

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/2/18

18 Infantry Brigade

September - October 1942, part 1
of 2

~~substituted~~

4-

Para 4

insert as 4 (a) (ii) & (iii)

(ii) Beach defences from both incl MAIWARRA
R to No 3 STRIP

(iii) Defended localities in ^{its} area of
No 3 STRIP and RAIBA

(iv) Tracks over STIRLING RANGE East
of and incl track GILGILI - CARUPUTTA
(track No 4 on patrol map - NOT route 4)

4 (b) as before

Hold 301 cont
file

Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde
18 Sept 49.

ITEM FORCE

The following points were noted during the course of recent ops and are forwarded for information together with certain recommendations arising therefrom.)

2. In putting forward these matters it is realised that certain comments and recommendations may not have general application and may only apply in similar conditions; that is to say, when fighting takes place upon a narrow front on a coastal belt of dense jungle flanked by foothills and astride a rough native track. At the same time it is thought that in principle the greater part of the suggestions put forward will have general application.

JAP PERSONNEL

3. The Jap is a bad rifle shot while, in addition, our men are invariably quicker on the trigger.
4. The Jap is cunning in ambush but has no relish for fighting at close quarters and, in instances, was demoralised at the sight of the bayonet.
5. The Jap persists in the use of "noise" tactics and it is suggested that these noises are as much to bolster up his own morale as to attempt to damage ours. The possibilities of "counter noise" would therefore appear great.
6. Jap MG fire is not up to our standard.

JAP ARMS & EQUIP

7. Jap Tommy guns were not encountered during the ops.
8. The Jap 2-in mortar, though noisy, is ineffective. Casualties sustained resulted almost exclusively from direct hits.
9. A number of Japs were found to be wearing breast plates, (specimens of which have been forwarded.) These have been found to be completely impervious to TMSG but offer no effective resistance to MG or small arms fire.

JAP TACTICS

10. The Jap showed little inclination to use the jungle any more than was absolutely essential, seldom moving more than 100 or so yds from a track. He appears to prefer to take up a position astride a track with a total frontage of not more than 200 to 300 yds.
11. The Japs almost invariably withhold their fire until they were within 20 to 30 yds or even less. Small recon parties are allowed to pass through his area and are not molested if he is not seen.
12. The Jap makes prolific use of snipers. These are well hidden both in the undergrowth and in palm trees and are left behind to delay our advance when he withdraws. These tactics must inevitably delay the progress of any advance while the area is thoroughly beaten for such snipers.
13. Individual Japs maintain a policy of bold infiltration at night both for direct attack and to engage the attention of the defenders by setting off delayed fire crackers while other bodies attempt to attack from the flank. Infiltrators may best be dealt with by a small reserve within a perimeter. This reserve should neither fire nor move until the infiltrators are located when the bayonet only should be employed.

*Difficult
with two only!*

JAPANESE TANK TACTICS.

- 14. Enemy tank tactics at night combined mutual support by the tanks and by inf. In attacking a perimeter camp the tanks endeavoured to penetrate. Supporting one another, they advanced two fwd and one in reserve while enemy inf attempt to follow up immediately behind the tanks.
- 15. Out fire positions were located by the fwd tank lying 'doggo', switching off its engine, listening and observing. On locating the fire position the tank fired tracer at it, indicating it to the second tank, which then moved to the area and heavily engaged the position with LMG fire and hand grenades. Fire from light mortars also fell but whether from within the tank or from supporting inf is not certain. Headlamps and x spotlights on the tanks were used successfully in assisting to locate these and other positions.
- 16. At a later stage, when attempting to exploit along the track the enemy made use of his tanks to carry inf armed with LMGs covering them by fire while they occupied fire positions, apparently for the purpose of covering further advance or preventing any counter-attack.
- 17. Inf in attempting to follow the tanks, moved fwd in several waves by bounds believing at this stage that their tanks had destroyed our positions. These inf were dealt with effectively.
- 18. On approaching our position the enemy talked incessantly in loud voices either to break down our morale or to boost up his own.
- 19. The enemy showed speed in endeavouring to exploit, sacrificing security to gain an advantage.
- 20. Although it was felt at the time of the tank attack that the tanks were not vulnerable to A.Tk rifle fire or to ST grenades, subsequent experiment has put it beyond all doubt that even the turret of the captured Jap tanks can be penetrated by the A.Tk rifle. Whenever, therefore, tanks may possibly be encountered units should move with all available A.Tk weapons while all ranks should be informed of the positive results of recent experiment with the A.Tk rifle on Jap tanks.

NEW TACTICS

- 21. Successful tactics employed during advance were for a light screen of some six men moving 20 to 30 yds in front of the leading pl to draw fire. On this being done the pl manoeuvred to find the enemy flanks, supported where necessary by another pl of the fwd coy. In the early stages of the operations withdrawal of the enemy almost invariably followed attempted encirclement. It was then necessary to beat the area for snipers. In the latter stages of the operation when the enemy was defending his base withdrawal did not follow attempted encirclement, it was found most effective to withdraw our fwd troops for a sufficient distance to allow our arty, mortar and RAAF being employed prior to an attack which was pressed home immediately on the conclusion of the supporting fire programme. Concurrently with this attack a res coy previously sent on a wide flanking movement would attack the enemy rear. Arty and mortar ranging should be carried out during the initial movement of this res coy to distract enemy attention.
- 22. It should be stressed that in these operations the bn concerned had available on an extremely narrow front support of one bty of 25-pdrs and as much close air support as could be desired. Nevertheless in such country an opposed advance of 3000 to 4000 yds constitutes a very successful days work.
- 23. It must further be appreciated that the task of the arty was rendered comparatively easy in so far as ranging could be done in the bay prior to swinging onto the target, -- a condition which would not apply in complete jungle warfare.

24. Forward movement by night is virtually impossible. Firm bases in the nature of perimeter camps must be established at night. Work on this must commence in sufficient time to allow of the clearing of the perimeter prior to dark. In the recent ops some perimeters were formed on the seashore. Weapon pits were constructed roughly six feet apart along the length of the perimeter while the small reserve referred to before was kept in hand. It is considered that two coys constitute the smallest force that can safely hold such an area. Without the advantage of the sea possibly a larger force may be necessary.
25. During the advance the establishment of such firm bases is equally a key to success, for, by establishing such a firm base held by two coys on each objective as it is taken, the rear coys may be passed rapidly through the fwd while the base is assured in the event of the enemy encircling such attacking coys, or counter attacking.
26. Our fighting patrols should invariably carry 3-in mortars to drive the hidden MB's, and LMG's to the open.
27. Whenever a position is taken up by any man or weapon this position should be altered at Stand Down each night and its original position reoccupied at Stand To each morning. This confuses the enemy infiltrator by night who has marked a particular position by day.
28. Owing to their vulnerability it is suggested that Listening Posts should not be left outside perimeter camps. It is considered that in the extreme darkness of the jungle simple booby traps made from 36 pound grenades are equally effective.
29. Formations for a bn moving both on a coastal rd and inland which were successfully employed in this op are attached for information.
30. The value of controlled and accurate aimed rifle fire in jungle warfare cannot be over stressed, not only for its conservancy of ammunition but also for its effectiveness. The value of the TSMG lies in chance encounter in the closest country or in stopping a rush but it is wasteful of ammunition. As carrying of ammunition on the man is essential, but fatiguing in tropical climate anything tending to waste ammunition must be avoided. There is no doubt that the rifle and LMG in attack, defence and the beating of areas for snipers were by far the most effective weapons. Whenever LMG (or TSMG) are employed they should be fired first as single shot weapons and bursts used only when indicated by circumstances. Accuracy of fire is the surest method of success.
31. The following recommendations are made:-
 - (a) That all ranks be issued capes equipped with cross straps in lieu of present type capes.
 - (b) That all ranks wear shirts khaki with long sleeves, slacks ED, Boots, short puttees, and carry one spare pair of socks. (short puttees are suggested in lieu of gaiters as it has been found that small stones, pebbles etc pass down the tops of the gaiters into the boots thus causing foot trouble by stone bruising and chaffing. The American type of high leaced gaiters with a strap under the arch of the foot could also be supplied in lieu of short puttees).
 - (c) It is suggested that each coy (if possible each pl) be equipped with a light two-wheeled cart similar to captured Jap type. These carts proved invaluable for rapid transport of mortars and bombs, stores and ammunition and in some cases for the evacuation of the wounded.
 - (d) That box magazines be carried in place of drum magazines for TSMG and that 19 box type magazines be carried.
 - (e) That bayonets be sharpened to have a cutting edge to assist in the quick clearing of undergrowth.

The Jap showed himself, on occasion, owing to his methods singularly vulnerable to well planned D.F..

32. Experiment was tried of using 3.7 AA guns as field guns at a time when our tps were passing beyond the limit of the 85-pdr range. The time fuse of the AA gun has a limit of 10,000 yds though the shell has a range of 20,000 yds. When fired with their own fuse as an experiment it was found that the 3.7 shell did not detonate on impact. It was found that the 117 and 119 85-pdr fuse could be fitted to the 3.7 AA shell with complete success.

33. In all cases where line and phones were available signal communication was maintained even in the heaviest undergrowth as it was found that men can make fwd progress, signal cable can follow. It is suggested for operations of this nature that a large and immediate reserve of cable and spare phones be available for issue to Bns. Without such communication, inevitable long delay and lack of information result, limiting and jeopardising the success of operations.

34. The value of light 4-wheel drive AF such as the Jeep is proved beyond all possible doubt.

35. An experiment was tried laying a line across the floor of the bog. Until this line was cut by the anchor of a ship the experiment was attended by every success.

36. It was found that W/T sets deteriorated considerably owing to the condensation of moisture inside them. The provision of some completely waterproof, air tight case is essential.

ARMY

37. In fighting of this nature at times it is only possible for the P.O.O. to provide adequate results while working within approximately 100 yds of the front line. Adequate inf protection must therefore be afforded him.

38. P.O.O. suffered from poor observation and had generally to get right on top of the target and engage as a close target. This is wasteful and as ranging is long and tedious.

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41. Communications proved to be very lengthy and the W/S found to be inadequate for this type of warfare. At least 50 miles should be available. Constant maintenance was necessary and strong parties had to be sent along lines for repairs.

42. Wireless gave good service provided sets were placed in clearings or on foreshores. Heavy rain played havoc with signal eqpt and brought out the need for reserve eqpt.

43. Tractors of the Dodge 10-wheel type are ideal for this country and should be fitted with a front winch. Jeeps could be used to advantage by tps for taking personnel and eqpt to ops. Bicycles were useless, both mud and fords proving big obstacles. Only vchs with high clearance and four wheel drive were of use.

44. For tpt of guns to fwd posns barges with a drop front if available could work along the coast. Small rubber tyred hand carts would facilitate the work of signallers by carrying reels and supplies. Log platforms for guns had to be built in several instances as firing sank the guns into soft mud.

45. Close support given by the RAAF proved invaluable. There was much evidence to hand of the damage wrought by both bombers and ground strafing fighters.
46. It is felt that the present system of recognition of our positions, calling as it does for very considerable expenditure of very cartridges could be improved by the issue of RAAF type signal pistols and cartridges so that a more less expensive in signal gun could be established.
47. During operations it was found difficult to indicate to the Air Force points for bombing and strafing. A method tried was for the guns to put a round of smoke on each side of the target according to which way the wind was blowing. This proved very effective as the smoke drifted slowly through the trees and hung about the tops and was easily sighted by planes.
48. RAAF comment would appear to favour this method of target identification as being practically fool-proof and further use of this method is advocated.

MEDICAL

49. Medical evacuation was by sea and the problem was rendered comparatively easy. Even then difficulties were such as to give rise to grave fears as to medical evacuation in complete jungle warfare or if sea transport could not be used.





GENERAL

50. Many instances occurred of Japs lying 'doggo' among their own dead and coming to life to attack our troops as they passed. So general was this habit that it was essential that rigorous and drastic measures be taken to ensure against its recurrence.


W. J. ...
 Brig.
 Genl 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Suggested Formation of Bn. moving on a Coastal Road.


GENERAL DIRECTION OF ADVANCE.



200 yds.



200 yds.




Other Coys. and REAR Bn. H.Q. in firm base.

C O A S T


Suggested formation for Bn moving on Inland Road.

GENERAL
DIRECTION
OF
ADVANCE.





Alternative formation for Bn on Inland Rd

↑ GENERAL DIRECTION OF ADVANCE.



Alternative formation for Bn on Inland Rd.




GENERAL
DIRECTION
OF
ADVANCE.



600'

C.O. & Battle H.Q.



Other Coy & Rear
Bn H.Q. in firm base

Subject : LESSONS FROM RECENT FIGHTING

H.Q. MILNEFORCE

The following infm is based on report made by C.O's of units of 7 Aust inf bde which were engaged in the recent operations against the JAP landing force at MILNE BAY. More detailed infm is contained in 7 Aust inf bde intell summaries No 1 dated 9 Sep, and No 2 dated 16 Sep. This report concerns itself only with the tactical lessons learned.

A. JAP METHODS AND TACTICS

1. Patrolling (a) The captured JAP order for the MILNE BAY operation gives the strength of an offr's patrol (1 and 6) and an N.C.O's patrol (1 and 3) for a special task. Patrols encountered at night by our units numbered from 10 upwards, and by day 6 to 10 men. These patrols moved as a body and generally kept to tracks.

(b) By day, while his main body was resting, the JAP carried out recce of our posns by scouts working singly or in pairs. These men made use of the thick jungle to approach our defended localities or were left in posn when the enemy withdrew from a night attack. They lay doggo and observed, allowing our patrols and working parties to pass unobserved. Presumably they later got back to their own lines with whatever infm they had collected. The JAPS did not use fighting patrols for recce. If met by our tps in daylight, they generally withdrew and hid in the jungle.

2. Night Operations

(a) The JAPS made no attacks and little movement during daylight. This was partly due, no doubt, to our complete comd of the air. By day, their main body rested, often with little regard for local protection. Several times our patrols surprised small parties of the enemy in native villages. Some of these did not have their arms and eqpt at hand and ran away when fired on.

(b) Approach March This JAP force relied almost entirely on night operations, for which it appeared to have been well trained. During the approach march the tps moved rapidly in gps of 20 or 30, with little care for flank protection. The main line of adv was the rd or beach and formed bodies do not seem to have moved more than 300 yds off the rd. By this moving on the rd the enemy advanced with a speed he could not have achieved had he tried to secure his flanks as he went. His tps talked a good deal during the approach march but were careful about lights and absolutely silent just before contact.

(c) Night attacks. When contact was imminent, the JAP formed up very silently for the attack. At this stage his tps tended to bunch. Once the attack began, they made all the noise they could - firing mortars and grenades, throwing crackers, calling out and whistling. These noises were made partly to draw our fire, partly in an attempt to demoralize our tps and to encourage his own.

Night attacks were on a small frontage but mortars were fired well fwd to the flanks - apparently to give the impression of a large force advancing on a wide front. The rear elements of the attacking force seemed to be more widely deployed - probably placed so as to envelop our flanks.

When our tps opened fire, the JAPS tried to infiltrate to our flanks and rear. When in posn, they used mortars or threw grenades and under cover of these attempted to rush the posts.

(d) Night withdrawals. These night attacks were suddenly broken off before first light and the JAPS withdrew - again in chattering gps along the main rd. In two instances the signal to withdraw was a bugle call. As they withdrew, they left snipers and

snipers and/

observers in trees close to our F.D.Ls and along tracks. A great deal of their eqpt abandoned on the battlefield but no wounded were left.

3. Sniping. The JAPS used snipers to harass our tps during the day and interfere with our adv. The fieldcraft of these snipers was very good. They climbed coconut palms and secured themselves in the leafy top or hid in sago palms or other trees, using foliage in helmet and body camflg nets. Their greenish uniform blended well with the vegetation. These snipers would allow our tps to approach within a few yds or go past before opening fire. They were so well hidden that it was necessary to draw their fire in order to discover their posn: even after firing they were hard to detect. These snipers cooperated with others hidden on the ground. When our tps exposed themselves to shoot at tree-snipers, they drew fire from the ground. Other snipers lay hidden among their own dead and allowed our patrols and burial parties to go by before firing. The snipers' marksmanship was less good than their fieldcraft.

4. Defence. JAP tactics in this action were mainly concentrated on attack. Tps of this bde met very little solidly organized def. All def posns were covered by a screen of snipers in trees and the tps in def posns were well concealed and camflgd. They were ~~thus~~ difficult to dislodge.

5. Inf cooperation with tks At least two lt or med tks were used by the JAPS in this operation. At the first contact with an outpost pl, the tk cmd directed ops standing up in the turret. When he was shot, the tk withdrew.

Later, two tks were used at night. Except in one open plantation, these A.F.Vs moved entirely on the rd and made no attempt to enter the jungle. They used strong headlamps to illuminate targets for themselves and for the accompanying inf. Some machine-gunners either rode on the tks or followed close behind them, so that the glare of the headlamps prevented our tps from seeing them. Other inf parties preceded the tks at defiles to deal with A.Tk guns or tank-hunters lying in ambush.

6. Deception. In addition to skilful fieldcraft and ruses to draw fire, the JAPS made free use of English phrases - often in very good English. Some were well chosen to give the impression that formed bodies of our tps were approaching the posn:- e.g. "Keep to the centre of the road"; "Take it easy. Go slow" ... "Don't fire. Troops coming in". ... "At last". Others prematurely used - had been learned in anticipation of an easy victory: "We are the Japanese. Surrender"... "It is no use resisting any longer"... "Order the whole army to stop fire"... "Where is the headquarters?"... "Where is the Commander?"... "Where is the wireless station?". Some were quite inappropriate: "Who goes there? Friend. Good morning!" (in the middle of the night) or "That you, mun?". Some invited vigorous Australian replies: "Australia man, you go. Japan man, we come" - to which was given the answer "Come on, you b-----!"

B OUR COUNTERS TO JAP METHODS AND TACTICS

7. Patrolling. (a) In this jungle country our units found that the most effective patrol is a sec well closed up, or even three determined men. This small party is easily handled; it can attack and withdraw as it pleases, whereas a large party is difficult to handle in the jungle.

(b) By night, it was found most effective not to send moving patrols through the jungle (where as distinct from desert warfare, they can see nothing) but to put down small standing patrols or listening posts at important pts at dusk. Those must engage anything that approaches. They must be taught, however, not to fire indiscriminately and at night must not fire until the enemy is at point-blank range. In one case a Pl Comd produced the essential night discipline amongst our troops by stating that anyone above ground after dark would be assumed as enemy and be fired on.

(c) For nighting patrols, a pl gave sufficient numbers for all-round protection. The pl comd is best placed with the fwd sec,

fwd sec, /

while one sec watches the right flank and rear, and another the left flank and rear.

8. Night operations

(a) The need for organized rest by day was soon apparent since JAP operations began soon after dark and continued until first light. The value of alternative posns to be occupied after nightfall was also proved since the JAPS made careful daylight recon of our posns.

(b) Approach march. During his approach march the JAP is vulnerable to small parties of determined men, lightly equipped but provided with great fire power, who lie in wait on his main route.

(c) Night attacks. The most effective counter to the JAP night attack was to have posts sited for all-round def (not in name but in fact) and a cleared field of fire. It is absolutely essential to force the JAP into the open where he can be dealt with by automatic weapons and to prevent him from creeping up to our posts. The heaviest enemy casualties were caused in swathes cut through the jungle where his tps were caught in bunches as they crossed. It was found useful to have a second clearing beyond the belt of jungle at the side of the main field of fire. The JAPS formed up in this clearing for an attack and were caught in close formation by mortar fire.

It is almost impossible to stop JAP infiltration through jungle unless fds of fire have been cut.

At night our tps must disregard all ruses to draw their fire and fix their posns. They must hold their fire until the JAPS are close. By this means attack after attack was thrown back with heavy enemy casualties.

A post with weapon pits sited for mutual support and surrounded by protective wire outside grenade range is an effective counter to both the creeping and the "noise and rush" JAP attack.

A def posn must have no flanks or rear since the JAP has rear elements of his attacking force thrown out to the flanks ready to envelop the posn once his leading tps have made frontal contact. We must have a series of self contained localities along the main axis.

(d) Night withdrawals. In jungle country to follow up a night withdrawal is to invite ambush. By day, the area through which our tps have to pass must be carefully cleared of the remaining enemy - mainly snipers in trees. This makes the follow-up slow.

9. Sniping. The main difficulty in stamping out snipers was to locate them. They had a great nuisance value and hampered the movts of our tps since every yard of ground had to be carefully searched and every coconut palm scanned. Even areas which had been thoroughly combed, not once but several times, were still found to be infested. Generally, the sniper's fire had to be drawn. In a small area, distributed A.A. M.G. fire dislodged a number of tree-snipers, but this method could not be made general. The only effective way of clearing an area was to search it thoroughly with a sec specially detailed to destroy snipers. This had to be done every day because snipers would be reestablished each night.

Since JAPS tried to pick off offrs and N.C.O's, obvious badges of rank should be avoided and offrs should carry rifles and be equipped as nearly as possible like their men. Our K.D. uniforms are conspicuous in jungle country and should be dyed green.

10. Defence. (a) In attacking JAP def localities our tps must avoid tracks leading into the posn, which are covered by the fire of automatic weapons and of snipers. They must be trained to move speedily and silently through the jungle. One difficulty met was the coordination of an adv in which part of the tps moved by the rd and beach while the other part made its way through the jungle. Movt in an attack must be very carefully controlled and secs given specific tasks - e.g. one sec to deal with snipers in trees while another deals with ground forces.

(b) Air support and the fire of our own supporting arms and weapons was of great value in attacks. It heartened our own tps and all reports proved the JAP dislike of ground strafing and arty

and arty,

and mortar fire. The special circumstances of fighting along a coastal strip enabled the Fd Arty to be used to advantage but this must be regarded as a particular case since observation for arty fire is generally most difficult in the jungle country.

11. Inf cooperation with Tks. When a JAP tank led the adv down a rd and drew fire, the tank engaged from the rd while the following inf worked round to a flank. The counter to this is to allow the tank to pass through to be engaged by our A.Tk weapons sited in depth and to deal with the following inf.

Sometimes tks were both preceded and followed by inf. If the leading tps were fired on, the tank rushed up to their support while the following inf moved round.

Against this, our inf disposed in depth down the rd should allow the leading JAPS and the tk to pass through into a tank-trap or onto a minefield before engaging front and rear inf simultaneously.

A.Tk weapons must be well concealed so as to avoid headlights and must have good local protection or they will probably be overrun by JAP inf before they can fire.

In country where tks keep mainly to narrow rds through jungle, A.Tk mines have great value.

12. Deception Our tps must keep silence at night and not answer questions called out of the darkness.

To avoid confusion between friend and foe in close country, one C.O. suggests that members of a sec should be numbered --- say 1 - 10; 11 - 20; 21 - 30 and should call out their numbers when trying to establish one another's position.

C EFFICIENCY OF JAP WEAPONS

13. The list of JAP weapons used in this operation is att to the O.O. for the HAYASHI S.L.F. Opinions on the principal types are:-

Rifle (Type 38) Shooting erratic and generally high, especially at night.

L.M.G. (type 96) Very similar to our Bren. Seems to have been fired indiscriminately to produce a great volume of fire, but with limited effect. It is reported that our Bren magazine fits the L.M.G.

M.M.G. (type 92) Fired from a fixed mounting and very effective. M.M.G. mountings were fitted with poles for carrying the gun completely mounted - the whole assembly making a two-man load.

Grenade discharger type 89. This weapon, similar to our 2" mortar, but fitted with a curved base-plate for firing from the thigh, was widely and effectively used.

It was brought into action with remarkable speed, possibly by the following method :- Bombers move in rear of rifle-men. When these have drawn fire, they put up a flare and the lt mortars immediately fire in the direction of our tps. Though much of this mortar fire was apparently at guess-work range, the loud explosion of the bomb had an unnerving effect at night.

No ht mortars appear to have been used by the JAPS in this operation

Grenade hand type 91. JAPS had plentiful supplies of these. They burst with a great deal of noise but, although of the fragmentation type, their effect was small.

Explosive smoke candles type 99. No infm.

Revolver type 14. No infm.

Automatic rifle type 97. No infm.

37 mm Tk gun No infm of effect of fire against carrs. A lt fd piece of the same calibre was also used. The shells for this had a percussion cap. There is no definite infm on the bursting effect but it is considered to be very inferior to similar weapons in use by us.

any
NO

in which

circumstances of fighting along a strip enabled the enemy to be used to advantage but this must be regarded as a particular case since observation for arty fire is generally most difficult in the jungle country.

11. Inf cooperation with Tks. When a JAP tank led the adv down a rd and drew fire, the tank engaged from the rd while the following inf worked round to a flank. The counter to this is to allow the tank to pass through to be engaged by our A.Tk weapons sited in depth and to deal with the following inf.

Sometimes tks were both preceded and followed by inf. If the leading tps were fired on, the tank rushed up to their support while the following inf moved round.

Against this, our inf disposed in depth down the rd should allow the leading JAPS and the tk to pass through into a tank-trap or onto a minefield before engaging front and rear inf simultaneously.

A.Tk weapons must be well concealed so as to avoid headlights and must have good local protection or they will probably be overrun by JAP inf before they can fire.

In country where tks keep mainly to narrow rds through jungle, A.Tk mines have great value.

12. Deception Our tps must keep silence at night and not answer questions called out of the darkness.

To avoid confusion between friend and foe in close country, one C.O. suggests that members of a sec should be numbered -- say 1 - 10; 11 - 20; 21 - 30 -- and should call out their numbers when trying to establish one another's position.

C. EFFICIENCY OF JAP WEAPONS

13. The dist. of JAP weapons used in this operation is att to the C.O. for the HAYASHI S.L.F. Opinions on the principal types are:-

Rifle (Type 38) Shooting erratic and generally high, especially at night.

L.M.G. (type 96) very similar to our Bren. Seems to have been fired indiscriminately to produce a great volume of fire, but with limited effect. It is reported that our Bren magazine fire

M.M.G. (type 96) fired from a fixed mounting and very effective. Mountings were fitted with poles for carrying the gun completely mounted - the whole assembly making a two

Grenade (type 89). This weapon, similar to our 2" mortar but fitted with a curved base-plate for firing from the

and effectively used. It was brought into action with remarkable speed possibly by the following method :- Bombers move in rear of the position. When these have drawn fire, they put up a flare and the mortars immediately fire in the direction of our troops. Though much of this mortar fire was apparently at guess-work range, the loud explosion of the bomb had an

annoying effect at night. No heavy mortars appear to have been used by the JAP in this operation.

Grenade (type 96) JAPS had plentiful supplies of these. The burst which is great deal of noise but, although of the fragmentation type, their effect was small.

Explosive smoke candles type 99. No infm.

Revolver type 14. No infm.

Automatic rifle type 97. No infm.

37 mm Tk gun effect of fire against carrs. A lt of piece of the same calibre was also used. The shells for had a percussion cap. There is no definite infm on the bu ing effect but it is considered to be very inferior to similar weapons in use by us.

Flame-thrower. These do not seem to have been used, though at least three were captured. The JAP O.O. shows that they were intended for use against A.F.V.'s.

D. EFFICIENCY OF OUR INF WEAPONS

14. Experience in these operations gave our men great confidence in their own weapons by comparison with those of the JAPS.

Rifle An effective weapon in all situations. It was the most useful all weapons for dealing with single JAPS, especially snipers. Our tps realized its killing power and had absolute confidence in it. The rifle bullet readily penetrated the armour plate jacket worn by a number of JAPS in the action although T.S.M.G. bullet would not do so.

T.S.M.G. This was an effective weapon for close-quarter work, especially on patrols. The use of a good number of T.S.M.Gs raised the morale of our own men and had a demoralizing effect on the JAPS. It was a particularly useful weapon for close defence of Bren gun posns. In order to cut down ampx expenditure, the T.S.M.G. should generally be fired at repetition and not full automatic.

Bren This gave excellent results at night when dealing with concerted attacks on our posns. It was especially successful where good fcs of fire had been cleared. In one gp of four brens used as required throughout a three hours' engagement, not one stoppage occurred.

M.M.G. In very few places could the Vickers gun be used to take full advantage of its characteristics but when given an opportunity it caused by casualties. Sited to control clearings and obstacles it remains a first class weapon and our tps have great confidence in it.

Grenade, hand. This was very useful for jungle fighting in small clearings and thrown from ambushes on the rd. Its destructive power was great, especially when JAPS bunched. Our tps soon realized how much more effective it is than the JAP grenade.

Mortar 3" As a close support weapon this was very effective, devastating in results and demoralizing in its effect. One attack was completely broken up by mortar fire. The mortar provided accurate, quick and reliable support close in front of inf posns.

Especially for work at night line comm from O.P.'s to mortar posns would be very valuable. Improvised comm of this type used during the action proved to be of the greatest value.

Boys A.Tk Rifle .55" This bde has only two A.Tk rifles per bn and had no chance of using them in these operations. In a test on the abandoned JAP tanks the .55" bullet fired from 30 yds penetrated the armour in any part of the tank, incl the driver's shield and the turret. It pierced the track without damaging it. Fire at this type of tank should be directed first at the driver's seat, low down on the right-hand side.

Petrol bomb ("Molotov Cocktail") These were available but were quite ineffective for the reason that the device is still in the primitive stage. Under jungle conditions with high humidity and rain it is practically impossible to obtain results by endeavouring to light any sort of match and ignite the cotton waste.

It is suggested that some attempt be made to devise a cap for the beer bottle which will keep the igniting material dry until required. This could incorporate an ignition match and striking surface which could be set going by the simple operation of tearing off the cap. Troops will have no confidence in the bomb until something of this nature is produced.

E. SERVICEABILITY OF OUR VEHS, INCL CARRS

15. The almost incessant rain throughout the operations made the unformed rds impassable to all except F.W.D. vchs. Two-wheel drive vchs were immobilized and wheeled traffic of any kind seriously restricted. Carrs were confined to the rds and even there were often bogged. F.W.D. vchs proved more serviceable even than carrs. Our tpt problems in this coastwise operation would have been much simpler had suitable small craft been available for carrying tps, Qmn and sups.

amn and sups/
and exacuating wounded.

