

AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/1 CORPS

1 Australian Corps
General Branch (1 Aust
Corps 'G' Branch)

May 1944



1/4/1-0463

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit ~~General Staff Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps~~ Date and Time.—From 0001K Hrs 1 May To 2400K hrs 31 May 1944

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	1 May		Lt Col Stroude and Capt Cornaby of RAG India arrived HQ 1 Aust Corps on inspection tour.	
	2 May		Lt Col Stroude and Capt Cornaby departed HQ 1 Aust Corps for B Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	
	3 May	(a)	3 Aust Div passed from comd 1 Aust Corps to First Aust Army as from 0001K hrs.	
		(b)	Maj Darty and Capt Richardson from LEI, after attachment to British Forces in ME arrived in area for general discussion of S & T and C aspect of overseas experience	
	4 May	(a)	1 Aust Corps Training Directive No 1/1944 issued	Copy attached at Appx B
		(b)	1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 3/1944 issued "Stage 2 Training of Aust Cav (Commando) Regts"	Copy attached at Appx C
	6 May	(a)	His Excellency the Governor of Queensland arrived at YUNGABERRA for inspection 1 Aust Corps area	Itinerary attached at Appx D
		(b)	Lt Col T.K. Blamey and Maj R.B. McKenzie arrived from Adv LHQ to discuss	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit ~~General Staff Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps~~ Date and Time—From 0001K hrs 1 May To 2400K hrs 31 May 1944

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	7 May		1 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 2 issued	Copy attached at Appx K
	8 May		(a) Brig H Wells BGS left for LHQ to attend conference on Staff Appointments	
			(b) Lt Col Stroude and Capt Cornaby, visiting officers RAC India, left area	
			for NEW GUINEA	
			(c) Eight Canadian officers attached AMF arrived in area	Details shown at Appx E
			(d) First Aust Army assumed comd of L of C units in area previously under comd	Details shown at Appx F
			1 Aust Corps for local administration	
	9 May		Lt Col T.K. Blamey and Maj R.B. McKenzie returned to Adv LHQ	
	10 May		Capt Jamison US Navy, Lt Col Cheston US Army arrived from ATC MILNE BAY	
			to discuss combined operations training with 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	
	12 May		Lt Col J H Pilcher GSO II (Ops) First Aust Army temporarily assumed	
			duties of GSO I (Ops)	
	14 May		1 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 3 issued	Copy attached at Appx K
	16 May		Brig R.G.H. Irving DMT arrived in area to discuss pamphlet "Fighting in Tropical Countries" and training requirements generally.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

Unit General Staff Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 0001K hrs 1 May To 2400K hrs 31 May 1944

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	17 May		Brig H Wells BGS returned from LEQ	
	19 May		Brig R.G.H. Irving DMT returned to Adv LEQ	
	20 May		1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 4/1944 "Fighting Training for all Units in Jungle Formations and Japanese Tactics used to counter landing operations issued	Copy attached at Appx G
	21 May		1 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 4 issued	Copy attached at appx K
	23 May	(a)	1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 2/1944 "Combined Operations Beach Organisation and Maintenance" issued	Copy is attached at appx H Distribution List (1 Aust Corps G/3369/3D of 23 May) is attached at appx I
		(b)	Maj J Snow C.I. LEQ School of Mech arrived in area to discuss arrangements for training drivers of this formation at LEQ School of Mech (Mobile Wing)	
			WONGABEL	
	25 May		1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 5/1944 "Stage 3 Training of Aust Cav (Commando) Regts" issued	Copy attached at Appx J
	26 May		Maj J Snow left area	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118
(adapted.)

72nd General Staff Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 0001K hrs 1 May To 2400K hrs 31 May 1944

[illegible]

APPX A

APPX A

WAR DIARY - GENERAL STAFF BRANCH HQ 1 ANST CORPS

FOR PERIOD 1 - 31 MAY 1944

SUMMARY OF APPENDICES

Appx A Summary of Appendices

- " B Copy of 1 Anst Corps Training Directive No 1/1944
- " C Copy of 1 Anst Corps Training Instruction No 3/1944
- " D Itinerary - His Excellency the Governor of Queensland - visit to 1 Anst Corps area.
- " E Itinerary - Visit of 8 Canadian Officers attached to AMF
- " F Details of assumption of comd by First Anst Army
- " G Copy of 1 Anst Corps Training Instruction No 4/1944
- " H Copy of 1 Anst Corps Training Instruction No 2/1944
- " I Distribution List for 1 Anst Corps Training Instruction No 2/1944
- " J Copy of 1 Anst Corps Training Instruction No 5/1944
- " K Copies of 1 Anst Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 2 - 5.
- " L Amendments No 1 and 2 1 Anst Corps Location Statement No 3
- " M Location reports No 523 - 532
- " N 1 Anst Corps Location Statement No 4

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS TRAINING DIRECTIVE

COPY NO. 51

NO. 1/1944

App B

TRAINING OBJECTIVE

1. The training objective is to prepare 1 Aust Corps to carry out operations which may include any of the following:-
 - (a) Operations in terrain similar to that encountered in NEW GUINEA, both along the coast and inland, and including operations in mountainous country.
 - (b) Operations involving an amphibious landing, probably by a division and a beach group against opposition.
 - (c) Operations involving a coastwise movement from an established beachhead, using landing craft and possibly small craft, and employing up to a brigade group with tanks.
 - (d) Operations involving the movement of a division by air.

SPECIAL TRAINING

2. Special attention should be paid to the following aspects of training, and in particular to those involving co-operation with other arms and with Allied Services:-
 - (a) Close Air Support.
 - (b) Ground to Air Signals.
 - (c) Co-operation of Infantry with tanks in jungle country.
 - (d) Maximum use of Artillery.
 - (e) Night Operations.
 - (f) Coastwise movement and maintenance.

Training Instructions on certain of the above subjects giving recent developments from operations, will be issued separately.

TIME FACTOR

3. The target dates for readiness for movement and final rehearsals by formations of 1 Aust Corps have been made known to formation commanders.

As the time available for training is dependent on many factors including future operations, it is not possible to state definitely what period will be available.

4. The period indicated as being available is shorter in some cases than the period needed. For this reason programmes must be arranged to give preference to essential training, periods for other training being limited where necessary. In this regard, as individual and section training form the basis of all higher training these phases must be carried out thoroughly to ensure that the higher training has a firm foundation on which to build.

TRAINING FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

5. (a) The tentative programme for this training was issued in 1 Aust Corps G/2947/SD of 5 Apr 44. The extent of the training period being determined by the availability of the craft of Seventh Amphibious Force.

- (b) In view of the limited period of availability of the amphibious craft of Seventh Amphibious Force, it will be necessary to use the Amphibious training programme as the basis for the training programmes of formations and units 1 Aust Corps.
- (c) It is possible that the dates of availability of the Amphibious craft of Seventh Amphibious Force may be altered at short notice.

6. The training of 2 Aust Beach Gp will be assisted by the provision of training cadres from units of 1 Aust Beach Gp and will be carried out under the direction of 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec commencing 7 May 44. Training will be completed in time to fit the Beach Gp for training with the first flight of 9 Aust Div.

TRAINING AIDS

- 7. (a) A training instruction on Amphibious Warfare is in process of production and will be available for early issue to all formations including 7 Aust Div.
- (b) Adv LHQ have been requested to provide sufficient copies of Ship diagrams.

TRAINING IN OPEN COUNTRY

8. The big majority of troops in formations in this Corps having either fought in the jungle or having been trained in the jungle, are familiar with jungle conditions.

As tactical training is more easily carried out in the open or semi-open country and as the use of such country would give a necessary change of training environment, a period of training in areas other than the jungle is desirable. A return to exercises in the jungle can be made when found necessary during the later stages of the training.

TRAINING WITH TANKS

9. 2/9 Aust Arm'd Regt has been detailed to move to the Tablelands and will come under command of 6 Aust Div on arrival.

When required, arrangements can be made for training with other formations.

10. Training in co-operation with tanks should be designed to study operations in open, semi-open and jungle areas.

TRAINING OF PNR PTL

11. Recent campaigns in tropical areas has shown the need for greatly increased engineer resources. The engineer units within the division have been increased by the addition of one field company, and a field company is included in the Beach Group OCB.

Further engineer resources cannot be counted on except from within divisional resources. For these reasons Pioneer battalions will be trained to undertake tasks normally accepted as engineer tasks.

12. As engineer tools and equipment are essential, this training may be carried out by

- (a) Using engineer equipment during periods when field companies are otherwise employed,
- (b) By the attachment of a company of the Pioneer battalion to each field company during training, and working two shifts with the same equipment, if necessary.

TRAINING OF ALL UNITS OF THE DIVISION. INCLUDING ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS.

13 In tropical warfare against the Japanese every unit within the area of operations is liable to attack by enemy parties infiltrating through from a larger attack, or by Raiding Tai, and, therefore, every unit (administrative or otherwise) must be capable of fighting and undertaking its own defence.

A special training instruction is being issued to define unit responsibilities in this regard, to indicate the probable forms of attack, and the training necessary to combat them.

M.T.SCALES

14. The scale of M.T. to be issued to each unit of a jungle formation has now been fixed and is unlikely to alter. Scales for the division have been issued in LHQ SM4177 of 25 Apr 44.

Trial loading, the adjustment of unit equipment to these motor transport scales, and the finalization of loading tables should be effected as early as possible and tested during the training period.

CONTROL OF INCIDENCE OF MALARIA DURING TRAINING

15. Experience in 6 Aust Div has proved that the incidence of attacks of malaria can be reduced by restricting the hard physical effort required of troops, during the first period of training after return from leave.

In 17 Aust Inf Bde hard physical effort was avoided, by prohibiting football and limiting marches to 5 miles, during the first two months of training after return from leave. These steps proved effective in greatly lowering the incidence of attacks and recurrences of malaria.

16. Summary of training instructions being printed or to be issued in the near future:-

- (a) 1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No.11
- (b) Fighting training for all units in Jungle Formations and Japanese Tactics used to counter landing operations.
- (c) On certain of the subjects listed in para 2 (Special Training).

4 May 44.

H. Wells
Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

	<u>Copy No.</u>		<u>Copy No.</u>
6 Aust Div	1 - 10	DA & QMG	39
9 Aust Div	11 - 20	A	40
2/7 Aust Cav(Commando)Regt	21	Med	41
1 Aust Beach Gp	22 - 23	Pro	42
2 Aust Beach Gp	24 - 25	Q	43
1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	26 - 28	S & T	44
HQ RAA 2 Aust Corps	29	Ord	45 - 46
HQ RAE 2 Aust Corps Tps	30	AEEME	47 - 48
A Aust Corps Sigs	31	Camp	49
HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps		File	50
-AASC	32	War Diary ✓	51 - 52
46 Aust Sqn AL Sec	33	Copy (for info)	
GOC	34	Adv LHQ	53
BGS	35	First Aust Army	54
G	36	7 Aust Div	55 - 56
CSO	37		
CE	38		

W/Diry (x)
G-110)

A/11: C
COPY NO. 16

1 AUST CORPS TRAINING INSTRUCTION NO. 3/1944

Reference: 1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No. 8
of 27 Feb 44.

STAGE 2 : AUST CAV (COMMANDO) REGTS.

GENERAL

1. This instruction outlines the general policy for training Aust Cav (Commando) Regiments and Aust Commando Squadrons during Stage 2. The greater part of time still available for training should be spent on this stage, which will consist mainly of tactical exercises.

OBJECT

2. Objects of Stage 2 training are: -

- (a) To achieve cohesion in the tactical handling of the squadron as a unit.
- (b) To practice troops and squadrons in their cavalry roles.
- (c) To accustom troop and squadron leaders to work as independent units when required.
- (d) To instil into all ranks the qualities of inquisitiveness and aggressiveness.

SCOPE

3. Exercises by troop and squadron to be conducted in following roles,

(a) Dismounted recce for formations

Advance guard-forward protective recce for formation advance, recce patrols to locate and determine extent of enemy position, attacks to overcome minor resistance or to determine strength and extent of enemy positions. Flank protection. Maintenance of contact with enemy.

(b) Seizing ground and holding for limited periods

(e.g. Capture of KAIAPIT by 2/6 Aust Commando Sqn)
Exercises involving fast movement in approach - forced marches - followed by immediate attack and quick, complete consolidation. These exercises to progress to carrying out such attacks where there is little information available, little time for recce, and time is vital factor.

Examples of objectives:-

- (i) Airfield required for landing own troops and supplies.
- (ii) Defile on enemy line of advance or enemy L of C to delay troop movements and supplies. In these exercises an active enemy should be provided, and counter-attacks will always be staged.

(c) Long range independent patrols

Some examples of the purposes of such patrols are:

- (i) Recce of possible lines of advance far to flanks.
- (ii) Investigation of possible airfield sites within territory under enemy control.
- (iii) Taking up of ambush positions behind enemy lines on his L of C to restrict and hamper enemy troop movements and supplies.
- (iv) To leave behind from a strong fighting patrol an OP party with W/T set to pass up to the minute reports of enemy movements and actions. This is a very inexpensive and efficient way of obtaining information. A strong fighting patrol may often be necessary to get the OP to its position, and in order to carry sufficient supplies to leave it there.
- (v) To reach a landing beach where it is intended to land a force on enemy flank or rear. This patrol can forward accurate reports of enemy movements, suitability of the beach, signal landing craft to shore, and act as guides.

4. Amphibious Training

To be arranged during any stage of training at convenience of formations.

5. Revision - Infantry Training

If time still available for training permits, units should conduct further exercises using squadron as infantry in attack and defence.

SPECIAL TRAINING

- 6. (a) Specialist sections should be used to the greatest extent during all exercises in their normal functions within the squadron.
- (b) Pioneer sections should be trained in recce of ground for airfields and in initial preparation of landing strips.
- (c) In this connection, attention is directed to 1 Aust Corps G/3144/SD of 29 Apr 44 dealing with the training of pioneer platoon commanders.

4 May 44.

Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Aust Div
9 Aust Div
2/7 Aust Cav(Commando)Regt
1 Aust Beach Gp
2 Aust Beach Gp
GOC
BGS
G
CCRA
CE
CSO
DA & QMG
A

Copy No.		Copy No.
1 - 3	Medical	18
4 - 6	Pro	19
7	Q	20
8	S & T	21
9	Ord	22
10	AEME	23
11	File	24 - 25
12	War Diary	26 - 27
13	Copy(for infn)	
14	Adv LHQ	28
15	First Aust Army(one for	
16	LHQ Trg Centre(JW)	-
17	CANUNGRA	29 - 30
	7 Aust Div	31 - 33

ITINERARY

VISIT BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR OF QUEENSLAND TO 1 AUST
CORPS AREA 7-8 MAY 44

- 7 May 44 0930 hrs Vice Regal party departs rail car
YUNGABURRA for HQ 3 Aust Div
Accompanied by Brig Sheehan.
- 0945 hrs 3 Aust Div Pro will meet Vice Regal party
(approx) at LAIRI Railway Crossing.
- 1000 hrs Arrive HQ 7 Aust Inf Bde when his Excellency
will be met by Brig Adm Comd 3 Aust Div.
(Attend Church Parade) (Queensland battalion
of 7 Aust Inf Bde.
Morning tea 7 Aust Inf Bde HQ Officers' Mess.
- 1130 hrs- Visit units of 7 Aust Inf Bde.
1230 hrs.
- 1245 hrs- Lunch HQ 3 Aust Div
1400 hrs.
- 1415 hrs Attend 5 Aust Inf Bde Swimming Sports at
LAKE BURAHOO.
- 1545 hrs Visit BOALA Soldiers' Club.
- 1615 hrs Tea at 5 Aust Inf Bde HQ Officers' Mess.
- 1700 hrs Depart HQ 3 Aust Div for rail car YUNGABURRA.
- 1845 hrs Depart rail car YUNGABURRA for "A" Mess
HQ 1 Aust Corps. Capt Came to accompany.
- 1915 hrs Supper 'A' Mess.
- 8 May 44 0930 hrs Depart rail car YUNGABURRA for HQ 6 Aust Div.
Accompanied by Brig Sheehan.
- 1005 hrs Arrive HQ 6 Aust Div (Met by Maj-Gen Wootton).
- 1025 hrs Leave to inspect Battalion Exercise - 16
Aust Inf Bde.
- 1300 hrs Lunch at 6 Aust Div HQ.
- 1400 hrs Inspect Bridge Building - RAB 6 Aust Div.
- 1500 hrs Inspect Brigade Exercise - 17 Aust Inf Bde
Afternoon Tea HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde.
- 1700 hrs Depart HQ 6 Aust Div for rail car YUNGABURRA.

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Marking

APP E

(Appendix 'A' to 1 Aust Corps
G/3225/SD of May 44)

ITINERARY FOR VISIT OF CANADIAN OFFICERS

Serial	Date	Event	Remarks
1	8 May	Arrive CAIRNS by air from BRISBANE	(a) Proceed HQ 1 Aust Corps under arrangements "Q" Branch 1 Aust Corps (b) Remain HQ 1 Aust Corps night 8/9 May
2	9 May	Proceed HQ 6 Aust Div at 0930 hrs.	(a) Under arrangements "Q" Branch 1 Aust Corps (b) Officers will be attached in terms of para 3 of 1 Aust Corps G/3225/SD of May 44.
3	23 May	Proceed 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	(a) 6 Aust Div will arrange tpt (b) Programme to be arranged by 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec
4	26 May	(a) Depart 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec for CAIRNS (b) Depart CAIRNS by air for BRISBANE	(a) Q Branch 1 Aust Corps will arrange transport in conjunction with 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec (b) Authority for Air Travel LHQ 57100 of 28 Apr 44.

COPY

MESSAGE IN

G-111 (0)

App. F.

TO: 1 AUST CORPS

FROM: FIRST AUST ARMY

ED 4162

11

confidential (.) ref first aust army G(ED) 3001 dated

2 may 44 (.) WEF 0001K hrs 15 may all correspondence

previously addressed rear HQ first aust army will be addressed

HQ first aust army all infm

Serial No: 4814

IMPORTANT

TOO: 111730K

Date: 111950

G(Ops) Distribution

CCRA

CE

CSO

A

DAMS

Chaplains

Med

Dental

Legal

Pro

Amenities

Education

Q

S & T

Ord (2)

AEME (2)

Postal

Sal

Camp

Copy to

GOC

EGS

War Diary (2)

File

G III ops

SECRET

Subject: ASSUMPTION OF COMD BY FIRST AUST ARMY

HQ 1 Aust Corps
8 May 44
G/3221/SD

1. Confirming verbal instructions and consequent upon the establishment of HQ First Aust Army at MAREEBA on 3 May 44, the subordinated units will communicate direct with First Aust Army on all matters of local administration. (1 Aust Corps Administrative Standing Orders of 1 Mar 44, para 15, refers). For any purpose for which these units were under comd 1 Aust Corps they now come under comd First Aust Army.

Town Major ATHERTON
Camp Staff ATHERTON
Camp Staff KAIRI
Camp Staff WONDECLA
Camp Staff RAVENSHOE
Camp Staff WONGABEL
Camp Staff MAPEE
8 Aust CRE Wks
54 Aust DCM 3 Wks (AIF)
2 Pl 12 Aust A Tps Coy
3 Aust Maint Pl
89 Aust Op Sec (Adv LHQ Sigs)
Det E Sec Q11 L of C Area BIPOD
3 Aust Fd Bakery (AIF)
HQ 27 Aust Sup Depot Coy
Det 2/109 Aust Gen Tpt Coy
2/2 AGH
2/6 AGH
2/1 Aust Base Depot Med Stores
4 Aust Amb Train

2/1 Aust Gen Depot
2 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit
9 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit
2/1 Aust Adv Ord Depot
17 Aust Ord Store Coy
1 Aust Adv Ord Depot Sec
7 Aust Ord Veh Pk
2/2 Sec Aust Officers Shop
5 Sec Aust Officers Shop
2/6 Aust Mob Laundry and
Fwd Decn Unit
13 Aust Adv Ord Depot
73 Aust Fd Ann Depot
3 Aust Adv Base Wksp
80 Aust Depot Cash Office
3 ADCS Officers Club
65 AWAS Barracks
Det No 5 Sec Aust Kit Store
51B Area Staff
15 Aust Leave Train Cooking Sec

2. Acknowledge.

F. G. Hassell
1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION

As per Appendix "A"

~~SECRET~~

Appendix "A" to 1 Aust Corps
G/2221/SD of 2 May 44

F

DISTRIBUTION.

6 Aust Div	(10)	GOC
9 Aust Div	(10)	BGS
1 Aust Beach Gp	(2)	G
2 Aust Beach Gp	(2)	CE
1 Aust Combined Ops Sec		Svy
2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt		CSO
RAA 2 Aust Corps		DA & QMG
RAE 2 Aust Corps		A
1 Aust Corps Sigs		DAMS
HQ, Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC		Chaplains
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office		Med
2 Aust Corps Pro Coy		Dental
2 Aust Corps Fd Punishment Centre		Legal
First Aust Army Stationery Depot (AIF)		Pro
First Aust Army Press Unit		Amenities
First Aust Army Mob Printing Unit		Education
2 Aust Corps Reception Camp		Q
AIF Staging Camp		S & T
Det No.1 Mob Wing LHQ School of		Ord (2)
Mech		AELE (2)
Mob Team Junior Leaders Wing First		Postal (2)
-Aust Army Regt Trg School		Sal
45 Aust AL Sec		Camp
Town Major ATHERTON		War Diary (2) ✓
Camp Staff ATHERTON		File
Camp Staff KAIRI		
Camp Staff WONDECLA		
Camp Staff RAVENSHOE		
Camp Staff WONGABEL		
Camp Staff MAPEE		
8 Aust CRE Wks		
54 Aust DCRE Wks (AIF)		
2 Pl 12 Aust A Tps Coy		
3 Aust Maint Pl		
89 Aust Op. Sec (Adv LHQ Sigs)		
Det E. Sec Qld L of C Area BIPOD		
3 Aust Fd Bakery (AIF)		
27 Aust Sup Depot Coy		
Det 2/109 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		
2/2 AGH		
2/6 AGH		
2/1 Aust Base Depot Med Stores		
4 Aust Amp Train		
2/1 Aust Con Depot		
2 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit		
9 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit		
2/1 Aust Adv Ord Depot		
17 Aust Ord Store Coy		
1 Aust Adv Ord Depot Sec		
7 Aust Ord Veh Pk		
2/2 Sec Aust Officers Shop		
5 Sec Aust Officers Shop		
2/6 Aust Mob Laundry and Fwd		
-Decon Unit		
13 Aust Adv Ord Depot		
73 Aust Fd Amn Depot		
3 Aust Adv Base Wksp		
80 Aust Depot Cash Office		
3 ADCS Officers Club		
65 AWAS Barracks		
Det No 5 Sec Aust Kit Store		
51B Area Staff		
15 Aust Leave Train Cooking Sec		

Copy(for infm)

First Aust Army (3)
17 Aust L of C Sub Area

SECRET

Subject: ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND BY FIRST AUST ARMY

HQ 1 Aust Corps
4 May 44
G/3206/SD

CCRA
CE
CSO
A
DAMS
Chaplains
Med
Dental

Legal
Pro
Amenities
Education
?
S & T
Ord (2)
AEME (2)

Postal
Sal
Camp
Copy to
GOC
BGS
War Diary (2)
File

1. Consequent upon the establishment of HQ First Aust Army at MAREEBA the following procedure relative to command 1 Aust Corps has been laid down by LHQ :-

- (a) Adv LHQ will define the training policy for 1 Aust Corps for implementation by HQ First Aust Army.
- (b) Adv LHQ and 1 Aust Corps will continue to communicate direct on the following matters concerning projected overseas offensive operations only:-
 - (i) Plans
 - (ii) Operation Orders and Instructions
 - (iii) Intelligence directly connected with (i) or (ii)
 - (iv) Provision of Code Words and maps.

Copies of such communications will be passed as desirable by Adv LHQ to LHQ or First Aust Army for information. 1 Aust Corps will not pass copies for information on these matters to LHQ or First Aust Army.

- (c) There will be no direct communication either way between LHQ and 1 Aust Corps. Communications from or concerning 1 Aust Corps will be addressed to Adv LHQ for matters mentioned in sub-para (b) above and to HQ First Aust Army for all other matters. Copies will be passed for information as necessary subject to restrictions regarding such copies in matters mentioned in sub-para (b).

2. Until further notice all correspondence to First Aust Army will be addressed to:-

HQ First Aust Army

W. Maclellan May
for Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

→ GTO ops

MESSAGE OUT

TO:

6 AUST DIV	HQ COMD 2 AUST CORPS TPS AASC
9 AUST DIV	46 AUST AL SEC
1 AUST BEACH GP	2 AUST CORPS FD CASH OFFICE
2 AUST BEACH GP	FIRST AUST ARMY STATIONERY DEPOT (AIF)
2/7 AUST CAV (COMMANO) REGT	FIRST AUST ARMY PRESS UNIT
RAA 2 AUST CORPS	FIRST AUST ARMY MOB PRINTING UNIT
RAE 2 AUST CORPS	FIRST AUST ARMY MOB TEAM REGT TRG SCHOOL
A AUST CORPS SIGS	2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP
1 AUST COMBINED OPS SEC	

FROM: 1 AUST CORPS

SD 4662

3

SECRET	(.)	HQ	first	aust
army	closed	T00W00:BA	reopened	MAREEDA
ref	map	BIB00HRA	1	in
school	at	333604	0001K	hrs
3	may	(.)	rear	first
aust	army	opened	T00W00:BA	same
am1	informed			

This message must be sent in cipher
if liable to interception or to fall
into enemy hands

T00: 042230K

W. M. M. M. M. M.

Distributed by G(Ops) on 3 May as under:-

GOC
BGS
G(Ops)
G(Int)
G(SD)
G(Air)
G(Liaison)
CE
Svy

CSO
DA & QMG
A
DAMS
Chaplains
Med
Dental
Legal
Pro

Amenities
Education
C
S & T
Ord (2)
AEME (2)
Postal
Sel
Camp
Far Diary (2) ✓
File

War Diary

Gm 10/12

COPY NO: 50

1 AUST CORPS TRAINING INSTRUCTION NO 4/1944

FIGHTING TRAINING FOR ALL UNITS IN JUNGLE FORMATIONS
AND
JAPANESE TACTICS USED TO COUNTER LANDING OPERATIONS

App A G

APPROACH AND INITIAL LANDING

1. Sea and Air Attack

Local sea and air supremacy being essential for the protection of seaborne operations it may be assumed that adequate protection to defeat enemy attacks of this nature will be provided and, therefore, that attempts to interfere with the expedition by sea or air are unlikely to succeed.

Resolutely pressed attacks in either sphere may be expected to achieve some results and cause minor damage.

SUBSEQUENT TO THE LANDING

2. Attack by Sea

When the force is established ashore the Naval Forces covering the landing will be withdrawn from the area to safer waters and light naval protection by PT Boats will probably be all that will be available; therefore the use of the sea for the movement of enemy land or light naval forces may be possible.

3. Attack from the Air

Air protection on the scale provided for the landing cannot be maintained indefinitely, and at a comparatively early stage air protection of the beachhead is likely to be removed and placed 'at call' from the nearest air fields available. Therefore attack on the beachhead and beach area by enemy aircraft is to be expected, and, should they be available enemy Paratroops could be employed.

4. Attack by Land Forces

A strongly opposed landing is not likely to succeed, and therefore landings are planned to take place where opposition is not expected or where light opposition only is expected.

Thus the landing will probably be made in the first place against widely spaced protective detachments supported by local reserves as soon as the latter can be moved to the area.

The immediate land attacks to which the landing force may be exposed after its establishment ashore are therefore -

- (a) Attack by local reserves by land.
- (b) Attack by Mobile Raiding Units - the approach being by sea or land.

The Japanese attacked in this way on a small scale at SCARLET BEACH and on a larger scale at MOMOTE.

Subsequently, as the enemy reserves can be concentrated against the landing, deliberate attempts to recapture the beachhead may be attempted, and at this period the probable forms of attack are likely to be:-

- (a) Deliberate large scale attack such as that launched by the Japanese to recapture SCARLET BEACH-FINSHAFEN.
- (b) Operations by Raiding Tai directed particularly against gun areas. The Japanese carried out raids at SOPUTA and at LIT TALEU with this object.

Enemy Methods

A brief description of the various forms of attack is given in Appendix "A" together with instances of where they have been employed by the enemy and reference is made to the document where a full description of each method can be studied.

Characteristics Common to Each Form of Attack

Although the scale and weight of the attack differ considerably, the methods are usually similar and have the following common characteristics.

- (a) The attack is pressed with great vigour regardless of casualties and non-success in other sectors of the attack.
- (b) Infiltration is employed extensively to gain positions well inside the defence, to isolate defended areas, and cause confusion.
- (c) The attack is normally accompanied by an encircling attack which is designed to come in from the flank or rear or to gain a position astride the supply route into the area.

The Japanese Attack

When pressed vigorously and made in superior strength this form of attack is difficult to defeat and its successful application contributed largely to the extremely rapid advance of the Japanese through the PHILIPPINES, MALAYA and the NEI to where it was finally halted when the enemy suffered his first defeat at WILHELM BAY.

Even when the opposing forces are more equal in strength, this form of attack is difficult to defeat quickly and time is required to eradicate enemy parties which have infiltrated into the defended area.

The Japanese method is good, and if applied with greater tactical skill than the enemy usually displays, would be difficult to combat.

The Japanese application of these tactics usually displays the following weaknesses, which render the attack vulnerable to effective counter measures;

- (a) The enemy relies on the vigour with which the attack is pressed rather than on the skilful use of the ground and his weapons, thus exposing himself to heavy casualties.
- (b) Should the attack fail it will probably be repeated using exactly the same plan, the same plan and the same troops, (or those of them that remain unwounded from the former attack).
- (c) Should the attack fail or only partially succeed the maintenance of his forward troops becomes difficult, and at times has completely failed as it did at WAU and SATELBERG.

Counter Measures

To defeat this form of attack full advantage must be taken of the weaknesses found in the Japanese tactics.

- (a) Preparations must be made so that the maximum fire power can be brought onto the attacking troops, e.g., the clearance of undergrowth to give fields of fire

Which are not evident to the enemy and the siting of weapons to gain the full benefit from their fire.

- (b) As positions which are encircled must fight on, prior steps must be taken to ensure that they are well stocked with water, supplies and ammunition, to enable them to do so. In this regard it must be realized that, should the enemy get behind your position, he is no better placed than you are, for although you may be cut off from your own forces temporarily, he is also cut off from his forces, and unlike you, is probably not provisioned, as you are for that eventuality.
- (c) Japanese maintenance of forward troops is left largely to chance and the results in all the recent fighting have proved disastrous to the enemy. Should the enemy gain a position inside our defences, he can only continue to fight until his supplies and ammunition are exhausted and therefore, by preventing supplies reaching him, his position becomes untenable.

9. Training

It will be seen from the brief descriptions of the Japanese method of attack, the Mobile Raiding Tai and the Raiding Tai, that in warfare in close country against the Japanese, all units and installations in the forward area are liable to attack from the rear as well as from the front, and, that at any time they may have to defend themselves, and hold their positions just as infantry units do.

To defend themselves effectively, units and services must be able to fight in this way and training of all units and services will be carried out to this end.

By training of this nature the effect of these Japanese tactics can be limited and the alarms and wild rumours occasioned by his penetrating raids avoided.

19 May 44

Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

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BRIEF DESCRIPTIONS OF PROBABLE FORMS OF ATTACK

ATTACK BY LEGAL RESERVES BY LAND

1. As this type of attack will follow the general lines of the normal Japanese attack (outlined in para 3 below), a separate description is not given.

ATTACK BY MOBILE RAIDING UNITS

2. Summarised from the account given in AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No. 86 of Mar 44.

As the terrain in tropical areas usually prevents the rapid mounting of a counter attack in the event of an enemy landing, Mobile Raiding Units have been formed to move by sea in high speed boats and counter-land in force to destroy the enemy, by attacking him in rear during the initial phase of the operation.

It is intended that the attack be launched on the night of the landing, or failing that, the following night, and that it be made as a sudden thrust supported by sea and air forces if they are available.

Each Company of the force has signals and engineers attached to it to make it self-contained and it is clearly stated that the counter landing "must be made within the enemy's landing area."

On landing, the tasks of the Mobile Raiding Unit are many. "As soon as the barges reach the beach, annihilate the enemy and destroy or burn his equipment, ammunition, fuel etc. Continue to push on to the objective. Endeavour to acquire utmost results before dawn.

Continue the attack with absolute reliance on cold steel disregarding losses. However, once the fighting subsides, capture worthy staff officers for intelligence purposes, or utilize captured equipment.

At daybreak while the attack is being carried out move to daytime disposition and continue on. At such time, forces should not be concentrated in order to minimize the loss from artillery shelling. However, the pressure of the attack must not be let up by giving too much consideration to safety of personnel."

JAPANESE ATTACKS

3. The largest attack launched by the Japanese in the FINSCHHAFEN area was designed to re-capture SCARLET BEACH, which was the beach captured by 20 Aust Inf Bde and the one on which the beachhead was based.

The attack consisted of three parts:-

- (a) The Main attack driving from inland through to the beachhead to secure the beach,
- (b) An attack along the coast on to the flank of the beachhead, and,
- (c) A small scale seaborne attack by a Mobile Raiding Unit.

The Seaborne attack was delivered before the main attack, and suffered complete defeat and very heavy loss.

The attack along the coast was not pressed and was easily held.

The main attacking force, screened by protective parties, moved between the widely spaced posts of the outpost position into position for the attack on our main defended areas. No detailed reconnaissance was made before the attack was launched. The attack was pressed with great determination, and when repulsed the enemy reformed and attacked again. After 1½ hours of these "Bull-headed" tactics he discovered the southern flank of the position: patrols were moved round it and infiltrated through our reserve positions into the SIKI COVE area - which formed the SE end of SCARLET BEACH - the objective.

Two hours later a further Japanese attack was launched on the northern flank and the attack appeared to be designed to discover the soft spots in the defence.

It is not known whether the enemy intended this part of the attack to have been synchronised with the main attack or not.

The enemy parties which had successfully infiltrated through our positions to their objective - SIKI COVE - made no attempt to capture the ground which commanded the Cove. In the position reached, they were cut off from their forces and could not be maintained. Although these parties maintained their position for some days, the lack of supplies and the pressure from our forces finally forced them to withdraw and it is doubtful, in this case, if the inconvenience caused by his penetration, justified the heavy losses suffered by this portion of his force.

RAIDING TAI (TEISHINTAI)

4. A fuller account of these raiding parties is given in Japanese Tactics Bulletin No 1 LHQ Oct 43, which should be studied.

In the Japanese Army a TEISHINTAI is a temporary organization of a body of troops formed to carry out deep raids. It varies in strength and organization according to the task allotted and whether the attack is to be a surprise or storming attack.

