAQMG
DAD Tn

Lt-Col BARTER
Maj SHAPLAND
Not yet appointed.

Air Section.

Wing Comdr De Sibour RAF

Naval Section.

Capt Morse, R.N.


Press & Propaganda, Censorship,
Finance & Economic

Brig Walsh.

(PLAN OVERLEAF)

Distribution .

GOC
BGS
G
I
A
Q
File
WD (2)
Spare (12)



SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.48

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 7 Aug to 1200 hrs 8 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I

(a) BULGARIA: Distribution of Forces: It is reported that on 26 Jul German AA Artillery was moving East along the road SOFIA - SHIPKA. (SHIPKA is a pass in the Balkan Mts about 100 miles East of SOFIA.)

ROUMANIA: It is reliably reported that five is the maximum number of German divisions in ROUMANIA not yet engaged against RUSSIA. (From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.441, dated 4 Aug 41.)

TURKEY: A report has been received from the Frontier stating that the Turks have been commandeering all MT in AINTAB.

(b) Technical Information - Nil

(c) Topographical.

Road Recce - TELL KALLIAKH 200303 to HOMS 242309(HOMS 1/200000):
31 Jul 41.

<u>Miles</u>	<u>Object</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
0	TELL KALLIAKH	
2.5	Rd crosses Rly line	
3.	Bridge	3 Arch stone bridge. Good block.
3.4	Culvert	Running water; surrounding country flat and probably boggy in wet weather. Irrigated crops. 12 wire T.L. follows rd, every 10th pole cement and iron.
5.6	Bridge	Stone
6.1		Enter foot hills. Easy gradient, road slightly rough and loose - needs repairs.
6.3	Culvert	2 Arch stone culvert. No water.
7.8		Metal stacked for rd repair. Also 3 steam rollers.
8.5	HADIDE	Surrounding country open and undulating.
10.		Road rough and rocky.
10.3	Culvert	3 stone arch culvert. No water.
12.9	Ammunition dump	
18.2	Police Barracks	Surrounding country flat. Few crops.
24.4	River	Country very marshy and several creeks with running water. Rd crosses on causeway. Impassable to tanks except rd.
26	HOMS	The rd throughout is good, some repairs needed and some are being done now by native labour. On Rd TELL ABDE (TRIPOLI 1/200000) 173286 to HOMS. First posn resistance could be offered for some time at TELL KALLIAKH. This area, however, lacks depth, but receive consideration with the excellent def posn (up to 6 miles depth) which commences about 1 1/2 miles to east thereof, and astride road TELL KALLIAKH - HOMS/. (OVER)

PART 11. SECURITY.Possession and collection of arms.

A report received from DAMASCUS area indicates that the collection of arms is proceeding favourably. It is interesting to note that a number of hill tribes, with whom a certain amount of trouble was anticipated, are complying satisfactorily with the terms of the Proclamation. As there has been ample opportunity for obtaining and hoarding arms in this area during the past two months, it is possible that the arms being surrendered constitute only a small proportion of the arms actually in the possession of these tribes, and that their present action is calculated to allay suspicion.

Adler Maj
for Lt-col
GS 1 Aust Corps

Distribution as per Summary No 28.

WD
SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.49

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 8 Aug to 1200 hrs 9 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART I

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS - N11

(b) RAILWAY WHEEL ANTI-TANK OBSTACLE:

The following particulars have been received of an anti-tank obstacle of POLISH origin of which the GERMANS may be presumed to have full details.

The obstacle unit consists of a single standard railway wheel complete with a portion of the axle, the hub of the wheel being extended if necessary by means of a length of piping. To form a road block several wheels and axles are laid in rows, the hubs towards the direction of attack, and the axles away from it.

A tank advancing at speed may knock the first wheel out of the way, but momentum is lost and the tank is finally brought to rest by bellying on the second or third row. It is usually possible for the tank to back clear of the obstacle.

Tests have proved the value of the obstacle and show that it is effective on any road surface. In common with most anti-tank obstacles the effect is greatest against tanks advancing uphill. Further tests are to be carried out to determine the effect of fire from the cannon of the tank.

(From GHQ Tech Int Summary No.29, dated 30 Jun.)

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

Road Recce - HOMS - HAMA (HOMS 1/200,000) LATTAQUIE - HAMA.

0
4.1 Water control pt Large cement water control left of rd, from here water channel runs for six miles along right of rd. Country very flat and cultivated. Some vines.
7.0 TELL BISSE Large village on right. Rd needs surface repairs for few miles.
12.6 RASTANE Rd block at entrance. Fairly large town. Rd crossed valley and river (good supply of water) by 12 arch stone br, narrow roadway. Valley covered by high ground on either side. Fairly even and good grade out of valley, rd cut on cliffs face for two miles.
20.0 Country undulating on left, low hills on right.
24.0 Country flat.
26.4 HAMA

General - Rd first class bitumen 2 way traffic almost straight due North. Tanks could move off rd in most places. Many suitable places for planes landing.

Road Reŕce - HAMA - ALEP (LATTAKIE-HAMA 1/200000 - ALEP 1/200000)
Large amm dump on left of rd near MAARDESS at pt 245365.

SOURANE Inhabitants seem very friendly.

KHANE EN NOIYANE Fairly large town. Few good buildings,
General - Distance 90 miles first class bitumen rd. The rd nearly
the whole way passing through flat country. From MAARET EN SARAKIB.
For some miles before entering ALEP undulating with some good
defensive posns.

PART II - SECURITY

Enemy Propaganda: From a reliable source it has been
reported that for several years Italian propaganda has been active
in Northern SYRIA. It has only met with success with certain
Christian families, especially Syrian Catholic commercial families,
e.g. the HINDIE family, the Catholic Branch of the ASSOUD family
and the MARCOPOLI family. Italian propaganda has failed amongst
the Moslems, but Nazi agents during the course of last year, using
Italian money, have succeeded where the Italians have failed. It
is alleged that German propaganda indicates that ALEPPO will be
handed over to TURKEY, presumably as a quid pro quo for Turkish
assistance in furthering or assisting German aims in the NEAR EAST.

Attitude of Vichy Troops: It is reported that on 1 Aug 41,
on the DJOUNIEH - FAIRAYA rd, three truckloads of Vichy French tps
passed along giving vigorous and strict Nazi salutes to the villagers.

K. Brown

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.50

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 9 Aug to 1200 hrs 10 Aug 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART I

(a) GERMANY: Enemy Methods: An unconfirmed report states that the Germans have used air-borne tanks behind the Russian lines. (This might well be the 15 to 17 cwt light tank armed with one LMG. In addition it is understood that the Germans have converted civil planes which are capable of carrying tanks up to 6 tons in weight.)

IRAN: It is reported that a number of AA guns have been recently transferred to the IRAQ frontier. Work has begun on the construction of barracks at QASR-I-SHIRIN (on the IRAQ border); when completed it is intended to station a regiment (1200 men) and a detachment of artillery there.

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.442, dated 5 Aug 41.)

RUSSIA: The following brief account of the fighting is reprinted from GHQ Daily Int Summary No.443, dated 6 Aug 41:-

"Operations. North of Lake LADOGA Finnish and German troops have advanced to near OLONETZ; no progress has been made on the KORELIAN ISTHMUS.

Little German advance is reported on the BALTIC Front. Soviet forces are withdrawing from Northern ESTONIA.

The drive towards LENINGRAD between Lakes PEIPUS and ILMEN is held up by considerable Soviet Forces.

On the Western Front fighting West of SMOLENSK has ceased. German progress East of SMOLENSK is being impeded by considerable Soviet counter-attacks.

German Forces have crossed River DNIEPER down to ROGACHOV where Soviet counter-attacks are not so strong as formerly.

In the UKRAINE - BESSARABIAN region German advance towards KIEV has not progressed. The main effort seems to be south-eastwards from the town of BERDICHEV and north-eastwards from BELTA."

- (b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION - Nil

PART II - SECURITY

ATTITUDE OF VICHY FRENCH: Articles in the newspaper "LA SYRIE" suggesting that Vichy French Officers have been given promotion and additional pay for preventing their men from joining the F.F.F. are reported as having a detrimental effect on our relations with the Vichy French.

Further it is alleged that the latter have received no mail since the cessation of hostilities. They are of the opinion that the letters are being withheld by the British.

ATTITUDE OF CIVILIANS: Impressions gained from unofficial conversations with local inhabitants suggest that a show of strength by the British would not be resented in the villages, on the contrary it would be admired, as the inhabitants would be agreeable to being disarmed with a show of force.

Several people, including muktars, have expressed thanks and possibly relief for the good behaviour of our troops, especially vis a vis the opposite sex. Their bearing compares very favourably with that of the French troops.

W. H. W.

Lt-Col

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

GS 1 Aust Corps

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.51

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 10 Aug to 1200 hrs 11 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART I

(a) BULGARIA: A Bulgarian Engineer Battalion is reported to be building fortifications in the KARABURUN sector of the Turkish frontier.

The garrison at SHUMEN moved to VARNA on 18 Jul.

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.444, dated 7 Aug.)

Comment: VARNA and BURGAS are suitable "invasion ports", if the Axis is thinking of offensive seaborne operations around the BLACK SEA littoral. It is known that two or three Bulgarian divisions have recently been moved from YUGOSLAVIA to these ports. (This HQ Int Sum No.46.) It is reported (reliability unknown) that a large number of barges have lately been seen at CONSTANZA.

FRANCE: During the embarkation of Vichy troops who were being repatriated to FRANCE last week some interesting reports on the conditions prevailing in FRANCE were obtained from the crews and from a few Vichy NCOs who had just arrived in SYRIA from FRANCE prior to the Convention. The food shortage is acute. Soap is particularly scarce - this was confirmed by the inspection of the ships and information from the crew. It was learnt that underground organisations are being formed in sections of Unoccupied FRANCE, composed of people favourably disposed towards us, who are waiting for the day the scales are turned against GERMANY, when they will lead revolts.

(b) DUMMY TANKS:

A German PW states that these are used extensively in NORTH AFRICA. He assisted in the construction of a number at TRIPOLI. Made of cardboard on a wooden frame they are mounted on a M/C and side car. They are employed solely to deceive the enemy with a show of strength, the strategy being (a) to parade "tanks" at a distance from the enemy lines in order to draw fire,

(b) to confuse the enemy as to the probable point of attack, and (c) to conceal a change in the position of a genuine tank unit. Prisoner had actually taken part in such demonstrations outside TOBRUK. He added that when tanks were withdrawn from the lines to workshops for repair, it was customary to substitute them with dummy tanks in order to conceal a decrease in strength if replacements were not forthcoming.

(From RAF ME Weekly Int Summary No.58, dated 22 Jul.)

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL: TURCO-SYRIAN FRONTIER:

River SOUYOU Sector (from R EUPHRATES to N & S Grid line 330):

This country is rolling pasture land which offers no obstacle to AFVs except the river itself. From the EUPHRATES to DADATE (353521) the greater part of the river constitutes a natural A/Tk obstacle, but West of this point considerable work is required to make it an effective obstacle.

Bridges and fords exist at the following points:-

1. DADATE. A concrete bridge carrying one stream of traffic.
2. KAOUR ELLI (334524). Stone bridge carrying single stream of traffic.
3. SPAHLAR (332530). A good stony ford.

PART II - SECURITY

Possession and Collection of Arms:

Ref 1 Aust Corps Summary No.44, Part II(b), AAQOURA district. Further investigation has revealed that two Sheikhs, JOSEPH MIRIB and FAHRID IMMED, each control about 150 armed men and are believed to be responsible for the bulk of the trouble. It has been suggested that the arrest and imprisonment of MIRIB and IMMED against the surrender of 150 rifles by each of their factions, may achieve quicker and certainly cheaper results than will the use of cavalry.

Enemy Propaganda:

As a result of shortage of quinine and other medical supplies used to combat malaria NAZI propaganda is active in alleging that this is positive proof that German raids on our shipping is having its effect, and that the supply position will become even more acute as the intensity of these attacks increases.

It has been reported that propaganda is being circulated in TURKEY and amongst the Turkish community of SYRIA that the British have sent, or are sending Armenians as a part of their force to the Turkish frontier. It is alleged that this news is creating considerable ill feeling against the Allies.

Attitude of Vichy French:

The Muktar of SOUK EL GHARB reported that on 10 Aug 41 Vichy tps had entered his town, stolen goods and had meals without paying for them. The villagers complained bitterly, shut up all their shops and were generally in a state of terror. Four people are alleged to have been assaulted.

Appropriate action was immediately taken to restore order. Later reports indicate that the situation was quickly brought under control by Australian troops.

General:

Att as Appx "A" is a letter from GSI Force HQ P&TJ dealing with security of information in SYRIA and the LEBANON.

E. Mander
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

APPENDIX "A" TO 1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.51

The following information has been received from Force Headquarters:-

"SECURITY IN SYRIA AND THE LEBANON."

"From an official source we have received expressions of concern at the apparent ease with which permission is being given, by various individual officials, for Vichy officers to enter establishments or barracks in occupation of our troops.

2. Our source points out that through this more or less promiscuous and uncontrolled grant of permits General DENTZ was in a favourable position to send trained observers who can gain information regarding our material resources and Order of Battle.

3. It is a fact that one such person visited an establishment with the object of collecting certain papers, which, he alleged, he required. Fortunately he was denied them.

4. It is well known that the Germans are striving by all means to obtain information relevant to ^{the} Order of Battle of our Forces in SYRIA. In view of this and of the fact that wireless security is practically non-existent, it is suggested that stringent orders should be issued precluding Vichy officers from entering any British occupied areas or Barracks."

The cooperation of Formation and Unit Commanders is sought in this matter.

There is no intention or desire that any action likely to prejudice the existing good relations with Vichy officers should be taken. On the other hand it is felt that with tact and good will there can be appropriate measures to ensure that the full spirit of the suggested instruction is followed without insisting on strict adherence to the letter.

E. Manderson
Maj
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.52

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 11 Aug to 1200 hrs 12 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART 1.

(a) Operations in the Western Desert.

: TOBRUK AREA. Our patrols continue their activity and have obtained useful identifications. There is no doubt that they have put the ITALIANS and, to a lesser extent, the GERMANS into a constant state of apprehension.