Because of the limitations of the road and track system reserves had to be disposed in more forward localities than normal in order that they might be available in time. The small American Quarter-ton scout car (Joep) proved absolutely invaluable when it was available. It would be particularly useful for L.O's and D.R's. Motor cycles had no value at all under the condition and terrain prevailing in this area.

F. DETERMINATION

16. This operation showed the superiority of our tps and their weapons. A greater determination to close with the enemy and destroy him must still be developed and is expected to follow now that our troops have proved the JAP is not a superman. This is the most effective way of demonstrating the superiority of the White Race.

John Field Brig.
Comd. 7 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No	1 - 2	MILNEFORCE
	3	18 Aus t Inf Bde.
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	11	Staff
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REPORT ON OPS OF 18 AUST INF BDE IN MILNE BAY AREA
26 AUG - 8 SEPT 42.

File

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.
13 Sept 42.

MILNE FORCE.

1. Attached is brief statement of 18 Aust Inf Bde Ops in MILNE BAY area 26 Aug - 8 Sept 42.

Greoster
Brig.
Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.

5c 14/9
10. after personal pt work in opps file.
1-0 to notes when read by all opps
then return to Sgt King Woods for filing
14/9

REPORT ON OPS OF 18 AUST INF BDE IN MILNE BAY AREA

26 AUG - 8 SEPT 42.

Ref Maps : GILI GILI and WAIGANI 3" to 1 Mile.

1. Jap Landing was effected on Northern shore of MILNE BAY night 25/26 Aug between ANIOMA and RABI.

2. On 26 Aug 42 18 Aust Inf Bde was disposed in Force res:-

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	-	978995.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn, less one coy	-	area HAGITA FORD.
A. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn	-	STRIP 1.
2/10 Aust Inf Bn, less one coy	-	Route 8 area 035018.
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	-	area STRIP 3 9198.

3. On 25 Aug all allied admin and engr units within Bde area had been placed under comd for ground defence. These units were to carry out their primary task as long as possible. On the same day one coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn had been placed under comd 7 Aust Inf Bde while Comd 7 Aust Inf Bde had been authorised in necessity and if unable to communicate with Force HQ to employ the remainder of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.

26 AUG.

4. At 0600 hrs 2/12 Aust Inf Bn commenced move fwd to area 9598 West of Force HQ. Responsibility for protection of medical units in area of STRIP 2 and of STRIP and approaches passed to E. Coy 46 Engr Bn USA.

5. At 1930 hrs 2/10 Aust Inf Bn commenced to move to area Route 7 North of STRIP 1.

6. Both moves were made under orders from Force HQ.

27 AUG.

7. At 0230 hrs 2/10 Aust Inf Bn placed under comd 7 Aust Inf Bde and moved to area of Administrative Buildings No. 1 (087007).

8. At 1030 hrs it was learnt that G1 Aust Inf Bn of 7 Aust Inf Bde were holding the line of the GAMAR R and that immediate contact with the enemy had been lost, though during the night parties of approx 30 Japs had been observed moving East between GAMAR R and KB MISSION.

9. At 1030 hrs advice was received that 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was moving to an assembly area preparatory to an attack that afternoon. CO, 2/10 Aust Inf Bn reports that the plan arranged at an interview between Comd 7 Aust Inf Bde and CO 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was for 'B' Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to move from KILALO to occupy KB MISSION and for 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less 'B' Coy, equipped as a large scale fighting patrol, to move to RABI thence North to track junc approx 5 miles NE of RABI, thence SW to KB MISSION. 24 additional TMM were borrowed and a proportion of Brens left behind. A.Tk rifles were not taken as CO, 2/10 Aust Inf Bn had

apparently in his appreciation discounted the possibility of encounter with the although the landing and employment of the by the enemy had been reported by 61 Aust Inf Bn. 80 S.T. Grenades were carried.

10. 8/10 Aust Inf Bn reached RAB1 without incident and received info there that some 5000 Japs had been seen to land the previous day.

11. In view of this info the plan was altered by 8/10 Aust Inf Bn after consultation with 7 Aust Inf Bde and 8/10 Aust Inf Bn moved direct to KB MISSION and formed a perimeter camp.

12. At approx 2000 hrs this perimeter camp was attacked by enemy the supported by inf. At 2345 hrs unit was forced to withdraw by small parties.

13. In view of subsequent successful experiments on captured Jap the with the A.Tk rifle it is likely that had these weapons been taken by 8/10 Aust Inf Bn, the bn would have succeeded in overcoming the attack by enemy the and inf.

22 AUG.

14. On 22 Aug 8/10 Aust Inf Bn less parties still not returned and less B. Coy under comd 7 Aust Inf Bde moved into area of HAGITA FORD, reverting to comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.

15. The enemy did not press home his attack and 7 Aust Inf Bde established themselves on general line of STRIP 2.

29 AUG.

16. Conference of Force Comd and Bde Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde re proposed counter-attack by 18 Aust Inf Bde.

17. 8/18 Aust Inf Bn moved to Staging Camp, GILI GILI, its assembly area for projected attack by 18 Aust Inf Bde.

18. At 1700 hrs a conference was held at Hq 7 Aust Inf Bde between Comd 7 Aust Inf Bde, G.1, CO 8/18 Aust Inf Bn and BN 18 Aust Inf Bde regarding inter-bde arrangements in relation to attack of 8/18 Aust Inf Bn through STRIP 5, to take place on morning 31 Aug.

19. At approx 1900 hrs G.O.C. MILNE FORCE gave verbal orders to Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde "to attack and destroy enemy forces on North shore of MILNE BAY from exel GILI GILI to incl KB MISSION with a view to later mopping up EAST CAPE PENINSULAR."

9 Bty 2/5 Aust Pz Regt and one sec A.Tk guns were placed under comd 18 Aust Inf Bde. "Not more than one inf bn will be committed without prior approval" of MILNE FORCE. 7 Aust Inf Bde to hold line of STRIP 5 as fire base. Verbal orders confirmed in writing.

20. At 2100 hrs Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde issued verbal orders to CO 8/18 Aust Inf Bn to attack through STRIP 5 and to destroy enemy between there and KB MISSION. These orders were confirmed in writing.

91. CO 61 Aust Inf Bn reported an attack on his front during night 30/31 Aug.

92. Start Line for 2/18 Aust Inf Bn attack was No. 3 STRIP.
Start Time 0900 hrs.

93. Owing to enemy attack on 61 Aust Inf Bn during night 30/31 Aug there were several hundred enemy in the fwd area. The attack of 2/18 Aust Inf Bn encountered these at the outset and close fighting followed. This slowed down the initial rate of advance but enemy opposition was methodically overcome and the advance proceeded.

94. By nightfall 2/18 Aust Inf Bn after constant fighting and mopping up of snipers had reached the following positions:-

Bn HQ, A and D Coys	-	KB MISSION
B and C Coys	-	GAMAR R.

95. 7 Aust Inf Bde took over protection of tracks leading North from STRIP 3 to excl KB MISSION.

96. GAMAR R posn, where two pls 9 Aust Inf Bn had joined two coys 2/18 Aust Inf Bn, was attacked during night. Attacks were repulsed. Jap killed estimated 90.

1 Sept.

97. It was felt impracticable to continue advance of 2/18 Aust Inf Bn until coys at GAMAR R reinforced those at KB MISSION.

98. During afternoon two coys 7 Aust Inf Bde relieved 2/18 Aust Inf Bn coys at GAMAR R and these then joined 2/18 Aust Inf Bn at KB MISSION.

99. CO 2/18 Aust Inf Bn was advised that 2/9 Aust Inf Bn NOT yet available in support of him. KB MISSION was to be held as firm base with two coys and advance to be continued with two coys.

2 Sept.

30. 2/18 Aust Inf Bn continued advance at 0700 hrs.

31. At 1225 hrs G.O.C. gave permission for 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to be used.

32. By afternoon 2/18 Aust Inf Bn had secured POWRIK WOOD 194006 and were consolidating for the night.

33. CO 2/9 Aust Inf Bn given verbal orders by Bde Comd to move on as soon as sea tpt available by sea to KB MISSION and on 5 Sept to attack through 2/18 Aust Inf Bn which latter to hold areas at present occupied as firm bases. Bde Comd instructed CO 2/9 Aust Inf Bn always to move by bounds and have firm base for part of Bn while remainder of Bn advancing.

34. Move of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to KB MISSION was to be by sea. It must be realised that after the initial advance to RABI all movement of personnel, evacuation of wounded, supply of am etc and building up of reserves had necessarily to be done by launch and it may be stated at this juncture that throughout the operation the meagre amount of launch tpt that could be made available and its mechanical unreliability on many occasions gravely jeopardised our chances of success. It is most strongly urged that more craft be made available immediately for possible further ops of this nature.

35. During night 2/3 Sept three enemy attacks were made on fwd posns of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn and on KB MISSION but were repulsed.

3 Sept.

36. By 0730 hrs 2/9 Aust Inf Bn was concentrated at KB MISSION and commenced to move fwd.

37. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn met with heavy opposition area 600 yds East of FOURTH FORD. Arty and RAAF support arranged.

38. By nightfall the attack had succeeded and 2/9 Aust Inf Bn had made good their ground to approx 600 yds East of FOURTH FORD.

39. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn ordered to continue advance 4 Sept.

40. During night 3/4 Sept enemy shelling from warships in bay but without effect.

4 Sept.

41. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn continued advance with RAAF and arty support and by 0830 hrs fwd elements reached GORONI where a large W/T transmitter was found.

42. Stiff resistance encountered past GORONI which was not cleared up till late afternoon. Perimeter camp formed at GORONI for night.

5 Sept.

43. 2/12 Aust Inf Bn moved up taking over posns at 145003 and GORONI while 2/9 Aust Inf Bn ordered to continue advance with all possible speed until enemy base captured.

44. During the day 2/9 Aust Inf Bn continued advance as far as WAGA WAGA where determined and tenacious opposition encountered.

45. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn ordered to press fwd 6 Sept with all speed, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to take over WAGA WAGA.

46. The Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde instructed by HQ Milne Force to destroy all dumps and stores which were not immediately salvageable. 2/12 Aust Inf Bn was made immediately responsible for these demolitions.

47. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn continued advance to Eastern end of Jap base and at nightfall were occupying two perimeter camps at LILINI and LILIHUA.

48. Demolitions proceeding during day.

49. During night 5/6 Sept enemy warship shelled WAGA WAGA inflicting casualties (3 killed, 11 wounded).

7 & 8 Sept.

50. On completion of demolition of enemy dumps 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns were withdrawn.

51. Owing to grave shortage of launches it became necessary for 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to march with the result that they would not have been immediately fit to fight. Without adequate launches being available it could not be hoped that future ops could be guaranteed with similar success, for our launch resources were stretched far beyond the safe limit of demand.

52. Casualties suffered by 18 Aust Inf Bde in these ops were:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES	
	DEAD.	GR.	DEAD.	GR.	DEAD.	GR.	DEAD.	GR.	DEAD.	GR.
<u>2/9 Aust Inf Bn.</u>	-	23	1	7	5	64	-	2	6	96
<u>2/10 Aust Inf Bn.</u>	2	37	1	9	1	16	1	2	5	64
<u>2/12 Aust Inf Bn.</u>	2	29	-	3	2	42	-	-	4	74
TOTALS:	4	89	2	19	8	122	1	4	15	234.

53. A separate paper has been submitted on 12 Sept incorporating points noted and lessons drawn therefrom during these ops.

[Signature]
Brig.
Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.

comd
15/10
with reports dated

1. On 26 Aug 42 18 Aust Inf Bde was disposed in Force Res - *File 87(7)*
 - HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde - 978995 (400 yds West of HAGITA FORD)
 - 2/9 Aust Inf Bn less "A" Coy - area HAGITA FORD
 - A Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn - GURNEY FIELD (N^o 1 Strip)
 - 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less one coy - Route 8 area 035018
 - 2/12 Aust Inf Bn - Area Strip 2 (WAIGANI) 9198

2. In accordance with orders of GOC MILNE FORCE the following moves were carried out 27 Aug:-
 - (a) Commencing at 0600 hrs 2/12 Aust Inf Bn moved East from WAIGANI to area 9598 immediately West of Force HQ. Responsibility for the protection of medical units in WAIGANI area and of the strip and approaches passed to Coy E 46 Engar Bn USA. (192)
 - (b) Commencing 1930 hrs 2/10 Aust Inf Bn (less one coy under comd 7 Aust Inf Bde) moved to Route 7, North of GURNEY FIELD.

3. During the night 26/27 Aug ~~our~~ tps of 7 Aust Inf Bde which were in contact with enemy had been forced to withdraw slightly from their original posns East of KB MISSION and at dawn were holding a line on GAMA R (East of RABI)

Three enemy naval vessels had entered MILNE BAY during the night and had bombarded the shore between KB and GILIGILI. No damage, one casualty.

4. At 0830 hrs 27 Aug 8 enemy medium bombers escorted by twelve fighters attacked GURNEY FIELD. Bombs were dropped but no damage or casualties resulted from these though one Liberator Bomber was destroyed by ground strafing. Heavy losses - a minimum of 10 planes were accounted for - were inflicted upon the enemy.

5. Contact ^{by milne force forward tps} with the enemy at RABI was lost during the day.

6. At 0230 hrs 2/10 Aust Inf Bn had been placed under comd 7 Aust Inf Bde and had moved from Route 7 to the area of Administration Buildings No 1 (027007) this move being completed by approx 0800 hrs.

7. ^{assembly} At 1030 hrs advice was received that 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was moving to an area preparatory to an attack that afternoon. CO, 2/10 Aust Inf Bn reports that the plan arranged at an interview between Comd 7 Aust Inf Bde and CO 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was for "B" Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to move from KILAI0 to occupy KB MISSION and for 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less "B" Coy, eq uipped as a large scale fighting patrol, to move to RABI thence North to Track junc approx 5 miles NE of RABI, thence SW to KB MISSION. 24 additional TSMG were borrowed and a proportion of Brens left behind. A/Tk rifles were not taken as CO, 2/10 Aust Inf Bn had apparently in his appreciation discounted the possibility of encounter with tks although the landing and employment of tks by the enemy had been reported by 61 Aust Inf Bn. 20 ST Grenades were carried.

8. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn reached RABI without incident and received infm there that some 5000 Japs had been seen to land the previous day.

9. In view of this infm the plan was altered by 2/10 Aust Inf Bn after consultation with 7 Aust Inf Bde and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn moved direct to KB MISSION and formed a perimeter camp.

10. At approx 2000 hrs this perimeter camp was attacked by enemy tks supported by inf. At 2345 hrs unit was forced to withdraw by small parties.

11. In view of subsequent successful experiments on captured Jap tks with the A/Tk rifle it is likely that had these weapons been taken by 2/10 Aust Inf Bn, the Bn would have succeeded in overcoming the attack by enemy tks and inf.

28 Aug

12. On 28 Aug 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less parties still not returned and less D Coy under comd 7 Aust Inf Bde moved into area of HAGITA FORD, reverting to comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.

13. The enemy did not press home his attack and 7 Aust Inf Bde established themselves on general line of STRIP 3.

30 Aug

14. ~~Conference~~ ^{confirmed} of Force Comd and Bde Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde ref proposed counter-attack by 18 Aust Inf Bde ~~during~~ ^{morning} 30 Aug ~~possible~~

15. 2/12 Aust Inf Bn moved to Staging Camp, GILI GILI, its assembly area for projected attack by 18 Aust Inf Bde.

16. At 1700 hrs a ^{S.O.} conference was held at HQ 7 Aust Inf Bde between Comd 7 Aust Inf Bde, G.1, CO 2/12 Aust Inf Bn and BM 18 Aust Inf Bde regarding inter-bde arrangements in relation to attack of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn through STRIP 3, to take place on morning 31 Aug.

17. At approx 1930 hrs GOC MILNEFORCE gave verbal orders to Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde "to attack and destroy enemy forces on North shore of MILNE BAY from excl GILI GILI to incl KB MISSION with a view to later mopping up EAST CAPE PENINSULAR."

9 Bty 2/5 Aust Fd Regt and one sec A/Tk guns were placed under comd 18 Aust Inf Bde. "Not more than one inf bn will be committed without prior approval of MILNE FORCE." 7 Aust Inf Bde to hold line of STRIP 3 as firm base. Verbal orders confirmed in writing.

18. At 2100 hrs Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde issued verbal orders to CO 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to attack through STRIP 3 and to destroy enemy between there and KB MISSION. These orders were confirmed in writing.

19. CO 61 Aust Inf Bn reported an attack on his front during night 30/31 Aug.

20. Start Line for 2/12 Aust Inf Bn attack was No. 3 STRIP. Start Time 0900 hrs.

21. Owing to enemy attack on 61 Aust Inf Bn during night 30/31 Aug there were several hundred enemy in the fwd area. The attack of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn encountered these at the outset and close fighting followed. This slowed down the initial rate of advance but enemy opposition was methodically overcome and the advance proceeded.

22. Although a government track exists along almost the entire length of the North side of MILNE BAY, the prevailing weather rendered this useless for tpt purposes between GILI GILI and KB. So seriously had the surface been effected by rain that two Jap tks were found to have been abandoned, inextricably bogged. This meant that during this advance 2/12 Aust Inf Bn had to carry with them not only res rations and water but also their hy weapons incl 3" mortars and MMGs.

23. The counter attack in force by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn was happily timed. During the night 30/31 Aug the enemy had pushed on to the line of No 3 STRIP on which our forces from the GAMA R had returned. He had brought up some light fd pieces with which he had shelled the area of 7 Aust Inf Bde HQ in a desultory manner during the night. It was obvious that he was massing for an attack on STRIP 3 but before he could take action 2/12 Aust Inf Bn had ~~been~~ ^{delivered}. His own attack was never mounted and from that time the Jap, losing the initiative, was ^{pushed} back along the track to his base. *though he fought hard day by day to prevent this*

24. The country through which this attack was delivered consisted of a thick belt of jungle lying between the coast and the foot-hills. The enemy took immediate and full advantage of this jungle to fight delaying action by full use of snipers hidden in the trees. This necessarily slowed the advance of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn, for every yard gained necessitated the thorough beating of the jungle for snipers who were most adept at concealment.

25. By nightfall 2/12 Aust Inf Bn after constant fighting and mopping up of snipers had reached the following posns:-

At 1800 hrs 18 Aust Inf Bde instructed CO 7/10 for that deployment of attack was to be possible if a very early stage of the attack was to be made - Pop 3 - in better formation

Bn HQ, A and D Coys - KB MISSION
B and C Coys - GAMA RIVER

The actual orders issued by GOC Melbourne to Bde Comd & 2/12 Aust Inf Bde had been completed.

26. 7 Aust Inf Bde took over protection of tracks leading North from STRIP 3 to excl KB MISSION.

27. GAMA RIVER posn, where two pls 9 Aust Inf Bn had joined two coys 2/12 Aust Inf Bn, was attacked during the night. Attacks were repulsed. Jap killed estimated at 90.

28. In his appreciation the Bde Comd had ~~encouraged~~ ^{envisaged} the necessity for establishing firm bases on the shore of the bay as the advance progressed. This was for a three-fold reason :-

(a) Supply by land would be virtually impossible and it was therefore essential that water tpt be used which could only be done to protected landing points.

(b) The very nature of the jungle made it always possible for our advance to be bypassed. By the establishment of a chain of bases and by patrolling between them this danger could be minimised.

(c) It was found ^{impracticable} impossible to advance or even to patrol by night. By holding a close perimeter it was possible to counter ~~infiltration~~ infiltration while at the same time assuring necessary rest to the majority of our own tps.

29. This policy was followed during the whole advance and was found eminently satisfactory. In considering this, it must be remembered that the country through which the advance took place was so thick that an advance of 4000 yds between 0700 and 1600 hrs, dealing with enemy opposition and mopping up ground taken, represented not only a most successful but also a most exhausting days work. Apart from patrolling fwd until dark the advance could not continue beyond approximately 1600 hrs if a perimeter were to be established before nightfall.

30. Enemy attacks on our perimeter by night were frequent, but unsuccessful either in breaking the perimeter or in achieving ~~their~~ ^{the} other desired result of ~~causing~~ ^{preventing} rest. Some infiltrators did, in fact, penetrate the perimeters but these were adequately dealt with by a small mob res committed to the use of the bayonet only.

31. To revert to the morning of 1 Sep, it was felt impracticable, in accordance with the policy of maintaining secure bases, for 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to continue its advance for KB MISSION until reinforced by its coys from GAMA R. *This was agreed to.*

32. During the afternoon two coys 7 Aust Inf Bde relieved 2/12 Aust Inf Bn coys at GAMA R and these then joined 2/12 Aust Inf Bn at KB MISSION.

33. CO 2/12 Aust Inf Bn was advised that 2/9 Aust Inf Bn NOT yet available in support of him. KB MISSION was to be held as firm base with two coys and advance to be continued with two coys.

2 Sept.

34. 2/12 Aust Inf Bn continued advance at 0750 hrs.

35. At 1225 hrs GOC ~~has~~ ^{to Comd 10th Aust Inf Bde} gave permission for 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to be used.

36. By afternoon 2/12 Aust Inf Bn had secured FOURTH FORD 124006 and were consolidating for the night.

37. CO 2/9 Aust Inf Bn given verbal orders by Bde Comd to move Bn as soon as sea tpt available by sea to KB MISSION and on 3 Sep to attack through 2/12 Aust Inf Bn which latter to hold areas at present occupied as firm bases. Bde Comd instructed CO 2/9 Aust Inf Bn always to move by bounds and have firm base for part of Bn while remainder of Bn advancing.

Notes that 2/9 Aust Inf Bn should be able to split further East & keep perimeter to enemy's flanks to advance. Comd 10th Aust Inf Bde should take over perimeter.



71 57 2/3
17th guns and
a "Jeep" and

38. Move of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to KB MISSION was to be by sea. It must be realised that after the initial advance to RABI all movement of personnel, the evacuation of wounded, supply of am etc and building up of reserves had necessarily to be done by launch and it may be stated at this juncture that throughout the operations the meagre amount of launch tpt that could be made available and its mechanical unreliability on many occasions gravely jeopardised our chances of success. It is ~~is~~ ^{was} most strongly urged that more craft be made available immediately for possible further ops of this nature.

39. The vessels that were available were powered coastal luggers. In all only three were available but rarely were more than two, ~~and~~ ^{servicable} and for a great deal of the move only one was ~~available~~. When it is realised that these boats could take comfortably only 60 to 70 personnel --- though in one case of urgent necessity over ~~100~~ 120 were crowded in --- the precarious nature of our sea routes of supply became obvious.

of 40. During night 2/3 Sept three enemy attacks were made on fwd posns of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn and on KB MISSION but were repulsed.
3 Sep.

41. By 0720 hrs 2/9 Aust Inf Bn was concentrated at KB MISSION and commenced to move fwd.

42. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn met with ~~heavy~~ ^{easy} opposition area 600yds East of FOURTH FORD. Arty and RAAF support arranged.

43. By nightfall the attack had succeeded and 2/9 Aust Inf Bn had made good their ground to approximately 600 yds east of FOURTH FORD.

44. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn ordered to continue advance 4 Sep. Arty and RAAF support was arranged by ~~by~~ ^{the} ~~the~~ ^{on} advance was

45. During night 3/4 Sep enemy shelling from warships in Bay but without effect.

4 Sep.

46. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn continued advance with RAAF and Arty support and by 0820 hrs fwd ~~elements reached GORONI~~ ^{only as before along the beach.} elements reached GORONI where a large W/T transmitter was found. ^{induced by Bde and to be carried from base being secured}

47. Stiff resistance encountered past GORONI which was not cleared up till late afternoon. Perimeter camp formed at GORONI for night.

5 Sep.

48. 2/12 Aust Inf Bn moved up taking over posns at 143003 and GORONI while 2/9 Aust Inf Bn ordered to continue advance with all possible speed until enemy base captured.

49. During the day 2/9 Aust Inf Bn continued advance as far as WAGA WAGA where determined and tenacious opposition encountered.

50. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn ordered to press fwd 6 Sep with all speed, 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to take over WAGA WAGA.

51. Bde Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde instructed by HQ MILNE FORCE to destroy all dumps and stores which were not immediately salvageable. CO 2/12 Aust Inf Bn was made immediately responsible for these demolitions.

52. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn continued advance to the Eastern end of the Jap base and at nightfall were occupying two perimeter camps at LILIHU and LILIHUA.

~~53. Demolitions proceeded during night~~

53. Fighting patrols had been sent fwd to AHIOMA without encountering any enemy.

54. Demolitions proceeding during day.

Orders to continue attacks

55. During night 5/6 Sep enemy warships shelled WAGA WAGA inflicting casualties ~~in~~ (3 killed 11 wounded).

7 Sep.

56. In accordance with orders from MILNE FORCE one coy 2/12 Aust Inf Bn moved fwd through 2/9 Aust Inf Bn at LILIHOA to AHIOMA, and for a distance of 1½ miles further East. No enemy were encountered, while evidence was seen of natives returning to their villages.

7/8 Sep.

57. On completion of demolition of enemy dumps 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns were withdrawn.

58. Owing to grave shortage of launches it became necessary for 2/2 Aust Inf Bn to march with the result that they would not have been immediately fit to fight. Without adequate launches being available it could not be hoped that future ops could be guaranteed with similar success, for our launch resources were stretched far beyond the safe limit of demand.

59. Casualties suffered by 18 Aust Inf Bde in these ops were:-

	KILLED		DIED OF WOUNDS		WOUNDED		MISSING		TOTAL BATTLE CASUALTIES.	
	Offrs	ORs.	OFFRS.	ORs.	Offrs	ORs.	Offrs	ORs.	OFFRS	ORs.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn.	-	23	1	7	5	64	0	2	6	96
2/10 Aust Inf Bn.	2	37	1	9	1	16	1	2	5	64
2/12 Aust Inf Bn.	2	29	-	3	2	42	-	-	4	74
TOTALS:	4	89	2	19	8	122	1	4	15	234.

60. A separate paper has been submitted on 12 Sep incorporating points noted and lessons drawn therefrom during these ops.

61. A very considerable quantity of stores was destroyed in the Jap base which Appx "A" shows a list of certain eqpt which was sent back for closer examination.

62. Also captured was a vast amount of documentary and other material of great interest for its Intelligence value. This material included

63 (over)

DOCUMENTS: ~~A very large quantity of documents incl the following:-~~

- Operation Order for landing and marked maps.
- Documents giving organisation and eqpt of KURE No.5 SLF, YAWO SLF and portion YOKOSUKA No. 5 SLF
- Documents and Text Books giving Jap fd formations and tactics.
- Numerous diaries giving infm of Jap Order of Battle, and shipping movements in SWPA
- List of English phrases apparently intended for use for deception.

FLAGS CAPTURED.

- Jap naval ensign.
- Individual flags.
- 2 flags marked with blue anchor and two blue zigzags

Incl. in war diary

APPENDIX "A"

JAP MATERIAL CAPTURED BY 18 AUST INF BDE AT MILNE BAY. (7/1)

RETURNED FOR EXAMINATION

EQPT.

- Aeroplane belly tank.
- Rifles and Grenade Discharger Attachments.
- 5 Type 96 LMGs
- 2 TAISHO II LMGs and spare parts.
- 5 Lewis type with tripod mounting (One of Japanese manufacture).
- 2 MMGs with 8 dial sights.
- 2 .5 AA MGs and amn.
- 1 Ground Sight for .5 MGs.
- 2 Pack Flame Throwers.
- 3 Grenade Dischargers and amn.
- 2 Bullet proof vests.
- SAA Amn 6.5 mm and 7.7 mm.
- Hand Grenades
- Smoke Candles.
- 1 Portable ~~W/T~~ W/T set and batteries (Lighter than 108 set. Experiments being made to adopt principles for own use. a)

XX

- 4 Transmitting Valves (Large)
- 8 Telephones
- Voices Tubes from Jap tk.
- One cannister of HE of peculiar pattern, use not yet discovered.
- Jap handcarts, collapsible and rigid types.
- Steel helmet and cover.
- 2 Bullet proof vests
- Respirators incl one with supplementary cannister.
- 4 Identity Discs and 3 Identity Tags.
- Uniform Cap.
- Rubber Tree Climbing Boots.
- Rank Badges
- Water Bottle
- Bugle.

In addition large supplies of rice, canned food, ammunitions, medical supplies, were found in the Japanese base dumps and destroyed by burning, explosion of the water pump etc.

These notes would not be complete without reference to the full and ready cooperation of 18th AIF Bde by bombing and ground shelling. All efforts for support were made with full completeness and unhesitatingly.

25/12. As it was unknown whether the enemy still possessed tanks, it was decided upon using his up to front of the gun house established by the 1st. The gun of 17th AIF Bde by 101. 17th AIF Bde by bank to KB. The remaining see later ground then and moved forward as 2/4 AIF Bde subsequently continued advance. In this manner 17th AIF Bde in depth was advanced.

25/12. One accurate report was also taken by sea to 18th AIF Bde and proved invaluable in planning operations and actions.

TACTICAL AND OTHER LESSONS FROM
FIGHTING MILNE BAY

10

ops
rule + 12/9

HQ 2/9 Aust Inf Bn
10 SEP 42

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.

1. TACTICS-

(a) The Jap always withheld his fire till troops were within 20-30 Yards from them even less in some cases.

He always allows small Recce Parties to wander through his Area and does not molest them if he is NOT seen.

In all cases his position only covered 200-300x and astride Rds and Tracks.

(b) A light screen of 6 men to move 25-30x in front of leading Pl is suggested to draw fire. The Pl will then manoeuvre to find the enemy flanks. It is also possible that another Pl of the fwd Coy may have to be employed to obtain full information.

