

**AWM52**  
**2nd Australian Imperial Force and**  
**Commonwealth Military Forces unit war**  
**diaries, 1939-45 War**

Item number: 8/2/18

18 Infantry Brigade

December 1942



# WAR DIARY

or

## ~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 211

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Referen- Appendices
MILNE BAY	1 Dec		Tng <del>and</del> exercise H.Q. 18 Aust Inf Bde personnel	
	2 Dec		Maj J.E. BROCKSOPP B.M.(L) , Mr N.J. SHERWIN L.O.2, Mr H McCOLM L.O.3 ,carried out umpires recce for 2/9 Aust Inf Bn exercise , area KALOHI Ck (4-5 Dec )	
	3 Dec		Maj J.A.Y. DENNISTON B.M. ,Capt F.E. QUILTY Sig Offr , Departed for GOODENOUGH ISLAND by air, where the a/c crash landed on VIVIGANI STRIP , no casualties.	
	4 Dec		Bde Comd Brig G.F. WOOTTEN D.S.O. ceased to adm comd MILNE FORCE and resumed comd. 18 Aust Inf Bde. Mr P.D. CONNOLLY det temporarily from 2/12 Aust Inf Bn as I.O. 18 Aust Inf Bde. Maj J.E. BROCKSOPP B.M.(L) & Mr N.J. SHERWIN L.O.2, Mr H. McCOLM L.O.3 , acted as umpires on 2/9 Aust Inf Bn exercise.	
	6 Dec		4+154 reinfnts for 2/10 Aust Inf Bn embarked 0400 hrs for HATFORCE. 2+179 reinfnts for 2/12 Aust Inf Bn embarked 0630 hrs for DRAKEFORCE. Bde Comdr Brig G.F. WOOTTEN D.S.O. embarked in H.M.A.S. BROOME for GOODENOUGH ISLAND at 0630 hrs.	
	7 Dec		127 reinfnts allotted to 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and 17 to H.Q. 18 Aust Inf Bde. Maj J.E. BROCKSOPP B.M. (1) admitted to 52 A.D&S.	
	9 Dec		1800 hrs Bde Comd Brig G.F. WOOTTEN D.S.O. & Maj J.A.Y. DENNISTON B.M. , and Col ROBINSON U.S.A.S.O.S. Chief Engr Adv Base MORESBY returned from GOODENOUGH ISLAND , where a recce had been carried out for the PIGMY Op. -6666-	For period 8-14Dec both incl, see also 18 Aust Inf Bn Gp report on Ops Cape ENDAIADERE- GIROPA PT.- SANANANDA. 14Dec 42- 22 Jan 43.
	10 Dec		Brig Comdr Brig G.F. WOOTTEN D.S.O., Maj J.A.Y. DENNISTON B.M. left by plane for MORESBY where verbal instns were issued by C.inC. General Sir THOMAS BLAMEY . Col ROBINSON U.S.A.S.O.S. remained at 18 Aust Inf Bde H.Q.	
	11 Dec		0930 hrs Maj J.A.Y. DENNISTON B.M. returned from MORESBY and Col ROBINSON departed. Maj J.A.Y. DENNISTON B.M. and Mr P.D. CONNOLLY I.O. attended conference with G.S.O.I and A.A.&Q.M.G. MILNE FORCE , and C.O. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn Lt Col C.J. CUMMINGS, relative to move of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to HARIKO. Details of fwd movement of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn and tanks of 2/6 Aust Armd Regt and relief by tps of 7 Aust Inf Bde were decided. Agreed that MILNE FORCE would be responsible to HARIKO. At 1430 hrs a Bde recce party consisting of Maj J.A.Y. DENNISTON	Short title "Report on Ops"



# WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 21

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY~~  
(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks references to Appendices
MILNE BAY	11 Dec (cont)		B.M. , Capt F.E. QUILTY Sig Offr , Mr P.D. CONNOLLY I.O., and Mr I.M. McKENSEY 2/4 Aust Fld Coy flew to MORESBY where they stayed the night at H.Q.N.G.F. ,receiving latest tactical and topographical infm and collecting maps. Here Lt Col C.R. HODGSON ,C.O. 2/6 Aust Armd Regt , joined Bde recce party as A&F&V.adviser to Bde Comdr.	For movement of Bde Comd Brig G.F.WOOTTEN D.S.O. ,11 Dec see Report on Ops.
	11 Dec		Chaplain PHILLIPS, 10 C.C&S.,reported to 2/9 Bn for fwd movement to 2/1? Bn. Skeleton Bde H.Q. of following composition to move to HARIKO with 2/9 Aust Inf Bn. S.C. ,Sig Offr, L.O. 2, L.O. 3, 3 'I'personnel, 'G' Clerk, 'A.Q' Clerk, batmen, Sig Sec of 15-20.	
	12 Dec		2/9 Aust Inf Bn relieved of its Op role by 2/5 Aust Inf Bn. At 1730 hrs after a hot meal at MILNE FORCE Reception Camp, Battle H.Q. 18 Aust Inf Bde , and 2/9 Aust Inf Bn embarked in H.M.A. Corvettes COLAC, BROOME ,and BALLARAT. First and second line ammn, seven days rations, and sups and essential unit equipt ONLY were carried . All ranks embarked in Battle Order carrying packs which were stowed. Capt CRAMP of 17 Aust Inf Bde moved with 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to take command of 17 Aust Inf Bde Carriers in the BUNA Area.	See att 2/9 Aust Inf Bn Movement Order No. M.B.5 of 12 Dec. For details
	13 Dec		At 2400 hrs the convoy hove to off Cape SUDEST where tps and stores were to be transferred to small craft for disembarkation. Flares were dropped by an u/i a/c . Lt Col C.J. CUMMINGS C.O. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn , Lt Col J.DOBBS C.O. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn, Mr P. TEESDALE -SMITH, I.O. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn with 18 Pl 2/9 Aust Inf Bn were disembarked by barge.	Bde Recce Party see report on Ops.
	14 Dec		At 0245 hrs approx ,word having been received that an enemy Naval Formation was approaching, the convoy put about and returned to PORLOCK HARBOUR, arriving at 1030hrs. At 2345 hrs the convoy reached ORO BAY when personnel and stores were disembarked . Heavy stores were dumped at ORO BAY for fwd. movement to HARIKO by barge and personnel ordered to march to HARIKO. 666	See att message from Capt EMERSON U.S. Regt to Lt Col C.J.CUMMINGS C.O.2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

Period 14 Dec 42 to 22 Jan 43 is covered in detail by following Report on Ops Cape ENDAIADERE -GIROPA POINT -SANANANDA and Log Diary and files for the period which are attached.



File 5

TOPOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION.

TRACK DETAILS

BUNA APPROACHES FROM WAIROPE.

(re<sup>e</sup> suitability for Jeeps 26 NOV 42)

Sources of information - Terrain Study No. 27 (BUNA)  
" " " 28 (MAIN ROUTES ACROSS  
NEW GUINEA).  
Report - COUNTRY NORTH OF HYDROGRAPHERS RANGE.  
All issued by Allied Geographical Sec.

MAP REFERENCE BUNA (REVISED) 4 MILES TO 1 INCH.  
BUNA SPECIAL 1 MILE  
POPONDETTA SPECIAL 1 MILE.

Use has also been made of Patrol Officers' Reports and Reports of interrogations of local residents, incorporating latest information from Maj KING and Capt SCHOFIELD.

1. DOBODURA - INONDA - POPONDETTA.

Distance 20 miles. Walking time 9 hrs. Track leads out through grassland over fairly flat country to HORANDA, then up a long slight rise to INONDA. MT could be used on this section of track if it was widened where it passes through patches of jungle near INONDA. Soil is sandy loam and patches of gravel. After INONDA, track passes through heavily forested country to the GIRUA River Crossing. From this Crossing it is approximately 5½ miles to POPONDETTA. The track INONDA-POPONDETTA varies in width from 2 feet to 10 feet, in general all timber cleared to 10 feet width, over flat country with many creeks and some sharp depressions. Ground shows evidence of much gravel and also rock floaters. Many villages, some large gardens and two good Kuni patches. Bridges as required to make this track suitable for jeeps would be :-

- (a) 10 bridges over 20 feet span, including one of 55 feet span and one of 130 feet span (GIRUA River).
- (b) 12 bridges of 20 feet span and under.
- (c) 170 yards of corduroy over swampy stretches.

Cuttings and sighting cuts require the excavation of 190 cubic yards of earth including 80 cubic yards for approach to GIRUA River Crossing. Clearing required :-

- (a) 3,000 square yards of grass and undergrowth.
- (b) 900 square yards of detour clearing in light jungle.

It is estimated that one Fd Coy with mechanical equipment would complete track for jeeps in two weeks.

2. DOBODURA - BUNA.

From DOBODURA track passes over level grasslands to BEURU and on over similar country to WARISOTA. Leaving this village the track crosses a small creek and enters SINEMI Village. This creek is at present bridged by logs but the construction of a ford would NOT be difficult. Road passes on through a small coconut plantation and winds through forest and grassland to another small creek which is crossed by a bridge. Bridge is some 60 feet long, by 6 feet wide, with 3/16 inch sheet iron decking. From here track runs into a swamp. A causeway would need constructing before heavy traffic could pass this section. Then crosses the SINEMI Creek by a bridge similar to the above-mentioned one. Track then skirts a grassy plain, only 2 feet above sea level on which the BUNA aerodrome is located. This section of the road is about 12 feet wide bounded by Kura-Kura grass 2-3 feet high. Road continues parallel to the SINEMI Creek into a coconut plantation and through into BUNA. The surface of the road is of medium sandy loam which becomes very boggy in wet weather. Most of the road is from 10-12 feet wide, and could be widened with little trouble. It is suitable in its present condition for jeeps, except in wet weather, but bridges must be reconstructed for heavy traffic. Plenty of material for bridging is easily obtainable near the streams crossed.

HAROKI - BUROPA - PEN. GOOD EXPERT IN BRIDGE AT HAROKA creek. suitable for jeeps. U.S. report creek 2 ft, not bottom.



3. DOBODURA-SOPUTA

Track runs northward from DOBODURA through open grassland and then over slightly undulating, lightly timbered country, to ANGO. A good jeep track is at present in use. The track has also been developed towards GERUA and supplies are being carried forward. A very bad track leads from ANGO to the GIRUA River through jungle and is very badly drained. After heavy rain there is at least six inches of water over most ~~km~~ of the track. The GIRUA River is about 70 yards wide, rises about 3 feet after rain, and flows at a very fast rate. Even when at low ebb a rope is necessary to assist in a safe crossing. Great difficulty would be experienced in finding a good anchorage for any bridging project. The SOPUTA bank of the river is very muddy and subject to flooding for about 200 yards inland. From the river the track leads to SOPUTA through jungle and after rain is flooded. The track ANGO-SOPUTA is NOT passable by any type of MT; only a foot track exists as connecting link between villages.

4. INONDA-HORANDA-DOBODURA

See TRACK 1.

5. EAST - FROM KUMUSI RIVER.

- (a) WAIROPE-AWALA-HAGENA HAMBO. The track in this section is generally very bad, wet and low lying. Extensive drainage, corduroy and small bridges are required. The track also requires opening up. Grades are reasonably good and with attention to above-mentioned points, the road can be made capable of carrying jeeps - this is one of the worst sections of the track and will require extensive work.
- (b) HAGENAHAMBO-IGORA STORE. An MT road exists from a point one mile east of HAGENAHAMBO with a good surface of gritty loam and gravel in some places. The surface is well drained throughout with a width of 12 feet with good grades and at present can be considered as a light MT road in all weathers.
- (c) IGORA STORE-AMBOGO CROSSING. Requires extensive draining as the surface is very wet and 25% of the distance is at present quite impassable, while only 50% is passable for MT in dry weather.
- (d) AMBOGO CROSSING-POPONDETTA. Well drained sandy surface 16 feet wide - suitable for light MT traffic all weathers.
- (e) POPONDETTA-SOPUTA. Generally fit for light MT in all weathers, but requires attention to drainage and surfacing in low spots and improvements to corduroy. At present being used by captured MT.
- (f) SOPUTA-BUNA. The main trail to SANANANDA Point is left at SOPUTA Village a few hundred yards from the GIRUA River. The river is normally crossed by a ford at this point; this constitutes a defile for MT. The trail follows the right bank of the GIRUA River to GERUA, thence to BUNA through similar type of country. It is an almost level trail, wide enough for jeeps and with the preparation of several small bridges plus a bridge over the GIRUA River would be suitable.



6. OTHER ROUTES.

(a) WAIROPE-SANGARA MISSION-POPONDETTA

The track from WAIROPE via ISIVATA-SANGARA MISSION-POPONDETTA has been traversed but this route is quite impossible for MT under existing conditions without enormous expenditure of time and use of mechanical equipment. Many bridges and heavy cuttings.

(b) AMBOGO CROSSING-JUMBORA

The track is at present quite impassable for MT and it is recommended, due to the existing wet season, that no attempt be made to improve this road at present. The greater portion of the track is at present knee deep in mud and little permanent benefit would be obtained from deviation.

(c) JUMBORA-SOPUTA.


This track has at one time been used by MT and sections of it are at present capable of carrying jeep traffic. Seven bridges are required; the whole length of the road requires opening out to the sunlight and two sections require deviation or extensive corduroy. As a suitable landing ground is under construction approximately half way along this road, improvements to it are now being carried out. The time in which it will be available to MT depending on the amount of labour available.

(d) POPONDETTA LANDING STRIP, (1½ miles west POPONDETTA)

This track has been improved and two bridges constructed and is now capable of carrying jeeps from the strip to POPONDETTA.

7. ISIVATA-SANGARA.

See 6(a).

  
(B.H. MacCORMICK) Capt,  
I(t).

*Distributed by IT.*

G.H.A.  
C.I.N.C.  
G.O.C.  
C.F.  
A/D SURVEY.  
FILE







3800 Bren ammo	27 hand grenades
70 magazines (rifle)	64 Automatic rifle ammo
300 automatic rifle ammo	35 light mortar ammo
80 automatic gun magazines	1 gas mask
3 parts of Bren Gun	1 smoke cylinder
1 signal flare	

Battle started 0800	Ended 0900
3 wounded 0830	Sgt YAMADA killed 1745

- Dec. 6 Expect enemy counter-attack but no changes. There was something not up to par about last night's provisions. Battalion Commander's instructions have come. Praise as to yesterday's battle. After sundown there was a warning that enemy troops were landing. We prepared, but found that we mistook an enemy flare for a signal flare.
- Dec. 7 Last night Corporal BABA slept in my place and so I got wet from the rain and could hardly sleep. After breakfast gave a few instructions after which I again gave instructions to Corp. TORII. There are some in a part of the 1st squad who are completely deteriorated spiritually. At about 3 there was a little firing. Received 10 days rations today. At about 2100 the battalion commander came on inspection and cautioned about camouflage of positions. All 23 of the men worked on camouflage. 1st anniversary of great East Asia War to be tomorrow. Instructions and orders came. Reports that army staff has landed. Rumor of KANEMORI.
- Dec. 8 Today is finally the the 1 year anniversary. We should have a ceremony but everyone is exhausted. There is no excuse for this. Corp. TORII and men have gone to take the tank. 1 light mortar, 2 rifles, 1 reserve gun, 2000 ammo, 35 hand grenades. Had air raid early in the morning but quiet afterwards. About 1000 there was concentrated fire of mortar. Aside from a superior private being wounded there has been no change. Just about night fall the enemy threw 5 or 6 hand grenades in the vicinity of the tank but were repulsed by MG fire. Will do a little construction work.
- Dec. 9 From morning till noon there was an almost continuous concentration of mortar fire. Fortunately ASAI was only slightly wounded (1200) and is safe. Recently enemy air attacks have decreased but there is a tendency of increased artillery fire. Interchanged with 3rd platoon.
- Dec. 10 During morning there was mortar fire but it was unusually quiet during the afternoon. We are in reserve and we rest or we can take a bath. In the afternoon ammunition and provisions were dropped by our planes. Immediately afterwards enemy planes appeared but damage unknown.
- Dec. 11 As usual there is artillery fire. Again there was made arrangement as to the feeding of men. It is very regretful there are many rumors going around about the battle situation, but it seems as if it is gradually getting better. I certainly do want a smoke.
- Dec. 12 From today's mortar fire 3rd platoon received great damages. NAKAWA KOHEI killed in action. IMURA KUMAZAWA wounded. Because of this 2nd platoon relief postponed till tomorrow. Carrying out construction of shelters. KIUCHI and others sent out to reconnoiter.
- Dec. 13 As usual there was continuous mortar fire but little damage. Talked with YOSHIDA of the command squad about all sorts of things. He is smart considering his age. At evening relieved the 2nd platoon at left central dividing post position.



- Dec. 14 At about the time when the rain which started last night let up there was mortar fire. The following 2nd squad men of the central post HASEGAWA, HOSUKA were wounded. (0850) There is little mortar fire here, but there is no wild firing. Instructions from battalion and company commanders. Constructed shelters at central post.
- Dec. 15 It is relatively quiet today. There is only wild firing at times. I am tired of sleeping within trenches. We think of this and that, but we in the present situation think first of food. There is a big bearded fellow who talks about past reminiscences or about the food he will eat in the future. How nonchalant he is.
- Dec. 16 For the first time in a long while I had a dream about an incident which happened 10 years ago. I remember sadly of many things. 0915 lance corporal OOSHIRO hit in head. One can not look lightly up the wild firing of the enemy. Today we were given this month's ration. Again in the matter of distribution there are some who do not understand. It is very regretful

DISTRIBUTION:

I Corp  
Adv NCF  
NGF  
GHQ  
7th Aust Div  
Warren Force  
Urbana Force  
127th Inf (CO)  
32d Div



Brig. Wooten

INTERROGATION OF YOSHIDA, TOSHIO, CAPTURED JAPANESE PRISONER 18 DEC 42.

Name of P/W	Yoshida, Toshio
Age	21 (19 our count)
Residence	Nagoya
Grade	1st Class Private
Branch of Service	Infantry
Unit	3rd Bn. 229 Infantry
Where Captured	North of our Eastern Front (Warren in Coconut Grove between Cape Endaiadere and our forces on right flank.
How Captured	Wounded in right eye by machine gun fire from tank. Did not resist capture.

The Following Information is a Factual Summary of P/W's Statements.

Military History.

The P/W left Ujina, Japan December 27, 1941 for China. He was in China in the area of Canton until ordered to the Buna Area.

En route to Buna two days were spent in Sumatra, then to Rabaul. There the 1st and 2nd Bn's. split off with C.O. Tanaka and departed for Guadalcanal. The 3rd Bn. departed for GIRUWA, arriving between November 14 and 19, 1942. The following night they started the march along the coast which took them to their bivouac area, (Buna) where they have been to date. The march took two days. (Note: Three prisoners questioned all claimed they were of the 129th Regiment, including this one. However, a captured document in the possession of this prisoner showed it to be the 229th. This prisoner claims he meant to say 229 when shown the document.)

Disposition of 3rd Bn 229th Regiment.

Three companies were on a front facing our front, extending from the coast south of Cape Endaiadere, just north of the new strip to a point approximately the position of the bridge between the old and new air strips. This P/W is from the 11th Company, which was on the coast flank. The 10th and 12th Companies were to the west, and the 9th Company in reserve to the rear. The CP was approximately 300 meters to the south of the center of the front, in the coconut grove.

Strength of Japanese Forces. (See Document Attached).

This P/W claimed the 3rd Bn strength to be between 500 and 600 men when it first arrived. The toll of casualties and sickness has reduced it about one platoon per company (or 1/3) before the attack on December 18. He stated, therefore, that there were about 300 to 400 men in this Bn.

The P/W was vague on the strength of the Japanese Marines. He stated that it was general knowledge that the Marines were 1000 strong in the Buna Area. Allowing for casualties and sickness among the Marines, he said their shrinkage is at least 35 1/3 per cent. P/W places the total combat strength in the Buna Area between 300 and



1000 men. The P/W did not know the disposition of their forces in the area west and north of them, (between Buna Mission and their lines) or their forces to the west of south of Buna Mission. He did say that theirs was the only army fighting unit in this area.

He did not know of a Lt. General Yamamoto, but had heard that a Col. Yamamoto was their C. O.

Comment: Col. Yamamoto possibly C.O. 144 Regt?

#### Artillery and Machine Gun Strength.

The P/W stated to his knowledge there were four artillery pieces in the area in which they were operating. Two of these were called (dai tai ho) battalion cannon, and two mountain guns.

He stated he had heard that one mountain gun was damaged to the extent of being unserviceable. As nearly as we could determine, the battalion cannon are 75 mm. and the mountain guns of larger size. The P/W did not know where they were located, but believed one was a short distance to the north of the east end of the new strip on the edge of the jungle where it meets the coconut grove. He stated that our artillery fire had not bothered them much--but our mortar fire was very effective, even more so than bombing.

He stated there were four heavy machine guns to the company and three light machine guns per platoon. Each squad had two men who carried molotov cocktails. There is one flame thrower per company.

He stated that the Australian hand grenades they used against us were taken from dead Australian soldiers. (Did not know just where) The tommy guns of ours used on December 18 were taken from the Bren Carriers they captured in attack prior to this one. To attack tanks, they used a disc shaped magnetic bomb which sticks to tank and explodes.

The P/W was unable to give accurate picture of MG emplacements.

The P/W stated they knew we had tanks because during our attack on 5 December, he knew of four of them they had destroyed. Comment: This refers to the five Bren Carriers we used on our attack 5 December. The P/W did not know the difference and was unaware of our 18 December tank maneuver plans.

#### Rations and Supplies.

The P/W stated that food supplies were getting low. He thought they had enough to last until January 1, 1943. They were eating three meals a day consisting mostly of rice, some soya bean flour, no tea, or meat, or canned goods. However, he stated the Marines are reported to have abundant food supplies.

The P/W stated that for the past 25 days they had been out of tobacco and were smoking coconut palm leaves.

On ammunition the P/W stated that for the last 10 days they did not even shoot, because of orders to conserve on ammunition.

Comment: All our attacks have met heavy fire.

The P/W stated he knew of one parachute dropping and it was a food dropping. He had heard that one or two destroyers had gotten in since his arrival, which brought them food and ammunition, and evacuated the wounded. He did not know when this had been.



### Morale

The P/W stated that the Emperor's message on November 28 encouraged them to carry on, awaiting reinforcement.

He stated that their morale was low, due to lack of food, which was weakening them physically, and the inability for their ships to get in with reinforcements, and lack of air support.

The P/W stated that they had been told their ultimate goal was "The Air Ports Over the Mountains," and then Australia. However, they were dug in for defence now and could not attack.

The P/W stated he was glad to be alive, and did not want to go back to Japan after the war. He stated that he had not been given instructions what to say if captured. They were told "One Must Die Rather Than be Captured."

The P/W stated that after the fall of Singapore they felt they could not be defeated, but now doubts have arisen in the rank and file.

He stated that our mortars were causing the greatest casualties, which was "Making Him Very Sad."

He stated that no plans for evacuation were known to him.

He stated that liason between their forces and Buna Mission had been broken by destruction of bridge.

The P/W's knowledge was limited by having not moved out of his Company's position.

*George E. Aurel*

GEORGE E. AUREL  
1st Lt., A.U.S.,  
Interrogating Officer.

*Gordon B. Rogers*

GORDON B. ROGERS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
AC of S, G-2.

I Corp  
Adv NGF  
NGF  
GHQ  
7th Aust Div  
Warren Force  
Uroana Force  
127th Regt (C.O.)  
Brig. Wooten  
32nd Div.



Translations of Documents Captured by U. S. Forces Warren 18 December 1942. Translated by Sgt. S. Ishio.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION OF THE 11TH COMPANY, 229TH INFANTRY, 23 Sept 42.

Company Commander	Capt. Hitabe
Platoon	1st Lt. Kamio - 43 Men
Platoon	2nd Lt. Ishihara 44 Men
Platoon	Probational Off. Suzuki 42
Command Section	W.O. Matsubayashi 26 Men

NOTE:

Battalion Hq.	10 Men
3rd MG Company	6 Men
Regt Hq.	6 Men
Labor Platoon	1
Signal Unit	3
BARENPAN MP Unit	4
Div. Hq.	4
Nanking Res Officer School	1
Nanking NCO Candidate	
Intendance Unit	3
Patients in Hospital	9

I Corp  
Adv NGF  
NGF  
Adv GHQ  
7th Aust Div  
Warren Force  
Urbana Force  
127th Regt (C.O.)  
Brig. Wooten  
32nd Div.



Leanley. Comd - 19/12.  
HEADQUARTERS  
BUNA FORCES

18 December, 1942

The following are, word for word, extracts from Japanese Diaries which have been captured by our forces during the current operations in the Buna Area.

1. 25 Nov. -- I wonder what our replacements from Rabaul are doing, also, what our planes are doing. Passing the day like this means only waiting for death. Dried bread is issued now and then, however, this is only temporary relief. Every day, from morning till night, there are enemy air raids. Our unit daily becomes weaker. There is food, but we cannot cook it. There is water, but we cannot drink it. I pray fervently that the following on units will land.  
28 Nov. -- From morning, we are heavily bombed. It is more terrifying than that of the 25th. The daily enemy air raids and assaults kill off my comrades. Hunger assails me and there is nothing I can do but await death.  
29 Nov. -- This morning, the enemy persistently worries us with mortar fire.  
  
25 Nov. -- From 1400 there was very heavy rifle and machine gun fire. Every moment I thought there was going to be a charge. During the night, we made a cover for the trench.  
5 Dec. -- Receiving concentrated fire incessantly from early morning. We are more dead than alive. Reinforcements do not arrive. The gradual extermination of my fellow soldiers makes me feel lonely at heart.
3. 27 Nov. -- The desperate struggle of the Nankai Detachment is fearful. It is utterly beyond ones expectation. I don't know why, but the whole outfit lacks efficiency. In particular, the patients in the hospital are like living statues. There is nothing to eat. Everybody is in a weak and staggering state. Without food, having become terrifyingly thin and imitated, the appearance of our fellow soldiers does not bear reflection. How could the people at home understand this state of affairs? It must be seen to be believed.
4. 18 Nov. -- This morning, we mistook our men for enemy and fired upon them for awhile. After that, as before, there were several air raids.  
21 Nov. -- Today the enemy suddenly took the offensive. The mortar bursting on our front is fierce and the enemy definitely has superiority in the air. Enemy bombers and fighters raided rear positions and afterwards strafed. Because of that, our forces could not move.  
22 Nov. -- Enemy mortar fired from morning, bursting fiercely around us. Enemy scouts appear everywhere and attack, shooting automatic rifles. Today, enemy planes again flow over and because of this we could not step outside.  
23 Nov. -- In the afternoon, enemy mortar opened fire ferociously. The shells are passing our hut and landing in the shore area. I feel that our lives are finally being shortened.  
24 Nov. -- At this rate, we can't hold out. Taking this advantage, the enemy is gradually pressing on. As time passes on, enemy bombing becomes more fierce. Today's were the fiercest yet. In the afternoon, the enemy suddenly took the offensive. Mortar shells are really bursting close by. At night we had our first encounter. The enemy sent a three-man scouting party to reconnoiter our positions. Went out to check this party. It was fairly dark when suddenly alarming sounds of fire, rifle and automatic, were heard. Here they come. We replied with mortar fire and the enemy finally withdrew, but we had one man killed in action.



28 Nov. -- At last our lives are becoming shorter. Look at the fierceness of the enemy mortar fire, which burst near us. Today the word that the Buna Crisis is imminent, has reached the ears of the Emperor and he has asked that Buna be defended to the last man.

*W.D. Hawkins*  
W.D. HAWKINS,  
Major, G.S.C.,  
Asst. AG of S., G-2.

18 December 1945



BRIG WOOTEH

Translations of Japanese Documents Captured 16 December 1942 by U. S. Forces Urbana in Buna Village Vicinity. Translated by Sgt. S. Ishio.

ARMY MOST SECRET

July 24, 1942

DESTROY AFTER READING

Direction (orders) for Buna Base Personnel (Part I).

1. This area shall be called the Buna Naval Base, abbreviated Buna Base. (BUNA KICHI).
2. In the future, all of the main body (force) of this unit shall be concentrated in Buna Base, and further the 15th Construction Unit (approximately 1500 personnel). Depending on the situation, a few seaplanes shall be based here.
3. This unit has the mission of making this place a foothold, assisting the 15th Construction Unit, completing ground supply roads, and obliterating obstructions to the operations of the army.
4. Until superiority of air in this area is in our hands by dealing a terrific blow to the enemy air force, have the utmost patience and take care of yourselves against the enemy air attacks. Strive to conceal our army strength. Utilize air raid facilities to the utmost degree so that injuries will be as small as possible.
5. Anti-aircraft equipment will not be fired until special orders are received.
6. Avoid appearing on the beach during daytime as much as possible.
7. During an enemy air raid take shelter in whatever air raid facilities the unit commander designates, or get as far away as possible from buildings, scatter and strive to conceal yourselves. In such cases everyone must carry a No. 2 first aid pouch.
8. When enemy bombers appear, lie on the ground, and against strafing from fighters, utilize objects. Use coconut trees, etc., for shields and take a squatting position.
9. In any case, when enemy planes come near it is important not to move, and running particularly is strongly prohibited. This is because it is extremely difficult to notice the presence of people from the air when one does not move.
10. From the viewpoint of safeguard against spies, natives without exception, are not to be allowed within the base.



11. When resting or sleeping under a coconut tree, there are times when a life may be lost due to falling coconuts, therefore, it is necessary to be careful.

12. In this area, there are relatively few mosquitoes, but it is definite that malarial mosquitoes do exist. If we stay for a long while, we may tend to become lax, but warn each other and be careful not to get stung by mosquitoes.

13. Strive to keep the camp area as clean as possible. Be especially thorough about the disposition of waste material, and it is necessary to take strict precautionary measures to prevent the growth of flies so that dangerous contagious disease will not spread.

14. There is a lack of fresh water in this area and on top of that we are entering into the dry season. The amount of rainfall should gradually decrease, therefore, rain water is only for drinking purposes, and for miscellaneous needs, well water is to be used.

15. So that concealment may be sufficient, it is strictly prohibited to cut down coconut trees. When it is necessary to cut coconut trees, cut them at a point 2000 meters southeast of the base.

16. It is essential that this area, when viewed from the air, be kept as nearly as possible in the same unchanged condition as it was before being taken.

I Corp  
32nd Div  
Adv NGF  
NGF  
7th Aust Div  
Warren Force  
Urbana Force  
127th Regt. (C.O.)  
Brig. Wooten

ADV GHQ



18 Dec 42 Bde

G-2 PERIODIC REPORT

From: 1800L 9 December, 1942.  
To : 1200L 14 December, 1942.  
Headquarters U. S. Forces.  
1900 L 14 December, 1942.

No. 2.

MAPS: TARGET PLAN, BUNA, NO. N 24 AND OVERLAY.

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

a. ENEMY FRONT LINE:

The enemy front line extends generally from the island SW of the mouth of ENTRANCE CREEK, then south along the east bank of ENTRANCE CREEK to 25.7-26.9, thence south of the old runway and parallel thereto, then to the new strip, through the new strip and the junction of the forks at the east end of the strip, continuing to the coast. (See overlay attached hereto). Indications are that all available personnel are being used in the line.

b. DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATION:

No change from Periodic Report No. 1, except that the enemy no longer holds BUNA VILLAGE. The enemy appears to be holding two main positions in the BUNA area. One from a point on the east coast 700 yards SE CAPE ENDAIADERE along the N edge of the new strip including the S end of the old runway to the mouth of SANIMA CREEK; the other from a point on the N coast E of GIROPA POINT SW to the road junction at point 25.5-27.0 (Target plan, Buna, Plan No. N24), thence along the E bank of ENTRANCE CREEK, the island in the mouth of ENTRANCE CREEK and BUNA MISSION (see overlay). The MLR of the first position is about 4500 yards long; that of the second position is about 2000 yards long. The area between the two positions S of GIROPA POINT is extremely swampy. Of the two positions it is thought that position No. 1 is the main position for the reasons that this position affords excellent fields of fire across the air strips and grass strips, the approaches into this position are more difficult due to swampy ground, and organization of the ground of this position consisting of barricades along the east coast, pill boxes NE and SW of the bridge between the two air strips, entrenching along the N side of the old runway appears to be much more complete than in position No. 2.

c. UNITS IN CONTACT:

No change in units identified in G-2 Periodic Report No. 1 to 1800L 7 December, except that PW Ikedo reported the presence of 3d Bn 129th Regiment (part of 38th Division) in the area. The other Bns of this regiment were said by the PW to be in GUADALCANAL.



The total in the BUNA-GONA area was estimated in G-2 Periodic Report No. 1 to be 5350. Since the Australian forces reported approximately 650 in the GONA area, when this area was taken, on 9 December (previous estimate 150), it is now estimated that there are in the BUNA-SANANANDA area about 3600 (allowing for casualties). Of these it is estimated that about two-thirds or more are in the SANANANDA area for the following reasons:

(1). The SANANANDA area is the only area in which the enemy has endeavored to maintain a deep bridgehead.

(2). The aggressive attitude on the part of the enemy in the SANANANDA area. (The enemy S of the junction of the CAPE KILBERTON track with the SANANANDA-SOPUTA track is reported to be making frequent counter-attacks).

(3). Severe losses on this front. (NGF reports losses of 40 officers and 400 EM on 7/8 December.

(4). The use of medical, finance and construction troops in MIA and in small counter-attacks in the BUNA area.

(5). PW Ikedo stated that the Japanese troops in the BUNA area numbered 1200.

(6). The lack of any serious counter-attacks by the enemy in the BUNA area (enemy's attitude: passive defense).

Therefore, it is considered that the maximum strength in the BUNA-SANANANDA area is: SANANANDA area: 2400 men, BUNA area: 1200 men. Comment: While the above figure represents the maximum in the BUNA area it is suggested that the strength is probably considerably less. Japanese Periodic Report dated 27 November 1942 headed SEISAN Report No. 3, Information Report No. 1 YAMAGATA BUTAI, Headquarters at RABAUL, captured by NGF, in paragraph 2b estimates American troops, including a parachute unit and native troops in the BUNA area to be about 1 Bn (1200). It is thought that if the Japanese had 1200 as reported by PW Ikedo and estimated American troops at 1200 that they would have attacked instead of maintaining a passive defense. Therefore, it is considered that the enemy strength in the BUNA area is from 800 to 1100. It is not thought that the enemy strength in this area is less than 800 on account of the length of the Japanese MIA. It is possible that 800 men are manning this line due to the nature of the terrain (swampy areas deny avenues of attack over most of the front of the Japanese position and their line is anchored on the sea coast at both ends).



d. ARTILLERY.

During the past week enemy A/A guns have become more active suggesting receipt of ammunition by the parachute dropping previously reported. The location of a number of A/A guns and fire from at least one 75mm gun has been reported. 80mm mortars or mountain guns have fired on our troops. The enemy is using 20mm A/A guns against both air and ground targets. PW Ikedo stated that he had seen some 3" A/A guns.

e. RESERVES AND OTHER FORCES CAPABLE OF INTERVENTION.

The enemy has employed air dropping to some extent as a means of replenishing supplies. On 3 December supplies were dropped by 100 parachutes along the main strip. On 6 December six enemy planes passed over BUNA MISSION and one was seen to drop objects without parachutes on the main strip. On 10 December two flights of six bombers each, accompanied by eighteen fighters, dropped supplies at BUNA VILLAGE. Although numerous barges and destroyers have been sighted in the BUNA-SALAWAUA area, no definite information of actual landings was received until 14 December, when five destroyers, twelve barges and two ship's boats were sighted at the MAMBARE RIVER mouth and two barges at the KUMUSI RIVER mouth. It is estimated that the enemy landed 900-1000 men at the MAMBARE RIVER mouth and 200 men at the KUMUSI RIVER mouth in addition to the estimated 350 landed at the AMBOGA RIVER mouth night 1/2 December. The continued presence of naval craft in VITIAZ STRAIT indicates that other landings could be made in force under favorable weather conditions.

f. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION ESTABLISHMENTS.

Extracts from documents captured in the AMBOGA area 11 December indicate that the enemy is experiencing great difficulty in the supply of arms and ammunition, viz: "For the 900 personnel comprising the main strength of the YAZAWA BUTAI (41st Regiment) which is withdrawing from the region bordering the KUMUSI RIVER, there is but only 100 rifles, 10 LMG's and one HMG." "Also the troops at BABABUA and GIRUWA are suffering a shortage of arms and in this area supplies are a problem and I request you send forward immediately 500 rifles, 30 LMG's and 30 grenade throwers." "I have reported a shortage of rifle ammunition, and request that you send forward supplies to the limit of your replenishments." PW Ikedo reported the presence of an ammunition dump in BUNA VILLAGE, at the NW corner of the cleared area on ENTRANCE CREEK and that it was hit by an aerial bomb 5 December. Numerous blazes in the vicinity of the old strip and BUNA MISSION caused by our mortar shoots suggests that supply dumps, particularly of gasoline and ammunition, are well dispersed throughout the area. Supplies have been dropped by parachute on at least three occasions. It is estimated that sufficient supply is being barely maintained by droppings from aircraft.



## 2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.

### a. GENERAL SUMMARY.

Enemy covering forces have been slowly driven back during period 16 November to 15 December. During this period the enemy made the most of the use of snipers in trees, mutually supporting weapon emplacements, and the defiles between swamps afforded by the very difficult terrain. It is considered that the American forces were in contact with the main position on 1 December. Here again the enemy exploited the principle of economy of forces to the fullest by blocking the defiles into his position with pill boxes, manning the MLR thinly by snipers in trees and presumably disposing local supports in the rear of his MLR. On 5 December BUNA VILLAGE was isolated by American troops who proceeded to the sea coast E of the village and contained the village on the W along BUNA CREEK. This operation was concluded against heavy resistance. During the period 5 December to 14 December enemy troops in BUNA VILLAGE made counter-attacks in an effort to fight their way into BUNA MISSION as follows: at about 0515L 6 December (attack repulsed with an enemy loss of 30 to 40 men); this attack was assisted by a simultaneous counter-attack from the direction of BUNA MISSION which was also repulsed with estimated heavy casualties; at 2100L night 6/7 December another attack was made from BUNA VILLAGE which was repulsed. The following morning 8 Japanese bodies were seen on the beach. It is not known how many casualties had been removed during the night. At 2000L 7 December a barge moving toward BUNA VILLAGE from BUNA MISSION was set on fire by our MG fire and towed back in the direction of BUNA MISSION. It could have had the mission of evacuating the enemy forces in BUNA VILLAGE to BUNA MISSION. The barge appeared to be empty and was manned by only four or five men. During our attack on 14 December some Japanese were observed swimming from BUNA VILLAGE in the direction of BUNA MISSION. Preceded by a heavy barrage of mortar fire, American troops over-ran BUNA VILLAGE on December 14th. The attack began about 0700L, the troops were reorganized along the sea coast to the N and E of BUNA VILLAGE by 1000L. Mopping up operations continued. The number of enemy casualties in this action are estimated to be 50-75. At first this attack was met by heavy fire which thereafter diminished rapidly. His resistance continues strongly along the remainder of his MLR.

### b. OPERATIONS OF COMPONENT UNITS.

#### 1. ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY.

AA fire was reported light in volume during the early part of the period but during the latter part of the period, AA fire became more intense and one pompon previously silenced was again in action. These activities have definitely maintained effective AA defense in spite of our heavy bombardments.



(2). ANTI-TANK UNITS.

