AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters, formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/5/14
DIVISIONS

7 Australian Division General Staff Branch (7 Aust Div GS Branch)

June 1943



1/5/14-0479

17 JUL 1943

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118 (adapted.)

Unit HQ 7 AUST DIV Date and Time.—From 1 Jun 43 To 30 Jun 43

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
RAVENSHOE	1 Jun 43		2/4 Aust Fd Regt and 2/51 Aust LAD arrived	
"	10 Jun 43	0800 hrs	HQ 7 Aust Div personnel proceeded on 12 mile route march; returned 1230 hrs	
"	11 Jun 43		Visit of Minister for the Army, Mr F.M. FORDE, and the Adjutent-General (Maj-Gen C.E.M. LLOYD)	
"	"		Inspected brigades and units during training	
"	12 Jun 43		Capt H.N. FLAHERTY GIII (CW) returned from Combined Camflg Trg School, YUNGABURRA	
"	"		C Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt arrived TUMOULIN and came under command 7 Aust Div	
"	14 Jun 43		Capt J.A. JAMES attached temporarily as LO II from 2/31 Aust Inf Bn	
"	17 Jun 43	0800 hrs	HQ 7 Aust Div personnel proceeded on 12 mile route march; returned 1230 hrs	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118 (adapted.)

Unit HQ 7 AUST DIV *Date and Time.—From* 1 Jun 43 *To* 30 Jun 43.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
RAVENSHOE	19 Jun 43		LO I (Maj A.S. McKINNON) departed for RAAF ARMY-AIR COOPERATION SCHOOL, CANBERRA	
"	20 Jun 43		2/7 Aust Cav Regt disbanded; personnel absorbed in 7 Aust Div units	
"	"		7 Aust Div Carrier Coy ceased to be under comd 2/7 Aust Cav Regt and came under comd 7 Aust Div	
"	"		7 Aust Div Exercise No.2 - Mountain Warfare TEWT - GOC (Maj-Gen G.A. VASEY CB CBE DSO) was director; attended by Bde Comds, BMs, and COs of units and Div Tps	See Appx 'Q'
"	23 Jun 43		Capt A.H. McLAY, IO, returned from School of Military Intelligence, SOUTHPORT	
"	"		Visit by C-in-C General Sir THOMAS BLAMEY; inspected Brigades and units during training	
"	24 Jun 43		HQ 7 Aust Div personnel proceeded on 11 mile route march;	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Erase heading not required)

Army Form C.2118 (adapted.)

Unit HQ 7 AUST DIV *Date and Time.—From* 1 Jun 43 *To* 30 Jun 43.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
RAVENSHOE	24 Jun 43		returned 1230 hrs	
"	25 Jun 43		Capt A.H. McLAY, IO, evacuated to 2/2 AGH with recurrent malaria	
	26 Jun 43		Race Meeting was held at TUMOULIN for 7 Aust Div	
	27 Jun 43		Lt-Cols LAWRIE and KENSLER 503 US Parachute Regt visited HQ 7	
			Aust Div for discussion with GOC (Maj-Gen G.A. VASEY, CB CBE DSO)	
	28 Jun 43		Message from 2 Aust Corps that NO more blank amn will be	
			available for training.	
	"		2 Aust Pack Tpt Coy came under Comd 7 Aust Div	
	"		Lieut A. FRANCIS LO III marched out to assume regimental duties	
			with 2/12 Aust Inf Bn	
	30 Jun 43		7 Aust Div Exercise No.3, attended by Bde Comds, BMs, SCs, COs	Appx 'S'
			and Adjts of Div Tps	

LIST OF APPENDICES TO WAR DIARY 1 JUN 43 TO 30 JUN 43

Appendix	Date	Subject
A	3 Jun 43	DRLS Time Table for 7 Aust Div
B	3 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Distribution Lists (Master Sheet)
C	4 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Distribution Lists A,B,C,D.
D	6 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Training Instruction No 3.
E	6 Jun 43	Instruction to Unit Security Officers to attend conference on Security Policy.
F	7 Jun 43	Amendment to 7 Aust Div Training Instruction No 3.
G	9 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Location Statement No 9.
H	11 Jun 43	7 Aust Div GS Instruction No 1.
I	11 Jun 43	7 Aust Div GS Instruction No 2.
J	14 Jun 43	Amendment to 7 Aust Div Location statement No 9.
K	14 Jun 43	Amendment to 7 Aust Div Distribution List (Master Sheet)
L	14 Jun 43	Amendment to 7 Aust Div Distribution Lists A,B,C,D.
M	14 Jun 43	Notification of date and time for conference on Security Policy.
N	14 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Training Instruction No 4.
O	15 Jun 43	Amendment to 7 Aust Div Distribution Lists (Master Sheet)
P	15 Jun 43	Amendment to DRLS Time Table.
Q	16 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Exercise No 2 Mountain Warfare TEWT.
R	18 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Air Raid Warning Net.
S	19 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Exercise No 3 General Instuctions .
T	19 Jun 43	7 Aust Div GS Instruction No 3. Left out of Battle Personnel.
U	20 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Exercise No 3 Opening Narrative.
V	21 Jun 43	Amendment to DRLS Time Table.
W	21 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Carrier Coy reverts to comd 7 Aust Div.
X	22 Jun 43	Amendment to 7 Aust Div Exercise No 3. Opening Narrative.
Y	22 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Training Instruction No5
Z	24 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Location Statement No 10
AA	24 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Exercise No 3 Agenda and Narratives for Discussion.
BB	24 Jun 43	7 Aust Div Training Instruction No 6.
CC	25 Jun 43	Addendum to DRLS Time Table.
DD	25 Jun 43	Warning Order for Div Exercise on 12 Jul 43.
EE	27 Jun 43	Publications
FF	28 Jun 43	7 Aust Div O O No 2
GG	28 Jun 43	Appendix 'G' to 7 Aust Div O O No 2.
HH	30 Jun 43	Unit Vehicle Markings.
II	30 Jun 43	Appendix 'G' to 7 Aust Div Exercise No 3. Detailed List of Officers present 7 Aust Div Exercise No 3

APPENDIX 'G' to 7 Aust Div
Exercise No.3 of 30 Jun 43

OFFICERS TO ATTEND 7 AUST DIV EXERCISE No.3.

			NAME AND APPOINTMENT		
DIRECTING STAFF					
Director	GOC	7 Aust Div	Maj-Gen	G A	VASEY
Assistant	GSO I		Lt-Col	W T	ROBERTSON
Assistant	AA & QMG		Lt-Col	L G	CANET
FORMATIONS AND UNITS					
18 Aust Inf Bde					
	Comd		Brig	F O	CHILTON
	BM		Maj	O D	JACKSON
	SC		Capt	R J S	SEDDON
21 Aust Inf Bde					
	Comd		Brig	I N	DOUGHERTY
	BM		Maj	E S	OWENS
	BM (L)		Capt	H J	KATEKAR
25 Aust Inf Bde					
	Comd		Brig	K W	EATHER
	BM		Maj	G F	LARKIN
	SC		Capt	W	PRENTICE
2/4 Aust Fd Regt					
	CO		Lt-Col	A J	BLYTHE
	Adjt		Capt		LEWIS
RAE 7 Aust Div					
	CO		Lt-Col	R J	THOMPSON
	Adjt		Lieut		GOSSOP
SIGS 7 Aust Div					
	CO		Lt-Col	R K	PARKER
	Adjt		Capt	H N	CHUCK
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn					
	CO		Lt-Col	J T	LANG
	Adjt		Capt	G	BELLMAINE
Medical					
	ADMS		Col	F H	BEARE
	DADMS		Capt	T K S	WHITING
AASC					
	CASC		Lt-Col	D	NELSON
	Senior Sup Offr		Maj	R	FOX
HQ 7 Aust Div					
	GSO II		Maj	I H	LOWEN
	DAQMG		"	P S	SMITH
	DAAG		"	H A	SOLOMON
	ADOS		"	C S	McKAY
	GSO II(L)		Capt	J	DENT
	DAQMG (L)		"	K F	MURDOCH
Miscellaneous					
	DDMS	2 Aust Corps	Brig	R K	NORRIS
	Sqn Comd	5 AC Sqn	S/Ldr		MUIRO
	CO	503 US Parachute Regt	Lt-Col		KENSLER
	Adjt	"	Capt	G	PAGET

SECRET.

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES

HQ 7 Aust Div.
G93/2/320

2 Jun 43.

DRLS TIME TABLE 7 AUST DIV
2 JUN 43.

HQ 7 AUST DIV - HQ 6 AUST DIV - HQ 2 AUST CORPS.

BY RAIL COURIER

Monday to Saturday Only.

Leaves	HQ 7 Aust Div		0600 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 6 Aust Div		0810 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 2 Aust Corps	approx	0930 hrs.
Leaves	HQ 2 Aust Corps		1330 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 6 Aust Div		1430 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 7 Aust Div	approx	1615 hrs.

BY ROAD D/R

		Monday to Saturady	Sunday.
Leaves	HQ 2 Aust Corps	1000 hrs.	0700 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 6 Aust Div	1145 hrs.	0845 hrs.
Leaves	HQ 6 Aust Div	1155 hrs.	0855 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 7 Aust Div	1320 hrs.	1020 hrs.
Closes	HQ 7 Aust Div	1315 hrs.	1015 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 2 Aust Corps	1705 hrs.	1440 hrs.

BRIGADE RUN DRLS.

Closes	HQ 7 Aust Div	0815 hrs.	1330 hrs.
Departs	HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	0855 hrs.	1410 hrs.
"	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde	0905 hrs.	1420 hrs.
"	HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	0915 hrs.	1430 hrs.
"	HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	0925 hrs.	1440 hrs.
"	2/4 Aust Fd Coy	0926 hrs.	1441 hrs.
"	2/5 Aust Fd Coy	0927 hrs.	1442 hrs.
"	2/6 Aust Fd Coy	0928 hrs.	1443 hrs.
"	2/4 Aust Fd Regt	0930 hrs.	1445 hrs.
"	18 Bde Sec Wkshop AEME	0935 hrs.	1450 hrs.
"	25 Bde Sec Wkshop AEME	0936 hrs.	1451 hrs.
"	HQ 7 Aust Div Wkshops AEME	0937 hrs.	1452 hrs.
"	18 Aust Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk	0940 hrs.	1455 hrs.
"	25 Aust Inf Bde Sec Ord Fd Pk	0941 hrs.	1456 hrs.
"	AASC 7 Aust Div	0945 hrs.	1500 hrs.
"	2/6 Aust Fd Amb	0950 hrs.	1505 hrs.
"	2/4 Aust Fd Amb	0955 hrs.	1510 hrs.
"	2/5 Aust Fd Amb	1000 hrs.	1515 hrs.
"	2/7 Aust Cav (Commando) Regt	1010 hrs.	1525 hrs.
"	2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	1015 hrs.	1530 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 7 Aust Div	1040 hrs.	1555 hrs.

LOCAL RUN

Closes	HQ 7 Aust Div	0800 hrs.	1515 hrs.
Departs	Sigs 7 Aust Div	0840 hrs.	1355 hrs.
"	6 Aust CCS	0850 hrs.	1405 hrs.
"	7 Aust Div Salvage Unit	0900 hrs.	1415 hrs.
"	RTO RAVENSHOE	0905 hrs.	1420 hrs.
"	ADCS RAVENSHOE	0910 hrs.	1425 hrs.
"	40 Sup Depot Pl	0920 hrs.	1435 hrs.
"	7 Aust Div Pro Coy	0930 hrs.	1445 hrs.
"	7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	0950 hrs.	1505 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 7 Aust Div	1020 hrs.	1535 hrs

HQ 7 AUST DIV - 110 AUST INF BDE WKSHOPS RUN

Closes	HQ 7 Aust Div	0845 hrs.
Arrives	110 Aust Inf Bde Wkshops	0930 hrs.
Leaves	110 Aust Inf Bde Wkshops	0935 hrs.
Arrives	HQ 7 Aust Div	1005 hrs.

Lowe Maj
for Lt-Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

Distribution: List C
6 extra Sigs 7 Aust Div.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div.
G85/1/327

3 Jun 45.

7 AUST DIV DISTRIBUTION LISTS A, B, C and D.

1. Herewith Master Sheet of Distribution Lists A, B, C and D. All previous lists are cancelled.

2. Distribution is based on the following:

List A - Brigades, services and detached units.

List B - Down to major units.

List C - Down to units and attached and/or detached sub units.

List D - Down to companies and equivalents.

3. A pro forma sheet indicating distribution as attached is being forwarded to Brigades, etc.

Lt-Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

Distribution:

G1	AQ	'A' Office
G11	DAAG	Sigs 7 Aust Div (2)
G11 (L)	DAQMG	War Diary (2)
G111 (O)	ADMS	Spares (6)
G111 (I)	ADOS	
G111 (CW)	ADME	
G111 (L)	'G' Office	

7 AUST DIV DISTRIBUTION LISTS A, B, C and D.

3 Jun 43.

MASTER SHEET

Serial	Unit	List A	List B	List C	List D	Remarks
1	HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	1	2	2	2	
2	5 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn			1	1	
3	J Sec Sigs			1	1	
4	2/47 Aust LAD			1	1	
5	Inf Bn (3)		1	1	6	2/9. 2/10, 2/12 Aust Inf Bns.
6	Total 18 Aust Inf Bde	1	5	8	23	
7	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde	1	2	2	2	
8	6 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn			1	1	
9	K Sec Sigs			1	1	
10	2/59 Aust LAD			1	1	
11	Inf Bns (3)		1	1	6	2/14, 2/16, 2/27 Aust Inf Bns.
12	Total 21 Aust Inf Bde	1	5	8	23	
13	HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	1	2	2	2	
14	7 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn			1	1	
15	L Sec Sigs			1	1	
16	Aust LAD			1	1	
17	Inf Bns (3)		/	1	6	2/31, 2/25, 2/33 Aust Inf Bns.
18	Total 25 Aust Inf Bde	1	5	8	23	
19	7 Aust Div Carrier Coy	1	1	1	2	
20	2/4 Aust Fd Regt	1	1	2	5	
21	E Sec Sigs			1	1	
22	2/51 Aust LAD			1	1	
23	Total 2/4 Aust Fd Regt	1	1	4	7	
24	HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	1	1	1	2	
25	Fd Coys (3)		1	1	4	2/4, 2/3, 2/5 Aust Fd Coys
26	53 Aust Fd Pk Coy		1	1	4	
27	230 Aust LAD			1	1	Under comd 53 Aust Fd Pk Coy
28	7 Aust Div Camflg Trg Unit			1	1	
29	Total RAE 7 Aust Div	1	5	7	20	
30	HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	1	1	1	7	For HQ, HQ Coy, Nos 1, 2 and 3 Coys, Cipher Sec
31	2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	1	1	1	6	
32	HQ Comd AASC 7 Aust Div	1	1	1	2	
33	2/153 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		1	1	5	
34	2/2 Aust Sup Depot Coy		1	1	8	
35	Total AASC 7 Aust Div	1	3	3	15	
36	ADMS 7 Aust Div	1	1	1	2	
37	Fd Amb (3)		1	1	4	2/4, 2/5, 2/6 Aust Fd Ambs
38	7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit			1	1	Att RAE 7 Aust Div.
39	Total Medical 7 Aust Div	1	4	5	15	
40	ADOS 7 Aust Div	1	1	1	2	
41	2/117 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk		1	1	1	
42						
43	7 Aust Div Salvage Unit			1	1	Under comd.
44	Total Ord 7 Aust Div	1	2	3	4	

Serial	Unit	List A	List B	List C	List D	Remarks
45	ADME 7 Aust Div	1	1	1	2	
46	2/117 Aust Ind Bde Gp Wkshop		1	1	2	
47						
48	Total AEME 7 Aust Div	1	2	2	4	
49	7 Aust Div Pro Coy	1	1	1	2	
50	7 Aust Div Sec Recep Camp	1	1	1	2	
51	Camp 7 Aust Div	1	1	1	2	
52	7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office			1	1	
53	7 Aust Div Postal Unit			1	1	
54	7 Aust Div Concert Party			1	1	
55	B Coy 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn			1	2	
56	C Sec FSW			1	1	
57	Total Camp 7 Aust Div	1	1	6	8	
58	Comd and G1	1	1	1	1	
59	G	2	2	2	2	1 for file, 1 for circulation
60	AQ	2	3	3	3	1 for AQ, 1 for DAAG, 1 for DAQMG
61	War Diary	2	2	2	2	
62	File	1	1	1	1	
63	Spares	4	4	4	4	
64	Total 7 Aust Div	27	51	71	176	

War Diary

SECRET.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div.
G85/1/334

4 Jun 43.

7 AUST DIV DISTRIBUTION LISTS A, B, C and D.

1. Herewith Distribution Sheet of the above lists. All previous lists are cancelled.

2. Distribution is based on the following:

List A - Brigades, services and detached units.

List B - Down to major units.

List C - Down to units and attached and/or detached sub units.

List D - Down to companies and equivalents.

Lt-Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

Distribution: List C.

7 AUST DIV DISTRIBUTION LISTS A, B, C and D

DISTRIBUTION SHEET

4 June 43

Serial	Unit	List A	List B	List C	List D	Remarks
1	HQ of an Inf Bde	1	2	2	2	
2	Pl of a Gd Bn			1	1	
3	Sig Sec			1	1	
4	LAD			1	1	
5	Inf Bn		1	1	6	
6	Total Inf Bde	1	5	8	23	
7	Carrier Coy	1	1	1	2	
8	Fd Regt	1	1	2	2	
9	Sig Sec			1	1	
10	LAD			1	1	
11	Total Fd Regt	1	1	4	4	
12	HQ RAE	1	1	1	2	
13	Fd Coy		1	1	4	
14	Fd Pk Coy		1	1	4	
15	LAD			1	1	
16	Camflg Trg Unit			1	1	
17	Total RAE	1	5	7	20	
18	Sigs	1	1	1	7	
19	Pnr Bn	1	1	1	6	
20	HQ Comd AASC	1	1	1	2	
21	Gen Tpt Coy		1	1	5	
22	Sup Depot Coy		1	1	8	
23	Total AASC	1	3	3	15	
24	ADMS	1	1	1	2	
25	Fd Amb		1	1	4	
26	Mob Bath Unit			1	1	
27	Total Med	1	4	5	15	
28	ADOS	1	1	1	2	
29	Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk		1	1	1	
30	Salvage Unit			1	1	Under Comd
31	Total Ord	1	2	3	4	
32	ADME	1	1	1	2	
33	Ind Bde Gp Wkshop		1	1	2	
34	Total AEME	1	2	2	4	
35	Pro Coy	1	1	1	2	
36	Reception Camp	1	1	1	2	
37	Camp	1	1	1	2	
38	Fd Cash Office			1	1	
39	Postal Unit			1	1	
40	Concert Party			1	1	
41	Coy HQ Gd Bn			1	2	
42	Sec FSW			1	1	
43	Total Camp	1	1	6	8	
44	Div HQ Staff	5	6	6	6	
45	War Diary	2	2	2	2	
46	File	1	1	1	1	
47	Spares	4	4	4	4	
	TOTAL	27	51	71	170	

War Diary

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 AUST DIV
6 Jun 43

7 AUST DIV TRAINING INSTRUCTION No.3

1 The present period of training covered by 7 Aust Div Training Instruction No.2 ends on 12 Jun 43. A further period of six weeks training commencing on 13 Jun 43 will be covered by this instruction. Once again it is emphasised that the period is one rather of refresher training than initial training and so will not be divided into individual and collective training periods but that these two types of training will be run concurrently.

2 In drawing up training programmes brigades and units will make allowance for the exercises mentioned below which will be conducted under divisional control -

(a) 20 June - A TEWT in Mountain Warfare. This exercise will be attended by brigade staffs, battalion commanders, the CO 2/4 Aust Fd Regt and CRE.

(b) During the week ending 3 Jul - a brigade exercise will be conducted with the following troops -

25 Aust Inf Bde
54 Bty 2/4 Aust Fd Regt
2/6 Aust Fd Coy
2/4 Aust Fd Amb
det AASC 7 Aust Div
det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy

2/2 Aust Pnr Bn - enemy
21 Aust Inf Bde - umpires

3 A short course in elementary administration will be conducted by Div HQ commencing on 28 Jun 43. Details of this course will be issued shortly.

4 The attention of all commanders is drawn to FSR II Chapter X Secs 93, 97, 98. In these paragraphs the principles underlying operations in mountainous and undeveloped country will be found and should be studied. As an example FSR stresses the tactical importance of clearings or areas where the bush is less thick. The importance of such areas was fully borne out by this division's last campaign. Recent pamphlets issued more-ly enlarge and give examples of the application of these principles.

5 Since the Division has arrived back in Australia there have been many changes in personnel and a large number of personnel without tropical experience has been absorbed. It is therefore essential that a proper training in anti-malarial measures be commenced. These measures will be taught as an "anti-malarial drill", which will be carried out by the whole division for short periods at regular intervals. Detailed instructions will be issued on this subject as soon as proper stores become available.

6 The importance of sound inter-communication need not be stressed. It is vital in any type of warfare, and is of supreme importance, in the jungle where visibility may be nil and thus control difficult to achieve. This difficulty of control and the need for intensive training of all signal personnel were fully brought out in the lessons from the recent divisional exercise. Every effort must be made to improve the standard of signal training throughout the division.

7 Units will be exercised during this period in the tactics of river crossing.

8 In considering tactical problems and in conducting exercises with or without troops, commanders will make full use of the assistance which can be given by 2/4 Aust Fd Regt. The problems of arty support and co-ordination under tropical conditions will be continually studied. In order to facilitate the co-operation between inf and arty the btys of 2/4 Aust Fd Regt will be affiliated to bdes as follows -

7 Bty - 18 Aust Inf Bde
8 " - 21 Aust Inf Bde
54 " - 25 Aust Inf Bde

In all matters dealing with the combined training of the infantry and arty bde comds will deal direct with the CO 2/4 Aust Fd Regt. Arrangements will be made by this HQ to establish a range on which infantry training under arty fire can be exercised.

9 It is hoped that during this period of training units may be exercised in cooperation with army tanks and army cooperation aircraft. Details will be issued later.

W T. Robertson.
Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

Distribution:- List A
Copy for infm -
2 Aust Corps
6 Aust Div
9 Aust Div

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div
6 Jun 43
GS1 11/22

SUBJECT: UNIT SECURITY OFFICERS

1. All units who have NOT already appointed a Unit Security Officer will do so immediately. Where possible thisoffr should be the 2 1/c of the unit.

2. Names and appointments of offrs selected and offrs already appointed will be forwarded through normal channels to reach this HQ by 11 Jun 43.

3. A conference of all unit security offrs will be held shortly - details will be notified later. At this conference, the duties of unit security offrs will be fully explained and any suggestions or queries discussed.

for Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

Distribution:- List A

MESSAGE FORM

IN / OUT	GR	

To - 18 Bde, 21 Bde, 25 Bde, 7 Aust Div Carrier Coy, 2/4 Aust Fd Regt, RAE 7 Aust Div, Sigs 7 Aust Div, 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn, AASC 7 Aust Div. ADMS, ADOS, ADME, 7 Aust Div Pro Coy, 7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp, CAMP, G, AQ, War Diary, rptd to 2 Aust Corps, 6 Aust Div, 9 Aust Div

From - 7 Aust Div	Originators No. 0 4C4	Date 7

ref	our	trg	instn	No.
3	~~para~~	3	(.)	amend
date	of	course	to	read
26	Jul	43	all	informed

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CYPHER	Copies by hand to - ADMS, ADOS ADME, CAMP, G AQ, War Diary	TOO /410 THI TOR

Maj

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

COPY No 54

HQ 7 Aust Div
G 19/2/359

9 June 43.

Subject :- LOCATION STATEMENT No 9

1. Herewith 7 Aust Div Location Statement No 9, as at 2400 hours 8 June 43.

2. It is requested that any errors or omissions be immediately notified to this Head Quarters.

3. Copies of previous location statements will be destroyed.

4. Acknowledge.

for Lt-Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION :

	COPY No		COPY No
18 Aust Inf Bde	1 - 4	2 Aust Corps	33 - 34
21 Aust Inf Bde	5 - 8	RTO RAVENSHOE	35
25 Aust Inf Bde	9 - 14	Comd	36
2/7 Aust Cav Regt	15	G(O)	37 - 39
2/4 Aust Fd Regt	16	G(I)	40
RAE 7 Aust Div	17 - 21	AQ	41
Sigs 7 Aust Div	22 - 24	A	42
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	25	Q	43
AASC 7 Aust Div	26 - 28	Medical	44 - 47
7 Aust Div Pro Coy	29	Ord	48 - 49
7 Aust Div Postal Unit	30	A E M E	50 - 51
7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	31	Reception Office	52
C Sec Aust FSW	32	War Diary	53 - 54
		File	55

- -

Date 43

HQ 7 Aust Div.

Receipt is acknowledged of Copy No ..... of

7 Aust Div Location Statement of 8 June 43.

.....

SECRET

7 AUST DIV LOCATION STATEMENT NO 9

AS AT 2400 HOURS 8 JUNE 43

7 Aust Div Vehicle Sign : KOOKABURRA ON BOOMERANG.

Map Legend: Mt G - Mt GARNET - 1 inch to 1 mile.
P - PALMERSTON- 1 inch to 1 mile.

Serial No.		Unit Vehicle No.	Location	Map Reference	Remarks.
	HQ				
1	HQ 7 Aust Div	84	Tully Falls Rd	P431813	
2	"C" Sec Aust FSW	84	" " "	P431813	
3	HQ B Coy 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn		" " "	P431813	
4	8 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn		" " "	P431813	
	CAV				
5	2/7 Aust Cav Regt	94	B Camp Div Tps Area	Mt G 321813	Waiting instns disposal
	RAA				
6	2/4 Aust Fd Regt	74		Mt G 334810	
	RAE				
7	HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	81	U Camp	Mt G 340808	
8	2/4 Aust Fd Coy	60	"	Mt G 340808	
9	2/5 Aust Fd Coy	89	"	Mt G 340808	
10	2/6 Aust Fd Coy	86	"	Mt G 340808	
11	53 Aust Fd Pk Coy	67		Mt G 341812	
12	7 Aust Div Camflg Trg Unit	73		Mt G 340808	
	SIGS				
13	HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	66	Tully Falls Rd	P431817	
14	C Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	94	B Camp Div TpsArea	Mt G 321813	Under Comd 2/7 Aust Cav Regt
15	E Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	74		Mt G 334810	Under Comd 2/4 Aust Fd Regt.
16	J Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	88	A Bde Area	Mt G 386836	Under Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde
17	K Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	96	B Bde Area	Mt G 382815	Under Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde
18	L Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	65	C Bde Area	Mt G 367819	Under Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde
19	7 Aust Div Cipher Sec	68	Tully Falls Rd	P431813	Under Comd Sigs 7 Aust Div
	INF				
20	HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	88	A Bde Area	Mt G 386836	
21	5 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn		A Bde Area	Mt G 386836	
22	2/9 Aust Inf Bn	50	A Camp	Mt G 390835	
23	2/10 Aust Inf Bn	99	B Camp	Mt G 386832	
24	2/12 Aust Inf Bn	56	C Camp	Mt G 388827	
25	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde	96	B Bde Area	Mt G 382815	
26	6 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	96	" "	Mt G 382815	
27	2/14 Aust Inf Bn	63	G Camp	Mt G 375815	
28	2/16 Aust Inf Bn	61	E Camp	Mt G 379812	
29	2/27 Aust Inf Bn	93	F Camp	Mt G 374812	
30	HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	65	C Bde Area	Mt G 367819	
31	7 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn		" "	Mt G 367819	
32	2/25 Aust Inf Bn	82	J Camp	Mt G 371821	
33	2/31 Aust Inf Bn	91	H Camp	Mt G 374816	
34	2/33 Aust Inf Bn	77	K Camp	Mt G 363818	
35	7 Aust Div Carr Coy		B Camp Div TpsArea	Mt G 321813	Under Comd 2/7 Aust Cav Regt.
	PNR				
36	2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	61	X Bn Area	Mt G 321816	Veh Sign Porcupine on Boomerang.

Serial No.	Unit	Unit Veh No.	Location	Map Reference	Remarks
	AASC				
37	HQ Comd AASC 7 Aust Div	59	W Camp	Mt G 335814	
38	2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	97	"	Mt G 335814	
39	2/2 Aust Supply Depot Coy	64	"	Mt G 335814	
	AAMC				
40	2/4 Aust Fd Amb	57	A Camp Div Tps Area	Mt G 324813	
41	2/5 Aust Fd Amb	52	" "	Mt G 324813	
42	2/6 Aust Fd Amb	70	" "	Mt G 324813	
43	7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	79	Ravenshoe	Mt G 420837	
	AAOC				
44	2/117 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk (less det.)	83	W Camp	Mt G 338812	
45	Det. 2/117 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk	83	Ravenshoe	Mt G 403850	
	AEME				
46	2/117 Aust Ind Bde Gp Wkshop	76	W Camp	Mt G 338812	
47	7 Aust Div Wkshop (less 21 Bde sec)	76	W Camp	Mt G 338812	Awaiting disposal
48	2/47 Aust LAD		A Bde Area	Mt G 388834	Under comd 18 Bde
49	2/51 Aust LAD	74		Mt G 334810	Under comd 2/4 Aust Fd. Regt.
50	2/53 Aust LAD	76	B Bde Area	Mt G 382815	Under comd 21 Bde.
51	230 Aust LAD	67		Mt G 341812	Under comd 53 Aust Fd Pk Coy
	MISCELLANEOUS				
52	7 Aust Div Pro Coy(less dets)	95	Ravenshoe	Mt G 398862	
53	Det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	Tully Falls Road	P 431813	
54	Det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	Mt Garnet	Mt G 994760	
55	7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	50	Tully Falls Road	P 431813	
56	7 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"	P 431813	
57	7 Aust Div Salvage Unit	78	Mt Garnet	Mt G 941736	Under comd ADOS 7 Aust Div.
58	7 Aust Div Reception Camp	71	Tumoulin	Mt G 368912	
59	7 Aust Div Concert Party	90	Tully Falls Road,	P 431813	
	UNITS IN DIV AREA NOT UNDER COMD				
60	C Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt		Tumoulin	Mt G 370305	(only Advance party
61	40 Aust Sup Depot Pl		Ravenshoe	Mt G 405859	2 Aust Corps Tps
62	A Tpt Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		"	Mt G 405837	" "
63	106 Aust CCS		Tully Falls Road.	Mt G 420837	First Aust Army Tps
64	1 Aust Mob Bact Lab		Ravenshoe	Mt G 420837	LHQ Tps
65	2/8 Aust Dental Unit HQ(1), E & C Secs				Att 21 Bde Units
66	2/8 Aust Dental Unit HQ(2), F & B Secs				Att 18 Bde Units
67	2/8 Aust Dental Unit A & D Secs				Att 25 Bde Units
68	2/110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk		Milla Milla Rd	P 495856	2 Aust Corps Tps
69	2/110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Wkshop		" " "	P 495856	2 Aust Corps Tps

7 AUST DIV GS INSTRUCTION No. 1

HQ 7 Aust Div
1 Jun 43

Subject : MAPS

OBJECT

1 The object of this instruction is to set out the system of supply and demand of maps within the division.

2 For the purpose of this instruction, maps will be divided into the following categories:

(i) Operational maps:- those maps on which coy and bn comds etc work - i.e. largest distribution.

