

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and Citizen
Military Forces unit war diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/2/30

30 Infantry Brigade

March 1942

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form
(ad)

(Erase heading not required).

Unit HQ 30 Inf Bde

Date and Time.—From 2400 hrs 1 Mar To 1400 hrs 1 Mar 42

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BOOTLESS INLET	1 Mar	0800 to 1400	A "fishing" expedition comprising an RAAF I.O. (Lieut COLLEY, R.A.N. I.O. (Lt Comdr FELDT) B.I.O. (Capt BENJAMIN) and 4 RABAUL boys from crew of R.A.N. auxiliary LEANDER, moved in RAAF tender to spot in BOOTLESS INLET marked by C. Coy, 39 Bn as spot where Japanese plane crashed 28 Feb. Comd C. Coy (Capt ROBINSON) had already succeeded in locating wreckage and bringing some to surface with aid of native boys from TUPUSULEI area, who proved much better divers than RABAUL boys. After making a good haul RAAF tender subsequently returned to MORESBY leaving C Coy still diving.	For results of expedition and subsequent ops by C. Coy, 39 Bn see Int Summary No 15 para (aa) and Appx 1. (Appx 1 hereto) 39 Bn also located auxiliary fuel tank, Mar 2

*A. J. [unclear] and
Capt*

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit HQ 30 Inf Bde

Date and Time.—From 1400 hrs 1 Feb To 2400 hrs 1 Mar

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
FORT MORESBY	1 Mar	1515 to 1400 approx	Air alert following RAAF report of 1123 hrs that nine 2-engined bombers had passed over FINSCHAVEN flying direction MORESBY RAAF tender returning from "fishing" trip was caught by this alert. FORT WAR semaphored "KEEP OUT - AIR RAID." Tender quickly sought shelter behind LOLOZUA ISLAND until all clear.	These evidently landed WAW and BULOLO. See note in Int Summary No 13 para (a) (Appx 1 hereto)
	" "	1530	39 Bw reported C. Coy had hooked a heavy object believed to be engine block of crashed fighter and had recovered more parts.	Advised RAAF through C.O.I.C. RAAF two days later went out and fished up heavy wreckage which 39 Bw had buoyed. Other parts handed over through HQ Bde.

A Benjamin Capt.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required).

Unit HQ 30 Inf Bde

Date and Time.—From 0001 hrs 2 Mar To 2400 hrs 5 Mar

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MORESBY	2 Mar	0940 to 0955 approx	Enemy Recce Flight	See Int Summary No 12 para (a) (Appx 1 hereto)
"	3 Mar	1415 to 1440	MORESBY Raid No 5	See Int Summary No 13 (Appx 1 hereto)
"	4 Mar	1425 to 1440	Enemy Recce Flight	See Int Sum. No 14 (Appx 1)
"	5 Mar	0030 - 0035	MORESBY Raid No 6	"
"	" "	0235 - 0340	MORESBY Raid No 7	"
"	" "	2230	GI and GII (Lt Col FITT and Maj WALKER) visited Bde Comd and informed him that as a result of enemy activities at RABAU (seen by RAAF recce) and GASMATA indicating concentration of a large convey, attempted landing might be possible within 36 hrs. G.O.C's orders that 7 Fd Coy come under comd 8 MD 6 Mar and move to 12 mile as Dist res.	(Seen by RAAF recce) B.M. (Maj NEWMAN) ordered O/C 7 Fd Coy (Capt FITZGERALD) to move early 6 Mar coming under comd 8 MD on completion

A. Benjamin Capt

of Move.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required).

Unit HA 30th Bde

Date and Time.—From 0001 hrs 6 Mar To 2400 hrs 13 Mar

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MORESBY	6 Mar	1200 to 1205	Enemy Recce Flight	See Int Summary No 15 (Appx 1 hereto)
"	7 Mar	1230 to 1310	MORESBY Raid No 8	} See Int Summary No 16 (Appx 1 hereto) See above ref.
"	8 Mar	0905 to 0915	Enemy Recce Flight	
"	9 Mar	1110 to 1150	MORESBY Raid No 9	
"	10 Mar	1157 to 1225	MORESBY Raid No 10	} See Int Summary No 17 (Appx 1 hereto)
"	11 Mar	1230 to 1300	MORESBY Raid No 11	
"	12 Mar	—	No enemy recce or raid	} See Int Summary No 18
"	13 Mar	0840 - 0910	MORESBY Raid No 12	
			on 11 Mar and 12 Mar to 12 miles SW of Moresby	

Cap. Benjamin Capt.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required).

Unit H.Q. 30 Inf Bde

Date and Time.—From 17 Mar To 21 Mar

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MORESBY	17	0840-0920	Enemy recce flt	Int Summary No 20 para aa)
		1440-1445	Post C, 49 Pw, and B Coy 53 Pw reported sightings of a single unidentified plane (TELNOCAD 1222211) which reccecd over TYRAMID and MORESBY. One observer reported it had wingtip marks consisting of a blue star similar to U.S.A. C.O.I.C. reported two planes over IOMA 1455 hrs	
	18	0910-0920 1425-1435	} Enemy recce flts	Report graded C.4 "Stand-by for Alert" given all units.
	19	1100-1045	Moresby Raid No 14	Int Summary No 21 para (aa)
	20	1157 and 1430	} Unidentified planes reccecd briefly over 7 MILE D Coy, 39 Pw commenced march to EILQGO...	Similar type to recent Jap reccecd. Ref OO. No 3
		0715-0718 0825-0830		
	21	approx 1400	Arrival of P. 40's	Int Summary No 22 para (aa)
		approx 1400- 1425	Enemy recce flt. As recce plane was shot down, screaming of thro in fwd posns could be heard as far inland as THREE MILE.	See Int Summary No 23 and setref No 28 See Int Summary No 25 (aa)

A. Ryan
Capt.
I.O.
B.

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required).

Unit H.Q. 30 Inf Bde

Date and Time.—From 22 Mar To 29 Mar 42

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MORESBY	22	1000	49Bn reported K1HA drone cleared of obstacles, as ordered verbally by Bde 21 Mar, on request by RAAF.	
		1455-1500	Three unidentified aircraft sighted by Bde A.A. Posts. A.A. guns fired three rounds. Planes appeared to be fighters; but were too high for accurate identification.	C.O.I.C. informed P40's took off but did NOT close.
"	23	1345-1410	MORESBY Raid No 17	} Int Summary No 23
"	24	0730	Recce flt.	
		1040-1115	MORESBY Raid No 18	} and Sitrep No 28
"	25	0915-0932	MORESBY Raid No 19	
"	27	0810-0830	MORESBY Raid No 20	" " " 25 & 26.
"	28	1142-1225	Air alert. No enemy action.	Alert received from C.O.I.C. on ROUNA report.
"		1321-1350	MORESBY RAID No 21	Int Summary No 26.
" B.I.O.	29	-	Nil report from MT LAWES patrol, 39 Bn, re avian reported down 27 Mar from 7.40	

WAR DIARY ~~or~~ INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required).

Unit HQ. 30 Inf Bde

Date and Time.—From 30 Mar To 31 Mar 42

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
MORESBY	30	1215-1250	Enemy Recce flt	1st Summary No 26
"	31	1255-1305	Enemy Recce flt. Wreckage of plane was inspected by I.O., RAAF, and material salvaged from plane and dead bodies.	" " " 27
		0800	Report received from C.O.I.C. that all U.S.A aircraft to have RED circle in centre of insignia painted WHITE.	All informed See 1st Summary No 27 (footnote)
<div style="position: absolute; left: 10%; top: 10%; font-family: cursive;"> A. J. S. Capt. B. I. O. </div>				

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required).

Unit HQ 30 Inf Bde

Date and Time.—From 1 Mar To 30 Mar

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
<u>Introduction</u>		(a)	<p>Incidental references to following subjects will be found <i>passim</i> in file of Bde Int Summaries att as Appx 1.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tng and practice shoots 2. Censorship, security, rumours. 3. Distribution of maps, silhouettes. 4. Morale (See also Chaplain's memo att.) 	Appx 4
		(b)	<p>Following documents are also att:—</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pro forma for Bde Sitreps (missing from War and Int Summary No 4 Diary for Feb) 2. Messages re capture of prisoner 28 Feb. and marking tag from his clothes (RAAF Int has duplicate) 3. Chaplain K Dowdings memo re Morale of Tps 	<p>Appx 2</p> <p>Appx 3</p> <p>Newsheet re War Diary for Jan was to combat effects of lack of news</p> <p>Appx 4</p>

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

(Erase heading not required).

Unit HQ 30 Inf Bde Date and Time.—From 1 Mar To 31 Mar.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
			4. Passwords List 2.	Appx 5
			5. Tug Instruction No 3	Appx 6
			6. C.O. 13 Fd Regts Notes for sub-unit Comds	Appx 7
			7. Amendments O.O. No 2	Appx 8
			8. Files of R.O.'s	Appx 9
			9. File of Strength returns	Appx 10.
			10. Bde O.O. No 2 and amendment etc.	Appx 11
			11. Tracings of Situation Maps	Appx 12
			12. Memo re Move of Bde HQ.	Appx 13
			13. File of Bde Sitreps for Mar.	Appx 14. Nel reports are NOT always incl in file as they were usually passed verbally by Lt/T to Int Sec, 8 M.P.
			14. Memo re Working Parties	Appx 15
			15. Adm Order re Reinforcements	Appx 16. First Time A.I.F. reinforcements, in strength, marched into militia units.

of King
 B. I.O.
 Capt

D.3487/5.39.—C.4788.

Ref. Map PORT MORESBY 1:63,360.
(Pro Forma as for Bde. Sitreps).

Copy No. 2

30 Mar. 42

- aa.
1. MORESBY RAID NO. 21. - MAR 29.
 - i. 1321 to 1350 hrs.
 - ii. Three bombers and seven fighters.
 - iii. Bombers probably Serial 37 or Serial 5; Fighters Type "C".
 - iv. Three bombers in V formation at 25,000 ft.
 - v. Three bombers flew in from out of sun, from NW over "TARCONA" to 'Drome. Formation was broken by P.40's. Bombs were dropped on area West of dispersal bays, in line with runway. Bombers then made off to NE. Our fighters then attacked the Jap fighters who, after a brief dog-fight broke the engagement and disappeared to the North.
 - vi. (a) 25 bombs approx on 'Drome area.
(b) 250 lb.
(c) H.E. and a few A/Personnel.
(d) Same craters as previously.
(e) Unexploded - Nil.
(f) Damage - Nil.
 - vii. Casualties - Nil.
 - viii. 3.7 A.A. opened fire, firing 13 rounds; planes were also attacked by our fighters, but no reports to hand of any planes down.
 - ix. Clear, with cloud at 20,000 ft.
 - x. It was reported that smoke was seen coming from one plane, but it is NOT known whether this plane was one of ours or an enemy. One P.40 landed while the dogfight was in progress.
 2. MORESBY RECCE FLT 30 MAR.

Jap recce plane, probably Serial 57, accompanied by three Type "C" fighters, came in from SE over MORESBY at 1215 hrs. A.A. opened fire on bomber, which was flying lower than usual. Plane headed over 'Drome into clouds to East, then made another run from East over 'Drome towards MORESBY, but turned and headed NW, disappearing into clouds. A.A. out towards 12 MILE opened fire at 1240 - plane then seen flying very high from North towards MORESBY. 3.7 A.A. again engaged plane, which turned towards the West, finally disappearing in SW direction. Fighters were observed to release a balloon over POREBADA, then they disappeared into clouds, reappearing over 39 Bn. area. At 1250 hrs. a "Type L" was seen being attacked by three Type "C" fighters over BOOTLESS. All planes disappeared in direction of ROUNA.
 3. SALAMAUA. Reports show that SALAMAUA is probably being used as a garrisoned shelter for shipping and as a seaplane base.
 4. MANDANG & TULAGI. Ten enemy bombers raided MANDANG on 27 Mar. Enemy planes also raided TULAGI on 28 Mar. No details yet to hand.
 5. RIGO PATROL. A patrol from RIGO discovered a crashed enemy bomber, previously reported by natives as having crashed in bush near HOOD PT. Plane was evidently victim of our A.A., as fighters were NOT in MORESBY when natives first reported.
 2. NADZAB. N.G.V.R. scouts report that 'Drome at NADZAB is still covered with obstructions placed on it by our troops.
 3. MT. LAWES PATROL. A patrol from 39 Bn. has been out trying to locate the airman who crashed in the vicinity of MT. LAWES on 27 Mar. A petrol tank of wooden construction was found and is presumed to have been jettisoned by a Jap. plane - remains were forwarded in. So far patrol has not found any trace of missing airman and is continuing the search.
 - dd. 1. MUNUN. Enemy forces at MUNUN, midway between NADZAB and LAE, formed two lines, stopping all natives, but, having no interpreter, they obtained no information and returned to LAE.
 2. MARKHAM VALLEY. Heavy floods are reported in MARKHAM area. BULLDOG 'Drome was covered with 5 ft. of water three days ago.
 - hh. M.V. "TARCONA" has been refloated from Reef and sailed from PORT MORESBY, escorted by two CORVETTES, at 0955 hrs. 30 Mar.

J. K. ... Major.
B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

H.Q., 30 INF. BDE. INT. SUMMARY No. 25.

Pro Forma as for Bde. Sitreps.
Ref. Map. PORT MORESBY 1:63,360.

SECRET.

Copy No. ²⁴ 27 Mar. 42.

aa. MORESBY RAID No. 20.

1. 0820 hrs. - 0830 hrs.
2. Two bombers.
3. TYPE : Probably Serial 37.
4. Two planes flying abreast at about 15,000'.
5. TACTICS : Planes came in very quickly from N.E. and dropped bombs on North side 7 MILE Drome, between RUNWAY and ROUNA Rd. Area. All bombs fell about 400 yds. off Runway behind new Dispersal Bays.
6. BOMBS : (a) Estimate twenty (approx.) 7 MILE Drome Area.
(b) 250 lbs.
(c) Mostly H.E. Some A.P.
(d) Same as previously.
(e) Unexploded; NIL.
(f) Damage; NIL.
7. Casualties; NIL.
8. Defence; 3.7" A.A. opened fire.
9. Weather; Clear, with some cloud about 15,000'.
10. General; A report from 49 Bn. states that the planes were Type 97, Serial 4A, KAWASAKI.

DARWIN and WYNDHAM. : On Mar. 22, enemy planes raided DARWIN. No damage inflicted and one enemy plane shot down by our fighters. WYNDHAM was also raided for second time but only slight damage caused.

- ff.** 1. Raid on LAE. On Mar. 22, our fighters made a successful attack on LAE. Ten Type "O" fighters destroyed and three or four damaged. Three heavy bombers destroyed; two damaged. Also two planes, type unknown, destroyed. Our losses were two fighters, pilot of one since reported safe.
2. Raid on RABAU. : Our planes attacked shipping in RABAU HARBOUR. One cruiser hit and left burning; another possibly destroyed. Other ships noticed in harbour and large no. of planes on VUNE Drome.
- hh.** M.V. TAROONA entered port 25 Mar., cleared port 26 Mar. Later reported that both TAROONA and H.M.A.S. COLAC aground on reef. COLAC refloated but TAROONA still aground.

E.K. Newman Major,
B.M., 30 Inf. Bde.

Pro forma as for Bde. Sitreps.
Ref. Map PORT MORESBY 1:63,360.

Copy No. 12
25 Mar. 42.

- aa. 1. 0915 - 0932.
2. Three bombers; four fighters.
3. TELNORCAD ; 1222211 (1 & 4) 2. Probably Serial 37.
4. Three bombers in V formation; four fighters, formation NOT observed; flying at 22,000'.
5. Came in from N.W. and flew over MORESBY. Bombs dropped on town side of TUAGUBA and between PAGA Bty. and reef; also between Wreck and LOCAL Island. Planes flew off to N.E. Fighters NOT observed until after bombing, when they appeared to join bombers over sea East of SCOTLESS.
6. A number of bombs, approx. 15, on Westerly slope of TUAGUBA. One near Oil Tank; one between PAGA Bty. and reef.
a. Six in sea between LOCAL Island and Wreck.
b. 250 lbs.
c. H.E. and A.P.
d. NOT known.
e. NIL.
f. Damage : No damage reported.
7. Casualties : NIL.
8. 3-7 A.A. fired; fire appeared very good. Kittihawks did NOT engage either bombers or fighters.
9. Weather fine. Slight haze at 20,000'.
10. GENERAL : Four Kittihawks were 500' above bombers at commencement of attack, but owing to failure of W/T. from ground, they could NOT be ordered to attack. They missed bombers in a cloud and could NOT find them.
- dd. 1. A Japanese attack was intercepted by an A.I.F. bayonet charge and enemy tps. forced back in disorder, discarding their rifles.
2. At this stage Japanese used gas, forcing our tps. to cease adv. Respirators were carried, but NOT worn by Japanese. Our tps. did NOT carry respirators.
3. Gas appeared as a whitish blue smoke which spread from two areas to 1,000 yds. rearwards. Air cleared in 25 minutes. Offr. considered weapon a candle impregnated with toxic agent. Original report that lachrymator was used can be discounted. Lachrymatory reaction probably produced by smoke or toxic agent therein.
4. Country had thick rubber and cover crop. Ground steep, crossed by re-entrants. Breeze light; weather fine.
5. Casualties were three only, one of which was a hospital case, with an inflamed trachea. Several men were vomiting next day.
6. In another report, ref. was made to a small local engagement in which Australians bayoneted Japanese tps, piercing containers strapped to their belts, releasing gas. Other containers were thrown by men lying on ground apparently wounded.
It was NOT believed that a tear gas attack took place.
Enemy tps. were ordinary infantry.

Comment : It is possible that the containers mentioned were of the prussic acid type/

A. J. Benjamin
Capt.
for P.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

ff.
26 ARRIVAL OF FIGHTERS.

A warning message that four KITTYHAWKS (P.40s) would be arriving during the day of 21 Mar was passed to all units between 1145 and 1200 hrs, but no definite E.T.A. was available.

At approx 1400 hrs four fighters approached the 'Drome, hedgehopping. Owing to this and bad visibility, they could NOT be identified by A.A. posts and their markings had NOT been advised. R.A.A.F. siren blew and several R.A.A.F. personnel opened fire with rifles. M.Gs. on 'Drome also opened fire. All planes, when landed, showed bullet holes and were damaged to some extent.

3. RABAUL - 18 Mar. Direct hit heavy cruiser, 3 near misses 2 large ships.
19 Mar. Near misses large warship.
Recc 18 Mar. disclosed 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 9 tpts, 7
by bombers, 8 F/Bs.

42.
1. ENEMY RECCE FLT 21 MAR.

49 Bn. reported one u/i plane coming in from N, then headed NW, pursued by two P.40s. Bursts of M.G. fire were heard. Enemy recce plane was shot down in flames, crashing into sea between PRUTH wreck and BEACON. Plane burst on impact with water. Also reported that plane dropped seven bombs on BOOTLESS while being pursued by fighters.

2. ENEMY RECCE 24 MAR.

One u/i plane passed ROUNA - possibly Serial 37. At 0730 hrs it was shot down over the sea from 28,000 ft by a P.40. No chance of any members of crew being alive.

3. PORT MORESBY RAID NO. 17 - 23 MAR.

(i) 1345 to 1410 hrs approx.

(ii) 19 bombers and at least 3 fighters. Bombers Serial 10 &/or 37. Fighters Type "O".

(iii) One V of 9, one V of 10. Bombers approx 20,000, fighters extended above.

(iv) Types - as above.

(v) 10 came in from North, bombed SE end of SEVEN MILE 'DROME. 9 then passed West of 'Drome and attacked TUAGUBA. Fighters came in low to M.G. 'Drome. Bomber formations joined company before flying off NE.

(vi) One bomb South end of runway proper. Approx 12 on West side of runway, approx 60 on East side of runway. Mostly 250 lb H.E., some A/Personnel. No unexploded found. No damage by bombs. Two KITTYHAWKS totally destroyed by cannon fire on ground, one slightly damaged.

(vii) Casualties - Nil.

(viii) DE A.A. defences at 'Drome engaged fighters, shot down two. One crashed MORRIS HILL, one West of NW end of runway, thought to be about one mile beyond 'Drome. NOT yet found. By A.A. defences engaged high-level bombers.

(ix) Sunny and clear below 20,000 ft.

(x) Japanese notebook found near crashed plane is being fwded to these H.Q.

4. MORESBY RAID NO. 18 - 24 MAR.

(i) 1040 to 1105 hrs. approx.

(ii) Two flights - one of 8 planes and other of 10 planes. Also 3 fighters were observed.

(iii) Bombers probably Serial 37 and fighters Type "O".

(iv) Both formations in V shape and later in extended line. Bombs were dropped from 20,000 ft. Approx.

(v) One 'V' shaped formation of 8 planes came in over 7 MILE Drome and dropped bombs between S end of drome and 'Bispersal Areas', almost the same area as raid No. 17. Mar 23. Other formation of 10 came in over MORESBY and bombed R.A.A.F. Hanger, Lower Port Road and the Township. One plane broke off this formation and headed E. Planes then flew out to sea in a S.E. direction. The formation of 10 came back over 'MURRAY BARRACKS', bombed the wireless station and the

3 Fd. Amb. area. Planes then flew off to North.

- (vi) Approx 80 on SEVEN MILE DRONE.
 - " 40 in MORESEY HARBOUR.
 - " 5 on cliff above AQUATIC CLUB.
 - " 6 on TOWNSHIP.
 - " 90 on MURRAY BARRACKS, WIRELESS STATION & HOSPITAL AREA.
- 250 lb. H.E. and A/Personnel. Unexploded Nil. There was no damage on 'Drome. One house destroyed in Hunter Street. Engineer's Store damaged at intersection of Hunter St. and Upper Port Rd. Communications down, and burst water main in front of STEAMSHIPS. R.A.P. destroyed and Dental Clinic shattered in 3 Fd. Amb. Hospital area and a number of huts destroyed and damaged in MURRAY BARRACKS.
- (vii) Casualties - Nil.
 - (viii) 3.7 A.A. engaged bombers at approx 20,000 ft. Fire very good.
 - (ix) Weather fine and clear - slight breeze.
 - (x) Two planes were observed with smoke pouring from them. One plane was later reported to have crashed on a bearing of 345 from Map Ref 149997.
- Three enemy fighters were engaged by our fighters. Bursts of M.G. fire were heard but no further reports are to hand.

PART II - EXTERNAL.

KOEPANG - 18 MAR.

Attacked by 6 HUDSONS, dropping 24 bombs on runways and other targets.




eg. SILHOUETTES OF AIRCRAFT.

Silhouettes of Lockheed HUDSON are distributed herewith.

MAPS. PORT MORESBY 1:31,680. Copies of this map have now been made available to units of Bde. Gp. Further copies are ~~NOT~~ yet available.


Distributed herewith as a map showing form lines of an area vicinity MERRIGEDDA MISSIONS mapped at same scale by Int. Sec., 39 Bn. Units holding copy of map can add this detail.

A. D. [Signature]
 Major.
 B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.



LOCKHEED HUDSON (P. & W. Wasp).

SPAN - 65'-6". LENGTH 44'-4". HEIGHT 11'-10 $\frac{1}{2}$ ".



Ref. Map PORT MORESBY 1:63,360.

Copy No. 12.

Pro Forma as for Bde. Sitreps.

20 Mar. 42.

aa.

1. MORESBY RAID NO. 14 - 19 MAR, 42. (Ref Int. Summary No. 21).

No trace has yet been found of enemy bomber reported shot down (Ref in para 9 to place where plane reported crashed should read "TATANA" NOT "TITANA". Ref in para 5 and in para hh of that summary to vessel attacked, should read "WONAKA" NOT "WINAKA").

2. RECCE FLT - 19 MAR, 42.

1430 hrs. Post "C" 49 Bn reported hearing a plane coming from NW. At 1432 plane was sighted over SEVEN MILE 'DROME, heading NE. At 1435 plane had headed North into cloud. Only description obtained - same type as previous recces during this week.

