AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/1
CORPS

1 Australian Corps
General Branch (1 Aust Corps 'G' Branch)

October 1944

Army Form C.2118.
(Adap[illegible]

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Unit 'L' Branch [illegible] 1 Aust Corps   Date and Time.—From 1 Oct 44   To 31 Oct 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BARRINE	Oct 1		Consequent upon a request by this headquarters approval was granted for 2 A[illegible] to remain on Order of Battle 1 Aust Corps in lieu of 1 A[illegible]. The marching order previously issued for the move of 2 A[illegible] was cancelled and a marching order was issued for the move of 1 A[illegible].	[initials]
	Oct 2		Following upon a suggestion received from Forward Echelon LH, this headquarters recommended the addition of one wireless section type 'L' to the Order of Battle 1 Aust Corps. The function of the section is to monitor wireless communications.	
			Instructions were issued for 2/3 Aust [illegible] less one sqn to be placed under command of 7 Aust Div for training in co-operation with infantry and also to provide sets for amphibious training. The remaining sqn to be placed under	[initials]

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapt)

Unit 'G' Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Oct 44 To 31 Oct 44.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BARNUM	Oct 3 (Cont'd)		command 9 Aust Div.	Nil.
	Oct 3		Request to LHQ that "Display of New Weapons and Equipment" be held in abeyance owing to the training commitments during the next two months.	
			1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No3/1944 issued	Appendix 'C' Nil.
	Oct 4		Gen HEWITT arrived at HQ 1 Aust Corps and conferred with GOC.	Nil.
	Oct 5		C-in-C arrived HQ 1 Aust Corps. Conference attended by the undermentioned GOCs was held at 1400 hours to discuss "Staging and Embarkation Areas for Div Task Forces".	Nil.

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C2118.
(Adapted)

'G' Branch
Unit HQ 1 Aust Corps *Date and Time.—From* 1 Oct 44 *To* 31 Oct 44.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
DARWIN	Oct 5		Maj-Gen CANNAN — A.G	
	(Cont'd)		Brig WELLS — SGS 1 Aust Corps Brig RISSON — CE 1 Aust Corps	
			Brig STEELE — A/DA & Q(G Adv HQ) Brig BIRKS — DMS LHQ	
			Brig LEGGE — Brig I/C Adm HQ, Queensland L of C Area	
			Col [illegible]) Lt Col WEBSTER) LHQ Lt Col [illegible])	
			Lt Col HARVEY) Maj BIRD) HQ 1 Aust Corps Maj KAISER)	Ack.
	Oct 7		C-in-C departed area. GOC accompanied by ADC, BGS and A/A&Q departed for HOLLANDIA.	
	Oct 8		CE departed for LHQ	Ack.
	Oct 10		2/1 Aust Comp AA Regt equipment position unsatisfactory.	
			Essential unit arrive this area fully and serviceably equipped.	Appendix 'D' Ack.

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted)

(Erase heading not required.)

Unit 'G' Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps   Date and Time.—From 1 Oct 44   To 31 Oct 44.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BARRINE	Oct 14		GOC and party returned from HOLLANDIA.	
			Visit by Lt Col OXLEY from Forward Echelon LHQ to discuss matter affecting planning for future operations.	[initials]
	Oct 17		LHQ agreed that PIATs from Cond Task Pool to be issued on scale of 1 per rifle pl of infantry and pioneer battalions. 7640 bombs required for training ammunition. LHQ requested to confirm that bombs cannot be provided unless released from pool.	Appendix 'E' [initials]
	Oct 18		Flight Lieutenant HUNT RAAF HQ MELBOURNE arrived HQ 1 Aust Corps for discussion with Lt Col HODG GSO I Ops regarding aircraft requirements for training. GSO I Ops stated the following required as early as possible -	[initials]

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adap e.)

'G' Branch
Unit HQ 1 Aust Corps *Date and Time.—From* 1 Oct 44 *To* 31 Oct 44.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BARRIM	Oct 18		(a) 16 Air OP Flight	
	(Cont'd)		(b) Drogue towing aircraft for AA training and for mobile AA training school.	
			(c) Aircraft for co-operation with 7 Aust Div and 9 Aust Div during amphibious and other training to practise air support links.	
			Maj GEN 7 A Tk Regt RA and Maj GENERAL THOMPSON 1 Airborne Division arrived in the area to gain knowledge of SWPA operations. Both officers attached to 7 Aust Div for experience with brigades.	
			CE returned to HQ 1 Aust Corps from LE.	

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118. (Adapted)

Unit 'G' Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps *Date and Time.—From* 1 Oct 44 *To* 31 Oct 44.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BARRINE	Oct 18		Lt Col HASSETT loaned to HQ 7 Aust Div pending arrival of	
	(Cont'd)		their own GSO I - duration of loan 7 Oct - 2[illegible] Oct.	[initials]
	Oct 20		Brig MACARTHUR-ONSLOW arrived at HQ 1 Aust Corps.	
	Oct 21		CE and Maj KAISER departed for HOLLANDIA.	
	Oct 27		1 Aust Base Sub Area came under command HQ 1 Aust Corps as	Appendix 'F'
			from 270001K. LANDFORCES signal SD4471 refers.	[initials]
			Lt Col FLEMING, GSO I (Air) Forward Echelon GHQ, on the way	
			to HOLLANDIA called at HQ 1 Aust Corps to discuss air support	
			with GS Air and CO 1 Aust AL Gp.	
			DMI, DSO-in-C, Lt Col OGLE arrived HQ 1 Aust Corps on way	
			to HOLLANDIA.	[initials]

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Army Form C. 2118. (Adap ed)

(Erase heading not required.)

'G' Branch

Unit HQ 1 Aust Corps *Date and Time.—From* 1 Oct 44 *To* 31 Oct 44.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
BARRINE	Oct 28		GS returned from HOLLANDIA.	(initials)
	Oct 29		DMI, DSO-in-C, Lt Col FLEMING, Lt Col [illegible] departed for HOLLANDIA.	(initials)
			1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 7/1944 "[illegible]" issued.	Appendix 'G' (initials)
	Oct 31		During Oct amphibious training was carried out by two brigade groups of 7 Aust Div. From 14 Oct - 23 Oct 44, 21 Aust Inf Bde was located in the TRINITY BAY area for amphibious training, concluding in exercise "[illegible]" which was an assault landing with 1 Aust Beach Gp under command.	(initials)

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted.)

(Erase heading not required.)

Unit 'G' Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps *Date and Time.—From* 1 Oct 44 *To* 31 Oct 44

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
[illegible]	Oct 31 (Cont'd)		From 25 Oct - 3 Nov 44, 2/ Aust Inf Bde carried out a similar programme to 21 Aust Inf Bde, culminating in exercise "WELSH". All training was carried out in conjunction with 7 Amphibious Force Training Unit Group and 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec. Shipping employed during training included [illegible]	
			During October 9 Aust Div was engaged in training in open warfare. Training included two sided brigade exercises, and battalion exercises in co-operation with tanks. As it had been decided that Tk A Regts would man 4.2 inch mortars as alternative weapons, 101 Aust Bde Support Coy commenced conducting courses of instruction on the 4.2 inch mortar for personnel of Tk A Regts.	Nil.

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WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C. 2118.
(Adapted.)

Unit 'G' Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps *Date and Time.—From* 1 Oct 44 *To* 31 Oct 44.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
			Trials were conducted to determine the effectiveness of 3 inch and 4.2 inch mortars fired from a landing craft in support of an assault landing. Trials were satisfactory and reports were forwarded to LHQ.	
				A K Stoodley Capt 2 Nov 44

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TABLE FOR APPENDICES TO 1 AUST CORPS

WAR DIARY FOR OCT 44

Appendix 'A'

Appendix 'A'	List of Appendices.
Appendix 'B'	War Diary - GOC 1 Aust Corps
Appendix 'C'	1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 9/1944
Appendix 'D'	2/1 Aust Comp AA Regt - Position re equipment.
Appendix 'E'	1 Aust Corps SD8036.SD8037 - re issuing of PITA bombs.
Appendix 'F'	LANDFORCES SD94471 - 1 Aust Base Sub Area under comd 1 Aust Corps 001K 27 Oct.
Appendix 'G'	1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No 7/1944 "COASTWISE OPERATIONS".
Appendix 'H'	Location Statement No 8.
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Appendix 'J'	SD Summary Nos 70 - 76.
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Appendix 'L'	Issue of Operational Vehicles.
Appendix 'M'	Command of Units.
Appendix 'N'	Wireless Sets No 46.
Appendix 'O'	1 Aust Corps Weekly Intelligence Summary Nos 3 - 6.

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Appendix 'B'

WAR DIARY - GOC 1 AUST CORPS

1 Oct 44 - 31 Oct 44

PLACE	DATE	TIME	SUMMARY OF EVENTS
BARRINE	1	1430	GOC met General [illegible] and with him attended football match between 2/[illegible] Aust Inf Bn and 2/11 Aust Inf Bn at WONDECLA.
		1630	GOC departed WONDECLA for [illegible] area.
		1700	GOC attended football match between 2/[illegible] Aust Fd Regt and [illegible] Aust Fd Coy.
	2	1200	Maj-Gen MILFORD called on GOC.
		1515	GOC called on Maj-Gen WOOTTEN at HQ 9 Aust Div
		1600	GOC returned to HQ 1 Aust Corps.
		1900	Sir William [illegible], Col [illegible] and three officers from 2/[illegible] [illegible] were guests of GOC at Dinner.
	3	1930	Capt JAMIESON and Lt Comdr GORDON (US Amphibious Training Centre) arrived at HQ 1 Aust Corps, and remained as guests of GOC.
	4	1100	GOC accompanied by Capt JAMIESON and Lt Comdr GORDON went to HQ 7 Aust Div and met Maj-Gen MILFORD and Brigs DOUGHERTY and CHILTON.
		1345	GOC accompanied by Capt JAMIESON, Lt Comdr GORDON, Brig IRVING and Brig [illegible], visited HQ 9 Aust Div and met Maj-Gen WOOTTEN, Brigs [illegible] and [illegible] and at 1700 hours met Maj-Gen STEVENS and Brigs [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] at HQ 6 Aust Div.
	5	0930	Capt JAMIESON, Lt Comdr GORDON and Brig IRVING departed HQ 1 Aust Corps.
		1125	GOC met C-in-C and Maj-Gen [illegible] at [illegible] and accompanied them to Officers Club, ATHERTON.

Place	Date	Time	Summary of Events
BARRINE	5	1430	C-in-C and Maj-Gen [illegible] arrived at H, 1 Aust Corps and C-in-C conferred with G.O.
		1500	Brigs [illegible], [illegible] and [illegible] arrived at H, 1 Aust Corps.
		1700	C-in-C and Maj-Gen [illegible] departed for ATHERTON.
	6	1015	Maj-Gen MILFORD called on GOC.
		1030	Maj-Gen WOOTTEN called on GOC.
		1300	Maj-Gen [illegible] lunched with GoC.
		1500	GOC saw Brig DUTT, DDS.
		1900	C-in-C and Lady [illegible] were guests of GOC at dinner.
	7	0630	GOC left [illegible] with C-in-C and Maj-Gen [illegible] for C-in-C's plane for Mackay to attend conference on planning.
		1400	GOC arrived Mackay, was met by Lt Gen [illegible] and moved to HQ Forward Echelon [illegible].
	8	0630	GOC conferred with Maj Gen [illegible] and Lt Col [illegible] throughout morning.
		1530	GOC with C-in-C, Lt Gen [illegible] and Maj-Gen [illegible] left Forward Echelon HQ, for H, 6 US Army.
		1800	Dined with Lt Gen EICHELBERGER at H, 6 US Army.
		2100	Returned to Forward Echelon HQ.
	9	1000	GOC saw Maj [illegible].
		1100	GoC accompanied C-in-C also Maj-Gen [illegible], Brig [illegible] and Lt Col [illegible] on a visit to Lt Gen KREUGER at HQ 6 US Army.
		1600	C-in-C and party called on Admiral [illegible], Comd 7 Amphibious Force on USS [illegible].

Place	Date	Time	Summary of Events
	9	1700	Returned to Forward Echelon HQ.
		1900	GOC and C-in-C were guests of Lt Gen BUTLER and staff at HQ for dinner.
	10	0930	Lt Condr DAVIES, RN Ports (US Navy) called on GOC.
	11	0800	GOC saw C-in-C and Maj-Gen DANIEL off at [illegible] AIR.
		0930	GOC with Brig WELLS, Lt Cols HARVEY and WARREN attended conference at H. Q US ARMY.
		1030	GOC and party lunched with Lt Gen [illegible].
		1500	Returned to Forward Echelon HQ.
		1900	GOC dined at HQ with Lt Gen [illegible].
	12	1000	GOC conferred with Lt Gen [illegible].
		1100	GOC saw Brig WHITE.
		1130	GOC saw Lt Col OKLEY.
		1900	GOC dined with Lt Gen [illegible] at HQ.
	13	1430	GOC conferred with Lt Gen [illegible].
		1900	Lt Gen [illegible] dined with GOC at Forward Echelon HQ.
	14	0730	GOC left [illegible] en route for CASSINO.
		1100	Arrived CASSINO.
		1230	Departed CASSINO.
		1715	Arrived CASSINO and returned to HQ, 1 Aust Corps.
	16	1130	GOC saw Comdrs PEARSON and FOWLER RAN.

Place	Date	Time	Summary of Events
	17	1000	Maj-Gen STEVENS called on GOC.
		1530	GOC called on Maj-Gen WOOTTEN at HQ 9 Aust Div
		1915	Returned to HQ 1 Aust Corps.
	18	2100	GOC was admitted to 2/2 AGH.
	23	1430	Brig MACARTHUR-ONSLOW called on GOC at 2/2 AGH.
	24	1030	Comdrs PAL ER and BLACKBURN, RAN called on GOC.
		1130	Maj-Gen STEVENS called on GOC.
	28	1000	Maj-Gen MILFORD called on GOC.
		1600	Brigs ROGERS and EDWARDS with Brig WELLS called on GOC.
	29	1600	Maj-Gen WOOTTEN called on GOC.

APPENDIX 'C' 30

SECRET

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
3 Oct 44.

1 AUST CORPS TRAINING INSTRUCTION NO 9/44

GENERAL

1. The period available for training may be limited. Formations should plan to complete all essential training within the next two months.

Transport Scales

2. It is understood that no change in the scale of transport allotted to units of formations of this corps is intended prior to operations. Certain GT Coys have been added to the OOB of 1 Aust Corps and from those coys, unit transport may be augmented when necessary during operations.

Terrain

3. Two types of country should be used for training exercises and study :-

(a) Semi-open forest country.

(b) Sparsely roaded swampy country where vehicles cannot move off the road.

ENEMY ARMOUR AND TRAINING IN COUNTER MEASURES

4. Reports from current operations indicate that, as further penetration is made into enemy occupied territory, greater resistance must be expected from enemy armoured forces, which hitherto have been used only on a light scale in the SWPA.

Tk A Weapons

5. (a) One Tk A Regt has been included in the OOB of each division of this corps. The training of these units will include the use of these weapons in open warfare and their early landing in the assault echelons of amphibious operations.

(b) The training of infantry units in the use and employment of the PITA will continue. Formation recommendations for the scale and basis of issue of the PITA are being asked for separately.

A Tk Mines

6. (a) The training of engineer and pioneer units in mine laying should be completed.

(b) The same units will be trained in the clearance of mines and booby traps. In addition, personnel of tank units and drivers of all vehicles should be trained sufficiently to enable them to lift mines to clear a gap for their vehicles. Application for the issue of Japanese mines for this training has been made. Information has been received that some will be made available, but that the quantity will be limited.

ANTI AIRCRAFT TRAINING.

7. As operations progress it is apparent that the enemy must employ the maximum air power available to prevent the establishment of our bases, to support counter attack by ground troops and to destroy our air component and airfields as soon as possible.

It is therefore important that the following measures be incorporated in training :

(a) PAD measures incl concealment and camouflage.

(b) Training in engagement of aircraft with small arms.

(c) Training of fd arty offrs in shooting 3.7 guns in a ground role.

(d) Training of hy AA gunners in land shooting, seaward shooting and co-operation with RAAF.

TRAINING OF INFANTRY UNITS WITH TANKS.

8. 2/9 Aust Armd Regt (less one sqn) comes under comd 7 Aust Div and one sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt comes under comd 9 Aust Div for this training.

AMPHIBIOUS TRAINING.

9. Time available for planning.

The tempo of operations will increase proportionately with the progress of the general offensive: therefore, all formations must be prepared to plan and mount operations in an ever decreasing space of time.

Instructions have been received that the action given in sub paras (a) (b) and (c) below be taken so that a material reduction in the time required for planning should be arrived at by all formations and units.

(a) A study of the various capacities and loading combinations of the following ships should be carried out :

LSI
APA
AKA
LSD
LST
LSM

Types of small assault craft which will possibly be required for loading into the above ships are :

LCM
LVT (A) (1) or LVT (A) (4)
LVT (A) (2), LVT 2 or LVT 4
DUKW

The above study should facilitate the quick preparation of loading tables for assault shipping when allocated for an operation.

Specifications of the larger types of shipping which are NOT contained in O N 1 226 - "Allied Landing Craft and Ships" dated 7 Apr 44, will be forwarded when available. (One copy of O N 1 226 is held by each 1 and 2 Aust Mil Landing Gps and 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec. Additional copies have been requested).

(b) Co-ordinated schedules for assault, light and normal scales of unit equipment are also required so that, when a tactical plan has been finalized, loading tables mentioned in sub para (a) above are immediately available for detailed planning. Scale to be based on the following -

Assault - Pers, vehs and equipment to enable formations to operate for 48 hrs, 8 miles inland.

Light - Pers, vehs and equipment for 14 days 15 miles inland.

Instructions in amplification are being issued separately.

(c) Landing schedules for the following assault formations should be considered by the staffs of Corps and Div HQs.

Corps landing with one div assault
Corps landing with two div assault
Div landing with one bde assault
Div landing with two bde assault

TRAINING OF 7 AND 9 AUST DIVS

10. By GHQ letter AG38[illegible] 23 Sep 44, copies distributed direct to 7 and 9 Aust Divs, 7 and 9 Aust Divs will be trained for amphibious operations by Seventh Amphibious Force during the period ending 2 Dec 44.

11. The tentative division of the training period is -

7 Aust Div - Training to be completed 15 Nov
9 Aust Div - 18 Nov to 2 Dec.

12. Authority is given for 7 and 9 Aust Divs to deal direct with the representatives of Seventh Amphibious Force and 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec.

13. 1 Aust Beach Gp and 1 Aust Mil Landing Gp are placed under command 7 Aust Div for training purposes only.

Armoured assault craft.

14. The introduction of the following armoured assault craft into the Pacific theatre should be taken into account during the training and planning for future operations :

LVT (A) (1) or LVT (A) 4 (Amphibious Tank)
LVT (A) (2))
LVT 2)Amphibians for troop and
LVT 4)veh tpt)
DUKW

The above craft should ease the problem of putting assault units ashore dryshod and with a certain amount of protection.

Matters for special study during training.

15. (a) Flat landing beaches.

Reports from operations have indicated that landing beaches of a gradient NOT better than 1 : 50 may well have to be utilized thereby entailing a "wet" landing except possibly by the most forward "waves" carried in armoured amphibians. It is therefore important that provision for such an eventuality be made during training.

A paper on suggested methods of bridging the water gap is being prepared for issue at an early date.

(b) The clearance of lanes for landing craft and amphibians through sea and beach obstacles.

(c) Close support of the assault waves during the final approach by the use of mortars firing from landing craft.

Selection and Training of Special Personnel.

15. The following personnel should be selected and trained :

(a) Embarkation staffs - one for each division.

(b) Ship's Adjutants -

15 per Division
10 from Corps Tps

Indications are that the Corps will have to obtain these officers from its present resources. Officers for employment as Ship's Adjutants require more than an average measure of common sense and should be of a type which can create and maintain harmony between OC Tps, Ship's Officers and Ship's Boat Officers. A knowledge of shipping is a distinct advantage and without such knowledge officers should have the faculty for learning quickly.

(c) Loading Officers for LSTs, etc :

50 per Division
40 from Corps Tps

These officers should be selected forthwith, trained during the forthcoming training period and be available for operations.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

H. Wells
Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION	Copy No
6 Aust Div	1
7 Aust Div	2 - 4
9 Aust Div	5 - 7
1 Aust Beach Gp	8
2 Aust Beach Gp	9
1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	10
RAA 1 Aust Corps	11
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	12
'A' Aust Corps Sigs	13
HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	14
GCC	15
BGS	16
GS	17
CE	18
Svy	19
CSO	20
DA & QMG	21
A	22
Mod	23
Q	24
ST	25
Ord	26
E & ME	27
File	28
War Diary	29 - 30

APPENDIX 'C'

CONFIDENTIAL

1 Aust Corps Training Instruction
No. 7/1944

COASTWISE OPERATIONS

HQ 1 AUST CORPS,
12 Sep 44.

1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No. 7/1944

COASTWISE OPERATIONS

1. This pamphlet on Coastwise Operations has been written by 9 Aust Div.

2. It is based largely on the experience of the Division in the landing at LAE and FINSCHHAFEN and the subsequent coastwise move to SIO.

3. The sections dealing with the employment of an Australian Beach Group in such operations, though not the direct result of previous experience, are based on experience with an American ESB unit (532 Regt 2 ESB), a temporary beach organisation formed from 9 Aust Div units, and upon discussions with 1 and 2 Aust Beach Gps and 1 Aust Combined Ops Sec.

HQ 1 AUST CORPS
12 Sep 44.

H. WELLS, Brigadier.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

COASTWISE OPERATIONS.

PART III.—INTELLIGENCE.

PART IV.—MAINTENANCE.

PART V.—BEACHHEAD ORGANISATION.

PART VI.—FUNCTIONING OF SERVICES.

PART VII.—USE OF AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES.

PART VIII.—CO-OPERATION WITH NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

COASTWISE OPERATIONS.

1. SCOPE OF REPORT.

This report deals with coastwise operations by a force of up to a brigade group with tanks, moving from an established beachhead, and using landing craft and possibly small craft.

PART I.—GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS.

2. FORMS OF COASTWISE OPERATIONS.

Coastwise operations may take two forms:—

(*a*) Assault landings within the area of enemy occupation.

(*b*) Advance along a coast by land, in which the sea is used for maintenance and the movement of supporting arms, reserves, administrative units and echelons, to beaches previously secured by the landward advance.

3. The first class involves one or more landings against possible or actual enemy opposition, and the problems which arise are those common to all seaborne attacks. The means of maintenance and reinforcement rest solely upon communications by sea, and are subject to the normal hazards of loss or delay by enemy action or bad weather. These risks may be accepted where there are special difficulties of terrain along the coast making progress by land difficult, or where speed or surprise are important.

4. In the second class, the sea is merely used as a highway for the movement of supplies of all kinds and of those troops and services which do not move by land, and for evacuation of casualties, salvage, etc. A succession of suitable beaches is secured by land advance from one beach to the next; as each is gained by the forward troops, the balance of the force and its supplies can be brought forward by land and sea, and the advance continued. Landings are not made ahead of the leading troops except in special circumstances—e.g., to circumvent a land obstacle such as a cliff, gorge or wide river. A possible combination of both forms might occur in the case of a move to outflank strong enemy defences by a small-scale landing behind the enemy's positions, supported by land-based artillery. An assault landing made from landing craft, which are not armoured, would be extremely hazardous.

5. FACTORS AFFECTING CHOICE OF LAND OR SEA COMMUNICATIONS.

Assuming that vehicles and craft are both available, the most economical form of coastwise movement is that in which sea and land communications are used in conjunction. The relative advantages of the two forms of transportation will vary at any particular stage of the advance but general characteristics are:—

(a) Advantages of Movement by Sea.

(i) Craft are not confined to a track. No difficulties of traffic control, blocks in defiles, one-way tracks.

(ii) Absence of delays caused by the necessity for engineer work on tracks or bridges at rivers and other obstacles.

(iii) Movement of craft is not normally affected, apart from increased difficulties of navigation, by the heavy rain characteristic of many tropical areas.

(b) Disadvantages of Movement by Sea.

(i) Sea moves in general tend to be slower and more complicated than land moves. They require greater handling of stores and consequently more labour.

(ii) Craft can operate only at suitable beaches. This tends to make traffic by sea less flexible than by land, both for the movement of troops and weapons and for maintenance, because delivery and off-loading points for supplies, and disembarkation points for troops, cannot be varied at will to suit the tactical situation.

(iii) Operation of craft is often limited to certain hours each day by conditions of wind and tide on the beaches.

(iv) Craft are especially vulnerable to air attack, and adequate AA protection is most difficult to provide. The use of beaches indicates the presence of dumps and troop areas nearby, and they become likely air targets.

(v) Concealment from the air is virtually impossible by day. Moving craft by night only often involves difficulties in navigation and control, and sacrifices speed of movement.

(vi) High wind and rough seas may retard or completely prohibit movement by sea and may make beaching of craft impossible.

(c) Advantages of Movement by Land.

These are largely indicated in sub-para (b) above—it is more flexible, has greater security from air observation and attack, is more adaptable to tactical developments, and is less liable to interruption by enemy naval action or rough seas.

(d) Disadvantages of Movement by Land.

(i) Liable to serious delays because of rivers, gorges, cliffs, swamps, and other land obstacles.

(ii) Difficulties of track building and maintenance are considerable.

(iii) Heavy rain frequently makes tracks unusable and streams impassable to vehicles.

(iv) Land communications are easily interrupted by raiding parties or infiltration tactics.

The choice will therefore depend in each case on a combination of the above factors, on the existence of coastal tracks, and the speed with which they can be improved, or new ones built; on the terrain along the coast; on the existence and potentialities of beaches; on climatic and meteorological conditions; and on the enemy situation by land, sea and air.

PART II.—TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

6. FACTORS AFFECTING BRIGADE TACTICAL PLAN.

The following will have special bearing on the planning and execution of coastwise operations:—

(a) Composition of Force.

The allotment of supporting arms and services to the brigade group from Divisional resources will depend upon many factors, particularly on the scale of fighting expected in the Divisional beachhead area, and the task allotted to the brigade group. Main factors affecting the employment of supporting arms and services are discussed below, paras 7 to 15 and 43 to 63.

(b) Fixing of Bounds.

Beaches suitable for development into beach maintenance areas assume great tactical importance. Normally the advance will proceed from beach to beach, the rear beachheads being closed when forward beaches are firmly secured; the availability of suitable beaches, and the distance between them, will normally determine the main bounds for the forward troops. Successive objectives will normally be tactical features, the capture of which is essential for the seizing and protection of the next selected beach. Requirements of a maintenance beach are discussed below, para 25.

(c) Protection of Beachheads.

Experience has shown that in an operation of this kind, a brigade will require additional troops for the task of protecting its beachheads against seaward and landward attack. If the brigade has to provide the necessary covering force from its own resources, it will be compelled either to deploy only one battalion in the advance, or to operate with little or no reserve. In the case of a brigade group, it is considered that at least one extra infantry battalion will normally be required.

(d) Terrain.

(i) On coastal strip—conditions for movement of infantry, tanks, motor transport and guns, and the obstacles to such movement.

(ii) Inland—conditions for movement of flank guards and deeper inland patrols.

(iii) Existing tracks, bridges and other artificial features and suitability for track construction.

(iv) Location of suitable beaches, and possible lying-up places for landing craft.

(e) Weather Conditions.

(i) Heavy rain hampers movement by land and the construction of tracks.

(ii) High seas or heavy surf cause delays in movement by sea.

(iii) Cloudy or overcast weather, and bad weather fronts restrict air operations, both own and enemy.

(f) Availability of Transport.

Availability of various transport agencies:—Motor transport, especially jeeps, 2½ ton GMCs; and tracked tractors: landing craft: small ships, amphibious vehicles of various kinds: and native porters.

(g) Protection of Movement by Land.

Protective troops are required for two purposes:—

(i) Advance guard—i.e., moving ahead of main body, brushing aside enemy rearguards and reconnoitring detachments, gaining information of enemy dispositions, and, when necessary, covering deployment of main body.

(ii) Flank guard—i.e., flank protection on landward side.

Cavalry units are suitable for these tasks, being more lightly equipped than infantry battalions. Their squadrons are better organised and equipped for operating, detached at a distance. Native indigenous troops are able to move fast and live on the country, and may save exhaustion of white troops, especially if the landward flank is mountainous; but native troops should be regarded as reconnaissance troops only, and should not be expected nor relied on to protect the flank against enemy in strength. The speed of the advance will be greatly influenced by the nature and extent of the forces committed on the landward flank.

(h) Limitations of Time.

Target dates laid down by higher authority, and the necessity for pressing forward and maintaining the momentum of the advance, may influence the decision to take risks, and rely solely on sea communications for all or part of the operation.

(i) Naval and Air Situation.

This will have considerable effect on the tactical plan. At the worst, all movement, both by land and sea might have to be by night: and craft might only be able to travel in strongly escorted convoys. With naval and air supremacy on our side, movement both by land and sea can proceed freely in daylight. The security of the seaward flank against enemy naval attack or amphibious operations is principally dependent on the naval and air forces supporting the advance.

7. FACTORS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY.

(a) Scale of Artillery Support.

The scale of artillery support, and the manner of its employment, will depend partly on the enemy resistance expected, and partly on the capacity of the maintenance system to keep up the supply of ammunition. The most favourable situation is one in which the artillery can come into action near one beachhead and support the advance of the infantry to the next, and still have several thousand yards of range for defensive fire against enemy counter attack.

(b) Movement of Artillery.

If it is decided that the forward infantry are not to advance without artillery support, and beaches are too far apart for this to be given without moving the guns by land, it may be necessary to fix intermediate bounds for the forward infantry, and the speed of advance will be regulated by the speed of movement of the artillery over the available tracks.

The brigade plan will probably provide for the leap-frogging of artillery, either by sea or overland, because in undeveloped country the artillery has little reserve of speed over the infantry, since most of the men move on foot. This will affect the scale of artillery support which can be expected to be immediately available at any particular time.

(c) Selection of Gun Areas.

Owing to the difficulties of terrain, or shortage of suitable gun tractors, it may often be decided to deploy field artillery near forward landing beaches. This has the following advantages:—

(i) Conserves transport for carriage of ammunition:

(ii) Simplifies re-embarkation for further advance:

(iii) Simplifies recovery of dumped ammunition:

(iv) Provides increased protection for gun area:

(v) Permits economy in AA guns which can protect gun area and beachhead simultaneously.

On the other hand, deployment close to a beachhead may involve a sacrifice of range, and may require the very early landing of guns after the next beach has been secured, in order to ensure continuous fire support. It will also increase the congestion in the beachhead area with consequent liability to air attack.

(d) Ammunition Supply.

Availability of craft or vehicles may limit the resupply of artillery ammunition, and the number of guns considered desirable must be weighed against the probable ammunition requirements. It may be a case of fewer guns, more ammunition, and an increased overhead (OPOs and signallers) in order to maintain flexibility.

(e) Use of Short 25-pounder.

If all moves of artillery are by sea, the lack of large landing craft or the difficulties of the ground off the forward beach may be strong arguments in favour of the use of Short 25-pounder. These must be weighed against its shorter range and the more frequent moves this involves.

(f) Beach Defence.

Knowledge of our degree of local superiority at sea is required in order to decide what beach guns are needed on forward beaches. Should they be needed and no unit exists for this purpose, tank attack guns (RAA or infantry) can be used, but provision must be made for extra stores such as signal searchlights or flares and means of challenging.

In many instances it has also proved possible for some AA guns to be so sited that in addition to, and without restricting their primary role of AA, they can, in a secondary role, form part of the beach defence system.

In addition, AASLs sited in their primary role near beaches are capable of being used to illuminate the approaches to these beaches provided the angle of depression is NOT great—i.e., not more than approx 10 degrees.

(g) Artillery Survey.

(i) Artillery Survey has an additional function wherever maps are inaccurate or the country unmapped. This function is the fixation of forward points identifiable on vertical photographs. This is performed whilst carrying out its normal function of fixing the relative positions of guns and targets, which generally takes place forward of the area in which Australian Survey Corps may be working.

(ii) Experience has shown that this information is invaluable to Australian Survey Corps in the production of maps. It is passed rapidly from artillery survey to Australian Survey Corps through the medium of the close liaison maintained between these two survey units.

(iii) The present policy, which it is intended to implement, is that Australian Survey Corps shall bring survey information forward to artillery much earlier than has been the case in the past. Under certain conditions this survey may be facilitated if work is commenced at the forward beach as well as, and concurrently with, the rear beach.

(iv) It is considered that the inclusion of a survey battery RAA on the Order of Battle of a Division provides sufficient artillery survey for divisional areas. In addition, the inclusion of a field survey section in a divisional task force may enable the policy set out in para (iii) above to be followed.

(h) AA Defence.

Experience in NEW GUINEA has shown that the Japanese, even when he has a defensive air policy, will act offensively to hinder or prevent the establishment of a beachhead, particularly in the early stages, when it presents a concentrated target. Adequate dispersion at beachheads is often a problem as

(i) it extends the area to be defended against land attack and

(ii) it may be limited by difficult terrain and shortage of transport.

It is therefore advisable to provide AA protection on all beachheads at an early stage. Bofors guns are not much more difficult to land than field guns, though their mobility ashore is very much less. They have proved an effective deterrent to low level bombing and strafing attacks, though not to medium level precision bombing. Having no Radar, they are of little use at night, and for these reasons the provision of mobile Heavy Anti Aircraft should be considered if the beachhead is likely to be in use for some time.

The other main role of Light Anti Aircraft will be the protection of the gun areas, always a chief target of enemy bombing in NEW GUINEA. The forward move of a field battery will therefore usually involve the move of at least one section of Light Anti Aircraft.

Since mobility of Light Anti Aircraft guns overland is poor, particularly with the present wheeled tractors it is usually necessary to move Bofors by craft.

8. ENGINEER TASKS.

The duties of engineers on the beaches brought into use and in beach maintenance areas will be similar to those allotted to beach group engineers in 1 Aust Corps Training Instruction No. 2/1944.

Engineers not employed on beaches are likely to have as principal tasks:—

Construction and maintenance of tracks:

Passage of water obstacles including bridging:

Co operation with tanks.

9. FACTORS AFFECTING ENGINEER PLANNING.

(a) Policy on Land Communications.

Where the advance is to be made both by land and sea, it will be a matter of policy for decision by the brigade group commander whether the land Line of Communication is to be maintained throughout the advance right back to the main divisional beachhead, whether it will be sufficient for the engineers to construct communications durable enough merely to pass the brigade group through each area and maintain it only for the period of movement from beach to beach, or whether, between certain points, construction of land communications is not to be attempted. If a land Line of Communication to Division is to be kept open, maintenance should be the responsibility of Division initially. As the Line of Communication lengthens responsibility for rearward portion will have to be taken over by Corps.

(b) Topography.

As in all tropical warfare, general configuration, water courses, swamps, vegetation and tracks will affect planning and must be studied. Three other matters particularly affecting coastwise operations are ground conditions, nature of coastline and extent and nature of the beaches.

(i) *Ground conditions.*—Usually undulating jungle should carry traffic for 24 hours. The method adopted to keep roads open should be to clear new tracks as the old ones become impassable. If the policy is to develop and maintain any road, then as time permits the main road should be cleared to a width of 50 yards to allow the track to dry and it should be secured by corduroy, local gravel or coral.

(ii) *Nature of coastline.*—Availability of beaches will affect constructional work and may make it possible to have men and equipment working on both ends of a task or sometimes to have engineers and equipment ashore between obstacles which then need not delay progress in construction along the whole length of the task.

(iii) *Extent and nature of beaches.*—Some beaches may be used as roads during either all or part of the day depending on tides. If they are extensive they may save considerable work in the construction of roads.

(c) Meteorological Conditions.

Characteristics and dates of main seasons, e.g., NW and SE monsoons, will affect plans considerably.

(d) Engineer Equipment and Stores Available.

The more equipment that can be used, the faster the development and the easier the maintenance of works. Any shortage of stores will entail improvisation and consequent loss of man-hours. The availability of stores and equipment at the right place is frequently governed by availability of water-craft for their transportation. If resources permit, it will be advantageous to allot craft to field engineers for their own use.

10. SIGNALS.

As in all jungle operations it is desirable, but not always possible, that first reliance should be placed in line communications, with wireless as alternative means. This involves continuous land communications between division-brigade, and if any part of the advance is made wholly by sea, the provision of line communication will become extremely difficult.

11. In cases where engineers are able to keep jeephead up with the leading infantry, signallers will have no difficulty laying the main division-brigade or brigade-battalion trunk from a jeep moving with the leading battalion. Where track construction is unable to keep fully abreast of the advance, both engineers and signallers will achieve most speed by working in two detachments—forward from the rear beach and rearwards from the forward beach. This method allows the maximum economical use of personnel and available equipment.

12. Communications rearward become more difficult as the advance proceeds. Even well built-up D VIII twisted cable will rarely carry speech more than 20 miles, and if it is desired to maintain speech communication for a long continuous overland Line of Communication between Rear Divisional Headquarters-Division, Division-Brigade, Brigade-Battalion or forward beachhead, two solutions are possible:

(*a*) Institution of intermediate report centres, manned by General Staff Officers or liaison Officers, to allow transmission and relaying of verbal information and orders not in signal form. The signals merely provide equipment and operators for these points, and it is frequently advisable that they be test points at which line maintenance detachments are stationed.

(*b*) Building of copper airline route.—This is likely to be a lengthy process, even if instituted early, and report centres will normally be required for a period at least.

13. Since the maintenance of rearward communications is a function of divisional signals, it is their responsibility to ensure that sufficient line construction and maintenance parties are attached to the brigade, and working in its rear. Over long distances, the resources of divisional signals will rarely be sufficient, and additional unskilled labour will be required from other sources for the poling of cable routes etc. To avoid the difficulties of laying, maintaining and perhaps protecting a land line link division-brigade, it may be possible to use light submarine cable laid by small craft.

14. MOVEMENT OF SIGNALS PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT.

Personnel and equipment must be prepared to move either by land with a limited transport scale, or by small craft. This necessitates:—

(*a*) A flexible system of loading tables.

(*b*) A pre-determined priority of movement, and grouping to meet either contingency.

(*c*) Strict attention to the weight of signal stores. This is particularly applicable to transport by landing craft. Items may have to be broken down into two-man loads so that they can be readily manhandled on the beaches and craft.

(*d*) Waterproofing of all technical equipment. This is important not only because of climatic conditions, but because movement by sea is a constant possibility, and stores are liable to become wet, either by seas breaking over the landing craft in rough weather, or in manhandling stores on and off the landing craft.

15. SIGNAL EQUIPMENT DUMP.

Consideration must be given to the transportation to forward beachheads of a small dump of signal equipment, e.g., cable, batteries etc, to provide for brigade requirements. This is a responsibility of divisional signals who should provide the staff required, and arrange movement and maintenance of adequate stocks at the dump. The dump should be controlled by brigade signals officer, and the staff allotted under command of the brigade at the outset of the operation.

PART III.—INTELLIGENCE.

16. GENERAL.

Intelligence requirements are as normally required for amphibious operations in tropical countries, but special attention must be paid to the following points:—

(*a*) Information of beaches must be exhaustive, not selective. Information must be collated with regard to all possible beaches. Very small beaches (even those 20 yards long) may be used tactically during the advance for landing special equipment such as tanks or bulldozers. Beaches only large enough for one DUKW may be used to maintain an infantry battalion.

(*b*) Information about anchorages for small ships and boat harbours for small craft. The longer the advance to be undertaken, the more important does this type of information become.

(*c*) Information on meteorological factors likely to affect movements of small craft, such as winds, tides, currents, fogs. The times at which the prevailing wind rises and subsides daily is most important. Information of rainfall will also be important in determining the extent to which land communications will be available as an alternative to movement by sea.

(*d*) Information of ground conditions underfoot. This is required for engineer planning in track construction and so that the amount of traffic which can be passed over existing tracks or virgin ground can be correctly assessed.

17. SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

(*a*) Until beach reconnaissance parties are able to make physical reconnaissance the most important source of information is air photography. Both verticals and off-shore obliques, covering the whole coastline of advance, are essential. Photographs taken at low tides and at a time when the prevailing wind is fairly strong are desirable, since these would assist in determining conditions of surf, existence of reefs etc. However, since the length of the projected advance may often be considerable and the force making the advance comparatively small, it is unlikely that photographic resources will enable extensive sorties to be flown for the special purposes of the force. Consequently, the majority of air photos available may be old ones, flown for various purposes.

(*b*) Therefore the information obtained from air photos must be supplemented and brought up to date by air reconnaissance by Tac R squadron, or by Army officers in light liaison aircraft. Initially, various considerations, including security may restrict air reconnaissance to but a moderate distance coastwise from the main beachhead. However, after the coastwise advance has commenced, considerations of security will have less weight in affecting the range of air reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance is a valuable source of information on such matters as the following:—

(i) Condition of surf in various types of weather;

(ii) State of bars and beaches at river mouths;

(iii) Improvements and obstacles made by the enemy to beaches and exits;

(iv) Tracks and defiles;

(v) Obstacles to land movement, e.g. rivers (state of flow) and gorges. (The depth of a gorge is often difficult to estimate from air photos when the gorge is narrow and contains close vegetation;

(vi) Enemy defences and enemy activity generally.

(*c*) PW, captured documents, ex-inhabitants and natives are all potential sources of information, and information from a variety of sources is usually available in publications such as Terrain Studies and Handbooks.

(*d*) Meteorological forecasts through Army or Air Force channels.

18. AIR PHOTOS AND PHOTOMAPS.

As in other types of operations, in undeveloped country, a liberal supply of air photos will be necessary. It is desirable that vertical stereopairs be available in sufficient numbers for distribution of relevant photos on following scale:—

One set to brigade headquarters.

One set to headquarters of each battalion.

One set to each forward rifle company.

Provision must also be made for issue of air photos to the beach group, landing craft unit, cavalry, armoured, artillery and engineer units. Stereoscopes must be provided on at least the same scale as given above for vertical air photos. Off-shore obliques will always be required to assist in interpretation of beaches for planning purposes, e.g., obliques are essential to determine whether a beach is composed of sand or pebbles, and to determine the nature of the coastline where vegetation closely fringes the sea. Whether obliques will be required for use during operations on a scale similar to that set out above for verticals, will depend largely on the nature of the hinterland backing the coast. If the coastal plain is wide, obliques will be of limited use. The closer the foothills approach the sea, the more useful will obliques be.

Owing to the time taken to fulfil demands air photos, maps and photomaps required for planning and for operations must be ordered well ahead of the time they will be required.

19. ATTACHMENT OF ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL.

The principle to be followed is that the brigade group should have sufficient resources with it to take immediate advantage of all sources of information, including PW, captured documents, natives, air photos and captured equipment. Consideration should be given to the allotment of some or all of the following:—

(*a*) ATIS detachment—one officer interrogator is essential and if he is not a proficient Japanese reader, a translator (NCO) will also be required.

(*b*) Additional IO, experienced in enemy Order of Battle, to assist brigade IO.

(*c*) AAPIU detachment.

(*d*) FS detachment. This should be considerable because:—

(i) Enemy documents and equipment must be speedily recovered as the advancing brigade "draws in its tail."

(ii) Communication by land or sea to divisional headquarters may be slow, requiring a greater number of FS NCO escorts.

PART IV.—MAINTENANCE.

20. FACTORS AFFECTING THE MAINTENANCE PLAN OF THE DIVISION.

The object of the Divisional maintenance plan is to ensure adequate deliveries of reserves of all natures to the forward dumps of the brigade group. As far as possible maintenance should be on normal lines, but the fact that a part of the division is to operate independently at a distance, and the risk of interruption of both seaborne and land traffic by adverse weather or enemy action, makes it desirable to carry greater reserves in forward dumps than would be normal.

21. The responsibilities of division resolve themselves into two parts:—

(*a*) The allotment of service detachments, labour and transport to the brigade group.

(*b*) Planning and executing a system of resupply.

22. The main factors affecting the divisional maintenance plan are likely to be:—

(*a*) Composition of the force to be maintained.

(*b*) Service and transport commitments of the division in the established beachhead.

(*c*) The existence of suitable landing beaches and the distances between them.

(*d*) The number of beachheads likely to be operating at any one time. Normally this should be expressly limited to two.

(*e*) The scale of reserves to be maintained with the brigade group as laid down by Commander. This will depend mainly on the enemy situation by land, sea and air, and on weather and climatic conditions.

(*f*) Type of country over which the force is to operate and likely availability of tracks for:—

(i) jeeps;

(ii) 3 ton traffic.

(*g*) Availability of transport agencies, viz.:—

(i) MT—limited by availability of tracks.

(ii) LC—use limited by weather conditions, availability of beaches and maintenance requirements (from experience only 50 per cent. of craft can be considered "runners" at any one time). Allowance must be made for losses due to broaching in surf on the beaches.

(iii) Native Carriers.—There will be calls for native labour in beachhead areas, which must be weighed against demands for maintenance of forward troops.

(iv) Air supply—either by transport aircraft as airstrips are secured and made serviceable, or in emergency by air dropping by transport aircraft or bombers.

(*h*) Expected rate of advance.

(*j*) Weather conditions.—In a coastwise operation this is a major factor since it affects both land and sea communications. The effects of bad weather on the construction of tracks are:—

(i) Mechanical equipment becomes less effective.

(ii) Flooded rivers may become impassable.

(iii) Depth of swamps is increased.

(iv) Tracks become slippery and soft causing bogging of MT.

(v) Tracks become unusable more quickly.

Bad weather affects the operation of landing craft, in that:—

(vi) Heavy surf may prevent loading or unloading.

(vii) High seas may prevent craft operating, or increase the time for turn-round.

(viii) The substitution of small ships, which can operate in seas too rough for landing craft, may become necessary.

(*k*) Estimate of casualties.—This affects not only the scale and siting of medical units, but organisation and transport required for evacuation and for reception in main divisional beachhead.