3 August. There was heavy fighting at Post S.7 (RAS EL MEDDAUUAH sector). (Comment : Posts S.7 and R.7 in the S.W. sector of the TOBRUK Perimeter defences are the flanks of the series of posts on the perimeter held by the enemy). It is reported that 28 enemy were killed there and in the sangars adjoining. Post R.7 (BIR EL MEDDUUAH sector), held in strength by GERMANS, was entered by our troops under severe fire, particularly by mortars, from the enemy which inflicted casualties on both sides. Casualties were collected without interference, the GERMANS assisting our ambulances by removing mines. The enemy recaptured the post on 4 August. Their casualties are known to have been heavy. Our losses were about 150 of whom 28 were killed and at least 10 are missing.

There was considerable bombing activity without damage on 4 August. The harbour was shelled despite the heavy attack by our bombers on enemy gun positions on 3 August.

5 August. Shelling and bombing attacks continued. A patrol to Post S.7 found the enemy rewiring and laying mines; otherwise the Western sector was quiet. Our patrol in the SIDI DAUD sector lifted 38 ITALIAN mines and put them to our own use.

AIR Action. There were 235 raids on TOBRUK in July. Since the commencement of the Siege of TOBRUK 68 enemy planes have been shot down.

Distribution of Forces.

Ever since the Operations in Mid-June there has been some doubt as to the exact locations of GERMAN units and formations, especially tank regiments. 8 Tank Regiment is believed to be in the area SIDI AZEIZ-CAPUZZO where it can rest, and yet be ready for action at short notice. It is possible that its personnel take turns at resting at MARSALA LUCCH seaside camp. A PW from 115 Lorried Infantry Regiment has recently stated that both battalions of this Regiment are at TOBRUK together with a battery of 33 Arty Regt and part of 104 Lorried Inf Regt. It is still not certain if the battalion of 104 Regiment has been relieved in the HALFAYA area by ITALIANS, as was expected. Recent reports from PSW, too numerous to be disregarded, indicate disappointment in the German Africa Corps that there has not been any relief of personnel. It is therefore probable that as many men as possible are sent in rotation for a rest at the comparatively pleasant MARSALA LUCCH CAMP. (Summarized from GHQ Daily & Weekly Int Summaries up to 7 Aug 41).

FRONTIER AREA 4/5 Aug. Enemy arty shelled BATTUMA at night and again on the morning of 5 Aug. On 5 Aug there were explosions in the KAFRET HABBUNI area and more than the usual movement by armoured cars in the areas BIR NUH, SIDI SULEIMAN and SCHEFERZEN.

(b) Technical Information. - Nil

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL: TURCO-SYRIAN FRONTIER:
"PLAIN sector". (From N & S Grid line 330 to Road ALEP-AZAZ incl).

This sector, being comparatively featureless, provides no delaying positions. The difficulty of defending this sector is very considerable and would require extensive preparations or a large armed force.

An advance through this sector would be canalised to a certain extent by three Wadis.

(1) Wadi TELL CHAIR (299518) to DOUEIBIYE (293513). Average width 15 yds; average depth 7 ft. A small stream flows throughout the year.

(2) Wadi KARA KEUPRU (292520) to DOUEIBIYE. Average width 10 yds. Average depth 7 ft. Dry in Summer.

(3) NAHR TAFCHINE (287514) Description of this Wadi is the same as that of (2) above.

The Road ALEP-AZAZ passes through no localities suitable for demolition or delaying action.

PART 11. - SECURITY.

Collection and Possession of Arms.

(a) Two French soldiers have been imprisoned in connection with report of the sale of rifles and revolvers in the BISHTLIDA Area (150244).

(b) Enemy Propaganda. - It is reported that JOSEPH SALEM BOUDIE of ERDEN moves amongst the labouring classes spreading exaggerated reports of GERMAN victories against the RUSSIANS. He assures his hearers that GERMANY will soon successfully terminate the war against RUSSIA and will then be free to turn towards SYRIA and drive out the BRITISH and AUSTRALIAN troops. He promises that all who assist GERMAN and ITALIAN aims will be rewarded when the time comes. From infm received it would appear that his propaganda has been well received amongst certain elements of the poorer class, mostly MOSLEMS who have lost faith in BRITAIN'S military prowess.

Mandub...
 Lt-col
 GS 1 Aust Corps

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SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.53

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 12 Aug to 1200 hrs 13 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I

(a) IRAN: Since the end of June, there has been a considerable amount of military activity in IRAN, chiefly the movement of troops towards the North and West. Of the nineteen divisions in the Iranian Army, we believe that about fourteen are now located in the quadrangle TEHRAN - ISFAHAN - ABADAN - MAKU. This shows nervousness for the safety of the Trans-Caucasian frontier, the Iraqi frontier and the oilfields. Most of the Iranian divisions, and particularly those in the East and South Eastern districts, are probably at three-quarter strength only.

The Persian Army, like the Russian Army until recently, is one about whose fighting value little is known. The evidence goes to show that the officers are poor but that the men, especially those from certain tribal districts, would fight well if well led. They could not be compared with Indian troops but, as far as courage and morale are concerned, would conceivably make a better show than Iraqi troops under similar conditions. The Army cannot be described as well trained nor is it mobile. In the early years of the present SHAH's reign, the Army gained a considerable amount of experience in tribal warfare but it has little knowledge even theoretical of modern warfare. Until recently its training used to culminate in a yearly combination of Review, manoeuvres and Tattoo, the main object of which appears to be to impress the population of TEHRAN.

The SHAH at present is subject to British, Russian and German pressure and is undoubtedly nervous that either we or the Germans will attempt sabotage or occupation of the oilfields area. It is probable that the SHAH's fear and hatred of RUSSIA and his suspicion and dislike of GREAT BRITAIN have produced in him a pro-German reaction, strengthened by German propaganda as to the benevolence of German feelings towards IRAN.

(Reprinted from GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation dated 4 Aug 41.)

- (b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION - Nil

PART II - SECURITY

ATTITUDE OF VICHY FRENCH:

The following extract from a report by the Security Officer attached to the Embarkation Board is of interest. It is to be borne in mind that the Security Officer, F.S. Officers, and N.C.O.'s engaged on this work have been in close and friendly contact with all ranks of the Vichy French for some weeks past, and were present at their recent embarkation and departure from BEYROUTH.

" Morale of T.F.L.: (Troupes Francaises du Levant-ie, VICHY FRENCH)

(a) There is no pro-German feeling whatever. Again and again, Officers have said that the sooner they are fighting the Boche the better.

(b) Anti-British feeling does not run deep. Our invasion of

SYRIA is considered an act of aggression, but the French officers admit they do understand our reasons. What is represented is :-

(1) Our dealings with the French Fleet.

(2) Our references to PETAIN.

The T.F.L. believe that PETAIN is whole-heartedly anti-German, and is patiently waiting his time.

(c) The hatred of the T.F.L. for the Free French is bitter, and vice versa. Incidents such as firing on volunteers for the Free French should not be considered either as anti-British or pro-German. The Free French are blamed for having entered SYRIA and fought their own compatriots when they might have stayed in AFRICA and fought the Boche. In the feeling of one side for the other there is all the cruelty and passions of Civil War".

For Anderson
may

of Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

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1 AUST COMPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.54

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 13 Aug to 1200 hrs 14 Aug 41

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SPECIAL NOTE (From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.446, dated 9 Aug 41.)

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

MORE ENEMY PAPERS, LESS BRITISH CASUALTIES

Will all recipients of this Summary please do all that is in their power to improve the flow of captured enemy documents to G.S.I., G.H.Q., M.E.F. Despite frequent reference to the importance of captured documents, it is still obvious that many individuals and even headquarters do not realise the vital importance of the information which is daily found in captured enemy documents.

The following examples show how little importance is still attached in many quarters to these documents:-

A batch of German diaries captured in GREECE during April was found in the corner of an office near CAIRO at the end of July. The officer concerned "did not know what to do with them"!!

A private soldier was found at PORT SAID in possession of a most important German diary which he was keeping as a souvenir.

Some documents captured in LIBYA in mid-June reached G.S.I., G.H.Q., M.E.F. at the end of July.

Prisoners of war in hospital and in prisoner of war camps are frequently found in possession of diaries and other papers which they have been allowed to retain since their capture.

Among items of first class importance lately revealed by captured documents have been the following:-

The exact organisation of the German tank units facing us in the Western Desert.

Official German tank tactics, a document of the greatest importance.

Detailed description of German anti-tank guns, also of great importance.

Detailed information as to the whereabouts of enemy dumps and headquarters in LIBYA.

Detailed information as to enemy losses in shipping between ITALY and TRIPOLI.

Most valuable information as to the state of enemy health and morale.

MORE ENEMY PAPERS, LESS BRITISH CASUALTIES

PART I

(a) SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: Distribution of Forces: German troops are reported to be leaving EUBOEA Island (GREECE), via CHALCIS and moving Northwards. Reports from two sources indicate

that one or both of the German divisions in the SALONIKA area is now moving Northwards. This refers presumably to 72 Division from SALONIKA, and to 164 Division which was occupying the AEGEAN Islands, with its HQ at KAVALLA (on the Greek mainland, 80 miles NE of SALONIKA).

GERMANY: According to a source, believed reliable, arrivals of German wounded in BERLIN in mid-July were between 10,000 and 12,000 daily.

Attached as Appx "A" is the translation of a letter to a German soldier in LIBYA from his sister in GERMANY. It gives an interesting picture of the effectiveness of RAF raids over GERMANY.

(b) GERMAN TACTICS (From BTE Special Summary No.5) :

(1) Tanks

So far, the enemy has employed his tanks in three ways:-

- (a) As patrols, in much the same way as our own.
- (b) For a quick advance by rushes.
- (c) For a ponderous attack in mass formation well supported by Field arty close behind, and with soft-skinned vehicles behind that.

Regarding

- (a) Cases are on record of patrols of 3 and 4 tanks, of 3 tanks lying "doggo" all day with the crews inside and feigning dead, supported by arty if attacked, and of the use of tanks as pill-boxes, dug in.
- (b) On two occasions during the past operations, quick jabs forward were made by between 40 and 60 tanks in mass formation with the idea of causing us to withdraw, but no attack was pressed home.
- (c) This is the usual way of attacking. Tanks can be seen forming up in mass formation, up to 100 all told, at fairly regular spacing, in waves. There is Field arty behind then, and behind that "B" echelon. The advance is quite slow, and either the tank guns or the Field arty keep our own AFVs at a distance of some 2 - 3000 yards, at which range our 2 pdr is not effective. If a counter-move is put in by us, the arty concentrates on it and halts our advance. There are two obvious solutions
 - (i) to lie up in ambush in hull-down positions while the enemy advances and then to shoot him broadside at an effective range, and
 - (ii) advance at full speed from at least three sides, firing hard on the move.

The question as to what sort of gun keeps our tanks out of effective 2 pdr range is not settled. One case occurred of a tank being hit by a 50 mm HE shell at approx 2,500 yds, but it is thought that a heavier gun is normally used, either 75 mm tank guns or 105 mm Field arty.

The enemy shooting on the whole was accurate, but it is not yet clear whether some tanks stopped to fire while the others moved on, or whether all tanks fired on the move.

Tanks were found dug-in on the HAFID ridge position, and one tank was destroyed by an attack by our tanks in the SULEIMAN area from three sides. This tank had remained quiet until an Arm'd Car patrol saw it revolving its turret.

If the enemy withdraws, he usually leaves a few tanks behind, moving by bounds, as rearguard.

It was noticeable that many enemy tanks burst into flames almost immediately after being hit.

(11) Armoured Cars

Enemy Arm'd Cars although ready to take on light opposition, show great respect for our 2 pdrs. Despite their equivalent armament they usually retire when engaged, and their role is essentially reconnaissance. On 12 May

three 8-wheeled Armd Cars were advancing quickly on a desert road, but on being engaged retired rapidly West. Enemy Armd Cars usually hunt in twos and threes, sometimes in fours. Parties meet at times, and then confer before separating again, which may argue a lack of wireless or a restriction on its use.

(iii) General

(a) Afternoon Movement

It is remarkable how often enemy advances take place in the late afternoon. As a rule, his major movements are not seen until 1630 hrs in the afternoon and the completion of the movement takes place after dark, leaving our tps in some doubt as to the exact location of enemy tps after nightfall.

(b) Signals

Swastika flags (as previously reported) and orange smoke signals are the principal ground to air recognition marks. The flags are laid out on the ground, waved, or spread over vehicles.

The tank danger warning used by both Air Force and Army consists of blue or violet light or smoke signals.

(c) Wireless

It is reported that wireless communications on the forward frequency of the Desert Group was jammed recently by repetitive speech in Italian.

(d) Laager Areas

Two red and green lights of ribbed glass raised on poles were observed by one of our patrols in the vicinity of a recent tank laager near KINIBISH; it is thought that they may have served as a guide to the laager area.

PART II - SECURITY

ATTITUDE OF VICHY FRENCH: A person, hitherto found to be reliable, expressed the following views:-

Quite a number of his acquaintances who were pro-British previous to our occupation of SYRIA, had swung against us, and his explanation was that powerful 5th Columnist activity was rife in BEYROUTH.

A cousin of his, a member of the Vichy Forces, informed him that he had no intention of joining the Free French, as in his opinion, the British Forces would be incapable of holding SYRIA when the Germans attacked. This view was shared by the majority of the Vichy Forces.

His cousin also commented on the fact that their camp was placed in between two De Gaullist camps, with the idea of obtaining converts. In his opinion, no greater mistake could have been made. In fact, it only served to antagonise them further.

Handwritten signature
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.28.

NOTE: Maps of the Frontier Zone

The three sheets covering the Frontier Zone between EGYPT and LIBYA have been reproduced and are being forwarded under separate cover to recipients of this Summary.

THESE REPORTS WERE RECEIVED FROM A GERMAN SOLDIER IN
LIBYA FROM HIS SISTER - DATED 13 JUL 41

APPENDIX "A"

to

1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.54

EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER TO A GERMAN SOLDIER IN

LIBYA FROM HIS SISTER - DATED 13 JUL 41

" On Saturday I went to the cinema and saw on the
news how they are fighting before TOBRUK. The things
you have to put up with there ! ----- but who knows how
long it will all last ----- . We are advancing very
rapidly against the Russians too, that's just as well, if they
had come here they would have skinned us alive.

What are the Tommies doing over there ?

Aren't they putting their hands up yet ? Here they send
their bombers over every night, and last week they so bombed
MUNSTER in WESTPHALIA that the town had to be evacuated till
the evening. 6 or 7 churches are in ruins. No house in
the whole town is undamaged. It was burning for a few days,
they couldn't put the fire out as they had no water. Water
Tower and the mains all bombed. They will do a lot more
damage too before the war is over. "

.....
(Reprinted from 9 Aust Div Int Summary No.107.)