3. MORESBY RAID NO. 15 - 20 MAR, 42.

0715 - 0718 hrs. Post "C" reported four fighters attacking 'drome. Cannon heard at Bde. H.Q. Posts 1 & 2 identified as low wing monoplanes, single tail fin. Later 39 Bn. identified attackers as Type 'O' Fighters. They came from NW, circled to South end of 'drome, then opened fire on West side of dispersion area, firing about 200 rs incendiary into scrub between North edge of runway and watercourse, which is North of and roughly parallel to runway. (See map of 'Drome area - Appx to Int. Summaries Nos. 8 and 12). No shells actually entered dispersion area. Fighters made only one run, then made off, after A.A., L.M.Gs, and M.Gs. of 39 Bn. had fired about 70 rs at them. No damage, no casualties.

4. MORESBY RAID NO. 16 - 20 MAR.

0825 - 0830 hrs. Bde A.A. posts reported a single enemy bomber over SEVEN MILE 'DROME, Telnorcad 020211213. Later posts reported plane had bombed SEVEN MILE 'DROME. A.A. opened fire approx 0829 hrs. Plane headed off NW. 39 Bn reported six bombs dropped NW of runway. H.E. type. No damage. No casualties. Bomber similar to Serial 13 in outline, but may have been bigger plane.

5. RECCE FLTS 20 Mar.

At 1007 hrs Post C reported drone of planes NW. 39 Bn confirmed this. At 1012 hrs Post C reported sighting one plane above TATANA IS. 39 Bn also sighted a single plane. At 1019 hrs plane was out of hearing of all posts. Type NOT observed.

At 1325 hrs approx 39 and 49 Bns reported a single enemy recce plane, which approached from South. It circled SEVEN MILE 'DROME for approx 25 mins, being lost to sight intermittently in cloud. During this time a single Type 'L' was approaching 'drome, short of petrol. It landed only a few mins after recce plane had made off to North. Another Type 'L' had taken off from 'Drome, after refuelling, only half an hour (approx) before recce plane came over. Type was similar in outline to Serial 13. Note: "Type 'L' will in future be used in all aircraft messages and reports instead of "HUDSON MK VI"

6. N.G.V.R. REPORT LAE is now being used as a main enemy air base. R.A.A.F. report flying boats located there.

7. SERIAL 37. R.A.A.F. Int has received several reports that some Type 96 Hy Bombers have one rudder fin only. This was reported after one attack on RABAU in Jan, but was considered by R.A.A.F. to be unlikely. However, possibility of Type 96 having undergone modifications should NOT be overlooked (reliably reported that in attack on "PRINCE OF WALES" and "REPULSE", Type 96's, adapted for torpedo-carrying, were used). Observers should endeavour to report shape of rudder, as well as number of rudder fins. For instance, Type 96 has tapered rear edge to rudder and Serial 13 has oval-shaped rudder.

8. AIRCRAFT MESSAGES.

Distances from MORESBY of certain places frequently mentioned in aircraft messages are as follows (distances in miles):-

OBU 52,	TUPI 142	SAMARAI 250
IOMA 88,	KAIRUKU 184	
CAPE RODNEY 93,	DOGURA 188	
BUNA 100,	EAST CAPE 252	

cc. SALAMAUA Natives being used construct River Footbridge. Reported enemy living on board grounded ship.

A. J. Pennington
Major.
5.11.42

aa. Enemy Recce Flights; 18 Mar.

At 0905 hrs., C.O.I.C. reported one unidentified plane passed over GARAINA (approx. 100 miles N. of MORESBY) at 0845 hrs; also one unidentified plane passed over IOMA. At 0910 hrs., Post "C" 49 Bn, reported sighting plane coming over PYRAMID at approx. 25,000' and heading towards MORESBY. TELNORCAD description was 122211, (1 and 4) 21, probably Serial 5. At 0915 hrs plane circled ove POREBANA towards MORESBY, disappearing in easterly direction. At 1425 hrs., Post "C" reported sound of plane engines to North. One plane also heard over PRUTH wreck. At 1426 hrs, C.O.I.C. reported one plane over ROUNA. Bde. A.A. Posts at 1432 hrs. reported plane over 7 MILE Drome heading towards MORESBY. Single tail-fin seen; plane flying very high. Plane disappeared N.E.

MORESBY Raid No. 14; 19 Mar.

1. TIME : 1000 - 1045 hrs.
 2. NUMBER OF PLANES : Eight bombers.
 3. TYPE : Probably Serial 37 and 5A. TELNORCAD descriptions :
 - 53 Bn. : 122221224.
 - 49 Bn. : 12222211 and 42.
 - A.A. Posts. : 122221211.
 4. FORMATIONS AND HEIGHT : Eight planes in large open V formation at 23,200'; later broke up into two V formations of three and four planes; then into one formation of seven planes in extended line.
 5. TACTICS : Eight planes in open formation came in from sea from S.E. direction; passed over PRUTH wreck towards MORESBY, then turned North, disappearing in clouds. Seven planes appeared from clouds over 7 MILE Drome, one plane had broken formation. Main formation then split into two gps. of four and three in V formation. First formation of four headed towards MORESBY and second of three headed North; both flights disappeared in clouds. Planes came out of clouds and formed one formation of seven in extended line, circled over BASILISK Passage and came in over PAGA. Bombs dropped near stern of WINAKA which was off PAGA Point. More bombs dropped near wharf but fell in harbour. Planes flew off to North in one formation of seven. Two flashes seen from one plane in formation and planes then disappeared to N.W.
 6. Bombs ??? Estimated near Beam Wireless Station beyond HANABADA. These presumed to have come from plane which crashed. Eighteen near stern of ship off PAGA Point and twenty approx., near wharf in harbour.
 - a. SIZE : NOT known.
 - b. TYPE : NOT known.
 - c. UNEXPLODED : Nil.
 - d. CRATERS : NOT known.
 - e. DAMAGE : No damage reported.
 7. CASUALTIES : Nil.
 8. DEFENCE : 3.7" A.A. guns at TUAGUBA opened fire at 1005; fire very close to planes. A.A. opened fire second time at 1020 hrs. and again 1028 hrs. Plane that crashed may have been struck by A.A. fire.
 9. WEATHER & GENERAL : Dull with heavy cloud at approx. 20,000'. Plane which broke formation while over MORESBY reported to have crashed into hills near TITANA. "C" Coy 53 Bn. have bearing of 325° on posn. where plane crashed. Patrols from "B" Coy, under O.C. Coy. have gone out to locate plane. Map ref. from 53 Bn. gives posn. of plane as 961109. Report from 49 Bn. states that two planes had two tail-fins, remainder one fin.
- 1157 hrs. : One unidentified plane, presumed to be recce plane, passed over 7 MILE Drome at approx. 20,000' heading S.E. Same



- ff. N.G.V.R. : Constant air activity reported from MARKHAM Valley, also heavy tp. concentrations in same area suggested that paratps. were included. Also reported that German missionaries cooperating with Japs. and have all local natives working for them and disclosing in our posns. Enemy reported to have questioned natives about SALAMAUA - WAJ route.
- g. HORN ISLAND. : Flight of eight planes reported KEREMA at 1125 hrs. on 18 Mar. flying S.W. Air raid warning sounded at HORN ISLAND at 1208 hrs.
- h. BUKA : Air Force recee. 16 Mar. reports eight enemy ships anchored off KESSA Harbour. Radio SAIGON reports alleged landing at BUKA by a few Jap. tps. Message on 17 Mar. reports Jap. ships anchored seventeen miles off BUKA.
- i. DARWIN : R.A.A.F. Drome raided from 1430 hrs. to 1537 hrs. 16 Mar. by fourteen Serial 37 bombers. One hundred bombs, mostly A. Personnel were dropped. Damage to bldgs., rds. and airfields. Service casualties; two killed, eleven wounded.
- j. SALAMAUA : Unconfirmed B.B.C. report on 18 Mar. states that Aust. and U.S. planes attacked a convoy off SALAMAUA. Twenty three ships sunk, twelve being escort vessels. Also three enemy seaplanes shot down. Allied losses, one bomber failed to return.
- hh. S.S. WINAKA entered port 1000 hrs., 18 Mar.

GENERAL : Silhouettes of Aircraft :- Distributed herewith, silhouettes of CURTIS P.40 PURSUIT Plane (KITTIHAWK), (U.S. Army). Copies included for distribution to Pls. and Arty. Secs. of Bde. Gp. Extra copies of all silhouettes to date may be obtained from Bde. Int. Sec.

PART II: EXTERNAL.

JAVA : Airforce recee. from KOEPANG reveals new clearing has been made, apparently Runway near OEBEL, twelve miles from KOEPANG.

Ch. Newman Maj.,
B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.



CURTIS P-40.

PURSUIT

Span 37'-3", Length 31'-7", Height 10'-6".

NOTE : 1. A.A.F. A.57s for these summaries will NOT in future be required from recipients. Note Serial No. of Summary and notify this H.Q. immediately if any Serial has NOT been received.

2. Portions of Summaries marked with a sideline contain information which will NOT be passed to persons or sub-units other than Comd. and Staff of H.Q. to which Summaries are originally addressed.

aa. Enemy recce flight; 17 Mar.

At 0900 hrs. a single unidentified plane was reported approx. 100 miles North of MORESBY. At 0900, Carrier Pl., 53 Bn., reported hearing one plane to North. 39 Bn. reported one unidentified plane heading S.W. and low over 7 MILE Drome, and Post C reported that it had flown low over BOOTLESS and headed towards ROUNA. Plane was sighted North of Bde. H.Q. 0910 hrs., when 39 Bn. identified it as a two engine enemy bomber with single tail fin. 49 Bn. gave TELNORCAD description 1222311 and 431 and 4. Plane circled town at a radius of about 11,000 yds. from PAGA Bty., and was also judged by Post C to have flown over M.V. CANBERRA which was then approaching port. Plane was last seen by Post C heading Southerly at 0920 hrs. Probably Serial 5, 5A or 13.

BOUGANVILLE; Mar. 15. A further enemy recce was made.

bb. SYDNEY : A floating mine located 6 miles S.S.E. SYDNEY Heads 15 Mar.

cc. E. Coy 53 Bn. has moved to posn. previously occupied by sec. R.A.S. at 036027.

ff. RABAU; 12 Mar. : Hy. damage inflicted on grounded enemy aircraft. One direct hit observed on an enemy plane and another bomb probably destroyed two others. One hy. bomb exploded among closely packed aircraft on drome, and although results of this explosion NOT observed, they were probably considerable.

GASMATA; 12 Mar. : Runway damaged. Hy. A.A. fire encountered.

RABAU; 13 Mar. : One Allied bomber attacked VUNAKANAU Drome, hitting runway and destroying one plane for certain and probably two others. New buildings were seen near runway; a large tpt. and more than ten probable warships in harbour; about twelve planes at VUNAKANAU and four at LAKUNAI.

GASMATA; 13 Mar. : One HUDSON bombed dispersed aircraft and installations. Results NOT positively observed. Hy. A.A. and fighter opposition encountered. Drome had been camouflaged.

MORESBY; 13 Mar. : HUDSON which was attacked by "O" fighters during MORESBY Raid No. 12 is thought to have probably destroyed one fighter. No less than twelve attacks were made on this HUDSON during twenty minute dogfight, enemy fighters firing bursts of M.G. and cannon of 2 to 15 seconds duration.

gg. Censorship : Deletions from tps. letters recently found necessary (i) include refs. to following :-

Distances by which bombs missed certain installations and posns. incl. Bde. H.Q.

Arrival of U.S.A. fighters here.

Presence of U.S.A. forces in AUSTRALIA.

Absence of fighters from MORESBY Sta.

(ii). Instances of good morale noted :-

Frequent statements that writers do NOT want to go home before their job here is done.

Repeated statements that air raids have ceased to worry writers and are regarded as "just a nuisance".

(iii) General.

(iii). General : Numerous refs. have been made to rumours that beer will shortly become unavailable. Refs. are invariably derogatory. Several admissions have been noticed that food after all is NOT too bad. Indications are that morale of tps. is, in general, satisfactory.

Silhouettes of Aircraft : Silhouettes of Serial 43 (KAWANISI Flying-boat) which was first enemy aircraft to be identified over MORESBY, are distributed herewith. Extra copies are included for distribution down to pls. and arty. secs. of this bde. gp.

Searchlights : An R.A.E. A.A. Unit with twelve searchlights arrived on M.V. MACDHUI.

hh. M.V. CANBERRA was sighted and identified at approx. 0850 hrs. this morning approaching port. Later, several posts reported sighting three or four other ships indistinctly owing to bad visibility. These sightings were found to be "blobs" of black smoke from CANBERRA hanging low over sea in vessel's wake, there being NOT enough breeze to disperse them. All observers should be warned that an optical illusion of this nature is possible during still, hazy conditions.

M.V. CANBERRA still unloading at 1330 hrs.

PART II : EXTERNAL.



MIDWAY Island : U.S.A. fighters shot down one Jap., Serial 43, 12 Mar.

JAVA SEA : One probable enemy aircraft carrier sighted South of JAVA.

KOEPANG : Sixteen 2-engined bombers, twenty fighters on drome, two 6,000 ton and one 1,000 ton Tpts. off wharf and lighters sighted. Unconfirmed report states 500 prisoners being used to build wharf.

Adj. Benjamin Capt

for Major,
B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.



TYPE 97 -- KAWANISI

Four-engined Flying Boat (Naval Air Service)
Span 131'-0". Length 82'-0". Height 20'-7".

SERIAL 43.

30 INF. BDE. INT. SUMMARY No. 19

SECRET

Ref Map PORT MORESBY 1:63,360

Copy No. 12

Pro Forma as for Bde. Sitreps.

ea. MORESBY RAID NO. 13 - 14 MAR. and HORN ISLAND RAID NO. 1 - 14 Mar. 15 MAR. 42

Details of these raids are included in Appx L, extra copies of which are forwarded herewith to Units of this Bde Gp, in order to facilitate distribution of this information to sub-units. In future summaries similar information will be included where possible in Apperices for this reason.

ENEMY RECCE FLIGHT 14 MAR. (See Appx 1).

MORESBY RAID NO. 12 - 13 MAR. }

MORESBY RAID NO. 8 - 7 MAR. }

(See Appx 1 for further details).

gg. SILHOUETTES OF AIRCRAFT.

Silhouette of Serial 11, MESSERSCHMITT M.E. 109, of which Japanese are known to possess numbers, is distributed herewith.

hh. SHIPPING MOVEMENTS.

M.V. "MACDHUI" left port at 1800 hrs. 13 Mar. Two of H.M. Corvettes reached port at 0700 hrs and left again at 1600 hrs - 14 Mar.

Note: Heading indicator (hh) will be used in future sitreps to these H.Q. and in summaries, to denote subject of own shipping activity.

[Signature]
Major.
B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

30 INF. BDE. INT. SUMMARY NO. 19.

Ref Map PORT MORESBY 1:63,360.

Pro Forma as for Bde. Sitreps.

15 MAR. 42

aa.

1. MORESBY RAID NO. 13. - 14 MAR. 42.

- (i) 1133 - 1210 Hrs approx.
- (ii) Nine bombers.
- (iii) Serial 37. Telnorcad 1222121.
- (iv) Came in arrowhead composed of three Vs, made run across 'drome in formation at 23,000 ft approx.
- (v) Pattern bombing on East-West run. After completing run one plane broke off. Single plane subsequently recced over 3.7 A.A. posn, then circled over TATANA and made off. White balloon seen over MORESBY after planes made off. Balloon below cloud level.
- (vi) Approx 70 bombs dropped, mostly A/Personnel, but incl. 250 lb. H.E., five of which were dropped on SEVEN MILE 'DROME runway. No unexploded were found, only damage was bombs on runway and two sig wires cut. Area bombed was Southern side of 'drome, near YANKEEVILLE.
- (vii) Casualties Nil.
- (viii) 3.7 A.A. Bty opened fire, which was observed to be on line but short.
- (ix) Fine, clear, light breeze at ground level, scattered cloud above 23,000 ft.

2. ENEMY RECCE FLIGHT, 14 MAR. 42.

A single multi-engined floatplane, which had been sighted over CAPE RODNEY and HOOD PT. earlier, was heard by Post "C" at 1313 hrs, very high and at 1325 reported by PAGA Bty to be over HANUABADA. A description obtained later was - high wing four-engined floatplane. Probably a Serial 43. Early reports mentioned that it sounded like having an engine defect. This may, however, have been caused by de-synchronising of engines. Headed off to NE.

3. MORESBY RAID NO. 12 - 13 MAR. (Ref Int Summary No. 18).

Pilot of HUDSON which eluded enemy fighters for 20 mins (and incidentally attempted to draw them over A.A. posns) reports expending all his ammunition on the fighters and observing tracer hits on both. HUDSON was untouched.

4. MORESBY RAID NO. 8 - 7 Mar. (Ref Int Summary No. 16).

A patrol under a P.A.U. Offr was sent out after suspected crashed plane (Ref para 10). No trace was found.




5. HORN ISLAND RAID NO. 1 - 14 MAR. 42.

1120 - 1150 hrs eight Type 96 Heavy Bombers, escorted by nine Type 0 Fighters, raided 'drome at HORN ISLAND (near T.I.) Bombers made one run over dispersion bays, dropping about 32 bombs, incl 250 lb H.E. and A/Personnel. Two unexploded have been found, maybe duds. Simultaneously, six fighters swooped to M.G. aircraft and buildings. One HUDSON was set on fire and completely burned, two HUDSONS were slightly damaged (but today took off for mainland), eight drums of petrol destroyed and a few water tanks and buildings holed. A number of P.40's (KITTYHAWKS) were patrolling at 19,000 ft, when attack commenced. They dived on and completely surprised enemy fighter patrol of three Type 0. One KITTYHAWK blew out the cockpit and cabin of a Type 0, which exploded in mid-air. Another KITTYHAWK emptied his guns at 300 yds into a bomber, which crashed in flames, after one engine and tail guns had been put out of action. A third KITTYHAWK put a long burst into a Type 0, collapsing fuselage. KITTYHAWKS guns then jammed, so pilot rammed Type 0's cockpit with starboard wing tip, then landed safely with wing tip damaged. He reported that enemy shooting was notably inaccurate. Yet another KITTYHAWK made hits on cockpit of a Type 0; and another KITTYHAWK pilot observed tracer enter another Type 0 before cloud obscured it.

Appx to Int. Summary No.

MESSERSCHMITT M.E. 209
Single Seater Fighter (Army Air Service)
Span 32'-5". Length 28'-3". Height 8'-4".

SERIAL 11



aa. MORESBY RAID NO. 11. Preliminary Report.

1. TIME. 1250 - 1300 hrs. approx. 11 Mar. 42.

2. NUMBERS 12.

3. TYPE Serial 37. Telnorcad 1222121. Tail, seen from below, definitely observed to have diamond shape of Serial 37.

4. FORMATIONS & HEIGHT. Flew in formation, composed of four threes, each three in V, and whole formation in diamond. Flew in at approx. 19,000 ft and bombed from approx 23,000 ft.

5. TACTICS Flew in from NE, made SW run across SEVEN MILE VALLEY, made wide turn and returned over West ends of THREE and SEVEN MILE Valleys and bombed SE end of 'drome and runway, continuing along SEVEN MILE Valley to BOOTLESS INLET, where more bombs dropped. Formation unbroken throughout.

6. BOMBS At least 12.

- (a) Unexploded None known.
- (b) Size 250 lbs.
- (c) Type H.E. craters.
- (d) Craters
- (e) Damage

One bomb on 'drome runway, one in middle of main road, six vicinity runway, all at SE end of 'drome. At least one near VAI-VAI Ck, towards BOOTLESS Inlet. Traffic on main rd across SE end of 'drome had to be diverted for a short time. Runway quickly repaired.

7. CASUALTIES None reported.

8. DEFENCE A.A. 3.7 inch opened fire and appeared to interrupt East-West run.

9. WEATHER Drifting cloud banks made sighting difficult, both for attack and defence.

aa 2. LORENGAU (Admiralty Islands) 8 Mar. Three monoplanes similar type 94 bombed, machine-gunned LORENGAU for half hour from 1130. No casualties, no damage. They conducted thorough recce of Island for one hour.

3. IOMA 10 Mar. Recce by one enemy seaplane for 50 mins 10 Mar.

4. BUNA Mar. One Jap seaplane attacked 1000 hrs, M.Gd. and bombed small vessels off shore and houses. No casualties. Plane then landed. A small detachment of sigs opened fire with rifles, forcing plane to retire.

5. MORESBY RAID NO. 12. 13 Mar.

Six fighters, believed Serial 48 (Type O) came in low over SEVEN MILE and M.Gd. and cannoned drome approx 0840 hrs. A civil FOKKER on 'drome was destroyed and a small quantity of petrol on 'drome was fired. One R.A.A.F. ground staff was wounded in leg. Two enemy fighters pursued a HUDSON which had been about to land. HUDSON eluded them skilfully for 20 mins before they made off in a Southerly direction. Subsequently these two reappeared near PAGA Bty, circled and again made off Southerly. 39 Bn A.A., L.M.Gs, and M.Gs. opened fire early in raid, firing approx 360 rounds. Tracer was observed, both in front and rear of planes, close; but no hits were observed. Three fighters, after strafing 'drome, made off in NE direction.

6. KAIRURU reports an attack by four enemy fighters at 0926 hrs 13 Mar.

7. AIR RAID ALARM Moresby Harbour. In future air raid alarm signal for shipping in harbour by day will be hoisting of red flag at masthead of FORT WAR Sig Sta (PAGA PT). Flag will be kept flying until all clear, when it will be replaced by International Code Pendant

cc. As previously reported by L/Toc to Units of this Bde Gp, enemy landings were made approx 0200 hrs 7 Mar at LAE and SALAMAUA, and on 10 Mar at FINSCH HAVEN (also known as FINSCH HARBOUR). Further details NOT yet available

ee. "D" Coy. 53 Bn (less one Sec) has moved from NAPA NAPA to vicinity 022024 and H.Q. 13 Fd. Regt has moved from MURRAY BARRACKS to H.Q., recently vacated by 7 Fd. Coy.

ff. LAE & SALAMAUA.

As result of attacks in recent days by R.A.A.F. and Allied planes, at least five enemy ships are known to have been sunk, one beached and one a probable total loss. One enemy flying-boat, seen at anchor at GASMATA, 10 Mar, was M.Gd. and set on fire by a HUDSON. An enemy pinnace was also attacked and probably sunk by a HUDSON vicinity SALAMAUA. The 'drome runway and buildings at SALAMAUA were also heavily bombed.

gg. 49 BN MORTAR SHOOT, 10 MAR, BABUKORI.

Mortar posn 051989, range 800 yds, target area 150 x 150 yds, containing 15 floating petrol drums, three packing-case rafts and 57 sealed bottles. Of 15 r fired, 12 fell in target area. One drum sank before observation carried out, 23 shrapnel hits on drums and rafts, one raft shattered and one drum cut adrift from mooring. 32 bottles were left after shoot. Absence of smoke from bursts noticeable. Water was very choppy in target area, possibly accounting for small number of shrapnel hits.

ECONOMIC INT.

Although many natives went bush after first raid, they are now returning and P.A.U. reports labour posn satisfactory. Rubber plantations at KOITAKI, ITTKINUMA and EILOGA are producing and shipping about 75% capacity. Producing areas in Northern Div are producing as usual and production at GALLEY REACH is being recommenced. Copra. Because of bulky nature of produce and lack of shipping space, production is being curtailed. Gold production in YODDA VALLEY is proceeding as usual.

A. Binjamina Capt
for Major.
B.M. 50 Inf. Bde.

30 INF. BDE.
Int. Summary No. 17.

SECRET.
Copy No. 1.
10 Mar. 42.

Ref. Map PORT MORESBY 1:63,360.
Pro forma as for Bde. Sitreps.

aa. MORESBY Raid No. 9. 9 Mar. 42.

