

AWM52

Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/1 CORPS

1 Australian Corps
General Branch (1 Aust
Corps 'G' Branch)

December 1941, part 1



1/4/1-0171

SECRET

WAR DIARY - HQ 1 AUST CORPS

PERIOD - 1 - 31 Dec 41

- 1 Dec (a) GHQ MEF letter CRME/1919/SD.1a stated that it had been decided to divide the present PALESTINE - SYRIAN Comd into NINTH ARMY AREA and PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN AREA. Table 'A' att to this letter showed the division of responsibility within PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN between these two AREAS.
(Appx 'A' - G.1882)
- 2 Dec (a) Twenty A Tk rifles were withdrawn from units of 1 Aust Corps and handed over to 50 Div.
(b) "Notes for Lectures: The Air Force and the Army" were issued as a suggested basis of lectures to be given to all ranks.
(Appx 'B' - G.1887)
(c) 1 Aust Corps G.1893 referred to the availability of PHE as an explosives for demolitions and sabotage.
(Appx 'B' - G.1893)
- 3 Dec (a) No. 5 weekly staff conference was held in GS Conference Room.
(Appx 'C' - Notes on conference - G.1898)
(b) Tables showing tng exercises which Ninth Army proposed to direct during the winter were fwded to divs and heads of services.
(Appx 'C' - G.1897)
(c) 1 Aust Corps G.1885 stated that Corps HQ (and HQ AIF) required outline programmes of tng covering one calendar month.
(Appx 'C' - G.1885)
- 4 Dec (a) 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No 43 to Comd 1 Aust AA Bde set out AA defence requirements in 1 Aust Corps area -
(i) Before attack on SYRIA by land forces and
(ii) When land operations in SYRIA were in progress.
(Appx 'D' - Instn dated 3 Dec - issued 4 Dec)
- 5 Dec (a) 1 Aust Corps G.1922 set out vacancies allotted to Ninth Army for two special ten day courses in liaison duties to be held at METS HELWAN. As some of the vacancies were to be sub allotted to AIF units, formations and services were asked to select suitable offrs and submit lists to this HQ.
(Appx 'E' - G.1922)
- 6 Dec Nil report
(Appx 'F' reserved)
- 7 Dec Nil report
(Appx 'G' reserved)
- 8 Dec (a) Corps Comd (Lt-Gen J.D. LAVARACK CB, CMG, DSO) met BGS 10 Corps, Comds 16 and 17 Aust Inf Bdes at HQ 10 Corps.
(Appx 'H' - O 953)
(b) 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No 44 dealt with the three oil installation demolition schemes with which 1 Aust Corps was concerned.
(Appx 'H')

Handwritten:
11/12/41
3 Jan 41

- 8 Dec (c) A location statement of 1 Aust Corps and att tps was issued.
(Appx 'FF')
- (d) An Order of Battle for 1 Aust Corps and att tps was issued.
(Appx 'GG')
- 9 Dec (a) GOC AIF (ME) and Deputy C-in-C (General Sir T.A. BLAMEY CB, CMG, DSO) was met at LAKE TIBERIAS by the Corps Comd and proceeded to Corps HQ.
- (b) 6 and 7 Aust Divs were advised that it was proposed to establish an educational scheme during the winter.
(Appx 'I' - G.1982)
- 10 Dec (a) GOC AIF and Deputy C-in-C (Gen Sir T.A. BLAMEY), Corps Comd (Lt-Gen J.D. Lavarack), Comd 6 Aust Div (Maj-Gen E.F. HERRING CBE, DSO, MC, ED), Comd 7 Aust Div (Maj-Gen A.S. ALLEN CB, CBE, DSO, VD) and DAG AIF (Brig C.E. PRIOR) met in conference at HQ 1 Aust Corps.
- (b) No. 6 weekly staff conference was held in the GS Conference Room.
(Appx 'J' - Notes on conference - G.1990)
- (c) Aust Ord Wkshops were instructed to give priority to repair of FFL vehicles of British and French types.
(Appx 'J' - O 984)
- 11 Dec (a) 1 Aust Corps G.1996 explained the defence scheme for Corps HQ ALEY.
(Appx 'K')
- (b) 1 Aust Corps G.1994 dealt with courses being run at the Anti-Malaria School BEIRUT.
(Appx 'K')
- 12 Dec (a) 1 Aust Corps G.2006 to 7 Aust Div stated that it was considered that our present dispositions together with the provision of mobile colns should be sufficient at this stage to support the coast watching service.
(Appx 'L')
- 13 Dec (c) 6 Aust Div were ordered to make carriers and instrs available to Free French at DAMASCUS and CHUCRI GANEN.
(Appx 'M' - O 997)
- (b) 7 Aust Div were ordered to make carriers and instrs available to Free French at ALEPPO and LATAKIA.
(Appx 'M' - O 996)
- 14 Dec (a) Ninth Army SD/162 received dealing with lessons and observations on recent operations in CYRENAICA.
(Appx 'N')
- 15 Dec (a) Corps Comd left for PALESTINE at 1100 hrs.
- (b) Revised signal security instrns received from Ninth Army. (GSI/414/B - not att)
- (c) The following suggested appointments were submitted to AIF HQ :
- | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Comd AIF (ME) Reinf't Depot | Brig G.F. WOOTTEN DSO |
| Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde | Lt-col J.E.G. MARTIN OBE |
| Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde | Lt-col I.N. DOUGHERTY DSO |
- (Appx 'O' - 01004)

- 15 Dec (d) Recommendations for replacement of Lt-col J.D. ROGERS MC as G2 (Liaison) were sent to AIF HQ.
(Appx 'O' - O 1005)
- 16 Dec (a) Corps Comd in TEL AVIV.
- (b) Ninth Army were asked when RAF would commence demonstrations and manoeuvres referred to in part B of Programme for Tng in air co-operation.
(Appx 'P' - G.2038)
- (c) An amendment to the location statement of 1 Aust Corps and att tps was issued.
(Appx 'FF' - G.2041)
- (d) An amendment to the Order of Battle for 1 Aust Corps and att tps was issued.
(Appx 'GG' - G.2040)
- 17 Dec (a) Corps Comd at GAZA.
- (b) Minimum notice for move of 7 Aust Div communicated to that formation.
(Appx 'Q' - O 1017)
- 18 Dec (a) Corps Comd returned to HQ 1 Aust Corps.
- (b) Ninth Army SD/162 received dealing with lessons from operations in CYRENAICA.
(Appx 'R')
- 19 Dec (a) No. 7 weekly staff conference was held in the GS Conference Room.
(Appx 'S' - Notes on conference - G.2058)
- (b) SOs for guard, HQ 1 Aust Corps, were issued.
(Appx 'S' - G.2056)
- (c) 1 Aust Corps G.2062 stated there was a shortage of mk II binoculars, which were graticuled and were essential for certain arms such as arty and MGs. It was thought that some units which needed only Mk I (not graticuled) were in possession of Mk II. Formations were to take steps to adjust this by interchange amongst their units.
(Appx 'S')
- 20 Dec (a) A note on security by Chief of GS AHQ was distributed to offrs of Corps Tps.
(Appx 'T')
- 21 Dec (a) Observations on recent ops by our armed forces in CYRENAICA were received from Ninth Army under cover of their SD/162.
(Appx 'U')
- 22 Dec (a) Corps Comd, BGS 1 Aust Corps, Comds 6, 7 and 9 Aust Divs, attended 10 Armd Div exercise in DAMASCUS area.
- (b) 2/16 Fd Coy to revert to comd CRE C Tps on 27 Dec for rd construction duties.
(Appx 'V' - O 1045)
- 23 Dec (a) Corps Comd by air to CAIRO.
- (b) With ref to OCTU heads of services were advised that selected lists in each arm in order of priority for members of Corps HQ and C Tps were to be kept at A Branch Corps HQ.
(Appx 'W' - G.2107)

- 24 Dec (a) Maj-Gen ODLUM, elect High Commissioner for CANADA in Australia, and G2(o) AIF HQ (Lt-col BURTON) arrived at Corps HQ.
- (b) Weekly staff conference No. 8 was devoted to a talk by Lt-col D.A. WHITEHEAD 2/2 MG Bn on the recent ops in the WESTERN DESERT and CYRENAICA up to the establishment of the line TOBRUK - EL ADEM - BIR EL GOBI.
- (c) Forms covering most of the points which should be considered when framing orders and instns involving demolitions were issued for infm to obviate the necessity for reference to textbooks.
(Appx 'X' - G.2128)
- 25 Dec (a) 7 Aust Div were advised that the plan for the move of 7 Aust Div to EGYPT and 9 Aust Div to SYRIA had been cancelled.
(Appx 'Y' - O 1061)
- (b) 1 Aust Corps G.2110 was issued in continuation and amplification of 1 Aust Corps Op Instn No. 44 dealing with the oil installation demolition schemes.
(Appx 'Y')
- (c) Heads of branches and services were asked to submit articles, reports, diagrams etc for inclusion in a weekly letter sent by GOC AIF (ME) to AIF MELBOURNE.
(Appx 'Y' - G.2139)
- 26 Dec (a) Formations and heads of services were advised supplies of .450 amn were uncertain in view USA situation. There was to be no expenditure of this amn for tng until further notice.
(Appx 'Z' - O 1067)
- 27 Dec (a) Ninth Army SD/158 on tng of HQs and Base personnel was fwded to formations and heads of services.
(Appx 'AA' - G.2153)
- 28 Dec (a) 6 and 7 Aust Divs were asked to send a rep to report to BGS Ninth Army on 29 Dec to brief BGS on progress of defence works.
(Appx 'BB' - O 1073)
- (b) Instns to Duty SO with ref to distribution of messages were issued.
(Appx 'BB' - G.2178)
- (c) A location statement of 1 Aust Corps and att tps was issued.
(Appx 'FF')
- (d) An Order of Battle for 1 Aust Corps and att tps was issued.
(Appx 'GG')
- 29 Dec (a) Weekly staff conference No. 9 was devoted to a talk by Lt-col J.D. ROGERS, Senior LO, on ops in CYRENAICA from the attack on GAZALA MEKILI posns to the occupation of BENGHAZI.
- (b) 6 Aust Div were advised 2/1 Aust Fd Regt were to move as arranged in addition to 2/3 Aust Fd Regt. 2/2 Aust Fd Regt was to stand by pending further instns.
(Appx 'CC' - O 1082)

- 5 -

- 30 Dec (a) Observations on recent ops in CYRENAICA were received from Ninth Army (lessons 4 - 7)
(Appx 'DD')
- 31 Dec (a) Notes on weekly staff conferences Nos 8 and 9 were issued.
(Appx 'EE')

Atty
3 Jan

WAR DIARY - HQ 1 AUST CORPS

PERIOD 1 - 31 Dec 41

SUMMARY of APPENDICES.

Appx	A	Attachments for	1 Dec
	B		2
	C		3
	D		4
	E		5
	F		6
	G		7
	H		8
	I		9
	J		10
	K		11
	L		12
	M		13
	N		14
	O		15
	P		16
	Q		17
	R		18
	S		19
	T		20
	U		21
	V		22
	W		23
	X		24
	Y		25
	Z		26
	AA		27
	BB		28
	CC		29
	DD		30
	EE		31
	FF		Location Statements
	GG		Order of Battle
	HH		Intelligence Summaries
	II		Situation Reports.

SUMMARY OF OP INSTNS ISSUED

Op Instn No. 43 issued 4 Dec
44 " 8 "

APPENDIX 'A'

Set No. (1)

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
1 Dec 41.
G.1682

6 Aust Div
7 Aust Div

CCRA CM CSO DDST DMS ADOS

ORGANIZATION OF COMD, SYRIA PALESTINE
and TRANSJORDAN

The enclosed copy of GHQ letter CRME/1919/SD.1a of
23 Nov 41 is fwded.

R. M. Skellie Maj for
Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

Copy

SUBJECT - Organisation of Command SYRIA - PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN

SECRET

GHQ MEF
CRME/1919/SD.1a
23 Nov 41.

NINTH ARMY

1. It has been decided to divide the present PALESTINE - SYRIAN Comd into NINTH ARMY AREA, and PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN AREA. Both will be direct under GHQ except for certain items under Column (b) of attached Table 'A', for which PALESTINE AREA WILL BE responsible to NINTH ARMY.
2. NINTH ARMY AREA will consist of SYRIA. PALESTINE AREA will comprise PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN, inclusive of the Southern Boundary laid down in CRME/4706/2G(C) of 20 Sep 41.
3. The separation will take effect from 1 Dec 41.
4. The object of the separation is to relieve HQ NINTH ARMY of local administration duties in PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN which contain many Base and L of C installations whose general administration is under GHQ MEF.
5. Though it is desirable to relieve NINTH ARMY of the local administration of PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN there are certain spheres in which NINTH ARMY, for political or operational reasons, must retain a measure of control.
6. The attached table 'A' shows the division of responsibility within PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN between HQ NINTH ARMY AND HQ PALESTINE AREA.

for Lt-Gen
C.G.S.

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN PALESTINE & TJ

SECRET

TABL 'L' att'd to
ORME/1919/CSD.1a of
23 Nov 41.

SUBJECT (a)	Responsibility held by <u>NINTH ARMY</u> (b)	<u>PALESTINE AREA</u> (c)	Remarks (d)
1. <u>Operational Command and responsibility for training</u>	Entire responsibility for defence of PALESTINE & TJ against external attack. All units and formations required for this purpose will be placed under comd NINTH ARMY by GHQ.	Fighting formations and units located in the area and placed under comd PALESTINE Area by GHQ or NINTH ARMY	
2. <u>Internal Security</u>	NIL	All; direct to GHQ	
3. <u>Defence & PAD</u>	ALL (i)	Except for execution within PALESTINE AREA of PAD policy laid down by NINTH ARMY.	(i) Operational Comd is vested in NINTH ARMY so as to facilitate co-ordination with RAF. GHQ may order certain minimum scales of Air defence. PALESTINE AREA will indicate all requirements to NINTH ARMY, keeping GHQ fully informed.
4. <u>Coast Defence</u>	All, but may be delegated to PALESTINE AREA by NINTH ARMY	NIL - except as in column (b)	
5. <u>Defence work</u>	All, except local administration of units and labour	Local administration of units and labour	
6. <u>R.S. Branch</u>	Formations and Units in NINTH ARMY Order of Battle located in PALESTINE & TRANSJORDAN	Nil (iv)	(iv) Formations & Units in PALESTINE & TRANSJORDAN other than those in c of B NINTH ARMY will be dealt with by R.S. branch GHQ through its branch PALESTINE AREA

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
7. All Duties AG Staff	Formations & Units in NINTH ARMY C of B, located in PALESTINE & TRANSJORDAN	Other units in PAL & TJ even though under operational cmd of NINTH ARMY (incl MS duties see Note (iv))	
8. All AG Services	NIL	ALL	
9. Movement	Issues Orders for move to any ops under operational cmd in PALESTINE OR TJ	Executive orders for move within AREA in consultation with GHQ	
10. Accommodation	NIL	Provision of accommodation for formations or units of NINTH ARMY and those under own cmd.	
11. Ordnance Services	Formations and units in NINTH ARMY C of B, located in PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN	Units in PALESTINE & TJ other than those in NINTH ARMY C of B	
12. All other AG Services	NIL	ALL	
13. Political matters	Only such matters in PALESTINE & TJ as have a bearing on the defence of PALESTINE and SYRIA, or have a reaction on SYRIA (ii)	All matters of purely local importance affecting adminis- tration of the Area and recruitment in PALESTINE & TRANSJORDAN (iii)	(ii) All political matters connected with SYRIA are the responsibility of NINTH ARMY. (iii) Recruitment for Druze Legion is dealt with in special instructions.
14. Financial	NIL	Powers of a GOC as delegated by GHQ	

APPENDIX 'B'

Set No. (1)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
2 Dec 41.
G.1887

6 Aust Div (6)
7 Aust Div (6)

CCRA CRE C Tps CSO DUST (2) DMS DADOS (2)

For info - G. I. A. Q. CE

THE AIR CO-OPERATION

My G.1389 of 22 Oct 41. Att are "Notes for Lectures: The Air Force and the Army" which are suggested as the basis of lectures to be given to all ranks, vide para A of the programme att to G.1389.

2. It is considered that the organisation of lecture teams for this purpose has much to commend it and accordingly the notes for this lecture have been given a limited distribution.

R. M. McKeown Maj
Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

NOTES FOR LECTURE : "THE AIR FORCE AND THE ARMY"

General Arrangement of Lecture

The Past

Status of the RAF with respect to the other Services
Why the RAF has been so weak numerically
How it has done its job in spite of that

The Present

Why we seldom see our own aircraft
What is the effect of dive bombing
Why the army must defend itself
How the army must defend itself

The Future

Army co-operation
Direct air support
Relations between the Army and the RAF

THE PAST

Status of the RAF with respect to the other Services

1. Until the RFC was formed there were only two services, and as they had co-operated for centuries the line of division was clear. When RFC came into being it clearly affected both the other Services. Both wanted it. Navy got their own, on account of specialised work. (In most countries the navy has a naval air service). But army did not get its own air force. RAF constituted as a third service. (This is a posn also in Germany, but as they knew they would have air superiority, with a powerful army and relatively weak navy, they decided to use their air force in a new way.)

2. Army must therefore get loan from RAF. Loan depends on how much the lender has and how much trust he has in the borrower. Hence need for co-operation and understanding between Army and RAF.

3. What types of aircraft could the RAF lend? Explain prewar concept of RAF functions, and show how they led to formation of sqns of fighters, bombers and AC aircraft.

- (a) Opposing armies heavily engaged
- (b) Navy exercises blockade at sea
- (c) Bombing aircraft attacking resources in enemy territory
- (d) Fighter aircraft holding off enemy bombers trying to do the same to us.

Note that this scheme led to bombers which were unsuitable for dive bombing, or for direct intervention on the battlefield, and to fighters with high performance but short range. AC aircraft, with longer range and low landing speed, were too slow to do their work unless we had air superiority.

Why the RAF has been so weak numerically

4. How many aircraft could the RAF lend the Army? Explain our disarmament era which last up to the Munich agreement, 1938. Parallel German re-armament in secret. At time of Munich we dared not fight. Our own re-armament dates from then. Up to Munich, Britain can be likened to a householder who refused to pay his fire

insurance premiums. In Sep 1939 we were not ready, but had to fight and actually surprised the Germans who had not reckoned on early British participation in the war.

5. History shows that the price of unpreparedness has to be paid in lives until the material leeway is made up. This war is no exception.

6. As Germany was not ready for ops on western front in Sep 1939 there was a pause, while both sides busily armed, until the offensive began in spring 1940. Effect of blitz in France - Britain lost all the cpt of the BEF and many aircraft, also large quantities of reserve stores moved across the channel to offset the anticipated German air attack on our comms. Britain was then almost defenceless, but contrary to German expectations did not give in. Germany not ready to invade, hence a pause. By now German superiority in aircraft and tanks was clearly visible.

7. Ever since spring 1940 Britain has had an uphill fight to equip her new armies and to re-equip her old. Whenever we have been obliged to fight it has been with forces only partially equipped, in aircraft as in other weapons. RAF have never had enough planes. Note expedients to keep aircraft in action - example, blankets used as inner tubes in WESTERN DESERT for landing gear of aircraft. To sum up, the RAF has had little to lend the army.

How the RAF has done its job in spite of its weakness

8. Although hopelessly outnumbered the RAF won the Battle of Britain. Result of guts together with good aircraft. Quote details from pamphlet "Battle of Britain."

9. Odds against RAF were 2 to 1 in CYRENAICA, 600 to 50 in FRANCE. In GREECE RAF fought until all their aircraft had been destroyed. Quote -

(a) Story of sqn of Blenheims when last two pilots after having been shot down got back to LARISSA on foot, took off in a Lysander only to be shot down again and this time killed by a standing German fighter patrol high over the aerodrome.

(b) Story of pilot of a Lysander who fought a German Messerschmitt; knowing he had no chance. He couldn't but he tried.

10. In spite of their numerical weakness, and the unsuitability of the few aircraft they could spare for the job we wanted, the RAF did lend aircraft for close co-operation with the army. They did all they could.

11. We have now reached parity with Germany in aircraft but it must not be forgotten that owing to interior lines it is comparatively easy for Germany to obtain local air superiority at any given point, and especially easy when in possession of the initiative. i.e. when attacking. But we in turn can now expect local superiority when we attack.

THE PRESENT

Why we seldom see our own aircraft

12. (a) We have had no bombers designed for direct intervention on the battlefield, and the bombers available have been much more profitably used in indirect support - for example, attack on enemy aerodromes.

(b) Our bombers cross our own lines high.

(c) Our fighters nearly always fly high so as to be ready to attack enemy bombers.

(d) All types of aircraft usually approach their targets on an east and west line so as to achieve surprise by attacking out of the sun; in SYRIA our aircraft rarely flew over our own tps but went round them.

13. The fact that our tps rarely see our aircraft during cps does not indicate that the RAF are not giving us every possible help. (We rarely see the navy, but it continues to deliver the goods).

What is the effect of dive bombing

14. Dive bombing and machine gunning from air does little material damage to tps who are prepared for it. The noise of the planes gives plenty of warning. Show by examples how small is the damage and number of casualties caused by the heaviest air attack on areas where PAD instns are carried out.

15. These forms of air attack are largely directed against our morale, and we have to preserve that no less than our skins and our eqpt.

Why the Army must defend itself

16. As explained, it is difficult to prevent the enemy from getting local air superiority. Furthermore, even if we have superiority ourselves it is next to impossible to stop all EA from coming over our own lines - to do so by a system of standing fighter patrols would mean terrific waste and would tie up enormous numbers of aircraft; most of the time doing nothing. (Note limited range of fighters, length of sorties, proportion of aircraft grounded for repair, maintenance, resting of crew etc). These large numbers of aircraft would be far better employed intercepting EA at the source, the enemy aerodrome, where EA are concentrated and can often be caught on the ground.

17. To preserve its morale, the army must hit back. It can also inflict much material damage this way (see below). Quote TOBRUK, the morale of the AA gunners, "the Captain and Tiny" (see ME Tng memo No 1).

How the Army must defend itself

18. Unless there are special reasons for the contrary, we must fire on all EA within range. This not only attacks the enemy's morale, - distracts his aim and makes him fly higher; not only preserves our own morale; but inflicts real and tangible damage to EA.

(a) Not all EA brought down by our fire crash in sight of the tps. They crash anywhere between the front and the aerodrome.

(b) Even if EA is not brought down it may be in the workshop hrs, days or weeks having SAA damage repaired.

19. Aircraft are vulnerable to small arms fire. Only limited portions are armoured and "bouncing bullets" are not bullets ricocheting off armour plate but simply the tracer element which is apt to be diverted when the bullet hits the target. Such a phenomenon is to be welcomed as indicating a direct hit.

20. Note importance of recognition of aircraft. There must be a quick and accurate response as soon as the aircraft is sighted.

21. Don't clamour for the introduction of German methods. If we copy we are bound to be out of date. We are producing something better than the Germans have shown - no doubt they are trying to improve too. That they are not as good as they could be is shown by their failures -

- (a) Could not hit vital brs at IALISSA. Hit abutment of PHARSALA br only once and could not repeat it.
- (b) Failed to fly at night, and thus allowed our withdrawal in long columns of vehs with headlights
- (c) In CYRENAICA, failed to attack our cols withdrawing by day after TOCRA, owing to clash between dive bombers and a handful of our fighters.

THE FUTURE

Army Co-operation

22. Not to be confused with direct air support. No change in present system. Explain Tac R, Arty R, Photo R.

Direct Air Support

23. Explain new scheme:-

- (a) Direct air support normally operates against targets beyond the range of our arty. Our aircraft, therefore, may not be seen.
- (b) Not all targets are suitable for air attack. Explain.
- (c) Some targets visible to tps on the ground are hard to locate from the air
- (d) There is an inevitable time lag between calling for air support and arrival of aircraft over the target. (Give example). But this time will be greatly reduced when we have enough aircraft to maintain continuous patrols.

Relations between the Army and the RAF.

24. To sum up, explain that the job of the RAF is primarily to gain air superiority, and that this is best done by attacking aircraft at or near their aerodrome. The more aircraft are diverted from this role the longer it will take to achieve superiority. But some aircraft are needed for direct support, to enable army to get on and to maintain good morale. These two needs must be reconciled and a balance struck. The more aircraft there are, the more as a rule can be allotted to direct air support. But the army must be able to defend itself without direct air support, since operational requirements may necessitate a smaller allotment to direct support tasks.

25. In the past the RAF has failed at times because of lack of eqpt, never lack of guts. We have failed at times too because of lack of numbers, but there have been times in GREECE and CYRENAICA and CRETE when we have had small reason to be proud of our capacity to take it.

26. There are still some difficulties between Army and RAF that have to be solved, but the programme of tng in air co-operation that is just beginning should solve many of them. Explain the programme laid down in CR/PAL/18054/SD of 19 Oct 41.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

S E C R E T

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
2 Dec 41.
G.1893

Experiments in Demolitions and Sabotage

Ref this HQ G.1735 of 21 Nov 41, the following further report on above subject is fwded:

"It should be noted that PHE is only available in the AF for very specific tasks. Although experiments were only carried out with this type of explosive it is certain that double the quantity - i.e. 1 lb - of other high power types of service explosive will produce an equal result. Gelignite would appear most suitable, closely followed by Gun Cotton."

for display
for Eric.
GS 1 Aust Corps

Distribution -

6 Aust Div	40	G	1	Camp	1
7 Aust Div	40	I	1	APH	2
CCRA	8	A	1	War Diary	2
CRE 1 Aust C Tps	2	Q	1	File	1
CSO	2	CE	1		
E Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	1	DDST	8	For Infr	
1 Aust Corps Salvage	1	ADOS	3	AIF (ME) Int School	1
GOC	1	DADCS	1		

APPENDIX 'C'

Set No. (/)

SECRET & PERSONAL

Weekly Staff Conference No. 5

- RMCNoble May

DISTRICT VI -

DA & QMG
AQMG
CE
ULST
DDMS
ADOS
File - 2
War Diary - 2

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
3 Dec 41.
G.1897

6 Aust Div (2)
7 Aust Div (2)

CCRA CSO DDMS
CE DDST ADOS

Copies - Comd G AQ

TNG EXERCISES

The att table shows the tng exercises which
Ninth Army proposes to direct during the winter. Details
later.

(Sgd) F.H. Berryman Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

OUTLINE PROGRAMME OF EXERCISES - NINTH ARMY 1941/42.

SECRET.

Serial No. (a)	Dates. (b)	Description. (c)	Location. (d)	General Objects. (e)	To be carried out by. (f)	Remarks. (g)
1	15/16 Dec '41.	T.E.M.T.	QATANA area and AIN SOFAR Hotel.	<p>To study :-</p> <p>(a) At what stage during operations the Armd Div should be moved out from the QATANA defences.</p> <p>(b) The procedure to be followed by 10 Armd Div in debouching through the QATANA Gap and necessary arrangements to be made by 10 Corps.</p> <p>(c) The further action of the Armd Div to defeat the enemy.</p> <p>(d) Maintenance of the Armd Div during operations outside the defences.</p>	10 Armd Div in conjunction with H.Q. 10 Corps.	<p>(a) Narrative issued under Ninth Army O/87 of 26 Nov.</p> <p>(b) Personnel to assist may be required from 1 Aust Corps viz reps arty etc. etc.</p> <p>(c) Further details will be notified.</p>
2	Late Dec '41 or early Jan '42.	Air Support Exercise.	Present H.Q.'s.	To practice Comds and Staffs in the procedure laid down in H.E. Tng Pamphlet (Army & R.A.F.) No. 3, "Direct Air Support".	<p>(a) All H.Q.'s of 1 H.Q. Air Support Control and Aust Corps down to incl Inf Bns and Fd Regts.</p> <p>(b) Reps of 10 Corps, 10 Armd Div, 3 Ind Motor Bde, H.Q. PzL. Base and L of C Area as umpires.</p>	H.Q. Air Support Control and Air Support Control Sigs will be improvised.
3	Early Jan '42.	War Game.	To be decided.	(a) To test the arrangements for the defence of SYRIA and PALESTINE as laid down in Ninth Army Op. Instrn. No. 1 dated 15 Nov '41.	All H.Q. staffs down to incl Divs & Areas.	

Serial No. (a)	Dates. (b)	Description. (c)	Location. (d)	General Objects. (e)	To be carried out by. (f)	Remarks. (g)
3 (contd)				(b) To examine the administrative problems involved.		
4	First week Feb '42.	Skeleton Exercise.	Area East of EL MAJDAL, PALESTINE.	To practice the 10 Arm'd Div in Defence in preventing enemy arm'd forces from debouching from the hills	Skeleton H.Q.'s and Sigs 10 Arm'd Div down to incl Regts.	Some assistance may be required from 1 Aust Corps to represent Support Gp.
5	Mid Feb '42.	Movement Exercise.	To be decided.	To practice a tactical move of H.Q. Ninth Army.	All branches and services H.Q., Ninth Army.	To be preceded by a series of preliminary exercises commencing early Jan '42.
6	March '42.	Staff Exercise. (Strategical Moves)	To be decided.	To practice the staffs of H.Q.'s, Ninth Army, Corps and Divs in the strategical movement or formations under their commands. As far as possible actual moves will be carried out by 1 Aust Corps and att tps.	1 Aust Corps. 10 Corps. 10 Arm'd Div. 3 Ind Motor Bde. Field units under Comd Palestine Area.	
7	Mid March '42	Counter Offensive Exercise.	To be decided.	To practice the launching of a limited counter-offensive from the Lebanese Defences involving the use of 'I' Tanks.	To be decided.	

