

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/3/27

2/27 Infantry Battalion

July 1941

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Vol. I. and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Month and Year JUL. 1941.

ABC Coy W.D.
DEC 31 1941

SECRET
WAR DIARY

or
~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~
(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27th Bn A.I.F.

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. M.J. MOTEN, F.D.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
BARJA	1.	1300	<p>C.O. went fwd to carry out an extensive recon of the enemy defences from the fwd ops of Hill 394, a task which occupied most of the daylight hours.</p> <p>All was quiet throughout the day and night of 1/2 July, apart from harassing from enemy arty which sent shells around A and C Coys' areas, but without ever landing them actually in their positions. No damage resulted. At 1300 hrs our arty was brought up to engage the enemy, and very accurate ranging soon put some of the enemy guns out of action and silenced the others. It is also believed that an enemy ammunition dump was destroyed.</p> <p>The Coys remained concealed in fwd positions, with as little movement as possible, spending the time making observations of enemy defences and movements. The usual protective and recon patrols were carried out at night. The only change in dispositions was that 14 PL relieved 13 PL on Hill 394.</p> <p>9 PL under command of LIEUT SIMS left on recon of tracks north of Hill 394.</p>	

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Month and Year JUL, 1941

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required).

Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/37th Bn A.I.F.

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. M. J. MOTEN, F.I.C.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
BARTHA.	2.		<p>Little activity throughout the day. Bn remained disposed as for yesty, except that the R.A.P. moved back to a position near the main rd. at RASEN NEBI JOUNES 11921901. Ips remained concealed with a minimum of movement, activity being confined to observation of enemy movements from fwd OPs and vigorous protective and reconce patrols by night. Report on reconce patrol of 9 PL under LIEUT SIMS stated that PL returned to Coy with the exception of LIEUT SIMS and engineers who remained on fwd slopes of Hill 394 until 0230 hrs to make further observations.</p> <p>Aty continued harassing fire on known enemy defences, particularly hostile litys. Much enemy arty fire throughout the day, most of which fell in areas not occupied by our troops. Many shells did not explode. Defensive works continued on north side of DAMOUR RIVER, but little movement during the day.</p> <p>Coy went fwd to Clay's area at nightfall and remained there all night on extensive reconce of fwd areas and enemy defences.</p>	

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WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Commanding Officer LT COL M. J. MOTEN E.D.

Month and Year JUL '41

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Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
BARJA.	3		<p>The bearing on the site north of EL BATTAL was improved by report submitted by Lieut SIMS showing a possible route down the steep slopes to the DAMOUR. He had remained in the area 36 hrs. D Coy moved to BAAQOUN and B Coy to AAQLIYA thus bringing all coys to the features immediately south of DAMOUR R.</p> <p>No damage from hostile arty, although shells fell in neighbouring areas.</p> <p>Influx of $\frac{2}{3}$ 2/5 Bn and 2/14 Bn to area.</p>	

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WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

or

~~INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.~~

Unit 2/27 BN 171 F

(Erase heading not required).

Commanding Officer LT COL MOTEN, E.D.

Month and Year JUL 41

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
BARJA	4/5		<p>A day of much patrolling of fwd slopes, observation to detect enemy posts and gun pieces and recce of routes of tracks winding down the exceptionally steep slopes to R. DAMOUR.</p> <p>Reports attached</p> <p>A Coy - Lt Bell - clearing EL BATTAL</p> <p>B " - Enemy OP located</p> <p>" " 11 P1 Observation of DAMOUR - BEIT-ED-DENE rd.</p> <p>I.O. Enemy post on rd EL MOUGHARA.</p> <p>C Coy Fwd OP report on enemy movements</p> <p>A " Patrols recce tracks EL BATTAL</p>	

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WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Month and Year JUL 41

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Commanding Officer LT COL MOTEN ED

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
ER REZANIYE	5/6	1000	Bn HQ closed at BARTJA and re-established at ER REZANIYE	
		1710	OO 19 issued in field - copies written	
		2010	A Coy moving to spur SOUTH EL BATTAL	
		2035	D " " " " 800' SW " "	
		2114	B " " " " saddle between heights 394 + 450	
		2100	C " " " " creeks EAST hill 432	
	6	0230	C Coy moved to capture spur 12651958. Action completed by 0330	
		0330	A Coy crossed R. DAMOUR	
			D Coy held up by hostile shelling from EL BATTAL to R. DAMOUR	
			OC. Capt Rice wounded + Lt Grant killed	
		0330	Bn HQ and HQ Coy moved to region of OP ED DALAMIYE	
		0600	B Coy crossed R. DAMOUR	

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A B C & D Coy's WD appended

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Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Commanding Officer LT COL MOTEN ED

Month and Year JUL 41

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
EL BOUM	6/7	0600	A Coy moved via track SW from river to capture EL BOUM which was captured 0600 hrs. and on to first objective Pt 498 which was taken by 1500 hrs. Lt Geddes was killed in this action.	
		1515	B Coy moved through and took role of D Coy (disorganised) and captured second objective at ER ROUMANE + FOUR A CHAUX.	
		2300	Under covering fire from B Coy, C Coy advanced taking over B Coy's task and captured Pt 512 + post SOUTH of DARAYA.	
			D Coy reorganised under Lt S. Thomas and became reserve Coy with Bn HQ.	
			Bn HQ moved via EL BATTAL - R. DAMOUR to EL BOUM.	
			all Coy's now on objectives by 2300 hrs	

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Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Commanding Officer LT Col MOTEN ED

