

AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/1 CORPS

1 Australian Corps
General Branch (1 Aust
Corps 'G' Branch)

September 1941, part 2, appendices v



1/4/1-012\$

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps
28 Sep 41
G. 1126

HQ P & TJ

LEBANON DEFENCES

PILL BOXES

1. It has been decided to use the circular design of pill box for fwd inf posts; particulars of the design have been fwded to your CE. For A Tk guns the standard design will be used but modified in accordance with the requirements of the various sites.

QATANA - DIMAS POSN

2. Work on the QATANA - DIMAS defences will commence on 29 Sep. The recon of the BARADA Gorge is being completed. This has been delayed owing to the change in cmd of 6 Div. The policy being followed is to make each of the QATANA, BARADA, and JEBEL MAZAR posns "Blitz-Proof" and then to concentrate the bulk of our resources on the QATANA sector which is the most vulnerable to attack by AFVs in conjunction with inf.

(sgd) J.D.Lavarack

Lt-Gen
Cmd 1 Aust Corps.

Copy to 6 Div.

DRIVING POINTS FOR OFFICERS AND DRIVERS

DANGEROUS ROAD CONDITIONS NOW EXIST

1. The attention of all drs shall be drawn to the dangerous conditions that exist on rds in SYRIA and the LEBANON now that the first rains have begun. From now on, when odd showers may fall, till the heavy rains set in, the rds will be EXTREMELY DANGEROUS when wet, or muddy.
2. The grease, oil, and dust which have accumulated during the summer give the wet surface of bitumen a surface like glass until sufficient heavy rain has fallen to wash the rds clean. This normally takes four or five days of heavy continuous rain. After thus being cleansed the wet rds drop from extremely dangerous to the normally dangerous state of any wet bitumen rd. All rds under frost or ice conditions are extremely dangerous at all times. On many rds a local natural asphalt (like macadam) has been used: this produces a very smooth surface which becomes extremely slippery when wet.
3. Unit comds are reminded that most of their drs have had no experience for 12 months at least of driving on wet rds, whilst some who have learnt to drive in ME have never yet driven on wet surfaces.

IMPROPER USE OF CHANGE DOWN

4. It has been noted that many drivers change to a lower gear just before entering a corner and use the engine as a break while cornering. Cases also occur where rapid deceleration is obtained on the straight by changing down. These habits are wrong because:-
 - (a) The vehicle is decelerated through the friction of only two tyres on the road instead of four. If the road is wet this friction (or coefficient of adhesion as it is called) may fall to only one-tenth of the value that applies if the road is dry. If the braking force exceeds the friction a skid occurs, perhaps with fatal results. A skid is ALWAYS the result of bad driving. In an emergency bad driving may be excused only if the driver /but almost has been forced into a position from which he lacks the skill to extricate the car.
 - (b) Rapid deceleration causes much more strain on the engine and transmission than rapid acceleration.
 - (c) The clutch does not permit as "gentle" an application of the braking effort as does the foot pedal.
 - (d) A vehicle reaches its maximum stability, and is most controlable only when power-driven.

BRAKING AND CORNERING (See att sketch)

5. The engine, except in top gear, can be used as a powerful but SUDDEN form of brake; but it acts on only two wheels whereas the normal brakes act on four. A change-down to effect braking is liable to induce skidding and is dangerous on smooth, wet, slippery or muddy roads. Changing down should be done only at a slow speed except in an emergency. (Below 20 mph for cars, below 15 mph for trucks).
6. In turning corners the car should be slowed down by leaving the engine in gear and taking the foot gradually off the accelerator. The brakes should be used to assist only if in a hurry or when

the distance has been misjudged. The car should reach its SLOWEST speed BEFORE reaching the corner. The car should then be power-driven, or gently accelerated around the corner: only to gain acceleration, or power for hills, should a change down be made.

7. Do NOT swing out at corners.

8. The engine should be used as a brake on long down slopes.

9. Quick acceleration and sudden braking are wasteful, and expensive, and are usually signs of bad driving. STOP WASTE.

10. No car should be driven at such a speed that it cannot be stopped within the distance that can be seen to be clear ahead, bearing in mind the road and traffic conditions. The car ahead may crash.

A car in good order on a dry road should be able to stop:-

from 20 mph in 15 yds

from 40 mph in 40 yds

from 60 mph in 75 yds

On a wet road these distances are very greatly increased.

11. Attention is drawn to the maximum speeds allowed except in emergency:-

Cars 45 mph

Trucks 30 mph

For details of speeds see Corps Instn Q1/18 of 6 Jul 41.





12. Every officer must ensure that his own driver follows these notes and is to assist in ensuring safety on the roads and in improving the standard of driving. Driving includes road manners and intelligent anticipation.

26 Sep 41.

W. R. ... Brig.
GS/1 Aust Corps.

For distribution down to coys, and to all tpt offrs and HCOs in charge of secs.

HOW TO TURN CORNERS



AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps.
28 Sep 41.
G.1124

6 Div
7 Aust Div

State of Tng

Ref 1 Aust Corps G 699 of 23 Aug 41.

1. In order to standardise the return it will be rendered, in future, in accordance with the att specimen return.
2. The headings given in para 3 of the pro forme att to 1 Aust Corps G 699 of 23 Aug will still be covered in coln (f) of the att pro forme, but statements should be brief.

Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Copies for info to -

CCRA
CSO
G
I
A
Q
CE

DDST
DDMS
ADOS
DADOS
File
War Diary

/ Specimen return...

REPORT ON FITNESS FOR WAR OF FORMATIONS IN

| Serial No. | Formation (a) | STATE OF EQUIPMENT | | | | Fitness for Operations (f) | Remarks (g) |
|------------|---------------|---|---|---|---|--|---|
| | | Weapons (b) | 'A' Vehicles (c) | 'B' Vehicles (d) | Other Items (e) | | |
| 1 | | Deficient of 813 .38" pistols 21 - 2" mortars 170 SMGs | Deficient of - 37 Cruisers 27 Lt Tanks 7 Lt Tanks 97 Scout Carriers 8 Carriers 43 Carriers Bren | Deficient of - 7 Cars 87 15-cwts 15 FA Tractors 3 A Tk Portees 7 Scammell Transporters (see note 1 in coln (g)) | Deficient of - 108 No 8 W/T Sets 14 No 11 (HP) W/T Sets 28 Compasses | Fit for mobile operations when completed with equipment and vehicles | 1. Against deficiencies shown in coln (d) hold a surplus of 5 - 3 ton 83 - 30 cwts |

APPENDIX "CC"

Set No. (/)

COPY

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

6 Div
7 Aust Div

Hq 1 Aust Corps
29 Sep 41
G. 1143

Training and Construction of Defences

To provide a guide as to the allotment of the time available as between training and the construction of defences the following policy has been decided for 1 Aust Corps.

Approximately two thirds of the time available may be allotted to the construction of defences so that a minimum of one third will be available for training.

(sgd) R.E. Berryman Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

APPENDIX "DD"

Set No. (/)

INWARDS MESSAGE = MOST SECRET CIPHER

TO AUSTCORPS 6 Div

FROM FORCE HQ SD 480 30

MOST SECRET (.) code word move remainder 6 Div CULTIVATE
repeat CULTIVATE (.) 1 (.) Warning Order first to move 1800
repeat 1800 repeat 1800 men of 23 Inf Bde gp from ALEPPO
prepared to move on or after 5 Oct by rail to RAYAK thence
road to PALESTINE thence rail to 1371 (.) 2 (.) orders
remainder 6 Div incl 1st Bn ESSEX Regt later (.) please send
staff officer(s)? conference force HQ 1400 hrs 1st Oct (.)
acknowledge

MOST IMMEDIATE

T00 1140
THI 1230
TOR 1255
Cipher 1320
G Branch.

URGENT

MOST SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
30 Sep 41.
G.1163

7 Aust Div
6 Div

Relief of 23 Inf Bde - ALEPPO

This has been put forward and will commence in the next few days. On account of the urgency and "Q" problems involved it has been decided that 18 Aust Inf Bde will relieve the 23 Inf Bde and will take over their equipment. Rear parties of 18 Aust Inf Bde will hand over their equipment at DJEDEIDE to the incoming bde of 6 Aust. Div.

2. Details regarding move and handing over of equipment are being dealt with at a conference at Force HQ on 1 Oct 41.

(Sgd) F.H. Berryman Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

APPENDIX 'EE'

Set No. (1)

SECRET

1st AUST CORPS AND A-LT TPS

LOCATION STATEMENT (by Groups)
as at 2359 hrs 6 Sep 41.

(1) HQ 1 Aust Corps and Units under Comd.

HQ UNITS

| | | |
|--------------------------|---------|----------|
| Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps | ALEY | 138208 |
| Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps | ALEY | 138208 |
| 1 Aust Corps Int Sec | ALEY | 138208 |
| 1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec FSS | ALEY | 138208 |
| 1 Aust Corps AIL Sec | BAALBEK | 195228 |
| 'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn - | | |
| HQ & 18, 19, 20 Pls | ALEY | 13802070 |
| 17 Pl | ALEY | 13752085 |

Arty

| | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------|----------|
| HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps | ALEY | 138208 |
| HQ 64 Med Regt | | |
| 211 Med Bty | BAALBEK RANGE AREA | 18312199 |
| 212 Med Bty | | |
| 2/1 Aust Svy Regt - | | |
| HQ Comd Bty (HQ F Sp Bty) | Olive Grove | 13052092 |
| F Sp Tp) | | |
| S Reg Tp) | BAALBEK RANGE AREA | 18252225 |
| Svy Sec) | | |

Engrs

| | | |
|-------------------------|----------|----------|
| HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps | ALEY | 138208 |
| 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy | ALEP-O | 16342775 |
| 2/14 Aust A Fd Coy | QOUCHEIR | 229285 |
| 2/15 Aust A Fd Coy | HOMS | 242311 |
| 23 Aust Corps Fd Fk Coy | ALMA | 16602770 |

Sigs

| | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------|
| 1 Aust Corps Sigs (less 4 W/T | | |
| Sec, 1 A Fd Regt Sec, and | | |
| 2 A Fd Regt Sec) | ALEY | 138208 |
| 4 W/T Sec | SOUK EL KHARRB | 13502065 |

AASC

| | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------|--------|
| 1 Aust Corps Mob School of Mech | DJOUBAH | 140227 |
| Det 1 Ech Aust C T Sup Col | KHARRB | 127206 |
| 2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk | CHOUEIFAT | 132209 |
| 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk | BERAGINI | 132212 |
| 2 Aust Sup Per Sec | BATROUNE | 145256 |
| 4 Aust Sup Per Sec | HOMS | 237308 |
| 5 Aust Sup Per Sec | CHTUARA | 163208 |
| 6 Aust Sup Per Sec | ALBFFO | |
| 25 Army Tk Bde Coy RASC | | |
| (129 Res Coy) | SAIDA | 118179 |
| 211 Med Bty RASC Sec) | | |
| 212 Med Bty RASC Sec) | CHOUEIFAT | 132209 |
| Det 2 AASC Sec AA Regt (att | | |
| 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk) | BERAGINI | 132212 |
| Det 2 AASC Sec AA Regt | RAYAK | |

Medical

| | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|----------|
| 2/13 Aust Fd Amb | DHOOR CHOUEIR | 14802190 |
| 2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec | | 146207 |
| 1 Aust MAC - 'A' Sec | JAMHOUR | 13552110 |
| HQ 2 MAC | | 139208 |
| 2/1 Aust CCS | Mental Hospital | 133213 |
| 2/3 Aust CCS | Italian Hospital BEYROUTH | |
| 1 Aust Mob Bact Lab | BEYROUTH (att 2/3 Aust CCS) | |
| 2 Malaria Fd Lab | AIN SOFAR | |
| Det 2 Aust Base Depot Med | | |
| Stores | BEYROUTH | |

Ord

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop -
4 Rec Sec
5 Rec Sec (att 2/3 Aust A
Fd Wkshop)
2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less
three Rec Secs)
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -
Corps Sec
Details Res Sec
3 Replacement Veh Sec
1 Aust L of C Rec Sec
6 L of C Rec Sec
1 Bde Gp Sec 10 Armd Div Wkshop
(working with FFF)

Qartier Petaïn Barracks

Area KHALDE 128207
Area KHALDE 128207
KHALDE Area 128207
KHALDE Area 128207
KHALDE Area 128207
BARBARA
KHALDE Area 129208
MEZZE

Pay

1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office

ALEY 138208

Postal

1 Aust Corps Postal Unit

BEYROUTH

Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less
two secs)
Two Secs (less one det at
DAMASCUS)

ALEY
BEYROUTH

Miscellaneous

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl
1 Aust Corps Graves Registration
& Enquiries Unit (less one
Sec at BEYROUTH)
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit
(less det at DAMASCUS)
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp
MH and Infm Sec

ALEY 138208
DAMASCUS
BEYROUTH Area 13012157
13152110
138208
ALEY

2) 7 AUST DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 7 Aust Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 7 Aust Div, Int Sec)
S' Sec FSS, HQ C Coy and)
10 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn)

BROUMANA 14012156

Cav

7 Aust Div Cav Regt

EL BEDAQUI 16422788

Arty

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div
2/4 Aust Fd Regt)
7 Fd Bty)
8 Fd Bty)
2/6 Aust Fd Regt)
11 Fd Bty)
12 Fd Bty)
2 Aust A Tk Regt
One Svy Tp (2/1 Aust Svy Regt)

BROUMANA 14012156
SE BAABDA 13142102
AJELTOUN 14572258
BIKFAYA Area 14692195
KHMAILA 16772749

Engrs

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div
25 Aust Fd Pk Coy
2/5 Aust Fd Coy (less one sec)
One Sec 2/5 Aust Fd Coy
2/6 Aust Fd Coy

BROUMANA 14012158
ANTELLIAS Area 13982205
14382457
16342775
15092109
FALOURHA

| | | |
|--|---------------------------------------|----------|
| 7 Aust Div | BEIT MERI | 13812136 |
| 2/3 Aust MG Bn (less 1st & 2nd Coys) | MROUJ | 152219 |
| <u>AASC</u> | | |
| HQ AASC 7 Aust Div | BROUMANA | 14012158 |
| No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (7 Aust Div Amn Coy) | KHALDE Area | 12852080 |
| No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (7 Aust Div Pet Coy) | South of DJOUNIEH | 140227 |
| No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div (3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk & 3 Aust Sup Per Sec) | CHEKA | 15252655 |
| 4 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy | Att 21 Aust Inf Bde for Tng | |
| <u>AAMC</u> | | |
| HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Amb | Italian Hospital TRIPOLI | 16042777 |
| HQ & B Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb | TRIPOLI | 16312783 |
| A Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb | LATTAQUIE | 15983996 |
| HQ Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb | | 14412072 |
| A Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb | | 13502068 |
| B Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb | | 13502068 |
| HQ and one Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb | RHAZIR | 144232 |
| 1 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit | TRIPOLI | |
| 2 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit | BEIT CHEBAB | 145221 |
| 2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec | AIN ALAQ | 14302210 |
| 7 Aust Dental Unit | DHOOR CHOUEH | 14802190 |
| 9 Aust Dental Unit (att 1st Coy 2/4 Fd Amb) | LATTAQUIE | 15983996 |
| <u>Ord</u> | | |
| 2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop - | EL GRAYE | 14522077 |
| 7 Aust Rec Sec | East of TRIPOLI | 16472775 |
| 8 Aust Rec Sec | AAMCHITE | 14152450 |
| 9 Aust Rec Sec | | |
| 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk - | | |
| A Div Sec | AAMCHITE (with 9 Aust Rec Sec) | |
| B Div Sec | EL GRAYE (with 7 Aust Rec Sec) | |
| C Div Sec | East of TRIPOLI (with 8 Aust Rec Sec) | |
| <u>Pay</u> | | |
| 7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office | BROUMANA | 14162161 |
| <u>Postal</u> | | |
| 7 Aust Div Postal Unit | BROUMANA | 14162161 |
| <u>Pro</u> | | |
| 7 Aust Div Pro Coy | DHOOR CHOUEH | 14802190 |
| <u>Miscellaneous</u> | | |
| 7 Aust Div Emp Pl | BROUMANA | 14012156 |
| 7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit | BEYROUTH | 13002155 |
| 7 Aust Div Mob Laundry and Fwd Decontamination Unit | BEYROUTH | 13002155 |
| 7 Aust Div Salvage Unit | (Quartier FRANCHET DESPEREY) | |
| 7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp | | 13022089 |
| 3 MH and Infm Sec | | 15252710 |
| | BROUMANA | |
| (b) 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp | | |
| HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde (and 5 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn) | ELMINA | 15922789 |
| HQ 2/5 Aust Fd Regt | TRIPOLI Area | 16362776 |
| 9 Fd Bty | | 16352776 |
| 10 Fd Bty | LATTAQUIE Area | 103397 |

| | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------|----------|
| 2/3 Aust Inf Bn | TRIPOLI Area | |
| 2/5 Aust Inf Bn (less 'D' Coy) | LATTAQUIE Area | |
| 'D' Coy | KASSAB Area | |
| 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn | NE TRIPOLI | 16572805 |

(c) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------|----------|
| HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde (and 9 Pl Aust | | |
| HQ Gd Bn) | AIN SOFAR | 14592069 |
| 2/14 Aust Inf Bn | AIN ANOUB | 13242053 |
| 2/27 Aust Inf Bn (less 'B' Coy) | SW HAMMANA | 14942089 |
| 'B' Coy | ANTELLIAS | 13732212 |

(d) 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp

| | | |
|------------------------------------|----------|-----------|
| HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde (and 12 Pl Aust | | |
| HQ Gd Bn) | KAMCHITE | 14152465 |
| 2/25 Aust Inf Bn | | 1410 2314 |
| 2/26 Aust Inf Bn | | 14282524 |
| 2/33 Aust Inf Bn | | 14332396 |

(e) With BEYROUTH Force (under comd 84 L of C Sub-Area)

| | | |
|------------------|------------------------|----------|
| 2/16 Aust Inf Bn | BEYROUTH (Caserne Gey) | 12842178 |
|------------------|------------------------|----------|

(3) 6 DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 6 Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

| | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| HQ 6 Div, Int Sec and 279 Sec | | |
| FSS (less dets) | Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK | 195228 |

Cav

| | | |
|---------------------|---------------------------|----------|
| 9 Aust Div Cav Regt | BAALBEK (moves to QOUCEIR | 19552285 |
| | 8 Sep for tng) | |

Arty

| | | |
|------------------|-------------------------|----------|
| HQ RA 6 Div | Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK | 195228 |
| 60 Fd Regt | BAALBEK | 195228 |
| 237 Fd Bty | BAALBEK | 194229 |
| 239 Fd Bty | BAALBEK | 195228 |
| 1 Aust A Tk Regt | | |
| 1 Bty | BAALBEK | 19272298 |
| 1 Tp 2 Bty | | |
| 4 Bty | | |

Engrs

| | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| HQ RE 6 Div | Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK | 195228 |
| 219 Fd Pl Coy | RAYAK | 175212 |
| 2 Fd Coy | | 212257 |
| 12 Fd Coy | | 163170 |
| 54 Fd Coy (less one sec) | BAALBEK | 195228 |
| One Sec 54 Fd Coy | ZAHLE | 166212 |

Sigs

| | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| 6 Div Sigs (less dets) | Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK | 195228 |
|------------------------|-------------------------|--------|

ASC

| | | |
|------------------------|-------------------------|----------|
| HQ RASC 6 Div | Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK | 195228 |
| 1 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy | | 16702010 |

AMC

| | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| 10 Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb | Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK | 195228 |
| 33 Fd Hyg Sec | BAALBEK | 195228 |
| 3 Mob Bact Lab (att 173 Fd Amb) | ZAHLE | 165212 |
| 12 Anti-Malarial Control Unit | BAALBEK | 195228 |

Ord

| | | |
|--------------------|-------|--------|
| HQ 6 Div Ord Fd Pk | RAYAK | 178215 |
|--------------------|-------|--------|

Postal

| | | |
|-------------------|-------------------------|--------|
| 6 Div Postal Unit | Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK | 195228 |
|-------------------|-------------------------|--------|

Coy & one Sub-Sec Caserne Gouraud BAALBEK 195228

| | | |
|---------------------------|------------------|----------|
| 6 Salvage Unit | BAALBEK | 195228 |
| 8 Mob Laundry | DOUMMAR | 197177 |
| One Mob Meteor Unit (RAF) | BAALBEK Range | 186224 |
| 19 Mob Bath Unit | (Att 14 Inf Bde) | 12362138 |

(b) 14 Inf Bde Gp

| | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------|----------|
| HQ 14 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS | ZAHLE | 16522125 |
| HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt and) | | |
| 1 A Fd Regt Sig Sec) | RAYAK Area | 18162199 |
| 21 A Fd Bty) | | |
| 22 A Fd Bty) | | |
| 1 Aust A Tk Regt - | | |
| 3 Bty (less one tp at SOUEIDA) | RAYAK Area | 17752125 |
| J & K Mtn Bty | TANAIL | 16252060 |
| 1 Bedfs Herts | | 170212 |
| 2 Black Watch | | 14672125 |
| 2 Y & L | TALIA Area | 183221 |
| 'A' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn | | 16512117 |
| 14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC | | 17562127 |
| 173 Fd Amb | New Hospital ZAHLE | 165212 |
| 1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop | | 17982174 |
| One Sub-Sec 6 Div Pro Coy | ZAHLE | 16522125 |

(c) 16 Inf Bde Gp

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|
| HQ 16 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS | Maison de Commandement, HOMS | 242308 |
| HQ 4 Fd Regt | HOMS | |
| 4/14 Fd Bty (less one tp at SOUEIDA) | BAALBEK Range | |
| 7/66 Fd Bty | (for duty as depot Bty) | 186224 |
| 2 Queens | HOMS | |
| 2 Leicesters | Ecole Militaire, HOMS | 242308 |
| 'C' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn | HOMS | 245353 |
| 16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC | HOMS | 240311 |
| 215 Fd Amb | HOMS | 241306 |
| 3 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop | It. Gen. School, HOMS | 239308 |
| 16 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk | HOMS Station | 239308 |
| One Sub-Sec 6 Div Pro Coy | HOMS Barracks | 239308 |
| | Maison de Commandement, HOMS | |

PALMYRA Det (under comd 16 Inf Bde)

| | | |
|------------------------|---------|--------|
| 2 King's Own) | | |
| 'D' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb) | PALMYRA | 385289 |

(d) 23 Inf Bde Gp

| | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|
| HQ 23 Inf Bde, 255 Sec FSS) | | |
| 'B' Sec 1 Aust Corps FSS) | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| HQ 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt and 2) | | |
| A Fd Regt Sig Sec) | ALEPPO | 285473 |
| 17 A Fd Bty) | | |
| 18 A Fd Bty) | | |
| HQ Royals | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 'A' Sqn | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 'B' Sqn | KARIBACHE | 248502 |
| 4 Border | IDLIB | 235442 |
| 1 DLI | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 11 E Czechoslovak Bn | ALEPPO Aerodrome | |
| 23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 189 Fd Amb () | French Military Hosp ALEPPO | |
| 6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 23 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk | ALEPPO | 283473 |

23 Inf Bde Gp (contd)

One Sub-Sec 6 Div Pro Coy ALEPPO
One Sec 205 Pro Coy ALEPPO

All copies of previous 1 Aust Corps Location Statements should be destroyed on receipt of this Statement.

H. Wells, H. G.
Brig.
CS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION -

| | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|
| 6 Div | 6 | 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp | 1 |
| 7 Aust Div | 6 | 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit | 1 |
| HQ 10 Armd Div | 3 | 1 Aust Corps and Infm Sec | 1 |
| 84th of C Sub Area | 1 | OC 268 Sec, FS Wing, Int Corps | 1 |
| 85th of C Sub Area | 1 | BEYROUTH | |
| Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps | 1 | 3 Replacement Veh Sec | 1 |
| CCRA | 1 | 2 Aust Adv Ord Depot | 1 |
| CRE C Tps | 1 | 3 Adv Ord Depot | 4 |
| CSO | 1 | Fd Ord Depot DAMASCUS | 1 |
| GOC | 1 | 1 Aust Ord Fd Depot | 1 |
| BGS | 1 | Fd Ord Depot BEYROUTH | 1 |
| G | 1 | 2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec | 1 |
| | 1 | 6 Div Postal Unit | 1 |
| | 1 | HQ BF P & TJ | 6 |
| SE | 1 | HQ AIF (ME) | 3 |
| Q | 3 | HQ AIF Base Area | 2 |
| CE | 1 | HQ 6 Aust Div | 1 |
| DDST | 3 | Aust LO GHQ (MEF) | 1 |
| DDMS | 1 | Movement Control BEYROUTH | 1 |
| ADMS (Dental) | 1 | Movement Control TRIPOLI | 1 |
| DADMS | 1 | Movement Control HAIFA | 1 |
| ADOS | 2 | RTO RAYAK | 1 |
| DADOS | 1 | RTO HOMS | 1 |
| | 1 | RTO ALEPPO | 1 |
| | 2 | HAIFA Fortress Area | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office | 1 | Army Post Office HAIFA | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Sigs | 1 | Maj Curtiss (c/o Aust Comforts | |
| Sigs Office | 2 | Fund, Metropole Hotel, | |
| BERINGS Offr 1 Aust Corps | 1 | BEYROUTH) | 1 |
| | | War Diary | 2 |
| | | File | 6 |

APPENDIX 'A' to Location Statement as at 2359 hrs
3 Sep 41. Units NOT under Comd 1 Aust Corps but
in Corps Area

| Unit | Location | Remarks |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 7 CRE Aerodromes | ALEPPO (att 23 Bde) | Under direct comd E-in-C GHQ (MEF) |
| 660 General Construction Coy RE | RAYAK Aerodrome | Under control 7 CRE Aerodromes |
| 138 Mech Eqp Coy | | " " |
| 1/4 Fwd Construction Gp | HAMA | " " |
| 2/4 " | ALEPPO | |
| 1 CMVS | ABLAH 172214) | |
| 4 CMVS | BAALBEK) | |
| Adv Remount Sqn, SYRIA | ABLAH 172214) | Under Comd HQ BF P & TJ |

SECRET

1. AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS

LOCATION STATEMENT (by Groups)
as at 2359 hrs 13 Sep 41

(1) 1 Aust Corps and Units under Comd

HQ UNITS

Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps
1 Aust Corps Int Sec
1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec FSS
1 Aust Corps AIL Sec
'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn
HQ & 18, 19, 20 Pls
17 Pl

ALEY
ALEY
ALEY
ALEY
BAALBEK

138208
138208
138208
138208
195228

ALEY
ALEY

13802070
13752085

Arty

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps
HQ 64 Med Regt)
211 Med Bty)
212 Med Bty)
HQ 1 Aust Svy Regt
HQ F Sp Bty)
Tp F Sp Bty)
HQ S Rg Bty)
Tp S Rg Bty)
HQ Svy Bty)
Sec Svy Bty)
Tp F Sp Bty)
Sec Svy Bty)

ALEY

138208

BAALBEK Range Area

18312199

CHOUEIFAT area

13052092

BAALBEK area

18642230

CHOUEIFAT area

13052094

QATANA area

18331678

Engrs

HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy
23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy

ALEY
ALEPPO
QOUCEIR
HOMS
ALMA

138208
16342775
229285
242311
16602770

Sigs

1 Aust Corps Sigs (less 4 W/T
Sec, 1 A Fd Regt Sec, and
2 A Fd Regt Sec)
4 W/T Sec

ALEY
SOUE EL GHARB

138208
13502065

ASC

1 Aust Corps Sch of Mech
Det 1 Ech Aust C T Sup Col
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk
1 Aust Corps Pet Pk
2 Aust Sup Per Sec
4 Aust Sup Per Sec
5 Aust Sup Per Sec
6 Aust Sup Per Sec
HQ 25 Army Tk Bde Coy RASC
(129 Res MT Coy)
one det
one Sec
one det
211 Med Bty RASC Sec)
212 Med Bty RASC Sec)
Det 2 AASC Sec AA Regt
Det 2 AASC Sec AA Regt

BSARMA
Quartier Granger BEYROUTH
CHOUEIFAT
BERAGINI
TRIPOLI (Legout Bks)
HOMS
CHTUARA
ALEPPO
QOUCEIR
QOUCEIR
HOMS
LATTAQUIE
CHOUEIFAT
TRIPOLI (Legout Bks)
RAYAK

16172658
12812164
132209
132212
16302775
237308
163208
229285
229285
242311
160399
132209
16302775

Medical

2/13 Aust Fd Amb
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec

DHOUR CHOUER
EL GRAYE

14802190
146207

Med (cont'd)

1 Aust MAC -
 'A' Sec
 1 sub-sec 'C' Sec)
 HQ 2 MAC
 2/1 Aust CCS
 2/3 Aust CCS
 1 Aust Mob Bact Lab
 2 Malaria Fd Lab
 Det. 2 Aust Base Depot Med Stores

JAMHOUR

1c

Mental Hospital 138210
 Italian Hospital BEYROUTH 133213
 BEYROUTH (att 2/3 Aust CCS)
 AIN SOFAR
 BEYROUTH

Ord

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop
 4 Rec Sec
 5 Rec Sec (att 2/3 Aust A
 Fd Wkshop)
 2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less
 three Rec Secs)
 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -
 3 Corps Sec
 Details Res Sec
 3 Replacement Veh Sec
 1 Aust L of C Rec Sec
 6 L of C Rec Sec
 1 Bde Gp Sec 10 Armd Div Wkshop
 (working with FFF)

Qartier Petain Barracks BEYROUTH

Area KHALDE 128207

Area KHALDE 128207

KHALDE Area 128207

KHALDE Area 128207

KHALDE Area 128207

BARBARA

KHALDE Area 129208

MEZZE

Pay

1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office

ALEY

138208

Postal

1 Aust Corps Postal Unit

BEYROUTH

Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less
 two secs)
 Two Secs (less one det at
 DAMASCUS)

ALEY

BEYROUTH

Miscellaneous

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl
 1 Aust Corps Graves Registration
 & Enquiries Unit (less one sec
 at BEYROUTH)

ALEY

138208

1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit (less
 two dets)

DAMASCUS

One Det

BEYROUTH Area

13012157

One Det

DAMASCUS

1 Aust Corps Reception Camp

HOMS Ry Sta - moving shortly to QOUCEIR

1 MH and Infm Sec

ALEY

13152110

138208

(2) 7 AUST DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 7 Aust Div and Units under Comd

Units

HQ 7 Aust Div, Int Sec
 'C' Sec FSS, HQ C Coy and
 10 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn

BROUMANA (move Tripoli 14012156
 15 Sep)

Cav

7 Aust Div Cav Regt

BANIAS

175361

Arty

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div

BROUMANA (moves BAALBEK Arty
 Range 15 Sep and
 later EL KALMOUNE
 area 15602722) 14012156

2/4 Aust Fd Regt (less 7 Fd
 Bty)
 'E' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div
 7 Fd Bty

JDAIDE Area 165268

BAALBEK Range (Depot Bty) 186224

| | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|----------|
| <u>Sigs</u> | BAALBEK Arga | 195228 |
| 11 Fd Bty | JDAIDE | 16562689 |
| 12 Fd Bty | BSARMA | 16172658 |
| 'G' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div | KHMAILA | 16772749 |
| 2 Aust A Tk Regt | | |
| 'H' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div | | |
| One Svy Tp (2/1 Aust Svy Regt) | | |
| <u>Engrs</u> | DAHAR EL AIN | 16142727 |
| HQ RAE 7 Aust Div | LEGOUT Bks | 16302775 |
| 25 Aust Fd Pk Coy | East of Tripoli | 16352774 |
| 2/5 Aust Fd Coy | | 16372763 |
| 2/6 Aust Fd Coy | | |
| <u>Sigs</u> | TRIPOLI | 16052745 |
| HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div | DEDDE | 15702715 |
| 1 Coy Sigs 7 Aust Div | | |
| <u>MG</u> | DAHAR EL AIN | 16142727 |
| 2/3 Aust MG Bn (less 'A' & 'C' Coys) | | |
| <u>ASC</u> | DAHAR EL AIN | 16142727 |
| HQ ASC 7 Aust Div | Auger Bks Tripoli | 161278 |
| No 4 ASC Coy 7 Aust Div | DAHAR EL AIN | 163272 |
| (7 Aust Div Amn Coy) | | |
| No 5 ASC Coy 7 Aust Div | | |
| (7 Aust Div Pet Coy) | | |
| No 6 ASC Coy 7 Aust Div | | |
| (3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps | | |
| Amn Pk & 3 Aust Sup Per | | |
| Sec) | CHEKA | 15252658 |
| 4 CYRPIOT Pack Tpt Coy | MADJLAYA | 16452760 |
| <u>Medical</u> | Italian Hospital TRIPOLI | 16042777 |
| HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Amb | TRIPOLI | 16312783 |
| HQ & B Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb | LATTAQUIE | 15983996 |
| A Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb | | |
| HQ Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb | ACHACHE | 170275 |
| A Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb | | |
| B Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb | | |
| HQ 14 Lt Fd Amb | Hosp Legout | 16302775 |
| 'A' Sec | Hosp Legout | 16302775 |
| 'B' Sec | RHAZIR | 144232 |
| 1 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit | TRIPOLI | |
| 2 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit | CHEKA Area | 14962635 |
| 2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec | CHEKA Area | 14962635 |
| 7 Aust Dental Unit | DHOUR CHOUER | 14802190 |
| 9 Aust Dental Unit (att 'A' Coy 2/4 Fd Amb) | LATTAQUIE | 15983996 |
| <u>Ord</u> | DAHAR EL AIN | 16142727 |
| 2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop | East of TRIPOLI | 16472775 |
| 7 Aust Rec Sec | Legout Bks | 16302775 |
| 8 Aust Rec Sec | | |
| 9 Aust Rec Sec | | |
| 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk | Legout Bks (with 9 Aust Rec Sec) | |
| A Div Sec | DAHAR EL AIN (with 7 Aust Rec Sec) | |
| B Div Sec | East of TRIPOLI (with 8 Aust Rec Sec) | |
| C Div Sec | | |
| <u>Pay</u> | BROUMANA (moves Tripoli 15 Sep) | 14162161 |
| 7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office | | |

Postal

7 Aust Div Postal Unit

BROUMANA (moves Tr
15 Sep)

Pro

7 Aust Div Pro Coy

Prevote Tripoli

Miscellaneous

7 Aust Div Emp Pl

BROUMANA (moves Tripoli 15 Sep) 14012156
Legout Bks 16302775

7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit

7 Aust Div Mob Laundry and
Decontamination Unit

7 Aust Div Salvage Unit

Legout Bks 16302775
BEYROUTH (moves Legout
Bks 15 Sep) 13022689

7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp
3 MH and Infm Sec

BROUMANA (moves Tripoli 15 Sep) 15252710

(b) 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde (5 Pl Aust
HQ Gd Bn and 'J' Sec Sigs
Aust Div)

2/3 Aust Inf Bn (less dets)
One Det

One Det

2/5 Aust Inf Bn (less 'D' Coy)
'D' Coy

2/2 Aust Pnr Bn

ELMINA 15922789
KFAR HAZIR 15702646
EDEBBA 15602675
BECHMEZINE 15602650
LATTAGUIE Area 16023993
KASSAB Area 178439
NE TRIPOLI 16572803

(c) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde (9 Pl Aust
HQ Gd Bn and 'K' Sec Sigs
7 Aust Div)

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

MADJLAYA 164276
SYR Area 178272
SW HAMMANA 14942089

(d) 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde (12 Pl Aust
HQ Gd Bn and 'L' Sec Sigs
Aust Div)

2/25 Aust Inf Bn

2/31 Aust Inf Bn

2/33 Aust Inf Bn

Legout Bks 16302775
MERIATA 173283
Legout Bks 16982764
16302775

(e) With BEYROUTH Force (under comd 84 L of C Sub-Area)

2/16 Aust Inf Bn

BEYROUTH 12842178
(reverts comd 21 Aust Inf Bde and
moves SYR area 15 Sep)

(3) 6 DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 6 Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 6 Div, Int Sec and 279 Sec
FSS (less dets)

Wavell Barracks BAALBEK 195228

Cav

9 Aust Div Cav Regt)

'A' Sqn

'B' Sqn

'C' Sqn

'E' Mech Sqn TJFF

GOUCEIR Area 2228

PALMYRA 385289

Arty

HQ RA 6 Div

Wavell Barracks BAALBEK 195228

1st A Tk Regt)
1 Tp 2 Bty
4 Bty

BAALBEK 195228
BAALBEK 194229
BAALBEK 195228

BAALBEK 18272298

Engrs

HQ RE 6 Div
219 Fd Pk Coy
2 Fd Coy
12 Fd Coy
54 Fd Coy (less one sec)
One Sec 54 Fd Coy

Wavell Barracks BAALBEK 195228
RAYAK 175212
212257
163170
BAALBEK 195228
ZAHLE 166212

Sigs

6 Div Sigs (less deta)

Wavell Barracks BAALBEK 195228

ASC

HQ RASC 6 Div
1 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy
6 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy

Wavell Barracks BAALBEK 195228
att 14 Inf Bde - moving
EL HAME 195160 15 Sep
moving from MANSURA to BAALBEK

Medical

'C' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb
33 Fd Hyg Sec
3 Mob Bact Lab (att 173 Fd Amb)
12 Anti-Malarial Control Unit

Wavell Barracks BAALBEK 195228
BAALBEK 195228
ZAHLE 165212
BAALBEK 195228

Ord

HQ 6 Div Ord Fd Pk

RAYAK 178215

Postal

6 Div Postal Unit

Wavell Barracks BAALBEK 195228

Pro

HQ 6 Div Pro Coy & one Sub-Sec

Wavell Barracks BAALBEK 195228

Miscellaneous

6 Div Salvage Unit
8 Mob Laundry
One Mob Meteor Unit (RAF)
19 Mob Bath Unit

BAALBEK 195228
DOUMAR 197177
BAALBEK Range 186224
(att 14 Inf Bde) 17362138

(b) 14 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 14 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS
HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt and
1 A Fd Regt Sig Sec
21 A Fd Bty
22 A Fd Bty

QATANA 183166

1 Aust A Tk Regt -

3 Bty (less one tp at SOUEIDA) RAYAK Area

17752125

J & K Mtn Bty

TANAIL

16252060

1 Bedfs Hqts

18321682

2 Black Watch

18031682

2 Y & L

17731704

'A' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn

16512117

14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC

17562127 - moving to 18571659 15 Sep

173 Fd Amb (less one sub-sec at QATANA)

New Hospital ZAHLE

165212

1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop

17982174

One Sub-Sec 6 Div Pro Coy

QATANA

183166

(c) 16 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 16 Inf Bde & det 279 Sec FSS RAS BAALBEK

214257

16 Inf Bde (cont'd)

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|
| HQ 4 Fd Regt | | |
| 4/14 Fd Bty (less one tp at SOUEIDA) | RAS BAALBEK | 214257 |
| 7/66 Fd Bty | | |
| 2 Queens | JDEIDE South | 2125 |
| 2 King's Own | JDEIDE North | |
| 2 Leicesters | RAS BAALBEK | 214257 |
| 'C' Coy 2/3 Aust MG Bn | EL AINE | 211254 |
| 16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC | HOMS | 241306 |
| 215 Fd Amb | Italian School, HOMS | 239308 |
| 'D' Bde 14 Lt Fd Amb | PALMYRA | 385289 |
| 3 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop | HOMS Ry Station | 239308 |
| 16 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk | BAALBEK | 195228 |
| One Sub-Sec 6 Div Pro Coy | Maison de Commandement, HOMS | |

(d) 23 Inf Bde Gp

| | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------|
| HQ 23 Inf Bde, 255 Sec FSS) | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 'B' Sec 1 Aust Corps FSS) | | |
| HQ Royals | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 'A' Sqn | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 'B' Sqn | KARIBACHE | 248502 |
| HQ 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt and 2 | | |
| A Fd Regt Sig Sec | | |
| 17 A Fd Bty | ALEPPO | 285473 |
| 18 A Fd Bty | | |
| 4 Border | IDLIB | 235442 |
| 1 DLI | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 11 E Czechoslovak Bn | ALEPPO Aerodrome | |
| 23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 189 Fd Amb | French Military Hosp ALEPPO | |
| 6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| 23 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| One Sub Sec 6 Div Pro Coy | ALEPPO | 283473 |
| One Sec 205 Pro Coy | ALEPPO | 283473 |

All copies of previous 1 Aust Corps Location Statements should be destroyed on receipt of this Statement.

H. Wells M.L.
Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION -

PTO

BUTTON

| | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|
| 7 Aust Div | 6 | 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit | 1 |
| Northern L of C District | 6 | 1 MH & Infm Sec | 1 |
| 84 L of C Sub Area | 3 | OC 268 Sec, FS Wing, Int Corps | 1 |
| 85 L of C Sub Area | 3 | BEYROUTH | |
| Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps | 1 | 3 Replacement Veh Sec | 1 |
| CCRA | 1 | 2 Aust Adv Ord Depot | 1 |
| CRE 1 Aust C Tps | 1 | 3 Adv Ord Depot | 4 |
| CSO | 1 | Fd Ord Depot DAMASCUS | 1 |
| GOC | 1 | 1 Aust Ord Fd Depot | 1 |
| BGS | 1 | Fd Ord Depot BEYROUTH | 1 |
| G | 1 | 2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec | 1 |
| I | 1 | 6 Div Postal Unit | 1 |
| A | 1 | HQ BF in P & TJ | 6 |
| Q | 3 | HQ AIF (ME) | 3 |
| SLO | 1 | HQ AIF Base Area | 2 |
| CE | 1 | 6 Aust Div | 1 |
| DDST | 3 | Aust LO GHQ (MEF) | 1 |
| DDMS | 1 | Movement Control BEYROUTH | 1 |
| ADMS (Dental) | 1 | Movement Control TRIPOLI | 1 |
| DADH | 1 | Movement Control HAIFA | 1 |
| ADOS | 2 | RTO RAYAK | 1 |
| DADOS | 1 | RTO HOMS | 1 |
| APM | 1 | RTO ALEPPO | 1 |
| DAI | 2 | HAIFA Fortress Area | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office | 1 | Army Post Office HAIFA | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Sigs | 4 | Maj Curtiss (c/o Aust Comforts | |
| Sig Office | 2 | Fund, Metropole Hotel, | |
| Hirings Offr 1 Aust Corps | 1 | BEYROUTH) | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp | 1 | War Diary | 2 |
| | | File | 6 |

APPX 'A' to Location Statement as at 2359 hrs
13 Sep 41. Units NOT under Comd 1 Aust Corps
but in Corps Area

| <u>Unit</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 7 CRE Aerodromes | ALEPPO (att 23 Bde) | Under direct comd E-in-C GHQ (MEF) |
| 660 General Construction Coy RE | RAYAK Aerodrome | Under control 7 CRE Aerodromes |
| 138 Mech Eqpt Coy | | |
| 1/4 Pwd Construction Gp | HAMA | " " |
| 2/4 " " | ALEPPO | " " |
| 1 CMVS | ABLAH 172214 | Under Comd HQ BF in P & TJ |
| 4 CMVS | BAALBEK 195228 | |
| Adv Remount Sqn, SYRIA | ABLAH 172214 | |

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS

LOCATION STATEMENT (by Groups)
as at 2359 hrs 23 Sep 41.