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
3 Dec 41.
G.1685

6 Aust Div
7 Aust Div

CCRA DDST
CRE C Tps DDMS
CSC ADCS

For info - CE

THE PROGRAMMES

1. The policy of tng will be laid down by superior formations. In addition from time to time attention will be drawn to certain points which are to be emphasised.

2. In accordance with instns received unit comds will prepare detailed syllabuses one week in advance, and these will be examined when units are inspected.

3. Corps HQ (and HQ AIF) require outline programmes of tng covering one calendar month. These will be sent by the above addressees for the tps under their comd so as to reach Corps HQ by 22nd of the previous month, and will show -

(a) The approx number of hours available for tng in the month and, separately, the number of nights.

(b) Any directions issued by div or above as to the time to be spent on special subjects. Night work will be shown separately.

(c) Dates and places of bn, or higher, tactical or adm exercises. The object and scope of the exercises will be shown.

(d) Dates and places of important experiments or demonstrations with explosives, tanks, arty, pillboxes, etc. Arty firing will be included.

4. The programmes to be submitted for corps tps will be in outline, as for divs, but detailed syllabuses will be prepared for all units and will be available for inspection.

5. The following is an example of the type of outline programme required from a div :-

"(a) Time available

One day a week - 4 days of 4 hrs - 16 hrs

Two nights a week - 2 nights

"(b) Special directions as to time to be spent on indicated subjects.

Units to spend not less one half day on co or bn tactical exercises involving the crossing of a minefield without bridging, and one half day on laying of mines. Three night exercises to be held dealing with deep patrolling behind the enemy lines

" (c) Bn and higher exercises

Date & duration	Place	Unit or Exercise	Day or night	Object & scope
3 Jun 6 hrs	TRIPOLI etc	25 Aust Bn	Day	Bn in attack, crossing mine rd and passed area
7 Jun 12 hrs	from 25 Bn camp etc	25 Aust Inf Bde	Night	Night attack, advance to assembly area and to starting line.

" (d) Experiments and demonstrations

14 Jun TRIPOLI firing tests from two types of ATK pillbox.
for defenses

H. Buryman Brig
CS 1 Aust Corps

APPENDIX 'D'

Set No. ()

MOST SECRET

1 Aust Corps Op Instrn No 43

Copy No 10

3 Dec 41

To Comd 1 Aust AA Bde

AA Defence in 1 Aust Corps Area

1. The plan for defence of SYRIA from the North, NE and East includes -

- (a) Retention for our use as long as possible and subsequent denial to the enemy of all aerodromes in Northern SYRIA.
- (b) Imposing delay on the enemy's advance by all possible means.
- (c) The occupation of tank proof areas prepared for all round defence and sited
 - (i) To deny to the enemy the use of all main arteries of comm in Southern SYRIA, PALESTINE, and TRANSJORDAN.
 - (ii) To protect our main aerodromes and Base installations.
 - (iii) To enable sorties in strength to be made against the enemy L of C in the event of his passing round these areas, and so to create a favourable opportunity for a counter stroke when he has expended himself in his efforts to push forward.

2. Ninth Army comprising Army Tps, 1 Aust Corps and 10 Corps is --- responsible for defence of SYRIA. The att tracing Appx 'A' shows Corps boundaries. 84 Base Area has operational comd of AA defences within its area at BLYNOUTH and TRIPOLI.

3. 1 Aust Corps (comprising 6 and 7 Aust Divs) with under comd two lt divs FFL has the following roles:-

- (a) Assuming the worst case in which our main forces are ordered to occupy the LEBANON defences, 1 Aust Corps is providing a force comprising -

Two div cav regts
One inf bde gp from 7 Aust Div
One lt div FFL

to delay the enemy along the frontier as long as possible and effect demolitions, at the same time covering our northern aerodromes. The task of protecting these aerodromes from air borne attack will be carried out by lt div FFL. The whole force will eventually withdraw into the LEBANON defences, the operation being under comd 7 Aust Div.

- (b) The defence of defended areas at TRIPOLI and DJEBEL, covering approaches from the North along the coastal route and into the SYRIA respectively. TRIPOLI defences are the responsibility of 7 Aust Div, DJEBEL defences, 6 Aust Div.
- (c) The inner defences of BEIRUT. This task is allotted to one lt div FFL, which will establish defended localities at NAHR EL KILB, AIN SOFAR, and astride the rd LAMIE - BA'URANA.

4. The defended localities in para 3 (b) and (c) will be organized as 'fortresses' capable of all round defence and self contained in water, food, arm, etc for a minimum of 60 days. Adm installations will be sited within these localities. Reserve dumps etc outside 'fortress' areas will probably be under control of Ninth Army.

5. AA defence requirements in 1 Aust Corps area therefore include two phases:-

Phase 1 - Before attack on SYRIA by land forces and

Phase 2 - When land operations in SYRIA are in progress.

6. During phase 1, it will be necessary to consider protection of certain vital road and rail comms with TURKEY in the frontier area which we may, in certain circumstances, require to use, in addition to any important installations within the LEBANON defences. During this phase air attack is likely to be concentrated on important strategic targets such as ports and major installations which are NOT the responsibility of 1 Aust Corps. During phase 2, if withdrawal to the LEBANON defences takes place, the enemy may be expected to use his air power primarily in direct support of his land forces, and all available cover must be given to the 'fortress' areas at TRIPOLI and BEIRUT, especially to gun areas. The withdrawal of the frontier force (vide para 3) must also have AA protection.

7. You already have a plan showing existing and proposed aerodromes in 1 Aust Corps area. Although 1 Aust Corps is responsible for protection of these aerodromes against air borne attack, the policy and scale of AA defence thereof has not yet been laid down by Ninth Army in conjunction with IAF. You will no doubt be instructed by Ninth Army in this connection.

8. With the undermentioned exception it is NOT considered that there are any 1 Aust Corps arm installations or dumps justifying AA defence either during phase 1 or phase 2. At ALMA (TRIPOLI 1/50,000 - 16652764) however, an arm dump is shortly to be built up to a total of approx 2,000 tons. Subsequently this arm will be distributed within 'fortress' areas.

9. Att Appx 'B' sets out in order of priority the installations and areas (excepting aerodromes) for which AA protection is considered necessary. In addition, during phase 2, there will of course be a constant demand for temporary AA tasks, such as covering defiles during important road moves within the LEBANON defences, and mobile striking forces operating outside.

10. You will please prepare a plan for AA defence within 1 Aust Corps area and submit it to this HQ by 18 Dec 41.

ACK

Time of Signature 11/800 hrs

Issued through Sigs

DISTRIBUTION -

Copy No 1 (with Appx 'A') 1 Aust AA Bde
2 7 Aust Div
3 BGS
4 DA & JAG
5 G
6 I
7-9 Ninth Army
10-11 War Diary
12 File
13-14 Spare

Yochinton L1 Col
for Brig
43 1 Aust Corps

MOST SECRET

Copy No

Appx 'B' to 1 Aust Corps Op Instrn No 43 dated 3 Dec 41

Serial (a)	Task (b)	Priority (c)	Remarks (d)
	<u>PHASE 1</u>		
1	Ry viaduct BEIDANE LAKES	1	
2	Ry br - DJERABLOUS	2	May be difficult as br is across frontier
3	ALMA dump	3	Temporary
4	Ry June HOMS	4	
5	Formation HQs	5	Present HQs 1 Aust Corps, 6 & 7 Aust Divs
	<u>PHASE 2</u>		
6	Protection of frontier force during delaying actions and withdrawal	1	Comd 1C Aust Inf Bde is preparing plan of withdrawal
7	Protection of gun areas at DJERIDE and TRIPOLI	2	
8	Fortress HQs at DJERIDE and TRIPOLI	3	Not yet sited
9	Field posns at DJERIDE and TRIPOLI		
10	1 Aust Corps, battle HQ	4	Not yet sited
11	Rear localities - DJERIDE and TRIPOLI	5	
12	Ry installations - RAYAK	6	
13	Inner defences of BENTROUT defended localities at NAHR EL KELB, AIN SOFAR and ASHIDE rd BROULANA - ZAHLE	7	Posns not yet recd in detail

APPENDIX 'E'

Set No (1)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps
5 Dec 41
G.1922

6 Aust Div (6) 1 Aust AA Bde
7 Aust Div (6) CRE C Tps
9 Aust Div (6) CSO
G DEST
A DMS
Q ADOS
CCRA APH

TNG IN LIAISON DUTIES

1. The first of two special 10 day courses will be held at REETS REMLAN from 25 Dec to 3 Jan to train liaison offrs for work with allied armies. By G.1877 of 1 Dec refers (not to all addressees).
2. 30 vacancies have been allotted to Ninth Army to be filled as follows:-

<u>Arm</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Rank</u>
General Staff	1	Capt
A Staff	1	"
Q Staff (Armd formation)	1	"
Q Staff	1	"
Armd Corps	6	Lieut
Arty	3	"
AA	1	"
Engrs	2	"
Sigs	2	"
Inf	5	"
ASC	3	"
Medical	1	"
Ord	1	"
Pro	2	"
	<u>30</u>	

3. As some of these vacancies are to be sub allotted to AIF units, formations and services will select suitable offrs and submit lists to this HQ by 12 Dec showing names and qualifications in order of preference.

4. Offrs selected need not have language qualifications, but should be able to ride a motorcycle, drive a truck, and have a thorough knowledge of British army organization.

R. M. McNeil
Erig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

APPENDIX 'H'

Set No ()

ARMY FORM C.2129.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO 10 Corps 16 Aust Inf Bde 17 Aust Inf Bde rptd 6 Aust Div
Copy to Corps Comd

FROM

Austcorps

Originator's Number

0 953

Date

3

In Reply to Number

Corps

comd

will

meet

BGS

10

Corps

Comd

16

and

17

Aust

Inf

Bdes

1100

hrs

Mon

8

Dec

at

HQ

10

Corps

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY
ANY MEANS.
except wireless

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE
SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

DRLS

TIME OF ORIGIN

1530

SIGNED F.H. BERRYMAN Brig

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MOST SECRET

1 AUST CORPS OP INSTN No 44

Copy No 18

8 Dec 41.

DEMOLITIONS
"BILGE", "BOATSWAIN" & "ASTERN"

1. This instn is based on Ninth Army Op Instn No. 3 of 30 Nov 41 which cancels P & TY Op Instn No 58 of 5 Oct 41. OCS, BILGE and BOATSWAIN will destroy copies of the latter instn in their possession and render a certificate to that effect to this HQ.

2. Technical schemes have been prepared for carrying out these demolitions. This Op Instn contains the method of Issue of Orders for carrying out such of them as come within the province of 1 Aust Corps.

3. 1 Aust Corps is concerned with three oil installation demolition schemes, the code names and descriptions of which are as follows :

- (a) BILGE - Scheme for the destruction of the TRIPOLI pipeline pumping stations T.2, T.3 and T.4.
- (b) BOATSWAIN - Scheme for the destruction of the SPC Refinery and Terminal at TRIPOLI.
- (c) ASTERN - Scheme for the destruction of the Socony Vacuum Oil Installation and the Shell Coy Installation at BEYROUTH.

4. The technical schemes will be kept constantly under review by RE and amendments will be fwded to all concerned as they become necessary.

5. STATE OF PREPAREDNESS

- (a) Working parties will be detailed for each scheme, in accordance with the schedules contained in the technical instns, as follows :-

For BILGE Ly 6 Aust Div
For BOATSWAIN by 7 Aust Div
For ASTERN To be detailed by CE 1 Aust Corps.

- (b) Additional tpt required, as shown in the technical schemes will be earmarked by the HQs responsible for each scheme and they will also arrange the provision of the necessary reserves of rations, water and medical supplies. 6 Aust Div will ensure that the tpt earmarked for BILGE is in first class condition. CSO 1 Aust Corps will also arrange that Army E/T operators trained on IPC sets are available to man the IPC W/T sets at TRIPOLI and T.3, and that Army field sets and personnel are earmarked to proceed with the demolition parties to TRIPOLI, T.2, T.3 and T.4. CSO 1 Aust Corps will arrange with the IPC for an IPC W/T operator to be available to proceed with the demolition and signal party to T.3.

- (c) These parties will in every case be at 4 days notice to move from the receipt of this order. This period will be shortened progressively as circumstances demand on instns issued from this HQ. The first instn to shorten this period will include an order to 6 Aust Div to organise the parties for BILGE Scheme and despatch them to their stations as soon as possible

on account of the distance they have to cover and because, if possible, they should be in posn before the issue of warning order ~~YELLOW~~.
(See below para 6)

6. Orders will be issued and action taken in three stages.

(a) Order to shorten four day period (5 (c) above) and (to 6 Aust Div only) to despatch BILGE parties. This may be followed by further orders shortening the warning period.

(b) Order declaring a state of emergency.

BILGE/BOATSWAIN/ASTERN - YELLOW

(c) Order for demolition to be carried out.

BILGE/BOATSWAIN/ASTERN - RED

7. ACTION TO BE TAKEN - STATE OF EMERGENCY - Code Word YELLOW

(a) A state of emergency will be ordered when a threat is imminent. It is to be notified by the sending of the relevant scheme code word following by the words "YELLOW rpt YELLOW ACK."

e.g. BOATSWAIN rpt BOATSWAIN YELLOW rpt YELLOW ACK

(b) Working parties other than those for BILGE (for which 6 Aust Div will arrange separately, (see 5(c) above) will draw the additional tpt earmarked for them in accordance with the schemes, and proceed forthwith to their stations. Stores, explosives, rations and water to be carried are shown separately in the appendices to each scheme.

(c) Action will be taken immediately on arrival by working parties to ensure that destruction can take place at once on receipt of orders. This will involve the stopping of certain engines, pumps, etc, in oil installations, and putting in charges ready for firing etc.

(d) Continucus W/T watch will be kept on all T stations where IPC W/T sets are installed. 6 Aust Div and 7 Aust Div will maintain touch by W/T or line with all demolition parties in the areas for which they are responsible in these schemes, in order to ensure that destruction orders can be received by these parties at any time. In the case of ASTERN E4 Base sub area will be responsible for informing the unit to be designated by CE 1 Aust Corps.

(e) IPC and CRL employees who are to assist in operations and who have been commissioned and enlisted, will don their uniforms.

(f) Demolition parties are not normally to carry out any destruction on their own responsibility before the "State of Emergency" is ordered. As however, it is essential that in no circumstances must any oil resources fall intact into enemy hands, they are authorised to act without waiting for orders from higher authority if in their judgment this is necessary. Such action will be notified at once to all concerned.

8. ACTION TO BE TAKEN - DEMOLITION - code word RED

- (a) Demolition order will be notified by 1 Aust Corps (in the case of ASTERN by 84 Base sub area) by the issue of the relevant code name following by the words "RED rpt RED ACK."

e.g. BOATSWAIN rpt BOATSWAIN RED rpt RED ACK

- (b) On receipt of this signal, demolition parties will carry out demolitions forthwith and will withdraw under arrangements made by their respective HQ..
- (c) Before parties withdraw they are responsible for ensuring that the maximum possible destruction has been carried out and that no eqpt is left behind intact, which might be of value to the enemy in obtaining the use of any oil resources.

N.B. The demolition order for BOATSWAIN and ASTERN Schemes must be carefully co-ordinated with the demolition order for the destruction of civil and military installations and docks in TRIPOLI and BEYROUTH. No demolition will be carried out in any of these schemes before consulting the Senior Naval and Military offrs on the spot, unless there is imminent danger of these oil resources and installations falling into the hands of the enemy.

9. METHOD BY WHICH SIGNALS ARE TO BE COMMUNICATED

A. ACTION AT HQ 1 AUST CORPS

The Staff Offr on duty at HQ 1 Aust Corps on receiving one or more of the following

BILGE/BOATSWAIN/ASTERN - YELLOW/RED

will:

- (a) if BILGE, pass the message by telephone 'priority' to 6 Aust Div, followed by signal franked "Emergency Operations."
- (b) if BOATSWAIN, pass by telephone 'priority' to 7 Aust Div, followed by signal franked "Emergency Operations."
- (c) if ASTERN, pass by telephone 'priority' to the unit to be designated by CE 1 Aust Corps (para 5) followed by signal franked "Emergency Operations."

NOTES 1. In the case of ASTERN, 84 Base sub area is primarily responsible for informing the unit which is to provide demolition parties detailed by CE 1 Aust Corps, repeating the message to 1 Aust Corps.

B. ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY IPC

1. On receipt of the messages mentioned in para 6 above, IPC will send similar messages by V/T to the following stations :-

TRIPOLI TERMINAL, T.3 and K.3.

2. Action to be taken by Tripoli Terminal and K.3

On receipt of messages mentioned in para 9 B (1) above, messages will be passed by telephone to all stations on the TRIPOLI branch.

3. Action by T.3

T.3 will pass messages mentioned in para 9 B (1) above by Army Signals to T2 and T4.

NOTE

In the event of all the above mentioned comms breaking down on the T line, it is intended to despatch an aeroplane to fly over T.4, T.3, T.2 and T.1 to drop the messages mentioned in para 9 A (a) for BILGE.

10. LOCAL PROTECTION

6 Aust Div will be responsible for detailing troops for local protection of Engr Demolition parties for BILGE and 7 Aust Div for BOATSWAIN.

11. CANCELLATION

In the event of the 'State of Emergency' being cancelled an offr known to all demolition parties, will visit each party and give the cancellation order personally.

No other method of cancellation will be used.

12. When sufficient tps come under cmd 10 Corps, it is intended that BILGE should be taken over by 10 Corps from 1 Aust Corps.

13. Two copies of any orders or instns issued by 6 Aust Div, 7 Aust Div and CSO 1 Aust Corps are required by this HQ. CE 1 Aust Corps will notify this HQ and 84 Base sub area of the unit supplying ASTERN parties and name of OC ASTERN. Two copies of OC ASTERN's orders are also required by this HQ.

ACK

H. B. Berriman Brig
GS/1 Aust Corps

Time of signature 1130 hrs

Issued through sigs

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No 1 - 4	6 Aust Div
5 - 6	7 Aust Div
7	EGS
8	G
9	AQ
10 - 11	CE
12	CSO
13	84 Base sub area
14 - 16	Ninth Army
17 - 18	War Diary
19	File
20 - 21	Spare

APPENDIX 'I'

Set No. (/)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
9 Dec 41.
G.1982

6 Aust Div
7 Aust Div
2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop

For info - CCRA CRE C Tps CSO
G I AQ CE DDST DDMS ADOS

EDUCATIONAL SCHEME

1. It is proposed that an educational scheme be established during the current winter. Courses in French and Arabic have been suggested; other languages might be considered and also such subjects as English, mathematics and physics. It is considered that the cost of tuition (where not done by serving members of the forces) and books could be charged to the public.

2. Formations are requested to consider this matter and advise by 23 Dec the extent of the schemes recommended in their areas, with an estimate of the number of students in each subject and also the sources from which instructors would be enrolled. Any data on costs would be welcomed.

3. 2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop, which already has a scheme in operation, is requested to furnish details of :

- (a) Number of students receiving instrn in each subject
- (b) Duration of each course.
- (c) Cost of textbooks per student for each course.
- (d) Amount of instructors' fees for each course.
- (e) Maximum number of students that can be handled in each class.

C. M. V. H. H. H. Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

APPENDIX 'J'

Set No. (1) .

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET & PERSONAL

HQ 1 Aust Corps.
10 Dec 41.
G.1990

WEEKLY STAFF CONFERENCE NO 6 : 10 DEC 41

1. Present: CCRA Comd 1 Aust AA Bde
CE G2(o & SD)
A/CSO G2(o)
DDST G2(1)
DDMS AQMG
Maj R.J. Inglis G3(o)
(representing ADOS)

2. Remarks by G2(1)

No news about PACIFIC situation. In WESTERN DESERT a stabilized line appears to be forming south of TOBRUK, with only pockets of resistance remaining near the frontier.

3. Owing to a misapprehension orders had been given by a formation on the frontier to restrict amicable intercourse with the Turks. As GOC's policy is to encourage these activities the instns have been altered. There is no objection to crossing the frontier, on invitation.

Dumping Programme

4. AQMG stated that importation of res is far behind programme.

	Nov programme	Actually shipped
Into BEIRUT	(tons) 26,000	7,000
Into TRIPOLI	32,000	12,000
	Oct - Nov programme	Shipped
Into SYRIA	108,000	68,000

Programme was to lay in 60 days res in 3 months, Oct - Dec. Now that res have been increased to 90 days, doubtful if it will be completed before end of Mar, if then.

Defence Programmes

5. CE stated that FF had asked for engr stores and plant for the BEIRUT defences. G2(o) explained that one PF light div was under 1 Aust Corps for ops and was responsible for the building of defences on the NAHR EL KELB, at AIN SOFAR and on the rd ZAHLE - BROUJANA.

R. W. D. H. S. C.

Maj GS.
A/SO to Conference.

DISTRIBUTION -

CCRA
CSO
GOC
BGS
G2s(o) - 2
G2(1)
Comd 1 Aust AA Bde
SLO

DA & QMG
AQMG
CE
DDST
DDMS
ADCS
File - 2
War Diary - 2

Army Form C5124

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO 6 Aust Div 7 Aust Div 2/2 Aust A Pd Wkshop 2/3 Aust A Pd Wkshop
rptd ADOS R Ninth Army copies to Q ADOS COMR

FROM	Originator's Number	Date	In Reply to Number		
Austcorps	0 984	10			
Till	further	notice	Aust	ord	wkshops
will	give	priority	to	repair	of
FPL	vehz	of	British	and	American
types	(.)	FPL	will	supply	spares
wherever	possible	(.)	details	later	(.)
applies	only	to	first	and	second
line	repairs				

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
(DEGREE OF PRIORITY)

TIME OF ORIGIN

(Sgd) C.M.L. ELLIOTT

IMPORTANT

1645
T.H.I.

SIGNALS (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)											
SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
T.O.R.											

APPENDIX 'K'

Set No. (1)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
11 Dec 41.
G.1996

CCRA	SLO	DDMS
CRE C Tps	I	ADOS
CSO	A	DADOS
GOC	Q	Camp
HGS	Rear HQ	APM
G	CE	DADPS
	DDST	A,B,C,D, E & F Messes.
		Comds A,B,C & D Pls Corps Defence Unit

DEFENCE OF CORPS HQ, ALEY

1. Outline defence plan is att as Appx A.
2. All addressees will divide their staff into two categories described in para 2 of appx A. A nominal roll of personnel in category (a) will be passed to Camp by 15 Dec 41.
3. Camp will allot these persons to pls of Corps HQ Defence Unit, retaining as nearly as possible the organization used for tng. (Each tng coy forms a defence pl with the same letter to indicate it.) Camp will report to this HQ the numbers of men allotted to each pl.
4. With the approval of heads of branches, pl comds have been selected as under :-

Defence Unit	Maj A. KERSHAW
A Pl	(Capt K. HAIGH Lieut J.A. McLEOD
B Pl	(Capt L. LUXTON Lieut G.M. ROGERS
C Pl	(Capt D. OLDMEADOW Capt J.D. HISLOP
D Pl	(Capt R.H. COGSWELL Lieut J.W. OGDEN

5. Comds B, C and D Pls will carry out detailed recces of respectively NE, SW and SE approaches (as in appx A), and will send to Camp by 18 Dec plans and sketches of their areas showing posns of section posts, mines, wire etc. Pl Comds will ensure that their flanks are co-ordinated with those of the neighbouring sectors and that no ground is left uncovered.

6. Comd Guard Coy will -

- (a) report to this HQ by 15 Dec the number of men available for local defence vide para 3(a) of appx A;
- (b) make recce and submit a plan for defence of the inner posn vide para 6(b) of appx A.

7. Further to para 3 above, Camp will draft detailed orders for

- (a) Dress, carrying of arms, drawing of amn etc.
- (b) What the alarm will consist of
- (c) Tpt arrangement for fwd pls and mobile res
- (d) Location of cmd post

- 2 -

- (e) Intercomm between comd post and fwd localities
- (f) Medical arrangements
- (g) Provost arrangements (to prevent entry of civilians and refugees into HQ area)
- (h) Provision and allotment of stores: amn, wire, mines, grenades, tools, sandbags.

8. In due course a consolidated order is to be issued embodying the plan and covering all the above matters.

H. B. Burman Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

DEFENCE OF CORPS HQ, ALEY

The following outline plan has the object of defeating an enemy raid. Such a raid might take various forms :-

- (a) A det of AFVs or motorcyclists who have approached by some unguarded track.
- (b) A force of paratps.
- (c) A long range patrol of mountain inf which has passed through a gap between our fortresses,

Resources

2. Personnel of Corps HQ can be classified as :-

- (a) Available for local defence without bringing the work of Corps HQ to a standstill. Includes -

About half the clerks and orderlies in each branch
All batmen
All storemen
Certain drivers not allotted tpt duties in the defence plan.

- (b) Available for local defence only if normal activities stop -

Remainder of clerks and orderlies
Cooks and assistants

3. Personnel of 'E' Coy HQ Gd Bn can be classified as :-

- (a) Available for local defence without prejudicing the security of office buildings. Includes -

Employed men
Men, not allotted to guard duty.

- (b) Available for defence of office buildings only -

Sentries on duty and their reliefs.

Vital Areas

4. There are three main lines of approach into ALEY :-

- (a) From NE, i.e. the main rd
- (b) From SE, i.e. AIN TRAZ rd
- (c) From SW, i.e. from BEIRUT or the coast rd via SOUK EL GHARB.

5. Other vital areas are certain of the buildings of Corps HQ.

Plan

6. Defensive posns are shown roughly in att sketch :

- (a) Outer posns which control access by rd
- (b) Inner posn which comprises the following buildings -


G A & Q
I Grand Hotel
Sig Office

7. The Corps HQ personnel classified in para 2(a) above will be organised into four pls. B, C and D Pls will man the three sectors of the outer defences, and A Pl will form part of the mobile res (see next para) under comd of Gd Coy.

8. Gd Coy personnel shown in para 3(a) above will form a mobile res located in a central posn. 'A' Pl of the Defence Unit will be under comd.

9. Sentries on duty in the various buildings, together with their reliefs, will man the inner defences. They will be assisted by personnel shown in 2(b) above.

10. Distribution of Weapons. The 2 A Tk rifles of the Gd Coy will be permanently allotted to the NE and SW sectors. Each of B, C and D Pls will have 3 Brens, leaving 3 with the res pl. All TSMGs will be kept for the inner defences, being distributed amongst the buildings.



AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps
11 Dec 41
G.1994

6 Aust Div
7 Aust Div
DDMS (pass to schools) (5)

DADH - for infm

ANTI MALARIA CONTROL - 1942 SEASON

1. Refomy G1686 of 18 Nov, as the fd hyg secs are running their courses at different times, students are not being sent as required to the advanced course at the Anti-Malaria School BEIRUT.

2. The CI of each fd hyg school should select the students best suited for further tng and advise the formations from which they came. The selected students will be sent to attend the first following OR's advanced course at the Anti-Malaria School BEIRUT. As students from some fd hyg sec courses will not have time to return to their units before the next OR's advanced course begins, it will be the responsibility of the CI of the fd hyg sec to arrange to send them direct to BEIRUT School and to advise formations of the particulars of those so sent.

3. Courses are being held as follows

<u>BEIRUT</u>		<u>2/1 Fd Hyg</u>	<u>2/2 Fd Hyg</u>	<u>2/3 Fd Hyg</u>
<u>RMO</u>	<u>OR</u>			
1 Dec	8 Dec	8 Dec	1 Dec	1 Dec
22 Dec	29 Dec	22 Dec	15 Dec	15 Dec
12 Jan	19 Jan	5 Jan	5 Jan	29 Dec
3 Feb	10 Feb	19 Jan (a)	19 Jan (a)	12 Jan
24 Feb	2 Mar	2 Feb (a)	2 Feb (a)	26 Jan (a)
		16 Feb	16 Feb	9 Feb
				25 Feb

4. Four students will be sent to BEIRUT from each fd hyg school except from courses marked (a) whence only three students will be sent.

5. Responsibility for allotting vacancies at the fd hyg schools is as follows :

2/1 Fd Hyg Sec School	6 Aust Div
	18 Aust Inf Bde
2/2 Fd Hyg Sec School	7 Aust Div
2/3 Fd Hyg Sec School	6 Aust Div

11/11/41
G.1994

APPENDIX 'L'

Set No. (/)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
12 Dec 41.
G.2006

7 Aust Div

Beach Defence

Further to our G.1981 of 11 Dec and pending any instns from Ninth Army, it is considered that our present dispositions together with the provision of mobile colns, should be sufficient at this stage to support the coast watching service.

2. Unless already covered in your plan, therefore, mobile colns should be organized as follows -

One bn gp based on TRIPOLI
One coy gp based on LATAKIA

(Sgd) F.H. Berryman Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

APPENDIX 'M'

Set No. (1)

ARMY FORM C.2122.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

6 Aust Div rptd Ninth Army Free French Forces in the Field

FROM

austcorps

Originator's Number

0 997

Date

13

In Reply to Number

one

carrier

and

instr

to

report

forthwith

Hq

free

franch

each

JAMBOUS

and

col

DELANOE

barracks

CHUGAT

GAMES

13352127

(.)

use

transporter

where

necessary

(.)

period

of

attachment

one

month

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS THIS MESSAGE MUST BE KEPT IN SECRECY

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1415

SIGNED

SIGNED Lt-Col

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Army Form C.128.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

7 Aust Div rptd Ninth Army Free French Forces in the Field

FROM

Austcorps

Originator's Number

0 996

Date

13

In Reply to Number

one

carrier

and

instr

to

report

forthwith

by

free

French

each

ALEPO

and

LATAKIA

(.)

period

of

attachment

one

month

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY
ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE
SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

C. M. M. M. Lt-Col
SIGNED (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

1415
T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

APPENDIX 'N'

Set No (1)

14 Dec 41.

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaica No.1.