None have been reported.

(3). ARMORED FORCES.

None observed and none reported by PW Ikedo when interrogated.

(4). ARTILLERY.

On 11 December a 25 pounder position of the Warren Force was shelled by what was believed to be a 75mm gun. In addition an enemy mountain gun has been reported firing from a position at point 251-259. Results of our counterbattery fire have not been reported. It is also probable that two 70mm infantry guns are in the area, one of which is reported damaged.

(5). AVIATION, COMBAT.

On 11 December 27 Zeros were in the area and subsequently other unidentified ships reported by our forces may have been enemy planes. No actual strafing of our ground troops has occurred during the period.

(6). AVIATION, OBSERVATION.

On 11 December our front lines, rear installations and CP's were reconnoitered by the force of 27 Zeros (above). Almost nightly, unidentified planes have been reported to be dropping flares along the coast near our right flank.

(7). CAVALRY.

None reported.

(8). CHEMICAL WARFARE.

It is suggested that the reported wearing of masks with adjusted face pieces in the GONA sector was to avoid the stench from unburied enemy dead.

(9). ENGINEERS.

It is reported that construction of pill boxes and shelters has been continued by enemy engineer troops, particularly on their left flank. Entrenching continues north of the old runway.

(10). INFANTRY.

Enemy ground troops have confined their activities mainly to sniping, patrolling and resisting our attacks. Their attitude indicates a passive defense, awaiting the arrival of reinforcements or sacrifice of the garrison.



(11). TANKS.

None have been reported during the period and PW Ikedo confirms this.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

a. ESTIMATED ENEMY CASUALTIES, INCLUDING PRISONERS.

PW Ikedo reported that fifty wounded men were in BUNA VILLAGE on 9 December. Other reported casualties would increase the estimate of enemy losses to 100 to 150 men for the period.

b. MORALE.

The enemy has continued to resist us strongly and PW Ikedo states that the determination to defend is still strong. Prior to the time of his capture, a message from the Emperor was read to the troops asking them to resist a little longer. The effect of our propaganda pamphlets is probably not very successful.

c. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT.

PW statements together with other information indicates that rations have been successfully maintained. See Paragraph 2a for shortage of munitions. It is believed that the ammunition supply is barely maintained by air droppings.

d. TERRAIN NOT UNDER OUR CONTROL.

Interpretation of aerial photos indicates that there are trails leading south west from GIROPA POINT into the area previously reported swampy by reconnaissance patrols from both Warren and Urbana forces. A special patrol is in the area looking for possible routes. Interviews with natives indicate that no feasible routes penetrate the swamps to the west of SINEMI-DOBODURA trail. No doubt the enemy is taking full advantage of shell and bomb craters in developing his defensive positions. The lack of known bridges across SANIMA CREEK would not preclude lateral communication as air reconnaissance indicates that shallow fords exist at 100 yards and at 200 yards east of the mouth.

e. ENEMY'S PROBABLE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.

It is likely that the enemy is well informed as to our general situation, by patrolling and by documents taken from a Bn 3-2 who was killed.



f. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY.

A considerable amount of rainfall has occurred mainly at night during the period. Notwithstanding the wet conditions, an average of four landing strips at DOBODURA have remained serviceable daily. Delivery of supplies to forward areas have been delayed at times by muddy road conditions.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES: BUNA AREA.

a. TO CONTINUE TO DEFEND THE BRIDGE HEAD BUNA-CAPE ENDAIADERE:

For the same reason as advanced in G-2 Periodic Report No. 1 and in addition the statement of PW Ikedo that the troops have been asked by their Emperor to hold on a little longer, and which they are determined to do to the last man, this is probable.

b. TO BE REINFORCED:

Captured documents and the statement of PW Ikedo give evidence that reinforcements are expected. The landings at the MAMBARE RIVER mouth and KUMUSI RIVER mouth on 14 December, the troops landed at AMBOGA RIVER mouth 1/2 December might be intended for this purpose.

c. TO EVACUATE:

Still a possibility, however, the increased use of LAE-SALANAU air dromes, the landings the night 1/2 December and 14 December lessen the likelihood of adoption.

d. TO ATTEMPT TO CUT OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION ON THE KOKODA TRAIL IN THE VICINITY OF ISIVITA:

The troops landed at the mouth of the MAMBARE RIVER 14 December could come up the MAMBARE RIVER by boat to within 1-1/2 miles NE of IOMA, thence to ISIVITA by the trail IOMA-OINTATANDI-DIVINIKOARI (4 mile strategical series NG Buna, First edition). The 200 landed at KUMUSI RIVER mouth could proceed up the KUMUSI RIVER to the same track, thence to the KOKODA track W of ISIVITA. However, it is not believed that the enemy will adopt this capability due to insufficient forces which have already taken heavy losses from our aircraft. It is believed more likely that these forces will move to the south in an attempt to reinforce the SANANANDA area or to the north to reinforce the LAE-SALANAU area.

e. TO ATTACK:

All the previous operations, doctrines and traditions of the Japanese Army have been to attack when forces were available to him. It is probable that the enemy strength in this area at present



prevents the adoption of such a move. It is suggested that the enemy will make further attempts to reinforce his forces from naval vessels and motor landing craft during darkness and inclement weather with a view to retaking the offensive. It is not believed that the enemy is willing to take the risk to his naval forces and transports by attack of our land based aircraft and by our naval forces, of an all out combined attack against this area or against Port Moresby. However, he retains the capability of holding in the SOLOMONS and transferring his main attack to NEW GUINEA.

COMMENT: The enemy will probably adopt a above. His capability which presents the greatest danger to us and to the accomplishment of our mission is a combination of b and c.

*Gordon B. Rogers*

GORDON B. ROGERS  
Colonel, G.S.C.  
AC of S, G-2

DISTRIBUTION:

NGF  
Adv NGF  
GHQ  
Rear Echelon, I Corps  
7th Aust Div  
32d Div  
18 Aust Bde  
File



Brig. Wooten

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REPRODUCTION FROM HQF SUMMARY  
OFFICE OF AS OF S, G-2

MOST SECRET

WORLD REVIEW SITUATION FROM LONDON TO 7 DEC/42

1. MILITARY.

RUSSIA.

Norther Sector. South of LAKE ILMEN situation for some months has been obscure. Recent information states that the Russians hold DEMYANSK and that the front line follows that LOVAT R.

Central Sector. Russian offensive operations are continuing in the same directions. Fierce German resistance and blizzards appear to have slowed down progress. Russian General Staff satisfied with progress at 1 Dec but said rivers, marshes and woods made speedy advance difficult against fully prepared enemy.

DON-STALINGRAD SECTOR. (a) Believed up to 200,000 of SIXTH German Army completely circled in STALINGRAD area. Entirely dependent on air supplies but still resisting fiercely against increased Russian pressure.

(b) The sudden thaw and heavy rains have impeded Russian progress at the DON bend and SW of STALINGRAD. German DON bridgeheads near mouth of CHIR have probably been eliminated. Russians claim 2 bridgeheads lower CHIR R. No major German counter action yet but enemy claims interference with Russian supply lines by motorized columns KAIMUK STEPPE.

CAUCASUS SECTOR. Germans continue on defensive but Russian progress has been retarded by local counter attacks and heavy rains.

General. Adverse weather and fierce German resistance appear to be holding up Russian offensive operations in all sectors. Capture of bridgeheads over CHIR may presage a fresh offensive.

BURMA.

Jap garrison at AKYAB has been reinforced by the withdrawal of some troops from BUTHIRDAUNG. Jap patrols are active in the HOMALIN area. No confirmation Chinese reports Japs about to launch attack Yunnan Province.

LIBYA.

Railway expected open to TOBRUK 1 Dec. BENGHAZI port open. Situation satisfactory.

TUNISIA.

Dec 1/3. The enemy made three heavy counter attacks with



tanks and dive-bombers, considerable losses were inflicted including 33 tanks. Enemy has succeeded in reoccupying TEBOURBA. FIRST army is now regrouping south of TEBOURBA improving heavily strained ADM situation and advanced landing grounds. Commandos landed RASS AL KORAN 1 Dec have now linked up with column West of HAFUR. Axis forces TUNISIA estimated 12,000 Germans, 6,000 Italians 40/60 tanks.

## 2. NAVAL.

### NORTHERN WATERS.

Convoy 29 ships from RUSSIA arrived U.K. lost 1 ship torpedoed by U Boat and 1 missing. Three independently routed Russian ships arrived ICELAND from RUSSIA. Russian icebreaker NIKOLAI left BLACK SEA 3 Dec 41 via BURZ, CAPE TOWN, CAPE HORN, ALIUTIAN ISLANDS, NORTH SIBERIA has reached WHITE SEA. Italian blockade runner intercepted 500 miles West CAPE FINISTERRA by convoy escort 1 Dec. Ship surrendered but had to be sunk owing to bad weather.

### MEDITERRANEAN.

Axis shipping losses 1 Dec to 4 Dec en route TUNISIA and TRIPOLI. Nine ships sunk 1 tanker left on fire as result naval air and RAF attacks. Three warship escorts known sunk other shipping damaged or destroyed. No sign activity by Italian heavy ships or cruisers.

### TOULON.

26 Nov. French ships included battle cruisers DUNKIRQUE STRASBOURG battleship PROVENCE aviation transport COMMANDANT TEST 4 heavy 3 light cruisers 18 large 12 small destroyers 19 submarines in harbour. 28 Nov. Following appear left undamaged of Original escaped. Now confirmed NO 8" cruiser left undamaged. Russians claim large tanker 2 merchant ships and small craft sunk by surface forces Western BLACK SEA.

### "U" BOAT WARFARE.

Week ending 28 Nov. "U" Boats quiet East and West GIBRALFAR but signs greater activity Central North ATLANTIC. Week ending 29 Nov. 6 ships sunk by "U" Boats 2 in ATLANTIC 4 INDIAN OCEAN. 2 ocean convoys totalling 87 ships arrived U.K. without loss. 6 promising attacks on "U" boats reported during week.

## 3. AIR.

### OFFENSIVE.

Night. 29 Nov to 6 Dec. 29/30 Nov. Small force attacked TUNIS and railway targets BRISQUIN. 2/3 Dec. Over 100 A/C attacked WESTERN GERMANY (FRANKFURT).

Day. Fighter Command A/C attacked daily targets mostly railways in France 29 Nov 1 Dec and 2 Dec. 4 Dec. Attack on BRISQUIN.


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PHOTO INTERPRETATION 67-G-680 BUNA 10/12/42

FURTHER ENTRENCHMENTS NORTH END MAIN RUNWAY AT ENTRANCE INTO COCONUT GROVE AND  
IN COCONUT GROVE ESPECIALLY ALONG ROAD (.) CONTINUED HEAVY ACTIVITY SOUTH OF  
COCONUT PLANTATION NORTH WEST END MAIN RUNWAY WHERE POSSIBLY SEVERAL NEW MACHINE  
GUN POSITIONS ARE LOCATED (.) THERE ARE SIGNS OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE ARTILLERY  
FIRE MARKS NORTH SIDE NEW LANDING STRIP (.)







BRIG WOOTEN

Partial Translations of Documents Captured by U. S. Forces Urbana in Buna Village Vicinity, 16 December 1942. Translated by Sgt. S. Ishio.

14TH CONSTRUCTION UNIT ROUTINE ORDER #1. AUGUST 6, 1942.

C. O. 14TH CONSTRUCTION UNIT.

1. I shall command the main body of this unit and depart from "RR" towards BASABUA at 1500 of the 6th, and after arriving at said place, proceed towards "RAF" and strive to hurriedly construct a ground air base.

2. The success or failure of this present operations depends greatly, first, on the success or failure of the construction of the RAF air base. All personnel must cooperate and expect to complete this by evening of the 15th.

3. Plans for the landing of material at BASABUA will be settled separately.

4. The change of direction advance towards RAF will be carried out under the following outline.

(a) I will lead the advance unit and advance towards RAF (Expect to leave about 0430 of the 9th).

(b) The security unit commander shall lead a part of his men (about 30) and shall have the duty of escorting the advance unit and afterwards shall have the duty of guarding the vicinity of the RAF air base.

(c) The Equipment Unit Commander shall organize an advance unit (about 250) composed mostly of ground workers and carpenters, with part carrying material, and do the following.

(1) Put up tents for this unit (Plans for putting up tents will be settled separately).

(2) Determine tent positions for the 15th Construction.

(3) Dig skirmish trenches at the working place of air base.

(4) Submit the construction process chart and work plans of the air base to me.

(d) The transport unit commander shall take the remaining men and move, with speed, landed material to RAF.

- I Corp
- 32nd Div
- Adv NGF
- NGF
- 7th Aust Div
- Warren Force
- Urbana Force
- 127th Regt. (C. O.)
- Brig. Wooten

ADV 649



Partial Translations of Documents Captured By U. S. Forces Urbana In Buna Village Vicinity, 16 December 1942. Translated by Sgt. S. Ishio.

14TH CONSTRUCTION UNIT ROUTINE ORDER #2. AUGUST 6, 1942.

C. O. 14TH CONSTRUCTION UNIT.

1. After the TURAGI Detachment withdraws from RR, the remaining troops in RR shall come under the command of YOKOI Detachment Commander.
2. When a part of the LAE expeditionary unit withdraws from RR, said unit shall come under the command of the YOKOI Detachment Commander.
3. After the TURAGI Detachment withdraws from RR, said detachment shall be called the RR Detachment.

14TH CONSTRUCTION UNIT ROUTINE ORDER #3. AUGUST 6, 1942.

14TH CONSTRUCTION UNIT C. O.

For the Time Being, the Daily Schedule will be Revised as Follows:

0430	Reveille
0445	Breakfast
0530	Begin Work (Flag Raising Ceremony)
0800	Rest (15 Minutes)
1100	Stop Work. Mess.
1200	Begin Work.
1400	Rest (15 Minutes)
1630	Stop Work. Supper.
1830	Preparation of Beds.
1845	Prepare for Inspection.
1900	Inspection.

Note 1: From supper until time for preparation of beds, bathing, and visiting of canteen allowed.

Note 2: Cooling off allowed till 2030.

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ADV G+9



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Partial Translations of Documents Captured by U. S. Forces Urbana,  
December 15, 1942 in Buna Vicinity. Translated by Sgt. S. Ishio.

Nov. 11 From morning the enemy bombers and fighters came and went, bombing above my tent, but I have not been injured. The number of bombs dropped by the enemy till about 4:30 PM ~~is about 66.~~ At about 3:30 an order came down for us all to fall out. We immediately carried two shells per individual to the AA positions. It seems that the AA shells ran out and for awhile firing had ceased. During this time several enemy planes came over and bombed us. On this day from about 2:30 PM until about 5:00 at approximately 2 1/2 miles from where we stay an enemy unit of about 1000 landed. That is, about 2 1/2 miles in front of the Buna airfield on the beach, five enemy ships appeared and landed troops, so it seems. Furthermore, at about 6:00 two more ships followed the others and appeared. The time for which we had been waiting for sometime had finally come. Soldiers were all given ammunition and set out for the front to beat back the enemy. Loud explosions were heard around 5:30.

*I was unable to count*

I Corp  
32nd Div  
Adv GHQ  
Adv NGF  
NGF  
7th Aust Div  
Warren Force  
Urbana Force  
127 Regt (C.O.)  
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Partial Translations of Documents Captured by U. S. Forces Urbana  
in Buna Vicinity, 15 December 1942. Translated by Sgt. S. Ishio.

According to stories related by soldiers who had been on the extreme front line in the Moresby battle, our forces lacked provisions and proceeded under difficulties. Due to the fact that the rear units did not come up, and the fact that landing operations against the enemy from the sea were delayed, our forces turned back, so they say. Whatever the case may be, they had to climb mountains twice as high as Mt. Fuji, and as soon as they crossed one river, they had to face enemy positions. In the meantime, they were strafed by enemy planes countless number of times, and compared to the Singapore, Malay, Bataan battles, since the China incident, there has been no comparison to the hardships encountered here, so they say. Out of rice and short on tobacco, they attempted to requisition things from the natives, but here in New Guinea, conditions have come to a point where there isn't a single piece of paper. They used Papaya leaves for tobacco, and dug roots during the night and ate them. Enemy remnants wandered around during the daytime, and even though these groups were small in number, they were dangerous and our men could not loiter around.

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Partial Translations of Documents Captured by U. S. Forces, Urbana  
in Buna Village Vicinity 15 December 1942. Translated by Sgt. Ishio.

Oct. 9 We are awaiting our opportunity today. I was able to sleep soundly in the tent I put up yesterday. It rained very hard all night, but not a single drop leaked through. Since yesterday, breakfast is OKAYU (soft boiled rice). We will probably have this for quite awhile. It has been about a week since I ran out of tobacco. I got one from Mr. Kan and one from Mr. Kanizawa. I don't know how long I will last after this. Since last month, have had only one bag of biscuits here distributed from the canteen. The 15th Construction has much more this time in all respects. Today again, we made the natives get us some coconuts, which we ate. My stomach can't take it. Mr. Takahasai, on mess duty, requisitioned papaya, pineapple, etc., and brought a lot of it back. I received a box of pineapples and ate some, although they were green. Just so my stomach is full, that is enough. Right now, we are only waiting for the next boat to come in from BASABUA. With this there are about 40 in BASABUA. According to news from the patients, our planes downed three enemy Boeings and three fighters. On our side, there were only three planes downed.

I Corp  
32nd Div  
Adv GHQ  
Adv NGF  
NGF  
7th Aust Div  
Warren Force  
Urbana Force  
127 Regt (C.O.)  
Brig. Wooten



Brig Wootten  
Warren Force

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE BUNA FORCES

SECTION II

INSTRUCTIONS TO COLLECTING AGENCIES

1. a. General. All agencies will report through prescribed channels as follows: (This provision applies when in combat)

(1) Report by the most rapid means to G-2 I Army Corps, attack by or approach of the following hostile forces:

- (a) Air Force.
- (b) Parachute Troops.
- (c) Air-borne Troops.
- (d) Tanks.
- (e) Tank Destroyer Units.
- (f) Use of any new or unusual methods or equipment by enemy.

(2) Report the following by Urgent message:

- (a) Approach or presence of hostile forces in strength.
- (b) First contact with the enemy.
- (c) First artillery fire received.
- (d) Changes in, reinforcements to, or withdrawal of enemy troops with whom contact has been made.
- (e) Use of chemicals by the enemy.
- (f) Location of obstacles or demolitions.
- (g) Hostile defensive works.
- (h) Hostile cavalry, mechanized reconnaissance vehicles or truck columns.
- (i) Mine fields - (Location, extent - Whether or not defended.)

b. Specific reconnaissance missions. At the beginning of each operation, Corps Headquarters will issue detailed instructions for intelligence operations.

c. Information to be included in all reports, including those required by Pars. 1a(1) and (2), above.

- (1) Type and composition of forces involved.
- (2) Their locations.
- (3) The nature of the enemy activity. Speed and direction of movement of mobile forces. If a truck column, state nature of load (empty, personnel, portee artillery, etc.).
- (4) Nature of terrain when it is a factor (bridges or other defiles, swamps or other natural obstacles); any changes not shown on maps.
- (5) Time observation was made.
- (6) Unit making the report.

d. Reports by Aviation.

(1) Aircraft enroute to Corps CP with information of value to troops in contact and the Division flown over will give this information to them by dropped message. This is particularly applicable to Corps Cavalry Reconnaissance Regiment and Divisional Cavalry prior to contact by opposing Infantry.



(2) Such information will consist of the following:

- (a) 15 or more hostile tanks or mecz vehicles.
- (b) 30 or more hostile trucks.
- (c) Troops on the ground the size of a Bn. or more.
- (d) Threat of hostile air attack; three planes or more.
- (e) Blown bridges and other demolitions of importance within enemy territory to the front of the units concerned.
- (f) Approach of air borne troops.

2. a. Division G-2's will send to Corps G-2, for questioning, prisoners they select as having important information.


b. Other prisoners to be questioned by Corps G-2 will be selected by a representative of Corps G-2 at the Corps Prisoner of War enclosure. (When Corps acting alone), or at Division PW collecting points (When Corps is part of an Army)

c. (1) Aviation personnel captured by Divisional units will be evacuated as other prisoners except that Division G-2 will notify closest air support control so that arrangements can be made for questioning air intelligence officers.

(2) Aviation personnel captured by non-divisional units will be sent directly to Corps CP and air support control will be notified.

3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE -- All units of the Corps will comply with the provisions of FM 30-25 and AR 380-5 and current instructions of the War Department and GHQ, SWPA with respect to counterintelligence.

By command of Lt. General EICHELBERGER:

  
GORDON B. ROGERS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
AC of S, G-2



DRIG  
WOOTEN

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT CAPTURED BY U. S. URBANA FORCES 12/26/42  
TRANSLATED BY SGT. J. TSUMURA

JAP OUTLINE OF DEFENSE AREA AS OF NOVEMBER 25

A - Sector

C.O. Lt. Mumada  
Infantry 1 Platoon (33)  
MG 1 Platoon (2 guns)  
Navy (15)

B - Sector

C.O. Fukuda (Kenshi?)  
Infantry 1 Platoon  
Navy 63  
Laborers 220  
LMG 1  
MG 1

C - Sector

C.O. Capt. Nishimura  
Navy 21  
MG 1  
Laborers 200

Left Section

C.O. Fukuda (Petty Officer?)  
Navy 47  
MG 1

Right Section

C.O. T. Suzuki (Kenshi?)  
Infantry 1 Platoon (33)  
MG 1  
TA (?) 1

Reserve Unit

C.O. Y Suzuki (Kenshi?)  
Infantry 1 Platoon (28)  
MG 1

1. In case of enemy attack the 2d Sentry Group will be reinforced by the Right Sector Guard and B-Sector by the Reserve Unit.

2. In case of an enemy landing C-Sector will be reinforced by half a platoon from B-Sector, the left Sector by the Reserves and the Right Sector by the Naval Intendance (Not on map).

DISTRIBUTION

I Corps Warren Force  
ADV NGF Urbana Force (3)  
NGF 127 Regt (OO)  
GHQ Brig Wooten  
7 Aust Div 32d Div



BUNA AREA

SOURCES OF INFORMATION :-

INFM TO 11 DEC 42

TERRAIN STUDY No 27 (BUNA)  
REPORT - NORTH OF HYDROGRAPHERS,  
PACIFIC ISLANDS PILOT  
AIR PHOTOGRAPHS  
RETURNED PERSONNEL FROM 128 U.S. REGT.

LIST OF APPENDICES.

"A" Detailed particulars - SIMEMI CREEK.  
"B" Climate and Meteorological Information.  
"C" Map - BUNA Locality.

1. LOCATION.

Area between - SIWORI VILLAGE - SIMEMI VILLAGE -  
HARIKO VILLAGE and CAPE ENDAIADERE.

2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION.

Area is almost wholly level country, with a very low elevation. In parts the land fades into swamps and in other places is often water-logged. Many patches of kunai grass are to be found. The coast line and beach are suitable for landings at almost any point. Vegetation consists of rain forests - kunai grass and swampy growths such as Nipa palm. One river and numerous small creeks cross the area. Only three main tracks suitable for Jeeps exist.

3. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS.

Enemy dispositions to 8 DEC 42 - See appendix "C".

4. LANDING GROUNDS.

BUNA - See appendix "C".

Strip No 1 (Old Strip). Runway about 1400 x 100 yds -  
direction NW to SE.

Air photos show the strip to be well cratered by bombs.  
It is not in use.

Strip No 2 (New strip). Drome constructed by Japanese.  
Runway about 600 x 60 yds. running East to West.

Air photos show strip well cratered from bombs. Not in use.

Possible Landing Grounds. Several large areas of grass-  
land exist, which appear to be suitable for aircraft landings  
when grass is cut.

5. COASTLINE - GENERAL.

Coast is flat with practically an unbroken stretch of beach.  
At high water mark only about one foot of beach remains. At  
low water mark about ten to twenty feet of firm black sand  
shows.

Prevailing winds are from the NW and only two good shelter-  
ed landing places exist. Currents in this area are not strong  
and do not affect navigation. Tides rise as much as 4 ft 6 ins.

Inshore there are patches of mangrove, some native gardens  
and coconut plantations. The remainder of the coastal strip  
is covered with kunai and forest growth.



BUNA - CAPE ENDAIADERE. The usual landing area is to the West of BUNA Point where there is sheltered water in all seasons. Beach is firm and well exposed - about 10 ft at low water. Behind beach lies the BUNA Coconut plantation. To the West of BUNA is a narrow sand spit, with a lagoon and swamp inshore.

The area to the West of CAPE ENDAIADERE has sheltered water from SW winds. The beach is of sand similar to that at BUNA. In from the shore lies a coconut plantation - elsewhere is Savannah forest but immediately behind the plantation strip is a 300 - 600 yd wide grassy plain.

DUROPA PLANTATION - HARIKO. Sea is usually calm but no sheltered anchorages or landing places exist. No difficulty should be experienced in landing from small boats.

The beach about 10-20 ft wide at low water consists of firm coral sand suitable for foot traffic - No rock, mangroves or other obstructions are on the beach - the beach over this area slopes steeply to waterline.

Inshore are patches of mangrove and dense jungle. Beach track from ORC BAY to BUNA passes close to shore.

## 6. RIVERS AND CREEKS.

GIRUA. This is the only stream of any consequence in the area. It flows into the sea near BUNA Village through several mouths which drain from the swamp area formed around the river mouth.

River is NOT navigable and NOT fordable in this area. Track from BUNA to SIWORI crosses the different outlet channels of the stream by bridges, not suitable for M.T.

There are few creeks of any consequence in area, and existing creeks are mainly fordable for troops being about 30 to 40 ft wide with steep banks 4 to 5 ft high. The depth of water varies from 1 to 5 ft but sudden rises occur after rain. The beds are usually sandy with some gravel. A track, which has been made Jeepable by construction of a rough timber bridge, over HARIKO Creek.

SIMEMI and HARIKO Creeks (Tidal to about 800 yds). Information regarding these creeks is very vague reputed depths varying from 1 to 5 ft at low tide. Sand bars usually form across the mouth of HARIKO Creek during SE Season and SIMEMI Creek during NW season. These bars are often out of water at low tide.

Detailed particulars of SIMEMI Creek - see appx "A".

## 7. LAKES AND SWAMPS.

Swampy patches are frequent. These are grass swamps with a little sago and consist of approximately one ft of muddy water and a mud bottom, the load bearing capabilities are unknown, movement is by foot only and very tiring.

Patches occur 500 yds south of Strip No 1 (New Strip) from edge of coconuts west. The track SIMEMI Plantation to PILL BOXES on New Strip passes through this but is built up on the only high ground available. Another large swamp patch occurs west of the lagoon at HARIKO. Extent is unknown but it becomes very boggy immediately off the track.

Other small patches of water-logged country occur and on the main trails these are being timbered. See map.



## 8. ROADS AND TRACKS.

(a) DOBODURA - SIMEMI PLANTATION. Now in use by Jeeps, 8 to 10 ft wide, good track mostly through open grasslands - crosses one stream 200 yds West of SIMEMI Village. Creek has 5 ft steep banks shallow and bridged suitable for light M.T.

(b) WARISOTA, KENDATA, SIMEMI PLANTATION. Good track to KENDATA, deteriorates between KENDATA and Plantation. Suitable for Jeeps.

(c) SIMEMI PLANTATION - NEW STRIP. In dry weather Jeep track - narrow 4 to 5 ft and soft underfoot in timbered areas. Runs through swamp 400 - 700 yds south of New Strip.

Creek 300 yds South of New Strip bridged - suitable for Jeeps.

Track generally troops only, would need preparation and extra clearing to make usable light M.T. track.

(d) SIMEMI PLANTATION - HARIKO. Newly constructed Peep track - 6 ft wide, timbered in wet areas and drained in parts. Area adjacent to track boggy. Several small streams roughly bridged.

(e) HARIKO - DUROPA PLANTATION. Peep track passes along sandy cocanut covered spit and crosses peep bridge over inlet, (bridge is under observation from CAPE ENDAIADERE) then follows track through thick jungle to DUROPA Plantation. Track hidden from seaward by very heavy jungle of large trees and vines. Track approximately 8 ft wide.

(f) GERUA - BUNA. This is the last stage of the main KOKODA - BUNA Track. From GERUA it is about 9 ft wide and corduroyed - now being used by Jeeps.

(g) DUROPA PLANTATION - SIWORI VILLAGE. This track is in the Japanese occupied areas. Air photographs show it to be at present in very bad condition owing to bomb craters but with the construction of bridges between BUNA Plantation and SIWORI would be suitable for Jeep traffic.

## 9. VEGETATION.

### i. Type of country:

- Soil - (a) Sandy loam.  
(b) Clay and black soil.

(a) Found in coastal belt about one mile wide and in grassed areas. This is very porous and quickly absorbs moisture. (Bomb craters in these areas fill with water to about 2 - 3 ft below surface.)

(b) Mainly in timbered and swampy areas, becomes boggy with little traffic in wet.

### ii. Type of Vegetation:

#### (a) Plantations.

DUROPA PLANTATION. Coconuts average trunk diameter 15 inches, planted about 8 ft apart. Soil is a grey sandy loam with about 3 ft of grass.



SIMEMI PLANTATION. Small coconut plantation fringed by grass and low undergrowth. Track passes through same.

(b) Grassed areas. Mainly Kunai grass ranging from 3 to 5 ft high with some elephant grass.

(c) Timbered Areas. Coastal timber very thick with large trees ( up to 3ft 6 ins diam) interspersed with smaller growth and vines. (Tropical growth).

Inland becomes slightly thinner and smaller with patches of vine.

10. CLIMATE AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS. See appendix "B".

Distributed by I(t) to:

Adv Comd Post	(3)
Adv NGF	(2)
32 U.S. Div	(10)
6 Aust Div	(2)
7 Aust Div	(10)
Milne Force	(12)

C in C  
BGS  
DA&QMG  
G(0)  
G(1)  
G(3) Air  
I(a)  
I(t)



SIMEMI CREEK

Ref Map - BUNA LOCALITY (Revised) 4 inches to 1 mile.  
Information ex. Maj ELLIOTT-SMITH, ANGAU 11 DEC 42.

For the purpose of this study the creek is divided into the following sections:

1. Mouth (From map ref 278257 - 284254)
2. Lower reaches (284254 - 294245)
3. Middle reaches (294245 - 293246)
4. Upper reaches - swampy area.

1. MOUTH (Lagoon)

Photos taken during September shew exposed sand bar across mouth. Later photos shew area covered and exact conditions at low tide unknown.

N.B. All coastal creeks have bars which vary with the seasonal changes.

Depth. In this 800 yards stretch depth varies from 3 ft to 8 ft.

Width. Approximately 40 ft at mouth decreasing to 10 ft.

Approaches. Through heavy timber (jungle classification) and some nipa swamp. The immediate approaches are through a fringe of swampy grass.

Banks are shelving - black soil.

Bed is of sandy mud.

Current strong after rain and not greatly affected by tidal influences.

Bridges - Nil. Material (natural) for bridge construction is doubtful, however plenty available growth for corduroying.

Fords may be fordable at low tide at bar.

2. LOWER REACHES.

The stream develops into a chain of connected waterholes of varying depths and widths.

Approaches. In immediate vicinity are patches of swampy growth with a fringe of heavy timber.

Bed - sandy mud.

Current - Strong during rain and becomes easily flooded, the stream spreading to 60 to 100 yards.

Bridges - Nil. Natural material suitable for corduroying.

3. MIDDLE REACHES.

Creek runs through boggy belt of timber, and swampy growths and sago about 50 to 100 yards wide, with breaks of kunai grasslands.

Country is low and water-logged black soil, the creek bed being merely an indistinct depression. Easily flooded after rain and remains underwater for several days.

Bridges. Bridge shown at 294244 when built by administration was of rubble construction in the form of a culvert. It is approximately 15 - 20 ft long, 9 ft wide with a culvert 1 ft high and 2 ft wide.

4. UPPER REACHES.

The creek rises in a low lying swampy timbered grass area. The soil in the timbered areas being black loam and the grasslands sandy, the load carrying capacity of which is very doubtful.

-----



## APPENDIX "B"

### METEOROLOGICAL

#### Rainfall:

BUNA has an average annual rainfall of above 121 inches, but the total normally fluctuates between 90 and 150 inches. The fluctuation in annual rainfall over the last 33 years is shown in Graph 1.

BUNA experiences two seasons governed by the direction of the prevailing wind -- the northwest season from NOV to APR which tends to be wet with a monthly rainfall of ten to twelve inches, and the Southeast season from MAY to OCT which tends to be drier with four to nine inches. Graph 2 shows the monthly distribution of rainfall. The middle line shows the average rainfall recorded for each month over the last 34 years. The top line shows the highest fall recorded for any JAN, any FEB and so on. The lowest line similarly shows the lowest total recorded for each month. All three lines show the tendency for a heavier rainfall in the northwest months than in the southeast months. The driest month is AUG and the wettest months tend to occur at the change of season -- late NOV to early DEC, and again in APR. A good deal of this doldrum rainfall comes as late afternoon thunderstorms.

Past trends show that the rainfall is rather erratic and cannot be depended upon to follow the average behaviour. Thus Graph 3 shows the rainfall records for JAN over the last 34 years. From this it is apparent that whereas 70% of the totals are between 10 and 17 inches a drought year occurs about once in nine years with much lower totals, and an unusually wet JAN occurs about as frequently. These abnormal years do not occur at regular intervals.

Graph 4 shows the number of wet days which may be expected each month in the BUNA area. Again the top line shows the highest number of wet days which have been recorded for each month, the middle line shows the average number of wet days recorded for each month, and the bottom line shows the lowest number. It will be seen that during the northwest season NOV to MAR some rain may be expected on one day in two. In wet years rain may be expected on three days in four during these months, whereas in dry years the average drops to one day in four.

#### Floods.

GIRUA River is frequently swollen or flooded, sometimes sufficiently to damage bridges. In a normal month during the wet season the River GIRUA is in flood practically the whole time, its normal condition during that time of the year. Heavy rain in the dry season occasionally causes temporary flooding. Besides rain locally, the streams in the BUNA district are subject to flooding as a result of heavy falls inland.

On one occasion, after rains that were persistent at BUNA, but not excessively heavy, the KORODA-BUNA road near the latter place was flooded to a depth of 4 ft, and gardens and coconut trees were washed out. With heavy floods, the sea for miles from the river mouth is discolored a dark brown.

#### Winds.

In NEW GUINEA generally the season from MAY to OCT is dominated by the southeast trades while the northwest monsoon dominates from NOV to APR.

BUNA is rather sheltered from the full force of the prevailing winds with the result that winds are moderate with a high percentage of calms and gentle breezes due to the unequal heating of the land and sea.



Graph 5 herewith shows the wind direction frequency at BUNA observed at 0900 hrs. for each month of the year. From this it is seen that at 0900 hrs the southeast wind dominates throughout the year, even from NOV to APR when the northwest wind is the dominant regional wind. Winds in general are moderate and over 30% of the 0600 hrs observations are recorded as calms. During the day the prevailing wind of the season tends to rise and dominate. But there is also a tendency for easterly sea breezes to appear in the afternoon and off shore land breezes to develop at night.

Tropical cyclones (hurricanes) do not occur, but squalls and thunderstorms are common mainly during the afternoon and evening, and they are most frequent during the northwest season but particularly during the doldrums of DEC and APR.

State of Sea.

Sea is normally smooth or moderate. Rough seas occur for periods of a few days at a time, mainly when seasonal winds are strongest; but the degree of sea disturbance bears little relation to the wind at BUNA. In very light winds, heavy seas and heavy surf have been experienced.


Moon's Phases.

Moon's phases and times of Moonrise and Moonset at BUNA for DEC 1942 are shown below. JAN times are not available because almanacs for 1943 have not yet arrived.

R - Moonrise                      DEC 1942.                      S - Moonset

Times given are Eastern Summer Time, i.e. in "L" time as used in AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA. (For G.M.T. subtract 11 hrs)


DEC			DEC		
10	R	0838	21	R	1816
	S	2133		S	0528
11	R	0942	22	R	1904 F.M.
	S	2231		S	0615
12	R	1041	23	R	1952
	S	2327		S	0702
13	R	1138	24	R	2039
	S	0018		S	0750
14	R	1234	25	R	2125
	S	0018		S	0838
15	R	1325 1st Q	26	R	2210
	S	0105		S	0926
16	R	1416	27	R	2254
	S	0150		S	1013
17	R	1503	28	R	2336
	S	0234		S	1101
18	R	1551	29	R	2419
	S	0317		S	1148
19	R	1640	30	R	2419
	S	0357		S	1235
20	R	1727	31	R	0100 Last Q
	S	0444		S	1324





GRAPH I.  
BUINA AREA.

Fluctuation in ANNUAL RAINFALL during 33 yrs.



Scale of years

Rainfall in inches



GRAPH - No 2.


PERIOD:- 1908-1941.

AVERAGES:-

JAN - DEC } 32 YRS.  
MAY - AUG. }  
FEB - APR - SEP. 33 YRS.  
OCT - NOV. 34 YRS.

BUNA


Rainfall






GRAPH N° 3

January Average Fall  
Last 34 years.







GRAPH NO 4.

BUNA — NO. OF WET DAYS

PERIOD 1908-1941.

AVERAGES :-

MAY 26 YRS — MAR-SEP-NOV 29 YRS  
 JAN-DEC 27 YRS — JULY — 30 YRS  
 FEB-APR-JUNE-AUG. 28 YRS. — OCT — 31 YRS




Wind Direction Frequency.

~~WIND DIRECTION FREQUENCY~~

BUNB

% at 0900 hrs.




GRAPH No 5.



# BUNA LOCALITY (Revised)

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID  
SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA ZONE

APPROX Scale: 4 Inches to 1 Mile



SVY./MISC./185


REPRODUCED BY 2/1 AUST. ARMY TOPO. SURVEY COY., DEC. '42

- TRACK -----
- BRIDGE -----
- WATERCOURSE -----
- COCONUT PLANTATION -----
- GRASSLAND -----
- TIMBER -----
- SWAMP -----
- A.A. POSITION -----
- HEAVY A.A. -----
- LIGHT A.A. -----
- DEFENCE POST -----

MAGNETIC  
VARIATION  
5°40'

**WARNING**  
GRID DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH  
THAT SHOWN ON PREVIOUS EDITION

COMPILED FROM ALL AVAILABLE  
INFORMATION TO 5 DEC. 1942  
H.Q.N.G.F.





PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT CAPTURED BY U.S. FORCES URBANA ON  
23 December 1942

Translated by S/Sgt. Ishio

DIARY OF KUBA, SATONAO, 1st Class Mechanic, Navy, TSUKIOKA Unit,  
Transport Unit.

Sept. 1 0630 Left Rabaul.

Sept. 3 1700 Entered port safely. Unit commander has gone to enemy  
air field (RABI) and isn't here. Spent the night on the  
front at BUNA in huts.

Nov. 30 Since the beginning of the battle there hasn't been any  
ground battles but the enemy flies over in planes. All we  
do is get severely bombed. Buna is gradually falling into  
a state of danger.

Dec. 1 Our troops are expected to come in today but I have doubts.  
2000 at BASABUA there seems to have been an aerial fight.  
4 destroyers may have entered Buna. A few enemy appeared in  
front of us, we took up positions.

Dec. 2 Until now the enemy did not bomb us at night but now they  
are coming over at night. We lived till today, but it is  
something unusual. There are tears in my eyes as I realize  
the meaning of the fact that I am alive.