(1). HQ 1 Aust Corps and Units under Comd

HQ UNITS

Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps
1 Aust Corps Int Sec
'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn -
HQ & 18, 19, 20 Pls
17 Pl

1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec FSS
Arty

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps
HQ 64 Med Regt)
211 Med Bty)
212 Med Bty)

HQ 1 Aust Svy Regt

HQ 1 Bty)

B Tp)

C Tp)

F Tp)

HQ 2 Bty)

A Tp)

E Tp)

Engs

HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy
23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy

Pnrs

2/2 Aust Pnr Bn (less two Coys)
One Coy
One Coy

Labour

1217 Ind Labour Coy

Sigs

1 Aust Corps Sigs (less 4 W/T
Sec, 1 A Fd Regt Sec, and
2 A Fd Regt Sec)
4 W/T Sec

ASC

1 Aust Corps Mob School of Mech
Det 1 Ech Aust C T Sup Col

2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk
1 Aust Corps Pet Pk
2 Aust Sup Per Sec

4 Aust Sup Per Sec

5 Aust Sup Per Sec

6 Aust Sup Per Sec

HQ 25 Army Tk Ede Coy RASC
(129 Res MT Coy)

one det

one sec

one det

211 Med Bty RASC Sec)

212 Med Bty RASC Sec)

Det 2 Aust AA Regt AASC Sec

Det 2 Aust AA Regt AASC Sec

ALEY 138208
ALEY 138208
ALEY 138208

ALEY 13802070
ALEY 13752085

ALEY 138208

ALEY 138208

BAALBEK Range area
(moving to 12942079 18312199
on 24 Sep)

CHOUEIFAT area 13052094

BAALBEK area 18642230

YAAFOUR 18131758

CHOUEIFAT area 13052094

ALEY 138208
ALEPPO 16342775
QOUCEIR 229285
HOMS 242311
ALMA 16602770

I.P.C. area 165280
DJEDEIDE 211255
RAYAK 175213

RAS BAALBEK area 2125

ALEY 138208
SOUK EL GHARB 13502065

BSARMA 16172658

Quartier Granger,
BEYROUTH 12812164

CHOUEIFAT 132209

BERAGINI 132212

TRIPOLI (Legoult
Barracks) 16302775

HOMS 237308

CHTUARA 163208

ALEPPO

QOUCEIR 229285

QOUCEIR 229285

HOMS 242311

LATTAQUIE 163399

CHOUEIFAT 132209

TRIPOLI (Legoult Barracks) 16302775
RAYAK

Medical

2/13 Aust Fd Amb
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
1 Aust MAC
1 'A' Sec
1 sub-sec 'B' Sec
HQ 2 MAC
2/1 Aust CCS
2/3 Aust CCS
1 Aust Mob Bact Lab
2 Malaria Fd Lab
Det 2 Aust Base Depot Med Stores

DHOUR CHOUER
EL GRAYE
JAMHOUR 1345
142208
Mental Hospital 133213
Italian Hospital,
BEYROUTH
BEYROUTH (att 2/3 Aust CCS)
AIN SOPAR 14752075
BEYROUTH

Ord

2/2 Aust Fd Wkshop -
4 Rec Sec
5 Rec Sec (att 2/3 Aust A
Fd Wkshop)
2 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less
three Rec Secs)
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -
3 Corps Sec
Details Res Sec
3 Replacement Veh Sec
1 Aust L of C Rec Sec
6 of C Rec Sec
1 Bde Gp Sec 10 Armd Div Wkshop
(Working with FFF)

Qartier Petain Barracks BEYROUTH
Franchet D'Espercy Barracks,
BEYROUTH 13002155
Franchet D'Espercy Barracks,
BEYROUTH 13002155
do do 13002155
do do 13002155
do do 13002155
BARBARA
Franchet D'Espercy Barracks,
BEYROUTH 13002155
MEZZE 199174

Pay

1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office

ALEY 138208

Postal

1 Aust Corps Postal Unit

BEYROUTH

Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less
two secs and one det)
Two Secs
One det

ALEY 138208
BEYROUTH
DAMASCUS

Miscellaneous

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl
1 Aust Corps Graves Registration
& Enquiries Unit (less one det)
One det
1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit (less
two dets)
One det
One det
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp
1 MH and Infm Sec

ALEY 138208
DAMASCUS 13152110
BEYROUTH area 13012157
DAMASCUS
HOMS Ry Sta - moving shortly to
QOUCEIR
ALEY 13152110
138208

(2) 7 AUST DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 7 Aust Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 7 Aust Div, Int Sec
'C' Sec FSS, HQ C Coy and
10 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn

Italian School,
TRIPOLI 16142777

Cav

7 Aust Div Cav Regt
'C' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div

BANIAS 175361

Arty

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div
HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Regt
7 Fd Bty
8 Fd Bty
'E' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div

EL KALMOUNE area 15812722
JDAIDE area 16622692

Regt)
 Sigs 7 Aust Div)
 2/6 Fd Regt)
 11 Fd Bty)
 12 Fd Bty)
 'G' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div)
 HQ 2 Aust A Tk Regt)
 5 Bty)
 6 Bty)
 7 Bty)
 8 Bty)
 'H' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div)

Engrs

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div
 25 Aust Fd Pk Coy
 2/5 Aust Fd Coy
 2/6 Aust Fd Coy

Sigs

HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div
 1 Coy Sigs 7 Aust Div

MG

2/3 Aust MG Bn (less 'B' Coy)
 'B' Coy

ASC

HQ AASC 7 Aust Div
 No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div
 (7 Aust Div Amn Coy)
 No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div
 (7 Aust Div Pet Coy)
 No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div
 (3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps
 Amn Pk & 3 Aust Sup Per Sec)
 4 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy
 10 Ind Mule Coy
 12 Ind Mule Coy

Medical

HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Amb
 'A' Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb
 'B' Coy 2/4 Aust Fd Amb
 HQ 2/6 Aust Fd Amb)
 'A' Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb)
 'B' Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb)
 HQ 14 Lt Fd Amb)
 'A' Sec)
 'B' Sec)
 1 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit
 2 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit
 2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
 7 Aust Dental Unit
 9 Aust Dental Unit (att 'B'
 Coy 2/4 Fd Amb)

Ord

2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop -
 7 Aust Rec Sec
 8 Aust Rec Sec
 9 Aust Rec Sec
 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -
 A Div Sec
 B Div Sec
 C Div Sec

BSARMA Area 160274

JDAIDE (Monastery) 16562688

BSARMA (Convent) 16172658

DAHER EL AIN area 16172748
 1670
 Legoult Barracks,
 TRIPOLI 16302775
 16812755

Rue L'Eveque, TRIPOLI 16072777
 DEDDE 15752713

Beach area from 152271 to
 159275 (HQ 15952746)
 Legoult Barracks 16302775

DAHER EL AIN area 16172768
 16352770

DAHER EL AIN 16152730

CHEKKA 15252655
 MADJLAYA area 16462742
 CHEKKA area 15252655
 CHEKKA area 152265

Italian Hospital
 TRIPOLI 16042777
 BTERRAM 15852659
 LATTAGUIE 15983996

ACHACHE 17012749

Hosp Legoult 16302775

TRIPOLI
 CHEKKA area 14962635
 Cement Works, CHEKKA 14962635
 TRIPOLI area

LATTAGUIE 15983996

DAHER EL AIN 16142727
 East of TRIPOLI 16472775
 Legoult Barracks 16302775

Legoult Barracks (with 9 Aust Rec
 Sec)

DAHER EL AIN (with 7 Aust Rec Sec)
 East of TRIPOLI (with 8 Aust Rec
 Sec)

7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office

Italian School
TRIPOLI

Postal

7 Aust Div Postal Unit

Italian School
TRIPOLI

161427

Pro

7 Aust Div Pro Coy

Prevote TRIPOLI

16122774

Miscellaneous

7 Aust Div Emp Pl

Italian School
TRIPOLI

16142777

7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit

Legoult Barracks

16302775

7 Aust Div Mob Laundry & fwa decn Unit

Legoult Barracks

16302775

7 Aust Div Salvage Unit

16352771

7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp

15252710

7 Aust Div and Infm Sec

Italian School
TRIPOLI

16142777

(b) 17 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde (5 Pl Aust

HQ Gd Bn and 'J' Sec Sigs 6

Aust Div)

2/3 Aust Inf Bn (less A, C, D, Coys)

KFAR AKKA

16052623

'A' Coy

BECH MEZZINE

15702646

'C' Coy

ABI

160267

'D' Coy

BDEBBA

15922670

2/5 Aust Inf Bn (less 'D' Coy)

KFAR HAZIR

15502635

'D' Coy

LATTAQUIE Area

16023993

KASSAB Area

178439

(c) 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde

2/4 Aust Fd Coy

2/9 Aust Inf Bn

2/10 Aust Inf Bn

2/12 Aust Inf Bn

7 Aust Div Sup Col

2/5 Aust Fd Amb

Moving from PALESTINE.

Will arrive RAS BAALBEK area

24 Sep and 25 Sep.

(d) 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde (9 Pl Aust

HQ Gd Bn and 'K' Sec Sigs

7 Aust Div)

2/14 Aust Inf Bn (less A & C Coys)

MADJLAYA

16432753

'A' Coy

SYR area

17512755

'C' Coy

SYR area

17662765

HQ 2/16 Aust Inf Bn

SYR area

17632755

HQ Coy

SYR area

17812714

'A' Coy

SYR area

17752715

'B' Coy

SYR area

17932712

'C' Coy

SYR area

17882701

'D' Coy

SYR area

17812702

2/27 Aust Inf Bn (less A & B Coys)

SYR area

17622745

'A' Coy

SYR area

17722742

'B' Coy

(e) 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde (12 Pl Aust

HQ Gd Bn and 'L' Sec Sigs

7 Aust Div)

2/25 Aust Inf Bn

Legoult Barracks

16302775

Caseme Bejat Ghanim,

TRIPOLI

2/31 Aust Inf Bn

MERIATA

16982754

2/33 Aust Inf Bn

Legoult Barracks

16302775

(3) 6 DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 6 Div and Units under Comd

Its
6 Div, Int Sec and 279 Sec
PSS (less dets)

Wavell Barracks
BAALBEK 195228

Cav

HQ 9 Aust Div Cav Regt)
'A' Sqn
'B' Sqn
'C' Sqn
'L' Mech Sqn TJFF

QOUCEIR area 2228

PALMYRA 385289

Arty

HQ RA 6 Div

Wavell Barracks,
BAALBEK 195228

HQ 4 Fd Regt)
4/14 Fd Bty (less one tp)
at SOUEIDA)
7/66 Fd Bty)

(Moving to)
EL AINE (EGYPT) 21052535
(24 Sep)

HQ 60 Fd Regt
237 Fd Bty
239 Fd Bty
HQ 1 Aust A Tk Regt
1 Bty
3 Bty
4 Bty

BAALBEK 195228
BAALBEK 194229
BAALBEK 195228
BAALBEK 19272298
EL AINE 211254
RAYAK area 17752125
BAALBEK 19272298

Engrs

HQ RE 6 Div

Wavell Barracks
BAALBEK 195228
RAYAK 175212
QATANA 183166
BAALBEK 195228
ZAHLE 166212

22 Aust Fd Pk Coy
2/2 Aust Fd Coy
54 Fd Coy (less one sec)
One Sec 54 Fd Coy

Sigs

Det 6 Div Sigs

Wavell Barracks,
BAALBEK 195228

6 Aust Div Sigs (less 2 & 3 Coys)

Wavell Barracks,
BAALBEK 195228

ASC

HQ RASC 6 Div

Wavell Barracks,
BAALBEK 195228

1 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy
6 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy
6 Ind Mule Coy
17 Ind Mule Coy

EL HAME 195180
BAALBEK Area
ABLAH area 171215
BAALBEK Area

Medical

215 Fd Amb (less 'A' & 'B' Coys)
'A' Coy
'B' Coy
'C' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb
3 Mob Bact Lab ()
12 Anti-Malarial Control Unit

Italian School HOMS 239308
ZAHLE 165212
DEIR EZ ZOR
Wavell Barracks,
BAALBEK 195228
ZAHLE 165212
RAS BAALBEK 214257

Ord

HQ 6 Div Ord Fd Pk
One Sec 6 Div Ord Fd Pk (from
16 Inf Bde Gp)
3 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop

198172
BAALBEK 195228
BAALBEK 195228

Postal

6 Div Postal Unit (less Bde dets)

Wavell Barracks,
BAALBEK 195228

Pro
6 Div Pro Coy (less dets)

Wavell Barracks,
BAALBEK 195228

Miscellaneous

6 Div Salvage Unit
8 Mob Laundry
One Mob Meteor Unit (RAF)
18 Mob Bath Unit

BAALBEK 195228
DOUMMAR 197177
BAALBEK Range 186224
(att 14 Inf Bde) 17362138

(b) 14 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 14 Inf Bde & det 279 FSS
HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt and)
1 A Fd Regt Sig Sec)
21 A Fd Bty)
22 A Fd Bty)

QATANA 183166
18201725

1 Bedfs Herts
2 Y & L
2 Black Watch
14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC
1 Det Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb
1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop
One Sub-sec 6 Div Pro Coy

QATANA 18321682
MEZZE 17731704
QATANA 18031682
MEZZE 18571659
QATANA 183166
MEZZE 199174
QATANA 183166

(c) 23 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 23 Inf Bde, 255 Sec FSS)
'B' Sec 1 Aust Corps FSS)

ALEPPO 283473

HQ Royals

'A' Sqn

'B' Sqn

ALEPPO 283473
ALEPPO 283473
KARIBACHE 248502

HQ 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt and 2)
A Fd Regt Sig Sec)
17 A Fd Bty)
18 A Fd Bty)

ALEPPO 285473

4 Border

1 DLI

11 E Czechoslovak Bn

23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC

189 Fd Amb

6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop

23 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk

One Sub Sec 6 Div Pro Coy

One Sec 205 Pro Coy

IDLIB 235442
ALEPPO 283473
ALEPPO Aerodrome 288470
ALEPPO 283473
French Military Hosp ALEPPO
ALEPPO 283473
ALEPPO 283473
ALEPPO 283473
ALEPPO 283473

All copies of previous 1 Aust Corps Location Statements should be destroyed on receipt of this statement.

H. Wells
Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION -

P.T.O.

| | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|---|---|
| Div | 6 | 1 Aust Corps Pro Coy | 1 |
| 84 L of C District | 6 | 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit | 1 |
| 84 L of C Sub Area | 3 | 1 MH & Infm Sec | 1 |
| 85 L of C Sub Area | 1 | OC 268 Sec, FS Wing, Int Corps | 1 |
| CCRA | 1 | BEYROUTH | 1 |
| CRE 1 Aust C Tps | 1 | 3 Replacement Veh Sec | 1 |
| CSO | 1 | 2 Aust Adv Ord Depot | 1 |
| GOC | 1 | 3 Adv Ord Depot | 4 |
| EGS | 1 | Fd Ord Depot DAMASCUS | 1 |
| G | 1 | 1 Aust Ord Fd Depot | 1 |
| I | 1 | Fd Ord Depot BEYROUTH | 1 |
| A | 2 | 2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec | 1 |
| Q | 1 | 6 Div Postal Unit | 1 |
| SLO | 4 | HQ BF in P & TJ | 6 |
| CE | 1 | HQ AIF (ME) | 3 |
| DDST | 1 | HQ AIF Base Area | 2 |
| DDMS | 3 | 6 Aust Div | 2 |
| ADMS (Dental) | 1 | Aust LO GHQ (MEF) | 1 |
| DADH | 1 | Movement Control BEYROUTH | 1 |
| ADOS | 1 | Movement Control TRIPOLI | 1 |
| DADOS | 2 | Movement Control HAIFA | 1 |
| DADFS | 1 | RTO RAYAK | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office | 2 | RTO HOMS | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Sigs | 1 | RTO ALEPPO | 1 |
| Sig Office | 4 | HAIFA Fortress Area | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp | 2 | Army Post Office HAIFA | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Fd Fun Centre | 1 | Maj Curtiss (c/o Aust Comforts Fund, Metropole Hotel, BEYROUTH) | 1 |
| Maj WARTON, G (R) | 1 | War Diary | 2 |
| APM | 1 | File | 6 |
| Hirings Offr 1 Aust Corps | 1 | | |

APPX 'A' to Location Statement as at 2359 hrs 23 Sep
Units NOT under Comd 1 Aust Corps but in Corps Area.

| Unit | Location | Remarks |
|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| Det 24 Coast Regt | TRIPOLI | Att 171 Lt AA Bty RA |
| 171 Lt AA Bty |) EL MINA & TRIPOLI | Under Comd 1 Aust AA Bde |
| 4 Aust Hy AA Bty | | |
| 1 Aust Lt AA Regt Wkshop Sec | | |
| One tp 170 Lt AA Bty | RAYAK aerodrome | Under Comd 1 Aust AA Bde |
| 10 Aust Hy AA Regt |) BEYKOUTH (one Lt tp at aerodrome) | Under Comd 1 Aust AA Bde |
| 5 Aust Hy AA Bty | | |
| 6 Aust Hy AA Bty | | |
| 9 Aust Lt AA Bty | | |
| 2 Aust AA Regt Sig Sec | | |
| 2 Aust AA Regt Wkshop Sec | | |
| 7 CRE Aerodromes | ALEPPO (att 23 Bde) | Under direct Comd E-inc GHQ (MEF) |
| 660 General Construction Coy RE | RAYAK Aerodrome | Under control 7 CRE Aerodromes |
| 138 Mech Eqpt Coy - | | |
| 1/4 Fwd Construction Gp | HAMA | " " |
| " " | ALEPPO | " " |
| 1 Sec 1 Aust Svy Coy RAE | QATAN | |
| 1 CMVS | ABLAH 172214) | Under Comd HQ BE in P & TJ |
| 4 CMVS | BAALBEK 195228) | |
| Adv Remount Sqn, SYRIA | ABLAH 172214) | |
| 1 Union (S.A.) Graves Registration and Enquiries Unit |) (Att 1 Aust Corps Graves) (Registration and Enquiries Unit, (DAMASCUS, during Sep.) | |

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS

LOCATION STATEMENT (by Groups)
as at 2359 hrs 30 Sep 41

(1) HQ 1 Aust Corps and Units under Comd

HQ UNITS

Adv HQ 1 Aust Corps
Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps
1 Aust Corps Int Sec
'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn
HQ & 18, 19, 20 Pls
17 Pl
1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec PSS

ALEY
ALEY
ALEY

138208
138208
138208

ALEY
ALEY
ALEY

13802070
13752085
138208

Arty

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps
HQ 1 Aust Svy Regt
HQ 1 Bty)
B tp)
C tp)
F tp)
HQ 2 Bty)
A tp)
D tp)
E tp)

ALEY
CHOUEIFAT area

138208
13052094

BAALBEK area

18642230

QATANA area

18251728

CHOUEIFAT area

13052094

Engrs

HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy
23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy

ALEY
ALEPPO
QOUGEIR
HOMS
ALMA

138208
16342775
229285
242311
16602770

Sigs

HQ 1 Aust Corps Sigs

ALEY

138208

ASC

Det 1 Ech Aust C T Sup Col
2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk
4 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk
1 Aust Corps Pet Pk
2 Aust Sup Per Sec)
3 Aust Sup Per Sec)
4 Aust Sup Per Sec)
5 Aust Sup Per Sec)
6 Aust Sup Per Sec)
25 Army Tk Bde Coy RASC
(129 Res MT Coy)
Det 2 Aust AA Regt AASC Sec
Det 2 Aust AA Regt AASC Sec

Quartier Granger, BEYROUTH 12812164
CHOUEIFAT area 132209
CHOUEIFAT area 129208
BERAGINI 132212
TRIPOLI (Legoult Barracks) 16302775
BAALBEK 195229
ALEPPO 283473
HOMS 242309
TRIPOLI (Legoult Barracks) 16302775
RA YAK 175213

Medical

2/13 Aust Fd Amb
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
1 Aust MAC
'A' Sec & 'B' Sec)
HQ 2 MAC
2/1 Aust CCS
2/3 Aust CCS
1 Aust Mob Bact Lab
2 Malaria Fd Lab
Det 2 Aust Base Depot Med Stores BEYROUTH

DHOUR CHOUEIR
EL GRAYE
JAMHOUR

14802190
14512072
13452110

Mental Hospital
Italian School BEYROUTH
BEYROUTH (att 2/3 Aust CCS)
AIN SOFAR

14552070
133213
14752075

Ord

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop -

1 Rec Sec
5 Rec Sec (att 2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop)

2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less three rec secs)

1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -

3 Corps Sec

3 Replacement Veh Sec

1 Aust L of C Rec Sec

6 L of C Reg Sec

1 Edge Up Sec 10 Armd Div Wkshop (working with FFF)

Qartier Petain Barra

Franchet D'Esperey Barracks

BEYROUTH

Franchet D'Esperey Barracks

BEYROUTH

13

13002155

do

do

13002155

do

do

13002155

BARBARA

Franchet D'Esperey Barracks

BEYROUTH

13002155

MEZZE (Moving to H4 on 5 Oct)

199174

Pay

1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office

ALEY

138208

Postal

1 Aust Corps Postal Unit

Rue du Liban, BEYROUTH

Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less two secs and one det)

Two Secs

One Det

ALEY

BEYROUTH

DAMASCUS

138208

Miscellaneous

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl

1 Aust Corps Graves Registration

2 Enquiries Unit (less one det)

One det

1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit (less dets)

ALEY

DAMASCUS

BEYROUTH

138208

13152110

13012157

1 Aust Corps Reception Camp

1 MH and Infm Sec

ALEY

13152110

138208

(2) 7 AUST DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 7 Aust Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

HQ 7 Aust Div, Int Sec

'C' Sec FSS, HQ C Coy and

10 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn

Italian School

TRIPOLI

16142777

Cav

7 Aust Div Cav Regt, less 'A' Sqn

'C' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div

'A' Sqn

LATTAQUIE Area

160399

177442

Artz

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div

HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Regt

7 Fd Bty

8 Fd Bty

'E' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div

HQ 2/5 Aust Fd Regt

9 Fd Bty

10 Fd Bty

'F' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div

HQ 2/6 Aust Fd Regt

11 Fd Bty

12 Fd Bty

'G' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div

EL KALMOUNE Area

15812722

JDAIDE Area

16622692

BSARMA

16062655

JDAIDE (Monastery)

16562688

leg
Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div

Engrs

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div
25 Aust Fd Pk Coy
2/5 Aust Fd Coy
2/6 Aust Fd Coy

Sigs

HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div
1 Coy Sigs 7 Aust Div

MG

2/3 Aust MG Bn (less 'B' Coy)
'B' Coy

Pns

HQ 2/2 Aust Pns Bn
HQ Coy
C Coy
D Coy

ASC

HQ AASC 7 Aust Div
No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div
(7 Aust Div Amn Coy)
No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div
(7 Aust Div Pet Coy)
No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div
(3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps
Amn Pk)
4 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy
10 Ind Mule Coy
12 Ind Mule Coy

Medical

HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Amb
'A' Coy)
'B' Coy)
HQ 2/6 Aust Fd Amb)
'A' Coy)
'B' Coy)
HQ 14 Lt Fd Amb)
'A' Sec)
'B' Sec)

1 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit TRIPOLI
2 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit CHEKKA Area
2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
7 Aust Dental Unit
9 Aust Dental Unit

Ord

2/3 Aust A Fd Vkshop -
7 Aust Rec Sec
8 Aust Rec Sec
9 Aust Rec Sec
1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -
A Div Sec
B Div Sec
C Div Sec

BSARMA (Convent)

16172658

DAHER EL AIN Area

16172765

16652763

Legoult Barracks, TRIPOLI

16312773

16812755

Rue L'Eveque, TRIPOLI
DEDDE

13072777

15752777

Beach Area from 152271
to 159275 (HQ 15952746)

Legoult Barracks

16302775

I.P.C. Area

16572803

16682801

16512798

Aerodrome

176294

DAHER EL AIN Area

16172765

16352776

DAHER EL AIN

16152730

CHEKKA

15252655

MADJLAYA Area

16462742

CHEKKA Area

15082650

CHEKKA Area

15082650

Italian Hospital TRIPOLI

16042777

BTERRAM area

15852659

ACHACHE

17012749

Hosp Legoult

16302775

Cement Works, CHEKKA

14962635

CEA Area

14962635

LATTAQUIE

160267

15993996

DAHER EL AIN

16142727

East of TRIPOLI

16472765

Legoult Barracks

16302775

Legoult Barracks (with 9 Aust Rec Sec)

DAHER EL AIN (with 7 Aust Rec Sec)

East of TRIPOLI

16512762

(with 8 Aust Rec Sec)

| | | |
|--|------------------------|----------|
| 7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office | Italian School TRIPOLI | |
| 7 Aust Div Postal Unit | Italian School TRIPOLI | |
| Pro 7 Aust Div Pro Coy | Prevote TRIPOLI | 16122774 |
| <u>Miscellaneous</u> | | |
| 7 Aust Div Emp Pl | Italian School TRIPOLI | 16142777 |
| 7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit | Legoult Barracks | 16302775 |
| 7 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit | Legoult Barracks | 16302775 |
| 7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp | | 15252710 |
| 7 Aust Div Salvage Unit | | 16352771 |
| 3 MH and Infm Sec | Italian School TRIPOLI | 16142777 |

(b) 17 Aust Inf Bde

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------|----------|
| HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde (5 Pl Aust | | |
| HQ Gd Bn and 'J' Sec Sigs 6 | | |
| Aust Div) | | |
| 2/3 Aust Inf Bn (less A, C, D Coys) | KFAR AKKA | 16052623 |
| 'A' Coy | BECH MEZZINE | 15702646 |
| 'C' Coy | ABA | 160267 |
| 'D' Coy | EL MINA | 15922789 |
| 2/5 Aust Inf Bn | KFAR HAZIR | 15502635 |
| | LES CEDRES | 18152560 |

(c) 21 Aust Inf Bde

| | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------|----------|
| HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde (9 Pl Aust | | |
| HQ Gd Bn and 'K' Sec Sigs | | |
| 7 Aust Div) | | |
| 2/14 Aust Inf Bn (less A & C Coys) | MADJLAYA | 16422752 |
| 'A' Coy | SRAR Area | 17512756 |
| 'C' Coy | | 17672765 |
| HQ 2/16 Aust Inf Bn | SHAR Area | 17632755 |
| HQ Coy | SIR Area | 17822713 |
| 'A' Coy (9 pl at 19262683) | SIR Area | 17752715 |
| 'B' Coy | | 18982694 |
| 'C' Coy | | 17882701 |
| 'D' Coy | | 17812702 |
| 2/27 Aust Inf Bn (less A & B Coys) | | |
| 'A' Coy | | 17632745 |
| 'B' Coy | HAZINIYE Area | 17722742 |

(d) 25 Aust Inf Bde

| | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------|----------|
| HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde (12 pl Aust | | |
| HQ Gd Bn and 'L' Sec Sigs 7 | | |
| Aust Div) | | |
| 2/25 Aust Inf Bn | Legoult Barracks | 16312773 |
| | Caserne Bejat Ghanim, | |
| | TRIPOLI | 16302775 |
| 2/31 Aust Inf Bn | MERIATA | 16922753 |
| 2/33 Aust Inf Bn | Legoult Barracks | 16312773 |

(3) 6 DIV & ATT TPS

(a) HQ 6 Div and Units under Comd

HQ Units

| | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|--------|
| HQ 6 Div, Int Sec and 279 Sec | Wavell Barracks | |
| FSS (less dets) | BAALBEK | 195228 |

| | | | |
|--|---------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| <p>Av Regt)</p> | | <p>ALEPPO</p> | <p>283475</p> |
| <p>mecc TJFF</p> | | <p>PALMYRA</p> | <p>385289</p> |
| <p><u>Engrs</u></p> | | | |
| <p>HQ RE 6 Div</p> | <p>Wavell Barracks BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p>2/2 Aust Fd Coy</p> | <p>QATANA</p> | <p>183166</p> | |
| <p>2/4 Aust Fd Coy</p> | <p>RAS BAALBEK</p> | <p>214257</p> | |
| <p>54 Fd Coy (less one sec) at ZAHLE</p> | <p>BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p>22 Aust Fd Pk Coy</p> | <p>RAYAK</p> | <p>175212</p> | |
| <p><u>Sigs</u></p> | | | |
| <p>Det 6 Div Sigs</p> | <p>Wavell Barracks, BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p>6 Aust Div Sigs (less 2 & 3 coys)</p> | <p>Wavell Barracks BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p><u>Pnrs</u></p> | | | |
| <p>2/2 Aust Pnr Bn -</p> | | | |
| <p>A Coy</p> | <p>DJEDEIDE</p> | <p>211255</p> | |
| <p>B Coy</p> | <p>RAYAK</p> | <p>175213</p> | |
| <p><u>Labour</u></p> | | | |
| <p>1217 Ind Labour Coy</p> | <p>RAS BAALBEK Area</p> | <p>2125</p> | |
| <p><u>RASC</u></p> | | | |
| <p>HQ RASC 6 Div</p> | <p>Wavell Barracks BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p>1 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy</p> | <p>EL HAME</p> | <p>195180</p> | |
| <p>6 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy</p> | <p>BAALBEK Area</p> | | |
| <p>6 Ind Mule Coy</p> | <p>ABLAH Area</p> | <p>171215</p> | |
| <p>17 Ind Mule Coy</p> | <p>BAALBEK Area</p> | | |
| <p><u>Medical</u></p> | | | |
| <p>HQ 2/5 Aust Fd Amb)</p> | <p>HOMS</p> | <p>242309</p> | |
| <p>Two coys)</p> | | | |
| <p>One coy</p> | <p>RAS BAALBEK</p> | <p>214257</p> | |
| <p>HQ 215 Fd Amb)</p> | | | |
| <p>'A' Coy)</p> | <p>ZAHLE (one coy moving</p> | <p>165212</p> | |
| <p>'B' Coy)</p> | <p>shortly to</p> | | |
| | <p>ZEBEDANI)</p> | | |
| <p>'C' Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb</p> | <p>Wavell Barracks BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p>11 Anti-Malaria Control Unit</p> | <p>QOUCEIR</p> | <p>229285</p> | |
| <p><u>Ord</u></p> | | | |
| <p>HQ 6 Div Ord Fd Pk</p> | | <p>198172</p> | |
| <p>One Sec 6 Div Ord Fd Pk</p> | | | |
| <p>(from 16 Inf Bde Gp)</p> | <p>BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p>3 Independent Bde Gp Workshop</p> | <p>BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p><u>Postal</u></p> | | | |
| <p>6 Div Postal Unit (less Bde dets)</p> | <p>Wavell Barracks BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p><u>Pro</u></p> | | | |
| <p>6 Div Pro Coy (less dets)</p> | <p>Wavell Barracks BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p><u>Miscellaneous</u></p> | | | |
| <p>6 Div Salvage Unit</p> | <p>BAALBEK</p> | <p>195228</p> | |
| <p>8 Mob Laundry</p> | <p>DOUMMAR</p> | <p>197177</p> | |
| <p>One Mob Meteor Unit (RAF)</p> | <p>BAALBEK Range</p> | <p>186224</p> | |
| <p>19 Mob Bath Unit</p> | <p>(att 14 Inf Bde)</p> | <p>17362138</p> | |
| <p>(b) 14 Inf Bde Gp</p> | | | |
| <p>HQ 14 Inf Bde & det 279 FSS</p> | <p>QATANA</p> | <p>183166</p> | |
| <p>HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt and)</p> | | | |
| <p>1 A Fd Regt Sig Sec)</p> | | <p>18201725</p> | |
| <p>21 A Fd Bty</p> | | <p>180172</p> | |
| <p>22 A Fd Bty</p> | | <p>179172</p> | |

14 Inf Bde Gp (cont)

1 Bedfs Herts

2 V & L

2 Black Watch

14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC

'D' Sec Lt Fd Amb

1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop

One Sub Sec 6 Div Pro Coy

QATANA

MEZZE

QATANA

28031682

18571659

183166

199174

183166

(c) 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde

2/9 Aust Inf Bn

2/10 Aust Inf Bn

2/12 Aust Inf Bn

7 Aust Div Sup Col

EL AINE

DJEDEIDE

RAS BAALBEK

HOMS

211253

21502620

211256

21452570

242309

(d) 23 Inf Bde Gp

HQ 23 Inf Bde, 255 Sec FSS)

'B' Sec 1 Aust Corps FSS)

HQ Royals

'A' Sqn

'B' Sqn

HQ 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt and 2)

A Fd Regt Sig Sec

17 A Fd Bty

18 A Fd Bty

4 Border

1 DLI

11 E Czechoslovak (less one coy
at HADAOU)

23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC

189 Fd Amb

6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop

25 Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk

One Sub sec 6 Div Pro Coy

One Sec 205 Pro Coy

ALEPPO

ALEPPO

ALEPPO

KARIBACHE

ALEPPO

IDLIB

ALEPPO

ALEPPO Aerodrome

ALEPPO

French Military Hosp ALEPPO

ALEPPO

ALEPPO

ALEPPO

ALEPPO

283473

283473

283473

248502

283473

235442

283473

288470

283473

283473

283473

283473

283473

(4)

(a) All copies of previous 1 Aust Corps Location Statements should be destroyed on receipt of this statement.

(b) Please acknowledge receipt on att form

14.11.66
1st Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION -

P.T.O.

| | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|
| | 6 | 1 Aust Corps Pro Coy | 1 |
| | 6 | 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit | 1 |
| | 1 | 1 MH & Infm Sec | 1 |
| C District | 1 | OC 268 Sec, FS Wing, Int Corps | 1 |
| Area | 1 | BEYROUTH | 1 |
| Sub Area | 1 | 3 Replacement Veh Sec | 1 |
| CCRA | 1 | 2 Aust Adv Ord Depot | 1 |
| CRE 1 Aust C Tps | 1 | 3 Adv Ord Depot | 4 |
| CSO | 1 | Fd Ord Depot DAMASCUS | 1 |
| GOC | 1 | 1 Aust Ord Fd Depot | 1 |
| BGS | 1 | Fd Ord Depot BEYROUTH | 1 |
| G | 1 | 2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec | 1 |
| I | 2 | 6 Div Postal Unit | 1 |
| A | 1 | HQ BF in P & TJ | 6 |
| Q | 4 | HQ 10 Corps | 4 |
| SLO | 1 | HQ AIF (ME) | 3 |
| CE | 1 | HQ AIF Base Area | 2 |
| DDST | 3 | 6 Aust Div | 2 |
| DDMS | 1 | Aust LO GHQ (MEF) | 1 |
| ADMS (Dental) | 1 | Movement Control BEYROUTH | 1 |
| DADH | 1 | Movement Control TRIPOLI | 1 |
| ADGS | 2 | Movement Control HAIFA | 1 |
| DADOS | 1 | RTO RAYAK | 1 |
| DADPS | 2 | RTO HOMS | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office | 1 | RTO ALEPPO | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Sigs | 4 | HAIFA Fortress Area | 1 |
| Sigs Office | 2 | Army Post Office HAIFA | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp | 1 | Maj Curtiss (c/o Aust Comforts | 1 |
| 1 Aust Corps Fd Pun Centre | 1 | Fund, Metropole Hotel, | 1 |
| Maj WARTON, G(R) | 1 | BEYROUTH) | 1 |
| APM | 1 | War Diary | 2 |
| Hirings Offr 1 Aust Corps | 1 | File | 6 |
| O2E AIF (ME) | 1 | | |

To HQ 1 Aust Corps

Received copy of 1 Aust Corps and Att Tps Location Statement
 as at 2359 hrs 30 Sep 41.

Date Oct 41. (Rank)
 (Unit)

APPX 'A' to Location Statement as at 2359 hrs 3
Units NOT under Comd 1 Aust Corps but in Corps Area

| Unit | Location | Remarks |
|--|--|------------------------------------|
| HQ 10 Corps (less Sigs) | BHAMDOWN 14352075 | Under comd HQ BF in P & TJ |
| Det 14 Coast Regt.) Det 171 Lt AA Bty) | TRIPOLI | Under comd HQ BF in P & TJ |
| One tp 171 Lt AA Bty 4 Aust Hy AA Bty 1 Aust Lt AA Regt Wkshop Sec One tp 170 Lt AA Bty | BEYROUTH TRIPOLI BEYROUTH | Under comd 1 Aust AA Bde |
| HQ 2 Aust Hy AA Regt 6 Aust Hy AA Bty det 2 Aust AA Regt Sig Sec det 2 Aust AA Regt ALSC Sec det 2 Aust AA Regt Wkshop Sec | BEYROUTH (one Lt tp at aerodrome) | Under Comd 1 Aust AA Bde |
| 7 CRE Aerodromes | ALEPPO (att 23 Bde) | Under direct comd E-in-C GHQ (MEP) |
| 660 General Construction Coy RE | RAYAK Aerodrome | Under control 7 CRE Aerodromes |
| 138 Moch Eqpt Coy - 1/4 Fwd Construction Gp 2/4 " " " | HAMA ALEPPO | " " " |
| 1 Sec 1 Aust Svy Coy RAE 1 CMVS 4 CMVS Adv Remount Sqn, SYRIA | QATANA ABLAH 172214 BAALBEK 195228 HOMS 242309 | Under Comd HQ BF in P & TJ |
| 1 Union (S.A.) Graves Registration and Enquiries Unit | (Att 1 Aust Corps Graves Registration (and Enquiries Unit, DAMASCUS, during Sep) | |
| Det 3 Res MT Coy | ALEPPO | Under comd HQ BF in P & TJ |
| Det 4 Bulk Pet Storage Coy | ALEPPO | Under comd HQ BF in P & TJ |

APPENDIX 'FF'

Set No. (1)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps.
7 Sep 41.

G. 872

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS & ATT TPS (SYRIA)

1. Forwarded herewith copy of Order of Battle, 1 Aust Corps and Att Tps (SYRIA). All previous issues will be destroyed.
2. Please acknowledge receipt.

H. Wells
Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

| | | | |
|----------------------|---|-----------------------------|----|
| 6 Div | 5 | Q | 2 |
| 7 Aust Div | 5 | CE | 1 |
| HQ 10 Armd Div | 1 | DDST | 1 |
| 84 L of C Sub-Area | 1 | DDMS | 1 |
| 85 L of C Sub-Area | 1 | ADOS | 1 |
| Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps | 1 | DADOS | 1 |
| CCRA | 1 | APM | 1 |
| CRE C Tps | 1 | DADPS | 1 |
| CSO | 1 | 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office | 1 |
| GOC | 1 | 1 Aust Corps Sigs | 1 |
| BGS | 1 | HQ BF P & TJ | 3 |
| G | 2 | HQ AIF (ME) | 3 |
| I | 1 | HQ AIF Base Area | 2 |
| A | 1 | HQ 6 Aust Div | 1 |
| | | Aust LO GHQ MEF | 1 |
| | | War Diary | 2 |
| | | File | 2 |
| | | Spare | 10 |

To HQ 1 Aust Corps

RECEIVED _____ copies of O of B 1 Aust Corps & att tps as
at 7 Sep 41.

(Rank)

Date Sep 41.

.....

(Unit)

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS.

SECRET.

| M OF SERVICE | FORMATION OR UNIT | |
|-------------------|--|---|
| | Australian | British |
| Headquarter Units | HQ 1 Aust Corps 1 Aust Corps Int Sec 1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec & 'B' Sec FSS 1 Aust Corps AIL Sec 'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn HQ 7 Aust Div 7 Aust Div Int Sec 7 Aust Div 'C' Sec FSS Aust HQ Gd Bn :- 5 Pl ('B' Coy) 10 Pl ('C' Coy) (less 11 Pl) | HQ 6 Div 6 Div Int Sec 255 Sec FSS 279 Sec FSS |
| Cavalry | <u>7 Aust Div</u> 7 Aust Div Cav Regt <u>9 Aust Div</u> 9 Aust Div Cav Regt | Royals (less one Sqn) |
| Artillery | <u>Corps Tps</u> HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps 2/9 Aust A Fd Regt 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt 2/1 Aust Svy Regt:- HQ F Sp Bty One F Sp Tp One S Rg Tp One Svy Bty <u>6 Aust Div</u> 1 Aust A/Tk Regt (less two tps 2 Bty) <u>7 Aust Div</u> HQ RAA 7 Aust Div 2/4 Aust Fd Regt 2/5 Aust Fd Regt 2/6 Aust Fd Regt 2 Aust A Tk Regt | HQ RA 6 Div 4 Fd Regt HQ 60 Fd Regt 237 Fd Bty 239 Fd Bty 64 Med Regt J & K Mtn Bty (INDIAN Unit) |
| Engineers | <u>Corps Tps</u> HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps 2/9 Aust A Fd Coy 2/14 Aust A Fd Coy 2/15 Aust A Fd Coy 23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy <u>7 Aust Div</u> HQ RAE 7 Aust Div 2/5 Aust Fd Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Coy 25 Aust Fd Pk Coy | HQ RE 6 Div 2 Fd Coy 12 Fd Coy 54 Fd Coy 219 Fd Pk Coy |

| ARM OF SERVICE | FORMATION OR UNIT | |
|--------------------------|---|--|
| | Australian | British |
| Signals | <p><u>Corps Tps</u> HQ 1 Aust Corps Sigs HQ Coy (Incl Adm Sec & Tech Maint Sec) HQ 1 Coy 1 Line Sec 2 Line Sec 3 Line Sec 5 Line Sec 1 Line Maint Sec 2 Line Maint Sec HQ 2 Coy 1 Op Sec 3 Op Sec 4 Op Sec 5 Op Sec 1 DR Sec 2 DR Sec HQ 3 Coy 1 A fd Regt Sec 2 A fd Regt Sec 7 Aust Div Sigs 7 Aust Div</p> | Sigs 6 Div |
| Infantry | <p><u>6 AUST DIV</u> 2/3 Aust Inf Bn (16 Aust Inf Bde) HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde 2/5 Aust Inf Bn 7 Aust Div HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde 2/14 Aust Inf Bn 2/16 Aust Inf Bn 2/27 Aust Inf Bn HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde 2/31 Aust Inf Bn 2/33 Aust Inf Bn 9 Aust Div 2/25 Aust Inf Bn</p> | <p>HQ 14 Inf Bde 1 Bedfs Herts 2 Black Watch 2 Y & L HQ 16 Inf Bde 2 Queen's 2 King's Own 2 Leicesters HQ 23 Inf Bde 4 Border 1 DLI 11 E Czechoslovak Bn</p> |
| Machine Gun | <p><u>Corps Tps</u> 2/3 Aust MG Bn</p> | |
| Pioneers | <p><u>Corps Tps</u> 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn</p> | |
| Army Service Corps | <p><u>Corps Tps</u> Det 1 Ech 1 Aust C T Sup Col 2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk 3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk 2 Aust Sup Per Sec 3 Aust Sup Per Sec x 4 Aust Sup Per Sec 5 Aust Sup Per Sec 6 Aust Sup Per Sec Det 2 AASC Sec AA Regt 1 Aust Corps Mob School of Mech (x as No 6 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div) 7 Aust Div HQ AASC 7 Aust Div 7 Aust Div Amn Coy (as No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div) 7 Aust Div Pet Coy (as No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div)</p> | <p>HQ RASC 6 Div 14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC 16 Inf Bde Gp Coy (61 Coy) RASC 23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC 211 Med Bty RASC Sec 212 Med Bty RASC Sec 25 Army Tank Bde Coy RASC (129 Res MT Coy) 1 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy 4 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy</p> |

| FOR VICE | FORMATION OR UNIT | |
|---------------|---|--|
| | Australian | British |
| Medical | <p><u>Corps Tps</u> 2/13 Aust Fd Amb 2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec 1 Aust M A C - 'A' Sec 2/1 Aust CCS 2/3 Aust CCS <u>7 Aust Div</u> 2/4 Aust Fd Amb 2/6 Aust Fd Amb 2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec</p> <p><u>Base & L of C Tps</u> 1 Aust Mob Bact Lab 1 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit 2 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit 7 Aust Dental Unit 9 Aust Dental Unit Det 2 Aust Base Depot Med Stores</p> | <p>173 Fd Amb 189 Fd Amb 215 Fd Amb 14 Lt Fd Amb 33 Fd Hyg Sec 2 M A C 3 Mob Bact Lab 2 Malarial Fd Lab 12 Anti-Malarial Control Unit</p> |
| Ordnance | <p><u>Corps Tps</u> 2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop - 4 Rec Sec 5 Rec Sec 2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk - 3 Corps Sec 'A' Div Sec 'B' Div Sec 'C' Div Sec Details Res Sec 3 Replacement Veh Sec <u>Base & L of C Tps</u> 1 Aust L of C Rec Sec</p> | <p>1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop 3 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop 6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop 1 Bde Gp Sec 10 Armd Div Wkshop 6 Div Ord Fd Pk (less one inf Bde Sec) 6 L of C Rec Sec</p> |
| Pay | <p>1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office 7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office</p> | |
| Postal | <p>1 Aust Corps Postal Unit 7 Aust Div Postal Unit</p> | <p>6 Div Postal Unit</p> |
| Pro | <p>1 Aust Corps Pro Coy 7 Aust Div Pro Coy</p> | <p>6 Div Pro Coy One Sec 205 Pro Coy</p> |
| Miscellaneous | <p>1 Aust Corps Emp Pl 7 Aust Div Emp Pl 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit 1 Aust Corps Graves Registration & Enquiries Unit 7 Aust Div Salvage Unit 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp 7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp 7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit 7 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd decontamination Unit 1 M.H. and Infm Sec 3 M.H. and Infm Sec</p> | <p>6 Div Salvage Unit 19 Mob Bath Unit 8 Mob Laundry One Mob Meteor Unit (RAF)</p> |

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET
HQ 1 Aust Corps
14 Sep 41.

G.975

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS & ATT TPS (SYRIA)

AMENDMENT No. 1

Ref: 1 Aust Corps G.872 of 7 Sep 41, herewith amendments.

(1) CAV

British

After "Royals (less one Sqn)" add
" 'L' Mech Sqn T.J.F.F."

(2) ARTY

Australian

After "2/11 Aust A Fd Regt" delete from
"2/1 Aust Svy Regt :- "
to
"One Svy Bty".
and substitute "2/1 Aust Svy Regt".

(3) SIGS

Australian

After " 2 A Fd Regt Sec" delete
" 7 Aust Div
Sigs 7 Aust Div"
Add " 6 Aust Div
J Sec (3 Coy)
7 Aust Div
HQ 7 Aust Div Sigs
HQ 1 Coy
A Sec
B Sec
C Sec
D Sec
M Sec
HQ 2 Coy
E Sec
F Sec
G Sec
H Sec
HQ 3 Coy
K Sec
L Sec . "

(4) ASCT

British

After "4 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy" add
"6 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy".