(ii) Large scale maps:- 1/4000 to 1/10000 - those used at Bn and Bde HQ's as situation maps.

(iii) General maps:- those used at Bde and Div HQ as situation maps and area maps: i.e. maps of SWPA.

(iv) Photo maps.


DISTRIBUTION LISTS

3 In the event of this Division moving quickly to another area, it is essential to know immediately the number of maps of various categories required in the new area. Therefore, Formations and Units will prepare a distribution list of maps in the following form and submit a copy to this HQ as soon as possible.

For Issue to:-	Class 1 Operational Maps	Class 2 Large Scale Maps	Class 3 General Maps	Class 4 Photo Maps
all offrs				
Bn HQ				
Bn HQ				
1st replacements carried with unit				
TOTAL:				

SYSTEM OF ISSUES AND DEMANDS

4 The following diagram shows the channels of issues and demands for all maps:



During non operational periods, each Bde HQ and Div tps will submit demands for maps to reach this HQ on 1st and 15th day of each month - NIL demands are NOT required. This system will commence forwith. During operations, demands will be made as required by quickest possible means. In urgent cases, units may send demands direct to this HQ.

REPLACEMENT OF MAPS

5 (i) In Jungle Warfare, maps soon become useless through dampness, and rough handling, owing to officers NOT being able to carry map cases.

(ii) IO's must keep this fact in mind when ordering maps and a percentage of replacements must always be carried at the unit HQ.

(iii) To enable new maps or replacements to be carried forward from Adv Map Depot, it is essential that when ordering maps IO's advise this HQ well in advance of likely requirements.

NOTIFICATION OF OMISSIONS OR CORRECTIONS TO MAPS

6 (i) In northern Australia and in many of the islands north of Australia, very few detailed or accurate maps exist. This position is being rectified by field survey units, but we must be prepared to carry out operations frequently on inaccurate maps.

(ii) All personnel must be trained to pass back quickly any information obtained of additions or corrections to the maps on which they are operating. This information can best be sent back in the form of a trace or field sketch, and will show

(a) the person making the report

(b) the source of the information

(c) the time and date of the report

CAPTURED ENEMY MAPS

7 (i) These are frequently an important source of information not only in giving enemy positions, but also in adding topographical detail to our maps of the enemy territory.

(ii) Unit IO's must ensure that in the event of enemy maps being captured they compare them quickly with our own maps and then forward to this HQ as soon as possible for detailed examination.

W T Robertson

Lt Col
GS 7 AUST DIV

Distribution List C.

7 AUST DIV GS INSTRUCTION No. 2

HQ 7 AUST DIV
11 Jun 43

Subject: CONVENTIONAL SIGNS

1 The object of this instruction is to standardise the use of conventional signs within the Division.

2 In mapping and field sketching only those conventional signs shown in Supplement to ATM (Aust) 13 - Map Reading - will be used. These signs supersede those issued in FSPB pam 3 1939 Plate 11 and Manual of Map Reading, Photo Reading,, and Field Sketching - Plate VI.

3 Attached as appx A is a list of conventional signs which will be used on all maps and traces when carrying out route recces.

4 Comds will ensure that all officers, NCO's, and Int personnel receive training in the use of the above conventional signs.

W.T. Robertson
Lt.Col.
GS 7 AUST DIV

Distribution - List B.

[illegible] ARMY [illegible] 1938 (2) Sheet.

Additional to conventional signs as shown on Second Edition 1938 and Standard 1" Series.

(1) ROADS

(a) Surfaces :

Continuous line means sealed surface

Broken line means unsealed metal or gravel surface

Dotted line means unmetalled earth or sand

All vehicular rds should be shown in red.

(b) Widths of Roadway :

A 18' and over enabling two streams of traffic to move at normal convoy speeds

B Other than A and C

C 12' and under, necessitating one-way traffic control for convoys.

(c) Load Limit :

F Fd, incl surface, foundation, brs, culverts, fords, etc is capable of carrying by MT at normal density.

T Capable of carrying MT up to 3 Ton lorries.

H Difficult for MT. Possible for c.w.d. tracked vehs, and H.T.

A Suitable for park rpt only.

(d) Construction :

B : Bitumen
C : Concrete
E : Earth
G : Gravel
M : Metal
S : Sand
UF : Unformed

(e) Condition of Surface :

G : Good
M : Mediocre
B : Bad
VB : Very Bad - state maximum mph if possible

(f) Effect of Weather

Section of road regularly affected by floods To be shown in Blue

Impassable after rain

(2) COVER (one or both sides of road)

Light
Medium } To be shown on one side of road only
Dense

Cover for MT will be shown in green
Cover inaccessible to MT but accessible to cps will be shown in yellow.

(3) DISPERSION FOR MT (one or both sides of road)

Limited
Good } To be shown in green.

(4) BRIDGES

(a) Dimensions :

Cl : Weight carrying capacity will be given (MLC 1) the bridge is marked with Sugar circuit's cables)

L : Length in feet (abutments to abutments)

W : Width in feet (roadway)

H : Height in feet (mean height of roadway above bed of stream)

Clr : Clearance in feet (for AC passing under br, gubmurs etc, height from datum AC to underside of br. For rivers and navigable streams from high water to underside of br.)

(b) Materials used :

C : Concrete
I : Iron
M : Masonary
W : Wood

(c) Detours :

RD : Easily detoured
PD : Construction of detour practicable
ND : Construction of detour impracticable.

(5) FORD LEVEL

Fords will be accompanied by sketch showing area of dock loading space. Time taken for return trip viz from commencement of loading until completion of unloading at same point will be stated.

(6) DEFILES.

Defile

Defiles will be indicated by the word DEFILE and exact position shown by arrow

Defile


Where length of rd is involved, the length of the defile will be indicated by a bracket.

(7) DETOURS

Detours will be marked DETOUR and classification indicated.

(8) GRADIENTS

Or 1 in 6 — Only steep gradient, difficult for HV to negotiate will be shown.

 — Double arrow will indicate (a) commencement of climb (b) Direction of climb. Gradients will be calculated in Auxiliary AOP perspectives.

War Diary.

MESSAGE FORM

IN

OUT

To - List "B", C Sec FSW, 2 Aust Corps, RTO [illegible]

From - 7 Aust Div	Originators No. 0 510	Date 14

SECRET (.) 7 aust div location statement no 9 is amended as follows (.) one (.) add ATV serial 4A C sqn 2/9 aust armd regt TWOFOLD MT GARRET 370305 (.) two (.) add serial 51A det 4 aust armd bde gp wkshop TWOFOLD MT GARRET 370305 under comd C sqn 2/9 aust armd regt (.) three (.) amend pl nos of F coy 2/1 aust HQ gd bn to serial 4 5 pl serial 21 6 pl serial 26 7 pl serial 51 8 pl(.) four (.) delete serial 60 (.) add serial 64A 3 pl 8 aust WAC MT G 387827 all informed

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CYPHER

DRLS all except 2 Aust Corps

TOO 1910
THI
TOR

J.J. Bummer Capt.

Army Form C.2126
(Pads of 100)
Reprinted May, 1941.

W.D.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.

IN

OUT

No. of Groups GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO GI,GLI,GLII(O),GIII(I),GIII(CW) GIII(L),AQ,DAAG,DAQMG,ADMS,ADMS,ADJE, DAPM,G office,A office,SIGS 7 AUST DIV,War Diary (2)

FROM 7 AUST DIV

Originator's Number 0/504

Date 14

In Reply to Number.

~~ref our G85/1/327 of 3 Jun distribution lists MASTER SHEET amend as follows~~ (.) serial 49 under UNIT delete 7 Aust Div Pro Coy and insert DAPM 7 Aust Div (.) add new serial 49A 7 Aust Div pro coy dash 1 1 2 (.) new serial 19A ~~C sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt 1 1 1 2 remarks under cond (.) amend totals~~ accordingly

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN. 1600

SIGNED [signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

System In.	Time In.	Reader.	Sender.	System Out.	Time Out.	Reader.	Sender.	System Out.	Time Out.	Reader.	Sender.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

W.D.

MESSAGE FORM

IN	GR	
OUT		
TO Distribution List "C" W.D.		
FROM 7 AUST DIV	Originators No C1505	Date 14

ref our G85/1/334 of 4 Jun distribution lists DISTRIBUTION SHEET amend as follows (.) serial 35 delete PRO COY and insert DAPM (.) add new serial 35A PRO COY dash 1 1 2 (.) new serial 7a armd sqn 1 1 1 2 remarks under comd (.) amend totals accordingly

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CYPHER	C. DRIS	TOO/540 TTI TOR

MESSAGE FORM

IN	GR	
OUT		
TO Distribution List "A". War Diary.		
FROM 7 AUST DIV	Originators No GSI/211	Date 14

conference of all unit security officers will be held in marquee opposite 25 bde HQ 367818 at 1930 hrs 18 Jun (.) where a unit security officer is absent through illness unit representative will attend (.) units arrange own tpt (.) 7 Aust Div pro coy will provide two MP's for traffic control report Capt CURNEEN HQ 7 Aust Div 0900 hrs 18 Jun

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CYPHER J Curneen Capt	DRLS	TOO THI TOR	1520

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div

7 AUST DIV TRAINING INSTRUCTION No 4. 14 Jun 43

1. Any operation which the Division may be called upon to undertake in the islands to the north of Australia must be an operation for which two conditions hold good. These conditions are:-

(a) The operation must be prefaced by either a move by air or a sea move involving transhipment to and landing from small craft.

(b) The operation will be fought in undeveloped country through which may pass only a few badly constructed roads.

2. These conditions, therefore, dictate that the bulk and weight of the equipment of the division and its transport be cut to a minimum. Just as these factors have a bearing on the equipment of the division and the nature of future operations so will they dictate the equipment to be used for the present training and the nature of this training.

3. In operations the shortage of transport will be felt and the necessity to discard all but the bare essentials of equipment will be experienced. In the present training period units must become accustomed to these things. It is better that units be practised in expedients now, rather than that they should be faced suddenly with improvisation, just prior to setting out on operations.

4. Thus, with this object in view, units will be guided in future training by the following general rules:-

(a) No more than the transport set out in Appx A or its equivalent will be used on any exercise.

(b) All exercises will be based on the assumption that the unit has just either landed from small craft or been landed by aircraft.

5. To elaborate on 4(a) above, Appx A sets out a scale of transport which it is considered reasonable to expect may be available to the division. In the case of units other than infantry, it has been specifically allotted.

6. The infantry will be catered for from a divisional pool, and for the purpose of exercises their scale of transport must NOT exceed the following or its equivalent poundage:-

	Jeeps	Trailers
HQ INF BDE	10	10
INF BN	24	20

7. When working out equivalents, that is to say, when using say a 3 ton truck to represent a jeep or a number of jeeps, the following data will be taken as the basis:-

One jeep carries 600 lbs
One trailer carries 900 lbs

EQUIVALENTS

Type	Jeeps		Trailers
Trucks 15 cwt or 1 ton	1½	and	1½
Trucks 3 ton	5	and	5

8. In working out the amount of transport allowable for an exercise in accordance with this instruction, two points must be kept in mind:-

(a) Any jeep which would normally be drawing a gun, Tk A gun, or water trailer, etc., cannot also be drawing a trailer, and therefore, the additional weight of stores, etc., cannot be counted on.

(b) Additional blankets, greatcoats etc., which would not be carried normally in tropical conditions, will not be counted in the weight of material lifted, and additional transport may be provided for such items.

9. It will appear obvious that with the scale of transport envisaged the whole war equipment of units cannot be carried. So that considerable last minute planning will not be necessary, units will divide their war equipment into three groups.

Group A - Total war equipment of the unit which would be carried were the unit ordered to move from this area to an advanced base.

Group B - That equipment which could be carried in the scale of transport allotted. In this group the man will not be called upon to carry more than his normal fighting equipment, which should not exceed 40 lbs weight.

Group C - That equipment which can be carried on the man when no transport is available. The maximum weight will not exceed 60 lbs per man. Steel helmets will not be included in this scale and will not be carried.

10. It is realised that until the exact conditions of any given operation are known, no firm decisions can be made as to equipment which will be required, but if all units have their equipment divided into the above groups, and lists prepared showing distribution and weight, minor adjustments can be made as required. The grouping in groups B and C will be tested on exercises. At a later date (after the divisional exercise), brigades and divisional troops units will be called upon to submit their lists for consideration.

L T Robertson
Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

Distribution

List B
Copies for info

2 Aust Corps (2)
6 Aust Div
9 Aust Div

APPENDIX "A" to 7 Aust Div Training Instruction No 4.

DIVISIONAL TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR JUNGLE OPERATIONS

SERIAL (a)	UNIT (b)	SUGGESTED TPT JEEPS (c)	SUGGESTED TPT TRAIL-ERS (d)	SUGGESTED TPT WATER TRAI-LERS JEEPS (e)	SUGGESTED TPT MCs (f)	TOTAL JEEPS (g)	TOTAL TRAIL-ERS (h)	TOTAL WATER TRAIL-ERS JEEPS (j)	TOTAL MCs (k)	ADDITIONAL VEHS (l)	Total (m)
1	HQ Div	10	8	1	2	10	8	1	2		
2	FSW Sec	1			2	1			2		
3	Div Cash Office	1				1					
4	Div Postal Unit	2	2			2	2				
5	Div Pro Coy	8			8	8			8		
6	HQ Inf Bde (3) Gd Fl (3) Inf Bn (9)	191	150	12	24	191	150	12	24		
7	Fd Regt	75	48	3		75	48	3			
8	HQ RE	5	4		3	5	4		3		
9	Fd Coy (3)	13	12	1	4	39	36	3	12	4 trucks 3-ton w/winch 9 " " tipping winch 1 " " water 3 trailers air compressor	12 27 3
	Carried forward	306	224	17	43	332	248	19	51		42

DIVISIONAL TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS FOR JUNGLE OPERATIONS

SERIAL	UNIT	SUGGESTED TPT				TOTAL				ADDITIONAL VEHS	Total
		JEEPS	TRAIL-ERS	WATER TRAILERS JEEPS	MCs	JEEPS	TRAIL-ERS	WATER TRAIL-ERS JEEPS	MCs		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
1	HQ Div	10	8	1	2	10	8	1	2		
2	FSW Sec	1			2	1			2		
3	Div Cash Office	1				1					
4	Div Postal Unit	2	2			2	2				
5	Div Pro Coy	8			8	8			8		
6	HQ Inf Bde (3) Gd Fl (3) Inf Bn (9)	191	150	12	24	191	150	12	24		
7	Fd Regt	75	48	3		75	48	3			
8	HQ RE	5	4		3	5	4		3		
9	Fd Coy (3)	13	12	1	4	39	36	3	12	4 trucks 3-ton w/winch 9 " " tipping winch 1 " " water 3 trailers air compressor	12 27 3
	Carried forward	306	224	17	43	332	248	19	51		42

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
	Brought Forward	306	224	17	47	332	248	19	51		42
10	Fd Pk Coy	12	12		4	12	12		4	4 trucks 3-ton winch 9 " " tipping winch 1 " " derrick 1 " " water 1 " " Wkshop 'A' loading 1 " " Wkshop 'T' loading 4 " " semi trailer 3 tractors angle dozer with winch 1 trailer ripper 1 trailer grader 2 trailer 2 wheeled air compressor 1 " welders electric	4 9 1 1 1 1 4 3
11	Camflg Trg Unit			IL							
12	Div Sigs	54	35	2	25	54	35	2	25	3 trucks 3-ton GS	3
13	Fd Amb (3)	9	6	3	2	27	18	9	6		
14	AASC HQ Comd	11	10		6	11	10		6		
15	Sup Depot Coy HQ	8	7	1		8	7	1			
	" " Pl (6)	9	8	1		54	48	6			
16	Gen Tpt Coy AASC,HQ	12	10	2	4	12	10	2	4		
	" " Pl (3)	39	37	2	8	117	111	6	24		
	Carried Forward	460	349	28	92	627	499	45	120		69

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
	Brought Forward	460	349	28	92	627	499	45	120		69
17	Ord Fd Pk	1	1		1	1	1		1	2 trucks 15-cwt GS 3 " 3-ton stores binned 3 " " stores unbinned 1 trailer 2 wheeled water	2 3 3
18	Salvage Unit			NIL							
19	Ind Bde Gp Wkshop				3				3	4 trucks 15-cwt GS 5 " 3-ton GS 1 " " battery charging 3 " " breakdown IP No.4 1 " " garage 1 " " stores binned 4 " " stores unbinned 1 " " water 4 " " wkshop machinery 2 trailers recovery 6-wheeled	4 5 1 3 1 1 4 1 4
20	LAD Type 'A' (2)				1				2	2 trucks 15-cwt GS 1 " 3-ton GS 1 " " stores binned 1 " " garage 1 lorry 6-wheeled b/down	4 2 2 2 2
21	LAD Type 'J'	8	3			24	9				
		469	353	28	97	652	509	45	126		113

Trailers 19

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
	Brought Forward	460	349	28	92	627	499	45	120		69
17	Ord Fd Pk	1	1		1	1	1		1	2 trucks 15-cwt GS 3 " 3-ton stores binned 3 " " stores unbinned 1 trailer 2 wheeled water	2 3 3
18	Salvage Unit			NIL							
19	Ind Bde Gp Wkshop				3				3	4 trucks 15-cwt GS 5 " 3-ton GS 1 " " battery charging 3 " " breakdown IP No.4 1 " " garage 1 " " stores binned 4 " " stores unbinned 1 " " water 4 " " wkshop machinery 2 trailers recovery 6-wheeled	4 5 1 3 1 1 4 1 4
20	LAD Type 'A' (2)				1				2	2 trucks 15-cwt GS 1 " 3-ton GS 1 " " stores binned 1 " " garage 1 lorry 6-wheeled b/down	4 2 2 2 2
21	LAD Type 'J'	8	3			24	9				
		469	353	28	97	652	509	45	126		113

Trailers 19

MESSAGE FORM

IN	GR	
OUT		

TO: G1 G11 G111(O) G111(I) G111(CW) G111(L) AQ DAAG DAQMG ADMS ADOS ADME G .A SIGS 7 AUST DIV WAR DIARY (2)

FROM:	Originators No	Date
7 AUST DIV	0515	15

Ref distribution list MASTER SHEET (.) amend as follows (.) serial 2 delete 5pl insert 6pl (.) serial 2 delete 6pl insert 7pl (.) serial 14 delete 7pl insert 8pl

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CYPHER		TOO/147 THI TOR

MESSAGE FORM

IN	GR	
OUT		
TO : Distribution List "C"		
FROM : 7 AUST DIV	Originators No 0514	Date 15

Ref DRLS timetable (.) amend as follows ¢.) insert after HQ 25 aust inf bdeB pl C aust MAC 0917 hrs and 1452hrs (.) insert after 7 aust div sec reception camp Csqn 2/9 aust armd regt 0952 hrs and 1597 hrs.

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER.	DRLS	TOO 1247 THI TOR

War Diary

7 AUST DIV EXERCISE NO.2.

Mountain Warfare TEWT

HQ 7 Aust Div
16 Jun 43

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Ref Map HERBERTON 1 inch to 1 mile

OBJECT

1. The objects of this TEWT are:-

   (a) To illustrate some of the problems involved in moving through mountainous country.
   (b) To show the tactical importance of the hills in this type of country.
   (c) To show a method of advancing through mountainous country when contact with the enemy is probable.

OFFICERS TAKING PART AND SYNDICATES.

2. The following offrs will take part in this exercise and will be required to work in syndicates as shown:-

Syndicate No. 1.	Syndicate No. 2.	Syndicate No. 3.
Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde	Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde	Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde
BM " " " "	BM " " " "	BM " " " "
C.O. 2/9 Aust Inf Bn	C.O. 2/14 Aust Inf Bn	C.O. 2/25 Aust Inf Bn
C.O. 2/10 " " "	C.O. 2/16 " " "	C.O. 2/31 " " "
C.O. 2/12 " " "	C.O. 2/27 " " "	C.O. 2/33 " " "
C.O. 2/4 Aust Fd Regt	GSO 11	C.O. 7 Aust Div Sigs.
	C.O. 2/2 Aust Pnr Bn.	

TIME AND PLACE

3. The offrs mentioned in para 2 will RV at road and rail crossing 390255 (this crossing is just south of ATHERTON) at 0930 hrs on 20 Jun 43. The exercise is expected to end on road at 333175 at about 1530 hrs.

ROUTE TO RV

4. RAVENSHOE - CHILVERTON - UPPER BARRON - ATHERTON .

LUNCH

5. Officers attending will bring their own lunch. Tea for lunch will be provided by HQ 7 Aust Div.

NARRATIVE

6. Attached as Appx A is the Opening Narrative, Narrative 1, and Problem 1. Syndicates will submit their answers to Problem 1 to reach this HQ by 1200 hrs 19 Jun 43.

for Lt-Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION
One copy to each offr taking part.
GOC
GSO 1
File (2)
War Diary (2)
Copy for infm
2 Aust Corps.

APPENDIX 'A' to
7 Aust Div Exercise No.2
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
dated 16 Jun 43.

OPENING NARRATIVE

(Ref Map - HERBERTON 1 inch to 1 mile).

1 The situation around HERBERTON is not dissimilar to that at KOKODA in August 42. The JAPANESE, having advanced from the South, secured HERBERTON and its airfield in the afternoon of 19 Jun, their strength is unknown but is estimated at approx 2000. Their advance had been opposed by poorly trained units who had not succeeded in causing either much delay or many casualties to the JAP. Elements of these tps are in contact with the JAP to the north of HERBERTON, but these units have become disorganised and have lost their fighting efficiency.

2 The Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde had been sent from MAREEBA via ATHERTON with the troops, as shown, to secure HERBERTON before the arrival of the JAPANESE or, alternatively, should the JAPANESE have occupied it, to recapture it.

HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde
2/9, 2/10, 2/12 Aust Inf Bns
2/6 Aust Fd Coy
F Tp, 2/4 Aust Fd Regt
2/6 Aust Fd Amb

No other formed bodies of Australian troops are in the area. Maintenance is by air dropping. The dropping ground selected for 20 Jun is South of TOLGA.

NARRATIVE 1

18 Aust Inf Bde Gp arrived just South of ATHERTON at 1700 hrs 19 Jun after a long day's march, during which there were no signs of the JAPANESE.

The Bde went into bivouac in this area, with outposts provided by 2/10 Aust Inf Bn on a line through the knoll (to be pointed out on the ground) about 1½ miles South of ATHERTON. The information contained in para 1 of the Opening Narrative was confirmed by stragglers from the forces who had been in contact with the JAPANESE. They also informed Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde that for about four or five miles from the Railway Crossing just South of ATHERTON the road was flanked on the right by tree covered hills and on the left the country was flat and mostly timbered except for the first mile or so. Beyond that the road ran up a narrow valley flanked on both sides by timbered hills, some of which were high and steep.

The Bde Comd decided to advance on HERBERTON on 20 Jun.

PROBLEM 1

Give the order of march of 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp for the advance on 20 Jun and also the time of start of the main body in relation to the advance guard.

Three extra for Sigs 7 Aust Div.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div
GS/S/390
15 Jun 43

SUBJECT: AIR RAID WARNINGS


1. Attached is Air Raid Warning Net for 7 Aust Div area. This cancels all previous systems of spreading air raid warnings in this area.

2. Units etc are responsible for warning other units as indicated on the diagram, priority reading from left to right.

3. In addition, units etc will warn any unit in their area which may NOT be included in those on the attached diagram.

Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

Distribution:
One to each unit and sub-unit shown on diagram.
Three extra for Sigs 7 Aust Div


CAMO
SIGS
R2O
P2O
KANTEEN
HQ 44 SC
HQ D.A.E
2/2 PARAS
7 Amb Coy

SECRET.

7 AUST DIV EXERCISE NO.3

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

OBJECT.

1. This exercise will take the form of a discussion with the object of considering the problems which arise from para 1(a) 7 Aust Div Training Instruction No 4 when applied to movement by air.

POSTPONEMENT OF 25 BDE EXERCISE.

2. In view of the shortage of time before the divisional exercise and the necessity for considering the problem mentioned in para 1 before units proceed with further training the exercise scheduled in 7 Aust Div Training Instruction No 3 para 2(b) is cancelled. It is intended that an exercise based on the discussion will be conducted at a later date, involving the troops which were to have been employed in the exercise mentioned above.

PLACE AND TIME.

3. The discussion will be held at HQ 7 Aust Div commencing at 0900 hrs and concluding at 1700 hrs on 30 Jun and if necessary 1 Jul 43. For outline time table of exercise see Appx "A".

DIRECTING STAFF.

4. Director - GOC 7 Aust Div
Assistant - GSO1
Assistant - AA&QMG

OFFICERS ATTENDING.

5. The following Offrs will attend the exercise:-

18 Aust Inf Bde	-	Comd
		BM
		SC
21 Aust Inf Bde	-	Comd
		BM
		SC
25 Aust Inf Bde	-	Comd
		BM
		SC
2/4 Aust Fd Regt	-	CO
		Adjt
RAE 7 Aust Div	-	CRE
		Adjt
Sigs 7 Aust Div	-	CO
		Adjt
2/2 Aust Fnr Bn	-	CO
		Adjt
Medical	-	ADMS
		DADMS
AASC	-	CASC
		Senior Sup Offr
HQ 7 Aust Div	-	GSO11
		DAAG
		DAQMG(L)
		ADOS

MEALS.

6. Lunch will be provided for Offrs attending.

[signature]
Maj
for Lt-Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

19 Jun 43.

DISTRIBUTION.

2/4 Aust Fd Regt
RAE 7 Aust Div
Sigs 7 Aust Div
18 Aust Inf Bde
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde
2/2 Aust Fnr Bn
Comd AASC 7 Aust Div
GCC
G3O1
AA&QMG
ADMS
ADOS
War Diary (2)
File (2)

Copy for Information
2 Aust Corps.

Appx "A" to 7 Aust Div

Exercise No 3

General Instructions

OUTLINE TIMETABLE FOR EXERCISE No 3

19 Jun	Issue General Instructions
21 Jun	Issue Narrative, Basic Data, Proforma Staff Tables and Requirement I.
24 Jun	Issue Agenda for Discussion.
29 Jun	Solution to Requirement I to reach HQ 7 Aust Div by 1200 hrs.
30 Jun	Discussion - commences 0900 hrs.
1 Jul	Discussion continued if necessary.
2 Jul	Issue decisions reached during discussion.

SECRET

7 AUST DIV GS INSTN No 3

"Left out of Battle Personnel"

1. Prior to certain types of action, or a particular type of move (e.g the initial landing in a combined operation, or a move by air) units may be required to leave a trained nucleus of officers, NCO's and men out of battle, to provide a body of trained personnel on which to reform a unit in the event of very heavy casualties.

2. These personnel will be known as "Left out of Battle Personnel" (LOB) and will be withdrawn from units prior to action, and also during advanced training. Their disposal will be the subject of separate instructions upon each occasion though normally they will remain within the brigade area.

3. LOB personnel will be changed regularly, and during advanced training may be used as enemy or umpires as applicable.

4. Attached as Appx "A" are details of units and personnel concerned.

19 Jun 43

for Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

Distribution
18 Aust Inf Bde
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde
2/4 Aust Fd Regt
RAE 7 Aust Div
2/2 Aust Fnr Bn
7 Aust Div Carrier Coy
Comd
G(B)
AQ (2)
File (2)
War Diary (2)

LEFT OUT OF BATTLE PERSONNEL

APPENDIX 'A' to 7 Aust Div GS Instruction No.3 of 9 Jun 43

	Offrs	ORs
(a) A FIELD REGIMENT RAA		
2 i/c (iii)	1	
Capts	3	
Lieuts	2	
Surveyors or Computers		3
GPOAs or OPAs		3
BSM or TSM		3
Sgts (nos 1)		6
Signal Sgts or Bdrs		3
Signallers		12
Bdrs MT or Mechanics MT		3
Gunners (suitable as Gun Layers)		12
	6	45
(b) FIELD COMPANY		
One Offr	1	
One WO or Sgt		1
One Cpl		1
9 ORs (incl two Drs MT)		9
	1	11
(c) INFANTRY BATTALION		
2 i/c (iii)	1	
Five Offrs (i)	5	
Two WOs) one from each Coy		2
Three Sgts)		3
7 Cpls		7
41 ORs (ii)		41
	6	53
(d) PIONEER BATTALION		
2 i/c (iii)	1	
Six Offrs (i)	6	
Two WOs) one from each Coy		2
Three Sgts)		3
9 Cpls		9
47 ORs (ii)		47
	7	61
(e) DIVISIONAL CARRIER COMPANY		
One Offr	1	
One WO or Sgt		1
One Cpl		1
8 ORs (incl One Dr MT)		8
	1	10

Notes: (i) Incl an offr suitable to replace Adjt but not to include QM. Three to be made up of Majors or Capts.

(ii) Incl 3 Sigs, 2 Mortar Personnel, 2 MG personnel

(iii) 2 i/c or other officer suitable for Comd.

SECRET.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div
G21/12/403
20 Jun 45

Subject: 7 AUST DIV EXERCISE No.3 -
OPENING NARRATIVE AND BASIC DATA

Forwarded herewith Opening Narrative and Basic Data for 7 Aust Div Exercise No 3.

W T Robertson
Lt-Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION

2/4 Aust Fd Regt
RAE 7 Aust Div
Sigs 7 Aust Div
18 Aust Inf Bde
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde
2/2 Aust Fnr Bn
Comd RASC 7 Aust Div
GOC
GSO1
AA&QMG
ADMS
ADOS
ADME
War Diary (2)
File (2)
Copy for Information
2 Aust Corps
Brig. Morris - 2 Aust Corps.

SECRET

7 AUST DIV EXERCISE NO 3

OPENING NARRATIVE AND BASIC DATA

OPENING NARRATIVE

1. Our forces holding the tropical island 'B' have been attacked by the JAPS. Our forces consisted of two independent Companies who had recently been sent to the island to prevent the JAPS from developing the emergency landing ground which is on it. The JAPS landed one Battalion Group and by gaining surprise they inflicted heavy casualities on our troops and drove them back to positions covering the landing strip through which they are being maintained. The position is serious and not unlike the position at WAU during the early part of this year.

2. Information from the usual source indicates that the JAPS intend to land the balance of the regiment and six tanks in the near future. Thus it becomes imperative to reinforce our garrison as quickly as possible. We have no troops immediately available so it has been decided to move a Brigade Group from Northern Australia by fast ships to the advance base 'A' and thence by air. The composition of this Brigade Group is shown as Appx A.

3. The task of this Brigade is to establish itself in the area of the village 'Q' (see sketch Appx B) and whilst protecting the landing strip carry out offensive operation against the enemy.

4. Some topographical notes and a sketch of the island 'B' are attached as Appx B. The island is about one hour's flying time by transport from the advanced base 'A'.