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
EL BOUM	7/8		<p>All Coys settling into positions on features NORTH of EL BOUM. RAP in banana groves of R. DAMOUR valley below EL BOUM.</p> <p>Boys assist further advance of 2/16 Bn towards DAMOUR by fire & fighting patrols from Coy positions line height 104 to spur SOUTH EL HAMRA.</p> <p>ENEMY MG posts located at heights 135 and 225</p> <p>Track from R. DAMOUR to EL BOUM repeatedly shelled by fire from concealed positions in high ground & re-entrants on right flank.</p>	
		1345	<p>TO (Lt Dean) and Pte Ashenden left on recon to local arty positions and on return ^{at 2215 hrs} reported surprising of enemy patrol and enemy digging on eastern slopes of height 560.</p>	
		2235	<p>B Coy ^{on RPL of} Lt Oke P1 and D Coy to move to capture 560</p>	

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Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Commanding Officer LT COL MOTEN ED

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Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
EL BOUM	7/8		<p>and investigate enemy activity on eastern slopes. They met with considerable opposition and the steep upward slopes gave much trouble maintaining contact with one another and an A Coy patrol in that area. Increased enemy activity made the position a serious one and the OC B Coy (Lieut Lee) asked the T.O. to return to Bn HQ and put the situation before the Co. He gave promise of further support & instructions that the position be held at all costs and cleared by daylight. He then advised Lieut Thomas with the remainder of D Coy to move in support of Lieut Lee. PW captured stated that reinforcement of 6 Regt 1 Bn 1st Ind. Inf Coy Foreign Region & 29 Tirailleurs totalling 300/400 had come to the area during night 7/8 from TEZZINE - DAMASCUS.</p> <p>During afternoon C Coy patrols with the assistance of I Coy 2/4 Bn attacked & captured MG post at pt 225. Lieut Mulligan being killed in this action.</p>	

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Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

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Commanding Officer Lt Col MOTEN ED

Month and Year JUL 41

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
EL BOUM	7/9	0530	Bn HQ transferred to position of western slopes of EL BOUM as a result of intensive enemy shelling	EL BOUM
	8/9	0700	B Coy less one pl and P Coy concentrated west of Hill 560 holding down but unable to shift enemy. Lt Sims with a pl from A Coy sent in as further support to try to turn right flank of enemy but were unsuccessful.	
		1440	Remainder of A Coy ordered into attack. The whole situ to some order command Capt White. By 2000 hrs enemy appeared to be withdrawing except for stubborn resistance on crest and timbered western slope. Lieut Thomas fatally wounded during this period.	
		0400	CO moved to Hill 560 and conferred with Capt White	
		0530	Patrols reported enemy had withdrawn & by 0600 feature occupied.	

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Commanding Officer Lt Col MOTEN ED

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
EL BOUM	9/10		C Coy moved PIs to protect right flank features previously covered by B + D Coys.	
		0800	A Coy in occupation Hill 560 C Coy moved to EAST - WEST spur DARAYA. B " occupied Bridge area in DAMOUR valley south of AIN MIKHAL D Coy - Pt 245 area on BEIT - ED-DINE rd vicinity EL MOUGHIRA. relieving Coys 2/14 Bn Lt Kimber recalled to act as OC D. Coy. Lt Magarey " " " B Coy.	
			Sgt Martin C Coy patrolled DACOUR and ABEY and found clear of lps.	

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27 Bn A11th

Commanding Officer LT COL MOTEN ED.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
EL BOUM	10/11		All coys enjoying a day of well earned rest.	
			D Coy area MG by one of our own planes. No casualties.	
			Rent Lt instructed to move B Coy in support of D Coy and for him to resume responsibility of right rear flank.	

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Commanding Officer LT Col MOTEN ED

Month and Year JUL 41

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
EL BOUM	11/12	2230	<p>Bn still resting. Co left for a two days spell and comd of Bn was taken over by Maj J. G. DOBBS news that hostilities would cease at 0001 hrs was received and a message was sent to Co from the Brig suggesting that he might postpone his leave and rejoin the unit.</p>	

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Army Form C. 2112.

Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Commanding Officer 1st Col MOTEN ED

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
EL BOUM	12/13	0430	Bn stood to as usual but were gladdened by news of cessation of hostilities.	
			during day, troops rested but did not relax military precautions	
		1645	C.O. rejoined bn.	
			CO ordered Bn HQ and A and C Coys to move to river DAMOUR below EL BOUM. C.O. went to VIBA	
		1750	Bn HQ est. River DAMOUR 1255 1964	
		1920	CO returned to Bn H.Q.	
		2200	C and A Coys in posn River DAMOUR C at 1254 1967 A at 1257 1964	

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WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27 BN AIF

or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Commanding Officer LT COL MOTEN ED

Month and Year JUL 41

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Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
R. DAMOUR	13/14		BN again at rest, tps devoting time to bathes, washing clothes, and generally cleaning up.	
		0800	B Coy less one section remaining with A/Hk gun moved to River DAMOUR at 12611959	
		0830	D Coy moved to River DAMOUR at 12631961.	

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27 BN AIF

Commanding Officer Lt Col MOTEN ED

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
R. DAMOUR	14/15		BN remained at rest During afternoon preliminary activity for movement was commenced.	
		1300	Warning order issued. Bn to be ready to move by morning 15 JUL	

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. MOTEN E.D.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
<u>R. DAMOUR</u>	<u>15/16</u>	<u>0600</u>	<u>During morning Bn completed preparations for movement.</u>	
		<u>0930</u>	<u>C.O. called and presided over conference of Coy Comds. Future policy of Bn in SYRIA defined as one of occupation and protection. Details of next movement outlined and instructions concerning same issued.</u>	
		<u>1030</u>	<u>O.O. No 22 for Bn movement issued through sigs.</u>	
		<u>1340</u>	<u>Bn H.Q. at 12551964 closes</u>	
		<u>1345</u>	<u>Bn adv. gd. moves</u>	
		<u>1350</u>	<u>Bn moves. Route: S.P. Rd Junc 13221955 BECHTANE 13351974, Rd Junc 13451991, AIN TRAZ 13621999, AALEY 1382081, AIN SAOUFAR 14752074 HAMMAMA 151209. Throughout route inhabitants displayed signs of friendliness and welcome.</u>	

