AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/1
CORPS

1 Australian Corps
General Branch (1 Aust Corps 'G' Branch)

November 1943

1/4/1-042%

28 DEC 1943

WAR DIARY

SECRET

Unit HQ 1 AUST CORPS Branch G (Ops) Period From 1 NOV - 30 NOV 43

Date		Particulars	Remarks
2 NOV		Lt Col T.K. WALKER, Royal Marines, assumed appointment as GSO I (Combined Ops) 1 Aust Corps.	
3. NOV		Conference at HQ 6 Aust Div concerning recce of new beach training area in the neighbourhood of CAIRNS.	
8 NOV		Medical Group of 220 Military ("Lethbridge") Mission visiting ATHERTON area.	
9 NOV		Medical Group leave area.	
	GOC	Lt Gen Sir Edmund HERRING, KBE, DSO, MC, ED, at Adv LHQ; conferred with C-in-C.	
10 NOV		Maj Gen J.S. LETHBRIDGE, CBE, MC, and party visit area to discuss standard and special equipment, and to investigate the suitability of the ATHERTON area for jungle training. They will remain until 14 Nov.	
	GOC	1330 met at MAREEBA by Maj Gen J.S. STEVENS, GOC 6 Aust Div.	
		1615 entertained Maj Gen LETHBRIDGE.	
11 NOV	GOC	in company with Maj Gen LETHBRIDGE watched exercises and training in the area of 6 Aust Div.	
12 NOV		A discussion was held on Combined Operations at HQ 6 Aust Div, attended by GOC.	
13 NOV	GOC	with Maj Gen LETHBRIDGE watches jungle shoot by RAA 6 Aust Div.	
18 NOV		Maj Gen SIMPSON, SO-in-C and Brig EDWARDS visit 1 Aust Corps area.	
		Conference at HQ 1 Aust Corps concerning ship to shore training of 6 Aust Div and the Australian Beach Group. Officers present: Representatives from Adv LHQ, HQ 1 Aust Corps, HQ 6 Aust Div and in addition Capt P.A. STEPHENS, USN and Comdr PEARSON, RAN.	
20 NOV		Lt Col WILLOUGHBY, Lt Col BRODIE, Lt Col READHEAD of the Lethbridge Mission arrived in the area to investigate respectively infantry training, artillery and armour as affected by jungle conditions.	
22 NOV		Lt Col WILLOUGHBY, Lt Col BRODIE, Lt Col READHEAD moved to CAIRNS area to discuss amphibious training with Lt Col WALKER.	

RRB.

FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 6 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP LOCAIRNS
SIG CENTRE ATHERTON

1 AUST CORPS 0 1312 13

SECRET	(.)	location	report	442
to	2100	hrs	13	xxx nov
(.)	adv	parties	HQ	23
aust	inf	bde	23	aust
inf	bde	sig	sec	7
aust	inf	bn	8	aust
inf	bn	2/103	LAD	now
KAIRI	area	(.)	E	sec
2/4	aust	dental	unit	KAIRI
to	1	AUST	CORPS	area
BARRINE	(.)	2/15	aust	fd
coy	det	2/155	aust	gen
tpt	coy	det	2/5	aust
sup	depot	pl	det	2/119
aust	bde	wkshops	det	6
aust	div	pro	coy	2/4
aust	pnr	bn	all	moved
previous	location	to	DEADMANS	GURNEY
(.)	ref	location	report	445
substitute	B sqn	for	A sqn	

R.R. Baldwin Capt

IMPORTANT
DRLS to remainder

FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP LOCATIONS
SIG CENTRE ASHERTON

1 AUST CORPS 0/520 16

SCRET	(.)	location	report	450
)	162100L	HQV 43	(.)	adv
)	6	AUST	DIV	TRINITY
LACH	(.)	2	PL	2/3
IST	RY	CONST	COY	MECH
NT	3	and	4	SECS
	AUST	ARMD	DIV	PRO
OY	2	AUST	BEACH	SIG
C	2	AUST	ORD	BEACH
T	B	COY	2/12	AUST
	AHB	2/4	AUST	PNR
all	DEADMAN'S	GULLY		

Copies to
A
Sigs
CSO
G III (Ops)
Extra Copy 6 Aust Div
Q(2)
War Diary (2)
File
Log

DEPOTANT to First Aust
Army
HEADQUARTERS DALS

Townshend
Capt

162252

War Diary

Army Form C.2128
(Adapted, Large)
(Pads of 100)
A.F. 20cm pads

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

TO FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST BTY 1 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP LOCAIRNS
SIG CENTRE ATHERTON

FROM 1 AUST CORPS | Originator's Number G 1321 | Date 17 | In Reply to Number

(Write horizontally)				
SECRET	(.)	location	report	451
to	172100L	NOV 43	(.)	units
23	AUST	INF	BDE	as
detailed	location	report	449	now
complete	KAIRI	area	(.)	acv
parties	1	AUST	BEACH	GP
HQ	and	228	AUST	LT
AA	BTY	and	228	AUST
LT	AA	BTY	WKSHOPS	DEADMAN'S
GULLY				

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means: (*(except)) wireless

Signature

* Originator may delete "except" and insert "including"

This message must be sent IN CYPHER if liable to interception or to fall into enemy hands.

Originator's instructions
Degree of priority
IMPORTANT to First Aust Army
REMAINDER DEIS

Time of origin

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

System In	Time In	Relays	Sender	System Out	Time Out	Relays	Sender	System Out	Time Out	Relays	Sender

1542 Log

MESSAGE FORM

To: FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP L OF C CAIRNS

From: 1 AUST CORPS 0 1343 30 ----

SECRET	(.)	location	report	456	to
302207L	NOV 43	(.)	HQ	3	AUST
DIV	HQ	RAA	3	AUST	DIV
202	AUST	LAD	3	AUST	DIV
SEC	RECEPTION	CAMP	KAIRI	(.)	det
1	AUST	CORPS	FD	CASH	OFFICE
BARRINE	(.)	det	2/155	AUST	GEN
TPT	COY	2/46	AUST	LAD	WONDECLA
(.)	2/7	AUST	CAV	(COMMANDO)	SQN
WONGABEL					

Copies to:- A 2 (2)
SIGS File
CSO War Diary
G III (Ops) Log
Extra Copy for 6 Aust Div

A.H. Lawlor Capt.

This message must be sent in Cipher if liable to interception or to fall into enemy hands.

Originator's Instructions
Degree of Priority

TOO 302202L

THI

IMPORTANT to FIRST AUST ARMY
REMAINDER D R L S

SECRET

Subject: GOC - 3 AUST DIV

HQ 1 Aust Corps
24 Nov 43

G/ 1301 /Ops

3 Aust Div
8 Aust Inf Bde
23 Aust Inf Bde
RAA 1 Aust Corps
2/9 Aust Cav Regt
7 Aust MG Bn

Copies to :-

GOC	DAMS
G (SD)	Legal
G (Int)	DDST
GE	DDOS
GSO	DDME
DA&QMG	File
A	War Diary
Q	

1. As from 250001L Nov 43 the following will come under comd 3 AUST DIV:

2/9 Aust Cav Regt and Sig Sec
HQ 23 Aust Inf Bde and Sig Sec ✓
7 Aust Inf Bn ✓
8 Aust Inf Bn ✓
7 Aust MG Bn ✓
2/82 Aust LAD
2/108 Aust LAD
316 Aust LAD
Det 12 Aust Div Postal Unit

2. The following units upon arrival will also come under comd 3 AUST DIV:

HQ 8 Aust Inf Bde and Sig Sec ✓
4 Aust Inf Bn ✓
30 Aust Inf Bn
35 Aust Inf Bn ✓
18 Aust Coy AASC
133 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk
133 Aust Bde Wkshops
251 Aust LAD
Det 2 Aust Div postal Unit

Detachments of certain of these units have already arrived but none of them are, as yet, complete in the area.

J.H. Kendall
Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

MESSAGE FORM

To: 3 AUST DIV

From 1 AUST CORPS O 1338 27

SECRET	(.)	add	8	AUST	FD
COY	to	list	of	units	in
para	2	our	G/1301/Ops	of	24 NOV 43

Copies to GOC
G (SD)
G (Int)
CE
CSO
DA&QMG
A
Q (2)
DAMS
Legal
DDST
DDOS
DDME
File
War Diary ✓

This message must be sent in Cipher if liable to interception or to fall into enemy hands.

Originator's IHstructions Degree of Priority

TOO 27/4 C.C.L

THI

E.R

S Appx "B"
C

GSI
1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 3

Compiled from information received
from 1200 hrs 29 Oct to 1200 hrs 6 Nov 43

1. Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols command.
2. A receipt is not required but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue.
3. All dates and times are Eastern Australian standard time.

PART I
OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

FINSCHHAFEN

Fighting in the KATIKA area has diminished during the past week and only clashes by our patrols testing the strength and dispositions of the enemy have been reported.

On 31 Oct, the Japanese were reported digging in 2½ miles west of KATIKA and a patrol on 2 Nov located a forward position 1½ miles west of the village.

Further north and NW, considerable enemy movement has been seen along the BONGA-WAREO track. On 31 Oct, patrols located an enemy ADS just west of BONGA and observed small parties of wounded moving east along the track to BONGA. As there has been no evidence of barge traffic to BONGA, it may be that the enemy is evacuating casualties from the vicinity by submarine.

Ration dumps were reported by our patrols about 2 miles SW of BONGA, where it is thought a staging area is located.

On 3 Nov, a company of Japanese was seen moving west along the track from BONGA to WAREO.

The track from WAREO which runs south to FIOR is reported held by 500 enemy. They were in positions sited so as to cover movement along the track.

On the SATELBERG track, there was renewed activity on 30 Oct when our troops drove the enemy from two positions 700 yards east of JIVEVAUENG and inflicted a number of casualties. Fighting continued in this area during the next four days and a number of enemy counter-attacks were repulsed. On 3 Nov, our forces made further slight progress and occupied a position just east of the village.

It was reported on 29 Oct that KWEMBUNG (approximately six miles south of SATELBERG) was occupied by a company of enemy.

LONG ISLAND

It was reliably reported on 30 Oct that the enemy had evacuated LONG Island. Several possible air strip sites and good landing beaches were stated to exist on the island, and fresh water is said to be obtainable.

RAMU VALLEY

Activity has been confined to patrolling, with occasional minor clashes. On 30 Oct, enemy artillery, from a position between YOKOPI and KANKIRO, shelled our troops six miles north of DUMPU and inflicted some casualties.

East of KESAWAI, small enemy parties are reported still in the area, evading our patrols.

On 30 Oct a patrol to the area 18 miles west of BOGADJIM reported that there was no sign of enemy occupation of the villages of ENAM, NAWAR, SAMAU, SILO and PUKTABLO.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA - KASTEEL RIVER

Some enemy interest is evidenced in the coastal area approximately 90 miles ESE of KAUKENAU, as a party of 20 Japanese and 100 Papuans had camped near the KASTEEL River during period 10/18 Oct. It is reliably reported that the enemy is still in the region of the TJENARA River (north of the KASTEEL River).

SOLOMONS

Allied forces landed on CHOISEUL and BOUGAINVILLE Islands during the past week.

On 28 Oct, a successful landing was made on the NW coast of CHOISEUL Island and the enemy were reported withdrawing north of the WARRIOR River (one mile SE of CHOISEUL BAY). In fighting at SANGIGAI on 30 Oct, 72 enemy were killed, but approximately 40 escaped to the SE. On 1 Nov small enemy parties moved inland near the VIVILAKI River (20 miles SE of CAPE ALEXANDER) and to the NW of MOUNT VASU (near VIVILAKI River). Our troops advanced north on 3 Nov and destroyed an enemy outpost north of WARRIOR River. The same day an enemy force landed from eight barges at the mouth of the VAVORA River (13¾ miles south by east of CAPE ALEXANDER) and caused our troops to withdraw slightly from NIJIKI (11¼ miles south by west of CAPE ALEXANDER).

On TREASURY Island, more than 100 enemy had been killed up to 30 Oct and it was reported on 2 Nov that mopping up was proceeding.

The landing on BOUGAINVILLE Island was made early on 1 Nov at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY (approximately half way up the west coast). Sporadic fighting continued during the following two days and up to nightfall on 2 Nov 135 enemy had been killed. The main Japanese force was reported at JABA (9½ miles SE by east of CAPE TOROKINA). Another Allied force landed on PURUATA Island (1500 yards west of CAPE TOROKINA). By 2 Nov mopping up operations were completed and 29 enemy had been killed.

(b) SEA - ENEMY

There have been numerous sightings of enemy convoys passing through the northern approach to the BISMARCK SEA between NEW HANOVER and the ADMIRALTY Islands.

This large scale shipping activity is apparently operating between Japanese bases in the CAROLINE Islands and RABAUL.

It seems likely that, apprehensive of further Allied moves, the enemy is making every endeavour to accelerate the arrival of supplies and reinforcements into NEW BRITAIN.

NEW IRELAND

The following is a list of vessels sighted in the vicinity of the northern approach to the BISMARCK SEA.

0200L/2 - One u/i vessel 77 miles south by west of KAVIENG course NW by west.

1400L/3 - One light cruiser, Three destroyers, Two freighter transports 5500/8500 tons each, One gunboat — 152 miles [illegible] of KAVIENG course SW

2135L/3 - One large transport 57 miles south by east of KAVIENG course SE.

0100L/4 - Two medium cargo vessels 32 miles WSW of KAVIENG course east.

0932L/4 - One hospital ship 170 miles NE by east of KAVIENG course SSE.

1815L/4 - One heavy cruiser, Two destroyers, One large cargo vessel — Approximately 150 miles north of KAVIENG course NE by north

1835L/4 - Three large merchant vessels and three destroyers 229 miles NE of KAVIENG course SW.

NEW HANOVER

20551/4 - Ten unidentified vessels 32 miles south of CAPE HATAHALEH.

ST MATTHIAS GROUP

Between 30 Oct - 2 Nov three small convoys were seen off this island group.

At 1315L/4 a convoy of considerable interest was sighted 93 miles NNW of CAPE SIMPSONS on a SW course. It consisted of -

Five heavy cruisers
Three light cruisers
Five destroyers
One 6000 ton whaling ship
Two corvettes
Three 4/7500 ton freighters

NEW BRITAIN

RABAUL

Photographs were taken of SIMPSON Harbour prior to the heavy air attack on 2 Nov.

As they did not include the cruiser anchorage, they cannot be considered complete but the following shipping was seen :-

Seven destroyers
One converted auxiliary destroyer tender
Two auxiliary minesweepers
Three submarines
Twenty merchant vessels totalling 9100 tons

It is estimated that on 2 Nov between the time the photographs were taken and the heavy air attack an additional 20,000 tons of shipping entered the harbour.

NEW GUINEA

There have been few sightings of enemy shipping off the coast of NEW GUINEA.

One 4/7500 ton freighter was seen at WEWAK on 29 Oct and two small freighters and seven barges at HANSA BAY on the same day.

Numerous barges were reported at ALEXISHAFEN on 28 Oct. On the same day a probable corvette was seen off SEK Island.

SOLOMONS

An enemy [illegible] force of 12 vessels was sighted 30 miles SSE of CAPE ST GEORGE on a course SE by south at 2215L/1.

The force attempted to reach EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY but was driven off twice by an Allied naval force.

Damage sustained by the enemy is reported to be -

SUNK - One cruiser and four destroyers
DAMAGED - Two cruisers and two destroyers

SUBMARINES

NEW BRITAIN

The northbound and two southbound submarines were seen off the south coast of NEW BRITAIN.

On 29 Oct a submarine was seen [illegible] by Dash 8I GASMATA.

Numerous sightings of submarines have been made off CAPE ST GEORGE.

NEW GUINEA

At 0325L/2 a submarine was seen 25 miles N by E of SIO.

A possible submarine was sighted off the mouth of the MASAWENG River.

(c) AIR - OWN

NEW GUINEA

Attacking enemy bases and supply lines, two forces of nine and one force of 17 Mitchells made bombing and strafing raids along the coast from ALEXISHAFEN to south of MADANG. A number of barges was destroyed and hits were scored on a jetty at DAMASA and a bridge over the MAKLEY River.

On 2 Nov Bostons and Vengeances attacked barge hideouts at NAMBARIWA and enemy positions at FORTIFICATION POINT reporting that all targets were well covered.

A successful interception of 57/65 enemy fighters and bombers was made by 16 of our fighters between SAMUAK BAY and SATELBERG on 28 Oct. Twelve enemy aircraft were destroyed for certain and seven probably.

NEW BRITAIN

RABAUL has received a further battering from our bombers in a series of daylight raids.

On 29 Oct, 41 Liberators escorted by 75 Lightnings attacked VUNAKANAU airfield, destroying in combat and on the ground 47 enemy aircraft. A large ammunition dump was also exploded.

Shortly after midday on 2 Nov, a force of 75 bombers and 80 fighters made a highly successful low level attack on the airfield at LAKUNAI and shipping in the harbour. The following results have been reported :-

Seventy-eight aircraft destroyed on the ground and in the air.

Vessels sunk : One light or heavy cruiser
Three destroyers
One 9/12000 ton transport
Three 5500/7500 ton freighter transports
Two merchant vessels (one 5000 tons, one 2/3000 tons)
Two 500/1000 ton stack aft vessels
Four luggers.

Vessels damaged: Two 1700/1900 ton stack aft vessels
One destroyer
One heavy cruiser
One 7000/10,300 ton tanker
One 7/9000 ton transport
Two 7/8,500 ton freighter transports
Four 5500/7500 ton freighters
One large transport or tanker.

In addition five medium to large merchant vessels were probably damaged.

TOBERA airfield was attacked three times at night by small forces of Beauforts.

NEW IRELAND

Harassing night raids on KAVIENG airfield were carried out on four nights of the past week by small forces of Catalinas. Hits were claimed on the runways and dispersal areas and explosions and fires caused.

SOLOMONS

Large scale attacks were carried out against enemy installations in the SOLOMONS as preliminary to and in support of recent Allied landings at CHOISEUL, TREASURY and BOUGAINVILLE Islands.

More than 1000 sorties were made between 26 Oct and 3 Nov; the main targets were the airfields at KAHILI, KARA, KIETA, BALIALE, BUKA and BONIS. In addition shipping in TONOLEI Harbour received attention and several small cargo vessels were hit and left burning and a number of barges destroyed.

ATTACKS ON SHIPPING

With the recent increase in enemy shipping activity, our armed reconnaissance units have been provided with numerous targets. The following results of attacks carried out during the past week in the NE and NW sectors have been reported :-

SUNK

One cruiser
One merchant vessel or tanker 6/10,000 tons
One transport 7/9000 tons
One freighter 1000 tons

DAMAGED

One destroyer
One merchant vessel 5/10,000 tons
One cargo vessel 5,000 tons
One " " large (probably sunk)
One " " 500/1000 tons (beached)
One sea-plane tender small

NW AREA

On 25 Oct following the report of a small Japanese force at JAPERO, three medium units bombed and strafed the area. Fires were started in several newly constructed huts.

In a successful attack on the nickel mines at POMELAA (CELEBES) on 1 Nov, tanks of the concentrating plant were reported probably damaged.

Targets in the ARCE Islands and CERAM have also been attacked by small forces.

AIR - ENEMY

With the exception of an attack against Allied shipping off BOUGAINVILLE I the scale of enemy air effort has been negligible over the past week. A small force dropped bombs harmlessly in the BUNA-PORT HARVEY area on night 28/29 Oct and again on the following day. Our light surface vessels were attacked at LANGEMAK BAY on morning 4 Nov, but no damage or casualties resulted.

In the SOLOMONS, 70 enemy aircraft attacked Allied naval vessels 40 miles SW of CAPE MOLTKE (BOUGAINVILLE) on 2 Nov. Intercepting fighters shot down 10/12 of the raiders but no other details are yet available.

PART II

6. EQUIPMENT

JAPANESE 75 mm TYPE 94 (1934) MOUNTAIN GUN

Details and characteristics accompanied by photographic and diagrammatic reproductions of this weapon have been extracted from a report recently published by Ordnance Intelligence Section USASOS and are attached as Appendix "A" and "A(i)" respectively.

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Series No 63,

JAPANESE 50 mm MORTAR BOMB -SMOKE - AIR BURST TYPE.

Photographic reproductions and description of the Japanese 50 mm Mortar Bomb: Smoke - Air Burst Type, are attached as Appendices "B" and "B(i)" respectively.

(NGF Intelligence Summary No 143)

7. TACTICS

(a) JAPANESE BARGES-FIXED ARMAMENT

The first evidence of the installation of fixed armament on Japanese barges was provided by a captured undated mimeographed book presumably belonging to a member of an SNLF when at SALAMAU.

An annotated sketch in this book depicted a type "A" barge with a machine cannon forward, a 13 mm MG in the centre and a 7.7mm MG aft. The latter had a traverse of 120° while the central MG was limited to a similar traverse on either side of the barge. Fixed platforms were shown as fitted for the MGs and the cannon.