To the Truck Company Commander; Thank you for all you have  
done for me. Since landing at Buna I haven't been able to  
do anything and I have nothing I can say in apology. I am  
grateful that you readily released me so that I could volunteer  
Please hold BUNA. The BUNA BASE that COMMANDER TSUKIOKA  
captured. Hurrah for the Emperor, Hurrah for Japan. Regards  
to the people in Rabaul. Here's to the health of one and all.

Lance Corp. KONDO

Dec. 5 In the battle following bombing, out of the 4th squad, 4  
killed 4 wounded by mortar.

Our troops do not come. Even though they do come, they are  
driven away by enemy planes. Every day my comrades die one  
by one and our provisions disappear day by day.

There are no replenishments from our troops. It's just like  
waiting for death. However, there is no fighting at night and  
it is that much less of a strain. When the sun sets in the  
West we look at each other and wonder that we lived till now.  
How long will this battle last. We are waiting only for our  
troops.



- Dec. 8 December 8 is the 1st Anniversary of this war. The enemy doesn't offer much battle today, but the enemy may start a general attack in revenge of Hawaii. If reinforcements come by then, all will be well, but if not BUNA BASE may be completely lost. I will fight to the last--while my eyes are open.
- Dec. 6 About 1130 our heavy bombers in formation of 15 fly over northward (Rabaul). Probably bombed Moresby. Two or three times a week enemy transport planes drop ammo and provisions. After they are dropped there is always enemy mortar fire.
- Dec. 8 Thought it unusually quiet for the 1st anniversary, but in the afternoon there was fierce mortar barrage. Received slight wound. There were two shells that hit our position. Towards evening five scouts picked, myself among them. We rushed the enemy but they had already left. We returned.
- Dec. 9 0500 heavy mortar barrage. TODA, UYEMURA and myself had been sent to the YASUDA Unit since last night. There are only five in our position. We have only rifles.

This may be the place where I will meet my death. I will fight to the last.

1800 Ordered back to Hq. to find that the mortar barrage during the morning had hit our position and three had been killed out of the 2nd squad and one killed from my squad (3rd). Our platoon leader was wounded and our company commander (1st Lt. NIORII) was killed.

If we had not been sent out we may have been killed too. It is only fate that I am alive today.

- Dec. 10 1400 Bombed and strafed by enemy Martin planes but no changes. About 1330 eleven of our planes were over but went back without bombing or strafing. They dropped supplies (provisions and ammo). Today again our troops did not come in.

The enemy has superiority of the air and our transports can't sail as they would like.

- Dec. 11 0600 About 200 meters front of the Independent Platoon the rapid fire gun which fired two days ago fired ten rounds. Platoon leader of the Independent Platoon was wounded but it was very light and would not hinder him.



Dec. 13 While on night sentry duty myself and 1st mechanic TOZAWA fired on by mortar. About five meters away one dropped. I was only covered with dirt and rocks. A guardian angel was watching over me.

Expect our troops to land today. Hope they land safely.

Dec. 14. Quiet during morning. About two in the afternoon there was sudden rapid fire from the enemy. They hit our positions but no one was hurt. Only covered with dirt.

DISTRIBUTION:

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NGF  
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Urbana Force  
127th Regt. (CO)  
Brig. Wooten  
32nd Div.



OPS  
10  
031/24  
WARREN  
PRIORITY

NO 4674

31 December 1942

TO: NGF, ADV NGF, 7 AUST DIV, ALO (ALMA), 5TH AF, G-2 GHQ, BUNA FORCES  
SITREP NO 135 TO 0400L 31 DEC. OWN OPS: WARREN FORCE: NO ACTIVITY REPORTED

SITUATION UNCHANGED. URBANA FORCE: NO ACTIVITY REPORTED SITUATION UNCHANGED.

ARTY FIRED HARASSING MISSIONS THROUGHOUT NIGHT. ENEMY OPS: ENEMY PLANES REPORTED

OVER BUNA AREA AT 0315L NO BOMBING OR STRAFING REPORTED. WEATHER: CLOUDY WITH

OCCASIONAL RAIN END

EICHELBERGER



PRIORITY

NO 4674

31 December 1942

TO: NGF, ADV NGF, 7 AUST DIV, ALO (ALMA), 5TH AF, G-2 GHQ, BUNA FORCES

SITREP NO 135 TO 0400L 31 DEC. OWN OPS: WARREN FORCE: NO ACTIVITY REPORTED

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OCCASIONAL RAIN END

EICHELBERGER

BRIG  
WOUTEN



WARREN FORCE  
BRIB, WOOTEN

ops  
10  
and  
9 31/12

PRIORITY

NO 4650

TO: NGF, ADV NGF, 7 AUST DIV, ALO ALMA, 5TH AF, BUNA FORCES

MAP REF: BUNA LOCALITY, REVISED 4 TO 1

SITREP NO. 134 INFORMATION TO 1700L/30 DEG STOP OWN OPS COLON WARREN FORCE COLON  
SHIFTING AND REORGANIZATION OF FORWARD ELEMENTS WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING DAY  
STOP ARTY BELEIVED TO HAVE KNOCKED OUT POM POM POSITION AT 278255 STOP 35 OFF  
634 EM OF 2/12 BN NOW IN AREA. 10 TANKS REPORTED SERVICEABLE STOP URBANA FORCE  
COLON SLOW PROGRESS TOWARD BUNA MISSION BEACH AND SLIGHT PROGRESS INTO GOVT  
GARDENS STOP ENEMY OPS COLON AIR OBSERVER REPORTS JAPS MOVING STORES FROM IN-  
LAND LOCATIONS TO THE COAST STOP TWO NEW MOUNDS 3 TO 4 FEET HIGH OBSERVED AREA  
GIROPA POINT STOP ENEMY SHOWS NO OFFENSIVE ATTITUDE STOP WEATHER LIGHT RAINS  
VISIBILITY 2 MILES END

EICHELBERGER

<sup>10</sup>  
(a) Lt check with div or platoon - we  
signalled none ok one slight  
repairs no longer repairs  
(b) check with Major then  
if 10 now suitable

G-3 in found shell goals successful.  
Work on other two continuing.

bc. 1205 4/31.

9 31/12



10  
Cmnd 6-21/12 WARREN

Partial Translation of Captured Document taken by U. S. Forces, Warren,  
December 29, 1942. Translator - S/Sgt. S. Ishio

Field Diary

- Nov. 17 Left RABAU at 2400.  
Nov. 18 Landed GIRUWA at 1700.  
Nov. 19 Arrived BURIA Airfield. Returned to Battalion. Constructed Battle Positions.  
Nov. 20 Firing from 1000 to 1300. Changed positions.
- Dec. 1 At 0200 Sgt. Major UCHIKI sent to rear because of wounds. Enemy aerial bombings continue. A mortar shell exploded extremely close by.  
Dec. 2 Bombings in the morning. Severe mortar fire morning and afternoon. Concentrated fire around shelters. YOSHIKAWA wounded by shell fragment. AIZU also wounded by shell fragment. UCHIKI wounded by bullet. YOSHIKAWA severely wounded, the rest have only slight wounds. YOSHIKAWA sent to rear.  
Dec. 3 2 G3 5 SHAKU (.09725 gal. - about a handful) rations now. Bombing and mortar fire during morning. Fired Battalion gun at 3:30 AM. Our planes flew over today. 6 heavy bombers and 3 fighters.  
Dec. 10 Our planes flew over and dropped a lot of provisions for the rear Navy Mess.  
Dec. 12 Firing of rapid-fire gun in front of the Navy positions.  
Dec. 16 During the morning there was a little mortar fire. No change in enemy situation. The rapid fire gun which seemed to have changed its position during the afternoon and night opened sudden fire upon our positions and the Navy positions. The 1st and 2nd squads received some direct hits but there were no casualties. During the night at 1830 the TSUCHIYA Squad (13 men) was sent to the MATSUO Unit. The remaining one squad with the command and ammunition squad (Sgt. NASAKI and 23 men) changed positions and were sent back to a point 800 meters in the rear.  
Dec. 17 To the right front of our positions, in the direction of the YAMAMOTO Unit, rifle firing heard most.  
Dec. 19 Our troops which captured positions in the coconut grove were repulsed due to enemy tanks.  
Dec. 20 2 or 3 enemy planes reconnoitered our positions and the Navy positions several times. Artillery and mortar fire around our positions, following this there was rifle fire. In the afternoon motor noises resembling tanks were heard. At 1430 firing was most severe. At 1700 platoon leader, Lance Corp. NATSUME went on Mission to regimental C.P.  
Dec. 21 Concentrated mortar fire around our positions. The observation plane reconnoitered about 10 times over our position. Seems as if it were coordinating with artillery fire. At 1200 30-40 enemy appeared in right front near jungle. 12 rounds of ammo fired today.

DISTRIBUTION:

Adv NGF, NGF, G-2 GHQ, 7 Aust Div, 32nd Div, Urbana Force, Warren Force & I Corps File.



WARREN FORCE

COL. MARTIN

PRIORITY

NO 4650

TO: NGF, ADV NGF, 7 AUST DIV, ALO ALMA, 5TH AF, BUNA FORCES

MAP REF: BUNA LOCALITY, REVISED 4 TO 1

SITREP NO. 134 INFORMATION TO 1700L/30 DEG STOP OWN OPS COLON WARREN FORCE COLON  
SHIFTING AND REORGANIZATION OF FORWARD ELEMENTS WAS ACCOMPLISHED DURING DAY  
STOP ARTY BELIEVED TO HAVE KNOCKED OUT POM POM POSITION AT 278255 STOP 35 OFF  
634 EM OF 2/12 BN NOW IN AREA. 10 TANKS REPORTED SERVICEABLE STOP URBANA FORCE  
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GIROPA POINT STOP ENEMY SHOWS NO OFFENSIVE ATTITUDE STOP WEATHER LIGHT RAINS  
VISIBILITY 2 MILES END

EICHELBERGER



Crown  
10  
27/12

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DIARY CAPTURED BY U. S. WARREN FORCE 12/27/42  
TRANSLATED BY S/SGT. S. ISHIO

NO NAME

28 December, 1942.

- Oct 31 Landed Rabaul.
- Nov 18 Landed at BASA 2:20. NIG Company went to GIRUWA by motor launch and landed there at 4:00. From there they went towards SOPUTA 4 KM away and rested there taking up positions of readiness. At 1800 left there and headed towards BUNA.
- Nov 19 Reached BUNA. Due to activities of enemy planes withdrew temporarily to the mountain gun positions. Just as we reached the mountain gun positions we received reports of enemy attack and immediately went forward. Engaged enemy near position of the navy NCO outpost and repulsed them. Received orders to return to Battalion. On shore watch tonight. Platoon leader Toyoda probational officer killed in action. 3d platoon leader is Sgt. Nishayama.
- Nov 26 There were many duds in enemy mortar shells. One out of five shells exploded.
- Nov 29 The Emperor has heard of our situation and given words of praise to the army and navy in the BUNA Area. Morale very good.
- Nov 30 Monday. Fair. From early morning the enemy bombed us. All along the front enemy scouts approaching. Seems like the enemy has received light MG's, and it seems that cannons have arrived too, for there are bursts, but there is no firing heard. It is also lively at night.
- Dec 1 Tuesday. Fair. Enemy appeared about 50 meters in front in line of sweeping fire and fired from left to right. I chose a large silhouette of the enemy and fired and saw one fall. At night the enemy still remained. Placed in emergency alert positions. They threw three hand grenades. There was no damage.
- Dec 3 Thursday. Rain later fair. They dropped bombs uncomfortably close during the morning. All were parachute bombs, but there was no damage done. Extremely quiet in the afternoon. About 0200 repaired shelters of the Mizaki squad. From today rations cut, but there is an abundance of provisions and morale is high and there are reports that our troops are landing continuously.
- Dec 4 Friday. Our troops and enemy troops are quiet today. Only once in a while a plane flies over. Cleared out the zone of fire taking advantage of the dusk. While clearing up, 1st class private Suzuki found an automatic rifle and 1st class private Furuta found a rifle and 112 rounds rifle ammunition.



- Dec 5 The enemy attacked all day long. They drop bombs, fire artillery, mortar, automatic rifles, LMG and put all their fire power into it and attack. It's too bad that we can't see their forms. We know roughly where they are, but we can not see their figures. They fire so much that we retaliate with a few sounds. Around evening heard from the unit commander that there were tanks in front of the 11th company. The enemy attacked today with tanks. Out of the 5 tanks 1 returned. 4 tanks had some trouble or other. In that condition they were bombed during the night. Heard two explosions and felt relieved. The platoon, hearing of these tanks made trenches and reinforced the shelter positions.
- Dec 6 Sunday. Fair later rain. Very quiet during the morning. Mortar fire in the afternoon. Seems that the enemy are now using short delayed action fuzes. It is necessary to further reinforce our positions. Took advantage of the dusk and assembled material. Towards evening saw a red light out at sea. Thought it might be enemy landing parties and we were put on emergency alert. The Iwata platoon is in readiness near location of the Battalion Hq. The Nishiyama platoon has put in a protective screen to the front. Received 10 days provisions. 1 GO 6 Shaku a day per man (about a handful of rice).
- Dec 7 Cloudy. Quiet since yesterday. Considerable mortar fire. Aerial combat about 1300.
- Dec 9 Wednesday. Rain later fair. From early morning today there was mortar fire around us. From the left there is a considerable large artillery fire (cannon) which lands to the left rear of us. There is a constant flight of enemy planes overhead. We are now in a delaying and holding action. The amount of provisions is small and there is no chance of replenishing ammunition. But we have bullets of flesh. No matter what comes we are not afraid. If they come, let them come, even though there are thousands of the enemy, we will not be surprised. We have the aid of Heaven. We are warriors of YAMATO. The enemy fired 990 mortar shells this morning. Didn't think they could do it. One shell hit our shelter but there was no damage done. In one squad a soldier was slightly wounded. From the army commanding officer to the Kimmochi unit there were words of praise. Tomorrow they expect provisions by air.
- Dec 10 Thursday. Fair. Continued from yesterday there is mortar fire. 30 of our planes flew overhead.
- Dec 11 Friday. Cloudy, rain. As usual there is mortar fire. They fire rifles a lot. We are quiet. Our chance is not yet ripe. Enemy approached to about 50 meters. Difficult to distinguish their forms in the jungle. How can we hit them when we must make every bullet count. If one goes according to the theory of hitting an enemy every time one shoots, then one simply can not shoot.
- Dec 13 Sunday. Fair. It is a clear day. Enemy planes around all over. Enemy fire has become considerably accurate. The coconut trees around here have been badly hit by shells. The leaves are gone or rotting. It is a barren sight. During the night heard motors which may have been enemy landing party. Placed on emergency alert the same as the 6th.



- 14 Monday. Rain, later fair. The enemy approached close as usual and fired tommy guns and rifles on our positions. But only once in a while they fire mortars. It seems that since yesterday their mortar fire has decreased somewhat. Maybe they are short on shells. Still they scatter a large amount of bursts. We are quiet as usual.
- Dec 15 Tuesday. Fair. Enemy planes overhead all day. Our antiaircraft machine gun fired at them at times. Enemy condition same as yesterday. Borrowed clippers at night and all had haircuts.
- Dec 16 Wednesday. Rain, later fair. Corp. Munari interchanged with officer candidate Watanabe. The enemy approached within 20 meters and threw hand grenades at the 2d platoon. We fired ten rounds with a captured rifle. In the afternoon we took advantage of enemy mortar fire and cracked some coconuts. Made loopholes and posts for sentries at night. At night there is artillery shelling. About 1700 the 6th squad opened fire. The enemy shouted. Can't see their figures but it seems that the firing was effective.
- Dec 17 Thursday, fair. Intense mortar barrage before dawn. Can't come out of the camouflage. Very quiet after the mortar barrage ceases. We hear the motor of planes.

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I Corps file



THE SOUL OF A SOLDIER

November 13, 1942

Light Armour 13mm MG

Nov. 13. According to reports from the Army, enemy troops in ENODA, ERORO vicinity have had supplies of provisions and ammunition sent in and are about to counterattack this unit. Due to this report, this unit is taking strict precautionary measures. It is 8:00 in the morning. Enemy planes have circled this airfield 4 times, but we have received no damage.

Nov. 14. As usual there is enemy air attacks, but there isn't much damage done to us. At 4:30 PM Commanding Officer YASUDA inspected the airfield. He gave us the following instructions: 1. The enemy forces (strength unknown) are about to counterattack this airfield unit and are pressing forward from the southwest. From this unit 22 men have been sent out since two days ago as scouts to a certain place (not stated where). If the enemy should approach close, then scouts will retreat and fall in with the main force. In such a case, in order to distinguish between enemy and our troops, use a signal (password) which is agreed upon so that we will not fire upon each other. 2. In order for the 13mm MG to have sufficient fire power along the road running through the jungle, cut down tall grass and trees in the way, although there may be difficult instances. In such cases when there is nothing else to do but retreat due to the fact that the enemy has large forces, fix the machine gun so that the enemy will not be able to use it. Retreat and go back to the main force. 3. If the Shore Units and this airfield unit forms the decision that there is no fear of enemy attacks along the shore or from the rear, all platoons will put all their men along the line of the 13mm MG and take part in the battle. 4. Disposition. With the NCO outpost as a nucleus the airfield unit will include the road and the area towards the mountains. However the 13mm MG will be under the command of the C.O. of the Airfield Unit. The Shore Unit will not include the road but take posts along the shore. 5. With the aforementioned disposition of troops, strive not to let the enemy have the airfield. All platoon leaders will dig skirmish lines according to the disposition of troops, but do not go too far in front of the ditch.

(T.N. The following names were listed on the document)

13mm MG 3rd Section

3rd Class Petty Officer FUKUNAGA, ZIKICHI - S.N. SASHISUI 25033 (Active)  
1st Class Seaman KUWARA, SHIGEJI - S.N. SACHOSUI 70838 (Reservist)  
1st Class Mechanic FUJIMOTO, TSURUO - S.N. SACHOKI 12452 (Reservist)  
1st Class Mechanic KAMOTO, TOSHIO - S.N. SACHOKI 13061 (Reservist)  
3rd Class Seaman YOSHIMURA, YOSHICHI - S.N. SACHOSUI 42889 (Active)  
3rd Class Seaman TSUJI, INAO - S.N. SACHOSUI 47651 (Active)



Partial Translations of Document Captured by U. S. Forces, Warren, December  
27, 1942.  
Translator - S/Sgt. S. Ishio

(Continued)

3rd Class Seaman MORI, ISAMU - S.N. 43670 (Active)  
1st Class Seaman NISHIYAMA, KUREJI - S.N. SACHOUI 9509 (Reservist)  
1st Class Seaman MINOHARA, KANAU - S.N. SACHOSUI 13988 (Reservist)

(T.N. SASHISUI may be the abbreviation for SASEBO, conscript seaman.  
And SASHI SUI may be the abbreviation for SASEBO volunteer seaman).

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Warren Force  
I Corps File



*ave*  
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PRIORIT.

No. 4442

28 December 1942

TO: ADV NGF, NGF, ALO (ALMA) 5TH AF, G-2 GHQ, BUNA FORCES

SITREP NO 129 TO 0400L 28 DECEMBER. MAP REFERENCE BUNA LOCALITY REVISED 4 TO 1. OWN  
OPS: WARREN FORCE: DISPOSITIONS AS OF 2200L 27 DEC: 2/9 BN CONTINUES TO HOLD AREA NORTH  
OF SINEMI CREEK. COMMENCING AT POINT 283255 ON SOUTH BANK SINEMI CREEK THE LINE EXTENDS  
GENERALLY SOUTHWESTWARD TO POINT 280252 AND ENDING AT POINT 276246. THE LINE IS HELD  
BY 2/10 BN (LESS 2 COS) B CO 128 A CO 2/10 BN A AND C COS 128 C CO 2/10 BN IN ORDER  
FROM NORTH TO SOUTH. A COMPOSITE CO 128 IS LOCATED IN REAR OF SOUTH FLANK AT POINT  
276246 B CO 126 IS AT POINT 283248 AND A AND C COS 126 ARE AT POINT 279249. DISPOSITIONS  
OTHER UNITS NO CHANGE. ATTACK TO BE RESUMED AT 0700L. URBANA FORCE: REPORTS OF  
DISPOSITIONS GIVEN IN OUR SITREPS OF 26 AND 27 DEC. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION HAVE  
PROVEN TO BE ERRONEOUS IN PART. DISPOSITIONS EAST OF ENTRANCE CREEK ARE AS FOLLOWS:  
COMMENCING AT POINT 263258. THE LINE EXTENDS GENERALLY NORTHEAST TO EDGE OF COCONUT  
PLANTING AT POINT 265264 THENCE NORTH ALONG EDGE OF PLANTING AND CURVING TO THE WEST  
TO END AT POINT 264265. THIS LINE IS HELD FROM SOUTH TO NORTH BY 1 PLAT E CO 127  
1 PLAT AT CO 127 G K B C F AND A COS 127 IN THAT ORDER. DISPOSITIONS OTHER UNITS  
UNCHANGED. ENEMY OPS: AT 2145L 27 DEC SIGNAL LIGHTS WERE OBSERVED ON BEACH AT BUNA  
MISSION. ARTY FIRE WAS REPORTED FALLING ON THE URBANA FORCE FROM GIROPA POINT AT  
2250L AND FROM THE SEA AT 2345L 27 DEC. BARGES WERE REPORTED OFF BUNA MISSION AT  
2250L 27 DEC. OUR ARTY ENGAGED RESULTS NOT REPORTED. WEATHER FAIR, SLIGHT OVERCAST  
VISIBILITY GOOD. END

EICHELBERGER



Warren Force  
and  
10  
27/12

PRIORITY.

NO. 4415

TO: ADV NCF NCF 7TH DIV G-2 GHQ 5TH AF ALO BUNA FORCES  
SITREP NO. 128 INFORMATION TO 1700L/27 DEC. OWN OPS: URBANA FORCE: SITUATION  
AND DISPOSITIONS UNCHANGED. REGROUPING. WARREN FORCE: SLIGHT PROGRESS BEING  
MADE. ONE 25 PDR ENGAGING BUNKERS BY DIRECT LAYING. ENEMY OPS: BUNKERS OLD  
STRIP AREA STILL RESISTING. ENEMY MORTAR FIRE ON BUNA VILLAGE AREA FROM  
MISSION CAUSING SEVERAL CASUALTIES AND THREE KILLED. ARTY ENGAGED AND  
SILENCED MORTARS. REF. OUR SIGNAL NO. 4390 27 DEC CASUALTIES OF BOMBING  
AND STRAFING THREE KILLED SEVEN WOUNDED. CASUALTIES TO 2400L/26 SINCE 18TH  
AMERICAN 51 KILLED 104 WOUNDED AUSTRALIAN 54 KILLED 135 WOUNDED ENEMY  
FIRED GRASS IN GOVT GARDENS AND OUR TROOPS FIRED TRIANGLE JUNCTION BUNA  
SOPUTA TRACKS. BOTH FIRES BURNING 1530L. WEATHER FINE WITH BROKEN CUMULUS  
5000 FEET VISIBILITY BELOW UNLIMITED. END.

EICHELBERGER

FERGUSON


To 2400/26	96.	OR	} 86 } 106
Killed	10 -	76	
Dgnw	1 -	19	
Wounded	25 -	305	} 20 }
missile		32	

41	276
56	113

36-432



DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS BUNA VILLAGE  
December 14, 1942





Sound / Seen  
S O  
ops

Brig Wooten  
1 copy

MOST SECRET

MOST SECRET

SUBJECT: - LAND TO SEA IDENTIFICATION SIGNALS

1. Pending detailed instructions from N.G.F. the following temporary system will be employed by all coast watching stations and allied craft operating between Tufi and Ambogo river mouth. This cancels previous instructions issued by adv N.G.F. in this regard.
2. All coast watching stations will challenge unidentified vessels by flashing the letter of the day. A green lamp will be used.
3. Vessels on being challenged will answer immediately with the reply letter of the day. Vessels will not signal shore unless so challenged.
4. Daily challenge and reply letters for period three days commencing 1200/L 30 Dec. 42 are as follows.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CHALLENGE</u>	<u>REPLY</u>
1200/L 30 Dec. 42 to 1159/L 31 Dec. 42	G	B
1200/L 31 Dec. 42 to 1159/L 1 Jan. 42	R	A
1200/L 1 Jan. 42 to 1159/L 2 Jan. 42	T	L

5. Copies of these letters will be held by all coast watching stations and allied vessels operation in area as in para 1.

For the Commanding General:

OFFICIAL

*S. S. Auchincloss*  
**S.S. AUCHINCLOSS**  
 Colonel, S. C.

**F.S. BOWEN, JR.**  
**Lt. Col., G.S.C.**  
 AC OF S, G-3



*Waven June*  
*Big letter*

PRIORITY

NO. 4598

TO: ADV NGF, NGF, 7TH AUST DIV, G-2 GHQ, 5TH AF, ALO (ALMA) BUNA FORCES

SITREP NO. 133 TO 0400L 30 DEC. OWN OPS: NO CHANGE, ENEMY OPS:

THREE FLARES FIRED FROM GIROPA POINT 2210L ANSWERING FLARE FAR OUT

TO SEA. WEATHER CLEAR BROKEN CLOUDS 10,000 FEET.

EICHELBERGER



Brig Wooten

PRIORITY

NO. 4371

29 DECEMBER 1942

TO: ADV HQ, HQ, 7 DIV, G-2 HQ, 5TH AF, ALO (ALMA), DIA FORCES.

SITREP NO 132 INFORMATION TO 1700L/29 DECEMBER. REF DIA LOCALITY REVISED.

ONE OPERATIONS: URUANA FORCES: FORWARD MOVEMENTS CONTINUING TO EXPAND BEACH POSITION VICINITY NJ 26266, TO CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE ALONG COAST INLAND TOWARD DIA MESSIAH. THIS CORRIDOR FROM ENTRANCE CREEK TO THE SEA WAD BE FOLLOWING UNITS A, F, L, CO 128 AND G ON THE NORTHWEST SIDE, B CO HOLDS SOUTHEAST SIDE OF MAIN CORRIDOR ALONG TRACK THEN C AND K CO 128 ARE IN LEFT REAR, I CO 128 IS TO BE REAR CENTER IN RESERVE. OTHER DEPOSITIONS: NO CHASE. VARIOUS FORCES: PREPARATIONS DURING DAY FOR ATTACK LAUNCHED 1600L IN CONJUNCTION WITH TANKS. DIRECTION OF ATTACK NORTHEAST. SOME ADVANCE INTO COCONUT GROVE ALONG COAST NORTHWEST OF OLD RUNWAY REPORTED BY 1700L. INFANTRY OPERATIONS: ATTACK ON CP OF C CO 128 MADE BY REAR PATROL UNIT 26/29 USING GRENADES AND BAYONETS. RESULT ELEVEN OUR MEN KILLED AND TWELVE WOUNDED INCLUDING COMPANY COMMANDER. FOUR AUSTRALIANS KILLED. ESTIMATED FOURTEEN JAPS KILLED. OFFENSIVE DEFENSIVE TACTICS EMPLOYED. WEATHER FINE AND CLEAR. END.

RICHLINER



7th 18th Bde

BUNA FORCES

For Distribution Down To Companies:

29 December 1942

The following is a translation of the last entries in a diary taken from the bunker at the road junction, which for so long, held up our advance along the Sineni-Buna Track:

Dec. 20 With dawn the enemy starts shooting all over. All I could do was shed tears of resentment. As soon as the sweeping fire and explosions cease a concentration of mortar fire starts and Superior Private IIT'A is killed. Enemy fires fiercely. ADSHIA Unit in danger. We of the 2nd Platoon hear there is to be a charge and, after making complete preparations, fill ourselves up with dry bread. Now we are only waiting for death. The rest of you comrades, get revenge for me. Since the great Far East War, I have come from Hong Kong to Sumatra to New Guinea. The time for my glorious death is now 12:07. The enemy is quiet after that and the attack is not made. Shelling again at night and I cannot sleep. Raining.

Dec. 21 Stopped raining. First of all, we fill up our stomachs at 5 A.M. Now we are ready for shelling and bombing. The news that reinforcements had come turned out to be a bad rumor. No hope at all. Only thing to do is to wait for the final moment though we can't tell when that will be. Enemy explosions coming nearer. Will it start again? Starting at 0700 there is a heavy mortar concentration fire, and Superior Privates TSUTSUI and OKAMOTO killed. What's left are the squad leader and 4 men. Cpl. HATTORI, HASEGAWA, and TAJIJI have minor wounds too. The only ones not wounded at all are Superior Private KOJII and myself. All day long we stay in the bunker (gō) and let the enemy do as they will. We are filled with vexation. If only we had troops and guns. Comrades are you going to just stand by and watch us die. Even the invincible Imperial Army is at a loss. Can't anything be done. Please God. Day fades away during the firing and night falls again. Must be about the 13th or 15th night of the moon but when she is completely round I suppose something will be done. The end seems to be near. Shelling ceases so we start fixing the bunker. Is all this so that we may live. 3 reinforcements come to the Ind. Squad tonight. One is ADACHI who had been at the field train and the other 2 are temporarily assigned from other units. Now we are 8 with the squad leader. But we have no light MG and feel sad. After work we bury the 2 dead.

Dec. 22 As usual, shelling at dawn. At 0600 concentrated shelling but in a different direction and we are somewhat safe. Last night Sgt. Major OGAWA said that our troops had come as far as Rock 14? and that this was just a matter of 2 or 3 days more of hardship. Cannot be thought of as any other than to cheer us up with rumors. At 1300



heavy bombing and mortar fire. Enemy planes fly overhead all the time and we can only watch crouched down in our bunkers. Night falls. The enemy finally seems to be using tanks and smashing our front lines. Headed this way. Conditions take a turn for the worse. KALIADA was standing guard and said he saw 2 enemy troops. Wanted to throw a grenade, but I told him to make sure and it turned out to be a bird or rat. Runner WAKAIATSU and Sgt. Maj. OGAWA came and told of guards becoming completely afraid of the enemy and running back as soon as a shot was fired. Said that was unbecoming to a Japanese soldier who had the Great Work of establishing peace in the Far East.

*Gordon B Rogers*  
GORDON B. ROGERS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
AC of S, G-2. *Lew*



HEAD-QUARTERS DUTA FORCES

23 December, 1942

Extract from this diary relative to propoganda -- PLEASE NOTICE.

"About 1200 the white and green circle plane reconnoiter our lines and dropped propoganda is not very good. Contents have many foolish things in them. When the infantry comes I hope they push them all back."



Warren Force  
Big Wooten

HEADQUARTERS BUNA FORCES

Dec, 22, 1942

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY U.S. FORCES WARREN 12/19/42  
(TRANSLATED BY S/SGT. S. ISHIO)

DIARY OF SUGANUMA

No date Weighed anchor about 1330 notified Navy and transferred to small boat. Saw a transport apparently run aground front of landing point. Signalling with Heliograph. Several motor launches came out to take us in. Landing point is a sandy beach and various units have already landed. I saw the MATSUO unit and the HITABE unit. Since the enemy bombings are fierce, we dispersed into the jungle. After a while we were given rations and the 1st platoon was to leave. Even though it is low tide there were several times when the water was knee and waist deep when we crossed small streams. At dawn I found that we were on a small trail in the jungle. We are following this trail. At about 1000 we reach GIRUWA. Here and there troops are present. There are some who say that they just arrived from the front. All are dispersed in the jungle to avoid being bombed. We too disperse according to squads and rest.

When we will set out is not known. I hear stories of conditions in the New battle fields.

We were told that we could not eat till after 1700 and it was not ten minutes after I started to prepare my mess that we would leave in ten minutes. I hurried as much as possible and somehow made it. We departed. Due to the full tide the swamps are full of water and there are places where the road is under water. What a place, I thought. It was a difficult march to the sea shore. We rested at the sea shore. Enemy planes flew over and dropped flares after which they strafed a motor launch that had been washed ashore. Here and there I saw shore patrol soldiers. They seemed very alert. On the small trail along the shore there were suspension bridges and broken down bridges at places. This takes quite a while. They gave us a rubber boat. When we meet with soldiers and sailors we ask how many kilometers it is to the airfield. The guides are very kind. Near entrance of air field made connection with the 3rd platoon which we met before and was surprised. When we crossed the airport it was getting a little



lighter. We headed for the Coconut grove. It started to rain again. 30 minutes after eating breakfast there was an alarm. At first I thought that they told us to put up camouflouge because of enemy planes.

We hurriedly took off our extra weight and with light arms went towards the grass plain (dummy air field) and went as far as the front edge of the coconut grove.

Much firing heard. It was said that our scouts were firing at their scouts. The MATSUO unit steadily pushing on the left. After lunch we went out to the right edge of the coconut grove.

- Dec, 1 The enemy scouts which have been bothering us all night quit their activities about 2 hours before dawn. The day is slowly dawning. The night of strain has passed. Thought of clearing the field of fire in front of position which I have been planning for several days and put the whole squad out under sufficient protection but after a few minutes of work 3 enemy scouts opened fire. SHIMIZU, MASAYUKI hit in chest. About 1600 in front of 3rd MG squad enemy troops infiltrated. They were fired upon: NAMIDA wounded.
- Dec, 2 From early morning enemy planes flew over. In formations of 3, 3 combinations and 4 groups flew over. They bombed and strafed us as usual, and with this there were a few mortar and Infantry guns firing. In coordination with this the enemy ground troops opened fire heavily. They could not be seen only rifle firing heard. 4 or 5 seen on edge of field of fire clearing. Withdrew after heavy MG and mortar. Following this there was concentrated mortar and Mountain gun fire. They fired several hundred rounds continuously until I thought they would run out of shells. One enemy mountain gun shell exploded between the 2nd and 3rd squad near the coconut grove. 3rd squad is resisting enemy ground forces.
- YAMADA received leg and arm wounds. about 0700. Enemy artillery fire as if they were crazy. After the enemy withdrew 4 or 5 infiltrated into coconut trees and stayed until sundown. The right of the 1st squad is in great danger.
- Dec, 3 Utilizing early dawn strengthened shelter of MIZAKI MG squad. This morning enemy planes are late, about 0800 enemy fighters flew over. Bombed and strafed. Wonder if the enemy has withdrawn. There have been no enemy patrols today for a change. At sundown command section news: 23 enemy planes downed, 7 burned to ground that was why enemy planes didn't come over today. For once the soldiers are not busy. Within the shelters listened to stories by first year soldiers and stories about new years. There were many interesting stories of men who have been in their third battle and have spent two new years in the field. New Years in "KOMON" and HongKong. What about



this new year? Will I greet new years in this trench? No, no if the main force comes, we will go forward. Even last year until the 26th I wondered what would happen to us, but I never spent a better new years. Last year it was bad, no, it was good. We made rice cake together with the MP unit in the Hongkong Hotel. I certainly ate a lot. It was really good. We left on 30th and ate rice cakes on the boat. Battalion commander instructions. Carried out reinforcements of shelters.

Dec, 4 Planes circling around and no rifle fire, only a few sniper shots in front of 3rd platoon. Came the dawn. Carried one coconut tree and filled in all of the shelter. Now we are safe from mortar fire. As before, there have been no appearance of enemy. The usual strain of the night. With bloodshot eyes and all nerves strained listening all night we sleep when dawn comes, leaving a relief soldier and sentries. We start up when we hear rifle fire. That is how we maintain our alertness and go to sleep. Surprisingly there are no enemy planes, but an airplane something like an observation which may be ours or the enemy's has been reconnoitering must be reconnoitering enemy landing. Flies that were not here before have gradually begun to increase. They must have increased because of dead enemy bodies in front of protection. About 1630 carried out clearing of field of fire. At this time protection Lance Corporal MIYOSHI wounded in stomach.

Dec, 5 MIYOSHI killed in action. Burial early morning. About 0600 many enemy planes flew over and dropped parachute bombs all around and strafed us. Following this mountain artillery and mortar fire and ground force fire all at once. They fire recklessly from the jungle when our field of fire is not effective. Probably fired most today. Fired about 1 hour and quit all of a sudden. After, only 3 or 4 enemy seen to move about. About 1100 again they started firing all at once for about 10 minutes. Mortar and artillery fire followed. Fired so much I wondered whether their ammo. would last. Heavy firing in front of 1st squad. Seem like enemy infiltration. Sundown 4 men screamed. Must be hit. According to Sgt. YAMADA "the enemy has received almost no training, Even though we fire a shot they present a large portion of their body and look around. Their movements are very slow. At that rate they can't make a night attack" - so he says.

According to reports at evening 5 enemy tanks appeared in front of the HITABE unit and the enemy attacked, but were repulsed. It is the same as at Hongkong. If we shot the men on the tanks and stopped them they withdrew. We pursued them and inflicted severe losses on them. It was very effective when hand grenades were thrown in them. So it was at Hongkong. The enemy who went so far as to bring a tank and was repulsed is as Sgt. YAMADA says really dependent upon fire power. It



does not matter how superior an automatic rifle they have. Even at that the HITABE unit not expecting tanks repulsed them.

Dec. 6 Perhaps it may be due to the fact that the enemy who, depending only on fire power attacked and was repulsed, but it is very quiet today. But their patrolling is as usual. Had terrific rainstorm last night and my equipment and clothes got wet. Very hard to dry out. At times they fire in front of HITABE unit. Automatic rifle fire sounds very near. Seems cloudy tonight. At about 2000 liaison soldiers arrived. Reports that enemy may land on beach so kept strict guard.

Between 2200 and 0340 there was rain.

Dec. 7 During the morning 3-4 groups of 3 plane formations flew over. Bombed blindly the A/A position area. Enemy patrols infiltrating in front of HITABE unit and firing automatic rifle and withdrawing. At times it seems that we fired our infantry gun. The planes seem to fly very high. We can hear them but can't see them. Concentrated mortar fire. Everyone in shelters. Heard reports of our troops being reinforced.

Dec. 8 According to instructions from Battalion commander, at 430 each squad within shelter bowed towards the Imperial Palace. Told the meaning of great East Asia War to the squad. Bombing during the morning. Morning and afternoon concentrated mortar fire. Several burst in front of 3rd squad. Until night there was firing in the jungle. It is not in front of the HITABE unit and it isn't in front of our unit. Only firing heard. There were no bullets coming our way. We could not see them, yet they are shooting LG and Automatic rifles and rifles. Soldiers impressed by the firing. Enemy worn out by attackers. Furthermore the enemy has been repulsed by our keen-eyed snipers and nowadays they seem very quiet. The enemy who depends solely on fire power must be afraid because of the severe losses they suffered. In the jungle it seems that they fire at any sound, due to illusions. They must be frightened by the little animals and shoot at them. From sundown till about 2000 they fired LG and threw hand grenades recklessly. However because of the feeling that the enemy is near we have heavy guards. According to reports our troops are continuously landing. We just have to hold on only a little longer. From tomorrow we will get 1 GO 7 SHAKU (.0643) gal. about a handful) of rice, but today we have 2 GO (little more than above) However, even though we get 2 GO I am still hungry. I said I would positively eat only twice, but about 0700 after breakfast I eat at about 1300 after all and leave some for supper. Ate 3 coconuts, but there are no more coconuts in the rear. We must go in front of the outposts to get them. There were lots of coconuts before, but due to the constructing of trenches and shelters they have been made used up. It is said that a bullet cannot pierce a coconut



and is used widely. There were a lot once, but they are all used in constructing skirmish trenches and in camouflaging shelters. At RABAUL we ate coconuts and drank coconut milk and didn't think much of it, but here at the front coconuts are about all we can get to eat at hand. The coconut and milk are eaten and the outside is used for tobacco. Coconut meat is slightly sweet and is hard; the inner part is water. It doesn't fill the stomach very much, but it is good. Maybe it is because I haven't had much sugar to eat since landing, but the sweetness of the coconut tastes very good.