(5) WFO

Australian

Under "Corps Tps" after "1 Aust MAC - 'A' sec"
insert "and one sub-sec 'C' sec".

H. Wells UGE
Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

As for 1 Aust Corps G.872 of 7 Sep 41 except that
"HQ 10 Armd Div" is replaced by "Northern L of C District".

500

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps
24 Sep 41.

G.1056

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS & ATT TPS (SYRIA)

1. Forwarded herewith copy of Order of Battle, 1 Aust Corps and Att Tps (SYRIA). All previous issues will be destroyed.
2. Please acknowledge receipt.

H. Wells
Br.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

| | | | |
|--------------------------|---|-----------------------------|---|
| 6 Div | 5 | DDMS | 1 |
| 7 Aust Div | 5 | ADOS | 1 |
| Northern L of C District | 1 | DADOS | 1 |
| 84 L of C Sub-Area | 1 | AFM | 1 |
| 85 L of C Sub-Area | 1 | DADPS | 1 |
| CCRA | 1 | 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office | 1 |
| CRE 1 Aust C Tps | 1 | 1 Aust Corps Sigs | 2 |
| CSO | 1 | HQ BF in P & TJ | 3 |
| GOC | 1 | HQ AIF (ME) | 3 |
| BGS | 1 | HQ AIF Base Area | 2 |
| G | 2 | 6 Aust Div | 2 |
| I | 1 | Aust LO GHQ (MEF) | 1 |
| A | 1 | Maj WARTON G(R) | 1 |
| Q | 3 | War Diary | 2 |
| CE | 1 | File | 2 |
| DDST | 1 | Spare | 6 |

To HQ 1 Aust Corps

RECEIVED _____ copies of O of B 1 Aust Corps & att tps as
at 24 Sep 41.

(Rank)

Date Sep 41.

.....

(Unit)

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS

SECRET

ARMY OF SERVICE

FORMATION OR UNIT

Australian

British

Headquarters Units

1 Aust Corps
1 Aust Corps Int Sec
1 Aust Corps 'A' Sec
& 'B' Sec FSS
'E' Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn
HQ 7 Aust Div
7 Aust Div Int Sec
7 Aust Div 'C' Sec FSS
Aust HQ Gd Bn
5 Pl ('B' Coy)
'C' Coy (less 11 Pl)

HQ 6 Div
6 Div Int Sec
255 Sec FSS
252 Sec FSS

Cavalry

7 Aust Div
7 Aust Div Cav Regt
9 Aust Div
9 Aust Div Cav Regt

Royals (less one Sqn)
'L' Mech Sqn T.F.F.

Artillery

Corps Tps
HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust A Fd Regt
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt
2/1 Aust Svy Regt
6 Aust Div
1 Aust A/Tk Regt (less
2 Bty)
7 Aust Div
HQ RAA 7 Aust Div
2/4 Aust Fd Regt
2/5 Aust Fd Regt
2/6 Aust Fd Regt
2 Aust A Tk Regt

HQ RA 6 Div
4 Fd Regt
60 Fd Regt
64 Med Regt

Engineers

Corps Tps
HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy
23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy
6 Aust Div
22 Aust Fd Pk Coy
2/2 Aust Fd Coy
7 Aust Div
HQ RAE 7 Aust Div
2/4 Aust Fd Coy
2/5 Aust Fd Coy
2/6 Aust Fd Coy
25 Aust Fd Pk Coy

HQ RE 6 Div
54 Fd Coy

| ARM OF SERVICE | FORMATION OR UNIT | |
|----------------------|--|---|
| Signals | <p><u>Australian</u></p> <p><u>Corps Tps</u></p> <p>HQ 1 Aust Corps Sigs Coy (Incl Adm Sec & Tech Maint Sec)</p> <p>HQ 1 Coy 1 Line Sec 2 Line Sec 3 Line Sec 5 Line Sec 1 Line Maint Sec 2 Line Maint Sec</p> <p>HQ 2 Coy 1 Op Sec 3 Op Sec 4 Op Sec 5 Op Sec 1 DR Sec 2 DR Sec</p> <p>HQ 3 Coy 1 A Fd Regt Sec 2 A Fd Regt Sec 6 Aust Div</p> <p>6 Aust Div Sigs (less 2 & 3 Coys) J sec (3 Coy)</p> <p>7 Aust Div</p> <p>HQ 7 Aust Div Sigs</p> <p>HQ 1 Coy A sec B sec C sec D sec M sec</p> <p>HQ 2 Coy E sec F sec G sec H sec</p> <p>HQ 3 Coy K sec L sec</p> | <p><u>British</u></p> <p>Det 6 Div Sigs</p> |
| Infantry | <p><u>6 Aust Div</u></p> <p>2/3 Aust Inf Bn (16 Aust Inf Bde)</p> <p>HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde 2/5 Aust Inf Bn 7 Aust Div</p> <p>HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde 2/9 Aust Inf Bn 2/10 Aust Inf Bn 2/12 Aust Inf Bn</p> <p>HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde 2/14 Aust Inf Bn 2/16 Aust Inf Bn 2/27 Aust Inf Bn</p> <p>HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde 2/31 Aust Inf Bn 2/33 Aust Inf Bn 9 Aust Div</p> <p>2/25 Aust Inf Bn</p> | <p>HQ 14 Inf Bde 1 Bedfs Herts 2 Black Watch 2 Y & L</p> <p>HQ 23 Inf Bde 4 Border 1 DLI 11 E Czechoslovak Bn</p> |
| Machine Gun | <p><u>Corps Tps</u></p> <p>2/3 Aust MG Bn</p> | |

| Formation or Unit | | |
|------------------------------|--|---|
| Australian | | British |
| Corps Tps 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn | | |
| | | 1217 Ind Labour Coy |
| Army Service Corps | <p>Corps Tps</p> <p>Det 1 Ech 1 Aust C T Sup Col</p> <p>2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk</p> <p>x 3 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk</p> <p>1 Aust Compst Pk</p> <p>2 Aust Sup Per Sec</p> <p>x 3 Aust Sup Per Sec</p> <p>4 Aust Sup Per Sec</p> <p>5 Aust Sup Per Sec</p> <p>6 Aust Sup Per Sec</p> <p>Det 2 Aust AA Regt AASC Sec</p> <p>1 Aust Corps Mob School of Mech</p> <p>(x as No 6 AASC Coy</p> <p>7 Aust Div)</p> <p>7 Aust Div</p> <p>HQ AASC 7 Aust Div</p> <p>7 Aust Div Amn Coy (as No 4 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div)</p> <p>7 Aust Div Fet Coy (as No 5 AASC Coy 7 Aust Div)</p> <p>7 Aust Div Sup Col</p> | <p>HQ RASC 6</p> <p>14 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC</p> <p>23 Inf Bde Gp Coy RASC</p> <p>211 Med Bty RASC Sec</p> <p>212 Med Bty RASC Sec</p> <p>25 Army Tank Bde Coy RASC (129 Res MT Coy)</p> <p>1 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy</p> <p>4 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy</p> <p>6 CYPRIOT Pack Tpt Coy</p> <p>6 IND Mule Coy</p> <p>10 IND Mule Coy</p> <p>12 IND Mule Coy</p> <p>17 IND Mule Coy</p> |
| Medical | <p>Corps Tps</p> <p>2/13 Aust Fd Amb</p> <p>2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec</p> <p>1 Aust MAC - A Sec</p> <p>One Sub-Sec B Sec</p> <p>2/1 Aust CCS</p> <p>2/3 Aust CCS</p> <p>7 Aust Div</p> <p>2/4 Aust Fd Amb</p> <p>2/5 Aust Fd Amb</p> <p>2/6 Aust Fd Amb</p> <p>2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec</p> <p>Base & L of C Tps</p> <p>1 Aust Mob Bact Lab</p> <p>1 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit</p> <p>2 Aust Anti-Malarial Control Unit</p> <p>7 Aust Dental Unit</p> <p>9 Aust Dental Unit</p> <p>Det 2 Aust Base Depot Med Stores</p> | <p>189 Fd Amb</p> <p>215 Fd Amb</p> <p>14 Lt Fd Amb</p> <p>2 MAC</p> <p>3 Mob Bact Lab</p> <p>2 Malarial Fd Lab</p> <p>12 Anti-Malarial Control Unit</p> |
| Ordnance | <p>Corps Tps</p> <p>2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop - 4 Rec Sec</p> <p>5 Rec Sec</p> <p>2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop</p> <p>1 Aust Ord Fd Pk - 3 Corps Sec</p> <p>A Div Sec</p> <p>B Div Sec</p> <p>C Div Sec</p> <p>Details Res Sec</p> <p>3 Replacement Veh Sec</p> <p>Base and L of C Tps</p> <p>1 Aust L of C Rec Sec</p> | <p>1 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop</p> <p>3 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop</p> <p>6 Independent Bde Gp Wkshop</p> <p>1 Bde Gp Sec 10 Armd Div Wkshop</p> <p>6 Div Ord Fd Pk (less one inf bde sec)</p> <p>6 L of C Rec Sec</p> |

| ARM OF SERVICE | FORMATION OR UNIT | |
|----------------------|--|--|
| | Australian | British |
| Pay | 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office 7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office | |
| Postal | 1 Aust Corps Postal Unit 7 Aust Div Postal Unit | 6 Div Postal Unit |
| Pro | 1 Aust Corps Pro Coy 7 Aust Div Pro Coy | 6 Div Pro Coy One Sec 205 Pro Coy |
| Miscellaneous | 2 Aust Corps Emp Pl 2 Aust Div Emp Pl 1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit 1 Aust Corps Graves Registration & Enquiries Unit 7 Aust Div Salvage Unit 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp 7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp 7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit 7 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd Decon Unit 1 MH and Infm Sec 3 MH and Infm Sec | 6 Div Salvage Unit 19 Mob Bath Unit 8 Mob Laundry One Mob Meteor Unit (RAF) |

~~AUTHORITATIVE DOCUMENT~~

S E C R E T

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
30 Sep 41.

G.1162

ORDER OF BATTLE.

1 Aust Corps and Att Tps (SYRIA)

Ref 1 Aust Corps G 1056 of 24 Sep 41, herewith amendments:

ARTY

- (a) Australian
Under "6 Aust Div" delete "1 Aust A Tk Regt (less 2 Bty)"
- (b) British
Delete "HQ RA 6 Div
4 Fd Regt
60 Fd Regt
64 Med Regt."

2. MACHINE GUN

Above "2/3 Aust MG Bn"
delete "Corps Tps" and substitute "7 Aust Div"

3. ASC

- (a) Australian
 - (i) After "2 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk"
insert "4 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk"
 - (ii) Before "3 Aust Sup Per Sec" delete the asterisk.
 - (iii) Delete "1 Aust Corps Mob School of Mech".
- (b) British
Delete "211 Med Bty RASC sec
212 Med Bty RASC sec."

4. MEDICAL

- (a) Australian
Under "1 Aust MAC -" delete "One sub-sec B sec",
and insert "B sec".
- (b) British
 - (i) Delete "3 Mob Bact Lab"
 - (ii) Delete "12 Anti-Malarial Control Unit"
and substitute "11 Anti-Malarial Control Unit"

5. ORD

Australian
Under "1 Aust Ord Fd Pk"- delete "Details Res Sec".

ACK.

H.W. 11-12 17/10/41
For Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION :-

As for 1 Aust Corps G 1056 of 24 Sep 41,
plus "HQ 10 Corps 3 copies." "O2E AIF (ME)...1 Copy"

APPENDIX 'GG'

Set No. (/)

150D
SECRET

AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 72

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 31 Aug to 1200 hrs 1 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART I

(a) IRAN: Operations: On 29 Aug Persian envoys met the British forward troops with the information that the SHAH had ordered the cessation of hostilities.

In the Northern sector British Indian troops were met with a flag of truce from the Persian army which retired to KERMANSHAH. The Persian commander offered to withdraw and surrender the town if he were given until 1 Sep. The British commander had information that the Germans in KERMANSHAH had been advising on its defence, and he refused to accept any delay but insisted that the Persians withdraw by successive stages, starting immediately.

Entry by our troops into KERMANSHAH was timed to take place at 0900 hrs 30 Aug. The situation on this line of advance is described as fast approaching normal. The local inhabitants are selling fruit and vegetables to the troops and their attitude is said to be very friendly.

Two captured Persian anti-tank guns proved to be of the latest SKODA manufacture.

In the Southern sector Indian infantry with RAF fighter protection continued to advance up the KARUN river and occupied AHMAZ.

The New Russian column reported that it has reached DILIAN, West of lake URMIA (lake URMIA is in the NW corner of IRAN), and is continuing its Southern advance.

Local inhabitants complain that Persian troops have been begging for food owing to the shortage of rations. Our policy is to help lessen the general food shortage throughout the country, and arrangements have been made to send 700 tons of wheat into the British occupied area of Southern PERSIA.

(From Force HQ Daily Int Summary No. 8, dated 30 Aug.)

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION

BEACH-LANDING OF ITALIAN AFVs: A cutting from the FOPOL D'ITALIA of 8 Jun 41 contained photographs purporting to show ITALIAN tanks being landed from a ship in CRETE.

So far as can be seen from the photograph, the ship does not appear to be of a type specially constructed for this work, but is a normal flat-bottomed shallow-draught coaster, broad in the beam and with the engine and navigating bridge well aft.

In the photograph, the ship is shown beached, and with a ramp leading down from the bows to the beach. Inboard, there is another ramp leading up from the ship's deck to the top of the outboard ramp, the two meeting and forming an apex just over the ship's stem. It cannot be seen from the photograph whether the two ramps are actually hinged or pinned together, or by what means the outboard ramp is run out to bridge the gap between ship and beach.

The photograph shows CV3 tanks landing from the ship. One is ascending the secondary ramp towards the ship's bow, a second is descending the main ramp from ship to shore, and a third is commencing to make its way up the beach.

A light hand-rail runs down one side of the main ramp. By comparisons with the known dimensions of the CV3 tank, it is estimated that the width of the ramp is 6 ft 3 ins, the length, from apex to

beach, 31 ft 6 ins.

(From GHQ Tech Int Summary No.34, dated 4 Aug.)

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL: Attached as Appx "A" is a short description of climatic conditions in the ALEPPO area (from Force HQ Daily Int Summary No.82, dated 29 Aug.)

PART II - SECURITY

N11.

E. H. Anderson
Maj
of Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: as per Summary No 61.

Appendix "A"

1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No.72

SYRIAN CLIMATE
=====

CLIMATIC CONDITIONS ALEPPO AREA:

RAINFALL:

The average fall for the rainy season which begins 1 Oct and finishes at the end of April is about 23 inches.

The following figures are for the season 1940/41:-

| | | |
|----------|---------|------------|
| October | -(1940) | 3.4 inches |
| November | " | 2.2 " |
| December | " | 4.9 " |
| January | (1941) | 5.9 " |
| February | " | 3.3 " |
| March | " | 2.7 " |
| April | " | .65 " |

In the DJERABLOUS area rain sometimes falls in May.

TEMPERATURE:

The hottest months of the year are July and August when the Temperature reaches 104.9°F. The coldest month is January but there is very little snow, the last occasion being January 1939.

The following figures are for the year 1940/41:-

| | | | | | |
|----------|------|--------------|---------|---------|---------|
| October | 1940 | Maximum Temp | 92.59°F | Minimum | 58.51°F |
| November | " | " | 68.50 | " | 45.59 |
| December | " | " | 56.35 | " | 42.24 |
| January | 1941 | " | 54.79 | " | 37.99 |
| February | " | " | 64.22 | " | 40.4 |
| March | " | " | 60.1 | " | 43.03 |
| April | " | " | 75.2 | " | 49.64 |
| May | " | " | 90.23 | " | 59.83 |
| June | " | " | 94.57 | " | 65.3 |
| July | " | " | 96.01 | " | 68.58 |

During August 1941 the temperature reached 110.3°F some days, and during January 1941 was 5°F below freezing point.

SECRET

AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 73

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 1 Sep to 1200 hrs 2 Sep 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART I

(a) IRAN: Our troops have moved from KERMANSHAH and have made contact with the Russians near HAMADAN (90 miles NE of KERMANSHAH) and SINNEH. It has been reported that the Russian forces will not move any further south. Persian troops are to return to their peace-time stations.

There are some indications that Russian Divisions in IRAN are being moved to the UKRAINE.

MEDITERRANEAN: It has been reliably reported that PATRAS is being used as a collecting port for convoys crossing the ADRIATIC. Prior to our heavy bombing raid on the night 8/9 Aug, the CORINTH Canal was being used extensively by Germans and Italians. Reports have been received stating that, at the moment, as a result of the raid, only limited caique traffic is possible and dredges are at work.

[Summarised from reports of RN Staff Offr for Int(SYRIAN PORTS)]

ROUMANIA: The estimated damage by Russian air raids on the PDCESTI oil refineries is 100 tank cars and 25 or 26 tanks. The Russians have bombed the DANUBE bridge and pipe-line to CONSTANZA at CERNA VODA. Repairs are likely to take three weeks. A Roumanian source reports the arrival on 20 Aug of a large number of German sailors at the port of SULINA at the DANUBE mouth.

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.465, dated 28 Aug.)

RUSSIA: It has been reliably reported that at midnight 1/2 Sep ODESSA was still in Russian hands.

YUGOSLAVIA: Evidence continues of widespread guerrilla and sabotage activities. Rebels are reported to have captured several villages in BOSNIA, to have sabotaged the railway from ITALY to ZAGREB and to be harassing the Italians in MONTENEGRO.

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.465, dated 28 Aug.)

AIR ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST - 19/26 Aug:

ENEMY - German: As might be expected there has been no appreciable change in the scale of enemy air activity as compared with the last week or so. On 21 Aug, 30 JU.87s in two waves escorted by 12 MC.200s attacked the harbour and quays at TOBRUK. No material damage or casualties resulted, but two JU.87s were shot down and others damaged. On the nights 22/23 and 24/25 Aug attacks were made against TOBRUK by small formations of German aircraft, probably operating from Southern GREECE. Most of the bombs fell on the town, causing damage to telephone and power lines. MERSA MATRUH was bombed on the night 23/24 Aug; HE and incendiary bombs were dropped, causing slight damage to buildings. ALEXANDRIA has had three raids during the period under review. The bombing has been carried out from medium level, but the accuracy has been poor. Slight damage to civil property and a small number of civilian casualties resulted, but most of the bombs fell either into the sea or Lake MARIUT.

Against Shipping: The German Air Force has made seven attacks

against shipping off the coast between MERSA MATRUH and the morning of 19 Aug two formations of JU 87's attacked our ships. Each aircraft carried one heavy bomb and our three ships were sunk. On 23 Aug a similar attack was made- this time off SID BARRANI. No ships were damaged in this raid, but two of the enemy were shot down by escorting TOMAHAWKS.

Italian. Despite the reported petrol crisis, there has been no diminution in Italian fighter activity in LIBYA during the past week. FAMAGUSTA (CYPRUS) was attacked by bombers on 21 Aug. One ship and some houses were damaged; there were fifteen military and eighteen civilian casualties. Two night attacks have been made against MALTA. Incendiary bombs were dropped, but negligible damage resulted.

Against shipping: Three attacks against our destroyers have been made by torpedo-carrying S79's whilst they were engaged in convoy work off the EGYPTIAN Coast. They failed to do any damage in either attack. One of our tankers was hit by a torpedo off ROSETTA; however she managed to reach port under her own steam.

OUR ACTION. Numerous sorties have been made from EGYPT against LIBYA and against the garrison at GONDAR. It is stated by a reliable source that the Wellington attacks on HERAKLION and MALEME (CRETE) on the night 1/2 Aug, were most successful. Troop carriers and reconnaissance aircraft were burnt out and a large petrol store blown up. Air photographs of the Chemical works at CROTONE (Southern Italy) show severe damage to one of the buildings. On 20 Aug Hurricanes made a surprise attack against the harbour at SYRACUSE (SICILY). Two seaplanes were damaged and three balloons shot up. TRIPOLI has been raided four times. Warehouses near the Spanish Quay were hit and one ship was sunk and others damaged. BENGHASI, BARDIA and DERNIA were also raided. One large convoy on the BENGHASI-TRIPOLI road was attacked with machine gun fire and with bombs. Three lorries were destroyed.

Against shipping: A TRIPOLI bound convoy was attacked on 23 Aug, and a merchant vessel of between 80 and 1000 tons was hit by a 250 lb bomb. The next day a second convoy was attacked, and one escort vessel and a schooner were sunk, and a second schooner left with a heavy list. (Summarized from RAF ME Weekly Intelligence Summary No 62 dated 26 Aug.)

The Italian newspaper IL SECOLO RIX of GENOA, dated 23 Aug 41, reports that 23 civilians were killed and 36 injured when CATANIA (SICILY) was raided on the night of 15/16 Aug.

GENERAL. A PW (a fighter pilot who was a member of the Italian unit which tried to operate against ENGLAND from Northern FRANCE), gives the following information on the camouflage of installations in the CAP GRIS NEZ area (near CALAIS). Aircraft are parked in protected pens. The camouflage, depicting roads, hedges and trees, makes it impossible to land unless the pilot is absolutely in the know. The Germans have a specialist corps, a section of which concentrates on aerodrome camouflage.

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

Enemy Methods. Russian sources report that the following interesting changes in German tank tactics have taken place in the Russian campaign:-

"German Panzer divisions no longer operate further ahead than the infantry, as they did in POLAND and FRANCE, since several divisions which tried to do it in RUSSIA suffered severe casualties. Tanks now seldom operate without infantry in close support and incidentally, infantry seldom operate without tanks. If the tanks do find themselves ahead of the infantry, they always now withdraw to the infantry at night and no longer attempt to laager in enemy territory.

Molotov cocktails and similar grenades containing petrol and other liquids, have been found most effective against German tanks."

(From GHQ Daily Int Summary No.467, dated 30 Aug.)

PART II - SECURITY

At Appendix "A" to this Summary is a note on Signal Security compiled to show the way in which information is given to the enemy by the use of addresses in apparently harmless W/T messages.
(Reprinted from GHQ, MEF Daily Int Summary No.466, dated 29 Aug.)

E. Manderson
Maj
for Lt-Col
GS: 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No.61

SIGNAL SECURITY

1. The object of Signal Security is to prevent the enemy obtaining information from our communications, whether wireless, telephone or telegraph.

Signal Security is therefore not merely restricted to calling attention to breaches of regulations; there must be a constant effort to discover leakages not covered by regulations and to suggest methods of stopping these leakages.

2. It is now widespread knowledge that the enemy has been most successful in the intelligence they have derived from our wireless traffic. Some of this success has been due to unwise use of clear text in R/T and W/T; some of it has been due to flaws in our procedure; and some has probably been due to successful enemy reading of our codes.

3. In the next paragraph are notes compiled from the study of one single wireless link. They only show the effect of the compromises resulting from the use of Fixed Call Signs. The numerous other forms of compromise which might confirm or contradict the deductions made in these notes have not been explored for lack of facilities; but other methods of research, for instance, into registered addresses, originators' numbers, code names, types of cipher, re-transmissions and frequencies can be equally informative.

The staff actually employed in this study consisted of two sets and the traffic sorting was done by one clerk. It is therefore possible that some of the deductions or the locations may be incorrect.

4. a) It is probable that many officers do not realise that the addresses of messages alone can give information to the enemy and that one harmless message often compromises another. The following are examples from actual messages intercepted in CAIRO:-

1. On 4 Aug a message was sent to station NJC addressed to the Supt. JSH from the Supt. BECA. The originators number was BC 167. The message contained some trifling question of Signals procedure. JSH is obviously an abbreviation for JERUSALEM and wireless station NJC is consequently located there.
2. On the same day a message was sent to station NJC from NJA addressed to AUSTFORCE from BECA. The clear text originators number, A 345, by itself was unimportant. This shows that AUSTFORCE is in the JERUSALEM area, or that messages are routed to AUSTFORCE via JERUSALEM.
3. On the next day a message was sent to NJC from NJA addressed to LAMP from Spears Mission DAMASCUS. Originator's number was FF 354 and the text by itself was unimportant. This established that wireless station NJA is at DAMASCUS. The sender's number indicated that the Spears Mission are working with the Free French.

4. On 7 Aug a message was sent to NJC from NJA addressed to CSO MILPAL from ISAW. The originator's number was SIGS 42 in reply to X/24 and the text was "No".

b) Since all these messages were sent to NJC from NJA for delivery it becomes apparent that NJC is in JERUSALEM and NJA at DAMASCUS, that MILPAL and LAMP are located at JERUSALEM, and LAMP may be code name for MILPAL. ISAW is shown to be a Signals unit from the originator's number. BECA and the Spears Mission are evidently at DAMASCUS or in that area.

c) The approximate locations of other formations and units have been given away in the same manner.

For example:-

Messages transmitted from station NJA, compromised as at DAMASCUS, from Capt. MILES 13 Corps Sigs to Capt. MAITLAND 5 L of C Sigs indicate that the 13th Corps Signals are working in SYRIA.

A message transmitted by the JERUSALEM station NJC to NJA from 23 SGH (23 Scottish General Hospital) to O.C. 57 L.A.A. R.A. reporting diagnosis on a Gunner locates this Light Anti-Aircraft Regt in SYRIA.

Numerous further examples could be quoted.

d) Not merely are locations given away. Moves of H.Q's and units are also disclosed. For example, the Spears Mission which we located at DAMASCUS on 5 Aug, appears to have moved to BEIRUT by 18 Aug. This is shown by the following:-

On 17 Aug a cipher message was sent to a W/T station BLO from ADV. It was addressed in clear to FRANCON CAIRO from FRANCON BEIRUT. This indicated BLO as CAIRO, ADV as BEIRUT.

On 18 Aug cipher messages were sent to ADV from BLO addressed HARPOH and signed in clear, LAMPSON. It seems to be a reasonable deduction that HARPOH is a code name for SPEAR. LAMPSON is, of course, well known as the Ambassador in CAIRO. The signature of the message is, of course, an added confirmation to station BLO being in CAIRO, and would have compromised that location, if the message addressed FRANCON CAIRO had not already done so.

5. The above evidence of what can be achieved by a very small staff in the examination of one link of our W/T traffic, so far as Fixed Call Signs are concerned, will surely provoke caution. The Germans have a large and efficient interception service, supported by a great number of Intelligence Officers, interpreters and cryptographers. It may be taken as certain that they have resources capable of intercepting ALL traffic that passes on the air and of card indexing and analysing it thoroughly.

Our own security will benefit enormously if Signal Officers, Cipher Officers and writers of telegrams will always bear these facts in mind.

SECRET

T CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 74.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 2 Sep to 1200 hrs 3 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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ENLISTMENTS INTO THE FREE FRENCH FORCES.

A report from the Commission of Control dated 23 Aug 41 states that at that date 90 Officers and 3981 other ranks had "opted" to join the Free French. Of these figures 25% were coloured, 25% North African, 25% Foreign Legion, and 25% French. There are also 1046 ex PSM volunteers in PALESTINE, which brings the total of those who have joined the ranks of FREE FRANCE during and after the SYRIAN campaign to 5116.

PART 1.

- (a) OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT. Frontier area.
Period up to 29 Aug.

Traffic on HALFAYA PASS is reported to be still above normal. Enemy MT arriving on the HALFAYA PASS have been consistently sniped by our artillery. Blasting operations are still being carried out by the German troops.

During an air raid on 27 Aug damage was done to the SENUSSI Mosque at JARABUB.

TOBRUK area. On 28 Aug there was heavy enemy shelling on the Eastern perimeter. In addition, the harbour was shelled for three hours by enemy heavy artillery; only slight damage resulted. The normal activity is reckoned at 100 rounds daily. On the 28 Aug, 1000 rounds were fired, and on the 29 Aug, 700 rounds. (Summarized from GHQ Daily Intelligence Summaries up to 29 Aug).

- (b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

French Rifles in German hands. An extract from a captured copy of the GERMAN Army Orders and Gazette of 25 Apr 1941 is as follows -

It has been observed that the barrels on FRENCH rifles have had holes drilled in them. The holes are situated in front of the cartridge, and are hidden by the hand guard.

As a preventative measure, and a protection against accidents, the following orders are published :-

1. All captured FRENCH rifles and carbines, which are held by units, are to be inspected forthwith for holes by the armourer-sergeant or N.C.O.
2. Weapons on which holes are found are to be handed in to the competent Ordnance Depot.

It is the duty of Ordnance Depots to inspect all FRENCH weapons for holes before issuing them.

The inspection and rejection of weapons with holes is to be carried out urgently.

Gliding Bombs. The GERMANS are reported to be experimenting with a bomb of 5000 kgs., which, on account of its size, is fitted with glider wings and towed behind an aircraft. When the bomb is released, the glider wings fall off and the bomb

- 2 -

is armed by an electrical current which passes down the towing cable.
(From GHQ Technical Intelligence Summary No 36 dated 18 Aug 41.)

(c) Attached is Appx "B" is a report on SYRIAN RIVERS (From Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 84 dated 31 Aug 41).

GENERAL: Attached as Appx "A" is the first instalment of the diary of 2/Lieut SCHORM, captured in LIBYA.
(From GSI GHQ MEF Daily Intelligence Summary No 443 dated 6 Aug 41).

PART 11. - SECURITY.

Propaganda. Axis propaganda has, at intervals, made much of the flow of Jews into SYRIA which would "inevitably" follow a British occupation. Indispensable military works in the country have led to the presence there of a limited number of Jewish contractors and the like from PALESTINE. The employment, as a stopgap, of a few censorship personnel from PALESTINE led to a broadcast from BERLIN that the Syrian Post Office was "flooded with Jews". The danger of such propaganda amongst the Arab and Christian populations is obvious. It is suggested that whenever possible civil employees and contractors for work in SYRIA should be locally engaged. Whilst this may not always be possible for reasons of technical competence, any additional trouble involved will be a direct contribution to the security of the country. One Jew, knocked on the head in DAMASCUS, might well start a conflagration which would cause us endless trouble.

(Extract from GSI HQ BFP, T. 1. 1. Weekly Intelligence Review No 11).

W. H. H. H.

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION : As per Summary No 61.

APPENDIX "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.74.

TRANSLATION OF GERMAN DIARY (2/Lt. SCHORN)

CAPTURED IN LIBYA.

Instalment 1.

26 Feb. To-day we are really moving. At 16.00 hrs. the tanks are rolling along to WUNSDORF station. Loading on to the train takes two hours. At 20.00 hrs. we are off. The journey, via MUNICH, the BRENNER, FLORENCE and ROME to NAPLES is to take three days. (Then follow reflections on parting from friends and relations, and on the attitude of the troop.)

27 Feb. After breakfast we become lively again in our compartment. The sidings of LEIPZIG and NUREMBERG are not very attractive.

28 Feb. Have scarcely shaved when the train pulls into INNSBRUCK. With some excitement we look forward to the BRENNER. At 11.00 hrs. here we are in Italy. Poor, ragged people, but in DOPOLAVORO we get scrambled eggs cheap and a glass of Chianti too. In BOLZANO we ask: "What are the Italians saying?" Answer: "It's a good thing there are so many coming! It looks just like an occupation." We have "something" up our sleeves for the return journey.

1 March. The Italian landscape is probably barren and dismal - not a tree, a shrub or a blade of grass. At 12.00 hrs. exactly we reach AULIA. The Italian inhabitants gave us a magnificent welcome. The boys and girls of the 'Ballilla' are delightful. Young and old, they bring us cigarettes, wine, cake, chocolate, fruit and sweets. Even the country begins to look brighter, with factories dotted here and there. The leaning of PISA leans even more than one thought. At SPEZZA we have our first glimpse of the Mediterranean. Moving along the coast, we see the Italy we have imagined. In LIVORNO more scrambled eggs. Everywhere the people wave to us and cry "Heil Hitler!". At midnight we are aroused by a loud knocking at the door - it's the train conductor, and we have halted in ROME.

2 March. At 09.30 hrs. they wanted to unload us in CASERTA, but after we had been shunted backwards and forwards, they sent us on to NAPLES. On the station platforms a host of bright uniforms and everywhere small boys crying "Cigarette, Sir". At 13.30 hrs. we reach the suburban station of NAPLES. Shunting, shunting, unloading. Then with many 'Heil Hitlers' we march through the town to quarters in the Collegio Constanto Cianc. BUGH and I go off to the 'Albergo delle Terme'. (Then follows an account of the evening's tour of cafes.)

3 March. Visit to POMPEII and VESUVIUS.

/4 March

4 March. At 05.00 hrs. we leave our bed and climb into the tanks. There is an endless column going down to the harbour. Tanks, M.T. crowded together. Why doesn't Tommy come over? - Because he can do it more comfortably in TRIPOLI? The "MARBURG" takes on tank after tank, lorries, cars, tractors, heavy M/cycles and 500 Kg. bombs. The "REICHENFELS", "KYBFELS" and "ANKARA" likewise. Ours is the biggest - 7000 tons and a four-masted into the bargain, worse luck. The others are only 5-6000 tons two-masters. At 19.00 hrs. the gangway is raised. We cast off and drop anchor in the harbour.

5 March. 08.00 hrs. I make myself presentable and report to Col. OLBRIGHT. 09.30 hrs. The Squadron is given instructions, 10.00 hrs. there is a practice alarm. From 11.00 hrs. to 16.00 hrs. SCHORM sleeps. We were due to weigh anchor at 17.00 hrs. At last the tugs begin manoeuvring and at supper-time we leave port - the last boat. The weather has become very dirty. After half an hour we drop anchor. They say that in this sea the two destroyers could give us no protection. We drown our sorrows in chianti, and at 03.00 hrs. everyone staggers to bed.

6 March. I get up at 11.00 hrs. - magnificent weather. Meanwhile, the 1st Bn. has arrived and is embarking. Suddenly we realise with horror that their biggest transport, the "LEVERKUSEN" is on fire. I hope they save the tanks. At last at 16.30 hrs., escorted by three torpedo boats, we set sail. Besides the two 2 cm. A.A. at bow and stern all available M.Gs. are manned for A.A. defence. There is a Mk.II tank on the starboard side and another on the port side. Will the Tommies really not do all they can to prevent us landing in Africa? Tanks, turning the scale in North Africa?

7 March. At 09.00 hrs. am awakened by the sound of engines. M.E.110s and H.E.111s watch over us. At PANTELLARIA, which we pass to port, our destroyer escort increases to seven, with two auxiliary cruisers as well. At 16.30 hrs., just as we are playing a game of 'skast' with the M.O. and Lieut. ERHARDT, we are told that we have turned back. The British fleet is said to be looking for us. I expected this, of course, from my experiences in Norway. And there is this too: If 5th Div. gets to Africa, England loses the war! The British know this, too. How are we to get to Africa? The Italian navy has suffered very heavy losses. In the last convoy, when the British thought they would catch the tanks, a 10,000 ton cruiser was attacked and sunk outside TRIPOLI by six squadrons of British bombers and torpedo carriers At 19.30 hrs. everyone ordered to stay on deck. It was about 23.30 when it happened - A terrific crash. "That's a torpedo" says one. Bump!!! "That was another", shouts Captain PROFFEN. Everyone tries to get into his life-jacket. Faces are pale. "Quiet, order!" shouts someone. As we come out the starboard look-out tells me that we have had a slight crash with the "REICHENFELS". It appeared that the "REICHENFELS's" engines had failed, and in the darkness we had crashed side on. Unfortunately, besides the two starboard life-boats, we also had our degaussing hawser broken.

SYRIAN RIVERS.

NAHR BALIKH.

This river rises at TEL ABLAD and AIN ARUS (two miles SOUTH of TEL ABLAD), and flows roughly in a Southern direction for 55 miles, until it joins the EUPHRATES at RAQQA. It runs in a shallow valley, averaging anything from 800 yards to two miles in width, and bounded on both sides by slightly undulating gravelly desert, over which motor transport can travel at high speed. The Northern half of the BALIKH valley contains a considerable number of villages, mostly consisting of mud and stone huts built in the distinctive beehive shape peculiar to the ALEPPO district. The Southern half of the valley contains few, if any, villages, but in summer is dotted with Bedouin encampments. The Northern or village section is chiefly cultivated by the small fellah tribe of ALBU ASSAF. The Southern Section of the valley belongs to the LUHEID family, the sheikhs of the FEDAAH division of ANEIZA.

The BALIKH, if left to itself, would probably be a considerable stream some 20 yards wide. In practice, however, it is very much split up and used for irrigation. Frequently none of its water reaches RAQQA as it has all been used on the fields. The depth or width of any particular irrigation channel encountered in the BALIKH valley cannot be foreseen because it depends on the distribution of irrigation water at the time. It may be assumed that the BALIKH is impassable to motor transport from AIN ARUS to KHERBET AL RIZ, where there is a track crossing it, partly over fords and partly by a rickety bridge. This track is said to be normally passable to light cars, but it was not so early in August 1941, the water level having been raised by irrigation dams.

SOUTH of KHERBET AL RIZ, the BALIKH is probably impassable to motor transport as far as 20 kms NORTH of RAQQA. From this point Southwards, the stream may be entirely dry in summer, but probably would contain water in winter. The bed just above RAQQA is about five yards wide.

The BALIKH would present no serious obstacle to a considerable force with a minimum of bridging equipment, or even a certain amount of labour. In the case of reconnaissance parties, raids or light armoured forces, it might, however be a serious obstacle. It would similarly be an obstacle to motor transport if the crossing were disputed by the enemy.

SECRET

KAUST COMB INTLLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 75

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 3 Sep to 1200 hrs 4 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

SPECIAL NOTICE SYRIAN MILITARY HANDBOOK

A new handbook on SYRIA is in course of preparation. If it is to be really comprehensive, the maximum amount of topographical and other detail should be made available.

Will all those who have fresh material of possible use, send it through the normal channels to CSI Headquarters, British Forces PALESTINE, TRANSJORDAN and SYRIA. It is realised that in many cases such material is already being sent as it becomes available.

PART 1.

(a) RUSSIA. It is reliably reported that the ROUMANIAN General Staff estimate the casualties of the German and co-operating forces on the Russian front up to 31 Jul as follows :-

| | |
|------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <u>ROUMANIA</u> | 28,000 dead 92,000 wounded |
| <u>HUNGARIAN</u> | 12,000 dead 40,000 wounded |
| <u>GERMAN</u> | 250,000 dead 1,000,000 wounded |
| Total casualties | <u>1,422,000</u> |

GERMANY. Distribution of Forces. The number of German divisions engaged up to the present on the RUSSIAN front is believed to be 171. Of these, 18 are Armoured and 17 Motorised.

Recent reports suggest an increase in the strength of German forces in BULGARIA. Troops are reported to have come from ROUMANIA, and also from GERMANY. One source mentions the arrival of two Armoured divisions from the Russian front to re-fit. Pending confirmation, these reports should be treated with reserve. (From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 468 dated 31 Aug).

TURKEY. There is considerable evidence that certain of the Turkish Ministries are actively co-operating with the Germans in the development for winter use of the caravan route ERZURUM-PERSIAN frontier. The development is nominally being carried out by the well known transportation firm of SHENKERS, but in practice is being arranged by the German Embassy and special experts have been sent from GERMANY to arrange the actual development. The development includes the provision of thirty ten-ton German lorries and of snow ploughs and other equipment. At the end of the war the Turks are apparently to receive the lorries and equipment free of charge- hence their desire to co-operate. (ANKARA letter No 7 of 22/8).

- 2 -

IRAN. North Iran. Situation. On 31 Aug our troops at the AVEJ Pass, about 70 miles EAST of HALADAN. Contact was made with Soviet troops yesterday and SEMNA was occupied after the Russians had withdrawn to the NORTH of the town. The boundary between British and Soviet troops was conveyed to the Russian Liaison Officers and apparently accepted by them. The British area of control is bounded by the line AVEJ - SEMNA, both inclusive. The local inhabitants were everywhere friendly and the whole area is now quiet. (From Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 86 dated 2 Sep).

THE ISLANDS. Cretans in GREECE are not to be allowed to return to CRETE in view of the danger of increasing guerilla fighting there.

The Turkish General Staff estimates that there are 250,000 Italian troops in GREECE, of whom 7000 are in the ATHENS area. There is one Italian division in CRETE. The Italians are constructing five new aerodromes there. There has been no air activity over the ISLANDS for some days. Another report from the same source states that all Italian fighter aircraft have been withdrawn to ITALY from LEROS and the ground personnel attached to these fighter formations despatched to REODEN. 350 ground personnel are left there, in charge of 15 old reconnaissance aircraft and two heavy bombers. According to copies of orders issued in July by the GOC SAMOS, certain harbours there have been closed. Shipping movement is forbidden EAST of the longitude of FIGARI, and all vessels approaching and leaving the ISLAND ports must do so within a mile of the shore, having reached that limit. The waters between the Island and the Anatolian mainland are forbidden to all shipping by the GOC Island. (ANKARA letter No 7 dated 22 Jul 41).

BULGARIA. The Turkish General Staff report Italian troops NORTH of PLOVDIV and also a considerable movement of Italian troops from YUGOSLAVIA towards SALONIKA, but it is not known whether they are to relieve the remaining German Division in SALONIKA or for other purposes. They also report the collection of floats at SAMOS suitable for carrying equipment and horses. Italian officers have been seen reconnoitring the Lower MARITSA about SUFLI. (ANKARA letter No 7 dated 22 Jul 41).

GREECE. The Turkish General Staff estimate German troops in GREECE at one German Division in SALONIKA, one in CRETE, a large garrison in ATHENS and unidentified detachments in Greek THRACE. (ANKARA letter No 7 dated 22 Jul 41).

GENERAL. Att as Appx "A" is the second instalment of the diary of 2/Lieut SCHORN. (From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No. 444 dated 7 Aug 41).

(b) TOPOGRAPHICAL. SYRIAN MOUNTAINS.

JEBEL ABDUL AZIZ. This is a range of rough rocky mountains about 40 miles long, running EAST and WEST in the JEZIREH, WEST of HESICHA. The country NORTH, WEST and SOUTH of it is a flat gravelly plain over which motor transport can travel everywhere at high speed. The valleys of JEBEL ABDUL AZIZ, therefore, seem to be well suited for the concealment of raiders, who might dodge out and attack enemy motor transport crossing the open desert.

JEBEL SINJAR. SINJAR is a considerably higher range than ABDUL AZIZ. It is entirely in Iraq. The Southern slopes of JEBEL SINJAR are dotted with villages. The Northern face of the range is, however, very precipitous. There are four or five villages to the North of the mountains, in the plain at the foot of the cliffs. SINJAR is inhabited by a peculiar race called the YEZIDIS, who follow a secret religion. In this they may be compared to the DRUZES, although they are not so strong or numerous as the latter.

R would form a valuable "hide-up" for guerilla operations, in this respect the alliance of the YEZIDIS would be of value.

SINJAR is extended towards the WEST by a lower range called AL JARAIBA. At the junction of SINJAR and JARAIBA is a pass called THANIYYA ASH SHILLU, crossed by a track passable to motor transport, which runs Southwards from the IRAQ police post of BARA.

The JARAIBA ridge peters out to the plain near AL HOL, at a distance of some 25 miles E.S.E. of HASSETCHE. At AL HOL, however, a saline lake forms a further obstacle to motor transport and from it a narrow wadi with steep banks winds across the plain to the KHABUR, just SOUTH of HASSETCHE. On the EAST of the River opposite HASSETCHE, is a lava outcrop called AL KAUKAB, forming a further obstacle to motor transport.

These various physical obstacles do a great deal to narrow and impede the gap between the WEST end of JARAIBA ridge and the KHABUR at HASSETCHE. (Al Fariq Glubb's report).

PART 11. SECURITY.

Nil.

Al Fariq
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: As per summary No 61.

X "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.75.

SECTION OF GERMAN DIARY (2/Lt. SCHORN).

CAPTURED IN LIBYA

Instalment 2.

8 March. 09.00 hrs. I get up to find that we are lying at anchor in PALERMO harbour, Sicily. Among the boats in the harbour are two cruisers and some auxiliary cruisers.

9 March. We set out for the third time at 02.00 hrs. At 15.00 hrs. we again pass PANTELLARIA. Our escort is again four destroyers. Two cruisers and a destroyer are said to be ahead. In the evening our escort of planes leaves us. About midnight we pass the little Italian island of LAMPEDUSA lying to starboard.

10 March. Our course is now set towards MALTA. Everyone is on deck. 10.00 hrs. we catch sight of the African coast and at 12.30 hrs. we enter the harbour of TRIPOLI. We've done it! Fifteen miles away from us, it's true, an Italian merchant ship and two tankers were sunk by submarine. Behind the Colonel and Adjutant I leave the "HARBURG" at 13.00 hrs. at the head of half of 6 Coy. The scene in the docks is indescribably picturesque: General ROMMEL and German officers in field-grey, Air Force men in khaki trousers, breeches, shorts; Italians in every conceivable uniform.