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27 BN AIF

Commanding Officer H. G. MOTEN E.D.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
HAMMAMA	16/17	0600	Bn prepared to formally take over military zone from VICHY French force. 2 1/2 (MAJ. J. G. DOBBS) make recon of military zone A Coy moved to its allotted area ANTELIASS 13702205.	
		1300	Bn (Bn HQ, HQ Coy, D Coy) paraded and marched to French HQ	
		1400	In presence of ceremonial Sds supplied by French force and D Coy, the representative of French force formally handed over command of military zone to C.O.	
		1500	Bn HQ established 14952090, and our troops occupy barracks and take charge stores	
		1630	B Ech. arrived.	

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27 Bn AIF

Commanding Officer Lt Col. MOTEN ED

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
HAMMAMA	17/18		<p>Bn was engaged in duties connected with its new role and in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">(a) ascertained situation of dumps and factories and appointed adequate guards(b) commenced taking acc of stores taken over(c) commenced proper cleansing of barracks	

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27 BN AIF

Commanding Officer Lt Col MOTEN ED

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
<u>HAMMAMA</u>	<u>19/30</u>		<p>Bn continued its garrison duties, providing guards over munition dumps, and actively patrolling roads and villages in Bn area of responsibility.</p>	
		<u>1015</u>	<p>7ps at Barracks paraded & were reviewed by Brig JES. STEVENS, who congratulated Bn on its performance in the SYRIAN campaign and on its smart appearance this day.</p>	
		<u>1310</u>	<p>May-Sen LAVARACK visited Bn</p>	

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Month and Year JULY 1941

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27th Bn. A.I.F.

Commanding Officer Lt. Col. M.J. MOTEN E.D.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
HAMMANA	20/21	0700	Bn. still doing garrison and guard duties. Troops on leave to BEIRUT for first time. Leave allotment 10% of Coy. strength - leave parties moved per Bn. transport.	
		2000	Bn. area of responsibility defined and night patrols were instituted to improve efficiency of security and protection.	

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Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27th Bn. A.I.F.

ACTING Commanding Officer MAJOR J.G. DOBBS

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
HAMMANA	26/27		Another routine day	
		1900-2130	Guard Bn band entertained troops.	

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Unit 2/27th Bn. A.I.F.

Month and Year JULY 1941

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ACTING Commanding Officer MAJOR J.G. DOBBS

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
HAMMANA	28/29		Security and Protective Patrols continue. Capt. S.J. TOMS in command of H.Q. Coy. Coy. given definite areas of responsibility. School for junior N.C.O.s commences under direction of Lieut. C.A.W. SIMS.	

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WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

Unit 2/27th Bn A.I.F.

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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ACTING Commanding Officer MAJOR J.G. DOBBS

Month and Year JULY '41

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
HAMMANA	29/30		Capt. Nichols o.c. C Coy in charge of party to TRIPOLI area on two day Road Recce	
			Lt Col. M.J. MOTEN E.D. returns from leave but left almost immediately to take charge of 21 st Aust. INF. BDE during absence of Brig. J.E. STEVENS.	
			Capt. J. CUMINGS returned to Bn from REST CAMP.	

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Unit 2/27th Bn.

Army Form C. 2118.

ACTING Commanding Officer MAJOR J.G. DOBBS.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	References to Appendices.
HAMMANA	30/31		Another Routine day	
		1730	Road Recce Party under Capt. Nichols returns.	



W.A. DIVISION

KEEP YOUR MOVEMENTS SECRET.

Express
Sgt M. J. Moran
17 Aust Inf Bde
AIF abroad.

15 Feb 41.

Dear Harry.

If this ever catches up with you
it is the précis of the operations of the Coy Bn
in Syria June - July 1941.

I have lodged with O2E all the
extracts of history of the Coy Bn during AIF period
which I was working on up in Syria
with very sincere regards to you all.
M. Moran.

~~Please attach~~

D. Records office
with Col. Sany

WRITE ON BOTH SIDES. IT'S A WARTIME ECONOMY.

2/24 Bn Syrian
Campaign

MAY 28 1948

PRECIS OF OPERATIONS OF 2/27 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTALION

IN THE SYRIAN CAMPAIGN.

JUNE-JULY 1941.