Dec. 9 Sunrise at 0400. From today one man gets 1 GO 6 SHAKU a day. Other auxiliary food is the same as before, MISO SHOYU 5 grams. Most of us finish breakfast around 0500. I think that just one more mouthful, just a little more won't lessen the amount, but before I know it I have eaten more than I have planned. Nothing like one-third of the food, I eat most of it. About 0600 there is mountain artillery fire. The shells seem to be dropping way in the rear. Following this there is concentrated mortar fire. There is reckless firing before and after this the same as yesterday. However, today perhaps due to the increased number of our planes, they do not fly low but high making a lot of noise. I can not tell whether they are patrolling or reconnoitering or whether they are our planes or the enemies!

But the mortars are pouring heavy fire on us. Really "pot fishing shooting" (TSURIKAME UCHI). Concentrated fire with 3 mortars. The one on the very left is aimed at the HITABE unit, the center one is aimed at the 2.3 squad. The one of the right seems to fire way to the right. They fire 30 or 50 rounds of concentrated fire. The firing stops all of a sudden and everything is quiet. After a while rifle shots are heard in the jungle. Then there is concentrated fire with the 10 cm guns. No time for rest. Feeling that enemy scouting patrol infiltrating but since the target isn't definite, restrained from firing. We are waiting for one good shot. The enemy comes in feeling safe because we do not shoot. It seems as if these scouts are observing where the shells are landing. Shells fall continuously around the 2nd and 3rd squads. Even though it is but a mouthful I eat my meager noon meal. Mortar fire has died down. The squad leader's trench is full of mud. There are marks on his rifle. There is a hole left by a fragment in SHIMIZU'S mess kit. Corp WATANABE has a wound on his nose due to a shell exploding near the entrance of the trench. From noon there is continuous concentrated firing about 1530, the mortar fire ceased. There is no firing in the jungle. About 1630 it became cloudy and it felt as if it were evening. TAKASE was feverishly reinforcing his trench. Suddenly there was automatic rifle firing. I told them to hurry and jump into the trench. I wondered how TAKASE was but he had been shot through the head. Almost unconscious. He had reinforced his own trench and piled dirt up so that it would shelter him from mortar fire, and while he was just putting on camouflage, rear part at that, he was wounded, without entering the trench that he himself had dug out. He lost consciousness. He was a man who strived till the last. He died around evening. In this battle his helmet was hit, and again he was scraped on his leg by a piece of mortar shell. Surprisingly enough both wounds were light but on the third time due to a wound in the head he died. By the same fire KATO of the 3rd squad was wounded in the hand.

Dec. 10 TAKASE'S body was buried last night and we pass a night of strain. About



0800 There was rain as usual. We are soaked through and through. These last 3 or 4 days it rains every day. Even though we are directly under the equator it is cold at night. We take advantage of the dawn and put up camouflage. Before sunrise there is concentrated mortar fire. Today we expect enemy ground troops. Everyone alert. Today they say that provisions and ammo will be dropped from planes for us. We just have to bear and have patience for three or four days more, so the unit commander's instructions say. The main force of the army will make an enforced landing against the enemy so they say. The advance unit is already at GIRUWA. I instruct everyone for the next 3 or 4 days we must hold this present position to the last man. There has been a telegram from the army commander to the effect. "The KIMMOCHI unit has securely held the airport against a superior enemy and under difficult conditions, we are grateful." Morale was greatly boosted. Noise of planes heard but can't tell whether they are enemy planes or ours. They may be our planes dropping provisions. Yesterday's mortar and artillery rounds fired total 1200. They certainly fired a lot. A fighter plane flew very low. Thought it was one of ours, but it was an enemy plane. After that it seems they are flying high. As usual, I wonder how the dropping of provisions has turned out. Due to lack of food around 0900 SAIMIZU asks whether it is time to eat and when I tell him there are still two hours left he answers "my, my." We borrow superior private NAKAYAMA from 1st squad. When the enemy approaches close by, the sound of the cracking of coconuts attracts them, so for the time being, we are prohibited to eat them. Relief of sentries etc., during the daytime, will be absolutely carried out by crawling on all fours. The next three or four days will be tough so until then no matter what happens, hold out. During the daytime those who do not have any business must not go outside of the trenches etc.--so I tell my men. Two or three enemy infiltrate and start sniping. During the morning there was mortar fire, but after that although some fell in front of the HITABE Unit none fell around here. It is too early to feel safe. It is 1200 now. Although there are enemy planes there is no bombing. It is surprising. Maybe after observation they may come and bomb. Carelessness is the greatest enemy. Today from noon there isn't a cloud in the sky. About 1230 there were explosions. Didn't jump into trenches, and when I looked closer found it was a large formation of our bombers. Nine navy bombers in two formations with a few fighter planes flying over and flew away. Probably bombed enemy air fields and were on their way back. About 30 minutes later, I heard the roar of motors and I thought that our planes had come again, but they came in turn and bombed and strafed the AA position vicinity, and CP vicinity. About six or seven planes flew over. After that only the roar of the motor was heard. The enemy came into our position to the front edge of the field ~~of~~ fire clearing at 0890 and started sniping. About three o'clock they went towards the 1st squad but the situation there is the same. Two rounds of infantry gun fired into them but it didn't do so well. As soon as the infantry guns quit firing there was concentrated enemy mortar fire. Fired about 340 rounds. Really does us good.



Dec 1 About 2400 - 0200 there was heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. About dawn TANAKA who went to prepare mess. Came back and said that our mess gear was gone because of the terrific mortar barrage of last night. Well, today we can't eat. There is nothing we can do about it. The enemy is in front of us but we can't do anything about not being able to eat for a day. We are in a difficult situation. What with only 1 GO SHAKU a day and hungry even with that little rice, everyone seems depressed but there is nothing we can do. When TANAKA went to communicate with the command section IIDA had brought the rice. There was our food. Relief showed on every face. All at once everyone began to smile. About 0600 concentrated mortar barrage and bombing and strafing by planes. According to rumors last night 40 planes dropped 10 KG of ammo and provisions. At times there is mortar fire. Even though there is the noise of the cracking of coconuts they continue to fire mortar shells.

Dec 12 New moon 2nd and 3rd day. It was a half moon last night. I thought it would be clear tonight but during the night it started to rain heavily and I was drenched to the skin. Rained in dribbles till dawn. There is no consideration by the mortar and airplanes and we enter the trenches dripping wet. Planes overhead, mortar shells drop in front of the HITABE Unit. They aim at our trenches and fire but we don't know the firing position of the enemy so we just stay on guard and do not fire back. They fire quite a bit and quit. Don't know whether they went back or not. Probably only two or three remaining while they interchange. About 3 o'clock there is heavy mortar barrage. After our mountain gun fired several tens of shells they fire about 100 rounds. Went to 3rd squad when it was a little dark. During the last several minutes at dusk it is said that they fired 65 rounds. WATANABE and KATO progressing favorably. Went to MG Company Commanders. No news of importance. Met 2nd Lt. IWATA. Second time since coming here. Haven't met HITABE yet. After dark SAKAZU came. From fairly reliable news reports they have figured that the enemy have 620 dead and over 1200 wounded. The enemy is using small boats incessantly to move cargo and for transportation. Don't know whether it is personnel or provisions or ammunition. There were instructions as to guarding and caution not to lack in preparation against enemy dummy attacks. Skies are clear. 3rd day moon tonight. The light of the moon filters through the palm trees and makes white patterns on the ground. After the moon has gone there is only the light of the stars. It is very dark within the coconut

Dec 13 grove.

About 0430 there was sudden mortar barrage and after that, as usual, the enemy is shooting in the jungle. The mortar is firing near at hand. There is a plane, probably the enemy's flying overhead. Fair weather all day. Mortar firing as usual. We are waiting for one good shot and will not fire. They are in the jungle firing as long as their ammunition lasts. It is the same as firing by the planes, maybe they get so much money for firing so many rounds. They hit coconuts which are about 15 meters from us. There are some low shots, but most of the shots are high. They do not look out and determine their targets and fire from the jungle. Maybe that could be the reason. Because it was clear last night my clothes are dry, and I made up for the lack of sleep the other night, listening to the mortar barrage as if it were a cradle song. Since it is clear weather,



there were many planes. Can't tell whether they are enemy planes or not but as soon as we hear a motor we jump into our trenches and don't move. It would be terrible if we were to be walking around outside and discovered by enemy planes and bombed. It seems that the enemy planes do not know where the front lines are. Today again they came over several times to reconnoiter. Fighters fly low and observation ships fly high observing incessantly. About 1500 there was enemy mortar barrage. With the last shell TSUMURA was wounded. At dusk heard a tank's motor and all of a sudden in front of the platoon we saw something advancing under concealment which we judged to be the tank which we heard. Ordered every squad to be ready. Of course, since it has no top there isn't anything much to fear. The roar of the motor was heard to advance and withdraw several times. Next morning we found out that last night's motor roar was an enemy motor launch.

Dec, 14 Did a little construction work at dawn. Before the sun came up enemy Boeings came over after the rain had let up. About 0700 the enemy in front started to fire. The rain which started about 0200 stopped and the skies cleared up. Since we did not fire our rifles the enemy increased their fire. There is mortar fire and LG and rifle fire. As before enemy planes are reconnoitering. All along the coconut grove line we do not shoot, only the enemy fire their rifles, however, we can tell where their firing positions are. They fire heavily towards the center of the coconut grove. At times there is a low shot.

Daytime activities are prohibited. If we stand up just a little bit there is a mortar barrage or there is rifle fire. We are required to do trench construction work, but unless it is at dusk or dawn we can not do it. There is little to eat, but I encourage the men and make them do a little work. Mortars recently use delayed action and therefore when we receive direct fire the shelters do not protect us completely. Wonder what the condition of our troops is. If they are not coming at all then the stories must be false. There are stories that they will come, there are stories that they are on their way, but I don't know what is true. If it comes out in orders it will be definite, but at any rate it isn't good to raise false hopes. Sgt. YAMADA wounded by mortar fire about 0300. Not much of a wound. Orders from Hq. to reinforce shelter of 1st platoon.

Dec, 15 Carried out construction of shelters at dawn but the enemy near at hand fire mortars and at times artillery. There is automatic rifle fire even before sunrise. Construction work halts. Today as usual they start firing. Many planes overhead. Must be due to clear weather.

If we attack we would push back the enemy in front. If reinforcements come we would be able to attack, but at the present there is nothing to do but defend. It is all right for the enemy to shoot their ammunition, but while they fire a lot of ammunition there may be some accidental hits. The enemy is using ammunition wildly. I wish the main force would hurry and come. Even one day or one hour earlier. A fighter plane flies high and sometimes low. There are none of our planes of course. They are all enemy planes, so we jump into our trenches. But there must be a few of our planes although almost all of them are enemy planes.



Nowadays there are no planes with the star insignia but planes with the white and green circle. Perhaps they have gone to Guadalcanal to take part in the attack, there, anyway the number of bombers has decreased quite a bit. It may be that our planes are taking over superiority of air.

De About 1200 the white and green circle plane reconitred our lines and dropped propoganda leaflets and enemy propanganda is not very good. Contents have many foolish things in them. When the infantry comes I hope they push them all back.

About 1230 under serial observation there comes artillery fire near the vicinity of Hq. That is the height of impertinence. Ate all of my 2 CO of rice by 1300, stayed in trench all day without doing anything but ate my rice up fast.

Dec, 16 Last night about 1000 TAKAGI came. There were instructions. From early morning there is mortar barrage. It is raining. After intense firing of mortars there is heavy LG fire in front of 1st squad. Today the enemy's advance is more distinct than usual, and while thus musing, there are reports that 2 or 3 are infiltrating in front of 2nd squad and everyone is placed in alert positions.

(Comment: SUGANUMA MAY BE A FIRST LT. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION FOUND ON SEPARATE DOCUMENT)

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32nd Div.



For the tributes  
Brigadier Wootton; Regt  
and Bn Commanders,

10 - hold until further  
advance of 32 Nov 9  
N.C.F. no. 8 26/12

13 copies



*Brig. Gen. Wooten*

MOST SECRET

HEADQUARTERS - AMERICAN FORCES  
BUNA AREA

MOST SECRET

25 Dec. 1942

SUBJECT: - INTER SERVICE RECOGNITION PROCEDURE

Aircraft may initiate procedure by flashing the appropriate letter from column 3, surface craft or ground station will answer by flashing the appropriate letter from column 4 followed by the letter R sent 3 times. Surface craft or ground station may initiate the procedure by flashing the appropriate letter from column 4; the aircraft will answer by flashing the appropriate letter from column 3; the surface craft or ground station will then acknowledge by flashing again the letter from column 4 followed by the letter R sent 3 times.

25 Dec.	1300 - 1900	M	---	G	---
	1900 - 2400	L	..	S	..
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100	L	! ..	S	..
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	H	..
	0700 - 1300	N	---	V	..
	1300 - 1900	S	..	V	..
	1900 - 2400	G	---	I	..
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100	G	---	I	..
	0100 - 0700	L	..	W	---
	0700 - 1300	M	---	X	..
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	P	..
	1900 - 2400	W	..	J	---
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100	W	..	J	---
	0100 - 0700	I	..	Z	---
	0700 - 1300	S	..	M	---
	1300 - 1900	F	..	V	---
	1900 - 2400	M	---	Q	---
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100	M	---	Q	---
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	O	---
	0700 - 1300	C	---	H	..
	1300 - 1900	B	..	V	..
	1900 - 2400	Q	---	I	..
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100	Q	---	I	..
	0100 - 0700	Y	---	W	---
	0700 - 1300	S	..	X	..
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	V	..
	1900 - 2400	J	..	N	---
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100	J	..	N	..
	0100 - 0700	B	..	O	---
	0700 - 1300	H	..	C	---

NOTE: - ALL TIME IS "L" TIME (LOCAL TIME)

For the Commanding General:

OFFICIAL:  
*S. Auchincloss*  
S.S. AUCHINCLOSS  
Colonel, S. C.

F. S. BOWEN, JR.  
Lt. Col., G.S.C.  
AC of S, G-3

UNTIL FURTHER INSTNS IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT NAVAL CRAFT WILL NOT INITIATE SIGNALS TO GROUND STATIONS BUT MAY ANSWER GROUND STATION SIGNALS (COL 4) WITH THE CORRECT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AS FOR AIRCRAFT (COL 3).

(A FIXED BEACON OF THREE WHITE LIGHTS IN VERTICAL LINE 6 FEET BETWEEN LIGHTS TO BE SCREENED TO OBSERVATION FROM NORTH AND AIR TO BE SITUATED CAPE ENDIAI DERE.



25 Dec. 1942

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	1300 - 1900	Z	---	V	---
	1900 - 2400	J	..---	N	---
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100	J	..---	N	---
	0100 - 0700	B	..---	O	---
	0700 - 1300	H	..---	C	---

NOTE; - ALL TIME IS "L" TIME (LOCAL TIME)

For the Commanding General:

OFFICIAL:  
*S. Auchincloss*  
S.S. AUCHINCLOSS  
Colonel, S. C.

F. S. BOWEN, JR.  
Lt. Col., G.S.C.  
AC of S, G-3

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25 Dec. 1942

SUBJECT: - INTER SERVICE RECOGNITION PROCEDURE

Aircraft may initiate procedure by flashing the appropriate letter from column 3, surface craft or ground station will answer by flashing the appropriate letter from column 4 followed by the letter R sent 3 times. Surface craft or ground station may initiate the procedure by flashing the appropriate letter from column 4; the aircraft will answer by flashing the appropriate letter from column 3; the surface craft or ground station will then acknowledge by flashing again the letter from column 4 followed by the letter R sent 3 times.

25 Dec.	1300 - 1900	M	---	G	---	.
	1900 - 2400	L	.	S	.	.
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100	L	.	S	.	.
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	H	.	.
	0700 - 1300	N	---	V	.	.
	1300 - 1900	S	.	V	.	.
	1900 - 2400	G	---	I	.	.
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100	G	---	I	.	.
	0100 - 0700	L	.	W	.	.
	0700 - 1300	M	---	X	.	.
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	P	.	.
	1900 - 2400	W	.	J	.	.
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100	W	.	J	.	.
	0100 - 0700	I	.	Z	.	.
	0700 - 1300	S	.	M	.	.
	1300 - 1900	F	.	V	.	.
	1900 - 2400	M	---	Q	.	.
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100	M	---	Q	.	.
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	O	.	.
	0700 - 1300	C	.	H	.	.
	1300 - 1900	B	.	V	.	.
	1900 - 2400	Q	---	I	.	.
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100	Q	---	I	.	.
	0100 - 0700	Y	.	W	.	.
	0700 - 1300	S	.	X	.	.
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	V	.	.
	1900 - 2400	J	.	N	.	.
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100	J	.	N	.	.
	0100 - 0700	B	.	O	.	.
	0700 - 1300	H	.	C	.	.

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25 Dec.	1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	M _ _ _ . L . _ . .	G _ _ _ . S . . .
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	L . _ . . Z _ _ . . N _ . . . S . . . . G _ _ . .	S . . . . H . . . . V . . . . V . . . . I . . . .
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	Ga _ _ . . L . _ . . M _ _ . . Z _ _ . . W . _ . .	I . . . . W _ _ . . X . . . . P . . . . J . . . .
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	W . _ . . I . . . . S . . . . F . . . . M _ _ . .	J . _ . . Z _ _ . . M _ _ . . V . . . . Q _ _ . .
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	M _ _ . . Z _ _ . . C _ . . . B _ . . . Q _ _ . .	Q _ _ . . O _ _ . . H . . . . V . . . . I . . . .
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	Q _ _ . . Y _ . . . S . . . . Z _ _ . . J . _ . .	I . . . . W _ _ . . X . . . . V . . . . N _ . . .
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300	J . _ . . B _ . . . H . . . .	N _ . . . O _ _ . . C _ . . .

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25 Dec.	1300 - 1900	M	---	G	---	.
	1900 - 2400	L	.	S	.	.
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100	L	.	S	.	.
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	H	.	.
	0700 - 1300	N	---	V	.	.
	1300 - 1900	S	.	V	.	.
	1900 - 2400	G	---	I	.	.
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100	G	---	I	.	.
	0100 - 0700	L	.	W	.	.
	0700 - 1300	M	---	X	.	.
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	P	.	.
	1900 - 2400	W	.	J	.	.
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100	W	.	J	.	.
	0100 - 0700	I	.	Z	.	.
	0700 - 1300	S	.	M	---	.
	1300 - 1900	F	.	V	.	.
	1900 - 2400	M	---	Q	---	.
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100	M	---	Q	---	.
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	O	---	.
	0700 - 1300	C	.	H	.	.
	1300 - 1900	B	.	V	.	.
	1900 - 2400	Q	---	I	.	.
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100	Q	---	I	.	.
	0100 - 0700	Y	.	W	.	.
	0700 - 1300	S	.	X	.	.
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	V	.	.
	1900 - 2400	J	.	N	---	.
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100	J	.	N	---	.
	0100 - 0700	B	.	O	---	.
	0700 - 1300	H	.	C	---	.

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25 Dec.	1300 - 1900	M	---	G	---
	1900 - 2400	L	. --- . .	S	. . .
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100	L	. --- . .	S	. . .
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	H	. . .
	0700 - 1300	N	---	V	. . .
	1300 - 1900	S	. . .	V	. . .
	1900 - 2400	G	---	I	. . .
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100	G	---	I	. . .
	0100 - 0700	L	. --- . .	W	---
	0700 - 1300	M	---	X	. . .
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	P	. . .
	1900 - 2400	W	. ---	J	---
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100	W	. ---	J	. ---
	0100 - 0700	I	. . .	Z	---
	0700 - 1300	S	. . .	M	---
	1300 - 1900	F	. . .	V	. . .
	1900 - 2400	M	---	Q	---
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100	M	---	Q	---
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	O	---
	0700 - 1300	C	. . .	H	. . .
	1300 - 1900	B	. . .	V	. . .
	1900 - 2400	Q	---	I	. . .
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100	Q	---	I	. . .
	0100 - 0700	Y	. ---	W	---
	0700 - 1300	S	. . .	X	. . .
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	V	. . .
	1900 - 2400	J	. ---	N	---
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100	J	. ---	N	. . .
	0100 - 0700	B	. . .	O	---
	0700 - 1300	H	. . .	C	---

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	1900 - 2400	L	..---	S	..---
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100	L	..---	S	..---
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	H	..---
	0700 - 1300	N	---	V	..---
	1300 - 1900	S	..---	V	..---
	1900 - 2400	G	---	I	..---
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100	G	---	I	..---
	0100 - 0700	L	..---	W	---
	0700 - 1300	M	---	X	..---
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	P	..---
	1900 - 2400	W	..---	J	---
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100	W	..---	J	---
	0100 - 0700	I	..---	Z	---
	0700 - 1300	S	..---	M	---
	1300 - 1900	F	..---	V	..---
	1900 - 2400	M	---	Q	---
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100	M	---	Q	---
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	O	---
	0700 - 1300	C	..---	H	..---
	1300 - 1900	B	..---	V	..---
	1900 - 2400	Q	---	I	..---
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100	Q	---	I	..---
	0100 - 0700	Y	..---	W	---
	0700 - 1300	S	..---	X	..---
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	V	..---
	1900 - 2400	J	..---	N	---
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	1900 - 2400	L	..	S	..
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100	L	..	S	..
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	H	..
	0700 - 1300	N	..	V	---
	1300 - 1900	S	..	V	..
	1900 - 2400	G	---	I	..
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100	G	---	I	..
	0100 - 0700	L	..	W	---
	0700 - 1300	M	---	X	---
	1300 - 1900	Z	..	P	---
	1900 - 2400	W	..	J	---
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100	W	..	J	---
	0100 - 0700	I	..	Z	---
	0700 - 1300	S	..	M	---
	1300 - 1900	F	..	V	---
	1900 - 2400	M	---	Q	---
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100	M	---	Q	---
	0100 - 0700	Z	..	O	---
	0700 - 1300	C	..	H	..
	1300 - 1900	B	..	V	..
	1900 - 2400	Q	---	I	..
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100	Q	---	I	..
	0100 - 0700	Y	---	W	---
	0700 - 1300	S	..	X	---
	1300 - 1900	Z	..	V	---
	1900 - 2400	J	---	N	---
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100	J	---	N	---
	0100 - 0700	B	..	O	---
	0700 - 1300	H	..	C	---

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25 Dec.	1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	M _ _ _ . L . _ _ . .	G _ _ _ . S . . . .
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	L . _ _ . . Z _ _ _ . . N _ _ . . S . . . . G _ _ _ .	S . . . . H . . . . V . . . . V . . . . I . . . .
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	G _ _ _ . L . _ _ . . M _ _ _ . Z _ _ _ . . W . _ _ _ .	I . . . . W . _ _ _ . X . . . . P . . . . J . _ _ _ .
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	W . _ _ _ . I . . . . S . . . . F . . . . M _ _ _ .	J . _ _ _ . Z _ _ _ . . M _ _ _ . V . . . . Q _ _ _ .
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	M _ _ _ . Z _ _ _ . . C _ _ . . . B _ _ . . . Q _ _ . . .	Q _ _ _ . . O _ _ _ . . H . . . . V . . . . I . . . .
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	Q _ _ _ . . Y _ _ . . . S . . . . Z _ _ _ . . J . _ _ _ .	I . . . . W . _ _ _ . X . . . . V . . . . N _ _ . .
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300	J . _ _ _ . B _ _ . . . H . . . .	N _ _ . . O _ _ _ . . C _ _ . . .

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	1900 - 2400	L	.---	S	.---
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100	L	.---	S	.---
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	H	.---
	0700 - 1300	N	---	V	.---
	1300 - 1900	S	.---	V	.---
	1900 - 2400	G	---	I	.---
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100	G	---	I	.---
	0100 - 0700	L	.---	W	---
	0700 - 1300	M	---	X	.---
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	P	.---
	1900 - 2400	W	.---	J	---
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100	W	.---	J	.---
	0100 - 0700	I	.---	Z	---
	0700 - 1300	S	.---	M	---
	1300 - 1900	F	.---	V	.---
	1900 - 2400	M	---	Q	---
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100	M	---	Q	---
	0100 - 0700	Z	---	O	---
	0700 - 1300	C	.---	H	.---
	1300 - 1900	B	.---	V	.---
	1900 - 2400	Q	---	I	.---
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100	Q	---	I	.---
	0100 - 0700	Y	.---	W	---
	0700 - 1300	S	.---	X	.---
	1300 - 1900	Z	---	V	.---
	1900 - 2400	J	.---	N	---
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100	J	.---	N	.---
	0100 - 0700	B	.---	O	---
	0700 - 1300	H	.---	C	---

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MOST SECRET

HEADQUARTERS - AMERICAN FORCES  
BUNA AREA

MOST SECRET

25 Dec. 1942

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25 Dec.	1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	M _ _ _ L . . . .	G _ _ _ . S . . . .
26 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	L . . . . Z _ _ _ . N _ _ . S . . . . G _ _ _ .	S . . . . H . . . . V . . . . V . . . . I . . . .
27 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	G _ _ _ . L . . . . M _ _ _ . Z _ _ _ . W . . . .	I . . . . W . . . . X . . . . P . . . . J . . . .
28 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	W . . . . I . . . . S . . . . F . . . . M _ _ _ .	J . . . . Z _ _ _ . M _ _ _ . V . . . . Q _ _ _ .
29 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	M _ _ _ . Z _ _ _ . C _ _ _ . B _ _ _ . Q _ _ _ .	Q _ _ _ . O _ _ _ . H . . . . V . . . . I . . . .
30 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300 1300 - 1900 1900 - 2400	Q _ _ _ . Y _ _ _ . S . . . . Z _ _ _ . J . . . .	I . . . . W . . . . X . . . . V . . . . N . . . .
31 Dec.	0000 - 0100 0100 - 0700 0700 - 1300	J . . . . B _ _ _ . H . . . .	N . . . . O _ _ _ . C _ _ _ .

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COVER



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(A fixed beacon of three (3) white lights in vertical line six (6) feet between lights to be screened to observation from the North and Air to be situated CAPE ENDIAIDERE)

Station	Time	Signal	Station	Time	Signal
G	1900 - 2100	...	M	0000 - 0100	...
S	1900 - 2100	...	L	0100 - 0700	...
S	0000 - 0700	...	L	0700 - 1300	...
H	0700 - 1300	...	M	1300 - 1900	...
V	1300 - 1900	...	S	1900 - 2100	...
V	1900 - 2100	...	G	0000 - 0100	...
I	0000 - 0100	...	L	0100 - 0700	...
I	0100 - 0700	...	M	0700 - 1300	...
P	0700 - 1300	...	S	1300 - 1900	...
J	1300 - 1900	...	W	1900 - 2100	...
J	1900 - 2100	...	W	0000 - 0100	...
L	0000 - 0100	...	I	0100 - 0700	...
H	0100 - 0700	...	S	0700 - 1300	...
V	0700 - 1300	...	F	1300 - 1900	...
V	1300 - 1900	...	H	1900 - 2100	...
I	1900 - 2100	...	M	0000 - 0100	...
I	0000 - 0100	...	S	0100 - 0700	...
V	0100 - 0700	...	O	0700 - 1300	...
V	0700 - 1300	...	H	1300 - 1900	...
I	1300 - 1900	...	G	1900 - 2100	...
I	1900 - 2100	...	G	0000 - 0100	...
V	0000 - 0100	...	I	0100 - 0700	...
V	0100 - 0700	...	S	0700 - 1300	...
X	0700 - 1300	...	X	1300 - 1900	...
V	1300 - 1900	...	V	1900 - 2100	...
V	1900 - 2100	...	M	0000 - 0100	...
M	0000 - 0100	...	L	0100 - 0700	...
M	0100 - 0700	...	H	0700 - 1300	...
O	0700 - 1300	...	H	1300 - 1900	...
O	1300 - 1900	...	H	1900 - 2100	...

NOTE: - ALL TIMES IN THIS (LOCAL TIME)

For the Commanding General:  
 S. S. RICHMONDS  
 Colonel, S. C.

LA. COL., S. C.  
 Lt. Col., S. C.



PRIORITY

NO 41502

*Warren*

*cont*  
*10*  
*0 29/12*

28 DECEMBER 1942

TO: ADV NGF, NGF, 7 AUST DIV, G-2 GHQ, 5TH AF, ALO (ALMA), BUNA FORCES

SITREP NO 130 TO 1700L 28 DEC. MAP REF: BUNA LOCALITY REV 4 TO 1. OWN OPS: WARREN

FORCE: ATTACK PROGRESSED FAVORABLY PARTICULARLY ON THE SOUTH FLANK WHICH SWUNG AROUND SO THAT THE FRONT LINE IS NOW MORE NEARLY PARALLEL TO THE COAST LINE WITH THE LEFT FLANK AT POINT 272258 AND AFTER PASSING THRU POINT 274256 EXTENDS EASTWARD TO THE SOUTH BANK OF SINEMI CREEK AT POINT 284255. THIS LINE IS HELD FROM RIGHT TO LEFT BY THE FOLLOWING UNITS IN ORDER: A CO 128 - C CO 128 - C CO 2/10 BN. A AND C COS 126 ARE IN REAR OF THE LINE AT 275253 AND B CO 126 IS AT 278252. COMPOSITE CO 128 IS IN REAR OF C CO 128 AT 274254. 2 COS 2/10 BN ARE FACING WEST ON RIGHT FLANK 278256. B CO 128 IS WEST OF THESE COS AT 277256. 2/9 BN STILL HOLDS AREA NORTH OF SINEMI CREEK. THE POM POM AT 278255 WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN KNOCKED OUT AT 1035L.

URBANA FORCE: PROGRESS WAS MADE IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF POSITIONS EAST OF ENTRANCE CREEK. C CO 127 SUCCEEDED IN TAKING THE TRIANGLE AREA. PRESENT FRONT LINE: SALIENT BEGINS AT POINT ON EAST SIDE ENTRANCE CREEK AT POINT 263264 EXTENDS TO 266263 CURVING SOUTHWESTWARD TO POINT 263259 AND SOUTH ALONG EAST SIDE OF TRACK INCLUDING THE TRIANGLE AT POINT 262255. DISPOSITIONS ALONG THE LINE WERE NOT STABILISED AT 1700L. CASUALTIES: AMERICAN 16 KILLED 29 WOUNDED. ENEMY OPERATIONS: EVENT WHICH OCCURRED DURING PERIOD COVERED BY OUR SITREP NO 129 BUT NOT INCLUDED BECAUSE OF LATE ARRIVAL OF REPORT: A LOCAL JAP COUNTERATTACK AGAINST THE 2/10 BN ON THE RIGHT FLANK OF THE LINE HELD BY WARREN FORCE WAS LAUNCHED LAST NIGHT AT 2300L BUT WAS SUCCESSFULLY REPELLED AND THE SITUATION WAS NORMAL AT 2330L. OTHERWISE THE ENEMY EMPLOYED DEFENSIVE TACTICS. WEATHER CLEAR, CEILING 8000, VISIBILITY UNLIMITED BELOW CEILING END

EICHELBERGER



*Brig Wooten*

PRIORITY

NO. *4519*

29 DECEMBER 1942

TO: ADV NGF, NGF, 7 AUST DIV, G-2 GHQ, 5TH AF, ALO (ALMA), BUNA FORCES.

SITREP NO. 131 INFORMATION TO 0400L/29 DECEMBER. OWN OPERATIONS: URBANA FORCE:

SITUATION NO CHANGE. WARREN FORCE: NO REPORT. ENEMY EQUIPMENT CAPTURED IN

RUNWAY AREA INCLUDES TWO 3 INCH NAVAL GUNS, 1-37 MM GUN, 2-50 CAL A/A, 3

LMG AND 3-50 CAL MG. ONE ZERO IN GOOD CONDITION ON OLD STRIP. WEATHER LIGHT

RAIN.

EICHELBERGER

FOR AC OF S, G-2

FERGUSON



2/4 F.A. Cox.

HEADQUARTERS Buna Forces

GBR/wc

24 December 1942



MEMO:

The following are diagrams and sketches of Japanese shelters and bunkers in the Cape Endaiadere area.



*Gordon B. Rogers*

GORDON B. ROGERS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.;  
AC of S, G-2.







THIS BUNKER WAS LOCATED AT N.W. END OF NEW STRIP. TO ENTER ONE MUST CRAWL ON HANDS AND KNEES.




THIS TYPE OF SHELTER HAS SLIT TRENCHES & SIDES & FRONT. SOME OF THESE ARE CONNECTED BY COMMUNICATING TRENCHES.

BUNA FORCES





REAR VIEW




THIS SHELTER IS COVERED WITH STEEL (SHEET), LOGS AND MUD. WILL ACCOMODATE 3 OR 4 MEN. LOCATED AT N. E. CORNER JUNCTION OF DRAINAGE ALONG NORTH EDGE OF NEW STRIP.

U.S. BUNA FORCE

LOCATED IN "V" AT EAST END OF NEW STRIP






FRONT VIEW

ONE MAN COVERED FIRE PIT WITH SLIT



BUILT UP PILLBOXES OF LOGS AND GROUND VICINITY OF C. ENDAIADERE





RIFLE POSITION  
(OPEN)

CONNECTING  
TRENCH

CONCEALED  
FIRE SLIT  
(COVERED)  
RIFLE  
POSITION

MG. POSITION  
CONCEALED FIRE  
SLIT.

POSITION SOUTH OF  
C. ENDAIADERE - 1000 YDS  
500 YDS WEST OF COAST  
LINE.

INTERIOR CONSTRUCTION - PIT COVERED  
UP WITH COCONUT LOGS AND DIRT.  
TOP COVERED ABOUT 4 FEET.

S. BUNA FORCE



HEADQUARTERS  
BUNA FORCES

VDH/rbm

21 December 1942

SUBJECT: Constructional Details of Enemy Emplacements.

1. Attached hereto are a diagrammatic sketch of one of the main Jap installations on Cape Endaiadere and constructional details of the bunkers encountered there and in the vicinity of the bridge between the two air strips.



2. It will be noted that in the Cape Endaiadere installations, the dugouts are connected by communicating trenches and have more than one entrance. This, in addition to the angular plan of some of the dugouts, make it impossible to eliminate all enemy resistance from one dugout by throwing in one grenade. There have been instances where this has apparently been assumed, with the result that men who have actually got into the entrenchments, have been shot from behind.

3. All dugouts or bunkers encountered have had firing slits so small as to be almost invisible from the front, which with heavy overhead cover, has made it impossible to reduce them by a frontal assault with infantry. In order to reduce these positions, it is therefore necessary either to secure a direct hit with artillery or to overrun or envelop them and attack them from the rear.

4. These sketches are issued for distribution to front line units to be distributed as widely as possible.

*W. D. Williams*  
W. D. WILLIAMS,  
Major, G. S. C.,  
Asst. AC of S, G-2.







CONSTRUCTION DETAILS  
 JAP EMPLACEMENTS  
 C. ENDAIADERE

U.S. BUNA FORCE  
 20 DEC 42







C. ENDAIADERE  
 FIRST LINE OF FORTIFICATIONS  
 Details of Dugouts and Connecting  
 Trenches  
 Sketch Scale: 1" = 16'  
 U.S. BUMA FORCES





FRONT VIEW


GRASS & MUD COVERING



CROSS SECTION OF ONE BUNKER

REAR VIEW

GRASS & MUD COVERING



ACTUAL SIZE SPIKE USED IN HOLDING LOGS

DETAILS OF BUNKERS BUILT ENTIRELY ABOVE GROUND LEVEL 20 DECEMBER U.S. BUNA FORCES



18 BDE

RECORDS TO BE MAINTAINED AND RETURNED TO BE RETURNED  
TO AND PASSED ON BY THE 'I' UNIT.

SERIAL	SUBJECT	DETAILS REQUIRED	WHEN REQUIRED
1	Location of HQ	Map ref and time of change	On change of location
2	Sitrep	All relevant	At least hourly
3	Hostile Shelling	See Pro forma	when necessary
4	Observation	See Pro forma	where possible
5	Hostile A/U	See Pro forma	where necessary
6	Patrol Report	As <sup>or</sup> ordered See Pro forma	when necessary
7	Works Report	See Pro forma	weekly
8	Detailed Road Report	As ordered See Pro forma	When necessary
9	Intelligence Diary	All possible See Pro forma	Continuously
10	New tps from other units in area	Strength, Armaments Unit, Location etc.	On arrival
11	Alteration to defences	Improvements Destruction by enemy	On completion.
12	Alteration to manning detail	Applies to :- (1) W.H. (11) Occupation of defences	On completion



WORKS REPORT.

..... Coy

As At ..(date)...

TYPE OF WORK	A PROJECTED BUT NOT APPROVED	B APPROVED NOT COMPLETED	C COMPLETED	D TOTAL	REMARKS
1. Wiring DAF BWC	...yds	...yds	...yds	...yds	
2. Digging Section posts	_____	§	§		
3. Revetting	_____	§	§		
4. Pill boxes	Numbers	Number	Number	Number	











HOSTILE A/C REPORT.

Ref Map .....

REMARKS height of planes etc)	Number and type of A/c	Direction in which A/c departed.	Damage done	Area attacked.	Time to	TIME W/ OUT	Nature of a attack.	Direction from which A/c came.	Location of reporting post.

SERIAL.



INTELLIGENCE DIARY.

SHEET NO ....

SERIAL NO	TIME OF RECEIPT.	TIME OF ORIGIN	FROM	INFORMATION TIME      ITEM	ACTION TAKEN	REMARKS OR DEDUCTIONS



ARTILLERY SHELLING REPORT.

Ref Map .....

Remarks	No of shells fired No of duds	No, type and calibre of gun.	Direction of fire.	Target's name.	Area shelled.	Time to.	Time from.	Direction of flash, sound or groove made by shell.	Locality of reporting point.	Nature of reporting point.
Extreme Accuracy noticed.	80 1 duds	4 guns 100 mm	East-	House destroyed	870300	0700	0630	510°	187208	O.P.



PATROL REPORT.

Patrol from ..... Coy.  
Strength .....  
Bond .....  
Task .....  
Time out .....  
Time in .....  
Route out .....  
Route in .....

PART 1.

( Answer/a to the questions asked by the offr ordering the patrol)

PART 2.

*inc*  
(~~will~~ any info of importance but NOT relevant to the object of the patrol)



Buna Locality	revised 4 <del>miles</del> inches	15
Buna	4 miles to inch	9+
Buna	(4 miles <sup>to inch</sup> revised 2" [deton])	2+
Buna	South Seas 2 miles to inch	2
Buna	1 inch	1
Buna	Plan 24	21 ✓
Buna	Plan (Green)	1 ✓
Gona (revised)	4 miles to inch	5
Popondetta	1 inch to mile	6 ✓
<u>Yotee</u>		<u>62</u>



PRIORITY

NO. 4344

TO: ADV NGF NGF 5TH AF ALO G-2 GHQ.

SITREP NO 127 TO 0400L 27 DECEMBER.

WARREN FORCE NO CHANGE

URBANA FORCE: K COMPANY 127 NOW IN POSITION SOUTH OF ISLAND NO OTHER CHANGE.

FLASHING LIGHTS BETWEEN BUNA MISSION AND BOAT AT SEA REPORTED AT 0030L AT SAME TIME FIVE SHELLS THREE TO FIVE INCH CALIBER LANDED VICINITY BUNA VILLAGE COMING FROM SEAWARD. SND.