As soon as we have disembarked we move off to our barracks "Five Kilometres on the Via Littoranea". At 19.00 hrs we are ordered to the "Uddian Hotel". General ROMMEL, G.O.C. German Africa Corps, explains the situation. At the hotel entrance I meet Lt.Col. KORBEL and Lieut Dr. BEYER; both belong to a A/Tk unit.

11 March. Put on tropical kit. Unload the rest from equipment in the docks.

12 March. We load up the tanks and lorries. Inspect the troop, fill up with petrol, charge the oil, and we're ready. 14.00 hrs move off to the town and take up position in parade. After the review at 17.00 hrs General ROMMEL and General GARIBOLDI Commander-in-Chief of troops in North Africa speak - the German commander with caution and tact, the Italian with emphasis. At 18.00 hrs the tanks rumble through the town along the Via Balbia (Littoranea) towards the east. All night long we are greeted by soldiers, settlers and natives. So we pass through TAGIURA, GASR GARABULLI, GASR CHIAR, LITTORIANO and HOES.

13 March. At 08.30 hrs we camp behind LEPTIS MAGNA. We fill up with petrol, check up on the tanks, and pitch tents quickly. At 16.00 hrs, just as we are thinking of bathing, a full-sized Ghibli forces us to take refuge in the tanks. We cover up the tanks quickly with blankets and tenting. When we set off again at 19.00 hrs the sand is still whirling about. On we go through barren desert, passing the oases of ZLITEN, MISURATA, and BER GIMI.

14 March. At 09.30 we halt near TAUORGA. We scrounge two basins of water from an Italian petrol lorry and can wash and shave, clean our teeth and wash stockings and handkerchiefs - five of us! At 15.25 hrs my tank 625 arrives. Just before MISURATA it had to change tracks. The crew are busy on it till 17.00 hrs. But at 18.00 hrs we're on our way again through EL HESSIA.

Unfortunately there was an accident in the twilight - 624 knocked out a heavy M/cycle, gunner HUBNER losing three toes. There are two killed in 5 Coy. Italian lorries which do not dim their lights and approach on the right hand side are gently pushed aside by us.

/15 March.....

- 15 March. At 04.00 hrs we halt for a rest at EL CHET fill up with petrol, then we heat up some coffee. A hellish cold. Not till 07.00 hrs can we get an account of the accident I switch round Cpls PE KACK and SAMI, At 21.00 hrs we are off again - IMED HASSA, BU DJARADA, BIR BU RETMA. About 01.00 hrs, in the middle of an air raid warning, we have to adjust the right-hand steering brake.
- 16 March. We arrive at 08.00 hrs. at the camp at SIRTE, an hour after the Squadron.
- 17 March. Slept well, even though rather cold. Put our vehicles and other things in order. 16.00 hrs. the column moves off on a 140 km stage of the journey. SIRTE is full of troops. There are a number of M.E.110s parked in the aerodrome. Then the grim and barren desert again. But at 18.30 hrs the scene improves as we near the sea again. Yesterday the British attacked the A/Tk Bn ahead of us. Unfortunately there were wounded and dead. By night we pass through EL SULTAN, BIR EN NAIM, EL ASELA, all strongly held.
- 18 March. At last we halt at 04.30 hrs near NOFILIA. After the usual tasks we all disappear inside the wig-wams. In the afternoon we learn what the situation is. Against us are:- One English arm'd. Div., one French motorised brigade, one Australian Corps of three divisions and one Indian division. The enemy has 400 tanks and 4 artillery regts. with about 100 8-12 cm. guns. The last is the most unpleasant part.
- At 22.00 hrs we set out on the last stage. MARSA EL AUEGIA, SIDI BHARI BEN GAUAD, B-er REEM, MARSA EL IHUDIA, BEN AMOR, MATRATIN, and finally the Arch of FILENE. Here there are already clear signs of war. At 08.00 hrs we reach our position, from which we are to cover to the South. And already there's the first enemy reconnaissance plane. The German A.A. promptly brings him down. And now the three stages of our journey are completed - railway, sea, road - and here we are 50 km. from the British.
- 19 March. 06.00 hrs we pitch camp. Rumour has it that we are to be here three weeks. But I can be certain that no sooner have we got the tent-poles fixed in this stony ground than the order to move will come. - It's extremely annoying. Tank 623 had had to remain behind with a defective fan-spindle. Over-heated. Did Cpl Sube forget to grease? Irritating, because it will take several days to put it right. In my own tank, 621, the steering brakes are always giving trouble. But still, there's fun to compensate. Good hunting - to-day over a hundred head, scorpions and vipers.
- 20 March. The English plane was not on recon. It had come from England and made an intermediate landing in France or Tunisia. The 6 English sergeants had French money on them.
- 21 March. 06.00 hrs while it is still dark, I go the rounds of the posts. Another heavy sandstorm.
- 22 March. Fortunately the 2nd echelon arrives. We get some replacements from the tropical chest. Every day more tanks arrive from the Repair Section. But my tank is no better.
- 23 March. 11.30 hrs new situation. The Squadron is to take EL AGHEILA. Fine! 15.00 hrs my tank returns from the workshop section: bolt of steering brake broken. Non starter. Of course, just as I thought. In consequence I have to transfer to 625 and at 15.30 hrs move off with three tanks. After 30 km. we pass behind EL MUGTAA, at 18.00 hrs we reach EL HAG'HATEIHA. Paint has only just arrived, so overnight our tanks put on their yellow tropical uniform.

24 March.....

07.30 hrs we are in battle order. But the morning passes without action. Other formations had surrounded EL AGHEILA on all four side. Not an Englishman inside. Strangely enough, they let three lorries of Englishmen pass in and out again. Not a shot. On the other hand, the leading tank of 5 Company runs on to a mine. Driver and wireless operator dead, the gunner and commander, Lt. KESTNER, severely wounded. The place where the mines lay on the road was clearly recognisable by yellow diagonal stripes. Engineers were elsewhere. The swastika flag flies over the citadel. Other units go forward to occupy the town. I send tank 624 back to the workshop - cardan shaft twisted. And "now there were only two". An armoured car from the Recce Bn. runs on to another mine south of EL AGHEILA - total loss. These mines, German, Italian, and British are going to give us a lot of trouble all the way to CAIRO.

25 March. 621 is back again.

26 March. I transfer back to my 621. In the afternoon a visit from Major. HOHMANN. 623 reports back. Shortly after 22.00 hrs 624 arrives. 2nd Troop at full strength!

27 March. Letter writing. I spend the evening with Sgt. KUBELBECK.

End of Instalment 2.

SECRET.

1 CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 76

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 4 Sep to 1200 hrs 5 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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The following figures of Vichy casualties were obtained from Vichy Records - Total Losses - 8 Jun - 15 Jul 1941.

| | Killed | Wounded (1) | Prisoners | Missing (2) | Total |
|----------|--------|-------------|-----------|-------------|-------|
| Officers | 32 | 69 | 99 | 22 | 222 |
| NCOs | 125 | 246 | 356 | 226 | 953 |
| Men | 364 | 1475 | 2549 | 789 | 5177 |
| | 521 | 1790 | 3004 | 1037 | 6352 |

Note (1) Including natives. (2) These figures certainly include prisoners who went over to deGAULLE and who were not as a consequence reported by the British as prisoners. These figures may be taken as accurate.

PART I.

(a) OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN DESERT. The following are GHQ ME estimates of enemy strength in the TOBRUK area:-

| | | | | | |
|-----------|----------|-------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|
| GERMAN - | 6604 Tps | 48 Fd guns | 45 A Tk guns | 50 Lt AA | 4 Hy AA |
| ITALIAN - | | | | | |
| (PAVIA) | 6957 | do 24 do | 16 | 8 do | - |
| (BOLOGNA) | 7677 | do 44 do | 24 do | 12 do | - |
| (BRESCIA) | 6287 | do 24 do | 14 do | 8 do | - |
| Corps and | | | | | |
| Army Tps | 5355 | do 84 do | - | 39 do | 24 do |
| TOTAL | :32880 | 224 Fd guns | 99 A-Tk Guns | 117 Lt AA | 28 Hy-AA. |

It will be noted that no tanks or armoured cars are shown, but these have not been identified in the area recently.

They are thought to be lying up between TOBRUCH and the Frontier, possibly in the GAMBUT or MARSALA LUCCH area.

(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 464 dated 27 Aug.)

BULGARIA

Distribution of Forces. Recent reports of the arrival of considerable German forces in BULGARIA appear to be somewhat exaggerated. War office estimate a maximum of two German divisions in BULGARIA and Greek THRACE - possible one division each in areas SOFIA and VARNA-BURGAS; and NO Italian forces in this region. There is NO confirmation of the presence of German Armoured Divisions in BULGARIA.

ROUMANIA. General. It is reported that the train ferry service across the DANUBE at GIURGIU has been inaugurated, but is working only irregularly. Large numbers of German wounded are being sent via GIURGIU up the DANUBE to GERMANY.

AEGEAN ISLANDS. General. It is reported that on 10 August considerable orders for timber were placed in SAMOS for use in RHODES for building rafts and pontoons.
(Three preceding paras from GHQ Daily Int Summary No 470 dated 2 Sep.)

GREECE. The following report has been received of
ogation of a GREEK officer who arrived at LATAKIA fr 26 Aug.

Athens:- A fair number of British Troops who were left behind in Greece, are still at large in the town. They have been taken in by Greek families and are being cared for. They have discarded their uniforms and on occasions roam about the town. The Greek police even if they do see turn a blind eye, and leave them alone.

Morale: The morale of Italian troops stationed in GREECE is poor. They do not get on at all well with the Germans and think only of going back to ITALY as soon as possible. The general impression among them is that we intend to retake GREECE in the near future. GREEK families are asked by Italian soldiers if and when the British land in GREECE whether they will give them sanctuary in the same way that they are doing to British troops. Photographs of wives and sweethearts are produced to support their claim. They say they did not wish to fight the Greeks and that all they were interested in was getting back to their own country at the first opportunity.

Samos. A convoy of 7 ships arrived about the 6 Jul 41 and disembarked 400 motor vehicles and 1000 mules. The Greek peasantry is causing considerable inconvenience to the Italian authorities by burning forests. They are all agreed that should they be asked to hand over their crops to the Italians they will destroy them. Food is very scarce for everybody. Italian troops are rationed to 300 grammes of bread a head per day. A translation of an order published in the newspaper L'ECO d'ITALIA by General Carlo MELOTTI reads as follows:-

"Several acts of sabotage have been done to Military property i.e. cutting of Military telephone wires on the island. Although the necessary steps have been taken to trace the persons concerned the result is negative. I am therefore now obliged to take adequate precautions to safeguard military property. To start with, I order that every act of sabotage committed by unknown individuals, to military installations of any kind be punished by fine varying from 15 to 50 thousand Drachmas to be levied on the local authorities of the district concerned, and further that the distribution of flour to the population be suspended."

Atrocity stories:- The officer mentioned the following incident which took place in July in ATHENS, in the Square which he describes as the Place de La Concorde, in front of the memorial to the Unknown Soldier. A loaf of bread fell off a German ration truck as it was on its way through the square. A child rushed in to the road to pick it up and was shot dead by a German soldier who happened to be nearby.

Several rounds were fired by German machine gunners into a crowd in a street in Athens because they were cheering the passage of British prisoners of war.

Anyone caught saying "Long live the Allies" is liable to 5 years penal servitude.

GENERAL Attached as Appendix "A" is the third instalment of the diary of 2/Lieut SCHORM. (From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 445 dated 8 Aug).

TOPOGRAPHICAL: Following infm has been obtained from I.P.C. officials who have had several years experience in the area:-

WINTER CONDITION OF ROAD HOMS-PALMYRA.

- (a) There are very few streams flowing across the road and these only immediately after rains.
- (b) The main trouble occurs in the form of patches of boggy ground, apparently no different in aspect than the firm ground. Light P.U.s. are frequently caught in such patches sinking right down to their axles and for army traffic the road is certainly inadvisable for regular use.

3.

oute through the hills to the North which is
of the I.P.C. personnel and is often used

track along the HAIFA pipe line is similarly affected
and the I.P.C. officials consider that these conditions
will apply to a large proportion of the SYRIAN desert.

BRIGENDUM. In 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No 72 dated
1 Sep the average rainfall during the rainy months at ALEPPO is
given as "about 23 inches". This is an extract from Force Int-
elligence Summary No 82 and conflicts with Syrian departmental
records over a period of ten years during which the mean annual
recorded rainfall was 17 inches.

PART II - SECURITY

General

(i) RAQQA. A serious tribal battle is reported to have
taken place in the RAQQA district. On the 29 Aug 1941 trouble
broke out between the ANEIZA and the WULDA. In the battle which
followed, one hundred casualties are said to have occurred.

(ii) DAMASCUS. It is reported that there was a certain
amount of stone throwing and that a few home made bombs were
used in DAMASCUS on the evening 30 Aug. The reason for this
demonstration was a protest against the price of bread.

The position on 31 Aug was considerably easier. After a
meeting at the Municipality on the 31 Aug, the Shopkeepers agreed
to keep their shops open for another three days.
(Extract from Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 86 dated
2 Sep.

(iii). BEIRUT. A further convoy of Vichy troops sailed on
4 Sep 41 without incident.

Wabrus

Lt-col
CS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION : As per Summary No 61.

" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.76.

ION OF GERMAN DIARY (2/Lt. SCHORM).

CAPTURED IN LIEYA.

Instalment 3.

March. I exchange W/T Corporal MULLER for gunner LOHRER, a S.S. man who is serving 60 days close arrest. I also have the nice task of trying three men. And now I hope we have gone through the whole gamut in 2 Troop - accidents, vehicle casualties, crime (Unfall, Ausfall, Sunderfall).

29 March. Washing day. I read something to the troops about the Austrian rebels, then sing with them, as for ten years I sang with my S.A. men.

30 March. Sunday and a new situation. Two groups are to advance on MARSA EL BREGA, one along the VIA BALBIA, one along the track to the south of the road, almost parallel. At 16.00 hrs, we advance as far as EL AGHEILA. Having reconnoitred the track with Capt SCHUTZE (tank 605) we crawl into our wig-wam at 22.00 hrs.

31 March. 04.00 hrs. Reveille, 05.30 we move off: 2nd M.T.W. Engineers, Light Tank Troop, 8.8 cm A.A., Medium Tank Troop, half-company of A/Tk guns, Mechanical echelon, W/T lorries, etc. Suddenly, 20 metres above us there is the roar of an English fighter. A single one. Didn't fire a shot, and by the time we recognise the markings he is already away. - The enemy reported here have vanished. There's not enough petrol for us to go round the salt lakes. Cross-country driving impossible. Already some of the tanks are stuck. At last, with tremendous effort, we reach the VIA BALBIA. Here there is great activity. In the Salt-lake defile outside MARSA EL BREGA the enemy's resistance has put a halt to our venture. With both troops I proceed to give cover to Div. H.Q. and report to Major RAU. Then I go forward on a M/cycle, recce. the ground, MARSA EL BREGA, and then away across the nearest dip to the Coy Commander, all the time in full view of the enemy and in his field of fire. The Coy Commander with his tanks is in front of the hills immediately outside the town. In the morning we had already suffered loss through our own M.E.110s: 20 of them had unloaded part of their freight over our own armoured troops. As if that was not enough, they had then made a low-level A.G. attack. The squadron could not adopt its normal formation - there were minefields across the road. Two Km. from the town - six houses - tank ditches and mine fields as far as the coast, defensive fire from A/Tk guns, A/Tk rifles, tanks and one troop (artillery). Several tanks were hit, but only damaged. While we are talking the artillery duel resumed. I decide to ask Major RAU for permission to rejoin the squadron. Twelve British Blenheims come over and drop their bombs from 6000 ft., but they miss our artillery troop. I get back, but Major RAU refuses me permission. Meanwhile M2, working along the coast, has succeeded in taking BREGA. Again the British artillery blazes away. I throw myself down flat - not very comfortable, but nothing to worry about. Shells burst on every side fifty yards away. Troop withdraws into cover. We can't manage it yet: So I move back. We take up positions covering the south-east. Fill up with petrol, then sleep.

1 April. The Tommies have made April Fools of us. Under cover of the night they have withdrawn unobserved. Our advance tanks are now 6 km beyond BREGA. I visit the Squadron Commander. We share the booty: 1 officer's mess trolley - and so for the first time we have corned beef for breakfast and RAF cigarettes. Two 18-ton tractors haul a tank back to its base. A little way off prisoners are being interrogated - a few Tommies from a shot-up tank and some Free French. Losses in M2 were considerable. Everywhere abandoned lorries. At 19.00 hrs I go forward and rejoin the Squadron. Just as we move off a M.T. echelon arrives. Of course they want to park on the lovely flat ground - bad luck, in a moment eight lorries sink up to the axles. Then the interminable business with tractors.

2 April. 07.15 hrs alarm. 07.30 hrs move off beyond EL BREGA we halt. New situation: 5 Squadron VIA BALEIA against AGEDABIA, 6 Squadron, 8 Squadron, E. Regt H.Q. to the east in to the desert, then turn north to AGEDABIA. Enemy tanks reported near ALLAH ED DIB, 624 just ready, after change-over of tracks 621 not ready, of course. So I transfer to 625. 621's electrical firing apparatus not working. We move off, turn left after a few Km and take up position. 621 arrives and I transfer back. At 12.00 hrs we are off. The Gyro compass points north and we move along the road. Course corrected to one-thirty. We turn off to the right into the desert. Squad H.Q. is leading, 1 Troop on the right, consisting of three tanks, 2 Troop on the left of four tanks, 4 Troop with five tanks is recceing ahead. Following the Squad is H.Q. 2 Bn. and Regt H.Q. 2 Troop moves in file, then in arrow-head behind H.Q. 2 Bn protecting the open flank. Direction of attack - two o'clock. We go crashing through the sand - the dust cloud must be visible for miles. Then I move up in line with the Squad Commander, 1 Troop covers my flank. Over the dunes we go, 15-20 km an hour. 18.00 hrs 623 falls out with engine trouble. 18.15 hrs on high ground, about 1000 metres away, I see vehicles. Halt for observation. No doubt about it, they are tanks. British or Italian? Squad Commander wireless! Presumably enemy tanks. Commanders and Gunners 1 and 2 are naturally standing or sitting 'on deck'. Swish! That one fell ten yards from the left-hand track. Everyone disappears inside the tank; the hatches are slammed. Straight ahead eleven o'clock H.E. 1000 metres. Tanks! Fire! Bang! a dud. And over my round turret-opening the tracer shells whizz by. Driver, overtake! Left steering brake! In front, behind, to right and left the shells burst. "H.E., 800 metres! same tank!" Bang - too short. But my other tanks have got the direction from the impact. Soon the enemy's on fire. Now for the next. Stoppage. Hatch open, breech open, out with the shell. "Change position, right, ahead! A.P. shell, turret 1.30 hrs! 800 metres! Tank moving on right!" "Sighted!" Carrying Commander's pennant. "Fire!" Bang - a hit? Already three opponents burning - "Stoppage! Breech won't open!" Wireless message: 2 Troop. Attack tanks on high ground! Roll up flanks! And the gun won't open! It must, must! Driver, one o'clock. to the high ground! - 625 is for the moment out of the battle - brakes overheated. I reach the height with three tanks, pass the burning British tanks and look for some more. Crash! That came from the left. Heavens! 2 Troop is firing on us. Driver, 11 o'clock! On fast. British crews who have left their tanks come forward with their hands up. Six British tanks are burning. "Stoppage removed!" Well; thank God for that! "A.P. shell, load!" Wireless command: "Squadron, halt!" But I go forward 500 yards on the sand in order to have a field of observation and fire: There's no enemy to be seen. Out we get. "Elevate Gun". 622 has two hits on track through the right head-lamp and chain-cover. Not a scratch on mine. How well we carried out the change of position. Squadron, left wheel, forward!" We make contact again. Meanwhile, 2nd Bn had dashed past my Troop. Rejoin the squadron, and here comes 626, which joined the Squadron Commander when it got moving again. We have to increase speed, as it's getting dark. As the sun goes down, we really do look like the "Wild Huntsmen" roaming along at 35km an hour towards AGEDABIA. It's an incomparable experience. The enemy is smashed, who will oppose us now?! White Very Light signal. "German's approaching". And the answer tells us that AGEDABIA is taken. We move to the south of the town to take up a covering position. The Squadron Commander greets me in an almost shocked voice. "What, still alive?! We lost a lot of tanks. Only one troop at full strength, apart from 623 which fell out before the action. Of eighteen tanks only seven are here. With the exception of myself all the troop commanders are missing. We shall have to wait till morning. Fickets are posted. And then, with the satisfaction of having gone through my baptism in tank fighting without the loss of a man or tank, I fall asleep.

SECRET.

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 77

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 5 Sep to 1200 hrs 6 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (c) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART 1

(a) GREECE. It is estimated that through traffic in the CORINTH CANAL is unlikely before the end of September.

GERMANY. The total of German divisions in FRANCE remains unchanged at 26, but the effective field force is unlikely to exceed 10 - 15 divisions. The Germans are reported to be improving communications and establishing dumps near the Franco-Spanish frontier. (From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 471 dated 3 Sep).

RUSSIA. - The following information has been obtained from a reliable source; the source having left RUSSIA about mid-August. Morale. After ten weeks of continuous fighting the Russian morale seems higher than in the beginning. The Russian soldier is inspired by a fanatical belief in STALIN and is prepared to sacrifice himself with absolutely Oriental fatalism, this tendency has completely surprised the Germans and consequently the detachments which the Russians left behind inflicted heavy casualties.

Strategy. The Russians had expected an attack by Germany and consequently a plan of defense, in depth, was evolved. Russian heavy industries had been established back in the URAL mountains around SVERDLOUSK and TCHELINABINSK. The main motor and tank works being established at KAZAN (Some 450 miles ENE of MOSCOW). The impression was gained that even if Leningrad and MOSCOW fell, Russian resistance was likely to continue, nothing short of a political revolution inside RUSSIA would terminate Russian resistance, and no inklings of this were anywhere seen.

Russian Air Force and AA Defences. The source was in MOSCOW from the first German air-raid onwards. The AA defence and Balloon barrage being most effective. The PAD and general discipline of the civilian population was excellent. Few German planes had penetrated the city's defences. The number brought down when attempting to bomb MOSCOW was really large. German planes generally seemed to try to avoid combat.

Russian Communiques. Asked point-blank whether he believed Russian communiques and their claims concerning German air losses and German land casualties, he stated, categorically, that he did. He mentioned that the Russian communiques during the RUSSO-FINNISH war had been untruthful, that the Russian people's reaction when they discovered the truth had been so disastrous that the Government were determined, as a matter of policy, to give the truth in their communiques during this war. He also based his opinion that the Russian communiques were truthful on the specific communiques issued after the air raids on MOSCOW, when he had taken the trouble to verify the Russian claims of German aircraft brought down in these raids, and found that the Russian communiques erred, if anything, on the conservative side.

Generally speaking the Russians have withdrawn according to plan except in the UKRAINE where it was not in the Russian plan to have given ground in this area to the extent to which they have been forced - they were prepared to retire to the DNIEPER line if necessary. It is considered that even if the UKRAINE were over-run as far as the DON, the CRIMEA could hold out, provided TURKEY did not lease any of her BLACK SEA naval ports to GERMANY.

The only danger he saw of Russian collapse was as the German propaganda, which he described as extremely clever. Russian soldiers were being urged not to fight against Nazis, which was represented as opposed to English capitalists and Jews who were endeavouring to get every nation in the world to fight their battles for them without risking their own necks. He suggested that even a small British force (i.e. NOT Indian, Canadian, Australian or New Zealand) sent to RUSSIA to fight alongside the Russians would be of inestimable value in combating this propaganda. FRANCE. It is considered certain that stores and food are sent to LIBYA via MARSEILLES and TUNISIA. (This is confirmed by an independent statement by a Vichy French Naval Officer on a Vichy transport.)

GENERAL. Attached as Appendix "A" is the fourth instalment of the diary of 2/Lt. SCHORL. (From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No. 446 dated 9 Aug.)

TOPOGRAPHICAL. Attached as Appendix "B" is a list of variations in spelling of TURKISH Place Names.

PART 11: SECURITY.

British Security Mission.

An office of the BSM is being opened in the former Italian consulate ALEPPO, under Capt T.B.D. MACADEM-SHERWIN.

French Civilians. The Surete Generale, ALEPPO, are preparing a list of French civilians opting to remain in SYRIA. These are divided into three classes :-

Free French
Vichy French
Neutral.

Every effort is being made to repatriate the Vichy French. Frontier Control Posts. The following control posts have been established on the Frontier:

| | |
|----------------|-----------|
| MEYDAN EKBE | 239542 |
| IDLIB | 235443 |
| HARIM | 225473 |
| BAB EL HADHA | (315491)? |
| DJISR CHAIBOUR | 207429 |
| AKHTERINE | 299507 |
| DJERABLOUS | 357543 |

Train Control. F.S. personnel engaged on train and frontier control report the following :-

- Many travellers are carrying miniature photographic copies of identity cards, claiming to have lost originals at home. These copies are difficult to decipher and make it possible for the original to be used by another person.
- The identity cards of Moslem women bear neither a photograph nor description of holder.

Unstamped and Uncensored Mail. Snap controls by FS NCOs between BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS and ALEPPO have revealed that unstamped and uncensored mail is still circulating freely.

GENERAL. Among some packing case material left by the Vichy French at a Greek school in TRIPOLI, neatly hollowed out board has been found. It is believed that by this means documents and small articles of value have been taken out of the country. A thorough search of the building failed to reveal any other items of interest.

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No 61.

Lt-col
GS 1 Aust Corps

FILE "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.77.

TRANSLATION OF GERMAN DIARY (2/Lt. SCHORM).

CAPTURED IN LIBYA

Instalment 4.

3 April. The morning brings fresh puzzles, but little definite information. About midday, my 623 is towed in. The crew had already arrived last night with the Mechanised Section. The engine of the tank had jammed. The Commander of the Repair section could do nothing. Thereupon, Cpl KEBEL unloaded all the most important equipment and locked the tank. It'll have to go back to the workshop for a new engine. Au revoir! Hello, five Bristol Blenheim Bombers! Right! They're wheeling and making for 2 Troop! In or under the tanks! Boom... boo-com, fifteen of them, but fifty-hundred metres off the target. Despite the fact that there are three dead and more than a dozen wounded in the Supply Echelon of 1 Squadron. During the afternoon BOGH and FRANK drop in. FRANK, who was right up in front (641) was hit right at the beginning, then had a second hit. Two further hits halted the tank completely. BOGH's experience was even worse, although he was lying further back and had a Mk III tank. The first hit set the engine on fire. Hardly had the crew got out when the hand grenades began flying, a side-hatch was torn off and all the ammunition went up. 623, however, got it worst of all. The first hit from the English 4 cm. tank gun ripped through the superstructure, wounding gunner and wireless operator, then passed through the tank into the petrol tank. There was a jet of flame, and then the whole tank was ablaze. All the crew luckily managed to tear open the hatches and jump out. Simultaneously more shells burst upon the tank. The other men are only scratched, but everything in and on the tank is a complete loss. So against six British tanks destroyed, we have two of our own destroyed, one Mk II out of action for a long time and several others temporarily. Seven British dead, eleven prisoners while we have two dead and several wounded. The victory was costly enough. It's true we had superiority in numbers, but that was offset by our deep formation. Tactically the enemy had all the advantage. For all practical purposes only 6 Squadron was in action. Repair work goes on through the afternoon. At 14.00 hrs I am able to report to the Squadron that I have 4 tanks ready for service.

4 April. Sleep till 03.30 hrs. Am called to the Squadron Commander. "Own troops in front of BENHASI. Take petrol tins on board. Move at 05.45 hrs." Gently, gently, a little more sleep first. 04.00 hrs fill up with petrol. 05.30 hrs ready to move off, 05.45 we move off. After 30 km. we take up a covering position to the east. Scattered Arab camps. Rogues, the Bedouins. They have robbed wounded British soldiers, down to their very shirts, and left them lying helpless in the cold. I am sure they would do the same to us, too. At the road-side masses of Italian lorries abandoned by the latter in their flight. 622 falls out with a defective locking pin. The rocker-arm will have to be changed right away....Punctually at 12.00 hrs Bristol Blenheims pass us well to the flank. At the camp at ZURTINA we learn that BENHASI is already in our hands. 20.00 hrs, the sergeant-major returns with 622. The troop is complete. We celebrate the day with real coffee.

5 April. 07.00 hrs we're out of bed. Great inspection activity - cleaning of filters, oil-change, greasing of tanks, weapon-cleaning. We are to advance to MECHILI, where there's supposed to be a British Division. Where is MECHILI? Somewhere in the middle of Cyrenaica. Poor tanks! At 14.30 hrs we move off, on our third trip into the desert. Half-way there the leading tank of my troop, 624, drops out - piston jammed. In the evening we reach the important post ANTELAT.

6 April. 02.15 hrs we are awakened. 03.00 hrs we move off. After an hour we give up. Even by day, with the sand whipped up by the tanks and wind, it's wretched enough, by night it's impossible. Every vehicle loses its way. When we reach the VIA BALBIA again - who will? - our tanks, or at least the engines, will be ruined. According to instructions, the engines must be changed at 2000 Kms. Their life is given by the firm at 2500 kms. They had already done 500 kms. in Germany. We have come 1000 Km along the VIA BALBIA. By the time we reach DERNA every tank will easily have exceeded the limit of 2000 km. 600 km will have been accomplished across the desert, in desert dust and desert heat, and that counts more than treble! However, on the wireless we hear of our advance into Yugoslavia. We hear that General WAVELL is there with troops from North Africa. Ergo, says General ROMMEL, to work! I suppose WAVELL is counting on the release of British troops from Abyssinia, and the Admiralty has, as usual, I expect, been prolific in assurances: the Germans, then, cannot appear before the middle of May. But they are already there - a British Division! - Suddenly, from the east, three planes dive on us, drop their bombs fifty yards away, then let loose at us with their cannon. Then they fly over again, this time without firing a shot. I'll eat my hat if they are not Messerschmitts who've finally made up their minds that we are really German tanks.

As it's Sunday, there's naturally fresh trouble! From ZUETINA to here 621 has consumed 18 litres of oil, 18 times its normal consumption. The engine's running irregularly, too. Farewell! With my toothbrush and pistol I climb into 625. While we are resting at midday, 622 reports engine trouble and has to drop out. Now I have only one tank left in running order. Before we reach SUS, where we encamp, we lose our way again.

7 April. Up at 05.00 hrs, move off at 06.00 hrs. Speed, speed, The British Division is said to have no petrol.... The squadron still has two heavy and two light tanks. An attack by British planes: three killed and several wounded in the M.T. echelon. There are endless columns moving along, at our side and in our tracks. Reminds me of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps. We have covered 110km and camp 80km north-east of M. F. Fifteen tins of corned beef supplement our rations. The field-kitchen has long since dropped out, and we are living on iron rations. Everywhere there are lorries abandoned by the British in their flight. My cooling fan is protesting; but we must get on to MECHILI. We work till 02.00 hrs.

APPENDIX "B" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 72.
(Extract GSI GHQ Sum No 470)

TURKISH PLACE NAMES (SYRIAN Frontier Area)

A good deal of confusion prevails over the name to be used for Turkish places and the spelling to be adopted. The synoptic list below gives the main variants which are found on current maps for the Turco-Syrian frontier region. The correct spelling is that in the first column for places in TURKEY.

| Turkish Official Name | Name on Unrevised British Maps | French Maps | Old or Other Names. |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| ADANA | - | ADANA, SEYKHANE | SEYHAN |
| AKCEKALE | AKCHE KALA | TELL ABIAD | - |
| ANTAKYA | ANTIOCH | ANTIOCHE | - |
| BASKALE | BASHKALA | BACHKALE | - |
| BEYTUSSEBAP | EIK | BEYTOUCHCHEBAP | EIKI |
| B IRECIK | BIREDJIK | BIREDJIK | - |
| BULANIK | BAGHCHE | BOULANEUK | BAHCE |
| CARABLUS | DJERABLOUS | JERABLOUSS | BARAK |
| CEYHAN (Town) | YARSUAT | DJEIKHANE | HAMIDIYE |
| CEYHAN (River) | DJAHUM, JIHAN | DJEYKHANE | - |
| CIZRE | JAZIRAT IBN OMAR | DJIZRE | - |
| COLEMERIK | JULAMERK | TCHÉULEMERIK | HAKARI |
| DICLE (River) | TIGRIS | DJIDJIE | - |
| DIYARBAKIR | DIARBEKR | DIARBEKIR | - |
| ELAZIZ | KHARPUT | - | ELAZIG |
| ERGANTOSMANIYE | ARHANA | - | - |
| FEVZI PASA | FEVZI PASHA | FAOUZI PACHA | - |
| GAZIANTEP | GAZIANTEP | GAZIANTEP | AYNTAB |
| HARAN | GAZI AYNTAB | - | - |
| ISLANIYE | ISLANIYA | KHARANE | - |
| ISKANDERON | ALEXANDRETTE | ISLAKHIYE | - |
| KILIS | KILLIS | ALEXANDRETTE | - |
| MALATIA | MALATIA | KIKISS | AZBUZI |
| MARAS | MARASH | MARACH | - |
| MERSIN | MERSINA | ITCHEL, MERSINE | ICEL |
| MEYDANIEKBES | MEIDAN EKBES | MEIDANE EKBES | - |
| MSUS | HISSIS | MISSISS | - |
| NIZIP | NIZIB | NEUZEUP | - |
| NUSAYBIN | NISIBIN | NESSIBINE | - |
| OSMANIYE | OSMANIA | - | GEBELIBEREKET |
| RESULAYN | RAS EL AIN | RASELAIN | - |
| SEYHAN (River) | SEIHUN | SEYKHANE | - |
| SIIRT | SAIRT | - | - |
| SIVEREK | SEVEREK | - | - |
| SURUC | SERUDJ | SURUTCH | - |
| SUVEDIYE | SUEDIA, SUWEIDIYA | SQUEIDIYE | - |
| URFA | - | URFA | - |
| VIRANSEHIR | VERANSEHIR | VIRANCHEKHIR | - |
| YUSEKOVA | DIZI CAWARS | - | GEVAR |

40212

SECRET

1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 78

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 6 Sep to 1200 hrs 7 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I.

(a) Information from other fronts.

AIR. Our activity.

Night 2/3 September. A convoy of 7 destroyers and 5 merchant vessels averaging between 8000 and 13000 tons, having been sighted South of Cape SPARTIVENTO, a striking force of Swordfish aircraft was despatched for offensive operations. One ship of 8000 or 9000 tons, another ship of 9000 tons, and two further vessels were hit. An explosion on the 9000 ton ship sent a column of smoke 9000 feet into the air. The attack achieved complete surprise and caused great confusion amongst the enemy destroyers, which opened fire on their own ships and avoided collision only with the greatest difficulty.

3 September. A formation of about 15 enemy aircraft, which were engaged in low-flying attacks in the neighbourhood of SIDI BARRANI, were intercepted by our aircraft. 5 Italian fighters were destroyed.

PERSIA. Operations. 2 September. Bands of armed Persian soldiers under rebel officers are still at large. Action by our troops against them has so far resulted in the collection of fifty rifles.

(From GHQ MEF Int Summary No 472, dated 3 Sep.)

(b) Technical Information.

Armour Piercing Tests. The WAR OFFICE has decided that in all future reports of penetration tests against armour plate, the following definitions will apply:

"HOLED" signifies: "Projectile passed completely through armour."

"DENTED" signifies: "Projectile entered but did not pass through armour."

In all cases where the result is given as "dent", a full description should be given.

Anti-tank Gun Model 41. Preliminary trials have been carried out on a captured Anti-tank Gun Model 41, and the following results have been observed:-

| | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Observed Velocity at 90 ft. | 4,500 ft/sec. |
| Muzzle Velocity, estimated | 4,650 - 4,700 ft/sec. |

Performance

At 100 yds at normal - holed 70 mm homogeneous armour plate.
- holed 80 mm machineable plate.

At 100 yds at 30° - dented 70 mm homogeneous armour plate.
- dented 80 mm machineable plate.

(From GHQ MEF Technical Int Summary dated 18 Aug.)

(c) Topographical.

Turkish Railways.

Line ANKARA - SIVAS - SAMSOUN.

This line 593 miles in length, was constructed between 1925 and 1932. It contains numerous vulnerable points of which the most outstanding are:-

| Vulnerable Point | Size | Miles from SAMSOUN |
|---|---|--------------------|
| 1. Metal bridge over TCHEKEREK IRMAK | 33 yards long | 95½ miles |
| 2. Viaduct over river TERS AKAN | One span of 6½ yards plus 3 spans of 11 yards plus final span of 6½ yards | 77½ " |
| 3. Metal bridge in the valley of the MERD IRMAK | 33 yards | 16½ " |
| 4. Metal bridge in the valley of the MERD IRMAK | 33 yards | 16 " |
| 5. Metal bridge in the valley of the MERD IRMAK | 33 yards | 9½ " |
| 6. Metal bridge in the valley of the MERD IRMAK | 3 spans of 21 yards each. | 5½ " |

Between SAMSOUN and SIVAS there are 37 tunnels of a total length of about 5400 yards, and in the section ANKARA - SIVAS there are 26 tunnels of a total length of about 4500 yards.

Line IRMAK - FYLIOS - ZONGULDAK.

This line which was started in 1930 and finished in 1937 covers a distance of 242 miles. It contains 27 stations, 1,368 culverts and bridges and 37 tunnels of a total length of about 9500 yards. The longest is the tunnel of RATIBEDJE, which is 3740 yards long.

The principle bridges between FYLIOS and IRMAK are:-

| Bridge | Size | Miles from IRMAK |
|---------------------------------|--|------------------|
| 1. Metal bridges | 55 and 35 yards | 3 miles |
| 2. Metal bridge | 23 yards | 5 " |
| 3. Metal bridge | 23 yards | 5½ " |
| 4. Metal bridge | 23 yards | 10 " |
| 5. Metal bridge | 2 spans each of 17½ yards | 10½ " |
| 6. Metal bridge | 3 spans each of 23 yards | 12½ " |
| 7. Reinforced concrete bridge | 3 spans each of 16 yards | 14 " |
| 8. Reinforced concrete bridge | 3 spans each of 16 yards | 25½ " |
| 9. Metal bridge | 2 spans each of 35 yards | 39½ " |
| 10. Reinforced concrete viaduct | 5 spans each of 16 yards, and one span of 56 yards | 44 " |

| | Bridge | Size | Miles from IRMAK |
|-----|-----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| | Reinforced concrete viaduct | 3 spans of 30 yards | 46 $\frac{1}{4}$ miles |
| 12. | Reinforced concrete bridge | 89 yards | 52 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| 13. | Masonry Bridge | 3 spans each of 11 yards | 56 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 14. | Metal Bridge | 35 yards | 61 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| 15. | Metal Bridge | 35 yards | 73 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 16. | Masonry Bridge | 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 91 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |

The line IRMAK - FYLIOS is 242 miles long and cost 550,000,000 francs to build. It leaves FYLIOS at sea level and rises to 5000 feet before re-descending to about 2250 feet at IRMAK.

Close to ZONGOUDAK is a tunnel about 1500 yards long.

(From Appendix "A" to Force HQ Daily Int Summary No 86 dated 1 Sep)

General.

Attached as Appendix "A" is the last instalment of the diary of 2/Lieut SCHORM. (From GHQ Daily Int Summary No 447 dated 10 Aug)

PART II. SECURITY

Food Riot. At 1020 hrs to-day a food riot broke out in HAMA. The civil administrator appealed to the local Comd for assistance and two coys were turned out. Up to the time of this information being received, no firing had been reported. At 1300 hrs it was reported that all was quiet at HAMA.

Internal Security

From many sources it is becoming apparent that popular feeling of all classes is growing more and more anti-British. Even though it has been explained to them and announced many times that the administration of SYRIA and the LEBANON is in the hands of the Free French, it appears impossible to convince them however that the British are not really the masters behind the scene.

For this reason all apparent mistakes or delays in administration by the Syrian or Lebanese Government are laid to the door of the British authorities.

There is a growing feeling that the Germans will invade the country and a tendency to non-cooperation with the present authorities, meanwhile marking time until the German occupation occurs.

The main cause of dissatisfaction amongst all classes is connected with the thorny problem of Ravitaillement and until the Syrian and Lebanese Governments can be forced to reach agreement and to arrange the distribution of essential commodities on an equitable basis, there will be no improvement in the attitude of the people towards the FF and ourselves.

There can be little doubt that the attitude of the Syrian Government is dictated as much by political motives as by economic ones. There are sufficient essential commodities in SYRIA and the LEBANON for all civilians and the time is fast approaching when some authority must take over control and handle this distribution if we do not want the security situation to deteriorate still further.

Interlocked with the problem of Ravitaillement is that of rising prices and it would appear that the only solution to this would be for the country to abandon gold and the currency.

be stabilised on a sterling basis - exchange could then be pegged and prices of essential commodities fixed.

At the moment many prices have soared beyond the means of the poorer classes and dissatisfaction and unrest is becoming increasingly prevalent, the more so since on the arrival of the Allied forces they had been led to believe in the coming of a sort of economic millenium.

It is believed that if this big economic problem can be satisfactorily solved before winter sets in, other security problems such as the collection of arms, will almost automatically solve themselves, through the goodwill of the inhabitants and their acceptance of the new administration.

K. H. H. H.

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No 61.

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

APPENDIX "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.78.

TRANSLATION OF GERMAN DIARY (2/Lt. SCHORM).

CAPTURED IN LIBYA.

Instalment 5.

8 April. Up at 05.00 hrs, move off at 05.30 hrs. MECHILI! At 07.00 hrs something goes crack in the engine. Cause: the belt-roller has been put in wrong way round and the belt has broken. Luckily the carden-shaft is undamaged and the pistons have not yet jammed. In spite of that, it takes six hours to put right. Then on again. What a journey! There's a following wind and we move all the time in our own dust-cloud. Just outside MECHILI there is General ROMMEL's "STORCH" which has made a forced landing. We're just in time to join up with the last tanks of the battalion as we drive past MECHILI to take up a covering position to the north-east and to camp. 1 Battalion reached MECHILI in the early morning with seven tanks, and with seven tanks had attacked. Five of them had been shot up, but MECHILI was taken. Many casualties. But a rich booty - two thousand prisoners 2/Lt. FRICKE, who ran on to a mine at LENGHASI and was captured was freed. Italians take charge of the prisoners. Unfortunately, the Division got away. We've no more petrol. JU.52s brought up stores for our light columns, but now we must wait.

9 April. 20.30 hrs. I almost get left behind to bring up the rest of the Battalion, but escape at the last moment. 21.30 hrs, we move off. Objective: SIDI EL THIMY.

10 April. More desert. After several kms, we fill up with petrol and clean the oil filters. At 16.00 hrs we are back on the VIA BALEIA again. One wall, one house - AIN AL GAZALA. Towards evening, we reach the advanced positions - 28 km in front of TOBRUK. We have covered 150 km! On the left is the Italian EUSCIA Division; on the right, M 2 and M 8; on the road A 3. Wearily we pitch camp. Vehicles are checked over - we have to force the slits open with a hammer, the sand having jammed them; they'll just have to stay open.

11 April. 6 Squadron has ceased to exist. With two tanks Mk II, I from 3 Troop in 5 Squadron with Lieut GURGA. At 09.00 hrs we move off into the desert again - to the south-east in order to cut off TOBRUK from the south. With us A/Tk, M.G. and A.A. At the end of 50 kms we find ourselves 16 km south of TOBRUK, and already artillery is giving us an H.E. welcome. Presumably naval guns from destroyers and cruisers. As soon as they get the range we withdraw 100-200 metres. The fire follows us - they must have good observation. 16.30 hrs, attack with two half-squadrons. Artillery puts down a barrage, but can make little impression on us. Through! We career on for 1000 metres, then carefully through the mine-field. As the smoke lifts, I see barbed wire and anti-tank ditches. Halt! I see muzzled flashes. "Gun 900, armour-piercing shell, light-coloured mound, fire!" A hit! Again 10 metres right...

/With six shots

With six shots we have finished off the A/Tk positions. We move along the wire looking for a gap, but of course the leading tank runs on to a mine. Another goes to its rescue, while I give covering fire. Over there the A/Tk guns are silent. I am on the point of ordering M.Gs. to open fire when the order is given to retire. 2/Lt. BOGH is missing. A/Tk gunners come in from the right; they have been badly mauled by British tanks. Five self-propelling chassis are lost. Artillery is still dropping shells among us. We retire a further 200 metres. Our 2 cm A.A. deals with British fighters out on recce., 8.8 cm A.A. goes past on our right to attack the harbour. At last the field-kitchen arrives. And then BOGH comes in by car. 6 Squadron now consists of three tanks under my command. All the tanks have had hits from splinters. One 7.5 cm has a direct hit from artillery, but is still running. Lt. MILDEBRATH is all smiles. 24.00 hrs bed.