SECRET.

HQ NINTH ARMY.
Ref:SD/162.
10 Dec 41.

10 Corps. (10)
1 Aust Corps. (130)
13 Arm Div. (50)
Pal. Area. (50)
5 Cav Bde. (8)
3 Ind Motor Bde. (8)
84 Base Sub Area. (20)
85 Base Sub Area. (20)

All Branches.

1. The enclosed copies of G.H.Q., letters CRME/9209/3/M.T.1 of 30 Nov 41 and CRME/9209/17/M.T.1 of 5 Dec 41 are forwarded for distribution to Lt-Cols.

At Comds.

2. Attention is drawn to the fact that these lessons have not yet been fully considered by all comds concerned in the operations and may therefore be subject to variation later.

F. Cawley Lt Col
Prigadier, G.S.

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaica No.1.

S E C R E T.

GHQ MEF Ext : 528.
CRME/9209/17/M.T.1

Ninth Army.

5 Dec 41.

The following observations on recent operations have been received from N.Z. Div. They have not been fully considered by all Comds concerned in the operations but are circulated for information and are suggested as suitable for consideration by Comds addressed.

A. ENEMY TACTICS

1. The Germans always make for the highest ground and once on there, it is very difficult to push them off. They dig in and deploy large numbers of anti-tank weapons.

2. Co-operation between German tanks, tank guns and infantry was good. Arty support was poor, but he used the smoke and dust from it to cover operations. His method of attack was with the sun behind him. Infantry protected the tanks to get them into good hull down positions where they could deal with our arty and anti-tank guns. They were so handled that they seldom presented good targets to our guns. Tanks actually carried inf and machine gunners forward on the outside of the tanks.

B. NIGHT OPERATIONS.

3. Limitations of ammunition supply reduced the possibility of adequate arty covering fire and made necessary the maximum use of moonlight and darkness for attacks against anti-tank defences, which were thus disorganised. Both SLI REZECH and BELHAMED were captured in the moonlight with the bayonet.

4. Tanks can attack in the moonlight. EL DUDA was captured by a Bn led by a Sqn of 'I' tanks deployed. Although there was considerable opposition, the attack was most successful and casualties were slight.

5. The value of the principle of surprise was seen in these operations. It was found that motorised columns could move under desert conditions over long distances by night. These long night marches always caught the enemy unprepared and created favourable opportunities for the use of arm forces. But we were never sufficiently strong to follow them up.

C. GENERAL

6. Where 25-pr ammunition was available, the combination of time concentrations, tanks, carriers and a minimum of infantry was most successful. Two Fd Regts fired about 1000 rounds covering a Sqn of 'I' tanks, ten carriers and a coy of inf, advancing one and a half miles and capturing 60 prisoners. Casualties very light.

7. The large number of vehicles with a Division cannot be adequately protected against raids and are a liability in this respect during the operations.

8. Good as direct air support was, much still can be done to speed it up.

9. The whole code system broke down for two reasons :-

- (a) It was captured by the enemy on several occasions
- (b) It was too cumbersome to use.

Within the Div messages should either be in high grade cipher or in clear.

(This question and the question of the M.E. Map Reference Code are now under investigation by a specially constituted Committee).

10. Despite modern means of communication, information was always scanty about formations on our flanks, except when we were able to make contact with them ourselves.

(Sd) 7777777777

Lessons from Operations - Nov 41 - Cyrenaica.

1.

Traffic Control

Provision of T.C. Posts and signboarding along routes and axes of advance. T.C. Posts, near readily discernible landmarks, who can direct M.T. columns to destination areas. Signboards which can be placed along the route showing where to turn off to H.Q., unit areas etc. These should be part of unit etc equipment and their use must be laid down in S.Os.

Traffic Control is done by Prov. In large scale operations in desert areas prov require to be augmented by additional personnel for T. Control duties.

2. Intercommunication.

The substitution of a proportion of trucks for M/Cs. in desert areas results in an inadequate number of suitable conveyances for D.R.L.S. e.g. Div Sigs have seven trucks and thirteen M/Cs instead of 27 M/Cs. The number of trucks must be increased.

3. Movement of Convoys.

Dispersed movement was excellent. Any tendency to form a number of columns in line ahead must be avoided since in line ahead the column presents an ideal air gunners' target.

4. Protection of H.Q.

When, as in this case, H.Q. areas are liable to raid by tank formations and they are not protected by our own tank dispositions, it will be necessary to provide anti-tank defence. Owing to the requirements of maximum concentration of tanks on the battlefield tanks should NOT be detailed for this purpose.

5. Patrol Consumption.

Exceeded estimates due to slow running, particularly during night movement, and excessive wastage figures. All vehicles should carry an emergency reserve - e.g. 15 cwt trucks, 10 galls; and 3 ton, 16 galls.

6. Method of Marking Routes for Night March.

Preliminary recon during daylight.

Provost truck placed every four miles with light shining on differential.

Move made in four columns - led by navigator with Armoured Car on either side. Navigator had differential light on.

Four columns led by G.I., G.C., G.I., G.I. all with diff lights on.

Dispersal area marked by four dimmed hurricane lamps. As each vehicle reached the outside of the harbour area it was told the distance to drive and how many degrees for dispersion to aim off after the distance was covered.

These arrangements proved satisfactory and dispersion in daylight was found to be adequate.

7. Replacement of Tanks.

Spare tanks and Armored Cars being moved up MUST be provided with maps and compasses or alternately sent fwd with a reliable guide. Spare tanks arrive without W/T; W/T is issued on a regimental basis, but it is usually impossible to recover W/T from derelict tanks; Some provision must be made for spare W/T sets to be held at 3rd Fd Pk or other suitable place for issue to spare tanks before they are issued to units.

8. Interrogation of P.W.

More liberal supply of interpreters is absolutely essential. All I.C.s must be mobile. Arrangements must exist for C.C.S. and hospitals to notify when wounded prisoners are there who can be interrogated.

9. Recovery.

The enemy methods are vastly superior to ours. Immediate steps ^{that} can be taken include movement, closely in touch with tank units, of transporters and units. Only transporters with winch gear are suitable. Adequate forward provision of spare parts will save many damaged tanks from subsequent recovery or destruction by the enemy. Scaled spare parts must move with the unit into battle.

The long range policy should envisage the repair and recovery unit as a permanent part of the tank unit.

10. Destruction of Enemy Tanks.

Arrangements must be made for the early destruction of temporarily disabled enemy tanks if their recapture or recovery by the enemy is likely.

11. Co-operation with the R.A.F. Ground Organisation.

If forward landing grounds have to be abandoned, AA and other Army units guarding them must also be warned.

12. Passing of Information.

All T.C. Posts must be kept aware of the situation. Many cases have occurred of loaded vehicles being turned back, when they were badly wanted forward.

APPENDIX 'O'

Set No. (1)

ARMY FORM C.212M

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

WD

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

AUSFORCE

FROM - AUSTCORPS

Originator's Number

0 1004

Date

15

In Reply to Number

in

view

changes

suggest

WOOTEN

tng

depot

MARTIN

18

bde

DOUGHERTY

19

bde

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY
ANY MEANS.

except wireless

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE
SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
Degree of Priority

IMMEDIATE

TIME OF ORIGIN

1020

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM

TIME

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM

TIME

OUT

OUT

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM

TIME

OUT

OUT

READER

SENDER

T.O.R.

Form C.212M, 12. Wt. 2015/1756. 1/00M. para. 12. 39. R. 2. 1/4. 51-5337.

Army Form C-2125

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

AUSFORC copy A

FROM

AUSTCORPS

Originator's Number

0 2005

Date

15

In Reply to Number

AD/3777 G

replacement

ROGERS

in

priority

Maj

KOLLOY

Lt-Cols

OGLE

SPOWERS

WINDEXER

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

except wireless

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

SIGNED

Lt-Col

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS

DEGREE OF PRECEDENCE

IMMEDIATE

TIME OF ORIGIN

1115

T.H.I.

SIGNED

SYSTEM IN

TIME IN

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM OUT

TIME OUT

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM OUT

TIME OUT

READER

SENDER

T.O.R.

APPENDIX 'P'

Set No. (/)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps
16 Dec 41
G.2038

Ninth Army

TNG IN AIR CO-OPERATION

1. Will you please advise when the RAF will commence the demonstrations and manœuvres referred to in part B of Programme for Tng in Air Co-operation. Until these commence it will be impossible to progress beyond, or even to complete Stage 1.

2. If for operational reasons demonstrations cannot be arranged it would be of benefit if aircraft could manœuvre over the areas at pre-arranged times to provide tps with something realistic at which to aim. Without this tps cannot be practiced properly in aiming off for movement or firing without checking the swing.

Lt-Gen
Comd 1 Aust Corps

APPENDIX 'Q'

Set No. (/)

ARMY FORM C-2125

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN <i>W.D.</i>	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

TO 7 Aust Div (ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM	1 Aust Corps	Originator's Number	0 1017	Date	17	In Reply to Number
for	Gen	ALLEN	(.)	minimum	notice	
as	follows	(.)	two	days	is	
tpt	and	supt	NOT	to	be	
completed	in	SVHIA	(.)	otherwise	three	
days	(.)	no	move	before	18	
Dec	(.)	extend	try	to	3	
days	a	week				

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

W. H. H. H.
SIGNED

Lt-col

IMMEDIATE

0810

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

Forms C-2125/12, Wt. 36165/1726, 1,000M. pads. 12 / 33, B.A. S. Ltd. 61-5537.

T.O.R.

APPENDIX 'R'

Set No. (/)

DISTRIBUTED BY 1 AUST CORPS

6 Aust Div	44
7 Aust Div	49
9 Aust Div	10
CCRA	5
CE	2
GSO	1
GOC	1
EGS	1
G	1
A	1
Q	1
DDST	2
ADOS	2
DADOS	1
CHE C Tps.	3
W.D.	2
Spare	2
COME	2

18/Dec 41

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Operations. - Cyrenica No.2 and 3.

10 Corps. (10)
1 Aust Corps. (130)
10 Arm Div. (50)
Pal Base & I of C Area. (50)
5 Cav Bde. (8)
3 Ind Motor Bde. (8)
84 Base Sub-Area. (20)
85 Base-Sub-Area. (20)

All Branches.

SECRET.

HQ NINTH ARMY.
Ref: SD/162.
17 Dec 41.

The enclosed copies of G.H.Q., letters CRME/9209/MT.1 dated 10 Dec 41, are forwarded for distribution to Lt.-Cols. Comds.

C. Crawford
Brigadier, G.S.

SECRET.

SUBJECT:- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaica No.2.

GHQ MEF.
Tel Ext 528
CPME/9209/17/MT.1.
10 Dec 41.

Ninth Army

The following observations on recent operations by our arm'd forces have been received. They have not yet been fully considered by all Comds concerned in the operations, but are circulated for information and are suggested as suitable for consideration by Comds addressed. They are not final.

ARMoured TACTICAL NOTES

A. GENERAL.

1. Armoured Brigades.

All armoured brigades in the 7th Arm'd Div were Brigade Groups and consisted of all arms, including a proportion of infantry. Mobile desert warfare appears to be largely a matter of columns of all arms, which may work over large distances very widely separated.

2. Tanks are no use for holding ground and when at rest they need protection both by day and by night, by infantry and A.Tk guns.

Cruiser tanks are not suitable for attacking enemy holding positions with A.Tk guns. In such attacks casualties will be disproportionate to the results achieved.

3. Artillery with Arm'd Bdes.

Each Arm'd Bde has its own artillery (25-pr) under comd, and usually some were put in support of the leading Tank Regt. It appears to be agreed that the guns should be well forward and that the FOO should be with the leading squadron Leader or even with the leading troop.

The FOO should be given a tank with Flick Frequency or two wireless sets, one to his own guns and one to the Regt he is supporting. Effective fire can be produced in 10 minutes.

There is in our view, a general demand for an armoured gun for close support of tanks, in a tank or on a chassis which can keep up with the tanks.

4. Artillery.

All arty resources in the Corps were sub-allotted to Bdes leaving no reserve under the CRA Corps.

In Arm'd Bdes, Leading Sqns had a troop in close support with an FOO.

In the 4th Arm'd Bde each FOO was allotted an M.3 Tank, each with a No.11 set to work with the guns, and an American set to work with the Regt they were supporting.

In addition they have 3 other American sets, one for the CO RHA netted to Bde HQ and one for each Bty Comd netted to their respective regiments.

The other 2 Bdes had Arm'd Cs for their FOOs each with 2 wireless sets as above.

In desert warfare owing to the difficulty in calculating accurate ranges it is considered advisable to always have the guns in action close to the OP and to open with a 1000 bracket, so as to obtain observation of the first round.

There has been practically no employment of survey methods.

It is thought that with the FOO well forwarded Support should be given within three minutes and effective fire reached within 10 minutes.

B. GERMAN TACTICS AND ARMAMENT

The Germans move in a square formation, with their Mk IV Tank (75mm) close up. They move rather deliberately and when shelled usually halt and await attack.

They have an anti-tank gun (about 4 1/2-pr) 50mm which is also brought well forward.

Their 75 guns fire one round in the air for line. They are very quick on the target and very accurate. They fire HE and AP shell. No incendiary shell has yet been found though a number of our tanks have caught fire when hit.

The German anti-tank gun appears to have an effective range against our tanks of well over 2000 yds. It is probably this gun that sets our tanks on fire with AP shell that fragments after penetration. Our AP shot does not fragment. /2...

The 50mm gun on the Mk III tank has not the same penetration and performance as the 50mm A.Tk gun.

The German Mk III and Mk IV has very thick armour in front.

It is reported that when they are stationary they have spotters on their feet who run from tank to tank pointing out targets.

They use arm and flag signals extensively.

The enemy's use of his A.Tk guns, pushed right up with or in front of his tanks, was a notable feature of most engagements. They are most inconspicuous and very boldly handled, and he appears to use them for the protection of his tanks in advance, withdrawal and during replenishment.

It has been the experience of our Tank Regts that columns of German MET are not things that can be attacked with impunity. They are well supplied with A.Tk guns.

The German very often attacked in the evening with the sun behind him. This added advantage of assisting him to recover from the battlefield. had, the

C. OUR TACTICS

Our tactics have been dictated by the superior range of the German gun, which has made it most expensive for our tanks to get within effective range.

The following methods have been adopted :-

(a) Smoke from close support tanks to cover the advance in, and more smoke to cover the withdrawal, also smoke was used against advancing tanks, so that they were silhouetted against it, when they came within effective range. As M.3 tanks cannot put down smoke it is suggested that 25-prs should do this.

(b) Regiments have always endeavoured to get hull down positions and to wait attack where possible.

If attack has to be made it should be made very fast from a flank, halt to fire one or two shots, then move again.

Even when hull down it is necessary to move after every few shots. The oblique attack in and out is recommended. It has been found most expensive to make a head on attack from the front and should never be done except in extreme circumstances, as it was found that the enemy destroyed our tanks before his tanks were within effective range (800y to 1000y). He was penetrating our tanks at 1500 yds. The only chance our gunners have against Mk IIIs is if they can be surprised on the flank. This entails considerable training and manoeuvre which can only be effective if every tank has a wireless set.

(c) Once the attack has gone in, control is very difficult and it is a case usually of each troop or squadron for itself.

(d) Owing to the heavy armament of the German our tactics have had to be on the hit and run principle.

To be able to deal effectively with German Arm Divs we require an armoured gun and a tank mounting a heavier weapon than the 2-pr.

2. Our Tanks.

Mk VI (A15) Tanks are very good and are a good gun platform. They had little maintenance. They have been operating for 14 days with no opportunity for maintenance.

Some tanks in one Bde did over 500 miles in the first 8 days of the operations.

M.3 (American) Tanks have proved very reliable and on the whole a success. They stand a lot of knocking about. The drawbacks are:-

(a) The 37mm is very accurate but has not enough range.

(b) Not a good gun platform on the move.

(c) A radius of only 40 miles. It is therefore essential that petrol replenishment should be made prior to any attack.

(d) Carries no smoke weapon.

3. Reconnaissance.

Brigades very definitely require a recon unit. During these operations at one period Bdes had a sqn of Arm Cs under command and they were found to be extremely useful. It has been suggested that Bdes should always have Arm Cs under command for recon. The use of tanks for recon is very wasteful in tanks and not so effective as Arm Cs recon.

The Regiment too required a recce unit and this can well be done by "Dingoes" fitted with wireless, if sufficient can be supplied.

D. OUR METHODS OF HARBOURING.

1. Triangular as laid down in Armd Div Standing Orders.
2. The following methods were also used

(a) Regt Harbour.

Sqns in double line ahead 60 yds between columns with their tpt between the columns. Tanks were 30 yds apart. All vehicles faced the same direction.

Bren guns were placed on the ground, covering the Perimeter. Two offrs were on patrol at night.

On alarm occurring the column moved straight out and to a flank to mislead the enemy.

(b) Bde or Regt in square, with all vehicles facing the same way..

Enemy Methods of Harboursing.

Night Harbours

An offr P.W. has stated that from an hour before dusk until an hour after dawn the enemy is in close harbour, vehicles are tightly packed with intervals of only 10 - 15 yds, guns, if any, are placed on the outside of the harbour. About threequarters to one mile away on four sides a single point of one staff car is placed. When in close harbour as described above the enemy vehicles present an admirable bombing target.

E. SIGNALS AT NIGHT.

Some signal at night is necessary to bring into the harbour replenishing parties, Liaison Offrs etc. Some morse signal on a torch, each unit having a different letter, might meet the case.

F. AIR RECOGNITION SIGNALS

Instances have occurred on more than one occasion of our own units being bombed by the RAF.

To obviate this, especially in desert operations, it is necessary for all units and sub-units besides forward units to display a sign when halted.

G. GROUND RECOGNITION SIGNALS.

Some system of ground recognition is necessary as our troops have found difficulty in recognising own troops.

Pennants are used in AFVs but no method has been evolved for transport.

?????????? Lt. Col.

for C.G.S.

NOTE :- Where the word Harbour is used it refers to the procedure previously known in the M.E. as leaguer.

SUBJECT:- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaiia - No.3.

SECRET.

Ninth Army

GHQ MEF
Tel Ext 528
CRME/9209/17/MT.1.
10 Dec.

1. Two sets of lessons from operations in CYRENAICA have already been issued.
2. In all cases, these lessons are to be considered as provisional until issued in their final form.
3. In order to facilitate reference to the various lessons derived from the experience gained during the operations in the Western Desert, and to enable formations to be kept up to date, lessons will be forwarded as they arise, and should be added to the appropriate section in the attached report.

For instance, the Infantry lessons already forwarded under CRME/9209/17/MT1 dated 5 Dec 41 should be included as the first paras in the Infantry Section and the Armoured lessons forwarded under CRME/9209/17/MT1 dated 10 Dec 41 should be included as the first para in the Armoured Section.

4. Amendments to lessons already issued will also be forwarded as necessary.
5. In due course, a full report on the operations will be made out by the EIGHTH ARMY, which will take the place of these interim lessons, but that cannot be expected for some considerable time.

????????????
for Lt-Gen
CGS.

SECRET.

LESSONS OF THE OPERATIONS IN CYRENAICA - No. 3

(18 Nov to 4 Dec 1941.)

Section 1 GENERAL

1. Introductory.

The Imperial Forces in the Middle East have now had their first clash with the Germans, armour against armour and infantry against armour and/or infantry. Some training lessons are set out in following sections and many more will emerge as the operations proceed.

2. Enemy Characteristics. :- Speaking generally the courage and powers of endurance of the German soldier was amply demonstrated. The superior armament of his Mk III and Mk IV tanks and of his dual purpose A.Tk and AA 88 mm. gun had perhaps not been fully appreciated in the M.E.F. or by our tank designers and had a direct effect on the operations as also had his admirable system of Tank recovery in battle.

3. Air Support.

(a) Air superiority was obtained by the RAF from the outset but fighter protection for bombers was necessary throughout the operations. On this account bomber squadrons had to be kept under the hand of the Army Commander and the A.O.C.

There were instances of our fighters interrupting enemy Stukas in the act of bombing and dispersing them with heavy loss. The moral effect of this air superiority on our own troops and on the enemy was most marked. That the material damage caused to enemy concentrations was very considerable was borne out by the evidence of prisoners and British Army personnel who had been captured and escaped, though it is suggested by recaptured prisoners that the confusion caused by a raid is adjusted within an hour and therefore one is led to the conclusion that once a suitable target is selected it should be subjected to continual attacks until destroyed.

The early morning between 0900 and 1000 hrs and the afternoons between 1530 and 1630 appeared to be favourite periods for enemy bombing activity.

(b) The application of Direct Air Support.

Air Support Controls were with Corps HQ but no squadrons were allotted to Corps because fighters and bombers had to be married up by Air HQ. The disposal of Air Support was kept in the hands of the Army Commander.

Requests for support normally came through Tac/R to ASCs thence through G(O) channels to Army HQ where it was dealt with by G(O) after approval by the Army Commander or BGS.

The time taken for the arrival of aircraft was normally about two hours. The bombers on arrival being put into the picture by FASIs or by the Tac/R aircraft.

The communications of Air Support Controls were on the whole good except to the Tac/R aircraft. The application of Direct Air Support is still a matter for experiment and further light will be thrown on the problem as the campaign proceeds.

(c) Recognition Signals

In the tank battle area recognition of friend from foe was very difficult and our own concentrations were bombed on several occasions, though on many others, our troops saved themselves from being bombed by putting out the recognition signals, flares or strips.

The light flick put up by German Armoured columns has to be experienced to be believed and was equally intense whether the column was stationary or on the move. Low level bombing was therefore out of the question and fighter reconnaissance had to be carried out by high speed dives.

If we are to prevent our own columns being mistaken for the enemy ones we must give the airman something fool proof to go by. He asks for clear distinctive marks painted on top of our AFVs and vehicles. This is airtight so long as we have air superiority, but in converse circumstances might be undesirable. The matter should be gone into without delay.

(d) Air Liaison Sqdn. - Air Transport - preparation and guarding of LGs are dealt with elsewhere in the report.

4. Training of HQ.

The formation and training of large HQ is a matter that requires considerable time. Staff officers and clerks have first to get to know each other, and to work out their procedure. After that the HQ must be given time to settle down and to work out and practice its battle procedure. Until this has been done, a HQ cannot be regarded as a team, which is so essential to the conduct of operations.

EIGHTH ARMY HQ had some two months to form and train, which was barely sufficient, and great credit is due to the staff for its efficient working when operations began.

The 30 CORPS HQ had only three weeks in which to form and train. This was partly due to the aeroplane accident which deprived it of its Comd designate and two senior Staff Officers. The time allowed was quite insufficient, and its training had, perforce to be completed during the operations themselves. This is a severe handicap to any HQ.

5. Preliminary Issue of Equipment - Training - Effect on Operations.

There were two instances during the preparation of the EIGHTH ARMY where equipment was not available for issue by the dates anticipated. In the case of the 1 SA DIV, the issue of desertworthy vehicles was not completed up to schedule, and in the case of the 22 ARMED BDE, they were not concentrated in the EIGHTH ARMY Area until D-12, although they had been intended to have three clear weeks for training in the desert. The result was that the 1 SA DIV and the 22 ARMED BDE had only one week's preliminary training with full equipment in the desert, and in order to allow them even this short period, it was necessary to postpone the operations on two occasions.

Although the delay was probably unavoidable for some very good reason, the effect it must have on the operations of the formations concerned must not be overlooked.

6. Splitting of HQs

It has become customary to split all formation HQs into an Advanced and Rear HQ during operations, and even sometimes before operations, the Advanced HQ consisting of the Comd and his operational staff, and the rear HQ of the bulk of Q and administrative staffs.

It is questionable whether at periods when operations are not in progress, it is advisable to split HQs at all, and during operations there should normally be no necessity to split HQs of Inf Bdes. It will, however, normally be necessary to split HQs of higher formations, but they should obviously be as close to each other as possible and in any case, close enough to permit of telephone communication.

The division of EIGHTH ARMY HQ, which has proved to work very well, is as follows:-

<u>ADVANCED HQ</u>	The Comd.
	G(Cps) Staff less one G.II Ops.
	GSO 1 S.D.
	GSO 1 'I' with a staff of 4 or 5.
	The DA & QMG with a staff of two.

The location of ERA, CE etc must be decided as required by operations. The remainder of the staff are at rear HQ.

Heads of services were instructed to place themselves where they can best supervise the activities of their particular Service, and where they can keep in touch with Rear HQ.

In all cases, a senior 'Q' Staff Officer should be at the advanced HQ.

It will occasionally be necessary for Comds to move fwd from their HQs during a particular period of the operations, when they take with them a small Battle HQ. This procedure, however, should be the exception rather than the rule, and the Formation Comd should normally be at his own HQ where he can get the best communications, and is readily available when required.

7. Pinpointing of HQs.

Out in the open desert, once enemy territory is penetrated where there are practically no landmarks, the actual pinpointing within two or three miles of HQs

or dumps is very difficult. If a location is given and is not correct, liaison officers or MT convoys who are proceeding to it on compass bearings may well miss their destination and considerable delay may be caused in delivery of important messages or stores. Surveys are investigating the matter.

8. Comfort of Commanders.

Formation Commanders should be provided with a comfortable mobile office where they can sleep, have privacy to think, and hold small conferences when necessary.

A very good type of office sleeping room can be made without difficulty, inside a three ton lorry. The only fittings required are boarded sides, a wooden bed, table, and sloping map board, and two wooden seats.

Approval has been given for such lorries to be provided now before the rigours of the winter set in, for commanders down to Bde Commanders, and for chiefs of staff (G & Q) Army and Corps HQs (JOC in C, BGS and DA & QMG of Eighth Army are already so provided).

9. Deception

(a) Enemy

The following were some of the methods of deception employed by the enemy:-

(i) Dummy Tanks

A number of dummy tanks were reported to have been used by the enemy with the majority of his mobile columns of all arms.

(ii) Aircraft

On one occasion the enemy used a captured Hurricane to lead a force of fighters and bombers which attacked one of our landing grounds. This Hurricane approached the aerodrome at a low altitude with its wheels down as though about to make a landing.

On another occasion a formation battle HQ was reconnoitred by an old type of aircraft which circled round slowly with its wheels down, as though about to land. As soon as AA MG fire was opened, the aircraft flew away and enemy bombers appeared over the area in due course.

(iii) Fifth Column

When the enemy was making his armoured push on the 24 and 25 Nov two reports were received of persons, presumably enemy agents in British uniform, who had come into British Unit Lines and shouted an order to pack up and prepare to move as the German columns were approaching. In these particular cases the statements were quite untrue, and no notice was taken of the orders, but this form of deception must always be guarded against when fighting the Germans and when operations are somewhat confused.

(b) Our Troops

(i) Dummy Tanks

Dummy Tanks were used by us during the preliminary concentration, but have not so far been used in a mobile role. They are believed to have misled the enemy as to our actual intentions.

When they are used in a mobile role it is recommended that they should not be mixed with armour as they are so vulnerable. They should be used as a separate armoured unit for deception purposes with a leavening of genuine tanks to give a measure of protection and added effect to the deception.

(ii) Dummy Railhead

A Dummy Railhead was constructed some three miles from the actual railhead. The construction was carried out by a SA Camouflage Unit under the direction of the Eighth Army Camouflage Offr. Dummy engines, trucks and dumps were constructed, fires were lit during bombing attacks; dummy AA gun positions and dummy flashes were provided also, but until they were ready it was found necessary to site a large proportion of the AA guns themselves at the Dummy Railhead to complete the deception.

As a result of these measures, the bulk of the night bombing which was intended for the railhead actually fell on the dummy railhead.

APPENDIX 'S'

Set No. (/)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET & PERSONAL

HQ 1 Aust Corps.
19 Dec 41.
G. 2058

WEEKLY STAFF CONFERENCE NO 7 : 17 DEC 41

1. Present:

BGS	DIMS
CCRA	ADOS
CE	G2(o & SD)
A/CSO	G2(1)
DDST	AQMG
2. I Appn. G2(1) read latest sitrep from WESTERN DESERT.
BGS explained that problem was now mainly administration.
3. G2(1) expounded the views of US Military Attache at ANKARA.
MA said that Turks' dislike of Germans is increasing and their fear of USSR is decreasing. But Turks have not grasped the implications of modern mechanization. G2(1) also discussed Turkish defence plans.
4. BGS spoke on the flexibility that already exists in WE and war eqpt tables. Changes to meet circumstances should be made within existing tables.
5. BGS spoke on need for secrecy regarding plans, movements, etc. Only those offrs who need to know should be told, but co-operation must not fail for lack of passing on even secret info.
6. GS explained that 7 Aust Div had been ordered to carry out 3 days tng per week.
7. ADOS stated that owing to lack of accommodation Nos 1 and 3 Sub-depots are staying at HAIFA temporarily.

