

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/2/24

24 Infantry Brigade

July 1942

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Vol. 1. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Month and Year Jul 42

- 1 -
WAR DIARY

or
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Unit HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde

Commanding Officer

Army F

169
act
- 5. NOV. 1942

Place.	Date	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
	1		<p>Bde Gp road party left bivouac area on East Bank of SUEZ CANAL opposite ISMAILIA at 0500 hrs, and proceeded via CAIRO to ALEXANDRIA area. Bde HQ established 2250 hrs at 49249288 (ref ALEXANDRIA 1:100,000).</p> <p>In the meantime Tac Bde HQ, having received Div verbal order for occupation of defences to cover approaches to ALEXANDRIA, departed MENA at 0130 hrs for AMIRIYA. Their journey via DESERT ROAD took 9 hours instead of normal 3 hrs, due to packed convoys moving almost head to tail in each direction. This rd was an excellent bombing target for the enemy at dawn.</p> <p>1000 hrs - Bde R Gp commenced recce of defensive area, Bde's intention being to hold the west sector of 9 Aust Div. defences with 2/43 Bn right, 2/32 Bn left and 2/28 Bn in DIKEILA LINE. The DIKEILA LINE is a very strong posn constructed by the Poles to cover the isthmus north of LAKE MARYUT on the outskirts of ALEXANDRIA. The construction of the posn had commenced late in 1940 and defences were in an advanced stage. They were, however, constructed for at least a Bde Group. At this stage a mixed force grouped under a Col McBANE was placed under comd and this was disposed in the right sector of the DIKEILA LINE and for anti-paratroop tasks on the western approaches to ALEXANDRIA. The force included:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Remnants HQ 150 Bde" RNF (MG Bn)Commandos (200)A. & S.H. (180)R.M. (70)R.N. (30)Czech Army (120)Base personnel.	

1622/PMEA/1-500,000-9/41

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Month and Year...Jul...42.....

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit...HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde

Commanding Officer.....

Place.	Date	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
	1	(contd)	<p>These formed a most enthusiastic group, armed with many types of our own and enemy weapons, incl four 4 in guns and two 6 in guns manned by R.M. personnel.</p> <p>Some of these guns required re siting, as they had been placed prior to our arrival, to fire point-blank down the ALEXANDRIA - MATRUH rd., and with field of fire 100 yds.</p> <p>Rail partys arrived during afternoon and were ferried to posns and commenced work on defences.</p> <p>Main Bde HQ and road party commenced to arrive 2250 hrs.</p> <p>Bde warned to remain mobile despite primary defensive role, and W.E. scale of equipment and amn commenced to arrive during day for distribution.</p>	
	2		<p>Ry line just south of us bombed during the night 1/2 Jul despite lack of moon. MG straffing from a passing bomber at 0530 hrs caused us first casualties in this campaign - 1 killed and 3 wounded</p> <p>Troops were occupied during day in preparing defences. FDLs extended from approx 48909286 to 49049277 to northern edge of MALLAHET MARYUT at 49129262. (Plans for the defence of ALEXANDRIA included the flooding of the MALLAHET MARYUT). To cover the occupation of these FDLs each fwd line established an outpost of one Coy approx 1000 yds fwd of the line just mentioned.</p> <p>Defence of this area had been planned by a S.A. Div and an A Tk ditch covering the front from the sea to MALLAHET MARYUT had been commenced. This ditch had been completed from the coast to MATRUH rd and on the left flank for some 300 yds north from MALLAHET MARYUT, but otherwise was in elementary stage of construction.</p>	

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Commanding Officer.....

Place.	Date	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
	2	(Contd)	<p>A rear A Tk ditch some 1000 yds east of the main ditch was completed and water-filled from the coast to MATRUH rd.</p> <p>Re-planning of the defences was necessary as they had been initially planned for a larger formation and bns organised on a 5 coy basis.</p> <p>0700 At conference of Bde HQ offr BM gave information as to situation and explained role of Bde. Object was to hold the western approaches to ALEXANDRIA.</p> <p>(Appx 1 - 9 Div O.O.No.1) (Appx 2 - Marked Map ALEXANDRIA 1:100000 showing line of FDLs)</p>	
	3 Jul		<p>0945 hrs - Following warning order from 9 Aust Div received earlier in morning, Bde comd issued verbal warning order for fwd move of Bde as a mobile battle gp. Handiness of the formation to be increased by dropping off one bn and as many other sub units as possible. Some units that trained with the Bde at FORGLOSS came under comd during the day and the battle gp was formed as follows:-</p> <p>HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde K Sec, 9 Div Sigs One Sec 2 Pl HQ Gd Bn 76 L.A.D. 2/32 Bn 2/43 Bn 2/8 Fd Regt and 64 L.A.D. 11 Bty 3 A/Tk Regt, (8 x 6 pdr; 8 x 2 pdr) One Sec 2/7 Fd Coy D Coy 2/2 MG Bn 345 Gen Tpt Coy, R.A.S.C. (Tp carrying)</p>	

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Month and Year Jul 42

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Place.	Date	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
	3	(contd)	<p>12 Bty, 4 Lt A.A. Regt. 101 Gen Tpt Coy, (Composite for 2nd line sup.) HQ one coy, and a Mob Sec, 2/3 Fd Amb.</p>	
			<p>LOB personnel remained with 2/28 Bn in DIKEILA LINE and 2/7 Fd Coy (less one sec), 9 Bty 3 A/Tk Regt, C Coy 2/2 MG Bn and one coy (less one Mob Sec) 2/3 Fd Amb reverted to Div control.</p> <p>Arms and equipment continue to come in until late at night, but Bde remained 80 percent strong in tpt, 10 percent strong in A/Tk rifles and 90 percent in LMGs. However, 2/32 Bn, for instance, were still carrying some weapons and amm captured in TOBRUK.</p> <p>9 Div O.O. Order No.2 received during late evening, placing 24 Aust Inf Bde under comd 30 Corps on 4 Jul.</p>	
	3	-29	<p>A Report on operations 24 Aust Inf Bde 3 - 29 Jul 42 is attached as Appx 3. This may be read as the main text of the war diary for the period, and below will be given items supplementary to the contents of Appx 3, and attached as Appendices are a number of original documents, copies of which are included in appx 3.</p>	
	4		<p>Appx 4 - 9 Div O.O. No.2 Appx 5 - 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No.2. Appx 6 - 30 Corps O.O.No.57 Appx 7 - 30 Corps O.O.No.58</p>	
	6		<p>Advice received from 9 Aust Div that Main HQ 9 Aust Div would move fwd 7 Jul. A number of units, incl 2/28 Bn with under comd LOB personnel from 2/32 Bn and 2/43 Bn, would remain to form AUST RES GP (comd COL H WRIGLEY M.C.) under comd 10 Corps</p> <p>Appx 8 - 9 Div Message O 246.</p>	
			1622/PMEA/1-500,000-9/41.	24

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Month and Year Jul 42

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Place.	Date	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
	6	(contd)	Appx 9 - 24 Aust Inf Bde Op. Instn No.1.	
X	7	1200	24 Aust Inf Bde reverted to comd 9 Aust Div. Appx 10 - Raiding Party Night 7/8 Jul - Extract of orders 2/43 Aust Inf Bn. Appx 11 - Report by Comd 2/43 Aust Inf Bn on Raid night 7/8 Jul. Appx 12 - Report by Comd 4 Sec 2/7 Fd Coy on Raid night 7/8 Jul. Appx 13 - 30 Corps Message O 180.	
	8		Appx 14 - Message O 102 - Warning order for move to coastal sector.	
	14		Appx 15 - Message O 108 - Warning order for move to ALAM EL HALFA.	
	16		Appx 16 - 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 3. Appx 17 - 24 Aust Inf Bde Adm Order No. 4.	
	17		T/Capt J.L. HALLIFAX, Bde T.O., was killed in action today. Capt HALLIFAX was a most energetic officer, whose active and good - natured disposition was well-known throughout the Bde. For a long period, since Bde was in TOBRUK, Capt HALLIFAX had acted as Camp Commandant and his hard work in this capacity had benefited all ranks of Bde HQ. Capt HALLIFAX was forward at the time he was killed; while fwd attending to tpt matters, he came upon a group of soldiers whose offr had become a casualty. Capt HALLIFAX immediately set about reorganising them, and while engaged in this was killed by shellfire.	

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WAR DIARY

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Month and Year Jul 42

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Commanding Officer

Place.	Date	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
	17	(contd)	<p>On the same day Lieut A.D. WALLACE, L.O. was wounded, his injury being a shrapnel wound in right side.</p> <p>Capt P.B. ROBIN, O.C. "K" Sec, 9 Div Sigs, who was attached to 24 Bde was also wounded.</p> <p>Appx 18 - Report on operations of 2/32 Bn 16/17 Jul.</p> <p>Appx 19 - Report on operations of 2/43 Bn 17 Jul.</p> <p>Appx 20 - Further Report on operations of 2/43 Bn 17 Jul.</p> <p>Appx 21 - Report on operations of 11 Aust A/Tk Bty 17 Jul.</p>	
	18		<p>Lieut A. DONNELLY, comd No. 2 Pl, HQ Gd Bn, attached to 24 Bde was wounded today when a stack of mines was exploded by shell - fire.</p>	
	21		<p>Appx 22 - 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 4.</p>	
	22		<p>Appx 23 - 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 5.</p> <p>Appx 24 - Report on operations of 2/32 Bn 21/22 Jul.</p>	
	23		<p>Appx 25 - Message All7 from Rear HQ 9 Aust Div, conveying congratulatory message from C-in-C and from Gen Sir THOMAS BLAMEY.</p>	
	25		<p>Appx 26 - 24 Aust Inf Bde Notes on future Ops No. 1.</p>	
	26		<p>Appx 27 - 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 6.</p> <p>Appx 28 - Copy of Special Order of the Day issued 25 Jul by C-in-C.</p>	
	27	1525	<p>Received message O 430 from Main 9 Aust Div. :- "From receipt this order two tps 9 Aust A/Tk Bty come under</p>	

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WAR DIARY

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Month and Year Jul 42

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Commanding Officer

Place.	Date	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
X	27	(contd)	C Coy 2/2 MG Bn less one pl.comd Capt C.C. BROWN (.) This force is responsible for A/Tk defence between left fwd coy 2/48 Bn and most northerly posn 2/13 Bn (.) Force under comd 24 Bde through 2/13 Bn and will be in posn by 1800 hrs 27 Jul (.) Recce by C.O. 3 A/Tk Regt, C.O. 2/2 MG Bn and rep 2/13 proceeding".	
		2030	<p align="center">Apex 29.</p> Received message O 433 from Main 9 Aust Div :- "2 Armd Bde withdrawing night 27/28 Jul by 2030 hrs covered by inf in rear (.) 1 S.A. Div withdrawing by 2200 hrs night 27/28 Jul to posns held this morning."	
	28	1325	Received message O 437 from Main 9 Aust Div :- "Confirming (.) 1 Army Tk Bde less one sqn 50 RTR moves to area 879296 28 Jul (.) One sqn 50 RTR remains in sp 24 Aust Inf Bde rejoining 50 RTR last night 28 Jul."	
	30		Maj D.R. JACKSON, B.M., was evacuated sick to 2/3 Fd Amb. Capt G.B. COMBES was attached from 9 Aust Div as Acting B.M.	
	31	1930	Capt K.E. BISHOP B.M. (L) was evacuated sick to 2/3 Fd Amb. Message O 461 received from Main 9 Aust Div :- "Warning order (.) 2/12 Aust Fd Regt moves into EL ALAMEIN defences night 31 Jul/1 Aug (.) 2/28 Bn moves to 20 Aust Inf Bde area night 31 Jul/1 Aug under separate orders by Q (.) 20 Aust Inf Bde and 26 Aust Inf Bde relieve each other nights 1/2 and 2/3 Aug (.) Adv parties of bdes may proceed night 31 Jul/1 Aug (.)"	

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Unit HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde

Commanding Officer.....

Month and Year Jul 42

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
		31(Contd)	<p>Details supporting arms to be relieved will be issued later (.) 24 Aust Inf Bde will prepare outpost posns in present area for one bn flanks to be linked to 26 Bde and EL ALAMEIN defences by A/Tk and MG posts (.) Assistance for laying A/Tk minefids to be provided by 2/3 Pnr Bn and 2/13 Fd Coy as required (.) 2/3 Pnr Bn will take over EL ALAMEIN western defences from the sea to telegraph lines from 3 S.A. Bde at date to be arranged coming under comd 24 Aust Inf Bde on taking over."</p> <p>Message O 462 from Main 9 Aust Div :-</p> <p>"23 Armd Bde have certain tasks in sp of 9 Aust Div (.) 50 RTR is under comd 9 Aust Div and is leaguering in the area 880298 for use in sp of either fwd bde (.) C.O. 50 RTR will recce probable tasks in conjunction with comds fwd bdes (.) Fwd bde will make any preparations necessary to enable tanks to operate in the areas selected (.) 24 and 26 Bdes will establish line comms with HQ RTR (moving to 88072980 evening 31 Jul) (.) 50 RTR will drop rear link to this HQ (.) In the event of 50 RTR being ordered to move in sp of fwd bde it is intended that the rear link at Div HQ will move fwd to the HQ of the bde concerned."</p>	

Dr Jackson
Comd 24 Aust Inf Bde



JULY WAR DIARY
APPENDICES

APPX 1

9th Aust Div 90 No.1

SECRET
Copy No.

H.Q. 24 INF. BDE.

Ref Map : 1/100,000 DAMAHUT, ALEXANDRIA

File 51/152/D/146.

Date 2/7/42

Time 0145 hrs

Brig.	
B.M.	
B.M.I.	
S.C.	
S.C.L.	
L.O.I	
L.O.II	
L.O.III	
I.O.	
T.O.	
A.O.	

OPERATION

1. (a) As issued verbally

(b) Additional tps :-

Force now on BHERLA posn, under comd Col McRANE

INTENTION

2. 9 Aust Div will deny the enemy the approaches to ALEXANDRIA from the west and SW

METHOD

3. P.M. as marked on map

4. Sectors - West - 24 Aust Inf Bde
 2/8 Aust Pz Regt
 2/7 Aust Pz Regt (less tps) for A Tk role ^{three}
 Col McRANE's force

South West - 26 Aust Inf Bde
 2/12 Aust Pz Regt
 Three tps 2/7 Aust Pz Regt for A Tk role
 10 Bty 3 Aust A Tk Regt

5. Hqs - Two coys each fwd bde

6. AA - 10 Bty 4 Aust Lt AA Regt will on arrival ALEXANDRIA area come under comd RAA 9 Aust Div and will protect the area of the rd triangle north of and the causeway on the rd CAIRO - ALEXANDRIA, north of AMRIYA

7. RAE - One Pz Coy under comd each fwd bde on their arrival in ALEXANDRIA.

8. Except as specified above, tps at present in bde gps will remain under comd bdes until further orders are issued.

9. Policy of Defence :-

Approaches will be held strongly and adequate reserves held in hand.

ACKNOWLEDGE ✓ 7/7/42


[Signature]
CS 9th AUST DIV

Distribution:-	Copy No		
24 Aust Inf Bde	1	G	9
26 Aust Inf Bde	2	AQ	10
RAA 9 Aust Div	3	AASG 9 Aust Div	11
RAE 9 Aust Div	4	Medical	12
Hqs 9 Aust Div	5	Ord	13
Col McRANE	6	File	14 & 15
2/8 Aust Pz Regt	7	War Diary	16 & 17
Comd	8		

Magnetic Variation 0° 0' (1939) increasing towards the East 4' annually. Grid North is 34' West of True North at centre of Sheet.

Notes: This sheet is overlaid on the map of the Survey of Egypt, 1900-1905. It is based on the datum of the Survey of Egypt, 1900-1905. The scale is 1:100,000. The grid is based on Long. 31° E.

TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET. PAY ATTENTION TO THE LARGER FIGURES AND TO THOSE PRINTED ON THE FACE OF THE MAP. POINT RAS EL TIN PALACE. East 070436 North 436



REFERENCE tables in Arabic and English. Includes symbols for Standard Gauge Railways, Light Railways, Tracing Lines & Densities, Markers, Coastlines, House Tax, Village, and various symbols for bridges, locks, and other features. Includes a scale bar and a note about vertical interval.

H.Q. 24 INF. BDE.

File 152/0/159

Date 10 Jul 42

Time _____

	INTL
Brig.	
B.M.V.	
B.M.L.	
S.C.	
S.C.L.	
L.O.I	
L.O.II	
L.O.III	
I.O.	
I.O.	

Rec 1447

SECRET

Ref No 184

9 Jul 42

Correction to RAA 9 Aust Div OO No 1 of 9 Jul 42

Para 2 : "Own Tps sub-para "Under Comd 26 Aust Inf Bde Gp - (Additional tps) "

delete present reference and substitute -

"Three Tps 9 Aust A.Tk Bty
44 R Tks (less one or two sqns)
2/23 Aust Inf Bn. "

DISTRIBUTION as per RAA 9 Aust Div OO No 1 dated 9 Jul 42

Method of Issue

To units under Comd SDR
To others through sigs.

[Signature]
Maj
BMRA 9 Aust Div..

SECRETREPORT ON OPERATIONS 24 AUGST INF BDE 8/29 JUL 42.

Ref maps: DARA 1:500,000
 ALEXANDRIA 1:100,000
 EL HAMMAN 1:100,000
 EL DARA - EL ALAMBIN 1:100,000
 QASABA 1:50,000
 ELALAMBIN 1:50,000

APPENDICES

<u>PART I:</u>	Appx I	More detailed extracts from I log.
	Ia	24 Aust Inf Bde C.O. No. 3
	Ib	30 Corps C.O. no. 57
	Ic	Notes on Verbal Orders by Bde Comd 0800 hrs 5 Jul.
	Id	Verbal orders by Bde Comd at 1018 hrs 5 Jul.
	Ie	Constitution of WALL GP.
<u>PART II:</u>	Appx IIa	Operation Instn No. 1.
	IIb	Extract from 2/43 Bn Orders.
	IIc	2/43 Bn Report on Raid.
	IIId	Engr Report on Raid.
<u>PART III:</u>	Appx III	More detailed extracts from I log.
	IIIa	Message regarding defence of RUWEIGAT Ridge.
	IIIb	Notes on orders for move to coastal area.
	IIIc	Trace of dispositions TELL EL SHAMANA 11 Jul.
	IIId	Orders for attack on 12 Jul.
	IIIe	Orders for defence of sector.
	IIIc	Trace of dispositions 12 Jul.
	IIIg	Warning order for move to ALAM EL HALPA.
<u>PART IV:</u>	Appx IVa	Bde C.O. No. 3
	IVb	Trace of dispositions 1200 hrs 17 Jul.
	IVc	Report by C.O. 2/32 Bn
	IVd	" " " 2/43 Bn (two reports)
	IVe	Trace of dispositions 0800 hrs 18 Jul.
<u>PART V:</u>	Appx Va	24 Aust Inf Bde C.O. No. 4.
	Vb	Report of C.O. 2/32 Bn on operations 21/22 Jul.
	Vc	Verbal orders for attack on MITHINIYA Ridge 22 Jul.
	Vd	Trace of Bde dispositions 23 Jul.
<u>PART VI:</u>	Appx VIa	Notes on Future Operations No. 1.
	VIb	24 Aust Inf Bde C.O. No. 6.
	VIc	Trace of known enemy dispositions 26 Jul.
	VI d	Report by Lieut J. HEAD.
	VI e	" " Lieut E. D. RULE.
	VI f	" " Lieut J. T. COOK.
	VI g	" " Capt F. MACKL.
	VI h	" on Casualties.
	VI j	Enemy Intercepts and Casualties.
<u>PART VII:</u>	Appx VIIa	Statement of own casualties in men and material and PWs and captured arms and material taken 3-29 Jul.

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REPORT ON OPERATIONS 24 AUST INF BDE 3-29 JUL 42.

1. 24 Aust Inf Bde moved from TRIPOLI on 28 Jun 42, arriving in the outer defences of ALEXANDRIA on night 1/2 Jul. From the time of leaving ALEXANDRIA on 4 Jul, until 29 Jul, the operations of the Bde are divided into the following parts :-

- Part I 3-5 Jul - Approach and Preliminary Moves.
- Part II 6-8 Jul - First Contact - Raid on GERMAN A Tk Defences.
- Part III 9-15 Jul - Move to COASTAL area and Recce with a view to Exploitation of successes by 26 Aust Inf Bde.
- Part IV 16-20 Jul - Attacks on -
- (a) MAKHKHAD Ridge
 - (b) MITEIRIYA Ridge
 - (c) Enemy Counter action
 - (d) Consolidation
- Part V 21-24 Jul - (a) Attack on CAIRN - pt 22 Ridge
(b) Attack on MITEIRIYA Ridge
(c) Consolidation and recce
- Part VI 25-29 Jul - (a) Attack on MITEIRIYA Ridge
(b) Consolidation

Part VII GENERAL

The various operations are as far as possible given in broad outline, supported by appendices giving more detailed reports by Bns and from Bde I log.

Part I - Approach and Preliminary Moves

2. After a strenuous day and night in bringing units up to approx 80% of tpt and equipment, 24 Bde Gp (less 2/28 Bn) moved from ALEXANDRIA area to TELL EL SHAMMAMA area on 4 Jul, coming directly under comd 30 Corps. No sooner in position and digging in, than the Bde was placed on immediate notice to move with a pursuit role as enemy withdrawal was considered likely. Nothing developed. On 5 Jul, Bde Gp moved to RUWEISAT Ridge and took up positions with a view to establishing a firm base from which operations of 1 Armd Div and various colns (SACKCOL, SQUEAKCOL, ROBCOL), formed under WALL GP could take place. The colns referred to were portions of various units grouped under one command, pending reorganisation, the Gp being under comd Brig WALLER. A vigorous digging and mining programme was immediately put into effect, and continued up to 10 Jul.

- Appx I More detailed extracts from I Log.
- Ia 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 2
 - Ib 30 Corps O.O. No. 57
 - Ic Notes on Verbal Orders by Bde Comd 0600 hrs 5 Jul.
 - Id Verbal orders by Bde Comd at 1012 hrs 5 Jul.
 - Ie Constitution of WALL GP.

Part II - First Contact - Raid on GERMAN A Tk Defences.

3. With a view to vigorous offensive policy, early advantage was taken to recce forward area by Bde and Bn Comds. When the Comd 30 Corps (Lt. Gen. NORRIE) instructed Bde Comd that an offensive operation was to be undertaken, much valuable infm of enemy dispositions and habits had been obtained.
- 24 Aust Inf Bde was given alternative roles -

- (a) To send 2 coys to enemy positions on LOW RIDGE, WEST of ALAM BAOSHAZA 8827, to inflict damage on enemy A Tk guns, demolish derelict tks and vehs, obtain infm of enemy dispositions and kill or capture enemy encountered - and return.
- (b) As for (a) but remain and consolidate - and to be supported at first light by 6 pr guns and tks which would move forward.

Instructions were that the operation was to be conducted by 1 Armd Div, 24 Aust Inf Bde supplying the inf for the assault, to be carried out on night 6/7 Jul, with a proviso that Comd 24 Aust Inf Bde could apply for postponement if time for recce and coordination of plan were insufficient.

After a long conference at WALL GP HQ at which were present Comds 1 Armd Div, 4 and 22 Armd Bdes, WALL Gp, 2/43 Aust Inf Bn and 24 Aust Inf Bde, it was obvious that plan (b) could not be put into effect as the required assistance of A Tk guns and tks could not be made available to support inf in consolidation. So much time had been fruitlessly spent during the conference that reccees by subordinate comds for plan (a) could not be carried out, so I applied for and was granted a postponement of 24 hrs for the operation.

4. On 7 Jul, a further conference took place, and a plan on a more limited scale was arrived at - a raid by one coy with engr demolition parties, which, being directed against the forward elements of the main German Armd formation seemed much more within the compass of the tps available.

Recces proceeded. Bde HQ established Tac HQ with WALL Gp at 89132780, and the raid was launched at 2300 hrs. It proved most successful, the net result being :-

- 4 enemy A Tk guns and 6 gun tractors full of amm destroyed;
- 1 75mm or 105mm gun destroyed;
- 1 A Tk gundestroyed by enemy before leaving same.
- 1 Carrier recovered;
- 1 German MG captured;
- 3 damaged British tks in enemy lines demolished;
- 9 Prisoners of War(GERMAN);
- 40 enemy casualties estimated, incl 15 GERMANS definitely killed.

Our casualties were 1 killed, 7 wounded.

5. Apart from the material damage caused, this successful raid had a very marked effect on all Allied tps. To the AIF, it was a most heartening re-entry into armed contact with German tps, and to know that Germans belonging to 33 A Tk Bn had fled in terror from our tps was most reassuring. To other tps in the area the offensive action acted as a stimulant and helped greatly in the effort to wrest the initiative from the enemy. Congratulations from the Comd 30 Corps were expressed by telephone and the following message was received from 1 Armd Div :-

"From General LUMSDEN. Well done. A grand re-entry and a most useful raid. Thank you".

6. 24 Bde had by this time reverted to comd 9 Aust Div. The Div Comd(Lt.Gen.Sir Leslie Morshead) visited the forward area with the Bde Comd on 6 Jul, and again on 8 Jul, when he addressed and congratulated members of 2/43 Bn Raiding Party.

- Appx IIA Operation Instn No. 1.
- IIB Extract from 2/43 Bn Orders.
- IIC 2/43 Bn Report on Raid.
- IID Engr report on Raid.

Part III - Move to Coastal Area and Reces with a view to exploitation of successes by 26 Aust Inf Bde.

7. At the request of Corps Comd(Lt.Gen.RAMSDEN) a further raid was being prepared for night 9/10 Jul, but 9 Aust Div instructed that no commitments were to be accepted in view of projected operational moves.

8. 24 Bde Gp moved back to coastal sector it had previously occupied(area TELL EL SHANNAMA) on 10 Jul, and news of success of 26 Bde's attack on trig 33 and TELL EL BISA was soon to hand.

9. During night 10/11 Jul, 2/28 Bn rejoined the Bde from BIKHILA position (ALEXANDRIA).

10. Bde Comd was summoned to Div HQ on 12, 13 and 14 Jul to receive orders for exploitation, but in all these cases, after varying degrees of action had been taken for issue of orders and reces, the proposed actions were cancelled.

11. Meanwhile, the defences at TELL EL SHANNAMA were being materially strengthened, despite the fact that the Bde was for considerable periods at one hrs notice to move.

12. On night 14/15 Jul, Bde was ordered to move early on 15 Jul to Ridge ALAM EL HALFA (4388) to cover threat to our forces in the South. This move was cancelled at 0545 hrs 15 Jul, and it was learned that 20 Aust Inf Bde had been allotted this role.

- Appx III More detailed extracts from I Log.
- IIIIa Message regarding defence of RUWEISAT Ridge.
- IIIIb Notes on orders for move to Coastal area.
- IIIIc Trace of dispositions TELL EL SHANNAMA 11 Jul.
- IIII d Orders for attack on 12 Jul.
- IIII e Orders for defence of sector.
- IIII f Trace of dispositions 16 Jul.
- IIII g Warning Order for move to ALAM EL HALFA.

Part IV - 16/20 Jul

- (a) Attack on MARKHAD Ridge
- (b) Attack on BITIRIYA Ridge
- (c) Enemy counter action
- (d) Consolidation

13. On 16 Jul, after reces by Bde O Gp, as a result of Div instructions, final orders for an attack during night 16/17 Jul, followed by exploitation, were issued at 1900 hrs (Appx IVa). Bde Tac HQ opened at post No. 4(ALAMEIN defences) astride main rd 881296 and Main Bde HQ moved to area 88452953 at 2200 hrs.