- (1) TIME. 1110 - 1150
- (2) NUMBER OF PLANES. Two flights - 1st of 5 and second of 4. Both flights were led in by single plane about 2 miles ahead of each flight.
- (3) TYPE. Probably SERIAL 10. TELNORCAD 122211112.
- (4) FORMATIONS & HEIGHT. First flight of five planes in V formation. Second flight of four planes in T formation. Height 23,000/24,000 ft.
- (5) TACTICS. First flight of five planes came in from N.E. and flew from N.E. to S.E. over drome. Bombs were dropped along the length of drome. Planes then circled and flew N.E., all flying very high. Second flight of four planes passed over MORESBY from N.W. then on over SEVEN MILE DROME - dropped bombs and flew off to S.E. One lone plane came in from N.E. over A.A. on TUAGUBA, dropped bombs and flew on over drome to S.E.
- (6) BOMBS.


<u>Numbers</u>	Estimated 8 in 53 Bn. and TUAGUBA area. Estimated 57 on SEVEN MILE DROME area.
(a) <u>Unexploded.</u>	Nil.
(b) <u>Size.</u>	250 lb.
(c) <u>Type.</u>	H.E. and A/Personnel.
(d) <u>Craters.</u>	Same as previous H.E. and A/Personnel craters.
(e) <u>Damage.</u>	Small fire on Drome (grass). Sig Lines at TUAGUBA Sty and SE end of Drome cut. During the raid a hut was destroyed by fire at MURRAY BARRACKS. Cause of fire NOT known.
- (7) CASUALTIES. Nil.
- (8) DEFENCE. A.A. opened up at 1123. Opened fire second time at 1131. Fire appeared very good.
- (9) GENERAL & WEATHER. Small white Meteor Balloon was released over 49 Bn. area during raid, but burst during descent. Bursts of M.G. fire were heard from planes - thought to be signals. Bombs aimed at Runway fell to the N. side in scrub well away from target. Weather was clear, with cloud banks to N. and N.E.

MORESBY RAID NO. 10. 10 Mar. 42.

- (1) TIME. 1157 hrs to 1225 hrs.
- (2) NUMBER OF PLANES. 1 Flight of six planes. (Report of 12 from
- (3) TYPE. Telnorcad 12222211 & 4 1. (May be (B Coy, 49 Bn.)
Serial 37)
- (4) FORMATIONS & HEIGHT. Two groups of three planes came in at 15,000 ft, bombed at 11,000 ft, then climbed back to 15,000 ft.
- (5) TACTICS. Planes came in over BOOTLESS from the East, then flew over to the North, circled and split into two groups of three planes each; flights then circled drome for about 10 minutes before dropping bombs. Bombs were dropped the whole length of the drome on MORRIS HILL side of Runway, the planes flying then from SE to NW in V Formation. After bombing, planes disappeared to SE.
- (6) BOMBS. Estimated that 40 bombs fell MORRIS HILL side of SEVEN MILE 'DROME.



(a) <u>Size</u>	250 lbs.
(b) <u>Type</u>	H.E. and A/Personnel.
(c) <u>Unexploded</u>	Nil.
(d) <u>Craters</u>	Same as previous craters.
(e) <u>Damage</u>	Petrol drums were hit on 'drome, causing small fire.

7. Casualties/



TYPE 96 --- MITSUBISHI

Single Seater Fighter (Naval Air Service)
Span 39' - 4" Length 28' - 5" Height 9' - 2"
SERIAL 43.



TYPE 97 -- MITSUBISHI
Single Seater Fighter (Naval Air
Service)
Span 39' - 6" Length 25' Height 10'
SERIAL 39.

aa. (Continued).

Page 2.

(7) CASUALTIES. Nil.

(8) DEFENCE. Passive - A.A. guns did NOT fire owing to low cloud obscuring view of planes.

(9) WEATHER & GENERAL. Fine, with heavy cloud at 10,000 ft, with occasional patches of clear sky showing. Planes appeared to have a longer narrower wing than usual, also their engine sounds appeared to be different.

gg. (1) SHIPPING. "MACDHUI" arrived in port at 0840 hrs. 10 Mar. 42.

(2) MOVEMENT OF 39 BN. H.Q. As from 2300 hrs 9 Mar, 39 Bn. H.Q. will be situated at EVANS HOUSE - 8 MILE VALLEY. (Map Ref 104053).

SILHOUETTES OF PLANES - FIGHTER TYPES. Type 97 MITSUBISHI and Type 0 MITSUBISHI - similar to one which crashed during raid on 28 Feb. 42 are attached.

A limited number of copies silhouettes of planes and ships (copies att to Summaries 15 and 16) are obtainable from Bde. Int. Sec.

E.A. Veerman Major.
B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

8 Mar. 42.

Ref. Map PORT MORESBY 1:63,360.
Pro forma as for Bde's Sitreps.

(aa). MORESBY Raid No. 8.

1. TIME. 1230 - 1310 hrs. approx.
2. NUMBERS. Two flts. of five planes. May also have been a lone plane present. (NOT confirmed.)
3. TYPE. TELNORCAD, 22221111 and circling.
4. FORMATION and HEIGHT. In V formations, approx. 20,000 ft. up.
5. TACTICS. Two flts. of five approached from N.E. to EAST from direction of ROUNA. One flt. flew S.W. to bomb Bde. H.Q. and M. Barracks area. (See Map, Appx. 1.) Other flight a few minutes later came in from similar angle to bomb 7 MILE DROME. A white meteor balloon was released shortly before bombing commenced.
6. BOMBS.
 - (a) 53 Bn. - 28.
 - (b) Bde. H.Q. and M. Barracks - 14.
7 MILE DROME and 39 Bn. area - 39.
7 MILE Valley straddling LALOKI Track - at least 5.
 - (c) Type : 250 lbs. A. Personnel and H.E. Bomb splinters with Jap. markings from 53 Bn.
 - (d) Unexploded : 1 possible 53 Bn; 1 suspected 109 Fd. W/shops area.
 - (e) Craters : 250 lbs. size.
 - (f) Damage : 13 Fd. Regt., Bde. H.Q. area : 1 hut with shrap ; 53 Bn : 2 tents destroyed and personal gear damaged, 1 truck damaged, repairable; Bde. H.Q. : bomb on rd., Sig. wires down; 7 Mile : 2 bombs on edge of short rd. across drome, which remained trafficable. A HUDSON bomber which taxied to a standstill in this target area remained undamaged.
7. CASUALTIES. Nil. (One dvr. at Bde. H.Q. was blown over backwards by H.E. blast and scraped skin on back).
8. DEFENCE. 3.7-in. A/A engaged bombers and near misses were observed.
9. WEATHER. Fine and clear.
10. GENERAL. Following is from report to 8 M.D. ref. suspected crashed plane :
"More than ten observers incl. P.O. WADSELY and two A/C Is, R.A.A.F., heard unusual whistling noise like plane coming down with engines cut back or conked. Other observers heard sick engine, all after A/A fire had shaved enemy formation. Minutes later first mentioned observer saw from hill, 035016, bearing 95° true, column white smoke which grew more intense for ten minutes, spluttered then turned oily black for five minutes, then burned out on lower slopes ASTROLABE Range. Graded B3. 39 Bn., "C" Coy. heard and saw nothing unusual. Panorama of range following."

Recco Flight 8 Mar.

A single enemy plane recced over 7 MILE Drome between 0905 and 0915 hrs approx. When fired on by 3-in. A/A Mob. Sec. from new posn., plane made off N.E. and then S.E. Last burst went close and plane was observed to turn sharply and dive to avoid fire. Type was NOT observed with certainty, TELNORCAD descriptions varying considerably. May have been new type. Most prominent feature, very long body.

/sg. (1) Silhouettes of ships.

(gg). (i). Silhouettes of Ships.

(Ref. Int. Summary No. 2, para gg.). Appx. 2 contains drawings of some merchant ships which have been in these waters frequently, also typical Japanese warships. Object of these silhouettes is to assist in correct reporting/sightings from O.Ps., and circulation should be given accordingly to extra copies distributed herewith. Observers should be warned that all merchant ships are most likely to be greyed over these days, and that a coastal launch with flat topped canvas awnings up may, at first glance, resemble aircraft carrier.

(ii). Following paras are reproduced from Notes by C.O., 13 Fd. Regt., distributed to B.Cs. and Tp. Comds. :-


"THOUGHTS ON DEFENCE OF PORT MORESBY FROM ARTY. POINT OF VIEW.

Counter measures by defenders :-

1. To so hide and camouflage weapons emplacements that their location will be difficult to both eye and camera.
2. To so protect defenders, their weapons, vehicles and stores that destruction becomes very difficult and so ensure their survival.
3. Preparation of alternative gun emplacements and weapon pits capable of being fired from in the event of a previously prepared one becoming untenable.
4. Preparation of dummy posns. at some distance from real one. these should be realistic and camouflaged and dummy tracks and slit trenches prepared.
5. If a landing becomes imminent to ensure that an adequate watch is kept and that detachments are close to their emplacements and protected from air attack. Difficulties of visibility at night, in rain, mist or falling light must be fully taken into consideration.
6. A full understanding by all ranks of the Beach Guns Role which is as follows :- All Beach Guns will remain in posn. and hold their fire until sure of hitting targets presented to them. This should occur within 3,000 yds. off shore. Guns will be run onto platforms at discretion of cmd. of gun according to amount of fire he is receiving at the moment. Each will then open heavy and accurate fire designed to sink M.L.Cs and put their human cargo into sea. Fire from guns must be continued so long as it remains effective. Spare gun Nos. should remain under cover until required. Local Inf. Comd. should be made fully aware of above instructions. There is some misunderstanding by Inf. Offrs. of Beach Guns Role and if Beach Guns are withdrawn too soon, they might just as well NOT be on beach at all. It will be necessary for Beach Gun to remain in action until fire becomes ineffective or its emplacement untenable. It may even be necessary to sacrifice guns, provided they can continue their fire usefully up to last moment. Having successfully dealt with M.L.Cs., fire of guns can then be turned onto large ships if within range.
7. Premature opening of fire will be avoided. It will only disclose site of our guns and weapons and lose certainty of obtaining effective fire from the outset. It is emphasized that Dive Bombing and M.G. from air can win no victory alone and that it is to destruction of landing forces BEFORE THEY LAND that all our endurance, will power and energy must be directed.
8. Ability of each defended locality to provide for all round defences must be insisted upon. A close degree of liaison and understanding of each others plans by all arms be arrived at and settled. This does NOT appear to be so in all cases at present. Every Gnr. Offr. should have a close knowledge of local Inf. dispositions and alternative plans of action.
9. ALL Arty personnel must be instructed in their courses of action in the event of sudden and unforeseen situations arising, such as having to move on foot to assembly areas or defend their gun posns., etc.

W. Benjamin Capt.,
for R. 30 Inf. Bde.

APPX. A.



MURRAY BARRACKS REF. MAP PORT MORESBY 1:63360


Enlarged Scale 2 inches to mile

(1) where Single Bombs Fell. 14 in all
 28 in line of arrow marked. 28
 Total 42


JAPANESE WARSHIPS




"KAGA" (Aircraft Carrier). "




"NATI" "ASIGARA"
"MYOKO" "HAGURA"
(Cruiser)




"HIBIKI" Class
Destroyer.



"MERKUR"
Tonnage: 5,900 g. 3500 N. 5300 dwt.



"MACDHUI"
Tonnage 4600 g. 26 00. N. 3200 dwt.



"MALAITA"
Tonnage 3300 G. 1900 N. 3700 dwt.

L.H. Coon P.S.
307 of R.R. H.Q.

30 INF. BDE. Int. Summary No. 15.

Ref. Map PORT MORESBY 1:63,360.
Pro forma as for Bde. Sitreps.

SECRET.

Copy No. 12
6 Mar. 42.

(aa). MORESBY Raid No. 4.

(i). Following is extracted from sig. message sent South by R.A.A.F. MORESBY re PW captured 28 Feb. and salvaged plane. A statement on this subject which may be released to tps. is contained in Appx. 1. Following is NOT for release below H.Qs. of units :-

"NAME SHO EIICHI 23rd FLEET AIR ARM YOKOSUKA NAVAL BASE 1st CLASS PTE. UNIT NO. 2077 NOT AIRFORCE NUMBER (.) CLOTHING ISSUED MAR. 40 (.) EDUCATED OSAKA TECH. SCHOOL TO MIDDLE STANDARD (.) FLEWING TNG. ONE YEAR FLEW ALL FIGHTERS UP TO "O" TYPE (.) FINISHED TNG. ONE MONTH AGO (.) LAST FOUR WEEKS SPENT THREE TRUK ONE RABAU (.) FLEW "O" FIGHTER TRUK RABAU WEEK PRIOR 28 FEB. (.) FLEW 28 FEB. RABAU MORESBY NEVER BEEN GASMATA (.) STATES A/C NAVY NAKAJIMA 101 REISHIKI SENTOKI WHICH MEANS TYPE "O" FIGHTER (.) RETRACTED U/C (.) ARMAMENT 2-20 m.m. CANNON SHELL GUNS NOS. 1389 AND 1396 MADE DEC. 41 SALVAGED WITH LIVE INCENDIARY SHELLS (.) HYDRAULIC ACTION NOT GAS (.) TWO JAP. MADE VICKERS Mk. V M.G. FIRING .303 THROUGH PROPELLOR IDENTICAL BRITISH (.) ONE M.G. AND .303s SALVAGED (.) STATED CAPACITY 400 SHELLS PER CANNON GUN (.) SIGHTS RING AND BEAD REFLECTOR SALVAGED (.) OIL FILTER Mk. II NO. 111047 MADE JUN. 41 NAKAJIMA A/C CO. SALVAGED AND GERMAN OXYGEN OR AIR BOTTLE (.) ENGINE PW STATES RADIAL TWELVE CYLINDER MITSUBISHI TWIN ROW H.P. UNKNOWN SPEED 600 KILOS FLAT AND MORE DIVING (.) CYLINDERS SALVAGED (.) NO BOMBS CARRIED (.) FUEL ORDINARY TANKS 800 LITRES PLUS AUXILIARY SIX FT. BY THREE ONE BELLY HOLDING FURTHER 300 (.) SIMILAR TANK FOUND LAND (.) CAUSE CRASH PW SAYS GROUND BULLET (.) TWO WAY W/T ALL A/C NO FURTHER ORDER BATTLE DETAILS (.) DOCUMENTS PW SAYS HAD MAP BUT NONE FOUND (.) AIR FIGHTING CONTROLLED BY CONTROLLER WHO STANDS OFF USING R/T (.) THIS CONFIRMED 3 MAR (.) PW OFTEN LIED UNTIL TOLD SALVAGE BUT CONSIDER ABOVE STATEMENTS ADMISSIONS TRUE (.) WRECKAGE BEING EXAMINED (.) PW IN ARMY CUSTODY IN HOSPITAL."

(ii). Since preliminary interrogations it has been ascertained by salvage and admissions of PW that plane was MITSUBISHI Type "O" powered by fourteen cylinder NAKAJIMA engine, 1,000 H.P.

(iii). PW was moved South by plane 6 Mar. for further interrogation by experts and detention.

Recce Flt. - MORESBY 6 Mar.

1200 hrs. Bde. A/A posts reported enemy plane approaching over 7 MILE DROME. 1202 hrs. 39 Bn. reported that plane was over drome. 1204 hrs. C.O.I.C. reported that enemy recce plane was over MORESBY; A/A guns opened fire; shots very close to plane which was reported losing height as it made off. 1205 hrs. 39 Bn. reported plane circled over BOOTLESS and headed out to sea disappearing under clouds S.E. TELNORCAD description 224241131. Several observers sighted two planes at same time, one reportedly a 4-engine float plane. (Graded C3). This report lends some support to TELNORCAD description given by 39 Bn. Several reliable observers saw a round object apparently att. to a small parachute released from a plane.

(ss). Silhouettes of Japanese planes.




Silhouettes of Serials 5, 5A, 10 and 37 are distributed herewith and should be given as wide circulation as possible. All these Serials have been reported sighted over MORESBY at various times.

J. Benjamin
Capt.
for B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

MORESBY Raid No. 4 - 28 Feb. 42.

1. Very valuable information has been obtained from the Japanese pilot captured and the plane salvaged, after that Raid.
2. The pilot was 23 years old, educated at OSAKA Technical School and had more than a year's training. He was evidently a first-rate fighter pilot; but, in spite of his education, training and ability, when taken prisoner he forgot the lesson that every good soldier has learned:- "NAME, RANK and NUMBER ONLY!"
3. For example, when first interrogated he volunteered the information that he belonged to Fleet Air Arm, YOKOSUKA Naval Base, that his plane was a MITSUBISHI 1941 fighter, carrying four guns, capable of 375 m.p.h. with petrol capacity of 180 gallons, and that he had flown from RABOUL.
4. The prisoner also tried to mislead us by deliberately lying. For instance, he said that his plane did NOT carry either an auxiliary petrol tank (to give it extra mileage) nor guns of the air-cannon type. When confronted with the fact that two air-cannon and one auxiliary tank had been salvaged, he was surprised into disclosing other true and valuable information. By telling lies, instead of saying nothing, he actually assisted us. Remember, if captured, say your NAME, RANK and NUMBER (which is all you are obliged to say under International Agreements) and THEN SAY NOTHING.
5. Because nobody had been silly enough to "souvenir" parts of plane, many other valuable parts were salvaged, including:-
 - Switchboard with electrical equipment.
 - Oil Filter of a new pattern.
 - Cylinders and attachments.
 - Stressed fabric and metal portions of wings and body.
 - Wheels and retractable landing gear.
 - Oxygen or gas cylinder (made in GERMANY).The whole plane was considered by R.A.A.F. experts to be very well made indeed. These experts stressed that souveniring means robbing us of information which will enable us to shoot down these planes more easily.
6. The pilot stated that his plane caught fire after being hit by small arms fire.
7. The pilot's clothes were found to be marked with tags giving information of value to our intelligence. ~~Masovary of his wristwatch~~ also assisted in his interrogation.
8. DON'T FORGET.
If captured, give NAME, RANK and NUMBER ONLY.

SOUVENIRING means stealing information that will help us to win the war.



FIAT B.R. - 20
HEAVY BOMBER (Army Air Service)

Span 70'8"
Length 52'10"
Height 14'0"



SERIAL 10





TYPE 96
MITSUBISHI
HEAVY BOMBER (NAVAL AIR
SERVICE)

Span 82'0"
Length 54'0"
Height 12'6"

SERIAL 37






TY PE 97 - MITSUBISHI

Heavy Bomber (Army Air Service)

Span 72'0" Length 47'0"
Height 12'0"

SERIAL 5.





TYPE 97 KAWASAKI KAWA 95

Heavy Bomber (Army Air Service)

Span 75'0", Length 62'0".
Height 12'6"

SERIAL 5 A.



Ref Map PORT MORESBY 1;63,360
(Pro forma as for Bde. Sitreps)

5 MAR. 42.

aa. RECCE MORESBY 4 MAR.

At 1425 hrs a single enemy plane was sighted by A.A. Posts, Bde. H.Q., high over SEVEN MILE and an alert was notified to all units. At 1427 39 Bn. observed plane flying through cloud direction MORESBY, 53 Bn. reported it circling high over town. At 1430 49 Bn. observers sighted three smaller ~~silver~~ planes, like fighters, in clouds over MOTUHONUA (LION) ISLAND. Tailorcad of single plane was given as 12223112, confirming original report that it was probably Serial 5 or 5A. Planes were NOT again sighted or heard. A.A. Bty did NOT fire. Good use was made by enemy of sun and cloud.

MORESBY Raid No. 6.

1. Time. 0030 - 0035 hrs approx.
2. Numbers. NOT known accurately. Probably three.
3. Type. NOT positively identified. Probably Serial 43; engine noise similar. Both wings looked straight-edged. Nose prominent.
4. Formations & Height. NOT known. Planes evidently bombed in formation.
5. Tactics. Came in from S.E. straight to SEVEN MILE, bombed and flew off East without waiting to observe results. A parachute flare was dropped but apparently did NOT open properly. Portion of this was picked up 5 Mar by 39 Bn. and is being studied by R.A.A.F. It does NOT appear to be of Japanese make.
6. Bombs. Approx twenty vicinity drome, incl one on edge of runway and three on rd; 250 H.E. Damage to runway repaired before daylight and rd remained trafficable.
7. Casualties. Nil.
8. Defence. Passive. Planes were heard at Bde H.Q. simultaneously with report by 49 Bn that they had been heard over BOOTLESS. A warning message from REGO was NOT received by 8 M.D. in time to be of use. Consequently, adequate warning could NOT be given to all units.
9. Weather. Full moon was almost directly over 'Drome. Light breeze, fine.

MORESBY Raid No. 7.

1. Time. 0255 - 0340 hrs. approx.
2. Numbers. NOT known accurately. Probably four.
3. Types. Same as Raid No. 6, but may have included one machine of different type.
4. Formations & Height. NOT known.
5. Tactics. Planes came in from South-Easterly direction and appeared to pick up direction from PYRAMID POINT to make East to West runs over MORESBY. Flares were dropped vicinity PAGA PT. Target was evidently "Reclamation Area" vicinity R.A.A.F. HANGAR, but all bombs dropped further West, vicinity HANUBADA - KONEDOBUI.
6. Bombs. Numbers and types NOT known, but many fell in water and damage was nil.
7. Casualties. Nil.
8. Defence. Passive. Adequate alert could be given, as warning from REGO received in time.
9. Weather. Moon was more nearly over MORESBY than in Raid No. 6. Cloud formations were more prominent & favourable to raiders.

gg. 1. MOVEMENT OF LAKATOIS.

23 A.A. Bty had reported that during recent daylight raids and recess suspiciously similar movements of lakatois had been observed between PARI village and REEF. These movements had NOT been observed on days when enemy planes were NOT over. Two lakatois were observed during Recce Flight 4 Mar (ref Para aa) and efforts were made to have them intercepted. Owing to lack of launches these efforts were NOT successful. However, two lakatois were prevented from setting out from PARI and a patrol offr of PAPUAN ADM. UNIT (See next sub-para) questioned crews and summoned a village meeting at PARI. Following facts were ascertained:-

(a) Villages all along coast vicinity MORESBY are short of food, because of drought. Consequently, fishing is vital to health of villagers.

(b) PARI/

- (b) PARI natives have recently been out fishing, early in morning and around midday, according to favourable tides.
- (c) Numerous lakatois from villages East of PARI have been passing PARI to and from MORESEBY, seeking and bringing back food.
- (d) PARI natives will readily co-operate in scheme, which it is proposed to adopt, of marking lakatois belonging to areas near MORESEBY with distinctive pennants, which can be observed from shore and provide a means of controlling movements. (Details of this scheme will be notified to all concerned as soon as possible).

eg.2. P.A.U. (PAPUAN ADM. UNIT) under comd. Lieut. ELLIOTT-SMITH, is a new unit formed to implement recently assumed responsibility of Dist. Commandant for adm of Government of PAPUA incl Native Affairs. P.A.U. includes all remaining magisterial personnel (Resident Magistrates and Patrol Offrs), Med Assistants, Papuan Constabulary and adm details from various Govt. offices. Services of native police and Patrol Offrs now belonging to P.A.U. may be made available to units for special duties in connection with recce, security investigation and interpreting etc.

3. MOVEMENT OF 3rd A.A. Bty. During night 4/5 Mar this bty moved from MORRIS HILL to a posn North of ROUNA RD, vicinity "PITT ST". Dummy guns etc. have been left in former posns.

4. RUMOURS still prevalent that this force will be relieved by Americans who are within a few days sail. Numerous rumours prevalent re cause of lack of mail. Origin of these are being investigated.

PART III - EXTERNAL.

1. BURMA. 26 Feb. Our planes attacked MULMEIN 'Drome. Results NOT observed. RANGOON: During raid at least 22 enemy planes shot down. Our loss one.

2. N.E.I. SUMATRA: 28 Feb. Our planes attacked 30 enemy bombers on Drome at PALEMBANG and enemy shipping PALEMBANG RIVER. Results of both attacks NOT observed.