BASIC DATA

5. In the calculations necessary to arrive at the answer to Requirement 1 the following basic data will be used:-

(a) Personnel to be moved - see Appx 'C'
The weight of each man with personal equipment and kit (not including weapons) will be taken as 250 lbs.

(b) Rations
All personnel will carry -
(i) three days field operational rations
(ii) two days emergency ration

(c) Scale of Equipment and Ammunition
Group B equipment and ammunition (see 7 Aust Div Trg Instn No 4)
Arty equipment will be one troop 25 pdr lt (Aust) Mk 1 and one troop 25 pdr Mk 11

(d) Scale of Transport
Transport in accordance with Appx 'C' will be taken.

(e) POL
Each vehicle will emplane with full tank and one 4 gall drum of petrol.
Additional petrol will be loaded in Jeep carrying planes as set out in para 5 (d)

(f) Plane Capacity
Douglas DC3 planes will be used with a capacity of 5000 lbs.
The dimensions are in accordance with the sketch att as Appx 'D'.

(g) Availability of Planes
D day : 100 plane loads pers and equipment
D + 1 day: 80 plane loads pers and equipment
20 plane loads maintenance

D+2 to Completion of landing programme	: as for D+1	with possible reduction for moving reserve of ammn supplies etc and reinforcements.

(h) Reserves of Amn. etc.
These will be considered in detail at the discussion and are not necessary for Requirement I.

TACTICAL LOADING FOR AIR MOVE

6. In considering the tactical loading of planes for an air move the following principles will be followed:-

(a) Where it is desired that several units or dets of units should move together they should move in the same flight (for this exercise six planes in each flight) but should not be mixed in the same plane. In other words personnel and stores of units as differentiated from sub-units will NOT be mixed in the same plane.
(b) Sub-units where possible should move complete in flights.
(c) Stores should be distributed among planes so that the personnel riding in the plane can unload it quickly. Where possible NOT more than 1000 lbs of stores should be carried in mixed planes. Personnel per plane should be limited to twenty.
(d) Planes carrying jeeps should be loaded either with:-
(i) two jeeps
(ii) one jeep and trailer
(iii) three trailers
The balance of available weight should be made up with POL.

The first six planes to carry jeeps should also carry unloading ramps (weight about 500 lbs.) This will ensure that an adequate supply of ramps are available at the destination.

REQUIREMENT 1

7. Brigades, Units and services will submit the following data for each of the units shown in the Order of Battle Appx A to reach this HQ not later than 1200 hrs 29 Jun.

(a) Summary of Personnel, weapons, technical equipment, signal equipment, ammunition and, general stores to be transported. This should be submitted in accordance with the pro-forma and example att as Appx E.

(b) Plane Loading Table for each unit of the Order of Battle submitted in the form of Appx F.

8. Three copies of each will be submitted. CASC need NOT submit tables for the det Div Tpt Coy.

SECRET

Appendix A to Opening Narrative and Basic Data 7 Aust Div Exercise No3.

ORDER OF BATTLE 'X' FORCE

HQ	HQ Inf Bde
	Pl Cd Bn
ARTY	Bty Fd Regt
	Bty Lt AA (Airborne)
ENGRS	Fd Coy
SIGS	Bde Sec Div Sigs
INF	Inf Bns (3)
	Fwr Pn
AASC	Pls Sup Pen Coy (2)
	Tpt Pl Lt Tpt Coy
	Relief Driver Increment
	Pl Div Tpt Coy (less two secs)
MED	Fd Amb with surgical team att
AAOC	Det Bde Ord Fd Pk
AEME	LAD (Type J)
	Det Bde Wkshop
MISC	One Sec Div Pro Coy
	Det Div Postal Unit
	Det Air Support Control (Type A)
	Det Salvage Unit.

Appx B to Opening Narrative
And Basic Data 7 Aust Div
Exercise No 3.

ISLAND 'B' - Topographical Notes

Ref Attached Sketch

General

1. Island 'B' is country similar to the BUNA-GONA country, but has rather more and larger kunai patches. There are large tracts of rain forest and swamp as shown on the sketch.

Towns and Roads

2. There are only two villages of any importance on the island. They are 'M' which is the mission station on the coast and 'Q' a native village, and tea growing centre about 30 miles inland from 'M'. The two towns are joined by a good motor track. For the rest, with the exception of the track from 'Q' to the lake 'K' which could be developed to a jeep track, the tracks in the island are rough native pads. At 'Q' is the landing strip. This is undeveloped and merely a cleared strip of kunai but is on good high ground. It's present capacity is not more than six planes at one time.

Rivers

3. The river 'P' is the only river of any importance in the island. It drains from the huge volcanic lake 'K' and at the part where it passes 'Q' is about 150 yds wide, normally about 6 ft deep and flows at about 2½ knots. This river drains into the vast impenetrable swamps of southern 'B'.

Coast


4. The north and west coasts are very dangerous and reef infested. They are guarded by high cliffs and no access tracks are known to exist over the high mountain range which fringes them. And, on account of the swampy nature of the southern coast the only suitable landing places are in the vicinity of 'M'.

Population

5. The island is sparcely populated by a shy race who have retired to the mountain fastnesses in the vicinity of lake 'K'.

As nothing will induce them to leave these hills there are no natives in the coastal area of the present operations.

ISLAND "B"



LEGEND

Rd suitable for MT
Tracks which could be made Jeepable
Native Huts
Rivers

LEGEND

Swamps - Impassable
Rain Forests
Kunai Patches
Coconut Trees
Rubber Plantations
Airfield
Rocky Cliffs

0020327


SHR No.	UNIT	TE	HQ			SUB (f)			TO TOW			TRANSPORT		ARMS			REMARKS
			Offrs	ORs	Total	Offrs	ORs	Total	Offrs	ORs	Total	Jeeps	Trailers	25 Pr (Sp II)	25 Pr Lt.	40 mm AA	
i	ii	iii	iv	v	vi	vii	viii	ix	x	xi	xii	xiii	xiv	xv	xvi	xvii	xviii
1	HQ Inf Bde	II/2/3	16	56	72 (a)				16	56	72						
2	Pl HQ Gd Bn	III/63A/1	1	44	45				1	44	45						
3	Bty Fd Regt	III/80/1	10	165	178	1	15	16	9	153	162	5	5	4	4		
4	Bty Lt AA (Airborne)	III/270/2	7	142	149				7	142	149					12	
5	Fd Coy	II/10A/4	7	244	251	1	11	12	6	233	239	3	3				
6	Bde Sec Div Sigs	II/11A/1	2	51	53 (b)				2	51	53						
7	Inf Bns (3)	II/12C/2	102	2322	2424 (c)	18	159	177	84	2163	2247						
8	Fwd Bn	II/12C/2	33	881	914 (d)	7	61	68	26	820	846						
9	Pl Sup Dep Coy (2)	IV/40A/2	4	60	64				4	60	64						
10	Tpt Pl (1) RCT (1) } Lt Tpt Coy	II/14B/2 II/14F/2	1	92	93				1	92	93	56	33				
11	Pl Div Tpt Pool (less two Secs)	Est. submitted	1	48	49				1	48	49	29	24				To provide for Inf Bns and Bde HQ
12	Fd Amb	II/16/3	12	220	232 (e)				12	220	232						
13	Det Bde Ord Fd Pk	II/19/2		6	6					6	6						
14	LAD (Type J)	II/18C/1	1	16	17				1	16	17	1	1				
15	Det Bde Wkshop	II/18/2		10	10					10	10						
16	Sec Div Pro Coy	II/20/2		16	16					15	15						
17	Det Div Postal Unit	II/21/5		2	2					2	2						
18	Det Div Salvage Unit	II/27/2		4	4					4	4						
19	Det Air SC (Type A)	III/58A/1	1	19	20				1	19	20	1					
	TOTAL		198	4401	4599	27	246	273	171	4155	4325	75	66		32		


NOTES :

(a) Tropical Scale plus 1 IOC ar. Batman from Div, 1 Ordnance Officer, less 3 Chaplains and Batmen to .3, 6 Ord lies for Sig Sec.
(b) Plus 6 Orderlies from Bde H, and 2 Cipher personnel from Div Cipher Sec.
(c) Plus per Bn : 20 ORs in Pioneer Pl, 1 Chaplain and Batman att from Bde H), less 1 Sjt at Base.
(d) Plus 20 ORs in Pioneer Pl, 10 Riflemen. less 1 Sjt at Base.
(e) Tropical Scale.
(f) Ref 7 Aust Div GS Instruction No.3 of 19 Jun 43. Bty [illegible] Fd Regt : 1 Capt, 1 Computer, 1 CSM, 1 Bdr, 2 Nos 1 Div [illegible] 4 5 5, 1 Mech MT, 4 Dnrs.

Appx B Pa 7 Aust Dr. Engrng
No 8 - Cargo Vehicle and
Equip Data

DETAIL OF CARGO SPACE DOUGLAS DC3 TRANSPORT PLANE





Typical Section
at A-A

Cross Section
at BB

Cross Section
at CC

Cross Section
at DD

DETAIL OF SEAT

SECRET

APPENDIX 'E' to 7 Aust Div Exercise No.3. - Opening Narrative and Basic Data.

SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL, EQUIPMENT ETC

GROUP 'B'

WE Table.....

UNIT. LAD (Type 'J') WE. II/18C/1

SER No. (i)	DETAILS (ii)	INDIVIDUAL WEIGHT (lbs) (iii)	NUMBER TAKEN (iv)	TOTAL WEIGHT (v)	REMARKS (vi)
	Personnel				
	Offrs	250	1	250	Personnel will be as shown in Cols X & XI Appx 'C'
	ORs	250	16	4000	
	Weapons				
	Rifles				
	LMGs				
	etc				
	Ammunition				
	.303				Only that NOT carried on the men will be shown.
	etc				
	Technical Stores				Brief details only required.
	Signal Stores				
	General Stores				

PLANE LOADING TABLE

Unit _____ Date _____ "W" _____ "W" Table _____

Plane Ser No	Sub-Unit	Serial Comd	Loading													Total Weight For Plane	Remarks
			Personnel				Stores (lbs) by natures							Vehs & Guns			
			Offrs	ORs	Tot	Weight (lbs)	Weapons	Amn	Signal	Mechanical	Rations	General	POL	No and Type	Weight (lbs)		

MESSAGE FORM

TO LIST C		
FROM 7 AUST DIV	0538	21

ref DRLS timetable (.) delete 2/7 aust cav (commando) regt and insert 7 aust div carrier coy

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

T.O.C 10H 7

T.H.I.

Signed [signature]

T.C.R.

Originator's Instructions
Degree of priority

DRLS

War Diary

MESSAGE FORM

TO LIST A

FROM 7 AUST DIV 0539 21

7 aust div carrier coy reverts to comd 7 aust div

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

Signed [signature]
Originator's
instructions
Degree of priority

DRLS

T.O.O. 1047

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 AUST DIV
G21/12/412
22 Jun 43

Subject : 7 AUST DIV EXERCISE No.3
OPENING NARRATIVE AND BASIC DATA

Forwarded herewith amendment No.1 to above.

Lt-Col
GS 7 AUST DIV

DISTRIBUTION

2/4 Aust Fd Regt	AA & QMG
RAE 7 Aust Div	ADMS
Sigs 7 Aust Div	ADOS
18 Aust Inf Bde	ADME
21 Aust Inf Bde	War Diary (2)
25 Aust Inf Bde	File (2)
2/2 Aust Par Bn	Copy for information
Comd MASC 7 Aust Div	2 Aust Corps
GOC	Brig MORRIS - 2 Aust Corps.
GSO1	

AMENDMENT No.1 TO 7 AUST DIV EXERCISE No.3
OPENING NARRATIVE AND BASIC DATA

Para 5, Sub-para (a) - delete and insert new sub-para:-

5 (a) Personnel to be moved - See Appx 'C'.

The weight of each man with personal equipment and kit including rifles, LMGs, and SMGs, and such ammunition as is carried on the man will be taken as 250 lbs.

SPARES.

SECRET

7 AUST DIV TRAINING INSTRUCTION No. 5

TRAINING OF DIV CARRIER COY

1. During the present period of training ending 25 Jul 43, 7 Aust Div Carrier Coy will be employed as follows:-

Individual Training
Weapon Training
Driving and Maintenance Instruction
Organization and Equipment of Carrier Coy.

2. ROLES OF DIV CARRIER COY

(a) In general the Carrier Coy will be employed, either as a whole or by pls in the manner set out in MTP No 39 Part 1 Chap 11. The employment of carriers in close co-operation with inf will be the same as for bn carrier pls in the past.

(b) In operations in non jungle country the role of the Div Carrier Coy may be that of recce ahead of the forward infantry or to a flank.

(c) On occasions it may be necessary to employ the Carriers of the Coy as armoured transport vehs, to carry ammn and food to positions which cannot be reached by other means.

(d) If tanks are att to the Div it may be necessary to employ carriers for the refuelling and rearming of the tanks.

(e) Tasks such as that envisaged in (b) above, the defence of airfields or other independent tasks, call for independent action by the Carrier Coy, and training for this purpose will be carried out.

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF CARRIERS

(a) Carriers are not tanks and will not be used as such.

(b) It must be remembered that the carrier is not protected on the top, and therefore it cannot, even if the ground permits, be used successfully in close fighting in the jungle; the very nature of this type of fighting leaves the carrier at a dis-advantage from the start.

4. New uses for carriers will suggest themselves during training and every opportunity for trial and experiment should be taken before operations commence.

Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

22 Jun 43

DISTRIBUTION

List A
Copy for Information
2 Aust Corps
6 Aust Div
9 Aust Div

Date.....43

HQ 7 AUST DIV

Receipt is acknowledged of Copy No..... of 7 Aust Div Location Statement No.10 of 24 Jun 43.

.....

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE — SECRET

HQ 7 AUST DIV
G19/2/424
24 Jun 43
Copy No. 54

Subject : LOCATION STATEMENT No.10

1 Herewith 7 Aust Div Location Statement No.10, as at 2400 hours 23 Jun 43.

2 It is requested that any errors or omissions be immediately notified to this Headquarters.

3 Copies of previous location statements will be destroyed.

4 Acknowledge.

Lt-Col
GS 7 AUST DIV

DISTRIBUTION

	Copy No.		Copy No.
18 Aust Inf Bde	1 - 4	2 Aust Corps	32 - 33
21 Aust Inf Bde	5 - 8	RTO RAVENSHOE	34
25 Aust Inf Bde	9 - 12	Comd	35
C Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	13	G(O)	36 - 38
		G(I)	39
2/4 Aust Fd Regt	14	AQ	40
RAE 7 Aust Div	15 - 19	A	41
Sigs 7 Aust Div	20 - 22	Q	42
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	23	Medical	43 - 46
AASC 7 Aust Div	24 - 26	Ord	47 - 48
7 Aust Div Pro Coy	27	AEME	49 - 50
7 Aust Div Postal Unit	28	DAPM	51 - 52
7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	29	Reception Office	53
		War Diary	54 - 55
C Sec Aust PSW	30	File	56
- Coy 2/1 Aust MG Gd Bn	31		

Date.....43

HQ 7 AUST DIV

Receipt is acknowledged of Copy No..... of 7 Aust Div Location Statement No.10 of 24 Jun 43.

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7 AUST DIV LOCATION STATEMENT No 10

AS AT 2400 HOURS 25 JUNE 43

7 Aust Div Vehicle Sign: KOOKABURRA ON BOOMERANG

Map Legend: Mt G-MT GARNET - 1 inch to 1 mile
P -PALMERSTON - 1 inch to 1 mile

Serial No.		Unit Vehicle No	Location	Map Reference	Remarks
	HQ				
1	HQ 7 Aust Div	84	Tully Falls Rd	P431813	
2	"C" Sec Aust FSW	84	" " "	P431813	
3	HQ "B" Coy 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	225	" " "	P431813)	Veh sign Swan on boomerang.
4	5 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	225	" " "	P431813)	
	AFV				
5	"C" Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt	53	Tumoulin	Mt G 370905	Veh sign Pine tree and Crocodile on boomerang
	RAA				
6	2/4 Aust Fd Regt	74		Mt G 334810	
	RAE				
7	HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	81	U Camp	Mt G 340808	
8	2/4 Aust Fd Coy	60	"	Mt G 340808	
9	2/5 Aust Fd Coy	89	"	Mt G 340808	
10	2/6 Aust Fd Coy	86	"	Mt G 340808	
11	53 Aust Fd Pk Coy	67		Mt G 341812	
12	7 Aust Div Camlg Trg Unit	73		Mt G 340808	
	SIGS				
13	HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	66	Tully Falls Rd	P431817	
14	C Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	94	" " "	P431817	
15	E Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	74		Mt G 334810	Under Comd 2/4 Aust Fd Regt
16	J Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	88	A Bde Area	Mt G 386836	Under Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde
17	K Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	96	B Bde Area	Mt G 382815	Under Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde
18	L Sec Sigs 7 Aust Div	65	C Bde Area	Mt G 367819	Under Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde
19	7 Aust Div Cipher Sec	68	Tully Falls Rd	P431813	Under Comd Sigs 7 Aust Div
	INF				
20	HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	88	A Bde Area	Mt G 386836	
21	6 Pl 2/1 Aust HQ Gd Bn	225	A Bde Area	Mt G 386836	Swan on Boomerang
22	2/9 Aust Inf Bn	50	A Camp	Mt G 390835	
23	2/10 Aust Inf Bn	99	B Camp	Mt G 386832	
24	2/12 Aust Inf Bn	56	C Camp	Mt G 388827	
25	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde	96	B Bde Area	Mt G 382815	
26	7 Pl 2/1 HQ Gd Bn	225	" "	Mt G 382815	Swan on Boomerang
27	2/14 Aust Inf Bn	63	G Camp	Mt G 375815	
28	2/16 Aust Inf Bn	61	E Camp	Mt G 378812	
29	2/27 Aust Inf Bn	93	F Camp	Mt G 374812	
30	HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	65	C Bde Area	Mt G 367819	
31	8 Pl 2/1 HQ Gd Bn	225	" "	Mt G 367819	Swan on Boomerang

Serial No.	Unit	Unit Veh No.	Location	Map Reference	Remarks
32	2/25 Aust Inf Bn	82	J Camp	Mt G 371821	
33	2/31 Aust Inf Bn	91	H Camp	Mt G 374816	
34	2/33 Aust Inf Bn	77	K Camp	Mt G 365818	
35	7 Aust Div Carr Coy		B Camp Div Tps Area	Mt G 321813	
	PNR				
36	2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	61	X Bn Area	Mt G 321813	Veh Sign Porcupine on Boomerang
	AASC				
37	HQ Comd AASC 7 Aust Div	59	W Camp	Mt G 335814	
38	2/155 Aust Gen Tpt Coy	97	"	Mt G 335814	
39	2/2 Aust Sup Dep Coy	64	"	Mt G 335814	
	AAMC				
40	2/4 Aust Fd Amb	57	A Camp Div Tps Area	Mt G 324813	
41	2/5 Aust Fd Amb	52	" "	Mt G 324813	
42	2/6 Aust Fd Amb	70	" "	Mt G 324813	
43	7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	79	RAVENSHOE	Mt G 400857	
	AAOC				
44	2/117 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk (less det)	83	W Camp	Mt G 338812	
45	Det 2/117 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk	83	RAVENSHOE	Mt G 403850	
	AEME				
46	2/117 Aust Ind Bde Gp Wkshop	76	W Camp	Mt G 338812	
47	7 Aust Div Wkshop (less 21 Bde Sec)	76	W Camp	Mt G 338812	Awaiting disposal
48	2/47 Aust LAD	88	A Bde Area	Mt G 388834	Under comd 18 Bde
49	2/51 Aust LAD	74		Mt G 334810	Under comd 2/4 Aust Fd Regt
50	2/59 Aust LAD	96	B Bde Area	Mt G 382815	Under comd 21 Bde
51	230 Aust LAD	67		Mt G 341812	Under comd 53 Aust Fd Pk Coy
52	Det 4 Aust Armd Bde Gp Wkshop	94	TUMOULIN	Mt G 370305	Under comd C Sqn 2/9 Aust Armd Regt Veh sign Palm Tree & Crocodile on Boomerang.
	MISCELLANEOUS				
53	7 Aust Div Pro Coy (less Lets)	98	RAVENSHOE	Mt G 398862	
54	Det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	Tully Falls Road	P 431813	
55	Det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	Mt Garnet	Mt G 994760	
56	7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	60	Tully Falls Road	P 431813	
57	7 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	"	P 431813	
58	7 Aust Div Salv Unit	78	Mt Garnet	Mt G 941736	Under comd ADOS 7 Aust Div
59	7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	71	TUMOULIN	Mt G 368912	
60	7 Aust Div Concert Party	90	Tully Falls Road	P 431813	

Serial No.	Unit	Unit Veh No.	Location	Map Reference	Remarks
			UNITS IN DIV AREA NOT UNDER COMD		
61	40 Aust Sup Depot Pl		RAVENSHOE	Mt G 405859	2 Aust Corps Tps
62	A Tpt Pl 131 Aust Gen Tpt Coy		"	Mt G 405837	" "
63	106 Aust CCS		Tully Falls Road	Mt G 420837	First Aust Army Tps
64	1 Aust Mob Bact Lab		RAVENSHOE	Mt G 420837	LHQ Tps
65	B Pl 8 Aust MAC			Mt [illegible] 387827	
66	2/8 Aust Dental Unit HQ(1), B & C Secs				Att 21 Bde Units
67	2/8 Aust Dental Unit HQ(2), F & B Secs				Att 19 Bde Units
68	2/8 Aust Dental Unit A & D Secs				Att 25 Bde Units
69	2/110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Ord Fd Pk		MILLA MILLA Road	P495856	2 Aust Corps Tps
70	2/110 Aust Ind Bde Gp Mkshop		" "	P495856	2 Aust Corps Tps

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 AUST DIV
G21/13/425
24 Jun 43

SUBJECT: 7 AUST DIV TRAINING No 3
AGENDA AND NARRATIVES FOR DISCUSSION

1. Attached hereto are the Agenda and Narratives for the discussion.

2. In the Agenda it will be noted that certain Officers have been called upon to consider in detail the various subjects for discussion and to open that particular discussion. COs of other arms and services and Staff Officers attending the conference should consider each subject with particular reference to their own arm or service.

Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

ATTACHMENTS

2/4 Aust Mtd Regt	A & QMG
AA 7 Aust Div	ADOS
Sigs 7 Aust Div	ADOS
18 Aust Inf Bde	[illegible]
21 Aust Inf Bde	War Diary (2)
25 Aust Inf Bde	File (2)
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	Copy for information
Comd ASC 7 Aust Div	2 Aust Corps
CO	Dril WORRIS - 2 Aust Corps
ADOL	5 FC Sqn RAAF

SECRET

7 ARMY DIV EXERCISE No 8

AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION

Serial No	Subject for Discussion	Discussion opened by	Narratives to be referred to in considering the subject. (See Appx "A")
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)
1	Introductory remarks	Comd 7 Inf Div	
2	Movement of a Division to an advanced base.	A & Q	Narrative 1
3	Suitability of the order of battle of 'X' Force as set out in Appx 'A' to the opening narrative for the task and information given in Narrative 2	Comd 25 Bde	Opening Narrative Narrative 2
4	Arrangements necessary prior to moving to the embarkation area(s)	A & Q	"
5	Requirement 1 viii para 7 of the Opening Narrative	Bde Comds and Cdr Div Tps	"
6	The desirability of not mixing units in ships	Comd 18 Bde	"
7	Sequence of loading and despatch of ships in view of tactical information given in Narrative 2	Comd 25 Bde	"
8	Arrangements necessary at the embarking ports(s)	Comd 21 Bde	"
9	If the situation depicted in Narrative 3 took place how would the pilot of the recce plane know that the strip was in our hands	Comd 25 Bde	Narrative 3
10	Action of leading flights on arrival at the destination in view of Narrative 3	Comd 18 Bde	Opening Narrative Narrative 2
11	Organisation necessary to control the destination landing strip	Comd 21 Bde	"
12	Development of the destination landing strip (a) Tactical (b) Engr Aspects	Comd 21 Bde CRE	"
13	Landing of maintenance & reserves of ammunition, rations etc.	A & Q	"
14	Communications at destination in situations envisaged by Narratives 4(a) & 4(b)	CO Div Sigs	Narrative 4
15	Medical arrangements in situations as for 14 above	ADMS	"
16	Considerations occasioned by situation in Narrative 5	Comd 18 Bde CRE	Narrative 5
17	Further organisation and development of the landing field in view of Narrative 6	Comd 21 Bde CRE	Narrative 6
18	Action taken by Comd 'X' Force on receiving the information contained in Narrative 7	Comd 25 Bde	Narrative 7

SECRET

Appx "A" to 7 Aust Div
G21/12/25 of 24 Jun 43

SITUATION 1

7 Aust Div is training in the present area when it is ordered to move to the forward base III. The move of the main body is to commence seven days after the receipt of the order to move.

The forward base III is situated in the Talene to the north of which it and its ports all the facilities required of a Base.

SITUATION 2

The enemy to base I has been engaged and the whole division is now disposed about five miles from the two main landing fields.

On D-1 day the GOC, 7 Aust Div, was called to a conference by the local Force Cmdr, and was given the following information and order:-

(a) The position at Talene III is considerably complicated by the fact that some hours ago it was extremely serious. The strength of the two Independent Companies at Talene III is now reduced and they are hard pressed with difficulties in the area covering the landing strip. The last of information available is shown on the attached sketch (Appx "B"). This sketch is the best available of the area. Talene III lying in the mountains is hilly and malarious.

(b) It has been decided that III Force, composed as shown in Appendix III of the Operation Instruction will be flown in as quickly as possible commencing on the day following the conference (D day). The task of this force will be to establish itself in the area of the village and thereafter to capture the landing strip and carry out offensive operations against the enemy.

(c) The air situation is now favourable and has almost reached parity. Several fighter squadrons as well as close protection will be provided throughout the move.

(d) Naval liaison officers have arranged for all available assistance and ships in order of ships have been arranged to Talene III. They will take in the first of six. The complete force will be ready to sail with [illegible] hours notice. One of this force will be [illegible] 100 has a Div. [illegible] that ships will [illegible] 100 has a draught of [illegible] ships could only go to Talene III. The capacity of the ships at III is six ships.

(e) Owing to the state of the tide at III it is only possible to use 20,5 ships at one time owing to bad landing conditions.

(f) Advance Base HQ will not available but it is important to move the Landing Craft HQ to the forward base to its own sites.

(g) The Independent Coy are to be relieved as soon as possible by "X" Force and returned to Force "A".

SITUATION 3

During the night D-1/D day the Airfield at Talene III [illegible] was cut by the enemy and the contact was lost between Talene III with Talene III. The Local Force Commander decides, however, that the operation will continue according to plan if the landing strip is still in our hands. He directs that a report will be made at first light on D day to determine if this is so.

SITUATION 4

(a) The landing ground does prove to be serviceable, and by the evening of D+1 day the units as named in "Bullet for Discussion 7" have been landed.

(b) The whole of Force III has been landed.

NARRATIVE 5 (Narrative 4(b) has now been cancelled)

Up till the finish of flying on D+2 Day troops as agreed in Subject for Discussion have landed. The first flight on D+3 day has just landed when a large force of enemy fighters and bombers appears. The Drome is heavily bombed, 30 x 500 lb bombs hitting the runway, and destroying five out of the six planes on the ground. Our casualties are 20 killed and 45 wounded. In the meantime the enemy fighters have attacked the second flight shooting down four out of the six planes. The raid was costly from the enemy's point of view as they lost over 50 planes, but they did succeed in preventing any further flying for D+3 Day.

NARRATIVE 6

The 6 mtr guns asked in Narrative 4 to the Drome has been received and it is now D+6 Day and the bulk of 'X' Force has been landed. Comd 'X' Force receives the following message :-

"Your signal (.) Ten send X Force (.) indications enemy propose land reinforced regiment at X night D+6/D+7 (.) our AF attacking (.) in view this improbable you develop landing strip to their present capacity or build new strip immediately for transports."

NARRATIVE 7

It is D+8 Day and work is proceeding on the landing strip. 'X' Force has had some success and now has possession of the whole of the Kumi areas surrounding the landing strip. The enemy have been driven back into the jungle along the track towards 'Y', but 'X' Force is striking stiff opposition and slow progress is being made.

At about 1200 hrs Comd 'X' Force intercepts a message from a coast watching station which is high in the mountains overlooking Lake 'Y'. The message reveals the startling news that at least twenty large flying boats have landed on Lake 'Y' and numbers of JAP soldiers can be seen being ferried ashore in rubber boats.


SITUATION AS AT 1200 HRS D-1 DAY
ANX B TO G 21/12/425
24 JUN 45

LOCALITY MAP - VILLAGE 'Q'

ENLARGED FROM MAP 'ISLAND B'

2 INS TO 10 MILES

RF. 1:63360



LEGEND

RD SUITABLE FOR MT...
TRACKS WHICH COULD BE MADE JEEPABLE...
NATIVE PADS...
RIVERS...

V.I. - 50 FT.

SCALE: 1 INCH TO 1 MILE

MILE 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES
YDS 1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 YDS

LEGEND (CONT.)

KUNAI PATCHES
TEA PLANTATION...

REPRODUCED BY GSI 7 AUST DIV FROM AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS

0020338

War Diary

SECRET

7 AUST DIV TRAINING INSTRUCTION No.6

AIR CO-OPERATION

1 5 (AC) Sqn RAAF is now in 2 Aust Corps Area and will be ready to commence training in co-operation with formations immediately.

2 The possible methods of air co-operation available from this sqn are listed as Appendix 'A'.

3 Aircraft allotted for co-operation will be in support and not under command of brigades and units for training exercises.

4 Requirements of this formation for the period 20 Jun/14 Jul 43 have been submitted and approved, and are being forwarded to brigades and units under separate cover. Subsequent outline demands for period 15 Jul/15 Aug 43 and later will be submitted to this HQ not later than 10 days prior to commencement of period concerned.

5 Upon approval of outline demands, detailed arrangements will be finalised direct with ALO from 5 AD Coy.

6 In the absence of an air support control, units will use their own resources coupled with those of the co-operating sqn. Attached as Appendix 'B' is a diagram showing suggested communications which are within the resources of Brigade and Unit Sig Secs. Existing facilities may not allow of this in practice, and brigades and units should experiment to arrive at the most suitable intercommunication having regard to available equipment.

7 It is known that the scope of an army co-operation sqn in jungle country is limited and that the Recognition Signals, set out in Manual of Direct Air Support Appendix 'I' are generally impracticable. However, it is emphasised that the methods set out in this Manual are still applicable in many cases and should be used where possible. Improved methods of recognition may suggest themselves during this period of training and experiments to this end will be conducted.

8 In cases of direct support, identification of our own troops by supporting aircraft has been successful by use of the following:-

(a) 2" mortar illuminating fired as nearly vertically as possible.
(b) 3" mortar phosphorous bomb (airburst)

Stocks of the former are being procured on a provisional scale of four flares per 2" mortar. These should be available shortly. Efforts are being made to obtain supplies of the latter to enable experiments to be made.

9 It is stressed that these signals would only be used to identify one particular pre-arranged point in a demand for direct support, the danger of using this method to identify all forward posts to aircraft being self-evident.