Although fixed mountings have not been encountered to date on any barges, it is possible that armament as described above may be adopted in the future.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary No 144)

(b) BOOBY TRAPS

Although to date the Japanese have not systematically mined or planted booby traps on any appreciable scale in evacuated areas, there is a definite increase in the number of such items encountered. According to a PW captured at SALAMAU, the most common booby traps were either hand grenades which exploded when objects attached to them were removed or mines concealed by branches on foot tracks.

During the operations at LAE variations of these devices were encountered. Two or three cases were reported in which brightly coloured rounds of ammunition were connected to booby traps. The use of documents and equipment as booby trap lures was described in First Aust Army Intelligence Summary No 75. Another type of anti- personnel device consisted of detonators attached to signal wires. The detonators were apperently intended to explode when the wires were trodden on or run through the hand.

There have been several variations of a simple device employing the hand grenade as the bursting charge. One of these variations is illustrated in Appendix "C" to this Summary. A length of pipe or tubing or a shell case is set

into the ground and an armed hardgrenade is suspended upside down in the top of the tube by means of a loosely fitting transverse retaining pin, as illustrated. A second type of suspension has been reported in which the grenade is supported by the retaining pin which passes beneath the body of the grenade.

The retaining pin is connected to a trip wire, souvenir or window so that slight pull will withdraw the pin, allowing the grenade to drop to the bottom of the tube, where it explodes on impact.

A man standing 10 feet away from the explosion of one of these booby traps was unharmed, so that they may possibly be used rather as a warning device.

However, the burst charge has been stepped up in some cases by placing the grenade in a tin can with the striker protruding through the bottom. The can was then packed with a plastic explosive and suspended as before.

What to look for:-

(i) Upright pipes or tubes in the ground.

(ii) Pieces of string or wire, either loose or taut.

(iii) Documents or equipment with cord or wire attached.

(iv) Watches, fountain pens or any other attractive souvenir.

To disarm the trap:

(i) If buried, remove the earth cover.

(ii) Remove the tin cover.

(iii) Support the grenade carefully while withdrawing the supporting pin, then lift out the grenade.

(iv) Carefully remove the flexible brass fuse cover and take out the striker and creep spring.

(H.Q. First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 78)

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

BURMA

There has been no change in the general situation, but Japanese pressure continues on Chinese elements in the SALWEEN RIVER area east and NE of TENGCHUNG. Enemy movement is reported east of KUNLONG (112 miles south by east of TENGCHUNG).

Photographic reconnaissance shows the SIAM-BURMA railway from THANBUZAYAT (38 miles SSE of MOULMEIN) to WANG-GA. Free Siamese in CHUNGKING state that the section KANCHANI (70 miles NW of BANGKOK) to WANG-GA was completed early in July.

In the SALWEEN area a fresh Japanese advance by three enemy columns is meeting slight opposition. One column is advancing from TENGCHUNG, and the other two columns are advancing from LA (12 miles SW of HTAWGAW). One of these columns has moved eastwards to LUSHUI (28 miles east by north of HTAWGAW). The situation is still not clear, but two Chinese Divisions in the area east and NE of TENGCHUNG are reported to have withdraw to the east bank of SALWEEN RIVER.

On 18 Oct a Chinese report stated that enemy troops were crossing the SALWEEN RIVER at KUNLUNG and moving east towards KENGTUNG (50 miles NE of KUNLONG).

In the [illegible] HILLS area there is constant patrol activity. One company of our troops attacked enemy positions half a mile west of NGALZANG (five miles SE of FORT WHITE), but met strong opposition and failed to make progress. However a considerable number of casualities was inflicted on the enemy at close quarters. Our force sustained some casualities.

On the DUTHIDAUNG - MAUNGDAW front the usual patrol activity continues.

On 19 Oct our artillery engaged an enemy position two miles south of ZEGANBYIN (four miles east of MAUNGDAW).

On the night of 20/21 Oct our patrol from TEKNAF crossed the NAF RIVER, penetrated to GODUSARA (five miles SSE of MAUNGDAW), and returned without loss.

The situation is temporarily stabilised in this area.

(HQ First Aust Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 78)

RUSSIA

Attached as appendix "D" is a map showing operations on the Russian front compiled from information received to 28 Oct 43.

PART V

SECURITY

The following is extracted from War Office Weekly Intelligence Review 7 Sep 43 :-

IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFICATIONS

(a) If anyone should ask what is the object of risking men's lives for the sake of gaining indentifications, the final offensive which broke through to TUNIS should provide the answer for all time. The selection of the point for the main thrust was based largely on our knowledge.

(i) that the two battalions opposing us here were weak and not of the first quality;

(ii) that the main TUNIS road was on inter-divisional boundary, and

(iii) that the immediate reserves had just been transferred to another part of the front.

The casualities saved to our forces by this knowledge, which was gained entirely by identifications and by familiarity with German units, cannot be over-estimated.

(b) Information concerning forthcoming operations was withheld from the men until about two days before D day. Our projects were less liable to leak out through indiscreet talking (for there were few people outside their own ranks with whom Guardsmen could converse) than through intelligent observation of our movements by the enemy, and information taken by Arab spies. Vast harbours of dummy tanks were devised to mislead the enemy, and divisions were concentrated for an assault as far back as possible. The success of these measures may be judged from the fact that after our breakthrough by two infantry divisions, followed by two armoured divisions, on a front of 4,000 yards, the enemy admitted that he had expected the blow to fall several miles to the South.

(AAF Weekly Intelligence Review No 65)

PEN FRIENDS

Recently the main breach of Censorship Regulations has been the practice of troops writing to "Pen Friends", especially in other countries.

It is apparent that troops do not realise the dangers that such correspondence incurs, and additionally that franking officers, who pass these letters are not aware of their duty in this regard.

Original letters to "Pen Friends" are easily recognized and usually are rather stereotypedin the first sentence:-

" You probably wonder who is writing to you, but whilst I was on leave recently I met Elmer BROWN, who gave me your address."

" I found your address in a chocolate wrapping, and thought I would write you a note."

Such addresses come from numerous sources- advertisements, enclosures in anything from a uniform pocket to an ammunition box, by word of mouth.

Troops should be told why they should not write to people they do not know personally and in addition all franking officers should at all times destroy such letters.

(HQ [illegible] Army Weekly Intelligence Summary No 78)

Brian Peters Capt

GS 1 Aust Corps

S E C R E T

DISTRIBUTION 1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

	Copy No
6 Aust Div	1-31
2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	32
2/9 Aust Cav Regt	33
7 Aust MG Bn	34
HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	35-39
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps Tps	40
A Aust Corps Sigs	42
18 Aust Fd Amb	42
109 Aust CCS	43
5 A/C Sqn	44
GOC	45
BGS	46
G(O)	47
G(I)	48-51
LOs	52
CCRA	53
CE	54
CSO	55
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When this Distribution List has been perused, please destroy by fire.

APPENDIX "A"

1 Aust. Corps Int. Summary No. 3

JAPANESE 75 mm TYPE 94 (1934) MOUNTAIN GUN

The following information together with photographs and diagrams of this weapon, has been extracted from a report prepared by Ordnance Intelligence Sec, USASOS.

When the Japanese mountain artillery was reorganised, the original mountain gun, Model 41 (1908) was withdrawn and reissued to infantry regiments, the type 94 taking its place.

It has been employed during the NEW GUINEA and SPA operations wherever the terrain would permit and observations to date would indicate that this weapon is the only 75 mm mobile artillery piece to be brought to and used in these theatres.

DESCRIPTION:

The gun examined was manufactured at OSAKA Arsenal in 1938 and is designed for rapid assembly, disassembly and carriage by pack animals, either horses or mules. It could be transported by manpower but some of the parts are very heavy and transportation of the gun over long distances and rough country would be an arduous and heavy job. When assembled, the gun can be drawn by horses, mules or manpower over short distances by attaching traces or drag-ropes to the spades.

SHIELD: The shield is in two pieces and is locked together centrally. It is made of 1/8 in armour plate and no provision is made for aprons.

BARREL: The barrel is of single piece construction held to the breech by three sets of 60° interrupted threads.

BREECH BLOCK: The breech block is of the horizontal sliding type and its operation, together with the firing of the gun, is performed on the right side.

RECOIL AND RECUPERATOR SYSTEM: The recoil and recuperator system is of the hydro-pneumatic type consisting of oil and air cylinders, somewhat similar to the British Mks 11 and 17 18 pdr guns.

CARRIAGE: The carriage and axle assembly contains the elevating and traversing mechanism and provides a mount for the recoil and recuperator system, breech and barrel assemblies.

TRAIL: The trails are of unusually long, split, tube type, with fixed [illegible] and adjusting spades.

WHEELS: Are of the wooden artillery type fitted with steel rims and plain steel axles.

SIGHTS: No sights were observed with the weapon but the sight mount indicates that a telescopic sight, with a central cross-hair reticle is used.

RANGE INDICATOR: Is consumated as an integral part of the sight and graduated in metres from 600 to 2400. With the cross-levelling bubble in the centre of its run, the pointer on the range scale is set at 1200 metres

The maximum range of this weapon is not known but it is considered to be possibly between 5000 to 7000 yards. Until these weapons have been proof-fired, the muzzle velocity will be an unknown quantity but this information will be published per medium of Technical Intelligence Summary at a later date.

DISASSEMBLY FOR PACK LOADS: The weapon is broken down into eleven pack assemblies for transportation, as shown diagrammatically on the photographic appendix.

GENERAL INFORMATION:

The only type of ammunition recovered and examined is HE, but it is thought that possibly AP can also be used. Instantaneous percussion fuses have been the only type found with this ammunition, but it is now known that two types of percussion fuses are in existence, one of which, possibly has a short delay. The complete round weighs 16.75 lbs and, less fuse, is 22 inches long, the shell case being 11 inches and the projectile 12 inches long.

Because of the construction of the recoil system, the recuperation takes approximately 5 seconds and the maximum rate of fire is reported to be 10-12 rounds per minute. This rate is considered to be too high however, and the correct rate will no doubt be established when the weapon is proofed.

The weight of the barrel, breech and recoil assemblies make recuperation comparatively slow when firing at angles over 30 degrees, and it is reported that the weapon rarely fires over angles of 30 degrees, the weapon being run-up and moved forward instead.

Porter bars are reported to be used to assist in loading and unloading the assemblies from pack animals because of the small stature of the Japanese.

Two aiming posts are supplied with gun, one red and one white, but it is also reported that only one of these is generally used; this only applies to light field pieces however. Provision is made on the aiming posts for the installation of an apparatus illuminating aiming post and a type of Battery Picket or guide light.

It is reported that air is introduced into the recuperator cylinder by means of a hand pump, when necessary, and a pressure of 160 atmospheres is used. This pressure, however, is considered to be excessively high.

A recent report states that a later model of this weapon is now being manufactured. The main difference appears to be in the elevating wheel and mechanism which are built and operated from the right side. Integral with the elevating gear is the range drum. This weapon is also known as the Type 94.


It is believed that a crew of five men are required to operate this weapon. One to operate the sights, two to open and close the breech and fire the gun by means of a lanyard, three to load the gun, whilst four and five are purely ammunition numbers.

(ABF Review No 65)


APPENDIX "A" (1)
1 Aust. Corps Int. Summary No. 3 ~~APPENDIX B (i)~~

JAPANESE 75mm. "TYPE 94" (1934)

MOUNTAIN GUN




PACK LOADS




BARREL - WT. 206 LBS.



BREECH - WT. 82 LBS.




SHIELDS *(Two Parts)* WT. 48 LBS.





CRADLE, BUFFER and RECUPERATOR ASSEMBLY-WT. 207 LBS

RIGHT TRAIL *(Plus Spade)* WT. 131 LBS.




LEFT TRAIL *(Plus Spade)* WT. 138 LBS.






WHEELS *(Each)* WT. 76 LBS



CARRIAGE — WT. 209 LBS.



CHARACTERISTICS

Calibre	75mm (2.95 in)
Weight (overall)	1183 lbs.
Length of Barrel (less breech)	5 ft. 1 1/4 ins.
Length of Trails	8 ft. 8 ins.
Elevation	44.3 degrees
Depression	10.5 degrees approx.
Traverse	21 degrees right 20 " left
Breech	Horizontal Sliding Type
Sights	Periscopic Type
Recoil	Buffer and recuperator System - Oil and Air
Length of Recoil	22 in. (maximum)
Range Indicator	Disc type incorporated into sight


Reproduced by 1 Aust. Mob. Lilho. Sec. (AIF) Aust. Svy. Corps.


ADV/MISC/5081

GSI (a) ADV LHQ

JAPANESE MORTAR BOMB
SMOKE AIRBURST

50 MM





ACTUAL SIZE

G.S.I. FIRST AUST ARMY
(FROM G.S.I. N.G.F.)

REPRODUCED BY 6 AUST ARMY TOPO SURVEY COY AIF. OCT '43

Appendix " B(1) "
HQ 1 Aust Corps
Intelligence Summary No 3

JAPANESE 50 mm MORTAR BOMB- SMOKE-AIR BURST TYPE

GENERAL DESCRIPTION

Nineteen of these weapons were recovered from dumps in LAE area during visit of Technical Officer G7, 20-28 Sep 43. The bomb is identical in outward appearance to HE bomb projectile from Japanese Type 89 Grenade Discharger except for time fuze and markings on body.

CHARACTERISTICS

Weight:	2 lbs 5 ozs.
Overall Length:	5¾ inches
Diameter:	1.97 inches-50 mm
Filling:	Smoke mixture
Markings:	Body painted black
	Red ring around nose
	Two white bands on body
Copper Band:	5/8 inches
Fuse:	Nose time fuze- air burst

CONSTRUCTION

The body is of steel, made up of four component parts which screw together to make one complete unit.

(a) The shoulder, which is threaded to take nose time fuze and which is screwed into main body, does not contain normal aluminium cup but is fitted with a steel plate 3/16" thick. The plate, presumably to break the force of explosion, has four flash ports 1/16" diameter.

(b) The main body, to which the shoulder is screwed, contains a small smoke generator, constructed of brass. The generator 1-9/16 " diameter x 2-5/16" long, is held in position by two semi cylindrical steel sleeves. Brass lugs hold two brass plates in position in top of generator. Each plate has seven emission ports. A thin layer of black powder is packed between the plates. Beneath central part of lower plate is an aluminium cup of ignition mixture probably composed mainly of magnesium powder. This extends half an inch into smoke mixture which appears to be a berger type.

(c) Fitted into base of main body and held in position by four small screws, is cylindrical plug with a hemispherical aluminium cup. A piece of hempen string 19" long is attached to two brass loops, one on base of generator, the other in base of hemispherical aluminium cup. A metal disc in two segments fits against base of generator.

(d) The base section which contains the propellent charge screws on to the base of the cylindrical plug.

FUZE

Description

The fuze consists of a conical shaped brass body segregated into nose cap (A) ; two powder train rings (B.C) ; graduated ring, magazine and ignition tube (D) ; housing striker assembly.

Action

It is a time fuze of powder ring variety functioning on acceleration of the projectile up the bore. The train is regulated by co-ordinating rings B.C with graduated ring D. (23 graduations). Due to upward thrust, striker compresses creep spring sufficiently to detonate cap providing flash to ignite powder ring train. Powder train ignites explosive in gaine magazine which ignites primary and secondary burning mixtures in generator.

ACTION OF BOMB

Generally the constructional details of bomb are interesting and unusual. Presumably it is an air burst, base ejection type.

The explosive thrust from charges in gaine magazine and between the brass plates should be sufficient to eject the smoke generator by shearing the four screws which connect base of shell to main body.

The hemispherical aluminium cup and hempen string are presumably for purpose of ensuring that the generator falls with the smoke emission holes toward the ground. This would tend to accelerate the burning of the smoke mixture.


COMMENT

It is considered that this type of mortar bomb has been designed especially for ranging by Type 89 Grenade Discharger in Jungle Warfare. The air burst time fuze allows the ejected smoke generator to function above the trees.

No experiments have been carried out in the field, but initial samples have been forwarded to Allied Equipment Board for testing.

(HGF Intelligence Summary No 143)

-JAPANESE-BOOBY-TRAP-



SCALE

ACTUAL SIZE

FROM NG FORCE WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY 144

REPRODUCED BY 6 AUST ARMY TOPO SVY COY A.I.F. NOV '43.

GSI (a) ADV. LHQ 29 OCT. 43

OPERATIONS – RUSSIAN FRONT

AS AT 28 OCT. 43

(Compiled from all available sources including the press)

LEGEND

FURTHERMOST GERMAN ADVANCE

SITUATION AS AT 5 JULY 43

SITUATION AS AT 28 OCT. 43

LINE OF RUSSIAN THRUSTS

STATUTE MILES

0 50 100 200 300

NORWAY
SWEDEN
FINLAND
BALTIC SEA
GULF OF FINLAND
LAKE ONEGA
LAKE LADOGA
MURMANSK
WHITE SEA
ARCHANGEL
LENINGRAD
ESTONIA
LAKE PEIPUS
PSKOV
RIGA
LATVIA
LAKE ILMEN
STARAYA RUSSA
LITHUANIA
EAST PRUSSIA
VELIKIE LUKI
NEVEL
POLOTSK
VITEBSK
SMOLENSK
KALININ
VOLGA
RZHEV
STANTZA
WARSAW
MINSK
MORISOV
VIAZMA
MOSCOW
VLADIMIR
GORKI
MOHILEV
ROSLAVL
KALUGA
BOBRUISK
TULA
POLAND
BRYANSK
GOMEL
OREL
LWOW
YELETS
KONOTOP
KURSK
KIEV
VORONEZH
SUMY
LUBNI
BYELGOROD
DNIESTER
BUG
RIVER
DNIEPER
CHERKASI
POLTAVA
KHARKOV
KREMENCHUNG
DNEPROPETROVSK
PAVLOGRAD
KRIVOI-ROG
MILLEROVO
RUMANIA
ZAPOROZHE
STALINO
STALINGRAD
ODESSA
NIKOLAEV
KHERSON
MELITOPOL
MARIUPOL
TAGANROG
DON
ROSTOV
BUCHAREST
SEA OF AZOV
KERCH
SEVASTOPOL
BLACK SEA
ELISTA
CASPIAN SEA

ADMIR CJ5077

REPRODUCED BY CAUST MOBILITHO SEC (AUST) AUST SVY CORPS

0010247

War Diary (G)

Appx "C"

SECRET
Copy No 63

GSI

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 4

Compiled from information received
from 1200 hrs 6 Nov 43 to 1200 hrs 13 Nov 43

1. Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols command.
2. A receipt is not required but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue.
3. All dates and times are Eastern Australian standard time.

PART I
OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - SWA AND BISMY

FINSCHHAFEN

Fighting in this area has been on a small scale, but our forces, in several clashes on the SATTELBERG track, have driven the enemy from positions, which he had held for a considerable time, east of JIVEVANENG. Our patrols 1500 yards west and NW of this village, on 10 Nov, located enemy positions, which were engaged by artillery.

SIGI is now clear of the enemy but a patrol on 7 Nov located and attacked Japanese positions astride the track 900 yards NW of KUMAWA. The same day, there was a further clash when an enemy post three miles west of GURUNGOR was engaged.

Our perimeter west and NW of MATMA has been slightly enlarged.

Further north, considerable movement of armed and unarmed enemy parties, the latter usually carrying large packs, has been observed both ways along the BONGA-WAREO track. It seems that the Japanese may be developing a line north of our positions, to prevent any possible thrust up the coast by our forces. The stiff resistance which is being met in the area generally makes it obvious that he intends to sell dearly his bases on the RAI Coast.

RAMU VALLEY

Ground activity has been slight, but our patrols have penetrated north as far as KUMAU, about six miles NW of the previous limit of our patrolling. Fifty enemy were encountered at this village, but UMILAI, KEPSAU and JOBSO, villages in the vicinity, were reported clear.

Another patrol occupied a position less than two miles SE of [redacted], overlooking the main Japanese L of C.

A small enemy force which was contacted in the KERRINGGE area on 6 Nov, was attacked and dispersed by one of our patrols the next day, after suffering casualties.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Further evidence of enemy interest in the coastal area east of KAUKENAU has been received during the week.

It was reported on 10 Nov that AIKA village (23 miles ESE KAUKENAU) was occupied by 200 Japanese and 10 Dutch of unknown type. INOREP village (32 miles east by south KAUKENAU) is occupied by 10 to 12 enemy, who are training the natives in rifle shooting.

SOLOMONS

BOUGAINVILLE I

Early on 7 Nov, an enemy force estimated at 300 landed from barges near the LAKUNA River (six miles NNW of CAPE TOROKINA) and at ATSINIMA BAY (a mile further west). Our troops immediately attacked this force and killed 150, without loss to

On 10 Nov, our forces were reported to be no longer in contact with the enemy, who has positions near PIVA and in the JAB. River vicinity.

Attached as Appendix "D" is a map of BOUGAINVILLE and adjacent islands.