RICHELBERGER

COL MARTIN



PRIORITY

Brig Wooten

NO.

TO: ADV HQF HQF 5TH AF ALO G-2 CHQ

SITREP HQ 126 TO 1700L 26 DECEMBER. MAP REF: BUHA LOCALITY REVISED STOP OUR  
OPERATIONS: WARREN FORCE: ATTACKS BY UNITS SOUTH OF SINMI CREEK CONTINUED  
AND SOME ADVANCES WERE MADE STOP A MG EMPLACEMENT AT POINT 265248 WAS TAKEN  
OUT AT 1500L BUT AN AA GUN AT 263249 HAS RESISTED ATTEMPTS TO DISLodge IT STOP  
A 3 INCH DUAL PURPOSE GUN WITHOUT AMMUNITION WAS CAPTURED AT POINT 263248 STOP  
DISPOSITIONS AT END OF PERIOD AS FOLLOWS: 2/10 BN FROM 264253 TO 265250 TO 264247  
STOP 1ST BN 126 FROM 264247 TO 266244 STOP C CO 2/10 BN IS AT 262247 stop 2/10  
BN LINE EXTENDS ACROSS OLD STRIP, HELD UP BY HEAVY MORTAR FIRE STOP CO C 126  
MOVING UP IN JUNGLES ON LEFT FLANK HAS REACHED POINT 263247 STOP 2/9 BN HOLDS AREA  
FROM POINT 266254 ALONG SINMI CREEK TO MOUTH THENCE ALONG COAST TO STRIP POINT  
STOP THE MISSION OF THE 3d BN 126 IS BEACH DEFENSE AROUND CAPE HEDALADERE AS FAR  
SOUTH AS HARIO STOP ESTIMATED CASUALTIES: AMERICANS 3 KILLED 11 WOUNDED STOP  
UREANA FORCE: ATTACKS WERE CONTINUED TO ENLARGE THE AREA HELD BY OUR TROOPS  
BETWEEN ENTRANCE CREEK AND THE SEA STOP STIFF RESISTANCE CONTINUES IN COVE GARDENS  
AREA STOP PRESENT FRONT LINE COMMENCING AT RJ 262255 NORTHWESTERLY ALONG BUHA  
VILLAGE ROAD TO THE BRIDGE OVER ENTRANCE CREEK HELD BY COS F G AND H OF 126 IIF  
THENCE ALONG ENTRANCE CREEK TO POINT 263259 WHERE 1 PLATOON E CO 127 IS LOCATED  
THENCE SOUTHEASTERLY GENERALLY PARALLEL TO ENTRANCE CK TO POINT 264263 COMMA HELD BY  
L AND G COS 127 THENCE EASTERLY TO RJ 266264 HELD BY F CO 127 THENCE TO THE SEA AT  
POINT 266264 THENCE CURVING WESTWARD TO BEND IN ENTRANCE CK AT 263265 COMMA HELD  
BY A AND C COS 127 IS LOCATED AT 264263 H CO 127 IS ON THE ISLAND AND ONE PLATOON  
OF E CO 127 OCCUPIES THE FINDER AT 263264 STOP K CO 127 IS IN RESERVE AT 262259  
STOP OTHER DISPOSITIONS NO CHANGE STOP ESTIMATED CASUALTIES COLON 13 KILLED 33



WOUNDED BERRY OPS COLON UNUSUAL HEAVY AIR ACTIVITY CHARACTERIZED THE PERIOD STOP  
CBO BAY WAS ATTACKED AT 1030L STOP ONE ZERO WAS SHOT DOWN BY 50 CAL AA GUN STOP  
ONE LOCKHEED HUDSON TRANSPORT WAS DOWNED IN WATER OFF CBO BAY AT 1120L STOP  
OF 8 PERSONS ABOARD 6 WERE RESCUED ALL WOUNDED AND 2 WERE LOST IN THE PLANE  
A FORCE OF 10 ZEROS STRAFED THE CP 128 INF AT 1130L WITHOUT DAMAGE STOP THREE  
ZEROS AND 2 TWIN-ENGINE BOMBERS STRAFED THE AREA INREAR OF 127 INF CP AT 1120L  
THIS FORCE PASSED OVER SEVORI VILLAGE AND OUT TO SEAF 1145L STOP AT 1115L  
HEAVY AIRCRAFT STRAFED AIR STRIPS NO 2 AND 4 AT ALMA DAMAGING FRONT WHEEL OF  
LANDING GEAR ON ONE LOCKHEED TRANSPORT OF SQUADRON 6 RAAF AND CONTROLS ON ONE  
DOUGLAS TRANSPORT STOP TWO ZEROS WERE REPORTED SHOT DOWN IN THE POPODETTRA  
AREA AND ONE ZERO WAS SHOT DOWN BY A WIRRAWAY AT THE MOUTH OF THE AMBOCU RIVER  
WEATHER CLEAR CEILING 15000 FT VISIBILITY UNLIMITED END

RICHLEBROER



(Consisting of two sheets with typed instructions 1 - 23 and such additional written instructions as may be included.)

I CORPS CP  
(Station)

NO. 2

INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS

TO 18th Brigade Effective December 18, 1942.

MAPS BUNA LOCALITY 4" = 1 mi  
Target Plan BUNA Plan N-24

REPORT ALL INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY AND IMPORTANT FACTS ABOUT THE TERRAIN WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE ITEMS CIRCLED BELOW:

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

(Areas and roads to be observed, if not included in unit's normal sector of observation. Special intelligence activities. Hour and destination of reports.)

1. RAILROADS - Traffic densities, detrainments.
2. CONCENTRATION AREAS - Location, strength and composition of troops, activities, movements into, movements from.
3. ASSEMBLY AREAS - Locations, strength and composition of troops, activities, movements into, movements from.
4. AVIATION - Type, location, number, elevation, speed, direction of flight and activity, location of airdromes, methods of attack, gunfire other than .30 cal.
5. MOVEMENTS ON ROADS - Time, location, nature, strength and composition or length of columns, direction and destination, head and tail of columns.
6. MOVEMENTS ACROSS COUNTRY - Time, location, nature, strength and composition or length of columns, direction and destination.
7. UNITS IN CONTACT - Line occupied, strength, composition, identification and attitude of the hostile units, reinforcements; weakening.
8. INFANTRY WEAPONS - Type, location, activities.
9. ARTILLERY - Location, number of batteries, calibers, fires, movements.
10. RESERVES - Location, strength, composition, movements.
11. MECHANIZED UNITS - Location, strength, type of vehicle, direction of movement, length of column, assembly areas.
12. COMMAND POSTS - Location, movements, size of area.  
RADIO STATIONS - Location, movements, changes in traffic.
13. RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES - Air, ground. Time and period.
14. EXTENSION OF FLANKS - Location, strength and composition of occupation, defensive works.

Report all items when observed to I Corps CP.



INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)  
In Two Pages - Page 2

15. DEFENSIVE WORKS - Location, nature, work in progress. Flanks.
16. DEMOLITION AND OBSTACLES - Location, nature, work in progress.
17. PERSISTENT GAS - Nature of chemical, when and where used, method of projection.
18. SUPPLIES - Accumulation, removal, destruction, activities of trains.
19. ESTABLISHMENTS - Location, nature, movements.
20. NEW POSITION - Location, organization, occupation. Flanks.
21. TERRAIN - Fordability of streams, condition of crossings, condition of roads, obstacles to cross-country movements, concealment, errors on existing maps.
22. PARACHUTE TROOPS - Location, strength, time of landing, number, equipment, activities and movement.
23. AIR BORNE TROOPS - Time of landing, location, number of planes and type, strength, equipment and activity. Course out and back.

Report on entrenching, use of tactical wire, machine gun pill boxes.

24. NAVY OR CARGO VESSELS - Small boats moving toward ship to shore or shore to ship.

Report location - decks clear of troops and gear or loaded.

25. EVACUATION PLANS - Movement of troops toward seacoast - destruction of supplies and installations.

26. AGGRESSIVE ACTION - By enemy patrols and covering forces.

27. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

For the Commanding General:

*Gordon B. Rogers*  
GORDON B. ROGERS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.



HEADQUARTERS I CORPS  
United States Army

3 December, 1942.

INTELLIGENCE INSTRUCTIONS:

NUMBER )  
1 :

1. Situation report will be delivered to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, CP, I Corps as follows:

As of 0300L by 0600L

As of 1400L by 1700L

Overlay showing location of all units will be submitted covering the above mentioned period by the most expeditious means available.

2. Special reports showing important changes in enemy or own situation will be delivered as obtained.

3. Patrolling will be intensified by night and by day to obtain information as to strength, composition and dispositions of enemy on your front. Special efforts will be made to locate accurately machine gun nests holding up your advance.

4. Prisoners are desired.

5. Intelligence S.O.P., I Corps, United States Army, will be applied where applicable.

C. E. BYERS,  
Brigadier General,  
Chief of Staff.

*a true copy  
Gordon B. Rogers  
Col GSC ADC of S, G-2*



10 - despatches  
card seen

2/9 3  
2/10 3  
2/12 3

at 2/4 fol copy 1  
2/4 fol copy #  
return 3

X34m 2/6 and 2/7

3

4 25/

HEADQUARTERS LUNA FORCES

GBR/wc

24 December 1942

MEMO :


The following are diagrams and sketches of Japanese shelters and bunkers in the Cape Endaiadere area.

*Gordon B. Rogers*


GORDON B. ROGERS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
AC of S, G-2.





FRONT VIEW



PLAN VIEW




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
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U.S. BU... FORCES






REAR VIEW




LOCATED IN "V" AT EAST OF NEW STRIP



THIS SHELTER IS COVERED WITH STEEL (SHEET), LOGS AND MUD. WILL ACCOMODATE 3 OR 4 MEN. LOCATED AT N.E. CORNER JUNCTION OF DRAINAGE ALONG NORTH EDGE OF NEW STRIP.


U.S. BUNA FORCE






FRONT VIEW

ONE MAN COVERED FIRE PIT WITH SLIT



BUILT UP PILLBOXES OF LOGS AND GROUND  
VICINITY OF C. ENDAIADERE





RIFLE POSITION  
(OPEN)

CONNECTING  
TRENCH

CONCEALED  
FIRE SLIT  
(COVERED)  
RIFLE  
POSITION

MG. POSITION  
CONCEALED FIRE  
SLIT.

POSITION SOUTH OF  
C. ENDAIADERE - 1000 YDS.  
500 YDS WEST OF COAST  
LINE.

INTERIOR CONSTRUCTION - PIT COVERED  
UP WITH COCONUT LOGS AND DIRT.  
TOP COVERED ABOUT 4 FEET

U.S. BUNA FOI



HEADQUARTERS Buna Forces

GBR/wc

24 December 1942


MEMO:

The following are diagrams and sketches of Japanese shelters and bunkers in the Cape Endaiadere area.


*Gordon B. Rogers*

GORDON B. ROGERS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
AC of S, G-2.







LOGS 1 1/2 DIA




THIS BUNKER WAS LOCATED AT N.W. END OF NEW STRIP. TO ENTER ONE MUST CRAWL ON HANDS AND KNEES.




THIS TYPE OF SHELTER HAS SLIT TRENCHES AT SIDES & FRONT. SOME OF THESE ARE CONNECTED BY COMMUNICATING TRENCHES.

U.S. BUNYAN FORCES






REAR VIEW




LOCATED IN "V" AT EAST OF NEW STRIP



THIS SHELTER IS COVERED WITH STEEL (SHEET), LOGS AND MUD. WILL ACCOMODATE 3 OR 4 MEN. LOCATED AT N.E. CORNER JUNCTION OF DRAINAGE ALONG NORTH EDGE OF NEW STRIP.

U.S. BUNA FORCE





SIDE VIEW

GUN SLIT

ENTRANCE

FRONT VIEW


ONE MAN COVERED FIRE PIT WITH SLIT



GUN SLIT

BUILT UP PILLBOXES OF LOGS AND GROUND VICINITY OF C. ENDAIADERE





RIFLE POSITION  
(OPEN)

CONNECTING  
TRENCH

CONCEALED  
FIRE SLIT  
(COVERED)  
RIFLE  
POSITION


MG. POSITION  
CONCEALED FIRE  
SLIT.

POSITION SOUTH OF  
C. ENDAIADERE - 1000 YDS.  
500 YDS WEST OF COAST  
LINE.

INTERIOR CONSTRUCTION - PIT COVERED  
UP WITH COCONUT LOGS AND DIRT.  
TOP COVERED ABOUT 4 FEET.

U.S. BUNA FORCE





SIDE VIEW

GUN SLIT

ENTRANCE

FRONT VIEW


ONE MAN COVERED FIRE PIT WITH SLIT



GUN SLIT

BUILT UP PILLBOXES OF LOGS AND GROUND VICINITY OF C. ENDAIADERE





RIFLE POSITION  
(OPEN)

CONNECTING  
TRENCH

CONCEALED  
FIRE SLIT  
(COVERED)  
RIFLE  
POSITION


MG. POSITION  
CONCEALED FIRE  
SLIT.

POSITION SOUTH OF  
C. ENDAIADERE - 1000 YDS.  
500 YDS WEST OF COAST  
LINE.


INTERIOR CONSTRUCTION - PIT COVERED  
UP WITH COCONUT LOGS AND DIRT.  
TOP COVERED ABOUT 4 FEET.

U.S. MARINE FORCE






REAR VIEW



LOCATED "V" AT EAST END OF NEW STRIP




THIS SHELTER IS COVERED WITH STEEL (SHEET), LOGS AND MUD. WILL ACCOMODATE 3 OR 4 MEN. LOCATED AT N.E. CORNER JUNCTION OF DRAINAGE ALONG NORTH EDGE OF NEW STRIP.


U.S. BUNA FORCE





FRONT VIEW



PLAN VIEW



THIS BUNKER WAS LOCATED AT N.W. END OF NEW STRIP. TO ENTER ONE MUST CRAWL ON HANDS AND KNEES.



THIS TYPE OF SHELTER HAS SLIT TRENCHES AT SIDES & FRONT. SOME OF THESE ARE CONNECTED BY COMMUNICATING TRENCHES.

U.S. BUNA FORCES



HEADQUARTERS Buna Forces

GBR/wc

24 December 1942

MEMO:

The following are diagrams and sketches of Japanese shelters and bunkers in the Cape Endaiadere area.

*Gordon B. Rogers*


GORDON B. ROGERS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
AC of S, G-2.



# BUNA


TRACED FROM TARGET PLAN NO N24  
BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS TO 10 SEPT. 42.

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID  
SOUTH NEW GUINEA ZONE



## LEGEND

- COCONUT PTN
- CLEARINGS & GRASS
- Note: Remainder of Area Wooded.



G.S.I. N.G.F. 27 OCT. 42.

To Dobudura



New battery  
made used  
by 2/9 Bn on  
18 Dec

— 11 — 7  
Approx 100 no 36 guns  
used by 2/9 Bn on first day  
1914.



Cond Seen ✓  
S.C. ✓  
L.D. ✓  
I.O. ✓

ops.  
18<sup>th</sup> Bde

HEADQUARTERS  
BUNA FORCES

VDH/rtm

21 December 1942

SUBJECT: Constructional Details of Enemy Emplacements.

1. Attached hereto are a diagrammatic sketch of one of the main Jap installations on Cape Endaiadere and constructional details of the bunkers encountered there and in the vicinity of the bridge between the two air strips.

2. It will be noted that in the Cape Endaiadere installations, the dugouts are connected by communicating trenches and have more than one entrance. This, in addition to the angular plan of some of the dugouts, make it impossible to eliminate all enemy resistance from one dugout by throwing in one grenade. There have been instances where this has apparently been assumed, with the result that men who have actually got into the entrenchments, have been shot from behind.

3. All dugouts or bunkers encountered have had firing slits so small as to be almost invisible from the front, which with heavy overhead cover, has made it impossible to reduce them by a frontal assault with infantry. In order to reduce these positions, it is therefore necessary either to secure a direct hit with artillery or to overrun or envelop them and attack them from the rear.



4. These sketches are issued for distribution to front line units to be distributed as widely as possible.

*W.D. Williams*  
W. D. WILLIAMS,  
Major, G. S. C.,  
Asst. AC of S, G-2.

Copies to - 2/9 Amd. Inf. Bn  
2/10 " " "  
2/12 " " (Held)  
1/128 U.S. Regt.  
Cav.  
Carriers  
File

Gene to 128 Regt plus 32 Div.







CONSTRUCTION DETAILS  
 JAP EMBLACEMENTS  
 C. ENDAIADERE

U.S. BUINA FORCE  
 20 DEC 42






C. ENDAIADERE  
 FIRST LINE OF FORTIFICATIONS  
 Details of Dugouts and Connecting  
 Trenches  
 Sketch Scale: 1" = 16'  
 U.S. BUMA FORCES






FRONT VIEW

GRASS & MUD COVERING





1' EARTH ON TOP  
LAYER SHEET IRON



CROSS SECTION OF ONE BUNKER

REAR VIEW

GRASS & MUD COVERING



ACTUAL SIZE SPIKE USED IN HOLDING LOGS

DETAILS OF BUNKERS BUILT  
ENTIRELY ABOVE GROUND LEVEL  
20 DECEMBER U.S. BUNA FORCES



# Report on Strength of Amer. Bns.

AS of 2400L DEC. 14, 1942

ops  
10/12 & 16/12

1st Bn 126 o. E.M.

Co A - 2 - 97

B 4 100

C 1 54

X D 0 0

7 251

Total Less H.W. Co's 7 251

6 225

9 221

22 697

1st Bn 128 off E.M.

Rights they require

Co A 2 68

B 2 81

C 2 76

X D 3 116

9 341

8 x 81mm Mortars at 128 LP

4 x 37mm ATK 3 - 1/126  
1 - 3/128

2/3 each with way 34 60mm M

2 x LMG

not MME or HME

2 x 50 cal - 1/128

4 x 30 cal water cooled 1/128

3rd Bn 128 off E.M.

(53-128)

I 4 103

K 2 62

L 3 56

X M 2 82

11 303

J. M. Howarth  
Capt. gnf.  
H.O.

Total 27 895



Tips sum

- 32 dia ✓
- 128 R/L X
- 2/9 ✓
- 2/10 ✓
- TR ✓
- arty X
- cond (1)
- BM ✓
- 10 (2)

Phase 1 - to attack and capture ~~concrete~~  
~~strip~~ strip between coast of right  
 and a line high East end of  
 NEW Runway then along  
 general line of SIMMENT CR  
 to to north

Phase 2 - to attack and capture NEW  
 STRIP and STRIP

Phase 3 - to attack and capture BONA  
 missed



HEADQUARTERS BUNA FORCES  
22 Dec, 1942

229th Infantry  
10th Company  
No. 114

On Identification tags taken  
by U.S. Forces Warren.  
12/22/42



HEADQUARTERS BUNA FORCES  
22 Dec, 1942

TAKU HA  
10th Company  
No. 451

On identification tags taken  
by U.S. Forces Warren.  
12/22/42



PRECEDENCE

*Being  
written*

NO 3966

22 December 1942

TO: ADV NGF, NGF, ALO 5TH AF, GMR

SITREP NO 115 TO 1700L 22 DECEMBER. OWN OPS: WARREN FORCE: ATTACKS WERE LAUNCHED ON TONGUE OF LAND EAST OF MOUTH OF SINEMI CREEK BETWEEN THE CREEK AND THE SEA BY THE 2/9 BN WHICH REACHED THE MOUTH SINEMI CREEK AND ONE CO OF THE 2/10 BN SUCCEEDED IN CROSSING THE CREEK AND ESTABLISHING A BRIDGEHEAD AT THE POINT 293247. OUR CASUALTIES: 4-0, 30 EN SOME BEING KILLED. 1ST BN 126 REGT, 1ST AND 3D BN 128 REGT HOLDING POSITIONS AND PROTECTING FLANKS. 10 MAN PATROL 2/10 BN HAVE REACHED A POINT AT 290239. URBANA FORCE: PLANNED CROSSING OUR TROOPS TO EAST SIDE OF ENTRANCE CREEK SUCCEEDED IN PLACING ALL OF K CO AND 2 PLATOONS OF I CO 127th ACROSS. EXTENSIVE PATROLLING WAS CONDUCTED IN AREA SOUTH AND WEST OF GOVERNMENT GARDENS. OUR CASUALTIES 8 KILLED 40 WOUNDED. 2 PLATOONS OF F CO HOLD ENTRANCE CREEK ISLAND INCLUDING SOUTH BRIDGE AND SOUTH END OF EAST BRIDGE EXCLUDING SMALL SWAMP AREA SE TIP OF ISLAND. INTEND TO TAKE EAST BRIDGE NIGHT 22/23 AND SHELL SAND SPIT EXTENDING SW FROM BUNA MISSION. ENEMY OPS: AIR OBSERVER REPORTED 4 BARRELED AA GUN AT 272266 AND 20 MM AT 293246. ENEMY AA GUN AT 283245 SHOT DOWN WIRRAWAY NO 160 KILLING FO HAWKINS AND MAJ O'HARA. ENEMY KILLED CAPE AREA TO DATE NOW 198 BURIED BY US TROOPS ONLY NUMBER BURIED BY AUSTRALIANS LATER. S/A FIRE FROM BUNA MISSION ON OUR TROOPS ON ENTRANCE CREEK ISLAND. ESTIMATE ENEMY STRENGTH NOW 400 - 600. MAP REFERENCE BUNA LOCALITY. SITUATION OVERLAY BY AIR 23 DEC. WEATHER FINE OVERCAST 10000 VISIBILITY BELOW 20 MILES END

EICHELBERGER



PRIORITY

Brig. Wootten

3991

23 DECEMBER 1942

ADV NGF HGF 7 DIV CHQ 5 AF ALO BUNA FORCES.

SITREP NO. 119 INFORMATION TO 0400L/23. OWN OPERATIONS: UREANA FORCE: CONTROL OF BOTH BRIDGES ENTRANCE CREEK ISLAND ESTABLISHED NIGHT 22/23. OTHER WISE NO CHANGE. WARREN FORCE: PATROL 2/9 BE KNOCKED OUT TWO ENEMY MG POSNS. MORTAR SHOOT ON JAPS REPORTED ON ISLAND IN SINIMI CREEK. NO LOCATION OF ISLAND REPORTED. ARTY: HARASSING FIRES NIGHT 22/23 ON OLD STRIP AND GIROPA POINT. ENEMY OPERATIONS: SOME MORTAR FIRE DURING NIGHT ON OUR TROOPS ON ENTRANCE CREEK ISLAND AND ALSO CAPE AREA. ENEMY NOT ENGAGING OUR TROOPS IN STRAIGHT. WEATHER FINE AND CLEAR CEILING 15000 VISIBILITY 30 MILES. END.

KICHELBERGER



PATROL REPORT.

PATROL consisting of 1000 men  
left 8 PM area at 1945 hrs on  
a bearing of 115° to reconnoitre  
enemy positions. Contacted  
enemy positions approx 150\*  
After hearing enemy talking  
and moving we threw grenades  
into two pits and then  
delivered rapid fire for  
one minute.

~~Having no enemy fire~~  
Patrol then listened and  
observed no movement  
of fire and returned  
by same route at 2115 hrs.

~~Signature~~  
8 PL CMBR

R. P. [Signature]  
0074



Patrol Report.

22. 12. 42

Strength 1-15.

Patrol left posn at 1940 hrs 22-12-42. & proceeded in open formation on a bearing of 295°. After moving through high grass for approx 75'. we encountered a force of enemy on our left flank. & in our immediate front. We pushed forward another fifteen yards but enemy fire



(I estimate strength of enemy encountered to)  
number to

too heavy & I ordered the patrol to  
withdraw. Returning at approx 2000 hrs

22.12.42 (.) One man killed (.)

The object of the patrol was to clear out  
enemy H.M.C. pen which is thought to be  
around 250+ in that bearing already given

295°

O Gray Lieut  
4th P. A Coy

Handwritten note:  
00 154



To 10 Barker Block  
From Bayenal.

22 Dec.

Patrol started 0720, from 126 HQ, m.  
MB 305° ○

0825.

B 305° for 150' struck possible jap patrol  
tracks, jap papers ○ Following jap tracks  
on B from 290° to 320° ○ ~~Heard~~ Heard  
an axe being used approx 150' on right front  
Swampy tree deep. T.O.O. 0910 hrs



Capt. Kent.

Air support would have given  
me this tonight. It may be of  
use to you — anyway I pass  
it to you for what it is worth  
C. Kent  
1/12



SECRET

Dec 42

CODES AIR SUPPORT MESSAGE

The following time and map reference codes will come into effect from 1200 hrs 9 Dec 42 for use in Air Support Messages sent in clear:-

Time code

Non carrying adder - 6903  
Indicator - TOKIO.

Map Reference Code

<u>Map</u>	<u>Reference in message</u>
BUNA 1 inch to 1 mile	B 1
POPONDETTA 1 inch to 1 mile	B 2
GONA LOCALITY ( REVISED ) 4 inches to 1 mile	B 3
BUNA LOCALITY ( REVISED ) 4 inches to 1 mile	B 4
BUNA TARGET MAP N 24	B 5

Reference Code

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
F	X	G	D	Z	M	T	L	J	A
Q	E	P	Y	H	C	R	S	O	U
				N	W	I	B	V	K

E.G. Message Bomb 368294 ( GONA LOCALITY ( REVISED ) 4" to 1 mile ) at 0930 hrs.

ENCODED. Bomb B3 - PWSXJY at TOKIO 6833.

Sgnd S.J.HILL Lt.Col  
Comd 2 Aust Air S.C.



*big weather*

TO: ADV HQ, NGF, 7 AUST DIV, GHR, Buna Forces, ALO, 5TH AIR FORCE.  
STAFF NO 106 TO 1700L/16. OWN OPERATIONS. WARREN FORCE: SLIGHT ADVANCE BY  
1ST AND 3RD BNS 128 REGT AGAINST STEADY ENEMY RESISTANCE. PATROLS SENT AROUND  
EACH FLANK 1ST BN 126 REGT TO MORTAR EMPLACEMENTS EAST OF BRIDGE BETWEEN RUN-  
WAYS. RE-DUTY ONLY FILL BOXES FIRING OF THE 6 NE AND 3 SW OF BRIDGE BETWEEN AIR  
STRIPS ARE LOCATED AT 262251 AND 283252, PATROLS CONTINUE. URBANA FORCE: JAP  
POCKET WEST OF ENTRANCE GREEK IN THE COCONUT GROVE AT 256274 ATTACKED AT 0700L  
CLEARED AT 1255L. TWO M/G POSNS NOW ESTABLISHED ON EAST BANK OF ENTRANCE GREEK  
WHICH WILL BE REINFORCED. ONE 100 YARDS SOUTH OF BRIDGE AT 255273, THE OTHER  
AT 258273. E AND G Cos. 128TH INF BOTH MOVING AGAINST ENEMY MACHINE GUN NEST  
AT NJ AT 255270. JAP'S COUNTER ATTACKED FROM DIRECTION OF BUNA MISSION TOWARD  
EAST OF LOG FOOTBRIDGE AT 257273 AT 1640L UNDER COVER OF MORTAR FIRE AND ARTY  
FIRE FROM DIRECTION OF GIROPA POINT STOP ATTACK REPULSED STOP. OUR CASUALTIES  
4 DEAD 13 WOUNDED. ENEMY 20 DEAD COUNTED TO DATE 1 WOUNDED TAKEN P/W. 2ND  
BN 127 REGT COMPLETELY ASSEMBLED VICINITY ANGO. 127 REGT HQ NOW ANGO. HAWKER  
FORCE HQ ESTABLISHED NEAR WARREN FORCE HQ. MOVE 18 BNS NOT YET COMPLETE.  
ENEMY OPERATIONS: ENEMY INFANTRY GUN POSITION 276261 FIRING ON OUR POSNS AREA  
251273 DURING AFTERNOON. ENGAGED BY ARTY AND SILENCED. AGAIN BEGAN FIRING  
AND AGAIN ENGAGED. ENEMY FOOD DUMP TAKEN IN COCONUT GROVE AT 256274. S/A  
FIRE REPORTED BY OUR OP'S FROM NORTHWEST END OLD STRIP FIRING IN DIRECTION OF  
BUNA VILLAGE. WIRRAWAY REPORTS ENEMY ARTY FIRE AT 27102605. ALSO ENTRENCHMENTS  
FROM 291258 EAST TO 294257. APPEAR TO BE FOUR FEET HIGH OF LOGS AND EARTH.  
HEAVY M/G FIRE ON ENCIRCLING PATROLS OF WARREN FORCE. AT 0815 ENEMY MG AT 259274  
FIRING ON URBANA FORCE FORCED TO WITHDRAW WITH M/G BY OUR ARTY. MAP REFERENCES  
BUNA TOT NO. 24. SITUATION OVERLAY BY AIR 0700L/16/. WEATHER FINE AND CLEAR  
CEILING 10000 VISIBILITY UNLIMITED. END.

SICHELBERGER



PRIORITY

NO. 3816

TO: ADV NBF NCF GHQ 5TH AF ALO 7TH AUST DIV BUNA FORCES.

SITREP NO. 115 TO 0400L/21. OWN OPERATIONS: WARREN FORCE: NO CHANGE IN

DISPOSITION. WHEN BRIDGEHEAD IS ESTABLISHED ACROSS SIMIMI CREEK BETWEEN STRIPS

ENGINEERS TO CONSTRUCT BRIDGEHEAD FOR TANKS STOP 100 VISIBLE ENEMY DEAD COUNTED

20 DECEMBER IN AREA 2/10 BN PERIMETER BEING 200 YARDS SQUARE APPROXIMATELY 304246.

URBANA FORCE: E CO 127TH REGT RELIEVED 2ND BN 126 IN FRONT LINE VICINITY TRIANGLE

N OF RJ. SIWARI-BUNA TRACK OTHERWISE NO CHANGE IN DISPOSITIONS. SCHWARTZ PATROL

ALONG SIWARI CREEK PUSHING TOWARDS TARAKENA REPORT ENEMY ENCOUNTERED **NOT**

AGGRESSIVE AND APPARENTLY IN VERY POOR CONDITION. WEATHER CLEAR CEILING

VISIBILITY UNLIMITED. END.

EICHELBERGER



PRIORITY

NO. 3312

16 DECEMBER 1942

TO: ADV NGF RPT NGF, 7 AUST DIV, GHQ, BUNA FORCES, ALO, 5TH AIR FORCE.  
SITREP NO. 105 TO 0400L, 16 DEC STOP OWN OPS STOP WARREN FORCES NO CHANGE IN  
SITUATION STOP URBANA FORCE NO CHANGE STOP A DIRECT HIT BY OUR ARTILLERY  
DESTROYED THE CENTER SPAN OF BRIDGE LEADING BUNA MISSION AREA FROM ISLAND SOUTH  
MOUTH ENTRANCE CREEK AT 0930L 15 DEC STOP AIR OBSERVER WHILE ATTEMPTING TO  
ADJUST ARTILLERY FIRE ON ENEMY POSITIONS SOUTH OF OLD RUNWAY REPORTED HAVING  
BEEN FIRED ON BY WHAT APPEARED TO BE MORTARS STOP FOREWARD OBSERVER AT BUNA  
VILLAGE 15 DEC REPORTED SALVAGE STORES AND EQUIPMENT APPARENTLY BELONGING TO ENEMY  
MARINE SURVEY OFFICERS STOP ENEMY OPS NO ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE ENEMY TO  
RETRIEVE PERSONEL ARTICLES FROM THE DEBRIS IN BUNA VILLAGE COMA INDICATING THAT  
THE OWNERS WERE EITHER KILLED OR LEFT HURRIEDLY STOP AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF  
UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT WERE REPORTED OVER OUR AIR STRIP AT DOBODURA AT 0235L  
TODAY STOP WEATHER STOP RAIN VISIBILITY LOW END.

EICHELBERGER



*Brig Wooten*

NO. 3089

15 Dec, 1942

TO: ADV NGF NGF 7AUST DIV GHQ 5TH AF ALO BUNA FORCES:

SITREP NO. 104 TO 1700L/15A. OWN OPS WARREN FORCE: DISPOSITIONS REMAIN UNCHANGED. MORTAR BARRAGES AT INTERVALS THROUGHOUT DAY AND PATROLS OPERATING BETWEEN OUR ADVANCE POSTS. URBANA FORCE: ATTACK LAUNCHED 1520L ON STRONG ENEMY POSITION IN COCOANUT GROVE 255274 ONLY REMAINING ENEMY WEST OF ENTRANCE CREEK MOUTH. 100 RDS MORTAR PRECEDED ATTACK. ATTACK STILL PROGRESSING. ARTY ENGAGED TARGETS DURING MORNING WITH AIR COOP. FIRED ON AA POSITION AT 273258 AT 1430L AND 1530L AND 1650L RESULTS NOT KNOWN. ENEMY OPS: GENERAL ACTIVITY NIL. NO REPORT ON RESISTANCE IN COCOANUT GROVE. AA POSITION LOCATED AT 278254 AND MTN ARTY NOW BELEIVED LOCATED AT 282255 OBSVN POST CONFIRMS THAT LOG EMPLACEMENTS SOUTH OF BRIDGE BETWEEN RUNWAYS ARE OCCUPIED. ONE OUR PATROLS REPORT PIECES PARACHUTE CLOTH AND JAP FOOTPRINTS IN AREA NEAR 259266 ALL REFERENCES AND ACCOMPANING OVERIAYS ON BUNA TARGET PLAN NO. 24. WEATHER FINE AND CLEAR SCATTERED CLOUDS 8000 FEET VISIBILITY UNLIMITED END.

EICHELBERGER



Brig Wooten

TO: ADV NGF, 7 AUST DIV, GHQ, BUNA FORCES, ALO, 5TH AIR FORCE  
SITREP NO 107 TO 0400L/17. OWN OPERATIONS. WARREN FORCE: ENCIRCLING MOVES  
BY PATROLS ON LOG EMPLACEMENTS. STRONG M/G FIRE ENCOUNTERED AND ENEMY PATROLS  
ATTEMPTING TO CUT OFF OUR PATROLS. ONE OUR PATROLS FORCED TO WITHDRAW. URBANA  
FORCE: NO CHANGE. ARTY FIRED HARASSING MISSIONS ON KNOWN POSNS. ONE BOAT AND  
BARGE ARRIVED HAREKI NIGHT 16/17. 80 TONS AMMO AND OTHER IMPEDIMENTS FOR  
18TH BRIG. ENEMY OPERATIONS: SINGLE PLANE BOMBED AREA NEAR PONGANI STRIP  
AT 2130L/16. 2 BOMBS IN RIVER 400 YARDS FROM STRIP. NO DAMAGE. WEATHER FINE  
AND CLEAR. CEILING AND VISIBILITY UNLIMITED.

EICHELBERGER



# Brig Wooten

PRIORITY  
NO.

TO: ADV NCF, NCF, 7AUST DIV, GHQ, 5TH AF, ALO, BUNA FORCES.

SITREP NO. 108 TO 1700L 17 DECEMBER. OWN OPS. WARREN FORCE: NO CHANGE.

STOP VIGOROUS PATROLLING CONTINUES. STOP URBANA FORCE: 37 DEAD JAPANESE HAVE BEEN FOUND IN COCONUT GROVE AT 236274 SO FAR. STOP ATTACK AGAINST ROAD JUNCTION SOUTH OF ENTRANCE CREEK AT 255270 (REF. BUNA TARGE MAP NO. 24) CONTINUES.

STOP 127TH INFANTRY: NO CHANGE. STOP

ENEMY OPS: DEFENSIVE, INCLUDING SNIPING, PATROLLING AND CONSTRUCTION WORKS.

TRANSLATION OF INFORMATION ON MAP CAPTURED AT BUNA VILLAGE 14 DECEMBER GAVE LOCATION COMMAND POSTS OF 14TH AND 15TH CONSTRUCTION UNITS. (SEE OVERLAY)

STOP AERIAL OBSERVER REPORTS THAT BREASTWORKS 4 FEET HIGH SOUTH OF CAPE ENDAIADERE REPORTED OUR SITREP NO. 106 NOW APPEAR AS A ROAD (COMMENT: POSSIBLY FORTIFICATION CAMOUFLAGED) STOP NO AA FIRE AGAINST PLANES ENTIRE AREA TODAY.

STOP WEATHER FINE SLIGHTLY OVERCAST VISIBILITY GOOD.

EICHELBERGER



MSG NO. 461

20 DECEMBER 1942

TO: ADV NGF NGF 7 AUST DIV GHQ 5TH AF ALO BUNA FORCES

*Brian Wootton*  
*18 BDE*

SITREP NO. 113 INFORMATION TO 0400L/20. OWN OPERATIONS: WARREN FORCE: NO CHANGE. URBANA FORCE: NO CHANGE. 105 FA PLACED 9 DIRECT HITS ON EMPLACEMENTS NEAR BRIDGE BETWEEN RUNWAYS. BATTLE CASUALTIES 18/19 DEC URBANA FORCE 4 KILLED 11 WOUNDED. WARREN FORCE 50 KILLED 127 WOUNDED 36 MISSING. ENEMY OPERATIONS: ONE LONE ENEMY PATROL OPERATING IN AREA B CO 2/9 BN. WEATHER LIGHT SHOWERS CEILING OVERCAST AT 3000 VISIBILITY 2 MILES. END.

EICHELBERGER



*Big Water*

PRIORITY

*8/15  
10  
mmt  
9 2/12*

NO:

TO: ADV NGF, NCF, CHQ, 5TH AF, ALO, 7TH AUST DIV, BUNA FORCES  
SITREP NO. 116 INFORMATION TO 1700L/21. OUR OPERATIONS: URBANA FORCE: ELEMENTS  
ARE MOVING INTO POSITIONS IN PREPARATION FOR NEXT OPERATIONS. PATROL IN AREA OF  
TRACK JUNCTION AT 263255 ADVANCED TO 263257 AND RECEIVED STRONG SMALL ARMS RIFLE  
GRENADE AND AUTO FIRE. STRENGTH SWARTZ PATROL NOW 2-0'S 65 KM. ENROUTE TO  
ESTABLISH A BRIDGEHEAD ON WEST BANK OF UNNAMED CREEK NEAR TARAKENA AND TO  
PATROL W AND SW FROM THERE. WARREN FORCE: RCH PATROLS ACTIVE SEEKING TROOP  
AND TANK CROSSINGS OVER SINEMI CREEK. REPORT NO SUITABLE CROSSING FROM MOUTH TO  
STRIP POINT. NONE FOUND TO 1500L. CP 128 REGT MOVED FORWARD TO NEAR 30102465  
ENEMY OPS: 4 BARRELED A/A GUN OBSERVED FIRING 1445L AT 277255 BELIEVED KNOCKED  
OUT BY ARTY 1645L. COLUMN SMOKE FROM POSITION AND BARRELS SEEN AT UNUSUAL ANGLE  
AFTER ENGAGED. MORTAR FIRE ON OUR TROOPS IN CAPE AREA FROM UNLOCATED POSITIONS  
SOME ENEMY SOLDIERS STILL WITHIN OUR LINES, HOPPING UP CONTINUES ABOUT 5  
KILLED TODAY. FURTHER TENTS AND SHELTER OBSERVED VICINITY GIROPA PT TO RUNWAY  
SOME EMPLACEMENTS IN OLD RUNWAY REPORTED UNUSED AND MOUNDS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED  
AT 287252 APPEAR WATER LOGGED BOMB CRATERS. 3 ENEMY BOMBERS FLEW SOUTH FROM  
BUNA ALONG COAST AT 1535L. NO REPORTS OF BOMBING RECEIVED. ESTIMATED ENEMY  
STRENGTH BUNA MISSION 100, GOVT. GARDEN AREA 150, GIROPA PT - OLD RUNWAY  
AREA 350. WEATHER FINE OVERCAST AT 10000 FEET VISIBILITY BELOW 30 MILES END.