14. The intention was to capture, by night attack Ridge 22 (MAKHHAD ridge) (87652952 to 87842958) and exploit at first light to capture RUIN RIDGE (MITIRIYA RIDGE) 87422903 to 87672887 on 17 Jul. 2/32 Bn were allotted the first task which was to be carried out as a silent attack. Other units of Bde Gp were to move to assembly areas astride ry line at 88002965 during the night.
- 1 Army Tk Bde consisting for the operation of C Sqn 44 RTR (Valentines and some Honey tks) with under comd one Sqn 9 Aust Div Cav (Crusaders), were assembled in support prepared -
- (a) To assist 2/32 Bn in mopping up on Ridge 22 at first light, if called on;
 - (b) To follow and support 2/43 Bn in attack on RUIN RIDGE from Ridge 22 at first light;
 - (c) Give protection to right flank.
- On success 2/32 Bn, 2/43 Bn were to move forward crossing Ridge 22 at first light, followed by one sqn Valentines in support and capture RUIN RIDGE, attack to be supported by concentrations on RUIN RIDGE and later by observed arty fire. A strong S.A. force came under comd ready to exploit Southward. 2/28 Bn Gp remained in reserve.
15. 2/32 Bn was on its PUP as arranged at 0230 hrs 17 Jul, and moved forward to attack at this time. By 0245 hrs, considerable enemy shelling, mortar, A Tk and MG fire was falling among attacking tps.
16. After reports that 2/32 Bn had moved from ALAMEIN FORTRESS, there was a long period during which comms between 2/32 Bn and Tac Bde Hq failed. The Sig Offr 2/32 Bn was spoken to by R/T and he stated that there was line laid from his post on perimeter of FORTRESS to Tac Hq 2/32 Bn, but he could get no report. R/T calls for reports continued until 0532 hrs without success.
17. At 0523 hrs, Lt. Col. W. J. WAIN, CO 2/43 Bn, reported by telephone that he had contacted right and centre coys of 2/32 Bn, but NOT the left coy. Right and centre coys were "all right". Bde Comd therefore ordered 2/43 Bn forward.
18. It was later found that A Coy 2/32 Bn, after capturing some 60 PW had overstepped its objective and had been cut off by enemy action, and the C.O. was forced to use his reserve Coy to fill the gap. After personal recce by C.O., the new line was co-ordinated by 0845 hrs, with 2/32 Bn on its objective with the exception of pt 22 on right, which was still in enemy hands, despite all efforts to dislodge him. Here the fighting was hard all day with neither side being able to gain definite ascendancy. Full report of operations 2/32 Bn is given in Appx IVC.
19. 2/43 Bn, after debussing in assembly area, passed through 2/32 Bn at 0600 hrs. Supported by C Sqn 44 RTR, they advanced under severe shelling until the final objective was reached, meeting with severe resistance, particularly on left flank. Our arty provided a heavy concentration on objective at 0640 hrs, and by 0703 hrs, the objective was captured and consolidation commenced.
20. At 0712 hrs, Bde Comd ordered S.A. Exploiting Force out to advance and mop up on left flank by 2/43 Bn.

21. Enemy immediately commenced to bring down by fire on 2/43 Bn from front and flanks, while a counter attack by inf supported by tks developed on their right flank. This was beaten off. With the appearance of more enemy tks, and after conferring with Comd C Sqn 44 RTR (only left with 6 tks), who could not give support to a proposed move forward into enemy gun area some 800 yds further away, C.O. 2/43 Bn ordered his Bn to withdraw. At this stage, all arty communications had broken down, am supplies were almost exhausted, and a large enemy counter attack supported by approx 16 tks were seen to be forming up.
- Bde Comd concurred in the withdrawal, and 2/43 Bn were ordered to take up posn on left flank of 2/32 Bn. The withdrawal was well carried out and covered by arty concentrations, communication with FOO having been restored. Enemy arty and dive bombing attacks during the period of approx one hour during which 2/43 Bn held RUIN RIDGE were intense. Full report of 2/43 Bn operation is attached as Appx IVd.
22. At 0906 hrs, C.O. 2/32 Bn reported posn by telephone. He said that shelling had slackened a little. His request for up to 4,000 mines to be sent forward immediately was acceded to.
23. At 0918 hrs, Bde Comd advised C.O. 2/12 Fd Regt that 2/8 Fd Regt FOO with 2/32 Bn was a casualty, and a 2/32 Bn officer (Capt FAHEY) was now acting as an FOO. C.O. 2/12 Fd Regt requested that a replacement for the FOO be sent forward.
24. At about 0930 hrs, Bde Comd instructed LO from S.A. Exploiting Force to inform that Force of the posn and tell them to consolidate where they were and be responsible for their own protection. (W/T comm between LO and S.A. Exploiting Force had broken down. LO therefore had to convey this message personally).
25. At 0950 hrs, Bde Comd went forward to confer with Bn Comds. He adjusted dispositions of bns and returned to Tac Bde HQ at 1155 hrs. Dispositions of Bde as at 1300 hrs 17 Jul are shown on trace, Appx IVd att.
26. At 1000 and 1200 hrs enemy counter attacks with AFVs developed in 2/32 Bn area. The first was repulsed, three enemy tks and two arm cars being immobilised. The second attack met with local success, and our tps were forced to withdraw slightly in vicinity pt 22, but the movement was checked, and by 1400 hrs, the line was as originally held.
27. At about 1700 hrs, enemy launched a further and stronger attack with tks against the junction of 2/32 and 2/43 Bns. Two forward pls of C Coy 2/32 Bn were overrun and remainder of C Coy withdrew through portion of B Coy. With enemy forcing forward in the centre, 2/32 and 2/43 Bns lost contact with each other, and were forced to pull back. An ugly situation appeared to be developing, but Bde Comd was able to get in touch with B.M. & C.O. D Coy 2/2 HQ Bn who were in the forward area, and these two officers did much to stabilise the posn. A line was then reorganised on the road along telegraph line with GATTARA track as junction between 2/32 and 2/43 Bns.
- S.A. Exploiting Force meanwhile had been ordered to withdraw within ALAMRIN defences. At 1830 hrs, C.O. 2/28 Bn was summoned to Bde HQ to await orders.
28. Shortly after B.M. returned to Tac Bde HQ at 1910 hrs 17 Jul, and advised that front was firm and the defence coordinated, Bde Comd gave orders to Maj J.P. COX, Acting C.O. 2/28 Bn. These orders were for a night operation

(start time 2330 hrs) by 2/28 Bn to occupy position from which 2/32 and 2/43 Bns had withdrawn in late afternoon. The Bn's start line was the line of the telegraph line, 500 yds on each side of the GATTARA Track, with A Coy on right, D Coy in centre and C Coy on left. A Coy was not available for the operation, being engaged in escorting PWs captured 17 Jul. Bn HQ moved in rear of D Coy.

29. At 0020 hrs, 18 Jul, Bn crossed start line and advanced to objective. At 0215 hrs, LO reported to Tac Bde HQ that 2/28 Bn reached objective at approx 0130 hrs. The line occupied by the 2/28 Bn was approx 1650 yds SW of the telegraph line, measured along GATTARA Track. The only coy which encountered enemy was A Coy (on the right). This coy met some inf and a tk. The latter was destroyed and the crew of 3 Italians taken prisoner. A Coy sustained two casualties (wounded).

30. At 0705 hrs, 18 Jul, Bde Comd went forward to 2/28 Bn. He found that 2/32 Bn and 2/43 Bn extended along telegraph line from approx 87732962 to 88052936. He ordered one coy 2/32 Bn to be moved to close the gap approximating 878 EAST gridline between right flank 2/28 Bn and 2/32 Bn posn. He likewise ordered one coy 2/43 Bn to close gap between approx 87872932 and 88022934.

(see trace IVE att - dispositions as at 0800 hrs 18 Jul).

31. After first light enemy were observed on trig 22 feature (87672950) and enemy working parties were observed 1000 yds fwd of 2/28 Bn PBLs. These were engaged by mortars and MMGs, and enemy replied with MMGs and A Tk fire. Later our arty shelled trig 22 feature and also area where working party had been seen. At 0843 hrs, enemy commenced shelling of 2/28 Bn area, and light intermittent shelling occurred through the day.

32. During the ensuing days all three bns engaged in consolidation and active patrolling, with carriers during day and on foot at night.

33. Enemy Losses 17 Jul.

During the operations 17 Jul, 29 offrs and 707 ORs, all Italian, were captured and passed through PECP. There were also about 16, not included above, evacuated by Pd Amb. These PWs came from following units :-

- 111 Bn 61 I.R.
- 1, 11 and 111 Bns 62 I.R.
- 11 Bn 65 I.R.
- 10 and 11 Bns, 7 BERSAGLIERI REGT
- 13 Coy 2 MINATORA Bn.
- 4 A Tk Bn
- 1 and 3 Btys 46 Arty Regt
- 21 Arty Regt
- 2 W/T Coy 13 Engr Regt
- 28 Engr Coy
- 32 Engr Bn

Number of enemy killed unknown.

2/43 Bn destroyed 4 75mm guns, 9 A Tk guns, 12 MGs and 3 45mm mortars.

One A Tk gun of L Tp 11 A Tk Bty claimed 6 tks, and 1 Armd C was knocked out by 44 RTR.

34.

Our Losses, 17 Jul.

Battle casualties of the three bns were :-

	Killed		Died of		Wounded		Missing		Totals	
	In Action		Wounds							
	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs
2/23 Bn						2				2
2/32 Bn		24			7	73	3	137	10	234
2/43 Bn	2	10	1	6	4	62		3	7	81
	2	34	1	6	11	137	3	140	17	317

A Tk guns :- one 6 pr and one 2 pr A Tk guns destroyed; two 6 prs and two 2 prs abandoned after removal of firing mechanisms.

All these guns were later recovered and the total loss for the action was one portee completely destroyed and one 2 pr piece destroyed but carriage in good order.

35.

Appendices attached as under :-

IVa Bde C.O. No. 3
 IVb Trace of dispositions 1300 hrs 17 Jul
 IVc Report by C.O. 2/32 Bn
 IVd " " " 2/43 Bn (two reports)
 IVe Trace of dispositions 0800 hrs 18 Jul

Part V - 21/24 Jul - (a) Attack on CAIRN - pt 22 Ridge
 (b) Attack on BITKIRIYA Ridge
 (c) Consolidation and recce

36.

On the afternoon of 20 Jul, G1 9 Aust Div visited Bde HQ and gave Bde Comd an outline of a forthcoming operation under which 24 Aust Inf Bde would be required to capture and secure successively - 1st, CAIRN 875296; 2nd, pt 21 (pt 22 on 1/100,000 map) 870296; 3rd, trig at 87002927.

37.

The Bde Comd considered the outline task and at about 2200 hrs left for Tac 9 Aust Div where he discussed the plan with GOC. Bde Comd expressed opinion that tps advancing towards CAIRN and pt 21 would be caught by fire, especially arty fire, from both NORTH and SOUTH. The observation for enemy arty fire from the NORTH would be largely obtained from TELL EL EISA feature, sqs 873299 and 874299. Bde Comd expressed opinion that occupation by a force of our own tps would be only surely effective means of preventing this. Further, once in our hands, the feature could be used as arty OP by ourselves. Failing this, no satisfactory OP seemed available for arty supporting our tps' advance to pt 21 (870296). In such an event, arty support would be dependent upon FOCs with W/T comm. Our recent experiences of casualties to FOCs and their communications, led us strongly to desire some other means of calling for arty support. The GOC recalled the experience of 26 Bde in recent attacks on the TELL EL EISA feature, and advised that the plan in process of being formed would include arty concentrations on the TELL EL EISA feature to prevent its use by enemy for arty observation. Finally, the GOC stated, he would consider the matter further, and advise the Bde Comd of his decision in the morning.

38.

During the morning of 21 Jul, GOC advised Bde Comd that 26 Aust Inf Bde was to capture TELL EL EISA feature in cooperation with phase 1 of 24 Aust Inf Bde operations.

39. At a conference at 1330 hrs at Bde.HQ, Bde C Gp received an outline plan of the operation, and verbal orders for the operation. Written orders (24 Aust Inf Bde O.C. No. 4, attached as Appx Va) were issued at final conference at 1900 hrs.
40. In accordance with these orders the following moves took place during night 21/22 Jul: - 2/32 Bn moved to start line, 2/28 Bn occupied former area 2/32 Bn, and 2/13 Bn moved out of ALAMEIN FORTRESS, came under comd and took over 2/28 Bn area.
41. Our operation was part of an attack by Eighth Army to destroy the enemy's army in its present location.
42. At 0430 hrs 22 Jul advice was received from G1 9 Aust Div that 1 NZ Div and 1 S.A. Div had both gained their first objectives. Indian Div did not gain all their objectives. Our attack is to go on. There is no alteration in plans.
Accordingly, Phase 1 of 24 Aust Inf Bde operations was commenced.
43. Phase 1 was to be carried out by 2/32 Bn to capture enemy positions CAIRN 875296 - re-entrant 876294 and 876295 West of trig 22 (876295) and was concurrent with 26 Bde attack on TELL EL BISA feature.
Phase 11 was to be initiated by 9 Aust Div some two hours after success of Phase 1, permitting 2/12 and 2/7 Fd Regts to move forward. It consisted of exploitation West to pt 21 (87012963) by 50 RTR Gp with inf, MG and Engrs from 2/28 Bn Gp riding on tks, closely followed by 2/28 Bn.
Phase 111 was to be as follows - On heading over second objective to 2/28 Bn 50 RTR were to move South and capture third objective (area trig 30 87002927), and would be followed by 2/43 Bn lorried, who would take over and consolidate this position.
44. At 0515 hrs, our arty concentrations on objective commenced, and 2/32 Bn (with A Coy 2/43 Bn under comd) crossed their start line at 0530 hrs. Enemy resistance was exceptionally strong and a very fierce fight soon developed. At 0615 hrs, came info from FOO 2/12 Fd Regt with 2/43 Bn that our tps seemed to be making good progress. Then at 0634 hrs, 2/32 Bn advised that centre coy was held up about 100 yds from objective by mortar and A Tk fire. Some PWs were coming back. At 0650 hrs, mortar offr was reported to be getting good observation into valley beyond trig 22. 36 bombs had been fired.
45. The first reports giving any details were the following :-
T.O.C. 0715 hrs :- A Coy 2/43 Bn (which was under comd 2/32 Bn for this operation), fighting astride and North of telegraph line approx 1000 yds forward of West end of start line. Capt SUNDOLZ, O.C., had been badly wounded. Coy was under arty fire from SW and was engaging two fd guns and one A Tk gun 200 yds from them. This placed A Coy 700 yds from objective. O.C., Lt.Col. D.A. WHITEHEAD had gone forward.
T.O.C. 0723 hrs :- FOOs wireless had broken down. B Coy (in centre) was on objective, but was now weak in numbers. No info from left coy, but it was known they were under fire from several armd cars. It appeared that A Coy 2/43 Bn was slightly off its line. A Tk guns and mortars were being pushed forward. Shelling was mostly from 75ms and A Tk guns in the WEST. A line was being run forward to FOO.

46. At 0808 hrs, info was received that FOO HOLLISON had been on trig 22 and reported no hostile tps between trig 22 and CAIRN. A 88mm gun at 87542966 had been knocked out. A Coy 2/43 Bn had met opposition from its right which brought Coy 500 to 600 yds off its line of advance. C.O. 2/32 Bn was carrying out recce in this area. Centre coy was on objective. Left coy was held up by armd cars and action was being taken to get forward.
47. By 0855 hrs, 1 offr 56 ORs, all GERMANS, had been counted through PRCP.
48. At 0850 hrs, a FOO reported a counter attack was imminent on trig 22. Our arty was already engaging the enemy. At 0900 hrs, C.O. 2/12 Fd Regt reported that 23 Bty had been left firing on this target, and other two btys had been directed onto 87432937, where there were tks (number unknown). Bde Comd gave C.O. 2/12 Fd Regt line 87522963 to 87532950 as line for fire on counter attacking forces. At 0912 hrs a FOO reported tks within 300 yds of our tps 876296; the tks were being engaged with observed fire. 50 RTR and 2/32 Bn were kept informed of the situation.
49. At 0915 hrs, line from rear to fwd HQ 2/32 Bn was out of action. W/T comm between Bde HQ and fwd 2/32 Bn HQ was checked and found correct.
50. At about 0945 hrs, came info that res coy had moved fwd and taken up a posn about 100 yds from CAIRN. A Coy 2/43 Bn was reported about 1100 to 1200 yds from CAIRN. There was still little info about left coy. At 0950 hrs, info was received that MG sec on left had had one veh knocked out by MG fire. One of the two guns had no tripod and there were only four men remaining to man the two guns.
51. At 1132 hrs, 2/13 Bn reported that two tks which were moving NORTH along GATTARA Track turned off track at KB and moved in direction of trig 22. Arty and 2/32 Bn were advised of this info. Between 1147 and 1155 hrs, came the following advices from 2/32 Bn. There were a number of tks and armd cars in depression SW of 22, at 8765029465. A Tk guns could not engage them without exposure. FOO had been held up by an A Tk gun. Snipers were very active and made movement difficult. 87702985 to 87522962 to trig 22 would be a good arty target.
52. Bde Comd ordered a concentration in depression where tks and armd cars were; this was reported falling in right place.
53. At 1240 hrs came info that there were 10 to 15 tks and a large number of other tpt in western side of sq 875295. Bde Comd called for concentrations on this area.
54. At 1348 hrs, 2/32 Bn advised that an FOO was of opinion that the enemy line ran from 87582953 to CAIRN and then generally on line NE. D Coy may have come back a little off ridge to prevent being sniped.
55. At about 1515 hrs, LO, Lieut R. DOWNEY, returned with following info:- Up to 1500 hrs, there had passed through RAP 102 all ranks and 5 Germans. This figure included at least 13 from A Coy 2/43 Bn, which coy states that it has lost 18 killed and in total strength was down to approx 40 to 50. B Coy had 1 offr killed, 2 wounded; it was not known how many of this coy were left. D Coy had drawn back about 300 yds to escape sniping. Trig 22 area was providing cover and concealment for FOO, A Tk ^{guns} and a few men, but was not held in strength. Bn had now consolidated along approx

line 87632950 to 87572960 to 87612971. Enemy arty seemed to have quietened, but enemy AFVs were doing a lot of shooting from successive hull down posns. From personal observation from trig 22, Lieut DOWNEY confirmed the general line of enemy PILEs as given by FOO at 1345 hrs.

56. At 1544 hrs, 2/32 Bn reported there was enemy movement across its front from right towards centre. Enemy were being engaged by mortars and arty.
57. 2/32 Bn had throughout the day met fierce resistance, but by dint of great perseverance and outstanding leadership by their C.O. (Lt. Col. D.A. WHITEHEAD), they finally gained the day, and held their complete objective. Complete report of operations of 2/32 Bn is attached (Appx Vb).
58. Our casualties during the day amounted to 7 offrs, 180 ORs, and equipment losses, 5 vehs, one 6 pr portee (recoverable) 2 Carriers (recoverable).
59. PWs captured in this operation were 1 offr and 56 ORs, all GERMANS, from 1 Bn 155 L.I.R. The number of enemy killed is known to be considerable.
60. Div Comd visited Bde HQ a number of times during the day, and at approx 1545 hrs, decided that Phases II and III were definitely cancelled, but that exploitation Southward was to take place, with the object of getting a footing on MITIRIYA RIDGE by last light, and consolidating on reverse slopes during night 22/23 Jul.
Brig RICHARDS, Comd 1 Army Tk Bde, and C.O. 2/28 Bn were in attendance and reps of 50 RTR and supporting arms were immediately summoned. On their arrival a conference was held at Bde HQ and verbal orders were issued for the capture and holding of high ground WEST of GATTARA Rd in 874290 and 875289. The attack was to be supported by arty and by 50 RTR. (Copy of verbal orders attached Appx Vc).
61. Start time was fixed over inf start line - telegraph line 87802946 to 87852943 - at 1900 hrs. 2/28 Bn had been standing by for attack on area pt 21 (87012963) as Phase II of C.O. No. 4. Little time was available for change of plans, and it was 1700 hrs before C.O. 2/28 Bn and his Adjut left Bde H.Q.
62. At about 1800 hrs, advice was received that South Africans were sending out a patrol to K 11, which would try to contact 2/28 Bn. Bde Comd advised 2/28 Bn.
63. Between 1800 and 1900 hrs a Tac R report timed 1615 hrs was received - "Ridge 870293 to 878288 500 MT well dispersed inf digging at least 20 gun posns whole area very well camouflaged no movement to or from WEST." Bde Comd drew the attention of GI 9 Aust Div to this infn.
64. At 1925 hrs, 2/13 Bn reported our tks were on their way, and inf were moving through 2/13 Bn lines. Our tks were being shelled by guns from behind feature 22.
65. The attack proceeded satisfactorily and at 2044 hrs, 2/13 Bn reported that approx 50 PWs, all GERMANS, had reached PWCP. The leading elements of 2/28 Bn apparently reached objective some time after the tks, according to plan. The attack was subjected to heavy enemy arty, A Tk and HG fire, and by the time the main body of inf were nearing their objective, many tks had returned owing to being holed or partially disabled - and the inf were not definitely established.

66. C.O. 2/28 Bn, who was well forward and on breasting a rise, decided the rise was the objective, and prepared to occupy the reverse slope, darkness then starting to set in. W/T comm failed and the first report received from 2/28 Bn was when line was established fwd to 2/28 Bn HQ. At 2245 hrs, first report from 2/28 Bn stated :-
- "We struck ridge with what appeared to be a ruin on left, and were all up at 2040 hrs. There seemed to be a large flat on top of ridge, and we were half way across when it began to become dark and we withdrew to reverse slope. At the moment we are sorting out and getting into posn. At moment 5 Italian tks are on ridge to our left and 5 to our left front - 2 fairly close and 3 further back. 5 of our tks appear to have been knocked out (2 on minefield). Our tks withdrew from ridge at dusk."
67. Owing to the report of the tks returning to leaguer further back than was intended, Brig RICHARDS (Comd, 1 Army Tk Bde) went forward and returned at 0130 hrs 23 Jul, reporting that instead of being on objective, 2/28 Bn was some 3,000 yds short of same. This was also reported by Bde Sig Offr. Reports were also received from Maj MURN, C.O. 2/7 Pd Coy and from 2/7 Pd Regt. After consideration of these various reports, it appeared that 2/28 Bn was between Kilos 8 and 9, with two coys fwd, with left rear sec on rd and left fwd sec about 400 yds WEST of rd.
68. At 0450 hrs, Bde Comd went forward, reaching 2/28 Bn HQ at about first light. The posn was found to be just fwd of Kilo 8 and to WEST of GATTARA Rd, some 3,000 yds short of objective. Bde Comd instructed C.O. 2/28 Bn immediately to widen the Bn front, put patrols well forward and contact 2/32 Bn left flank at pt 22 (87672950) and endeavour to get forward as far as possible.
69. Adjustments to dispositions on lines of instructions by Bde Comd were put in progress, and patrols were sent out. At 0923 hrs, 23 Jul, 2/32 Bn reported contact had been made with 2/28 Bn.
70. In this operation by 2/28 Bn, 1 German Offr and 58 German ORs and 5 Italian ORs were captured. The Germans were identified as from 1 Bn 155 Lt I.R., 1 Bn 361 Lt I.R., 1 Bn 200 L.I.R. The Italians came from 62 I.R. TRENTO DIV.
71. The result of this attack was disappointing, for instead of being established as desired on NITKIRIYA Ridge, we were still some 3,000 yds short. An opportunity to have occupied this ridge whilst enemy was weakened was missed. The reasons for full success not being attained were :-
- (a) Failure of 50 BTR to see 2/28 Bn established on objective before withdrawal.
- (b) Lack of action by C.O. 2/28 Bn to check his position, and lack of bold decision to hold and consolidate forward - faulty tactics in allowing coys to withdraw from the positions they had reached.
72. Casualties sustained by 2/28 Bn in this operation were :- 2 Offrs, 58 ORs.
73. During period 23/26 Jul, many patrols by day and night were sent out from 2/28 Bn, 2/32 Bn and 2/13 Bn, and much enemy activity in mining, wiring and digging was reported.

74. Trace of Bde dispositions up to 26 Jul is given in
Appx Vd.

Appx Va 24 Aust Inf Bde C.O. No. 4.
Vb Report of C.O. 2/32 BN on operations 21/22 Jul.
Vc Verbal Orders for attack on MITERIYA Ridge 22 Jul.
Vd Trace of Bde dispositions 26 Jul.

PART VI - 25/29 Jul - (a) Attack on MITERIYA Ridge
(b) Consolidation.

75. Report on operations by 24 Aust Inf Bde Gp on
night 26/27 Jul 42 has been submitted previously, but is
attached as PART VI.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS BY 24 AUSST INF BDE CP 26/27 JUL 42.

Ref map: EL ALAMEIN 1/50,000

Preparations.

1. An outline plan was given Comds 2/28 Bn, 2/43 Bn and supporting arms on 23 Jul, defining our probable task and the method, in support of a break through by 1 Arm'd Div south of ridge BANYET EL MITIRIYA. Recce commenced, and at this stage it was understood that our attack onto the ridge would take place during night 24/25 Jul.
2. The operation was then postponed to night 26/27 Jul, and preparations continued.
24 Aust Inf Bde Notes on Future Ops No. 1 (att as Appx A) was issued on 25 Jul, defining in greater detail tasks of 2/28 Bn and 2/43 Bn.
3. On receipt of 9 Aust Div O.C. No. 9 at 1545 hrs 25 Jul followed by O.C. No. 9A (verbal), 1 Army Tk Bde O.C. No. 14 at 1905 hrs 26 Jul, and RAA 9 Aust Div O.C. No. 6 at 1430 hrs 26 Jul, Bde Comd's final orders were given at 1430 hrs 26 Jul, confirmed by 24 Aust Inf Bde O.C. No. 6 (att as Appx B).
Coordinating conferences between comds and supporting arms continued at Bde HQ for some hrs.
4. Bde Tac HQ opened at 87952956 at 2045 hrs, 2/43 Bn moved into 2/28 Bn area and was in occupation by 0030 hrs.

Infm of Enemy Dispositions at Time of Issue of Orders.

5. Such infm collated from summaries of higher formations, air photo interpretation, HB lists, OPs, and our patrols, is shown on Appx C att.
It was appreciated that enemy was holding area NE of ridge BANYET EL MITIRIYA lightly with tps (more heavily WEST of GATTARA Rd), but with a high proportion of MGs and mobile A Tk guns, and a few fd guns. From patrol reports it was apparent that tps on our front were German, who had been thickening their line and for some nights had been observed improving fd works and obstacles.
Less was known of enemy strength and dispositions SW of the ridge, but from shelling reports, HB lists and Tac R, it was appreciated that this area would be more strongly held, and that enemy would have tks at close call, particularly from the SOUTH.
A minefield running generally parallel to and EAST of GATTARA Rd onto the ridge had been reced, but though suspected, no minefield had been found WEST of the Rd by our patrols. However, our patrols in this area had been unable to penetrate further SOUTH than 291 northing grid line.

Topographical Knowledge of Objective.

6. 2/43 Bn, which had in a previous attack seen the area, reported that line of BANYET EL MITIRIYA ridge was rocky and digging extremely hard, and that ground SW of 30 metre contour line was flat and almost featureless for some miles.
Going to objective good over hard surface with a few rock strewn and sandy patches; light scrub and camelthorn on later stages of approach, and ground with few minor folds.

Outline of 2/28 Bn Plan

7. (a) 2/28 Bn was to leave its assembly area in vicinity Bn HQ 87742930 at 2355 hrs 26 Jul and cross start line 300 yds fwd of assembly area at 2400 hrs.
Two coys fwd, C Coy right and D Coy left on a frontage of 800 yds and coy depth 300 yds.
- (b) Fwd coys to be followed by a line of sappers 2/7 Fd Coy. Bn HQ then followed, ahead of B Coy right and A Coy left. A Coy echeloned to the left and with its right flank covering left of D Coy and with a sec carriers under comd for protection of left flank.
- (c) Supporting arms, with mortars and carrier pl (less one sec) were to cross start line at 0030 hrs 27 Jul, followed by A Ech tpt upon success signal.
- (d) Rate of adv - 100 yds in 2 mins
Axis of adv - 215 deg magnetic
Start line - to be taped by 2300 hrs 26 Jul and marked at centre with green light and with red light on each flank. A tape to be laid during adv to indicate bn centreline.
Control pt - to be established 3,000 yds from start line and tapes run out, diagonally to fwd Coy HQs as well as at right angles, to 400 yds on each side of centre line.
- Arrangements for control and marking appeared particularly good, and each offr of Bn HQ Gp was further issued with a diagram showing his posn in relation to Comd Post.
- (e) Det 2/7 Fd Coy in support was to be prepared to open 4 gaps in any enemy minefield encountered and mark with tapes and sign posts.
- (f) C.O. warned C Gp that fire could be expected from flanks during adv and that this would be answered by our tps on the flanks firing from the hip without changing direction, halting, or deploying.
He also said that pockets of resistance could be expected to remain on either flank of lines of adv after bn had reached its objective, but these would later be dealt with in daylight on EAST of rd by South Africans and on WEST of rd by 2/43 Bn.
- (g) Orders for consolidation included -
Bn would consolidate much in the formation in which it advanced and fwd coys would each push two pls 200 yds fwd onto flat SW of ridgeline.
6 sandbags per man to be carried between the man and A Ech vehs. Extra picks and shovels to WE Scale issued and carried similarly.
- (h) Maximum possible number of A Tk grenades to be carried by men and A Ech veh.