(*l*) Distance over which the force is to operate.—It is estimated that a platoon of an Australian Landing Craft Company would be capable of maintaining a force of up to a brigade group over a distance of 50 miles, provided replacements for unserviceable landing craft were readily forthcoming.

23. MAINTENANCE IN FORWARD AREA.

(a) Allotment of Craft.

The real problem is the economical use of a number of craft which will never be sufficient to meet all requirements. Demands will be made on craft,

(i) operationally for—
movement of troops, especially reserve units;
movement of supporting arms—tanks, artillery, etc.;
subsidiary landings in enemy rear; and

(ii) administratively for—
transport of supplies of all natures;
movement of service and beachhead detachments;
carriage of MT;
evacuation of wounded and salvage.

In any case, craft should be "allotted" rather than placed "under command" because they must return to base to refuel, to carry out maintenance, and for unit administration. Every effort should be made to establish forward bases for landing craft, provided

suitable boat harbours exist along the coast. This increases the range of the landing craft operating under command of the beach. If craft must come forward from bases well to the rear, the long turn-round imposes great strain on the landing craft and crews, and the availability of landing craft is greatly reduced by the necessity for maintenance.

In certain circumstances it may become necessary to use craft for the movement of unit weapons, or the delivery of unit supplies to its forward troops, in which case the landing craft constitute the unit's first line transport, replacing MT or native porters.

Experience in NEW GUINEA showed that the need to use craft in this way seldom applied to any but the leading infantry battalion, and could be met by a small allotment, probably 2 LC and 2 DUKWS. (From experience it has been found sound not to operate craft singly.) Other units of the brigade group will usually be located near the brigade beachheads, or can be supplied there-from by jeeps.

(b) Clearance of Rear Beachheads.

It is essential that rear beachheads be closed and the dumps and installations moved forward as the advance proceeds, otherwise the resources of the brigade group in transport, labour and services detachments and other beachhead units become strung out in a series of areas along the coast, with the consequent additional dissipation of fighting strength in providing detachments for their protection. To economize in administrative units and keep the force concentrated, no more than two beaches should be in use at any one time.

(c) Water Supply.

Water supply can be a problem even in tropical areas. Water can be carried in the large ballast tanks of Australian Landing Craft but a means of delivery must be considered. S tanks ashore have proved satisfactory and from them water can be drawn off into 2 gallon containers or any other type available.

(d) Selection and Organisation of Beachheads.

The earliest possible information about beaches is essential to effective maintenance planning. This is obtained partly from Intelligence sources (para 17) and partly by reconnaissance of each potential beach as soon as it has been secured. The composition and duties of these reconnaissance parties are discussed below (para 35). The problems connected with the organisation of beach groups and the development of the beach maintenance areas are dealt with in Part V.

(e) Boat Harbours.

These should constitute forward bases for landing craft at which repair, maintenance and refuelling of craft can be carried out. For security it is undesirable to base all the available craft on one harbour.

It is generally preferable both for administrative reasons and for concealment and dispersion against air attack that the harbour selected should NOT be merely a section of a maintenance beach. Harbours situated near the main beaches between which the landing craft ply, i.e., at each end of the run, are the most economical. If the main harbours are elsewhere, one or more "stand by" craft will be required at any busy beach for communication and emergency. This will only be possible where the craft is able to "lie up." Open beaches are seldom suitable. Estuaries of slow flowing rivers with vegetation overhanging the water, permit concealment of craft and provide the best harbours. Sheltered inlets where a few craft can be drawn up under cover on the beach without risk of broaching are also satisfactory. If possible landing craft should not be anchored off a beach. They are conspicuous from the air, liable to be lost in bad weather and their crews are vulnerable to air attack.

PART V.—BEACHHEAD ORGANISATION.

24. TYPES OF MAINTENANCE BEACH.

Two main types of maintenance beach are employed in a coastwise operation:—

(*a*) Beach used for only one day as a resupply beach, or for a short time to maintain a portion of the force—e.g., the leading infantry battalion or for temporary tactical use.

(*b*) Beach used for holding reserve dumps, unloading supporting arms and reserve units and equipment, and evacuation of casualties and salvage.

25. REQUIREMENTS OF A MAINTENANCE BEACH.

The requirements of a maintenance beach depend partly on the extent to which it is to be developed, the length of time for which it will be in use, and the items it is proposed to pass through it. For the daily maintenance of an infantry battalion, for instance, any place permitting the beaching of one landing craft at a time and giving access by foot to the unit bivouac area, might be satisfactory. When, however, the beach is required to be developed into a holding beach for reserves, and as discharging point for guns, tanks, motor transport and reserve units, the following are probable requirements:—

(*a*) Good seaward approaches, free of sand bars, reefs and nigger heads, and providing adequate depth to the shoreline to allow dry-shod beaching of landing craft.

(*b*) Headlands on windward side providing sheltered water and reducing the surf.

(*c*) Landing beach large enough for at least three landing craft at a time.

(*d*) Firm ground inland from beach—absence of swamp.

(*e*) Good beach exits—either existing or able to be quickly developed by engineers. Hard rock cliff behind a beach may require extensive engineer work before tanks, guns and motor transport can be got off the beach. Consideration of time and mechanical equipment available will determine whether development of any particular beach is economical.

(*f*) Suitable boat harbour or strand within reasonable distance of beach.

(*g*) Cover ashore and standing suitable for building of dumps.

(*h*) Running fresh water if possible nearby.

(*i*) Dry areas with cover suitable as staging areas for troops.

26. PROVISION OF BEACH ORGANISATION.

The beach organisation required to support the brigade group will be considerable. Experience has shown the weakness of an ad hoc beach organisation consisting merely of detachments of Divisional arms and services not specially trained in the problems of beachhead development and control. Since this is one of the functions for which Australian beach groups are trained, it is considered that a beach group should be provided to accompany the brigade group. Some changes in organisation would be required, e.g., BIPOD would probably NOT be required, and one extra supply depot platoon AASC from the Division might be necessary, but the general organisation can readily be adapted for the conditions of coastwise operations.

27. AUSTRALIAN BEACH GROUP IN COASTWISE OPERATIONS.

The composition of an Australian beach group is shown in I Aust Corps Training Instruction No. 2/1944, but its organisation also embraces a Naval beach commando of approximately 12 officers, 12 petty officers and 86 ratings, including a Naval beach signal section of 1 officer, 2 petty officers and 21 ratings.

28. The beach group is capable of operating simultaneously two major maintenance beaches for the brigade group and also a small third beach—e.g., a landing place for temporary tactical use or a battalion maintenance beach. Generally, on any such third beach, little more than a small Naval detachment and a small amount of labour, say one platoon, could be provided. The Naval beach commando is divisible into three beach parties, each of a beach master, two assistant beach masters and ratings leaving the principal beach master and his deputy as advisers to the beach group commander.

29. The beach group is a unit specially formed for organising and working the beaches for the landing of one assault infantry brigade group, and, subsequent to the assault landing, for working the beach maintenance area for a force of one jungle division. In coastwise operations, however, the requirements of a brigade group in beach group components will vary from operation to operation and can be determined by Division only during the planning of each operation. Then, the compositions of both the brigade group and the beach group, should be considered together, after technical advice has been obtained from Divisional RAE, Divisional Signals and the services. From past experience in coastwise operations where Australian beach groups have not been employed it appears that although the major portion of a beach group will be required by a brigade group, usually the whole of it will not.

30. Beach group headquarters can exercise control of both the forward and rear maintenance beaches of the brigade group by forming an advanced headquarters and a rear headquarters. The beach group commander can be located at whichever area is for the time the more important.

31. The beach group would be responsible for:—

(*a*) reconnaissance of all beaches and landing places likely to be required for tactical or maintenance purposes. This will include off-shore reconnaissance and reconnaissance for the development of dump areas.

(*b*) development of maintenance areas, and

(*c*) operation of maintenance areas.

32. Beach Group headquarters would co-ordinate Naval and Army aspects of the beach organisation. Beaches would be controlled by beach company commanders of the beach battalion in conjunction with Naval beach masters.

33. The services of the beach group would carry out their functions as laid down in I Aust Corps Training Instruction No. 2/1944 with modifications as suggested in Part VI. of this pamphlet.

34. If a complete beach group is required to accompany a brigade group, and the beach group in the divisional beachhead area is the only one available, then in effect a new beach group has to be formed to release it. If sufficient suitable

detachments from base sub area units cannot be provided, the division may be able from its own resources to provide certain reliefs depending on operations in hand and the state of development of the area. There would, however, be difficulty in providing relief for—

Staff of beach group headquarters
Naval beach commando
Bulk of beach group engineers
Beach signals
BIPOD
MCU
Ordnance beach detachment
Provost platoon
Salvage unit

35. RECONNAISSANCE PARTIES—COMPOSITION AND ROLE.

Reconnaissance to be complete must be carried out seaward and landward. The beach group is responsible for reconnaissance of all beach maintenance areas irrespective of the size and of all beaches employed for tactical purposes. Reconnaissances by the beach group and by the remaining components of the brigade group must be co-ordinated by the Brigade Commander.

36. The beach group's advanced reconnaissance party comprising,
an officer RAN commando (ABM or BM),
an officer beach group field company, and
a beach group intelligence NCO,

should move with the leading infantry battalion along the coast and examine every likely landing place and be prepared to report on their possibilities. What additional officers from other components of the brigade group accompany this party will depend on tactical and maintenance requirements.

37. The beach group's main reconnaissance party is responsible for detailed seaward and landward reconnaissance of landing places. Its composition will vary according to the work required and it may at times absorb the advanced reconnaissance party when it joins it.

38. At a minimum, to reconnoitre a small temporary beach for tactical or maintenance purposes, the party might consist only of an ABM and a representative of the landing craft company to carry out a seaward reconnaissance for off-shore obstacles.

39. A guide as to its maximum composition for opening a main beach for handling up to seven days maintenance for the brigade group is:—

Beach group commander or DAQMG,
Beach group IO and detachment,
DPBM party and gear,
a beach company commander or representative,
Officer commanding beach group field company or representative,
detachment Provosts,
detachment beach signals, and
brigade group representatives.

This party would probably move by water. It could probably complete its reconnaissance and plan for development in about three hours by which time it would be ready to receive the beach group units required to develop the area.

40. SUPERVISION OF PERSONNEL IN TRANSIT.

A transit assembly area with latrines and garbage receptacles should be established for parties of troops who have disembarked and are waiting to go forward to their units. This area should be close to the beach, but not at the actual landing place. The beachhead is a focal point round which installations tend to become grouped, and it becomes a staging point for bodies of troops in transit both by land and sea; in addition, various rear echelon details, "X" list personnel, swimming parties and miscellaneous stragglers tend to congregate on or near the beach and the area becomes very congested and covered with litter. Strict control under the direction of the beach group commander is essential to keep free the landing beach where stores are being handled and to prevent confusion and disorder. The best location for coffee stalls, etc., conducted by philanthropic organisations is in the transit assembly area.

41. ORGANISATION OF LOADING AND UNLOADING.

This is the function of the beach company commander. The pioneer battalion of the beach group can supply a maximum of four companies for labour both on the beaches and in the dumps. This may be inadequate and the labour pool may have to be supplemented from other sources, preferably from outside the brigade group. Experience has shown that in allocating this labour pool, the following principles should be observed:—

(*a*) Minimum time must be taken in loading and unloading. This has proved one of the vital factors in the operation of landing craft, especially on open beaches. Since the ETA of craft can never be exact, beach company commanders must have sufficient labour readily at hand for all expected demands, so that no time will be wasted when landing craft arrive on the beach.

(*b*) All labour must be strictly controlled and directed by experienced supervisors.

(*c*) Men work best in their normal units and sub-units. Casual labour details composed of troops in transit, and small ad hoc detachments not under their usual officers and NCOs are most unsatisfactory.

(*d*) Loading parties may be allotted an operational defence role in an emergency, but cannot effectively combine operational and labour duties.

(*e*) A high standard of discipline and control is essential. Some unloading takes place at night, and opportunities for pilfering—broken packages, difficulty of making complete check, ease of concealment in the dark—are great. All officers and NCOs in charge of loading parties must be reliable and observant, with rigid and scrupulous standards of discipline.

(*f*) Native labour has proved to be the most effective in this role. Separate accommodation and hygiene arrangements in a native compound will be required.

42. DEFENCE OF BEACHHEAD.

Defence of a beachhead resolves itself into two problems, beach and close local defence, and landward defence.

(*a*) Beach and close local defence is the responsibility of beach group commander, who is in operational control of all units and detachments in the beachhead area. Beach defence detachments will have to be allotted to the brigade group from the outset, based on an appreciation of likely landing places on the brigade group coastline and the enemy's probable reaction to our advance. The task of beach defence may be entrusted to a combination of 6 pounder detachments, MMG platoons of the machine gun battalion, beach anti-aircraft guns with a secondary role firing seaward, or infantry 2 pounders and MMGs, in addition to the weapons of beach group units, and such assistance as may be possible from the resources of the brigade group. The question of the most effective command and control of the beach defence detachments may cause some difficulty:—

(i) In the case of a rough and rocky coastline, with only a few suitable landing beaches, most of which will be in use as maintenance beachheads, it may be preferable to vest the co-ordination and operational control of beach defence detachments in beach group commander. This would probably ensure the best integration of all resources available in the beachhead area.

(ii) In the case of a coastline which offers facilities for landing along almost the entire length, it will probably be preferable for the brigade commander with the advice of his senior artillery commander to control all resources available for beach defence in a co-ordinated plan for defence of the whole shoreline, and in this case the detachments which happen to be sited within the beachhead area would be in support of the beach group commander.

(*b*) Other points involved in close defence will be:—

(i) Challenging procedure to craft and recognition signals as laid down by GHQ. Special equipment—lamps signalling, etc., will be necessary.

(ii) Coast watching system—coast watching can be done by beach defence detachments, but a warning system of intercommunication by signal flares supplemented wherever possible by line, should be evolved.

(iii) Passive air defence and prevention of lights showing to seaward.

(iv) Policy on use of flares illuminating and beach lights in event of attack.

(v) Co-ordination in ground fire plan of all beach anti-aircraft guns, which should have a secondary role firing seaward.

(vi) Alarm posts and local protective arrangements for all units under command. Orders about action in event of attack, personal equipment and weapons of working parties, and provision for ammunition supply.

(*c*) Landward defence will be carried out by a covering force, which will often require to be one infantry battalion, provided either from the resources of the brigade group, or preferably, as mentioned above, by an additional unit from divisional resources. The commander of the covering force should not be concerned with the details of the close defence of the beachhead area. His role is to hold a covering position controlling the landward approaches to the beachhead, and any suitable landing beaches on either flank of the beachhead, in order to prevent the enemy securing any position from which he can closely overlook the beachhead area, or bring observed fire to bear upon it. His FDL will probably be some distance from the beach, but the beachhead may well lie within the area occupied by his troops, and for this reason it may often be advantageous for brigade to place the covering force under operational control of beach group commander.

PART VI.—FUNCTIONING OF THE SERVICES.

43. GENERAL.

As far as possible, services should be required to function normally. The principal differences to normal operation will result from:—

(*a*) The necessity for the force to be to some extent self-contained. This involves the holding of increased stocks of reserves forward in brigade beachheads and the frequent moving of dumps as the advance progresses.

(*b*) The uncertainties attached to both land and sea communications.

(*c*) The distance from the main divisional beachhead at which the brigade group is to operate.

44. SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT.

It is considered that one additional supply depot platoon may have to be allotted to the beach group from divisional resources to allow leap-frogging of installations as rear beachheads close and forward beachheads are secured and developed. One, or two, supply depot platoons will be allotted to the brigade group according to its composition.

45. AASC units of the brigade group will be responsible for the delivery and issue of supplies, including ammunition, from dumps in the beachhead area to units of the brigade group.

46. MEDICAL.

The ordinary principle of evacuation of casualties from RAP through ADS to MDS is still tenable in coastwise operations. Evacuation of the RAP is effected by personnel of a divisional field ambulance. Other functions of the ADS, however, are performed by a casualty evacuation post established at a beachhead and manned by personnel of the beach group medical company. Instead of establishing ADSs with personnel of the field ambulance it has been found of advantage to divide the companies into a total of four sections, allotting one in close support of each infantry battalion, and keeping the fourth with field ambulance headquarters as a reserve. With efficient coastwise traffic the establishment of staging posts along the track becomes unnecessary.

47. The composition of the casualty evacuation post will vary with the rate of advance and the number and type of casualties expected, and perhaps with the availability of small craft. It should be sited within 100 yards of the beach, advantage being taken of any natural cover present. Close liaison must be maintained with the beach master to ascertain times of departure of supply craft and to apprise him of the number of casualties awaiting evacuation.

48. As successive beachheads are opened a "leap-frog" movement of beach group personnel, and hence of casualty evacuation posts, will occur. The post, therefore, must not become bogged down with casualties who cannot be moved, and the use of a surgical team with a casualty evacuation post during a move along a coast is not warranted except in exceptional circumstances.

49. For the most efficient functioning of the medical service it is advisable that some small craft be allotted purely for medical purposes. Such craft should fly a Red Cross flag for recognition purposes and should be specially fitted. Medical stores can be carried on forward journeys and a regular time-table of evacuations arranged on the rearward run.

50. A detailed plan must be made to inform the brigade group field ambulance of the moves and situations of casualty evacuation posts.

51. THE MDS.

The MDS should be sited as far forward as possible in order to provide early surgical facilities, and should be set up within a beachhead for ease of access and for local protection. It should not be so close to the beach that enemy air attack on the beach will involve it. The best beach for the MDS is the one most likely to be used for the longest period.

52. Casualties operated on in a MDS may need to be nursed for six to ten days before being evacuated. Subdivision of the headquarters personnel of a field ambulance to form more than one MDS leads to loss of efficiency, and therefore the movement of a MDS during mobile coastwise operations is a slow matter. To overcome this by allowing a "leap-frog" movement of MDSs the use of headquarters of another field ambulance will be required. This may be available from within the division. But as the other field ambulances of the division will normally be working with their brigades, or resting with them in preparation for a further operational role, it may be necessary to have the use of at least headquarters of a corps field ambulance. Where inland transport is a problem the companies of the corps field ambulance could well be used in addition to the headquarters.

53. When a second MDS cannot be provided it may be practicable to use the light section of a CCS in lieu. It must be remembered that the light section has practically no transport of its own, while independent working of the light and heavy sections, with consequent duplication of administration, leads to some loss of efficiency.

54. A surgical team should work with each MDS so that as far as possible surgical facilities are available within not more than four hours travel for troops in contact with the enemy. It may be practicable to employ the surgical team allotted to the beach group medical company in the MDS.

55. HYGIENE.

Hygiene along inland tracks is difficult to supervise, especially in the case of units fighting and making a track as they go. Fly and mosquito breeding in discarded tins may not be serious along isolated parts of the track, but breeding must be prevented in areas at the back of supply beachheads where there is a tendency for units to congregate and remain for some time. Efficient control here is, therefore, essential.

56. Malaria control in a supply beachhead will usually comprise a breeding survey and adult mosquito destruction; attempts to control breeding have no practical advantage unless occupation of the area is to continue for longer than three weeks. The malaria control unit of the beach group will have a special knowledge of, and is likely to be employed in, the main beachhead of the forward base. Personnel available for malaria control in subsidiary beaches are, therefore, obtained from the divisional malaria control unit, or are selected NCOs detached from the beach group malaria control unit; one well trained corporal and a few natives can readily do all necessary control of the average beachhead. Energetic adult destruction should be carried out during the first night of occupation.

57. ORDNANCE.

The ordnance beach detachment consists of 5 officers and 65 ORs organised into:—

Headquarters	1 officer 5 ORs
Stores section	2 officers 31 ORs
Ammunition section	2 officers 29 ORs

58. The stores and ammunition sections can be split into two subsections capable of independent operation. One sub-section (i.e. 1 officer and 15 ORs of the stores section and 1 officer and 15 ORs of the ammunition section) would be available to operate the first brigade beachhead and should carry in a reserve of all categories which should be built up to the requirements of the commander as early as possible. On the opening of a second beachhead the second sub-section of the ordnance beach detachment would carry in the initial reserves. Subsequent policy for new beachheads would be dictated by questions of communications and transportation, but sub-sections could be either "leap-frogged" in their entirety or go forward in "bounds."

59. The officer commanding the beach detachment would liaise with the brigade ordnance officer and brigade staff as to stocks to be carried etc. It may be necessary to establish a brigade ordnance dump (stores only) at, say, jeephead, under the direction of the brigade ordnance officer and supervised by a storeman from ordnance beach detachment or ADOS dump staff. Ammunition would normally be a responsibility of AASC forward of the beachhead.

60. Controlled stores carried by the ordnance beach detachment sub-sections should be regarded as "controlled" and released only by brigade staff.

61. BRIGADE ORDNANCE FIELD PARKS.

The speed of the advance, and track or craft limitations may prohibit the forward movement of a full brigade workshop. A light section of the brigade workshop may then be employed at advanced beachheads. A light section of the brigade ordnance field park will then have to be thrown off the main body, carrying a special scaling appropriate to the equipment to be serviced by this workshop and advanced LADs. Latest vehicle establishments for brigade ordnance field parks incorporate jeeps and trailers which would facilitate this task particularly if removable steel bins (maximum weight filled 80 lbs., i.e., a two-man lift) were provided.

62. E. & ME.

In certain circumstances it may be sufficient for only one workshop to move with the brigade group. This might be either the beach group workshop or a brigade workshop, but since neither is readily divisible into two sections for operating in separate beachheads, it may be advisable to use both workshops, "leap-frogging" forward as the advance proceeds. Each workshop might carry a lighter scale of vehicles and equipment than normal, to suit the conditions of a swift coastwise advance, and to prevent workshop installations becoming tied down by lengthy repair tasks. Throwing off a light section is made possible in the case of brigade workshops by the new scale of motor transport provided.

63. Movement of heavy sections of workshops, if used, should be by sea wherever possible. Movement by land has been found extremely difficult for heavy workshop and machinery lorries.

PART VII.—USE OF AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES.

64. EMPLOYMENT OF DUKWS.

DUKWS when allotted to a force operating along a coast, can be used for following:—

(*a*) Maintaining troops through a beachhead:—
  (i) Before it has been reconnoitred for landing craft;
  (ii) Not suitable for landing craft because approach is too shallow;
  (iii) During a surf which would prevent landing craft beaching;
(*b*) Ferrying stores from beach to beach over a short distance (thus assisting in clearance of rear beaches);
(*c*) Ferrying stores, etc., round river mouths;
(*d*) Unloading of small ships direct to dump areas or to forward troops.

65. ADVANTAGES OF DUKWS.

(*a*) DUKWS can proceed direct from the ship across the beach to dump areas. This results in:—
  (i) Less handling of stores both in loading and unloading;
  (ii) Increased cover and dispersion from air attack;
  (iii) Saving of stores, etc., becoming damaged by salt water during unloading;
  (iv) No additional transport being required to clear stores from beach;
  (v) Quicker clearance of beachhead.
(*b*) Do not require boat harbours protected from seas.
(*c*) Can operate over beaches not suitable for landing craft owing to shallow approach or low tide.
(*d*) Can cross sand bars without danger of becoming grounded.
(*e*) Can be used as load carrier on roads if not required as water transport.

66. DISADVANTAGES OF DUKWS.

(*a*) Slow speed.
(*b*) Small load capacity.
(*c*) Cannot be used over long distances.
(*d*) Use limited in high seas owing to very small freeboard.
(*e*) Heavy maintenance requirements.
(*f*) Cannot manoeuvre quickly if attacked.
(*g*) Cannot wade on a mud sea bed.

67. No experience has been obtained in the use of other amphibious vehicles, e.g., Buffaloes, but it is assumed that they could be employed in the same manner as DUKWS, with the following advantages:—

(*a*) Better swamp crossing capacity.
(*b*) Armoured sides, which would be particularly valuable in an assault landing or on a beach under enemy fire.
(*c*) Greater load capacity.

PART VIII.—CO-OPERATION WITH NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

68. AIR FORCE LIAISON.

The difficulties of co-operation with the Air Force which are common to all advances in undeveloped country, are increased in the case of coastwise operations. These difficulties may be summarized:—

For the Army—problem of keeping Air Force accurately informed of progress of advance, our intentions and position of own troops, and of framing clearly intelligible requests for bombing or strafing missions. In the case of close support:—

(i) the difficulty of forecasting rate of advance of our infantry in jungle, quite apart from enemy resistance;

(ii) the uncertainty of tropical weather, and hence of TOT.

For the Air Force—difficulty of recognising targets in jungle, and of giving any predetermined time for the strike.

In coastwise operations, there is the additional difficulty for the Air Force of identifying our own small craft.

69. It can be assumed that the enemy will be using barges and small ships for coastwise maintenance to the maximum possible extent, and that his forward dumps and bases will probably be located at his beachheads. Therefore a considerable air attack on the enemy's maintenance system may be directed against the enemy's water-borne traffic and for the destruction of his dump areas and installations.

70. Close liaison is therefore necessary to ensure that the Air Force has the latest information of the progress of the advance and particularly of the forward limits of our own small craft movement. It has been found that fighter pilots in particular, whether engaged in barge sweeps or providing escort for bomber missions, are often uncertain of their position because they have less time for navigation and use larger scale maps than bomber crews. For this reason it is necessary to fix the Air Force bombline well ahead of our advance and to make it a very prominent feature—e.g., a broad river; and it must be clearly understood by both Army and Air Force that no air attacks whatever, either on land or sea targets are to take place within the Air Force bombline without the express request or approval of the ground force.

71. Liaison is provided by GIII (Air) at divisional headquarters and ALOs at fighter and bomber stations. Communication is provided by an Air Support party in direct communication with Air Force Headquarters. If the situation in the divisional beachhead allows, GIII (Air) and Air Support party should be attached to brigade headquarters.

72. CO-OPERATION WITH TAC R AIRCRAFT.

Principal uses for Tac R aircraft will be:—

(*a*) Arty R—particularly registration as advance proceeds.

(*b*) Photography—particularly of engineer obstacles (e.g., gorges, rivers, cliffs) and enemy beachheads and dump areas.

(*c*) Tac R—particularly of enemy movement as revealed by use of tracks in rear areas. Since sorties are made by different pilots in weather subject to daily variations, a comparison with some specified track behind our FDL is advisable as a basis for considering reports. Tac R should also be used for locating enemy beachheads and dump areas and for topographical reconnaissances such as

reports on beaches, underwater obstacles, and hinterland;

reconnaissance of terrain for obstacles to land advance.

Communication with Tac R Squadron is provided by WT section RAAF which should move with brigade headquarters if possible.

73. LIAISON AIRCRAFT.

Light planes (both land and sea planes) are particularly useful for liaison when there is no land Lines of Communication or when communication by land or sea is temporarily impossible, and for local reconnaissance where enemy air defence is entirely passive. The provision of suitable landing grounds at divisional and brigade headquarters will constitute an additional engineer task.

74. LIAISON WITH NAVY.

Most likely forms of Naval support are:—

(*a*) Light Naval craft such as PT boats, with tasks of—

(i) harassing enemy's water Lines of Communication:

(ii) harassing enemy's land Lines of Communication by light bombardment of coastal tracks, installations, etc.:

(iii) supporting by fire the landing of troops on enemy held beaches.

(*b*) Heavier Naval craft such as DDs with tasks of—

(i) bombardment of targets out of range of field artillery but considered more vulnerable to Naval attack than air bombing:

(ii) Naval bombardment to cover landings of our own troops.

(*c*) Naval cargo-carrying ships such as LCTs and LSTs for maintenance.

(*d*) Naval patrol forces for the protection of our own water Lines of Communication.

Liaison with Navy on (*b*) (*c*) and (*d*) above would take place on a high level. Support as outlined in (*a*) above, is more frequently available and will afford necessity for liaison on brigade level, usually with a PT Task Group Headquarters.

75. INFORMATION REQUIRED BY PT TASK GROUP.

Close liaison is necessary to ensure prompt interchange of accurate information required by both services for efficient co-operation. Naval forces will want to know:—

(*a*) The exact position at last light of our foremost troops.

(*b*) Any observations of enemy movement on coast made by our forward troops.

(c) Any late information from captured documents, interrogation of PW, or Tac R on such matters as:—

(i) Enemy coastal concentrations of troops and activity on coastal tracks and beaches;

(ii) Location of coastal batteries;

(iii) Barge hideouts;

(iv) Details and timetables of shipping movements—e.g., submarines, small ships, barges, etc.;

(v) Light signals;

(vi) Radar installations.

(d) A general picture of land operations during previous 24 hours—of great help in maintaining interest of Naval personnel, especially when their efforts have resulted in the practical cessation of enemy sea activity in the area of their patrol.

(e) Land defensive measures against enemy landings on own coastline must be fully explained and will include:—

(i) Location of beach guns;

(ii) Ship-to-shore recognition signals. SWPA ship-to-shore recognition signals differ from Naval challenging and recognition procedure—hence the need for close understanding;

(iii) Location of visual challenging posts;

(iv) Forward AA gun positions (useful for own Naval craft to run close to in event of attack by hostile aircraft).

(f) Movements of Army controlled barge traffic, particularly at night.

(g) Army maps covering present and projected theatre of operations. Naval maps are useless for following ground developments.

(h) Knowledge of any terminology of weapons, equipment—particularly that of enemy so that Naval reports to Army are understandable by Army personnel.

76. INFORMATION REQUIRED BY ARMY.

(a) Number of barges sighted, type, course, nature of cargo, exact location, time of contact and result of action.

(b) Observations of enemy occupied coast, activity, lights, enemy equipment, hostile action, carrying parties, etc., which will form a basis for deductions about enemy intentions strength and dispositions.

77. METHODS OF LIAISON WITH PT BOATS.

(a) An Intelligence officer from task group headquarters should if possible be attached to brigade and divisional headquarters for periods. Periodical exchange of this officer will enable Navy to obtain a clear picture of the land force movements and its attendant problems.

(b) Direct wireless link, if possible, between brigade headquarters (or through divisional headquarters) to PT Task Group Headquarters.

(c) All possible information must be passed to Navy in sufficient time for briefing of crews (usually in late afternoon) carrying out coastwise missions. This is best done by sending task group headquarters a copy of the morning sitrep, brought up to date by later messages during the day.

(d) Contact before mission. Most missions take place during night and Naval craft will endeavour to pass our FDL just after last light and return just before first light.

78. Liaison should be established with the captain of the lead boat of the mission at some convenient anchorage near brigade headquarters with protection from the weather. The LO from ground forces should board the Naval craft and pass any information available as outlined in para 75 above. At the same time he should collect from the Navy the more important details of the mission with particular reference to the engagement of any targets likely to be observed and reported by our own troops. On LO's return to headquarters, beach guns and visual challenging posts should be warned through normal channels of probable ETA of friendly craft passing their positions both on out voyage and voyage home.

79. Morning contact by LO is confined to obtaining information collected during the night's mission. Experience has shown that boat captains need special briefing as to what to look for which may be of interest to the Army. At the same time any documents for task group headquarters are handed to the boat captain for delivery. This morning handover is desirable because some documents are likely to be of security nature and should not be carried into enemy waters.

APPENDIX 'D'

COPY

FROM I AUST CORPS 091715K

TO LANDOPS

INFO SECOND AUST ARMY

SD7895 CONFIDENTIAL second aust army SD24368 of 071145K . consider equipment position unsatisfactory . essential regt arrive here fully and serviceably equipped . please advise if immediate re-equipping possible and estimated date by which complete

Distributed by GS 9 Oct

CCRA
Q
ORD

APPENDIX "E"

COPY:

FROM: 1 AUST CORPS 161700K

TO: LANDFORCES

INFO: LANDOPS

SD8036 restricted (.) am issuing PITA from comd task pool on scale one per rifle pl of inf and pnr bns (.) also 15 bombs fuzed 425 per weapon as first line amn (.) require 2640 bombs as trg amn (.) LHQ OS88874 states all PITA bombs in task force pool (.) request you confirm that LHQ cannot provide bombs for trg before release from pool

Distributed by GS 16 Oct 44.

Q
Ord

(Sgd) A.J.WATT Maj.

1 AUST CORPS 161701K

FORLAND

SD8037 confidential (.) am issuing PITA from comd task pool on scale one per rifle pl of inf and pnr bns (.) also 15 bombs fuzed 425 per weapon as first line amn

(Sgd) A J WATT Maj. IN CIPHER

APPENDIX 'F'

COPY:

FROM: LANDFORCES 251205K

TO: LANDOPS

INFO: FORLAND 1 AUST CORPS 1 AUST BASE SUB AREA MILBASE BRISBANE REAR FIRST AUST ARMY

SD.94471 . restricted . 1 aust base sub area will come under comd 1 aust corps 001K 27 oct but will remain under comd Qld L of C area for local adm

DISTRIBUTION BY GS 10 Nov 44.

CCRA: CE: CSO: A(4): DAMS: Q(4):

SECRET

Subject: 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT NO 8.

HQ 1 Aust Corps
5 Oct 44.
G/1497/Ops.

6 Aust Div	1 - 3	1 Aust MC Gp SYDNEY	43
7 Aust Div	4 - 6	2 Aust MC Gp MELBOURNE	44
9 Aust Div	7 - 9	3 Aust MC Gp BRISBANE	45
1 Aust Beach Gp	10	4 Aust MC Gp PERTH	46
2 Aust Beach Gp	11	5 Aust MC Gp DARWIN	47
1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	12	6 Aust MC Gp ADELAIDE	48
1 Aust AL Gp	13	7 Aust MC Gp THURSDAY IS	49
46 Aust AL Sec (Tac R Sqn)	14	Det 2 Aust MC Gp HOBART	50
RAA 1 Aust Corps	15	Mov CAIRNS	51
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	16	Mov ATHERTON	52
A Aust Corps Sigs	17-18	Sig Centre ATHERTON	53
HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	19	13 Aust AOD	54
1 Aust Corps Accounts Office	20	First Aust Army Comd Pay Office	55
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	21	1 Aust HQ Area Comd ATHERTON	56
		Q'ld L of C Area (for LHQ Investigation Committee)	57
Copy for infm to:		Q'ld Ech and Records	58
		Det Q'ld Ech and Records CAIRNS	59
GHQ SWPA	22	Det Q'ld L of C Stationery Unit ATHERTON	60
LHQ	23-29	Eastern Area RAAF	61
Adv LHQ	30-34	NE Area RAAF	62
Fwd Ech LHQ	35-37	A Sub HQ Aust Kit Store IPSWICH	63
2nd Ech (AUST)	38		
Rear Echelon First Aust Army	39-41		
2/1 Aust Mov & Tn Gp TOWNSVILLE	42		

1. Herewith 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No 8 as at 2400 hours 30 Sep 44.

2. The serial numbers shown in the margin are for convenience of reference only and bear no relation to any other document.

3. Please destroy Location Statement No 7 and return the subtended certificate duly completed to this headquarters.

G. J. Dail Maj
for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

.....

1 Aust Corps

1. Receipt is acknowledged of Copy No .... 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No 8 as at 2400 hours 30 Sep 44.

2. Certified that Copy No .... 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No 6 has been destroyed.

..... Date

..... Signature

..... Appointment

..... Unit

Distributed by GS 5 Oct 44.

	Copy No		Copy No
GOC	64	Q	81-82
G	65-67	Legal	83
G (Int)	68	Med	84
G (Liaison)	69	Dental	85
G (Trg)	70	Pro	86
CE	71	S & T	87
Svy	72	Ord	88-89
CSO	73	E & ME	90
DA & QMG	74	Postal	91
&	75-79	War Diary	92-93 ✓
DAMS	80	File	94

.....

APPENDIX 'H'

SECRET

COPY NO 92

1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT 8

AS AT 2400 HRS 30 SEP 44

Ref Maps
(1/63360 series)

BF - BARTLE FRERE
D - DIMBULAH
G - GORDONVALE
H - HERBERTON
MG - MT GARNET
C - CAIRNS
B - BIBOOHRA
P - PALLERSTON

CORPS TROOPS

Formation Sign - Bulldog on Boomerang

Units at present under cond 1 Aust Corps incl on Provisional OOB 1 Aust Corps

Serial No (a)	War Office Serial No (b)	Veh No (c)	Unit (d)	Location (e)	Map Ref (f)	Remarks (g)
	HQ UNITS					
A1	61001	1/107	HQ 1 Aust Corps	BARRINE	G555344	
A2	92189	1/252	1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	TAYLOR PT	C648863	
A3	92204	1/889	1 Aust Mil Ldg Gp	TAYLOR PT	C648863	
A4	92205	2/889	2 Aust Mil Ldg Gp	TAYLOR PT	C648863	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A5	49221	4/732	4 Aust Cond AL Sec	WONGABEL	H392196	
A6	49242	31/856	31 Aust Sqn AL Sec	WONGABEL	H392196	
A7	49248	37/856	37 Aust Sqn AL Sec	WONGABEL	H392196	
A8	49259	54/856	54 Aust Sqn AL Sec	WONGABEL	H392196	
A9	49440	62/856	62 Aust Sqn AL Sec	WONGABEL	H392196	
A10	49441	63/856	63 Aust Sqn AL Sec	WONGABEL	H392196	
A11	92365	1/490	1 Aust Visitors and Observers Sec	BARRINE	G555344	
A12		677	Det Aust Mil Hist Sec	ATHERTON		
ARTY						
A13	61120	1/109	HQ RAA 1 Aust Corps	BARRINE	G555344	Incl CB staff
A14	61038	2-3/62	2/3 Aust Tk A Regt	WONGABEL	H395171	To be placed under cond 9 Aust Div
A15	61359	2-4/126	2/4 Aust LAA Regt	WONGABEL	H398162	
A16	61221	2-13/415	2/13 Aust Comp AA Regt (LE)	KAIRI	G464358	
A17	48634	84/539	84 Aust Mob SL Bty	KAIRI	G467357	
A18	45129		1 Aust Mob Met Flt	BARRINE	G555344	
A20	47578	77/539	77 Aust Mob SL Bty	MAPEE	D372415	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
	ENGRS					
A21	61199	1/101	HQ RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	WONGABEL	H404177	
A22	46040	2/60	2 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	H402184	
A23	46094	24/60	24 Aust Fd Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	H393182	
A24	47343	2-11/129	2/11 Aust A Tps Coy (less 3 pl)	WONGABEL	H401182	3 pl TRINITY BEACH C654848
A25	47742	1/651	1 Aust BD Pl	WONGABEL	H406164	
	SVY					
A26	45593	5/111	5 Aust Fd Svy Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	H388186	
A27	45597	2-1/281	2/1 Aust A Topo Svy Coy	WONGABEL	H388186	
A28	45596	12/703	Det 12 Aust Fd Svy Depot	[illegible]	H393273	
	SIGS					
A29	48657	2-3/63	2/3 Aust Tk A Regt Sig Sec	WONGABEL	H376172	
A30	61359	2-4/448	2/4 Aust LAA Regt Sig Sec	WONGABEL	H398163	
A31	61350	2-13/215	2/13 Aust Comp AA Regt Sig Sec (LE)	MAPEE	G467375	
A32	49427	4/45	4 Aust Engr Sig Sec	WONGABEL	H404177	
A33	61008	A/115	HQ A Aust Corps Sigs	BARRINE	G559336	
A34	45721	1/304	1 Aust Tech Maint Sec	BARRINE	G559336	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A35	45679	5/304	5 Aust Tech Maint Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A36	61327	1/246	1 Aust Line Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A37	61328	2/246	2 Aust Line Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A38	61329	3/246	3 Aust Line Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A39	45812	8/246	8 Aust Line Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A40	61332	1/322	1 Aust Line Maint Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A41	49373	13/322	13 Aust Line Maint Sec	BARRINE	G559336	
A42	61335	1/268	1 Aust Op Sec	BARRINE	G557339	
A43	61336	2/268	2 Aust Op Sec	BARRINE	G557339	
A44	61345	1/201	1 Aust DR Sec	BARRINE	G557339	
A45	61346	2/201	2 Aust DR Sec	BARRINE	G557339	
A46	61340	1/510	1 Aust WT Sec (Hy)	BARRINE	G557339	
A46(a)	61341	2/510	2 Aust WT Sec (Lt)	BARRINE	G557339	
A47	45677	13/510	13 Aust WT Sec (Hy)(AIF)	BARRINE	G557339	
A48	47358	24/510	24 Aust WT Sec (Lt)	BARRINE	G557339	
A49	45609	13/309	13 Aust Tele Op Sec	BARRINE	G557339	
A50	45675	14/309	14 Aust Tele Op Sec	BARRINE	G557339	
A51	47569	33/287	33 Aust Phone Swbd Op Sec	BARRINE	G557339	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A52	45722	21/68	21 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K)	BARRINE	G557339	
A53	92318	49/68	49 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K)	BARRINE	G557339	
A54	92187	1/411	HQ 1 Aust Pigeon Coy	BARRINE	G555344	
A55	46852	3/650	HQ 3 Aust Pigeon Sec	BARRINE	G556341	
A56	47645	8/650	HQ 8 Aust Pigeon Sec	BARRINE	G556341	
	LF					
A57	61005	2-1/225	23 Pl F Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	BARRINE	G555344	
	INT					
A58	45733	1/272	1 Aust Corps Sec Int Corps (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
A59	45166	U/429	UK Aust FS Sec (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
A60	92048	3/867	3 Aust AAPIU	WONDECLA	H366046	Temporarily attached 6 Aust Div
	AASC					
A61	61380	1/108	HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	WONGABEL	H399178	
A62	48045	2-34/78	HQ 2/34 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	WONGABEL	H400178	
A63	92296	2-22/91	2/22 Aust Tpt Pl	WONGABEL	H400178	
A64	92297	2-23/91	2/23 Aust Tpt Pl	WONGABEL	H400178	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A65	92298	2-24/91	2/24 Aust Tpt Pl	WONGABEL	H400178	
A66	92299	2-25/91	2/25 Aust Tpt Pl	WONGABEL	H400178	
A67	92300	2-26/91	2/26 Aust Tpt Pl	WONGABEL	H400178	
A68	92302	2-34/117	2/34 Aust Wksp Pl	WONGABEL	H400178	
A69	47919	3/41	HQ 3 Aust Sup Depot Coy (AIF)	WONGABEL	H397186	
A70	48840	11/65	11 Aust Sup Depot Pl (AIF)	WONDECLA	H297098	Operating DID WONDECLA
A71	48841	12/65	12 Aust Sup Depot Pl (AIF)	WONGABEL	H397186	Operating DID WONGABEL
A72	48842	13/65	13 Aust Sup Depot Pl (AIF)	MAPEE	D414396	Operating DID MAPEE
A73	48529	1/405	1 Aust Air Maint Coy	WONGABEL	H404164	
A74	92494	51/91	51 Aust Tpt Pl	WONGABEL	H404164	)
A75	49463	246/65	246 Aus Sup Depot Pl	WONGABEL	H404164	) Allotted 1 Aust Air Maint
A75(a)	92292	2-21/91	2/21 Aust Tpt Pl	WONGABEL	H400178	) Coy
A75(b) MED	92295	2-3/210	2/3 Amphibious Vehicle Increment	WONGABEL	H400178	) Part of 2/34 Aust Gen Tpt) Coy
A76	55520	2-2/151	2/2 Aust CCS	MAPEE	D388361	To be placed under comd 7 Aust Div
A77	55521	2-3/151	2/3 Aust CCS	WONGABEL	H390195	
A78	61566	2-12/57	2/12 Aust Fd Amb	WONGABEL	H392183	
A79	29758	2-13/57	2/13 Aust Fd Amb	WONGABEL	H414167	
A80	45724	10/57	10 Aust Fd Amb	WONGABEL	H409168	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A81	45325	2-7/696	2/7 Aust MCU	BARRON RIVER	C703765	
A82	45329	11/696	11 Aust MCU	WONGABEL	H392183	Adv party only - att 2/12 Aust Fd Amb
A83	47636	13/696	13 Aust MCU	WONGABEL	H409106	Att 10 Aust Fd Amb
A84	48024	3/657	3 Aust Mob Entomological Sec	WONGABEL	H392183	Att 2/12 Aust Fd Amb
A84(a)	47954	20/661	20 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit (Type B)	MAREE	D358361	Att 2/2 Aust CCS
A84(b)	47955	20/661	21 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit (Type B)	WONGABEL	H390195	Att 2/3 Aust CCS
DENTAL						
A85	45632	2-1/181	2/1 Aust Dental Unit			
A86			HQ Sec 2/1 Aust Dental Unit	MARRINE	G955344	Att HQ 1 Aust Corps
A87			Det HQ Sec 2/1 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H376172	Att 2/3 Aust Fd A Regt
A88			A Sec 2/1 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H398163	Att 2/- Aust LAA Regt
A89			B Sec 2/1 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H392196	Att 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp - Inoperative
A90			C Sec 2/1 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H400178	Att 2/34 Aust Gen Hpt Coy
A91			D Sec 2/1 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG299818	Att 2/8 Aust Fd Regt, under 9 Aust Div for local adm
A92			E Sec 2/1 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H392196	Att 1 Aust Corps Reception Camp
A93			F Sec 2/1 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H414167	Att 2/13 Aust Fd Amb