12 April. The Commander of 15th Armd Div, whose advanced elements are on the way, was shot up in his car by A/Tk fire on the VIA BALBIA. M2 was heavily engaged by artillery yesterday with severe losses. 14.45 hrs we get the order to attack. At 15.00 hrs the engines are roaring and the battalion, not yet a squadron strong, advances against the fortifications of TOBRUK. This time we attack rather further to the west. Suddenly, not more than 70 metres to the right of my tank, there is a fountain of sand and an ear-splitting report. Instinctively I look up! Hell! Two bombers 150-250 metres up. Right wheel, step on it! Again they come over, but luckily they miss their target, i.e. us again. And now we must bring our eyes down to earth again. We have to get round our own M.Gs. and A/Tk gunners. And all the time the shells are bursting round us. Over there, half-left, is a troop firing directly at us. We manoeuvre and engage them, but their shells follow us. A Mk II is stuck, with a A/Tk shell in its gearing and its caterpillar band shot away. Rally. We are ordered to retire to our old position. General STREICH gives the order to halt.

In the evening 1 Battalion arrives with 30-40 (?) tanks. I hope there are a few repaired ones of 6 Squadron to bring my troop up to war strength.

13 April. The enemy's harassing fire is intensified. An Italian column is moving westwards fifty vehicles at least, towards TOBRUK. Surely, we think, they'll not try to take TOBRUK. For they have actually got three guns! Things like infantry guns! We've heard of them in the army communiques, now we've seen them. If only we could wash! No water, no cream, no oil. The men look like old men, old tramps. Then the order comes: 16.45 hrs ready to move, 17.45 wireless-readiness. That doesn't worry us - there's nowhere to go. 22.00 hrs bed. But little sleep - we have aerial visitors.

END OF DIARY.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 79

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 7 Sep to 1200 hrs 8 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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SPECIAL NOTE.

At Appendix "A" is described the correct procedure to be adopted by military authorities when an ENEMY aircraft crashes or lands in their area.

Will all recipients of this Summary republish this Appendix and emphasise to those under their command the vital importance of adhering closely to the instructions. Failure to follow the correct procedure has already, in many cases, caused the Royal Air Force to lose really valuable information about the German Air Force, German aircraft and German methods.

PART I.

- (a) Information from other fronts.

Operations in Western Desert.

Ground Activity. TOBRUK. Enemy shelling in all sectors of the TOBRUK perimeter has increased considerably during the last week, but in other respects there has been no enemy ground activity. An example of the greatly increased enemy shelling is shown by a report which states that on 28/8 1,000 rds were fired by guns on the Eastern side of the perimeter, and on 29/8 about 700 rds. Normal activity in any given sector is assessed as being 100 rds per day. The greater part of this arty activity has been concentrated on our fwd posns, but the enemy has also continued to shell the harbour, without any great success. Our arty have again carried out successful shoots on enemy working parties and movements of tps. Our patrols have again been active. On the night 30/31, a patrol in the EL ADEM area attacked an enemy post with bayonets and grenades, killing 10 of the enemy. Our casualties were 1 officer wounded and 3 ORs missing. On the night 31/1, two parties of a fighting patrol contacted the enemy and inflicted about 6 casualties. Another patrol occupied a knoll, about 1,000 yds fwd of the Western perimeter, which had been evacuated by the enemy as a result of our arty and MG fire. On the average, during the week, traffic along the EL ADEM escarpment, in both directions, has been on the increase, but is fairly even both ways.

FRONTIER. Heavy shelling by both sides has been the main ground activity in this area. Our arty have carried out shoots on Armd Cs at SCHEFERZEN and in HALFAYA Pass. In the latter place, increased MT traffic had been observed, and our shelling successfully reduced this traffic. Enemy shells are still reported to include a large number of "duds". MT traffic has, on the whole, been normal except in the KINIBISH area where blasting has also been carried out. Blasting has also been heard from BIR NUH, HALFAYA and SCHEFERZEN. There has been a marked decrease in Armd activity in the fwd area,

which suggests the possibility of their being used more in the OASIS area in the future. The two largest concentrations of MT appear to be along the coast between MARSALA EL MREISA and SOLLUM and in the area B.P. 38 - SIDI SULEIMAN - ABU FARIS. In the former area approx 1,400 MT were reported as being dispersed along the coast and in the latter 64 tanks, mostly medium. There are also 140 MT West of the HAFID ridge. There has been little movement behind these concentrations.

Air Activity.

Raids over TOBRUK have decreased greatly during the last week except for one very heavy raid on 1/9, and such occasional raids as there have been (including this heavy raid), have caused slight damage and very few casualties. The enemy seems to have concentrated on reconnaissance flights over the area, particularly over the Eastern perimeter. Planes have been brought down by AA fire both during raids and reconnaissance flights.

On the FRONTIER, the enemy has continued his raids on the OASIS sector, where he has also inflicted very few casualties. The only damage reported, as a result of these raids, has been to the Senoussi mosque in GIARABUB. MATRUH was raided on 29/8; slight casualties, and damage only resulting.

The RAF have continued their protective tasks on shipping and have destroyed several enemy planes in engagements whilst on this duty. Their most important action has been that which took place on 27/8, when they attacked a concentration of enemy tanks near RAS UMMA, and the majority of the bombs were seen to fall among the vehicles. BENGAZI and TRIPOLI have been bombed repeatedly and many large fires and explosions have been noted in these ports as a result of these raids. Reconnaissance have been made for shipping in the Central Mediterranean, and offensive sweeps carried out over the FRONTIER Area. No shipping or aircraft were encountered on these occasions.

(From HQ BTE Weekly Int Summary No 64 dated 4 Sep 41.)

Western Mediterranean.

Air Action 4 September. Of 28 enemy fighters which approached MALTA during the day 9 or 10 were shot down and 6 others damaged. Two of our aircraft are missing.

(From GHQ MEF Int Summary No 473 dated 4 Sep 41)

(b) Technical Information. Nil.

(c) Topographical.

Turkish Railways.

Line FEVZI PASHA - DYARBEKIR.

This line is 327 miles long and was constructed between 1927 and 1935.

In the section along the valley of the TIGRIS, a length of about 99 miles, tunnels totalling about 9,000 yards besides numerous bridges and viaducts were necessary.

The line cost 700,000,000 francs to construct.

The lowest part of the railway is at the station of EL OGLU, 1638 feet above sea level. The railway rises little by little and reaches about 4000 feet at the station of VIRANCHIR descending subsequently to 2145 feet in the valley of the EUPHRATES. It rises again to 4620 feet near the station of SAFKAT. The line follows the valley of the TIGRIS, passes through a long plain and finally, by the pass of DEVEGECIDI, reaches DYARBEKIR.

64 tunnels of a total length of about 15,000 yards have been constructed.

The following are the principle bridges:-

| | Size | Miles from FEVZI PACI |
|--|---|------------------------|
| 1. Metal Bridge | 35 yards | 26 $\frac{1}{2}$ miles |
| 2. Metal Bridge | 12 yards | 36 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| 3. Reinforced concrete viaduct over the river GOK SU | 7 spans of 38 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards each | 90 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 4. Masonry Bridge | 33 yards | 95 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 5. Masonry Bridge | 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 96 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| 6. Metal Bridge | 44 yards | 96 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 7. Reinforced concrete viaduct | 77 yards | 98 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| 8. Reinforced concrete viaduct | 72 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 98 $\frac{1}{2}$ " |
| 9. Reinforced concrete viaduct | 101 yards | 99 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 10. Reinforced concrete viaduct | 92 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 103 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 11. Reinforced concrete Bridge | 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 111 $\frac{1}{2}$ " |
| 12. Reinforced concrete Bridge | 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 111 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 13. Reinforced concrete Bridge | 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 111 $\frac{7}{8}$ " |
| 14. Reinforced concrete Bridge | 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 112 " |
| 15. Masonry viaduct | 44 yards | 126 " |
| 16. Masonry viaduct | 58 yards | 126 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| 17. Masonry viaduct | 52 yards | 126 $\frac{3}{8}$ " |
| 18. Masonry viaduct | 82 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 126 $\frac{1}{2}$ " |
| 19. Masonry viaduct | 82 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 126 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 20. Masonry viaduct | 78 yards | 126 $\frac{7}{8}$ " |
| 21. Masonry viaduct | 78 yards | 149 $\frac{3}{4}$ " |
| 22. Masonry viaduct | 77 yards | 150 $\frac{1}{8}$ " |
| 23. Reinforced concrete viaduct | 121 yards | 168 " |
| 24. Reinforced concrete viaduct over the River EUPHRATES | 4 spans of 60 $\frac{1}{2}$ yds each, and 4 spans of 30 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards | 176 $\frac{1}{4}$ " |

The two most important points are the viaduct over the GOK SU near KUMLU; length about 330 yards; height 38 $\frac{1}{2}$ yards; and the large viaduct over the EUPHRATES near MALATYA.

PART II.

Food Riot. The disturbance at HAMA which was reported in yesterday's issue of this summary was successfully dealt with by the civil authorities. No casualties have been reported. The two coys which were turned out in response to an appeal from the local administrator were not required to take any action. Whilst this particular demonstration passed off without any untoward "incidents", similar disturbances may be expected throughout the country so long as the present conditions governing the distribution of foodstuffs continue.

General. The dock and railway area at TRIPOLI has now been completely wired off, and passes have been issued to all employees.

Gladwin May
for Lt.-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No 61.

APPENDIX "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.

LOCATION AND HANDLING OF CRASHED ENEMY AIRCRAFT.

GENERAL PROCEDURE: A crashed or forced landed enemy aircraft is the property of the Royal Air Force, which is the sole authority for its disposal.

Information of vital importance is obtained from crashed aircraft, documents and expert interrogation of prisoners of war.

This can only be obtained by close co-operation between the Civil, Military and Royal Air Force authorities and in order to ensure that all available information is placed before the proper authorities with the minimum delay, the following procedure will in future be adopted.

DUTIES OF MILITARY AUTHORITIES:

(A) Officer Commanding Nearest Army Unit.

On hearing of a crashed or forced landed enemy aircraft, the Officer Commanding the nearest Army unit should;-

- (i) Detail a Guard to proceed to the scene immediately.
- (ii) Advise Officer Commanding nearest R.A.F. unit with a request for R.A.F. "Crash Officer".

(B) Guard Commander.

- (i) Take over from the Egyptian Civil or Military authorities, if either are first on the scene of the crash, and mount guard near the aircraft.
- (ii) Remove prisoners from close vicinity of aircraft to prevent sabotage and thoroughly search them for letters, documents and personal effects, and segregate them as far as possible.
- (iii) Ensure that there is no fraternisation between prisoners and other persons.
- (iv) Ensure that no interrogation is attempted.
- (v) Arrange for removal of injured prisoners to hospital.
- (vi) ENSURE THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS NOT INSPECTED, LOOTED OR INTERFERED WITH IN ANY WAY.
- (vii) Co-operate with R.A.F. "Crash Officer" for the disposal of prisoners fit for interrogation.
- (viii) Hand over ALL letters, documents and personal effects of prisoners to R.A.F. "Crash Officer", who will then proceed to inspect the crash.
- (ix) Maintain Guard until notified by the R.A.F. "Crash Officer" that inspection and salvage operations have been completed.

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 80

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 8 Sep to 1200 hrs 9 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

PART I

(a) Information from other fronts.

NORWAY. The War Office announced this morning that a mixed force of Canadian, British and Norwegian troops under Canadian Command have landed and taken SPITSBERGEN. (The SPITSBERGEN ISLANDS both East and West were NORWEGIAN Territory before the war with GERMANY; they are approx 400 miles North of NORWAY and are in the ARCTIC CIRCLE. Their combined area is approx the same as that of ICELAND). The War Office communique said that the move was necessitated by a number of reasons, chief of which was the large coal deposits there, on which since the Russo-German war, GERMANY had designs.

IRAN. Northern IRAN. The general situation has improved. The bands of rebel soldiers (Reported in this Headquarters Summary No 78 dated 7 Sep 41) have now been dispersed. They handed over four 75 mm guns, eight machine guns, five hundred rifles, and some light machine guns. Sixty rifles were collected from villages. It is reported that telegraphic communications between KERMANSHAH and TEHERAN have been restored. Frontier Situation. Our troops have been patrolling the frontier between KHAMAQIN and QASR-ISHIRIN and have encountered armed IRAQIS on the IRANIAN side of the frontier. There is no evidence that IRANEANS are crossing into IRAQ. It is reported that the local IRAQI officials are co-operating with the British Forces.

(From Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 89 dated 5 Sep 41)

RUSSIA. During the week, the German thrusts in the LENINGRAD and GOMEL sectors, coupled with the successful crossing of the lower DNIEPER, have created a serious situation on all fronts.

The main threat to LENINGRAD has come from the South, where a German armoured thrust has reached the LENINGRAD - MOSCOW railway on a wide front. This thrust has reached the River NEVA at IVANOVSK, 20 miles South-South-East of LENINGRAD, thus cutting all rail communication between the city and the rest of the U.S.S.R. To the North, Finnish forces in the KARELIAN Isthmus have reached the line SUVANTO - R. VUOKSA, and have occupied VIPURI.

Further South, the attack South Eastwards through GOMEL has made progress and has succeeded in cutting the railway BRYANSK - KONOTOP - KIEV, near GLUKHIV. (1 Sep). It is not yet known for certain how successful the large scale Russian counter attack in this sector reported on 9 Sep has been. This counter attack - if successful - may remove the danger of the Russian forces in this sector being cut off by a German subsidiary advance North of KIEV, which by 1 Sep, had crossed the DNIEPER and reached the River DESNA. On the Southern DNIEPER, the Russians are believed to retain no bridgeheads South of KIEV. The Germans have crossed the river at DNEPROPETROVSK and are fighting for a bridgehead at BERISLAV. Their probable intention is to drive South on the CRIMEA. ODESSA is still holding out strongly and is being supplied by sea.

On other fronts there is little to report. Between the East and the East of Lake LADOGA there have been no operations of importance. In ESTONIA, TALLIN and some fortified islands North of the city are in German hands. North West of SMOLENSK, VELIKIE LUKI has been captured by the Germans, who are now advancing on TOROPETZ. There has as yet been no further attempt to advance on MOSCOW.

While the situation has undoubtedly deteriorated from the Russian point of view, the Germans are still far from a decision. LENNINGRAD is isolated and threatened, especially from the South East, but reports of the arming of civilians with hand-grenades and Molotov cocktails indicate a determination to defend the city to the last. Time is the critical factor in this sector. Even if the Germans can manage to take the city before the weather breaks, the effort seems likely to prove expensive in men and material.

Now that the Finns have reached their old frontier, there are many reliable reports that Finnish opinion is tending towards a negotiated peace. The Finnish forces have had to bear the brunt of the fighting. The bulk of the small German expeditionary force is considered to be virtually moribund in the TUNDRA, after its vain attempt to seize MURMANSK. Other German troops have been checked within FINLAND'S 1939 boundaries, near the battlefield of KALLA, where the Finns won glory during the terrible Winter war. In this territory, the Germans, though better equipped, have proved themselves inferior to the admiring Finns, who have now ceased to admire. That the Germans realise the necessity of strengthening this front is indicated by the arrival in Northern FINLAND of 6 Mountain Division, which left SALONIKA as late as the end of July. The Germans are likely to do all they can to prevent the Finns making a separate armistice. Such an event might encourage the Roumanians and Hungarians, who are none too happy at the moment, to a similar action.

The development of the drive from GOMEL commented on earlier in this Review, has made the position of the Russian troops on the lower DNIEPER somewhat precarious. The extension of this drive to KHARKOV, to meet an advance North-Eastwards from DNEPROPETROVSK, is a serious possibility. In the BLACK SEA area the Russian fleet remains the commanding factor. The shortest route to the Caucasian oil-field is straight across the BLACK SEA. Lack of shipping, however, and inability to protect his convoys, has forced HITLER to try the longer way round. This is about twice the distance and over difficult country. The Germans have been unable to use sea-transport, except in the extreme Western end of the BLACK SEA.

Despite their steady advance, it seems doubtful if the Germans can exploit their successes on the scale required to gain a decision before Winter sets in. Several factors are now contributing to slow down their pace. The roads in the South are said to be cut up by heavy rains. The changed tactics the Germans have had to adopt, of employing their infantry and tanks together, will seriously reduce their speed of advance. Their supply difficulties are increasing as they advance further East. With deteriorating weather, a system bound to the roads is certain to get worse and worse. Above all a shortage of close-support aircraft is evidenced by the use of large numbers of long-range bombers for tactical bombing. This will prevent those bold penetrations which, in other campaigns, have done so much to paralyse their enemies' defensive systems. The provision of aviation spirit is proving a difficulty, and may justify the Russian claim to have air superiority in some sectors. It may be significant of German calculations now that the opening of the autumn Fair at KONIGSBERG has been postponed from 17 August to 12 October.

encourageing factor is the quality of the Russian troops. It has been reflected in the bearing and discipline of the troops, but its full height may be measured by the blowing of the DNEPROPETROUSK dam. The decision to destroy what had become a monument and symbol of Soviet progress is a measure of the determination of the Russian people. In order finally to break Russian resistance it would seem that HITLER, despite his undeniable successes, will have to achieve something more drastic even than the capture of LENINGRAD and the reaching of the DON. He has yet to achieve either of these.

(From GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation No 66 dated 1 Sep 41)

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL (Extract from Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 86 dated 2 Sep 41)

Railway SIVAS - ERZURUM.

This line was opened in October 1939. It has many vulnerable points, in particular :-

| Vulnerable Point. | Size. | Miles from SIVAS. |
|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Metal Bridge | 55 yards | 82½ miles. |
| 2. Metal Bridge | 55 yards | 84½ miles. |
| 3. Two metal bridges | 35 yards | Over the river KALTI. |
| 4. Two metal bridges | 55 yards | |
| 5. One bridge | 2 spans each 35 yards | |
| | | |
| 6. Metal bridge | 66 yards | Over the river EUPHRATES. |
| 7. Metal bridge | 330 yards | |
| 8. Two bridges | 55 yards | Over the river KARASOU. |

The line SIVAS - ERZURUM is 339 miles in length and cost a milliard francs to construct. It rises to a height of 6,000 feet at ERZURUM.

This line is already joined to the railway FEVZI PACHA-DYARBEKIR by a branch line 87 miles in length running from MALATYA to CETINKAYA. This branch contains 11 metal bridges of which one has three spans of 35 yards, three have two spans of 35 yards, one is 35 yards and six are 44 yards long.

PART II. SECURITY - SABOTAGE

The IRAQ Petroleum Company report that the pipeline between T1 and T2 is being punctured by determined locals. The object is to obtain oil for sale. This sabotage is interfering with pumping and the Military Forces have been asked to take steps to stop this practice.

(From Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 89 dated 5 Sep)

Sadler
for Maj
Lt-Col.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No 61.

SECRET

1ST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 81.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 9 Sep to 1200 hrs 10 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART 1.

(a) AIR ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST- 26 AUG - 2 SEP.

ENEMY- GERMAN. There does not appear to have been any reduction in the scale of German activity over CYRENAICA, but it is noticeable that recce aircraft and night bombers have, to a great extent, operated from Southern GREECE and CRETE. A number of FOCKE WULFS (heavy four-engined bombers, with a medium load range of 2500 miles), have arrived in Southern GREECE. They are probably intended for attacks on shipping in the RED SEA. Attacks against MERSA MATRUH and targets in the DELTA area carried out from Southern GREECE have slightly increased. (Enemy air raids on the Frontier Zone and TOBRUK were reported in this Headquarters Intelligence Summary No 79 dated 8 Sep.) No attacks against shipping at sea have been reported, although sea recce activity has been maintained. On the night 27/28 Aug enemy aircraft dropped bombs at PORT SAID, KANTARA, SOHUT and ABU SULTAN. At the last named place an ammunition train was hit, blowing up several trucks and causing twenty four casualties. On the night 28/29 Aug several HE and incendiary bombs were dropped at PORT SAID with negligible effect, although it is believed that some may have been 1000 KG bombs. On the night 31 Aug/1 Sep, eight JU88s attacked PORT SAID. Slight damage was caused to civilian property, two civilians were killed and forty injured. On the same night ALEXANDRIA was raided by six aircraft. Bombs were dropped over a wide area and demolished two houses, causing a number of casualties to service and civilian personnel.

It is reported in Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 92 dated 8 Sep that at 2038 hrs on 27 Aug 41 there were a number of unidentified aircraft flying N.W. from DAMASCUS, at about 10,000 ft. RAF are reported to have no knowledge of Allied aircraft in that area. No bombs were dropped.

ITALIAN. Protection of convoys is still the main duty of the Italian Air Force, and during the past week there have been the usual routine recce flights, fighter escorts and standing patrols over harbours, anti-submarine patrols, and convoy escort flights by bomber aircraft, to cover the arrival and departure of shipping in all sectors. Only one attack against shipping is reported. On 27 Aug two torpedo-carrying S79s operating from DERNA, attacked a ship about 15 miles off MERSA LUCCH. The ship was hit, but was able to proceed to ALEXANDRIA under her own steam.

OUR ACTION. The scale of our air offensive has been well maintained. Attacks have been carried out from MALTA against enemy shipping in the MEDITERRANEAN and in TRIPOLI harbour. The successful attacks upon TRIPOLI have continued to increase in intensity.

Against shipping. Between 27 Aug and 31 Aug five attacks

were made on enemy shipping from MALTA. On the 2nd aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm attacked, in very bad weather, a bound convoy of four destroyers and four merchant vessels ten miles South of the Island of LAMPEDUSA. One merchant ship of 8000 tons was badly hit. On the morning of 28 Aug Blenheim aircraft bombed another convoy in the MEDITERRANEAN. One ship of 5000 tons was hit three times, and when last seen was down by the stern. On the night of 30 Aug Fleet Air Arm "Swordfish" attacked a 1200 ton vessel near LAMPEDUSA. One torpedo struck the ship, causing a large explosion and leaving it with a heavy list.

Against ITALY. On 1 Sep seven of our aircraft attacked the town and harbour of CROTONE. Direct hits on three buildings, believed to be part of a munitions factory, caused large explosions. A merchant vessel of between 3-5000 tons was set on fire. Objectives in SICILY were attacked seven times during the week. HE and incendiaries were dropped on the aerodromes of PALERMO and GERENI. TRIPOLI has been heavily attacked on four nights in succession up to 1 Sep, by Wellingtons. When our planes arrived over the harbour on the night of 29 Aug, fire fighters were seen attempting to control a fire on the Spanish Quay, which had been started by a previous raid. Bombs were dropped, causing many fires. An 8000 ton ship outside the harbour was left blazing from stem to stern. A 5000 ton motor vessel in the harbour was seen to be on fire, and later exploded, and a third motor vessel in the harbour, was left on fire. On the night 31 Aug the harbour was again attacked, one medium H/V was hit and two further ships were left ablaze. BENGHASI, DERNIA, BARDIA, and enemy landing grounds in CYRENAICA have also been attacked.

In GREECE, MENIDI and ELEUSIS aerodromes were subjected to heavy attacks by Wellingtons on the night 28/29 Aug. One hangar was destroyed at each place, and fragmentation and incendiary bombs were dropped in dispersal areas, which caused explosions and started several large fires.

In CRETE the aerodrome of HERAKLION was also bombed.

In RHODES, MARITZA and CAESTO aerodromes were also heavily attacked. At MARITZA two AA guns were put out of action, and several fires started.

Activity against the beleaguered garrison in ITALIAN EAST AFRICA has been on a reduced scale during the period under review. (Summarised from RAF IE Weekly Summary for period 26 Aug/1 Sep).

(b) TOPOGRAPHICAL. Nil.

PART 11. SECURITY. FOOD SUPPLY.

The following report has been received from the Political Officer, LATAQUIE :-

The situation is deteriorating rapidly. The price of wheat is now 30 piastres a kilo as against 25 at the end of last week; the price of bread is being maintained at the already excessive price of 20 piastres a kilo, but the proportion of wheat flour in it has been still further reduced. The seriousness of the situation can be seen from the fact that the Delegee himself accompanied the Director of Economic Services and the President of the Revitailllement Committee to DAMASCUS to-day in order to attempt to obtain supplies of wheat. Meanwhile, discontent is general in the town; the local newspapers have devoted long, critical leaders to the question, one pointing out that the authorities no longer have the British blockade and the petrol shortage to blame for their shortcomings. What-ever the British authorities may say about the responsibility of the Free French and the local administration for the food supply, it is the British who are blamed for the present state of affairs. This is hardly surprising since local opinion, encouraged by British propaganda had come to expect that a British occupation would bring about a general fall in prices; instead, prices have risen and even people who are genuinely pro-British are bitterly disappointed.

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No 61.

W. W. W.
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

SECRET

AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 82.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 10 Sep to 1200 hrs 11 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART 1

- (a) RUSSIA. It has been reliably reported that at 1200 hrs on 10 Sep ODESSA was still in Russian hands.
-

Notes on Armies. Our troops report that when they met detachments of the Red Army at KAZVIN (PERSIA) on 31 Aug, they found them well turned out, smart and disciplined.
(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 476 dated 8 Sep).

LIBYA. In spite of the RAF policy of "catch them on the ground", the enemy seem to have no difficulty in delivering heavy and sustained dive-bombing attacks from time to time on TOBRUCK Fortress Area.

Such an attack was delivered at 1150 hrs, 1 Sep, when 40 JU 87's dive-bombed our Hy AA positions. This was followed by a high level bombing attack carried out by a large number of planes incl 12 B.R.20's, eight S 79's and six G.50's.

Three of the Hy AA positions were attacked. Four guns were put out of action temporarily and five ORs were slightly wounded.

Full details are not yet available, but, as far as can be ascertained, bombs were also scattered all over the Fortress Area and even on some of the fwd enemy troops in the SE.

Our ground policy of active offensive infantry patrolling is being continued. At Appendix "A" is given an account of two such patrols.

(Taken from 9 Aust Div Summaries Nos 133, 134 and 135).

- (b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

1. PONTOON UNITS. A photograph, taken in the port of CONSTANTZA in June 1941 has been received. This shows three pontoon units in process of assembly, but it is not possible to make out more than the broad out-line in the photograph. It has, however, been possible, with the assistance of an eye-witness, to determine the main details of the construction, and diagrams illustrating them are attached at Appendix "B" to this Summary.

Each unit comprises two pontoons carrying a platform. At the forward end of the platform or deck is a ramp, which slides underneath between the pontoons when not in use. This appears to be intended to facilitate the embarkation of vehicles or A.F.Vs; on the deck is a small open wheel-house. Each pontoon has an engine aft, accessible through a hatchway, and a rudder controlled from the wheelhouse. A small derrick is fitted in the bows of each pontoon, possibly to manipulate the anchor.

Wooden runners are fitted to the pontoons and apparently serve to facilitate the beaching of the craft. Beaching exercises are reported to have been carried out, and the craft are said to run a considerable distance up the beach, though it was not stated whether this was achieved with the craft loaded or unloaded. A speed of 12 to 15 knots is said to have been attained, but no details of seaworthiness have been received.

(Over)

It is estimated that a raft of this nature, with a load of 70-tons, but while suitable for river crossings, would be useless at sea.

A confirmatory report, which repeats in general the information given above, mentions the construction of ten rafts, and adds that each pontoon is in five sections. If this is so, the craft should be transportable overland.

2. FLOWERS OF SULPHUR AS A LUBRICANT FOR M.Gs. During recent months, fairly frequent reference has been made by Prisoners of War and captured documents to the use of Flowers of Sulphur as a lubricant for Machine Guns under desert conditions. Tests have now been carried out to determine the efficacy of this substance as lubricant, and to obtain comparison with other lubricants in general use.

The weapon used for the tests was a BREN Gun, as this is subject to more firing difficulties than other service machine guns. Of the various lubricants tested, three only gave really satisfactory results under sand and dust-free conditions. They were :-

- (a) GREASE RD. 1179 (the approved WAR OFFICE lubricant for BREN guns).
- (b) GREASE C. (the approved local substitute for (a)).
- (c) GREASE and FLOWERS OF SULPHUR Compound.

Under sandy or dusty conditions the only lubricant which gave really satisfactory results was :-

- (a) GREASE and FLOWERS OF SULPHUR Compound.

After firing with the sulphur-grease compound, which gave perfect functioning under dust-free conditions, the piston and breech-block were sprinkled with sand. The gun functioned perfectly under these conditions. It was found possible, by means of further liberal applications of sand, to cause occasional intermittent stoppage, but re-lubrication over the original sanded lubricant enabled automatic firing to continue.

Several tests showed conclusively the superiority of the sulphur-grease mixture over other lubricants. Tests were carried out at the same time with Graphite, both in flaked and powdered form, both alone and mixed with Grease M.T. and Oil M80 in various proportions. Oil M.80 was also tested with Sulphur.

A mixture of Grease and Sulphur compound, and equal quantity of sand, when applied as a lubricant, resulted in perfect functioning of the gun.

- (c) TOPOGRAPHICAL. (Extract from Force GSI Summary No 86 dated 2 Sep 41).

TURKEY. RAILWAY REPAIR SHOPS. The principle workshops are those of SMYRNA, ESKIHISAR and SIVAS.

The workshops at SMYRNA are those of the former French Company SMYRNA - GASSABA and branches. These shops are rudimentary and can repair only 6 or 7 locomotives a month.

The workshops of ESKIHISAR, constructed by the Turkish Railway Company of ANATOLIA before the war, can repair 10 - 15 locomotives per month. These workshops are more important than those of SMYRNA. From the point of view of rolling stock, they can repair 100 wagons per month.

The workshops of SIVAS can repair 10 - 15 locomotives and 150 wagons per month.

There also exist numerous locomotive depots, i.e. installations for the up-keep of railway material. The principle depots are in the following towns :-

Line.

Depot

HAYDAR PACHA - ANKARA

HAYDAR PACHA, ESKIHISAR, ANKARA

Depot

SILYRNA, AIDINE, BANDIRMA.

ISSAR - KONIA -
ADAN - DYARBEKIR

ESKIHISAR, ALAYAT, AFYON, KONIA,
ERIGLI, ADANA, FEVZI, PACHA, HALATYA,
HADEN, DYARBEKIR.

Lines to the EAST of
ANKARA.

ANKARA, TCHATALAGZI, CESAREE, SIVAS,
CETINKAYA, SAMSOUN, ERZINGAN, ASKELE,
ERZURUM.

PART 11.

SECURITY.

(a) FOOD PRICES. The excessive price of foodstuffs, especially wheat, is causing considerable unrest. During the period 6 - 8 Sep demonstrations have occurred at HAMA, HOMS, and ZAHLE. From reports received it is clear that the demonstrations have been essentially peaceable in character. No stones have been thrown and no violence used. A report indicates that it is the retailers who are forcing up prices in order to profiteer, although undoubtedly there is a shortage of wheat. Farmers have had to sell a large portion of their wheat at £S.30 per kaurer. In consequence they now have insufficient for their own needs, and insufficient seed for next year's crop. The retail price in HOMS is £S.80 per kaurer.

The situation in ZAHLE is slightly different. It appears that there is quite sufficient wheat in the BEKAA plain. Certain merchants, however, have acquired a monopoly and are refusing to release it except at exorbitant prices. This situation is being investigated by political officers.

(b) POSSESSION and COLLECTION of ARMS. Intensive patrolling of villages in the SOUEIDA area continues and arms that are voluntarily surrendered are being concentrated in dumps for removal by the Free French authorities.

In other cases an estimate based on previously ascertained information is made and an appropriate demand for a specific number of rifles, revolvers, and ammunition is presented to the mukhtar of each village concerned. The execution of these demands is carried out in co-operation with Free French officers, backed up by a show of military force.

(c) GENERAL. It is reported that during the campaign in SYRIA Jewish-owned lorries managed to cross the frontier by joining in convoys of civilian vehicles used for military purposes. In this manner they succeeded in transporting a considerable number of arms to Jewish Colonies in PALESTINE.

W. H. W. H.

Lt-col
GS Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION : as per Summary No 61.



1 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 82

dated 11 Sep 41.

o Descriptions of offensive patrols carried out by our troops
TOBRUK.

PERIOD 29 - 30 AUG. Patrol of one offr and 11 ORs from 2/28 proceeded to 42334167. At 42284179, a line of old weapon pits and bars not occupied for some time was passed. 42294178, two new telephone wires were encountered. Along the wires was a pad showing foot prints of hobnailed boots and bare feet. The wires were followed to 42264178 where they terminated in a nest of v sangars, showing evidence of recent occupation. GERMAN and ALIAN cigarette packets were found there. Continuing its original course, the patrol reached 42334167 and was fired on by one LMG and two rifles from the left front. The patrol moved closer with the object of assaulting the position and four more LMGs, rifles, and an A Tk gun opened fire. Our patrol withdrew and during this, was fired on by MGs on both flanks. The patrol found it impossible to outflank the fire and returned to the perimeter. Between 1700 and 1710 hrs, B Coy 2/28 Bn carried out a harrassing shoot on enemy positions at 42484223, 42504233, and 42504238, using LMGs, two 47mm guns and one 75mm gun. Results are not known, but shells were seen to fall on the targets. The enemy replied with arty fire.

2. PERIOD 30-31 AUG. A patrol of one offr and 10 ORs from 2/15 Bn moved out and attacked an enemy posn in the el ADEH Sector. At 40774184, the patrol deployed for the attack and advanced on the post from the rear. They were apparently seen at this stage, for a Very light went up from the Post and four Bredas opened up on them. At the same time, the enemy threw a volley of Grenades the flash of which temporarily blinded the patrol. The patrol manoeuvred for the attack and went in with grenades and bayonets. The enemy were estimated at between 40 and 50 strong, and the post was a proper trench system in the form of a horse shoe; all pits being connected by crawl trenches about 4/5 ft deep, with further crawl trenches to sleeping quarters. At least one Breda at each extremity of the post and two in the centre. The right hand Breda was definitely silenced and its crew killed. Enemy fire was also met from posns from SOUTH and EAST. Grenades were thrown in all the posts and sleeping quarters and the bayonet used freely. Estimated enemy killed - at least 15, but unable to estimate number of wounded. Patrol withdrew through minefield to the NORTH, but were unable to obtain a prisoner. The patrol leader, with a bullet wound in the hip, at one stage had two prisoners by the neck, attempting to pull them out of the trenches which were about 5 ft deep at this spot. His Tommy gun was empty - and he could not use his pistol, as both hands were fully occupied. He released the prisoners when he was hit in the face by a grenade. The line of defence of the Post at 40834185 consists of a row of "S"-type mines, then three rows of trip wire, then a single row of Dannert. After passing through the field on the way out, the patrol was pinned down by fixed line of fire from MGs and A Tk guns, and while there, observed an enemy patrol come out after them. One of the patrol, Pte RANDALL, tripped into a post and was temporarily stunned. He remained in the post after the patrol had passed through. He states the enemy - 11 ITALIAN - were very excited and rushed around the post, shouting wildly. He managed to make his way out along the route he came in and at daylight, was still inside the post. He saw three empty MT pull off the el ADEM road and into the post. After daylight, twenty enemy were seen approx 750 yds NORTH of the position apparently searching the ground. They were dispersed by our arty fire. Our total casualties - one missing, believed killed, two missing, three wounded (two slightly, none seriously). One L/Cpl and two ORs are the personnel missing.



SECRET

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 83.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 11 Sep to 1200 hrs 12 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I.

(a) PALESTINE

AIR - Enemy action. At 0259 hrs on 9 September a raid was carried out on HAIFA by enemy aircraft. Approximately 18 incendiary bombs were dropped EAST of the I.P.C. Tank Farm and near KIRIAT HAIM 156248. RAF night fighters went up, but did not intercept.

The attack lasted 1½ hrs, but no damage was done and there were no casualties.

(From HQ British Forces P T-J & S Int Summary No 94, dated 10 Sep 41.)

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

Equipment.

It has been confirmed that the Germans are using "SOMUA" S.35 tanks in FRANCE.

In view of the possibility that these tanks may be encountered in the future, the following are brief particulars of the two types of this tank.

SOMUA S.35.

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| Weight | 18 tons. |
| Crew | Three (Driver, gunner and Comd). |
| Armament | One 47 mm gun and one LMG. |
| Armour basis | 40 mm. |
| Height | 8 ft. 10 ins. |
| Length | 17 ft. 6 ins. |
| Width | 6 ft. 8 ins. |
| Suspension | 9 bogie wheels. 4 bogies with leaf spring. 1 independent bogie wheel. Suspension protected by skirting. |
| Maximum gradient | 40 deg. |
| Ground clearance | 1 ft. 4 ins. |
| Engine | 190 HP 8 Water cooled. |
| Drive | Rear sprocket. |
| Maximum speed | 29 mph on roads. |
| Radius of action | 140 miles. |
| Intercommunication | W/T and flag. |
| Trench crossing | 7 ft. 10 ins. |
| Fords | 3 ft. 3 ins. |
| Step | 2 ft. 11 ins. |
| Ammunition carried | 120 rds for gun 5000 rds for LMG. |

Considerable numbers were in existence.

SOMUA S.Au. 40.

| | |
|--------|---|
| Weight | 21.5 tons. |
| Crew | Three (or four) (Driver, Comd, gunner) loader. |

SOMUA S.Au. 40 (Cont).

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| Armament | One 75 mm gun. |
| Armour basis | 40 mm. |
| Height | 8 ft. 10 ins. |
| Length | 19 ft. 5 ins. |
| Width | 6 ft. 11 ins. |
| Suspension | 9 bogie wheels. 4 bogies with leaf springing. 1 independent bogie wheel. Suspension protected by skirting. |
| Ground clearance | 1 ft. 4 ins. |
| Engine | 190 HP V8. Water cooled. |
| Drive | Rear sprocket. |
| Maximum speed | 20 mph on roads. |
| Radius of action | 140 miles. |
| Intercommunication | W/T and flag. |
| Trench crossing | 7 ft. 10 ins. |
| Fords | 3 ft. 3 ins. |
| Step | 2 ft. 11 ins. |

32 were in existence. Long barreled 75 mm gun mounted in the hull. Were to be used as Armoured Artillery.

(From GHQ MEF Int Summary No 474 dated 6 Sep 41).

GENERAL.

Attached as Appendix "A" is a report on an Invasion Exercise at RUGEN ISLAND, NW of STETTIN, GERMANY.

PART II. SECURITY

General.

The first night performance of "The Victory of Democracy" at the Cinema Royal, ALEPPO by the TROUPE NADIA was an interesting barometer of public feeling. The show was effective British propaganda, well planned so as to cause the minimum of political feeling. A few minor incidents were observed: e.g. in some cases the British flag and the Croix de Lorraine were hissed. A few Nazi salutes were seen.

A number of informers have suggested that at future performances it would have a very salutary effect if gendarmes arrested any person giving the Nazi salute. This would show that the authorities can act quickly and vigorously when necessary.

At a rough estimate it may be said that 50% of the audience were well disposed towards us, 30% indifferent and 20% hostile.

E. Mandel
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION : As per Summary No 61.

APPENDIX "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 83.

Invasion Exercise at RÜGEN. 19-21 March, 1941.

The following report of an exercise by the Germans at RÜGEN ISLAND is of particular interest in view of the considerable scale on which it was carried out; RÜGEN has frequently been mentioned in recent months as the scene of "invasion practices", and a tactical school is also believed to be there.

It will be noticed that :-

- (a) no use appears to have been made of barges unloading A.F.Vs. direct on to the beaches.
- (b) smoke was an important factor in the operations;
- (c) the exercise was carried out mainly by S.S. troops, who are highly trained and very efficient.

The report states that disembarkation and attack exercises took place on the island of RÜGEN from 19th to 21st March 1941.

The manoeuvres were carried out by troops (mainly S.S.) who arrived a few days beforehand in STETTIN from the S.W. of GERMANY and from the occupied countries.

The embarkation of troops, tanks, artillery, vehicles, rafts and pontoons was effected on the night of 19th March at STETTIN in the Industrie Hafen, at POLITZ, SWINEMÜNDE, OSTWINE and KOLBERG, on warships of smaller tonnage (motor launches, torpedo boats, dredgers, tugs) and lighters.

A hundred ships of all classes were employed for transport. Each of the tugs, dredgers or launches towed 2 lighters. The larger lighters (with raised sides), loaded with tanks, pontoons and rafts, went under their own power.

The island of RÜGEN had been covered and surrounded by a curtain of artificial fog. When this fog was dispersed by the wind before the disembarkation, it was renewed by the fast launches which raced ahead of the lighters.

When the small warships and lighters arrived near the island, rafts and pontoons were thrown on the water and the soldiers got down on to them.

The large lighters lowered their sides to allow the tanks to come out on to the pontoons, which the soldiers had covered with planks. These pontoons were joined together with chains, and were towed through the fog by tugs and fast launches.

After disembarking the troops and materials of the first echelons, the small warships and the lighters (with or without motors) returned to the larger vessels to collect the armoured cars, heavy tanks and artillery. Each vessel had on either side from four to six large ramps down which the troops came on to the lighters. The transports loaded with tanks and A.C's. had sides pivoted or shuttered to allow the vehicles to descend upon the lighters without using cranes.

In the air, a large number of aircraft dropped parachutists on the island.

After the fog had cleared away, an observer noticed in the SASSNITZ - DINZ area two large pontoons, thrown perpendicularly to the coast, on which the infantry and tanks advanced: along the coast he noticed embarkations (sic) and rafts filled with soldiers.

He did not notice any large warship near the places of disembarkation. While the disembarkation was being carried out these vessels manoeuvred near TRAUFER - WICK, to the NE of the island - apparently to cover the operations.

According to rumours in STETTIN, 2 lighters and 1 raft were lost and 42 soldiers drowned, some being parachutists dropped in the water.

The ships which took part in these exercises returned empty to STETTIN. The troops returned overland.

Groups of officers, NCOs and men from the different arms followed the manoeuvres as spectators from small cargo ships, upon which they embarked at FREIHAFEN and the quays of the ODER.

There is every reason to believe that these exercises were a repetition of a type of drill studied or adopted.

Since 26 Mar, the majority of the small warships and lighters which took part in the RUGEN manoeuvres have left the port of STETTIN for an unknown destination.

(from WAR OFFICE WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO:95.)

APPENDIX "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 83.

German Harassing Commandos (Jagdkommandos)

During the period of position warfare in France in 1939/40 the Germans employed assault detachments (Stosstrupps) and reconnaissance patrols (Spahtrupps) for raiding and harassing the French and ourselves in No Man's Land. These parties worked with skill and dash and were well imbued with the offensive spirit. On occasion they even penetrated behind the allied advanced positions and attacked defensive posts well inside the forward area.

It is possible that these will be superseded in the war of movement by so-called "harassing commandos" (Jagdkommandos).

The following description of these units is paraphrased from a German manual.

Harassing commandos are independent mobile detachments entrusted with the execution of difficult and dangerous missions such as infiltration into the enemy flanks and rear and attacking his headquarters. In addition their tasks may include attacks on encampments and supply points, the shooting up of small bodies of security troops, the destruction of railway plant (station buildings and track, rail and road bridges) etc. They can be employed to particular advantage in withdrawal.

Difficult country, such as large woods and creeks of estuaries, are used as hide-outs. Great mobility, the ability to appear and disappear suddenly; stealth and boldness are pre-requisites for success.


The strength of the commando varies from ten to thirty men according to the task involved. The chief consideration is quality and not numbers. It is of fundamental importance that the qualities, both mental and physical, of the commando leader and of his men be first class; this applies particularly to initiative.

Both leader and men must have a good knowledge of the locality in which they are to operate, and some of the men must be able to speak the language of the country.

Equipment will also vary according to the task. It should be light, and where baggage is carried it should be restricted to a rucksack. Every man carries a dagger, a pistol with sufficient ammunition and an adequate supply of food. Rifles are often not required, though a light machine gun, or preferably one or more tommy guns, may be carried in addition to hand grenades. The commando leader and as many of his men as possible should be equipped with a whistle, pocket torch, binoculars, watch and map. Small tools, such as hand-saw and wire-cutters, may also be carried. On occasion incendiary grenades and explosives may be useful.

(From War Office Weekly Int Summary No 93)

APPENDIX "E" to 1st Corps Int Summary No 35
 CHART SHOWING VARIATIONS IN LOCAL TIMES.