24 Jun 43

Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

DISTRIBUTION

List A

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2 Aust Corps
6 Aust Div, 9 Aust Div

APPX A to 7 Aust Div
TRAINING INSTRUCTION NCC.

NOTES ON POSSIBLE METHODS OF
AIR CO-OPERATION.

Based on present equipment of 5 (AC) Sqn RAAF

1 A/C/R AND CONF.A/C/R.

(a) Camps and Installations - Recce for location and identification of camps of opposing type and kpt, - report on dispersal and concealment.

(b) Tactical Reconnaissance - Recce for location and identification of own or opposing type and kpt, - report on dispersal and concealment.

(c) Topographical - Recce of roads and tracks for report on suitability for movement of kpt-recce of rivers and creeks, with oblique photographs for study by CRA for possible crossings - recce of bridges, with oblique photographs for study by CRE, and location of targets.

2 ARTY RECCE As above for CRA, and location of targets.

3 NIGHT RECCE Limited use of parachute flares for locating large concentrations.

4 RECOGNITION PROCEDURE. Procedure for challenge, reply and identification of our own tps and MGs, in roles mentioned in para 1.

5 RECCE CODE. Use of recce code for R/T reports or dropped messages.

6 "T" PANEL CODE Limited practice in "T" code.

7 MESSAGE DROPPING - In conjunction with exercises.

8 MESSAGE PICKING UP - Sqn equipment NOT suitable.

9 ARTY OBSERVATION - Observing and directing fire on to pre-arranged or impromptu targets-methods, 2 way R/T; 1 way R/T; "Heath Robinson" (no R/T).

10 A.A. Attacks on AA positions-train AA crews (report by AA crews on vulnerability of A/C in different types of attack, for instruction of air crews).

11 SUPPLY DROPPING.

(a) PARACHUTE CONTAINERS: - Sqn equipment at present unserviceable - new equipment may be available later.

(b) FREE DROPPING - Bundles NOT larger than 12" cube-experiment with packing and weight of drop - experiment with special crates for free dropping from bomb-racks.

12 SMOKE SCREENS Two smoke generators held by sqn, more in process of manufacture. Each container holds 8 gals - giving approximately 400 yard screen with stannic chloride. Limited supply of stannic available.

13 PHOTOGRAPHY Five overlaps-small mosaics-stereo pairs-hand held obliques. Sqn NOT able to take oblique overlaps or MERTONS. Equipment does NOT permit large printing orders, which must be sent to BULK PRINTING SEC. Personnel NOT available for producing "Stuck down" "Mosaics" in quantity.

14 PASSENGER FLIGHTS - One passenger per A/C provided R/T or photography NOT required. GOC's approval necessary. Lists of authorized passengers and nature of flight to be submitted by Formations.

15 DIRECT SUPPORT

(a) Sqns primary role is co-operation but direct support can be carried out, provided W/T facilities provided by others. Sqn has one W/T tender which can be made available.
(b) Methods of requesting support.
(c) Methods of directing A/C onto target - R/T; strips; smoke bombs.
(d) A/C can drop 8½ or 11 lb practice bombs (smoke) on "hard" targets. (Attitude of NORTH EASTERN AREA regarding bombing on unauthorised ranges is NOT known).
(e) A/C are not permitted to drop flour bombs on troops.

16 PILOT TRAINING

Sqn has recently received many new and untrained crews to replace postings to operational sqns. Facilities should be given for these to become familiar with various army formations, units, and equipment.

Special Training - Train pilots in recognition of various types of blocks; traps; mine fields etc, and types of gunfield; Tank Attack; AA.

17 A/C CAPABILITIES

WIRRAWAY - 2½ hours range at 135 mph.
6 practice bombs.
2 night parachute flares.
R/T good results with Army 109.

TIGER MOTH - 2½ hours range at 85 mph.

Sqn at present has 14 WIRRAWAYS, 5 TIGER MOTHS.

18 REQUIREMENTS OF GROUND/TROOPS

Ground strips and Discs.
Ground indicators (Formation and unit shapes).
Provision for attracting A/C-smoke; flares.
"T" panel code books.
Copy of Recce Code.

19 FORMATIONS TO SUPPLY TO AIR LIAISON SECTION

W/T frequencies.
Code Names
Code letters of the day (identification)
Any special ground indicators.(Technical Units).
Map codes.
Appreciate location Statements.


20 LIAISON OFFICERS

During fulfilment of Formations' photographic demands, it will be difficult for an Air Liaison Officer to carry out extensive liaison with units.

Details of exercises should therefore be developed well in advance, and co-ordinated as far as possible by divisions.

Appx "B"
To 7 Aust Div Training Instn N°6

AIR COOPERATION.



MESSAGE FORM

TO List'C' (6 extra copies for Sigs)

FROM 7 AUST DIV 2564 25

ref DRLS timetable (.) D/D service to 2 Aust Corps on SUNDAYS now same as week days

This message may be sent AS TELEGRAM by any means except T/T

DRLS

T/O
T/I
T/F

N Blackwell Capt

MESSAGE FORM

TO LIST A

FROM 7 AUST DIV CSCS 25

WARNING ORDER (.) div ... (.) expected time of commencement AM 12 Jul 43

If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER. T.O.O 1610 T.O.I T.O.R

Signal ... Capt

Ord Master Instructions ... of priority

DRLS

War Diary

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

HQ 7 Aust Div
G17/1/442
27 Jun 43

Subject : PUBLICATIONS

LIST A

1. Enquiries disclose that difficulty is being experienced in obtaining manuals, pamphlets and memoranda essential for training.

2. It is proposed therefore to make representation to higher authority and, if necessary to place a consolidated indent for the whole Division.

3. All units will submit by 3 Jul 43 a return showing:-

(a) Publications indented for and NOT yet received.

(b) Additional publications required.

4. Requirements should be considered carefully in view of the present paper shortage and general manpower situation.

5. A reasonably up to date list of publications is available for perusal at this HQ.

[signature]
Lt-Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

SECRET

Copy No. 33

28 Jun 43

7 AUST DIV OO No 2

(Ref 7 Aust Div Adm Circ Q16 para 5 (d))

Ref Map : MT GARNET one inch to one mile.

INFORMATION

1 A ceremonial parade and march past is being held on NEWMARK PARK RACECOURSE 041736 on Saturday 17 Jul 43.

2 The C in C LHF is inspecting and addressing the parade, and taking the salute at a march past of the Division.

INTENTION

3 7 Aust Div will parade at NEWMARK PARK RACECOURSE on 17 Jul 43.

METHOD

4 Parade Formation - See Appendix 'A' attached.

(a) The Division will parade without vehicles, and will form up in line of units in close column.

(b) Units will be organised so that sub-units are of even strength. The number of sub-units per unit may be increased above normal if necessary. Unit frontages must be from 21 to 25 files allowing a lateral space of 40 ins per man (i.e. a unit frontage of approximately 25 yds).

(c) Interval between units 5 yds.

(d) Diagrammatic layout of a unit on the Inspection line is shown in Appendix 'B' attached.
Appendix 'B' also shows relative positions of Bde Comds, Staffs and Unit Comds on the Inspection Line.

(e) Positions for Bde Comds, Staffs, and Unit Comds for the March Past are shown in Appendix 'C' attached. (see also MTP No 18 Plate 7).

(f) Officers will remain in front of their coys and will NOT take post in review order.

(g) WO's and Sjts not required to act as guides, will form serrefile but other NCOs will be distributed in the ranks.

5 Grouping

Unit or Formation	No. of Units on Inspection Line
HQ 7 Aust Div 'C' Sec 2/3 3 Coy 2/1 Aust MG Bn (less three pls) 7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office 7 Aust Div Postal Unit	1

PTO

5 Grouping (Contd)

UNIT or FORMATION	No. of Units on Inspection Line
2/4 Aust Fd Regt Sig Sec & LAD	1
RAE 7 Aust Div	1
Sigs 7 Aust Div	1
19 Aust Inf Bde	4
21 Aust Inf Bde	4
25 Aust Inf Bde	4
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	1
7 Aust Div Carrier Coy	1
AASC 7 Aust Div	1
AAMC 7 Aust Div	1
AAOC 7 Aust Div AEME 7 Aust Div	1

6 Assembly and Dispersal

(a) Routes to parade positions are shown on Appendix 'E' attached.

(b) Movement within outer rail of race track will be in accordance with March Table Appendix 'F' attached.

(c) Bde and Unit Comds will time movement from camp sites so as to arrive at outer rail of race track at times shown. Units using same route will arrange by liaison times of movement from camp sites.

(d) Bde and Unit Comds will ensure that routes through scrub from camp sites to race track are cleared of grass etc., on 15 Jul 43.

(e) After March Past and on passing point 'F' the following will turn right and return to camp sites via track and main road:-

HQ 7 Aust Div
2/4 Aust Fd Regt
Sigs 7 Aust Div
21 Aust Inf Bde
25 Aust Inf Bde
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn

The remainder will continue along track and return to camp sites by the same routes as for move to parade positions.

(f) In order to avoid bunching after marching past, NO halting will be permitted until camp sites are reached.

7 Marking of Parade Ground - see Appendix 'A'

The following marking is being carried out under Div arrangements. As soon as each unit is in position it will remove the unit sign, flag and pegs referred to in sub para (a) below, and stack them near the running rail in rear of the unit. RE 7 Aust Div will collect all flags and pegs after the march past.

(a) On Inspection Line

(i) A unit serial number will mark the right, and a flag the left of each unit frontage. Pegs in rear of unit serial number, will mark the right marker of each sub-unit.

(ii) Unit Comds will arrange to supply one unit sign per unit to CRE before 12 Jul 43 for this purpose.

(b) For the March Past

(i) Passing line will be in the centre of the race track.

(ii) Red flags will mark points C and D at which the salute will begin and finish respectively.

(iii) Blue flags will mark points A,B,E and F.

(iv) Small furled flags at 25 yard intervals will mark the passing line.
These flags will give sub-unit comds a guide as to when to give command "eyes front".

8 Order of Parade

Is given in Appendix 'D' attached. This starts at the approach of Bde Comd.

9 Timing

(a) Units will be in position, bayonets fixed, on Inspection Line by 0915 hrs.

(b) C in C MEF will arrive at 0930 hrs.

10 Saluting

On Inspection Line: Units not carrying rifles will remain at attention during "Present Arms". All officers will salute on the third movement of the Present.

In March Past

(a) Bde Comds and their staffs will salute without word of command, on reaching point 'C'.

(b) Unit Comds on reaching point 'C' will order, "... Bn, in succession, eyes right". Unit Comds will salute.

(c) Each sub-unit Comd will order "Eyes Right", as he passes point 'C', and "Eyes Front", when the rear of his sub-unit has cleared point 'D'. The right hand man of leading three will NOT turn his head and eyes to the right.

PTO

(d) All officers will salute (ref Manual of Ceremonial Chap III Sec 15 (iv)) the following points being observed:-

(i) Left arm steady at the side

(ii) Shoulders parallel with the ground, and kept square with the front.

(iii) The right upper arm in line with the shoulders.

(iv) The officer will look at the Inspecting Officer in front of, and NOT in rear of his right hand and forearm. When it is no longer possible, owing to the movement forward, to look at the Inspecting Officer, the position of the salute will be maintained in accordance with (i), (ii), and (iii) above, until the command "Eyes Front" is given.

(v) Officers should NOT stiffen the body unnaturally or step short during the salute.

11 Words of Command

(a) Orders by the Parade Comd will be repeated by Bde, and Unit Comds in accordance with Appendix 'D' attached.

(b) In order to ensure that units work simultaneously the following procedure will be adopted:-

(i) On the cautionary word being given by the Parade Comd a large red flag located in front of the parade, near the dais will be raised. This flag will be held aloft, until all Unit Comds have given the cautionary word (Lieut D F SAUNDERS - HQ 7 Aust Div - will control this flag).

(ii) Unit Comds will give executive word of command as the flag is lowered.

(c) Should the execution of the above procedure be interrupted, Unit Comds will conform as quickly as possible to the movement they are in execution.

12 Rest

After reaching parade position, and until arrival of Div Comd, troops may be allowed to sit down. After arrival of Div Comd troops will NOT sit down.

13 March Past

See Appendix 'D' attached serials 14, 15, and 16.

14 Rehearsal and Recce

(a) Units will carry out as many rehearsals as possible before the parade. These rehearsals must be designed to impress on all ranks, the sequence of orders and movements shown in Appendix 'D'. Arms Drill will be practiced on 14 and 15 Jul 43.

(b) A full dress rehearsal will be held on the site of the parade on 16 Jul 43. Units to be in position on Inspection Line be 0915 hrs. The same timings as for 17 Jul will apply.

(c) Bdes and units will arrange to send a recce party to report to Chief Marshal at the ground at 1000 hrs on 15 Jul 45. These recce parties will locate parade positions and routes to them, and act as guides to units for the rehearsal and parade.

15 Marshalling

(a) Chief Marshal — Maj I H LOWEN - HQ 7 Aust Div

(b) Assistant Marshals — Each Bde, 2/4 Aust Fd Regt, 2/2 Aust Fmr Sn, and RAE 7 Aust Div will detail one junior officer to report to Maj LOWEN on parade ground at 1400 hrs on 16 Jul 45. These officers are to be available for duty until after the parade on 17 Jul.

(c) Marshals will wear red arm bands provided by HQ 7 Aust Div.

16 Bands

(a) Bands will be provided as follows:-

(i) 18 Aust Inf Bde - combined band

(ii) 21 Aust Inf Bde - combined band

(iii) 2/33 Aust Inf Bn

(iv) 2/2 Aust Fmr Bn

(v) 21 Aust Inf Bde - combined Pipes and Drums.

(b) For the march on of units, and until after the inspection bands will be massed in rear of the parade see Appendix 'A'.

(c) For the march past bands will move to a posn opposite the dais, and on right side of the running rail, where they will play on position during the march.

(d) When all units have marched past, bands will move through gate on to track and march past in rear of the Div.

(e) Capt J B DUNSTAN HQ 7 Aust Div, will act as Staff Officer Bands, and will make detailed arrangements for:-

(i) Musical Programme

(ii) Movement of Bands

(iii) Rehearsals

17 Dress

(a) Offrs

(i) All officers :- SD, belts web, hats turned up. NO anklets, pistols, sticks or gloves.

(ii) Staff officers will NOT wear arm bands.

(b) OR's

SD, belt and bayonet, hats turned up. Anklets web will NOT be worn. Rifles will be carried by units armed with rifles. Men carrying sub-machine guns will be concentrated on left of their sub-unit.

PTO

18 Amplifying System

2/9 Aust Inf Bn is providing and operating a public address system, with the co-operation of Sigs 7 Aust Div.

19 Spectators and Official Guests

(i) Area enclosed by race track will be out of bounds to all spectators during the parade.

(ii) Official guests will arrive via main entrance to MOOMBA PARK, and will be accommodated in the Grandstand.

(iii) Other spectators may use that portion of the grandstand not reserved for official guests.

20 Photography

(a) During Parade and C in C's address - the area between the Dais and Inspection Line will be out of bounds to photographers.

(b) During [illegible] motion photographers will be permitted on the [illegible] ground.

(c) During March Past - the race track will be out of bounds to photographers.

21 Security of Camps

Sufficient personnel will be left in unit camp sites to ensure security during absence of units.

22 Constructional Work

Instructions to CRE for following work are contained in Appendix 'G' (to Aust 7 Aust Div only).

(a) Construction of Dais and Saluting Base

(b) Removal of railings from fences to allow passage of troops, and replacing same after parade.

(c) Erection of flag poles.

(d) Enclosures for guests etc.

(e) Marking the ground.

23 Special Duties

(a) Maj P S SMITH - HQ 7 Aust Div will escort C in C AMF.

(b) Maj H SOLOMON - HQ 7 Aust Div will be staff officer on duty at Dais and Saluting Base, and will be responsible for breaking the flag.

ADM

24 Pro

7 Aust Div Pro Coy will arrange traffic control etc., under instructions to be issued by Maj as follows:-

(a) Control of Spectators

(b) Control of Photographers

(c) Control of Visitors' cars.

(d) Control of official enclosures.

(e) Outriders (six) for C in C.

25 Boots

As units will have to march from camp sites to parade positions, each unit should provide materials to polish boots before the parade.

26 Medical

(a) ADMS will arrange for the following to be in position at ea. of three aid posts shown on sketch Appendix 'A':-
medical officer with first aid kit.
motor ambulance.

(b) In the event of men falling out during parade they will be assisted to rear. Personnel fulfilling this task will first unfix their bayonets.

27 Latrines

RAE 1 Aust Div will construct screened shallow trench latrines at points shown in Appendix 'A'.

INTERCOMM

28 Div Report Centre - (Capt J DUNN) will be established at Dais by 0845 hrs on days of full dress rehearsal and the parade. Bde and Unit Comds will send to this centre:-

(a) Report on arrival of Bde or Unit on Inspection Line.

(b) Bde or Unit parade state by 0905 hrs.

[signature]
Lt-Col
GS 7 AUST DIV


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
Time of Signature 1600 hrs

Issued through Sigs

DISTRIBUTION

UNIT	OO No.2	Appendices A to F	Appx G
	Copy Nos.	Copy Nos.	Copy Nos
18 Aust Inf Bde	1 - 4	1 - 4	-
21 Aust Inf Bde	5 - 8	5 - 8	-
25 Aust Inf Bde	9 - 12	9 - 12	-
2/4 Aust Fd Regt	13	13	-
RAE 7 Aust Div	14	14 - 18	1
Sigs 7 Aust Div	15	19	-
2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	16	20	-
7 Aust Div Carrier Coy	17	21	-
AASC 7 Aust Div	18	22 - 24	-
AATC 7 Aust Div	19	25 - 29	-
AAOC 7 Aust Div	20	30 - 32	-
AEME 7 Aust Div	21	33 - 34	-
7 Aust Div Pro Coy	22	35	-
Comd	23	36	2
G	24 - 26	37 - 39	3
AQ	27 - 28	40 - 41	4
Camp	29	42	-
DAPM	30	43	-
File	31 - 32	44 - 45	5-6
War Diary	33 - 34	46 - 47	7-8
Spares	35 - 39	48 - 52	-
For Information			
2 Aust Corps	40	53	-






Scale 1 inch to 200 feet.

DIAGRAMMATIC LAYOUT OF A UNIT ON THE INSPECTION LINE SHOWING RELATIVE POSNS OF BDE COMDS AND BDE STAFF

Appx "C"
to 7 Aust Div OO N° 2.
Dated 28 JUN 43
Copy N° 46



5 places

25 places

1 place

5 places

3 places
1 places
2 places
2 places

5 places

3 places
3 places
2 places
2 places

5 places


3 places
2 places
2 places

5 places

3 places
2 places
1 places

DIAGRAMMATIC LAYOUT SHOWING RELATIVE POSNS DURING MARCH PAST

Appx 'C'
To 7 Aust Div OO No 2
Dated 26 JUN 43
Copy No. 46



NB The distance between Bdes, Units of different arms, and between 25 Bde and 2/2 Pnr Bn will be 50 paces.

SECRET

APPENDIX 'D' to 7 Aust Div OO No.2
of 25 Jun 43.
Copy No. 46


ORDER OF THE PARADE

SER No.	EVENT	ORDERS BY PARADE COMD	ORDERS BY BDE COMDS	ORDERS BY UNIT COMDS	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	Approach of Div Comd	7 Australian Division	...Bde	...Bn	Parade stands at ease
2	Arrival of Div Comd	The Division will come to attention	...Bde will come to attention	...Bn attention	All executive words of comd to be given on drop of flag - scepers ll
3	Div Comd takes over parade	The Division will stand at ease	...Bde will stand at ease	...Bn stand at ease	
4	.....	The Division will stand easy	...Bde will stand easy	...Bn stand easy.	
5	Approach of C in C Air	7 Australian Division	...Bde	...Bn	Parade stands at ease
6	.....	The Division will come to attention and slope arms	...Bde will come to attention and slope arms	...Bn attention ...Bn slope arms	Red flag raised and lowered second time for slope arms
7	Arrival of C in C	General Salute	General Salute	...Bn present arms	(i) Bands will play first part of slow march, starting on third movement of present (ii) Flag is broken
8	.....	The Division will slope arms	...Bde will slope arms	...Bn slope arms	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
9		The Division will order arms and stand at ease	. .Bde will order arms and stand at ease	...Bn order--- ---arms ...Bn stand at ---ease	Red flag raised and lowered a second time for "stand at ease".
10	Inspection				(i) Bde and Unit Comds call up their own bdes etc., as Inspecting Offr approaches and stand them at ease after he passes. (ii) Parade Comd only will accompany Inspecting Offr. Bde etc Comds will stand fast. (iii) No officers will salute.
11	Inspecting Offr returns to dais				
12	Address by C in C				
13	Conclusion of C in C's address	(a) The Division will come to attention (b) The Division will stand at ease	...Bde will come to attention ...Bde will stand at ease	...Bn atten-- --tion ...Bn stand at ---ease	C in C moves to saluting base
14	March Past	7 Australian Division will march past in column of route	(in succession) ...Bde will march past in column of route	(in succession) ...Bn atten-- tion. Move to the right in column of route number one company leading	(i) Sub Unit comds then give comd in succession "Eyes - coy, right turn, Quick - March" (ii) Bands move to point opposite the saluting base, through gap between 18 and 21 Bdes, HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde will close to left to allow passage for bands.
15	The March Past will be in column of route along the straight from North to South as shown on Appx 'A'. After marching past, units will continue movement and return direct to respective camp sites (for distances between Bdes Units etc), see Appx "C" attached.				
16	Bands March Past - When last unit has passed, bands will move to the right, then on to the track and march past the saluting base.				

PLAN SHOWING ROUTES TO PARADE POSNS

ADDX 'E'
TO 7 AUST DIV OO [illegible]
DATED 10 JUNE 45
Copy No 10



SECRET

APPENDIX 'F' to 7 Aust Div
OO No.2 of 28 Jun 43

46

Copy No.....

MARCH TABLE SHOWING TIMES OF ARRIVAL AT PARADE GROUND

Ser No.	UNIT	ARR OUTER TRACK RAIL		ARR PARADE POSN		REMARKS
		HEAD	TAIL	HEAD	TAIL	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1	25 Aust Inf Bde	0838	0840	0831	0843	
2	2/2 Aust Pnr Bn	0840	0844	0844	0848	follows 25 Bde
3	Sigs 7 Aust Div	0845	0846	0851	0852	follows 2/2 Pnr Bn
4	HQ 7 Aust Div	0846	0848	0850	0852	follows Div Sigs
5	2/4 Aust Fd Regt	0844	0847	0849	0852	
6	21 Aust Inf Bde	0847	0856	0851	0900	follows 2/4 Fd Regt
7	AASC 7 Aust Div	0844	0847	0852	0855	
8	18 Aust Inf Bde	0849	0856	0855	0900	
9	AAMC 7 Aust Div	0850	0852	0857	0859	
10	7 Aust Div Carrier Coy	0853	0854	0859	0900	follows AAMC.
11	RAE 7 Aust Div	0843	0846	0845	0848	tail of RAE must clear track by 0848.
12	AAOC and AEME	0854	0855	0859	0900	

NOTES -

1. HQ 7 Aust Div and Sigs 7 Aust Div must keep to right of track when moving into position to allow 18 Aust Inf Bde to use left of track.

2. AAMC 7 Aust Div and 7 Aust Div Carrier Coy must keep to left of track to enable 18 Aust Inf Bde to move on right of it.

APPENDIX 'G' to 7 Aust Div
OO No.2 of 28 Jun 43

Copy No...8...

INSTRUCTIONS TO RAE 7 AUST DIV

1 CONSTRUCTION OF DAIS AND SALUTING BASE

(a) The central dais for parade will be constructed in accordance with sketch attached (to RAE only), at point shown on ground plan attached (to RAE only).

(b) Dais at Saluting Base:- to be simple platform of following dimensions:-

platform size	6' X 12'
height	2'

The whole to be covered with dyed hessian in accordance with verbal instructions.

(c) Fence rails will be removed on either side of dais and an enclosure constructed in rear of dais as shown on plan. This enclosure to be fenced with a 3ft high, angle iron picket and rope fence, gates being left as shown. This fence to be removed immediately after departure of C in C AMF.

(d) Flag Pole - to be placed immediately behind centre of dais at Saluting Base as shown on plan. Height 20 ft.

(e) All above work to be completed by 15 Jul 43.

2 REMOVAL AND REPLACING OF TRACK RAILS

(a) Railings will be removed in accordance with plan att, gaps to be minimum of 15 ft wide. To be completed by 14 Jul 43.

(b) All railings must be replaced immediately after parade and before race meeting.

3 MARKING OF GROUND

(a) Inspection Line

(i) Will be marked in accordance with plan attached. Line itself to be white with unit numbers and flags placed as shown. Pegs at least 12" high to be placed at 40 ft intervals in rear of unit serial numbers as shown on plan.

(ii) White spots to mark position of Div Comd, Bde Comds, and unit comds on inspection lines.

(iii) White line to mark position of front rank of bands.

(b) Passing Line

See plan attached. Line will not be marked on the ground other than by flags shown.

(c) All marking of ground to be completed by 15 Jul 43.

4 LATRINES

Seven screened shallow trench latrines to be constructed at points shown in Appx 'A'. These latrines to be at least 30 ft from outer track rail. To be completed by 15 Jul 43.

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 AUST DIV
G19/6/451
30 JUN 43

Subject : UNIT VEHICLE MARKINGS

LIST 'B'

1 The following is issued to clarify doubts which may exist regarding the correct vehicle numbers to be used by units.

2 Owing to reorganisation, some units have NOT yet been allotted a unit number. A list of units whose numbers have been confirmed to date is attached as Appx 'A'. These numbers will be used forthwith, the remaining units continuing with numbers already in use until such time as that number is confirmed or a new one allotted.

3 All markings will be placed on vehicles to comply with 3 Aust Corps G 2546 of 19 Mar 43 amended by G 2801 of 25 Apr 43.

Lt-Col
GS 7 Aust Div

APPENDIX 'A' to 7 Aust Div
G19/6/451 of 30 Jun 43

FORMATION SIGN : KOOKABURRA ON BOOMERANG

SER No.	UNIT	No.	BACKGROUND
1	HQ 7 Aust Div	84	Black
2	C Sec FSU	84	Black
3	2/4 Aust Fd Regt	74	Red & Blue Horizontal
4	'E' Sec Sigs	74	White & Blue Horizontal
5	2/51 Aust LAD	74	Black
6	HQ RAE 7 Aust Div	C1	Blue
7	2/4 Aust Fd Coy	60	Blue
8	2/5 Aust Fd Coy	89	Blue
9	2/6 Aust Fd Coy	86	Blue
10	55 Aust Fd Pk Coy	67	Blue
11	230 Aust LAD	67	Black
12	7 Aust Div Camflg Trg Unit	73	Blue
13	HQ Sigs 7 Aust Div	66	White & Blue Horizontal
14	7 Aust Div Cipher Sec	68	" " "
15	HQ 18 Aust Inf Bde	88	Red
16	'J' Sec Sigs	88	White & Blue Horizontal
17	2/47 Aust LAD	88	Black
18	2/9 Aust Inf Bn	50	Red
19	2/10 Aust Inf Bn	99	Red
20	2/12 Aust Inf Bn	56	Red
21	HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde	96	Green
22	K Sec Sigs	96	White & Blue Horizontal
23	2/59 Aust LAD	96	Black
24	2/14 Aust Inf Bn	63	Green
25	2/16 Aust Inf Bn	61	Green
26	2/27 Aust Inf Bn	93	Green
27	HQ 25 Aust Inf Bde	65	Brown
28	'L' Sec Sigs	65	White & Blue Horizontal
29	2/25 Aust Inf Bn	82	Brown
30	2/31 Aust Inf Bn	91	Brown
31	2/33 Aust Inf Bn	77	Brown
32	7 Aust Div Carr Coy	85	Black
33	HQ Coml AASC 7 Aust Div	59	Red & Green Diagonal
34	2/4 Aust Fd Amb	57	Black
35	2/5 Aust Fd Amb	52	Black
36	2/6 Aust Fd Amb	70	Black
37	7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit	79	Black
38	7 Aust Div Pro Coy	95	Black
39	7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office	80	Black
40	7 Aust Div Postal Unit	55	Black
41	7 Aust Div Salv Unit	78	Black
42	7 Aust Div Sec Reception Camp	71	Black

NOTES :-

1. Figures of Unit serial numbers will be in the following colours. -
   (a) All Units other than Sigs - WHITE
   (b) Sig Units - RED

Append to G Branch HQ 7 Div June 43 ck
Original
8 Sep 43
ck

ADDENDA FOR WAR DIARY : 1 JUN 43 - 30 JUN 43

LIST OF APPENDICES FOR WAR DIARY

APPENDIX	DATE	PARTICULARS
A		Notes on Operations in New Guinea (7 Aust Div) by Maj-Gen G A VASEY CB CBE DSO.
B		Report on, and lessons from, the PAPUAN campaign. Final Stage. GONA - SANANANDA Area, 21 Nov 42 to 22 Jan 43 by Maj-Gen G A VASEY CB CBE DSO.
C	31 Mar 43	Report on Operations of 7 Aust Div from 15 Aug 42 to 2 Dec 42 : by Col SPRY (then G1 7 Aust Div)
D	13 Mar 43	Comments on "Jungle Warfare" Pamphlet by Maj-Gen G A VASEY CB CBE DSO.
E	16 Apr 43	Covering letter for Appendix 'C' by GOC N.T FORCE (Maj-Gen A S ALLEN CB CBE DSO VD.

HEADQUARTERS
NORTHERN TERRITORY
FORCE

16 Apr 43.

6414/G/T10

SUBJECT - REPORT ON OPS IN NG

1. I have this day posted under Reg mail, addressed HQ 7 Aust Div. ~~AIF~~ A.I.F. two reports on NG Ops which were sent to me by Col SPRY, late G1, for my signature.

2. Will you please advise me when reports are received.

3. I wish the Division Good Luck and every success in future operations.

Major-General,
Commanding Northern Territory Force.

HQ 7 Aust Div ~~AIF~~ A.I.F.

Notes on Ops in New Guinea
by Maj Gen G. A. Vasey CB. CBE. DSO.

Prior to the Coral Sea Battle in May, 42, the garrison in New Guinea consisted of one infantry Brigade in Moresby. Subsequent to the battle this garrison was increased to two infantry Brigades. At that time our main thoughts were devoted to the protection and retention of Port Moresby. Very little, if any, consideration was given to the defence of the north coast of Papua, and the Owen Stanley Ranges were considered to be a barrier impassible to large numbers of troops.

In July 42, the Japanese landed in the Gona Buna area and it was necessary to take some action to prevent their infiltration towards Moresby. Consequently first one and later a second battalion were sent from Moresby over the Owen Stanley Range to the Kokoda area. The Japanese advanced in strength against Kokoda and these most forward troops were compelled to withdraw.