Action up to Capture of Objective.

8. Start line was crossed on time and to plan. There was bright moonlight which gave visibility to 800/1000 yds.
At midnight 2/12 Pd Regt had placed a concentration on an enemy fd gun posn on right of and close to line of adv. Probably in reply, enemy shelled assembly area from 0010 hrs, destroying two veh incl a mortar truck before they advanced from the area.
9. When Bn was about 800 yds fwd of start line, enemy opened up on general area of advance with fd guns, mortars and MGs, inflicting first casualties to personnel and wounding O.C. (Capt STEINHOUSE) and one pl comd B Coy (leaving them one offr); Actg O.C. C Coy (Lieut CARLTON) probably wounded at this stage.
10. At 0030 hrs, when veh of supporting arms advanced, the enemy opened with A Tk guns, and his shooting with those and other guns then became accurate. At same time, our own arty concentration on the objective opened, but effect on enemy fire in early stages of adv was not appreciable, and their fire from flanks continued.
11. On arrival at a line 87602908 - 87542913, the first group of vehs struck a minefield. The Bn centreline tape had been laid through it, but at that stage there was no gap or marking. One A Tk gun portee and one carrier were disabled on the minefield and other vehs halted at it came under fire of an enemy by A Tk gun sited on the right flank, apparently covering the field. Spandaus also opened up on the minefield and two more carriers and another veh (probably an A Tk portee) were knocked out.
12. 0100 hrs, arty concentration on objective lifted to fwd of objective and flanks, and at 0130 hrs, stopped according to plan.
13. 0242 hrs - message "We are here - Mac" intercepted by wireless, being passed back from 2/28 Bn (by a No. 18 set) to 2/43 Bn.
Report agreed code for "We have taken objective and commenced consolidation."
At this stage it was reported by Bde Sig team that their cable was about $\frac{2}{3}$ of way to objective, but that they were unable to get cable across the minefield under the fire - also that the wireless van att to 2/28 Bn had been struck and both wireless and veh destroyed. Another wireless was sent forward to the minefield, placed in a cable veh, but was unable to cross. Cable reel was then taken from veh and attempts were made to get it forward by crawling through near the gap and on the flanks - all without success.

Situation at Enemy Minefield.

14. With 2/28 Bn reported on objective and without comms, attention was focussed on the enemy minefield for some hrs.
Enemy appeared to have increased number of MGs and brought up at least another A Tk gun of smaller calibre to fire along the obstacle.
15. Immediately gap was made, three 6 pr, three 2 pr A Tk guns, two carriers and a MHC veh are reported to have passed through. Two vehs following were struck and at that stage four veh were in flames, further illuminating the area. Apparently one sub-sec D Coy 2/3 MG Bn had got through with gun and stores complete, but remainder of pl veh were hit and some

burning - crews dismounted and went on, but with what proportion of stores is not known. FOO 2/7 Fd Regt was killed and his wireless put out of action - the remaining veh of supporting arms then returned to the assembly area, incl FOO 2/12 Fd Regt.

16. 5 carriers of 2/28 Bn remaining (out of 19) commenced ferrying wounded and escorting prisoners, according to their orders. One carrier was sent out to the right to silence enemy A Tk guns. It returned in an hr and reported unable to approach guns covering the gap, but had fired into the area.

17. 2/28 Bn A Ech tpt was under orders to move fwd upon capture of objective and expected a carrier to report back. Being without news, Capt SIMPSON, at the time i/c A Ech tpt, formed up the tpt at 0130 hrs to move and was apparently undecided in view of lack of infm. The message "amm immediately" received from 2/28 Bn by 2/43 Bn was passed to him. This was followed shortly afterwards at 0230 hrs by a message similarly transmitted "We are here - Mac".

Capt SIMPSON then went ahead of A Ech tpt with amm vehs and passed through minefield gap under hy fire. An engr stores veh following him was hit at the entrance to the gap and four vehs following it were also hit. A Ech vehs came up but returned to assembly area. An amm veh blazed until late in the morning, making fifth veh on fire in the area. Daylight came.

Amm veh of 2/43 Bn was ordered fwd through Staff Capt but the driver was told that minefield gap had been blocked and was moved back some thousand yds short of the minefield.

A further effort was then prepared. At about 0825 hrs, 1 Army Tk Bde were requested to get amm fwd in two tks. When Comd 50 RTR reported for orders, situation had changed, and at about 0915 hrs, 1 Army Tk Bde were asked to counter attack to relieve 2/28 Bn.

Situation on Objective.

18. Apart from the wireless messages notifying capture of objective and two calls for amm, the only infm of situation on the objective came from -

(a) Bde L.O. who left 2/28 Bn at 0200 hrs to report objective taken. His veh was also hit during return journey and his report not available until 0308 hrs (att as Appx D).

(b) A driver of 2/28 Bn who had been detailed by Maj THOMPSON, Actg 2 i/c, to drive back COMB D Coy (wounded on journey) to the assembly area, and bring fwd amm. His veh was also knocked out and both reported to 2/43 Bn.

This party left 2/28 Bn on the objective at about 0430 hrs. There was very light shelling in that area at the time, but Maj THOMPSON mentioned enemy forming up on the right flank and right rear. Bn was digging in but ground was stony and progress slow. A party of pioneers under Lieut HARROD had been detailed to move back and silence A Tk guns firing on the minefield but had not returned by 0430 hrs.

Infm of Progress 69 Inf Bde Attack.

19. A liaison party had been sent to 69 Inf Bde at 1200 hrs 26 Jul with orders to move with the right fwd bn onto 69 Inf Bde objective, then to contact 2/28 Bn.

A similar party from 69 Inf Bde moved with 2/28 Bn to its objective.

Our liaison party was unable to maintain touch with 69 Inf Bde during its attack, and reported at 0855 hrs 27 Jul that the attack appeared disorganised.

Report by Lieut E.D. RULE att as Appx E.

20. The following messages were received through 9 Aust Div -
- 0135 hrs - 69 Bde not reaching enemy mines before 0130 hrs.
 - 0200 hrs - 69 Bde arty bombardment postponed to 0230 hrs.
 - 0223 hrs - 69 Bde reach enemy mines 0245 hrs.
 - 0315 hrs - SA made gap in minefield and 69 Bde going through.
 - 0548 hrs - Right bn 69 Inf Bde is nearing rd (.) left bn is further back (.) right gap of 300 yds made in minefield by SA is being reced by tk offr who is not yet sure it is clear of mines.

21. Only other infm of 69 Inf Bde activities came later as messages from 9 Aust Div :-

1000 hrs - LC with 69 Bde has made request (.) can 2/28 Bn observe own tps on objective near K13 (.) rumour some reached there.

1023 hrs - Comd 69 Bde's opinion fwd own tps on objective but enemy still holding out at pockets EAST.

22. Situation of 69 Inf Bde which was to be on objective at 0330 hrs and exploit at first light was not at all clear, and at least up to 1000 hrs it appeared that their attack had not been successful.

Situation as known at Bde HQ.

23. 2/28 Bn attack and supporting fire appeared to open according to plan. There was utmost confidence in 2/28 Bn's ability to carry out its task on time. 2/43 Bn was prepared to attack if objective was not gained, or counter attack if it was lost. If necessary, supported by 50 RTR Gp in daylight, 2/43 Bn's task to capture portion of ridge SANYET EL MITIRIYA on right of 2/28 Bn was to follow only on success of 69 Inf Bde.

24. The following infm was received, immediately affecting the operation :-

- (a) 0235 hrs - message from 2/28 Bn - "Ann immediately". This message preceding the Success Signal appeared serious, and Bde Comd instructed S.C. to send fwd a truck of ann immediately (if necessary, to save time, from 2/43 Bn).
- (b) 0242 hrs - Success Signal from 2/28 Bn. Received 0230 hrs at 2/43 Bn and retransmitted. This explained the ann situation somewhat, as 2/28 Bn A Ech veh were not due to leave assembly area until success notified.
- (c) 0302 hrs - 2/28 Bn request for ann repeated.
- (d) 0306 hrs - from 2/43 Bn - "Capt SIMPSON left with ann (.) 2/28 Bn A Ech leaving (.) line half way to 2/28 Bn." Situation then appeared more satisfactory.

(e) 0308 hrs - Bde LO with 2/28 Bn rang from 2/43 Bn to say - On way back (.) car knocked (.) borrowing one from 2/43 Bn (.) a number of vehs lost - ran into minefield - also solid fire from A Tk gun (.) vehs lost incl amm truck and W/T van (.) A Tk gun about 700 yds NORTH of objective on flank - also LMGs (.) party from 2/28 Bn going out to deal with them.

(f) 0320 hrs - Lieut HEAD arrived at Bde HQ and gave fuller account of difficulties at enemy minefield - see appx D.

It was then clear that 2/28 Bn were taking steps to deal with guns covering the minefield from the right.

No further reports were received except of PW passing back through 2/43 Bn and 2/13 Bn, until Bde Sig Offr rang from 2/43 Bn to report that the minefield appeared blocked and covered with A Tk and MG fire, and that he was unable to get line through, and asked if there was an alternative route.

(g) 0430 hrs - Sig Offr was called to Bde HQ to give a more detailed report. Location of enemy minefield was deduced with some accuracy from length of cable run out from assembly area, and Sig Offr was told to get line through to 2/28 Bn if humanly possible.

Line party then made attempts to crawl forward with line through the centre and then right of the gap - each time meeting enemy posts and MG fire.

(h) 0515/
0700 hrs - 2/43 Bn were ordered to send forward and try to contact 2/28 Bn - unable to get through. FOO 2/12 Fd Regt for 2/28 Bn, FOO with 2/32 Bn and OP with 2/43 Bn were instructed to go forward to locate and engage A Tk guns and enemy posts at the minefield. All were unable to pinpoint targets but fired on the area without apparent effect, and FOO with 2/32 Bn tried observation from pt 22 (87672950) and then moved out well forward of 2/43 Bn.

(i) 0729 hrs - Bde Comd ordered 2/43 Bn to send a force including two carrier borne mortar dets with carrier protection to move out and destroy guns covering the minefield gap. This force moved out not later than 0755 hrs, but found guns silent, and fired heavily on South of the minefield.

(j) 0732 hrs - Bde Sig Offr reported unable to get cable party through at gap or on right, but was going to try a wider sweep round left of the gap.

(k) 0750 hrs - Bde Comd ordered Bde LO, Lieut COOK, to visit 2/43 Bn for information, then attempt to contact 2/28 Bn. Lieut COOK's plan was to move wide to the left onto ridge SANYET EL MITIRIAY and contact 69 Inf Bde right flank or 2/28 Bn strongpost in the vicinity point 30 (87542895). He moved out in a bantam and came under mortar fire at about 87622833, where his veh was hit and destroyed. Lieut COOK was held to the ground by fire from posts nearby for 22 hrs, before able to return - report att as Appx F.

- (1) 0815 hrs - 2/12 Pz Regt commenced firing TIN CAN (support to 1 Armd Div break through). This had been cancelled at 0814 hrs, but it was not possible to stop guns until 0817 hrs. From this incident it was apparent that operations either of 69 Inf Bde or 2 Armd Bde had not gone to plan, but the situation on that front was otherwise obscure.

Counter Attack on 2/28 Bn.

25.

The situation immediately prior to word of a counter attack from 2/28 Bn appeared as follows :-

- (a) 2/28 Bn on objective and consolidating, with 6 A Tk guns and amn, one and possibly more MEG, but without A Ech tpt, balance of supporting arms and res amn.
- (b) Bn's l of C cut and held by enemy detachments, who were being engaged by a party from 2/28 Bn, a carrier force from 2/43 Bn and observed arty fire from up to three FOOs.
- (c) Balance of supporting arms and A Ech tpt in assembly area awaiting first opportunity to get through.
- (d) No wireless comm except for messages received some hrs before from a short range set, the No. 18, transmitting to the Bde No. 101 Set.
No line comm, line party having failed to get cable through near minefield gap or to its right, but at the time attempting a route to the left of the gap.
2/43 Bn unable to get contact party through, but a Bde LO attempting a route to EAST of QATTARA Rd.
- (e) Little info of progress of 69 Inf Bde attack but news of 2 Armd Bde moving up to pass through minefield gap.
3 SA Bde colns operating WEST of ALAMEIN BOX mopping up in the area from the BOX to QATTARA Rd.
- (f) 2/43 Bn and 50 RTR were standing to, awaiting advice of success of 69 Inf Bde, or to counter attack if 2/28 Bn was pushed off its objective.

26.

At about 0825 hrs, Comd 50 RTR reported for orders for an attempt to get amn forward to 2/28 Bn. At about 0915 hrs, authority of G.O.C. 9 Aust Div was received to employ 50 RTR Gp for counter attack to SANYRT EL MITEIRIYA ridge to assist 2/28 Bn.

Comd 1 Army Tk Bde who was with Comd 24 Aust Inf Bde ordered the attack, and the move forward commenced 0955 hrs.

50 RTR advanced with two sqns up, with one in reserve hull down in 2/43 Bn area.

Of these, some tanks reached a point on the ridge near pt 30 (873290) and met a ring of A Tk guns - one tp comd returned on foot and reported only Germans seen.

On the left a tp gained the ridge near RUIN (875239), saw none of our tps and were forced back by heavy HE fire; 22 tks were knocked out, of which 10 have later been brought in.

27. 0905 hrs - Comms reopened between 2/28 Bn (No. 18 set) and Bde HQ.
W/T and reception bad.
IN - "We are in trouble".

0909 hrs - Fire task F ordered for 2/7 Fd Regt, 2/12 Fd Regt, 3 Fd Regt RA.

0913 hrs - 2/12 Fd Regt opened fire.

0914 hrs

IN - "We need help now (.) we need armour".
OUT - "Where is trouble coming from".
IN - "Our front and right flank (.) rock it in".
OUT - "You are getting what you asked for with arty support (.) send map references in clear of arty and bombing targets".

At this stage, FOO with 2/43 Bn reported tks on ridge firing WEST with own tps apparently mingling with them. This gave rise to grave doubt whether we had not been firing on 2 Armd Bde, wrongly identified by 2/28 Bn. Stop to arty was given at 0917 hrs.

0918 hrs - Arty stopped.

0928 hrs - Arty ordered to continue. Rate normal.

0935 hrs - 2/43 Bn report tks 500 yds SOUTH of Kilo 9.

0938 hrs

IN - "Barrage too close on left".
2/12 Fd Regt advised and probable dispositions
2/28 Bn checked.

0940 hrs

OUT - "How far barrage to move out on left".
IN - "200 yds forward left flank".
Correction given to 2/12 Fd Regt.

0942 hrs - Arty fire corrected.

OUT - "Is concentration on left OK".
IN - "Barrage 200 yds fwd now (.) we need reinforcements".
CO 2/12 Fd Regt spoke to CRA then ordered 2/12 Fd Regt, 2/7 Fd Regt, 3 Fd Regt RA, to continue Firetask F. Rate slow, until further orders.

0943 hrs

IN - "Are there any of our tanks helping us (.) there are tanks all round us".
OUT - "Whose are they".
IN - "They are Jerries (.) you had better hurry (.) rock arty in".
OUT - "Where do you wish concentrations".
IN - "Same barrage as they made after the first lift last night over the ridge".

0945 hrs

IN - "Are there any of our tanks at 87352913".
OUT - "No."

0949 hrs

OUT - "Our witchcraft (code for tanks) with you soon (.) stick it Mac".
IN - "87352910 tanks (.) if not ours lay barrage (.) we are 1/3 strength (.) is that barrage for tanks now".

0952 hrs
OUT - "Enclosing you in arty box".
IN - "Barrage needed 87412910".
CRA asked to put one bty on this task.

1000 hrs
IN - "Barrage Kilo 10 270 yds".
OUT - "Kilo 10 astride or side of rd (.) its coming".

1003 hrs
IN - "We have got to give in".

1004 hrs
OUT - "Hold on our tanks will be with you immediately".
IN - VA VA VA.

Conclusion

28. The foregoing report has been based on information known or gained from all available sources. From the last wireless message at 1003 hrs, no direct information has been obtained, the only message being an intercept from BRIEHL Gp to Panzer Div HQ received by phone at our Main HQ at 1235 hrs 27 Jul, reading -

"From Briehl Gp to Panzer Div HQ -
pt 31 (shown as pt 30 on EL ALAMAIN 1/50,000 map)
875289 has been retaken with difficulty and 100
prisoners taken".

and later an intercept from 361 I.R. stating -

"In sector 1/361 there remains still one officer,
2 NCOs and 10 men, weapons, 1 LMG, 1 HMG, remainder
of Bn killed, wounded, missing or dispersed. Main
part of 1 Bn BRIEHL remain. Wounded cannot at
moment be looked after owing to strong arty fire".

(Full intercepts Appx J).

29. The operation was divided into phases -

(a) Capture by 2/28 Bn of objective EL MITEIRIYA ridge
from 87372906 to 87532897 by 0100 hrs.

(b) Capture of QATTARA Rd from K13 - K16 by 69 Bde by
0330 hrs.

(c) Break through by 2 Armd Bde on 69 Bde objective to
establish a southern flank and if attacked, to engage enemy
armour.

(d) Attack by 2/43 Bn on objective west of 2/28 Bn on ridge
on success of 69 Bde with 50 RTR in support, but not to be
used unless absolutely necessary. 50 RTR to exploit on
success further west to pt 31 87702926.

(e) Exploitation by 1 Armd Div (less 2 Armd Bde) westward
to DABA.

30. Phase (a) was carried out by 2/28 Bn but no succeeding
phase was completed, with the result that instead of receiving
support from 69 Bde and 2 Armd Bde, 2/28 Bn were left in a
position on EL MITEIRIYA ridge vulnerable from attack from
South, SE, SW and NW. Their position was made more precarious
by the enemy positions NW of MITEIRIYA ridge being able to
disrupt their communications.

31. The danger of the enemy counter attack from the right
flank (NW) was much stressed at each conference and this

threat made it inadvisable to use the 2/43 Bn or 50 RTR until success had been gained by 69 Bde allowing break through of 2 Arm'd Bde, except in direct support of 2/28 Bn.

32. The amount of success gained by 69 Bde is not known, but at no time did our armour (2 Arm'd Bde) advance west of the QATTARA Rd. Had this phase been attempted even up to 0900 hrs (it was due at 0700), it would have had the effect of drawing off enemy tanks which later overran 2/28 Bn.
33. 2/28 Bn knew they had to gain their objective, consolidate and hold on until 69 Bde attained their objective and 2 Arm'd Bde passed through. The matter of any withdrawal was not considered, and could not have been attempted without orders through 9 Aust Div from 30 Corps.
34. Counter attack by 50 RTR was delayed owing to lack of information from 69 Bde, and the expectation of 2 Arm'd Bde's attack being launched. When attack was launched by 50 RTR it failed to reach its objective owing to strength of enemy arty and A Tk guns which were fully concentrated on this front.
35. The attack carried out by 2/28 Bn was a brilliant and gallant one - they reached their objective and immediately consolidated. Failure of communications soon after capture was due to bold use by enemy of A Tk guns and MGs from the right flank. Despite the various measures taken to deal with enemy on right flank as described in report, they were not effective, and this had a considerable effect on the Bn being overrun, owing to a large number of their supporting arms being destroyed and the loss of observed arty support through loss of FOOs and their communications.

The outstanding reason for 2/28 Bn not being able to hold their position was the failure of the break through by our arm'd forces on left flank and the lack of information that this break through could NOT take place.

From the wireless reports from the C.O. (Lt. Col. L. McCARTER) it is obvious that the Bn put up a most stubborn resistance, whilst being attacked by tanks on all sides and that their strength had become much depleted. The claim by the Germans that 100 prisoners were taken (which would include wounded) speaks for itself, when compared with the figures of personnel unaccounted for in Appx H attached.

Although the result proved disastrous as far as 2/28 Bn are concerned, that Bn, I consider, carried out its attack with the utmost determination and skill and their resistance against large forces of German armour was most stubborn. The casualties caused to the enemy must have been severe.

(sgd) A. H. L. Godfrey Brig.
Comd 24 Aust Inf Bde.

Appx G is report from OC Carrier Pl 2/28 Bn.

Appendices to PART VI are :-

Appx VIA	Notes on Future Operations No. 1.
VIB	24 Aust Inf Bde C.O. No. 6.
VIC	Trace of Known Enemy Dispositions 26 Jul.
VID	Report by Lieut J. HEAD.
VIe	" " Lieut E. D. RULK.
VIF	" " Lieut J. T. COOK
VIG	" " Capt P. MASHL
VIh	" On Casualties
VIj	Enemy Intercepts and Casualties

PART VII - GENERAL

76.

The foregoing report brings out the fact that our tps during the period have fought hard and well. In every action, they have met with initial success. That the initial success has not always been crowned with greater result appears to be due to the following reasons :-

- (a) Initial attack on too narrow a frontage. The use of a Bde instead of a Bn would limit flanking fire and allow deeper penetration - and allow armour to exploit.
- (b) Dependence on success of other units, sometimes at considerable distance, for the launching of our succeeding phases.
- (c) Faulty communications and high casualty incident in FOCs and wireless vehs.
- (d) Tks not pushed through when crust has been broken.
- (e) Limiting feature of tks firepower (Valentines in support) as compared with enemy armour met.

77.


The break through of by tks on 27 Jul being cancelled led to B/28 Bn being exposed on all sides and was mainly responsible for the overrunning of that Bn after capturing and holding their objective until about 1000 hrs. Action to notify this Bde that this exploitation would not take place would have enabled a plan to be put into execution to extricate the Bn from the exposed position in which the failure of other units to make good their objectives, had placed it.

78.

Enemy resistance can be broken by the combined action of our arty, inf and tks, all working in one co-ordinated attack, but the isolated actions so dependent on other actions, employed to date, have not met with the success which the forceful, stubborn and gallant fighting of tps of this Bde deserves.

79.

Appx VIIa gives list of own casualties in men and material, and present strengths, together with numbers of PW and captured arms and material during the period under review.


Brig.
Comd 84 Aust Inf Bde.
(A. H. L. GODFREY)

THE APPROACH TO FORWARD AREA - 3 JUL to 1200 hrs 6 JUL incl.
(Extracts from I Log)

3 Jul

1. 0945 hrs - Bde Comd at Bde HQ 49249288 (ALEXANDRIA 1:100,000) issued verbal warning order for advance of 24 Aust Inf Bde Battle Gp to EL ALAMEIN operational area not later than 0500 hrs 4 Jul to come under comd 30 Corps. Representatives of units constituting Battle Gp were to report to Bde HQ at earliest possible with complete information as to major deficiencies in vehs, equipment and desert equipment etc.
2. At this stage it was intended that 9 Bty 3 A Tk Regt and 10 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt should move as part of group. These Btys were during the day replaced by 11 Bty 3 A Tk Regt and 12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt respectively. The Bde Gp had an exceedingly busy day attending to the equipping of the Group for its move forward.
3. 2220 hrs - issue of 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 2
(Appendix Ia)

4 Jul

4. 0530 hrs - Bde Recce Party (para 8 of O.O. No. 2) left Bde HQ on arrival at EL IMAYID ry sta (442898), Bde Comd, C.O. 2/3 Fd Regt and Bde I.O. left remainder of party near ry sta and moved to Main 30 Corps HQ which were at 442895. Bde Comd reported to Lt. Gen. NORRIE, GOC 30 Corps, and received orders from him. Bde Comd also discussed situation with C-in-C General AUCHINLECK.
(Copy of 30 Corps O.O. No. 57 is att as Appx Ib)
5. Bde Comd then returned to EL IMAYID ry sta, where he met R Gp. He read to the party the relevant portions of 30 Corps O.O. No. 57 and decided that 2/32 Bn would take up the left portion near trig 25 (433898) and that 2/43 Bn would be on right on TELL EL SHAMMAMA feature 435901. C.O. 2/43 Bn then left to recce his area and Bde Comd with remainder of Bde R Gp, carried out recce of 2/32 Bn area. Bde Comd later visited 2/43 Bn area and discussed dispositions with Bn Comd.
6. The main body of the Bde Gp was delayed on the rd for a long period to allow the passage of tps towards ALEXANDRIA. The 2/43 Bn gp was beginning to arrive in its area about 1600 hrs and 2/32 Bn gp in its area at about 1715 hrs. During late stages of the move several enemy planes did some ground strafing. One 2/43 Bn veh was destroyed.
7. 1630 hrs - Bde HQ established at 43608982.
8. At 1700 hrs, Bde Comd received infm over the telephone from BGS 30 Corps that in view of the possibility of the enemy attempting to withdraw, the 24 Bde Gp was to remain mobile and ready for a quick move. The Bde Comd therefore issued verbal orders that Bns should not proceed with the defence measures but should keep tpt well forward. At 2240 hrs, instructions were issued that "units may rest at one hr's notice". Bde Gp Recce party was to RV at Bde HQ 0600 hrs 5 Jul.
9. Notification was received that 260 A Tk Bty RA, was coming under comd.

5 Jul

10. Bde Gp Recce party gathered at Bde HQ at 0600 hrs and Bde Comd issued verbal orders for move of Bde Gp to assembly area vicinity 440892.

(Appx Ic - Notes of Verbal Orders issued by
Bde Comd at 0600 hrs 5 Jul 42).

11. At 0730 hrs Bde Comd reported at Main HQ 30 Corps and received instructions from GOC 30 Corps to establish two Bn group positions at pt 97 (42928900) and pt 93 (43188911) as a base for operations. On relief by the Bde Gp, 50 Div HQ and a force known as STANCOL which occupied a posn at pt 97 were to move to the Delta for reorganisation.
12. Bde Recce Gp then called at 50 Div HQ and then proceeded to recce areas to be occupied. At 1012 hrs Bde Comd issued verbal orders (Appx Id) to Bde Recce Gp (less 2/43 Bn and 2/3 Fd Amb Repts) near pt 97. The orders were repeated to 2/43 Bn repts at 1110 hrs at 43298915, and were read to C.O. 2/3 Fd Amb at about 1345 hrs at the Bde assembly area.
13. Once again the heavy traffic and general accumulation of MT on areas of good going made convoy movement most difficult and slow. Units did not reach their new areas until late afternoon. Bde HQ was established 1830 hrs at 43408916.

6 Jul.

14. Bde Gp was busily engaged in occupation and improvement of their posns. The minefd in vicinity of pt 97 was found to be only three rows deep, with large gaps. Steps were immediately taken to lay 3 additional rows of mines, and to close large gaps. Traffic detours were enforced to prevent traffic through 2/32 Bn area.
15. During the morning the GOC AIF(ME), Sir Leslie Morshead visited the Bde area, and with the Bde Comd went forward to pt 79 (89132780) to see the fwd areas. The posn at this time was that the line forward of the Bde posn was held by 1 Armd Div, which included 4 Armd Bde and 22 Armd Bde, together with a number of colns, known as ACKCOL (or SACKCOL), SQUEAKCOL & ROBCOL. These three colns were later organised into the WALL MOTOR GROUP, the constitution of which is shown in Appx Ie. Opposite the 1 Armd Div, and therefore in the fwd areas West of the Bde Gp, were the remnants of the 15 and 21 German Panzer Divs, and the area north to grid line 890 was believed to be held by the German 90 Lt Div. About this time, however, there were indications that a relief was being effected between 90 Lt Div and the Italian PAVIA Div, taking the 90 Lt Div SW to meet a threat from the NZ Div. The estimated tk strength of the enemy was 30 German tks and some 80 Italian tks.
- The low ridge on which the Bde Gp took up posn was tactically most important because it provided the only satisfactory "going" between the bitumen road on the coast and the BARREL TRACK. The enemy attacks of the past week, which had threatened Alexandria, had been therefore directed on the general axis of the ridge.

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COPY

SECRET
Copy No.
3 Jul 42.