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A94	45633	2-2/181	2/2 Aust Dental Unit			
A95			HQ Sec 2/2 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G464358	Att 2/13 Aust Comp AA Regt
A96			Det HQ Sec 2/2 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G464358	Att 2/13 Aust Comp AA Regt inoperative
A97			A Sec 2/2 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G465365	Att 2/1 Aust MG Bn) Under 7 Aust Div for Local adm
A98			B Sec 2/2 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G453367	Att 2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt)
A99			C Sec 2/2 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H345064	Att 2/2 Aust Fd Regt) Under 6 Aust Div for Local adm
A100			D Sec 2/2 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H324073	Att 2/3 Aust Inf Bn)
A101			E Sec 2/2 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H317080	Att 2/11 Aust Inf Bn)
A102			F Sec 2/2 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H320075	Att 2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy)
	CRD					
A103	49042	120/83	120 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	WONGABEL	H410163	
	AEME					
A104	61039	2-71/40	2/71 Aust LAD (Type G)	WONGABEL	H395175	Att 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt
A105	45723	319/40	319 Aust IAD (Type A) (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	Att HQ 1 Aust Corps.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A106	45736	290/40	290 Aust LAD (Type A) (AIF)	BARRINE	G559336	Att A Aust Corps Sigs
A107	49059	120/76	120 Aust Bde Wksp (Type A)	WONGADEL	H410163	
A108	61360	2-4/228	2/4 Aust LAA Regt Wksp	WONGADEL	H398162	
A109	49072	2-13/311	2/13 Aust Corps AA Regt Wksp (AM)	KAIRI	G464350	
A110	48638	84/426	84 Aust AASL Wksp Sec (Mob) (AIF)	KAIRI	G467357	
A110(a)	73277	77/426	77 Aust AASL Wksp Sec (Mob) (AIF)	MAPEE	D372415	
PAY						
A111	49423	1/341	1 Aust Corps Accounts Office	BARRINE	G555344	
A112	45781	1/162	1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
POSTAL						
A113	45763	1/154	1 Aust Corps Postal Unit (AIF)	BARRINE	G555344	
PRO						
A114	61499	1/37	1 Aust Armd Div Pro Coy	BARRINE	G555344	
GRAVES						
A115	47500	8/801	8 Aust War Graves Unit	WONGADEL	H392196	
MISC						
A116	45785	1/166	1 Aust Corps Sal Unit	TOLGA	D388399	
A117	61243	1/163	1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	WONGADEL	H392196	

Units at present under cond 1 Aust Corps NOT incl on Provisional OOB 1 Aust Corps

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
HQ UNITS						
A118	45185	46/840	46 Aust Af Sec (Tac R Sqn)	MAREEBA	D316521	Allotted 5 Tac R Sqn
AFTY						
A119	48457	53/415	53 Aust Comp AA Regt (LE)	HAPEE	D372415	
ENGRS						
A120	45588	17/60	17 Aust Fd Coy	WONGABEL	H402177	
A121	46158	54/67	54 Aust Fd Pk Coy	WONGABEL	H402183	
A122	29849	2-3/186	2/3 Aust Rly Constr Coy (Mech Eqpt)	WONGABEL	H392182	
A123	48329	1/541	1 Aust Welding Pl	CHINAMANS COVE	C646864	
A124	40331	3/541	3 Aust Welding Pl	CHINAMANS COVE	C646864	
A125	48275	41/673	41 Aust Ldg Craft Coy (Type A)	BARRON RIVER	C703774	
A126	48276	42/673	42 Aust Ldg Craft Coy (Type A)	TRINITY BEACH	C648860	
A127	92423	1/849	1 Aust Water Amb Convoy	CAIRNS	C742679	
SIGS						
A128	47918	3/474	3 Aust Beach Sig Sec	BARRINE	G555340	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
INF						
A129	45203	101/781	101 Aust Bde Sp Coy	WONGABEL	H392196	
INT						
A130	47914	1/867	1 Aust AAPIU	DARRINE	G555344	
DENTAL						
A131	45636	80/181	80 Aust Dental Unit			
A132			A Sec 80 Aust Dental Unit	HAPEE	D388361	Att 2/2 Aust CCS
A133			D Sec 80 Aust Dental Unit	HAPEE	D372415	Att 53 Aust Comp AA Regt
ORD						
A134	45641	3/147	3 Aust Inf Tps Ord Fd Pk	WONGABEL	H463138	Det at TOLGA under cond LHQ and allotted to 7 Aust Ord Veh Pk
ENGR						
A135	45702	2-2/155	2/2 Aust Inf Tps Wksp	WONGABEL	H408182	incl - one armoury wksp sec (Type F4) one wireless sig eqpt wksp sec (Type A) one instrument wksp sec (Type A)
A136	46159	232/40	232 Aust LAD (Type A)	WONGABEL	H406183	Att 54 Aust Fd Pk Coy

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A137	45867	287/40	287 Aust LAD (Type A)(AIF)	WONGABEL	H395183	Att 2/3 Aust Rly Constr Coy
A138	92018	1/499	1 Aust Ldg Craft Wksp Sec	BARRON RIVER	C703774	
A139	92019	2/499	2 Aust Ldg Craft Wksp Sec	DEADMANS GULLY	C642860	
A140	92016	1/751	1 Aust Floating Watercraft Wksp	CAIRNS	NAVAL FUEL WHARF	
A140(a)	48459	53/311	53 Aust Comp AA Regt Wksp (LE)	MAPEE	D372415	
~~A141~~ UNITIES						
A141	47862	903	12 Aust Mob Cinema			
A142	47862	903	14 Aust Mob Cinema			
A143	47862	903	27 Aust Mob Cinema			
A144	47862	903	28 Aust Mob Cinema			
A145	47862	903	30 Aust Mob Cinema	MOBILE		
A146	47862	903	96 Aust Mob Cinema			
A147	47862	903	97 Aust Mob Cinema			
A148	47862	903	111 Aust Mob Cinema			
A149	45979	799	2 Aust Div Concert Party	WONGABEL	H392196	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
MISC						
A150			EDMONTON MT PK	EDMONTON	CCC CAMP	
A151	45787	2/163	2 Aust Corps Reception Camp	WONGABEL	H392196	
A152	48389	2/176	2 Aust Fd Punishment Centre	WASP CREEK	G533316	
A153		682	LHQ School of Arty (Fd) Mob Wing			With 9 Aust Div until 17 Oct, RAA 1 Aust Corps 19 Oct - 10 Nov.
A154		723	No 1 Mob Wing LHQ School of Mech	WONGABEL		
A155		780	LHQ SME Mob Team Bomb Disposal Wing	WONGABEL		
A156			1 Aust Corps Veh Waterproofing School	DEADMANS GULLY	C613880	
A157			3 Aust Mob Wksp Wing LHQ AASC School	TRINITY BEACH		

6 AUST DIV -

Formation Sign : Kangaroo on Boomerang

Serial No (a)	War Office Serial No (b)	Veh (c)	Unit (d)	Location (e)	Map Ref (f)	Remarks (g)
			DIVISIONAL TROOPS			
HQ UNITS						
B1	61026	6/84	HQ 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H366046	
B2	92366	2/490	2 Aust Visitors and Observers Sec	WONDECLA	H366046	
B3		677	Det Aust Mil Hist Sec	WONDECLA	H366046	LHQ Unit
ARMD CORPS						
B4	61459	2-9/52	HQ & HQ Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	WONDECLA	H343064	Corps Tps
B5			A Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	WONDECLA	H343064	
B6			B Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	WONDECLA	H343064	
B7			C Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	WONDECLA	H343064	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
ARTY						
B9	45983	6/94	HQ RAA 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H344065	
B9	45125		3 Aust Mob Met Plt	WONDECLA	H344065	
B10	61032	2-1/74	2/1 Aust Fd Regt	WONDECLA	H339069	
B11	61034	2-2/74	2/2 Aust Fd Regt	WONDECLA	H345064	
B12	29416	2-3/74	2/3 Aust Fd Regt (Less 5 6 and 13 Aust Fd Btys)	WONDECLA	H337068	Btys allotted also
B13	40139	2-6/87	2/6 Aust Svy Bty	WONDECLA	H319068	
ENGRS						
B14	61040	6/81	HQ RAE 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H325076	
B15	61201	2-14/60	2/14 Aust Fd Coy	WONDECLA	H326074	
B16	61044	2-22/67	2/22 Aust Fd Pk Coy	WONDECLA	H325076	
SIGS						
B17	61046	6/66	Sigs 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H358052	
B18	48637	2-9/79	2/9 Aust Armd Regt Sig Tp	WONDECLA	H343064	Corps tps
B19	49081	2-1/48	2/1 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H333069	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
B20	48654	2-2-/48	2/2 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H345064	
B21	48658	2-3/48	2/3 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H337068	
B22	49104	1/45	1 Aust Engr Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H325176	
B23	46136	2-41/68	2/41 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K)	WONDECLA	H358052	
B24	47201	4/650	4 Aust Pigeon Sec	WONDECLA	H358052	
INF						
B25	61230	2-3/164	2/3 Aust MG Bn	WONDECLA	H320067	
B26	61005	2-1/225	C Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt (less 10,11,12 pls)	WONDECLA	H366046	Army Tps - Pls allotted to Bdes
INF						
B27	61003	4/429	'A' Aust FS Sec	WONDECLA	H366046	
AASC						
B28	61066	6/59	HQ Comd AASC 6 Aust Div	WONDECLA	H327076	
B29	48427	2-155/78	HQ 2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (TS)	WONDECLA	H320075	
B30	92266	2-1/91	2/1 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	WONDECLA	H317074	
B31	92267	2-2/91	2/2 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	WONDECLA	H317074	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
B32	92268	2-3/91	2/3 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	WONDECLA	H317074	
B33	92269	2-155/117	2/155 Aust Wksp Pl (TS)	WONDECLA	H317074	
B34	61364	2-3/78	HQ 2/3 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (TS)	WONDECLA	H327076	
B35	92270	2-4/91	2/4 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	WONDECLA	H327076	
B36	92271	2-5/91	2/5 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	WONDECLA	H327076	
B37	92272	2-6/91	2/6 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	WONDECLA	H327076	
B38	92273	2-3/117	2/3 Aust Wksp Pl (TS)	WONDECLA	H327076	
B39	48425	2-5/41	HQ 2/5 Aust Sup Depot Coy	WONDECLA	H327076	
B40	61179	2-35/65	2/35 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076	
B41	48995	2-188/65	2/188 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076	
B42	40401	33/118	33 Aust Tk Tptr Pl	WONDECLA	H343064	Corps tps att 2/9 Aust Armd Regt
MED						
B43	45839	104/51	104 Aust CCS (AIF)	WONDECLA	H304099	
B44	55737	2-3/704	2/3 Aust Mob Bact Lab	WONDECLA	H304099	Corps tps - NOT incl Provisional OOB
B45	55446	2-4/696	2/4 Aust MCU	WONDECLA	H327074	
B46	92225	41/681	41 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit	WONDECLA	H304099	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
B47	61237	2-117/152	2/117 Aust Mob BU	WONDECLA	H304099	Att 104 Aust CCS
DENTAL						
B48	45696	2-4/181	2/4 Aust Dental Unit			
B49			Det HQ Sec 2/4 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H366064	Att HQ 6 Aust Div
B50			A Sec 2/4 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H315067	Att 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
B51			B Sec 2/4 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H341068	Att 2/6 Aust Inf Bn
B52			C Sec 2/4 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H343066	Att 2/5 Aust Inf Bn
B53			D Sec 2/4 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H325075	Att 2/1 Aust Fd Amb
B54			E Sec 2/4 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H317079	Att 2/4 Aust Inf Bn
B55			F Sec 2/4 Aust Dental Unit	WONDECLA	H333069	Att 2/1 Aust Fd Regt
ORD						
B56	48583	2-9/53	2/9 Aust Armd Regt Ord Fd Pk	WONDECLA	H343064	Corps Tps
AEME						
B57	48586	2-9/54	2/9 Aust Armd Regt Wksp	WONDECLA	H343064	Corps Tps
B58	61035	2-40/40	2/40 Aust LAD (Type D)	WONDECLA	H345064	Att 2/2 Aust Fd Regt

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
B59	61121	2-41/40	2/41 Aust LAD (Type D)	WONDECLA	H337068	Att 2/3 Aust Fd Regt
B60	61047	2-42/40	2/42 Aust LAD (Type A)	WONDECLA	H358052	Att HQ 6 Aust Div
B61	61033	2-43/40	2/43 Aust LAD (Type D)	WONDECLA	H333069	Att 2/1 Aust Fd Regt
B62	61045	2-80/40	2/80 Aust LAD (Type A)	WONDECLA	H325076	Att 2/22 Aust Fd Pk Coy
B63	[illegible]	-95/40	2/95 Aust LAD (Type H)	WONDECLA	H343064	Corps Tps, Att 2/9 Aust Armd Regt
PAY						
B64	61020	6/80	6 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	WONDECLA	H366046	
POSTAL						
B65	61070	6/55	6 Aust Div Postal Unit (less dets)	WONDECLA	H366046	
PRO						
B66	61071	6/95	6 Aust Div Pro Coy	WONDECLA	H362046	
MISC						
B67	61073	6/38	6 Aust Div Sal Unit	WONDECLA	H322072	
B68	61168	6/71	6 Aust Div Reception Camp	WONDECLA	H295103	
B69	47862	903	99 Aust Mob Cinema	MOBILE		

16 AUST INF BDE GP

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
HQ						
B70	61048	16/88	Hq 16 Aust Inf Bde	WONDECLA	H319074	
ARTY						
B71	29416	2-3/74	5 Aust Fd Bty	WONDECLA	H337068	2/3 Aust Fd Regt
ENGRS						
B72	61041	2-1/60	2/1 Aust Fd Coy	WONDECLA	H325076	
SIGS						
B73	40650	16/89	16 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H319074	
INF						
B74	6104[illegible]	2-1/56	2/1 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H318073	
B75	61050	2-2/56	2/2 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H315067	
B76	61051	2-3/56	2/3 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H324073	
B77	[illegible]	1/225	10 Pl, C Coy, 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	WONDECLA	H319074	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
AASC						
B78	48851	2-24/65	2/24 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076	
B79	48852	2-25/65	2/25 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076	
MED						
B80	55405	2-1/57	2/1 Aust Fd Amb	WONDECLA	H325073	
ORD						
B81	45779	110/83	110 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	WONDECLA	H327073	
AEME						
B82	45778	110/76	110 Aust Bde Wksp (AIF)	WONDECLA	H327073	
B83	61053	2-45/40	2/45 Aust LAD (Type J)	WONDECLA	H319074	
POSTAL						
B84	61070	6/55	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	WONDECLA	H319074	

17 AUST INF BDE GP

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
HQ						
B85	61054	17/88	HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde	WONDECLA	H341067	
ARTY						
B86	29416	2-3/74	6 Aust Fd Bty	WONDECLA	H337068	2/3 Aust Fd Regt
ENGRS						
B87	61043	2-8/60	2/8 Aust Fd Coy	WONDECLA	H325076	
SIGS						
B88	49119	17/89	17 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H341067	
INF						
B89	61055	2-5/56	2/5 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H343066	
B90	61056	2-6/56	2/6 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H341068	
B91	61057	2-7/56	2/7 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H339069	
B92	61005	2-1/225	11 Pl, C Coy, 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	WONDECLA	H341067	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
AASC						
B93	48849	2-22/65	2/22 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076	
B94	48859	2-23/65	2/23 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076	
MED						
L95	55406	2-2/57	2/2 Aust Fd Amb	WONDECLA	H325073	
ORD						
B96	48430	2-119/83	2/119 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	WONDECLA	H333067	
AEME						
B97	48431	2-119/76	2/119 Aust Bde Wksp	WONDECLA	H333067	
B98	61059	2-46/40	2/46 Aust LAD (Type J)	WONDECLA	H341067	
POSTAL						
B99	61070	6/55	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	WONDECLA	H341067	

19 AUST INF BDE GP

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
HQ						
B100	61000	19/88	HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde	WONDECLA	H318080	
ARTY						
B101	29416	2-3/74	53 Aust Fd Bty	WONDECLA	H337068	2/3 Aust Fd Regt
ENGRS						
B102	61042	2-2/60	2/2 Aust Fd Coy	WONDECLA	H325076	
SIGS						
B103	48660	19/89	19 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	WONDECLA	H318080	
INF						
B104	61061	2-4/56	2/4 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H317079	
B105	61062	2-8/[illegible]	2/8 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H318079	
B106	61063	2-11/56	2/11 Aust Inf Bn	WONDECLA	H317080	
B107	61005	2-1/225	12 Pl, C Coy, 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	WONDECLA	H318080	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
AASC						
B108	48847	2-20/65	2/20 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076	
B109	48848	2-21/65	2/21 Aust Sup Depot Pl	WONDECLA	H327076	
MED						
B110	55411	2-7/57	2/7 Aust Fd Amb	WONDECLA	H327074	
ORD						
B111	49051	135/83	135 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk (AIF)	WONDECLA	H330073	
AET						
B112	49069	135/76	135 Aust Bde Wksp (Type B) (AIF)	WONDECLA	H330073	
B113	61065	2-79/40	2/79 Aust LAD (Type J)	WONDECLA	H318080	
POSTAL						
B114	61070	6/55	Det 6 Aust Div Postal Unit	WONDECLA	H318080	

7 AUST DIV

Formation Sign : Kookaburra on Boomerang

Serial No (a)	War Office Serial No (b)	Veh No (c)	Unit (d)	Location (e)	Map Ref (f)	Remarks (g)
HQ UNITS						
C1	61074	7/84	HQ 7 Aust Div	KAIRI	G512397	
CAV						
C2	61183	2-7/102	HQ 2/7 Aust Cav(Commando) Regt	KAIRI	G453367	
C3	45522	2-3/239	2/3 Aust Commando Sqn	KAIRI	G453369	
C4	45524	2-5/239	2/5 Aust Commando Sqn	KAIRI	G454370	
C5	61421	2-6/239	2/6 Aust Commando Sqn	KAIRI	G455368	
ARTY						
C6	48377	7/94	HQ RAA 7 Aust Div	KAIRI	G514402	
C7	61077	2-4/74	2/4 Aust Fd Regt	KAIRI	G503377	
C8	61079	2-5/74	2/5 Aust Fd Regt	KAIRI	G505375	
C9	61083	2-2/62	2/2 Aust Tk A Regt	KAIRI	G512397	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
C10	45900	2-7/87	2/7 Aust Svy Bty	KAIRI	G507382	
C11	45129		4 Aust Mob Met Flt	KAIRI	G503377	
ENGRS						
C12	61085	7/81	HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	KAIRI	G474386	
C13	61086	2-4/60	2/4 Aust Fd Coy	KAIRI	G479391	
C14	61087	2-5/60	2/5 Aust Fd Coy	KAIRI	G476389	
C15	61088	2-6/60	2/6 Aust Fd Coy	KAIRI	G474387	
C16	61200	2-9/60	2/9 Aust Fd Coy	KAIRI	G473382	
C17	61089	2-25/67	2/25 Aust Fd Pk Coy	KAIRI	G473384	
SIGS						
C18	61091	7/66	Sigs 7 Aust Div	KAIRI	G506392	
C19	46142	2-42/68	2/42 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K)	KAIRI	G506392	
C20	49082	2-4/48	2/4 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G503377	
C21	49083	2-5/48	2/5 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G506377	
C22	49097	2-2/63	2/2 Aust Tk A Regt Sig Sec	KAIRI	G512379	
C23	49105	2/45	2 Aust Engr Sig Sec	KAIRI	G474384	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
C24	49120	18/89	18 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	KAIRI	G482368	
C25	49122	21/89	21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	KAIRI	G484394	
C26	49124	25/89	25 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	KAIRI	G486382	
C27	49487	2-7/148	2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt Sig Tp	LAPEE	G451369	
INF						
C28	29263	18/88	HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	KAIRI	G481360	
C29	29265	2-9/56	2/9 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G473372	
C30	29266	2-10/56	2/10 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G475367	
C31	29267	2-12/56	2/12 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G475371	
C32	61045	2-1/225	6 Pl, B Coy, 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	KAIRI	G479370	
C33	61098	21/88	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde	KAIRI	G484394	
C34	61099	2-14/56	2/14 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G483388	
C35	61100	2-16/56	2/16 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G481392	
C36	61101	2-27/56	2/27 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G483394	
C37	61005	2-1/225	7 Pl, B Coy, 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	KAIRI	G484394	
C38	29739	25/88	HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	KAIRI	G486382	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
C39	61216	2-25/56	2/25 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G483373	
C40	29864	2-31/56	2/31 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G485385	
C41	29866	2-33/56	2/33 Aust Inf Bn	KAIRI	G475386	
C42	61005	2-1/225	8 Pl, B Coy, 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	KAIRI	G486382	
C43	29268	2-1/164	2/1 Aust MG Bn	KAIRI	G166365	
C44	61010	2-1/140	2/1 Aust Pnr Bn	KAIRI	G486369	
C45	61005	2-1/225	HQ B Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	KAIRI	G512398	
C46	61005	2-1/225	5 Pl B Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	KAIRI	G512398	
INT						
C47	61172	C/[illegible]	'C' Aust FS Sec	KAIRI	G512397	
AASC						
C48	61110	7/59	HQ Cond AASC 7 Aust Div	KAIRI	G514401	
C49	61367	2-6/78	HQ 2/6 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (TS)	MAPEE	G450370	
C50	92278	2-10/91	2/10 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	MAPEE	G450370	
C51	92279	2-11/91	2/11 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	MAPEE	G450370	
C52	92280	2-12/91	2/12 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	MAPEE	G450370	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
C53	92281	2-6/117	2/6 Aust Wksp Pl (TS)	MAPEE	G450370	
C54	47942	2-153/78	HQ 2/153 Aust Gen Tpt Coy (TS)	KAIRI	G449371	
C55	92274	2-7/91	2/7 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	KAIRI	G449371	
C56	92275	2-8/91	2/8 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	KAIRI	G449371	
C57	92276	2-9/91	2/9 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	KAIRI	G449371	
C58	92277	2-153/117	2/153 Aust Wksp Pl	KAIRI	G449371	
C59	47943	2-2/41	HQ 2/2 Aust Sup Depot Coy	KAIRI	G501383	
C60	48834	2-5/65	2/5 Aust Sup Depot Pl	KAIRI	G501383	
C61	48835	2-6/65	2/6 Aust Sup Depot Pl	KAIRI	G501383	
C62	48836	2-7/65	2/7 Aust Sup Depot Pl	KAIRI	G501383	
C63	48837	2-8/65	2/8 Aust Sup Depot Pl	KAIRI	G501383	
C64	48838	2-9/65	2/9 Aust Sup Depot Pl	KAIRI	G501383	
C65	48839	2-10/65	2/10 Aust Sup Depot Pl	KAIRI	G501383	
C66	61180	2-33/65	2/33 Aust Sup Depot Pl	KAIRI	G501383	
C67	61200	2-34/65	2/34 Aust Sup Depot Pl	KAIRI	G501383	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
MED						
C68	55408	2-4/57	2/4 Aust Fd Amb	KAIRI	G476377	
C69	55409	2-5/57	2/5 Aust Fd Amb	KAIRI	G473376	
C70	55410	2-6/57	2/6 Aust Fd Amb	KAIRI	G469377	
C71	55520	2-2/151	2/2 Aust CCS	MAPEE	D388361	Still under cond HQ 1 Aust Corps
C72	55669	2-2/696	2/2 Aust MCU (Type A)	KAIRI	G489384	
DENTAL						
C73	45843	2-6/181	2/6 Aust Dental Unit			
C74			HQ Sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G510400	Att HQ 7 Aust Div
C75			A Sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G485385	Att 2/31 Aust Inf Bn
C76			B Sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G505375	Att 2/5 Aust Fd Regt
C77			C Sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G481392	Att 2/16 Aust Inf Bn
C78			D Sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G510400	Att HQ 7 Aust Div
C79			E Sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G473385	Att 2/6 Aust Fd Coy
C80			F Sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit	KAIRI	G475366	Att 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
ORD						
C81	47944	2-117/83	2/117 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	KAIRI	G480376	
C82	49044	2-124/83	2/124 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	KAIRI	G487382	
C83	48432	2-125/83	2/125 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	KAIRI	G473379	
[illegible]						
C84	47945	2-117/76	2/117 Aust Bde Wksp (Type B)	KAIRI	G480376	
C85	49061	2-124/76	2/124 Aust Bde Wksp (Type B)	KAIRI	G487382	
C86	48433	2-125/76	2/125 Aust Bde Wksp (Type B)	KAIRI	B473379	
C87	61128	2-47/40	2/47 Aust LAD (Type J)	KAIRI	G482371	Att 18 Aust Inf Bde
C88	61078	2-51/40	2/51 Aust LAD (Type D)	KAIRI	G503377	Att 2/4 Aust Fd Regt
C89	61080	2-52/40	2/52 Aust LAD (Type [illegible])	KAIRI	G505375	Att 2/5 Aust Fd Regt
C90	61084	2-54/40	2/54 Aust LAD (Type G)	KAIRI	G512397	Att 2/2 Aust Tk A Regt
C91	61090	2-55/40	2/55 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G473384	Att 2/25 Aust Fd Pk Coy
C92	61092	2-56/40	2/56 Aust LAD (Type A)	KAIRI	G506392	Att HQ 7 Aust Div
C93	61103	2-59/40	2/59 Aust LAD (Type J)	KAIRI	G484394	Att 21 Aust Inf Bde
C94	45745	315/40	315 Aust LAD (Type J)	KAIRI	G486382	Att 25 Aust Inf Bde

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
PAY						
C95	61021	7/CO	7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	KAIRI	G512397	
POSTAL						
C96	61114	7/55	7 Aust Div Postal Unit	KAIRI	G510397	
PRO						
C97	61115	7/[illegible]	7 Aust Div Pro Coy	KAIRI	G497303	
MISC						
C98	61119	7/38	7 Aust Div Sal Unit	KAIRI	G472300	
C99	61244	7/71	7 Aust Div Reception Camp	DIMBUMAH	D396322	
C100	47062		12 Aust Mob Cinema	MOBILE		
C101	47062	903	96 Aust Mob Cinema			

9 AUST DIV

Formation Sign : Platypus on Boomerang

Serial No (a)	War Office Serial No (b)	Veh No (c)	Unit (d)	Location (e)	Map Ref (f)	Remarks (g)
			DIVISIONAL TROOPS			
			HQ UNITS			
D1	29734	9/84	HQ 9 Aust Div	RAVENSHOE	P432810	
D2	92367	4/490	4 Aust Visitors and Observers Sec	RAVENSHOE	P432810	
D3		477	Det Aust Mil Hist Sec	RAVENSHOE	P432810	LHQ unit
			CAV			
D4	61239	2-9/102	HQ 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	
D5	45525	2-4/239	2/4 Aust Commando Sqn	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	
D6	49428	2-11/239	2/11 Aust Commando Sqn	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	
D7	49429	2-12/239	2/12 Aust Commando Sqn	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	
			ARTY			
D8	48378	9/94	HQ RAA 9 Aust Div	RAVENSHOE	P432810	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
D9	61122	2-7/74	2/7 Aust Fd Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG333C17	
D10	61036	2-C/74	2/C Aust Fd Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG299C13	
D11	61124	2-12/74	2/12 Aust Fd Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG333C14	
D12	45740	C/C7	C Aust Svy Bty	RAVENSHOE	MG333C14	
D13	45129		2 Aust Mob Met Flt	RAVENSHOE	P432C10	
D14	48480	1/922	'A' Tp 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp	RAVENSHOE	MG333C17	
D15	48480	1/922	'B' Tp 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp	RAVENSHOE	MG333C14	
ENGRS						
D16	29737	9/C1	HQ RAE 9 Aust Div	RAVENSHOE	MG340C12	
D17	61207	2-16/60	2/16 Aust Fd Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG340C12	
D18	61186	2-24/67	2/24 Aust F Pk Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG340C12	
SIGS						
D19	29738	9/66	Sigs 9 Aust Div	RAVENSHOE	P430C15	
D20	49037	2-9/148	2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt Sig Tp	RAVENSHOE	MG326C19	
D21	48655	2-7/48	2/7 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG333C17	
D22	48656	2-8/84	2/8 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG299C18	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
D23	49085	2-12/48	2/12 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG333014	
D24	49106	3/45	3 Aust Engr Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG340012	
D25	46113	2-43/60	2/43 Aust Cipher Sec (Type K)	RAVENSHOE	P430019	
INF						
D26	61233	2-[illegible]/140	2/3 Aust Pnr Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG310017	
D27	61176	2-2/164	2/2 Aust MG Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG320012	
D28	61065	2-1/225	A Coy 2/1 Aust Gd Regt (less 1, 2 and 4 pls)	RAVENSHOE	P432010	Pls with Pnr
INT						
D29	61028	B/429	B Aust FS Sec	RAVENSHOE	P432010	
AASC						
D30	29743	9/59	HQ Comd 9 Aust Div AASC	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D31	47476	2-142/70	HQ 2/142 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D32	92286	2-16/91	2/16 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D33	92287	2-17/91	2/17 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D34	92288	2-18/91	2/18 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
D35	92289	2-142/117	2/142 Aust Wksp Pl (TS)	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D36	48428	2-156/70	HQ 2/156 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D37	92282	2-13/91	2/13 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D38	92283	2-14/91	2/14 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	RAVENSHOE	MG403860	
D39	92284	2-15/91	2/15 Aust Tpt Pl (TS)	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D40	92285	2-156/117	2/156 Aust Wksp Pl (TS)	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D41	48426	2-6/41	HQ 2/6 Aust Sup Depot Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	Pls (less det at DID RAVENSHOE), allotted to Bdes
D42	48994	2-107/65	2/107 Aust Sup Depot Pl	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
D43	48996	2-109/65	2/109 Aust Sup Depot Pl	RAVENSHOE	MG326016	
MED						
D44	55519	2-1/151	2/1 Aust CCS	RAVENSHOE	P423043	
D45	55445	2-3/696	2/3 Aust MCU	RAVENSHOE	MG363021	Att 2/3 Aust Fd Amb
D46	47956	22/601	22 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit (Type B)	RAVENSHOE	MG347800	Att 2/1 Aust CCS
D47	49398	109/70	109 Aust Adv Depot Med Stores	RAVENSHOE	P423043	Att 2/1 Aust CCS)Not incl)Provisional
D48	45314	103/704	103 Aust Mob Bact Lab	RAVENSHOE	P422042	Att 2/1 Aust CCS) OOB

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
D49	55573	2-8/181	HQ Sec 2/8 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG378820	Att 24 Aust Inf Bde
D50			Det HQ Sec 2/8 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG375823	Att 2/11 Aust Fd Amb
D51			A Sec 2/8 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG384832	Att 2/17 Aust Inf Bn
D52			B Sec 2/8 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG326819	Att 2/9 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt
D53			C Sec 2/8 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG326816	Att 26 Aust Inf Bde
D54			D Sec 2/8 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG310817	Att 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn
D55			E Sec 2/8 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG333817	Att 2/7 Aust Fd Regt
D56			F Sec 2/8 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG340812	Att RAE 9 Aust Div
Abroad						
D57	61125	2-61/40	2/61 Aust LAD (Type D)	RAVENSHOE	MG333814	Att 2/12 Aust Fd Regt
D58	61123	2-63/40	2/63 Aust LAD (Type D)	RAVENSHOE	MG333817	Att 2/7 Aust Fd Regt
D59	61037	2-64/40	2/64 Aust LAD (Type D)	RAVENSHOE	MG299818	Att 2/8 Aust Fd Regt
D60	61241	2-67/40	2/67 Aust LAD (Type A)	RAVENSHOE	P432810	Att HQ 9 Aust Div
D61	61187	2-72/40	2/72 Aust LAD (Type A)	RAVENSHOE	MG340812	Att 2/24 Aust Fd Pk Coy

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
	PAY					
D62	61210	9/CO	9 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	RAVENSHOE	P432C10	
	POSTAL					
D63	29746	9/55	9 Aust Div Postal Unit (less dets)	RAVENSHOE	P432C10	Dets with Bdes
	PRO					
D64	29745	9/95	9 Aust Div Pro Coy	RAVENSHOE	P433C20	
	MISC					
D65	61195	9/3C	9 Aust Div Sal Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG318817	
D66	45119	9/71	9 Aust Div Reception Camp	RAVENSHOE	MG392845	

20 AUST INF BDE GP

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
HQ						
D67	61093	20/88	HQ 20 Aust Inf Bde	RAVENSHOE	MG390840	
ENGRS						
D68	29269	2-3/60	2/3 Aust Fd Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG340812	
SIGS						
D69	49121	20/89	20 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG390840	
INF						
D70	61094	2-13/56	2/13 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG392839	
D71	61185	2-15/56	2/15 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG386835	
D72	61095	2-17/56	2/17 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG384832	
D73	61005	2-1/225	1 Pl, 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG390840	
AASC						
D74	48053	2-26/65	2/26 Aust Sup Depot Pl	RAVENSHOE	MG402853	) 2/6 Aust Sup Depot Coy
D75	48054	2-27/65	2/27 Aust Sup Depot Pl	RAVENSHOE	MG326816	)

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
MED						
D76	55412	2-8/57	2/8 Aust Fd Amb	RAVENSHOE	MG309820	
Qqw						
D77	40117	2-118/83	2/118 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	RAVENSHOE	MG375829	
AEME						
D78	40118	2-118/76	2/118 Aust Bde Wksp	RAVENSHOE	MG375829	
D79	61097	2-58/40	2/58 Aust LAD (Type J)	RAVENSHOE	MG390840	
POSTAL						
D80	29746	9/55	Det 9 Aust Div Postal Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG390840	

24 AUST INF BDE GP

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
HQ						
D81	61180	24/80	HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde	RAVENSHOE	MG378320	
ENGRS						
D82	61127	2-7/60	2/7 Aust Fd Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG340312	
SIG						
D83	49123	24/89	24 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG378320	
INF						
D84	61189	2-28/56	2/28 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG378818	
D85	29865	2-32/56	2/32 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG374818	
D86	61190	2-43/56	2/43 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG374823	
D87	61005	2-1/225	2 Pl 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG378820	
AASC						
D88	48855	2-28/65	2/28 Aust Sup Depot Pl	RAVENSHOE	MG326816	)
D89	48856	2-29/65	2/29 Aust Sup Depot Pl	RAVENSHOE	MG326816	) 2/6 Aust Sup Depot Coy

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
MED						
D90	29270	2-3/57	2/3 Aust Fd Amb	RAVENSHOE	LG363021	
D91	40295	2-122/63	2/122 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	RAVENSHOE	LG346016	
AEME						
D92	48253	2-122/76	2/122 Aust Bde Wksp	RAVENSHOE	LG346016	
D93	61152	2-76/40	2/76 Aust LAD (Type J)	RAVENSHOE	LG378020	
POSTAL						
D94	29746	9/55	Det 9 Aust Div Postal Unit	RAVENSHOE	LG378020	

26 AUST INF BDE GP

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
HQ						
D95	61104	26/88	HQ 26 Aust Inf Bde	RAVENSHOE	MG363824	
ENGRS						
D96	29418	2-13/60	2/13 Aust Fd Coy	RAVENSHOE	MG340812	
SIGS						
D97	49125	26/89	26 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE	MG363824	
INF						
D98	61105	2-23/56	2/23 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG371826	
D99	61106	2-24/56	2/24 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG370827	
D100	61107	2-48/56	2/48 Aust Inf Bn	RAVENSHOE	MG355822	
D101	61005	2-1/225	4 Pl 2/1 Aust Gd Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG363824	
AASC						
D102	48857	2-30/65	2/30 Aust Sup Depot Pl	RAVENSHOE	MG326816	) 2/6 Aust Sup Depot Coy
D103	48858	2-31/65	2/31 Aust Sup Depot Pl	RAVENSHOE	MG326816	)

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
MED						
D104	55413	2-11/57	2/11 Aust Fd Amb	RAVENSHOE	MG375023	
ORD						
D105	48296	2-123/63	2/123 Aust Bde Ord Fd Pk	RAVENSHOE	MG312019	
AREME						
D106	48294	2-123/76	2/123 Aust Bde Wksp	RAVENSHOE	MG312019	
D107	61109	2-70/40	2/70 Aust LAD (Type J)	RAVENSHOE	MG363024	
POSTAL						
D108	29746	9/55	Det 9 Aust Div Postal Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG363024	

1 AUST BEACH GP

Serial No (a)	War Office Serial No (b)	Veh No (c)	Unit (d)	Location (e)	Map Ref (f)	Remarks (g)
HQ						
F1	49457	1/640	HQ 1 Aust Beach Gp	DEADMANS GULLY	C622862	
ENGRS						
F2	61206	2-15/60	2/15 Aust Fd Coy	DEADMANS GULLY	C616855	
F3	92190	1/408	1 Aust Mech Eqpt Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C616855	
F4	92192	1/529	1 Aust Beach Gp Stores Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C616855	
SIGS						
F5	45270	2/474	2 Aust Beach Sig Sec (AIF)	DEADMANS GULLY	C623863	
INF						
F6	61595	2-/240	2/4 Aust Pnr Bn	DEADMANS GULLY	C616861	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
AASC						
F7	46178	2-166/78	2/166 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	DEADMANS GULLY	C622060	
F8	92331	2-47/91	2/47 Aust Gen Tpt Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C622060	
F9	92332	2-48/91	2/48 Aust Gen Tpt Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C622060	
F10	92333	2-166/117	2/166 Aust Wksp Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C622060	
F11	92242	57/207	57 Aust BIPOD Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C620859	
F12	49459	2-240/65	2/240 Aust Sup Depot Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C620859	
MED						
F13	92206	1/630	1 AAMC Coy (Beach Gp)	DEADMANS GULLY	C619857	Incl surgical team 2 offrs 5 ORs
F14	48394	20/696	20 Aust MCU (Type B) (AIF)	DEADMANS GULLY	C619857	
DENTAL						
F15	47298	70/701	HQ & E Sec 70 Aust Dental Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C619857	Att AAMC 1 Aust Beach Gp
F16			B Sec 70 Aust Dental Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C621861	Att AAMC 1 Aust Beach Gp.
ORD						
F17	48341	2/803	2 Aust Ord Beach Det	DEADMANS GULLY	C613855	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
AELE						
F18	92119	1/649	1 Aust Beach Wksp	DEADMANS GULLY	C613053	
PRO						
F19	92051	15/145	15 Aust Indep Bde Gp Pro Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C621062	
MISC						
F20	45859	3/34	3 Aust Armd Div Sal Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C614053	
RAN						
F21			RAN Commando (A)	DEADMANS GULLY	C621063	

2 AUST BEACH GP

Serial No (a)	War Office Serial No (b)	Veh No (c)	Unit (d)	Location (e)	Map Ref (f)	Remarks (g)
HQ						
G1	92122	2/648	HQ 2 Aust Beach Gp	PALM BEACH	C627871	
ENGRS						
G2	61535	2-11/60	2/11 Aust Fd Coy	DEADMANS GULLY	C609886	
G3	92191	2/408	2 Aust Mech Eqpt Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C611886	
G4	92193	2/529	2 Aust Beach Gp Stores Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C611886	
SIGS						
G5	45277	1/474	1 Aust Beach Sig Sec (AIF)	PALM BEACH	C627871	
INF						
G6	61232	2-2/140	2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	DEADMANS GULLY	C613880	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
AASC						
G7	47477	2-100/79	2/100 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	DEADMANS GULLY	C613883	Being organised
G8	92328	2-45/91	2/45 Aust Tpt Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C613883	
G9	92329	2-46/91	2/46 Aust Tpt Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C613883	
G10	92330	2-100/117	2/100 Aust Wksp Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C613883	
G11	92243	58/207	58 Aust DIPOD Pl	DEADMANS GULLY	C611883	
G12	49034	235/65	235 Aust Sup Depot Pl (AIF)	DEADMANS GULLY	C611883	
MED						
G13	92207	2/63	2 AAMC Coy (Beach Gp)	DEADMANS GULLY	C607883	
G14	48612	23/696	23 Aust MCU (Type B)	TRINITY BEACH	C607883	
DENTAL						
G15	47298	78/101	A Sec 78 Aust Dental Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C609882	
G16			D Sec 78 Aust Dental Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C611883	
ORD						
G17	47922	1/883	1 Aust Ord Beach Det	DEADMANS GULLY	C608890	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
AEME						
G18	49401	2/649	2 Aust Beach Wksp	DEADMANS GULLY	C608890	
PRO						
G19	49403	17/145	17 Aust Indep Bde Gp Pro Pl	PALM BEACH	C627871	
MISC						
G20	61507	1/34	1 Aust Armd Bde Sal Unit	DEADMANS GULLY	C609890	
RAN						
G21			RAN Commando (B)	PALM BEACH	C627871	

War Diary
Appendix "I"

SECRET

Subject: AMENDMENT TO 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT NO 8

HQ 1 Aust Corps
16 Oct 44
G/1499/Ops

6 Aust Div	1 - 3	1 Aust MC Gp SYDNEY	43
7 Aust Div	4 - 6	2 Aust MC Gp MELBOURNE	44
9 Aust Div	7 - 9	3 Aust MC Gp BRISBANE	45
1 Aust Beach Gp	10	4 Aust MC Gp PERTH	46
2 Aust Beach Gp	11	5 Aust MC Gp DARWIN	47
1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	12	6 Aust MC Gp ADELAIDE	48
1 Aust AL Gp	13	7 Aust MC Gp THURSDAY IS	49
46 Aust AL Sec (Tac R Sqn)	14		
RAA 1 Aust Corps	15	Det 2 Aust MC Gp HOBART	50
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	16	Mov CAIRNS	51
A Aust Corps Sigs	17-18	Mov ATHERTON	52
HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	19	Sig Centre ATHERTON	53
1 Aust Corps Accounts Office	20	13 Aust AOD	54
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	21	First Aust Army Comd Pay Office	55
		1 Aust HQ Area Comd ATHERTON	56
Copy for infm to:		Q'ld L of C Area (for LHQ Investigation Committee)	57
GHQ SWPA	22	Q'ld Ech and Records	58
LHQ	23-29	Det Q'ld Ech & Records CAIRNS	59
Adv LHQ	30-34	Det Q'ld L of C Stationery Unit ATHERTON	60
Fwd Ech LHQ	35-37	Eastern Area RAAF	61
2nd Ech (AUST)	38	NE Area RAAF	62
Rear Echelon First Aust Army	39-41	A Sub HQ Aust Kit Store IPSWICH	63
HQ 17 L of C Sub Area	96		
2/1 Aust Mov & Tn Gp TOWNSVILLE	42		

1. Herewith Amendment No 1 to 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No 8 as at 2400 hrs 15 Oct 44.

2. Please acknowledge on attached certificate.

R. J. Watt Maj
for Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

.....

1 Aust Corps

1. Receipt is acknowledged of Amendment No 1 to 1 Aust Corps Location Statement No 8 as at 2400 hrs 15 Oct 44.

.....Date

.....Signature

.....Appointment

.....Unit

Distributed by GS 16 Oct 44

	Copy No		Copy No
GOC	64	Q	61-62
G	65-67	Legal	63
G (Int)	68	Med	64
G (Liaison)	69	Dental	65
G (Trg)	70	Pro	66
CE	71	Education	95
Sy	72	S & T	87
CSO	73	Ord	88-89
DA & QMG	74	E & ME	90
A	75-79	Postal	91
DA&S	80	War Diary	92-93
		File	94

AMENDMENT NO 1 TO 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT NO 8. COPY NO 92.

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A55a	46326	5/650	5 Aust Pigeon Sec delete 'HQ'	BARRIE	G556341	
A55/A56						
A59a	48485	2/867	2 Aust AP. IU	BARRIE	G555344	
A60				DEADMANS GULLY	C527671	(delete)
A89						att 9 Aust Div
A92						att 2/13 Aust Inf Bn
A130			delete			
A133a	45525	75/181	79 Aust Dental Unit	WONGABEL	H392196	
A134		2-3/147	2/3 Aust Inf Tps Ord Fd Pk			
A151			delete			
B3a			Det Public Relations	WONDECLA	H366046	
B4			)			
B5			) delete			
B6			)			
B7			)			
B18			delete			
B44	57737	2-3/704	2/3 Aust Mob Bact Lab	WONDECLA	H304099	Corps Tps.
B56						Corps Tps u/c 7 Aust Div
B57			2/9 Aust Armd Regt Hosp (less det)			Corps Tps u/c 7 Aust Div
B69a		903	100 Aust Mob Cinema	WONDECLA	MOBILE	
	3844					
C5a	31459	2-9/52	HQ & HQ Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt (less rear HQ)	KAIRI	G506393	Corps Tps

AMENDMENT NO 1 TO 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION STATEMENT NO 8. Copy No ________

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
C5b			B Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	MAIRI	G506393	Corps Tps
C5c			C Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	MAIRI	G506393	
C6a	61061	2-6/74	2/6 Aust Fd Regt	MAIRI	G459361	
C11a	48480	1/922	A Tp 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp	MAIRI		
C19a	48637	2-9/79	2/9 Aust Armd Regt Sig Tp (less det)	MAIRI	G506393	Corps Tps
C21a	49054	2-6/48	2/6 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec	MAIRI	G459361	
C86a	48586	2-9/54	det 2/9 Aust Armd Regt Wksp	MAIRI	G506393	Corps Tps
C89a	61062	2-53/40	2/53 Aust LAD (Type D)	MAIRI	G459361	Att 2/6 Aust Fd Regt
D7a	61455	2-9/52	A Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	RAVENSHOE	MG299818	Corps Tps
D14			delete			
D47) D48)						delete "NOT on provisional OOB"
D56a	48586	2-9/54	det 2/9 Aust Armd Regt Wksp	RAVENSHOE	MG299818	Corps Tps

95

Subject: 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION REPORT 2

HQ 1 Aust Corps
21 Oct 44
G/1502/Ops

GHQ	1	Mov CAIRNS	32
LHQ	2 - 8	Mov ATHERTON	33
Adv LHQ	9 - 13	Sig Centre ATHERTON	34
Fwd Ech LHQ	14 - 16	13 Aust AOD	35
2nd Ech (AUST)	17	First Aust Army Comd Pay Office	36
Rear Ech First Aust Army	18 - 20	1 Aust HQ Area Comd ATHERTON	37
HQ 17 L of C Sub Area	21	Q'ld L of C Area (for LHQ Investigation Committee)	38
2/1 Aust Mov & Tn Gp TOWNSVILLE	22	Q'ld Ech and Records	39
1 Aust MC Gp SYDNEY	23	Det Q'ld Ech & Records CAIRNS	40
2 Aust MC Gp MELBOURNE	24	Det Q'ld L of C Stationery Unit ATHERTON	41
3 Aust MC Gp BRISBANE	25	Eastern Area RAAF	42
4 Aust MC Gp PERTH	26	NE Area RAAF	43
5 Aust MC Gp DARWIN	27	A Sub HQ Aust Kit Store IPSWICH	44
6 Aust MC Gp ADELAIDE	28		
7 Aust MC Gp THURSDAY IS	29		
10 Aust MC Gp	30		
Det 2 Aust MC Gp HOBART	31		

Attached as Appendix 'A' is Location Report 2.

