

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/3/27

2/27 Infantry Battalion
December 1945, part 1 of 2

A39-7954
28 Oct 45

Subject : VISIT OF PRELIMINARY SURVEILLANCE PARTY TO KENDARI

Headquarters MAKASSAR FORCE
Reference Number : G222
28 October 1945

Advanced Headquarters
Second Japanese Army

Copy to : 2/27 Australian
Infantry Battalion

1. A Surveillance Party under command of Captain REDDIN, 2/27 +Australian Infantry Battalion, will leave MAKASSAR in HMAS BURDEKIN at 0800 hours 29 October 1945 and will arrive KENDARI at approximately 1200 hours 30 October 1945.
2. (a) You will concentrate all arms and ammunition held in the S.E. CELEBES, at KENDARI by 1800 hours 30 October 1945, and provide the necessary working parties to dump them into the sea on 31 October and 1 November 1945 under supervision of the Australian Party.
(b) Rifles may be retained for 5% of total Japanese personnel
3. You will provide guides, interpreters and the necessary technical officers for the following types of materials :-
 - (a) Arms and Ammunition
 - (b) Petrol and Oils
 - (c) Food
 - (d) Ordnance Stores
 - (e) Medical Stores
4. You will arrange to provide whatever transport is required by Officer Commanding Surveillance Party.
5. The Party will live on board HMAS BURDEKIN while at KENDARI.

Banning for Maj
Chief of Staff MAKASSAR FORCE

MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION NO 5

Ref Maps : Aeronautical Map CELEBES 1 : 1,000,000
Sheets A4 and B4

INTENTION

1. MAKASSAR FORCE will despatch a preliminary Surveillance Party to KENDARI on the East coast of the South East CELEBES Peninsula. The object of this party is to collect the necessary detailed information on which the evacuation of Japanese Forces from the S.E. CELEBES can be planned.

COMPOSITION OF PARTY

2.	(a)	Comd	Capt REDDIN	2/27 Aust Inf Bn		
	(b)	<u>Tps</u>	Protective Det	2/27 Aust Inf Bn	<u>Offr</u>	<u>ORs</u>
			Engineers	2/6 Aust Fd Coy	1	15
			AASC	2/2 Aust Sup Dep Coy		4
				2/25 Aust Tpt Pl	1	1
			Med	2/6 Aust Fd Amb	1	1
			Ord	Ordnance	1	1
			Civil Adm	NICA	2	1
			Interpreter	ATIS		1
				Total	6	24
				O.C.	1	
				Grand Total	7	24

(c) Note: 2/27 Aust Inf Bn to include one cook.

TASKS3. Infantry

- (a) Investigate the problem of the evacuation of Japanese together with their stocks of food, POL, tpt and ordnance supplies, from S.W. CELEBES Peninsula to main Concentration Area at MALIMPOENG.
- (b) Obtain accurate strength state of Japanese in this area, showing separately, Army, Navy and Civilian and their location.

Infantry and Engrs

- (c) (1) Japanese have been ordered to concentrate all arms and ammunition at KENDARI. Party will supervise dumping of these arms and ammunition into the sea. If possible this task should be completed but this will depend on the quantities involved and the time available.

- (ii) Investigate condition of KENDARI Airfield.
- (iii) Swords, Pistols, Revolvers and Optical Instruments will be brought back to MAKASSAR.

AASC

- (d) Investigate stocks of POL and food, particularly rice,
 - (i) under Japanese control
 - (ii) under native control
- (e) Investigate transport in the area, both Japanese and civilian, and obtain accurate state by types and condition of vehicles.

CPD

- (f) Investigate stocks of ordnance supplies held by Japanese in the area.

MED

- (g) Investigate Hygiene and Medical condition prevailing in the area.

NICA

- (h) Investigate civil administration problems, and conditions of natives.

GENERAL

- (i) Senior inf and service representatives will submit reports on their respective tasks on return to MAKASSAR.

SHIPPING

- 4. The party will move in HMAS "BURDEKIN".

EMBARKATION

- 5.
 - (a) Time 290730I Booy 0700
 - (b) Place JULIANA QUAY
 - (c) Control Movements MAKASSAR will coordinate embarkation.

TIMINGS

- | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|----------|---------|
| 6. | (a) | ETD | MAKASSAR | 290800I |
| | (b) | ETA | KENDARI | 301200I |
| | (c) | ETD | KENDARI | 020800I |
| | (d) | ETA | MAKASSAR | 031200I |

TRANSPORT

- 7.
 - (a) For Embarkation Under Unit arrangements
 - (b) At KENDARI Japanese have been ordered to supply OC Party with whatever transport is required.

SUPPLIES

- 8. 2/2 Aust Sup Dep Coy will place rations for 7 days aboard HMAS BURDEKIN by 281600I.

ACCOMMODATION

9. Party will live aboard HMAS BURDEKIN throughout trip.

RECEPTION

10. Japanese have been ordered to provide guides, interpreters and the necessary technical officers to enable inf and service representatives to carry out their tasks.

INTERCOMM

11. (a) HMAS "BURDEKIN" will come on MAKFORCE W/T frequency.

(b) Signal Officer MAKFORCE will arrange direct with "BURDEKIN".

ACK.

Time of Signature 28/2507

Issued through Sigs
SQR

Maj
Chief of Staff MAKASSAR FORCE

DISTRIBUTION

- 2/27 Aust Inf Bn 1 - 3
- 2/6 Aust Fd Coy 4
- 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec 5
- 2/2 Aust Sup Dep Coy 6 - 7
- 2/6 Aust Fd Amb 8
- Ord Officer MAKFORCE 9
- NICA 10
- ATIS 11
- PD MAKASSAR 12
- HMAS BURDEKIN 13
- Hqts MAKASSAR 14
- Comd 15
- BC 16
- SC (G) 17
- SC (A) 18
- IO 19
- Adv HQ AMF 21
- 7 Aust Div 22
- 2/14 Aust Inf Bn 23
- 2/16 Aust Inf Bn 24
- File 25- 26
- War Diary 27 - 28

B COY,
2/27 AUST INF BN.
28th October 1945.

NOMINAL ROLL

FOR TRIP TO KENDARI

SX9362	Capt	Reddin	J.W.
NX114328	Lt	Young	N.A.
SX17161	Sjt	Agars	L.G.
NX150925	Cpl	Johnson	C.H.
SX18041	Cpl	Seekamp	R.C.
NX105249	Cpl	Wilcox	R.C.
QX28950	Cpl	Stenzel	H.W.
SX17690	Pte	Thiel	L.A.
SX29042	"	Sivewright	J.F.
NX153708	"	Bulmer	W.G.
NX127226	"	Carney	N.T.
QX39992	"	Ryan	M.J.
SX18033	"	Smith	D.E.
NX101606	"	Pepper	R.J.
NX203502	"	Le Sueur	R.S.
QX58139	"	Hiskens	A.G.V.
SX10454	"	Sherman	C.A.

PART II.

H.Q.
MAKFORCE.

KENDARI SURVEILLANCE PARTY

Problem of evacuation of Japanese with their stores and transport from S.E. Peninsular to MALIMPOENG.

1. Evacuation could be effected from KENDARI PORT if 10 days notice given.
2. Recommend all transport and ordnance stores be left in area and handed over to new administration.
3. In the event of
 - (a) Evacuation in the near future, I recommend that Japanese and food stocks be concentrated now at KENDARI AIRFIELD.
 - (b) Evacuation at some later date, I recommend that Japanese concentrate at KENDARI AIRFIELD now and establish a farming centre at WAWATOBI sufficient to grow rice for the whole force. Administration parties would also remain at AMBESIA and POMELAA and KENDARI town. Vegetable gardens can be established at the airfield, and fishermen could operate from the port.
4. Points for consideration of early move. Natives are at present peaceful and pro-Dutch. Jap transport is on almost it's last legs.
5. As the port entrance was mined as late as October 1944 with both acoustic and magnetic mines, Jap shipping should be used if available. Japs have been, and still are, sweeping the entrance, but their sweeping gear is inefficient. On the other hand, the minimum time limit for the mines to remain effective has expired. The commander of the "BURDEKIN" has requested the Navy to send a minesweeper to KENDARI.
6. In the event of LST being used, suitable landing beaches are available (see App. E). I estimate 4 LSTs would shift whole force plus food and POL stocks and necessary gear.
7. Japanese commander, Capt TANAGUCHI, desires to disperse his force in community life groups at SIREA (20 km north of POMELAA) 300 : AMBESIA 500 : KENDARI AIRFIELD 1300. At present he is, on orders from 23rd Base Force H.Q. at MAKASSAR (?), building barracks at WAWATOBI for 1300 and MOWEWE 300, preparatory to concentrating in that area. In both instances, stores and troops would be too far from KENDARI PORT for evacuation, particularly when considering state of transport.
8. KENDARI PORT is the only port suitable for the evacuation.

Details of information gained.

1. App. H, Location Statement, shows number of Japanese Army, Navy and civilians, their location and activities. App. L details Japanese business activities during the war period.
2. Certificates for the dumping of arms and ammunition into the sea are attached as appendices. Ammunition dumped totalled almost 5 million rounds. Each box had to be thoroughly punctured, so that it would sink. In some instances, bombs were burned. The only explosives not dumped were 1650 truck loads spread over 48 separate dumps in the KENDARI area. This included 750 2000lb bombs which we could not lift in the time available. There are no fuses left in the area. Torpedo warheads were dumped. The torpedo base on WAWONI ISLAND was not inspected. Two torpedo dischargers were situated one on each side of the harbour for harbour defence. For details of torpedo assembly plant, see Appx. E.
3. Appx. E gives details of KENDARI AIRFIELD.
4. Swords, pistols and optical instruments have been handed over to MAKFORCE H.Q.
5. For details of transport, see Appx D.
6. Reports on condition and quantities of POL, ordnance stores and AASC stores are shown in Appendices C, D, & E.
7. Medical and Hygiene arrangements were thoroughly investigated by Maj Rowe. Final instructions given to the Japanese are shown in Appx. G.
8. The War Criminals were arrested as ordered and handed over to Provost, MAKFORCE. Particulars are shown in Appx. M.
9. Money confiscated:-

Jap invasion currency	- approx. 1,100,000 guilders.
Jap currency	- approx. 8,000 yen.
Dutch currency (prewar)	+ approx. 6,000 guilders.

 This has been handed in to Cash Office. Jap civil administrators employed many tricks and ruses to retain money. After arresting two, a further $\frac{1}{2}$ million guilders were brought in. I estimate at least another one million in area not yet disclosed.
10. Capt TANAGUCHI obeys orders to the minutest detail. His staff, however, is poor and unreliable. His civil administrators are corrupt and his civil business men are racketeers. He has been in the Jap Navy for over 30 years, fought for the Allies last war and gained his commission in Australia.
11. Capt TANAGUCHI states that he did not receive some of his orders until 26th October. This applies to AMF orders issued on 15th September. Also he does not receive the orders in full. Therefore, some minor clauses of these orders had not been complied with.
12. Civil administration was unsatisfactory with regard to money and food but otherwise appeared sound. Full report appears in NICA Report, Appx. F. The islands of BOETON and WAWONI also come under this administration, but little information could be gleaned about those islands.

Food Problem.

1. The Japanese have ample tinned supplies for at least 9 months, plus rice for 18 months. They are finding it hard to obtain fresh vegetables and fish from the natives. The natives are refusing to sell to the Japanese because they resented the Japs' previous monopoly of all foodstuffs, and their present monopoly of last season's rice crop, purchased by the Japs before peace.
2. Summarising the situation, the Japanese now control the bulk of the rice and the natives control the fresh foods. Japanese have approx. 1300 tons of rice and the natives have 26 tons of rice.
3. I ordered the Japs to hand over immediately 200 tons of rice to the native administrators, and ordered Capt TANAGUCHI to personally investigate the situation and make the necessary adjustments for an equitable distribution.
4. It is 5 months to rice harvest time.
5. I conferred with the Rajah on the food problem, and told him of my actions and advised him to get his people to sell a proportion of their fish and vegetables to the Japanese.
6. A community of approx. 200 Chinese were unfortunately neither the responsibility (according to them) of Native or Jap administration. I carefully explained to Capt TANAGUCHI his full responsibilities and I ordered him to call a meeting of the Native, Chinese and Japanese leaders to listen carefully to all complaints, to enquire thoroughly into all administration matters and to personally ensure that all peoples in his area of responsibility were properly administered to in every way.
7. I feel confident that this will be done.

Native Politics.

1. Indonesians have never heard of Free Indonesian Movement. The Japs have made no attempt to foster it.
2. The pro-Dutch feeling, on the other hand, is remarkably intense.
3. On landing, our NICA representative, Mr Wolhoff, who lived in KENDARI before the war, was cheered wildly.
4. When the Rajah was visited, he and his whole village greeted the NICA man, kissed him on both cheeks and said, "It is as if my father had come to life again."
5. On the WAWATOBI visit, crowds lined the route near the villages and threw flower petals into the car. Schoolboy bands played tunes and choirs sang Dutch songs. Many of the men broke down and wept when they greeted Mr. Wolhoff.
6. The Rajah has arranged a time of feasting and dancing, when many caribou will be slaughtered, timed to start as soon as the Dutch administration takes over again.
7. Natives would accept only Dutch guilders in payment of various trinkets.
8. The foregoing does not apply to the POMELAA KOLAKA area.

Final instructions to Capt TANAGUCHI.

1. You will continue to concentrate the remaining stores at KENDARI.
2. You will receive further instructions regarding the concentration of all Japanese in the Peninsular.
3. You will continue to administer said area.
4. You will investigate personally, the activities of the Jap civil administration, and ensure that all communities are fairly treated in every respect.
5. You will, every 7 days, call a conference of the Chinese and Native leaders. At this conference, you will discuss problems and will, to the best of your ability, set them right.
6. You will release immediately 100 tons of rice to the native administrator at WAWATOBI and 100 tons of rice to the Rajah at KENDARI.
7. Certain instructions have been issued to your senior medical officer. You will ensure that they are carried out.
8. You will concentrate all Jap business men at KENDARI barracks forthwith.
9. You will organise some form of maintenance of vehicles and will conserve transport as much as possible.
10. You will take a personal interest in the well-being of the entire community in your area of responsibility.

REPORT OF SURVEILLANCE OF POMELAA (SOUTHERN CELEBES)

BY AUSTRALIAN PARTY

31st. OCTOBER 1945 - - - - - 1st. NOVEMBER 1945

Personnel in Party:

S/Lieut. J.W.Marshall, R.A.N.R. (Burdekin)

Cpl. H.Stenzel (2/27th. Btn. A.I.F.)

Pte. J.Thiele (2/27th. Btn. A.I.F.)

Australian Party departed Kendari 0815 I in two cars with one Jap Liaison Officer (Lieut. I.Kowzumi), arriving in Pomelaa at 1320 I. Japs were immediately contacted and we established ourselves in the Commanding Officers mess and residence.

Informed that the C.O. of Pomelaa Garrison, Lieut. Fujiwara, was absent carrying out routine inspectional tour, and was at present located at Boengitiale, a distance of 120 km.

All inspections were conducted by, and all action carried out by Executive Officer of Pomelaa Garrison, Lieut. Kabashima.

Following is a brief list of inspections, action taken, and general observations under the sub-headings:-

1. Ammunition
2. Ordnance
3. Airstrip
4. Barracks
5. Boats
6. Clothing
7. Food
8. Harbour facilities (Navigational etc.)
9. Hospitals
10. Medical
11. Mining Coy.
12. Personnel
13. P.O.L.
14. P.O.W's.
15. Roads
16. Shipping
17. Telephones
18. Vehicles
19. Wireless, Radar, Electrical
20. Natives

Summary

Appendices. A - F.

1. AMMUNITION:

Entire stocks of ammunition were dumped at sea with exception of 420 rounds .310 rifle ammunition and 240 rounds .32 pistol ammunition which Japs were authorised to keep.

No stocks of fuzes were held, having previously been returned to Macassar under terms of surrender.

Japs had already transported approx. 1/3 of ammunition stocks to wharf prior to my arrival. Dumping supervised by Australian Party.

2. ORDNANCE:

All lethal weapons were dumped at sea or returned to Kendarii with following exceptions:

- 8 No. Pistols .38 calibre
- 7 " Rifles .310 calibre
- 7 " Bayonets

Certified list of ordnance returned Kendari prior to my arrival obtained, but apparently mislaid.

Uncertified list herewith (see appendix B.)

Certified list of complete ordnance stocks inspected herewith (see appendix A.)

3. AIRSTRIP:

Inspection of Pomelaa Airstrip, some 30 km. S.E. ^{feet} of town, revealed it to be totally U.S. covered by grass about 5 inches high.

Strip runs N-S, length 1500 Metres, breadth 100 metres, cleared breadth 500 metres. Has been non-operational since Dec. 1944. While operational only 3 night fighter-bombers based there. Test landings have been carried out up to March 1945.

4. BARRACKS OF JAP GARRISON:

Mowewe Group, Pomelaa Garrison. Jap built H.Q. and barracks.

Officers living in former Dutch residences. Strength of Garrison 146 (9 Officers, 1 Navy Doctor).

Ancilliary Wharehouses, garages etc., all Jap constructed, (see appendix).

Inspection revealed quarters to be clean and orderly in all respects.

5. BOATS:

Three power boats only in Pomelaa, viz.

- 1 Deisel motor launch (20') (Navy)
- 1 Jap Deisel L.C.P. (2m. x 3m.) (Navy)
- 1 motor launch (20') Jap Mining Coy. U.S.
- 9 wooden 15 ton lighters) Property
- 4 steel " " ") of Indonesians.

6. CLOTHING:

Estimate 6 months supply
Itemised list to AASC officer.

7. FOOD.

At leaste 6 months supply Jap food .
Abundance of locally grown foods.

8. HARBOUR FACILITIES etc.

Pomelaa harbour is enclosed from seaward by chain of islands .
Extensive shoals at entrance , but comparatively clear inner harbour.

2 small brea kwaters and narrow opening enclose jetty,
accessible by small craft only.

Depth alongside - 20 metres
" inner harbour - 20 to 50 metres

Spring tides - ~~2 1/2~~ 2 metres } approximate.
Neap tides - ~~1 1/2~~ 1 1/2 " }

Tides, currents in anchorage negligible .

Last ship from Japan arrived almost 3 years ago .

Largest ship to enter during Jap occupation approx 800 - 900 tons .

Should be quite safe for shallow draft vessels (LST'S etc)

Limited amount inter-island shipping, mostly native craft.

17. TELEPHONES.

Telephones installed throughout Jap buildings and as far as airstrip.

No telephone communications to outlying parts, W/T to Kendari.

18. VEHICLES.

2 cars (American) - 1 U.S.

4 trucks (1 American - 3 Jap) , all working (just)

Detailed report to AASC officer.

19. WIRELESS, ELECTRICAL etc.

W/T transmitting and receiving station at Jap HQ.

7 radios only in town (5 U.S)

2 radio location sets , dismantled generating gear at Paria,

Radar sets in warehouse, could assemble 1 in working order.

Part of other sets shipped to Java for repair 3/45.

20. NATIVES.

Native administration carried out by Indonesians leader , Oemar , and whom I conferred for about 1 1/2 hours.

Population 343 in Pomelaa.

approximately 900 in Pomelaa district.

1 Indonesian Doctor (Chinese).

Natives in town reported to be 100% free Indonesian movement.

Pre-war , employed mining and farming.

During Jap occupation similarly engaged .

Rates of pay in mines - pre-war Dutch 25¢ per day and food.

Jap 55¢. " " " "

Cost of living nil. (No clothing supplied or available from Japs.)

Natives apparently not molested by Japs, but allowed to live by themselves.

FREE INDONESIAN MOVEMENT.

Would be leader, present administrator OEMAR .

Regular meetings not held , but committee established.

Do not want to see Dutch authority restored, in fact want no authority other than Indonesian.

Reasons for anti - Dutch attitude :-

(1). General prejudice - maintain they (Dutch) are different from other races in Character.

(2). Natives not treated as human beings by Dutch , little attention from them , no encouragement.

(3). Badly treated by Dutch , compelled to work against their wishes etc.

(4). Starvation wages.

(5). Better off under Japs. because they were left to themselves, minimum of interference.

(6). Believe themselves capable of self government.

(7). Inherent desire for self government from olden times, but never had opportunity to effect it . Under present circumstances, now see opportunity to overrule other authorities, and mean to take advantage of it,

Proposed action by Indonesians in the event of Dutch

Re - occupation :-

1. No armed resistance (Have no arms)

2. Non co-operation.

3. Are not prepared to work under Dutch , but live by farming , fruitgrowing, etc.

Unfortunately this interview took place in presence of 2 Jap interpreters (1 English - Jap, 1 Jap Indonesian), so leader may have been a bit wary of anti & Jap views.

Fact that the local Native Administrator is also local Indonesian leader, may have given distorted facts. Supposed to be 100% Free Indonesians in Pomelaa.

Very outspoken in views given in this analysis.

20. (Cont).

B Incidence of disease among Natives small.
Malaria only exception , 1 or 2 deaths per month.
Limited medical treatment obtainable from Jap (NICA) hospital.

General impression of local natives - not up to much - more indolent than other places observed on trip.

SUMMARY

Object of surveillance believed to have been achieved , but shortage of time main hindrance.

Practically all that could be done was to destroy materials ordered , and to inspect and check all other items listed by Japs themselves. Very little opportunity to investigate beyond this.

All declared material appeared to be as per itemised lists, few things only found which were not listed.

My opinion is that the Garrison was the most ill-equipped service force imaginable, or else they declared ~~xxxxxx~~ only the amounts they wished to , May be wrong.

The Jap Naval force performed garrison and policing duties only , No other function apparent.

LIST OF NECESSARIES OF LIFE etc Herewith ^{forwarded AAS' C. Officer} ~~to the appropriate~~ -)

Japs co-operated very well and seemed to do their best to allow work to be done as quickly as possible e.g. had started to move ammo before my arrival and every thing was done with the least waste of time.

Surrender terms have been correctly carried out.

EVACUATION OF JAPS FROM POMELLA

2 Alternatives - sea, or road to Kendari .

Latter probably better if sufficient vehicles available , owing to larger concentration at Kendari, enable Japs to be mustered and embarked en masse.

Possible, if desired, to evacuate by sea.

LST'S should be able to effect evacuation (See 8. HARBOURS).

Departed ^{at} Poalaa 1120 Item 1st November arriving Kendari 1720 Item.

*Inanshan
Lieut. R.A.N.R.*

APPX B.
3rd November, 1945.

REPORT ON OSANA CORPS AMBESIA

BY

LT N.A. YOUNG, 2/27 AUST INF BN

1. Evacuation from Ambesia to Kandari.
The transport situation is inadequate as approximately 7 trucks are useable from a total of 14. The road is very bad and passes over two mountain ranges. Time taken in travel is 3½ to 4 hrs with loaded vehicles. I think the vehicles on hand would cope with an evacuation to Kandari, providing the troops marched and the evacuation was done within six months, the present life of the vehicles on hand.
2. Evacuation from Ambesia to Tabaloeloe.
Distance one hour, loaded vehicles. Bad road, non mountainous. Has a small pier and wharf fitted with rails and 3 railcars. Would be possible to ferry troops from wharf to awaiting ship. Shallow water and sand bar would prevent the mooring of a large vessel. Much better for handling stores and heavy equipment, easier and faster loading.
3. I destroyed all small arms, ammunition, bomb fuses, heavy guns and air bombs up to 500 lbs - by dumping them into the sea, in deep water and well out from the shore. I can report the area clear of arms and ammunition, excepting the 5% allowed.
4. Ambesia Airstrip is overgrown with kunia grass and has been bombed and craters exist throughout the area. It's length is approx. 5000 feet and runs an up grade to the East, with dispersal bays scattered on all flanks. I estimate it would take 100 natives approximately one month to have the airstrip in working order and fit for use.
5. All binoculars, pistols, swords and optical gear were confiscated by me and brought back to Kandari, with the exception of officers' pistols.
6. I investigated stocks and condition of all ASC, Ordnance, Engineers and Medical stores and reported details to officers concerned on arrival back to Kandari.
7. Natives are well controlled by the Japanese, but are being administered by Civil Administration (Japanese). Clothing situation is poor, similar to other parts of the country. Native feeling is generally difficult to trace without an interpreter, but it appears they dislike the Jap intensely. Free Indonesian Movement does not exist in this area. Food stuffs are grown mainly by the natives themselves. I feel the rice supply is very poor, and not liberally supplied by the Japanese.
8. Japanese foodstuffs good, well protected and in large quantities. Civil Administration appears to be good but controlled rigidly. Schools are in progress, with good attendance by the natives.

I was quite pleased with the help and co-operation given me by Maj OSANO and his officers and men. Without his assistance and co-operation, I am quite sure my task would never have been completed in the time allowed.

I know the surrender terms are being carried out to the best of Maj Osano's ability and you may rest assured that any orders issued in future, will be speedily and thoroughly dealt with.