To date its most usual employment in NEW GUINEA has been to destroy our guns e.g. the raids at SOPUTA and TAMBURU. When used to destroy a troop of four guns, it would probably be composed as follows:-

HQ Group	1 Officer 1 Liaison NCO 1 Orderly
Demolition Group	} About 15 men
Assault Group	
Support Group	About 12 men
Reserve Group	About 12 men

The raid is usually carried out in the following stages:

- (a) A secret advance by night, or through the jungle by day avoiding enemy traffic routes, to a lying up position within striking distance of the objective.
 - (b) Observation and reconnaissance of the objective to determine when and where the raid should be launched.
 - (c) The attack either using surprise or storming the objective in strength.
 - (d) The withdrawal.
-

11/11/44
CONFIDENTIAL

1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No. 2/i944

**Combined Operations.
Beach Organisation and
Maintenance**

★

HQ 1 AUST CORPS,
21 Apr 44.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUST CORPS TRAINING INSTRUCTION No. 11

COMBINED OPERATIONS.

BEACH ORGANISATION AND MAINTENANCE

NOTE: This pamphlet was originally issued as
"1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No. 2"
of 17 Dec 43. It has now been revised and
amended.

*HQ 1 AUST CORPS,
24 April, 1944.*

*H. WELLS, Brigadier,
GS 1 Aust Corps.*

BEACH ORGANISATION AND MAINTENANCE

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COMBINED OPERATIONS. BEACH ORGANISATION AND MAINTENANCE

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION.

GENERAL.

1. This pamphlet sets out the methods by which it is proposed to organise the beaches and Beach Maintenance Area (BMA) during a landing operation carried out by an Australian Army formation. The Beach Group organisation and the methods described are based on those used in the Middle East and United Kingdom, and on experience gained during the training of 1 Aust Beach Group.

2. The process of getting men and vehicles ashore during an assault landing and of maintaining them at their full fighting efficiency is complicated by the very nature of the operation. Frontages will be narrow, causing great congestion of personnel, vehicles, equipment and stores; reserves will be limited by the available space in ships and craft and, in addition, units will be operating with a reduced scale of men and vehicles.

It is no exaggeration to say that, once a beach-head has been secured, the success of the operations will depend very largely on the early establishment and smooth running of an efficient beach organisation.

3. DEFINITIONS.

Beach Organisation embraces the whole process of organising the beaches and their immediate hinterland, of landing and maintaining assault and follow-up formations. It includes the units, personnel, stores and vehicles specially allotted for this work.

Definitions of common terms used in the Beach Organisation are given at Appendix "A."

4. NAVAL RESPONSIBILITY.

The Navy is responsible for:—

- The beaching of ships, craft, boats and lighters at the correct time and place.
- The turn round of ships, craft, etc.
- The operation and control of the ferry service between ship and shore.
- The marking of beaches.
- The disembarkation of personnel and discharge of material from warships when these are used.
- Signal communications to seaward.

5. ARMY RESPONSIBILITY.

The Army is responsible for:—

- The clearance of obstacles from the beaches and the water inshore.
- Preparation of beach exits.

- (c) Construction of road framework and dump area.
- (d) Discharge of all landing ships and craft, boats and lighters, at the beaches.
- (e) Clearance of personnel, vehicles, stores and equipment from the beaches to the dumps, transit areas etc.
- (f) Defence of the Beach Maintenance Area against:—
 - (i) Enemy ground penetration through the covering position.
 - (ii) Attack of enemy aircraft.
 - (iii) Enemy threat to the beaches from seaward.

6. AIR FORCE RESPONSIBILITY.

The Air Force is responsible for:—

- (a) Assisting and advising the Army on the handling of all Air Force personnel, vehicles, equipment and stores landed at the beaches.
- (b) The operation and maintenance of Air Force Radar and early warning devices in the Beach Maintenance Area.

7. COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY.

The organisation of a beach landing requires the closest possible co-operation among the Services throughout, and especially on the beaches where the rapid clearance of the craft and of the beaches is of vital importance. The ideal is for each Service to be ready and able to carry out the other's duties in an emergency.

CHAPTER II

STAFF AND UNITS OF THE LANDING ORGANISATION WORKING WITH THE INFANTRY DIVISION.

A. Naval Staff

8. SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER LANDING (SNOL).

The Senior Naval Officer Landing is responsible for the Naval aspects of the assault carried out by the assaulting force to which he is attached. He is therefore responsible for the organisation and control of the anchorage and waters of that part of the enemy's coast which has been allotted to his assaulting force. This force will normally be a brigade and the SNOL will usually be with the brigade commander until the latter goes ashore.

He controls the landing ships, craft etc. allotted for the assault. He is assisted by the Principal Beachmaster/Deputy SNOL.

The SNOL is usually an officer of Captain's rank.

9. PRINCIPAL BEACHMASTER (PBMr).

The Principal Beachmaster/Deputy SNOL (usually a Commander) controls, under the SNOL, all landing ships and landing and support craft etc during the assault. He commands the Naval Beach Commando and is assisted by the Group Commander afloat and the Beachmasters ashore.

10. DEPUTY PRINCIPAL BEACHMASTER (D/PBMr).

Assistant to PBMr and during his absence commands Naval Beach Commando.

11. ASSISTANT SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER LANDING (ASNOL).

The Assistant Senior Naval Officer Landing is a naval officer (usually a Commander) who is, under the SNOL, in charge of unloading all ships carrying personnel, vehicles, equipment and stores.

B. The Military Landing Group

12. COMPOSITION.

Aust Military Landing Groups have been raised and organised to supplement the normal staff of a Division and Brigades warned for Combined Operations. Each Group consists of 6 Officers and 15 ORs and will provide for the attachment of a Principal Military Landing Officer (PMLO—Lt-Col), 2 Assistant Military Landing Officers (AMLO's—Capt or Lieut) to the HQ of the Division, and a Military Landing Officer (MLO—Major) to the HQ of each Brigade.

13. FUNCTIONS.

(a) P.M.L.O.

- (i) The PMLO should be allotted to assist the Divisional Staff as required during the preparatory training phases and will be available for advice, from the earliest stages of planning, regarding the allotment of the Force to Ships and all factors concerning loading, stowage and forward movement.

(ii) During embarkation he and his assistants will work with and supervise the authorities controlling the loading, and will ensure that Ships and Craft are stowed in accordance with the plan of landing.

(iii) At the discretion of the Divisional Commander the PMLO will either remain at the Forward Base after the Assault Convoy has sailed for the purpose of supervising the loading and despatch of subsequent echelons, or, in the instance of a "Ship to Shore" movement, he may go forward with the Assault Convoy for the purpose of controlling the tactical disembarkation in accordance with the landing plan.

(b) MLOs.

The MLO is a Staff Officer attached to the HQ Inf Brigade Group to advise on the use of shipping in Combined Operations and to assist in the preparation of the documents necessary to ensure that Ships and Craft are so loaded and discharged as to fit in with the operational plan for the Assault. In the case of a "Ship to Shore" operation he will travel in the HQ Ship and, with the SNOL, arrange for the discharge of the convoy in accordance with the Brigade Landing Table.

After final discharge of the Ships of the Brigade Group the MLO will land and report to Beach Group HQ, where he will act as the PMLOs representative, pending further instructions from the PMLO.

14. GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS, GRADE II.

These are not members of the Military Landing Group but are drawn from the Staff of the Combined Operations Section, and are mentioned here for convenience. In addition to the PMLO, one Staff Officer, Grade II is allotted to each Division from the commencement of training until the operation has been completed. This officer acts as adviser and assistant to the GSO I on all matters pertaining to Combined Operations.

C. Air Force Staff

15. COMMANDER, AIR FORCE BEACH UNIT.

The Commander, Air Force Beach Unit, is attached to Beach Group Headquarters. He is the Air Force adviser to the Divisional Commander, and also to the Beach Group Commander, on all matters connected with the landing, handling and maintenance of Air Force stores, equipment and transport, to be passed through the Beach Maintenance Area.

D. The Beach Organisation

NAVAL.

16. NAVAL BEACH COMMANDO.

A Naval Beach Commando is designed to handle the landing craft etc. required for one brigade entry, together with the further units, stores etc. landed on the same beaches.

It consists of a headquarters and three Beach Parties. Each party is designed to handle the ships, craft etc. landing on one beach. Full details are given in Combined Operations Pamphlet No. 17.

17. NAVAL OFFICERS ON THE BEACHES.

(a) The Deputy Principal Beachmaster (DPBMr) assists the PBMr in the running of the beaches and the co-ordination of the Beach Parties. The PBMr or D/PBMr works in closest co-operation with Beach Group HQ.

(b) The Beachmaster (BMr) is in command of a Beach Party and is responsible for:—

(i) The reconnaissance of the Beach in conjunction with the Beach Coy Commander.

(ii) The erection and maintenance of the beach signs.

(iii) The rapid and safe turn-round of landing craft etc. at his beach, including the recovery and salvage of craft.

(c) There are two Assistant Beachmasters (ABMr) in each Beach Party. They land with the first waves and are responsible under the BMr for:—

(i) The preliminary reconnaissance of the beach.

(ii) The working of the Beach Party and the handling of landing craft etc. on the beach.

(iii) The calling in of landing craft etc. to beach.

18. NAVAL MAINTENANCE PARTIES.

One Naval Maintenance Party of approximately three officers and fifty-three ratings may be attached to each Naval Beach Commando to carry out first line repair and maintenance on landing craft etc. on the "Far Shore."

ARMY

19. THE BEACH GROUP.

The Beach Group is a unit specially formed for organising and working the beaches for the landing of one assault infantry brigade group. Subsequent to the assault landing it will organise and work the beach maintenance area for a force of one "jungle" division. It will be responsible for the movement of personnel, vehicles and stores from landing ships, craft etc. across the beaches to transit areas, dumps and assembly areas.

The composition of the Beach Group and the functions of its various sub-units are given in Chapter V. Details of the organisation of the Australian Beach Group are given at Appendix "B."

20. "KEY" PERSONNEL OF THE BEACH GROUP.

(a) Beach Group Commander.

(i) Commands the Group.

(ii) Responsible to the Force Commander for the planning, organising and working of the beaches and Beach Maintenance Area.

Adviser to the Force Commander, during the planning period, on matters concerning the beaches and maintenance area. Works with the AA & QMG of the Division.

(iii) Responsible for: the close (or inner perimeter) ground defence of the beach area and the close seaward defence of the beaches. The holding of the covering position is a Force responsibility.

(b) Beach Company Commander (BCC).

The Beach Company Commander commands the Beach to which he has been allotted. He lands about the same time as the assaulting battalion headquarters and works in close co-operation with his Naval opposite number, the Beachmaster. He is responsible with the BMr. for the detailed reconnaissance of his beach and its exits, and will request the Beach Group Headquarters to carry out such work as may be necessary to ensure the quick clearance of all parts of the Force across his beach. The BCC commands the Beach Company allotted to his beach and uses it to effect the quick discharge of craft and the orderly clearance of stores etc. The co-ordination of the work of the several beaches is the responsibility of Beach Group Headquarters.

(c) Beach Control Officers.

Subordinate officers of Beach Companies to whom beach control duties are delegated by the Beach Company Commander.

(d) Unit Landing Officer (ULO) and Tank-Unit Landing Officer.

The Unit Landing Officer is a senior officer, usually the battalion 2 i/c, detailed by each unit in the initial assault. He will be responsible for organising the rapid and orderly passage of personnel and vehicles of his unit across the beach. He will work in close liaison with the ABMr and the BCC. He will be responsible for marking the gaps made by his unit in the beach defences prepared by the enemy, and for guiding personnel and vehicles to them. On completion of his duties he will rejoin his unit.

If the battalion (or unit) is landing at a number of small, separated beaches, the ULO will detail another officer or senior NCO to act for him on each company beach, himself remaining on the main beach which has been selected for further development.

AIR FORCE

21. AIR FORCE BEACH FLIGHT.

When required, one Air Force Beach Flight will be allotted to each Beach Group. It will be responsible for advising and assisting in the movement over the beaches of the Air Force vehicles landed, and in the handling of Air Force stores and equipment which pass through the Beach Maintenance Area.

22. IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL OF THE BEACH ORGANISATION.

In order that personnel of the Beach Organisation may be readily distinguished both by day and by night during operations, steel helmets will be marked as follows:—

(a) All ranks of the Beach Organisation will wear a white band 1½" wide round the steel helmet.

(b) The following will have the letters shown against their names painted on the front of their steel helmets in luminous paint or if that cannot be obtained, in white paint.

Principal Beachmaster	—	PBMr.
Beach Master	—	BMr.
Assistant Beach Master	—	ABMr.
Beach Company Commander	—	BCC.
Beach Control Officer	—	BCO.
Unit Landing Officer	—	ULO.

CHAPTER III.

SUBDIVISION OF COASTLINE INTO BEACHES; BEACH MARKINGS.

23. SECTORS.

(a) The stretch of enemy coast selected for an assault will be divided in the planning stage into a number of sectors, each between 3000 yards and 100 yards long. Sector limits will be chosen to coincide with some easily recognisable object, such as a river or a promontory, or even some prominent object inland.

(b) Sectors will be lettered serially from right to left facing inland, starting with A (ABLE) and will be called by the names of the letters, as laid down in the phonetic alphabet. (See Appendix "C.")

(c) Sectors will cover the whole coastline, whatever its nature, i.e.: beach, cliff, rock, esplanade, etc. A diagrammatic representation of the division of a section of coast into sectors, beaches and landing points is given at Appendix "D."

24. BEACHES.

(a) Those parts of a sector suitable for the disembarkation of personnel, vehicles or stores will be known as beaches. No sector will be divided into more than three beaches, which will be called, reading from right to left, facing inland:—

RED (left) : YELLOW : GREEN (right).

(b) Where a sector contains only two beaches, they will be called "YELLOW" and "GREEN." Where a sector contains only one beach, it will be known as "GREEN."

(c) When designating a beach: the sector, the colour, and the word "beach" will always be used, for example:—

Able Green Beach,
Baker Red Beach,
Dog Yellow Beach.

(Notes:

(i) Combined Operations HQ in the United Kingdom has recently authorised the use of WHITE in place of YELLOW, and the use of a white border around all coloured signs.

(ii) It is unlikely that the colour GREEN will ever be used in operations on tropical coastlines.)

25. LANDING POINTS.

(a) The grouping and relative positions of landing points within each beach will depend on the nature of the shore and the hinterland.

(b) A landing point may be used for all types of personnel, vehicles and stores, or separate landing points may be developed for each type; e.g. personnel, tracked vehicles and stores. In the case of stores separate beaches may be allotted for commodities.

26. RESPONSIBILITY.

The division of the coast line into sectors will be the responsibility of the Force Headquarters.

The selection of beaches within sectors is the responsibility of the assault brigade.

The setting up of beach signs is the responsibility of the BMr concerned. Beach signs authorised for use in the SWPA are given at Appendix "E."

27. BEACHING SIGNALS.

Signals used by the Naval Beach Parties to bring in craft are the following:—

(a) By Day.

The flag "G" waved and pointed in the direction of the craft indicates "Beach here."

(b) By Night.

A blue torch flashing "G" in morse, in the direction of the craft, indicates "Beach here."

28. STORES.

(a) Beach signs required by Naval Beach Parties for marking the beaches (details of which are given at Appendix "E") are made and supplied by the Beach Group Fd Coy. Lights for night use are at Naval store.

(b) Signs for marking organisations, HQs etc within the Beach Maintenance Area are made to a standard design by the Beach Group Fd Coy. They are held by the HQ or unit concerned and are erected immediately the organisation is established. The distinctive design for all such Beach Group Signs is black lettering on a yellow background and with a pale blue border around the edge of the sign.

(c) Road signs etc, are part of the equipment of the Beach Group Provost and will normally conform to the same colour scheme as that given in (b) above.

CHAPTER IV

BEACH MAINTENANCE AREA

29. DEFINITIONS.

The Beach Maintenance Area (BMA) is an area in which the Beach Group establishes dumps, workshops, transit areas etc. in order:—

- (a) to maintain formations and units in the forward areas,
- (b) to maintain a steady flow of traffic through the beaches.

The BMA includes the beaches developed for the landing of personnel, vehicles and stores (after the initial assault), and the transit and dumping areas.

30. FUNCTIONS.

The function of the BMA is to receive and handle all stores, vehicles and equipment required by the fighting troops and have them available for issue on demand. The BMA fulfils the functions of an ordinary Base Sub-area and of refilling points in the field from the time of an assault landing to the time when the normal system of replenishment in the field is operating through a port which has been captured or developed.

31. CONTROL.

The Beach Group Commander will be entirely responsible to the Commander of the Force for the organisation and control of the BMA.

In the initial stages, AA defence may be controlled by the Beach Group Commander assisted by the senior AA officer ashore. Later these duties will be taken over by the AA Defence Commander, who will work in close co-operation with the commander of the Beach Group.

32. COMPOSITION.

The BMA will consist of:—

- (a) Dumps of various stores by types which are landed over the beaches and held for issue to the troops forward of the area, in the area, and on the beaches.
- (b) Transit areas, to which personnel and vehicles landing are directed in order to clear the beaches, and where they will be readily available on call.
- (c) A traffic framework to facilitate movement and ensure continuity.
- (d) Headquarters and administrative areas for purposes of administration and command.
- (e) Vehicle Parks.
- (f) Defensive positions as may be necessary.

33. SIZE.

The size of the BMA will vary according to the following factors:—

- (a) The size of the Force to be maintained.
- (b) The numbers of men and vehicles to be passed through it.
- (c) The quantities of stores that it is proposed to land.
- (d) The nature of the ground and the capacity of Engineers to develop it quickly.
- (e) The capacity of the beaches.
- (f) Dispersion against air observation and attack.

BMAs may be sufficient in size to maintain a Battalion Group, a Brigade Group, or a Division.

24. LOCATION WITHIN THE COVERING POSITION.

- (a) The covering position will include, besides the BMA, sufficient room for:—
 - (i) Defence Units.
 - (ii) Manoeuvre of mobile reserves.
 - (iii) Assembly Areas.
- (b) The actual location of the BMA within the covering position cannot be laid down rigidly, but must be:—
 - (i) Central with regard to the beaches to be used.
 - (ii) Suitable for adequate road and movement facilities.
 - (iii) Free from observed enemy artillery fire.

35. LAYOUT.

The layout of the BMA will be prepared in detail during the planning stage of the operation. Responsibility for its preparation rests with the A-Q staff of the formation concerned, advised and assisted by the Beach Group Commander. It will be prepared after study of all available intelligence data, maps and air photographs. A specimen layout is given at Appendix "P."

36. ASSEMBLY AND TRANSIT AREAS.

- (a) Assembly Areas are areas within the covering position but outside the BMA, to which personnel and vehicles, either as units or formed detachments, are directed after leaving the transit areas. They are the responsibility of formations concerned and not of the Beach Organisation.
- (b) Transit Areas, being within the BMA, are entirely the responsibility of the Beach Organisation. Here personnel and vehicles meet guides, reform into sub-units and detachments and move to assembly areas.
- (c) Assembly areas will not be necessary for units of the Beach Group. They will occupy bivouac areas determined by reconnaissance and which will normally be shown on the Key Plans.

37. TRAFFIC.

(a) Volume and Nature.

In an assault landing the initial expenditure of ammunition and other items is likely to be high; reserves will be non-existent in the early stages, and superimposed on the maintenance system will be an abnormal flow of reserve (follow-up and build-up) formations to the front. Within the covering position there will, therefore, be a great density of men and stores and a heavy volume of traffic on the roads. Careful traffic control becomes vital and, within the BMA, is the responsibility of the Beach Group. Outside the BMA, the responsibility rests with formations.

(b) Control

(i) Within the BMA.

This is the responsibility of the DAQMG on the Beach Group Staff. Control is implemented through the Beach Group Provost, who provide the necessary police and guides, and who are responsible for signposting traffic circuits, dumps, transit areas, exits to forward areas etc.

(ii) Beyond the BMA.

It will be a Brigade or Divisional responsibility to provide guides to conduct troops to assembly areas and to signpost roads and tracks leading from the BMA to forward areas. Regulation and control of movement from the BMA to the forward areas is also a Formation responsibility. Intimation of troop movements will always be conveyed to Brigade or Division, by the DAQMG of the Beach Group.

38. CAPACITY.

The handling capacity of a BMA depends on:—

- (a) The tonnage that can be handled over the beaches in 24 hours.
- (b) The capacity of the road framework to support continuous and heavy traffic.
- (c) The availability of transport and mechanical aids.
- (d) The size of dumps and the amount of manpower available to work them.
- (e) Whether it is possible to work for twenty-four hours of the day, in shifts, using lighting by night.

Work on the beaches and in the BMA may be severely prejudiced by adverse weather. Therefore every effort must be made to discharge craft and clear the beaches while weather conditions are favourable.

39. QUANTITIES.

It has been found in the Mediterranean, and also in exercises in Australia, that one ton of stores per day per man available for labour, will be handled from craft to dumps. This places the daily handling capacity of the Beach Group, with its additional unit for labour, at 1000 tons.

40. DEFENCE.

- (a) The Beach Group Commander is at all times responsible for local defence of the BMA. This responsibility is confined to the area itself and does not extend beyond it. The assault formations holding the covering positions are responsible for the area beyond the BMA.

(b) Ground Defence.

The Beach Group Commander will prepare a local defence plan, which can be put into effect as required as soon as the Beach Group has landed. All ranks must be prepared to use their weapons and must know their "action stations."

(c) AA Defence.

No Light or Heavy AA Unit is at present included in the organisation of the Beach Group. Arrangements for the AA defence of the BMA will be the responsibility of the Force Comd. The nature of this defence will be such as to provide AA protection of the beaches as rapidly as possible after the initial waves have passed through, and later will be extended to include the whole of the Beach Maintenance Area.

(d) **Smoke.**

Smoke may be used for area screening. Its use will be co-ordinated by the AA Comd. Labour to operate generators may be specially found from Corps or Army Troops, or may be found from reserve troops of the Beach Group.

(e) **Defence Against Gas.**

If gas is used against the beaches, two aspects must be considered:—

- (i) Liquid contamination of beaches over which stores and personnel must pass.
- (ii) Vapour danger to personnel working in the BMA.

The Beach Group Commander is responsible for:—

- (i) An efficient warning system.
- (ii) Effective measures for ensuring that clearance of stores etc. continues after gas attack.
- (iii) Area decontamination.

Individuals are responsible for:—

- (i) Personal anti-gas equipment.
- (ii) Personal decontamination.

CHAPTER V

THE BEACH GROUP.

The Composition and Functions of the Headquarters and Sub-Units

41. BEACH GROUP HEADQUARTERS.

(a) Composition.

(i) COMMANDER.

(ii) **GSO III**—Staff Officer to the Comd.

(iii) **DAQMG**—Responsible for all movements in the Beach Maintenance Area, maintains an up-to-date record of all personnel, equipment, vehicles and stores held in the Beach Maintenance Area, available to the Force.

(iv) **STAFF CAPTAIN**—"A" and "Q" duties for Beach Group units.

(v) **INTELLIGENCE OFFICER**—Specialised Beach "I" work, normal "I" duties, available as LO.

(vi) **DADMS**—Responsible to Beach Group Comd for all medical organisation within the Beach Maintenance Area, including arrangements for the evacuation of casualties to seaward. He may act as Casualty Embarkation Officer or appoint an officer of the Beach Medical Section as such.

(vii) **HYGIENE OFFICER**—Responsible for the supervision of hygiene within the Beach Maintenance Area.

(viii) **BRIGADE ORDNANCE WARRANT OFFICER**—Similar duties to those of the normal appointment on Inf Bde HQ.

(b) Role.

Organises and controls the working of the beaches and Beach Maintenance Area for one "jungle division," landing on a one brigade front.

42. BEACH GROUP ENGINEERS.

(a) Composition.

(i) A Field Coy, RAE.

(ii) An RAE Stores Platoon.

(iii) A Platoon of a Mech Eqp Coy.

(iv) A Coy of the Beach Bn will always train with the Fd Coy and will normally be placed under comd for operations.

(b) Command.

All engineer units, and non-specialist units attached, will be under command the OC Fd Coy. The OC Fd Coy will advise the Beach Group Comd on technical matters, and is responsible to him for all engineer work.

(c) Engineer Responsibilities.

Beach Group Engineers are responsible for the following tasks, which are arranged in appropriate sequence of priority:

(i) Beach Clearance.

Clearance of the beaches of mines, wire and other obstacles, as may be necessary.

- (ii) **Beach Mat.**
Laying of beach mat for the off-loading of vehicles.
- (iii) **Under-water Obstacles.**
Demolition of under-water obstacles, including sandbars, as required by the Beachmasters.
- (iv) **Beach Exits and Road Framework.**
Construction of beach exits, the beach lateral and the road framework of the Beach Maintenance Area.
- (v) **Dumps.**
Clearance of the area required for dump sites and the construction of dump circuit tracks, as required.
- (vi) **Unloading Bays and Piers.**
Provision of semi-permanent facilities for bridging the water-gap between beaching craft and the shore.
- (vii) **Water Supply.**
Installation of permanent water supply.
- (viii) **RAE Stores.**
The holding and issue of engineer stores in the RAE dump.

43. BEACH SIGNAL UNIT.

(a) Composition.

- (i) One Naval Beach Signal Section—attached to the Beach Group and designed to work in conjunction with (ii).

- (ii) One Army Beach Signal Section.

The whole unit is trained and organised to work as one team, and while each section is commanded by officers of its own service, it is an accepted principle that where necessary the senior officer, Petty Officer or NCO may take charge of any of the parties regardless of its composition.

(b) Role.

The objects of the Beach Signal Unit are:—

- (i) To provide communications between Naval authorities ashore and those afloat.
- (ii) To provide Signal centres during the passage of successive unit and formation headquarters inland.
- (iii) To provide communication between headquarters ashore and their respective beaches in the initial stages.
- (iv) To provide alternative channels between headquarters ashore and those afloat and to act as step-up stations should the range become too great for the direct links to be maintained.
- (v) To provide communications between beaches.
- (vi) To provide communications in the beach area for beach maintenance and beach defence.

(c) Organisation.

One Beach Signal Unit is normally allotted to each Assault Brigade, and is organised into parties capable of providing communications for:—

- (i) A three battalion front.
- (ii) A two battalion front and a detached landing.
(Details are given in Combined Operations Pamphlet 6B.)

(d) Other Beach Group Signals.

Units comprising the Beach Group have their own signal detachments, any or all of which may be used at the discretion of the Beach Group Comd. on the advice of the OC Beach Sigs. It will be normal for the Signal Pl of the Beach Battalion to provide the internal signal communications of the Beach Group.

(e) Command.

The OC Beach Sig Section will be responsible for advising the Beach Group Comd on all matters relating to Signals. All Signals used by the Beach Group in operations will be placed under his command.

44. THE BEACH BATTALION.

(a) Organisation.

That of an Inf or Pnr Bn. tropical scale.

(b) Role.

(i) Beach Companies.

Provides Beach Companies, each of which is commanded by a Beach Coy Comd. The Beach Coy Comd controls the beach in conjunction with the Beachmaster. He is assisted by his subordinate officers and he uses his company for unloading craft and clearing the beaches.

(ii) Dump Working.

May provide labour for working the dumps in the Beach Maintenance Area, though in the early stages additional labour for this purpose may have to be provided from the formations carrying out the landing.

(iii) Engineers.

May allot a Company to assist the Fd Coy in the engineering work of developing the Beach Maintenance Area.

(iv) Sig Platoon.

Allots Sig Pl to come under comd OC Beach Signal Unit, and to establish, operate and maintain internal communications within the Beach Maintenance Area.

(v) Stretcher Bearers.

Provides stretcher bearers to work with the Beach Dressing Station.

(vi) Defence.

The Tk A Pl may be required for defence against an enemy seaborne attack on the beaches. The MG and Mortar Pls may be sited for this purpose, and to frustrate an enemy threat to the Beach Maintenance Area.

45. GENERAL TRANSPORT COY.

(a) Composition.

- (i) A HQ and two load-carrying pls, one of which is equipped with US 6 x 6 2½ ton trucks and the other with 4 x 4 ½ ton trucks and trailers.
- (ii) Two secs of a workshop pl.
- (iii) An RDI.

(b) Role.

It is the function of the Gen Tpt Coy to transport all stores discharged from craft, from the beaches to the appropriate dumps in the Beach Maintenance Area. It is the responsibility of the Beach Group DAQMG to demand vehicles in accordance with the requirements of Beach Coy Comds. The loading of the vehicles is carried out by the Beach Coys and may be either direct from craft or from provisional dumps under cover near the beach.

46. SUPPLY.

(a) Composition.

The supply organisation consists of the following:—

(i) A Supply Depot Pl of 2 Offrs and 31 ORs.

(ii) A BIFOD Pl of one offr and 23 ORs.

(NOTE: When Air Force supplies and fuel are being landed initially by the Army, a detachment of the Beach Flight of one officer and three ORs should be attached.)

(b) Role.

The Supply organisation given in sub-sec (a) above is responsible for the following:—

(i) Design and layout of the supply, POL and water dump areas.

(ii) Receipt, and orderly stacking of all commodities and accounting for them.

(iii) Issue in bulk and detail.

The Air Force detachment is included to advise on the appropriate handling of such Air Force supplies as may be handled by the Army. Vehicles, sleighs and DUKWs bringing stores to the dump area will be unloaded by parties allotted to the area from Beach Group labour resources. (Further particulars are contained in Combined Operations Pamphlet No. 38.)

47. AAMC.

(a) Composition.

(i) An AAMC Coy (Beach Group), of 5 offrs and 75 ORs, in which is included a Surgical Team of 2 Offrs and 5 ORs.

(ii) An Aust Malaria Control Unit.

(b) Control.

The DADMS, Beach Group is responsible to the Beach Gp Comd for the organisation and disposition of all medical components of the Beach Group. The DADMS may act as Casualty Embarkation Officer, or may appoint an officer of the Beach Group AAMC Coy to do this duty.

(c) Roles.

(i) The Beach Dressing Station.

It will be normal for half of the Beach Group AAMC Coy to land with each of two assaulting battalions and set up immediate Beach Dressing Stations in relation to the respective battalions. These two initial detachments will later concentrate to form one Beach Dressing Station within the Beach Maintenance Area.

The Beach Dressing Station is responsible for the collection and sorting of casualties within the Beach Maintenance Area, including beached craft. Stretcher bearers from the Beach Bn are attached to assist in collection.

(ii) Seaward Evacuation.

The seaward evacuation of all casualties is the responsibility of the Casualty Embarkation Officer, who may be the Beach Gp DADMS or an officer nominated by him. In this, co-ordination with the Principal Beachmaster and BMrs will be necessary.

(iii) The Surgical Team.

Works in conjunction with the Beach Dressing Station and carries out major surgery on cases unfit for seaward evacuation.

(iv) AMCU.

The Malaria Control Unit is responsible for malarial control within the Beach Maintenance Area.

48. THE ORDNANCE BEACH DETACHMENT.

(a) Composition.

The Ordnance Beach Detachment consists of 5 Offrs and 65 ORs. It is organized into a Headquarters of one offr and one OR, a stores section of 2 offrs and 30 ORs, and an ammunition section of 2 offrs and 32 ORs.

(b) Role.

The OC commands both stores and ammunition sections. He may also act as ordnance officer to the assault brigade, in the early stages. The stores and ammunition sections are each subdivided into sub-sections designed to handle the various categories of stores and ammunition passing into and out of the dumps. When Air Force stores are being landed, the Detachment will be assisted by two Air Force Sections (total, 2 Offrs and 12 ORs) of the Beach Flight. The handling of stores and ammunition in and out of the dumps is carried out by labour provided from Beach Group resources. (Combined Operations Pamphlet 40 covers the functions of the Ordnance Beach Detachment.)

49. AEME.

(a) Composition.

The Beach Group Workshop consists of a Workshop Sec and a Recovery Sec. The Recovery Sec is equipped with three US Diamond T "Wreckers" and a D8 tractor. When necessary, the detachment may be reinforced by an Air Force Beach Flight of one offr and 17 ORs.

(b) Role.

(i) Recovery.

Recovery Points will be established to ensure the quick recovery of drowned vehicles and vehicles which have been bogged or disabled in the Beach Maintenance Area.

(ii) Water-proofing of Vehicles.

The Beach Group Workshop will be responsible for the water-proofing of Beach Group vehicles. It will establish a de-waterproofing area at the Far Shore where all the vehicles of the Force will be de-waterproofed to Stage 4.

(iii) Maintenance.

The Beach Group Workshop will carry out second line repairs to Beach Group vehicles and to such vehicles of the Force as may have been left in the Beach Maintenance Area.

- (iv) **Evacuation.**
Vehicles requiring major repairs will be evacuated either by sea or to Workshops when they have been established.
- (v) **Craft Repair.**
The Beach Group Workshop may be required to assist the Naval Beach Commando and Maintenance Sec in the recovery and repair of craft.
(Further details are given in Combined Operations Pamphlets 41A and 41B.)

50. PROVOST.

- (a) **Composition.**
An Independent Provost Pl with a HQ (1 Offr. 6 ORs) and two secs (each of 16 ORs).
- (b) **Role.**
Beach Group Provost are responsible for the following duties:—
 - (i) Police and guide duties and the establishment of Traffic Posts to regulate traffic within the Beach Maintenance Area.
 - (ii) The erection of signposts throughout the Beach Maintenance Area, on a liberal scale.
 - (iii) Establishment of Stragglers Posts.
 - (iv) Custody of Prisoners of War.

Much depends upon the smooth flow of traffic through the Beach Maintenance Area. Congestion and delays hamper operations of the Field force and render the congested areas vulnerable to enemy air attack. The efficient handling of well trained provost will obviate the many dangers which may arise from confused and uncontrolled traffic arrangements.
- (c) **Control.**
The traffic circuits are indicated in the First and Second Key Plans. The Beach Group DAQMG is responsible for traffic arrangements and the OC Provost is responsible to him for traffic control.

51. SALVAGE.

The Salvage Unit will organise a Salvage Dump in the Beach Maintenance Area and will receive salvage from the Beach Maintenance Area and from forward areas. It may re-issue to Ordnance or evacuate to seaward.

CHAPTER VI

DEVELOPMENT OF THE BEACH MAINTENANCE AREA

52. TYPES OF BEACH MAINTENANCE AREA.

The term "Beach Maintenance Area" is a general term which is used irrespective of its size or the formation it is required to serve. In all cases, it will be the responsibility of the Beach Group to develop the area. The various levels at which the term has application are the following:—

- (a) **Division.**
The Beach Maintenance Area in this case must be on a scale to maintain one division and attached troops. Its development will certainly entail the committal of the whole of the Beach Group plus additional labour.
- (b) **Brigade.**
In the event of a detached landing by a Brigade Group, the area to be developed will be relatively smaller and will require a small Beach Group component for development and maintenance.
- (c) **Battalion.**
If a Battalion Group is operating in a detached role and requires maintenance, then a Beach Group Detachment of the requisite size should be organised to accompany the Battalion Group develop a maintenance area for it and maintain it through the area.
- (d) **Subsidiary Beaches.**
In the event of a Force moving coastwise from its main Beach Base and requiring subsidiary beaches to be opened along the line of march for the delivery of supplies from seaward, then it will be the responsibility of the Beach Group to reconnoitre and open subsidiary Beach Maintenance Areas.