Fwd tps are then withdrawn to allow for Arty and Mortar clearance and the reserve Coy sent well clear of the flank to come down in rear of the enemy position.

Whilst the reserve Coy is moving, Arty and Mortar ranging should be carried out.

(c) In the Operation recently concluded, it is to be appreciated that most of the Arty ranging was done on the Sea and moved to the target Area towards the end of ranging. Final observation was difficult and the F.O.O. had to be within 100x of the enemy protected by a section or two of Infantry in most cases.

If there is no sea to range on Arty support will be difficult and it may be necessary for the F.O.O. to establish an O.P. in a tree to gain observation forward and then to commence ranging well beyond the target and gradually bring the ranging rounds back into the target Area.

(d) It is necessary to have two Coys established in a firm base whilst the others are moving, passing the rear Coys through the forward Coys as each objective is taken or reached. This will allow for the stopping of the enemy if he endeavours to bypass the forward Coys.

2. COMMUNICATION -

(It is essential that at least twenty miles of Sig. Cable and twice the present establishment of Hand Sets travel with the Bn.

R/T was found to be absolutely useless in country of this type and LINE was the ONLY reliable means of communication during the action just concluded.

IN ALL cases, where LINE and Phones were available, Coys Sigs were able to keep in touch with fwd Bn HQ's even in the heaviest undergrowth; as we found that where men can make fwd progress Sig Cable can follow.

3. SUPPLIES & TRANSPORT

(a) In country of this nature and in view of the so-called roads it is recommended that vehs. of the ("JEEP" type be available for the forward movement of supplies and ammunition.

(b) Communication by sea is also of considerable value, where bases can be established on beaches or suitable landings, and providing that an adequate supply of launches or similar vessels are available, is preferable to movement by land.

(c) It is recommended that for the movement of Bn supplies on land at least SIX (6) "JEEP" type vehicles are necessary and for movement of supplies by water ONE vessel of 50/70 Tons for supplies, ammunition and the necessary evacuation of wounded and sick personnel.

Lt Col

Comd 2/9 Aust Inf Bn

SUGGESTED ALTERATIONS TO EQUIPMENT AND
NUMBER AND TYPE OF WEAPONS CARRIED FOR
FIGHTING IN CLOSE OR JUNGLE COUNTRY

HQ
2/9 Aust Inf Bn
10 Sept 42

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde

1. EQUIPMENT AND DRESS

- (a) That BASIC Pouches be abolished and POUCHES CARTRIDGE M.T. Ptn. be issued in lieu.
- (b) That Bren magazines be carried in UTILITY Pouches and distributed amongst members of section.
- (c) That present haversack be made ONE half present size and to carry, ONE day hard ration plus ONE day reserve ration plus personal gear.
- (d) That present waist belt be equiped with hooks to carry Hand Grenades.
- (e) That ALL ranks be issued CAPES equiped with cross straps in lieu of present type cape.
- (f) All ranks wear shirts Khaki with long sleeves, Slacks K D, Boots A B, Short Puttees, and carry ONE spare pair of socks.
(Short Puttees are suggested in lieu of Gaiters as it has been found that small stones, pebbles etc. pass down the top of the gaiters in to the boots thus causing foot trouble by stone bruising and chaffing)
- (g) It is suggested that each Coy (if possible each Pl) be equipped with a light TWO wheeled cart similar to captured JAP TYPE. These carts proved invaluable for rapid transport of Mortars and Bombs, Stores and Ammunition and in some cases evacuation of wounded.

2. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION

- (a) That 12 BREN Magazines be carried only and be distributed amongst members of gun crew. Remainder to be carried filled in Coy Amn Reserve. (If possible that Magazine of BREN Gun be altered to correspond to BREDA Light Automatic type, thus doing away for the necessity of spare magazines, Clips of twenty (20) Rds to be carried in lieu)
- (b) That BOX Magazines be carried in place of DRUM Magazines for T.S.M.G. and that 12 Box type Magazines be carried.
- (c) That A/Tk Rifles be left in Coy dumps at Fwd Bn HQ.
- (d) That No 73 Grenade be discarded. ONE S.T. Bomb to be carried by each section in lieu. This to apply ONLY when moving through jungle country.
- (e) That E.Y. Rifle and Discharger be discarded.
- (f) That 2" MORTAR and Bombs be carried at all times.
- (g) That the SPIKE, STANDARD, and SLING for BREN guns be discarded and that all guns be carried slung at RIGHT side by sling over LEFT shoulder. This method has proved to be very effective and the gun is in ACTION much quicker.
- (h) That ALL personnel be trained thoroughly in shooting from the hip with Light Auto's, Rifles and Pistols and that the use of REPETITION fire from light Auto's be stressed for use against indivudal targets. AUTOMATIC FIRE being reserved for use against concentrated targets such as M.G. posts etc.
- (i) That BAYONETS be sharpened to have a CUTTING edge to assist in the quick clearing of undergrowth.

ADDENDUM Para 1 (f)

The AMERICAN type of High laced GAITERS with a strap under the arch of the foot could also be supplied in lieu of Short Puttees.

[Signature] Lt Col

Comd 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS 2/12 AUST INF BN
AUG 31 to Sept 8 1942

HQ 2/12 AUST INF BN
SEPT 42

HQ
12 AUST INF BDE

1. INITIAL ADVANCE

FORMATION:

- (a) Advance Guard Coy (D Coy) with orders to beat astride the track for 10 to 30 yds according to the density of the jungle and to clear aside any organised resistance.
- (b) Mopping up Coy (B Coy) with orders to beat astride the road for 30 yards, irrespective of the density of the jungle and to mop up all snipers etc missed by Adv Gd Coy.
- (c) Bn HQ to follow leading Pl of B Coy
- (d) RESERVE:- HQ Coy; C Coy; A Coy.

2. ATTACK

On each occasion the forward elements of the Adv Gd Coy were held up, immediate encirclement was commenced by the following Section or Pl as the case may be and the result was invariably the same, i.e. withdrawal by the enemy.

3. DEFENCE

At GAMAX River, KB STATION etc, the same defensive tactics were used. A perimeter was formed with its ends resting on the sea. Wpn pits were constructed roughly 6 ft apart along the whole length. A small reserve was left inside the perimeter to deal with any infiltration. These men were forbidden to fire or move, but were ordered to use bayonet only. It is considered that two Coys constitutes the smallest force that can safely hold an area.

4. POINTS NOTED

- (a) JAPANESE seldom moved more than 30 yds from a track in dense jungle.
- (b) Our men were invariably quicker on the trigger than the JAPANESE. This natural advantage of ours should be exploited.
- (c) Fighting patrols should invariably carry 2" Mortars to drive hidden MGs into the open.
- (d) Whenever a posn is taken up by any man or wpn it's posn should be altered to "stand down" each night and it's original posn re-occupied at "Stand To" each morning. This confuses the enemy infiltrator who has marked the particular posn by daylight.
- (e) Listening Posts are always liable to be cut off or captured. It is considered that in the extreme darkness of the jungle simple "booby-traps" made from 36 Grenades can sometimes be used as an alternative.
- (f) When posn allows very lights cuts down amn expenditure.
- (g) Within a defensive perimeter a loose bayonet is much more effective than a rifle and bayonet, particularly when the soldier is resting. An issue of suitable knives as suggested sometime ago by Gen ROWELL would be ideal.
- (h) Some JAPANESE infiltrators let off delayed action cracker and while the attention of the defenders was thus attracted the enemy attempted to approach from the flank.

- (i) JAPANESE breast plates ^{can} ~~will~~ not be penetrated by TSMG at any range, a rifle bullet, however, is effective.
- (j) No signs of any wpn resembling the "Tommy" Gun were found. It is assumed that their ILM was mistaken for this wpn.
- (k) Pack sets were found to be an ideal means of comm during the adv so long as the sets were not more than 1000 yds apart.

AW Arnold

Lt-Col
Comd 2/12 Aust Inf Bn

47.A.

Fighting patrols had been sent fwd to ALLIOMA
without encountering any enemy.

7. SEPT.

49. A.

In accordance with orders from MILNE FORCE one coy
2/12 Aust Inf Bn moved fwd through 2/9 Aust Inf Bn at
LILIHOA to ARIOMA, and for a distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles further
East. No enemy were encountered while evidence was seen
of natives returning to their villages.

HQ 2/9 Aust Inf Bn
9 Sep 42.

18 Aust Inf Bde.

REF MAP K B MISSION 3" - 1 Mile

At 0630 Hrs On morning of 3 Sep B & C Coys 2/9 Aust Inf Bn moved from K.B. Mission to take over from B & C Coys 2/12 Bn at FORD 124006. Two Coys of 2/12 Bn were in contact with enemy and withdrew at 0930 Hrs. C Coy took over with B Coy in reserve. At 1010 following concentrations of Arty and Mortars B & C Coys attacked. B Coy was moved to left flank to attack S from about 130005.

On reaching objective it was found that the enemy had retired. B Coy was ordered to move forward with Rd as Axis of advance. D Coy to follow in reserve. After moving Forward, about 600x, the enemy was again encountered and driven out by B & D Coy. D Coy moving to the flank and rear. Most of enemy got away. Estimated strength 1 Coy (300) Marines.

Dispositions night 3/4 Sep B & D Area 143004 C & A & BN HQ 130005.

At 0630 Hrs on morning of 4 Sep A Coy moved from Perimeter Camp Area and D Coy moved at 0645 Hrs.

The Plan was for D Coy to move astride the Road to a point (about 145994) where the Coastal strip widened to the foothills and then swing out to the left flank for protection and search of the jungle up to 600x inland. "A" Coy would move astride the Road. C Coy and Bn HQ were to move at 0730 Hrs to Area 143004. A Patrol consisting of spare Drivers from Tpt Section under Lieut HAMILTON moved at 0615 Hrs to move along the high ground N of Camp at 130005 to TRACK & Rd JUNC 144004 remaining astride this Junc to prevent infiltration from the N from TAUPOLA. At 0830 Hrs D Coy contacted enemy at GORONI and moved to flank "A" Coy continuing to press forward and were eventually stopped at FORD (NOT on TRACE) at 145994. D Coy less 1 Pl who had lost contact with Coy moved to flank but withdrew. At 1000 Hrs I then ordered Capt HOOPER to move NORTH 600x then EAST 600x and attack enemy right rear, expecting the attack between 1100 and 1130 Hrs. Sig wire was NOT available and I could not keep contact. Runners also failed to locate D Coy. The other Pl of D Coy turned up at 1000 Hrs and I put them on the left flank of A Coy to strengthen the posn.

At 1230 Hrs when no word or sign of D Coy was forthcoming I called up Capt ANDERSON and his Pl Comds and made a Recce for them to attack the enemy in the right rear. His Coy was ordered up and was ready to move at 1400 Hrs. At this time Capt HOOPER turned up stating that he had gone 1 1/2 to 2 Miles to enemy rear and located dumps where he was fired on and withdrew. I then ranged Arty and Mortars whilst B Coy was moving into position. At 1515 Hrs the Attack commenced. A Coy plus 1 Pl of D Coy astride the Rd, B Coy moving in behind. The attack was unsuccessful as the enemy must have got wind of the move through D Coy showing up so far behind earlier.

A terrific Battle ensued and B Coy sustained 35 Casualties. A Coy gained about 150 Yards. At 1650 Hrs I ordered a withdrawal to the perimeter Camp as there was less than one hour of daylight left to prepare. B Coy also had about 12 Men missing but all except three turned up next day. Owing to the lateness I was NOT able to arrange and range D.F. tasks for Mortars and Arty.

Dispositions night 4/5 Sep were A, B, D & Bn HQ at GORONI 145995. C Coy and Coy of 2/12 Bn at 143995.

At 0630 Hrs next morning a Patrol from A Coy under Lieut TAYLOR was sent out and found that enemy had evacuated the position.

I then ordered a move on a two Coy front - D Coy astride the Rd and A Coy on their left. Move commenced at 0830 Hrs. Capt BARNES was now in Command D Coy.

At 1430 Hrs D Coy contacted enemy at FORD (NOT on MAP) 162987 and endeavoured to ascertain the extent of position. Enemy countered and attacked and C Coy was brought up to GORONI. Counter attack failed and A Coy was ordered to flank and come in on enemy right rear, C & D Coy to attack astride ROAD. Whilst getting into Posn I arranged Air Strafing, which was excellent, and then ranged Arty and Mortars. Air ordered to cease at 1430 Hrs, Arty ranges 1500 Hrs, attack 1510 Hrs. Very light opposition-most of enemy withdrawn.

GORONI and WAGGA WAGGA appeared to be enemy's main Bases and I occupied these places. I arranged bombing and strafing of LILIHU as I anticipated that this is where the enemy had withdrawn to. From observations next day this proved to be such.

Dispositions for night 5/6 Sep were as follows
A, C, D, and Bn HQ at WAGGA-WAGGA. B Coy and Coy of 2/12 Bn GORONI.


During Nights 3/4, 4/5, 5/6 enemy warships were in harbour and shelled and apparently was taking off rear details of force.

At 0700 hours on morning of 6th B Coy, followed by D Coy, moved fwd.

After B Coy had passed TRACK (NOT on map) and Rd Junc at I69985 D Coy was moved up track to NORTH. The track ended about 600x inland and I then ordered D Coy to move EAST for 600x and then SOUTH to LILIHU. B Coy reached LILIHU at 1230 hrs, reporting on meeting 4 Jap stragglers. I then ordered them to proceed as far as AHIOMA MISSION. No sign of enemy occupation either there or in the ^{past} push from LILIHU to the MISSION.

Dispositions night 6/7. B and A Coys LILIHU, C and D Coys and BN HQ at LILIHU.

B Coy returned to GILI GILI afternoon 7 Sep, remainder of Bn on 8 Sep 42.


Lt Col.
Comd 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

B/F

SUBJECT : REPORT ON JAPANESE TACTICS - MILNE BAY.

2/10 Aust Inf Bn.

6 Sep. 42.

18 Aust Inf Bde.

Herewith report on the above, as suggested by MILNEFORCE.

[Handwritten signature]

Lt. Col.

Comdg. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

Comd

9 2/9

JAPANESE TACTICS - MILNE BAY

On the night of 27/28 Aug 42, in the action of K B Mission, MILNE BAY, AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA, Japanese made full use of tanks in close support of infantry. The tactics initiated in this co-operation of tanks and infantry were rather unusual and valuable lessons can be deduced from them.

The following is a brief summary of the operation.

1. TOPOGRAPHY.

K.B. MISSION, a small plantation running parallel to the coast line for 800 yds with an average depth of 500 yds, is located approx. 4 miles to the WEST of the main plantation area in MILNE BAY. This point is the only clearing in the area, the surrounding country being jungle and high ground. The main track from our base runs parallel to the coast EAST and WEST through the Mission. Owing to the nature of the country, apart from the clearing, main movement must be confined to this track.

The Mission area provides ground suitable for a perimeter defence offering fields of fire of from 50 to 200 yds and as it transpired, was in close proximity to the enemy's base.

2. OBJECT OF THE OPERATION.

The task of the Bn was to locate the enemy and estimate his strength. For this reason it moved lightly equipped and armed, as movement through dense jungle was anticipated. Of the four Rifle Coys, fifteen sections carried two Thompson Sub-Machine Guns each, and the remaining twenty-one sections carried one Bren L.M.G. and one Thompson S.M.G. each. In addition rifles, hand grenades and 2" Mortars were carried.

It had previously been reported by 7 Aust Inf Bde that only one tank had been sighted. The commander was reported to have been shot and the tank to be badly bogged.

The A/T defence of the Bn consisted of 20 S.T. Grenades, all it possessed.

3. OCCUPATION OF K.B. MISSION.

The Bn occupied the position by dusk with three coys on the perimeter, one pl along the coast line and one coy less one pl in reserve. Bn H Q was located in a rubber plantation 100 yds square in the centre of the perimeter. Local protection of Bn H Q was provided by No. 4 Pl (Carriers) on foot.

4. ENEMY TACTICS.

At approx 2000 hrs, two enemy tanks moved WEST along the track and contacted B Coy on the EAST of the perimeter. After engaging the F D Ls the tanks penetrated the perimeter via the track, supporting each other's advance. A third tank, apparently in reserve, remained outside the perimeter. Enemy infantry attempted to follow immediately behind the tanks.

Our fire positions were located by the forward tank lying 'doggo', switching off its engine, listening and observing. On locating the fire position, the tank fired tracer at it, indicating it to the second tank, which then moved to the area and heavily engaged the position with L M G fire and hand grenades. Fire from light mortars also fell, but whether from within the tank or from supporting infantry is not certain. Headlamps and spotlights on the tanks were used successfully in assisting to locate these and other positions. (NOTE. The above paragraph should be carefully noted, the Japanese method of mutual support between tanks being the chief theme ~~of~~ of this memo.)

His tank movement was confined mainly to the track and clearing. At a later stage, when attempting to exploit along the track, the

4. ENEMY TACTICS. (Cont.)

enemy made use of his tanks to carry inf armed with L M Gs, covering them by fire while they occupied fire positions, apparently for the purpose of covering further advance or preventing any counter attack.

Infantry in attempting to follow the tanks, moved forward in several waves by bounds, believing at this stage that their tanks had destroyed our positions on the EAST. However the line had held and the infantry were dealt with effectively.

On approaching our position the enemy talked incessantly in loud voices, either to break down our morale or to boost up his own. If it was for the former, it was unsuccessful.

The enemy showed speed in endeavouring to exploit, sacrificing security to gain an advantage. This type of tactics provided good opportunities for ambush.

Great faith was placed by the Japanese in his small mortar, which he used with extreme accuracy, but these were most ineffective and required almost a direct hit to cause a casualty. The Japanese light mortar has a flight so silent as not to be audible when L M G's are in action.

Small arms fire from Japanese infantry was ineffective at night. It was usually too high and passed over the heads of our own troops. The Japanese evidently relying on noise and pyrotechnical effect rather than the infliction of casualties. During the 4½ hrs actions against tanks and infantry in the perimeter defense, only 50 casualties were sustained, the majority being from tank action. The strength of the Bn in action was 465.

5. COUNTER TACTICS.

It can be observed that without adequate anti-tank defense, the best policy is to allow the tanks to pass through the F D L's without engaging them with small arms fire. The F D Ls then deal with the infantry while tank hunting parties deal with the tanks. Fire positions must be well concealed, so as not to be revealed by tank lights. In such a manner the Bn held its positions for 4 hours before withdrawing to the jungle and so further held up enemy advance.

When dealing with enemy infantry, noise and pyrotechnical effects should be employed by our own troops. For example, a leading enemy pl was completely dispersed in a surprise encounter by an officer, unsupported by troops, who gave the order to 'Charge!' followed by suitable adjectives, in a loud voice, at the same time firing his pistol. It is considered that an air raid siren or something similar could be used with good effect.

When infiltration is taking place, small parties must be placed in a position where they can ambush enemy infantry with their L M G's being conveyed forward by tanks.

6. CHARACTERISTICS OF TANKS.

The tanks could not be clearly identified in the dark, but certain chief characteristics were observed and have since been confirmed.

They were of a medium type, approx 15 to 20 tons, carrying a crew of three. Dimensions were 12 ft long, 6 ft wide and 7 ft high, having a very low turret. They were very strongly armoured as they appeared to withstand the effect of an S T Grenade without serious inconvenience.

Armament consisted of one 37 mm gun, one M. M. G. in turret which had an all around traverse with good depression. Also one L. M. G. in body operated by the driver.

It had a front sprocket drive, with 3 bogies and idler at rear. The forward 4 ft of the tracks was armoured.

6. CHARACTERISTICS OF TANKS. (Cont.)

Lighting consisted of 2 headlamps and a spotlight, all of which were capable of withstanding Small arms fire. Numerous observation slits were in the sides, giving a clear all round view.

7. The notes that formed the basis of this ~~theme~~ memo were carefully compiled by Capt. T J Schmedje, Adjutant of this Bn, as a result of personal observations by himself and confirmed by other officers.

T. J. Schmedje

file + return # 6/9

SUBJECT : REPORT ON JAPANESE TACTICS - MILNE BAY.

2/10 Aust Ing Bn.

5 Sep 42

18 Aust Inf Bde.

Report by Capt. T J Schmedje, Adjt., 2/10 Aust Inf Bn. on the above subject, as suggested by H Q MILNE FORCE for inclusion in an A T M., is attached hereto for information and forwarding.

J. J. Dobbs

Lieut. Col.

Comdg. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

*Report of C.O. must be under his signature
as he was present at*

JAPANESE TACTICS - MILNE BAY

On the night of 27/28 Aug 42, in the action of K B Mission, MILNE BAY, Australian New Guinea, Japanese made full use of tanks in close support of infantry. The tactics initiated in this co-operations of tanks and infantry were rather unusual and valuable lessons can be deduced from them.

The following is a brief summary of the operation.

1. TOPOGRAPHY.

K.B. MISSION, a small plantation running parallel to the coast line for 800 yds., with an average depth of 500 yds., is located approx. 4 miles to the WEST of the Main plantation area in MILNE BAY. This point is the only clearing in the area, the surrounding country being jungle and high ground. The main track from our base runs parallel to the coast EAST and WEST through the Mission. Owing to the nature of the country, apart from the clearing, main movement must be confined to this track.

The Mission area provides ground suitable for a perimeter defence, offering limited fields of fire, and as it transpired, was in close proximity to the enemy's base.

2. OBJECT OF THE OPERATION.

The task of the Bn was to locate the enemy and estimate his strength. For this reason it moved lightly equipped and armed, as movement through dense jungle was anticipated. Of the four Rifle Coys, 15 sections carried 2 Thompson Sub-Machine Guns each, and the remaining 21 sections carried 1 Bren L.M.G. and 1 Thompson Sub-Machine Gun each. In addition, rifles, hand grenades and 2 in. Mortars were carried.

It had ~~previously~~ been reported that the only tank landed was out of action and consequently the anti-tank defence was 20 S.T. Grenades, all the Bn possessed.

3. OCCUPATION OF K. B. MISSION.

The Bn occupied the position by dusk with three coys on the perimeter, one pl along the coast line and one coy less one pl in reserve. Bn. H. Q. was located in a rubber plantation, 100 yds square in the centre of the perimeter. Local protection of Bn H. Q. was provided by No. 4 Pl (Carriers) on foot.

4. ENEMY TACTICS.

At approx 2000 hrs two enemy tanks moved WEST along the track and contacted B Coy on the East of the perimeter. After engaging the F D Ls the tanks penetrated the perimeter via the track, supporting each other's advance. A third tank apparently in reserve remained outside the perimeter. Enemy infantry attempted to follow immediately behind the tanks.

4. ENEMY TACTICS (Cont.)

2
L.F. 2
Our fire positions were located by the forward tank lying 'doggo', switching off it's engine, listening and observing. On locating the fire position the tank fired tracer at it indicating it to the second tank, which then moved to the area and heavily engaged the position with L M G fire, Mortar fire and hand grenades. Headlamps and spotlights on the tanks were used successfully in assisting to locate these and other positions. Mortar fire from infantry outside the perimeter was also brought to bear on the fire positions by indication from the tanks in such manner.

His tank movement was confined mainly to the track and clearing. At a later stage, when attempting to exploit along the track, the enemy made use of his tanks to carry inf. armed with L M G's, covering them by fire while they occupied fire positions, apparently for the purpose of covering further advance or preventing any counter attack.

Infantry in attempting to follow the tanks moved forward in several waves by bounds, believing at this stage that their tanks had destroyed out positions on the East. However the line had held and the infantry were dealt with effectively.

On approaching our position the enemy talked incessantly in loud voices, either to break down our morale or to boost up his own. If it was for the former, it was unsuccessful.

The enemy showed speed in endeavouring to exploit, sacrificing security to gain an advantage. This type of tactic provided good opportunities for ambush.

Great faith was placed by the Japanese in his small mortar, which he used with extreme accuracy, but these were most ineffective and required almost a direct hit to cause a casualty.

Small arms fire from Japanese inf. was ineffective at night. It was usually too high and passed over the heads of our own troops. The Japanese evidently ~~rely~~ relying on noise and pyrotechnical effect rather than the infliction of casualties. During the 4½ hrs. action against tanks and inf. in the perimeter defense, only 50 casualties were sustained, the majority being from tank action. The strength of the Bn in action was 465.

5. COUNTER TACTICS.

anti-

It can be observed that without adequate tank defense, the best policy is to allow the tanks to pass through the F D Ls without engaging them with small arms fire. The F D Ls then deal with the infantry while tank hunting parties deal with the tanks. Fire positions must be well concealed, so as not to be revealed by tank lights. In such a manner the Bn held it's position for 4 hrs. before withdrawing to the jungle, and so further held up enemy advance.

5. COUNTER TACTICS (Cont.)

When dealing with enemy inf. noise and pyrotechnical effects should be employed by our own troops. For example, a leading enemy pl. was completely dispersed in a surprise encounter by an officer unsupported by troops, who gave the order to charge followed by suitable 'adjectives' in a loud voice, at the same time firing his pistol. It is considered that an air raid siren or something similar could be used with good effect.

Where infiltration is taking place, small parties must be placed in a position where they can ambush enemy inf. with L.M.G.s being conveyed forward by tanks.

6. CHARACTERISTICS OF TANKS.

The tanks could not be clearly identified in the dark, but certain chief characteristics were observed and have since been confirmed.

They were of a medium type, approx weight ¹⁵⁻²⁰ ~~30-35~~ tons, carrying a crew of three. Dimensions were 12 ft. long, 6ft. wide and 7 ft high, having a very low turret. They were very strongly armoured as they appeared to withstand the effect of an S T Grenade without serious inconvenience.

Armament consisted of one 37 mm gun, one M.M.G. in turret which had an all around traverse with good depression. Also one L.M.G. in body operated by the driver.

It had a front sprocket drive, with 3 bogies and idler at rear. The forward 4 ft of the tracks was armoured.

Lighting consisted of 2 headlamps and a spotlight all of which were capable of withstanding S A Fire. Numerous observations slits were in the sides, giving a clear all round view.

SX 649

P. Schmedje Cap't.
Adj. 2/10 Aust Inf. Bn.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS 2/12 AUST INF BN
AUG 31 to Sept 8 1942

HQ 2/12 AUST INF BN
SEPT 42

HQ
18 AUST INF BDE

1. INITIAL ADVANCE

FORMATION:

- (a) Advance Guard Coy (D Coy) with orders to beat astride the track for 10 to 80 yds according to the density of the jungle and to clear aside any organised resistance.
- (b) Mopping up Coy (B Coy) with orders to beat astride the road for 80 yards, irrespective of the density of the jungle and to mop up all snipers etc missed by Adv Gd Coy.
- (c) Bn HQ to follow leading Pl of B Coy
- (d) RESERVE:- HQ Coy; C Coy; A Coy.

2. ATTACK

On each occasion the forward elements of the Adv Gd Coy were held up, immediate encirclement was commenced by the following Section or Pl as the case may be and the result was invariably the same, i.e. withdrawal by the enemy.

3. DEFENCE

At GAMAR River, KB STATION etc, the same defensive tactics were used. A perimeter was formed with it's ends resting on the sea. Wpn pits were constructed roughly 6 ft apart along the whole length. A small reserve was left inside the perimeter to deal with any infiltration. These men were forbidden to fire or move, but were ordered to use bayonet only. It is considered that two Coys constitutes the smallest force that can safely hold an area.

4. POINTS NOTED

- (a) JAPANESE seldom moved more than 80 yds from a track in dense jungle.
- (b) Our men were invariably quicker on the trigger than the JAPANESE. This natural advantage of ours should be exploited.
- (c) Fighting patrols should invariably carry 2" Mortars to drive hidden MGs into the open.
- (d) Whenever a posn is taken up by any man or wpn it's posn should be altered to stand down each night and it's original posn re-occupied at "Stand To" each morning. This confuses the enemy infiltrator who has marked the particular posn by daylight.
- (e) Listening Posts are always liable to be cut off or captured. It is considered that in the extreme darkness of the jungle simple "booby-traps" made from 36 Grenades can sometimes be used as an alternative.
- (f) When posn allows very lights cuts down amn expenditure.
- (g) Within a defensive perimeter a loose bayonet is much more effectice than a rifle and bayonet, particularly when the soldier is resting. An issue of suitable knives as suggested sometime ago by Gen ROWELL would be ideal.
- (h) Some JAPANESE infiltrators let off delayed action crackers and while the attention of the defenders was thus attracted the enemy attempted to approach from the flank.

- (i) JAPANESE breast plates ^{can} will not be penetrated by TSMG at any range, a rifle bullet, however, is effective.
- (j) No signs of any wpn resembling the "Tommy" Gun were found. It is assumed that their LMG was mistaken for this wpn.
- (k) Pack sets were found to be an ideal means of comm during the adv so long as the sets were not more than 1000 yds apart.

W. S. Andrews

Lt-Col
Comd 2/12 Aust Inf Bn

MESSAGE FORM

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

rule 4 2710

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No.
OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

49 ansch inf div

FROM

18 ansch inf div

Originator's Number

0335

Date

15

In Reply to Number

<i>com</i>	<i>defended</i>	<i>probably</i>	<i>ans</i>	<i>Don't</i>	<i>3011A</i>
<i>with</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>engaged</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>two</i>	<i>any</i>
<i>1320</i>	<i>①</i>	<i>made</i>	<i>force</i>	<i>suggest</i>	<i>expans com</i>
<i>of</i>	<i>present</i>	<i>was</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>two</i>	<i>see</i>
<i>headlines</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>pl</i>	<i>breaking</i>	<i>①</i>	<i>com</i>
<i>49</i>	<i>div</i>	<i>with</i>	<i>substant</i>	<i>plan</i>	<i>to</i>
<i>the</i>	<i>HQ</i>	<i>end</i>	<i>possible</i>		

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN**
BY ANY MEANS *without*

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST
BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1130

SIGNED

by hand

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

9
Serial No. _____
No. of Groups _____
GR. _____
OFFICE DATE STAMP
JUN 10 X 42
SIGNALS

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN
OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

2/9 2/12 Aust Inf Bn 2/4 Aust Fd Coy col, B.M.