TREASURY I

Enemy resistance is virtually ended on TREASURY I, and only small isolated parties remain. Nine of 10 Japanese contacted on 6 Nov were either killed or captured and on 8 Nov our troops killed a further 12 in a cave half a mile west of SOLOMTALAU.

CHOISEUL I

On 4 Nov, the enemy were reported to be located at MOLI I, NUKIKI and in the vicinity of the WARRIOR River, while a force of 1000 is believed to be in the KAKASA area. Barge activity was heard throughout the night 4/5 Nov, and the enemy may have landed supplies and reinforcements.

Scattered enemy parties were reported on the west coast on 8 Nov, located mainly in the bush.

SHORTLAND I

On 9 Nov, an Allied patrol contacted 200 Japanese on GOMAI I (off SW coast of SHORTLAND I).

(b) SEA - ENEMY

RABAUL

Intense shipping activity, particularly in cruiser and destroyer forces, continues in the waters around NEW BRITAIN.

Convoys en route to RABAUL have been targets for Allied aircraft and damage to both naval and merchant shipping has resulted.

A preliminary interpretation of photographs taken on 9 Nov shows 35 units in the harbour.

Undamaged vessels :

Two light cruisers	Five submarines
13 destroyers	Four 4000 ton merchant vessels
	One tanker

Vessels apparently damaged :

One heavy cruiser	One large merchant vessel
One destroyer	Two medium vessels
One destroyer tender	One 7000 ton freighter transport
Two merchant vessels	One lugger

NEW BRITAIN

Regular movement along the north coast of NEW BRITAIN is reported and many sightings have been made off the WITU Islands. During the period 23/31 Oct 17 ships were observed to pass UBILI during the night on a westerly course.

On 5 Nov two submarines were attacked off GASMATA but no apparent damage was caused.

NEW GUINEA

The process of reinforcing MADANG from WEWAK appears to have ceased for the time being, and generally little shipping has been observed off the coast of NEW GUINEA.

On 5 Nov however, a vessel was seen in WEWAK harbour and three others in the vicinity.

Barge traffic from SIO to the east continues despite the heavy damage inflicted by our light surface vessels.

Many enemy barges have been destroyed and hits were scored on two submarines near BLUCHER POINT.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Two interesting sightings were made on 8 Nov when 5 freighters were seen off MANIWA and 3 unidentified vessels sighted in the BABO area.

AMBON

Three large, four medium vessels and 33 small craft were reported to be in AMBON Harbour on 5 Nov.

CELEBES

On night 5/6 Nov one large vessel and four possible minesweepers were reported at KENDARI.

SOLOMONS

BOUGAINVILLE

Early on the morning of 7 Nov an enemy task force was sighted WNW of CAPE HOLTZE on a SSW course. It consisted of two light cruisers and five destroyers. No further reports on the movement of this force have been received.

Photographs taken at BUKA on 6 Nov revealed two cargo vessels and 28 barges whilst on the following day 71 barges and 3 small craft were photographed in the vicinity.

SUBMARINES

The absence of sightings off the south coast of NEW BRITAIN may indicate a change of route for enemy submarines.

The more logical supply line via the north coast has apparently become necessary due to

(a) our control of the VITIAZ Straits

(b) The precarisusness of the Japanese positions south of FORTIFICATION POINT.

That traffic continues is evidenced by an attack by our light surface units on two submarines at BLUCHER POINT on 5 Nov and a sighting of a submarine off GAROVE Island on 8 Nov.

On 5 Nov a submarine was seen off KIRIWINA Island and on 11 Nov one was seen on a SE course off SANGIGAI.

NEW HANOVER

A late report states that a convoy of 15 or more vessels was sighted approximately 57 miles west of TINGWON I (40 miles west of NEW HANOVER) at 1210L/12 hours, course not stated.

The convoy consisted of :

One battleship	One 7/9000 ton transport
Two heavy cruisers	Three 5500/7000 ton freighter transports
Seven destroyers	One unidentified vessel

(c) AIR - OWN

NEW GUINEA

The growing enemy base at ALEXISHAFEN has received considerable attention from our bombers during the week, when four low level attacks were made on the airfields by strong forces of medium bombers. As a result of our operations in this area and over MADANG 51 enemy aircraft were destroyed in combat and on the ground and 14 probably destroyed or damaged. In addition the airfields were thoroughly bombed and strafed, buildings destroyed and fires started.

Other attacks were made on villages and barge hideouts along the coast between ALEXISHAFEN and MADANG. A strike was also made on the enemy staging point of HAMBARIVA (HUON PENINSULA).

Direct support was given to our ground troops when a strong force of medium bombers attacked enemy positions in the UPPER EARI Valley. Our troops identified the targets for our aircraft by the use of smoke.

In sweeps and interceptions in the localities of SAIDOR and MADZAB, our fighters shot down at least 26 enemy aircraft.

NEW BRITAIN

Further heavy daylight strikes have been made on RABAUL harbour and airfields by heavy and dive bombers, and once again shipping in the harbour has suffered considerable damage, while the enemy has also lost heavily when fighters attempted interception.

In five daylight attacks between 5 and 11 Nov, the following damage was inflicted :

Shipping

Five heavy and one light cruisers hit by both bombs and torpedoes (one heavy cruiser blew up).
One heavy cruiser and two destroyers hit by torpedoes.
One light cruiser hit by bombs.
U/i vessel received direct hit.
A light cruiser received a probable hit.

Aircraft (on ground and in combat)

66 certain
18 probably

In addition, the strips were accurately bombed, fires started, buildings destroyed and damaged, and hits scored on wharves and fuel dumps.

Night attacks were made by forces of Beauforts.

SOLOMONS

Enemy airfields on BOUGAINVILLE Island received a further heavy pounding during the week, and so effective were the attacks that at least two of the fields - at BUKA and BONIS - were rendered unserviceable. Judging by the small scale of the enemy's effort in the SOLOMONS, at a time when excellent targets have been readily available to him, it seems that our persistent attacks are gradually rendering all the BOUGAINVILLE and BUKA strips untenable.

In addition to these strikes, enemy ground positions in EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area have been attacked, while shipping has also received attention. Vessels known to have been sunk include a destroyer, a corvette, six small to medium cargo vessels and a number of barges.

NW AREA

On night 9 Nov, 14 Liberators made the long trip to SOURABAYA, and unloaded 41½ tons of bombs, and also incendiaries, on the naval base there and the hanger and barracks area at TANDJOENG and the PERAK airfield. Results were not observed due to bad weather.

Near KAIMANA, a Liberator scored a direct hit on a 1000/1500 freighter transport.

AIR - ENEMY

Feature of the enemy's air effort during the week has been a number of attacks on our air strips in the RAMU Valley and at MADZAB. Although the number of aircraft employed was not large, some damage was done to our grounded aircraft, and it is apparent that the enemy views with concern our rapid development of strips in this area.

In the SOLOMONS, 30/40 torpedo bombers escorted by fighters attacked Allied shipping 25 miles SW of EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY on 8 Nov. No details of the attack have been received, but it is known that seven enemy aircraft were destroyed and seven probably destroyed.

PART II

1. ENEMY COL-LAND

Attached as Appendix "A" is an estimate by ADV HQ of enemy strengths in the SWPA as at 3 Nov 43.

2. ENEMY COB-AIR

Estimate of enemy land based air strength as at 5 Nov showing comparative totals (1) 26 Oct, (2) one month ago, (3) three months ago, are as follows :-

AREAS	-	2/E F	L/B H/B	T/B & D/B	F/B	F/P	Trans & Obsn	5/11	x Comparatives 1	2	3
SE AREA											
NEW BRITAIN	150	15	49	-	2	12	8	236	172	256	292
NEW IRELAND	18	-	4	17	-	12	-	51	34	29	43
NEW GUINEA	46	6	70	-	-	6	6	134	170	[illegible]	172
SOLOMONS	10	-	-	-	-	15	-	25	52	122	102
Area Totals	224	21	123	17	2	45	14	446	428	573	609
NW AREA											
TIMOR	22	2	18	-	-	-	-	42	42	42	42
AMBON	6	-	9	-	3	15	-	33	33	33	25
AROE & KAI IS	6	3	3	-	-	6	-	18	18	20	25
DUTCH NG	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	9	9	6
CELEBES	18	-	24	-	-	9	26	77	77	77	84
JAVA-BALI	47	-	27	12	9	24	18	137	110	158	159
Area Totals	117	5	81	12	12	54	44	325	289	339	341
TOTALS	341	26	204	29	14	99	58	771	717	912	950

x Comparative totals in last three columns may reflect previous strength at locations now unoccupied by enemy aircraft.

(Extracted from RAAF Intelligence Summary No 79)

6. EQUIPMENT

(a) PATROL DETECTOR EQUIPMENT

In a recent translation of an enemy operation order, reference is made under "Organisational Equipment" to the "siren and patrol detector equipment" being brought forward to a certain area with the unit baggage.

Many forms of equipment capable of detecting patrols could be conjured up in the mind of anyone with a colourful imagination. This equipment might range from the simple bully beef and jam tins tied to wire obstacles or it might be some form of trip wire joined up to bell, buzzer or signal lamp units, that would ring, buzz or flash on when any pressure was applied to the wire. Ingenious use might also be made of radio equipment such as microphones or sensitively tuned transmitter sets keyed to the frequency of a master receiver. Small sets of this nature could be placed on tracks, water points, observation posts, machine gun nests etc and transmit a quiet warning to troops somewhere in the rear or to a flank specially detailed to engage and mop up enemy patrols.

Nothing is known of such equipment but this reference gives food for thought and units are advised to be on the alert for any such equipment or device.

(ALF Intelligence Review No 66)

(b) Attached as Appendix "B" is a photographic reproduction and description of method of use of the Japanese Water Filter Purifier.

(c) Photographic and diagrammatic reproductions of the Japanese Hollow Charge Rifle-Grenade and Grenade Discharger, and descriptions of the Grenade and also of the principles of Hollow Charge Explosives are attached as Appendix "C" (four sheets).

PART III
TOPOGRAPHICAL

1. CAPTURED PLAN OF ROAD FROM YOKOPI TO SAMEWA

An interesting captured document gives considerable detail concerning the unfinished latter stages of the road from BOGADJIM to the MARKHAM VALLEY. It is a plan for the construction of a road between YOKOPI (also shown as WAGOBI on the MT HAGEN 1" Overprint) and SAMEWA (a hamlet near WAPUN), and gives further confirmation to recently captured maps which have indicated YOKOPI as being the roadhead for MT traffic.

Although this sector is only 40½ miles long, two bridges and 123 culverts had to be constructed.

Work was to begin on 1 Aug 43, and was to be completed by 22 Dec 43, with 112 actual working days. General labour was to be done by troops of the 20 Infantry Group (taking about 2,700 men), and approximately 880 men of the 4 Engineer Group.

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 66)

2. BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND :

(i) TACTICAL

The Allied landing and establishment of a beachhead in EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY on 1 Nov is a further step in the encirclement of BUIN and also constitutes a threat to the KIETA base from the landward.

The plain country in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area should provide sites suitable for development as landing grounds.

A consideration of the available land approaches to BUIN and KIETA is timely.

(ii) TERRAIN AND VEGETATION

The coastal plain country from EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY to BUIN extends inland for 10 to 15 miles ; generally undulating to flat, it is swampy in places and intersected by several large rivers.

The dividing range which runs NW to SE, rises fairly abruptly from the coastal plain and provides a natural barrier to approach from the SW towards KIETA. On the eastern fall the hill features approach closely to the coastline.

The country is generally heavily timbered with rain forest while native gardens and secondary jungle growth occur frequently in the populated areas.

(iii) COMMUNICATIONS

(a) EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY to BUIN -

Communication between PURUATA and JABA on EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY is by way of the hard sandy beach, as the country north of the JABA RIVER is very swampy and trackless. From JABA to BUIN and KAHILI is by native track of which the following details are available :-

A good pitched track capable of taking bicycle or horse traffic runs from JABA via MAWARAKA to BUIN, a distance of approximately 50-60 miles. The track dries quickly after heavy rain, and as it stands, could be utilised by light MT (Jeep) traffic. The difficulty of crossing the unbridged rivers, chief of which are the PURIATA, MIVO and RORO, is the main consideration.

The HIVO is 30 yards wide at the ford, the others 40-60 yards wide and fairly sluggish. Normally they are waist or shoulder high at the crossings but in flood are impassable.
Floods may be expected in the NW season (Oct to Apr) and less frequently in the SE season. Past experience of local residents indicates that crossings on foot should always be possible in the mornings.
All villages along the route are connected by track, and guides would be necessary to indicate the through route. The approach to KAHILI itself can be made via the route from the west, branching off near KAMORAI village and passing through KAIEU, or around the back of the town to a point near the KULIKO RIVER where it meets the track from KIETA, four miles above a suspension bridge across the KALIKO RIVER on the eastern outskirts of KAHILI.
The whole journey may be made by bicycle on one day ; estimated marching time for infantry, approximately 20/24 hours.
Additional tracks, muddy only near the coast, leading from possible coastal landing spots at AITARA and TAKUAKA join the main track near the villages of RUMAI and AKU respectively.
It is pointed out that should a landing be made at TAKUAKA the crossing of the HIVO RIVER would be avoided; the only obstacle to the approach to KAHILI being at the RORO RIVER. This is not so formidable a barrier as the others.

(b) EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY to KIETA -

From PORUATA via the hard sand beach to JABA, thence across the island to KIETA entails the crossing of the high dividing range. It is however, good easy going to SIROMBI a distance of about 16 miles. From there the track becomes rough and mountainous, crossing the range at 3300 feet through the gorge near KUPEI gold mine ; a further 20 miles. A good track leads from JUPEI to ARAWA on the coast a distance of 14 miles, of which the last six miles is improved and suitable for motor traffic.

From ARAWA to KIETA there appears to be a good Government track along the coast, though there is no information to indicate the quality or width of the surface.

The distance may be covered on foot in 3 days. Country in the vicinity of KIETA is rugged and jungle covered, with coconut plantations immediately surrounding the village.

SUMMARY :

(a) Suitable landing ground sites should be available on the plain country in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area. Extensive clearing of rain forest will, however, be necessary.

(b) Movement on foot by the existing tracks to BUIN should present no difficulty but deployment in the heavy rain forest would be restricted.

(c) Bridging of rivers is necessary to allow the passage of MT to BUIN but a big economy could be effected by additional landings at TAKUAKA. Such a proceeding would also reduce the approach march to approximately 20 miles.

(d) Movement from EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY to KIETA is possible for infantry but deployment very restricted. Extensive improvement necessary to allow the passage of jeeps.

(ALA Weekly Intelligence Summary No 79).

3. INDEX OF PLACE NAMES

Place names mentioned in recent operations, which may not be commonly known :

NAME	TERRITORY	LAT		LONG	
		DEG	MIN	DEG	MIN
AIKA	DUTCH NG	4	53	136	40
CAPE MOLTKE	SOLOMONS	6	10	154	40
PURUATA	SOLOMONS	6	17	155	5
WALINGAI	NEW GUINEA	6	15	147	44
TIETJEN GP	NEW HANOVER	2	35	149	40
BERRINGER	NEW GUINEA	5	46	145	53
OBSAU	NEW GUINEA	5	25	145	26
JOBSO	NEW GUINEA	5	24	145	24
KEPSAU	NEW GUINEA	5	23	145	25
ULILAI	NEW GUINEA	5	22	145	27
KULAU	NEW GUINEA	5	22	145	26
LARUMA R	BOUGAINVILLE	6	12	154	59
JABA R	BOUGAINVILLE	6	21	155	13
BONIS	BOUGAINVILLE	5	27	145	40
TARLENA	BOUGAINVILLE	5	29	154	43
KITCHIN BAY	BOUGAINVILLE	5	31	154	40
SISI	NEW GUINEA	6	30	147	48
ZIGAMBI	NEW GUINEA	6	21	147	44
LAMONA	NEW GUINEA	6	22	147	51
GERUP	NEW GUINEA	6	14	147	39

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

1. BURMA :

No major change has taken place in the situation in BURMA.

Increased patrol activity is reported in the CHIN HILLS area, and the Japanese have advanced to within 10 miles SE of FALAL.

There has also been increased patrol activity in the MAUNGDAW-BUTHIDAUNG area, enemy patrols being especially active north of BUTHIDAUNG.

In NORTH BURMA it is reported that Japanese troops are moving eastward from MYITKYINA in the direction of WAUCHON.

In the SALWEEN area it is reported that Japanese forces now hold the west bank of the SALWEEN River from LUSHI to the BURMA ROAD, but have not yet crossed the river.

(Condensed from FAA Intelligence Summary No 79)

PART V
SECURITY

1. AIRGRAPH LETTERS

It is apparent that considerable education is needed amongst officers in regard to the censoring and franking of airgraph letters.

In brief :

(a) Censorable matter should NOT be excised by cutting the portion from the letter, but by blacking out with dark ink.

(b) The franking officer's signature should be placed in the lower left hand corner, above the line, underneath which appears - "This space should not be used".

(c) The Unit Censor Stamp should be used in the space between the address block and above the double line towards the top of the letter.

(d) The stamps should be affixed only in position allotted on back, and in no case must a defacing stamp be used except on the back of the letter, either by Military or Civil Post Offices.

(FAA Intelligence Summary No 79)

2. LOOSE TALK

A recently captured enemy document discloses that an Allied PW stated during an interrogation by the Japanese :-

> "Two or three weeks ago, I heard the Medical Colonel of a Hospital in Northern Australia tell a patient that it appeared as if the "X" Division were in Buna".

Here is a direct example of how the information disclosed in careless talk by a senior, did in fact reach the enemy.

(AMF Intelligence Review No 66)

Capt
GS 1 Aust Corps

SECRET

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APPENDIX "A"
1 Aust. Corps Int. Summary No. 4

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTHS IN THE SWPA
AS AT 3 NOV 43

NW SECTOR	1.	PHILIPPINES		60,000(a)
	2.	JAVA		30,000
	3.	BORNEO		7,000(a)
	4.	CELEBES		7,000
	5.	TIMOR		15,000 (b)
	6.	BANDA SEA		
		including :- Ambon, Saumlaki, Toeal, Dobo		8,000
	7.	DUTCH NEW GUINEA :		
		including :- Tobas, Fak Fak, Kaukenau, Kaimana, Babo, Manokwari, Nabire, Sorong	6/7,000	6/7,000
NE SECTOR	1.	BRITISH NEW GUINEA		
		Hollandia-Vanimo	1,500	
		Aitape	200	
		Wewak	15,000/27,000(c)	
		Burui	500	
		Hansa Bay (incl Rubia & Bogia)	3,000(d)	
		Madang, Ramu Valley	15,000(e)	
		Marakum-Sio	1,000/1,500(d)	
		15 miles E of BOGADJIM		
		Forward of SIO	7,500(f)	43,700/56,200
	2.	NEW BRITAIN		
		C Bushing	500	
		Rooke Is	500	
		C. Gloucester	3/4,000	
		Talasea	1,000 / 1,500	
		Hoskins Plantation		
		Witu Group	1,000(g)	
		Ubili	500(g)	
		Arawe	100	
		Gasmata	1,000/1,500	
		Jacquinot Bay	300(g)	
		Rabaul	55,000(h)	62,900/64,900
	3.	ADMIRALTY IS	1,000	1,000
	4.	NEW IRELAND		
		Kavieng	4/5,000	
		Namatanai	500	4,500/5,500
	5.	SOLOMONS		
		Shortlands	5/6,000	
		Ballale & Misc Islands	3,000	
		Bougainville -		
		Southern Sector	17,000	
		Eastern "	5,000	
		Northern "	5,000	
		Choiseul	3,000	
		Unlocated	2/5,000	40,000/44,000
		Total NW Sector		133,000/134,000
		" NE "		152,100/171,600
		GRAND TOTAL		285,100/305,600

NOTES

(a) Considered a maximum figure.

(b) Decrease due to reassessment.

(c) (1) The higher figure assumes the presence of all of 54 Div.

(2) It includes :-

(i) A regimental Group of 41 Div (either 237 or 239 Inf Regt)

(ii) Portion of Div tps of 41 Div.

(iii) 1 Bn of 11 Regt 5 Div.

(3) A Regimental Group of 41 Div (either 237 or 239 Inf Regt) is thought to have moved to the MADANG area.

(d) Principally L of C tps.

(e) It includes :-

(i) HQ 18 Army.

(ii) One Regimental Group of 41 Div (either 237 or 239 Inf Regt).

(iii) 78 Inf Regt (est strength 1,000) and some 20 Div tps.

(iv) 2 Bn 42 Inf Regt 5 Div.

(v) Elements 80 Inf Regt (5 Coy).

(vi) Portions 3,8,36,37,96 Indep Engr Units.

(vii) An unknown number of evacuees from LAE.

(f) (1) It includes :-

HQ 20 Div
79 Inf Regt
80 " " (2 & 3 Bns less 5 Coy)
Bulk 20 Div tps
238 Inf Regt (2 Bn & 9 Coy)
21 Lt Mortar Bn
33 Independent Engineer Regiment
An unknown number of evacuees from LAE

(2) This figure includes a total deduction of 3000 for casualties of which 1200 are known killed. The GHQ estimate of 6000 allows for 4000 casualties.