- 20 - MAY At this time 2/27 Bn, within 21 Aust Inf Bde, formed portion of the garrison of MERSA MATRUH fortress.
- 21 - MAY 2/27 Bn were placed under 12 hours notice to move as from 1500 hrs 21 May. A conference of 7 Aust Div Comds was called and preliminary arrangements put in hand.
- 22 - MAY Under orders from Western Desert Force the advance party of 2/27 Bn left at 1500 hrs.
- 23 - MAY The road party of the unit left MATRUH in convoy at 0450 hrs for Palestine.
- 24 - MAY The night of 23/24 May was spent by road party in bivouac at Wadi Natroun and the night of 24/25 May at Moascar. At HQ 6 Aust Div Bde Comd received outline of concentration area of Bde in North-eastern Palestine and indication of Bde task in hand. Bde Comd moved out and Bn Comd was left in charge to supervise Bde and handing over of Comd to Brigadier Armstrong of the 5th South African Bde. Bn Comd left Mersa Matruh on the night of the 24th at 2200 hrs.
- 25 - MAY Bn left at 0400 hrs.
- 26 - MAY Road and rail parties commenced to arrive and detrained at HADERA.
- 27 - MAY Bn Comd and recon party with Bde Comd made a recon of the Bde lying up area for the attack just south of the Syrian border in the Ummal Faraj-Tarshiha area. Bn moved up through the Musmus pass to Kfar Yehezkel.
- 28 - MAY Bn Comd received from Bde Comd further details of the task.
- 29 - MAY Additional vehicles to bring the Bn up to W.E. strength were received
- 30 - MAY The day was spent in operational planning.
- 31 - MAY Unit representatives made a final recon of laying up area. To reduce vehicle loads to a minimum, a supplementary kit store was established at Acre.
- 1 - JUN With the Bn established at Kfar Yehezkel, a conference of Coy and equivalent Comds was held at Bde Hq. They were given an outline of the task and "put in the picture", which up till then had not been passed below unit Comds for security reasons. The outline plan provided for the capture of Beyrouth on the first day, with the slogan "Beyrouth or Bust". Training was continued with day and night route marches.
- 2 - JUN Bn still disposed at Kfar Yehezkel with troops in training.
- 3 - JUN Bn Comd with Bde Comd, B.M., and C.O. 2/14 Bn visited HQ North Somerset Yeomanry to finalise details of co-operation with that unit in the early stages of the operation. The Bn remained in training at Kfar Yehezkel.

- 4 - JUN 21 Aust Inf Bde O.O. No.7 placed 2/27 Bn and attached units, to be known as MOTCOL, in the assembly area UMM AL FARAJ.
- 5 - JUN Coy Comds conference held in the morning. Bn at KFAR YEHEZKEL. Portion of MOTCOL commenced move to lying up area. No further movement other than normal training during the day.
- 6 - JUN At 0900 hrs a conference was held attended by Officers, Sergts, and "I" section. C.O. unfolded the future role of the Bn. At 1430 hrs I.O. and Int Sec left Kfar Yehezkel for laying up area in an olive grove just south of the Syrian border, to act as guides to the Bn. At 2330 hrs MOTCOL (less B Echelon which remained at Kfar Yehezkel) commenced its night move to the assembly area at AL HUMEIMA. 2/27 Bn Op Instn No.1, giving D.l. as 8 June, was issued to all Coys.
- 7 - JUN The movement to the assembly area was completed by 0525 hrs with digging and camouflaging finished at 0600 hrs. During the day the Bn remained under cover. A Coy Comds conference was held at 1100 hrs. 2/27 Bn O.O. No.6 issued giving information that 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp is moving on D.l. into Syria to seize the aerodrome at BEYROUTH and the eastern and northern entrances to BEYROUTH between ZAAJAR and ANTELIAS. The objective to be Rd RAYAK-BEYROUTH, (west of AIN SOFAR inclusive). MOTCOL to seize the eastern and northern entrances to BEYROUTH between ZAAJAR and ANTELIAS. Bde Comd held a conference in the assembly area and final orders were issued.
- 8 - JUN Reveille at 0330 hrs. At 0400 hrs Comd Gp moved off and Adv Gd D Coy under Major Isaachsen formed up, prepared to move. At 0800 hrs 17 Pl (Lieut Rudd) D Coy, with supporting arms moved over the border and cleared enemy post on the high ground south of ISKANDAROUN at 0650 hrs. 2/14 Bn now being in possession of NAQOURA, C.O. 2/14 Bn ordered 17 Pl back to rejoin MOTCOL in the Bn area at AL HUMEIMA, where they arrived at 1100 hrs. Following a recce party from D Coy, the Bn, (less B Ech left at AL HUMEIMA) moved forward and crossed the Syrian border at approx 2000 hrs and bivouacked north of NAQOURA (ref map 16342810). The delay in the advance of MOTCOL being occasioned by the failure of the special ISKANDAROUN raiding party to prevent the road demolition. A conference, C.O.s of supporting arms and O.C.s Coys in attendance, was held at 2100 hrs.
- 9 - JUN At 0500 hrs the Bn left bivouac area at NAQOURA and crossed the demolition at ISKANDAROUN which had been repaired by Engrs and advanced by transport to a point south of TYR. 2/27 Bn D Coy moved forward to assist 2/16 Bn to force a crossing of the LITANI RIVER. The attack was made at 2130 hrs and a bridgehead was formed across the river to the east of the blown bridge. Exploitation was carried forward to the high ground to the North and East. At 1900 hrs the remainder of the Bn moved forward by transport to the vicinity of a deep re-entrant immediately south of the LITANI RIVER, arriving at 2030 hrs, and there bivouacked for the night.

10 - JUN By 0100 hrs D Coy had successfully carried out their part in the crossing of the LITANI RIVER, suffering two casualties.

At 0230 hrs A Coy moved and crossed the river about 0500 hrs and took up a position in the rear and to the left of D Coy, here they, (A Coy) came under fire for the first time, from snipers and M.G.s. At 0430 hrs B Coy moved in support of A Coy.

MOTCOL, which had been ordered by Bde not to move north of position held by D Coy until recce had been made in QUASMIYE area to ascertain definitely the location of enemy positions reported by P.O.W.s, moved forward at 0600 hrs and made HQ at QUASMIYE (map ref 11611561).

At 0715 hrs MOTCOL assumed the role of advance guard and moved forward. The move was largely brought about by news from 6 Div Cav who reported, Enemy retiring.

C.O. enlisted the aid of the Navy by signalling to two destroyers lying close inshore asking them to deal with AFVs. Good work was done by the Navy on their Target. Bde Comd then conferred with Bn Comd.

At 0950 hrs A Coy moved forward between foothills and road and came under heavy M.G. and rifle fire from positions high in the hills. After a particularly hard day in which they cleaned up several positions, and with 9 Pl assisted by Bren carriers, captured the Convent area, they finally took up a position at 1700 hrs on the hills forward of JEM JEM. A Coy casualties for the day were seven.