R. M. Nicole

Maj GS.
/ A/Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION -

CCRA
CSO
GOC
BGS
G2s(o) - 2
G2(1)
Comd 1 Aust AA Bde
SLO

DA & QMG
AQMG
CE
DDST
DDMS
ADOS
File - 2
War Diary - 2

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps.
19 Dec 41.
G. 2056

E Coy HQ Gd Bn (20)	CE
CCRA	DDST
CSO	DDMS
GOC	ADOS
G	Camp
I	APM
A	War Diary (2)
Q	File

SOs for Guard, HQ 1 Aust Corps

(Replacing G.1633, which is hereby cancelled)

1. The gd will consist of 1 offr, 3 NCOs and 30 ptes.
2. Posts -

No 1	Billet of Main Gd
No 2	Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps
No 3	Grand Hotel
No 4	CSO and Comd Gp Sigs (opposite Grand Hotel)
No 5	AQ Building, basement (A)
No 6	" " ground floor (Q)
No 7	" " first floor (S & T)
No 8	GOC's House
No 9	G Building
No 10	I Building
3. Tour of Duty. The gd will mount at 1800 hrs daily. All posts except No 7 will be manned continuously. Post 7 will be manned from 0800 hrs to 1830 hrs.
4. Between 0800 hrs and 2000 hrs sentries on duty inside buildings will be mounted in four hourly shifts or until sooner dismissed by gd comd: between 2000 hrs and 0800 hrs they will be relieved every two hours. Sentries on Posts 1 and 2 will be relieved every two hours by day and by night.

Duties of NCO of the Gd

5. An NCO of the gd will properly post and relieve all sentries.
6. In addition to the ordinary relief of sentries each post will be inspected once in each hour by an NCO of the gd who will ensure that sentries are carrying out their duties.

Duties of Sentries

7. Sentries on Posts 1 and 2 will be mounted as normal sentries with fixed beats and fronts. They will pay the prescribed compliments. They will prevent unauthorised persons from approaching or loitering near their posts. In the event of an alarm, or such incident as they cannot deal with themselves, they will call the comd of the gd.
8. Sentries on other posts will be accommodated in hallways, etc, so situated that no one can gain normal access to the building without passing the sentry. Sentries will keep their rifles where they can be easily reached. When an offr passes they will stand to attention without arms, saluting if they are wearing a hat.
9. Sentries will require all military personnel not known to them, and all civilians, to produce satisfactory identification, and unless they are members of Corps HQ to enter the following particulars in the visitors' book:

their names

the names of the persons whom they wish to see (or branches or their business if they do not know which person)

10. Civilians are to be escorted to the person with whom they have business. Sentries will call on orderlies of the branch concerned to provide escorts.

11. Civilians and others who are not clear as to which offr they should see are to be escorted to any convenient cffr.

12. In case of doubt as to identification the senior WO or NCO clerk of the branch will be summoned.

Dress

13. As ordered from time to time. Web eqpt will be worn, with pouches basic. Sentries on Posts 1 and 8 will have bayonets fixed, other sentries will not.

14. All NCOs and men of gd will carry 10 rds SAA.

Messing

15. Gd comd will so arrange reliefs that sentries are relieved for meals.

Hygiene

16. Sentries at posts other than 1 and 8 are responsible for keeping the surroundings of their posts clean and orderly.

17. If a sentry needs to go to the latrine during his tour of duty, he will arrange for a soldier to take his place temporarily. Sentries will NOT leave their posts unless such relief has been arranged.

General

18. Although sentries other than those on posts 1 and 8 are allowed to sit down, they are not allowed to read or to take part in any diversion.

19. In order to facilitate recognition of persons having duty in the various branches, the same sentries will be used as far as possible for the same building.

Chukrist

Lt-Col.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps.
19 Dec 41.
G.2062

6 Aust Div
7 Aust Div

CCRA (3) DDST (8) Camp (1)
CRE C Tps (5) DDMS (7)
CSO (2) ADOS (8)

For infm - CE G Q DADOS
9 Aust Div

BINOCULARS PRISMATIC

There is a shortage of Mk II binoculars, which are graticuled and are essential for certain arms such as arty and MGs. It is thought that some units which need only Mk I (not graticuled) are in possession of Mk II.

2. Formations will take steps to adjust this by interchange amongst their units, incl units under comd, and will report to this HQ by 15 Jan the deficiency of Mk II binoculars in those units requiring them.

3. Corps units not under comd of divs will report as follows by 31 Dec:

Particulars of binoculars on charge to

Regd No	Nomenclature	If graticuled	Size	Make

(Size indicated by, e.g. 6 x 30, where the first figure is the magnification and the second the dia of the object glass in millimetres).

CIRCULATION	
G.O.C.	<i>[Signature]</i>
B.G.S.	<i>[Signature]</i>
G.2(o)	<i>[Signature]</i>
G.2(o)	<i>[Signature]</i>
G.3(o)	<i>[Signature]</i>
G.3 Air	<i>[Signature]</i>
G.3 CW	<i>[Signature]</i>
G.3 Cam	<i>[Signature]</i>
See to	
Lo. H.S.	
Lo. H.B.	
C.C.	

[Signature] L.W.D.

[Signature] for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

APPENDIX 'T'

Set No. (/)

W. H. B. L.

TO EVERY AUSTRALIAN OFFICER: FROM THE C.G.S.

Repeated warnings have been given to all members of the Service, that indiscreet conversations on Service matters may result in lost battles and lost lives.

Nevertheless indiscreet talk persists.

As a holder of the King's Commission, you have a special responsibility regarding the leakage of information to the enemy, a responsibility that does not end with the exercise of discretion by yourself.

Should you hear improper discussion of Service matters, it is your duty to caution those taking part.

If, despite this warning, such discussion continues, it is your further duty to report the incident to the proper authority. This is your plain duty, however distasteful it may be.

Much indiscreet discussion concerning embarkation, equipment, training, military plans and other confidential service matters takes place in clubs, messes, trains, trams and other public places. Even a private home or a party does not mean a licence for indiscreet talk on service matters.

The writing of letters, particularly to women, often provides an avenue whereby information of value to the enemy may be innocently disclosed by being passed on.

The morale of our people and the forces is again your proper concern. False rumours are often damaging to morale and frequently such rumours start with some apparently insignificant remark.

If made in your presence, you should be ready to stop many rumours at this source.

Remember that persons seeking information are clever in opening up subjects by innocent leading questions in the hope that a discussion will follow. In this regard there is a tendency to show one's greater knowledge of the subject by going just one better. This is playing into the hands of those seeking information.

In all these matters bear in mind the issues at stake, and the fact that the more senior your rank, the more significance will be found in your remarks, or in your mute acquiescence with the remarks of others.

The mere fact that you wear His Majesty's uniform will invest your opinions and your attitude with authority.

It is your positive duty as an officer of His Majesty's Forces to prevent the leakage of information, and to maintain the morale of those forces and of your countrymen.

In short it is most important that you keep your mouth shut and teach those under you to do the same.

I am attaching for your further close attention extracts from reports just received from Middle East Headquarters.



Army Headquarters,
31 January, 1941.

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

(Extracts over leaf.)

RECENT EXAMPLES

Extracts from reports on 'Recent operations around Sidi Barrani from Middle East Headquarters.'

'Secrecy before the operations started on 9 Dec. was well maintained because NO SINGLE INDIVIDUAL WAS INFORMED A MOMENT BEFORE IT WAS NECESSARY for him to be told and even then only such information as was essential was imparted at any stage in the preparations.'

'The initial surprise in the opening phases of the present operations in the Western Desert was due, in a large degree, to the maintenance of secrecy. The results are apparent for all to observe. At the cost to us of under a thousand casualties, the enemy has lost in casualties and prisoners the best part of 45,000 officers and men together with quantities of material which may prove a vital factor in the subsequent course of our operations against ITALY.'

'The Commander-in-Chief hopes that this example will be an inspiration to officers and men alike and that their New Year resolution will be to exercise discretion, to conserve secrecy, and to protect the lives of their own comrades by preventing with all means in their power the leakage of information to our enemy.'

'WHAT THE EXAMINATION OF PRISONERS AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS Clearly shows :

- (a) Much information reaches the Italians from EGYPT and most of this originates from indiscreet talk by Officers and Other Ranks. Various ladies were overheard announcing that the leave of their husbands and friends had been stopped and wondering why !
- (b) British prisoners of war have very often revealed their units. THEY SHOULD NOT DO THIS. Prisoners are required to give only their number, rank and name. There is no evidence that the Italians have used force to extract information from British prisoners.
- (c) The Italians, during their September advance to SIDI BARRANI, gained much information from Intelligence Summaries and Reports found in abandoned vehicles. Italian prisoners report and Italian documents confirm that a certain number of Intelligence papers were found lying about in the desert. One of them, a battalion Operation Order, is now in GSI, GHQ ME.'

APPENDIX 'U'

Set No. (1)

21 Dec 41

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Operations. - Cyrenaica No.2 and 3.

SECRET.

10 Corps. (10)
1 Aust Corps. (130)
10 Armd Div. (50)
Pal Base & I of C Area. (50)
5 Cav Bde. (8)
3 Ind Motor Bde. (8)
84 Base Sub-Area. (20)
85 Base-Sub-Area. (20)

HQ NINTH ARMY.

Ref: SD/162.

17 Dec 41.

All Branches.

The enclosed copies of G.H.Q., letters CRME/9209/MT.1 dated 10 Dec 41, are forwarded for distribution to Lt.-Cols. Comds.

Chapman
Brigadier, G.S.

SECRET.

SUBJECT:- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaica No.2.

GHQ MEF.
Tel Ext 528
CRME/9209/17/MT.1.
10 Dec 41.

Ninth Army

The following observations on recent operations by our arm'd forces have been received. They have not yet been fully considered by all Comds concerned in the operations, but are circulated for information and are suggested as suitable for consideration by Comds addressed. They are not final.

ARMoured TACTICAL NOTES

A. GENERAL.

1. Armoured Brigades.

All armoured brigades in the 7th Arm'd Div were Brigade Groups and consisted of all arms, including a proportion of infantry. Mobile desert warfare appears to be largely a matter of columns of all arms, which may work over large distances very widely separated.

2. Tanks are no use for holding ground and when at rest they need protection both by day and by night, by infantry and A.Tk guns.

Cruiser tanks are not suitable for attacking enemy holding positions with A.Tk guns. In such attacks casualties will be disproportionate to the results achieved.

3. Artillery with Arm'd Bdes.

Each Arm'd Bde has its own artillery (25-pr) under comd, and usually some were put in support of the leading Tank Regt. It appears to be agreed that the guns should be well forward and that the FOO should be with the leading squadron Leader or even with the leading troop.

The FOO should be given a tank with Flick Frequency or two wireless sets, one to his own guns and one to the Regt he is supporting. Effective fire can be produced in 10 minutes.

There is in our view, a general demand for an armoured gun for close support of tanks, in a tank or on a chassis which can keep up with the tanks.

4. Artillery.

All arty resources in the Corps were sub-allotted to Bdes leaving no reserve under the CRA Corps.

In Arm'd Bdes. Leading Sqns had a troop in close support with an FOO.

In the 4th Arm'd Bde each FOO was allotted an M.3 Tank, each with a No.11 set to work with the guns, and an American set to work with the Regt they were supporting.

In addition they have 3 other American sets, one for the CO RHA netted to Bde HQ and one for each Bty Comd netted to their respective regiments.

The other 2 Bdes had Arm'd Cs for their FOOs each with 2 wireless sets as above.

In desert warfare owing to the difficulty in calculating accurate ranges it is considered advisable to always have the guns in action close to the OP and to open with a 1000 bracket, so as to obtain observation of the first round.

There has been practically no employment of survey methods.

It is thought that with the FOO well forwarded Support should be given within three minutes and effective fire reached within 10 minutes.

B. GERMAN TACTICS AND COMMENT

The Germans move in a square formation, with their Mk IV Tank (75mm) close up. They move rather deliberately and when shelled usually halt and await attack.

They have an anti-tank gun (about 4.5-pr) 50mm which is also brought well forward.

Their 75 guns fire one round in the air for line. They are very quick on the target and very accurate. They fire HE and AP shell. No incendiary shell has yet been found though a number of our tanks have caught fire when hit.

The German anti-tank gun appears to have an effective range against our tanks of well over 2000 yds. It is probably this gun that sets our tanks on fire with AP shell that fragments after penetration. Our AP shot does not fragment. /2...

The 50mm gun on the Mk III tank has not the same penetration and performance as the 50mm A.Tk gun.

The German Mk III and Mk IV has very thick armour in front.

It is reported that when they are stationary they have spotters on their feet who run from tank to tank pointing out targets.

They use arm and flag signals extensively.

The enemy's use of his A.Tk guns, pushed right up with or in front of his tanks, was a notable feature of most engagements. They are most inconspicuous and very boldly handled, and he appears to use them for the protection of his tanks in advance, withdrawal and during replenishment.

It has been the experience of our Tank Regts that columns of German MET are not things that can be attacked with impunity. They are well supplied with A.Tk guns.

The German very often attacked in the evening with the sun behind him. This added advantage of assisting him to recover from the battlefield.
had, the

C. OUR TACTICS

Our tactics have been dictated by the superior range of the German gun, which has made it most expensive for our tanks to get within effective range.

The following methods have been adopted :-

(a) Smoke from close support tanks to cover the advance in, and more smoke to cover the withdrawal, also smoke was used against advancing tanks, so that they were silhouetted against it, when they came within effective range. As M.3 tanks cannot put down smoke it is suggested that 25-prs should do this.

(b) Regiments have always endeavoured to get hull down positions and to wait attack where possible.

If attack has to be made it should be made very fast from a flank, halt to fire one or two shots, then move again.

Even when hull down it is necessary to move after every few shots. The oblique attack in and out is recommended. It has been found most expensive to make a head on attack from the front and should never be done except in extreme circumstances, as it was found that the enemy destroyed our tanks before his tanks were within effective range (800yds to 1000yds). He was penetrating our tanks at 1500 yds. The only chance our gunners have against Mk IIIs is if they can be surprised on the flank. This entails considerable training and manoeuvre which can only be effective if every tank has a wireless set.

(c) Once the attack has gone in, control is very difficult and it is a case usually of each troop or squadron for itself.

(d) Owing to the heavy armament of the German our tactics have had to be on the hit and run principle.

To be able to deal effectively with German Arm Divs we require an armoured gun and a tank mounting a heavier weapon than the 2-pr.

2. Our Tanks.

Mk VI (A15) Tanks are very good and are a good gun platform. They had little maintenance. They have been operating for 14 days with no opportunity for maintenance.

Some tanks in one Bde did over 500 miles in the first 8 days of the operations.

M.3(American) Tanks have proved very reliable and on the whole a success. They stand a lot of knocking about. The drawbacks are:-

(a) The 37mm is very accurate but has not enough range.

(b) Not a good gun platform on the move.

(c) A radius of only 40 miles. It is therefore essential that petrol replenishment should be made prior to any attack.

(d) Carries no smoke weapon.

3. Reconnaissance.

Brigades very definitely require a recon unit. During these operations at one period Bdes had a sqn of Arm Cs under comd and they were found to be extremely useful. It has been suggested that Bdes should always have Arm Cs under command for recon. The use of tanks for recon is very wasteful in tanks and not so effective as Arm Cs recon.

The Regiment too required a recon unit and this can well be done by "Dingoes" fitted with wireless, if sufficient can be supplied:

D. OUR METHODS OF HARBOURING.

1. Triangular as laid down in Arm Div Standing Orders.
2. The following methods were also used

(a) Regt Harbour:

Sqns in double line ahead 60 yds between columns with their tpt between the columns. Tanks were 30 yds apart. All vehicles faced the same direction.

Bren guns were placed on the ground, covering the Perimeter. Two offrs were on patrol at night.

On alarm occurring the column moved straight out and to a flank to mislead the enemy.

(b) Bde or Regt in square, with all vehicles facing the same way..

Enemy Methods of Harbours.

Night Harbours

An offr P.W. has stated that from an hour before dusk until an hour after dawn the enemy is in close harbour, vehicles are tightly packed with intervals of only 10 - 15 yds, guns, if any, are placed on the outside of the harbour. About three-quarters to one mile away on four sides a single point of one staff car is placed. When in close harbour as described above the enemy vehicles present an admirable bombing target.

E. SIGNALS AT NIGHT

Some signal at night is necessary to bring into the harbour replenishing parties, Liaison Offrs etc. Some Morse signal on a torch, each unit having a different letter, might meet the case.

F. AIR RECOGNITION SIGNALS

Instances have occurred on more than one occasion of our own units being bombed by the R.A.F.

To obviate this, especially in desert operations, it is necessary for all units and sub-units besides forward units to display a sign when halted.

G. GROUND RECOGNITION SIGNALS.

Some system of ground recognition is necessary as our troops have found difficulty in recognising own troops.

Pennants are used in AFVs but no method has been evolved for transport.

????????? Lt. Col.

for C.G.S.

NOTE :- Where the word Harbour is used it refers to the procedure previously known in the M.E. as leaguer.

SUBJECT:- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenai-a - No.3.

SECRET.

Ninth Army

GHQ MEF
Tel Ext 528
CPME/9209/17/MT.1.
10 Dec.

1. Two sets of lessons from operations in CYRENAICA have already been issued.
2. In all cases, these lessons are to be considered as provisional until issued in their final form.
3. In order to facilitate reference to the various lessons derived from the experience gained during the operations in the Western Desert, and to enable formations to be kept up to date, lessons will be forwarded as they arise, and should be added to the appropriate section in the attached report.

For instance, the Infantry lessons already forwarded under CPME/9209/17/MT1 dated 5 Dec 41 should be included as the first paras in the Infantry Section; and the Armoured lessons forwarded under CPME/9209/17/MT1 dated 10 Dec 41 should be included as the first para in the Armoured Section.

4. Amendments to lessons already issued will also be forwarded as necessary.
5. In due course, a full report on the operations will be made out by the EIGHTH ARMY, which will take the place of these interim lessons, but that cannot be expected for some considerable time.

??????????
for Lt-Gen
CGS.

SECRET.

LESSONS OF THE OPERATIONS IN CYRENAICA - No. 3

(18 Nov to 4 Dec 1941.)

Section 1 GENERAL

1. Introductory.

The Imperial Forces in the Middle East have now had their first clash with the Germans; armour against armour and infantry against armour and/or infantry. Some training lessons are set out in following sections and many more will emerge as the operations proceed.

2. Enemy Characteristics :- Speaking generally the courage and powers of endurance of the German soldier was amply demonstrated. The superior armament of his Mk III and Mk IV tanks and of his dual purpose A.Tk and AA 88 mm gun had perhaps not been fully appreciated in the M.E.F. or by our tank designers and had a direct effect on the operations as also had his admirable system of Tank recovery in battle.

3. Air Support.

(a) Air superiority was obtained by the RAF from the outset but fighter protection for bombers was necessary throughout the operations. On this account bomber squadrons had to be kept under the hand of the Army Commander and the A.O.C.

There were instances of our fighters interrupting enemy Stukas in the act of bombing and dispersing them with heavy loss. The moral effect of this air superiority on our own troops and on the enemy was most marked. That the material damage caused to enemy concentrations was very considerable was borne out by the evidence of prisoners and Eighth Army personnel who had been captured and escaped, though it is suggested by recaptured prisoners that the confusion caused by a raid is adjusted within an hour and therefore one is led to the conclusion that once a suitable target is selected it should be subjected to continual attacks until destroyed.

The early morning between 0900 and 1000 hrs and the afternoons between 1530 and 1630 appeared to be favourite periods for enemy bombing activity.

(b) The application of Direct Air Support.

Air Support Controls were with Corps HQ but no squadrons were allotted to Corps because fighters and bombers had to be married up by Air HQ. The disposal of Air Support was kept in the hands of the Army Commander.

Requests for support normally came through Tac/R to ASCs thence through G(0) channels to Army HQ where it was dealt with by G(0) after approval by the Army Commander or BGS.

The time taken for the arrival of aircraft was normally about two hours. The bombers on arrival being put into the picture by FASLs or by the Tac/R aircraft.

The communications of Air Support Controls were on the whole good except to the Tac/R aircraft. The application of Direct Air Support is still a matter for experiment and further light will be thrown on the problem as the campaign proceeds.

(c) Recognition Signals

In the tank battle area recognition of friend from foe was very difficult and our own concentrations were bombed on several occasions, though on many others, our troops saved themselves from being bombed by putting out the recognition signals, flares or strips.

The light flank put up by German Armoured columns has to be experienced to be believed and was equally intense whether the column was stationary or on the move. Low level bombing was therefore out of the question and fighter reconnaissance had to be carried out by high speed dives.

If we are to prevent our own columns being mistaken for the enemy ones we must give the airman something fool proof to go by. He asks for clear distinctive marks painted on top of our AFVs and vehicles. This is airtight so long as we have air superiority, but in converse circumstances might be undesirable. The matter should be gone into without delay.

(d) Air Liaison Sqdn - Air Transport - preparation and guarding of LGs are dealt with elsewhere in the report.

4. Training of HQ.

The formation and training of large HQ is a matter that requires considerable time. Staff officers and clerks have first to get to know each other, and to work out their procedure. After that the HQ must be given time to settle down and to work out and practice its battle procedure. Until this has been done, a HQ cannot be regarded as a team, which is so essential to the conduct of operations.

EIGHTH ARMY HQ had some two months to form and train, which was barely sufficient, and great credit is due to the staff for its efficient working when operations began.

The 30 CORPS HQ had only three weeks in which to form and train. This was partly due to the aeroplane accident which deprived it of its Comd designate and two senior Staff Officers. The time allowed was quite insufficient, and its training had, perforce, to be completed during the operations themselves. This is a severe handicap to any HQ.

5. Preliminary Issue of Equipment - Training - Effect on Operations.

There were two instances during the preparation of the EIGHTH ARMY where equipment was not available for issue by the dates anticipated. In the case of the 1 SA DIV, the issue of desertworthy vehicles was not completed up to schedule, and in the case of the 22 ARMD BDE, they were not concentrated in the EIGHTH ARMY Area until D-12, although they had been intended to have three clear weeks for training in the desert. The result was that the 1 SA DIV and the 22 ARMD BDE had only one week's preliminary training with full equipment in the desert, and in order to allow them even this short period, it was necessary to postpone the operations on two occasions.

Although the delay was probably unavoidable for some very good reason, the effect it must have on the operations of the formations concerned must not be overlooked.

6. Splitting of HQs

It has become customary to split all formation HQs into an Advanced and Rear HQ during operations, and even sometimes before operations, the Advanced HQ consisting of the Comd and his operational staff, and the rear HQ of the bulk of Q and administrative staffs.

It is questionable whether at periods when operations are not in progress, it is advisable to split HQs at all, and during operations there should normally be no necessity to split HQs of Inf Bdes. It will, however, normally be necessary to split HQs of higher formations, but they should obviously be as close to each other as possible and in any case, close enough to permit of telephone communication.

The division of EIGHTH ARMY HQ, which has proved to work very well, is as follows:-

<u>ADVANCED HQ</u>	The Comd.
	G(Cps) Staff less one G.II Ops.
	GSO 1 S.D.
	GSO 1 "I" with a staff of 4 or 5.
	The DA & QMG with a staff of two.

The location of PRA, CE etc must be decided as required by operations.
The remainder of the staff are at rear HQ.

Heads of services were instructed to place themselves where they can best supervise the activities of their particular Service, and where they can keep in touch with Rear HQ.

In all cases, a senior "Q" Staff Officer should be at the advanced HQ.

It will occasionally be necessary for Comds to move fwd from their HQs during a particular period of the operations, when they take with them a small Battle HQ. This procedure, however, should be the exception rather than the rule, and the Formation Comd should normally be at his own HQ where he can get the best communications, and is readily available when required.

7. Pinpointing of HQs.

Out in the open desert, once enemy territory is penetrated where there are practically no landmarks, the actual pinpointing within two or three miles of HQs

or dumps is very difficult. If a location is given and is not correct, liaison officers or MT convoys who are proceeding to it on compass bearings may well miss their destination and considerable delay may be caused in delivery of important messages or stores. Surveys are investigating the matter.

8. Comfort of Commanders.

Formation Commanders should be provided with a comfortable mobile office where they can sleep, have privacy to think, and hold small conferences when necessary.

A very good type of office sleeping room can be made without difficulty, inside a three ton lorry. The only fittings required are boarded sides, a wooden bed, table, and sloping map board, and two wooden seats.

Approval has been given for such lorries to be provided now before the rigours of the winter set in, for commanders down to Bde Commanders, and for chiefs of staff (G & Q) Army and Corps HQs (70C in C, BGS and DA & QMG of Eighth Army are already so provided).

9. Deception

(a) Enemy

The following were some of the methods of deception employed by the enemy:-

(i) Dummy Tanks

A number of dummy tanks were reported to have been used by the enemy with the majority of his mobile columns of all arms.

(ii) Aircraft

On one occasion the enemy used a captured Hurricane to lead a force of fighters and bombers which attacked one of our landing grounds. This Hurricane approached the aerodrome at a low altitude with its wheels down as though about to make a landing.

On another occasion a formation battle HQ was reconnoitred by an old type of aircraft which circled round slowly with its wheels down, as though about to land. As soon as AA LMG fire was opened, the aircraft flew away and enemy bombers appeared over the area in due course.

(iii) Fifth Column

When the enemy was making his armoured push on the 24 and 25 Nov two reports were received of persons, presumably enemy agents in British uniform, who had come into British Unit Lines and shouted an order to pack up and prepare to move as the German columns were approaching. In these particular cases the statements were quite untrue, and no notice was taken of the orders, but this form of deception must always be guarded against when fighting the Germans and when operations are somewhat confused.

(b) Our Troops.

(i) Dummy Tanks

Dummy Tanks were used by us during the preliminary concentration, but have not so far been used in a mobile role. They are believed to have misled the enemy as to our actual intentions.

When they are used in a mobile role it is recommended that they should not be mixed with armour as they are so vulnerable. They should be used as a separate armoured unit for deception purposes with a leavening of genuine tanks to give a measure of protection and added effect to the deception.

(ii) Dummy Railhead.

A Dummy Railhead was constructed some three miles from the actual railhead. The construction was carried out by a SA Camouflage Unit under the direction of the Eighth Army Camouflage Offr. Dummy engines, trucks and dumps were constructed. Fires were lit during bombing attacks; dummy AA gun positions and dummy flashes were provided also, but until they were ready it was found necessary to site a large proportion of the AA guns themselves at the Dummy Railhead to complete the deception.

As a result of these measures, the bulk of the night bombing which was intended for the railhead actually fell on the dummy railhead.

APPENDIX 'V'

Set No. (1)

ARMY FORM C-212

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

6 Aust Div CRE C Tps rptd 7 Aust Div Q CZ

FROM	Originator's Number	Date	In Reply to Number
1 Aust Corps	0 1045	22	
2/16	rd	coy	will
cond	CRE	C	Tps
Dec	(.)	main	body
on	27	Dec	under
C	Tps	to	area
for	rd	construction	duties (.)
accommodation stores	in	possession	will
THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.	IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.	ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY	TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED				SIGNATURE				ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY				TIME OF ORIGIN			
				<i>Polchultrick-col</i> (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)				<i>Important</i>				1630 T.H.I.			
SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	T.O.R.			

APPENDIX 'W'

Set No. ()

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
23 Dec 41.
G.2107

CCRA	2	A	1
CRE C Tps	8	Q'	1
2/1 Aust Fd Svy Regt	1	CE	1
CSO	2	DDST	8
E Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	1	DDMS	6
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	1	ADOS	4
1 Aust Corps Salvage	1	DADOS	1
1 Aust Corps Graves		Camp	1
Registration & Enquiries		APM	1
Unit	1	DADPS	1
1 MH and Infm Sec	1	War Diary	2
G	1	File	1
I	1		

For infm - AACs BEIRUT	1	1 Aust Corps Ski School	1

OCTU

1. Selected lists in each arm in order of priority for members of Corps HQ and C Tps will be kept at 'A' Br Corps HQ. New names added do not automatically go to the bottom of the list, but will be placed in the order of priority warranted by the candidate's merits. Names will be placed on the list as shown in paras 3 and 4.

2. ME OCTU is divided into -

Inf Wing
RA Wing
All arms Basic Course

From the inf wing successful candidates are granted commissions after a 16 weeks' course. Candidates at the other wings complete a short basic course and then pass to specialist courses at schools of arty, engrs, cav, sigs, ord or ASC. Successful candidates receive commissions as reinfnts to their particular arms.

3. (a) Candidates for their own arm of the service will be interviewed as under -

Arty	CCRA
Engrs	CRE C Tps
Sigs	CSO
ASC	DDST
Ord	ADOS
All other addressees	DAAG

(b) Where a candidate has special qualifications and is selected by at least a bde or equivalent comd of the arm concerned, he may be placed on the selected list of an arm other than the one in which he is serving.

(c) The names of candidates considered desirable by the interviewing ofrs shown above will be sent to the DAAG with a recommendation as to the posn in which they should be placed on the list. Interviewing ofrs will therefore ensure that their own lists are checked against those held by the DAAG from time to time.

- 2 -

4. A candidate from a non-combatant corps is not to be recommended for a vacancy in a combatant wing of the OCTU until he has served a minimum of two months as at least a junior NCO in the arm concerned, and has been recommended by the CO of the unit with which he so serves. If a man has previous NCO service in a combatant arm, the above restrictions may be waived.

5. When vacancies are allotted to 1 Aust Corps they will be filled by the DAAG from the top of the selected list. COs will therefore frequently review their nominations to ensure that the order of priority is always correct and that no suitable offer material is being overlooked.

6. Heads of branches will regularly review their own staffs so as not to overlook anyone who should be considered for a commission.