JAVA: 28 Feb. Our air attacks on convoy of 4 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 30 merchant vessels 150 miles North of BATAVIA resulted one direct hit on very large merchant vessel. Enemy force 15 destroyers and 43 tpts 100 miles North of MADURA attacked by our planes. One tpt sunk, 13 severely hit. Recce sighted 10 tpts approaching Central North JAVA coast. Our planes attacked naval vessels, causing one to stop.

TIMOR: 28 Feb. Our recce report presence of 12 enemy tpts, 2 destroyers and 3 smaller vessels. Planes observed on Drome at KOEPANG.

W. H. H. H.
Lieut.
for B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

Ref Map PORT MORESBY 1:63,360.
Pro forma as for Bde Sitreps.

4 MAR. 42.

aa. MORESBY RAID NO. 5.

1. TIME: 1415 to 1440 approx.
2. NUMBER OF PLANES: 18 bombers and at least three fighters.
3. TYPE: Probably includes Serial 37 or 10. (Telnorcad description 1222111.) Report of four-engined floatplanes participating, supported by several observers. Engine noise like Serial 43. (Telnorcad description 2442221.)
4. FORMATIONS & HEIGHT: Formations of six, split into 3 - 3 - 1, and three formations of three. Bombed from 23,000 ft.
5. TACTICS: Planes had already evidently gauged wind and had line-up before flying straight in and bombing SEVEN MILE drome. Use was made of sun and cloud.
6. BOMBS: Main entrance to S.E. end, SEVEN MILE drome, between drain and runway - 12.
Main entrance to NW end of drome, same boundaries - 22, incl one Ck across runway - 5. on runway.
West end YANKEEVILLE - 5.
"A" Coy, 39 Bn. Area, MORRIS HILL, 12.
H.Q. Coy, 39 Bn. S.W. Bn. H.Q. - 4 (incl 1 on road). Total drome 55.
(See Map Appx 1, Summ. 12).
BADILLI - 18, 6 craters near GAOL.
NAPA NAPA reported NO bombs.
KONEDOBU - numbers NOT known.
- (a) Size: Bombs included 500 lb, 250 lb H.E. and A/Personnel.
- (b) Type: H.E. and A/Personnel. A.A., MORRIS HILL forwarding fragments to 8 M.D. of unusual type, other fragments held this H.Q.
- (c) Unexploded: NIL.
- (e) Damage: One 500 lb bomb landed on A.A. kitchen. One 250 lb bomb of peculiar type landed MORRIS HILL, firing grass. Petrol drums near runway were fired, also some at HANABADA.
7. CASUALTIES: R.A.A.F. - 2 injured. One A.A. Gnr. MORRIS HILL injured.
8. DEFENCE: 3.7 A.A. engaged bombers. Fire went close early, may have broken up first formation.
9. WEATHER: Fine, slight haze in patches 20,000 ft (approx).
10. GENERAL: No confirmation of parachute report. No crash in report that HUDSON which took off at beginning of raid was shot down.
"LOREBADA" passed BEACON heading for MORESBY during second alert.

ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY - WAU AND BULOLO: Nine twin-engined enemy planes reported sighted over FINSCHAVEN (FINCH HARBOUR) on 1 MAR. were evidently responsible for raids now reported to have occurred at WAU and BULOLO.

gg. 39 BN. CARRIER PL EXERCISE - TUPUSULEI AREA 25/28 FEB.

Narrative.

Search for paratps reported to have landed TUPUSULEI area. Exercise consisted of searching of country, moving by bounds, negotiating difficult obstacles, pinning down of enemy and attacking from a flank. Occupying of defensive posns incl beach defence. All round protection by night and general recce tasks.

Route. Carriers moved from C Cpy area, crossed NAGINA CK to TUPUSULEI Village and thence to BARACAU.

Country found to be most difficult between MERIGEDA & TUPUSULEI village, taking five hrs to reach village. As a route has now been reced, trip to village could be made in less than one hour. Country beyond TUPUSULEI towards BARACAU is more open and movement was much easier, except for last three miles, when difficult country was again encountered. Time would NOT permit recce of a track through this part, which consisted of dense jungle and swampy ck beds.

10 Carriers took part in the exercise.

Water. A stream was found near BARACOU with an unlimited supply of fresh running water suitable for drinking. D. & M. Vehicles functioned well considering difficult nature of country and tps taking part gained valuable experience in handling vehicles, as well as a good working knowledge of the locality. Communications. Visual comm was maintained throughout exercise with 6th Coy and thence by line to Bn H.Q. This afforded signallers valuable tng. (39 Bn Sitrep)

DUMMY POSNS. 13 Fd. Arty. Regt reports dummy gun posns estab now at 914047, 043982, 135952. A small gun, formerly a war memorial, is one dummy DISTRIBUTION OF SILHOUETTES. Aircraft silhouettes of Japanese types & copies of R.A.A.F. publication No. 143 have been distributed amongst units of this Bde. Gp. It is hoped to make available copies of amendments and additions to these publications.

PART II - EXTERNAL.

SINGAPORE. Following is condensed from a press despatch sent early in Feb. by AUST. Official War Correspondent, MALAYA.

JAP. BN. WIPED OUT.

Whilst main AUST effort in JOHORE was taking place on Western Sector, performance of two N.S.W. Bns. who remained at MERSING, in Eastern Sector, is worthy of special mention.

At MERSING and JEMUALANG main AUST forces had been concentrated and had built defences regarded as virtually impregnable. Japs never attempted landing there in what has been regarded for a long time as the "Gateway to Singapore". Only after his successes on West coast did he make any move towards ENDAU, 29 miles North of MERSING, a spot where we had never contemplated fighting more than a delaying action with a small force, under orders to fall back on our main defences South of MERSING River.

Even when posn in West necessitated transferring main body of A.I.F. in that sector, two bns left at MERSING were confident they could hold Japs. They only withdrew when enemy looked like cutting them off from West. And when they withdrew they hit Japs so hard that they retreated, with result that all tps on East coast were able to withdraw to SINGAPORE without further contact with the enemy, over a period of 4 days.

Early morning Jan 26 it was realised Bns would have to fall back, as NOT only was enemy heading towards KLUANG, but reports had come through that Japs had got large convoy ashore at ENDAU. Rapid conference of leaders decided that Japs could not get a large number of these forces South for 24 hrs; it was estimated he had only 2 regts to contact A.I.F. at MERSING River/

A bold plan was drawn up to entice these Japs into a trap on rd running South of JAMALUAN. One bn, who had been great patrol work, broke off contact with enemy during day and fell back through the other to the South of the JEMUALANG-KLUANG X rds. This was then dispersed into Coys, so that one covered the rd, others were placed on flanks on either side, as far as 1,000 yds into jungle. Arty and mortars were placed in posn, well covered, and by dusk all was ready, with a seemingly open and unprotected rd for Japs to come along.

Late in afternoon fwd pl came along, small parties of Japs beating through rubber, firing tommy guns and shouting. Their role was obvious, an attempt to draw our fire, which would have disclosed the presence of our tps. We did NOT fall into trap and pl silently withdrew.

At 0115 Japs opened fire from rd on our Coy covering it, but again the men were NOT to be drawn; their role was to let the Japs pass through into trap. Though it was their first time under fire, they maintained perfect discipline and soon Japs, reassured, started to file past them pl by pl. A silent count showed that a complete enemy bn was in our grip.

At 0220 hwy enemy made contact with Coy holding flank East of rd and our tps joined action. Fighting was severe, but Japs were pushed into more compact gps to make better targets for waiting gnrs. At 0330 Fd. Regt opened fire, backed by mortars. They were trained to perfection and got range from first shot. Opening barrage lasted seven mins and then they crept forward in distances of 100 yds, phases of fire lasting two mins to enable our inf to adv and keep contact with Japs.

So this went on/

So this went on from 0330 hrs to 0800, with terrified Japs meeting slaughter from every point to which they turned. Our inf adv 1,000 yds this time, through rubber and jungle. Enemy had six mortar and numerous heavy automatics, but these were silenced by gnr's and by 0800 hrs a complete Jap bn had been destroyed.

There was little time to wait. "Fall back," were the orders. Last tps to leave area reported that even Jap reinforcements were retreating towards MERSING.

MERSING must be regarded as one of most successful actions in MALAYAN campaign, though our distances there were never used. They served their purpose as a deterrent.

A. J. Benjamin Capt
for Major.
B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

NOTE: A.A.F. 57s for these summaries are NOT required in future from recipients. Note Serial No. of Summary and notify this H.Q. immediately if any Serial has NOT been received.

MORESBY RAID NO. 4. (Ref Int Summary No. II)

2 MAR. 42

- (i) Fighter planes used air-cannon of approx 20 mm cal. One cannon salvaged intact reveals it to be of Japanese make, excellently turned out and powered by a compressed air or gas cylinder, also salvaged, made in Germany. Portions of shell were found in cannon and in area occupied by "B" Coy, 39 Bn.
- (ii) Salvage also reveals plane to have been of high quality light metal construction, radial type engine, instruments of Japanese make, almost certainly a MITSUBISHI, Type 0, Serial 48 (as reported Int Summary No. II. R.A.A.F. are holding post mortem on remains, after which it is hoped to make fragments available for exhibition to all ranks of all sub-units of this Bde. Gp., together with pieces of bombs to be returned by R.A.A.F.
- (iii) Interrogation of pilot is proceeding in hospital, where he is under guard. So far he has revealed a good deal of information. This will be collated and issued as an Appx to later Summary, to be read to all ranks as an example of what useful information enemy may obtain from a Soldier who forgets the rule; "NAME, RANK and NUMBER ONLY."

See map of bombed areas SEVEN MILE att

- (iv) Recce Flight Mar 2. 0940 hrs one unidentified plane reported very high, 0945 hrs 53 Bn. reported plane identified by A.A. as Japanese recce plane. 0950 49 Bn. gave Telnored description I22222II circling, Japanese markings visible. Plane headed NW over MORESBY and then over SEVEN MILE. Identified and reported to C.O.I.C. as Serial 37 or 10, probably 37.
 - (v) Unexploded Bombs. (Reported Int. Summary No. 11 as suspected). On closer examination shown NOT to be duds or delayed action bombs.
 - (vi) A.A. engaged three times, firing 47 in all at 20,000 ft. 3.7 Sec claim near miss or hit in last series (one bomber behaved very irregularly). Some observers claim hit on an engine in first series. There is no confirmation however that any bomber was brought down anywhere near MORESBY.
 - (vii) Casualties. Number reported in Int Summary No. 11 confirmed. 23 A.A. Bty. casualties all slight.
- RECCE 27 FEB. At 1455 hrs on day previous to raid No. 4 a single recce plane was reported flying high (approx 20,000 ft) over BOOTLESS INLET toward MORESBY (49 Bn).

bbVICTORIA. A submarine was recently reported sighted off SHELLBACK Island West coast WILSON'S PROMONTORY. An air recce was made.

fER.A.A.F. Night Raids. 25/26 Two CATALINAS raided LAUNI drome, one dropped bombs on drome - damage uncertain but five fires started and two planes destroyed on ground.

26/27 Feb. RABAUL Raid (Reported Int. Summary No. 10.)

28 Feb/1 Mar. HUDSONS raided GASMATA - bombs dropped on runway - four hits observed. Rapid A.A. fire encountered. Formation of four planes and a single fighter were seen in air but did NOT engage. All ours returned safely.

gg. (1) WORKS - 7 Fd Coy (R.A.E.)

(a) 12 MILE VALLEY RD (CALLOW Rd) to BOOTLESS INLET. Bdgs and crossings, repairs nearly completed - trafficable in an emergency.

(b) ELA BEACH Rd from A.W.A. Station MORESBY to KOKI (Native village) is being drained. Job almost completed.

(c) Rd to VABUKOU. Only 75 yds (approx) to metal to complete job.

(ii) FIRES reported in native huts KOKI 1450 hrs 1 Mar are being investigated.

(iii) RUMOURS - Story still being circulated that 8 M.D. tps will be relieved early in Mar by U.S.A. tps. This rumour should be regarded as dangerous. It is strongly suggested anyone caught spreading it, charged under Sec 5 (5) Army Act as a deterrent example. One or two rumour spreaders "jumped on" in this way in each unit would probably do much to diminish present rumour mongering.

(iv) MOV REGISTRATION. Proposed registration by how tp, 13 Fd. Regt has been postponed for time being.

PART 11. - EXTERNAL.

BURMA. 23 Feb. A diary taken from a dead Japanese enabled local Comd. to establish at that time that two enemy warships were in SOUTH BURMA Area and gave us two valuable targets. It is suggested that this fact be communicated to all tps as an example of danger of writing about military matters in diaries.. (Steps may be anticipated to enforce collection of all diaries within Bde. Gp. and their transmission to 2 Ech).

N.E.I. 23 Feb. Eight warships and six tpts sighted 150 miles North of SUMBAWA. U.S.A. submarines reported two hits on each of two ships in convoy. Our planes sank two enemy tpts in mouth of MACASSAR River.

E. K. Newman Major.
B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

(iv) Recon flight on 23 Feb. 1945 was one unidentifiable plane reported very high. 0250 hrs. reported plane identified by A.A. as Japanese recon plane. 0250 hrs. gave following description: Japanese aircraft, Japanese markings visible. Plane headed NW over MURSEY and then over SEVEN HILLS. Identified and reported to C.O.I.C. as Bortel 27 or 10, probably 27.

(v) Unpackaged bombs. (Reported Int. Summary No. 11 as unreported.) on closer examination shown NOT to be date or delayed action bombs.

(vi) A.A. engaged three times, firing 77 in all at 20,000 ft. 2.7 sec claim near miss or hit in last series (one bomber behaved very irregularly). Some observers claim hit on an engine in first series. There is no confirmation however that any bomber was brought down anywhere near MURSEY.

(vii) Casualties. Bomber reported in Int Summary No. 11 continued. 23 HEDGE BY 750. At 1445 hrs on day previous to raid No. 4 a single plane was reported flying high (approx 20,000 ft) over DOOLEY'S HILL toward MURSEY (40 N).

PHOTOCOPY. A submarine was recently reported sighted off SHELLBACK Island West coast WILSON'S PROMONTORY. An air force was made. 23 Feb. A.A. Night Raid. 23 Feb. GATILIAS raided LAKEBI area. one dropped bomb on ground - damage uncertain but five trees struck and two planes destroyed on ground.

23 Feb. KASAU Raid. Reported Int. Summary No. 10. 23 Feb. Mrs. HUBBONS raided GAMBATA - bombs dropped on runway - four hits observed. Raid A.A. fire encountered. Formation of four planes and a single fighter were seen in air but did NOT engage. All our returned safely.

23 Feb. (1) WORME - 7 N Coy (R.A.F.) (2) 12 HILL VALLEY RD (CALLOW RD) to 50 FTRESS TREST. 1445 hrs and explosion, repairs nearly completed - trellis in an emergency. (3) KLA BRACH rd from A.W.A. Station MURSEY to KOKI (Native village) is being drained. Job almost completed. (4) Rd to VANUKOU. Only 75 yds (approx) to metal to complete job. (5) PIRES reported in native news KOKI 1430 hrs 1 Km. away being investigated.


(6) PIRES - story still being elicited that 3 M.A. tps will be relieved early in Mar by U.S.A. tps. This rumor should be regarded as dangerous. It is strongly suggested anyone caught spreading it be charged under Sec 5 (3) Army Act as a seditious offence. One of the rumors spreaders "jumped on" in this way in each unit would probably be such to diminish present troop morale.

(7) PIRES. Proposed registration of how tp. 13 Feb. 1445 hrs. was postponed for time being.

Page 11

BOMBED AREAS 7 MILE DROME

RAID 3 AREAS ○ 24 FEB
RAID 4 AREAS ○ 28 FEB.



SCALE 8" TO 1 MILE.

Distribution:-

- 39 Bn.
- 49 Bn.
- 53 Bn.
- 13 Pld. Regt.
- 7 Pld. Coy.
- "C" Tp. 17 A/T.
- War Diary.
- File.

26th. Jan. '42.

War Diary

RULES FOR SITUATION REPORTS.

1. Situation Reports will be rendered daily to reach H.Q. 30 Inf. Bde. by 1500 hrs, commencing *27* Jan. 42. (*TUESDAY*)
2. Situation Reports will be numbered serially and will commence with phrase. (eg.) "SITREP 58".; To save signal transmission time.
3. ~~Save signal time in transmission~~
Headings on left of vertical line will NOT be sent but will be indicated by sending of heading indicators eg. aa, bb, cc, For example :-
"bb two destroyers, three transports sighted eight miles south of point 202904 1000 hrs steaming west".
4. Omission of any heading indicator will be understood to mean a Nil report under that heading. If all heading indicators are omitted, phrase "Nil report" will be sent.

Situation Report No. SITREP.

Enemy air activity	: (aa)
Enemy naval activity.	: (bb)
Enemy landings incl.	: (cc)
Strength of enemy observed.	:
Action of enemy when observed.	:
Location " " "	:
Unit identification. (If any)	:
Time enemy observed.	:
Equipt. of " "	:
Other enemy information.	: (dd)
Changes in position of position of own troops.	: (ee)
Own air activities.	: (ff)
Other information of own troops.	: (gg)

W. H. ... Major.
B.N. 30th. Inf. Bde.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN
OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.
OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

All units opta 8 M.D., CO.I.C., 23 AA Bty, PAGA Bty

FROM

30 Inf Bde

Originator's Number

I 86

Date

24

In Reply to Number.

SECRET/Int

Summary

7.

(aa)

DARWIN

Two

raids

only

made -

⊙

Pet

installations

explosive

stores

NOT

damaged

intercomm

interrupted

by

bomb

fragments

severing

overhead

lines

Civil

drone

damaged

service

drone

undamaged

Losses

out

nine

destroyed

an

ground

enemy

five

certain

five

probable

⊙

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.
OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

MORESBY	Hecc	22 Feb	single	enemy	identified
by	RAAF	as	Serial 37	but	all
tdc	observers	saw	only	one	tail fin
A.A.	secs	TUAGUBA	and	KIFA	fixed
66	rs	without	success	(ff)	flying
fortresses	and	Catalinas	attacked	RABAUL	and
BASMATA	night 22/23 Feb	low clouds	observed		targets

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.
OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

hits	NOT	observed	③	Fortresses	were
attacked	by	fighters	21,000	ft	over
GASMATA	three	wounded	an	one	plane ③
Shooting	down	several	enemy	fighters	possible
but	NOT	confirmed			

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

except w/T
A. J. Ryan
Capt

0950

SIGNED
(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.
T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

Appx 3 Bde War Brany
Mar 42

Army Form C.2128
(Pads of 100)
Reprinted May, 1941.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO 8 M.D. (ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

FROM 30 Inf Bde

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

Raid 4 1315 to 1400 hrs approx 0
At least eleven planes participated and one
fell into BOOTLESS INLET Types included several
5A and 13 flying in formations of five 5As and
6 at approx 20,000 ft 0 SEVEN MILE, MORESBY
and 5th Bn HQ areas bombed HARBOUR
M.D. 0 Casualties one injured so far 0

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

*One man parachuted from plane
captured and on way to
Send fwd Capt Lloyd to Bde HQ.
Two CATALINAS burst out other
damage NOT known*

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN**
BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST
BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.
OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO *Bde H.Q.*

FROM *HQ DMD.*

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

28/2

*Capt. LLOYD at C.O.I.C. NO communication
between 12 mile and C.O.I.C. Hold prisoner
at Bde HQ*

J

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN**
BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST
BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

J.P. Bergin
SIGNED

SIGNED

1530 hrs.

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

C.O. I.C. rpta 8 M.D.

FROM

30 Inf Bde

Originator's Number

I. 96

Date

2

In Reply to Number.

Here with	fragments	believed	as cannon	shell	found
B. Coy	39	Bo	area	⊙	a
land	"plop"	was	heard	when	shell
burst	and	powder	found	near	fragments
⊙	Ref	SITREP	18		

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

0755

SIGNED

A. Benjamin
Capt

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

(COPY)

R.A.A.F. Form A 22 (Revised May, 1937).
(R.A.F. Form 96A.)
(S.575A. (Naval).)

MESSAGE FORM.

Office Serial No.

Call IN
and
Preface. OUT

No. of Office Date Stamp.
Groups.
GR

(Above this line is for Signals use only.)

TO* AIRINTEL N.E. AREA

FROM* AIRINTEL MORESBY

Originator's Number.
AI.

Date.
4/3

In reply to Number and Date.

(Write horizontally.)

RESULTS INTERROGATIONS POW SALVAGE BEGINS (.) NAME SHO EIGUI 5

23 FLEET AIR ARM YOKOSHUKA NAVAL BASE 1st CLASS PRIVATE UNIT NUMBER 10

2077 NOT AIRFORCE NUMBER (.) CLOTHING ISSUED MARCH 1940 (.) 15

EDUCATED OSAKA TECHNICAL SCHOOL TO MIDDLE STANDARD (.) FLYING 20

TRAINING ONE YEAR FLEW ALL FIGHTERS UP TO "O" TYPE (.) FINISHED 25

TRAINING ONE MONTH AGO (.) LAST FOUR WEEKS SPENT THREE TRUK ONE 30

RABAU (.) FLEW "O" FIGHTER TRUK RABAU WEEK PRIOR 28/2 (.) 35

FLEW 28/2 RABAU MORESBY NEVER BEEN GASMATA (.) A/C CRASHED IN SEA 40

APPROX. 1315K/28 (.) POW PARACHUTED IN SEA RESCUED (.) STATES 45

A/C. NAVY NAKAJIMA 101 REISHIKI SENTOKI WHICH MEANS TYPE "O" 50

FIGHTER (.) RETRACTED U/C. (.) ARMAMENT 2 - 20 m.m. CANNON 55

SHELL GUNS NUMBERS 1389 AND 1396 MADE DECEMBER 1941 SALVAGED WITH LI 60

LIVE INCENDIARY SHELLS (.) (.) HYDRAULIC ACTION NOT GAS (.) TWO 65

JAP MADE VICKERS MARK 5 M.G. FIRING .303 THROUGH PROPELLOR 70

IDENTICAL BRITISH (.) ONE M.G. AND .303s SALVAGED (.) STATED 75

This message must be sent AS WRITTEN and may † be sent by W/T Signature

This message must be sent IN CYPHER and may † be sent by W/T Signature

Originator's Instructions.* Degree of Priority.*

TIME OF ORIGIN.

T.O.R.

† Originator to insert "NOT" if message is not to go by W/T over any part of the route. (Below this line is for Signals use only.)

System in.	Time in.	Reader.	Sender.	System out.	Time out.	Reader.	Sender.	System out.	Time out.	Reader.	Sender.	T.H.I.

The Signal Department is responsible that these details are transposed to the appropriate portion of the message form and that all possibility of compromising distinguishing signals, &c., by omitting to remove their significance from the address, &c., is avoided. Before delivery of the message these details are to be re-inserted in P/L.

MESSAGE FORM.

Office Serial No.

Call IN
 and :-
 Preface. OUT

No. of Office Date Stamp.
 Groups.
GR

(Above this line is for Signals use only.)

TO *

-2-

FROM *

Originator's Number. Date. In reply to Number and Date.

(Write horizontally.)