(g) Increase due to increased activity.

(h) This figure includes :-

(i) Elements 2 Div (uncertain)

(ii) Rear Echelon 6 Div, plus 1,500 reinforcements thought to have arrived approx Aug 43

(iii) Bulk 38 Div including 2,500 reinforcements thought to have arrived approx Aug 43

(iv) Rear Echelon 51 Div

(v) Rear Echelon 65 Div

(vi) Remnants 21 IMB

(vii) 8 Tank Regt (probably portion only)

(viii) Miscellaneous tps


(ix) It does not include an estimated 3,800 army air personnel, or 6,200 navy air personnel.

GENERAL

Unless otherwise stated, strength estimates do not include air force personnel, but do include aerodrome bns who are responsible for the construction, maintenance and defence of airfields.

JAPANESE WATER FILTER-PURIFIER






This item of equipment is a personal issue to the Japanese for use in the field for the purpose of obtaining drinking water. The components and use of the purifier are illustrated above. (1) Bakelite body with attached rubber tubing, two wads of cotton wool each of different colour either blue or green and white, also a perforated bakelite screw cap allowing the ingress of water. (2) Section of assembled purifier with cotton wool wads in position. Green or blue (coarse filter) to the bottom, white (fine filter) to the top. (3) System of filtration:- The bakelite filter is immersed in a container of impure water, the rubber tube is placed in the mouth and water is sucked through the tube. When the water begins to flow the tube is placed into receptacle and allowed to syphon in the normal manner. Five water canteens may be filled through the purifier before having to replace cotton wool wads. (4) Phials and ladle, contained in a flat tin, may be used in an emergency or for additional purification when large quantities of impurities are found in water. The top illustration, depicting the actual use of the unit, has been compiled from data contained in an ATIS translation of a captured document.

GSI (a) ADV LHQ

Reproduced by 1 Aust. Mob. Litho. Sct. (AIF) Aust. Sig. Corps.
ADV/MISC/5 0 8 8

[redacted]

JAPANESE HOLLOW CHARGE RIFLE-GRENADE and Grenade Discharger



SECTION OF GRENADE

GSI (a) ADV LHQ 24 SEP 43

Reproduced by 1 Aust. Mob. Litho. Sec. (AIF) Aust. Sup. Corps.

JAPANESE HOLLOW CHARGE RIFLE - GRENADE

DESCRIPTION:

The Japanese Rifle Grenade is a copy of the German G Pzgr or possibly the larger GR Gpzgr. The grenade incorporates the "Munro" or hollow charge principle and is fired from an adapter which is attached to the standard 6.5mm MEIJI 38 Rifle. The body is made in two parts and is fitted with a ballistic cap and cone to form an air space in order to utilise the hollow charge principle. It contains a bursting charge of 3.81 oz TNT and a 70 grain booster of unknown composition. The lower cylinderical body contains the fuze and consists of an aluminium case fitted at its base with a rifled collar for engagement in the rifling of the adapter barrel. The grenade is inserted into the barrel with a twisting motion in order that the rifled collar engages with the rifling. A flash cap is situated immediately above the fuze, followed by the detonator and a booster pellet. No prior data was available on this projectile and for complete dimensions see Appendix "E(ii)".

CHARACTERISTICS:

Weight of complete grenade	12.45 oz	Weight complete, Inert	8.28 oz
Weight of explosive charge	3.81 oz	Overall length	7.08 in
Weight of booster	70 gr	Length of body (less ballistic cap)	3.218 in
Weight of fuse	.71 oz	Length of fuse housing	3.124 in
Weight of detonator	.30 oz	Length of cone	2. 562 in
Weight of primer	6 gr	Diameter of cone at top	1.516 in
Weight of base plate and spigot	.65 oz	Diameter of cone at bottom	.230 in
Weight of body	4.61 oz	Thickness of cone ½" from top	.012 in
Weight of fuse, detonator and primer	4.03 oz	Thickness of cone at bottom	.059 in

FUSE:

(a) The base detonating fuse is composed of the following components;-

(i) Fuse base plate and spigot
(ii) Firing pin housing
(iii) Setback Spring
(iv) Firing Pin
(v) Arming spring
(vi) Flash cap
(vii) Booster

(b) The fuse base plate with a protruding spigot is screwed into the base of the grenade. The fuse and setback spring are held in position by the spigot. On top of the firing housing and encircling the firing pin, is an arming spring. Upon set back, the firing pin housing compresses the set back spring and is locked in the rear position by four stirrup-like springs which protrude from the side of the firing pin housing. Also upon setback, the arming spring reasserts itself into the circular groove provided in the fuse housing. This action clears the way between the firing pin and flash cap. A creep spring which fits over the firing pin prevents the assembly from creeping forward due

to retardation of the projectile in flight. Upon impact, the weight of the firing pin assembly compresses the spring and the firing pin penetrates the flash cap and explodes the detonator. The resultant explosion sets off the booster which in turn explodes the main bursting charge.

The grenade was fired statically against a mild steel block and a penetration of three and seven-eighth inches in length and half an inch in diameter at the top of penetration was the result. The cone appeared to have melted and fused with the mild steel block.

Foreign Material Branch
Aberdeen Proving Ground
Maryland US..

TO FIRE:


(1) The grenade is loaded into the discharger barrel as described. A 6.5mm propellant cartridge (possibly ballastite) with a wooden projectile fitted instead of the usual metal projectile, is loaded into the breach of the rifle and fired in the usual manner. The grenade is safe to handle since the fuze is not armed until the grenade is in flight. The grenade is fired by impact with the target, a base detonating inertia actuated fuse, being carried in the rear of the projectile behind the bursting charge.


(2) While this is the only instance of use by the Japanese of the hollow charge principle that has been discovered to date, it is to be expected that they will employ it in other weapons. The penetrating effect obtained is not dependent on impact velocity and the Japanese have in quantity a variety of low velocity weapons of fairly large calibre which are suitable for firing hollow charge projectiles. Such weapons are the Type 92 (1932) 70mm Battalion Gun and the Model 41 (1908) 75mm Regimental Gun.

War Dept
Mil Int Division
Washington.

(JMF Review No.60)

JAPANESE HOLLOW CHARGE RIFLE- GRENADE





FUSE PARTS

(A) Ballistic cap
(B) Hollow cone
(C) Bursting charge
(D) Booster pellet
(E) Detonator
(F) Block cap
(G) Creep spring
(H) Clock spring
(I) Arming sleeve
(J) Setback spring
(K) Arming spring retainer washer
(L) Needle firing pin
(M) Needle firing pin housing
(N) Spigot
(O) Base plate

PRINCIPLE OF "HOLLOW-CHARGE EXPLOSIVES"

(a) It has been found that the force of high explosives can be directed or some what focussed by properly shaping the explosive charge. In the figures below there are illustrated in plan and elevation four cylindrical charges such as might be used in demolition works. The solid charge of TNT is presumed to weigh 220 grams. The other charges weigh proportionately less.




Fig i Fig ii Fig iii Fig iv


If these charges are placed on a steel plate 30mm thick and detonated, it will be found that the solid charge (Fig i) will only make a dent in the plate. The charge with a small cavity (Fig ii) will make a much deeper dent, while the other two hollow charges (Figs iii and iv) will penetrate the plate. It has been found that the performance of hollow charges is markedly affected by the size and shape of the cavity, the material and thickness of the liner, the kind of explosive and numerous other factors.

(b) The principle of the hollow charge has been known to explosive experts for many years. Many nations have applied the principle to ammunition of various types to obtain greater penetrative effect, independent of velocity impact. Two instances of this type of projectile are the explosive charge used in the American "bazooka" and the British "68" A/tk Grenade fired from a rifle grenade discharger.

(c) To date, the only known use by the Japanese of this principle is as illustrated by photographic Appendix "B(i)".

War Department
Mil Int Division
Washington.

NOTE - A recent report published by Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit No 1, shows a hitherto unknown I KG HE Aerial Bomb employing the same principle.
(AMF Review No 60)


BOUGAINVILLE AND ADJACENT ISLANDS (SOLOMON IS.)
LEGEND
OPERATIONAL AIRFIELDS
SEAPLANE BASES
ANCHORAGES
CAPE HANPAN
BUKA PASSAGE
MATCHIN BAY
TAIOF I.
C. L AVERDY
NUSSI PT
NUMA NUMA
TENAKAU
C. MOLTKE
KIETA PENIN
ARAWA
KOROMIRA MISSION
EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY
MOTUPENA
LULUAI PT
C. FRIENDSHIP
BOUGAINVILLE STRAIT
OVAU I.
KARA
KAHILI
PATAPATUAI
BALLALE I.
FAURO I.
SHORTLAND I.
FAISI I.
MORGUSIAI I.
REPRODUCED BY 6 AUST ARMY TOPO SURVEY COY AIF. OCT '43
FIR/MISC/6576

0010258

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SECRET

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GSI

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 5

Compiled from information received

from 1200 hrs 13 Nov 43 to 1200 hrs 20 Nov 43

1. Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols command.
2. A receipt is not required but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue.
3. All dates and times are Eastern Australian standard time.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

FINSCHHAFEN

Extensive patrolling by our troops west and NW of JIVEVANENG was followed on 16 and 17 Nov by attacks which resulted in a considerable improvement in our positions.

On 16 Nov in an advance west along the SATELBERG track, our forces occupied the important SISI-SATELBERG track junction. The following day an attack with artillery support was made NW from JIVEVANENG, and the objective 1¼ miles from that village was captured. This position - on the lower slopes of enemy held high ground - is approximately a mile east of SATELBERG.

Patrols also cleared several enemy posts threatening the right flank of our advance. On 17 Nov further progress was made along the track towards SATELBERG, but thick jungle was reported to be impeding the advance.

In the KUMAWA area, our patrols contacted a number of enemy positions 1000 to 1500 yards north, NW and NE of that village. In an attack early on 17 Nov, our troops reached a point 1200 yards NE of KUMAWA against opposition.

Enemy movement both ways along the BONGA-WAREO track has continued, and our artillery has shelled this route. Our patrols north from the SONG River along the BONGA track made contact on several occasions and on 16 Nov an enemy force approximate strength two platoons was observed two miles north of the river mouth.

Further north, there is evidence that the enemy is using the tracks inland from AGO, LAKONA and KANLAGIDU POINT. All three of these places are known to be off-loading points for barges.

Natives have reported the presence of 1000 Japanese, including convalescents from SATELBERG, at KULUNGTUFU (approximately 18 miles west by north of SATELBERG and in track communication with it). The natives stated that the village is being used as a collecting point for native foodstuffs, and aerial photographs show new huts in the vicinity. A further native report of a carrier line of 1000 natives from KULUNGTUFU to WAREO suggests that the former village is being used as a supply depot for the enemy forward area.

RAMU VALLEY

Enemy activity has been limited, but work on the road south from BOGADJIM is being continued. Defensive positions in the ORGORUNA-[illegible] area are also being developed.

Casualties were inflicted on a strong enemy party at AMINIK (18 miles west by north BOGADJIM) when it was attacked by one of our patrols on 11 Nov.

A few miles SW of YOKOPI, patrol clashes also occurred, on 12 and 16 Nov. On both occasions our troops inflicted casualties on the enemy.

On 16 Nov patrolling into the hinterland west of BOGADJIM revealed that KULAU (approximately 23 miles WNW by west BOGADJIM) and BAGASIN (approximately 19 miles WNW BOGADJIM) were occupied by the enemy.

NEW BRITAIN

Aerial photos taken on 14 Nov revealed further Japanese activity in the GASMATA area. The coastal road from AIWIT to a point west of VAHSEL Harbour is being developed, though no bridges have yet been constructed. Further east, a road from MONTAGU Harbour to CAPE DAMPIER is almost continuous, and has been partly surfaced.

Reliable reports indicate that the enemy at RABAUL is decentralising his troops. The continuous bombing attacks to which the town has been subjected recently are probably responsible for this precautionary measure.

SOLOMONS

BOUGAINVILLE

Activity has been confined mainly to patrolling, with our forces in the CAPE TOROKINA area extending their beach head in all directions.

On 13 Nov, contact was made with the enemy in prepared positions 5600 yards NE CAPE TOROKINA, and next day our patrols contacted an enemy party 600 yards east of the LARUMA River.

By 16 Nov, our perimeter at CAPE TOROKINA had been extended by 1000 yards on all sides and was then 8000 yards wide and 5500 yards deep.

CHOISEUL ISLAND

Enemy patrol activity has been observed around TAGATAGERA (17 miles NNW SANGIGAI).

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Native sources have reported the existence of a training camp at TJEMARA (80 miles east by south KAUKENAU).

It was stated that during Oct, 500 natives were being trained there by 20 Japanese instructors.

(b) SEA-OWN

BUKA

On the 17 Nov Allied surface vessels bombarded the airfield at BUKA.

HUON PENINSULA

Whilst on patrol along the RAI COAST our light surface craft encountered enemy barges on nights 10/11 and 15/16 Nov.

As a result of these engagements five barges, three of them fully loaded, were sunk and two others probably damaged.

SEA-ENEMY

There has been a decrease since 13 Nov in sightings of enemy ships operating along the supply route to RABAUL from the north. It is thought that during the two weeks prior to 13 Nov reinforcements and supplies on a large scale were moved into RABAUL. The decrease in shipping sightings since that date may possibly indicate that this movement has been completed. On the other hand, it is more probable that the enemy is reluctant to risk further shipping losses on a scale sustained during recent Allied air attacks. If this is so there is the possibility that greater use may be made of KAVIENG as a shipping terminal and base for supplies destined for NEW BRITAIN and the SOLOMONS.

On 17 Nov a convoy of one light cruiser or destroyer and eight merchant vessels was sighted in HANSA BAY on the north coast of NEW GUINEA. HANSA BAY is known to be a base through which troops and supplies are moved to MADANG. It is possible therefore that the convoy may have carried reinforcements for Japanese troops operating forward of MADANG.

RABAUL

Photographs taken of the harbour on 15 Nov show the following shipping present :-

Four destroyers
Five submarines
One destroyer tender
Nineteen merchant vessels totalling 83,400 tons

It will be noted that no heavy naval vessels were seen and that the total merchant tonnage is well below that normally present, prior to recent Allied air raids.

BARGE ACTIVITY - RAI COAST

On 12 Nov 25-30 barges were sighted in daylight along the RAI COAST.

The following day 35 barges and luggors,many of them laden, were seen at MADANG.

An unusual circumstance was the makeshift concealment of the barges possibly indicating that the normal hideouts were fully occupied.

Attached as Appendix "A" is a review of Japanese barge traffic and the effect of Allied attacks on it.

(c) AIR-OWN

NEW GUINEA

Further heavy strikes on the enemy bases and airfields at ALEXISHAFEN and MADANG were made by our heavy and medium bombers. Supply and fuel dumps, installations, and the air strips were the main targets, and a number of grounded aircraft destroyed. The importance of these bases to the enemy cannot be overestimated, supplying as they do his ground forces along the RAI COAST, in the SATELBERG-FINSCHHAFEN area, and south of BOGADJIM towards the RAMU Valley.

Barges, barge hideouts, staging points and dumps along the RAI COAST received considerable attention from our attack bombers and strafing planes in low level attacks.

In support of our ground troops enemy positions at GUSIKO village (nine miles north by west of FINSCHHAFEN) and at FIOR were attacked by low-flying medium bombers, and a successful attack by dive bombers on positions at MASANGKOO (1½ miles north SATELBERG) was made on 17 Nov.

Fighter sweeps over WEWAK resulted in the destruction of 11 enemy fighters, with four probably destroyed.

NEW BRITAIN

Enemy shipping concentrations at RABAUL were again subjected to heavy attacks by aircraft operating from NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMONS. Heaviest strikes were in daylight and made by heavy, medium, dive and torpedo bombers

Beauforts maintained the attack with a number of night raids on the known harbour and airfields. Damage inflicted between 11 and 18 Nov is as follows :-

One light cruiser or large destroyer - sunk
Two destroyers - sunk
Eight other warships hit by torpedoes
Two direct hits on 8000 ton transport (left sinking)
Hits on large merchant vessel
Twenty nine aircraft destroyed in combat

Night attacks by single Catalinas on convoys close to RABAUL have also met with success, and the following damage has been reported :-

Direct hit on 10,000 ton cargo vessel
Direct hit on a light cruiser
Several hits on 6000 ton cargo vessel (thought to have sunk)
Direct hit and a near miss on 8/10,000 ton cargo vessel which was later beached.

Attacks by medium bombers and fighter bombers were also carried out on installations at GASMATA.

NW AREA

On nights 11/12 and 17/18 Nov Liberators made two further attacks on the Japanese naval base at SOURABAYA. Hits were scored on installations and fires started.

KAIMANA, in DUTCH NEW GUINEA, where increased enemy shipping activity has recently been observed, was raided on two occasions. Raids were made on the TANIMBAR Islands, AMBOINA and BOEROE Island.

SOLOMONS

Further heavy attacks, mainly by large forces of dive bombers, were made during the week on enemy airfields. Shipping in MATCHIN BAY was also attacked, and enemy troop positions near JABA were bombed and strafed. Opposition by enemy fighters remains negligible.

AIR-ENEMY

Despite recent heavy losses the enemy has reinforced his aircraft strength in NEW GUINEA and has made a number of attacks on our airfields in the RAMU VALLEY. While some damage was inflicted, the attacks proved costly, and in a raid by 55 to 70 aircraft cn GUSAP on 15 Nov, 25 aircraft were destroyed and seven probably destroyed.

Nuisance raids were made on LAE, SALAMAUA, SOPUTA and DOBODURA, but damage was negligible.

In the SOLOMONS, during attacks by dive bombers on our surface units taking supplies and reinforcements to EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY, nearly 100 enemy aircraft were destroyed. Reports indicate that recent attacks in this area were made by carrier-based planes, which flew into RABAUL prior to the attack.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

(a) 17 DIV

Last located during Nov 42 in NORTH CHINA, elements of this division have now been identified in the SOLOMONS.

A preliminary report stated that 2 Bn 54 Inf Regt had been identified at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY and that 81 Inf Regt and the balance of 54 Inf Regt were in the BUKA area and in NEW IRELAND. There was no information concerning Div HQ or 53 Inf Regt.

However, a PW captured on 13 Nov gave the following locations :-

53 Inf Regt	Was sent to GASMATA for defensive purposes.
54 Inf Regt	Part RABAUL, part still en route from CHINA on 4 Nov.
81 Inf Regt	North central NEW BRITAIN.

He also stated that the troops who landed at BOUGAINVILLE I on 10 Nov came from RABAUL and were the only ones which could be spared as all others were committed elsewhere.

(NG Force Weekly Intelligence Summary No 148)

(b) Distribution of Japanese forces by Divisions and Independent Mixed Brigades is attached as Appendix "B".

4. ORGANISATION

Organisation and details of 51 Division Engineer Regiment are attached as Appendix "C".

5. PERSONALITIES

There is now documentary evidence that Lt-Gen MANO, Goro was appointed commander 41 Div on 14 Jun, Maj-Gen IWASA, Shun replacing him as commander 65 Div on that date.

However, on approximately 3 Aug Maj-Gen IWASA became commander of "No 6 Inf Group", which may be a reformed 6 Div Inf.

The appointment of commander 65 Div appears to have been filled by Maj-Gen MATSUDA. A note in a diary, dated 9 Sep, stated that he was expected to move to TULUVU to command a portion of the shipping transport force and take charge of guard duties on Western NEW BRITAIN.

(NG Force Weekly Intelligence Summary No 148)

6. EQUIPMENT

HANDLING OF JAPANESE AMMUNITION

Reports received indicate that, within recent weeks, numerous injuries have been received by personnel tampering with complete rounds of Japanese High Explosive or Incendiary ammunition.

In the majority of cases the detonation could have been avoided if unauthorised and inexperienced personnel had not endeavoured to investigate the shells. However, there are at least two types of Japanese ammunition which require such a small amount of heat to ignite their incendiary compositions that they have been known to explode and ignite in magazines or when lying in the open.

The types referred to are :-

(i) 20 mm aircraft cannon - HE - incendiary.

(ii) 7.9 mm aircraft machine gun - incendiary.

The first type - 20 mm HE - is easily recognised by the greenish yellow body and brass nose fuze. The body may be plain yellow or may have either one or two white bands. It may be found in the 20 mm drum magazine, which is used with the cannon, lying around loose in captured areas, or in its original packing case.

The second type - 7.9 mm - will be found loose, in packing boxes, or in the saddle type drum magazine.

In captured areas this ammunition is a serious hazard. It must be kept clear of all other ammunition prior to shipment or disposal. It should be kept in the shade and not exposed to heat. Should certain of it explode or commence smoking the remainder should be drowned in the deepest water available without delay.