53. THE FIRST KEY PLAN.

- (a) **Definition.**
The First Key Plan is a plan of the proposed layout of the Beach Maintenance Area which is based upon all the available information. A specimen First Key Plan is included at Appendix "F."
- (b) **Responsibility for Production.**
The Beach Group Comd is responsible to the Formation Comd for the production of the First Key Plan. During the planning stage, the Force Comd will furnish the Beach Group Comd with all available information. He will also give him such assistance as may be necessary in regard to photographic interpretation. It will be necessary for the Beach Group Comd to consult and confer with various key officers of the Formation in regard to details of the Plan. An indication of what may be necessary in this regard is given below:—
 - (i) **AA and QMG.**
"Q" Branch of Division must be satisfied that the size and layout of the proposed area is consistent with Divisional requirements.
 - (ii) **CRA.**
It may be necessary to consult the CRA in regard to accommodation and siting of such AA as may be landed by the Force for immediate and subsequent defence of the beaches and Beach Maintenance Area.

(iii) CRE.

It will be necessary to ensure that the road framework proposed to be developed within the Beach Maintenance Area is in accordance with the plans for the Force being made by the CRE. The closest possible co-operation will be desirable in this regard.

(iv) ADMS.

The medical plan for the Beach Maintenance Area must be co-ordinated with the medical plan of the Force and the ADMS may require accommodation for an MDS and a CCS to be included within the limits of the Beach Maintenance Area.

(v) Assault Bde Comd.

Assault Bde HQ and Bde Sig Office should be sited near Beach Group HQ and the Main Beach Signal Office. Consultations to effect this may be necessary.

54. RECONNAISSANCE.

(a) Composition of Parties.

A suggested composition of Beach Group recce parties is given at Appendix "G." Under conditions of tropical jungle it will generally be necessary for all of the early recce to be done on foot and in order to allow it to be completed in adequate time, the work will be allotted to a considerable number of officers, each of whom will be responsible for his own particular section.

(b) Priority and Sequence of Landing.

Beach Group recce parties will be landed in sequence, with the Assault Brigade, consistent with the priority pertaining to their respective tasks. It will always be desirable for recce parties to be landed in time to complete their recce before their main bodies or working parties arrive. A suggested sequence of landing is included in the table given at Appendix "H."

(c) Action on Landing.

The particular action to be taken by the various Beach Group recce personnel on landing will be dictated by the nature of their role. In general, the senior officer of each group or service will report the result of his recce to the Beach Group Commander as soon as recce has been completed.

(d) Intercommunication.

Officers whose recce takes them some distance inland should be provided with portable wireless sets to enable them to make progress reports of their observations to their service comd or to Beach Group HQ. This is particularly desirable in the case of the long and arduous recce required in respect of the proposed road framework, and perhaps some of the dump areas. It will allow the Beach Group Commander to adjust and co-ordinate his ultimate Plan without waiting for all recce parties to return.

55. THE SECOND KEY PLAN.

(a) Definition.

The Second Key Plan is the firm plan for the layout of the Beach Maintenance Area. It is based upon the result of ground reconnaissance.

(b) Responsibility for Production.

The Beach Group Commander is responsible for the production of the Second Key Plan. A senior "Q" representative of the Formation landing will land early and will represent Division in the acceptance of the Second Key Plan.

(c) Total Revision of Plan.

In the event of its being necessary for the First Key Plan to be totally abandoned (because the landings have taken place on the wrong beaches, or for tactical or other considerations) some delay in the production of a Plan for development will inevitably occur. In order to provide against eventualities such as these, it will be desirable for the Beach Group Commander and the main body of the Beach Group to remain afloat until a firm decision has been given as to what area will be developed for maintenance. Such decision will usually be given by the Assault Bde Comd in consultation with the Beach Group Comd and will be based upon information received from forward troops.

(d) Method of Production.

A master Second Key Plan is built up at Beach Group HQ by adjusting and amending the First Key Plan in accordance with the reports of the recce parties, as they are received.

(e) The Time Factor.

It has been found that final completion of the Second Key Plan may not be effected until H plus 6 or H plus 7 hours. This, however, will not prevent the implementation of portions of the plan as they become firm. For example, firm decisions will have been made earlier in regard to what sections of beaches are to be used, the beach lateral and some of the road framework. Construction of these and other essentials will be commenced as rapidly as possible after recce.

(f) Promulgation.

Firm decisions in regard to the Second Key Plan will usually be given verbally to relevant officers, as they are made. The final Key Plan, when completed, will be issued to all recipients of the First Key Plan. Written orders may later be issued in confirmation of such orders as have been given by other means to implement the development of the Key Plan.

56. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN.

(a) Strength of Beach Group Units.

During the planning stage, and at Divisional level, decision will be given in regard to the strength and composition of components of the Beach Group to be landed. In this regard, relevant factors for consideration are the following:—

- (i) The size and nature of the Force which is to be landed and maintained, including Air Force requirements.
- (ii) The quantity of reserve stores which are to be handled.
- (iii) Availability of shipping space for personnel, material and equipment.

(b) Priority and Sequence of Landing.

General principles which will influence the times at which Beach Group Units are put ashore are the following:—

- (i) Sufficient personnel and equipment must always be landed in sufficient time to do the work that is required of them. For example, if beach roadway is required for the discharge of MT, then engineer personnel and equipment must be landed in time to have the work completed before the arrival of the vehicles. Likewise, labour for the discharge of stores must be landed in advance of the arrival of the stores.
- (ii) Large detachments of main bodies should not be planned to arrive before they are required.
- (iii) Main bodies of the Beach Group should not be committed to a beach until a firm decision has been given to develop that area.
- (iv) The nature of the shipping provided will influence the times at which the Beach Group will land. For instance, when landings are from Ships to Shore, the arrivals of Beach Group components may necessarily be spread over the greater part of D Day. On the other hand, when beaching ships (LST, LCI, LCT) are used, there will be a tendency for the Beach Group to be put ashore in force, in large numbers, and often in advance of requirements.

Priorities for the Beach Group and its general allotment of snipping space will be determined on the Divisional level. The actual "marrying up" of the Beach Group with the Assault and other brigades will be worked out by the Brigade and Beach Group Staffs in accordance with the wishes of the Brigade and Beach Group Comds.

A suggested sequence of landing for Beach Group units is included in the table given at Appendix "H."

(c) Tasks on Landing.

On landing, Beach Group Units will be directed straight to their tasks by recon officers who have already landed, and the Area will be developed in accordance with the Plan of the Beach Group Comd.

The roles of the various units have been given in Chapter V. The development of these roles is also referred to in the table given at Appendix "H."

57. LIMITATIONS OF THE BEACH GROUP.

The Beach Group is designed to maintain the Force through the open beaches until such time as a port is captured or the area has been developed as a port by the construction of the necessary facilities. It will then be relieved by a Base Sub-area and will be withdrawn into reserve.

Operations may necessitate the opening up of a number of subsidiary beaches for maintenance, (see para 52d above). The number that can be staffed will be limited by the Beach Group resources in personnel and equipment which can be released from the BMA.

CHAPTER VII INTERCOMMUNICATION.

58. NAVAL SIGNALS.

- (a) Communications during the voyage are entirely the responsibility of the Navy.
- (b) The Navy will provide all communications necessary for the discharge of ships, the beaching of landing craft, and the naval control of the beaches.

59. COMMUNICATIONS WITHIN THE BEACH MAINTENANCE AREA.

It is the responsibility of the Beach Signal Unit to provide communications within the Beach Maintenance Area in addition to assisting in the tactical requirements of the Assault Force. This is carried out in three phases:—

- (a) Initially, when communications provided by Beach Signals will be used to assist and augment those of the Assaulting Force passing across the beaches.
- (b) Secondly, when the Beach Group functions more fully, and greater demands are made for communications between Beach Group HQ, Beaches, Transit Areas, dumps etc.
- (c) Thirdly, when communication is established with the Near Shore, until such time as the Beach Group is relieved by a Base Sub-area.

60. SITING OF MAIN BEACH SIGNAL OFFICE.

The Main Beach Signal Office must be sited to suit the requirements of the Formation Commander and the Beach Group Commander, but it must be borne in mind that the requirements of the Assault Force in the initial stages will take precedence over those of the Beach Group.

61. EMPLOYMENT OF THE SIGNAL PLATOON OF THE BEACH BN.

The Signal Platoon of the Beach Bn establishes, operates and maintains the internal communications in the Beach Maintenance Area. OC Signal Platoon will work in close touch with OC Beach Signal Unit, so that the Signal organisation within the Beach Maintenance Area is under one control and able to meet the requirements of the Beach Group Comd and the Assault Force Comds.

CHAPTER VIII

WORK IN THE BEACH MAINTENANCE AREA.

62. CONTROL OF THE BEACHES.

(a) Beach Headquarters.

As soon as possible after landing, the BMr and the Beach Coy Comd of each beach will set up a joint command post which will be known as Beach HQ. This HQ should be sited so as to give visibility over the whole beach. It will be well signposted and will always be manned by a responsible officer. Communications will be provided initially through the Adv Det Beach Signal Unit, and when the HQ becomes organised and dug-in, it will be served with line communication. From this HQ, the BMr and the Beach Coy Comd will exercise joint control of their beach.

(b) Co-ordination of Beaches.

Co-ordination of the arrival and discharge of craft on the whole beach frontage of the Beach Maintenance Area is effected by Beach Group HQ. The officers principally concerned in this co-ordination are the D/PBMr and the DAQMG. Some control may be effected by signal arrangements but it will be necessary for the officers concerned to be continually on the beach if difficulties and adjustments are to be promptly dealt with.

63. THE BEACHING OF SHIPS AND CRAFT.

(a) Responsibility.

It is the responsibility of Naval Officers of the Naval Beach Commando to bring in all landing ships, craft and DUKWs at the most suitable places, consistent always with Army requirements.

(b) Landing Points.

By agreement between the Navy and the Army Officers of a beach, landing points may be allocated for the beaching of different types of ships or craft, or for the discharge of certain commodities, such as ammunition, POL etc. The appropriate signs for this purpose are given at Appendix "E." It is the responsibility of the BMr to place these signs in the agreed places.

It may be desirable later to co-ordinate the allocation of landing points along the whole of the working beach. This will be done by the D/PBMr in accordance with the Beach Group Plan.

64. THE WATER GAP.

(a) Definition.

When a landing ship or craft has beached, any stretch of water between the end of its lowered ramp and dry land is known as the water gap.

(b) Depth.

It is the responsibility of the Navy to test the depth of the water gap and inform Army personnel and drivers of vehicles intending to land.

(c) Wading of Personnel.

In respect of personnel landing from the larger landing ships and craft (LST, LCI, LCT) when the water gap is negotiable but deep, naval ratings will pass a line or lines ashore to assist the Army personnel in getting ashore.

(d) Wading of Vehicles.

All drivers must know the wading capacity of their vehicles. Decision as to whether the vehicles can get ashore will depend upon the depth of the water-gap.

(e) Bridging.

Bridging the water-gap may be effected by pontoons or bridging equipment carried on the LST, or put into position by the Beach Group RAE.

As soon as it is known that a water-gap cannot be avoided along the beaches, and if NL Pontoon Gear is not available the Beach Group will take action to have suitable landing bays constructed by the RAE.

65. BEACH CLEARANCE.

(a) The Assault.

Troops in the initial waves must make their own way through beach minefields and wire. In this they will be assisted by small detachments of Divisional RAE. Any gaps made through wire or minefields by the assaulting troops will be marked by the ULO.

(b) Subsequently.

The plan of subsequent beach clearance will be made by the Beach Coy Comd and BMr and will be given, together with priorities, to the RAE rece party.

66. PREPARATION OF EXITS.

The location of beach exits, beach lateral and beach feeders will have been determined by the Beach Coy Comd in consultation with the BMr. The priority of these tasks, and their nature, will be indicated to the RAE rece party.

Beach clearance and the necessary preparations for the reception of vehicles will be carried out by the RAE with their equipment, as soon as they arrive.

67. THE DISCHARGE OF VEHICLES.

(a) MT

If in the opinion of the Beach Coy Comd, the beach will not support heavy vehicles without mesh, then the discharge of MT will only be carried out over feeders which have been prepared with mesh.

(b) Tracked Vehicles.

On no account will tracked vehicles be discharged over beach roadway and separate exits will always be marked for them.

68. THE DISCHARGE OF STORES.

(a) Organisation of Labour.

The efficient discharge of stores irregularly arriving at the beach imposes a heavy strain on the labour available for handling them. This labour requires the utmost care in organisation and relief. Organisation of the labour on the beach is the responsibility of the Beach Coy Comd. Control and relief of all the labour resources of the Beach Group is the responsibility of the Beach Group Comd.

(b) Beach Dumps.

If vehicles are not available to remove stores direct from craft, temporary dumps will be established under cover and near the beach. Craft must be discharged rapidly, even though this may mean the initial dumping of stores just above high water mark.

(c) Mechanical Aids.

Mechanical equipment designed to economise in time and labour is the following:—

(i) Gravity Runway.

Roller runway will prove useful for unloading the larger craft, provided the necessary fall can be obtained.

(ii) Cranes.

Cranes may be used for discharging LSTs or LCTs direct from deck to vehicles.

69. ENGINEER WORK.

(a) Priority of Tasks.

Priority of engineer tasks in the construction of the Beach Maintenance Area will be decided in the planning stage and will be confirmed or amended, after the landing, by the Beach Group Comd or his representative. Demands for major engineer work will normally be made to Beach Group HQ. Lesser tasks will be undertaken by agreement between relevant officers on the spot, but care must be taken to ensure that such action does not result in the diversion of personnel and equipment from tasks given urgent priority in the Beach Comd's Plan.

(b) Regulation of Work.

During the planning, the OC Fd Coy will have made his appreciation of the men, equipment and materials required, and his resources should be landed in sequence to meet this plan. Under jungle conditions a heavy strain will be placed upon the RAE. Success will only be achieved by the OC arranging for good supervision and control of work, and himself co-ordinating the whole engineer effort. In this regard, good communications will be necessary to link his working platoons to his HQ.

70. TRANSPORT.

(a) Gen Tpt Coy.

As soon as vehicles from this unit have been landed, and the tracks or ground are fit to support them, they will be used to move stores from the provisional beach dumps, or from craft, to the various dumps. In this regard, the following points are of importance.

(i) If rain-sodden ground is anticipated, vehicles should land with chains fitted.

(ii) Drivers must be trained to recognise what constitutes a maximum load of various commodities for their vehicles. If vehicles are overloaded, they will bog and be affected by other stoppages, all of which place a strain on labour and resources and tend to dislocate movement.

(iii) Much delay in delivery will be avoided if trucks are wholly loaded with one commodity.

(iv) The driver must be ready to state the type and nature of his load in order to effect its rapid transit to the appropriate sub-dump.

(b) Sleighs.

Sleighs have a limited value in passing stores over beaches or ground unsuitable for MT. They will be hauled by tractors and should therefore be directed away from beach roadway and tracks being prepared for MT.

(c) DUKWs.

Detachments from the DUKW Gen Tpt Coy will be allotted for working with the Beach Group in the case of ship to shore movement or when substantial water-gaps cannot be avoided.

DUKW's will conform to Naval control while water-borne and to the Beach Group traffic regulations, on land.

At the dumps, DUKW's will be unloaded by means of cranes, gravity runway or "A" frames.

71. THE DUMPS (RAE, SUPPLY AND ORDNANCE).

It is the responsibility of the Services concerned to control fully the work within their respective dump areas. The unloading of vehicles from the beaches and the loading of vehicles drawing commodities will be done by labour allotted from Beach Group resources and by such mechanical equipment as may be available.

Camouflage, coverage and fire control must all be taken into account during the planning so that the necessary materials will be on hand when required.

The organisation within the dump areas must be such that the officer in charge will be in a position to render a statement of dump holdings, at any time. This information is communicated to Beach Group HQ and from there it can be given to the Force when called for.

72. TRANSIT AREAS.

The vehicle and personnel transit areas will usually only be occupied by any one echelon of troops for a few hours at most, but they will be in constant use by follow-up troops. Immediate steps will therefore be made by the Beach Group Comd to provide adequate sanitation arrangements in these areas.

The Beach Group Comd will appoint an officer to control each transit area, who may be assisted by a small detachment. The officer in charge of a transit area will check troops into and out of the area. He should always be able to inform Beach Group HQ of particulars of units and their equipment which are in the transit area and such information will be available to Brigade etc Comds, when required.

An officer from the Gen Tpt Coy will normally be placed in charge of the Vehicle Transit Area and the Personnel Transit Area might be controlled by an officer from the Beach Battalion.

73. TRAFFIC CONTROL.

(a) Responsibility.

The traffic control plan is worked out by the DAQMG and is implemented and policed by the Provost Pl.

(b) Sign Posts.

The Provost will land with a liberal supply of signposts which will be set up at frequent intervals. By night, the place of signposts will be taken by shaded lamps. The nature of the signposts to be used is given in paragraph 28 (b).

(c) Control Posts.

Control Posts will be established at Key Points as early as possible after the landing. Provost on duty should always be supplied with a copy of the Key Plan and must know the location of all HQs, dumps etc.

(d) Traffic Circuits.

In the very early stages traffic may be restricted to a limited number of tracks, but as soon as possible circuits should be developed and used. As development proceeds, tracks will be widened to allow two-way traffic.

Separate routes should always be marked for tracked vehicles and tanks.

74. DE-WATERPROOFING.

The general policy in regard to the waterproofing of vehicles will be laid down by the Force. When there is reasonable expectation of suitable beaches, the waterproofing of all vehicles may not be ordered.

Detachments of the Beach Group Workshop should be landed early in order to supervise the de-waterproofing of vehicles landing with high priority. The De-waterproofing Area should be sited near the beach and every effort will be made to make vehicles available for use as rapidly as possible.

75. RECOVERY AND MAINTENANCE.

Recovery Posts will be sited to serve the beaches and the Beach Maintenance Area generally. They should be provided with intercommunication and should always be manned. Control of recovery arrangements should be centralised.

76. THE AAMC COY (BEACH GROUP).

There are no special problems associated with the work of the Beach Group AAMC Coy. If the company is split to provide detachments for each of two battalion landing beaches, it is probable that it will concentrate to form one Beach Dressing Station before the end of D Day.

The Surgical Team will usually establish in association with the detachment which it is intended to build up. If the Surgical Team is required to function early, then its considerable amount of equipment should be landed on wheels.

The DADMS will maintain general supervision over the Beach Group medical service and co-ordinate its activities with those of the Force. He must make early arrangements with the PBMr or his subordinates in regard to the seaward evacuation of casualties. He will ensure that the retraction of craft is not delayed by casualties awaiting embarkation and it may be best if these are held in dug-out shelters near the Casualty Embarkation Point.

77. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

It will be seen from the foregoing paragraphs of this Chapter that effective control and co-ordination of all the activities within the Beach Group can only be achieved with the assistance of a good signal system. The responsibility for this lies principally with the Signal Pl of the Beach Bn. The ultimate net-work required in the Beach Maintenance Area will take some time to provide but priority will be given in the landing plan for such personnel and equipment as will be required early.

Signal cable has proved particularly vulnerable to damage in landing operations. All cable will be raised 14 feet above the ground or buried to a depth of 8 inches.

78. DEFENCE.

(a) Ground.

The resources of the Beach Group are not sufficient to allow of detachments being allotted a purely tactical role. Emergency defence measures are met by the following arrangements:—

(i) All personnel in the Beach Group will be trained in the use of their weapons and in minor tactics.

(ii) Immediately on landing, a senior officer of the Beach Bn, usually the Bn Comd, will reconnoitre the whole of the Beach Maintenance Area and prepare a plan for the emergency defence of the area and will allocate sectors or positions to be occupied when ordered. The completed plan will be submitted to the Beach Group Comd for approval and promulgation.

(iii) The Beach Group Comd will institute an alarm signal, the sounding of which will be the signal for all personnel to abandon their tasks and assemble in accordance with the Emergency Defence Plan.

(b) Anti-Aircraft.

The Force Commander's Plan will always include arrangements for the adequate AA defence of the beaches and Beach Maintenance Area. High priority will be given to a proportion of LAA for the immediate defence of the beaches after the initial landings. Guns will later be allotted for the defence of the area generally. HAA will be brought forward to the beaches as soon as practicable.

For the AA defence to be immediately effective, a high degree of co-operation will be necessary between the Beach Group Comd and the AA Comd.

(c) Seaward Defence.

The Beach Group is held responsible for the close seaward defence of the beaches. Any such attacks would be launched from small craft and the best defence against them would be the fire of the LAA guns sited on the beaches, supported by the weapons of the Tk A Pl of the Beach Bn. Fire from these weapons at such targets will be greatly aided by the use of such illuminants as flares or searchlights.

CHAPTER IX

THE MAINTENANCE PROJECT.

79. DEFINITION.

The Maintenance Project is the administrative plan for maintaining and supplying all the forces engaged in a landing operation. It will include requirements in all commodities for consumption on a daily basis, plus what amounts have been ordered to be landed as a reserve.

80. ESSENTIALS FOR THE PLAN.

In order to prepare the Maintenance Project the "Q" Staff will require the following information on which to base their calculations:

- (a) Order of Battle.
- (b) Scales of Equipment etc.
- (c) War Usage Rate.
- (d) Period for which the formation will be responsible, i.e., from D Day till the time the higher organisation takes over responsibility for maintenance.
- (e) Shipping which will be available during the period of the Formation's responsibility.

81. LEVELS AT WHICH MAINTENANCE IS PLANNED.

(a) LHQ.

Planning on the broad scale begins at the LHQ level very many months in advance of intended operations. This is because much of the material to be used must be ordered and brought forward from factories and bases, so as to be available at close call when actually required.

(b) Corps.

Maintenance on the Corps level will usually also be in general terms, and anticipatory of what Formations may require when their detailed planning commences. In the event of a Corps being committed as such in a landing operation, then a Corps Maintenance Project would require to be worked out in detail and its Divisions would accept the arrangements made at the higher level.

(c) Division.

When an operation is to be carried out by a Division, or a Division plus some Corps Troops, then all of the work of the detailed planning devolves upon the Divisional Staff. The detailed plan is known as the Divisional Maintenance Project and is, in fact, the Divisional Administrative Order. The Divisional Project is based upon, and interwoven with, the Divisional Operation Order for the operation.

(d) Brigade.

Brigade Maintenance Projects will not be necessary except in the case where the operation is being carried out at the Brigade level.

82. SCOPE OF DIVISIONAL MAINTENANCE PROJECT.

The Divisional Maintenance Project covers all aspects of supply and maintenance, in every category, from the Forward Base to the dumps in the Beach Maintenance Area. It therefore covers the following phases:—

- (a) Drawing and concentrating the stores and equipment at the ports and/or beaches at the Near Shore.
- (b) Loading and shipment in accordance with the shipping and convoys available.
- (c) Unloading at the beaches and organisation for issue in the dumps of the Beach Maintenance Area.

83. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN.

(a) Near Shore.

Division will be assisted at the Near Shore by Corps or Base Area units in concentrating and loading its maintenance requirements. Particularly will this be necessary when the bulk of the Force has sailed.

(b) Far Shore.

The Beach Group has the task of discharging the maintenance requirements at the Far Shore and making them available for issue. Such of the Divisional supply organisations as have been put ashore are therefore free for employment in forward maintenance. From the foregoing, it will be seen that the following are essentials:—

- (i) That the Beach Group is acquainted with full details of the Divisional Maintenance Project.
- (ii) That Division is satisfied with the Beach Group Plan for handling the situation.

(c) The Key Plans.

The First and Second Key Plans have already been referred to in Chapter VI. They are part and parcel of the Divisional Maintenance Project.

CHAPTER X

ORDERS AFFECTING BEACH ORGANISATION.

84. STANDING ORDERS.

The length of an Administrative Order for a Landing Operation will be reduced enormously if Standing Orders have been produced to include all procedure which has become standard. Much of the procedure which has become a drill in training, may then be omitted from the Orders for the Operation. Divisional Standing Orders will have application to all units included with the Division for an operation. Beach Groups will require their own Standing Orders, in addition.

85. EMBARKATION ORDERS.

Embarkation Orders affect Beach Organisation in that the manner and sequence in which a Force has been loaded will generally determine the sequence of discharge at the Far Shore. For this reason separate "Loading Tables" are not necessary. A good Landing Table will fix the position of every person and thing, in the shipping, just as it determines the sequence of discharge.

86. ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS.

These have already been dealt with in Chapter IX under the general heading of "Maintenance Project."

87. FORCE OPERATION ORDER.

The Operation Order of the Force and of the Assault Brigade are of interest to the Beach Group as these will indicate the position of the Covering Position and of any intermediate positions.

88. BEACH GROUP ORDERS.

A specimen Beach Group Order is included at Appendix "I." With good Standing Orders, relevant extracts from Landing Tables and a First Key Plan, little remains to be included in Beach Group Orders.

CHAPTER XI

LANDING TABLES.

89. DEFINITION.

A Landing Table is a Table giving the distribution of a Force through ships and craft and the sequence of its discharge at the Far Shore.

90. LANDING TABLES AT DIFFERENT LEVELS.

(a) Division.

Division will normally issue a Table known as the "Distribution of Force to Ships." This Table also gives an indication of the general sequence of the landing, down to units. Division cannot normally produce a detailed Landing Table until Brigades and Battalions have had an opportunity of working out the detail, and of "marrying up" with the Beach Group.

Alternatively, Division may assume the responsibility of producing the complete detailed Landing Tables. If this method is adopted, Brigades must be freely consulted during the period of preparation in order to ensure that the lower formations are landed in accordance with their Commanders' plans.

(b) Brigades.

"Brigade Landing Tables" are based upon the general distribution and sequence laid down by Division. They will show the allotment of units to craft and the sequence of landing. They will include such Corps, Divisional and Beach Group detachments as are allotted to the Brigade's quota of ships and craft.

(c) Battalion.

Tables at the Battalion level are usually referred to as "Landing Craft Tables." They show the exact composition of the load of each craft in personnel and equipment.

91. CENTRALISED PLANNING.

The system of making each successive subordinate formation responsible for the production of its own Landing Tables was originally based upon an Assault Brigade being self-contained within its own convoy and each Battalion being self-contained within its own ship. With the introduction of the larger landing ships and craft (LCIs, LSTs), some dispersion of units and brigades through the shipping becomes inevitable. In this event some co-ordination at the higher plane, as suggested in para 90 (a), will be inevitable.

92. PRO FORMA LANDING TABLES.

A Specimen Brigade Landing Table is included at Appendix "J." and a Specimen Unit Landing Craft Table at Appendix "K." These Tables will satisfy all requirements in respect of a Force landing from both LSTs and the larger beaching ships and craft.

93. DISTRIBUTION OF LANDING TABLES.

(a) Within the Force.

Landing Tables will usually be issued as appendices to Orders and should receive a wide distribution through both Navy and Army since they constitute the basis of the whole Landing Plan.

(b) Within the Beach Group.

Complete Force Landing Tables should be issued to the Beach Group in sufficient quantity to allow of copies being held by all Beachmasters and Beach Coy Comds, as well as "key" personnel of the Beach Group Staff.

The Beach Group Operation Order will be accompanied by a Beach Group Landing Table which is built up from extracts of all relevant Unit Landing Craft Tables. This Table serves to regulate the landing of the Beach Group units and detachments.

Appendix "A" to
"Beach Organisation and
Maintenance."

DEFINITIONS OF COMMON TERMS USED IN THE BEACH ORGANISATION.

ASSAULT SCALE.

The Assault Scale is the minimum number of men, vehicles and weapons which will enable a unit to operate effectively as a fighting unit for 48 hours and from 6/8 miles inland.

ASSEMBLY AREA.

Assembly Areas are positions, outside the Beach Maintenance Area, to which units move after leaving the Transit Areas.

BEACH.

The term "beach" as used in respect of an assault landing, means a section of the enemy coastline over which a battalion is to land. In Beach Organisation, the beaches used for maintenance may vary in size from those used in the initial assault.

BEACH DRESSING STATION.

A Beach Dressing Station is a dressing station set up by the medical component of the Beach Group. It is located within the Beach Maintenance Area. Its main function is to tend wounded and not to collect them.

BEACH EXIT.

A Beach Exit is a natural or developed outlet from the beach to the hinterland for vehicles, tracked or wheeled, and/or personnel. The term includes entrances to the beach used by returning vehicles.

BEACH FEEDERS.

The Beach Feeders are tracks laid across the Beach to connect Landing Points with the Beach Lateral.

BEACH FRAMEWORK.

The Beach Framework is the layout of temporary roadway on the beaches. It comprises feeders, laterals and beach exits.

BEACH HEAD.

The term "Beach Head" denotes the area which must be captured in order to prevent direct small arms fire being brought to bear on the landing place.

BEACH HEADQUARTERS.

Beach Headquarters is the control post of a Beach. It is occupied jointly by the Beachmaster and the Beach Coy Comd, or their representatives.

BEACH LATERAL.

The Beach Lateral is a track running laterally above high-water mark along a beach which is in use for landing vehicles or stores. It forms part of the beach framework and should normally be of double width to permit two way traffic.

BEACH LEADING LIGHTS (OR BEACONS).

Beach Leading Lights (or Beacons) are two lights (or Beacons) which, when brought into and kept in line, by a landing ship, craft, boat or lighter approaching or leaving the beach, indicate that she is on the correct course. The responsibility for placing leading lights will be that of the Assistant Beachmaster.

CASUALTY EMBARKATION POINT.

The Casualty Embarkation Point is a site on the beach from which casualties are embarked into landing ships, craft, boats or lighters.

COMMODITY BEACH.

A Commodity Beach is one which is allocated to a limited number of special types of stores.

COMMODITY LOADING.

Commodity Loading is the loading of landing ships, craft, boats or lighters with one particular type of stores.

COVERING POSITION.

The Covering Position is the position which must be secured in order to gain sufficient space for the assembly of the follow-up formations and the development of the Beach Maintenance Area. The general line of the covering position should be far enough from the beaches to ensure the freedom of the landing places and the anchorage from ground-observed artillery fire.

FERRY SERVICE.

The Ferry Service is the system whereby landing craft and boats which have landed their initial load of personnel, vehicles or stores, return to the ships of the convoy, are reloaded and return to the beach. In operations where the sea passage is short, the ferry service might be from shore to shore rather than from ship to shore. Control of the Ship to Shore ferry service is exercised by the SNOL.

FIRST KEY PLAN.

The First Key Plan is a plan of the layout of the Beach Maintenance Area produced in the planning and based upon all the available information.

H-HOUR.

H-Hour is the time at which the first waves of landing craft or boats should touch down.

LANDING POINT.

Landing Points are points along the beach which are marked for the bringing in of landing ships and craft. Landing Points may be marked with special signs for special commodities such as ammunition, POL, stores, etc.

RELEASE POSITION.

The Release Position is the point at which the landing boats are lowered from the ships and form up for the final assault run-in to the beach.

SECOND KEY PLAN.

The Second Key Plan is a plan of the layout of the Beach Maintenance Area as affirmed after ground reconnaissance.

TACTICAL STOWAGE.

Tactical Stowage means the loading of vehicles, equipment and stores into landing ships, craft, boats and lighters in such a way that they can be disembarked in the order in which they will be tactically required.

TOUCH DOWN.

Touch Down is the moment at which a landing ship, craft, or lighter touches the beach.

TRANSIT AREA.

A Transit Area is an area set aside within the Beach Maintenance Area, to which troops proceed immediately on landing. As units and sub-units are built up in the Transit Areas, they are moved forward to the Force Assembly Areas. Transit Areas are provided for personnel and for vehicles.

TURN ROUND.

In assault landings this term means the time taken for a landing ship, craft, boat or lighter to complete the cycle of its trip, i.e., loading, outward passage, unloading, and the return passage to its loading port or ship.

DETAILS OF THE ORGANISATION OF AN AUST BEACH GROUP

Appx "B" to Beach Organisation and Maintenance.

APPENDIX B - BEACH ORGANISATION AND MAINTENANCE.																																		
Serial	Unit	PERSONNEL			WEAPONS												VEHICLES																	
		Offrs	ORs	TOTAL	Pistols		Rifles		Machine Guns				Mortars		Guns	TOTAL	Trucks 1-ton 4 x 4	Trucks 2½ ton 6 x 6	Trucks, 3-ton 4 x 4								Trac- tors Track- ed	Trac- tors whld. Crane 3-ton	Trans- port'rs 20-ton	Trailers			TOTAL	
					Sig	.38 in	.303 in.	.55 in. Tk A	SMG 9 mm	LMG 303 in	AALMG 303 in	MMG 303 in	2 in	3 in					Tk A 2 pdr	B'dwn Dmnd T	Gar- age	Machy or Wksbp	Semi- Trailer	Stores Stanned	Stores Un- binned	Tip- ping				Water 300 gls	Air Com- pressor	Jeep		2 whld Water 80 gals
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	aa	bb	cc	dd	ee	ff	gg	hh	
1	HQ Beach Gp	7	26	33		8	23									31	3													2		5		
2	Fd Coy	7	244	251		20	197	8	33		18					276	11	(a) 3							20					3	7	4	48	
3	Mech Eqpt Pl	1	41	42		1	33	1	8		2					45	3	1			2						(b) 11		2	3			23	
4	Engr Stores Pl	1	25	26		1	19	1	6		2					29	1	2				1						2					6	
5	Beach Sig Sec	2	42	44		25	8		11							44	5													1		6		
6	Par Bn	33	789	822	12	95	634	14	109	41		4	12	8	4 (a)	933	3													1		4		
7	Gen Tpt Coy																																	
8	HQ	4	45	49		10	36	2	2		2					52	3	1												2	1	7		
9	One Tpt Pl (Jeep)	1	61	62		9	48	2	5		2					66	(c) 42													(d) 40	2	84		
10	One Tpt Pl (2½ ton)	1	61	62		9	48	2	5		2					66	4	34	1	1			1							2	2	45		
11	One RDI		31	31			31									31																Nil		
12	Wksp Pl (HQ & 2 secs)	1	50	51		3	48	1			1					53	1			1	2		1	1							1	7		
13	Sup Dep Pl	2	31	33		2	29	1	2		1					35	1	1															2	
14	BIPOD Pl	1	28	29																													Nil	
14	AAMC Coy (Beach Gp)	5	74	79		5	9									14	(e) 5	1												3		10		
15	Mal Control Unit (TypeB)	1	10	11		2	5		4							11	2	1												1		4		
16	Ord Beach Det	5	65	70		5	63		2		6					76	2															2		
17	Beach Gp Workshop	3	75	78		4	60		13		3					80	3	(f) 1	3	1	2		1	1			(g) 1				2	15		
18	Indep Pro Pl(HQ & 2 secs)	1	38	39		36	3									39	10													3		13		
19	Sal Unit	1	29	30		1	29									30	1													1		2		
20	TOTAL BEACH GP	77	1765	1842	12	236	1323	32	200	41	39	4	12	8	4	1911	100	45	4	3	6	1	3	2	20	1	12	2	2	3	66	12	282	

Remarks: (a) With Winch; (b) Mechanical Plant:—Auto Patrols D12 2, Shovels Mech 1, Tractors D4 with PCU 2, Tractors D6 with PCU 6; (c) Includes 2 Trucks Machinery 1-ton and 1 Truck Recovery 1-ton; (d) Includes 2 Trucks Machinery; (e) With Stretcher fittings; (f) Bty Charging; (g) Tractor Tracked DS.