CAPACITY 400 SHELLS PER CANNON GUN	(.) SIGHTS RING AND	5
BEAD REFLECTOR SALVAGED	(.) OIL FILTER MARK 2 NUMBER 111047	10
MADE JUNE 1941 NAKAJIMA A/C CO. SALVAGED AND GERMAN OXYGEN		15
OR AIR BOTTLE	(.) ENGINE POW STATES RADIAL TWELVE CYLINDER	20
MITSUBISHI TWIN ROW H.P. UNKNOWN SPEED 600 KILOS PIAT AND		25
MORE DIVING	(.) CYLINDERS SALVAGED (.) NO BOMBS CARRIED (.)	30
FUEL ORDINARY TANKS 800 LITRES PLUS AUXILIARY SIX FEET BY		35
THREE BY ONE BELLY HOLDING FURTHER 300	(.) SIMILAR TANK FOUND	40
LAND	(.) CAUSE CRASH ARMAMENT OFFICER SUGGESTS DAMAGED CANNON	45
BREECH CAUSED PREMATURE EXPLOSION	(.) POW SAYS GROUND BULLET	50
(.) TWO WAY W/T ALL A/C NO FURTHER ORDER BATTLE DETAILS	(.)	55
DOCUMENTS POW SAYS HAD MAP BUT NONE FOUND	(.) AIR FIGHTING	60
CONTROLLED BY CONTROLLER WHO STANDS OFF USING R/T	(.) THIS	65
CONFIRMED 3/3	(.) POW OFFEN LIED UNTIL TOLD SALVAGE BUT	70
CONSIDER ABOVE STATEMENTS ADMISSIONS TRUE	(.) WRECKAGE (IN CHARGE	
EQUIPMENT) BEING EXAMINED	(.) POW IN ARMY CUSTODY IN HOSPITAL.	

This message must be sent AS WRITTEN and may be sent by W/T
 Signature

This message must be sent IN CYPHER and may be sent by W/T
 Signature

Originator's Instructions.* Degree of Priority.*

TIME OF ORIGIN.

T.O.R.

† Originator to insert "NOT" if message is not to go by W/T over any part of the route. (Below this line is for Signals use only.)

System in.	Time in.	Reader.	Sender.	System out.	Time out.	Reader.	Sender.	System out.	Time out.	Reader.	Sender.	T.H.I.

The Signal Department is responsible that these details are transposed to the appropriate portion of the message form and that all possibility of compromising distinguishing signals, &c., by omitting to remove their signification from the address, &c., is avoided. Before delivery of the message these details are to be re-inserted in P/L.

From: Sub-area Intelligence Officer, R.A.A.F., PORT MORESBY
To : Headquarters, North-Eastern Area, R.A.A.F., TOWNSVILLE.
Date: 4th MARCH, 1942.
Ref.:

RAID 4 - PORT MORESBY, 28TH FEBRUARY 1942.

With reference to this subject and the interrogation of the Prisoner of War captured at Bootless Inlet, MORESBY on above date, the following are forwarded herewith:

- (i) Copy No. 17, 30th Infantry Brigade Intelligence Summary No. 11, prepared after collaboration between Army and R.A.A.F.
- (ii) Copy sticker on A.P. Bomb.
- (iii) 3 Copies Form P.W., Prisoners of War Interrogation Report and annexures.
- (iv) Piece of black enamelled substance containing numbers, possibly relating to patent rights.

2. At about 1315 hours "K" on 28th FEBRUARY, 1942, 5 fighters were observed at about 16000 feet approaching MORESBY from the North. These fighters continued South and dived out towards the ship wreck, South of MORESBY, and fired rounds at it, presumably to warm up guns. They then turned and singly attacked Catalinas moored on Western side of MORESBY Harbour, near Napa Napa.

3. Each fighter dived to within several hundred feet of Catalinas, and gunned them on Northward and Southward runs. The broad-side views of fighters from the MORESBY side of the Harbour strongly resembled "O" Type Fighters.

4. Shortly prior to the time of the attack by Fighters, a single fighter was observed to break formation to the east of MORESBY, and sheer off to the east. An aircraft was, about the same time, seen to crash in Bootless Inlet, and a parachute seen to descend in the sea, in the vicinity of where the aircraft crashed. Army personnel reached the Japanese pilot, rescued him and finally brought him to the Military Hospital at Murray Barracks, where, by arrangement, he was put into hospital under Army custody at about 2100 hours "K" 28 FEBRUARY, 1942. At about 2200 hours "K" on same date, the P.O.W. was seen by Captain LLOYD, Army Intelligence Officer and Interpreter, and an R.A.A.F. Intelligence Officer, and questioning of the P.O.W. took place. At this stage, P.O.W. was greatly shocked through burns on the arms and legs and questioning was incomplete.

5. Subsequent visits were made to the P.O.W., and further information obtained from him, in the light of salvaged portions of the wrecked A/c. The result, therefore was that many statements of the P.O.W. were proved to be false by inspection of the wreck, and when discrepancies were pointed out to the P.O.W., he admitted facts which he had previously denied. Two visits were made to the wreck for salvage purposes, on 1st and 3rd FEBRUARY respectively, and much wreckage was recovered.

Captain Benjamin was also present.
H.

6. It is now considered that the information contained in Message on this matter represents a substantially accurate record of facts so far as statements and admissions of the P.O.W. are concerned. It is also noted that in many respects the information contained in such message and in this memorandum confirms the information concerning this type of aircraft, embodied in Headquarters Intelligence Summaries Nos. 82, 103, 104, 105, 107 and 108, and subsequent summaries.

7. Individual portions of wreckage include the following:

- (a) Oleo leg and other portions of retractable gear.
- (b) Cylinders and attachments.
- (c) Stressed skin portions of leading edge of mainplane.
- (d) Oil filter mark 2, made by Nakajima Aircraft Co., No. 111047, JUNE, 1941.
- (e) Switchboard for electrical equipment.
- (f) Oxygen or Air cylinder or bottle (German)
- (g) Petrol guage, to which is attached a hook with parachute string, which permits of alternative means of releasing parachute (hook was not used for release, which was manually operated.)
- (h) Tail wheel - rubberised and marked 150 x 75. about 6" diameter over all (Apparently little used.)
- (i) Two cannon shell guns.
- (j) 1 Vickers Mark 5 Machine gun
- (k) shells for both of the above guns.
- (l) Various guages from instrument panel
- (m) Pilot's lever controls.
- (n) Ring and bead sight reflector.
- (o) Army states auxiliary belly tank, 6feet x 3 feet x 1 foot, recovered on land, but not seen by R.A.A.F. as yet. P.O.W. states that his belly tank was not jettisoned.
- (p) Landing wheel equipment
- (q) Much sundry wreckage, wiring and odd parts.
- (r) Clothing at Hospital, as follows:
 - Calico Flying Belt, wound round stomach, 6" x 6 ft.
 - Undershirt
 - White shirt
 - Khaki shorts
 - Duck belt with chrome anchor clasp
 - Khaki giggle-jacket, with half sleeves
 - Flying Jacket, knee length.
 - (No helmet, goggles, shoes or socks worn).
- (s) Nose portion of what appears to be a .303 m.g. bullet. Other portions are human tissue.

This was removed from an airman who was struck by it during this raid.

8. All armament and equipment are on charge to Equipment Section, and are now being examined, pending further instructions. The P.O.W. is still under Army custody in hospital.

9. The provisions of Air Intelligence Instruction No. 12, paragraphs 7 to 9, and Intelligence Organisation Memorandum No. 2, have been complied with as far as possible, and any further instructions would be appreciated.

Flight Lieutenant,
Sub-area Intelligence Officer,
R.A.A.F., PORT MOESBY, PAPUA.

AHB.

PRISONERS OF WAR INTERROGATION REPORT

Report No.	Interrogation took place at: Army Hospital, Murray Barracks. Date: 28/2/42	Details of Crew: Name: SHO EIGUI
	Type of Aircraft: Type "0" Mitsubishi. (Navy Nakajima 101 Reishiki Sentoki which means Type "0" Fighter.)	Rank: 1st class Pte.
	Place of Capture: Bootless Inlet, PORT MORESBY.	Age: 23
	(1) Operational and Tactical Information: (See Instructions para 1.) See annexure	Length of Service: 13 months
	(2) Order of Battle: (See Instructions para. 2.) See annexure	Fate: Captured MORESBY 28/2
	(3) Technical Information: (See Instructions para. 3.) See annexure	
	(4) Personnel and Training: (See Instructions para. 4.) See annexure	
(5) Morale: (See Instructions para. 5.) See annexure		
(6) Results of Allied Actions: (See Instructions para. 6.) See annexure		
(7) Interrogating Officer's Remarks: (See Instructions para. 7.) See annexure		

Signature of Interrogating Officer S. B. Collins

PRISONERS OF WAR INTERROGATION REPORT

INSTRUCTIONS.

Details of Crew: Name: Age: Length of Service: Date:	Date: _____ Interrogation took place at: _____ Type of Aircraft: _____ (1) Operational and Tactical Information: Unit Place of departure Mission Course Height and speed Time of combat Details of combat and tactics employed Reason for landing and fate of aircraft (i.e., destroyed by crew, captured intact, etc.). (2) Technical Information: Present location Length of time spent at present location Previous movements of squadron Details of other squadrons operating from the same aerodrome or base Names of officers, units and formations, mentioned above, and any other information that is obtainable on the Order of Battle, and the names of any Commanding Officers of other units and formations. (3) Morale: (See Instructions) Armament Navigation Photography Signals Engines and Air Formations. Under this Heading should also be included any information pertaining to new types of aircraft and their performance, any shortage of aircraft, spares, technical troubles, and production. (a) Length of training course or courses, intake of pupils, number of establishments, situation, shortage or otherwise of volunteers, and training casualties. (b) Advanced training, including air fire, bombing, and dive bombing, night flying, and general efficiency. (c) Training of parachutists, air borne troops, gliders, etc. The morale of— (a) Air Force, Navy and Army Personnel. (b) Civil Population. Under this Section should be included anything of importance which could not suitably be classified under any of the above headings, i.e., food and water supplies, use or otherwise of gas, etc. The items under the heading GENERAL will probably cover a wide field, as doubtless new points of interest will crop up from time to time which may not have been previously contemplated. The Interrogating Officer should study the type of personnel and state what degree of reliance can be placed on the statements obtained.	Report No. _____
--	--	------------------

Signature of Interrogating Officer: _____

ANNEXURE TO FORM P.W. -

PRISONERS OF WAR INTERROGATION REPORT.

SECTION I.

Name - SHO KIGUI, 1st class private, aged 23, unmarried, born Kyushu, Fleet Air Arm, YOKOSUKA Naval Base, Unit No. 2077. (This is probably not an Air Force number, but a number allotted by the Pilot's Unit.

Clothing issued March, 1940, by YOKOSUKA Military Stores Branch.

Departed Japan about four weeks prior to 28/2/42, such four weeks being spent as follows:

Three at THUK, doing routine work, after which P.O.W. Flew "0" Fighter to RABAU. P.O.W. first stated that he was flown to RABAU with other airmen in a large aircraft. P.O.W. stated he had never been to Gasmata, and that the flight on which he crashed was his first flight since reaching RABAU.

He first stated that he was quartered on the night of 27/28 FEBRUARY near aerodrome, but he later stated that he spent the night in RABAU and left on flight at about 8 or 9 a.m.

He also stated that the volcano was causing trouble at RABAU and that everything corroded.

Place of departure from Lakumai, where fighters were based, direct for MORESBY.

P.O.W. first stated that he carried no auxiliary fuel tank, and that his ordinary tanks carried 800 litres (approx. 178 gallons). When later told that an auxiliary tank had been recovered on land, P.O.W. stated that he carried an auxiliary tank, but that he had not jettisoned it. P.O.W. stated capacity of auxiliary tank was 300 litres, making total fuel capacity of 1100 litres.

It has been suggested in MORESBY that two of the five fighters which attacked Catalinas in Harbour had unretracted undercarriages, but P.O.W. says that the flight of six including himself were all "0" Fighters, with undercarriages retracted.

Height and Speed. P.O.W. stated speed 600 kilos (Approx. 372 miles per hour) flat, and more in dives.

Time of crash. About 1315K 28th FEBRUARY.

Details of combat and tactics to be employed. P.O.W. stated that all ~~xxx~~ instructions for fighter pilots come by w/t, which all aircraft carry, and which are capable of two-way communication, W/T and R/T. These instructions come from a single fighter controller, of rank equivalent to Lieutenant of the Navy. Specific instructions on this raid were to machine gun A/A. posts and engage any Allied fighters which might be encountered. The fighter controller had the same aircraft as the others, and his practice was to stand off, view, and control the proceedings. Confirmation of the presence of a fighter controller may be gained from the fact that during the raid on 3rd instant, a single aircraft maintained a low position well away from scene of bombing.

Reason for landing and fate of aircraft. The Station Armament Officer, after examination of one cannon gun, suggests that a possible cause of the fire on aircraft was a premature explosion

in the cannon breech. Upon examination, he found evidence of this, which included a considerable amount of phosphorus in the slide-way and on the bolt. The Armament Officer believes that phosphorus is used in Japanese incendiary bullets and bombs. The side-plates, breech and feed-way were bulged by what could have been a premature explosion.

Documents. P.O.W. stated that he carried a map or chart 60 miles to the centimetre, but no map or document has been recovered from the aircraft. The only papers on P.O.W. were shrine symbols, from what were probably various towns as yet unidentified. These symbols are carried as good luck charms.

SECTION 2.

Apart from the statements above, P.O.W. was entirely non-committal concerning information which might be capable of building up an order of battle. Every effort was made to obtain this information.

SECTION 3.

Armament. Two 20 m.m. Cannon Shell Guns, Nos. 1389, 1396, both manufactured DECEMBER 1941, have been recovered, together with one live shell. The station armament officer's comments on these Cannon Guns are these:

"These cannon fire ball, armour-piercing, and incendiary bullets. Examination reveals no gas action. Recoil action is brought about either by air or oil forcing recoiling portions and cocking the Unit. The firing mechanism is caused by hydraulic action. The forward action of breach block is initiated by spring steel recoil spring 15" long extended and about 4" compressed. The firing pin is not spring loaded, but is operated by a rocker arm which rides over a cam on the side plates (knee action). P.O.W. Stated capacity 400 shells per cannon gun."

Two Japanese made Vickers Mark 5 machine guns, firing .303 through propeller and identical with British Mark 5 Machine gun. Three rounds recovered.

P.O.W. at first stated that his aircraft carried no cannon but mounted four machine guns in wings of calibre larger than the usual infantry rifle and he thought the calibre was 5 - 6 m.m.

Engine. P.O.W. states radial 12 cylinder Mitsubishi twin row of unknown horsepower. P.O.W. insisted that engine was 12 cylinder and examination of portions of cylinders may or may not confirm this. ^{check} Black enamelling on cylinder valve heads.

Air Formations. No comment.

No information could be given concerning new types of aircraft, performances, shortages or troubles of production.

P.O.W. later admitted that engine was 14 cylinder 1000 h.p. 14 cylinder engine according with R.A.A.F. intelligence concerning this type 0

SECTION 4.

- (a) P.O.W. educated Osaka Technical school to middle standard. Flying training one year at Training schools, during which time he flew all types of fighters, finishing training on "0" Type.
- (b) From interrogation, it appeared that P.O.W. was purely and simply a fighter pilot, well trained in his restricted sphere.

SECTION 5.

Morale. No information obtained.

SECTION 6. No comment.

SECTION 7.

On the evening of capture and first questioning of P.O.W., he was in considerable pain and greatly discomforted by shock and burns, and he exhibited a disinclination to discuss his fate. It does however appear that on this and subsequent occasions, the P.O.W. deliberately lied.

It is however, considered that in so far as the above information contains statements and admissions of P.O.W., they are true.

S. H. Ballie JP
INTERROGATING OFFICER.

MESSAGE FORM.

Office Serial No.

Call IN
 and :-
 Preface. OUT

No. of Groups.
GR
 Office Date Stamp.

(Above this line is for Signals use only.)

TO* *Airintel A. E. Area*

FROM* *Airintel Hoesoby* Originator's Number. *A1-121* Date. *5/3* In reply to Number and Date.

(Write horizontally.)

<i>Almy</i>	<i>interceptor</i>	<i>says</i>	<i>POW</i>	<i>admits</i>	5
<i>engine</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>cylinders</i>	<i>1000</i>	<i>HP</i>	10
<i>⊙</i>	<i>POW</i>	<i>departed</i>	<i>Hoesoby</i>	<i>A24-1</i>	15
<i>EPA</i>	<i>Latimer</i>	<i>2300</i>	<i>Z/5</i>		20
					25
					30
					35
					40
					45
					50
					55
					60
					65
					70
					75

This message must be sent AS WRITTEN and may be sent by W/T Signature

This message must be sent IN CYPHER and may be sent by W/T Signature *B. Bellier*

Originator's Instructions.* Degree of Priority.*

Intercept

TIME OF ORIGIN.

1205 Z/5

T.O.R.

‡ Originator to insert "NOT" if message is not to go by W/T over any part of the route. (Below this line is for Signals use only.)

System in.	Time in.	Reader.	Sender.	System out.	Time out.	Reader.	Sender.	System out.	Time out.	Reader.	Sender.	T.H.I.

The Signal Department is responsible that these details are transposed to the appropriate portion of the message form and that all possibility of compromising distinguishing signals, &c., by omitting to remove their signification from the address, &c., is avoided. Before delivery of the message these details are to be re-inserted in P/L.

MEMO TO A.Q.

Two matters seriously affecting the morale of the troops in the Port Moresby area:-

(i) Mail.

(a) Delay in the arrival of letters. There are many examples of letters taking several weeks to arrive from Australia, although posted by Air Mail. There are also examples of letters posted by Air Mail having arrived by ship.

(b) Infrequency of the inward mails. While appreciating the fact that under present conditions the mail service cannot be altogether regular, it must be obvious that the danger threatening Australia makes it imperative that the men should get letters not less than once every week. The more serious the situation, the greater the men's need for letters. (It is now nine days since this unit received an inward mail.).

(c) A better arrangement for the location of personnel whose letters are wrongly addressed, and for those whose letters are marked "Not Known" by the unit to which they are addressed. (A return from each unit shewing an alphabetical list of personnel and a weekly return of alterations would serve the purpose.).

Note:- There is no implied criticism of the Postal Unit in this memo.

(ii) News.

(a) Some sort of efficient and reliable news service is required to enable the men to follow the development of the war. To some extent this can be done through individual units providing for their own troops a daily news bulletin, as is done in 30 Bde. H.Q. and 7Fd. Coy. But more than this is required to maintain the morale of the troops at a high level. A bi-weekly News Sheet issued in the area, giving a short summary of the general war situation, a good review of the position in the Papuan and New Guinea areas, and a survey of Australia's reactions, is also required.

(b) None of the suggestions in the above paragraph can hope to meet the men's need for a fairly complete picture of life in Australia NOW. This can be met only by the receiving of newspapers from Australia. This is not simply for the provision of reading material, which is better met by an ample supply of magazines, even several weeks old; but for supplying the details which cannot be included in a news service. It would be essential that the papers be not more than several days old. (Many of the men, anticipating this need, arranged for papers to be posted to them from the time they left Australia: in many cases not a single paper has yet been received.).

Appx 5 Bde War Diary Mar 4
Spore

SECRET 42/75/3

SECRET.

Copy No. 8

7 Mar. 42

39 Bn.
40 Bn.
53 Bn.

PASSWORDS - LIST B.

1. Following list of passwords will be used by patrols challenging and recognising one another. This list will be taken into use 0001 hrs. 8 / 8 Mar. 42. Previous list dated 4 Feb will then be burned immediately.

- 1. Milk Run.
- 2. Dolly.
- 3. Pocket.
- 4. Drum.
- 5. Eagle.
- 6. Kanga.
- 7. Thunder.
- 8. Hawk.
- 9. Watch.
- 10. Morris.
- 11. Strapnel.
- 12. Smoke.
- 13. Parrot.
- 14. Circus.
- 15. Cerbo.
- 16. Swing.
- 17. Lemon.
- 18. Horse.
- 19. Sydney.
- 20. Spitfire.

2. This H.Q. will send out in code by L/T or other available means the password to be used each night.

3. Example of Codes- P.W. 18/4/3 meaning Password No. 18 (Horse) will be used on night of 4/3 Mar or other current month.

Copies To:
Page 107.
R.A.A.F.
War Diary.
File.

[Signature]
Major.
R.N. 30 Inf. Bde.

30 INF. BDE. TNG. INST. No. 3.
AIR ACTION AGAINST LAND FORCES.

The following extract from A.T.M. (Aust.) 6 has a very direct bearing on this situation, both present and future. It is issued with the intention of giving all ranks a guide as to the action to be taken when various types of enemy aircraft are about, and should be made the subject of talks to the tps.

It should be realised by all responsible Offrs. and N.C.Os. that work of vital importance should NOT be interrupted by the flight of enemy planes overhead except under special circumstances and in certain obvious target areas, particularly since air attacks in the future may reasonably be expected to be more severe than those already experienced.

The article is the work of a skilled observer and is founded on his experiences in NORWAY and GREECE.

1. AIR ACTION AGAINST LAND FORCES.

Air action against tps. in the field may take any one of or any combination of the following forms of attack :-

- (i). High level bombing.
- (ii). Dive bombing.
- (iii). Machine gunning by fighters.
- (iv). Machine gunning by bombers.

All forms are disconcerting and alarming, but are surprisingly ineffective in inflicting casualties. It is estimated that it takes the LUFTWAFFE, completely unopposed, between fifty and one hundred bombs to kill one man.

The moral effect of air action is however out of all proportion to the material damage done. It is impossible to completely nullify this effect, but it can be reduced by sound tng.

2. OBJECT OF TNG.

Dispersal is essential, but the value of concealment from aircraft, apart from recon planes, is doubtful, except where surprise is aimed at.

Reasons :-

- (i). Attempts at hasty concealment largely ineffective, (except where tps. are in prepared camouflaged posns.)
- (ii). Concealment impairs the offensive spirit; e.g. the attitude of partridges to a hawk.

Tps. are NOT encouraged to expose themselves, but tng. should NOT lead them to scramble to any available cover and lie prostrate, since this has little effect on their chances of survival, and has a very bad effect on morale.

It should be the aim of all tng. to make every section as efficient as any of R.M. small ships, which fight well because they feel themselves at bay. Land forces do NOT have this same feeling, since every man hopes some neighbouring tps. are the target for the attack, with the result that there is a tendency to hold fire and NOT give away the posn. by engaging the aircraft.

The writer saw many instances of this defeatist tendency in GREECE, including two in which the offenders were the crews of light A/A guns.

A less serious variation is for men to hold fire until the aircraft has passed and offers a poor target.

3. SPECIALIZED TNG.

3. SPECIALIZED TNG.

All ranks should be taught a few facts about the behaviour of aircraft rather than acquiring them from experience in the field, and the object of tng. should be to break down the feeling of awe at the sight of unopposed enemy aircraft flying in his vicinity. The soldier thinks he can be seen, and that he will be attacked with bombs or machine gun fire if he moves. The enemy planes are credited with a degree of omnipotence which is far from being theirs.

These reactions cannot be wholly eliminated, but they can be rationalized and modified by tng. e.g. In GREECE, many tps. soon learnt what they should have known before they went into action; i.e. that a large formation of aircraft flying in the usual V formation down a narrow rd. are not going to bomb the rd. as long as they keep that formation. Knowledge would have saved the unnecessary expense to nerves and morale.

Apart from learning when they are or are NOT to be bombed, tps. should learn to be bombed. e.g. Watch the bombs leaving low flying aircraft and judging the point of impact, allowing for the wind &c, and then taking appropriate action. A working knowledge of bomb load and fire power of the commonest types of bomber will also save strain on nerves.

If the enemy is at all regular in his bombing habits, and is known to be operating from a base a certain distance away, Offrs. and N.C.Os. can estimate roughly the prospect of enemy air activity from hour to hour. This at the least gives something to work on, and is preferable to the habit of regarding bombing as an Act of God, arbitrary, incalculable and perpetually imminent.

4. MACHINE GUNNING FROM THE AIR.

Casualties from this form of attack are very small indeed. In POLAND, where machine gunning was frequent, casualties were light, but the confusion and moral effect was disproportionate.

Tps., when hearing a rattle in the sky, think that they individually are being shot at, even though the gun. may be simply firing a "feu" de joie" at nothing in particular.

Loose talk always enhances the effect. In NORWAY and GREECE, when planes would fly up and down valleys, no casualties would be caused and probably NOT more than one soldier in one hundred would even see a bullet hit the ground.

However, every man believed he was machine gunned, and said so. The enemy achieved his object of intimidation at little cost in amm., and the piece of rd. got an unhealthy reputation.