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

FROM

18 Aust Inf Bde

9724

10

Please	advise	all	advised	units	in
your	defence	areas	that	were	is
available	for	defence	purposes	and	ensure
that	same	is	indented	for	immediately
0	Refer	our	of	instr	Number
20	Para	17	of	7	Oct

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

[Signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

0845

T.H.I. 912

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

~~SECRET~~

Copy No. _____

7 Oct 42.

13 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No. 20

Ref Maps: GILI GILI & MIAIAMI Sheets 8" = 1 mile.
S.M.R./I 1" = 1 mile.
Patrol Map S.E. NEW GUINEA. 1" = 2 miles.

GENERAL

1. This Op Instn supersedes 13 Aust Inf Bde Op Instns No. 15 of 9 Sep and No. 16 of 11 Sep 42 and embodies amendments thereto to 6 Oct 42.

INFORMATION

2. (a) Enemy.

- (i) Further enemy ops against MILNE BAY area may be either sea or air borne or may be a combination of both.
- (ii) Inf may be landed in large numbers.
- (iii) Enemy tps may use parachutes or personnel planes which themselves may be crash landed ~~by air~~ on incomplete runways or in clearings.
- (iv) Tankettes may be landed by air or from the sea and medium tks from the sea.

(b) Own Tps.

- (i) ~~Inf.~~ • 9 Aust Inf Bde with u/e 9 Bty 2/5 Aust Fd Regt and 4 Bty (less A.Tp) 101 Aust A.Tk Regt.
- (ii) Force Reg. - 10 Aust Inf Bde (less 2/10 Aust Inf Bn) with u/e A.Tp & Bty 101 Aust A.Tk Regt.
- (iii) R.A.F Spotting Sta is established at MULLINS HARBOUR.
- (iv) It is not intended at the present time to move further tps to area of No. 2 Runway.
- (v) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn has established listening posts, strength each one sec at Track junc 926928, at GHEMI GHEMI RENA on track leading to WEDAU at 936044 and vicinity of BOWLA 872997.
- (vi) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn has established posts of pl less one sec at track junc 937044 and of one sec at track junc 973050.

3. Inter-Bde Boundary (for operational purposes only).

GIBARA - junc MIWARA R and KALOHI CK (990962) - KALOHI CK to junc Routes 1 and 3 (936987) - LAVIAM CK at 124010 - along track to TAUPOTA (incl to 7 Aust Inf Bde).

4. 7 Aust Inf Bde is undertaking:-

- (a) Defence against enemy tps from seaward on MILNE BAY incl:-
 - (i) Approaches along South and North shores of Bay;
 - (ii) Beach defences from, both incl, MIWARA R to No. 3 STRIP.
 - (iii) Defended localities in the area of No. 3 STRIP and RAB.
 - (iv) Tracks over STIRLING RANGE East of and incl track DUIA-TAUPOTA area.
- (b) Protection of No. 1 Runway (GURNEY FIELD) against airborne or other attack.
- (c) Protection of No. 3 Runway against airborne or other attack.

INTENTION

5. 13 Aust Inf Bde will:-

- (a) be prepared to counter-attack in any direction, especially against any landing effected in MILNE BAY;
- (b) Guard against incursion by:-
 - (i) tracks over STIRLING RANGE West of excl track DUIA-TAUPOTA area.
 - (ii) tracks leading in from MULLINS HARBOUR.

- (e) Maintain one rifle coy on NE coast in area TADPOTA-WEDAU. Detailed instns are contained in 10 Aust Inf Bde Op Instn No. 18 of 25 Sep 42.
- (d) Protect No. 2 Runway against airborne or other attack.
- (e) provide task forces for special ops as required.

METHOD.

6. General Defence Policy.

- (a) The whole area occupied by MILNE FORCE is to be regarded as one locality organised for allround defence.
- (b) The basis of the general defence policy will be the **MAINTENANCE OF THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT AND OF OFFENSIVE ACTION.** Sub-units will be disposed for prompt counter-attack and will be prepared to operate speedily in any direction within the scope of their tasks. Prior recon by all concerned and rehearsal of probable roles is essential. Defended localities are to be regarded primarily as bases from which mobile offensive ops can be initiated and within which units can reorganise and replenish amn and sups.
- (c) A determination never to surrender will be inculcated in all ranks.
- (d) The principles laid down in ATM's 10 and 11 for defence against Jap tactics will be studied and followed. Attention is specially directed to Chap 2 of ATM 10 and Appx "A" to ATM 11.
- (e) Particular attention will be paid to:-
 - (i) Physical fitness and tng in jungle conditions;
 - (ii) Depth in defence particularly along rds and tracks in close country;
 - (iii) The necessity for guarding all avenues of quick approach into our posns;
 - (iv) The importance of patrolling, especially to flanks when country permits;
 - (v) The permanent importance of aggressive action.

7. Essentials of Defence.

It is essential that runways are secured for our use and denied to the enemy. This will necessitate:-

- (a) The disposition of tps at runways for defence against both airborne and land attack;
- (b) the disposition of tps on all approaches from MILNE BAY into Bde area;
- (c) the disposition of tps to secure approaches from WEDAU and MULLINE HARBOUR;
- (d) the maintenance of local mob res for counter attack purposes;
- (e) the maintenance of a general res for counter attack purposes.

8. Defended Localities.

- (a) Every unit and sub-unit, incl adm units, will be organised in defended localities for allround defence.
- (b) All fd works will be camouflaged. Advantage will be taken of long grass to aid in concealment.
- (c) Such localities will be wired and provision made for storing food, water and amn sufficient for seven days.
- (d) Localities will be sited to protect all adm installations and dumps of amn, sups and POL within the bde area.
- (e) When siting and constructing fd works full consideration will be given to drainage so as to prevent their becoming valueless. Necessary drainage will therefore be carried out concurrently with construction of works.

9.

Aerodrome and Anti Para Tro Defences

- (a) Bns responsible for the defence of aerodrome will dispose NOT less than one rifle coy supported by a proportion of MMG's and 3" Mortars for perimeter defences.
- (b) CO of Bn concerned will coordinate ~~the~~ ~~air~~ and ~~RAF~~ units in the defence of the runways.
- (c) ~~RAF~~ ground staffs and ~~air~~ units (other than those already organised in defence of runways - sub-para (b)) are to prepare defended localities near the areas in which they normally work. These will be manned in the event of war, primary task becoming no longer possible. CO's will advise and assist all such units within or adjacent to their areas and will coordinate their defence into a general plan.
CO's will impress upon CO's of such units that, in the event of enemy penetration, they are to fight from localities referred to until the situation is restored. It must be remembered however that engines and ~~air~~ tps are to be allowed to carry on their primary tasks under the comd of their respective heads of services as long as possible. CO's will notify this HQ immediately upon assuming active operational comd of any such unit.
- (d) Senior inf offr will, in the event of attack, assume comd of all tps in Runway area.
- (e) Aerodrome perimeter defences will be continually manned and all tps manning them will stand to one hour before dark and first light.
- (f) Arrangements for defence against para tps, detailed in MILNE FORCE Op Instrn No. 5 of 19 Aug, will continue.

10.

Tps Available

- (i) HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde
J Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div
11 Pl Aust Hq Gd Bn
2/47 Aust LAD } Bde Hq.
- (ii) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
- (iii) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn
- (iv) A.Tp 4 Bty 101 Aust L.Tk Regt.

11.

Responsibilities of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn (with in support A.Tp 4 Bty 101 L.Tk Regt).

- (a) Establishment of a defended locality or localities in present bn areas;
- (b) Protection against incursion into area by:-
- (i) Route 1, Route 3 from GILI GILI, tracks along KILOHI CK from North and South, and/or Route 4 leading into HAGITA from WAIGANI.
- (ii) all tracks over STIRLING RANGE West from incl Track 10 - KILOHI CK;
- (iii) all tracks leading in from MULLING HARBOUR;
- (iv) tracks leading from WEDAU.
- (c) Recce and report on all possible tracks or other avenues of approach into area;
- (d) Construction of coy defended locality area DONA DONA;
- (e) Maintenance of mob res as large as possible consistent with above;
- (f) Recce and rehearsal of possible offensive action or counter-attack.
- (i) in area MAIWARA R - LAVIAN CK by Route 3 and/or tracks along KILOHI CK;
- (ii) in area No. 1 Runway by Route 1 and/or by new jungle track 977994 - 983002.
- (c) Disposition of one coy on NE coast in area WEDAU-TAUPOTA --- See 18 Aust Inf Bde Op Instrn No. 18 of 28 Sep 42.

- (h) Coordination of defence of Adm and Engr units within Bn area of responsibility. See para 16.

12. Responsibilities of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.

- (a) Establishment of a defended locality in localities in present Bn area.
- (b) Recce and report on all possible tracks or other avenues of approach into area.
- (c) Protection against incursion into area by all tracks over STIRLING RANGE from excl Track DUILA-TAUPOTA area to excl Track 10-KILOHI CK. 2/12 Aust Inf Bn will liaise direct with 7 Aust Inf Bde and 2/9 Aust Inf Bn re bds.
- (d) Maintenance of mob res as large as possible consistent with above.
- (e) Recce and rehearsal of --
- (i) Possible offensive or defensive ops against enemy action area No. 1 STRIP or approaches thereto from South and/or East;
- (ii) Occupation of def switch line vicinity Route 8, just West of AWADUM CK (vacated by 25 Aust Inf Bn).
- (iii) Offensive action area GILI GILI - No. 3 STRIP.
- (f) Coordination of defence of adm and engr units within bn area of responsibility. See para 16.

13. Dets Covering Tracks.

At the present juncture it is NOT considered necessary or advisable to detail more tps from bns for this purpose than, in the majority of cases one sec and, in some cases, one pl.

14. Patrols.

Units will implement a policy of active deep patrolling along all avenues of approach. 24 hrs notice will be given to this HQ of any other than purely local patrols in order that essential notice may be given to other units and formations.

15. TNG.

Every opportunity will be taken in tng to benefit from experience of jungle warfare, especially by night.

16. Bn Areas of Responsibility.

- (a) To implement Para 9 of this instr present CO's areas of responsibility are defined as follows:-

	<u>G.O.</u>	<u>AREA</u>
(i)	Lieut-Col A.S.W. ARNOLD (2/12 Aust Inf Bn)	From excl No. 1 Runway North to inter-bde bdy.
(ii)	Lieut-Col C.G. CUMMINGS (2/9 Aust Inf Bn)	From excl No. 1 Runway to excl FORCE HQ.
(iii)	Maj. N. JELBART (2/4 Aust Pd Coy)	From excl FORCE HQ to incl WAIGANI.

- (b) Maj. JELBART will nominate Sub Area Comd for engr and adm units West of FLYING FOX FORD. The name of this sub area comd will be notified to this HQ.
- (c) CO's will coordinate defence of engr and adm units within their areas and will inform them of the contents of this and other instr that may be issued.
- (d) List of Engr and Adm units within areas of responsibility is attached as Appx "A". This list is not exhaustive. Area Comds will recce their areas and will fwd to this HQ complete list of engr and adm units within their areas together with numbers of tps and weapons.

- 3-
- (c) OC Bde HQ Gd Pl will establish defended locality at 18 Aust Inf Bde Battle HQ and will contact CO 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to coordinate its defences with those of other units in 2/9 Aust Inf Bn area.

Mr. ...

- (d) Outline plans to implement this Op Instrn will be forwarded to this HQ forthwith.

17. Wiring

In anticipation of the provision of wire, plans will be drawn up and fwded to this HQ of all proposed wiring. Area Comds will fwd wiring proposed for engr and adm units.

MEMO.

18. Bde Res.

- (a) Carriers of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will be armed with LMG or HMG (details to be arranged by CO's 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and 2/12 Aust Inf Bn and B.M.).
- (b) These carriers will be attached for adm to 2/9 Aust Inf Bn but will be under direct operational comd of this HQ. In the event of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn moving from present location these carriers will NOT move.

ADM.

19. A separate Adm Instrn is to be issued.

INTERCOM.

20. 18 Aust Inf Bde /Adm HQ - KAGITA HOUSE.
Battle HQ - 907996.

ACK.

Time of Signature *1940* hrs.

Issued by H. King *1940*

Ray B. ...
Major.
BN 18 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Gd Pl Comd		11
Bde HQ Offrs File		12
Spare		13-14
War Diary		15-16
File		17.

ADMIN UNITS IN UNIT AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Ref Maps GILIGILI and WAIGANI 2" to 1 mile

2/9 AUST INF BN AREA

1 AIF and AMF

RAAF

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------|
| 1 Det 2 Aust Ny AA W/shop Sec
979989 | 1 RAAF Base Ops
975986 |
| 2 A Coy 11 Aust Fd Amb 987988 | 2 37 Radio Sta
975986 |
| 3 10 Aust CCS 985985 | 3 RNF Unit
976993 |
| 4 Medical Stores Depot 985985 | <u>AAF</u> |
| 5 308 Aust Dental Unit 984991 | 1 8 Fighter Cp 975986 |
| 6 2/47 Aust LAB 979992 | 2 694 Sig Plotting Sec 975986 |
| 7 18 Bde Sec Ord W/shop 985987 | 3 35 Sqn 979993 |
| 8 18 Bde Sec Ord RA FA 985987 | 4 36 Sqn 979993 |
| 9 101 Ind Bde Op Ord W/shop 985987 | |
| 10 101 Ind Bde Op Ord RA FA 985987 | |

2/12 AUST INF BN AREA

AIF and AMF

USFLA

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 Sec 25 Aust Ny AA Bty 009010 | 1 Coy A 394 QM Bn 005007 |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|

2/4 AUST FD COY AREA

AIF and AMF

- | |
|---|
| 1 5 Sec 1 Bomb Disposal Coy 956983 |
| 2 2/6 Coy AASC 950988 950988 |
| 3 25 Coy AASC 967984 |
| 4 123 FOD 972990 |
| 5 23 FAD 945983 |
| 6 2/1 Aust CCS 945984 |

STATION HOSPITAL SUB AREA

USFLA

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| 1 HQ Coy and A Coy 2/5 Aust 913998 | 1 C Bty 101 CA AA Bn 917997 |
| 2 HQ Coy 11 Aust Fd Amb 909998 | 2 Coy H 45 Engrs Strip #2 |
| 2 HQ Coy 11 Aust Fd Amb 909998 | 3 US Hospital 909999 |

Keep for future reference

REPORT ON OPS - MILNE BAY - 2/10 AUST INF BN

26 August 1942

On 26 Aug 42, the morning enemy landed at MILNE BAY, this Bn was in occupation of a perimeter defence at the northern end of Route 8 by 0330 hrs.

At 1200 hrs enemy patrols were believed to have been sighted about 1000 yds to the NORTH. Investigation proved that these were in fact U.S. tps attired in blue uniforms, occupying a posn very similar to our own, but of which fact no information had reached this unit.

A regrettable incident could easily have occurred.

It is considered in view of the similarity of the U.S. overall to the enemy uniform that it is desirable that our Allies confine their attire to khaki.

At 1830 hrs on 26 Aug 42 the unit received instructions to move ~~immediately~~ immediately to No.1 Strip, which it occupied at 2230 hrs. It is seriously advanced that such an occupation by night, without opportunity for prior recon, would not have given the Bn a fighting chance to do a sound job had it been called upon to deal with the enemy at dawn on that ground.

27 August 1942

However, at 0300 hrs, on 27 Aug 42, the Bn again received orders to move, and at 0500 hrs occupied an area adjacent to 7 Bde HQ, near House 1. Two nights had now been spent in moving and preparations for moves, and many tps were already weary. Few officers or senior NCO's had had any opportunity for sleep. Furthermore, the equipment of the soldier is on such a scale, and such large quantities of amm are carried with weapons, that mobility has not yet been attained to anything like the degree desirable.

This is the chief lesson learnt by the Bn. To remedy it, a permanent B Ech with Bn 2i/c in command, has now been established, at which all excess gear will be dumped under C.Q.M.S's in the event of future moves. If necessary, an A Ech will likewise be established forward, at which will be held a readily mobile quantity of amm and rations on wheels.

It has been proved that an infantry bn cannot move and re-establish itself in toto in less than 8 hrs of working time with the whole unit available.

The establishment of the permanent B Ech will enable the unit to march out equipped and ready to fight at not more than 45 minutes notice, ~~having~~ knowing that its stores are in safe custody.

During 26 Aug, B Coy was detached from the unit under command 7 Bde, and at dawn on 27 Aug moved to KIALBO, but failed to contact enemy.

The unit war diary notes that at 0300 hrs 61 Bn reported the destruction of 2 enemy tanks. At 0830 hrs the CO interviewed the Bde Commander, 7 Bde, and suggested that the Bn be pushed EAST towards the enemy. The plan was that B Coy (now at KIALBO) move EAST and occupy KB MISSION, and that the remainder of the unit, equipped as a large scale fighting patrol, move to RABI, thence NORTH to a junction of tracks about 3 miles NORTH-EAST of RABI, then SOUTH-WEST to rejoin B Coy at K B MISSION.

At 1030 hrs this was assented to, and the Bn received orders to move at 1200 hrs.

Twenty-four T.S.M.G's were borrowed from a US unit stationed nearby, and the Bn marched out equipped as under with automatic weapons:-

REPORT ON OPS - MILNE BAY - 2/10 AUST INF BN.

26 August 42:

In the morning enemy landed at MILNE BAY, on 26 Aug 42, this Bn was in occupation of a perimeter defence at the northern end of Route 8

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to fading and bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. It appears to be a detailed account of the operations and the state of the perimeter defence.]

[This section continues the report, describing further actions and observations. The text is very light and difficult to decipher.]

[The final section of the report, containing concluding remarks and possibly a signature or date. The text is faint and partially obscured by a blue stamp or mark.]

A Coy	3 L.M.G's	15 T.S.M.G's
B Coy	9 L.M.G's	9 T.S.M.G's
C Coy	- L.M.G's	18 T.S.M.G's
D Coy	3 L.M.G's	15 T.S.M.G's
Dets HQ Coy and Bn HQ		12 T.S.M.G's

Request for more
Bum
Who by?

In view of the only tanks reported as having been landed being stated to be out of action, and bush warfare being anticipated, the unit's only A/T defence was 20 S.T. Grenades, all it possessed. *? ATK upls*

Coys took their 2" mortars, and one 3" mortar, with additional personnel, was man-handled with 40 rounds H.E.

On arrival at KIALBO, B Coy was sent forward as advance guard. The thick 7 feet high grass on either side of the track was not closely searched, but coys moved well dispersed by sections in single file at 50 yds distance on either side of the road, and all likely ambushes were carefully investigated.

The Bn reached RABI without incident, where it contacted a Militia officer, Capt DAVIDSON, of 25 Bn, with about 80 men, moving WESTWARD. He reported having watched 5000 Japanese land on the previous day, and had made his way through the hills with his coy.

In view of this infm, 7 Bde was contacted by telephone from RABI, and the Bn plan was varied.

The instructions received was to move the whole unit direct to KB MISSION where it arrived at 1730 hrs. A perimeter defence was formed around the main mission building, consisting of B Coy to the EAST, D and A Coys to the NORTH and WEST respectively, and C Coy with 1 pl on the sea front and the remainder in reserve. Details of HQ Coy formed an inner perimeter around Bn HQ.

All tps were in fire groups of 3 men stationed at the butt s of coconut trees. Security measures against the accidental shooting of our own men were taken, and against infiltration by enemy. Standing patrols were placed on the track to the N.E. and WEST, and two fighting patrols operated to the EAST until night fell, but beyond a doubtful report of 2 enemy being sighted by the standing patrol to the NORTH, no infm resulted.

At dusk an arty O.P. party reported in, having laid a line from 7 Bde. This was the first infm that arty support was forthcoming. The C.O. 2/10 Bn did not permit registration before dusk. Observation was limited to the immediate area with not more than 200 yds field of view, and it was anticipated that any fight would be of a hand-to-hand nature (which transpired) such as to render defensive arty fire impracticable.

At 1940 hrs an engine note similar to that of one of our own carriers was heard to the EAST, and a patrol under Lieut A.R. SCOTT was sent with S.T. Grenades to meet it.

At this time began yelling and screaming in the bush to the NORTH and EAST. The tone of the enemy's shouting implied boasting accompanied by threats. ~~th~~ No notice was taken of this, our tps remaining quiet.

At about 1955 hrs a strong light lit up the EASTERN sector of the perimeter. This came from the headlights of the leading tank. At 2000 hrs fire was opened, and within a few seconds the NORTHERN and WESTERN sectors were heavily engaged by the two leading tanks and infantry.

Tank tactics have been described in detail in a separate memo, but in brief the tanks (of which there were three) support each other in depth, using headlights (which are impervious to small arms fire) to locate opposing infantry. They were also used to transport L.M.G's and crews to our flanks, which they covered during occupation of positions.

From 2000 hrs until 2345 hrs, the engagement consisted of a persistent

attempt to break through the perimeter with much fire from both sides, and as persistent an attempt on the part of the men to put the tanks out of action, with S.T. Grenades and mortars. These attempts failed. S.T. Grenades did not appear to adhere to the tanks. The tanks' action was cautious until 2345 hrs, but apparently realising by then that the Bn had no surprises in store, the leading two vehicles began to cruise around endeavouring to flatten out the men.

Throughout the above period enemy infantry endeavoured to exploit behind the tanks, but were never successful in passing beyond B Coy's perimeter, and were repeatedly repulsed by local section counter-attacks.

At 2345 hrs C.O. 2/10 Bn ordered a withdrawal WEST about 400 yds, to the line of a creek bordering the jungle, which offered some good protection and was calculated to impede the tanks' movement.

The withdrawal was carried out in good style, with the exception that parties of B Coy did not receive the order and continued to fight on for another hour. "A" Coy covered the withdrawal of the bulk of the Bn.

29 August 1942.

By the time of the Bn's arrival behind the creek, a good deal of inter-mixing of subunits had taken place, and upon the enemy shortly afterwards exploiting WEST along the road, with two tanks in support of a force estimated at 700 infantry, the unit mostly fought its way back to the GAMA RIVER in small groups led by officers, where they were reorganised by Captains BROCKSOPP and SCHMEDJE. "A" Coy and the C.O. in one group, and portion of D Coy in another group, remained in the creek area by K.B. MISSION until daylight, by which time only a few enemy were in the vicinity, the remainder having passed on to the WEST towards No. 3 Strip.

A patrol under Lieut K. R. ERSKINE-WILSON patrolled the battle area between 0700 and 0800 hrs on 28 Aug, clearing the area of wounded and such automatics as it could find.

(Sheet 4 follows)

This patrol also explored for 800 yds WEST of KB MISSION in an effort to locate a P 40 plane that was said to have crashed with Flight Lieutenant TRUSCOTT, R.A. A.F.

The whole of the rear party then returned to GILI GILI area via the hills, A Coy being left by the C.O. for 24 hrs to man BULOBULOLO HILL; they then returned to camp. During 28/31 Aug various parties of the Bn either came into the perimeter via the road, and were incorporated into the defence, or returned to GILI GILI by more circuitous routes.

Casualties for the above operations were:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>O.R.s</u>
Killed in action		
and Died of Wounds	3	34
Wounded	1	25
Missing	1	2

As a result of the action at KB MISSION recommendations for 4 MC's, 4 D.C.M's, 4 M.M's, 1 B.E.M. and 5 M.I.D's have been lodged.

Since 28 Aug further casualties have comprised 4 O.R's killed, 1 wounded as a result of enemy air action.

The tactical lessons learned have been as under:-

1. That the Japanese is a bad rifle shot, poorly armed, and that his L.M.G. shooting is far from good.
2. That his small mortar is noisy but ineffective, a direct hit being needed to inflict any serious casualty. That
3. That he is cunning in ambush, but he will not stand up to determined attack in the open. In one case a man of the unit bayoneted 5 enemy, who did nothing but squeal, making no concerted attack on the man concerned.
4. It is believed that his shouting and yelling are inspired to better his morale, and on the next occasion it is proposed to begin some counter-tactics.
5. His treatment of certain of our men has engendered in our tps a clean-cut determination to give no quarter nor to expect any.
6. Little sign was seen of the enemy in the hills. It is believed that he will not take to the jungle any more than is absolutely necessary, but that his chief method of aggression will be firstly by patrols and ambushes of about 30 men, followed by a full scale attack by the most direct route.
7. Tps who occupy properly prepared positions, and who are determined to stand their ground and shoot him down as he appears, may eventually go down under strong superiority of enemy numbers, but will impose a lot of punishment in the process.
8. Clear evidence was gained of the hostility of the native population towards the enemy.

J. S. Hobbs

Lieut-Col
Comd 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

HQ 7 Aust Div
10 Sep 42
SG34/4/112

War Diary

GENERAL

A. The main factors which caused the withdrawal of MAROUBRA Force in the KOKODA GAP in the last week in Aug, appear to have been the following:-

1. The Japs gained the initiative before 2/14 and 2/16 Bns reached ISURAVA because -

(a) the disorganisation of sups caused by the Jap air attack on PORT MORESBY on 17 Aug delayed both bns at MYOLA for four days. They were unable to move fwd because of lack of food and amm;

(b) meantime, ineffective patrolling by 53 Bn had given the enemy a chance to launch a strong attack against 39 Bn's posns at ISURAVA and to manoeuvre into posns from which to comd the high ground on either flank. 39 Bn was being strongly attacked when the first coys of 2/14 Bn reached HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde at ALOLA on 26 Aug.

2. 21 Bde were unable to wrest the initiative from the enemy because the comd was compelled to use his AIF bns to extricate 39 Bn and 53 Bn. In doing this, he had to commit so much of his force that he could not regain the advantages lost by the failure of the 53 Bn patrols on the flanks.

3. Result was that the Japs established themselves on high ground on either flank and made the posn of the main force on the MYOLA-KOKODA track untenable. Strong patrols of 2/16 Bn endeavoured to regain the high ground, but found the enemy strongly established in superior numbers. The enemy throughout had sufficient numbers to maintain strong pressure on the force holding the track. If Comd 21 Bde had had another reliable bn, he could probably have relieved pressure on his centre by driving the enemy from their posns on the high ground on the flanks.

4. In spite of their strenuous march to the front, both AIF bns arrived remarkably fresh and fit. They were at a serious disadvantage because their uniforms and eqpt were inadequately camflgd. Tps invariably reported that they could not see the enemy till they were right upon them. The Japs appear to have a definite advantage in having prepared for jungle warfare more scientifically - in regard to eqpt and clothing - than we have.

5. "Q" rather than "G" factors are still the governing ones in this campaign. Our tps appear to have been out-fought and out-manoeuvered primarily because the enemy had superior numbers, and it appears likely that he will have until "Q" problems become more difficult for him. Comd 21 Bde believed that the ^{enemy} is tackling his "Q" problems so thoroughly that he intends to try to push a comparatively large force through the mountains - eg, he is already cutting a 9-ft wide mule track along the back of the ridge east of EORA CREEK leading across the main range to MYOLA. In view of this and of the losses sustained by 2/14 and 2/16 Bns, it seems that even with the help of 2/27 Bn Comd 21 Bde may not have sufficient tps to hold the enemy on both the KAGI and MYOLA tracks.

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

B. When 21 Bde took over comd of MAROUBRA Force, it was believed that patrols of 53 Bn had been effective in keeping contact with the enemy on the MYOLA-KOKODA track and in watching the flanks. This proved to be wrong. On the left flank on the high ground above the main track, the enemy quietly established themselves on

ridges which the 53 Bn patrols had reported were clear. By gaining comd of this ground, the enemy were placed in a strong posn to attack the 39 Bn's FDLs, which they did on 26 Aug (the day the leading coys of 2/14 Bn were due to arrive from NYOLA).

From then on, the coys of 2/14 Bn, as they arrived, had to be used to extricate the 39 Bn from posns which became extremely difficult to hold after the enemy forced the patrols of 53 Bn off the high ground.

Posns, in addition, appear to have been/well prepared. 39 Bn lacked trenching tools and many of the posns 2/14 Bn took over were not proper weapon pits but merely shallow trenches dug with bayonet and steel helmet. In spite of this, B Coy 2/14 Bn, which took over the most exposed and least well prepared posn, re-took its posn five times after it had been overwhelmed by the enemy. The sixth time, it failed to regain the lost ground. Once they had forced our left flank and established themselves on the high ground, the enemy were able to keep their advantage because Comd 21 Bde never had enough tps to spare to drive them off the commanding ridge.

The primary reason for this was that, in the meantime, the posn on the opposite side of the valley had deteriorated to such an extent that this flank was also open. On 25 Aug, a standing patrol of 53 Bn was attacked at KAILE. It fought well and held KAILE all that day but was not able to prevent the Japs penetrating to MISIMA. Fwd of MISIMA, the enemy encountered the relief patrol on its way to KAILE. This patrol had not taken its automatic weapons with it as it was easier to exchange them with the fwd patrol. The relief patrol withdrew apparently in some disorder, because it was six hours before 21 Bde was advised of the Jap penetration to ABCUARI. 53 Bn was then ordered to restore the posn and two coys were detailed. The attempt was unsuccessful. The CO, Lt-Col WARD, proceeding down the MISIMA track in the wake of his tps, heard the firing cease and presumed that his tps were driving the Japs back. He walked into an enemy ambush and was killed. This flank was dangerously open until the leading coys of 2/16 Bn arrived. Two coys were sent to clear the ridge, but by this time the Japs had established themselves on the top of the ridge, so far along that they were able to bring MMG and mortar fire from there against the flank of our forces on the opposite side of the valley. The 2/16 Coys found they could not drive the Japs off the ridge without additional help. Two pls D Coy 53 Bn were sent to work round the enemy's flank and attack down the ridge while the 2/16 Coys continued attack up-hill. The 53 Bn pls failed to reach their start-line. Unassisted, the 2/16 Coys could not dislodge the enemy and they were withdrawn because the enemy had out-flanked the 2/14 Bn on the track and had already attacked both HQ 21 Bde and HQ 2/14 Bn.