Attached is a complete list of stores and equipment held by the Japanese, both on Ambesia and Tabaloeloe areas.

Signed.....Lt


AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES

APPX C

MAKASSAR FORCE
OS 18/45
5 Nov 45

Subject:- KENDARI SURVEILLANCE PARTY
ORDNANCE REPORT

Chief of Staff MAKASSAR FORCE

Herewith report of Ordnance supplies in KENDARI South East CELEBES in accordance with MAKASSAR instruction No 5 .

2. CLOTHING AND NECESSARIES

The range of clothing is limited to Flying Suits and heavy naval garments. Although all Jap troops are well clothed items such as Shirts, Trousers, Jackets, Hats or Socks do not appear in warehouses or on lists of stores.

Recent liberal issues of these items have completely exhausted stocks.

3. M.T. SPARES.

Apart from a few spanners DE. there is insufficient tools to maintain the running vehicles in the area. Maintenance of vehicles is non-existent.

4. CAMP EQUIPMENT AND HARDWARE

Stocks of hand tools, crockery, glassware, paints and oils are exhausted. Blankets quantity 1560 and Mosquito Nets quantity 1250 are the only items worthy of mention.

Hand tools that are in the area are being used to erect buildings for housing troops.

5. WIRELESS AND SIGNAL EQUIPMENT

Test equipment such as Voltmeters and Multitesters have been bought to MAKASSAR. Attached hereto are the stores in use by the Japanese in KENDARI area.

There are no maintenance stocks of signal equipment Charging sets or batteries.

6. GENERAL

From a booty point of view KENDARI offers nothing of value or use to the Australian Army. Inspection and check of stores in warehouses reveals that articles are well stored and listed. In no instance did actual stores disagree with the lists prepared by the Japanese.

L. J. Leggie
..... Lt

O.O. 21 Aust Inf Bde

List of Japanese Gestapo men.

APPX F

- A. 1. Jap. Lt. name unknown to reports. Is still in Kendari.
2. So. (x) *arrested*
3. Miokeni.
4. Abe. (x)
5. Kawakami.
6. Foekoeda. (x) *arrested*
7. Susaki.
8. Ninomia.
9. Satoh. (x) *arrested*
10. Suematsu.
11. Takemoto.
12. Saito.
13. Koebo.
14. Murakami.
15. Koebo.
16. Okui. (x) Interpreter. *arrested*
17. Nakamoera. "
18. Josisaki. " *arrested*

- B. 1. Koga. (x)
2. Jokejama. (x)
3. Taboetji
4. Okujama
5. Okuda.
6. Amano.
7. Kato.
8. Jonejama.
9. Mori.

A. Japanese Militarij Police (Tokobetsu Keisatsu Tai)
B. Jap. secret service (Hanakikan).

(x). The cruellest ones.

Report short visit to Kendari.

Route:

Mondaj. 28-10-1945.

7 a.m. onboard frigate "Burdekin" Makassar, together with Austr. A&Mij Unit Cpt. Reddin. 4 p.m. conference with Cpt. and Officers dividing tasks.

Tuesdaj 29-10-1945.

1 p.m. arrival at Kendari. Went ashore and conference with Japanese Commander.

Wednesdaj 30-10-1945.

Conference in Civil Adm. Office with Jap. Ass. Resident and Controleur and Adm. personnel. 3 p.m. visit to Radjah together with Cpt. Reddin and Comm. Offic. "Burdekin".

Thursdaj 31-10-1945.

8 a.m. visit to Kapitan at Wawotobi conference Jap. administrators of firms-taking stocks. Back Kendari 4 p.m. Conference at Kendari with Jap. Ass. Resident.

Fridaj 1-11-1945.

7 a.m. left Kendari.

Saturdaj 2-11-1945.

2-11-1945. 2 p.m. Arrival Makassar.

Time was too short to go into details so only a general view can be given as to:

1. Civil Administration.
 2. Economic situation.
 3. Political situation.
1. Civil Administration: There are two different administrations:
 - a. Government administration (Jap. "Minseibu")
 - b. Native state "
 - a. Head of Government adm. is Japanese Ass. Resident at Kendari. He has the supervision over Kendari (Native state Laiwoei), Boeton and Moena (Nat. State Boeton) and Kolaka. (Native State Loewoe), each under the supervision of a Japanese Controleur. At Kendari there is an Ass. Resident office and a Controleurs office each with mainly native personnel. Administration of Controleurs office is divided into following parts:
 1. Police: 1 Japanese head of Police with police personnel under native Djaksa.
 2. Roads, Bridges, Buildings: Only native personnel.
 3. Economical Affairs: 1 Jap. head with native personnel (Agriculture, Fisheries, Veterinary service, Forestry).
 4. Education: 1 Jap. head with native supervisor of schools.
 5. Customs office: Native personnel.
 6. Post Office: Native personnel.
 7. Public Health service: 1 Jap. Civil doctor and native personnel.

Approximatelij the same ^{divi} ~~duration~~ is to be found in Boeton, Moena and Kolaka.

There are 3 government adm. chesses. Revenues consist of taxes from Chinese and customs and moneij sent over regurlarlij from Makassar. Expenditures are salaries of personnels, exp. on roads and bñidges and also now costmof food for ex. coolies (Roomoesjas) In Kendari chess, at moment of investigation + f 60.000.- which were not taken in because necessarij going on pajing salaries of personnel.

General impression was that administration is en disorder especiallij financial adm. Government safe were found three amounts of moneij accounted for bij Japs as follows:

+ f 2.800.- "dice moneij" + f 4.000.- "trade moneij" and + f 12.000.- "moneij used for general welfare of people" (reallij "wax fund") As there were no books kept this moneij was taken on.

Another instance is that hijgiene conditions in Kendari were verij bad, town looked unclean, drains neglected. Civil doctor never went on tours inspec-^{ting} health of native population. (Armij controls water supplij and electric light). Roads, bridges, stone houses looked negleted except roads to Kendari II airbase and Ambesea airbase which are improved bij armij.

Police is onlij partiallij reliable and as Jap. authoritij declined after peace Assistent Resident expressed fear of disturbances breaking out espaciallij between Chinese and Ambonese on one side and natives who worked as spies for Jap. Police and Gestapo on other side. + one month before peace administration was given over bij Japanese Controleurs to Radjah for Kendari, Radjah Boeton for Boeton, Laode Ipa (native chief) for Moena and Andi Kasim (substitute for Radjah Loewoe in Kolaka) for Kolaka, and just after peace the Radja of Boeton was made Ass. Resident. Japanese Controleurs were sent to Kendari. But then after a while riots broke out in Bae-Bae (Boeton) between Chinese one hand and police together with native population on the other hand. Then Jap. Ass. Resident sent some Japanese personnel over to Boeton and this stopped riots. In Kendari I impressed upon Chinese, Ambonese and native chiefs to keep quiet and await mij coming back to arrange anij affairs theij had, which theij promised tod do. In Kendari Radja and personnel expressed no serious complaints about native police.

- b. Native state. Organisation is approximatelij as before war. In Kendari on top of native state is Radja with his two secretaries of state called Sapati and Kapitan (Kapitan stationed at Wawotobi). Constituting central power with central office and native personnel. This controls own budget (f. 80.000.- in chess at moment of investigation which were left there). Countriij is divided into 7 districts under district-chiefs. Of which the two largest ones.

Ranomeeto and Konawe are respectively divided into 5 and 7 subdistricts. Other 5 districts are Palangga, Andolo, Lasolo, Wiwirano and the island of Wawonii. Under these district and subdistrict chiefs are the village chiefs.

Administration is a bit in disorder and corrupt but on the whole can go on, only, needs some cleaning up here and there.

Special Remarks on administration.

1. Police: No special complaints, but only half reliable. Worked to closely together with Japanese Gestapo. Needs gradual cleaning up. When we are going to take over it is necessary to bring a 100 of our own soldiers for Kendari and Kolaka to use as police force to, keep peace and order. In Wawotobi are concentrated a lot of our ex-soldiers, Eurasian, Ambonese Javanese but better not use them in Kendari because there is bad feeling between them and native spies working for Japs. Many of them have been beheaded or tortured to death by Japanese.

2. Justice. Petty offences are judged by Japanese head of police. Other offences up to murder by natives were judged by Radja, Sapati and Kapitan functioning as council. All according to prewar regulations. There were no special complaints about justice. Only when Japanese Gestapo members interfered. Hundreds of Europeans, Chinese, Ambonese and natives were beheaded or tortured to death by these Gestapo men on slight evidence or no evidence at all. Some natives were working for this Gestapo as spies. All this has to be investigated very carefully and gradually sorted out. A list of Gestapo men is added to this report. A list of spies working for them is in my hands.

3. Education. There are a lot more schools than before the war and a special training course for native teachers. Schools were used mainly for propaganda (anti-Dutch and Allies) and teaching of Japanese language. Results however are meagre. Teaching of Japanese has already been stopped.

4. General idea on expenditure of Government and Native State personnel. To give general idea of expenditure on personnel salaries hereunder are to be found numbers of personnel and total amount of salaries for Kendari, Boeton, Moena and Kolaka (complete personnel Lists are in my hands).

	Number.	Amount.
<u>Kendari.</u>		
Government	60	f. 2894.20.
Native State	244	f. 7578.-
<u>Boeton.</u>		
Government	51	f. 2329.10
Native State	378	f. 12657.-
<u>Moena.</u>		
Government	44	f. 1516.-
Native State	195	f. 5626.70
<u>Kolaka.</u>		
Government	48	f. 1929.69
Native State	136	f. 3882.-

Economic Situation. During Japanese occupation practically all economic activity was under control of Japanese combines. Combines worked as follows:

1. The Selebes Busshi Haikiju Kumiai (S.B.H.K.). Controlled rice and maize trade and trade in several other articles like cloth, sugar, coffee, tea, soap, salt. Bought the articles from the population in Kendari itself or imported them from outside and distributed them mainly to personnel (including Roomoesja's) all at fixed prices with a slight profit. Prices were on prewar scale so in relation to black market price very low. Distribution was corrupt.

Rice trade. Up to May 1945 (just after last rice harvest) rice was imported from Bone to be distributed to civil personnel and other private persons in Kendari town and Wawotobi and the thousands of Roomoesja coolies and Heiho's that were brought in from Java and other places outside. Then about May 1945 as prahu-transport was hampered and nearly stopped a big gathering was held with native chiefs and were ordered to gather and sell 1500 tons of rice in the husk at fixed prices by the Army as a reserve stock. About 800 tons were gathered mostly in sheds under the control of village and district chiefs some of it in Kendari and Wawotobi. After the peace the Japanese started to sell this rice back to the population but a couple of days before our visit to Kendari that was stopped probably because the Japanese misunderstood the order that they had to stop selling it back. During our visit they got the order to go on giving it back. At the time of our visit in Kendari town was only 28 tons (enough for about 6 weeks) of rice and 10 tons of maize for distribution; in Wawotobi nothing. As these two places need rice for distribution for the people concentrated there who mostly have no rice gardens, the Captain ordered 200 tons of rice in the husk to be used for distribution in those two townships. At the moment of our visit the total amount of rice in the husk bought by the Japanese was \pm 477 tons of which \pm 149 tons were transported to Pomalaa to be used for the Roomoesja's there, 121 tons were sold back to the population and 205 tons left in the sheds. So when 200 tons are to be reserved for distribution in Kendari and Wawotobi out of this 205 tons only 5 tons are left to be given back to the population.

My impression is that Japanese Army, Navy and Airforce have enough food stores (rice, tinned food) for at least 6 months and moreover I got information that after the peace a lot of rice (and other articles like material and sugar) were taken out of the stores from the S.B.H.K. by the Army and transported in the direction of Wawotobi, probably the place where all Japs are to be concentrated. Further that they must be some hidden stores. My opinion is that all stocks should be carefully checked when we come back so that a fair amount of stocks can be given.

The same has ^{to} be done with the stores of other articles. As there is practically no material, sugar, soap available for distribution to the population.

On the whole the food supplies seem to be sufficient to hold out until the next harvest in April/May 1946, as the maize crop will come in much earlier.

But then the civil administration must have the control over sufficient means of transport (prahu's and trucks) to bring the food and other articles where a needed.

2. The Minsen Unkookai: Regulated the control over prahu's (shippings) There are 45 big trading prahu's (above 10 M3) stationed at Kendari but after the peace the Japanese lost control over them and part of them is now trading on their own. They have to be put under control again to be used for the export of copra and rattan out of Kendari (which export was stopped during the Japanese occupation) and for the import of rice (eventually if needed) and other articles as there is no other shipping. There were some other combines which controlled fresh fish, dried and salted fish, cotton growing and manufacturing of cotton thread and sarongs, but they have stopped activity and free trade is developing slowly. Prices are getting fairly high but the Radjah was advised to stimulate supply and keep prices down and under control.

Currency: Under Japanese occupation a certain amount of prewar Dutch money circulated together with the Japanese paper money at the same value. On our visit we did not tell the people that the Government has fixed a rate of exchange of 3 cents for a Japanese guilder. When we take over it seems to be the best way when we break the bad news only gradually to the population. As a lot of work has to be done roads, bridges, building, cleaning up of Kendari town and a large amount of salaries are to be paid, there is plenty of opportunity of getting in the new money. Then the best way seems to be to let prices and rates of exchange adjust themselves for a while and on the meantime to register the amount of Japanese money in the hands of the population. Then after that switch over to the new money by taking it in at the rate of 3 cents a guilder, when there is enough import articles to keep prices low. Then when prices have adjusted themselves again adjust salaries, wages, rents to the price level. During the whole period intense propaganda for the new money (comparing them with the Japanese money) is necessary.

An important thing is to start as soon as possible the buying of copra and rattan, the two most important export articles, paying them with new money to be used to buy imported cloth, sugar, soap and other articles.

The Chinese: Before the war practically the whole of the import and export trade was in the hands of Chinese shop owners and traders. As Japanese trade combines took over all the trade and all Chinese shops are burnt down by bombing the Chinese suffered badly, have lost practically all capital. They can and must be helped in the first place by giving them credit and using them

in building up trade again.


On the whole the economic situation is not so bad but sharp control of food situation is necessarij.

3. Political situation. The political situation in Kendari itself is quite good. About Boeton and Moena I am not sure. In Kolaka there seems to be a red and white movement and as it belongs to the native state Loewe and ^{there are} his connections with Bone there may be some trouble-especially with the 20.000 Buginese along the Bone gulf coast.

In Kendari and Wawotobi I was received by a large crowd cheering me. On my visit together with the Commander of the Burdekin to Wawotobi schoolchildren along the road lined up and cheered us. In Wawotobi itself schoolchildren stopped the car threw flowers into it and followed the car singing and playing flutes. A large crowd was cheering us as we went on to the house of the Kapitan. When I stepped out many women wept seeing me back alive again. Then the schoolchildren sang the "Wilhelmus" and "God save the King" to welcome us. I made a short speech, also on behalf of the Commander of the "Burdekin" to thank the people.

The Radja, Sapati and Kapitan seem to be alright and the same seems to be true of practically all the district and village chiefs. Amongst the personnel are some who have too closely worked together with the Japanese and are probably influenced by the Japanese sponsored red and white Soekarno movement. It is most important that we go back to take over the administration from the Japanese as soon as possible to keep peace and order and cut off any propaganda from the south western peninsula. The best thing to do then is to make the Radja Controleur and responsible for peace and order. Let administration get on and gradually cleaning it up after careful investigation. But I must press the point, as soon as possible. To go back and take things over we need a hundred of our own soldiers to use them as a police force especially for Kolaka. Then when I am sent back there I need a good motorcar and sufficient trucks for food transport and improving some of the most important roads and a good radio set to keep in contact with Macassar and the outside world.

Macassar, 4 th. November 1945.



(G. J. Wolhoff).

ORDERS RE CO-ORDINATION OF MEDICAL SERVICES.

Major Amagai is appointed senior medical officer - SOUTH EAST CELEBES area.

1. He will co-ordinate and be responsible for :-
Navy
Army
Air Force
Civilian (including natives)
at Kendari, Ambesia, Pomelaa, Airdrome and Wawatobi.
2. Japanese Medical Stores will be concentrated
 - (1) Airdrome
 - (2) Ambesia
 - (3) PomelaaA list as at the 3rd November of all medical stores will be submitted to S.M.O. A list of items used each week will be submitted to S.M.O. Stores will be conserved, as there will be no further supplies.
3. Medical treatment and advice re medical and sanitary problems will be the responsibility of the Jap medical services.
4. Records of
 - (a) All sick will be kept. They will be consolidated weekly by S.M.O.
 - (b) All deaths will be notified, both Japanese and Indonesian.
 - (c) Any epidemic will be immediately notified to H.Q. Aust Army MAKASSAR.
 - (d) Any cases of smallpox or cholera will be notified immediately to H.Q. Aust Army MAKASSAR.
5. Natives:-
 - (a) Will receive medical treatment from Japanese medical services.
 - (b) Arrangements will be made for (SEMBOR), accompanied by a Japanese doctor to visit outlying districts once per 14 days.
 - (c) The Dutch hospital will be used by Indonesians only. The local Japanese doctor will advise and co-operate.
 - (d) Equipment, beds, blankets, tables, chairs etc. will be supplied from barracks.
6. Hygiene:-

The hygiene in the KENDARI area is poor. The Japanese, with assistance of Indonesians will:-

 - (a) Repair all cisterns.
 - (b) Clean out all septic tanks.
 - (c) Clean all drains in town area.
 - (d) Remove all refuse - burn and bury.
 - (e) Inspect and maintain cleanliness of Dutch buildings.

7. Japanese Barracks Area.

All areas unsanitary. Latrines:-

- (a) Deep trench latrines will be dug.
- (b) One latrine for 30 men.
- (c) They will be used and filled in after 3 months.
- (d) All existing latrines, Japanese built, will be closed before Japanese move from KENDARI.
- (e) Latrines will be covered at all times.

8. Reports:-

The S.M.O. will submit a medical report re health and sanitation weekly to Capt TANIGUCHI.

H.J. Rowe Maj.
for SMO MACFORCE.

APPX H

4th November, 1945.

LOCATION STATEMENT OF ALL JAPS ON KENDARI PENINSULAR.

Arm	Unit	Location	Strength	Total	Activities
Navy	23rd Base Garrison Unit	KENDARI	409		Guard duties, concentration of stores Tanaguchis H.Q.
Civil Admin	Attached to 102 Naval Expeditionary H.Q.	KENDARI	95		Civil administration.
Civilians	Business men Mitsubishi etc.	KENDARI	53	Kendari 557	None.
Navy	Kendari Expeditionary Force of the East Indies Air Fleet.	AMOITO (Kendari Airfield)	629		Concentrating stores. Guard duties, erecting barracks
Civil Admin	102 Naval Expeditionary H.Q.	"	5	Airfield 634	Postal work???
Army	109 Airfield Bn (OSANO CORPS)	AMBESIA (2 & 20 detached to Torobolde for guard duties)	473		Guard duties, concentration of stores. Have started to build barracks.
Civil Admin	102 Naval Expeditionary H.Q.	AMBESIA	3	Ambesia 476	Native administration.
Navy	23rd B.G.U.	POMELAA	87		Guard duties - practically none.
Civil Admin	102 Naval Expeditionary H.Q.	"	6		Civil administration (incl KOLAKA district)
Civilians	Business men & mining company	"	70	Pomelaa 163	None.
Navy	Mixed force of 23 B.G.U. and Air Fleet Force	WAWATOBI	177		Erecting barracks on order from 2nd Jap Army H.Q. for ultimate concentration.
Civil Admin	102 Naval Expeditionary H.Q.	"	15		Administration.
Civilians	Business men	"	27	219	None.

Arm	Unit	Location	Strength	Total	Activities
Navy	Detachment of 23 B.G.U.	MOWEWE	64	64	Erecting barracks for farm community.
Civilians	Business clerks etc.	SIREA	31	31	"
Civil Admin	102 Naval Expeditionary H.Q.	RAHABANGKA	5	5	Farming
"	"	POHARA	6	6	"
"	"	SAMBEANI	3	3	"
"	"	RAHA	2	2	Civil administration work.
"	"	BUETON	2	2	"
				2162	

SUMMARY

Total Navy	1366
" Army	473
" Civil Admin.	142
" Business men	181
	<u>2162</u>

LIST OF BOAT

East Celebes dominion and civilian

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Classification of destination	sort	Number	Length	Width	Accommodation	ton
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Kendari	Motorboat	* I	30feet	6feet	5	6
		* I	30	5	6	8
		I	60	7	30	35
	Sailing vessel	I	60	II	20	9
		2	45	9	20	19
		I	48	II	10	30
		2	45	8	10	13
		I 1	8 10	2 5	10 3	2 2
		I 1	4 10	2 4	10 1	1 1
		* I	9	4	11	0.5

.....

Pomal, a	Motorboat					16
						16
						4.5
						4
	wooden					
	Teranspeter	2I				100-150 size

* marks are in condition of non-usage, by damage or hitch of engine

LIST OF BOATS

East Celebes Navy and Army Corps

Classification of possession	Sort	number	Length	Width	Ton	Accommodation
Kendari Garrison	(motor lighter)					
	Daihatsu (wood)	I	45 feet	10 feet	20 ton	20 men
	Motorboat (wood)	I	30	7	8	10
	Yamma Diesel (wood)	I	45	10	10	20

Department of Munition	Daihatsu (steel)	2	48	12	12	25
	Yamma Diesel (wood)	2	45	10	10	20
	Transportship I (steel) lighter		100	20	50	50

Pemala Garrison	Daihatsu (steel)	I	48	12	12	25
	Motorboat (wood)	I				
	Cutter (wood)	I				

Anbeshia Army Corps	Motorboat (wood)	I	16	6	5	5
	Cutter (wood)	I	14	4	2	5

Total	Daihatsu	4				
	Motorboat	3				
	Yamma Diesel	3				
	Cutter	2				
	Transportship I					

13

Remarks: One of Yamma Diesel belonging of Munition is almost unable to use by damage of bottom. Daihatsu belonging to Kendari garrison is unable to use by hitch of engine. Yamma Diesel belonging to Kendari garrison is relied upon its custody from Army and in condition of non-usage by leakage. Accommodation of each boat may be doubled on the calm water in short distance.

Outline of business of Japanese CO, that under jurisdiction of Kendari. - before truce

APPX L.

Name of Company	Business place	The date of opening	Capital working fundament	Staff of Co. (Japanese)	Outline of business
Boeton Sangyo CO, Ltd.	Boeton (Main office) Raha (Branch office) Kendari	June 1942	Cl. 2.000.000.00 Wd. 4832.097.00	52	Mining Asfalt Farming industry (tan ^o nahare, Tobea ^o) Timber
Nanyo Kohatsu CO, Ltd.	Kendari Pohara Wawotobi Ambesea	August 1943	Cl. 50.000.00 Fixed capital 6.000.00	6	Collection of vegetables (Konawe, Sambeani, Pohara). Farming industry Napoha. Milling.
Toindo Suisan CO, Ltd.	Kendari Kasilampe	November 1943	Wd. A month 3.500.00	1	Fishing Amount a month 7 ton Artificial ice " 1 ton Collection fish " 7 ton
Taiwan Chikusan CO, Ltd.	Wawotobi Pomalaa Kendari	March 1943.	A month 5.00.00.	5	Collection of skin, butchers meat.
Itonaga CO.	Lacra Raha Boeton Kendari	November 1 1942	Wd. 50.000.00 (Fixed capital) 20.000.00	4	Collection Mangrove bark, timber, karoro and salt fish ...
Selebes Busshi Haikiu Kumiai	Kendari Boeton	May 1943	Wd. A month 40.000.00	1	Sale ^{of} necessaries of life, food, miscellaneous ^{goods.}
Kokusai Denki Station CO. Ltd.	Bae2 Pomalaa	May 1942 November 1943	Wd. 10.000.000 " 10.000.00%	3	... telegram
Selebes Kogyosho	Pomalaa	1942	Wd. 20.821.000.00	101	Mining nikel, and refinement Nikel
Tsubono CO.					Collection of ^c kopi and mangrove bark. ^{coffee}
Ni Chi In CO.					Collection of resin, beeswax, and wistaria (rotan).
Minsen Unkookai	Kendari Boeton Kolaka	1943 1944 1944		2	Government of sailing ship.

PARTICULARS OF SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS

ARRESTED KENDARI 30th OCTOBER, 1945.

S. Sō, Warrant Officer.

Served mainly at KENDARI as a member of Naval Special Police from July 1942 to September 1945.
Duties were to maintain public peace and to inspect affairs.
From May 1944 to January 1945, he stayed at KARONODARE on duty.

A. Fukuda, Warrant Officer.

Served mainly at KENDARI as a member of Naval Special Police from July 1942 to September 1945.
Main service was to collect information.
From October 1943 to March 1944, he served at POMBLAA and RAHA district on duty.

T. Sata, Police Inspector.

From October 1944 to August 1945, he served at KENDARI.
Main service was to manage business of justice.