General Notes: (i) Equipment of Beach Groups has recently been increased by the inclusion of 7 x 3 ton crawler cranes, 3 loud speakers and 2,000 ft of gravity roller runway.
(ii) The details in this table are correct up to 2 May 44.

Appendix "C"
to "Beach Organisation
and Maintenance."


THE PHONETIC ALPHABET

A	ABLE	N	NAN
B	BAKER	O	OBOE
C	CHARLIE	P	PETER
D	DOG	Q	QUEEN
E	EASY	R	ROGER
F	FOX	S	SUGAR
G	GEORGE	T	TARE
H	HOW	U	UNCLE
I	ITEM	V	VICTOR
J	JIG	W	WILLIAM
K	KING	X	X RAY
L	LOVE	Y	YOKE
M	MIKE	Z	ZEBRA

SECRET

APPX "D" TO BEACH ORGANISATION
& MAINTENANCE.

SECTORS & BEACHES




HYDROGRAPHIC & BEACH MARKINGS

- SECRET -

Approx E



DAY
Left Flank



NIGHT
(From Seaward)




DAY
Centre Red Beach




NIGHT




DAY
Right Flank





NIGHT





Rocks, Shoals &
Submerged Obstacles




Ammunition





Gasoline & Oil





Tracked Vehicles





Wheeled Vehicles




Miscellaneous Supplies




Medical - (Supplies landed
or casualties evacuated)





L.C.T.




- SIZE OF MARKERS -	
<u>Flank Markers:</u>	12' x 2½'
<u>All Others:</u>	6'



L.C.I.




L.S.T.



SECRET

APPX "F" TO BEACH ORGANIZATION
AND MAINTENANCE



SPECIMEN

FIRST KEY PLAN

SCALE

0 100 200 YDS

LEGEND

	RAIN FOREST		EXISTING TRACKS
	KUNAI		TRACKS TO BE CONSTRUCTED

Appendix "G" to "Beach
Organisation and
Maintenance."

**A SUGGESTED COMPOSITION OF BEACH GROUP
RECONNAISSANCE PARTIES (x)**

Ser.	Unit	Detail
1.	Beach Gp HQ.	(a) DAQMG and runner, IO and assistant land initially. (y) (b) Beach Gp Comd, GSO III, DADMS, 5 ORs and jeep land later.
2.	RAN Commando.	(a) 4 ABMrs and 12 ratings land initially. (b) 2 BMrs land later, followed successively by. (c) D/PBMr and rating. (d) PBMr and rating.
3.	AA Regt.	(z) (a) LAA Tp Comd and 3 ORs land initially. (b) LAA Bty Comd and orderly lands later. (c) HAA Bty Comd and party land in accordance with AA Defence Plan.
4.	RAE.	(a) 2 Pl Comds, 2 NCOs and 4 ORs land initially. (b) Fd Coy Comd and orderly land later.
5.	Beach Sig Sec.	OC and orderly.
6.	Pnr Bn.	(a) 2 Beach Coy Comds and 6 ORs land initially. (b) Bn Comd, 2 ORs and jeep land to recce for emergency defence positions. (c) HQ Coy offr and orderly land to recce Personnel Transit Area. (d) 2 l/c and orderly land to recce bivouac site for Pnr Bn and additional labour unit.
7.	Assault Bns.	(z) One ULO and 2 orderlies per Assault Bn.
8.	Gen Tpt Coy.	OC, 2 ORs and jeep land to recce veh park and Veh Transit Area.
9.	Sup Dep Pl.	OC and orderly.
10.	BIPOD PL.	OC and orderly.

Ser.	Unit	Detail
11.	AAMC.	(a) 4 ORs land initially. (b) DADMS and orderly incl in Ser 1 above.
12.	Ordnance.	OC and orderly.
13.	AEME.	OC and orderly.
14.	Pro.	OC and orderly.
15.	Salvage.	OC and orderly.

NOTES:

- (x) A Sequence of Landing for recce parties is included in Appendix "H."
- (y) Division AA and QMG or his representative will land with Beach Gp Comd.
- (z) Not part of the Beach Gp.

A SUGGESTED SEQUENCE OF LANDING FOR THE BEACH GROUP

Serial	LDG TIME in relation to		TROOPS		Eqpt	TASKS ON LANDING
	H-hr (approx)	Tactical Tps	Particulars	No.		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	H-hr	First Wave	ABMrs and dets	4	Lamps, beach markers	One ABMr lands on each flank of each bn beach. Responsible for quick beach recce, safe beaching of succeeding craft and gives situation to BMr when he lands. Army opposite number is the ULO.
2	"	"	ULO and runners	3		ULO is a senior offr of an assault bn. He is responsible for clearing his bn across the beach. He will mark gaps made through mines or wire. Works with ABMrs and hands over to ECC when he lands.
3	H plus 15-20 mins	Assault En HQ	Beach Coy Comd	4		One per assault bn beach. Secures infm from ULO, detailed recce for beach exits and posn of first beach roadway. Consults engr recce party re work to be done. Develops his org for unloading craft and clearing beaches. Establishes his HQ with BMr and works in harmony with him throughout. Meets Beach Gp DAQMG when he lands and gives him the situation.
4	"	"	BMr and Beach det Parties	12	Beach signs, gear Salvage	One per assault bn. Receives infm from ABMrs on ldg. Does detailed recce of beach and goes firm on the suitability of the beach. Determines the method of its utilisation with the BCC and places markers accordingly. Regulates the calling in of craft. Establishes HQ with BCC and gives situation to PBMr when he lands.
5	"	"	Adv Engr Recce Dets	4	—	Incl one offr, 1 sjt and 2 OR per half of proposed BMA. Offr does recce for beach clearance and exits etc to suit plan of BCC and BMr, leaves sjt to brief working parties and then moves inland to recce one half of rd framework for BMA. Meets OC Fd Coy on return.

Serial	LDG TIME in relation to		TROOPS		Eqpt	TASKS ON LANDING
	H-hr (approx)	Tactical Tps	Particulars	No.		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
6	H plus 15-20 mins	Assault Bn HQ	Adv Dets Beach Sigs, Navy and Army	9	46 set and spare	One det per assault bn beach sets up near Bn HQ about 50 yds inland. Establishes comms with Navy and Army afloat and to adjacent beaches.
7	"	Assault Bn RAPs	Recce dets, Beach Med Sec.	2	—	2 OR land with each assault bn RAP and recce site, near bn RAP and about 100 yds inland, for Adv Beach Dressing Stas.
8	H plus 30-60 mins	Assault Bn rear elements, or Res Bn.	DAQMG	2	—	Gets situation from BCCs, opens Adv Beach Gp HQ, consults with DPBMr and effects co-ordination generally. Meets Beach Gp Comd when he arrives.
			IO	2	—	Checks posn and ground, recce site for Beach Gp HQ, ascertains and keeps tactical situation, studies the ground generally.
			OC Fd Coy	2	—	Consults Engr adv recce dets, examines engr situation and revises or prepares co-ordinated works plan. Advises DAQMG till Beach Gp Comd arrives.
			OC AEEME	2	—	Checks site for dewater-proofing area and organises dewater proofing. Selects sites for Rec Pts in consultation with BCCs and DAQMG.
			OC Pro.	3	—	Examines ground and prepares plan of guides and TC for DAQMG.
			D/PBMr	2	—	Met, on ldg by BMr and learns situation. Co-ordinates Naval Beach control. Works in consultation with DAQMG.
9	"	"	Beach Sigs, Navy and Army, Main Sp Party.	37	2 jeeps, 1000 lbs Sig Eqpt	Includes Navy and Army OCs, who recce site for and set up the MBSO which will be in close relation to HQs of Beach Gp and Assault Bde.

Serial	LDG TIME in relation to		TROOPS		Eqpt	TASKS ON LANDING
	H-hr (approx)	Tactical Tps	Particulars	No.		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
10	H plus 30-60 mins	Assault Bn rear elements, or Res Bn.	Pl, Fd Coy and det Mech Eqpt Pl	70	B' dozers and arc mesh on sleighs or wheels.	Pl for each half of proposed Beach Maint Area. Directed to tasks on beaches, and later inland, by Engr recce dets landed earlier (Serial 5).
11	"	"	Adv Beach Dressing Stas.	29	600 lbs med stores.	One per bn beach. Met by recce dets landed earlier (Serial 7) and functions forthwith. Stores carried on the man, in yukon packs.
12	H plus 30-60 mins	Ass't Bn rear elements, or Res Bn.	Naval Beach Parties	18	Salvage gear.	Det to each beach to reinforce Naval Parties landed earlier (Serial 4).
13	"	"	Det AEME	10	Tools, etc	Supervision of dewater-proofing.
14	H plus 1-1½ hrs	Assault Bde HQ	Beach Gp Comd.	3	Veh with office gear	Met by DAQMG and ascertains situation. Assumes control of Beach Maint Area. Receives reports of recce offrs and in consultation with AQ Div, produces Second Key Plan.
			G III CO Beach Bn.	5	jeep	Sets up Beach Gp HQ. Recce for emergency defence posns for all of the Beach Gp, submits plan and allocation of tasks to Comd. Note: These arrangements should be completed well before nightfall on D-Day. May also recce for personnel transit area.
			OC Beach	2	—	Recce for Amn and Ord Stores dump sites and reports back to Comd.
			OC Det	2	—	Recce for Sup dumps and reports back to Comd.
			OC Sup	2	—	Recce for POL dumps and reports back to Comd.
			Dep Pl	2	—	Recce for Gen Tpt Coy Park and Veh Transit Area and reports back to Comd.
			OCBIPODPI	2	—	Co-ordinates Beach Med Plan and reports back to Comd.
			OC Gen	2	—	Organises embarkation of cas with BMrs and BCCs.
			Tpt Coy	2	—	Gets situation from D/PBMr and assumes naval control ashore. Acts as Naval advisor ashore to Div, Bde and Beach Gp.
			DADMS	2	—	
			PBMr	2	—	

Serial	LDG TIME in relation to		TROOPS		Eqpt	TASKS ON LANDING
	H-hr (approx)	Tactical Tps	Particulars	No.		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
15	H plus 1-1½ hrs	Assault Bde HQ	Beach Bn Sig Pl	30	veh and sig eqpt	Establishes line comm within Beach Gp in accordance with priorities given by OC Beach Sigs.
16	"	"	Pro.	32	Sign Posts etc	Met by OC who landed earlier (Serial 8) and given orders as to sign posting, guides and TC.
17	"	"	Pl, Fd Coy Det Mech Eqpt Pl Coy, Beach Bn allotted to Fd Coy.	70 12 110	EngrEqpt Hy Mech Eqpt	Reinforces the pls landed earlier (Serial 10) for execution of all engr work.
18	"	"	Beach Coys	110		One per beach to be worked. Lands in adv of the first arrivals of bulk stores. Unloads stores from craft and clears stores to dumps.
19	—	—	Beach Ord Det		veh with coverage	Prepares amm and ord stores dumps.
20	—	—	RAE, stores pl		vehs with stores	Prepares RAE dump.
21	—	—	Sup Dep Pl.		veh with coverage	Prepares Sup dumps.
22	—	—	BIPOD PL		veh with coverage	Prepares POL dumps.
23	—	—	Lab for dumps.		—	From Beach Bn or bn placed under comd.
24	—	—	AEME, Rec and maint dets.		Rec and maint vehs	Est Rec Pts and Wksp.
25	—	—	Gen Tpt Coy.		Vehs	Load carrying vehs for carrying stores from beaches to dumps.
26	—	—	RAN com- mando maint sec.		—	For repair of damaged craft.

Serial	LDG TIME in relation to		TROOPS		Eqpt	TASKS ON LANDING
	H-hr (approx)	Tactical Tps	Particulars	No.		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
27	—	—	Beach Sigs. maint sec.	—	—	Repair and maint of Beach Sig Eqpt.
28	—	—	AMCU	—	—	Institutes malarial control measures in Beach Maint Area.
29	—	—	Lab Res.	—	—	Includes all lab not already landed.
30	—	—	Adm echelons of all HQs and units.	—	vehs and eqpt	For adm of units.
31	—	—	Sal Unit.	—	—	Establishes sal dump.

47A

NOTES:

- (i) Small dets of Div RAE may be included with first waves if early demolitions on the beaches is envisaged.
- (ii) The Div Plan will include the landing of appropriate LAA recce parties followed by the guns allotted for immediate AA defence of the beaches and maintenance area.

**A SPECIMEN BEACH GROUP
OPERATION ORDER**

TOP SECRET

Appendix "I" to "Beach
Organisation and
Maintenance."

Aust Beach Group Operation Order No..... Copy No.....
Ref Maps: Date

INFORMATION.

1. Enemy.
 - (a) Sea. (Defence of beaches against threat by enemy craft.)
 - (b) Land. (Local, especially beach works and defences.)
 - (c) Air.
2. Own Troops.
 - (a) Assault Force Covering Position and intermediate objective. If any. (Attached as trace.)
 - (b) Force AA Defence Plan, in so far as it affects the Beach Maintenance Area.
 - (c) Brief outline of Div Intention.
 - (d) Additional troops under command (probably a MG Bn for extra labour).
3. Topography.
 - (a) Subdivision of coast into sectors and beaches (Attached as trace).
 - (b) Beaches—Length, breadth at high and low water, slope, texture (hard, soft, sand, shingle, mud), offshore obstacles (sand bars, reefs).
 - (c) Beach Exits—Presence of swamps, sand hills, cliffs, thick timber etc.
 - (d) Hinterland—Nature and extent of timber. Presence of existing roads.

NOTE: A detailed description will be given of the beaches and ground which it is proposed to develop into a Beach Maintenance Area but some information must be given about adjacent beaches and areas in case these have to be used as alternatives, due to faulty navigation or to tactical necessity.

4. Meteorological.

Sun, moon, tide, nautical dawn, prevailing wind, rainfall.
5. The Maintenance Project.

General outline of the Divisional Maintenance Project as it affects the Beach Gp, i.e., quantities of commodities etc.

The size and capacity of all dumps will depend upon a forecast of the quantities of commodities that will require to be held in them.

Complete Landing Craft Tables will be attached as appendices to orders issued to officers concerned with the handling of the equipment and stores of the Force.

INTENTION.

6. Aust Beach Gp will land on BAKER GREEN and BAKER YELLOW beaches and develop an area to maintain 53 Aust Div.

METHOD.

7. Landing of Beach Gp will be in accordance with extracts from Landing Craft Tables attached at Appendix
8. H-Hour.
9. First Key Plan (Attached at Appendix).

10. Recce.
 - (a) Composition and landing sequence of recce group as per Landing Craft Table.
 - (b) Reports to HQ on completion of recce, NOT later than H plus—
11. Second Key Plan.

Will be issued verbally or by runner NOT later than—
12. Ground Defence.

Comd Beach Bn will be responsible for the co-ordinated defence of the Beach Maintenance Area. He will prepare detailed plans after landing, allocating defence tasks to all units of the Beach Gp.
13. Anti-Craft Defence.
 - (a) By LAA sited on beach.
 - (b) By Tk A pl. Bn. on landing.
14. RAE.
 - (a) Troops under command.
 - (i) Pl of MG Bn (allotted for labour) for RAE dump.
 - (ii) Coy of Beach Bn for Engr works.
 - (b) Tasks (in order of priority).
 - (i) Beach Clearance.
 - (ii) Beach exits.
 - (iii) Beach feeders.
 - (iv) Beach lateral.
 - (v) Road framework.
 - (vi) Water supply.
 - (vii) RAE Dump.
15. LABOUR.
 - (a) Beach Coys.

BAKER GREEN Beach—Comd. Capt—and "B" Coy, Beach Bn.
BAKER YELLOW Beach—Comd. Maj—and "C" Coy, Beach Bn.
Reserve (lands later) Comd Capt—and "D" Coy, Beach Bn.
 - (b) Dumps.

MG Bn (allotted for labour) will allot a pl. on landing, to each of the following dumps: RAE, Amn. Ord Stores, Sups, POL.
 - (c) Reserves.

Beach Bn and MG Bn less dets given in sub paras (a) and (b) above.

NOTE: All demands for labour will be expressed in terms of actual numbers of personnel, as well as sub-units, in order to ensure that adequate manpower is provided for the tasks contemplated.
16. AASC.
 - (a) Tpt—Gen Tpt Coy will build up pool of de-waterproofed vehicles at Vehicle Park on landing.
 - (b) Sups—Dump ready for issues by H plus.
 - (c) POL—Dump ready for issues by H plus.
17. Ordnance.
 - (a) Amn ready for issues by H plus.
 - (b) Ord Store ready for issues by H plus.
18. Recovery.
 - (a) Recovery Points on each of BAKER GREEN and BAKER YELLOW beaches on landing.
 - (b) De-waterproofing and maintenance as per Key Plan.

19. Medical.
 - (a) Beach Dressing Stations for each of BAKER GREEN and BAKER YELLOW beaches, on landing.
 - (b) Concentrate into one Beach Dressing Station as per Second Key Plan.
 - (c) Evacuation arrangements.
 - (d) Malarial control.
 20. Provost.
 - (a) Allotment to beaches.
 - (b) Guides.
 - (c) TP.
 - (d) Stragglers.
 - (e) Sign-posting policy.
 21. Salvage.

Salvage Unit will open Depot by H plus—D plus—
- ADMINISTRATION.**
22. Transport.

Allotment of vehicles from Gen Tpt Coy to Beach Gp Units for carrying ashore unit requirements.
 23. Medical.

Internal Beach Gp arrangements.
 24. Identification of Key Personnel.

(PBMrs. BMrs. Beach Coy Comds. Beach Control Officers.)
 25. Dress. Amn. Rations. Water. Lights and Fires.
- INTERCOMMUNICATION.**
26. Location of Beach Gp HQ and Main Beach Signal Station as indicated on Key Plan.
 27. Beach Bn Sig Pl under comd Beach Sig Sec and will provide comms to Beach Gp HQ in the following order of priority.
 - (a) Beach Coy Comds. BMrs.
 - (b) RAE.
 - (c) Beach Bn HQ.
 - (d) AEME (Recovery, de-waterproofing).
 - (e) LAA.
 - (f) Beach Dressing Station.
 - (g) Labour Bn (MG).
 - (h) Dumps.
 - (i) Transit Areas.
 28. Beach Sig Sec will provide normal external comms.
 29. Codes.
- ACK
Signed at Major
Aust Beach Group
- Issued by
- List of Appendices.**
- "A" Assault Bde Covering Position and Intermediate Objectives.
 - "B" Sub-division of coast into Sectors and Beaches.
 - "C" Complete Landing Craft Tables (limited distribution).
 - "D" Extracts from Landing Craft Tables relevant to Beach Gp Units.
 - "E" First Key Plan.
 - "F" Sig Diagram.

DISTRIBUTION.

Craft available:—

LCM (3) 8
LCVP 60

Turn round Time (Average) 2 hrs

(A SPECIMEN BRIGADE LANDING TABLE)
(17 Aust Inf Bde Landing Table)

(Issued in conjunction with 17 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No. 1 dated.....44)

Appendix "J" to "Beach Organisation and Maintenance"

SECRET

Sheet No. 1
Copy No. 1

Landing Craft Serial No. (a)	Craft ready to Beach (b)	UNIT (c)	Personnel Parties		Vehs and Guns No. (f)	Stores Type Tons (g)	Embarkation Sector or Beach (h)	Craft (i)	Ship (j)	Landing Sector and Beach (k)	REMARKS (l)
			Foot (d)	Veh (e)							
1-6	H hr	2/5 Bn LT ABMr & Party	208 8				CAIRNS	6 VP	Yellow	Easy Yellow	Beach Signs & lamps to be pre- loaded.
7-12	"	2/6 Bn LT ABMr & Party	202 8				TRINITY BEACH	6 VP	Blue	Easy Red	Beach Signs & lamps to be pre- loaded.
13-18	"	2/11 Bn LT ABMr & Party	202 8				CAIRNS	6 VP	White	Easy Green	
19-21	H + 10	2/5 Bn LT Bch Fd Coy Recce.	102 6				CAIRNS	3 VP	Yellow	Easy Yellow	
22-24	"	2/6 Bn LT Bch Fd Coy Recce.	99 6				TRINITY BEACH	3 VP	Blue	Easy Red	
25-27	"	2/11 Bn LT	142				CAIRNS	4 VP	White	Easy Green	
28-31	H + 20	2/5 Bn LT LO 17 Bde 17 Bde Sig Sec BMr & Det. Bch Coy Comd Adv Bch Sigs AAMC Coy Recce.	82 1 4 12 5 9 2	2	1 MT 4x4	1 Boat	CAIRNS	4 VP	Yellow	Easy Yellow	1 No. 11 Set 6 spaces al- lowed for boat. Accom- panies RMC

Landing Craft Serial No. (a)	Craft ready to Beach (b)	UNIT (c)	Personnel Parties		Vehs and Guns No. (f)	Stores Type Tons (g)	Embarkation Sector or Beach (h)	Craft (i)	Shlp (j)	Landing Sector and Beach (k)	REMARKS (l)
			Foot (d)	Veh (e)							
67-72	H + 70 Ferry Service Com- mences	2/5 Bn LT 2/5 Bn LT (Fd Amb) Bch Gp Fd Coy 228 Aust Lt AA Bty Naval Commando 2/4 Pnr Bn Beach Coy	53 20 31 15 44	2 6 50 HMG	2 1/2 T 4x4	15 cwt	CAIRNS	6 VP	Yellow	Easy Yellow	
73-78	H + 70	HQ 17 Bde 2/6 Bn LT Bch Gp Recce Party Det B Coy 2/4 Pnr Bn Lt AA Bty	8 153 14 5 31		6 50 HMG		TRINITY BEACH	6 VP	Blue	Easy Red	
79-82	H + 70	2/11 Bn LT	140				CAIRNS	4 VP	White	Easy Green	
83-84	H + 70	2/4 Pnr Bn	70				CAIRNS	2 VP	White	Easy Yellow or Red	
85	H + 80	HQ 17 Bde 17 Bde Sig Sec Beach Gp AAMC Coy	25	2 4	1 1/2 T 4x4 2 1/2 T 4x4		TRINITY BEACH	LCM	Blue	Easy Red	LCM from LSI White.
86-88	H + 80	Bch Gp Fd Coy 2/4 Pnr Bn Beach Coy	34 74				CAIRNS	3 VP	Yellow	Easy Yellow	

Landing Craft Serial No. (a)	Craft ready to Beach (b)	UNIT (c)	Personnel Parties		Vehs and Guns No. (f)	Stores Type Tons (g)	Embarkation Sector or Beach (h)	Craft (i)	Ship (j)	Landing Sector and Beach (k)	REMARKS (l)
			Foot (d)	Vet. (e)							
89-91	H + 80	2/6 Bn LT Bch Gp Fd Coy Naval Com- mando Bch Gp Pro. 6 Div Pro. 2/46 LAD	33 39 5 6 16 8				TRINITY BEACH	3 VP	Blue	Easy Red	
92-93	H + 80	2/4 Pnr Bn	70				CAIRNS	2 VP	White	Easy Yellow or Red	
94-98	H + 80	2/7 Bn LT	930			FLOATING RESERVE	TRINITY BEACH	5 LCI		Easy Yellow or Red	Time & place of beaching at Bde Comd's discretion.
99-100	H + 80	2/11 Bn LT	19	4	2 1/4 T 4x4 2 Tk A Guns		CAIRNS	2 VP	White	Easy Green	
101	H + 90	2/4 Pnr Bn Bch Coy Beach Gp Pro.	28 6				CAIRNS	1 VP	Yellow	Easy Yellow	
102-106	H + 90	HQ 17 Bde Bde Sig Sec Pl Gd Regt HQ 6 Fd Bty HQ 2/2 Fd Amb HQ D Coy 2/3 MG Bch Gp Recce & Comd 2/4 Pnr Sig Pl	27 39 15 26 3 12 12 8				TRINITY BEACH	4 VP	Blue	Easy Red	
106-109	H + 90	2/4 Pnr Bn	143				CAIRNS	4 VP	White	Easy Red or Yellow	

Landing Craft Serial No. (a)	Craft ready to Beach (b)	UNIT (c)	Personnel Parties		Vehs and Guns No. (f)	Stores Type Tons (g)	Embarkation Sector or Beach (h)	Craft (i)	Ship (j)	Landing Sector and Beach (k)	REMARKS (l)
			Foot (d)	Veh (e)							
110-111	H + 100	2/4 Pnr Bn Bch Coy	53				TRINITY BEACH	2 VP	Blue	Easy Red	
112-113	H + 100	2/11 Bn LT	20	4	2 Tk A Guns 2 1/4 T 4x4		CAIRNS	2 VP	White	Easy Green	
114	Not before H + 3 hours.	HQ 6 Aust Div HQ 17 Bde 17 Bde Sig Sec HQ 6 Fd Bty 2/5 Bn LT (6 Fd Bty)	14	12	2 1/4 T 4x4 2 1/4 T 4x4 2 1/4 T 4x4 3 1/4 T 4x4 2 25 pr & 2 Tractors Arty		TRINITY BEACH	LST		Easy Red or Yellow	
		2/5 Bn LT	13	2	2 Tk A Guns 1 1/4 T 4x4						
		2/6 Bn LT (6 Fd Bty)	14	12	2 25 prs & 2 Tractors Arty						
		2/7 Bn LT	8	4	2 Tk A Guns 2 1/4 T 4x4						
		2/7 Bn LT (2/2 Fd Amb)		2	2 1/4 T 4x4						
		6 Div Carr Coy		9	3 carriers						
		135 Bde Wksp (Gp A)	39								
		Det 135 Bde									
		Ord Fd Pk	22								
		Bch Gp Fd Coy	14	11	4 3T Tip with ARC Mesh HD7 Tractor 2 D4 Tractors 6 sleds mesh						
		2/4 Pnr Bn Bch Gp GT Coy	65	4	2 1/4 T WC with ARC Mesh						

Landing Craft Serial No. (a)	Craft ready to Beach (b)	UNIT (c)	Personnel Parties		Vehs and Guns No. (f)	Stores Type Tons (g)	Embarkation Sector or Beach (h)	Craft (i)	Ship (j)	Landing Sector and Beach (k)	REMARKS (l)
			Foot (d)	Veh (e)							
114	Not before H + 3 Hours.					Amn 25 Tons POL 25 " Ord 15 " Sups 20 " Med 5 " Engr 10 "					
115	Not before H + 5 Hours.	HQ 6 Aust Div 6 Div Carrier Coy Bch Gp HQ 228 Aust Lt AA Bty Bch Gp Surgical Team Bch Gp AAMC Coy	13 18 40 7	33 4 20 2	10 carriers 2 1/4 T 4x4 4 Bofors & Tractors 3 1/4 T WC with 1 1/2 Tons Med Stores.	Med 1 Ton	TRINITY BEACH	LST		Easy Red or Yellow	

Issued with
Appendix "J" to
"Beach Organisation
and Maintenance."

Specimen Brigade Landing Table
Explanatory Notes

- Col. (a) Landing Craft Serial.**
Craft Serials refer to Craft loads (LCVPs, LCMs, LCIs) and LSTs. In the event of a Division Landing, blocks of serial nos. will be allotted to Brigades in the required order of beaching. Serial nos. will run consecutively throughout the table.
- Col. (b) Craft Ready to Beach.**
Time of landing for first waves only (H-Hour). All other times are approximate only, and may be varied if circumstances ashore so warrant.
- Col. (c) Units.**
- Col. (d) Marching Parties.**
All personnel not actually travelling in own Unit vehicles, on motor cycles or forming gun or tank crews, etc.
- Col. (e) Vehicle Parties.**
Personnel actually travelling in vehicles, on motor cycles or forming Gun or Tank crews, etc.
- Col. (f) Vehicles.**
- Col. (g) Stores.**
- Col. (h) Embarkation Sector or Beach.**
- Col. (i) Craft.**
Types of Craft available in LSI etc. viz. VPs, ALAs, or LCMs etc.
- Col. (j) Ship.**
Code name or colour of LSI, LST etc.
- Col. (k) Landing Sector and Beach.**
- Col. (l) Remarks.**
Show in this column such details as are necessary for the information of those concerned which are not already apparent in other columns (Unit supplying OC Troops; War Office Serials where necessary).

LSI BLUE

A SPECIMEN UNIT LANDING CRAFT TABLE

Appendix "K" to "Beach
Organisation and Maintenance"

CRAFT AVAILABLE

2/6 Aust Inf Bn Landing Craft Table

SECRET

21 LCVP
3 LCM

Issued in conjunction with 2/6 Aust Inf Bn OO No. 6

SHEET No. 1
COPY No. 1

AVERAGE TURN ROUND—2 Hrs

Landing Craft Serial No.	Landing Craft No. Type	PERSONNEL			LOAD		MANNING		LANDING		REMARKS
		Sub-unit	Marching/Veh Parties		Stores	Guns/Vehs	Place	Time	Beach	Time	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)
7	VP	7 Pl ABMr & Party	1 30 1 3 2 33				No. 5 BS	0700	Red	H Hour	WAVE 1 RIGHT FLANK. Beach signs and lamps to be preloaded
8	VP	8 Pl A Coy HQ OC A Coy Batman Orderlies Sigs I Sec CSM	1 24 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 33				No. 3 BS	0700	Red	H Hour	WAVE 1. 103 Set; Sig Wire Drums 1 Phone 1
9	VP	9 Pl ULO Orderly SB	1 30 1 1 2 2 33				No. 1 BS	0700	Red	H Hour	WAVE 1.
10	VP	10 Pl CSM SB Coy Driver I Sec	1 29 1 2 1 1 1 34				No. 2 BS	0700	Red	H Hour	WAVE 1.

Landing Craft Serial No.	Landing Craft No. Type	PERSONNEL			LOAD		MANNING		LANDING		REMARKS
		Sub-unit	Marching/Veh Parties		Stores	Guns/Vehs	Place	Time	Beach	Time	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)
11	VP	11 Pl	1	27			No. 4 BS	0700	Red	H Hour	WAVE 1.
		B Coy HQ									
		OC B Coy	1								
		Batman		1							
12	VP	Orderlies		2			No. 6 BS	0700	Red	H Hour	103 Set
		Sigs		4							Sig Wire
											Drums 1
											Phone 1
13	VP	12 Pl	1	29			No. 6 BS	0700	Red	H Hour	WAVE 1.
		ABMr Party		4							Left Flank
			1	33							

Issued with Appendix "K"
to "Beach Organisation
and Maintenance."

Specimen Unit Landing Craft Table Explanatory Notes

- Col. (a) **Landing Craft Serial Number.**
Craft Serials refer to Craft loads (LCVPs, LCMs, LCIs) and LSTs, extracted from, and follow the same sequence as, Bde Landing Table.
- Col. (b) **Landing Craft Number and Type.**
Type of Craft shown by the Bn LT; No. of Craft inserted by Ship's Flotilla Officer or Navy Rep.
- Col. (c) **Sub-Unit.**
Show Sub-Units—viz Coy or Pl, ABMr, Beach Gp etc.
- Col. (d) **Marching Parties.**
- Col. (e) **Vehicle Parties.**
Show personnel actually required to embark and disembark as drivers, gun crews, MCs etc.
- Col. (f) **Stores.**
Stores required to accompany craft ashore—if these are to be preloaded, state so in "Remarks Column").
- Col. (g) **Vehs/Guns.**
Show number and type of vehicle etc.
- Col. (h) **Manning Place and Time.**
and (i) To be inserted after consultation by Ship's Adjutant—refers to Boat Stations etc and times troops required to embark in craft.
- Col. (j)
and (k) **Landing Beach and Time.**
- Col. (l) **Remarks.**
Provided for additional information NOT disclosed elsewhere.

AMENDMENTS

Appx I

Subject: 1 AUST CORPS TRG INSTRUCTION 2/1944 -
BEACH ORGANISATION AND MAINTENANCE.

HQ 1 Aust Corps
23 May 44
G/3369/SD

6 Aust Div	<u>Copy to:</u>
7 Aust Div	BGS
9 Aust Div	G
1 Aust Beach Gp	CE
2 Aust Beach Gp	CSO
1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	DA & QMG
1 Aust Mil Landing Gp	A
2 Aust Mil Landing Gp	Medical
2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	Pro
RMA 2 Aust Corps	Q
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	S & T
A Aust Corps Sigs	Ord
HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	AEME
	File
	War Diary (2) ✓

1. Attached at Appendix 'A' is distribution list for 1 Aust Corps Training Instruction 2/1944 - Beach Organisation and Maintenance.

2. Additional copies are expected within one month when a further distribution will be made.

3. Copies of the training instruction are being forwarded under separate cover and receipt of such copies will be acknowledged together with those already distributed (refer Appendix 'A').

A. W. C. J.
Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Appendix 'A' to 1 Aust Corps
G/3369/SD of
23 May 44

DISTRIBUTION LIST - 1 AUST CORPS TRAINING INSTRUCTION 2/1944.
BEACH ORGANISATION AND MAINTENANCE

Serial No	Formation Unit etc	Number allotted	Number already distributed	Number forwarded under separate cover	Remarks
1	6 Aust Div	65	1	64	
2	7 Aust Div	65		65	
3	9 Aust Div	65	3	62	
4	1 Aust Beach Gp	90	20	70	20 Copies fwded by 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec
5	2 Aust Beach Gp	90	90	-	
6	1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	28	28	-	
7	1 Aust Mil Landing Gp	6	6	-	} Distributed by 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec
8	2 Aust Mil Landing Gp	6	6	-	
9	2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	4		4	
10	RAA 2 Aust Corps	5		5	Distributed direct
11	RAE 2 Aust Corps Tps	9	5	4	5 copies fwded by 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec to 42 Aust LC Coy
12	A Aust Corps Sigs	3		3	
13	HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	6		6	
14	G	4	4	-	} These copies distributed direct
15	CE	1		1	
16	CSO	1		1	
17	A	3		3	
18	Medical	3		3	
19	Pro	1		1	
20	Q	4		4	
21	S & T	2		2	
22	Ord	4		4	
23	AEME	4		4	
24	War Diary	2	2	-	

War Diary

SECRET

COPY NO: 29

1 AUST CORPS TRAINING INSTRUCTION NO 5/1944

Reference: 1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 8
of 27 Feb 44 and 3/1944 of 4 May 44

STAGE 3: TRAINING OF AUST CAV (COMMANDO) REGTS

GENERAL

1.
 - (a) The Cav Regt provides formation commanders with a convenient reserve which may be used for any task calling for detachment of troops from the main force. By this means, a formation commander retains the full striking power of his infantry. A Cav Regt is armed and equipped as infantry, and except where man-loads are reduced by the provision of special transport such as additional native carriers or frequent air drops, mobility superior to that of an infantry battalion cannot be expected. Squadrons of the Cav Regt are organised as self-contained units, and each squadron has the necessary establishment to permit it to build each troop into a self-contained sub-unit organised to operate independently, or to be detached from the regiment for employment with a brigade. This organisation combined with its special training fits the Cav Regt to operate with greater dispersion than is normally used in infantry units, and to carry out the detailed reconnaissance of large areas.
 - (b) This instruction gives the policy for the training of a Cav Regt as a tactical unit.