At 1115 hrs HQ Coy assisted by 5 Pl and 2 Pl took the role of a rifle Coy and supported 2/16 Bn. Exchanges with the enemy continued for the remainder of the day.

Information received from D Coy at 1049 hrs stated that a fighting patrol attacked the enemy on the peak above QUASMIYE but were forced to withdraw. Another platoon was called up to make a further attack.

At 1700 hrs M.T. rejoined the Bn which had moved approx one mile further North.

Bde Comds held a Bde conference at 2/27 Bn HQ at 1900 hrs and an hour later C.O. conferred with G.C.s Coys.

Bde Warning Order issued during the day :-- " 2/27 Bn will capture Innsariye posn 2400 hrs ".

At 2130 hrs C.O. and Bn HQ moved to start line for attack on ADLOUN and village south of ADLOUN. At 2400 hrs Artillery barrage opened up for 25 minutes while the Bn moved to attack with B and G Coys forward, A following B, then Bn HQ and Pioneers in rear of A Coy. D Coy acting as special flank protection of MERDJAYOUN Rd.

11 - JUN At 0500 hrs on nearing first objective A Coy and Bn Hq arrived on B Coy objective and C.O. decided to send back and check up on delay of other Coys who were being held up. C Coy were unable to keep pace with the barrage and met considerable opposition from the shore area.

B Coy suffered greatly by the collapse of the wall of a burning building. Four O.R.s were killed and the O.C. wounded. O.C. C Coy was also wounded. A Coy had no casualties.

By 0300 hrs the village of ADLOUN was by-passed, the long enemy opposition being due to Foreign Legionaires.

At 0600 hrs the Bn took up positions along the coast road at 101167 and had a day of rest.

At 2100 hrs a conference of all Comds in Bde was held at MOTCOL HQ. Half an hour later orders were issued for further movement North.

After the capture of the objective by the 2/27 Bn at day-light, 2/14 Bn were ordered to pass through and take up the advance on the 12th June.

- 12 - JUN At 0330 hrs the Bn, less B Echelon, moved off in M.T. towards the ZAHRANI RIVER but were held up while Artillery barrage was put down on enemy positions to enable 2/14 Bn to go forward.
 21 Aust Inf Bde Op Instn No.18 gave Bde objective as the road DJEZZINE-SAIDA, and placed 2/27 Bn as advance guard.
 At 0535 hrs Bn moved up to 2/14 Bn HQ. At 1100 hrs D Coy pushed forward as first support to 2/14 Bn. C Coy following soon afterwards. A and B Coys were held in reserve.
 D Coy crossed the river safely and went on to top of hill. C Coy met fierce opposition and were pinned down for some time. The advance continued with D and C Coys searching the hills.
 C.O. who had closely followed operations then called up A Coy from reserve and a quick recce was made for an attack on SAIDA.
 At 1345 hrs A Coy was made the vanguard and moved behind a detachment of Cav carriers.
 At 1533 hrs the enemy shelled the road and troops were forced to disperse from M.T. Dive bombing tactics were used by the enemy and one plane which crashed amongst A Coy caused several casualties.
 At 1730 hrs Bn HQ was established at HASSANIYE. At 2200 hrs A and B Coys were ordered to move forward to positions at 11721782 and 11671776 respectively, in preparation for attack.
 During the day the Navy co-operated in the advance.
- 13 - JUN At 0550 hrs no communication had been received from forward Coys, A Coy at MAHRDOUCHA 117176 and B Coy near RHAZIYE 116176.
 Bn HQ, HQ Coy, C and D Coys and A Echelon were located near HASSANIYE 115174. Enemy aircraft attacked the area doing very little damage.
 At 0930 hrs a runner sent forward to contact the forward Coys, failed to do so and at 1300 hrs Major Pope with a small party was sent forward to take charge of the forward Coys and issue orders for one Coy to move across the SAITANIG RIVER.
 Enemy aircraft again attacked, concentrating on artillery positions and A Echelon. A Bde conference of Comds was held at 1345 hrs.
 Bn HQ, HQ Coy, C and D Coys moved out East in the rear of commanding hills, to a high feature overlooking the SAITANIG RIVER. This move was not completed until 0400 hrs 14 June.
 A Coy remained in occupation of the high feature just west of MARHDOUCHA, all day, while B Coy having attained their objective, the high ground overlooking the NAHR SAITANIG on the right of A Coy remained there for the rest of the day.
 A message from 21 Bde instructed 2/27 Bn to press forward to originally allotted objective and act as right flank guard and assist as much as possible the advance of 2/16 Bn
- 14 - JUN Bn HQ and HQ Coy remained at DARB ES SIM all day.
 At 1400 hrs artillery barrage opened and Coys prepared for the attack on the high feature south of MEY OUI MEYIE 11721782.
 A and B Coys moved forward to the start line by way of the SAITANIG RIVER and the shelter of Hill 192. From here the enemy defences were slowly pushed back.
 At 1500 hrs D and C Coys were ordered into the attack on MEY OUI MEYIE and commenced their move on to the start line at 1530 hrs. D Coy, unable to reach the start line in time asked artillery barrage to be extended a further half hour.
 E/A attacked Bn HQ and O.P.s. The start line being the crest held by A and B Coys, D and C Coys commenced the attack at 1700 hrs, but were almost immediately held up by devastating fire from the barracks at MEYMOUI MEYIE. Officer casualties were high. A small party entered the village but were forced to withdraw later in the night after inflicting many casualties in street fighting.
 Small patrols pushed forward on to the objective during the night and reported that indications were that the enemy were preparing to withdraw. Great difficulty was experienced in maintaining contact with the situation. At 2400 hrs C.O. issued further orders for the attack on MEY OUI MEYIE.