S. Yoshizaki, Naval Interpreter.

From May 1944 to August 1945, he was engaged in general business (affairs) of Naval Special Police as interpreter. During this period he was also sent on duty to ROEK.

S. Okui, Naval Interpreter.

From March 1943 to August 1945, he was engaged in general business of Naval Special Police as an interpreter. During this period he had also been sent on duty to BOETON.
From August 1944 to January 1945, he was sick in bed in the hospital in BOETON.

NOTE:-

TOKUDA (Heisha) W/O was unknown.
FUKUDA (Heisha) W/O was arrested in case of misspelling. A Platoon Commander by the name of TOKUDA was sent to SOURABAYA some time last year, but had nothing to do with the Special Police.

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 2

REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS OF MAKASSAR FORCE

22 SEPTEMBER 1945 to 20 DECEMBER 1945

Ref Maps: AERONAUTICAL SERIES SHEET 4 A) 1:1,000,000
AERONAUTICAL SERIES SHEET 4 B) 1:1,000,000

SCOPE OF REPORT

1. This report deals with the activities of 21 Aust Inf Bde and attached units from 22 Sep 45 to 20 Dec 45. During this period 21 Aust Inf Bde has been known as MAKASSAR FORCE and has been the ANF occupation force in SOUTH CELEBES.

GENERAL ROLE OF MAKASSAR FORCE

2. The role of MAKASSAR FORCE was set out in Adv HQ Operation Instruction No 8 of 12 Sep 45, the relevant portion of which is repeated below for reference:-

"1. To occupy MAKASSAR area in the Southern CELEBES for the following purposes:-

- (a) To recover and evacuate as may be necessary the Allied PW and Internees in MAKASSAR area and in such other areas in Southern CELEBES as are within the capabilities of the force.
- (b) To implement the surrender of the Japanese forces in the Southern CELEBES and by control of the HQ of Second Japanese Army, ensure control of the Japanese occupied areas until such time as occupation forces can be sent to these areas.
- (c) To take such preliminary action as is practicable which will facilitate the re-establishment of the NEI Government."

MOVE TO MAKASSAR

3. The force moved from BALIKPAPAN in three phases as follows:-

Phase I : A small command and control group with a protective detachment of one coy of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn. Arrived MAKASSAR 21 Sep 45.

Phase II : The remainder of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn Group. Arrived MAKASSAR 27 Sep 45.

Phase III : The remainder of 21 Aust Inf Bde Group.
 2/14 Aust Inf Bn arrived MAKASSAR on
 1 Oct 45 and 2/16 Aust Inf Bn on 17 Oct 45

4. The OOB for each phase is shown in Appendix "A".

TASKS

5. The tasks to be carried out in each Phase were as follows:-

Phase I

- (a) Establish an AMF HQ in MAKASSAR with communications to MOROTAI.
- (b) Contact and collect details of RAPWI in the area and conduct rapid survey of their medical condition.
- (c) Arrange provision of supplies, medical stores etc essential for maintenance of RAPWI prior to their evacuation.
- (d) Arrange evacuation urgent medical cases to BALIKPAPAN or MOROTAI.
- (e) Exercise general supervision of Japanese evacuation of MAKASSAR.
- (f) Provide liaison with HQ Second Japanese Army.
- (g) Take such measures as are practicable for control and relief and protection of civil population.

Phase II

- (a) Occupy key points in MAKASSAR area.
- (b) Establish control of the Japanese forces in MAKASSAR area.
- (c) Consistent with the security of the force enforce the surrender terms in the area occupied by AMF.
- (d) Consistent with the security of the force and in accordance with instructions contained in Appendix "B" attached. (NOT attached to this report)
 - (i) Suppress activities of individuals and organisations which may be hostile to the operations of the occupation forces.
 - (ii) Secure and safeguard intelligence information of value to the United Nations and arrange with the appropriate naval and air comds for mutual exchange and unrestricted access by each service to matters of interest.

(iii) Control signal communications.

(iv) Apprehend and take into custody all comds, staffs and guards of PW camps and any persons suspected of having committed atrocities.

Phase III

In relation to the South Western CELEBES, and consistent with the security of the force:-

- (a) Establish control of the Japanese Armed Forces and civil population and impose thereon prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.
- (b) Disarm Japanese Armed Forces and their auxiliaries and establish control of military resources as rapidly as the situation permits.
- (c) Destroy hostile elements which oppose by military action, the imposition of surrender terms upon the Japanese.
- (d) Recover, relieve and repatriate Allied PW and Chinese Internees without delay.
- (e) Control principal routes of overland communication and in coordination with naval elements, control principal routes of coastwise communication as arranged with the appropriate naval commander.
- (f) Ensure that law and order are maintained among the civil population.
- (g) Facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which contributes to the subsistence, clothing and shelter of the population.
- (h) Occupy such places in designated areas of responsibility as are considered necessary and practicable to implement surrender terms.

6. It should be mentioned at this stage that the Force was, in many instances, precipitated into action required under Phases II and III before the Phase II troops arrived. This was due entirely to the local situation. For example, it became immediately necessary to establish some control over Japanese Forces; to suppress hostile activities by local political rebels; and, to maintain law and order.

7. Phase I troops embarked on HMAS "BARCOO" and HMAS "INVERELL" at BALIKPAPAN on 19 Sep 45 and arrived at MAKASSAR in the late afternoon of 21 Sep 45. The Force disembarked early on 22 Sep 45 and set up an AMF HQ in MAK-SSAR in accommodation which had been provided by Second Japanese Army under directions from Adv HQ AMF.

GENERAL SITUATION AS AT 22 SEP 45

8. The town area of MAKASSAR was quiet. The majority of the Japanese Forces who had been stationed in MAKASSAR had been moved NORTH.
9. Approximately 500 seamen, mainly from H.M.S. "EXETER", who had been in MAKASSAR since 1942, were at the time accommodated in the old Dutch Military Hospital. A large number of Dutch IV and Internees who had no homes to which to go, were still living in the same buildings. Although undernourished and with many sick among them, their general condition was fair.
10. Although there were no actual civil disturbances at this time there was a pronounced undercurrent of antagonism towards the Dutch and there was some outward evidence of the Free Indonesian Movement in the form of red and white flags and badges. The natives all appeared to be in good health and there was no shortage of food. Very little damage had been done to the city by bombing.

JAPANESE FORCESGeneral

11. The original area of responsibility of MAKASSAR Force was the South Western CELEBES peninsula North as far as the line of 5° South latitude, which ran through MAROS. Prior to our arrival the majority of Japanese Forces had been moved north of this line. There were however approximately 2000 still in our area. These consisted of :-
 - (a) The Japanese Liaison Office.
 - (b) Guards on dumps and installations.
 - (c) Civil administration personnel.
 - (d) Specialist Officers and staff.
 - (e) Civilians controlling factories and businesses.
12. There was a total of 20,723 Japanese in Central and South Western CELEBES, and a further 2,562 in the South Eastern peninsula, mainly at M'DALI.
13. HQ Second Japanese Army was stationed at RAUTERAO in Central CELEBES. This was the controlling HQ of all Japanese in:-
 - (a) CELEBES
 - (b) ALBON
 - (c) CERAM
 - (d) VOGELKOP (NEW GUINEA)
 - (e) TIOU
 - (f) LESBEN SUKDA
 - (g) THE MOLLAS

14. In addition to MAKASSAR Force's local task in South CELEBES, we were to act as a forwarding HQ for information and reports between Adv HQ AIF and Second Japanese Army on matters concerning the above areas. All signals from Adv HQ AIF to Second Japanese Army were repeated to MAKASSAR Force and vice versa. In cases of doubt or confusion arising over instructions we were to clarify the position by direct liaison. For this purpose the Japanese maintained a Liaison Office in MAKASSAR with direct communication to Second Japanese Army. The initial intention was that the Japanese outside our area of responsibility (i.e. North of 1205) were responsible for maintaining law and order and carrying out civil administrative functions. For reasons shown later this plan was changed.
15. The attitude of the Japanese could be described as one of complete "correctness". They went to extraordinary lengths to produce complete and tabulated details of their strength and locations, their holdings of arms, ammunition, food, petrol, clothing and medical supplies as well as all the other war materials in their possession. The impression given was that, as a beaten nation, they were determined to establish themselves securely at the foot of the international ladder down which they had recently fallen, by demonstration of their unflinching desire to assist, almost to ingratiate themselves. It must in fairness be stated that their staff work was of a high order. Everything was produced in writing and in English. With very few exceptions it has been found they disclosed all their possessions. There is no evidence that any quantity of arms, ammunition or other goods fell into the hands of natives. They had been, and were on our arrival, living in very comfortable circumstances. Wireless sets, furniture, refrigerators were in abundant supply. When ordered to return these to NICA for re-possession by their rightful owners, they were delivered, in most cases promptly. As we moved them out of the area, they were all passed through check posts and were not allowed to take more than 30 kilogrammes of purely personal belongings with them to the concentration area.
16. Considerable difficulty was experienced at first in dealing with Japanese Army and Navy independently. There was obviously no love lost between the two services and little or no cooperation one with the other. The Navy in particular plainly showed their utmost contempt for the Army. When dealing with the Army it was found that they claimed no knowledge of, or responsibility for, the activities of the Navy, and, vice versa. Finally it had to be made very clear that we could deal only with the Liaison Office, and that internal service differences of the Japanese would have to be sorted out before the matter reached our HQ.

Personalities

17. The Naval Commander was Vice Admiral OHSUGI

who was in command in MAKASSAR during the war, when it had been a Naval Base. He had served in H.M. Ships during the 1914-18 War and had visited AUSTRALIA in 1923. When the Commander MAKASSAR FORCE paraded him shortly after our arrival he delivered an address of welcome in which he particularly expressed his appreciation of the Naval honours accorded the Japanese submarine crew who were killed in Sydney Harbour in 1942. He further expressed the greatest admiration for AUSTRALIA and her fighting forces, and he affirmed his desire to do everything possible to assist in the present situation. This he did, in fact, carry out.

18. The senior army officer was Maj Gen YOSHIDA, Chief of Staff, Second Japanese Army. His address on the same occasion was on similar lines but lacked the sincerity of the Admiral's. He was not a pleasing personality and was very soon returned to RANTEPAO.
19. Chief of the Liaison Office was Lt Col ISHIRO of the Japanese Air Force. He was efficient and tried hard to assist in every way.
20. Lt Gen TESHIMA, Commander Japanese Army met the Commander MAKASSAR Force at PINRANG some time later. He was utterly inscrutable and appeared a typical Japanese. His face was expressionless and altogether he was not an imposing figure.
21. These were the main personalities with whom this force has had to deal.

Concentration of Personnel

22. It soon became obvious that to obtain control of the country and the inhabitants, the chief factor was to control the food supply. As the main rice producing areas were in the central plain, it was decided to extend the area of responsibility of the force to the general East West line of the SADANG River, 130 miles north of MAKASSAR. 2/14 Aust Inf Bn were to be stationed in the PARE PARE area and from there to control the concentration of Japanese forces.
23. After reconnaissance, a concentration area was selected between BENTENG and MALIMPOENG, immediately south of the SADANG River. Into this area all Japanese, with the exceptions detailed in para 26 below were to be concentrated. Further, sufficient cultivation land was allotted to enable the Japanese to become self sufficient, except for rice. Details of this aspect of the concentration are covered in para 37 below.
24. Attached as Appendix "B" is a sketch showing the areas allotted and allocation of personnel to them.
25. The main concentration area was a tract of undulating, open, grassy country, selected primarily because it was not used by the natives and was remote from the main native areas. It was dry and well supplied with water and had two fair access roads.

26. Orders for the concentration were issued on 11 Oct 45 and more detailed orders on certain special matters, on 1 Nov 45. These were MAKASSAR Force Instructions Nos 2 and 6 which are attached as Appendices "C" and "D". The concentration was to be completed by 10 Nov 45. It was realised that, due to shortage of transport, this would probably not be achieved, and the date was subsequently extended to 15 Nov 45. By this date the concentration had been substantially effected. Again owing to lack of transport, and also the fact that the Japanese dumps were widely scattered, detachments of Japanese had to be left temporarily in various places as guards. The main areas were SINDANG, WATEESOPPENG, TAJA DA and MAPANG. These dumps are being cleared systematically and the Japanese guards moved to MALIPOENG. The present situation is shown on location statement attached as Appendix "E".
27. The exceptions referred to in para 23 above are the Japanese authorised to remain in the area North of the SADAHO River which was an area of direct responsibility of Second Japanese Army to Adv HQ AIF. As they were responsible for maintenance of law and order in that area, detachments of 200, were left at various key points. The total for this area, including civil administrative personnel, was approximately 3,000.
28. As the result of a surveillance tour in this area in November it was recommended to Adv HQ AIF that all Japanese be withdrawn into MALIPOENG. This is now approved but it will take some time to clear them all, as guards on dumps will still be required. The other exception was the Japanese Liaison Officers and staff and a working party of 150 which were kept in MAKASSAR.
29. MAKASSAR Force's area of responsibility was extended in Nov 45 to take in the South Eastern CELEBES Peninsula with the proviso that this was NOT to involve any additional commitment of AIF troops. The Japanese from KENDARI and the South Eastern CELEBES area were moved to MALIPOENG by 20 Dec 45. The only personnel remaining in that area are a Naval Detachment of 150 at KOLAKA to maintain law and order and a small Liaison Staff at KENDARI. RNIA established a company at KENDARI, but as no Australian forces could be allotted for South Eastern CELEBES and as the political situation at KOLAKA is very bad, no allied troops have yet been committed at KOLAKA.
30. The most recent extension of our area of responsibility was for political reasons, (see later) and takes in the Division of LOEMOE which includes PALOPO, a main trouble centre. At present the Japanese in this new portion of our area are being moved to MALIPOENG.

Japanese Arms and Ammunition

31. The majority of arms and ammunition in the Southern portion of the peninsula were concentrated

at the time of our arrival, in an Armoury in MAKASSAR. There were numerous other dumps, however, in the area south of MAKASSAR, at PARE PARE and in the Japanese area of responsibility in Central CELEBES. The dumps were well laid out and the equipment was generally in good condition. The Japanese had gone to considerable trouble to prepare armoury lists of arms and ammunition in each dump and to tabulate and index their storage. This greatly facilitated checking. As far as can be ascertained all arms held by them were disclosed and it does not appear that any quantity got into the hands of the Free Indonesian Movement. Once again shortage of transport imposed considerable delay in the concentration of this equipment but it was all finally collected by the end of November. All equipment south of MAROS was concentrated under control of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn; all from the area north of MAROS at PARE PARE under control of 2/14 Aust Inf Bn. All dangerous ammunition and explosives were dumped into the sea immediately. RNIA were allowed to requisition such items as they required and the balance is now held at MAKASSAR and PARE PARE by 2/27 and 2/14 Aust Inf Bns respectively. Attached as Appendix "F" is a state showing present position.

Transport

32. On 1 Oct 45 the Japanese were ordered to produce all vehicles held by them for registration. A system of registration was involved consisting of a serial number in large black lettering on a white card, attached inside the windscreen of each vehicle. This, together with road blocks and check posts which were established on main roads, provided a reasonable amount of control over movement of transport.
33. Without exception all Japanese transport was in a very bad condition, due mainly to lack of maintenance. Tyres and batteries were worn out and there were no replacements. Spare parts were non-existent. Not more than 60% of vehicles taken over were in running order and of these another 20% are off the road every second day for repair.
34. In addition to our large transport commitments in concentrating arms, ammunition and other materials, NICA requirements had to be met and until a transport platoon of 2½ ton 6 x 6 vehicles arrived the situation was very nearly impossible. Attached as Appendix "G" is a state showing present position of Japanese transport.

War Criminals

35. Generally speaking it appears that the Japanese in the CELEBES did NOT treat Prisoners of War and Internees as badly as in other areas. In particular the women and children were relatively well treated. There were many instances of beatings and there were several executions. A considerable amount of evidence was collected from ex Prisoners of War and Internees, Aust and Allied as a result of which approximately 240 Japanese were listed as war criminals. Orders were issued for these personnel to

report, and of the total number 147 were produced. They were arrested and placed under guard in a special compound at MANDAI airfield to await trial.

Details of those who did not report were forwarded by the Japanese, including information as to their present whereabouts. This was passed to Adv H. AMT for promulgation. The Japanese involved in the most serious crimes, however, are in our custody. The compilation of the evidence into cases against individuals is still in progress but it is anticipated that the first trials should take place early in January 1946.

Japanese Factories and Money

36. See under Civil Affairs.

Food

37. Before the war finished the Japanese had bought and were holding in dumps, a considerable portion of the last rice crop. They were allowed to retain approximately 1700 tons, which is sufficient for their own forces until Jul 46. The balance was taken over and transferred to NICA for relief of the civil population.

38. To provide land for the Japanese self sufficiency programme it was decided to allot them sufficient areas to produce vegetables, as the balancing items to rice. MAKASSAR Force Senior AASC Officer, together with a NICA agricultural expert and a Japanese supply officer made a detailed inspection of the area in the vicinity of the MALIMPOENG concentration area. By mutual agreement the areas shown in Appendix "B" were allotted. In addition certain emergency areas were decided upon, to be used if additional personnel were concentrated at MALIMPOENG at a later date. These areas are sufficient to provide vegetables up to the authorised ration scale for the whole Japanese Force in South CELEBES.

39. It was decided that it was preferable not to allot land to the Japanese for rice-growing. This would have involved a large area and would have meant depriving the native farmers of the use of it. As mentioned above the Japanese have retained sufficient rice to last until Jul 46. After that date, rice will be purchased for them through NICA, under arrangements between the Japanese and Dutch Governments. In this way the natives will retain their land and be paid for their produce.

40. It was estimated that it would take approximately four months before any vegetables would be ready. This means that by the end of Feb 45 the Japanese should be self sufficient. In the meantime it has been necessary to allow them to purchase these items monthly. The method evolved is that the Japanese submit their requirements by types and areas, and this demand is inspected by the Senior

AASC Officer MAKASSAR FORCE. If the quantities agree with their authorised scale, it is submitted to NICA whose economic and agricultural experts decide on the areas in which it can be bought and prices to be paid. NICA then instructs the local native chiefs as to the quantities to be supplied from their respective areas and the prices to be paid. The Japanese then purchase the items, using Japanese currency which they have been allowed to retain on the basis of 100 guilders per head.

41. Additional items such as firewood, building materials, and coconut oil are provided under a similar system.
42. The Japanese have been allotted fishing rights and craft in the POLEWALI and LANGA areas as per our instruction No 6, and are self sufficient as far as the supply of fish is concerned.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

Political Situation

43. A small NICA unit accompanied MAKASSAR FORCE, under command, to take over control of civil affairs. The policy was that this unit would be enlarged by enlisting the services of the pre-war Dutch and Indonesian administrative officials, and incorporating them in NICA. This has been done and the present strength of the NICA unit in South CELEBES is approximately 150.
44. Considerable difficulty was experienced by NICA from the outset. As a result of the situation in JAVA, the preaching of Free Indonesian Movement agitators, and certain Japanese ex-HEIHOs, the movement, "Indonesia for the Indonesians" was well established in South CELEBES. From the natives' point of view, the presence of NICA, whose functions and relationships with the AMF, they were either unable, or refused, to understand, was an indication that the old form of Dutch Colonial Administration was to be re-established and that the old order would apply again.
45. The local rulers (the Rajahs, Karengs and Adat Chiefs) informed the Commander MAKASSAR FORCE that they acknowledged the authority of the AMF and would NOT cooperate or have anything to do with any NICA officer.
46. The situation became impossible, in that NICA were unable to carry out any of their functions either in the inland districts or in the city. Foodstuffs were prevented from being brought to the city and no headway was being made in the re-establishment of public utilities, trade or commerce. A conference was held on 20 Oct 45 between Commander MAKASSAR FORCE, CO NICA, and Dr HOVEN, the Netherlands Government's

economic representative in the NEI. It was agreed to take the following action :-

- (a) as far as our resources would permit Australian troops would be established at key points in the country.
 - (b) NICA representatives would accompany these detachments and, with their protection, would take over civil administration as far as possible in these areas.
 - (c) from these main centres, Australian patrols would move constantly through the country.
 - (d) road blocks would be established on the main road communication system to prevent movement of political agitators from one area to another.
47. In pursuance of this MAKASSAR Force Instruction No 4 was issued (see Appendix "H") and the Force was located as shown on map attached as Appendix "M".
48. In general terms, 2/14 Aust Inf Bn, located at PARE PARE with detachments at PINRANG and RAPPANG, was responsible for the northern half of the peninsula - to maintain law and order, assist in establishing NICA and controlling the Japanese concentration in MALIMPOENG. 2/16 Aust Inf Bn was responsible for the southern half of the peninsula with detachments at BONTAIN, BOELAKOMBA, MALINO, SOENGAMANASA, MAROS and WATAMPONE. The Headquarters was to remain in MAKASSAR and the general tasks of the battalion were to maintain law and order in their area and to assist in establishing the authority of NICA. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn was to remain in MAKASSAR and be responsible for the town area and its immediate environs.
49. The arrival of Australian troops in these areas had a very decided effect on the civil population. The local chiefs however, still declared their acknowledgement of the Australian Military Government but refused to cooperate with NICA and demanded their removal. As these chiefs continually tried to discuss their affairs, particularly politics with the local Australian commander rather than NICA, an instruction was issued to all officers as a guide in their dealings with these people. A copy of this instruction, which sets out the relationship between the AMF and NICA and the policy to be adopted, is attached as Appendix "I".
50. Cooperation with NICA was forced on the local rulers in many ways, primarily by making them go to the NICA representative for rice, petrol, etc. This went a long way towards re-establishing the authority of NICA.
51. A series of conferences were held over the first three or four weeks at which the relationship between the AMF and NICA was fully explained to various groups of native rulers. It was impressed on them that NICA

was an army unit, that it was a temporary measure for re-establishing the community on a peace time basis, and would be disbanded when the final lawful government, whatever form that should take, was established; that NICA was under command of the AMF as the expert advisers to the Commander on local matters concerning the civil population and administration; that orders issued by NICA had the authority of the Comd and were, in fact his orders.

52. Despite this, however, the extremist political element, mainly the Youth Movement, resorted to minor riots and terrorisation. The Youth Movement consisted of the younger political element which had obviously been fostered by the Japanese during their occupation. Some of the ex-HEIHO who had been released by the Japanese were also involved in the movement. Complete independence for Indonesia was their platform and they possessed a propensity for "cloak and dagger" activities such as stopping natives in the streets and threatening them with death if they did not declare themselves willing to support the movement actively. The spreading of propaganda such as intimidating notices and pamphlets, and occasional raids on the homes and families of those who did not agree with their views, were among their other activities. They were organised into bands within various areas and there has been some evidence of them training in marching and drill movements. Numerous raids were made by our patrols, on information received from underground sources, and several small quantities of weapons, ammunition and grenades were captured. Various natives were named as local leaders of this Youth Movement and, whenever definite evidence of their complicity in acts of violence was obtained, they were arrested.

53. The most important of the local Free Indonesian agitators is Dr RATU LANGIE who, some time prior to the war, had been the South CELEBES representative on the Council at BATAVIA, until dismissed as a result of irregularities in certain public funds. Later he edited a Nationalistic paper at BATAVIA. The Japanese had employed him there after their occupation of the country and later brought him to MAKASSAR as adviser to the Minseibu on civil administration. When the war ended the Japanese informed him he was now in complete charge of civil administration, in which view he was further fortified by the announcement of Dr SOEKARNO from BATAVIA that "Dr RATU LANGIE had been appointed Governor of the CELEBES". The Commander refused to recognise him in any way other than as a private citizen with decided political views and it was not our intention or policy to become involved in the politics of the country. Subsequently he called on the Commander who received him. The Commander said that if Dr RATU LANGIE could show that he was in fact a leader and had control of the people he professed to represent, he must prove it by seeing that there were no disturbances to the peace, that normal rice trading was resumed and that no interference with the

movement of rice vehicles and prahus to MAKASSAR took place, over a test period of three weeks. If this test was passed the commander said he would consider convening a conference between, NICA, Dr RATU LANGIE and other leaders, to discuss the possibility of Dr RATU LANGIE and other Indonesians being given responsible positions in NICA, in which they could use their ability to the benefit of their countrymen. He must first, however, show he was willing to cooperate.

54. During these three weeks, there were no disturbances but definite evidence was obtained of certain activities on his part which were a direct breach of faith. He addressed a meeting in BONTAIN at which he expressed the opinion that if the Australian authorities did not accede to his requests when the time came, he would continue his activities and eventually seize control of the Government of the South CELEPES. He was, in the meanwhile, continuing to organise the Youth Movement in country centres. Against orders, he travelled to various parts of the country in furtherance of his political activities and he gave orders that 200 tons of rice in the FARE PARE area was NOT to go to NICA. In view of all this he has not since been received by the Commander and the ultimate action to be taken in his case is still under consideration. In the meanwhile, other events have produced a change in attitude on the part of the Rajahs and Karengs and it is doubtful if Dr RATU LANGIE's influence is at present of any real importance though he remains the most intelligent and capable personality in the so called Free Indonesian Movement and cannot be ignored.