(FAA Weekly Intelligence Summary No 80)

7. TACTICS

(i) BOOBY TRAPS

(a) Further details (to those appearing as Appendix "C" to 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No 4) have recently been received dealing with the increase in explosive powers of a similar type booby trap. These are produced as Appendix "D"

Method of Use

Figure 1 shows the shell case set well into the ground and it is considered that, when used in this manner, the anti-personnel effect would not be great and its main purpose would be to act as a warning device.

Figure 2 shows an inverted shell case or suitable cylinder set well clear of the ground, which would allow maximum fragmentation of the grenade on explosion, thereby increasing anti-personnel effect.

Figures 3 and 4 show two further methods of use which would appear to be set as anti-personnel devices.

(Adapted from AIF Weekly Intelligence Review No 67)

(b) A further device, similar in principle has now been found at FINSCHHAFEN. It consists of a Type 97 Japanese grenade and a fuzed 50 mm mortar shell wired together in such a way that the grenade fuze projects from one end of the assembly. The percussion fuze of the 50 mm shell rests against the upper end of the grenade and the assembly is suspended by a string with the grenade fuze pointing downward.

Drawing a pull or trip wire attached to the suspension string allows the assembly to fall on the grenade striker. Explosion of the grenade depresses the mortar fuze striker thereby causing detonation. The delay train was not removed from the grenade to give instantaneous action.

While well constructed, the booby trap appears to be impracticable due to the probable time involved in assembly.

Disposal may be accomplished by carefully replacing both safety pins.

(NG Force Weekly Intelligence Summary No 148)

PART III
TOPOGRAPHICAL

INDEX OF PLACE NAMES

Place names mentioned in recent operations, which may not be commonly known :

NAME	TERRITORY	LAT DEG	LAT MIN	LONG DEG	LONG MIN
AIWA R	NEW BRITAIN	6	03	150	43
BAKOA	NEW GUINEA	6	09	147	38
CAPE DAMPIER	NEW BRITAIN	6	05	151	05
CAPE RALUANA	NEW BRITAIN	4	17	152	13
DAVAUN	NEW BRITAIN	4	18	152	11
DUKE OF YORK I	NEW BRITAIN	4	10	152	30
GANONGGA	SOLOMONS	8	5	156	35
KARAKA	SOLOMONS	7	40	156	40
KUMAWA	NEW GUINEA	6	29	147	26
MONTAGU Hbr	NEW BRITAIN	6	07	150	54
PALANKO	NEW GUINEA	6	28	147	48
TOBERA	NEW BRITAIN	4	24	152	17
VAHSEL Hbr	NEW BRITAIN	6	11	150	52

PART IV
OTHER FRONTS

ITALY

Attached as Appendix "E" is a map showing extent of Allied operations in Italy as at 7 Nov 43.

BURMA

No major change has taken place in the situation in BURMA, but the enemy is reinforcing his defences, particularly in the CHIN HILLS and HUKAWNG VALLEY areas.

In the MAUNGDAW-BUTHIDAUNG area, he made further attacks against out positions seven miles west by north of BUTHIDAUNG on 3 Nov and the night 4/5 Nov. All attacks were repulsed and casualties were inflicted on the enemy. Our patrol on 4 Nov encountered the enemy at AWLANBYIN (seven miles NNW of BUTHIDAUNG), and both enemy and our troops suffered casualties.

In the CHIN HILLS area our forces encountered strong resistance.

In northern BURMA Chinese forces are making slow progress, and the Japanese are reinforcing. 300 Japanese are reported to have arrived on 6 Nov at SHADUZUP (27 miles north by west of KAMIANG).

Enemy forces in YUPBANG GA have also recently been reinforced.

(Condensed from FAA Intelligence Summary No 80)

PART V

SECURITY

(a) The Army is often wrongly criticised by the civil population. However, the following extract from a letter addressed to a soldier contains criticism that is no doubt justified.

"A woman from ..... was fined £25 for writing of the movement of troops. So silly to punish civilians when soldiers talk so loudly about everything".

Civilians through the mediums of the press, radio and posters, have been reminded continually that service matters must not be discussed. It is not therefore surprising that they are sometimes at a loss to understand why they should be so careful when service personnel are continually discussing matters of a secret nature with them.

Enquiries are at present being made into a statement by a soldier that the civilians in a nearby town knew of the cancellation of the movement of his unit before the men themselves had official intimation that they were moving. If this is true, it indicates that someone who knew of the move had talked openly, probably with the intention of making an impression.

When a movement of any body of troops is contemplated the same applies as to form in horse racing - the fewer who have the 'good oil' the better. When a unit is to move only those officers and ORs who require the information to discharge their duties should be given the 'good oil' by the CO.

While it is the responsibility of the commanding officer to safeguard military information, it is the personal responsibility of all members to ensure that they are in no way responsible for passing it on.

(FAA Weekly Intelligence Summary No 80)

(b) DESTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS IN EMERGENCIES:

(i) B Echelon Area of a forward unit was recently overrun by the Japanese. Later, when this area was recaptured by our forces, FS personnel assisted patrols to recover documents which had not been destroyed when our withdrawal was effected.

Several documents recovered concerned previous operations in NEW GUINEA, and distribution lists were an indication of our OOB in the area.

Unit files should be regularly checked to eliminate documents of no further operational value. If this practice is followed, the few documents retained may be speedily destroyed in an emergency.

(ii) Translation of relevant captured Japanese documents discloses that an Australian officer's diary, operation orders, etc captured by the Japanese, contained the following information :-

> "The enemy which attacked BOBDUBI was an Australian Infantry Battalion (specified). Its aim was to occupy the high hill of BOBDUBI, and so control the KOMIATUM Road. The organization of the Battalion is four Infantry Companies, some trench mortar units, and some MG unit. The same battalion is attached to the 15th Brigade (which is attached to the 3rd Division). There is one independent company in the HOTE area, and No 4 Company of the 24th Infantry Battalion is at KOMIATUM. After gathering at MISSIM, that Battalion will open an attack on BOBDUBI. During the attack communication in open spaces is by signal shots (fired from trench mortars)".

(iii)Another captured enemy document discloses that a pamphlet found on the body of another Australian officer contained, inter alia, notes on the Allied methods of enciphering map references.

(Extracted from AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 67)

(c)ENGLISH SPEAKING PW

An educated Japanese taken prisoner by a patrol was escorted back through several staging camps by an FS NCO. At each post, as soon as troops found that he could speak English, they began to question him until they were restrained by the NCO who explained the dangers of this course. An equally serious danger exists in the case of Japanese PW who understand English but conceal their knowledge. If careless conversations take place in the hearing of such a prisoner, he obtains knowledge that might be of great value in the event of his escape. Troops should be reminded that they must not discuss military information in the hearing of PW nor converse with them. It is particularly desirable that whenever possible, PW should be escorted by FS NCOs until they can be handed over to Provost or delivered to PW cage.

(NG Force Weekly Intelligence Summary No 148)

D. Rain Capt

SECRET

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APPENDIX "A"
1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 5.

JAPANESE BARGE TRAFFIC AND ATTACKS ON IT BY AIR

HISTORY :

Supply of the LAE-SALAMAUA area by barge from MADANG and from RABAUL along the north and south coast of NEW BRITAIN on its present large scale was an expedient forced upon the Japanese by Allied air superiority, which denied the use of the immediate waters to larger vessels. It was instituted after the BISMARCK SEA battle in early March.

In the early stages, sightings of barges at sea gave a clue to the nature of the traffic and air attacks caused considerable loss of craft, personnel and stores to the enemy with a consequent disruption of supply lines. Evidence of the effectiveness of these raids is contained in the following few extracts from many similar references in captured documents :-

"No 1 Coy of 5 Shipping Engr Regt was spotted by enemy planes while camouflaging the boats in broad daylight on 13 May. Four MLC hidden in the area were completely destroyed, and it has become impossible to use this hiding point any more. This is a great setback to our transport plans of crossing the DAMPIER STRAITS".

COMMENT : Attack was in CAPE GLOUCESTER area by five A20s. They reported results unobserved.

" 8 Aug. There are only a few large MLC remaining after the heavy bombing by the enemy in this area".

COMMENT : This refers to Allied attacks in the CAPE GLOUCESTER area in July and August.

" 11 May. MIYAMOTO, who has just returned, related the story that most of the IAI that entered the harbour were bombed and strafed by 33 enemy planes causing heavy casualties".

COMMENT : This refers to an attack on 8 May on MADANG by eight Beaufighters and nine B25s.

Many other documents show how great was the enemy's concern at these losses and also losses caused by bombing and strafing of personnel and dump areas.

A captured document gives information in this connection as follows :-

"Intelligence Report No 138 - 4 Aug 43 - HQ Force Staff Section, MADANG Area.

(b) About six enemy aircraft raided HANSA BAY for about one hour inflicting the following damage :-

Killed	:	Officers	3	ORs	37
Wounded	:	Officers	3	ORs	40. "

COMMENT : The raid referred to was probably a night raid on HANSA BAY dump areas on 2 Aug. The raid was carried out by six B17s which reported one large fire.

The result was that the Japanese took energetic measures to ensure that the camouflage, both of barge hiding places and adjacent bivouac areas, was improved since the discovery of either by Allied reconnaissance was likely to lead to the discovery of both.

METHODS OF CAMOUFLAGE

No exhaustive study of Japanese methods is intended but documents reveal that the following have received attention :-

(a) Barge Concealment Places :

Documents show that reefs have been blasted to allow access to coastal areas offering good chances of concealment. Concealment places after selection have been worked on to make camouflage fool-proof. Thus documents refer to work on "strengthening camouflage" (which may imply specially built and covered shelters at the water's edge). Areas selected have been discussed in the following terms :-

"Big trees jut out, hiding the sky. Quite some construction work is necessary. Amount of work - 100 man-days".

(b) Bivouac Areas :

A great many captured orders emphasise upon the various Japanese units to which they are addressed, the need for making the utmost use of cover at all times. Hours during which washing may be hung up, and cooking carried out, are strictly regulated. It is noticeable that sketch plans of bivouac areas show kitchens to be some hundreds of yards from the main bivouac area so that smoke from fires if seen by aircraft will not reveal the use of the complete locality.

(c) Time of Movement :

Many recently captured schedules of barge movement show that the enemy moves largely in the hours of darkness. However, it is apparent that he considers that the risk of detection by aircraft entailed in leaving hiding places in the late afternoon is not great and he prefers this time of starting with the attendant advantage of arriving at the next staging point about midnight.

This allows craft to be hidden, stores to be unloaded, personnel to be fed and dispersed before first light.

From the foregoing, it appears that the enemy has concluded that the likelihood of Allied aircraft being on search and attack mission after 1600 hours is not great.

STAGING POINTS :

Documents and other indications reveal the areas used for barge staging quite early after the inception of this traffic. There were alternative staging areas, but from MADANG to FINSCHHAFEN, the following were the most used :- MARAKUN, MINDIRI, BILIAU, FANGGER (FUNGAIR), GALI, KIARI, SIO-NAMBARIWA. This information, however, was not sufficiently precise to allow successful attacks to be carried out against the barge hiding places. Careful camouflage denied observation of barges during daytime and dispersal of personnel and other precautions made difficult the task of spotting and bombing the vital areas.

However, it is considered that a new stage in this campaign against barge traffic has been reached during the past few days Carefully made sketch plans of staging points showing bivouac areas, rest areas, kitchens, positions of prepared hideouts, navigation entrances blasted through reefs and other information have come to hand in captured documents.

From these sketch maps it has been possible to plot these vital enemy supply areas on aerial mosaics and the accurate target information now provided will probably enable our airforces to again attack successfully.

(NG Force Weekly Intelligence Summary No 148).

APPENDIX "B"
1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 5.

JAPANESE ARMY
DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES BY DIVISIONS AND INDEPENDENT MIXED BRIGADES

(On information up to 15 Nov 43)

LOCATION	IDENTIFICATION	NO OF ACTIVE DIVS
JAPAN	2 (?) (Reforming), 4,7 (One Regt may be in RABAUL),52(?),53,62,63,64,66,67	10
MANCHOUKUO	1,8,10,11,14(?),23,24,25,28,29,71	11
KOREA	19	1
NORTH CHINA	26,27,32,35,36,37,59,69,110	9
CENTRAL CHINA	3,13,22,39,40,58,60,68,70,116	10
SOUTH CHINA	104	1
F.I.C.	9(?),12(?),21	3
BURMA-YUNNAN	15(?),18,33,55,56	5
MALAYA	2 Guards Div (Part SUMATRA),16(?), 34 (Part SUMATRA)	3
PHILIPPINES	1 Guard Div (?)	1
JAVA	61	1
TIMOR	48	1
NEW BRITAIN	2(Elements),17(?) (Part), 38 (Main Body), 54 (?) (Elements), 65 (Less one Regt)	3
SOLOMONS	6,17 (Elements), 38 (Part)	1
NEW GUINEA	20,41,51(Remnants), 54(?)	4
DUTCH NEW GUINEA (AMBON-KAI-AROE IS)	5 (Equivalent to one Regt NE SECTOR)	1
MARSHALLS	52(Elements), One Regt 65 Div	-
UNLOCATED	57	1
	TOTAL	66
	INDEPENDENT MIXED BRIGADES	
NORTH CHINA	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,15	10
CENTRAL CHINA	12,13,17	3
SOUTH CHINA	19	1
HAINAN	22(?),23(?)	2
WAKE-NEW GUINEA	21 (Remnants)	1
SAGHALIEN	KARAFUTU MIXED BRIGADE	1
	TOTAL	18

(FAA Weekly Intelligence Summary No 80)


APPENDIX "C"
1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 5.

ENEMY ORGANISATION

51 DIVISION ENGINEER REGIMENT :

(i) The following organisation of 51 Division Engineer Regiment as at Feb 43, has been built up from PW statements and captured documents :-

51 DIVISION ENGINEER REGIMENT
(MOTO 2808)



TOTAL STRENGTH : 951

Regimental HQ and HQ Group - approximately 150.

NOTES (i) 51 Division Engineer Regiment arrived in RABAUL from CANTON in Nov 42. The unit (less one Company) sailed for LAE in Feb 43, took part in the fighting in the MUBO-SALAMAUA area and later was evacuated to LAE. Those of the unit that escaped, are believed to have made their way overland to SIO in an endeavour to reach MADANG.

A portion of the Regiment was retained at FINSCHHAFEN and formed part of the FINSCHHAFEN area Tai.

(ii) A PW has stated that Divisional Engineer Units handle all types of engineering work except steel bridge and railroad building, communications, and construction of buildings. The duties are not divided up among companies or platoons, but all sections are required to build roads and bridges, repair airfields, carry out demolition work etc, as occasion demands.


(ii) A loading table, dated Nov 42, and captured at WAU in Feb 43, gives a detailed list of arms and ammunition to be carried to the front by No 3 Company, 51 Divisional Engineer Regiment.


The table is as follows :-

EQUIPMENT	AMOUNT	AMMUNITION
Sword	3	
Type 38 Rifle	210	25,680
Bayonet	217	
Type 96 LMG	1	
Lewis LMG	1	4,350
10th Year Type Grenade Thrower	1	60
Type 98 Grenade Thrower	2	260
2 in Mortar	2	270
Type 99 Armour Piercing Mine	100	
Type 93 Tank Land Mine	56	
Type 98 Explosive Tube	30	
Type 93 Small Flame Thrower	2	7 drums Petrol
Collapsible Boats : Large	1	
Small	1	
97 cm Searchlight	1	

(AIF Weekly Intelligence Review No 67)

JAPANESE
BOOBY TRAP






Diagrams shown, illustrate four known methods of using this type of booby trap.

(1) Shows the booby trap suspended in a partially buried shell case. When pressure is applied to trip wire, suspension pin is withdrawn from the wire suspension loop, allowing booby trap to drop. Impact with the base of the shell case sets back the striker, exploding the grenade.

(2) Shows an inverted shell case, or suitable cylinder tied to stake. Booby trap is released in the same manner, and impact with flat stone or any hard object sets back striker, exploding grenade.

(3) Shows two booby traps suspended from a three nail arrangement (shown in inset). String connecting the two booby traps is easily snapped allowing them to fall.

(4) Shows booby trap arranged as in (2) projecting through the floor with suspension pin attached to the door. Any movement of the door withdraws suspension pin resulting in the same action previously described.



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ADV/MISC/5091

GSI (a) ADV LHQ

OPERATIONS ITALIAN FRONT

AS AT 7 NOV '43

LEGEND

SITUATION AS AT 7 NOV '43

LINE OF ALLIED THRUSTS

PISTOIA
PRATO
SAN MARINO
PÉSARO
FANO
PISA
ARNO R.
FLORENCE
URBINO
SENIGALLIA
LEGHORN
ANCONA
JESI
VOLTERRA
AREZZO
CECINA
SIENA
MACERATA
PTO CIVITANOVA
L. TRASIMENO
PERUGIA
FERMO
PIOMBINO
CANTALUPO
FOLIGNO
SAN BENEDETTO
ELBA
ASCOLI PICENO
GROSSETO
L. BOLSENA
TERAMO
TERNI
S. STEFANO
VITERBO
RIETI
PESCARA
AQUILA
CHIETI
ORTONA
L. BRACCIANO
CIVITAVECCHIA
TEVERE R.
VASTO
SULMONA
AVEZZANO
ATESSA
TERMOLI
TIVOLI
PESCHICI
ROME
SANGRO R.
AGNONE
LARINO
FIUMICINO
9 OCT 43
VELLETRI
SAN SEVERO
MOLISE
FROSINONE
ISERNIA
MANFREDONIA
MACCHIAGODENA
CAMPOBASSO
ANZIO
LITTORIA
CASSINO
VENAFRO
VINCHIATURO
FOGGIA
FONDI
MATESE MTS
VOLTURNO R.
BARLETTA
TERRACINA
FORMIA
TEANO
CERIGNOLA
ANDRIA
GAETA
G. of GAETA
MONDRAGONE
ALLIED LINE
BENEVENTO
CASERTA
MELFI
AVELLINO
NAPLES
G. of NAPLES
SALERNO
SORRENTO
POTENZA

GSI
FIRST AUST ARMY
MAP NO. 69
DATE 7-11-43

FIR/MISC/6585

REPRODUCED BY 6 AUST ARMY TOPO SVY COY AIF. NOV '43.

Appx "E"

SECRE

Copy

GSI

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 6

Compiled from information received
from 1200 hrs 20 Nov 43 to 1200 hrs 27 Nov 43

1. Information herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols command.
2. A receipt is not required but copy holders should note serial numbers and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue.
3. All dates and times are Eastern Australian standard time.

PART I

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

FINSCHHAFEN

Further progress has been made by our troops advancing on SATELBERG with the object of capturing the vital high ground in this area. In addition, many strong points by-passed during the opening stages of the attack have been mopped up by our troops operating to the north and NW of JIVEVANENG.

By 19 Nov our troops, advancing westwards through difficult jungle country along the SATELBERG track, reached a position 1600 yards south by east of SATELBERG. Tanks used in support of this drive proved effective in spite of anti-tank ditches and minefields that had been constructed by the enemy. One 75 mm gun, two 37 mm guns and several machine guns were knocked out by the tanks on 19 Nov.

On 20 Nov commanding high ground 1350 yards south of SATELBERG was captured and contact made with our troops who had moved up from KUMAWA. The following day, with the support of tanks, an enemy position 1000 yards SW of SATELBERG was captured.

On 22 Nov a further advance was made along the track as far as " the ford " (500 yards west by south of SATELBERG). Here strong enemy opposition was encountered and part of our forces swung west to carry out an outflanking movement. Enemy resistance to this movement was met on a spur 750 yards west of SATELBERG.

On 24 Nov the attack for the SATELBERG HEIGHTS was commenced. Our troops on the left flank attacked from a position 600 yards west of SATELBERG but were forced to withdraw to their original positions when the enemy counter-attacked from the west and north. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy who, it is reported, attacked his own positions after our troops had withdrawn.

In conjunction with our attack from the west others of our troops moved from " the ford " to outflank the enemy positions from the east.

In face of heavy fire from the SATELBERG HEIGHTS they reached a kunai patch 150 yards from the top of the ridge and repulsed an enemy counter-attack. Latest reports stated that on 25 Nov a footing had been gained on the eastern end of the " Heights ".

Our artillery and patrols have been active in harassing enemy troops moving along the BONGA-WAREO track.

On 22 Nov, apparently in an endeavour to afford some protection to this line of supply, the enemy attacked our positions located one mile NE, 600 yards NW and 1000 yards west of the mouth of the SONG River. All attacks were repulsed.

RAMU VALLEY

Only patrolling activity has been reported.

To the east and north of DUMPU, GOMUMU, GURIA and MUNGO were found to be clear of the enemy. On 24 Nov casualties were inflicted on a small enemy force four miles north of KUMBARUM.

To the north of KESAWAI increased enemy activity is reported in the vicinity of KISA but no contact was made with the enemy in the IRIGINA-URIA area (4½ miles NW KISA).

Attached as Appendix "A" is a photographic reproduction of a topographical model of the MADANG-RAMU VALLEY area.