SECRET.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.55

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 14 Aug to 1200 hrs 15 Aug 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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PART 1.

(a) OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT. 10 Aug. Enemy tanks shelled our patrols in the SIDI-SULEIMAN area. Our guns in the ABU FARIS area engaged two armd cars and one tank, which withdrew behind a smoke screen. Fourteen bombs were dropped on the BAGUSH-FUKA area. Some failed to explode. A telephone line was damaged.

TOBRUK AREA Night 9/10 Aug. An Italian patrol was allowed to approach within 300 yds of our O.P. at BIR CHERSA before we opened fire. 26 Italians were killed. Because of heavy enemy shelling the post had later to be abandoned. There were no casualties. A three gun battery in the South-West shelled the town and there were two harmless air-raids.

10 Aug. A dive bombing attack in the late afternoon by eighteen JU 87 escorted by four fighters demolished a concrete crane near number 1 jetty and destroyed a disused building in the town. At least one aircraft was brought down. A high-level attack shortly afterwards by two JU 88 killed one officer and wounded ten men. Enemy guns in the East shelled the town without causing damage.

BULGARIA. One German division ex GREECE (mentioned in yesterday's summary) is reported to have arrived in SOFIA. In addition another German division is said to be located between VARNA and BURGAS.

AEGEAN ISLANDS. Italian troops on SAMOS are reported to be collecting considerable numbers of barges and small craft.

(b) TOPOGRAPHICAL.

TURKO-SYRIAN FRONTIER.

"HEIDANE- EKBES SALIENT SECTOR" From rd ALEP-AZAZ to rd ALEP-AFRINE - KICHLA (both incl.) This sector is hilly and wooded and is intersected with numerous Wadis running S W & N E. It provides innumerable delaying positions.

The valley through which run the road and Rly. is steep and narrow. There are a number of sites suitable for demolition.

The AFRINE SOU constitutes an A.Tk obstacle. It is bridged at 259520, 267531, and 267532. The tracks BULBUL (252535) - DERSOUAN (269529) and BULBUL-KATMA (265515) are narrow and would be impassable to M.T. in winter.

PART 11.

SECURITY

ATTITUDE OF VICHY TROOPS. Vichy troops have now left ALEPPO and Free French troops have entered it. General de GAULLE was given a friendly welcome by the civil population who seem to be settling down quite contentedly under British rule. There is no doubt that this is due, to a considerable extent, to the excellent way in which British troops have conducted the selves in the town; their orderly behaviour has been in marked contrast to that of the Vichy soldiers. Townspeople express disappointment, however, that there has been no appreciable fall in prices since the arrival of the British. There

- 2 -

is discontent in the police services over low rates of pay; this is longstanding and it is said that the Vichy authorities had promised to improve matters.

E. In order to
by
Lt-col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 56.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 15 Aug to 1200 hrs 16 Aug 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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SPECIAL NOTE (From FORCE HQ Weekly Intelligence Review No 8).

GSI (Force) would like to take this opportunity to express their appreciation of the mass of topographical information which is reaching them from units in all parts of SYRIA. Like Oliver Twist, however, they ask for more. It is most important that as much information as possible should be available as soon as possible, to compile an up-to-date topographical intelligence picture of SYRIA for those who can use it. All such information should be dated, and in cases of road and track reports in lesser known parts of the country, details of soil and estimates of passability under winter conditions should be included. There should be no fear of duplication, since the more individual reports on the same subject can be obtained, the more detailed and useful will be the final picture.

PART 1.

- (a) GERMANY. Notes on Armies. Russian sources state that reliable information has been received that German divisions have suffered the following casualties :-

7 Armoured Division	30%
11, 13, 14 and 16 Armoured Divisions	40%
18 Armoured Division	Considerable.

Both 7 and 18 Armoured Divisions known to have been engaged in the Central (SMOLENSK) area. 11, 13, 14 and 16 Armoured Divisions were in the Southern (KIEV-ODESSA) area. From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 448 dated 11 Aug.

RUSSIA. It is interesting to note in connection with the German claim to have cut off ODESSA and NIKOLAIEV on 13 Aug that the Wireless Stations at both these ports were functioning quite normally on 14 Aug.

- (b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION- Nil.

- (c) TOPOGRAPHICAL.

TURCO-SYRIAN Frontier - Jebel es Smaane Sector (From rd ALEPPO-AFRINE-KICHLA to rd ALEPPO-TERIB-KASR EL BANATE).

The low ground to the North of the R. NAHR AFRINE provides no obstacle to attack from the West. The Road AFRINE-KICHLA traverses no suitable position for demolition.

The NAHR itself constitutes a fair lateral obstacle, but is not Tk proof in dry weather.

The JEBEL SMAANE is a rocky steep feature. The only track passable to MT is track DANA-DARTE AZZE-DEIR ES SMAANE. The construction of a track Northwards from DEIR ES SMAANE would be of great military value.

The road ALEPPO-TERIB-KASR BANATE passes through no defile except at KASR BANATE where the hills are moderately steep.

PART 11

SECURITY

General. The following extract from GSI Force HQ Weekly Intelligence Review No 8 is re-printed for information :-

SYRIA. The situation in SYRIA has changed outwardly very little during the week under review. On the other hand, arrangements for the relative responsibility of the Free French and British in SYRIA have now been made by negotiations on the highest level, and this should go far to ensure internal stability for the future. Briefly summarised, these arrangements are that the Free French are responsible for the administration of the whole of SYRIA. For military purposes a zone North and East of a general line (all inclusive) LATTAKIE-ALEPPO-QUARIATAYN-SAB BIYAR- junction of the Syrian/Transjordan frontier is to be considered "in a state of siege" in virtue of which the civil administration in the area is subordinated to the wishes of the local military commanders. The latter are at present British. Throughout SYRIA other privileges and priorities in signal and communications are granted to the Military Authorities. The ports remain under the control of the Royal Navy.

These arrangements look simple on paper, but it is important to remember that if they are to work satisfactorily, close co-operation between the military and civil authorities, both in the military zone and in the rest of SYRIA and LEBANON is essential. From the security angle, nothing is more certain than that Axis friends and supporters will still continue their efforts to cause dissension between the British and Free French in SYRIA. In isolated cases and in the absence of a definite administrative directive, some friction has occurred in the past. There is now no reason for a repetition of such friction in view of the present arrangement, and given mutual goodwill and a determination to make things work.

The internal security of the country rests in the first instance on the Surete, the Police and the Gendarmerie, both in the LEBANON and in SYRIA. A "British Security Mission" for liaison with these authorities is in the process of establishment at BEIRUT. Its functions will be to act as a link between the British Security Authorities in the Middle East and the French Security Authorities in SYRIA and the LEBANON. It will also, when required, advise and assist the French Authorities in security matters. Hitherto, an improvised skeleton staff has been performing this function with some success, but it is clearly of the utmost importance that measures should be concerted with the Free French Administration to ensure the internal security of the country as soon as possible. The purely military security of the country will be a matter for the Allied troops of occupation.

Along the Turkish frontier contacts with the Turks have been generally most friendly, and one or two incidents during the earlier part of the occupation are in process of being smoothed over. It is worth noting that the attitude of the Turkish Government which must inevitably be reflected to some extent in that of its soldiers and officials, is at present one of not unnatural caution. Whilst the great majority of the Turkish people is naturally sympathetic and friendly to the Allied cause, TURKEY's position in the present world situation is one that forbids her to offend GERMANY and makes her regard with mixed feelings the present conflict between GERMANY and RUSSIA. The main Turkish bugbear for some years past has been the Russian threat from the CAUCASUS and whilst the attrition of the RUSSIAN war effort against GERMANY appears to have removed this bugbear for the time being, the average Turk must regard the possible outcome of this conflict with mixed feelings. In his view, it may lead either to a German demand for passage towards the S.E. in the event of a German success, or an ultimate renewal of the Russian threat from the CAUCASUS should the Russians succeed in containing the German attack. In addition, the Turk is by nature suspicious and the Turkish soldier obeys orders blindly. In dealing with the Turks on the frontier

therefore, it is clearly in our interests to allay this suspicion and to cultivate the best possible personal relations.

General DENTZ, General ARLABOSSE, GENERAL JEANNERET and senior Vichy French Officers have been taken as hostages for the return of British prisoners flown from SYRIA during hostilities. The first instalment of the latter is due to return within the next few days by sea from TOULON. There are, however, still some eighteen of these prisoners in SCARPANTO and therefore in Axis hands. Some form of pressure was clearly necessary to support our demands for their return.

ATTITUDE OF CIVILIANS.

Owing to unsettled conditions, due to the operations of bands of brigands in the area, a demonstration in force was made through the SARAYA district (174426).

The inhabitants showed a general lack of interest and greetings were infrequent and unsmiling. A few isolated watchers were seen in the bushes and on the hill tops. The general impression was that the British troops were feared and unwelcome, either because the inhabitants dislike us of their own volition, or because they had been told that we were likely to injure and interfere with them.

Adair Maj
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 57

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 16 Aug to 1200 hrs 17 Aug 41

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PART I

(a) ROUMANIA: It is reported that the Germans have recently laid a double 10-inch pipe-line from PLOESTI to GIURGU on the DANUBE. It is not known whether the work is yet completed, but it has been very hurried, and the pipes are laid on the surface alongside roads and bridges.

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.449, dated 12 Aug.)

Operations in the WESTERN DESERT: Both the German and Italian Orders of Battle were given in this Headquarters Int Summary No.42, dated 2 Aug. A PW from 102 TRENTO Division (TOBRUK Eastern Sector) captured on 8 Aug stated that he had heard that 25 BOLOGNA Division is now in the TOBRUK area and is about to relieve the TRENTO Div.

Morale: A group of German prisoners from the Western Desert who were recently interrogated all profess to have had quite enough of the War. They did not care how it ended, so long as they could get home soon. This spirit is said to prevail amongst the majority of German troops in LIBYA, who feel that the Italians can have the desert so long as the Germans get home. There was considerable enthusiasm when first they came to AFRICA, but they have since become thoroughly disillusioned by actual conditions in the desert.

(From RAF ME Weekly Int Summary No.59, dated 5 Aug.)

(b) PRECAUTIONS AGAINST SUN

Captured documents show that the Germans are much concerned at the effect of the tropical sun on their munitions and weapons. All ammunition other than SAA is specially packed for the tropics. All munition cases are so marked. Normal charges for tropical use are calculated at an average temperature of 25° C (77° F). Troops have been specially instructed to protect weapons and munitions from the direct rays of the sun. The instructions for the 'S' mine 35 and 'T' mine 35 include a clause to the effect that failures can be expected owing to high ground temperatures and also to the rotting of the rubber parts. Special instructions are issued for the protection of weapons from dust. Certain vehicles such as limbers, MG trailers etc, are provided with double fly covers and suggestions are made for putting a type of double fly cover over Hy MG's in position.

(From BTE Special Summary No.5.)

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL - TURCO-SYRIAN FRONTIER

ORONTES Sector (Comprising the hill country South of HARIM and East of the ORONTES Valley):

The country South of HARIM is hilly and the tracks are for the most part impassable to MT. There is a partially constructed track from SARMADA to HARIM.

The ORONTES itself constitutes an A/Tk obstacle throughout. It is bridged at DERKOUCHE and JISR ECH CHOGOUR. Passage of the River at the former place would be hindered by the narrowness of

- 2 -

the village streets of DERKOUCHE.

The Road IDLIB - HARIN and Road SALKINE - DERKOUCHE are passable in all weathers to HT. On the West bank of the ORONTES the NAHR ABIAD (204435) constitutes a minor obstacle. A good delaying position exists at 220427 on the Road IDLIB - JISR ECH CHOGOUR.

PART II - SECURITY

ATTITUDE OF LOCAL INHABITANTS:

In the ALEPPO area the arrival of the British is generally welcomed in the country districts visited by our patrols, although the maintenance of the Services Speciaux is the subject of many questions. A clean sweep of all French Authorities was apparently expected. Many complaints concerning officers of the Services Speciaux are received, but even if these merit the removal of the officers concerned, it is at present impossible to find personnel to replace them. Local inhabitants are anxious for information concerning British policy in SYRIA.

General de GAULLE accompanied by General CATROUX and Colonel COLLET visited ALEPPO on Aug 9-11. The ALEPPO press, which is fickle and unreliable, was enthusiastic. The general public was luke-warm and inclined to be suspicious at the beginning of the visit, but became more enthusiastic later. On the evening of 10 Aug General de GAULLE made a speech in the Hotel Baron, ALEPPO, which was very well received.

A number of local notables visiting a unit HQ all expressed dislike of French rule, which they hoped would be entirely abolished.

It is to be expected that the arrival of the FFF will make the situation extremely delicate.

TURCO-BRITISH RELATIONS: On the Turkish frontier relations have become cooler. It is reported that this is due to Turkish officers receiving orders that no fraternizing is allowed for fear of their coming under British influence.

Verhulst

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 58

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 17 Aug to 1200 hrs 18 Aug 41

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 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I

(a) Information from other fronts - Nil

(b) GERMAN ARMY A.A. UNITS:

The general AA defence of the zone of the German Armies is the business of the G.A.F., and G.A.F. AA Units are attached to formations of the field Army as required.

The Army, however, has also its own motorised AA bns (Flugabwehr Bataillone Motorisiert).

The weapons of all these units, both GAF and Army, are dual purpose, and are provided with A.P. ammunition. They are used against AFVs and against concrete emplacements, as well as against aircraft.

It should not be forgotten that every German Army unit is responsible for its own defence against low-flying aircraft; for this purpose they use rifles, MGs on AA mountings, and the 2 cm (.79 in) MGs distributed among the divisional Inf and arty. Further, A/Tk units have weapons which are also suitable for AA purposes.

The motorised AA ("Fla") bns of the German Army form part of the Inf arm. They are assigned to the GHQ pool, and coys may be allotted down to corps or divs according to requirements. In addition, it may be the intention to include such bns in the establishment of divs.

Motorised AA bns are now equipped with the following weapons:-

- 2 cm (.79 in) AA A/Tk guns (super-heavy MGs)
- 4 barrelled 2 cm super-heavy MGs.
- 3.7 cm (1.45 in) dual purpose AA A/Tk guns.

The total number of guns in a bn is believed to be 36, but the number of each calibre issued is not known and may vary.