Comd 21 Bde, throughout, was aware of the importance of holding the high ground on the flanks, but in view of the continued pressure on the centre and the failure of the 53 Bn, the comd had insufficient tps for the task.

sgd J L MARCHANT

Capt
for Col
GS 7 Aust Div.

WAR DIARY
or
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

from 0700 hrs 23 Sep 42 to 0700 hrs 24 Sep 42.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

File by [unclear]

Is this correct? Let me know

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	<u>Serial</u> No.			
	1	0830	CO, Adjt, IO, C/D Coy recce and prepare plan of coy defensive area SOUTH of DOHA DOHA	(Later confirmed by Capt Brocksopp that light from enemy cruiser which had come to rescue Jap party on Normanby Is.
	2	0830	Airforce advise that C Coy arrives safely at MALANA. Report also that enemy searchlight seen at CAPE PIERSON at 0100 hrs.	
	3	1000	BAIBAINNE outpost reported arrival of 5 natives from TAUPOTA bringing in Jap capt etc, and information re 19 Japs who were at TAUPOTA 2 days ago. -- Escorted to Bde.	
	4	1145	Bde advises that Lt BRISON is to form Bde pack tpt sec 24 Sept.	
	5	1330	Air raid red.	
	6	1335	5 Jap bombers and 3 Zeros fly over MILNE BAY area towards SAHARI, reform there and thence on to NORMANBY IS. Sighted 1400 by Capt Brocksopp flying about 100 ft above him. -- No action by A.A. noted again, and no interception by own aircraft.	
	7	1450	Receive message that 2/9 Bn is to recce bn posn HAGITA POND and defen. posns at BAIBAINNE and DOHA DOHA.	
	8	1455	All clear.	
	9	1455	Wharf working parties return.	
	10	1500	Bde advise that C Coy will be returning 2200 hrs. Lt HARKIE at 1200 hrs had reached HADE GADI with 3 Jap pris	
	11	1500	R.D.F. advise that Jap aircraft reced islands around SAHARAI. -- Same a/c noted above.	
	12	1515	D Coy less 17 PI move from C Coy's area to new area SOUTH of CCS. -- 17 PI remains guarding C Coy's line	
	13	1630	C Coy had embarked safely. Due GILI GILI 2300.	
	14	2150	Capt Brocksopp reports in with PSW. His report will be submitted later. He recommended that a small party could have done better than 1 coy. -- No preparations for handling PSW above Bns yet.	
	15	2330	17 PI rejoins D Coy, and Lt Forward returns to D Coy.	

and 17 24/9

J. J. Sobbs
Lt-Col
Comd 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

Bdr bnd

SECRET

ADON HQ Coy 2/9 Bn
BAGO HQ 2/5 Bn
BELO A Coy 2/12 Bn
BEMA HQ 9 Bn
CERA B Coy 2/12 Bn
DATO D Coy 2/10 Bn
EBID D Coy 2/12 Bn
GOLA HQ 2/12 Bn
GUBA A Tp 4 Bty 101 A Tk Regt
HUXU A Coy 2/9 Bn
KIKA HQ 2/5 Fd Regt
KOPA HQ Coy 2/10 Bn
KUNA HQ 2/9 Bn
LEFI A Coy 2/10 Bn
PIDI C Coy 2/9 Bn
RIGU HQ 61 Bn
RUZI B Coy 2/10 Bn
SODA HQ Coy 2/12 Bn
TAGI HQ 2/10 Bn
TARO 9 Bty 2/5 Fd Regt
TOMA 10 Bty 2/5 Fd Regt
UBIN B Coy 2/9 Bn
VOFO D Coy 2/9 Bn
WIKA HQ 2/7 Bn
WEYO C Coy 2/12 Bn
YANI 55 Bty 2/5 Fd Regt
YEDI HQ 2/6 Bn
YOGI HQ 25 Bn
YIPO C Coy 2/10 Bn
RAPO HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde (for use in reference only)

KURA HQ 2/9 Bn
ADON HQ Coy
MUKU A "
UBIN B "
PIDI C "
VOFO D "

TAGI HQ 2/10 Bn
KOPA HQ Coy
LURI A "
RUZI B "
YIPO C "
DATO D "

GOLA HQ 2/12 Bn
SODA HQ Coy
BFLO A "
CHRA B "
WYFO C "
WBID D "

GURA A Tp 4 Bty 101 Aust A Tk Regt
BENA HQ 9 Bn
YOGI HQ 25 Bn
RIGU HQ 61 Bn
BAGO HQ 2/5 Bn
YUDI HQ 2/6 Bn
WIKI HQ 2/7 Bn
KILA HQ 2/5 Fd Regt
TARO 9 Bty 2/5 Fd Regt
TOMA 10 Bty 2/5 Fd Regt
YANI 55 Bty 2/5 Fd Regt

RAPO HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde (for use in reference only)

25 Sep 42.

18 AUSST INF BDE OP INSIN No. 18.Ref Map: SAMARAI 1" = 4 miles.INFORMATION

1. A number of small parties of enemy have been reported on N.E. coast between both incl AWAIMA BAY and WEDAUI. These parties do NOT appear to be organised, and in most cases are poorly armed. There have been a number of clashes between Jap parties and our detts at WEDAUI and TAUPOTA.
2. Natives, believed reliable, state that there is a party of 84 Japs with a number of rifles at HUHUNA area AWAIMA BAY. (L. 5853).
3. Further reports state that a party of 30 Japs is at HEOGE I., 2964. LMG and rifles suspected. Japs looting native gardens.
4. A. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn is operating on EAST CAPE PENINSULA from WAGA WAGA 25 Sep/1 Oct.
5. Det at TAUPOTA comprises one pl of 61 Aust Inf Bn and one pl 25 Aust Inf Bn under comd Lieut COLLINS. One pl 2/9 Aust Inf Bn is at WEDAUI.
6. Det J. Sec Sigs will come under comd D. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to operate W/T sets at WEDAUI and TAUPOTA.
7. A.A.F. is arranging fighter protection during sea voyage.

OPERATION

8. D. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will relieve 7 Aust Inf Bde det at TAUPOTA and will remain on N.E. coast in area TAUPOTA - WEDAUI capturing or destroying any enemy encountered.

METHOD

9. Comd.
 - (a) Comd - Capt E. BARNES, 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
 - (b) D. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will be under direct operational comd of 18 Aust Inf Bde.
 - (c) On adm matters D. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will remain under comd parent unit.
10. Not less than one pl will be based in general areas of TAUPOTA and WEDAUI respectively.
11. Dispositions of Coy HQ and remaining pl will be notified to this HQ.
12. ROLE OF TAUPOTA DET.
 - (a) Maintain coast watching post vicinity of TAUPOTA.
 - (b) Deal with Jap parties attempting to pass through area.
 - (c) Subject to (b) to patrol coastal approaches to TAUPOTA.
 - (d) In event of enemy incursions beyond capacity of det it will retire on GILI GILI and delay enemy advance.

ROLE OF WEDAU DET.

- (a) Maintain coast watching post vicinity WEDAU.
- (b) Deal with Jap parties attempting to pass through area.
- (c) Subject to (b) patrol coastal approaches to WEDAU especially from N.W..
- (d) In the event of enemy incursions beyond capacity of det it will retire along track WEDAU - MILNE BAY and delay any enemy advance along that route.

D. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and det J. Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div will report to GILI GILI jetty prepared to embark in accordance with instns to be issued.

AAING will be mounted on boats in addition to .50 cal guns provided by AMDC for trip.

D. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will take over reserve amn, sups and tentage now at TAUPOTA.

S.C. is arranging for 30 days sups (incl quinine) and amn to be loaded into boats. These will be off loaded with dets in appropriate amounts.

S.B's. will be allotted to all dets.

D. Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will take over one No. 11 Set now at TAUPOTA. This set will be manned by personnel of J. Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div.

Reporting code now in use at WEDAU and TAUPOTA will be continued.

Reports will be rendered to this HQ at 0700, 1300 and 1700 hrs and otherwise as deemed necessary.

ACK.

J. Barnes
Major.
BN 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Time of Signature 1345 hrs.

Method of issue by 10 & through sups

DISTRIBUTION:

Capt. BARNES (2/9 Aust Inf Bn)	Copy No. 1
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	2
7 Aust Inf Bde	3
Comd.	4
B.M.	5
S.C.	6
Bde Sig Offr	7
Bde Offrs File	8
Spare	9
War Diary	10-11
File	12.

20 Sep 42.

18 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No. 17.

Ref Map: NORMANBY ISLAND 1" = 4 miles.

INFORMATION1. Enemy

- (a) A party of Japs est strength 70 and believed to be survivors of destroyer sunk by RAAF on 11 Sep approx 25 miles East of NORMANBY ISLAND, is reported to be spread over the villages of KWANOULA, SOIA SOIA and MAIWABA.
- (b) It is reported that this party, which included a number of wounded, landed in one launch and one barge. RAAF have not seen either Japs or craft referred to but have sighted a number of native craft at the above villages.
- (c) The Japs are reported to be occupying native houses in ones and twos along a considerable stretch of narrow coastal strip backed by jungle.
- (d) It is reported that the only weapons possessed by the Japs are two bayonets. No reliable report can be obtained on this point.
- (e) Tac/R 18 Sep reported sighting of possible tank in area KORONAU-AI (SE corner of island). There are no vehs on island and ANGAU discount any possibility of there being a tank.
- (f) A ships searchlight was seen off DAUADA night 13/14 Sep. This may possibly have been a Jap ship searching for survivors.
- (g) MILNE FORCE have ordered 18 Aust Inf Bde destroy or capture all enemy on NORMANBY ISLAND.

2. Own Tps.

- (a) HMAS STUART is to cooperate in ops to the following extent:-
- (i) embark all tps GILI GILI 1700/1800 hrs 21 Sep.
 - (ii) disembark tps NADI NADI as soon as practicable after first light 22 Sep.
 - (iii) re-embark all tps NADI NADI 1600hrs 23 Sep.
 - (iv) disembark all tps GILI GILI on return.
 - (v) provide naval cover against hostile enemy action as practicable.
- (b) The following small craft are moving to NADI NADI on 21 Sep:-
- (i) MV GILI GILI
 - (ii) MV TIERYO
 - (iii) MV KISMET
 - (iv) two whalers.
- (c) RAAF is providing air cover as practicable.

INTENTION

3. C. Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will capture or destroy enemy in area KWANOULA.

METHOD

4. Comd

- (a) All military ops will be under comd Capt J.E. BROCKSOPP, 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.
- (b) Should circumstances render it essential Capt BROCKSOPP shall be at liberty to depart from the letters of these orders, making such new arrangements with Captain HMAS STUART and others as may be necessary.
- (c) Capt MARSHALL, 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will join HMAS STUART 21 Sep and will remain there as Military Liaison Offr until conclusion of ops.

5. Disembarkation and Re-embarkation.

- (a) Disembarkation and re-embarkation will be carried out under orders of Naval Beach Master detailed by Captain HMAS STUART.
- (b) Lieut. FORWARD and 3 OR's will remain at NADI NADI as Beach Party and will carry out instns of Naval Beach Master.
- (c) Re-embarkation into "GILIGILI", "TIERYO" and "KISMET" on 23 Sep will be carried out in such time that all tps are embarked in these boats by 1600 hrs.
- (d) MV GILI GILI carrying res rations will remain at NADI NADI from time of arrival until after departure of HMAS STUART with re-embarked tps 23 Sep. Under no circumstances must this be departed from.

in completion of operations

6. Guides.

Capt TIMPERLY (ANGAU) will provide guides as required by Capt. BROCKSOPP or his representative.

7. Secrecy.

Proposed ops will be treated with a high degree of secrecy to prevent otherwise very probable enemy counter action.

8. Security

No papers or documents containing identification or other articles capable of giving infm of military value to the enemy, will be carried.

ADM

9. Dress

Battle Order with K.D. slacks.

10. Rations.

- (a) 3 days rations carried on man.
- (b) 7 days rations for all ranks will be carried in MV 'GILI GILI'. These rations will be placed on shore under orders of ~~OC~~ Beach Party if situation demands.

11. Water.

Chlorination tablets will be carried by all ranks.

12. Amn.

(a) First and Second line amn will be taken.

(b) Amn NOT carried on man will be placed on MV 'GILI GILI' and, if circumstances demand, landed under orders of O.C. Beach Party.

13. Weapons.

W.E. Scale will be taken.

14. Medical.

(a) 7 days quinine tablets will be carried in a tin by all ranks.

(b) All ranks will be in possession of FIRST FD DRESSING.

(c) S.B. will accompany dets.

15. Embarkation at GILI GILI.

Details later.

INTERCOMN

16. 108 Sets.

3 x 108 sets will be taken for intercomm.

17. Beach Sig Party.

(a) Bde Sig Offr will detail two W/T sets and personnel to report to HMAS STUART 21 Sep.

(b) One set will be landed at NADI NADI for intercomm Shore to Ship.

(c) Naval personnel of Beach Sig Party are being detailed by Captain HMAS STUART.

18. Bde Sig Offr will endeavour to arrange intercomm between HMAS STUART and HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK.

Jay [Signature]
Major.
BM 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Issued by hand and through Sigs.

Time of Signature 2.00 hrs.

DISTRIBUTION:

Capt. J.E. BROCKSOPP	Copy No. 1	Comd	Copy No. 8
Captain HMAS STUART	2	BM	9
RAAF	3	SC	10
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	4	Bde Sig Offr	11
Capt. MARSHALL, 2/9 Aust Inf Bn	5	Offrs File	12
		Spare	13
Lieut. FORWARD	6	War Diary	14/15
Capt. TIMPERLEY (ANGAU)	7	File	16,

Spare for oc Beach Party 3

Command

S E C R E T

11 SEPT 42.

Copy No 9

18 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No. 16

Ref Maps: GILI GILI and WAIGANI 3" = 1 mile.
Patrol Map N.E. NEW GUINEA 2" = 1 mile.

GENERAL

1. This Op Instn is issued to supplement Op Instn No. 15 of 9 Sep 42 and embodies all new information and amendments to 1100 hrs 11 Sep.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

2. RAAF Spotting Station is being established at MULLINS HARBOUR 11 Sep.
3. Anti para tp defence of STRIP No. 2 is immediate responsibility of E. Coy 46 Engr Bn USA and Det 104 Lt A.A. Bty USA. It is not intended at the present juncture to move further tps into this area.
4. List of adm and engr units falling within bn areas of responsibility is attached as Appx "A". This list is NOT exhaustive and is subject to revision. Bns will advise this HQ of any further adm or engr units within their areas.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST INCURSION BY TRACKS.

5. 7 Aust Inf Bde is responsible for all tracks over STIRLING RANGE East of and incl tracks DUIUA - TAUPOTA area.
6. (a) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn is responsible for all tracks over STIRLING RANGE from excl track DUIUA - TAUPOTA area to excl Track 10 - KALOLI CK.
- (b) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn will liaise direct with 7 Aust Inf Bde and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn regarding bdys.
7. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn is responsible for :-
- (a) All tracks over STIRLING RANGE from incl Track 10 - KALOLI CK to incl track 978997 - TOPURA.
- (b) Route 1, Route 3 and track along KALOLI CK to East of HAGITA.
- (c) Route 1 leading into HAGITA from WAIGANI.
8. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn is responsible for:-
- (a) All tracks leading into area over STIRLING RANGE from excl track 978997 - TOPURA.
- (b) All tracks leading in from MULLINS HARBOUR.
9. CO's will indicate in outline plans the size of proposed dets covering these tracks. At the present juncture it is NOT considered necessary or advisable to detach more tps from bns for this purpose than, in the majority of cases, one sec and in some cases one pl.

OPENING POSTS

10. (a) In addition to such other listening posts as bns may decide upon to implement this ins. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will establish posts, strength one sec as:-

- (i) SAGARI
- (ii) BALAGA or DUGHAMA
- (iii) On Track 6 leading to WEDAU.

(b) 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bns will make mutual arrangements for relief of 2/10 Bn posts already in posn.

COUNTER ATTACK ROLES

11. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will recce immediately possible counter-attack East along line of MAIWARA R.

12. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will recce immediately alternative route from HAGITA to West end STRIP 1 for use as route for possible counter attack.

ACK.

[Signature]
Major
BM 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Date of Signature 13/5/45

Issued by A. D. [Signature]

DISTRIBUTION

2/9 Aust Inf Bn	Copy No. 1
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	2
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	3
A. Tp 4 Bty 101 Aust AcTk Regt	4
Milne Force	5
7 Aust Inf Bde	6
AADC Rep (Capt STOUGHTON)	7
RAAF Def Offr	8
Comd	9
B.M.	10
S.C.	11
I.C.	12
T.O.	13
J. Sec Sigs	14
Gd Pl Comd	15
Offrs File	16
Spare	17
War Diary	18-19
File	20

APPX "A" TO 18 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No.16 of 11 SEPT 42.

Ref Maps: GILI GILI and WAIGANI 3" to 1 mile.

Admin Units in Unit Areas of Responsibility.2/9 Aust Inf Bn Area.

	<u>AIF and AMF</u>	<u>U.S.F.I.A.</u>	
1. 2/4 Aust Fd Coy	939983	1. E. Coy 46 Engrs	906007
2. Bomb Disposal Sec	939983	2. U.S. Hospital	909999
3. 2/6 Coy AASC	950983		
4. 25 Coy AASC	967984	<u>R.A.A.F.</u>	
5. 23 FAD	946983		
6. HQ Coy & A Coy		1. 8 Fighter Gp	943983
2/5 Aust Fd Amb	912998	2. 694 Sig Plotting	
7. HQ Coy 11 Aust Fd Amb.	909998	Sec.	943982.
8. 2/1 Aust C.C.S.	945984		

2/10 Aust Inf Bn Area.

	<u>AIF and AMF</u>	<u>U.S.F.I.A.</u>	
1. 12 Air Liaison Sec	GURNEY FIELD.	1. 101 CA Hy AA Bn	GURNEY FIELD.
2. 2/6 Bty 2/2 Aust Lt AA Regt	990989	2. 104 CA Hy AA Bn	GURNEY FIELD
3. Det 2 Aust Hy AA W/Shop Sec	983987		
4. 123 F.O.D.	983987	<u>R.A.A.F.</u>	
5. A. Coy 11 Aust Fd Amb	987988	1. RAAF Base Ops	973986
6. 10 Aust C.C.S.	985985	2. 37 Radio Sta	973986
7. 308 Aust Dental Unit	984991	3. R.D.E. Unit	976993
8. Med Stores Depot	985985	4. 75 Sqn	GURNEY FIELD
9. 2/47 Aust L.A.D.	978991	5. 76 Sqn	GURNEY FIELD
10. 18 Bde Sec Ord W/Shop	983987		
11. 18 Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk.	983987		
12. 101 Ind Bde Gp Ord W/Shop	983987		
13. 101 Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk	983987		

officers file
publ

SECRET

Copy No 16

SEPT 42.

68 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No. 15.

Ref Maps: GILI GILI and WAIGANA Sheets 3" = 1 mile.
SAMARAI 1" = 1 mile.
Patrol Map S.E. NEW GUINEA 1" = 2 miles.

INFORMATION

1. (a) Enemy

- (i) Further enemy operations against MILNE BAY area may be either sea or air borne or may be a combination of both.
- (ii) Inf may be landed in large numbers.
- (iii) Enemy tps may use parachutes or personnel planes which themselves may be crash landed on incomplete runways or in clearings.
- (iv) Tankettes may be landed by air or from the sea and medium tanks from the sea.

(b) Own Tps

- (i) Fwd - 7 Aust Inf Bde with u/c 9 Bty 2/5 Aust Fd Regt and 4 Bty less A Tp 101 Aust A.Tk Regt.
- (ii) Force Res - 18 Aust Inf Bde with u/c A.Tp 4 Bty 101 Aust A.Tk Regt.

2. Inter Bde Bdy (for operational purposes only)

GIBARA - junc MAIWARA R and KALOHI CK (990962) - KALOHI CK to junc Routes 1 and 3 (986987) - LAVIAM CK at 014010 (No. 1 Runway incl to 18 Aust Inf Bde) - along track to TAUPOTA (incl to 7 Aust Inf Bde).

3. 7b Aust Inf Bde is undertaking:-

(a) Defence against enemy tps from seaward on MILNE BAY incl:

- (i) Approaches along South and North shores of bay;
- (ii) Beach defences from, both incl, MAIWARA R to No. 3 STRIP.
- (iii) Defended localities in the area of No. 3 STRIP and RABI.
- (iv) Tracks over STIRLING RANGE East of and incl track GILIGILI - GARIUPUTA (Track No. 4 on patrol map - Not Route 4).

(b) Protection of No. 3 Runway against airborne or other attack.

INTENTION

4. 18 Aust Inf Bde will:-

- (a) be prepared to counter-attack in any direction, especially against any landing effected in MILNE Bay;
- (b) guard against incursion by -
 - (i) tracks over STIRLING Range from excl GILIGILI - GARIUPUTA to incl track WEDAU - GILIGILI;
 - (ii) tracks leading in from MULLINS HARBOUR.
- (c) dispose a det at WEDAU. - Separate instns will follow.
- (d) protect -
 - (i) No. 1 Runway (GURNEY FIELD);
 - (ii) No. 2 Runway.
- (e) provide task forces for special ops as required.

METHOD

5. General Defence Policy

- (a) The whole area occupied by MILNE FORCE is to be regarded as one locality, organised for allround defence.
- (b) The basis of the general defence policy will be the MAINTENANCE OF THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT AND OF OFFENSIVE ACTION. Sub-units will be disposed for prompt counter-attack and will be prepared to operate speedily in any direction within the scope of their tasks. Prior recce by all concerned and rehearsal of probable roles is essential. Defended localities are to be regarded primarily as bases from which mob offensive ops can be initiated and within which units can reorganise and replenish amn and sups.
- (c) A determination never to surrender will be inculcated in all ranks.
- (d) The principles laid down in A.T.M's 10 and 11 for defence against Jap tactics will be studied and followed. Attention is specially directed to Chap. X of A.T.M. 10 and Appx "A" to A.T.M. 11.
- (e) Particular attention will be paid to:-
 - (i) Physical fitness and tng i jungle conditions;
 - (ii) Depth in defence especially along rds and tracks in close country;
 - (iii) The necessity for guarding all avenues of quick approach into our posns;
 - (iv) The importance of patrolling, especially to flanks when country permits;
 - (v) The paramount importance of aggressive action.

6. Essentials of Defence

It is essential that runways are secured for our use and denied to the enemy. This will necessitate:-

- (a) The disposition of tps at runways for defence against both airborne and ground attack;

6.

- (b) The disposition of tps on all approaches from MILNE BAY into bde area;
- (c) The disposition of tps to secure approaches from WEDAUI and MULLINS HARBOUR;
- (d) The maintenance of local mob res for counter attack purposes;
- (e) The maintenance of a general res for counter attack purposes.

7.

Defended Localities

- (a) Every unit and sub-unit, incl adm pts, will be organised in defended localities for allround defence;
- (b) All fd works will be camouflaged. Advantage will be taken of long grass to aid in concealment;
- (c) Such localities will be wired and provision made for storing food, water and amm sufficient for 7 days;
- (d) Localities will be sited to protect all adm installations and dumps of amm, sups and POL within the bde area.
- (e) When siting and constructing fd works full consideration will be given to drainage so as to prevent their becoming valueless. Necessary drainage will therefore be carried out concurrently with construction of works

8.

Aerodrome and Anti Para Tp Defence.

- (a) Bns responsible for the defense of runways will dispose NOT less than one rifle coy supported by a proportion of MMG's and 3" Mortars for perimeter defence;
- (b) CO of Bn concerned will coordinate AA, Engr and AAF units in the defence of the runways;
- (c) AAF ground staffs and adm units (other than those already organised in defence of runways - sub-para (b)) are to prepare defended localities near the areas in which they normally work. These will be manned in the event of units primary task becoming no longer possible. CO's will advise and assist all such units within or adjacent to their areas and will coordinate their defences into a general plan.
CO's will impress upon OC's of such units that, in the event of enemy penetration, they are to fight from localities referred to until the situation is restored. It must be remembered however that engns and adm tps are to be allowed to carry on their primary tasks under the comd of their respective heads of services as long as possible. CO's will notify this HQ immediately upon assuming active operational comd of any such units
- (d) Senior inf offr will, in the event of attack, assume comd of all tps in runway area;
- (e) Aerodrome perimeter defences will be continuously manned and all tps manning them will Stand To one hour before dark and first light;
- (f) Arrangements for defence against para tps, detailed in MILNE FORCE Op. Instn No. 5 of 19 Aug will continue.

9. Tps Available

- (i) HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde }
 J. Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div } Bde HQ
 11 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn }
 2/47 Aust LAD }
- (ii) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
- (iii) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.
- (iv) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.
- (v) A. Tp 4 Bty 101 Aust A.Tk Regt.

10. Responsibilities

(a) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

- (i) Protection of No. 1 Runway (GURNEY FIELD) and all immediate approaches thereto;
- (ii) Establishment of a defended locality or localities in present Bn area;
- (iii) Protection of 10 C.C.S. and D.I.D..
- (iv) Maintenance of mob res as large as possible consistent with above;
- (v) Recce and rehearsal of possible counter-attack roles, in particular No. 1 Runway, water front approaches, track GILIGILI - WAIGANI.
- (vi) Recce and report on all tracks or other avenues of approach into area;
- (vii) Protection against incursion into area by all tracks from excl track 12 to excl track 978997 - TAUPOLA to East of HAGITA and by Route 1, Route 3 on track along KALUBI CK to West of HAGITA. incl
0198

(b) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn

- (i) Establishment of a defended locality or localities in present bn area;
- (ii) Maintenance of mob res as large as possible consistent with above;
- (iii) Recce and rehearsal of possible counter-attack roles, in particular No. 1 Runway, No. 3 Runway, Water front approaches;
- (iv) Recce and report on all possible tracks or other avenues of approach into area;
- (v) Protection against incursion into area by all tracks from excl Track 4 GILIGILI-GARIUPUTA to incl Track 12.

(c) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn

- (i) Establishment of a defended locality or localities in present Bn area and protecting 2/1 C.C.S.;
- (ii) Recce and rehearsal of possible counter-attack roles, in particular No. 2 STRIP, No. 1 STRIP and waterfront approaches referred to in para 10(a)(vii).

10.

(c)

(iii) Protection against incursion into area by -

- (I) All tracks leading from MULLINS HARBOUR;
- (II) Track 6 from WEDA.U.

(d) Bde HQ

will establish defended locality in present situation.

(e) A. Tp 4 Bty 2 Aust A.Tk Regt.

In support 2/10 Aust Inf Bn. One sec will remain area HAGITA FORD - junc Routes 1,3 & 4^T to carry out role of countering enemy penetration past HAGITA FORD.

11. COs will fwd outline plans covering bn responsibilities to reach this HQ by 1600 hrs 10 Sept.

PATROLS

12. Units will implement a policy of active deep patrolling along all avenues of approach. A separate instn in this regard is to be issued. Pending its issue 48 notice must be given to this HQ of any other than purely local patrols in order that essential notice may be given to other units and formations.

13. TNG

Every opportunity will be taken to benefit from experience of jungle warfare, especially by night.


ADM

14. A separate Adm Instn will be issued.

INT^RCOMN

15. Bde HQ - Adm HQ - HAGITA HOUSE.
Battle HQ - 987996.

~~16x~~
ACK.


Major.
BM 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Time of Signature 1206 hrs.

Issued by hand + sigs

DISTRIBUTION

- ✓ 2/9 Aust Inf Bn
- ✓ 2/10 Aust Inf Bn
- ✓ 2/12 Aust Inf Bn
- ✓ A.Tp 4 Bty 101 Aust A.Tk Regt.
- ✓ MILNE FORCE
- ✓ 7 Aust Inf Bde
- ✓ AADC Rep (Capt STOUGHTON)
- ✓ RAAF Def Offr
- ✓ Comd
- ✓ B.M.
- ✓ S.C.
- ✓ I.O.

- 13 T.O.
- 14 J. Sec Sigs
- 15 Gd Pl Comd
- 16 Offrs File
- 17 Spare
- 18 W.D. (2)
- 19 File.

Offs File
11/9
Mack

S E C R E T

11 SEPT 42.

Copy No 16

18 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No. 16

Ref Maps: GILI GILI and WAIGANI 3" = 1 mile.
Patrol Map N.E. NEW GUINEA 2" = 1 mile.

GENERAL

1. This Op Instn is issued to supplement Op Instn No. 15 of 9 Sep 42 and embodies all new infoamtion and amendments to 1100 hrs 11 Sep.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

2. RAAF Spotting Station is being established at MULLINS HARBOUR 11 Sep.
3. Anti para tp defence of STRIP No. 2 is immediate responsibility of E. Coy 46 Engrn Bn USA and Det 104 Lt A.A. Bty USA. It is not intended at the present juncture to move further tps into this area.
4. List of adm and engrn units falling within bn areas of responsibility is attached as Appx "A". This list is NOT exhaustive and is subject to revision. Bns will advise this HQ of any further adm of engrn units within their areas.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST INCURSION BY TRACKS.

5. 7 Aust Inf Bde is responsible for all tracks over STIRLING RANGE East of and incl tracks DUIUA - TAUPOTA area.
6. (a) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn is responsible for all tracks over STIRLING RANGE from excl track DUIUA - TAUPOTA area to excl Track 10 - KALOHI CK.
- (b) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn will liaise direct with 7 Aust Inf Bde and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn regarding bdys.
7. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn is responsible for :-
- (a) All tracks over STIRLING RANGE from incl Track 10 - KALOHI CK to incl track 978997 - TOPURA.
- (b) Route 1, Route 3 and track along KALOHI CK to East of HAGITA.
- (c) Route 1 leading into HAGITA from WAIGANI
8. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn is responsible for:-
- (a) All tracks leading into area over STIRLING RANGE from excl track 978997 - TOPURA.
- (b) All tracks leading in from MULLINS HARBOUR.
9. CO's will indicate in outline plans the size of proposed dets covering these tracks. At the present juncture it is NOT considered necessary or advisable to detach more tps from bns for this purpose than, in the majority of cases, one sec and in some cases one pl.