EICHELBERGER



BRIG  
Wootton

ops  
and  
12 mark a map  
+ 2/12

PRIORITY

NO 3897

22 December, 1942

TO: ADV NGF, NGF, 7 AUST DIV, GHQ, BUNA FORCES, ALO 5TH AF

SITREP NO 117 TO 0400L/22 OWN OPS: WARREN FORCE: ONE PLATOON 2/10 BN HAD  
CROSSED SINEMI CREEK BY 2026L 21 DEC NEAR POINT 294247 IN PREPARATION FOR  
ATTACK 22 DEC. OTHER DISPOSITIONS NO CHANGE. URBANA FORCE: DISPOSITIONS: ONE  
PLATOON L CO IN BUNA VILLAGE; REMAINDER ON RIGHT EXTENDING TO BRIDGEHEAD LEADING  
ONTO ISLAND; ONE PLATOON F CO ACROSS ROAD GUARDING BRIDGEHEAD. K CO HAS 47  
MEN ACROSS RIVER 9 CASUALTIES; I CO HAS 2 PLATOONS ACROSS. BOTH UNITS ON LINE  
EXTENDING FROM POINT 263264 TO POINT 263259. REMAINDER OF BN UNITS IN RESERVE  
POSITIONS. ENEMY OPS: ENEMY AIRCRAFT DROPPED ONE BOMB 1000 YARDS FROM MANNING  
BTRY AT 2400L. CONTINUED DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE IN BUNA AREA. WEATHER CLEAR  
CEILING AND VISIBILITY UNLIMITED. MAP REFERENCE BUNA LOCALITY REVISED END

EICHELBERGER



MEDICAL

"AKAO" Medical Unit  
"TATE" 842 : Capt AKAO  
Fd Hospital : ?

SUPPLY & TPT

ASC Unit : Lt-Col TOMITA  
38 Bn Ind M.T. Coy : ?  
120 Land Duties Coy : ?  
15 Naval Billeting  
Unit : ?  
(incl TAKASAGA Vol Unit  
KOREAN Vol Unit).

4. ORGANIZATION: - Attached as appendix "A" is a translation of a document found in the SUPUTA area on 27 NOV. This shows the organization of No 2 Coy 47 Fd AA Bn.

6. EQUIPMENT: New Type Japanese Uniforms.

New styoe khaki drill tunics have been captured in the BUNA-GANA area, and our troops report having seen some of the enemy wearing them.

The tunics were of good quality, although rather heavy for this climate. Markings on the tunics showed the maker's name and date of manufacture but nothing to identify any particular arm of service.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS.

TIMOR. Both Japanese and Allied ground forces have been increasingly active during the past week, and in the central and southern areas of PORTUGUESE TIMOR many skirmishes and small scale actions have taken place. On 22 NOV information indicated that possibly 1000 Japanese had been moved by road to LAUTEM (32 miles east of BAUCAU). It is now reported that the transport with destroyer escort which was at DILLI on 24 NOV, disembarked a new commander and 2000 troops. At LAGA, an anchorage on the north coast, 10 miles east of BAUCAU, 500 Japanese with trucks and probable tractors were at the new wharf on 26 NOV. On the following day, fifteen trucks of Japanese and natives arrived at LAGA from the west, but thirteen of these continued east. It is obvious that the enemy is garrisoning and consolidating the north coast, in addition the report of an aerodrome under construction at PUILORO (2 miles south of VILA de AVIZ) is significant.

Allied fighters strafed MVA LUSA on 26 NOV, and native reports state that this attack was very effective. BENO was also attacked on the same day and LAGA was strafed on 28 NOV. Enemy aerial movement has increased and aircraft operating from this area bombed DARWIN on night 25/26 NOV, while unidentified planes were reported over BROOME and DERBY on 23 NOV.

SOLOMONS. BUIN FAISI. Considerable enemy activity has been noted at KIHILI aerodrome. On 20 NOV, additional dispersal lanes and bays were under construction while 44 dispersed aircraft were observed.

SANTA YSABEL. Natives report 3000 Japanese, 4 AA guns, W/T station and fuel etc at REKATA BAY. Ninety-six transport planes were used to bring many Japanese on 19, 20 and 21 NOV.

NEW GEORGIA. On 18 NOV, it was estimated that more than 200 Japanese were at KOKENGALO MISSION (7 miles NW of RENDOVA Harbour).



(ii) The following information regarding Japanese units and commanders identified in the BUNA-G. NA area is based on documents and Ps... statements up to 30 NOV 42.

NANKAI DET : MAJ-GEN HARRI, Tomitaro (Also known as "HARRI Force")

INF.

144 Inf Regt. : Col YAMAMOTO  
"TATE" 8417

1 Bn : Lt-Col TSUKAMOTO  
2 Bn : Maj TAKAMURI  
3 Bn : Lt-Col KUWADA  
Regt Sig Coy : Capt NYUKU  
" Gun Coy : ?

41 Inf Regt

"MATSU" 4 or  
"KI" 5169

: Col YAZAWA  
1 Bn : MIYAMOTO (?)  
2 Bn : Lt-Col KAWAI  
3 Bn : Lt-Col (?) KAWAYASHI  
Regt Sig Coy : ?  
" Gun Coy : ?

228 Inf Regt : ? Col D. I

"NUMA" 8924

1 Coy : ? (landed 1 NOV)

*consider more of this regt probably landed since*

ARTY

Mtn Arty Bn : Lt-Col H. ZUMI  
"TATE" 8420

1 Bty : ?  
2 Bty : ?  
3 Bty : Lieut TAKAKI

Bn Combat Train : Lieut KAWADA

47 Fd AA Bn : Maj FUCHIYAMA

ENGRS

55 Engr Regt : Col YUKOYAMA  
15 Ind Engr Unit : Lt-Col (?) TAKAMURI

4 Ind Engr Unit : ?

9 Div Br Constr Coy : ?

CAV

KAWAJIMA : ?  
Cav Det  
"TATE" 8418

COMMS

45 Perm W/T Unit : Lieut KANIZUMI  
7 Ind W/T Unit : Lieut IIZUKA  
88 Ind Telegraph Coy : ?



B.M. WOOTEN

PRIORITY

NO 3636

19 December 1942

TO: ADV HQF, HQF, 7 AUST DIV, GRCQ, 5AF, A.O, Buna Forces  
SITREP NO 111 INFORMATION TO HQOOL 19 DECEMBER. OWN OPS: WARREN  
FORCES: DISPOSITIONS UNCHANGED. TOTAL THREE TANKS BURNED OUT  
ACCORDING TO REPORT AT 1845L 18 DECEMBER. SLEDGE HAMMER LESS TWO  
COMPANIES AND LESS BULK AMMUNITION AND STORES ARRIVED. CASUALTIES  
18 DECEMBER 40 KILLED, 9 OFF AND 96 ORS ADMITTED TO ADS. URBANA  
FORCES: NO CHANGE IN DISPOSITIONS. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR  
PERIOD OUR SITREP NO 110: TWENTY ENEMY TRUCKS SIGHTED BY AIR  
OBSERVER VICINITY POINT 273261. ARTY (MANNING BATTERY) ENGAGED  
TARGET AND LAST SALVO AT 1515L DESTROYED FIVE TRUCKS AND TWO HUTS.  
THIS WAS NEAR APPARENT LOCATION OF ENEMY CP. 127TH INF: NO CHANGE  
ENEMY OPS: FIVE BOMBS LANDED 300 YARDS FROM PONGANI STRIP AT  
2120L NO DAMAGES TO PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT. WEATHER: FAIR SCATTERED  
CLOUDS CEILING 6000 VISIBILITY UNLIMITED END

NICHOLSON

ops  
19/12



Authority: G.G.

Initials

H.Q Buna Force

21 Dec

1942

288199

0300L 21 Dec 1942

#4.

Buna Locality (Revised) 4<sup>th</sup> to mile.

8<sup>th</sup> Inf less mortar Plat will move from its present position at Ango to a concealed defensive area N of SINEMI Plantation. The move will be completed by 1200 Lhrs 21 Dec.

G-4 H.Q Buna Force, will arrange for guides to the new area. Route of March: ANGO - SINEMI PLANTATION - new area.

Upon arrival at new area, 2<sup>nd</sup> Bn 128<sup>th</sup> Inf will prepare defensive positions astride the SINEMI PLANTATION - DOBODURA Trail.

Bn will prepare & submit to the Div, plans for the defence of its area in case of attack from the N, E & W. It will also be prepared to furnish protection for the Force C.P.

During the time the Bn occupies the defensive position it will maintain strict camouflage & air precaution discipline.

During the time the Bn remains in the defensive position it will reorganize & re-equip.

Defensive positions will be occupied by skeleton personnel from 0700L to 1500L; from 1800L to 0700L - 50% of the Bn will occupy the defensive positions.

At all times the Bn will hold itself in a state of readiness to occupy its defensive positions with a minimum of delay.

Eichelberger.

Bowen.

G-3.

Distribution N.G.F.

G-3

EG

G-4

C

Sig O.

C.O 128 Inf (4) Col De Graff D.O.B.

G-1

G-2



128 Jul  
Warner Force

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE BUNA FORCES

SECTION II

INSTRUCTIONS TO COLLECTING AGENCIES

1. a. General. All agencies will report through prescribed channels as follows: (This provision applies when in combat)

(1) Report by the most rapid means to G-2 I Army Corps, attack by or approach of the following hostile forces:

- (a) Air Force.
- (b) Parachute Troops.
- (c) Air-borne Troops.
- (d) Tanks.
- (e) Tank Destroyer Units.
- (f) Use of any new or unusual methods or equipment by enemy.

(2) Report the following by Urgent messages:

- (a) Approach or presence of hostile forces in strength.
  - (b) First contact with the enemy.
  - (c) First artillery fire received.
  - (d) Changes in, reinforcements to, or withdrawal of enemy troops with whom contact has been made.
  - (e) Use of chemicals by the enemy.
  - (f) Location of obstacles or demolitions.
  - (g) Hostile defensive works.
  - (h) Hostile cavalry, mechanized reconnaissance vehicles or truck columns.
- (1) Mine fields - (Location, extent - Whether or not defended.)

b. Specific reconnaissance missions. At the beginning of each operation, Corps Headquarters will issue detailed instructions for intelligence operations.

c. Information to be included in all reports, including those required by Pars. 1a(1) and (2), above.

- (1) Type and composition of forces involved.
- (2) Their locations.
- (3) The nature of the enemy activity. Speed and direction of movement of mobile forces. If a truck column, state nature of load (empty, personnel, portee artillery, etc.).
- (4) Nature of terrain when it is a factor (bridges or other defiles, swamps or other natural obstacles); any changes not shown on maps.
- (5) Time observation was made.
- (6) Unit making the report.

d. Reports by Aviation.

(1) Aircraft enroute to Corps CP with information of value to troops in contact and the Division flown over will give this information to them by dropped message. This is particularly applicable to Corps Cavalry Reconnaissance Regiment and Divisional Cavalry prior to contact by opposing Infantry.



(2) Such information will consist of the following:

- (a) 15 or more hostile tanks or mecz vehicles.
- (b) 30 or more hostile trucks.
- (c) Troops on the ground the size of a Bn. or more.
- (d) Threat of hostile air attack; three planes or more.
- (e) Blown bridges and other demolitions of importance within enemy territory to the front of the units concerned.
- (f) Approach of air borne troops.

2. a. Division G-2's will send to Corps G-2, for questioning, prisoners they select as having important information.

b. Other prisoners to be questioned by Corps G-2 will be selected by a representative of Corps G-2 at the Corps Prisoner of War enclosure. (When Corps acting alone), or at Division PW collecting points (When Corps is part of an Army)

c. (1) Aviation personnel captured by Divisional units will be evacuated as other prisoners except that Division G-2 will notify closest air support control so that arrangements can be made for questioning air intelligence officers.

(2) Aviation personnel captured by non-divisional units will be sent directly to Corps CP and air support control will be notified.

3. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE -- All units of the Corps will comply with the provisions of FM 30-25 and AR 380-5 and current instructions of the War Department and GHQ, SWPA with respect to counterintelligence.

By command of Lt. General RICHEMBERGER:



GORDON B. ROGERS,  
Colonel, G. S. C.,  
AC of S, G-2.



REPORT ON OPERATIONS 18 AUSLT INF BDE OP AT CAPE KIDAIADERE,  
DINOGA POINT AND BANAWANDA AREA - 14 DEC 49/23 JAN 45.

Ref Maps:- BUNA LOCALITY REVISED Approx 4" to 1 mile.  
GUNA LOCALITY REVISED Approx 4" to 1 mile.  
BUNA (SECOND EDITION) 1" to 1 mile.

PRELIMINARY.

1. On 8 Dec 49 Bde Comd (Brig. G.F. WOOTEN DSO) was making a recon of GOODENOUGH ISLAND where 2/18 Aust Inf Bn was stationed.

2. At this time 18 Aust Inf Bde was disposed as follows:-

- |     |                    |   |                               |
|-----|--------------------|---|-------------------------------|
| (a) | Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde | - | MILNE BAY                     |
| (b) | 2/9 Aust Inf Bn    | - | MILNE BAY                     |
| (c) | 2/10 Aust Inf Bn   | - | WANIGELA and PORLOCK HARBOUR. |
| (d) | 2/18 Aust Inf Bn   | - | GOODENOUGH ISLAND.            |

3. On 8 Dec a message was received from MILNE BAY for Bde Comd to return forthwith to MILNE BAY. Passage was made by HMAS BROOME and, on arrival at MILNE BAY at approximately 1900 hrs, Bde Comd learnt from Maj-Gen. C.A. GLOVER that he was to report to C-in-C at MORESBY on the following day.

4. Bde Comd and S.M. left by plane for MORESBY at 0800 hrs 10 Dec arriving there at 1030 hrs when Bde Comd received verbal instructions from the C-in-C (Gen. Sir THOMAS BLANKY).

CASE OF BDE.

5. C-in-C informed Bde Comd that the advance of 33 US Div from the South was held up at CAPE KIDAIADERE on the general line of the NEW STRIP, from the West at BUNA VILLAGE which was in our hands, and from the South at approx track junc 262855. In accordance with HQ Op In-Ins Nos. 49 and 51 two Australian inf bns and two tps of tks were to be moved to CAPE KIDAIADERE area where Brig. WOOTEN, who was to fly there immediately was to assume comd of this force to clear up the area of NEW STRIP and OLD STRIP to BUNA MISSION held by the enemy.

6. It was intended that the two Australian bns should be 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and one bn from 7 Aust Inf Bde.

7. In accordance with Brig WOOTEN's request it was subsequently directed by the C-in-C that the second bn should be 2/10 Aust Inf Bn and that that bn should be relieved of its responsibilities at WANIGELA and PORLOCK HARBOUR by a bn of 7 Aust Inf Bde. The necessary administrative arrangements were completed with Col WHITE (G3 HQ) and HQIC.

11 Dec.

8. At dawn Bde Comd flew to POPONDETTA where he conferred with Lt-Gen HERRING, GOC HQP and BGS (Brig. HERRING) at AIV HQ. Later he flew with BGS to DOBODURA where he met Lt-Gen RICHENBERGER, Comd 1 US Army Corps who had assumed personal direction of ops of 33 US Div.

9. During the afternoon Comd and BGS reconed area of the NEW STRIP where 128 US Regt was held up by the enemy on the general line of the NEW STRIP from the sea to the main DOBODURA track. Comd spent the night at 33 US Div.

10. S.M. flew to MILNE BAY and reported to GOC MILNE FORCE. Details of move of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and att'd Engin and Medical personnel were arranged at a conference at Force HQ attended by GOC I, AG, CO 2/9 Aust Inf Bn, BN and IO. At this conference it was arranged that MILNE FORCE should be responsible for the movement of all units and att'd units 18 Aust Inf Bde until their arrival at HARIKO 3852.



11. At a conference at 18 Aust Inf Bde HQ, BM arranged the composition of skeleton Adv HQ to move by sea and for the following recce party to fly to MORESBY - BM, Bde Sig Offr, IO and Engr Offr 2/4 Aust Fd Coy. Recce party departed by air for MORESBY at 1600 hrs.

12. It was arranged by Col. WHITE that Lt-Col. C.R. HODGSON (2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt) should join this recce party.

12 Dec.

13. Bde recce party flew to DOBODURA, arriving at about 0800 hrs, and proceeded to HQ 32 US Div, reporting to Bde Comd.

14. At approximately 1100 hrs a conference was held at 32 US Div attended by GOC NGF (Lt-Gen HERRING), Commanding General US Corps (Lt-Gen EICHELBERGER), Commanding General 32 US Div (Brig-Gen. BYERS), Bde Comd and BGS.

15. At this conference it was decided that at a time to be notified by him after the arrival of tps of 18 Aust Inf Bde, Brig. WOOTTEN should assume comd of the NEW STRIP sector with under comd 128 US Regt (Comd, Col MARTIN) comprising 1/126, 1/128 and 3/128 US Bns and attd adm units.

16. At approximately 1500 hrs Bde Comd and Bde recce party moved fwd from HQ 32 US Div to proposed site for Bde HQ on the coastal track at 308238.

17. At 0730 hrs Bde HQ and 2/9 Aust Inf Bn sailed from GILI GILI in HMAS "COLAC", "BROOME" and "BALLARAT".

18. CO 2/10 Aust Inf Bn who had flown from WANIGELA to MILNE BAY accompanied HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde.

19. During the night 12/13 Dec the convoy approached CAPE SUDEST and were met by barges which brought fwd CO's 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bns and one pl 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to HARIKO.

20. At this time news was heard of a Japanese naval force approaching BUNA and the convoy returned to PORLOCK HARBOUR.

13 Dec.

21. During the day detailed recces of fwd posns on the line of NEW STRIP were made by CO's 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt, 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bns. On the night 13/14 Dec convoy arrived at ORO BAY where tps were disembarked, marched two miles West along coast and rested.

22. One tp of four tks which had been landed at HARIKO the previous night were moved up the beach across the entrance of creek 315226 to tank lying up area approximately 310236.

23. For this move aircraft noise camouflage was requested through 32 US Div but did not eventuate.

14 Dec.

24. CO's recces of fwd areas were completed. Personnel of HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde and 2/9 Aust Inf Bn set off from ORO BAY at first light to march overland, arriving area HARIKO where they spent the night and moved on to Bde HQ and Bn bivouac areas respectively at first light 15 Dec.

25. This march was one of a most exhausting nature involving as it did marching in battle order along almost continual soft sand and the crossing of the SAMBOGA RIVER which was chest high and in a hot muggy atmosphere.

26. At this stage a reference may well be made to the tenuous nature of the L of C for the area which depended alternately on air from MORESBY, which was liable to interruption both by enemy action and bad weather and which depended further for its extension from DOBODURA on a native track ill-suited to the Jeep traffic it was called upon to bear and where frequent bogging was almost inevitable, and, on the other hand, upon small boats from ORO BAY which were both insufficient in number and again most susceptible to enemy action.



27. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn personnel rested in bivouac area. Coy Coals, pl coals, and section loaders made recesses of fwd area.

28. Australian tps available to Bie Comd in the area at this stage were:-

- (a) Hq 16 Aust Inf Bde.
- (b) One tp 2/6 Aust Arml Regt.
- (c) 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Cp (comprising 5 carriers).
- (d) Det 2/4 Aust Fd Coy.
- (e) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
- (f) Det 2/5 Aust Fd Arb.

29. Arty already in the area comprised:-

- HANNING Tp 2/1 Aust Hl Regt of four 25-pdrs (29252340).
- HALL Tp 2/5 Aust Fd Regt of four 25-pdrs (31702330).
- O'HARE Tp 1 Aust Mountain Bty of three 3.7" hps and one 105 mm gun (240190).

These tps were widely dispersed from each other and depended on different lines of supply and means of tpt for their am.

30. On night 15/16 Dec second tp of four tks of 2/6 Aust Arml Regt disembarked at HARKED and moved straight up beach to tk lying up area.

#### 16 Dec.

31. Unit recess continued. Bie Comd conferred with Lt-Gen RICHALBERG, Col MARTIN and Col HARDING (US Arty) at 1800 hrs. At this conference it was decided that Bie Comd should assume comd of the sector on 17 Dec and that an arty C.P. should be established at Bie Hq.

32. From patrols, air photographs and intelligence sources it was known that the enemy was firmly entrenched along the line of NEW STRIP, in depth through the CAPE HINDALADERE coconut area and in depth along OLD STRIP while the bridge at 294244 was covered by pill boxes sited in depth both fwd of and on his own side of the bridge.

33. Enemy pill box pens were both numerous and strong and had proved practically impervious to gunfire with instantaneous fuse. These pill boxes were so sited as to be mutually supporting while they were themselves inter-connected by a series of fire and crawl trenches.

34. As a result of his appreciation, Bie Comd had decided to attack on a one in front past the East end of NEW STRIP up the coast to CAPE HINDALADERE and thence West to the line of SIKEMI CREEK with the object not only of clearing this area of enemy and facilitating supply by sea but of turning the enemy's flank by securing a bridgehead over the SIKEMI CREEK in the vicinity of its mouth. At the same time US tns were to maintain pressure and gain all possible ground to their respective fronts.

35. At this time US tps were disposed as follows:-

On the right 5/126 US Bn from the coast to approximately the dispersal bays at the East end of the NEW STRIP, thence 1/126 US Bn to approximately 297243 while 1/126 US Bn was astride the BOBBERA track South of BRIDGE 294244.

36. After recess it had been appreciated that the CAPE HINDALADERE coconut plantation area was suitable for the employment of the operating in close conjunction with inf.

37. Attd as Appx "A" are notes dealing in detail with the tactical employment of the in these and subsequent ops.



17 Dec.

38. At 0900 hrs in accordance with Lt-Gen EICHELBERGER's direction, Brig. WOOTTEN notified all units in the area of his assumption of comd of the NEW STRIP sector.
39. 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp Operation Order No. 1 was issued (Copy attd as Appx "B").
40. Bde Comd conferred with Lt-Gen HERRING and Lt-Gen EICHELBERGER at HARIKO at 1400 hrs.
41. Between 1800 and 1930 hrs tks were moved fwd from lying up area to FUP. For this move aircraft noise camouflage again did not materialise, despite assurances that it would be available. From the fwd areas however it was reported that it was unlikely that the noise would have been heard, and, if heard at all, would probably be confused with aircraft. This assumption was subsequently borne out by interrogation of P.W.

18 Dec.

ATTACK BY 2/9 AUST INF BN ON CAPE ENDAIADERE.

42. Preceded by arty shoot on registered targets, this attack was launched at 0700 hrs and was gallantly and brilliantly executed. Though heavy casualties were suffered, such dash was displayed that the coastline West of CAPE ENDAIADERE was reached at 0800 hrs and though long and bitter hours of fighting and mopping up remained, the backbone of the Japanese resistance in this area was broken. Casualties in the initial stages were heavy but this was unavoidable. They would however have been far heavier had the attack not been pressed home with the determination that was shown.
43. In this first attack the area taken was that lying approximately between the North-South 302 grid line and the coast, but narrowing between the Eastern end of the NEW STRIP and the coast owing to strongly held and fortified Japanese posns in these dispersal areas.
44. Both Capt N.G. WHITEHEAD and Lt-Col C.R. HODGSON of 2/6 Aust Armd Regt were wounded in the early stages of the action and two tks were made early casualties - one by Molotov cocktail and the second when its engine failed while alongside burning am dump which set it on fire. The cooperation between tks and inf had left nothing to be desired and the momentum of the attack was never allowed to slacken.
45. By 1500 hrs the area captured had been generally cleared of enemy and mopped up but a strong enemy centre of resistance consisting of approximately 20 pill boxes situated at the dispersal bays at East end of NEW STRIP had resisted all attempts to subdue it. At approx 1600 hrs an attack by two coys 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and four tks was made upon it. Hard and continuous fighting ensued in this locality for approx two hours but at 1800 hrs approx the strong point was reduced. This eliminated the bottle neck East of NEW STRIP.
46. By nightfall the Eastern end of the NEW STRIP, thence North approximately along the 302 North South grid line was in our hands.
47. Casualties suffered by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn during the day were -  
Oftrs; 5 killed 6 wounded, ORs; 44 killed 105 wounded.
48. Tk casualties during the day totalled two burnt out (mentioned above) and one requiring considerable repairs to vision slits which had been badly splintered by MG fire.
49. During the night 18/19 Dec 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less two coys arrived at bivouac area previously occupied by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn at HARIKO.



19 Dec

- 50. The day's operations consisted in completing mopping up of <sup>the</sup> area gained, in minor advances to straighten out line on West and in establishing firm contact between left flank 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and right flank of 5/128 US Bn across East end of NEW STRIP.
- 51. The enemy, dislodged from his strongpoints at the East end of NEW STRIP by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn on 18 Dec abandoned his hold on the STRIP during the day and by nightfall it was in our hands.
- 52. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn had now concentrated in bivouac area previously occupied by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn while further the had arrived to replace casualties.
- 53. It was decided to continue operation on 20 Dec and in order to strengthen 2/9 Aust Inf Bn for the purpose of exploring and exploiting all possibilities of securing bridgehead over SIMMI GK, C. Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was placed under comd 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

20 Dec.

- 54. The operation was continued at 0700 hrs in accordance with Operation Order 0.22 (attd as Appx "G").
- 55. Supported by the 2/9 Aust Inf Bn attacked at conclusion of preliminary arty concentrations. A day of hard fighting ensued, while it was found that the were not able to move with any practicable degree of freedom after the West edge of the coconuts had been reached owing to difficulties of ground which consisted of marsh and jungle.
- 56. By nightfall the advance had continued West past STRIP POINT and had reached a line running from 296956 South along Eastern edge of small grass patch where contact was made with US tps.  
*to S.W. of large grass patch.*
- 57. There were no tk casualties due to enemy action but one tk was irretrievably bogged and another was not freed until 31 Dec.
- 58. At 1145y 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less one coy was moved fwd to a concentration area astride the track leading NE from the Eastern end of the NEW STRIP to the coast.
- 59. The swampy nature of the ground bordering the SIMMI GK made it increasingly apparent that an essential prelude to an attack on the OLD STRIP was to secure a crossing for the either at the mouth of the SIMMI GK or over the vital BRIDGE at 294944.
- 60. 1/128 US Bn were ordered to attempt the crossing of the SIMMI GK under cover of darkness to secure this BRIDGE. This attempt was not successful.

21 Dec.

- 61. Bde Comd had ordered 2/10 Aust Inf Bn and 2/128 and 5/128 US Bns to explore every possibility of crossing SIMMI GK.
- 62. Such a crossing was discovered by a patrol of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn at the creek bank 295947 at approximately 1500 hrs. The Bde Comd ordered immediate exploitation of this possibility by utilising it to move 2/10 Aust Inf Bn across creek to the area at SE end of OLD STRIP.
- 63. This crossing had only been discovered as a result of vigorous patrolling for it involved men moving at times neck deep in water through jungle and swamp, for, at this point, there was no defined creek but an area of dense marshy jungle.



64. To move the bn across the swamp was to prove a slow and arduous task but one which, successfully completed by early morning of 23 Dec, was to take the enemy completely by surprise and to give us possession of the vital bridge which in turn was to give us access to the OLD STRIP almost without casualties. The enemy had deemed the country impassable and had neglected it in his defensive plan - refusal to accept the "impassability" of the ground gained both surprise and immediate success.

65. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn were engaged during day in mopping up ground gained in straightening out the line and in reorganisation for attack on 23 Dec.

24 Dec.

66. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn continued the operation by attacking to the west supported by tanks which were themselves greatly restricted in their movement by the swampy nature of the ground and by nightfall had captured the whole area bounded by the SIKEMI CR to the west and by the coast to the North and East.

67. The enemy continued to hold one post on a small island in the mouth of SIKEMI CR which was to prove a source of annoyance until the end of the action. It was decided not to attempt to attack this as it was felt to do so would only be to result in heavy casualties without the reward for it had been found that no practicable tank crossing existed along the whole length of SIKEMI CR.

68. Although, in fact, it was not found practicable to attempt to cross the SIKEMI CR near its mouth without bridging this possibility remained as a constant threat to the enemy during the operation. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn made, in fact, no further attacks but their presence along the bank of the SIKEMI CR resulted in great interference with the enemy's power of movement and necessitated his employing a considerable portion of his force to guard against this threat to his left flank and rear.

69. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn were to remain in control of this area until the successful conclusion of ops. This entailed a high standard of discipline on the part of all ranks as they were constantly subject to enemy fire and in addition to some of the over from our own troops attacking Jap positions on the OLD STRIP from the west and NW.

25 Dec.

70. By first light 2/10 Aust Inf Bn less one Coy were in position across SIKEMI CR at SE end of OLD STRIP.

71. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn were ordered to extend from present bridgehead over the SIKEMI CR SE to take in BRIDGE at 204004 and to ensure that bridgehead was in sufficient depth to allow engineers to repair bridge for use by tanks. This was accomplished by night practically without opposition the enemy having been completely surprised by a move across what he had regarded as completely impassable ground. The vital bridge head was virtually absorbed without casualties.

72. 1/126 US Bn were ordered to move across the BRIDGE and maintain contact with the left flank of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.

73. 1/126 US Bn was moved to the area previously occupied by 1/126 US Bn immediately South of BRIDGE.

74. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn having secured the bridgehead then moved up to OLD STRIP and by nightfall had advanced some 400 yards on the right and 200 yards in the centre while 1/126 US Bn on the left maintained contact as left flank guard. During the night 23/24 Dec a supply boat at HARIKO was fired on and set on fire by two unidentified motor boats firing what was thought to be .50 MG.



75. It was decided to continue the attack the following day when one tp of four tks would be allotted in support of B/10 Aust Inf Bn.

76. In this connection there remained the possibility of AA guns which were known to have been in existence on STRIP being employed in an A.Tk role. No high or medium AA guns had however fired on our aircraft for many days. The possibilities therefore remained that either the enemy had run out of gun or, as the arty had grounds to believe, the guns had been destroyed by our own arty which had been active in that cause. Alternatively it was realised that the enemy might be deliberately maintaining high and medium AA silence as a ruse. It was accordingly decided that until this position was clarified no greater tank force should be committed than the smallest tactical unit i.e. one tp of three tks while a fourth tk was held in immediate reserve.

24 Dec.

77. B/10 Aust Inf Bn supported by one tp of three tks attacked up OLD STRIP but, while ground was made, the initial momentum of the attack was lost when two successive tks became casualties when hit by a dual purpose AA A/Tk weapon of approximately 3-in calibre. A third tk was bogged and subsequently hit by gunfire. The endeavour to push further forward on the right was unable to make progress against heavy fire from strong Japanese positions in coconut grove bordering the Northern side of the OLD STRIP. The A/Tk gun revealed by the enemy was engaged by arty and was destroyed. Both this gun, and a second, also hit by arty, were captured in U/S condition by inf on 26 Dec (see para 78). No further tks were to become casualties from gunfire in any of the succeeding four actions in which tks were engaged in this area.

78. On the initial tks being put out of action it was decided not to commit further tks until the A.Tk gun had been dealt with. The inf accordingly maintained pressure using arty support and endeavouring to use both infiltration and encircling tactics. Local advances only were however achieved in the face of heavy opposition.

25 Dec.

79. At first light G. Coy B/10 Aust Inf Bn reverted to combat parent unit and moved to BRIDGE area. During the night 24/25 Dec B/10 Aust Inf Bn had attempted to gain further ground under cover of darkness by means of fighting patrols but these were without success and it was reported that the Japanese position was strongly held.

80. Bn went fwd to see CO B/10 Aust Inf Bn. The necessity for the employment of soft spot tactics as emphasised by the Bde Comd was passed on to CO B/10 Aust Inf Bn and the advisability of employing his reserve coy to push HQ along outposts of STRIP to gain ground and threaten enemy right flank was pointed out to him.

81. G. Coy, which was in Bn reserve was ordered by CO to make this movement, made slow progress during the day on the left flank of the Americans who were themselves on the left of B/10 Aust Inf Bn and as a result of this slow progress did not make their presence felt. Despite determined efforts by inf, B/10 Aust Inf Bn made no further progress that day.

26 Dec.

82. It was proposed that G. Coy B/10 Aust Inf Bn should attack across the STRIP from their positions on the left while inf in the centre and on the right endeavoured to make such ground as they could.

83. This attempt was successful in part and ground was gained on all coy fronts. During this attack two AA/A.Tk gun positions (referred to in para 77) were captured. A. Coy however in the centre and G. Coy on the left finished the day in a disorganised state and it was not until the following morning that their exact position was made known.



84. During the night 26/27 Dec D Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn on the right were counterattacked. This counter attack was repulsed with numerous enemy casualties.

27 Dec.

85. The day was occupied in minor advance and consolidating the line now secured.

86. During the morning the enemy staged an air raid with approximately 50 planes. No damage and few casualties resulted.

87. On the night 27/28 Dec Jap again made a local counter attack on the right flank 2/10 Aust Inf Bn, but, was without success.

88. It was decided to move one 85-pdr fwd to an emplacement which was prepared at the Southern end of the Old Strip where, utilising excellent observation that was available, it could shell the Jap positions at the Northern end of the STRIP. Conspicuous success attended this move and, from then until the end of the action, this gun achieved ~~excellent~~ results. Both A.P. shot with Ho. 5 charge and H.E. with Capped Fuse were used and did material damage to Jap pillboxes.

28 DEC.

*attending*

89. Tanks were moved to assembly area at the Eastern end of the New Strip. At 1030 hrs Major MOSS was ordered by the Bde Comd to organise and make a recon for a probable attack with tanks from our left across the STRIP to the Japanese positions in the coconuts.

90. The day was spent in reorganising. One composite Coy of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn under command Lieut BRON being made available to reinforce 2/10 Aust Inf Bn, while A Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was moved left to make contact with C Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn. U.S. tps previously bridging the gap between right of C Coy and left of A Coy, now bridged gap between right of A Coy and left of B Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn in position on STRIP. During the afternoon a further attempt was made with arty support by C. and A. Coys to attack coconut grove but this was not successful.

91. Accordingly Bde Comd arranged for tp of four tanks which were now available to be moved forward at first light 29 Dec to a position North of BRIDGE and for a conference to be held at H.Q. 2/10 Aust Inf Bn to discuss plan for 29 Dec.

29 Dec.

92. At 0600 hrs a conference was held at Hq 2/10 Aust Inf Bn attended by Bde Comd, CO and Adjt 2/10 Aust Inf Bn, BN, and Majors MOSS and FYE (2/6 Aust Armd Regt) and the tp leaders. Plan of attack was discussed at this conference and confirmed subsequently in Message O.82 (att'd as Appx "D") for an attack by 2/10 Aust Inf Bn supported by tks not before 1400 hrs. Subsequently ZERO was fixed for 1600 hrs but even then ZERO could not be adhered to owing to the late arrival of the tks. The tks, endeavouring to make up for lost time came in obliquely across the front and, in fact, failed ever to reach the left coy. The inf on this flank attacked without support of tks and were initially successful. It was found, however, that these successes could not be maintained and, though some ground was made, the inf were unable to maintain a footing in the coconuts. The line was consolidated for the night. During the night 29/30 Dec the Jap again endeavoured to counter attack on our right flank but without success.

93. 2/12 Aust Inf Bn arrived during the day and were moved to bivouac area at the Eastern end of the NEW STRIP where they remained in Bde Res. Bn stores had arrived by the early morning 30 Dec.

94. It was decided by Bde Comd that 2/10 Aust Inf Bn should now hold the ground already gained and that his fresh bn - 2/12 Aust Inf Bn - should make a further attack supported by tks. In this connection it should be remembered that 2/12 Aust Inf Bn though fresh, had arrived very considerably under strength. See para for table of unit strengths.



30 Dec.

95. Accordingly CO 2/12 Aust Inf Bn went fwd on a posse. During the day 1/126 US Bn was relieved by 2/126 US Bn, 1/126 Bn moving to area CAPE BUDAIDERRI.

96. At the request of the Bde Comd, Lt-Col IRWIN CBE 6 Aust Div had come fwd to carry out experiments with both flame throwers and blast charges to arrive at some practicable manner of dealing with Japanese pillboxes. Local experiments with flame throwers were without fruit but those with blast bombs containing 2 lbs of ammonal detonated by 55 grenades promised well. A supply of these blast bombs was manufactured locally for use by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn. Reports by Lt-Col IRWIN are attd as Appx "E".

31 Dec.

97. The day was occupied in effecting relief by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn of left coys of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn and posse by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn CO and offrs for attack on 1 Jan. 12 Aust Inf Bde Gp Operation Order No. 2 (Copy attd as Appx "F") was issued.

1 Jan.

98. Attack by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn supported by the anti arty through to the coast from incl GIROPA POINT East for a distance of approximately 400 yards was successful. Very strong enemy resistance was met particularly ~~near~~ from strong points near mouth of SINEI CRK and it took eight hours hard fighting by six tanks and two coys 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to overcome this. This area was mopped up and consolidated that night.

99. On the right of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn 1/126 US Bn advanced towards the coconuts to maintain contact with 2/12 Aust Inf Bn but on their right they were unable to make ground nor was 2/10 Aust Inf Bn able to move fwd. Constant pressure was however maintained during the day by both 1/126 Bn and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn in support of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn. By nightfall the line of GIROPA CREEK had been made good except for one pillbox which was holding out at the very mouth of GIROPA CREEK. On the left of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn a left flank guard was maintained by 2/126 US Bn.

100. In the BUNA MISSION area advances had been made by the left flank of 53 US Div (URBANA FORCE) through the Govt Gardens and endeavours were being made to establish contact with them by patrol.

101. At this stage reference may be made to the fact that very considerable success attended the use of the ammonal blast bombs prepared under direction of Lt-Col IRWIN and referred to in Appx "E".

102. During the day the following casualties were suffered:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.	
	Off.	Off. Cms.	Off.	Cms.	Off.	Cms.	Off.	Cms.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	-	5	-	-	-	22	-	-
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	5	15	-	-	7	103	-	25
2/6 Aust Armd Regt	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-

2 Jan.

103. The attack was continued at 0615 hrs supported by the but owing to the proximity of our own tps to the enemy no preliminary bombardment was practicable. Shortly after midday the whole area of the coconut grove was in our hands.

and that only a small pocket of enemy resistance remained between  
104. Simultaneously reports were received that URBANA FORCE had captured BUNA MISSION and GIROPA CREEK. Contact had been established with URBANA FORCE along the beach.

105. Arrangements were made for 2/12 Aust Inf Bn to attack west over GIROPA CREEK to deal with this pocket on 3 Jan but this proved unnecessary.



3 Jan.

106. The day was spent in reorganising and clearing the battle field.

107. Following is summary of casualties of 18 Aust Inf Bde for period 14 Dec to 3 Jan:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL	
	Off.	ORS.	Off.	ORS.	Off.	ORS.	Off.	ORS.	Off.	ORS.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	8	70	1	16	14	235	-	32	25	351
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	7	91	1	11	12	170	-	6	20	278
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	5	49	-	8	7	121	-	1	12	179
<b>TOTALS :</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>524</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>808</b>

108. Estimate of Enemy Casualties: 800 - 1200 Killed.

Accurate figures cannot be given as enemy dead were largely found and buried in pill boxes and a detailed count was not possible.