H. B. Bergeyman Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

APPENDIX 'X'

Set No. (/)

AUSTRALIAN MATERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps
24 Dec 41
G.2128

6 Aust Div (6)
7 Aust Div (6)

CCRA CSO
CE (2) DIST
CCE, C. Tps. ADOS

For info - Ninth Army HQ, AIF (19)
9 Aust Div

INSTNS. FOR DEMOLITIONS

1. The att. forms, which cover most of the points which should be considered when framing orders and instns involving demolitions, are issued for info, to obviate the necessity for reference to several textbooks.

2. It is not intended that the forms should be rigidly adhered to. In some cases a number of the paras can be left out; in other cases paras will have to be added.

3. Formations and units which have already given any orders for demolitions will review them in the light of this memo.

W. R. Ryan
Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

..... Op Instn No.

To (Div, Bde Bn etc.)

Ref Map

INFORMATION

1.

INTENTION

2. You will be responsible for the destruction of (bridges, tunnels, water supply, any installation) set out below:

.....
.....

METHOD

3. You will arrange for

(a) the preparation of
..... for demolition;

(b) the examination and completion, if necessary, of the preparations for demolitions at
.....

4. You will give orders for the following to be demolished at all costs, so that the enemy cannot use them
.....

5. You will give orders for the following to be demolished but ONLY in accordance with specific orders from you or your nominee
.....

6. The following will NOT be prepared for demolition
.....

7. In the following cases (a) charges will NOT be placed; or (b) detonators will NOT be inserted; until orders are given by this HQ (or some other condition is fulfilled)
.....

8. You may NOT order the demolition of the following until permission has been given by this HQ (or some other condition is fulfilled)
.....

9. Orders to the offr or NCO in charge of each demolition will be given in the att form. (Action to be taken in the event of a small enemy party seizing the site of a demolition will be laid down in the orders to the offr or NCO in charge. See para 4A in att form).

INTERCOM

10. When each demolition is effected the time and degree of destruction will be reported by you to by emergency ops signal.

11. ACK.

On Instrn to Comd in charge of Demolition at

Ref Map

INFORMATION

1. (a) At hrs on (day) the enemy had reached
- (b) Our own or allied tps expect to use until hrs (or, to at least hrs) (or, until not later than hrs)
- (c) The last tps to cross will probably be (unit, or rear gd, etc.).

INTENTION

2. At all costs you will destroy the (steel, ry, traffic, rd br, tunnel etc; this description must be specific) at (map ref and description of place)
 - (a) before it can fall into enemy hands
 - or (b) but ONLY on receipt of orders to do so,

METHOD

3. Normally the order to destroy the will be given by the (title of offr, e.g. CO ... Bn commanding rear gd) or the offr acting in his stead. The order will be suspect unless it contains Code Word

4. You may however fail to receive from the order to effect the demolition. Then, immediately you, or if you are unable to give the order, any of your demolition party, realize that ANY FURTHER DELAY WILL PREVENT THE DEMOLITION BEING CARRIED OUT you, or they, will destroy the so as to prevent it falling undamaged into enemy hands.

4a. (Alternative to 4.) Neither you nor your party will destroy the even though it is in danger of falling undamaged into enemy hands unless you get the proper order from to do so (or any other condition laid down is fulfilled).

5. Charges will NOT be placed (or detonators will NOT be inserted) until orders to do so are given to you by (or some other condition is fulfilled).

6. You will explain these orders personally to each member of your demolition party so that each man knows what to do if other people become casualties or are unable to act, for example because they are captured. You will also give a copy of these orders to the offr or NCO in comd of the protective det.

7. You will warn your men against :

- (a) allowing any parties, military or civilian, near their posts;
- (b) paratps;
- (c) being surprised by the enemy, who may be in British or Allied vehs and in British or Allied uniforms.

8. You will inspect your arrangements for firing at least every 4 hrs, and whenever else you think desirable.

9. You will see that the men who are to fire the charges are protected from surprise whether by fire or by assault.

PROTECTIVE DET

10. (unit) is to provide for the protection of the, and the demolition party. It is the duty of the comd of this det to see that the enemy does not destroy the before the proper time.

11. He will place guards over all charges to prevent enemy interference.

12. He will establish rd blocks at least 100 yds from each end of the (bridge) where all vehs, except convoys, will be searched before they are allowed to approach the site. With convoys the first and particularly the last few vehs must be stopped and searched to see that no enemy have joined the coln, possibly in captured vehs.

12A. He will establish train stopping points about 800 yds from each end of the (bridge, viaduct, tunnel) and search thoroughly each train before letting it approach the site.

INTERCOMINT

13. To keep in touch with the tactical situation you will maintain contact with (units in the vicinity).

14. You will report time of demolition, amount of explosive used, and damage effected, by quickest means to :

(a) Authority issuing this instn

(b) HQ Div (and/or Bde)

(c) CRE Div

(d) Other offrs (as ordered e.g. comd rearagd).

15. ACK

APPENDIX 'Y'

Set No. (1)

*Notes on TNG for GOC for conference at
HQ AIF (AF) on 15 Dec 41*

1. The time available for tng other than in conjunction with operational needs has been governed by orders from C in C and GOC in C SYRIA in their written instns. The time shown below as spent on tng is exclusive of time spent at schools, courses, exercises etc.

2. Corps tps not under comd of divs set aside one day a week for tng in other than their normal duties. The other days are spent on works which are identical with their duties in active ops, e.g.

Arty svy regt - production of large scale maps.
Corps tps engrs - constructional work
Corps sigs - maintenance of comms
Corps AASC - maintenance of supplies, and dumping in accordance with plans.
Corps ord units - storeholding, operation of workshops.

The days thus spent cover practical tng in operational work.

3. 6 Aust Div, incl corps tps under comd and also units in 10 Corps area are devoting one day a week to tng and 5 days to defence works. 2/3 and 2/5 Aust Inf Bns in addition do one weeks extra tng each month (22 Dec).

4. These defence works have a definite tng value, since :

- (a) Offrs and NCOs have received practical tng in recce and selection of defences, fire plans, application of fire, beaten zones and the selection of A Tk posns.
- (b) Units are practised in fd works. Task work is the rule as it would be if the job were done under active operational conditions.
- (c) Jobs are decentralised to sub-units and sub-unit comds practised in controlling their men and organising work. Div comds have stressed the particular value of this work in teaching comd to junior leaders.
- (d) The men are being hardened. This is important, as many are reinfts. The time is equivalent to time spent on tng in PT.

5. Specialist units of divs are largely engaged in their operational duties of supply and maintenance. This applies particularly to sigs, ASC, medical and ord. As for engrs, the work on the defences represents one of the most effective types of tng for that arm. All such units are at the same time tng in rd discipline, driving control and maintenance. Such tng work is thus in fact being combined with operational needs.

6. 7 Aust Div up to 18 Dec were devoting one day a week to tng, 6 days to defence works. Since that date under authority from Ninth Army three days a week have been allotted for tng. The same remarks apply to time spent on defence works as in the case of 6 Aust Div.

7. Personnel on HQ staffs are being trained as inf so that in case of necessity they could protect their HQ. The time spent on this varies from every alternative day down to 12 hrs per week. Fd ambts which are functioning as small hospitals are releasing one coy for 3 days each week for tng.

War Diary

8. Excluding 9 Aust Div there are at any time an average of 800 all ranks at AIF and ME schools and courses. On 22 Dec the figures were 187 offrs and 421 ORs but this is exceptionally low as some schools do not run courses over Xmas. In addition courses have also been run within Corps, such as lectures and practical tng for junior offrs run by HQ 1 Aust Corps each morning for 6 weeks, adm classes run by HQ 6 Aust Div and various refresher courses in CW of 14 days duration run in divisional units. MT drivers school and map reading courses have been run. Cipher sends five special tng practice messages daily in addition to normal traffic.

9. Various series of lectures are being given on points that have been learnt through the practical application of the teaching in tng manuals, so that tng methods will not remain static. 8 senior offrs from 9 Aust Div have given a series of lectures on various aspects of the defence of TOBRUK; all ranks have been given a series of lectures on air support; a U(R) circus is touring each div giving lectures and demonstrations; camouflage tng courses are being run in most units. In addition to these "military subjects" educational schemes are being carried out on a volunteer basis by certain units. Subjects covered at present include physics, mathematics, surveying, French and Arabic. Arrangements are being made to expand these into a general plan available to all units and covering a wider range of subjects.

10. 1 Aust Corps Ski School is in operation at The CEDARS and, if an expected request from Ninth Army is agreed to, will train nearly 1000 skiers before April. These may not all be AIF. From those trained the div ski coys are being formed.

11. Demonstrations have been given to all bdes in wire crushing. Tng in mule pack tpt is also being carried out in each div.

12. TEWTs, indoor exercises, and tactical schemes are being run under corps, div and bde arrangements.

13. Rifle range work is carried out in addition to the one day a week as the days on which ranges are available do not fit in with the normal tng days. Btys have been doing 4 days arty shoots on the arty ranges.

14. Besides the tng set out above every unit is carrying out night tng exercises regularly.

24 Dec 41

W. Berryman Bay
95 1st Aust Corps

ANY FORM C-2178

Serial No.

**CALL
AND
INSTRUCTIONS**

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

7 Aust Div rptd 6 Aust Div copy - 0 A Q

FROM

Originator's Number

Date _____

In Reply to Number

ABSTRACT

~~0-1-381~~

-25-

1977	SECRET	(.)	confirming	telephone	message
(.)	plan	for	move	of	7
Aug	Div	to	HAIR	and	9
Aug	Div	to	SYRIA	cancelled	rpt
cancelled					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE
SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

except wireless

Sixty

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SICKLE

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
<p>FORMS 212-11, WT. 36163/1736, 1-00K, pads 12/35, R.S. P. 1-1-1, 51-1127.</p>											

T.O.R.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

MOST SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
25 Dec 41.
G:2110

Ref 1 Aust Corps Op Instr No 44

"BILGE" and BOATSWAIN"

1. In the case of "BILGE" the code word RED will be notified to demolition parties as follows :-

PALESTINE area will notify IPC HAIFA which will act in accordance with para 9 B of Op Instr No 44. NO action is therefore required of 6 Aust Div on receipt of the message "BILGE rpt BILGE RED rpt RED ACK."

2. To minimise the possibility of false messages -

In the message from 1 Aust Corps (both by telephone and signal) "BILGE/BOATSWAIN/ASTERN - RED" the Duty Offr 1 Aust Corps will refer to the number of the previous signal declaring a state of emergency.

3. Cancellation of the state of emergency will be notified by 1 Aust Corps to the formation (or unit in case of ASTERN) by telephone message confirmed by signal. This message must refer to the number of the signal declaring a state of emergency.

Lochington Lt Col
for Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION -

6 Aust Div	4
7 Aust Div	2
BGS	1
G	1
AQ	1
CE	2
CSO	1
84 Base Sub Area	1
Ninth Army	3
— War Diary	2
File	1
Spare	2

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
25 Dec 41.
G.2139

CCRA	1	DADOS
CRL C Tps	1	Camp
CSO	1	AFK
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash	CL	DADFS
1 Aust Corps Salvage	DDST	1 Aust Corps Ski School
1 M.M. & Infla Sec	DDMS	Amenities Offr
G	DOS	MCS BLIRUT

INFORMATION FOR AUSTRALIA

1. A weekly letter is sent by the GOC AIF (ML) to AIF MELBOURNE. This contains info regarding the activities and orgzn of the AIF in the ML, and tng data.

2. In order that this letter may be as informative and useful as possible addressees will submit articles, reports, diagrams etc for inclusion in it.

3. Material for this letter must be despatched in duplicate to reach this HQ by Sunday of each week. It will be clearly marked "For GOCs letter to Aust."

H. K. Argman Brig
GOC 1 Aust Corps.

APPENDIX 'Z'

Set No. (1)

ARMY FORM C2128

MESSAGE FORM

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

5 Aust Div 7 Aust Div rptd CCRA CIE O Tps CSO DDST ADOS Camp
B Coy Gd Bn copy Q DADOS

FROM

AUSTCORPS

Originator's Number

0 1087

Date

28

In Reply to Number

supplies	450	ann	uncertain	in	view
UEA	situation	(.)	strictest	economy	necessary
(.)	until	further	notice	no	expenditure
this	ann	for	tng	(.)	report
any	deficiencies	0 1088	and	state	stock
on	hand	for	tng		

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY
ANY MEANS.

except wireless

[Signature]

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE
SENT IN CIPHER.

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

RLS

TIME OF ORIGIN

1005

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Form C2128/12. W.C. 36163/1736. 1,000M. pads. 12/73. R.A. & L.L. 51-237.

APPENDIX "AA"

Set No. (1)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
27 Dec 41.
G.2153

6 Aust Div	(15)	Q	(20)
7 Aust Div	(15)	2/1 Aust Corps Fd Svy Coy	(1)
CCRA	(3)	1 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	(1)
CE	(10)	1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	(1)
CSO	(5)		

For infm * G I A DDST ADOS AFK DADPS Camp

TNG OF HQs AND BASE PERSONNEL

- 1. Herewith Ninth Army memo SD/158 of 12 Dec for infm and action.
2. CE and Q will distribute circular to comds of dumps and depots under their control. CSO will distribute to special W/T secs and Corps Sigs. Further copies are obtainable if required.
3. Progress reports, vide para 5 of SD/158 will be fwded through normal channels to reach this HQ by 12 Jan 42.

H. B. Benjamin Brig
G 1 Aust Corps

SUBJECT :- Training of Base etc Personnel.

H.Q. Ninth Army.
SD/158.

17 Dec 41.

10 Corps
1 Aust Corps
10 Armd Div
Pal Base L of C Area.
5 Cav Bde
3 Ind Motor Bde
84 Base Sub Area
85 Base Sub Area

All Branches Ninth Army

1. The enclosed GHQ letter CPM/9022/MT2 of 30 Nov 41 is forwarded for information and action.

2. The lessons from campaigns which have already taken place in this war show how flanking movements by Armd and motorized formations achieve considerable success against HQ of fighting formations as well as Base and L of C installations. Consequently there is a need for all arms of the Service to be prepared to defend themselves.

3. Tng programmes will therefore be arranged on the lines indicated in /letter para 3 of this GHQ/under reference. All ranks of formation and Area HQs and of formation and area tps including Base installations Depots, and Services Establishments on the Base and on the L of C will be given training.

4. Requirements of .22 amn will be included in the next quarterly demand for tng amn. HQ Palestine Area and HQ 84 and 85 Sub Areas will notify this HQ

- (a) If they are unable to provide the necessary instructors locally, and if so what assistance they require.
- (b) Their requirements of tng stores.

5. Progress reports giving a brief outline of the tng carried out and the numbers exercised will be forwarded to reach this HQ on 15 Jan 42.

P. J. J. J.
Prigadier G.S.

Copy Letter

GHQ MEF
CRME/9022/MT.2

MIDDLE EAST TRAINING INSTRUCTION

Training of Base etc Personnel.

1. Preparations for defence against parachute and air-borne troops, land attack and sabotage must be maintained at a high standard. It is most important that all ranks of all arms and services receive elementary training in infantry weapons and tactics. This is particularly necessary at Base etc. Installations, since these Installations will often be the chief targets of attack.
2. The General Staff of Commands will be responsible for the standard of training and will provide such guidance and assistance as is necessary to C.Os. of Installations, Depots, and Service Establishments on Base and Ls of C. in carrying out their training programmes.
3. The following will be included in training programmes:-
 - (a) Tactics
Instruction to Offrs and NCOs in fire orders. Elementary section and platoon tactics both in local defence and attack, to include dispositions for local defence and formations and movement for attack and local counter attack.
 - (b) Weapon Training
Standard of recruit T.O.E.T. (including A.A.) for rifle and L.M.G., bayonet fighting and grenade training. Competitions with the .22 rifle among Base Installations of both RASC and RAC are already in progress; these will be encouraged.
 - (c) Guard and defence duties.
Sentry duties, including air attack and gas. Occupation of alarm posts.
4. Training programmes will provide for a minimum of 4 half hour training periods per week arranged to suit the normal working of the establishment. In making arrangements for the above training the working of Installations must not be interfered with.

?????????
for Lt. Gen.
C. G. S.

30 Nov 41.

APPENDIX "BB"

Set No. (1)

ARMY FORM C-2128

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

XXXX 6 Aust Div 7 Aust Div

FROM			Originator's Number	Date	In Reply to Number
Austcorps			0 1073	28	
representative	each	formation	will	report	DGS
Ninth	Army	29	dec	as	foliows
8	Aust	Div	rep	at	1100
hrs	7	Aust	Div	rep	1200
hrs	(.)	reps	will	brief	BOS
on	progress	of	defence	works	preparatory
to	BOS	attending	C in Cs	conference	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY
EXCEPT wireless

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE
SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

IMMEDIATE

TIME OF ORIGIN

0938

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps.
28 Dec 41.
G.2170

CCRA	A	ADOS
CSO	Q	DADOS
GOC	CE	APM
BGS	Camp	DADPS
G	DDST	Each offr on Duty SO's Roster
I	DDMS	Chief Clerk (G Ops)
Copy - Duty SOs file		Spare (5)

INSTNS DUTY SO

There have been several instances of unnecessary delay due to the Duty SOs failure to distribute messages as laid down in his instns (G1284 of 11 Oct). Attention is invited to paras 3 and 4 of that circular.

2. Typical distribution lists are held in the Duty SOs file.

3. Messages not distributed during the night must be on the table of the responsible offr at 0830 hrs next morning. This means that copies have to be typed and distributed by at least 0800 hrs.

R. W. Nichol
Lt-Col.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

APPENDIX "CC"

Set No. (1)

ARMY FORM C-212B

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

6 Aust Div copy A Q CCRA

FROM

AUSTCORPS

Originator's Number

0 1082

Date

29

In Reply to Number

my

0 1074

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2/1

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2/2

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THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

except wireless

IS LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CLIPPER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

ELS

TIME OF ORIGIN

1800

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN

TIME IN

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM OUT

TIME OUT

READER

SENDER

SYSTEM OUT

TIME OUT

READER

SENDER

T.O.R.

APPENDIX 'DD'

Set No. (1)

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaica No.4.

S E C R E T

Ninth Army

GHQ MEF
CHCE/9209/17/MTI

The following observations on recent operations have been received. They have not yet been fully considered by all Comds concerned in the operations, but are circulated for information and are suggested as suitable for consideration by Comds addressed. They are not final.

1. JOCK COLUMNS.

The main German columns which drove Eastwards on the 24th & 25th, after reaching the wire broke up into smaller Columns.

To engage and break up these German formations and to prevent them from concentrating to the West again, JOCK COLUMNS were formed.

JOCK COLUMNS were made up from units of the Support Group commanded by Brigadier JOCK CAMPBELL DSO.

These Columns were composed of all Arms, Det of Artillery 25 pdrs A.Tk Guns, AA guns motorised infantry and R.E.

Two or three Columns were usually employed at the same time, and were each commanded by one of the Lt. Cols in the Support Group.

They did excellent work and inflicted considerable damage and casualties to Enemy Formations and Transport. This was especially so up on the Trigh Capuzzo, whilst the enemy was moving Westwards against the N.Z.Div.

They have been freely employed and have obviously been of great value in their harassing tactics.

It is for consideration whether a Det of Armoured Cars for distant Recce and a Sqn of Tanks to give the requisite 'punch' would not have been an added advantage to the Composition of the Columns.

2. A.D.W. (Armoured Div E/shot)

The A.D.W. moved forward from Dump to Dump of aeroliet tanks collected on the centre line under orders of the S.O.M.E. It repaired what was beyond the capacity of the L.R.S. or evacuated to FH.

Normally the L.R.S. evacuate to the ADW but owing to the fluctuation of the operations, the ADW instead moved forward to LRS Dumps.

At times repair work was delayed owing to the ADW having to move its location to enemy action.

3. CONTROLLED STORES.

Controlled Stores are dealt with at RH by Ordnance as dictated by G(SD). Owing to the long L of C. it was found at the commencement of the operation that a quantity of stores despatched from RH never reached the correct units in the forward area. It was therefore found necessary to establish a Forward Report Centre at Army Battle H.Q. All convoys coming forward reported for further orders. As the operations continued, this proved its worth priorities changed and forward areas at times were not safe for unescorted convoys. The forward Report Centre was controlled by G(SD) owing to the last minute improvisation. but this threw a heavy work on the staff. It is recommended that this centre should be manned by a representative of ADOP(E) with the task of co-ordinating equipment moving by transporters, and an O.C. to book in and direct stores as directed by G(SD).

If Control Stores are established between Army and F.M.C. for general traffic, this will considerably help forward loading.

SUN SPILLER (TANKS)

1. Tanks were kept in line in positions in order to check the enemy or our tank strength. Tanks coming along and report their location to Div via Bie.

Their recovery is a matter of difficulty, as Regts are widely dispersed and the Sun Shields are spread over a large area.

The Div had no transport to carry these shields owing to their bulk, only 10 tonners can carry them.

The Shields for the M3 take 20 minutes to remove though in an emergency they can be broken off in 3 or 4 minutes.

The recovery of shields would appear to be a task for the Salvage Corps at the conclusion of operations.

5. TANK STATES.

The Army plan is to a great extent dependent on the enemy and our own tank state. It is therefore most important that :-

- (a) Our tank states are forwarded regularly every evening and every morning.
- (b) Enemy tank casualties are immediately reported. Tanks must be properly destroyed before being considered a total loss.

6. TRANSPORTERS.

The 7 Armd Div had one Transporter Coy RASC (67 Transporters) organised into four sections each of 16 and 3 spare. This is capable of lifting one complete Regt and a Bde HQ. These Transporters are for strategical or tactical moves and not for recovery though they can be and are used for recovery on occasions. They cannot recover a tank that cannot move under its own power, as tanks have to be driven on to transporters.

It is understood that all A10 tanks in the Division were lifted by transporters on D.1 for their battle positions this day.

The 7 Armd Bde had about 35 of these transporters which took one complete sqn of 7th Hussars (A10) and the Bde HQ.

7 Armd Div HQ were also lifted.

These transporters were found extremely useful not only for this tactical move on D.1 but also for the previous concentration of the Division, saving some hundreds of track miles which could be used for training.

The Army Tank Bde also had a section of transporters for lifting 'I' Tanks. Valentines can be lifted by them but not Matildas.

It is open to question whether these transporters should be run by RAC instead of RASC.

After the initial wave on D.1 a proportion of transporters were sent back to the Delivery Sqn to bring back tank replacements and evacuate casualties.

The reserves with the Tank Delivery Sqn consisted of some 20 M.3 and about 6 M.5.

Should not all transporters be fitted with a winch?

7. NOTES ON GERMAN EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT.

(a) Diesel Oil.

It has been definitely proved that German A.F.Vs run on petrol and NOT on Diesel Oil as is the general belief at the present moment.

(b) Types of German Guns

(i) 50mm A.Tk Gun (38 P.A.K.) Split trail and towed.

Fires an A.F.H.E. (4 1/2 lb) shell or HE (2 3/4 lb).

Very accurate up to 2000 yds.

Penetration - 71mm at 600 yds at angle of 30 degrees.

63mm at 850 yds at right angle.

(ii) 50mm Tank Mounted Gun (121 111) K.W.K.

Fires the same shell as the 38 P.A.K. but the gun has a shorter

barrel, lower L.V. and poorer all-round performance than the 38 P.A.K.

Penetration - 69mm at 200 yds at angle of 30 degrees

59mm at 430 yds at right angle.

Both the above guns have a remarkably efficient and expansive sight which gives extreme accuracy and is practically foolproof.

(iii) 75mm Tank Mounted (Mk IV)

Three types of shell have been identified, H.E., A.P.H.E., and smoke.
2 further unidentified types are being examined by Ordnance, which may be incendiary or High Air Burst.
This gun has poor penetration (32mm at 500 yds)
Range up to 9000 yds.

(iv) 88mm Gun (dual purpose A.A./A.Tk gun)

Very long range up to 18000 yds and has great penetration :-
70mm at 3850 yds at right angles
100mm at 400 yds at angle of 30 degrees.
Tractor drawn.

(c) Incendiary Effect.

Up to date no German incendiary ammunition has been found. It is considered that the incendiary effect on our Tanks may have been due to any of the following reasons :-

- (i) The German A.P. ammunition is strictly A.P.H.E. and has an explosive content which causes fragmentation after penetration.
- (ii) The Tracer element in the A.P.H.E.
- (iii) The Red Phosphorus Smoke Box in the 50mm H.E. shell. Phosphorus burns persistently and might be the cause of ignition.

Our 2-pr is solid shot, has great penetration but no fragmentation and therefore does not have an incendiary effect.

• GERMAN FLAK

The light A.A. put up by German armoured columns has to be experienced & be believed. They move along in columns of four guns in close formation at high speed and put up a wall of light flak which made any form of low or dive-bombing attack out of the question.

They did not slacken speed or disperse on the arrival of our bomber formations but forged straight ahead on their course.

????? Col
for Lt. Gen.
C.G.S.

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaica No's 4 & 5

SECRET
HQ NINTH ARMY.
SD/162

27 Dec 41.

10 Corps. (10)
1 Aust Corps. (130)
10 Arm'd Div (50)
Pal Base & I of C Area. (50)
5 Cav Bde. (8) 3 Ind Motor Bde (8)
84 Base Sub-Area. (8)
85 Base Sub-Area. (8)

All Branches.

The enclosed copies of G.H.Q.. letters CMHE/9209/17/MTI dated 12 and 13 Dec 41, are forwarded for distribution to Lt.-Cols Comd.

G. S. Campbell
Brigadier G.S.

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Cyrenaica - No 5.

SECRET
CHQ MEF
CRME/9209/17/MT1.
13 Dec 41.

Ninth Army

The following observations on recent operations have been received. They have not yet been fully considered by all Comds concerned in the operations but are circulated for information and are suggested as suitable for consideration by Comds addressed. They are not final

Lt.Gen.
C.G.S.

Section II . INTERCOMMUNICATIONS.

1. Liaison by Air.

In fast moving operations, where long distances between HQs are involved communications must depend on wireless and on liaison by air. During the present operations, the Army Comd has made frequent visits to his Corps Comds, and liaison officers from Army HQ have visited 30 Corps HQ once and sometimes twice daily. The importance and value of this form of communication cannot be over-emphasised. The Comd Flt aircraft, which had been promised to the EIGHTH ARMY, and which would have enabled Corps Comds and Liaison Officers to visit Div HQs, were not, in fact, available, and the liaison aircraft limited to four at Army HQ. It is important that the pilots of these aircraft should be highly trained in map-reading, and recognition of HQs on the ground, and also that the aircraft themselves should permit of speech between the passenger and the pilot.

The provision of aircraft for Comds or Liaison Officers is far too important a matter to be treated lightly, and action should be taken to ensure that sufficient aircraft are made available, and that they are entirely at the disposal of Army HQ.

Wireless Blackout.

In the early stages of the operations, difficulty was experienced with wireless communications during the night, a complete blackout having occurred between ARMY and 30 CORPS HQ on two successive nights. In order to adjust this, it was found necessary to change frequencies between day and night.

It is for consideration on future occasions whether arrangements should not be made to hold training exercises on some form of test from the correct distances before operations begin in order to try out the frequencies beforehand. Wireless silence and security, added to the fact that Signals personnel are always fully employed before operations may make this difficult, but whenever possible, it is desirable.

3. The most suitable W/T Set.

Consequent upon the requirements for change from high to low frequency at night, the question of a suitable W/T Set arose. The normal Army sets No 11 and No 9 could not take the ranges of frequency for instance, for Army HQ to keep 24 hours W/T communication with ALB, it was necessary to have a No.9 and a No.11 set at each end. The Collins set was found to be the best set, as it could be adapted to the high and low frequencies required, but it cannot be fitted with remote control. This is an important point from the Staff point of view. At EIGHTH ARMY HQ, the Staff had to motor to the various sets, which wasted time and energy, and they were difficult to find in the dark.

W/T Sets which can take the necessary range of frequencies and can be used with remote control are the ideal to be aimed at.

4. Line Maintenance.

The line maintenance parties were hard at work throughout the 24 hours, and even then found it difficult to keep the lines in working order.

This was in great part due to ME traffic following signal lines in order to be assured of arriving at their destination.

Section III R.E.

1. Armoured Division.

The Fd Sqn with the Arm Div was provided with 14 Arm Cars from 30 Corps resources. This has enabled small RE recce parties to accompany Arm and Jock cols. One of the chief activities of these parties has been the destruction of enemy abandoned AFVs.

1. Preparation of Advanced Landing Grounds.

A CRE Landing Grounds was appointed, and two Fd Coys or Sqns and elements of a Construction Coy were employed in the preparation of ALGs.

The system adopted was :-

- (a) Recce by the RAF with an RE representative.
- (b) The advance parties of the RAF Sqn came fwd and roughly marked out the boundaries of the ALG.
- (c) RE detachments came up and completed the marking out, and generally improved the landing area.

Another requirement of the RAF which was carried out under CRE Landing Grounds was the marking of pin points on the desert to assist in RAF navigation. These consisted of the letters R A F marked out in white at certain selected points. Each letter was 100 feet long.

2. Enemy Anti-Tank Mines.

Among the documents captured from Libyan Omar was the German Handbook on the laying of Anti-Tank minefields. Details of the methods will shortly be available. Some of the mines at Libyan Omar were found to have "bottom ignition".