A partial remedy is to explain the volume of fire expected from an enemy bomber, angle of incidence and beaten zones from such a high posn. More important is to stress the felly of loose talk. The effect of such attacks is negligible against well dispersed tps. On an average, soldiers compare unfavourably with civilians and Civil Defence workers in BRITAIN.

5. ROAD MOV'T. UNDER AIR ATTACK.

In GREECE, L of U rds. passing hundreds of miles over mountainous country were never cut by bombing. Delays, however, occurred when convoys halted and tps. dispersed at the threat of air action.

Thus actually 80% of this time;

(i). was wasted;
(ii). tended to jeopardize rather than safeguard personnel and material.

If every vehicle has a spotter and good convoy discipline prevails, such delays can be minimized, morale raised, and risk to material and personnel lessened.

MEETING THE THREAT OF AIR ATTACK.

MEETING THE THREAT OF AIR ATTACK.

The aim of the above common sense suggestions is to inoculate tps. while in tng. against the moral effect of bombing in the field as far as possible.

How many tps. in this area have actually had the experience of being bombed? Only a very small percentage. But how many have said they have, and have given lurid descriptions to their friends and in letters home? A much larger percentage.

It is hoped that this extract will give some guidance in dealing, NOT so much with air attack, which is dealt with in tng. manuals, as with that unnecessarily paralyzing factor - the threat of air attack.

F. H. Shaw Capt.,
Bde. Tng. Offr.

Appx 7 Bde War Diary
Mar 42

THOUGHTS ON DEFENCE OF FORT MORESBY FROM ARMY POINT OF VIEW.

OBJECT OF ENEMY FORCE.

1. To deny at all costs to Japanese the use of Port Moresby as a base.
2. The Japanese have the initiative and can attack us how, when and where they will. Therefore by our foresight, care and energy we must foresee their probable courses of action and do our utmost to counter them when and as they occur.
3. TOPOGRAPHY. The localities which we must hold are:-
 - (a) The Port and Air installations at Moresby itself.
 - (b) The Aerodrome at 7 Mile.
 - (c) The L.O.C. up 12 Mile and ROUNA areas.
 - (d) The approaches by sea and from flanks to the above.

The approaches direct to Moresby are by sea. There are shallows and reefs protecting these and few entrances through reefs for big ships.

Deduction any attempted landings will be made from ships outside reefs and M.L.Cs and barges preferably on a flood tide and by darkness, poor light, rain or other disturbers of visibility.

Likely approaches by land are:

1. On Right Approaches covered by 53 Bn. disposed with 1 Coy. on Nappa Peninsular and remainder in defence of Moresby and the hills to the N.E. thereof.
2. On the Left the three Mile covered by the defences at Pyramid, ~~and Lookout Ridge~~ with reserves in 7 Mile Drome area.
3. The 7 Mile and 12 Mile covered by defences at Smelters area. and Lookout Ridge.

The bulk of forces available are disposed in beach defence along foreshores from Hanuabada to the Smelters area each Bn. having 1 Troop of 18 Pdrs under command.

To the North of the above area is a high range of mountains which is impassible after approximately 30 miles to vehicles and is then only passible with difficulty to small parties of men on foot.

Therefore it is a question of stand or fall on our existing positions as there is little or no space for manoeuvre in depth.

ARMAMENTS ETC. Japanese are superior in Naval and shipping strength, aircraft, landing craft and men. Are armed with the most modern weapons and know how to use them. Their main effort is now in S.W. Pacific and they have near bases at RABAUL and GASMATA. Their troops are highly trained, noiseless, are lightly armed but adepts in infiltration tactics once ashore.

THEREFORE we must hit them hardest when most vulnerable i.e. while on the water and to this end all guns and weapons will hold their fire until able to make sure of hitting the enemy. At the same time attempted envelopment or penetration from the flanks must be countered.

JAPANESE TACTICS. Sporadic air attacks on Air Force installations and machines and quarters. Object to prevent our air countermeasures. Followed by shattering attacks on defenders located positions, aerially photographed previously, by Dive bombing and machine gunning from air. These usually precede an attempted landing by strong seaborne forces. The object of this air attack is to destroy the weapons and wear down the will to resist of the defence (ourselves). Due to the lack of own naval and aerial support this has been remarkably successful. The fine resistance and heavy losses inflicted by the Rabaul Garrison should be called to mind as an example of determination against heavy odds however.

While dive bombing and M.G. attacks are in progress the Japanese convoy lays off the selected landing places and at a propitious moment the M.L.Cs and barges make inshore then speed up to 16 knots, it is understood. They are armoured and mount mortars and M.Gs which thicken up fire on defenders.

It is probable that parties will try to land outside the flanks of the positions if these have been located and attempt to envelop or infiltrate our positions from flanks and rear.

These tactics were successful at RABAUL. Many lessons may be learnt by 13 Fd. Regt from other theatres of war Malaya and Rabaul in particular.

Counter measures to above by defenders:-

1. To so hide and camouflage weapons emplacements that their location will be difficult to both eye and camera.
2. To so protect defenders, their weapons, vehicles and stores that destruction becomes very difficult and so ensure their survival.
3. The preparation of alternative gun emplacements and weapon pits capable of being fired from in the event of a previously prepared one becoming untenable.
4. The preparation of dummy positions at some distance from real one. These should be realistic and camouflaged and dummy tracks and slit trenches prepared.
5. If a landing becomes imminent to ensure that an adequate watch is kept and that detachments are close to their emplacements and protected from air attack. The difficulties of visibility at night, in rain, mist or failing light must be fully taken into consideration.
6. A full understanding by all ranks of the Beach Guns Role which is as follows.
All Beach Guns will remain in position and hold their fire until sure of hitting the targets presented to them. This should occur within 3000 yds off shore. Guns will be run onto platforms at discretion of the commander of the gun according to the amount of fire he is receiving at the moment. Each will then open heavy and accurate fire designed to sink M.L.Cs and put their human cargo into the sea. Fire from guns must be continued so long as it remains effective. Spare gun Nos. should remain under cover until required. The local Inf. Comdr. should be made fully aware of the above instructions. There is some misunderstanding by Inf. Officers of the Beach Guns role and if Beach Guns are withdrawn too soon they might just as well not be on the beach at all. It will be necessary for the Beach Gun to remain in action until the fire becomes ineffective or its emplacement untenable. It may even be necessary to sacrifice guns provided they can continue their fire usefully up to the last moment. Having successfully dealt with M.L.Cs the fire of guns can then be turned onto large ships if within range.
7. Premature opening of fire will be avoided. It will only disclose the site of our guns and weapons and lose the certainty of obtaining effective fire from the outset. It is emphasised that Dive bombing and M.G. from air can win no victory alone and that it is to the destruction of the landing forces BEFORE THEY LAND that all our endurance will power and energy must be directed.
8. The ability of each defended locality to provide for all round defence must be insisted upon. A close degree of liaison and understanding of each others plans by all arms be arrived at and SETTLED. This does not appear to be so in all cases at present. Every Gumer Officer should have a close knowledge of the local Infantry dispositions and alternative plans of action.
9. ALL arty personnel must be instructed in their courses of action in the event of sudden and unforeseen situations arising such as having to move on foot to P.As or defend their gun positions etc.
10. B.Cs., Tp. Comdrs. will study suitable courses of action to change from Beach Defence to indirect fire in alternative positions to flanks or rear, or to be prepared to move as reinforcing Arty from their present positions to others inland or to other Beach areas in vicinity of Port Moresby. Orders for local moves are to be expected from Bn. Comdrs. Other moves from R.H.Q. or Bde. H.Q.
11. Tp. Comdr. "D" Tp. will recall that his is the reserve Troop and may be called to move in support of Infantry to either flank of present defensive positions. As a guide the Arty. plan briefly is for 49 Bty. to reinforce left flank. 50 Bty. to reinforce Right. This, however, may be subject to change.
12. In view of each defended locality becoming in theory self-contained the possession of adequate ammunition, food, water, clothing will be taken into consideration by B.Cs and Tp. Comdrs. forthwith. It is suggested that 14 days supply would be enough.
13. The question of replenishment of these supplies by R.H.Q. and Bty. H.Qs will also be considered and arrangements made to do so under the most difficult service conditions i.e. enemy air and land action, rain etc.

THOUGHTS ON DEFENCE OF PORT MORESBY FROM ARTY POINT OF VIEW. -3-

14. COMMUNICATIONS. The likelihood of aerial telephone lines remaining intact during enemy action is remote. The question of the immediate establishment of alternative means must be taken in hand.

These are 1. W/T or R/T.
2. L/T.
3. D.R.L.S.

In (1) provision for training personnel particularly in W/T and good speech arises with the provision of spare Batteries and parts.

In (2) a high standard of training of sigs. Suitable visual stations chosen for mutual inter-visibility in case of need and the necessary instruments examined and placed in position.

In (3) Provision of sufficient D.Rs spare D.Rs and routes reced and pointed out to the men concerned.

15. R.H.Q. is at present preparing an alternative position for itself in the event of being forced to vacate its present one. Bty. H.Q. will immediately take steps to do likewise and it is suggested that as any subsequent moves of Bty. H.Q. are likely to entail the establishment of C.P. and Waggon lines that the latter might be the more suitable site to look for and should be chosen in conjunction with alternative Bty or Tp. positions already pointed out.

16. The above is considered to be as real a presentation of the facts as can be made at the moment. It is not considered advisable that the whole of the above is to be passed on to all ranks, but only such parts as are considered necessary by B.Cs and Tp. Comdrs.

W. J. ... Lt. Col.
C.O. 13 Field Regt. R.A.A.

Appx 8 to B.M. War Diary
0944
- Mar 42

SECRET.

H.Q., 30 INF. BDE.,

2 MAR. 42

AMENDMENTS TO 30 INF. BDE. O.C. NO. 2, DATED 6 FEB. 42.

1. After para 9 insert new para:-

10. PARA TFS. Areas of responsibility are:-

39 Bn. 040100 - track junc 040068 - track junc 042043 -
060052 - 085026 - 075015 - 107977 - along coast.
to 240895 - 240020 - 160020 - 060100 - 040100.

49 Bn. 075015 - 062998 - 046006 - alongroad to 026003 -
along coast to 107977 - 075015.

53 Bn. 864100 - along coast to 026003 - 046006 - 036016 -
043021 - track junc 040068 - 040100 - 864100.

"C" Tp. 17 A.Tk. 050045 - 075015 - 085026 - 060052 - 050045.

30 Inf. Bde. Def. Pl., 13 Fd. Regt. H.Q., and 7 Fd. Coy. H.Q., under
30 Inf. Bde. Def. Pl. Comd.

050045 - track junc 042043 - 043021 - 036016 -
046006 - 062998 - 075015 - 050045.

Para tps to the North of this area will be dealt with by 8 M.D.
H.Q., Tps, others by special force under orders from Bde. H.Q.

2. Renumber paras 10 to 15 to correspond.

3. Delete para "15 Medical" and substitute new para:-

15. MEDICAL. A.D.S. (forward) MURRAY BARRACKS.

A.D.S. (rear) JOHN'S GULLY 094078.
(39 Bn. to use rear A.D.S. during action).

M.D.S. DOMANA MISSION, off FERRY STREET.

Distribution:-

39 Bn.
49 Bn.
53 Bn.
13 Fd. Regt.
"C" Tp. 17 A.Tk. Regt.
7 Fd. Coy, R.A.E.
3 Fd. Amb.
8 M.D. (2)
Def. Pl. Comd.
G.D. & T. Depot.
Page Bty.
File.
War Diary. ✓

E. J. ... Major.
B.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

Appx 9 War Diary
30 Inf Bde.

by
ERIC. H.C. HATTON, M.C., M.B., V.D., COMD. 30 INF. BDE.

19 MAR. 42

1. PROMOTIONS.

Ref. Bde. R.O. No. 15.

V.52744 Cpl. Lindsay W.H. Prom. Sgt. 27 Feb. 42
(should read) --- Prom. S/Sgt. 27 Feb. 42.

V. 90475 Pte. Jackson, A.K. Prom. Cpl. 15 Mar. 42.

V. 56129 Pte. Carey, A.J.K. Prom. Cpl. 15 Mar. 42.

2. PUNISHMENTS.

V.330088 Pte. Staggard, A.E.J. When on Active Service failing to appear at a place of parade appointed by his Commanding Officer. ... Fined 5/-.

V.57240 Pte. Smith, J.H. When on Active Service failing to appear at a place of parade appointed by his Commanding Officer. ... Fined 5/- and awarded 7 days detention.

V.310152 Pte. Carter, H.F. (1) When on Active Service disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer
(2) When on Active Service using insubordinate language. ... Awarded 7 days detention.

3. MIDDAY MEAL.

As from the 18 Mar. 42, the midday meal will be at 1230 hrs, instead of 1200 hrs.

4. SICK PARADE.

Morning sick parade is at 0800 hrs. at R.A.P. Duty N.C.O. will see that personnel reporting on that parade are at R.A.P. at the time stated.

5. LATRINES.

It has been reported that personnel have been fouling the ground around their tents. Disciplinary action will be taken against anyone found offending.

Latrines are built for your use - USE THEM.

Latrine at bottom of Bde. Hill is for use of Bde. Sig. Sec.

6. POWERS OF SENTRIES TO FIRE ON SUSPECTED PERSONS.

In view of the present position and while the present state of emergency continues, sentries safeguarding their posts or preventing the activities of enemy, or suspected enemy agents, will take any action required to ensure the safety of their posts or to defeat the activities of enemy, or suspected enemy agents.

If necessary, they will fire upon or otherwise attack any persons threatening the safety of their posts or engaging in hostile action. Before firing upon any person, the sentry will challenge that person to "Halt". If that person does not halt, the sentry will challenge him again, "Halt or I fire". If he does not halt and no other means are available for stopping him - as for example by calling on the rest of the guard - it is the duty of the sentry to shoot, aiming low to hit, but not to kill.

The sentry must use his intelligence and sense of responsibility as to whether he will shoot or not, but he must be careful not to allow any suspected person to approach so close that he can be rushed and overpowered.

7. FIELD GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL, PAPUA.

Members Tried	Charge & Finding	Sentence	Confirmation & Date
Q.42031 Pte. Crooks J.L. Reception Depot.	Desertion - Found guilty of absence without leave.	To undergo 90 days detention.	Confirmed 13/3/42.

FIELD GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL (CONTINUED)

Members Tried	Charge & Finding	Sentence	Confirmation & Date
Q.38 Pte. Wheadon, J.M. Reception Depot.	Desertion - Found guilty of absence without leave.	To undergo detention for 6 months.	Confirmed 13/3/42.
Q.42411 Pte. Watson, A. Ist. P.I.B.	Desertion - Found guilty of absence without leave.	To undergo detention for 90 days.	Confirmed 13/3/42.

Date of promulgation - 15 March, 42.

8. M.T. DRIVERS LICENCE.

It has come to notice that drivers of M.T. vehicles are not carrying their Army Driving licence "G.11" while on duty. All Commanding Officers having vehicles on their charge will ensure that drivers are instructed to be in possession of such licences at all times whilst in charge of M.T. vehicles

9. SPEED LIMIT - ALL VEHICLES.

It is again necessary to draw attention to all units that the speed limits laid down in District R.Os. (20 m.p.h.) must be adhered to. Further breaches of these instructions will result in immediate cancellation of operator's licence.

10. CANTREEN SUPPLIES.

- (a) As from Wednesday, 18 Mar. 42, retail sales by Canteens will cease.
- (b) Bulk canteen store will be established at Restaurant for bulk sales to all units from Fort Moresby to 7 Mile Aerodrome.
- (c) Each Unit will appoint a Canteen Officer and will notify O.C., Canteen Services immediately of the name of the Officer appointed. This Officer will be authorised to purchase on behalf of the Unit.
- (d) Unit will purchase Canteen supplies only once each week.
- (e) Cash will be paid at time of purchase and canteen supplies will NOT be issued to units on credit.
- (f) In view of limited Canteen supplies, it is found necessary to ration all stocks and units are responsible that such stores are equally distributed to all members of the units
- (g) O.C., Canteen Services will periodically visit all units and any complaints should be directed to him.

11. DEMOLITIONS - WARNING TO ALL RANKS.

All ranks are warned that they are NOT to interfere with any stores which are now prepared for demolitions, such as - drums and bottles of petrol, boxes and cartons of explosive etc. These stores can be recognised by the presence of a red circle of varying dimensions painted on the demolition stores.

12. ARTILLERY RANGE PRACTICE.

13 Pd. Regt. will carry out Firing Practice with 4.5 hows. on Monday, 23 Mar. 42 at 1600 hrs. (or alternatively, if enemy air activity prevents this, at 1600 hrs. on Wednesday, 25 Mar. 42.

13. TESTING OF BEACH LIGHTS.

53 Bn. will be testing Beach Lights at ELA BEACH on 20 Mar. 42 (Friday) at 2200 hrs.

Distribution:

Bde. I.O.
Bde. T.O.
War Diary.
Notice Board.
G.S.M.
Bde. Sig. Sec.
File.

J. J. G. G. G.
Capt.
Staff Capt. 30 Inf. Bde.

P.M. T.C.

5. CARELESSNESS WITH LOADED AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

On inspection it has been noted that rifles are left charged and lying about. THIS MUST STOP. Rifle magazines will be charged only when the Air Alarm is given and Machine Gunning is expected. Rifles will be unloaded immediately the All Clear is given.
BRIG. A.S. HAYTON, R.C., R.M., V.D., COMD. 30 INF. BDE.

REGIMENTAL AND CORPS BADGES AND TITLES.

Regimental and corps badges are to cease to be worn forthwith and badges Commonwealth, copper oxidized, are to be issued in lieu thereof. The wearing of shoulder titles as specified in Standing Orders for Brass 1933, Para. 79, will also be discontinued. Titles "Australia", "V.A.S." and "A.S.A.S." will continue to be worn where authorized.

2. NECESSITY FOR TAKING QUININE.

Attention is drawn to previous instructions concerning the necessity for all ranks to take prophylactic doses of quinine (5 grains per diem). The amount of issues from medical stores indicates that these instructions are not carried into effect. Already one fatal case of Cerebral Malaria has occurred in this District. Fatalities are impossible if quinine is taken regularly. The responsibility for seeing that all ranks take the prescribed issue must be placed on platoon, etc. commanders.

3. BLOOD GROUPING - FILLING IN OF LABELS.

Space is provided, on the labels which are used to record particulars of Blood Grouping, for the unit of the soldier concerned. It is of paramount importance, however, that such information be NOT shown, and in instances where it has been filled in it will be thoroughly obliterated immediately.

4. INJURIES DUE TO NEGLIGENCE.

The Reports of several Courts of Inquiry recently held relative to injuries sustained by personnel while handling small arms, have included statements to the effect that such injuries were occasioned by carelessness or negligence.

Should C.O.'s. of units concur in a Report of this nature by a Court of Inquiry, a charge will be instituted under A.S.48 against the member concerned, and a record of this fact will be attached to the proceedings.

5. CARELESSNESS WITH LOADED ARMS.

On inspection it has been noted that rifles are left charged and lying about. THIS MUST STOP. Rifle magazines will be charged only when the Air Alarm is given and Machine Gunning is expected. Rifles will be unloaded immediately the All Clear is given.

6. REGIMENTAL AND CORPS BADGES AND TITLES.

Regimental and corps badges are to cease to be worn forthwith and badges Commonwealth, copper oxidized, are to be issued in lieu thereof. The wearing of shoulder titles as specified in Standing Orders for Brass 1933, Para. 79, will also be discontinued. Titles "Australia", "V.A.S." and "A.S.A.S." will continue to be worn where authorized.

7. DISTRICT RECORDS OFFICE FOR STORING.

Diaries must be clearly marked:- Private diary of, (Reg. No. Rank, Name and Unit.) Date.....

Diaries may be recovered by their owners on application, but the release thereof will be authorized by A.S.Q. only.

Present and past Notebooks and/or Diaries of Officers are to be disposed of similarly.

Advice received from the War Office indicates that valuable information has been obtained by the enemy from Diaries. Immediate action will be taken by all units to collect all private Diaries and Notebooks as in (c) above.

The first collection will be forwarded to D.R.O. by 30 Mar. 42.

8. CARELESSNESS IN HANDLING OF SMALL ARMS.

Several instances have occurred wherein personnel have sustained foot injuries by discharging Small Arms accidentally while cleaning or otherwise handling their weapons.

Weapons loaded for security reasons will at all times have the safety catch applied. They will be unloaded as laid down in relevant training

publications with the barrel pointing in a safe direction before cleaning/

8. CARELESSNESS IN HANDLING OF SMALL ARMS. (cont.)

/or practice in handling is undertaken.

Personnel armed with rifles will keep their magazines charged with five rounds only at the discretion of C.O.s. concerned.

Officers and privates only will load rifles (i.e. round in chamber).

Members who sustain self inflicted injuries accidentally or otherwise are liable to trial by Court Martial under A.A. Sec. 18.

9. INDISCRIMINATE FIRING OF RIFLES.

Many instances are occurring wherein irresponsible personnel fire rifles and other weapons at game and other objects. This practice while indicating lack of discipline, may cause injuries to natives or our own troops with serious repercussions.

While such practice is needed in handling and firing of Small Arms, indiscriminate firing of live ammunition will cease forthwith.

Any firing practice, in future, will be carried out under the control of a responsible officer or warrant officer in an area which, having been reconnoitred, is found to be safe and fulfills the following requirements.

- (a) Provides a natural stop butt.
- (b) Avoids the vicinity of Native villages and habitation.
- (c) Avoids frequented roads and tracks.
- (d) Provides flanking safety of 90° in regard to camps, troop positions etc.
- (e) Provides reasonably free views of entrances and exits.

Troops near the selected area will, at all times, be warned when firing practice with ball ammunition is proposed.

Disciplinary action will be taken against personnel who, in future, fire ball ammunition indiscriminately.

10. GENERAL APPEARANCE OF TROOPS.

Ref. D.R.G. No. 5. Para. 85 A.

All ranks are to maintain as smart and soldierly an appearance as circumstances permit. Troops will shave regularly and the hair will be cut short.

11. 5th COLUMN ACTIVITIES.

In the past, the way of all Japanese advances have been paved by 5th columnists. THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN HERE. These 5th column activities are liable to have serious results, ALL UNITS MUST take precautions.

If necessary a patrol will be maintained over defence installations in the unit area.

All members of units will be warned to look out for suspicious actions and any individual seen acting in a suspicious manner will be detained and taken to the unit H.Q.

Should the suspected individual attempt to escape, fire should be opened upon him.


Capt.
Staff Capt. 50 Inf. Bn.

NOTICE. CHURCH PARADES.

0645 hrs. R.C. Mass - Mess Hut near showers, old Ede. area, Murray Barracks

0648 hrs. Holy Communion - Mess Hut near showers, old Ede. area, Murray Barracks.

0900 hrs. Church Parade - Men's Mess Hut, Ede area (around hill from Murray Barracks)

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

H.Q., 30 INF. BDE. ROUTINE ORDERS, No. 16.

by

BRIG. N.G. HATTON, M.C., M.M., V.D., COMD. 30 INF. BDE.

14 MAR. 42.

- PAY PARADE.** Next Pay Parade will be on Tuesday, 17 Mar. 42, 0930 hrs. at Orderly Room.
- SLIT TRENCHES.** All personnel will dig slit trenches by their tents immediately.
- DUGOUTS.** Bde. dugouts are definitely OUT OF BOUNDS to all troops. Area around dugouts is to be kept clear to obviate trampling of grass and making tracks, etc.
- D/R. SIG. SEC.** Applications are called for a good Motor Cyclist, to be D/R., Bde. Sig. Sec. Personnel interested to hand in their names to C.S.M. by 0800 hrs., 15 Mar. 42.
- CARRIAGE OF ARMS.** Ref. Bde. R.O. No. 15, of 9 Mar. 42, still quite a number of ~~personnel~~ personnel have been seen moving without arms. ALL RANKS WILL MOVE ARMED AT ALL TIMES.
- ROAD TRAFFIC.** In future, road leading to new camp site will be ONE WAY TRAFFIC ONLY; IN from South end (By Bde. H.Q.). Speed limit 5 m.p.h. All dvrs. will be instructed in this matter.