55. Several outbreaks of rioting occurred in the middle and at the end of October. These were undoubtedly inspired and performed by the Youth Movement. The first occasion however was precipitated by the RNIA Ambonese soldiers, who had been IW and, on their release, were reformed and re-armed at MAKASSAR. They objected to certain natives wearing red and white badges and attacked them. Several natives and soldiers were killed as well as innocent bystanders. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn obtained control of the situation by means of patrols. Up to 12 jeeps and trailers, patrols, linked by 22 sets and controlled by BHQ patrolled the town area continuously. Wherever a disturbance occurred, or threatened, additional patrols were called quickly to the spot. The trouble soon subsided under the threat of these forces which proved most effective.

56. The second occasion was on 29 Oct 45 when several demonstrative and intimidatory raids were made concurrently on public installations. In addition several road blocks were set up by the Free Indonesian Movement. The same system of patrolling was again effective. In several small clashes 2/27 Aust Inf Bn killed a dozen or more Free Indonesians who were involved therein.

57. On this day the Commander issued a proclamation making certain matters offences against the Australian

Military Government. Chief among these were the carrying of arms, in which case the offender was liable to be shot. Copy of this proclamation is attached as Appendix "J".

58. Referring to para 54 above, a decided improvement in the attitude of the population towards NICA has taken place since the end of November. The Rajah of BONE, who is the most influential of the hereditary rulers, signified on 29 Nov 45 that he wished to cooperate, and further, that he wished to call a conference of all other rulers under his influence, at which he could declare his change of attitude and call on them to do likewise. The conference was held at WATAMPORE on 1 Dec 45, attended by CO NICA and CO 2/16 Aust Inf Bn, and was entirely successful. Subsequently conferences were held in the MAKASSAR and PARE PARE areas, at which all the Rajahs, KarEnggs and chiefs signified that they were willing to cooperate with NICA and signed a declaration to that effect. This has eased the political situation very greatly and assisted NICA to carry out its tasks of reestablishing the civil functions of the community.
59. At the present time the situation may be summarised as follows:-
- (a) The three most important local rulers, the Rajahs of BONE, LOENOE, and GOA have declared their intention of cooperating with NICA. Under their influence, the majority of district chiefs have followed their lead, and, on paper at least, have signified a similar desire.
 - (b) Despite this, the extent to which their respective subjects are prepared to assist actively in restoring peace and trade can NOT be accurately assessed. It appears however that there will be little active opposition from now on.
 - (c) Certain groups of Youth Movement adherents are still known to be ready to make trouble if they see an opportunity for doing so, and it is unlikely that their policy of threats and intimidation can be completely suppressed.
 - (d) The ex-HEIHO, are at present being gathered together under control in preparation for their repatriation to JAVA.
 - (e) NICA representatives have been established at BONTALIN, WATAMPORE, SOENGMANASA, MAROS, PARE PARE, SINGKANG, PINRANG, RAPANG and KENDARI.
 - (f) One company 2/16 Aust Inf Bn has been established at BALOPO and NICA will be installed there by the end of December.

(g) The battalion areas of responsibility have been revised, and now conform to the political subdivision of the country (see MAKASSAR Force Instruction No 11 attached as Appendix "Q"). In general terms

(i) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn is responsible for the old PARE PARE District from PANTJA north to the SADANG River and east to the west boundary of BONE.

(ii) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn less one coy is responsible for BONE and LOEWOE with companies at WAT.MPCNE and PALCPO. and the Battakion less three coys at SINGKANG.

(iii) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn is responsible for the southern area generally south of line PANTJAWA-SINDJAI incl GOA.

(h) NICA now expects to be able to purchase rice in the inland districts and vehicle and prahoe movements should no longer be subject to interference.

Japanese Currency

60. MAKASSAR FORCE was responsible for the collection of all Japanese invasion currency AND all other monies in the hands of the Japanese. This was collected and handed over to NICA Paymaster. A copy of MAKASSAR Force report on this matter is attached as Appendix "K".

Factories

61. Approximately 105 Japanese firms and businesses operating from 272 factories, offices, and branches were in operation in South CELEBES. These, being Japanese public concerns, were booty and as such regarded as the property of the Australian Government. As it was necessary to remove the Japanese, and at the same time keep the factories running, instructions were issued whereby an Australian Officer accompanied by a NICA representative with escort went to each factory in turn, and took possession in the name of the Australian Government. The books were sealed and the factory handed over to NICA, who replaced the staff and continued production. Complete statement of the affairs of each company are being prepared by NICA and submitted to HQ MAKASSAR Force. A considerable amount of work is involved in preparing these statements and it will take some time before they can be completed.

62. A list of the factories taken over is attached as Appendix "L".

Rice Distribution

63. While the natives refused to cooperate with NICA, it was impossible for the normal flow of trade to go on and for foodstuffs to be brought from outlying districts to the city. The quantity of rice required for MAKASSAR is 54 tons per day.
64. NICA trucks were prevented by extremists from moving through the country. The prahees were forced to discharge their cargoes at coastal villages and prevented from entering MAKASSAR Harbour.
65. The situation was overcome first by transporting rice from Japanese dumps in A F vehicles, direct to MAKASSAR, and later, by taking it to PARE PARE from the northern rice districts and thence to MAKASSAR in Japanese coastal ships. With the improved political situation NICA are now able to transport rice under their own control.
66. As mentioned above the balance of all Japanese rice, other than that required for the Japanese forces until Jul 46, has been made available to NICA. The food situation generally in South CELEBES is satisfactory. There is sufficient rice for the whole population until the next crop is ready.
67. NICA are required to provide up to 20,000 tons for other areas under control of the AMF. A request was received from SACSEA to know what quantity, if any would be available for areas under their control. NICA advised that 5,000 tons are available for this purpose but that the rice was still on the farms. In each case, however, the difficulty will be to transport this rice from the farms to the coast for shipment. The only vehicles available are Japanese trucks which are in the last stages of disrepair. Even the small proportion of "runners" cannot travel over any distance without considerable maintenance which in itself is often impossible owing to the complete lack of tyres, batteries and spare parts. NICA require at least 200 trucks in good mechanical condition to re-establish their export trade.

Internal Trade

68. Over the last few weeks there has been a decided increase and general improvement in private trading. The flow of foodstuffs to local markets has commenced, many shops and cafes have opened up and factories and businesses have been re-opened.
69. The arrival of large quantities of trade goods in Dutch shipping has provided an added inducement and helped to re-establish the Dutch guilder. As the country people find available in MAKASSAR the

clothes and goods they have been without during the war, so will they be more anxious to grow and sell the produce of their lands.

OWN FORCES

Disposition

70. The disposition of the Force has varied in accordance with the requirements of the political situation. It has throughout been dictated by that situation.
71. It has been necessary to maintain at least one battalion in MAKASSAR as this was the most important centre of political unrest. PARE PARE was the next key point from which to control the northern portion of the peninsula and the Japanese concentration at MALIMPOENG, and is the responsibility of a second battalion. The third battalion was dispersed as required into various country districts from where they exercised as much control as possible by means of patrols. The places at which Australian troops were stationed, and the reasons therefore have been mentioned under Civil Affairs. The main re-dispositions are shown on maps attached as Appendices "M" and "N" respectively.

Surveillance Tours

72. Surveillance parties have been to the following areas:-
- (a) South Eastern CELEBES peninsula.
 - (b) RANTEPAO - PALOPO - PCSO and later to MADJEJE and MAMOEDJOE.
73. Brief reports on each of these tours are attached as appendices "O" and "P" respectively.

Special Tours

74. An WMF detachment accompanied the NICA party to KENDARI and took part at the official installation ceremony.
75. A further party visited PALOPO and KOLAKA in HMAS "CESSNOCK". Their tasks were to "show the flag" at PALOPO, and at KOLAKA to recover a RNIA officer who had been captured by the Indonesians when visiting the area from KENDARI. At the same time it was considered desirable for an Australian detachment to visit this area, as there was every evidence of a strong and militant Free Indonesian Movement there.
76. Generally speaking Australian troops have been well received in all areas in which they have been stationed, or which they have visited. One exception was PALOPO as shown in the report on the surveillance trip to this area. It appeared however that the objection

was to the fact that NICA representatives were with the party, rather than to the Australian troops themselves. When the company of 2/10 Aust Inf Bn moved there, they were well received.

R.N.I.A.

77. RNIA ex-Prisoners of War have been brought to MAKASSAR and reformed into four companies. An additional company arrived from MOROTAI and was moved to KENDARI area as a protective force for NICA there.
78. This latter company was equipped with Australian pattern equipment at MOROTAI. The other companies, which were re-formed here, have been equipped as far as possible with surrendered Japanese arms, ammunition and equipment. It is intended to re-equip these four companies with Australian pattern equipment which is at present enroute from other AMF areas.
79. Training of these companies was undertaken at MAKASSAR and they have already relieved Australian troops of various guard duties in the town area. When their training is complete it is intended to relieve some of our troops stationed in country districts.
80. Owing to lack of transport, and the difficulties of training caused by variety of types of weapons and equipment at present on issue to them, completion of their training has been retarded.

PRISONERS OF WAR and INTERNEES

81. A PW and Internee Contact Team accompanied the Phase I troops to MAKASSAR. There were approximately 500 Royal Navy men, mainly from HMS "EXETER", two British Army Officers and 6 Australian merchant seamen. They were quartered in the old Dutch Military Hospital together with a large number of Dutch PW and Internees. Two Australian soldiers and several Americans had been moved out by RAAF and US aircraft prior to our arrival.
82. When the war came to an end the Japanese had released the Prisoners of War and Internees and quartered them in the Hospital. They had been given the freedom of the city and were mentally overwrought at their new found liberty.
83. Their state of mind was unnatural, in that the hardships and suffering they had undergone at the hands of the Japanese was temporarily eclipsed by their changed conditions. At first some went so far as to say they had been well treated by the Japanese and that those who had been beaten almost to death, or in some cases executed, had deserved their fate. It was not until they had experienced 2 or 3 days of contact with people from the outside world that their sense of balance began to return, together with the memory of what they had suffered. It was a remarkable experience to witness their change of attitude. When the British Prisoners of War were embarked on HMS "BALDSTONE" on 24 Sep 45, three days after our arrival, their last words to the Commander MAKASSAR FORCE were, "You get those Japs for us, sir. See they get what they deserve".

84. The general condition of the Prisoners of War and Internees was fair although they were under-nourished and many were very sick. About 27% of those who were originally brought to MAKASSAR, died here. It is regrettable that, owing to the speed of their evacuation, no evidence for use in the trial of war criminals could be obtained. A request has been made, however, for this evidence to be forwarded from ENGLAND.
85. The majority of the Dutch Prisoners of War and Internees were moved to homes and billets throughout the town over the first two or three weeks. Some were sent to Australia for recuperation but the majority have remained in MAKASSAR.

ENGINEERS (for detailed Engineer Report see Engineer Appendix to follow).

86. A detachment of 2/6 Aust Fd Coy (20 officers and 34 Other Ranks) accompanied the Force to MAKASSAR. No transport or equipment other than hand tools was available until early November when 1 Officer and 20 Other Ranks arrived with 6 vehicles and a quantity of engineer stores. On 23 Nov 45 the remainder of the Coy, at reduced strength, moved in with mechanical equipment, LT and specialist personnel, making engineer strength 5 Officers and 140 Other Ranks.
87. The engineer role in initial stages was :-
- (a) Commence repair of airstrip.
 - (b) Supervise disposal of enemy explosives.
 - (c) Coordinate repair and maintenance of public utilities.
 - (d) Engineer reconnaissance for water supply and Prisoner of War compound areas.
 - (e) General engineer support for the Force.
 - (f) Engineer intelligence reconnaissance of roads, bridges and airfields.
88. On arrival of the company, a works plan for restoration of and extension of the airstrip was commenced on a scale previously impossible due to lack of personnel and equipment, all work to date being done by native labour. Progress rate of work increased and by 9 Dec 45, a 4300 feet strip was open to aircraft. The strip will remain open whilst the length is increased to 5200 feet and width to 200 feet all sealed surface plus unsurfaced 100 feet flight strips each side of runway and two dispersal bays providing accommodation for 14 transport planes. Flight Control Tower and buildings are provided for.

89. Other engineer tasks are:-
- (a) Assistance to RAN with repair and placing of mooring buoys in harbour to facilitate the berthing of ships during monsoons. Also boosting water supply from main to ships.
 - (b) Assistance to and supervision of civil authorities on water and electricity supply.
 - (c) Provision and installation of refrigeration facilities for the Force, also repair, and supervision in operation, of enemy installations.
 - (d) Locating, collecting and disposing of captured enemy equipment and installations, e.g. power stations etc.
 - (e) Operation of Engineer Stores Depot to meet requirements of the Force.
 - (f) Collecting and collating Engineer Intelligence data, South CELEBES.

SIGNALS (For detailed signal report see Signal Appendix to follow).

General

90. Corps of Signals personnel allotted to MAKASSAR Force for the MAKASSAR Operation were as follows:-
- (a) 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
 - (b) Det 41 Heavy Wireless
 - (c) Det 12 Wireless (Lt)
 - (d) Det 36 Cipher Sec

Wireless

91. The Wireless commitments for the Force have been heavy. Owing to the wide dispersion of the battalions and coys of the Brigade, it was desirable that wireless of a higher power than field sets be used. For the purpose of stabilising long range communications, three Japanese fixed installations were taken over. One 1-Kilowatt and two 250 watt transmitters are in use. The heavier transmitter is used for the rear link to MOROTAI with AMBON on the same circuit. Japanese transmitters are also being used for the main Brigade-Battalion net and the lateral to BALIKPAPAN. The transmitting centre is operated and maintained by Japanese technicians and is keyed from HQ MAKASSAR FORCE.
92. Six additional Wireless Sets No 22 (Aust) were allotted to the Force mainly for use in the MAKASSAR town area by patrols of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn.
93. The present Wireless situation is shown in diagramatic form in the Signal Appendix.

Line

94. All lines, civil and military, in the MAKASSAR Force area are the responsibility of the 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec. Civil lines are maintained under army supervision, by Dutch Civil authorities. Army lines and the 49 extensions off MAKASSAR Force are maintained and operated by army personnel.
95. Although the civil telephone network in the South CELEBES is comprehensive it has deteriorated from lack of maintenance during the Japanese occupation. Generally the lines are reliable, but due to their many faults are bad for speech transmission.
96. Trunk lines to all outlying Battalions and Detachments are civil installations. Trunk line switching is done by MAKASSAR Civil Exchange. This has been found satisfactory, except for language difficulties.
97. Line diagram showing army lines is attached to Signal Appendix.

Enemy Equipment

98. Considerable quantities of Japanese Signal equipment was taken over. Material required for the re-establishment of civil communications was transferred through NICA. The balance of the stores is being listed for Australian Ordnance by a Signal Equipment Officer.
99. The bulk of the stores were in good condition. Excellent craftsmanship is shown - especially in wireless. The design and valve types is however, not modern.

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT (For detailed S & T Report see S & T Appendix to follow).General

100. The AASC component of MAKASSAR Force comprises
- | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| (a) Hq 2/2 Aust Sup Depot Coy | - Located at MAKASSAR |
| (b) 2/8 Aust Sup Dep Pl | - Located at PARE PARE |
| (c) 2/34 Aust Sup Dep Pl | - Located at MAKASSAR |
| (d) 2/25 Aust Transport Pl | - Located at MAKASSAR |
| (e) Det 40 Fd Baking Pl | - Located at MAKASSAR. |

Tasks

101. The AASC tasks fall into two distinct functions as follows:-
- (a) Maintenance of the Force.
 - (b) Collection, control and distribution of Japanese rations and POL.

Maintenance of MAKASSAR Force

102. (a) General: The force has been maintained from BALIKPAPAN and MOROTAI. No major problems have been met with, except that of transporting supplies to the Northern areas: this has now been overcome by transporting practically all supplies by sea to PARE PARE, whence 2/14 and 2/16 Aust Inf Bns are supplied by 2/8 Aust Sup Depot Pl.
- (b) Fresh Commodities: Considerable difficulty was experienced at first in making local purchases owing to the non-acceptance of Dutch Guilders by the civil population and as a temporary expedient, a limited system of bartering of certain specified items on a unit basis was authorised. Arrangements have now been made for supplies and fresh commodities (other than meat) through NICA.
- (c) Refrigeration - see S & T Appendix to follow.

Japanese supplies

103. (a) General: AASC conducted a survey of Japanese rations and POL stocks held in dumps in the AMF area of responsibility. Considerable difficulties were experienced owing to:
- (i) the non-disclosure of many dumps at first.
 - (ii) discrepancies between figures supplied by Japanese and actual stocks.
 - (iii) the difficulty of checking stocks of badly stacked Japanese commodities by AMF personnel.
 - (iv) probable pilferage by natives before the AMF could establish adequate control.
- (b) Rations: After allotting sufficient hard components of rations to maintain the Japanese on the authorised ration scale until 30 Jun 46 the balance (rice only) was transferred to NICA control. As the rations were scattered in numerous dumps throughout the CELEBES, the Japanese were ordered to concentrate them into dumps at MAKASSAR, PINRANG and RAPPANG; this concentration has been much hampered by shortage of transport, and is still in progress. From these three dumps issues were made to Japanese by 2/34 Aust Sup Depot Pl (MAKASSAR) and 2/8 Aust Sup Depot Pl (RAPPANG and PINRANG). As the Japanese supplies were deficient in vegetables, authority was given for the Japanese to purchase through NICA fresh commodities not exceeding

the authorised scale; purchases not to prejudice the civilian supplies.

- (c) Self sufficiency programme: A recce of cultivation areas was made and an allotment of land given to the Japanese to make themselves self sufficient in vegetables by February 1946.

POL (Japanese)

104. POL was handled in a similar manner to rations. Certain dumps were handed over to NICA and the Japanese ordered to concentrate the balance at MAKASSAR and RAPPANG. Owing to shortage of transport, the concentration at RAPPANG could not begin until late December 1945. Issues of Japanese POL are made for use by AMF in vehicles taken over from Japanese as required, and to Japanese by monthly allocation.

POL (Civilian (See S & T Appendix to follow)).

Transport

105. Shortage of transport has been the greatest difficulty met by the Force. One Pl of 2½-ton 6 x 6 vehicles was allotted, and as the Japanese vehicles taken over were found to be in a bad state of repair, the Australian vehicles had to be used almost entirely for long distance tasks. As a result of several accidents and major breakdowns, the platoon was reduced to 20 effective vehicles.

With Battalions and companies 100 miles apart, and a considerable amount of patrolling over the whole area to be done, demands on AASC transport far exceed its availability. Two additional Platoons could have been usefully employed in the Force Area. Lack of transport has hindered every aspect of the Force's tasks in the CEEBES and Japanese arms, ammunition, food (rice in particular), medical stores, signal equipment etc., had to be left in scattered dumps over the whole area; this meant delay in concentrating the Japanese forces, as guards had to be provided at dumps until they could be cleared, and our own forces were completely committed. Had a transport company of three pls been available it is probable that this part of our task would have been completed by the end of October 1945; now, the final concentration and clearing will take until the end of January 1946. The delay has taken the task well into the wet season and the condition of the roads at present is causing further difficulties.

MEDICAL

General

106. 2/6 Aust Fd Amb has been responsible for holding and treating the sick of MAKASSAR Force. Total number of troops are approximately 3,500. The MDS is located at a site which was previously a Girls' School. The buildings are suitable. Adjacent premises have also been taken over. These have been converted into wards, and are capable of accommodating 150 to

to 100 patients. It has been necessary to install additional latrines in the form of 'hot-squat' types. The whole site is considered quite satisfactory for a Field Ambulance, MDS or a CCS. By further re-arrangement accommodation could be found for a total of two hundred patients.

Location of Medical Establishments

107. (a) MDS 2/6 Aust Fd Amb MAKASSAR
 (b) Light ADS PARE PARE
 (c) Convalescent Camp MALINO
- also Town RA P and PAC;
 PAC PARE PARE
 Air Strip RAP and Jeep ambulance
 at MANDAI Airfield.

Tasks of Medical Units and detachments

108. (a) MDS MAKASSAR: to hold and treat all cases, average bed state 80.
 (b) Light ADS PARE PARE: to hold minor cases, and evacuate to MDS all other types of illnesses, Average bed state 7.
 (c) Con Camp MALINO: This consists of four houses, at a place which before the war, was a favourite Dutch resort. It is a delightful spot approximately 3000 ft high, with attractive surroundings, and a swimming pool. It is admirable for treating skin cases and for convalescence. Up to 30 patients can be held there.

Evacuation Plan

109. Troops in MAKASSAR area, approximately 1020, are evacuated through unit RA Ps to 2/6 Aust Fd Amb. Troops at PARE PARE consisting of 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and attached troops, are evacuated via a light ADS, PARE PARE to MDS MAKASSAR. Time for trip $2\frac{1}{2}$ hrs over a good road. The third battalion of the Force, 2/16 Aust Inf Bn is very dispersed. The lines of evacuation are long. From WATAMPONE to MAKASSAR takes 4 hours over a fair road. PALOPO is a 6 hour drive from WATAMPONE, SENGKANG is a 2 hour drive by fair road to PARE PARE. The RMO of that battalion is forced to travel around a great deal to visit his various companies. In the event of a surgical emergency, it is intended to despatch a surgeon with equipment to the site, rather than subject the case to the arduous trip to MAKASSAR. Cases requiring treatment at an AGH area evacuated by air, or by sea, to BALIKPAPAN, MOROTAI or AUSTRALIA.

Personnel

110. The Field Ambulance has had between six and eight Medical Officers on its strength. Of these one is a surgeon. There is also a Medical Officer attached to each Battalion (3). These have been sufficient to cope with the medical problems.

Medical Supplies and Equipment

111. (a) Medical: one 'M' scale (sufficient for one brigade for 60 days) was brought with the Force, for supplying Australian troops. It has been necessary to supplement this at various times with special items, e.g. penicillin, condoms, blue light outfits, cillamine lotion and staining materials for pathology slides. The fact that R/AMs are dispersed throughout the South Western CELEBES, (approx 40) had therefore made economy of medical stores difficult. It has not been the practice of the Force to treat the native population. This is the responsibility of NICA.
- (b) Ordnance: owing to suitable dwelling being available, it has not been necessary to use tentage.. Because of plentiful supplies of local furniture, other accommodation stores have not been in great demand.
- (c) Red Cross: under Red Cross arrangements some 35 tons of Red Cross Stores have been provided for distribution in needy circumstances.

Pathology

112. The Dutch pathologist in MAKASSAR, Dr D.E. MOOR, has given valuable assistance by doing cultures and various examinations, which are beyond the scope of the Field Ambulance equipment. He has also given valuable advice concerning the epidemiology of the area. His laboratory is relatively well equipped and staffed.

Medical Summary and Health Statistics

113. Prevaling diseases:
- (a) In the South Western CELEBES - Bacillary Dysentery, Typhoid and para typhoid A, Cholera (of El Tor Type, is endemic) Bowel parasites, Malaria, Venereal disease.
- (b) Affecting Australian troops - Gonorrhoea, non-specific urethritis, soft sores, lympho granuloma, inguinale, URTI, diarrhoeal diseases, dysentery, skin diseases.

The general health of the Force has been satisfactory. There has been a rise in the incidence of VD. This rise has been noticeable since the arrival of 1000 reinforcements. These lads are young and inexperienced. Lectures and demonstrations have been repeatedly given. There are many brothels which are difficult to control. All women examined have been found to be infected.

The incidence of dysentery has been low, there have only been 10 cases of clinical dysentery, one case of amoebic dysentery, and one case of bacillary dysentery. Local authorities promise a rise, particularly in bacillary dysentery, between the months of January and March.

Epidemics: There have been no epidemics affecting the Force. However, there have been four cases of poliomyelitis, with one death from respiratory failure. Heretofore, this disease had been unheard of in the South Western CELEBES.

Hygiene of General Area

114. (a) Australian Army establishments: As the result of constant attention to the details of hygiene a satisfactory standard has been maintained throughout the Force. Particular attention has been paid to:
- (i) fly proofing of food preparation rooms.
 - (ii) keeping all cooking utensils in fly proof cupboards.
 - (iii) forbidding natives any access to kitchens, or the preparation of food.
 - (iv) Sterilization of troop's eating utensils.
- (b) Town hygiene: This was in a deplorable state when the Force first arrived in MAKASSAR. By using squads of natives, commanded by specially trained Army personnel, and zoning MAKASSAR it has been possible to bring about a great improvement. Drains have been cleaned and, except in the seriously bombed-out areas, are now running satisfactorily. Septic tanks have been repaired, hot squats have been installed, incinerators have been distributed, and a town garbage system has been instituted.
- (c) Water: AS MAKASSAR, PARE PARE and KATAPONE, a town reticulation system is available. As it is impossible to differentiate between civil and army water supplies, the Force has accepted the responsibility of filtration and chlorination of these supplies. In other areas where our troops are located the water is super chlorinated in 44 Gall drums. It is obvious that the demands for alum and JSP are very great. This has been supplied under army arrangements, and made a charge on the Dutch Government. Approximate using rate in South Western CELEBES per week is as follows:

Alum 1200 lbs

Japanese medical arrangements

115. These are left in general to the Japanese medical personnel in the concentration area. They have adequate supplies in most things. A weekly medical report of infectious diseases is submitted by them to SMO. Any

epidemics are reported at once. Their standard of medicine is not very impressive.