24 Aust Inf Bde C.O. No. 2.

Ref maps: ALEXANDRIA 1/100,000
 EL HAMMAM 1/100,000

INFORMATION

1. General line of fighting is now area ALAMEIN SOUTH. During afternoon and night 2/3 Jul enemy attacked in NORTH with armad units. Our forces counter attacked and were in turn attacked by the enemy armad units. Reported that in battle enemy lost number of tanks.
2. The following is composition of 24 Aust InfBde Battle Gp to come under comd 30 Corps for operations from 4 Jul 42 -

HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde
K Sec Sigs
one sec HQ Gd Bn
76 LAD
2/32 Bn
2/43 Bn
2/8 Fd Regt and 64 LAD
11 Bty 3 A Tk Regt
12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt
one sec 2/7 Fd Coy
D Coy 2/2 MG Bn
101 GenTpt Coy
two pls 345 Gen. Tpt Coy RASC
2/3 Fd Amb (less details)

INTENTION

3. 24 Aust Inf Bde Gp will adv to EL ALAMEIN operational area 4 Jul 42.

METHOD

4. Preceded by a Bde Recce Pty, the Bde Gp will move in three gps, with protective dets on two rds to the area EL HAMMAM, and there halt and await further orders for movement from 30 Corps.
5. Adv Gd Route A Comd - Capt M.R. JEHANES, 2/43 Bn
 Carrier pl 2/43 Bn
 D Coy 2/43 Bn
 one tp 11 A Tk Bty

 Route B Comd - Capt K. KORWOOD, 2/32 Bn
 Carrier pl (less one sec) 2/32 Bn
 A Coy 2/32 Bn
 one tp 11 A Tk Bty
6. Grouping - Grouping and order of march - Appx A.
7. Speed - Routes and timings - Appx A.
8. Recce Party - Recce party to accompany Bde Comd, to depart 0500 hrs, will incl -

C.O. 2/8 Fd Regt
C.O. 2/43 Bn
2 i/c 2/32 Bn
B.M. (L)
I.O.
L.Os. 1, 11, 111
W/T veh

9. Left out of Battle Personnel

Bn 2 i/cs will accompany gps for initial move - remainder 2 Pl HQ Gd Bn and left out of battle personnel will be placed u/c 2/28 Bn in DIKEILA area.

ADM

10. Sup - The following will be carried in unit vehs -

2 days normal sup
3 days hard rations

Units unable to carry this weight of sup will have it carried in bulk by 101 Gen Tpt Coy.

11. POL POL for 150 miles for all veh.

12. Amn 1st line ech.

13. Rec One breakdown veh 3 Rec Sec is allotted 64 and 76 LADs.

INTERCOMN

14. Bde HQ closes present posn 0955 hrs, then moves at head of Gp 11.

15. Codes and Code Names are to be reissued on arrival 30 Corps area.

(sgd) D.R. Jackson Maj.
R.M. 24 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK

Time of signature 2220 hrs

Issued by LO and Sigs

Distribution

COPY

2/32 Bn	1
2/43 Bn	2
2/8 Fd Regt	3
11 Bty 3 A Tk Regt	4
12 Bty 4 Lt AAREgt	5
4 sec 2/7 Fd Coy	6
K Sec Sigs	7
D Coy 2/8 MG Bn	8
2 Pl HQ Gd Bn	9
101 Gen Tpt Coy	10
345 Gen Tpt Coy RASC	11
2/3 Fd Amb	12
76 LAD	13
30 Corps	14-15
9 Aust Div	16
20 Aust Inf Bde	17
26 Aust Inf Bde	18
2/28 Bn	19
Comd	20
S.C.	21
T.C.	22
Bde Sup P.	23
File	24-25
War Diary	26-27

APPX 'A' - MOVEMENT TABLE

SECRET

Appx Ia

issued with 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O.No.2.

Initial concentrations: to be completed by 0830 hrs.
Route A : coast rd.
Route B : coast rd to rd junc 47349160, thence BURG EL ARAB - RL QASIMIYA
 track NORTH of ry line, to EL HAMMAN.
Speed & Density : 10 mih 20 vtm.
Halts: : 20 mins to each even clock hr for 20 mins, commencing 0940 hrs.
Start Point : Flagged point on coast rd 1 mile SW of fwd A Tk ditch.

Ser No	Group	Units	Timings		Route	Remarks
			Past S.P. Head	Tail		
1	Adv Gd, Route B	Carrier pl (less one sec) 2/32 Bn one coy 2/32 Bn one tp 11 A Tk Bty			B	
2	Bde Comd Gp		0900	0902	B	CO 2/32 Bn, B.M., S.C. (C), L.O., W/T veh
3	Gp 1	2/32 Bn (less one coy and carriers) 11 Bty 5 A Tk Regt (less two tps) D Coy 2/2 MG Bn one tp 12 Lt AA Bty	0903	0951	B	Concentrate in 2/32 Bn
4	Gp 11	HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde K Sec Sigs one sec HQ Gd Bn one sec 2/7 Fd Coy one sec 9 Aust Div Pro Coy 2/8 Fd Regt (less one bty) 64 LAD 12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt (less two tps)	0956	1050	B	Concentrate in Bde HQ area
5	Left flank Gd	one carrier sec 2/32 Bn	1055	1057	B	Free movt after BURG EL ARAB
6	Adv Gd Route A	Carrier pl 2/43 Bn one coy 2/43 Bn one tp 11 A Tk Bty	1102	1110	A	Free movt after rd junc 47349160
7	Gp 111	2/43 Bn (less one coy & carrier pl) 16 Bty 2/8 Fd Regt 2/3 Fd Amb 76 LAD one tp 12 Lt AA Bty 101 Gen Tpt Coy	1115		A	101 Gen Tpt Coy will not assemble in 2/43 Bn area prior to 1030 hrs

COPY

SECRET
Copy No.
239/G
3 Jul 42.

30 Corps O.O. No. 57.

Ref maps 1/250,000 sheet DABA
1/100,000 " 88/42
ALL REFERENCES TO THE RED GRID.

INFORMATION

1. 9 Aust Div (Comd, Lt.Gen. Sir L. MORSHHEAD) is joining EIGHTH ARMY and has been placed under comd 30 Corps.
2. The leading bde gp will probably comprise -
 - one sqn Div Cav (carriers)
 - two bns
 - one fd regt (24 guns)
 - one fd coy
 - one fd shtb
 - one coy MG bn
3. Although enemy air has up to date been dominated by our own RAF, some interference is still possible on the way up. Hostile air activity increased considerably in the fwd areas today.

INTENTION.

4. The leading bde gp 9 Aust Div will prevent the enemy advancing EAST of the 435 Easting Grid between the sea and the 895 Northing Grid should he either penetrate or outflank the EL ALAMEIN defended locality. Subsequent role of 9 Aust Div will depend on general situation and on instructions received from Commander-in-Chief.

METHOD

5. The bde gp will establish two bn defended localities in the general areas :-
 - (a) pt 23 435901 (ABYAR EL SHAMMARA)
 - (b) Pt 25 and Pt 24 about 433898.

The ry and old rd will both be denied to the enemy.
6. The leading bde gp will be under comd 50 Div pending the arrival of HQ 9 Aust Div.
7. Recce parties report HQ 30 Corps by last light 3 Jul. Bde gp is expected to arrive by 1300 hrs 4 Jul. Posns as stated in para 4 will be prepared and occupied as early as possible.
8. 2,000 mines, wire pickets and sandboxes are available at BURG EL ARAB for the locality defences and will be drawn in bde tpt by arrangements with CE 30 Corps.

It is hoped to make power tools, explosives and one sec Fd Coy available to assist with work on the hard ground in the northern locality.

ADM

9. 9 Aust Div, less the leading bde gp, will move westwards from AMIRIYA and come into Div res NORTH of the ry in the general area between 455 and 465 Easting Grids.

10. Movement fwd of all tps will be by the main rd and routes NORTH of the ry. Strictest rd discipline will be observed and movement will be at a density of NOT more than 20 VTM. MT colns will not pass line BURG ABU SIR 473916 - BURG EL ARAB 475911 until given "all clear" by ACVL, Main 30 Corps, through exchange BURG EL ARAB. A staff officer of 9 Aust Div will ring up 30 minutes before colns are due to reach this line.

11. Further adm instn will be issued separately.

INTERCOMM

12. 30 Corps will establish L/T between Bde HQ and following by 1200 hrs 4 Jul :-

- HQ 30 Corps
- HQ 50 Div
- HQ 1 SA Div

L/T with 9 Aust Div HQ will be provided under arrangements by 9 Aust Div.

13. Leading bde will be netted on the 50 Div W/T fwd control frequency.

14. Until such time as HQ 9 Aust Div assumes control, leading bde will provide three LOs for work as follows :-

- one with HQ 30 Corps
- one with HQ 50 Div
- one with HQ 1 SA Div

In addition, a "G" and a "Q" liaison staff officers will be dispatched to 30 Corps HQ (Rear) as early as possible for attachment until HQ 9 Aust Div arrives.

15. Pregnet locations.

Main 30 Corps HQ	441893
Rear "	443893
1 SA Div HQ	430899
50 Div HQ	435892
1 Armd Div HQ	437893

ACK		(sgd)	Brig.
Method of issue	LO ELS		General Staff.
Time of signature	1930		

Distribution

	<u>Copy No.</u>		<u>Copy No.</u>
9 Aust Div	1-3	G(SD)	14
50 Div	4	CCRA	15
1 Armd Div	5	CE	16
1 SA Div	6	CSO	17
13 Corps	7	AQ	18
Tac EIGHTH ARMY	8	ST	19
ALEX area	9	M	20
AMIRIYA sub area	10	OS	21
Comd	11	Pro	22
BGS	12	War Diary	23,24
G(I)	13	File	25

Notes of Verbal Orders issued by Bde Comd at 0600 hrs
5 Jul at 24 Aust Inf Bde HQ area 436898 ref KL HAMMAN
1/100,000

(Notes taken by Bde I.O., Lieut E.T.S. PEARCE)

Infm

Enemy recently launched tk attack which failed. There are signs of enemy weakening and withdrawing. 13 Corps are to conduct an indirect pursuit and 30 Corps are conducting a direct pursuit Westward South of ry line.

Intention

24 Aust Inf Bde Gp will move to assembly area vicinity 440892.

Method

Rece parties report 30 Corps 0700 hrs 5 Jul.
Gps constituted as follows :-

- A Gp 2/8 Fd Regt (less 16 Bty)
 260 A Tk Bty R.A.
 one tp 4 Lt AA Regt

- B Gp 2/32 Bn
 D Coy 2/2 MG Bn
 12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt (less two tps)
 4 sec 2/7 Fd Coy
 11 A Tk Bty (less one tp)

- C Gp Bde HQ
 2/43 Bn
 one tp 11 A Tk Bty
 2/3 Fd Amb
 one tp 4 Lt AA Regt

- D Gp 101 Gen Tpt Coy

Start Line

Ry crossing KL INAYID Sta 442898.

Start Times

- A Gp 0715 hrs
- B Gp 0800 hrs
- C Gp 0915 hrs

15 vtm
10 mih

Adm

Normal

.....

Notes of Verbal Orders issued by Bde Comd
1012 hrs 5 Jul 42 near pt 97 (430890).

(Notes taken by 24 Aust Inf Bde I.O., Lieut E.T.S. PEARCE).

Ref map: DARA 1:250,000

INFORMATION - as already given.

INTENTION: 24 Aust Inf Bde will hold posns at pt 97 (430890) and between pt 93 and pt 95 (432892) as bases for operations.

METHOD:

One battle gp fwd on pt 97 posn.
One battle gp on res posn between pt 93 and pt 95.

Compositions

No. 1 Gp (pt 97) -
one tp 58 Bty, 2/3 Fd Regt
11 Bty 3 A Tk Regt
D Coy 2/2 MG Bn
No. 4 Sec 2/7 Fd Coy
one tp 4 Lt AA Regt
All under comd C.O. 2/32 Bn

In support:
Two btys, less one tp, 2/3 Fd Regt.

No. 2 Gp
HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde
2/43 Bn
260 Bty 28 Fd Regt R.A.
2/3 Fd Regt less two btys
12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt less one tp
36 Fd Amb

No. 1 Gp will move into selected posns at earliest under COs arrangements.

No. 2 Gp will move forward on completion of move of No. 1 Gp.

Arty. Two btys support No. 1 Gp
One bty supports No. 2 Gp

Minefields within area are to be inspected and reported on. Spare mines are available within Box to complete field. Defensive works will proceed.

ADM: SP, AP, POL P will be advised.

INTERCOMM: Bde HQ will be in area WEST of pt 95 (436893). Line will be laid by Bde to Bn Hqs.

The above orders were issued verbally at 1110 hrs to 2/43 Bn rep at 4328915.

C.O. 2/3 Fd Amb was shown these notes at 1354 hrs at assembly area.

.....

WALL MOTOR GP

Comd Brig. R.P. WALLER D. SO., M.C.
Det sigs

ROBCOL

Comd - Lt. Col. A. O. MCCARTHY M. C.

Tps - HAC Bty RHA
Two tps 113 L.A.A. Bty
11 Fd Regt
1/4 Essex
Three pls 1 RNF (MMGs)
Med Det.
3 I.M.B.T. Coy.

SQUEAKCOL

Comd - Lt. Col. D. PURDON M. C.

Tps - 539 Bty RHA (104 RHA)
9 RB
Two pls 1 RNF (A Tk)
113 L.A.A. Bty less two tps

ACKCOL (under comd SQUEAKCOL)

3 RHA
Three Coys Coldstream and Scots Gds.
One pl Buffs (A Tk)
One pl 1 RNF (A Tk)

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SECRET

Copy No. _____

6 Jul 42.

To

Lt Col W.J. WAIN
2/43 BN

24 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN NO. 1

Ref maps DABA 1:250000
1:100000

INFN

1. As per Bde Int Sum No. 1 and special summary to be issued for the task.

TASK

2. You will recce the area WEST of ALAM BAOSHAZA 9827 with a view to taking either of the following actions :-

(a) Send fighting patrols to inflict damage on enemy A Tk guns, demolish derelict tks, obtain infm of enemy dispositions, and kill or capture enemy encountered - and return.

(b) As for (a) but remain and dig in - in this case the patrols will be supported at first light by 6 pdr guns and tks which will move fwd.

3. Recce

(a) Suggested initial recce party -

Coy Comd
Three pl comd
Sec comd 2/7 Fd Coy

(b) Guides are arranged to be available at Trig ALAM BAOSHAZA at 1400 hrs 6 Jul to take recce parties fwd to OPs from HQ WALGROUP.

A.H.L. GODFREY

Brig
Comd 24 Aust Inf Bde

Time of issue 1220 hrs.

COPY

SECRET
HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde
7 Jul 42.

RAIDING PARTY NIGHT 7/8 JUL - EXTRACT OF ORDERS - 2/43 AUST INF BN

1. OBJECT
 - A. Destruction A Tk guns disposed east and SW pt 72, 88472767.
 - B. Destruction enemy tpt and AFVs, killing or capturing of personnel disposed along LOW RIDGE 885279.
2. STRENGTH
4 offrs, 84 ORs (incl 20 engineers)
3. COMPOSITION
 - A. Three gps each 1 offr 24 ORs (incl 6 engineers)
 - B. one gp 1 offr 12 ORs (incl 2 engineers)
4. TPT to FUP
6 tp carriers
3 pl trucks
11 Carriers (incl Comds)
5. FUP
Pt 71, 88612755.
6. MOVEMENT
All gps will move in ech to contour 70 ridge then :-
 - A. Right gp will exploit 800 yds east along contour 70, thence north to 'L' in LOW RIDGE (847793)
 - B. Left gp will exploit 800 yds SW along contour 70 then NW towards EL RUWEISAT returning through "E" in RUWEISAT (820792). Exploitation along LOW RIDGE westwards to trig 63 760794.
 - C. Centre gp will remain at pt 72 until right and left gps gain contact, thence move northwards giving inner flank protection.
7. START TIME 2400 hrs (area contour 70)
8. EXTRICATION. FOO (11 Regt) with 43 Bn HQ.
FOO is to report pt 71 (88612755) by 2000 hrs 7 Jul.
9. MEDICAL SB with each gp.
3 Amb to be available, one in rear FUP pt 71.
10. INTERCOMM Tac HQ 2/43 Bn pt 71 thence pt 72 (88472767).
Tac HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde - with WALLER GROUP at pt 79 (89132780).
One No. 101 Set - Tac HQ 2/43 Bn.
One No. 101 Set - Tac HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde.

(sgd) D.R. Jackson Maj.
B.M. 24 Aust Inf Bde.

COPY

Ref map: el DABA el ALAMEIN, 1/100,000

PATROL REPORT OF PATROL BY 2/43 Aust Inf Bn - night 7/8 Jul 42.

TYPE: Fighting.
STRENGTH: Capt M.R. JEANES, 3 offrs 64 ORs of D Coy, 2/43 Aust Inf Bn. 6 Stretcher Bearers of 2/43 Aust Inf Bn. 20 sappers of 2/7 Fd Coy.
OBJECT: Destruction of enemy A Tk guns, enemy vehs and enemy in general area pt 66, 883277, with exploitation to trig 63, 87602794, if possible.
ROUTE: To pt 71, 88612756, thence to 88472760 with pls in echelon, thence a fanning out to NORTH, NE and WEST.
TIME OUT: 2300 hrs (from pt 71)
TIME IN: 0300 hrs (to pt 71).
RESULT: 4 enemy A Tk guns, 6 tractors were destroyed. 1 75 mm or 105 mm gun was destroyed. 1 A Tk gun apparently destroyed by the enemy. 1 carrier recovered. 3 damaged British tks were demolished. 9 PWs were captured. 15 enemy were killed, besides other possible casualties. One enemy MG recovered.

Our casualties; 1 missing, believed killed. 7 wounded.

REPORT: The Coy moved out from its posn in area 431891 (ref map el HAMMAN, 1/100,000) at 1730 hrs to an assembly area 1,000 yds SE of pt 71, 88612756 and formed up at 2230 hrs at pt 71. It moved off at 2300 hrs in echelon (17 Pl, Coy HQ, 18 Pl, 16 Pl) for 1400 yds to approx 88472760, when the fwd pl reported enemy occupation of the ridge about 800 yds to the NW. At this time some light MG fire was coming from this ridge and beyond as well as some A Tk fire from the same area. The enemy was using tracers. The area in the vicinity of 3 British tks damaged on 7 Jul appeared to be strongly held and without delay the fwd pl pushed in a frontal attack. The other 2 pls fanned out to right and left and attacked frontally. Resistance came from the area of the 3 tks and this was knocked back. The pl concerned re-organised SE of the ridge and the following is a report of the action taken by pls.

16 Pl (Sgt W.B. CURREN, Comd)

From 88472760 pl moved off N for 350 yds thence on 284 $\frac{1}{2}$ deg for 200 yds (approx 88462763) where one gun, probably a 50mm gun, and tractor with crew of at least 3 were found. The gun and tractor with amn were destroyed, 1 PW was taken and two enemy were killed. This crew appeared to have 1 sub machine gun which was used by the enemy but no rifles. Pl moved fwd a further 150 yds on the same bearing while the gun and tractor were blazing and Pl Comd could hear tpt moving westerly off the ridge. Fire was opened on the tpt (2 tractors) which returned the fire. Three grenades were thrown into one vehicle and it blew up; fire prevented approach to the second vehicle which was at its side. Two PW were obtained and four men disappeared into the darkness. Pl continued a further 150 yds to another tractor, without crew, which was destroyed by sappers. Throughout this phase 2 MGs and two A Tk guns were firing at the Pl from the ridge to the East. Six men returned to this ridge and came under fire from sub machine guns and A Tk guns. Enemy also used grenades. While these men were moving up an explosion was heard from the ridge and the Pl Comd is of the opinion that the enemy blew one of their own guns. Pl seized the two guns (A Tk) which had been firing, sappers destroyed one of them and a Thermite bomb was placed in the other. One PW was obtained, one enemy was killed and balance of crews disappeared into the darkness. A live carrier was found here and it was driven back to the assembly area by a member of the pl (maps found in this carrier have been handed to Bde I.O.). While the last two guns were being destroyed, remainder of pl returned to assembly area under comd Pl Sgt.

17 Pl (Lieut E. C. GRANT)

From 88472760 pl continued on 284½ deg for about 400 yds and Pl Comd saw 3 "Honey" tks on the ridge. Pl moved in and sappers destroyed these 3 tks which had steel cables attached to them on the enemy's side. Coy Comd then ordered Pl to attack a pt from which verrey lights were being fired. Pl moved on bearing of about 360 deg. for about 300 yds and fired on the posn. An MG firing from this posn caused the Pl two casualties. Enemy retired when Pl was about 50 yds from the posn leaving 1 seriously wounded man and one 50mm gun and tractor on the posn. The gun and tractor were destroyed and the man was too seriously wounded to move, but he was searched and nothing was found. Pl then moved back with its two wounded men and the enemy MG.

18 Pl (Lieut G. D. GOMBE)

From 88472760 Pl moved off to the West for 310 yds then turned N for about 200 yds and located slightly to the East an enemy gun which was firing towards the East. Pl moved to the left and rear of the gun posn and engaged same. Pl moved in, killed 3 enemy, took 5 prisoners and destroyed the gun, tractor and amn. This gun was either a 75mm or 105mm. Pl reorganised and deferred further action until 17 Pl had completed demolition of the tks, remained in posn and finally withdrew under orders.

GENERAL.

Movement of all pls was considerably hampered once demolition started by the light caused by blazing guns and tractors. The enemy obviously expected trouble; he was very nervous and wide awake. He fired many flares including twin Green and Red. He failed to put up a stout resistance except in the case of crews of last two guns destroyed by 16 Pl. The posn appeared to be poorly held, and without any coordinated fire plan. While similarly held, penetration of the ridge can be effected at any time. A number of guns appeared to be sighted in the reverse slope of the ridge with some set well back. Coy Comd reports that there appeared to be an 88m gun and posn containing at least 3 LMGs on a bearing of 285 deg from pt 71, 88612756 and about 800 yds beyond the demolished tks.

After conversation with personnel engaged in the raid, I am of the opinion that enemy casualties have been underestimated and would rather approximate 40.

When engaged by our tps the enemy appear to have been inclined to take to their heels rather than offer resistance.

(sgd) W. J. WAIN Lt. Col.
Comd 2/43 Aust Inf Bn.

TO: O.C.
2/7 Aust Fd Coy RAE

REPORT ON RAID ON ENEMY POSITIONS AREA 884276 FROM PT 71(88612756).

The following personnel took part: Sgt Gressley C.A., Sprs Benbow, Newman, Harvey, Daley, Swain, Hollett, Dyke, Haren, David, McAllan, Trethewey, Renwick, Shadforth, Hegson A.J., Vickers, Litfin, Gordon D.G., Coe, and Kilpatrick.

Parties of two moved with each Infantry section carrying three prepared charges per man (a) 10 lbs of ammonal (b) two 5 lb charges of gelignite. Infantry carried thermite incendiary bombs and No. 73 Grenades. Each Sapper carried two hand grenades and thirteen carried revolvers.

Works performed were :- Three British tanks previously knocked out were completely destroyed. Sappers say that there was one Honey and two General Grants. Three half tracked troop carriers were destroyed by Sappers one containing ammunition. Three guns (it is thought 50mm) were destroyed by Sappers. One gun, either 88mm or 105mm was destroyed. This gun had a telescopic sight attached. A Spandau was brought in by a Sapper and given to the Infantry, also one TBMG.

All sappers returned safely and in high spirits.

Conclusions : - For a party like this equipment to be carried per man should be -

- (1) Two 5 lb charges of ammonal, two 5 lb charges of gelignite, two thermite incendiary bombs, two hand grenades, and pistol with 12 rounds.
- (2) A 5 lb charge on the breech block of any gun will render it irrecoverable.
- (3) A 10 lb ammonal charge inside any tank will damage it beyond repair and probably set it on fire.
- (4) Thermite incendiaries are most useful for rapid destruction of guns. Molten metal apparently welds breech block into position.

(sgd) P. Wyche Lieut.
 4 Section Comd

8 Jul 42.

APPX III

MOVE TO COASTAL AREA AND RECES FOR EXPLOITATION
WEST AND SW, 8-15 Jul incl.

1. On 7 Jul 30 Corps had issued an order to the effect that the front then held by the Corps should be strengthened artificially in order to release largest possible amount of armour and arty for mobile action. GOC 1 Arm'd Div was required to forward recommendations for defence of his sector by 1800 hrs 7 Jul, including recommendations as to the part that he desired 24 Aust Inf Bde to take in these new plans. A copy of the message embodying these instructions is attached as Appx IIIa.

8 Jul

2. The new plan, however, did not produce any alteration in the task of the Bde for at 0300 hrs 8 Jul a message was received from Main 9 Aust Div as follows:- "24 Aust Inf Bde Gp will send recce party to 26 Aust Inf Bde area a.m. 8 Jul with view to taking over area after completion 24 Aust Inf Bde relief by 5 Indian Bde". The area held at this time by the 26 Bde was the area astride ry and coastal rd previously occupied by 24 Bde. The recce party found that the 26 Bde posns were fwd of the posns planned by our Bde previously, but it was decided to take over the 26 Bde dispositions.
3. 24 Aust Inf Bde, it might be mentioned, still had only two bns in the operational area. 2/28 Bn was still near ALEXANDRIA under comd AUST RES Gp, AMIRIYA.
4. Late in the afternoon 4 Fd Regt R.A., came into Bde area and under our comd, taking the place of 2/8 Aust Fd Regt, which had previously moved to EL ALAMEIN to co-operate in 26 Bde attack in that area.

9 Jul

5. Under direct instructions from 30 Corps, another raid by 2/43 Bn in sq 8327 was being planned. 9 Aust Div, however, declined permission, as the operation might result in delay in the relief of the bn concerned.
6. At 1408 hrs, 9 Jul, Bde Comd issued verbal orders for move to coastal area.
- (Notes on orders att as Appx IIIb)
7. At 1615 hrs, 101 Gen Tpt Coy, 3 Div Sec OPF, and 3 Rec Sec moved into their new area. 260 A Tk Bty, 28 Fd Regt R.A., also left the area and came under comd 20 Aust Inf Bde.
8. About 1700 hrs elements of 5 Ind Bde arrived, and 3/10 BALUCHS began to relieve 2/43 Bn and 4/6 RAJPUTS began to relieve 2/32 Bn.

10 Jul

9. Bde Gp moved to its new area early in the morning and Bde HQ was established at 0950 hrs at 43309015.
10. During the afternoon and night 2/28 Bn moved fwd from AMIRIYA and bivouaced about 5 miles East of Bde HQ, with Bn HQ at 44349000.

11 Jul

11. The 2/28 Bn moved from bivouac area during the day, and took up a defensive posn between 2/43 Bn and 2/32 Bn.

(see dispositions trace att as Appx IIIc)

12 Jul

12. At 0730 hrs Bde Comd visited Tac 9 Aust Div. On his return Bde O Gp was summoned and the Bde Comd at 1015 hrs issued verbal orders for an attack on ridge trig 33 (87662887) to trig 30 (87002928).

(Notes of orders att as Appx IIIId)

13. The Bde R Gp RVED at Bde HQ at 1530 hrs, and moved to Tac 9 Div intending to meet guides there and proceed on recce. However, on arrival the Bde Comd was informed by the GOC that the attack on the feature just mentioned would not be made at the moment.
14. Lt. Col. J. E. LOUGHREY, CO 2/28 Bn, who had been ill for some days, was evacuated this evening, and Maj J. P. COX assumed acting comd of the Bn.

13 Jul

15. 0925 hrs - message to Bde Comd that GOC 9 Aust Div desired to see him immediately and that Bde came under one hr's notice as from 0930 hrs.
16. At 1100 hrs, Bde O Gp met to receive verbal orders (Appx IIIe). Bde Comd explained that 21 Panzer Div was moving from SOUTH up towards EL ALAMEIN and that 24 Bde was required to hold present posn and be prepared to move forward a short notice for counter offensive. The Bde Comd appreciated that 21 Panzer Div might attack either (a) Salient along coast held by 26 Bde, or (b) ALAMEIN Box itself, or (c) might make a thrust to the NE, SOUTH of ALAMEIN Box. The lastnamed was considered the most dangerous, and the Bde Comd therefore decided to give greater depth to the southern sector of the Bde area. To achieve this the Bde Comd decided to move the 2/28 Bn to a posn in rear of the 2/32 Bn.
17. The B. E. and Maj COX therefore went on recce for new bn area. The area determined on is shown in att trace (Appx IIIf). By 1730 hrs 2/28 Bn rifle coys were in posn and digging hard. Bn HQ was established at 43568988.
18. During the afternoon and evening, the enemy launched attacks on 26 Bde and on SW portion of ALAMEIN Box. The attacks were however successfully repulsed.
19. At about 2000 hrs, R Gp of 3 Fd Regt R.A. (with only 8 guns) arrived and went fwd to Tac 9 Div. The intention was that they should relieve 2/12 Fd Regt RAA, but this being impossible at the time, the 3 Fd Regt came under comd.
20. During the day, 101 Gen Tpt Coy AASC left our comd; they were replaced by 11 Coy AASC.