SOLOMONS

BOUGAINVILLE

During night 22/23 Nov Allied troops landed near the mouth of the TOROKINA River (6000 yards east CAPE TOROKINA).

On 23 Nov enemy guns shelling Allied craft unloading east of TOROKINA were silenced by Naval air and counter-battery bombardment.

The Allied beach head at EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY has been extended and by 23 Nov was 9000 yards wide and 7000 yards deep. Heavy enemy resistance which was encountered on the NE sector of the perimeter was overcome by artillery fire and 75 enemy were killed.

(b) SEA - OWN

NEW BRITAIN

On night 19/20 Nov Allied light surface units attacked a submarine 40 miles SSE GASMATA. Results were not observed.

HUON PENINSULA

During night 22/23 Nov light Allied surface craft, on patrol along the RAI COAST, destroyed two barges west of SIO and three southbound barges off BLUCHER POINT. All barges were reported fully loaded.

On the following night two empty northbound barges were sunk off HARDENBERG POINT (28 miles NNW FINSCHHAFEN).

SEA - ENEMY

NEW BRITAIN - NEW IRELAND

Sightings of merchant shipping apparently destined for RABAUL or returning to the north from that base, have remained on a scale commensurate with normal supply.

On 21 Nov a possible task force, heading for RABAUL, and consisting of at least six naval vessels was reported 45 miles SSE of KAVIENG.

A photographic coverage of RABAUL Harbour showed the following vessels present on 24 Nov :

One light cruiser (possibly damaged)

Nine destroyers

One auxiliary destroyer tender

Nineteen merchant vessels totalling 97000 tons

Reports of small vessels operating along both the north and south coast of NEW BRITAIN continue to support other evidence of increasing enemy strength in the western sector of this island. In particular it appears that the reinforcement and development of GASMATA is receiving considerable attention by the enemy at present.

SOLOMONS

With present Allied air supremacy and apparent naval mastery in the SOLOMONS there has been a noticeable absence of enemy merchant shipping in the area.

It appears that, in common with past practice, the enemy is again resorting to the extensive use of barges in an endeavour to overcome his supply problem. Numbers of these craft have been sighted at BUKA and BUIN-BAISI. In addition, information from enemy sources indicates that a small ship and barge traffic is in operation between RABAUL and BUKA.

Details of one of the routes used on the RABAUL-BUKA link are as follows :-

(a) Depart RABAUL at sunrise, proceed down coast of NEW BRITAIN to WILE BAY, arriving after dark and camping on shore.

(b) Depart the following night and, travelling all next day, sight land that evening.

(c) Land on southern tip of BUKA Island (on the south side of RAMUN BAY), remain over night and the following day. Move on at night to MATCHIN BAY.

This makes a total of four days and nights for the trip and is probably an alternative to the more direct route on which barges stage in the CAPE ST GEORGE area.

NEW GUINEA

Reports of shipping reaching enemy bases on the north coast of NEW GUINEA indicate a continued building up of supplies and possibly reinforcements in this theatre.

On 19 Nov five ships were sighted in MADANG Harbour. Although no details of the tonnage of these vessels were given, their presence is significant in view of enemy reluctance in the past to bring shipping to this base.

NW SECTOR

HALMAHERA ISLAND

On 23 Nov small convoys containing in all eight merchant vessels and two destroyers were reported in various positions off the east coast of HALMAHERA Island. It seems likely that these vessels are included in the following sightings as disclosed by a photographic reconnaissance on 24 Nov :-

WEDA BAY

One 3000 ton freighter transport
One 20/4500 ton freighter transport
One 2500 ton freighter
One 500/1000 ton freighter

WAISILE BAY (128°E 1°10'N)

One 8000 ton freighter transport
One 6500 " " "
One 4500 " " "
One 3000 " " "
Three 20/4500 ton freighter transports
Two 2500 ton freighters
One 15/2500 ton freighter
One 500/1000 " "
One possible minelayer

(c) AIR - OWN

NEW GUINEA

During the week heavy, medium and light bombers attacked enemy lines of communication along both the inland and coastal tracks from SATELBERG to as far north as SIO. In all nearly 200 bombers took part in these attacks. The main targets were areas in the vicinity of SATELBERG and JOANGENG, and dumps and supply points at KALASA, WALD BAY, SIALUM I, GUSIKO, KLARI and at KULUNGTUFU.

On 20 Nov low flying Mitchells attacked small craft, shore installations and AA positions at HANSA BAY and villages from HANSA BAY to ALEXISHAFEN. On 25 Nov the BOGADJIM Rd was bombed and strafed by fighter bombers.

NEW BRITAIN

Medium and heavy bombers attacked the airfield, supply dumps, AA positions and RING RING Plantation in the GASMATA area. Fuel fires and extensive damage to stores at RING RING Plantation are reported.

Bivouac and stores areas at CAPE GLOUCESTER were also attacked.

One Catalina on night reconnaissance bombed a 10,000 ton cargo vessel which was one of a five vessel convoy 45 miles NNW of RABAUL. It was reported that the vessel was later abandoned.

NORTH OF KAVIENG

On two occasions Liberators on reconnaissance bombed enemy shipping in the vicinity of the ST MATTHIAS GP. Hits were scored.

NW AREA

Small forces of Liberators, Mitchells, and Catalinas bombed FAK FAK, SORONG, TABERFANE and AMBON. Shipping at MANOKWARI, MAIKOOR, TABERFANE and off HALMAHERA and SERMATA Is was also attacked. Two 2000/4500 ton freighters were sunk, one 7000/8500 ton merchant vessel was left sinking and direct hits were scored on two other vessels. One of four float planes which attempted to intercept our bombers was shot down.

SOLOMONS

Large forces of dive bombers, and also medium and heavy bombers, bombed and strafed KAHILI, BUKA and KARA airfields. Attacks were also made on KIETA, CHABOI (MATCHIN BAY), FAURO I and on enemy concentrations and supply lines in the EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY area.

AIR - ENEMY

Only slight enemy air activity has been reported in NEW GUINEA. Since his costly raid on GUSAP (15 Nov) and our heavy attacks on the airfields at ALEXISHAFEN and MADANG, no further attempts have been made to disrupt our forward air bases in the MARKHAM and RAMU Valleys.

There were three raids in the FINSCHHAFEN area, two by nine bombers and one by a single aircraft. No damage was reported.

In the SOLOMONS the enemy continued his efforts, on a reduced scale, to disrupt our sea supply of EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY. Main attacks were directed against shipping in EMPRESS AUGUSTA BAY and positions on PURUATA I and CAPE TOROKINA. None of these attacks were effective and at least sixteen aircraft were destroyed by our intercepting fighters or by AA fire.

PART II

1. ENEMY OOB - LAND

(a) RE-ORGANISATION OF JAPANESE DIVISIONS

The only division which may still be a four regiment formation is 19 Division. In this case, when the change is made to the three regiment organisation, it is considered that 74 Infantry Regiment is the one most likely to be dropped.

Recently it was suggested that 109 Infantry Regiment had been dropped from 116 Division. Further investigation now indicates that 138 Infantry Regiment is much more likely to be the one eliminated from this division.

Allied to this is the incidence of the numeral "100" in the numbering of Japanese formations. In this regard, the following is significant :-

40	Infantry	Regiment	was	dropped	from	10 Division
140	"	"	"	"	"	110 "
70	"	"	"	"	"	4 "
170	"	"	"	"	"	104 "
38	"	"	"	"	"	16 "
138	"	"(?)	"	"	"	116 "

(b) The following amendments have been made to estimates of enemy strengths in SWPA since 10 Nov 43 :-

NE SECTOR :

Forward of SIO	8,500	This increase is due to the presence of 5 Company 3 Battalion 80 Infantry Regiment, 1 Battalion 238 Infantry Regiment, Miscellaneous Units (including Naval troops) in area.
RABAUL	60,000	This increase is due to presence of portion of 17 Division in NEW BRITAIN.
NEW IRELAND	10,000	Increase due to the arrival of part 17 Division.


(FAA Weekly Intelligence Summary No 81)

4. ORGANISATION

MEDIUM ARTILLERY REGIMENT

The following organisation of a Medium Artillery Regiment has been taken from a notebook captured on GUADALCANAL in Mar 43.

The strengths are only approximate, and are taken from a loading table, which gives each battery a strength of 200.



TOTAL ESTIMATED STRENGTH :-

1,550 all ranks
24/155 mm How

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 68)

6. EQUIPMENT

(a)JAPANESE FIELD TELEPHONE MODEL "92":

Photographic reproductions and details of this instrument are attached as Appendices "B(1)" and "B" respectively.

(b)NEW TYPE JAPANESE TANK

Attached as Appendices "C" and "C(1)" are description and sketches of a new type Japanese tank recently observed at RABAUL.

9. GENERAL

NEW GUINEA NATIVES UNDER THE JAPANESE

The following has been extracted from F.E.L.O. Information Review No.7, 1 November,1943 :

"It is now possible to obtain a picture of native conditions under Japanese domination in some parts of New Guinea.

"In areas which have been recently recaptured by Allied forces, numbers of natives have reported to District Officers for labour, largely as a result of instructions to that effect distributed by means of leaflets and broadcasts. It has been stated that these natives are happy to be working again for the Government and glad to see Australians again in charge of the area. Most of them had become exasperated at their treatment by the Japanese, who either did not pay at all for the food and services required or paid only in Japanese money which the natives did not value.

"It appears that the natives, during the Japanese occupation, were divided into 2 definite groups - one comprising those who actively assisted the Japanese and the other those who avoided contact with the invaders and retired to the bush. In one place the Japanese themselves reported that the natives were originally friendly but because of Allied propaganda had fled into the bush.

"The natives who were pro-Japanese became actively hostile to Allied parties, whose movements they reported to the Japanese, and assisted the enemy willingly in other ways. When this area was invested by the Allies and the full effect of the bombing and shelling began to be felt, these natives, fearing for their own safety, abandoned the Japanese out of self-interest. Now that this part of the country is again in Allied hands, they expect punishment for having assisted the enemy but, despite this, they are relieved that fighting has ceased and they are back under control of those they know.

"In some places the Japanese had trained natives to be used as auxiliary troops or police. They were given training in small arms exercises, using sticks for rifles and stones for hand grenades; reports have been received of armed natives operating on their own in certain areas. In lieu of uniform they were issued with a black loin cloth and an arm-band. They were also instructed in scouting and spying, and it is known that natives were used by the Japanese to keep them posted of Allied troop movements. These Japanese-trained agents were also taught to spread Japanese propaganda amongst other natives.

"The invaders used individuals who could speak Pidgin English to negotiate with villages for carriers and food. If they did not obtain co-operation, the Japanese would burn the village and shoot all livestock. As a result of these methods they usually obtained their requirements. Movement of individual natives was restricted, and passes were issued to those who were travelling on Japanese business. Another form of pass issued by the Japanese military police to certain natives was a certificate of good citizenship, a mimeographed form in which the bearer's name, business and domicile were filled in in ink, and the period for which it was valid.

"Health of the natives in an area recovered from the Japanese has definitely deteriorated, and the women and children particularly are suffering from deficiency diseases. Knowledge of elementary hygiene has been largely forgotten, and will have to be taught again.

"Natives in a certain area still occupied by the Japanese were at first friendly to the invaders, but are now definitely antagonistic towards them. All except a few are waiting for liberation. Their antagonism was caused by the behaviour of the Japanese, who looted gardens, shot livestock and molested women. An elderly native who protested against such actions was shot in cold blood, an incident which aroused the natives' hostility. Only a few of the natives are collaborating and there is said to be one native Quisling who is greatly resented by the other villagers and who is likely to be eliminated by them when the moment is opportune.

"At first these natives believed Japanese propaganda to the effect that all New Guinea was in their hands and the Japanese forces had nearly reached Sydney. After seeing Allied leaflets, however, the natives believed the messages contained therein and discounted all enemy propaganda. They are keen to get leaflets and believe in them implicitly. Allied airmen have reported that after a flight on which leaflets have been dropped, natives come out on the beach and wave to the planes. When the noise of the Allied bombardment of Lae was heard in this area, the Japanese tried to pass it off as their own guns practising, but the natives were not deceived, especially after reading leaflets telling of the fall of Lae and Salamaua.

"Natives in a part of Papua from which the Japanese were driven about nine months ago are puzzled that the war is not yet over.

about
They have no doubt/the respective merits of the Japanese and the Australian Administrations. In one village a painted sign has been put up over the Government Rest House, with the slogan, 'Our flag is the blue Ensign, the sign of Peace in Papua', flanked on one side by the American star and on the other by the R.A.A.F. roundel. This was done on his own initiative by the native constable."

(AAF Intelligence Summary No 156)

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL

(a) JAPANESE MAP OF FINSCHHAFEN AREA

Included in this Summary, as Appendix "D", is a reproduction of a captured Japanese map, showing the disposition of opposing forces in the FINSCHHAFEN - WAREO area as at 1600 hours, 14 (presumably Oct) 43.

Translations are placed next to the Japanese characters and conventional signs.

(b) INDEX OF PLACE NAMES

Place names mentioned in recent operations, which may not be commonly known :

NAME	TERRITORY	LAT DEG	LAT MIN	LONG DEG	LONG MIN
BAGABAG Is	NEW GUINEA	04	49	146	14
BAGASIN	RAMU VALLEY	05	22	145	28
GREEN RIDGE	FINSCHHAFEN	06	30	147	48
JOANGENG	"	06	24	147	36
KALUENG R	"	06	25	147	52
KUANKO	"	06	27	147	48
KERAVIA BAY	RABAUL	04	18	152	12
LAKE TAGE	DUTCH NEW GUINEA	04	00	136	15
LAKE TIGI	"	04	05	136	15
MAIKOOR	AROE I	06	10	134	10
MAWARAKA	BOUGAINVILLE I	06	27	155	13
MIBO	"	06	48	155	32
RING HILL	FINSCHHAFEN	06	25	147	52
ZAGAHEMI	"	06	20	147	44

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

BURMA:

The situation generally shows little change in northern BURMA, but our forces met strong opposition in the CHIN HILLS and BUTHIDAUNG - MAUNGDAW areas, and have been forced to withdraw. No further reports have been received of the position in the SALWEEN area.

Our forces west of the MANIPUR RIVER in the FALAM area are now called HASFORCE. Forces east of the MANIPUR RIVER are called CHINFORCE.

In northern BURMA reliable reports state that the enemy garrison at SUMPRABUM has been raised to 300 Japanese, and the enemy force in the MINGCHAUNGYANG area (37 miles NE by north of MYITKYINA) has been increased to one rifle company.

On 12 Nov it was reported that the Japanese occupy LAKCHANG GA (three miles WSW of TARO). Chinese forces at TAGAHKU (five miles NW of TARO) successfully repulsed an enemy attack. Enemy strength at YUPBANG GA (19 miles NNW of MAINGKWAN) is estimated at one rifle company, with six machine guns.

(Condensed from FAA Weekly Intelligence Summary No 81)

PART V

SECURITY

(a) Censorship in the Army has never been popular and due, partly, to the actions of some franking officers the position is not improving. Far too many instances are noticed of troops complaining that something they have written in their letters has been openly discussed by the franking officer in his mess etc.

Dealing with this matter LHQ FCI No 4 states :-

(i) Franking officers shall treat as secret and confidential all information gained by them in the performance of their duties as franking officers, and shall on no account and in no wise, divulge any information so gleaned except when public safety or the interest of the Service requires a report to be made to a superior officer.

(ii) COs Units will see that their officers are fully seized with the fact that the letters they read and frank are the private communications of their men, and are to be treated as secret. It must be appreciated by all franking officers that the authority to examine the private correspondence of other ranks is justified legally and morally only by war emergency. To discuss unlawfully or ridicule any matter read in another man's communication is a despicable act. It is the duty of every CO to ensure that severe disciplinary action is taken against offenders in this regard.

Naturally the soldier does not like to think that the contents of his letter may become the topic of conversation in an officer's mess and looks about for some other method of sending mail to avoid Unit censorship. This can prove very dangerous as the writer, with the idea in his mind that the letter will not be censored, is apt to discuss matters of military importance. The addressee may be a member of the forces and considered reliable by the writer who does not think of the possibility of the letter being intercepted by persons who would use the information against the Allies.

It is the duty of every officer to point out to the men why censorship is necessary and give them examples of how information in a letter may be intercepted by the enemy.

(Extracted from FAA Weekly Intelligence Summary No 81)

(b) JAPANESE SEARCHING THE DEAD

Own Dead -

A recent Allied patrol in NEW GUINEA discovered many unburied Japanese. Very few letters or papers of any description were found on the bodies, and it would seem that, when time and opportunity permit, the Japanese are now searching their dead and removing any articles which may be of use to the Allies.

Our Dead -

A captured Japanese document discloses that the enemy is adopting our methods. The document reads:-

"Enemy method will be used in the accumulation of intelligence, particularly the taking of prisoners and examination of abandoned corpses."

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No.68)

(c) DOCUMENTS CARRIED ON PATROL

A captured enemy document, which describes a clash with one of our patrols, evidences that documents of operational value were carried by the patrol.

A detailed description of the action ends as follows:-

".....we captured 1 automatic rifle, 4 magazines, a sketch map, a pocketbook, etc, which were of tremendous military value to future operations".

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No.68)

Brian Ryder
Capt
GS 1 Aust Corps

SECRET

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APPENDIX "A"

1 Aust. Corps Int. Summary No. ...

PHOTOGRAPH OF TOPOGRAPHICAL MODEL

MADANG – RAMU VALLEY



ROAD FROM BOGADJIM UNDER CONSTRUCTION BY JAPANESE REPORTED NIL TO YOKOPI ONLY

OUR PATROLS ACTIVE IN THESE AREAS

5 0 5 10 15

SCALE IN MILES

GSI a ADV LHQ

ADV/MISC/s c 9 3

Reproduced by 1 Aust. Mob. Lithe Sec. (AIF), Aust. Sig. Corps.

APPENDIX "B"

1 Aust. Corps Int. Summary No. 6

JAPANESE FIELD TELEPHONE - MODEL 92

The description and characteristics of this instrument have been extracted from a report made by the PMG Department and published in GSI LHQ Technical Intelligence Summary No 7 - Oct 43. Annotated photographs showing component parts were produced by GSI Adv LHQ and are shown in the accompanying photographic appendix.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION:

The complete set is contained in a wooden cabinet with a sheet metal lid and metal reinforced corners. The metal fittings are plated with several very thin alternate layers of nickel and copper, and the complete outer surface is heavily coated with glycerylpthallate resin lacquer. The handset was not available for examination but it is of a similar design and weight to that used with the trench telephone No. 2 type carried in a leather case.

EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHT:

Length	:	10⅜ in
Breadth	:	6⅞ in
Depth	:	4½ in
Weight (less handset)	:	10½ lbs

TACTICAL USE:

The appearance of the instrument would suggest that it is intended for installation at a Headquarters or sheltered location. Whilst it is sturdily made, its finish would suffer in comparison with the trench telephone if it was given the same treatment and exposure to the elements as the latter.

The following facilities are provided :-

(i) Speech circuit - handset and spare receivers are provided.

(ii) Magneto signalling facilities -hand generator and magneto bell.

(iii) Telegraph facilities - telegraph key operates the buzzer in a local circuit, providing a tone of 600 cycles per second.

METHOD OF HANDLING:

A - CONNECTION:

(i) Connect line to main (shown thus 本) Earth bar to Earth return (shown thus 地)

On the surface are two links; maintain in normal position i.e. closed.

(ii) Use of telegraph circuit. Open electric bell by means of left hand link.
Connect telegraph wires to main, earth bar to earth return.

(iii) Connect lightning arrester, if necessary and ensure that it is installed inside lid otherwise lid will not close.

(iv) When a two wire, or metallic circuit is used, connect the wires to main and earth terminals. If the lightning arrester is used an "escape ground" or earth pin connection is necessary. When a single line is used with a lightning arrester, it is necessary to connect the earth terminals of both the telephone and lightning arrester to the "escape ground" or earth pin.

B - USE OF DRY BATTERIES:


Place two dry batteries in position and connect battery wires when using the set. When battery voltage runs down, the vibrator cannot be used and the batteries should then be renewed.


(AHF Review No 68)

APPENDIX "B" (3)
1 Aust Corps Int. Summary No. 6.

~~APPENDIX B (3)~~


JAPANESE FIELD TELEPHONE MODEL 92





SET OPEN FOR USE

REAR VEIW OF CABINET



KEY TO NOMENCLATURE

1 Line Terminals
2 Handset Terminals
3 Protector Block
4 Protector Earth Terminal
5 Test Terminals
6 Telegraph Key
7 Batteries
8 Generator
9 Condenser
10 Spare Parts Container
11 Spare Parts
12 Opening Catch
13 Handset
14 Earphone
15 Induction Coil
16 Circuit Diagram & Instruction

GSI (a) ADV LHQ

Reproduced by 1 Aust. Mob. Lubr. Ser. (AIF) Aust. Sup. Corps.
ADV/MISC/3 a 98

APPENDIX "C"
1 Aust. Corps Int. Summary No. 6

NEW TYPE JAPANESE TANK

Photographs taken over the RABAUL area north of SULPHUR CREEK on 2 Nov revealed 12 tanks of a hitherto unknown type. As the photographs are very small, it has been impossible to give, accurately, full particulars of the tank, but the sketch shown in Appendix "C(i)" is considered to give a correct impression of the proportions and salient features.