OBJECT

2. The objects of training in Stage 3 are:-
 - (a) To achieve efficient control of the regiment as a tactical unit.
 - (b) To practice regimental commanders in the tactical handling of a widely dispersed regiment when sub-units are engaged in different roles.
 - (c) To enable regimental commanders to determine the efficiency of specialist training (particularly signals training) within the regiment.

PERIOD

3. A minimum of three weeks will be required. After completion of this stage, units should be trained in exercises with other arms.

SCOPE

4.
 - (a) Regiment as infantry in attack and defence

Exercises in attack and defence with the regiment as a tactical unit should achieve the object in paragraph 2(a). This phase should be used by regimental commanders to determine the efficiency of battle procedure within squadrons.
 - (b) At least two exercises should include simultaneously several of the roles as set out in 1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 3/1944 with all squadrons remaining under command of RHQ. These exercises must be carefully planned and should involve:

(1) Active enemy

- (ii) Use of the entire signal resources of the regiment
- (iii) Full use of intelligence sections
- (iv) Problems in supply and administration
- (v) At least two tactical moves of RHQ

One of these exercises should involve 5 days in the field, away from normal camp facilities.

SPECIAL TRAINING

5. (a) Signal Sections and Signal Troops

- (i) During this stage, training in L/T should be confined mainly to the exercises as in paragraph 4(a). Exercises in paragraph 4(b) will call for great efficiency in signals, as control of the regiment will be dependent largely on wireless communications.
- (ii) Prior to this stage all squadron signals personnel should be trained thoroughly in the use of low grade ciphers. It will be found, when signals personnel are detached to troops and sections, that additional cipher clerks will be necessary to prevent delays. The additional men trained in intelligence duties (ref Training Instruction No 8 paragraph 8) should therefore be trained also in the use of ciphers.

(b) Intelligence Sections

In past operations, the standard of intelligence training in some squadrons has proved lamentably weak. It must be stressed that in every role in which a regiment may be employed, intelligence will be of primary importance. Exercises in Stage 3 will therefore be planned to include the maximum work for intelligence sections.

PHYSICAL TRAINING

- 6. Units will ensure that a high standard of physical training is maintained, and that squadrons returning from leave are brought up to their former standard without delay.

25 May 44.

Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

	<u>Copy No</u>		<u>Copy No</u>
6 Aust Div	1 - 3	Medical	21
7 Aust Div	4 - 6	Pro	22
9 Aust Div	7 - 9	Q	23
2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	10	S & T	24
1 Aust Beach Gp	11	Ord	25
2 Aust Beach Gp	12	ABME	26
GOC	13	File	27 - 28
BGS	14	War Diary	29 - 30
G	15	Copy (for info)	
CCRA	16	Adv LHQ	31
CE	17	First Aust Army (one for	
CSO	18	LHQ Trg Centre (JW),	
DA & QMG	19	CANUNGRA	32 - 33
A	20		

War Diary

Appa K

SECRET

Copy No. 79

GSI

1 AUST CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 2

Compiled from information received
from 1200 hrs 15 Apr to 1200 hrs 5 May 44

1. Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Command.
2. A receipt is not required but copy holders should note serial number and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue.

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APPENDICES

Description of Jap 75 mm Incendiary Shell - A (1)
Illustration of Jap 75 mm Incendiary Shell - A (11)

SECRET

GSI

1. AUSTRALIAN CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 2

PART 1

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

SOLOMONS

Allied troops landed in the vicinity of MAVAVIA on 19 Apr to lend support to an Allied thrust, with tanks, against an enemy force estimated at a company, situated at MAVAVIA. Five days later, tanks were again used to support an Allied advance across the MAVAVIA RIVER and cleared the enemy from the coastal positions to the east. Activity has since been confined to minor clashes on the Allied perimeter.

NEW BRITAIN

Reports received indicate that enemy parties are continuing eastward along the North Coast of NEW BRITAIN to the GAZELLE PENINSULA.

During 20 Apr an Allied raiding party landed at PALMALMAL on the southern shores of JACQUINOT BAY and found only a small number of enemy in the plantation. Five of these were killed and the remainder fled. A small quantity of stores, arms and equipment was captured.

A reliable report of the 25 Apr stated that there were no Japs between PALMALMAL and the ESIS RIVER (WATERFALL BAY area).

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

Activity in this area appears to have been confined to mopping up operations on MANUS ISLAND and on 25 and 26 Apr a total of twelve Japs were killed near LORENGAU. These stragglers were in a poor condition and nearing starvation.

Known enemy casualties in the ADMIRALTIES to 1 May were 3089 killed and 37 captured. In addition, 71 Sikhs and Chinese have been captured. It is estimated that 100/175 enemy effectives remain in the area.

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

WADJING-LORENGAU AREA On 23 Apr Australian troops landed at BOGADJIM, but failed to make contact with the enemy. Patrols moved northward and encountered some difficulty in crossing the GOGOL RIVER until led by PT boats.

These vessels were later used to transport the patrol to BILLI BILLI where on 24 Apr they contacted an Allied detachment which had been landed at that village, and by that afternoon this combined force had entered WADJING where only slight opposition was met. By 25 Apr the western end of the airfield had been cleared and large amounts of stores (including RT, medical equipment, ammunition and weapons) captured.

On 26 Apr our troops occupied ALEXISHAFEN without opposition. Some light and mountain gun fire was encountered from SEK ISLAND, but a landing party supported by naval gun fire subdued all resistance from that area by night-fall.

Our patrols were operating to the west of ALEXISHAFEN by 1 May but their progress was being delayed owing to flooded rivers.

AITAPE

WAPIL (8 miles SE of AITAPE) was selected by the Allies as the site for the landing which they effected in that area on 22 Apr. Very slight opposition was encountered and by midday the airfield at TADJI as well as TADJI SETTLEMENT (which was reached via VOKAU) had been captured without encountering any serious opposition.

TUHELO and SELEO Islands fell to the Allies on 23 Apr and two days later AII and ANGEI Islands were captured. AITAPE settlement was occupied on the morning of the 24 Apr.

Extensive patrolling to the East and West of the airfield on 25 Apr failed to contact the enemy but that night an enemy counter attack five miles South of AITAPE was repulsed by the Allies. On 26 Apr an enemy force estimated at 200 was encountered in the KATI area (South of KAPOAM) - 52 were killed and a further 9 the following day.

Total enemy casualties to 2 May are estimated at 52 killed, 35 captured.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

HOLLANDIA AREA - TAMMERAN BAY

After their landing at TABELSOERA and DEKAPRE BAY on 22 Apr, the forward elements of the Allied troops engaged, supported by artillery, had reached LISRON by 25 Apr. Little opposition was encountered and HOLLANDIA airfield was captured on 25 Apr. Proof of the surprise achieved and the enemy's rapid evacuation is borne out by the amount of equipment which was captured intact. A complete radar station, crated aircraft parts, many documents, rations and medical supplies were among the items secured.

On 30 Apr Allied troops landed at DEMER (14 miles West of CAPE TAMMERAN) in an attempt to cut off a large enemy force reported to be en route to SARMI via a track westward from SENTANI LAKE.

HUMBOLDT BAY

Allied landings in this area on 22 Apr were made at CAPE TJOBERI; just North of CAPE PEE; at PIM, and at CAPE TJEWERE. HOLLANDIA township and PIM were in Allied hands by 23 Apr and the advance continued towards SENTANI LAKE. Among the booty captured in that operation were many crated aircraft engines. Medium opposition was encountered but after an amphibious crossing of the SENTANI LAKE, the CYCLOPS Airfield was captured by early afternoon on 25 Apr. SENTANI LAKE was occupied on 26 Apr.

The TAMI strip was reached on 27 Apr and the Southern shore of SENTANI LAKE reconnoitred. A report dated 2 May states that there is evidence of enemy activity in the TAMI area.

On night 28/29 Apr a Japanese attack launched against the Allied perimeter at HOLLANDIA Airfield was repulsed.

Casualties were inflicted on the enemy NE of HOLLANDIA Airfield on 30 Apr.

Subsequent operations suggest that the main enemy resistance is concentrated in the foothills of the CYCLOPS Mountains. On 2 May an Allied force with Naval cover landed unopposed at WARI (13 miles NW of HOLLANDIA) apparently in an attempt to intercept possible enemy forces withdrawing via the track which connects that point with NEFAAR and the airfields.

The Naval covering Force for these operations was on a very large scale and consisted of a Carrier Force and a Cruiser Force. Intensive Naval and Air bombardments preceded the landings.

(b) SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

SOLOMONS

During night 2/3 May Allied light surface craft damaged three Southbound enemy barges laden with personnel one half mile off CAPE FRIENDSHIP (SE BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND).

NEW HANOVER

Allied PT boats damaged one 650 ton vessel and sank one barge off the East coast of NEW HANOVER on night 2/3 May.

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

WEWAK

Allied light naval craft destroyed six enemy barges in NIGHTINGALE BAY (15 miles ESE of WEWAK) during night 28/29 Apr. Two of these barges were carrying personnel (50 to 60 on each) and of these troops three were captured and approximately 100 either killed or drowned. The remaining barges were transporting equipment and supplies.

No opposition was encountered from the barges or shore installations.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

The majority of enemy shipping in this theatre was reported in the WEWAK BAY area.

Concentrations of vessels have been reported at BIAK ISLAND the size of which are increasing with the reinforcement and development that is taking place in that locality. Five small and one large merchant vessels, one PT boat and approximately 100 barges were sighted between 26 and 28 Apr. The large vessel was reported to have been beached.

NOEMFOOR ISLAND and MANOKWARI have also been consistently visited by enemy shipping but the concentrations at either place have not been large.

Four small cargo vessels and a number of barges were attacked by Allied aircraft at CAPE WAIGS (approximately 80 miles NW of MANOKWARI) on 24 Apr. Of these barges, 10 were loaded with armed troops and were destroyed, resulting in heavy casualties.

One 3500 ton HOSHO type of aircraft carrier with 20/30 aircraft on the deck was observed stationary 5 miles WSW of BORONG.

(Comment: It is considered that this vessel was being employed as a means of ferrying aircraft, probably fighters, to the area.

Elsewhere in the North Western District there have been sightings of small type vessels and barges which are being kept under review.

(c) AIR - OWN

SOLOMONS

Allied air activity in this area has been limited to small harassing raids on enemy positions, and strafing and bombing missions against buildings, personnel and supply areas.

NEW BRITAIN AND NEW IRELAND

Airfields, installations and supply areas have been the principal targets for Allied aircraft operating over the RABAU area and airfields in NEW IRELAND. Numerous fuel fires have been caused in and around RABAU.

NEW GUINEA

Heavy bombings, by both land and carrier based aircraft, of enemy bases from HAJISA BAY to SORONG were a feature of the preliminaries to the Allied landings at AITAPE and HOLLANDIA.

On 21 Apr 157 bombers dropped 275 tons of explosives on the AITAPE area, and aircraft from the Carrier Force attacked HOLLANDIA, WAKDE and SAMAF. In the latter operations 101 Japanese aircraft were destroyed of which 88 were caught on the ground.

During the past week enemy airfields at WAKDE, BLAK, HOFMOOR and JEFFMAN ISLANDS and at BABO and SAWAR were again well bombed and extensive damage caused. Seventy-eight enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground and 54 in interception during these raids.

On 2 May Mitchells on a coastal sweep from TAKAR to SARMI destroyed two grounded fighters and a fuel dump at WAKDE, an anti-aircraft position at BAGEISERWAR and started numerous fires in stores and fuel dumps along the coast.

CAROLINE ISLANDS

On 30 Apr/1 May TRUK ISLAND was heavily raided by Allied Carrier based aircraft, when a total of 800 tons of bombs were dropped.

During the two day operation, 126 enemy aircraft were destroyed. Of the 66 destroyed in the air, five were shot down by naval gun fire.

AIR - ENEMY

Two attacks by small forces of enemy aircraft were directed against the Allied base at HOLLANDIA with little success. A third by 12 torpedo bombers, launched against the base on 25 Apr was also unsuccessful.

PART II

ENEMY OOB - (a) LAND

Further reinforcements totalling 6000 troops have arrived in the North West Sector of the SWPA and have been disposed along the North Coast of DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

These troops are additional personnel of 56 Div, the major part of which is now in the area, and it is considered that the Headquarters of the Division plus parts of 223 and 224 Regts are at SAMAF while elements of the remaining Infantry Regt of this Division viz 222 Inf Regt, are located at BLAK Is. There are indications that elements of the division are also at HOFMOOR.

The following is a revision of the estimates of enemy strengths in SWPA as at 26 Apr 44 and the places mentioned are those where an alteration in strength has taken place since 19 Apr 44:-

NW SECTOR

NORTH COAST DUTCH NEW GUINEA

SARMI	10,000	Increase due to inclusion of an additional 5000 troops of 56 Div
-------	--------	--

BLAK ISLAND

2,000

Increased from 1,000 owing to the arrival of further 1,000 troops of 36 Div.

NE SECTOR

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

WEWAK-HANSA BAY

50,000

Increase due to the inclusion of approximately 5,000 troops (mainly 239 Regt 41 Div) who are considered to be en route from MADANG.

NEW BRITAIN

50,000

The bulk of the NEW BRITAIN Garrison is now believed to be concentrated in the GAZELLE PENINSULA.

TOTAL NW SECTOR 211,000

TOTAL NE SECTOR 144,000

TOTAL SWPA ... 355,000

SECTION 2

ENEMY OOB - (b) AIR

ENEMY OPERATIONAL AIRPLANE STRENGTH

Estimate of Enemy Land Based Air Strength on information up to 29 Apr 44 is shown in the following tables:-

AREA	F	L/B M/B	T/B D/B	F/B	F/P	Obsn	Comparatives		
							29 Apr	21 Apr	7 Apr
<u>NE AREA</u>									
NEW BRITAIN	4			1	4	2	11	11	16
NEW IRELAND	2		2		6		10	10	12
SOLOMONS					2		2	2	2
<u>NW AREA</u>									
TIMOR & SOEMBA	18					6	24	24	24
AMBON	8	12			24	9	53	53	42
CERAM									
BOEROE									
AROE & KAI IS	6						18	18	10
HALMAHERA	28	32			3		63	70	56
NEW GUINEA	61	36		2	13	9	121	164	237
CELEBES	35	24					59	59	27
JAVA-BALI-									
LOMBOK	15				9	5	29	38	33
BORNEO	12				7	3	22	22	22
PHILIPPINES	91	90	22	3	27	9	242	213	125
TOTAL	280	194	24	5	95	43	642	681	611

(ALF Summary No 203)

FACTICS

LOW ANGLE FIRING WITH THE GRENADE DISCHARGER

The following observations were contained in a Japanese notebook dealing with the firing of the Grenade Discharger in the jungle and have been extracted from War Information Circular No G.40 of 15 Feb 44:-

INTRODUCTION

"In the jungle, low angle firing of the grenade discharger can be effectively used to demoralize and subdue the enemy. It has been especially effective in checking assaults and counter attacks, and in giving support in any attacks we made on the enemy flanks.

Both the type "91" grenade and the type "89" shell can be used in low angle firing, but the former is more effective."

WHEN TYPE "89" SHELLS ARE USED

GENERAL

"In firing against an enemy at a range of 50 to 100 yards, good results can be obtained by employing direct laying.

When in jungles where there are small trees about 9 feet high, an elevation of 15 degrees will be effective and the recoil against the base plate is slight.

Since the shell has a direct action fuse it is important to consider the height of the trees. There is danger of a premature explosion in flight even if a leaf is touched.

When fired at an angle of 15 degrees the apex of trajectory is at a point one half of the range; at an angle of 10 degrees it is approximately one third of the range."

WHEN TYPE "Q-1" ADDRESSERS ARE USED

"One of the chief advantages of using the grenade is that it has a 7 seconds delay fuze, and it will not detonate in mid-air, even though it hits a small tree.

It can be used against an enemy only 60 yards away.

Since the apex of the trajectory is 3 feet when fired at an angle of 10 degrees and 5 feet when fired at 15 degrees it is extremely effective against enemy flank and frontal defences."

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

SECTION 6

EQUIPMENT

JAPANESE 75 mm (2.95 in) INCENDIARY SHELL

Attached hereto as Appendix "A (i) and "A (ii)" is a description and illustration respectively of the Japanese 75 mm (2.95 in) Incendiary Shell.

SECTION 8 - GENERAL

RESUME OF JAPANESE RADIO BROADCASTS

A perusal of the records of Japanese Radio broadcasts on the progress of the war over the past two years, has shown that the nature of their employment of propaganda over radio network both to the homeland and to other nations has taken a definite change of late.

During the first six months of the Pacific War, Japanese propagandists adopted the principal of reporting accurate facts, and could well afford to do so. The speed of their advancing Armies told a story that delighted the Axis and the Homeland and at the same time disheartened the Allies.

With the successful Japanese attacks against PEARL HARBOR, HONG KONG, the PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, BURMA, the NEI, the GILBERTS, and the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and the SOLOMONS gave the Japanese commentators a seemingly inexhaustible rich and solid material for erecting the structure of the future as they planned it.

From the start, the Japanese have not shown very much concern for logic in their war news broadcasts and their continued use of the superlatives and the extreme is employed with monotonous regularity. Examples of that tendency are as follows:-

- (a) That Allied ships do not merely sink but "sink instantaneously."
- (b) When a P-40 crash landed in FRENCH INDO-CHINA, not just the pilot was captured but "the entire crew was captured."
- (c) According to the Radio TOKIO, their planes almost always return from operations blissfully and unscathed. If, however, they decide to mention losses they are referred to as being either due to self destruction or merely as "not yet returned."
- (d) The Japanese never just win, they always win completely.
- (e) Allied aircraft never retire after dropping their bombs but are always summarily repulsed even by small arms fire in some cases.
- (f) Jap air raids never inflict varying amounts of damage, they are always devastating.

From the early stages of the war a characteristic of the Jap broadcasts was that even though their aircraft and other equipment was always most superior, their victories had been gained as a result of their offensive spirit and proudly suicidal skill. Spirit was made the sole issue and the single determinant of battles and the war, and victories were explained as the conquest of Japanese spirit over the material power of BRITAIN and AMERICA. This is not the case today however, and they are openly calling for greater effort from their industrial organizations.

When the Allies first started to turn the tide against the Enemy, mainly in the form of the Naval actions in the GILBERTS and the CORAL SEA Battle in May 42, the Japs made very little comment on the heavy losses which they suffered, as there was no alteration from a geographical point of view, and as their propaganda had previously disposed of all Allied Naval Power, and thus they considered that any explanation was unnecessary.

The Allied landing at GUADALCANAL predicted the possibility of Japanese reverses which could not be concealed for ever, and they described the action as part of the Japanese plan to lure the Allies to the SOLOMONS where they could be more easily annihilated than further South.

However, further Japanese withdrawals and their resultant change of the geographical picture caused them to alter the tune, and their actual defeats were explained by radio TOKIO as :- "In order to establish strong bases from which to launch another major offensive, the High Command had

had sent advance parties into PAPUA and GUADALCANAAL to stall the Allies until the springboard bases were completed. These bases had now been built according to plan and the advance units, having successfully completed their missions were accordingly being transferred to other posts."

Up to this time the people of JAPAN had been told that the GREATER EAST ASIA War was practically over and that Japanese "flesh" had beaten the Anglo-American steel. But towards the end of 1942 a change was noticed and it was the Prime Minister TOJO who told the Diet and the public that the Allies were still resisting doggedly and that production needed to be stepped up and that plans should be made for a protracted war of 100 years.

The battle of the BISMARCK SEA was ignored by Radio TOKIO for several days until world-wide broadcasts made it essential to say something and then the Japs gave the results in the form of a recapitulation of Allied and Japanese losses over a period of four or five weeks covering the action.

With the Allied occupation of AITU in May 43 a new turn in Japanese propaganda was witnessed. The Allied attack was labelled an Offensive and no withdrawal was claimed, but AITU turned into a "SEMPINE" with many stories broadcast of the fanatical resistance of the Garrison. AITU's men are still probably the most celebrated and venerated Japanese heroes of this war. The occupation of the GILBERTS by the Allies was described somewhat similarly to that of AITU.

Following these campaigns came the Allied Offensives in the SOLOMONS, NEW BRITAIN, NEW GUINEA, the MARSHALLS and ADMIRALTY and coupled with the heavy air (and Naval) assaults on RABAU and adjacent areas brought strong resurgence of realism and alarm from Japanese broadcasts. Details in their broadcasts were vague and optimism definitely lacking.

Such lack of optimism was evident in the Japanese broadcasts of the huge loss suffered at TRUK as a result of Allied Air and Naval attack on that base in Feb 44. The reason for this exceptional admission is obscure and perhaps it was felt that the communique would provide a specific basis for further demands on the Japanese public or more probably as a justification for the expulsion of the Chiefs of Staff of the Japanese Army and Navy, and the resultant assumption of the post of War Minister by TOJO himself.

Latterly the Japanese have been urging the people for greater efforts as regards production of material, particularly aircraft, and the following extracts from a translation of a publication which was published last November, containing an appeal to the Japanese people by Vice Admiral ONISHI Takijiro of the Affairs Dept of Naval HQ, give some indication of the change that has taken place in the nature of the information made available to the public at the beginning of the war and at the present time:-

Quote:-

"Since the middle of 1942 the enemy has been using a gigantic air force to attack us in the South West Pacific. This is a form of warfare, island hopping, which was first practiced by the Japanese except that they covered far greater distances than the Americans. With the aid of our air power we have achieved the greatest results in the history of warfare and we have also revolutionized Naval warfare.

"However, since the middle of 1942 the enemy has employed gigantic forces to attack us in the North East and South West Pacific and I must regretfully admit that despite our successes in individual combat, we are hard pressed by the enemy. The reason for this is that our air force is inferior and the command of the air is always in the hands of the enemy.

"The rate of exhaustion of aircraft is very great. Our losses are always fewer than those of the enemy, because of the technical and spiritual superiority of our pilots and the excellence of our planes. This applies

to losses in actual combat, but we have to admit that our losses in other forms of operations and in training are higher than we expected.

"We must dispel wishful thinking. Too many people have been intoxicated by our early victories and only dream of final victory. We must get away from the belief that Japan can never be defeated and we must endure every sacrifice and strive with our whole material and spiritual power to achieve eventual victory."

(Adapted from AAF Summaries No 200 and 201)

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

BURMA

The main centre of interest in the BURMA theatre is still the KOHIMA area, where British counter attacks have relieved the pressure that was being applied by the Japanese. It is reported that the enemy is moving strong reserves with artillery to this sector.

British troops have been withdrawn from the KALADIN VALLEY to the ARAKAN area where strong patrol clashes, with heavy losses, have been reported.

The Japanese have had slight successes to the South East of IMPHAL, where it is reported tanks are being used against our positions. To the North, North West, and South West of IMPHAL, however, the enemy has lost heavily as a result of successful British actions in those areas during the past week.

In the area South West of IMPHAL the enemy has been using his strong artillery forces mainly in an anti-tank role and several British tanks have been destroyed as a result of fire from these weapons.

ITALY

Practically no change has been reported from the ITALIAN front, except for a slight advance by American Forces South West of CARROCCETO.

RUSSIA

The German garrison at SEBASTOPOL is still holding out despite the Russian pressure which is being concentrated on the area.

The Russians are consolidating their positions and increasing the threats to the German occupied towns of JASSY and CRISINAU in the lower DANUBE.

PART V

SECURITY

The question is often asked by soldiers if taken prisoner of war why are we forbidden by the Allies from participating in broadcasts, arranged by the enemy, in which we are allowed to send messages to our wives and families.

The following extract from a RAAF security Bulletin is self-explanatory and if read to all military personnel should be sufficient explanation as to why such broadcasts are forbidden:-

"It must be made clear to personnel that such broadcasts are arranged for propaganda purposes, and it is interesting in this connection to note how a prisoner in Japanese hands was made the victim of a highly ingenious fake broadcast which had a strong propaganda value. He was

- 10 -

questioned by the announcer who, unknown to him, was speaking into a dead microphone, and thus the prisoner was seemingly presented as answering questions from another announcer of whose existence he was wholly unaware.

The bogus announcer, speaking into the dead microphone, would ask an innocuous question such as, "Are you resigned to your interment" while the actual announcer, heard by all listeners but not by the prisoner, was asking some controversial question such as, "Are you convinced of the futility of opposing the onward march of Greater JAPAN?" Under these circumstances the prisoner's reply of, "Yes, I'm quite resigned to it" appeared as a defeatist statement showing lamentable morale. This is but another example of the trickery that may be practised on prisoners and of the need for the utmost caution and reticence."

(First Aust Army Summary No 104)

J. Buckridge Capt
for Maj
GS 1 Aust Corps

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NOTE: This distribution list to be destroyed by fire after perusal.

Appendix A (1)

To 1 Aust Corps Intelligence

JAPANESE 75mm (2.95 in) INCENDIARY MORTAR SHELL Summary No 2 of 5 May 44

HISTORY:

Five rounds of this hitherto unknown type of shell have been forwarded for examination but it is as yet unknown whether any more have been recovered. Whilst the use of this type of filling is new in artillery ammunition, the same filling and principle is employed in the 90mm Incendiary Mortar Shell, 50 kg Incendiary Bomb and a stick-type hand grenade. Of the five rounds received, one was recovered without a fuse and the other four were in their original packing. A translation of characters on all four sides of the box indicates that the ammunition is meant for use with the Type 41 Regimental Gun. Translation of an extract from captured documents, however, states that the same ammunition can be employed with Type 94 Mountain Gun and the Type 38 Field Gun.

ECONOMIC FEATURES:

One round without fuse was recovered in a Japanese supply dump at KERAI-AI, North coast of NEW BRITAIN, during late February or early March 44 and the other four, complete with packing and fuses, were captured at LCS NEGROS - ADMIRALTY ISLANDS on or about 18 Mar 44.

The primers of all five shells bore the inscription OSAKA ORDNANCE Aug 1942. The base of the four packed shells bore an inspection stamp NAGOYA ARSENAL and the following dates, Nov 38, Feb 39, Apr 42 and Aug 42. The base of the single shell was stamped Dec 40. Only one burster was examined which consisted of picric acid and dated Dec 34. The two conventional Type 88 instantaneous fuses examined were translated to read OSAKA ORDNANCE Jan 43.

CHARACTERISTICS:

Length of round, complete	:	50.3 cm (20 in)
Weight of round, fused	:	6.48 kg (14 1/2 lb)
Weight of projectile, filled and fused	:	5.36 kg (11 3/4 lb)
Weight of incendiary filling		
(a) liquid (WP-CS2 Solution)	:	300 gm (10.5 oz)
(b) pellets (rubber)	:	317 gm (11.18 oz)
Type and weight of propellant, plus silk bag	:	279 gm (9.8 oz) Nitrocellulose powder

MARKINGS:


The projectile is painted blue-grey with a red band, 1/2 in wide, directly below the fuse. Several markings, one under the other, each of which is about 1/8 in high, are painted in white on the side of the projectile midway between the bourrelet and driving band. The plus, or plus and minus signs, applying to the discrepancy above the standard weight (+ ±) and, underneath, the figures 16.6, which appear on two shells, meaning June 1941 and on the other three 16.11, November 1941. Following these, appear the signs √ and ㇿ, the second of which is the Kana symbol (KA) and is used to denote an incendiary shell. The meaning of the first

Kana symbol, ヲ, is not quite clear and has been used, in some cases, to denote a common shell and also the symbol for KOBE Steel Mfg Co.

The following figures, letter and marking, $\frac{1}{8}$ in high, were painted on the sides of all cartridge cases:-

18.9 A



The figures 18.9 indicate that the shell was fully assembled in Sep 43, and it is thought that the letter "A" denotes lot A. The symbol, , probably indicates the arsenal in which the final assembly was made but has not been identified as yet. A translation of the markings on the various components of the shell, denoting arsenal and dates of manufacture are given in the foregoing paragraph Economic Features.

The markings of these projectiles are not consistent with those on other Japanese incendiary munitions with a similar filling. The 90mm Incendiary Mortar Shell has red and blue bands at the tip of the projectile, a yellow band midway between the bourrelet and tail and a white band at the tail. The 50 kg Incendiary Bomb was painted blue-grey with superimposed 1 in yellow and white bands.

DESCRIPTION:

FUSE - The Type 88 Instantaneous Fuse was found packed with the shells and translation of captured documents states this to be the standard fuse for use with the Type 41 Regimental Gun. An examination of this fuse is being made to ascertain whether any difference exists between it and other Type 88 fuses used with shells for the Type 94 Mountain Gun. It has been established that this type fuse is used with the 70mm Battalion Gun and possibly the Type 38 Field Gun.

INCENDIARY FILLING - The projectile cavity was packed with 96 small, cylindrical pellets approximately $\frac{7}{8}$ in long by $\frac{1}{2}$ in in diameter made of natural rubber and slate grey in colour. They were immersed in a solution of white phosphorous in carbon disulphide and due to the porous nature of the rubber, the WP Solution (White Phosphorous), had penetrated to a depth varying from $\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ inches.

The solution was a milky yellow colour. The solvent was identified as carbon disulphide and the solute as white phosphorous combining to make a solution of the following ratio:-

Carbon Disulphide	12.2%)	WP-CS ₂
White Phosphorous	87.8%)	

PACKING - Shells are packed, fitted with fuse hole plugs and as a safety measure, in the event of leakage of the incendiary filling, a cloth bag containing 340 gms of finely powdered clay fits tightly over the nose of the projectile so that the powder is in contact with the projectile.

TACTICAL USE:

Translation of an extract from captured documents shows the tactical use for which the shell was made, apparently at the beginning of the CHINA Incident and at the request of forward troops.

The type of shell is classified as chemical ammunition and is used to destroy combustibles (wooden buildings, trees, grass and any materials used for camouflage, etc.) by burning.

- 3 -

The incendiary filling (M) used in the shell are subject to spontaneous combustion and ignite spontaneously when exposed to the air. The bursting radius is approximately 20m and it burns approximately two minutes.

PRESERVATION:

Further translations quote methods of preservation and special precautions from "Ammunition Handling Regulations" and "Chemical Warfare Regulations". These state that the shell is normally kept in a special yellow phosphoreous container but if this is not possible, it will be given the same attention and care as our own ammunition. It may be stored for two years and except for those defective, due to leakage, should be used as soon as possible. If a leakage does occur, a warning is issued not to handle the shell with bare hands and if the leakage is small, it may be used immediately after cleaning with copper sulphate solution and water. If the leakage is extensive or the round is not fired immediately, it should be either exploded or drowned in deep water where it will not be recovered and so endanger personnel.

(MEF Review 91 - from a report prepared by #2 US Chem Lab Coy 18 Apr 41)

JAPANESE

75mm (2.95in)

INCENDIARY SHELL




DIAGRAM
1/2 SCALE

Mr. Barry

SECRET

Copy No. 84....

GSI

1 AUST CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 3

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 5 May 44 to 1200 hrs 12 May 44

1. Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Cols Command.
2. A receipt is not required but copy holders should note serial number and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue.

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SECRET

-GSI

1 AUGUST CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 3

PART 1

OPERATIONS

(a) LAND - GUN AND ENEMY

NEW BRITAIN

Reports of the withdrawal of small enemy parties in direction of the GABELLE PENINSULA are still current.

On 8 May Allied troops occupied the HOSKINS Airfield without opposition although some booby traps were found. Previously a patrol from THALSEA had moved to within ten miles of this area without making contact and on the same day six enemy were killed in the vicinity of DAGI RIVER (18 miles WSW from G. HOSKINS).

It was reported on 8 May that the entire enemy garrison at THALSEA were killed but no further details have yet come to hand.

It is interesting to note that some stragglers who arrived at FORTBET by the coastal road from GASMATA are reported to have abandoned their arms and equipment en route.

ADMIRALTY ISLAND

Patrolling continues and between 5 May and 6 May 7 enemy captured, 29 killed and 4 found dead on MANUS ISLAND leaving an estimated 100 to 125 effectives on that island.

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

KADANG-ALEXISHAFEN

No contacts have been reported in this area although patrols have been active west and NW of ALEXISHAFEN and in the AMIT area.

On 8 May the KADANG-ALEXISHAFEN road was open to restricted Jeep traffic and the road ALEXISHAFEN to 4 miles north was reported clear of mines.

A PT Boat patrol reported that there were no signs of enemy activity on BAGAENG ISLAND on 6 May.

AITAPE

Patrolling has continued in this area and reported enemy casualties to 11 May: 4 dead and 4 wounded to 11 May.

Japanese activity has been mainly concerned with the acquisition of food. Patrols reported that 100 Japanese entered WEMBLE (3 1/2 miles WNW from DRINDARIA RIVER) on night 7/8 May and stole food from native ration dump then returning inland. On 8 May an enemy party of unknown strength attacked Allied ration dump near WEM (7 1/2 miles SW from AITAPE).

It is reported that the enemy will endeavour to escape from the area via ROMEI (2 1/2 miles WSW from AITAPE) and thence westward by inland tracks.

Comments: If such a move eventuates it would be safe to assume that few would survive such a journey. Alternatively, it is considered more probable that the enemy will decide to contact his own forces in the WEMAF area.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

HOLLANDIA

On 9 May the enemy evacuated a perimeter defence 4 miles north from HOLLANDIA Airfield, leaving booby traps,

Natives report that prior to 4 May well fed and well armed Japanese in groups of 200/300 had passed through MARNEDA and DOMANDI (12 and 14 miles respectively SW from HOLLANDIA Airfield).

Subsequently the parties were only of strength of 10/20 and were unarmed and ill fed.

Total enemy casualties reported in this area to 11 May are 917 killed and 265 captured.

(b) SEA - GULF AND WHEEL

SOLOMONS

During the period from 3 May to 9 May Allied PT boats were active, having sunk 14 barges and damaged 3 others.