J Hoffman Lt Col
for Lieutenant-General.
Commanding 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 21 Oct 44

6 Aust Div	45 - 47	G (Trg)	72
7 Aust Div	48 - 50	CE	73
9 Aust Div	51 - 53	Svy	74
1 Aust Beach Gp	54	CSO	75
2 Aust Beach Gp	55	DA & QMG	76
1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	56	A	77 - 81
1 Aust AL Gp	57	DAMS	82
46 Aust AL Sec (Tac R Sqn)	58	Q	83 - 84
RAA 1 Aust Corps	59	Legal	85
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	60	Medical	86
A Aust Corps Sigs	61 - 62	Dental	87
HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps ASC	63	Pro	88
1 Aust Corps Accounts Office	64	Education	89
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	65	ST	90
GOC	66	Ord	91 - 92
G	67 - 69	E & ME	93
G (Int)	70	Postal	94
G (Liaison)	71	War Diary	95 - 96
		File	97

Appendix 'A' to 1 Aust Corps G/1502/Ops of 21 Oct 44.

LOCATION REPORT 2

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A75a				EDMONTON		
A75b				EDMONTON		
A89				RAVENSHOE	MG392839	Att 2/13 Aust Inf Bn u/c 9 Aust Div for local adm.
A92				BARRINE	G559336	Att HQ A Corps Sigs
A101					H333069	Att 2/1 Aust Fd Regt u/c 6 Aust Div for local adm
A117					H396185	
A123			Delete			
A124				BARRON RIVER	C703774	
A138					C703765	
A139			(less det)			
A140					D374410	
B42			(less det)			
B55					H317080	Att 2/11 Aust Inf Bn
B57			(less dets)			Corps Troops u/c 7 Aust Div for local adm
B63			Delete			
B100				In transit		
B104				In transit		
C5a C5b C5c					G504392	
C19a					G504392	
C67a	48401	33/118	Det 33 Aust Tk transporter pl	KAIRI	G504392	
C71			(less lt Sec)			
C71a	53320	22/151	Lt sec 2/2 Aust CCS	KAIRI	G476377	Att 2/4 Aust Fd Amb

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
C78					G486369	Att 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn
C79					G474386	Att HQ RAE 7 Aust Div
C86a					G504392	
C93a	61485	2-95/40	2/95 Aust LAD (type H)	KAIRI	G504392	Att 2/9 Aust Armd Regt
D50					MG378820	Att 24 Aust Inf Bde
D51					MG386835	Att 2/15 Aust Inf Bn
D54						Att 2/3 Aust Pnr Bn
G15					C613883	Att 2/108 Aust Gen Tpt Coy
G16						Att 58 Aust BIPOD Pl

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Subject: 1 AUST CORPS LOCATION REPORT 3

HQ 1 Aust Corps
27 Oct 44
G/1503/Ops

GHQ	1	Det 2 Aust MC Gp HOBART	32
LHQ	2 - 8	Mov CAIRNS	33
Adv LHQ	9 - 13	Mov ATHERTON	34
Fwd Ech LHQ	14 - 16	Sig Centre ATHERTON	35
2nd Ech (AUST)	17	13 Aust AOD	36
Rear Ech First Aust Army	18 - 20	1 Aust HQ Area Comd ATHERTON	37
HQ 17 L of C Sub Area	21	Q'ld L of C Area (for LHQ Investigation Committee)	38
2/1 Aust Mov & Tn Gp TOWNSVILLE	22	Q'ld Ech and Records	39
1 Aust MC Gp SYDNEY	23	Det Q'ld Ech & Records CAIRNS	40
2 Aust MC Gp MELBOURNE	24	Det Q'ld L of C Stationery Unit ATHERTON	41
3 Aust MC Gp BRISBANE	25	Eastern Area RAAF	42
4 Aust MC Gp PERTH	26	NE Area RAAF	43
5 Aust MC Gp DARWIN	27	A Sub HQ Aust Kit Store IPSWICH	44
6 Aust MC Gp ADELAIDE	28		
7 Aust MC Gp THURSDAY IS	29		
10 Aust MC Gp TOWNSVILLE	30		
11 Aust MC Gp MONGASEL	31		

--- Attached as Appendix 'A' is Location Report 3.

for Lieutenant-General,
Commanding 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 27 Oct 44.

6 Aust Div	45 - 47	G (Trg)	72
7 Aust Div	48 - 50	CE	73
9 Aust Div	51 - 53	Sy	74
1 Aust Beach Gp	54	CSO	75
2 Aust Beach Gp	55	DA & QMG	76
1 Aust Combined Ops Sec	56	A	77 - 81
1 Aust AL Gp	57	DAMS	82
46 Aust AL Sec (Tac R Sqn)	58	Q	83 - 84
RAA 1 Aust Corps	59	Legal	85
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps	60	Medical	86
A Aust Corps Sigs	61 - 62	Dental	87
HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC	63	Pro	88
1 Aust Corps Accounts Office	64	Education	89
1 Aust Corps Reception Camp	65	ST	90
GOC	66	Ord	91 - 92
G	67 - 69	E & ME	93
G (Int)	70	Postal	94
G (Liaison)	71	War Diary	95 - 96
		File	97

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
A12a	92574	11/712	% 11 Aust Mov Control Gp (Type E)	WONGABEL		
A14			delete and add new serial			
A14	61217	2-9/74	18 Aust Fd Bty	WONDECLA	H308085	(Adv party 2/9 Aust Fd Regt)
A21a	61202	2-23/67	2/23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy	WONGABEL	H402183	
A23a	48687	2-10/733	2/10 Aust Docks Ops Coy (Type E)	EDGE HILL CAMP		
A29			delete			
A46b	61342	3/510	3 Aust MT Sec (LT)	BARRINE	G557339	
A46(c)	45615	12/510	12 Aust MT Sec (LT)	BARRINE	G557339	
A48(a)	45044	40/510	40 Aust MT Sec (LT)	BARRINE	G557339	
A75a				HAMBLEDON	G684870	
A75(b)				HAMBLEDON	G684870	
A104			delete and add new serial			
A104	61203	2-65/40	2/65 Aust LAD (Type A)	WONGABEL	H402183	Att 2/23 Aust Corps Fd Pk Coy
A124a	48333	5/541	5 Aust Welding Pl	CAIRNS		
B100						Departed area
B103						Departed area
B104						Departed area
B114						Departed area
D11a	61038	2-3/62	2/3 Aust Tk A Regt	RAVENSHOE		

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
D22a	48657	2-3/63	2/3 Aust Tk A Regt Sig Sec	RAVENSHOE		
D48a	45635	79/181	E Sec 79 Aust Dental Unit	RAVENSHOE	MG378820	Att HQ 24 Aust Inf Bde
D59a	61039	2-71/40	2/7lAust LAD (type G)	RAVENSHOE		Att 2/3 Aust Fd Regt
			1 AUST BASE SUB AREA			
H1	92215	1/740	HQ 1 Aust Base Sub Area (AIF)	CHERMSIDE		Under command 1 Aust Corps from 2400 hours 26 Oct 44.

APPENDIX 'J'

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUST CORPS

SD SUMMARY - NO 70

MOVEMENT AND ORGANISATION

		Previous Ref Summary No.
WARNING ORDERS ISSUED		
1.	**2/1 Aust Fd Regt** Warned for embarkation tropical service NOT later than 25 Nov.	-
2.	**1 Aust AAPIU** To prepare to embark at an early date for tropical service.	-
3.	**3 Aust AAPIU** Warning order cancelled.	66
MOVEMENTS IN		
4.	**2/2 Aust Tk A Regt, Sig Sec and 2/54 Aust LAD** Move completed 26 Sep.	67
5.	**2/9 Aust Fd Regt (less 18 Bty).** To move from MERAUKE to WONDECLA. On arrival under command RAA 1 Aust Corps.	-
6.	**3, 7, 12 and 40 Aust Wireless Secs (Lt)** To move from VIC to BARRINE. On arrival under command 'A' Aust Corps Sigs.	-
7.	**5 Aust Welding Pl** To move earliest to CAIRNS. On arrival under command RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps to assist in completion of watercraft.	-
8.	**2/21 Aust Tpt Pl and 2/3 Aust Amphibious Veh Increment.** Move completed 29 Sep.	67
9.	**HQ 5 Aust Pigeon Sec** Arrived at BARRINE. Under command 'A' Aust Corps Sigs.	-
10.	**21 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit** Move completed 30 Sep.	67
11.	**B Tp 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp** HQ B Tp, 6, 8, 9 and 10 Shore Fire Control Parties arrived RAVENSHOE. Under command 9 Aust Div.	67

Previous Ref
Summary No.

MOVEMENTS WITHIN AREA

12. 20 Aust Inf Bde

Returning to RAVENSHOE from training at TRINITY BEACH. Move commences 3 Oct.

13. 21 Aust Inf Bde

Moving from KAIRI to TRINITY BEACH for training. Move commences 3 Oct.

14. 2/11 Aust Tpt Pl

Move completed 29 Sep. 69

GS
2 Oct 44.

K.K. Owen Maj
Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 2 Oct 44.

GOC
BGS
G (2)
CCRA
CE
DA & QMG
A
Q
DAMS
Med
Dental
Pro
ST
Ord (1 for DADOS C Tps) (2).
E & ME
U Aust FS Sec
Capt McMAHON (DOS Rep - 13 AOD) - DRLS
War Diary (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUST CORPS

SD SUMMARY - NO 71

MOVEMENT AND ORGANISATION.

		Previous Ref Summary No.
MOVEMENTS IN		
1.	2/1 Aust Comp AA Regt, Sig Sec and AA Wksp	
	To move from Second Aust Army area to 1 Aust Corps area to arrive not later than 1 Nov. On arrival under comd RAA 1 Aust Corps.	-
2.	2/104 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	
	To move from NSW to 1 Aust Corps area to arrive not later than 1 Nov. On arrival under comd HQ Comd 1 Aust C Tps AASC.	-
3.	24 Aust War Graves Unit.	-
	To move from VIC to WONGABEL to arrive not later than 1 Nov. On arrival under comd 1 Aust Corps.	
4.	5 Aust Mech Eqpt Coy	
	Now to move to arrive 1 Aust Corps area not later than 1 Nov.	65
5.	2/23 Aust C Fd Pk Coy & 2/65 Aust LAD	
	Now to move to arrive 1 Aust Corps area not later than 1 Nov.	65
6.	1 Aust Para Refolding Pl	
	Now to move to arrive 1 Aust Corps area not later than 1 Nov.	61
7.	20 Aust Hosp Laundry Unit	
	Move complete	67
MOVEMENTS WITHIN AREA		
8.	'A' Tp 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp	
	To move from RAVENSHOE to 7 Aust Div area 6 Oct. On arrival under comd 7 Aust Div.	-
9.	78 Aust Dental Unit	-
	det HQ Sec - Moved from DEADMANS GULLY to BARRON RIVER 25 Sep - attached to 41 Aust Ldg Craft Coy.	

GS
6 Oct 44

Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 6 Oct 44

GOC
BGS
G (2)
CCRA
CE
DA & QMG
A
Q
DAMS
Med
Dental
Pro
ST
Ord (1 for DADOS C Tps) (2)
E & ME
U Aust FS Sec
War Diary (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUST CORPS

SD SUMMARY - NO 72

MOVEMENT AND ORGANISATION

	Previous Ref Summary No.
WARNING ORDERS ISSUED	
1. LHQ SME Mob Team Bomb Disposal Wing To prepare to embark for tropical service NOT before 4 Nov.	-
MOVEMENTS IN	
2. 2/10 Aust Docks Op Coy (Type C) To move from NORTHERN TERRITORY to arrive 1 Aust Corps area not later than 1 Nov. On arrival under comd 1 Aust Corps as C Tps.	-
3. 2 Aust Fd Sqn To move from NORTHERN TERRITORY to 1 Aust Corps area not later than 1 Nov. On arrival under comd 1 Aust Corps as C Tps.	-
4. 116 Aust Mob B U To move from VIC to 1 Aust Corps area to arrive not later than 1 Nov. On arrival under comd 1 Aust Corps as C Tps	-
5. 2 Aust AAPIU Move complete 4 Oct	69
6. 100 Aust Mob Cinema Move complete 9 Oct. Under comd 6 Aust Div	62
7. 2/6 Aust Fd Regt Adv party arrived KAIRI	67
8. A Tp 1 Aust Naval Bombardment Gp Move complete 6 Oct	71
MOVEMENTS WITHIN AREA	
9. 3 Aust AAPIU Moved from WONDECLA to PALM BEACH 9 Oct. Under 2 Aust Beach Gp for local adm.	-

for Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

GS
11 Oct 44.

Distributed by GS 11 Oct

GOC : BGS : G (2) : CCRA : CE : DA&QMG : A : Q : DAMS : Med : Dental : Pro : ST : Ord (1 for DADOS C Tps) (2) : E & ME : U Aust FS Sec : War Diary (2).

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUST CORPS

SD SUMMARY NO 73

MOVEMENT AND ORGANISATION

Previous Ref Summary No.

WARNING ORDERS ISSUED

1. 1 Aust Welding Pl

To move earliest to BRISBANE. On arrival under command QUEENSLAND L of C Area.

2. 3 Aust Welding Pl

To move to arrive BRISBANE by 1 Nov. On arrival under command 1 Aust Base Sub Area.

3. Det 2/1 Aust Army Topo Svy Coy

To prepare for embarkation tropical service. Det to consist of det HQ, one svy sec, one lithograph sec, one drawing sec.

MOVEMENTS OUT

4. 1 Aust AAPIU

Departed this area 11 Oct. 70

MOVEMENTS IN

5. 2/6 Aust Fd Regt, Sig Sec and 2/53 Aust LAD

Move completed 11 Oct. 67

6. 2 Aust Med Regt, Sig Sec and 234 Aust LAD

To move from HELIDON to 1 Aust Corps area. On arrival under command RAA 1 Aust Corps.

7. HQ 2 Aust Docks Gp)
8. 2/1 Aust Docks Op Coy)
9. 5 Aust Docks Op Coy)
10. 7 Pl 1 Aust Port Maint Coy)

To move from Second Aust Army area to 1 Aust Corps area. On arrival under command 1 Aust Corps as Corps troops.

11. 34 Aust FS Sec (Enemy Eqpt))
12. 35 Aust FS Sec (Enemy Eqpt))
13. 5 Aust Bomb Disposal Pl)
14. HQ 2/105 Aust Gen Tpt Coy)

2/27 Aust Tpt Pl)
2/28 Aust Tpt Pl)
2/29 Aust Tpt Pl)
2/105 Aust Wksp Pl))

Previous Ref
Summary No.

15. 4 Aust Entomological Sec)
)
16. 6 Aust Entomological Sec)
)
17. 2/4 Aust Mech Eqpt Wksp)

To move from QUEENSLAND L of C Area to 1 Aust Corps area. On arrival under comd 1 Aust Corps as Corps troops.

GS
17 Oct 44.

for Lt Col,
GS.

Distributed by GS 17 Oct 44.

GOC
BGS
G (2)
CCRA
CE
DA & QMG
A
Q
DAMS
Med
Dental
Pro
ST
Ord (1 for DADOS C Tps) (2)
E & ME
U Aust FS Sec
War Diary (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUST CORPS

SD SUMMARY NO 74.

MOVEMENT AND ORGANISATION

Previous Ref Summary No

WARNING ORDERS ISSUED

1. 33 Aust Sqn AL Sec

To prepare for embarkation tropical service.

MOVEMENTS OUT

2. 1 Aust Welding Pl

Departed this area 17 Oct. 73

MOVEMENTS IN

3. 113 Aust Mob Cinema)
4. 114 Aust Mob Cinema)

To move from NSW to KAIRI to arrive NOT later than 1 Nov. On arrival under command 7 Aust Div.

5. 115 Aust Mob Cinema)
6. 116 Aust Mob Cinema)

To move from NSW to RAVENSHOE to arrive NOT later than 1 Nov. On arrival under command 9 Aust Div.

7. 117 Aust Mob Cinema)
8. 118 Aust Mob Cinema)

To move from NSW to WONGABEL to arrive NOT later than 1 Nov. On arrival under command 1 Aust Corps as Corps Troops.

9. Op Det 5 Aust Pigeon Sec

To move from VIC to BARRINE to arrive NOT later than 1 Nov. On arrival under command 'A' Aust Corps Sigs for allotment to 5 Aust Pigeon Sec.

10. 2 Sec 1 Aust Base Depot Dental Stores

To move from VIC to WONGABEL to arrive NOT later than 15 Nov. On arrival under command 1 Aust Corps as Corps Troops.

MOVEMENTS WITHIN AREA

11. 2/3 Aust Tk A Regt, Sig Sec and 2/71 Aust LAD

Moving 20/21 Oct from WONGABEL to RAVENSHOE. On arrival under command 9 Aust Div.

Previous Ref
Summary No.

12. Two Op Dets 8 Aust Pigeon Sec

To move from BARRINE to KAIRI NOT before 7 Nov. Placed under command 7 Aust Div from 8 Nov.

13. Two Op Dets 3 Aust Pigeon Sec

To move from BARRINE to RAVENSHOE NOT before 7 Nov. Placed under command 9 Aust Div from 8 Nov.

14. 2/21 Aust Tpt Pl)
15. 2/3 Aust Amphibious Veh Increment)

Moved from WONGABEL to Ord Veh Pk EDMONTON for issue of DUKWS.

16. LHQ Flame Warfare Trg Cadre

To move from RAVENSHOE to KAIRI 16 Nov. On arrival under command 7 Aust Div for local adm to conduct series 5 day courses.

GS
20 Oct 44.

Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 20 Oct 44.

GOC
BGS
G (2)
CCRA
CE
DA & QMG
A
Q
DAMS
Med
Dental
Pro
ST
Ord (1 for DADOS C Tps) (2)
E & ME
U Aust FS Sec
War Diary (2)

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUST CORPS

SD SUMMARY NO 75

MOVEMENT AND ORGANISATION

		Previous Ref Summary No
MOVEMENTS IN		
1.	**18 Bty 2/9 Aust Fd Regt** Move completed.	68
2.	**2/23 Aust C Fd Pk Coy and 2/65 Aust LAD** Move completed.	58
3.	**5 Aust Welding Pl** Move completed.	70
4.	**8 Pl 1 Aust Port Maint Coy** To move from NSW to CAIRNS to arrive NOT later than 1 Nov. On arrival under command 1 Aust Corps as Corps troops.	
5.	**23 Aust War Graves Unit** To move from TOWNSVILLE to WONGABEL. On arrival under command 1 Aust Corps as Corps troops.	
6.	**Mob Wing LHQ School of Artillery (AA)** To move from NSW to KAIRI by 28 Oct. On arrival to be attached to 2/13 Aust Comp AA Regt.	
MOVEMENTS WITHIN AREA.		
7.	**2/3 Aust Tk A Regt, Sig Sec and 2/71 Aust LAD.** Move completed.	74

GS
23 Oct 44.

Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 23 Oct 44.

GOC	Med
BGS	Dental
G (2)	Pro
CCRA	ST
CE	Ord (1 for DADOS C Tps) (2)
DA & QMG	E & ME
A	U Aust FS Sec
Q	War Diary (2)
DAMS	

CONFIDENTIAL

1 AUST CORPS

SD SUMMARY NO 76

MOVEMENT AND ORGANISATION

Previous Ref Summary No

WARNING ORDERS ISSUED

1. 53 Aust Comd AA Regt, Sig Sec and Wksp

   To move earliest from MAPEE to Second Aust Army area.

2. 1 Aust Floating Watercraft Wksp

   To move CAIRNS to BRISBANE to arrive NOT later than 20 Nov, On arrival under comd MILBASE BRISBANE.

MOVEMENTS OUT

3. 27 Aust Sqn AL Sec

   To move from WONGABEL to TOWNSVILLE earliest. On arrival to be attached to HQ RAAF NEA.

4. 3 Aust Welding Pl

   Departed area 26 Oct — 73

MOVEMENTS IN

5. 3, 12 and 40 Aust Wireless Secs (Lt) — 70

   Move completed 25 Oct.

6. 2/10 Aust Docks Op Coy — 72

   Move completed 23 Oct.

7. Det 2/13 Aust Comp AA Regt

   68 SL personnel to move from NSW to join 2/13 Aust Comp AA Regt KAIRI not later than 1 Nov.

8. 4 Aust Beach Sig Sec

   To move from Vic L of C to PALM BEACH to arrive not later than 15 Nov. On arrival under comd 2 Aust Beach Gp.

9. 2/93 Aust LAD

   To move from BRISBANE to WONGABEL soonest after reorganisation. On arrival to be attached 5 Aust Mech Eqpt Coy.

10. 110 Aust Adv Depot Med Stores

    To move from NSW L of C to KAIRI to arrive not later than 1 Nov. On arrival under 7 Aust Div for local adm.

11. One Sec 72 Aust Dental Unit

To move from TORRES area to WONGABEL. On arrival temporarily allotted to 1 Aust Corps.

MOVEMENTS WITHIN AREA

12. 2/3 Aust Rly Constr Coy (Mech Eqpt)& 287 Aust LAD

To move from WONGABEL to WONDECLA 29 Oct.

13. 'E' Sec 79 Aust Dental Unit

Moved from WONGABEL to RAVENSHOE 24 Oct. Under 9 Aust Div for local adm.

14. 2 Aust AAPIU

To move from BARRINE to KAIRI 30 Oct. On arrival under 7 Aust Div for local adm.

15. 3 Aust AAPIU

To move from PALM BEACH to BARRINE 28 Oct.

Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps

GS
28 Oct 44.

Distributed by GS 28 Oct 44.

GOC	Med
BGS	Dental
G (2)	Pro
CCRA	ST
CE	Ord (1 for DADOS C Tps) (2)
DA & QMG	E & ME
A	U Aust FS Sec
Q	War Diary (2)
DAMS	

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX 'K'

Subject: LIGHT AND ASSAULT SCALES

HQ 1 Aust Corps
7 Oct 44.
G/5065/SD.

7 Aust Div
9 Aust Div
1 Aust Beach Gp
2 Aust Beach Gp
RAA 1 Aust Corps
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps
'A' Aust Corps Sigs

1. It is necessary to prepare light and assault scales of personnel, vehicles and equipment, so that a tactical plan can be implemented quickly.

2. Light and assault scales are defined as -

(a) Light scale - Personnel, vehicles and unit equipment to enable formations to operate for 14 days, 15 miles inland.

(b) Assault scale - Personnel, vehicles and unit equipment to enable formations to operate for 2 days, 8 miles inland.

3. Divisions and beach groups will prepare proposed scales as defined in para 2 above. RAA 1 Aust Corps, RAE 1 Aust Corps Troops and 'A' Aust Corps Sigs will prepare similar scales for units of corps troops for which similar units are not included in divisional or beach group orders of battle.

4. Divisions and beach groups will appoint representatives to attend a conference at this headquarters prepared to discuss these scales. The object of the conference is to reach a common scale acceptable to all formations which will be adopted as 1 Aust Corps scales. Changes in proposed scales will be referred to formations for concurrence or otherwise before adoption.

5. Divisional and beach group representatives of arms and services will be available to attend this conference, if it is found necessary to discuss technical aspects of the scales.

6. The proposed formation scales will be prepared in accordance with the attached pro forma. The form provides columns for all the information required, detailed lists of stores and weapons are not required.

7. Scales should provide for the landing of full water carrying vehicles and trailers.

8. The scales are required at this headquarters by 13 Oct. The date for the co-ordinating conference will be notified by signal.

R. Hodgman Lt-Col
for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 6 Oct 44.

BGS
GS
CE
CSO
Svy
DA & QMG
A
DAMS
Med
Dental
Q
ST
Ord
E & ME
Pay
Pro
Postal
Camp
War Diary (2)
File

"""" ASSAULT)
"""" LIGHT) SCALE

TYPE OF UNIT .....

Serial	Sub-unit or detachment	Personnel	VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND GUNS									Stores out of Vehicles Tons	
			Jeeps	Trucks 2½ ton 6 x 6	Trucks 3 ton 4 x 4	Tracked Vehicles +	Transporter 20 ton	Trailers Jeep	Trailers 2 wh water	Trailers Various +	Guns Various +	DW	M
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)

"""" ... delete as applicable
\+ ... include note at bottom of scale to indicate by types

APPENDIX 'L'

Subject: ISSUE OF OPERATIONAL VEHICLES

HQ 1 Aust Corps,
7 Oct 44.
G/5078/SD.

7 Aust Div (10)
9 Aust Div (10)
RAA 1 Aust Corps
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps
A Aust Corps Sigs
HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC
E & ME 1 Aust Corps Tps

1. The issue of operational vehicles to bring formation holdings up to 100 per cent of Scale in accordance with LHQ SF5767 will commence on Monday 9 Oct.

2. The priority of issue and an approximate forecast of dates of issue is as follows :-

A	9 Aust Div	Div HQ and 24 Aust Inf Bde Gp	9/10 Oct
B	7 Aust Div	25 Aust Inf Bde Gp	11/12 Oct
C	9 Aust Div	20 and 26 Aust Inf Bde Gps and Div Tps	13/18 Oct
D	7 Aust Div	18 and 21 Aust Inf Bde Gps and Div Tps	19/23 Oct
E	1 Aust Corps	1 Aust Corps Tps	24/31 Oct

3. Indents are not required. Issue will be arranged by this headquarters, formations and units of Corps Troops will be notified by DDOS 1 Aust Corps of the time vehicles will be collected from 7 Aust Ord Veh Pk.

4. All vehicles will be run in and given initial service by 1 Dec. After initial service, use of vehicles will be restricted to essential training or maintenance running which should not exceed 20 miles weekly.

[signature]
for Brig,
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 7 Oct 44

CE	ST
Svy	Ord (2)
CSO	E & ME
A	Postal
Q (3)	Sal
Med	Camp (2)
Dental	War Diary/(2)
Pro	File
Amenities	

APPENDIX 'M'

Subject: COMMAND OF UNITS

MINUTE

RAA 1 Aust Corps
G (Int)
G (Air)
CE
Svy
CSO
A
Q
DAMS
Legal
Chaplains
Med
Dental
Pro
Education
Amenities
ST
Ord
E & ME
Postal
Catering
Salvage
Camp
War Diary (2) ✓

1. It should be noted that the DDMS and ADDS 1 Aust Corps are the commanders of all medical and dental units of 1 Aust Corps tps.

2. Communications from branches and services for medical and dental units should be addressed to DDMS and ADDS not direct to units.

A. J. Wirth Major
for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

GS
3 Oct 44.

APPENDIX 'N'

Subject: WIRELESS SETS NO 46.

HQ 1 Aust Corps
30 Oct 44.
G/5348/SD.

7 Aust Div
9 Aust Div
1 Aust Beach Gp
2 Aust Beach Gp

1. The quantity of 44 wireless sets No 46 held by 1 Aust Corps represents the full resources of Australia in this type of set, which is of British manufacture, and of particular value in amphibious operations.

2. Two maintenance kits of spare parts were forwarded from ENGLAND each containing five sets of spare valves. These spare valves have all been expended in the recent series of amphibious exercises.

3. Action is being taken to obtain any spare valves which may be available within Australia and a request will be made to LHQ for supply of valves by urgent air freight.

4. The 44 wireless sets mentioned in para 1 will only permit distribution being made on the scale of 6 sets to each of four assaulting brigades and 5 sets to each of four beach signal sections. This will meet operational requirements and provide one spare set with each brigade with no maintenance reserve whatsoever.

5. The high usage rate in valves was found to be due to incorrect insertion of the plug on the set end of the battery lead. A technical instruction has been issued by CSO 1 Aust Corps to prevent a recurrence, but the cause was discovered too late to prevent the entire stock of spare valves being expended. To prevent further damage from this cause signal officers in charge of detachments should personally see that the cause of the damage is fully explained to their detachments.

6. Until such time as adequate spare valves are obtained, it will be necessary to recall all wireless sets No 46 on issue to each 2 Aust Beach Gp. 7 Aust Div and 1 Aust Beach Gp may retain five sets/ until the conclusion of the present series of amphibious exercises, but every possible precaution will be taken to see that no further damage occurs.

J. Hoffman Roe
for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 30 Oct 44.

CSO
Q
Ord
E & ME
File
War Diary (2) ✓

War Diary

APPENDIX 'O'

SECRET
COPY NO 1

GENERAL STAFF INTELLIGENCE

1 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

No. 3

1. Information contained in this summary is for circulation down to battalions or equivalent units
2. Items sidelined will not be reproduced
3. Other items may be reproduced for the information of all units but, as reproduced material may be taken as confirmatory intelligence, the source of all such items will be acknowledged



AIR DISTANCE MAP
DISTANCES ARE SHOWN IN NAUTICAL MILES
TO CONVERT TO STATUTE MILES MULTIPLY BY 1·15
FRENCH INDO CHINA
THAILAND
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
LUZON
MINDANAO
BORNEO
CELEBES
JAVA
TIMOR
CERAM
NEW GUINEA
NEW BRITAIN
PACIFIC OCEAN
CAROLINE ISLANDS
MARIANAS
SAIPAN
GUAM
YAP
PALAU IS
TRUK IS
PONAPE
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS
BIAK IS
MOROTAI IS
HALMAHERA IS
SOLOMONS

GSI 1 AUSA CORPS [illegible] INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.5

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 29 Sep 44 to 1200 hrs 6 Oct 44

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GENERAL.

On night 29/30 Sep, a strong force of Liberators successfully attacked BALIKPAPAN, the chief enemy source of aviation fuel and fuel oil for the SWPA and Mandates. Main target there is probably the PANDANSARI Refinery, which, once destroyed, may take several months to repair. Photographs taken there in Aug 44 showed in progress certain construction work designed to increase the refinery capacity. Other targets of almost equal importance are the EDELEANU and sulphuric acid plants, and the lubricating oil plant, which were also attacked.

Allied carrier-based aircraft successfully attacked widespread targets in the Central PHILIPPINES, sinking 36 vessels, probably sinking another 18 and damaging 27 others. More than 200 Japanese vessels have either been sunk or damaged in PHILIPPINE waters in three weeks.

Following the declaration of a state of war between the Republic of the PHILIPPINES and GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, made on 23 Sep by President LAUREL, a further speech was made by the President on 26 Sep. In this speech, after referring to the failure of the UNITED STATES to heed his appeal that the PHILIPPINES be spared the suffering and destruction entailed in the resumption of military operations, he said:

> " About a week ago I announced that the 'Republic has but one course to pursue, and that is to render every aid and assistance to the Imperial Japanese Government short of the conscription of Filipino manhood for active military service.' I will stand by that statement."

PALAU ISLAND

INFORMATION UP TO 051800K OCT 44

PELELIU ISLAND:
27 Sep: Except UMURROGOL Mtn and small pocket in NE tip of Island, whole of Peleliu Is under Allied control.
28/29 : Jap troops infiltrated Allied lines causing some casualties with grenades.
29 : Little progress - stiff resistance on UMURROGOL Mtn area.
Casualties: 9076 killed
to 1 Oct 180 PsW.



28 Sep : Allied trcops landed NGESEBUS and KONGAURI Islands.
29 Sep : Both Islands completely under Allied control.

29 Sep: Enemy remnants NW island resisting stubbornly from caves pillboxes.
Casualties to 1 Oct: 1075 killed
7 PsW.
26/27 Sep: 2 enemy aircraft dropped 4 bombs, nil damage.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

S.W.P.A.

INFORMATION UP TO 051800K OCT 44

SCALE AT EQUATOR

100 75 50 25 0 100 200 Mls.

CATALINA NIGHT PATROLS
26/27 Sep: One 5800/7000-ton freighter-transport damaged, One 10000-ton transport fired and considered sunk.

30 Sep/1 Oct: 4 freighters, total 1200/4000-tons (1 damaged).
30 Sep : 5 grounded enemy aircraft destroyed by Coronado.

BORNEO:
27/28 Sep: One 300/1000-ton freighter damaged.

NORTHERN PHILIPPINES:
26 Sep : 2 battleships.

CENTRAL PHILIPPINES:
24 Sep : 35 vessels incl
1 large transport
3 large tankers
2 large cargo vessels
6 medium cargo vessels
5 small cargo vessels
1 destroyer
3 destroyer-escorts
11 small craft
} sunk.
18 vessels probably sunk.
27 vessels damaged.

29 grounded enemy aircraft destroyed.
7 enemy aircraft destroyed in combat.

MINDANAO:
26 Sep : 4 small freighters
26/27 : 6 vessels total 7500 tons
27 : 1 tanker
27/28 : 1 freighter 700-tons left listing, 4 barges and luggers sunk.

MOROTAI:
28 Sep : 2 barges destroyed.
28/29 : 6 enemy aircraft dropped approx 30 bombs. Nil damage.
30 Sep : Natives report 260 Japs in LEPAU (SE Coast) area.
Allied troops attacked positions on hill 2700 yds east of PILOWO (SW Coast).
Casualties to 29 Sep: 50 killed, 23 PsW.

110 sorties flown against various targets, 3 of 8 intercepting enemy aircraft and 3 grounded enemy aircraft destroyed.

BALIKPAPAN:
29/30 Sep: 74 Liberators attacked installations, heavy damage to cracking plant and sulphuric acid works. 7 of 20 enemy aircraft shot down.

27 Sep : 2 small cargo vessels, several freighters.
30 Sep/1 Oct: 2 small freighters, one schooner, 1 landing craft } sunk

25 Sep : 3 small cargo vessels.

Casualties to 28 Sep:
603 killed.
79 Jap PsW.
164 Formosan PsW.
6 Korean PsW.

Scattered targets attacked daily with a total of over 260 sorties.

Casualties to 29 Sep:
5891 : killed.
424 : Jap PsW.
278 : Formosan PsW.

29 Sep : Allied troops contacted the enemy in unknown strength in vicinity SAWAR airfield. 1 tankette destroyed by Allied artillery fire.

BOUGAINVILLE:
27 sorties flown against enemy positions.

Daily air attacks contin against enemy store-dumps with 146 sorties.

TRUK ATOLL:
ETEN:
One attack by 26 Liberators damaged installations.

28 Sep : One 2000-ton freighter-transport, 28 merchant vessels, total 7000 tons, 140 small craft.
1/2 Oct: Two 4000/6000-ton vessels.
3 : 23 merchant vessels, total 7700 tons.

Attacked with over 50 sorties. Fighter-escort destroyed 3 of 5 intercepting enemy fighters and 1 air-borne bomber in target area.

29 Sep : 1 submarine

25 Sep : One 700/1300-ton cargo vessel
27/28 : 1 freighter 700-tons
29/30 : 1 merchant vessel 8500-tons probably sunk.
30 : 22/32 barges, two 200/500-ton vessels.
1 Oct : 3 vessels, total 600-tons 10 luggers and barges.

29 Sep : 2 freighters, total 2300/5000 tons
30 : 5 vessels, total 2100/3500 tons 45 small craft.
2 Oct : One 150/300-ton vessel destroyed, 2 barges sunk.
4 : 5 vessels, total 900/2200 tons, one probably destroyed.

Attacks by bombers and fighter-bombers throughout area totalling over 200 sorties.

Night attack by 24 heavy bombers caused much damage to installations

3 Oct : 6 possible submarines.

JAVA:
28/29 Sep : 7 vessels, total 1300 tons, barges and luggers.

28 Sep : 1 submarine
1 destroyer

GSI 1 AUST CORPS

REPRODUCED BY 2/1 AUST ARMY TOPO SVY COY SEPT 44

001069G

PART 1

OPERATIONS - SWPA

1. LAND:

Further Allied landings have been made on [illegible]BUS and KONGAURI in the PALAU ISLANDS. Both these islands are now completely under Allied control. On PELELIU the enemy hold parts of the NE tip and the central west coast of the island. As on ANGAUR, where only remnants of the enemy are left, mopping up of enemy-held caves is slow and difficult.

2. SEA:

Enemy submarines have been very active in the BANDA SEA. Five submarines were sighted on 3 Oct 90 miles SW of B'ERUE and two other submarines sightings have been reported. Three of the submarines sighted on 3 Oct were in formation , line abreast and approximately 100 yards apart. It is likely that these submarines are engaged on supply duties.

Again the only substantial shipping sightings reported were in PHILIPPINE waters. On 24 Sep, 32 vessels representing some 100,000 tons of merchant shipping, and 4 naval vessels were sunk by carrier-based aircraft in the central PHILIPPINES. A further 18 vessels were probably sunk and 27 others damaged.

3. AIR:

(a) OWN

Activity was maintained in all areas except the SOLOMONS, where only 27 sorties were flown.

Daily attacks were continued against WEWAK, targets in VOGELKOP Peninsula, and enemy positions on the islands in the ARAFURA Sea.

Both heavy and medium bombers continued attacks on CELEBES and destroyed 3 grounded aircraft in addition to severely damaging installations.

On 24 Sep, another carrier-based attack was made against central PHILIPPINES (commonly referred to as "The VISAYAS" by our Allies). Thirty-six enemy aircraft were destroyed,and heavy toll was taken of enemy shipping.

A force of 74 Liberators on night 29/30 Sep attacked BALIKPAPAN and it is considered that serious damage was caused to PANDANSARI Refinery. In addition, possible damage was done to the cracking plant and sulphuric acid works.

(b) ENEMY

Enemy activity both offensive and defensive was increased during the period under review.

Night attacks were made by 6 aircraft on Allied positions on South MOROTAI and 2 aircraft on ANGAUR Island. No damage was reported from either attack.

During attacks by our aircraft on AMBOINA, KENDARI and BALIKPAPAN, interception by a total of 33 aircraft was reported. Of these 13 were shot down.

PART II

1. STRENGTHS AND DISPOSITIONS:

LAND:

A general review of the main enemy formations in the NW Sector was published in 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No.1 and showed the composition of armies down to divisions. Further information has now come to hand showing the following units under the command of 19 ARMY as at 1 Jan 44:-

5	Division
46	Division
48	Division
4	Tank Regiment
2	Battalion, 5 Medium Artillery Regiment
32	Field AA Battalion
44	Field AA Battalion
5	Infantry Mortar Battalion
31	Special MT Company
32	" " "
33	" " "
34	" " "
35	" " "
1	L of C MT Company
190	L of C MT Company
15	Southern Army Hospital
109	L of C Hospital
39	Casualty Clearing Platoon
40	" " "
2	Field Water Purification Unit
8	" " " "
68	Independent Line Company
19	Army Signal Unit H
19	Army Field Ordnance Depot
19	Army Field MT Depot
19	Army Field Freight Depot
5	Field MP Unit
54	Construction Duty Company
13	Field Post Office
114	Airfield Construction Unit
116	" " "
+ 117	" " "
118	" " "
+ 119	" " "
120	" " "

(NOTE: The units marked + are known to have left the command of 19 Army since 1 Jan 44).

A document captured at SAMSAPOR and giving the dispositions and strengths of enemy forces in the WOGSTKOP PENINSULA during Jun 44, discloses a total strength there at that time of 30,115, of whom 25% were labourers. The Intelligence estimate covering the same period was 20/25,000, excluding labourers.

It is reliably reported that Japanese troops from BOUGAINVILLE Island have been filtering back to MOIS?UL Island via FAURO.

2. TACTICS:

(a) DUMMY INSTALLATIONS

One of the noted characteristics of the Japanese mentality is deception and in the field this quality has been well exploited in the use of dummy installations erected to mislead our aerial observers. A series of illustrations showing examples of dummy installations are attached as Appendix 'A'

to this summary. These examples refer to ground installations but another example of effective deception to protect a valuable cargo ship at KISKA was published in Naval Aviation News of 1 Aug 44. This example is summarized as follows in A.F Summary No.242:-

"A damaged ship was beached in the harbour, and became a familiar landmark to pilots and interpreters. When one day the Japs sneaked in a sister-ship loaded with valuable stores, put it in the location the damaged ship had occupied, and pulled the damaged ship out to a new position and surrounded it by a group of barges to give the impression of activity. They then proceeded to unload the new supply ship, and until interpreters recognised the damaged ship in its new location, the activity simulated around the ship drew bombs which should have been directed at the new ship."

(b) JAPANESE RAIDING UNITS

Previous reference has been made to Japanese TEI KIN T.I or Raiding Units, stressing that the purpose of these units was to infiltrate into Allied lines, doing as much destruction by demolition as a small party of about 30 men could accomplish in enemy territory in a short space of time, paying particular attention to artillery positions and grounded aircraft. These units have been variously referred to as Infiltration Parties, Demolition Squads and Close Combat Units.

In their documents the Japanese make repeated reference to the continual use of infiltration methods against the enemy. An enemy diary dated May to July 1944, belonging to a member of 30 Infantry Regiment 20 Division, and captured in the AITAPE area, gives the following interesting notes made during a short refresher course in tactics held by the Regiment while waiting to attack our forces at AITAPE.

1. Out of a 12 day training programme, eight days were to be devoted to obstacle demolition and infiltration.
2. Several references to actual parties being used.
3. Strengths of parties vary from a minimum of three to a maximum of 30.
4. Where available enemy (Allied) uniforms will be worn. Cases of Japanese wearing our uniforms have been reported.
5. All personnel excepting the security Squads (2 of 4 to 6 men who carry LMGs) are armed with pistols, hand grenades and explosives.
6. Explosives should be wrapped in rubber or cellophane to protect them from dampness.
7. Hand grenades should be attached to two or three sticks of explosives to ensure destruction in case the fuse fails.
8. Where possible always avoid native paths.
9. Time of attacks about 0200 to 0500 hours, or about one hour after the moon has set on rainy nights.
10. Enemy telephone lines should be cut and camouflaged.
11. Avoid cutting wire entanglements as much as possible.

(A.F REVIEW No.112)

3. ECONOMIC TARGETS IN THE NEI

The recently enlarged radius of operation of Allied aircraft tends to negative the value to Japan of the economic resources of the NEI. Large scale attacks such as that made on targets at [redacted] on 29/30 Sep will do much to disrupt the Japanese war potential in the NEI. It can be expected that further attacks of this nature will follow. The map attached as Appendix 'B' shows known important economic targets in the NEI.

4. JAPANESE MEDICAL TREATMENT OF ALLIED P/W:

A detailed account of an outbreak of "tropical ulcers" which occurred among labour units and P/W engaged in the construction of the BURMA-SIAM railway in the latter part of 1943, is given in SEATIC Translation Report No 24. It was an extensive outbreak, and the following extract gives the details:-

"Since June of this year, P/W and Malay labourers in areas where SIAM-BURMA railway is being constructed, have been subject to a high incidence of tropical ulcers. The outbreak reached its peak in Aug and Sep. Now, on 10 Oct, casualties (which are concentrated in KANCHANABURI district) number 3408 (including 2178 P/W) i.e. 23.5% of total casualties. If patients in forward hospitals and among troops stationed in their vicinity be added, the total is reckoned at over 5,00. Death-rate in labourers' hospitals is 16.8%, (number of patients estimated at 1,2[illegible] and, in P/W hospitals, 2.0% (number of patients estimated at 2,626). Patients critically ill number about 1,500, of whom at least one third are expected to die, while 3,000 require normal treatment for three months, after which it is likely that more than half of them will be left with permanent disabilities. Scarcely any cases of this disease in the ranks of the Imperial Army have been reported. Judging by present conditions, outbreaks consequent on war wounds must be expected in future."

Official information of 50 deaths reported among Australian P/W in SIAM in Dec 43 reveals that deaths were attributable to the following causes:- malaria 40%; beri-beri 18%; dysentery 16%; malnutrition 14%; tropical ulcer 2%; miscellaneous and unknown 10%. It will be noted that tropical ulcer is the least common cause of death in this group.

SEAC Weekly Intelligence Summary No 147 of 25 Aug 44 contains details of a second report, dated 28 Dec 43, which deals with information extracted by the Army Medical School from an investigation of disease amongst white P/W held in six P/W camps in JAPAN.

The report covered the investigation of 2,306 P/W, most of whom were British, American and Canadian. Amoebic dysentery and malaria appear to be the most common causes of incapacity. The investigators state that "from the results of the investigations, most attention should be paid to the outstanding fact that there was great suffering from dysentery, amoeba and other intestinal parasites. In addition, the number of men carrying malaria protozoa was very large," and go on to admit that this state of affairs is contributed to by inadequate clothing, food and lodging, and that more than half the P/W suffer from chronic diarrhoea. In the words of the report: "This may be considered to have caused the state of ill-health existing amongst the P/W in Camps."

Emphasizing the need for thorough medical precautions and early diagnosis, the authors naively add that "the minds of enemy peoples will be impressed by the excellence of the Army Medical School in its orderly conduct of group examination and its complete organization and equipment."

(AMF REVIEW Nos 111-112)

PART V

MISCELLANY

THE JAPANESE G.I.

(This article was drafted by an American sergeant who served as a PW truck driver for the Japanese Army for 15 months. During that time he became acquainted with many Japanese officers and enlisted men and managed to learn enough of the Japanese language to speak and understand it. In the language of the American G.I., he pictures the Japanese G.I. In order to preserve the "earthy realism" of the draft, it has not been re-edited either by the writer or by this office. The article represents the views of the writer, which are not necessarily vouched for or held by this office.)

"The first group of Jap soldiers I came in contact with, were veterans of from three to five years service in the China Incident. They fought in North China. A great majority of their officers could speak English. The G.I. had nothing but praise for the fighting qualities of the Chinese soldiers. What impressed the Japanese most was the way the Chinese would many times charge at the Japanese with nothing but long swords. The Japanese complained that no matter where they bivouacked the Chinese would somehow manage to make life unbearable for them.

"Most of the Japanese G.Is are from the farms and as a consequence have about a fourth grade education. They all can read and write. They are subject to conscription at the age of 21, but this can be deferred until 25 if they are attending school. The training they undergo for the Army is probably the most brutal in any Army. This is to toughen them, so they claim. The Japanese told me that many commit the honourable hara kiri during the training period because they can no longer stand the brutal punishment being meted out to them. Corporal punishment is practised to the fullest extent. The soldier must stand at attention while he is being slapped or kicked by his superior. If he falls as a result of a blow, he must get up and resume the position of attention, and receive more punishment. I have personally seen these Japanese beaten unconscious, and had to be carried to their quarters. On one occasion I watched a Japanese captain kick a Japanese G.I. in the testicles. (It did my heart good). Any man who outranks another, has the right to administer this punishment, at any time if he just thinks the other has done something not according to his fancy.