14 Jul

21. At 0830 hrs, Bde Comd left for Tac 9 Div, where he spent some three hours in conference. At this stage, it was proposed that the 24 Bde should exploit WESTWARDS from 26 Bde area.
22. Accordingly, the Bde R Gp RVED at Bde HQ at 1530 hrs. The Bde Comd went ahead, and when he reached Tac 9 Div, he learned that plans had been changed and the Bde was now required to exploit SW from 26 Bde and ALAMEIN Box to a line running approx through pt 23 (37252969) trig 22 (87672950) K 8 (87732925).
23. The R Gp, which had moved forward to Tac 9 Div, then left and carried out recce from a S.A. post at 88132933 and from

pt 26 (87913001). The party was accompanied by Brig RICHARDS, who was comd tks which were to co-operate with our inf.

24. On leaving pt 26, the Bde Comd moved ahead to Tac 9 Div, and when the remainder of the R Gp arrived about 1900 hrs, they received the news that the projected operation was definitely off, and that orders would be received later for a move by 24 Bde to ridge ALAM EL HALFA 4388.

25. At 2035 hrs, a Warning Order for the move was issued (Appx IIIg).

26. At about 2230 hrs, LO brought copy of 9 Aust Div O.C. No. 5 but this order gave little additional info.

27. 3 Fd Regt R.A. left our comd and area during the afternoon.

15 Jul

28. 0545 hrs, 9 Div advised over the telephone that the projected move was cancelled and Bde was to remain in present posn.

29. During the night 14/15 Jul and early morning 15 Jul, 2/12 Fd Regt moved from EL ALAMNIN into Bde area and came under comd. At about 0900 hrs, they reported that all guns except one were in posn and the remaining gun was expected any moment. At 1215 hrs, a message was received to the effect that 2/12 Fd Regt and one tp 12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt were to move to EL ALAMNIN to be in posn 1700 hrs 15 Jul coming under comd RAA 9 Aust Div from 1300 hrs.

.....

Copy

TO: 1 Arm'd Div, 9 Aust Div, 1 Army Tk Bde, rpt'd Tac 8th Army,
Main 8th Army, Main 13 Corps, 1 SA Div, Rear 30 Corps,
CORA CE GSO G(I) G(SD)

FROM: Main 30 Corps

0 180

7

Confirming verbal orders to Comd 1 Arm'd Div (.) C in Cs policy that front now held by 30 Corps should be strengthened artificially in order to release largest possible amount armour and arty for mobile action (.) 1 Arm'd Div will (.) First (.) Continue present role (.) Second (.) Organise defence of present sector by use of mines wire and anti tank guns supported by arty MMGs and inf (.) Least possible number inf will be used (.) Inter div boundary all incl 1 SA Div 283 Northing grid WEST to 882285 thence 873286 - thence NORTH on 873 Easting grid (.) Third (.) Withdraw 4 Arm'd Bde Gp incl arty engineers and inf to area SW of pt 97.430886 prepared to operate as needed under comd either 1 or 7 Arm'd Divs or independently (.) 4 Arm'd Bde will remain under comd 1 Arm'd Div but will be in GHQ mobile reserve and NOT used without permission from HQ 30 Corps (.) In order to carryout maintenance and inspection vehicles at least one third of bde will be placed at fourhrs notice to take part in operations remainder at discretion Comd 1 Arm'd Div according to situation (.) Policy re-equipment will be to build up 4 Arm'd Bde Gp as strong as possible in armour (.) All GRANT STUART AND CRUSADER tks coming from base will be allotted this formation (.) Only tks capable of operating further 80 miles will be kept in 4 Arm'd Bde (.) 22 Arm'd Bde will consist of all other tks capable of fighting and NOT incl in 44R Tanks (.) 44 R Tanks incl any other VALENTINES or MATILDAS arriving from base will be in Corps reserve concentrating area EL IMAYID 443900 (.) Comd 1 Arm'd Div will forward recommendations for defence his sector by 1800 hrs 7 Jul and will NOT begin construction ~~in~~ until recommendations approved (.) When approved construction will begin immediately and be carried out as quickly as possible (.) 1 Arm'd Div will forward earliest requirements engineer stores and mines and engineer assistance needed (.) Recommendations will state (.) First (.) What tps of 24 Aust Bde will be needed and where they should be placed (.) Second (.) What party of construction should be undertaken by 24 Aust Bde (.) What assistance in working parties 24 Aust Bde should provide (.) 24 Aust Bde will remain under comd 9 Aust Div (.) Reorganisation armour will be put in hand immediately and completed earliest possible (.) ACK

≠ THIRD (.)

TCO 1245

If liable to be intercepted or fall into
enemy hands this message MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER

NOTES ON VERBAL ORDERS ISSUED BY BDE COMD AT
 HQ 24 AUST INF BDE (43408916) AT 1408 HRS 9 JUL 42

Ref map: HAMMAM 1:100,000

We are being relieved in this posn by 5 Ind Bde. Time of relief is uncertain.

We move over to posn on coast which we previously occupied.

INTENTION: 24 Aust Inf Bde will occupy area TELL EL SHAMMAMA (435901) and trig 25 (433898) and be ready to move at short notice.

METHOD: We will occupy new posn with 2/43 Bn on right, 2/32 Bn on left, Bde HQ on right near coast rd.

Arty have reverted to Div comd.

11 A Tk Bty will be in support, one 6 pr tp and one 2 pr tp being allotted to each bn.

One sec 12 Lt AA Bty with 2/32 Bn, one sec 12 Lt AA Bty with 2/43 Bn; 12 Lt AA Bty less one tp with Bde HQ.

D Coy 2/2 MG Bn less one pl in support 2/43 Bn.

One pl D Coy 2/2 MG Bn under comd 2/32 Bn.

2/7 Fd Coy in res Bde HQ area.

2/3 Fd Amb behind Sth African C.C.S. 43859025.

One amb with each RAP - evacuate to 11 MDS (438902).

260 A Tk Bty R.A., move with us, and come under comd 20 Aust Inf Bde.

101 Gen Tpt Coy.

COLUMNS: As early as possible, under arrangements by OC, 101 Gen Tpt Coy, that coy, 3 Rec Sec, and G Div Sec OFF are to move to new area.

When relieved, remaining units will move in following gps:-

- 1st gp 2/43 Bn
 11 A Tk Bty less two tps
 one sec 12 Lt AA Bty
 D Coy 2/2 MG Bn less one pl
 Order of march within gp to be determined by CO 2/43 Bn.
- 2nd gp HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde, with K Sec 9 Div Sigs,
 sec HQ Gd Bn, HQ 345 Coy RASC.
 260 A Tk Bty
 HQ 12 Lt AA Bty
 2/7 Fd Coy
 2/3 Fd Amb
- 3 gp to follow when relieved -
 2/32 Bn
 two tps 11 A Tk Bty
 one pl D Coy 2/2 MG Bn
 76 LAD
 one sec 12 Lt AA Bty

Timings will be issued later, after arrangements with 5 Ind Div.


Routes: As for move to present area, avoiding Corps HQ and LG. Use both ry Kings at EL IMAYID sta.

Pro Sec will assist in traffic control at this end.

.....

Disposns 24 Aust Inf Bde
as at 1800hrs 11 Jul '42

Superimpose on QASABA sheet
1/50,000



- | | |
|---------------------|----------|
| 24 Aust Inf Bde | 43309015 |
| 2/7 Fd Coy | 43309014 |
| 2/43 Bn | 43319019 |
| 2/32 Bn | 43348986 |
| 2/2 MG Bn | 43359018 |
| 101 Gen Tpr | 43959024 |
| Rear 24 Bde | 43359020 |
| 20 Aust Inf Bde | 44929047 |
| 11 Btry 3 A/Tk Regt | 43309014 |
| 12 Btry 4 Lt AA | 43299015 |
| 2/28 Bn | 43379001 |

Notes of Warning Order issued verbally by Bde Comd at Bde HQ
43309015 at 1015 hrs 12 Jul 1942.
(notes taken by 24 Aust Inf Bde I.O. Lieut E.T.S. PEARCE)

INFM

(a) Enemy Considerable movement on rd SIDI ABD EL RAHMAN
Eastwards towards 26 Bde.

PW captured West of 26 Bde was from 382 I.R., flown
over from CRETE. PW states only one coy has arrived so far.

Enemy armour in same central area but inclined to
move North.

(b) Own Forces. NZ Div has pushed West. Further offensive
action is expected today.

Armour available for use as decided by higher comd.

9 Aust Div Cav is making recce West and South of
26 Bde posn.

INTENTION

24 Aust Inf Bde will attack and capture ridge trig 33
87662887 to trig 30 87002928.

Attack will not take place for 48 hrs as from last
night.

METHOD

Tps available.

Present Bde Gp

Tks :- probably 1 sqn GRANTS and 1 or 2 sqns VALENTINES
together with "Honey" tks.

1 Regt Fd Arty

Extra A Tk guns

Support from present posns by fd and med arty (apart
from regt moving with us). There are about 5 med guns.

Warning

Probably two bns fwd (2/43 Bn on right, 2/32 Bn left),
2/28 Bn in res.

Local left flank protection required and extensive
right flank protection also required.

Move to assembly areas must be made by dark and
the initial attack would probably be by dark.

INTERCOMM

Tac Bde HQ will move on line of adv.

.....

Notes of verbal orders issued by Bde Comd at Bde HQ
43309015 at 1100 hrs 13 Jul 42.
(Notes taken by 24 Aust Inf Bde I.O. Lieut R. T. S. PEARCE)

INFM

Situation is that 21 Panzer Div is moving from South up towards ALAMEIN. There were attacks last night on 26 Bde by 104 Lorried Inf Regt.

INTENTION

24 Aust Inf Bde will hold present posns and be prepared to move fwd at short notice for counter offensive.

METHOD

2/43 Bn and 2/32 Bn will remain in present posns and improve those posns.

2/28 Bn will move to a posn to be reced East of 2/32 Bn. B.M. will be available to recce with Major COX and Lt. Col. WHITEHEAD will be able to give valuable infm.

2/12 Regt or 3 Fd Regt RA will come under comd.

I propose to use one bty in support 2/43 Bn, one bty in support 2/32 Bn with one bty superimposed.

2 pr A Tk tp at present with 2/43 Bn to come under comd 2/28 Bn to add depth to posn on ry line at old rd.

AA as at present - one sec with each Bn and one sec on COAST Rd.




MG remains as at present.

Fd Amb - no change.



No mines to be laid yet.

Bn Dispositions 24 Aust Inf Bde
 ds at 16 Jul '42

Appx III-f



32	43348986
28	43538987
43	43299018



Superimpose on QASABA 1/50000

COPYSECRET
Copy No
16 Jul 42.24 Aust Inf Bde O.C. No. 3.

Ref map: EL ALAMEIN 1/50,000

INFORMATION

1. A special summary giving latest info on enemy's dispositions and a trace of located enemy minefields will be issued.
2. 26 Aust Inf Bde took the "Double 24" TELL EL EISA sta feature early on 16 Jul, but later withdrew on receiving heavy casualties from arty, mortar and automatic fire.
3. The following additional tps come under comd -
 - one tp 12 A Tk Bty at 1800 hrs 16 Jul
 - one sec 12 Lt AA Bty (reverts to comd from 2/12 Fd Regt at 1800 hrs 16 Jul)
 - 1 SA Exploiting Force - 0600 hrs 17 Jul
(composition below)

INTENTION

4. 24 Aust Inf Bde Gp will capture by night attack RIDGE 22 (87652952 to 87842938) and exploit at first light to capture RUIN RIDGE 87422903 to 87672887 on 17 Jul 42.

METHOD5. Outline of Operation

The operation will be carried out in two phases.

Phase A

2/32 Bn will move from an assembly area within EL ALAMEIN BOX at about 0001 hrs and capture ridge 22 by silent attack.

During the night, Bde Gp (less 2/32 Bn) with subunits 1 Army Tk Bde in support move to assembly areas astride the rly line at 88002965.

Phase B

On report of success of 2/32 Bn, 2/43 Bn (less one coy) move fwd crossing RIDGE 22 at first light, followed by one sqn VALENTINES in support, and capture RUIN RIDGE. This attack is to be supported by observed fire from all guns within range.

One coy 2/43 Bn take up a posn to link PWLs 26 Aust Inf Bde at TELL EL EISA sta and 2/32 Bn right flank.

1 SA Exploiting Force is held prepared to exploit success of 2/43 Bn, and subunits 1 Army Tk Bde to cover Bde right flank.

6. Objectives

<u>Phase A</u>	2/32 Bn	RIDGE 22 (incl pt 22 87672950 to incl QATTARA Rd 87832938)
<u>Phase B</u>	2/43 Bn	RUIN RIDGE (87422903 to incl trig 33 87672887)

7. Grouping

- (a) 2/32 Bn with under comd two tps 11 A Tk Bty (one 6 pr
one 3 pr)
one sec 12 Lt AA Bty
det 2/7 Fd Coy
one pl 2/2 MG Bn
- (b) 2/43 Bn (less A Coy with under comd -
one tp 11 A Tk Bty (2 pr)
one sec 12 Lt AA Bty
det 2/7 Fd Coy
one pl 2/2 MG Bn
- (c) Flank Gd Coy - A Coy 2/43 Bn, with under comd -
one tp 11 A Tk Bty (6 pr)
- (d) 1 S.A. Exploiting Force - Comd - Lt. Col. McN. COCHRAN 2 R.B.

HQ Personnel	}	from 2 R.B.
two arm'd cars		
carriers		
Sigs		

B & C Coys D.E.O.R.	}	Composite
B Coy R.L.I.		
7 Pl D.M.R.		
3 Bty 1 Fd Regt S.A.A.		
two tps 79 A Tk Regt		
one tp 1 Lt AA Regt		
det 2 Fd Coy S.A.E.C.		
one lt sec 18 Fd Amb (4 amb)		

8. Reserve

- 2/28 Bn
- HQ 11 A Tk Bty
- 1 tp 12 A Tk Bty (6 pr)
- 12 Lt AA Bty (less 3 secs)
- 2/7 Fd Coy (less 2 dets)
- D Coy 2/2 MG Bn (less 2 pls)

9. Action of A Coy 2/43 Bn.

On commencement of Phase B, A Coy 2/43 Bn (Capt SUDHOLTZ) with under comd one tp 11 A Tk Bty will take up and hold a defensive posn in vicinity cross grids 876297, gaining touch with 2/32 Bn right and FILs 26 Aust Inf Bde in area TELL EL BISA by patrolling.

10. Arty.

- (a) FOO from each 2/8 Fd Regt and SAA will accompany 2/32 Bn. Each will have call on one bty for support subsequent to capture of RIDGE 22.
- (b) One Bty Comd and three OPOs 2/12 Fd Regt, OPOs 3 Fd Regt R.A., and S.A.A., with 2/43 Bn.
- (c) CB fire from first light.
- (d) As 2/43 Bn nears objective, concentrations on RUIN RIDGE by 2/12 Fd Regt, 3 Fd Regt RA, SAA, and 7 Med Regt.
- (e) Subsequent to capture RUIN RIDGE, support by observation by all guns within range.

11. Tanks

1 Army Tk Bde consisting, for the operation, of -
C Sqn 44 RTR (Valentines)
some "Honey" tks
one sqn 9 Aust Div Cav (Crusaders)
is to support this Bde, being prepared -

- (1) to assist 2/32 Bn in mopping up on RIDGE 22 in vicinity first light, if called.
- (11) to follow and support 2/43 Bn in attack on RUIN RIDGE from RIDGE 22 at first light.
- (111) give protection to right flank.

12. ENGRS.

(a) Dets with Bns to assist in laying minefields during consolidation of objective.

(b) At least three crossings to be constructed on ry line in vicinity 87992965 before arrival 2/43 Bn.

13. Air Support.

Fighter cover is to be provided from 0730 hrs over area of our operations, one kilo EAST and one kilo WEST of QATTARA Rd as far SW as kilo 12.

14. Minefield Gaps.

Gaps in minefield are being made under arrangements with 1 S.A. Div (in RLI area) at -

- (a) main rd 88172964 opened at 2100 hrs 16 Jul.
- (b) telegraph line 88132933 opened at 2100 hrs 16 Jul.

ADM - issued separately

- 15. B Ech tpt Bde in area 889293. No movement to this area before 2100 hrs.

INTERCOMM

- 16. Tac Bde HQ at post No. 4 astride main rd (881296) from 2200 hrs 16 Jul until first light - then to 88022970, then moving as notified SW along QATTARA Rd.
- 17. Main Bde HQ in area 88452953 from 2200 hrs.
- 18. Tentacle with Tac Bde HQ.

ACK

(sgd) D.R. Jackson

Issued at final conference 1900 hrs 16 Jul.

Maj.
B.M. 24 Aust Inf Bde.

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>		
2/28 Bn	1	Comd	26
2/32 Bn	2	S.C.	27
2/43 Bn	3	I.C.	28
1 SA Exploding Force	4	T.O.	29
2/12 Fd Regt	5	File	30-33
11 Bty 3 A Tk Regt	6	War Diary	34-35
12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt	7		
2/7 Fd Coy	8		
K Sec Sigs	9		
D Coy 2/2 MG Bn	10		
2 Pl HQ Gd Bn	11		
11 Coy AASC	12		
345 Gen Tpt Coy	13		
2/3 Fd Amb	14		
76 LAD	15		
3 Rec Sec	16		
G Div Sec OFF	17		
9 Aust Div	18-21		
1 S.A. Div	22		
1 Army Tk Bde	23		
26 Aust Inf Bde	24		
RAF	25		

Dispositions 24 Aust Inf Bde Group.





1300 hrs 17 Jul 42

Superimpose on EL ALAMEIN sheet

1/50.000

Appx IV b

four tps 9 Aust Div Carriers
two tps 9 Aust Div Tks.
one tp 1 Armd Bde



1 SA
Force

consolidating
from 88372877
to 88362862

Note

2/28 Bn. in reserve
area 88032977

Copy

MOST SECRET
2/32 Aust Inf Bn,
In the Field.
13/1/3
28 Jul 42.

24 Aust Inf Bde

Report on Operations of 2/32 Aust Inf Bn 16/17 Jul 42.

1. General Plan

With the 26 Bde in general area trig 33 875301 - trig 26 879300 with FDLs running from the coast west of trig 33 to the ry then generally along ry line to a posn South of Trig 26 a gap of 4000 yds to the East found the 1st SA Div established in the ALAMEIN BOX with further detts to the South. With a view to joining these two areas and pushing fwd our general line, 24 Aust Inf Bde was ordered to capture firstly the ridg efrom trig 22 87672950 to the QATTARA Track between the 7 and 8 kilo post approx 87772928; 2nd objective capture of RUIN RIDGE from approx 87432900 through RUIN 87542893 to trig 33 87662887. The first phase of these operations were allotted to the 2/32 Aust Inf Bn.

2. Preliminary Moves.

Some days previously comd offr had made a fd glass recce of the country towards Trig 22 from post 10 (88132934) in ALAMEIN BOX and from pt 26 (879300) but only limited infm could be obtained. Coy Comds made their recce from post 10 on the late afternoon 15 Jul 42 under unfavourable conditions. A warning order was received at 1200 hrs for a conference at Div HQ at 1330 hrs. Outline plan was received together with some detail. Bn Order Gp was ordered to phone to be ready and waiting the arrival of the CO - Lt. Col. D. A. WHITEHEAD.

Preliminary orders were issued and coy comds moved fwd to post 10 ALAMEIN BOX to take advantage of the remaining daylight for further recce and to make all necessary preparation for the debussing of tps and dispersal of tpt. 2 i/cs of coys were left to make all necessary preparations regarding man load and veh load for move by tpt to post 10. Conference for issue of final orders commenced at 1900 hrs at Div HQ and was NOT complete till 2030 hrs; this meant that all further preparations so far as the bn was concerned would have to be done in darkness.

3. Move into the ALAMEIN BOX.

The move was NOT to take place before 2045 hrs; from the track after leaving the rd south from the ALAMEIN sta along the telephone line was very bad owing principally to the unsuitability of some of the vehs and unknown drs a number of vehs were bogged and disorganised the bn; this was taken in hand by the acting 2 i/c and by 2330 hrs all tps were debussed; by 0200 hrs A Ech vehs were organised into their respective gps to move fwd at first light.

Orders were issued to Coy Comds at 2100 hrs, final coordinating conference timed for 2245 hrs. The only alteration was in start time due to delay caused by tpt hold up.

4. Plan

The objective allotted to this bn to capture was the ridge to be known as ridge 22 - from trig 22 (87672950) incl to QATTARA Track incl at 87832939. The attack was to be made with three coys fwd A Coy right, B Coy centre, C Coy left. A Coy to capture trig 22 feature; B Coy the ridge 1000 yds to the SE; C Coy was to proceed along QATTARA Track with one pl to the East. D Coy, covered by patrols, were to push out from the ALAMEIN Box along the telephone line to its junc with the QATTARA Track and there take up a posn covering both the Track and the telephone line. When this was reported secure A, B, C Coys would move out in that order.

FUPs on telephone line - A Coy 2000 yds and B Coy 1000 yds west of the QATTARA Track. When coys commenced their advance to the objective D Coy would come into bn res. A Ech vehs and supporting arms were arranged in colns ready to adv fwd to the respective coys on receipt of success signal which were the code words 'Good going'; the attack was to be silent and the start time from the FUP was fixed at 0230 hrs 17 Jul 42.

5. Operations.

Owing to the tpt delays D Coy did NOT move from post 10 until 2350 hrs. Telephone line was adv at the same rate as Coy HQs (100 yds in 2 mins); continuous touch was maintained until the arrival at QATTARA Track; owing to the lateness of the start of D Coy it became necessary to start the remaining coys fwd when D Coy reported all clear 1000 yds west which incl some reported enemy diggings in the area.

By 0100 hrs D Coy reported in posn covering the QATTARA Track; by 0200 hrs D Coy reported that the remaining three coys had moved through; up to this time NO enemy action had taken place and it appeared coys would arrive at their FUP without enemy interference. On receipt of this report Bn Tac HQ moved up to QATTARA Track - telephone line junc.

The three coys left FUP on time and at 0245 hrs approx enemy counter action commenced. Considerable mortar fire and hy shelling from a number of supporting guns of calibres up to 105 mm, as well as a quantity of A Tk and MG fire.

Right - A Coy

A Coy on the right had as its objective trig 22 an important point for enemy observation. This posn was strongly held and known to be supported by guns to the W and SW. Hy enemy fire came from the direction of trig 22 at 0250 hrs and was replied to by Bren and TSMG fire of our own. At approx 0330 hrs some 40 PW with escort and some wounded of A Coy passed along the Bn axis. One of the escort delivered a verbal message that the coy was on its objective. Two way wireless communication broke down at approx 0310 hrs although A Coy set could be heard asking Bn to report their signals. At approx 0515 hrs A Coy sent a message saying - "I have captured my objective but think I have overshoot the mark; am considering pulling back to objective". It was NOT possible to reply to this message as the Bn set was out of action.

At 0530 hrs the supporting arms - 1 pl MG 1 tp A Tk 2 det Mortars det Fd Coy and A Ech vehs moved up taped track to trig 22. Came under hy fire and took cover on the reverse slope. Engr vehs and A Ech vehs attempted to go over the crest and were immediately shot up, two only were able to get under cover.

Pl Comd of MG (Lieut R. CAMERON) moved on foot on the general bearing of adv and at approx 0500 hrs contacted Capt FORWOOD on the Northern part of his coy area (since identified as 1500 yds from trig 22 at 87582942). Capt FORWOOD said: "I don't know whether I'm too far forward or not". Lieut CAMERON replied that everybody else was on the next ridge back and that his guns were there. He then asked where were his guns wanted. Capt FORWOOD indicated a posn to the NW of his coy area saying he wanted right flank protection. There were at least 50 PW in centre of coy area at this time. Posn now came under hy MG fire from west and NW. Lieut CAMERON signalled for his guns; when NOT answered sent a runner who failed to get through. said he would give covering fire from trig 22. Capt FORWOOD seemed satisfied with this. Lieut CAMERON started to return to his guns but owing to hy fire from MG and arty took at least 2½ hrs to return to his pl, losing his orderly on the way. He finally reported the situation to CO at approx 0930 hrs.

Centre Coy - B Coy.

B Coy succeeded in capturing their objective and commenced consolidation after taking some 60 PWs. One pl lost touch but was found by the CO at approx 0630 hrs and directed to their coy. In this area little progress could be made with digging as the posn was on solid rock.

Left Coy - C Coy.

C Coy moved to their objective on the right (west) of the QATTARA Track; found a minefield laid with our mines, captured their objective and some 50 PW. At first light the Coy Comd (Capt JACOBY) readjusted his posn to place one pl left of the QATTARA Track. Several Breda 20 mm were captured in this area and Cpl LEBSON of C Coy placed one in action and later was able to do excellent work.

Res Coy - D Coy.

D Coy remained in posn covering the QATTARA Track - telephone line until approx 0530 hrs and were then ordered fwd to take up a res posn fwd of the telephone line and some 1000 yds to the west of the Track. The digging was good and the coy were soon in posn.

6. Consolidation.

Communication was bad with all coys and only meagre reports were received up to 0630 hrs. All supporting arms had moved up and appeared to be in posn. The main activity was on the right in the area trig 22. It became necessary to make a recce of each coy area and arrange for the coordination of the flanks as the Bn front extended for some 2500 yds which necessitated gaps between coys. It was during this recce that the true state of affairs at trig 22 was discovered. Apparently A Coy after capturing their objective had moved off against further opposition and dug in some 1500 yds further on. Strong enemy forces were in the depression between the reported A Coy posn and trig 22. The supporting arms (A Tk and MG) were still endeavouring to hold the crest but the difficulty of digging in and by fire forced them on the reverse slopes. It was evident that if we were to hold trig 22 or the approaches it would be necessary to send fwd additional tps. By approx 0700 hrs we had definitely lost the crest of trig 22. D Coy less one pl was ordered to counter attack and by 0745 hrs had gained the crest. Owing to complete lack of cover and by fire they in turn were forced to come behind the crest. Digging in was started in better ground. Adjustments were made in the other two coy areas and by 0845 hrs consolidation was well under way and the front coordinated.

7. Enemy Counter Attacks.

Shortly after 0900 hrs the enemy seems to have realised that he had lost the ridge. A systematic shelling of the whole posn started and was maintained throughout the whole day with guns up to 150 mm. The latter was particularly consistent with air bursts, which because of the shallow diggings, caused a large number of casualties. About 1000 hrs tks and armoured cars that had been operating in the area of trig 22 and had maintained a continuous fire on the crest without attempting to move up, now moved under cover of the escarpment towards the areas of B and C Coys. They were engaged by our A Tk guns and by the enemy Breda operated by C Coy. Three tks and two armoured cars were immobilised, one car was later hit by a 25 pr and was burnt out. The tks withdrew. A further adv was made about 1200 hrs, this time more under cover of the escarpment and the 2 pr could not engage without fully exposing the gun and crew; attempts to do so resulted in casualties. The Breda remained in action until disabled by a tk shell that wounded the gunner. This left one pl of B Coy fully exposed to the fire of a number of AKVs without adequate means of replying. The pl was apparently ordered to withdraw to the reverse slope but the order was badly given as men were found moving back through the coy area.

They were immediately returned to their coy and allocated to their new posns. Up to this time casualties in offr and NCOs had been high and control in pls had weakened. The news of the apparent withdrawal of one pl of B Coy spread to other coys and certain moves commenced. These were checked and by 1400 hrs the line was as originally held and touch made with the 2/43 Bn on our left. Shelling was intensified from this time and consisted mainly of air burst 150 mm accurately placed over our posns and those of the 2/43 Bn.