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

PT boats sank two northbound barges 5 miles SE from BOGIE on night 2/3 May and on 5 May one northbound barge was destroyed and two damaged off RUMABUN HARBOR.

In the WELAK area PT Boats destroyed 8 and damaged 7 barges and killed 24 Japanese. Five barges were destroyed on the night 5/6 May and two more 6/7 May.

On 6 May one 500/1000 ton freighter was sighted at SEPEK RIVER mouth and on 9 May 7 new barges were observed near CAPE PARANOF (17 miles NW from WELAK).

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Shipping consistent with the normal requirements of enemy troops in this area was sighted in the GEELVINK BAY area.

FAMMARTU

One 2500/2500 ton attack transport, two 1000/1500 ton freighter transports and a transport were sighted off FEEB ISLAND on 6 May and three 2000/2500 and three 1000/1500 ton freighter-transports were seen at WASTEL BAY on the same date. At KLOE BAY there was one 2000/2500 ton freighter-transport and a convoy of six 1000/1500 ton freighter transports off CAPE TOFARA. The tonnage represented suggests further stopping-up of activity in that area.

(c) AIR - GULF

SOLOMONS

Harassing raids by Allied fighters and bombers over scattered targets throughout the area were carried out. The number of aircraft involved on any one day ranged from 25 to 90. Damage was inflicted on installations, supply and personnel areas.

NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND

Allied bombers supported by fighters continued their now routine attacks on airfields, supply dumps and installations both at RABAU and at BORPO and NAKATANI in NEW IRELAND.

NEW GUINEA

Enemy bases in the KANSI BAY and WELAK areas as well as airfields and installations in the GEELVINK BAY area were consistently attacked by Allied aircraft during the week. Special attention by heavy bombers was paid to bases on PAK ISLAND.

ENEMY

Apart from a few interceptions by enemy fighters in the GEELVINK BAY (Dutch New Guinea) area Japanese air activity was negligible.

PART II

SECTION 2 - ENEMY OOB - LAND

(1) ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTHS IN THE SWPA

There is no change to report on the estimate of enemy strengths in the SWPA.

Although it is definitely known that the total enemy strength in the general HOLLANDIA area on 20 Mar 44 was approximately 15,000 of which some 7,000 were classified as Air Personnel (including Ground Air Personnel) and that the extent of the opposition met and other evidence acquired by the Allied landing on 22 Apr would suggest that there were less than 15,000 in that area at the time, it is considered inadvisable to alter strengths on NEW GUINEA until the full story is available from the large quantity of documents captured.

(11) IDENTIFICATIONS - HANSA BAY-WENAK AREA

The Adv HQ 18 Army, commanded by Lt-Gen ADACHI is reported to be at BOHEW (approximately 20 miles NW of WENAK).

It is reported that in addition to the numerous L of C and Construction Units etc, the following Units are in the general 1 HANSA BAY AREA:-

HQ 20 Div	}	Totalling approximately 9,000 personnel.
20 Div Inf HQ		
78, 79 and 80 Inf Regts		
Divisional Troops		

HQ 41 Div	}	Totalling approximately 10,600 personnel
41 Div Inf HQ		
237, 238 and 239 Inf Regts		
Divisional Troops		

SECTION 3-ORGANIZATION

The Japanese Navy has established a number of Base Forces, which act as garrisons in occupied areas, and serve as Naval Bases as required. They are responsible for the administration and defence of the areas within the base, and control all Naval troops including SNELPs, anti-aircraft and pioneer units, in that area.


Each base force is sub-divided into a varying number of Guard Forces, whose duties are to maintain reporting and observation points, conduct sea patrols with small naval craft, and carry out the defence of their allotted area.

The strength and organization of a Guard Force is extremely flexible and may vary considerably. Equipment may include heavy Naval Guns, field, anti-tank and anti-aircraft, rifles, and patrol and escort craft, mine layers, and mine sweepers.

The following chart, built up from information contained in captured documents, gives an example of the organization of a Guard Force. The particular force was located in the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS.

Nov 43

88 GUARD FORCE



TOTAL STRENGTH: 745

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 92)

SECTION 6 - ENEMY EQUIPMENT

HELMETS OF COMPRESSED SILK

Reference has been made previously to this type of Japanese equipment and an article in the Japanese illustrated newspaper "Science of Living," dated 10 Oct 43 gives details of a new type of helmet for the Japanese Army. It is made of a compressed silk composition known as "SORGHUM" and is claimed to be proof against falling shrapnel.

The main advantages of this type helmet are stated to be as follows:-

- (a) It is one third the weight of the existing pattern.
- (b) Due to being made from non-ferrous composition it provides no interference to compasses.

The helmet is similar in appearance to the German pattern helmet but has a shorter vizor. It has not, as yet, been identified in operations.

(AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 92)

SECTION 8 - GENERAL

OIL INSTALLATIONS - VOGELKOP PENINSULA (DUTCH NEW GUINEA)

Considering the possibly imminent eviction of the Japanese from DUTCH NEW GUINEA, it is of interest to note the work that had been done pre-war in the development of oil fields in that territory.

Prior to the Japanese occupation of the VOGELKOP PENINSULA at the end of 1942, Dutch Enterprises had discovered and were developing three oilfields in this region.

Two of these fields were destroyed before the evacuation of the area and the amount of evidence available at present is so incomplete that it is difficult to estimate to what extent, if any, the Japanese are working the sites. The following is an outline of the development of the fields that had been completed before the evacuation and the activity that has been observed, per medium of aerial photographs, since that time.

KLAMONO

The KLAMONO field is situated near the KLASAFET RIVER and is approximately 26 miles SE of SORONG.

Fourteen wells had been drilled, of which twelve were producing, but pipe-lines, storage tanks and other port facilities had not been completed. The field is stated to have a potential yield of 2,738,000 barrels per year. The installations in this area had not been destroyed prior to the evacuation and the present state of productivity is not known as no photographs have been taken since the Japanese occupation.

The unloading point for this site was a pier on the KLASAFET RIVER thence apparently by surface craft down the BERSOER RIVER to the CERAM SEA. The last photographs of the unloading point were taken on 10 Jun 43 and revealed a Dutch 100 ft building and another 100 ft building of apparent Japanese design in addition to a Dutch 1,000 barrel tank.

WASIAN AND MOGOI

WASIAN lies approximately 25 miles north of SENTOENI BAY on the WASIAN River and MOGOI is situated approximately 13 miles WSW of WASIAN.

Three wells had been drilled at the former site and two at the latter before their evacuation, and although oil had been found, production had not been developed. The potential annual yield is reported to be 3,000,000 barrels but the quality of the oil is said to be lower than that tested at KLAMONO.

The present status of the WASIAN and MOGOI wells is not known as the only photographs taken of this area were those of Aug 43 which covered WASIAN only and then no signs of any activity could be observed.

The installations had been destroyed by the Dutch Authorities before leaving the area, but it is considered that they could probably be put into production without great difficulty.

TEST WELLS

Four test well sites had been discovered prior to Allied personnel leaving the area, but again there is insufficient evidence available to assess whether the Japanese are proceeding with these projects or not. The test wells referred to are as follows:-

KLAMOGOEN

Plans had been made for a test well at KLAMOGOEN, approximately 10 miles west of KLAMONO, but as no photographs of the area have been taken its present status is unknown.

A slipway for the offloading of supplies for KLAMOGOEN is said to exist approximately 5 miles to the south east of the site and an earth surface road was under construction to join the two places. A clearing for a road between KLAMONO and KLAMOGOEN was also prepared but it is not known whether the Japanese ever completed the actual roadway.

JEF LIO

A test well had been drilled approximately 7 miles west of JEF LIO (on the eastern side of SELE STRAITS) and photographs taken on 24 July 43 showed the buildings and derrick to be visible.

There is a well surfaced road from the well to the coastal terminal at JEF LIO and photographs taken on 2 Feb 44 show signs of current foot traffic but it is not possible to state whether or not MT were present or in use.

A good jetty (built by the Dutch) still exists and the settlement showed signs of occupation.

SELE WELLS

Two test wells were drilled near SEGET (approximately 8 miles ESE of JEF KASIM which is opposite JEF KASIM ISLAND in SELE STRAITS).

The sites of these wells have not been photographed but the North Western portion of the road from the wells and the coastal terminal at JEF KASIM have been photographed on several occasions.

At this terminal there is a jetty, said to be capable of accommodating ships up to 2,000 tons. Photos taken on 17 Jun 43 revealed a total of 32 buildings, the old bare foundations of five tanks, and the road leading inland. At this time all tracks were overgrown and there was no sign of current occupancy. By Sep 43 some of the tracks appeared to have been used, and photos taken on 27 Jan 44 disclosed the presence of 5 new huts in the settlement area, a fair area of garden cultivation which appeared to be of Japanese design, foot tracking was plentiful and the road in the direction of the wells was in good condition. It was not possible to tell from the photographs whether there were any MT present in the area, but if such traffic was traversing the road to the wells it was not heavy enough to indicate transport of substantial quantities of supplies etc.

PART V

SECURITY

JAPANESE DISPOSAL OF DOCUMENTS

Reports received over a long period show increased security precautions on the part of the Japanese. There have frequently been signs of the systematic destruction of documents by burning, and documents are moved back in anticipation of a retreat. Generally, enemy corpses searched have had no identification tags, documents or personal papers of any description. The padding of helmets has usually been entirely removed. When the pouch was left intact it seldom contained items of value. The Japanese appear to search their own dead whenever practicable. Furthermore, recent reinforcements have had the usual identifications insignia removed from their clothing before arriving in this theatre. Documents show that security instructions have been issued frequently by enemy formations and strenuous efforts are being made to ensure that documents of value do not fall into our hands.

Although large quantities of Japanese documents and equipment are being sent back from current operations in spite of Japanese precautions, it is most important that strenuous efforts be continued to obtain every available document.

It becomes more than ever important that every Japanese document captured is promptly handed to Intelligence for examination. Every care must be taken to ensure that no soldier retains any document or equipment for its souvenir value. A clear explanation of the method of handling equipment and documents, so that items not wanted by Intelligence will be sent to an address on the mainland nominated by the soldier, should assist in this.

(NGF Weekly Intelligence Summary No 172)


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1 AUST CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 4

Compiled from information received from
1200 hours 5 May 44 to 1200 hours 19 May 44

1. Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Col's Command,
2. A receipt is not required but copy holders should note serial number and bring under notice non-receipt of any issue.

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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 4

PART I

OPERATIONS

GENERAL

The main event during the week was the successful landing by Allied land forces in the WAKDE Islands and on the adjacent mainland. The capture of the airfields will enable our Air Force to provide fighter cover over practically the whole of DUTCH NEW GUINEA. With an additional 140 miles from HOLLANDIA to march, the plight of the enemy troops from HANSA BAY west becomes even graver.

The enemy east of AITAPE appear to be making an attempt to bypass our forces in this area by an inland route, and a Battalion attack launched by the enemy on night 13/14 May against our forces near BABIANG may have been an attempt to cover this movement.

The total number of prisoners captured at HOLLANDIA to 16 May has reached the surprising figure of 410. Apparently there has been some organized surrender by small groups, which possibly indicates a change in the outlook of at least sections of the Japanese Army. There are also indications which suggest that the enemy now considers the possibility of his troops surrendering.

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

NEW BRITAIN

Operations were restricted to patrolling.

Reliable reports indicate that on 11 May there were no Japanese at ULAMONA, SULE or UBILI and that on 15 May Japanese had moved from PONDO PLANTATION.

It was reported on 17 May that enemy in force were at the headwaters of a small stream inland from AILO POINT (OPEN BAY) with outposts on the beach.

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

SAIDOP

Patrols to the vicinity of YOGA YOGA killed 5 Japanese and discovered 41 dead.

ALEXISHAFEN

Our forward troops reached GILAGIL RIVER (14 miles NNW from CAPE CROISILLES) on 15 May without making contact with the enemy.

AITAPE

On 11 May an Allied patrol observed approx 55 enemy preparing defensive positions 2½ miles east along the coast from our outpost at BABIANG (35 miles ESE of AITAPE). On night 13/14 May enemy estimated strength one battalion attacked the BABIANG outpost. The attack was repulsed but on 14 May the outpost withdrew 7 miles west by sea to NYAPARAKE.

On 14 May it was reliably reported that enemy parties were moving inland from the coast east of AITAPE in an attempt to bypass Allied troops in this sector. The route being used is reported to run through SIRI and YERISI (approx

26 miles south of TADJI) towards LUMI and TAUWETEI (34 miles SW of TADJI).

Total enemy casualties in the sector to 16 May are 664 killed and 28 captured.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

HOLLANDIA

Active patrolling was continued in this area and casualties have been inflicted on the enemy bringing the total casualties to 1442 killed and 410 captured to 16 May. The stiffest resistance was encountered at AJAPO (on Lake SENTANI 10 miles WSW of HOLLANDIA) from enemy of unknown strength.

On 13 May Allied troops landed without opposition at two points in IRIS BAY (8 miles west from TANAHMERAH BAY).

WAKDE ISLAND

On 17 May after a heavy naval bombardment, Allied troops landed at ARARA on the mainland 3 miles SW from WAKDE IS. There was no opposition and by 1000 hrs the beachhead had been extended west to TOR RIVER and east to TOEM.

With aerial and naval support, Allied troops moving by barge from ARARA landed on INSOEMANAI Island (the smaller of the WAKDE islands). Again no opposition was encountered.

A late report states that on 18 May following artillery fire on ISOEMOAR Island (the larger island, on which the airfield is situated) from ISOEMANAI, our troops landed on the former at 0900 hrs against slight opposition, and advanced inland. In the face of enemy mortar fire our troops had reached the edge of the airfield by 1117 hrs.

(b) SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

NEW IRELAND

Allied PT boats shelled shore installations in the vicinity of RAMAT BAY during night 10/11 May and again on night 15/16 May.

During the week/total of eight barges were sunk by these light surface craft at RAMAT BAY, MAKUDUKUDU BAY (approx 15 miles SSW MANATANAI) and off DYALU ISLAND.

NEW GUINEA

Enemy installations, including a possible Radar and wireless station, and positions on KARKAR ISLAND were attacked by Allied Naval Units on 12 May and again on the following day. Gun positions and buildings were destroyed and fires started as a result of these operations.

Twenty enemy barges of unstated serviceability were observed off WEWAK POINT on 15 May and later that day strafing Thunderbolts left twelve of these craft burning.

One enemy launch was observed 35 miles up the RAMU RIVER travelling upstream on 16 May.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

The enemy is continuing to use his shipping in the general GEELVINK BAY area and on 11 May four medium and one small vessel, and ten barges were sighted in the waters adjacent to BIAK ISLAND. The next day 37/45 barges were

observed near the island.

One light cruiser and three merchant vessels (one 6000, one 7000 and one 8000 tons) were reported seventeen miles WNW of MANOKWARI on a westerly course. The merchant vessels were covered by four aircraft but these did not prevent our airplanes from damaging them by strafing.

On 12 May one submarine was observed 38 miles west of CAPE DURVILLE and another 70 miles WNW of the same Cape. The following day a submarine was reported 30 miles north of CAPE DURVILLE on an easterly course.

BORNEO

On 14 May an enemy Naval Force consisting of three battleships, three heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier and one light cruiser was reported 90 miles ENE of DARVEL BAY (North BORNEO) on a southerly course. It is considered that this force possibly anchored at TAWITAWI ISLANDS.

On the same day three tankers with three destroyers as escort passed DARVEL BAY on a southerly course.

(c) AIR - (1) GVN

SOLOMONS

In addition to the usual targets on BOUGAINVILLE, enemy supply and storage areas at BUKA PASSAGE and SORUM were attacked by Allied aircraft during the period under review.

On 15 May a total of 110 aircraft attacked the suspected 17 Army Headquarters at MUGUAI Mission (5½ miles north of KAHILE). Four buildings were destroyed and many small fires started.

NEW BRITAIN

Allied aircraft continued their attacks on enemy airfields in NEW BRITAIN during the past week. Target areas were well covered and many fires, including some at fuel dumps, started.

On 12 May Rocket guns were successfully used from Allied aircraft against enemy barges and AA positions at RABAU. Some gun positions were silenced and 30/40 barges were sunk as a result of the attack.

NEW GUINEA

Airfields, ammunition dumps, personnel and supply areas, gun positions and bridges along the NEW GUINEA coast from ULIGAN Harbor to HW of DUT were consistently attacked by strong formations of our aircraft. A total of four bridges were destroyed and many fires started including fuel and ammunition dumps.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Prior to the successful landing on WAKDE Island, the enemy airfields and personnel areas on the islands and on the mainland in the vicinity were subjected to a tremendous aerial bombardment during the week. MAFFIN, SAWAR and SARMI were the main targets on the mainland. In these attacks fuel and ammunition dumps were set alight, and a total of 7 intercepting enemy fighters were destroyed by our aircraft.

Installations on BIAK Island were attacked by our bombers.

On 16 May 8 enemy aircraft attempted to intercept 16 Lightnings on recce over GEELVINK BAY and three were destroyed.

(d) ENEMY

The only enemy air activity reported during the week was in the HOLLANDIA area. On 13 May six aircraft bombed HOLLANDIA strip and TANAMERAH BAY area without inflicting any damage.

The following day another six enemy airplanes dropped 22 bombs in the TANAMERAH and HUMBOLDT BAY areas and on CYCLOPS and HOLLANDIA airfields. Again no damage or casualties were suffered.

PART II

SECTION 2 - ENEMY OOB - LAND

(a) ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTHS IN SWPA

NW SECTOR

The changes made in the estimate of Enemy Strengths in the SWPA as at 10 May 44 are as follows:-

HALMAHERAS

Increased from 5,000 to 10,000. This increase is due to the arrival of an estimated 5,000 troops which are considered to be part of 32 and/or 35 Div.

Comment:- 32 Div is thought to have moved from JAPAN to SHANTUNG in May 39. After participating in operations in that area, it moved to TSINAN in North China, where it has been carried up to the present time.

35 Div also arrived in China in May 39 and was stationed in the SHANSI area. Twelve months later elements of this Division were identified in KAIFENG and HOPOI. Part of this formation is probably at DAVAO (PHILIPPINES).

LESSER SUNDIA ARCHIPELAGO (excl TIMOR)

The enemy strength in this area has been increased from 10,000 to 15,000 owing to the arrival of further elements of 46 Div, and it is now considered that the bulk of this Formation is in that theatre.

The movement of the above troops increases the total for the North West Sector to 221,000.

NE SECTOR

Although changes in strengths have probably occurred in actual localities, no change is made in the total for BRITISH NEW GUINEA which still remains at 57,000. It is considered that evacuees from the various localities are still in the general area.

Insufficient evidence has been obtained as yet, to explain the present location of the HOLLANDIA-AITAPE Garrisons.

(b) IDENTIFICATIONS

3 DIVISION

It is now considered doubtful whether 3 Div will move to the DUTCH NEW GUINEA area as was previously reported. It is being carried in CENTRAL CHINA at present, although some elements of the formation have been identified at MAHOKWARI. There is no evidence that the remainder of the Division is destined for that area.

29 DIVISION

This Division is at present located in the MARIANAS-CAROLINE Island area.

43 DIVISION

This Formation is considered to be moving from JAPAN to the Central PACIFIC and is probably destined for the MARIANAS.

7 AREA ARMY

In addition to SOUTHERN ARMY, 7 AREA ARMY has recently been identified at SINGAPORE.

SECTION 7 - SUPPLY

JAPANESE SUPPLY SYSTEM

The following extract from HQ AAF Intelligence Summary No 205 gives particulars of a method which the Japs have employed in an attempt to supply his Garrisons:-

"A new efficacious method of unloading supplies from Japanese submarines has been discovered recently. The principle is the same as that of the Human Torpedo once used by the Italian Navy. A special torpedo-propelled submarine hull has been devised, with a cruising range of about six nautical miles. This device is called the "Cargo Tube" by the Japanese, and is piloted by one helmsman. Carried to the unloading point by the submarine, the cargo tube is released and beached by the helmsman. The hull cruises submerged and only the helmsman's seat, one meter above water, is visible.

Even on moonlit nights, surface ships or aircraft would find it difficult to detect a cargo tube. The tube has a 100-ton cargo capacity; two tubes being capable of unloading the submarine's entire cargo.

"At GUADALCANAL, the cargo tube method was considered 100% successful, whereas unloading by barges or by releasing the cargo in floating bags met with 40% failure."

SECTION 8 - GENERAL

COMMENTS ON CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

The following story has been given by a recently captured PW:-

"Allied bombers made several hits on the headquarters of Lt-General IMAMURA in RABOUL on 20 Dec 43. The General was in his super concrete air-raid shelter which was supposed to be bomb proof. One bomb landed beside the shelter, burying the General. He was dug out three hours later uninjured but very angry."

(AMF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW NO 93)

PART V

SECURITY

INA RECOGNITION SIGNS

In a document entitled "Points to recognition of Indian National Army soldiers in the front lines," issued by the commander of a Japanese Regiment in ARAKAN, the following extract on the recognition of INA personnel returning from behind our lines appears:-

"On meeting with our troops, all of them must not only proclaim their identity as "HIKARI KIKAN" or "INDO KOKUMIN GUN (INA)" but also expose the letter 'T' sign stitched on to their outer garments or elsewhere."

The use of this 'T' sign has recently been mentioned by a Jif (JAPANESE INFLUENCED FIFTH-COLUMNIST) whose report refers to 4 Corps Front. He states that if a member of the INA has difficulty in convincing a Japanese of his identity he makes a 'T' sign on the ground or indicates a 'T' on the palm of his hand. In some cases INA personnel have stitched the outline of the letter 'T' with thread under the lapel of the coat of other

- 6 -

garments. This method of recognition is possibly in use on other fronts.

(AMF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No 93) -

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1 AUST CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 5

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 19 May 44 to 1200 hrs 26 May 44

1. Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Col's Command.
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1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 5

PART I

OPERATIONS

GENERAL

There is further evidence of a general evacuation from WEWAK westwards. A document captured on 18 May indicates that the main body of one enemy division was in the jungle south of MARUBIAN, (34 miles SE of AITAPE) and moving inland. Following the battalion attack referred to in last week's summary, a two company enemy attack on our outpost at NYAPARAKE on 23 May appears to have been an attempt to open up the track running south from BABIANG for the inland movement of further enemy troops. At HOLLANDIA the cre enemy desire appears to be escape. It is as yet too early to decide to what extent the enemy will stand and fight in the MAFFIN-SARMI sector.

On 21 May two Japs were reported captured at BOEKISK (HOLLANDIA sector) as the result of surrender leaflets dropped by Allied aircraft.

On 17 May a carrier borne air attack was launched against SOURABAYA. The great measure of success achieved can be gauged from the damage listed on page 4.

(a) LAND - OWN AND ENEMY

SOLOMONS

Patrolling still continues on BOUGAINVILLE Is. NE of the TOROKINA Perimeter a hospital containing 200/250 Jap bodies was discovered on 15 May. Subsequently a second one containing an unstated number of bodies and much equipment was found nearby.

Two days later an Allied patrol encountered rifle and mortar fire from 50 Japs located north of the Perimeter area. The patrol withdrew and the enemy position was engaged by arty.

On 21 May a patrol north of the Perimeter discovered 60/70 dead Japs and an estimated further 500 buried.

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

On 21 May Allied troops landed at DRABWI (South coast of MANUS Island). Patrols are being pushed west to KUBANU which is reported occupied by the enemy.

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

SEPIK RIVER

On 21 May natives reported that enemy were in occupation of three villages approx 30 miles ESE of MARUI (50 miles SW of WEWAK). They also reported that small parties were moving downstream from MARUI in canoes at night, and one party camped on the river bank near ANGORAM. A fortnight earlier a native report was received that a large body of the enemy had moved from BUT to MAPRIK and that some had moved south to MARUI,

WEWAK

On 23 May reliable natives reported that the enemy were moving supplies and equipment from the east to ANUMBE R (38 miles WNW of WEWAK) by motor transport and from this point native carriers were being employed to continue the movement westwards.

The main enemy strength is believed to be located in the BUT area.

AITAPE

To the east of AITAPE, Allied patrols clashed with the enemy to the south and east of NYAPARAKE and on 23 May an enemy attack by approx two coys armed with MGs and mortars forced our NYAPARAKE outpost to withdraw 2,500 yds to the west.

A document captured on 18 May indicates that the main body of one enemy division were located south of MARUBIAN (34 miles SE of AITAPE) and were moving inland.

Natives report that the enemy is occupying SALATA (23 miles SSE of BABIANG) in force.

West of AITAPE our patrols inflicted casualties and found enemy dead near SERRA and at MORI (5 miles south from PRITWITZ Point). At the latter, 8 Japs were killed including two officers; the party was in poor condition and armed with only two rifles.

Total enemy casualties to 23 May are 786 killed and 31 captured.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

HOLLANDIA

The enemy appears to be disorganized and no attempt at co-ordinated resistance has been reported.

On 19 May a patrol operating SW from TANAHMERAH Bay reported that the enemy were retreating westward in complete disorder through GENJEM, discarding rifles and MGs as they went. Natives report that small parties in very poor condition are using inland tracks in an attempt to reach SARMI.

Reliable natives reported that on 22 May there were 1,000 Japs (many sick and wounded) at ARZO (20 miles south of HUMBOLDT Bay). They are stated to have returned after having been unable to reach GENJEM owing to lack of food. On 18 May a PW stated that a number of enemy who had attempted to walk overland from WEWAK to ARZO had been reported to have died of starvation.

To the east of HOLLANDIA, on 22 May patrols killed 21 enemy, captured 13 and found 69 dead at TAMI.

As the result of our patrol activities enemy casualties to 23 May were increased to 1,921 killed and 484 captured.

WAKDE AREA

Organized resistance on WAKDE Islands was overcome by 19 May.

After enlarging the bridgehead on the mainland near ARARA, patrols were pushed forward to the west. On 20 May Allied positions on west bank of TOR River were subjected to a counter attack, which was repulsed.

The enemy has been employing 90 mm mortars from MAFFIN I against our bridgehead. This village and the MAFFIN airfield were reported to be strongly defended. Our forward troops reported that there were 1,500 enemy troops with ample supplies in the MAFFIN-SARMI area.

On 23 May Allied troops advanced on MAFFIN I against heavy rifle and MG fire.

Enemy casualties reported to 23 May are 909 killed and 5 captured.

KOEMAMBA Islands

On morning 19 May, Allied troops effected unopposed landing on LIKI and NIROEMOAR Islands. This group is approx 30 miles NW of WAKD Islands.

MERAUKE AREA

Signs of recent occupation of villages on the EILANDEN and NORTH WEST Rivers have been found. On 21 May a native reported that 6 Japs with a W/T set and approx 100 native troops are stationed at JAPERO.

(b) SEA - OWN AND ENEMY

SOLOMONS

On night 16/17 May our PT boats strafed MIBO and on 17/18 May our light naval units shelled TAKI (20 miles SE from KIETA).

On 17 May an enemy submarine thought to be in a damaged condition was sighted approaching BUKA from the west. Another submarine is believed to have been sunk by one of our naval units, 130 miles NE of BUKA.

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

An enemy submarine was attacked by light surface craft in the GULF OF PAPUA 125 miles WNW from PORT MORESBY on 23 May. Other enemy sightings were confined to barges and small craft in the WEWAK AREA; five barges and two boats were destroyed by aircraft on 19 May.

Our PT boats strafed MATAPAU (west of WEWAK) on the night 17/18 May and encountered intense enemy fire. On the same night other light surface craft shelled and strafed enemy positions along the north and west coasts of KARKAR ISLAND.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

Enemy shipping activity in GEELVINK BAY remains consistent with the maintenance requirements of enemy occupied localities within the area. From 27 to 33 merchant vessels with tonnages ranging from 400 to 2,000 were sighted between 17 and 22 May, the majority being in the vicinity of MANOKWARI. Of these vessels 8/9 were destroyed including one of 1,000 and one of 2,000 tons.

The only warships sighted were one described as a possible warship off JERI ISLAND on 17 May and one destroyer escorting a small merchant vessel on an easterly course 62 miles NE of SORONG on 19 May.

Barge activity around the south coast of BIAK ISLAND has been intense.

BORNEO

The enemy naval force previously reported as being at TAWITAWI ISLANDS (1 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary No 4) was still anchored there on 19 May, when it was joined by three destroyers and two fleet tankers.

HALMAHERA ISLANDS

A total of nine cargo vessels from 1,500 to 9,000 tons were sighted in these waters about 18 May and intense activity of barges and small merchant vessels throughout the group was

observed. The following naval units were sighted:-
3 possible cruisers, 6 possible destroyers and 2 escort vessels.

(c) AIR

(1) OWN

SOLOMONS

Widespread targets mainly dump and personnel areas, were raided. The largest strike was by 105 medium and fighter bombers on KAHILI on 20 May.

NEW BRITAIN

were made

Daily heavy attacks/on airfields in the RABAU area. An improvement upon the practice of spraying native gardens with diesel oil is the ignition of the sprayed area.

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

On 19, 20 and 21 May attacks by 130, 158 and 153 planes respectively, caused considerable damage to enemy installations and gun positions at WEWAK.

Enemy troop concentrations east of DADRIWAD RIVER were attacked in strikes in direct support of our troops in that area.

DUTCH NEW GUINEA

BIAK ISLAND was the main target in this sector; heavy attacks being made against the airfields. On 17 May and 22 May, 94 and 57 Liberators respectively were employed.

Two grounded aircraft and seven or eight vessels were destroyed and four aircraft damaged when MANOKWARI was attacked on 19 May.

TANIMBAR ISLAND

Four medium bombers sank a 500/1,000 ton vessel and damaged another on 19 May.

TIMOR

Allied medium bombers destroyed or damaged 30 buildings at ATAMBOEA.

JAVA

On 17 May a large carrier borne force attacked installations and airfields at SOURABAYA and MALANG, and the Naval Base at the former.

By achieving complete surprise considerable damage was caused by direct hits on numerous targets. The oil refinery at WONOKROMO, the BRAAT Naval Engineering Works and a power house were completely destroyed, and floating docks and other naval installations damaged. At least 10 ships, totalling 35,000 tons were hit and a total of 21 enemy aircraft destroyed. Many other aircraft were damaged on the two airfields.

Only one of our aircraft failed to return.

(11) ENEMY

Two unsuccessful raids were made on Allied shipping by two and one enemy aircraft in the NEW IRELAND area on nights 16/17 and 17/18 May.

Minor damage was caused at HOLLANDIA by bombs from one enemy plane on night 17/18 May.

Otherwise enemy air activity was confined to ^{one} recce plane over MERAUKE on 15 May and recce aircraft over HOLLANDIA and DARWIN on 16 May.

Attempts at fighter interception in DUTCH NEW GUINEA resulted in 11 enemy aircraft destroyed.

PART II

SECTION 2 - ENEMY OOB - LAND

ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTHS IN SWPA

The following changes in estimate of enemy strengths in the SWPA are based on information received from Adv LHQ as at 17 May 44:-

NW SECTOR

WAKDE-SARMI

These localities are now grouped together and the estimate of 11,000 for WAKDE and SARMI as at 10 May 44 has been reduced to a total of 6/9,000.

BIAK ISLAND

The total strength of this area has been reduced to 1,000 from the former estimate of 2,000.

NABIRE

Figures for this area have also been reduced, and instead of 2,000, it is now considered that 500 enemy are in this area.

MANOKWARI

An estimate of 2,000 troops of 35 Div are considered to have arrived in the MANOKWARI area and the strength for that theatre is now assessed at 8/10,000.

SORONG

Estimate for this area has been increased from 1,000 to 10,000; it is now considered that bulk of 35 Div is in area.

HALMAHERAS

An increase of 15/20,000 troops has been reported in this area and the total is now estimated to be 25/30,000 troops.

This increase is due to the inclusion of all of 32 Div and also possibly part of 8 Independent Mixed Brigade.

CELEBES

It is reported that 2 AREA ARMY has moved from the PHILIPPINES (DAV.O) to MENADO and thus the estimated strength of the CELEBES has been increased from 7,000 to 9,000.

The total for the NW SECTOR has shown an increase of from 9/19,000 and is now estimated to be 230/240,500.

NE SECTOR

The estimated total number of enemy troops in the NE SECTOR has been reduced from 144,000 to 122/132,000. This reduction is due to reassessment, details of which are as follows:-

BRITISH NEW GUINEA

The total for this area remains unchanged at 67,000.

NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND

The combined total for these areas as at 10 May was quoted at 60,000 but it is now considered that 40/50,000 remain in the area.

SOLOMONS

The estimated strength for this theatre has been reduced from 17,000 to 15,000.

Totals for SWPA are:-

NW SECTOR	230/240,500
NE SECTOR	122/132,000
TOTAL SWPA ...	<u>352/372,000</u>

A preliminary examination of documents recently captured indicates that in Mar 44 there were 96,000 enemy troops in NEW GUINEA between HANSA BAY and HOLLANDIA, both inclusive under command 18 Army. As only a preliminary perusal of these documents has so far been made, it is considered inadvisable to alter the estimate of enemy strengths in the relevant areas as yet.

DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE ARMIES AND DIVISIONS

Attached hereto as Appendix "A" to this Summary is a map showing the distribution of Japanese Armies and Divisions as at 12 May 44.

SECTION 6 - ENEMY EQUIPMENT

Attached hereto as Appendix "B (i)" and "B (ii)" is a description and illustration respectively, of a Japanese Wireless Set Transmitter and Receiver Type 94, Mk 36 Model "D".

PART V

SECURITY

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS OF JAPANESE SPECIAL ASSAULT PARTIES

CAPTURE OF DOCUMENTS

Under instructions as to the "Organization and Methods of attack by Special Assault Parties" (contained in an enemy document captured in the ARAKAN area), the Japanese have laid down that the role of these troops includes the capture of our secret documents and maps for use in current and future operations. The opening paragraph of these instructions reads:-

"Role. To carry out surprise attacks on enemy HQ and capture enemy Commanders - destruction of enemy's HQ will cause confusion throughout his whole force and destroy him. At the same time enemy secret documents and maps will be captured; from these we can immediately learn his strength and dispositions and they are of great value to us in future operations. The task is great and its achievement difficult but there is an old saying, "You cannot catch a tiger cub unless you go into the tiger's den." The courage necessary to carry out this duty, which is not impossible, is repaid by the results."

It is of interest to note that the organization of these Special Assault Parties provides for a "Booty Party" which includes

PRISONERS OF WAR

These troops are further instructed that, as soon as the assault is effected, prisoners are to be taken, disarmed, tied and taken aside.

It is then the task of the interpreters to endeavour to get the prisoners to indicate the position of their Commander. "Any who resist will be killed, but it must be remembered that the main task is the capture of the Commander."

If it is found that the Commander has been killed during the action, "evidence will immediately be collected (shoulder badges etc). Secret documents, maps showing dispositions etc will be collected. The party will withdraw as soon as their mission is completed."