During the operations of 1940 it is believed that bns were equipped with 2 cm MGs only; the introduction of the 3.7 cm gun, previously confined for AA purposes to GAF units, is new and may not yet have progressed far.

During the operations of 1940, bns generally transported their MGs by towing them behind tractors. Recent information suggests that now they are being mounted on universal semi-tracked carriers (the method previously used by GAF units). It is also possible that, following the example of the assault gun and the mobile anti-tank gun, AA guns too, of all calibres, may be mounted on tank chassis.

The tendency in the German Army, therefore, is to increase both the calibre and the mobility of its AA weapons.

The AA defence weapons of the German Army are always found well up with the forward troops. This was most noticeable during the advance in FRANCE in 1940 and in JUGOSLAVIA this year.

Since Army AA tps wear the inf colour (white), there is unfortunately a tendency for them to be assigned in reports to Inf Regts of the same number.

PART II - SECURITY - Nil

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E. Manderson
Thy.
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.59

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 18 Aug to 1200 hrs 19 Aug 41

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SPECIAL NOTE: Information has again been received that in German Prison Camps British prisoners of war are asked to fill in a form giving amongst other information the unit of the prisoner.

All ranks are reminded that a British prisoner of war should give his name, number and rank only.

On no account should he state his unit.

PART I

(a) Operations in the WESTERN DESERT:

Frontier Area: There has been a slight increase in the activity of enemy artillery and armoured cars. Enemy aircraft have been active. MATRUH was bombed on the nights 12/13 Aug and 13/14 Aug.

TOBRUK Area: Our patrols have been active in the Western Sector. On 13 Aug there was an air raid lasting for three hours around the perimeter defences which resulted in damage to telephone lines. There were six raids on the Town throughout the day. The Hospital, Salvation Army Room, and power and telephone lines were damaged. Casualties were three killed, and fourteen wounded. Most of these were in the hospital.

(Summarised from GHQ Daily Int Summaries.)

AEGEAN ISLANDS: It is reported that large numbers of rafts are being made at RHODES. It is interesting to note that, as reported in this Headquarters Summary No.55, the Italians are carrying out similar work at SAMOS.

It is reported that both the Italian and German garrison tps on CRETE maintain bi-weekly patrols. In addition there are armed motor boat patrols close inshore. This increased activity has probably been necessitated by the guerrilla action of the Cretan irregulars operating from the mountains.

RUSSIA: Transport presents a great problem to the Russian High Command. Railways in RUSSIA carry about 90% of the traffic, waterways 8% and roads 2%. Over 1 Km of railway about 4.2 million tons are carried annually. Lack of rolling stock, and sleepers for the tracks are reported to be the main deficiencies of the system. It is reported that on the main Trans-Siberian line new bridges have been built alongside the present ones in order to provide immediate alternative tracks should the present ones be destroyed.

(Summarised from GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No.452, dated 15 Aug.)

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION - Nil


PART II - SECURITY

Attached as Appx "A" are extracts from a Force HQ Directive on Security matters.

PUBLIC OPINION: In general, the better the social class, the more contented they are with the change of administration. The poorer people, however, are anxiously awaiting a fall in prices. There is marked tendency in religious circles (Syrian Catholic Patriarchate for instance) to exaggerate the horrors of the recent campaign.

The mail from French prisoners of war in PALESTINE speaks of good treatment, outings, the correct behaviour of the English, etc.

ERRATUM: Ref 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.55, Part II Security, line 4: For "British rule" substitute "the new regime".



Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No.28.

APPENDIX "A" to 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No.59

Extracts from Directive to Commanders, Concerning Security
of British Military Areas - SYRIA, issued by Headquarters,
British Forces in PALESTINE, TRANSJORDAN & SYRIA, 15 Aug 41.

FRONTIER CONTROL:

- (a) Great importance is attached to strict control over frontiers in order to prevent undesirable elements entering or leaving the country. No persons will be allowed to enter SYRIA from TURKEY without a visa issued by a British Diplomatic or Consular official.
 - (b) No person will be allowed to leave SYRIA unless in possession of a visa countersigned by the Surete Generale in BEIRUT.
 - (c) Persons entering SYRIA from PALESTINE must be in possession of an exit permit from the C.I.D., PALESTINE Police, JERUSALEM, and a pass issued by A.P.H., Force H.Q..
 - (d) No person will be allowed to enter SYRIA from IRAQ without a permit from the British Military authorities in IRAQ, and from the IRAQ Government.
 - (e) Military personnel crossing the Syrian-Palestine, and Syrian-Iraq frontiers must be in possession of identity cards, in the case of officers, and A.B.64s in the case of O.Rs.
-

Care will be taken to ensure that any civilians who may be employed are adequately 'vetted' before being engaged. Persons of non-British nationality will not be allowed access to secret or confidential information.

Similar care will be taken to check the bona-fides of contractors, civilian officials and employees in key positions where sabotage or other fifth column activities would be most harmful. All forms of civilian labour, including casual workers and transport drivers employed by the military authorities, must be adequately checked and supervised.

SECRET

W 2
1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 60.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 19 Aug to 1200 hrs 20 Aug 41.

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PART 1

(a) TURKEY. Various small troop movements have been taking place during the last month.

It is reported that 800 troops have moved from HADDIN (Just over the Turko-Syrian border about 60 miles North of HASSETCHE) to JAZIRA IBN OLAR, (a Turkish frontier post 35 miles North of TEL KOTCHEK). Reinforcements totalling about one battalion reached BIREDJIK between 31 Jul and 3 Aug.

(From Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 71 dated 18 Aug).

AXIS AIR ACTIVITY. Both the German and Italian Air Forces have been active in the Middle East during the last month. Their operations in LIBYA have already been dealt with in this HQ commentary on WD operations. The major offensive tasks- as might well be expected- have been carried out by the German Air Force. The Italians have confined their activities to shows of force (i.e. large protective fighter formations over BENGHASI); they have shown no desire to engage our fighters.

Whilst various reports have been received stating that the enemy are embarrassed by a petrol shortage in CYRENAICA, it must be remembered that the acquisition of such bases as CRETE greatly assist offensive bomber action. Germans have made attacks each night from 6 Aug to 12 Aug against KANTARA, ISMAILIA, PORT SAID, SUEZ, and the DELTA area. On 6/7 Aug bombs were dropped on SUEZ. The main objective was shipping. Some bombs fell on the oil refinery, damaging it slightly.

ALEXANDRIA was raided at night on 7 Aug; 50 to 60 HE bombs were dropped in and around the harbour. One ship was damaged by a near miss. Enemy aircraft attacked aerodromes South of ISMAILIA on night 10/11 Aug- little damage was done. On the same night SUEZ was raided where a few ships were damaged by incendiaries.

MALTA was raided once during the week. No damage resulted, as our fighters went up and drove off the enemy.

OUR ACTION. Fighter patrols have been carried out by Hurricanes and Tomahawks over convoys and HM ships in the MEDITERRANEAN. The RAF and SAAF have bombed the Italian garrison at GONDAR in East Africa. Bombing raids have been made by the RAF and Fleet Air Arm against targets in SICILY, Southern ITALY, where severe damage was done to the chemical works at CROTONE, and shipping in the MEDITERRANEAN. One large scale raid was made by Wellingtons on the CORINTH CANAL on the night 8/9 Aug. Mines were dropped in the Eastern entrance of the canal, and the remainder of our aircraft dropped 23 tons of bombs. A recce aircraft later reported that one hundred yards of the canal had been blocked. As a result of this raid we lost one aircraft and two were damaged. The aerodrome of ELEUSIS in GREECE was bombed on the same night. CRETE has been bombed twice during the period under review.

(Summarized from RAF HE Weekly Int Summary dated 14 Aug 41)

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION. Nil.

(over)

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL - Road and track report. DJERABLOUS to MESKINE.

Route. DJERABLOUS: --MENBIDJ; JOUBBEL KICHLI-(359495): right fork below H of AHMAD (362490); --TELL-EL HOUDANE (363484); QOUBAB EL NEBIR (363475); AAROUDA (365476); BABIRA (365464); left on main road to MESKINE (366453).

Notes on condition of road.

The road to MENBIDJ is good and metalled for first 5 miles, then it becomes a track with some rather rough parts but passable for all traffic. Bridge over River SOUYOU (353521) is good and takes all vehicles. From MENBIDJ to right fork (362490) good in dry season, doubtful in Winter. From right fork (362490) to nearly TELL EL HOUDANE (363484) road very bad, being crossed by 5 bad stream beds which are dry at present, but this part of the road will be impassable in Winter, and is very difficult at present (dry season). Then very good track to AAROUDA (365476).

The stream at AAROUDA has a little water in it at present, but it will be deep in wet season. There is no bridge over stream and ford very bad and will not be useable in Winter. Road from AAROUDA to MESKINE quite clear and good and strikes main road from ALEP to MESKINE about 2 miles from MESKINE. (Total journey 63 miles).

PART 11. SECURITY.

General. SALE OF W.D. STORES AND ARMS. Instances of the stopping of trucks, previously reported by 7 Aust Div, in an attempt to buy arms and petrol from British troops, have occurred in the ZAHLE area. Two natives, SOULFIHAN AHMED HAMED ABOU ASKAR and HOUSTAFI IBRAHIM MEISS, were arrested in BARR ELIAS on 12 Aug. The latter "flagged" passing trucks to stop. Having stopped a truck he offered to buy petrol, and this object achieved, he attempted to buy arms and amm. After his arrest his house was searched; three revolvers, some loose rounds and some army blankets were found.

Propaganda. It is stated that ITALIAN propaganda has been disseminated in N. SYRIA during the last few years. This has met with some success amongst Syrian Catholics. Amongst Moslems it is reported to have had no success, though GERMANS employing Italian funds are said to have been more successful. The main trend of propaganda in the North has been to attempt to alienate TURKISH and ARMENIAN sympathy from the BRITISH. To this end many anti-BRITISH rumours have been circulated.

Kawia
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.61

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 20 Aug to 1200 hrs 21 Aug 41

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PART I

(a) GERMANY: The total number of German Divisions is now believed to be 260, an increase of 10 on previous estimates. Out of the 260 Divisions some 30 to 40 are reported to be low category troops. There is evidence that drafts of trained men were recently sent from NORWAY to the Eastern Front. Amongst the German prisoners taken by the Russians on the Ukrainian Front were men whose ages ranged between 48 and 51.

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.453, dated 16 Aug.)

ALGEEAN ISLANDS: A Greek officer who left ATHENS on 21 Jul 41 confirms that the number of troops in the island of SAMOS is three divisions including a mechanised division, 800 motor vehicles and a large number of pontoons and motor-boats.

He further stated that on the train journey from SMYRNA a number of civilian passengers travelling on the same train but who got off at the frontier endeavoured to obtain information from his men as to the various methods they had employed for escaping from GREECE. He thinks they were German agents.

He also said that before the Germans withdrew their troops from GREECE, 130 Austrians trained as parachutists were executed at the aerodrome of DHADHI (? DAPHNE) in ATTICA as they refused to continue to be parachutists. A large number of Austrians are also held at ATHENS for sabotage.

Comment: If the report in the first paragraph is accurate these three divisions are presumably Italian.

It has already been reported that elements of 11 BRESCIA Div and 50 REGINA Div are in this island, together with an ALPINI unit, three mountain btys and IIT. On the other hand a later report definitely states that there is one Italian Division only in this island and that there are no German troops

TURKEY: It is felt that the statement of the Greek officer mentioned in the first paragraph above should be collated with the following four reports:-

1. 20 (Turkish) Division has been moved from EULAIR (DARDANELLES area) to ISLAHYE (40 miles NE of ALEXANDRETTA).
2. A German officer, Major HANSEN, has arrived in TURKEY to study communications through ANATOLIA.
3. A Turkish officer on leave is reported to have said that the old Greek-Turkish frontier is manned by German troops.
4. Barges and small boats are being collected at SAMOS and RHODES: though this has not been confirmed by a later report.

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION - Nil

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

MEMBIDJ - QICHLET YOUSSEF PACHA (37454945):

Bad surface leaving MEMBIDJ for about half a mile. Passable then all the way to ABOUQALQAL (36754980). One new well 5 miles

from MEMBIDJ (halfway to ABOUQALQAL). This road passable in any weather. Local information even during rains NO roads in this area impassable for more than one to one and a half hours at a time. Leave Pond at ABOUQALQAL on the left and the way out is difficult to find (ASK). Terrible road from here onto YOUSSEFF PACHA crossing a series of dry river beds, sheer drops and rises up to one and a half feet. Surface very rough and in places very crumbly.

YOUSSEFF PACHA to AALLOUGH (36954981):

Rocky surface, level in no place at all, very narrow with sharp bends and crevices into the track. In places there are steep vertical drops up to 50 feet. TAOURED DOUKHOA is NOT an island as shown on the map, but on the mainland, one and a half miles from YOUSSEFF PACHA. Having passed a well under a private house, it is necessary on reaching a second well to turn sharp right and to cross by a ford. From here on to AALLOUGH there is a very rough track indeed along fields, and it is necessary to cross about ten irrigation streams (without bridges).

PART II - SECURITY

Local Situation (DJEZIREH): A general improvement is noticeable, the population generally speaking being contented. Business is proceeding normally, and with more normal conditions of travel between villages and towns a feeling of security and order is growing.

The availability again of sugar and oils has created a favourable impression.

The question of the Independence of SYRIA is beginning to be discussed locally at DEIR EZ ZOR; the general feeling appears, however, to be that no answer to political questions can be given pending the cessation of hostilities.

Recruiting for the "Troupes Speciales" has been brisk, practically all the local unemployed ex-military having presented themselves on the first day.

German propaganda is reported to have lost much ground.

Illegal Sale of Petrol: Cases are still occurring of vehicles being hailed by civilians, and money offered for the purchase of petrol, ammunition or other military stores.

In this connection and in co-operation with O.C. 7 Aust Div Pet Coy a rendezvous was arranged by a member of that unit who had previously been approached by civilians desirous of purchasing petrol.

Nine persons turned up at the appointed hour and having handed over the money, were informed they were under arrest.

All endeavoured to make themselves scarce as rapidly as possible; however, one was inadvertently knocked out whilst another was winged in full flight, and later captured.

They were taken by Military Police and handed over to the Surete General.

One of the prisoners, Albert J. SAADI, being somewhat apprehensive, was willing to talk, and stated he was but a "cog" in a relatively large and well-organised system for the purchase of the aforementioned articles.