It is intended to publish further details as and when information is forthcoming. For the present the following points may be noted :-

(a) The tank is a new and possibly amphibious type. It virtually has no rounded curves for deflection of fire but is angular in form.

(b) Consistent with the possibility of it being amphibious are :-

(i) The appearance of an exhaust pipe at the rear right hand side of the top of the hull.

(ii) The absence of exterior attachments, thus precluding the fixing of luggage etc to the outside of the tank. The absence of such attachments would also, however, assist against sticky bombs and against personnel climbing onto the tank.

(c) It appears to have the following characteristics :-

(i) Weight approximately 9 tons
(ii) Length approximately 14 feet
(iii) Height to top of turret approximately 7 feet
(iv) Width to top of turret approximately 8 feet

(d) Armament consists probably of a 37 mm gun in the turret and a MG (probably 7.7 mm) forward on the left of the hull.

(e) The suspension is of the Carden-Lloyd type, has two bogies (4 bogey wheels) and appears to have the idler wheel at the rear touching the ground. This would be consistent with the Japanese later model Tankette (2598 - 1938), and would place the driving sprocket at the front.


(f) Two hatches with hatch covers hinged at the rear are located on either side of the turret, and a ventilator hatch is on the top and centre rear of the hull. The turret has a cupola top.


(g) One photograph shews that a periscope is probably mounted on the right side of the hull forward of the hatch.

(NEW GUINEA Force Weekly
Intelligence Summary No 148)

APPENDIX "C" (1)
1 Aust. Corps Int. Summary No. 6...

NEW TYPE JAPANESE TANK





G.S.I. FIRST AUST. ARMY....
BASED ON INFM. FROM X.G.3. INT SUMMARY HQ.
REPRODUCED BY 6 AUST ARMY TOPO SVY DDY AIF. NOV '43

FIR/MISC/6694

JAPANESE SKETCH MAP of FINSCHHAFEN AREA


Showing Disposition of Own and Enemy Forces

Date 14 (presumably October) 43

Note: 1 For ease of reading the enemy conventional signs have been translated.

2 The Japanese use blue for their own troops and red for the enemy

SECRET
Appendix 'C' to A.M.F.
Weekly Int. Review No 6



ADV/MISC/5092

Reproduced by 1 Aust. Mob. Litho. Sec. (AIF) Aust. Sup. Corps

GSI (a) ADV LHQ 19 Nov 43

Appx "F"

MOE

Subject: 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT.

Copy No. 47...

1 AUST CORPS
13 Nov 43

G//591/OPS

DISTRIBUTION	Copy No.		Copy No.
6 Aust Div	1-3	GOC	27
RAA 1 Aust Corps	4	BGS	28
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps Tps	5	G (Ops)	29
A Aust Corps Sigs	6-8	G (SD)	30
Signals Centre ATHERTON	9	CE	31
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	10	CSO	32
2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	11	DA&QMG	33
First Aust Army (AIF)	12-13	A	34
Queensland L of C Area	14	Q	35
1 (NQ) L of C Sub Area	15	RAMS	36
17 (CAIRNS) L of C Sub Area	16-17	Legal	37
2 Aust Fd Censorship Sec	18	S & T	38
First Aust Army Stationery Det (AIF) ATHERTON	19	Medical	39
		Ord	40-41
Movts CAIRNS	20-21	AEME	42
Movts TOWNSVILLE	22-23	Pro	43
RTO ATHERTON	24	Postal	44
2/2 Aust Gen Hospital	25	File	45
13 Adv Ord Depot	26	War Diary	46-47

1. Herewith 1 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 2359 hrs 8 Nov 43.

2. Please acknowledge.

R Z Hughes Maj
for Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

HQ 1 Aust Corps

1. Receipt is acknowledged of 1 AUST CORPS Location Statement as at 2359 hrs 8 Nov. Copy No .....

.....Rank

.....Appt.

APPENDIX "A"

MOST SECRET

Map Legend: BF - BARTLE FRERE One inch
D - DIMBULA " "
G - GORDONVALE " "
H - HERBERTON " "

1 Aust Corps Location Statement

CORPS TROOPS 1 Aust Corps - Veh Sign - Bulldog on Boomerang

Scr No	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No	Veh No	Unit	LOCATION	Map Ref	Remarks
1.	HQ UNITS	61001	107	HQ 1 AUST CORPS	BARRINE	G555344	
2.			107	1 AUST CORPS SIG UNIT CORPS	BARRINE	G555344	
3.		45735	120	Det 1 AUST CORPS Def & Emp Pl	BARRINE	G555344	
4.		61005	225	2/1 Aust Gd Regt (less A,B,C,E & two pls D Coy)	KAIRI		
5.	CAV	61183	102	HQ 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt HQ and HQ Sqn	WONGABEL		
6.			102	2/3 Aust Cav (Commando) Sqn	WONGABEL	H390190	
7.		45524		2/5 Aust Cav (Commando) Sqn	WONGABEL	H390190	
8.		61239	165	2/9 Aust Cav Regt	KAIRI	G566379	Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation.
9.	ARTY		109	HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	BARRINE	G555344	
10.		61034		2/2 Aust Fd Regt	KAIRI	G471389	
11.		61122	142	2/7 Aust Fd Regt	KAIRI	G484373	
12.		61036	152	2/8 Aust Fd Regt	KAIRI	G472383	
13.		61038	145	HQ 2/5 Aust Tk L Regt	KAIRI	G476377	
14.		45990	177	3 Aust Fd Svy Bty (AIF) (less three fd secs)	KAIRI	G476377	One Fd Sec under each 6 7 9 Divs.
15.		45740	87	8 Aust Fd Svy Bty (AIF)	KAIRI	G474377	
16.				5 Aust Mob Met Flt	MAREEBA		
17.				1 Aust Mtn Bty	KAIRI		
18.	Engrs	45741	101 HQ R/E	2 Aust Corps Tps (AIF)	WONGABEL	H401180	
19.		46040	138	2 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	G704411	
20.		45726	118	17 Aust Camflg Unit (AIF)	WONGABEL	H401180	
21.	SVY	45597		Det 2/1 Aust L Topo Svy Coy	TOLGA	D385318	Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
22.	SIGS	61008	115	"A" Aust Corps Sigs (AIF)	BARRINE	G557338	
23.		45722	185	21 Aust Cipher Sec (Type A)	BARRINE	G557338	
24.		45587		Det LHQ Cipher Replacement Sec	BARRINE	G557338	Temp under command 1 Aust Corps Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation.

Scr No.	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No	Veh No	Unit	LOCATION	Map Ref	Remarks
25.	SIGS Contd	61239	165	2/9 Aust Cav Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G566379	
26.		61034	134	2/2 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G471389	
27.		61122	142	2/7 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G484373	
28.		61036	183	2/8 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G472383	
29.		61038	145	2/3 Aust Tk A Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G476377	
30.				23 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec			Not yet in area.
31.	Inf			HQ 23 Aust Inf Bde	)		
32.				Det 12 Aust Div Postal Unit	)		Not yet in area.
33.				7 Aust Inf Bn	)		
34.				8 Aust Inf Bn	)		
35.		47768	68	7 Aust MG Bn (AIF)	KAIRI	G503376	Corps Tps
36.	AASC	61380		HQ Cond 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	WONGABEL	E399178	To be redesignated 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC
37.		45773	907	132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less C pl)	ROCKY CREEK	D376371	C Pl under comd NGF
38.		45629	188	8 Aust MAC (AIF)	EAST BARRON	BF479228	First Aust Army Tps.
39.		45289	678	2 Aust Pack Tpt Coy	KAIRI	G465385	Under comd 1 Aust Corps for training Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation To move shortly.
40.		61364		2/3 Aust Coy AASC	WONGABEL	E400178	Det ATHERTON
41.				2/3 Aust Coy AASC	KAIRI		
42.				HQ 3 Aust Sup Depot (AIF)			
43.				11 Aust Sup Pl (AIF)			Not yet under comd 1 Aust Corps.
44.				12 Aust Sup Pl (AIF)			
45.				13 Aust Sup Pl (AIF)			
46.		48435		Det 1 Pl 5 Aust Farm Coy AASC	WASP CREEK	G525326	Raised for HQ Qld L of C Area.
47.	Medical			2/12 Aust Fd Amb	KAIRI		
48.		45693	117	18 Aust Fd Amb (AIF)	KAIRI	G476366	
49.		45381	135	109 Aust CCS (AIF)	WONDECLA	H510096	On leave
50.				104 Aust CCS (AIF)	WONDECLA	H510096	
51.				105 Aust Mob Bath Unit			Not yet under comd 1 Aust Corps
52.		45312	271	101 Aust Mob Evac Amb	WONDECLA	H510096	LHQ Tps. Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation

Serial	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No.	Veh No	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
53.	MEDICAL			2/3 Aust Mob Path Lab	CAIRNS		LHQ Tps
54.				2 Aust Mob Micro-Radiograph Unit	ATHERTON		LHQ Tps
55.	DENTAL			First Aust Army Sub Depot Dental Stores	ATHERTON		Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
56.		45696	181	2/4 Aust Dental Unit			First Army Tps
57.				HQ Sec (1)	BARRINE		Att HQ 1 Aust Corps
58.				HQ Sec (2)	KAIRI		Att 2/2 Fd Regt
59.				A Sec	ROCKY CREEK		Att 132 Gen Tpt Coy
60.				B Sec	KAIRI		Att 2/9 Aust Cav Regt
61.				C Sec	KAIRI		Att 2/8 Fd Regt
62.				D & F Secs	WONGABEL		Att HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps Tps
63.				E Sec	KAIRI		Att 2/3 Tk A Regt
64.	ORD	45779	127	110 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	KAIRI	G-82370	
65.	AEME	45778	158	110 Aust Bde Wkshops AEME (AIF)	KAIRI	G-82370	
66.		61283		2/44 Aust LAD (Type J)	KAIRI	H401180	Att 110 Bde Wkshops
67.		45723	107	319 Aust LAD	BARRINE	G555344	Att HQ 1 Aust Corps
68.		61039	145	2/71 Aust LAD (Type A)	MOGILL	G476377	Att HQ 2/3 Aust TK A Regt
69.		61240	165	2/82 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G566379	Att 2/9 Aust Cav Regt
70.		61035	134	2/40 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G471389	Att 2/2 Fd Regt
71.		61123	142	2/63 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G484373	Att 2/7 Fd Regt
72.		61037	183	2/64 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G472383	Att 2/8 Fd Regt
73.				108 Aust LAD			Not yet in area
74.		45736	115	290 Aust LAD (AIF)(Type A)	BARRINE	G-57338	Att 1 Corps Sigs
75.		46248	68	316 Aust LAD (AIF)(Type A)	KAIRI	G-03376	Att 7 Aust MG Bn
76.	PRO	45782	128	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
77.		48389		2 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre	WASP CREEK	G533316	Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
78.	POSTAL			1 Aust Corps Postal Unit	BARRINE	G555344	
79.		45783	154	2 Aust Corps Postal Unit (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	Rear Det only
80.	PAY	45781	162	2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
81.	MISC	45787	133	2 Aust Corps Reception Camp(AIF)	WONGABEL		
82.		45785	166	2 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	TOLGA		
83.		45646		Det First Aust Army Stationery Depot (AIF)	ATHERTON		Army Tps
84.		48038	203	First Aust Army Press Unit (AIF)	ATHERTON		Army Tps Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation

Ser No	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No	Veh No	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
85.	MISC Contd	47862		11 Aust Mobile Cinema Unit	YUNGALBURRA	)	LHQ TPS Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation.
86.		47862		12 Aust Mobile Cinema Unit	YUNGALBURRA	)	
87.		47862		17 Aust Mobile Cinema Unit	YUNGALBURRA	)	
88.				5 A C Sqn	MAREEBA		
89.		45185		46 Aust AL Sec (AC) (AIF)	MAREEBA		LHQ Tps. Under comd 1 Aust Corps for Operations.
90.		45934		1 Aust Div Concert Party	MONDECLA		LHQ Tps
91.				30 Club Concert Party			Not yet under comd 1 Aust Corps
92.				Det No 1 Mob Wing LHQ School of Mech	MONGABEL		
93.				No 2 Mobile Trade Testing Sec	TOLGA		

APPENDIX "B"

MOST SECRET

1 Aust Corps Location Statement

6 AUST DIV — Vehicle Sign Kangaroo on BOOMERANG

Ser No	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No	Veh No	Unit	LOCATION	Map Ref	Remarks
1.	HQ	61026	84	HQ 6 AUST DIV	WONDECLA	H366046	
2.	RAA	45983	69	HQ RAA 6 AUST DIV	"	[illegible]	
3.		29416	74	2/3 AUST FD REGT	"	H377068	
4.			48	2/1 AUST LT AA BTY (AIRBORNE)	"	H345064	
5.	RAE	61040	81	HQ RAE 6 AUST DIV	"	H325076	
6.		61042	60	2/2 AUST FD COY	"	H325076	
7.		61206	86	2/15 AUST FD COY	"	H325076	
8.		61044	67	2/22 AUST FD PK COY	"	H325076	
9.	SIGS	61046	66	SIGS 6 AUST DIV	"	H358052	
10.		29416	74	2/3 AUST FD REGT SIG SEC	"	H337068	
11.			81	1 AUST ENGR SIG SEC	"	H325076	
12.		61048	88	16 AUST INF BDE SIG SEC	"	H319074	
13.			96	17 AUST INF BDE SIG SEC	"	H341066	
14.			65	19 AUST INF BDE SIG SEC	"	H319078	
15.	INF	61048	88	HQ 16 AUST INF BDE	"	H319074	
16.		61070	55	DET 6 AUST DIV POSTAL UNIT	"	H319074	
17.		61049	50	2/1 AUST INF BN	"	H318073	
18.		61050	99	2/2 AUST INF BN	"	[illegible]	
19.		61051	56	2/3 AUST INF BN	"	H324073	
20.		61054	96	HQ 17 AUST INF BDE	"	H341066	
21.		61070	55	DET 6 AUST DIV POSTAL UNIT	"	H341066	
22.		61055	63	2/5 AUST INF BN	"	H342067	
23.		61056	61	2/6 AUST INF BN	"	H341067	
24.		61057	93	2/7 AUST INF BN	"	H340067	
25.		61060	65	HQ 19 AUST INF BDE	"	H319078	
26		61070	55	DET 6 AUST DIV POSTAL UNIT	"	H319078	
27.		61061	82	2/4 AUST INF BN	"	H317079	
28.		61062	91	2/8 AUST INF BN	"	H318079	
29.		61063	77	2/11 AUST INF BN	"	H317078	
30.		48423	39	6 AUST DIV CARR COY (LESS ONE PL)	"	H343063	
31.	AASC	61036	59	HQ COMD AASC 6 AUST DIV	"	H327076	
32.		61070	55	DET 6 AUST DIV POSTAL UNIT	"	H327076	
33.		48427	97	2/155 AUST GEN TPT COY	"	H327076	
34.		48425	64	2/5 AUST SUP DEPOT COY	"	H327076	less 25 AUST SUP DEPOT PL
35		48425	64	25 AUST SUP DEPOT PL	"	H297098	
36	AAMC	55405	57	2/1 AUST FD AMB	"	H325073	
37.		55406	52	2/2 AUST FD AMB	"	H325072	
38.		55411	70	2/7 AUST FD AMB	"	H237074	

Ser No	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No.	Veh No	Unit	LOCATION	Map Ref	Remarks
39.	AAOC	48430	83	2/119 AUST BDE ORD FD PK	WONDECLA	H33[illegible]7	
40		46184	98	135 AUST BDE ORD FD PK	"	H330073	
41.	AEME	48431	76	2/119 AUST BDE WKSHOPS	"	H333057	
42.		46183	90	135 AUST BDE WKSHOPS	"	H330073	
43.		61121	74	2/41 AUST LAD	"	H337068	att HQ RAA 6 AUST DIV
44.			84	2/42 AUST LAD	"	H358052	
45.		61053	88	2/45 AUST LAD	"	H319074	att 16 AUST INF BDE
46.		61065	65	2/79 AUST LAD	"	H319078	att 19 AUST INF BDE
47.		61045	67	2/80 AUST LAD	"	H325076	att HQ RAE 6 AUST DIV
48.	MISC	61071	95	6 AUST DIV PRO COY	"	H362046	
49.		61020	80	6 AUST DIV FD CASH OFFICE	"	H366046	
50.		61070	55	6 AUST DIV POSTAL UNIT (LESS DETS)	"	H366046	
51.		61073	78	6 AUST DIV SALVAGE UNIT	"	H322072	

LHQ, ARMY AND CORPS TPS UNDER COMD.

52.	CAV		102	2/5 AUST CAV (COMMANDO) SQN	WONGABEL	H390190	u/c 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt
53.	ARMD	61459	53	"B" SQN 2/9 AUST ARMD REGT	WONDECLA	H327073	
54.		61459	53	"C" SQN 2/9 AUST ARMD REGT	"	H327030	returning to 4 AUST ARMD BDE
55.	RAA	61038	145	12 BTY 2/3 AUST TK A REGT	"	H345064	
56.		45990	177	3 SEC 3 AUST SVY BTY	"	H344065	
57.	RAE	61281	73	26 AUST CAMFLG UNIT	"	H325076	
58	SIGS	46136	68	2/41 AUST CIPHER SEC	"	H358052	
59.		45278	701	2 AUST BEACH SIG SEC	"	H358052	
60.	INF	61230	182	2/3 AUST MG BN (LESS "B" COY)	"	H320067	"B" COY u/c MERAUKE FORCE
61.				2/1 AUST PNR BN	WONGABEL	H403180	
62.		61595	140	2/4 AUST PNR BN (LESS "D" COY)	WONDECLA	H332072	
63.		61595	140	"D" COY 2/4 AUST PNR BN	ROCKY CK		
64.		61005	225	"C" COY 2/1 AUST GD REGT (less 10,11,12 PLS)	WONDECLA	H366046	
65.		61005	225	10 PL 2/1 AUST GD REGT	"	H319074	att 16 AUST INF BDE
66.		61005	225	11 PL 2/1 AUST GD REGT	"	H341006	att 17 AUST INF BDE
67.		61005	225	12 PL 2/1 AUST GD REGT	"	H341006	att 19 AUST INF BDE

SER No	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No	Veh No	Unit	LOCATION	Map Ref	Remarks
68.	FSW	61003	84	"A" AUST FS SEC	WONDECLA	H366046	
69.	AAMC	45839	143	104 AUST CCS	"	H327075	
70.				109 AUST CCS	"	H310096	u/c 1 AUST CORPS
71.				101 AUST MOB	"	H310096	u/c 1 AUST CORPS
72.		61237	79	2/117 AUST MOB BATH UNIT	"	H322072	
73.		48393	161	19 AAMCU	"	H325073	
74.	AADC	55573	156	HQ (1) SEC 2/8 AUST DENTAL UNIT	"	H366046	att HQ 6 AUST DIV.
75.			156	HQ (2) 2/8 AUST DENTAL UNIT	"	H325076	att HQ RAE 6 AUST DIV
76.			156	"A" SEC 2/8 AUST DENTAL UNIT	"	H317079	att 2/4 AUST INF BN
77.			156	"B" SEC 2/8 AUST DENTAL UNIT	"	H318079	att 2/8 AUST INF BN
78.			156	"C" SEC 2/8 AUST DENTAL UNIT	"	H337068	att 2/3 AUST FD REGT
79.			156	"D" SEC 2/8 AUST DENTAL UNIT	"	H315067	att 2/2 AUST INF BN
80.			156	"E" SEC 2/8 AUST DENTAL UNIT	"	H318073	att 2/1 AUST INF B BN
81.			156	"F" SEC 2/8 AUST DENTAL UNIT	"	H327076	att AASC 6 AUST DIV
82.		47908	53	DET WKSHOPS 4 AUST ARMD BDE	"	H327073	
83.		61231	182	2/66 AUST LAD	"	H320067	
84.	ADCS			MESSING STORE		H300091	NOT under comd.
85.	MISC	61168	71	6 AUST DIV RECEPTION CAMP		H295103	
86.				TWO SECS 1 AUST MILITARY LANDING GP		366046	
87		46940	799	VIC L OF C CONCERT PARTY		366046	

LOST SECRET

Subject: 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT.