"The lowest ranking Japanese is a one star Private, which means second class soldier. His life is the worst. He must wash the other soldiers' clothes, cook their food, make their beds and their packs, plus any other dirty job that comes along. He is the constant butt of all jokes and the fall guy when anything goes wrong. After six months' service in the field he is automatically promoted to the rank of a two star private, or first class soldier. His life is made a little more pleasant by the fact that he has now the right to beat up one star privates, which he proceeds to do so with gusto. But if there are no one star privates around he is still the sucker.

"The Japanese G.I. is just like our own soldiers when it comes to bitching about chow and work. They have gold bricks and usual run of boot lickers. The only difference is that they are very careful that their superiors do not hear the complaints.

"The chow is no problem. The main dish being rice, which they get plenty of, plus perhaps a little meat or vegetable or fish. They are taught to live off the country they occupy as

much as possible. When the troops are out on campaign they steal everything eatable. The dumbest soldier is always placed in the kitchen to do the cooking so you can imagine the quality of the cuisine. No sanitary rules are observed, no self-respecting pig would be seen in a Japanese G.I. kitchen. The food is then dished into cans or messkits. In garrisons the soldiers eat in their dormitory and the food is brought to them by one or two star privates. They eat like pigs and throw everything on the floor. Incidentally, they eat on the floor also.

"In the field they cook their own chow in their mess kits, and you can always spot one of their bivouacs by the many fires they have going. The usual sucker is called to do this work also.

"They are given cigarettes and beer and saki rations every month when available. They are also allowed to purchase these articles if they wish to have more. Every now and then the company will have a party for all the men and officers. They will all sit in a big circle and proceed to get plastered to the gills. The party usually ends up in a battle between some of the men, but it is quickly stopped. These parties are also held just before going into battle to pep the boys up. I have never seen any use of narcotics by the Japanese G.Is. If it is used, it is being done behind the scenes, and perhaps then only by the officers.

"The Japanese soldiers are taught that to die for their Emperor is the most glorious thing that can happen to them. They earn a place in the Yasuki Shrine, and are promoted one rank, but if the battle is big enough, he jumps two ranks (providing he is dead). The country yokels believe this line of crap, but the well-educated city boys don't go for it. Many have told me they are looking strictly for "little Willie." But they all believe that if they surrender or are captured, they can never return to Japan. If they do, the people will kill them. Even the most highly educated ones believe this doctrine. This belief makes them the toughest soldier of all our enemies, because we must kill all of them. The fear of corporal punishment is also one of the greatest factors in their performance in battle. Personally I rate the Japanese as a third class soldier as far as brains and ability to think for himself goes. I have met a few Japanese that would be good soldiers in any man's army, but there are damn few.

"Their clothes are made out of the cheapest cotton materials. It tears very easily. It is not an uncommon sight to see the Japanese in uniforms so patched up that you can no longer recognise the original garment. They will wear any kind of clothes they find. Only on inspections must they wear the regular uniform.

"When a soldier dies in battle and they have time to get him back for cremation, they have quite a ceremony. No doubt to impress the others how wonderful it is to be dead (?). They will dig a large hole, about 3 feet by 8 feet and fill it with wood. They will lay the body on top of this pile and place more wood and douse the whole mass with gasoline. The whole company lines up dressed in their Sunday uniforms, and the commander makes a speech, but he talks to the stiff as if he were still alive. He tells what a great guy he was and what a wonderful thing he has done by getting himself killed, and then he promotes him (what a break). He then bows and the company comes to port arms with fixed bayonets. He throws torch to the pyre. Each soldier files by the fire, bows, places ashes from one cup to another which sets on a little table in front of the pit. After the fire has died out, they rake the ashes for any pieces of bone that has not been consumed by the fire.

This is placed into a little wooden box. It is handled very reverently. The box is bound up in a pure white cloth and one soldier carries it to the nearest headquarters. Everyone must salute the box from the General down. The box is then sent home to the parents who are supposed to become mad with joy because they can place their son's ashes in the Yasuki Shrine (bansai?).

"How to get back to the rest of the ashes. They are raked into the hole and buried. A nice mound is built over the grave and a wooden four by four pillar is placed over the grave like a tombstone with the soldier's name, rank and serial number and how he died. They fix the grave up very nicely, a little table is placed in front of the grave. Every meal time food is placed on this table. Cakes, beer, fruits and even cigarettes are also provided (the lucky stiff). But by nightfall only the rice and water remain. The other G.Is don't mind the grave looking at the nice things they set on the table, but they aren't that dumb to leave the stuff not. They make sure nothing stays too long on the table.

"Every morning and evening time the soldiers line up, face to the Emperor's place, bow, say a prayer and bow again. Most of the Japanese are not religious, but they will carry a small pouch with religious matter tied to their belts. This is G.I. issue and they are all supposed to carry it. Outside of this pouch I have never seen or heard of any religious services being conducted by the Army, except at funerals.

"The soldiers also sing songs when marching to battle. In garrison towns they will march around the streets in the evening singing Army songs. This is probably done to impress the civilians. They also have exercises in the mornings and evenings followed by a run of about a mile. Each soldier must know how to lead these exercises and every day the leader is changed, so they all get a chance at it.

"The Japanese G.I. is told that after he serves five years in the Army he will be allowed to return to Japan. I have seen groups of Japanese leaving for home after their five years' service is up; they are happy and are tickled to death to get out of the war, (at least 80% of the Japanese now think that this war is a pain and want to quit but the only thing that holds them together is their policy of no surrender). The Japanese G.Is I have met during 1943 are definitely fed up with the war. They hate the tropics and long for their homeland. One told me that all the world leaders including Tojo should be put in a big cage armed with clubs, and then fight it out while the soldiers of the world watch.

"The Japanese are also taught that Americans will kill them if they try to surrender, but it seems to me that this is not the reason why they will not surrender, but the reasons mentioned before. They all have their favourite movie stars, Clark Gable and Deanna Durbin being most frequently mentioned. They were amazed when I would tell them of the things you could buy in America. Of course the country yokels wouldn't believe it, but the boys from the city were all ears.

"The first bunch of Japanese were sure they were going to America, but before they left in November 1942 for SWPA they were talking of a 100 year war, and believing it.

"The last bunch of Japanese I was with had their doubts about winning the war. Several Jap civilians told me that the jig was up for Japan. They were worried about their own lives because if the Japanese Army pulls out and leaves them behind the civilians in the occupied areas will massacre them.

"The Japanese G.I. is brutal because it is beaten into him to be that way. The Japs are poor marksmen, rely mostly on their automatic rifle and small grenade thrower for success. They have the guts to run into fire, but I have witnessed several charges where the men were a little reluctant about following their officers. One time in particular the officer after yelling for a charge, advanced a couple of hundred yards only to find himself alone. He went back and after working his boys over, they charged. (There were only three of the enemy shooting at them). This officer has since been promoted. (That is, the hard way, in a Jap shrine).

"They are trained and trained in bayonet fighting. They only have one stroke and that is the thrust. They have bayonet practice on bags in the same manner as we do, but also they are taught to yell bloody murder, to frighten their enemy. If they don't yell they are in for a swing session, and how. They also match two soldiers up with wooden guns the same length as a rifle with fixed bayonets. The soldiers are protected by a head and face mask and pads over their chests. The object of this exercise is to learn the art of parrying and thrust. When you touch your opponent, you must also yell like hell. I guess if the bayonet wound don't kill him the yell will scare the enemy to death (or is supposed to). Wrestling is also taught, but most of the Japs aren't very good at this sport. They also have kendo. This is the game where they beat one another with bamboo clubs. They have Jap moving pictures, propaganda showing their early victories, also old American movies. The Japs go wild when they see a good American musical comedy with singing and dancing in it.

"In garrison towns they are allowed to go into the town about once a week on pass. They have army clubs for them where they can buy chow and hear music. There are plenty of native girls there to wait on them and talk to them. But most of the Jap G.Is are looking for the same thing our own soldiers are looking for when on pass, that is, a whore house and a nice place to get drunk. The Jap army have their own prostitute houses which are inspected by them, but they are generally inadequate to handle the rush of business. The soldiers pick up the usual run of street walkers and get the usual run of the clap and syph and other venereal diseases. But when a Jap G.I. turns in with a venereal ailment he gets a good beating and loses what few privileges that are allowed to him. As a consequence of this they try to doctor themselves or go to civilian doctors and drug stores. Many of them are infected. Short arm inspection is held only on rare occasions, in fact, I only heard of one such inspection in all my stay with them.

"Each company has a first aid man who takes care of most of their malaria and other ailments. When a soldier is really bad he may get a break and get into a hospital. Malaria is taking a heavy toll of their personnel because of their methods of sleeping 4 to 60 men under one mosquito net. The nets come in various sizes but only the officers get individual nets. They have sufficient quantities of quinine but the soldiers don't follow the instructions on how to take it. Most of them throw it away. Many of them complained to me about their method of sleeping so many under one mosquito net. They were smart enough to realise the main factor of such a high rate of malaria.

"They are definitely home-loving boys and are very proud of their mother country. The ambition of every Jap is to conquer the world so they can be the master race. The Jap soldiers told me they would take on Russia after they beat us and then they would tackle Germany.

"The average height of a Jap G.I. is about 5 feet 4 inches. But I have seen plenty of big Japs over six feet. Some are

black as the ace of spades and I have seen some that looked as white as we are. They have plenty of breeds in them, that is, half Jap, half German, or mixed with Russian or other European blood. The only non-Jap soldiers I have ever seen are some Formosans who wore the regular Jap's uniform but were considered as work troops. I have never once seen or heard of a Korean (I found this out the hard way). They have some Chinese soldiers with them, but they were born and raised in Japan and are considered as Japanese as the rest of the soldiers.

"The Jap officers fare not much better than the enlisted men, that is, the low ranking officers. Their food is the same crap that the others eat with a ribbon on. The high ranking officers eat and live like kings. You can always tell a Jap officer in the field by his saber. Non-commissioned officers also may carry sabers, but when in field most of the NCOs carry rifles.

"The favourite Jap tactics are night surprise attacks. They are taught to move silently at night and not to shoot back when fired on at night during a surprise attack until the order is given. This is done perhaps to make the guards who shot think they made a mistake.

"The Japs have no love for each other. They call other regiments cowards and old women and all claim that they are the best in the whole Jap Army, and the rest are a bunch of saps. One truck company won't help the other unless forced to do so by a ranking officer. They will lie about not having parts for the trucks. They steal and sell to the civilians anything that they can sell and make money. Their wage scale is probably the lowest of any army in the world. The lowest soldier gets three yen a month in Japan; in the field he gets the equivalent of about five dollars a month. But he can't buy much in the occupied areas because prices have increased on most things about two thousand per cent.

"In conclusion I would say that the Jap G.I. is definitely behind the eight ball, but definitely.

P.S.

"We have all heard so much about the cleanliness of the Japs so I believe it would be interesting to relate how the Japs in garrison life bathe themselves.

"They will get a couple of empty gasoline drums and cut the tops out. Then they will fill them both with water. Under one they will build a fire to heat the water. They really love to bathe in hot water. The other drum is filled with cold water. They place a wooden platform next to the drums so you won't get your feet muddy. When the hot water is at the right temperature, the highest ranking officer is informed and he will proceed to take a bath. He finishes the bath by soaking for a few minutes in the hot water, and then rinses off with cold water. By the time the Jap sad sack gets to take a bath the water is slightly soiled to say the least. About 30 to 40 men will take a bath in the same hot water. And the lower the rank the longer he waits."

(JAP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.193 from Fifth Air Force Weekly Intelligence Review No.40).

PART VI

OPERATIONS - OTHER FRONTS

1. EUROPE:

Shown as part of this summary is a situation map covering the European operations for the week ending 051 GOOK Oct.

Since this map was prepared it has been announced that Allied forces landed on the mainland of GREECE on 3 Oct. The landing was made at PATRAS on the northern coast of MOREA Peninsula against practically no opposition. On the Eastern front, Russian troops are within 8 miles of BELGRADE.

2. ASIA:

(a) CHINA

Following the capture of WUCHOW on 24 Sep three separate Japanese columns have continued their advance intothe Southeastern portion of KWANGSI PROVINCE. The first column which crossed the KWEI RIVER at a point 12 miles west of WUCHOW has advanced to TANCHUK which was occupied by 28 Sep. Meanwhile, the second column which commenced its drive from KUANGCHOW BAY has occupied SUNGLUNG, 24 miles South of WUCHOW. On 26 Sep a third column which had advanced along the Southern bank of the WEST RIVER, crossed the KWANGTUNG-KWANGSI border and is now closing in on the walled city of SHUNKAI.

Further North in the KWANGSI PROVINCE, YUNGLING and LINGCHWAN have both fallen to Japanese troops who are advancing on KWEILIN from the North; they are now reported to be within 19 miles of the city. Fierce fighting still continues in this area. The Japanese forces operating in the HUNAN PROVINCE claim to have occupied PAOKING on 27 Sep.

On 3 Oct it was reported that strong Japanese forces had landed on the South China coast opposite FORMOSA and are now closing in on FOOCHOW.

(b) BURMA

14 Army troops are advancing along a second road known as the CHOCOLATE STAIRCASE, a steep winding road leading to TIDDIM. Fierce opposition is being encountered but our forces are gradually nearing the town. An Allied raiding party South of TIDDIM wrecked a bridge and ambushed a supply column.

Indian troops over the last six months are reported to have killed 10,000 Japanese in the TIDDIM Rd area.

On the SALWEEN River sector the Japanese claim to have commenced a drive to recapture PINYA and to have reached HUCHIACHI 6 miles to the west.

Maj.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION: As per Int Summary No 1.

SITUATION MAP
EUROPE



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GSI I AUST CORPS

REPRODUCED BY 2/1 AUST ARMY TOPO SVY COY OCT 44

WESTERN FRONT

CALAIS : German garrison surrendered 1 Oct 44.

ANTWERP : Canadian troops entered suburbs on 3 Oct; Dock area practically clear of enemy but street fighting continues. Polish troops have advanced 7 miles to the north.

NIJMEGEN : British troops north of town are holding against fierce German counter attacks and succeeded in expanding the bridgehead. British Second Army troops moving along TURNHOUT Canal to link up with troops at ANTWERP.

AACHEN : Allied troops in this area have driven a wedge three miles wide and at least two miles deep into the SIEGFRIED LINE, north of AACHEN.

WESTERN GERMANY : 96 HAF Lancasters bombed the DORTMUND-EMS Canal in two places causing great damage to this vital waterway.

MOSELLE VALLEY : Allied troops occupied high ground overlooking METZ but encountered stiff opposition and tank battles are now in progress. Further penetration has been made SE of NANCY, and our troops are reported to be within 10 miles of the BELFORT GAP.

SOUTHERN FRONT

ITALY : Fifth Army troops reached point 16 miles from BOLOGNA on 4 Oct. Slight advances have been made by Eighth Army from RIMINI but weather has restricted recent operations to patrolling.

GREECE : At least 6 islands are reported clear of German troops including CYTHERA where British commandos landed unopposed.
On 3 Oct Germans were reported to be moving to Western half of CRETE.
On 4 Oct, PELEPPONESE Peninsula was reported clear of Germans

EASTERN FRONT

ESTONIA LATVIA : Germans holding OSEL ISLAND in GULF of RIGA. Other islands taken by Russians.
Three Russian Armies closing on RIGA have hemmed German forces into area two miles square in town. 23 German transports sunk in RIGA HARBOUR during week.

POLAND : Polish resistance in WARSAW ceased on 4 Oct after 63 days bitter fighting. Polish supplies exhausted. Some Polish troops crossed VISTULA and joined Russians.

RUMANIA HUNGARY : Russians captured town 28 miles SW of KLUJ On 1 Oct. Russian and Rumanian troops crossed Hungarian border 120 miles from BUDAPEST on 50 mile front.

YUGOSLAVIA : On 31 Sep, Russians crossed DANUBE south of IRON GATE linking with TITO's forces on 3 Oct between TURNU SEVERIN and NISH and on 5 Oct reached a point 35 miles from NISH. Fresh crossings made from RUMANIA on 4 Oct and on 5 Oct Russian troops captured town 15 miles NE of BELGRADE.

ENEMY INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT

ORGANIZATION:

SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS:

In the Japanese forces, the TOKUMU KIKAN or Special Service Organizations play a prominent part in the gathering of information, handling of natives, and espionage. In practice, the organizations are divided into small units such as the following, which are known to have been active in North West NEW GUINEA and which were assigned specific tasks:-

TAKA UNIT : 1 officer and 32 men were carrying out survey and native pacification duties in the area of the WISSEL LAKES in Mar 44.

KAMI UNIT : 1 officer and 38 men were to indulge in counter-espionage work along the upper reaches of the SEPIK River.

TATSU UNIT : 1 officer and 35 men completed investigation of terrain and the native situation in the DEMTA area.

MANI UNIT : Organized a counter-intelligence system of 100 men along the MAMBERAMO River.

TORA UNIT : 1 officer and 13 men were to carry out propaganda work around BARMI.

UME UNIT : 1 officer and 20 men carried out reconnaissance of the terrain on BIAK I.

Documentary evidence on the methods of enlistment, training etc. is not available but the following information (published in AMF Review No. 112) has been provided by an officer PW.

TOKUMU KIKAN
SELECTION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL:

A Japanese officer PW has stated that TOKUMU KIKAN personnel are essentially army men, chosen from the ranks for their strength of character, spirit of self-sacrifice, high intelligence, intestinal fortitude and physique.

Men who have been noticed by their CO were recommended for this organization, and were carefully watched by several officers during the training period. If the group of officers believed the soldier to have the qualifications needed, he was sent to the NAKANO School (TOKUMU KIKAN) in TOKYO for an entrance examination.

Upon passing this rigid examination, the soldier changed his name, estranged himself from his family, and donned civilian clothes. Upon graduating, after a three years' course, this agent was sent to some specific area and carried out his espionage work there for the TOKUMU KIKAN.

During his three years at this school, the student was trained in espionage, explosives, liaison, and the operation of all forms of W/T sets. For training problems, the trainees were sent into factory areas which were heavily guarded by MPs, and instructed to gain access to certain buildings. From this point, the student was instructed to contact his HQ by a portable W/T set (Walkie Talkie, approximately 4" by 5" in size) which he carried about with him at all times. If the trainee was apprehended by the MPs, his mission had failed and a black mark was placed upon his records for this lack of skill and dexterity.

ORGANIZATION

LOCAL KIKANS
CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION TO GENERAL STAFF, TOKYO:

The following is an outline, given by a PW, of the flow of information to General Staff, JAPAN, from Kosaku Kikan (collective term applied by the Japanese to TATSU, TORA, WANI, etc, Organizations (Operations Squads) in NW NEW GUINEA).

Information gained by these organizations was sent to 36 Division HQ at BARMI, e.g. WANI Organization sent, by W/T, information regarding dispositions, strengths, armament and topography, gained through its native espionage net, or from its own reconnaissance. Information such as maps and documents was sent by courier.

This information was then relayed to Capt TAKAKI, 2 Army HQ, HAIOKWARI, administrator of the numerous Kosaku organisations under command 2 Army HQ.

In cases where an organization was not attached to Division but was under the jurisdiction of Army, i.e. UME, TAKA, KAKI, information was sent direct to TAKAKI at Army. Pertinent and vital information was collated and passed to the co-ordinator who then passed it to Chief of Staff, 2 Army.

Chief of Staff, 2 Army, would make strategical and tactical plans from such information. All valuable information was then sent to Chief of Staff, 2 Area Army in the PHILIPPINES, and thence to Chief of the General Staff at TOKYO.

TOKUMU BU
NAVAL SPECIAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT:

According to information given by a PW, GHQ TOKYO is served by two independent Special Service Organisations - an Army organization known as TOKUMU KIKAN, and its Navy counterpart, TOKUMU BU (Naval Special Service Department).

PW, who was associated with the Department from Aug 39 to Apr 41 at CANTON (South China Naval Special Service Department), presumed that, as in the case of Army Special Service Organization, the Naval Department doubtless utilised native agents and civilian employees for espionage purposes. These individuals would be scattered throughout various ports.

In South China its functions were collaboration with the puppet government; liaison with the local branch of TOKUMU KIKAN, with Japanese military and civilian officials, and with Chinese naval personnel and water police; interpretation; and translation. It also kept in close touch with North China Naval Special Service Department, Japanese banks and business firms, both in order to keep informed on trading and economic matters, and to gather what information was available for Intelligence.

During his association with the South China Naval Special Service Department, it was controlled by Navy General Staff, TOKYO, through No 6 Section (China) of No 3 Department (Intelligence). PW thought a similar chain of command would apply to Naval Special Service Department wherever situated, e.g. through No 8 Section (South Seas) if the Department was located in that theatre.

He knew that the Naval Special Service Department at SOERABAJA was the HQ for the Western NEW GUINEA Area, but maintained no direct branches in NEW GUINEA. Information of interest was passed to SOERABAJA by the local Navy establishment through a branch of Army TOKUMU KIKAN.

IDENTIFICATIONS:

JAPANESE POSTAL IDENTIFICATIONS:

It is now evident that a knowledge of Japanese Army and Navy post office numbers and designations will assist us to locate and follow the movements of Army and Navy units over a long period. These numbers and designations may be obtained from postal savings books, letters, post-cards, diaries, notebooks and other documents which might otherwise be regarded as of secondary importance.

In the Japanese Army, mail and postal savings accounts for personnel outside JAPAN are handled by numbered post offices which, with the exception of those in the immediate combat areas, are believed to have a fixed location. They are divided into two groups:-

(a) ARMY POST OFFICES : Numbers 1 - 78 have been identified to date - all in MANCHURIA.

(b) FIELD POST OFFICES: are believed to run from 1 - 363 and serve units in areas outside of JAPAN and other than MANCHURIA.

In the Japanese Navy, mail for personnel outside JAPAN is sent through three main post offices at YOKOSUKA, SASEBO and KURE which serve the following areas:-

YOKOSUKA : INNER SOUTH SEAS, BISMARCKS, BRITISH NEW GUINEA.

SASEBO : CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA, MALAYA, SUMATRA, NORTHERN BORNEO (SARAWAK), SIAM.

KURE : PHILIPPINES, S.NORTHERN BORNEO, JAVA, CELEBES, DUTCH NEW GUINEA.

The local post offices within these areas are designated by a number, preceded by the KANA indication for the main office serving the area. The following are the KANA indicators in use:-

J - YOKOSUKA
I - SASEBO
TE - KURE (PHILIPPINES area)
SE - KURE (other than PHILIPPINES)

Adapted from (A.F REVIEW No.110).

EQUIPMENT:

(a) JAPANESE AA DIRECTOR:

General

This director is believed to provide continuous computation of firing data, transmitted electrically to those Type 88 75mm Mobile AA guns which have the necessary attachments. (A PW stated that he considered this director was Type 94).

The director is mounted on a tripod, all being carried on a four-wheel trailer and towed by a prime mover. In one instance it was set up at approximately the centre of a battery of guns, not more than 100 metres (109.4 yds) from the guns and within five metres (5.4 yds) of the OP. One director could serve as many as six guns. (A PW stated that his battery completed a relocation overnight, which included the digging of emplacements).

Power

Three electric batteries are necessary to operate the director. These are believed to be good for approximately two hours continuous firing. A 3 HP gasoline engine generator recharges these batteries.

A cable about one inch in diameter and approximately 100 yards long (in two pieces, probably connected to main junction box) carries the current to each of the guns.

Control

A range squad with height finder, target speed calculator and sometimes a range finder is said to determine the initial data, which would then be transmitted verbally to the director crew who set the instrument. Optical instruments on the director permitted observation of fire so that subsequent adjustments could be determined.

An elevation indicator dial is presumed to be mounted on the left of the gun, whilst a traverse indicator dial is on the right; each of these dials is graduated to 6,400 mils (360 degrees). An inside disc with red needle dial is rotated electrically according to data set on the director. The gun crew manually synchronize gun by "match pointing" outer and inner dials and fire at the target at will.

The fuse range is transmitted to a dial just forward of the traverse indicator dial. The cutting of the fuse and the fuse cutter are both manually adjusted.

Efficiency

In an instance stated by a PW each gun of a battery could fire approximately 30 rounds maximum per minute with the aid of the director and 20 rounds per minute without.

Night Firing

All range and computating instruments were lighted and the battery fired with the aid of searchlights.

Repairs

Light repairs are believedto be carried out within the unit, but for technical maintenance the director would have to be returned to JAPAN.

(AMF REVIEW No 112.
Extracted from ATIS
Interrogation Report
No467)

(b) JAPANESE 50mm SMOKE GRENADE:

Included in this supplement are illustrations of the Japanese 50mm Smoke Grenade. The technical detail regarding this grenade is not yet available but will be published as soon as it comes to hand.

~~APPENDIX B TO~~
~~AMF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE~~
~~REVIEW NO 113 OF 20 SEP 44~~

JAPANESE 50mm SMOKE GRENADE

EXTERNAL VIEW



SECTIONAL VIEW



GSI (a) ADV LHQ

~~APPENDIX "G" TO AMF~~
~~WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW~~
~~NO. 116 of 29 SEP 44~~

Japanese
DUMMY INSTALLATIONS

1 Dummy installations on MAKIN.



2 Dummy searchlight and dummy operator on a beach at SAIPAN.

3 Dummy gun on MAKIN.

4 Spare dummy Barrels for a 6" gun.

5 Dummy installations on MAKIN.

6 Dummy coast defence "gun" on GUAM. It was placed on a concrete base built by Americans for a projected gun emplacement.



7 Dummy 5" dual purpose gun.

8 Fake Observation Tower.

9 Dummy rangefinder with binoculars.



10 Dummy triple mount 25mm AA gun.



11 Genuine 25mm type 96, Model 2 AA gun.



12 Dummy Radar.

13 AA gun on ridge, SAIPAN.



14 Coast Defence "guns", SAIPAN.

GSI(a) ADV LHQ

Reproduced by 1 Aust Mob Litho Sec (AIF) Aust Svy Corps

IMPORTANT ECONOMIC TARGETS IN N.E.I.

SCALE AT EQUATOR

100 0 100 200 300 400 500 miles

★ Targets marked with a star are key objectives, the destruction of which would fundamentally affect the war potential of Japan proper. Other targets are of significance only for the defence of the NEI.

THAILAND

FRENCH INDO CHINA

Bangkok

Saigon

SOUTH CHINA SEA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

LUZON

Manila

Cebu

MINDANAO

Davao

Zamboanga

Kota Bharu

MALAY STATES

Singapore

Brunei

Kuching

BORNEO

SUMATRA

CELEBES

JAVA

TIMOR

Palembang

Bandjermasin

Balikpapan

Tarakan

Manado

Ternate

Makassar

Kendari

Batavia

Sourabaya

Dilli

Koepang

Darwin

Sorong

Manokwari

Kokas

Babo

Sarmi

Hollandia

Aitapu

Wewak

Ambon

CERAM

HALMAHERA IS

NEW GUINEA

TOEAL / DOBO

SAUMLAKI

Merauke

Port Moresby

Madang

Lae

NEW BRITAIN

Rabaul

Kavieng

ADMIRALTY ISLANDS

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Truk IS

Ponape

CAROLINE ISLANDS

MARIANAS

SAIPAN

GUAM

YAP

PALAU IS

PACIFIC OCEAN

LUTONG, MIRI & SERIA:
Oil targets in Sarawak and Brunei. Refinery. Bulk oil storage. Sea loading lines. Pump stations.

BINTAN:
Bauxite (aluminium ore) Mines: capacity 400,000 tons a year. Present status unknown.

BANKA & BILLITON:
Tin targets: Japan is not short of tin.

BALIKPAPAN:
Largest oil refinery in Dutch, probably producing at least 7 million barrels a year, in spite of bomb damage. Large bulk storage. Pump stations and water supply. Loading piers. Wooden shipbuilding.

TARAKAN:
Important source of bunker oil (needs no refining). Bulk oil storage. Loading piers.

BERAOE RIVER:
Former coal mines of K.P.M. Big potential production.

SANGA-SANGA:
Most important oilfield in S.E. Borneo. Some loading to ships on river here.

PARE-PARE:
Suspected important new base. Harbour installations. Stores 4 new jetties.

MALILI:
Large nickel reserves. Suspected activity.

BOELA:
Small oil production. Useful as fuel oil (needs no refining).

PALEMBANG:
Largest oil refineries in Jap control. Est. present production 22 million brls per year.

SE BORNEO & P. LAOET:
Iron, nickel and coal deposits in this area. Suspected activity.

BOEKIT ASAM COALFIELD:
Produced nearly 1 million tons per year. Shipped through Palembang.

MAKASSAR:
Fourth harbour of NEI. All loading and wharfage facilities. Small bulk oil storage. Wooden shipbuilding.

BATAVIA:
Important harbour. Floating docks. Wooden ship building. Bulk oil storage. Important secondary industries.

CHERIBON:
Wooden shipbuilding. Phosphate works. Large cigarette factory.

AMBON:
Most important port of NEI E of Makassar. Japanese distribution base. Wooden shipbuilding.

BUITENZORG:
Goodyear Rubber factory. Only source of tyres in NEI.

SEMARANG:
3rd harbour of Java. Wooden shipbuilding.

POMELAA:
Source of up to 80% of Japan's nickel. Concentrating plant. Loading jetty. Light railway.

BANDOENG:
4 Ordnance factories, producing small arms, ammunition, artillery and repairs.
Quinine factory: main source of quinine in the world.

MADIOEN:
State Railways locomotive works. Most important in NEI.

SOERABAJA:
Chief naval base of Jap Sqdn. in NEI. Aircraft assembly plant. Heavy industrial and factory area. Small oil refinery at Wonokromo (severly damaged since 17 May). Bulk oil storage. Wooden shipbuilding.

TJEPOE:
Largest oil refinery in Java (damaged). In vicinity Kawengan oil field. Bulk oil storage.

TJILATJAP:
Harbour, oil storage. 9,000-ton floating dock.

PROBOLINGGO:
Important paper factory. Minor harbour.

GSI I AUST CORPS
INFN FROM A A F SUMMARY No 235

REPRODUCED BY 3/1 AUST ARMY TOPO SVY COY SEPT 44

ICO/MISC/8431

War Diary

SECRET
COPY NO 151

GENERAL STAFF INTELLIGENCE

1 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Nº

1. Information contained in this summary is for circulation down to battalions or equivalent units
2. Items sidelined will not be reproduced
3. Other items may be reproduced for the information of all units but, as reproduced material may be taken as confirmatory intelligence, the source of all such items will be acknowledged

AIR DISTANCE MAP

DISTANCES ARE SHOWN IN NAUTICAL MILES

TO CONVERT TO STATUTE MILES MULTIPLY BY 1·15



GSI 1 AUST CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.4

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 6 Oct 44 to 1200 hrs 13 Oct 44

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GENERAL:

The failure of the Japanese to take positive action to interfere with the Allied grip on PALAU suggests an inability on the part of the enemy to rectify the situation. It would appear that the enemy commander of the PALAU Garrison is faced with the necessity of retaining sufficient of his 20/25000 troops for the defence of his remaining possessions, and cannot afford to waste any of his force in major counter-attacks on the islands already strongly held by the Allies. It seems unlikely now that the enemy will attempt to reinforce the PALAU Garrison; and so another of Japan's key bases appears to have been relegated to the role of an isolated outpost.

Meanwhile, steps are being taken to ensure against similar occurrences taking place throughout the PHILIPPINE Islands. Since May, enemy strength in this area has been built up from 70,000 to 224,000, and the flow of shipping in PHILIPPINE waters continues.



SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
S.W.P.A.
INFORMATION TO 121800K OCT 44
SCALE AT EQUATOR
NORTHERN PHILIPPINES:
2 Oct: 46 vessels comprising
7 large cargo vessels
2 medium " "
25 small " "
5 large tankers
1 medium tanker
2 large transports
6 destroyers
) Off SAN FERNANDO Point.
3 Oct: 7 large freighters
1 small freighter
3 tankers
3 destroyers
) Left SAN FERNANDO course SW.
CENTRAL PHILIPPINES:
4 Oct: 2 large freighters
2 medium freighters
1 sub-chaser
1 motor gunboat.
MINDANAO:
3 Oct: 1 merchant vessel 7000/8000 tons
2 freighters total 600/2000 tons
7 barges
5 : 5 freighters total 1500/5000 tons
7 : 4 vessels total 600/1200 tons) on fire
1 medium vessel
15 barges
9 : 5 merchant vessels
2 freighter-transports
2 stack-aft freighters,
small shipping.
3 Oct: 6 stack-aft vessels
total 1200/3200 tons
1 tanker 300-ft.
4 : 5 freighters total
10900/15500 (1 destroyed
1 left burning)
Heavy attacks by 40 B24's damaging oil tanks & warehouses.
BORNEO:
4/5 Oct: 2 large freighters, 2 medium freighters,
1 sub-chaser, 2 motor gunboats.
BALIKPAPAN:
8 Oct: 1 large merchant vessel, 4 med tankers
5 small sub-chasers, numerous small
merchant vessels.
21 B24's attacked oil tanks, 30/40 enemy
aircraft intercepted - 16 destroyed.
M I N D A N A O
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
DAVAO
C E L E B E S
S E A
TALAUD IS
SANGIHE IS
PALAU IS
BABELTHUAP
ANGAUR I.
PELELIU
SONSORAL IS
MERIR IS
Mopping up continued.
Casualties to 7 Oct -
10083 : Killed
314 : PW
ANGAUR Is:
Casualties to 7 Oct-
1128 : Killed
10 : PW.
P A C I F I C
O C E A N
3/4 Oct: 1 light cruiser or mine layer sunk
1 light cruiser
1 destroyer
1 destroyer escort
5 : 1 light cruiser
2 destroyers
2 gunboats.
67 sorties flown against enemy airfield and installations in central sector of HALMAHERA.
6 Oct: One 300/1000 ton freighter.
MOROTAI
Mopping up continued
scattered resistance.
1 enemy aircraft dropped
4 bombs causing some
damage and casualties.
HALMAHERA
62 sorties flown against enemy airfields and installations.
4 Oct: 2 small cargo vessels sunk.
9 : 6 freighters, total 1800/6000 tons.
M O L U C C A
S E A
BATJAN
SOELA IS
Enemy airfields kept under continual air attacks with 200 sorties.
MAPIA IS
Casualties to 6 Oct -
1914 : Killed
236 : Jap PW
591 : Formosan PW
2 : Korean PW
1 Oct: Allied troops made
unopposed landing
north coast SOEPIORI.
9 enemy dead in area.
BIAK: Casualties to 8 Oct.
6185 : Killed
461 : Jap PW
301 : Formosan PW.
BISMARCKS - SOLOMONS
Air attacks in this area
increased with a total of
over 500 sorties.
Casualties to 3 Oct -
7 : Jap PW
1 : Formosan PW
Daily attacks continued with
a total of approx 180 sorties.
WAIGEO
MISOOL
NOEMFOOR I
BIAK I
JAPEN
WAKDE I
HOLLANDIA
C E L E B E S
5 Oct: 14 vessels, total 3400 tons
5/6 : 4 vessels total 4500 tons
numerous barges,
2 submarines,
10 : 2 merchant vessels total
7500 tons
1 destroyer.
24 Liberators attacked installations
causing considerable damage.
BOEROE
C E R A M
AMBON
2 Oct: 10/12 stack-aft vessels(each 300/1000 tons)
4 : 5 freighters, total 4900/12600.
8/9 : 1 freighter 300/1000 tons.
9 : 1 submarine.
3/4 Oct: One 2000/4500
freighter-transport
probably destroyed.
31 Liberators attacked
enemy installations.
Varied targets on enemy held islands subjected to air attack with over 300 sorties.
N E W G U I N E A
WISSEL LAKES
SEPIK RIVER
B A N D A S E A
5/6 Oct:
50/100 barges
3 vessels total
3000 tons.
TIMOR: 9 Oct : 1 possible freighter-transport 2000/4500 tons
2 freighters total 600/2000 tons.
10 : 1 vessel (500 tons) left burning.
1 schooner (80 ft) destroyed.
KAI IS
AROE IS
GSI I AUST CORPS

001072A

PART 1

OPERATIONS - SWPA

1. LAND:

Mopping up has continued on MOROTAI Island in the HALMAHERAS and in the PALAU Islands where there is an unofficial report of a further landing by Allied troops.

An interesting revival of activity has taken place in the WIDE BAY area of NEW BRITAIN. On 28 Sep some 80 Japanese attacked an Allied camp in the vicinity of KIEP and during the night a further 200 enemy troops arrived by barge. An enemy party at MILIM (14 miles north of KIEP) was ambushed by our troops but on 30 Sep skirmishing took place on the MU River and during the night approximately 400 Japanese occupied the Allied camp. The Japanese were using heavy weapons thought to be 70mm battalion guns. It is estimated that enemy casualties totalled 100.

2. SEA:

The only substantial shipping sightings during the past week have again been in the PHILIPPINE waters where 42 merchant vessels totalling some 1[illegible]0,000 tons, and six naval vessels were sighted off the west coast of LUZON on 2 Oct.

3. AIR:

(a) OWN

Allied air effort was increased in the NE sector where approximately 330 sorties were flown against NUMA NUMA, BUKA, KAVIENG and RABAUL.

Enemy positions on the mainland of NEW GUINEA were attacked continuously. In SARMI area close support for Allied troops was provided on one occasion by 83 Bostons.

Targets throughout the NW Sector were attacked by both fighter and bomber aircraft. Heaviest attacks were against AMBESIA and WITASOLA (SE CELEBES) by 31 Liberators, KAOE (HALMAHERAS) by 34 Mitchells and MACASSAR by 24 Liberators.

Allied heavy bombers ranged further afield to strike at Jap oil refineries and store tanks in BORNEO and MINDANAO. 21 Liberators attacked BALIKPAPAN and 40 Liberators bombed ZAMBOANGA causing considerable damage and starting large fires in both targets.

(b) ENEMY:

Only one enemy aircraft attacked Allied positions this week. A total of 4 bombs were dropped on South MOROTAI causing some damage and casualties.

At BALIKPAPAN our heavies met 30/40 enemy fighters over the target and succeeded in destroying 16 of these.

PART II

1. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS OF ENEMY FORCES:

(a) LAND

A map showing the estimated strength and disposition of Japanese forces in the SWPA as at 4 Oct 44 is attached as Appendix "A" to this summary.

It is interesting to note that since May this year, when the strength was estimated at 70,000, the enemy has reinforced the PHILIPPINES to such an extent that the 224,000 troops located there at present represent almost half of the 514,900/534,900 distributed throughout the whole of the SWPA.

As shown on the map, strengths for MANOKWARI and SORONG have been grouped as have those for the SCHERAI Peninsula.

(b) AIR

Estimate of Enemy Land Based air strength in the areas listed below on information to 1800K/5 Oct 44.

	F	2E/F	SE/B	2E/B	F/B	F/P	Obsn	Total 5 Oct	Comparative Totals 27 Sep	20 Sep
NEW BRITAIN) NEW IRELAND) SOLOMONS)						10	2	12	10	10
TALAUD						3		3	3	3
PHILLIPINES:										
MINDANAO	12	11	19	6	2	7	7	64	52	38
VISAYAS	46	18	21	13	3	10	9	120	57	57
LUZON	80	48	31	27	5	13	6	210	302	426
								394	411	521
AMBON AREA	8		5	7	2	9	6	37	39	39
CELEBES	31	8	30	36	3	16		124	146	137
TIMOR-SOEMBA) -SOEMBAWA- FLORES)	10					3	3	16	16	16
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK	12			12		15	5	44	41	41
BORNEO	31	8	24	67		12		142	125	114
	230	93	130	168	15	98	38	772	796	866

2. TACTICS:

JAPANESE USE OF INCENDIARY MATERIAL FOR BEACH DEFENCE

The following is extracted from Seventh Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No 11:-

"Drawings have been circulated among Japanese Army and Navy forces illustrating a method of setting a line of drums afire as a check to landing forces. The drums are connected in series with six or more coils of detonating cord wrapped around them and ignited simultaneously. The igniting agent

appears to be calcium phosphide, which is calculated to set afire aviation gasoline which may flow out to sea from the ignited drums. If crude oil is used in the drums, seven or more "saki" bottles filled with an igniting agent may also be attached to each drum. Distance between the drums is prescribed as about five yards apart. "

A report from an Allied patrol in NEW BRITAIN mentions wire barricade topped by a number of glass bottles filled with liquid and connected with fuses. These could be ignited electrically.

Fuller details of the NEW BRITAIN installations are not available, but the methods the enemy intends to use may be those outlined in the Seventh Fleet publication. In any event, the report is further confirmation of Japanese preoccupation with the use of incendiary material for beach defence.

(AIF Review No 113)

3. JAPANESE POLICY TOWARDS OWN PW:

Documents and recent events afford further confirmation of the strict methods employed by the Japanese High Command to ensure that the traditional attitude to surrender undergoes no general or widespread change.

A document found at KOOR states that between 1941 and Nov 43, 26 Japanese fell into enemy hands in the course of the CHINA incident. There were no cases in 1940, two in 1941, two in 1942 and 18 to Nov 43. By any but Japanese standards, this would seem a very low figure for nearly four years of war, but the document states that "It is a really serious situation".

Many recent incidents tend to show that although a number of surrenders have been obtained from forces surrounded or cut off, the bulk of the Japanese forces know nothing of these surrenders and Japanese policy at the moment is activated by a desire to avoid the facts becoming known.

This policy is, to a great degree, successful. A PW (2nd class PO) taken at HOLLANDIA wrongly claimed to be a pilot because he understood that all pilots were killed immediately. His reason for this, he said, was that he thought he was the only Japanese PW. He did not want to die when he discovered that there were many others.

On several occasions it has been reported from the PACIFIC that survivors of sunken Japanese ships have refused to be taken aboard USN vessels. In a recent instance, only five of 20 found floating in the water, accepted proffered lifelines.

The handling by Japanese propagandists of the recent Australian Government announcement of the outbreak at a prison camp for Japanese military PW is in keeping with past policy. Officially the incident has been ignored. No mention of the matter has been made by Japanese radio stations nor has any attempt been made to use, for propaganda purposes, the announcement of a heavy death-roll. This can only be because the Japanese authorities feel that an admission that any large number of PW was in our hands would be calculated to undermine existing Japanese attitudes to this question. They are not, apparently, willing to run this risk to gain a temporary propaganda advantage.

Propagandists in Japanese occupied countries have also had little to say regarding the announcement. It was reported,

once only from SHANGHAI, and BATAVIA "demanded explanations" after carefully stating that the personnel involved could not possibly have been military PW, since Japanese never surrender, and must therefore have been internees.

As far as is known, this too was broadcast only once, and apparently even this ingenious approach was considered unconvincing and too dangerous for repetition.

(JIP Review No.114)

PART III

AIRDROMES IN NEW GUINEA AND SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES:

Details of airdromes in the MINDANAO - VISAYAN areas have been revealed following the heavy strikes recently made by carrier-based aircraft.

The most significant information is that only a relatively few of the many airdromes in these areas have been developed into bases with facilities equivalent to the major enemy bases in NEW BRITAIN, NEW GUINEA and HALMAHERA.

The following Airdrome Status Chart gives details of the more important known airdromes. These and the other known airdromes in these areas are also shown on the attached map. Some are still under construction and will naturally assume greater importance when completed. Many are satellite and staging drones, forming an adequate network from which large-scale strikes could be made against any profitable targets in the area.

(Adapted from information contained in AAF Int Summaries 242 and 243).

MINDANAO - VISAYAN AIRDROME STATUS

Based on information up to 14 Sep 44

Airdrome	Runways No.	Length of longest in feet	Revetments F	Revetments B	Additional unprotected dispersal points	Hard-standing Capacity	Remarks
DIKLOM	2	6,500	0	17	54	200	The largest and most important of the DEL MONTE airdromes. The facilities of the DEL MONTE airdromes is limited, their main role is apparently for staging aircraft through the area from NORTH to SOUTH through Central MINDANAO.
LICANAN	4	5,100	25	21	4	400	The best developed airdrome known in MINDANAO. Pier facilities and good MT roads are available.
SASA	2	4,700	9	5	10	210	A major airdrome in the DAVAO area with complete facilities.
MATINA	1	5,200	0	20	15	500	Developed into a bomber base and is one of the major bases in the DAVAO area.
SAN ROQUE		[illegible],000	4			200	Serviceable but still under construction. Ample facilities appear to be present.
TACLOBAN	2	4,700	0	0	9	150	Key airdrome in NE LEYTE area. All-weather graded airdrome for fighters and bombers, developing into an important field for the defence of TACLOBAN, the most important port of LEYTE Island.
DULAG	1	4,800	0	0	35	150	Under development as an important airdrome for the protection of the LEYTE Valley and the EAST flank of the VISAYAS.
LAHUG	2	5,150		8			Excellent facilities and appears to be the air centre for Central VISAYAS. CEBU, the second largest PHILIPPINE city, is immediately adjacent.
ALICANTE	1	4,200	30	6		100	Well developed airdrome lying equidistant DAVAO and MANILA and is an important link in the enemy's PHILIPPINES chain of airdromes.

NOTE: Unprotected Dispersal Point: Figures under this heading relate to actual, and not to the potential, dispersal capacity at the airdromes.

Hard-Standing Capacity: This column is an estimate of the capacity for parking airplanes in cleared areas available in the airdrome area (other than in revetments and at dispersal points) and accessible from the runway. It is assumed that airplanes will be spaced in the parking area in a manner similar to their distribution in the various dispersal lanes.