109. Captured equipment included:-

- (a) Three 3" naval guns.
- (b) One 25 mm Triple Pom Pom.
- (c) One 25 mm Dual Pom Pom.
- (d) Large number of HMGs and LMGs and amm.
- (e) Two 37 mm guns and amm.
- (f) Number of .5 MGs.
- (g) Two 75 mm Mountain guns on wheels.
- (h) Large quantities of .256 amm and rifles.
- (i) Large generating set and wireless eqpt.
- (j) Number of bicycles and 1 Motor cycle combination.
- (k) Nine trucks (all unserviceable).
- (l) Two fighters (latest model ZERO) in good condition on OLD STRIP.
- (m) Number of smashed aircraft on OLD STRIP.

Examples of the following eqpt were captured:-

- (a) Flamethrower.
- (b) Magnetic tank grenade.
- (c) Small Land Mine.
- (d) A/A Sight.
- (e) 77 mm Shell and fuse.

4 Jan.

110. Bde Comd attended conference at HQ Aiv NGF at DOBODURA at which it was arranged that HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde should move forthwith to SOPUTA area coming under comd 7 Aust Div.

5-8 Jan.

111. Bde Comd, B.M. and I.O. went forward to HQ 7 Aust Div at SOPUTA. Bde Comd conferred with Maj-Gen G.A. VASEY, Comd 7 Aust Div and made personal recce of fwd area.

112. On the arrival of 18 Aust Inf Bde in the area, fwd tps of 7 Aust Div consisting of 30 Aust Inf Bde (39 and 49 Aust Inf Bns and with under comd 2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt) were in contact with the fwd Jap posn on the M.T. road at approx 179248 where it tapered to a "V" and with both its flanks.



113. In fact, as became obvious subsequently, the Jap defences in the SAHANANDA area were organised in three zones:-

(a) Fwd Zone - astride M.T. road at 179948 thence running North to approx 178355 and N for a further 200 yards, back East along Jap track to approx 185355 and East to 185355 thence to NE road at 179948.

This zone which was strongly organised with mutually supporting pillboxes sited in depth for approx 1400 yards and with a total width of nearly 1600 yards covered approaches to SAHANANDA by the M.T. road, the CAPE KILLBERTON TRACK and the WEST KILLBERTON TRACK.

(b) Intermediate Zone - Approx 185355 covering the junction of M.T. road and CAPE KILLBERTON TRACK.

(c) Rear Zone - The inner perimeter defences which extended from CAPE KILLBERTON, through CAPE KILLBERTON VILLAGE, track junc 198200, track end M.T. road junc 206332, thence to GIRUNA.

This position as was discovered subsequently was particularly strongly held in depth on M.T. road and along the coast, in particular between WYE POINT 200300 and SAHANANDA.

114. It should be remembered that tracks in this extremely close country afforded the only apparent possibility of movement and by securing the tracks the enemy apparently appreciated that he had secured his stronghold from attack.

115. Units of 18 Aust Inf Bde moved to a concentration area vicinity SOPUTA BRIDGE arriving -

S/9 Aust Inf Bn	-	5 Jan 45.
S/10 Aust Inf Bn	-	6 Jan 45.
S/12 Aust Inf Bn	-	7 Jan 45.

116. It was arranged that 18 Aust Inf Bde should relieve 30 Aust Inf Bde who were in contact with Japanese posts astride the M.T. road at 179948 and that S/7 Aust Div Cav Regt who were in contact with Japanese right flank should come under command 18 Aust Inf Bde.

117. Prior to the deterioration of the track from BUNA to SOPUTA owing to heavy rain it had been possible for one tp of the of S/6 Aust Armd Regt to be brought across. These were made available for the attack which was to ensue.

118. Arty support was available from the following tps of 85-pdrs:-

- (a) HANSON Tp S/1 Aust Pz Regt - vicinity SOPUTA.
- (b) HANNING Tp S/1 Aust Pz Regt - vicinity ANBO.
- (c) HALL Tp S/5 Aust Pz Regt - vicinity BUNA.

It should be noted, however that of these tps, HANNING and HALL Tps fired obliquely across front with the result that tasks upon which they could be employed were limited owing to lack of safety margin between our own tps and the enemy posts to be engaged. These tps were, therefore, principally used in harassing tasks in the rear.

119. Simultaneously with relief of 30 Aust Inf Bde by 18 Aust Inf Bde, 103 U.S. Regt which had just recently arrived relieved US tps at the HUGGINS road block astride the NE road at 187307 between Jap fwd and intermediate zones with a view also to cutting the WEST KILLBERTON TRACK at approximately 177307 thereby completely isolating the Japanese Fwd Zone.

120. Bn pieces for relief were completed 8 Jan.



9 Jan.

-18-

181. The following reliefs were carried out:-

40 Aust Inf Bn by 8/9 Aust Inf Bn.  
50 Aust Inf Bn and BOMBER Det US Tps by 8/10 Aust Inf Bn.

Bde Hq opened at 178944 while 8/10 Aust Inf Bn came into Bde reserve immediately South of Bde Hq.

182. It was also reported that US tps of 163 US Regt had cut the WEST KILLERTON track at approx 177265.

10 Jan.

183. The day was spent in ascertaining all that could be found out of enemy dispositions to the immediate front and in making such local advances as were possible and which would bring units of the Bde right up against the enemy positions. Intelligence of enemy A/A and Fl guns was that none had fired since 23 Dec. It was appreciated however that one or more of such guns might still be available to enemy and being kept silent.

11 Jan.

184. Bde Comd discussed with CO's his outline plan for an attack on 12 Jan whereby it was intended to overcome Jap resistance right of HF rd with a view to the subsequent destruction of all enemy resistance in the Fwd Zone.

18 Aust Inf Bde Operation Order No. 5 was issued (Attd as Appx "G").

185. Dispositions of our own tps prior to attack were:-

Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde	- approx 178947.
8/7 Aust Div Cav Regt	- 178948-178955.
8/9 Aust Inf Bn	- 187252-187248-188948.
8/18 Aust Inf Bn	- 185948-182948-178947.
8/10 Aust Inf Bn	- area 177264.

12 Jan.

186. Attacks by 8/9 and 8/18 Aust Inf Bns, the latter with in support one tp 8/6 Aust Arm Regt went in at 0800 hrs at the conclusion of preliminary arty concentrations. The three tanks were to operate along the line of M.T. road in close mutual support. Employment of tanks was particularly required for the attack on enemy strong points West of the road and immediately North of our own position. This strong point was so close (approx 70 yards away only) that our arty could not bombard it with safety to our own tps. The initial advance required of the tks to attack above strong points was very short, only 40 to 50 yards.

187. Outline plans of bns were as follows:-

- (a) 8/9 Aust Inf Bn - Two coys to move NE to circle enemy left flank thence to attack SW to objective which was timber line 183854-180255.
- (b) 8/18 Aust Inf Bn - One coy supported by tks to attack Jap position astride M.T. road at approx 178948, two coys crossing road from 178948 to 182948 to attack in to road. As coy advancing up road reached then these coys would come into pos and would be available to allow coy on road to extend sufficiently to left to secure road from enemy interference.

188. In this instance the inf were early left without tk support, for three tks in succession were knocked out by a well-sited Japanese A.Tk gun on the M.T. road, combined with A.Tk mines. The tks were unable to manoeuvre to attack this gun owing to their movement being limited by the marshy nature of the ground off the road.



129. Unfortunately the wireless set of the leading tk, commanded by the tp comd, was put out of action by an enemy .Tk shot and he lost control in consequence and could not advise other tks of A.Tk guns or order them to withdraw. The second tk on coming fwd was hit and the driver injured; it careered on down the road for approx 150 yards when it was knocked out. The third tk was pierced. The first tk withdrew and the third was subsequently recovered.

130. A long and bitter day's fighting ensued in which the 2/9 Aust Inf Bn on the right flank made a considerable advance while 2/12 Aust Inf Bn, though delivering hard blows at the enemy made only little ground and that was to the right of H.F. road.

131. During the day the following casualties were sustained:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	EST.	ONS.	EST.	ONS.	EST.	ONS.	EST.	ONS.	EST.	ONS.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	3	5	-	-	5	23	-	-	6	27
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2/12 Aust Inf Bn.	3	12	-	1	1	37	1	45	4	95
2/7 Aust Div Cav Regt	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1-
I Bn 2/6 Aust Arml Regt	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	5	-	8
<b>TOTALS :</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>131</b>

13 Jan.

132. This day was spent consolidating gains made and active patrolling to ascertain possible weaknesses of Japanese positions and to make such local advances to keep pressure on enemy to straighten out our line and to make further ground as were possible.

14 Jan.

133. Pressure was maintained by both 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns by mortar fire and attacks on enemy strong points and these tactics proved successful. The Japanese resistance, hard hit as it had been in the attack of 12 Jan commenced to wilt under the pressure and, this pressure being maintained both 2/9 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns made good ground to their front and before darkness the whole area of the Japanese position was in our hands.

134. Orders were then received from 7 Aust Div to exploit this success by pushing 12 Aust Inf Bn down the WEST KILLBERTON TRACK to the coast and to seize the area CAPE KILLBERTON - CAPE KILLBERTON VILLAGE with a view to attacking BANAWANDA and the RT rd from the West.

15 Jan.

135. Order (Message O.120 att'd as Appx "H") was issued.

The Bn moved down WEST KILLBERTON TRACK. Order of March:-

- 2/10 Aust Inf Bn
- Hq 12 Aust Inf Bn.
- 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.
- 2/12 Aust Inf Bn.

136. On arrival at plantation 1725 2/10 Aust Inf Bn pushed fwd along track to explore the going to the coast and CAPE KILLBERTON VILLAGE, while 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and 2/12 Aust Inf Bn were held in reserve in the vicinity of the plantation. Extreme difficulty resulted from tracks, marked on the map, actually not being in existence on the ground, having apparently been overgrown. The WEST KILLBERTON TRACK as disclosed by aerial photos previously taken was inaccurately shown on map - its Northern portion should have been marked approx 1000 yards (one thousand yards) further West.



137. B. Coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn which was searching for CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE, on being unable to locate the village, was directed by Tac/R aircraft to a clearing with native huts that was assumed to be the village and took up posn there overnight. In fact this coy was not at the village and on the following morning was found to be bivouacked in the area 193890. Remainder of 8/10 Aust Inf Bn bivouacked at 178308. Bde Hq was established at 178308.

138. During the day no enemy resistance was encountered.

16 Jan.

139. Bde Comd's intention both to exploit North to the coast thence to advance eastwards through CAPE KILLERTON and WYE POINT to SAHANANDA and eastwards along the track from 193890 to the M.T. road thence NE to SAHANANDA.

140. Accordingly a second ("A") coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn was ordered to secure track junc 193890 while 8/10 Aust Inf Bn less two coys was ordered to press North to coast then East.

141. As already mentioned B. Coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn was in fact already at 193890 and not at CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE.

142. When this was realised it was arranged that "B" Coy should hold the track junc and send fighting patrols East along the track to the M.T. road and that "B" Coy should occupy CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE.

143. While this was being done 8/10 Aust Inf Bn had reached the coast and had encountered opposition at BRIDGE 185514 over the creek West of CAPE KILLERTON.

144. Coy at CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE was then ordered to push up track running NE from KILLERTON VILLAGE to the coast, thence East along the coast. This was done, minor opposition being overcome at track junc 194308 and ground was made good before nightfall to WYE POINT (200507) where strong enemy resistance organised in depth of pillboxes along the beach, was encountered.

145. Hq 8/10 Aust Inf Bn moved first to CAPE KILLERTON VILLAGE and then to the coast at 194308.

146. During this time 163 US Regt was still encountering opposition on the M.T. road North of the HUB INS road block at approximately 190968. During the day A. Coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn had pushed East through deep swamp along line of the track shown on the map from clearing at 193890 to the MT road approximately 207882 and had run up against enemy resistance.

147. Bde Comd decided to employ 8/18 Aust Inf Bn on this line of attack and accordingly ordered CO 8/18 Aust Inf Bn to go fwd with one coy on night 16/17 Jan, and for "A" Coy 8/10 Aust Inf Bn to come under comd 8/18 Aust Inf Bn.

202

17 Jan.

148. Remainder of 8/18 Aust Inf Bn moved at first light from plantation to clearing at 193890 thence to the M.T. road and commenced to press an attack NE along the line of the road towards SAHANANDA.

149. Contact with solid enemy resistance had now been gained on the two direct avenues of approach to SAHANANDA, i.e. along MT road and along the coast. While strong pressure by attacks was maintained on these approaches Bde Comd again decided to exploit the possibilities of penetration through country which the enemy might regard as a sufficient natural obstacle and which might be less heavily defended. Accordingly 8/9 Aust Inf Bn was moved from the vicinity of Bde Hq to the area of the small kunai patch 200868 and were later in the day moved to big kunai patch at 207890. Subsequently Bde Comd issued orders to 8/9 Aust Inf Bn to attack NE ~~NE~~ to capture SAHANANDA VILLAGE on morning 18 Jan.



150. Again these tactics were successful for while 2/12 Aust Inf Bn and 2/10 Aust Inf Bn were unable to make headway on the M.T. road and coast respectively 2/9 Aust Inf Bn thrusting through swamp, jungle and lundal BE drove through to SAHANANDA which was in our hands at 1130 hrs.

151. Again the Japanese reliance on natural defences had proved his undoing and his defences was split in two. The Comd had ordered 2/9 Aust Inf Bn to immediately exploit the success by at once pushing on and capturing SAHANANDA POINT and eastwards along the coast to GIRUWA. This was successfully carried out and we now held the coast from CAPE HILLINGTON to GIRUWA with the exception of 1500 yards enemy strong points on the beach between WYE POINT and SAHANANDA.

### 19, 20, 21 Jan.

152. Two pockets of strong enemy resistance still remained, one on the M.T. road between approximately 210200 and the road bend at 214200 and on the beach between WYE POINT and SAHANANDA. SAHANANDA itself and the coast to exclusive GIRUWA was however in our hands while reports were received that 33 US Div were to move West from TARAKINA to GIRUWA.

153. One coy of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn was ordered to assist the attack of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn by moving South down the M.T. road. By the pressure of this coy in the rear and the attack BE by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn the resistance on the MT road was overcome by the early morning 21 Jan. This however had only been achieved after prolonged fighting under most miserable conditions, the tps never, in fact, being out of water and frequently remaining for hours in water up to their waists.

154. In the case of the coastal pocket soft spot tactics again proved successful for by dint of active patrolling 2/9 Aust Inf Bn discovered a way through to the centre of the Japanese pen from the top of the large lundal patch at approximately 208200. To exploit this C. Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was placed under comd 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and a coordinated attack by 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bns from both ends of beach and by this coy in the centre on 21 Jan broke the back of the Japanese resistance in this area. One strong point still held out. This was reduced after it had been subjected to arty concentrations on the morning of 22 Jan.

155. 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bns met on the beach at approximately 1315 hrs 22 Jan and organised resistance in the area was at an end.

156. American tps from TARAKINA reached GIRUWA on 22 Jan while 165 US Regt overcame final resistance in the Jap intermediate zone on the M.T. road the same day.

### 23 Jan.

157. The HQ moved to SAHANANDA and the BE assumed the role of beach defence from excl GIRUWA to incl GIRARA.

158. These posts were maintained until relieved by 8 Bn 165 US Regt on 29 Jan.

159. The casualties suffered during the SAHANANDA ops were as follows:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		MIS. INJ.		TOTAL.			
	Off.	Obs.	Off.	Obs.	Off.	Obs.	Off.	Obs.		
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	5	17	1	6	5	61	-	-	9	84
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	2	49	-	1	2	73	-	2	4	125
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	2	67	-	7	2	123	-	-	7	197.
TOTALS:	7	133	1	14	12	257	-	2	20	406



160. Estimate of enemy casualties was:-

- (a) Killed by 18 Aust Inf Bde - 6/700.
- (b) Found dead in areas captured by 18 Aust Inf Bde - 3/400
- (c) P.V. - approx 140 (incl 40-50 Chinese coolies).

161. Captured eqpt included:-

- (a) Large number of MGs (2 types) and LMGs (5 types).
- (b) Large number of rifles and .303 am.
- (c) Magnetic Tank Grenades.
- (d) Two 20 mm Dual Purpose Guns.
- (e) Large Wireless Transmitter.
- (f) Large quantity of Medical Eqpt.
- (g) Drums of various eqpt, e.g. filters, wire, shovels, picks, tents at SANANANDA, all largely unserviceable.

162. Battle casualties suffered by units of 18 Aust Inf Bde and att'd units 18 Dec 42 to 22 Jan 43 were:-

	KILLED.		DIED OF WOUNDS.		WOUNDED.		MIS. LFG.		TOTAL.	
	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.
2/9 Aust Inf Bn	11	67	3	22	13	294	-	52	33	436.
2/10 Aust Inf Bn	9	136	1	17	14	241	-	8	24	404.
2/12 Aust Inf Bn	7	116	-	15	12	244	-	1	19	376.
X Sqn 2/8 Aust Armd Regt	-	3	-	4	3	9	-	5	2	20.
Det 2/8 Aust Fd Regt	-	-	-	-	4	2	-	-	4	2.
J. Sec Sig	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	3.
<b>TOTALS :</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>793</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>1239</b>

NOTE : The above figures do NOT include any personnel evacuated due to illness.

163. See att Table I showing comparative units strengths on arrival at CAPE ENDALABERE, reinforcements received during ops, battle casualties and sick evacuations during period under review.



TABLE I.

Period Covered - 10 Dec 42 to 22 Jan 43 (both dates inclusive).

	<u>2/9 Aust Inf Bn.</u>				<u>2/10 Aust Inf Bn.</u>				<u>2/12 Aust Inf Bn.</u>			
	<u>OFFICERS.</u>	<u>ORGS.</u>	<u>OFFICERS.</u>	<u>ORGS.</u>	<u>OFFICERS.</u>	<u>ORGS.</u>	<u>OFFICERS.</u>	<u>ORGS.</u>	<u>OFFICERS.</u>	<u>ORGS.</u>	<u>OFFICERS.</u>	<u>ORGS.</u>
Unit Strengths on arrival			86	638			34	648			33	588
<b>CAPE MIDLANDERS</b>												
	K.I.A.	11	87		KIA	9	138		KIA	7	116	
	DOF	8	88		DOF	1	17		DOF	-	15	
Battle Casualties	W	19	264		W	14	211		W	18	264	
	M	-	32		M	-	8		M	-	1	
			38	435			34	404			19	376.
Evacuated Sick			6	217			5	179			5	188
Reinfts Received			25	360			13	337			3	239.



LESSONS LEARNED IN GAVE HINDALABERE - GIROPA POINT AND BAHANANDA AREA OPS  
DNB 48 - JAN 45 AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARISING THEREFROM.

REINFORCEMENTS AND X LIST.

1. Jungle warfare through its inherent wastage from sickness quite apart from battle casualties necessarily entails the constant provision of reinforcements. Reinforcements were received during the ops under consideration but in 2 by far the majority of cases their trg left much to be desired. Whilst in most cases their weapons trg embraced all inf weapons except 8" mortar their tactical trg was not high and in a few cases even the rudiments of weapon trg had not been taught.
2. Although the 8" mortar is one of our most useful inf weapons, apparently owing to lack of these weapons for trg purposes in AUSTRALIA no reinforcements had any knowledge or trg in this most important weapon. Most reinforcements had had little real collective trg, and did not know or understand the usual field orders and signals as laid down in Inf Section Training. It could not be said that these reinforcements were fully competent to take their place as members of a section in battle. This applied too to specialist personnel. To remedy this present weakness it is felt that the necessity cannot be over emphasised for the retention of "X" List personnel to a unit as a matter of regular procedure and that every endeavour should be made to keep units in the field up to full W.E. personnel plus 1st reinforcements. It is again most strongly emphasised that in this type of warfare numbers of personnel available to actually fight is of supreme importance and unless units are kept up to strength the use of unit nomenclature is virtually fictitious and entirely misleading.

INF AND TANK COOPERATION IN JUNGLE WARFARE.

3. A separate paper on this subject is attached as Appx "A".
4. While no general opinion can be expressed as to future possibilities for the employment of tks in NEW GUINEA owing to lack of knowledge of the areas in which they might be called upon to operate, it would appear that the employment of tks will be largely limited to areas such as PORT MORSBY, MILNE BAY and BUNA-CAPE HINDALABERE where extensive clearing of jungle and drainage has been carried out, thereby providing country over which tks may operate with comparative freedom. In hilly, swampy or thick jungle or timber country not so cleared and drained it would appear probable that tks, forced to operate in the defiles of the few prepared and semi-prepared tracks are from the outset at a disadvantage against an enemy so well versed in A.Tk warfare as the Jap has proved to be, provided, as is likely, that he has effective A.Tk weapons.
5. It may however be stated with confidence that the type of tk most suited to any conditions encountered will be a heavily armoured, slow moving tk possessing excellent cross country performance and ample range and a carrying capacity. The tk should possess at least a 37 mm and preferably a 75 mm gun to deal with pillboxes and enemy A.Tk guns.
6. The possibilities of a flame throwing attachment being used with tks are put fwd after experiments by CRE G Aust Div in Appx "B".

METHODS OF DEALING WITH PILLBOXES

7. Considerable use was made by the enemy of strongly constructed pillboxes in the manufacture of which he used coconut logs, steel rail, earth-filled 44-gal drums and a variety of other material.
8. During the course of ops at GAVE HINDALABERE Lieut-Col. IRWIN, CRE G Aust Div came forward at the request of Brig. G.P. SCOTTEN and carried out various experiments. These are summarised in his reports, att'd as Appx "C".



18

9. Very considerable success attended the use of the "blast bombs" described therein and their use under similar circumstances is strongly advocated.

**ANNEX**

10. It was found at CAPE ENDALADERE-GIROPA POINT that arty were at a disadvantage in dealing with Jap pillboxes owing to lack of delayed action fuses.
11. This was overcome partially by firing fuse 119 with cap on which achieved a slight delayed action effect, while during ops in SAHANANDA area fuse 231 was also available with satisfactory results.
12. Even more successful was the use of a 25-pdr at OLD STRIP (BUHA) at a range of little over 1000 yds with both AP shot and HE. Here conditions were extremely favourable for the employment of a fwd gun, an emplacement being prepared at one end of the OLD STRIP with excellent observation of the Jap pillboxes at the far end. While such conditions may not often be met with it is suggested that the possibilities of employing one or more 25-pdrs in a fwd role against prepared defences be always borne in mind. A large number of AP shot with No. 3 charge were successfully used against pillboxes by this fwd gun.
13. Generally it may be stated with confidence that arty may be employed very successfully in jungle warfare. The problem is one more that of an supply than of making guns available; it was found nevertheless that the devotion of tpt space to arty was amply repaid. The problem is to produce the number of shells of required types on desired targets, which is a combined one of both guns and am.
14. It will frequently be found that our own tps and the enemy are in such proximity that our tps must be withdrawn slightly to allow of arty being brought down. On this being done two matters are essential:-
- (a) That the enemy is prevented by fire from coming fwd and thus occupying from the arty shoot; and,
  - (b) Our own tps, withdrawn to a safe range, should during the shoot move as far fwd under cover of the shoot as is possible. The safety distance is laid down for ranging, once the first shells fall such ground can always safely be made.
15. Two points arise in connection with the dispersion of arty sub-units, as was the case in the ops under review:-
- (a) Dispersion over a wide front may result in limitation of arty tasks to possibly only one sub unit which is favourably sited for the task while it cannot be engaged by other sub-units from other points. In the jungle it will almost invariably happen that our tps and the enemy will be engaged at very close quarters. To engage his front line therefore arty sub-units firing from an angle will be well placed, while those firing from behind can do so only after our own tps have been withdrawn a safe distance. This factor should constantly be borne in mind in siting arty sub-units.
  - (b) The supply routes for am may vary for the various gun sites e.g. during the ops under review one tp was supplied by sea and two by air. It is doubtful if guns should be sited in any point unless it is considered that adequate am for their effective employment can be readily supplied to them. The availability of am at the site is the all important factor in working out the plan of attack. Guns not favourably placed for close tasks (see (a) above) should therefore be used primarily for any harassing tasks.



SURPRISE & SOFT SPOT TACTICS.

16. The Jap has proved himself an enemy particularly susceptible to surprise. He plans with the greatest of detail but the very rigidity of his plans can prove his undoing. A full realisation of this, coupled with an endeavour at all times and in all manners to achieve surprise and to probe for the soft spots in his defence amply repaid the effort. He is an enemy quick to take advantage himself of natural features and to exploit unlikely going, but, nevertheless, he himself on two occasions at least underrated the possibilities of determined troops crossing unfavourable ground, and, having deemed ground "impassable" he left it virtually undefended.

17. The two occasions referred to are the SIMBIL CREEK at the SE end of the OLD STRIP at BUNA and the approach from the SW to SAHANANDA through kuni grass, swamp and jungle.

18. Obviously he had regarded this ground as "impassable" and he had not prepared adequate defences to cover approach in these directions. This led to his undoing for vigorous patrolling discovered ways through this "impassable" country, and determined inf following up quickly had pierced his defences before he could recover or, in the case of SAHANANDA, was even aware of his presence.

19. Surprise, too, can be achieved in the surprise use of weapons, for example, the use at CAPE ENDALADERS and the ANZAC Blast Bombs constructed locally after initial experience of his pillbox defences during those ops.

20. Success, too, has continually attended the use of soft spot tactics both on the larger scale of Bie ops and equally importantly by units and sub-units.

21. By "soft spot" tactics is meant a policy of engaging the enemy and weakening his strength and of pressing home and exploiting the attack where the enemy is weakest and by so doing piercing his defences and "mushrooming" behind those defences. His strong centres of resistance are weaked by an adequate force while reserves are used to attack not those centres which are holding out, but to exploit success where success has been achieved or is likely and leaving centres of resistance that are holding out for subsequent destruction. These very centres thus weaken in strength as they become isolated and it was found not on one but on numerous occasions that by continually hammering away and exploiting the weak spots and by maintaining constant pressure that even the hardest nuts were found to crack under the pressure and a general weakening and ensuing collapse resulted.

22. Typical of this was the initial action on the MT road against Jap Fwd Bn at SAHANANDA where, despite the fact that 2/12 Aust Inf Bn at the conclusion of the first days operations had made little headway, nevertheless the success achieved by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn on the right by constant pressure all along the front and by the exploitation of local successes wherever possible by both has this exceedingly strong Japanese force soon virtually folded up within 48 hrs.

MINOR TACTICS.

LEADERS AND LEADERSHIP.

23. The enemy has shown himself constantly on the watch to pick out and pick off the leader and it is therefore essential the leader train himself to carry out his task without such gesture or action as to focus attention upon himself. This postulates the employment of well trained soldiers and reinforcements. A large number of officers and NCOs were lost due to extra exposure required in leading sub-units consisting largely of reinforcements. It is not felt, however, that badges of rank should be discarded for, in the opinion of all units the leaders have suffered from their actions and not from these minor and inconspicuous parts of dress. On the other hand it is felt most definitely that the retention of cloth badges of rank by officers is an advantage both as regards leadership and morale and it is further suggested that some less conspicuous cloth insignia be provided for wearing by NCOs.



TREES.

24. In jungle and grass land, trees are definite tactical features. To control adjacent grass or semi-jungle ground the timber line must be held. By doing so we obtain observation and deny it to the enemy. The enemy has realized this and has exploited to full advantage the possibilities of sniper nests and arty C.Ps. controlling large areas outside the timber line by comparatively few well trained riflemen and arty F.O.s. This is a policy which we must follow. Our officers and GIs must be taught to use the trees for sniping and observation on all possible occasions and to deny these advantages to the enemy.

SNIPERS.

25. The extensive use made by the enemy of snipers makes it essential in any plan of action that, as an integral portion of that plan, a specific course of action should be laid down for dealing with snipers. This, according to circumstances, may comprise preliminary arty or mortar bombardment, MG fire on tree tops, specially selected anti-sniper parties of riflemen, etc etc or any combination of such methods. The essential thing is that a manner of dealing with snipers form part of the plan of action.

CAMOUFLAGE.

26. The enemy has generally shown a standard of personal and unit camouflage which it should be our aim not only to emulate but to surpass. The extreme value of camouflage in jungle warfare against observation both from the air and from the ground should be stressed to the utmost to all ranks, while ample time should be spent in teaching individuals in the elements of successful camouflage.

CONSERVATION OF AMM.

27. This is an all important factor in jungle warfare. The necessity for rigid control of fire cannot be over emphasized. If an enemy is heard or gives his position away by movement of bushes, a short burst by MG will often be justified and may be successful, but it has been the definite experience of all units that well aimed fire from the rifle and single round firing of MG is more effective when observed small targets are offered. Against a closely bunched party of observed enemy a burst of automatic fire would probably be more effective.

NOISE AND TALKING.

28. Noise of any kind, particularly talking and coughing must be rigorously suppressed. Nothing is more calculated to give away our position to the enemy. In this connection it is essential that the present type of phone be improved so as to permit of low voiced conversation.

PATROLLING BY NIGHT.

29. It is felt that, when conditions other than dense jungle obtain, a policy of active patrolling and raiding by night be carried out as a matter of course. It is suggested while the locality defenses taken up as night disposition should incorporate a mobile reserve prepared to deal with infiltrating enemy by means of the bazooka, a further reserve be maintained to carry out a coordinated policy of active patrolling by night.

30. Any rigid distinctions in task and composition between recon and fighting patrols should disappear. All patrols should be strong enough to deal with any but major enemy opposition encountered while even when the primary task may be recon the patrol should always be constituted in sufficient strength to take immediate advantage of any advantageous ground that it discovers. To send out a small recon patrol with the idea of later sending out a small force to seize ground it has discovered to be there for the taking is but to ask the enemy to seize it in the meantime. As stated the patrol should be initially capable of doing this, while it may itself always detach a small scouting party from its own strength to do local recon. Patrols or detachments for such operations should vary from strength of a pl to a Coy according to strength required and strength of sub-unit.



INTERCOMMUNICATION.

51. Previous experience to the effect that line communication was the only really reliable form of communication was amply borne out during ops. In one respect our task would be made far easier by the provision of lighter cable e.g. of the type of D9 or of the US Army "assault cable" which would enable both far greater quantities of wire to be carried by units, and would further enable the highly desirable practice of patrols maintaining communication by L/T to be carried out more extensively.

52. The success, however, of line communication must not overshadow the possibilities of R/T and V/T. In fact the great lesson is that it is highly desirable to provide at all times as many alternative means of communication as possible.

53. The 100 Set did not prove reliable, but reasonable results were achieved with the US 536A "walkie Talkie" sets. To meet all conditions it is suggested that sets should be made available on the following scale:-

Pls HQ

5 x No. 11 Sets	} includes 3n rear links.
5 x No. 308 Sets	
1 x No. 100 Set	

Pls

While reasonable but by no means constant results were achieved from US 536A "Walkie Talkie" sets, it is considered essential that a portable set with greater range and reliability be provided on a scale of 9 per bn.

54. The possibilities of V/T should also not be overlooked and it is recommended that eqpt on the following scale be carried:-

Pls HQ	-	2 x Lucas Lamps.
Pls	-	6 x Lucas Lamps.

55. One of the principal difficulties encountered at all times is the deterioration of signal eqpt and metallic circuits owing to moisture and condensation. It is recommended that experiments be carried out with a view to successfully waterproofing signal eqpt and ensuring audible telephone circuits in very rainy and waterlogged conditions.

Field Telephone.

56. The type of field telephone at present on issue is thought not to be satisfactory and the provision of a more robust and more reliable phone which will permit of low voiced conversation is highly desirable.

57. An increase in the establishment of a bn sig Pl of one HQ and 4 signalmen equipped with eight telephones and three to four miles of light cable is recommended. The purpose of this increase is to provide means of communication for Mortar Ops which in the jungle must almost invariably be sited at a distance from the Mortar.

WEAPONS AND AMM.

58. As a direct result of experience during ops it is recommended that the OWM 308 be issued to units in preference to T308. To avoid further complexity of am supply it is not desired that two types of sub-machine gun be issued. If available the OWM gun is preferred both for its performance and for its additional great advantage in that its am is lighter. Further advantage is found in the packing of its am in sealed cases of 1000 rds which is far preferable to the boxes of 5000 provided for T308. It is recommended however that the design of the OWM gun be altered so that the magazine is underneath the weapon and does not impede sighting as it does at present.



WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

39. The following alterations to present war scale of arms are recommended:-

- (a) Stretcher Bearers. - That these personnel should be issued with Owen guns in place of rifles which proved a great handicap to their work under jungle conditions owing to the difficulty of carrying and handling in swamp and jungle.
- (b) Pioneer Pl should be issued with full weapons of an inf pl and its establishment increased to that of an inf pl. This would enable the pl not only to carry out its present tasks but in addition to provide the Comd with a ready reserve of fire and man power without a great increase in the numbers.
- (c) Full scale of issue of weapons recommended for an rifle Coy and pl is as follows:-

- (i) One Bren gun per section;
- (ii) Two Owen guns per section;
- (iii) One 3-in Mortar per pl;
- (iv) One A/Tk gun per pl;
- (v) One M rifle per pl.

3 IN MORTAR

40. Experiment is recommended to devise:-

- (a) Some lighter but equally efficient form of base plate and bipod for 3" Mortar;
- (b) Waterproofing and ensuring of standardisation of ballistics of 3" Mortar Am. Charges recently used differed considerably and were greatly affected by weather.

A.TK RIFLES.

41. It is felt that the provision of explosive bullets for the A.Tk rifle would be advantageous.

NO. 53 GRENADE.

42. It is recommended that :-

- (a) both the 4 and 7 second grenades be packed in waterproof containers, that they should be painted different colours and that the base plate be permanently fixed to the 7 second grenade to allow it to be readily distinguished by night.
- (b) It is further recommended that an individual issue be made of a waterproof envelope capable of carrying two grenades so that they may be kept dry after issue to the man.

RIFLE OIL.

43. It is recommended that, in addition to the oil bottles carried in rifles, rifle oil be issued in expendable containers thereby facilitating distribution. Wet conditions of the type of warfare experienced demands a lavish expenditure of rifle oil to keep all ing weapons in good working order.



CLOTHING AND EQUIP.

44. It is recommended that:-

- (a) the most suitable clothing for jungle warfare is a tunic of safari type pattern as now being issued and slacks buttoning at the ankle after the fashion of British battle dress;
- (b) that these trousers be worn with present Australian type canvas gaiters;
- (c) that boots could be improved by waterproof tongues with an extra two inches of leather on the top of the boot; boots should be sprigged, preferably with brass;
- (d) that short puttees preferably of waterproof material remain on issue for use with shorts;
- (e) that in place of the present ground sheet or cloak, which is both not completely waterproof and is heavy to carry, a square 7' x 7' of light oiled waterproof silk be carried by each man;
- (f) that Dixie and water bottle be made of lighter material; the Dixie could be made smaller with advantage;
- (g) that a small waterproof container be provided for quinine tablets and a small waterproof packet for matches, pay book and other personal necessities.

TOOLS.

- 45. (a) It is recommended that an individual issue be made of a portable entrenching tool or of a small shovel of the type carried by US troops.
- (b) Machetes should be issued on the scale of two per man.

EMERGENCY RATIONS.

46. It has been found that considerable wastage in emergency rations has resulted from their being insecurely taped.

47. Regarding normal rations it is recommended that baking powder, flour and rice be included in the ration to enable cooks to vary the diet, while the provision of mustard is highly desirable.

COOKING EQUIP.

48. While hydra petrol burners are invaluable for preparing meals and hot drinks the provision of a light collapsible oven for frying and grilling would be an improvement.

49. It was found possible by day to ensure that during the entire ops a minimum of two hot meals per day was available even under the worst conditions. In the majority of cases the food was cooked under tin arrangements and sent forward by native carriers. In the cases where owing to the isolation of troops by swampy ground this was not possible the "Tomy Cooker" of solidified alcohol proved invaluable in that it enabled the individual to make his own hot food.

50. Rations though plentiful were monotonous. It is felt that greater efforts should be made to vary diet for, faced with a monotonous diet, troops do not eat with relish with consequent prejudicial effects both to health, strength and morale. This is not to be construed as any criticism of the supply organisation but points to the necessity for the manufacture and provision of such types of food as will enable that supply organisation to provide a more varied and attractive diet to soldiers in battle under conditions such as existed in the campaign under review.



MEDICAL

51. An increase in the medical section of the bn from 30 to 34 ORs is recommended. These personnel represent not only the nucleus of trained stretcher bearers in normal times but, in action, are the nursing orderlies with sub-units and are normally split up on a basis of four per Coy (one per pl and one for Coy HQ) with a reserve of four at the RAP. The reserve of four is felt to be insufficient and an increase to 34 would allow this reserve to be doubled.
52. M.M. It is strongly recommended that individuals who conscientiously object to the bearing of arms should not be allowed to function as stretcher bearers beyond the HQ as their usefulness is gravely affected by the additional responsibility they become.
53. Stretchers. It is urged that experiment be carried out in the provision of a lighter stretcher by, say, the substitution of tubular metal poles in place of the present wooden ones. It would be an advantage in jungle warfare if the poles could be made to fold and were made longer for shoulder carriage.
54. Trench Feet. It is recommended, too, that experiments be carried out by the medical authorities into some means of preventing waterlogging of feet. Instances are quoted of the successful use of Lenoline, Bubberin and Mosquito cream. It is felt that the provision of some medically safe substance to be rubbed into the feet would have considerable beneficial results. In the last war conditions of wet were met by the application of whale oil to the feet.

OFFICE REPT.

55. The issue of light waterproof and light proof tents, say 3 ft x 10 ft on a scale of four per Coy HQ and two per unit as a minimum would be greatly to increase efficiency at night.

INTELLIGENCE.

56. Increased issue of compasses and binoculars is recommended.
57. The extensive use of air photography as the only reliable means of obtaining information in country which has for the most part been but inaccurately mapped was most effective. It is recommended that as many vacancies as possible be made available at Air Photo Interpretation courses and that personnel of Bn and Bde Intelligence sections be increased in each case by one HQ trained in air photograph interpretation.



NOTES ON TANK AND INF COOPERATION IN CAPE MIDALABERE-GIROPA POINT AND  
SAHANANDA AREA OPS.

1. These notes treat the CAPE MIDALABERE-GIROPA POINT and SAHANANDA Area ops separately owing to the widely divergent conditions encountered in the respective ops.
2. At CAPE MIDALABERE-GIROPA POINT, the tanks operated either on grass overgrown air strips or in coconuts. In the case of the air strips the ground was low lying and sodden, and for the most part covered by head high or higher grass which obscured vision; and though it was studded with hidden bomb craters, it was nevertheless ground that had at one time been cleared, was for the most part level and, apart from swampy patches, it was reasonably firm. The coconuts area was also firm and had been cleared, though a light jungle growth had grown up between the palms due to neglect for many months.
3. Despite these disadvantages the terrain was far more suitable to the use of tanks than is normally the case in NEW GUINEA and was in direct contradiction to SAHANANDA area where owing to the low lying swampy nature of the terrain, movement off the road or well defined tracks was virtually impossible, with the result that tanks were obliged to operate in a defile.
4. The two ops are therefore dealt with separately.

CAPE MIDALABERE - GIROPA POINT.

GENERAL.