- 15 - JUN At 0600 hrs A and B Coys advanced and found enemy positions evacuated. A Coy occupied MONASTERY HILL and B Coy occupied the village of MEY OUI MEYE.
 Recce patrol having established that MAR ELIAS 11781805 was clear of enemy, C Coy moved in.
 At 1330 hrs Bn HQ left DARB ES SIM for MEY OUI MEYE. After occupation of MAR ELIAS, C.O. followed recce party to the College American area which was reported clear. On examining SAIDA township he suspected that it had been evacuated by the enemy. Sgt Johns on a captured motor cycle rode along the coastal road and through the town and found it clear. C.O. with a small party then moved in to the town. After seeing the Mayor he returned and reported to Bde HQ.
 1700 hrs approx, with Bn HQ established on MONASTERY HILL, orders were issued for a further advance. All troops moved North and passed through the eastern outskirts of SAIDA.
 At 2000 hrs the unit reached bivouac site and Bn HQ was established at BRAMIYE 11821822. Troops settled down for their first real rest for many nights.
- 16 - JUN At 0900 hrs C.O., I.O., and F.O.O. moved forward on recce of forward areas. Operations on the coastal sector were at this stage slowed down to some extent pending the cleaning up of the positions around MERDJAYOUN and DJEZZINE.
 At 1015 hrs orders were issued to Coy Comds on the ground, for occupation by A Coy of the RMALE-AALMANE feature, and the moving forward of B Coy to occupy feature 11901830 overlooking WADI BOU TARE, also for D Coy to send one platoon to occupy A Coys previous position.
 Platoons moved in to WADI BOU TARE and searched orchards in that area and later A Coy moved up and occupied area as directed. B and D Coys then completed their necessary moves.
 An uninterrupted nights rest was had by all.
- 17 - JUN Troops were beginning to recover from the reaction of battle.
 At 1100 hrs a Bde conference attended by C.O. was held at 2/16 Bn HQ. At a Coy Comd conference held at Bn HQ at 1400 hrs C.O. outlined likely future moves of the Bn.
 Between 1700 hrs and 1800 hrs A French Naval vessel fired near the Bn area but was driven off by Arty action. E/A were also in action in the vicinity.
 No movement was made by sub units of the Bn during the day.
- 18 - JUN Due to 2/14 Bn moving to support 25 Bde, C Coy was called upon to stand to in order to protect the right flank.
 At 1000 hrs C.O. left on recce of forward Coys.
 Bn was disposed with A and B Coys forward, A Coy in the RMALE area and B Coy with two platoons on the high ground north of the WADI HABRA 11851832 and 11861831 and one platoon in the fork of the WADI BOU TARE 12021838. The remaining two Coys were situated, one in the rear and the other just forward of Bn HQ, which was still in the BRAMIYE area 11821822.
 C.O. carried out a recce of Bn area with Bde Comd and returned to Bn HQ at 1530 hrs.
 Movement during the day was confined to active patrolling.
- 19 - JUN At 0800 hrs a detachment of mortars moved out of Bn HQ area to approx 11841826 where a listening post had been established the previous night.
 2/27 Bn were ordered to hold with two Coys in the SEBLINE-KAFR MAYA area, the laterals leading to the coast from CHARIFE. To enable them to do this one Squadron of the Cheshire Yeomanry took over the DJEZZINE lateral. 2/27 Bn were strung out guarding laterals for a distance of five miles.
 A line was laid under very difficult circumstances from RMALE to D Coy, a distance of 4 miles.
 At 1615 hrs the Coys moved forward to occupy new positions.

- 19 - JUN The Bn was dispersed with three Coys A,C,D forward and B Coy in reserve. A Coy occupied OUARDANIYE area, C and D Coys the KAFR MAYA area while B Coy was at JAMLIEH.
At 1635 hrs E/A bombed A Coy area on the north edge of Wadi at 120186.
- 20 - JUN The MERDJAYOUN-DJEZZINE flank not yet having been secured, 21 Bde received orders from Div that no further advances were to be undertaken on the coast until the inland flank was secured.
The three forward Coys A, C, and D occupied the line El Ourdaniye-Kfar Maya, with A Coy at EL OUARDANIYE and C and D Coys near SEBLINE 12281873 and KFAR MAYA 12401869 respectively. Further back in the JAMLIEH area 12141854 B Coy still acted as reserve Coy. Throughout the day the Coys carried out recce patrols in the forward areas but no enemy seen.
Although far from well, the C.O. carried out his full programme as usual, conferring at length with the Bde Comd in the morning and carrying out recce amongst forward Coys in the afternoon.
- 21 - JUN In the morning C.O. carried out recce among the forward troops.
The Coys were disposed as yesterday, continuing their tasks of consolidating the ground won with a view to all round defence.
Active patrolling continued all day and night.
- 22 - JUN Coys occupied the same positions as yesterday and carried on with defensive preparations and patrols. One patrol passed through BARJA at 1400 hrs and found no signs of enemy. The Mouktaf of BARJA reported that there were no enemy in occupation of BAASIR and JIYE. D Coy patrol located an enemy O.P. at CHEHIM which on information passed was shelled out by the Arty.
All information pointed to the fact that DAMOUR RIVER would be the next enemy position of any strength and that it would be very strong.
Re-inforcements for the Bn arrived from Palestine and bivouacked to the rear of Bn HQ. (4 Offrs, 77 ORs).
- 23 - JUN Reinforcements were allotted and moved out to Coys.
As a result of the days operations, slight enemy movement was located at QASSOUBA, otherwise all quiet. Coys still disposed as yesterday, carrying out patrols in forward area and guarding right flank of column.
- 24 - JUN The Coys were disposed as yesterday. Patrols advanced as far as BARJA and reported all quiet in that area, no sign of enemy movements. At 1630 hrs orders were issued to B Coy to send back one platoon supported by two carriers and one A/Tk gun as a standing patrol to guard against outflanking in the area of the road block just west of JOUN 12331834. This task was assigned to 12 Pl.
More reinforcements arrived from Palestine, (6 Offrs, 39 ORs).