The Surete General have been requested to institute a thorough investigation with a view to cleaning up the whole gang.


Vichy Propaganda Badges: A badge of this nature was observed in a shop window at ALEPPO.

Enquiries revealed the fact that a short time ago a French Major had ordered two dozen badges to a pattern he produced, saying it had arrived from FRANCE.

A reproduction of this badge appears below.

It will be noticed that the shape is that of a FASCES, the stem of which is made of a French Marshall's "Baton de Commandement", obviously that of Marshall PETAIN.

The manufacturer made several hundred such badges as a speculation and put them in the window. At 30 francs each they sold like hot cakes to both civilians and military personnel.



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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.62

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 21 Aug to 1200 hrs 22 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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PART I

(a) IRAN: A further indication of German interests in this country is borne out by two reports that have been received of German planes carrying "specialists" that have recently arrived from ROUMANIA. The SHAH is apparently still nervous and military precautions are continuing, the garrisons in the West and NW are reported to have been recently reinforced. Four sloops have been sent to MOHAMMERAH (near ABADAN at the head of the PERSIAN GULF).

Notes on Army: The estimated strength of the Army on 15 Jun was 126,400 all ranks, 9750 gendarmerie, 524 guns, anti-aircraft included. At that time formations were mostly at three-quarter strength.

Reported A.F.V. totals are 24 armoured cars with one 3.7 cm gun and two machine guns each, 50 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton tanks with one light and one heavy machine gun each, and 50 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton tanks with one 3.7 cm and two machine guns. 3 Mechanised Infantry Regiment has 50 armoured lorries and 50 motor-cycle combinations armed with BROWNING machine guns.

AFVs and 3 Mechanised Infantry Regiment, with one AA and one Field Artillery regiment, form the Mechanised Division on active service. In war they are to be attached to 1 and 2 Divisions. It is reported that 12 light and 12 medium tanks each are already attached to 1 and 2 Divisions.

Distribution of Forces: The following are reported in area ABADAN:-

6 Division at full strength, moved from AHWAZ to KHORRAHSHAHR (sometimes known as MOHAMMERAH) about 7 Aug.

12 Light and 12 Medium Tanks.

40 Armoured cars and armoured lorries.

1 PAHLEVI Infantry regiment of 1 Division is in KUZISTAN.

Comment:- These 64 AFVs are doubtless under command of 1 Division.

(From GHQ Daily Int Summaries up to 18 Aug.)

TURKEY: Attached as Appx "A" is a sketch map showing the dispositions of the TURKISH Army as at 27 Jul 41.

(Taken from Appx "B" to GHQ Daily Int Summary No.446, dated 9 Aug.)

(b) 20 mm ISOTTA FRASCHINI AA Gun: The following report on the value of the 20 mm ISOTTA FRASCHINI AA Gun (ITALIAN) has been received from the garrison of TOBRUK:-

"This weapon has proved much more satisfactory than the BREDA, and has not the tendency to stoppages caused by dust and sand. The elevating and traversing gears are more robust. This equipment has required very little workshop maintenance.

Plate chargers are easily damaged, and like the BREDA feed trays, must be treated carefully, kept clean, and lubricated with thin oil.

Defects have been noted in main and feed springs - these are

frequently incorrectly tempered and easily break or lose their temper.

Both the 20 mm BREDA and 20 mm ISOTTA FRASCHINI have proved a very good supplementary AA armament, but the performance of both equipments compares very unfavourably with that of the 40 mm BOFORS gun.

(From GHQ Tech Int Summary dated 10 Aug.)

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL - Road and Track Reports:

BAB - KHAISSA - KAOUR ELLI - BOZ HEUYUK - Ref ALEP 1/200,000

(328512) BAB - KHAISSA B 1 Track, a much used track with a good surface shewing little sign of wear. It runs through flat cultivated country all the way and dispersion is possible anywhere. There is no cover from air.

(335524) KHAISSA - KAOUR ELLI. The map shews two tracks running from KHAISSA to KAOUR ELLI. The Eastern most track should be followed and is B 1 throughout. Probably passable in all seasons. The Bridge at KAOUR ELLI is a stone causeway about 9 ft wide and 20 yds long.

KAOUR ELLI - BOZ (338531) B 1 Track.

FRONTIER TRACK FROM TCHOBANE BEY STA - BOUZLIOJA - AYACHE -

KADILAR This is a B.I. Track.

From KADILAR to BOZ HEUYOK the track deteriorates. The River SOUJOU at SPAHILAR is crossed by a ford with a hard stony bottom. Two other streams here are crossed by small bridges made of iron railway sleepers; they are about 8 ft wide. The river crossing is impassable to MT in winter.


BOZ HEUYAK - DOK NOUK - DJERABLOUS - B 1 track running through rolling cultivated country for the most part. The last 8-10 miles into DJERABLOUS the country becomes slightly hilly and dispersion would be difficult in places.

PART II - SECURITY - Nil

E. Mandelones
my
+ / Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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APPENDIX A 1 ARMY CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 62



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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.63

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 22 Aug to 1200 hrs 23 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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PART I

(a) TURKEY: HBN Ambassador, ANKARA, has reported that four German officials who recently arrived at ISTANBUL to negotiate a Turco-German trade agreement have been recalled as it is considered that the present is not a favourable time for bringing pressure to bear on TURKEY.

(From MEIC Daily Summary No.583, dated 18 Aug.)

IRAN: It has been reported that the armoured car battalion of the IRANIAN mechanised Division has arrived at AHWAZ (about 75 miles North of MOHAMEDERAH).

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.453, dated 16 Aug.)

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION - Nil

PART II - SECURITY

Collection of Arms: The following extract from Force HQ Weekly Int Review is a general statement of existing arrangements:-

"It seems probable that the present system of collection by local police and gendarmerie is the best course to adopt so long as it produces results. The natural indolence of the Syrian and Lebanese police personnel will have to be overcome by a stimulus from the administrative and military authorities. It is probable that after a time no further results will be achieved and a "hard core" of arms in the wrong hands will be reached. As far as can be foreseen at present, it is then, and then only, that more drastic measures should be considered. In this case too, local conditions should be taken into account in adopting any fresh measures. In this connection, it is essential that if G.S.I. are to frame suggestions for further executive action, they should be kept closely and continuously informed on the arms situation in the different areas."

Press and Propaganda: The Syrian newspapers give considerable prominence to the declaration of British policy in SYRIA recently broadcast by the B.B.C., based on a telegram from our Ambassador in CAIRO. Its provisions were briefly as follows:-

- (1) Both BRITAIN and FREE FRANCE have guaranteed the independence of SYRIA and the LEBANON.
- (2) BRITAIN wants nothing for herself in SYRIA and the LEBANON, and the British Army is there for war purposes only.
- (3) The SYRIANS and LEBANESE have now a unique opportunity to realise their national aspirations.
- (4) FRANCE has historical relations with SYRIA and the LEBANON which BRITAIN recognises, therefore it is the FREE FRENCH who will negotiate the treaty of independence with SYRIA and the LEBANON and until then they will control the administration of the country.

- 2 -

- (5) The BRITISH will do their best to facilitate negotiations between the FREE FRENCH, SYRIANS and LEBANESE, in conformity with the British guarantee.

W. A. W. W.

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 64

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 23 Aug to 1200 hrs 24 Aug 41

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PART 1

(a) U.S.S.R.

- (i) Operations up to 18 Aug are summarized as follows :-

The whole length of the MURMANSK - LENINGRAD railway is still in Russian hands. There is no immediate threat to MURMANSK.

On the BALTIC front, German forces have reached the GULF OF FINLAND between TALLIN and NARVA. TALLIN and the BALTIC ports are still in Russian hands. The advance towards LENINGRAD has been resumed from the NARVA area.

In the SMOLENSK sector the Germans are digging in. Further South, activity is reported West of ROSLAVL, and there are indications of an enemy drive S.E. towards the BRYANSK - GOMEL railway.

In the UKRAINE the Russians have repulsed strong attacks on a narrow front at KIEV. From KIEV to KREMENTCHUG they hold positions well West of the DNIEPER. South of this, the Germans are pushing on rapidly into the loop formed by the DNIEPER. ODESSA is cut off by land.

(From GSI GHQ ME Intelligence Summary No 457, dated 20 Aug 41).

- (ii) It will be seen from the above resume that the five sectors which have been referred to in our previous summaries (especially Nos 27 and 38) have now been resolved into three, viz-

- (a) the BALTIC front, which includes the Finns' drive Southwards on LENINGRAD to the West of LAKE LADOGA, as well as the German advances from NARVA and from PSKOV.

- (b) the Centre front, including the SMOLENSK area and the thrusts to the North and South of that town, and

- (c) the UKRAINE front, where the attacks on the 4th and 5th sectors have now been combined into a single far spread offensive, which extends from a point some 50 miles North of KIEV along the line of the DNIEPER to the BLACK SEA somewhere East of NIKOLAIEV.

In addition there has been fighting in the far Northern Sector, i.e. the Eastern frontier of FINLAND. On this sector there are three principal thrusts: against MURMANSK, against PETROZAVODSK, an important railway town on LAKE ONEGA, and against OLONETS, just to the East of LAKE LADOGA.

- (iii) So far as the scanty and sometimes conflicting reports permit a connected picture of the situation to be formed, operations since 18 Aug may be summarized as follows :-

FAR NORTHERN SECTOR. Here there has been no appreciable change in the last fortnight. MURMANSK, PETROZAVODSK and OLONETS are still apparently in Russian hands, and it is possible that the German-Finnish attacks have been held up by bad weather. It is significant that no attempt to cut the MURMANSK - LENINGRAD railway by a drive Eastwards from the long waist of FINLAND has been reported.

ON THE BALTIC FRONT. The Germans, after attempting- apparently with at least partial success- to mop up the Russian guerrillas in

ESTHONIA, and the troops which were cut off West of LAKE PEIPOUS have resumed their drive on LENINGRAD. They have captured KINGISEPP (some 75 miles South East) and NOVGOROD (100 miles W S W of LENINGRAD). This last is within 50 miles of the main LENINGRAD - MOSCOW railway. The German advance is at present held at both these points. At the same time the Finns have re-commenced their thrust down the West side of LAKE IADOGA, but have apparently made little headway against the fierce Russian resistance.

This double threat to LENINGRAD has led H. Stalin to direct an appeal to the citizens of the city to defend their homes to the last. Apart from its importance as a great industrial centre, the loss of the area around LENINGRAD would make the position of the Russian BALTIC fleet extremely difficult.

IN THE CENTRE SECTOR. The fighting in the VELIKIE LOUKI and SMOLENSK areas has apparently been stabilised, and both sides appear to be digging in for the Winter. Nothing further has been heard of the German thrust to KHOLM which, at one stage looked so threatening. Similarly, the attack on ROSLAVL appears to have been held at the moment, though there has been a possibility of an advance South East of BRIANSK.

Further South, however, the Germans captured GOBEL on 21 Aug. This is an important railway centre, and its loss must be a severe blow to the Russians in this region. The Germans appear to be making a serious thrust at this point, but it is not yet clear whether their next move will be directed North East towards BRIANSK with the object of turning the Russian positions around SMOLENSK, or South East to threaten the rear of the forces defending KIEV.

UKRAINE FRONT. In view of their definite check just East of SMOLENSK, the main weight of the German attack on the U.S.S.R. has now been transferred from the drive on MOSCOW to an attempt to conquer the UKRAINE. Here the main Russian defensive line is along the DNIEPER River from the Southern edge of the PRIPET MARSHES, about 50 miles North of KIEV to KREMENTCHOUK and DNIEPROPETROVSK. From here it is not clear if the line continues along the River to its mouth near ALECHKI, or runs due South to the Sea of AZOV. The latter would mean the abandonment of the CRIMEA, and, as a consequence, difficulties for the Russian BLACK SEA fleet. In either case, however, most of the vital industrial centres of the UKRAINE, including the key city of KHARKOV, would be protected. The early German attack on KIEV failed despite the German claims to have captured the place. The subsequent attack to the North appears to have been submerged in the PRIPET Marshes about 3 Aug, whilst the attack to the South was held at TCHERKASY.

Further South, however, the Russian resistance was overcome, and the Germans proceeded to exploit the weak spot. NIKOLAIEV, a Russian Naval base, and KRIVOIROG, which was producing 60% of the iron ore used by the Soviet, were captured on 18 Aug, and a definite threat to DNIEPROPETROVSK itself developed the next day. It became obvious that the aim of the Russian commander was now merely to extricate his forces from the bend in the DNIEPER with a minimum of loss. This he succeeded in doing by the 21 Aug, with the loss of only 6000 prisoners even according to the German claim.

On the other hand, BERLIN has not yet claimed the capture of DNIEPROPETROVSK, though this lies on the West bank of the River and there is no doubt that further still to the West isolated centres of resistance are still holding out.

The indications at present are that the main force of the German offensive in this area has expended itself, and it is fairly certain that the Germans have not up till now succeeded in crossing the DNIEPER at any point.

The garrison of ODESSA is still apparently maintaining resistance. The city is completely cut off except by sea, and the Germans are extensively dive-bombing all shipping in the harbour as well as the town itself. The fall of the city may be imminent, but it was still in Russian hands at 1200 hrs 25 Aug.

(iv) In general, there is as yet no sign that Russian resistance is anywhere nearing a collapse. Russian reserves, not only

in men but in equipment and supplies of all kinds, are still apparently available in large quantity, and the Red Air Force is still capable of vigorous offensive action. There has, however, been a marked lessening lately in the claims that the German supply columns are being bombed and MGd by Russian planes.

(v) "The further developments in the German plan are now unfolding. The present phase appears to be a desperate drive, before Autumn sets in, to reach ROSTOV and thus isolate the CAUCASUS. This would deprive Old RUSSIA of some 80% of her oil supply and seriously weaken her ability to carry on a long campaign. The destruction of the bridge over the River DON at ROSTOV would force land-borne oil from the CAUCASUS to take the longer alternative line via STALINGRAD. Oil could also be shipped from BAKU to ASTRAKAN and possibly KRASNOVODSK, but all this would be a poor substitute for the present heavy shipments via the BLACK SEA and ROSTOV.

Recent indications have pointed to the probability of combined operations from Roumanian and Bulgarian ports against the CRIMEA. This attack would presumably be designed to outflank the DNIEPER position and to seize the naval base at SEVASTOPOL, thus confining the Russian BLACK SEA Fleet to the inadequate Eastern bases of BATUM and NOVOROSSISK.