AIRDROMES
CENTRAL & SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES
14 SEP 44
122°
124°
126°
12°
10°
8°
6°
N
MASBATE
CALBAYOG
LOCTUGAN
VALENCIA
MEDELLIN
FABRICA
ANAHAO
TACLOBAN
ORMOC
SAN JOSE
BACOLOD
SANTA BARBARA
MANDURRIAO
DULAG
BAYUG
SAN PABLO
HINUNDAYAN
SURIGAO
TANJAY
DUMAGUETE
CAROLINA
ALICANTE
TALISAY
MALOGO
BADAS
PLACER
BANCASE
LUMBIA
CAMP OVERTON
DIKLOM
DEL MONTE
III
IV
TAGOLOAN
DEL MONTE VIII
DANSALAN
MALAYBALAY
MALABANG
JACGOL
VALENCIA
MARAMAG I
II
BASSA PT
COTABATO
AYALA
RECODO
SAN ROQUE
CALARIAN
LICANAN
SASA
MATINA
LIBBY
DALIAO
SANTA CRUZ
PADADA
BUAYAN
Scale 1/4000,000

PART IV

JAPANESE HANDLING OF NATIVES.

A report from an ANGAU official gives some idea as to the treatment accorded natives in the various Japanese held areas in NEW GUINEA which have recently been re-occupied by the Allies. It also describes how they were employed.

The following information is based on interrogation and statements of various natives known to have actively assisted the Japanese.

Whenever the Japanese occupied new territory some few natives invariably came and offered their services in any way required. As the occupation spread further afield, these natives (usually former malcontents and trouble-makers) would move with the enemy and entice others into general service with them. Also, each village contacted would be bound to supply its quota of labourers for general labour, carrying and the building of gardens. The better type of native would be prevailed upon from these lines to become soldiers or police.

There is no evidence of definite native units having been set up - the natives having been recruited as police and guides.

Those natives picked for service were given distinguishing marks such as armbands or cloth caps and allowed to sleep in separate huts in the Japanese lines, whereas ordinary labourers returned to their villages t sleep.

Some were issued with rifles and some with wooden battens.

Every morning and evening, parades were held to make obeisance to the Sun (this was termed 'KERI' and regarded by the natives as mere ceremony as they seemingly did not have any finer points of the ritual explained to them).

Policy talks were given but no training in military tactics or extensive rifle drill. Natives state that during their probationary period they were always watched over and spied upon by the Japanese day and night.

No definite training period seems to have been laid down but natives were brought into responsible jobs when the Japanese leaders deemed them sufficiently fit and loyal.

Guarding and escorting carrier lines, guarding food dumps and accompanying Japanese roving patrols were among their duties; also acting as press-gangs to obtain native labour, spies on other natives or Allied troops and liaison between the Japanese and native groups.

Natives state that when on patrols they would never be allowed to post guard by themselves, but that the usual procedure was for camp guards to be made up of even numbers of Japanese and native troops. Similarly, the watch on PW gaols was shared by Japanese and natives together. In attacks by patrols on Allied forces, the natives would generally be placed on guarding roads and lines of retreat and not in the first wave of attacking troops.

Earlier natives joined voluntarily but most of the later recruits were impressed for service either by the Japanese, who used threats of decapitation, or by their native press-gangs. Many natives were bribed into service by the promise of great privileges on cessation of hostilities.

(ANP BULLETIN No.114)

PART V

1 AN EDUCATED PRISONER'S VIEWS ON THE WAR:

What a Japanese prisoner who was a graduate lawyer thinks of various aspects of the war is revealed by an interrogation report received from CINCPOA. He was captured at SAIPAN. The report states the "PW is well-educated, thoughtful and mature in his judgment. He wishes to return to JAPAN after the war to teach, preferably in a university, and also to aid 'in the development of Japanese culture'".

Effect of Allied Propaganda:

"At the time of the attack when the Americans started to land (on SAIPAN), PW was told by a Hawaiian-born Japanese soldier that the Americans would treat him well if he were captured because they are a humane people. This contradicted what PW had previously heard, that Americans had tortured Japanese prisoners captured on GUADALCANAL and NEW GUINEA, but accorded with PW's conception of what Americans were like. At the time, however, the thought of becoming a prisoner did not enter his head.

"Later, during the attack, PW come across an American propaganda leaflet which he recalls having read and approved in entirety. PW did not recollect exactly what the leaflet said but states that the general purport was to the effect that JAPAN had lost everything on SAIPAN and that it was useless to struggle further. PW says that at the time it was perfectly apparent to him that the struggle was indeed hopeless on SAIPAN but he still did not conceive of himself becoming a prisoner. It was not until he was actually confronted with the situation described in the details of his capture that the choice offered itself in his mind.

"PW believes that propaganda leaflets could have a good deal of effect if properly used and in sufficient quantity. He said that there were far too few leaflets on SAIPAN, that most of the troops had never seen any of them. PW stated that it was extremely unlikely that any troops would surrender in the company of fellow-soldiers but that it was probable that only men cut off from their units could be induced to give up, even by the most skilful leaflets. He thought that any 'believable' propaganda would work but that it must be couched in immediate terms and not in the terms of general statements about wicked war-lords. Leaflets which stated that the Japanese position was helpless, that the Japanese Navy would not help the troops, and material of a similar nature would be believed and would be effective under the conditions stated above. On the other hand, leaflets attacking overall Japanese strategy, the military clique or the like would not be understood by most of the troops and would probably produce no results. PW was most emphatic in stating that pictures of PW held by Americans would have a bad, even contrary effect, causing those who saw them to determine never to become prisoners themselves.

"PW declined to write any propaganda leaflets himself, feeling that he could not return to JAPAN with propriety if he did."

Emperor Worship:

"PW said that he had no strong personal political views but that he was basically a 'liberal.' During the time that he was at school, PW states that he was able to read books of all kinds about all types of political theory, but admits that he was unable to read so basic a book as Professor MINOBE's 'Organic Theory' which claims that the emperor is a function of the state. PW felt a general distaste for communism without being able to state for exactly what reasons. Although PW obviously feels no sense of 'emperor worship' he believes that it would be best for JAPAN to maintain the emperor after the

war in a figure-head capacity, much in the same position as the King of ENGLAND. PW feels that if the Emperor were overthrown, the Japanese people as a whole would be at a complete loss and would fall easy prey to any organised group. He states that although the educated classes would be able to understand and work for a democratic state (in fact, PW believes that many if not most of the educated people of JAPAN are 'liberals' although forced to hide the fact), the lower classes still do not understand democracy and must be educated to it. For this reason, it would be best, according to PW, to preserve the form at least of the old order to prevent chaos within JAPAN."

Origin of "BUSHIDO":

"Throughout the interrogation, PW took the rather sophisticated view that most of what is usually considered the 'Japanese temperament' is characteristic only of the uneducated and has been carefully fostered by the religious power. Thus, the conception of 'BUSHIDO' is totally foreign to him. He volunteered the information that 'BUSHIDO' was conceived after the MEIJI Restoration by the ruling group in order to strengthen their power. Furthermore, the interpretation of 'BUSHIDO' which has been passed down to the unthinking lower classes, has been carefully conceived by the ruling class to mean the necessity of not being taken prisoner, the absolute power of the emperor, the unquestionable veracity of the old legends and many other similar 'typically Japanese' characteristics. PW said that the educated classes, even though unable to say or do anything about it, did not believe in 'BUSHIDO' or any of the interpretations connected with it."

Must JAPAN be Invaded?:

"PW believed that if FORMOSA were invaded, JAPAN would risk everything she had to repel the Americans, including the fleet. PW has heard the view expressed that unless JAPAN Proper were invaded, JAPAN would not surrender, and even if JAPAN were invaded, the Japanese would not surrender but would fight to the last man. PW cannot seriously accept such a view. He believes that the loss of FORMOSA might induce JAPAN to ask for peace and that it is unlikely that JAPAN would hold out until she has nothing left except the main islands. In case it ever did come to a landing, PW does not believe there will be more than scattered resistance from civilians."

Treatment of Enlisted Men by Officers:

"PW states that the custom of non-commissioned officers of cuffing enlisted men on the slightest provocation continues. He says that he was struck innumerable times and his glasses broken five or six times. This he says proves that the Japanese lower classes are cruel not only to foreigners but also to other Japanese."

(AMP REVIEW No.114)

2 FORMOSA UNDER JAPANESE DESPOTISM:

A Formosan PW, a former crew member of a Japanese ship sunk by American aircraft, spoke with feeling of the oppression of the Formosans by their Japanese overlords, and the resentment of the Formosans toward them.

PW regards Americans as friends rather than adversaries and expressed the hope that he might be allowed to land in FORMOSA with any American Expeditionary Force which might attack the island. He is vehemently opposed to Japanese rule in FORMOSA and wished for the complete independence of the Formosan nation after the war, feeling that nothing short of free nationhood could ever be a guarantor of peace and material well-being for the people of FORMOSA.

He declares that almost all Formosans share his feeling, having not merely a national, but in most cases a personal enmity towards the Japanese, mainly because of their coercive

measures and the stranglehold that they have held over the island's material goods. Relations between Japanese and Formosans are never good, PW stated, and even on the ships on which he sailed, quarrels were always breaking out between the two. PW doubts, however, whether his countrymen would attack the Japanese in a massrising at the moment of a possible American landing operation, for repressive measures practised by the Japanese against the island's inhabitants have been so severe that active resistance has been largely discouraged.

PW asserted that discrimination against Formosans in all fields was still the general rule. It was only with the greatest difficulty that Formosan students could gain even a high-school education, and one was almost forced to go abroad in order to attend college. Even in cases where higher or secondary education was open to the native population, Japanese students almost invariably received scholastic preferment whether or not their ability warranted it.

The Japanese language is generally used throughout the island, and PW stated that in any locality, no matter how remote, Japanese-speaking people can be found. As it is taught in the schools and its use made mandatory for commercial and official transactions, this fact can be readily understood. PW added, however, that great numbers of people in the country districts speak only Formosan and, in general, Japanese was used only when it was impossible or forbidden to converse in the native tongue.

The Japanese Army in FORMOSA, according to PW, was continually undergoing the most rigorous type of training. Large-scale manoeuvres were held twice every year, at which times most of the troops on the island would go out of the barracks for extensive field practice, long marches, and training in jungle and mountain warfare. PW knew of units which had crossed the island several times by going straight through the wild mountainous area in the interior, deliberately shunning whatever roads might have been at hand. Although the soldiers suffered great hardships on such expeditions, it was obvious that they were, as a result, not only well acquainted with the nature of the land, but experienced in manoeuvring under virtually all possible conditions.

The Japanese police exercise a most stringent control over the life of the entire island and the most minor offences, particularly those against public order, are punished with severe penalties. The rigid family system in FORMOSA has lent itself to more easily controlling the populace in the country districts; the Japanese give orders to an elected chief in charge of a varying number of subdivided household groups, who is then held responsible for passing the word down until it reaches each individual under his jurisdiction. This method obviously eases greatly the duties of police officials. As city and town populations are more accessible, this system need not be practised in thickly-settled areas. In any case, the efficiency of Japanese coercive measures has been such that PW could not recall any outbreak against Imperial authority in recent years.

Virtually all of the young men in FORMOSA are included in two Japanese-sponsored youth organisations - the Home Defence League (Boeidan) and the Union of Able-bodied men (Boteidan).

PW held that membership in these two groups is compulsory, thus making it impossible for any Formosan boy or young man to avoid participation in them. In time of war, they are under the command of the Japanese military commander on the island and can be called up at any time for whatever service is demanded of them. However, PW stated that their loyalty to the Japanese is of the most questionable sort; he had little doubt that, in the event of an American invasion of FORMOSA, they would be of little service to the Japanese, and he felt, furthermore, that they might well be a good asset to the American forces.

(ATIS Review No 114 from CINPAC-CINCPOA Interrogation Report No 60)

[redacted]

PART VI

OPERATIONS - OTHER FRONTS:

1. ASIA:

A map showing the general situation throughout Southern ASIA as at 1000K on 12 Oct is attached as part of this summary. This map has been prepared from all available information but in some areas where activity is restricted it has been possible to show only the approximate spheres of influence. This applies particularly to the area north of the line ICHANG-SHANGHAI in Central CHINA, and from LUNGLING to LUNGCHOW in the BURMA-SOUTH CHINA area.

2. THE SIEGE OF IMPHAL:

The following review extracted from AIF Review No 113 and previously published in SEAC and IO Weekly Summary No 149, provides an interesting sidelight on the BURMA operations. The information was contained in a Japanese soldier's notebook found on the KIDDIM Road on 22 Jul 44.

"The operations conducted by the Supreme Commander, BURMA Area Army, against IMPHAL, which is being described as a second GUADALCANAL, have been on the whole, a lamentable failure. With the three divisions, YUMI(33 Division), MATSURI (15 Division) and RETSU(31 Division), and with the same tactics with which we took BURMA, we began attacking before air support had arrived. What with the bad weather, the barrier of the ARAKAN RANGE, men going down with malaria all the time, and more and more laid out with diarrhoea, together with the merciless bombing, the three divisions have been practically annihilated. For example, in the YUMI(33 Division) one company finished up with its commander and two men as its total strength.

"Although we had occupied hills in the ARAKAN RANGE by March of this year, there was not much hope of our taking IMPHAL. At this stage the Army had been asking for reinforcements. It was planned to send four new divisions, YASU(55 Division), KIKU(18 Division) and another two. The seven divisions were then to attack IMPHAL. But as a result of transport difficulties and insufficiency of air units, we could not win mastery of the air, and completely lost the transport battle.

"Again, enemy air-raids were becoming more violent and the result was that our reinforcements were in a bad way. Moreover, accidents with trucks on the ARAKAN hillsides were surprisingly numerous. It was not merely that the transport of troops - and of course, food and ammunition - was delayed; the thing was practically impossible.

"So the troops just had to march through the ARAKAN RANGE, carrying a month's rations. More than 50 per-cent fell out and took twice as many days to get there. Although, as a result of fatigue and bad weather, the number of malaria cases and other casualties kept increasing, they managed in some way to transport the troops, but not the ammunition or supplies.

"The whole Division, including the Divisional Commander, fought ten days without rice, and, because of things like this, the date of the general offensive, originally 10 Jun, was postponed ten or twenty days, and left indefinite.

"We felt it bitterly, this need for aircraft and motor transport. We wanted to shout to the people at home, 'Send more aircraft to the battle fronts'. The enemy stands firm, having plenty of weapons, ammunition and food. His attacks with tanks and mortars are something terrific - so are his air raids, and we can do nothing.

"Today is 28 Jun. Gradually the general offensive is getting under way. YASU Butai is in the front line of all and has begun the final attack, but this is the toughest going, and if we do manage to take a position, the enemy bombards it with mortars and bombs it from the air to a heart-shaking degree; so that those who have dug deep trenches are buried in them, and those who have dug shallow have hands and feet blown away.

"The Battalion commander and adjutant have been killed. NO ISHIDA, left in charge of the company, rushed out waving his sword, and was killed. The Sergeant-Major in charge of the working party detailed to cut wire, was doing his duty when enemy shells exploded near him. He was killed. 2/Lt UESUTO was wounded, and the Company Commander who had gone out on an 'officer's patrol' was killed, while No 1 and 3 Platoons were almost wiped out. What men were left went to other units. The Company has been virtually destroyed. This is the kind of hell war can be.

"The wounded men were sent back, but the sick were not. Kept in the front line, they have to pound the unhulled rice. Up to the time of their death they have to pound unhulled rice, and, when they die, they die from sheer exhaustion. It is rumoured that the Regimental Commander too has been killed. For us it is a matter of days."

[signature]
Maj.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION:

As per 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 1.

SITUATION MAP
SOUTHERN ASIA

INFORMATION TO 121800K OCT 44



BURMA

During the first week in Sep fighting suddenly flared up in the ARAKAN Sector when Allied troops commenced a drive and occupied several important heights on the MAYU RANGE, SW of BUTHIDAUNG, heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

On 16 Sep British and Indian troops crossed the MANIPUR RIVER and continued their southward advance, they are now reported to be within 400 yds of TIDDIM.

SITTAUNG was occupied without opposition on 4 Sep and these troops crossed the CHINDWIN RIVER opposite SITTAUNG. Other troops have reached a point 43 miles SSW of TAMU.

On the SALWEEN RIVER front there has been heavy fighting especially around LUNGLING which has changed hands a number of times but is now reported held by CHINESE troops although the Japanese are throwing in strong counter attacks from the south. The Japanese claim to be driving on PINKA but this information is not confirmed.

SOUTHERN CHINA

In their endeavours to smash the US airdromes in this area, Japanese forces commenced three main drives. The first aimed at the capture of KWEILIN and PAOKING, commenced from HENGCHOW. The attack on PAOKING was successful for the city was captured by 27 Sep after very heavy fighting. On 9 Sep, the HUNAN - KWANGSI border was crossed and a force struck southward along the HENGCHOW-LIUCHOW railway towards KWEILIN. By 14 Sep, this force reached and passed through CHUANCHOW. Continuing the drive the force is stated to have reached HINGAN and to have taken LUNGLING and YUNGMING. When last reported the spearhead of this force was said to be within 19 miles of KWEILIN.

Two other forces commenced drives in the KWANTUNG Province. The first one was from the CANTON area along both banks of the WEST River. One column crossed the PEI River on 11 Sep and occupied SHIUHING, while a second column advanced along the southern bank to KAOMING. These forces continued their advances and by 22 Sep had reached the KWANTUNG-KWANGSI border city of WUCHOW and, after crossing the border, occupied TANGHUK. They are now reported to have reached LINGCHI 30 miles west of WUCHOW.

In the third drive (from KWANGCHOW BAY) the Japanese drove northward and occupied SUNLING, 24 miles south of WUCHOW.

CENTRAL CHINA

Although main roads and railways are under Japanese control, Chinese guerillas are still active in the area.

In their offensive in CHEKIANG Province Japanese forces occupied LISHUI on 27 Aug and then pushed onwards to WENCHOW which was taken by 9 Sep, they then crossed the OU River and commenced a drive to the NE towards TAOCHOW.

A strong force landed early on 27 Sep in the vicinity of the mouth of the TEI River, 25 miles NE of FOOCHOW and was last reported to have reached LIENKONG.

In the HUPEH Province heavy fighting is reported to be in progress for the fortress town of ITU, 45 miles south of ICHANG.

ENEMY INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT

LOGISTICS:

(a) JAPANESE SELF SUFFICIENCY OBJECTIVES

A 35 Division Operation Order dated 4 Jun 44 captured at CAPE SANSAPOR on 25 Aug (ATIS Bulletin 1455) throws some interesting light on Japanese Self Sufficiency Objectives in the MANOKWARI area.

The order laid down a production plan, divided into two periods each of six months. At the end of the first six months, each man was to have cultivated an area of "35 TSUBO (140 square yards) or more", which would produce the equivalent of 1/10 or more of his normal staple food ration and 2/5 of his normal vegetable ration.

At the completion of the second six months period, and subsequently, each man was required to cultivate "90 TSUBO (360 square yards) or more", which would produce the equivalent of 1/5 or more of the staple food ration and 4/5 of the vegetable ration.

In addition to the gardening as outlined above, an attempt was to be made to increase the production of livestock (cows, pigs and fowls) and the catching of fish.

Information now to hand reveals that in Jun 44 enemy gardens on BOUGAINVILLE and BUKA were estimated to cover a total of from 3,000 to 5,000 acres (about one fifth of which was rice).

Systematic efforts to destroy these gardens have been made in an endeavour to neutralise this source of food supply to the Japanese. The following details of the methods employed have been adapted from an article published in Naval Aviation Bulletin No 8 and are reproduced for interest. The methods employed include:-

(a) Dropping belly tanks - some filled with petrol and others with a mixture of petrol and diesel oil - the area subsequently being ignited with incendiary bombs.

(b) Spraying the gardens with diesel oil from a 75 gallon tank fitted in the bomb bay of an Avenger aircraft.

This "garden bombing" is generally conducted by a two plane section of Avengers, one plane carrying the incendiary liquid and the other carrying a load of twelve 100 pound bombs or incendiary clusters. The former customarily goes in first, at an altitude of about 50 feet and either drops his load or sprays the garden area. The average coverage with spray is a strip some 50 to 100 feet wide and up to 1,500 feet long. The second plane, acting as escort, observes the run from 1000-2000 feet and then makes its run at a minimum altitude, bombing and strafing targets of opportunity and igniting the area covered by the incendiary liquid.

It has been found that gasoline filled belly tanks are not very effective since the resulting fire is rapid and localised. The half-diesel oil mixture is better since it burns more slowly and covers a larger area. To date spraying with diesel oil has been by far the most destructive type of attack. One fire was reported to have burned out an acre of garden and, in some cases where fires were not started, large areas were subsequently observed to turn brown as a result of the spraying, and coconut trees were reported to be withering.

In most cases a single spraying with diesel oil will not result in a devastating fire, but if, after the spraying, the crop is allowed to wither and dry out, satisfactory fires can be started which will not only burn out the sprayed area, but will also spread to the surrounding vegetation.

Since sweet potato and other root crops appear to be one of the Japanese staples, a method must be developed for destroying underground growths. In the case of such crops, burning is at best only a partial solution as the roots continue to send up new shoots.

(AMF Review No 113)

(b) NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPANESE SUBMARINES

The I-15 is one of the newest and is the largest class of Japanese cruiser-type submarines. Although this class was originally fitted for carrying aircraft, midget submarines or supplies, it is now believed that only the I-16 carries a midget and very few units still retain the aircraft. Instead, most of the units of this class are engaged in supplying outlying bases. They have been converted in design by an arrangement which allows clear deck space aft for nesting up to five landing craft, or carrying large loads of provisions in canvas containers.

Dimensions of the standard aircraft-carrying model are as follows:

Length	:	335 - 338 feet
Beam	:	17 feet 8 inches - 21 feet
Endurance	:	4 - 5 hours (submerged)
Fuel	:	600 - 700 tons (including fuel for supply of other submarines)
Displacement	:	2,100 tons (standard surface)

New reports indicate that up to 40 or 50 tons of bulk provisions or parts are carried internally by units of this and other cruiser-type submarines. Up to 156 troops have also been transported on short runs in the same space. This cargo is in addition to the 40 or more tons of provisions usually carried in rubberised canvas containers on the deck.

(AMF Review No 114)

EQUIPMENT:

(a) JAPANESE 50 mm SMOKE GRENADE

In 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No 3, illustrations of this grenade were included, and the following descriptive detail has now come to hand.

GENERAL:

This grenade is similar in some respects to the Japanese Type 91 HE Grenade, in as much as it consists of a nose fuse similar in design and action and a propellent unit suitable for projecting from a discharger of 50mm calibre. Since the fuse could be initiated by a blow on the fuse head as well as by shock of discharge, the grenade is suitable for throwing by hand.

IDENTIFICATION:

The grenade consists of a fuse covered by a brass safety cap, which is held in position by a double pronged brass safety pin with an attached finger loop of string. The fuse projects from the necked head of a smooth unpainted brass body. The propellent unit is of blackened steel having six equally spaced ports at the side and a visible percussion cap at the base. This unit is located at the bottom of the grenade and screwed into a threaded recess. Translations of markings on the grenade examined are as follows:-

On the base - "December 1937 NAGOYA Arsenal"
On the fuse body- "March 1939 OSAKA Army Arsenal"

CHARACTERISTICS:

As with the Type 91 HE Grenade, before the grenade is inserted into the barrel of the discharger, the fuse must be armed by screwing home the striker pin. Then the safety pin is removed, leaving the safety cap loosely held at the groove in the fuse body. On discharge, the striker sets back on the percussion cap, which in turn ignites the delay pellet. After the delay period, the burning train reaches the black powder composition in the base of the pellet and initiates the intermediary pellet, which functions the burster. The WP(white phosphorus) container would be shattered and probably forced out with the grenade head thus scattering the contents. Even if thrown by hand, it is necessary to leave the propellent unit in place to retain the two pellets of the burster unit.

Weight complete	543 gms	(19 oz)
Weight of propellent unit	85 gms	(2.97 oz)
Weight of WP container (filled)	255 gms	(8.93 oz)
Weight of WP filling	174 gms	(6.09 oz)
Overall length	14.5 cms	(5.71 in)
Diameter of grenade body	49.7 mm	(1.958 in)

(AMF Review No 113)

(b) JAPANESE LAND MINES

The following information concerning the use of Japanese Land Mines in SAIPAN is of interest and has been extracted from "Weekly Intelligence" of 22 Sep 44, published by United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Japanese use of land mines on SAIPAN was extensive, rather than well-planned. The hastilly laid fields were ill-concealed and often poorly sited. Where groups of mines were used, cunning and trickery were demonstrated, rather than good tactical employment. The relatively large numbers of mines used, however, is significant, and indicates the importance with which these weapons are regarded by the Japanese as a counter to movement of traffic on tracks and roads.

The Anti-Vehicular or "Yardstick" Mines were used in groups of three or four on the roads; whilst type 93 Land Mines were found singly and in pairs, on and near highways. At one point along the beach, 60 mines of the latter type were placed 10 feet apart in two rows, one at the highwater mark and the other further inland. They had been set under boards and most of them were visible and easily identified.

The filling of this mine to date has been two pounds of picric compound, but others were apparently recovered on SAIPAN containing a 50/50 mixture of TNT and Cyclonite. This fact is significant as the explosive effect of mines filled with the latter mixture can be expected to be greatly increased.

63 Kg bombs filled with picric acid or other HE filling were also used as land mines. The bombs were olive drab or metallic in colour, 51 inches long and 8 inches in diameter, and were buried with the nose protruding above the ground. They were located along roads and at intersections, in fields ranging from 6 to 200. Many were unfused and not capable of being detonated, indicating possibly that they had been hastily installed. In some cases, however, they proved effective Anti-Tank mines and resulted in a light tank being over-turned, killing the entire crew. Another blew the track and two bogie wheels off a medium tank.

Metal mines and depth charges, equipped for electrical firing, were buried in the wharf of GARAPAN.

Japanese Booby Traps

Only in one instance were booby traps encountered during the attack on SAIPAN, being on D Day at an air-ground radio command post. This post consisted primarily of a generator and transmitter housed in a tent. A total of seven charges were found, each comprising 10 one pound blocks of picric acid with firing devices. Five of these charges were connected in series with the transmitter and so installed as to detonate if the transmitter were energised. A sixth charge was connected with a trip wire covering the entrance to the tent, whilst the remainder were connected to a rifle in the immediate vicinity.

(AMF Review No 114. Extracted from "Report on Japanese Defense Plan for the Island of SAIPAN").

(c) JAPANESE MORTARS

It has been reported that two Japanese Mortars of 155mm (6.1 in) calibre were encountered by US forces at PALAU. No description has been received as yet of these weapons.

(AMF Review No 114)

(d) JAPANESE PRE-FABRICATED ASSAULT BRIDGE

Details and illustrations of a pre-fabricated assault bridge in use by the Japanese is shown as part of this supplement.

(d) JAPANESE 25mm (.98 in) MODEL 96 DUAL PURPOSE GUN:

The following ballistic data applies to the ordinary type ammunition for this weapon and has been obtained from a captured range table:

Muzzle velocity	:	870 metres (2,853.6 feet) per second
Maximum horizontal range	:	6,800 metres (7,439.2 yards)
Time of flight for maximum horizontal range	:	40 seconds (approximately)
Maximum vertical range	:	5,000 metres (5,470 yards)
Time of flight for maximum vertical range	:	25 seconds

It is believed that the ordinary type ammunition referred to in this range table is the standard HE ammunition fitted with percussion fuse.

(AMF Review No 114)

APPENDIX B TO AMF WEEKLY
INTELLIGENCE REVIEW NO 114
OF 6 OCT 44

JAPANESE PRE-FABRICATED ASSAULT BRIDGE



DESCRIPTION

THE span is divided into three pre-fabricated sections, each section consisting of nine planks forming the decking with drawn steel tube rails. In section the top rail was circular whilst the bottom rail was oval.

The bottom rail terminates in an extension which forms carrying handles covered with rubber grips.

Crossmembers and struts reinforce the superstructure.

Each section is clamped together by interlocking joints and spring loaded bolts, which are placed alternatively inside and outside the top and bottom rails.

The bridge can be assembled and carried by two men making it of value in manouvreability and facile assembly.



CHARACTERISTICS

Overall Length (including handles)
32 ft 11 in

Internal Width
17½ in

Total Weight
152 lb

Diameter of Tubing

Top rail	20mm
Bottom rail	14 x 22mm
Uprights	16mm
Stays	11mm

Crossmembers
¾ in Angle Iron
(20 x 2.5mm)

Decking

Planks 6¼ x ¾ in

Length

End Sections
9 ft 1½ in

Centre Section
9 ft 5 in

APPX "A" TO I AUST CORPS INT SUMMARY No 4

STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS OF JAPANESE FORCES

SCALE AT EQUATOR

AS AT 4th OCT 44

THAILAND
FRENCH INDO CHINA
Bangkok
Saigon
SOUTH CHINA SEA
MALAY STATES
Kota Bharu
Singapore
Kuching
BORNEO
SUMATRA
Palembang
Bandjermasin
Batavia
JAVA
Sourabaya
Brunei
Tarakan
Balikpapan
Manado
Makassar
CELEBES
Kendari
Ambon
CERAM
Ternate
HALMAHERA IS
Koepang
TIMOR
Dilli
Darwin
Sorong
Kaimana
Babo
Manokwari
MAPIA I
Windensie
Mabire
NEW GUINEA
Timoeka
TOEAL
DOBO
SAUMLAKI
Merauke
Port Moresby
Lae
Madang
Wewak
Aitape
Hollandia
Sarmi
YAP
PALAU IS
SONSORAL I
MERIR I
MARIANAS
SAIPAN
GUAM
TRUK IS
PONAPE
CAROLINE ISLANDS
PACIFIC OCEAN
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS
Kavieng
Rabaul
NEW BRITAIN
SOLOMON ISLANDS
LUZON
Manila
Cebu
MINDANAO
Davao
Zamboanga
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

102,700
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS TOTAL : 224,000
56,900
64,400
NORTH WEST SECTOR TOTAL :431,900/444,900
15,000
39,000
13,000
25,000
25/30,000
19,000
19,000
12,000
7,000
400
1,000
1,000
500
1,500
3,000
5,000
3,000
20/25,000
1,500
NORTH EAST SECTOR TOTAL:86,000
28,000
45,000
13,000

GSI I AUST CORPS

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WAR DIARY

SECRET
COPY NO 161

GENERAL STAFF INTELLIGENCE

1 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Nº 5

1. Information contained in this summary is for circulation down to battalions or equivalent units
2. Items sidelined will not be reproduced
3. Other items may be reproduced for the information of all units but, as reproduced material may be taken as confirmatory intelligence, the source of all such items will be acknowledged

AIR DISTANCE MAP

DISTANCES ARE SHOWN IN NAUTICAL MILES

TO CONVERT TO STATUTE MILES MULTIPLY BY 1·15



GSI 1 AUST CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.5

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 15 Oct 44 to 1200 hrs 20 Oct 44

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ENEMY INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT

GENERAL

Japanese radio has reported the commencement of Allied landing operations in the Central PHILIPPINES. No official confirmation of this report has yet been published.

The report follows a week of tremendous Allied activity. FORMOSA, the link in the chain of supply from the Japanese homeland to the PHILIPPINES, has been under constant air attack from land-based Super Fortresses and carrier-based aircraft, which have wrought havoc on the enemy's immediate reserves of aircraft and shipping. The destruction of 915 aircraft and 341 vessels in a week is a severe blow to the enemy's potential reinforcement of the PHILIPPINES.

Simultaneously, carrier-based aircraft have continued to strike at targets in LUZON and aircraft operating from the SEPA have conducted harassing raids on MINDANAO.

Allied naval forces have probed deeper than ever before into Japanese waters with successful attacks on the OKINAWA Group, approximately 300 nautical miles SW of KYUSHU, the nearest portion of the Japanese homeland. Even this raid failed to evoke any enemy naval response.

The constription of the 17 and 18 year old classes in JAPAN is probably designed to assist in the defence of JAPAN itself rather than to increase the strength of the Japanese Army overseas.

Following the recent Allied landing on MOROTAI, reports have been received of the movement of the headquarters of 2 Area Army from MENADO to PLARANG, in the SW CELEBES. This movement is a logical reaction to the Allied threat, but may also suggest the trend of Japanese thought in preparing the defence of the southern and eastern NEI.

PART I

OPERATIONS - SWPA:

1. Land

Tokyo radio has reported that on Tuesday 17 Oct,44, a large fleet of Allied naval vessels and transports sailed into LEYTE Gulf in the Central PHILIPPINES and began to bombard shore positions. A report from MANILA states that Allied landing operations began on the morning of 17 Oct on SULUAN Island in the Central PHILIPPINES. Unofficial reports, of Japanese origin, refer to landings on the islands of LEYTE and SAMAR.

Mopping up has continued on MOROTAI Island in the HALMAHERAS, and in the PALAU Islands where there is still some resistance from caves in ULORBOGOL Mountain area on PELELIU Island.

On ANGAUR Island, Allied troops are clearing enemy snipers and eliminating the last small enemy pocket.

In NEW BRITAIN patrol activity has continued. On 10 Oct an Allied patrol, which left HOSKINS by barge to investigate a reported Japanese move towards EA-EA and to make a recce of UBILI area, returned without having sighted enemy forces.

Our OPEN BAY patrols reported large numbers of Japanese in the KORINDINDI RIVER - MEVELO plantation area and that the enemy is combing the country towards BAIA.

In the WIDE BAY area it is reported that all Japanese evacuated MILIM by road and sea on night 9/10 Oct following Allied air attacks. A total of 27 dead Japs were found in MILIM-MU area.

2. Sea

Once again the greatest concentration of shipping has been in PHILIPPINE waters. One large convoy was sighted off the west coast of LUZON and another convoy, escorted by a destroyer, was seen off N/ tip LUZON. Excluding these convoys, 86 merchant ships totalling some 125,000 tons, many small craft and seven naval vessels were sighted around the PHILIPPINES.

3. AIR

a. Own

Highlights of the Allied air offensive for the week were the heavy attacks on BALIKPAPAN and the considerably increased air effort against CERAM.

The first attack against BALIKPAPAN was made by 100 Liberators escorted by Thunderbolts and Lightnings on 10 Oct. Four days later a similar force repeated the attack. Considerable damage was inflicted on vital enemy installations and a total of 83 enemy aircraft shot down and 14 more probably destroyed. Allied losses were negligible

Airfields and installations on CERAM, AMBON and BOEROE IS were attacked by large forces of fighters, bombers and attack aircraft with considerable success.

Elsewhere the air effort was maintained at its normal high tempo.

b. Enemy

The enemy bitterly defended the BALIKPAPAN target area with 60/70 fighters during each Allied attack but the attacks were nevertheless accurate, and he paid heavily in aircraft losses.

Attacks were made on Allied positions on SOUTH MOROTAI by flights of from 2 to 4 aircraft causing some slight damage and casualties.

On 9 Oct 4/8 enemy aircraft penetrated deeper into Allied territory than for some considerable time to bomb airfields on NOEMFOOR ISLAND, but caused no damage.

OPERATIONS - CENTRAL PACIFIC:

Following almost continual air attacks by Allied Super Fortresses and carrier-based planes on FORMOSA, the facilities that made the island such a vital link in the enemy's southern air chain are reported to have been put out of action.

On 12 and 13 Oct carrier-based planes attacked port and shore installations, air bases and industrial establishments at TAICHU, ENSHO, TAISUI, HEITO, REIGARYO and OKAYAMA. Thirty-five vessels totalling approximately 47,000 tons were sunk, 16 vessels probably sunk, 34 vessels damaged and 37 small craft sunk or damaged.

On 15 Oct photographs revealed 2 battleships and 15 unspecified vessels in TAKAO Harbour.

Admiral NIMITZ has announced that, in the week's operations against FORMOSA from 12-19 Oct, 915 Japanese aircraft have been destroyed and 341 vessels of all types have been lost by the enemy.

In an attack on the OKINAWA Group on 10 Oct by carrier-borne aircraft, 1 destroyer-escort, 1 submarine tender, 4 midget submarines, 25 small ships, 14 freighters, 1 small tender and 45 small craft were sunk, 14 vessels and 9 small craft were probably sunk, 1 destroyer was beached and 11 vessels and many small craft were damaged.

On 16 Oct a task force comprising 1 aircraft-carrier, 2 battleships, 1 heavy 2 light cruisers and 8 destroyers, was sighted 115 miles east OKINAWA JIMA on a course WSW, but there has been no indication of any interference with Allied naval units.

The attacks on the OKINAWA Group represent the deepest penetration into Japanese waters so far made by Allied naval forces.

For the first time extensive photographic coverage of ports in southern JAPAN was obtained on 6 Oct. At NAGASAKI, 24 vessels including 1 heavy cruiser, under construction were seen while at WAKAMATSU, 24 merchant vessels totalling 57,100 tons, and at SHIMONOSEKI 19 vessels totalling approximately 56,000 tons were revealed.

Allied submarines have been active in the CHINA SEAS. During the period 2 to 7 Oct 1 large, 3 medium merchant vessels and 1 medium oil tanker were sunk. One large oil tanker was probably sunk and one large and one small oil tanker were damaged. On 9 Oct a large minelayer was sunk. An attack by Allied aircraft on 6/8 naval vessels 120 miles east of HONGKONG resulted in 1 light cruiser sunk and 1 destroyer probably sunk. The convoy was heading towards TAKAO.

A sighting in HONGKONG Harbour on 15 Oct revealed 12 naval craft and 49 vessels totalling 138,000 tons.

PART II

1. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS OF ENEMY FORCES:

(a) LAND

NE SECTOR

In the light of recent evidence enemy strength in the SOLOMONS has been reassessed and the total increased from 15,000 to 25,000. No other change is recorded for the sector but in NEW GUINEA there are indications that Japanese troops are moving out of DAGUA to the MAPRIK area and it is considered that there are now 2,000 troops in the vicinity of MAPRIK and 500 forward in the TONG-YAPUNDA area.

NW SECTOR

It has been reported that following the move of HQ 2 ARMY from MANOKWARI to IDORE, at least part of HQ 19 ARMY has been moved from AMBON to PIRO Bay (CERAM). At the same time there is evidence that HQ 2 AREA ARMY has been moved from MENADO to PINRANG.

In DUTCH NEW GUINEA strength at TIMOEKA has been reduced to 1,000 and a similar reduction of 500 has taken place in the BOMBERAI Peninsula where total strength is now 6,500. The total for AMBON, however, has been increased from 19,000 to 20,000.

Principal changes in the NW SECTOR have taken place in the PHILIPPINES and the following are the latest figures by main areas :-

LUZON: Increased to 121,700 and includes

NORTHERN - 39,400
CENTRAL - 60,000
BATANGAS - 7,500
BICOL PENINSULA - 12,900
MINDORO - 1,000

CENTRAL: Increased to 60,900 and includes

PALAWAN - [illegible] 1,500
PANAY - 7,200
NEGROS - 11,000
BOHOL-CEBU-
LEYTE-SAMAR - 15,700
MASBATE - 25,500

MINDANAO: Reduced to 59,400 and includes

NORTHERN - 25,500
SOUTHERN - 27,900
ZAMBOANGA-SULU
ARCHIPELAGO - 6,000

The total estimate for the PHILIPPINES has thus been increased to 242,000 including HQ SOUTHERN ARMY, 16, 30, 100, 102, 103 and 105 Divisions.

As a result of the above changes, the current estimates by sectors are as follows :-

NE SECTOR: 98,000
NW SECTOR: 452,900/462,900
TOTAL SWPA: 550,900/560,900

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
S.W.P.A.
INFORMATION TO 191800K OCT 44

SCALE AT EQUATOR

Attacks by Liberators and P38s destroyed 6 enemy aircraft and one 300-ton freighter
4 Oct: 4 large cargo vessels

15 P38s damaged much MT and caused casualties amongst personnel and cavalry.

45 heavy bomber sorties flown against airfields.

NORTHERN PHILIPPINES:
4 Oct: 2 destroyers
2 large transports
2 large tankers
1 medium tanker
1 medium freighter
43 small freighters
1 large convoy off west coast LUZON,
1 large destroyer escorted convoy off NW tip LUZON.
Carrier-based aircraft attacked APARRI damaging installations and destroying 14/15 grounded enemy aircraft.

CENTRAL PHILIPPINES:
5/6 Oct: 5 small cargo vessels
9 : 3 escorts
9 merchant vessels
11 : 2 light cruisers
2 medium tankers
1 large tanker
2 converted tankers
1 transport
4 medium freighter-transports.
1 freighter (destroyed)
many small vessels.
15/16 : 1 heavy cruiser, 1 destroyer
1 possible aircraft carrier
2 small gunboats, 3 large tankers.

MINDANAO:
4 Oct : 4 large cargo vessels
5/6 : 5 freighters total 900 tons.
: 65 luggers and barges
7 : 2 cargo vessels total 600 tons
11/12: 1 freighter-transport 500/1000 tons

BORNEO:
10 Oct: 2 possible destroyers
7 large freighters
5 u/i vessels
3 freighters total 6100/9000 tons
BALIKPAPAN:
10 Oct: Attack by 100 Liberators escorted by P38s and P47s.
14 Oct: Attack by Liberators and escorts.
Total enemy aircraft destroyed 63
Considerable damage inflicted

7 Oct:
1 u/i merchant vessel

10 Oct: 2 freighters
1 5500/7000 freighter-transport
14 : 1 stack-aft freighter
25 luggers and barges.
24 sorties flown against enemy airfields and installations.

132 sorties flown against enemy airfield and installations in central sector of HALMAHERA.

Mopping up continued.
Contact with 200 Japs at BOESOBOESO.
Enemy aircraft dropped bombs on 2 occasions causing some damage and casualties.
Casualties to 14 Oct:
97 : Killed.
24 : Jap PW.

6 & 7 Oct: 8 barges (destroyed).
6 Oct: 1 300/1000 ton freighter burning.
9 : 15/20 barges
: 4/5 freighters (150/1000 tons)
11 : 3 freighters total 450/900 tons.

Enemy airfields kept under continual air attacks with 290 sorties.

4-8 enemy aircraft bombed KORNASOREN, nil damage.

16 Oct: Many luggers.

Casualties to 10 Oct:
6228 : Killed
471 : Jap PW
301 : Formosan PW

Air attacks continued with 100 sorties against BOUGAINVILLE, 112 sorties against targets NEW IRELAND and GAZELLE PENINSULA with over 60 sorties.

Patrol activity some clashes.
Casualties to 15 Oct:
8952 : Killed
122 : Jap PW
6 : Korean PW

Daily air attacks totalled 75 sorties

11 Oct: 1 possible destroyer
1 merchant vessel 5400 tons
11 freighters total 4000 tons
2 sub chasers
19 freighters total 5700 tons (one sunk, one left burning)
13 : 4 small naval vessels
15 small merchant vessels
16 : 10 vessels totalling 17800/31400 tons - 1 probable destroyer - 100 small craft - 2 sub chasers - 1 patrol craft - 18 merchant vessels total 4000 tons.
Over 50 sorties by heavy bombers against enemy installations in this sector.

Attack against airfields and waterfront targets with approx 530 sorties.

16 Oct: 1 submarine.

5 Oct:
8 barges

8 Oct: 1 500-ton merchant vessel
6 barges
15 : One 1400/1600 freighter-transport
16 : 2 freighters total 450/1300 tons destroyed.

Varied targets on enemy held islands subjected to air attack with over 110 sorties.

12 Oct: 8 merchant vessels
3 small " "
many small craft & barges.

6 Oct:
4 u/i vessels
4 small vessels

TIMOR:
12 Oct: 10/12 barges
17 : 3 freighters total 300/600 tons.

Mopping up continued.
Casualties to 15 Oct:
10447 : Killed
284 : PW

ANGAUR Is: Mopping up in last small enemy pocket.
Casualties to 14 Oct:
1192 : Killed
11 : PW

PALAU IS
BABELTHUAP
ANGAUR
PELELIU
SONSORAL IS
MERIR IS
MAPIA IS
MOROTAI
HALMAHERA
MOLUCCA SEA
SOELA IS
CERAM
BOERO
BANDA SEA
CELEBES SEA
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
MINDANAO
TALAUD IS
SANGIHE IS
WAKDE I
HOLLANDIA
WISSEL LAKES
NEW GUINEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
NOEMFOOR I
BIAK I
JAPEN
KAI IS
ARU IS
AROE IS

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(b) AIR -

Estimate of enemy Land based air strength in the areas listed below on information to 1800K/9 Oct 44.

AREAS	F	2E/F	SE/B	2E/B	F/B	F/P	Obsn	Total 9 Oct	Comparative Totals 5 Oct	Comparative Totals 27 Sep
NEW BRITAIN) NEW IRELAND) SOLOMONS)						10	2	12	12	10
TALAUD						3		3	3	3
PHILIPPINES:										
MINDANAO	15	11	19	6	2	2	7	62	64	52
VISAYAS	46	18	21	12	3	10	9	119	120	57
LUZON	80	48	31	59	5	13	6	242	210	302
								423	394	411
AMBON AREA	4		3	4	2	9	4	26	37	39
CELEBES:										
NORTH	7		2	6		6		21		
SOUTH	27	18	28	30	3	10		116		
								137	124	146
TIMOR-SOEMBA- SOEMBAWA- FLORES	10					3	3	16	16	16
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK	4			12		15	5	36	44	41
BORNEO	92	8	32	70		12		214	142	125
	285	93	136	199	15	93	36	867	772	796

(AAF Review No 115)

2 TACTICS:

(a) MISCELLANEOUS RUSES - NEW AND OLD

The following notes have been selected from reports on the AITAPE operations by small unit leaders engaged:-

AUSTRALIAN DRESS

"A small patrol of about eight men were observed across the KABENAU RIVER, approximately 300 yards from our position. Some were wearing Australian shorts and one had an Australian 'slouch'hat. We could not determine whether they were Australians or Japs. They were waving and motioning us to come over .. In order to persuade them to come to our side, a few of our party showed themselves and waved back. When they were within a hundred yards of us, we recognised them as Japs, opened fire and killed both .."

FAKED PARLEYE

"I spotted a Jap sticking his head out of the thick underbrush. All I was armed with was a GI pistol. I walked in front of his hideout and ordered him out, so that I could make sure of the kill... He would not come out right away so I took aim and ordered him out once more. He then stepped from the bank slowly and cautiously with his hands raised.