4. Defensive Works

Enemy defensive works at the Omar were thought to be good, and were of a very different standard from those dug by the Italians last year. Their standard trench consisted of a narrow slit trench 2' wide and some 4½ ft deep with no parapet or para-ditch. From this trench led out L pits and LHM pits. Small dugouts were let in from the side. They were approximately 6' by 6' and had no overhead cover except for a well camouflaged ground sheet or piece of corrugated iron.

The whole effect of this system of dug in platoon posts was that they were very difficult to see until the attacking infantry were right up to them, and were not vulnerable to air attack or tank attack.

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Operations. - Cyrenaica Nos. 6 and 7.

SECRET.


HQ NINTH ARMY.
Ref: SD/162.

28 Dec 41.

10 Corps. (10)
1 Aust Corps. (130)
10 Arm Div. (50)
Pal Base & L of C Area. (50)
5 Cav Bde. (8)
3 Ind Motor Bde. (8)
84 Base Sub-Area. (8)
85 Base Sub-Area. (8)

All Branches.

The enclosed copies of G.H.Q., letters CRME/9209/17/MT.1 dated
Dec 41, are forwarded for distribution to Lt.-Cols. Comds.


Brigadier G.S.

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaica No 6

SECRET

CHQ LEF
CRME/9209/17/MT1.
Dec 41.

Ninth Army

NOTES ON THE MOVEMENT OF INFANTRY

1. General

From an Infantry point of view the main lessons from the first Phase of this Campaign are :-

- a. The necessity of thorough training before operations for both Units and HQ Staffs
- b. The need for close and continuous co-operation with all arms, especially Army Tanks.
- c. The limitations forced upon us by the numbers and performances of our A.Tk weapons.
- d. The advantages of a clear and well understood drill covering day and night moves.

2. Preliminary Training.

All Infantry formations engaged in these operations had operated or trained in the desert for sufficient time to enable them to become familiar with the country and to learn some of the problems involved. Units not actually in defensive positions were concentrated in rear areas in the WESTERN DESERT. They could train under conditions approaching those to be expected in the Frontier Area. Co-operation with the other arms of the Div was practised during combined training but was limited to some extent by shortages in transport. Restrictions in Tank mileage and the move of 1 ARMY Tk Bde to the forward area prevented adequate training of the infantry with Army Tanks.

3. Movements.

Movements of whole Divs and Bde Gps were carried out both day and night without any difficulty. This was due to each formation setting out a "Desert Formation" to suit its own requirements and ensuring that this was practiced until perfected. (Details of the methods used will be given in separate notes)

4. Attack against prepared positions.

The attack on the QMARS was the only one against a position that the enemy had been able to prepare for a protracted defence. These positions had been prepared to resist attack mainly from the SOUTH and EAST. Our attack was developed from the NORTH and the NE, but was not delivered till 18 hrs after troops had been placed to the NORTH of these positions. This respite was used by the enemy to lay a minefield some 4000 yds in extent and this with existing minefields completely encircled the position. Although the enemy's plan for all round defense was far from complete he very quickly minimised the disadvantages in which he had been placed and was able to cause serious damage to a large number of our Army Tanks.

A prepared position of this nature is likely to prove expensive to the attacker unless the distribution of enemy weapons have been accurately located and plans made to deal with them. Enemy 88mm dual-purpose guns remained in action sufficiently long to do serious damage to our Army Tanks. An attack where Tanks and Infantry advance on a common line and are prepared to deal with opposition as it is found is likely to prove expensive. Such points of resistance as the 88mm guns must be legislated for in the plan of attack.

5. Co-operation with Army Tanks.

The GERMEN A.Tk defences have developed to such an extent that it is no longer possible to employ the Army Tank as was done in the first CYRENAICA Campaign.

As a preliminary to any effective action by Army Tanks the Infantry must be prepared with their own resources to clear up or at the very least, seriously weaken the enemy's A.Tk defences. Any consideration of the problem of attack must keep this point well to the fore.

6. A.Tk Defences

the A.Tk defence of a Bde Gp as present constituted proved serious and difficult. GERMAN tactics were such that he seldom attacked any formation until such time as he had either destroyed the bulk of the A.Tk defences or found a spot where these defences were weak or non-existent. As a preliminary to these tactics it was necessary for the enemy to make us disclose the strength of our A.Tk weapons. GERMAN Tanks sat outside the effective range of our A.Tk weapons and shelled them whenever they were located. He used every means possible including feint attacks by his Tanks to force us to disclose the location of our A.Tk defences.

The problem is a difficult one. 25 prs could be used at the longer ranges, but unless supplied with AP Am they quickly become ineffective due to the amount of dust and smoke created by the bursting of their own shells.

It is essential that the A.Tk gun be held in reserve until such time as the enemy really launches his Tanks to the attack. The difficulty is to decide when this attack is actually launched. It is considered that a proportion of armd cars for recce are essential to Bde Gps. These in conjunction with TAC/R would provide the necessary information on which a more accurate judgement could be made.

The use of A.Tk mines in mobile warfare presents many difficulties but so long as we are going to find ourselves faced by enemy armd forces consideration must be given to their employment. One of the main dangers of minefields in mobile operations is the fact that they may be a greater menace to our own Tanks and vehicles than to the enemy. In this regard it was noticeable that the enemy takes little if any attempt to hide, dig-in or camouflage his mines. In this he is a long way behind us.

The Boys rifle appears to be of little use against GERMAN Tanks. It was not found possible to find an example of its effective use.

7. Dispersion

At the commencement of these operations 200 yds between vehicles was laid down as the normal daylight dispersion. Later owing to the effectiveness of our air support this was reduced to 125 yds between vehicles. In a Bde Gp complete with B Ech. this wide dispersion produces serious problems in regard to A.Tk defence. Quite apart from alterations in the composition of a Bde Gp and increase in A.Tk weapons this problem will largely remain. It is essential therefore that Units reduce their transport to a minimum consistent with their task.

Consideration could usefully be given to some modification in the system of dispersion. For example if two or even three vehicles were used as the unit of dispersion the perimeter could be considerably reduced. Vehicles would move in groups or "blobs" of two or three with only distance and interval necessary for driving. The next group would be at the normal dispersion distance of, say, 200 yds. When halted the vehicles in a "blob" could close in still closer.

8. Tank Hunting

Throughout the operation the system of Tank Hunting that has been propounded and prepared over the last year appears to have been overlooked. On several occasions when the opportunity offered none of the Tank Hunting appliances appear to have been easily available for use. If these are to be used on a much more liberal scale of issue should be made of ST Grenades and 68 Grenades and numbers of Molotov Cocktails prepared by the Units themselves.

It would appear that in changing from the specialist Tank Hunting platoons and making this work part of general platoon training something has been lost. This part of training will have to receive considerably more attention if the required standard is to be reached.

The re-introduction of the Tank Hunting Platoon would perhaps help to keep this important part of training well to the fore, but must not be allowed to lessen the training of other platoons in this method of warfare.

9. Night Operations

Night moves have become almost a normal part of desert fighting as far as our own troops are concerned. Formations of all arms as high as a Div successfully moved distances up to 30 miles on dark nights.

3.....

In addition to these night moves, the superiority of certain enemy equipment forced us to resort to night operations to still further extent. Where his A.Tk defences have proved too strong by day they were repeatedly and successfully overcome by night; in most cases with astonishingly small losses to ourselves. At EL DUDA, a moonlight attack in which Army Tanks moved with covers raised resulted in 600 PCW being taken.

Recovery of Army Tanks put out of action during daylight was another example of a successful night operation. This was carried out under cover of an Infantry attack.

Owing to the enemy's temporary interruptions to our I of C it was necessary to conserve arty arm. The night attacks in the BEL HAMED area saved arm at a critical period in the fighting for the TUBRUK corridor. Night training has always been emphasised and its advantages were once again borne out in these operations. No opportunity should be lost to improve still further our technique in this regard. (Details of night moves are issued separately)

10. Timings.

Experience in the MLRS Battle again showed the necessity for Infantry to receive with reserve the estimated timings of supporting arms. This is even more important when there has been little opportunity to work out with the Units concerned.

In all operations involving co-operation between two or more arms the most liberal allowances in any timings should be made. Owing to a variety of factors that can effect their speed this is particularly important in regard to Army Tanks. In many cases the approach marches may be long, and bad going could seriously effect their time of arrival.

11. Reserves.

Lack of reserves was seriously felt on a number of occasions. Any det of Bde Gps from Div should be avoided whenever possible. The operations of NZ DIV Westwards toward TUBRUK were seriously hampered by the fact that only two Bdes were available throughout the operation. The 5 NZ BDE which was of necessity temporarily detached was never able to rejoin the Div.

12. HQs of Formations and Units.

When HQs are frequently on the move as was the case in these operations, considerable difficulty was experienced by convoys, signals and LOs in finding the exact location. Owing to the general featureless nature of the desert it was seldom possible to locate HQs close to easily defined spots. Much time and trouble could be saved especially with convoys if they first were directed to some clearly defined point where they would find definite instructions as to distance and bearing of the HQ concerned.

13. Layout.

Most formations adopted a set pattern for the layout of the whole of the vehicles in the HQ. The operations office was marked with a flag by day and a lamp by night. When this was located and the plan known it was easy to find any office required. Staff Officers of the formation were able to contact one another immediately the Column halted.

Bde CPs

A very effective CP for Bde HQ was mounted on a three ton lorry. This consisted of a four-sided tower, tapering from a base of 24" to approx 12" at the top. It was constructed of 5/8" round iron bar for the uprights and cross members with diagonal bracing of 3/8" round. This tower 12' long hinged to the top of the hood framework so that it could be carried horizontally on the move. The seat for the observer was fastened on top of the tower and would have been still further improved had this seat been able to swivel.

13. Defence of HQs

Under conditions as were experienced in the first phase of these operations HQs of Units and Formations continually found themselves liable to attack by enemy arm'd forces. The protection companies and platoons as at present constituted are inadequate to offer any serious defence. As a result HQs were forced to change their position on a number of occasions to avoid attack. This seriously interfered with the exercising of command. Failing adequate protection for Corps and Div HQ they should locate themselves in areas which are fully protected. The following was suggested as a scale for Corps HQ :-

2ty A.Tk, Two Two Tps Lt AA, One Tp Fd Arty, Two Carrier Pls
and in certain circumstances a Tp of Arm'd Cars.

Div HQ should be protected on a similar scale.

14. Enemy A.Tk Mines and Booby Traps

Once again these operations have demonstrated how necessary it is that the maximum number in every unit should have a comprehensive knowledge regarding the handling and disarming of enemy mines and booby traps. If this is not the case and units have to rely on engineer assistance in an advance, much valuable time will be lost. The answer to this problem appears to be that adequate supplies of all enemy mines and booby traps found during the course of operations must be returned to base for distribution to formations and schools for training purposes.

15. Recognition in the Desert.

Under desert conditions recognition of our own and enemy vehicles both arm'd and un-arm'd is extremely difficult. Diagrams and photographic illustrations while useful are hardly sufficient to make recognition effective. Training under desert conditions is essential and it would help considerably if examples of enemy transport and AFV were collected and used for this purpose.

16. Use of Motor Cycles in the Desert.

M/Cs as in the past proved completely useless in the desert. A scale of substitution by Bantam Cars had already been laid down prior to the commencement of these operations. This should be made 100% effective at the earliest opportunity. The Bantam Car proved itself to be ideal for the purpose. It is however very similar in appearance to a GERMAN Lt Car and a number were fired upon by our own troops.

?????????
Lt-Gen.
C.G.S.

SUBJECT :- Lessons from Operations - Cyrenaica No. 7

SECRET

CHQ MEF
CRME/9209/17/MT1

NINTH ARMY

Dec 41.

EMPLOYMENT OF MAG's

1. Differences in establishment

4 Indian Div retained the old support coy organisation while 70 Div and NZ Div each worked with a MG Bn.

Owing to the shortage of transport in TOBRUK the RNF attached to 70 Div were only able to make 2 coys fully mobile. As one coy was still required for the defence of the Western Perimeter, and the operations in the corridor were limited as to objectives, the Bn was able to work satisfactorily.

2. MAGs in Desert Formations

In the formation of bde gp, NZ Div allotted a MG coy to each Bde. The Bdes in turn allotted one Pl to each move at the head of the two leading Bns in desert /a formation. The third Pl moved immediately in front of Bde HQ and acted as/reserve. With this allotment it would be difficult to employ the coy as a whole, which is the ideal to be aimed at.

3. Preparation for offensive action.

Where MG Bns have been employed for a long time on the preparation and manning of defensive positions, it is necessary that they receive intensive tng prior to being used in offensive operations. This difficulty was overcome by the RNF in TOBRUK Garrison by withdrawing one coy at a time for tng in mobile operations.

4. Employment of Coys

The increased range afforded by the Mk VIIIIZ amn enables MAGs effectively to engage enemy Lt weapons, more especially if fire can be brought to bear from a flank. At these ranges it must be realised that the full fire effect can only be obtained if the whole of the guns of a Company are employed on the same task. With one Bn, coys were employed in this way with considerable success.

5. Co-operation with Army Tanks

During the operations in the TOBRUK Corridor MAGs co-operated with Army Tanks with considerable success. In the initial breakout from the Perimeter a coy of MAGs was sent immediately following the second wave of Army Tanks. It was found that in this type of country there was no difficulty in keeping up with the tanks. They were able to take full advantage of the dust created by the tank movement to get their guns into position without being observed by the enemy. Once established the guns were able to remain in these positions for the whole of the day and effectively dealt with a large number of targets.

6. Camouflage Nets

To obtain satisfactory observation it was necessary for MAGs to take up exposed positions on a number of occasions. By using sufficient camouflage nets to cover the gun. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 plus sufficient amn for use during daylight, two pla were able to remain in action all day. They were not detected by the enemy.

Although contrary to general teaching the grouping of No.3 close to the gun, enabling him to assist without giving the position away by moving backwards and forth b/w between the amn dump and the gun was successful. Nets as issued on the G 1098 scale are not sufficient to enable this to be done. Additional nets were obtained from the camouflage dump.

7. Harassing Fire - During the GERMAN withdrawal from the E. of TOBRUK MAGs were employed to harass enemy tps. To carry out this task effectively the guns were moved forward of the infantry positions.

(Srd) 22222 Col.

APPENDIX 'EE'

Set No. (1)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET & PERSONAL

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
31 Dec 41.
G.2203

WEEKLY STAFF CONFERENCES Nos 8 & 9 - 24 and 30 Dec 41.

1. Conference No 8 on 24 Dec was devoted to a talk by Lt-Col D.A. WHITEHEAD 2/2 MG Bn, on the recent ops in the WESTERN DESERT and CYRANAICA up to the establishment of the line TOBRUK-EL ADEI-BIR EL GOBI. Present :-

BGS	G2(o)	Asst to CSO
DA & QMG	G3(o)	Lt-Col STINSON
A/CSO	G3(1)	Maj SOUTHWELL (Corps Sigs)
DDST	G3 C	Capt SMITH
DDMS	LOs (2)	Capt LEWIS
ADOS	AQMG	Lieut HUTTON
CRE C Tps	COME	Lieut ROGERS
G2(o)	G2 Arty	

2. Conference No 9 on 30 Dec was devoted to a talk by Lt-Col J.D. ROGERS, Senior LO 1 Aust Corps, on ops in SYRANAICA from the attack on the GAZALA-ELKILI posns to the occupation of BENHAZI. Present:-

BGS	Maj MACINTOSH	2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshops
DA & QMG	Maj KERSHAW	Lt-Col MORAN
A/CSO	Maj BODEN	
DDST	Maj GIBSON	6 Aust Div -
DDMS	Capt SMITH	Brig STRUTT
ADOS	Capt LEWIS	Col BILKORTH
G2(o)	Capt CARTER	
G2(1)	Capt WATT	7 Aust Div -
G3(o)	Lieut HUTTON	Col DURANT
G3(1)	Lieut OGDEN	Lt-Col RISSON
G3(C)	Lieut ROGERS	Lt-Col CANNON
LOs (2)	Lieut MACLEOD	Lt-Col FOULKES
AQMG		Maj RODD
DAQMG	RAL 1 Aust Corps -	
SORE	Lt-Col MAIR	..IF HQ -
COME	Capt COLBATCH	Capt MCCARTNEY
Lt-Col HOBBS		
Lt-Col FINNEY	Sigs 1 Aust Corps -	4 Adv Grd Depot -
	Maj DAVIS	Col CANN
	Maj COUSIN	

R. R. B. B. B.

Maj GS.
Secretary.

DISTRIBUTION -

CCRA
CSO
GCC
BGS
G2(c) - 2
G2(1)
Comd 1 Aust A Fd Bde
SLO

DA & QMG
AQMG
CE
DDST
DDMS
ADOS
File - 2
War Diary - 2

APPENDIX 'FF'

Set No. (1)

1 AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

LOCATION STATEMENT

1. Herewith copy of Location Statement, 1 Aust Corps
and att tps (SYRIA) as at 2400 hrs 7 Dec 41.

2. ACK

DISTRIBUTION -

To - HQ 1 Aust Corps

Date Dec 41

..... (Rank)

..... (Unit)

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS.

as at 2400 hrs 7 Dec 41.

<u>HQ</u>	HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
	HQ 6 Aust Div	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
	HQ 7 Aust Div	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
<u>INT</u>	1 Aust Corps Int Sec	ALEY	
	6 Aust Div Int Sec	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
	7 Aust Div Int Sec	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
<u>FSS</u>	'A' Sec Aust FSS	LATAKIA	
	'B' Sec Aust FSS	ALEPPO	
	'C' Sec Aust FSS	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
	255 Sec FSS	ALEPPO	
	279 Sec FSS (less dets at HOMS and QATANA)	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
<u>AUST HQ GD BN</u>	Aust HQ Gd Bn -		
	HQ 'B' Coy and 8 Pl	BAALBEK	
	5 Pl	ADSAYA area	
	6 Pl	EL AINE	
	7 Pl	QATANA	
	HQ 'C' Coy and 10 Pl	TRIPOLI	16102776
	9 Pl	MAJLAYA	
	11 Pl	ALEPPO	
	12 Pl	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
	'E' Coy (less 19 & 20 Pls)	ALEY	13802070
	19 Pl)		
	20 Pl)	ALEY	13722085
<u>CAV</u>	6 Aust Div Cav Regt)		
	'C' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div)	LABQUE	
	39 Aust LAD)		
	7 Aust Div Cav Regt)		
	'C' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div)	ALEPPO AERODROME	
	50 Aust LAD)		
<u>ARTY</u>	HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
	Det HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	BAALBEK	
	HQ RAA 7 Aust Div	DEDE Area	15812722
	2/9 Aust A Fd Regt)		
	2/9 Aust A Fd Regt Sig Sec)	ALEPPO Aerodrome	
	68 Aust LAD)		
	HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt)		
	2/11 Aust A Fd Regt Sig Sec)	QATANA Area	18201725
	70 Aust LAD)		
	21 Bty)	QATANA Area	180172
	22 Bty)		
	61 Bty)	QATANA Area	179172
	HQ 2/1 Aust Svy Regt)		
	90 Aust LAD)	ABLAH Barracks	
	HQ 1 Bty & B Tp	ABLAH Barracks	
	HQ 2 Bty		16842684
	'A' Tp		17012758
	'E' Tp		15742603
	Adv 1 Aust A Tk Regt)		
	'H' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div)	ZABOUD	
	49 Aust LAD)		
	2 Aust A Tk Regt)		
	'H' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div)	ESARMA (Convent)	16172658
	54 Aust LAD)		
	HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Regt)		
	'E' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div)	JDAIDE Area	16622692
	51 Aust LAD)		

/ 2/4 Aust Fd Regt (cont)

<u>ARTY</u>	<u>2/4 Aust Fd Regt (contd)</u>		
(contd)	7 Fd Bty	JDAIDE Area	16592685
	8 Fd Bty	JDAIDE Area	16612692
	54 Fd Bty	JDAIDE Area	16642698
	HQ 2/5 Aust Fd Regt		
	'F' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div		
	52 Aust LAD	BSANNA Area	16082648
	9 Fd Bty		
	10 Fd Bty		
	35 Fd Bty		
	HQ 2/6 Aust Fd Regt		
	'G' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div		
	53 Aust LAD	JDAIDE Area	16572688
	11 Fd Bty		
	12 Fd Bty		
	56 Fd Bty		
<u>ENGRS</u>	HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
	HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	BALBEK, Gouraud Barracks	
	HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	Armenian Village	16172765
	71 CRE Works	ALEY	
	2/9 Aust A Fd Coy	ALEPPO Aerodrome	
	2/14 Aust A Fd Coy	QOUCEIR	
	2/15 Aust A Fd Coy (less det at TRIPOLI)	HOMS Area	
	2/16 Aust A Fd Coy	DJEDEIDE	
	2/1 Aust Fd Coy	DJEDEIDE Area	207258
	2/2 Aust Fd Coy		206257
	2/4 Aust Fd Coy	EL BEDAUI	
	2/5 Aust Fd Coy	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
	2/6 Aust Fd Coy (less 2 Sec)	KHMAILA	
	2 Sec	LATAKIA	
	2/8 Aust Fd Coy	DJEDEIDE	21082555
	22 Aust Fd Pk Coy		
	80 Aust LAD	RAYAK	
	23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy		
	65 Aust LAD		14852628
	25 Aust Fd Pk Coy		
	55 Aust LAD	ALMA Area	
	1 Aust Boring Sec (less dets)	NABLUS	
	Dets	ALEPPO Area	
	2 Aust Boring Sec	DJISR ECH CHOUGHOUR	
	1 Aust Corps Cam Tng Unit	ALMA	
<u>SVY</u>	2/1 Aust Corps Fd SvY Coy		
	(less det)	SOUK EL GHARB	
	Det	AZAZ	
<u>SIGS</u>	HQ Sigs 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
	HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div		
	42 Aust LAD	BALBEK, Gouraud Barracks	
	HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	TRIPOLI, Rue L'Eveque	16072777
	1 Coy		
	56 Aust LAD	DEDDE	
<u>INF</u>	HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde		
	'J' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div	QATANA	
	45 Aust LAD		
	HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde		
	'K' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div	ADSAYA Area	19531778
	46 Aust LAD		
	HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde		
	'J' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	ALEPPO	
	47 Aust LAD		
	HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde		
	'L' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div	EL AINE	
	179 Aust LAD		

<u>INF</u>	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde)		
(contd)	'K' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div)	MAJLAKA	
	59 Aust LAD)		
	HQ 23 Aust Inf Bde)		
	'L' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div)	TRIPOLI, Legault Barracks	
	44 Aust LAD)		
	2/1 Aust Inf Bn		QATANA Area	18321679
	2/2 Aust Inf Bn		QATANA Area	17961689
	2/3 Aust Inf Bn		QATANA Area	17641706
	2/4 Aust Inf Bn		EL AINE	
	2/5 Aust Inf Bn		DOUMMAR Area	19761776
	2/6 Aust Inf Bn (less 'A' Coy)		DIMAS Area	
	'A' Coy		BAALBEK	
	2/7 Aust Inf Bn (less dets			
	at ZEBEDANI)		ADSAYA Area	19421783
	2/8 Aust Inf Bn			20902524
	2/9 Aust Inf Bn (less 'B' Coy)		LATAKIA	
	'B' Coy		QASSAB	
	2/10 Aust Inf Bn (less 'B'			
	and 'D' Coys)		ALEPPO Aerodrome	
	'B' and 'D' Coys		IDLIB	
	2/11 Aust Inf Bn		DJEDEIDE	211255
	2/12 Aust Inf Bn -			
	HQ Coy & Bn HQ		ALEPPO	
	'A' Coy		DJERABLOUS	
	'B' Coy		AZAZ	
	'C' Coy		MEIDAN EKBES	
	'D' Coy		RADJOU	
	2/14 Aust Inf Bn		SRAR Area (HQ AT	16492746)
	2/16 Aust Inf Bn		SIR Area (HQ "	17812714)
	2/25 Aust Inf Bn		TRIPOLI, Caserne Bejat Ghanim	
	HQ 2/27 Aust Inf Bn			17332776
	HQ Coy		ARBE Area	16772750
	'A' Coy)		
	'B' Coy)	KAER AYA Area	173278
	'C' Coy)		
	'D' Coy)		
	2/31 Aust Inf Bn (less 'A'			
	'B' 'C' Coys)		MERIATA	16922753
	'A' Coy			16452766
	'B' Coy			16832799
	'C' Coy			17212773
	2/33 Aust Inf Bn (less B Coy)		TRIPOLI, Legault Barracks	
	'B' Coy			16982734
<u>MG</u>	2/3 Aust MG Bn (less 'A')			
	'B' 'D' Coys)		FIH	
	66 Aust LAD)		
	'A' Coy		BTERRAM	
	'B' Coy		BECH MEZZINE	
	'D' Coy		BELMARD Monastery	15552699
	Adv 2/1 Aust MG Bn)		
	43 Aust LAD)	ZABOUD	
<u>PNR</u>	2/2 Aust Pnr Bn (less 'A', 'B' & 'C' Coys)		QATANA Area	
	'A' Coy		RAS BAALBEK	
	'B' Coy		RAYAK	
	'C' Coy			178184
	HQ 64 Gp NTAAPC		BAALBEK	
	1971 Coy)		
	1972 Coy)	DJEDEIDE	
<u>ASC</u>	HQ AASC 6 Aust Div		BAALBEK, Gouraud Barracks	
	HQ AASC 7 Aust Div		TRIPOLI Area	16172765
	1 Sub-pk 1 Aust Corps Armn Pk		CHEUEIFAT Area	
	4 Sub-pk 1 Aust Corps Armn Pk		CHEKKA Area	
	(less one sec)		BAALBEK	
	One Sec			

ASC
(contd)

1 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy	QOUCEIR	
6 Aust Div Amn Coy	EL AINE	
7 Aust Div Amn Coy	TRIPOLI, Cartier Auger	
1 Aust Corps Pet Pk	BERAGINI	
7 Aust Div Pet Coy	DAHAR EL AIN Area	16152730
Det 1 Aust C Tps Sup Coln	BEIRUT T2 Camp	
6 Aust Div Sup Coln	QATANA Area	
7 Aust Div Sup Coln	ALEPPO, AZIZ Rd	
HQ 1 Aust AA Bde Coy AASC	BAALBEK	
1 Aust Lt AA Regt AASC Sec	BAALBEK	
(less dets)	LABOUE and ALEPPO	
Dets		
2 Aust Hy AA Regt AASC Sec	ALEPPO	
(less dets)		
Det 1 Aust DID	ALEPPO (near ry sta)	
2 Aust DID	BAALBEK	
3 Aust DID	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
1 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy	EL HAME	
4 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy	MAJLAYA Area	
6 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy	DJEDEIDE	
6 Ind Mule Coy RIASC	ABLAH Area	
10 Ind Mule Coy RIASC)		
12 Ind Mule Coy RIASC)		16522741
17 Ind Mule Coy RIASC	BAALBEK Area	
Sec 1 HT Coy RIASC	EL MINA	
Sec 1 HT Coy RASC	ALEPPO	

MEDICAL

2/1 Aust Fd Amb (less A Coy & det)	ZEEDANI	
A Coy	QATANA	
Det	ZAHLE	
HQ 2/2 Aust Fd Amb (less A & B Coys)	HOMS	
A Coy	RAS BAALBEK	
B Coy	BAALBEK	
2/4 Aust Fd Amb (less A Coy)	TRIPOLI, Italian Hospital	
A Coy	BTERRAM Area	15852653
2/5 Aust Fd Amb	ALEPPO, Italian Hospital	
2/6 Aust Fd Amb (less A Coy)	ACHACHE	17042753
A Coy	Hosp Legoult	
2/13 Aust Fd Amb)	DHOUR CHOUER	14802190
1 Aust Corps Rest Sta)		
2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBEK	
2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	CHEKKA Area	15022660
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	EL GRAVE	14512072
2/1 Aust CCS	Mental Hosp	133213
2/3 Aust CCS	BEIRUT, Italian School	
14 Aust Special Hosp	BEIRUT, New Hotel	
1 Aust MAC - HQ, C & D Secs	AIN SOFAR	
'A' Sec)	Dets ALEPPO, BEYROUTH	
'B' Sec)	and DAMASCUS	
4 Aust Adv Depot Medical Stores	BEIRUT	
1 Aust Mob Bact Lab	BEIRUT Italian School	
2 Malaria Fd Lab	AIN SOFAR	
1 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit)	CHEKKA Area	15022660
2 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit)		
11 Anti-Malaria Control Unit	QOUCEIR	
7 Aust Dental Unit	BECH MEZZINE	
9 Aust Dental Unit	LATANIA	
10 Aust Dental Unit	BAALBEK	
11 Aust Dental Unit	QATANA	

ORD

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop		
(less three rec secs)		
4 Rec Sec	ABLAH	
5 Rec Sec	MEZZE	
2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less		
three rec secs)		
7 Rec Sec	BEIRUT T2 Camp	
8 Rec Sec	APA Area	16472765
9 Rec Sec	ALEPPO, Varnieres Barracks	

ORD
(contd)

1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -	ABJAH
1 Corps Sec	BEIRUT. . T2 Camp
3 Corps Sec	MEZZE
'A' Div Sec	ALEPPO, Varnieres Barracks
'B' Div Sec	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks
'C' Div Sec	BEIRUT. . T2 Camp
3 Replacement Veh Sec	BEIRUT. . T2 Camp
1 Aust L of C Rec Sec	BEIRUT. . T2 Camp
7 Sub-sec 3 adv Amn Depot AROC	ALEPPO

PAY

1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	ALEY
6 Aust Fd Cash Office	BAALBEK
7 Aust Fd Cash Office	TRIPOLI, Italian School

VET

1 Cav Mob Vet Sec	ABJAH
4 Cav Mob Vet Sec	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks

PRO

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less two Secs)	ALEY	
Two Secs	BEIRUT	
6 Aust Div Pro Coy (less dets at DAMASCUS and ZAHLE)	BAALBEK	
7 Aust Div Pro Coy (less det at ALEPPO)	TRIPOLI, Prevote	16122774

POSTAL

1 Aust Corps Postal	BEIRUT. . Rue du Liban
6 Aust Div Postal	BAALBEK
7 Aust Div Postal	TRIPOLI, Italian School

MISCELLANEOUS

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl	ALEY	
6 Aust Div Emp Pl	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
7 Aust Div Emp Pl	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
1 Aust Corps Salvage (less Dets)	BEIRUT	13052180
6 Aust Div Salvage	BAALBEK	
7 Aust Div Salvage	TRIPOLI	16352771
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	BAABDA Area	13152110
6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	ABJAH Barracks	
7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp		15252710
7 Aust Div Mob Bath	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
19 Mob Bath	QATANA	
7 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
1 Aust Corps Graves Registration & Enquiries Unit (less det)	DAMASCUS	
Det	BAABDA Area	
1 MH and Infm Sec	ALEY	
2 MH and Infm Sec	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
3 MH and Infm Sec	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
1 Aust Corps Ski School	THE CEDARS	

APPX 'A' to Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 7 Dec 41.
Units NOT under Comd 1 Aust Corps but either in Corps area, or
NOT in Corps Area, of interest to 1 Aust Corps.