A. J. Simpson
Lieut.,
S/Capt. 30 Inf. Bde.

NOTICE. CHURCH PARADES.

- 0645 Hrs. Holy Communion in No. 1 Iron Hut near Showers in Old Bde. H.Q. Area, Murray Barracks.
- 0900 Hrs. Regimental Church Parade in Bde. H.Q. Mess Hut, New Camp Site.

Bde I.O. (2)

WAR DAW

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

30 INF. BDE. H.Q., ROUTINE ORDERS NO. 15.

by

BRIG. N.G.HATTON. M.C., M.M., V.D., COMD. 30 INF. BDE.

9 Mar. '42.

PROMOTIONS.

V.52744	Cpl. LINDSAY,	W.H.	Prom. Sgt., 27 Feb. 42.
V.52603	Pte. DUFFELL,	E.T.	Prom. Specialist Gp. II. 4 Mar. 42.
V.90475	Pte. JACKSON,	A.K.	Prom. Specialist Gp. III. 4 Mar. 42.
V.64333	Cpl. NORMAN,	H.C.	Prom. Sgt., XXXX 8 Mar. 42.
V.52603	Pte. DUFFELL,	E.T.	Appointed L/Cpl. 8 Mar. 42.

SHAVING.

All personnel will shave daily before breakfast. Disciplinary action will be taken against any person disobeying this order.

WASHING.

N.C.Os. will see that all personnel under their control wash their clothes daily. Quite a number of men have been seen wearing dirty clothes. N.C.Os. will be responsible that this is carried out.

CONSERVATION OF WATER.

Ref. Bde. R.O. No. 14, water is still being wasted. All taps must be turned off tightly after using.

DEFERRED PAY.

In accordance with F.G.M.55 authority is hereby given to Unit Commanders to have entered in the Paybooks of Members of their respective Units, who come under the following categories:

- (1) Members of the Citizen Military Forces serving in 8 M.D.
- (2) Members of P.M.F. who were appointed on or after 6th Oct. 1939 (other than Members of the A.I.F. or Members of the Australian Staff Corps or Corps of Staff Cadets)

Deferred Pay at the rate of 1/- per day as directed hereunder:

- (1) Members of the above Forces who were in 8 M.D. on 7 Nov. 1941.- to be entered in Paybook as from 7 November 1941.
- (2) Members who disembarked after 7th November 1941 - to be entered in paybook as from date of disembarkation.

The above entries will be made in the Deferred Pay column only of the Member's Paybook and will conform to the examples given below:-

Pay.	
1/- p.d.	
from	To members of the Forces who were in 8 M.D.
7/11/41.	on 7/11/41.
1/- p.d.	
from	? is date of disembarkation for these Members
?	who disembarked at a later date than 7/11/41.

DIRECTION FOR ALL UNITS → ENEMY AIR ACTIVITY.

It has come to notice that on enemy planes being heard or seen, or advice being received that they are in the locality, certain members have been in the habit of panning for shelter.

This must cease or disciplinary action will be taken by O'S C. Units.

In future all normal activities will continue until the Officer or N.C.O. in charge of the Camp or Party gives instructions to cease work and take cover.

REPORTING OF BATTLE CASUALTIES AND SERIOUS OR DANGEROUS ILLNESS.

Battle Casualties admitted into Hospitals or Dressing Stations, or treated at R.A.P's., will be reported to H.Q. 8 M.D. either by telephone or D.R., immediately after initial treatment has been given and the nature of the wound and condition of the member have been diagnosed. Such reports will be confirmed in the usual Casualty Returns submitted.

The following is/

REPORTING OF BATTLE CASUALTIES (etc) (Contd.)

The following is published for information concerning the definition of "Battle Casualty" :-

- (a) All Casualties caused by Enemy Weapons.) Will be regarded
 (b) All Casualties caused by British or Allied Weapons which are in action) as Battle
 against the enemy.) Casualties.

- (c) All Casualties caused by British or Allied Weapons which are NOT in action against the Enemy will be reported as "Accidental" thus :-

Killed (accidentally)
 Wounded (do)

- (d) For the purpose of these instructions, the word "WEAPON" will be held to include GAS and HIGH TENSION ELECTRIC CURRENTS as well as all other instruments used in fighting.

In reporting casualties due to GAS and HIGH TENSION CURRENTS the special nature of the casualty will be indicated thus: Killed (Electrocuted)

Wounded (Electric Shock)

Killed (Gas)

Wounded (Accidentally - Gas).

- (e) Injuries caused by BARBED WIRE, will NOT be classified as Battle Casualties.

Units and hospitals will also take action to immediately report to H.Q. 8 M.D. the fact that a member is seriously or dangerously ill, regardless of the cause of such illness, such report being subsequently confirmed by Casualty Return.

LOSSES OF EQUIPMENT.

7 Fd. Coy. R.A.E. Murray Barracks report the loss of one Spare Wheel and Rack holding same, from vehicle C4669 between 4 Mile and Port Moresby. All units are to make inquiries and reports to be forwarded direct to H.Q. 7 Fd. Coy. R.A.E.

MOVEMENTS. HYGIENE.

Units will pay particular attention to Sanitation particularly when vacating an area. They will ensure that all Latrine Pans are emptied, slit Latrines are covered in and marked and the area left in a clean condition. Garbage in area not serviced by Hygiene Section will be disposed of daily by burying or burning as warranted. It cannot be impressed too closely the danger of neglect on these matters and strictest attention will be paid in the future.

CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT.

Captured enemy equipment in unit areas will be guarded by that particular unit for 24 hrs. or longer if ordered and will report the capture to Bde. Int. Sec. who will report the results of the investigation to 8 M.D. OPS. H.Q.

CARRIAGE OF ARMS.

All ranks will move armed at all times. If a task in hand makes the carriage of a rifle or other personal weapon impracticable, the weapon must be left in a position where it is immediately available for use. This order applies particularly in the Lines of Communication Area.

DISPERSION OF VEHICLES ON THE MOVE & AT REST.

The density of rd. traffic will NOT exceed 8 vehicles to a mile, i.e. all dvr. will maintain a MINIMUM distance between vehicles of 200 yds. Vehicles will be parked under available cover with a minimum interval of 30 yds. Where no cover is available, the minimum interval will be 200 yds. All C.Os. having vehicles on their charge will ensure that their dvr. are instructed accordingly and take the necessary action for this instruction to be carried out.

✓ AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS.

AIR RAID
PRECAU-
TIONS.

The terms "ALERT" and "ALARM" used to denote imminence of possible enemy action from the air are being misinterpreted by units and individuals. Following is the action to be taken when these indications are given :-

"ALERT": This will be passed verbally through the normal channels when it is known that enemy or unidentified aircraft are operating in our vicinity. This advice is required so that aircraft, vehicles, etc. can be dispersed and stretcher cases at hospitals can be made ready for removal to shelters, but particularly to warn aircraft sentries to keep a keen look-out for enemy planes. During this stage normal work will NOT be disturbed.

"ALARM": This is the indication that there is an actual threat to the locality in which it is given. As notified previously, the authority to give the alarm will be delegated to Coys., Pl. Secs., or equivalent units if these are detached from Unit H.Qs. and a sub-unit comd. so placed will use his discretion as to whether it will be given. It is possible that one sub-unit may have to give the alarm when its neighbour is free from actual threat. C.Os. will ensure that Offrs., N.C.Os. and men have explained to them the elements of bomb ballistics. If these are understood, greater confidence should follow. Obviously, in most cases this confidence is necessary to ensure proper and orderly conduct in all ranks.

ORDERS RE
BOMB LOCAT-
ION AND
DISPOSAL.

1. A system of Engineer Intelligence will be instituted as from 22 Feb. 42 to collect, collate and distribute information of engineering interest, particularly of types and effects of bombs including H.E. and Gas.
2. It is imperative that no person interfere with unexploded bombs, exploded bomb fragments, craters, damaged buildings or installations and C.Os. and O.Cs. of all units will inform all personnel present of this fact.
3. Special Engineering personnel trained for this work will be issued with a special PASS by C.R.E., S.M.D. These are the only personnel given authority to inspect and collect material for this purpose.
4. Unit Int. Offrs. will be responsible for determining the location, date of fall, and if possible the number of unexploded and exploded bombs, which have fell in unit areas, and for reporting through normal channels to S.M.D. H.Q. Int. Office.
5. Unexploded bombs in all defence areas, (incl. R.A.N. & R.A.A.F.) will be the responsibility of S.M.D. R.A.E. Bomb Disposal Squad.
6. Where bombs fall in Unit Areas, the unit in the locality will be responsible for placing a cordon to keep all personnel outside a distance of 100 yds. radius of all bombs and craters, etc., until they have been inspected and advised by members of Bomb Disposal Squad.
7. All members of units should be instructed to report the presence of any crater, bomb, booby trap, or gas bomb, shell, grenade or any explosive mechanism, or any sample of gas-contaminated material.
8. This instruction is NOT meant to deter personnel from making every effort to minimise damage caused by incendiary bombs and fire.
9. Should any unexploded bomb be exposed on the surface, the danger area as mentioned in Para. 6 above should be increased to 300 yds.
10. To disseminate information gained, Engineering Int. will forward to all I.Os. as necessary.

G. H. Springfield
Lieut.,
S/Capt. 30 Inf. Bde.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
30 INF. BDE. H.Q., ROUTINE ORDERS NO. 14

Appx 8
WAR DIARY
Mar '42

by
BRIT. N.G. HATTON, M.C., M.M., V.D., COMD. 30 INF. BDE.

2 MAR. 42

1. PAY

All personnel requiring pay will hand in their Pay Books at the Orderly Room by 0900 hrs. 3 Mar. 42. Pay parade will be held at 0900 hrs. Wednesday, 4 Mar. 42.

2. BOOTS.

Boots in need of repair will be clearly labelled and handed to Q.M. by 0900 hrs, 3 Mar. 42. Personnel living in new camp site will hand boots, labelled as stated, to Sgt. Crombie, by 0845 hrs, 3 Mar. Personnel living in huts will hand boots in direct to Q.M.

4. CONSERVATION OF WATER.

All personnel are instructed that every effort must be made to conserve water, as present consumption is in excess of capacity. For your own good, DO NOT WASTE WATER.

5. RUMOURS.

There are still too many rumours going about - THIS HABIT MUST STOP. The popular News Centre (6 W.C.) has been proved most unreliable. If you are in doubt or need enlightenment on any question, ask the C.S.M. or any Staff Officer, who will answer any question within reason, thus putting a stop to rumours that are causing a lot of harm to yourselves.

Remember: Any person found spreading false information will be dealt with under Army Act. Sec 5 (5).

J. Mansfield
Lieut.
Staff Capt. 30 Inf. Bde.

Distribution:-

Bde. I.O.
Bde. T.O.
Bde. Sig. Sec.
C.S.M.
Notice Board.
War Diary.
File.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

U.S. 30 Inf. Div. (Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1 Ranks.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment).
<i>Ensigns</i> *	1		
	-		
Lieut.-Colonels	-		
Majors	1		
Captains	2*		3
Lieutenants	3*		1
2nd Lieutenants	-		-
Quartermasters	-		-
Totals	7*		4

*Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.	
<i>Lieut.</i>	<i>Jones</i>	<i>C.P.</i>	<i>53 Bn.</i>	<i>27/1/42</i>	<i>To Det. C.C. Det. Co.</i>

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.	
<i>Lieut.</i>	<i>Loop</i>	<i>A.C.</i>	<i>U.S. 30 Inf. Div.</i>	<i>27/1/42</i>	<i>Insufficiently Qualified R.I.T. Det.</i>

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

* INCLUDES O.C. DET. CO.

* INCLUDES 1 CAPT. SUPERNUMERARY TO ESTABL.

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held.	Personal Number.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	If not present with Unit, state how employed.
BNIC.	W. 125157	HUTTON M.C.	H.Q. 30	Yes	
MAJ.	V. 59632	NEWMAN E.K.	Inf. Bde	Yes	
CAPT.	V. 55296	BENJAMIN D.L.	De.	Yes	
"	H.P. 9551	SHAW E.V.	De.	Yes	
LIEUT.	W. 12720	EVANS D.P.	De.	Yes	
"	V. 57291	MUNSELD E.J.	De.	Yes	
		<u>DEF. PL.</u>			
N. 34092	L. 1112	JEFFS C.P.	H.Q. 30 Inf. Bde	Yes	

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held.	Personal Number.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
CHIEFLIN.	V. 144350	DOWLING K.M.P.	H.Q. 30 D.	15/12/42	CHIEFLIN.
"	N. 0140	WOTTON R.N.	De.	20/12/42	De.
"	W. 114053	DICKINSON J.F.	De.	17/1/43	De.
"	P. 175	CRAYDEN K.J.	De.	29/1/43	De.
"	P. 320	EDDL N.J.	De.	4/2/43	De.

H.Q. 30 Inf. Bde (Unit.)

6-2-43 (Date of Despatch.)

[Signature] (Signature of Commander.)

S.M.D. (Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

B.I.O. Appx 10

War Diary
Mar 42
Army Form W.3009
(page 1)

TO BE MADE UP TO AND FOR SATURDAY IN EACH WEEK.

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

(Adapted)

U.S. Army (Unit) 1st - 1942 (Date)

(To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1 Detail.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.			
W.Os. Class II.	1		
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants	—		
Staff Serjeants	1		
Serjeants	2		1 } INADEQUATE
Corporals	1		2 } WITHIN UNIT
Troopers, Privates, &c.	40*		13
TOTALS	45*	*	16

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).

a.w. 3m bks 9/40

NOTE: THREE (3) ARMOURERS DRAFTED FROM S. COMD TNG. DEPT. INCLUDES TWO (2) CPLs. W.E. II. 14A/2 PROVIDES FOR THREE ARMOURERS TDC. GR. II. AND NOT CPLs.

H.Q. 30 Inf. Bde. Unit.

PART D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009.

Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)
Ammunition Examiners			Fire Control Operators			Panel Beaters		
Armament Artificers			Fitters			Pattern Makers		
Armourers			Fitters and Turners			Pharmacists		
Artificers, Artillery			Fitters, Cycle			Photographers, dry plate		
Axemen			Fitters, Drivers			Photographers, wet plate		
Bakers			Fitter's Mates			Photo-Writers		
Battery Surveyors			Fitters, M.V.			Plate Layers		
Battery Comdrs. Asst.			Fitters, Railway Signal			Plumbers		
Blacksmiths			Fitters, Signal			Predictor Numbers		
Boilermakers			Grinders			Printers		
Bricklayers			Gun Layers			Radiator Mechanics		
Butchers			G.P.O. Assistants			Radiographers		
Camouflage Modeller			Gun Operators			Range Takers		
Carpenter and Joiner			Hammermen			Riggers		
Clerks		1	Height Takers			Rivetters		
Clerks, Engineering			Helio Operators			Saddlers		
Clerks, Supply			Instrument Mechanics			Saddle Tree Makers		
Clerks, Technical			Instrument Mechanics, Surgical			Saw Doctors		
Coachmakers			Instrument Operators			Sawyers		
Computers			Intelligence Duties		1	Shoemakers		
Concretors			Joiners			Signallers		
Cooks			Leather Stitchers			Signwriters		
Cooks, Hospital			Linesmen			Stokers, Stationary Engine		
Coppersmiths			Linesmen, Signals			Storemen, Technical		
Dental Clerk Orderlies			Lithographers			Surveyors		
Despatch Riders			Machinists			Surveyors, Engineering		
Dispensers			Masons			Tailors		
Draughtsmen			Masseurs			Telescope Identification Numbers		
Draughtsmen, Architectural			Mechanics, Dental			Textile Refitters		
Draughtsmen, Mechanical			Mechanics, M.T.			Tinsmiths		
Draughtsmen, Signal			Mechanics, Typewriter			Toolmakers		
Draughtsmen, Topographical			Mechanics, Wireless			Turners		
Driver Mechanics			Millwrights			Vulcanizers		
Driver Operators			Miners			Wagon Erectors		
Drivers, Transportation Plant			Moulders			Watchmakers		
Electrical Fitters			Nursing Orderlies			Watermen		
Electricians			Nursing Orderlies (Mental)			Welders		
Electricians, Eng. Units			Nurses, Trained			Well Borers		
Electricians, Signal			Observation Post Assistants			Wheelers		
Engine Artificers			Operating Room Assistants			Whitesmiths		
Engine Hands I/C			Operators, Signal			Wiremen		
Equipment Repairers			Opticians			Woodturners		
Farriers			Painters					
Drummers		4						
Drummers (Bands)		12						
Drummers (Signal)		1						
Psychicist (M.M.S.C.)		1						
Drum. M.T.		2 (M.T.)						
Orderlies (M.M.T.)		4						
Totals (to agree with Columns 3 and 4 of Part A.)		15			1			

Notes—(a) If rank other than Private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised Trades or Specialists not included in list above will be added as required in spaces provided.

H.Q. 30 Inf. Bde. Unit.

[Signature]
S.M.D. (Signature of Commander)
LIEUT.

Date of Despatch 6-3-42

Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

H.A. 20 Inf. Bde. (Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1 Ranks.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment).
<i>Regimental</i> *	1		
*	-		
Lieut.-Colonels	-		
Majors	1		
Captains	2*		3
Lieutenants	3*		1
2nd Lieutenants	-		
Quartermasters	-		
Totals	7*		4

*Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

** INCLUDES 1 Capt. SUPERNUMERARY TO ESTAB.
* INCLUDES V.C. DEF. PL.*

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held.	Personal Number.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	If not present with Unit, state how employed.
Brig	R. 185157	HUTTON N.G.	H.Q. 30	YES	
Maj	V. 59632	NEWMAN E.K.	Inf. Bde.	YES	
Capt.	V. 55241	BENJAMIN H.L.	Di.	YES	
"	M.P. 9881	SHAW E.V.	Di.	YES	
Lieut.	R. 107716	EVANS R.D.	Di.	NO	H.P. H.D.T. - S.M.D.
"	V. 57291	MURFIELD F.J.	Di.	YES	
		<u>DEF. PL.</u>			
Lieut.	N. 30192	JEFFS C.P.	H.Q. 30	YES	

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held.	Personal Number.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Chaplain	V. 114550	WIDDING K.M.C.	H. H. Ch. D.	1/1/42	Chaplain
"	N. 6140	WOTTIN R.W.	Di.	1/1/42	Di.
"	N. 11755	DICKINSON J.F.	Di.	1/1/42	Di.
"	R. 145	CHAYBON K.J.	Di.	1/1/42	Di.
"	P. 324	EVANS H.J.	Di.	1/1/42	Di.

H. Q. 30 Inf Bde

(Unit.)

13-3-42

(Date of Despatch.)

[Signature]
for Bn. Comd. 30 Inf Bde.

(Signature of Commander.)

S. M. D.

(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

(Adapted)

11th Squadron (Unit) 12-3-19 (Date).

(To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1	2	3	4
Detail.	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.			
W.Os. Class II.	1		
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants	-		
Staff Serjeants	-		
Serjeants	1		
Corporals	4		
Troopers, Privates, &c.	33		
TOTALS	39	*	* 2

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).
11111	Pvt.	W. J. Jones	11th Sqn	11th Sqn, 11th Bn

H. B. 30 Inf. Bde. Unit.

PART D. Detail of Surplus or Reinforcements required as shown in Part A of Army Form W. 3009.

Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)	Detail of Specialists, Tradesmen, etc.	Surplus (a)	Reinfts. Required (a)
Ammunition Examiners			Fire Control Operators			Panel Beaters		
Armament Artificers			Fitters			Pattern Makers		
Armourers			Fitters and Turners			Pharmacists		
Artificers, Artillery			Fitters, Cycle			Photographers, dry plate		
Axemen			Fitters, Drivers			Photographers, wet plate		
Bakers			Fitter's Mates			Photo-Writers		
Battery Surveyors			Fitters, M.V.			Plate Layers		
Battery Comdrs. Asst.			Fitters, Railway Signal			Plumbers		
Blacksmiths			Fitters, Signal			Predictor Numbers		
Boilermakers			Grinders			Printers		
Bricklayers			Gun Layers			Radiator Mechanics		
Butchers			G.P.O. Assistants			Radiographers		
Camouflage Modeller			Gun Operators			Range Takers		
Carpenter and Joiner			Hammermen			Riggers		
Clerks		1	Height Takers			Riveters		
Clerks, Engineering			Helio Operators			Saddlers		
Clerks, Supply			Instrument Mechanics			Saddle Tree Makers		
Clerks, Technical			Instrument Mechanics, Surgical			Saw Doctors		
Coachmakers			Instrument Operators			Sawyers		
Computers			Intelligence Duties		1	Shoemakers		
Concretors			Joiners			Signallers		
Cooks			Leather Stitchers			Signwriters		
Cooks, Hospital			Linesmen			Stokers, Stationary Engine		
Coppersmiths			Linesmen, Signals			Storemen, Technical		
Dental Clerk Orderlies			Lithographers			Surveyors		
Despatch Riders			Machinists			Surveyors, Engineering		
Dispensers			Masons			Tailors		
Draughtsmen			Masseurs			Telescope Identification Numbers		
Draughtsmen, Architectural			Mechanics, Dental			Textile Refitters		
Draughtsmen, Mechanical			Mechanics, M.T.			Tinsmiths		
Draughtsmen, Signal			Mechanics, Typewriter			Toolmakers		
Draughtsmen, Topographical			Mechanics, Wireless			Turners		
Driver Mechanics			Millwrights			Vulcanizers		
Driver Operators			Miners			Wagon Erectors		
Drivers, Transportation Plant			Moulders			Watchmakers		
Electrical Fitters			Nursing Orderlies			Watermen		
Electricians			Nursing Orderlies (Mental)			Welders		
Electricians, Eng. Units			Nurses, Trained			Well Borers		
Electricians, Signal			Observation Post Assistants			Wheelers		
Engine Artificers			Operating Room Assistants			Whitesmiths		
Engine Hands I/C			Operators, Signal			Wiremen		
Equipment Repairers			Opticians			Woodturners		
Farriers			Painters					
Farriers		4						
"		2						
Drummer (M.A.S.T. Corp)		1						
Drum. M.T.		2						
M/Cyclist (M.A.S.T.)		1						
Orderlies (Drum. M.T.)		4						
Totals (to agree with Columns 3 and 4 of Part A.)		15			1			

Notes—(a) If rank other than Private is involved give details on back.
(b) Authorised Trades or Specialists not included in list above will be added as required in spaces provided.

H. B. 30 Inf. Bde. Unit.

[Signature]
Signature of Commander.
8. M. D.

Date of Despatch 13-3-42.

Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which unit is serving.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

H.Q. 30 Inf Bde (Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1 Ranks.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment).
<i>Brigadiers</i> *	1		
	—		
Lieut.-Colonels	—		
Majors	1		
Captains	2		3
Lieutenants	1*		2
2nd Lieutenants	—		—
Quartermasters	—		—
Totals	5*		5

*Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
<i>Capt.</i>	<i>EVANS</i>	<i>P.O. H.Q. 30 Inf Bde</i>	<i>15-3-42</i>	<i>To be D.A.D.T., S.M.D.</i>
<i>"</i>	<i>SHAW</i>	<i>E.V. Det.</i>	<i>7-3-42</i>	<i>Evacuated P.D.S. 3rd Amb.</i>

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

* INCLUDES O.C. Det. Pt.

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held.	Personal Number.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	If not present with Unit, state how employed.
Brig.	R.105157	HUTTON M. G.	H. Q. 30 Inf. Bde.	Yes.	
Maj.	V. 57632	NEWMAN E. K.	Do.	Yes.	
Capt.	V. 55276	BENJAMIN A. I.	Do.	Yes.	
	V. 57771	MANFIELD F. S.	Do.	Yes.	
		<u>DEF. PL.</u>			
Lieut.	N. 34072	JEFFS C. P.	H. Q. 30 Inf. Bde.	Yes.	