PERSIAN PLACE NAMES.

| <u>Modern Official Name.</u> | <u>Old or Other Name.</u> |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| ANDIMISHK | SALEHABAD |
| BABOLSAR | MESHED-I-SAR |
| BABUL | BARFARUSH |
| BASHT-I-MISHAN | BANI TURUF |
| BUSTAN | BASATIN |
| EILAM | DEHBALA |
| GACH SARAN | GACH QARAGULI |
| GURGAN | ASTERABAD |
| HAVIZEH | HAWIZEH |
| IRAQ | SULTANABAD |
| IZEH | MALAMIR |
| JAUGAND | ZAFARKAND |
| KHORRAMSHAHR | MOHAMMERAH |
| KHOZROWABAD | KHAZALABAD |
| KHUZISTAN | ARABISTAN |
| MALAYIR | DAULATABAD |
| NAU SHAHR | DEHNAU, HABIBABAD |
| PAHLEVI | ENZELI, BANDAR PAHLEVI |
| RAFSINJAN | BAHRAMABAD |
| REZAIEH | URUMIYEH, URMIA |
| SHADGAN | FALLAHIEH |
| SHAHABAD | HARUNABAD |
| SHAHI | ALIABAD |
| SHAHPUR | DILMAN, SALMAS |
| SIRJAN | SAIDABAD |
| SUSANGIRD | KHAFANIYEH |
| TUISARKAN | TUSAR KHAN |
| VARCHIN | VARCHAO |
| ZAHIDAN | DUZDAP |

(From GSI, GHQ, MEF DAILY INT SUMMARY No 463 dated 26 Aug 41)

SECRET

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 84.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 12 Sep to 1200 hrs 13 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART 1.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

TURKEY. Distribution of Forces. An unconfirmed report mentions increased concentration of Turkish troops in S.E. districts, and the recent arrival of infantry and artillery at DIYARRAKIR, MARDIN, SIIRT and CIZRE.

General. It is reported by travellers who arrived from TURKEY on 6 Sep that the Turks have commenced to round up Italian, German, Roumanian and Bulgarian nationals, and are deporting them summarily. The informants state that this action coincides with a marked increase in pro-British feelings.

BULGARIA. General. Increased activity of German forces is reported, mostly converging on the BLACK SEA ports. Other activity includes :- despatch of petrol and artillery ammunition to VARNA, the transference of German Naval HQ to BURGAS, an increased transit of German M.T. through SOFIA, and an inspection tour of VARNA and BURGAS by Admiral RAEDER. These activities may be connected with a possible combined operation against the CRIMEA, or the North-Eastern BLACK SEA Coast.

(From GHQ MEF Int Summary No 477 dated 9 Sep 41).

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

Own Equipment - Anti-Tank. 'Tin Hat' A/Tk Bombs. These bombs resemble tin hats in shape and are so constructed that they will adhere very strongly to any steel or iron surface. They are meant to be fired, either by a short time delay pencil, time fuse, or percussion igniter.

An experiment was carried out with one on an Italian M 11 tank. Upon detonation, the mine blew a 15" diameter hole in the turret, and shearing through all turret - to - tank connections, blew the turret bodily some ten yards from the tank.
(From 9 Aust Div Int Summary No 141 dated 7 Sep 41).

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL. (i) Attached as Appendix "B" is a chart showing variations in Local Times.

(ii) Attached as Appendix "C" is a list of PERSIAN place names.

GENERAL. Attached as Appendix "A" is a report on German Harrassing Commandos.

PART 11.

SECURITY.

Embarkation of Vichy Troops and Civilians at BEIRUT.

The embarkation of Vichy troops and civilians at BEIRUT

(OVER)

has now been completed with the exception of a final ship to leave on about the 25 Sep 41.

The whole of the embarkation has been carried out without any unseemly incident, and relations between Vichy Officers, civilians, and our Military personnel were comparatively good throughout.

The following are the particulars of the embarkations :-

| CONVOY | Date Sailed | Army, Naval and Air Force and families | Civilians | Total embarkation. |
|---------------------------|-------------|--|-----------|--------------------|
| "Z" | 7/8/41 | 4712 | 28 | 4740 |
| "A" | 16/8/41 | 5248 | 32 | 5280 |
| "B" | 22/8/41 | 4751 | 215 | 4966 |
| "C" | 29/8/41 | 4077 | 85 | 4162 |
| "D" | 1/9/41 | 5543 | 167 | 5710 |
| "Z 1" | 4/9/41 | 3015 | 144 | 3159 |
| "A 1" | 7/9/41 | 4215 | 138 | 4353 |
| "B 1" | 12/9/41 | 2723 | 116 | 28399 |
| | | 34,284 | 925 | 35,209 |
| Hospital Ship SS "Sphinx" | 27/8/41 | 450 (176 from HAIFA) | 50 | 500 |
| | | 34,734 | 975 | 35,709 |

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Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No 61.

S E C R E T

100 "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 84

A recce of the area near R9 was carried out by a Sapper of the RAE. His report is as follows :-

"On the night of Aug 24/30 between 2359 hrs and 0030 hrs I left our wire between R9 and R8 closer to R9 than to R8 and passed over our old "52" minefield along the wire between R8 and R7. Most of the minefields in the part I saw appeared to have been removed. When I was outside this old perimeter wire, which is full of gaps, I went to the West of R7 about 400 yds. South of it.

On this line I found a number of skeletons with GERMAN uniforms on them, about 40 in all, in a small area of ground in a dip. They had apparently been dead a long time, and all papers, gear and weapons had been removed from those whom I examined - about 20 in all. The headgear and boots were missing from most of them.

When West of R7 I could hear sounds of digging and movement of stones further to the West.

I kept moving West until I met the minefield of ITALIAN mines, two rows, in front of the old perimeter wire between R5 and R7. The wire was in fair order, concertinas having been added to the ITALIAN box type, but, as I moved up towards R7, it was broken and near the Post, was flattened down.

A number of tins were attached to the wire as a warning device. I stopped about 150 yds from R7 and could see four pits in the Post against the skyline. One appeared to be built out in front of the tank ditch to the East of the Post, and near the wire.

I could hear men talking and could see the upper half of their bodies as they walked around the tank ditch. I could not make out the language.

At this stage I moved North and skirted Post about 300 yds to the West meeting wheel tracks with a phone wire and a bundle of other wires between them. I cut the phone wire and tied a Mills grenade with the pin removed to it. I then moved East and in the general direction of R8. Whilst still in sight of the track, I struck two rows of TELLER mines about 12 ft between rows, in a row or rows of "S" type mines with trip wires. I cannot remember whether there was more than one row, and if "S" mines had push igniters. Passing through these, I set off one which did not have any disturbed earth around it and had either been laid some time or the ground watered or treated in some way to hide the signs of digging. The other rows showed definite signs of disturbed earth. The mine I set off was probably defective in some way, as when I pressed on the prong with my finger I managed to hold the cylinder in the ground where it exploded.

After setting off the mine, I set off quickly for our wire. Near R8, I was fired on from my right by a Spandau somewhere between R7 and R9. I passed one of our cruiser tanks on my left and then met the road. When near the road I was fired on from seemingly all directions but reached R8 safely at about 0415 hrs.

The bundle of wires between the wheel tracks mentioned previously and leading from R7 to R5 had leads going off to the TELLER mines in the field near the track. These wires went into the arming pt in the side of the one mine I examined, but wires also led to the other mine of the two between which I passed."

(From 9 Aust Div Int Summary No 139 dated 5 Sep 41)

APPENDIX "B" to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No

ANALYSIS OF MEDITERRANEAN AXIS MERCHANT SHIP SINKINGS
For AUGUST 1941.

1. Ships plying between Italy and Italian North African Ports.

- (a) Total sinkings. i.e. North and Southbound and ships in harbour 83,780 tons.
- (b) Southbound sinkings (including ships sunk in Italian Nth African ports) 74,130 tons.
(b) expressed as a percentage of (a) = 88%.
- (c) Total estimated sailings from Italy.
On incomplete evidence an estimate is reached:- 339,000 tons
On this basis the following percentages result:-
- (i) Southbound sinkings (b) expressed as a percentage of total sailings.....22%
- (ii) Total sinkings (a) expressed as a percentage of total sailings.....24%.

2. Aegean Sinkings 9,600 tons
3. Total Mediterranean Sinkings 93,380 tons

4. Analysis of Attacks.

| | | |
|---------------------|-------|--|
| Submarines sank | 44.5% | of total tonnage sunk during the month |
| Naval aircraft sank | 37.8% | " " " " " " " |
| R.A.F. sank | 17.7% | " " " " " " " |

5. Analysis of Sinkings - Sea and Harbour.

Out of a total of 93,380 tons of shipping only 6% was sunk in harbour.

6. Probable sinkings. The above figures represent a very conservative estimate as, in addition to known sinkings a further 23,600 tons is noted as "probable sinkings". This represents a further 7% of the sailings to Italian North Africa.

7. Damage to Shipping. Over and above sinkings and probable sinkings 104,180 tons are noted as damaged (30% of all sailings)
Of the total tonnage damaged 47% is credited to the R.A.F.

8. Total ships sunk 22. of which :-

| | |
|-------------------|----|
| By submarines | 10 |
| By torpedo bomber | 5 |
| By medium bomber | 4 |
| By heavy bomber | 3 |

9. Percentage of ships sunk by each weapon are as follows:-

| | |
|----------------|------|
| Submarines | 45 |
| Torpedo bomber | 22.5 |
| Medium bomber | 18.9 |
| Heavy bomber | 13.6 |

10. The tonnage totals sunk by each weapon are as follows:-

Submarines: 37,280 tons, Torpedo bombers: 31,700, Medium bombers: 10,000, Heavy Bombers: 4,800, TOTAL: 83,780 tons.

(From M.B.I.C. Daily Int Summary No 659 dated 6 Sep 41)

SECRET

SECRET INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 85

from information received from
1200 hrs 13 Sep to 1200 hrs 14 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART 1.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

TOBRUCH. The following reports have been received, covering operations from 2 Sep to 6 Sep.

The general situation has remained quiet.

Enemy air activity has been, if anything, on a decreased scale, although a number of HL, dive-bombing, and mine laying attacks have been made. In each case little or no damage has resulted.

At MADDALENA, one of our roving AA guns shot down an enemy plane and hit several others.

Our own fighters made numerous sweeps during the daylight hours, and, although on a number of occasions contact was not made with the enemy, on 4 Sep sixteen ME 109s and G 50s were intercepted whilst ground-strafting at SIDI BARANI. In the ensuing dog fight, five G 50s were confirmed shot down by our fighters and AA guns, while another two are probable. We lost no planes.

Enemy shelling of FDLs has been normal.

Working parties indicate that the enemy is actively engaged preparing new positions and strengthening his existing line North of the DERNA road.

Attached as Appendix "A" is a report by a sapper who carried out a lone recce.

(Extracts from 9 Aust Div Int Summaries.)

GERMANY.

Identifications. The following list of the distinctive colours now worn by personnel of the various arms of German mobile troops embodies all the changes which have occurred since the beginning of the war. Earlier publications should be amended accordingly.

| | |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Tank Regiments | Pink |
| Anti-Tank Battalions..... | Pink with letter "P" |
| All Reconnaissance Units..... | Copper Bronze. No letter "A" |
| Cavalry Regiments..... | Orange. |
| Lorried Infantry Regiments..... | Reseda Green. No letter "S" |
| Motor-cycle Battalions..... | Grass Green with Letter "K". |

RUSSIA. There are again indications that weather conditions are playing a part of increasing importance in the Eastern campaign, and may prove the determining factor in German strategy. In the LENINGRAD area, the autumn rainfall may set in as early as the beginning of September. The rains in this area, probably owing to maritime considerations, are heavier than in Central RUSSIA. Real winter conditions, when the roads are quite impassable, except for a narrow frozen strip in the middle about twelve feet wide, usually begin in late October. There may, however, be intermittent thaws until as late as the end of November. Early autumn rains, like those apparently being encountered at the moment, may cause serious obstacles in the low lands in the area West, South and South-East of LENINGRAD, and many roads, if not well surfaced and drained, may become soft and unable to stand up to heavy traffic. Two or

(Over)

three day's rain at this period may make movement on it difficult for the rest of the year, since they get very wet and there is not enough sun to dry them. In September, ground temperature fluctuates about zero at night.

In Central RUSSIA, the autumn season may start in late September or early October, and winter, with heavy snowfalls and temperatures of about -35° Centigrade, in late November or early December. In some areas, such as Northern and possibly Eastern ROUMANIA, the surrounding mountains cause very heavy late summer rain, and owing to the heavy nature of the soil, road surfaces are apt to become muddy and very heavy. In the area South of ROSTOV and along the BLACK SEA littoral it practically never freezes, and the climate might almost be called semi-tropical. Real winter here does not start much before January.

In the Far North, in the MURMANSK area, there are no roads whatever, and the only means of communication in the summer is the railway, supplemented in winter by sledge drawn by reindeer or dogs. Apart from this, it is fair to say that Russian main roads are generally passable for MT provided they can be kept clear of snow and traffic is not too intense. Secondary roads are, however, impassable during the winter because they are snow-bound, and are later waterlogged during the Spring thaw from mid-April to mid-May. The Russian road system is, however, so limited and the demands made upon it by the 210 Axis divisions are likely to be so extensive, that a major problem will arise. It is reported that the urgency of establishing supply routes by rail has compelled the Germans to start relaying one of the main lines from Central POLAND on the Continental 4'8 1/2" gauge.

While it is impossible at present to estimate at what date GERMANY might be able to stabilise her front and free formations, especially armoured divisions, and air forces, for other theatres; there are signs that that date is not yet at hand. A report from a fairly reliable source tells of the German intention to stabilise the front with a hundred divisions, leaving some sixty or seventy for other theatres. One thing seems certain: even if the Germans do succeed in stabilising the front before long, their casualties in personnel and equipment, especially in armoured formations, have been such that the best part of two months will be necessary to refit before they can be used in any other theatre. The same, to a lesser extent, applies to air forces.

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION. Nil.

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL. (Extract from HQ British Forces in P, TJ & Int Summary No 9, dated 12 Sep 41).
ROAD DEIR EZ ZOR A 5991 - T.2 F 5285.

| Miles | Remarks. |
|-------|--|
| 0.0 | Map Ref. A 5989. NE corner of perimeter wire DEIR-EZ-ZOR Airport. |
| 0.1 | Reach main DEIR-EZ-ZOR road. Surface loose but fit for all types of traffic in all weathers. Telephone line along road. |
| 2.1 | Track to right leading to petrol dump. Ground to left is cultivated with irrigation ditches. |
| 3.7 | Wadi. |
| 3.8 | Map Ref 6484. Turn right along track to T.2, clearly shown by brick pillar marked T.2 - 107 km. |
| 5.9 | Defile, wadi with steep sides, good cover from ground. |
| 6.4 | Gairn. |
| 8.4 | Defile. Single track over escarpment bending and rising somewhat steeply. |
| 8.6 | On reaching top of escarpment ground becomes flat with hard and smooth surface permitting good dispersion and speed. Continues for about 7 miles, after which speed may have to be reduced owing to loose surface. |

Remarks

19.4 Ruins approximately 300 yards to right of track. Ground, although permitting dispersion if necessary, is stony and bumpy, and speed is reduced. Surface of the track is loose.
 27.6 Good going for approximately 1 mile.
 28.3 Ground to side of track consists of small mounds of sand, and it is advisable for vehicles to follow the track. Continues so for about 8 miles.
 38.2 Wadi on right of track.
 38.7 Bends in tracks.
 39.0 Track becomes rocky and speed must be reduced.
 40.5 Well to left of track. Amount and quality of water unknown.
 42.2 Surface loose.
 44.4 Bends in track.
 54.4 Ground again becomes flat and open with good hard surface permitting good dispersion and speed. This continues until T.2.
 70.0 F 5585 T.2.

Branching right South off the DEIR EZ ZOR - ABOU KEMAL road approximately four miles from the DEIR EZ ZOR airport the route runs across open desert and is clearly defined the whole way.

It is an unconstructed desert track suitable for all types of motor transport, and provides good going throughout its length, having no sharp turns or steep gradients which present any difficulty. With the exception of defiles mentioned in the detailed report, the ground permits of wide dispersion, but after thirty miles the surrounding country becomes bumpy and stony, and, although not completely preventing movement in open formation, it is more comfortable for vehicles to keep to the track for the next 25 miles. There is no cover from air, but some ground cover is provided in wadis, though this is only occasional.

Ample water is available at T.2, but the only other supply is a well at 5729 - 41 miles out.

Planes could land along most of the route, and there is a landing-ground at T.2.

There are no bridges, fences, telephone wires or villages, but Bedouins are to be met at the well mentioned above.

GENERAL. Att at Appendix "B" is an analysis of MEDITERRANEAN A-1 Merchantship sinkings for August 41.

PART 11. SECURITY.

Nil.

Handwritten:
 Transmitted
 May
 Lt-Col.
 GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION. As per Summary No 61.

SECRET

ST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 86

Compiled from information received from
12 hrs 14 Sep to 1200 hrs 15 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

GERMANY.

Notes on Armies. The following divisions are now known to be motorised:-

| | | |
|-------------------------------|-----|--------------------|
| S.S. ADOLF HITLER Division | 18 | Motorised Division |
| S.S. REICH Division | 20 | " " |
| S.S. TOTENKOPF Division | 25 | " " |
| S.S. WIKING Division | 29 | " " |
| An unidentified S.S. Division | 30 | " " |
| 2 Motorised Division | 36 | " " |
| 3 " " | 60 | " " |
| 10 " " | 82 | " " |
| 13 " " | 93 | " " |
| 14 " " | 262 | " " |
| 16 " " | 269 | " " |

This gives GERMANY a total of at least 22 Motorised Divisions. In addition the following Infantry formations may also be motorised:-

| | |
|------------|-------------|
| 4 Division | 34 Division |
| 24 " " | 156 " " |

(From GHQ MEF Daily Int Summary No 478 dated 10 Sep 41.)

The total number of German Divisions engaged to date on the Russian front is estimated at 175, of which 18 are Armoured, 22 are Motorised, 2 are Cavalry, 4 are Mountain, and 129 are Infantry.

The S.S. KAVALLERIE Division has been identified on the Eastern Front. This is a new identification.

(From GHQ MEF Daily Int Summary No 480 dated 12 Sep 41.)

TURKEY.

Notes on Armies.

The Turkish Deputy Chief of General Staff has stated that no substantial change had taken place in the dispositions of Turkish troops in the Syrian frontier area since the Syrian campaign. Reports of concentrations in this area should be treated with reserve.

(From GHQ MEF Daily Int Summary No 478 of 10 Sep 41.)

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION. - Nil -

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL.

TRACK HAGGETCHE 2561 - CHEIKH AHMED 8982. 28.8.41.

0.0 On leaving the port take the first road going through the town, which leads up to the JAGH-JAGH bridge. Beyond the bridge is a cross roads. Take the track

- leading NE. The track here is well defined and good. Speed of 25-30 mph.
- 6.0 Point 362, map ref 8459. A good landing ground with even surface, marked by stones. Track runs through ground.
- 7.0 Track good, but full of small stones. Speed 15-20 mph.
- 8.5 Track becomes bumpy and going is slow, there are deep ruts. Speed 10 mph.
- 10.0 Track runs along bank of JAGH-JAGH river. Average speed only 15 mph. due to the presence of small wadis, which however have metalled crossings.
- 13.0 The track from here to TELL BARDE 2078 is good and a speed of 20-25 mph can be maintained easily.
- 19.0 Track forks. Take left fork to a concrete bridge over the OUADI JERRAH. Again fork left for TELL BARDE village; the track straight on goes to TELL AALO.
- 19.3 Track to TELL BARDE passes over a wooden bridge, capable of taking heavy motor transport. TELL BARDE 2078.
- 20.0 After TELL BARDE track is bumpy for about 500 yards and then good. Speed 20-25 mph except for occasional bumpy patches.
- 40.0 Three wadis at intervals of 200 yards with bad crossings at each. Track then becomes good.
- 48.0 Cross roads and signposts - left KAMISHLIE, right TELL AALO. The track which goes straight on leads into cultivated fields about a mile further.
- 50.0 CHEIKH AHMED. There is no bridge to cross OUADI JERRAH, but it is fordable in many places. Appears to be the watering point for animals of the nomadic Arab tribes of the area.

A good 25 mph track. Good dispersion possible all along the route except at mile 10 when crossing wadis.

GENERAL.

Attached as Appendix "A" is a diagram showing the organization of a German Inf Div based on information received at this HQ up to July 41.

It should be noted that in the Div Recce Unit, each Sabre Tp has one LMG and not three as shown on the diagram.

Additional copies of this diagram are being forwarded to formations under separate cover.

PART 11 - SECURITY.

Fifth Column Activities. During recent weeks a considerable number of reports have been received which suggest the existence of an ever-growing Nazi-controlled element in SYRIA and the LEBANON. Admittedly, the majority of these reports are based on information gleaned from civilians, and consist chiefly of personal opinions and "common talk". Nevertheless, bearing in mind the old adage that there is never smoke without fire, it is quite clear from all these reports and from other evidence (for example the discovery of German Fifth Column dumps) that a wide-spread subversive organisation is at work against us.

very prominently among the reports are persons
rs of the PARTI POPULAIRE SYRIEN. Whether
fact, German-controlled and the directing
in s subversive activity in this country, or whether
to : part of a larger organisation, remains yet to be
ed.

To date comparatively little evidence of a concrete
nature has been received, that is, evidence that can be used
conclusively and successfully in obtaining convictions against
the persons concerned.

Whilst admitting that the reports at present being
received are all of intense interest and serve as a basis
from which further investigation can be instituted, it must
be borne in mind that they are not sufficiently detailed or
concrete to enable the authorities to take direct action.

That a Fifth Column does exist in SYRIA there is no
doubt, but as to what line of action they will take in the
event of invasion is as yet not known. Such acts as sabotage
of communications and essential public facilities and sniping
of our convoys are to be expected and guarded against. Whether
their influence and/or numbers are strong enough to bring a
force against our rear and lines of communication in such an
eventuality is yet to be ascertained.

Quite a number of people, both military personnel and
civilians, have come forward with reports on persons and parties
believed to be engaged in subversive activities, and have later
expressed disappointment at our lack of action.

We should be at some pains to explain to these people
that all their reports are of value to us, and are being
utilised in building up sufficient evidence to enable us to
bring about conclusive actions against the persons or parties
concerned.


It is always difficult to detect the difference between
the persons who are openly engaged in subversive activities and
those who are operating under a cloak of some commercial occupa-
tion. For example a strongly suspected agent in TRIPOLI is
manager of a printing company while others are engaged as
engineers, accountants, etc.

All officers, and more particularly Security Officers,
should be ever watchful that these business cloaks do not serve
to allay any suspicions they may have in connection with
civilians' actions.

Mander
by Lt-col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION. As per Summary No 61.

(INFANTRIE — DIVISION)



NOTES.


- (a) THIS DIAGRAM SHOWS WHAT IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE THEORETICAL ORGANIZATION OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION AT THE PRESENT TIME. NEW FORMATION DIVISIONS MAY NOT ALL BE ORGANIZED ON THIS BASIS, BUT IT IS BELIEVED TO BE THE INTENTION THAT ALL DIVISIONS WILL BE ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED ON THIS BASIS.
- (b) IT HAS NOT YET BEEN DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED WHETHER IT IS INTENDED TO INCLUDE ONE OF THESE UNITS IN EACH DIVISION, OR WHETHER THEY ARE TO REMAIN G.H.Q. TROOPS.
- (c) IN SOME DIVISIONS THE PEACE-TIME ORGANIZATION OF ONE FIELD REGIMENT OF THREE HORSED BATTERIES AND ONE MEDIUM REGIMENT OF ONE HORSED AND ONE MECHANIZED BATTERY, MAY HAVE BEEN RETAINED.
- (d) EACH TROOP HAS TWO L.M.G.s AND PROBABLY TWO 2-c.m. A/A AND A/Tk GUNS FOR LOCAL DEFENCE.
- (e) IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE SABRE SQUADRON HAS BEEN IN SOME CASES REPLACED BY AN ADDITIONAL CYCLIST SQUADRON. IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER THIS CHANGE IN ORGANIZATION IS GENERAL OR WHETHER IT IS AN ISOLATED CASE, DUE POSSIBLY TO A SHORTAGE OF HORSES OR TRAINED HORSEMEN.
- (f) EXISTENCE NOT CONFIRMED.
- G.S.I.(a)
H.Q.I. AUST. CORPS. JULY 41.
P.D.R./MISC./1820.

FIRE POWER OF AN INFANTRY DIVISION

| | DIV. RECCE. UNIT. | DIV. INF. | DIV. ARTY. | MOT. (M.G. Bn.) ¹⁾ | DIV. ATK. Bn. | DIV. ENG. Bn. | TOTAL |
|---|-------------------------|--------------|---------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------|
| MACHINE PISTOLS (EXCL. THOSE IN ARMOURD CARS) | — | 432 | — | — | — | — | 432 |
| MACHINE GUNS, LIGHT MOUNTING | 24 | 336 | 24 | — | 18 | 28 | 430 |
| MACHINE GUNS, HEAVY MOUNTING | 8 | 108 | — | — | — | — | 116 |
| 2-cm. (79-in) A.T.K. RIFLES | — | 81 | — | — | — | — | 81 |
| 2-cm. (79-in) A.A. AND A.T.K. GUNS | — | 12 | 24 | 36 | 12 | — | 84 |
| 3.7-cm. (148-in) A.T.K. GUNS | 3 | 36 | — | — | 36 | — | 75 |
| 5-cm. (2-in) MORTARS | 3 | 81 | — | — | — | — | 84 |
| 81-cm. (316-in) MORTARS | 3 | 54 | — | — | — | — | 57 |
| 7.5-cm. (298-in) INFANTRY GUNS | 2 | 18 | — | — | — | — | 20 |
| 15-cm. (59-in) INFANTRY GUNS | — | 6 | — | — | — | — | 6 |
| 105-cm. (414-in) GUN-HOWITZERS | — | — | 36 | — | — | — | 36 |
| 155-cm. (414-in) GUNS | — | — | 4 | — | — | — | 4 |
| 155-cm. (59-in) HOWITZERS | — | — | 8 | — | — | — | 8 |

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SECRET

1. ST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 87

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 15 Sep to 1200 hrs 16 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS. - TURKEY.

It is reliably reported that the whole 1921 class will be called to the colours in the Autumn instead of the normal peacetime procedure of calling only technicians up in the Autumn and infantry in the Spring. This will mean that, apart from reservists, the 1921, 1920, 1919 and 1918 classes will be serving with the colours. The latter class, however, are to be given three months' leave during the winter months, so that, in effect, there will be only three classes with the colours until the Spring.

During the last few days of August, there has been a considerable ferry movement, including personnel, carts and baggage from KILIA to NGARA on the Asiatic side. The exact reason for this movement is not clear but it may well be that, owing to the general situation, a division is being withdrawn from the already overcrowded GALLIPOLI Peninsula to the Asiatic mainland. It is known that the Turkish General Staff intended to make such a reduction when the situation permitted. There is some reason for believing that the destination of the troops being ferried across is BIGA, about 20 miles SOUTH of KARABIGA on the coast of the Sea of MARMARA. (Ankara letter No 8).

It is reported that considerable numbers of Turkish troops are using the frontier railway and passing through SYRIA. Nearly every train for the past few weeks has contained twenty to fifty Turkish soldiers. They change trains at MUSLINIE. On the night 8/9 September, six waggons of Turkish troops passed through. Ten waggons were expected to arrive on 11 September. (FSS ALEPPO).

(From HQ British Forces in P, T-J & S Daily Int Summary, No 98 dated 14 Sep 41.)

Enemy Morale before TOBRUK.

When the Germans arrived outside TOBRUK, they considered it a matter of days. Later, prisoners began to admit that it represented a tough job. Recently German prisoners are beginning to express doubts as to whether it can be taken at all. A German tank corps Lieutenant says that ROMMEL "got a heavy kick in the pants" for the German losses in the attempted assaults of TOBRUK. General VON PAULUS is stated to have come over on a visit of inspection, but had to admit that the bosses in BERLIN had no conception of the conditions and difficulties prevailing in the desert.

(From RAF ME Weekly Int Summary No 64 dated 9 Sep 41).

German and Italian Air Action.

For the week ending 9 Sep, enemy air activity in the ME may be summarized as follows:-

The full moon period has been fully utilised aircraft based in Southern GREECE for bombing such strategic objectives as the ports ALEXANDRIA, PORT SAID and SUEZ, the base aerodromes of ABU SUEIR and ISMAILIA, and shipping in the Northern RED SEA. TOBRUK was also the object of an attack by German aircraft based in GREECE; the objective in this case was probably Naval units entering and leaving the harbour. German Air Force units based in CYRENAICA have shown no change in their scale of operations. Bombing attacks have been few, though reconnaissance aircraft have dropped their load on TOBRUK on their return, probably owing to lack of shipping or other suitable targets. No actions by dive-bombers have been reported. ME.109s have been encountered over the forward area on several occasions; two offensive sweeps over the SOLLUM - SIDI BARRANI area were carried out.

The Canal Zone was subjected to attacks of varying intensity on all seven nights by aircraft operating in every case, from Southern GREECE.

The main feature of interest has been the operations carried out by the newly arrived long range bombers based in GREECE. There had been some speculation as to the probable activity of these aircraft, but it now seems fairly certain that they will be employed against our lines of communication in the RED SEA and GULF of SUEZ.

All strengths and locations remain unaltered.

In LIBYA the fuel situation has eased and there has been a slight increase in the Italian air effort. This has taken the form of (a) high level night bombing attacks against HALTA, TOBRUK and MERSA MATRUH - as is their practice during the full moon period (b) low flying machine-gun attacks against SIDI BARRANI to which place a number of our fighters have been moved recently.

Other offensive action has been confined to one attack against HAIFA, two on CYPRUS and one or two single aircraft attacks against ground forces near the LIBYAN frontier. The main role of the Italian Air Force, however, remains the protection of shipping, harbours and aerodromes.

It is estimated that at least 60 Italian MC 200 fighters are based in the Roumanian front and are operating as part of the Italo-Roumanian force in the DNEIPROPETROVSK area. These machines were in action against the Soviet for the first time between 2 and 9 Sep.

(From RAF ME Weekly Intelligence Summary No 64 dated 9 Sep41)

U.S.S.R.

The situation on the Russian Front on 8 Sep is shown on the sketch attached (Appendix "A"). Since that date the principal events are as follows:-

Far Northern Sector.

The attack on MURMANSK was renewed on 11 Sep and it was reported on 13 Sep that the German approach to the port was developing. There is no news of the combined Finnish-German thrusts towards the WHITE SEA or towards PETROZAVODSK and OLANETS. It is not known that the railway line from LENINGRAD to MURMANSK has been cut except near LENINGRAD itself and the link with MOSCOW via ZVANKA is still almost certainly intact. There have been no further reports for the last three days.

LENINGRAD Sector.

The struggle for LENINGRAD has continued and heavy fighting has been reported every day for the last fortnight. Since 8 Sep German pressure has been intensified but so far there appears to have been little or no advance beyond the positions shown in the sketch, when the city was cut off from the South and South-East. To the North the Finns are established in the

from TAIPALE to SUMMA and the Red Army has withdrawn behind the 1939 frontier. The most serious threat to LENINGRAD has however come from the SW and on 10 Sep the Germans claimed to have completed a ring around the city by the capture of the town of SCHLUSSELBURG, East of LENINGRAD. This claim has been indirectly substantiated by the Russian statement that they can still provision the city across LAKE LADOGA. The present position is obscure, but Russian resistance is certainly still very strong and the Germans have undoubtedly sustained severe losses. Reliable reports indicate that the defenders are resolute and will put up as vigorous a resistance as is being made at ODESSA. They counter-attacked on 15 Sep and claimed to have destroyed one German force. Fierce fighting is in progress and the Germans appear to have substantially increased their air attacks. British fighters are now in operation in this area.

Central Sector.

Around SMOLENSK the initiative seems to have passed to the Red Army under Marshall TIMOSHENKO. A counter-offensive was begun on 8 Sep and, although the Russians have so far failed to recapture SMOLENSK itself, they have made some advances and the Germans have been definitely on the defensive. It is probable that the Russian attacks in this area have been designed to relieve the pressure elsewhere, as before they started the Germans were digging in in the positions they had previously reached and showed no disposition to continue their drive towards MOSCOW - at least for the present. Despite German claims that the Russian attacks have collapsed, it appears that the counter-offensive is still continuing and the Russian claim to be within twelve miles of the city on 15 Sep may very well be true.

The drive from GOMEL towards BRYANSK was checked in a battle around BRYANSK itself, commencing on 9 Sep. In this engagement the Germans were defeated by 14 Sep, but how far they were compelled to withdraw is unknown. Meanwhile a second thrust from GOMEL south-eastwards across the DESNA River developed. The initial advance of the German armoured formations was held by the Russians and the Germans were forced to bring up infantry divisions. On 13 Sep the Russians admitted the loss of a town 70 miles SE of GOMEL and there was a distinct threat to the rear of KIEV and to the defences of the whole of the lower DNIEPER. There has been no report of further German advances since 14 Sep, but the position remains serious.

Ukraine Sector.

As will be seen from the sketch the Germans secured two bridge-heads over the DNIEPER by 8 Sep - at DNIEPROPETROVSK and at KREMLENCHUG - though the MOSCOW communiques did not admit their forces had withdrawn from the latter till 15 Sep and on 13 Sep claimed that German attempts to cross the DNIEPER had been smashed. On the other hand all German efforts to enlarge these two bridgeheads appear to have failed. The attack North of KIEV seems to have been stopped, although the loss of a town NE of KIEV was admitted on 14 Sep. This town may be KOZELYETS. It is known that Italian troops were in action on the DNIEPER front by the first week of September. There has been heavy fighting near BERISLAV, a town on the DNIEPER about 60 miles from its mouth. German attempts to cross at this point have been unsuccessful. The object of this attack is presumably to cut the line of supplies to the CRIMEA.

ODESSA.

Although this city was completely surrounded some weeks ago, resistance is still being maintained, and the garrison is receiving considerable help from the Red Air Force based in the CRIMEA. Until recently also supplies were being brought in by sea and this may still be possible. The siege seems to be con-

ducted largely by Roumanian forces and it is reported that a two-day attack has been finally broken up. There is no doubt that Roumanian losses have been severe and the defence of the fortress has naturally hampered German operations further East. ODESSA was still in Russian hands at 1200 hrs 16 Sep.

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

Enemy Air Tactics.

The new German method of attacking shipping is as follows:- The approach is made very low at right angles to the longitudinal axis of the vessel and the bomb is dropped so that it hits the side just above the water line. By this method there is greater likelihood of sinking the ship. However, this exposes the attacker to the most effective AA fire and he also stands a good chance of being blown up by his own bomb. (Source: RAF (ME) W.I.S. No 59).

Orders to enemy AA units stationed in HAVRE in October last year were recently found on a prisoner. These documents reveal the following two points of interest.

Order dated 10 Oct 40. It has been frequently observed recently that in a night attack one plane will fly in at a height of 2,500 to 3,000 metres and draw on itself the fire of the AA. In the meantime another plane comes down to 800 - 1,000 metres with its engine throttled back and drops its bombs. The second aircraft is usually spotted by the AA posts only when it has regained height.

Order dated 10 Oct 40. Firing on enemy parachute flares by AA artillery henceforward is forbidden as serving no useful purpose. (Source RAF (ME) W.I.S. No 54).

AIRCRAFT MARKINGS.

(1) The following is a translation of a captured document:-

"In order to avoid the strong contrast between the white colour used for the Fascio marking and the main colour of the wing, the markings will be changed immediately as follows:-

(a) Markings on the upper wing surfaces: the white will be replaced by the existing camouflage (spots on the land aircraft and a uniform colour on seaplanes).

(b) Markings on the lower wing surfaces: replacement of the white background by the camouflage of the surfaces." (Source: RAF (ME) W.I.S. No 54).

(2) (a) Various markings have been observed on Ju 87s over TOBRUK. Some have had "Yellow noses" and German markings on the tail. Some have been painted light grey underneath, some dark grey and some orange-yellow.

(b) Change of Markings on Italian Aircraft:

Since last Sep the distinguishing tail markings are no longer the tricolour green white red stripes with the royal coat of arms at the top of the white stripe, but a plain white cross, again with the coat of arms towards the top of the upright stroke. This cross is painted directly on to the camouflage colour of the machine.

The distinguishing mark is no longer considered sufficient, especially since the fasces on the wing are no longer outlined against a white ring, and with the excessive fear of being attacked by their own aircraft which has led them to paint huge red and white diagonal lines on all their warships, the Italians have, also since about last Sept, painted a broad white band all around the fuselage of all their machines.

This, of course, ruins the effect of the camouflage and special instructions were given that when an aircraft was on the ground this marking should be covered with leaves etc to make it less conspicuous from the air. German Aircraft operating with the Italians have also been seen with this white band.

The question of "Yellow noses" on German and Italian aircraft is still being investigated. All that can be said is that it does not denote either nationality or Squadron.

On occasions recently the leading aircraft of German planes attacking Tobruk have been reported to have had and white check tail fins. It is considered likely that this marking is carried by the flight commander.

(Source: HQ BTE W.I.S. No 63)

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

TURKEY

A new military road has been completed from BEYKOS to the BLACK SEA coast about YUM BURNU. The road is reported to be about 27 feet wide, built of water-bound macadam, and well ditched on each side.

Rail communications between TURKEY and BULGARIA are still cut. An unconfirmed report states that the bridge at EDIRNE which was partly destroyed at the beginning of the Greek-German war is to be replaced by a new metal structure from GERMANY. The parts have arrived at TRIESTE, but as the Turkish Government did not pay the Marine Insurance on the material it has not yet been shipped. It is assumed in Government circles that the Turks are adopting a deliberate delaying policy.

(From GHQ MEF Int Summary No 480 dated 12 Sep 41)

PART II SECURITY

Food Shortage.

The problem of food supply, particularly wheat, has assumed such proportions during the past three weeks, that it must be considered one of major importance not only from a civil aspect but also from a military point of view.

Military commanders throughout the country, realizing the close relationship between this problem and that of Security have been doing much to bring the position before the administrative authorities. Nevertheless the fact remains that many families are starving already and with the winter approaching there is every indication that many more will be in a similar plight in the near future.


Reports from some centres indicate that wheat is not procurable; while others indicate that the supply available is made prohibitive because of the price asked.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to convince the inhabitants that the present state of affairs is not the fault of the British Army in Syria, particularly in view of the propaganda broadcasts before our entry into the country. As this is so the security problem within the country must be expected to increase in proportion as the food shortage becomes more acute.

qdadler
for Lt Col
GS 1 Aust Corp

DISTRIBUTION : As per Summary No 61.

APPENDIX "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int
Summary No 87.



SECRET

CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 88

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 16 Sep to 1200 hrs 17 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART I.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

TURKEY

Turkish soldiers in transit in SYRIA are reported to have been ordered to remove their badges to prevent the identification of units.

A training camp is said to have been started recently at URFA for recruits from VAN, BITLIS and EL AZIZ.

The Military Authorities at KILIS are said to have installed three heavy guns at CHAIRINE 281523 (1/200,000 ALEPPO).

(From HQ Ir Forces in P T-J & S Daily Int Summary No 99 dated 15 Sep 41)

EUROPE.

The following points have been learnt from two persons who were actually in the countries concerned :-

GERMANY. (Up to 21 Jul)

HAMBURG and MANNHEIM, it is stated, have suffered terrifically through RAF raids. COLOGNE has suffered considerably but the damage to FRANKFURT outwardly appears slight. In BERLIN, from what the man in the street is permitted to see, the damage does not appear heavy. Source attempted to get into the docks at KIEL but these were closed to the public and he was given to understand that all the marine work and submarine building from KIEL had been moved to DANZIG. The Germans continuously erect dummy wooden buildings at KIEL to draw RAF fire. BREMEN has suffered considerably from fires and every street bears signs of gutted buildings. Krupp at ESSEN has been transferred to HUNGARY, as it was apparently impossible to carry on work at ESSEN.

The LEUNA synthetic oil plant was reported to have been smashed entirely and no effort has been made to re-establish work there. On the PLESOW railway, between SAEINOV and LIPJAN, Czechoslovakia, in the LIPJANSKA DOLINA, lies a huge camp for prisoners of war, accommodating 23,000 men, mostly Poles and Serbs.

ROMANIA.

The same source as above stated that owing to the congested state of the railways in this country, all oil to GERMANY is shipped by the DANUBE.

GERMANY. (Second source.)

The report submitted by this source goes back as far as July 1939, and therefore only the more recent observations are given in this Summary.

/FRANKFURT -

FRANKFURT - April/May

Source states that he experienced the severe damage the city had suffered. During this period he noticed a change in the civil population's attitude towards air raids; they were beginning to take them seriously and to be worried about the future.

HAMBURG.

* Between 10th and 25th May there were two terrible raids, each lasting 5 hours. Thousands of people were rendered homeless and in one raid alone it was known that over 350 people were killed. During this period Blohm and Voss (a/c builders) sustained considerable damage.

It would require too much space to give in detail the accounts rendered by these two sources, but the few facts recounted above serve to show the serious view taken by the people in GERMANY of R.A.F. raids - and it is stressed that neither of the sources referred to visited the RHINE, RUHR and other industrial districts which have been the object of special and increased attention of the R.A.F. within the last two or three months. (From R.A.F. ME W.I.S. No 2 dated 9 Sep 41)

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION

GERMAN ARTILLERY - GERMAN.

Methods.

The following is a translation of a German Army Publication :-

GHQ 11 Dec 40.

NOTES FOR ARTILLERY No 21.

1. Fire against Concrete emplacements.

The High Command publication "Instructions for Artillery Fire against particularly resistant targets" has been replaced by a new publication (Army High Command/Director of Ordnance Supplies and Command of Reserve Army/AHA/Jn 4 III No.4100/40 Secret) with effect from 1 Aug 1940.

There has been repeated disregard of the following points with resultant lack of success.

- (a) Concrete emplacements and embrasures are point targets (PUNKTZIELE) and will be engaged with single guns. Concentrated or combined fire has very little moral effect and is usually a waste of ammunition. The smallest charge to be used is the one with which the cartridges are delivered ready to fire.
- (b) When firing in the lower angle groups as close an approach to the target will be made as is possible given the cover offered and the firmness of the gun. At ranges which give less than 5% direct hits on an area 1 x 1 metres, no success is to be expected.
- (c) H.E. shells are not at all suitable for achieving destructive effects. Against concrete only concrete or armour-piercing shells will be used, against armoured turrets only armour-piercing shells.
- (d) In view of the slow rate of fire of the heaviest high trajectory guns, as many as possible should engage the same portion of the target, so that at least one shot per minute is fired, assuming that this is possible in the given conditions for observation (simultaneous fire by high trajectory guns of smaller calibre).
- (e) For the use of ammunition pages 19 and 20 of the "Instructions" should be noted.

/11. Fire.....

Woods.

Against targets which are covered from above, in (with protective roofing, dug-outs) with percussion more than a moral effect, as the projectiles burst among the tree tops. Better prospects of success are offered if delayed action percussion fuses are used. A fuse will be chosen sufficiently small for 50% of the shots to be observed as ricochets and 50% with mine-effect (MINENWIRKUNG). If a sufficient number of ricochets cannot be observed, alternate percussion fuse and delayed action percussion fuse shells (mine-effect) will be used.

iii. Fire with Ricochets.

The much greater effect of ricocheting projectiles as compared with those bursting on impact has been confirmed by the testimony of numerous prisoners. Against all living targets, not covered from above, more ricochet fire than hitherto will be employed therefore. Ricochet fire may be also employed against concealed targets, if it can be observed from the burst, the noise of the explosion, or the flash of the exploding shell that a sufficient number (40-50%) of ricochets are occurring. Ricochets can be distinguished from projectiles which enter the ground by their sharper detonation sound, and by the brighter flash, visible even in daytime. This is particularly the case with shallow ricochets which are easily mistaken for impact-detonations. Projectiles which penetrate the ground make no, or very little, report and flash on exploding.

iv. Fire against Tanks.

Armour-plating of 60 mm and less is penetrated at ranges below 600 metres by Light Field Howitzer 18 with angle of impact over 60° and 5 or 6 charge. The 10 cm cannon 18 pierces all thicknesses of plating encountered at ranges below 1500 metres with a medium charge and an armour-piercing shell.

Direct hits from the heavy Field Howitzer 18 with H.E. percussion fuse projectiles have set enemy tanks on fire, or put them out of action by destruction of the drive mechanism. Thus, when engaging tanks with heavy Field Howitzer the impact should not be largely "over", as when firing armour-piercing shells, but should be evenly distributed, some "over" and some short. Concentrations of fire have been very effective against tank assembly points.

v. Firing Smoke-shells with Ejected Smoke Generator.

Smoke shells A.E. (- with ejected smoke generator) are fired as double fuse projectile. When the projectile bursts in the air the generator containing the smoke-material is ejected backwards. The smoke-generating material is kindled and smoulders for several minutes with a small flame (like a smoke candle). Smoke shells A.B. will shortly be delivered for use with Light Field Howitzer 18. The introduction of smoke-shell fire into H.E. fire and smoke shell fire in general have had on many occasions considerable moral effect, forcing the enemy to put on gas-masks, or even quit their positions.