LISTENING POSTS

10. (a) In addition to such other listening posts as bns may decide upon to implement this instn, 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will establish posts, strength one sec at:-

- (i) SAGARI
- (ii) BALAGA or DUGHAMA
- (iii) On Track 6 leading to WEDAU.

(b) 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bns will make mutual arrangements for relief of 2/10 Bn posts already in posn.

COUNTER ATTACK ROLES

- 11. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will recce immediately possible counter-attack East along line of MAIWARA R.
- 12. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will recce immediately alternative route from HAGITA to West end STRIP 1 for use as route for possible counter attack.

AGZ.

[Signature]
Major
BM 13 Aust Inf Bde.

Time of Signature 1315 hrs.

Issued by *[Signature]*

DISTRIBUTION

- | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------|------------------------------|----------|-------|
| 2/9 Aust Inf Bn | (i) | SAGARI | Copy No. | 1 |
| 2/10 Aust Inf Bn | (ii) | BALAGA or DUGHAMA | | 2 |
| 2/12 Aust Inf Bn | (iii) | On Track 6 leading to WEDAU. | | 3 |
| A. Tp 4 Bty 101 Aust A. Tk Regt | | | | 4 |
| Milne Force | | | | 5 |
| 7 Aust Inf Bde | | | | 6 |
| AADC Rep (Capt STOUGHTON) | | | | 7 |
| RAAF Def Offr | | | | 8 |
| Comd | | | | 9 |
| B.M. | | | | 10 |
| S.C. | | | | 11 |
| I.O. | | | | 12 |
| T.O. | | | | 13 |
| J. Sec Sigs | | | | 14 |
| Gd Pl Comd | | | | 15 |
| Offrs File | | | | 16 |
| Spare | | | | 17 |
| War Diary | | | | 18-19 |
| File | | | | 20 |

APPX "A" TO 18 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No.16 of 11 SEPT 42.

Ref Maps: GILI GILI and WAIGANI 3" to 1 mile.

Admin Units in Unit Areas of Responsibility.2/9 Aust Inf Bn Area.

	<u>AIF and AMF</u>		<u>U.S.F.I.A.</u>
1. 2/4 Aust Fd Coy	939983	1. E. Coy 46 Engrs	906007
2. Bomb Disposal Sec	939983	2. U.S. Hospital	909999
3. 2/6 Coy AASC	950983		
4. 25 Coy AASC	967984	<u>R.A.A.F.</u>	
5. 23 FAD	946983		
6. HQ Coy & A Coy		1. 8 Fighter Gp	943983
2/5 Aust Fd Amb	912998	2. 694 Sig Plotting	
7. HQ Coy 11 Aust Fd Amb.	909998	Sec.	943982
8. 2/1 Aust C.C.S.	945984		

2/10 Aust Inf Bn Area.

	<u>AIF and AMF</u>		<u>U.S.F.I.A.</u>
1. 12 Air Liaison Sec	GURNEY FIELD.	1. 101 CA Hy AA Bn	GURNEY FIELD.
2. 2/6 Bty 2/2 Aust Lt AA Regt	990989	2. 104 CA Hy AA Bn	GURNEY FIELD
3. Det 2 Aust Hy AA W/Shop Sec	983987		
4. 123 F.O.D.	983987	<u>R.A.A.F.</u>	
5. A. Coy 11 Aust Fd Amb	987988	1. RAAF Base Ops	973986
6. 10 Aust C.C.S.	985985	2. 37 Radio Sta	973986
7. 308 Aust Dental Unit	984991	3. R.D.E. Unit	976993
8. Med Stores Depot	985985	4. 75 Sqn	GURNEY FIELD
9. 2/47 Aust L.A.D.	978991		
10. 18 Bde Sec Ord W/Shop	983987	5. 76 Sqn	GURNEY FIELD
11. 18 Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk.	983987		
12. 101 Ind Bde Gp Ord W/Shop	983987		
13. 101 Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk	983987		

July 85 & 5/9

18 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No. 14.

Ref Maps: GILI GILI and WAIGANI Sheets 3" = 1 mile.
 SAMARAI 1" = 1 mile.
 PATROL MAP S.E. NEW GUINEA 1" = 2 m

INFORMATION

1. (a) Enemy

(i) ^{Further} Enemy operations against MILNE BAY area may be either ~~air~~ or sea borne or may be a combination of both. _{sea air}

(ii) Enemy tps may use parachutes or personnel planes which themselves may be crash landed on incomplete runways or in clearings.

(iii) Tankettes may be landed by air or from the sea and ~~light~~ tanks from the sea.

(iv) Inf ^{medium} may be landed, possibly in large numbers.

(b) Own Tps

The whole area occupied by MILNE FORCE is to be regarded as one locality, organised for allround defence.

2. Groupings. (b) Own Tps

(a) Fwd - 7 Aust Inf Bde with u/c 9 Bty 2/5 Aust Fd Regt and 4 Bty less one tp 101 Aust A.Tk Regt.

(b) Force Res- 18 Aust Inf Bde with u/c A. tp 4 Bty 101 Aust A.Tk Regt.

3. Inter Bde Bdy (for operational purposes only)

GIBARA - junc MAIWARA R+ and KALOHI CK (990962) - KALOHI CK to junc routes 1 and 3 (986987) - LAVIAM CK at 014010 (No. 1 Runway incl to 18 Aust Inf Bde) - along track to TAUPOTA (incl to 7 Aust Inf Bde).

4. 7 Aust Inf Bde is undertaking:-

(a) Defence against enemy tps from seaward on MILNE BAY incl:

(i) approaches along South and North shores of bay

(ii) track MULLINS HARBOUR via GIBARA ^{DUBA}

(iii) tracks over STIRLING RANGE East of ~~track~~ track WEDAU - EAVORI.

(b) Protection of No. 3 runway against ~~air~~ borne or other attack

para 5'

delete (b) and substitute

(b) guard against incursion ⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ by tracks
over STIRKINA range from pt ⁽ⁱⁱ⁾ GIN - GARAUPUTA
to incl track WEDAW - AIKAIKI

(ii) tracks leading in from MOKHINS
HARBOR

INTENTION

5. 18 Aust Inf Bde will:-

- (a) be prepared to counter-attack in any direction, especially against any landing effected in MILNE BAY;
- (b) guard against incursion via routes:-
 - (1) ~~MULLINS BARHOUR - DUBA incl ;~~
 - (ii) ~~WEDAU - EAVORI.~~
- (c) dispose a det at WEDAU. - *Separate units will follow*
- (a) protect:-
 - (1) No. 1 Runway (GURNEY FIELD);
 - (ii) No. 2 Runway.
- (e) provide task forces for special ops as required.

METHOD

6. General Defence Policy

(A) Take in 1.(b)

- (a) *(b)* The basis of the general defence policy will be the ~~MAINTENANCE~~ MAINTENANCE OF THE OFFENSIVE SPIRIT AND OF OFFENSIVE ACTION. Sub units will be disposed for prompt counter attack and will be prepared to operate speedily in any direction within the scope of their tasks. Prior recce by all concerned and rehearsal of probable roles is essential. Defended localities are to be regarded primarily as bases from which mob offensive ops can be initiated and within which units can reorganise and replenish amn and sups.
- (b) A determination never to surrender will be inculcated in all ranks.
- (c) The principles laid down in A.T. M's 10 and 11 for defence against Jap tactics will be studied and followed. Attention is specially directed to Chap X of A.T.M. 10 and Appx X "A" to A.T.M. 11.
- (a) Particular attention will be paid to:-
 - (1) Physical fitness and tag in jungle conditions
 - (ii) Depth in defence especially along roads and tracks in close country;
 - (iii) The necessity for guarding all avenues of quick approach into our posns;
 - (iv) The importance of patrolling, especially to flanks when country permits.
 - (v) The paramount importance of aggressive action

7. Essentials of Defence

It is essential that runways are secured for our use and denied to the enemy. This will necessitate:-

- (a) The disposition of tps at runways for defence against both airborne and ground attack;
- (b) The disposition of tps on all approaches from MILNE BAY into bde area;
- (c) The disposition of tps to secure approaches from WEDAU and

b) all fort works will be camouflaged advantage will be taken by long grass to aid in concealment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MULLINS HARBOUR;

- (e) The maintenance of local mob res for counter attack purposes;
- (f) The maintenance of a general res for counter attack purposes.

8. Defended Localities

Make use of long grass to hide earth works

- (a) Every unit and sub-unit, incl adm units, will be organised in defended localities for allround defence;
- (b) Such localities will be wired and provision made for storing food, water and amm sufficient for 7 days;
- (c) Localities will be sited to protect all adm installations and dumps of amm, sups and POL within the bde area.

9. Aerodrome and Anti Para Tp Defence

- (a) Ens responsible for the defence of runways will dispose NOT less than one rifle coy supported by a proportion of MMG's and 3" Mortars for perimeter defence;
- (b) C.O. of bn concerned will coordinate AA, Engr and AAF units in the defence of runways;
- (c) AAF ground staffs and adm units (other than those organised in defence of runways - sub-para (b)) are prepared defended localities near the areas in which they normally work. These will be manned in the event of units primary task becoming no longer possible. CO of bn concerned will advise and assist such units, and will coordinate their defences into a general plan *see such within or adjacent to this area*
- (d) Senior inf offr will, in the event of attack, assume comd of all tps in runway area;
- (e) Aerodrome perimeter defences will be continuously manned and all tps manning them will stand to one hour before before dark and first light;
- (f) Arrangements for defence against para tps, detailed in MILNE FORCE Op. Instn No. 5 of 19 Aug will continue.

10. Tps Available

- (i) HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde
J. Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div
11 Fl Aust HQ Gd Bn
2/47 Aust LAD } Bde H.Q.
- (ii) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn
- (iii) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn
- (iv) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn
- (v) A.Tp 4 Bty 101 Aust A.Trk Regt.

XX - COSG will impress upon o's of such units that, in the event of enemy penetration, they are to fight from the localities referred to until the situation is restored. It must be remembered however

that engineers and admin tps are to be allowed to
carry on their primary tasks under the command of
their respective units of services as long as possible. ^o
CO's will notify this HQ immediately upon
assuming active operational command of any
such unit.

81d)

When siting and constructing fort works full
consideration will be given to drainage so
as to prevent their becoming valueless.
Necessary drainage will therefore be
carried out concurrently with
construction of works.

2/AD
add (iii) (vii) § 11 a

Protection against incursion into area by
all limits from exd limit 12 to exd
limit 978994 - TAUPOKA to East 7
HAGITA and by routes 1, route 3
on track along KALUBI CK to ~~the~~ West
7 HAGITA

~~(viii) Area and reports on all tracks or
other~~

4/12

11(b) add

(v) Protection against incursion into area
by all limits from exd limit 4 BILIBILI -
CHAHIPUTA to exd limit 12

11(c) 4/9

add
(iii)

Protection against incursion into area
by
(i) all limits leading from MULLINS HARBOUR
(ii) limit 6 ~~to~~ from WEDAU

11. Responsibilities

(a) ^{2/10} 2/9 Aust Inf Bn

- (i) Protection of No. 1 Runway (GURNEY FIELD) and all immediate approaches thereto ~~incl track running North from 978994 - TAUPOLA;~~
- (ii) Establishment of a defended locality or localities in present bn area;
- (iii) Protection of 10 C.C.S. ^{4 D!D}
- (iv) Maintenance of mob res as large as is possible consistent with above;
- (v) Recce and rehearsal of possible counter-attack roles; ^{in particular No 1 runway, water front approaches, beach}
- (vi) Recce and report on all tracks or other avenues of approach into area.

(b) 2/12 Aust Inf Bn

GILGILI - WITIKINI

- (i) ~~Protection of No. 2 Runway and all immediate approaches thereto;~~
- (ii) ~~Guarding against incursion by tracks from WEDAU and MULLINS HARBOUR or other approaches into bn area;~~
- (iii) Establishment of a defended locality or localities in present bn area ~~and covering medical units situated there;~~
- (iv) Maintenance of mob res as large as is possible consistent with above;
- (v) Recce and rehearsal of possible counter-attack roles; ^{in particular No 1 Runway, No 3 runway, water front approaches}
- (vi) Recce and report on all possible tracks or other avenues of approach into area.

(c) ^{2/11} 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

- (i) ~~Bde res;~~
- (ii) Establishment of a defended locality or localities in present bn area ~~and protecting ADS;~~ ^{2/1 CCS}
- (iii) Recce and rehearsal of possible counter-attack roles; ^{in particular No. 1 Runway, No. 2 Runway, water front approaches and No. 3 Runway.}

(d) Bde H.Q. ~~will establish defended locality in present situation.~~

(e) A. Tp 4 Bty 2 Aust A.Tk Regt.

To be allotted. ^{in support} ~~under command of 2/10 and in bn. one~~ ^{will remain} ~~at~~ ^{with 1/17 Fordy - joint units 1, 3 & 4}

12. C.O's will fwd outline plans covering bn responsibilities to reach this HQ by 1600 hrs 26 Aug.

1600 hrs 10 Sep

++
in particular No 2 STRIP, water front, NO 1 STRIP and approaches referred to in para 11(c)(vii)

Counting enemy units role of punishment
Counting enemy punishment
post HPAITTA FORD.

PROLS

13. Units will implement a policy of active deep patrolling along all avenues of approach. A separate instn in this regard is to be issued. Pending its issue 48 hrs notice must be given to this HQ of any other than purely local patrols in order that essential notice may be given to other units. *information*

14. ENG

benefit from experience of

Every opportunity will be taken to train ~~troops~~ in jungle warfare, and to accustom them generally to local conditions, especially by night.

ADM

15. A separate Aqm Instn will be issued.

INTERCOMM

*adm Hq - 14th AIT 17 140057
D. Miller 1400 - 978996*

16. Bde HQ - remains present location.

17. Allocation of W/T Sets - One 101 Set to each Bn reports ~~forthwith~~ *forthwith, as early as practicable*

18. Frequencies, Call Signs - to be issued by Bde Sig Offr.

19. W/T Restrictions - Strict W/T and R/T silence will be observed until otherwise notified by this HQ.

20. Synchronisation - Bde time will be notified by L/T twice daily.

ACK

Capt.
Bde 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Time of Signature _____ hrs.

Issued _____

DISTRIBUTION

- 2/9 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/10 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/12 Aust Inf Bn
- A.Tp 4 Bty 101 Aust A.Tk Regt
- MILNE FORCE
- 7 Aust Inf Bde
- AADC rep (Capt STOUGHTON)
- RAAF Def Offr
- Comd
- B.M.
- S.C.
- I.O.
- T.O.
- J. Sec Sigs
- Gd. Pl. Comd.
- Offrs File
- Spare
- W.D.
- File.

①

In case of enemy attack (air and/or land) tie up of communications between all units in the coming up in the Bde area

②

Making of caches of food etc along tracks.

③

System of marking of tracks

④

When Coy goes to WEPAU build up reserve positions that you can fight on until reinforced & resupplied

20

then its name is a bad one and misleading and should be altered to some suitable name, e.g. "Jungle Dress."

In para 7(c) a description of a suggested jacket is given.

- (c) It is felt that the principal detraction to present eqpt lies in its shoulder straps which become greatly irksome under tropical conditions.
- (d) It is therefore recommended that in any redesigned eqpt the pouches etc should be hung from the belt. The haversack could be carried as at present but without being clipped to shoulder strap.
- (e) Many present inconveniences would be overcome by the provision of a many pocketed blouse. It is felt that this should not because of additional weight and greatly increased heat, be a separate garment but should replace the shirt after the style of the safari jacket with offr pattern side pockets, flap pockets on breast, and on the back a large pocket internally ^{divided} provided to replace the haversack.
- (f) In any event it is suggested that large thigh pockets be provided with all slacks.

G. F. W.

Brig.
Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde.

MILNE FORCE.

1. Ref your O.1072 of 16 Oct 42 the following represent the summarised views of units of this Bde.

2. These views are drawn from reports and recommendations of 2/9, 2/10 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns arising from MILNE BAY ops and upon consideration by 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns of the specific questions raised in your O.1072. It has not been possible to arrange for 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to give answers to these questions owing to their absence from this area.

3. (a) Jap Rifle Grenade Discharger.

Though noisy this weapon is ineffective lethally, a direct hit being virtually necessary to produce a casualty.

(b) Jap Type 89 Discharger.

(i) Again destructive power small compared with our own 2" Mortar. Noise and blast effect high.

(ii) Although this weapon is not one to be discounted and has one advantage over our own 2" Mortar in that its minimum range is 50 yds compared with our minimum range of 200 yds it is felt that its reduced effectiveness does NOT compensate for the advantages in lightness that it has over our own weapons.

4. 2" Mortar.

This is regarded as an excellent weapon and has proved most effective.

5. Spare Parts.

(a) Bren } W/F scale provided fully available satisfactory.
(b) MMG }

(c) Lewis - Not issued to this Bde.

(d) TSMG - It is suggested that the following spare parts and tools be made available with each TSMG:-

- (i) Spare return spring.
- (ii) Spare extractor.
- (iii) Clearing plug.

6. Molotov Cocktails.

(a) None of our units used the Molotov cocktails during the recent ops. From demonstration it is strongly felt that local conditions of excessive humidity and frequent and at times constant rain demand a more efficient manner of igniting cocktail.

(b) Experiments of using a 60 Grenade in conjunction with Molotov Cocktail have not been successful in igniting it.

7. Eqpt.

(a) The lightening of eqpt would be welcomed in principle.

(b) No comment is made on the proposal to issue an "assault jerkin" as no description of same is given or its particular advantages or usages.

If it is a garment or eqpt which is only put on for assault purposes as its name implies it would not appear to be of value in practice as it would have to be carried, perhaps for days, until an assault stage of battle is reached and would add weight and NOT reduce it.

If it is an article of eqpt or clothing for general battle use

MESSAGE FORM

IN 17

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

no work
pl complete file

OUT

4 18/10

No. of Groups
GR.



(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

18 Bde

FROM

MILNE FORCE

Originator's Number

01072

Date

16

In Reply to Number.

ref	telephone	conversation	Bde	C-2	PM 16
o	request	reports	o	men	who
have	actually	been	under	fire	effectiveness
or	otherwise	JAP	gunned	thrower	also
used	reports	efficiency	our	2	inch
MORTAR	o	also	review	of	space
parts	BREN	MMG	LEWIS	TSMG	o

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM



CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN
OUT

No. of Groups
GR.

2

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

What	use	made	of	MOLOTOV	cocktails
in	NG	apps	⊙	opinion	of
troops	consigning	light	weight	equipment	or
assault	junkies	of	green	canvas	with
pockets	for	grenade	hand	bombs	etc
⊙	con	such	reports	be	available
by	roy	1700	his	17	oct

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

MESSAGE FORM

**CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS.**

IN

OUT

3

No. of Groups
GR.

Serial No. *16 X 42*
OFFICE DATE STAMP
JUN 16 1942
SIGNALS

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY:)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number.

or failing that what is earliest

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN**
BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL
INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST
BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

2100/16

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

2212

T.O.R.

SIGNED

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.
<i>R</i>	<i>2212</i>		<i>R. K. ...</i>								

1. Ref your O.1072 of 16 Oct 42 the following represent the summarised views of units of this Bde.

2. These views are drawn from reports and recommendations of 2/9, 2/10 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns arising from MILNE BAY ops and upon consideration by 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns of the specific questions raised in your O.1072. It has not been possible to arrange for 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to give answers to these questions owing to their absence from this area.

3. (a) *Inf* Rifle Grenade Discharger.

Though noisy this weapon is ineffective lethally, a direct hit being virtually necessary to produce a casualty.

(b) *Inf* Type 89 Discharger.

(i) Again destructive power small compared with our own 2" Mortar. Noise and blast effect high.

(ii) Although this weapon is not one to be discounted and has one advantage over our own 2" Mortar in that its minimum range is 50 yds compared with our minimum range of 200 yds it is felt that its reduced effectiveness does not compensate for the advantages in lightness that it has over our own weapons.

4. 2" Mortar.

This is regarded as an excellent weapon *and has proved most effective* ~~for its purpose.~~

5. Spare Parts.

(a) Bren } W/E scale provided fully available satisfactory.
(b) MMG }

(c) Lewis - Not issued *to the Bde*

(d) TSMG - It is suggested that the following spare parts and tools be made available with each TSMG :-

- (i) Spare return spring.
- (ii) Spare extractor.
- (iii) Clearing plug.

6. Molotov Cocktails.

(a) None of our units used the Molotov cocktails during the recent operations. From demonstration it is strongly felt that local conditions demand a more efficient manner of igniting cocktail. *It remains hazardous and frequent and at times constant rain*

(b) Experiments of using a 36 Grenade in conjunction with Molotov Cocktail have not been successful in igniting it.

NOT

7. Eqpt.

(a) Both *the* ~~the~~ lightening of eqpt ~~and the possible provision of an assault jerkin~~ *are* welcomed in principle.

(b) *is* It is felt that the principle detractor ⁵ of present eqpt ~~is~~ in its shoulder straps which become greatly irksome under tropical conditions.

(c) It is therefore recommended that in any redesigned eqpt the pouches etc should be hung from the belt. The haversack could be carried as at present but without being clipped to shoulder strap

(d) Many present inconveniences would be overcome by the provision of a many-pocketed blouse. It is felt that this should not,

e, o

garment

because of additional weight and greatly increased heat, be a separate arrangement but should replace the shirt after the style of the safari jackets, with its offr pattern side pockets, flap pockets on breast, and on the back a large pocket internally provided to replace the haversack.

2/9 each in lbs.

1. Please advise urgently whether the above are in conformity with your views? Any alterations will be att. Any additions desired by 1600 hrs
2. Reply

[Signature] 2

Maj.

B. M. 18 Aust. Inf. Bde.

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- (i) Spare return spring.
- (ii) Spare extractor.
- (iii) Clearing plug.

6. Molotov Cocktails.

(a) None of our units used the Molotov cocktails during the recent operations. From demonstration it is strongly felt that local conditions demand a more efficient manner of igniting cocktail.

(b) Experiments of using a 36^{or 69} Grenade in conjunction with Molotov_q Cocktail have not been successful in igniting it.

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2/12 arch inf bo

1. Please advise urgently whether the above are in accordance with your views. Any additions or alterations

will be att.

2. Bde 1.0. will bring back this record with comment.

Garnerh 2

Maj.


18 Aust. Inf. Bde.

HQ 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
17 Oct 1942.

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde

In addition to the views on weapons and equipment set out in Bde memo, the following suggestion re clothing is put forward for consideration:-

In any new type of uniform for jungle warfare, consideration could be given to the design of the British Battle Dress, or the dress being issued to the Armoured Div. Attention is drawn particularly to the large thigh pockets which are most accessible and capable of holding Bren and TSMG mags, emergency rations, field dressing, maps and note pads.



Lt Col.

Comd 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

HQ 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
17 Oct 1942.

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde

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Lt Col.

Comd 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

Subject: Report on Army Sili Sili.

9 Fd. Battery
2/5 Fd. Regt. R.A.A.

5

11.9.42.

X NO.

18. Inf Bde.

Herewith report on Army ops at Sili.
Sili Aug/Sep 1942.

Leslie Capron Major
Commanding 9 Fd. Battery

O.P.S.

7/11/42

4/12/42

REPORT ON ARTILLERY OPERATION AT GILI GILI AUG/SEP 42

Notice of intended action was very short and with little time for intentions and reconnaissance of positions the guns were placed in action for their supporting role. Selection of area proved a very hard task as in practically every instance careful consideration and preparation was necessary. Coconut plantation proved a very difficult and jungle with a small amount of clearing gave quicker results. Roads throughout were in poor condition and almost without exception deeply rutted. This caused considerable worry as to vehicle and gun clearance and meant a large amount of manhandling, consequently change of position as far as possible had to be done during a dry spell.

2) Communications proved to be very lengthy and the Bty W/E found to be inadequate for this type of warfare. At least 30 miles should be available. Constant maintenance was necessary and strong parties had to be sent along lines for repairs.

3) Wireless gave good service provided sets were placed in clearings or on foreshores. Heavy rain played havoc with signal equipment and brought out the need for reserve equipment.

4) OPO suffered from the poor observation and had generally to get right on top of the target and engage as a close target. This is wasteful on ammunition as ranging is long and tedious.

Ranging in the sea was often resorted to and use of ears for sound when rounds fell in jungle or plantation.

5) Tractors of the Dodge 10 wheel type are ideal for this country and should be fitted with a front winch. Jeeps could be used to advantage by troops for taking personnel and equipment to OPs. M/cycles were useless, both mud and fords proving big obstacles. Only vehicles with high clearance and four wheel drive were of use.

6) *if available* For transport of guns to forward positions barges with a drop front could work along the coast. Small rubber tyred hand carts would facilitate the work of signallers by carrying reels and supplies. Log platforms for guns had to be built in several instances as firing sank the guns into soft mud.

Maps in any detail were unavailable and we had to rely on sketches made by compass and pacing which proved inaccurate and we were ~~unable~~ unable to obtain an air photograph of the area to check same.

7) During operations it was found difficult to indicate to the Air Force positions for bombing and strafing. A method tried was for the guns to put a round of smoke on each side of the target according to which was the wind was blowing. This proved very effective as the smoke drifted slowly through the trees and hung about the tops and was easily sighted by planes.

8) To thicken up the fire of the field guns the 3.7 A/A were tried but the time fuse failed to burst on impact. On experiment it was found that 117 and 119 fuses from 25 pdr shell fitted and on firing gave very effective bursts. These guns were later used in the field role when action went beyond the range of the 25 pdr on ranges up to about 20,000^x.

RECOMMENDATIONS

All personnel be armed.
Steel tracks be provided for vehicles
More jungle knives
F.W.D. for all trucks
3 Brens per Troop and B.H.Q. 2 ground defence 2 A/A.
Survey party in Bty in addition to CPO's party.

Signed *W. Winter* Maj.

O.C. 9 Fd Bty
2/5 Aust Fd Regt.

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Signed *W. H. Winton* Maj.

O.C. 9 Fd Bty
2/5 Aust Fd Regt.

27 Sep 42.

MILNE FORCE.

GENERAL

1. Survivors of a Jap destroyer which was sunk by RAAF approx 25 miles East of NORMANBY ISLAND on 11 Sep were reported in the vicinity of the village of KWANOULA on N.E. coast of the island.
2. It was reported that this party numbered approx 75, that a number were wounded and that they were short of food, scantily clad and probably without arms other than two bayonets.
3. Resident ANGAU officials from NORMANBY ISLAND urged that these Japs be dealt with as their continued presence was, in the opinion of ANGAU, lessening prestige and rendering administration and recruiting difficult.
4. Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde was instructed to prepare a plan and make all necessary preliminary arrangements for an expedition to capture or destroy enemy. MILNE FORCE advised that HMAS STUART (Commander S.H.K. SPURGEON RAN) would be available to cooperate.
5. Arrangements were made with the RAAF to bring Capt. TIMPERLY (ANGAU) and Mr. HENDERSON (a resident of NORMANBY ISLAND) to MILNE BAY to confer on the subject. They arrived by Catalina 20 Sep, the flying boat having taken with it to NORMANBY ISLAND an L.O. from this Bde.
6. On 20 Sep a conference was held at HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde which was attended by the NORMANBY ISLAND party abovementioned, and also at No. 1 HOUSE which was attended by Captain HMAS STUART and NORMANBY party. GOC MILNE FORCE was also present at second conference.
7. Both Capt. TIMPERLY and Mr. HENDERSON strongly urged the undertaking of the expedition for the reasons already stated. From the purely military viewpoint it appeared doubtful whether the expedition would succeed in capturing and destroying the enemy, as Capt. TIMPERLY and Mr. HENDERSON both stated definitely that it would be impossible to surprise the Japs who could easily escape into the jungle which was only a few yards from the huts in which they were living. It was suggested at the conference that a smaller number of soldiers be sent to NORMANBY ISLAND and stay there for say ten days to a fortnight so as to have time to hunt the Jap in the jungle. For various reasons GOC MILNE FORCE could not agree to this method. Owing to lack of charts of the particular area Capt. HMAS STUART desired to do disembarkation and embarkation in daylight. Night operations ashore offered no advantages to the military force, as owing to distance to be traversed on land no surprise could be effected. GOC MILNE FORCE after considering these representations and the availability of RAN, military and RAAF resources directed that the operations be undertaken.
8. Arrangements were made for Capt HMAS STUART to fly over the proposed area of ops so as to satisfy himself on the point of navigational difficulties. This was essential as his only guide was Mr. HENDERSON's local knowledge, HMAS STUART not possessing charts of the ~~area~~ North and N.E. of NORMANBY ISLAND.
9. On 21 Sep a coordinating conference was held at this HQ on the return of Capt HMAS STUART from aerial recce.
10. At this conference details of RAN and RAAF cooperation were gone over with Commander SPURGEON and Sqn-Ldr D. MARSHALL RAAF.