In the meantime one infantry Brigade of 7 Aust. Div. had arrived in Port Moresby and this Brigade was sent forward to reinforce the forward battalions and stop the Japanese advance. For various reasons this Brigade was unable to advance as a whole, and went forward rather piecemeal, with the result that the Jap was able to deal with it part at a time. This resulted in the withdrawal of the Brigade followed up by the Jap to the Irobaiwa area. The Jap advance was halted here by a second brigade of 7 Div. which, after stability had been reached, commenced offensive action against the Japanese.

The details of the actions from then until the battle of Eora Creek are unknown to me and it was between the latter phases of the Eora Creek battle that I took command of 7 Aust. Div.

A little north of Alola the track over the ranges bifurcated, one leading direct to Kokoda and the other in the direction of Oivi. Immediately the 16 Bde. had been successful at Eora Creek it was decided that we must secure Alola with all speed, so that I might connect the Division, then consisting of two Brigades with one brigade on each of these tracks, thereby moving on a broad front and hoping to outflank any Japanese who may try to deny our progress on either track.

The Jap. failed to offer any resistance on the south side of the track junction at Alola, and consequently I was able to put my plan into effect without any delay. The 25 Bde who were directed on Kokoda, occupied that place with its landing strip without any opposition. The 16 Bde moving by the more easterly track contacted the enemy west of Oivi and about 9 miles east of Kokoda.

The air field at Kokoda was rapidly improved and within twenty-four hours of our arrival there the first transport aircraft landed. The opportunity was taken to rest 25 Bde, refit it and give the troops a ration which was a great improvement on the bully beef and biscuits on which they had had to live during the crossing of the ranges.

The resistance west of Oivi proved stronger than 16 Bde were capable of overcoming, despite the fact that one battalion was sent round the south flank towards Garari. Consequently I decided to employ the whole of 25 Bde in the Garari area. After their short rest in Kokoda the Bde was in very good spirits and considerably rested. They moved towards Garari taking under their command the battalion of the 16 Bde already in that area. These four battalions under the command of Brigadier Eather then executed a well-planned attack on the Jap in the Garari area. This resulted in the complete rout of the Japs in that area as well as the withdrawal of all those who had been facing 16 Bde west of Garari.

As a result of this action, in which about 500 Japs were killed and considerable equipment including mountain guns were captured, brought the whole Division on to the one track which led to the Kumusi River at Wairopi.

My original instructions were to secure Kokoda and employ as far as the Kumusi. Though this had been varied on my arrival at Kokoda by a warning order which indicated that the proceß would continue to the coast in the Gona area. Consequently immediately following the successful action at Garari I ordered 25 Bde to make the line of the Kumusi as quickly as possible whilst 16 Bde who had had no rest from contact with the enemy for several weeks were given

a brief spell and were re-equipped as far as the resources of native carriers would permit.

Other than at the Ilimo no Japanese opposition was encountered west of the Kumusi with the result that 25 Bde quickly reached the river. This river proved to be a most formidable obstacle as there was about 300 feet of water flowing at a speed of 8 to 10 knots. All bridges across the river had been destroyed by the Japanese and any boats found on the western bank had been damaged beyond repair, and no possible forwarding place could be located. For some strange reason the Japanese failed to hold the eastern bank and we were able in the first few hours, to get about 20 men, who were strong swimmers across the river to act as a patrol on that side. The engineers immediately got to work in trying to repair what remained of the various wire ropes which the Japanese had used for crossing the river. However, additional engineering stores were required from Moresby and these were brought up by air and dropped almost on the sight of our new bridges. Had the Japanese left even as few as one hundred men on the far bank of the river this dropping of the stores and work by our engineers could not have proceeded as it did. Even so, it was over 48 hours before we could commence to send across the river on "flying foxes" infantry at any appreciable speed. Eventually we had three "flying foxes" and two wire rope bridges across the river. The "flying foxes" were each capable of transporting about 30 men per hour, whereas the bridges were each capable of about 100 men per hour. Whilst waiting on the west bank of the river the opportunity was taken to re-equip the troops further and ensure that every man had on the person 5 day's rations when he crossed the river. All these stores were dropped by air in our bivouac area west of the river.

From Wairopi to the coast there are two tracks. The main one going via Amboga Crossing to Gona and the latter stages of which were reputed to be a motor road. The other which proved to be nothing but a mere track went via Sangara to Sanananda. I decided to move one Brigade by each of these tracks, with Div. H.Q. following the right Brigade so that when the coastal area was approached and contact with the U.S. troops might be expected, I would be the more

conveniently located. 25 Bde crossed the river first and were directed on Gona whilst 16 Bde followed 24 hours later and were directed on Sananda.

25 Bde met no opposition except stray parties of escaping Japs until they reached Gona itself. Unfortunately at this stage owing to bad flying weather and the inability of the Air Force to drop rations for them the Brigade ran out of rations just as the leading Battalion reached Gona. In accordance with my previous instructions that if troops ran out of rations they were to remain quiet and thereby conserve their energy the Brigadier withdrew the leading Battalion and the Brigade remained halted some two or three miles south of Gona for 48 hours, by which time it had been possible to get rations to them.

Before 16 Bde crossed the Kumusi information was received that a large body of Japanese who had withdrawn from the Garari area were retreating northwards up the west bank of the Kumusi. With the object of exterminating these I directed the 3 Bn to pursue them. Unfortunately the Japs. had got too long a start and though 3 Bn overhauled them considerably I decided at the end of the second day to withdraw them since they would become an administrative liability to me and also would reduce the force I would have available on the coast. They returned to the Wairopi area and followed the track taken by 16 Bde.

The advance of 16 Bde was uneventful, though through difficult country, until about a mile south of Soputa where contact was gained with the Japanese for the first time since Ilimo.

It was at this stage that contact was first made with elements of 32 U.S. Div. who were operating on the east bank of the Garari River. A Battalion of 128 U.S. Regt was met by Div. Headquarters at Popendeta on the day following 16 Bde's passing through that town. On this day I received a message from N.G.F. saying that 128 U.S. Regt would come under my command should I deem it desirable. I did consider it necessary and got into touch with the Commander of the Regt., and arranged with him for his Regt. to move from east of the Gorari River to the Soputa area. He informed me,

however, that his Regt was less the whole of one Battalion and approximately half of a second.

16 and 25 Bdes. kept up pressure on the Japs opposed to them and eventually 16 Bde were brought to a halt about 3 miles north of Soputa, whilst 25 Bde had closed round Gona and contained the Japs. in a small area there.

Before commiting 128 U.S. Regt. to action I received a further message from N.G.F. asking if I could spare one Battalion of that Regt to re-join 32 U.S. Div. east of the river. I released one battalion for this purpose and it crossed the river at Soputa without having taken part in any action under my command. It appeared subsequently that N.G.F. at the time of sending their message were unaware that I did not have 128 U.S. Regt complete. The result was that I was left with Regimental Headquarters, one Battalion and elements of a second. These I employed to pass through 16 Bde north of Soputa in an endeavour to reach the coast at Sanananda. Due to a lack of experience and the rather wide encircling movement undertaken by the Regimental Commander, the action of this regiment was not successful in clearing the Jap. opposition, but it did give us suitable areas, including a block on the main track 1500 yards in rear of the Japs, from which subsequent offensive action could be taken.

In the Gona area, 25 Bde., who had 3 Bn. under their command, were physically exhausted, and were incapable of the final assault on Gona.

About this time the first Australian reinforcements I received, 21 Bde., arrived. And my original plan was to employ them along the coast eastwards from Gona and attack Sanananda from the west. Reconnaisance showed, however, that the area between these two places was very marshy and subject to tidal rise and fall, and it was impracticable to maintain a considerable force across this country. Consequently I directed 21 Bde to relieve 25 Bde and capture Gona. After several days of artillery, mortar and aerial bombardment of the area and determined assault by the Brigade, particularly 16 Bn., Gona was captured.on the 8 December. On the following days 600 dead Japs were buried in the Gona area.

Before the fall of Gona an enemy convoy had attempted to bring reinforcements to the Gona, Buna area. This convoy was attacked by the Allied Air Force and the survivors, estimated by prisoner statements to be about 300, got ashore in the area about 4 miles west of Gona. I decided to clear these up before withdrawing the maximum number of troops from Gona to the Soputa area where little if any progress was being made. Consequently 39 Bn., who had been under command of 25 Bde were sent to the west and after a week's operations in marshy and difficult country succeeded, with the assistance of some elements of 21 Bde, in destroying most of those who had landed. Those Japs who remained escaped up the coast to the west.

In the meantime additional reinforcements in the form of 30 Bde (39 Bn already sent to Gona, 49 Bn and 53 Bn) had been arriving in the Soputa area. I decided to use these in a determined attack against the Japanese who had been holding up 16 Bde and 128 U.S. Regt north of Soputa for the past two or three weeks. This attack was launched on 7 December but failed to achieve its purpose. This was mainly due to lack of information regarding the enemy and the terrain, for air photographs of the area had not been received by this time, and partly due to the inexperience of the militia battalions involved in the attack. The attack, however, did enable me to withdraw the 16 Bde who had completed the crossing of the Owen Stanleys and who had been in contact more or less continuously with the Jap since the battle at Templeton's Crossing.

Shortly after this I was informed by N.G.F. that it was the intention of the higher command to clean up the Buna area before finally clearing the Sanananda area. During the next two or three weeks 30 Bde continued harassing patrols against the enemy, but no material progress was made. However, a much easier and safer route to the Huggins Road Block was established to the east of the main Sanananda track instead of to the west as previously.

One further reinforcement I received was 7 Cavalry Regt. and in accordance with directions from N.G.F. it was to be employed in an effort to break through to the coast in the Sanananda area. We consequently decided that it would commence its advance from the Huggins Road Block and for that purpose it was moved to that area on 18 December. This Regiment, whose dismounted strength was only approximately 350 all ranks, commenced an advance northwards from the Huggins Road Block on the 19th December but after advancing about three to four hundred yards it came up against strong and determined Japanese resistance which it was unable to overcome. Subsequent events proved that this was the strongest Japanese position between the Huggins Road Block and the coast and was the last area to be cleared up in the whole of the operations.

The Huggins Road Block was still held by elements of 128 U.S. Regt and they had been in this area for about a month and were

becoming exhausted. Due to having cleared the Gona area I decided to withdraw from there Headquarters 21 Bde and 39 Bn and move them to the Soputa-Sanananda area. 39 Bn was instructed to relieve the U.S. troops in the Huggins Road Block, whilst 21 Bde assumed operational command of 39 Bn and 7 Cavalry Regt who were still only some three or four hundred yards ahead of the Huggins Road Block although the direct track between these two places was held by the Japanese in some strength.

Towards the end of December I was informed that 163 U.S. Regt would be coming under my command. So as to avoid mixing Australian and U.S. Units I decided that this regiment would in the first instance relieve 21 Bde (39 Bn and 7 Cavalry Regt) and that subsequent units of the regiment would establish themselves further to the west on the track leading to Cape Killerton and which I believed was used by the Jap for the maintenance of his troops facing 30 Bde. This plan was in fact carried out.

After the fall of Buna I was informed that 18 Bde would come under my command and with some tanks also to come from Buna were to be made available to me for the final clearing of the area north of Soputa to Sanananda.

I arranged for 18 Bde to relieve 30 Bde., who by this time were becoming exhausted and very short in numbers, and after a couple of days of reconnaisance organised an attack by this Brigade supported by tanks for 12th January. The only possible scope for the employment of tanks was along the main Soputa-Sanananda track. From information available it seemed impossible for tanks to get off this track by reason of the jungle or swamp which existed on either side. Furthermore it was rather anticipated that in view of the previous use of tanks in the Buna area the element of surprise in their employment would be lost and, therefore, that there was considerable risk of these tanks being opposed by anti-tank guns sighted to fire down the track. This proved to be the case and the leading tank only progressed about 200 yards before it was knocked out. The tank following in an attempt to turn about and come back down the track became bogged and was out of action from then on.

A third tank which took part in the attack although hit was able to withdraw back to our own lines. The infantry attack made little progress although the best possible artillery and mortar support had been arranged for it and by midday our infantry were held up by the Japs who were found to be occupying positions built of logs and earth which gave overhead cover and could not be approached by unsupported infantry.

I discussed the situation with Brigadier Wootton, commanding 18 Infantry Brigade on the afternoon of the 12th and it was decided that to continue the attack under the existing conditions would only lead to very heavy casualties and even then was unlikely to be successful. To attack such a position by infantry alone would have been a repetition of the disasters of 1915-16 and would have lead nowhere. I directed Brigadier Wootton to continue aggresive patrolling against the enemy positions and make such progress as he was able. This he did on the 13th and 14th of January.

On 13th January I discussed with Lt-Gen Eichelberger, who was then commanding all the troops in the Buna-Gona area, and put my views before him. However, before any change of plan could be put into effect patrols of the 18 Bde on the morning of the 14th January found that enemy resistance was weakening and Brigadier Wootton immediately increased the pressure on the whole of his front. At the same time I directed 163 U.S. Regt, who were to his north, to close in on the enemy from that direction. These latter were rather slow of movement and did not have any material effect on the operations of the day. As a result of the vigorous action by 18 Bde the whole of the enemy position which had been opposing us for nearly two months had been cleared and the 18 Bde were assembled ready to move the following morning on the track to Killerton.

This development of the situation was one which I had hoped would result more quickly as a result of 18 Bde's attack on 12th January and in preparation for a rapid continuation of the advance to the coast my plan was to send 18 Bde on the track towards Killerton and then strike eastwards in the direction of Sanananda,

whilst 163 U.S. Regt moved directly up the main track to Sanananda.

The action of 18 Bde in the succeeding week was one of a struggle against a difficult terrain. As was expected the country near the coast proved to be largely sago swamps and owing to heavy rain which fell during the period creeks which were usually only a few feet deep were found to be over the heads of the troops. However, despite these difficulties 18 Bde succeeded in getting one battalion moving down the coast from the direction of Killerton and one battalion on the main Soputa-Sanananda track about 1500 yards from the coast. Whilst these two battalions were engaged with elements of the enemy in these two areas a third battalion was directed by Brigadier Wootton to move through the centre and go direct to Sanananda. This the battalion succeeded in doing and captured both Sanananda and Sanananda Point. With the fall of these the core of the enemy resistance in that area was broken and it was only a matter of a few more days before the last elements were destroyed.

On the other hand 163 U.S. Regt in their direct advance on the main track to Sanananda encountered considerable opposition and it took several days before this was cleared up. A number of attacks of varying size were organised and carried out and eventually on the 19th January all organised resistance in the area had been overcome and the main track to Sanananda was cleared.

Although organised resistance in the area had ceased many small pockets of the enemy were encountered during the succeeding days and many of them tried to escape to the west. To prevent this the few troops I had in the Gona area were directed to intercept such parties but owing to their small numbers there could be no doubt that quite a number of Japanese did escape. Whether they lived to travel along the coast to Salamaua and join up with other Jap forces there or not is unknown, but it would seem very doubtful if many succeeded in doing so owing to lack of food.

Finally on the 22nd January, 7 Aust. Div. after having chased the Jap from Irobaiwa in August across the Owen Stanleys to the sea, and Gona from Sanananda were relieved by 41 U.S. Div.

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L. Wary.

Headquarters,
7th Aust. Div.
13 March.

Adv. L.H.Q. (D.M.T.).,

JUNGLE WARFARE PAMPHLET.

Reference your G/16003/TRG of the 4th Feb.

I submit the following comments on the draft 'Jungle Warfare' pamphlet forwarded with the above quoted letter. These have been discussed with Brig. Porter and represent his views also. In doing so I would remind you that my experiences in Jungle Warfare are limited to the operations of 7 Aust. Div. from the advance into Kokoda at the beginning of November until the end of the operations in the Sanananda Area on the 22nd January. The whole of the Area covered with the exception of a small area around Gona was true jungle.

2. My comments are divided into three parts; firstly those concerning the pamphlet as a whole, and secondly some detailed remarks on various paras in it and thirdly, recommendations. For ease of reference I have numbered the paras in each of your sections e.g. I preface, II General Tactics, etc., consecutively without reference to the numbering of sub-headings in the pamphlet as for example in Section IV - The Attack.

PART I GENERAL.

3. Although in Section I it states that the pamphlet is written primarily for Company and Battalion Commanders, there are many matters in it which refer to the Higher Command, Particularly is this so in Section XIII "Man Management", where the question of reliefs is raised. Such reliefs are only possible if the Higher Command makes the necessary troops available. "Strategic Reserve" as mentioned in para. 2 of that section has certainly nothing to do with Battalion or Company Commanders.

4. The pamphlet is full of matters which are not peculiar to 'Jungle Warfare' particularly is this so in Section IV, paras. 29 and 32, and also in the many references throughout the pamphlet to the necessity for speed and obtaining and maintaining of the initiative. I feel there is a tendency of clouding 'Jungle Warfare' with too much 'Hoodoo', and I therefore, think the pamphlet should confine itself to those matters which are peculiar to Jungle Warfare. In my opinion, the essentials for success in Jungle Warfare, is a very high standard of individual training to which must be added those few things which are peculiar to the jungle. These latter are the matters with which I think the Pamphlet should deal. I believe that the Preface to the Pamphlet should contain some definition of what is really meant by Jungle. In my opinion a Jungle area indicates an undeveloped area, both as regards communications and topographical information. Cocoanut Groves, Rubber Plantations are not Jungle, but are merely rather close country in which the visibility within limitations extends for several hundred yards in many directions. In true Jungle, visibility is limited, except along tracks to 30 yards as a maximum.

5. I think, therefore, that the pamphlet should be considerably reduced and written for Battalion and Subordinate Commanders.

6. I consider the main tactical considerations which influence Jungle operations are as follows:

(a) Lack of information and lack of a means of obtaining it, except by Infantry Patrols. This lack of information applies both to the enemy and to the Topography. As a result, Commanders are faced with the necessity of making and executing plans on the most nebulous information. Sometimes these plans when being put into operation are found to be impossible of execution and a complete recast is necessary. This is exemplified by my attempt to attack Sananda from the West before Gona had fallen. The difficulties of the country made maintenance of a considerable force in the area between these two places, an impossibility. As a result a complete change of plan was necessary.

(b) The difficulties of providing supporting fire even when enemy positions are located. This occasioned by the difficulties of observation since from any one point it is usually not possible to see more than one, or possibly two, of the enemy centres of resistance and to cover a number of such centres requires a very large number of observers, with their essential means of inter-communication, for the direction of Artillery and Mortar fire. The second cause of difficulty is that centres of resistance are usually located when our leading troops meet them at ranges of 30 yards or less. In such circumstances supporting fire can only be brought down by withdrawing our own forward troops.

(d) Slowness of Movement. In true Jungle all movement except along defined tracks, is of necessity, very slow. In addition even movement along a track, when contact with the enemy might be expected, is necessarily slow by the caution which it imposes on the troops moving along the track. This slowness of movement means that it is not possible to overtake an enemy who refuses to stand in any position. His movement is as fast as, if now faster than that of the pursuers.

(d) Necessity of Superior Numbers. For success in Jungle operations I consider superiority of numbers is essential. As the pamphlet says Night and Jungle operations have certain common characteristics. It is recognised that in Night operations numbers of men are necessary, both in defence and offence, to make up for the lack of fire power of automatic weapons occasioned by lack of visibility. This is true of Jungle warfare also. The panphlet refers continually to out flanking movements, but unless these are carried out by sufficient numbers, they are unlikely to succeed. To send a party of inadequate strength on an encircling movement is like opening the jaws so wide as to be unable to exert the necessary pressure to close them. This is well exemplified by the battle of Oivi and Gorari and Huggins Road Block. In the former, the encirclement consisted of four Battalions, more than half the force available to me, whereas in the latter, the strength of the Huggins Road Block was never more than about 250 men and it was of insufficient strength to take offensive action.

(e) In true Jungle, Night operations, except by the smallest of patrols, are unlikely. This is brought about by the difficulty of maintaining direction and control, and the noise, which cannot be avoided, of troops moving through the Jungle at night. The only possibility for this type of operation exists during rain, the noise of which very largely drowns the noise of the movement. However, even in these circumstances the difficulty of control and direction still remains. I consider a Platoon is the maximum Force which can be used through the Jungle itself.

7. As regards encirclement of our own forces by the enemy, I consider that the principle should be laid down that it is the responsibility of the Commander next in rear to clear a way forward rather than have the encircled troops fight their way out. Only in this way will the initiative be retained and offensive action be possible. It seems to me that the greatest fear engendered in the minds of Troops and Commanders, who are encircled, is that of Starvation. Ammunition expenditure can be controlled and if strong action is taken by the Commander in rear, shortage of ammunition is not very likely to necessitate withdrawal. Consequently in all Jungle operations all Troops including Headquarter Units should carry on the man a minimum of five (5) days rations. In 7 Aust. Div. this was done by providing men with three (3) days emergency dehydrated rations, which weigh slightly more than 2 lbs. and two (2) days ration of Bully Beef and Biscuits. In training it is very necessary to ensure that Troops do not Waste food. Even under the most trying ration conditions, it was nothing to see a tin of Bully Beef opened and partially consumed, and the remainder of the contents of the tin thrown away.

8. Jungle country is not infrequently mountainous and I, therefore, consider this pamphlet, or another one, should contain the principles of Mountain Warfare. There is no doubt that some of the difficulties in the early phases of the campaign were occasioned by neglect to piquet the Heights.

PART II - DETAILED COMMENTS.

9. Section I - Preface.

(a) Para. 1 This reference states that the pamphlet is written primarily for Company and Battalion Commanders. I have referred to this in my General remarks.

(b) Para. 3 I do not agree with encirclement as more "time consuming" except in so far as the distance to be travelled is greater than the direct attack, other than the few elements remaining on the main track. Troops employed in a Frontal attack also move through Jungle.

(c) The word 'logistical' needs some explanation. The weapons to be employed is more a matter for the Higher Command than a Battalion Commander, who, in practically all circumstances, will use the weapons with which he is equipped and which he has been able to carry forward to the Area of operations.

(d) Para. 4 This appears to be so vague and general as to cloud the issue for Battalion and Subordinate Commander.

10. Section II GENERAL TACTICS.

(a) Para. 1. It seems to me that initiative is of no greater importance in Jungle Warfare than in any other type of Warfare. The initiative can be maintained only by superiority of numbers. The statement that Jungle Warfare favors the attacker should be modified. It certainly simplifies the task of moving bodies of troops without the enemy's knowledge, but once contact with the enemy is obtained, the difficulties of the attacker are greatly increased by the lack of visibility which prevents the location of enemy posts.

(b) Para. 2 In this and many other Paras. throughout the pamphlet, reference is made to U.S. pamphlets. It is appreciated that the pamphlet to be issued will go to American Troops, but some note in the preface or elsewhere should be made regarding the U.S. Pamphlets.

(c) Para. 3. This seems rather conflicting. The necessity for speed in Jungle Warfare as in other forms of warfare, is fully appreciated, but "adequate preparation in the Jungle" takes considerable time and cannot hope to "anticipate all eventualities".

(d) Para. 6. The statement that the enemy will rarely have enough troops, infers that the enemy is numerically inferior. It is agreed that encirclement tactics by an enemy of inferior strength are unlikely to be successful. This gives point to my contention that superiority of numbers is necessary for successful offensive action.

(e) I do not agree with the statement in the last sentence that determined offensive will make encirclement tactics less likely in the future.

(f) Para. 7. Terrain only, unless it be the sea, will not make a flank secure. This is illustrated by the final action of the 18th Brigade in the Sananda Area where they passed through swamps up to their arm pits and creeks that were over their heads. This is also exemplified by the operations in Abyssinia where tremendous physical obstacles were overcome in encircling the Italians in many places. It is easier and less costly to move round or through a difficult obstacle than to advance against Machine Guns which are manned by a determined enemy.

(g) The question of the use of Artillery raised in this para. and the succeeding one are again for the Higher Command. Its availability will be a matter for decision by the Higher Command.

(h) Para. 8. In the reference to Tanks, the words "and Communications" should follow those "where Terrain permits".

(i) Para. 9. With a view to shortening the pamphlet, this para. might be deleted.

10. Section III <u>ADVANCE TO THE ATTACK IN TRUE JUNGLE</u>.

(a) The only real tactical feature is the main track along which the force is advancing. Owing to the lack of visibility the hills lose their importance. It would seem, therefore, that the statement "the advance for successive tactical objectives" is hardly correct. If as has been suggested every man carries five days' ration, each days' march is not necessarily limited to the progress made by the element in the supply chain.

(b) Para.3 Some information can be gained from practically all air photos, and I consider they are an essential preliminary to successful operations in the Jungle.

(c) The statement that "tracks are <u>often</u> overhung and it is <u>difficult</u> for air reconnaissance" are under statements. All tracks, as differentiated from what might be termed roads, give complete cover from view from the air.

(d) Para. 4. I agree entirely with the necessity for local reconnaissance when contact is about to be made, but the time involved in a complete reconnaissance of an enemy position will preclude any possibility of speed. Furthermore, since in Jungle Warfare, the defence is usually a perimeter one, the direction of the attack in the minor tactical sphere, is not of such importance as in more open country.

(e) I consider the last sentence is a pious hope which is seldom, if ever, possible of attainment, and therefore, the sentence might be deleted.

(f) Para. 5. I do not agree to Jeeps being used in Jungle Warfare, except along the main axis of advance in some stages.

(g) Para. 7. This para. appears primarily for the Higher Command, not for the Battalion.

(h) The third sentence should be altered to read "this also places our troops etc."

(i) Para. 8. I do not agree with this. Even on main tracks instant cover from view from the Air is available at the sides. Experience of 7 Aust. Div. is that the Air is unable to locate the enemy unless prior information from prisoners is available, complete Air superiority exists, and reconnaissance Aircraft are able to fly low over selected areas. This was the case in the Sanananda area. Even then it was huts which could be located only.

(j) Para. 10. It is not only to retain the initiative that Commanders must be well forward. It is also necessary in all circumstances so as to maintain control. The use of the word 'promptly' is hardly in agreement with para. 4 of this Section.

11. Section IV. THE ATTACK.

(a) In this section it appears to me that the term co-ordination, particularly with reference to time, is stressed too much. Plans for attack in Jungle Warfare are usually simple because of the lack of supporting fire, which of necessity must be co-ordinated with the Infantry plan. Since movement through the Jungle is liable to unexpected delays owing to physical obstacles, it is very difficult to combine speed with complete co-ordination as regards times.

(b) There is no mention of objectives in this section. It is most desirable that these be given although it is not always possible. Where air photos are available they can be given by describing differences in vegetation.

(c) Para. 1. The last sentence states ' it is essential to determine the extent etc.'. This is usually only possible by reconnaissance in strength, in other words by an attack, based on the minimum of information. This sentence appears contradictory to the preceeding sentence of the para, since this one takes considerable time to execute.

(d) Para. 2. I doubt if the whole front can be covered with fire. The denseness of the Jungle demands many points of origin of fire. Therefore to cover the whole front will demand many troops which usually are not available.

(e) Para. 3. The word 'final' in the first line should be deleted.

(f) Para. 5. The use of the word 'Strong' in the fifth line, suggests too much dispersion. I suggest deletion of the word.

(g) I suggest the deletion of the sentence commencing 'the encircling force must' since rarely will the extent of the hostile defence be known and the "terrain with thick vegetation" is merely jungle to which the whole of the pamphlet refers.

(h) Para. 6. This is the Jap method. We should devise a counter to the Jap tactics rather than adopt them. A suggestion is that when the leading Scouts who should include a connecting file, meet the Jap, the leading Sections move round the flanks whilst the third, well equipped with L.A's moves up the track. The effect of this is that the flanking sections obtain surprise. This method was used successfully on several occasions.

(i) The statement in the last sentence that the encirclement attack compels the defender to conform to the attackers movement is an overstatement. It may or may not according to the relative strengths.

(j) Para. 7. I doubt if a double encirclement of both flanks is the preferred attack. In my opinion it is merely one form, and as the last sentence of the para. states it requires a considerable body of troops to make it possible.

(k) Para. 8 If we are talking of Jungle the word 'often' in line two should be deleted, since observation in the jungle is always less than 40 yards.

(l) Question of pre-arrangement as set out in the end of this para, has been referred to in my general remarks on this section.

(m) Para. 9. The last sentence seems to be an over-statement I suggest its deletion.

(n) Para. 13. It is difficult to determine where resistence is minor only. Only by testing it out by an attack can the strength of resistence be determined. The sentence "Scouts precede each unit etc", should be deleted. This is normal even in thick jungle.

(o) Sketch for Sub-para. five on page nine. I doubt if the third company will arrive three (3) minutes later. I suggest the deletion of those words. Para. 8 on the same page, this refers to the Higher Commands.

(p) Para. 22. Even though the unit when surrounded may fail to take offensive action, it will not necessarily be destroyed, since the Higher Command may have plans to deal with encircling troops from other resources.

(q) Para. 23. The location of the flank, strength and depth of the enemy position is a very slow process and is unlikely to be completed fully in time for the Higher Command to make a plan based on it.

(r) Visual signalling in real Jungle to convey information of the enemy is not possible.

(s) Para. 25. The first part of this para. refers to the Higher Command.

(t) I fail to see why the effect of a strong attack on a vulnerable part of the enemy position is more effective in Jungle than in open Terrain.

(u) If the pamphlet is primarily for Battalion Commanders, I think the last sentence is dangerous as it is likely to cause undue dispersion.

(v) Para. 27. I do not agree with the first part of this para. It is important that the maximum strength available be used to ensure speed and make as certain as possible of overcoming the resistance. This part of the para may lead to the use of inadequate forces, which will result in greater delay than that which might be imposed by the skilful use of a few enemy patrols.

(w) Para. 29. Large parts of the Buna Area, were cocoanut plantations or Air Fields, in other words open country. The operations in that area can hardly be described as Jungle operations.

(x) Para. 32. In the Jungle there is no high ground, which is suitable for the use of these Machine Guns. The denseness of the Jungle determines the value of high ground.

(y) Para. 33. This Para. refers to the Higher Command and other than Jungle Country.

(z) Para. 34. The word 'our' should be inserted in line two in front of the word 'artillery'.

12. Section V. DEFENCE.

(a) In the Jungle Defence must always be perimeter defence, and I think a statement to this effect should be included in the opening paras. of this section.

(b) Para. 1. The second sentence in this para. is in contradiction to para. 32 of the preceeding section. I agree with the statement in this sentence.

(c) Para. 3. Standing patrols, or outposts should be positioned (with alternative positives for their own security) forward of the main defensive position to deceive the enemy and enable the defence to obtain surprise. Encircling movements by the enemy fail as when the movement is completed the enemy encounter the main position.

(d) Para. 4. As already stated, perimeter defence is an essential feature in the Jungle. The second sentence seems unnecessar in view of the preceeding para. Automatic weapons are sighted for perimiter defence by day as well as by night.

(e) Para. 7. The latter part of this para. is in my opinion an over-statement. The Mobile defence will not always stop an encirclement attack.

(f) The difficulties of an encirclement attack are stressed. Whereas, in considering attack by ourselves, it is this form of attack that is stated to be the preferred one.

(g) Para. 8. This assumes the defensive outlook. The action of the force moving along is surely dependent upon the role of that force.

(h) Para. 9. The latter half of this para. assumes that more information is available than in fact is practical.