(Source :- J.D.F. Int Summary No 131 dated 9 Aug 41)

Attached hereto as APPENDIX "E" is a performance table of German A/Tk Weapons.

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

The following road infm has been received from the MAIRN Transport Coy BEYROUTH.

1. With buses always on the road, the average number of hold-ups owing to rain on the route BEYROUTH - DAMASCUS - J. TEMF - ROUTBA - BAGDAD is about 3 per annum, usually lasting 2 days with a maximum of 3 days.

/2. On the

2. On the desert roads, mud flats can be avoided by keeping to higher ground, but they are impassable after rain.
3. The road PALMYRA - BIR ELBA - J. QENF has been improved by the French.
4. The road for about 25 miles on the DAMASCUS side of PALMYRA runs through mud flats.
5. Large wadis to the east and west of ROUTBA have now been bridged.

GENERAL:

Attached hereto as APPENDIX "A" is a diagram of the organization of a German Inf Bn based on information received at this HQ up to July 41.

Additional copies are being forwarded to formations under separate cover.

PART II SECURITY

N11.

Handwritten signature
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION: as per Summary No 61.

APPENDIX "E" to 1 Aust. Corps Int Summary No 38

PERFORMANCE TABLE OF GERMAN A/Tk. WEAPONS.

| Serial | Type of Weapon | Calibre | Muzzle Velocity | Effective Range | Normal Impact Power of Penetration | Remarks |
|--------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|---|--|---|---|
| 1 | A/Tk. Rifle Model 38 | 7.9 mm or 13 mm | 4,000 ft/sec. | 800 yds | 32 mm at 100X 28 mm at 300X | Rifle may be fitted with 7.9 or 13 mm barrel. Figures given are for latter. |
| 2 | AA/A.Tk. M.G. | 15 mm | 3,000 ft/sec. | 1,300 yds. | 30 mm at 100X 27 mm at 200X 25 mm at 400X | Belts of 40 rds. 400-500 r.p.m. |
| 3 | A/Tk. Gun Model 41 | 28/20 mm | German claim 6,250 ft/sec. U.K. Test 4,650 ft/sec. | 500 yds. | 75 mm at 100X | Special "Arrowhead" shaped projectile. |
| 4 | AA/A.Tk. Gun | 20 mm | 2,800 ft/sec. | 1,200 yds. | 40 mm at 350X 20 mm at 850X 15 mm at 1,250X | HE and AP Ammunition similar to Breda 20 mm |
| 5 | A/Tk. Gun | 37 mm | 2,500 ft/sec | 1,000 yds. | Normal shot 37 mm at 600X | Special "Arrowhead" Shot gives higher penetration but is inaccurate except at short range. |
| 6 | A/Tk. Gun | 47 mm | 2,000 ft/sec. | 1,200 - 1,600 yds | Only test showed 76 mm at 50X | As for Serial 5. |
| 7 | A/Tk. Gun Model 38 | 50 mm | ? | ? | 60 mm at 850X | Fires HE and Solid shot. |
| 8 | A/Tk. Gun mtd. in Mk.III Tank. | 50 mm | ? | ? | 60 mm at 350X | Fires HE and Solid shot. |
| 9 | Tank Gun mtd. in Mk. IV Tk. | 75 mm | ? | 7,000 yds. | Does not penetrate armour but damages suspension. | Smoke AP. HE and normal HE only - a close support weapon. |
| 10 | AA/A.Tk. Gun | 88 mm | 2,750 ft/sec. | Unknown as A/Tk. weapon but is con- siderable. Max. range 16,000 yds. | 60 mm at 1,500X | Shell weighs 19½ lbs. |
| 11 | Gun/How | 105 mm | ? | Unknown as A/Tk. weapon. | Damages suspension. | Special base fuse and charge for A/Tk. role. |

(From GHQ AFV Int. Summary dated 31 Jul 41)

SECRET

AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 89.

Compiled from information received from 1200 hrs 17 Sep to 1200 hrs 18 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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PART 1.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

ITALIAN MORALE.

Letters recently captured show a state of mind in ITALY, in which complete boredom with the war is intermingled with doubts as to the result.

A corporal in ITALY looks forward to seeing his friend again :

" Hope you return soon to live over those wonderful days when we were young together. But those days won't be the same as they were once, for then, we were two upstanding young men, and returned, what's more, victorious from the war we'd fought so energetically and we were celebrating our greatest victory".

and another

"Let's pray our potent Lord that he'll also make this frightful nuisance finish soon, so that you (her brother at the front), will be happier".

whilst a religious-minded Mother comes out with

"My God soon concede a just peace, such as ITALY deserves

ENEMY PROPAGANDA.

An interesting extract from an ITALIAN Army paper dated 28 Aug regarding our local shipping losses is repeated :-

"Recce over the port of TOBRUCK has made certain that a 2,000-ton ship (the bombardment of which was announced in our earlier bulletin), has been hit with one or two bombs in the region of the bridge and is very probably resting on the bottom of the harbour". (From 9 Aust Div Int Sum No 143 dated 9 Sep 41)

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

ENEMY EQUIPMENT - ITALIAN.

The following are brief particulars of the FRENCH R35 Tank, now believed to be in use in the ITALIAN Army:-

| | |
|--------------|--|
| Weight | 11 tons. |
| Crew | Two (driver and gunner). |
| Armament | One 37 mm. Gun and one L.M.G. coaxially mounted. |
| Armour basis | 40 mm. Cast Steel. |
| Height | 8 ft. 1 in. |
| Length | 13 ft. 2 in. |
| Width | 6 ft. |

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| Suspension | 5 bogie wheel bogies with One independent bogie wheel. |
| Max. gradient | 40 deg. |
| Ground clearance | 1 ft. 2 in. |
| Engine | 83.H.P. 4-cylinder, water-cooled. |
| Drive | Front sprocket. |
| Max. Speed | 12.5 m.p.h. on roads. |
| Radius of action | 90 to 95 miles. |
| Intercommunication | V/T and Flag |
| Trench crossing | 5 ft 3 ins. |
| Fords | 2 ft. 7 ins. - Step-2' 11" |
| Ammunition carried | 100 rds for gun- 2400 rds for LMG |

A large number of these were in existence. The tank may be fitted with a tail to improve the trench-crossing performance. Can be easily mass-produced.

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

JEBEL ABDUL AZIZ (SE OF HASSETCHE)

These heights are about 40 miles long, trailing off towards the WEST into rocky foothills. There is a gap of about 6 miles between them and the JEBEL BEIDA. This gap is rough and rocky but, in places, passable for motor transport in single file.

The SOUTH face has a more gradual slope than the NORTH. There are in it a number of gullies which would make satisfactory hiding places for motor transport. The SOUTH side is also more thickly wooded while the springs are lower in the plain and further from the heights than is the case on the NORTH side. There are several car tracks running SOUTH direct to DEIR EZ ZOR which are said to have been made by lorries carrying firewood from the JEBEL.

JEBEL BEIDA.

The NORTH face of these heights is very rocky and steep. There are a large number of springs in the foothills close to this face and these are listed below.

TUALI GASSIL.

This is a ridge of hills and the most marked feature between JEBEL BEIDA and JEBEL ABDUL AZIZ. A local guide stated that these hills form the watershed between river KILBOUR and river EUPHRATES. There are no springs in this range.

WADI BEIDA.

Runs from the SOUTH of JEBEL ABDUL AZIZ towards the EUPHRATES. It is deep and steep and it contained running water in August.

GENERAL.

Attached hereto as APPENDIX "A" are notes on the ROULNIN Army.

PART 11. SECURITY.

Internment of Enemy Nationals: During the past few days 74 persons of European Aryan descent have been detained and sent to PALESTINE for internment.

/ This

This total consists of :-

15 German males
3 German females
4 German children
52 Italian males.

Suspected Sabotage. It is reported that on arrival at the dump at HOMS, many drums of bitumen were found to be badly damaged. The damage might have been due to deliberate sabotage. The wastage was estimated as about one-fifth of total quantity.

As very large quantities of bitumen are now being used in SYRIA, such wastage, unless checked, represents a very considerable loss.

Harwell

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No 61.

APPENDIX "A" TO 1. MUST CORPS INT SUMMARY NO 89.

NOTES ON THE ROUMANIAN ARMY.

(Based on Information up to 25 August 1941).

1. COMPOSITION.

1 Army Corps.....2, 3 Infantry Divisions.
II " "4, 9, 10 " "
III " "15, 21 " "
IV " "7, 8, 14 " "
V " "5, 6, 13 " "
VI " "17, 20 " "
VII " "1, 18, 19 " "

NOT ALLOCATED, or Allocation unknown:- 11 and 35 Infantry, Guards, Frontier, One Armoured, One Mountain, and Four Cavalry Divisions.

Of the total of twenty-eight, there are therefore:-

Twenty-two Infantry (including Guards and Frontier), One Armoured, One Mountain, and Four Cavalry Divisions. Two at least, of the Cavalry Divisions are believed to be motorised.

2. STRENGTH.

Total strength is estimated at about 600,000. The strength of an Infantry Division is about 17,500.

3. DISTRIBUTION.

Some twenty-three Divisions have been reported on the Russian front, viz:-

Nineteen Infantry Divisions (2, 3^o, 4, 5^o, 6, 7^o, 8, 9, 10, 11^o, 13^o, 14^o, 15^o, 17, 20, 21, 35^o Guards^o, Frontier^o).
Two Cavalry Divisions^o - probably both Motorised.
One Armoured Division^o
One Mountain Division^o

Some five Divisions are believed still to be in ROUMANIA. viz:-
Three Infantry Divisions (1, 18, 19).
Two Cavalry Divisions.

Formations marked ^o have definitely been identified East of R. PRUTH.

4. CASUALTIES AGAINST U.S.S.R. It is reliably reported that 100,000 would NOT be an overestimate. 3, 5, 7, and 15 Infantry Divisions are believed to have lost heavily.

SECRET.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 90

from information received from
18 Sep to 1200 hrs 19 Sep 41.

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PART 1.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

AIR - Our Action. Night 12/13 Sep. The Convoy which was attacked by our aircraft on night 11/12 Sep was sighted on 12 Sep, consisting by this time of 5 merchant ships, and 6 destroyers. It was again attacked that night and 2 or 3 more ships were hit by torpedoes. Later during the night the convoy was heavily bombed, damaging all 5 ships. The total damage inflicted on the convoy appears, subject to confirmation, to be:

One 12,000 ton ship sunk and another damaged.
One 10,000 ton ship set on fire,
Three 6,000 ton ships damaged or set on fire.

RUSSIA. It is reported that Russian air formations are allotted only to Armies. They are sub-allotted to Corps and Divisions for specific operations, but there is an Air Force Staff Officer permanently on a Divisional Staff.

It is reported that a heavy A.A. battery has been added to the establishment of the Infantry Division.

The Russian Tank Brigade is now believed to consist of either 225 light or 135 medium tanks.

GERMANY. According to German Press reports the National Socialist Motor Corps (N.S.K.K.) has been used for salvaging H.T. In NORWAY they put together 1 038 Ford lorries from single parts, and from the remains of 5,000 vehicles left at DUNKIRK constructed 1,000 new motor vehicles.

Notes on Armies. There is evidence that the Artillery Regiment of a Mountain Division may now consist of three batteries and not of two as before. Its strength is estimated at 1,500 men. Each battery consists of twelve 75 mm. mountain guns.

Rations for the armed forces were reduced on 1 June for the second time since war began. The following is a comparison of German and British weekly scales:-

German

British.

Front line troops.

Troops in UNITED KINGDOM.

Meat 3 lbs
Fats 8½ ozs.

Meat 3½ lbs.
Margarine &
Bacon 31½ ozs.

Other Troops.

Troops in Middle East;

Meat 1½ lbs
Fats 6½ ozs.

Meat 4 lbs.6 ozs.
Margarine &
Bacon 31½ ozs.

Enemy Methods. It is reported that on the Russian front German medium mortars are often brigaded and used for a quick burst of concentrated fire. They are then immediately moved to a fresh position. (Above paras summarized from GHQ Daily Int Summaries Nos 483 and 484).

AEGEAN ISLANDS. Attached as Appendix "B" is a sketch of the AXIS FORCES in the AEGEAN ISLANDS as believed on 11 Oct 1941 (From GHQ Daily Int Summary No 481 dated 13 Sep 41, 1941).

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

ITALIAN TANKS. Two new types of Italian tanks apparently known as "P" tanks, of 15 tons and 22 to 25 tons respectively, are reported to exist. The following details of the latter have been reported:-

| | |
|---------------------------|--|
| Weight | 22 to 25 tons. |
| Max. Speed on Roads | 20 m.p.h. |
| Max. Speed, cross-country | 6 m.p.h. |
| Water Forded | 3' 11" |
| Step | 3' 7" |
| Trench Crossing | 9' 10" |
| Crew | 6 |
| Armament | One 47/32 gun in turret. Three L.M.Gs |

The dimensions and armour are not known. No details of the 15 ton tank have yet been reported.

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL

WATER.

The following is a list of the more important springs in the ABDUL AZIZ area (SE of HASSETCHE) :-

NORTH face of JEBEL ABDUL AZIZ:-

| | |
|-----------|----------------|
| TEL ZAITA | - undrinkable. |
| MAGLOUJA | - drinkable. |
| KHAZANA | - do - |
| BIDEA | - undrinkable. |
| GARAN | - do - |
| SFAIYAN | - do - |
| BEIDA | - drinkable. |

SOUTH face of JEBEL ABDUL AZIZ:-

| | |
|----------|------------------|
| KASEEBA |) |
| CHAWA |) |
| SHELLALA |) |
| KHANAZIR |) all drinkable. |
| SAJARIA |) |
| JIRIHA |) |

(From HQ, BRITISH FORCES IN P, TJ & S, daily Int Summary No 99 dated 15 Sep 41).

GENERAL.

Attached as Appendix "A" is a description of the relative percentage of "BLIND" AMMUNITION found in German and Italian Armies.

PART 11 SECURITY.

CENSORSHIP. The following arrangements have been made for the control of telephones, telegrams and cables, in SYRIA and the LEBANON.

1. The submarine cable from BEIRUT to TUNIS has been put out of use except for governmental traffic arising out of the armistice.
2. The commercial wireless station, RADIO - ORIENT, has been re-opened for public use for the transmission of messages to Metropolitan FRANCE, her African empire, and other Allied and neutral countries, but:
 - (a) A British wireless expert supervises the operators, and
 - (b) all messages are seen by a F.F. telegraphic censor stationed in the same building and re-examined by a

ting officer in the Controle Postale itself .
Controleur General, however, personally thinks
the continuation of this traffic undesirable from
the point of view of security, and he and the Spears
Mission have agreed to make simultaneous requests
to the Haut Commissariat to have it stopped.

3. Monitors are listening to all conversations by telephone across the Turkish frontier, and it has been suggested to the Controleur General that the use of the telephone across the frontier should be restricted to approved persons.
4. Telegrams leaving the country are censored before despatch. Internal telegrams are examined at the end of every day with a view to checking them, and discovering whose, in future, ought to be censored before despatch.

(Summarised from Force HQ Weekly Int Review dated 14 Sep 41).

W. H. W. W.
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION : as per Summary No 61.

Appx "A" to 1 Aust Corps Int
Summary No 90. (From GHQ MEF
Daily Int Summary No. 484
dated 16 Sep 41).

"BLIND" AMMUNITION.

1. The following are some figures noted during enemy bombardments recently :-

| | | | | |
|-------------|------------|------------|---------|------------|
| Enemy fired | 40 rounds, | of which | 11 were | "blinds". |
| " | " | 20 | " | " |
| " | " | 542 | " | " |
| " | " | 109 | " | " |
| | | <u>711</u> | | <u>221</u> |

Out of 711 rounds, therefore, 221 were "blinds", which is 31 per cent. This ammunition will probably have contained a proportion of both GERMAN and ITALIAN manufacture. It is almost certain that this figure is distorted by the probable absence of record of more successful shoots, and a figure observed in July 1940 for ITALIAN ammunition, 12 per cent, seems more generally representative of both GERMAN and ITALIAN ammunition.

2. Both in GREECE and on the RUSSIAN front, the high proportion of "blinds" in GERMAN ammunition has been noted, although no definite figures have been recorded.

3. The normal percentage of ammunition which fails to explode, or is defective in action, should, by BRITISH standards, be infinitesimal. An average for BRITISH artillery ammunition, taken over a considerable period in time of peace, would vary between $\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 per cent.


4. This allows for very careful manufacture, inspection and testing only, and the effect of considerably accelerated production with its consequent relaxation of standards, would immediately cause deterioration of these performance figures. This should not be very pronounced, and it is noteworthy that a battery of 25 pdrs at KEREN, working under conditions which could scarcely have been worse, recorded only 2 "blinds" out of 600 rounds, i.e. one third of one per cent.

5. It is not anticipated that, under any conditions, and at any stage of the war, BRITISH ammunition will ever include a proportion of "blinds" higher than 5 per cent.

-----oOo-----

APPENDIX B TO HQ I AUST CORPS
SUMMARY NO 90

DISTRIBUTION OF AXIS FORCES
IN THE AEGEAN SEA IS
BELIEVED ON 10TH SEPT. 1941.



SECRET

LT CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 91

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 19 Sep to 1200 hrs 20 Sep 41.

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 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to 'Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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PART I.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

Distribution of German Forces.

The total of German divisions in the BALKANS is now believed to be twelve, of which three are in GREECE and CRETE, three or four in BULGARIA (of which two at least are in the VARNA-BURGAS area), three in YUGOSLAVIA, and two in ROUMANIA.

Reports of train movements suggest that three German divisions may have moved from GERMANY into FRANCE, but in view of reports of troop movements to the Eastern front from the RHINELAND these may represent reliefs rather than reinforcements. It is still estimated, therefore, that there are five divisions and two tank battalions between ANGOULEME and the Spanish frontier, but there is a possibility of the arrival of additional units.

GREECE. Air reconnaissance of the CORINTH CANAL reveals a single railway track across the central bridge which has been newly constructed. Reports from other sources indicate that the ATHENS-PELOPONNESE line is now in operation. Our raid on night 8/9 Sep does not appear to have caused any further damage to the canal.

GERMANY. It is confirmed from captured documents that the Motorised Storm Artillery Troop (STURMGESCHUTZBATTERIE) is composed of six 75 mm guns.

RUSSIA. General evidence shows that the Soviet Air Force is still fighting efficiently, and is believed to be being satisfactorily reinforced.

Equipment. A British observer in PERSIA noticed the following equipment when passing a Russian platoon:-

75% of the men had modern automatic rifles.

2 MGs.

Automatic pistols.

Numerous stick grenades (similar to the German type).

Clothing well fitted but of rather thick material.

Steel helmets similar to the German type, except they covered a greater part of the back of the head.

The IT appeared to have been made up by Persian commandeered vehicles.

(Above paras summarised from GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 485 dated 17 Sep).

TURKEY. It is reported from a French source that the Germans have attempted to get winter equipment from France to enable them to campaign in TURKEY. They are stated to have ordered 2,000 snow ploughs so as to be able to keep the roads open in winter.

(Comment: These might be equally well for employment in RUSSIA or the CAUCASUS).

The Turkish Consul General who recently returned from a visit to ANKARA informed a reliable source that TURKEY'S policy had not changed and remained as anti-German as ever. TURKEY'S army being only suitable for a defensive war she did not want to force the pace. The treaty with GERMANY was signed to gain time

and allow the Allies to get stronger in the Middle East. regards the economic negotiations with Dr. Elocius, the Turkish Government were trying to spin them out as much as possible and to give away as little as possible.

(From Naval Officer in charge SYRIAN ports, Report No 9).

FRANCE. Damage by RAF. French sailors who have deserted to the Free French from the Vichy Convoys report that at HAVRE the Augustin Norman Workshops which were making submarines for the Germans were so damaged by the RAF that they have ceased to function.

Two French sources report that Colonial products such as rubber are unloaded at French African ports on the Atlantic side, transhipped by train to French North African ports on the Mediterranean, and shipped thence to France, thus avoiding British contraband Control at Gibraltar, the usual route being CASABLANCA, ALGIERS, MARSEILLES.

(From Naval Officer in charge SYRIAN ports, Report No 9).

SYRIA. A fairly reliable source reports that there are between 300 and 320 Syrians being trained as parachutists in GREECE with a view to their being dropped singly to act as agents in SYRIA at a suitable moment. They are all in the ATHENS area. Leaders are Abdul Megid SIREISSE, who has studied physical training in BERLIN and Mahmoud BOURAKI. There are also IRAKIS and PALESTINIANS being similarly trained elsewhere in GREECE.

(FSS Reports).

GENERAL.

Attached as Appendix "A" is a description of the great pains the German and Italian Arms and Services go to obtain successful camouflage.

(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 485 dated 17 Sep).

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION.

Road ALEPPO - AFRINE.

1 mile out of ALEPPO good metalled road finishes, running into a 2nd class road in good condition. All bridges on the road are stone and if blown could easily be detoured.

Rece of tracks:

(a) Track to SATANI 244505.

Track starts 5 miles from AFRINE, the latter part of the track is impassable to MT. A subsidiary track forks left to KARABACHE, and continues passable so far as TCHOLARHANE.

(b) Track to frontier area TELBATE 231495.

This track starts from EL HAIDIAN runs down at Wadi at 234492 joining another track at the first "E" of TELBATE 231495, from here a good track runs to CHEIKH-EL-HADID 232506, this track carries on passing WEST of ERINDE and leads over the hills to SARI OUCH-ARLI 236516; it joins the road at 243518. The track is twisty and often indistinct.

PART II. SECURITY.

Entry of Germans into SYRIA. It has been reported that Germans coming from SMYRNA Exhibition are crossing the frontier in the region of AINTAB and KALKUM with the aid of an Agha of the district. It is suggested that this man supplies them with Arab clothing and that a Bedouin shop keeper guides them to ALEPPO. Enquiries to date have failed to confirm this report, but are being continued.

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Hadger 11/11/41
Lt Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

TO 1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 91.

ID SERVICES. GERMANY AND ITALY. CAMOUFLAGE.

Recent reports show that both GERMANY and ITALY are becoming increasingly conscious of the importance of concealment, particularly from air. Concealment from the ground has always been second nature to skilled fighters, both attackers and defenders, human and animal. It is only with the increasing importance of the air arm, both for reconnaissance and bombing attack that the need has been appreciated for concealment from the air, an art which is both less instinctive and harder to accomplish than concealment from the ground.

In the last war the air was used more for reconnaissance than bombing, and consequently troop movements were more important to conceal than factories and aerodromes. It has needed the intensive bombing attacks of this war to develop the art of concealing enormous structures such as railway stations and hangars, tasks which at first sight could seem impossible.

The Germans have evidently studied the problem very closely, and with their usual thoroughness have resorted to elaborate schemes of concealment and deception wherever they consider such measures justified by the importance of the target. Thus it is now becoming the rule rather than the exception to see landing grounds and aerodromes as most convincing impressions of woods, roads, ditches, hedges, and cultivation patches. Brown, light green and yellow substances are sprayed over the ground to give the effect of plough or vegetation. Dummy farms and other buildings are disposed round aerodromes concealing workshops or isolated aircraft outside their hangars, whilst papier mache cows and beds of real flowers are used to add a note of conviction. Dummy cottages are erected or painted on the tops of hangars, the vertical sides of which are sloped off by lattice of steel wires garnished with green-dyed jute, shaped possibly to resemble trees. Great attention is always paid to changing the colour of the garnishing by spraying so as to correspond with the changing colours of the seasons.

The principal railway station at HAMBURG had a complete false roof built over it in the shape of a small hill. This false roof was completely covered with material resembling green grass, and artificial paths were made over the "hill". A hanger at RHEINE in north-west GERMANY had no other form of camouflage than two dark patches painted on top on the edge. These patches combined with the shadow to break up the regular shape of hangar and shadow together. Painted disruptive camouflage of this type is very simple and surprisingly effective when viewed under favourable lighting conditions.

Camouflage of a landing ground surface is begun at the earliest possible moment even when extensive work is still going on. A good example of this is at LAVAL, south of CHERBOURG, where the excellent camouflage of that area of the landing ground which is now finished, could only have been carried out under considerable difficulty in view of all the other leveling and drainage work involved.

Water is recognised as an easily distinguishable landmark, and lakes and canals in important industrial areas are covered by rafts and netting, painted to tone with the surroundings.

The importance of avoiding regular outline is appreciated and applied not only to the breaking up of the form of large buildings, but also to the parking of motor transport. In the desert this is of course particularly important, and Italian regulations state that vehicles must be at least 100 yards apart. Encampments also must be widely separated with tents on either side of and not amongst parked vehicles. Italian A.F.Vs are painted in three shades of grey ranging from dark to almost white, with a matt surface. When parked they are covered with bushes or sand coloured sheets. The latter, whilst serving as camouflage, also help to keep the sand out of working parts.

152
SECRET

CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 92.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 20 Sep to 1200 hrs 21 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
-

PART 1

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

TURKEY. Disposition of Forces. Reports have been received from a source believed reliable, that two regiments of the 7 Div are now in the vicinity of ALEXANDRETTA. They are the 48 Inf Regt, and an Arty Regt, located at ANTIOCH and KIRIKHAN. Col ALICI OGLU MUHTAT is the commander of this force. Two hundred personnel are at the Frontier Posts, and another two hundred engaged on defence works.

Comment. If this report be true, the two regiments in question may have moved Westwards from the DIYARBEKIR area where 7 Div was stationed.

The same source stated that two Bns were about to be sent to the frontier near MEIDAN EKBES (approximately 65 miles NW of ALEPPO, where the TAURUS Express line enters SYRIA), but were diverted to the IRANIAN frontier on the Allied occupation of IRAN.

From another source, of reliability unknown, the following information has been received :-

The BULGARIANS have reinforced their troops on the TURKISH Frontier, and now have seventeen Divisions, each commanded by a GERMAN. To counter this move, the TURKS have reinforced their troops with ten Divisions, making their total in this area twenty five Divisions.

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION.

Recce of KASR-EL-BANET - HAMMAM. Ref Map ANTIOCH E
1/200,000.

Road KASR-EL-BANET - Road Junction 245472 - DANA 248474, is suitable for MT as is also the road DANA - Rd Junction 249471. Both roads run through crops, and after rain are likely to become boggy. There is good water in DANA on track at 24944715 and at HERZE 249476.

The following tracks are impassable to MT :-

- DANA - CHEIKH MASSANE
- DANA - Track junction 244476
- DANA - KAFALDINE 245479.

The River AFRINE at NASRIYE 236439 can be forded at several places during the summer. The depth is 18" - 3 ft, width 25 ft. In Winter the river overflows its banks and would be impassable.

The following tracks are suitable for MT :-

1. KASR-EL-BANET - Tr Junc 245472 - DANA
2. DANA - Rd Junc 249471
3. NASRIYE - HAMMAM

Bridges - nil.

There seems to be a good water supply throughout the area at all times of the year.

The ground in this area would be very difficult for track vehicles owing to rocks.
(xtract from Report from 23 Bde).

PART 11. SECURITY.

At Appendix "A" are extracts from a report on ITALIAN Intelligence in BRIT. SOM. Campaign by Col BRUTTINI, Chief of Intelligence - I.E.A.

2. It shows clearly that ITALIAN Intelligence in E. AFRICA functioned almost exclusively on information obtained through interception of our wireless traffic. Documents captured subsequently have shown that a similar state of affairs existed in LIBYA.
3. The enemy success is not due primarily to failure of Signals or Ciphers to carry out existing instructions, but to our present system.
4. The insecurity of the present system is increased by the transmission in clear of W/T messages of an administrative nature. Many officers do not seem to be aware that the space on the message form "This Message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means" is normally ONLY to be used by those entitled to send EMERGENCY OPERATION Messages. (See Field Service Regulations Vol II 1935 Sec 19 and Military Training Pamphlet No 23, Part III 1939 Chap 5). A new and more secure system of Signal Procedure is being prepared, and Field Ciphers are being improved.
5. Will all recipients of this Summary please give the Appendix and these Notes the widest possible circulation. It is hoped that a general realisation of the results of our present insecure system will ensure the fullest co-operation of all officers in operating the new system, to be introduced shortly, and a determination to overcome the difficulties which are at first bound to arise with the adoption of new methods.

(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 482 dated 14 Sep 41).

Handed over
by Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION- as per Summary No 61.

TO 1 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 92.
ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE IN BRITISH SOMALILAND CAMPAIGN 1940.

A captured report written by Colonel BRUTTINI, Chief of Intelligence to the Italian Forces in Italian East Africa, shows how Italian Intelligence worked in the British Somaliland campaign.

It reveals that the enemy was able to follow and appreciate our every move through interception of our wireless traffic.

The following are some extracts from the report:-

(1) "On the 27 Jul a list of identifications was issued. This was prepared from information obtained partly by wireless interception and partly from captured documents. It included the following details:-

Identification of commands and their organization.

Identification of units and their location.

Organization of the Air Force.

Methods employed by the departmental services.

Methods of the wireless and telephone service.

Military and civil administration.

System of communication between British SOMALILAND, ADEN, CAIRO, NAIROBI, etc."

(2) "Between 31 Jul and 6 Aug, reliable information obtained chiefly from intercepted wireless messages, showed that units of the K.A.R. (King's African Rifles) had disembarked at BERBERA."

(3) "The reports from Advance Intelligence Centres which were based on enemy marconigrams which had been intercepted and decyphered, provided Command Headquarters with valuable material for the preparation of the "Battle of DAHAR BORUC".

(4) "The Intelligence Service followed the various stages of operations by means of radio interception..... It is pleasant to record that from the mass of intercepted messages, the Intelligence Service was able to obtain much valuable information. The study of these messages produced interesting reports both of enemy movements and of their intentions. The following are some examples:-

(a) Intention of the British to stop the Passerone Column from ZEILA by means of land forces at BULHAR, i.e. - "B" Company of the SOMALILAND Camel Corps and the BULHAR garrison. It was also intended that the British Navy should co-operate in this action.

(b) The beginning of an enemy counter attack, on the morning of 13 Aug against the left of the TOSTI column at the very moment when the latter was carrying out an enveloping movement against the right flank of the DAHA BORUC defensive system.

(c) The anticipation, later confirmed that the enemy, in the late afternoon of the 14th, was preparing to evacuate the forward position and to withdraw on the second line already prepared in accordance with the British plan of operation.

(d) The withdrawal of the Burao (2 companies of the Camel Corps) to Upper SHEIKH. This was carried out in the afternoon of the 15th.

(e) The loading of stores and the embarkation of troops ordered by British Headquarters on the morning of the 16th and the enemy's attempt to slow up our advance, using only the LAFARUK reserve (the Black Watch Battalion) and five tanks.

(f) Finally, on the 17th the withdrawal of the British forces from LAFARUK including the BULHAR detachment which was opposing the Passerone column."

(5) "On 17 Aug the enemy wireless had almost closed down and the Intelligence Service was reduced to following the situation from the reports of Intelligence Officers and spies. But by then the English were in full retreat....."

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ST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 93.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 21 Sep to 1200 hrs 22 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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PART I.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

Notes on WESTERN DESERT OPERATIONS.

FRONTIER AREA. On 14 Sep the enemy advanced Eastwards on the escarpment South of SOLLUM in two columns. The estimated strength of the Northern column was 40 tanks, and that of the Southern column 100 tanks. Identifications later obtained showed that in the Southern column were elements of 5 Tank Regt (German).

By dusk 14 Sep the enemy had reached a general line running South from BUG BOG. Our troops in both the Coastal and Escarpment Sectors withdrew in order. The RAF continually bombed the enemy columns and inflicted losses. During the operations five JU87s ran out of petrol and force landed - the crews were captured.

On 15 Sep, the enemy withdrew his two columns to their consolidated area between HALFAYU (HELL FIRE) and BATULEMA. Our fwd mobile troops followed up the withdrawal and reoccupied our former position held on 14 Sep. During the withdrawal the enemy lost 5 tanks.

In the operations the enemy lost altogether 10 tanks and 15 MT confirmed destroyed. Nine enemy bombers and two fighters were destroyed over the Frontier area, exclusive of damage inflicted during our successful ground-strafting and bombing of GAMBUT.

(Summarised from 9 Aust Div Intelligence Summaries Nos 149 and 150 dated 14 and 15 Sep).

Comment. It was at first thought that the enemy might have intended to capture positions near SIDI BARRANI in order to deny us the use of this area as a forward landing ground. However the fact that he himself withdrew on 15 Sep makes it now apparent that the move was simply a recce in strength. The extremely "fluid" nature of movement in Desert operations must always be borne in mind. Such a move by the enemy was perhaps worth while because it gave him an indication of our strength and it is always possible in such operations that he might have succeeded in pushing through to SIDI BARRANI.

TOBRUK AREA. 15 Sep. The centre of enemy activity has moved to the Eastern Sector during the last two days. Small formations of AFVs have been active, and one demonstration was made by two tanks against one of our outposts. Several bombing attacks have been made on the FORTRESS, and two vehicles were damaged at the AOD. On 18 Sep 10,000 lbs of sausages were destroyed by enemy aircraft during a morning raid.

GREECE. Italian troops are reported to be working on the construction of new defences facing South at MT OLYMPUS. Artillery is also reported on the coast between STYLIS and LAMIA. Gen. Feldt. KEITEL is reported to have been in ATHENS recently - probably about the end of Aug.

(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 487 dated 19 Sep).

IRAN. It is believed that the abdication in which the administration of the Army has been may lead to its rapid disintegration, and hence to its collapse. British troops occupied the Southern outskirts of TEHERAN on 17 Sep without incident. Russian forces simultaneously moved into the Eastern and Western outskirts of the town. (From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 487 dated 19 Sep).

ROUMANIA. An unconfirmed report states that during the three weeks preceding 11 Sep approx 15,000 troops deserted from the Roumanian Army. The same report states that on 2 Sep Roumanian troops tried to damage two factories working on army production - the "Astra" wool-weaving factory and an aniline dye factory.

GERMANY. Notes on Armies. According to a PW statement, units of the German Labour Service are stationed in occupied Russian territory as Army units. (Comment: The Labour Service REICHARBEITSDIENST, although a militarised formation, is not part of the German Army. This report, coupled with reports of the use by the Germans of Hitler Youth troops, may indicate a growing shortage of man power).

(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 486 dated 18 Sep).

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION.

Road OURUM ES SOHRA - BAB EL HAOUA 244473 (Extract from 23 Bde report).

Distance 13 miles.

Time - 20 mins from fork 259465.

Road - First class metalled road in good condition.
Width 20 ft.

TERIB - Bridge over dry wadi can be detoured (25154670).
Rd TERIB - ALEXETTE not metalled, but in good condition, after ALEXETTE the road is metalled.
Good water at KAHER DERIANA 238469 3 miles from BAB EL HAOUA.

Road IDLIB 235462 - MAARET EL MARRINE 239452 - TERIB 253465.

This track is in fair condition and is practicable for MT.

| MILES | PLACE |
|-------|--|
| 4 | NORTH IDLIB - Embankment 3 ft high prevents dispersion 237449. |
| 7 | NORTH MAARET - Track indistinct. Might be impassable after rain. 240453 |
| 14 | EBBINE - Track indistinct through village. 248459 Can be retraced NE of village. |

Bridges - Nil.

PART II. SECURITY.

2-111 -

Handwritten signature
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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ST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 94

filed from information received from
1200 hrs 22 Sep to 1200 hrs 23 Sep 41.

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PART I.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

GREECE. It is reported that German and Italian troops around ATHENS are being trained in landing operations from caiques.

(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 482 dated 14 Sep).

TURKEY. It has been reported from a reliable source that the Turks are reported to have commenced preparing demolitions in the tunnels on the main railway line from ISLAHIYE to the Syrian border.

ENEMY METHODS - GERMAN. A patrol operating in the Western Desert in an area known to be occupied by German troops discovered an Italian corpse with various booby traps and mines attached. Wires were attached to both legs, waist, shoulder straps and helmet.

(From 9 Aust Div Daily Intelligence Summary No 146 dated 12 Sep).

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

STEREOSCOPIC RANGEFINDER.

A report on a captured German Stereoscopic Rangefinder has been received. The instrument is of 1 metre base; bears the number 98945, and is manufactured by CARL ZEISS, of JENA.

The rangefinder is of the standard stereoscopic pattern, estimation of distance being by means of two graticule scales, one in each eyepiece, which when "fuses" stereoscopically appear superimposed upon the image in depth. The instrument is difficult to handle and considerable practice is necessary before an operator can obtain satisfactory results. It has of course the great advantage that once the preliminary adjustments are made ranges can be estimated continuously and instantaneously without further manipulation.

The preliminary adjustments referred to above are:-

- (a) focussing of each eyepiece independently.
- (b) Interocular distance.
- (c) height of image.
- (d) infinity.

In addition, two astigmatisers are provided, the purpose of which is not clear. Their astigmatic effect is very slight and amounts to little more than loss of definition.

The rangefinder incorporates a mechanism for exchanging by a turn of a lever the pair of graticules etched with the stereoscopic scale for an alternative pair, one plain and the other etched with a grid of 8 divisions each way, occupying between 2° and 2°30' in the centre of the field of view. These divisions are of the following value:-

In elevation, one division $5/16^\circ$.
In azimuth, one division $\frac{5}{6400}$ of a complete circle
or $0^\circ 16' 53''$.

This grid could be used for estimating bearing and angle of sight from a previously established datum, or for artillery spotting. The values of the divisions, which appear inconvenient, are presumably suited to the German system of artillery survey.

(From GHQ Technical Intelligence Summary No 37 dated 25 Aug).

PART II. SECURITY.

-Nil-

W. H. W. W.

Lt-Col.
GS 1 Aust Corps

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SECRET

CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 95

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 23 Sep to 1200 hrs 24 Sep 41.

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-

PART I.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

TURKEY. A report has been received from a source of reliability unknown, that the TURKISH authorities had expected that the BRITISH would march into the ALEXANDRETTA area. According to the source, petrol consumption has been reduced, and money and food are scarce in this area.

ITALY. Enemy Morale. It is now confirmed that the Infantry and the Artillery of the 55 BOLOGNA Division, (which recently relieved the 102 TRENTO Division in the Eastern Sector at TOBRUK) with the exception of some senior officers, come from NAPLES and the immediately surrounding provinces. The Neapolitans are not interested in soldiering. Although admired for their songs, they are despised in ITALY as soldiers both by the Northern ITALIANS and the SICILIANS. They have broken and run almost regularly in every battle in which they have participated since the 17th century, with one glorious interlude when a cavalry brigade got to MOSCOW - and back - in 1812.

They ran in 1799 before the FRENCH, in 1815 and 1821 before the AUSTRIANS, and finally lost the BOUREONS the kingdom and NAPLES its independence when their entire army dispersed before Garibaldi's few thousand troops at VOLTURNO in 1861. MURAT, a Marshal of Napoleon's who was King of NAPLES from 1807 to 1815, tried to furbish the Neapolitan Army in appearance, drill and morale. "You can dress the Neapolitans up in what you like", Napoleon is once reputed to have said, "but they'll run away just the same."

(Summarised from 9 Aust Div Daily Intelligence Summary No 152 dated 18 Sep).

Enemy Discipline. The following is an extract from the diary of a PW relating to the behaviour of the members of an Italian OP on hearing suspicious noises thought to be a patrol.

" July 12 : Great alarm to-night at our OP.

- i. Suspicious noises are heard (these turned out to be unreported Italian MT connected with mine-laying).
- ii. The patrol leaves the OP in a rush.
- iii. Capt L.... arms himself to the teeth with rifle, pistol, hand grenades etc, and throws the telephone away ...
- iv. Lieut A.... makes a heroic fwd recce of between 300 and 400 yards.
- v. Lieut S.... gets a good smack on the head with the barrel of a rifle.
- vi. My batman, A.... takes refuge in the tent with a rifle in each hand.
- vii. It is established that there are no BRITISH in the neighbourhood. The OP is manned and the telephone is recovered.

..... a shot or two is then fired.
(From 9 Aust Div Daily Intelligence Summary No 150 dated 15 Sep).

PART II.

SECURITY : Nil.

W. H. H. H.

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION. As per Summary No 61.

..... a shot or two is then fired.
(From 9 Aust Div Daily Intelligence Summary No 150 dated 15 Sep).

PART II.

SECURITY : Nil.

W. H. H. H.

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION. As per Summary No 61.

..... a shot or two is then fired.
(From 9 Aust Div Daily Intelligence Summary No 150 dated 15 Sep).

SECRET

T CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 96

led from information received from
2 hrs 24 Sep to 1200 hrs 25 Sep 41.

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PART 1

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

BULGARIA. According to an unconfirmed report, the port of VARNA has been closed to normal traffic, and the Germans are continuing to collect shipping and lighters. Distribution of GERMAN Forces in BULGARIA. In the GORNA-DJUMAJA-PETRICH district (the SW corner of BULGARIA) there are still said to be a number of German troops in small units. It is reported that some German parachutist troops have arrived recently in DOBRUDJA (a ROUMANIAN province bordering the BLACK SEA, with CONSTANTZA as its main port).

According to a recent report of some reliability, there are two GERMAN Divisions in the VARNA-BURGAS area, and one split up with a large portion at PLOVDIV. The same report denies the arrival of German troops or material to any important extent in BULGARIA. (Summarized from GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary Nos 489 and 490 dated 21 and 22 Sep).

TURKEY.

(a) It has been reliably reported that a Turkish Wireless Station, broadcasting in TURKISH, which up to two days ago maintained a neutral attitude towards the belligerents, has now altered its tone. It has swung over towards the Axis and is showing a definitely GERMAN bias.

(b) Last week the British Military Attache in ANKARA paid a liaison visit to this Command. The Turks are most anxious for cordial co-operation between the military authorities on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian frontier and steps are being taken to regularise the situation. The attitude of the Turkish General Staff and fighting forces in the face of the delicate international situation remains staunchly pro-British. Unrecorded speeches to the troops by senior Turkish Officers have stressed the necessity of readiness to fight the aggressor, and of co-operation with ourselves. Turkish politicians are more delicately placed, and their attitude is necessarily more indefinite in the face of direct German diplomatic pressure. The business community too, are clearly susceptible to enemy economic pressure, in view of the geographic situation, which permits uninterrupted overland transport between CENTRAL EUROPE and TURKEY. In this connection recent reports of the intention to re-construct the railway bridge over the River MARITZA at UZUNKOPRU indicate that commercial communications are likely to be further improved. In the face of this situation, the best contribution that can be made by members of this Command is to impress those Turkish troops with whom we come in contact with our determination and ability to support them in the defence of their country against any aggression. The more cordial our relations are on the frontier, the better. In the last resort the Turkish Government will naturally have to consult the army on the advisability of resistance to possible German demands. It is up to us to strengthen the army's hand by all means in our power.

(Last para from Force HQ Weekly Int Review No 14 dated 21 Sep 41).

U.S.S.R. It is always difficult to obtain a reasonably up-to-date picture of the situation on the Russian front. Apart from the Far Northern Sector, which extends for nearly 600 miles from MURMANSK in the North to OLONETS in the South, and where fighting is in three widely separated areas, there is the long and very irregular battle front, that stretches for approximately 1200 miles from Lake LADOGA to the BLACK SEA---possibly by now to the Sea of AZOV. This battle front is not a continuous line, but a series of thrusts and counter-thrusts by either side, though even these thrusts are sometimes on a front as broad as 30 to 60 miles. Only in three places can anything like a continuous line be said to exist---around LENINGRAD, in the SMOLENSK area, and around ODESSA---and even in these the defence is sufficiently fluid to allow one side or the other to claim an advance of 20 to 40 miles without in any way breaking through the enemy's defensive zones.

When the distances are so great, and the situation so constantly changing, it is to be expected that reports will be delayed, even when the true facts of the position are known to the local commanders themselves. Hence, apart altogether from the military need to hold up the publication of news when it may give away information of value to the enemy, it frequently happens that the information available is itself three or four days---sometimes over a week behind the events. This discrepancy will often explain apparent contradictions. It will also be understood that some interpretation of reports is necessary before individual claims are fully understood. With these reservations, the latest available information indicates that the present situation is approximately as follows :-

Far Northern Sector. Determined attacks have been made from time to time by German troops towards MURMANSK with the object of denying this important port of entry to British supplies to RUSSIA. So far these attacks have been held. The last attack was launched about 18 Sep, and this apparently was thrown back with some loss. Since then, no progress by the Germans has been reported. It is perhaps significant that on this front, where the Finns are showing a distinct lack of enthusiasm, a wholly German attack should have been launched. Between Lakes LADOGA and ONEGA, the combined German-Finnish forces have not yet crossed the River SVIR, and it is probable that the railway line from ZVANKA to MURMANSK is still intact.