MALARIA CONTROL

116. The following is a brief summary of the Malaria position in the MAKASSAR area.
117. Pre-invasion Dutch information on Anopheline mosquitoes is as follows:-
- (a) An BARGIROSTRIS
 - (b) An SUBPICTUS
 - (c) An HYRCANUS (3 varieties)
 - (d) An PARANGENSIS
 - (e) An ACONITUS
 - (f) An KOCHI
 - (g) An VAGUS

Infectivity

118. A summary of one series of checks give the following results:-

(a) An BARBIROSTRIS	190 dissections	7 positive (oocysts)
(b) An HYRCANUS var X	282 dissections	7 positive (oocysts)
(c) An SUBPICTUS	96 dissections	6 positive (oocysts)

Current Survey

- 119 (a) An SUBPICTUS breeding in large numbers in the former PW Camp, SAMBOHNDJAWA swamp in the same area. Heavy breeding on the MAROS Road, near railway crossing. Fish ponds, to the north of the town area, provide an unlimited breeding ground for An SUBPICTUS. They can be found wherever algal growth occurs.
- (b) An BARBIROSTRIS found in irrigation canals, ponds etc. on the Water Works area. They occur in large numbers in all the paddy fields, outside the town boundary. Only a few engorged females have been found in the native houses near the 2/6 Aust Fd Amb lines.
- (c) An HYRCANUS found in association with An BARBIROSTRIS. No adults found in the town area.
- (d) An VAGUS also found in association with An BARBIROSTRIS in Water Works area. In depressions on vacant block of ground in PRINSEN LAAN, at the rear of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn lines.

- (e) An PARANGENSIS: Only a few larvae found in rice fields. No adults seen in the town area.

Control

120. (a) Larval destruction was carried out in known breeding grounds near Unit lines. No attempt was made to control potential breeding areas.
- (b) Adult destruction was carried out on a house to house basis within a 100 yards radius of all military establishments. Two power sprays, hand continuous sprays and aerosol bombs were used. A 2% DDT, pyrethrum and power kerosene (Japanese) solution was found very satisfactory.

Dengue

121. (a) A AEGYPTI found in large numbers in unused wells, water containers and other artificial containers.
- (b) A. ALBOPICTUS also found in artificial containers, in native areas.
- (c) All unused wells were oiled weekly with power kerosene, and a check was made of all artificial containers.

Pest Mosquitoes

122. C. FATIGANS found breeding in prolific numbers in all the drains in the town area. Weekly spraying kept them under control. With the start of the North West Monsoon, all drains have been flushed and should solve this type of breeding.

Personnel

123. 14 Other Ranks and native labour have been employed in control work. A daily average of approximately 30 natives have been used. The quality is satisfactory but absenteeism is disconcerting. The natives have a decided aversion to wet weather.

Equipment

124. Two power sprays, 6 hand continuous sprays and ten Rega knapsack sprays, have been used continuously. 100 lbs of DDT is used each week and approximately 400 gallons of power kerosene. Aerosol bombs have also been used and have been issued to units in outlying districts.

PARE PARE Area

125. One NCO and one Other Rank are attached to the 2/14 Aust Inf Bn. The problems are a miniature of the MAKASSAR area, viz An SUBPICTUS and C. FATIGANS.

WATAMPONE - BONTALIN Area

126. (a) WATAMPONE: An VAGUS was breeding in small flooded fields within the town boundary; breeding grounds are not extensive. One A ALBOPICTUS taken in the Australian HQ.

- (b) BONTHEIN: Large numbers of An SUBPICIUS were found in a salt water swamp in the town area.

ORDNANCE

127. A detachment of nine other ranks from 1 Aust BOD arrived at MAKASSAR on 27 Sep 45 and established an Ordnance Dump in the European Club Building. This dump was later moved to PASSER STRAIT.
128. On instructions from Adv HQ AMF the Dumps' holdings were increased and became 176 F.O.D.
129. On 13 Oct 45 Capt TEMPLER arrived to control Ordnance Services in the area. 2/125 Bde Ord Pk also arrived, together with Bde Ord Officer on 20 Oct 45.
130. 176 F.O.D. carried a holding of No 2 Sub Depot items, whilst the Ordnance Pk Pa carried No 1 Sub Depot items as well as some signal spares.
131. The maintenance of MAKASSAR Force was drawn from 175 F.O.D. BALIKPAPAN, as a monthly bulk indent. The maintenance stores held were 30 days for a brigade group. Ammunition was 10 days at contact rate.
132. Personnel from the Depot inspected all Japanese dumps in the area and commenced to collect items of ordnance equipment. Other items of a salvagable nature, although no ordnance equipment, were collected also. All these stores were received into the Depot, sorted and taken on charge. Subsequently some of these stores were issued to unit and arrangements were made to transfer such items as were urgently required by the NEI Government to RNN, RNIA and NICA. All stores transferred to other services were transferred on A.F.M.G 1033 and signatures obtained. All cloth and piece goods were transferred immediately to NICA.
133. In the MALINO area there were large quantities of radio equipment and various types of machinery, stored, and in many cases, installed, as machine shops and radio stations in tunnels. As it was not possible to remove these items without first dismantling them, approval was given for a small detachment of technical personnel to be sent to MALINO and to dismantle items preparatory to moving them to the Depot. A jeep with an alternator was used to provide electricity to illuminate the tunnels, and a Diamond T Wrecker was used to lift the various items of equipment from the gullies where the tunnels were constructed.

A.E.M.E. (For detailed AEME report see AEME Appendix to follow).

134. The AEME commitments of this Force have been far in excess of the personnel, equipment and plant available.
135. Initially 2/59 Aust LAD accompanied Phase II troops to MAKASSAR. The AEME resources were subsequently built up by the addition of 2/125 Aust Bde Workshops.
136. These two units worked independently as first and second line repair shops. On 1 Dec 45 they were amalgamated into a Force Workshop, under one roof. This was necessitated primarily for co-ordination of work but secondly to pool resources of tradesmen and equipment.
137. As mentioned previously, all Japanese transport.

was in the last stages of disrepair. Lack of tyres, tubes, batteries and spare parts, together with bad maintenance and the continued use of low grade Japanese petrol was responsible for this. To maintain even a small proportion of these vehicles on the road has been a hard task.

138. Native mechanics have been employed to supplement our own technicians. Even so at the present moment more vehicles are being evacuated daily to workshops than are being put back on the road.
139. Transport has been the limiting factor throughout the operations of this Force, and lack of it has delayed very considerably the concentration of Japanese forces and materials and the occupation by our forces of outlying areas. If no more AMF vehicles are available, workshop facilities will have to be considerably increased to maintain the Japanese vehicles even at their present state and number.

R.A.N.

140. HMAS "INVERELL" accompanied Phase I troops to MAKASSAR and remained stationed here as a mobile Port Directorate.
141. This proved a most satisfactory arrangement, particularly with regard to Naval intercommunication with NOIC MOLUCCAS.
142. HMAS "INVERELL" was subsequently replaced by HMAS "JUNEE" in a similar role.
143. When HMAS "JUNEE" departed on 25 Nov 45 a RAN Officer and Staff took over duties and established a Port Director's Office ashore.
144. The main task of the RAN was the minesweeping of the harbour area, and the buoying and marking of the approaches.
145. Japanese naval forces, using minesweeper landing barges carried out this task under direction of the Port Director. The equipment was scarcely suitable to the task and it took many weeks before even a reasonable degree of safety could be guaranteed.
146. Two RAN Intelligence Officers were attached to the Force for the collection and collation of intelligence data. These officers were subsequently replaced by a RN Intelligence Officer who will remain when the British forces take over the area from us.
147. All Japanese craft were in a bad state of disrepair. Those that could be used were repaired and maintained by Japanese naval personnel, under direction of the Port Director.
148. Other naval tasks included:-
(a) reception and despatch of shipping.

- (b) Supervision of repairs to wharves and other port facilities.
- (c) Arrangements, in conjunction with engineers and NICA, for the refuelling and watering of ships.
- (d) Liaison with HQ MAKASSAR Force on all naval and shipping affairs.

149. The service appendices are in the course of preparation and will be forwarded on approximately 15 Jan 46.

150. Additions to this report will be compiled from time to time, while MAKASSAR FORCE remains in the CELEBES, and will be forwarded concurrently with our final relief.

T. P. ...
Brigadier
Commander MAKASSAR FORCE

31 Dec 45

ORDER OF BATTLE
MAKASSAR FORCE

PHASE 1

Comd Group and HQ Units

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde
Det C Aust FS Sec
Det 35 Aust FS Sec (RE)
Det ATIS
Det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy

Miscellaneous Dets

RAN
RAAF
Det PW & I Contact Team
War Correspondent
Red Cross

Sigs

21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
Det 12 Wireless Sec (LT)
Det 41 Wireless Sec (HY)
Det 36 Cipher Sec

Medical

Det 2/2 AGH
Det 2/6 Aust Fd Amb
Det 14 ANCU

PHASE 11

HQ and HQ Units

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde
Det C Aust FS Sec
Det 35 Aust FS Sec (RE)
Det ATIS
Det 7 Aust Div Fd Cash Office
Det 7 Aust Div Postal Unit
Det 7 Aust Div Pro Coy
Det Mil Hist Sec
Det Records

Miscellaneous Dets

RAN
RAAF
Det PW & I Contact Team
War Correspondent
Red Cross

Sigs

21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
Det 12 Wireless Sec (XX) (LT)
Det 41 Wireless Sec (HY)
Det 36 Cipher Sec

Eng'rs

One Sec 2/6 Aust Fd Coy

Infantry

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

Supp and Tpt

Det E/34 Aust Sup Dep Fl

Medical

One Coy 2/6 Aust Fd Amb
One Sec 2/6 Aust Dental Unit
Det 14 AMCU

AEME

Det 2/59 Aust LAD

PHASE III

H. and H. Units

Hq 21 Aust Inf Bde
Det 12 MG Gp (type B) (b)
Det 2 Aust Adv 2nd Ech (b)
35 Air Liaison Sec

Engrs

One 11 2/6 Aust Fd Coy

Sigs

21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
Det 12 Wireless Sec (LT)
Det 41 Wireless Sec (HX)
Det 36 Cipher Sec (type A)

Infantry

2/14 Aust Inf Bn
2/16 Aust Inf Bn
2/27 Aust Inf Bn
7 11 2/1 Aust Gd Regt (a)

Intelligence

Det AFIS
Det C FS Sec
Det 35 FS Sec (EE)

Supplies and Transport

Hq 2/2 Sup Dep Coy ASC
2/8 Sup Dep Pl
2/34 Sup Dep Pl
Det Fd Bakery Pl
2/35 Tpt Pl

Medical

2/6 Fd Amb
Det 14 AMCU

Dental

B Sec 2/6 Dental Unit
C Sec 2/6 Dental Unit

Ordnance

2/125 Bde Ord Fd Pl
176 FOD

AEME

2/125 Bde Wkaps
2/59 Aust LAD

Pay

Det 7 Div Cash Office

Postal

Det 21 Inf Bde Postal Sec

Provost

Det 7 Div Pro Coy

War Graves

Det 24 War Graves Unit


Canteens

Det 24 Canteens Service

AREAS OF JAPANESE CONCENTRATION AND SELF SUFFICIENCY PLAN

SUPERIMPOSE ON PARE PARE & RAPANG SHEETS

RF 1:125,000



SCALE 1 inch = 2 miles (approx)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 miles

Prepared by I Sec 31 AUST INF BDE 26 Dec 45

APPENDIX B

HQ MAKASSAR FORCE
Ref Number: G 136
15 October 1945

Reference Maps: RAJANG 1 in 125,000.

To:

HC Second
Japanese Army

INTENTION

In accordance with instructions received from Advanced Headquarters AMF, and notified to Second Japanese Army in Commander in Chief's signal 179 of 14 October 1945, Japanese subjects in the South Celebes will be concentrated in accordance with the orders contained in this instruction.

METHOD

2.

Allotment of Areas

- (a)
- (i) Headquarters Second Japanese Army will remain at RANTEPAO.
 - (ii) This Headquarters will be reduced to a minimum staff.
- (b) A minimum number of Japanese will be retained in the area North of the Northern Boundary of the Australian Occupation area (See MAKASSAR FORCE letter G 64 of 4 October 1945) to maintain law and order.
- (c) The Japanese Hospital at PINRANG will remain in its present position until suitable hospital accommodation can be prepared in the Main Concentration area.
- (d) Liaison Headquarters Second Japanese Army, and working parties, as at present, will remain in MAKASSAR in present areas.
- (e) All other Japanese, including Army, Navy and Civilians will be concentrated in the Main Concentration area defined in Para 3 below.
- (f) You may retain access to FARE FARE port for shipping as permitted from time to time.
- (g) The numbers of personnel which it is proposed to retain in the areas (a), (b) and (c) above will be notified to this Headquarters as soon as possible.

MAIN CONCENTRATION AREA

- 3.
- (a) The Main Concentration Area referred to in Para 2 above is the area bounded by a line joining the following points:-
Ref Map:- RAJANG 1 in 125,000)
E. 8088 - E. 8267 - E. 7791 - 7589.
 - (b) The exact limits of this area will be pointed out on the ground by the Commanding Officer of 2/14 Australian Infantry Battalion, and a representative of your Headquarters will report to him at FARE FARE as soon as possible for this purpose.
 - (c) An area on MALIMCENG airfield, sufficient for an airstrip, will be retained for use of MAKASSAR

GUARDS

- All guards remain at their posts until:-
- (a) The installation has been taken over by the Australians Army or by NICA, or:-
 - (b) the dump has been cleared of all materials and the guard dismissed by local Australian Commander.
 - (c) the post is no longer required and the guard is dismissed by the local Australian Commander.

CONSTRUCTION OF CAMP IN CONCENTRATION AREA

5. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will:-

- (a) Reconnoitre the Main Concentration Area and allot sub-areas within it in accordance with your plan for accommodation therein.
- (b) No transport
- (b) Move sufficient working parties to the area to construct the camp.
- (c) (i) Move the necessary building materials to the area for camp construction.
(ii) For this purpose all stocks of building materials held by you in dumps throughout South Celebes are available upon application.

REGULATION OF CONCENTRATION AREA

6. (a) Movement of Japanese Army and Navy personnel, and civilians, to the Concentration Area will be under your own arrangements.
- (b) No transport can be provided by this Headquarters.
 - (c) If necessary, personnel will move on foot.
 - (d) No furniture or equipment other than personnel clothing and accessories will be carried by Japanese from their present areas.

TIME TO COMPLETE ACTION

7. The concentration of all Japanese into their respective areas, in accordance with this instruction will be completed by 10 November 1945.

CONCENTRATION OF WAR MATERIAL

8. The concentration of all Japanese War Materials, in accordance with MAKASSAR FORCE letter 651 of 1 October 1945 will proceed concurrently with the concentration of personnel as per this instruction.

ADMINISTRATION

Rations

- (a) Present stocks

(i) The Senior Supply Officer of this Headquarters will meet your supply representative and decide the area in which all foodstocks will be dumped. This area will be probably RAFANG.

(ii) All food now held under Japanese control will be transported to, and dumped in this area decided upon, which will henceforth be known as Supply Point.

(iii) An Australian Supply Depot #1 will take control of this Supply Point and will be responsible for the issue of food in accordance with the ration scale laid down.

(iv) This Headquarters will provide the necessary transport for the deliveries of rations to the concentration area.

(v) A detailed supply instruction will be issued later by the Senior Supply Officer of this Headquarters.

(b) Food produced by cultivation

(i) In addition to the above a separate area will be allotted to Second Japanese Army, as close as possible to the main concentration area, for cultivation.

(ii) This area is subject to further consideration by NICA and you will be advised of its location later.

(iii) By cultivation of this area you will make yourselves self sufficient, taking into account present food stocks held by you.

(c) Fishing

(i) In addition, you will be allowed to employ a minimum number of personnel in fishing, to supplement your supplies.

(ii) For this purpose you will be given access to FARE FARE port, and the use of certain craft under supervision.

WATER
10.

(a) Adequate water exists both within, and in close proximity to, the concentration area.

(b) Pumping and storage of the water and its distribution will be the responsibility of Second Japanese Army.

COOKING GEAR
11.

Will be supplied by Second Japanese Army.

PETROL AND FUEL
12.

(a) Petrol and fuel will be dealt with in the same manner as foodstocks (sub para 9 above)

(b) Bulk issues will be made by the Australian Supply Depot Platoon.

(c) Details will be contained in the Supply Instruction to be issued later.

(Sgd) L E WALCOTT

Maj
Chief of Staff BAKASSAR FORCE

Time of Signature: 152200i

COPIES TO:

2/14 Aust Inf Bn	S.O. (C)
2/16 Aust Inf Bn	S.O. (A)
2/27 Aust Inf Bn	I.O.
NICA	Senior Supply Officer
Adv HQ AMF	BAGCO
7 Aust Div	Sig O
Comd	War Diary
BN	File

MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION NO 6

Ref Maps : Aeronautical Map 1 : 1,000,000 Sheets A4 and B4
RAPANG 1 : 125,000

Advanced Headquarters
Second Japanese Army

GENERAL

1. This instruction will be read in conjunction with
MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION NO 2.

CONCENTRATION AREA

2. The main concentration areas into which the Japanese Forces will move has been slightly increased. The boundaries are shown on map attached as Appendix "A". With the exception of those personnel shown in Appendices "C" and "D" all Japanese in S.W. CELEBES will be concentrated in this area by 10 November 1945.

CULTIVATION AREAS

3. The areas allotted to Second Japanese Army for cultivation, in pursuance of your self sufficiency programme, are shown in RED on Map attached as Appendix "A".

4. If it is found that further supplies are required, the additional emergency areas shown in GREEN on Appendix "A", may be allotted. Application to this effect, showing just cause for the extra requirements, will be submitted to Headquarters MAKASSAR FORCE.

5. To maintain supplies while gardens are being established, you may --

(a) transport the produce and seed of areas at present under cultivation, to the main areas up till 10 November 1945. After that date permission of this Headquarters will be requested for any such movement.

(b) use existing stocks of commodities on a substitution basis

6. Access route via SADANG River is shown on Appendix "A".
Off loading point at E 7393.

7. (a) Personnel allowed for cultivation purposes are shown on table attached as Appendix "C".

(b) Areas in which these personnel will live will be nominated by Second Japanese Army to Commanding Officer 2/14 Australian Infantry Battalion who will approve or adjust as he thinks fit.

FISHING

8. The fishing area and ports shown on Trace attached as Appendix "B" are allotted to the Japanese, subject to the following restrictions :-

(a) No dynamite, ammunition or other explosive of any kind will be used

(b) There will be absolutely no interference of any kind with Indonesian fishermen. Whenever Japanese and Indonesian interests clash, the Japanese will give way and move to another area.

- (c) Certain areas marked with a notice in Malay and Japanese "Rajah's Private Ground - Fishing Prohibited", will be out of bounds to all Japanese.
- (d) Reef fishing (keere-spi) is prohibited. (Amend 3 Nov 45)
9. The numbers and location of Japanese permitted to be employed on fishing are shown on Appendix "C", and Appendix "B".
10. The only access route permitted from LANGA is shown on Appendix "A".

PERSONNEL TO REMAIN NORTH OF AMF OCCUPIED AREA i.e. NORTH OF LINE OF SADANG RIVER

11. The location, numbers and duties of personnel authorised to remain permanently in the area North of the AMF Occupied Area, are shown on Table attached as Appendix "D".

PERSONNEL TO REMAIN WITHIN AMF OCCUPIED AREA BUT OUTSIDE THE MALIMPOENG CONCENTRATION AREA

12. The location, numbers and duties of all Japanese personnel authorised to remain permanently in the AMF Occupied Area, but outside the limits of the MALIMPOENG concentration area, are shown in Table attached as Appendix "C".

PERSONNEL REMAINING TEMPORARILY IN VARIOUS AREAS

13. Personnel required temporarily in various areas for the purposes shown below, in accordance with your Document No 20, may remain until 10 November 1945 :-

- (a) Guarding, supervision and handing over of stores
- (b) Taking down existing barracks
- (c) Collecting material for new barracks
- (d) Running timber mills
- (e) Gathering gravel for, and repair of, roads.
- (f) Drivers of vehicles employed in transporting stores
- (g) Supply Personnel (until Australian Supply Depot Platoon takes over)

14. If any of these tasks are uncompleted by 10 November 1945, special application will be made to this Headquarters for retention of the necessary personnel, stating, :-

- (a) Location
- (b) Number required
- (c) Task
- (d) Estimated Date of Completion

SHIPPING

15. You may retain access to PARE PARE Port for loading and unloading such ships as are allotted by this Headquarters from time to time.

16. Personnel permitted to be employed for this purpose and their location are shown in Appendix "C".

PRODUCTION OF GENERAL NECESSITIES

17. Permission is granted for production of the following general necessities, but only in the area North of the AMF Occupied Area :-

- (a) Bean Paste
- (b) Soy
- (c) Paper
- (d) Edible and Lighting Oil
- (e) Wood and Charcoal

18. The numbers of personnel to be employed, and location in which these commodities may be produced, is shown in Appendix "D"

WEAPONS

19. Rifles may be retained for 5% of total Army and Navy personnel remaining in area North of AMF Occupied Area. Officers may retain Pistols.

20. In the AMF Occupied area, ALL weapons will be passed into PARE PARE dump under control of 2/14 Australian Infantry Battalion by 10 November 1945.

VEHICLES

21. Between 10 November 1945 and 15 November 1945, all Japanese vehicles which are "runners" and which are NOT registered with the AMF, will report to Headquarters 2/14 Australian Infantry Battalion at PARE PARE.

22. 2/14 Australian Infantry Battalion will register these vehicles with a Serial Number and allot a certain proportion to Second Japanese Army.

23. The location and details of vehicles which are out of order and can NOT be moved, will be notified to 2/14 Australian Infantry Battalion who will despatch a party to register these vehicles at their present location.

24. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will submit a list of vehicles by types required to be permanently allotted to you for use :-

- (a) North of AMF Occupied Area
- (b) Within and around the MALIMPONG Concentration Area

25. ACK.

Time of Signature: 01 11 30 I

Issued By :

sup

L. Shalott
 Maj
 Chief of Staff MAKASSAR FORCE

COPIES TO :

- | | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| 2/14 Aust Inf Bn | SC(Q) |
| 2/16 Aust Inf Bn | SC(A) |
| 2/27 Aust Inf Bn | IO |
| NICA | Senior Supply Offr |
| Adv HQ AMF | Sig O |
| Comd | File |
| BM | War Diary |

JAPANESE REMAINING WITHIN OCCUPIED AREA
BUT OUTSIDE MALIMPOENG CONCENTRATION AREA

LOCATION	NUMBER	TASK	REMARKS
Area A	600	Cultivation Personnel	See Appendix "A"
Areas B & C	1,000	" "	" " "
Areas D & E	750	" "	" " "
LANGA	60	Fishing Personnel	
PINRANG	192	Hospital Staff	Patients Additional
MARONGIN	179	" "	" "
PARE PARE	10	Shipping Staff	
BANKAE	100	For handling ships cargo	
TAKASSAR	110	Liaison HQ	
	150	Working Party	
MERE LAKE	31	LOCAL LIAISON HQ	(Amend 3 Nov 45)

* Japanese Hospitals to be retained at BENTENG and SOBILI instead of PINRANG and MARONGIN respectively. (Amend 5 Nov 45)

The following additional personnel are indicated in Amendments No 3 of 7 Nov and No 4 of 9 Nov 45.