In the meantime, no considerable eastward advance is possible until the Germans overcome the obstacle of the DNIEPER. The Russian General Staff claim that the situation is under control, that communication between their armies is good, and that their rear services are working smoothly. This is perhaps somewhat optimistic. At the same time there is growing evidence of German supply difficulties, and digging in round SMOLENSK, as well as other signs in the North, indicates that the Germans are preparing for a winter campaign."

(These last 3 paras are from GSI GHQ ME Weekly Review No 64 dated 18 Aug).

IRAN : Distribution of Forces. The following reports are unconfirmed. Reference this Headquarters Summary No 62, further reinforcements arrived in ABADAN area on 15 Aug, viz- 2000 troops, 17 AFVs and 6 AA guns. It is reported that some 3000 Cavalry are now at SHUSH (75 miles North of ABWAZ). According to a report from a source believed reliable, preparations were being made on 17 Aug to send troops from SHIRAZ to BUSHIRE where previously there had been none. (From GHQ Daily Int Summary No 456, dated 19 Aug).

Attached as Appx "A" is a sketch map showing the disposition of the Persian Army as believed on 8 Aug (from Appx "A" to GHQ Daily Int Summary No 446, dated 9 Aug).

General. It is reported that mobilisation has caused some confusion. Lorry owners are doing their best to avoid requisitioning of their vehicles.

TURKEY: Topographical. It is reliably reported that the railway running East from DIARBEEKIR is now completed. Trains are operating as far as SALATA.

This line previously only went as far as BISMIL while earth-works had been completed as far as KURTALAN, West of SIIRT.

It is reported that plans have been completed for the construction of a new line linking the railway FELYAS - IRMAK with the line SAMSUN - SIVAS. The new line will probably branch off the former near CANKIRI and run via OSMANCIK to MERZIFON.

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION- N11.

PART 11.

SECURITY.

JEBAIL. It has been reported that the annual surplus of grain in SYRIA proper (excluding LEBANON) was about 213,000 French tons. The distribution of this was normally direct to LEBANON through merchants. The French Military authorities ordered that all grain, flour, etc, should be forwarded to them at BEYROUTH whence surplus was distributed to civilians. This system of distribution still

exists and is one of the basic causes of present shortage. Twelve months ago the price of flour was 15-20 piastres per rottle (2½ kilos). The average workers wage is 60 piastres per day.

In this connection the following petition from the people of KAFAR AAQAB (151223) is of interest :-

"When the British Forces occupied SYRIA and the LEBANON, with the Alliance of the Free French, the people began to feel the economic difficulties. At first the price of living fell because of the occupation, but recently the prices rose very quickly to the detriment of the poor people, and this is shown by the market prices.

The price of bread is 35 to 37 Syrian Piastres per kilo, sugar 80-85, rice 40-42 per kilo. As is shown, the middle and the poor classes cannot bear this situation. While the Lebanese Supply department is always interested in deliveries to the market, and does its utmost in that regard, the goods delivered to the mountain people mostly are not sufficient for more than two days. These goods are sold at less than the ruling market price.

The consequence of this situation is that the village of Kafar Aaqab with about 300 inhabitants, has a ration of 1½ kilos of flour, sugar and rice per man per month.


That is why we beg you to advise the competent authority (before our communications are cut because of the snow) to supply us with the necessary commodities at a reasonable price which the population can afford.

Awaiting a favourable reply, and sending compliments to the British Government.

Signed by the population of
KAFAR AAQAB"

In and out ones
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.65

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 24 Aug to 1200 hrs 25 Aug 41

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GENERAL: There are now grounds for believing that the British prisoners of war who were in Italian hands at SCARPANTO will be handed over to the French authorities and will be brought back to SYRIA. (Force HQ Daily Int Summary No.76, dated 23 Aug.)

PART I

(a) IRAN: It is reported that on 5 Aug the 38 Infantry Regiment (12 Div) commenced to move by march route from the KERMANSHAH area to the IRAQ frontier. Their intention is to occupy positions at QASR-I-SHIRIN (near the IRAQ frontier NE of KHANAQIN) and at NAFT-I-SHAH (oilfield area South of KHANAQIN). The 14 Artillery Regiment (12 Div) is reported to be about to move into the same area. This regiment is armed with:- 8 Bofors 75 mm Mtn guns
and 4 Skoda 105 mm guns.
(From HQ B.F.I. Daily Int Summary No.97.)

It is reported that on 15 Aug 112 lorries left TEHRAN for ABADAN with rifles and AA ammunition.
(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.457, dated 20 Aug.)

TURKEY: An experiment recently took place in transporting by day a mechanised detachment across the BOSPHORUS from the EUROPEAN to the ASIATIC side, utilising deck lighters, ordinary lighters and caiques. The mechanised detachment contained medium and field artillery and infantry. Subsequently the experiment was tried by night in transporting the same contingent back from the ASIATIC to the EUROPEAN side. All the men of the detachment were equipped with life belts and during the journey two caiques were supposed to have been put out of action by bombs. All troops were forced to take to the water in their full equipment, being subsequently picked up by special craft detailed for the purpose. This was done without any casualties. Preparations are now in progress for repeating the exercise with a whole division, and if they prove successful it is hoped before winter to repeat the same exercise with a whole army corps.

(ANKARA Letter No.6, dated 11 Aug 41.)

GERMANY: Russian reports state that German troop-carrying planes recently shot down were carrying light tanks and their crews.
(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.458, dated 21 Aug.)

(b) Technical Information - Nil

PART II - SECURITY

German Fifth Column Activity: From reports received from different sources it appears that the Germans, before they left SYRIA, devoted most of their attention to the town of ALEPPO. One report states that they spent 6 million French francs there before the Armistice was signed, and 6 million more afterwards. It is reported that they got together a group of 600 young men to be trained in Fifth Column work. These were mainly Moslems and Armenians, with very few Lebanese. When the end of hostilities was in sight, the Germans intended to take these young men to GREECE for further training, and asked the Turkish Government to allow them to cross TURKEY. The Turkish authorities, however, refused to allow them to go through as a body. It is therefore possible that they may be going through individually.

Enemy Propaganda: In general it appears that German propaganda has affected a large majority of the inhabitants of the country. The Moslems believe that Germany would rid the NEAR EAST of their two "betes noires", the Vichy French and the Jews. The more fanatical and gullible believe that HITLER is himself a Moslem and that his real name is ABU ALI. The Armenians, being above all things anti-Turk, would rather like to see GERMANY smash TURKEY. Practically everyone is united in disliking the Vichy French. The Lebanese are, as ever, opportunist, avaricious, clever and unreliable. British popularity was mainly founded on the fact that they expected us to deliver them from the Vichy French misrule. The Moslems of SYRIA were somewhat affected by the Iraq incident. Pan-Arabism in SYRIA has been divided into a cultural nationalist sentiment drawing its inspiration from EGYPT, and a more fanatical and political movement looking towards BAGDAD. The Germans played on the latter by persuading the Iraqis that they were destined, by their martial virtues and superior will-power, to be the Prussians of the Arab world. The puncturing of this interesting theory by British arms inevitably created some bitterness in pro-Iraqi circles in DAMASCUS, though it also raised British prestige and severely lowered the reputation of the Iraqis.

Border Control: The following is a report on a visit to the border control at QASSAB ref LATTAQUIE-HAMA 1/200,000, 177443:-

"There has been very little traffic over the border in the last two weeks. The Turkish authorities handed over four bandits who are wanted in PALESTINE for offences alleged to have been committed there.

The border is NOT wired and in parts NOT very clearly defined. In addition the country is well timbered, rough, hilly and difficult of access. In these circumstances it is impossible to stop unauthorised entry and exit to and from TURKEY without strong forces. There are Turks and Syrians patrolling the border, but it is not known just how reliable they are."

W. H. H. H.
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.66

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 25 Aug to 1200 hrs 26 Aug 41

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PART I

(a) IRAN: So far only brief communiques have been received of the operations in IRAN. The British Forces are under the command of General WAVELL. One British Force has landed at BANDAR SHAPUR at the head of the PERSIAN GULF, whilst another attack is being launched from IRAQ. Some opposition has been met by the British Forces. At the same time the Russians have launched a two column attack from the North across the CAUCASUS, one column making towards TABRIZ and another towards ARDEBIL.

An indication of German Fifth Columnist activities in IRAN and of IRAN's attitude towards the USSR was given in this Headquarters Int Summary No.28. The arrival of additional German "specialists" was mentioned in Summary No.62. The fighting value of the Army and the SHAH's present attitude were discussed in No.53. The estimated strength of the Army and notes on its distribution were given in No.60. The Order of Battle and the Distribution of Divisions were given in No.64.

Generally IRAN has been making feverish preparations to defend herself - whether against the Germans or ourselves was not clear - for the last two months. Roads and railways were repaired, there was a general commandeering of MT and Pack animals. It was reported that men of 20 - 28 years were called up on 11 Aug, partial mobilization had been anticipated as far back as 26 Jun. The SHAH has kept some of the best troops (TURKOMANS) in TEHERAN for his own protection. Attached as Appx "A" to this Summary is a statement showing strength and location of the Persian Forces as believed on 21 Aug (from Appx "B" to GHQ Daily Int Summary No.459, dated 22 Aug).

Topographical: It is reported that some rails have lately arrived at BANDAR SHAHPUR from USA. These are for the QUM (lat 34.3 long 50.4) - KASHAN - YEZD (lat 31.9 long 54.2) branch line, which is complete except for the laying of rails.

ROUMANIA: Recent events have demonstrated once more the value to GERMANY of ROUMANIA, her first Balkan acquisition. During the Spring the country formed a concentration area for troops preparing for the invasion of BULGARIA, YUGOSLAVIA and GREECE. Today it is proving its value as a base against the USSR, and may in the future perform the same function against TURKEY.

For such a purpose the country is well fitted. It is accessible from the West by rail, road, and the DANUBE, and its own railways, ports, and landing grounds are good. All these facilities have been further developed by the Germans during the last ten months. In the country the Germans have found oil, grain, cattle, and other resources vital to their war effort; ROUMANIA itself provides no economic problem as, in necessities, it is self-supporting.

Today the Roumanian Army is playing a not-unimportant role in the Russian campaign. Before the loss of BESSARABIA and TRANSYLVANIA, the Army consisted of forty-two divisions. At the moment, mobilization is believed to have reached half a million men, representing twenty-four infantry, four cavalry, and one Armoured Division. Even the infantry formations are believed to be reasonably mobile, and during the year have been equipped by the Germans with captured Polish and Czech vehicles. Anti-tank and anti-aircraft equipment is said to be fairly good, the latter being mainly French,

Belgian, and Dutch.

Since the occupation, training has been under German supervision, and particular attention has been paid to mechanisation. Various schools were set up throughout the country, and 13 German Motorised Division was charged with the task of instruction. In particular, the Cavalry Divisions, equipped with some new SKODA wheeled carriers, and 5, 6, and 13 Infantry Divisions have reached a fair pitch of efficiency. Some 15,000 troops are believed to have attended courses in parachute jumping in schools at BACAU, BUCHAREST, SIBIU, and CRAIOVA, but nothing is known of their ability.

On the Russian front the Roumanians are fighting between German formations, and there is believed to be at least one German officer attached to each regiment, and one German ECO to each company. ANTONESCU's General Staff is said to be recruited almost entirely from regular officers, a fact which has met with little approval from reservists who have been sent to fight, but there is little doubt that operations are in fact under German control. General HANSEN, rather than General ANTONESCU, is probably the real commander.

At the outset the Army showed some enthusiasm for the campaign. They were to re-take BESSARABIA, and were convinced of German invincibility. Today their morale is described by one observer as "worse than very bad". Their losses have been heavy, and their confidence in the Germans probably shaken. Moreover, not unexpectedly, they are not allowed to stop at the re-conquest of BESSARABIA, but must push on beyond the DNIESTER. Latest reports indicate that they have given way to German pressure to send to the East further formations previously held in reserve to deal with possible internal trouble.

At the moment we estimate that they have eleven divisions at the front. There have been reports of the formation of new divisions, but it seems more likely that the calling up, which now affects men up to 36 (at least in certain areas) has been for the purpose of reinforcing existing formations, especially those which have already been in action.

By comparison, their HUNGARIAN and ITALIAN friends have not been so heavily engaged. Little wonder that the Transylvanian affair still rankles. The Italians are believed to have earmarked six divisions for the front. Of these, four have apparently arrived, and press reports (Italian) leave no doubt that they have been in action. From the Roumanian front the Germans themselves have committed some thirty-five divisions, of which three or four may have moved South to BULGARIA.

(From GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation, dated 18 Aug.)

(b) Technical Information - Nil

PART II - SECURITY - Nil

Adler Maj
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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Appendix "A" to 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No.66

LOCATION AND STRENGTH OF PERSIAN FORCES AS BELIEVED ON 21 AUG 41

		Strength in Personnel	Guns
<u>A. WESTERN FRONTIER AREA</u>			
AHWAZ (including ABADAN)	6 Div	12,000	52 (includes 24 AA/A.Tk)
ISFAHAN	13 "	3,000 (see note 3)	8
DIZFUL	16 "	5,000	12
KERMANSHAH	12 "	4,500 (see note 4)	12
SINNEH	5 "	8,000 (see note 4)	20
KIZAYEH	4 "	8,000	28
<u>B. NORTHERN FRONTIER AREA</u>			
AHOI	17 "	1,800	4
TABRIZ	3 "	8,500	32
ARDEBIL	15 "	3,300	12
KESHT	11 "	3,300	12
GURGAN	10 "	3,500	14
MESHED	9 "	8,000	32 (includes 4 AA/A.Tk)
<u>C. EASTERN FRONTIER; SOUTHERN COAST AREA</u>			
TURBAT-I-SHAIKHJAN	18 Div	1,500	4
KERMAN	14 "	6,400	10
KHVASE	8 "	9,000	24
SEIRAZ	7 "	9,000	24 (includes 2 AA/A.Tk)
<u>D. CENTRAL RESERVE</u>			
TEHRAN	1 "))
TEHRAN	2 ") 28,000)	232 (includes 30 AA guns and Central Ordnance Depot)
TEHRAN		(see note 3)	
TEHRAN	Mechanized Bde	4,000	See Note 2
TEHRAN	? Cavalry Division	? (See Note 1)	

Notes:

1. It is possible that a Cavalry Division now exists, composed of the Cavalry Regiments of 1 and 2 Divisions under a separate cavalry command.
2. The Mechanised Brigade is liable to partial or complete attachment to 1 and/or 2 Divisions. The Mechanised Brigade includes fifty 3½ ton and fifty 7½ ton CZECHO MASARVSKA tanks, and twenty to twenty-four LARKON-HERRINGTON and four Rolls Royce Armoured Cars.
3. The AHWAZ-ABADAN area has recently been reinforced by 1 PAHLEVI Regiment of 1 Division, and even possibly the whole of 1 Division. 8 to 16 tanks have also been sent to that area, and possibly also elements of 13 Division.
4. Units of 12 Division and possibly of 5 Division have moved towards the IRAQ frontier near the PAITAN Pass.