(i) If my contention that the Commander next in rear is responsible for clearing any enemy who may cut off part of his force, the third last sentence requires amendment.

(j) Para. 6. Again this refers to the Higher Command.

(k) Para. 10. This is normal defence.

(l) Para. 11. Previously I have referred to the fact that other than the sea, there are no obstacles that cannot be crossed by determined infantry. Therefore, no flank can be considered secure because it rests on an obstacle.

(m) Para. 12. In this and many subsequent paras the term 'snipers' is used. I doubt if this is the correct term. These men are merely the riflemen used to protect automatic weapons. Are they not scouts rather than 'snipers'? The point is that the Jap doesn't place all his defences on ground level, but puts some of them in the trees. The term 'sniper' infers a Specialist with a special weapon. Most of the Japs found in trees appear to have been ordinary soldiers, and their standard of Marksmanship was certainly not what we would expect of a 'sniper'

(n) To deal with defenders in trees small arms "barrages" should be directed into the trees overlooking the movement of our troops.

(o) Para. 14. Booby traps if available are as effective by day as by night owing to the ease with which they can be concealed.

(p) Para. 15. I do not agree with the statement 'small forces at regular intervals can defend large areas'. The limitations of field of view and fire prevent this. I doubt whether the precise timing and movement of reserves as is given is practicable.

13. Section VI WITHDRAWAL.

(a) Para. 1. Withdrawals in the Jungle are facilitated by the fact that the enemy is unable to move any faster than our own infantry.

(b) Para. 2. I doubt if the last sentence is necessary.

(c) Para. 3. It is unlikely that previous reconnaissance of routes to the rear will be possible.

(d) Para. 4. The difficulty of maintaining direction in the Jungle, particularly at night makes it unlikely that individuals will remain out in the Jungle until dark when they will rejoin their units.

(e) Para. 5. This is applicable to Open Warfare as to Jungle Warfare.

(f) Para. 6. The last sentence is surely meant to mean 'that this tends to make him more cautious.'

(g) Para. 7. This states that enemy action is restricted, yet in other paras. in the pamphlet, considerable stress is laid on night operations.

14. Section VII

Para. 1. The essential thing in ambushes is that they are of sufficient strength for the purpose they are to achieve.

15. Section VIII PATROLLING.

(a) The opening paras. do not appear to be in accord with latter paras in this section, for example the statement that better results are obtained by using several small patrols. This is contradicted when a later reference is made to Fighting Patrols.

(b) Patrolling in the Jungle is the same as in

open warfare i.e., patrols are either for reconnaissance or fighting. The difference lies in the fact that in the Jungle many more patrols are required than in open country. In fact the many so called attacks are merely a combination of a number of fighting patrols.

(c) Para. 4. This states that patrols are to be lightly equipped, but then goes on to say that every man should carry several grenades.

(d) Lack of Maps or sketches is one of the peculiarities of Jungle Warfare, and it will be more common for patrols to be without them than with them.

(e) Para. 5. The last sentence presumably refers to Patrolling as a whole and not merely to a question of training.

(f) Para. 6. Prior to attack. It is not possible to appreciate when contact is iminent, since if the enemy is withdrawing, no knowledge of his next position will be known until contact is made by our leading patrols.

(g) During the attack. I doubt if patrols are able to protect from hostile fire or counter-attack or whether they can identify and designate targets.

(h) Encircling attack. The words 'and selected cover' should be omitted. In the Jungle cover from ground and air observation is always available.

(i) Para. 8. The patrol which destroyed the Field Gun at Soputa, in fact moved by day until within two or three hundred yards of the guns. Here they laid up until night and then under cover of the noise of rain, raided the gun position. This is hardly an example of a night patrol, but more of a raiding party, on a special mission in rear of the enemy's forward troops. The strength of the party of Japs was forty-three (43) which is considerably more than is normally envisaged as a patrol.

(j) Para. 10. The small fighting patrols can hardly be said to possess great mobility. Owing to their size, they can certainly move faster than larger bodies of troops, but this does not infer great mobility.

(k) Para. 11. The use of the term 'starting line' creates a wrong impression since it infers that a starting line is known before the encircling movement has commenced. Such is very rarely the case.

(l) Para. 13. This hardly appears to be in accord with the statements on page 16 of the draft pamphlet.

(m) Para. 14. The second para. is doubtless very desirable, but will infrequently be possible. I am sure the Jap was unable to rehearse his raid on the guns at Soputa.

(n) Para. 15. Is there such a thing as more open jungle. Is this not merely wooded country?

16. Section IX. SECURITY.

(a) Para. 2. The first sentence should be compared with all that is said on page 5 of the draft. This looks like a case of "backing it both ways".

(b) Para. 3. The last sentence is obviously a comparison, but it does not say with what.

(c) Para. 4. This is a matter for the Higher Command.

(d) Para. 6. The meaning of the first sentence is not clear.

(e) Para. 7. I presume the word 'out guards' is meant to be 'out-posts' or 'patrols'.

(f) Para. 8. This again refers to Hostile Air Action. For smaller units in the jungle this form of attack ismost unlikely.

17. Section X SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

(a) Para. 2. This is applicable to all personnel of all arms and not only to signals.

(b) Para. 4. I would say that line communication is provided normally down to companies. I have not heard of wire being laid to native camps.

(c) Para. 7. Due to the difficulty of keeping wires off the track and out of wet, I do not agree that Line Communication is effectively provided by an earth return circuit. It is certainly the most economical method and is very frequently used; but it cannot be considered to be effective.

(d) Para. 8. Of what is common in any one section?

(e) Para. 9. If the line is not laid on the ground, as is normal in the earliest stages, the cable should be tied, sufficiently high to enable, troops with slung rifles to pass underneath it.

(f) Para. 10. This is normal. I did not hear of any cases, such as referred to in the second last sentence.

(g) Para. 11. Owing to lack of labour, it is very rarely that cable can be recovered.

(h) Para. 12. Is the code system more necessary in the jungle than elsewhere. The code if used must be laid down by the Highest authority immediately controlling the operations.

(i) Para. 15. Except on broad tracks, panels are most unlikely to be seen.

(j) Para. 17. I have not heard of this method being adopted in real jungle. Owing to the lack of fields of vision, it seems unlikely that any target which is sufficiently distant to be suitable as an air target is likely to be identified by the use of Tracer Ammunitions.

(k) Para. 18. I do not consider a helio or lamp an excellent means of communication to and within small units. Visibility in the Jungle prevents their use.

(l) Para. 20. Is there any necessity for this para?

(m) Para. 21. It is for the reason stated in the second sentence that line communication down to companies is common practice.

(n) Para. 23. Surely this is a matter for the despatching authority at the base rather than a matter for units. Paraffin is unlikely to be available to units in the jungle.

(o) Para. 24. Tentage is most unlikely to be available below Brigade Headquarters.

(p) Para. 27. This is not a Unit Commander's responsibility.

17. Section XIII MAN MANAGEMENT.

The whole of this section appears to be a matter for the Higher Command. Unless the necessary troops are made available in the forward area, the system of reliefs set out in this para. is not possible. I quite agree with what is said in the para, but experience of 7 Aust Div. is that there were never adequate troops to carry this out, nor were there any appreciable reinforcements received during operations.

18. Section XIV. CONCLUSION.

(a) As I have said earlier, I consider the essentials in training for Jungle Warfare are firstly a thorough training in more open warfare, followed by such specialist training as is necessary for the jungle. It is for this reason that I have suggested that the pamphlet be reduced so as to include those matters which are peculiar to jungle warfare.

(b) Para. 7. 'Twilight of the Jungle' seems out of place. While it is obvious that the light in the jungle is not as clear as the outside, you can hardly describe it as 'twilight'.

19. Section XV - Japanese Tactics.

(a) Para. 1. I agree with the first sentence and this should surely be our object too.

(b) The Jap also depends on superiority of numbers for offensive action. The converse was shown by his precipitate flight after the battle of Gorari, when having lost superiority of numbers he fled and showed no further offensive spirit from then to the end of the campaign.

(c) Para. 2. I agree in General that the Jap is aggressive; but this aggressive spirit is knocked out of him by reverses.

(d) Para. 3. After the word 'SOLOMONS' add 'and New Guinea'. Whilst the statements at the end of this Para. are doubtlessly true, they do not reduce his tenacity and determination to inflict on us the greatest possible loss until he is actually killed. The wounded Jap, with an automatic weapon under some cover, will continue firing his weapon even though opposed by quite a considerable number of our own troops. This was well exemplified in the final stages of both the capture of Gona and the clearing of the Sananda Area.

(e) Para. 6. Has the Jap in fact, used the night attack, as opposed to patrols in the real jungle? Have not such attacks usually been through rubber or cocoanut plantations?

(f) Para. 7. I think the statement that their 'field craft is excellent' should be reduced to 'their field craft is very good'.

(g) Para. 8. Prisoners statements have denied that they are taught to chatter loudly to give the impression of a larger force.

(h) Para 10. The method employed in New Guinea, is similar to our own.

Part III Recommendations

20. In view of all the foregoing I submit the following recommendation in regard to the pamphlet and to training in preparation for jungle warfare.

21. The pamphlet should be shortened very considerably by

(a) The exclusion of all matters which are not peculiar to jungle warfare.

(b) Confining itself to matters which come within the province of Bn. Comds and their subordinates.

22. The pamphlet should contain -

(a) A definition of what is meant by the word jungle and the conditions as regards terrain, climate and communications which are likely to be encountered in jungle areas.

(b) A statement of what training is required to fit the individual, the unit and the formation for successful operations in jungle warfare.

23. As regards the immediately preceding para, I consider the following training necessary.

(a) The individual soldier.

(i) Complete and thorough individual training as at present laid down in our Manuals, though, I fear not always carried out.

(ii) Practice in "living hard" both as regards climatic conditions and food. He must be taught how to make the best by individual cooking of bully beef and biscuits and dehydrated rations.

(iii) He must be accustomed to the silence and lack of vision in the jungle and to move silently through it without losing direction.

(iv) Ability and preparedness to act on his own initiative in furtherance of the platoon or company plan if separated from his leader by vision or sound.

(b) N.C.Os. and officers.

In addition to the matter referred to in (a) above, these must be taught , in their various grades, the peculiar application to jungle warfare of the principles taught in more normal type of warfare. The main considerations which affects the application of "normal" principles are, I consider, those set out in para 6, 7 & 8 of this memo.

Major-General,
Commander, 7 Aust Div.

REPORT ON, AND LESSONS FROM, THE PAPUAN CAMPAIGN.

FINAL STAGE

GONA - SANANANDA AREA, 21st November, 1942, to 22nd January, 1943.

1. GENERAL

(a) Responsibilities:

The final stage of the PAPUAN CAMPAIGN was fought in the coastal belt from incl BUNA to incl AMBOGA R.

32 U.S.Div was responsible for the BUNA -GIRUWA area and 7 Aust Div for the destruction of all enemy between the GIRUA and AMBOGA rivers. The latter area included the defences around SANANANDA PT and GONA as well as enemy forces as far west as the AMBOGA R.

(b) Terrain:

Generally speaking 7 Aust Div area was bounded to the North by the coastline, to the East by the GIRUA R, and to the West by the AMBOGA R.

It was flat, lowlying country devoid of any high features, covered by jungle of varying height interspersed with kunai patches, swamps, marsh and small streams.

The main features as outlined above bear on the general military situation from three points of view:-

(i) L's of C and axes of advance were confined to narrow tracks which, in the occasional dry sections, had been built up and corduroyed. Normally / Main tracks were of sufficient width to allow ~~vehicles normally of~~ only one-way traffic/until passing points had been constructed. In parts, the tracks were so narrow that vehicles proceeding along them brushed the vegetation on either side. Other tracks were mere mud channels compressed on the swampy surface by the pressure of feet. No track was entirely dry; and, the wet sections became deep pools of slush.

(ii) The flat nature of the coastal plain resulted in streams dividing into numerous distributaries, many of which ended in swamps and lagoons. Thus the terrain had worse features from the point of view of movement and habitability than has a delta.

/(c)

(iii) The close vegetation resulted in a decaying mess of materials in which pests and bacteria thrived, to the detriment of comfort and health; hence to the detriment physical and mental energy.

(c) Enemy:

i. Dispositions:

The enemy occupied defensive posns, forming beachheads, around both SANANANDA PT and GONA, as well as posts along the coastline.

The SANANANDA defences extended southwards astride the SOPUTA - SANANANDA Rd to within 3 miles of SOPUTA. The posns were sited on the only "dry" ground available with their flanks protected by natural obstacles, such as swamps, streams and thick jungle.

Apparently owing to the rate of our advance, the enemy was unable to establish a position in depth for the defence of GONA.

Remnants of the Jap force which had been defeated in the mountains, and reinforcements subsequently landed, endeavoured to concentrate in the vicinity of AMBOGA R and to move eastwards with a view to reinforcing GONA garrison. Even after the fall of GONA, they were a constant menace to our left flank until finally overcome.

ii. Morale:

Factors which tended to demoralize the enmy included:-

defeat of the previously victorious force in the advance on PORT MORESBY;

lack of supplies;

excessive casualities, in battle, through sickness, & lack of food;

loss of Comd and other senior offrs, equipment & amn;

lack of air support;

inability to receive reinforcements, or to evacuate sick and wounded owing to our air superiority.

However, the following factors favoured the enemy:-

occupation of a defensive posn of his own choosing;

/fatigue

fatigue of our tps after the long, arduous and rapid advance over the mountains;

terrain;

and the fact that we were obliged to maintain the offensive with limited resources of men and fire support (both arty and mortar). Maintenance, incl reinforcements, was primarily dependent on transport by air from PORT MORESBY.

(d) Own Troops:

i. Dispositions:

Troops available had to be split in order to contain the enemy on one flank whilst the remainder were overcome.

Owing to the depleted strengths of units under comd 7 Aust Div, it was necessary, initially, to employ at least one brigade to contain the enemy occupying either GONA or SANANANDA positions.

The force in GONA area also had to be made responsible for the enemy on our left flank to the West of GONA.

ii. Morale:

The conditions under which the concluding stage of this campaign was fought tested the morale of our troops to the utmost. Initially and finally the morale was high and proved to be the deciding factor. It was very clearly shown that high morale is a corollary to efficient training. Training alone, will inspire confidence in ones weapons, oneself, ones fellow troops and leaders; Without training high morale can be only transitory, for it is rather the morale, or courage, of ignorance.

2. RESUME OF EVENTS - FINAL STAGE.

On 21 Nov 42, leading elements 7 Aust Div gained contact with the enemy in the vicinity of SOPUTA and GONA.

In spite of high morale and the desire of all ranks to complete the destruction of the Jap forces in PAPUA, they were prevented from doing so upon encountering prepared enemy defensive positions protected by marsh and jungle. These conditions superimposed upon their reduced numbers and physical fatigue made the task too great for their capabilities.

By the end of Nov it was obvious that these troops would have to be relieved as soon as possible. With this object in

/view

view 30 Aust Inf Bde (39 & 49 Bns) with under comd 55/53 Aust Inf Bn (from 14 Aust Inf Bde) was moved by air from PORT MORESBY to POPENDETTA and DOBODURA and thence by route march to SOPUTA.

Adv elements HQ 30 Aust Inf Bde and first flights of 39 Aust Inf Bn arrived at SOPUTA on 30 Nov but the move of the bde was not completed until 5 Dec.

On 1 Dec preliminary arrangements were made for the relief of 25 Aust Inf Bde by 30 Aust Inf Bde. During the day 21 Aust Inf Bde ~~continued~~ (less 2/14 Aust Inf Bn) continued the attack on GONA supported by covering fire from 25 Aust Inf Bde. A small party succeeded in entering the village but was unable to hold the ground gained. Heavy opposition was encountered throughout from enemy MG posts.

During this period, 2/14 Aust Inf Bn continued to make most satisfactory progress along the coast from GONA eastwards towards SANANANDA PT.

The situation at this stage was:-

(a) Although the enemy holding GONA were now virtually cut off, unsupported infantry attacks against the position were proving ~~too~~ very costly.

(b) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn was making rapid progress eastwards along the coast.

It was decided, therefore, to reinforce 2/14 Aust Inf Bn with 39 Aust Inf Bn and to place both bns under comd HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde.

The object of this force was to advance as rapidly as possible along the coastal track shown on the map to SANANANDA PT, in order to strike the main Jap force in the SANANANDA - SOPUTA area both in the flank and rear.

To assist this movement air support was requested. Support to take the form of bombing and straffing of enemy posns and any movement seen between SANANANDA PT and GARARA. The A F agreed to provide the desired support but unfortunately, during the operations, straffed our own troops three times during 3 Dec. This was undoubtedly due to the pilots concerned not being trained in the direct support of infantry.

Hopes of quick success in this direction were shortlived.

/ Tracks

Tracks shown on the map were found to be inaccurate and the one which it was proposed to use as a L of C did not exist. Marsh was encountered in all directions. Numerous patrols were sent out, but, as a suitable L of C could not be found the project had to be abandoned.

In view of this, and the fact that 16 Aust Inf Bde was incapable of further offensive action, it was decided that 30 Aust Inf Bde should relieve the former Bde instead of being employed in GONA area as originally intended.

On 4 Dec, HQ and ancillary units 126 US Regt reverted to comd 32 US Div. US tps remaining under comd 7 Aust Div (3 Bn and det 1 Bn 126 US Regt) were placed under comd 16 Aust Inf Bde. 21 Aust Inf Bde, with under comd 39 Aust Inf Bn, relieved 25 Aust Inf Bde and 3 Aust Inf Bn in the GONA area.

An unsuccessful attack was made on 5 Dec by US tps under comd against the enemy position 3 miles North of SOPUTA.

At 1700 hrs 6 Dec responsibility for the SOPUTA - SANANANDA area passed from 16 Aust Inf Bde to 30 Aust Inf Bde.

During 7 Dec, 30 Aust Inf Bde staged a full scale attack on the enemy position between it and the RD BLOCK posn held by sme o the US tps under comd. The attack, however, was only partly successful and little ground was gained. The casualities on the other hand were proportionately large.

A further attack on the GONA posn by 21 Aust Inf Bde was arranged for 8 Dec on the understanding, that should it fail, GONA would be contained whilst the maximum force possible was concentrated for the destruction of the Jap force to the West of GONA in the vicinity of the AMBOGA R mouth.

At the end of the day some ground had been gained but the garrison had not been overcome. However, subsequent events showed that the attack had succeeded in breaking the morale of the garrison as during the night 8/9 Dec the major portion of the Jap force endeavoured to break out in an easterly direction. This action resulted in the fall of GONA as this force was fully accounted for and GONA cleared of enemy during 9 Dec. /The

The next task undertaken by 21 Aust Inf Bde was the destruction of the Jap force between GONA and the AMBOGA R. Major offensive action continued until 18 Dec when the main body of enemy in this area was wiped out as the result of an encircling movement by 39 Aust Inf Bn.

On 19 Dec attacks were launched by 2/7 Aust Cav and 30 Aust Inf Bde in the SOPUTA - SANANANDA area.

2/7 Aust Cav was ordered to advance from our RD BLOCK posn with the object of seizing and holding SANANANDA PT whilst 30 Aust Inf Bde's task was to overcome the enemy posn to their immediate front and then follow closely behind 2/7 Aust Cav.

Only slight progress was made and portion of 2/7 Aust Cav was cut off some 600 yds North of the RD BLOCK. One positive factor was that 49 Bn fought a passage to the RD BLOCK from the East and thus opened communications with the latter which overcame the semi-isolation of it.

On 20 Dec, GOC, NGF and GOC, 7 Aust Div agreed that further major offensive operations would not be possible until additional tps were available. This course was forced upon the Comds owing to the lack of training of both 36 and 55/53 Aust Inf Bns which were now forming part of 30 Aust Inf Bde.

It was decided to endeavour to overcome the opposition by dealing with it piecemeal and thus maintain pressure against the enemy until additional tps were available.

Owing to shortage of tps in the SOPUTA - SANANANDA area, 39 Aust Inf Bn was ordered on 21 Dec to move to this area in order to concentrate the maximum force possible against the enemy there whilst leaving only a token force to guard the western flank and GONA coastline.

In order to relieve the US tps holding the RD BLOCK posn, orders were issued on 21 Dec for units in the SOPUTA - SANANANDA area to be regrouped as follows:-

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde, with under comd,
2/7 Aust Cav, 39 and 49 Aust Inf Bns,
HQ 30 Aust Inf Bde, with under comd,
36, 55/53 Aust Inf Bns and US Tps.

21 Aust Inf Bde was made responsible for RD BLOCK posn, ordered ordered to join forces with 2/7 Aust Cav 600 yds to the North, and to effectively cut Jap L of C to their southernmost posn by means of active patrolling.

/30 Aust

30 Aust Inf Bde was to contain the enemy to their immediate front and endeavour to overcome it by gradually closing in from the East, South and West.

2/14, 2/16 and 2/27 Aust Inf Bns were formed into a composite bn and made responsible for the protection of the left flank and defence of GONA area.

Following upon this re-grouping continuous offensive action, in the form of fighting patrols, small scale attacks, and arty and mortar harassing fire, was carried out, thereby restricting enemy activity and gradually reducing his strength and morale.

Further changes took place early in Jan 43, upon the arrival of 163 US Regt and 18 Aust Inf Bde in the SOPUTA area.

The RD BLOCK area was taken over by 163 US Regt, thus freeing 36 and 55/53 Aust Inf Bns. These bns were then moved to GONA under comd HQ 14 Aust Inf Bde in order to relieve the remaining troops of 21 Aust Inf Bde in that area.

On 9 Jan,43, 18 Aust Inf Bde relieved 30 Aust Inf Bde and the latter came into Div res.

An attack was launched by 18 Aust Inf Bde on 12 Jan and although several strong posts were taken the enemy posn was not overcome. However, the attack had the desired effect for on 14 Jan it was discovered that the Japs were endeavouring to evacuate their foremost posn. Immediate action was taken to ensure that as few as possible of the enemy escaped, and that the local success was followed up with the utmost speed and vigour, By the end of the day the entire Jap posn between 18 Aust Inf Bde and the RD BLOCK had been mopped up.

18 Aust Inf Bde was ordered to carry out a wide outflanking movement from the West on 15 Jan, in order to gain the coastline and SAMAMANDA PT, and thus prevent the enemy from forming a beachhead at SAMAMANDA. At the same time 163 US Regt was ordered to exert their maximum offensive efforts against the enemy to their immediate front, i.e., northwards from the RD BLOCK.

Although many difficulties, hardships, and fierce opposition were encountered the operation was completely successful and by 1300 hrs 22 Jan, all organized resistance had been overcome.

The Div res and 14 Aust Inf Bde were used to form two parallel " stop lines" to the enemy endeavouring to escape westwards. The tps on these lines continued to take toll of enemy stragglers for some days after the capture of SANANDA area.

At 1200 hrs 24 Jan,43, HQ 7 Aust Div was relieved by 41 US Div when the latter HQ assumed responsibility for the BUNA-SANANANDA-GONA area.

3. SUPPORT.

(a) Air Support and Co-operation:

The Air Force assisted both by air support and air co-operation

i. Air Support:

With the exception of three occasions the support given was "indirect" rather than "direct". It was soon realised that only specially trained pilots are capable of affording "direct", or close, support to infantry without accepting unwarranted risks to our own tps. A modification in the type of aircraft used for direct support may be a necessary consideration for future operations.

Known enemy posns, dumps, barge movements and concentrations of tps were bombed and straffed as well as enemy L's of C.

Support desired was not always readily forthcoming, owing to the many commitments of the Air Force, the fact that supporting aircraft were based on PORT MORESBY, and the absence of an experienced Air Force offr on the staff of the GOC.

The firing of the 25-pr smoke shell to indicate the "bomb-line"was found to be most effective in this type of jungle

ii. Air Co-operation:

Ph R and Arty R were invaluable as excellent results were obtained from both. Tac R provided was most helpful; but, owing to the jungle nature of the area, information obtained was necessarily limited.

The desirability of having AC planes under comd and operating from an ALG adjacent to Div HQ was obvious. Results would have been more readily obtained had it been possible for the AILO pilots to visit Div HQ regularly. Visits from senior AF offrs invariably produced immediate results, particularly as regards air photos urgently required for ops.

Owing to the lack of detailed maps of the area, and the many inaccuracies in those provided, information for the planning of operations was dependent upon the provision of air photographs.

(b) ARTY:

Although only a few 25-pr guns and limited ammunition were available the important part payed by the arty towards the successful conclusion of the campaign was most evident.

Early and continuous efforts were made to locate some guns, both 25-pr and 2-pr, for direct fire against enemy strongposts. These, however, proved fruitless either as a result of the infantry being unable to definitely pin-point the strongposts, or inability to position the guns owing to the swampy or jungle nature of the country.

A captured Japanese mountain gun was taken to GONA on 7 Dec but a suitable position could not be found for it to be employed.

When attacking prepared defensive posns with overhead cover adequate arty supporting fire must be provided if excessive casualties are to be avoided.

(c) TANKS:

Tanks were used in support of the attack by 18 Aust Inf Bde on 12 Jan, 43, but due to the nature of the terrain were restricted to the SOPUTA -SANANANDA track. 37mm A tk fire and A tk mines were encountered. As the tanks were unable to leave this narrow track three tank/ casualties suffered were [illegible], one was burnt out, another ditched and the third although hit succeeded in withdrawing.

The normal radio comn and control was not successful partly because of the difficult radio conditions and partly because operations could not be kept under observation from the control tank.

It was reported that the tanks after the fighting in the BUNA area and the move to SOPUTA nearly all required a workshop overhaul and that the existing LAD facilities were insufficient.

Tanks are definitely not suitable for employment in this type of country.

4. LESSONS AND POINTS DESERVING EMPHASIS

The following notes on lessons of the campaign would be apparent if the foregoing report had been written in greater detail. However simple, they were proved by events to be potent and worthy of consideration.

Training and Morale

(a) The attainment of a high standard of discipline and training, both individual and collectivs, is most essential. This results in confidence in oneself, ones weapons, ones fellow troops and leaders. The natural corollary to such confidence is high morale which is probably even more necessary in this kind of warfare than any other.

Offence

(b) The offensive spirit must be developed and skilful aggressiveness taught.

Outlook

(c) Troops must learn to regard war as a sport, The enemy is the game, we the hunters. The Jap is a barbarian, little better than an animal, in fact his actions are those of a wild beast and he must, therefore, be dealt with accordingly.

Action must be taken to counter any tendency towards the development of an inferiority complex due to reports of the super qualities of the Jap as a soldier. This has been proved to be incorrect as our troops, properly trained, are definitely superior. It is well to remember that whilst one must not underrate one's enemy, it is equally unwise to overrate him.

Topography and Trees

(d) When fighting in country consisting of high features it is imperative that the high ground be held as taught in mountain warfare.

In flat, featureless jungle country the trees represent normal features and should be made use of accordingly. Infantry posted in trees provide the necessary

observation, command approaches, give depth of fire and afford concealment and deception in the defence.

Troops must, therefore, be taught to climb trees and be provided with the means to do so - a suggestion is, "climbing irons" as used by linemen for climbing telegraph poles. Training is also necessary in picking the right tree.

With this object in view it would be of great assistance if part of the snipers course was included in the training of riflemen.

The Japs made full use of trees throughout this campaign. Constant reference has been made to Jap "snipers" in trees. This, however, is a misuse of the term as they were normally merely "riflemen in trees".

Fire Support

(e) Good results were obtained in the attack by affording the leading troops supporting fire by raking the trees with automatic fire. Raking the trees should be confined to such occasions as otherwise use of dummy snipers by the Jap may have the effect of disclosing our positions.

Air Photographs

(f) Instruction in the preparation of maps from air photographs must be undertaken. Owing to the lack of reliable maps it was necessary to rely almost entirely upon air photographs. These played a very important part in the planning and operations both in the SANANANDA and GONA areas. All officers and NCOs must be trained in the interpretation of air photos.

The RD BLOCK position had been occupied by us for some three weeks before the actual position could be definitely located on the map. The same difficulty was experienced in pin-pointing other flank detachments until air photographs of the area were available.

Maps

(g) Unless good maps are available air photographs MUST be provided. The maps in use during the campaign were most inaccurate and misleading, e.g., courses of rivers, tracks

shown which did not exist, and names and positions of villages wrong.

Encircling Movements

(h) Encircling movements must be made with sufficient strength to reduce the enemy. It is not sufficient to merely seize ground. Unless this is done it will only result in the dispersion of the force. The employment of numerous small fighting patrols is equally dangerous in this regard.

Infiltration and "Blocks"

(i) The action of infiltrating and occupying a "block" in the enemy L of C will not cause him to withdraw or achieve anything commensurate with the effort necessary to maintain it. "Blocks" must always act offensively if they are to carry out their object. Further, "blocks" must not be put in deeper than our strength permits. We must be capable of maintaining them without drawing unreasonably upon our available resources.

Attack

(j) Recce

Ample time must be allowed for recce and to permit all ranks to familiarise themselves with the local conditions and terrain.

(k) Supporting Fire

At times it may be impossible to afford arty and mortar supporting fire. However, as a rule unsupported infantry attacks proved costly and casualties suffered were out of all proportion to the results achieved.

Reports from prisoners of war indicate that the effectiveness of supporting fire was in the following order:- mortar, arty, air action.

Arty delayed action fuze was very effective both against the Jap "bunkers" and in the thick jungle.

(l) Against Prepared Positions

Upon encountering prepared defences our losses

through sickness and battle casualties were far greater than those of the enemy.

The alternatives for the attacker are:-

i siege

ii "stalk and consolidate"

iii overwhelming concentrations of fire

iv attack each sector of the defence with overwhelming numbers and accept high casualties,

or

- of ii and iii or iii and iv -

v a combination/~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ if supporting fire is available

The "stalk and consolidate" tactics combined with concentrations of supporting fire on located enemy posns have the effect of unnerving the Jap. He does not like to feel the "net" closing in. His reaction, normally, is to counter-attack and if this fails, to withdraw. As part of this process we should endeavour to cover our troops with automatic/fire in trees.

- supporting -

(m) Objectives

The importance of ample supply of air photos is borne out by the fact that very often objectives can only be given by the difference in vegetation e.g., edge of kunai patch, line of low scrub, or fringe of tall timber.

Defence

(n) Whilst it is agreed that the offensive spirit must be highly developed and that "offence is the best means of defence", more attention must be given to the defence.

Troops must learn to occupy good defensive positions quickly and silently.

Defence must be automatic when a halt is ordered or further progress temporarily impossible. The order to move should be/the only order to cease improvement of the defence.

- regarded as -

Even when going into bivouac a perimeter defence must be

occupied automatically.

The digging and preparation of defences should form an important part of the training.

Unless the above is understood and practised by all ranks, the result of a determined attack by the enemy will be withdrawal or defeat of our troops.

In the jungle, sentries should be posted in pairs. It should not be possible for a sentry to be scuppered without somebody's knowledge. They should be changed singly each half hour, so that both are not fatigued at the end of each clock hour.

Casualties

(o) Our troops, not being accustomed to such hard conditions and low standard of living, were undoubtedly more adversely affected than the enemy.