REI JARD	37	Handling of arms and equipment.	
REI JARD	18	Working parties at disposal of 2/14 Bn	
RAFANG	60	Transportation of rice	
AREA A AND BENTENG	130	Transportation duties along SADANG R between LABOKOR & BENTENG	
BENTENG	100	Loading parties and guards	
MALIMPOENG AIRSTRIP	45	Aircraft personnel and communication personnel	





TOTAL AREA		
A	River bend	50 Hectares
B	Soolili	70 "
C	Tiroang	30 "
D & E	Baroe	70 "
Total		220 "
EMERGENCY AREAS		50 Ha
Additional Unit areas		10 Ha

1. Area 50 Hectares
2. Tpt by river craft
3. Required also for firewood and paper making
4. 600 personnel

1. Area E 20 Hectares
2. Area D 50 "
3. Tpt by hand cart
4. 700 personnel

1. Area B 70 Hectares
2. Area C 30 "
3. Tpt by hand cart
4. 1000 personnel

 Area recommended



Access Road

Baroe

FAMBOESOEANG
 Salting works
 Office
 Repair yard
 Personnel
 Fishermen 200
 Salting 40
 Repairs 50
 Office 10

TEMPORARY SHIPBUILDING YARD
 (To be closed by Nov 30)
Present fleet
 6 x 1 ton vessels
 7 trawls
 1 Motor boat
 1 Motor post (us)
 To be built or in progress.
 24 x 1 Ton Vessels

MAPELE

FAMBOESOEANG

FISHING AREA

LANGA
 Port of distribution
 Office
 Salting works
 Personnel
 Fishermen 30
 Salting 20
 Office 10
 Total 60

BENTENG

Map Area

Access Road
 14 Miles

LANGA

RAIANG

FARE FARE

AMENDMENT NO 4 TO MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION NO 6

HQ MAKASSAR FORCE
Ref No: G295
9 Nov 45

1. PARA 12 ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL TO REMAIN WITHIN AMF OCCUPIED AREA BUT OUTSIDE CONCENTRATION AREA (These have been amended in green in Appendix C)
2. PARA 20 WEAPONS
 - (a) The following arms may be retained within the AMF occupied area:-
 - (i) Each officer- 1 Pistol and 30 rounds ammunition.
 - (ii) A total of 250 Rifles with 60 rounds amn per rifle.
 - (iii) Until concentration is completed guards at the following places may retain the number of rifles shown below:-

RAFFANG	35	SINGKANG	15	PINRANG	5
MAROANGIN	5	SOELILI	5	BANGGAI	5
 - (b) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn will ~~xxxxxx~~ issue 50 pistols and 1500 rounds amn for use by Naval Officers within MALIMBOENG concentration area.
 - (c) In addition, 2/14 Aust Inf Bn will retain under control the following weapons from those in PARE PARE dump:-

(i) HMG	5	} Plus 100 rounds per weapon
(ii) IMG	10	
(iii) Rifles	50	

These will be available on loan to Second Japanese Army on approval this HQ should they be required at any time.
3. DATE FOR COMPLETION OF CONCENTRATION

The date for completion of concentration is extended from 10 Nov 1945 to 15 Nov 1945.
4. TRANSPORT
 - (a) You are permitted to retain the following vehicles:-

(i) North of AMF Occupied Area but excluding KENDARI	Cars	9
	Trucks	25
	Vans	3
(iii) Within the AMF Occupied Area excluding MAKASSAR	Cars	5
	Trucks	20
	Vans	9
 - (b) All the above vehicles will be registered with 2/14 Aust Inf Bn by 20 Nov 1945.
 - (c) All other vehicles will be handed over to 2/14 Aust Inf Bn by 20 Nov 1945.
 - (d) You may retain the use of all vehicles at present under your control until 15 Nov 1945. Thereafter extra vehicles required for concentration of stores will be allotted on application to 2/14 Aust Inf Bn.
5. ACCESS ROADS

The roads:-

 - (a) PINRANG - SOELILI - MALIMBOENG; and
 - (b) MALIMBOENG - BENTENGmay be used as access roads.

Sgd L E Walcott

Msj
Chief of Staff MAKASSAR FORCE

REPORT ON OPERATIONS MAKASSAR FORCE

22 SEP 45 - 20 DEC 45

LOCATION OF JAPANESE PERSONNEL - 20 DECEMBER 1945WITHIN CONCENTRATION AREA OR OCCUPIED UNDER SELF SUFFICIENCY PLAN

<u>Place</u>	<u>Latitude & Longitude</u>		<u>Number</u>
BANKAE	3 deg 55' S	119 deg 45' E	80
BENTENG	3 " 43' S	119 " 39' E	650
KABERE	3 " 41' S	119 " 48' E	944
LANGA	3 " 50' S	119 " 31' E	124
MALIMPOENG	3 " 44' S	119 " 45' E	12400
PARE PARE	4 " 2' S	119 " 36' E	109
PINRANG	3 " 47' S	119 " 37' E	27
RAFANG	3 " 50' S	119 " 49' E	333
SOELILI	3 " 47' S	119 " 42' E	2014
			<hr/> 16681 <hr/>

OUTSIDE CONCENTRATION AREA.

BITOENG	2 deg 58' S	119 deg 38' E	52
ENREKANG	3 " 33' S	119 " 47' E	2
KALOSI	3 " 20' S	119 " 48' E	260
KRHPE	3 " 10' S	119 " 20' E	8
MADJENE	3 " 32' S	118 " 58' E	41
MAKALE	3 " 6' S	119 " 52' E	250
MAMASA	2 " 57' S	119 " 22' E	2
MAMOEDJOE	2 " 40' S	118 " 53' E	12
MANDATE	3 " 20' S	119 " 50' E	51
PANBOESOEAN	3 " 50' S	119 " 5' E	300
POLEWALI	3 " 27' S	119 " 20' E	424
RANTEPAO	2 " 58' S	119 " 55' E	1087
SADAN	2 " 51' S	119 " 57' E	40
TALOLIPOE	2 " 55' S	119 " 43' E	30
TJENRANA	4 " 15' S	120 " 25' E	70
TONDON	2 " 50' S	119 " 42' E	8
MAKASSAR	5 " 8' S	119 " 23' E	2271
MASAMBA	2 " 34' S	120 " 18' E	2
PALOPO	2 " 59' S	120 " 12' E	252
RALOMPAN	3 " 20' S	120 " 20' E	30
SINGKANG	4 " 8' S	120 " 2' E	46
SOENGOEMINASA	5 " 13' S	119 " 26' E	2
WOTOE	2 " 35' S	120 " 49' E	196
			<hr/> 2436 <hr/>

KENDARI AREA.

KENDARI	3 deg 58' S	122 deg 34' E	62
POMELAA	4 " 17' S	121 " 29' E	158
			<hr/> 220 <hr/>

SEAFREN ON BOARD SHIP

UNDER ARREST	166
MISSING	121
	<hr/> 20723 <hr/>

RETURN OF JAPANESE ARMS AND AMMUNITION

APPENDIX F to REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS
OF MAKASSAR FORCE
22 SEP 45 to 20 DEC 45

SERIAL NO	TYPES OF WEAPON	QUANTITY HELD IN DUMPS UNDER AMF CONTROL		QUANTITY HELD BY JAPANESE FOR GUARDS		QUANTITY DISPOSED OF TO NICA AND RNIA	
		WEAPONS	AMN	WEAPONS	AMN	WEAPONS	AMN
		A	B	C	D	E	F
1	SMALL ARMS PISTOLS & REVOLVERS (.8 & 9 MM)	294	6844	1 per officer	30 rds per pistol	312	7100
2	SWORDS	3950(a)				21	
3	RIFLES (6.5 mm)	2129	1094447	790		1243	1895550
4	CARBINES (6.5 mm)						
5	RIFLES (.303)						
6	RIFLES (7.7 mm)						
7	SMG's (7.63 mm)					38	9000
8	IMG's (6.5 mm)	69				95	See Rifle
9	MMG's (7.7 mm)	32	17276 698135			20	See Rifle
10	GRENADE DISCHARGERS (5.0 mm)	86				61	
11	MORTARS (81 mm and 90 mm)		838 cases			54	2662
12	A/C GUNS (various calibre)	186					
	<u>TK A GUNS</u>						
13	CALIBRE (37 mm)						
14	CALIBRE (47 mm)						
	<u>DUAL PURPOSE GUNS</u> (TK A - AA)						
15	CALIBRE 13.2 mm	5					
16	CALIBRE 20 mm	5	450				

APPENDIX 'F'

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
17	CALIBRE 25 mm	8	450				
18	CALIBRE 40 mm						
	<u>INFANTRY GUNS</u>						
19	CALIBRE 70 mm						
20	CALIBRE 75 mm						
	<u>ARTILLERY</u>						
21	CALIBRE 75 mm						
22	CALIBRE 105 mm						
23	CALIBRE 120 mm						
24	CALIBRE 150 mm						
25	CALIBRE 80 mm	2	141 cases				
26	HOWITZERS 4.5						
	<u>AA GUNS</u>						
27	CALIBRE 75 mm	2					
28	CALIBRE 105 mm						
29	CALIBRE 120 mm						
	<u>NAVAL GUNS</u>						
30	CALIBRE 76.2 mm						
31	CALIBRE 120 mm	2					
32	CALIBRE 140 mm						
	<u>AFVs</u>						
33	HEAVY TANKS						
34	MEDIUM TANKS						
35	LIGHT TANKS	1					
36	TANKETTES	4					
37	ARMOURD CARS						

APPENDIX 'F'

TRANSPORT

- Part I -- Surrendered Enemy Transport
Part II -- AMF Transport

PART I - SURRENDERED ENEMY TRANSPORT

1. On arrival in MAKASSAR it was found that a complete registration of vehicles was necessary so that as accurate a record as possible could be made. To implement this an Instruction was issued to 2 Japanese Army that all vehicles below the line 5° South latitude would report immediately to HQ MAKASSAR FORCE. Subsequently all remaining vehicles in South CELEBES were required at PARE PARE by 2/11 Aust Inf Bn.
2. This register was NOT complete, as many vehicles were still being found well hidden in the country. These were in reasonably good condition, except that they lacked wheels, batteries and one or two minor parts.
3. As a general rule all vehicles which appeared to have some life, or could be used for cannibalisation, were registered. Present allotment of these vehicles is shown in table attached as Annexure I.
4. At the moment there remains a total of 157 cars 139 trucks, and 47 miscellaneous vehicles on the road; and this only after a very considerable number of man hours of work have been put into each by Unit Transport Platoons and Area Workshops.
5. As NICA had no transport whatsoever on arrival about 65% of the total available vehicles were handed over to them. This number was hopelessly inadequate for NICA to carry out their tasks -- most important of which was the collection and distribution of rice, to the city of MAKASSAR. Considerable help was given by AASC vehicles until their limit of assistance was reached due to the number of vehicles off the road and awaiting 1st, 2nd and 3rd Echelon repair.
6. Surrendered transport was NOT suitable for tasks in the country due to its unreliability. It was almost certain to break down at some stage and the driver, or some other guard had to be left to guard it, otherwise natives pillaged all removable parts.

PART II - AMF TRANSPORT

1. On arrival at MAKASSAR only a limited number of Jeeps and trailers were brought over as unit equipment. On 2 Oct 45 after repeated requests for heavy transport 10 x 2½ ton airborne vehicles of the 2/10 Aust Tpt Pl arrived followed by 24 x 2½ ton vehicles of the 2/25 Aust Tpt Pl on 17 Oct 45.
2. The main tasks of this platoon have been:-
 - (a) Transport of personnel to outlying posts.
 - (b) Transport of supplies to outlying posts.

- (c) Collection and concentration of arms, ammunition stores and heavy wireless and mechanical equipment from Japanese dumps and installations mainly within a radius of 30 miles from MAKASSAR.
 - (d) Collection and transportation of POL from Japanese dumps.
 - (e) Collection and transportation of rice for NICA.
3. The figures showing the amount of work which has been done and the mileage covered by vehicles since arrival are self explanatory and are shown in a table attached hereto as Annexure II.
4. As can be seen from the attached table this platoon has covered in 12 weeks 125,145 miles carrying 8495 tons of stores etc. It will also be seen that only 51 per cent of the vehicles have been effective over the period of three months mainly due to the extremely rough conditions of the roads causing so many casualties, particularly with tyres.
5. This platoon, although able to cope with the maintenance of the brigade group which is spread over 60,000 square miles of country has not been able to concentrate to any degree on the large quantity of stores and heavy machinery which still remains in dumps. Due to the wet season the majority of these stores which have NOT been collected, will have to remain in scattered dumps. In MALINO alone, an estimated £50,000 worth of heavy machinery will most probably be lost to the Australian Government due to lack of transport.
6. It will also be seen that the number of effective vehicles per week decreased considerably once vehicles were used on the collection of rice etc. As stated in part I above this collection was discontinued when, after 7 weeks work, 14 out of 34 vehicles remained servicable.

WORK AND MILEAGE STATE

ANNEXURE II

WEEK ENDING	TASKS VEHICLES EMPLOYED	POL CONSUMED	MILEAGE COVERED	COMMODITIES CARRIED					TOTAL (TONS)
				SUPS	POL	TPS	AMN	GEN	
6 Oct 45	8	390	2673	80	120	400	-	100	350
13 Oct 45	8	430	2989	244	306	-	-	-	550
20 Oct 45	18	1214	6511	236	127	15	-	12	390
27 Oct 45	26	2229	14908	191	306	43	-	137	677
3 Nov 45	27	2138	14744	461	322	14	-	204	1001
10 Nov 45	27	2133	12597	229	740	42	-	254	1265
17 Nov 45	20	2131	12618	131	230	20	18	663	1062
23 Nov 45	14	1540	8635	160	27	103	92	269	651
1 Dec 45	14	1961	13104	281	3	127	12	28	441
8 Dec 45	13	1608	10510	408	12	586	32	97	797
15 Dec 45	22	2399	16112	510	35	526	70	62	900
22 Dec 45	12	1331	8744	417	54	100	35	6	610
TOTAL	209	19524	125145						8494

SURRENDERED ENEMY TRANSPORT AT PRESENT IN USE

ANNEXURE I TO APPENDIX "B"

SERIAL	UNIT	M/CYCLES SOLO	M/CYCLES WITH SIDELIGHT CARS	CARS COUPE	CARS SEDAN	MISC VEHICLES	TRUCKS UTILITY	TRUCKS 3-TON	TRUCKS WATER-PETROL	TRUCKS BREAK-DOWN	TOTAL	
1	HQ 21 Inf Bde			2	14		5	10			31	
2	2/14 Inf Bn			1	8	1	3	2			16	
3	2/16 Inf Bn				13	1	1	3			19	
4	2/27 Inf Bn	7	1	2	5		3	1			19	
5	2/6 Pd Coy				1		1	1			3	
6	2/2 Sup Dep Coy				1				1		1	
7	2/25 Tpt Pl				1						2	
8	2/34 Sup Dep Pl	1			1						2	
9	2/6 Pd Amb				1			1			2	
10	14 M.G.U.				1			2			2	
11	176 F.O.D.				1	1	1				3	
12	2/25 Bde W/shop				2					1	3	
13	2/59 L.A.D.				5						5	
14	R.A.N.				4		3				7	
15	R.A.A.F.				8		11	8			49	
16	WATAMPONE Area	20		1	1			1			9	
17	R.A.N.				4	4					8	
18	N.I.C.A.			3	2	57	4	10	62	1	140	
19	Civilians				1	11	3	1	7		23	
20	2 Jap Army				4			1			5	
TOTAL VEHs BY TYPES		28	1	7	8	142	14	40	99	2	2	343

TOTAL ALL VEHICLES: 343

WORK AND MILEAGE STATE

ANNEXURE II

WEEK ENDING	TASKS VEHICLES EMPLOYED	POL CONSUMED	MILEAGE COVERED	COMMODITIES CARRIED					TOTAL (TONS)
				SUPS	POL	TPS	AMN	GEN	
6 Oct 45	8	390	2673	80	120	400	-	100	350
13 Oct 45	8	430	2989	244	306	-	-	-	550
20 Oct 45	18	1214	6511	236	127	15	-	32	390
27 Oct 45	26	2129	14908	191	306	43	-	137	677
3 Nov 45	27	2138	14744	461	322	14	-	204	1001
10 Nov 45	27	2133	12597	229	740	42	-	254	1265
17 Nov 45	20	2131	12618	131	230	20	18	663	1062
23 Nov 45	14	1540	8635	160	27	103	92	269	551
1 Dec 45	14	1961	13104	281	3	127	12	28	441
8 Dec 45	13	1608	10510	408	12	586	32	97	797
15 Dec 45	22	2399	16112	510	35	526	70	62	900
22 Dec 45	12	1331	8744	417	54	100	35	6	610
TOTAL	209	19524	125145						8494

SECRET

MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION NO 4

- Ref Maps: (a) Aust Aeronautical Map 1 : 1,000,000
Sheet B4
(b) CELEBES NEI 1 : 50,000 Sheet 74/XXI IV/B
(c) CELEBES NEI 1 : 50,000 Sheet 74/XXI IV/D
(d) Traces attached as Appendices "A" and "B"

GENERAL

1. This instruction re-allots and defines the respective areas of responsibility and tasks of 2/14, 2/16 and 2/27 Aust Inf Bns.
2. The following instructions issued by MAKASSAR FORCE are hereby cancelled:-
 - (a) MAKASSAR FORCE INSTR NO 1 of 30 Oct 45
 - (b) PART 1 of MAKASSAR FORCE Letter NO 651 of 1 OCT 45

AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

3. 2/14 Aust Inf Bn
 - (a) The area between the following East-West lines:-
 - (i) On the South
East Coast-due West to, excl WAKA- thence excl road WAKA- SOLO - PAMPANOEIA - WATAN SOIFENG - thence direct line to excl SOEMPANBINANGOE.
 - (ii) On the North
KEPPE to G. PATOKSALOEDOERIAN - G. TJOETJOE - SADANG River at KABERE - thence excl SADANG River to G. SALIFODO%
 - (b) See area A on trace attached as Appendix "A".
4. 2/16 Aust Inf Bn
 - (a) The area of the South West CELEBES Peninsular North to all incl South boundary Area A but excl Area C (see below)
 - (b) See area B on Trace attached as Appendix "A"
5. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn
 - (a) The area of MAKASSAR CITY and immediate environs, bounded by the following line:-
All excl TALLOCK River, from river mouth to bridge at 510318 - thence direct line to ferry at 443272 - thence BERRANG River to mouth.
 - (b) See Trace attached as Appendix "B"
 - (c) See also Area C on trace attached as Appendix "A".

TASKS

6. 2/14 Aust Inf Bn
 - (a) Occupy PARE PARE area, establish military control of area A and ensure that law and order is maintained therein.
 - (b) Assist NICA to re-establish Civil Administration within Area A
 - (c) Supervise the concentration of Japanese Forces in the MALIMPOENG area in accordance with MAKASSAR FORCE INSTR NO 2, and any amendments to that instruction which may be issued.

- (d) Supervise the collection, checking and destruction of Japanese arms and ammunition in the area North of the line 5 degrees South, in accordance with MAKASSAR FORCE Letter # G167 of 20 Oct 45.
- (e) Establish road blocks as set out in Appendix "C"
- (f) Carry out security patrols within Area "A"
- (g) Carry out such other orders concerning the civil population or Japanese personnel within Area A as may be issued from time to time.

7. 2/16 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Occupy the following areas in the strengths set out below:-

- (i) WATAMPONE One Coy
- (ii) BONTAIN)
MALINO) One Coy
SOENGOEMINASA)
(incl protection
of power station
- (iii) MAROS) Not to exceed
MANDAI War Criminal One Coy
Compound when est.)

- (b) Establish Military Control in the Area "B" and ensure that law and order is maintained therein.
- (c) Carry out security patrols throughout area "B"
- (d) Assist NICA to re-establish Civil Administration within Area "B"
- (e) Establish road blocks as set out in Appendix B
- (f) Carry out such other orders concerning the civil population or Japanese personnel within Area B as may be issued.

8. HQ 2/16 Aust Inf Bn and One Coy will remain in MAKASSAR ? This Coy will be available to reinforce 2/27 Aust Inf Bn should it be required.

9. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn

- (a) Provide guards and pickets on specified civil and military installations within Area C.
(See Appendix "D" issued separately to 2/27 Aust Inf Bn)
- (b) Provide security patrols and town picket within Area C.
- (c) Supervise the collection, checking and destruction of Japanese arms and ammunition in Area South of 5 degree South in accordance with the instructions contained in MAKASSAR FORCE Letter G167 of 20 Oct 45.

10. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn will submit to HQ MAKASSAR FORCE any recommendation concerning orders governing the conduct of Australian troops within Area C which may assist in carrying out the above tasks.

11. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn may call on up to One Coy 2/16 Aust Inf Bn to assist in above tasks.

FININGS

12.

- (a) This order will become effective from 2412001.
- (b) 2/16 and 2/27 Aust Inf Bns will arrange relief of guards mutually, but not later than 2412001.
- (c) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn will occupy MALING and MAROS by 2412001, and WATAMPONE by 2512001.

ROAD BLOCKS.

13.

- (a) Road blocks will be established as shown in Appendix 'C'.
- (b) Object of Road Blocks, and duties of picket manning them, are contained in this HQ letter G.170 of 21 Oct 45.

POLICY IN DEALING WITH CIVIL POPULATION.

14.

- (a) NICA is under command MAKASSAR FORCE, and lawful orders issued through NICA have the authority of Comd MAKASSAR FORCE.
- (b) CsoC of detached units and sub-units will take all measures practicable to establish the authority of NICA and ensure that these instructions are carried out.
- (c) Any attempt on the part of the civil population, or any local leaders, to prevent such orders being carried out, will be treated as an offence against law and order.
- (d) Processions and demonstrations will NOT be permitted in public places in areas occupied by Australian Troops.
- (e) Special instructions will be issued separately to certain detachment comds on this subject.

ADM

15.

Transport

- (a) The following transport is allotted to units for carrying out all tasks specified above:-
 - (i) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn - 2 x 3 ton trucks (Japanese)
3 x 2 1/2 ton trucks
 - (ii) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn - 6 x 2 1/2 ton trucks
2 x 3 ton trucks (Japanese)
 - (iii) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn - 3 x 3 ton trucks (Japanese)
3 x 2 1/2 ton trucks
- (b) These vehicles are total allotment and include any already allotted.

SUPPLIES, WATER AND POL.

16.

Under unit arrangements.

QUARTERS

17.

Details of any building requisitioned as billets any any town or village will be forwarded to this HQ as soon as possible.

INTERCOMN.

18.

HQ MAKASSAR FORCE - remains present location MAKASSAR.

19.

Wireless.

Following wireless sets will be provided by 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec:

- (a) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn. - Japanese set at PARE PARE.

- (b) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn - (i) Lt Wireless Sec established at MAKASSAR FORCE for use HQ 2/16 Aust Inf Bn.
- (ii) Japanese set at BONTHEIN.
- (iii) 22 set at MAROS.
- (iv) 22 set at SOEGGOEMINASA.
- (v) 22 set at MALINO.

(c) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn - Three 22 sets for use in town patrolling.

Line.

(a) Direct trunk lines will be provided from HQ MAKASSAR FORCE to

- (i) PARE PARE
- (ii) WATAMPONE
- (iii) BONTHEIN
- (iv) MALINO
- (v) SOENGGOEMINASA
- (vi) MAROS

(b) These lines are NOT secure and full security precautions will be observed.

EL. SDS.

SDS will be provided by 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec from MAKASSAR to PARE PARE every second day.

Signed L Walcott Maj
Chief of Staff MAKASSAR FORCE

REPORT ON OPERATIONS

MAKASSAR FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

21 Sep to 20 Dec

HQ MAKASSAR FORCE

21 November 1945

TO ALL OFFICERS OF MAKASSAR FORCE

As there would appear to be some misunderstanding as to the role and duties of the Australian Forces in South CELEBES, the following notes are issued by direction of Comd MAKASSAR FORCE, the information and guidance of Officers.

By Allied agreement, the Australian Military Forces are responsible for disarming Japanese Forces and maintaining law and order in certain Dutch territories including South CELEBES. As our Forces are limited, the area of Australian responsibility is divided into :-

- (a) Areas occupied or controlled by Australian Forces in which local Australian Comds are directly responsible for all matters, including civil affairs, to the C-in-C AMF; and
- (b) Unoccupied areas in which Comd Second Japanese Army is directly responsible to the C-in-C AMF for law and order and civil affairs.

In the case of MAKASSAR FORCE, our area of responsibility is the area of South West CELEBES as far North as a general East West line through SADANG River, then following the West and North boundaries of the Division of LOENGE. North and West of our boundary Comd Second Japanese Army is responsible to C-in-C AMF and deals direct with Adv HQ AMF at MOROTAI.

We are also responsible for SE CELEBES as far North as the Southern boundary of MANADO Residency, but we are to commit no forces except NICA detachments in that area.

The responsibilities of MAKASSAR FORCE are set out in a Proclamation dated 6 October 45 issued by the C-in-C AMF and in certain instructions issued by Adv HQ AMF. These responsibilities are briefly :-

- (a) For supervising disarmament, and control of Japanese forces in our area of responsibility.
- (b) For civil administration and maintenance of law and order until such time as the lawful government of the M.I. is once again functioning. To assist the Comd in the discharge of this responsibility a NICA unit forms part of MAKASSAR FORCE.
- (c) In pursuance of Para (b) the old NRY laws will be applied and enforced by Officers of NICA subject only to any further orders which Comd MAKASSAR FORCE may be obliged, in the interests of good order, to issue.
- (d) Facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which constitutes to the subsistence, clothing, and shelter of the population.