11. Military comd of the expedition was vested in Capt. J.E. BROCKSOFF, 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.
12. Att as Appx's are:-
 - (a) Appx 'A' - 18 Aust Inf Bde Op Instn No. 17 of 20 Sep.
 - (b) Appx 'B' - 2/10 Aust Inf Bn O.C. No. 3 of 21 Sep.
13. The force embarked on HMAS STUART at GILI GILI at 1500 hrs 21 Sep. The ship then moved down MILNE BAY, anchored and at approx 2300 hrs left for NORMANBY ISLAND.
14. Air cover had been arranged both for HMAS STUART and to cover both disembarkation and re-embarkation at NADI NADI.
15. Paras 16 to 20 incl are drawn from report submitted by Capt. BROCKSOFF.
16. Embarkation and disembarkation satisfactory and on time. Disembarkation at NADI NADI commenced 0630 hrs, MV 'TIERYO' with 13 Pl moving direct to SOBA LASI having arranged with destroyer to recall her by lamp signal if necessary. Beach party was established, immediate vicinity searched, and coy less 13 Pl and beach party moved off 0730 hrs. At DAWAUDA 15 Pl moved to inland track, remainder waiting for 25 minutes in order to synchronise times of arrival. Progress was slow owing to rough going, creeks etc. All villages were searched and coy less 13 and 15 Pls entered KAPA KAPAI (one of the MA IWA villages) at 1300 hrs, having split into three parties to cover all exits. No enemy encountered, no natives living in villages, but natives reported 36 Japs normally slept there and signs of their occupation were found, e.g. battery and lamp, bamboo torches, coconut fibre slippers and destroyer's motor boat on engine of which Japs had apparently been working. 2 1/3 with 14 Pl, less one sec proceeded SOIA SOIA and commando pl with one sec 14 Pl pursued Jap party inland along creek. Coy HQ established KAPA KAPAI where Jap boat was destroyed by fire and engine smashed as own launches could not get anchorage in the vicinity. No name on this boat. Mail bag found on board, herewith. Two Japs sighted here but escaped, subsequently being fired on by 2 1/c's party but escaped again. Commando Pl returned 1645 hrs, having followed Jap tracks until these showed Japs had split into small parties, natives advising Japs had had two hours start and one native saying he had fed 50 to 60 of them. 2 1/c's party and 15 Pl made contact at SOIA SOIA 1330 hrs 15 Pl having sighted no enemy but being advised by natives that five Japs went to village in hills for food about 0600 hrs, saw destroyer and hastily returned to coast. Patrols were sent out from here, one of these with native assistance locating six Jap wounded who were made prisoners. Another Jap was wounded and captured by this patrol. 13 Pl arrived SOIA SOIA 1615 hrs having sighted no enemy but receiving reports that three Japs, one possibly an offr, had sighted MV 'GILI GILI' 20 Sep from SOBALASI, and left that afternoon. Coy with prisoners reassembled KAPA KAPAI for the night. One of prisoners believed to be an offr and senior member of the enemy party.
17. Naval Activity.

From 2325 hrs to 0150 hrs two Jap warships patrolled the coast with searchlights, also possibly a launch with searchlight. Estimated these ships originally four miles out, closing in to two miles with launch even closer. One of these ships could have been a cruiser and reports have been furnished to HMAS STUART. Small vessels with beach party moved South without being caught in searchlights. Three fires were seen in the hills by beach party which could have been Jap signal fires or natives burning off.

18. 23 Sep.

13 Pl moved overland to DAUWADA, leaving 0615 hrs but no Japs encountered. 15 Pl with Coy Hq less OC moved with wounded along coast embarking on small vessels at LOBODA, except 15 Pl less one sec, who proceeded along the coast.

14 Pl with OC waited for further native reports of Jap activity and also moved along coast to DAUWADA. At DAUWADA 13 Pl embarked on MV 'KISMET' which was already carrying bulk of Coy Hq. At 1250 hrs three Mitsubishi 96 flew over at approx 100 feet with eight Zeros above. 'KISMET' was run aground and tps disembarked. No hostile action by enemy, own tps on shore withholding fire on account of party on launch. Tps then marched back to NADI NADI some difficulty arising over gear on 'KISMET' which was fast aground, but this was transhipped and taken to NADI NADI on "TIERYO".

19. Despite unavoidable delays re-embarkation was completed by 1607 hrs 23 Sep. Action stations sounded 1815 hrs, but nothing eventuated.

20. Natives.

Information generally reliable. Brought in their women from the bush and reoccupied villages. Obviously impressed by our force and began to cooperate capturing one Jap at DAUWADA.

21. HMAS STUART returned to GILI GILI at 2100 hrs 23 Sep when prisoners (eight in number incl seven wounded) and tps were disembarked without incident.

INTERCOMM.

22. During ops, direct intercomm was maintained between this Hq - at HAGITA, HMAS STUART, and Beach Party at NADI NADI - this latter some 70 miles by air line from HAGITA.

23. Report of Bde Sig Dftr is attached as Appx 'C'.

24. Intercomm was also maintained by RAAF signals between MILNE BAY, HMAS STUART and both recce and fighter aircraft providing air cover.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

25. The following are submitted:-

26. Mosquito Craft.

It is recommended, and this is strongly supported by Commander S.H.K. SPURGEON of HMAS STUART, that "mosquito" motor craft such as are readily available in large numbers in Australia be made available and held locally for possible ops of this nature.

27. Craft of this nature, available in the necessary numbers, would enable the dispersed movement of large numbers of men together with stores to almost any part of the neighbouring islands.

28. Provided fighter cover is available to cover hostile strafing, the dispersion achieved would greatly reduce risk from bombing, while AALMG could be mounted in considerable numbers to meet low flying attack.


29. A naval screen could be provided in the form of warships, which would, at the same time NOT be exposed to the considerable navigational risks necessarily incurred when warships are used for the carrying of tps necessitating their going close inshore for embarkation and disembarkation in seas where so many reefs abound.

30. Army Liaison Offr.

Whenever RAN are cooperating it would appear advisable as was done in these operations that a military offr of the necessary seniority be made available to the SNO as Army Liaison Offr. This view is endorsed by Comd SPURGEON.

RAN and RAAF COOPERATION.

31. A marked feature of the operation was the smooth working of all arrangements and it is desired to express sincere appreciation of the full and ready cooperation given by RAN and RAAF.


Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde. Brig.

S E C R E T

Copy No 20

20 Sep 42.

18 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No. 17.

Ref Map: NORMANBY ISLAND 1" = 4 miles.

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

- (a) A party of Japs est strength 70 and believed to be survivors of destroyer sunk by RAAF on 11 Sep approx 25 miles East of NORMANBY ISLAND, is reported to be spread over the villages of KWANOULA, SOIA SOIA and MABA.
- (b) It is reported that this party, which included a number of wounded, landed in one launch and one barge. RAAF have not seen either Japs or craft referred to but have sighted a number of native craft at the above villages.
- (c) The Japs are reported to be occupying native houses in ones and twos along a considerable stretch of narrow coastal strip backed by jungle.
- (d) It is reported that the only weapons possessed by the Japs are two bayonets. No reliable report can be obtained on this point.
- (e) Tac/R 18 Sep reported sighting of possible tank in area KORONAU-AI (SE corner of island). There are no vehs on island and ANGAU discount any possibility of there being a tank.
- (f) A ships searchlight was seen off DAUADA night 13/14 Sep. This may possibly have been a Jap ship searching for survivors.
- (g) MILNE FORCE have ordered 18 Aust Inf Bde destroy or capture all enemy on NORMANBY ISLAND.

2. Own Tps.

- (a) HMAS STUART is to cooperate in ops to the following extent:-
 - (i) embark all tps GILI GILI 00/1800 hrs 21 Sep.
 - (ii) disembark tps NADI NADI soon as practicable after first light 22 Sep.
 - (iii) re-embark all tps NADI NADI 1600hrs 23 Sep.
 - (iv) disembark all tps GILI GILI on return.
 - (v) provide naval cover against hostile enemy action as practicable.
- (b) The following small craft are moving to NADI NADI on 21 Sep:-
 - (i) MV GILI GILI
 - (ii) MV TIERYO
 - (iii) MV KISMET
 - (iv) two whalers.
- (c) RAAF is providing air cover as practicable.

INTENTION

3. C. Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will capture or destroy enemy in area KWANOULA.

METHOD

4. Comd

- (a) All military ops will under comd Capt J.E. BROCKSOPP, 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.
- (b) Should circumstances render it essential Capt BROCKSOPP shall be at liberty to depart from the letters of these orders, making such new arrangements with Captain HMAS STUART and others as may be necessary.
- (c) Capt MARSHALL, 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will join HMAS STUART 21 Sep and will remain there as Military Liaison Offr until conclusion of ops.

5. Disembarkation and Re-embarkation.

- (a) Disembarkation and re-embarkation will be carried out under orders of Naval Beach Master detailed by Captain HMAS STUART.
- (b) Lieut. FORWARD and 3 OR's will remain at NADI NADI as Beach Party and will carry out instns of Naval Beach Master.
- (c) Re-embation into "GILIGILI", "TIERYO" and "KISMET" on 23 Sep will be carried out in such time that all tps are embarked in these boats by 1600 hrs.
- (d) MV GILI GILI carrying res rations will remain at NADI NADI from time of arrival until after departure of HMAS STUART with re-embarked tps 23 Sep. Under no circumstances must this be departed from.

6. Guides.

Capt TIMPERLY (ANGAU) will provide guides as required by Capt. BROCKSOPP or his representative.

7. Secrecy.

Proposed ops will be treated with a high degree of secrecy to prevent otherwise very probable enemy counter action.

8. Security

No papers or documents containing identification or other articles capable of giving infm of military value to the enemy, will be carried.

ADM

9. Dress

Battle Order with K.D. slacks.

10. Rations.

- (a) 3 days rations carried on man.
- (b) 7 days rations for all ranks will be carried in MV 'GILI GILI'. These rations will be placed on shore under orders of 06 Beach Party if situation demands.

11. Water.

Chlorination tablets will be carried by all ranks.

12. Ann.

(a) First and Second line ann will be taken.

(b) Ann NOT carried on man will be placed on MV 'GILI GILI' and, if circumstances demand, landed under orders of O.C. Beach Party.

13. Weapons.

W.E. Scale will be taken.

14. Medical.

(a) 7 days quinine tablets will be carried in a tin by all ranks.

(b) All ranks will be in possession of FIRST FD DRESSING.

(c) S.B. will accompany dets.

15. Embarkation at GILI GILI.

Details later.

INTERCOMM

16. 108 Sets.

3 x 108 sets will be taken for intercomm.

17. Beach Sig Party.


(a) Bde Sig Offr will detail two W/T sets and personnel to report to HMAS STUART 21 Sep.

(b) One set will be landed at NADI NADI for intercomm Shore to Ship.

(c) Naval personnel of Beach Sig Party are being detailed by Captain HMAS STUART.

18. Bde Sig Offr will endeavour to arrange intercomm between HMAS STUART and HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK.


Major.
BM 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Issued by hand and through Sigs.

Time of Signature 2.40 hrs.

DISTRIBUTION:

Capt. J.E. BROCKSOPP	Copy No. 1	Comd	Copy No. 8
Captain HMAS STUART	2	BM	9
RAAF	3	SC	10
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	4	Bde Sig Offr	11
Capt. MARSHALL, 2/9 Aust Inf Bn	5	Offrs File	12
		Spare	13
Lieut. FORWARD	6	War Diary	14/15
Capt. TIMPERLEY (ANGAU)	7	File	16,

21 Sept 42.

Copy No. _____

OPERATION ORDER NO. 5B/19 AUST INF BN.C. COY.INFORMATION.

1. Enemy: As per 18 Aust Inf Bde Op Instr No. 17.
2. Own Tps: (a) C. Coy, with Commando Pl and 2 secs A Coy incorporated, plus sig personnel will proceed NADI NADI by destroyer.
 - (b) Capt. TIMPERLY (ANGAU) is providing guides.
 - (c) HMAS STUART is co-operating.

INTENTION.

3. C. Coy and attached tps will capture or destroy enemy in area KWANOULA.

METHOD.

4. Disembarkation - will take place in vicinity NADI NADI as soon as practicable after first light 22 Sep 42.
Tps will disembark from HMAS STUART into the following vessels:- (Subject to alteration)
 - (a) 15 Pl - TIERYO (Mr. HENDERSON).
 - (b) Coy HQ and ANGAU party - Destroyer's whale boat.
 - (c) 14 Pl and 7 and 8 secs 15 Pl - GILI GILI, thence to dinghies.
 - (d) 15 Pl, less 7 and 8 secs - "KISHNET", thence to dinghies.
 - (e) B i/c, stores and Bde Sigs - "DAIWADA".
5. Assembly Positions: 14 and 15 Pls will assemble on beach at NADI NADI, posting 2 sentries per section, and will then move to cover in scrub. 15 Pl will remain aboard TIERYO while latest infm checked.
6. Tasks:
 - (a) 13 Pl will proceed by TIERYO to SOBALASI (SOBURATA), disembark and move North along the coast preventing any enemy movement South.
 - (b) 15 Pl with WO RUTLEDGE (ANGAU) as guide will proceed by overland track to SOIA SOIA, preventing any enemy movement inland via this track. On arrival at SOIA SOIA, 15 Pl will move South, mopping up any enemy encountered.
 - (c) 14 Pl with Coy HQs will proceed via MUADA to SOIA SOIA, with Capt. TIMPERLY (ANGAU) as guide. Any protection considered necessary for beach party will be provided out of 14 Pl and Coy HQ. At zero (to be laid down), 14 Pl will enter SOIA SOIA and continue attack South along coast until contact is established with 13 Pl.
7. Policy of Attack: There will be no unnecessary firing, bayonets and grenades being given preference. Wherever possible SAA fire must be directed towards either the bush or the sea so as not to endanger our own tps.
Re-assembly: Tps will assemble at point where 15 and 14 Pl make contact.

ADMINISTRATION.

8. As per Bde Op Instr.
9. Amm: 100 rounds SAA per man, all Bren mags filled, 600 rsn per TMM, 6 K.E. per 8" mortar, No. 56 Grenades as issued will be carried. No other type grenades will be taken. A/Ts rifle with 45 rounds will move with Coy HQ.

S 1/c will arrange for remainder of amn as Bde Op Instrn to be left with CG Beach Party.

- 10. Tools: 1 machet per section, 1 pick and shovel with each pl and Coy HQ.
- 11. Medical: AAMG Sgt and stretcher bearer with two stretchers will move with coy HQ. 1 stretcher bearer per det.
- 12. Prisoners will be handed over to CSM at re-assembly area. Every care must be taken and all prisoners stripped and searched, blindfolded and hands will be tied behind backs, NOT so as to permanently injure.
- 13. Identification: No letters, orders, etc disclosing unit and formation will be carried.
- 14. Password: Will be issued for night 22/23 Sep 42.

INTER-COMMUNICATION

- 15. SB W/T set will remain with beach party.
- 16. 108 set with 2 sigs will move with Coy HQ.
- 17. 2 108 sets with 5 sigs will move with 13 Pl, 1 to remain with 1 sig on board "TIERYO". "TIERYO" will maintain contact with 13 Pl and not return to NADI NADI until ordered by CG Pl.
- 18. Verrey pistol will be carried with each Pl.
 Signals - (a) 1 Red - encountering resistance.
 (b) 1 Green from Coy HQ - 13 Pl to re-embark on "TIERYO" and all pls to return to NADI NADI.
- 19. Verrey signals to destroyer as arranged with Commander.
- 20. Tracks: Careful note to be taken of all tracks in case guides become casualties.

ACK.

Issued by runner.

Time of signature 0910 hrs.

Capt.
CG C. Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.

DISTRIBUTION:


Copy No.

CG)	
21/c)	1.
13 Pl	2.
14 Pl	3.
15 Pl	4.
CSM)	5.
CGMS)	
2/10 Bn HQ	6-7.
13 Aust Inf Bde	8-9.
Capt HMAS "STUART"	10.
Capt. TIMPERLY (ANGAU)	11.
Lieut. FORWARD	12.
Capt. MERRAHALL, 2/9 Bn	13.
Spare	14-15.

HQ 2/10 Aust Inf Bn
24 Sep 42

18 Aust Inf Bde.

Attached herewith is a report to Bde Commander covering
operations on NORMANBY ISLAND.




Capt
OC "C" Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

Hq 2/10 Aust Inf Bn
24 Sep 42

18 Aust Inf Bde.

Attached herewith is a report to Bde Commander covering
operations on NORMANBY ISLAND.



Capt
OC "C" Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

REPORT ON NORMANBY ISLAND EXPEDITION

1. Embarkation and disembarkation satisfactory to self and command HMAS "STUART" and on time. Disembarkation at NAHI NAHI commenced 0630 hrs. MV "TIERYO" with 13 PI moving direct to SOBA LASI having arranged with destroyer to recall her by lamp signal if necessary. Beach party was established, immediate vicinity searched, and coy less 13 PI and beach party moved off 0730 hrs. At DANAUWA 15 PI moved to inland track, remainder ~~was~~ waiting for 25 minutes in order to synchronise times of arrival. Progress was slow owing to rough going, creeks etc. All villages were searched and Coy less 13 and 15 PIs entered KAPA KAPAI (one of the MA IWA villages) at 1300 hrs., having split into three parties to cover all exits. No enemy encountered, no natives living in villages, but natives reported 36 Japs, normally slept there and signs of their occupation were found, e.g. battery and lamp, bamboo torches, coconut fibre slippers and destroyer's motor boat, on engine of which Japs had apparently been working. 2 i/c with 14 PI, less one sec, proceeded SOI SOIA and commando pl with 1 sec 14 PI pursued Jap party inland along creek. Coy HQ established KA PA KAPAI, where Jap boat was destroyed by fire and engine smashed as own launches could not get anchorage in the vicinity. No name on this boat. Mail bag found on board, herewith. Two Japs sighted here but escaped, subsequently being fired on by 2 i/c's party, but escaped again.
Commando pl returned 1645 hrs, having followed Jap tracks until these showed Japs had split into small parties, natives advising Japs had had two hours start and one native saying he had fed 50 to 60 of them. 2 i/c's party and 15 PI made contact at SOI SOIA 1330 hrs, 15 PI having sighted no enemy, but being advised by natives that 5 Japs went to village in hills for food about 0600 hrs, saw destroyer and hastily returned to coast. Patrols were sent out from here, one of these with native assistance locating 6 Jap wounded, who were made prisoners. A nother Jap was wounded and captured by this patrol. 13 PI arrived SOI SOIA 1615 hrs, having sighted no enemy but receiving reports that three Japs, one possibly an officer, had sighted MV "GILI GILI" 20 Sep from SOBALASI, and left that afternoon. Coy with prisoners reassembled KAPA KAPAI for the night, one of prisoners believed to be an officer and the senior member of the enemy party.
2. Naval Activity: From 2325 hrs to 0150 hrs two Jap warships patrolled the coast with searchlights, also possibly a launch with searchlight. Estimated these ships originally four miles out, closing ~~in~~ in to two miles, with launch even closer. One of these ships could have been a cruiser and reports have been furnished to HMAS "STUART". Small vessels with beach party moved SOUTH without being caught in searchlights. Three fires were seen in the hills by beach party which could have been Jap signal fires or natives burning off.
3. 23 Sep: 13 PI moved overland to DANUWA, leaving 0615 hrs but no Japs encountered. 15 PI with Coy HQ less OC, moved with wounded along coast, embarking on small vessels at LOBODA, except 15 PI, less one sec, who proceeded along the coast. 14 PI, with OC, waited for further native reports of Jap activity and also moved along coast to DANUWA. At DANUWA 13 PI embarked on MV "KISMET", which was already carrying bulk of Coy HQ. At 1250 hrs three Mitsubishi 96 flew over at approx 100 ft with 8 Zeros above. "KISMET" was run aground and tps disembarked. No hostile action by enemy, own tps on shore withholding fire on account of party on launch. Tps then marched back to NAHI NAHI, some difficulty arising over gear on "KISMET", which was fast aground, but this was tanshipped and taken to NAHI NAHI on "TIERYO".
4. Natives: Information generally reliable. Brought in their women from the bush and re-occupied villages. Obviously impressed by our force and began to co-operate, capturing one Jap at DANUWA.
5. General: (a) Gas capes found sufficient protection from cold at night.
(b) Tps too heavily laden with rations, etc. A small party with 50 rads per man would have greater chance of success, could live on native food and go bush if armed enemy forces landed. Japs from native reports have at least one rifle and possibly a "short gun", apparently a pistol, plus two or three swords or bayonets.
(c) It can NOT be impressed too strongly on guides, scouts, junior leaders, etc, that parties moving in single file over rough tracks and obstacles must move very slowly at the front to avoid frequent halts for the rest to catch up.
(d) Topography: Country is rough and well covered with scrub.
(e) A small party with careful planning could probably in a week or ten days capture or destroy more of the enemy and bolster white prestige.
(f) Despite unavoidable delays, re-embarkation was completed by 1607 hrs 23 Sep. Action stations sounded 1815 hrs, but nothing eventuated.

"J" Sec Sigs
7 Aust Hqs
24 Sep 42

Report on comms. for Normanby Is. operation

Method used - wireless
Type of set - 3B
Frequency - 3795 K.C.
Stas. - 1 sta est HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde HAGITA HOUSE
1 sta est aboard HMAS "Stuart"
1 sta est NADI NADI Normanby Is.

Instrs. HQ Bde sta to work direct to Normanby Is. with ship sta on listening watch and only transmit if essential.

Remarks - some initial difficulty experienced in est. comm owing to fact that sets were new and no opportunity for testing calibration had been available. All receivers were approx 120 K.C. out.

Once comm est it remained R9 on R/T and C/W for remainder of operation except for short periods during early morning hrs.

Ship intercepted all messages passed and transmitted to Normanby island from Milne Bay.

Normanby Is. sta found some difficulty in keeping up batteries to the set on continuous watch and it is considered that stas in future should have 6-6v 150 a. hr. batteries.

Codes A report code was used for messages and this worked extremely well. Very little time was lost in encoding and decoding and sense of the messages was completely confused for any enemy interception.

Trully sent

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

No. of Groups
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

0735

OUT

cond put
10 12 2079

108

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

main force

FROM

18 Amb inf hds

Originator's Number

0247

Date

20

In Reply to Number

following ops	via	course	requested	for	projected
NADI NADI	NORMANBY	⊙	one	cover	disembarkation
K/22	first	by the	to	0900	has
NADI NADI	⊙	time	cover	launched	party
has	to	KWANOUKA	0900	to	1130
re-embarkation	approx	K/22	⊙	it was	cover
	NADI NADI	1400	to	1700	K/23

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR TO FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2000

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

*Stuart - sinking
spending money!
hot mud ✓*

SECRET

Copy No 9

20 Sep 42.

18 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No. 17.

Ref Map: NORMANBY ISLAND 1" = 4 miles.

INFORMATION

1. Enemy

- (a) A party of Japs est strength 70 and believed to be survivors of destroyer sunk by RAAF on 11 Sep approx 25 miles East of NORMANBY ISLAND, is reported to be spread over the villages of KWANOULA, SOIA SOIA and MAIWABA.
- (b) It is reported that this party, which included a number of wounded, landed in one launch and one barge. RAAF have not seen either Japs or craft referred to but have sighted a number of native craft at the above villages.
- (c) The Japs are reported to be occupying native houses in ones and twos along a considerable stretch of narrow coastal strip backed by jungle.
- (d) It is reported that the only weapons possessed by the Japs are two bayonets. No reliable report can be obtained on this point.
- (e) Tac/R 18 Sep reported sighting of possible tank in area KORONAU-AI (SE corner of island). There are no vehs on island and ANGAU discount any possibility of there being a tank.
- (f) A ships searchlight was seen off WADA night 13/14 Sep. This may possibly have been a Jap ship searching for survivors.
- (g) MILNE FORCE have ordered 18 Aust Inf Bde destroy or capture all enemy on NORMANBY ISLAND.

2. Own Tps.

- (a) HMAS STUART is to cooperate in ops to the following extent:-
 - (i) embark all tps GILI GILI 1700/1800 hrs 21 Sep.
 - (ii) disembark tps NADI NADI as soon as practicable after first light 22 Sep.
 - (iii) re-embark all tps NADI NADI 1600hrs 23 Sep.
 - (iv) disembark all tps GILI GILI on return.
 - (v) provide naval cover against hostile enemy action as practicable.
- (b) The following small craft are moving to NADI NADI on 21 Sep:-
 - (i) MV GILI GILI
 - (ii) MV TIERYO
 - (iii) MV KISMET
 - (iv) two whalers.
- (c) RAAF is providing air cover as practicable.

INTENTION

3. C. Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will capture or destroy enemy in area KWANOULA.

METHOD

4. Comd

- (a) All military ops will under comd Capt J.E. BROCKSOPP, 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.
- (b) Should circumstances render it essential Capt BROCKSOPP shall be at liberty to depart from the letters of these orders, making such new arrangements with Captain HMAS STUART and others as may be necessary.
- (c) Capt MARSHALL, 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will join HMAS STUART 21 Sep and will remain there as Military Liaison Offr until conclusion of ops.

5. Disembarkation and Re-embarkation.

- (a) Disembarkation and re-embarkation will be carried out under orders of Naval Beach Master detailed by Captain HMAS STUART.
- (b) Lieut. FORWARD and 3 OR's will remain at NADI NADI as Beach Party and will carry out instns of Naval Beach Master.
- (c) Re-embation into "GILIGILI", "TIERYO" and "KISMET" on 23 Sep will be carried out in such time that all tps are embarked in these boats by 1600 hrs. *at NADI NADI see § 2 (iii) with instructions advised 2/9*
- (d) MV GILI GILI carrying res rations will remain at NADI NADI from time of arrival until after departure of HMAS STUART with re-embarked tps 23 Sep. Under no circumstances must this be departed from.

6. Guides.

Capt TIMPERLY (ANGAU) will provide guides as required by Capt. BROCKSOPP or his representative.

7. Secrecy.

Proposed ops will be treated with a high degree of secrecy to prevent otherwise very probable enemy counter action.

8. Security

No papers or documents containing identification or other articles capable of giving infm of military value to the enemy, will be carried.

ADM

9. Dress

Battle Order with K.D. slacks.

10. Rations.

- (a) 3 days rations carried on man.
- (b) 7 days rations for all ranks will be carried in MV 'GILI GILI'. These rations will be placed on shore under orders of ~~OC~~ Beach Party if situation demands.

11. Water.

Chlorination tablets will be carried by all ranks.

12. Amn.

(a) First and Second line amn will be taken.

(b) Amn NOT carried on man will be placed on MV 'GILI GILI' and, if circumstances demand, landed under orders of O.C. Beach Party.

13. Weapons.

W.E. Scale will be taken.

14. Medical.

(a) 7 days quinine tablets will be carried in a tin by all ranks.

(b) All ranks will be in possession of FIRST FD DRESSING.

(c) S.B. will accompany dets.

15. Embarkation at GILI GILI.

Details later.

INTERCOMN

16. 108 Sets.

3 x 108 sets will be taken for intercomm.

17. Beach Sig Party.

(a) Bde Sig Offr will detail two W/T sets and personnel to report to HMAS STUART 21 Sep.

(b) One set will be landed at NADI DI for intercomm Shore to Ship.

(c) Naval personnel of Beach Sig Party are being detailed by Captain HMAS STUART.

18. Bde Sig Offr will endeavour to arrange intercomm between HMAS STUART and HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK.

Jay [Signature]
Major.
BM 18 Aust Inf Bde.

Issued by hand and through Sigs.

Time of Signature 2 30 hrs.

DISTRIBUTION:

Capt. J.E. BROCKSOPP	Copy No. 1	Comd	Copy No. 8
Captain HMAS STUART	2	BM	9
RAAF	3	SC	10
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	4	Bde Sig Offr	11
Capt. MARSHALL, 2/9 Aust Inf Bn	5	Offrs File	12
		Spare	13
Lieut. FORWARD	6	War Diary	14/15
Capt. TIMPERLEY (ANGAU)	7	File	16,

OPERATION ORDER No.3

SECRET

2/10 AUST INF BN.

Date: 21 Sep 42

C COY.

Copy No:.....9.....

INFORMATION:

1. Enemy: As per 18 Aust Inf Bde Op Instn No.17
2. Own Tps: (a) C Coy, with Commando Pl and 2 secs A Coy incorporated, plus sig personnel will proceed NADI GADI (NADI NADI) by destroyer.
(b) Capt TIMPERLY (ANGAU) is providing guides.
(c) HMAS "Stuart" is co-operating.

INTENTION:

3. C Coy and attached tps will capture or destroy enemy in area KANOULE.

METHOD:

4. Disembarkation - will take place in vicinity NADI NADI as soon as practicable after first light 22 Sep 42.
Tps will disembark from HMAS "STUART" into the following vessels:-(Subject to alteration)
 - (a) 13 Pl - "TIERYO" (Mr. HENDERSON)
 - (b) Coy Hqs and ANGAU party - Destroyer's whale boat.
 - (c) 14 and 7 and 8 Secs 15 Pl - "GILI GILI", thence to dinghies.
 - (d) 15 Pl, less 7 and 8 Secs, - "KISMET", thence to dinghies.
 - (e) 2 i/c, stores and Bde sigs - "BAUWADA".
5. Assembly Positions: 14 and 15 Pls will assemble on beach at NADI NADI, posting 2 sentries per section, and will then move to cover in scrub. 13 Pl will remain aboard "TIERYO" while latest info checked.
6. Tasks:
 - (a) 13 Pl will proceed by "TIERYO" to SOBALASI (SOBURATA), disembark and move NORTH along the coast preventing any enemy movement SOUTH.
 - (b) 15 Pl with WO RUTLEDGE (ANGAU) as guide will proceed by overland track to SOLA SOLA, preventing any enemy movement inland via this track. On arrival at SOLA SOLA 15 Pl will move SOUTH, mopping up any enemy encountered.
 - (c) 14 Pl with Coy Hqs will proceed via DANJADA to SOLA SOLA, with Capt TIMPERLY (ANGAU) as guide. Any protection considered necessary for beach party will be provided out of 14 Pl and Coy Hqs. At Zero (to be laid down), 14 Pl will enter SOLA SOLA and continue attack SOUTH along coast until contact is established with 13 Pl.
7. Policy of Attack: There will be no unnecessary firing, bayonets and grenades being given preference. Wherever possible SAA fire must be directed towards either the *bush* or the sea so as not to endanger our own tps.
Re-assembly: Tps will assemble at point where 13 and 14 Pls make contact.