Casualties suffered during this stage of the campaign were in the following proportions:-

KIA and Missing to Wounded = to

Battle Casualties to Sick = to

General

(p) Non-fighters within units must be reduced to a minimum.

(q) Personnel who are not physically fit, or capable of standing up to the rigours of this kind of warfare, should be disposed of immediately. Action must not be deferred until operations are imminent.

(r) Inefficiency: Ruthless culling out of inefficient leaders is essential.

(s) Reinforcements should be readily available and fed up regularly. In addition to having completed their recruits course they should have learnt to play their part in "the team" i.e. the section.

(t) Uniforms. In this particular theatre the colour of uniforms mattered little. This results from jungle battle being a close quarters combat. In the attack it was movement and noise which disclosed the presence of the attackers. In defence, concealment was easy.

(u) Concealment is of paramount importance. Vegetation should not be cut in the immediate vicinity of defensive posts. Even under ideal conditions for concealment this was neglected. Lanes of fire are NOT always needed, if jungle is soft. Lanes of vision must be carefully cut and should NOT be apparent to anyone standing in one.

(v) Indication of "bombline" to Air Force: The use of 25 pr smoke shell proved most satisfactory.

(w) Collection of arms (particularly SMGs and automatics) and ammunition from KIA is most essential. Isolated Jap pockets were able to hold out longer through neglect of this duty. In such cases it is also highly desirable that reserve or emergency rations also be removed from KIA.

(x) Salvage of all arms, equipment, ammunition, supplies, blankets, instruments etc should be returned for repair or reconditioning immediately opportunity affords.

(y) Congestion must be avoided. Latter stages of this

this campaign may produce wrong ideas. It must be remembered that we were fortunate enough to have superiorty in the air, possess the initiative, and a preponderance of arty and mortar fire. We developed a false security.

(z) Road discipline is imperative.and must be enforced at all times. Scarcity of MT roads and condition and narrowness of existing ones retards maintenance sufficiently without unnecessary delays caused by vehicles, being parked in narrow stretches, overloaded, travelling at excessive speeds, or committing other breaches of road discipline.

5. TRAINING.

It is considered that, in addition to the points set out in the foregoing and other normal training, attention should be paid to the following:-

(a) Exercises with troops should be carried out using live ammunition, including arty, mortars, grenades (both hand and rifle), as well as SAA. These would have the effect of, accustoming troops to the noise and capabilities of all these weapons when providing supporting fire, and would also inspire confidence.

(b) Troops must learn to accustom themselves to noise and to sleep as opportunity offers.

(c) They must be trained in "hard living". This should include living on emergency rations (to inspire confidence), long physical strains, and learning the art of improvisation.

(d) Intensive training is necessary in:-

i. Living and training in the jungle until it becomes a matter of course.

ii. Maintaining direction and recognizing different types of vegetation previously pointed out on air photos.

iii. Silent movement.

iv. Weapon training. All troops should be capable of using ALL weapons with which the unit is armed, and fire the various courses as far as possible.

v. Individual field ~~xxxx~~ firing.

vi. "Stalkers" ranges.

/vii.

vii. Occupation of "tree" positions, including selection of right tree, method of ascent, motionless waiting, loading and reloading, and camouflage.

viii. Choice and preparation of defensive posts, including fields of fire, fields of view, obstacles, camouflage and deception. Deception might include preparation of dummy fields of fire.

ix. Section training.

x. Obstacle, assault, and battle practice, courses.

6. CONCLUSION.

We must find the COUNTER to Jap tactics, NOT copy them.

TEL. NO. CANBERRA, 661.
All official communications should be addressed to the COMMANDANT, Royal Military College, and not to any Officer personally.
IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE:

GOC
G I
G II
G III JSR 1/2
S III (1)
I.O.
HC

AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES.

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE. & S.S. (Aust)
DUNTROON.
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY.

ADV. H.Q. 7 AUST. DIV.
File No. SG 34/4/126
Date 7 Apr 43.

Duntroon
31 Mar 43.

HQ 7 Aust Div.

Subject - REPORT ON OPS - 7 AUST DIV 13 AUG -2 Dec 42

Herewith a copy of a report upon Ops of 7 Aust Div from 13 Aug 42 to 2 Dec 42.

The original and duplicate have been sent to Maj-Gen ALLEN for signing etc. He has been asked to forward same direct to 7 Aust Div upon completion.

One copy has also been sent in addition to Maj-Gen ALLEN for his retention.

It will be noted that some dates have NOT been inserted. Unfortunately I was not able to procure them from documents at HQ 7 Aust Div prior to my departure. Maj-Gen ALLEN has been asked to supply as much data as possible in this report.

.....Col

Maj-Gen Allen
19 Apr 43

REPORT ON OPS OF 7 AUST DIV FROM 13 Aug TO 2 Dec 42

GENERAL

1. On the 2 Aug 42 a warning order was received from 1 Aust Corps that 7 Aust Div (then located north of BRISBANE) would proceed to NEW GUINEA. On the same day a conference was held at HQ 1 Aust Corps at ESK at which the General Officer Commanding 7 Aust Div and the AA & QMG attended. At this conference the composition of flights was discussed plus amount of transport and equipment to be taken by units. On 3 Aug 42 Col SPRY reported to HQ 7 Aust Div to relieve Col ELLIOTT and brought with him confirmatory orders giving composition of flights etc. 18 Aust Inf Bde Gp and 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp plus HQ 7 Aust Div and proportion of Div troops were to proceed in the first flight to MILNE BAY and PORT MORESBY area respectively. 25 Aust Inf Bde Group plus 7 Aust Div Cav Regt and proportion of Div troops was to follow to NEW GUINEA in subsequent flights. The first flight arrived at their respective destinations approx 13 Aug 42. The GOC accompanied by his senior G and AQ officers arrived in PORT MORESBY by air on the 13 Aug.

2. On 16 Aug, 7 Aust Div was allotted the role of recapturing KOKODA with a view to facilitating further operations against BUNA-GONA. On the 18 Aug, the following roles were also allotted to 7 Aust Div.

(a) Comd of operations in the area MIOLA LAKE-KOKODA.

(b) Defence of PORT MORESBY area against seaborne attack.

(c) Defence of aerodromes in the PORT MORESBY area against land or seaborne attacks.

... Attached as appx A is a list of units placed under the operational command of 7 Aust Div. In addition, in the event of a seaborne attack, all units of all Allied Forces were being made available to 7 Aust Div in the defence of the PORT MORESBY area.

3. In order that the operations may be more easily followed this report has been divided into the following:-

(a) Topographical

(b) Phase (1)

(a) The Withdrawal to IMITA RIDGE

(b) Defence measures for the protection of BASE AREA (PORT MORESBY).

(c) Phase (2) - The Recapture of KOKODA

(d) Phase (3) - The Advance to GONA-SOPUTA

(e) General lessons during operations up to completion of phase 3.

It is not proposed to deal with these roles vide 2 (a) and 2 (b) above in any detail, since all measures taken are contained in 7 Aust Div Op Instn No 7.

TOPOGRAPHICAL

4. The country traversed between ILOLO (base area PORT MORESBY) GONA can be divided by areas into three types:-

(a) ILOLO - KOKODA

(b) KOKODA - SOPUTA JUMBORA

(c) SOPUTA JUMBORA - BANANDA GONA.

5. ILOLO - KOKODA Area. This area includes the OWEN STANLEY Ranges and consists for the most part of precipitous ranges covered in rain forests. Here the tree growth is prolific with the result that the visibility is restricted to between 50-100 yards and the sunlight rarely penetrates to the ground below. This, coupled with the intense rainfall (400 inches a year), plus mists and clouds produces a soft and moist ground surface which rapidly deteriorates with foot traffic to a muddy morass. Rain invariably falls each afternoon. Of necessity, any movement of troops through this country is confined to native pads. These, for some reason only known to the native himself, follow the tops of ridges without regard to gradient and surface. Consequently tracks run up and down or over knife edge ridges with steep slopes to the valleys below. Movement along such tracks therefore can only be made with considerable exertion. Movement off the track is much slower and more difficult. Detours involve climbing up and down steep slopes, in addition to cutting a track

through the undergrowth. One mile in four hours is not a discreditable performance under such conditions. Wild animal and bird life is almost non-existent and natural foods are conspicuous by their absence. The highest area traversed between ILOLO and KOKODA lies in the KAGI - MEKARI - MYOLA triangle. Here the altitude reaches up to 7000 ft. As a result the nights become bitterly cold. From MYOLA the altitude falls steadily to KOKODA (2000 ft). Although references are made upon maps to the "pass" existing between KOKODA and MYOLA no such thing exists. From MYOLA to KOKODA runs a narrow valley containing KORA CREEK. It is this narrow valley which is generally confused with a pass. KOKODA itself is situated upon a tongue shaped plateau which protudes from the over-shadowing spurs running north from the massive OWEN STANLEY Ranges. The village consists of a few adm buildings only.

6. KOKODA to SOPUTA - JUMBORA Area. The country between KOKODA - SOPUTA - JUMBORA area consists generally of flat tropical jungle. Here the trees are less dense but the under-growth is thicker than in rain foret country. The main dominating feature of the track is the OIVI spur. After passing over this feature the track runs down to approx sea level. From thence onwards to the KUMUSI the track is cut by streams which in some cases prove a definite obstacle if the bridges are destroyed. Movement off the track is not difficult. The KUMUSI RIVER presents a major obstacle since it is approx 80 yds wide in places and approximately 12 ft deep and runs with a speed of 8 - 10 knots. The track from KOKODA to WAIROPE was suitable for pack transport but with the passage of troops and pack animals it had become in spots a muddy lake. Open areas are also encountered where all tree growth has been strangled by a coarse bladed grass known as Kunai which grows to a height of 4 - 6 ft. These kunai patches enable detours to be made comparatively easily and with speed. From the KUMUSI onwards the country between the KUMUSI River and the SOPUTA - JUMBORA track was of the same nature but with the ground surface becoming slightly more muddy.

7. SOPUTA JUMBORA - SANANANDA GONA Area. The country in this area consists of tropical coastal jungle interspersed with large kunai patches. Trees and undergrowth are prolific with water sometimes covering the ground to a depth of inches. Movement is restricted generally to kunai patches and small strips of higher lying ground composed of a sandy black loamy soil. Visibility is restricted to approx 5- 10 yards. The digging and occupation of weapon pits becomes a problem owing to the seepage of water.

PHASE I

A WITHDRAWAL TO INITA RIDGE

8. The situation confronting comd 7 Aust Div upon 15 Aug was as follows:-

(a) 39 Aust Inf Bn and remnants of PIB after successfully delaying the enemy at DOMIKI had withdrawn to the ISURAVA area. 53 Aust Inf Bn (comd Lt-Col K. WARD) was proceeding to reinforce 39 Aust Inf Bn (temporarily commanded by Maj.A.CAMERON). Comd 30 Aust Inf Bde (Brig S.PORTER) was on his way forward to take over control of operations from the CO of 39 Aust Inf Bn. He had been instructed to impose the maximum delay possible upon the enemy north of the OWEN STANLEY Range and at all costs was to prevent the supply depot MYOLA LAKE being captured. In addition he was at liberty to take any action which would have favourably influenced the recapture of KOKODA. Enemy strength opposing forward troops was not clear but was estimated at 1500 with a further 3000 having recently arrived in the GONA area. On the 13 Aug 21 Aust Inf Bde less 2/27 Aust Inf Bn was warned to be prepared to move foward to the ISURAVA area commencing on 16 Aug. This was later confirmed and,on 16 Aug, the leading bn commenced its forward move. Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde (Brig A.POTTS) had been given the role of recapturing KOKODA with a view to facilitating further operations against BUNA- GONA area. Upon his arrival in the forward area, under mutual arrangement with comd 30 Aust Inf Bde, he was to assume comd of all troops.

Unfortunately by the time the two bns of 21 Aust Inf Bde had reached ISURAVA, the Japs had gained the initiative. This was primarily due to the ineffective patrolling by the 53 Aust Inf Bn, and the delay occasioned by the non-arrival of supplies at MYOLA causing both bns of 21 Aust Inf Bde to be delayed there some four days. At this point with the initiative gone Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde was compelled to commit his battalions piecemeal as they came forward in order to counter attack the enemy who had seized the highground on both flanks overlooking ISURAVA. Considerable casualties were inflicted upon the enemy. 53 Aust Inf Bn having become disorganized was withdrawn to MYOLA and thence to PORT MORESBY. The performance of this battalion had NOT been creditable: this appeared to be the result of poor preliminary training and weak leaders. On 31 Aug, 2/27 Aust Inf Bn which had been retained in the MORESBY area as a reserve should PORT MORESBY be attacked from the sea,(pending the result of the operation in MILNE BAY area) was moved forward to rejoin 21 Aust Inf Bde. It was now evident that the Japs had been heavily reinforced. On 3 Sep GOC 7 Aust Div informed Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde that the holding of MYOLA was essential and stressed the need for offensive operations in order to regain the initiative. An attempt was made to do this, but by this time troops were fatigued, the majority had sore feet, and the lack of hot meals, shelters, sleep and dry clothes were beginning to show their effects. An attempt to make a stand north of MYOLA was unsuccessful owing to the outflanking and encircling movements by the enemy and the Bde Comd decided to hold a position in the vicinity of EFOGI. By this time, 2/27 Aust Inf Bn had joined the Bde. 39 Aust Inf Bn, by now very depleted in numbers, was returned to UBERI. On 8 Sep, Jap pressure became evident with the usual encircling movements. Bitter fighting occurred and again 21 Aust Inf Bde was forced to withdraw. It was during this withdrawal that 2/27 Aust Inf Bn became cut off from 21 Aust Inf Bde and took no further part in the withdrawal.

This Battalion endeavoured to withdraw upon MENARI by way of the ridge to the east of the main track. Unfortunately, however, they were retarded by a number of stretcher cases. Two companys were despatched to ascertain the position at MENARI which was found to be in enemy hands. These companys then lost contact with the remainder of the battalion; both parties after an arduous trek of some 13 days, with very little food, reached Base Area via JAWARERE. Meanwhile the withdrawal of the remainder of the brigade was continuing under strong Jap pressure.

9. On 9 Sep, Brig POTTS was relieved by Brig PORTER under instructions to GOC 7 Aust Div by command HQF. Brig PORTER was instructed by GOC 7 Aust Div to stabilise the position as far north as possible with the object of holding the enemy and gaining ground. Meanwhile 3 Aust Inf Bn had been sent to cover pads leading into the main tracks at MAURO and IORABAIWA in order to prevent any interference to the Lines of communication behind 21 Aust Inf Bde. In addition, 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn, (less one coy) had been moved to UBERI. Owing to the unsuitability of the MAURO position as a firm base and the difficulty of protecting the supply dropping ground on which supplies depended, Brig PORTER - (on arrival at 21 Aust Inf Bde) decided to continue the withdrawal to IORABAIWA RIDGE.

10. On 9 Sep, 25 Aust Inf Bde Group disembarked at PORT MORESBY and were placed under command 7 Aust Div for operations in the forward area. It is worthy to note that after a preliminary reconnaissance of PORT MORESBY GOC 7 Aust Div had asked NEW GUINEA Force on 14 Aug for this brigade group to be despatched to PORT MORESBY as early as possible. Had this brigade been despatched as requested the withdrawal from the forward area to IMITA Ridge would NOT have been necessary. Upon arrival Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde (Brig EATHER) was warned that his brigade must be prepared to move forward from Base Area commencing 10 Sep 42.

11. On 10 Sep the role of 7 Aust Div was amended to the following:-

(a) To establish control, as far north as possible of the

routes leading from KOKODA towards PORT MORESBY so as to defend PORT MORESBY base area against land attack from the north.

(b) To regain control of the route to KOKODA through the area ISURAVA - DENIKI, with a view to offensive operations for the capture of KOKODA.

(c) To deal with small enemy patrols trying to penetrate into PORT MORESBY base area.

This relieved Comd 7 Aust Div of the onerous duty of the defence of PORT MORESBY against seaborne attack, and the defence of PORT MORESBY Aerodromes area against land or seaborne attack.

The following role was allotted to 25 Aust Inf Bde:-

(a) To halt the enemy advance from the north towards PORT MORESBY by offensive action as far forward as possible.

(b) To regain control of the route to KOKODA through the area ISURAVA - DENIKI with a view to subsequent operations against KOKODA.

The vital necessity of securing supply dropping areas at NAURO, MEHARI, and MYOLA in order to maintain his advance, was impressed upon Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde. The native carrier situation had, by this time, deteriorated to such a degree through sickness and desertion (due to over fatigue) that only sufficient carriers remained to maintain one full infantry brigade one day's march ahead of a supply base. 2/1 Aust Pnr Bn (less one coy) was placed under command 25 Aust Inf Bde to assist the command in carrying out his role.

12. By 13 Sep 42, 25 Aust Inf Bde had assembled in the UBERI - IMITA Ridge area. After consultation with command 21 Aust Inf Bde, command 25 Aust Inf Bde decided to envelop and destroy the enemy forces opposing IORIBAIWA. His plan was to send one battalion on each flank to capture NAURO and then "mop up" towards IORIBAIWA, whilst one battalion advanced up the main track through IORIBAIWA. 2/1 Pnr Bn under command 25 Aust Inf Bde was to occupy a defence position upon IMITA RIDGE, prior to following up the advance of the 25 Aust Inf Bde.

13. By 15 Sep pressure had increased upon the whole front of 21 Aust Inf Bde, with the enemy making slight progress upon the right flank and centre. Both the outflanking battalions of 25 Aust Inf Bde had made contact with the enemy, and portion of the centre battalion had been committed to restore the position on the centre and right front of 21 Aust Inf Bde. Although determined and bitter attacks were made, the enemy could NOT be dislodged. A request by Commanders of 21 and 25 Aust Inf Bdes for authority to withdraw to IMITA RIDGE was acceded to by Commander 7 Aust Div. The importance of holding IORABAIWA was however impressed upon Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde, and he was instructed to leave harassing patrols behind should he withdraw. For purposes of the withdrawal, 21 Aust Inf Bde was placed under Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde.

14. The reasons for the withdrawal to IMITA RIDGE were as follows:-

(a) If 21 and 25 Aust Inf Bdes had continued to hold IORABAIWA RIDGE, all units of these formations would have been committed to defensive tasks, and freedom of movement to adopt the offensive would have been lost.

(b) It was essential to keep all available forces intact including freedom of movement owing to the offensive role of 7 Aust Div in the defence of PORT MORESBY.

(c) The supply etc system to IORABAIWA RIDGE was precarious, in that it was being maintained by a vastly inadequate carrier line. Small stocks of supplies and ammunition etc only were held at IORABAIWA RIDGE and any threat to the line of communication would have caused the carrier line to desert.

(d) The withdrawal to IMITA RIDGE allowed time for the regaining of patrol initiative, plus the establishment of a firm base from which to commence offensive action, (this had NOT been possible during the preceding phase of the campaign).

(e) Supporting arty fire could be provided up to and including IORABAIWA RIDGE. (No arty support was possible beyond this point).

(f) It was considered that the enemy must have been feeling the strain in his supply system, and that any further increase in his already attenuated Line of Communication would strain it to the breaking point.

15. By 1100 hrs 17 Sep, the withdrawal to IMITA RIDGE had been completed. One battalion of 25 Aust Inf Bde covered the withdrawal from a posn midway between IORIBAIWA and IMITA RIDGE. An ambush party from this battalion accounted for some 40 Japanese without loss to themselves. The remnants of 21 Aust Inf Bde, (240 all ranks) were withdrawn to UBERI area; IMITA RIDGE position being held by 25 Aust Inf Bde plus 2/1 Fnr Bn and 3 Aust Inf Bn.

16. During the next week our patrols established complete ascendancy in the forward area (inflicting a number of casualties upon the enemy) whilst preparations continued for an enveloping movement by one battalion on both right and left flanks, with one battalion advancing up the main track in order to recapture IORIBAIWA. Meanwhile two 25 pounders, having registered on IORIBAIWA RIDGE on 21 Sep, were giving invaluable aid in harassing the enemy. Patrols reported that intensive work was being carried out by the enemy upon field defences on IORIBAIWA RIDGE. On the morning of 27 Sep both outflanking battalions of 25 Aust Inf Bde were ensconced upon the high ground overlooking the right and left of IORIBAIWA RIDGE respectively with the third battalion advancing up the track with all indications pointing to the Japanese having withdrawn northwards. By 1500 hours that day all three battalions were upon IORIBAIWA RIDGE with battalion patrols closely following upon the heels of the retreating Japanese. By 1830 hours positions were being consolidated and quantities of Japanese stores and equipment were being recovered by forward units.

B. DEFENSIVE MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF BASE AREA PORT MORESBY

17. On 17 Sep 42, 14 Aust Inf Bde Group, (Comd Brig W.SMITH) composed as under, came under command 7 Aust Div in order to assist in the protection of Base Area PORT MORESBY:-

HQ 14 Aust Inf Bde, Signal Section and LAD
36 Aust Inf Bn
39 Aust Inf Bn
55 Aust Inf Bn
Two platoons NEW GUINEA Force Composite Carrier Company.

18. The following role was allotted to Command 14 Aust Inf Bde:-

(a) To maintain the security of the Line of Communication between all including ILOLO - MBERI.

(b) To prevent any enemy advance down the new track under construction from OMER'S CREEK - MAURO.

(c) To hold the KOITAKI - ILOLO area at all costs and cover the direct route into PORT MORESBY as well as covering routes from ILOLO on to HOMBROM BLUFF.

19. On 16 Sep 42, in order to give warning and to delay any enemy advance down the MAURO - ~~JUNIORO~~ JAWARERE track the rear details of 21 Aust Inf Bde were organised as a company (JAVFORCE) and despatched to the JAWARERE area.

20. As information of enemy movement behind IORIBAIWA was very meagre, a reconnaissance patrol (MACPAT) was despatched on 25 Sep 42 via JAWARERE to a position of observation of the main KOKODA track between MAURO - MENARI. As events transpired this patrol was of no use, as the enemy had commenced his withdrawal by the time it had reached a position of observation.

21. Due apparently to his lack of initiative, plus the supremacy of our patrolling in the forward area no Japanese patrols were ever located or notified as having entered Base Area.

REMARKS ON PHASE I

22. It is of interest at this stage to discuss the following:-

(a) Enemy strength

(b) Casualties inflicted upon the enemy.

(c) The action of the 21 Aust Inf Bde.

23. Enemy Strength. As at 11 Aug 42, the enemy strength was estimated by NEW GUINEA Force and advised to 7 Aust Div as 1500 in the KOKODA area, with some 3000 reinforcements having recently landed in the GONA area. These were thought to be mainly coolies and aerodrome constructional units. The Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde, soon after his arrival in the ISURAVA area, estimated that the enemy were considerably in excess of 1500. This was confirmed by acting CO 39 Aust Inf Bn (Maj A CAMERON). Later, as the result of his continued offensive, it was estimated that the Japanese force consisted of at least two regiments plus some artillery. From identifications obtained later at IORIBB AIVA it was established that the Japanese force during his advance consisted of:-

41 Regiment (less one battalion)
144 Regiment
Regimental Gun Company
Two Engineer Companys
Miscellaneous Supply etc details.

24. Jap Casualties. Up to the withdrawal to IMITA RIDGE it was estimated that 1500 Japanese had been killed. From information gleaned from captured documents, roll books, and Prisoner's of War, it was found that this estimate was fairly accurate. It is worthy of note that the two Japanese Engineer Companys alone were reduced to 50% each through battle casualties etc.

25. Action of 21 Aust Inf Bde. It is only proper at this stage to pay tribute to the achievements of 21 Aust Inf Bde. Within three days of their arrival at PORT MORESBY they were marching up the tortuous mountain track to KOKODA, each man carrying in the vicinity of 60 lbs under most trying and

unexpected conditions. They arrived at ISURAVA in time to find the initiative gone and the Japanese advancing. Despite the difficulties of supply and communication, and in the face of superior numbers of experienced Japanese jungle troops they had withdrawn throughout in an orderly and determined manner. Their strength before moving forward was approx 1700 all ranks. Due to battle casualties, missing (2/27 Bn) and sick their strength upon withdrawal to IMITA RIDGE was 240 all ranks.

It is considered that this brigade laid the foundation for the successful advance which ensued later. Had it not been for their presence at such a critical time, subsequent operations for the defence of PORT MORESBY would have been of a more difficult and perilous nature.

PHASE 2

THE RECAPTURE OF KOKODA

26. By 2 Oct the leading battalion of 25 Aust Inf Bde had occupied the high ground between MAURO - IORABAIWA. In addition patrols were pushing forward on the main track and both flanks. One patrol already reached MENARI. By 3 Oct 25 Aust Inf Bde was concentrated in the MAURO area, and a supply dropping area had been cleared. On 3 Oct 2/1 Pnr Bn reverted to command of NEW GUINEA Forces.

From IORABAIWA onwards until Japanese opposition was encountered the speed of the advance was limited solely by the availability of native carriers and supplies etc.

27. Upon 3 Oct 16 Aust Inf Bde, having come under the command of 7 Aust Div, commenced to move forward to MAURO. The roles allotted to the various formations under command 7 Aust Div were revised as follows:-

(a) 14 Aust Inf Bde

(i) To maintain security of line of communication between all including ILOLO - UBERI.

(ii) To prevent any enemy advance down the new track under construction OWERS CREEK - MAURO.

(iii) To deal with any enemy penetration into Base Area.

(b) 16 Aust Inf Bde

(i) To occupy a defensive position in vicinity of MAURO so as to prevent any enemy advance on to PORT MORESBY, and at the same time to ensure the protection of the dropping place in that area.

(ii) Preparation for the relief of 25 Aust Inf Bde. (The date when such relief was to take place was to be advised by Headquarters 7 Aust Div)

(iii) Upon relieving 25 Aust Inf Bde, to prevent any enemy advance on PORT MORESBY from the north by offensive action and to regain control of the route to KOKODA through the area ISURAVA - DENIKI with a view to offensive operations for the recapture of KOKODA.

(c) 25 Aust Inf Bde

(i) To halt enemy advance from north towards PORT MORESBY by offensive action as far north as possible.

(ii) To regain control of route to KOKODA through the area ISURAVA - DENIKI with a view to offensive operations for the capture of KOKODA.

(iii) Upon relief by 16 Aust Inf Bde, 25 Aust Inf Bde was to come into divisional reserve and be responsible for the protection of supply dropping areas as designated by 7 Aust Div, and at the same time adopt defensive positions to prevent any enemy advance on to PORT MORESBY.

21 Aust Inf Bde having passed to the command of 6 Aust Div, the role of JAYFORCE was added to that already allotted to 14 Aust Inf Bde.

28. In order to cause dislocation to the Japanese line of communication behind KOKODA, NEW GUINEA Force were asked to authorise the allocation of number of troops from 21 Aust Inf Bde for this purpose. This was approved and on 7 Oct 42 instructions were issued by Comd 7 Aust Div to 21 Aust Inf Bde to provide a force of approx strength 450 to carry out a harassing role upon the Japanese line of communication between WAIROPA and BUNA. The command of this force (which was called CHAFORCE) was Lt-Col CHALLEN. It was proposed to supply this force by means of supply dropping from the air. Unfortunately, during their movement to MYOLA preparatory to the commencement of their mission, a certain wastage occurred through sickness. This coupled with the arduous trek over the mountains which confronted them, raised a doubt in the mind of Comd 7 Aust Div as to whether the force was physically fit to undertake the task as previously allotted to them.

(It must be remembered that it was less than six weeks since these troops had undergone their strenuous withdrawal from ISURAVA). In addition no aerial photos were available of the area in which the force was to operate. As a result a request was made to NEW GUINEA Force to use CHAFORCE upon a closer outflanking movement along the main ridge due east of MYOLA Lake on to OIVI. This was not approved. This unit was however, retained in the forward area, and performed invaluable work, which included the construction of the landing strip at MYOLA, the collection of supplies, and at times the carrying of rations to the forward troops (necessitated by the shortage of native carriers). Their cheerful acceptance of any task allotted them was a credit to their Commander and offrs concerned. Owing to the paucity of numbers in 25 Aust Inf Bde upon arrival at WAIROPE CHAFORCE was disbanded, and one company allotted to each of the three battalions of 25 Aust Inf Bde. They rejoined their own units when 21 Aust Inf Bde later arrived in the forward area.

29. On 5 Oct 42 Advance Headquarters 7 Aust Div opened at UBERI. Some four days later the battle Headquarters commenced to move up the main track. (Owing to the shortage of native carriers it was NOT possible to move the whole Advance Headquarters)

30. It was expected, since KENARI was found to be unoccupied, that the main Japanese resistance would be met with in the ALOLA - MYOLA - KAGI triangle, since it was considered imperative for the enemy to deny us the ALOLA position if he wished to retain KOKODA. From ALOLA four tracks converged upon KOKODA and it was considered that the enemy was NOT in sufficient strength to hold all these avenues of approach. Comd 7 Aust Div had tentatively decided to allot 25 Aust Inf Bde (with 1/3 Aust Inf Bn under comd) the role of re-capturing ALOLA, retaining 16 Aust Inf Bde, in the MYOLA area, as the main striking force for the recapture of KOKODA.

A conference to discuss this plan was held by GOC 7 Aust Div at MENARI upon [illegible] (both commanders of 15 and 25 Aust Inf Bdes attended). The plan as proposed above was confirmed, but its completion depended solely upon the supply situation. This situation was far from satisfactory and was causing considerable worry owing to the shortage of native carriers and vastly inadequate droppings.

31. By 12 Oct strong Japanese resistance had been encountered by our forward patrols -

(a) At a point 1½ miles from TEMPLETON'S CROSSING upon track leading from KAGI - TEMPLETON'S CROSSING.

(b) Due north of MYOLA (upon track leading from MYOLA - ALOLA).

To clear this opposition the following plan was adopted by Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde:-

(a) One battalion to converge upon TEMPLETON'S CROSSING via KAGI.

(b) One battalion to move upon TEMPLETON'S CROSSING via MYOLA.

(c) One battalion to protect the supply dropping area at EPOOI NORTH and to prevent enemy advance down the SKREGINA - ALOLA track.

(d) One battalion to establish a supply dropping area at MYOLA and act as a mobile reserve to assist the battalion clearing the track to TEMPLETON'S CROSSING, should the necessity arise.

32. By 16 Oct, as a result of utilising the reserve battalion at MYOLA in an encircling movement on the enemy left flank, 25 Aust Inf Bde drove the Japanese (on the MYOLA - ALOLA track) back with heavy casualties to a position due north of TEMPLETON'S CROSSING. At the same time the battalion on the KAGI track moved forward to a position on the high ground west of TEMPLETON'S CROSSING (the Japanese having been forced to withdraw in view of his defeat on the MYOLA - ALOLA track).

33. During the 17 Oct the Japanese had counter-attacked our forward positions but were repulsed again with heavy casualties. Meanwhile Comd 25 Aust Inf Bde moved one battalion around the Japanese left flank to attck the enemy from the east. It was at this stage that Comd 7 Aust Div decided to relieve 25 Aust Inf Bde by 16 Aust Inf Bde for the following reasons:-

(a) To rest 25 Aust Inf Bde who had been employed continuously since 11 Sep, and allow them to be refitted etc.