Leningrad and the Northern Sector. There has been little effective change around LENINGRAD itself. The combined German-Finnish advance down the KARELIAN Isthmus has come to a stand-still, but on the Southern side the German positions from TROTZK up to SCHLUSSELBURG have been consolidated, and are at one point, within 15 miles of the city. Land communications have thus been definitely severed. Heavy fighting has been almost continuous, and dive-bombing and other air attacks have been pressed home. The Russian resistance has, however, been stubborn, and the defenders have made continual counter-attacks. They have apparently been able to force back the attackers for about 40 miles along the coast line of the Gulf of FINLAND. So far there is no sign of the defence cracking, and supplies can still be brought in across Lake LADOGA.

Although the Germans have cleaned up all pockets of resistance in the BALTIC STATES, Soviet forces on the Islands at the mouth of the Gulf of RIGA are still holding out, and German claims to have captured the Islands are premature.

In the Lake ILMEN area the German advance has divided. One column moving left beyond NOVGOROD cut the main LENINGRAD-MOSCOW line some time ago, and then swung to reinforce the attack on the former. A second column moving to the right of the Lake, beyond STARAYA ROUSSA has now captured DEMIANSK, and threatens the rail centre of BOLOGOE, about 190 miles NW of MOSCOW. The column which captured KHOLM does not seem to have advanced further.

Central Sector. The position in this sector is more stabilised. The great Russian offensive which took Marshall Timoshenko's forces to within 12 miles of SMOLENSK by 15 Sep, has apparently come to a stand-still, and it is possible that the Germans have themselves put to good effect the lessons they have been taught by the Soviet Army

fluid defence in great depth. Claims to have captured so many villages may very well be true, but are probably without much military significance, except as proof of what is already known, namely, that the Germans in this sector are definitely standing on the defensive.

The situation North and East of SMOLENSK itself is static. The German withdrawal after their defeat in front of BRIANSK about 14 Sep has halted, and Russian attempts to recapture YELVA have apparently failed. Their attacks seem to have petered out for the time being.

Ukraine. The principle event is, of course, the fall of the important city of KIEV, one of the four main German objectives, and the first to be attained (the other three are reported to be LENINGRAD, MOSCOW and ODESSA). The German thrust South Eastwards from GOMEL assumed serious proportions more than 10 days ago. MOSCOW communique claimed to have interfered considerably with this drive along the line Gloukhov-Tchernigov, but it now seems that the Germans were able to continue their advance Southwards, and reach the general line LOCKHVITSA-NIEJIN-OSTER (LOCKHVITSA is on the SULA about 30 miles South of ROMNY, and OSTAR is on the DESNA some 50 miles NNE of KIEV) by 15 Sep. This drive was, in effect, the Northern arm of the pincers, which closed behind KIEV by 19 Sep. The southern arm of the pincer came from KREMENCHUG. This bridge head was established by 8 Sep, but it was not immediately evident that the Germans were trying to drive on further. It now appears that, while they were content to hold their own ground at DNIETROPETROVSK, they made a determined effort to drive Northwards from KREMENCHUG and capture LUBNI by 15 Sep. A junction with the Northern Army was probably effected between this town and LOCKHVITSA about 4 days later. Very large Russian forces were thus cut off, but resistance has been maintained, and it is at least possible that a considerable part of the 4 Russian armies the Germans claim to have encircled will succeed in extricating themselves by hard fighting.

Meanwhile, the German attempts to cross the Lower DNIEPER at BERISLAV, which were reported to have been unsuccessful in our last Review (Int Summary No 87), have now met with success, and German troops reached the outer defences of PEREKOP by 15 Sep. This town commands the main road communications with the CRIMEA, though the Northern parts of the routes which junction here have been in German hands for some time. The only other line of communication is the railway line and road on the Eastern isthmus, and this has probably been cut by now by the German drive, which is reported (but not confirmed) to have reached the Sea of AZOV. The CRIMEA may thus be isolated, except for sea-borne supplies, and the time may have arrived for a combined land, sea, and air attack on the peninsula, using the advanced landing grounds around PEREKOP. The renewed reports of German naval and troop concentrations at the invasion ports of VARNA and BOURGAS in BULGARIA, may well be connected with such a combined operation, especially when considered in the light of the emphatic Russian protests at such a use of BULGARIAN soil. The importance of such a move is that the capture of the CRIMEA would deprive the Russian BLACK SEA Fleet of its important base at SEBASTOPOL and the defenders of ODESSA of all hope of obtaining further supplies by sea, as well as of support by fighter and bomber aircraft based in that area. These deprivations may well lead to the fall of the city, which would remove a very considerable thorn from the German side.

Odessa. The siege of ODESSA is still being pressed, though the defenders have shown a remarkably offensive spirit and still maintain a stout resistance. It was reported that on 20 Sep. Soviet Marines broke up an attack by a mixed force of Germans and Roumanians, and the garrison has since strengthened its position. The town of OVIDIOPOL, at the mouth of the DNIESTER, has, however, been captured, and this somewhat narrows the circle of the defence. The Axis attack is being pressed with daily dive-bombing, and it is said that the defenders are preparing to withstand the 100th attempt to over-run their defences.

COMMENT:- Summing up, it may be said that, while the threat

to LENINGRAD is being held-- at least for the time being. The position in the Central sector is more or less stable. The danger in the UKRAINE has become distinctly more serious. It would appear that the Russians were so obsessed with the importance of stopping the dangerous German thrusts towards their two capitals, that they failed to appreciate German preparations for the next phase in the South. It has therefore come to the stage when Marshall Budenny will be fortunate if he can extricate the bulk of his forces intact and fall back successfully to the next line of defence. This may be the line of the River DONETS. The terrain in this area, and the absence of any strong natural defensive positions in between, renders such a withdrawal a distinct possibility. The capture of KHARKOV, which is involved, would, however, be a blow at least as important as the fall of KIEV, and it must be remembered that a great part of the Soviets' heavy industries are concentrated in this region. In short, the loss of the UKRAINE would be a serious handicap to the whole Soviet war effort, though it would certainly not be an overwhelming disaster.

SOVIET and AXIS strength and casualties.

(a) In assessing German casualties to date, it must be remembered that in addition to the stubborn resistance of the Russian army during twelve weeks of intensive operations, large pockets of Russians left behind the German lines, although completely encircled, have inflicted severe losses on German reserve formations which otherwise would hardly have been in action. In addition, the German doctrine that the attack must be pressed home with the greatest determination at the point selected for the maximum effort, leads to heavy casualties if, as in this case, the defence is equally determined. A careful study of all reports on casualties and the German losses in past campaigns leads to a figure of at least 1,000,000 total casualties up to the end of August. This is 20 to 22 per cent of all German forces engaged in this theatre, which are estimated at between 4,500,000 and 5,000,000.

In view of the desperate nature of the fighting, Russian casualties in killed and wounded are probably not less than those of the Germans. It is estimated that in addition the Russians may have lost a total of about 1,000,000 prisoners. This loss may represent nearly 40 per cent of the total Russian forces, estimated at 5,000,000 already engaged, but at the moment there is no reliable information as to the figures of the Russian reserves.

The Germans have so far employed 175 divisions, and their allies have contributed 19 Finnish, 4 Italian, 9 Hungarian, and 23 Roumanian divisions, giving a gross total of 230 divisions. On the Russian side, there have been so far engaged in action 161 Infantry Divisions, 24 Cavalry Divisions, 52 Tank Brigades each with a strength of either 225 light or 135 heavy tanks, and 3 Tank Divisions. The total German A.F.Vs. of all types is estimated at 7,500, allowing 100 per cent reserves, while the Russians can muster, if their formations are up to strength, some 11,000 tanks in tank formations, not allowing for reserves; in addition they have a considerable number in the Infantry and Cavalry Divisional Tank Units.

At Appendix "A" is a sketch showing the present dispositions of the Axis forces on the front. (Last three paragraphs are from GSI GHQ ME Weekly Review No 68, dated 15 Sep 41.)

PERSONALITIES

The following are brief notes on the German Commanders in charge of Army Groups on the Eastern Front :-

GEN. FELDM. GERD V. RUNDSTEDT. Age 65. During the campaign in FRANCE and FLANDERS he was in command of Army Group A (initially 4, 12 and 16 Armies, whilst in the POLISH campaign he commanded the Southern Army Group in POLAND (8, 10 and 14 Armies).

GEN. M. FEDOR V. BOCK. Age 60. Commanded Army Group B in FRANCE and FLANDERS. (Initially 6 and 18 Armies) and the Northern Army Group in POLAND; (3 and 4 Armies).

GEN. FELDMARSHALL ARTHUR V. LEEB. Age 64. Commanded Army Group C in FRANCE and FLANDERS, initially 1 and 17 Armies.

GENERAL ADJUTANT NIKOLAUS V. FALKENHAGEN. Age 55. Was COC German Forces during the NORWEGIAN campaign.

(b) GENERAL REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN TO DATE. The campaign has now lasted for three months, and it is perhaps an opportune moment to attempt a general survey of operations. At the outset of the war the German General Staff doubtless hoped that a repetition of the tactics successfully employed against POLAND and FRANCE would yield the same satisfactory results in the case of RUSSIA. The plans must thus have anticipated the quick defeat of the Red Army, to be brought about by the surprise nature of their attack, and by the fact that the Russians had apparently concentrated an undue proportion of their forces in the forward areas: their estimate of quick victory must also have been based on a false appreciation of the value of the Red Army, as shown in FINLAND some eighteen months earlier.

Failure to achieve this object has forced them to adopt their present tactics, which are a modern version of the old Prussian doctrine "outflank - encircle, - and destroy". Thus the main German object would still appear to be the destruction of the Russian Field Armies and the crushing of all organized resistance. To this end they have made full use of their superior organization, mobility and command, seizing opportunities presented by the probable large-scale use of the Russian reserves to stem at all costs the strong thrusts made on MOSCOW, and to a lesser degree on LENINGRAD and KIEV.

In this gigantic struggle, the picture resembles that of two heavyweight wrestlers. So far the Germans have always had the initiative, and have several times looked like getting the fall. But each time the Russians have managed to avoid a stranglehold, though always on the defensive. In this they have been helped by the terrain, by the difficulties of long communications and of the break of gauge which the Germans have had to overcome, but above all by the fine fighting of the Red Army.

In such a contest a fall is often liable to come suddenly, due to the exhaustion of the weaker wrestler. But at the moment we cannot estimate whether or not this situation is impending or can be staved off, possibly indefinitely, lacking as we do any indication of the strength, the state of equipment, and value for war of the Russian reserves. There is however, no imminent sign of the Russian Army cracking.

At the same time, the recent German successes in the UKRAINE must have placed a great additional strain on available Russian reserves. The outflanking movement from GOMEL South-Eastwards virtually broke the DNIESTER line. It opened the way for an advance either Eastwards across the UKRAINE coal basin until the next big obstacle, the River DON, is reached, or Northwards in an attempt to roll up the Russians on the SMOLENSK front. Strenuous attempts are also certain against LENINGRAD, and attacks in any other parts of the front where weak spots can be found.

To sum up: it will be seen that no forecast as to the future can usefully be made. It must be borne in mind, however, that the winter is approaching; that from DNIEPROPETROVSK it is over 500 miles to MOSCOW, and about 250 miles to the nearest point on the River DON; and again, from ROSTOV on the DON it is about 400 miles to BAKU and 600 miles to BAKU.

(Last six paragraphs are from CSI GROUND Weekly Review No 68, dated 15 Sep 41).

PART 11. SECURITY.

General. The formation of an independent Syrian Government by Shoikh TAJ ED DINE, although primarily a political move, also raises a fresh aspect of the internal security problem. He is admittedly, at best, a "puppet", a role which he has played in the past at the behest of the VICHY authorities. There is a distinct risk that, under pressure of events, his nomination may ultimately unite the factions of the Nationalist opposition to sink their internal differences. In view of the known pro-Axis leanings of large sections of the Nationalists the purely political would then be superseded by the internal security aspect. Whilst internal Syrian politics are no business of ours, the possibility of their creating a threat to military security must not be forgotten.

In general, the internal situation is improving from the military security point of view. Much, however, remains to be done and it will need all the active co-operation of which the Allies are capable before SYRIA and the LEBANON can be considered even approximately secure as an operational or a L of C area.

Distribution of Foodstuffs. Although the food problem is still by no means solved, steps are at last being taken to meet the needs of the immediate future. Agreement has been reached that the distributing organisation should include 15 British Inspectors together with Syrian and Lebanese representatives. It is hoped that the organisation thus strengthened will be able to complete the task already begun of breaking the wheat "ring". The rice and sugar situation is already easier. It is important, however, that whatever results are achieved should be permanent if serious shortage and consequent danger to internal security, particularly in the LEBANON, is to be avoided in the coming winter.

On 19 Sep "L'Orient" published the names of 13 persons who have been arrested for hoarding foodstuffs and for profiteering. It is felt that this is a move in the right direction.


In many cases the prices of essential commodities have risen as much as 300 per cent since Sep 1939, as compared with the 30 per cent increase in the British Isles. Flour has risen 1200 (Twelve hundred) per cent.

W. H. H. H.

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: as per Summary No 61.

APPENDIX A TO I. RUSS. CORPS INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY No 96
DISTRIBUTION OF AXIS FORCES ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT



SECRET

CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 97.

led from information received from
hrs 25 Sep to 1200 hrs 26 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
 - (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.
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SPECIAL NOTE

It is of the utmost importance that specimens of GERMAN Parachute Cord be obtained for examination and testing. It is essential that all Parachutes used for dropping personnel, mines, flares, or other equipment, be forwarded intact to these HQ by the fastest possible means.
(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 488 dated 20 Sep 41).

PART 1.

(a) RUSSIA. The following are some impressions of a neutral observer believed reliable, who has just travelled through RUSSIA. Morale is reported as being excellent, especially amongst the wounded troops. The number of aircraft and airfields seen, particularly training establishments, was impressive. The RUSSIANS were hard at work making field defences facing the TURKISH frontier in the LENINAKAN area. Over 2000 workmen were seen making a tank defence field 500 yards broad, with boulders. RUSSIAN camouflage appeared excellent. The general impression gained was that the GERMANS are now obtaining air and material superiority at points where they are actually thrusting, but their attacks are now being made on narrower fronts.

GREECE. Distribution of GERMAN forces. A report, believed reliable, states that the number of GERMAN troops in GREECE has increased lately, and that during the last two months there has been frequent transit of German troops, vehicles and artillery, through ATHENS in the direction of PEALERON for embarkation. This report should be treated with reserve, pending confirmation.
(Last two paras summarised from GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 488 dated 20 Sep).

TURKEY. Identifications. It appears likely from a report received that both 2 and 54 Cavalry Regiments form part of 14 Cav Div (HQ at URFA).
(From Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 108 dated 24 Sep 41).

The following report has been received from an able observer of British nationality, who has just returned from a visit to TURKEY. It is considered that his information is reliable:-

The underlying principle of Turkish policy at present is undoubtedly to keep out of the war, and to concentrate her energies on the development of her own resources. There are, however, two other factors which play an important part in determining her foreign policy. One of these is her traditional fear of RUSSIA's imperialist ambitions, the other is a not unnatural wish to be on the winning side.

RUSSIA is regarded as the hereditary enemy of TURKEY in much the same way as the French regard the Germans. The interests of the two nations have frequently been in conflict, and in any case Czarist and Soviet Russia have coveted possession, or at least control of the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles. The result is that

TURKEY is sympathetic towards any power which opposes RUSSIA, though this sympathy probably stops far short of active participation in war against her. As long, therefore, as GERMANY seems to be getting the better of the U.S.S.R. TURKEY will continue to supply the former with much-needed primary products; but, if the U.S.S.R. seemed likely to defeat GERMANY, TURKISH help to the latter might well take a more active form.

It is this instinctive hatred for RUSSIA, and distrust of her intentions, that has gone far to cool Turkish feelings towards BRITAIN, as a result of the joint Anglo-Russian invasion of IRAN. Our own entry into IRAN was not looked upon with favour, for they considered that our reasons were hypocritical and insufficient; but to have made actual arrangements with RUSSIA to invade IRAN from the North at the same time was objected to strongly, for it brought the hated Soviet army down onto TURKEY's relatively unguarded backdoor, and has given them another frontier to protect.

TURKEY is also afraid of the spread of Bolshevism among her people, and for this reason alone hates and fears the great power of the North, which she considers has never abandoned her proclaimed intention to Sovietise the rest of EUROPE and to spread Communism throughout the world. It is not necessary to emphasise how distasteful the doctrines of Communism are to the Turks.

The other important factor is TURKEY's desire to support those who will ultimately win the war. Her natural leanings are undoubtedly more towards BRITAIN than towards GERMANY, but she cannot fail to be impressed by the size of the German forces, by the rapid GERMAN conquest of GREECE (compared with our own efforts in SYRIA), and by the present campaign in the UKRAINE which has already resulted in the occupation of three-quarters of the entire Province.

The net result of all this is that the Turks are prepared to make any concession to GERMANY which does not impair her sovereign rights or threaten her territorial integrity. If these concessions can be made without injuring her good relations with BRITAIN, so much the better. This attitude explains her Pact of Non-Aggression with GERMANY and her refusal to agree to the mineral concessions GERMANY so much wants, while at the same time accepting German assistance in building up her communication system, receiving a German trade delegation, and exporting primary products for the use of GERMANY's armies. On the other hand, she points out quite truthfully, that she has already performed a valuable service to the Allies by staying out of the Greek campaign (since her participation could only have resulted in the Germans over-running TURKEY-IN-EUROPE at least), that she is at present a bastion of defence protecting British interests in the MIDDLE EAST from an immediate threat of German attack, and that every week in which she can maintain this position of neutrality is so much time gained for further Allied preparations to withstand a German onslaught.

What the next development will be it is difficult to say. Pressure may be brought to bear to allow Italian warships to pass through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous, but there is no ground for assuming that TURKEY would not fight if her European frontier were invaded. Whether she would permit a free passage to German troops across her territory to attack RUSSIA in TRANSCAUCASIA--- or even British forces in Northern SYRIA and IRAQ--- is quite another matter. At the moment, it appears the direct question has not been put to her.

Comment. It appears most desirable that all officers and men, particularly in frontier areas, should do everything in their power to foster good relations with the Turks, and particularly with the Turkish Army, which is the most pro-British element in the country.

Above all, we must avoid at all costs giving our Turkish friends the impression that we do not trust them or that we think that there is any possibility that they may not stand by the terms of their Treaty with us.

ROUMANIAN SHIPPING. It is also reported from the same source as the above that the two large passenger liners, the "Transylvania"

and the "Bessarabia", each capable of carrying a large number of troops, are lying at anchor at ISTANBUL. These ships would be of great value as transports if combined operations in the BLACK SEA were contemplated. It is suggested that their movement, or even an indication that they were being prepared for camouflage, would be significant, and should be reported at once. At present these ships are painted white.

SYRIA. On 24 Sep, a Vichy French vessel, the SS "Colombi", proceeding from TOULON to BEIRUT, was bombed by an Italian plane. Five bombs were dropped, all of which missed.

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION. Italian Bombs. "Broad baskets" are being used by the Italians in attempted attacks on our forward landing grounds. The basket, which appears to disintegrate at about 500 feet, contains approximately 70 small shrapnel bombs which are scattered over a wide area. Each bomb weighs 7/8 lb. and is about the size of a cocoa tin. It has a fragmentation of about 500 yards.
(W.D.F. Summary No 201).

German Tanks. The following are the estimated performances of GERMAN tanks. They are all subject to confirmation by trial :-

| <u>TANK</u> | <u>TRENCH CROSSING</u> | <u>STEP</u> | <u>WATER FORDED</u> |
|-------------|------------------------|-------------|---------------------|
| Mk III | 5 ft 7 ins | 2 ft | 2 ft 11 ins. |
| Mk IV | 9 ft | 2 ft 3 ins | 3 ft 6 ins. |

(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 488 dated 20 Sep 41).

PART II SECURITY.

Erratum. Reference our Summary No 96 dated 25 Sep 41, para under heading General and para under heading Distribution of Foodstuffs down to the words "in the coming winter" are from Force P & TJ Weekly Intelligence Review No 14 of 21 Sep 41. It is NOT the opinion of HQ 1 Aust Corps that the internal situation is improving from the Military Security point of view.

Lt-Col
CS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No 61.

SECRET

CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 98

Based from information received from
1200 hrs 26 Sep to 1200 hrs 27 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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SPECIAL NOTE

In view of the difficulties for the forward troops in collecting captured documents, and in sending them back, the following example shows the value of such documents to Higher Formations---it might also serve to encourage even further efforts.

A roll of maps, which had been there since the SIDI BARRANI battle last year, was found recently. This roll contained six copies of the Italian 1/100,000 TRIPOLITANIA series which had not previously come into our hands. These have proved most valuable to Survey in their efforts to produce accurate maps for future use.
(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 491 dated 23 Sep).

PART 1.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

NORTH AFRICA. Our Air Action. A 24,000 ton Italian liner which was attacked in TRIPOLI Harbour by our aircraft on night 18/19 Sep has again been attacked. The liner was sighted by our recon aircraft off KURIAT Island. Eight direct hits were scored with 250 lb bombs, one striking the vessel on the waterline.

IRAN. It is reported that the area SAQQIZ (in the Province of KURDISTAN which is in the NW corner of IRAN) is in the hands of rebel KURDS who have set up a separate administration. It is doubtful whether effective action will be taken by Persian troops, in view of their increasing demoralisation since the invasion of the country.
(Last two paras summarised from GHQ Daily Int Summary No 491 of 23 Sep)

SYRIA. Attached as Appendix "A" are translations of two VICHY FRENCH Orders, published for information.

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION. The developments in GERMAN TANK organisation are shown in Appendix "B" (From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 486 dated 18 Sep 41).

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION. Nil.

PART II. S E C U R I T Y.

The tri-weekly mixed trains from TURKEY through SYRIA to TURKEY, via MEIDAN EKBES-MOUSLIMIE-TCHORANE BEY, carry Turkish soldiers-300-400 on each train. Their attitude has changed completely during the past two weeks, from one of suspicion and unapproachability to ready friendliness and willingness to talk. Many express the opinion that they expect to be allied soon to ENGLAND. This change is so marked that it could be considered inspired. This change of feeling is also evident in the attitude of the troops manning the Turkish border posts with whom our men at MEIDAN EKBES make daily contacts.

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No 61.

APPENDIX "A" TO 1 AUST CORPS DAILY INTELL
NO 98 dated 27 Sep 41.

COMMANDEMENT DES TROUPES.
DES TERRITOIRES SUD SYRIE
ETAT-MAJOR - 3^e BUREAU

Forward HQ 26/6/41

URGENT.

No 557 /3.S

SECRET

OPERATIONAL ORDER NO 24.

1. On the orders of the Colonel, OC Division, patrols will be carried out during the night 26/27 June in order to get the maximum information about the enemy and capture prisoners.
2. A small surprise attack with artillery preparation will if necessary also be arranged with this object in view
3. A premium of 1000 francs will be given to all those responsible for bringing in each prisoner alive, and 100 francs for each dead prisoner (sic). All documents seized and brought back will also be subject to reward.

General KEIME.

HQ 22/6/41.

H.N.
COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF
DES TROUPES DU LEVANT

ETAT-MAJOR - 3^e BUREAU

No 3426 /3.

SECRET
PERSONAL

GENERAL ORDER NO 21/A.

The Government informs the General C in C that reinforcements of troops and French supplies of all kinds will be sent.

This news is to be brought to the knowledge of the troops by word of mouth so as to keep up their spirits in spite of the tiring time they have been through and maintain the magnificent effort they have made so far.

(SgC) DENTZ

DISTRIBUTION

South SYRIA) This note
North SYRIA) must not be
LEBANON) reproduced

DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN TANK ORGANISATION.

1. A report received from War. Office states that 21 Tank Regiment (of 20 Armoured Division on the Russian front) is organised in three battalions each of three squadrons. Details of the organisation and strength are shown at para 4 below. This is the first report of the new organisation. In FRANCE Tank regiments had two battalions each of four squadrons, and in LIBYA 5 and 8 Tank Regiments each had two battalions of three squadrons.

2. It is not at present known how far this new organisation may have been adopted by other regiments. In view, however, of the fact that twelve of the armoured divisions operated in the BALKANS with regiments of two battalions, and had barely time to carry out a major reorganisation before proceeding to the Russian front, it is considered unlikely that the new organisation is yet widespread. 20 Armoured Division is, with the exception of 21 Armoured Division, the "latest model" and probably represents the latest ideas on organisation likely to be a pattern in time for the majority of divisions. 17, 18, 19 and 20 Armoured Divisions were formed in the same period (Spring and Summer 1941) and are probably all on the new model: Of the remainder only one or two (possibly 2 and 3 Divisions) are likely to be reorganised in three battalions, if at all.

3. The new organisation is the flowering of two distinct tendencies of which we have had indications: firstly the appearance of three smaller battalions in the regiment; secondly a change over in the balance of tanks. We shall consider these separately:

(a) The development in organisation can be traced through three distinct stages.

Stage One:- (French campaign). The regiment of two battalions of four squadrons each.

Stage Two:- (Libyan model) The regiment of two battalions of three squadrons each.

Stage Three:- (Russian stage) The regiment of three battalions of three squadrons each.

The change over from stage one to stage two seems to have taken place during the Winter 1940-41. The fact that when 5 and 8 Tank Regiments left for AFRICA (January-March 41) the squadrons were still numbered 1, 2 and 4 indicates that the development was not at that time far on its way. This theory is supported by a captured document dated 18 January 41 which envisages the possibility of three or four squadrons.

The change from stage two to stage three is probably still in process. There had been two indications of the possibility: the document mentioned above spoke of a "three battalion provisional stage" in January; and in May (the date of his capture) PW Wöhrmann (a very reliable source giving information in "M" only) had heard of the third stage. The report from the Russian front at present under consideration is the first concrete case.

(Note:- It is not without interest that General CREACH is reported to have said that he would prefer a Tank Brigade of three regiments rather than two for tactical reasons. The Germans seem to have been thinking along the same lines).


(b) Since Summer 1940 the proportion of medium to light tanks in the tank regiment has altered almost according to a geometrical progression. Here again there appear to be three main stages, an emphasis on the light tanks (Mark I and II), a period of balance, and finally an overwhelming emphasis on the Medium (Mark III and IV) tanks almost to the exclusion of the light tanks as fighting units. These stages are exemplified in the French campaign, the Libyan stage and the Russian stage.

| Total of tanks in Regiment. | Medium tanks (III and IV) | Light tanks (I and II) | Approx- imate proportion of light |
|---|------------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Stage one (French campaign) 204 | 68 | 136 | 1 : 2. |
| Stage Two (5 and 8 Tank Regiments in LIBYA) * | | | |
| (8 Regiment) 143 | 63 | 80 | 3 : 4 |
| (5 Regiment) 158 | 91 | 67 | 4 : 3 |
| Stage Three (21 Tank Regiment in RUSSIA) 195 | 126 @ | 69 | 2 : 1 |

* - It is interesting that 8 Tank Regiment (15 Armoured Division) seems to represent a slightly earlier stage in the process than 5 Tank Regiment (5 Light Motorised Division).

@ It is significant, but not surprising that in the newest organisation the Mark I tank has been dropped. Just as we have done with our now obsolete Light Tank Mark VI, it seems likely that the Germans will omit the Mark I from new regiments, and allow this type to go out of production, but will continue to use it where it already exists (as in LIBYA).

4. NEW ORGANISATION OF GERMAN TANK REGIMENT. (Based on reports of 21 Tank Regiment).



* Although it is not expressly stated it seems possible that the Mark II troops may be HQ troops.

| TANK STRENGTH. | Mark II | Mark III | Mark IV | Total |
|-----------------|---------|----------|---------|-------|
| Light squadron | 5 | 16 | - | 21 |
| Medium squadron | 5 | - | 10 | 15 |
| Battalion | 21 | 32 | 10 | 63 |
| Regiment | 69 | 96 | 30 | 195. |

SECRET

1. AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 99

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 27 Sep to 1200 hrs 28 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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PART I.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

BULGARIA. The Bulgarian Government is said to be requisitioning all motorboats and other small craft. The presence of about 4,000 GERMAN troops is reported in BOURGAS, but, it is stated, there are no GERMAN warships there.

ROUMANIA. Serious dissension between the Roumanian and GERMAN Commands before ODESSA is reported. The Roumanians complain that the Germans have made them bear the brunt of the seige, and have failed to supply promised heavy artillery. The same report confirms the heaviness of Roumanian losses, and attributes it largely to the Russians' intelligent use of machine guns.

(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 492 dated 24 Sep).

GREECE. It is reported that ammunition, including 75mm, anti-gas respirators, and 300 - 500 ton calques are being made in GREECE under Axis supervision.

TURKEY. Continued work is reported on the BULAIR defences, and great activity on the CATALIC lines. Construction of anti-tank ditches and large blockhouses is proceeding on the road UZUNKOPRU - ISTANBUL. (UZUNKOPRU is on the main railway line from BULGARIA, 10 miles inside TURKISH Territory).

GERMANY. Personalities. It is reported that Generalfeldmarschall LISZT and his Chief of Staff have been allotted houses in the outskirts of ATHENS. (Comment. This possibly indicates a prolonged stay). They were in ATHENS in August. Generalfeldmarschall LISZT is aged 60, he was in command of the German Forces in the GREEK Campaign and is regarded as a specialist in conducting mountain warfare.

(Last three paras from GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 493 dated 25 Sep).

IRAN. The condition of the Persian Army continues to deteriorate. Desertions are frequent, and even in TEHRAN, where hitherto some cohesion has been maintained, the situation is unsatisfactory. The Russians have turned out the Persians from their barracks on the outskirts of the city.

(From GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 492 dated 24 Sep).

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION.

Reference this Headquarters Intelligence Summary No 98, Appendix "B", (Development in GERMAN TANK ORGANISATION), the note to para 3 refers of course, to the SATTERLAGE period, when 7 Armoured Division had only two-regiment brigades, and not to the War Establishment of a BRITISH Armoured Brigade.

A. PW has stated that 5 Light Division has become "21

Heavy" Division. This is undoubtedly just the prisoner expression, and does not mean that tanks heavier than Mark IV are in, or en route for, LIBYA, which is most unlikely.

(Summarised from GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 493 dated 25 Sep).

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION.

ROAD DIYARBAKIR - KARPUT. 75 miles. - TURKEY.

This is a good road throughout, of crushed stone surface capable of taking heavy motor transport at all times of the year. For the first 40 miles the road traverses a flat plain before entering hilly country at BAKER MADEN (near ARGHANA). From here the road runs over a long saddle between the SIGHIK DAGH on the EAST and the BOSMA DAGH on the WEST. Once the road has entered the hills the country on either side is reported to be broken and intersected with small streams making movement off the road difficult. The GEULDJIK LAKE is an impassable obstruction.

Likely defensive position. From NORTH edge of SIGHIK DAGH, SOUTH of the GEULDJIK LAKE to NORTH of the BOSMA DAGH. Emerging from the saddle, the road crosses a short plain before entering the mountains again SOUTH of KEZRE.

Bridges are believed to be at the following places, but confirmation is awaited:-

1. KARADJADAGH SU (a strong stone bridge capable of taking heavy motor transport.)
2. KALANDER on the TIGRIS.
3. Bridge of PORTUS over the tributary of the MURAD SU, 6 1/2 miles SOUTH of KARPUT.

(From Force HQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 108 dated 24 Sep).

PART II. SECURITY.

EFFECTIVENESS OF AERIAL DEMONSTRATIONS.

An enquiry was made on the above subject relative to a "show-the-flag" demonstration which recently took place over part of SYRIA. This was the result:-

(i) An Australian Infantry Battalion reports that on the approach of the Squadron of fighters in perfect formation, the whole of the population of LATTAKIA came out in the streets. As the planes dived low over the town the people were very much impressed, and much excited discussion took place about the speed and fine appearance of the planes. This removed the rather bad impression left by the old Valentia which landed at LATTAKIA some weeks ago. At SLEME the people were similarly impressed by the demonstration.

(ii) KATABA, AQUARA, MEITKIA, LAKLOUK and ERMEJ were also visited. In these villages people were very impressed and anxious to know the reason for the demonstration. They were told that the RAF were keeping a close watch over them and safeguarding them against bandits.

(From HQ RAF P T-J & S Weekly Intelligence Summary No 3 dated 16 Sep).

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

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Detail. DAMASCUS-ABOU EL CHAMAT (Frontier Post).

HOMS Road (A1), is followed from DAMASCUS, the first nine miles being through cultivated areas with olive and fruit trees. Fifteen miles from DAMASCUS the BAGDAD road branches to the right and to ABOU EL CHAMAT is a metal road (A) in good repair, with sharp side drains, making dispersion of MT difficult.

(1000) ABOU EL CHAMAT - SAB BIYAR (French post).

Shortly after leaving the former a detour can be taken which crosses a clay pan at QAAH ES SEIGAL, and can be traversed at speed. There is a well near the western edge of the claypan.

Track rejoins marked route before passing the Trig "Tal at Sahi" on right.

At SAB BIYAR is a fort with wireless station, and some distance away a separate well. Track to left to PALMYRA.

SAB BIYAR - J. TENF.

Before reaching SAB BIYAR or shortly after leaving, a detour to the North can be taken which rejoins the marked route about 25 miles before reaching J. TENF. This track has some rough patches. At J. TENF two large stone pillars mark the PALMYRA turn-off. To the east and also to the west of J. TENF are patches which are exceptionally bad in wet weather.

J. TENF - RUTBA.

Along this stretch there are numerous depressions which are treacherous in wet weather.

RUTBA - BAGDAD.

This section is part of the main HAIFA-BAGDAD road which is being constructed to an A1 standard. At present there are some bad wadis to the East of RUTBA.

From DAMASCUS to BAGDAD is 530 miles, and this distance has been covered in a Chevrolet in 11 hrs.

PART 11. SECURITY.

Embarkation of Vichy troops. The "Gleaner Convoy" composed of SS "Colombie" and the Hospital Ship "Canada" completed the embarkation of Vichy troops, families and civilians. The Hospital Ship sailed on 25 Sep and SS "Colombie" sailed on 27 Sep 41.

| <u>Convoy</u> | <u>Date sailed</u> | <u>Army, Naval and Air Force and Families</u> | <u>Civilians</u> | <u>Total embk</u> |
|---------------|--------------------|---|------------------|-------------------|
| Gleaner | 25.9.41 | 1212 | 90 | 1302 |
| Convoy | 27.9.41 | | | |

Lt-Col
1 Aust Corps

NOTE: Summer Time TRANS JORDAN ends mid-night 30 Sep/1 Oct. Thereafter GMT will be used for all matters affecting TRANS JORDAN.

SECRET

1ST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 100

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 28 Sep to 1200 hrs 29 Sep 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will NOT be reproduced in any form.
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SPECIAL NOTE.

This is the 100th issue of this Headquarters Daily Intelligence Summary since the commencement of the SYRIAN campaign.

In view of the amount of information of great value to the enemy contained in these Summaries, will you please check NOW the arrangements that you have made for their safe custody, and in particular ensure that NO unauthorised person has access to them. "Unauthorised person" should be taken to mean ANY person who does not REQUIRE to see the Summaries for official purposes. It is suggested that if you do not require the back numbers you should destroy them by fire NOW.

PART 1

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

GERMANY. A report from SWEDISH sources states that the Germans are making active preparations for a Winter campaign in the U.S.S.R. Large numbers of ready-made wooden houses are being ordered in STOCKHOLM to provide shelter for troops, as all existing buildings have been destroyed by the retreating Russians. Vast numbers of skis have been ordered in NORWAY, whilst throughout SCANDINAVIA horses are being bought up on an extensive scale to secure transport during the Winter months.

GREECE. Distribution of Forces. Reference this HQ Summary No 97. It is now reported that recent troop embarkations from PIRAEUS were mainly Italians bound for DODECANESE and SAMOS. (Last two paras from GHQ Daily Intelligence Summary No 494 dated 26 Sep 41).

(b) TECHNICAL INFORMATION. Effect of SA fire against Aircraft. As an illustration of the effect of SA fire against ground-strafting aircraft, it should be noted that recently a G 50 (ITALIAN fighter) was shot down by ground forces near SIDI BARRANI. The pilot had died from several bullet wounds in the chest, and the plane itself was riddled with holes.

(Western Desert Force Intelligence Summary No 166).

(c) TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION.

ROUTE- DAMASCUS - BAGDAD.

General. The surveyed route passing through SAB BIYAR, J.TENF, and RUTBA, is marked by kilo posts, which in SYRIA are blue and spaced so that one is always in sight, and in IRAQ are white, and spaced at 5 km intervals.

In the desert the surface has been prepared to the extent that a wide swath has been cleared of rocks, and in some places small lengths have been metalled.

However, in dry weather detours with a better surface are followed. Generally speaking, the natural surface of the desert provides fairly good going for MT, making dispersing a simple matter.

The route would be impassable to ordinary MT after heavy rain, but as the average rainfall is about 4", few hold-ups are experienced.

(Over)

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SEC. 21

T CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 101.

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 29 Sep to 1200 hrs 30 Sep 41.

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PART 1.

(a) INFORMATION FROM OTHER FRONTS.

(1) U.S.S.R. Operations during the week 15-22 Sep may be summarised as follows :-

The Schwerpunkt of the Axis attack has remained in the South. The main development has been the completion of the encirclement of KIEV and of the area East of the city, and the subsequent German effort to destroy some fifteen Russian divisions in the pocket thus created. At the time of writing, a new thrust is developing towards KHARKOV from POLTAVA. In the extreme South, German forces advancing from PEREKOP have cut the railway line at the Isthmus of SALKOVO, thus severing land communications between the CRIMEA and the mainland.

In the UKRAINE, the twin advances Southwards from LOCHVITSA and Northwards from LUBNI have gained contact, and completely isolated the garrison of KIEV and the troops in the area East of the city. Early in the week, strong pressure was brought to bear from all sides on the narrow Russian pocket thus created, but, after considerable initial success, the German enveloping forces, owing to fierce Russian resistance, are temporarily on the defensive. East of the KIEV area, a further advance has been made in the direction of MICHAELOVKA, which is now in German hands. A fresh advance Eastwards from KREMENCHUG on the DNIEPER has resulted in the fall of POLTAVA, and is making progress towards KHARKOV. North of the CRIMEA, the present line reached by the German advance is TIMOSCHENKA-MENTSCHENKUR-GENITSCHESK. With the complete isolation of the CRIMEA by this last move, the threat to SEVASTOPOL becomes acute. With bases North of PEREKOP ISTHMUS in German hands, an air-borne invasion of the CRIMEA becomes a not too difficult project. There are no further reports of German preparations for combined operations from the BALKANS, but with two divisions concentrated in the VARNA-BURGAS area these operations are still considered likely.

On the Finnish front, the German attack on MURMANSK has been repulsed. In the South the Finns have extended their hold along the Northern bank of the River SVIR.

In other sectors there has been little change. The North-Eastern part of the island of OESSEL, off the Estonian coast, is in German hands. Round LENINGRAD, fierce fighting continues, but the morale of the garrison is reported to be high and the Russians claim that it is well-provided with tanks, artillery, and supplies of all kinds. In the STARA RUSSA sector, the Germans have advanced close to the MOSCOW-LENINGRAD railway. There is some confirmation of German claim to have inflicted heavy losses and captured many prisoners and much war material South of Lake ILMEN.

In the SMOLENSK sector there has been no change of front. The impression has been gained that further Russian counter-attacks are to be expected in this area.

The Russian campaign is now in its fourteenth week, and there are no signs of imminent Russian collapse. It is of value to the effect of this delay on German plans for action against TURKEY and through TURKEY to the Middle East. For a successful attack against TURKEY, or for the implementation of a threat strong enough

to compel TURKEY to allow the passage of Axis troops. G
require larger forces, including armoured formations, in
than she has at present. Neither the land forces nor the aircraft
necessary can be spared until the Germans break off their present
intensive operations on the Russian front. Once operations in RUSSIA
become static, it is believed that the Germans could not complete
the withdrawal, re-fitting and concentration of sufficient forces
to attack or over-awe TURKEY in less than two months. Supposing,
then that the Russians were to collapse almost immediately, movements
of German troops into TURKEY would appear unlikely before the middle
of November. By this time, certainly by 1st December at the latest,
winter conditions in ANATOLIA will have rendered movement off the
roads virtually impossible. On the Anatolian Plateau, even the roads
themselves will have become very difficult. Against a hostile
TURKEY, then, the Germans could hope to make little progress beyond
the fringes of ANATOLIA until the end of winter, about 31 March 42.
Even if TURKEY submitted to German demands and allowed the passage
of troops, the necessity for the concentration in ANATOLIA of
sufficient rolling stock should delay German movement for at least
another fortnight, that is till the beginning of December. After
that date, practically all MT would have to be moved across ANATOLIA
by rail and the concentration in Southern ANATOLIA of a force
sufficiently large to conduct a major offensive against SYRIA and
IRAQ would be a slow business. It is reasonable to hope, then, that
Russian resistance, protracted far beyond German expectations, has
made difficult, if not impossible, active operations designed to
subdue TURKEY or to threaten the Middle East through TURKEY this
year.

(From GSI GHQ MEF Weekly Review of the Military Situation No 69
dated 22 Sep 41).

Early in the week, BAKU, in Turkish, gave news of an alleged
German threat from BULGARIA. It was stated that in addition to the
four German and sixteen Bulgarian divisions previously reported on
the Bulgar-Turkish frontier, fifteen more German divisions had been
sent there from GREECE, and that three more Italian divisions were
preparing to follow.
(From HQ RAF P & TJ Weekly Int. Summary No 4, dated 24 Sep 41).

(11) ROUMANIA. (From Roumanian radio sources). Brigadier
General Alexander Joanitiu, Chief of the Roumanian General Staff,
was killed in action on 18th September on the Eastern front. This is
one of the heaviest losses so far suffered by the Roumanian Army.
was Marshal Antonescu's most intimate collaborator.
(From HQ RAF P & TJ Weekly Int. Summary No 4 dated 24 Sep 41).

TECHNICAL INFORMATION:

Material for German uniforms. An analysis was recently
of the material used in various articles of captured German
form. The garments examined included both Service and Tropical
form, working overalls, underwear and boots. The examination
revealed that the garments were of good material and well made up,
revealed no evidence of the use of inferior substitutes.
(From GSI GHQ MEF Technical Int Summary No 10 dated 15 Sep 41).

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION.

DEIR-EZ-ZOR (n) A 5890-RAHOUN

| Object | Map Ref. | Remarks. |
|----------------|------------|--|
| DEIR-EZ-ZOR | (n) A 5890 | Take track leading WSW to SOUKHNE 439326. |
| Pile of Stones | | Turn right West here and continue along WEST edge of racecourse. |
| Wadi | | Steep, with loose sand at bottom. Then good going for 1 mile. |
| Wadi | | Followed by series of wadis for 6 miles. |
| Wadi | | Wide and green (August); track |

| Ect | Map Ref | Remarks. |
|------|------------------|--|
| 18.4 | Ridge | follows Wadi. |
| 1915 | Water-hole | Small ridge of hills - rough going. Probably, in winter. |
| 20.9 | | Track winds, rough going. |
| 23.0 | KSEIBE (n)A 2393 | 2 ruins on right NORTH of track. One signal disc on pole. Concrete well with 3 troughs. Turn SOUTH by second ruin, continue for 200 yards, then turn right WEST to pick up track, which leads over hilly country- rough going. Single track through hills. |
| 30.7 | Defile | Sharp S-bends in track. |
| 33.6 | | Deep- possible obstacle in winter. |
| 35.4 | Wadi | Hill MADRA A 0292 clearly visible on left, 2 miles to SOUTH. Flat-topped concave hill with survey mark on top (2,200 ft approx). |
| 36.2 | | Take left fork. |
| 37.7 | Fork | Track very indistinct- keep westerly direction. |
| 39.2 | | Single track through hills. |
| 39.4 | Defile | Deep- possible obstacle in winter. |
| 40.1 | Wadi | On left. |
| 41.4 | Cairn | Take left fork. Right fork leads to well, BIR SEJRI Z 9303. |
| 44.8 | Fork | Track bears SOUTH. Hills on left, wadi on right. Track bears WEST again. Good going for 8 miles. |
| 55.5 | | Hill TELL-EL-QUAT E 7696 clearly visible on right 2 miles to North. Flat top and concave sides. Survey mark on top (approx 2,000 ft). The RAQQA 1/200,000 map shows the track in sq 79 as crossing an escarpment in a SW direction. No such track is recognisable, but a clearly defined track (not shown on map) leads direct to RAHOUM Z 5600. |
| 64.5 | Wadi | Steep wadi. |
| 66.1 | | Rough going. |
| 68.6 | Wadi | Wide wadi. |
| 69.1 | Wadi crossing | Steep |
| 73.3 | RAHOUM | well, concreted as at BIR KSEIBE and three troughs. Ample water at 12 seasons. Low escarpment running NORTH |

(Extract from HQ P TJ and Syria Daily Intelligence Summary No 108 dated 24 Sep 41).

PART 11 SECURITY.
Nil.

R. L. Lewis
Lt-Col

GS 1 Aust Corps.

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