AMF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW NO 94

for Bantle; Capt
for Maj
 GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION

As for 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No 4

SECRET

SECRET

APPENDIX "A" to 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No 5 of 26 May 44

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS ALLIED LAND FORCES SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA INTELLIGENCE SECTION GENERAL STAFF JAPANESE ARMY DISTRIBUTION OF ARMIES & DIVISIONS

LEGEND


- N CHINA** } AREA ARMY
- 8** }
- KWANTUNG** }
- 3** } ARMY
- 1** DIVISION
- 32** DIVISION EN ROUTE
- 64** INDEPENDENT INFANTRY GROUP

NOTE:
1. The C. CHINA and S. CHINA Armies are each equivalent to an Area Army.
2. CHINA GHQ, the KWANTUNG and SOUTHERN Army directly control Area Armies and/or Armies.

NOTES

- (A) 7 Area Army Newly identified at SINGAPORE.
- (H) 3 Division Some elements of this formation are known to be at MANOKWARI however, there is no evidence that the remainder of the division is destined that area.
- (C) 13 Division Some elements of this formation are known to be in the MARIANAS however, there is no evidence that the remainder of the division is destined that area.
- (D) 14 Division Probably moving to the NW Sector - SWPA, from MANOKWARI. Some elements are at MANOKWARI.
- (E) 32 Division Probably moving to the NW sector - SWPA, from North CHINA, destination HALMAHERA.
- (F) 35 Division Probably moving to HALMAHERA from PALAU.
- (G) 42 Division Believed disposed KURILE Islands.
- (H) 43 Division Moving to the Central Pacific area from JAPAN. Destination probably MARIANAS.
- (I) 46 Division The bulk of this formation is now believed to have arrived LESSER SUNDA ARCHIP. ELADO. Part is at SOEMBA and SOEMB-ABA Islands.
- (J) 1 & 2 Tank Division These formations have recently been identified. No information is yet available of their composition.

TOTAL
DIVISIONS 73
(INCLUDING 64 INDEPENDENT INFANTRY
GROUP PLUS 1 AND 2 TANK DIVISIONS)



ADV/MISC/5125- Reproduced by 1 Aust. Mob. Litho. Sec. (AIF) Aust. Svy. Corps.

0010405



SECRET

Appendix B (1)

to 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 5
of 26 May 44

JAPANESE WIRELESS SET TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER TYPE 94
MK 36 MODEL "D"

Photographic Appendix "B(ii)" illustrates only a single unit. The complete equipment consists of the following :-

Transmitter, receiver, receiver dry batteries
Hand driven Transmitter Generator
Antenna gear, earphones, morse key etc
Tools, calibration curves, spare dry batteries for
receiver, valve components

This equipment is primarily intended for transport by pack animal and is housed in two wooden cases with facilities for attaching to a pack saddle.

GENERAL:

Design incorporated in this set appears to date back to approximately 1937, although by its type number (Type 94) it is a 1934 model. It would appear that this type of set, when built in 1934, was then three years in advance of any other type or model manufactured in that year.

The whole equipment is extremely light, well designed and extremely efficient. Special attention has been paid to the construction of the front panel. All parts which are regularly handled have been chromium plated and all dials and dial name plates have been painted with luminous paint.

The main tuning condensers have celluloid casings placed over the plates and holders to protect them from dust, and all valves are clamped into place to prevent them from loosening during transportation.

The Transmitter has an oscillator, either crystal controlled or self excited, and a frequency coverage of 400-5700 kcs.

A complex aerial tuning circuit enables any length of aerial to be used on any frequency.

The Receiver is a six stage, superheterodyne unit using 5 valves with RF (Radio Frequency) Amplifier, using pentode type UFL34, Oscillator Mixer using heptode type UZ135 and a frequency range of 350 to 6,000 kcs.


It is worthy of note that the case cannot be closed when the LT switch is ON. This is a necessary precaution as the batteries supplied are of poor quality.

(AMF Review No 93
Extracted from GHQ INDIA's
Report No 3322)

JAPANESE WIRELESS SET


TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER

Type 94 Mk 36 MODEL "D"



COMPLETE SET
showing sliding
sections

TRANSMITTER



SECRET


APPENDIX "B(11)" to 1 Aust Corps
Int Summary No 5 of 26 May 44

KEY


- | | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Off | 8. Control switch | 15. Regeneration switch |
| 2. Receive | 9. Remote control plug | 16. Name plate |
| 3. Send | 10. Morse key | 17. Power terminals |
| 4. Aerial | 11. Key adjustment | 18. Earth |
| 5. Antenna meter | 12. Morse key plug | 19. "Transmitter" |
| 6. Coupling coil | 13. Oscillating condenser | 20. Antenna tuner |
| 7. Ammeter | 14. Oscillation | 21. Tuning switch |
| 22. Power switch | 29. Earth | |
| 23. Name plate | 30. Amplifying condenser | |
| 24. "Receiver" | 31. Trimmer condenser | |
| 25. Heterodyne control | 32. Earphones | |
| 26. Receiving coil | 33. Earphone switch | |
| 27. Aerial | 34. Filament measure plug | |
| 28. Tuning-band condenser | 35. Filament rheostat | |

Note: Information shown on this appendix has been collated from information extracted from a report originated by GHQ INDIA and a captured handbook translated in ATIS Publication No. 125 of 28 April, 1944.

ANTENNA CONSTRUCTION




RECEIVER



GSI (a) Adv LHQ

0010416



War Diary

Subject: 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT No. 3
AMENDMENT No. 1

SECRET

App L

HQ 1 Aust Corps
// May 44
G/ 1436 /Ops

Reference 1 Aust Corps G/1433/Ops of 1 May 44.

1. Herewith Amendment No. 1 (as at 2400 hours 10 May 44) to 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No. 3 forwarded under cover of the above-quoted memo.
2. Please acknowledge on attached slip.

J. Shewick Maj
for Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distribution: As for 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No.3.

1 Aust Corps

Receipt is acknowledged of Copy No. 55.56 of 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No.3, Amendment No. 1 dated 11 May 44.

Signature

Appointment

Date

Unit

AMENDMENT NO 1

as at 2400 hrs 10 May 44

to

1 Aust Corps Location Statement No 3

Page No	Serial No	CORPS TROOPS
1	46	Delete in remarks column "and temp under comd RAE 2 Aust Corps Tps (AIF) for camp constr". After 46 add serial 46A 45524 958 2/5 Aust Commando Sqn Mapee G453372 HQ Unit allotted 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt
	47	Amend map reference to read G555344
	48	Amend Location and map reference to read Mapee D380410
	412	Delete
2	417	Add to remarks column "2 pl at ROCKY CREEK D371377"
	419	Add to remarks column "1 pl at KAIRI G378481"
	421	Amend remarks column to read "1 pl under comd 9 Aust Div at RAVENSHOE MG347808"
	423	Amend Location and map reference columns to read "WONGABEL H401182"
		After 423 add "Survey - 423A 45595 Det 3 Aust Fd Svy Coy (AIF) MAPEE G440376"
	426	Delete - After 436 add serial - "436A 45679 115 5 Aust Tech Maint Sec BARRINE G559336"
4	472	In remarks column delete E substitute F. After 480 add serial - "480A 47744 Adv Party 2/117 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk MAPEE G467355"
		After 482 add serial - "482A 47945 Adv Party 2/117 Aust Bde Wksp MAPEE G467355"
	484	Amend remarks column to read "att 228 Aust Lt AA Bty"
	489	Delete
5	499	Amend Unit column to read "11, 12, 14, 96, 30 and 27 Aust Mob Cinemas of Aust Amenities Service"
	4102	Add 46024 War Office Serial Number After 4102 add serial - "4102A 46757 1 Amenities Concert Party Mobile"
		After 4105 add serial - 4105A 61243 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp WONGABEL H392196"

/6 AUST DIV TPS.

Serial
No No

6 AUST DIV TROOPS

- 10 C12 Unit column should read "2 and 3 Aust Shore Fire Control Parties of 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp (AIF)"
- C16 Delete
- 11 C30 Add Vehicle Number 97
- 13 C64 Map reference should read H315075
- C74 Map reference should read H343066

7 AUST DIV TROOPS

- 16 After E5 add serial -
"E5A 47540 159 8 Aust Svy Bty RAVENSHOE"
- After E12 add serial -
"E12A 29840 166 2/3 Aust Rly Constr Coy RAVENSHOE
MG326819 LHQ Tps"
- After E13 add serial -
"E13A 48037 926 2/9 Aust Commando Regt Sig Tp RAVENSHOE
MG326819 LHQ Unit"
- E16 Map ref should read "P430815"
- 17 After E28 add serial -
"E28A 61240 165 2/82 Aust LAD (Type A) RAVENSHOE MG326819
att 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt."

1 AUST BEACH GP

- 21 After F2 add serials -
"F2A 92190 1 Aust Mech Sqpt Pl WONGABEL H396167) Under comd
F2B 92192 1 Aust Engr Stores Pl WONGABEL H396167) 2/15 Aust Fd
Coy"

2 AUST BEACH GP

- 22 After G3 add serials -
"G3A 92191 2 Aust Mech Sqpt Pl DEADMANS GULLY C607895"
"G3B 92193 2 Aust Engr Stores Pl DEADMANS GULLY C607895"
- After G13 add serial -
ADD Corps
"G13A 45634 C Sec 2/3 Aust Dental Unit DEADMANS GULLY C607886
Temp att 2 Aust Beach Gp"

Subject : 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT NO. 3.

HQ 1 Aust Corps
25 May 44
G/1440/Ops

3 Aust Div	1 - 3 Town Major ATHERTON	32
6 Aust Div	4 - 6 13 Aust AOD	33
9 Aust Div	7 - 9 GOC	34
RAA 2 Aust Corps	10 BGS	35
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	11 G (Ops)	36
RAE 1 Aust Corps Sigs	12-13 G (SD)	37
HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps	14 G (Int)	38
46 Aust AL Sec (Tac R Sqn)	15 CE	39
2 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office	16 CSO	40
First Aust Army Stationery	D4 & QMG	41
Depot (AIF)	17 -18 A	42 - 43
2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	19 Q	44 - 45
First Aust Army (AIF)	20 DAMS	46
Qld L of C Area (Copies	S & T	47
22-24 for 7 Aust Div)	21-24 Med	48
17 (Cairns) L of C Sub-Area	25-26 Ord	49 - 50
Sig Centre ATHERTON	27 AEME	51
North Qld Det 1 Aust Fd	Postal	52
Censorship Coy	28 Pro	53
Mov CAIRNS	29 File	54
Mov TOWNSVILLE	30 War Diary	55 - 56
Mov ATHERTON	31	

Reference 1 Aust Corps G/1433/Ops of 1 May 44

1. Attached is Amendment No. 2, as at 2400 hrs 21 May 44, to 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No. 3.
2. Please acknowledge on attached slip.

[Signature]
for Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

1 Aust Corps

Receipt is acknowledge of Copy No 16 of 1 Aust
Corps Location Statement No 3 Amendment No 2 dated 25 May 44.

.....Signature

.....Appointment

.....Date

.....Unit

AMENDMENT NO 2

AS AT 2400 HRS 21 MAY 44

TO

1. AUSTRALIAN CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT NO 5

<u>PAGE NO</u>	<u>SERIAL NO</u>	<u>AMENDMENTS</u>
1		<u>CORPS TFS</u>
		After serial A3 add
		A3A 92205 2 Aust Mil Landing Gp TAYLOR PT - LHQ Unit under comd 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec
		After serial A6A add
		A6B 61421 Rear Pty 2/6 Aust Commando Sqm MAPEE - LHQ unit allotted 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt
		After serial A8 add
		A8A 61122 142 2/7 Aust Fd Regt KAIRI G484373 - { For allotment 9 Aust Div and moving to RAVENS- HOE shortly
	A10	Delete WONGABEL H416156 insert MAPEE
		Amend remarks column to read - Incl Rear Party 10 Bty Rear Party 11 Bty 12 Bty under comd 6 Aust Div
	A11	Delete H400180 insert H401183
		After serial A13 add
		A13A 49136 114 Aust LAA Regt (AIF) MAPEE
	A15	Amend serial to read
		61199 101 HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps BARRINE G554346
	A16	Amend unit column to read
		42 Aust Landing Craft Coy (AIF)
		After serial A17 add
		A17A 45588 17 Aust Fd Coy WONGABEL H401182
2	A21	Amend unit column to read
		HQ 2/3 Aust Rly Constr Coy (Mech Egt)
		Add to remarks column - one PL - TRINITY BEACH one PL - MAREEBA
	A23A	Amend location and map ref column to read
		MAREEBA D345495

PAGE NO.	SERIAL NO	AMENDMENTS
		<u>CORPS Tps (CONT'D)</u>
2	A27	Amend location and map ref columns to read MAPEE D380410
		After serial A27 add
		A27A 48655 142 2/7 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec KAIRI G484373 - att 2/7 Aust Fd Regt - moving to RAVENSHOE shortly (see serial A29)
	A29	Delete WONGABEL H416156 insert MAPEE
		After serial A29 add
		A29A 49132 114 Aust LAA Regt Sig Sec MAPEE
3		After serial A57 add
		A57A 61378 Rear Party 2/106 Aust Gen Tpt Coy WONGABEL H400178 - unit on leave.
	A58	Add to remarks column - Army Tps
	A59	Add to remarks column - Army Tps
	A60	Add to remarks column - Army Tps
	A63	Delete KAIRI G504382 - Insert MAPEE
	A66	Add to remarks column - Army Tps
		After serial A69 add
		A69A 55520 Rear Party 2/2 Aust CCS MAPEE
		A69B 55521 Rear Party 2/3 Aust CCS MAPEE
4	A72	Delete TOLGA D396322 insert WONDECLA
		After serial A78 add
		A78A 46181 2/7 Aust Dental Unit WONGABEL
		A78B 45641 3 Aust Inf Tps Ord Fd Pk WONGABEL
		After serial A83 add
		A83A 46431 114 Aust LAA Wksp. MAPEE
	A85	Delete RAVENSHOE MG333817 insert MAPEE D380410
		After serial A86 add
		A86A 61123 142 2/63 Aust LAD (Type D) KAIRI G484373 att 2/7 Aust Fd Regt - moving to RAVENSHOE shortly - see Serial A8A
	A88	Delete WONGABEL H416156 insert MAPEE
5		After serial A94 add
		<u>POSTAL</u>
		A94A 45783 2 Aust Corps Postal Unit BARRINE G555344

<u>Page No</u>	<u>Serial No</u>	<u>Amendments</u>
5	A100	Delete
10	C1	<u>6 AUST DIV TPS</u> Amend map ref to read H410075
16 17	E4	<u>9 AUST DIV TPS</u> Delete After serial E24 add <u>AAMC</u> E24A 55445 Rear Party 2/3 Aust ECU RAVENSHOE <u>AAD CORPS</u> E24B 45843 2/6 Aust Dental Unit RAVENSHOE
21		<u>1 AUST BEACH GP</u> Amend serial F7 to read 92242 57 Aust BIPOD P1 WONGABEE H 398173
22		<u>2 AUST BEACH GP</u> Amend serial G9 to read 92243 58 Aust BIPOD P1 DEADMAN'S GULLY C618874

MESSAGE OUT

Appx M

TO: FIRST AUST ARMY REAR FIRST AUST ARMY 3 AUST DIV 6 AUST DIV
9 AUST DIV A AUST CORPS SIGS SIG CENTRE ATHERTON
2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP MOV CAIRNS

FROM: 1 AUST CORPS

0.1736

3

SECRET	(.)	location	report	523
to	032130K	(.)	Corps	Tps
(.)	30	and	27	Mob
Cinema	arrived	area	30	apr
(.)	2	pl	2	Aust
Fd	Coy	now	at	ROCKY
CREEK	(.)	5	Aust	Bomb
Disposal	Pl	now	at	WONGABEL
(.)	det	132	Aust	Bde
Wksp	now	at	KAIRI	(.)
1	pl	2/11	Aust	Army
Tps	Coy	arrived	KAIRI	(.)
2	Aust	Beach	Gp	(.)
main	body	2/1	Aust	Ord
Beach	det	now	at	DEADMANS
GULLY	(.)	3	Div	Tps
(.)	54	Aust	Fd	Pk
	232	Aust	LAD	nov
	KAIRI	all	unclassified	

This message must be sent IN CIPHER
if liable to interception or to fall
into enemy hands

Degree of Priority
IMPORTANT to
First Aust Army
Rear First Aust
Army
Remainder -DRLS

T00:

12/10/44

By wire - 12/10/44

Copies : CSO: A(2): Q(2): War Diary (2) : Battle Room file

G. 3-15

✓

12-7 -

MESSAGE OUT

TO: FIRST AUST ARMY REAR FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 9 AUST DIV
A AUST CORPS SIGS SIGS CENTRE ATHERTON 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP
MOVS CAIRNS

FROM: 1 AUST CORPS

0.1738

8

SECRET	(.)	Location	Report	number
525	as	at	072130K	(.)
Corps	Tps	(.)	1	and
2	Mech	Eqpt	Pls	a . .
1	and	2	Engr	Stores
have	now	been	raised	(.) (.)
1	Mech	Eqpt	pl	1
Engr	Stores	pl	at	WONGABEL
under	comd	2/15	Aust	Fd
Coy	(.)	2	Mech	Eqpt
pl	and	2	Engr	Stores
pl	now	at	DEADMANS	GULLY
under	comd	2	Aust	Beach
Gp	(.)	1	Aust	Corps
Reception	Camp	arrived	WONGABEL	(.)
det	3	Aust	Fd	Svy
Coy	(AIF)	arrived	MAPEE	(.)
adv	party	2/117	Aust	Bde
Ord	Fd	Pk	and	adv
party	2/117	Aust	Bde	Wksp
arrived	MAPEE	(.)	C	Sec
2/3	Aust	Dental	Unit	arrived
DEADMANS	GULLY	att	2	Aust
Beach	Gp	(.)	6	Aust
Div	Tps	(.)	as	from
051200K	May	1	pl	2/3
Aust	Rly	Constr	Coy	(ME)
under	comd	9	Aust	Div
all	informed			

This message must be sent IN CIPHER
if liable to interception or to fall
into enemy hands.

Degree of Priority
IMPORTANT to
First Aust Army
Rear First Aust Army
Remainder - DRLS

T00:
07/10/44

Refer to last

Copies : CSO: A(2): Q(2): War Diary (2): Battle Room File

93 ops

MESSAGE OUT

TO FIRST AUST ARMY REAR FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 9 AUST DIV
'A' AUST CORPS SIGS SIGS CENTRE ATHERTON 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION
CAMP MOV CAIRNS

FROM 1 AUST CORPS

041740

10

secret	(.)	location	report	526	to
102130K	(.)	corps	tps	2/1	aust
fd	regt	moved	from	RAVENSHOE	to
MAPPE	(.)	8	aust	evy	bty
moved	from	WONGABEL	to	RAVENSHOE	under
comd	9	aust	div	(.)	all
infm					

This message must be sent in CYPHER if liable to interception or to fall into enemy hands. Originators instns T00: /1/2/2/ Degree of priority IMPORTANT to FAA Remainder DRLS

Signature. *H. J. ...*

Copy to: CSO
A (2)
Q (2)
War Diary (2) ✓

54(0)

MESSAGE OUT

TO: FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 9 AUST DIV A AUST CORPS SIGS
SIG CENTRE ATHERTON 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP MOV CAIRNS

FROM: 1 AUST CORPS 0 1743

SECRET	(.)	location	report	527
to	132130K	(.)	corps	tps
(.)	HQ	RAE	2	aust
corps	tps	closed	BARRINE	121000K
(.)	HQ	RAE	1	aust
corps	tps	opened	BARRINE	121000K
(.)	REHQ	2/3	aust	tk
a	regt	2/3	aust	tk
a	regt	sig	tp	2/71
aust	LAD	now	at	MAPEE
(.)	9	aust	div	tps
(.)	rear	party	2/3	aust
CCS	arrived	MAPEE	all	informed

This message must be sent in CIPHER
if liable to interception or to fall
into enemy hands

Originator's Instns
Degree of priority
IMPORTANT - FAA
Remainder - DRLS

TOO: *High P.*

Signature

Copy to: CSO A (2) Q (2) WD (2)

3(0)

MESSAGE OUT.

Date - Time of Origin
16 11 55 K

FROM : 1 AUST CORPS

TO : FIRST AUST ARMY
6 AUST DIV
9 AUST DIV
"A" AUST CORPS SIGS
SIGS CENTRE ATHERTON
2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP
MOV CAIRNS

01745	secret	(.) location report	528
of	152130K	(.) corps	tps
(.)	2/7	aust fd	regt
2/7	aust	fd regt	sig
sec	and	2/63 aust	LAD
under	comd	1 aust	corps
for	allotment	9 aust	div
as	from	0900K 14	may
(.)	rear	party 2/6	aust
commando	sgn	arrived MAPEE	under
comd	2/7	aust cav	commando
regt	(.)	2 aust	corps
postal	unit	now at	BARRINE
(.)	1	aust mob	microradiograph
unit	KAIRI	and WONDECLA	(.)
det	54	aust fd	pk
coy	KAIRI	and WONGABEL	administer
1	aust	corps engr	dump
(.)	br	pl 54	aust
fd	pk	KAIRI and	GORDONVALE
(.)	97	aust mobile	cinema
now	in	area (.)	30
club	concert	party 9	aust
div	concert	party left	area
(.)	rear	party 11	bty
2/3	aust	tk A	regt
now	at	MAPEE	

If liable to be intercepted or fall
into enemy hands, this message must
be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's Instns
Degree of Priority
IMPORTANT : FIRST AUST
ARMY

Remainder : DRLS

Signed. *[Signature]*

Copy to : CSO, A(2), Q(2), WAR DIARY (2)

MESSAGE OUT

FROM: 1 AUST CORPS	Time of origin	172200K
For action		
TO:	FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 9 AUST DIV A AUST CORPS SIGS SIG CENTRE ATHERTON 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP NOV CAIRNS	

SD 5142	(.)	SECRET	(.)	location
report	529	to	2130K	17
may	(.)	corps	tps	(.)
132	aust	gen	tpt	coy
and	161	aust	gen	tpt
coy	pass	under	comd	first
aust	army	as	A	tps
as	from	0900K	17	may
(.)	17	aust	fd	coy
now	at	WONGABEL	(.)	2/7
aust	dental	unit	arrived	WONGABEL
(.)	2	aust	mil	landing
gp	has	now	been	raised
and	is	at	TAYLOR	PT
(.)	2/1	aust	fd	regt
sig	sec	2/43	aust	LAD
RAVENSHOE	to	MAFEE	(.)	114
aust	LAA	regt	114	aust
LAA	regt	sig	sec	114
aust	LAA	regt	wksp	now
at	MAFEE	(.)	2/106	aust
gen	tpt	coy	arrived	in
area	and	proceeded	on	leave
16	may	(.)	adv	party
2/2	aust	inf	tps	wksp
and	adv	party	3	aust
inf	tps	fd	pk	now
at	WONGABEL	(.)	2/3	rly
constr	coy	(mech	eqpt)	one
pl	at	TRINITY	BEACH	under
comd	24	aust	fd	coy
one	pl	at	MAAREEBA	under
comd	first	aust	army	(.)
?	div	tps	(.)	rear
party	2/3	aust	MCU	now
at	RAVENSHOE	under	comd	9
aust	div	(.)	rear	party
2/6	aust	dental	unit	now
at	RAVENSHOE	under	comd	9
aust	div	all	informed	

If liable to interception or to fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent in CIPHER	Originator's Instructions
	Degree of priority
	FAA - IMPORTANT
Signature <i>W. J. ...</i>	Remainder - DRLS

Copies to: CS0, A(2), Q(2), War Diary (2)

MESSAGE FORM

War Diary

FROM

Originator

Date - Time of Origin

1 AUST CORPS

22 22 44 00

For Action

FIRST AUST ARMY 6 AUST DIV 9 AUST DIV "A" AUST CORPS SIGS
SIGS CENTRE ATHERTON 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION CAMP MOVS CAIRNE

TO

(w) For Information (INFO.)

Originator's No.

Q 1441

(.)

SECRET

(.)

location

report

530

to

232130K (.)

corps

tps

(.)

rear

party

10

bty

2/3

aust

tk

a

regt

now

at

MAPEE

(.)

57

and

58

aust

BIPOD

pls

have

now

been

raised

and

are

under

comd

1

aust

beach

GP

at

WONGABEL

and

2

aust

beach

GP

at

DEADMAN

GULLY

respectively (.)

2/6 aust

coy

AASC

now

at

MAPEE

(.)

det

2/2

aust

CCS

now

at

MAPEE

2

aust

beach

GP

(.)

C

sec

2/3

aust

dental

unit

left

area

If liable to be intercepted
or fall into enemy hands,
this message must be sent
IN CIPHER

Originator's
Instructions
Degree of
Priority

THI or TOR

Time Cleared

Signed *R. J. Smith*

MESSAGE OUT

Time of Origin 1010K

FROM: 1 AUST CORPS

TO: RAA 2 AUST CORPS RAE 1 AUST CORPS TPS HQ COMD 2 AUST CORPS TPS
46 AUST AL SEC (TAC R SQN) 2 AUST CORPS FD CASH OFFICE (-AASC)
FIRST AUST ARMY STATIONERY DEPOT (AIF) NORTH QLD DET 1 AUST
FD CENSORSHIP COY MOV TOWNSVILLE MOV ATHERTON
TOWN MAJOR ATHERTON 13 AOD

0 1446	SECRET	(.)	location	report	531	to
2130K	24	may	(.)	corps	tps	(.)
2/7	aust	dental	unit	(.)	HQ	now
at	BARRINE	(.)	A	B	and	F
secs	at	WONGABEL	(.)	C	D	and
E	secs	at	MAPEE	(.)	5	aust
fd	svy	coy	now	at	WONGABEL	(.)
5	aust	line	sec	13	aust	line
maint	sec	now	at	BARRINE	under	comd
A	aust	corps	sigs	(.)	78	aust
dental	unit	(.)	HQ	sec	now	at
WONGABEL	A	and	D	secs	now	at
DEADMANS	GULLY	(.)	HQ	3	aust	sup
depot	coy	and	11	12	and	13
aust	sup	depot	pls	now	at	WONGABEL
under	comd	HQ	comd	2	aust	corps
tps	AASC	(.)	2/3	coy	AASC	less
comp	pl	WONGABEL	to	WONDECLA	under	comd
6	aust	div	(.)	comp	pl	operating
DID	WONGABEL	under	comd	HQ	comd	2
aust	corps	tps	AASC	(.)	58	aust
fd	pk	coy	317	aust	LAD	left
area	(.)	first	aust	army	pt	trg
team	now	at	MAPEE	(.)	2/4	aust
dental	unit	(.)	HQ	A	and	E
secs	now	at	WONDECLA	under	comd	6
aust	div	(.)	110	aust	bde	ord
fd	pk	110	aust	bde	wksp	WONGABEL
to	WONDECLA	under	comd	6	aust	div
(.)	2/7	aust	fd	regt	2/7	aust
fd	regt	sig	sec	and	2/63	aust
LAD	from	KAIRI	to	RAVENSHOE	under	comd
9	aust	div	(.)	6	aust	div
tps	(.)	A	sqn	2/9	aust	armd
regt	33	tk	tptr	pl	now	at
WONDECLA	under	comd	6	aust	div	(.)
all	informed					

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originator's Instructions
Degree of Priority

Signed*Alfred J. Smith*.....

Copy to: CE, CSO, A, Q, DAMS, S & T, Med, Ord, AEME, Postal, Pro

MESSAGE FORM

FROM
[A]

Originator

Date - Time of Origin

3/2230K

1 AUST CORPS

For action

6 AUST DIV 9 AUST DIV RAA 2 AUST CORPS RAA 1 AUST CORPS TFS "A" AUST CORPS
SIGS H4 COMD 2 AUST CORPS TFS LASC 46 AUST AL SEC (TLC R S&N) 2 AUST CORPS
FD CASH OFFICE FIRST AUST ARMY STATIONERY DEPOT (LIF) 2 AUST CORPS RECEPTION
CAMP FIRST AUST ARMY (LIF) SIG CENTRE ATHLERTON MOV CAIRNS MOV ATHLERTON
TOWN MAJOR ATHLERTON 13 AUST LOD

(w) For Information (INFO)

Originator's No.					
9-1757	(.)	SECRET	(.)	location	report
532	to	2130K	31	may	(.)
ref	1	aust	corps	location	statement
4	(.)	corps	tps	(.)	add
serial	L115a	61499	adv	party	1
aust	armd	div	prc	coy	BARRINE
G555344	(.)	serial	L7C	delete	H397191 insert
H397186 /delete	remarks	(.)	serial	L75	delete
H397191	insert	H39186	and	add	in
remarks	coln	operating	DID	WONGABEL	(.)
serial	A68	delete	H4	comd	2
aust	corps	tps	LASC	insert	H4
comd	1	aust	corps	tps	LASC
(.)	2	aust	beach	SP	(.)
serial	G9	and	G10	delete	G618874
and	insert	C611863	(.)	5	aust
div	(.)	serial	B2	(.)	add
adv	party	3	aust	mob	next
flt	WONDECLA	H344065	att	H4 RAA	5
serial	div	(.)	under	heading	DELTA L
add	serial	B434	(.)	45633	H4
2/2	aust	dental	unit	WONDECLA	H327076
att	2/155	aust	gen	tpt	coy
(.)	A	sec	H539069	att	2/7
aust	inf	in	(.)	C	sec

Originator's No.
0 1757

H317080	att	2/11	aust	inf	bn
(.)	R	acc	H512083	att	2/6
aust	QAV	(Commando)	regt	(.)	B
and	E	scos	not	operating	(.)
serial	B4Y	(.)	delete	RAVENSHOE	.40731616
under	comd	9	aust	div	insert
WONDECL	H341068	att	2/6	aust	inf
bn	(.)	serial	B48	(.)	delete
RAVENSHOE	3375827	under	comd	9	aust
div	insert	WONDECL	H333069	att	2/1
aust	at	bn	all	infm	

If liable to be intercepted
or fall into enemy hands
this message must be sent
IN CLEAR

Originator's
Instructions
Degree of
Priority

THI or TOR

Time Cleared

Signed *[Signature]*

LEADER *[Signature]* FIRST
LAST NAME

- Copy to: GOC
EGS
G (Ops)
G (SD)
G (Int)
CS
USO
D & CAG
L
DAGS
Med
C (2)
S & T
Ord
MEME
Postal
Pro
✓ File
War Diary (2)

SECRET

Subject: 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT NO 4

HQ 1 Aust Corps
30 May 44
G/1450/Ops

1. Herewith 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No 4 as at 2400 hrs 28 May 44.
2. The serial numbers shown in the margin are for convenience of reference only, and bear no relation to any other document.
3. It is requested that any errors or omissions in the attached statement be notified to this HQ by the formation etc, concerned.
4. Please destroy Location Statement No 3, and return the subtended certificate, duly completed, to this HQ.

[Signature]
for Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION

6 Aust Div	1 - 3	BGS	25
9 Aust Div	4 - 6	G(Ops)	26
RAA 2 Aust Corps	7	G(SD)	27
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	8	G(Int)	28
A Aust Corps Sigs	9 - 10	CE	29
HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	11	CSO	30
46 Aust AL Sec (Tac R Sqn)	12	DA & OMC	31
2 Aust Corps Hd Cash Office	13	A	32 - 33
First Aust Army Stationery	14 - 15	C	34 - 35
Depot (AIF)		DAMS	36
2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	- 16	S & T	37
First Aust Army (AIF)	17 - 18	Med	38
Sig Centre ATHERTON	19	Ord	39 - 40
Nov CHIRNS	20	AEME	41
Nov ATHERTON	21	Postal	42
Town Major ATHERTON	22	Tro	43
13 Aust AOD	23	File	44
GOC	24	War Diary	45 - 46

1 Aust Corps

1. Receipt is acknowledged of Copy No 46 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No 4 as at 2400 hrs 28 May 44.
2. Certified that Copy No... 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No 3 has been destroyed.