Unit	Location	Under Comd
HQ 10 Corps	DAMASCUS, ORIENT PALACE Hotel	Ninth Army
HQ 1 Aust AA Bde	BEIRUT	" "
TRIPOLI Fire Comd -		
A/M Bty Coast Regt RA)	EL BEDAOU	" "
B/M Bty Coast Regt RA)		
Det one bty 14 Coast Regt RA	EL MINA 15922790	" "
HQ 116 Lt AA Bty (less one tp)	TRIPOLI 15922790	1 Aust AA Bde
One tp	BEIRUT	" " "
4 Aust Hy AA Bty)		
1 Aust AA Bde Sig Sec)	TRIPOLI 16172783	" " "
Det 57 Lt AA Regt Sig Sec)		
Det 1 Aust Lt AA Regt	TRIPOLI	" " "
1 Aust Lt AA Regt Wkshop Sec	TRIPOLI 16322784	" " "
HQ 2 Aust Hy AA Regt)		
6 Aust Hy AA Bty)	BEIRUT	" " "
2 Aust Hy AA Regt Sig Sec)		
2 Aust Hy AA Regt Wkshop Sec)		
D Tp 2 Bty 1 Aust Svy Regt	21603155	10 Corps
HQ RAE 9 Aust Div	DEIR AACHAIR	" "
2/3 Aust Fd Coy	BAB EL QALAA 176173	" "
2/13 Aust Fd Coy	DEIR AACHAIR	" "
24 Aust Fd Pk Coy	QATANA Area	" "
660 General Construction Coy		
RE (less one sec)	ALEPPO Aerodrome	Ninth Army
290 A Tps Coy RE	BROUHANA	" "
567 A Tps Coy RE	DAMASCUS Area	10 Corps
CRE No 7 Aerodromes	ALEPPO, Old American College, Rue de Baghdad	E-in-C GHQ (MEF)
138 Mech Eqpt Coy -		
8 Sec	HAMA	Under control CRE
9 Sec	ALEPPO Aerodrome	No 7 Aerodromes
2 Sec 18 Bomb Disposal Coy RE	BEIRUT	84 Base Area
Sigs 10 Corps	BEUDANE 167198	10 Corps
A Coy 2/17 Bn, 9 Aust Div	BROUHANA	Ninth Army
1 Aust Ry Svy Coy (less 2 & 3 Secs)	JOUNIEH	GHQ (MEF)
2 Sec	BATROUN	" "
3 Sec	BEIRUT	" " "
1 Pl A Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	BEIRUT	84 Base Area
HQ 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk)		
2 & 3 Sub-pk)	DAMASCUS	85 Base Area
15 DID	RAYAK	Ninth Army
Det 4 Bulk Pet Storage Coy	DAMASCUS	" "
224 Pet Depot RASC	ALEPPO	" "
8 Ind Mule Coy	BEIRUT	84 Base Area
3 Vet Eosp	BEIRUT	Ninth Army
1 Fd Remount Depot	BEIRUT	" "
Remount Depot	ALEPPO	" "
HQ 3 Adv Amn Depot	TALIA	" "
Det	ALEPPO	" "
Det Aust Base Amn Depot	TALIA	" "
1 Aust Ord Amn Coy	TALIA	" "
2 Secs 205 Pro Coy	BROUHANA	" "
1 AIF Stationery Depot	Rear Spears' Mission Building BEIRUT	

APPX 'B' to Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 7 Dec 41

O of B and Location Statement of

FREE FRENCH FORCES, LEVANT

as on 1 Dec 41.

1. UNITS NOT ATTACHED TO DIVISION

HQ Group for D.L.	BEIRUT
No 53 HQ Company	BEIRUT
Engineers (Survey Section)	BEIRUT
Signals Coy	DAMASCUS

Reconnaissance Groups	DAMASCUS
Tank Coy	DAMASCUS
23rd North-African Coy	DAMASCUS
Field Park Coy	BEIRUT
Engineer Field Coy (Pontoons)(in formation)	BEIRUT

11. 1st Light Division

Div HQ and No 51 HQ Coy	ALEPPO
21st North African Coy	HOMS
1st Artillery Group	HOMS
101st MT Coy	HOMS
1st Engineer Coy	HOMS
No 1 Signal Platoon	ALEPPO
1st Fusiliers-Marins Coy	TRIPOLI and CHEIKKA
1st Brigade HQ	HOMS
2nd Battalion Foreign Legion	ALEPPO
3rd Battalion Foreign Legion	HOMS
B.M.7	HAMA
2nd Brigade HQ	(-BANIAS
Bataillon du Pacifique	(ALEPPO -LATAKIA
No 2 Senegalese Battalion (B.M.2)(-T. RTOUSS and ROUAD
(Location later)	

111. 2nd Light Division

No 2 Signal Platoon	DAMASCUS
Div HQ and No 52 HQ Coy	DAMASCUS
22nd North-African Coy	HOMS
2nd Artillery Group	DAMASCUS
2nd Engineer Coy	BEIRUT
102nd MT Coy	DAMASCUS
2nd Coy Fusiliers-Marins	BEIRUT
3rd Brigade HQ	BEIRUT
Marine Battalion (B.I.M.)	BEIRUT
No 1 Senegalese Battalion (B.M.I.)	BEIRUT
No X1 Senegalese Battalion (B.M.X1)	BEIRUT
4th Brigade HQ	DAMASCUS
1st Battalion Legion Etrangers	DAMASCUS
No 3 Senegalese Battalion (B.M.3)	SOUEIDA

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

S E C R E T

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
16 Dec 41.
G.2041

LOCATION STATEMENT
1 Aust Corps and att tps (SYRIA)

Amendment No 1

1. Ref 1 Aust Corps G.1952 of 8 Dec 41 herewith amendments to 2400 hrs 15 Dec 41.
2. ACK.

HHBouryman Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION -

As for G.1952 - plus 1 Aust AA Bde 1
Snr Rep HEYWOOD C/o 2/3 CCS 1

3 Adv Ord Depot 3 copies NOT 4
After 4 Adv Ord Depot delete "C/c ROO
BEIRUT"

1. LOCATION STATEMENT

Arty

- (a) Amend "Det HQ RAA 6 Aust Div" to read
"HQ RAA 6 Aust Div"
- (b) Amend "HQ 2 Bty" to read
"HQ 2 Bty, E & D Tps TRIPOLI Area 16842684"
Delete "E Tp" and detail.
- (c) Amend "Adv 1 Aust A Tk Regt" to read
"1 Aust A Tk Regt"

Inf

- (a) Amend "HQ 23 Aust Inf Bde" to read
"HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde"
- (b) 2/6 Aust Inf Bn - Amend "A Coy" to read "B" Coy.

MG

Delete all ref to "Adv 2/1 Aust MG Bn" and "48 Aust LAD"
and substitute "2/1 Aust MG Bn (less one coy)) LABOUE
48 Aust LAD)

Pnr

After "1972 Coy NTAAPC" add -
"1974 Coy NTAAPC)
1975 Coy NTAAPC) RAS BAALBEK."

ASC

- (a) Alter location of "1 Sub-pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk"
to "T4 BEIRUT."
- (b) After "1 Aust Corps Pet Pk" insert
"6 Aust Div Pet Coy . DIKAS."

ASC (contd)

- (c) Alter location of "1 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy" to
"ADSAYA area 19531778."

Medical

- (a) Alter location of "7 Aust Dental Unit" to
"TRIPOLI - Legoult Bks."
- (b) Delete "10 Aust Dental Unit" and detail and
substitute "10 Aust Spec Dental Unit ADSAYA area
19421783."
- (c) After "1 Aust Mob Bact Lab"
add "3 Aust Mob Bact Lab ZEBEDANI."

Ord

- Delete "7 Sub-sec 3 adv Amn Depot AAO" and detail
and substitute "8 Sub-sec 3 Adv Amn Depot AAO ALMA."

Miscellaneous

After "1 Aust Corps Ski School" insert
"1 Aust Corps Pd Pun Centre T2 Camp BEIRUT."

2. APPENDIX 'A'

- (a) Delete "D Tp 2 Bty 1 Aust Svy Regt" and detail, and
substitute "F Tp 2 Bty 1 Aust Svy Regt MEZZE Bks
(under comd) 10 Corps."
- (b) Alter location of "HQ RAE 9 Aust Div" to "MEZZE."
- (c) After "1 Aust Ord Amn Coy" add
"4 ACD. BEIRUT MEDAWAR House Rue DAMAS (under comd)
Pal Base."
- (d) After "A Coy 2/17 Bn, 9 Aust Div"
add "One Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn DAMASCUS (under comd)
10 Corps."

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps
28 Dec 41.
G.2179

LOCATION STATEMENT

1 Aust Corps and att Tps (SYRIA)

1. Herewith ^{copy} of Location Statement, 1 Aust Corps and
copies att tps (SYRIA) as at 2400 hrs 27 Dec 41.
All copies of previous 1 Aust Corps Location Statements should
be destroyed on receipt of this statement.

2. ACK

R. W. N. Smith Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION -

6 Aust Div	6	OC 268 Sec, FS Wing, Int	
7 Aust Div	6	Corps BEIRUT	1
CCRA	1	3 Replacement Veh Sec	1
CHE 1 Aust C Tps	1	HQ Aust Base Amn Depot (TALIA)	1
CSO	1	2 Aust Adv Ord Depot	1
GOC	1	3 Adv Ord Depot	3
BGS	1	4 Adv Ord Depot	1
G	1	ROO DAMASCUS	1
I	2	6 Aust Div Postal	1
L	1	AIF Paymaster (SYRIA)	1
Q	5	1 AIF Stationery Depot BEIRUT	1
LOs	2	HQ Ninth Army	2
CE	1	HQ 10 Corps	2
DDST	3	HQ AIF (IE)	3
DDMS	1	HQ AIF (IE) Base Area	2
ADIS (Dental)	1	AIF (IE) Reinf Depot	2
DAD Hye	1	O 2 E AIF (IE)	1
ADOS	2	1 Aust L. Bde	1
DADOS	1	HQ Spears Mission BEIRUT	3
APR	1	Aust LO GHQ (IEF)	1
DADPS	2	CHE No 7 Aerodromes	1
Sigs 1 Aust Corps	1	Royal Sigs, HAIFA	1
Sig Office	2	Nov & Tn SYRIA Sub Area	1
2/3 Aust Fd Hvy Sec	1	Movement Control BEIRUT	1
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	1	Movement Control TRIPOLI	1
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	1	Movement Control HAIFA	1
1 Aust Corps Fd Pun Centre		RTO RAMAK	1
(at T2 Camp BEIRUT)	1	RTO HOMS	1
1 Aust Corps Pro Coy	1	RTO ALEPPO	1
1 Aust Corps Salvage	1	HAIFA Fortress Area	1
1 MEI and Infr Sec	1	Army Post Office HAIFA	1
AIF (IE) Base Area Sigs	2	Maj Curtis - C/o ACF, BEIRUT	1
Sirings Offr 1 Aust Corps	1	Snr Rep HEYWOOD C/o 2/1 Aust CCSl	
		War Diary	2
		File	6

To - HQ 1 Aust Corps

RECEIVED ^{copy}
copies 1 Aust Corps and att Tps Location Statement
as at 2400 hrs 27 Dec 41.

Date Dec 41.
Jan 42

.....(Rank)

.....(Unit)

SECRET

LOCATION STATEMENT

1 AUST CORPS AND ATT TPS

as at 2400 hrs 27 Dec 41

<u>HQ</u>	HQ 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
	HQ 6 Aust Div	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
	HQ 7 Aust Div	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
<u>INT</u>	1 Aust Corps Int Sec	ALEY	
	6 Aust Div Int Sec	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
	7 Aust Div Int Sec	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
<u>FSS</u>	'A' Sec Aust FSS (less det at ALEY)	LATAKIA	
	'B' Sec Aust FSS	ALEPPO	
	'C' Sec Aust FSS	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
	255 Sec FSS	ALEPPO	
	279 Sec FSS (less dets at HOMS and QATANA)	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
<u>AUST</u>	Aust HQ Gd Bn -		
<u>HQ GD BN</u>	HQ 'B' Coy and 8 Pl	BAALBEK	
	5 Pl	ADSAYA Area	
	6 Pl	EL AINE	
	7 Pl	QATANA	
	HQ 'C' Coy and 10 Pl	TRIPOLI	16102776
	9 Pl	MAJLAYA	
	11 Pl	ALEPPO	
	12 Pl	TRIPOLI, Legault Barracks	
	'E' Coy (less 19 & 20 Pls)	ALEY	13802070
	19 Pl	ALEY	13722085
	20 Pl		
<u>CAV</u>	3 Aust Div Cav Regt		
	'C' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div	LABOUE	
	39 Aust LAD		
	7 Aust Div Cav Regt		
	'C' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	ALEPPO	
	50 Aust LAD		
<u>ARTY</u>	HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	ALEY	
	HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	BAALBEK	
	HQ RAA 7 Aust Div	LEDDE Area	15812722
	2/9 Aust A Fd Regt		
	2/9 Aust A Fd Regt Sig Sec	ALEPPO Aerodrome	
	68 Aust LAD		
	HQ 2/11 Aust A Fd Regt		
	2/11 Aust A Fd Regt Sig Sec	QATANA Area	
	70 Aust LAD		
	21 Bty	QATANA Area	180172
	22 Bty	QATANA Area	179172
	61 Bty		
	HQ 1 Aust Svy Regt		
	90 Aust LAD	ABLAH Barracks	
	1 Bty (less one tp)	ABLAH Barracks	
	2 Bty (less F Sp tp)	KARIAB SAHRA Area	16842684
	F Sp Tp	EL AYOUNI Area	17012758
	1 Aust A Tk Regt		
	'H' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div	ZABBOUD	
	49 Aust LAD		
	2 Aust A Tk Regt		
	'H' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	BSARMA (Convent)	
	54 Aust LAD		
	HQ 2/4 Aust Fd Regt		
	'E' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	JDAIDE Area	1622692
	51 Aust LAD		
	7 Fd Bty		
	8 Fd Bty		
	54 Fd Bty		

HQ 2/5 Aust Fd Regt	}	BSARMA Area	1C082648
'F' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div			
52 Aust LAD			
9 Fd Bty			
10 Fd Bty			
55 Fd Bty	}	JDAIDE Area	16572C88
HQ 2/6 Aust Fd Regt			
'G' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div			
53 Aust LAD			
11 Fd Bty			
12 Fd Bty	}		
56 Fd Bty			
<u>ENGRS</u> HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps	}	ALEY BAALBEK, Gouraud Barracks Armenian Village ALEY ALEPPO Aerodrome QOUCEIK HOMS Area DJEDEIDE DJEDEIDE Area EL BEDACUI TRIPOLI, Logoult Barracks MERIATA DJEDEIDE RAYAK ALMA Area NABLUS ALEPPO Aerodrome DJISR ECH CHOUGHOUR ALMA SOUK EL GHARB AZAZ ALEY BAALBEK, Gouraud Barracks TRIPOLI, Rue L'Eveque DEDDE QATANA ADSAYA Area ALEPPO EL AINE	
HQ RAE 6 Aust Div			
HQ RAE 7 Aust Div			
71 CRE Works			
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy			
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy			
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy (less det at TRIPOLI)			
2/16 Aust A Fd Coy			
2/1 Aust Fd Coy			
2/2 Aust Fd Coy			
2/4 Aust Fd Coy			
2/5 Aust Fd Coy			
2/6 Aust Fd Coy (less 2 Sec)			
2 Sec			
2/3 Aust Fd Coy			
22 Aust Fd Pk Coy) 80 Aust LAD)			
23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy) 65 Aust LAD)			
25 Aust Fd Pk Coy) 55 Aust LAD)			
1 Aust Boring Sec (less dets) Dets			
2 Aust Boring Sec			
1 Aust Corps Cam Tng Unit			
<u>SVY</u> 2/1 Aust Corps Fd Svy Coy (less det) Det			
<u>SIGS</u> HQ Sigs 1 Aust Corps			
HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div) 42 Aust LAD)			
HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div) 1 Coy) 56 Aust LAD)			
<u>INF</u> HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde) 'J' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div) 45 Aust LAD)			
HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde) 'K' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div) 46 Aust LAD)			
HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde) 'J' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div) 47 Aust LAD)			
HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde) 'L' Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div) 79 Aust LAD)			

<u>INF</u>	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde)		
(Contd)	'K' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div)	MAJLAYA	
	59 Aust LAD)		
	HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde)		
	'L' Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div)	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
	44 Aust LAD)		
	2/1 Aust Inf Bn	QATANA Area	18321679
	2/2 Aust Inf Bn	QATANA Area	17951689
	2/3 Aust Inf Bn	QATANA Area	17641706
	2/4 Aust Inf Bn	EL AINE Area	
	2/5 Aust Inf Bn	DOUMMAR Area	19761776
	2/6 Aust Inf Bn (less B Coy)	JEBEL MAZAR Area	17931829
	'B' Coy	BAALBEK	
	2/7 Aust Inf Bn (less dets at ZEBEDANI)	ADSAYA Area	19421783
	2/8 Aust Inf Bn	EL AINE Area	20942524
	2/9 Aust Inf Bn (less B Coy)	LATAKIA	
	'B' Coy	QASSAB	
	2/10 Aust Inf Bn (less B and D Coys)	ALEPPO	
	B and D Coys	IDLIB	
	2/11 Aust Inf Bn	DJEDEIDE	
	HQ 2/12 Aust Inf Bn)	ALEPPO Aerodrome	
	HQ Coy)		
	A Coy	DJERABLOUS	
	B Coy	AZAZ	
	C Coy	ERIHA Area	23054287
	D Coy	RADJOU	
	2/14 Aust Inf Bn	SRAR Area	(HQ at 16492746)
	2/16 Aust Inf Bn	EL AYOUN Area	(HQ at 17812714)
	2/25 Aust Inf Bn	TRIPOLI, Caserne Bejat Ghanim	
	HQ 2/27 Aust Inf Bn		17332776
	HQ Coy	ARBE Area	16772750
	A Coy)		
	B Coy)		
	C Coy)	KAFR AYA Area	
	D Coy)		
	2/31 Aust Inf Bn (less A, B, C, D Coys)	MERIATA	16922753
	A Coy		13452766
	B Coy		16832799
	C Coy (less 14 pl at KLEIAT aerodrome)		17212778
	D Coy	EL MINA	
	2/33 Aust Inf Bn (less B Coy)	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
	B Coy		16982784
<u>MG</u>	2/1 Aust MG Bn (less B Coy)	LABOUE	
	48 Aust LAD)		
	2/3 Aust MG Bn (less A, B and D Coys)	FIH	
	66 Aust LAD)		
	A Coy	BTERRAM	
	B Coy	BECH MEZZINE	
	D Coy	BELMANE Monastery	
<u>PNR</u>	HQ 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	BAALBEK	
	HQ and C Coys	QATANA	
	A Coy	RAS BAALBEK	
	B Coy	RAYAK	
	D Coy	JEBEL MAZAR Area	178164
	HQ 64 Gp NTAPC	BAALBEK	
	1971 Coy)		
	1972 Coy)	DJEDEIDE	
	1974 Coy)		
	1975 Coy)	RAS BAALBEK	

<u>ASC</u>	HQ AASC 6 Aust Div	BAALBEK, Gouraud Barracks	
	HQ AASC 7 Aust Div	TRIPOLI Area	16172765
	1 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk	T4 BEIRUT	
	4 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk	CHEKKA Area	
	1 Aust Corps Tps Amn Coy	QOUCEIR	
	6 Aust Div Amn Coy	EL AINE	
	7 Aust Div Amn Coy	TRIPOLI, Quartier Auger	
	1 Aust Corps Pet Pk (less det)	BERAGINI	
	6 Aust Div Pet Coy	LIMAS	
	7 Aust Div Pet Coy	DAHAR EL AIN Area	16152730
	Det 1 Aust C Tps Sup Coln	BEIRUT T2 Camp	
	6 Aust Div Sup Coln	QATANA Area	
	7 Aust Div Sup Coln	ALEPPO, AZAZ Rd	
	HQ 1 Aust AA Bde Coy AASC	BAALBEK	
	1 Aust Lt AA Regt AASC Sec		
	(less dets)	BAALBEK	
	Dets	LABOUE and ALEPPO	
	2 Aust Hy AA Regt AASC Sec		
	(less dets)	ALEPPO	
	Det 1 Aust DID	ZGHORTA	
	2 Aust DID	BAALBEK	
	3 Aust DID	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
	1 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy	ADSAYA Area	
	4 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy	MAJLAY Area	
	6 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy	DJEDEIDE	
	6 Ind Mule Coy RIASC	ABLAH Area	
	6 Ind Mule Coy RIASC	BEIRUT, moving to ZGHORTA	
	10 Ind Mule Coy RIASC)		16522741
	12 Ind Mule Coy RIASC)		
	17 Ind Mule Coy RIASC	BAALBEK Area	
	Sec 1 HT Coy RASC	EL MINA	
	Sec 1 HT Coy RASC	ALEPPO	

MEDICAL

2/1 Aust Fd Amb (less A Coy and det)	ZEBEDANI	
A Coy	QATANA	
Det	ZAHLE	
HQ 2/2 Aust Fd Amb	HOMS	
A Coy	RAS BAALBEK	
B Coy	BAALBEK	
2/4 Aust Fd Amb (less A Coy)	TRIPOLI, Italian Hospital	
A Coy	BTERRAM Area	15852653
2/5 Aust Fd Amb	ALEPPO, Italian Hospital	
2/6 Aust Fd Amb (less B Coy)	Hosp Legoult, TRIPOLI	
B Coy	ACHACHE	
2/13 Aust Fd Amb)		
(1 Aust Corps Rest Sta))	DHOOR CHOUER	
2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	BAALBEK	
2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	CHEKKA Area	15022660
2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec	EL QRAYE	14512072
2/1 Aust CCS	Mental Hosp	133213
2/5 Aust CCS	BEIRUT, Italian School	
14 Aust Special Hosp	BHANDOUT, New Hotel	
1 Aust MAC - HQ, C & D Secs	AIN SOFAR	
A Sec)	Dets ALEPPO, BEIRUT	
B Sec)	and DAMASCUS	
4 Aust Adv Depot Medical Stores	BEIRUT	
1 Aust Mob Bact Lab	BEIRUT, Italian School	
3 Aust Mob Bact Lab	BAALBEK	
2 Malaria Fd Lab	AIN SOFAR	
1 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit)		
2 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit)	CHEKKA Area	15022660
11 Anti-Malaria Control Unit	QOUCEIR	
7 Aust Dental Unit	LEGOULT Barracks, TRIPOLI	
9 Aust Dental Unit	L TAKIA	
10 Aust Dental Unit	ADSAYA Area	19421783
11 Aust Dental Unit	QATANA	

<u>ORD</u>	2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less two rec secs)	ABLAH MAAQNE MEZZE	
	4 Rec Sec		
	5 Rec Sec		
	2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop (less three rec secs)	BEIRUT T2 Camp ABA Area	
	7 Rec Sec		
	6 Rec Sec		16472765
	9 Rec Sec	ALEPPO, Varnieres Barracks	
	1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -		
	1 Corps Sec	ABLAH	
	3 Corps Sec	BEIRUT T2 Camp	
	A Div Sec	MEZZE	
	B Div Sec	ALEPPO	
	C Div Sec	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
	3 Replacement Veh Sec	BEIRUT T2 Camp	
	1 Aust L of C Rec Sec	BEIRUT T2 Camp	
	8 Sub Sec 3 Adv Amn Depot	ALMA	
<u>PAY</u>	1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	ALEY	
	6 Aust Fd Cash Office (less det at DAMASCUS)	BAALBEK	
	7 Aust Fd Cash Office	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
<u>VET</u>	1 Cav Mob Vet Sec	ABLAH	
	4 Cav Mob Vet Sec	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
<u>PRO</u>	1 Aust Corps Pro Coy (less two Secs)	ALEY BEIRUT	
	Two Secs		
	6 Aust Div Pro Coy (less dets at DAMASCUS and ZAHLE)	BAALBEK	
	7 Aust Div Pro Coy (less det at ALEPPO Aerodrome)	TRIPOLI, Prevote	
<u>POSTAL</u>	1 Aust Corps Postal	BEIRUT, Rue du Liban	
	6 Aust Div Postal	BAALBEK	
	7 Aust Div Postal	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>			
	1 Aust Corps Emp Pl	ALEY	
	6 Aust Div Emp Pl	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
	7 Aust Div Emp Pl	TRIPOLI, Italian School	
	1 Aust Corps Salvage (less dets)	BEIRUT	13052180
	6 Aust Div Salvage	BAALBEK	
	7 Aust Div Salvage	TRIPOLI	16352771
	1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	BAALBEK Area	13152110
	6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	ABLAH Barracks	
	7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp		15252710
	7 Aust Div Mob Bath	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
	19 Mob Bath	QATANA	
	7 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwa Decn Unit	TRIPOLI, Legoult Barracks	
	1 Aust Graves Registration & Enquiry Unit (less det)	DAMASCUS	
	Det	BAALBEK Area	
	1 MH and Infm Sec	ALEY	
	2 MH and Infm Sec	BAALBEK, Wavell Barracks	
	3 MH and Infm Sec	TRIPOLI, Italian School	

APPX 'A' to Location Statement as at 2400 hrs 27 Dec 41. Units NOT under comd 1 Aust Corps but either in Corps area, or NOT in Corps Area, of interest to 1 Aust Corps.