The Jap had his left hand bandaged. He pointed with one finger and repeated 'One Jap soldier.' I know they travelled in nothing less than threes. I also noticed that the bulged bandage had been untied at the wrist. I suspected a hand grenade, so I put a few slugs into his head ....There was a grenade under the bandage."

SURRENDER RUSE

"My squad was guarding a trail when we spotted a Jap coming along. We held our fire until he came closer, and noticed that he apparently wanted to surrender. His hands were raised above his head and to all appearances he was unarmed. When he came closer he tossed a grenade which he had concealed in one hand, and dived for the brush...."

(FIRST AUST ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.125, extracted from HQ Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No.60)

(b) NEW WIRE CUTTING TECHNIQUE:

Recently the Japanese in the ARAKAN evolved a new technique of cutting British telephone lines. The enemy cuts them in such a way that there is no interference with the ringing of the telephone bells, and yet, when a conversation is begun, the transmission of the voices is so weak that they are likely to be unintelligible.

When the Japanese discover a British telephone line, they cut a 6-inch section from all but two strands of a seven strand wire. The remaining two are left intact. Insulation tape then is wrapped around the wire to suggest that an ordinary splice has been made by British linesmen.

Military observers report that if linesmen are able to identify their own splices, the sections cut by the enemy can be detected and repaired much more rapidly.

(AIR REVIEW No.115 from WASHINGTON Intelligence Bulletin Vol II No.12 of Aug 44)

(c) JAPANESE ARTILLERY RICOCHET FIRE:

The Japanese seem fully aware that the primary mission of field artillery in island defence is the destruction of approaching landing craft, and they have not overlooked the potentialities of ricochet fire in accomplishing this mission. Documents captured on SAIPAN reveal that the Japanese had carried out extensive firing tests prior to D-Day, for the purpose of obtaining data to enable them to make effective use of this type of artillery fire. Many hundreds of rounds had been fired with all types of artillery pieces, using both quick and delay fuse.

To date there has been no definite evidence of this type of fire having been used in combat by the Japanese.

Results of the tests, using 75mm, 105mm and 155mm howitzers and guns, showed 50% to 70% ricochets were obtained when firing on a calm sea at ranges from 2,200 to 2,700 metres.

(AIR REVIEW No.115 from United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas Weekly Intelligence No. 12 of 29 Sep 44)

5. JAPANESE ARMY MANPOWER

Following the recent raids on FORMOSA it was announced from TOKIO that the conscription age in JAPAN had been lowered from 19 to 17. It was previously reported in 1 AUST CORPS

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.1 that as from Nov 43 the lower age limit had been reduced to 19 and the upper age limit increased to 45, and this amendment would make a further 400,000 recruits available to the active army. Statistical datum on the census of JAPAN is not available, but taking previous age groups as broad examples it would seem that some 800,000 additional recruits will be conscripted in the first year the plan comes into operation. Thus, if the plan should be made effective immediately, the 1944 intake would total 1,600,000; if, however, the plan is left until 1945 the intake will total some 1,200,000. In any case, the gross intake from Nov 43 to Nov 45 will total 2,000,000. It is unlikely that JAPAN has the facilities, time or equipment to absorb such a large body of recruits into the active army and a large proportion will probably be retained as an active reserve to be called upon as required. Allowance must also be made for the needs of the NAVY and the demands of industry so that although the figure of 2,000,000 is imposing at first sight, probably the overseas army will not be greatly affected, but the bulk of these raw recruits will be available for the defence of the Japanese homeland.

PART III

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS:

The PHILIPPINES form a group of 7,083 islands and islets between 5° and 22° North Latitude and 117° and 127° East longitude covering an area roughly 680 miles East to West and 1,150 miles North to South. Only 462 of the islands have an area of a square mile or more, and only 2,773 are even named. The total area of the group is 114,400 square miles, LUZON being the largest island with an area of 40,814 square miles.

Geography

The determining features in the geography of the PHILIPPINES are the mountain chains running generally North and South with fertile valleys of varying width between them. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country, there are few large rivers, but many of the small streams rapidly become torrents when it rains. The land area of the group is approximately the same as that of the BRITISH ISLES, the more important islands being:-

LUZON	40,814	square	miles
MINDANAO	36,906	"	"
SAMAR	5,124	"	"
NEGROS	4,903	"	"
PALAWAN	4,500	"	"

The group as a whole is divided into three main areas: LUZON and adjacent islands; VISAYAS (including SAMAR, LEYTE, BOHOL, CEBU, NEGROS, PANAY, MASBATE and many smaller islands); MINDANAO and SULU (including PALAWAN).

Communications

MANILA, prior to the war, was a great trade centre, being the distributing point for American products in the East and the collecting point for Eastern good for AMERICA. MANILA is also an important air station. Domestic transportation in the PHILIPPINES depends on inter-island steamers, road(10,925 miles) and rail (867 miles).

Climate

Although in the tropics, the climate is pleasant, being generally warm with cool nights. As a result of regular monsoon breezes, it is never oppressively hot. Dec - Mar is the best period of the year, and Apr - May the hottest, the rest of the year being rainy.

Population

The population, amounting to 18,000,000, is of mixed descent with Spanish and Malay strains prominent in the original native stock. The original stock is represented by the dwarf Negritos in the mountains of Eastern LUZON who form only 0.5% of the total population. The Malay is the most important element in the people, the Pagan (626,000) and Moro (Mohammedan, 4% of total population) elements being practically pure Malay, while the Christians (90 % of the total) have intermarried extensively with the Spanish. The Chinese and Japanese form small but powerful economic minorities. The chief native stocks are the Tagalogs (Central LUZON) 3,500,000 and Ilocanos (NW LUZON) 2,350,000. There are about 262 newspapers and periodicals published in English and other languages.

Sanitation and Health

Although great progress had been made before the war in controlling disease, Japanese co-prosperity has probably reduced the country to that stage in its early history when epidemics of all kinds were a common occurrence.

Religion and Education

The principal religion is Roman Catholic, with 8,000,000 adherents. In 1902, an Independent Filipino Church was founded which now has 4,000,000 members. Minor sects are : Mohammedans 643,000; Protestants 200,000; Buddhists 24,000. Free education is provided in the public schools which had 1,738,868 pupils with a teaching staff of 88 Americans and 37,505 Filipinos prior to the Japanese occupation. In MANILA is the University of Santo Thomas, founded in 1611.

Language

There are 87 native dialects springing from eight related languages, which is one reason for the introduction of English as an official language to give a common tongue to all Filipinos. In 1937 one of these native dialects, Tagalog, was selected as a basis for a national language. All upper classes also speak Spanish as a matter of caste. During the American rule, English and Spanish were the official languages, but it was proposed to substitute Tagalog for Spanish on the granting of independence. The Japanese have made Japanese and Tagalog official languages. English is spoken by 27, and Spanish by 3, of the Filipinos. The franchise is extended to all citizens 21 years of age who can read and write Spanish, English or a native dialect.

History

The modern history of the PHILIPPINES began with the discovery of the group in 1521 by MAGELLAN who was, later in the year, killed on MACTAN near CEBU. In 1550 MANILA was discovered and became the capital under Spanish rule. Following the Spanish-American War, the group passed to AMERICA for 20,000,000 dollars. The American rule has been directed to training the people for self-government after suppressing Filipino resistance by 1901. In 1901 the first Civil Commissioner was appointed. In 1916 the JONES Act provided that the Filipinos were to make their own laws in their own House of Representatives and Senate. The final stage was reached in the TYDINGS McDUFFIE Act providing for complete PHILIPPINE independence from 4 Jul 45.

Economy

The PHILIPPINES are primarily an agricultural country, the principal crops being palay (rough rice), abaca (MANILA hemp), sugar cane, coconuts, tobacco, corn, maguey, cacao and coffee. Although numerous deposits of economic minerals exist in the islands, the mining industry is still undeveloped, except for gold mining which has grown rapidly since 1930 and produced 905,265 ozs in 1938.

The monetary unit is the peso (the pre-war equivalent of 3/- Aust) divided into 100 centavos. Coins are issued in the following denominations: one peso, 50, 20, 10, 5 and 1 centavo; paper money in 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 200 and 500 peso notes.

(ARMY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW 115)

PART IV

SECURITY.

ALLIED SECURITY AND ENEMY INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY.

The following summary of a report from Allied Armies in ITALY throws light on the successes which can be achieved by good security measures, as well as drawing attention to some of our weaker points.

Although this report deals with events in ITALY, it applies equally to the operations in SEA or any other theatre where our troops are in contact with the enemy, and should be read with that fact in mind.

It is recommended that this material should be used as the basis for security instruction in all units. When pointing to the lessons to be drawn from the paragraph dealing with the lack of security of Allied PW, the other side of the picture should not be forgotten - namely, that other reports have indicated a high standard of security among our PW.

A recent capture by our troops has resulted in the greater part of the Intelligence files of the German 14 Army falling into our hands. This gives us a most valuable insight into the methods of enemy intelligence and the degree of success obtained by our own security measures.

The most significant item is a map showing our order of battle as known to the enemy on 12 May, i.e. the day after our attack began. This reveals serious gaps in the enemy's knowledge. The enemy had, on the whole, a fairly accurate knowledge of the dispositions of those troops who had been for some time in the front line and which he had identified from prisoners. Thus he correctly placed two US and two British divisions, though he did not know under whose command they were. Corps sectors are shown correctly, though Corps HQ are wrongly located by a matter of a few miles, and the same is true of Army HQ, which is over twelve miles out.

Other mistakes are more surprising. For instance, in the French and Polish Corps sectors both the numbers and locations of troops are inaccurate and the Canadian picture is also very confused. In addition the movements of the 3A Armoured Division are wrongly reported and a false appreciation is made of landing practices, which are shown as taking place on 7 May at POZZUOLI, both as regards the scale of the practices and the identity of the formations taking part in them.

In fact, the picture presented to the enemy command was very faulty. He underestimated our strength in the area of our main attack by no less than seven divisions.

As a result, he credited us with having much larger reserves in the back areas, and, in view of this and the fact that he believed at least three of these divisions to be on or near the coast, where landing exercises were going on, he appreciated that our frontal attack was only diversion, and that we intended to carry out another landing in his rear. His dispositions on 11 May were clearly based on this belief; he had the minimum number of troops on the line and his reserve divisions were disposed along the west coast to meet the landing which he confidently expected. As a result our attack was made in much greater strength than he expected (in the FEC sector, for instance, in more than four times the strength he expected), which greatly assisted our initial success. All German divisions in reserve were either grouped round the ANZIO beachhead or strung out along the Western

coast, and by the time the enemy had decided his fears of a landing were groundless, these reserves were so slow in reaching the scene of battle that they were drawn in and destroyed piecemeal.

This was a most impressive example of the advantages to be gained from the observance of security measures. All troops should be informed, now that this stage of the battle is ended, of the facts revealed by the above and it should be stressed that this success, which is due to our security measures and to the way in which they have collaborated by strictly observing them, has undoubtedly saved thousands of lives and been of the utmost assistance towards the victory which has been gained. Such a demonstration of its importance will go very far towards removing any feelings of annoyance which may from time-to-time arise over individual security regulations.

The evidence made available by the capture of the Intelligence documents of the German 14 Army shows that the Allies went into battle on 11 May 44 against an enemy almost entirely blinded by the fog of war. Misled as to where the main weight of our attack was to fall, he had placed his reserves where we wanted them, far away from the point of attack. From these mistakes he was never to recover, and from then on he always found himself a move behind his opponent.

On the other hand the evidence also shows that once battle had been joined the German Command was quickly able to form a correct picture through the interrogation of PW, and the capture of documents; through our wireless telegraphy traffic, press releases and all other expedients of intelligence. This is to some extent unavoidable, but it is clear that too much information reached the enemy through these sources. It is therefore of the greatest importance that the security lessons which are thrown into such strong relief by this campaign should be brought home to all concerned, and positive steps taken to see that their implications are thoroughly understood.

(First Aust Army Intelligence Summary No.125. Abridged from War Office Weekly Intelligence Review No 51).

YOURS SINCERELY:

A handwritten letter of surrender, written on the reverse side of an Allied propaganda leaflet, and signed by four 1st Class Privates of a Construction Unit, was captured at NOEMFOOR recently. It read -

"Letter of Surrender

Construction Unit	1st Cl	Pte	INO, Tokutaro
	"	"	"	ISHIZUKA, Yukio
	"	"	"	SUZUKI, Shiro
	"	"	"	MATSUMURA, Hideo

The above four persons hereby surrender to your Army's invitation. Please be kind enough to spare our lives. We swear to obey your orders absolutely.

Signed - as above

To the Commanding General of the Allied Army. "

(AIF Review No 115).

PART V

4. THE JAPANESE NAVY TODAY:

Although the light forces of the Japanese Navy have suffered important losses, the enemy's strength in battleships, carriers and heavy cruisers has been maintained very close to the pre-war level. The enemy's present carriers, while in some instances not individually as formidable as those destroyed at CORAL SEA and MIDWAY, are quantitively at least equal to the force that struck us a heavy blow at PEARL HARBOUR and covered the PHILIPPINE and SOUTH PACIFIC campaigns. His heavy cruiser losses have been largely confined to older units.

It is only among light cruisers, destroyers and submarines that we have succeeded in substantially reducing the numbers of JAPAN's combatant units. New ships of the AGANO class have replaced, in part, the considerable losses the enemy has sustained in the light category. The fast, heavily armed TERUTSUKI flotilla leaders which appeared early in the war may in some degree have compensated for heavy destroyer losses sustained in older classes. Only in submarines has JAPAN thus far failed to show the ingenuity and enterprise that has characterized her naval design. While many ships in minor combatant categories have succumbed to Allied air-craft and submarines, JAPAN's escort craft, gunboats and anti-submarine vessels are still numerous and effective units.

THE BATTLE LINE

Since MIDWAY we have only gained a few glimpses of the enemy's major units. We have had a distant look at one of his new YAMATO class battleships at TRUK. Photographs show a ship of considerable size, whose armament and general characteristics parallel those of our IOWA. A relatively wide beam- proportionately much greater than in equivalent vessels of our navy - suggests exceptional stability and protection, with corresponding performance as a gun platform and high resistance to shell-fire and torpedo attack. An intermediary battery in 6" or 8" twin turrets represents a notable departure from traditional practice and recalls recent German capital design. It is considered unlikely that this "super-secondary" armament is dual-purpose. AA armament (probably 5"/40 d.p. and lighter automatic weapons) shows the emphasis to be expected in new capital ship design and approaches that provided for the defence of our recent battleships. Concentration of superstructure elements reflects the necessity of clearing fields of fire for increased AA, and renders ships of this class clearly distinguishable from older battleships. The conventional Japanese pagoda has been simplified as a high tower. Hull form and dimensions indicate an extremely rugged and manoeuvrable ship capable of somewhat lower maximum speed than is attained by our own IOWA. Photographs show indentations on either side of the stern, which would tend to bear out reports of some special installation or weapon in this position. (These indentations have also been noted on the CL AGANO). Without more reliable information as to the function of this particular installation no conclusions can be reached. The statement that some special device appears to have been

incorporated in the stern of at least one unit of the YAMATO class must, therefore, suffice for the present.

Very little has been seen of the older Japanese battleships. Photographs of a unit of the KONGO class taken at GUADALCANAL show few, if any, changes from the pre-war appearance of the class. There is reason to believe, however, that the majority of the units of the original Japanese battle line have undergone extensive reconstruction. One has only to consider the present appearance of the TENNESSEE, WEST VIRGINIA and CALIFORNIA to realise how completely a vessel's appearance can be altered in the course of major reconstruction on a basic hull and armament plan. While it is unlikely that changes in the design of Japanese capital ships have been as radical, it is probable that the appearance and characteristics of some of these ships may have undergone extensive alteration.

Reports indicate the possibility that the battleships ISE and HYUGA of the ISE class, now carry flight decks "abaft the centre turret". Planes are unable to land on the deck and must be catapulted off. The ships are believed capable of carrying 18 planes.

The addition of this flight deck would necessitate sacrificing at least four of the twelve 14 inch guns carried on ships of this class.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

The formidable carrier line of PEARL HARBOUR days has now been replaced by a mixed bag of ships - some built as carriers, some converted from other naval types, and others (CVEs) from passenger and combination vessels. Only the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU, the ZUIHO and the old HOSHO were operational as carriers at the outbreak of the war. Of these, only the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU may be regarded as worthy counterparts of our own ESSEX class. Reference to drawings and statistics covering the design and characteristics of these ships will show them to be at least the equivalents of our own first line carriers in speed and plane carrying capacity, while action reports and photographs amply demonstrate their capacity to survive punishment. The SHOKAKU is known to have managed on at least two occasions to return to home port after receiving very severe damage.

SEAPLANE CARRIERS

Losses and conversions have reduced the number of CVS to two units. At the beginning of the war JAPAN had a limited number of seaplane carriers. Since that time two units of the CHITOSE class have been converted to small aircraft carriers. The remaining units are conversions such as the KAMOI, a former oiler and collier built in the UNITED STATES. The AKITSUSHIMA, the newest of JAPAN's seaplane carriers, has not been observed since completion. It has been reported that the AKITSUSHIMA resembles the ships of the MIZUHO class.

A considerable number of merchant ships have been converted to use as seaplane tenders and aircraft transports by removal of kingposts and the addition of catapults.

One new unit, tentatively referred to as TAKACHIHO, is operational as a seaplane tender. It carries a large crane on the stern and has been seen with one MAVIS seaplane on deck. More units of this class may exist.

CRUISERS

No important developments in the design of Japanese heavy cruisers have come to light since the outbreak of war. Latest and most radical are the TONE and CHIKUMA, commissioned in 1938 and 1939 respectively. Very large for ships of their type, these unique vessels show a radical armament plan consisting of four 8 inch twin turrets concentrated forward of the bridge. Main battery

fire is thus blanketed by superstructure from 150 degrees to 210 degrees, and the ship's entire after section appears to be given over to accommodation for aircraft and provision for their handling and launching. In this connection it is interesting to note a variant of the AGANO class (CL), believed to be operational at this time, whose design shows a similar concentration of main battery turrets forward.

The hulls of the TONE and CHIKUMA closely resemble those of later units of the MOGAMI class and mark a departure from previous practice in cruiser design. Older CA's show an almost symmetrical taper at bows and sterns, while these more recent ships have been designed with considerably more beam aft.

The MOGAMI's represent an interesting example of an attempt by JAPAN to conform outwardly to her pre-war treaty commitments while at the same time building up the number of her heavy cruisers. Having reached her prescribed 8 inch gun cruiser strength at the time of the Treaty of LONDON in 1930, she announced the intention of building a class of 6.1 inch light cruisers of 8,500 tons. These were to be the four units of the MOGAMI class. They appeared in due course, armed with 6.1 inch main batteries in five triple turrets. In the spring of 1940 there were strong indications that the class was undergoing re-armament. Photographs of a MOGAMI class cruiser at MIDWAY showed a main battery of twin eights in five turrets closely resembling those of the ATAGO's and other recent Japanese CAs. These and subsequent photos show vessels of a size and tonnage far greater than those initially announced, and in this formidable class we find another example of the devious practices that have characterized Japanese naval policy.

Except for addition of light automatic and machine AA weapons, no alterations have been observed in the design of Japanese CAs since the war. In the light cruiser category a new class has joined the enemy's fleet. The AGANO's, already mentioned, represent a departure from Japanese precedent in design of ships of this type. While Japanese CLs operational before the war showed the familiar multi-stacked silhouette and wide spacing of superstructure elements, this new class more nearly recalls the general design of their heavy cruisers. Superstructure is highly concentrated. A single raked stack, an aircraft handling platform amidships served aft by a catapult and superfiring turrets forward differentiate units of this class. It is of interest to note, contrary to normal Japanese practice, the AGANO's are lightly armed for their size. While no information is available as to the maximum speed of which these vessels are capable, it is a fair guess that some of the displacement saved in weight of guns, mounts and ammunition stowage may well have been applied to an increase in propulsive machinery. As previously noted, at least one unit of this class is provided with installations at either side of the stern whose purpose remains obscure. These consist of twin objects, apparently cylindrical in section, which appear to have been faired into the ship's after sheer line. Whether or not these objects are separate individual elements or parts of the ship's structure cannot now be determined. Large torpedoes, midget submarines, special mine projectors, paravanes, smoke dischargers, and other hypothetical uses have been proposed. There is actually no evidence that they are intended as offensive weapons, although it is difficult to envision any function they may serve in connection with operation of the ship or her equipment. Judging from photographs, the cylinders are about 27 feet in length and four feet in diameter and appear to be slightly bulbous at the end towards the ship's stern. It is conceivable that some connection may exist between these objects and installations previously mentioned in reports on the YAMATO class.

The CL OYODO, previously thought to be a unit of the AGANO class, is now believed to be a variation of this class. Guns are mounted in two triple turrets forward, and the after portion is devoted to aircraft. A single centre-line catapult and deck space for plane stowage are located abaft the mainmast. In other respects the OYODO is similar to units of the AGANO class.

Considerable increase in the torpedo armament of older Japanese CLs is indicated by photographs. New quadruple and twin mounts have been installed in nearly all ships of this type, and strong evidence indicates these to be designed for projection of the new type 93 24-inch torpedo. Replacement of old single-purpose main battery mounts by clusters of 25 and 40 mm MGs has also been noted in some instances.

DESTROYERS:

Three new design classes have appeared among the destroyer forces of the Japanese Navy since PEARL HARBOUR. Ships of the TAKANAMI class represent logical developments from the latest types then known and closely resemble those of the ASASHIO-KAGERO group. Length, however, has been considerably increased, main batteries are dual purpose, and an AA platform has appeared forward of the bridge. A number of ships whose names include the -SUKI (moon) termination, formerly grouped under the KAGERO class, have turned out to be new, fast, powerfully armed vessels of the AKITSUKI class. These vessels represent radical departures from the design of their predecessors. Their heavily trunked single stacks, light torpedo armament, and exceptionally heavy dual-purpose main armament in mounts of a new type render these ships unmistakeable. Their armament shows a functional departure from emphasis on use of torpedoes and suggests that this class has been designed for duties closely paralleling those of anti-aircraft cruisers.

A third new class, previously grouped with the KAGERO's, is now designated by its name ship, the SHIMAKAZE. No unit of the class has as yet been observed and our information is restricted to a reported use of quintuple torpedo mounts in these ships which, if confirmed, would represent a new departure in Japanese naval design.

Receipt of more complete information and the fact that very heavy losses have been sustained among pre-war Japanese destroyer classes has led to regrouping in some instances. In these cases, groups of ships previously carried as separate classes have been combined into a single class. Only minor variations in armament differentiate vessels of the ASASHIO-KAGERO Group, for example, although these had previously been listed as separate classes. The same is true of ships now combined under the HATSUHARU-SHIGURE class. In the latter instance, attention is drawn to the fact that recently disseminated photographs of a member of this class, the HENOHI, indicate the presence of super-firing turrets forward. While it is true that in an experimental pre-war phase the HENOHI and other units of the HATSUHARU class were thus armed, those vessels are now known to conform to the armament plan currently disseminated in various publications such as ONI 41-42.

Since a number of units of the FUBUKI class have been lost, group differentiations as previously assigned within this class will not be maintained in future design lists published by the Division of Naval Intelligence. A number of units of the MINEKAZE class are known to have been transferred to escort duties, with corresponding modification of armament and removal of torpedo tubes. Most ODD's are now in escort status, with a few exceptions such as at least one unit of the WAKABA class which has been largely disarmed and converted into a minelayer. Other older destroyers have been converted into troop carriers, with corresponding elimination of tubes and guns to permit the transportation of personnel and gear on their decks.

An extremely important development has appeared in the armament of all newer Japanese DD classes. It is believed that without exception these newer vessels have been re-armed with the powerful, long-range type 93 torpedo. The great range and destructive potentialities of this weapon should not be underestimated in dealing with Japanese formations and individual destroyers. As partial compensation, however, for the development of a torpedo 24 inches in diameter, 29 feet 6 inches long and carrying an explosive charge of 1,200 pounds, there is some

indication that difficulties in handling so bulky a device have substantially increased reloading time.

SUBMARINES:

No very radical developments have appeared in the design of Japanese submarines since the outbreak of the war. Several classes of cruiser-type submarines have been developed in recent years and are among the largest ships of their type in existence. These vessels are designed for long-range patrol, although they have actually been used largely for reconnaissance and for the landing, supplying, and evacuation of land forces.

JAPAN possesses submarines which are equipped for the carrying of aircraft, as well as five large obsolete submarine minelayers. Reference to statistical information on individual units shows that newer classes are notable for extremely heavy gun armament.

By and large, diving time and manoeuvrability appear to be considerably inferior to corresponding performance of our own units, while extremely cramped accommodations and poor ventilation have resulted in a tendency to cruise on the surface whenever possible, which has often rendered Japanese submarines vulnerable to our own submarines, aircraft and lighter vessels. Compared to US and German undersea craft, those of JAPAN appear to be decidedly second rate.

MINOR COMBATANT CRAFT:

JAPAN's heavy losses in merchant ships have recently been reflected in added emphasis on construction of escort vessels. It is believed that a considerable number of heavily armed PFs of the MIKURA class are operational or under construction. These vessels are analogous with our own frigates or DEs but individually represent somewhat higher firepower, since they are armed with two of the new 4.7 inch twin d.p. mounts which first appeared in 1942. Several new submarine chaser types ranging from 100 feet in length up to more than 200 feet have been developed as well. A small wooden type of SCS has appeared in large numbers. These units are of such slow speed that parachutes are used in dropping depth charges to avoid self-destruction.

A tendency has been noted to employ old destroyers, whale-killer boats, trawlers and other conversions for minelaying, minesweeping and other specialised functions. The WAKATAKE represents an example of a destroyer conversion of this sort.

A number of Dutch PTs were captured by JAPAN in the early phases of the war and have been in operational use. New units have appeared whose design is based on these and Italian and British craft, but they have not proved particularly effective. Reports have been received of a new "HAYABUSA" boat intended to operate against Allied PTs. These ships are reported as being adaptations of the PT 201 Class without torpedoes and displacing 20 tons. They are said to be about 60 feet long, with heavy machine gun armament and a maximum speed of about 30 knots.

AUXILIARIES:

A number of MARU's have been pressed into service as AS's and AO's, while three naval auxiliaries are known to have been converted to carriers. These are the TAIGEI, (now CVL RYUHO), the TAKASAKI, (now CVL ZUIHO) and the TSURUGISAKI (ex AO) converted to the carrier SHOHO, which has been referred to erroneously as "RYUKAKU."

The two large repair ships known to have been in commission at the time of PEARL HARBOUR have either been lost or so severly damaged as to be considered non-operational. No indication of recent construction in this type has developed. Heavily armed AO's of the HAYASAKI class have appeared in some numbers, and appear to combine the functions of fuel carriers and storeships.

Twenty-one hospital ships have been announced by JAPAN, as compared with 29 and 31 such vessels announced by the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN respectively.

Many small foreign merchant ships, varying in size from 50 to 3,000 tons have been converted to naval use. Most of these vessels were formerly used for fishing and coastal freight carrying. They now operate as converted gunboats, patrol craft, mine-sweepers, mine-sweeper tenders, net tenders, survey ships and in other capacities.

Several hundred picket boats, former fishing craft of 20 to 200 gross tons, are serving as sea lookouts to warn of the approach of hostile vessels.

MILITARY LANDING CRAFT AND SUPPLY BARGES.

A development of the standard Type "A" landing barge has been observed in recent months. Designated as Type "H", these twin-screw craft are somewhat longer than Type "A" barges and are wholly constructed of wood. The many other new designs rec recently observed in this group appear to be designed primarily for purposes of supply rather than for more aggressive functions.

Use of most of the familiar Types "A" to "G" assault craft for transport has become increasingly common as losses in merchant vessels increase.

AVAILABLE NON-JAPANESE WARSHIPS.

A number of foreign vessels have fallen into Japanese hands through capture or salvage.

The Chinese vessels NING HAI and PING HAI were captured in 1937. The ships are rated as 2,000-ton light cruisers, although they are little better than gunboats. They mount six 5.5 inch /50 guns in twin turrets, and four 21 inch torpedo tubes and could unquestionably be adapted to use as escort vessels.

Seven Siamese torpedo boats of the THAD class are under Japanese control and have been observed in and around Siamese waters.

Four Siamese submarines of the YUEN class, completed in 1938, are also in service with the Japanese. These boats displace 325 tons and carry five 21 inch torpedo tubes.

Approximately five foreign destroyers are believed in operation with the Japanese Navy, including Siamese, British and Dutch vessels. The old US "flush-decker" STEWART has been reported in use as an escort vessel after salvage at SOERABAYA. Two Siamese ships, the PANGHIN and MANKIONG, displacing 1,400 tons and mounting four 4.7 inch/45 guns, are also well adapted for use as escort craft and parallel closely ships of the new Japanese PF HIKURA class.

(ATIS REVIEW No.114 from CHI Weekly, 30 Aug 44).

PART VI

OPERATIONS - OTHER FRONTS.

1. ASIA

British troops now control the whole of the IMPHAL - TIDDIM Road following the capture of the important Japanese base and road junction of TIDDIM. The Japanese forces fled SE towards KALEMYO leaving behind large quantities of stores and equipment.

On the Central CHINA coast Japanese forces who landed near the WEI River moved south and on 4 Oct occupied FOOCHOW.

2. EUROPE:

An annotated map showing the situation in EUROPE is attached as part of this summary.

Maj
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION

As per 1 Aust Corps Int Summary No.1

SITUATION MAP
EUROPE

INFORMATION TO 1600K OCT 44



WESTERN FRONT

German prisoners on the Western Front now total 600,000.

On 14 Oct, the greatest day raid of the war was made on DUISBURG inland port on the RHINE. 4,500 tons were dropped in 25 minutes by 2000 RAF bombers.

SCHELDE ESTURA: Canadian troops are within 1½ miles of BRESKENS main centre of German resistance.

MAAS RIVER: In a steady advance British troops have captured VENRAAI and established a line four miles from the river.

AACHEN: The town is now completely surrounded and it was announced on 17 Oct that 10,000 Germans have been killed and 9,000 captured. An attempt by a panzer division, which moved from AACHEN, to relieve the garrison has not been successful. Over 3500 civilians escaped to Allied lines and it is estimated only 1500 snipers remain in the town.

BRUYERES: The US Third Army has increased the threat to this rail junction and,at one point, French troops are five miles from the old border of ALSACE.

METZ: American forces have withdrawn from one fort in the area but were reported within four miles of METZ.

SOUTHERN FRONT

ITALY:

Adriatic Sector: Eighth Army troops have advanced against stubborn resistance and are within 2 miles of CESENA.

Central Sector: American forces have taken mountain positions within ten miles of BOLOGNA whilst British troops were last reported 12 miles from the city.

GREECE: It was reported on 9 Oct that the MORIA PENINSULA had been wholly liberated. Allied forces entered CORINTH on 10 Oct and after British paratroops had occupied ATHENS, British and Greek forces landed by sea.

ALBANIA: An important German supply base was captured by British forces near the Greek border, ten miles from CORFU IS. British commandos landed on CORFU IS on 14 Oct and the Island is now in Allied hands.

EASTERN FRONT

LATVIA: RIGA was captured on 14 Oct and fighting is now 12 miles to S & SW.

LITHUANIA: The port of MEMEL is now surrounded as Russian columns have reached the coast both to the north and south.

EAST PRUSSIA: Russian heavy artillery has shelled the East Prussian junction of TILSIT and unconfirmed reports state that the Russians have crossed the border.

POLAND: Many German counterattacks against the Russian bridgehead over the river north of WARSAW have been repulsed.

CZECHO-SLAVAKIA: Russian forces have seized seven passes and advanced on a front of 170 miles across the border a distance of twelve to thirty miles in some places. This constitutes a northern threat to BUDAPEST and threatens to cut off German forces near DEBRECEN.

HUNGARY: The Russians have advanced to within 50 miles of BUDAPEST. Heavy tank battles have taken place east of DEBRECEN and the railway to BUDAPEST has been cut. After crossing the TISA River Russians on 12 Oct captured SZEGED. Two days later this force was attacking SUBOTICA to the SW of SZEGED and inside the YUGOSLAV border.

YUGO-SLAVIA: Mopping up of isolated pockets at BELGRADE is proceeding and the important rail junction of NISH was captured on 16 Oct. Russian forces are now fifteen miles to the SW.

WEEKLY INFORMATION SUPPLEMENT

IDENTIFICATIONS:

NAVAL PERSONALITIES:

Several changes in appointment have been recently announced by the Japanese Navy Ministry and reflect the concern of the Navy Minister Admiral YONAI over the existing situation.

Vice Admiral TOZUKA, Nichitaro - an experienced Navy Air Force officer - has been appointed Director of Aviation HQ (ie C-in-C NAVY AIR FORCES). At the same time, Vice Admiral TSUKAHARA, Nishyo has been appointed C-in-C of YOKOSUKA NAVAL STATION in place of Vice Admiral NOMURA who has been appointed Chief of the "SURFACE ESCORT COMMAND."

TACTICS:

JAPANESE RECONNAISSANCE DURING THE DRINIUMOR RIVER OPERATIONS:

From the recent operations in the DRINIUMOR RIVER area an already familiar feature of Japanese reconnaissance was again convincingly illustrated: to use the phrase of one field report "the work of the Japs in individual patrolling or in two or three man groups was far superior to the enemy patrol work in larger numbers."

The thoroughness of enemy reconnaissance of our positions and his skill in its execution is attested by the following field reports - "We rarely contacted these small patrols, we merely saw where they had been...." "The individual Jap soldier is an excellent scout and his work alone or in parties of two or three men was exceptionally good."

"Complete positive and negative reconnaissance of our area....was carried out by many two to five man groups and by a system of two man observation posts along the enemy side of the river. One area of reconnaissance, that of our heavily fortified area, was 15-20 miles from the enemy's base. It is estimated that for this particular job, a party of eight men came ... to a point near our lines. Here this party broke up into two and three man groups.... We saw these small groups and signs of them over a period of three days but none of them was captured or killed. The excellence of their reconnaissance was proved by captured maps showing in detail the location of different elements of the command, weapon positions and fortified areas."

The last account serves as another example of the principles outlined in a captured document under the heading of "Infiltration Attack," a summary of which has been previously published.

In contrast with the work of the small patrol, enemy reconnaissance units when operating in larger numbers are consistently confirmed as poor by the following field reports:-

"Our patrol stopped near a clearing for a short rest and to listen. Due to the Japs' carelessness in movement, we have found this to be an extremely valuable means of locating enemy groups. The patrol had been halted about ten minutes ...,when loud talking and crashing of brush were heard."

"The larger Jap patrols were noisy, used no security, and were continually walking into one of our ambushes or ruining one of their own...."

"In every instance where Jap patrols larger than three men were encountered, our patrols were able to use the element of surprise to their advantage."

(FIRST CORPS ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.125 adapted from ALAMO Force G-2 Weekly Report No.59)

EQUIPMENT:

(a) JAPANESE 7.7mm (.303 in) MODEL 99 RIFLE:

A captured Japanese manual states that the maximum range of this weapon is 3,500 metres (3,829 yards). The two arms on the backsight, which are designed for AA purposes, are adjusted for a fixed range of 600 metres (656 yards) and a target speed of 200 - 300 kilometres (124 - 186 miles) per hour. This is the first reference to the maximum range of this weapon and the method of application of the wings on the backsight was hitherto unknown.

The brass clip for the 7.7mm ammunition used in this weapon may be distinguished from the clip used for 6,5mm ammunition by virtue of a small hole which is drilled in the centre of its base. In all other respects, these clips are virtually the same.

This document also confirms the local theory that the Model 99 rifle will fire both Type 99 and 92 ball ammunition. The muzzle velocity quoted for Type 99 ammunition is 730 - 740 metres (2,394 - 2,427 feet) per second and that of the Type 92, 220 - 230 metres (721 - 754 feet) per second.

(AHP REVIEW No.114)

(b) JAPANESE EXPERIMENTAL HAND THROWN MINE:

A captured printed booklet entitled "Manual on Experimental Hand Thrown Mine" dated Aug 42 issued by Army Technical Department Headquarters, has been translated and is reproduced for information and identification. Its primary use is stated to be for the destruction of tanks and, as the name implies, is thrown by hand at AFVs from close range.

Characteristics

Shape	Spherical
Diameter	120mm (4.7 in) approximately
Height plus fuse and protective cap	138mm (5.4 in) approximately
Height of protective cap	25mm (.98 in) approximately
Total weight	1.6 Kg (3.5 lb) approximately
Weight of filling	1.4 Kg (3 lb) approximately
Type of filling	Mk 2 TAIKYAKU (presumably a mixture of TNT, Cyclonite and Tetryl).
Throwing distance	10 metres (32.8 ft)
Effect	Destroys 20mm (.79 in) bullet-proof steel plate
Colour	Presumably black
Packing	10 mines packed in shallow wooden case - fuses packed separately in tins at one end Overall weight 42 lbs approximately.

Description

The mine consists of the main body, bursting charge, fuse, fuse container and packing case.

The main body is spherical in shape and constructed of aluminium. It is fitted with a carrying strap, fuse cavity and protective cap. The filling consists of Mk 2 TAIKYAKU, which is presumably a mixture of TNT, Cyclonite and Tetryl.

The fuse is a universal, instantaneous type and consists of the body, striker, hammer, detonator chamber, spring, detonator and safety pin. It is carried separately packed in a tin container. The action of the fuse is instantaneous and detonation bursts the main body.

Assembly

Remove the protective cap and the fuse from the container. Ensure that no foreign matter is present in the fuse cavity and gently insert the fuse. Replace protective cap.

Dis-assembly is carried out in reverse order.

Instructions stress that the fuse and detonator are not to be separated and when the safety pin has been removed, the mine must not be dropped on any hard surface or jolted in any way. These warnings signify that the fuse and detonator must be very sensitive.

Use

Remove protective cap and fuse safety pin immediately prior to use. Advance within 10 metres (32.8 feet) and hurl mine forcefully against target. The mine is not to be held by the carrying strap when thrown.

If the mine is not used after removal of safety pin, the latter must be retained and replaced in the following manner:-

Remove the fuse and align safety pin holes in fuse body B and striker. Gently insert safety pin and bind safety pin with cord.

The effective radius of concussion and fragmentation at the point and time of burst is approximately 10 metres. It is necessary, therefore, for the mine to be thrown form a distance of more than 30 feet, going to ground and taking advantage of natural cover in order to escape injury from blast and fragmentation.



(AIF REVIEW No.115)

(c) JAPANESE BOOBY TRAP:

A novel form of Japanese booby trap or incendiary device, has been found. Following is a report on the preliminary examination :-

It comprises a block of explosive or inflammable substance moulded to form a reproduction of 'IVORY' soap, the brand being embossed on the obverse side, and the maker's name, 'PROCTOR and GAMBLE' on the reverse.

The body of the trap has the appearance of thermite. It burns with an intense flame but is easily extinguished with water.

A primer of apparently the same substance is fitted into a recess in the side of the block. The method of initiation has not yet been definitely established, although it is possible that it is a pull type friction igniter.

From the preliminary examination, it would appear that the device is not an anti-personnel weapon but rather an incendiary device for sabotage purposes.

(FIRST AUST ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.125 from 5 Aust Div Intelligence Summary No.359)

(d) JAPANESE WATER FILTER "ISHII" TYPE:

Details and photographs of a Japanese Water Filter "ISHII" Type for Section use are shown as part of this supplement.

APPENDIX "B" TO AMF WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REVIEW No. 115 OF 13 OCT 1944

JAPANESE

WATER FILTER - ISHII TYPE

FOR SECTION USE



THIS filter is apparently intended to be carried for use by a section or equivalent unit. The method of filtering employed is the same as that in the "Individual Use" Water Filter—Ishii Type reported in AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No 92 of 5 May 44.

The "Section Use" filter is constructed of more component parts. The results of a trial at a moderate pumping rate and using clean water indicated it to have a performance eight times that of the "Individual Use" water filter. Respective rates of discharge were approximately 8 litre (1.76 gallons) and 1 litre (0.22 gallons) per minute. It is understood that larger models functioning on similar principles are in use by the Japanese Army.

The outfit consists of a cylindrical filter unit with an accompanying hand pump and two hoses is clamped into a rimmed and bedded plate of press construction. A removable case that fits onto the bed plate to house the outfit has a clamp at either end and two brackets for fastening straps on either side. Adjacent carrying handles are provided on the bed plate and case. All parts of the outfit are painted olive green except the plates, hoses, and the white painted internal surface of the case.

Translation of the instruction plate on the case reads:—"Instructions for handling ISHII Type Section Use Water Filter."

FILTERING PREPARATION

The filter is placed on an improvised stand slightly higher than the ground in a horizontal position. Connect the suction hose (having attached the strainer) and the high pressure connecting hose to the filter inlet. Connect the filtered water hose (white) to the filtered water outlet. Attach the drain cap. Open the air cock.

FILTERING OPERATION

Operate the pump after preparations have been completed. Expel the air from the air cock, Close the air cock after water flow is noticed. Operate the pump continuously to filter the water. Operate the pump up and down, slowly and smoothly. Sterilize the filtered water by adding the HODOGAYA fluid (3.5cc of dilute fluid to 10 times the volume of water in the tank) to make the water safe for drinking purposes.

WASHING OPERATION

When the filtering capacity has been reduced, suspend the filtering operation. Open the air cock and remove the drain cap. Drain out the remaining water. Attach the cleaning handle to the cleaning shaft, and rotate about 5 times in a clockwise direction. Operate the pump and wash out the dirty water. When the discharge water comes out equally dirty as the water being filtered, the filter requires cleaning. Always wash the filter after completing the filter operation. Thoroughly drain out the water.

STERILIZATION

If sterilization is necessary, mix the disinfectant (1 part of HODOGAYA fluid to 15000 parts of water or 1 part of carbolic acid to 33 parts of water) in the water tank. Place the suction and the filtered water hoses into the water tank. Pump the water through the filter for approximately 10 minutes. If necessary, immerse the water hoses and other parts of the equipment into the disinfectant. After the parts have been sterilized, wash them well with clean water until no odor of the disinfectant remains.

Translation of the name plate on the under side of the bed plate, reads as follows:—

"ISHII TYPE WATER FILTER—SECTION USE
MANUFACTURE No 62—1087
APRIL 1942
ARMY MEDICAL COLLEGE."



THE pipe clay filter is positioned over the spindle and is held between two gaskets by the spindle head which can be tightened by using the cleaning shaft and handle. The delivery end of the spindle receives the spindle bearing. This assembly can then be placed in the filter chamber, the support bracket located, the cleaning shaft positioned, the brush inserted and the cover plate fastened. The packing glands can then be tightened and the cleaning handle attached.

On the upward stroke of the pump, water enters the suction hose, passes the lower ball valve and enters the pump cylinder. On the downward stroke of the pump the lower ball valve is closed and water is forced into the filter chamber. Air present in the filter chamber is allowed to escape through the air cock provided. By closing the air cock, further pumping will force all the water through the pipe clay filter from the outside and out through the spindle to the filtered water hose. The pressure gauge indicates the water pressure developed by the pump.



ALL MEASUREMENTS IN CENTIMETRES

Extracted from a report by:—
2/1 Aust CW Laboratory RAE
GSI (a) Adv LHQ

SECRET
COPY NO 1

GENERAL STAFF INTELLIGENCE

1 AUST CORPS

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Nº 6

1. Information contained in this summary is for circulation down to battalions or equivalent units
2. Items sidelined will not be reproduced
3. Other items may be reproduced for the information of all units but, as reproduced material may be taken as confirmatory intelligence, the source of all such items will be acknowledged



AIR DISTANCE MAP
DISTANCES ARE SHOWN IN NAUTICAL MILES
TO CONVERT TO STATUTE MILES MULTIPLY BY 1·15
THAILAND
FRENCH INDO CHINA
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
LUZON
MINDANAO
BORNEO
CELEBES
JAVA
TIMOR
CERAM
NEW GUINEA
NEW BRITAIN
PACIFIC OCEAN
CAROLINE ISLANDS
MARIANAS
SAIPAN
GUAM
YAP
PALAU IS
TRUK IS
ADMIRALTY ISLANDS
BIAK IS
MOROTAI IS
HALMAHERA IS
SOLOMONS
PONAPE
Saigon
Singapore
Darwin
Port Moresby
1015
874
1442
735
552
934
1000
536
579
476
615
608
788
1417
500
522
705
635
660
195
393
417
275
732
720
510
278
405
316
637
704
345
341
380
549
457
831
1087
822
445
1156
425
432
783
496
354
203
672

G3I 1 AUST CORPS WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No.6

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 20 Oct 44 to 1200 hrs 27 Oct 44

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GENERAL:

At long last, in an abortive attempt to repel the Allied invasion of the PHILIPPINES, the Japanese Navy has been committed to a major engagement, and has suffered severely.

In a serious attempt East of LEYTE to disperse the Allied shipping engaged in the support of land operations, the enemy assembled three forces which represented the bulk of his striking fleet. Two forces attempted to force the SURIGAO and SAN BERNADINO STRAITS respectively, while a third force from the FORMOSA area was engaged east of LUZON.

The smaller force heading for SURIGAO from the SULU SEA was severely hit, but the main threat came from the force which passed from the SULU SEA through the SIBUYAN SEA. Elements of this force reached the eastern PHILIPPINE waters and were stopped 67 miles from LEYTE GULF.

Of a total of 3 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, 17 cruisers and 26 destroyers engaged, reports, still incomplete, indicate that 3 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, 9 cruisers and several destroyers were either sunk or damaged.

Meanwhile, favourable progress has been made in land operations and the Allied grasp on LEYTE has been considerably strengthened. Latest reports state that Allied units have landed on the south of SAMAR ISLAND.

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

INFORMATION TO 261800K OCT 44

CARRIER RAIDS:
13 Oct: 5 tankers sunk
1 floating dry dock damaged.
17 : 1 large oil tanker damaged. 1 oil tanker, 6 medium cargo vessels, 1 floating dry dock destroyed.
19 : 1 tanker sunk, 5 freighters seriously damaged. 6 freighters, 1 tanker damaged; 3 transports and 1 medium tanker hit by torpedoes.