.....Date

.....Signature

.....Appointment

.....Unit

SECRET

Copy No. 26

1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT No 1

AS AT 2400 hours 28 MAY 44

Ref Maps:
(1/65360 Series)BF - BARTLE FRERE
D - DINBULA
G - GORDONVALE
H - HERBERTONEG - MT GARNET
C - CAIRNS
B - BIBBOCHRA
P - PALMERSTON

CORPS TROOPS

Formation Sign: BULLDOG on BOOMERRANG

<u>Ser No</u>	<u>War Office Ser No</u>	<u>Veh No</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Map Ref</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
<u>HQ UNITS</u>						
A1	61001	107	HQ 1 Aust Corps	BARRINE	G555344	
A2	92189		1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	TAYLOR PT	G648863	LHQ Unit
A3	92204		1 Aust Mil Ldg Gp	TAYLOR PT	G648863	LHQ Units under comd 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec
A4	92205		2 Aust Mil Ldg Gp	TAYLOR PT	G648863	
A5	45185	242	46 Aust AL Sec (Tac R. Sqn)	MAREEBA	D316521	LHQ Tps allotted 5 Tac R Sqn
A6	45109	107	Mil History Sec	ATHERTON	H398269	To pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44
<u>CAV</u>						
A7	61183	760	HQ 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	MAPEE	G451369	LHQ Unit
A8	45522	957	2/3 Aust Commando Sqn	MAPEE	G453371	LHQ Units allotted 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt
A9	45524	958	2/5 Aust Commando Sqn	MAPEE	G453372	
A10	61421		2/6 Aust Commando Sqn	MAPEE	G453364	
<u>ARTY</u>						
A11	61120	109	HQ RMA 2 Aust Corps	BARRINE	G555344	Incl CS Staff
A12	61052	54	2/1 Aust Fd Regt	MAPEE	D372415	
A13	61036	183	2/8 Aust Fd Regt	MAPEE	D386407	
A14	61038	145	2/3 Aust Tk & Regt less 12 Bty	MAPEE	D378404	12 Bty under comd 6 Aust Div
A15	45900	87	2/7 Aust Svy Bty	WONGABEL	H401183	
A16	46201	293	1 Aust Mtn Bty (Mech) (AIF)	WONGABEL	H397179	to pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A17	49136	363 114 Aust LMA Regt (AIF)	MAPEE	D587403		
A18	45019	634 228 Aust LMA Bty (AIF)	MAPEE	D385402		
<u>ENGRS</u>						
A19	61199	101 HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	BARRINE	G554346		
A20	46040	138 2 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	H402184		
A21	45588	17 Aust Fd Coy (less one Pl)	WONGABEL	H401182		One Pl at ROCKY CREEK
A22	46094	86 24 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	H595183		
A23	47343	129 2/11 Aust A Tps Coy (less three pls)	WONGABEL	H401182		1 E & M Pl, 2 and 3 pls at MAPEE D414394
A24	29849	186 HQ 2/3 Aust Rly Constr Coy (Mech eqpt)	WONGABEL	H595183		1 Pl under comd 9 Aust Div RAVENSHOE 2 Pl at MAREEBA D336587 3 pl at MAPEE D412347
A25	47746	651 5 Aust Bomb Disposal Pl	WONGABEL	H401182		LHQ Unit
A26	48276	42 Aust Landing Craft Coy (type A)	TRINITY BEACH	C652855		LHQ Unit
A27		17 Aust Camouflage Unit	DEADMAN'S GULLY	C609886		To pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44
<u>SVY</u>						
A27A	45593	5 Aust Fd Svy Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	H388186		
<u>SIGS</u>						
A28	61008	115 HQ 'A' Aust Corps Sigs	BARRINE	G559336		
A29	49487	760 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt Sig Tp	MAPEE	G453371		
A30	49081	54 2/1 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	MAPEE	D372415		
A31	48656	183 2/8 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	MAPEE	D386407		
A32	48657	145 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt Sig Sec	MAPEE	D378404		
A33	49427	101 4 Aust Engr Sig Sec	BARRINE	G554346		
A34	61327	115 1 Aust Line Sec	BARRINE	G559336		
A35	61328	115 2 Aust Line Sec	BARRINE	G559336		
A36	61329	115 3 Aust Line Sec	BARRINE	G559336		
A37	45812	115 8 Aust Line Sec (AIF)	BARRINE	G559336		
A38	61332	115 1 Aust Line Maint Sec (AIF)	BARRINE	G559336		

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A39	49373	115	13 Aust Line Maint Sec (AIF)	BARRINE	G559336	
A40	45721	115	1 Aust Tech Maint Sec(HE)	BARRINE	G559336	
A41	45679	115	5 Aust Tech Maint Sec(HE)	BARRINE	G559336	
A42	61335	115	1 Aust Op Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A43	61336	115	2 Aust Op Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A44	61337	115	3 Aust Op Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A45	61345	115	1 Aust DR Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A46	61346	115	2 Aust DR Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A47	61340	115	1 Aust WT Sec (Hy)	BARRINE	G559336	
A48	61341	115	2 Aust WT Sec (Lt)	BARRINE	G559336	
A49	45677	115	13 Aust WT Sec (Hy)(AIF)	BARRINE	G559336	
A50	47358	115	24 Aust WT Sec (Lt)	BARRINE	G559336	
A51	48456	793	67 Aust WT Sec (Type C)(AIF)K/IRI		G435338	LHQ Unit under cmdr for local adm To pass to cmd HQ First Aust Army at 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44
A52	47918	642	3 Aust Beach Sig Sec(AIF)	BARRINE	G559336	LHQ Unit
A53	45722	185	21 Aust Cipher Sec(Type K)	BARRINE	G559336	
A54	47201	411	HQ 4 Aust Pigeon Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A55	47202	411	29 Aust Pigeon Loft	BARRINE	G556341	
A56	47203	411	30 Aust Pigeon Loft	WONDECLA	H362050	
A57	47204	411	31 Aust Pigeon Loft	RAVENSHOF	P430805	
A58	47127	411	32 Aust Pigeon Loft	TRINITY BEACH	G655849	
A59	47128	411	36 Aust Pigeon Loft	BARRINE	G559336	
A60	47129	411	37 Aust Pigeon Loft	BARRINE	G559336	
A61	47130	411	38 Aust Pigeon Loft	BARRINE	G559336	
A62	47131	411	39 Aust Pigeon Loft	BARRINE	G559336	
A63	47132	411	40 Aust Pigeon Loft	BARRINE	G559336	
A64	49132		14 Aust L.A. Regt Sig Sec	MAPEE	D387403	
A65	49449	634	228 Aust Lt A. Bty Sig Sec	MAPEE	D385402	
<u>INF</u>						
A66	61006		HQ 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	WONGABEL	H412167	To pass to cmd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
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INT

A67	45733	2 Aust Corps Sec Int Corps (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344		
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AASC

A68	61380, 108	HQ Comd 2 Aust Corps Tps AASC	WONGABEL	H399178		
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A69	61378 160	2/106 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	WONGABEL	H400178		
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A70	61364 136	Comp Pl 2/3 Aust Coy AASC	WONGABEL	H397191	Operating DID	WONGABEL
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A71	61367 146	2/6 Aust Coy AASC less 3 pls	MLPEE	G450370	A Tpt Pl-Dead-Mans Gully att 2 Aust Beach Gp B Tpt Pl-RAVENSHOE Comp Pl-MLPEE	
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A72	45629 390	8 Aust M.C (AIF)	EAST BARRON	BF479228	To pass to comd 1 Aust Area HQ Comd 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44	
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A73	48435 351	5 Aust Farm Coy	KAIRI	G498332		
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A74	47919 260	HQ 3 Aust Sup Depot Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	H397191		
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A75	48840	11 Aust Sup Depot Pl (AIF)	WONGABEL	H397191		
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A76	48841	12 Aust Sup Depot Pl (AIF)	WONGABEL	H397191		
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A77	48842	13 Aust Sup Depot Pl (AIF)	WONGABEL	H397191		
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A78	47493	HQ 13 Aust Fd Baking Coy (AIF)	RAVENSHOE	MG404856		
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A79	92077	15 Aust Fd Baking Pl (AIF)	RAVENSHOE	MG404856		
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MED

A80	55519 151	2/1 Aust CCS	RAVENSHOE	P423843		
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A81	55520	2/2 Aust CCS	MLPEE	D388361		
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A82	55521	2/3 Aust CCS	MLPEE	D388361		
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A83	45381 135	109 Aust CCS (AIF)	WONGABEL	H390195		
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A84	61566 117	2/12 Aust Fd Amb	WONGABEL	H392183		
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A85	48169	1 Aust Mob Microradiograph Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG375823	LHQ Unit att 2/11 Aust Fd Amb. To pass to comd First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44	
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A86	45478	3 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit (Type A)	ROCKY CREEK	D376364	To pass to comd 1 Aust Area HQ Comd 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44.	
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DENTAL

A87	46181	HQ 2/7 Aust Dental Unit	BARRINE	G555345	att HQ 1 Aust Corps	
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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A88		A Sec 2/7 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H392196	att 2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	
A89		B Sec 2/7 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H401283	att 2/7 Aust Survey Bty	
A90		C Sec 2/7 Aust Dental Unit	MAPEE	D376404	Att 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt	
A91		D Sec 2/7 Aust Dental Unit	MAPEE	D376404		
A92		E Sec 2/7 Aust Dental Unit	MAPEE	G451369	att 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	
A93		F Sec 2/7 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H399165	att 2/4 Aust Pnr Bn	
A94	47298	191 HQ 78 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H407164	att 1 Aust Beach Gp	
A95		A Sec 78 Aust Dental Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C613279	att 2 Aust Beach Gp	
A96		D Sec 78 Aust Dental Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C613279	att 2 Aust Beach Gp To pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44	

ORD

A97	45641	Det 3 Aust Inf Tps Ord Fd Pk	WONGABEL	H408182		
A98	47944	Det 2/117 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	MAPEE	G467355		
A99	49042	178 120 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	WONGABEL	H410163		
A100	48580	30 Aust Lt Laundry Unit (AIF)	TOLGA	D385313	To pass to comd 1 Aust Area HQ Comd 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44	

AEME

A101	45702	155 2/2 Aust Inf Tps Wksp	WONGABEL	H408182		
A102	47945	Det 2/117 Aust Bde Wksp	MAPEE	G467355		
A103	49059	144 120 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF)	WONGABEL	H410163		
A104	61033	54 2/43 Aust LAD (Type D)	MAPEE	D372415	att 2/1 Aust Fd Regt	
A105	61283	138 2/44 Aust LAD (Type J)	WONGABEL	H403184	att 2 Aust Fd Coy	

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

AMEE (cont'd)

A106	61037	183	2/64 Aust LAD (Type D)	MAPEE	D386407	att 2/8 Aust Fd Regt
A107	61039	145	2/71 Aust LAD (Type G)	MAPEE	D378404	att HQ 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt
A108	45867	186	267 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	WONGABEL	H395183	att 2/5 Aust Rly Constr Coy
A109	45736	115	290 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	BARRINE	G559336	att "A" Aust Corps Sigs
A110	45723	107	319 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	BARRINE	G555314	att HQ 1 Aust Corps
A111	46431		114 Aust LAA Regt Wksp	MAPEE	D337403	
A112	45024		228 Aust LAA Bty Wksp	MAPEE	D385402	
A113	49307	952	2 Aust MF Inspection Sec	BARRINE	G555344	LHQ Unit - att DDME HQ 1 Aust Corps

POSTAL

A114	45783		2 Aust Corps Postal Unit (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
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PRO

A115	45782	128	2 Aust Corps Pro Coy (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
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PRINTING AND STATIONERY

A116	45646	249	First Aust Army Stationery Depot (AIF)	ATHERTON	H393273	To pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44.
A117	48038	203	First Aust Army Press Unit (AIF)	ATHERTON	H394273	LHQ unit - to pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44.
A118	45647	218	First Aust Army Mob Printing Unit (AIF)	ATHERTON	H394271	

AMENITIES

A119	47862	903	11 Aust Mob Cinema	Mobile		LHQ Tps.
A120	47862	903	12 Aust Mob Cinema			LHQ Tps.
A121	47862	903	14 Aust Mob Cinema			LHQ Tps.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
<u>AMENITIES (CONT'D)</u>						
AI22	47862	903	27 Aust Mob Cinema)	Mobile		LHQ Tps.
AI23	47862	903	30 Aust Mob Cinema)			LHQ Tps.
AI24	47862	903	96 Aust Mob Cinema)			LHQ Tps.
AI25	47862	903	97 Aust Mob Cinema)			LHQ Tps.
AI26	46757		1 Amenities Concert Party	Mobile		LHQ Unit) To pass to comd HQ First Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44
AI27	46024		3 Aust Div Concert Party (AIF)	Mobile		LHQ Unit)
AI28	46078		4 Aust Div Concert Party (AIF)	Mobile		LHQ Unit)
<u>MISC</u>						
AI29	61243		1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	WONG/BEL	H392196	
AI30	45787	133	2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	WONG/BEL	H392196	
AI31	45785	166	2 Aust Corps Sal Unit	TOLGA	D383329	
AI32	43389	176	2 Aust Corps Ed Punishment Centre	W.SP CREEK	G533316	
AI33	61397	362	AIF Staging Camp	BARRINE	G555344	Att HQ 1 Aust Corps.
<u>SCHOOLS</u>						
AI34	45565	723	Det No 1 Mob Wing LHQ School of Mech	WONG/BEL	H391193	
AI35	49138		Mob Team of Junior Leaders Wing of First Aust Army Regt Trg School	WONG/BEL	H389197	
AI36	45571		First Aust Army Physical Trg Team	MAPEE	G465355	
<u>RAAF</u>						
AI37			5 Tac R Sqn	MAREEBA	B316521	Under comd for Ops; RAAF NE Area for adm.

- 8 -
6 AUST DIV

Formation Sign: Kangaroo on Boomerang

Ser No	War Office Ser No	Veh No	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
B1	<u>HQ</u> 61026	84	HQ 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H366046	
B2						
B3	<u>CAV</u> 61029	943	2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	WONDECLA	H312083	LHQ Unit
B4	61422	961	2/7 Aust Commando Sqn	WONDECLA	H312083	LHQ Units
B5	49425	943	2/9 Aust Commando Sqn	WONDECLA	H312083	allotted
B6	49426		2/10 Aust Commando Sqn	WONDECLA	H312083	2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt
B7	<u>ARMED CORPS</u> 61459	55	Adv RHQ 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	WONDECLA	H343064	Corps Tps
B8			A Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	WONDECLA	H343064	Remainder
B9			B Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	WONDECLA	H343064	of regt in transit
B10	<u>ARTY</u> 45983	69	HQ RAA 6 Aust Div (AIF)	WONDECLA	H344065	
B11	61034	134	2/2 Aust Fd Regt	WONDECLA	H345064	Corps Tps
B12	29416	74	2/3 Aust Fd Regt (less 5, 6 and 53 Aust Fd Btys)	WONDECLA	H337068	Btys allotted Bdes
B13	49137	48	2/1 Aust Lt AA Bty (Airborne)	WONDECLA	H332072	
B14	61038	145	12 Bty 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt	WONDECLA	H332072	Corps Tps
B15						
B16	48480	174	2 Aust Shore Fire Control Party	WONDECLA	H344065	LHQ Tps - both of
B17	48480	174	3 Aust Shore Fire Control Party	WONDECLA	H344065	1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp
B18	<u>ENGRS</u> 61040	81	HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H325076	
B19	61044	67	2/22 Aust Fd Plk Coy	WONDECLA	H325076	
B20		73	26 Aust Cam Unit	WONDECLA	H325076	To pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hours 5 Jun 44
B21	<u>SIGS</u> 61046	66	Sigs 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H358052	
B22	48637	55	Det 2/9 Aust Armd Regt Sig Tp	WONDECLA	H343064	Remainder in transit Corps Tps att 2/9 Aust Armd Regt

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
<u>SIGS (Contd)</u>						
B23	47825	943	2/6 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt Sig Tp	WONDECLA	H312083	
B24	48654	134	2/2 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H345064	
B25	48658	74	2/3 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H337068	
B26	49104	181	1 Aust Engr Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H325076	
B27	46136	66	2/41 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K)	WONDECLA	H358052	
<u>INF</u>						
B28	61230	182	2/3 Aust MG Bn (less B Coy)	WONDECLA	H320067	Corps Tps. B Coy to re-join after leave
B29	61010	140	2/1 Aust Pnr Bn	WONDECLA	H333069	Corps Tps
B30	48423	39	6 Aust Div Carr Coy	WONDECLA	H326074	
B31	61005	225	C Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt (less 10,11,12 Pls)	WONDECLA	H366046	Army Tps - Pls allotted to Bdes
<u>INT</u>						
B32	61003	84	"A" Aust FS Sec	WONDECLA	H366046	LHQ Unit
<u>AASC</u>						
B33	61066	59	HQ Comd AASC 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H327076	
B34	48427	97	2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (less A,B, & C Pls)	WONDECLA	H327076	
B35	48427		Wksp Pl 2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	WONDECLA	H317074	
B36	48401	84	33 Aust Tk Transporter Pl	WONDECLA	H343064	Corps Tps att 2/9 Aust Armd Regt
B37	48425	64	2/5 Aust Sup Depot Coy	WONDECLA	H327076	Pls allotted to Bdes
B38	61364	136	2/3 Aust Coy AASC less Comp Pl and A Pl	WONDECLA	H317075	
B39	61364	136	A Pl 2/3 Aust Coy AASC	WONDECLA	H328078	
<u>MED</u>						
B40	45839	143	104 Aust CCS (AIF)	WONDECLA	H304099	Corps Tps
B41	55737	772	2/3 Aust Mob Bact Lab	WONDECLA	H304099	Corps Tps
B42	61237	159	2/117 Aust Mob Bath Unit	WONDECLA	H322072	Corps Tps
B43	48393	161	19 Aust Malaria Control Unit (Type B)	WONDECLA	H325073	LHQ Unit - to pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44
<u>Dental</u>						
B44	45696	181	2/4 Aust Dental Unit			
B45			Det HQ Sec	WONDECLA	H366046	Att HQ 6 Aust Div
B46			A Sec	WONDECLA	H315067	Att 2/2 Aust Inf
B47			B Sec	RAVENSHOE	H331818	Under comd 9 Aust Div

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
<u>DENTAL (Contd)</u>						
B48		C Sec		RAVENHOLM MG	375827	Under comd 9 Aust Div
B49		D Sec		WONDECLA	H325075	Att 2/1 Aust Fd Amb
B50		E Sec		WONDECLA	H317079	Att 2/4 Aust Inf Bn
B51	55573	156	2/8 Aust Dental Unit			
B52		HQ. Sec		WONDECLA	H366046	Att HQ 6 Aust Div Under comd 1 Aust Corps
B53		A Sec				
B53		Det HQ Sec		WONDECLA	H325076	Att RAE 6 Aust Div
B54		A Sec		WONDECLA	H320067	Att 2/3 Aust MG Bn
B55		C Sec		WONDECLA	H337068	Att 2/3 Aust Fd Regt
B56		D Sec		WONDECLA	H345064	Att 2/2 Aust Fd Regt
B57		E Sec		WONDECLA	H324073	Att 2/3 Aust Inf Bn
B58		F Sec		WONDECLA	H327076	Att HQ Comd AASC 6 Aust Div
<u>ARME</u>						
B59	48586	55	Det 2/9 Aust Armd Regt Wksp	WONDECLA	H327073	Corps Tps. Att 2/9 Aust Armd Regt
B60	61035	134	2/40 Aust LAD(Type D)	WONDECLA	H345064	Att 2/2 Aust Fd Regt
B61	61121	74	2/41 Aust LAD(Type D)	WONDECLA	H337068	Att 2/3 Aust Fd Regt
B62	61047	84	2/42 Aust LAD(Type A)	WONDECLA	H358052	Att HQ 6 Aust Div
B63	61231	182	2/66 Aust LAD(Type A)	WONDECLA	H320067	Att 2/3 Aust MG Bn
B64	61045	67	2/80 Aust LAD(Type A)	WONDECLA	H325076	Att 2/22 Aust Fd Pk Coy
B65	61485	55	Det 2/95 Aust LAD(Type E)	WONDECLA	H327073	Corps Tps Att 2/9 Aust Armd Regt
<u>PAY</u>						
B66	61020	80	6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	WONDECLA	H366046	
<u>POSTAL</u>						
B67	61070	55	6 Aust Div Postal Unit (less dets)	WONDECLA	H366046	
<u>PRO</u>						
B68	61071	95	6 Aust Div Pro Coy	WONDECLA	H362046	
<u>MISC</u>						
B69	61073	78	6 Aust Div Sal Unit	WONDECLA	H322072	
B70	61163	71	6 Aust Div Reception Camp	WONDECLA	H295103	
B71			CI 303 Messing Store	WONDECLA	H297091	To pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 9 Jun 44

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
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16 AUST INF BDE GP

<u>HQ</u>						
B72	61048	88 HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde		WONDECLA	H319074	
<u>ARTY</u>						
B73	29416	74 5 Aust Fd Bty		WONDECLA	H337068	2/3 Aust Fd Regt
<u>ENGRS</u>						
B74	61041	60 2/1 Aust Fd Coy		WONDECLA	H325076	
<u>SIGS</u>						
B75	48659	88 16 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec		WONDECLA	H319074	
<u>INF</u>						
B76	61049	50 2/1 Aust Inf Bn		WONDECLA	H318073	
B77	61050	99 2/2 Aust Inf Bn		WONDECLA	H315067	
B78	61051	56 2/3 Aust Inf Bn		WONDECLA	H324073	
B79	61005	225 10 Pl C Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt		WONDECLA	H319074	Army Tps
<u>ASC</u>						
B80	48427	97 A Pl 2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		WONDECLA	H328078	
B81	48851	64 2/24 Aust Sup Depot Pl		WONDECLA	H327076	
B82	48852	64 2/25 Aust Sup Depot Pl		WONDECLA	H297098	
<u>MED</u>						
B83	55405	57 2/1 Aust Fd Amb		WONDECLA	H325073	
<u>ORD</u>						
B84	45779	127 110 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk		WONDECLA	H327073	
<u>EME</u>						
B85	45778	158 110 Aust Bde Wksp		WONDECLA	H327073	
B86	61053	88 2/45 Aust LAD (Type J)		WONDECLA	H319074	
<u>POSTAL</u>						
B87	61070	55 Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit		WONDECLA	H319074	

17 AUST INF BDE GP

<u>HQ</u>						
B88	61054	96 HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde		WONDECLA	H341067	
<u>ARTY</u>						
B89	29416	74 6 Aust Fd Bty		WONDECLA	H337068	2/3 Aust Fd Regt
<u>ENGRS</u>						
B90	61043	86 2/8 Aust Fd Coy		WONDECLA	H325076	
<u>SIGS</u>						
B91	49119	96 17 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec		WONDECLA	H341067	
<u>INF</u>						
B92	61055	63 2/5 Aust Inf Bn		WONDECLA	H343066	
B93	61056	61 2/6 Aust Inf Bn		WONDECLA	H341068	
B94	61057	93 2/7 Aust Inf Bn		WONDECLA	H339069	
B95	61005	225 11 Pl C Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt		WONDECLA	H341067	Army Tps

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
B96	48427	97 B Pl 2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	WONDECLA	H314074		
B97	48849	64 2/22 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076		
B98	48850	64 2/23 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076		
B98	<u>MED</u> 55406	52 2/2 Aust Fd Amb	WONDECLA	H325073		
B99	<u>ORD</u> 48430	83 2/119 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	WONDECLA	H333067		
B100	<u>AEME</u> 48431	76 2/119 Aust Bde Wksp	WONDECLA	H333067		
B101	61059	96 2/46 Aust LAD (Type J)	WONDECLA	H341067		
B102	<u>POSTAL</u> 61070	55 Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	WONDECLA	H341067		
<u>19 AUST INF BDE GP</u>						
B104	<u>HQ</u> 61060	65 HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	WONDECLA	H318080		
B105	<u>ARTY</u> 29416	74 53 Aust Fd Bty	WONDECLA	H337068	2/3 Aust Fd Regt	
B106	<u>ENGRS</u> 61042	89 2/2 Aust Fd Coy	WONDECLA	H325076		
B107	<u>SIGS</u> 48860	65 19 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H318080		
B108	<u>INF</u> 61061	82 2/4 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H317079		
B109	61062	91 2/8 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H318079		
B110	61063	77 2/11 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H317080		
B111	61005	225 12 Pl C Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	WONDECLA	H318080	Army Tps	
B112	<u>AASC</u> 48427	97 C Pl 2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	WONDECLA	H317074		
B113	48847	64 2/20 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076		
B114	48848	64 2/21 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076		
B115	<u>MED</u> 55411	70 2/7 Aust Fd Amb	WONDECLA	H327074		
B116	<u>ORD</u> 49051	98 135 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk(AIF)	WONDECLA	H330073		
B117	<u>AEME</u> 49069	90 135 Aust Bde Wksp (Type B) (AIF)	WONDECLA	H330073		
B118	61065	65 2/79 Aust LAD (Type J)	WONDECLA	H318080		
B119	<u>POSTAL</u> 61070	55 Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	WONDECLA	H318080		

9 AUST DIV

Formation sign: Platypus on Boomerang

Ser No	War Office No	Veh No	Unit	Location	Map Ref	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
DIVISIONAL TROOPS						
D1	<u>HQ</u> 29734	84	HQ 9 Aust Div	RAVENSHOE	P 432810	
D2	<u>CAV</u> 61239	926	HQ 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	LHQ Unit
D3	45523	94	2/4 Aust Commando Sqn	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	} LHQ Unit allotted 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt
D4	49428	956	2/11 Aust Commando Sqn	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	
D5	40429	937	2/12 Aust Commando Sqn	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	
D6	<u>ARTY</u> 48378	69	HQ RAA 9 Aust Div	RAVENSHOE	P 432810	
D7	61122	142	2/7 Aust Fd Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG333817	
D8	61124	74	2/12 Aust Fd Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG333814	
D9	45740	159	8 Aust Svy Bty	RAVENSHOE	MG333814	
D10	48434	48	2/3 Aust LAA Bty (AIRBORNE)	RAVENSHOE	MG335815	
<u>ENGRS</u>						
D11	29737	81	HQ RAE 9 Aust Div	RAVENSHOE	MG340812	
D12	61186	67	2/24 Aust Fd Pk Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG340812	
D13		73	2/29 Aust Cam Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG340812	To pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44
D14	29849	186	1 Pl 2/3 Aust Rly Constr Coy (Mech Eqpt)	RAVENSHOE	MG347808	
<u>SIGS</u>						
D15	29738	66	Sigs 9 Aust Div	RAVENSHOE	P430815	
D16	48037	926	2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt Sig Tp	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	
D17	48655	142	2/7 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG333817	
D18	49085	74	2/12 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG333814	
D19	49106	81	3 Aust Engr Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG340812	
D20	48113	68	2/43 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K)	RAVENSHOE	P430815	
<u>INF</u>						
D21	61233	169	2/3 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG310817	
D22	61176	169	2/2 Aust MG Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG321812	
D23	48424	39	9 Aust Div Carr Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG318817	
D24	61005	225	A Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	RAVENSHOE	P432810	Pls allotted to Bdes

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
D25	<u>INT</u> 61028	64	B Aust FS Sec	RAVENSHOE	P432810	LHQ Unit
D26	<u>AASC</u> 29743	59	HQ Comd 9 Aust Div AASC	RAVENSHOE	MG326816	
D27	48428	97	2/156 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG326816	Pls allotted to Bdes
D28	48426	64	HQ 2/6 Aust Sup Depot Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG326816	Pls (less det at DID RAVENSHOE) allotted to Bdes
D29	<u>MED</u> 55445	696	2/3 Aust Malaria Control Unit	RAVENSHOE	P423843	Adv party only
D30	<u>DENTAL</u> 45843		HQ 2/6 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG363824	Att 26 Aust Inf Bde. Under comd 1 Aust Corps
D31			A Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG321812	Att 2/2 Aust MG Bn
D32			B Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG392839	Att 2/13 Aust Inf Bn
D33			C Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG333814	Att 2/12 Aust Fd Regt
D34			D Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG378820	Att 24 Aust Inf Bde
D35			E Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG386835	Att 2/15 Aust Inf Bn
D36			F Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG378820	Att 24 Aust Inf Bde
D37	<u>ARME</u> 61125	74	2/61 Aust LAD(Type D)	RAVENSHOE	MG333814	Att 2/12 Aust Fd Regt
D38	61123	142	2/63 Aust LAD(Type D)	RAVENSHOE	MG333817	Att 2/7 Aust Fd Regt
D39	61241	34	2/67 Aust LAD(Type A)	RAVENSHOE	P432810	Att HQ 9 Aust Div
D40	61137	67	2/72 Aust LAD(Type A)	RAVENSHOE	MG340812	Att 2/24 Aust Fd Pk Coy
D41	61240	165	2/82 Aust LAD(Type A)	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	Att 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt
D42	<u>PAY</u> 61210	80	9 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	RAVENSHOE	P432810	
D43	<u>POSTAL</u> 29746	55	9 Aust Div Postal Unit (less dets)	RAVENSHOE	P432810	dets with Bdes
D44	<u>PRO</u> 29745	95	9 Aust Div Pro Coy	RAVENSHOE	P433820	
D45	<u>MISC</u> 61195	78	9 Aust Div Sal Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG393845	
D46	43119	71	9 Aust Div Reception Camp	RAVENSHOE	MG392845	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
<u>20 AUST INF BDE GP</u>						
D47	<u>HQ</u> 61093	83 HQ	20 Aust Inf Bde		RAVENSHOE MG390840	
D48	<u>ENGRS</u> 29269	60	2/3 Aust Fd Coy		RAVENSHOE MG340812	
D49	<u>SIGS</u> 49121	83	20 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec		RAVENSHOE MG390840	
D50	<u>INF</u> 61094	50	2/13 Aust Inf Bn		RAVENSHOE MG392839	
D51	61185	99	2/15 Aust Inf Bn		RAVENSHOE MG386835	
D52	61095	56	2/17 Aust Inf Bn		RAVENSHOE MG384832	
D53	61005	225	1 Fl 2/1 Aust Gd Regt		RAVENSHOE MG390840	
D54	<u>AASC</u> 48853	64	2/26 Aust Sup Depot Fl		RAVENSHOE MG402863	
D55	48854	64	2/27 Aust Sup Depot Fl		RAVENSHOE MG326816	
D56	<u>MED</u> 55412	52	2/8 Aust Fd Amb		RAVENSHOE MG309820	
D57	<u>ORD</u> 48117	83	2/118 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk		RAVENSHOE MG375829	
D58	<u>AEME</u> 48118	76	2/118 Aust Bde Wksp		RAVENSHOE MG375829	
D59	61097	38	2/58 Aust LAD (Type J)		RAVENSHOE MG390840	
D60	<u>POSTAL</u> 29746	55	Det 9 Aust Div Postal Unit		RAVENSHOE MG390840	
<u>24 AUST INF BDE GP</u>						
D61	<u>HQ</u> 61188	96 HQ	24 Aust Inf Bde		RAVENSHOE MG378820	
D62	<u>ENGRS</u> 61127	89	2/7 Aust Fd Coy		RAVENSHOE MG340812	
D63	<u>SIGS</u> 49123	96	24 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec		RAVENSHOE MG378820	
D64	<u>INF</u> 61189	63	2/28 Aust Inf Bn		RAVENSHOE MG378818	
D65	29865	61	2/32 Aust Inf Bn		RAVENSHOE MG374818	
D66	61190	93	2/43 Aust Inf Bn		RAVENSHOE MG374823	
D67	61005	225	2 Fl 2/1 Aust Gd Regt		RAVENSHOE MG378820	
D68	<u>AASC</u> 48855	64	2/28 Aust Sup Depot Fl		RAVENSHOE MG326816	
D69	48856	64	2/29 Aust Sup Depot Fl		RAVENSHOE MG326816	
D70	<u>MED</u> 55413	70	2/11 Aust Fd Amb		RAVENSHOE MG375823	
D71	<u>ORD</u> 48295	92	2/122 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk		RAVENSHOE MG34816	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
<u>24 AUST INF BDE GF (Contd)</u>						
	<u>AEME</u>					
D72	48293	46	2/122 Aust Bde Wksp		RAVENSHOE MG346816	
D73	61192	96	2/76 Aust LAD (Type J)		RAVENSHOE MG373820	
	<u>POSTAL</u>					
D74	29746	55	Det 9 Aust Div Postal Unit		RAVENSHOE MG373820	
<u>26 AUST INF BDE GF</u>						
	<u>HQ</u>					
D75	61104	65	HQ 26 Aust Inf Bde		RAVENSHOE MG363824	
	<u>ENGRS</u>					
D76	29418	86	2/13 Aust Fd Coy		RAVENSHOE MG340812	
	<u>SIGS</u>					
D77	49125	65	26 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec		RAVENSHOE MG363824	
	<u>INF</u>					
D78	61105	82	2/23 Aust Inf Bn		RAVENSHOE MG371826	
D79	61106	91	2/24 Aust Inf Bn		RAVENSHOE MG370827	
D80	61107	77	2/48 Aust Inf Bn		RAVENSHOE MG355822	
D81	61005	225	4 Fl 2/1 Aust Gd Regt		RAVENSHOE MG363824	
	<u>ASC</u>					
D82	48357	64	2/30 Aust Sup Depot Fl		RAVENSHOE MG326816	
D83	48358	64	2/31 Aust Sup Depot Fl		RAVENSHOE MG326816	
	<u>MED</u>					
D84	29270	57	2/3 Aust Fd Amb		RAVENSHOE MG363821	
	<u>ORD</u>					
D85	48296	93	2/123 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk		RAVENSHOE MG312819	
	<u>AEME</u>					
D86	48294	50	2/123 Aust Bde Wksp		RAVENSHOE MG312819	
D87	61109	65	2/78 Aust LAD (Type J)		RAVENSHOE MG363824	
	<u>POSTAL</u>					
D88	29746	55	Det 9 Aust Div Postal Unit		RAVENSHOE MG363824	

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)

1 AUST BEACH GP

<u>HQ</u>			
F1 49457	648 HQ 1 Aust Beach Gp	WONGABEL H410167	
<u>ENGRS</u>			
F2 61206	86 2/15 Aust Fd Coy	WONGABEL H396174	
F3 92190	1 Aust Mech Eqpt Pl	WONGABEL H396174	
F4 92192	1 Aust Engr Stores Pl	WONGABEL H396174	
<u>SIGS</u>			
F5 45278	642 2 Aust Beach Sig Sec (AIF)	WONGABEL H410167 LHC Unit	
<u>INF</u>			
F6 61595	140 2/4 Aust Pnr Bn	WONGABEL H399165	
<u>AASC</u>			
F7 46178	631 2/166 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	WONGABEL H398173	
F8 92242	368 57 Aust BIPOD Pl	WONGABEL H398173	
F9 49459	645 2/240 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONGABEL H398173	
<u>MED</u>			
F10 92206	638 1 AAMC Coy (Beach Gp)	WONGABEL H407164 Incl surgical team 2 offrs 5 ORs	
F11 48394	640 20 Aust Malaria Control Unit (Type B) (AIF)	WONGABEL H407164 LHC Unit	
<u>DENTAL</u>			
F12 47298	191 HQ Sec 78 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL H407164 To pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44	
<u>ORD</u>			
F13 49341	636 2 Aust Ord Beach Det	TOLGA D385318 Att 13 AOD for trg	
<u>AME</u>			
F14 92119	649 1 Aust Beach Wksp	WONGABEL H403165	
<u>PRO</u>			
F15 92051	43 15 Aust Indep Bde Pro Pl	WONGABEL H410167	
<u>MISC</u>			
F16 45859	101 3 and 4 Secs 3 Aust Armd Div Sal Unit	WONGABEL H404164	
<u>RAW</u>			
F17	RAW Commando	WONGABEL H410167	

2 AUST BEACH GP

<u>HQ</u>			
G1 92122	HQ 2 Aust Beach Gp	PALM BEACH C627871	
<u>ENGRS</u>			
G2 61535	2/11 Aust Fd Coy	DEADMANS GULLY C609886	
G4 92191	2 Aust Mech Eqpt Pl	DEADMANS GULLY C609886	
G5 92193	2 Aust Engr Stores Pl	DEADMANS GULLY C609886	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
G 6	<u>SIGS</u> 45277	1 Aust Beach Sig Sec (AIF)	PALM BEACH	C627871	LHQ Unit	
G 7	<u>INF</u> 61232 153	2/2 Aust Fnr Bn	DEADMANS GULLY	C613880		
G 8	<u>AASC</u> 47477	2/108 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	DEADMANS GULLY	C613883	Being reorgan- ised	
G 9	92243	58 Aust BIFOD Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C618874		
G10	49034	235 Aust Sup Depot Pl(AIF)	DEADMANS GULLY	C618874		
G11	61367	A Tpt Pl 2/6 Coy AASC	DEADMANS GULLY	C616876		
G12	<u>MED</u> 92207	2 AASC Coy (Beach Gp)	DEADMANS GULLY	C607886		
G13	48612	23 Aust Malaria Control Unit (Type B)	TRINITY BEACH	C652854		
G14	<u>DENTAL</u>	A Sec 78 Aust Dental Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C613880	To pass to comd HQ First Aust Army 0700 hrs 5 Jun 44	
G15		D Sec 78 Aust Dental Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C613880		
G16	<u>ORD</u> 47922	1 Aust Ord Beach Det	DEADMANS GULLY	C608890	adv party only	
G17	<u>AME</u> 49401	2 Aust Beach Wksp	DEADMANS GULLY	C609890		
G18	<u>PRO</u> 49403	17 Aust Indep Bde Gp Pro Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C627871		
G19	<u>MISC</u> 61507	1 Aust Armrd Bde Sal Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C609890		
G20	<u>RAN</u>	RAN Commendo	DEADMANS GULLY	C627871		