SECRET.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 67

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 26 Aug to 1200 hrs 27 Aug 41

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PART 1.

(a) Operations in the Western DESERT: At TOBRUK, during the last week, our fighting patrols, supported by artillery, have continued their successful raids into the enemy lines. The enemy counter measures appear to consist mainly in the strengthening of his machine gun and artillery defensive fire and there is no doubt that he is reluctant to attempt to patrol on anything like the same scale as our own troops.

Enemy bombing raids continue, directed chiefly at the harbour and water installations but, despite their scale, damage has been comparatively slight.

In the Frontier area, there has been an increase in activity. Our desert columns have been in contact with the enemy on the escarpment. On August 16, small bodies of the enemy attempted to advance along the coast after an artillery duel. They were checked and retired, leaving an indication that one battalion of 104 Lorried Infantry Regiment of 15 Armoured Division is still in the HALFAYA area.

(From GHQ ME Weekly Military Newsletter up to 21 Aug).

RUSSIA: It has been reliably reported that the Radio Station at ODESSA was still working at 0600 hrs on 26 Aug.

BULGARIA: The Russian Military Attaché at ANKARA reports a considerable increase of German troops in BULGARIA since 10 Aug. He is vague regarding numbers and locations, but definite that the troops are fresh and not tired troops; that there are a considerable number of airmen in SOFIA; and that a noticeable proportion of the infantry are S S personnel. (MEIC Summary No 586 of 21.8.41).

IRAN: Equipment. The Munitions Supply Depot is reported to have sent to KERMANSHAH 800 75mm shells, 800 105mm short shells, and 800 75mm for Desert(SARAI) guns; and to KURDISTAN 2790 76mm shells for guns of Russian manufacture. It is also reported that half a ton of Dynamite has been sent to engineering units of 6 Division at KHUZISTAN. This is presumably to destroy bridges with on the AHWAZ line. It is reported from a good source that officers in the AHWAZ area have been ordered to place Arab troops in the front, and Iranians behind. Arab villagers on the frontier are being armed.

Distribution of Forces. The following is a summary of reinforcement of the frontier districts believed to have taken place recently :-

Area KERMANSHAH - SENNEH.

20 Infantry Regt.)

One Artillery Regt.) From 1 Division at TEHRAN

6 Infantry Regt.)

21 " ") From 2 Division at TEHRAN.

One Artillery Regt.)

37 Infantry Regt.)

18 Artillery Bty.) From 13 Division at ISFAHAN.

2.

AREA KHUZISTAN.

1 Infantry Regt.) From 1-Division at TEHERAN.
2 " ")

Half of an Artillery Regt..... From 2 Division at TEHERAN.

11 Infantry Regt..... From 15 Division at ARDEBIL.

Ten Armoured Cars)
Eight Light Tanks) From Central Garrison at TEHERAN.
Eight Medium ")

Reports indicate that the main concentrations in the area KERMANSHEH - SENNEH are in the region of PAITAK PASS. Frontier defences have been strengthened by one Infantry regiment and one Artillery regiment between QASR I SHIRIN and NAFTI SHAH. (Summarized from GHQ Daily Intelligence Summaries up to Number 461 dated 24 Aug 41).

Attached as Appendix "B" is a sketch map of IRAN which should facilitate the following of the campaign. The main thrusts of both the British and Russian Forces - in so far as they are at present known - are shown by arrows.

MALTA. Attached as Appendix "A" is an account of the attack by "E" boats on MALTA on 26 Jul. (From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 459 dated 22 Aug).

(b) Technical Information : - Nil

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL : Nil.

PART II - SECURITY : Nil.

Na wies
Lt-col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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NOTES ON THE SEA-BORNE ATTACK ON MALTA HARBOUR, 26 Jul 41

1. The attacking force consisted of

- a) 1 M.T.S. - two-man motor torpedo boat carrying the leader of the attack.
- b) 9 M.T.'s - one-man motor torpedo boats.
- c) 2 S.L.C.'s - two-man submarines with detachable explosive bows.
- d) 1 M.T.L. - motor boat to carry 2 S.L.C.'s (crew of about six).
- e) 2 M.A.'s - large motor boats to rescue the crews of the M.T.B's and the S.L.C.'s after the attack (crew eight or nine).

In addition, a large fast torpedo carrier transported the M.T.B's from AUGUSTA in SICILY to a point about seven miles from MALTA Harbour. The carrier then retired.

2. PLAN OF ATTACK (Based on captured Italian Operations Orders).

A submarine (S.L.C.) having effected a breach in the viaduct of the breakwater, the M.T.B's were to pass through and attack vessels in the harbour. The targets were pre-arranged as the result of photographic reconnaissance.

The following are extracts from the orders of the motor boat pilots:

- a) If ships are seen to enter or leave the Harbour, M.T.B's are to enter by the gate, which will be open.
- b) If the group is heard, sighted, or illuminated and fired upon they will turn back at full speed and wait till dawn. It is important to maintain contact. If, however, caught in beams of searchlights but not fired on, speed is to be reduced to a minimum.
- c) At dawn, attack will take place in the same way as at night except that when fired upon by enemy, M.T.B's will proceed at full speed to attack.

3. THE ACTUAL ATTACK

At 2055 hours on 25 Jul, surface craft were detected South of SICILY approaching MALTA. By 2300 hours, they had approached within 14 miles. All guns were manned and the air raid warning sounded. Thereafter the noise of motor engines was heard at various points along the NE coast of MALTA but too far to sea to warrant exposure of the C.A. searchlights, except at 0130 hours, when a motor boat was heard close to the Grand Harbour. Nothing was illuminated on this exposure of the searchlights but the boat withdrew.

The air raid lasted from 0413 hours to 0446 hours, when the All Clear was sounded. One minute later an explosion broke up the breakwater viaduct. Searchlights were exposed and fire opened on vessels at ranges between 1000 and 3000 yards. In a few minutes fire was stopped as there appeared to be nothing.

At 0530, when dawn had broken, two objects thought to be wrecks were seen to be moving and fire was reopened. In a few minutes they were sunk and exploded under water. By this time Hurricanes were in the air, gunning the retreating boats. During the latter stage the Bofors guns were used with good effect. Machine guns are also believed to have been employed.

One submarine exploded in attacking the viaduct; one submarine ran aground; the M.T.B's and M.T.S's and the M.T.L's were destroyed by shore defences; and three M.T.B's and two rescue launches destroyed by the R.A.F.; and it is almost certain that not a single boat escaped back to SICILY.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Although the night was calm and visibility good, the attacking craft moved so slowly in the last stages of their approach that possibly three vessels reached 300 yards off shore without making any appreciable sound.

One formation of five boats in line ahead was broken up by sinking the first three. The others appeared to be disabled but later came into action.

H.T.B's are very hard to discover and are not easily distinguishable from wreckage.


Crews may abandon boats which are apparently disabled and return to them later if sound.

Manoeuvrerevealed the attacking craft to be better than anticipated. 180° turns were executed in incredibly short time, which increased the difficulty of Numbers 1 correcting fire.

(From Appx "A" to GHQ Daily Int Summary No.459, dated 22 Aug.)

APPENDIX

B' TO I AUST. CORPS INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY N° 67
U. S. S. R.



Railway Lines - - - - -

Railway Line - - - - -

Scale 1:5,880,000 = 93 Miles To An Inch

SECRET

16
1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.68

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 27 Aug to 1200 hrs 28 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I

- (a) IRAN: Situation at 1300 hrs 26 Aug:

ABADAN area: Our troops landed at ABADAN, capturing the Persian garrison and some gunboats. KHURRAMSHAH and the wireless station were also captured. A small force of our troops occupied BANDAR SHAHPUR, capturing intact two Persian gunboats, two German ships, and a floating dock. Other ships captured include three Italians (damaged, probably serviceable), two ships which are believed to be salvageable and one German on fire and sinking.

HAFT KHEL: Air-borne troops arrived to protect British families.

KHANIQIN area: NAFT-I-SHAH and QASR-I-SHIRIN were captured after some opposition.

AEGEAN ISLANDS: A German officer who was in SYRIA previous to the Allied entry is reported to have made the following observations about the CRETE "victory" in the course of conversation with French officers.

The tremendous cost in specialists and aircraft during the conquest of CRETE had caused a very unsatisfactory reaction in the minds of the Nazi General Staff, because, although the air attack and landing by airborne troops and parachutists achieved surprise, the British defenders were without air defence, and the island was mountainous and ideal for parachutists, yet it took them twelve days to capture it. During this period they lost some of their finest parachute troops and large numbers of their best troop-carrying and other planes.

He is further reported to have stated that the Nazi General Staff were of the opinion that a similar attack on the British Isles, where the system of air and land defence is adequate and the general conditions are less favourable than in CRETE, would meet with failure.

(From Force HQ Daily Int Summary No.79, dated 26 Aug.)

ROMANIA: Recent damage by Soviet bombing in ROMANIA includes severe damage to the oil loading installations at CONSTANTA where there was no opposition and no fighter defence has made low-flying attacks profitable. The shipyard at GALATZ is also reported to have suffered heavily.

The attacks against PLOESTI prior to 5 Aug appear to have been mainly daylight attacks, the night bombers (it is said) being led astray by a dummy town some eight miles NE of the real one. The ORIOU refinery has suffered most, the pipe-still being damaged seriously and eighteen tanks destroyed together with some 2,000 tons of products.

(From RAF ME Weekly Int Summary No.61, dated 19 Aug.)

TURKEY: Notes on Armies: It is reported that the medical examination of the first contingent of the class which should have been called up in the autumn of 1941 is being out at the present moment in the region of KILLIS.

According to information received the young recruits who will become liable for service, will be called to the colours next November. Another report states that the examination of the second

- 2 -

contingent of the class which should have been called up next April has already begun. The registration of youths of from 15 to 20 and the checking of their ages is being actively carried on in the HATAY.

It is stated that there are one or two divisions at BIREDJIK and that they are at present carrying out manoeuvres.

At ANTIOCH there is said to be one artillery group (reported to be the first battery of the 39th Regiment, moved from ISLAHIYE two months ago), one cavalry group and a battalion of infantry.

(From Force HQ Daily Int Summary No.78, dated 25 Aug.)

(b) Technical Information - Nil

PART II - SECURITY - Nil

Handwritten:
{ ~~Mandates~~
for
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.61

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 69

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 28 Aug to 1200 hrs 29 Aug 41

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 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I

(a) AIR ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 12-19 Aug:

ENEMY: German: The scale of the enemy's air offensive during the period under review - like our own - has been reduced to about one third with the approach of the new moon. Apart from one minelaying operation carried out against the approaches of TEL AVIV on night 13/14 Aug, all German air operations have been concentrated against TOBRUK and EGYPT and coastal shipping plying between ALEXANDRIA, TOBRUK and intermediate ports.

On the night 13/14 Aug about 20 JU.88's, probably operating from the ATHENS area, attacked the SUEZ Canal area. The main weight of the attack was against ISMAILIA aerodrome and HOASCAR camp, where a number of aircraft, stores and buildings were either destroyed or damaged. Some aircraft dived as low as 500 feet. The Canal was again raided on night 18/19 Aug, bombs were dropped at SUEZ and KANTARA, but no serious damage or casualties are reported.

Italian: The majority of Italian bombing attacks have been against targets where no fighter opposition is likely to be encountered. JARABUB was attacked by day and a number of casualties were caused. TOBRUK and IERSA MATRUH were attacked by night. Some risk was, however, taken when four day attacks were made against CYPRUS and a few aircraft scattered bombs in various localities in MALTA. In the attacks on CYPRUS 31 civilian casualties were caused. Attacks on MALTA have been on a considerably reduced scale.

OUR ACTION: As usual fighters have been engaged in patrol work over H H Ships and convoys in the Mediterranean. The RAF, SAAF and Fleet Air Arm operating from EGYPT, GIBRALTAR, MALTA and EAST AFRICA against objectives in LIBYA, GREECE, CRETE, SICILY and GONDAR garrison have carried out over 280 sorties. The most effective raids of the week have been those against Mediterranean shipping in bombing and torpedo attacks by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and RAF. The net result of these attacks appears to be the destruction of three merchant vessels of tonnage varying between 3000 and 8000, a destroyer, a tanker and probably a submarine, in addition to severe damage to two other merchant vessels (3000 and 9000 tons) two schooners and two more tankers. The following is a description of the attacks referred to above: On the 14th/15th a southbound convoy consisting of five merchant vessels escorted by five destroyers was successfully attacked by nine Swordfish thirty miles from LAMPION, and four ships including a destroyer were hit. A large explosion occurred on a 6,000 ton vessel which had been torpedoed and, when last seen, she was well down by the stern. Two vessels of 3,000 tons were also hit. Volumes of black smoke were seen rising from one ship and the other had a heavy list to port. In addition the crew of the damaged destroyer were observed being transferred to a second destroyer. It is believed that two of the merchant vessels and the destroyer subsequently sank. On the 17th/18th a second southbound convoy comprising five merchant vessels, six destroyers and a tanker was attacked by seven Swordfish 20 miles West of LAMPION. One vessel of 8,000 tons was bombed and torpedoed and two hours later the crew were seen abandoning the ship, then in a sinking condition. Another vessel of 9,000 tons which was hit by a torpedo was subsequently beached at LAMPEDUSA. In addition a large explosion occurred on a 6,000 ton tanker, which was later observed to be on fire and emitting clouds of black smoke.

2.

There was another mass attack upon the CORINTH CANAL (Aug 13/14) by Wellingtons. On 14 Aug, Vichy fighters engaged a Maryland on leaflet dropping operations over TUNIS. The Maryland was shot down, killing two of the crew and wounding the pilot.
(Summarized from RAF ME Weekly Intelligence Summary No 61 dated 19 Aug.)