ADMINISTRATION:

8. As per Bde Op Instn.
9. Amn: - 100 rounds SAA per man, all Bren mags filled, 600 rounds per TSMG, 6 H.E. per 2" mortar, No.36 grenades as issued will be carried. No other type grenades will be taken. A/Tk rifle with 45 rounds will move with Coy Hqs.
2 i/c will arrange for remainder of amn as per Bde Op Instn to be left with OC beach party.
10. Tools: 1 machet per section, 1 pick and shovel with each pl and Coy Hqs.
11. Medical: AAMC Sgt and stretcher bearer with 2 stretchers will move with Coy Hqs. 1 stretcher bearer per detachment.
12. Prisoners will be handed over to CSM at re-assembly area. Every care must be taken and all prisoners stripped and searched, blindfolded and hands will be tied behind backs, NOT so as to permanently injure.
13. Identification: No letters, orders, etc disclosing unit and formation will be carried.
14. Password: Will be issued for night 22/23 Sep 42.

INTER-COMMUNICATION:

15. 3B W/T set will remain with beach party.
16. 108 set with 2 sigs will move with Coy HQs.
17. 2 108 sets with 3 sigs will move with 13 Pl, 1 to remain with 1 sig on board "TIERYO". "TIERYO" will maintain contact with 13 Pl and not return to NADI NADI until ordered by OC Pl.
18. Verrey Pistol will be carried with each pl.
 Signals - (a) 1 Red - encountering resistance.
 (b) 1 Green from Coy HQs - 13 Pl to re-embark on "TIERYO" and all pls to return to NADI NADI.
19. Verrey signals to destroyer as arranged with commander.
20. Tracks: Careful note to be taken of all tracks in case guides become casualties.

ACK.

Issued by runner.

Time of Signature. 09:10 hrs

W. G. Beckie Capt
 OC C Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No.

CC)	
2 i/c)	1.
13 Pl.	2.
14 Pl	3.
15 Pl	4.
CSM)	
CO(S)	5.
2/10 Bn HQ	6 & 7
18 Aust Inf Bde	8 & 9
Capt HMAS "STUART"	10.
Capt TIMPERLEY (ANGEL)	11.
Lieut FORWARD	12.
Capt MARSHALL, 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.	13.
Spare	14 & 15.

OPERATION ORDERS.

APPENDIX I.

PROGRAMME FOR EMBARKATION.

H.M.A.S. "Stuart" to be anchored close inshore.

(a) FALL RIVER.

Troops are to be at Gilli-Gilli by 1730.
H.M.A.S. "Stuart's" motor boat and whaler and
R.A.A.F launch will transport troops and equipment.
Any other boats available will be utilized.
Boats will come alongside scramble nets rigged
either side and troops when on board will be
directed as follows :-

Headquarters and Stores - On Quarterdeck.

13 Platoon - Port side abreast tubes

14 Platoon - Star.side abreast tubes

15 Platoon - P'castle deck/Port side.

(No stores except personal gear.)

13 and 14 Platoons are to be embarked in
separate boats from shore.

(b) CAPE PIERSON - ON COMPLETION OF OPERATIONS.

Troops will return to beach by 1400K/23rd.
September and be aboard luggers ready to embark
in H.M.A.S. "Stuart" on her arrival at 1600K/23rd.
September.

SECRET.

OPERATION ORDERS.

APPENDIX II.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR PASSAGE.

Troops:

- (a) On embarking troops are to proceed to stations allocated and are to remain there until embarkation is complete.
- (b) Gear is to be dumped in these stations.
- (c) When all troops are on board they will be dispersed.
- (d) Particular care is to be taken to leave gangways clear.
- (e) No smoking or lights are to be shown on upper deck whilst on passage.
- (f) Tea will be provided for troops prior to disembarkation.
- (g) Light hot supper will be provided for troops during return passage to Fall River.

Ship's Routine for Passage:

- (a) On completion of embarkation weigh and proceed at Night Defence Watches.
- (b) Anchor at entrance to Milne Bay.
- (c) Weigh at approximately 0100K/22nd. September; close up Night Action Stations.
- (d) Ship's Company are to remain clear of Iron Deck except for guides during embarkation.
- (e) On arrival at Landing Beach secure luggers alongside and stand by to lower boats if necessary.
- (f) On completion of disembarkation weigh and proceed to Milne Bay.

Ship's Routine for RE-Embarkation:

As piped on similar lines to above.

Special Duties on Board:

Direction of Troops and Supervision of Boatwork on Board - First Lieutenant, Gunner (T), C.P.O.'s Trapman and Brown, s/P.O. Murphy, Torpedo Tubes crews. Gunnery Control Officer - Sub.Lieutenant Hughes. Motor Boats's Crew if required - No.1 M.B.'s Crew. Whaler's Crew if required - 'Y' Gun's Crew. Anchor Crew if Required - 'A' Gun's Crew.

OPERATION ORDERS.

APPENDIX III

DISEMBARKATION OF TROOPS.

(a) CAPE PIERSON - ON ARRIVAL.

H.M.A.S. "Stuart" will arrive at 0630K/22nd. September, rendezvous with luggers and anchor. All troops are to be ready with gear to transfer to luggers which will come alongside scramble nets at this time.

Beach Party will land in first boat and establish V/S communication.

H.M.A.S. "Stuart's" boats may be utilized as necessary.

(b) FALL RIVER - ON ARRIVAL.

As for embarkation, using all boats available.

SECRET.

H.M.A.S. "Stuart",
'Fall River'.
21st. September, 1942.

OPERATION ORDERS.

(All times are local time - Zone 'K')

Forces taking part:-

- (a) H.M.A.S. "Stuart" - local pilot on board.
- (b) One Company of the 18th. Brigade, A.I.F..
- (c) Luggers as necessary.
- (d) Air support as necessary.
- (e) Ketch from Gilli-Gilli for Army Stores.

INTELLIGENCE.

Own Forces:

- (a) Air reconnaissance of the area has been carried out.
- (b) Allied submarine is operating in the area East of Normanby Island.

Enemy:

- (a) Approximately 80 survivors of Destroyer sunk on September 8th. are believed to be on a beach on the East side of Cape Pierson, Normanby Island.
- (b) The Japanese are known to be in poor physical condition and unarmed.

OBJECT.

To land a military force and 'mop up' Japanese survivors.

METHOD OF EXECUTION.

- (a) H.M.A.S. "Stuart" will embark one Company of troops at 1800K/21st. September at Fall River and transport them to rendezvous to the West of Cape Pierson. Appendix I and II.
- (b) H.M.A.S. "Stuart" will rendezvous with luggers to West of Cape Pierson at 0630K/22nd. September and disembark troops. Appendix III.
- (c) H.M.A.S. "Stuart" will return to Fall River and resume A/S patrol duties.

- (d) H.M.A.S. "Stuart" will sail from Fall River so as to arrive off Cape Pierson, West Side, at 1600K/23rd. September to re-embark troops for return to Fall River. Troops to be disembarked on arrival at Fall River. Appendix I and III.

COMMUNICATIONS.

- (a) As per Appendix IV.

VICTUALLING AND STORES.

- (a) Ketch from Gilli-Gilli will transport seven days Army Stores to Landing Beach.
- (b) Beach party will take seven days victuals.

(S.H.K. Spurgeon)
COMMANDER IN COMMAND.

APPENDICES.

- I Programme for Embarkation.
- II Arrangements for troops on passage.
- III Programme for disembarkation.
- IV Communications.
- V Orders for H.M.A.S. "Stuart's" Beach Party.

CIRCULATION.

Commanding Officer, H.M.A.S. "Stuart".
Commanding Officer, Company of Troops.
H.M.A.S. "Stuart" (2).
Naval Liaison Officer.
Army Liaison Officer.

21/9/42.

OPERATIONS FOR 22/9. (Continued)

(11) Beauforts of 100 Squadron and Beaufighters of 50 Squadron will be maintained at standby to strike at any enemy shipping targets which may be located by reco. aircraft. Maximum possible dispersal of these aircraft is to be effected.

Charlton

(D. MARSHALL)
Squadron Leader.
for GROUP CAPTAIN.
COMMANDING 9 OPGROUP.
R.A.A.F. FALL RIVER.

DISTRIBUTION.

COPY NUMBER.

H.Q. MILNE FORCE	1
9 OPGROUP, PORT MORESBY	2
H.Q. A.A.F. PORT MORESBY	3
A.O.R. N.E.A.	4
O.C. R.A.A.F. FALL RIVER	5
C.O. 75 SQUADRON	6
C.O. 76 SQUADRON	7
C.O. 100 SQUADRON	8
C.O. 30 SQUADRON	9
C.O. 6 SQUADRON	10
BASE OPERATIONS FALL RIVER	11
18 AUST. INF. BRIGADE	12

INTELLIGENCE.

(I) ENEMY FORCES.

(a) LAND.

Natives report that there are numerous Japs in the jungle behind TAUPOTA and WEDAUI, and that they are stealing food from the village of HUHUNA. Many of these Japanese are wearing only breech clouts.

It is estimated that the total number of Japanese landed in MILNE BAY during the recent operations was 1645.

(b) SEA.

A Missionary and natives from SIDEIA and SISIKI ISLANDS report that warships were playing searchlights in that vicinity one night between September 10 and 13. This was possibly the destroyer which was in company with the one thought to have been sunk on 11th. September.

(II) OWN FORCES.

(a) AIR.

No sightings have been reported by any reconnaissance aircraft today.

2.

OPERATIONS FOR 22/9.

(1) (a)

Hudsons of 6 Squadron will carry out morning and afternoon searches of the sea lanes of approach to MILNE BAY. Instructions previously issued relative to reporting, attacking, shadowing and photography continue to apply. Aircraft on morning patrol are to take off at dawn; aircraft on the afternoon patrols are to take off at such time that they land before 0730Z.

(b)

One Hudson is to carry out a search of the Northern side of the LOUISIADE ARCHIPELAGO and MISIMA ISLAND, taking off as early as possible.

(c)

One Hudson of 6 Squadron is to carry out a morning reconnaissance of D'ENTRECASTEAUX GROUP. This aircraft is NOT to approach to within 20 miles of CAPE PIERSON.

(d)

One Hudson of 6 Squadron is to photograph the western and southern coastal areas of MILNE BAY. Exact details of the area to be photographed will be given by the Army I.L.O. when crews are briefed.

(II) (a)

P.40 aircraft of 75 and 76 Squadrons will maintain a standing security patrol over the MILNE BAY area during daylight hours, with the object of protecting shipping and aerodrome against air attack. The patrol will be maintained at maximum intensity between 1000K and 1600K. If well-broken cloud or clear weather obtains, the patrol is to be carried out at high altitude. In the event of aircraft of 8th. Fighter Group arriving, and aircraft of 76 Squadron moving out during the day, O.C., R.A.A.F., FALL RIVER will arrange the continuity of this patrol in conjunction with O.C. 8th. Fighter Group.

(b)

P.40 aircraft of 75 Squadron will provide special air cover in accordance with instructions contained in Appendix "A" to this order.

SECRET.

APPENDIX "A" TO AIR OPERATION ORDER F.R.11.

COMBINED OPERATION - NORMANBY ISLAND AREA.

1. INFORMATION.

(i) A party of Japs estimated strength 70, and believed to be survivors of the destroyer thought to have sunk on 11th. SEPTEMBER, is reported to be spread over villages in the vicinity of CAPE PIERSON.

(ii) A combined operation has been planned with a view to cutting out this party, and H.M.A.S. STUART will be employed to convey troops to and from the area of operations. Other vessels engaged in the operation will be:

- (a) M.V. GILI GILI
- (b) M.V. TIERYO
- (c) M.V. KISMET
- (d) 2 whalers.

The first three vessels named above are auxiliary schooners or ketches, which will be used for transport of troops from the point of disembarkation at NADI NADI to the vicinity of KWANAULA.

2. INTENTION.

To provide top fighter cover during the periods of dis-embarkation and re-embarkation, and during the period of transport by launch from NADI NADI to vicinity of KWANAULA.

3. EXECUTION.

(1) PROVISION OF COVER AND AREA OF PATROL.

Officer Commanding 75 Squadron will be responsible for co-ordinating the movements of fighter aircraft to maintain continuous cover over the area of operations during the required periods. The cover is to be maintained in as unobtrusive a manner as possible, to try to avoid making our intentions too obvious to the enemy. The exact area and height of patrol will be left to the discretion of the Section-leader. It is stressed that the object of the cover is to protect friendly forces against enemy air attack, and NOT to straff ground forces. If 75 Squadron aircraft move before the completion of this operation, the top-cover will be taken over by the 8th. Fighter Group.

(ii) STRENGTH AND DURATION OF AIR COVER.

A top cover of 4 P-40 aircraft is to be maintained during the periods shown below.

- (a) 0600/22K - approx. 0900/22K, to cover dis-embarkation from STUART at NADI NADI.
- (b) 0900/22K - approx. 1130/22K, to cover movement of troops by launch from dis-embarkation point to KWANAULA.
- (c) 1400/23K - approx. 1700/23K, to cover re-embarkation in STUART at NADI NADI.

4. COMMUNICATIONS.

(1) Communications between ground or ship and aircraft will be by R/T on 6200 Kcs. It is not anticipated that our ground troops will call aircraft in the air.

...../2

COMMUNICATIONS. (Continued)

(11) In the event of enemy air attack developing against H.M.A.S. STUART, that ship will probably assume the role of Fighter Direction Ship, and will issue interception instructions to fighter aircraft. STUART's R/T call sign is NUTS SIX.

(111) If STUART requires any additional fighter assistance, the normal procedure for protection of shipping will apply, - i.e. broadcast of "SHAD", "HELP" or "FORTU" messages on the current aircraft reconnaissance frequency.

OPERATION ORDERS.

APPENDIX IV.

COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) ARMY.

(1) Equipments- To be landed one complete transceiver,
To be stowed in W/T Office -
One complete Transceiver.

(2) Personnel:- Landing One Corporal and two.
Aboard " " " "

(3) Routine:- Continuous contact to be
maintained between Normanby Island
and 18th. Brigade H.Q. (Gilli-Gilli).

H.M.A.S. "Stuart" is to maintain
continuous listening watch .

If difficulty occurs in maintaining
contact between Gilli-Gilli and
Normanby Island "Stuart" is to act as
repeating ship.

(4) Frequency and Call Signs:-

	3795 K.C.'s
"Stuart"	N X M
18th. Brigade H.Q.	N F K
10th. Batt.	A X U

OPERATION ORDERS.

APPENDIX IV.

COMMUNICATIONS.

(b) R.A.A.F.

- (1) **EQUIPMENT:** One complete R/T set for fighter control.
- (2) **PERSONNEL:** Officer for controlling fighters
1 L.A.C. for maintainance.
- (3) **ROUTINE:** (i) Work on 6200 K.C.'s
(ii) R/T communications for control of fighters during combat.

DISTRIBUTION.

The Commanding Officer, H.M.A.S. "Stuart".

" " " , Troops.

Army Liaison Officer.

R.A.A.F Liaison Officer.

H.M.A.S. "Stuart" (2 eppies).

OPERATION ORDERS.

APPENDIX V.

BEACH PARTY.

The Beach Party will consist of:

Lieutenant Milne - Naval Liaison Officer.
Signalman McDonald, Able Seamen Clacy, Bradley and Bowden.

DUTIES.

General direction of all boat work on beaches.
To maintain V/S communication from Shore to Ship.

DRESS AND GEAR.

Overalls, stout boots, gaiters, pistols and pistol equipment, water bottles, sun helmets, shrapnel helmets, minimum bedding and changes of clothing for seven days.
Victuals for seven days - 1 barricoe of water.
Signalling equipment, 1 Aldis Lamp, 2 portable batteries, Hand Flags, Trigger Lamp, Pads, etc..
1 stripped Lewis Gun, 6 single magazines, 1 repair kit. (Replenish ammunition from Army Sources if necessary.)

ROUTINE.

Naval Liaison Officer and Signalman only required for Fall River Embarkation.
Beach Party to land in first boat at Cape Pierson and will remain ashore until completion of re-embarkation.

ops
cond

Refer any of - note & submit to me
+ 12/9

OPERATION ORDERS.

APPENDIX IV.

COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) Army.

(1) Equipment:- To be landed one complete transceiver,
To be stowed in W/T Office -
One complete Transceiver.

(2) Personnel:- Landing One Corporal and two.
Aboard " " " "

(3) Routine:- Continuous contact to be
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H.M.A.S. "Stuart" is to maintain
continuous listening watch .

If difficulty occurs in maintaining
contact between Gilli-Gillicand
Normanby Island "Stuart" is to act as
repeating ship.

(4) Frequency and Call Signs:-

	3795 K.C.'s
"Stuart"	N X M
18th. Brigade H.Q.	N F K
10th. Batt.	A X U

Brackets? →
yes

OPERATION ORDERS.

APPENDIX IV.

COMMUNICATIONS.

(b) R.A.A.F.

- (1) EQUIPMENT: One complete R/T set for fighter control.
- (2) PERSONNEL: Officer for controlling fighters
1 L.A.C. for maintainance.
- (3) ROUTINE: (i) Work on 6200 K.C.'s
(ii) R/T communications for control of fighters during combat.

DISTRIBUTION.

The Commanding Officer, H.M.A.S. "Stuart".

" " " , Troops.

Army Liaison Officer.

R.A.A.F Liaison Officer.

H.M.A.S. "Stuart" (2 copies).

1/KTG (12/9)

SECRET

H.Q. 7 Aust Inf Bde
AUSTRALIA
Sep 42

(24)

1.0
include the info in I
summary of units
hit me like 7 hrs know
7 our own plan? @ 12/9

SUBJECT: TRACK RECCO REPORTS & MAPPING

- 9 Aust Inf Bn
- 25 Aust Inf Bn
- 61 Aust Inf Bn
- MILNEFORCE
- 18 Aust Inf Bde

(a) Track Recce Reports Ref 7 Aust Inf Bde Op Instrn No 10 of 11 Sep 42.

Recce reports on tracks will be submitted in the form of a traverse at 3" to 1 mile marked to show:-

- (i) nature and penetrability of vegetation along track,
- (ii) creeks and bridges,
- (iii) points of tactical importance,
- (iv) possible landing places for paratroops,
- (v) possible O.P.s (visibility, distance, etc),
- (vi) bivouac areas
- (vii) arrows to indicate gradient e.g. ↑ uphill ↓ downhill.

2. Passability of route and travelling time will be stated.
3. Both recce and patrol reports will include any suggested areas for caches of ammo and rations.
4. Tracks will be blazed by recce parties and patrols as follows:-
 - △ main track
 - ✕ connecting track
 - ◇ track leads nowhere.

(b) Mapping Units will continue with the mapping of

- (i) areas outlined for patrolling in 7 Aust Inf Bde Op Instrn No 10
- (ii) new detail on areas already mapped.


Maps will be 3" to 1 mile and will show

- (i) plantations, cleared areas, jungle, swamps with boundaries clearly defined and marked "plantation" etc
- (ii) depth of water at jetties and possible unloading pts for stores

/(iii) Villages:

(iii) Villages Name and alternate name if any.
Principal hut marked PH.
Exact no. of huts.
Huts correctly aligned e.g. - - -

(This info required by R.A.A.F. to enable them to give maximum amount of air support. During recent operations JAPS were in habit of concentrating in principal hut).

(iv) Watercourses Only fully traversed streams to be shown on map.
Tank obstacles to be shown with double line
e.g. 
Depth and width to be marked.

C. M. Tuckey *lieut for*
Major
Bde Maj 7 Aust Inf Bde

18 AUST. INF BDE.

TOR

| / /

		INIT.	DATE
COMD.			
BM			
BM ()			19/6
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SC (L)			
IO	2		
LO1			
LO2			
LO3			
TO			
LAD			
SUP O			

~~SECRET~~

IMMOBILIZATION OF SMALL CRAFT

HQ 7 Aust Div
17 Jun 42

SG64/1/15

✓ 18 Aust Inf Bde
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde

SECRET

1. The C in C LHQ has directed that in all areas South of CAPE UPSTART excl, small craft will NOT be immobilized under the regulation quoted where adequate arrangements can be made for their immobilization within 3 weeks should the situation demand.
2. L of C QUEENSLAND is responsible for plans for the immobilization of small craft within the 3 week period allowed.
3. To ensure the destruction of boats, should L of C arrangements be incomplete or inoperative alternative plans are required from 21 and 25 Aust Inf Bdes covering their respective areas. Co-operation of the VDC should be sought.
4. Plans will NOT be promulgated below bns, nor given publicity so far as the general public is concerned.
5. Plans to HQ 7 Aust Div by 30 Jun.

Copies to

Comd
Q
CRA
CRE

Chambers Col
GS 7 Aust Div

IMMOBILIZATION OF SMALL CRAFT

S E C R E T

213

HQ 7 Aust Div ,
SG 64/1/6.
4 Jun 42.

18 Aust Inf Bde ✓
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde

1. Notes on talks between BGS 1 Aust Corps and GI, 7 Aust Div distributed on 2 Jun 42, cover the destruction of boats in an emergency.

2. In order to avoid -

- (a) removal of boats by the owner;
- (b) an adverse effect on civilian morale;

Secrecy as to the intention to destroy boats must be maintained between the VDC and the formation ordering the destruction.

W. R. ...
for Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

AUST. INF BDE.		
FOR		
	INIT.	DATE
CO. AD.	Handwritten initials	
PM	Handwritten initials	7/6
BM(O)	X	
ISC	X	
SC(O)		
IO	X	
LO1	→	8/6
LO2		
LO3		8/6.
TO		
LAD		
SUP O		

Handwritten signature

NOTES ON TALKS BETWEEN BGS 1 AUST CORPS and G1 7 AUST DIV ON
VARIOUS DATES RECENTLY

- Arty ✓ No svy bty det to come under Div. Med arty to remain under Corps.
- Engrs ✓ Pnrs are to remain under Corps.
- Pack Tpt ✗ Submit to Corps any demands. No units are available, but saddlery and a few horses can be obtained.
- Horsed Cav ✗ None exists now. If we want any formed, submit memo.
- ASC The Gen Tpt Coy for tp carrying (see Div Op Instn No 1) will be allotted for specific jobs on application.
- Boats In an emergency all boats in area will be destroyed, preferably by fire. This can be arranged now through VDC etc.
- Evacuation of areas Corps are pressing Army for action.

- - - - -

Will Bdes, etc, submit any remarks they wish re above notes.

CMK
Col
GS 7 AustDiv.

Distribution

- 18 Aust Inf Bde
- 21 Aust Inf Bde
- 25 Aust Inf Bde
- Comd
- G
- A
- Q
- CRA
- CRE
- ASC

18 Inf. Bde. A.i.F.
3 JUN 1942
9 71 66

18 AUST. INF. BDE.		
TOR	INT.	DATE
COMD.	<i>[Signature]</i>	
PM		4/6
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SC(L)		
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IO3	<i>[Signature]</i>	
TO		
LAD		
SUP O		

HQ MILNE FORCE
5 Oct 42.

SUBJECT: EQUIPMENT - INF BNS.

18 AUST INF BDE. ✓

1. Ref para 31 of 18 Aust Inf Bde report dated 12 Sep 42,
on the lessons from recent operations (copy att.).

HQ.

All recommendations are approved in principle by this

2. The following remarks are for information:

Sub-para (a): Capes W.P. (cross strap type) are authorised issue for all units of this Force. No stocks are at present held, but supplies are expected.

(b): Good stocks of shirts, trousers KD, short puttees and socks are held and unit indents can be met. Advice has been received that 10,000 prs American type gaiters are coming, also 3,000 "Boots, canvas special" and a small supply for experiment of "Boots, patrol light".

X (c): Samples of JAP equipment have been sent to AUSTRALIA. It is suggested that units experiment with a view to producing an improvised hand cart pending supplies becoming available from AUSTRALIA.

(d): This is being arranged.

(e): This is a unit matter and files are being issued by Ord for the purpose.

Loxton Col.
G.S. MILNE FORCE.

Copy to 7 Aust Inf Bde
" " Ord.

Para 31.

- (a) That all ranks be issued capes equipped with cross straps in lieu of present type capes.
- (b) That all ranks wear shirts khaki with long sleeves, slacks KD, boots, short puttees, and carry one spare pair socks. Short puttees are suggested in lieu of gaiters as it has been found that small stones, pebbles etc pass down the tops of the gaiters into the boots thus causing foot trouble by stone bruising and chaffing. The American type of light laced gaiters with a strap under the arch of the foot could also be supplied in lieu of short puttees.
- (c) It is suggested that each Coy (if possible each pl) be equipped with light two-wheeled cart similar to captured JAP type. These carts proved invaluable for rapid transport of mortars and bombs, stores and amm, and in some cases for the evacuation of wounded.
- (d) That box magazines be carried in place of drum magazines for TSMG and that 12 box type magazines be carried.
- (e) That bayonets be sharpened to have a cutting edge to assist in the quick clearing of undergrowth.

False copy

HQ 10 Aust Inf Bde.
7 Oct 42.

6/25/8

10 Aust Inf Bde
18 Aust Inf Bn.
8/10 Aust Inf Bn } for info.
S.O.

1. MILITARY ADVISE that the recommendations contained in Para 31 of 10 Aust Inf Bde Report on MILITARY ADVISE of 10 Sep 42 have been adopted in principle.

2. The following notes are for info:-

(a) (1) Recommendation. - "That all ranks be issued capes equipped with cross straps in lieu of present type capes."

(11) Capes S.O. (cross strap type) are authorized issue for all units of this Force. No stocks are at present held, but supplies are expected.

(b) (1) Recommendation. - "That all ranks wear shirts khaki with long sleeves, black ID, boots, short puttees, and carry one spare pair socks. Short puttees are suggested in lieu of gaiters as it has been found that small stones, pebbles etc pass down the tops of the gaiters into the boots thus causing foot trouble by stone bruising and chaffing. The American type of light leath gaiters with a strap under the arch of the foot could also be supplied in lieu of short puttees."

(11) Good stocks of shirts, trousers khaki, short puttees and socks are held and unit intents can be met. Advice has been received that 10,000 pairs American type gaiters are coming, also 3000 "Boots, combat special", and a small supply for experiment of "Boots, patrol light".

(c) (1) Recommendation. - "It is suggested that each Coy (if possible each pl) be equipped with light two-wheeled cart similar to captured Jap type. These carts proved invaluable for rapid transport of mortars and bombs, stores and men, and in some cases for the evacuation of wounded."

(11) Samples of Jap cart have been sent to AUSTRALIA. It is suggested that units experiment with a view to producing an improvised hand cart pending supplies becoming available from AUSTRALIA.

(d) (1) Recommendation. - "That box magazines be carried in place of drum magazines for rifles and that 10 box type magazines be carried."

(11) This is being arranged.

(e) (1) Recommendation. - "That experiments be commenced to have a 12 inch pipe trench in the trench alongside of wire entanglement."

(11) This is a self written and files are being issued by HQ for the purpose.

3. Units will carry out experiments as suggested in 2(c)(11) and will advise HQ of results attained.

8

Major.
HQ 10 Aust Inf Bde.

B.S.M.
H.Q. 2 Aust Corps (AIF)

11 July, 43.

D.D.M.S. 2 AUST CORPS.

MEDICAL ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO.7.

HYGIENE TRAINING 2 AUST CORPS

1. Ref 2 Aust Corps G.273L 4 of 26 June 43 and G.273L 6 of 11 July 43, following is syllabus set out by D.D.M.S. 2 Aust Corps to be completed within two weeks of commencement.

2. (a) WATER: Salient clinical features of diseases conveyed by water - Cholera, Dysentery, Typhoid, Leptospirosis, Bilharzia, with emphasis on their military importance instanced by historical disasters (where applicable).

All water even if piped to be suspect - not to be used for bathing or drinking until treated. Correct illusion that crystal clear streams are safe - compare survival of cholera and dysentery organisms in clear and foul water.

Follow immediately by demonstration of methods of sterilisation applicable in field - I.W.S. Tablets. Water Bottle method of chlorination. Reassurance regarding efficacy and harmlessness of chlorination. Boiling.

- (b) EXCRETA: Address on disease carried by faeces and urine including Ascariasis, Hookworm, Taeniasis.

Safe methods of disposal in field - emphasise necessity of avoiding infection of soil near lines or tracks, preventing access of flies, safeguarding water supply. Necessity for covering excreta with earth and using only points specially set apart. Shallow and deep trench latrines. Mark on closure.

- (c) FOOD: Diseases carried by food. Routes of infection - handling, use of infected water, contamination by flies.

Necessity of avoiding uncooked fruit and food sold by natives.

Methods of protection - Cleanliness of cookhouse and mess personnel, use of chlorinated water, covering from flies, prevention of infection of flies, destruction of flies, prevention of fly breeding.

Breeding and feeding habits of fly.
Period of survival of certain pathogens
on and in gut of fly. Flight range.

Control of fly - covered refuse tins,
burning of refuse and manure, protection
of human excreta from flies, sullage
water to be run underground.

(d) MOSQUITOES: Medical importance - Malaria, Dengue,
Yellow Fever, Filariasis.

Life history and feeding habits,
Anopheles, Aedes, Culex. Protective
measures - Tent discipline, destruction
of adults. Use of protective clothing
and repellent.

Control of breeding. Proofing of stored
water, disposal of litter, oiling,
draining, canalisation, flushing, filling.

All waste waters to be put underground.
No surface collection of casual water,
permissible.

(e) WASTES &
LITTER:

Necessity for scrupulous care in disposal.
Relation to Fly, Mosquito and Rat breeding
Role of Rat in disease. Plague,
Leptospirosis, Typhus, Rat bite fever.

Relation of litter to breeding of Dengue
and Yellow Fever mosquitoes and of
sullage water to Filariasis.

(f) PERSONAL
HYGIENE:

Care of Skin. Prickly Heat, Tinea,
Bites and Abrasions - Prophylaxis of
Tropical Ulcer.
Lice - relation to Typhus.

Water. - Salt.

Prevalence of Gonorrhoea, Syphilis
amongst native population. Two other
V.D.'s - Climatic Bubo, Granuloma venereum.


BRIGADIER

D.D.M.S. 2 AUST CORPS