The only form of Government for the time being in the South Moluccas is therefore a military administration. NICA is an army unit under command of Comd MAKASSAR FORCE. CONICA is responsible to him for administrative and civil affairs. Thus NICA is an integral part of the military administration and its orders and instructions have the authority of the Force Comd. There exists the closest possible liaison between Comd MAKASSAR FORCE and CONICA, and it is imperative that coms of detached units also work in the closest collaboration with the local NICA officers. It is our duty to assist in establishing the authority of NICA, and in the restoration of a more orderly civil administration. Some local chiefs and propagandists purport to dissociate NICA from the AMP. They say that they will obey the orders of the military commander, but will not recognise, obey, or cooperate with NICA. It will be quite evident from the above that this attitude is entirely incorrect. NICA officers are merely discharging the Force Comd's responsibility for civil administration, and their orders are in fact the orders of the Force Comd. The Force Comd has personally made this position quite clear to the more important Radjas and Karaengs.

In this connection para 14 of MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION No 4 (A. 100) is repeated for information.

POLICY IN DEALING WITH CIVIL POPULATION.

- (a) NICA is under command MAKASSAR FORCE, and lawful orders issued through NICA have the authority of Comd MAKASSAR FORCE.
- (b) Coms of detached units and sub-units will take all measures practicable to establish the authority of NICA and ensure that its instructions are carried out.
- (c) Any attempt on the part of the civil population, or any local leaders, to prevent such orders being carried out, will be treated as an offence against law and order.
- (d) Processions and demonstrations will NOT be permitted in public places in areas occupied by Australian Troops.

The present system of Military Control is a temporary measure. As soon as possible it will hand over to a civil government the form of which will be decided as a result of future conferences to be held between the Dutch Government (the only nation recognised in the NEI by the Allies) and the Indonesians. This is the declared policy of General Wetherill and the Dutch Government.

In the meantime, it is NICA's desire to get as many responsible Indonesians as possible to share in the task of administration. Several leading Indonesians have already agreed to cooperate and have been given important administrative tasks.

The Australian Military Forces are not concerned with the eventual form of Government to be set up in the NEI, and will maintain a completely impartial attitude on that question. Thus it is no concern of ours if Indonesians express a desire for a Republic or any other form of Government. On the other hand some local Karaengs have presented themselves as acting on behalf of "The Free Indonesian Republic" and, for example, have purported to pay officials in its name. This is obviously inconsistent with the existing Military Government and cannot be permitted. Public meetings and demonstrations of any kind are expressly forbidden, not because of our desire to suppress political aspirations, but because, in the present state of the country they are liable to lead to mob action and breaches of law and order.

Responsibility for the preservation of law and order, including the arrest of civilian offenders, rests primarily with the Police Force. Australian troops will only be employed where the Police are unable to carry out their task of maintaining law and order unaided. Before taking any action which may lead to a breach of good order, NICA officers and/or Police are expected to consult the appropriate Australian Commander.

Our relations with all sections of the population have been, and should be maintained on the most friendly and cordial basis. However, there is evidence that some political leaders have attempted to use us for political purposes, and with a view to setting us off against the Dutch. Care and discretion are necessary to avoid this.

Lastly, it is pointed out that no "movement", or party, nor any men claiming to be leaders, have been recognised by Comd MAIFORCE. In fact, there does not appear to be any closely knit party or movement, but rather, there are a number of political groups with no common leadership and often at variance with each other.

Politics should be carefully avoided in conversation with the population. If it is necessary to interview local rulers, a NICA representative should, if possible, be present. In any case of doubt as to action to be taken where political aspects are involved, the matter will, if possible, be referred to higher authority.

Chief of Staff LAKASAR TOR

PROCLAMATION
BY
BRIGADIER F O CHILTON DSO
COMMANDER AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES MAKASSAR

The following are offences against Allied Military control in the South West CELEBES :-

- (a) Carrying or being in possession of Arms or Weapons of any kind. This includes all kinds of firearms, hand grenades, explosives, swords, kris, and spears. Any person found carrying Arms or Weapons of any kind may be shot.
- (b) The holding of processions or demonstrations of any kind.
- (c) Violence or threat of violence to any person.
- (d) Giving aid or assistance to any person guilty of any offence.
- (e) Refusing to sell food, clothes or other daily necessities of life normally sold owing to racial or social differences.
- (f) Interfering with the free use of Public Highways.
- (g) Sabotage or destroying or interfering with public services, and/or Allied Military installations including waterworks, electricity and gasworks, telephone, telegraph cable works and radio broadcasting stations. Those guilty of this offence may be shot.
- (h) Robbery and looting.
- (i) Wearing of any uniform, not being members of the Allied Military Forces, or members of the Police Force.
- (j) Drilling or participating in any form of Military Training.

The above orders will be strictly enforced by all Forces under my command.

29 October 1945

(Sgd) F O CHILTON Brigadier
Commander AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
MAKASSAR

Subject : SURRENDER OF CURRENCY AND COIN SECOND JAPANESE ARMY CELEBES

HQ MAKASSAR FORCE

QG 583

14 Dec 45

TO REPORT ON OPERATION
MAKASSAR FORCE

20 SEPT 1945 TO 20 DEC

Adv HQ AMF.

1. This report summarises the collection, disposal and accounting of all currency and coin which has been surrendered during the occupation of SW CELEBES by MAKASSAR FORCE.
2. The total amounts involved have been recovered from two main sources:
 - (a) collected from Japanese sources
 - (b) taken over intact from the Bank of Taiwan
3. Attached hereto as Appendices A B C D & E respectively are the following
 - (a) Summary statement of all monies collected from Japanese sources and disposed of to NICA up to 29 Nov 45.
 - (b) Balance Sheet of the Bank of Taiwan as at 28 Sep 45 when NICA took over control thereof. It will be noted that the Japanese bank notes, Government money and aluminium coin (in Appx B) have been shown in the statement from the Netherlands Bank (Appc C) as yen and amount to the same sum.
 - (c) A consolidated statement of all currency confiscated from :
 - (i) Bank of Taiwan MAKASSAR
 - (ii) Japanese Civil Administration
 - (iii) Japanese Military Forces
 as at 20 Nov 45.
 - (d) A consolidated statement of all currency and coin surrendered by Second Japanese Army up to 20 Nov 45 showing source and denomination of currency. The object of this Appendix is to show, in addition to Appx C the division of currency and note issues.
 - (e) Balance Sheet of South Development Treasury CELEBES, see para 8.
4. It will be seen that the totals in Appx C correspond to the totals of Appendices A & B together except for monies collected and handed over since 20 Nov 45. This amounts to 6,992.92 NEI currency and 25,554.37 Japanese Invasion Currency, as shown in Appx A.
5. Discrepancies in Balance.
 - (a) It will be noted also that the amount of Netherlands Indies coins shown on Appx B amount to f145,040.00 and the actual amount received from the Bank of Taiwan as per Appx C is shown as f 144,367.16. A letter of explanation of this discrepancy of f672.84 from Paymaster NICA who certifies that the deficiency was caused by 'false, damaged or worn out' coins.
 - (b) A further statement is also attached to Appx C showing the amount of 4,294.02 Chinese currency which was included in the report of Bank on 28 Sep 45 but NOT on the report as at 20 Nov 45 (Appx CO

APPENDIX 'B'

BALANCE OF CASH TAKEN OVER BY NICA IN THE BANK OF TAIWAN

is shown below : As at 28 Sep 45

DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT
(1) Bank Of Japan f100	231,100.00	(2) Bank of Taiwan f100	6,400.00
Notes f 20	12,020.00	Notes f 10	21,810.00
" f 10	1,440,000.00	" f 5	11,685.00
" f 5	203,945.00	" f 1	9,916.00
" f 1	3,273.00		
Total	<u>1,890,398.00</u>	Total	<u>49,811.00</u>
(3) Bank of Tgosen f10	30.00	(4) Government Money	
Notes f 5	15.00	(Japan) f0.50	162,684.50
" f 1	21.00		
Total	<u>66.00</u>	(5) Aluminium Coins	
		f0.10	132.50
		f0.05	38.50
		f0.01	11.50
		Total	<u>182.50</u>
(6) Netherlands India Notes		(7) Netherlands India Coins	
f500	500.00	f 2½	83,720.00
f100	900.00	f 1	2,800.00
f 50	100.00	f ½	10,734.00
f 25	3,000.00	f ¼	23,007.00
f 10	6,300.00	f 1/10	23,450.00
f 5	90,575.00	c 5	576.50
f 2½	272,015.00	c 2½	294.00
f 1	415,588.00	c 1½	374.50
		c ½	3.50
Total	<u>788,978.00</u>	Total	<u>145,040.00</u>
(8) Invasion Money in Guilders	20,170,165.22		
(9) " " in Pesos	2,811.16		
(10) " " in Dollars	5,408.60		
(11) " " in Pound (12/-)	6.00		
(12) " " Notes (China)	4,294.02		
<u>TOTALS</u>			
(1) Bank of Japan - Notes	1,890,398.00		
(2) " " Taiwan- "	49,811.00		
(3) " " Tgosen- "	66.00		
(4) Government Money - Japan	162,684.00		
(5) Aluminium Coins - Japanese	182.50		
Sub-Total	<u>2,103,142.00</u>		
(6) Netherlands Indies -Notes	788,978.00		
(7) " " -Coins	145,040.00		
(8) Japanese Invasion Notes -Guilders	20,170,165.22		
(9) " " " -Pesc	2,811.16		
(10) " " " -Dollars	5,408.60		
(11) " " " -Pound	6.00		
(12) " " " -China	4,294.02		

APPENDIX 'C'

STATEMENT OF ALL CURRENCY HELD IN NETHERLANDS BANK on 20 NOV 45

Received JAPANESE INVASION CURRENCY vide receipt dated :

22 Oct 1945	f/	Jap Civil Adm (Minseibu) MAKASSAR	f 2,067,050.00
22 "	"	Jap Headquarters MAKASSAR	653,626.84
23 "	"	Jap Civil Adm (Minseibu) MAKASSAR	33,037.92
23 "	"	Jap Headquarters MAKASSAR	36,404.75
24 "	"	Jap Businessmen's Association MAKASSAR	293,044.66
30 "	"	Bank of Taiwan MAKASSAR	20,170,165.22
30 "	"	Jap Headquarters PALOPO	10,627,534.93
31 "	"	Jap Businessmen's Association MAKASSAR	66,371.66
5 Nov "	"	Jap Headquarters KENDARI	1,084,403.25
16 "	"	" " MAKALE-RANTEPAO & PALOPO	214,559.54
16 "	"	" " WATAMFONE (South CELEBES)	272,585.11
Total			f 35,518,783.88

Received NETHERLANDS INDES GOVERNMENT NOTES vide receipt dated :

30 Oct 1945	f/	Bank of Taiwan MAKASSAR	f 687,603.00
30 "	"	Jap Headquarters PALOPO	768,000.00
Total			f 1,455,603.00

Received NETHERLANDS INDES COINS vide receipt dated :

30 Oct 1945	f/	Bank of Taiwan MAKASSAR	144,367.16
5 Nov "	"	Jap Headquarters KENDARI	1,820.27
15 "	"	" " PALOPO	45,843.48
16 "	"	" " MAKALE - RANTEPAO	12,432.49
Total			f 204,463.40

Received JAV. BANK NOTES vide receipt dated :

30 Oct 1945 f/ Bank of Taiwan MAKASSAR as follows:

Banknotes @ f 500	f 500.00	
" " 100	900.00	
" " 50	100.00	
" " 25	3,000.00	
" " 10	6,300.00	
" " 5	90,575.00	f 101,375.00

30 " " Jap Headquarters PALOPO as follows :

Banknotes @ f 10	f 560,000.00	
" " 5	280,000.00	f 840,000.00

5 Nov " Jap Headquarters KENDARI as follows :

Banknotes @ f 10	f 4,000.00	
" " 5	530.00	f 4,530.00

Total f 945,905.00

PAYMASTER NICA
signed L J Leen

Received JAPANESE CURRENCY vide receipt dated :

30 Oct 1945	f/	Bank of Taiwan , MAKASSAR	Y 2,103,142.00
5 Nov	" "	Jap Headquarters, KENDARI	" 8,555.96
"	" "	Australian Headquarters MAKASSAR	" 2,368.50
Total			Y 2,114,066.46

received SEVERAL CURRENCIES as follows:

30 Oct 1945	f/	Bank of Taiwan, MAKASSAR	Pesos 2,811.16
			Str \$ 5,408.60
			Austr £ -11/-

PAYMASTER NICA

signed L J Been

Received JAPANESE MILITARY NOTES OF 1937 (North China Issue) on:

30 Oct 1945	f/	Bank of Taiwan , MAKASSAR	Y 4,294.02
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PAYMASTER NICA

signed L J Been

NB. It should be noted that notes higher than and including 5 guilder notes are issued by the JAVA Bank. Notes below this denomination are issued by the NEI Government.

6. Accounting for and disposal.

All currency, other than Japanese Invasion currency, has been brought to account either by Capt ALTKEN, Paymaster 7 Aust Div, or by 7 Aust Div Sub Depot Cash Office, strictly accounted for and advanced to NICA Paymaster on receipt.

All Japanese Invasion money has been handed over to Paymaster NICA on receipt.

7. Receipts.

Official receipts for all currency other than Japanese Invasion currency have been given to Japanese authorities. Further receipts have been given for all Invasion currency. Copies of these receipts are held at HQ MAKASSAR FORCE.

8. Bank of Taiwan.

It should be noted that the amount of cash held by the above Bank, 20,959,143.22 (Appx 'E') is made up of f20,170,165.22 Japanese Invasion Guilders and f 788,978.00 NEI Guilders (Appx 'B').

9. Money collected after 20 Nov 45.

It should also be noted that money collected after 20 Nov 45 (vide Appx 'A') is NOT included in Consolidated Statement of money held in Netherlands Bank (See Appx 'C').

10. Currency remaining in Japanese hands.

From enquiries from Japanese sources made by Capt ALTKEN -- 7 Aust Div Paymaster -- on his visit, it appears that approximately f5,113,058.11 guilders still remain in Japanese hands. However approximately f2,000,000.00 is allowed to be retained under order Number 12 on the basis of f100 guilders per head.

John D. Brigg
Comd MAKASSAR FORCE

DISTRIBUTION.

Chief Paymaster SWPA
Comd
Chief of Staff
SC (Q)
File
War Diary (2)

SUMMARY OF ALL MONIES COLLECTED FROM JAPANESE SOURCES.

Serial	Date	Place	Source	Currency	Amount	Remarks
1.	20 Oct	MAKASSAR	MINSEIBU HQ	Jap Invasion	2,067,050.00	
2.	20 Oct	"	2 Jap Army LO	" "	653,626.00	
3.	22 Oct	"	MINSEIBU HQ	" "	69,442.67	
4.	26 Oct	PALOPO	HQ 2 Jap Army	" "	10,627,534.93	
5.	26 Oct	"	" " "	NEI Guilders	1,608,000.00	See Appx 'D' ser 4E & 6
6.	31 Oct	MAKASSAR	Jap business mens Assn	Jap Invasion	293,044.66	
7.	31 Oct	"	" " "	" "	65,371.64	
8.	31 Oct	"	" " "	Jap Bank Notes (Yen)	2,368.50	
9.	5 Nov	KENDARI	2 Jap Army	NEI Guilders	6,550.27	
10.	5 "	"	" " "	Jap Invasion	1,084,403.25	
11.	5 "	"	" " "	Jap Bank Notes (Yen)	8,555.96	
12.	13 "	PALOPO	" " "	NEI Guilders	45,843.48	
13.	16 "	MAKALE- RANTEPAO	MINSEIBU HQ	" "	12,432.48	
14.	16 "	WATAMPONE	2 Jap Army	Jap Invasion	272,585.11	
15.	16 "	MAKALE- RANTEPAO	" " "	" "	214,559.54	
Money collected after 20 Nov 45						
16.	22 Nov	BONTHAIN	2 Jap Army	NEI Guilders	5,392.92	
17.	22 Nov	WATAMPONE	" " "	" "	1,600.00	
18.	22 Nov	BONTHAIN	" " "	Jap Invasion	6,493.70	
19.	29 Nov	BONTHAIN	" " "	" "	19,060.67	

	DATE	PLACE	SOURCE	CURRENCY			DE NOMINATION				REMARKS	
				Jap Invasion	NEI Govt Notes	NEI Coins	JAV Bank	Jap Currency	Pesos	Str		Aust
	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	j	k	l	
1.	20 Oct	MAKASSAR	MINSEIBU I	2,067,050.00								
2.	" "	"	LIATSON II.	653,626.00								
3.	22 "	"	MINSEIBU	69,142.67								
4.	26 "	PALCPO	HQ 2 Jap Army	10,627,534.93	768,000.00 (b)		844,000 (b)					
5.	31 "	MAKASSAR	J B A	293,044.66								
6.	" "	"	J B A	66,371.64				2,368.50				
7.	" "	KENDARI		1,084,403.25		1,820.27	4,530	8,555.96				
8.	13 Nov	PALOPU	2 Jap Army			45,843.48						
9.	16 "	MAKALE - RANTAPAO	MINSEIBU			12,432.42						
10.	" "	WATAMPONE		272,585.11								
11.	18 "	MAKALE		214,559.54								
12.			TOTALS	15,348,617.80	768,000.00	60,096.17	844,530.00	10,924.46	-	-	-	(a) Total 783,978.00
13.	23 Sep	Bank of Ta iwan		20,170,165.22	687,603.00 (a)	145,040.00	101,375.00 (a)	2,103,142.00	2,811.16	5408.60	6.00	(b) Total 1,608,000.00 See separate statement Appx 'B'
14.	T O T A L S			35,518,783.02	1,455,603.00	205,136.17	945,905.00	2,114,066.46	2,811.16	5408.60	6.00	See Bank Sheet 20 Nov 45 Appx 'C'

APPENDIX 'E'

BALANCE SHEET OF THE SOUTH DEVELOPMENT TREASURY, CELELES

28 SEPTEMBER 1945

<u>DEBTOR</u>	<u>SUBJECT OF ACCOUNT</u>	<u>CREDITOR</u>
	Overdrafts	
63,605,667.36	Loans	
13,277,731.17	Bankers' accounts debtor on account of governmental funds	
168.74	Sundry Asset account	
20,959,143.22	Cash	
8,225.76	Special Cash	
	Head Office and branches Accounts	88,600,835.91
	Current Accounts	7,104,691.97
	Sundry Liability Account	13,186.92
	Profit and Loss	2,132,221.45
<hr/> <hr/>	TOTAL	<hr/> <hr/>
97,850,936.25		97,850,936.25

For Copy only

PAYMASTER NICA

signed L J Been

LIST OF JAPANESE FIRMS AND BUSINESS.

Name of Firm.	Outline of Business.	Name of Manager of owner.	Present Location of Manager or owner.	Address of Office & Address of branch if any.	Location of Factory, Office, Farm Station &/or Business.
1 Asoh Kogyo K.K.	Coal Mining, Coke-making & Coal supply. Capacity of monthly production. (Coal at Tondenkoera 2,000 ton Coke at Tondenkoera 250 ton). (Coal at Baroe 1,000 ton Coke at Kadjiwara near Pangkadjene 200 ton).	T. Tada.	Malimpoeng.	129 Maradekaja Weg.	Tondongkeera. Pangkadjene (Kadjiwara). Baroe.
2 Asano Bussan K.K.	Importers of Gun-powder.	T. Kawai.			
3 Asahi News Paper Branch Office.	News reporting (Already closed at the time of closing war).				
4 Abe Shoten.	Retail shop of general merchandises.	G. Abe.	"	146 Ladjiangil Weg.	Nil.
5 Boetoeng Sangyo K.K.	Asphalt mining, Saw mill, Tanning Extract (Mangrove bark). Farm estate in Boetoeng island.	G. Itoh.	"	(Maros).Niewtallo Weg.	Boetoeng Island for Asphalt Mining. Saw mill at Makassar. Takalar, Raha (Muna island). Factory at tello Makassar.
6 Beisei Sangyo K.K.	Tobacco plantation & Cigarette works. Monthly production 8,000,000 pieces of cigarrette.	M. Okasaki.	"	108 - 8 Gang (Wattan Soppeng) NLEGWETALLE Weg.	Factory Makassar. " Soppeng.
7 Copra Kanrikumiai.	Administrating Association for business affairs of Copra.	Y. Tsuruta.	Malimpoeng.	Ladjangir Weg.	Pare-pare, Kolaka.
8 Dai Nippon Boseki K.K.	Cotton plantation, Ginning, Hand spinning & weaving, power spinning, weaving mill. Monthly production Cotton yarn No. 18 ^s . 20 ^s . 30 ^s B/L (12,000 Lbs). Pangkadjene mill. Coarse Cotton Cloth 200 pieces. Soenggoeminasa mill. Coarse Cotton Yarn 800 kg. Sail-cloth 200 pieces. Yearly production. Cement Factory. (unginned Cotton 7,500 p'cls).	S. Nakarai.	"	55 Maros Weg.	Pangkadjene (near Maros) mill. Bone Ginning mill. Soenggoeminasa mill. Soppeng branch. Sindjai " Singkang " Cement Factory at Kendari.
9 Domei Tsushin Sha.	News Agent.	S. Kusuno.	"	Klapper laan.	Nil.
10 Dai Nippon Yushi K.K.	Soap Oil mill. Monthly production at Makassar mill 300 ton. at Pare-pare mill 100 ton. Teeth Brush & powder manufacturs.	K. Fuwa.	"	278 Sambengdjava Weg Makassar.	Makassar mill. Pare-pare mill. Tjambalagian mill. Dongala mill. Madjene branch.
11 Eiga Haikyu Sha.	Moving picture Supply, Management of movie Theatre in Celebes.	M. Kashiwabara.	"	68 Maros Weg.	Makassar, Singkang, Pare-pare, Bone, Madjene, Palopo, Bonthain
12 Funai Seitoh K.K.	Manufacture of procelain.	J. Funai.	"	(Maros) Panaikan in Goa.	Factory at Panaikan.
13 Furukawa Takushoku K.K.	Ramie plantation, area to be planted about 200 H.	M. Shibata.	Palopo.	78 Schijfberg Weg.	Farm at Ramase, Ramie plantation. Ramasi near Palopo (farm).
14 H. Ohkawa.	Farming vegetable, Sake Brewery, monthly production 18,200 litre. Restaurant, Contractor.	H. Ohkawa.	Malimpoeng.	8 Zeestraat.	Makassar. Loka (farms & factory). near Bonthain.
15 Gohsho K.K.	Importers of textilegoods & other, Paper mill.	S. Iwai.	"	75 Schijfberg Weg.	Makassar.
16 Hayashikane Shoten K.K.	Manufacture & dealing. Miso 50 ton. Sake Brewery 200 ton. } Yearly production at Maros factory. Soy 50 ton. Confectionary at Makassar.	K. Nagasaki.	"	(Maros) 226 Vanschelle Weg.	Makassar Factory. Maros Factory.
17 Hazama Gumi K.K.	Contractor for house building & engineering works.	S. Kiuchi.	"	55 S.S. Weg.	Nil.
18 Harima Zousen K.K.	Wooden Ship building & repairing engines, iron works.	T. Masaki.	"	(") 4 Maros Weg.	Oedjoengtahah-Main factory in Makassar. Karoekoean-Branch factory in Makassar.
19 Kinomaru Kohun K.K.	Shipping at War time 14 vessels (total 2,300 ton) at the time of closing war 2 motor Vessels (350 ton) Soerabaja. 6 tug boat (120 ton) Makassar.	S. Tanaka.	"	(") 66 Prinsen Laan.	Nil.
20 Iwai Sangyo K.K.	Iron works at tello Factory. Monthly Production. (150 ton Steel Bars Round & Square 10 ton Nails. 30 ton Bolts & Nuts. 15 ton Rivets & nails for ship Building). Importers of textile goods & others.	H. Okada.	"	(") 102 Maros Weg.	Factory at Tello.
21 Ishihara Tekkojyo.	Iron works.	S. Ishihara.	"	(Bone). Djongaja.	Factory at Djongaja.
22 Ikeya Nanpo Sangyo K.K.	Cement Substitute works) at Makassar. fire brick works Coal mining at Tonasa 500 ton per month.	T. Ikeya.	"	Hospital Weg.	Makassar Factory Tonasa mining (near Pangkadjene) Makassar & Kendari.
23 Itonaga Shoten.	Dealers of local products.	T. Itonaga.	"	Wilhelmina Straat.	Nil.
24 Izeki Bussan Yookeo.	Wooden Ship Building & repairs, at Tonijaman (near Polewall, Mandar) at Tjampalagian (near Madjene Mandar).	H. Izeki.	Polewall.	Burgerwacht Straat.	Tonijaman Works Tjampalagian Works.
25 Kanematsu K.K.	Importers of Textile goods, porcelain & others. Weaving mill at Djongaja 150 Weaving Machine operated by foot. Substitute Sail-Cloth Production 2,000 m. (per month).	M. Hiramoto.	Malino (Makassar)	12 Denponto Str.	Makassar. Djongaja (Weaving mill).
26 Kashima Gumi K.K.	Contractor for building & engineering works, road construction.	I. Kajiura.	Malimpoeng.	156 Hospital Weg.	Makale.
27 Kaneko Shoten.	Dry-goods, retail shop. Miso & Soy works at Pare-pare.	H. Kaneko.	"	(Maros). 7 Ambon Weg.	Pare-pare Factory & branch.
28 Kanegafuchi Industrial Corporation.	Cotton plantation. Areas to be planted 2,500 ^{HA} Yearly products 6,000 p'cls unginnd cotton. Ginning Factory at Pinrang, Mapili, Sidenreng, Sigeri, Hand Spinning & Weaving at same places. Cotton Spinning & Weaving at Pinrang Factory. Spinning spindle 2,275 spindles installed, 1,600 spindles working. Weaving Machine 30 " " " " " Monthly Production 18 ^s threads 25 bales (400 ^{Lbs} per bale) Grey Cloth 200 p'cls (40 ^{Yds} per p'cls). Jute plantation at Mapili in Mandar.	Y. Shinohara.	c/o Japanese Liaison Office Makassar.	50 Wilhelmina Straat (now destroyed by bombing). 9 Konings Laan, Makassar. (newly shifted).	Pinrang-Spinning & Weaving mill Pinrang-Ginning Factory. Pinrang-Branch. Pare-pare Branch. Rappang " Sidenreng " & Ginning Fact-ory. Mapili " " sigeri " "