At about 1700 hrs, the enemy launched a further attack against the junc of C Coy and 2/43 Bn. The two fwd pl areas of C Coy were overrun. The remainder withdrew through portion of B Coy.

Earlier the enemy had established observation on trig 22 and the remaining pl of D Coy was sent up in an endeavour to clear up the situation but were unable to dislodge the enemy. They were forced to withdraw.

8. Reorganisation of Posn.

At about 1730 hrs the posn was reported to Bde and permission received to reorganise the line on the posn originally selected for the Res Coy, covering the track along the telephone line. The left flank was to extend to the QATTARA Track and to join up with the 2/43 Bn.

D Coy was ordered to withdraw to the right of the new posn. C Coy had lost its coy comd and had only one offr left. The coy was reorganised, stragglers collected and placed on the left.

One pl of B Coy and a portion of a second remained in their original posns on ridge 22 owing to a report that the coy comd was seen wounded on his way to the MDS and that the coy had withdrawn. This error was found out and late at night contact re-established and the balance of the coy under the coy comd (wounded) withdrawn about 2400 hrs.

By 2015 hrs the new line was established and improvement of the defences well in hand.

9. Some lessons.

The foregoing is a first report only with many gaps due to the high proportion of casualties among offr and the inability to obtain detailed accounts from coys and pls, nevertheless certain lessons seem to stand out and are worthy of note.

1. The care taken in taping and lighting approach routes was well repaid; but no means possible whereby offr can find their bearings should be passed over however elementary they may seem.

2. The ability of tps to dig in quickly and obtain adequate cover may decide whether the posn can be held or not. Consideration should be given to objectives where suitable digging can be obtained. Adjustments could be made later when compressors and explosives became available.

3. Some means of quickly constructing a limited amount of overhead cover must be pushed up to the fwd tps as early as possible to minimise casualties from air burst HE.

4. Posns must not be occupied where adequate A Tk defence cannot be given. Fwd slopes of escarpments are difficult in this regard. Inf posns some 200 yds behind the crest and at ground level will force tks to show themselves before being able to use their weapons.

(sgd) D. A. Whitehead Lt. Col.
Comd 2/32 Aust Inf Bn.

Report on Operations 17 Jul 42.

On the capture of ridge pt 22 (87652952) to rd incl (87842938) by 2/32 Aust Inf Bn, 2/43 Aust Inf Bn was ordered to pass through, capture and hold RUIN RIDGE from 87472897 to trig 33 at 87662887. 2/32 Aust Inf Bn estimated that their objective would be captured at 0300 hrs and our attack was timed to commence at 0520 hrs. It was not until 0520 hrs, despite no final word being received of the first objective captured that it was decided to press on with the attack. The Bn debussed in the area astride the rd at 87882947 at 0525 hrs and passed through the fwd Bn at 0600 hrs, 40 minutes late in full light. The formation was, B Coy fwd on the right, C Coy fwd on the left and D Coy astride the QATTARA Rd, 500 yds in rear. Bn HQ moved with the rear element of D Coy with supporting arms following along the rd itself. From the time of the fwd tps appearing over the first ridge, the Bn came under severe shelling from enemy btys which continued until the final objective was reached. The rate of advance was 100 yds to the minute and this rate was maintained with the exception of the left flanking tps of C Coy. This flank met with stiff resistance and was forced to veer further left and fight fwd through extensive enemy positions sited in broken ground, which although cleaned out caused fairly heavy casualties. All but one man in the left section were casualties but he carried on the work of the section with a Bren until he rejoined the remaining two sections of the Pl a thousand yds further on. At 0640 hrs the arty concentration was brought down on the objective and forced the enemy to retire, although MG and A Tk fire was still coming from both flanks together with the arty fire. The objective was captured at 0705 hrs and the reserve coy moved in to assist and cover consolidation. From the front and flanks heavy fire from MGs, Mortars and A Tk guns was increased whilst a counter attack developed on the right flank by inf supported by two tks. This was broken up in its early stages by small arms fire from the right coy. Four more tks appeared and also commenced firing. On the left flank one pl of C Coy together with some Coy HQ personnel moved on and captured three btys of guns and approx 150 more prisoners. These guns consisted of 19 Fd guns and 4 A Tk guns, together with two hy Breda MG and 2 Breda LMGs. Three of the Fd guns were destroyed but owing to tks threatening in the vicinity and no A Tk support available, grenades were conserved. Meanwhile with only six tanks left with which the Tank Comd decided that he could not support a proposed move fwd by D Coy on enemy vehs and guns some 800 yds away, and no A Tk or MG support, together with the hy fire being brought down on the Bn and the threat of a further large counter attack developing the C.O. gave the order to withdraw. Amn supplies were almost exhausted and the arty could not support owing to all comms having broken down. MMGs, A Tk guns, and A Ech vehs were temporarily halted by minefds and later by arty and A Tk fire together with a dive bombing attack by Stukas which knocked out eleven vehs. A Tk guns and MMGs however, engaged enemy on the right flank knocking out 2 light tks and 1 A Tk gun.

An orderly withdrawal was carried out covered after approx five minutes by a further arty barrage brought down by the Bty Comd when comms had been restored and the Bn took up its posn on the 2/32 Aust Inf Bn left flank on ridge from 87972932 to 87822938.

B COY REPORT

Apart from hy shell fire the first enemy resistance was met after 2500 yds consisting of LMG and rifle fire. This posn was engaged by continuing to move firing from the hip and enemy surrendered. A further 1000 yds was traversed and stiff opposition came from left from estimated two MMGs and an A Tk gun together with rifle fire. Fire continued as the coy advanced to within 400 yds of the posn where Coy Comd ordered 12 Pl to ground and 10 Pl to move up on the flank firing from the hip. When outflanked, firing ceased and enemy stood up. Coy moved on and the A Tk gun fired two more rds. Prisoners taken were approx fifty including an offr. The A Tk gunner was bayoneted and the guns destroyed. 2000 yds from the objective the barrage commenced lifting to 1000 yds, after which elements of the enemy could be seen withdrawing behind the ridge. As the Coy moved to the assault an enemy AFV which was apparently observing the approach withdrew over the ridge and as the ridge was reached was again seen stationary but moved off when fired on. The posn was captured at 0703 hrs. MT concentrations and five tks were immediately ahead at approx Kilo 13, two tks and MT on the right flank. Approx 400 MT were in each of squares 873289 and 874288 and beyond including portees, a large number of British vehs and some Jeeps. Consolidation was commenced with 10 Pl and 12 Pl fwd and 11 Pl in res to watch right flank. Enemy opened fire with three A Tk guns and two MMGs from the front, MMGs from the right flank also mortar which couldnot be located. Sangars offered good protection but were sighted in the wrong direction. At 0710 hrs inf on the right flank approx 1000 to 1500 yds away formed up for counter attack with two tks. The res Pl opened fire at 300 yds and inf went to ground. Four tks in front commenced firing and manoeuvring. Message sent to BHQ asking for support as enemy fire was increasing in intensity. 11 Pl silenced an MMG. Coy was ordered to conserve amm but to engage lightly any movement. No support was available and C Coy was seen to commence withdrawal. At 0730 fwd Pl was ordered to withdraw but shortly afterwards D Coy was seen moving fwd and fwd Pl reoccupied their posns. At 0745 hrs an attack was developing from the front and message was received a little later from BHQ to withdraw. Coy withdrew by fwd Pl moving out first, taking up a posn approx 800 yds to the rear and covered remainder of Coy withdrawal. Fifteen more Italians were here discovered hiding in a cave. These were taken prisoner, and an A Tk gun destroyed. When ridge had been evacuated four tks came up hull down and opened fire with 75mm and MMGs. The Coy reformed 2000 yds from their objective and continued to withdraw until CO ordered a line at 879293 to be held.

C Coy REPORT

After a thousand yds left fwd Pl came under MG fire from the ridge in front. Tks brought fire to bear on these posns and the advance continued. Passing through, the posns were seen to consist of slit trenches protected with a single row of demert and a double row of English Mk IV mines. One of our tks was destroyed on this field and another hit by A Tk fire. The Arty FOC was not seen after passing through this field and it is believed that hisveh was either hit or struck a mine in this area. After a further 800 yds the left fwd Pl came under hy MG fire in addition to the A Tk and arty fire, from the broken ground on their left flank. In order to deal with this threat it was necessary to swing this Pl some hundreds of yds to the left off the original line of advance. Reserve Pl was pushed fwd to close the gap between the two fwd Pls. The right fwd pl struck little opposition and continued to advance on the left of B Coy and joined that Coy on the objective. Owing to the resistance met by the two left pls, they were unable to maintain the same rate of advance. In fighting their way through

the broken ground the left Pl suffered considerable casualties. The Pl Comd was killed and in the left section one man was killed and the remainder with the exception of Pte DEAN were wounded. This man continued on with the task of the section with a Bren until he rejoined other members of his Pl approx 1000 yds further fwd. On reaching the objective the Coy came under further fire from MGs, A Tk guns and arty. Tks could be seen in front and to the right, also arty and MT which included staff cars which were retiring to the SOUTH. 300 yds to the left front of the right fwd pl were three bty posns which were causing trouble by firing across the Coy front. No supporting fire being available the left Pl and some members of Coy HQ moved straight fwd on the flank and captured these posns. They took 150 prisoners and damaged or destroyed three of the guns. There were 19 Fd guns, 4 A Tk guns, 2 Breda MGs and 2 Lt Breda MGs in the posn. With tks in the vicinity it was unwise to use the A Tk grenades for the destruction of the guns as there was no A Tk support. On an order from the CO, the Coy withdrew through D Coy to posn on ridge occupied by 2/32 Aust Inf Bn.

D Coy REPORT.

Owing to the fwd coys already topping first ridge, the Coy came under shell fire at its debussing area. The Coy moved 500 yds in rear of the fwd coys and maintained this interval to the objective. For the full distance it was continually under arty and A Tk fire owing to the tks moving amongst the tps. On reaching the objective the Coy moved 500 yds fwd of the ridge through C Coy posns to protect whilst consolidation was in progress. To the front approx 1500 yds away vehs estimated to be approx 500 including 16 AFVs were sighted. These vehs were being dispersed and A Tk guns moved to the flanks, obviously preparatory to a counter attack being launched. The Coy at this stage was under hy arty, A Tk, mortar and MG fire. The tk comd. was contacted to give support, but his tk strength was greatly depleted and he could not guarantee sufficient. At this juncture, a message arrived from the C.O. ordering the Coy to retire giving covering fire to C Coy. The Coy retired driving stray prisoners before them and destroying equipment until taking up a defensive posn on the ridge left of the 2/32 Bn.

(sgd) W. J. Wain Lt. Col.
Comd 2/43 Aust Inf Bn.

Estimate of prisoners captured - 1000
Weapons destroyed -
 75mm 4
 A Tk guns 9
 MGs 12
 Mortar 45mm 3
Vehs destroyed 1
Casualties inflicted - unknown.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/43 AUST INF BN 17 JUL
AFTER BEING FORCED BACK FROM MITEIRIYA RIDGE TO MAKHKHAD
RIDGE

On 17 Jul 42, following the withdrawal of the Bn from SANYET EL MITEIRIYA ridge a posn was taken up on EL MAKHKHAD ridge on the left flank of 2/32 Aust Inf Bn. Defensive wks were immediately commenced and by 1200 hrs the posn was fightable. Liaison had been established with 2/32 Bn, the minefield had been extended, weapon pits dug, and all weapons including A Tk and MMGs sited.

At 1600 hrs, a message was received from the right fwd coy stating that there was a movement of tps to the rear by the Bn on the right but as no advice had been received and no abnormal firing taking place it was thought that a slight change in dispositions was being effected. This movement could be clearly seen and increased over the following half hour. At 1630 hrs, a report was received from the right fwd coy that there were now no tps on their flank and also there were enemy tks threatening from this direction and from the front. Enemy arty fire by this time had been increased and it was appreciated that the right Bn had been attacked and the right flank driven from the ridge, followed by the remainder of the Bn. The arty FOO then intimated that better observation would be gained by him going back to the next ridge, which he did, leaving the unit with no arty support. With still no infm the C.O. issued a warning order and endeavoured to contact Bde and the Bn Comd of right Bn. With both flanks open the situation appeared extremely serious. The C.O. acting on orders from Bde then issued the final order for withdrawal. This was carried out in an orderly manner and the Bn took up a new position slightly in rear of the telegraph line with the left flank resting on the EL ALAMBIN BOX.

(sgd) F.A. Stretton Maj.
Adm Comd 2/43 Aust Inf Bn.

Appx IVe


Bn Disposns 24 Aust Inf Bde
as at 0800 hrs 18 Jul '42

Note

A Coy 2/32 BN
MISSING

B Coy 2/28 BN
IN RESERVE

298
883



292
874

Superimpose on EL ALAMEIN sheet
1/50,000

COPYSECRET
Copy No

21 Jul 42.

24 Aust Inf Bde C.O. No. 4.

Ref maps:	EL ALAMEIN	1/50,000
	EL DABA	1/100,000

INFORMATION

1. Latest info of enemy in sitreps and I Summaries Nos. 4 and 5.
2. Eighth Army is attacking to destroy the enemy's army in its present location.
Larger plan to be issued verbally.
3. (a) 30 Corps is to adv on Southern flank to conform with 13 Corps adv, and in the NORTH secure TEL EL EISA 872299 - pt 22 (870296) - pt 21 873294 - pt 27 (871290) and exploit WEST and SW as opportunity offers.
(b) NZ Div is to capture DEIR EL SHEIN 876281 to pt 59 (872279) to incl escarpment 87202767 as the operation on the 30 Corps Southern flank.
4. (a) 9 Aust Div is to capture and secure successively -
1st - TEL EL EISA 872299 - CAIRN 875296 - reentrant 876294 and 876295, WEST of trig 22 (876295).
2nd - pt 21 (pt 22 on 1/100,000 map) 870296.
3rd - Trig at 87002927 (trig 30 on 1/100,000 map)
(b) The attack is not to commence before first light 22 Jul 42 and all preparations are to be made so that attack may commence at shortest possible period upon receipt of orders.
(c) 26 Aust Inf Bde is to capture TEL EL EISA feature in cooperation with Phase 1 of 24 Aust Inf Bde operations.
5. Additional tps under comd -
two tps 12 A Tk Bty
In support for operations -
50 RTR Gp (50 Matildas)
Arty 9 Aust Div
all available arty 1 S.A. Div from present posns.
7 Med Regt R.A. with 234 Med Bty under comd.

INTENTION

6. 24 Aust Inf Bde Gp will capture and secure successively -
(a) CAIRN 875296 to high ground WEST of pt 22 (87602950)
(b) Pt 21 (870296)
(c) Trig 30 (87002927)
and be prepared subsequently to exploit situation.

METHOD

7. Outline of Operation

The operation is to be carried out in three phases.

Phase I

1st objective - CAIRN 87542962 to high ground WEST of pt 22 (87602950).

Supported by arty concentrations on objective and high ground TEL EL BISA 874299, 2/32 Bn will capture 1st objective and consolidate. Enemy minefields in the CAIRN area will then be cleared.

In the meantime, 2/28 Bn will occupy posns left by 2/32 Bn, moving on foot, and prepare for opening of Phase II. 2/13 Bn is to relieve 2/28 Bn at the same time.

Phase II

2nd objective - area pt 21 (87012963).

Phase II will be initiated by 9 Aust Div and should commence with NZ Div on its objectives, the TEL EL BISA and CAIRN features captured, and 50 RTR on its start line, SOUTH of building 87622992.

This phase should begin some two hrs after completion Phase I, permitting 2/7 Fd Regt and 2/12 Fd Regt to move fwd. Covered by arty concentrations and smoke, 50 RTR Gp with tps for initial consolidation is to adv on a bg 272 deg grid and capture 2nd objective. Inf, MG and engr of the tps for initial consolidation will travel on assaulting tks and A Tk guns will follow.

2/28 Bn (less one coy gp) will follow 50 RTR Gp, on foot, and join its coy gp in mopping up and consolidation on 2nd objective.

In the meantime, 2/43 Bn will prepare for Phase III by moving tp carrying tpt to their area.

Phase III

3rd objective - area trig 30 (87002928).

When 2/28 Bn has consolidated on 2nd objective, 50 RTR Gp with some A Tk guns of 2/43 Bn for initial consolidation, is to move SOUTH and capture 3rd objective. 2/43 Bn will be ordered fwd lorried to take over on objective from tks, and will consolidate - route, either direct or through pt 21 will be ordered by this HQ dependent upon situation. 50 RTR when relieved on objective by 2/43 Bn will withdraw to a fwd rally.

8. Groupings.

(a) 2/32 Bn, with under comd -
two tps 11 A Tk Bty (6 prs)
D Coy (less two pls) 2/2 MG Bn
A Coy 2/43 Bn
in support -
one sec 2/7 Fd Coy

(b) 2/28 Bn, with under comd -
one tp 11 A Tk Bty (2 pr)
one tp 12 A Tk Bty (6 pr)
one sec 12 Lt AA Bty
one pl D Coy 2/2 MG Bn
in support -
two sub-secs 2/7 Fd Coy

(c) 2/43 Bn (less A Coy, with under comd -
one tp 11 A Tk Bty (2 pr)
two tps 12 A Tk Bty (composite)
one sec 12 Lt AA Bty
one pl D Coy 2/2 MG Bn
in support -
two sub-secs 2/7 Fd Coy

ADM

18. Medical

- (a) 2 amb att RMO 2/28 Bn
 2 " " " 2/43 Bn
 1 " " " 2/32 Bn
 2 " vicinity 884295.
- (b) ADS - 88782941.
- (c) C.P. - 88782941.
- (d) Mob sec - 87952955.
- (e) MDS - 2/11 Aust Fd Amb
- (f) Walking wounded will be collected from unit RAPS.

19. PW

Bde collecting post - rd and telegraph line junc 87902948.

20. Amn

AP - unchanged.

21. Sup

Sup pt - unchanged.

22. POL

PP - unchanged.

23. Water

WP - unchanged.

24. Rec - unchanged.

INTERCOMM

25. ASC Tentacle with Bde HQ.

26. HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde -
 Tac - present posn to commencement Phase 11 then at 87832964.
 Main - present posn.
 B Ech - present posn.

(sgd) D.R. Jackson Maj.
 B.M. 24 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK

Time of signature 1830 hrs
 Issued at conference 1900 hrs

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>		
2/28 Bn	1		
2/32 Bn	2		
2/43 Bn	3		
2/12 Fd Regt	4		
11 A Tk Bty	5		
12 Lt AA Bty	6		
2/7 Fd Coy	7		
K Sec Sigs	8	Comd	24
D Coy 2/2 MG Bn	9	S.C.	25
2/3 Fd Amb	10	I.O.	26
76 LAD	11	File	27-29
3 Rec Sec	12	War Diary	30-31
G Div Sec OFF	13		
9 Aust Div	14-17		
20 Aust Inf Bde	18-19		
26 Aust Inf Bde	20		
1 Army Tk Bde	21-22		
RAF	23		

COPY

MOST SECRET

2/32 Aust Inf Bn
In the Field
13/1/4
29 Jul 42.

24 Aust Inf Bde

Report on Operations of 2/32 Aust Inf Bn 21/22 Jul 42.

1. Nature of Operations.

An approach march from defensive posns left of QATTARA track (87852953) carried out at night followed by a dawn attack with arty support and consolidation on line CAIRN (87552962) - High ground west of trig 22 at 87602950 as phase 1 of Bde operation.

2. Receipt of Orders.

CO was called to Bde HQ at 1330 hrs to receive outline plan and verbal orders for an operation in conjunction with tks and divided into three phases. These orders were confirmed in 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 4 issued at final conference at 1900 hrs.

Preliminary orders were issued to Coy Comds and att arms and final conference fixed for 2230 hrs.

3. Reorganisation of Bn.

Following operations of 16/17 Jul the Bn was reorganised on the basis of 3 coys with strengths respectively of -

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
"B" Coy	4	85
"C" Coy	4	93
"D" Coy	3	96

A res pl of 1 Offr 24 ORs was formed from the AA Pl and elements from the Pioneer and Carrier Pls.

Coy Comds of "B" and "C" were new and had had little time in which to complete their reorganisation. All coys were weak in NCOs.

4. Enemy Dispositions.

The enemy was known to be holding trig 22 in strength and along the ridge with guns in rear and close support. A strong enemy post with A Tk guns and MGs was located along the telephone line and to the North of our line of adv. This post had been tested by patrols from this Bn and from "A" Coy, 2/43 Bn, and found to be strongly held. The presence of this post was drawn to the attention of the Bde Comd.

5. Plan.

Following the above representations "A" Coy 2/43 Bn was left under comd. From past experience the area trig 22 was likely to be the most difficult part of the objective to gain. "A" Coy 2/43 Bn was the strongest coy but they had made themselves familiar with the ground to the right.

It was therefore decided to attack with three coys forward - "A" Coy 2/43 Bn on the right - "B" Coy in the centre - and "D" Coy the strongest and least disorganised of this Bn on the left - "C" Coy to move in support in rear of "B" Coy. A composite pl was held in Bn res.

The attack was to be made from a start line taped parallel to and 1700 yds from the objective. Assembly areas were to be in rear of this line.

Arty plan was concentrations from : Z-15 to Z and during the adv from: Z to Z + 15. Supporting arms MG and A Tk were to move up to right and left flanks when the objectives had been gained. Det of Pd Engrs was to be att to "A" Coy 2/43 Bn as a suspected minefield had been reported in the CAIRN area.

6. <u>Att Tps</u>	1 Pl	"D" Coy	2/2 MG Bn
	1 Tp	11 A Tk Bty	6 pr
	1 Tp	12 A Tk Bty	6 pr
	Det	2/7 Fd Coy	
	"A" Coy	2/43 Aust Inf Bn	

7. Issue of Orders

Final orders were issued verbally at 2330 hrs 21 Jul 42 to Coy Comds and Comd of att tps.

8. Preliminary Arrangements

After initial conference Coys worked out in detail the man-loads to be carried to ensure all necessary equipment arriving on the objective. In addition, a special pack to cover first requirements was made up by each coy into four loads, one for each pl and one for coy HQ, all to be carried on one carrier and dumped as soon as the objective was reached. The "I" Sec set out at 0100 hrs on 22 Jul and laid a 1700 yds tape line which crossed the telephone line at an angle. This line was approx 500 yds from the nearest known enemy posns. Using this line three coys would have to pass over the telephone at an angle and to avoid any possible change of direction that this might cause the axis of coy adv was taped for 300 yds towards the objective and this was extended across the telephone line by "I" Sec personnel moving in front of each coy during the attack. Guides were provided to lead each coy on to its correct posn on the start line.

9. Move to F U P

Thanks to the above arrangements the move of coys to their respective F U Ps was carried out without a hitch, the last coy arriving in posn by 0430 hrs. Choice of ground and laying up ensured that tps were undetected by the enemy. As soon as the arty concentrations commenced the dust covered all movement to the start line.

10. Adv to the objective

All coys crossed the start line at zero (0530 hrs) and moved fwd on a brg of 245 deg. Dust and haze from our shelling prevented sighting any land-marks and coys had to keep on the given brg until nearing the crest.

"A" Coy 2/43 Bn were the first to encounter enemy resistance when, after proceeding 600 yds from the start line they were heavily fired on from their right flank. This fire held up their adv and steps were taken to deal with the post. A pl endeavoured to work round the right and left flanks of the posn but could make no progress; casualties were heavy, including the O.C. Capt SUBHOLZ, who was wounded. This post contained a 76.2 mm, a 50 mm, and during part of the time an 88 mm. The enemy succeeded in withdrawing the latter; the others were later brought in. In addition, MG fire kept the coy pinned to the ground where they eventually dug in.

"B" Coy comd was killed shortly after the adv commenced and Lieut BENNETT took comd. The Coy gained its objective and sent in some 20 PW including 1 offr. The coy moved up to the escarpment and owing to the hard nature of the ground attempted to consolidate in existing German posns, mostly sangars, which did not give good cover and in addition were poorly sited from the Coy point of view. They were pinned to these posns by heavy enemy fire mainly from the NW and SW and from APVs to the West.

"D" Coy to the West succeeded in reaching the line of the escarpment but owing to intense enemy fire could not advance further. They were under flanking fire from Trig 22 having swung to the right due mainly to the similarity of a number of cairns on the crest. Three A Tk guns were captured by this Coy. The coy took up a posn back from the crest and commenced to dig in. The ground here was rocky and little progress could be made.

"C" Coy in support moved over the start line 600 yds in rear of "B" Coy and took up a posn some 400 yds in rear of that Coy. The digging was good and the posn gave good fields of fire.

Supporting arms moved up in close support of their respective coys. MG, on the left, came into action against heavy MG on TRIG 22. Under the able direction of the Pl comd (Lieut R. CAMERON) and by excellent work on his part, the enemy MGs were silenced, captured and turned on to the enemy. A truck with two mortars and man on board moving up to support "B" was hit by a shell from a tank and set on fire. At this stage heavy fire came on to the area from tks in hull down posns in the vicinity of the CAIRN (87552962), several "A" Ech vehs were hit and tps pinned to the ground.

11. Action against the CAIRN

The report that "A" Coy 2/43 Bn were still held up was confirmed by enemy action in this area. It was decided to use "C" Coy in support to clear up the situation. A FOO was contacted and a concentration arranged. Two dets of mortars were put into action; under cover of this fire "C" Coy, under Lieut Davidson, adv and secured the posn cleaning up an enemy post and securing 8 PWs. The remainder of the enemy retired to the NW and took up a posn on the flank of the post, holding up "A" Coy 2/43 Bn.

Four dets of mortars and a sec of MMGs were put into action against these enemy posns and successfully prevented his attempts to withdraw two guns in this area. At night, under cover of a patrol, engrs damaged these two guns.

12. Counter Attek on "B" Coy

At about 0945 hrs a heavy attack by tks and armd cars developed against "B" Coy preceded by arty fire on the crest of the escarpment. The coy suffered a number of casualties mostly killed, including Lieut BENNETT killed. A part of the coy was overrun and because of their posn fwd of the crest were not supported by A Tk guns. Owing to lack of observation arty support was not effective. Tks withdrew when our arty shelled below the crest.

13. Left Flank Posn

Despite the clearing of TRIG 22 the enemy tks and armd cars accompanied by two mobile 76.2 guns made their presence felt in this area. It was evident that the A Tk guns while in a good posn to deal with tks that came over the crest, they were too far back to deal with those using defilade of TRIG 22 to bring fire to bear on our posns to the right. The A Tk Comd was ordered to leap-frog his guns fwd until he was in a posn to deal with this form of attack. MMG were ordered to support this move. Trouble continued in this area for some time. A request was made to Bde that Maj THOMAS, A Tk Bty Comd, come up.

It was then arranged for guns to move up, supported by MMG to engage the enemy APV. This was done and two armd cars were put out of action. It was decided to cover the A Tk guns in this posn and the res pl was pushed up in to this area. Observation for the FOOs was now possible and the armd A Tk guns were engaged and two put out of action. Three attempts in the afternoon to concentrate against TRIG 22 area were successfully dealt with by the arty.

14. Organisation of the line

The key posn of the area was TRIG 22 and no advantage could be gained by going fwd of this or the escarpment that ran in a NW direction to the CAIRN.

Accordingly, a line was sited where A Tk guns covered both sides of TRIG 22 and prevented the enemy using this defiladed posn. Further posns were chosen in ground suitable for digging and back from the crest.

15. Consolidation

To conform with the above, "D" Coy was moved to fill the gap between "C" Coy and the composite pl in vicinity of TRIG 22 "C" Coy refused its right flank to make contact with "A" Coy 2/43 Bn. Observation posts were established in the crest. Consolidation proceeded with the main opposition continuing to come from the right flank. This was effectively dealt with by mortar and MMG assisted by the arty.

16. The outstanding lessons from this operation appear to be

- (a) Necessity to choose diggable ground for initial consolidation
- (b) Forward crests are not good posns unless adequately supported by A Tk and arty
- (c) The need for careful sighting of A Tk guns once the objective is gained and close cooperation between Coy Comds and A Tk offrs to effect this.
- (d) Consideration as to whether a creeping barrage would not be more effective than concentrations on those portions of the objective where he is organised in depth.