Copy No. 50

1 Aust Corps

3/ Nov 43

G/ 1306 /Ops

DISTRIBUTION	Copy No.		Copy No
3 Aust Div	1-3	Town Major ATHERTON	30
6 Aust Div	4-6	GOC	31
RAA 1 Aust Corps	7	BGS	32
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps Tps	8	G (Ops)	33
A Aust Corps Sigs	9-10	G (SD)	34
Signal Centre ATHERTON	11	CE	35
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	12	CSO	36
2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	13	DA&QMG	37
First Aust Army(AIF)	14-15	A	38
Queensland L of C Area	16	Q	39
1 (NQ) L of C Sub Area	17	DAMS	40
17(CAIRNS) L of C Sub Area	18-19	Legal	41
2 Aust Fd Censorship Sec	20	S & T	42
First Aust Army Stationery Det (AIF) ATHERTON	21	Medical	43
Movts CAIRNS	22-23	Ord	44-45
Movts TOWNSVILLE	24-25	AEHE	46
RTO ATHERTON	26	Pro	47
2/2 Aust Gen Hospital	27	Postal	48
13 Adv Ord Depot	28	File	49
2 Aust Corps Field Punishment Centre	29	War Diary	50-51

1. Herewith 1 Aust Corps Location Statement as at 232359L Nov 43.

2. Please acknowledge.

[redacted] Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps.

HQ 1 Aust Corps

1. Receipt is acknowledged of 1 AUST CORPS Location Statement as at 232359L Nov 43. Copy No .....

.....Rank

.....Appt.

APPENDIX "A"

MOST SECRET

Map Legend: BF - BARTLE FRERE One inch
D - DIMBULA " "
G - GORDONVALE " "
H - HERBERTON " "

1 Aust Corps Location Statement

CORPS TROOPS 1 Aust Corps - Veh Sign - Bulldog on Boomerang

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4.		61005	225	2/1 Aust Gd Regt (less A,B,C,E & two Pls D Coy)	KAIRI		
5.	CAV	61183	102	HQ 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt HQ and HQ Sqn	WONGABEL	H388188	
6.			102	2/3 Aust Cav (Commando) Sqn	WONGABEL	H390190	
7.		45524		2/5 Aust Cav (Commando) Sqn	WONGABEL	H390190	
8.		61239	165	2/9 Aust Cav Regt	KAIRI	G566379	Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
9.	ARTY		109	HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	BARRINE	G555344	
10.		61034		2/2 Aust Fd Regt	KAIRI	G471389	
11.		61122	142	2/7 Aust Fd Regt	KAIRI	G484373	
12.		61036	152	2/8 Aust Fd Regt	KAIRI	G472383	
13.		61038	145	HQ 2/3 Aust Tk/A Regt	KAIRI	G476377	
14.		45990	177	3 Aust Fd Svy Bty (AIF) (less three fd secs)	KAIRI	G476377	One Fd Sec under each 6 7 9 Divs
15.		45740	87	8 Aust Fd Svy Bty (AIF)	KAIRI	G474377	
16.				5 Aust Mob Met Flt	MAREEBA		
17.				1 Aust Mtn Bty	KAIRI		

Ser No.	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No		Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
18.	ENGRS	45741	101	HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps Tps (AIF)	WONGABEL	H401180	
19.		46040	138	2 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	H401180	
20.		45746	118	17 Aust Camflg Unit (AIF)	WONGABEL	H401180	
21.	SVY	45597		Det 2/1 Aust A Topo Svy Coy	TDLGA	D385318	Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
22.	SIGS	61008	115	"A" Aust Corps Sigs (AIF)	BARRINE	G557338	
23.		45722	185	21 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K)	BARRINE	G557338	
24.		45557		Det LHQ Cipher Replacement Sec	BARRINE	G557338	Temp under command 1 Aust Corps Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
25.		61239	165	2/9 Aust Cav Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G566379	
26.		61034	134	8/2 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G471389	
27.		61122	142	2/7 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G484373	
28.		61036	183	2/8 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G472383	
29.		61038	145	2/3 Aust Tk/A Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G476377	
30.				23 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	KAIRI	G485395	
31.	INF			HQ 3 Aust Div	KAIRI	G512398	Adv Parties Only
32.				HQ 8 Aust Inf Bde	KAIRI	G482370	Adv Parties Only
33.				HQ 23 Aust Inf Bde	KAIRI	G485395	
34.				Det 12 Aust Div Postal Unit	KAIRI	G485395	
35.				7 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G482391	
36.				8 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G479391	
37.		47768	68	7 Aust MG Bn (AIF)	KAIRI	G503376	Corps Tps
38.	AASC	61380	116	HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	WONGABEL	H399178	To be redesignated 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC
39.		45773	907	132 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less C Pl)	ROCKY CREEK	D375371	C Pl under Comd NGF
40.		45629	188	8 Aust MAC (AIF)	EAST BARRON	BF479228	First Aust Army Tps.

Ser No.	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No.	Veh No	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
41.	AASC (Cont)	45289	678	2 Aust Pack Tpt Coy	KAIRI	G4o5385	Under comd 1 Aust Corps for training Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation to move shortly
42.		61364		2/3 Aust Coy AASC	WONGABEL	H400178	Det ATHERTON
43.				2/6 Aust Coy AASC	KAIRI		
44.							
45.							
46.							
47.							
48.		48435		Det 1 Pl 5 Aust Coy AASC	Farm WASP CREEK	G525326	Raised for HQ Qld L of C Area
49.	MEDICAL			2/12 Aust Fd Amb	KAIRI		Less B Coy DEADMANS GULLY
50.		45381	135	109 Aust CCS (AIF)	WONDECLA	H310096	On leave
51.				105 Aust Mob Bath Unit			Not yet under comd 1 Aust Corps
52.		45312	271	101 Aust Mob Bact Lab	WONDECLA	H310096	LHQ Tps Surplus to Jungle Corp Organisation
53.				2/3 Aust Mob Bact Lab	CAIRNS		LHQ Tps
54.				2 Aust Mob Micro-Radiograph Unit	ATHERTON		LHQ Tps
55.				First Aust Army Sub Depot Dental Stores	ATHERTON		Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
56.		45696	181	2/4 Aust Dental Unit			First Aust Army Tps
57.				HQ Sec (1)	BARRINE		Att HQ 1 Aust Corps
58.				HQ Sec (2)	KAIRI		
59.				A Sec	KAIRI		
60.				B Sec	KAIRI		
61.				C Sec	KAIRI		Att 2/8 Aust Fd Regt
62.				D Sec	WONGABEL		Att 2 Aust Fd Coy
63.				E Sec	BARRINE		Att HQ 1 Aust Corps
64.				F Sec	KAIRI		

Ser No.	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No.	Veh No.	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
65.	ORD	45779	127	110 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	KAIRI	G465360	Temp under comd 6 Aust Div
66.	AEME	45778	158	110 Aust Bde Wkshops AEME (AIF)	KAIRI	G465360	
67.		61283		2/44 Aust LAD (Type J)	WONGABEL	H401180	Temp allotted 17 Aust Inf Bde
68.		45723	107	319 Aust LAD	BARRINE	G555344	Att HQ 1 Aust Corps
69.		61039	145	2/71 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G476377	Att HQ 2/3 Aust Tk/A Regt
70.		61240	165	2/82 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G566379	Att 2/9 Aust Cav Regt
71.		61035	134	2/40 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G471389	Att 2/2 Aust Fd Regt
72.		61123	142	2/63 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G484373	Att 2/7 Aust Fd Regt
73.		61037	183	2/64 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G472383	Att 2/8 Aust Fd Regt
74.				2/108 Aust LAD	KAIRI	G485395	Att 23 Aust Inf Bde
75.		45736	115	290 Aust LAD (AIF) (Type A)	BARRINE	G557338	Att A Corps Sig
76.		46243	68	316 Aust LAD (AIF) (Type A)	KAIRI	G303376	Att 7 Aust MG Bn
77.	PRO	45782	128	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
78.		48389		2 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre	WASP CREEK	G533316	Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
79.	POSTAL			1 Aust Corps Postal Unit	BARRINE	G555344	
80.		45783	154	2 Aust Corps Postal Unit (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	Rear Det only
81.	PAY	45781	162	1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
82.	MISC	45787	133	2 Aust Corps Reception Camp (AIF)	WONGABEL		
83.		45785	166	2 Aust Corps Salvage Unit	TOLGA		
84.		45646		Det First Aust Army Stationery Depot (AIF)	ATHERTON		Army Tps

Ser No.	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No.	Veh No.	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
85.	MISC (Cont)	48038	203	First Aust Army Press Unit (AIF)	ATHERTON		Army Tps Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
86.		47862		11 Aust Mobile Cinema Unit	YUNGABURRA		LHQ Tps Surplus to Jungle Corps Organisation
87.		47862		12 Aust Mobile Cinema Unit	YUNGABURRA		
88.		47862		17 Aust Mobile Cinema Unit	YUNGABURRA		
89.				5 AC Sqn	MAREEBA		
90.		45185		46 Aust AL Sec (AC) (AIF)	MAREEBA		LHQ Tps under comd 1 Aust Corps for operations.
91.		45934		1 Aust Div Concert Party	WONDECLA		LHQ Tps
92.				30 Club Concert Party			Not yet under comd 1 Aust Corps.
93.				Det No 1 Mob Wing LHQ School of Mech	WONGABEL		
94.				No 2 Mobile Trade Testing Sec	TOLGA		
95.			166	2 Aust Corps Salv Unit	TOLGA		

Ser No.	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No.	Veh No.	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
48.	MISC	61071	95	6 Aust Div Pro Coy	Wondecla	H362046	less det DEADMANS GULLY
49.		61020	80	6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	"	H366046	
50.		61070	55	6 Aust Div Postal Unit (less dets)	"	H366046	
51.		61073	78	6 Aust Div Salvage Unit	"	H322072	
				LHQ, ARMY AND CORPS TPS UNDER COMD.			
52.	CAV		102	2/5 Aust Cav (Commando) Sqn	WONGABEL	H390190	u/c 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando Regt
53.	ARMD	61459	53	"B" Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	WONDECLA	H327073	
54.		61459	53	Rear Party "C" Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	"	H327030	returning to 4 Aust Armd Bde
55.	RAA			Adv Party 228 Aust LAA Bty and Wkshops	DEADMANS GULLY		
56.		61038	145	12 Bty 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt	WONDECLA	H345064	
57.		45990	177	3 Sec 3 Aust Svy Bty	"	H344065	
58.	RAE			2 Pl 2/3 Aust Ry Constn Coy	DEADMANS GULLY		
59.		61281	73	26 Aust Camflg Unit	WONDECLA	H325076	
60.	SIGS	46136	68	2/41 Aust Cipher Sec	"	H358052	
61.		45278	701	2 Aust Beach Sig Sec	DEADMANS GULLY		
62.	INF	61230	182	2/3 Aust MG Bn (less "B" Coy)	WONDECLA	H320067	"B" Coy u/c MERAUKE FORCE
63.			2/1	Aust Pnr Bn	WONGABEL	H403180	
64.		61595	140	2/4 Aust Pnr Bn	DEADMANS GULLY		
65.		61005	225	"C" Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt (less 10, 11, 12 Pls)	WONDECLA	H366046	att HQ 6 AUST DIV
66.		61005	225	10 Pl 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	"	H319074	att 16 Aust Inf Bde

Ser No.	Arm of Service	War Office Ser No.	Veh No.	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
67.	INF (Cont)	61005	225	11 Pl 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	WONDECLA	H341006	att 17 Aust Inf Bde
68.		61005	225	12 Pl 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	DEADMANS GULLY		att 19 Aust Inf Bde
69.	FSW	61003	84	"A" Aust FS Sec	WONDECLA	H366046	
70.	AAMC	45839	143	104 Aust CCS	"	H327075	
71.				B Coy 2/12 Aust Fd Amb	DEADMANS GULLY		
72.		61237	79	2/117 Aust Mob Bath Unit	WONDECLA	H322072	
73.		48393	161	19 AAMCU	"	H325073	
74.	AADC	55573	156	2/8 Aust Dental Unit HQ (1) Sec	"	H366046	att HQ 6 Aust Div
75.				HQ (2) Sec	"	H325076	att HQ RAE 6 Aust Div
76.				"A" Sec	"	H317079	att 2/4 Aust Inf Bn
77.				"B" Sec	"	H318079	att 2/8 Aust Inf Bn
78.				"C" Sec	"	H337068	att 2/3 Aust Fd Regt
79.				"D" Sec	"	H315067	att 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
80.				"E" Sec	"	H318073	att 2/1 Aust In Bn
81.				"F" Sec	"	H327076	att AASC 6 Aust Div
82.	AEME	47908	53	Det Wkshops 4 Aust Armd Bde	"	H327073	
83.		61231	182	2/66 Aust LAD	"	H320067	
84.	ADOS		303	Messing Store	"	H300091	NOT under comd.
85.	MISC			3 & 4 Secs 3 Aust Armd Div Pro Coy	DEADMANS GULLY		
86.		61168	71	6 Aust Div Reception Camp	WONDECLA	H295103	
87.		46940	799	Vic L of C Concert Party		366046	

APPENDIX "B"

MOST SECRET

1 Aust Corps Location Statement

6 AUST DIV — Vehicle Sign Kangaroo on BOOMERANG

Ser No.	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No	Veh No	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
1.	HQ	61026	84	HQ 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H366046	
2.	RAA	45983	69	HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	"	H344065	
3.		29416	74	2/3 Aust Fd Regt	"	H377068	
4.			48	2/1 Aust Lt AA Bty (Airborne)	"	H345064	
5.	RAE	61040	81	HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	"	H325076	
6.		61042	60	2/2 Aust Fd Coy	DEADMANS GULLY		
7.		61206	86	2/15 Aust A Fd Coy	"		
8.		61044	67	2/22 Aust Fd Pk Coy	WONDECLA	H325076	
9.	SIGS	61046	66	Sigs 6 Aust Div	"	H358052	
10.		29416	74	2/3 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	"	H337068	
11.			81	1 Aust Engr Sig Sec	"	H325076	
12.		61048	88	16 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	"	H319074	
13.			96	17 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	"	H341066	
14.			65	19 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	DEADMAN'S GULLY		
15.	INF	61048	88	HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde	WONDECLA	H319074	
16.		61070	55	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	"	H319074	
17.		61049	50	2/1 Aust Inf Bn	"	H318073	
18.		61050	99	2/2 Aust Inf Bn	"	H315067	
19.		61051	56	2/3 Aust Inf Bn	"	H324073	
20.		61054	96	HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	"	H341066	
21.		61070	55	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	"	H341066	
22.		61055	63	2/5 Aust Inf Bn	"	H342067	
23.		61056	61	2/6 Aust Inf Bn	"	H341067	
24.		61057	93	2/7 Aust Inf Bn	"	H340067	
25.		61060	65	HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	DEADMAN'S GULLY		

Ser No.	Arm of Service	War Office Serial No.	Veh No	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
26.	INF (Corps)	61070	55	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	DEADMANS GULLY		
27.		61061	82	2/4 Aust Inf Bn	"		
28.		61062	91	2/8 Aust Inf Bn	"		
29.		61063	77	2/11 Aust Inf Bn	"		
30.		48423	39	6 Aust Div Carrier Coy (less one pl)	WONDECLA	H343063	
31.	AASC	61066	59	HQ Comd AASC 6 Aust Div	"	H327076	
32.		61070	55	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	"	H327076	
33.		48427	97	2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	"	H327076	less det DEADMANS GULLY
34.		48425	64	2/5 Aust Sup Depot Coy	"	H327076	less det DEADMANS GULLY less 21 AUST SUP DEPOT PL
35.		48425	64	21 Aust Sup Depot Pl	"	H297098	
36.	AAMC	55405	57	2/1 Aust Fd Amb	"	H325073	
37.		55406	52	2/2 Aust Fd Amb	"	H325072	
38.		55411	70	2/7 Aust Fd Amb	"	H237074	
39.	AAOC	48430	83	2/119 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	"	H333067	
40.		46184	98	135 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	"	H330073	
41.	AEME	48431	76	2/119 Aust Bde Wkshops	"	H333067	less det DEADMANS GULLY
42.		46183	90	135 Aust Bde Wkshops	"	H330073	
43.		61121	74	2/41 Aust LAD	"	H337068	att HQ RAA 6 Aust Div
44.			84	2/42 Aust LAD	"	H358052	
45.		61053	88	2/45 Aust LAD	"	H319074	att 16 Aust Inf Bde
46.		61065	65	2/79 Aust LAD	DEADMANS GULLY		att 19 Aust Inf Bde
47.		61045	67	2/80 Aust LAD	WONDECLA	H325076	att HQ RAE 6 Aust Div

V.D.

FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 2 AUST CORPS ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT LOCATIONS OF CORPS ARTILLERY

1 AUST CORPS 0 1318 15

SECRET (.) LOCATION AIRCRAFT 449 to
152100L now 43 (.) units of
23 aust inf bde as detailed
location report 448 now complete AAINF
area with exception rear portion (.)
3 sec 3 aust armd div pro
coy VEHICLE

Copies: A [illegible] ASSISTANT FILE AND RECORD NUMBER 15/2245/L
Sigs War Diary (2)
3 CSO File
Glll(Ops) Log
Extra Copy 6 Div

FIRST ARMY ARMY 6 ARMY DIV 2 ARMY CORPS RECEPTION CAMP LOCATIONS
STD CENTRE ATTENTION

3 ARMY CORPS 0 1945 19


SECRET (.) location report 4SE to 1945GL NOV 45 (.) left
area (.) 18 ARMY FD AMB recp details 2 ARMY CORPS FD CASH
OFFICE recp details 2 ARMY CORPS POSTAL UNIT (.) adv party
HQ 3 ARMY DIV FAIEX

DISPATCH to 1 ARMY
Remainder DHLD

Copies to: A 2 (2) Sigs
CSO G III (Ops) Extra Copy 6 ARMY DIV
War Diary File Log

1824 C

1105



ARMY FORM (2128 (Pads of 100). **MESSAGE FORM**

CAL AND INSTRUCTIONS		No. of Groups.	OFFICE DATE STAMP
	IN	GR.	
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP LOPS CAIRNS
SIG CENTRE ATHERTON

FROM	Originator's Number	Date	In Reply to Number
1 AUST CORPS	01331	25	

SECRET	(.)	location	report	453	to
PZ20QL	nov	43	(.)	2/2	aust
fd	aoy	DEADMANS	GULLY		
Copies to: A		C(2)			
	SHS	War Diary (2)	——		
	GSO	File			
	G III (Ops)	Log			
	Extra copy to 6 Aust Div				

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS *.....WIRELESS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY: IMPORTANT to FIRST AUST ARMY PZ20QL REMAINDER DELS

TIME OF ORIGIN: T.H.I.

SIGNED R.L. RUGGLES Maj

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

* Originator to insert "including" or "except" according to whether the message may or may NOT be sent by wireless.

(5/662) W1. 44921/1625. 400M Pads. 4/41. B. & B. Ltd. 5115.

FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP L OF C AIRMS
SIG CENTRE ATHERTON

1 AUST CORPS 0/335 25

SECRET	(.)	location	report	454	to
252200Z	NOV	43	(.)	adv	party
HQ	U	AUST	INF	DUR	KAIRI

Copies to: A
3igs
CSO
G III (Ops)
Extra Copy of 6 Aust Div
Q (2)
War Diary ✓
File
Log

184 c.

260945Z

R.R. Baldwin Capt

FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP L OF C CAIRNS
SIG CENTRE ATHERTON

1 AUST CORPS 0 1337 26

SECRET (.) location report 455 to
262200L nov 43 (.) 4 aust
Inf hn KAIRI

Copies to A Q (2)
Sigs War Diary
CSO File
G III (Ops) Log ✓
Extra Copy to 6 Aust Div

IMPORTANT TO FIRST AUST ARMY
REMAINDER DRLS

C
1814C

0705 /

Appx "A"

FIRST AUST ARMY & AUST DIV & AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP LOCATIONS
SIG CENTRE ATHERTON

1 AUST CORPS 0 1604 7

SECRET (.) LOCATION REPORT 449 to
2100 hrs 7 Oct (.) portion 9/13 aust
fd enb arrived GAIRI (.) A
sqn 8/9 aust arad regt arrived
RANDELLA

Copies to: A (2)
G(Int) War Diary (2)
Sigs
CSO Log
Gill(Ops)
Extra Copy 6 Aust Div

IMPORTANT FIRST AND 245
DELS Remainder

1 AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP L of C CAIRNS SIG CENTRE ATHERTON

1 AUST CORPS 0 1305 8

SECRET (.) location report 447 to 2100 hrs 8 nov (.) adv party 23 AUST INF BDE arrived KAIRI

IMPORTANT to 1 ARMY
DRLS to remainder 2240

Copies to:

A	Q(2)
Sigs	War Diary(2)
CSO	File
GIII(Ops)	Log
Extra copy 6 AUST DIV	

WAR DIARY - HQ 1 AUST CORPS

Herewith are appendices as stated hereunder:-

Appx "A"	-	Location Reports 446 - 456.
"B"	-	1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No 3
"C"	-	" " " " " " 4
"D"	-	" " " " " " 5
"E"	-	" " " " " " 6
"F"	-	1 Aust Corps Location Statements
"G"	-	OOB 3 Aust Div