CENTRAL PHILIPPINES:
16 Oct: 3 freighters total 6,500 tons, 20 barges.
17 : 6 large freighter-tpts
19 : 6 small freighters and 2 luggers strafed.
21 : 25 u/i vessels: 3 freighters totalling 2,000 tons sunk: 2 freighters total 1500 tons probably sunk: 4 merchant vessels.

24 Oct: 25 vessels including 4 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 destroyers; force heavily hit. (Later report suggests 28 to 31 vessels incl 6 to 8 battleships, 14 cruisers, 8 to 9 destroyers). 1 battleship,2 cruisers badly hit.

PALAWAN:
20 Oct: 2 destroyers
21 : 8 destroyers 11 freighters total 29,00 tons.

15 Oct: 10 small stack-aft vessels
21 : 3 medium u/i vessels.

24 Oct: 7 vessels incl 2 battleships 1 heavy cruiser. 4 destroyers attacked by aircraft - some damaged.

15 Oct: 7 small merchant vessels
21 : 1 medium freighter
1 destroyer-tender
2 medium u/i vessels.

20 Oct: 1 cargo vessel
1 destroyer

19 Oct:
3 merchant vessels
3 small craft
set on fire by Lightning.

24 Oct: 2 aircraft carriers
1 aircraft carrier cruiser hull
3 light cruisers
3 destroyers

24 Oct: 15 ships consisting 4 battleships, or heavy cruisers, 5 cruisers, 6 destroyers.

13 Oct: Naval air attack
1 large freighter-transport) sunk
1 sub-chaser)
2 vessels) probably sunk
2 luggers)
22 vessels, 28 small craft,
1 destroyer-escort damaged.

20 Oct: Allied forces landed in strength East coast LEYTE Is at following places:- Vicinity MARASBARAS, PALU, SAN JOSE, DULAG and northern tip PANAON Island.
21 : TACLOBAN town captured, airfield secured. CATAISAN PENINSULA secured. PALO town captured - resistance continuing.
22 : TACLOBAN area - enemy withdrawing north. Allies advancing in all sectors.
Casualties to 23 Oct: 1877 Killed.
13 PW.

17 Oct: Unopposed Allied landings on SULUAN Is, HOMONHON Is, and north DINAGAT Is.

Carrier-based aircraft attacked targets in LUZON and VISAYAS. All enemy interception destroyed after one attack. 90 enemy aircraft shot down or destroyed on ground. 42 probably destroyed. 50 vehicles destroyed by fighter sweeps.

Over 410 sorties flown by land aircraft against targets in MINDANAO and VISAYAS.

17 Oct: 19 merchant vessels total approx 18,500 tons.
18 : 2 freighters total 1500 tons burning.
21 : 1 small vessel set afire.

SABUYAN CHANNEL
APARRI
LAOAG
BANGUED
TUGUEGARAO
VIGAN
LUZON
BONTOC
ILIGAN
GAMU
BAYBAY
SAN-FERNANDO
NAGUILIAN
BAGUIO
LINGAYEN
BAUTISTA
TARLAC
CABANATUAN
STOTSENBURG
IBA
S.FERNANDO
MANILA
PASIG
CAVITE
STA CRUZ
LIPA
LUCENA
BATANGAS
DAET
NAGA
PILI
LEGASPI
SORSOGON
BULAN
BOAC
CALAPAN
MINDORO
ROMBLON
SAN-JOSE
MASBATE
GATARMAN
SAMAR
CALBAYOG
CATBALOGAN
BORONGAN
CAPIZ
PANAY
STA. BARBARA
MEDELLIN
CARIGARA
TACLOBAN
ORMOC
S. JOSE
ILOILO
FABRICA
BACOLOD
CEBU
LEYTE
BINALBAGAN
MALITBOG
UBAY
BOHOL
CARMEN
TAGBILARAN
NEGROS
TANJAY
DUMAGUETE
SIQUIJOR
SURIGAO
BUTUAN
PUERTO. PRINCESSA
PALAWAN
DIPOLOG
CAGAYAN
ILIGAN
MISAMIS
DANSALAN
MALAYBALAY
MINDANAO
BALABAC ID.
COTABATO
KABACAN
DAVAO
ZAMBOANGA
BORNEO
JOLO

STATUTE MILES 10 0 50 100 150 200
NAUTICAL MILES 10 0 50 100 150 200

GSI I AUST CORPS

ICO/MISC/8464

REPRODUCED BY 2/1 AUST ARMY TOPO SVY OCT. AUG 44


SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS
S.W.P.A.
INFORMATION TO 261800K OCT 44
SCALE AT EQUATOR
MINDANAO
DAVAO
BUAYAN
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
CELEBES SEA
TALAUD IS
SANGIHE IS
PALAU IS
BABELTHUAP
PELELIU
SONSORAL IS
MERIR IS
PACIFIC OCEAN
MAPIA IS
20 Oct: 1 heavy cruiser
7 medium u/i
vessels , 240 miles
NW PALAU.
15 Oct: NGULU ATOLL (180 miles
ENE PALAU) occupied by
Allies. Slight resistance
Casualties: 7 Killed,
1 PW.
BORNEO:
16 Oct: 23 merchant ships total 19,900 tons, 62 barges and luggers.
18 : 4 vessels total 20,000 tons.
20 : 2 freighter-transports 5500/7000 tons, 4 destroyers.
21 : 2 large tankers, 2 sub-chasers, several small freighters.
21/22 : 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 7 freighter-transports 23,000 tons.
22 : 3 tankers
18 Oct: 8 B24's bombed BALIKPAPAN without
interception or AA fire.
Enemy positions attacked by 24
heavy bombers.
MENADO
LANGOAN
TOLITOLI
MOROTAI
17/18 Oct: Indications
enemy possibly re-
organising for aggress-
ive action contact at
PILOWO River (SW MOROTAI)
Cas to 23 Oct:
207 Killed
25 PW
HALMAHERA
TERNATE
17 Oct: 70 barges
(some damaged)
18 : 5/6 small
vessels.
23 Oct: 1 battleship course NW
Enemy airfields and installations
under continual air attacks with
350 sorties.
MOLUCCA SEA
BATJAN
WAIGEO
CAPE SANSAPOR
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
NOEMFOOR
BIAK
JAPEN
WAKDE I
HOLLANDIA
AITAPE
SOELA IS
PAREPARE
54 Liberators
attacked en-
emy install-
ations start-
ing many large
fires.
CELEBES
KENDARI
MAKASSAR
15 Oct: 1 freighter-transport (damaged).
18 : 3 large vessels
19 : 11 merchant vessels total 28,000
tons, numerous 300/1000 ton freight-
ers (1 afire), 16 u/i motor vessels,
15/20 barges , 2 naval vessels.
21 : 2 freighter-transports total 4000/
9000 tons; 1 small cargo vessel
destroyed; 11 u/i vessels.
19 Oct: 2 destroyers
1 medium freighter
20 : 2 small freighters
(under construction)
21 : 12 vessels total 16,000 tons
22 : 1 large vessel
BOEROE
NAMLEA
CERAM
AMBON
MISOOL
Casualties to 17 Oct:
570 Killed
80 Jap PW
154 Formosan PW
6 Korean PW
20 Oct: 6 barges
Continued attacks against waterfront
targets, small ships, buildings and
MT made with over 350 sorties.
BANDA SEA
JAVA:
15 Oct: 15 vessels
KAI IS
AROE IS
NEW GUINEA
WISSEL LAKES
Air attacks continued with approx
450 sorties against BOUGAINVILLE,
NEW IRELAND, GAZELLE PENINSULA.
RABAUL:
19 Oct: 2 Single-seater fighters
apparently serviceable on
TOBERA airfield.
NEW BRITAIN:
17/18 Oct: 1 submarine OPEN BAY
Some Japanese
movement.
19 Oct: 1 submarine
Daily air attacks
totalled 96 sorties

OPERATIONS - S/PA

1. Land:

Prior to the main Allied landing on LEYTE Island in the PHILIPPINES on 20 Oct, our forces took control of three islands to the east, thus commanding the waters of LEYTE GULF and SURIGAO Straits. These landings were made on 17 Oct on SULUAN Island, HOHONHON Island and on the northern tip of DINAGAT Island.

On 20 Oct Allied forces landed in strength on the east coast of LEYTE at five points. A landing in the vicinity of HARASBARAS was unopposed. In PALO area heavy mortar fire was encountered but our troops quickly advanced inland and by the following day had captured PALO town. Landings were made in the SAN JOSE area and approximately three miles further south in DULAG area. The fifth landing was on the northern tip of PANAON Island and was unopposed. By 21 Oct TACLOBAN town was captured and the airstrip secured. Enemy forces were reported withdrawing along the road, north from TACLOBAN on 22 Oct. Our forces are now reported 20 miles north of the town. In the south, advances up to nine miles were made inland. A further landing on the south coast of SAMAR Island has been reported but no details have yet been received.

Mopping up continues on MOROTAI Island in the HALMAHERAS. On 17/18 Oct there were indications that the enemy was possibly reorganising for aggressive action and contact was made on the PILOTO River (SW MOROTAI).

On 15 Oct Allied troops occupied NGULU ATOLL (180 miles ENE PALAU) against only slight resistance.

In NEW BRITAIN Allied patrols have reported no enemy in LEMINGI, WIDE BAY area, WATERFALL BAY and JACQUINOT BAY areas. On 17 Oct unusually heavy truck activity was reported at RABAUL where 30/35 trucks were observed; and the sighting of 20/30 troop-laden barges moving north from KERAVIA BAY on 21 Oct may have been associated with this activity.

2. Sea:

Shipping sightings south of the PHILIPPINES have decreased considerably since the recent heavy air attacks on FORMOSA and the commencement of land and naval operations in the PHILIPPINES. In the southern CELEBES a total of 45 merchant vessels totalling some 82,000 tons and 4 naval vessels was sighted. In BORNEO waters 41 merchant vessels totalling approximately 98,000 tons, many small craft and eight naval craft were sighted.

In PHILIPPINE waters the enemy committed the bulk of his striking fleet in an attempt to interfere with the shipping supporting operations on LEYTE. On 24 Oct, a force of 7 warships unsuccessfully attempted to force the SURIGAO STRAITS. Meanwhile a force of at least 25 warships appeared south of MINDORO, heading for SAN BERNADINO STRAITS. Despite Allied attacks, this force reached a point 67 miles from anchored Allied shipping in LEYTE Gulf, and there suffered considerable damage from further carrier-borne aircraft. A carrier task force and another force of 15 warships were engaged east of LUZON.

In all their operations considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy. Reports are still incomplete, but those received so far place his losses at -

2 A/C carriers 2 battleships 3 cruisers 3 destroyers	Sunk

1 A/C carrier)
2 battleships) Probably sunk

6 battleships)
4 cruisers) Damaged
Several des-)
troyers)

In addition 150 aircraft were destroyed.

3. Air:

(a) Own -

During the past week Allied land-based aircraft continued to hammer the already badly battered enemy positions, installations and shipping. Allied carrier-based aircraft afforded considerable support to both naval and land operations in the PHILIPPINES area.

In the Eastern sector targets on BOUGAINVILLE, NEW BRITAIN and GAZELLE Peninsula were well covered with approximately 450 sorties.

Continued harassing attacks throughout the ARAFURA and BANDA Seas have inflicted severe losses on enemy small craft and caused heavy damage to waterfront installations.

Having pounded enemy defences into submission at BALIKPAPAN in previous raids, Allied heavy bombers made their bombing runs on 18 Oct free from interception from enemy aircraft or AA fire.

In the PHILIPPINES, the main target areas for the land-based planes lay in MINDANAO while the carrier-based aircraft attacked targets in LUZON, CEBU and LEYTE.

(b) Enemy -

Although no details have yet been received, it is believed that considerable air support was given to enemy naval forces during the past week. On the other hand, defensive activity over land targets has been negligible during the same period. The only interception was over LUZON and that was quickly shot out of the sky.

OPERATIONS - CENTRAL PACIFIC:

Substantial shipping sighting were reported in the CHINA SEA during the week.

On 18 Oct, 18 vessels, totalling approximately 90,000 tons were sighted 185 miles WSW HONGKONG, while a further convoy of 7 vessels totalling some 40,000 tons was reported 70 miles SW HONGKONG. Both convoys were heading NE.

Photographs of HONGKONG Harbour have revealed the following :-

15 Oct - 12 naval craft
49 vessels totalling 158,400 tons
7 vessels totalling 25,650 tons under construction

20 Oct - 31 vessels totalling 127,000 tons.

An attack on HONGKONG Harbour on 17 Oct resulted in the destruction of 8 vessels totalling 17,000 tons and probable damage to 12 vessels

Off HAINAN Point on the east coast of HAINAN, 10 merchant ships and 6 naval vessels were sighted during 18 and 19 Oct.

In FORMOSAN waters on 16 Oct 2 heavy cruisers or battleships, 1 possible carrier and 6 cargo vessels were sighted in TAKAO Harbour. On 17 Oct 15 large merchant vessels were at TAKAO.

A convoy of 7 naval vessels including 4 large ships on 22 Oct was steaming on a course south by west, 180 miles SW TAKAO.

PART II

1. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS OF ENEMY FORCES:

(a) LAND:

The 20,000 troops remaining in the PALAU Group comprise remnants of 14 Division, 49 and 43 Independent Mixed Brigade, but does not include 3,400 reservists who are presumed to have been drawn from the local population. Several thousand civilian labourers are also in the area.

In DUTCH NEW GUINEA the estimate of strength in the VOGELKOP Peninsula has been reduced to 11,500 whilst the total for the BOMBERAI Peninsula has been reduced to 6,000. Due to these alterations, the total strength for the NW SECTOR is reduced to 451,900/456,900, the total for NE SECTOR remains at 98,000 and the total for SWPA is reduced to 549.900/554.900

(b) AIR:

Estimate of Enemy Land Based air strength in the areas listed below on information to [illegible] K Oct 44.

AREAS	F	2E/F	SE/B	2E/B	F/B	F/P	Obsn	Total 18 Oct	Comparative Totals 9 Oct	5 Oct
NEW BRITAIN / NEW IRELAND / SOLOMONS						10	2	12	12	12
TALAUD						3		3	3	3
PHILIPPINES:										
MINDANAO	10	6	25	11	2	2	7	61	62	64
VISAYAS	56	8	11	10	3	10	9	107	119	120
LUZON	122	45	40	50	5	13	6	281	242	210
								449	423	394
AMBON AREA	4		3	4	2	9	4	26	25	37
CELEBES:										
MENADO AREA	7		2	4		6		19	21	
KENDARI-MACASSAR	20	18	8	14	3	12	4	79	116	
								98	137	124
TIMOR-SOEMBA-SOEMBAWA-FLORES	10					3	3	16	16	16
JAVA-BALI-LOMBOK	4			12		15	5	36	36	44
BORNEO	52	8	28	[illegible]		12		172	214	142
	295	85	[illegible]	[illegible]	15	95	40	612	867	772

2. TACTICS: (AMF REVIEW No. 116)

(a) TRANSPORT SHIP LANDING BOATS AND PATROL BOATS:

Extracts from AMIS Enemy Publication No. 201 "Landing Operations Pamphlet" may indicate possible new trends in lighter and speedier landing craft, and patrol boats having greater speed and increased armour.

It is apparently obvious to the Japanese that landing craft and patrol boats are going to play an increasingly important part in operations as the war is taken closer to JAPAN, and to provide an efficient counter to Allied landing craft and patrol boats, their craft must be greatly improved on present standards. It would appear that the remarks quoted hereunder were possibly made by an observer commissioned to enquire and report on this type of craft and, as a result, new and improved versions may make their appearance in future operations.

Transport Ship Landing Boats

"There is room for many technical improvements on present large MLCs. When they are perfected, they will be allotted many important duties. Increase of speed, however, is the immediate goal.

The purpose of operations is to accomplish transport and landings with rapidity by relying on destroyers. (Similar ships will be used exclusively for transport during swift landing operations).

The advent of a swift, collapsible, special landing craft with a capacity of 20 men is necessary, because small MLCs are slow due to their size and increased weight.

In order to land part of the guns, medium MLCs with a boat weight of six tons and capable of transporting two field pieces and one six-ton armoured vehicle, smaller than present MLCs, should be constructed. Moreover, it is necessary to plan a method of pulling the boat ashore and concealing it."

Patrol Boats

"The enemy (Allies) used high-speed torpedo boats to interrupt our landings at GUADALCANAL and harassed our (Japanese)convoys between BUNA and LAE. In future, high-speed patrol boats will be necessary to guard anchorages and protect small vessels.

It is necessary to equip patrol boats with armour similar to armoured boats, and with a speed greater than 30 knots.

Although the name "high-speed boat" has been heard, information about it is not yet known. However, it is hoped that the high-speed boats will be distributed immediately to combat areas."

(AIF REVIEW No.115)

(b) JAPANESE AND ALLIED USE OF BAYONET:

A Battle Instruction Circular issued by Imperial HQ in Sep 43 and captured in BURMA emphasises the need for efficiency in "hand to hand fighting."

It is learned from the document that in bouts of bayonet fighting between British, American and Canadian PW and Japanese, the Japanese were sometimes "regrettably" defeated. These contests were apparently arranged in order to study Allied technique in the use of the bayonet.

The document states that "practice in pairs" and "on dummies" was carried out and criticizes the attitude of Allied PW to this "hand to hand" practice. "They carry out the contests in the same spirit as boxing and other sports and will indulge in it only if interested." However, the Japanese seem to have acquired a considerable respect for their [illegible] and use of the butt stroke at close quarters, skilful parrying, their physical strength and powerful fore-arms, and effective use of superior weight and strength at close quarters.

The technique of British troops was said to be the best. Americans were not a success in the competitions held, but did not lack offensive spirit and many "went bald-headed at it."

The circular concludes by enumerating the "weak points" of Allied troops and suggesting counter measures. These two

sections are full of vague generalities and no detailed improvement of technique or specific counters to Allied methods are suggested.

(AMF REVIEW No.115)

3. EQUIPMENT:

JAPANESE USE OF ROCKETS:

It has been known for some time that the Aeronautical Research Institute in JAPAN has been experimenting with rocket projectiles and it was reported late in Aug 44 that Allied aircraft over GAZELLE Peninsula had encountered AA rockets.

Further information has now been obtained on SAIPAN where an instruction manual for a rocket propelled bomb was captured. The weapon is a Type 97 land bomb combined with a rocket mechanism and is launched from a rack consisting of an upper and lower trough with a detachable cover. The parts are easily assembled and apparently light in construction, whilst a spade attached to the base of the trough and driven into the ground, provides stability when firing.

The bomb is attached to the forward end of the rocket by means of a wooden ring which grips the bomb fins and rocket nose. The projectile rests in the trough and an electrically controlled igniter inserted in the forward end of the rocket sets off the charge. The current is supplied by a hand-operated magnetic generator producing up to 15 volts and 1.5 amperes of current, this generator is placed about 16 yards behind the launching trough. As with a mortar, range is regulated by the angle of elevation and it is claimed that ranges from 700 to 1200 yards are obtained using elevations of 30 to 50 degrees.

(Adapted from AMF REVIEW No.116)

4. JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY RELATIONS:

The Japanese Army and Navy, though united on ultimate national aims, have by no means always been in harmony on more immediate matters. Differences between them have their roots in Japanese history.

The overthrow of the feudal system of government in JAPAN was accomplished in 1867. Two of the most powerful clans in JAPAN played a leading part in the restoration of the monarchy and subsequent organization of the Army and Navy on European lines.

Prominent men of the CHOSHU clan, from the province of CHOSHU, most westerly province on the Japanese mainland, were responsible for the birth of the new Army. The men of the province fc SATSUMA, on the southern tip of JAPAN's most southerly island of KYUSHU, led in building up the Navy.

It was fitting that these two clans should be called upon to help in the building up of JAPAN's sea and land forces. The men of CHOSHU had long regarded themselves as a bulwark against possible invasion from the Asiatic continent, while the SATSUMA people, the traders with nearby islands, could boast a tradition of the sea. In those early days one could refer with relative accuracy to the SATSUMA Navy and the CHOSHU Army.

Some rivalry in the control of State affairs naturally developed between these two factions, and from it, in turn, grew inter-service rivalry. Although the Japanese Navy was (and according to prisoners of war, still is) the most popular of the services from the point of view of serving conditions, the Army has manoeuvred itself into supreme control of State affairs.

Following reverses in the PACIFIC one can imagine that differences in opinion, on matters of strategy, if not actual friction, have developed between the Army and Navy High Command.

The Japanese would naturally try to keep any such differences quiet, but one of the aims of the recent change in the Japanese Government may well have been to secure better co-operation between the services, and to allow the Navy more say in matters of strategy.

That all has not been well between the Army and Navy is borne out by a document dated Oct 43 and captured by American Forces in the MARSHALL Islands early this year. The document (a Navy Ministry Memorandum to Fleet Commanders) stated that in view of the Allied seizure of the initiative, an effort was being made to increase production and reinforce strategic points overseas; it urged therefore more careful use of shipping, and tighter belts all round :-

"As one glance at the geography of our defence system will show, the problem of surface transportation and shipping space must first be met in order that the desired rate of production and reinforcement may be achieved.

"Efforts are now being made to alleviate the problem of civilian supply and transportation, which is largely a matter of insufficient cargo space. Efforts are also being made to offset the serious inadequacy of military production and transportation. Despite these efforts, however, improvement to any large degree cannot be counted on. Although a large percentage of the ships in the Empire has been diverted to Army and Navy purposes, the number of requisitioned vessels is no longer sufficient to meet new demands.

"These conditions make it necessary to reduce the flow of supplies to all units, with a consequent need for increases in local self-supply and greater simplicity in living standards. Up till now the Navy's ability to maintain its supply lines has naturally been a reason for its strength. A marked difference between the living standards of Army and Navy forces in defence outposts has consequently arisen. A deliberate reduction of supplies is of course inadvisable; and thus the inequality of standards is causing ill-feeling on the part of Army forces - a factor which is likely to injure inter-service co-operation. Moreover, the enemy has recently sensed this Army-Navy rift and has exploited it for propaganda purposes. An immediate and thorough investigation is therefore felt to be imperative."

A Japanese soldier, recently captured on a PACIFIC island which had been garrisoned by a mixed force of Army and Navy troops under Naval Command, told his interrogators of ill-feeling between the two services. His main complaint was of the inferior food issued by the naval authorities for Army consumption. The soldiers, he said, received no fish, meat, fruit or fresh vegetables; their usual food was the oldest rice in the naval stores. Soldiers on other islands have accepted the same sort of discrimination more cheerfully; everyone knew that Navy men always had better food, said one, so he did not resent it.

(AIF REVIEW No.116 from War Office Weekly Intelligence Review No.58)

PART IV - SECURITY

JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS FOR OUR TROOPS IF CAPTURED:

A Japanese printed pamphlet entitled "Instructions for PW", issued by CHINA Expeditionary Army but captured at MAP EN, SWPA, (AMIS Bulletin 1478) points out the necessity for complete training as to the duties of a Japanese soldier if captured.

The main points of such training policy, abridged from the document, are as follows :-

Wounded Personnel in 'Enemy' Territory -

Wounded men in enemy territory are, by feigning death or other deceit, to avoid capture, and subsequently escape when the 'enemy' relaxes his vigilance. They are to be prepared to commit suicide, and to burn articles such as maps and documents that would be of advantage to the 'enemy.'

Unwounded Personnel in 'Enemy' Hands -

Death or escape are the only alternatives - they are to make a death-defying blow at the 'enemy.'

After Falling into 'Enemy' Hands -

Troops will commit suicide or escape, and are not to be misled by kind treatment or lies.

During interrogation, the best policy is not to talk but to maintain firm control of oneself. Above all, secret information or matters unfavourable to the Japanese Army must not be stated. The PW is to guard against a breakdown if third-degree methods are employed, and anti-war doctrines are to be resisted.

Action to be Taken When Released -

A released PW is to report to his unit, and on the way there should collect information concerning the 'enemy', which will be reported in detail to his superior.

Action after Return -

The ex-PW must realise his misdeed, show penitence, make a full statement, and await the decision of higher officers. He will perform his duty with the will to wipe out the humiliation, and await an opportunity to cleanse his disgrace in death in combat. Usually the only course for officers is to commit suicide.

Basis of Training Policy -

"Although there are sympathetic feelings against persons who have fallen into enemy hands due to severe wounds, no matter what the excuse may be, it is the utmost disgrace to be captured alive, as a Japanese soldier. Moreover, one must bear in mind that capture will end the life of a soldier."

It will be noted that, according to Seventh Air Force General Intelligence Bulletin of 15 Sep 44, since the US landings on SAIPAN, an estimated 25,000 Japanese have been killed, 900 PW taken and 15,000 civilians interned. The ratio of PW to Japanese troops killed is roughly between 3% and 4%, somewhat higher than in other engagements, but still not enough of an increase to indicate even a slight general weakening of the code that forbids surrender.

(AMP REVIEW No.116)

PART VI

OTHER FRONTS:

(a) EUROPE:

WESTERN FRONT

In the area of the SCHELDE Estuary, Canadian forces on 23 Oct occupied BRESKENS and have now captured FORT HENDRICK, whilst other forces driving north from ANTWERP are within 2 miles of BERGEN OP ZOOM and 3 to 4 miles from ROOSENDAAL. An attack along the northern bank of the estuary down the isthmus leading to BEVELAND IS has progressed 6 miles.

It is estimated that 60,000 German troops are cut off in WEST HOLLAND.

British troops attacking west from NIJMEGEN have encircled the important rail centre of HERTOGENBOSCH and are now driving towards TILBURG.

After several weeks of intense fighting our Allies succeeded in occupying AACHEN on 23 Oct and the drive is continuing NE of the city.

SOUTHERN FRONT

Italy:

Slight progress has been made along the coast towards RAVENNA on the ADRIATIC coast, and in the drive NW towards BOLOGNA, CESENA has been captured and progress made on the way to FORLI.

In the Central Sector, Fifth Army troops are fighting in the outskirts of ROSSINI and are eight miles from BOLOGNA.

Greece:

British forces advancing north from ATHENS have occupied LAMIA and are within 20 miles of LARISSA, which has been occupied by guerilla forces. With the exception of MACEDONIA and SALONIKA, the whole of GREECE is now liberated.

EASTERN FRONT

In EAST PRUSSIA, the Russian forces have crossed the border on a wide front extending from the vicinity of TILSIT, which has been evacuated by the Germans, to the SE corner of EAST PRUSSIA. The main drive is along the railway towards KONIGSBERG, and one report states that the Russians have reached a point 15 miles from INSTERBURG. German forces are resisting desperately and several panzer divisions have been used in counter-attacks.

In the southern thrust through CZECHO-SLOVAKIA to link up with Russian forces advancing north from HUNGARY it was reported that HUSZT had been occupied and later information states that the key industrial centre of MUKACEVO, 20 miles to the NW has been captured.

Considerable advances have been made north of DEBRECEN in HUNGARY. The capture of NYREGYHAZA and SATU-MARE in the NW corner of RUMANIA about 60 miles NE of DEBRECEN, has cut all remaining escape railways from RUMANIA.

In the south it was reported that ARAD had been captured.

In conjunction with MARSHALL TITO's partisans Russian forces have cleared more towns in YUGOSLAVIA and one place captured was reported as 60 miles SE of BELGRADE.

Russian forces moving from PETSAMO have captured KIRKENES which was the port used by the Germans to launch attacks on convoys through northern waters. It is estimated that 25,000 German troops are now isolated in NORWAY and have only two escape routes- one by sea and the other by a march of 200 miles to ALTON FIORD.

(b) ASIA:

CHINA

There has been very little information of the fighting in this area over the last week excepting from the South Eastern KWANGSI Province where the Japanese forces have continued their drive along the WEST RIVER, by 23 Oct they had captured PINGNAM and were driving towards SUNCHOW which is connected by road to both LUICHOW and NANNING. In this area Chinese troops supported by US fighters and bombers have commenced a large scale counter offensive which has halted the Japanese advance. In the KWEILIN sector, another Japanese column which swung North from HONKONG is now threatening the Chinese defence line from PINGLO(some 10 miles south east of KWEILIN)to KUEGCHENG,(15 miles west of PINGLO).

China based B29s have carried out another successful raid on the Japanese mainland. They raided OMURA aircraft repair and assembly plant on the island of KYUSEU southern-most island of the main group. This is the fifth attack on this island. SAIPHU Is south of KOREA was also attacked.

NICOBAR IS

Commencing 17 Oct a British Task force carried out two raids on KAR NICOBAR Island the most northern island of the NICOBAR Island Group. The main target was the harbour in the centre of the group where 6 enemy ships were sunk and much damage done to shore installations. No landings were attempted.

BURMA

The British 14th Army troops who captured TIDDIM have continued their drive southward and are now closing in on the Japanese Base at FORT WHITE, other troops who reported FALAM clear of the enemy occupied HAKA on 19 Oct.

Fierce fighting still continues on the SALWEEN RIVER Sector where Japanese forces claim to have driven the Chinese troops out of the town of LUNGLING.

for Lt.Col
G3 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION:

As per 1 Aust Corps Summary No 1.

JAPANESE MEDIUM MORTAR BATTALION:

The following organization of a Medium Mortar Battalion has been taken from the Japanese Army 1941 Mobilisation Plans. The strengths have been built up from an equipment table only, but are believed to be reasonably accurate.

Japanese Mortar Units are divided into Infantry Mortar Units equipped with mortars of up to 90mm calibre, Medium Mortar Units - up to 150mm calibre, and Heavy Mortar Units - up to 250mm calibre. All mortars of 150mm calibre and over appear to be referred to as Artillery Mortars. The Infantry Mortar Battalions, with a strength of approximately 850, are equipped with 36 81mm or 90mm mortars. Little is known of the organization and equipment of the Heavy Mortar Units.

The following chart shows the strength, organization and equipment of a Medium Mortar Battalion.



ARMAMENT:	Pistols	39	EQUIPMENT:	Car	1
	Rifles	183		Trucks	15
	150mm Arty Mortars	12		Carts	192

EQUIPMENT:

JAPANESE PARATROOP EQUIPMENT:

The following information has been obtained from P/W. sources and, whilst it is necessary that it be assessed accordingly, it is believed to be generally correct as it substantiates earlier Intelligence. Details of some of the equipment used by such troops are reproduced hereunder:-

(a) Pistol

This was stated to be a Browning automatic and carried principally for suicide purposes. The P/W was not certain of the calibre but considered it was between 5mm (.197 in) to 6.5mm (.256 in). It may be confidently stated that the P/W is mistaken in thinking that the calibre of this weapon was substantially less than 6.5mm (.256 in). Whilst pistols of many makes are known to be used by the Japanese, it is a comparative rarity to find any pistol, particularly an automatic, of such light bore. The Browning, however, is known to be freely made in .25 in (6.35mm) calibre and, as such, would be of an ideal size for secreting on the person for suicide or any other last resort purposes.

(b) Rifle

This was reported to be a break-down adaptation of the regular Model 99, 7.7mm (.303 in), and, as such, confirms an earlier report indicating the existence of this weapon.

The rifle breaks into two parts at the point of balance where the two sections are secured by a retaining pin. As the weapon is in consequence necessarily reinforced at this point, it is somewhat heavier than the standard infantry rifle of similar model. According to the PW, it is branded "Model 2" on the barrel, but as such is never called, being always referred to as the TERUJU.

(c) LMG

This is the ordinary Model 99, 7.7mm (.303 in) and differs only from the infantry weapon in so much that it has a readily removeable stock, and as such, it is designed to be carried on the person. In addition to the weapon, four magazines holding a total of 120 rounds are also carried.

(d) Grenade Discharger

The Model 89, 50mm (1.97in) is used. The standard grenade for this weapon is the Model 89, HE, but the Model 97 Fragmentation is also used. Each man, with the exception of the leader, carries 16 grenades. It is reported that the discharger was dropped by a separate parachute, but the reason for this is difficult to understand as the weapon weighs but 10½ lbs.

(e) Model 93 Flamethrower

One had been allotted to the battalion when they were situated at SAIPAN, but had never been used in practice or combat.

(f) Respirators

All paratroops on SAIPAN were equipped with respirators although they were stated not to be part of their regular equipment.

(g) Rations

These consisted mainly of glutinous rice plus some chocolate, the whole being referred to as "Airforce Ration". Biscuits were carried in addition.

(h) Water-bottles

Each man carried the regulation water-bottle but "water-sausages" were also used. These appear to be a water-filled length of tough, cellophane-like substance which is tied off into short lengths. Each length is bitten into and the contents drunk as needed. In use, they are carried either in the pockets or slung around the neck.

(AMF Review No 116)

ENEMY STRENGTHS AND REORGANIZATION:

The following information is of particular interest and was derived from a Japanese Officer PW:-

(a) 41 DIVISION The strength of 237 Inf Regt was -

On departure for AITAPE 1500/1700 and
On withdrawal from BRINIUMOR RIVER 300.

238 Inf Regt had been reduced to 150 and the strength of 41 Div, including Arty and Engr Regts, totalled only 1500 in Sep 44. On 29 Sep 237 and 239 Inf Regts were to withdraw from DAMLAP to SOWAN (8 miles WSW of BUT) and 238 Inf Regt was to move three days later to MALIN (four miles west of BUT). This withdrawal

has been partly confirmed by native reports of 4 Oct.

The Division was re-organized in mid-Sep 44, dissolving the Ltn Arty Regt, MG Coys and other units, and the personnel were assigned to rifle companies. The 237 Inf Regt, strength 400, consisted of two Bns of three Coys each, and the other regts were of similar strength.

(b) 20 DIVISION Elements of 20 Div were guarding BUT area and LUSCHU ISLAND, their mission being to furnish defence for possible evacuation by submarine. The Div strength was not over 1500 and it had been re-organized to re-distribute men of heavy weapon units and the services.

(c) 51 DIVISION At the end of Sep 44, 51 Div was on guard duty at WEWAK, had a strength of 3,000 and had also been re-organized. Other sources disclose that elements of the Div were in the HAPRIK area in early Oct 44.

Indian PW state that no shipping had arrived at WEWAK since Feb-Mar 44, and that stocks of rations there had been exhausted by Jul 44. It is believed however that some supplies are still held in the coastal area between WEWAK and BUT which, eked out with local-grown or foraged foodstuffs, may maintain the garrison until Dec 44.

(First Aust Army Summary 126)

JAPANESE PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES IN THE FIELD:

SEATIC Translation Report 28 gives details from captured Japanese documents of propaganda units, their methods and the application of propaganda in the field for one specific operation in BURMA.

Similar methods and activities may be encountered in the field in this theatre, when operations take place in closely populated areas where the people are civilized and educationally receptive. Further, the results of this type of Japanese propaganda activity will be encountered as Allied forces develop their offensive against areas occupied by the Japanese earlier in the war.

Primarily, the responsibility for propaganda appears to be that of the Military, and the propaganda offensive is developed during the preparatory stages of the operation under careful supervision. The need for caution in the handling of propaganda is stressed by the Japanese, as they realise that haphazard propaganda may reveal their own intentions. All important propaganda is therefore directed either from Area Army or Divisional Headquarters.

Indirect propaganda is developed towards areas occupied by the Allies and areas lying between the Japanese and Allied forces. Though directed at both Europeans, natives and Indian troops, the best immediate results are expected from the Indian troops; the aim is the undermining of morale concurrently with operations.

The co-ordinated propaganda plan involves the use of the ordinary troops and units, a special operative group, a Military Activities Group and a Propaganda Kikan. When necessity arises, co-operation is requested from the Special Service Organization in BURMA (HIKARI KIKAN) and the air forces.

Troops

The part played by the troops is that they maintain public peace, respect all Indian National Army troops, deserters, prisoners and the enemy dead. They do not carry out any specialised propaganda work, but are instructed to maintain close contact with the various

propaganda organizations and be thoroughly acquainted with their purpose and functions, know how to deal with personnel of the organizations and give them every assistance. Apparently operatives infiltrating into Allied lines had had difficulty in the past with Japanese front line troops through misunderstanding and these troops not having a proper knowledge of the operatives' functions.

It is the duty of unit Commanding Officers to furnish the Divisional Commander with suggestions as to the lines the propaganda should follow.

The Special Operative Group

This group directs its activities towards the people, especially tribes of natives, living in the future combat zone, in this instance on the frontier. It explains the Japanese aims for independence for all the peoples in GEA., exposes British and American ambitions, and impresses the certainty of Japanese victory. This is done by lectures, talks, posters and the taking of chieftains and influential people to areas occupied by the Japanese for them to see the results of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Scheme.

Military Activities Group

The Military Activities Group directs propaganda towards the Allied troops, whether European or Indian, and also towards native civilians in the areas held by the Allied forces. All the normal propaganda methods such as agents, broadcasts, news sheets, pamphlets and posters are used. Particular stress is laid on the existence of the Indian National Army when the propaganda is to Indian troops.

The Propaganda Hikan

The Propaganda Hikan carries out similar functions to those of the Military Activities Group, but indications are that it is auxiliary to that group in preparing wireless broadcasts, translating them into English and native languages, and supplying the personnel suitable to do the broadcasting under the guidance of the Military Activities Group. Co-operation for this task is obtained from a Field Report Unit (see under).

In addition it carries out loudspeaker broadcasts, using agents, deserters, PW and women. Times and places for this type of broadcasting have to be changed continually both to avoid jamming by the enemy and to obtain desired results at opportune times. Escorting troops may sometimes be necessary due to the close proximity to the Allies when operating. Included in these loudspeakers broadcasts are items in Japanese directed to help morale of their own troops.

A Field Report Unit

This unit consists of war correspondents from Domei News Agency and is directed by the Propaganda Bureau of the Army. Though their main task would obviously be to supply reports for publication in Japanese newspapers, they are also utilised in connection with the arrangement and preparation of propaganda broadcasts in the field.

Material for their newspaper reports is supplied by the Division, and is supervised from an operational and security aspect, but they are not censored.

(MIF Review No 115)

ORGANIZATION: A chart showing the organization of a Japanese Island Warfare Division is attached as part of this supplement.

JAPANESE ISLAND WARFARE DIVISION



ADV/MISC/5416

ESTIMATED TABLE OF EQUIPMENT

	Div HQ	Tank Unit	Regt Gp "A"	Regt Gp "B"	Regt Gp "B"	Sig Unit	Sen Tpt Unit	Land Tpt Unit	Intend Serv Unit	Fd Hosp	Hyg & WP Unit	Ord Serv Unit	Total
Personnel	300	130	3964	3165	3165	235	1542	131	133	595	163	107	13630
Rifle	160	60	2100	1800	1800	190	500	90	60	150	50	40	7000
Grenade Discharger			114	84	84								282
LMG	4		112	112	112		( )	2					342
HMG			18	18	18		( )						54
20mm Auto A Tk Rifle			9										9
20mm Machine Cannon			6										6
81mm Mortar			63										63
Flamethrowers			6										6
37mm A Tk Gun			6	6	6								18
70mm Inf Gun				6	6								12
75mm Fd or Mtn Gun			9	12(8)	12(8)								33(25)
10cm How				(4)	(4)								(8)
Lt Tank		17	9										26
MLC							120						120
Armd Boat							12						12

NOTES

1. The Regimental Group "A" is intended to be an amphibious regiment, used mainly in sea-borne counter-landings. 15 Infantry Regiment of 14 Division was equipped with a number of amphibious trucks, but their performance was reported to be unsatisfactory. The Regimental Groups "B" are self-contained island garrison forces.
2. No Transport Company is included in the Regimental Group "A", but there is a Transport Section on Regimental HQ.
3. The Artillery Battalion of the Regimental Groups "B" may be equipped with twelve 75 mm field or mountain guns, or eight 75mm field or mountain guns and four 10cm howitzers.
4. The Tank Company of the Regimental Group "A" may have from nine to fourteen light tanks -- generally the number is nine.
5. The Field Hospital may form two branch hospitals, each with a strength of 165. Detachments of the Hygiene and Water Purification Unit, with a strength of 40, may be alloted to Regimental Groups.
6. In the Regimental Group "B", an additional 500 labourers or replacement troops may be included in the Supply Company.

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ADAPTED FROM AMF REVIEW NO. 115

SUMMARY OF DISPOSITIONS OF MAJOR ENEMY FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES:

MINDANAO:

The present estimated strength in MINDANAO is 60,000. The nucleus of this consists of two Infantry Divisions, 30 and 100, whilst recent information suggests the possible presence of an unidentified Independent Mixed Brigade. Up to Sep, 30 Division had been allotted the role of the defence of the general SURIGAO PENINSULA, but towards the middle of that month, the Japanese apparently changed their plan and this formation was moved SW, and is now believed to have its headquarters at CAGAYAN. Its present role appears to be the defence of the Northern coast of MINDANAO, particularly CAGAYAN, whilst holding a large proportion of its forces inland along the SAYRE highway, to be used as a reserve available for switching to any threatened sector.

The defence of the Southern portion of MINDANAO has been allotted to 100 Division whose headquarters is located just outside DAVAO. It appears to have two roles -

(a) to defend the SARANGANI PENINSULA, and

(b) to maintain a mobile reserve around KABACAN from whence it can be despatched rapidly to reinforce any threatened area, particularly in the South of the island.

It should be noticed that the Western shores of DAVAO GULF appear to be defended by Naval personnel.

An Independent Mixed Brigade, as yet unidentified, has been reported, with its headquarters at ZAMBOANGA. It is alleged that it is responsible for the defence of the whole ZAMBOANGA PENINSULA.

VISAYAS:

The present estimated strength in the VISAYAS is 60,000, comprising an Army headquarters, two divisions and two Independent Tank Companies. With headquarters at CEBU, 35 Army controls 102 Division, the bulk of which is distributed between PANAY-NEGROS-BOHOL-CEBU ISLANDS, with portion on LEYTE, whilst 16 Division, with its headquarters at TACLOBAN, is responsible for the defence of the vital LEYTE area with its numerous airfields. Elements of 16 Division have been reported on the SW coast of SAMAR, but, generally speaking, the Eastern coast of this island does not appear to be defended, no doubt due to the fact that its ruggedness makes it unsuitable for landing operations. On LEYTE, the whole coast from TACLOBAN to ABUYOG is thought to be heavily defended.

The general policy as far as the VISAYAS is concerned seems to be to defend the forward LEYTE area with 16 Division and a portion of 102 Division, whilst the balance of this latter formation remains on the adjacent islands to the West,

LUZON:

The present estimated strength on LUZON, including MINDORO, is approximately 120,000, consisting of three or possibly four, divisions.

In the North an 'ad hoc' organisation termed the CAGAYAN Defence Force appears to have been formed for the defence of the CAGAYAN VALLEY. This is thought to consist of at least one regiment with indications that it may be expanded to a division. Its headquarters is located in the TUGEGARAO area. In the North-west, reports from ground sources would indicate that a new and, as yet, unidentified division recently landed at SALOMAGUE and was last reported to be moving Southwards. Its destination is not known. The defence of LINGAYEN GULF is shared by 103 and 26 Divisions. The two brigades of 103 Division are believed to be deployed along the Northern shores and inland from LINGAYEN GULF with headquarters at BAGUIO. The main strength of 26 Division is disposed in the Central CABANATUAN area, where it can be used for the defence of the LINGAYEN GULF or the important BALER BAY and DINGALEN BAY areas, as required.

In the BICOL PENINSULA, 105 Division has one brigade disposed from NAGA Southwards for the defence of the Southeasterly portion of the Peninsula, whilst the other is responsible for the defence of the LAGON BAY - TAYABAS BAY area with its headquarters probably at LOS BANOS on the shores of LAGUNA BAY.

(AIF Review No 116)

SECRET: APPENDIX "A (ii)" TO ~~AMF WEEKLY~~
~~INTELLIGENCE REVIEW NO 116~~
~~OF [illegible] OCT 44~~



PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
GENERAL
STAFF INTELLIGENCE
ALLIED LAND FORCES
SWPA
STATUTE MILES
NAUTICAL MILES
ESTIMATE OF
ENEMY STRENGTHS
IN THE
PHILIPPINES
AS AT 18 OCT 44
NORTHERN
TOTAL 121,700
CENTRAL
TOTAL 60,900
SOUTHERN
TOTAL 59,400
TOTAL PHILIPPINES 242,000
NORTHERN LUZON
39,400
CENTRAL LUZON
60,900
BATANGAS
7,500
BICOL PENINSULA
12,900
MINDORO
1000
PALAWAN
1500
PANAY
7,200
NEGROS
CEBU
BOHOL
15,700
NORTHERN MINDANAO
25,500
SOUTHERN MINDANAO
27,900
ZAMBOANGA-
SULU ARCH
6,000
BABUYAN CHANNEL
LUZON
SAMAR
LEYTE
MASBATE
MINDANAO
BORNEO
BALABAC ID.
GSI (a) ADV LHQ



PERSPECTIVE MAP OF
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
LEGEND
MAIN ROADS
RAILWAYS
LUZON
MANILA
MINDORO
CALAMIAN GROUP
BUSUANGA I
CULION I
SIBUYAN SEA
TABLAS I
SIBUYAN I
BURIAS I
CANTANDUANES I
MASBATE I
PANAY I
VISAYAN SEA
SAMAR I
PALAWAN I
Puerto Princesa
DUMARAN I
CUYO WEST PASS
CUYO EAST PASS
CUYO IS
NEGROS I
CEBU I
CAMOTES SEA
LEYTE I
DINAGAT I
SIARGAO I
BOHOL I
SIQUIJOR I
CAMIGUIN I
MINDANAO SEA
BALABAC STR
BALABAC I
BANGUEY I
CAGAYAN SULU I
SULU SEA
NORTH BORNEO
DARVEL BAY
SIBUTU I
TAWI TAWI I
TAWI TAWI GROUP
PANGUTARAN GROUP
JOLO I
JOLO GROUP
TAPUL GROUP
SAMALES GROUP
PILAS GROUP
BASILAN STR
TAPIANTANA GROUP
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
SIBUGUEY BAY
ILLANA BAY
MORO GULF
MINDANAO I
MACAJALAR BAY
BUTUAN BAY
DAVAO GULF
Cape San Augustin
SARANGANI IS
PALMAS I
CELEBES SEA
N