29	Karisoko Shoten.	Tortoise-Shell Workshop & retail shop of local products.	G. Karisoko.	Malimpoeng	At the junction of Niewtallo Weg & S.S. Weg.	Nil.
30	Kitajima Shoten.	Importer of sundry goods. Bicycle repair shop.	Y. Seko.	" (")	72 Maros Weg.	Nil.
31	Kohfuku Sangyo K.K.	Importers of Textile goods.	M. Hirano.	" (")	Passar Straat.	Nil.
32	Kohnan Gumi.	Contractor, Transporting business by carts. Construction material supply. Gypsum mining at Singkang. Carte factory at Makassar. Brick factory at Makassar. Yearly production 666,000 p'cs.	K. Kaneko.	"	31 Klapperlaan.	Branch. Maros, Pangkadjene & Pare-pare.
33	Kohnan Kaiun K.K.	Shipping.	K. Miyamoto.	"	4 Generaal van daalen Weg.	Nil.
34	Koha Shokudoh.	Restaurant.	T. Hanada.	" (Soppeng)	Passar Straat.	Nil.
35	Kokusai Denka-Tsushin K.K.	Telegraph & Telephone. Radio service station. Wireless communication in the area of N.E.I. & Japan. Wire communication in South Celebes.	K. Tobiyama.	"	22 Generaal van Daalen Weg.	Pare-pare, Bonthain, Watampone, Palopo, Makale, Malino, Other all town & Village in Celebes Telephone & telegraph station.
36	Kain Hōkōden.	Welfare organisation for seamen.	S. Yukawa.	"	5 Generaal van Daalen Weg.	Nil.
37	Makassar Suisan K.K.	Fishing by Japanese 565 tons per year. Fishing by Halves 1,528 tons per year. Fish distributing. Ice factory. Refrigerating equipment for wharf.	M. Uehara.	" (Maros)	1 stans Weg.	Pare-pare, Singkang. 5 Factories at Makassar. Factory at Pare-pare. Factory at Singkang.
38	Makassar Gomu Kogyo K.K.	Rubber & rubber goods manufacture.	H. Inagaki.	"	18 Pateoesang Weg.	Factory at Makassar.
39	Manwa.	Trade between Celebes, Java, & China. Petrols, Lubricants retail.	Sub Manager D. Tanabe. Manager K. Chiaki (in Java).	"	81 Ladjangir Weg.	Pare-pare, Watampone, Palopo, Madjene, Singkang, Rappang, & Bonthain.
40	Marufuku Sangyo K.K.	Tailoring at Makassar.	K. Kuratani.	" (Maros)	Soenggoeminasa.	Factory at Soenggoeminasa.
41	Mitsubishi Shoji K.K.	Trade (Export & Import). Cotton Ramie plantation at Kendari, muna & Boetoeng island. Purchase of Local products, Yearly purchasing quantity Peanut 2,500 tons, Green beans 1,500 tons. Sea biscuits factory.	H. Omoto.	"	Lage Weg.	Pare-pare, Singkang, Bone, Makale, Rantepao, Kendari & Wotoe.
42	Mitsui Bussan K.K.	Trade (Export & Import). Purchase of local products. Yearly purchasing quantity maize 20,000 tons Monthly " " " powder 500 kg. Paper mill at Enrekang monthly 150,000 sheets. Brick factory at Pare-pare production monthly 200,000 pieces. Paints works at Soenggoeminasa " " 8 tons. Rubber plantation at Ramasi (near Palopo), Rubber sheet 5 ton monthly. Rubber " Talenge (" Masamba) monthly. Rubber Gasoline 2,000 litre monthly. Vegetable farm at Enrekang, Karosi & Wotoe. Coffee estate at Goldman near Masamba.	H. Makino.	Gang 276-13 Mesman-Laan.	89 Klapper Laan.	Paints factory at soenggoeminasa Brick " " Pare-pare. Farm station at Ramasi, Karosi, Talenge, Enrekang. Branch at Pare-pare Watampone, Bonthain, Palopo, Enrekang.
43	Minami Taiheiyo Boeki K.K.	Shipping 15 vessels (3,300 tons) were sailing in war time, at present 2 vessels (400 tons) remained and transferred by your Authorities. Ship building, Saw mill, Timber felling. Trade of Copra. Mica Mining at Bangai island production 15 tons per year.	M. Torawa. (Sick).	Pinrang hospital.	41 Klapper Laan.	Poso, Loek Banggai Dongala.
44	Menado Zookan K.K.	Wooden ship building at Malili.	K. Okamura.	Malimpoeng.	47 Goa Weg.	Malili Shipyards.
45	Nanyo Seitai K.K.	Bag Factory at Poso at Halmahera island.	M. Fujita.	"	11 Konings Weg.	Halmahera.
46	Nanyo Koshatsu K.K.	Plantation. Malino Farm-Vegetable Yearly production 350 tons. Malakadji Farm-Vegetable " " 100 " Tanette Farm Coffee & rubber, Coffee per year 150 " Rubber smoked sheet 200 tons. Purchasing local products. Rice Yearly purchase 64,000 tons. Greens " " 60 " Vegetable " " 900 " Importer of sundries. Sake Brewery at sidenreng, yearly production 3,600 litre.	T. Bunno.	"	89 Klapperlaan Makassar.	Rice cleaning mill at Makassar Maros, Pangkadjene, Labakang, Baroe, Pare-pare, Sidenreng, Pinrang, Soppeng, Tomboero (Malino), Soenggoeminasa. Farm station at Malino, Malakadji, Tanette, Tjikoro. Branch. Pare-pare, Pinrang, Rappang, Sidenreng, Soppeng, Singkang, Bone, Bonthain, Djenepono, Soenggoeminasa, Maros, Pangkadjene, Kendari, Makale, Palopo.
47	Nanyo Seoko K.K.	Warehousing at Pare-pare & Makassar. Loading & unloading.	Y. Matsumori.	" (Maros)	19 Konings Laan.	Pare-pare.
48	Nanyo Takushoku K.K.	Land Transportation by motor-bus in South Celebes. Collection of rice at Poso & Dongala. Cotton plantation in North Celebes. Farms Vegetable at Karosi, Wotoe. Sulphur mining in North Celebes. Importers.	K. Hara.	"	76 Shiffberg Weg.	Farms-Karosi, Wotoe, Tentena, Branch-Pare-pare, Watampone, Palopo, Madjene, Bonthain, Sindjal, Poso, Singkang.


88	Takeda Yakuhin Kogyo K.K.	Importers of sanitary & chemical goods, Drug factory. T. Obata Medical manufacturework at Bonthain & Bone.	T. Obata	Malimpoeng (Maros)	11 Mesman Laan.	Factory - Bonthain, Wataspone, Makassar.
89	Taiken Sangyo K.K.	Importers of Textile goods & machine, others. Paper mill at Maros 4,000 sheets Toilet paper per month Hand weaving mill at Maros.	S. Yoshitomi	"	78 Schiffberg Weg.	Factory at Maros.
90	Taishin Yoko	Importers of Sundries.	K. Naruse	"	Passar Straat.	Nil
91	Taiwan Takushoku K.K.	Salt manufacture at Takalar 50,000 tons produced per year. Cotton plantation area 600 H at Bonthain, unginned Cotton production 2,000 picol per year. Farming in Vegetable at Maros. Handspinning & weaving, sewing, plantation of Jute.	T. Inata	" (Maros)	19 Dadi Weg.	Takalar, Djenepono, Boeloekoemba, Bonthain, Salaijar, Maros, Bilibili, Mamoeedjee, Spinning factory at Makassar.
92	Taiwan Shikusan Kohgyo K.K.	Leather factory at Soenggoeminasa. Production yearly Buffalo leather 7,000 sheets Goat leather 11,000 " Ice Refrigating Factory. Shoe maker. Glue factory, Stock farming, Meat manufacture. Dairy farm.	Y. Inami	"	98 Hospital Weg.	Pare-pare, Singkang, Makale, Palopo, Bonthain, Tjikoro, Factory - Bone, Soenggoeminasa, Tjikoro, Pare-pare.
93	Taiwan Ginko	Banking Business at Makassar. Agent for Imperial Bank & Nanpo Kaihatsu Kinko (South development institute)	S. Isomura	Makassar o/o Liaison Office	69 Prinsen Laan Makassar	Nil
94	Tetsudoo Kogyo K.K.	Contractor	S. Takaike	Malimpoeng	S.S. Weg	Nil
95	Tsubono Shoten	Importer & exporter. Collection of local products - Copal, Damar, Beeswax, Kapok, Coffee Bag mill & Button works at Rantepao. Farming at Bonthain.	H. Tsubono	" (Maros)	12 Waradekaja Weg	Branch - Bonthain, Bone, Palopo Rantepao Button - Factory - at Makassar Kapok - Factory - at Bonthain Farm at Paranglean Bag Factory at Rantepao
96	Tooyoo Hooseki K.K.	Cotton plantation, Ginning, Handspinning & weaving at Poso, Donggala. Production - unginned cotton 6,000 picol per year.	M. Fujita	" "	11 Konings Laan	Poso, Loek, Paroe, Donggala, Tolo-toli.
97	Toyoda Eidosha K.K.	Importers Repairing motor vehicles capacity 100 cars to be repaired. Carte factory at Makassar.	K. Terada	"	14 Tromp laan Makassar	Factory at Sanboengjawa. " " S. S. Weg. " " Makale.
98	Too-Indo Senjochin K.K.	Importers & retailers of ship supplies, ship tools & equipment.	S. Hayashi	"	23 Prinsen Laan Makassar	Makassar (office)
99	Tooa-Koko K.K.	Paper mill, repairing of iron tool, manufacture for polishing tools, wooden works	T. Sakai	" (")	6 Waradekaja or 45 Maros Weg Makassar	Paper & other mill at Panaiken in Goa.
100	Tokyo Gas K.K.	Gas Factory & supply	Y. Ohmori	"	19 Prinsen Laan Makassar	Gas Factory 9 Maros Weg Makassar
101	Tokyo Kaijo Kasai Hoken K.K.	Marine & fire insurance business.	T. Arakawa	" (")	70 S.S. Weg	Nil
102	Too-Indo Suisan K.K.	Fishing at Kendari, at Menado.				
103	Yamato Hotel	Management of Hotel & restaurant.	N. Ahara	"	5 Het Hooge Pad	Pare-pare, Malino.
104	Yomiuri Shinbunsha	Reporting (already closed at the time of closing war)				
105	Usui Shoten	Importers (member of S.E.H.K.)	Usui	"	Makassar	

Remarks: Regarding the present location of Manager or owners mentioned in this list, all personnel should be concentrated in Malimpoeng Area up to the 10th, inst. by Your order. Some of them put in brackets, for example (Maros) means they are staying at present in Maros, being expected to shift for Malimpoeng by S. S. Haruoka Maru sailing on the 6th, inst..

— AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY SOUTH CELEBES — INSTR 4 23 OCT 45 —

R.F. 1:1,000,000

REF MAP AERONAUTICAL SERIES SHEETS A4 AND B4



SCALE 1 IN = 16 MILES (approx)

MILES 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 MILES


APPENDIX 'M'

Prepared by 21 AUST INF BDE INT SEC 20 DEC '45

— AREAS OF RES. ONSBILITY SOUTH CELEBES — INSTR. II 7 DEC 45 —

R.F. H,000,000

REF MAP AERONAUTICAL SERIES SHEETS A4 and B4



SCALE 1 IN = 16 MILES (approx)

MILES 10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 MILES

APPENDIX "N"

Prepared by 21 AUST INF BDE INT SEC 20 DEC '45.

PRELIMINARY REPORT BY SURVEILLANCE PARTY IN THE AREA
NORTH OF THE SADANG RIVER, CELEBES - 19-27 NOV 1945

Ref Maps : Aeronautical Maps 1 in 1,000,000
Sheets A4 and B4

TO REPORT ON OPERATION
MAKASSAR FORCE
22 SEPT 1945 TO 20 DEC

STRENGTH

1. Strength of Party - 63 all ranks comprising :-

O.C. Major G O O'DAY	1
NICA Party	5
Capt GREGORY	1
War Crimes Investigators	2
ASC Party	2
Escort	52
Total	<u>63</u>

TASKS

2. Tasks of the party can be summarised as follows :-

- Investigate numbers of Japanese in the area North of SADANG River under their control
- Investigate store dumps, warehouses, including stocks held, if any.
- Investigate native resources and industries
- Investigate Japanese administration and make recommendations for future control
- Assist Capt GREGORY of D in C Staff in terrain study
- Investigate possible War Crimes

ROUTE

Pare Pare - Rapping - Enrikang - Malile - Kaseped - Palepo
Moesabe - Watoo - Pindolo - Taripa - Poso thence return to Palepo -
Siwa - Pare Pare

REPORT ON TASKS

4. Ref Para 2 (a) It was found that there was a deficiency of 724 between the numbers allowed by Makassar Force Instruction No 6 and Appendices, and those actually in the area. It was noticeable, that of a total of 65 civil administrative personnel allowed, only 36 were in the area.

5. Ref Para 2 (b) It was found that :-

- the Japanese throughout the area complained of robberies in their stores, particularly in rice and weapon stores
- the store dumps did not tally 100% with the figures shown, particularly at Kalosi and Malili, where stores were found which were not recorded by the Japanese, in the former, comprising cloth and general stores, and in the latter, a shipyard, timber mill and ships stores.

6. Ref Para 2 (c) The native resources in detail are being reported upon separately by the NICA party, but generally there is a shortage of cloth and medical supplies, also in some areas rice, notably at Enrikang. Factories as established by the Japanese have almost stopped, the main exception being a small cotton spinning mill at Poso.

7. Ref Para 2 (d). The following are typical examples of faults found in Japanese administration :-

- (a) Although the Japanese agree with the Rajah of Enrikang that rice is short in his area, they have taken no action to remedy it, despite large stocks held for the Japanese in the town and being allowed to deteriorate badly.
- (b) At Makale, the Rajah has continually requested permission to re-open a cloth mill, but the Japanese refused and when questioned could give no satisfactory explanation. They have since re-opened the mill. The Rajah has also asked for protection against the terrorising tactics of former Heihos, but the Japanese declare that they are powerless in the matter and take no action.
- (c) At a village near Rantapeo, Limbon, a number of Rifles and 500 rounds of ammunition were stolen on 24 Oct 45. No investigation was even attempted until 31 Oct 45, and as report was submitted covering the loss, the Japanese blamed the theft onto the Heiho but could give no explanation as to why no investigation was made for seven days, nor why no action was taken against the responsible persons.
- (d) Throughout the general stores area, deterioration of food, particularly rice and sugar, is pronounced, due to the method of storing and issuing.
- (e) From and including Masamba, there is no Japanese administration at all. No directive was given to the local authorities but they appear to have better control of their areas than those still Japanese controlled. There is noticeably no trouble with Heiho in these areas.
- (f) The situation at Palopo is the subject of a special summary attached as Appendix "A".

8. Ref Para 2 (e). Captain GREGORY's report has been made to Engineer in Chief. A terrain study in general terms will be submitted in the detailed report by the O.C. Surveillance Party.

9. Ref Para 2 (f). Much information was gained on both military and civil war crimes, which is the subject of a special report by Flt Lt O'SHEA, RAAF who controlled the investigation.

10. POLITICAL SITUATION

- (a) Throughout the entire area the F.I.M. has a very firm footing. In the areas supposedly administered by the Japanese, this shows a marked tendency to be extremist. Outside this area it exists but appears less radical and the intimidation and threatening methods used in such towns as Makale and Palopo are not employed.
- (b) It is to be noted that most Rajahs appear to be dominated by the F.I.M. and when a lack of control in the village administration is found, they state that they are unable to control the young people.
- (c) The presence of a party of NICA officials caused comments and in the case of Palopo and Poso, threats by the local population. It was extremely difficult to explain the relationship between NICA and the ANF, as the Indonesians have definitely separated the two identities. It was most noticeable that without exception, in the villages under Japanese administration, refusal to co-operate with NICA was well organised, notably in Enrikang, Makale and Palopo.

CONFIDENTIAL

It is recommended that :-

- (a) The Japanese be collected at Mallapoeng in their entirety as soon as their stores can be moved.
- (b) the Japanese civilian administration be withdrawn
- (c) a force of at least 150 be sent with necessary arms to maintain law and order at Palopo and assist in establishing NICA in the area Enrikang - Rantapeo - Palopo.
- (d) the former Heiho who do not belong to the Celebes be concentrated for deportation, instead of being permitted to terrorise the countryside.
- (e) no attempt at establishing NICA be made in the area North of the SADANG River without armed protection.
- (f) all dumps of ammunition and small arms held by the Japanese in excess of their entitlement be brought under AMP control as soon as is possible.
- (g) further surveillance parties move through the area periodically until the position is clarified politically and the Japanese administration completely removed.
- (h) the Proclamation of Comd Makassar Force covering sabotage and general disturbance of law and order be promulgated forthwith, whenever the presence of an armed party is practicable.

(Sgd) G O'DAY
OC Makassar Force Surveillance Party

SUMMARY OF EVENTS AT PALOPO

SER	DATE TIME	EVENT
1	261030	On arrival PALOPO - Warning by Japanese Comd of danger to law and order whilst NICA party was there
2	261100	Mahomed Sali of NICA party on arrival, was threatened
3	261200	Entire NICA party under escort
4	261300	Conference with Rajah's son, minister, chief of police, chief justice. Refusal :- (a) to post up Proclamation with (NICA) in it (b) to co-operate with War Crimes Committee while Mr COUVREUR was in it
5	261500	Sent to Rajah to give reply to 4
6	26 p.m.	Refusal by traders to sell goods to troops or barter in the markets. Fear expressed by Chinese, if they did, of consequences. Some parties of troops shadowed.
7	261650	Refusal to allow Japanese or Australians into former Dutch Barracks now used by Boy Scouts (?) Later explained, but not satisfactorily, by Rajah.
8	261730	Rajah's answer to 4 not forthcoming. Police insisted. Reply then was that 4 (b) would be done but 4 (a) would not be done. Rajah referred to meeting with Comd Makassar Force. Indicated that this refusal meant disobedience of Makforce.
9	261900	Japanese Comd ordered to visit Rajah and give similar instructions
10	262030	Rajah's answer to 9 not forthcoming. Police insisted. Japanese received same reply.
11	262130	Japanese ordered to put up C-in-C's Proclamation under guard
12	262130	F.I.M. guards with spears appear outside a) Rajah's Palace b) Former Dutch Residence (NICA) c) Pasa grahan
13	262200	Guards withdrawn after jeep patrolling
14	270730	Japanese with notices on sticks in streets picketed by F.I.M.
15	270740	Japanese ordered to put guards a few feet from notices
16	270805	Japanese attacked and notices removed
17	270830	2 Indonesians arrested trying to beat Japanese soldier
18	270840	Australians put up notices with guards. F.I.M pickets proceed to withdraw in 2 places and notices were read
19	270850	Indonesian guards with spears appear
20	270905	Notice on F.I.M. post - gate closed against vehicle, entry made Japanese grenades (16) pistol ammunition (30 rds) pistol holster, Samurai sword found. 7 men arrested all carrying concealed Kris
21	270915	Japanese Comd ordered to place Rajah in house arrest
22	270920	Rajah informed that this would be done, grounds being refusal to obey :- (a) AMF Order (b) Japanese Order and also inability to control his people
23	270930	Departed. Between SIWA and PALOPO 3 road blocks established to get Indonesians, brushed aside.

APPENDIX "0" to
REPORT ON THE OPERATIONS
OF MAKASSAR FORCE
22 SEP 45 to 20 DEC 45

HQ
MAKASSAR FORCE

3 Nov 45

REPORT OF KENDARI SURVEILLANCE PARTY
(SOUTH EASTERN CELEBES PENINSULA)

Ref Map: AERONAUTICAL MAP CELEBES = 1: 1,000,000 Sheet B4
OBJECTS

1. To investigate the problem of the evacuation of Japanese together with their stocks of food, POL, transport and ordnance stores from SE CELEBES peninsula to the main concentration area at MALIMPOENG.
2. To obtain accurate strength states of Japanese in this area showing separately army, navy and civilians and their locations.
3. To supervise dumping of all arms and ammunition into the sea.
4. To investigate condition of KENDARI airfield.
5. To ship swords, pistols and optical instruments back to MAKASSAR.
6. To investigate stocks of food under Japanese and native control.
7. To investigate and report on all transport.
8. To investigate ordnance stocks.
9. To investigate civil administrative problems and condition of natives.
10. To investigate medical and hygiene arrangements.
11. To arrest and ship to MAKASSAR five suspected Japanese war criminals.
12. To confiscate currency as per AMF order 12 to the Japanese army.

ANSWERS

1. Evacuation could not take place at present without at least ten days notice owing to wide dispersal of troops and stores, and the very limited amount of transport available.
2.

Army	473	Navy	1766
Civilians in Naval Adm Unit			142
Japanese businessmen			181
Grand total of Japanese in the area			2562
3. All arms and ammunition in the dumps at KENDARI, POMELAA, AMBESIA were dumped into the sea under supervision with the exception of the allowed 5% rifles, essential duty pistols and requisite amount of ammunition. All bomb fuses still in the area were dumped. All heavy guns were rendered useless. Bombs at POMELAA were dumped. Bombs at AMBESIA were burned.

No bombs at KENDARI were destroyed owing to lack of time and huge quantities involved.

4. Airfield could be put in working order within two or three weeks by using 100 natives to clear overgrowth and fill in craters. To make a good job of it, bitumen would be required for repair work. Undamaged surface is bitumen in fair order. Length 1 mile.
5. All swords, pistols and optical instruments were collected from dumps and shipped to MAKASSAR with the exception of duty pistols and a small quantity of ammunition, and also a quantity of ruined optical instruments.
6. There is sufficient food in the area to meet all requirements if properly administered and controlled.
7. Transport of all kinds is in extremely poor condition. Tyres are almost worn out with no spares available. Usable transport - 40 trucks (30 cwt and 3 ton), 10 cars, 2 motorcycles and 3 breakdown vans. Repairs by cannabilising. I recommend that in the event of the evacuation of the Japanese from the area, that all transport be handed over to the new administrators.
8. Ordnance stocks overall are in the last stages of disrepair and unservicability. I recommend that in the event of the evacuation of the Japanese forces from this area that all Ordnance stocks be dumped in one salvage heap and turned over to the new administrators.
9. Civil administration is more or less satisfactory. Several discrepancies were put in order.
10. Medical and hygiene arrangements were unsatisfactory. Maj ROWE drew up a reform programme.
11. The five war criminals listed were arrested and brought back to MAKASSAR with the exception of TOKUDA. In his place I arrested FUKUDA, also of the Special Police. He may however be the wrong man.
12. All moneys were confiscated (approximately one and a quarter million guilders) with the exception of the allowed percentage for administrative purposes.

TIMINGS: Party on the BURDEKIN left MAKASSAR on 290800I
 arrived KENDARI 301300I
 departed KENDARI 020000I
 arrived MAKASSAR 031300I

OC Party: Capt J.W. REDDIN, 2/27 Aust Inf Bn

Strength: 6 Officers 21 Other Ranks.

Signed: J.W. REDDIN Capt.
 OC KENDARI PARTY.

DISTRIBUTION

HQ MAKASSAR FORCE (2)
 File