25 - JUN 21 Aust Inf Bde Op Instn No.21 placed 2/27 Bn as forward troops on right, with 2/16 Bn on left, the intention being for 21 Bde Gp to capture the high ground including the following features:-- Bend in road 121194-EL HAREM 12351942. After consolidation on the objective, active patrolling to be carried out by 2/27 Bn East to ER REZANIYE 125194.

At 0830 hrs reinforcements were inspected by C.O. and drafted to various Coys.

C.O. went on recce to forward areas, contacted 2/16 Bn, and visited B,C, and A Coys. A Coy was given notice to move forward to the area south of the DAMOUR RIVER.

In the afternoon C.O. carried out a second recce in the forward areas, making observations from D Coy O.P. and moving on to contact 2/16 Bn.

At 1330 hrs A Coy moved out along the right flank of the coastal column, their objective being EL HAREM, there to take up a position as a standing patrol. They had not reached their objective by 2400 hrs.

During daylight hours and the night of 25/26 June the usual patrols were carried out by all Coys. No contact was made with the enemy.

A Coy patrol which had gone out at 1930 hrs 23 June reported back at 0630 hrs 25 June. No enemy had been seen by one branch of the patrol on the ridge ES SADIYATT-ES SIYAR-ED DALAMIYE, and very little movement in the DAMOUR area. The other section of the patrol, no enemy seen forward of, or in QASSOUBA. Country and track very difficult. Observations were made from HILLS 374, 412, and 296

26 - JUN A Coy advised that they had reached their objective at EL HAREM At 0700 hrs after overcoming light opposition.

At 1300 hrs B Coy less 12 Pl, which remained in the JOUN area, moved forward from JAMLIEH to take up C Coy posn near SEBLINE. Meanwhile C Coy moved up to BAASIR at 1800 hrs and almost immediately moved on to Hill 375(12371922).

At 1515 hrs Adj.recced BARJA area for the Bn HQ position Bivouac area for Bn HQ was recced at WADI EL ZEINA, halfway on their advance to BARJA, where they arrived at 2210 hrs and spent the night. Throughout the day and night 26/27 June the usual patrols were carried out by all Coys, but no contact made with enemy.

27 - JUN Bn Hq ., and Hq Coy left WADI EL ZEINE bivouac and continued on foot to NEBI YOUNES where they turned off to BARJA. BARJA was reached at 0850 hrs and Bn HQ opened at 1400 hrs.

B Coy, less 12 Pl, left Seblin and moved forward to BAASIR.. Their vacated position was taken by 16 Pl of D Coy.

C Coy moved forward from Hill 375 to the ER REZANIYE AREA. Patrolling was kept up during the day and night, and only in one case was contact made with the enemy. A small patrol of A Coy contacted an enemy patrol of approx 1 Pl strength on HILL 394 (12541955).

28 - JUN Bn Hq moved further down into the wadi forward of BARJA 12301911.

The two forward Coys, A and C were within a mile of the DAMOUR RIVER. A Coy occupying EL HAREM region and C Coy the ground near ER REZANIYE, both with patrols and O.P.s operating fwd at night.

Small detachments of enemy were observed by fwd Coys on HILL 394 and at rd track junction east of ED DALAMIYE. Enemy artillery was active throughout the day.

B Coy, less 12 Pl, at Hill 375(12371922) and BAASIR, patrolling the area fwd to A and C Coys. D Coy and 12 Pl-B Coy were still patrolling laterals to the rear. During the day 1 Offr and 15 ORs reinforcements arrived.

- 29 - JUN Commencing about 0015 hrs enemy Arty heavily shelled A Coy area. Between 1545 hrs and 1900 hrs C.O. made a recce of forward areas including HILL 394 with a view to preparing the ground for the coming night attack. By capturing HILL 394 the enemy would be driven across the DAMOUR RIVER on the Bn front and good O.P.s would be obtained for artillery and future advance.
- 30 - JUN The attack on HILL 394 was launched by two Pls of C Coy at 0001 hrs and the objective attained by 0055 hrs. No opposition was met as the enemy were taken completely by surprise. No.13 Pl was left on the feature to consolidate and deny it to the enemy. They were continually harassed by shell fire in the early hours of the morning and their movements were restricted during daylight hours as they were well in sight of the enemy.
At 1200 hrs C.O. attended a conference at 2/16 Bn HQ. A patrol of one Pl strength from A Coy went fwd to EL BATTAL where a detachment endeavoured to find a track down to the river. The river was reached at a point near the bridge after a steep and difficult descent. As the bridge was guarded, patrol endeavoured to move up river but were unable to do so owing to impassable cliff face. Patrol returned at 0430 hrs 1 July.
- 1 - JUL Dispositions at this time were; Bn HQ and HQ Coy at BARJA, B Coy at AAQLIYA, C Coy had 14 Pl at ER REZANIYE, 15 Pl on HILL 432, and 13 Pl on HILL 394. 14 Pl relieved 13 Pl on 394 at 2200 hrs. D Coy 16 Pl at KFAR MAYA, 17 Pl at JOUN, 18 Pl at MAZBOUD. A Coy at EL HAREM.
C Coy patrol under cover of darkness once more tried to locate a suitable track and river crossing but were unable to do so. C.O. spent most of the daylight hours making an extensive recce of enemy defences from the fwd O.P. on HILL 394.
- 2 - JUL At 1400 hrs Bde Comd outlined the Damour plan and specified the essential recces to Bn Comds. There was little activity throughout the day with the Bn remaining dispersed as for yesterday. Patrols were maintained in a further endeavour to find a suitable track and river crossing. On the night of 2/3 July Bn Comd and party recced a further possible route to the stone hut feature.
- 3 - JUL The situation was improved by the finding of a suitable track and river crossing by Lieut Sims patrol which returned at 0230 hrs after having been out since 0830 1 JULY.
B Coy moved to AAQLIYA and D Coy to BAAQOUN thus bringing all Coys to the features immediately south of the DAMOUR RIVER.
- 4 - JUL An outline plan for the attack on the DAMOUR posn gave the following objectives to be captured on D.l. (As a preliminary to the main attack the Bn will capture the high ground immediately north east of ED DALAMIYE)
(1) Track north of EL BOUM from the road and track junction 12621974 to approx 12701976.
(2) The northern edge of the wooded area in 126198.
(3) DARAYA 12701990 to approx 12601985.
Plans were also given for preliminary moves of Coys. C Coy patrol returned at 0430 hrs and reported that a suitable track had been found for the move forward of C Coy to their subsidiary task north-east of ED DALAMIYE.
During the day D Coy moved forward from BAAQOUN to EL FESTEQANIYE. At 1800 hrs at D Coy HQ an outline of the forthcoming attack was given by Major Dobbs.