(b) To speed up the advance by utilising fresh troops.

(c) The carrier situation would not allow of more than one brigade being used forward of MYOLA.

34. By 21 Oct the relief had taken place, and all battalions of 16 Aust Inf Bde were in forward positions. The dispositions of 25 Aust Inf Bde were as follows:-

(a) One battalion (Less one company) was moving to TEMPLETON'S CROSSING from KAGI to come under command 16 Aust Inf Bde. The remaining company was to carry out the role previously allotted to the battalion.

(b) Two battalions at MYOLA refitting and picking up supplies.

(c) One battalion protecting an ASC dump two hours march north of MYOLA.

35. On 21 Oct 16 Aust Inf Bde succeeded in dislodging the Japanese south of EORA CREEK village by means of an outflanking movement by 2/2 Battalion on the enemy flank. It was during this attack that a bayonet charge was made and a considerable number of enemy accounted for. The Japanese retired during night 21/22 Oct to a position north of EORA Village on west side of creek. (Our casualties were not inconsiderable, being approximately 180 all ranks).

36. On 23 Oct a conference was held at Headquarters 7 Aust Div MYOLA to discuss the plan for the recapture of KOKODA. The following roles were allotted:-

16 Aust Inf Bde:

(a) To secure dropping ground at ALOLA.

(b) To prepare dropping ground and pick up supplies at ALOLA (until relieved of this duty under instructions by Headquarters 7 Aust Div).

(c) To secure high ground eatride track at OIVI.

(d) To secure possible supply dropping ground large kunai patch vicinity KOBARA (to be used if, owing to operations, supply from KOKODA was impossible).

(e) To mop up area between OIVI and KOKODA and to effect junction with 25 Aust Inf Bde.

(f) To push forward patrols, to, if possible secure bridgehead over KUMUSI River at WAIEOPI and ASISI.

25 Aust Inf Bde:

(a) To capture and hold KOKODA.

(b) To prepare KOKODA for landing of aircraft by clearing (including mines, etc) and extending runway.

(c) To mop up enemy within area of responsibility and effect junction with 16 Aust Inf Bde.

(d) Protection of KOKODA aerodrome.

(e) Collection and guarding of all stores etc dropped or landed at KOKODA.

The inter - brigade boundry was EORA CREEK inclusive to 25 Aust Inf Bde. One section 2/6 Aust Fd Coy was placed in support of each 16 and 25 Aust Inf Bde for this operation. The above roles were afterwards altered so that 1/3 Aust Inf Bn, (division reserve) would be responsible for picking up supplies at ALOLA should necessity arise.

37. On 24 Oct in order to accelerate the capture of ALOLA 25 Aust Inf Bde was instructed to make an outflanking movement upon ALOLA from TEMPLETON'S CROSSING. The route to be followed was via the TEMPLETON'S CROSSING TRACK - KAGI, then across country to

the BEREGINA - ALOLA track. By 28 Oct two battalions 25 Aust Inf Bde were moving forward upon this route. Strenuous Japanese opposition was still being encountered by 16 Aust Inf Bde north of EORA CREEK Village.

38. On 28 Oct a severe blow was delivered to the Japanese right flank on the high ground overlooking EORA CREEK by means of an outflanking movement by 2/3 Aust Inf Bn of 16 Aust Inf Bde. Here a pocket of enemy were surrounded and after a grenade barrage our troops followed up with the bayonet. It was estimated that approximately 75 enemy casualties resulted from this operation. As a result of this action the enemy commenced to withdraw during night of 28/29 Oct.

39. On 29 Oct at 0800 hrs Major-General A.S.ALLEN was relieved by Major-General G.A. VASEY as Commander, 7 Aust Div.

40. On 30 Oct ALOLA was occupied without any enemy resistance being encountered. ~~##~~ 25 Aust Inf Bde (less two battalions) were then instructed to follow up 16 Aust Inf Bde on the main track. Advance HQ 7 Aust Div opened ALOLA on 31 Oct. CHAFORCE was instructed to move from MYOLA to KOKODA as quickly as possible. This force had been left behind in order to assist in moving the MDS from MYOLA No.1 to MYOLA No.2 in anticipation of air evacuation commencing from the strip under construction there. On 1 Nov the two battalions of 25 Aust Inf Bde who had been making the outflanking move arrived at ALOLA extremely tired and out of rations. Meanwhile 16 Aust Inf Bde had been pushing ahead down the track ABUARI - MISSIMA - KAILE with the leading battalion of 25 Aust Inf Bde advancing down the main track ISURAVA - DENIKI - KOKODA. In addition 1/3 Bn was moving upon KOKODA via MAURA. Fortunately a limited number of rations were dropped at ALOLA and these plus some which were brought forward from MYOLA, enabled the advance upon KOKODA being continued without delay.

41. On 2 Nov 25 Aust Inf Bde entered KOKODA without opposition. On 3 Nov GOC 7 Aust Div hoisted the Australian Flag upon what had been the site of the old administration building. Work was immediately commenced upon the strip and on 4 Nov 10 transport planes (DC 3's) successfully landed and took off. Quinine which was being forwarded on a high priority failed to materialise. (Actually supplies of this were not received until 24 Nov 42, when quantities were dropped in the AMMOGA crossing area). Meanwhile, 16 Aust Inf Bde had established a supply dropping area at KOBARA. On 6 Nov, strong enemy opposition was encountered by 16 Aust Inf Bde at OIVI.

REMARKS ON PHASE 2

42. Speed of Advance. The reasons which militated against a quicker advance from IORABAIWA to ALOLA may be summarised as follows:

(a) Terrain

(b) Availability of supplies

(c) Strength of units.

(d) Condition of troops.

43. Terrain. As explained in para 4, any advance in strength must of necessity be confined to native pads. These pads run along the tops of ridges and spurs, which are comparatively easy to defend, since any assault entails a stiff climb with the enemy in the position of observation and command. The only way to dislodge the Japanese in such a position is to outflank, cut his line of communication, and then reduce the position by assault. (No supporting artillery was available). This all takes time, more especially so if no tracks exist and one has to be cut. As an example it took the 2/2 Aust Inf Bn one day to climb to the crest of the ridge above EORA CREEK in order to outflank the enemy position south of EORA CREEK village. Such a climb was made in single file, and should any enemy resistance have been met with, the assault would have been impossible. The complete lack of accurate maps, together with the lack of detailed air

photos was a considerable handicap. This was aggravated by the difficulty of observation from the tops of ridges owing to the luxuriant tree growth on either side of the track.

44. Availability of Supplies. This was the limiting factor throughout. Motor transport and mule transport was only available to the fringe of the area (UBERI) in which the operations took place. The balance, some 65 miles, was traversed by native pads only. Any advance beyond NAURO with the native carrier resources then available (approximately 800) was impossible without additional assistance. It was therefore necessary to secure and establish supply dropping areas forward of this point, and then base the majority of carriers upon it. (The balance of carriers were employed carrying supplies, stores etc. from Base Area PORT MORESBY, which could not be dropped from the air). The next problem was clearing of dropping areas plus the recovery of stores dropped. This normally entailed a battalion of the leading brigade being detailed for the task with consequent diminution of the available striking force. The actual recovery and issue of stores presented a major problem and depended upon:-

(a) The accurate dropping of stores in the prescribed area (any stores dropped in the jungle are normally irrecoverable owing to the time factor in collection, plus damage caused by packages hitting trees).

(b) The firmness of the dropping ground surface (if the ground is hard recovery may be as low as 30%)

(c) The speed of inspection of certain stores upon collection. This applied particularly to tins of preserved meat and ammunition, which had to be inspected before issue, individually, tin by tin (for leakages), and round by round (for distortion of cases etc).

(d) Time factor in collection. If dropping continued throughout the day (as was normal) and no alternative dropping area was available, collection of dropped packages was negligible, for that day. Again if the dropping is not accurate packages may be strewn over over the area thereby making the collection a tedious and slow operation.

Upon the advance proceeding beyond MYOLA it was necessary to reduce the natives on the line of communication to the rear track to a bare minimum, discounting any evacuation of wounded beyond MYOLA No.2. Our requirements of carriers were approximately 3000, but only 1250 were available. Owing to this shortage the following courses were necessary -

(a) To limit the line of advance to one route MYOLA - TEMPLETON'S CROSSING - BORA CREEK VILLAGE - ALOLA.

(b) To hold one brigade within MYOLA area while supplies were being built up forward.

If carriershad been available 15 Aust Inf Bde would have been despatched via KAGI - SERENGIMA to capture ALOLA. This would without doubt have accelerated the rate of advance and saved a number of casualties.

45. Strength of Units. It must be realised that once a battalion as at present constituted is organised for jungle warfare, it is well below its original strength. This is further aggravated if battalions are below War Establishment. This was the case throughout and, as a point of interest, the 15, 21 and 25 Aust Inf Bdes, when they started for the forward area, were on an average 580 all ranks PER BATTALION. To obtain a proper perspective one should consider a brigade in this warfare as the equal to two normal battalions. In jungle warfare numbers are essential. Fire power is not so necessary as points of origin of fire, which means numbers of personnel. Reinforcements were non-existent, and it was necessary to advance so that casualties were reduced to a minimum. If this had not been followed, but intense pressure

maintained upon the enemy with consequent disregard for casualties, both the 16 and 25 Aust Inf Bdes would have found themselves too early in the campaign in the same unhappy position as 21 Aust Inf Bde (where two battalions, through total absence of reinforcements being provided, were reduced, after five week fighting, to a total combined strength of 240 all ranks).

46. Condition of Troops. The maintenance of the physical condition and well-being of troops was of the utmost importance. Owing to transport difficulties it was necessary for the troops to carry some 60 pounds on the man. This included reserve rations, ammunition, weapons and necessaries. This weight, together with steepness and muddiness of tracks, took a tremendous toll of energy and therefore limited the distance troops could cover in one day and then be in a condition to fight. Under normal conditions in this country 8 - 10 miles by troops along a track may be considered a good day's march without enemy opposition. Rain invariably fell during the afternoon and early evening. Once MYOLA area was reached nights became bitterly cold. The discomfort felt by troops, who after fighting all day got thoroughly wet and spent the night covered by half a blanket plus a waterproof sheet can be appreciated. (The height of MYOLA area is approximately 6,000 ft above sea level). This constant exposure plus heavy exertion and nervous strain inevitably told. The monotony of diet also was a big factor. Bully beef, biscuits rice, tea, and sugar, dried fruit, dried milk and salt may appear a lot but they had their limitations.

47. Evacuation of Wounded. Once MYOLA was reached it was impossible in view of the carrier situation to consider any evacuation by carriersto the rear since one stretcher case entailed the use of 8 carriers for each carrier stage (6 of the latter existed between MYOLA and OWEN ~~CREEK~~ CORNER). It was therefore decided to make a landing strip at MYOLA No.2 and

establish a MDS to hold casualties there for evacuation by aircraft. This strip was completed upon 25 Oct and evacuation of casualties by aircraft was commenced soon afterwards. Only a proportion of these casualties were evacuated by air from MYOLA, and the balance either walking back to PORT MORESBY or were carried forward to KOKODA for evacuation by air from there.

21 Oct — STINSON a/c [illegible] MYOLA. Carried
[illegible]

ADVANCE TO GONA - SOPUTA AREA

PHASE 3

48. Despite vigorous action by 16 Aust Inf Bde no headway could be made against the Japanese position at OIVI. 2/1 Aust Inf [redacted] was therefore despatched via KOSARA to cut the Japanese line of communication at ILIMO. This battalion being unable to find the track to ILIMO turned north towards GORARI and encountered enemy patrols which were driven back some 700 yards. As no further progress could be made by this battalion, commander 7 Aust Div despatched 25 Aust Inf Bde, on 7 Nov, to secure GORARI and then to mop up towards OIVI. 2/1 Aust Inf Bn was to come under command 25 Aust Inf Bde upon arrival. 16 Aust Inf Bde plus 1/3 Aust Inf Bn, were allotted the role of harassing the enemy in sufficient strength to keep his attention fully engaged whilst 25 Aust Inf Bde completed their outflanking movement. Owing to the shortage of carriers necessitated by the double line of communication, CHAFOROK who had recently arrived from MYOLA were utilized in carrying supplies etc to 16 Aust Inf Bde. In order to facilitate this supply, work was already in progress by 2/14 Aust Fd Coy, upon the construction of a Jeep track to OIVI. This work was afterward abandoned as it was realized that the amount of work required prevented any hope of the track being completed in time to assist the advance.

49. On 8 Nov 2/31 Aust Inf Bn, the leading battalion of 25 Aust Inf Bde took over from 2/1 Aust Inf Bn. Commander 25 Aust Inf Bde despatched 2/25 Aust Inf Bn to move round to right flank of 2/31 Aust Inf Bn with the object of cutting the track between the enemy position and GORARI. By a.m. 9 Nov this move had been completed. Meanwhile, 2/33 and 2/1 Aust Inf Bn were by-passing the Japanese left flank and moving on towards the track junction at GORARI. 2/33 Aust Inf Bn after heavy fighting cut the track some 100 yards south of GORARI whilst 2/1 Aust Inf Bn moving east cut main track OIVI-

KAIHOPE, 200 yards east of GORARI. On 11 Nov 2/31 and 2/25 Aust Inf Bns had been maintaining heavy pressure upon the isolated enemy pocket made a co-ordinated assault using grenades, sub machine guns and bayonet. At the same time the two battalions in the vicinity of the main track were destroying parties of enemy who were endeavouring to make their escape from the direction of OIVI. The enemy upon their front having withdrawn, 16 Aust Inf Bde advanced towards GORARI. Unfortunately the majority of the force opposing 16 Aust Inf Bde managed to effect their escape by utilizing a track unknown to us, which ran north of and parallel to the main track.

50. There is no doubt that GORARI was the deciding action of the campaign. The defeat of the Japanese was decisive and this without doubt resulted in his subsequent withdrawal to the GONA - SOPUTA area. From prisoner of war interrogations later it transpired that the Japanese were completely surprised by the direction and weight of the main attack. As a result of the whole action 580 Japanese dead were counted.

51. The advance to WAIROPE was continued with only minor opposition being encountered at ILIMO. Here a Jap force was again outflanked by 25 Aust Inf Bde. Unfortunately the outflanking battalion was not strong enough to occupy a large enough perimeter to contain the enemy and he managed to escape. By this time supplies etc were running short owing to the length of the line of communication beyond KOKODA. All supply therefore depended upon air droppings.

On 13 Nov the leading battalion of 25 Aust Inf Bde arrived at WAIROPE to find all bridges destroyed. By 14 Nov HQ 7 Aust Div (who had followed up 25 Aust Inf Bde) and 25 and 16 Aust Inf Bdes had arrived in the WAIROPE area. No Japanese opposition was encountered but some 300 Rabaul natives were captured. These had been brought to NEW GUINEA by the Japanese and were all in a semi starved condition.

52. On 15 Nov 1/3 Aust Inf Bn was despatched to intercept the Jap force which had retreated from OIVI area and was moving north up the west bank of the KUMUSI River. It was later reported that General HORII was with this party and that he was subsequently drowned when endeavouring to cross the KUMUSI by raft. Unfortunately 1/3 Aust Inf Bn was forced to discontinue their chase after some 3 days, owing to shortage of rations.

The bridging of the KUMUSI was found to be a major problem with the material available. . However by utilising cable from the destroyed bridge plus that dropped by our planes 3 bosuns chairs were constructed plus two cable footbridges. By 1800 hours 15 Nov the leading battalion of the 25 Aust Inf Bde had crossed per Bosun Chairs. CHAFORSE having arrived at WAIROPE had been split up between the Battalionsof 25 Aust Inf Bde owing to the depleted strength of the latter.

53. The plan adopted by Comd 7 Aust Div for the subsequent advance was as follows:-

(a) 16 Aust Inf Bde to secure SANANDA via ISIVITA - SANGARA MISSION - SOPUTA.

(b) 25 Aust Inf Bde to secure GONA moving via the ONG OGGERAHAMBO - AWALA - ICUBA STORE - AMBOGA CROSSING.

A dropping ground plus a landing strip capable of taking transport planes was completed at WAIROPE by 16 Nov 42.

54. By 18 Nov the leading elements of the 25 Aust Inf Bde had reached JUMBORA and had prepared a dropping ground there. Up to this point only Jap stragglers had been encountered. On 18 Nov 2/31 Aust Inf Bn after a sharp struggle penetrated into GONA MISSION Area. Unfortunately owing to unfavourable flying conditions over the OWEN STANLEY Ranges no supplies etc were dropped at JUMBORA, on 19 Nov and 20 Nov. As a result 2/31 Aust Inf Bn was forced to withdraw from GONA mission area having

run out of ammunition on the 24 Nov. After several abortive attacks against the enemy opposing them 25 Aust Inf Bde (with 1/3 Aust Inf Bn under Command) was forced, owing to shortage of numbers, to occupy a containing position south and west of GONA. A policy of harassing the enemy in this area by strong fighting patrols and heavy concentrations of Artillery, and Mortar, AND M.M.G. fire was then adopted.

55. Meanwhile after driving back the enemy some 2000 yards upon the SANANANDA track, 16 Aust Inf Bde was held up by a strong Japanese defensive position some 1½ miles north of SOPUTA. On [illegible] 126 U.S. Regiment less two battalions having come under Command 7 Aust Div took over the role of 16 Aust Inf Bde to continue the advance. Little progress was made but on [illegible] the 126 U.S.Regt succeeded in establishing a road block behind the Japs on the main track. Meanwhile 16 Aust Inf Bde with the remainder of the U.S.Regiment continued to contain the Japs to their front.
By [illegible] a transport landing strip had been completed at POPPONDETTA. A further strip was completed at SOPUTA upon [illegible] (the delay resulting from orders being received from NEW GUINEA Force to cease construction when the strip was half prepared).

56. By this time evacuation due to Battle Casualties & Sickness (Malaria) had assumed alarming proportions. (During the month of November 1500 all ranks were evacuated as a result of wounds and sickness. 16 and 25 Aust Inf Bde by this time were so depleted in numbers that they no longer existed as fighting formations. (The average strength of Battalions were 250 all ranks). ACCORDINGLY ~~According to~~ GOC 7 Aust Div asked that 7 Aust Div be reinforced. This was approved by NEW GUINEA Force and 21 Aust Inf Bde commenced to arrive at POPPONDETTA by air on 25 Nov.

57. It was originally proposed to move 21 Aust Inf Bde to the rear of 25 Aust Inf Bde, at GONA and thence N.E on the main track leading to SANANANDA whilst 25 Aust Inf Bde continued to contain GONA. This plan was later altered as it was considered essential to reduce GONA as early as possible in view of increasing Jap barge activity at night. On 29 Nov an attack was made upon GONA supported by 21 Aust Inf Bde supported by 25 Aust Inf Bde. As a result of this attack, the Jap was forced into a defensive locality 200 by 400 yards in the GONA area with a small pocket holding out on the coast one mile east of GONA. This latter pocket was destroyed on 30 Nov. The Jap defended locality at GONA was found to be exceptionally strong, consisting of very well concealed strong posts complete with overhead cover. In addition any assault to capture this position entailed an advance over fairly open ground.

58. Ever since their arrival by Air at POPPENDETTA on 24 Nov the four 25 pounders of the 2/1 Aust Fd Regt had carried out daily harassing and supporting shoots upon the GONA and SOPUTA Areas. Artillery Air shoots had also been carried out upon the SANANANDA Area with excellent results (several landing barges being destroyed).

59. On 1 Dec the relief of 25 Aust Inf Bde commenced with the arrival, by air, of commander 30 Aust Inf Bde (Brig PORTER). The first Bn (39 Aust Inf Bn) arrived at POPPENDETTA on 2 Dec. On 4 Dec 25 Aust Inf Bde, (less CHAPORCE who reverted to 21 Aust Inf Bde) was relieved by 39 Aust Inf Bn and withdrew to POPPENDETTA Area.

LESSONS

1. It is not proposed to deal with the minor tactical lessons learnt during the campaign as these have already been dealt with in the individual reports by the various brigades who participated in the operations.

The main lesson learnt is that the Jap soldier is inferior to determined British, Australian and American opposition. Any illusion that the Jap is a superman leans strongly towards the ridiculous.

JAPANESE CHARACTERISTICS

2. (a) It must always be borne in mind that the mere fact of cutting the Jap line of communication will not always cause him to retire, when he is holding a defensive position. His ideals and training are such that he will continue to fight until dislodged by direct assault However, if once dislodged from a defensive position, he tends to crumple and become thoroughly disorganized. Due to his low standard of living, small stature and frugal up-bringing, the Jap soldier can carry a considerable number of days' rations (it was reported that when the Japs originally landed at GONA they were carrying 20 days on the man. Later, when south of BUNA they were found to be carrying 10 days). This presumably explains "his lack of concern" when his line of communication is cut.

(b) Tactically, the Jap is most unenterprising except when advancing in superior numbers. In addition, his minor tactics, by our standards, are unsound, i.e., he bunches during the assault, chatters during the approach and his forward patrols blunder into ambushes.

If the Jap during his retirement from ILIMO had left rear-guard patrols to ambush our advance elements and our carrier line of communication, our advance would have been slowed up considerably. A small Jap force on the East bank of the KUMUSI River at KAMORA would have delayed our crossing for at least several days. It seemed that once he was told to retire he did so, and this object dominated his entire actions.

(c) Generally his junior leaders and troops lack initiative. Once his plans go awry, he tends to become hesitant and dismayed, and direct assault during this phase causes him to become completely disorganized. (Probably this weakness is due to the animal intelligence of the average Jap soldier).

(d) The Jap dislikes being attacked with the bayonet or hand grenades and becomes most perturbed under artillery and mortar fire.

(e) It was found that the Jap protective measures for his line of communication were normally weak, and laid themselves open to raids and ambushes. Presumably this occurred because of his non-dependence upon it for supplies, in view of the large reserve carried on the man.

(f) The Jap soldier, when captured, answers questions freely and generally makes little attempt to conceal information which is of t the most vital value to his enemy. Possibly this extraordinary situation arises as a result of the accepted idea of a Jap soldier that he must not be captured. Any attempt by his commanders to impress "security" upon him would thus immediately shatter the concept that he must not get captured. Jap soldier's also generally carry up-to-date diaries which have proved most valuable in obtaining identifications and details of movements of units.

(g) <u>The Jap soldier has, however, the cardinal virture of all soldiers. He will fight to the death, if that is in accordance with his orders.</u>

This trait, plus his ability to exist on a very meagre diet under squalid conditions (including close proximity to his own unburied dead), makes him a redoutable soldier at all times.

GENERAL TACTICAL LESSONS

3. (a) Once Jap resistance is encountered during the advance, it is most desirable that the initial attack be made in sufficient strength to overcome the enemy opposition even at the expense of using more troops than was afterwards found necessary. It was found from experience that once the Jap had driven off an attack he appeared to become more tenacious and offered greater resistance to subsequent attacks than to this initial one.

(b) When outflanking moves are made in force, such movements must normally (unless the surrounding country allows freedom and ease of movement) be bold and confined to existing tracks, and wide enough to avoid contact with the opposing enemy forces in contact with our own forward troops.

(c) It is essential that each man at all times whilst operating in jungle carries five days' rations (2 hard and 3 emergency). This is the only means whereby the mobility of the man can be increased to the utmost since it enables the commander in an emergency to be completely free of all ration deliveries for a period of five days. It is most desirable that the reserve of 5 days be increased but the weight of the present ration precludes this. (20 days would be the ideal).

(d) The force which gains the high ground wins the battle. The holding of this ground allows of the assault down-hill.

(e) No ground is impossible to any troops provided they are physically fit. The Jap appears to consider that the white man is "effete" and that he will avoid traversing objectionable areas. This can be exploited with success.

(g) Troops must be thoroughly trained in the rapid occupation of defensive positions, i.e. digging of weapons pits. It is most essential under jungle conditions owing to the limited visibility to consolidate rapidly upon reaching an objective, in order to hold ground gained. Our troops are naturally poor "diggers". This fault must be eradicated

PHYSICAL FITNESS

4. All ranks must be physically fit. The soldier must be capable of carrying 60 lbs daily over the roughest terrain and yet arrive fresh to fight. He must learn to be at home in the jungle and thrive upon the hard scale ration. He must learn to regard the march as the means to get him to a fight, not as a task, i.e., as footwork is to the boxer.

The campaign in PAPUA proved that human endurance has hardly a limit, if the will to persevere is there.

OFFICERS

5. Officers must be leaders and the fathers to their men. They must possess determination, aggressive spirit and fortitude. They must be able to "take" all which adversity offers and yet inbue their men with cheerfulness and the aggressive spirit.

In the jungle, more than in any other type of warfare the officer must be an example to his men. He must be tough physically so that his brain will always remain alert after the most strenuous exertion and not be dulled by fatigue into a muddled mass of inertia.

MAINTENANCE

6. (a) All manners and means of supply must be exploited. Preconceived notions, built upon text books must be applied to the changing circumstances and not slavishly copied.

(b) Supply by air is an integral part of tropical warfare since it allows movement independent of tracks, etc and native carriers.

(c) Mortar fuses cannot be dropped from the air with safety (this applies also to parachute). All ammunition and tins of bully beef dropped from the air must be inspected tin by tin (for air leakages) and round by round (for distorted cases).

(d) For general purposes a 30% loss in supplies, ammunition etc can be expected in all supply dropping by air.

REINFORCEMENTS

7. The wastage due to battle casualties and sickness during jungle operations in malarious areas in very high (e.g during Nov 42, 1500 personnel were evacuated from formations under Command 7 Aust Div). It is therefore essential that first reinforcements for units be constantly available NOT more than one days' travel from their parent unit (providing that they are not held in malarious areas).

It is most essential that units are kept up to strength. Owing to the lack of visibility, points of origin of fire, not fire power are the prime requisites in the jungle.

MALARIAL PRECAUTIONS

8. Every effort must be made by unit commanders to keep as many of his men on their feet as possible. This CAN be done by :

(a) Fanatical observance of the anti-malarial precautions to minimise the degree of infection.

(b) A close supervision to see that all troops take their atabrin daily.

The protection of the men in the forward weapon pits presents a problem. It is considered, however, that adequate quantities of non-greasy, odourless and powerful anti-mosquito lotion would solve this problem. There is NO reason why in rearward areas, mosquito nets cannot be used. Their transport presents difficulties but these are not insuperable provided the nets are not too heavy and bulky.

COMMUNICATIONS

9. It is most essential that ample quantities of field cable are always made available to Brigades, etc.

During any outflanking movement it is most essential that the Bde Cand be in communication with his battalions, and the batallion Commander with his Companys.(Wireless communication is not always possible). A lighter cable than the D3 is most desirable.

Strenuous training must be carried out in the use of wireless under jungle conditions. Results can be achieved provided adequate precautions are taken to prevent moisture destroying the efficiency of sets and that the sites for sets are carefully chosen. It is considered that complete replacements of technical instruments such as telephones, wireless sets, switchboards, should be made periodically from base to allow of thorough overhaul and drying out of those instruments which have been in use. Waterproofing of technical instruments, either by the use of covers or other internal means is essential.

108 R/T sets were NOT satisfactory even when converted to T/T. The 208 T/T set was quite satisfactory except that R/T would be a tremendous advantage.

It is recommended that, during training exercises, that communication between formations and units be restricted for long periods to wireless only so that operators can be thoroughly trained in the maintenance and operation of sets under all conditions.

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APPENDIX A

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REPORT ON OPS - 7 AUST DIV 13 AUG - 2 DEC 42.

The following units were placed under comd 7 Aust Div for the defence of Port Moresby (vide 7 Aust Div Op Instn No 7 of 29 Aug 42):-

Serial	Unit	Role.
	MORESBY PORT FORCE.	
1.	My Bty PAGA	Locality defence PAGA sub-sector.
2.	Sec Tp 17 Lt AA Bty	
3.	Sec 3 Pl A Bty 101 Bn AA	
4.	No 3 Sta 67 AASL Coy.	
5.	Prt Engrs	
6.	Det RG Force Sigs.	
7.	Port Det 10 AOD.	
8.	Det RG Force Salvage Sec.	
9.	RAN details.	
10.	2 Port Emb Det US AFIA	
11.	464 Rd Coy US AFIA.	
12.	Sta Hl 23 AA Bty	Locality Defence TUAGUBA Sub-sector.
13.	2 Pl DBty 101 Bn AA	
14.	440 Sigs US AFIA.	
15.	176 Sigs US AFIA.	
16.	1 Army Tps Coy.	
17.	Sta H5 AA Bde Gp.	Locality Defence KOMEDABU sub-sector.
18.	Dets RAAF.	
19.	ANGAU.	
	L of C Areas.	
20.	35 Service Gp Dets AAF.	Locality Defence.
21.	703 Ord Coy 8 AB Gp.	
22.	E Coy 29 QM Regt.	Movement of troops and supplies as required.
23.	D Coy 394 QM Bn.	
24.	HQ RG Force AA Regt.	Primary and locality defence 9 mile sector.
25.	AA Ops Room.	
26.	HQ 4 AA Bty.	
27.	HQ 23 AA Bty.	
28.	HQ 6 Sta AA Bde Gp.	
29.	HQ 101 CA Bn (AA)	
30.	HQ 3 Lt AA Bty.	
31.	HQ 67 AASL Coy.	
32.	HQ 3 Sec 67 AASL COY.	
33.	8 Air Bas e Gp (Less 703 Ord Coy)	
34.	35 Fighter Gp (Less 80 Fighter Sqn)	
35.	4 Fighter Sector.	
36.	HQ RAAF (less dets)	
37.	HQ AAF.	
38.	415 Sigs (Av)	
39.	15 Rep and Salvage Unit (RAAF)	
40.	C Coy 96 Engr Regt.	Locality defence 9 mile quarry.

Serial	Unit	Role.
41.	HQ AA Bde Gp.	Locality defence.
42.	Sigs 7 Aust Div.	
43.	HQ 96 Engr Regt.	
44.	80 Fighter Sqn (35 Fighter Gp)	
45.	Det 9 Coy AASC	Sup dump security and defence.
46.	Det 2/4 Coy AASC.	
47.	7 Aust Div Laundry & Fwd Decn Unit.	
48.	7 Aust Div Mob Bath Unit.	
49.	7 Aust Div Salvage Unit	
50.	Det 61 Fd Pk Coy.	Adv amn and engr dump security and defence.
51.	Det 2/25 Fd Pk Coy.	
52.	HQ Force Salvage Sec.	
53.	55 Ord Coy US AFIA.	
54.	9 Coy ASC (less det)	Stores and sup dump security and defence.
55.	13 Fd Bakery (less det)	
56.	10 AOD (less det)	
57.	14 Ord Store Coy (less det).	
58.	HQ Force Prov Sec (less det)	
59.	19 Ord Amn Sec (less Det)	
60.	HQ Force Mob Bath.	
61.	HQ Force Lof C Wkshops.	Workshops, stores sups and amn security and defence.
62.	22 Ord Amn Sec (less dets)	
63.	Dets HQ Force Ord Units.	
64.	HQ Force Base Depot AASC.	