D.A. WHITEHEAD Lt Col
Comd 2/32 Aust Inf Bn
(D.A. WHITEHEAD)

COPYSECRET
Copy No
22 Jul 42.24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 5.

ref map: EL ALAMEIN 1/50,000

INFM

1. Enemy. Only units of 90 Lt Div not identified in Northern area are 2 & 3 Bns 155 Lorried Inf Regt, Force 288 and 707 Hy Inf Gun Coy. 382 Inf Regt have also been identified in this area. 18 German tks knocked out today.
2. Own Tps.
 - (a) During the day, the following pts have been taken and held by our tps -
 - Twin 24 feature by 26 Aust Inf Bde.
 - CAIRN - trig 22 - 2/32 Bn
 - pt 63 (877279) by NZ DIV.
 - (b) 50 RTR Gp remains in our support, but Phases 11 and 111 of O.O. No. 4 are cancelled by this operation.

INTENTION

3. 24 Aust Inf Bde Gp, with in support 50 RTR Gp will capture and hold high ground WEST of QATTARA Rd in 874290 and 875289.

METHOD

4. Outline of Operation.

50 RTR will adv, one sqn up, on a frontage of 600 yds, followed by one sqn at about 700 yds distance - the latter carrying two inf pls and engr det.

Second wave tks will be closely followed by one A Tk tp (6 prs) and one MG pl.

2/28 Bn (less two pls) and supporting arms, will then follow closely on foot and inturn be followed by 50 RTR Gp (less two tk sqns).

Both fwd tk sqns will halt in hull down posns at objective and cover its occupation by 2/28 Bn.

Tk borne tps for initial consolidation will move fwd immediately tks reach objective, and tks will not withdraw until objective is occupied by mainbody 2/28 Bn.
5. Grouping.

2/28 Bn, with under comd -

 - three tps 11 A Tk Bty (one 6 pr and one 2 pr)
 - one sec 12 Lt AA Bty
 - two sub secs 2/7 Fd Coy.
 - one pl 2/2 MG Bn

and in support

 - 50 RTR Gp (52 Valentines)
 - mob sec 2/3 Fd Amb

6. Assembly Areas.

- (a) 2/28 Bn will assemble in present area.
- (b) Tk assembly area in sq 876292.

7. Centre line - a line running parallel to and 600 yds WEST of QATTARA Rd.

8. Start Lines.

Tks - telegraph line 2,000 yds SOUTH of ry line.

Inf - telegraph line 87802946 to 87852943.

9. Rate of Adv

Tks - 6 mih

Inf - 2 mih

10. Zero

(a) Zero hr will be time at which inf cross start line.

(b) Zero - 1900 hrs.

11. Action on Capture of objective.

2/28 Bn will consolidate on reverse slope and 50 RTR will withdraw to a fwd rally and then be prepared for counter attack role at 1st light.

On consolidation 2/28 Bn will push out listening posts, and in daylight OPs.

12. Arty.

Under orders CRA, arty will fire a programme to give -

(a) Concentrations south of Kilo 7 on QATTARA rd Z - 20 to Zero to cover formingup and opening of minefd - mainly smoke.

(b) Lifts to maintain smoke screen for tks, moving at 6 mih.

(c) Smoke screening of flanks.

(d) Final concentration on objective and on ridge EAST and WEST of objective.

(e) Protective fire to SOUTH of objective to cover occupation by inf.

13. Engrs

det 2/7 Pd Coy will open and mark 4 gaps in our fwd minefd between Z - 20 and Zero.

14. Relief 2/28 Bn. 2/43 Bn will occupy at Zero and defend 2/28 Bn present locality.

ADM

15. Ann, POL, Sup and water - no change.

16. Medical - no change - mob sec 2/3 Pd Amb will accompany 2/28 Bn.

17. PW. Bde PW CP at junc QATTARA Rd and telegraph line.

18. Mines 1000 Hawkins mines with 2/28 Bn A Ech tpt. Extra 800 mines to follow.

INTERCOMM

19. Bde HQ remains present posn for operation.
20. Cable will be laid to follow attack in closely, to HQ 2/28 Bn.
21. Codewords for Success.
Objective reached by tks - CANARY
Objective occupied by inf - BLACKBIRD.

(sgd) D.R. Jackson

ACK

Maj.

B.M. 84 Aust Inf Bde.




Issued verbally at conf 1630 hrs 22 Jul
to:

CO 2/28 Bn
" 50 RTR
" 2/12 Fd Regt
OC 11 Bty 3 A Tk Regt
" 12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt
" 2/7 Fd Coy
" D Coy 2/2 MG Bn
CO 2/3 Fd Amb
OC 76 LAD
" 3 Rec Sec
" G Div Sec OFF

LO 9 Aust Div
Comd 1 Army Tk Bde
CO 2/13 Bn

Bde Staff

24 Aust Inf Bde Disposns
As at 26 Jul 42
Minefields shown thus
Superimpose on El Alamein
1/50,000



25 Jul 42.

24 Aust Inf Bde Notes on Future Ops No.1.Ref maps: DABA - ALEXANDRIA Series 1/50,000
Sheets 2, 5 and 6.1. Secrecy.

- (a) Written orders for ops covered by these notes will NOT be issued by bn comds.
- (b) Every effort will be made to obtain security for this op.

2. The enemy has recaptured pt 63 87602794 and DEIR EL SHEIN 875280.

The enemy is experiencing a shortage of amm. His reinforcements are approx 700 a day.

Estimated tk strength 1st light 24 Jul - German 60
Italian 100 to 120.

- 3. (a) 9 Aust Div to secure the ridge 87372906 to 87532897 and probably exploit to a limited objective NW along the ridge.
- (b) 69 Inf Bde to secure the QATTARA Rd from K13 to K16 and 1000 yds West of this line at daylight 27 Jul.

The object of the attack is to provide a passage for 1 Armd Div to pass through the enemy line to attack his rear areas.

1 SA Div is clearing minefields during night 26/27 Jul to facilitate the adv of 1 Armd Div.

4. 1 Army Tk Bde is placed under comd 9 Aust Div.

5. 2/28 Bn and att tps will capture and secure the area west of the QATTARA rd from 87372906 to 87532897 and then establish a post on the QATTARA Rd in the area pt 50 87542896.

Objective to be captured not later than 0200 hrs.

2/43 Bn with in support 50 RTR Gp will -

- (a) be prepared to capture same objective in event of non success 2/28 Bn.
- (b) counter attack in event of 2/28 Bn being driven off objective.
- (c) capture and hold an objective on ridge NW of 2/28 Bn.

6. 69 Inf Bde is attacking from approx the 878 eastern grid to secure the QATTARA Rd within the limits given in para 3(b) by 0430 hrs and at daylight is securing the area 1000 yds to the West.

7. Liaison

A liaison patrol of 24 Aust Inf Bde will accompany 69 Inf Bde and make contact with 24 Aust Inf Bde at RUIN 87542893 on capture of 69 Inf Bde's night objective.

Similarly a liaison patrol of 69 Inf Bde will accompany 24 Aust Inf Bde for the same purpose.

8. 1 Armd Bde is expected to pass through 69 Inf Bde at 0700 hrs.

9. RA & RAA

Arty is being coord by Eighth Army and 30 Corps.
CRA is coord arty resources; -

- (a) to sp the attack;
- (b) to secure our present posns against counter attack;
- (c) to cover 1 Armd Div during its passage through enemy areas.
Guns may have to be moved for this task.
- (d) arty fire will be by predicted shooting until OPs are established on 24 Aust Inf Bde objective.
- (e) if 1 SA Div uses smoke to cover lifting of minefields 9 Aust Div will smoke TELL EL HISA and ring contour 25 873302.

10. RAE

Gaps made through minefields will be clearly marked with cairns, poles or shaded lights and guides provided as well.

11. Exploitation

Having secured the objectives given in paras 5 and 6, further penetration of the enemy's area will be made to assist 1 Armd Div in breaking through.

- (a) 24 Aust Inf Bde will be prepared to attack with arty support westwards at first light to secure the continuation of the ridge to the west of the objective in the area 872290, 873290 and be prepared to bring long range MG fire on enemy guns and A Tk guns to be SW of this area.

1 Army Tk Bde will be kept fwd, but will be used in this attack only if the attack cannot secure its objective without tk assistance.

- (b) 1 Army Tk Bde will be prepared to sp the above attack if it cannot succeed without tk sp, and to attack westwards to secure the area trig 30 870292 - pt 27 865291.

12. Res

30 Aust Inf Bde Gp remains in res and will be prepared for exploitation or pursuit as may be ordered.

ACK

Issued by LO

(sgd) D.R. Jackson Maj.
B.M. 24 Aust Inf Bde.

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
2/28 Bn	1
2/32 Bn	2
2/43 B n	3
File & Noting	4
War Diary	5-6

24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 6.

Ref map: EL ALAMEIN 1/50,000
EL DABA 1/100,000

INFORMATION.

1. Enemy. The following enemy forces are now believed to be in our area of operations :-

1 & 111 Bns 382 Inf Regt	-	Coast to incl TELL EL EISA
KEIL Gp and 33 Recce	-	area TELL EL EISA
361 Regt Battle Gp	-	area excl TELL EL EISA to
incl 1 Bn 361 Inf Regt		SANYET EL MITEIRIYA
1 Bn 155 Inf Regt		
BRIEHL Battle Gp	-	do
200 Inf Regt Gp	-	SANYET EL MITEIRIYA Southwards
		to approx 284 northing.
TRIESTE	-	in sp WEST & SW TELL EL EISA.
TRENTO	-	in sp area 200 Inf Regt Gp.

2. Own Tps

(a) Cp of our own tps is to follow that given in 24 Aust Inf Bde Notes on Future Ops No. 1 of 25 Jul, with the following modification -

para 11(a) now reads "24 Aust Inf Bde Gp will be prepared to attack with arty sp westwards at first light to secure the continuation of the ridge to the WEST of the objective in the area 872290 - 873290 and will in any case engage by long range MG fire enemy MGs and A Tk guns to SW of this area.

1 Army Tk Bde will be kept fwd but will be used in this attack only if the attack cannot secure its objective without tk assistance."

1 SA Div is to mop up in area NORTH of SANYET EL MITEIRIYA ridge EAST of QATTARA Rd.

(b) Changes in allotment -

12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt reverted from comd
24 Jul and remains in sp.

One tp (6 pr) 10 Bty 3 A Tk Regt -
under comd from 1200 hrs 26 Jul.

INTENTION.

3.v 24 Aust Inf Bde Gp will capture line ridge SANYET EL MITEIRIYA 87372906 to 87532897 by 0100 hrs 27 Jul, and on success of 69 Inf Bde Gp, capture extension of ridge NW 87252912 to 87372906.

4. Covered by arty concentrations on objective during their approach, 2/28 Bn will capture high ground from 87372906 to 87532897 shortly after 0100 hrs 27 Jul.

The Bn will then consolidate covered by arty concentrations to their SOUTH and flanks.

5. 69 Inf Bde is to capture line of QATTARA Rd between K13 and K16 by 0330 hrs and at first light exploit to secure an area 500 yds to the WEST.

This later phase will be supported by fire by 2/28 Bn Gp on enemy MG, guns and A Tk guns on their front.

A liaison patrol from 2/28 Bn accompanying 69 Inf Bde will make contact with 2/28 Bn and a similar patrol from 69 Inf Bde with 2/28 Bn will contact its own unit.

Strong point will be placed by 2/28 Bn between its left and 69 Inf Bde right flank to cover gap.

6. On advice of success of ops, 2/28 Bn and 69 Inf Bde, 2/43 Bn, covered by arty concentrations on its objectives and observed fire on its right flank, will be ordered to capture line of ridge 87252912 to 87352906 and consolidate covered by arty fire by observation and sp fire 2/28 Bn.

1 Army Tk Bde is to be fwd and available to sp 2/43 Bn attack only if 2/43 Bn is unable to secure its objective without such assistance.

7. 1 Army Tk Bde if not committed with 2/43 Bn is to attack westwards to secure the area trig 30 (870292) - pt 27 (868291).

8. On success of 2/28 Bn and 69 Inf Bde ops, 1 Armd Div attack commences.

9. Grouping.

2/28 Bn, with in sp -
12 A Tk Bty (less one tp)
one sec 2/7 Fd Coy
D Coy 2/2 MG Bn (less 2 pls)

2/43 Bn, with in sp -
11 A Tk Bty (less one tp)
one sub-sec 2/7 Fd Coy
one pl D Coy 2/2 MG Bn

2/32 Bn, with under comd -
one tp 11 A Tk Bty
one tp 12 A Tk Bty
one pl D Coy 2/2 MG Bn

10. Action of 2/32 Bn and 2/13 Bn.

(a) 2/32 Bn will remain in present posn in defence, maintaining observation as far NW to SW as possible to give warning of enemy movement.

(b) 2/13 Bn will remain in defence and maintain observation particularly to SOUTH and SE.

11. Start Line.

(a) S.L. will be laid and taped under arrangements 2/28 Bn from 87602926 to 87712920.

(b) Same area will be retaped by 2/43 Bn for its attack.

12. Adv 2/28 Bn.

Axis - 215° mag (600 yds NW from and parallel to QATTARA Rd).

Rate - 100 yds in 2 mins.

13. Contact Party

Pty of 1 offr, 1 sgt and rifle sec 2/28 Bn has reported 69 Inf Bde to accompany their attack, and then rejoin 2/28 Bn.

14. Strong Point from 2/28 Bn

On capture of own objective, 2/28 Bn will form a strong point in area pt 30 (87542396).
This will move out NOT before 0130 hrs.

15. Arty

(a) Arty ZERO - 0030 hrs 27 Jul.

(b) Arty plan coord by CRA is to provide -

- (1) Hy concentration on 2/28 Bn objective 0030/0100 hrs, lifting at 0100 hrs to give covering fire on front and both flanks to 0130 hrs.
- (11) Hy concentrations on 2/43 Bn objective for 30 mins,
- (111) From first light, fire by observation

16. AA

12 Bty 4 Lt AA Regt in support is to provide -

- (a) one sec to move to 2/28 Bn area at last light;
- (b) one sec to follow attack 2/43 Bn and remain in their area;
- (c) two secs protection 2/13 Fd Regt.

17. MG

D Coy 2/2 MG Bn (less one pl) and when on objective, engage to SW enemy MG, gun and A Tk gun posns by long range fire.

18. A Tk

One tp 10 A Tk Bty will be in res in area Bde Tac HQ from 2030 hrs.

19. Tks

1 Army Tk Bde, in sp, is to assemble fwd and be prepared -

- (a) to sp 2/43 Bn in counter attack to 2/28 Bn objective;
- (b) to sp 2/43 Bn if that Bn is unable to gain its objective otherwise;
- (c) on success 24 Aust Inf Bde attacks, to exploit westwards to secure area trig 30 (870292 - pt 27 (868291)).

20. Engrs

2/7 Fd Coy will -

- (a) assist in taping of S.L., axes of adv, lift mines, and assist in consolidation 2/28 Bn, 2/43 Bn.
- (b) one sec, lift mines in present areas 2/28 Bn and 2/13 Bn and along QATTARA Rd by 2359 hrs 26 Jul.

21. RAF

F cover from 0600 hrs to 0800 hrs - and later if required.

ADM

22. No change A.P., P.P., Sup P., W.Ps.

23. ENGR Stores.

Each man 2/28 Bn, 2/43 Bn will carry fwd 4 sandbags.

24. Medical

- (a) 2 amb cars att 2/28 Bn
- 2 " " " 2/43 Bn
- 1 " " " 2/32 Bn

- (b) ADS 2/3 Fd Amb at 87942955
- MDS 2/3 Fd Amb at 89122929

25. PWCP at junc main COAST RD and QATTARA Rd 881296.

INTERCOMN

26. Bde HQ Tac HQ 87952956 from 2045 hrs 26 Jul.
Main HQ present location

27. Air Sp Signals. Tentacle set with Bde Tac HQ.

28. AFV Recognition, 27 Jul.

Pennants - one top, one centre
Reply Challenge - blue flag vertical

29. Codes New map ref and appointments code in force from 0301 hrs
27 Jul.

(sgd) D.R. Jackson Maj.
B.M. 24 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK

Time of signature 1500 hrs
Issued at conference 1430 hrs 26 Jul.

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
2/28 Bn	1
2/32Bn	2
2/43 Bn	3
2/13 Bn	4
2/12 Fd Regt	5
11 Bty 3A Tk Regt	6
12 Bty 3 A Tk Regt	7
2/7 Fd Coy	8
K Sec sigs	9
D Coy 2/2 MG Bn	10
11 Coy AASC	11
2/3 Fd Amb	12
76 LAD	13
3 Rec Sec	14
6 Div Sec OFF	15
9 Aust Div	16-18
1 Army Tk Bde	19
20 Aust Inf Bde	20
26 Aust InfBde	21
69 InfBde	22
Comd	23
S.C.	24
I.O.	25
T.O.	26
Sup C.	27
File	28-29
War Diary	30-31


KNOWN ENEMY DISPOSNS.

AS AT 26 JUL 42

SUPERIMPOSE "ELALAMEIN" SHEET
1/50,000

LEGEND ENEMY DISPOSNS.

- 1 TRENTO
- 2 2 BN 200 L.I.R.
- 3 1 BN 200 L.I.R.
- 4 1 BN 361 L.I.R.
- 5 1 BN 155 L.I.R.
- 6 BRIEHL GP.
- 7 ELEMENTS TRIESTE & SABRATHA DIVS.
- 8 580 RECCE
- 9 33 RECCE
- 12 BRESCIA



COPYIn the Field
28 Jul 42.24 Aust Inf BdeReport on attack on RUIN Ridge night 26/27 Jul.

2/28 Bn HQ moved over start line at 0005 hrs and continued forward along the axis of advance tape. At approx 0025 hrs, flares were put up on the left forward flank, followed by heavy machine gun, 20mm and A Tk gun fire, and also some mortar fire from the front and left and right flanks. This fire gradually thinned as the Bn moved forward and our barrage took effect. A minefield about 20 yds wide, enclosed either side by single demerit wire running East and West was encountered about 800 yds from the objective. The minefield seemed fairly open and appeared to be laid with British Mk IV. The minefield was enfiladed from either flank by machine guns and by an A Tk gun about 40-50 mm. When supporting arms vehs came forward some got caught in the wire and then were freed and pushed on; others stopped and one veh was blown up by a mine. The A Tk gun hit the veh which caught on fire, thus silhouetting the other vehs, which were then knocked out and set on fire by the A Tk gun. Several Bren guns were engaging this gun and the protecting MG, but apparently without effect. The objective was gained by approx 0110 hrs with the exception of A & D Coys, which were held up on the left and right fronts respectively - this was on the objective. Bn HQ was established at approx 87482899. A patrol was sent out to help D Coy and one to A Coy. Communication with Bde HQ was impossible owing to the wireless set being knocked out on the minefield and the pack sets were damaged. The Sigs endeavoured to get through on the FOOs set but without success for awhile. The C.O. 2/28 Bn then told me to report success to Bde HQ as soon as possible and to arrange for communication by line and/or W/T. I left the Bn at approx 0200 hrs and at this time the only sounds of fire were MG fire well on the left flank, one light gun perhaps 50mm from some distance in front, and the A Tk gun and MGs on the right flank of the minefield with the Brens still engaging them. As I left the C.O. was moving to Coy areas to supervise consolidation. He had ordered the Adjut to detail immediately a patrol to destroy the A Tk gun which was enfilading the minefield. I did not see the Engrs but they were reported to be at the minefield endeavouring to open gaps. I saw about 4 A Tk guns near Bn HQ and the A Tk Bty Comd had gone off to endeavour to get the others off the minefield and from in rear of it. Some vehs and two carriers arrived at Bn HQ not long after I had left. As my Jeep had been blown up I walked back to the 2/43 Bn posn where I telephoned Bde HQ. I also there saw Lieut McNEILL, who assured me a line was being laid and another wireless was being obtained to go forward. I then reported to Bde.

(sgd) J.HEAD Lieut

Report of Liaison Patrol by Lieut E.D. RULE, Night 26/27 Jul 42.

Object: For liaison between 69 Bde and 2/28 Bn.

Strength: 1 Offr, 1 Sgt, 10 ORs.

Patrol contacted 6 D.L.I. at approx 1330 hrs 26 Jul, and received orders to advance behind 6 D.L.I. Bn HQ.

Patrol left start line at 0200 hrs and advanced on bearing of 300 deg.

Patrol had moved only a short distance when enemy shelling and machine gunning commenced. It was not long before ranks of D.L.I. broke formation and made use of old slit trenches.

From this time onwards the advance became disorganised and was made worse owing to the East Yorkshire Regt passing through and mixing with 6 D.L.I.

From the time the East Yorkshire mixed up with 6 D.L.I. I completely lost contact with Bn HQ. The C.O. himself had gone forward in his Jeep car at the beginning of the advance.

Knowing the Bn had with it a wireless van I contacted same which was being guided forward by unit Int Sgt and proceeded to follow van towards objective.

It was soon found out without a doubt that enemy still maintained MG posts on both flanks as my patrol was continuously fire upon by them.

After advancing approx 1000 yds, the Int Sgt admitted he was lost. I pushed my patrol forward taking the wireless van with me in an endeavour to locate 6 D.L.I. Bn HQ and made a thorough and systematic search all the way. However, my search was unsuccessful and dawn was fast approaching. It was then approx 0440 hrs.

I could see that without a doubt it would be impossible for my patrol to contact 2/28 Bn owing to enemy force on my right flank and the shortage of darkness left.

It appeared as though 6 D.L.I. had forced only a small gap through enemy on a front of approx 5-600 yds.

From the time the patrol started out behind the wireless van up to this time, I could see many small gps of D.L.I. personnel lost and without any knowledge of Bn whereabouts, quite a number apart from walking wounded were moving back towards start line. It was apparent the attack had gone in disorganised.

At this stage, I had to decide whether to carry on in an attempt to find D.L.I. Bn HQ or withdraw my patrol to assembly area before daylight. I am certain that had my patrol remained out it would have been caught in enemy cross fire and would not have got back at all. I decided to withdraw and arrived back in assembly area at approx 0650 hrs.

Here I contacted an Arty Observation Offr who assured me he would wireless my report back to 24 Bde HQ.

Patrol then reported back to 2/28 Bn B Ech.

Upon arriving at B Ech, I reported to Bde HQ at request of Staff Captain.

(sgd) E.D. RULE Lieut

Operation by 24 Bde Gp on 26/27 Jul 42 - Report by Bde Liaison Offr.

On the morning of the 27 Jul 42, at approx 0750 hrs, I was ordered by the Brigadier to proceed to the HQ of the 2/43 Bn and ascertain whether they had contacted the 2/28 Bn. If not, I was to telephone him and then try and contact the 2/28 Bn.

As the 2/43 Bn were not in comm with the 2/28 Bn, I left immediately in a Bantam car for the Eastern side of the Gattara track. My intention was to get through to the 2/28 Bn from their left flank as the direct route was under enemy fire. Furthermore, according to reports, the movement of the 69 Bde should have made this flank comparatively safe.

After proceeding some distance along the left of the Gattara track I saw the blazing vehs of the 2/28 Bn A Ech and heard MG fire from the extreme right. Here I stopped and observed the ground to my front. No movement could be seen and no sounds of firing were heard. Consequently I went forward to approx 400 yds SSW of trig 33 on Ruin Ridge. Here I stopped the car and had started to work my way West in the direction of the 2/28 Bn posn, when I came under mortar fire from about 300 yds to the East. Returning to the car I attempted to get out, but a direct hit blew the left front wheel of the car. Several more mortar bombs fell in the vicinity of the wrecked car and some rifle fire was directed at it from a semi-circular posn extending from trig 33 to the SW. I commenced to crawl through the scrub in the direction of a bare ridge opposite the enemy posns and approx 600 yds away from them. Reached this point late afternoon but could not get over the ridge as the enemy had it under observation and dropped occasional mortar bombs along it. Throughout the day the only small arms fire over the area I was in was from rifles but from late afternoon about 5 MGs and 1 hy MG commenced irregular firing over the area.

During the day I was able to clearly observe 1 fd piece firing from approx 300 yds ESE of trig 33. Also an automatic gun was firing fairly consistently throughout the day and night in the direction of our lines from immediately behind the Southern end of the defences.

The posn appeared to be very strongly held, and although shelled on two occasions during the day by our arty, no direct hits were recorded. The arty concentration, falling slightly beyond the posns.

At this time I was somewhat confused regarding the situation on the right of the Gattara Track, as on one occasion during the day when several of our planes were overhead, sounds of intense fire came from along the ridge and too close to where I expected the 2/28 Bn posn to be.

Early on the morning of the 28 Jul, I heard what sounded to be fire from a single Bren gun coming from the right and the enemy MGs opened up immediately.

Owing to the full moon I was not able to move very much during the night but I got close enough to the track entrance by trig 33 to take advantage of some fog in the morning, and at approx 0700 hrs, I was able to leave the area.

During the whole of the time in this area, and in proceeding to and from it, I did not observe any of our own tps.

(sgd) J.T. Cook Lieut

Report on 2/23 Aust Inf Bn Operations Night 26/27 Jul

1. Fwd elements crossed SL punctually at 2400 hrs. Some arty opened fire at 2400 hrs instead of at 0030 hrs as anticipated. The enemy at once shelled the assembly area, and some supporting arms vehs were destroyed.
2. At 0030 hrs, supporting arms incl Carrier Pl moved from assembly area. Enemy's barrage was now intense.
3. My carrier was moving along the taped axis of advance, immediately behind the A Tk portees. At about 2500 yds from the SL, one portee burst into flames, and I observed that an A Tk gun which I took to be an 88 mm was firing along a fixed line.
4. I was suddenly halted by yells from a A Tk gunner, and found myself on top of a minefield. The fixed line from the A Tk gun, with fixed lines from Spandaus, was covering the Northern edge of the field. At that moment, another vehicle was hit and burst into flames. I was informed that a gap was to be made in the minefield. In the interim I filled up my carrier with wounded, and escorted about 20 PW to the collecting pt. En route I learned that three of my carriers had been destroyed on the minefield - 2 by A Tk fire, one by mines.
5. As the wounded obviously exceeded the capacity of stretcher bearers, I organised my pl into a ferry service. The 5 carriers on hand made about 8/10 trips to the minefield, returning with wounded and PW. Approx 50 wounded and 100 PW were brought back.
6. Capt SIMPSON was preparing now to move fwd with A Ech vehicles. I warned him to be careful of the minefield. His veh crossed the gap safely, but the second vehicle- engrs stores- was struck, and burst into flames. Four vehicles were blazing furiously, and lit up all vehicles endeavouring to cross the gap. Some supporting arms vehicles turned back.
7. As I could see that consolidation would be seriously affected, I drove back to the assembly area, found an arty offr, and stressed the urgency of neutralising the A Tk gun. He claimed that all arty was tied up on tasks, but was eventually persuaded to go fwd and establish an OP. The A Tk gun was not silenced, however, and with still only one known gap, the passage of vehicles was almost impossible.
8. At first light I went fwd in a carrier to decide the chances of getting out to the Bn. The enemy was still active, but the Bn appeared to have completed its consolidation, and all seemed to be well. I reported to CO 2/43 Bn, who agreed that to attempt to move vehicles out would be madness. I therefore established my remaining carriers as a defensive line behind 2/43 Bn, until I came under Ede Comd as a reserve force.
9. The enemy shelled the approach area until dawn. His observation in the moonlight was excellent, and even when vehicles kept to dead ground, he fired on to the sound of engines with surprisingly accurate results.
10. A nominal roll of remaining personnel from the Bn will be submitted seperately when completed.

1500 hrs
27 Jul

Sgd P. NASEL T/Capt
O.C. 4 Pl

Casualties sustained in Operations by 24 AUST INF BDE GP
26/27 Jul 42.