Unit	Location	Under Comd
HQ 10 Corps	DAMASCUS, ORIENT PALACE Hotel	Ninth Army
HQ 1 Aust AA Bde	BHANDOUN	" "
TRIPOLI Fire Comd		
A/M Bty Coast Regt RA)	EL BEDAOUI	" "
B/M Bty Coast Regt RA)		
Det one bty 14 Coast Regt RA	EL MINA 15922790	" "
116 Lt AA Bty (less one tp)	TRIPOLI 15922790	84 Base Sub Area
One tp	BEIRUT	" " " "
4 Aust Hy AA Bty)	TRIPOLI 16172783	" " " "
1 Aust AA Bde Sig Sec)		
1 Aust Lt AA Regt Wkshop Sec	TRIPOLI 16322784	" " " "
HQ 2 Aust Hy AA Regt		
6 Aust Hy AA Bty	BEIRUT	" " " "
2 Aust Hy AA Regt Sig Sec		
2 Aust Hy AA Regt Wkshop Sec)		
oneTp 1 Bty 1 Aust Svy Regt	MEZZE Barracks	10 Corps
HQ RAE 9 Aust Div	MEZZE	" "
2/3 Aust Fd Coy	BAB EL QALAA	" "
2/13 Aust Fd Coy	DEIR AACHAIR	" "
24 Aust Fd Pk Coy	QATANA Area	" "
660 General Construction Coy RE		
(less one sec)	ALEPPO Aerodrome	Ninth Army
567 A Tps Coy RE	DAMASCUS Area	10 Corps
CRE No 7 Aerodromes	ALEPPO, Old American College, Rue de Baghdad	E-in-C GHQ (MEF)
138 Mech Eqpt Coy		
8 Sec	HAMA)	Under control CRE
9 Sec	DJERAH)	No 7 Aerodromes
2 Sec 18 Bomb Disposal Coy RE	BEIRUT	84 Base Sub Area
Sigs 10 Corps	BLOUDANE	10 Corps
A Coy 2/17 Aust Inf Bn	BROUMANA	Ninth Army
One Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn	DAMASCUS	10 Corps
1 Aust Ry Svy Coy (less 2 & 3 Secs)	MAAMELTEINE	GHQ (MEF)
2 Sec	CHEKKA	" "
3 Sec	BEIRUT	" "
HQ Aust Ry Construction & Maintenance	Gp BEIRUT Area	" "
1 Pl A Coy Aust HQ Gd Bn	BEIRUT	84 Base Sub Area
HQ 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk)		
2 and 3 Sub Pks)	DAMASCUS	85 " " "
15 DID	RAYAK	Ninth Army
224 Pet Depot RASC	ALEPPO	" "
1973 Coy NTAAPC	RAYAK and MAJDALOUN	" "
3 Vet Hosp	BEIRUT	" "
1 Fd Remount Depot	BEIRUT	" "
Remount Depot	ALEPPO	" "
HQ 3 Adv Amn Depot incl)	TALIA	" "
Det Aust Base Amn Depot)		
1 Aust Ord Amn Coy	TALIA	" "
4 AOD	BEIRUT	Pal Base & L of C
3 Aust Ord Wkshop Coy (2 AOW)	BEIRUT	GHQ (MEF)
2 Secs 205 Pro Coy	BROUMANA	Ninth Army
1 AIF Stationery Depot	Rear Spears' Mission Building BEIRUT	

PLACE NAMES AND CO-ORDINATES - SYRIA

28 Dec 41

(To be att tc 1 Aust Corps Location Statements)

Ref Maps SYRIA 1/200,000 series
PALESTINE 1/100,000 "

AAMCHITE	143246	DJERABLOUS	350542
ABA	160267	DHOUR CHOUER	148219
ABLAH	172214	DIMAS	183183
ABRINE	148257	DJEBLE	170360
ACHACHE	169275	DJEIDEH	135217
ADSAYA	195173	DJEDEIDE	211255
APRINE	256507	DJENOUDIE	204438
AIN SOFAR	147207	DJISR ECH CHOUGHOUR	207429
AJELTON	146225	DJOUNIEH	141227
ALEPPO	283473	DOUMA	161252
ALEPPO Aerodrome	287470	DOUMAR	212181
ALEY	138208	DOUMMAR	198178
ALMA	166276		
AMIOUNE	157262	EHDEN	173262
ARBAIN	165277	EL AYOUN	170276
ARBE	168275	EL BEDACUI	165279
AZAZ	273515	EL AINE	211253
AZGA	175277	EL HAME	195180
AZMARINE	214457	EL HAMMAN	233492
		EL KALMOUNE	150273
BAABDA	133211	EL MINA	159279
BAALBEK	195229	EL QRA'E	145208
BAALBEK Wavell Barracks	194228	ENFEH	151268
BAB	315491	ERIHA	233429
BAB EL QALAA	176173		
BACHNINE	133267	FIH	156267
BANIAS	172360		
BATROUNE	144258	HABACHETE	181281
ECHAIRE	177236	HAFPE	179406
BDEBBA	159267	HALBA	183289
BEENINE	175284	HALBATA	203257
BECH MEZZINE	157265	HAMA	245353
BNIB LARA	175276	HAMATE	148261
BLIRUT	129213	HAMIDIYE	171303
BEIRUT Quartier Granger	126216	HAMMANA	151209
BEIT ED DINE	136195	HARIN	225473
BEIT HERRI	138214	HASBAYA	149215
BELLANB	155270	HASROUN	174255
BERAGINI	132212		
BHAMOUN	143207	HASSIE	245274
BHANNES	145218	HAZINIYE	178274
BIKFAYA	145220	HELIL	172273
BLOUDANE	137193	HERMEL	212272
BROUMANA	141216	HIJJANE	225157
BSARMA	161266	HOMS	242309
BTERRAM	156266		
		IDLIB	235442
CHATE	197244	IPC Area	165200
CHENKA	152265		
CHMISTAR	177225	JAIROUD	243207
CHOUEIPAT	130203	JAMHOUR	134211
		JDAIDE	165258
DADKHINE	209436	JDEIDE 172190, 192181,	215271
DAHER EL AIN	164273	JERAIL	143243
DALASCUS	203175		
DAMOUR	124200	KAFR AYA	173278
DARAIYA	197133	KAFR HATA	166271
DARAYAN	147224	KAREBACHE	136272
DAR BECHTAR	157259	KARIAB SARRA	139269
DEDE	157272	KATMA	234516
DEIR ATIYE	246239	KAFR HABOU	172275
DEIR AACHAIR	176130	KAFR AKKA	161263
DEIR ANAR	167279	KAFR HATTA	153261
DEIR QANOUN	137135	KAFR HAZIR	155264
DERKOUCHE	214449	KHALDE	127203
DERRIYE	206450	KHAISSA	328511
DJERAH	351460	KHMAILA	168275

KISWE	197157	TALIA	185221
KIZLAKHER	217303	TARTOUSS	165328
KLEIAT aerodrome	176294	TOROSSE	180426
KOUSBA	162262	TRIPOLI	162278
LABOUE	208250	TRIPOLI, LEGOULT Barracks	163277
LABOUE Sta	205251	TRIPOLI, ITALIAN School	161277
LATAKIA	157397		
LES CEDRES	181256	YAAFOUR	161176
MAZRAA DEIR AACHAIR	175182	ZABBOUD	205255
MAAMELTEINE	143230	ZAHLE	166212
MAAQUE	195237	ZAKROUNE	153268
MAAREH	286504	ZEBEDANI	184198
MAJDALOUN	188228	ZEFTA	119163
MAJLAYA	164275	ZGHORTA	166274
MEARRET ED DABSE	248425		
MENBIDJ	355508		
MERIATA	170276		
MERKEBLA	173279		
MEZZE	199174		
MIYE OU MIYE	118179		
MJEIDE	153264		
MAHRIYE	250214		
NEBEK	243230		
PALMYRA	305289		
QARA	244245		
QARAQA	159274		
QARYATEIN	290253		
QASSAB	177442		
QATANA	183166		
QENAYE	206442		
QNEITRA	118173		
QOUCEIR	229285		
QTAIFE	231199		
QUNEITRA	P 227281		
RACHAYA EL OUADI	160174		
RADJOU	238524		
RAMDIYE	215454		
RANLIEH	168275		
RAS BAALBEK	214257		
RAS BAALBEK Sta	215262		
RAS EL AIN	180177		
RAS EL METEN	144212		
RATANE	243331		
RAYAK	175214		
REYFOUN	148227		
RHAZIR	144232		
SALA	150257		
SARIMADA	243470		
SERAYA	174426		
SIR	179272		
SOUK EL GHARB	135206		
SRAR	175275		

APPENDIX 'GG'

Set No. (1)

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps
7 Dec 41.
G. 1953

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUSTCORPS & ATT TFS (SYRIA)

1. Herewith ^{copy} ~~copies~~ of 0 of 3, 1 Aust Corps and att tps (SYRIA)
All issues of previous 1 Aust Corps Os of B should be destroyed
on receipt of this document.
2. ACK.

CMR/Chief of Staff for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION -

6 Aust Div	⑤	ADOS	1
7 Aust Div	⑤	DADOS	1
CCRA	1	APM	1
CRE 1 Aust C Tps	1	DADPS	1
CSO	1	1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	1
COO	①	Sigs 1 Aust Corps	1
①	①	HQ Ninth Army	②
I	1	HQ 10 Corps	③
A	1	HQ AIF (ML)	③
Q	3	HQ AIF (ME) Base Area	③
CE	1	O2E AIF (ME)	①
DDST	1	AIF (ML) Reinft Depot	①
DDMS	1	Aust LO GHQ (MEF)	③
		War Diary	2
		File	5

To HQ 1 Aust Corps

Received ^{copy} of 0 of 3 1 Aust Corps and att tps
as at 7 Dec 41. ^{copies}

Date Dec 41,

(Rank)

(Unit)

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 Aust Corps and Att Tps (SYRIA)

7 Dec 41.

1 Aust Corps

(a) Formations

HQ 6 Aust Div
16 Aust Inf Bde
17 Aust Inf Bde
19 Aust Inf Bde

HQ 7 Aust Div
18 Aust Inf Bde
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde

(b) Corps Tps

HQ Units HQ 1 Aust Corps
1 Aust Corps Int Sec
'A' Sec Aust FSS

Aust HQ Gd Bn -

'B' Coy

(under comd 6 Aust Div)

'C' Coy

(under comd 7 Aust Div)

'D' Coy

Arty

HQ RA 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust A Fd Regt)
68 LAD)
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt)
70 LAD)

(under comd 7 Aust Div)

(under comd 6 Aust Div)

HQ 2/1 Aust Svy Regt
90 Aust LAD
1 Bty
2 Bty less D Tp

(under comd 6 Aust Div)

(Under comd 7 Aust Div)

Engrs

HQ RA 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy
2/16 Aust A Fd Coy

(under comd 7 Aust Div)

(under comd 6 Aust Div)

23 Aust Corps Fd Fk Coy.

65 Aust LAD

1 Aust Boring Sec

2 Aust Boring Sec

71 CRE Works

(from MEF)

1 Aust Corps Cam Tng Unit.

Svy

2/1 Aust Corps Fd Svy Coy

Sigs

Sigs 1 Aust Corps
(less dets)

Fnr

2/2 Aust Fnr Bn

(under comd 6 Aust Div)

ASC Det 1 Aust Corps Tps Sup Coin
 1 Aust C Tps Amn Coy
 1 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk
 4 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk (under comd 7 Aust Div)
 1 Aust Corps Pet Pk
 det 1 Aust DID
 2 Aust DID
 3 Aust DID
 HQ 1 Aust Am Bde Coy RASC
 1 Aust Lt Am Regt RASC Sec (less det) (under comd 6 Aust Div)
 det 1 Aust Lt Am Regt RASC Sec
 2 Aust Hy Am Regt RASC Sec (less dets)
 Sec HT Coy RASC

Medical 2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
 2/13 Aust Fd Amb
 2/1 Aust CCS
 2/3 Aust CCS
 14 Aust Special Hosp (from Base & L of C Units)
 1 Aust LAC
 2 Malaria Fd Lab (from MEF)
 1 Aust Mob Bact Lab
 4 Aust Adv Depot Medical Stores (from Base & L of C Units)
 1 Aust Corps Rest Sta

Ord 2/2 Aust Am Fd Wkshop (less 6 Aust Rec Sec)
 2/3 Aust Am Fd Wkshop
 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -
 1 Corps Sec
 3 Corps Sec
 A Div Sec
 B Div Sec
 C Div Sec
 3 Replacement Veh Sec
 1 Aust L of C Rec Sec (from Base & L of C Units)
 1 Sup Sec 3 Adv Amn Dep RASC

Fay 1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office
 6 Aust Fd Cash Office (under comd 6 Aust Div)
 7 Aust Fd Cash Office (under comd 7 Aust Div)

Pro 1 Aust Corps Pro Coy

Postal 1 Aust Corps Postal

Miscellaneous

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl
 1 Aust Corps Salvage
 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp
 1 Aust Corps Graves Registration
 & Enquiries Unit
 1 ME and Infm Sec (from MIF (ME) tps)
 1 Aust Corps Ski School

6 Aust Div

(a) Formations 16 Aust Inf Bde
 17 Aust Inf Bde
 19 Aust Inf Bde

(b) Div Tps
Hq Units

HQ 6 Aust Div
6 Aust Div Int Sec
'B' Sec Aust FSS (under comd 7 Aust Div)
279 Sec FSS (from MEF)

Aust Hq Gd Bn -
'B' Coy (from C Tps)

Cav

6 Aust Div Cav Regt
39 Aust LAD

Arty

det HQ Rm 6 Aust Div
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt) (from C Tps)
70 Aust LAD)

2/1 Aust Svy Regt -
1 Bty (from C Tps)
Adv 1 Aust A Tk Regt
49 Aust LAD

Lngrs

HQ Rm 6 Aust Div
2/16 Aust A Fd Coy (from C Tps)
2/1 Aust Fd Coy
2/2 Aust Fd Coy
2/8 Aust Fd Coy
22 Aust Fd Pk Coy
80 Aust LAD

Sigs

Sigs 6 Aust Div
(less 2 Coy)
42 Aust LAD

MG

Adv 2/1 Aust MG Bn
48 Aust LAD

Enr

2/2 Aust Enr Bn (from C Tps)
HQ 64 Gp NTAPC)
1971 Coy) (from MEF)
1972 Coy)

ASC

HQ ASC 6 Aust Div
1 Aust Lt AA Regt ASC Sec (less det) (from C Tps)
6 Aust Div Amn Coy
6 Aust Div Sup Coln
1 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy (from MEF : under comd
17 Aust Inf Bde)
6 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy (from MEF : under comd
19 Aust Inf Bde)
6 Ind Mule Coy) (from MEF)
17 Ind Mule Coy)

Medical

2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
2/1 Aust Fd amb
2/2 Aust Fd Amb
10 Aust Dental Unit - (from Base & L of C Units)
11 Aust Dental Unit (from MEF)
11 Anti-Malaria Control Unit

Pay

6 Aust Fd Cash Office (from C Tps)

Vet 1 Cav Mob Vet Sec

Fro 6 Aust Div Pro Coy

Postal 6 Aust Div Postal

Miscellaneous

6 Aust Div Emp Fl
6 Aust Div Salvage
6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp
2 MH and Infm Sec (from AIF (ME) tps)
19 Mob Bath Unit (from MEF)

16 Aust Inf Bde

HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
45 Aust LAD
2/1 Aust Inf Bn
2/2 Aust Inf Bn
2/3 Aust Inf Bn

17 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde
46 Aust LAD
2/5 Aust Inf Bn
2/6 Aust Inf Bn
2/7 Aust Inf Bn
1 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy (from MEF)

19 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde
79 Aust LAD
2/4 Aust Inf Bn
2/8 Aust Inf Bn
2/11 Aust Inf Bn
6 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy (from MEF)

7 Aust Div

(a) Formations 18 Aust Inf Bde
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde

(b) Div Tps

HQ Units HQ 7 Aust Div
7 Aust Div Int Sec
'B' Sec Aust FSS (from 6 Aust Div : under comd 18 Aust Inf Bde)
'C' Sec Aust FSS
255 Sec FSS (from MEF : under comd 18 Aust Inf Bde)
Aust HQ Gd Bn -
'C' Coy (from C Tps)

Cav 7 Aust Div Cav Regt)
50 Aust LAD) (under comd 18 Aust Inf Bde)

Arty

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div
 2/9 Aust & Fd Regt) (from C Tps : under comd
 68 Aust LAD) 18 Aust Inf Bde)
 2/1 Aust Svy Regt -
 2 Bty (less D tp) (from C Tps)
 2/4 Aust Fd Regt
 51 Aust LAD
 2/5 Aust Fd Regt
 52 Aust LAD
 2/6 Aust Fd Regt
 53 Aust LAD
 2 Aust & Tk Regt
 54 Aust LAD

Engrs

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div
 2/9 Aust & Fd Coy (from C Tps : in support
 18 Aust Inf Bde)
 2/4 Aust Fd Coy
 2/5 Aust Fd Coy (in support 25 Aust Inf Bde)
 2/6 Aust Fd Coy
 25 Aust Fd Pk Coy
 55 Aust LAD

Sigs

Sigs 7 Aust Div
 56 Aust LAD

MG

2/3 Aust MG Bn
 66 Aust LAD

ASC

HQ AASC 7 Aust Div
 4 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Amn Pk (less sec) (from C Tps)
 7 Aust Div Amn Coy
 7 Aust Div Pet Coy
 7 Aust Div Sup Ccln (under comd 18 Aust Inf
 Bde)
 4 Cyriot Pack Tpt Coy)
 10 Ind Mule Coy) (from MEF)
 12 Ind Mule Coy)

Two Secs 1 HT Coy RASC (from MEF; under comd
 18 Aust Inf Bde)

Medical

2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
 2/4 Aust Fd Amb
 2/5 Aust Fd Amb (under comd 18 Aust Inf Bde)
 2/6 Aust Fd Amb
 1 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit)
 2 Aust Anti-Malaria Control Unit) (from Base & L of C Tps)
 7 Aust Dental Unit)
 9 Aust Dental Unit)

Pay

7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office (from C Tps)

Vet

4 Cav Mob Vet Sec (from MEF)

Fro

7 Aust Div Pro Coy (det under comd 18 Aust
 Inf Bde)

Postal

7 Aust Div Postal

Miscellaneous

7 Aust Div Emp Pl
 7 Aust Div Salvage
 7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp
 7 Aust Div Mob Bath
 7 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd
 Decn Unit
 3 LH and Infm Sec (from AIF (ME) Tps)

18 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde
 47 Aust LAD
 'B' Sec Aust FSS (from 6 Aust Div)
 255 Sec FSS (from MEF)
 7 Aust Div Cav Regt
 50 Aust LAD
 2/9 Aust & Fd Regt
 68 Aust LAD (from C Tps)
 2/9 Aust Inf Bn
 2/10 Aust Inf Bn
 2/12 Aust Inf Bn
 7 Aust Div Sup Coln
 2/5 Aust Fd Amb
 det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy
 Two Secs 1 HT Coy RASC (from MEF)

21 Aust Inf Bde

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde
 59 Aust LAD
 2/14 Aust Inf Bn
 2/16 Aust Inf Bn
 2/27 Aust Inf Bn

25 Aust Inf Bde

HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde
 44 Aust LAD
 2/25 Aust Inf Bn
 2/31 Aust Inf Bn
 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
16 Dec 41.
G.2046

ORDER OF BATTLE
1 Aust Corps & att tps (SYRIA)

Amendment No 1

1. Ref 1 Aust Corps G.1953 of 7 Dec 41 herewith amendments.
2. ACK.

W. H. Bergman Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION - As for G.1953

1. 1 AUST CORPS

ASC

Delete "Sec HT Coy RASC" and
add "Two Secs HT Coy RASC (under cmd 7 Aust Div)"

Medical

After "1 Aust Mob Bact Lab"
add "3 Aust Mob Bact Lab"

Ord

Amend "1 Sup Sec 3 Adv Amn Dep AAOC" to read
"8 Sup Sec 3 Adv Amn Dep AAOC"

Miscellaneous

After "1 Aust Corps Ski School"
add "1 Aust Corps Fd Pun Centre"

2. 6 AUST DIV

Arty

Amend "Adv 1 Aust A Tk Regt" to read
"1 Aust A Tk Regt"

MG

Amend "Adv 2/1 Aust MG Bn" to read
"2/1 Aust MG Bn"

Pnr

After "1972 Coy NTAAPC"
add "1974 Coy NTAAPC)
1975 Coy NTAAPC) (from MEF)."

ASC

After "1 Aust Lt AA Regt AASC Sec (less det) "
add "6 Aust Div Pet Coy"

Medical

Amend "10 Aust Dental Unit"
to read "10 Aust Special Dental Unit"

3. 7 AUST DIV

ASC

Amend note following "Two Secs 1 HT Coy RASC"
to read "(from MEF; one under cmd 18 Aust Inf
Bde)."

18 Aust Inf Bde Gp

Amend "Two Secs 1 HT Coy RASC" to read
"One Sec 1 HT Coy RASC"

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps.
28 Dec 41.
G.2181

ORDER OF BATTLE

1 AUST CORPS & ATT TPS (SYRIA)

1. Herewith ^{copy}
(SYRIA). ^{copies} of O of B, 1 Aust Corps and att tps

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2. ACK.

R M A Nourse Maj
for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION -

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7 Aust Div	5	DADOS	1
CCRA	1	APM	1
CKE 1 Aust C Tps	1	DADPS	1
CSO	1	1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	1
GOC	1	Sigs 1 Aust Corps	1
G	1	HQ Ninth Army	2
I	1	HQ 10 Corps	2
A	1	HQ AIF (ME)	3
Q	3	HQ AIF (ME) Base Area	2
CE	1	O2E AIF (ME)	1
DDST	1	AIF (ME) Reinft Depot	1
DDMS	1	Aust LO GHQ (MEF)	1
		War Diary	2
		File	5

To HQ 1 Aust Corps.

Received ^{copy}
as at 28 Dec 41. ^{copies} of O of B 1 Aust Corps and att tps

(Rank)
.....
(Unit)
.....
Date Dec 41
Jan 42

ORDER OF BATTLE

SECRET

1 Aust Corps and Att Tps (SYRIA)

28 Dec 41.

1 Aust Corps

(a) Formations

HQ 6 Aust Div
16 Aust Inf Bde
17 Aust Inf Bde
19 Aust Inf Bde

HQ 7 Aust Div
18 Aust Inf Bde
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde

(b) Corps Tps

HQ Units

HQ 1 Aust Corps
1 Aust Corps Int Sec
'A' Sec Aust FSS (under comd 7 Aust Div)

Aust HQ Gd Bn -

'E' Coy

(from AIF (ME) tps)

Arty

HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust A Fd Regt) (under comd 7 Aust Div
68 Aust LAD)
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt) (under comd 6 Aust Div
70 Aust LAD)
HQ 1 Aust Svy Regt
90 Aust LAD
1 Bty (less one tp) (under comd 6 Aust Div)
2 Bty (under comd 7 Aust Div)

Engrs

HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy (under comd 7 Aust Div)
2/14 Aust A Fd Coy
2/15 Aust A Fd Coy
2/16 Aust A Fd Coy (under comd 6 Aust Div)
23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy
65 Aust LAD
1 Aust Boring Sec
2 Aust Boring Sec
71 CRE Works (from MEF)
1 Aust Corps Cam Tng Unit

Svy

2/1 Aust Corps Fd Svy Coy

Sigs

Sigs 1 Aust Corps
(less dets)

Pnr

2/2 Aust Pnr Bn (under comd 6 Aust Div)

ASC

Det 1 Aust Corps Tps Sup Ccln
1 Aust C Tps Amn Coy
1 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Tps Amn Pk
4 Sub Pk 1 Aust Corps Tps Amn Pk
1 Aust Corps Tps Pet Pk (less det)
det 1 Aust DID
2 Aust DID
3 Aust DID
HQ 1 Aust AA Bde Coy AASC
1 Aust Lt AA Regt AASC Sec
2 Aust Hy AA Regt AASC Sec (less dets)
One sec 1 HT Coy RASC (from MEF)

Medical

2/3 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
 2/13 Aust Fd Amb
 2/1 Aust CCS
 2/3 Aust CCS
 14 Aust Special Hosp
 1 Aust MAC
 2 Malaria Fd Lab
 1 Aust Mob Bact Lab
 3 Aust Mob Bact Lab
 4 Aust Adv Depot Medical Stores

(from AIF (ME) tps)
 (from MEF)
 (from AIF (ME) tps)

Ord

2/2 Aust A Fd Wkshop
 2/3 Aust A Fd Wkshop
 1 Aust Ord Fd Pk -
 1 Corps Sec
 3 Corps Sec
 A Div Sec
 B Div Sec
 C Div Sec
 3 Replacement Veh Sec
 1 Aust L of C Rec Sec
 3 Sub Sec 3 Adv Amn Depot

(from Base & L of C Units)
 (from MEF)

Pay

1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office

Pro

1 Aust Corps Pro Coy

Postal

1 Aust Corps Postal

Miscellaneous

1 Aust Corps Emp Pl
 1 Aust Corps Salvage
 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp
 1 Aust Graves Registration & Enquiry Unit
 1 MH and Infrm Sec

(from Base & L of C units)
 (from AIF (ME) tps)
 (from AIF (ME) tps)

6 Aust Div

(a) Formations

10 Aust Inf Bde
17 Aust Inf Bde
19 Aust Inf Bde

(b) Div Tps

HQ Units

HQ 6 Aust Div
6 Aust Div Int Sec
'B' Sec Aust FSS (under comd 7 Aust Div)
279 Sec FSS (from MEF)

Aust HQ Gd Bn -
'B' Coy (from AIF (ME) tps)

Cav

C Aust Div Cav Regt
39 Aust LAD

Arty

HQ RAA 6 Aust Div
2/11 Aust A Fd Regt (from C Tps)
70 Aust LAD

1 Aust Svy Regt -
1 Bty (less one tp) (from C Tps)
1 Aust A Tk Regt
49 Aust LAD

Engrs

HQ RAE 6 Aust Div
2/10 Aust A Fd Coy (from C Tps)
2/1 Aust Fd Coy
2/2 Aust Fd Coy
2/8 Aust Fd Coy
22 Aust Fd Pk Coy
80 Aust LAD

Sigs

Sigs 6 Aust Div (less 2 Coy)
42 Aust LAD

MG

2/1 Aust MG Bn (less one coy)
48 Aust LAD

Pnr

2/2 Aust Pnr Bn (from C Tps)
HQ 64 Gp NTAPC)
1971 Coy)
1972 Coy (from MEF)
1974 Coy)
1975 Coy)

ASC

HQ AASC 6 Aust Div
6 Aust Div Sup Coln
6 Aust Div Amn Coy
6 Aust Div Pet Coy
1 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy (from MEF : under comd
17 Aust Inf Bde)
6 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy (from MEF : under comd
19 Aust Inf Bde)
6 Ind Mule Coy)
17 Ind Mule Coy) (from MEF)

Medical

2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
2/1 Aust Fd Amb
2/2 Aust Fd Amb
10 Aust Dental Unit
11 Aust Dental Unit (from AIF (ME) tps)
11 Anti-Malaria Control Unit (from MEF)

<u>Pay</u>	C Aust Fd Cash Office	
<u>Vet</u>	1 Cav Mob Vet Sec	
<u>Pro</u>	C Aust Div Pro Coy	
<u>Postal</u>	6 Aust Div Postal	
<u>Miscellaneous</u>	6 Aust Div Emp Pl	
	6 Aust Div Salvage	
	6 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	(from Base & L of C Units)
	2 MH and Infm Sec	(from AIF (ME) tps)
	19 Mob Bath Unit	(from MEF)
<u>16 Aust Inf Bde</u>	HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	
	45 Aust LAD	
	2/1 Aust Inf Bn	
	2/2 Aust Inf Bn	
	2/3 Aust Inf Bn	
<u>17 Aust Inf Bde Gp</u>	HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	
	46 Aust LAL	
	2/5 Aust Inf Bn	
	2/6 Aust Inf Bn	
	2/7 Aust Inf Bn	
	1 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy	(from MEF)
<u>19 Aust Inf Bde Gp</u>	HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	
	79 Aust LAD	
	2/4 Aust Inf Bn	
	2/8 Aust Inf Bn	
	2/11 Aust Inf Bn	
	6 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy	(from MEF)

Aust Div

(a) Formations

18 Aust Inf Bde
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde

(b) Div Tps
HQ Units

HQ 7 Aust Div
7 Aust Div Int Sec
'A' Sec Aust FSS
'B' Sec Aust FSS
'C' Sec Aust FSS
255 Sec FSS
Aust HQ Gd Bn -
'C' Coy

(from C Tps)
(from 6 Aust Div: under
comd 18 Aust Inf Bde)
(from MEF: under comd
18 Aust Inf Bde)
(from AIF, (ME) tps)

Cav

7 Aust Div Cav Regt)
50 Aust LAD)

(under comd 18 Aust
Inf Bde)

Arty

HQ RAA 7 Aust Div
2/9 Aust A Fd Regt)
68 Aust LAD)

(from C Tps: under
comd 18 Aust Inf Bde)

1 Aust Svy Regt -
2 Bty
2/4 Aust Fd Regt
51 Aust LAD
2/5 Aust Fd Regt
52 Aust LAD
2/6 Aust Fd Regt
53 Aust LAD
2 Aust A Tk Regt
54 Aust LAD

(from C Tps)

Engrs

HQ RAE 7 Aust Div
2/9 Aust A Fd Coy
2/4 Aust Fd Coy
2/5 Aust Fd Coy
2/6 Aust Fd Coy
25 Aust Fd Pk Coy
55 Aust LAD

(from C Tps: in support
18 Aust Inf Bde
(in support 25 Aust Inf Bde)

Sigs

Sigs 7 Aust Div
56 Aust LAD

MG

2/3 Aust MG Bn
66 Aust LAD

ASC

HQ AASC 7 Aust Div
7 Aust Div Sup Coln

(under comd 18 Aust
Inf Bde)

7 Aust Div Amn Coy
7 Aust Div Pet Coy
4 Cypriot Pack Tpt Coy)
8 Ind Mule Coy)
10 Ind Mule Coy)
12 Ind Mule Coy)
One Sec 1 HT Coy RASC)

(from MEF)

Medical

2/2 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
2/4 Aust Fu Amb
2/5 Aust Fd Amb
2/6 Aust Fd Amb

(under comd 18 Aust Inf
Bde)

Medical (contd) 1 Aust Anti-Malaria)
Control Unit)
2 Aust Anti-Malaria) (from AIF (ME) Cps)
Control Unit)
7 Aust Dental Unit)
9 Aust Dental Unit)

Pay 7 Aust Fd Cash Office
Vet 4 Cav Mob Vet Sec (from MEF)
Pro 7 Aust Div Pro Coy (det under comd 18
Aust Inf Bde)

Postal 7 Aust Div Postal

Miscellaneous 7 Aust Div Emp Pl
7 Aust Div Salvage
7 Aust Div Sec Recention (from Base & L of C
Camp Units)
7 Aust Div Mob Bath
7 Aust Div Mob Laundry & Fwd
Dech Unit
3 MH and Infm Sec (from AIF (ME) Tps)

18 Aust Inf Bde Gp

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde
47 Aust LAD
1B1 Sec Aust FSS (from C Aust Div)
255 Sec FSS (from MEF)
7 Aust Div Cav Regt
50 Aust LAD
2/9 Aust A Fd Regt)
68 Aust LAD) from C Tps
2/9 Aust Inf Bn
2/10 Aust Inf Bn
2/12 Aust Inf Bn
7 Aust Div Sup Coln
2/5 Aust Fd Amb
det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy

21 Aust Inf Bde

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde
59 Aust LAD
2/14 Aust Inf Bn
2/16 Aust Inf Bn
2/27 Aust Inf Bn

25 Aust Inf Bde

HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde
44 Aust LAD
2/25 Aust Inf Bn
2/31 Aust Inf Bn
2/33 Aust Inf Bn