TOPOGRAPHICAL : TURKEY. A British NCO who recently drove through "TURKEY in EUROPE" to ISTANBUL via UZUNKOPRU made the following observations regarding defences :-

BULAIR area :- Further tank traps are being dug by mechanical excavators. Guns are mounted below the village of BULAIR to enfilade road and tank ditches dug on either side of the road.

UZUNKOPRU area :- (Near Greek-Turko border, 30 miles South of EDIRNE (ADRIANOPLE). The bridge at UZUNKOPRU has several partial blocks formed of stone, over the pieces that span the summer flow of the river. As these piers are mined it is not certain if the piles of stone are really barriers, or only to prevent the charges being withdrawn. At the bridge-head near the barracks and furthest from the village, the roads to the Greek frontier and to the village of MERIC have partial blocks of tree trunks set into the road in an upright position.

CATALCA LINE. In this area intense activity was observed. Many anti-tank ditches have been dug and three mechanical diggers were at work. Over a dozen large blockhouses, either under construction or completed, were counted. The whole area is honeycombed with zigzag trenches, machine gun posts and gun positions.

(From Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 77 dated 24 Aug.)

PART II : SECURITY : - Nil

STOP PRESS: At 1200 hrs to-day
ODESSA was still in Russian hands.

Kahru

Lt-col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 70

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 29 Aug to 1200 hrs 30 Aug 41

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 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I

(a) AEGEAN ISLANDS:

CRETE: Equipment: About the middle of August 17 German six-wheeled armoured cars and 6 heavy guns were landed at HERAKLION. The latter are now covering the harbour entrance.

Distribution of Forces: Reports considered reliable indicate that in mid-August the garrison of CRETE consisted of some 5,000 Italians and some 15,000 - 18,000 Germans. The Italians are confined to the four Eastern provinces of SITIA, IERAPETRA, MIRABELLO and LASITHI, and are garrisoned mainly in the four chief towns of SITIA, IERAPETRA, NEAPOLIS and PANAGIA. The German garrison includes HQ and 3,000 troops at HERAKLION, 2,000 at RETIMO, 8,000 at CANEA, and a widespread system of posts and patrols throughout the island. The garrison of HERAKLION is a Bavarian Mountain Regiment - presumably belonging to 5 Mountain Division. There are reported also to be German Marines on the island.

General: The Germans are reported recently to have been transporting large numbers of donkeys by air to GREECE.

The food shortage on the island is acute, there being no bread. Boots and leather are unobtainable. The conduct of Italian troops is reported to be good, that of Germans extremely harsh.

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No. 463, dated 26 Aug.)

IRAQ: Attached as Appendix "A" is an account of how the VICHY General Staff in SYRIA sent arms and ammunition to the IRAQI rebels.

GENERAL: A party of 13 British and Australian officers who were prisoners of the Vichy French arrived in BEIRUT this morning from TOULON. These officers comprised the party that had been detained on the island of SCARPANTO.

It has been reliably reported that an Italian cruiser (believed to be approx the "Cavour" class) was aground near the Straits of MESSINA on 26 Aug, apparently having just been torpedoed, as the crew were still being taken off by life-boats. It is learnt that the GNEISENAU has been sunk and that the SCHARNHORST is in dry dock, listed over and damaged.

It has also been reported that Marshal GOERING was killed in a Casino at Le HAVRE during an air raid in March. HITLER and Frau GOERING were present but escaped. (Reliability somewhat doubtful.)

There are now no Italians in PARIS. The German soldiers in OCCUPIED FRANCE are old men, regular soldiers of "active" divisions having gone to RUSSIA. There are, however, still a large number of AFVs of all types in FRANCE.

It is learnt that British O.R. prisoners at BENGHASI and TRIPOLI are made to work loading and unloading warlike stores. Photographs of them at work were published in German and Italian papers on 3 Aug. Some attempts at sabotage are being made by these prisoners, but little can be done in a big way. Every opportunity is taken to damage fins of bombs, to throw sand into aircraft engines, and to steal food. Italians have a very healthy respect for the Germans. Italian officers appear to take orders readily from German soldiers, and it

appeared that the Germans had no respect for the Italians.

The morale of Greek officer prisoners in an Italian prison camp is reported as being very high. Many of these Greek officers were taken after the armistice, and brought to ITALY under false pretences. Greek O.R. prisoners are permitted to write only two postcards a month, each postcard not to exceed ONE line of news.

(b) Technical Information - Nil

PART II - SECURITY

Sentiments of Vichy Supporters: The following is a précis of extracts from Vichy correspondence obtained by Censorship.

The writers are at pains to show they acquitted themselves well during the late campaign. Many say that they were let down by the Vichy government, as it would only have required small reinforcements to alter the whole issue. Others are convinced that the Marshal did his best to send these forces, and one letter states that they even reached SALONIKA, but that the English fleet was on the watch. Capt COURREGES pertinently contrasts the abandonment of the troops in SYRIA with the despatch of a volunteer Legion to fight the Russians. In these circumstances the armistice put an end to a fight which could have had no possible success. It was an honourable peace, with the added satisfaction of soon seeing FRANCE again.

Anti-British feelings are very marked. A TOULOUSE correspondent of M.P. TIMBAL, Counsellor at the BEYROUTH Court of Appeal, thinks the English as low as the Germans; "Ils sont tous a foutre dans le meme sac". Comte FUIEY, Var, writing to M. Georges HAIMARI, Chef du Cabinet du President de la Republique Libanaise, accuses us of excesses worthy of the most backward savages, and expresses a hope for our utter annihilation; Comte de la BRUNIERE S.P.601 tells his wife that the Free French Forces will soon be fighting the Boches, the Turks or someone else and "bear the whole cost of the expedition in the place of the good English. It is horrible to see how they always find catspaws to fight for them. I should like to see them engaged in a general war of extermination with the Germans". S/LT Jean RAUX also sees possibilities for FRANCE in such a situation - "We want to see peace return, and yet not before RUSSIA is crushed and an exhausted GERMANY has succeeded in conquering ENGLAND, then I should be perfectly happy". There is general agreement in this class of letters that there could never have been any community of interests between FRANCE and BRITAIN. Just as it was English treachery which caused the defeat in May 1940, so this latest example of perfidy will be the lever to a national resurrection and to a restoration of colonial power which, being freed from the "Jewish-Masonic" tutelage of LONDON, will be a menace to the British empire. A writer to M. Antoine MASSOUD B.P.21 BEYROUTH believes that the British have long been planning to rectify their policy of evacuating in 1920 the territory occupied in the last war.

Telegraphic censorship indicates that traffic still mainly concerns the repatriation. GHQ ME asked Admiral GOUTON to inform VICHY that there was an outbreak of typhus in DJIBOUTI, saying that he might send doctors and supplies there which were urgently required. VICHY absolutely denied the truth of the report, and forbade him to take any such steps.

J. A. de la Maffei
for Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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Appendix "A" to 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No.70

A BAD STORY

(The following is a precis of an account given under the above title by an experienced Syrian railway official of how the Iraqi rebels were supplied with French arms and munitions in May 1941.)

The convention of friendship and good neighbourliness entered into by TURKEY and FRANCE on 30 May 26, Protocol No.5 states: "Important transports of troops or material as well as mixed transports necessitating the use of a complete train will be the object on the parts of either the Turkish Government or the French High Commissioner of Pre Advice by telegraph at least 5 days beforehand to the qualified authorities of the interested Government stating the number of trains and carriages making up each train". In addition, Article 10 of the ANKARA Accord of 1932 states: "SYRIA will have the right to make military transports by railroad in Turkish territory from TCHOBAN BEY to NISSIBIN". (TCHOBAN BEY is on the TURKO-SYRIAN Frontier 40 miles NE of ALEPPO, NISSIBIN is a frontier post on the NE boundary of SYRIA approx 50 miles NE of HASSETCHE.)

On Saturday 10 May 41 General DEBETZ' headquarters telephoned to the railway authorities at ALEPPO as follows: "We have important transports to make to TEL KOTCHEK. Will you please obtain for us urgently the authorisation of the Turkish military authorities without taking into consideration the Pre Advice clause of the Franco-Turkish Convention".

As the French representative was absent when this message arrived it was received by the representative of the SOUTH TURKEY railroad, who telegraphed the Turkish military Commissioner at FAWZI PACHA (in TURKEY, 40 miles West of ADIYAB) as follows: "Military Commissioner at ALEPPO station requests authorisation passage on line TCHOBAN BEY to NISSIBIN two military trains each composed of 30 coaches containing soldiers, horses and material to be despatched from ALEPPO to TEL KOTCHEK. Reference our good neighbourly relations. Will be obliged if you will communicate authorisation passage as soon as possible".

The authorisation was duly given and the officials on the spot understood that the whole affair was connected with measures for the protection of the Syrian border.

At 1000 hrs on 12 May 41 the first train from ALEPPO to TEL KOTCHEK was despatched. It was carrying military material loaded on at RAYAK and BAALBEK and a half company of the 16 Tunisian Rifles. A Staff Officer accompanied the train which contained 22 covered cars containing arms and munitions of a total weight of about 300 tons, 4 flat cars containing one battery of four 75 mm guns and two carriages for troops. The second train was not a complete military train and contained arms and munitions of a total net weight of 160 tons, plus some troops.

On arrival at TEL KOTCHEK the trains were met by an Ordnance Staff Officer and a gentleman of teutonic appearance who called himself M. REMOIR. There were no Iraqi locomotives to take away the rolling stock making up the two trains. The Ordnance Staff Officer therefore gave strict orders to the TEL KOTCHEK station master to assemble the two trains so as to make one, attach it to a Syrian locomotive with Syrian personnel and tow the whole thing to MOSUL. After some reluctance on the part of the station master this was accordingly done and the train left, accompanied by M. REMOIR and some Iraqi officers.

The men of the 16 Tunisian Rifles were very surprised and did not understand why the material was going to IRAQ. They were still more surprised when they were told to return to ALEPPO. Actually their job was finished, for their appearance on the train had led

people to believe that the material which was actually destined for IRAQ was going to be used in SYRIA by French troops.

The same thing happened again on 25 and 27 May, but on these occasions proper telegraphic advice was given to the Turkish authorities. Each train was received at TEL KOTCHEK by M. RENOIR and Iraqi officers.

As far as is known the loads on these two occasions were made up as follows:

- (1) 14 flat cars, each loaded with two trucks loaded with drums containing aviation spirit.
12 cars containing munitions of a net weight of 170 tons.
- (2) 19 flat cars each carrying two trucks loaded with drums containing aviation spirit.
4 flat cars containing a battery of 155 mm guns.
9 covered cars containing munitions of a total net weight of about 125 tons.

(Comment: M. RENOIR is the alias used by one Robert RAHN, a well known German agent who worked in conjunction with Col HANTEUFEL in the ALEPPO area.)

(Reprinted from Appx "B" to Force HQ Daily Int Summary No.80, dated 27 Aug.)

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 71

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 30 Aug to 1200 hrs 31 Aug 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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PART I

(a) TURKEY: There has been a very cordial exchange of visits between Turkish officers from NISIBIN and British officers from QAIECHLIYE. The Turks are most friendly and British officers have been allowed to visit shops in NISIBIN. A recent case of a British aircraft landing on the Turkish border brought forth apologies from their officials for the action of their troops in surrounding the machine. The aircraft was allowed to depart soon after the incident.
(From Force IRAQ Daily Int Summary No.105, dated 19 Aug.)

IRAN: It is learnt that the German company "Telefunken" has set up two radio-transmitters. One is situated 10 km North of TEHERAN and is a short-wave transmitter of 25/32 K.Watt. The other transmits medium waves. Its capacity is 2 K.Watt. The short-wave transmitter is connected with twelve 125 Watt medium-wave stations which transmit the short-wave broadcasts. Thus the broadcasts can be heard in all provincial towns on the cheaper sets.
(From Force HQ Daily Int Summary No.80, dated 27 Aug.)

ITALY: Equipment: It has been reliably reported that the boots, clothes and equipment of the Italian garrison troops in the AEGEAN Islands are in a very bad state of repair. In ITALY a slight improvement in the condition of uniforms and the state of arms and equipment is reported. There does not appear to be any shortage of metal. No attempts have been made to salvage iron and steel; old iron, railings, chains, rails etc were scattered and uncollected. Most of the IET noticed was German, and a large percentage ran on "producer gas". Chocolates were still being done up in tin foil.

VICHY FRENCH MORALE: A competent observer has reported the following. Officers' general morale appears to be low. They are of the opinion that nothing can beat the German Army, and that the war may last 10 years. They freely stated that the collapse of FRANCE was due to ENGLAND who forced FRANCE into the war and, when the time came, beat a hasty retreat back to ENGLAND. They also stated that BRITAIN is fighting to the last Frenchman. When the end of the war comes it will leave both ENGLAND and GERMANY so exhausted that FRANCE will rise and be the main power in EUROPE. FRANCE will get back all her former colonies, including INDIA, which have been or are now being filched by the British. Most of these remarks were made by young officers. One older man appeared to have sympathy with the British, but was too cautious to speak out in other people's hearing.

As far as ORs were concerned, the following impressions were gained. DARLAN and GENSAULE were hated the most by all true Frenchmen. In BRITTANY the inhabitants are reported to be 80% pro-British. In OCCUPIED FRANCE, DEITZ, DARLAN and GENSAULE are looked upon as traitors. British broadcasts in French are listened to and much appreciated. Both officers and men stated that 80% of the food in FRANCE, or coming in, was taken to GERMANY. There is now little or no wine in FRANCE, as it all goes to GERMANY for the production of motor and aviation spirit.

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(b) Technical Information - Nil

PART II - SECURITY - Nil

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EXTRACTS FROM CODE LISTS

APAD Free French Div	M
BECA HQ 1 Aust Corps BIFU Spears Mission	NEJA HQ 7 Aust Div (see also EMPY above).
C	OSDA 84 L of C Sub Area ORKI Rear HQ 5 Ind Inf Bde
D	PEME HQ 10 Armd Div (formerly 1 Cav Div)
EMPY HQ 7 Aust Div	Q
FERN HQ 1 Cav Div	R
GUZA HQ 5 Ind Inf Bde GLUM 85 L of C Sub Area	SKIN HQ 6 Aust Div
H	T
I	U
J	V
KEVI HQ 4 Cav Bde KUPU Commission of Control	WIND HQ 4 Cav Bde (see also KEVI above)
LAMP Force HQ P & TJ	X