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank and higher temporary rank, if held.	Personal Number.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Chaplain	V. 111130	DOWDING K. M. S.	A. A. Ch. Dist.	28/12/41	CHAPLAIN.
"	N. 0140	WITTEN B. N.	Do.	2/12/41	Do.
"	G. 119683	DICKINSON J. F.	Do.	17/12/41	Do.
"	F. 195	GRAYDON K. J.	Do.	29/1/42	Do.
"	P. 220	ENRIE N. T.	Do.	1/1/42	Do.

H. Q. 30 Inf. Bde. (Unit.)

[Signature]
(Signature of Commander.)
for Brig. Comd. 30 Inf. Bde.

20-3-42 (Date of Despatch.)

H. Q. 30 Inf. Bde. (Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

(Adapted)

112 301st Coy Bde Det (Unit) 20 - 3 - 19 4 (Date).

(To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1	2	3	4
Detail.	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.			
W.Os. Class II.			
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants	1		
Staff Serjeants	-		
Serjeants	1		
Corporals	4		1 (Incorporated)
Troopers, Privates, &c.	33*		1 (Coy. Tro. (C.P.))
TOTALS	39*	*	* 2.

*These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts if known).
424112	Pte	YOUNG, R. A.	Det Pte	R.I.T. DEPT.

a.w. 3m bks 5/41

* INCLUDES 1st REINFORCEMENT

Appx 10 War Diary
Mar 42

REF. No.
42/75/8.

30 INF. BDE. GP.

SECRET.

Copy No. // : : : .

26 Mar. 42.

OPERATION ORDER No. 3.

REF. MAP. PORT MORESBY; 2" to 1 mile.

INFORMATION. 1. Enemy. Now in occupation of SALAMAUA, LAE and FINSCHHAFFEN. The enemy's present sea strength in NEW GUINEA - NEW BRITAIN Area is NOT sufficient to force a passage to PORT MORESBY. Despatch of Tp. carrying aircraft is a possibility.

2. Own Tps. Allied naval units and aircraft in considerable strength are operating near NEW GUINEA Area. P.I.B. standing patrols have been established at RIGO, KOKODA and OBU. A series of air-watching posts are being established within NEW GUINEA and PAPUA. Posts have rapid communications. The 3rd A.A. will be mobile and searchlights will be disposed in the area. Defence of PAGA PT. will be responsibility of Arty. and Frt. Sigs. All units in L of C area will be responsible for their own protection. The Ind. Pl. will come under comd. 39 Bn. from 19 Mar. 42.

INTENTION. 3. 30 INF. BDE. GP. will;

(a). Prevent enemy landing in area bounded by coast line from R.A.A.F. Remote Control Receiving Stn., 977077 to TUPUSELEI HD., 900904, both incl., less PAGA PT. from incl. Slipway 998040, to incl. Native Hospital, 002997.

(b). Patrol area BOERA - POREBADA.

(c). Defend area between LALOKI R. and coast from North and South line through R.A.F. Rem. Con. Rec. Stn., 977077, to CALLOW RD., both incl. from enemy air landing.

(d). Defend 7 MILE Aerodrome against enemy aircraft attacks.

(e). Assist in defence of rear L of C area.

METHOD. 4. Two plans; Plan "A" and Plan "B".
PLAN "A".

5. On receiving of possible landing by sea, Plan "A" will come into operation at once.

6. Three Bns. fwd.; 53 on right; 49 centre; 39 left.

7. Inter Bn. boundaries.

53 Bn. from incl. 977077 to incl. KOKI, 026003, less PAGA PT. from Slipway to Native Hospital.

49 Bn. from excl. KOKI, 026003, to incl. INLET, 108984; PORT MORESBY - ROUNA Rd. incl; rear boundary excl. 6 MILE VALLEY.

39 Bn. from excl. INLET, 108984, to TUPUSELEI HD., 200904.

8. Role.

53 Bn. (a) Prevent enemy landing from BARONI LEADING LIGHTS to KOKI.
(b) Patrol as far North as BOERA.
(c) Prevent enemy movements Eastwards along North shores of FAIRFAX HARBOUR.

49 Bn. (a) Prevent enemy landing from KOKI to INLET, 108984.
(b) Defence of 3 MILE VALLEY.
(c) Defence of KILA KILA Aerodrome.
(d) To Liaison with 39 Bn. on left with view to assist by counter-attack if needed.

/39 Bn.

- 39 Bn. (a) Prevent landing of enemy from INLET, 108984, to TUPUSELEI HD.
 (b) Defence of 7 MILE Aerodrome from attack in any direction.
 (c) Prepare 7 MILE Aerodrome for all round defence.
 (d) Patrol as far South as TUPUSELEI HD.
 (e) Patrol North to LALOKI River.
 (f) Liaison with 49 Bn. on right with view to assist by counter-attack if needed.
9. Arty. One Tp. 13 Fd. Regt. under comd. of each Inf. Bn.
 53 Bn. One gun at 011029, 012025, 023001, 036992.
 49 Bn. " " " 048974, 077961, 139943, 133952.
 39 Bn. One Tp. at 168967, one at 178952 and 178948.

Role Beach Defence.

How. bty. in reserve at 051020. Counter attack in direction of PORT MORESBY and 7 MILE Aerodrome.

10. A. Tk. Bde. Reserve disposed in WONGA, 054015, area.
 11. Reserve. Two Coys., 39 Bn. now in position Aerodrome will act as Bde. Reserve; to remain in present position until needed; ~~DETAILS DEPON~~ to take over these ~~plans~~. when Bde. Reserve needed
 12. PLAN "B".

12. Inter Bn. Bde. Area.

53/39 Bns. from 070149 along ridge 0308 to MORRIS HILL 074044; along track to 036017; along ridge to MORESBY - ROUNA Rd. 043006; to KOKI 000008; all tracks incl. to 53 Bn. 026003.

39/49 Bns. from KOKI, 026003, along MORESBY - ROUNA Rd. to 043006; to track 061998 - 090020 - 190020; Beaches

Def. Pl., "C" Tp. 17 A. Tks and H.Q., 13 Fd. Regt., under comd. O.C. Def. Pl., will be responsible for area 061998-090020-MORRIS HILL, 074044; along track 036017-061998. Beach frontage will be lightly held.

13. 7 MILE Aerodrome. Forty A.A. Posts will be sited around drome for protection against enemy aircraft; will come under Comd. 39 Bn.
 Weapons and personnel will be supplied by units as under:-

39 Bn. plus Ind. Pl.	- 21.
49 Bn.	- 10.
53 Bn.	- 10.
	<u>41.</u>

On Plan "A" coming into operation, these guns will return to own units.

14. Defence of rear L of C area. One Coy. from Bde. Co. under comd. 3 M.D. will be sent to EILOGO Ck. area each fourteen days.

Role : (a) Assist in defence of rear L of C.
 (b) Undergo tng.
 (c) Rest and change of climate.

Schedule of dates will be advised separately.

15. Arty. One Tp. will be withdrawn from fwd. areas.
 Role : Cover (a) GAOL GARDEN.
 (b) WAIGANI SWAMPS.
 (c) Targets of opportunity.

16. A. Tk. Will assist defence of Bde. Paratp. area under instruction from O.C., Def. Pl.

ADM.

17. Rations. Every man will carry his IRON RATIONS. Eight days rations will be maintained by Units. Units on Drome defence will ration own tps.

18. S.A.A. One hundred rounds on the man, remainder in Bn. reserve. Dumps to be well dispersed.

19. Water. Where water NOT laid on, units will have to cart own water.

20. Medical. A.D.S., JOHNS GULLY and MURRAY BARRACKS,
and W.D.S., BOMANA MISSION off PITT St.

21. Coys. on defence of rear L of G area will march to area.
Blankets, Packs, etc. will be transported under unit arrange-
ments.

INTERCOMMUNICATING Bde. H.Q., P.I.B. HILL, MURRAY BARRACKS.
S.O.S. Two REDS.

23. Drome defence will have direct L/T to Fighter Control
and Bde., with party lines to sections.

ACK.

METHOD OF ISSUE. D.R.L.S.

TIME OF SIGNATURE. 1400 hrs

E. K. Newman Major,
B.M., 30 Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION :

- Copy No. 1. 39 Bn.
- 2. 49 Bn.
- 3. 53 Bn.
- 4. 13 Fd. Regt.
- 5. Wg^{ts} Tps., 17 A. Tks.
- 6. 3 Fd. Amb.
- 7/8. 8 M.D.
- 9. Page Bty.
- 10. File.
- 11. War Diary. ✓
- 12/13. Spare.

Appx. 10.
War Diary.
Mar. 42.

MEMO RE O.O. NO. 3 "PLAN B".

- 8 Mar. 42. Brig. and B.M. attended conference with G.O.C. at 0900 hrs; discussed Defence Plan, following on report, of large Jap. convoy in RABAUl harbour.
- 9 Mar. 42. Brig. and all C.O.'s conference with G.O.C., General **MORRIS**
- 14 Mar. 42. Brig. conference with G.O.C. Paratroop area.
- 15 Mar. 42. All C.O.'s and Adjts. conference Bde. H.Q. Discussed possibility of Para. landings. Units given areas of responsibility.
- 18 Mar. 42. Brig. & B.M. R.V. at 1000 hrs. with C.O's. 39 & 53. at PRIESTS, and co-ordinated boundaries for Para. areas adjusted boundaries between 39 & 49 in afternoon.

EA Newman 16/3/42

Ref. No.
42/75/8

S E C R E T

Copy No. ...*61*.....

H.Q. 30 Inf. Bde.

30 Mar. 42.

13 F. Regt.
" C " Tp., 17 A. Tr.
3 Fd. Amb.
8 M.D.
Page Sty.
War Diary. ✓

AMENDMENT 30 Inf. Bde. OPERATION ORDER NO. 3.


Para 3, line 3, for " slipway 998040 " read " slipway 998004 ".

Ed. Verner Major.
E.M. 30 Inf. Bde.

Appx. 13.
War Diary.
Mar. 42.

MEMO RE MOVE OF BDE. H.Q.

1. Troops of 30 Inf. Bde. H.Q. moved from old P.I.B. Barracks, on 8 Mar. to camp site previously prepared by 7 Fd. Coy. R.A.E. at map ref. 052020. Ref. Map - Port Moresby. O.S. 1 inch to 1 mile.
2. Offrs. & staff of Bde. H.Q. remained in quarters on P.I.B. Hill.
3. New camp site to be known as NEWMANS NOOK.
4. As a consequence of this move No. 3 A/A Post replaced No. 5, the latter taking up a ground defence posn. at map ref. 054022.
5. Bde. H.Q. Staff moved to prepared posn. at NEWMANS NOOK on 25 Mar. Dugouts were found to be severely affected by borers and work commenced on rebuilding them. Beams of green timber were replaced by 20 ft. lengths of 60 lb. lines (rly), obtained from SMELTERS. Tng. was suspended during this period to facilitate and expedite work by our own tps.

 o/c 30 Bde Inf Pl.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups

GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

DATE RECEIVED
10 APR 1942

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

D.R.O.

FROM

30 Inf Bde

Originator's Number

I.156

Date

9

In Reply to Number.

<i>War Bde</i>	<i>Diary</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>H.Q.</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>Inf</i>
<i>both</i>	<i>incl</i>	<i>Appxs</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>To</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>duplicate</i>	<i>copy</i>	<i>forwarded</i>	<i>herewith</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>also</i>
		<i>war</i>	<i>diary</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>ACK</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

*except w/T
of Dugan
Capt*

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1200

SIGNED

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

Serial No.

No. of Groups

OFFICE DATE STAMP

DATE RECEIVED

9 APR 1942

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

D.R.O.

FROM

30 Inf Bde.

Originator's Number

I-156

Date

9

In Reply to Number.

<i>War Bde</i>	<i>Brigade</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>HQ</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>Inf</i>
<i>Both</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>Appx</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>To</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>duplicate</i>	<i>incl</i>	<i>forward</i>	<i>herewith</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>Also</i>
	<i>copy</i>	<i>via</i>	<i>drawing</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>ACK</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

*except if
of [unclear]
copy*

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1200

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

IN. SYSTEM TIME	IN. HEADERS	SENDERS	OUT. SYSTEM TIME	OUT. HEADERS	SENDERS	OUT. SYSTEM TIME	OUT. HEADERS	SENDERS

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE REPT. AS WRITTEN

BE REPT. IN CAPNER. INTO ENERGY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE REPT. TO THE INTERCEPTED OR DATA

ORDER OF AMOUNT. ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS

TIME OF ORIGIN

T.O.R.

T.H.I.

1200

TO H. Lindsay

FROM

30/1/48

D.K.O.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

IONS? INST. IN. CIVL

OUT

IN

DATE RECEIVED

3 APR 1948

No. of Groups

OFFICE DATA STAMP

Serial No.

MESSAGE FORM

Revised 1st 1947
Printed at 1000
Army Form C 3152

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	<p style="font-size: 2em; text-align: center;">Appx 14 to</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em; text-align: center;">30 by Bde</p>	No. of Groups	OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		GR.	

Serial No.

WAR DIARY
Mar '42

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO *KED 1*

FROM *RATU*

Originator's Number.	Date.	In Reply to Number
<i>I 142</i>	<i>29</i>	

<i>Pit Rk P29</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>accordance</i>	<i>with</i>	<i>Plan</i>	<i>B</i>
<i>Beach</i>	<i>guns</i>	<i>will</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>withdrawn</i>	<i>from</i>
<i>011029</i>	<i>012025</i>	<i>168966</i>	<i>172963</i>	<i>0</i>	
<i>C.T.P.</i>	<i>4 guns</i>	<i>will</i>	<i>move</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>092082</i>
<i>Move</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>commence</i>	<i>1700</i>	<i>30 Mar</i>	<i>will</i>
<i>be</i>	<i>completed</i>	<i>1900</i>	<i>30 Mar</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>29 Mar</i>
<i>Patrol</i>	<i>trying</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>locate</i>	<i>German</i>	<i>start</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:	IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.	ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.	TIME OF ORIGIN
---	--	---	----------------

SIGNED (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM	Originator's Number.	Date.	In Reply to Number
<i>Laur</i>	<i>near</i>	<i>MT Lawo</i>	<i>same</i>
<i>Gap</i>	<i>Rehal</i>	<i>bank</i>	<i>constructed</i>
<i>wood</i>	<i>Amavis</i>	<i>forwarded</i>	<i>to</i>
<i>Palma</i>	<i>reported</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>return</i>
			<i>39 PM</i>
			<i>30 MAR</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

Amavis

1600

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.
OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

8 MD Intel

FROM

RATU.

Originator's Number

1136

Date

25

In Reply to Number.

<i>Sit Rep 28_A</i>	<i>Plane</i>	<i>which</i>	<i>was</i>	<i>reported to</i>	
<i>have</i>	<i>crashed</i>	<i>near</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>Co</i>	<i>area</i>
<i>during</i>	<i>raid</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>3 MTR</i>	<i>on</i>	<i>5 M 1/2</i>
<i>army</i>	<i>has</i>	<i>not</i>	<i>been</i>	<i>located</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>Recce</i>	<i>being</i>	<i>made</i>	<i>by</i>	<i>1370</i>	<i>REGT</i>
<i>for</i>	<i>new</i>	<i>sp</i>	<i>person</i>	<i>member</i>	<i>J.</i>
<i>quarters</i>					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1700.

SIGNED

Thomas Jt.

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN
OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.
OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

8 M.D.

FROM

30 Inf Bde

Originator's Number

2 126

Date

21

In Reply to Number.

—

Sitrep	28	(ff)	Confirming earlier	6/T
report	To	G III (1)	warning message	R
arrival	first	from	KITTYHAWKS	was
passed	To	all	units	incl
between	1145 and 1200		has	39 Pm
words	as	received	from	same
quote	ETA	will be	addressed	incl
			later	unquote

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.
OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

①	As they	planes could	approached	Drome	hedge off
by	AA posts	○	NOT	be	identified
when	advised	○	Markings	had	NOT
blew	and	○	RAAF	alarm	seen
up	with	○	RAAF	personnel	opened
Bde	NOT	○	○	Warning	from
		○	open	from	control

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

**CALL
AND
INSTRUCTIONS.**

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

Planes identified had	NOT	gone	fact
39 Bn H/Q. when	Planes	approached	Drone
Subsequent notice of	of	exact	ETA
that thirteen KITTYPUNKS by	warning	could	evidently
been given	me	just	have

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.
OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

KEDI

FROM

RATU

Originator's Number

1128

Date

22

In Reply to Number.

*SITREP 27
to
DOM.
been*

*(aa)
have
N° 21
Explosion
taken*

*Plane
Crashed
has
of
far*

*which
on
not
about
plane*

*was
20 MAR
been
may
crashing*

*reported
2nd
location
have*

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1900.

SIGNED

Herman Sgt.

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

8 M.D.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

FROM

30 Inf Bde

Originator's Number

1

Date

19

In Reply to Number.

<i>Sitrep</i>	<i>26A</i>	<i>(aa)</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>trace</i>	<i>jet</i>
<i>found</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>plane</i>	<i>reported</i>	<i>crashed</i>	<i>19</i>
<i>Mar</i>	<i>(cc)</i>	<i>Two</i>	<i>pls</i>	<i>C Coy</i>	<i>49</i>
<i>Bn</i>	<i>moved</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>area</i>	<i>NE</i>	<i>DOKUNA</i>
<i>between</i>	<i>032027</i>	<i>and</i>		<i>⊙</i>	<i>One</i>
<i>Coy</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>for</i>	<i>moving</i>	<i>early</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Mar</i>	<i>on</i>	<i>trek to</i>	<i>junction</i>	<i>LALOKI and LEWAROGO</i>	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

A. J. Bryan
Capt

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1900

SIGNED

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

HQ 8110

FROM

30 Inf Bde.

Originator's Number

2 121

Date

17.

In Reply to Number.

<i>SIT. REFS. 23-24-25</i>	<i>Nil</i>	<i>REPORTS.</i>	<i>C</i>	
<i>SIT REF 26</i>	<i>(aa)</i>	<i>Enemy</i>	<i>flight</i>	<i>17 MAR</i>
<i>1400 hr.</i>	<i>1405 hr.</i>	<i>Observer</i>	<i>Pat c</i>	<i>through</i>
<i>telescope</i>	<i>reports</i>	<i>seeing</i>	<i>up</i>	<i>markings</i>
<i>counting</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>blue</i>	<i>star</i>	<i>TELETYPE</i>
<i>122221</i>	<i>Star</i>	<i>report</i>	<i>radio</i>	<i>(see)</i>
<i>Camel</i>	<i>MAP REF</i>	<i>COANS</i>	<i>lost</i>	<i>39 Mar HQ</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

**CALL
AND
INSTRUCTIONS.**

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

111057	Please	inform	Recd.	Will not	C.
Order	information	already	judicial	with	INT
Sum No 20					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN**
BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST
BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

except w/it
A. J. King
Capt

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

1755

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

30 hnt Bde to 8 M.D.

Sitrep 21

11 Mar

(aa) Nothing to add to preliminary - any reports ~~nothing~~ still only 8 crates found all vicinity SE end runway.

(cc) D Coy 53 Bn moved from NAPA to map ref 022024 and vicinity (less one sec)

HQ. 13 Fd Regt moved from MURRAY BARRACKS to HQ vacated by 7 Fd Coy vicinity Bde Battle HQ.

HQ 39 Bn moved to EVAN'S HOUSE 103053.

(gg) Morale of gun troops
Arrival of overdue mail
has had obvious tonic effect.

12/3/42 Sit Rep 22 Nil Report.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO 8 M.D. rftd C.O.I.C.

FROM 30 Inf Bde

Originator's Number

I 100

Date

3

In Reply to Number.

—

TO	SITREP	20	aa	Raid	No 5
Additions	and	alterations	to preliminary bombing		
reported	passed	by L/T	1535 hrs	0	Para 3
Report of 4-engined float planes participating supported					
by several observers	0	Engine noise like	Serial 43's	0	
Para 4 Bombed from 23000 ft evidently already gauged					
wind and had line-up before flying straight in and bombing					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

**CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS.**

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

SEVEN	MILE	Para 6	Bombs	included	500 lb
250 lb	and A/Personnel	0	One 250 lb	food grass	MORRIS
with unusual type	AA.	are feeding	fragments	0	Some
fragment from	BADILLI	coated with	verdigris	0	No unexplod-
ed reported	0	NAPA now reported	NOT bombed	0	12
bombs	BADILLI	Six craters	near GAOL	fifty-five at least	
SEVEN MILE	(See map att.)	KONE DOBU	numbers	NOT known	0

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN**
BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST
BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

**CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS.**

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

Damage to AA. Kitchen MORRIS HILL only reported
so far 0 Para 7 One AA. gun shocked one RAAF
wounded Para 10 No confirmation of parachute
report on crash of HUDSON which took
off beginning of raid 0th LUREBADA passed
BEACON heading MORESBY during second alert
gg Morale stimulated by crash of enemy plane Rand of

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN**
BY ANY MEANS: *except R/T.*

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST
BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1925

SIGNED

A. Bryan
capt

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

8 MD RPTD C.O.I.C.

FROM

30 Inf Bde

Originator's Number

5.98

Date

2

In Reply to Number.

Sitrep	19	aa	a	petrol	tank
apparently	pettisoned	by	an.	enemy	plane
has	been	found	vicinity	BOOTLESS INLET	
on	land	gg.	Rumour	re	compendy
relief	now	refers	to	presence	HQUITANIA
near	MORESBY	with	the	aboard	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1900

SIGNED

*epoch 2/10
of Dugan
Capt*

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

30 Inf Bde to 8 M.D. 1 Mar 42

Set up 18 aa Large ~~no~~
number of parts of Japanese
fighter ~~shot~~ downed in Raid

4 Salvaged 1 Mar incl one
almost intact air-cannon
made in Japan powered by
~~compression~~ a gas cylinders

made in Germany, also Japanese
made instruments @ Pilot is
now under guard in CAMP

HOSPITAL THREE MILE @ 39

Bn has ~~found~~ fragments believed
air cannon shell found in
B Coy area. 99 Rumors
a reported 8 M.D. This will
be relieved by 4 units Mar

@ Jap radio reported to have
broadcast 1 Mar 640 hrs
from RATBAU incl cond.
surrendered to Japs (Hear
by 49 Bn personnel incl
one int sec.)

Photostat 2015
8 M.D. ALB

30 Inf Bde
HQ.

30 Inf Bde.

Please have someone
call for a parcel of
publications.

1 m. m. L.

1 J. S. P. B.

1 J. S. R. vol 1

1 " " 3

1 S. O. Op & maint m. v.

also silhouettes of
Japanese Aircraft.

D. B. Ley Sgt.


Stationery Dep

27-2-42.

Appx. 15.
War Diary.
Mar. 42.

MEMO RE WORKING PARTIES.

1. On arrival of all boats at PORT MORESBY, Bde. are asked to supply Unloading Parties.
2. Usual work party consists of 135 men, working eight (8) hourly shifts. Twenty four (24) hours each day of ships stay in port, involving a total of approx. 400 men daily at Wharf.
3. Bde. transport is also supplied for above work, each unit providing ten or twelve vehs., out of their total of twenty four (24).
4. In addition to Wharf Parties, working parties have been provided during Mar. 42, for construction of Dispersal Bays. R.A.A.F., at SEVEN MILE 'drome. This work occupies two full pl's daily, also two pl's daily erecting Sig. line, laying cable etc., this work lasting indefinitely. Construction of bays estimated to take five weeks, and is still going on.
5. Bde. vehicles and personnel are also called upon to transfer ammunition and supplies etc., from fwd. dumps, along the L of C, as far as Base Depot.
6. Above mentioned jobs are in addition to smaller fatigues, guards and picquets called for by higher formation.
7. This big call for personnel and vehicles from Bde. Gp. is badly hampering tng. and impairing efficiency of the Bde. as a fighting force.


Capt.
S/Capt. 30 Inf. Bde.