1. Personnel

	2/23 Bn		12 Bty 3 A Tk Regt		2/7 Pd Coy		D Coy 2/2 MG BN	
	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs
Killed	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-
Wounded	2	62	-	13	1	6	1	8
Missing	20	469	3	46	1	15	1	22

OFFICERS
2/23 Bn

Wounded

Capt V.R. NORTHWOOD
Capt T.R. STENHOUSE

Missing

T/Lt-Col L. McCARTER
Major J.B. THOMSON
Capt B. SIMPSON
" J.L. ALLEN
" L. LAMB
Lieut W.A. CARLTON (believed wounded)
" C.C. ELLIS
" R.J. HALL
" H.F. GAMBLE
" S.A.J. WALKER
" T.P. ROBERTSON
" M. HICKEY
" R.S. STEWART
" E.C. HARROD
" G.R. GREAM
" A.D. MONRO (believed wounded)
" J.W. DRAPER
" J.D. KEOGH
" W.T.G. CLOUTMAN
Capt K.W. PRIDDIS AMHC

12 BTY 3 A Tk
Regt

Missing

Capt B.M.A. ABBOTT
Lieut J.O. SCANLAN
Lieut J. KINNANE

2/7 Pd Coy

Wounded
Missing

Lieut E.D. MURRAY
Lieut K.H. BRADSHAW

D Coy 2/2 MG BN

Wounded
Missing

Lieut C.D. ROSE
Capt W.M.H. STEPHENS

2. VEHICLES
2/23 Bn

1 Bantam
2 15 cwt trucks
1 1 Ton van
8 30 cwt lorries
5 3 Ton lorries
2 A Tk portee
4 Carriers

VEHICLES (continued)

12 BTY 3 A Tk Regt

1 Bantan
3 15 cwt trucks
5 2pr portee
6 6pr portee

2/7 Fd Coy

2 30 cwt lorries
1 semi-trailer

D Coy 2/2 MG BN

1 Bantan
1 30 cwt lorry
2 3 Ton lorries

3.

WEAPONS

2/23 Bn

Bren guns 40
2" Mortars 13
3" Mortars 3
Pistols 40
Pistols signal 10
Boyes A Tk rifles 3
TSMG 35
2 pr A Tk guns 2

12 BTY 3 A Tk Regt

Bren guns 11
TSMG 8
Pistols 6
2 pr guns 5
6 pr guns 6

2/7 Fd Coy

TSMG 3
Pistols 4

D COY 2/2 MG BN

Vickers MGs (complete
with instruments) 4
Tripods 4
TSMG 2
Boyes A Tk Rifle 1
Pistols 12

INTERCEPT MESSAGES

1. Message received 1200 hrs 27 Jul by HQ 9 Aust Div from HQ 30 Corps.

Message received by phone at Main HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde at 1235 hrs 27 Jul 42.

"From BRIEHL Gp to Panzer Div HQ -

Pt 31 (shown as pt 30 on EL ALAMBEIN 1/50,000 map) 875239 has been retaken with difficulty and 100 prisoners taken."

2. Message received 1230 hrs 27 Jul by HQ 9 Aust Div from HQ 30 Corps -

"1107 hrs 33 Recce said" our own group (which means KIEL) attacking with tks 875237 to 872237 towards NE".

3. Message received 1500 hrs 27 Jul by HQ 9 Aust Div from HQ 30 Corps, and later passed to Tac HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde -

1315 hrs 27- from 361 I.R. to 90 Lt Div -

' Enemy tank attack on I/361 group repulsed (.)
 40 PWs 5tks shot up on fire or went on minefield.
 Enemy tk attack on I/155 repulsed. 4 tks destroyed.
 In sector of I/361 there remain still one offr, 2 NCOs and 10 men, weapons 1 LMG, 1 HMG. Remainder of bn killed, wounded, missing or dispersed.
 Main part of I Bn BRIEHL remain. Wounded cannot at moment be looked after owing to strong arty fire'.

Sgd PANZENHAGEN
 O.C. 361 I.R.

ENEMY CASUALTIES

PW	German	3 Offrs	112 Ors
	Italian		12
Evacuated to MDS			
	German		5
		3	127

Statement of Own Casualties in men and material and of PWs and captured Arms and Material taken 3-29 Jul.

Battle Casualties sustained in Operations by 24 AUST INF BDE GP 3-29 Jul :-

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
Killed	10	109
Wounded	22	490
Missing	25	672
	<u>57</u>	<u>1271</u>

Strength of Bde Gp as at 29 Jul

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
H. Q. 24 Aust Inf Bde	12	81
76 L.A.D.	1	16
K Sec 9 Div Sigs	2	51
No. 2 Pl A Coy HQ Gd Bn	-	37
2/26 Aust Inf Bn	5	198
2/32 Aust Inf Bn	30	530
2/43 Aust Inf Bn	31	674
2/13 Aust Inf Bn	32	849
2/7 Fd Coy	5	180
11 Bty 3 A Tk Regt	6	128
12 Bty 3 A Tk Regt	2	74
D Coy 2/2 MG Bn	4	105
3 Rec Sec	2	70
G Div Sec 1 Ord Fd Pk	1	14
Det 9 Div Pro Coy	1	16

Weapons Lost

Rifles	800 (approx)
Bren LMG	71
TSMG	70
2" Mortars	20
3" Mortars	5
Boyes A Tk Rifles	11
Vickers MMG	4
Pistols Revolver	73
Pistols Signal	22
2 pr A Tk Guns	7
6 pr A Tk Guns	6

Vehicles Lost

Bantams	5
15 cwt Trucks	13
1 ton Trucks	7
30 cwt Lorries	15
3 ton Lorries	7
Portees	17
Motor Cycles	3
Carriers	9

Pirsoners of War Captured

GERMANS:	5 Offrs	238 ORs
ITALIANS:	29 "	745 "

WEAPONS CAPTURED

Bren LMG	2
TSMG	1
Vickers MMG	1
Browning MMG	1
German SMG	1
Spandau MG	15
Schwartzlose MMG	1
Breda LMG	15
Fiat MMG	9
20mm Breda	5
47/52mm Breda	9
57mm Zolotherne	1
88mm A Tk Gun	1
50mm Braun A Tk Gun	1
76mm Gun on draught	2
76mm self propelled gun	1
81mm Mortar	2

VEHICLES CAPTURED

SPA 30 cwt	3
Bren Carrier	1

APPX 4

SECRET

Copy No. 2.

3 Jul 42

9 AUST DIV O O No. 2

Ref 9 Aust Div O O No. 1

INTENTION

1. 9 Aust Div less dets will join Eighth Army

METHOD

2. 24 Aust Inf Bde Gp (less one bn) will come under comd 30 Corps on 4 Jul 42 on moving into Eighth Army area
3. 26 Aust Inf Bde Gp (less one bn) will move into Eighth Army area at a date to be fixed
4. Reliefs and responsibility for sectors will be as follows :
 - (a) 20 Aust Inf Bde Gp - West sector
Tps under comd from arrival of bde in area :-
 - 2/8 Aust Fd Amb
 - 11 Bty 3 Aust A Tk Regt
 - 2/3 Aust Fd Coy
 - C Coy 2/2 Aust MG Bn
 - (b) 2/28 Aust Inf Bn on relief by S.A. units on 4 Jul 42 will move to bivouac site in 26 Aust Inf Bde area preparatory to moving into the SW sector when 26 Aust Inf Bde (less one bn) moves out
 - (c) 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn will move to a bivouac area to be allotted on arrival
 - (d) On 20 Aust Inf Bde Gp (less one bn) moving out 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn will move into West sector

ACKNOWLEDGE

Johnston
for

W. Bushang
Col
GS 9 Aust Div

Distribution :-

	<u>Copy No</u>
20 Aust Inf Bde	1
24 Aust Inf Bde	2 ✓
26 Aust Inf Bde	3
2/28 Aust Inf Bn	4
9 Aust Div Cav Regt	5
RAA	6
RAE	7
Sigs	8
MG	9
Comd	10
G	11
AQ	12 & 13
AASC	14
Medical	15
Ord	16
File	17 & 18
War Diary	19 & 20

War Diary

SECRET
Copy No 26

3 Jul 42.

24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 2.

Ref maps:	ALEXANDRIA	1/100,000
	EL HAMMAN	1/100,000

INFORMATION

1. General line of fighting is now area ALAMEIN SOUTH. During afternoon and night 2/3 Jul enemy attacked in North with armd units. Our forces counter attacked and were in turn attacked by the enemy armd units. Reported that in battle enemy lost number of tanks.
2. The following is composition of 24 Aust Inf Bde Battle Gp to come under comd 30 Corps for operations from 4 Jul 42 -

H.Q. 24 Aust Inf Bde
 K Sec Sigs
 one sec HQ Gd Bn
 76 LAD
 2/32 Bn
 2/43 Bn
 2/8 Fd Regt and 64 LAD
 11 Bty 3 A.Tk Regt
 12 Bty 4 Lt A.A. Regt
 one sec 2/7 Fd Coy
 D Coy 2/2 M.G. Bn
 101 Gen Tpt Coy
 two pls 345 Gen Tpt Coy RASC
 2/3 Fd Amb (less details)

INTENTION

3. 24 Aust Inf Bde Gp will adv to EL ALAMEIN operational area 4 Jul 42.

METHOD

4. Preceded by a Bde Recce Pty, the Bde Gp will move in three gps, with protective dets, on two rds to the area EL HAMMAM, and there halt and await further orders for movement from 30 Corps

5. Adv Gd Route A Comd - Capt M.R. JEANES, 2/43 Bn
 Carrier pl 2/43 Bn
 D Coy 2/43 Bn
 one tp 11 A.Tk Bty

Route B Comd - Capt K. FORWOOD, 2/32 Bn
 Carrier pl (less one sec) 2/32 Bn
 A Coy 2/32 Bn
 one tp 11 A.Tk Bty

6. Grouping

Grouping and order of march - Appx A.

7. Speed

Routes and timings - Appx A.

8. Recce Party

Recce party to accompany Bde Comd, to depart 0500 hrs, will incl -

C.O. 2/8 Fd Regt
C.O. 2/43 Bn
2 i/c 2/32 Bn
B.M. (L)
I.O.
L.Os. 1, 11, 111
W/T veh

9. Left Out of Battle Personnel

Bn 2 i/cs will accompany gps for initial move - remainder 2 Pl HQ Gd Bn and left out of battle personnel will be placed u/c 2/28 Bn in DIKEILA area.

ADM

10. Sup

The following will be carried in unit vehs :-

2 days normal sup
3 days hard rations

Units unable to carry this weight of sup will have it carried in bulk by 101 Gen Tpt Coy.

11. POL

POL for 150 miles for all veh.

12. Amn

1st line ech.

13. Rec

One breakdown veh 3 Rec Sec is allotted 64 and 76 LADs.

INTERCOMN

14. Bde HQ closes present posn 0955 hrs, then moves at head of Gp 11.

15. Codes and Code Names are to be reissued on arrival 30 Corps area.

ACK

Time of signature 2220 hrs

Issued by LO & Sigs

DR Jackson
Maj.
B.M. 24 Aust Inf Bde.

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
2/32Bn	1
2/43 Bn	2
2/8 Fd Regt	3
11 Bty 3 A.Tk Regt	4
12 Bty 4 Lt A.A. Regt	5
4 sec 2/7 Fd Coy	6
K Sec Sigs	7
D Coy 2/2 M.G. Bn	8
2 Pl HQ Gd Bn	9
101 Gen Tpt Coy	10
345 Gen Tpt Coy RASC	11
2/3 Fd Amb	12
76 LAD	13
30 Corps	14-15
9 Aust Div	16
20 Aust Inf Bde	17
26 Aust Inf Bde	18
2/28 Bn	19
Comd	20
S.C.	21
T.O.	22
Bde Sup O.	23
File	24-25
War Diary	26-27

Appx 'A' - MOVEMENT TABLE

SECRET

issued with 24 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 2.

Initial concentrations: to be completed by 0830 hrs
Route A : coast rd
Route B : coast rd to rd junc 47349160, thence BURG EL ARAB - EL QASIMIYA
 track NORTH of ry line, to EL HAMMAM.
Speed & Density : 10 mih 20 vtm
Halts : 20 mins to each even clock hr for 20 mins, commencing 0940 hrs.
Start Point : Flagged point on coast rd 1 mile SW of fwd A.Tk ditch.

Ser No	Group	Units	Timings		Route	Remarks
			Past S.P. Head	Tail		
1	Adv Gd, Route B	Carrier pl (less one sec) 2/32 Bn one coy 2/32 Bn one tp 11 A.Tk Bty			B	
2	Bde Comd Gp		0900	0902	B	CO 2/32 Bn, B.M., S.C.(L), L.O., W/T veh
3	Gp 1	2/32 Bn (less one coy and carriers) 11 Bty 3 A.Tk Regt (less two tps) D Coy 2/2 M.G. Bn one tp 12 Lt A.A. Bty	0903	0951	B	Concentrate in 2/32 Bn area.
4	Gp 11	H.Q. 24 Aust Inf Bde K. Sec Sigs one sec HQ Gd Bn one sec 2/7 Fd Coy one sec 9 Aust Div Pro Coy 2/3 Fd Regt (less one bty) 64 LAD 12 3ty 4 Lt A.A. Regt (less two tps)	0956	1050	B	Concentrate in Bde H.Q. area
5	Left flank Gd	one carrier sec 2/32 Bn	1055	1057	B	Free movt after BURG EL ARAB
6	Adv Gd Route A	Carrier pl 2/43 Bn one coy 2/43 Bn one tp 11 A.Tk Bty	1102	1110	A	Free movt after rd junc 47349160
7	Gp 111	2/43 Bn (less one coy and carrier pl) 16 Bty 2/8 Fd Regt 2/3 Fd Amb 76 LAD one tp 12 Lt A.A. Bty 101 Gen Tpt Coy	1115		A	101 Gen Tpt Coy will not assemble in 2/43 Bn area prior to 1030 hrs

BRIG. GODFREY

APPX 6,

SECRET

30 Corps Operation Order No. 57

Copy No. 2
239/G
3 July 42

Ref Maps 1/250,000 sheet DABA
1/100,000 " 88/42
ALL REFERENCES TO THE RED GRID

INFORMATION

1. 9 Aust Div (Comd - Lt-General Sir L. MORSHEAD) is joining EIGHTH ARMY and has been placed under comd 30 Corps.
2. The leading bde gp will probably comprise:-
 - One sqn Div Cav (carriers)
 - Two bns
 - One fd regt (24 guns)
 - one fd coy
 - One fd amb
 - One coy MG bn
3. Although enemy air has up-to-date been dominated by our own RAF, some interference is still possible on the way up. Hostile air activity increased considerably in the fwd areas today.

INTENTION

4. The leading bde gp 9 Aust Div will prevent the enemy advancing EAST of the 435 Easting Grid between the sea and the 895 Northing Grid should he either penetrate or outflank the EL ALAMEIN defended locality. Subsequent role of 9 Aust Div will depend on general situation and on instructions received from Commander-in-Chief.

METHOD

5. The bde gp will establish two bn-defended localities in the general areas :-
 - (a) Pt 28 435901 (ABYAR EL SHAMHARA) ^{TEL EL}
 - (b) Pt 25 and Pt 24 about 433898.

The rd, and old rd will both be denied to the enemy.
6. The leading bde gp will be under comd 50 Div pending the arrival of HQ 9 Aust Div.
7. Recce parties report HQ 30 Corps by last light 3 July. Bde gp is expected to arrive by 1300 hrs 4 July. Posns as stated in para 4 will be prepared and occupied as early as possible.
8. 2,000 mines, wire pickets and sandboxes are available at BURG EL ARAB for the locality defences and will be drawn

/in bde tpt...

40

in bde tpt by arrangements with CE 30 Corps.

It is hoped to make power tools, explosives and one sec Fd Coy available to assist with work on the hard ground in the northern locality.

ADM

9. 9 Aust Div, less the leading bde gp, will move westwards from AMIRIYA and come into Div reserve NORTH of the rly in the general area between 455 and 465 Easting Grids.

10. Movement fwd of all tps will be by the main rd and routes NORTH of the rly. Strictest rd discipline will be observed and movement will be at a density of NOT more than 20 VTM. MT colns will not pass line BURG A6U SIR 473916 - BURG EL ARAB 475911 until given "all clear" by ACV1, Main 30 Corps, through exchange BURG EL ARAB. A staff officer of 9 Aust Div will ring up 30 minutes before colns are due to reach this line.

11. Further adm instructions will be issued separately.

INTERCOMM

12. 30 Corps will establish L/T between Bde HQ and following by 1200 hrs 4 July:-

- HQ 30 Corps
- HQ 50 Div
- HQ 1 S A Div

L/T with 9 Aust Div HQ will be provided under arrangements by 9 Aust Div.

13. Leading bde will be netted on the 50 Div W/T fwd control frequency.

14. Until such time as HQ 9 Aust Div assumes control, leading bde will provide three LOs for work as follows:-

- One with HQ 30 Corps
- One with HQ 50 Div
- One with HQ 1 S A Div

In addition, a "G" and a "Q" liaison staff officers will be dispatched to 30 Corps HQ (Rear) as early as possible for attachment until HQ 9 Aust Div arrives.

15. Present locations:-

Main 30 Corps HQ	441893
Rear "	443893
1 S A Div HQ	430899
50 Div HQ	435892
1 Armd Div HQ	437893

/ACM..

Div.

ACK

W. H. H. H.
Brigadier
General Staff

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a T. H. Dy 79 Feb 1930

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

H. Q. 24 AUST. INF. BDE. (Unit.) For Week Ending 5/7/42

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

War Establishment.	1	2	3	4
	Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishment).
	*			
	*			
	*			
	* <i>Brigadier</i>	1		
	Lieut. Colonels			
	Majors... ..	1		
	Captains	4		
	Lieutenants	3	-	2
	2nd Lieutenants			
	Quartermasters			
	District Officers			
	TOTALS	9	-	2

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
<i>Lieut</i>	<i>Wallace A.D.</i>	<i>AIF</i>	<i>30/6/42</i>	<i>Rejoined Unit from Hospital</i>

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
<i>Lieut</i>	<i>Head G.M.</i>	<i>AIF</i>	<i>30/6/42</i>	<i>Ceases to be attached Rejoined 2/28 Bn</i>

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
M. or S.	Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	Date Joined Unit.	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	
1	Brig		Godfrey R.H.	A97	yes		Comd	
2	Major		Jackson B.H.	✓	✓		BM	
3	Capt		Bishop K.E.	✓	✓		BML	
4	Lieut	T/Capt	Sangster R.W.	✓	✓		S.C.	
5	Lieut		Worthley M.G.	✓	✓		S.C.L.	
6	Lieut	T/Capt	Gallagher T.G.	✓	✓		L.O.	
7	Lieut		Wallace F.D.	✓	✓		L.O.	
8	Lieut		Cook G.T.	✓	✓		L.O.	
9	Lieut	T/Capt	Hallyday J.R.	✓	✓		T.O.	
10								
11								
12								
13								
14								
15								
16								
17								
18								
19								
20								
21								
22			(ii) Officers attached from other Corps					
23								
24	Capt		Wheeler N.V.	AASC			BASCO	
25	Lieut		Butler F.V.	2/32 Bn			Att for duty	
26	Lieut		Downey R.K.	✓			✓	
27	Lieut		Peace E.T.S.	✓			✓	
28	Lieut		Sonnely F.D.	MAQd Bn			OC HQ 2 PL MAQd Bn	
29								
30								
31								
32								
33								
34								

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Chaplain		Gard T.	AACHD		Chap 2/43 Bn
✓		Swan C.M.	✓		2/2 P Bn
✓		Baskin G.E.O.P.	✓		2/32 Bn

H. Q. 24 AUST. INF. BDE.

(Unit.)

5/7/42.

(Date of Despatch.)

DR Jackson Brig

(Signature of Commander.)

7 Aust Bn

(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

Part D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in
Part A of Army Form W.3009.

DETAIL OF SPECIALISTS, TRADESMEN, ETC.	SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT.								REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.							REMARKS.					
	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	S.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.	Staff-Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.	TOTAL.	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	S.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.	Serjeants.		Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.	TOTAL.	
Bricklayers ...																					
Butchers ...																					
Carpenters and Joiners...																					
Clerks ...																					
Cooks ...																					
Despatch Riders ...																					
Drivers I.C. (Tracked) ...																					
" " (Wheeled)...																					
Driver-Mechanics...																					
Driver-Operators ...																					
Electricians...																					
Equipment Repairers																					
Farriers ...																					
Fitters ...																					
Machine Gunners ...																					
Masons ...																					
Motor Mechanics...																					
Pioneers, Infantry (other than tradesmen)																					
Plumbers and Pipefitters.																					
Range Takers ...																					
Saddlers & Harness Makers																					
Saddle Tree Makers ...																					
Sanitary & Water Duties.																					
Signallers ...																					
Storemen technical																					
Tailors ...																					
Wheelers ...																					
General duty personnel...									66												
TOTALS (to agree with Columns 3 & 4 of Part A)																					

H. Q. 24 AUST. INF. BDE.

Unit.

Date of Despatch

5 July 1942

DR Jackson

Signature of Commander.

9 Aust. Div.

Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

H. Q. 24 AUST. INF. BDE. (Unit.) For Week Ending 11 Jul 42

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

War Establishment:	1	2	3	4
	Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishment).
	*			
	*			
	*			
	* Brigadier	1		
	Lieut.-Colonels			
	Majors...	1		
	Captains	4		
	Lieutenants	4	-	1
	2nd Lieutenants			
	Quartermasters			
	District Officers			
	TOTALS ...	10	-	1

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Serjeant	Pearce E.T.S	R.I.F.	28/6/42	Appointed I.O. 24 Aust Inf Bde & remains seconded 2/32 Bn AIF(ME) List no 87 dated 4/7/42.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
	M. or S.	Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	Date Joined Unit.	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	
1		Bug		Godfrey G.A.R.	AIF	yes		Comd	
2		Major		Ahanson B.R.	✓	✓		B.M.	
3		Capt		Bishop K.E.	✓	✓		B.M.L.	
4		Lieut	T/Capt	Sangster R.W.	✓	✓		S.C.	
5		Lieut		Worthley M.F.	✓	✓		S.C.L.	
6		Lieut	T/Capt	Gillibrand T.G.	✓	✓		L.O.	
7		Lieut		Wallace A.D.	✓	✓		L.O.	
8		Lieut		Cook G.T.	✓	✓		L.O.	
9		Lieut		Pearce E.T.S.	✓	✓		I.O.	
10		Lieut	T/Capt	Hallyfax G.L.	✓	✓		T.O.	
11									
12									
13									
14									
15									
16									
17									
18									
19									
20									
21									
22									
23									
24				<u>(ii) Officers Attached from Other Corps</u>					
25									
26		Capt		Weekley N.V.	AASC			BASCO	
27		Lieut		Bowney R.K.	2/32 Bn			Att for duty	
28		Lieut		Burton E.V.	✓			L.O.B.	
29		Lieut		Donnelly A.D.	HQ 3d Bn			O.C. HQ 2 Pl	
30									
31									
32									
33									
34									

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Chaplain		Gard T.	AACHD		chap 2/43 Bn
✓		Swan C.M.	✓		✓ 2/32 Bn
✓		Baskin G.P.A.A.	✓		✓ 2/32 Bn

H. Q. 24 AUST. INF. BDE.
(Unit.)

11 July 42.
(Date of Despatch.)

[Signature]
(Signature of Commander.)
9 Aust Bn
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

H. Q. 24 AUST. INF. BDE.

(Unit.) For Week Ending

17/7/42

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

War Establishment.	1	2	3	4
	Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishment).
*				
*				
*				
Brigadier	*	1		
Lieut.-Colonels	...			
Majors...	...	1		
Captains	...	3	-	1
Lieutenants	...	3	-	2
2nd Lieutenants	...			
Quartermasters	...			
District Officers	...			
TOTALS	8	-	3

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
T/CAPT	HALLIFAX J.L.	AIF	17/7/42	Killed in Action
Lieut	WALLACE A.D.	✓	✓	Wounded in Action Shrapnel wound - Right Side

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
	M. or S.	Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	Date Joined Unit.	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	
1		Bug		Godfrey A.H.	AIF	Yes		Comd	
2		Major		Garrison A.P.	✓	✓		B.M.	
3		Capt		Bishop K.E.	✓	✓		B.M.L.	
4		Lieut	T/Capt	Sangster R.W.	✓	✓		S.C.	
5		Lieut		Wuthley M.G.	✓	✓		S.C.L.	
6		Lieut	T/Capt	Gelibrand T.S.	✓	✓		L.O.	
7		Lieut		Cook J.T.	✓	✓		L.O.	
8		Lieut		Paau E.T.S.	✓	✓		I.O.	
9									
10									
11									
12									
13									
14									
15									
16									
17									
18									
19									
20									
21									
22									
23									
24									
25				<u>10 Officers Attached from Other Corps.</u>					
26									
27		Capt		Weekley N.V.	AASC			BASCO	
28		Lieut		Downey R.K.	2/32 Bn			Off for duty	
29		Lieut		Bruton E.V.	✓			L.O.B.	
30		Lieut		Bonnelly A.D.	1st Bn			Off. to 2nd A Coy.	
31									
32									
33									
34									

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Chaplain		Gard T.	AACLD		Chap 2/43 Bn
✓		Swan C.M.	✓		2/38 Bn
		Baskin J.E.D.A.	✓		2/32 Bn

H. Q. 24 AUST. INF. BDE.

(Unit.)
18/7/44
(Date of Despatch.)

(Signature of Commander.)
Brisp
9 Aust Bn.
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

Part D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in
Part A of Army Form W.3009

DETAIL OF SPECIALISTS, TRADESMEN, ETC.	SURPLUS TO ESTABLISHMENT.									REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.						REMARKS.				
	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	S.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.	Staff-Serjeants.	Serjeants.	Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.	TOTAL.	W.Os. Class I.	W.Os. Class II.	W.Os. Class III.	S.Q.M.S.; C.Q.M.S., or Colour-Serjeants.	Serjeants.		Buglers, Trumpeters, &c.	Corporals.	Troopers, Privates, Guardsmen, Fusiliers, &c.	TOTAL.
Bricklayers ...																				
Butchers ...																				
Carpenters and Joiners...																				
Clerks ...																				
Cooks ...																				
Despatch Riders ...																				
Drivers I.C. (Tracked) ...																				
" " (Wheeled)...																				
Driver-Mechanics...																				
Driver-Operators ...																				
Electricians...																				
Equipment Repairers ...																				
Farriers ...																				
Fitters ...																				
Machine Gunners ...																				
Masons ...																				
Motor Mechanics...																				
Pioneers, Infantry (other than tradesmen)																				
Plumbers and Pipefitters.																				
Range Takers ...																				
Saddlers & Harness Makers																				
Saddle Tree Makers ...																				
Sanitary & Water Duties.																				
Signallers ...																				
Storemen technical ...																				
Tailors ...																				
Wheelers ...																				
General duty personnel...									66											
TOTALS (to agree with Columns 3 & 4 of Part A)									66											

H. Q. 24 AUST. INF. BDE.

Unit.

Date of Despatch

18/7/42

[Signature] Brig
Signature of Commander.

Ede., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

H. Q. 24 AUST. INF. BDE. (Unit.) For Week Ending 25/7/42

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

War Establishment.	1	2	3	4
	Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishment).
	*			
	*			
	*			
	* Bugher	1		
	Lieut.-Colonels ...			
	Majors... ..	1		
	Captains	3	-	1
	Lieutenants	3	-	2
	2nd Lieutenants			
	Quartermasters			
	District Officers			
	TOTALS	8	-	3

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc.).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Lieut	harris H.G.	AIF	24/7/42	Attached for duty from 2/28 Bn.
Lieut	Head J.M.	✓	25/7/42	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
	M. or S.	Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	Date Joined Unit.	If not present with Unit, state how employed.	
1		Brig		Godfrey	AIF	yes		Camel	
2		Major		Garrison	✓	✓		BM	
3		Capt		Bishop	✓	✓		BNL	
4		Lieut	T/Capt	Sangster	✓	✓		S.C.	
5		Lieut		Wraithly	✓	✓		S.C.L.	
6		Lieut	T/Capt	Gelibrand	✓	✓		L.O.	
7		Lieut		Cook	✓	✓		L.O.	
8		Lieut		Pearce	✓	✓		I.O.	
9									
10									
11									
12									
13									
14									
15									
16									
17									
18									
19									
20									
21									
22									
23									
24									
25									
26				<u>(ii) Officers attached from other Corps</u>					
27									
28		Capt		Weekley	N.V.	AAFC		BASCO	
29		Lieut		Downey	R.K.	2/12 Bn		After duty	
30		Lieut		Ruston	E.V.	✓		L.O.B	
31		Lieut		Howes	H.G.	2/28 Bn		After duty	
32		Lieut		Head	J.M.	✓		✓	
33									
34									

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Chaplain		Gard T	AAChD		Chap 2/43 Bn
✓		Swan C.H.	✓		2/28 Bn
		Baskin J.C. D.N.	✓		2/32 Bn

B. C. 24 AUST. INF. BDE.

25/7/42

(Unit.)

(Date of Despatch.)

[Signature]

(Signature of Commander.)

Brig

(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