5. It must be remembered that while a considerable portion of the ground was suited to tank movement, tanks were virtually confined to the area of once cleared and drained ground. Bogging resulted almost invariably and immediately that virgin ground was encountered.
6. In all 19 M3 Light ('General STUART') tanks were made available to 18 Aust Inf Bde for ops. Owing to the rate at which tanks arrived in the area of operations tank casualties from enemy action and irretrievable bogging the greatest number available at any one time was 11.
7. In all actions the tanks were operating in direct conjunction with infantry and their role was that for which the 'I' tank is specifically designed. This role is one for which the 'General STUART' is not intended and the necessity for operating at abnormally slow speeds told heavily on crews, engines, brakes and clutches.
8. The tank, too, is not heavily armoured with the result that, deprived of its normal mobility, it is an easy mark for enemy A.Tk weapons. While the 'I' tank is ~~practically~~ invulnerable to ~~any~~ A.Tk weapons other than possibly AA guns used in an A.Tk role the 'General STUART' can be made a casualty by even 20 mm AP gun fired from a high velocity weapon at moderately close range. As mentioned in the report these were the only tanks that could be made available under existing circumstances and transport limitations for the purpose. However they proved very effective notwithstanding.

Attd as Appx "AA" is an illuminating table of statistical data relative to the forces engaged.

TACTICS EMPLOYED.

9. Tank formations adopted were varied in the several attacks in accordance with availability of tanks and local conditions. In all cases the tanks preceded the main body of infantry while one tank was closely followed by a specially detailed protective party of infantry. The main body of infantry attacked in open order at a distance behind the tanks that was governed



by the nature of the ground - they were however never more than 50 yds behind the tks while in close country e.g. thick head high grass, they followed on the heels of the tks.

10. It was found most satisfactory to operate tks in pairs or threes to enable mutual support and protection. When a sufficiency of tks is available it is recommended that a tp of three tks be allotted to each fwd coy, the tp operating two up with one slightly back. This latter is then ready to move immediately in support of either of the leading tks or to replace a tk casualty.
11. In the event of an abundance of tks being available, the desirability of allotting tks to reserve coys to assist the latter in mopping up or alternatively to pass through the leading coys engaged in that operation without depriving them of their tk support is obviously desirable.
12. In all cases tks and inf operated on the same axis of advance. To do otherwise was not considered advisable or to offer any advantages in the type of country encountered.

#### ARTY COOP.

13. Owing to the relatively small number of guns and the wide dispersion of arty tp teams it was not possible to shoot more than one tp as a rule on a close target. For the attacks by 2/Am 2/10 and 2/12 Aust Inf Bns on 18, 20, 22, 24 and 29 Dec and 1 Jan a preliminary arty shoot on selected targets or areas was laid down for the ten minutes prior to zero. This was not possible for the attack by 2/12 Aust Inf Bn on 3 Jan owing to the proximity of enemy and our tps.

14. One lesson learnt and practiced was the desirability of maintaining constant air arty/2 during both the approach march of tks, when this is within possible range of enemy A.Tk weapons, and during the attack. By so doing our own arty is often able to engage immediately any enemy A.Tk guns which open fire, or alternatively blind them with smoke.

#### TANK APPROACH MARCH.

15. To achieve surprise the use of aircraft noise camouflage is recommended. In one captured document reference was made to noise of aircraft at a time when tks were moving without aircraft noise camouflage owing to its being unavailable.

16. The most detailed recon and marking of route of approach march from tk lying up area to FUP by tk officers and crew coms is essential, also of FUP and line of advance up to inf front line. The ground over which the tks passed in GAPS HINDALADERS - GIROPA POINT ops was both treacherous and, owing to tall grass, largely featureless and in addition was studded with craters. To follow it, each crew com must have an intimate knowledge of his route prior to attempting it in a tk.

#### P.H.P.

17. This was sited in each case behind and parallel to inf start line. The tks were therefore able to form up on their correct frontages facing in correct direction at FUP and move fwd from there so as to cross inf start line at ZERO.

18. This necessitated recon by tk officers and coms of routes from FUP to start line and of start line itself for the reasons already given in para 16.

19. Tk coms must be prepared too to leave their tk and take part in any conference which the inf com may call prior to giving his orders for an attack on enemy posn. This applies not only to bn coms conferences but also to coy coms and even pl coms who are preparing to stage an attack.

#### RATE OF ADVANCE.

20. In the absence of an arty creeping barrage the rate of advance must be regulated by that of main body of inf. Tk coms must therefore be constantly on the qui vive to ensure both that they do not outstrip



the inf nor, on the other hand, hold up its advance by continuing to engage targets with which inf are prepared to deal. If inf and the booby are severed during the action the tks are in much greater danger from Molotov cocktails, hand placed A.Tk mines and enemy personnel jumping on tk with A.Tk bombs. Inf casualties will be higher and their chance of success less.

#### THE PROTECTIVE PARTIES.

81. These must be assigned to each tk and must follow on the line of advance of that tk, ready to take instant action in the event of determined enemy endeavouring to make tk casualties by means of petrol, magnetic mines Molotov cocktails, firing through slits, etc.

82. The enemy encountered were well trained in A.Tk war and concentrated their fire on vision slits and weapon apertures and, given the opportunity, used magnetic mines, petrol and Molotov cocktails. Snipers concentrated on open turrets. Tks should therefore operate fully closed down, while they should not move right up to pill boxes or trenches. The pill boxes encountered were too strong to crush and the best method was to engage them at a range of 10 to 15 yds and to fire 37mm HE and .30 MAG through slits and entrances. It was found too that 57 mm will penetrate coconut logs in many cases.

83. Despite the additional discomfort it was found advantageous to employ a crew of five. This enables the crew commander to concentrate his attention on command while the addition of the fifth man enables one gunner to operate 37 mm and coaxially mounted MAG.

84. It is considered that in jungle warfare a periscope should always be available. Also the vision prisms which become damaged on account of firing at slits, should be readily replaceable at once by spares carried in the tk.

#### COMM AND INTERCOMM.

85. It was found to be of great advantage to use one tk as a comm tk, which remained with the Comm. Senior tk officer with the Comm can then control his tks by R/T. In the event of its becoming necessary to put this tk into the fight command can be exercised through the 101 Set or "Walkie Talkie" set to a tk set tuned to "comm" frequency.

86. Normally all tks were tuned to "TK" frequency on which to leaders directed ops, with "comm" frequency (used by the Comm, the Comm, Senior TK Officer and by the leaders as a rear link) as their alternative frequency.

#### VISUAL INTERCOMM AND INF.

87. The following signals were employed:-

- (a) Tk requiring inf assistance fired GREEN very light.
- (b) Tk requiring tk assistance fired RED very light.
- (c) Line of flight or very pistol fired by inf indicated resistance in that direction.
- (d) Inf desiring tk to move to them raised steel helmet on rifle and bayonet.
- (e) Targets or centres of resistance were indicated by pointing rifle and bayonet at arms length.
- (f) Positions of all wounded were marked by fixing rifle vertically with bayonet in ground. This is very necessary where fighting in grass, jungle or undergrowth.



SIG  
SIG CABLE.

28. Tks are a constant source of danger to sig cable. Tks coms, when receding routes should make a special note of sig cable so that an overhead cable bridge can be made at the crossing places. Tks should take care to use only those crossing places. There should be close liaison between Bie and En Sig Offrs and tk coms to safeguard this. On one occasion at a crucial moment all fwd communication with Bge HQ was destroyed by tks, 13 wires being cut.

AMM.

29. Tk replenishment area should be established as far fwd as possible, if necessary being moved further fwd after ZERO. In GAPS BUDAIADERE-GIROPA POINT ops brn carriers proved invaluable in maintaining tk replenishment areas.

30. The system found best to maintain tks in action was for one rec tk to be held in readiness, fwd of replenishment area, and for this to be called into action immediately a tk in action became a casualty or required replenishment. On the rec tk moving fwd into action another was immediately fwd from replenishment area. To minimise delay, direct intercom between En HQ and tk replenishment area is necessary.

31. While the frequent and rapid replenishment that was possible in GAPS BUDAIADERE-GIROPA POINT ops justified a lavish expenditure of amm, care should be taken to impress on all crew coms that such conditions do not always obtain, and that amm expenditure must be governed in accordance with replenishment facilities. A tk without amm is really of less use than a tk immobilised through lack of fuel.

RECOVERY.

32. The provision of block and tackle of sufficient strength and suitable type and of special recovery vchs is most desirable. In GAPS BUDAIADERE-GIROPA POINT ops fighting tks were of necessity used to recover others that were bogged.

33. As already stated, the necessity for operating for abnormally long periods in low gear and the additional wear and tear on brake linings and clutches imposed by the nature of the ground resulted in correspondingly higher maintenance periods. To allow of these being carried out a tk harbour must be established beyond the actual battle area to which tks can retire at dusk. This place should be one where lights can be used for, if this is not possible, it will be found that tks cannot be used on successive days for any length of time.

34. It is considered essential that all tk detts should be complete as regards LAD personnel, tools and stores on the necessary scale.

35. One replacement frequently required is the periscopes. If these are immediately available, tks whose sights have been blinded by enemy small arms fire may readily be put back in action.

36. Owing to both casualties and exhaustion from long periods of action it is essential that ample reserves of personnel be immediately available. It is suggested that a complete spare crew should be available for each tk.

SAMBAWA AREA Q. 3.

GENERAL.

37. SAMBAWA area presented an entirely different picture to earlier action for, in this case, tk movement, by virtue of the sodden and swampy nature of almost the entire terrain, was virtually confined to roads and defined tracks. The vchs used were obliged to operate on the defiled of prepared roads and tracks, while for the particular ops it had been found possible for four tks only to be brought from BUNA owing to deterioration of the track due to rain after the passage of the first tp.



38. Employment of tks was particularly required for the attack on enemy strong point West of the road and immediately North of our own post. This strong point was so close that our arty could not bombard it with safety to our own tps. Only one tk attack was made and the principal lesson learnt was confirmation of the fact that the enemy is well-versed in A.Tk warfare.
39. One tp of three tks with one tk in res, supported the attack of 2/12 Aust Inf Bn on 12 Jan.
40. It was known that the enemy might have A.Tk weapons, though no ft arty or high velocity weapons had fired for ten days.
41. The nature of the attack was such that the three tks in mutual support were obliged to advance in column along a road. The initial advance required was 40/50 yds. The leading tk was pierced by an A.Tk gun of approx 37 mm, but was driven clear, the second lost control when hit, ran on an anti-tk mine and subsequently burnt out, while the third also pierced by the 37 mm was later recovered.
42. By mischance the tp comd wireless set in the leading tk was put out of action with the result that control was momentarily lost. Had this not occurred at least one and probably two tk casualties would have been avoided.
43. The enemy showed himself both versatile in A.Tk warfare and astonishingly accurate in his A.Tk small arms fire. In this operation he had mines tied to bamboo ready to push out from jungle under tk tracks.
44. In such country against an enemy both well versed in A.Tk warfare and provided with A.Tk weapons, success can be achieved only by tks possessing a sufficiency of armour to enable them to close with the enemy A.Tk weapons to engage them. For this role the "General STUART" is NOT suitable.

TECHNICAL NOTES.

45. The sub-joined Technical notes were prepared by Capt. BALDOCK, 2/6 Aust Arml Regt.



APPENDIX "A"

to

NOTES ON TANK AND INF COOPERATION WITH IN CAPT HEADQUARTERS-CIRCA POINT  
AND BANAHANGA AREA OPS.

TECHNICAL NOTES BY CAPT. BALDOCK - S/D APT AND BMT.

1. Low track poundage per sq ft desirable.
2. Metal tracks. Heavy spalls.
3. Low overall height.
4. Armour and armament.
5. Ventilation.
6. Range - petrol and am (more petrol).
7. Easy replacement periscopes etc.
8. Periscopes essential.
9. Speed not a necessity.
10. Power sufficient to bash jungle.
11. Flaps to fasten and not fly open.
12. Moisture proof wireless.
13. B. frequency unnecessary.
14. Necessity of reserve frequency.
15. I.C. vital.
16. Netting should be checked late.
17. Trained operator should be able to check in a few seconds.
18. Range is limited by wet and jungle.
19. Very brief procedure necessary and use of the as broadcasting stations.
20. Control tk useful as signals link but not essential.
21. Use of tracer for indication of targets for HB.
22. Loading of belts with P ball and tracer.
23. Restricted use of TMS, grenade and pistol.
24. Use of independent gun control for hull gunner against snipers.
25. Fire only at indicated and observed targets.
26. Jettison the hindrance.

B. ENHANCE.

1. Five Jeeps and five trailers and Slave Battery Charger.
  - (a) Two coxks and capt with two Hydra burners, four jinxio stands, spare burners and spare pump.
  - (b) Rations. Two days reserve in tins for sgn.
  - (c) Q Items. Dubbin, recuperator oil, 4 x 8, boots and clothes.
  - (d) Hooks and Armourer, tools and capt and carrying gear.
  - (e) POL.

Five Jeeps without Trailers.

- (a) Chiefly RA.
- (b) Q.
- (c) RAP.
- (d) Sgn Ltr.
- (e) Sp Sgt.

Jeeps and Trailers to be pooled to capt POL and am fwd to RA, also to capt men's gear.

RA to be repaired and maintained as far fwd as practicable. Two tk refills per tk engaged to be maintained at RA.



**ATTN "AA" to Notes on Tk and Inf Cooperation CASE HIRALADRU-GIRPA KOLIT and BANWANDA Area Ops.**

(a) Serial	(b) Location	(c) Date	(d) Tks in support of:-	(e) Number of tks employed	(f) Tks destroyed by gun fire.	(g) Tks temporarily disabled by gun fire.	(h) Tks destroyed by causes other than gun fire.	(i) Tks temporarily disabled by enemy action other than gunfire.	(j) Tks irretrievably bogged.	Remarks.
1.	HIDA-IADRU	18 Dec	2/9 In	7	-	-	2	1(11)	-	(1) One tk destroyed by suspected Molotov cocktail, one caught fire when gun dump exploded. (11) Vision elite damaged by MM fire.
2.	"	20 Dec	do	4	-	-	-	-	1	
3.	"	22 Dec	do	3	-	-	-	-	-	
4.	OLD STRIP (GIRPA)	24 Dec	2/10 Sn.	3	1	2(111)	-	-	-	(111) One tk pierced and engine put out of action - abandoned but subsequently recovered, one tk bogged, then hit by gunfire, subsequently recovered.
5.	"	29 Dec	do	4	-	-	-	-	-	
6.	"	1 Jan	2/12 Sn	7	-	-	-	-	-	
7.	"	8 Jan	do	7	-	-	-	-	-	
8.	Jap Mt Zone BANWANDA Area.	18 Jan	do	4	1	2(1v)	-	-	-	(1v) One tk hit by gunfire withdrew, the second tk bogged after being hit by gunfire but subsequently recovered.
9.	TOTALS	-	-	59	2	4	2	1	1	

**NOTES:** 1. The held in res but not actually employed in battle are NOT included in figures.  
 2. Tks were in action on eight days, arty and inf on 28 days during ops.  
 2x

3. Total casualties sustained by all arms during ops were:

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		TOTAL.	
	Off.	Ops.	Off.	Ops.	Off.	Ops.
2/6 Aust Arty Regt	-	11	2	9	2	20.
Arty Units	-	-	4	2	4	2.
18 Aust Inf Bde*	30	442	45	775	75	1217.

\* These figures do NOT include casualties of U.S. inf and do NOT include personnel evacuated due to illness.



SECRET

Copy No. 134

Date: 17 Dec 42.

18 AUST INF BDE GP OPERATION ORDER NO. 1.

Ref Maps: BUHA LOCALITY REVISED approx 4 inches to 1 mile.  
BUHA TARGET PLAN NO. 24.

Note: Owing to these maps being gridded differently, any message must specify map used. In this order map used is BUHA LOCALITY REVISED.

INFORMATION.

1. Enemy.

- (a) As contained in topographical notes on BUHA AREA dated 11 Dec 42 already issued but NOT to all recipients of this order.
- (b) As given verbally at conferences by COMD 18 AUST INF BDE GP.
- (c) As contained in 18 AUST INF BDE GP INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY to be issued at 1600 hrs 17 DEC.

2. Own Troops.

The following troops are under command 18 AUST INF BDE GP.

- (a) X Sqn 2/6 AUST ARMED REGT.
- (b) MANNING TP 2/1 AUST FD REGT.
- (c) HALL TP 2/5 AUST FD REGT.
- (d) CHARA TP 1 AUST MOUNTAIN BTY.
- (e) DET 2/4 AUST FD COY (ENGINEERS).
- (f) 128 U.S. REGT (1/128, 1/128, 3/128 U.S. BNS and att tps).
- (g) 2/9 AUST INF BN.
- (h) 2/10 AUST INF BN.
- (i) 17 AUST INF BDE CARRIER GP.
- (j) DET 2/5 AUST FD AMB.
- (k) DET 10 AUST FD AMB.
- (l) DET A.A.S.G.
- (m) DET A.A.C.G.

INTENTION

- 3. 18 AUST INF BDE GP will attack and capture area CAPE ENDRAIDERE - NEW STRIP - OLD STRIP - BUHA MISSION.

METHOD

- 4. The attack will take place in phases. *the coast to*  
PHASE ONE to attack and capture area bounded on the right by <sup>ADD</sup> the mouth of SIMMI CK 978258 and on the left by a line through east end of NEW STRIP and west end of OLD STRIP thence NW along SIMMI CK to its mouth.
- 5. This order covers the details of PHASE ONE only. Orders will be issued subsequently by HQ 18 AUST INF BDE GP for later PHASES.
- 6. Groundings.
  - (a) Enl. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn with in support,
    - (1) X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt less ONE tank.



- (11) Manning Tp 2/1 Aust Fd Regt.
- (111) Hall Tp 2/5 Aust Fd Regt.
- (1v) Chera Tp 1 Aust Mountain Bty.
- (v) Det 2/4 Aust Fd Coy.

(b) Reserve

- (1) OHS tank X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt.
- (11) 198 U.S. Regt.
- (111) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn (on arrival HARGILL).
- (1v) 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Cp.

7. Objectives.

- (a) Area bounded by coast on right and by SIMMI CK on left to mouth of SIMMI CK but excluding NEW STRIP.
- (b) Bridgehead on west side of SIMMI CK in coconut grove at NW of OLD STRIP and commanding track OLD STRIP & BUHA MISSION.

8. Start Lines.

2/9 Aust Inf Bn will recon and mark start line by 1600 hrs 17 Dec. Start line will be approx 150 yards south of line now held by 2/198 Bn.

9. Forming Up Places.

- (a) X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm Regt less OHS tank will move from present position to forming up place already recon between 1800 hrs and 1900 hrs D - 1. Sqn will be responsible for its own local security during night D - 1/D.
- (b) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn less B Ech will recon forming up place south of 198 C.P. and will move there by 1800 hrs D - 1.

10. ZERO.

0700 hrs which is time when tanks cross infantry start line.

11. D DAY.

18 Dec.

12. Timing of Advance.

Pace of advance will be regulated by infantry. Tanks MUST conform to this rate of advance.

13. Compass Bearing of Advance.

335 deg true to CAPE ENDALADERS then 335 deg true.

14. Supporting Arms.

(a) ARTY.

- (1) Manning Tp 2/1 Aust Fd Regt, Hall Tp 2/5 Aust Fd Regt and Chera Tp 1 Aust Mountain Bty will fire on targets already indicated on ground on enemy front and centre from 2 - 10 minutes to 2. Targets already indicated in CAPE ENDALADERS area will be engaged from 2 - 10 to 2 + 10 minutes.
- (11) Rates of fire will be laid down by HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Cp in accordance with availability of amm.
- (111) Manning Tp, Hall Tp and Chera Tp will each send P.O.O. and sig party to report to 2/9 Aust Inf Bn by 1600 hrs 17 Dec.



(iv) On orders to be issued by HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp Hall Tp will move one 25 pdr gun and available A.P. shot and normal H.E. to a position near eastern end of NEW STRIP with a view to engaging enemy pill boxes on NEW STRIP.

(b) Mortars of 128 U.S. Regt.

(i) Heavy mortars of 128 U.S. Regt will give supporting fire on timed programme as arranged by C.O. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn with Comd 128 U.S. Regt on targets indicated on front of attack.

(ii) 128 U.S. Regt will engage observed targets in area of KKM NEW STRIP during PHASE ONE with heavy and light mortars using both H.E. and available smoke.

15. Role and Location of Reserves

(a) 128 U.S. Regt.

(i) 1/128 Bn will remain present position.

(ii) At 0600 hrs D day 1/128 and 3/128 U.S. Bn will withdraw to a line in rear of present positions to be indicated on ground by Maj Hall, 2/5 Aust Inf Regt on D - 1.

(iii) 1/128 and 3/128 U.S. Bns will re-occupy their present positions as soon as 2/9 Aust Inf Bn has passed through those positions.

(iv) 3/128 U.S. Bn will remain at immediate notice to take over ground from 2/9 Aust Inf Bn on orders HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp.

(v) Upon withdrawal of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn through 3/128 Bn, Maj Hall Tp F.O.C. will remain with 3/128 U.S. Bn which will have a call on that tp.

(vi) 1/128 U.S. Bn will remain at immediate notice to form a defensive flank facing west and linking up with defensive left flank of 2/9 Aust Inf Bn north of NEW STRIP.

(b) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn. will on arrival move from HARIKO to bivouac area at present occupied by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and will remain at immediate notice.

(c) 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp.

(i) Will move at 0700 hrs D day from present location to bivouac area 200 yds south of HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp at present occupied by X Bn 2/6 Aust Army Regt and will remain in Bde reserve at immediate notice.

(ii) Det 17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp will endeavour to recover two of carriers at present fwd of 3/128 U.S. Bn position if in fair running order when ground has been cleared by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn. These carriers will rejoin 17 Aust Inf Bde carrier Gp.

(d) Allied Air Forces.

(i) Direct air support will be arranged by HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp.

(ii) Aircraft noise camouflage will be provided from 1800 to 1915 hrs D - 1 and from 0615 to 0700 hrs D day to cover movements of tanks.



## ADMINISTRATION.

### 16. Rations.

Three days emergency rations will be carried on the men.

### 17. AMM.

First line amm will be carried. Amm will be replenished by S.C. 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp on urgent request or normal expenditure return.

### 18. Tank Replenishment Area will be notified.

### 19. ARTY AMM.

Separate orders will be issued.

### 20. Chlorination Tablets will be carried by each man.

### 21. Assault Boats.

S.C. will arrange to draw five assault boats from Major Lupient and will despatch these fwd as required by 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

### 22. Medical.

(a) R.A.P. will evacuate stretcher cases and walking wounded by nearest direct route to coastal track running south from CAPE HINDALADERN to HARIKO. Walking wounded will proceed down this track.

(b) Evacuation of Stretcher Cases on coastal track will be organised by SMO Maj Levarack 2/5 Aust FA Amb by Lt Sec 2/5 Aust FA Amb.

(c) Det 2/5 Aust FA Amb will establish ADS with 14 Portable US Hospital at 310836.

(d) S.C. will arrange further evacuation by Lt Sec 10 Aust FA Amb. Jeep and Native Carrier to DOBODURA.

(e) Det 10 Aust FA Amb will establish Lt Sec at DOBODURA.

### 23. Prisoners of War.

Will be sent under guard to 128 US Regt C.P. 306941.

### 24. B Echelons.

(a) 2/9 Aust Inf Bn B Ech will move to present bivouac area of X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arml Regt by 1800 hrs D - 1.

(b) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn B Ech will remain at bivouac area on arrival until receipt of further orders.

## INTERCOMMUNICATION.

25. Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp remains present location 309236.

26. Main Artery of Comm will be coastal track.

### 27. Allocation of Wireless Sets.

(a) 1 x 101 Set will move with 2/9 Aust Inf Bn.

(b) 1 x 101 Set and 1 x 11 Set will remain at Hq 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp.

(c) Five portable US wireless sets and two miles of US assault



cable will be issued by HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp to 2/9 Aust Inf Bn by 1600 hrs 17 Dec.

- (a) Capt guilty sig Offr HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp will arrange for visual intercom between 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and a terminal on coast at HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp as required.

28. Frequencies, Call Signs and Code Names.

Will be notified by Capt guilty.

29. Wireless Restrictions.

- (a) Except for aircraft shoot HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp, ~~and~~ Arty HQ and Arty Tps X Sqn 2/6 Armd Regt 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will maintain wireless silence until contact is made on D day.
- (b) 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will maintain wireless silence until further orders.

30. Passwords.

A new schedule of passwords will be issued by 1800 hrs D - 1.

31. Visual Intercom Tank and Inf.

~~inf~~ The following will be employed

- (a) Line of flight of Verey pistol will indicate resistance in that direction.
- (b) Inf desiring tank to move to ~~them~~ <sup>them</sup> will raise steel helmet on rifle and bayonet.
- (c) Targets or centres of resistance may be indicated by pointing rifle and bayonet at areas length.
- (d) Positions of all wounded will be marked by fixing rifle vertically with bayonet in ground.

32. ~~inf~~ In case it is necessary to postpone this operation the code words WYALONG till ----- hrs will be used to postpone ZERO.

SYNCHRONISATION.

33. Sigs 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp will synchronise watches on 32 US Div time at 1600, 2000 and 2400 hrs D - 1 and at 0300 and 0600 hrs D day. Synchronisation must be exact to within five seconds.

ASK.

Issued at 1230 hrs 17 Dec.  
By hand and through sigs.

Major  
B.H. 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp

DISTRIBUTION.

X Sqn 2/6 Aust Armd Regt  
Arty 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp  
Det 2/6 Aust Pd Coy  
128 US Regt  
2/9 Aust Inf Bn  
2/10 Aust Inf Bn  
17 Aust Inf Bde Carrier Gp  
Det AAMB (Maj Laverack)  
32 US Div  
Comd  
BH  
SC  
IO  
Sigs.  
War Diary

Copy No.

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Appendix "C" to Report on Operations of 18 Aust. Inf. Bde. Gp.  
CAPE ENDIAIDERE - GIROPA PT and SANANDA. 14 DEC. 42 - 22 JAN. 43

TO: X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt 126 US Regt 2/9, 2/10 Aust Inf Bns  
32 US Div Arty HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp SC IO

FROM: 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp. 0 22 19

Ref 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp Operation Order No. 1 operation continues 20 Dec (.)  
Intention 2/9 Aust Inf Bn will complete PHASE ONE (.) Under comd from  
1900 hrs 19 Dec one coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn in support from same time X Sqn  
2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt less one tank (.) Arty support will be arranged by  
this HQ to 0700 hrs (.) Supporting fire by HALL Tp can be arranged  
by this HQ as desired 20 Dec (.) FOO's MANNING HALL and OHARA tps remain  
with 2/9 Bn (.) ZERO 0700 (.) 128 US Regt will take over ground  
occupied by 2/9 Bn at ZERO as that Bn moves fwd (.) 1/126 and 1/128 US  
Bns will maintain active pressure on their fronts and will take immediate  
advantage of any opportunity to push fwd and consolidate (.) 2/10 Aust  
Inf Bn remains in Bde reserve at immediate notice probably moving area  
CAPE ENDIAIDERE when ordered by this HQ (.) One tank 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt  
remains Bde res at immediate notice (.) Administration and Intercommu-  
ication unchanged ACK

IMMEDIATE

1635

By hand to 32 Div



Appendix "D" to Report on Operations of 18 Aust. Inf. Bde. Gp.  
at CAPE ENDAIADERE-GIROPA POINT and SANANANDA. 14 DEC. 42-22 JAN. 43

TO: X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt 2/10 Aust Inf Bn 128 Inf Regt Rptd  
2/9 Aust Inf Bn 32 Div Adv NGF.

FROM: 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp.

0 82

29

Confirming verbal instns 2/10 Aust Inf Bn with under command COY 2/9 Aust Inf Bn and with in support one tp of four tjs X Sqn 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt will attack coconut grove between GIROPA POINT and mouth of SIMEMI CK (.). Attack will be in NE direction to coast with left on approx present C Coy posn and on a frontage that will allow forces on capture of objective to face N.W. and S.E. respectively with sufficient depth to allow consolidation and defence. (.). Start line for tks and inf and FUP for tanks and coordination of tank approach march will be laid down by bn cmd (.). Arty will fire on beach S.E. of GIROPA POINT from Z-10 to Z and along GIROPA CK on left flank from Z (.). 2/10 Bn will arrange smoke diversion on S.E. end of coconuts on bank of SIMEMI CK from Z-10 (.). ZERO NOT before 1400 repeat 1400 hrs (.). 128 US Regt will maintain left flank guard facing West S.W. and South (.). B Coy 1/126 US Bn will provide guard at tk Forming Up Place (.). Coys on right of C Coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn will take advantage of any opportunity to advance N.E. and maintain line (.). Synchronisation by this HQ (.). Administration and Intercommunication unchanged ACK

IMMEDIATE

1235



Ref 42/1/36.

SECRET  
HQ R.A.E.  
6 Aust Div.  
4 Jan 43.

18 Aust Inf Bde.

JAPANESE STRONG POINTS - EXPEDIENTS IN ASSISTING ATTACK.

1. At the request of Brig. G.F. WOOTEN, Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde, a visit was made to the Bde area at BUNA on 29 Dec-2 Jan 43, and the question of employing expedients to assist in attack and mopping up of Jap strong points discussed with Bde and Bn Comds.
2. In this area the Jap has constructed shell proof MG posts, comd posts and shelters by means of which his casualties during our arty and mortar preparation and harassing are reduced and good protection is provided against aerial attack. It is generally considered that fire posns unprovided with overhead cover are manned by observers only until attacked, when the Japs move from their shelters to these positions. It is thought that the effectiveness of fd arty against the strong points has been limited to hits in the close vicinity of doorway openings and loopholes using H.E., and for this reason A.P. shell has been used successfully.
3. The shelters are constructed of an interior framework for walls of either coconut logs or 44-gallon oil drums on end, with two or more layers of coconut log bearers side butted overhead, and with either  $\frac{1}{2}$ " steel plate or corr. iron on top of the bearers. Outside the walls and overhead framework to an overall thickness of at least 4 ft of earth is placed, with coconuts and strips of dry grass matting incorporated in the earth to assist in cushioning pressures set up by H.E., the structures vary in type and size and lengths from 12 ft to 40 ft, widths from 4 ft to 8 ft, heights - floor to underside bearers 3ft 6ins to 4ft 6ins. Access openings 2 ft wide, are at ends, sometimes on opposite sides and protected from splinters by low earth and coconut walls which serve as emergency fire positions. Loopholes, when provided, are approx 2 ft in length and 4 ins in height, sited at ends and/or sides. Floor levels are very little below the natural surface, in some cases within a few inches, in others, 2 ft below. This results in practically the whole of the strong point being above ground, with consequent difficulties in concealment, although this is assisted as far as possible by suitable siting. The underground water level in this area is generally within one to three feet of the surface, rendering it impossible to excavate to any depth below the surface.
4. Tests were carried out with ammunal charges on typical shelters as follows:-
  - (i) 5 lb charge placed inside shelter central to access opening to represent charge thrown through opening.  
Result:- Considerable blast effect, walls bulged outwards for almost full length of 30 ft, 8 ft of overhead cover above charge collapsed access opening at opposite end disturbed.  
Conclusion:- Charge sufficient to knock out all occupants by irrespective of interior arrangements of slit trenches or protective walls, if any.
  - (ii) 5 lb charge placed outside shelter between access opening and splinter protection wall.  
Result:- Similar to (i) but effect reduced.  
Conclusion:- As for (i).



(iii) 10-lb charge placed halfway up side of shelter, central to length of shelter, not in vicinity of access openings or loopholes.

Result:- Small crater effect with earth, grass matting and coconuts disturbed to diameter 3 ft and maximum depth of 15 inches.

Conclusion:- Structure not damaged and occupants unlikely to be more than slightly shaken.

(iv) 21 lb charge placed central on top of shelter.

Result:- Grater punched through earth, 4 sq ft of corrugated iron over bearers cut through, three bearers in each of the two layers of bearers disturbed by blast, structure otherwise undamaged.

Conclusion:- Occupants likely to be shaken but unlikely to be knocked out except within a few feet of the charge.

5. As a result of these tests it is concluded that the shelters are reasonably shellproof and that attack with explosives externally, will be ineffective unless heavy charges are employed. The design, however, provides little provision internally for blast, making it possible to ensure that occupants are knocked out by H.E. charges of 3 to 5 lbs thrown preferably through access openings or alternatively, exploded externally near these openings.. It is probable that 10 lb charges exploded within a few feet of either access openings or loopholes would knock out occupants by blast.

6. Comms of attacking troops consider that the two main problems are:-

(i) To provide positive action in close support during attack, neutralising strong points and increasing Jap casualties.

(ii) To provide means for rapid mopping up of strongpoints when surrounded. It was stated that this occupies considerable time and casualties, since remnants of Jap troops take refuge in shelters and cannot be readily dealt with by grenades.

7. Close support expedients during and in preparation for attack should preferably be either mobile or capable of operating at ranges approximating 1000 yards, in order to deal with defences in depth.

For this reason, expedients such as the fougasse with its range of 40 yards are of value only in limited cases. In discussion it was considered that flame and possibly explosive, non-poisonous gases would be of considerable value.

Some possibilities are:-

(1) Flame Throwers:-

Haversack type, weight 40 lbs. Considered unsuitable in attack as operator becomes casualty or is pinned before reaching striking distance. Would be of some value in mopping up. Harvey type is unarmoured and cumbersome in movement. Has disadvantage that jet cannot be turned on and off at will but this could be eliminated by improvement of ignition arrangement. Jet operates continuously for 30 seconds. Both types appear suitable for employment from carriers fitted with overhead steel plate. Effective range is approximately 40 yards.

The ideal type appears to be the flame thrower mounted on a tank. This would provide mobility as well as protection for the operator. Flame thrower would be fitted at side or rear of tank, with a quick release arrangement in case of fire. If fire risks from fumes in case of tanks is considered too great, trailer flame thrower is a possibility. In any case the flame thrower will be protected in armour plate.

It is generally considered that a tank mounted flame thrower would be most effective close



(ii) Mortar Fired Oil Bombs:-

There appears to be no practical difficulty in devising a mortar bomb containing a mixture of oil, kerosene and petrol with a small bursting charge to allow diffusion, and with a flash device to either fire independently on impact, or by first firing a number of bombs without the flash devices to explode the gas after a sufficient concentration has been prepared at the target area. The 81 mm mortar appears suitable.

Advantages would be accuracy, ranges probably exceed 1500 yds and simplicity in requiring no special equipment other than the oil bombs.

(iii) Levee Projectors and Improvised Mortars:-

Suitable for firing oil bombs but appears to possess no advantages over (ii) and several disadvantages including less accuracy, special eqpt to be carried, and a slower rate of fire..

(iv) Incenariers:-

Not considered to have any special advantages. Strong points will not readily burn and the flame throwers and mortar fired oil bombs would probably be much more effective.

8. Mopping up operations can be facilitated by the use of H.E. charges for blast effects referred to in para 5. Suitable charges have been made up using 2 to 5 lbs of ammonal in a ration tin container secured to a 36 grenade by a discharger cap, the assembled grenade and blast charge resembling the GERMAN Stick Grenade, with the 36 Grenade as a handle. Detonation of the ammonal charge is ensured by F.I.D. fastened to the grenade, which is primed and fired as when used independently.

It is considered that this expedient is the simplest and most effective for the purpose.

9. Scope may be found for the employment of booby traps and delay action charges in night raids, for which suitable eqpt is available in the form of Murray Switches and Time pencils.

10. As directed by G.E. HQF, experiments have been put in hand in conjunction with 2/25 Aust Pd Pk Coy and the GW Offr HQF to investigate the possibilities referred to in 7 (i), (ii) and (iii).

Further reports will follow when experiments have advanced.

(- IRWIN) Lt-Col.  
CRE 6 Aust Div.

Ref 3/43/17

HQ RAE, 6 Aust Div  
20 Jan 43.

JAPANESE STRONG POINTS - EXPEDIENTS IN ASSISTING ATTACK.

18 Aust Inf Bde.

1. Further to my report 4 Jan 43, progress to date with experier work is:-

FLAME THROWERS.

2. With the cooperation of the CO 2/6 Aust Arm'd Regt a tank is being fitted with a flame thrower and it is expected to be concluded and necessary adjustments made within a few days. The flame thrower being used is a standard Harvey type with all its disadvantages. The method adopted involves no structural changes to the tank, and it is considered will provide a simple and effective means for flame thrower use.



3. Alterations are being made to the Harvey eqpt to provide a valve between the fuel cylinder and the director, conveniently placed for the operator, and an ignition system by means of an acetylene gas jet playing on the fuel stream, itself ignited by an electric spark, switch controlled by the operator.. The method of operation will be for the operator to open the valve and switch on the electric current, which will be supplied from the tank batteries. Closing the valve will stop the flame thrower and the process will be capable of repetition until the fuel supply is exhausted. This system which will, if successful, remove the main disadvantages of the Harvey type flame thrower i.e. unsuitability for intermittent use, has been devised by Capt. L.O. MORTENSEN, 2/25 Aust Inf Par, Coy. Other alterations are of a minor nature, comprising extension of the pipe system and improvements in the director nozzle.

4. No structural alterations are required to the tank, the only alterations required being the mounting of the flame thrower cylinders on the floor and removal of the turret 3.7 mm gun. A steel tube, resembling the gun, takes its place and carries the thrower and acetylene piping and electric cable for the ignition device. The nearest point of combustion to this tk is, by means of the steel tube, kept clear of the tk tracks in case of splash. The turret mounting provides good traversing and elevation control as well as observation and protection for the operator.

5. It is anticipated that an effective range of 40 yds will be obtained and the capacity will be continuous operation for approx 3 mins, sufficient for a number of short bursts. An increase in cylinder capacities may be required to better its performances.

#### MORTAR FIRED OIL BOMBS.

6. Experiments have been carried out with bombs fired from a 3-in Mortar, containing 2 gallons of petrol oil mixture, and reasonable accuracy obtained at max range about 400 yds. The principal disadvantage is the size of the bomb, which, to get the 2-gallon capacity, consists of a pipe the full length of the mortar, with an extended pointed cylinder at the muzzle of the Mortar. A further disadvantage is the comparatively limited range.

7. Further possibilities being investigated are:-


- (a) Projectiles of smaller size and therefore less capacity for petrol oil filling, the object being to provide a similar type of projectile and increase the range.
- (b) Means of firing S.I.P. grenades from mortars or alternatively using a similar filling of yellow phosphorous, water, benzine and rubber, in mortar bombs.

#### BLAST BOMBS.

8. It is understood the BUNA type blast bomb has been used effectively, and that a 2lb amonal charge has been found sufficient. Tests have disclosed failures in this type due to the primacord not detonating. This disadvantage is eliminated by removal of the explosive filler screw from the grenade, packing a small quantity of gelignite into the space and stopping the opening with putty. When the grenade is prepared for use the end of the primacord loop is inserted through the putty into the gelignite. Sketch is attached. Adoption of this method is recommended.

(-IRWIN) Lt-Col.  
CRE 6 Aust Div.






Note Grenade is soldered to ration can as shown in sketch above.

Primer - Cord is inserted in container A & putty placed around hole to keep explosive dry

Primer cord is fixed to grenade with adhesive tape or light gauge wire.

Filling cap at (A) is removed & gelignite priming charge inserted - covered with putty to keep dry when carried Primer - Cord is not inserted in charge, but is inserted approx 1" when it is to be fired.








# BUNA LOCALITY ENLARGED

25 26 27 28 29 30 31



**LEGEND**

- TRACK
- COCONUT PLANTATION
- GRASSLAND
- TIMBER
- SWAMP
- A/A