5 - JUL Final orders for the attack on DAMOUR were issued and 2/27 Bn O.O. No.19 issued in the field.

Bn HQ closed at BARJA and reestablished at ER REZANIYE AT 1000 hrs. At approx 2000 hrs A Coy moved forward to the spur south of EL BATTAL. B Coy commenced moving to the saddle between Pts 394 and 450 while D Coy was moving to the spur 800 yards S.W. of EL BATTAL. C Coy moved to the creeks east of HILL 432. The creek was crossed at 2300 hrs and the Coy rested. All preparations for the battle were complete as troops moved to their lying up areas.

6 - JUL By 0330 hrs C Coy had captured their preliminary objective.

At 0040 hrs A Coy moved down the difficult track from EL LABIYE to the river. The bridge was blown during the time of the descent. No opposition was encountered at the river crossing except for mortar fire from the direction of EL BOUM. The capture of EL BOUM was completed by approx 0615 hrs.

D Coy who were following in the rear of A Coy came under heavy shellfire from our own and enemy artillery and were badly knocked about and disorganised. B Coy arriving on the scene took over D Coys role of capturing the second objective whilst D Coy reorganised. A small party of D Coy later attached themselves to A Coy. The remaining men of D Coy eventually rejoined their Coy early in the afternoon.

Bn HQ and details of HQ Coy moved at 0700 hrs from Adv HQ on the forward slopes of 432 and proceeded via EL BATTAL to the river which was reached at 1300 hrs. They were subjected to heavy shellfire on the fwd slopes of HILL 394. At the river contact was made with C Coy who were now at EL BOUM, A Coy 2/14 Bn having taken over the position captured by C Coy.

At 1530 hrs B Coy fulfilling D Coys role moved fwd to the second objective, ER ROUMANE-FOUR A CHAUX, which after a prolonged fight was captured by 1730 hrs. One Pl was sent on to feature 560 to protect the right flank. C Coy then took over B Coys original task and under covering fire from B Coy advanced and captured the third objective, Pt 512 to south of DARAYA, at approx 2235 hrs. D Coy after reorganisation became reserve Coy with Bn HQ now at EL BOUM.

All Coys were on their objectives by approx 2300 hrs. C.O.s orders to C Coy were to hold the line of the third objective defensively to-night and not to continue to the line of exploitation at present.

7 - JUL All Coys engaged in active patrolling to the West as far as the 125 grid line. C Coy secured their position on DARAYA feature and a standing patrol was established to protect the right flank with a fighting patrol moving West to the feature between Pts 104 and 225. The patrol met with enemy fire from this feature and were unable to move until artillery fire was brought to bear on the feature. Assistance was supplied by 13 Pl and the feature was cleared from North to South with the exception of Pt 104 where heavy L.M.G. fire was encountered and the patrol was forced to withdraw. Recce by I.O. established that enemy were digging on eastern slopes of HILL 560. One Pl of B Coy and one of D Coy given the task of capturing HILL 560 met with strong opposition. Fighting on the feature continued into the following day.

Throughout the day the track from the DAMOUR RIVER to EL BOUM was continually shelled from positions high on the right flank. Some confusion was caused during the day by the passing through of other Bns.

According to Bde Op Instn No.26 the following Ops were to be undertaken by 2/27 Bn on 8 JULY; 2/27 Bn to clear enemy posts as far West as 126 Grid line and as far North as 199 Grid line. 2/27 Bn to be responsible for track DARAYA-DAMOUR.

- 8 - JUL Increased enemy activity on HILL 560 made the position serious. C.O. promised further support to B Coy and gave instructions that the position be held at all costs.
 Enemy reinforcements were arriving from the DJEZZINE and DAMASCUS sectors.
 At 0520 hrs Bn Hq transferred to the western slopes of EL BOUM as a result of intensive enemy shelling.
 At 0700 hrs B Coy, less one Pl, and D Coy concentrated west of HILL 560, pinning down the enemy but were unable to shift them. A Pl from A Coy was sent as further support and at 1440 hrs the remainder of A Coy were ordered into the attack. The attack was made at 2000 hrs and went on fiercely until 0100 hrs the following morning. The position was extremely obscure and although the enemy were surrounded on three sides, they continued to hold their very strong position. A decision was made to withdraw to the southern end of the hill and ask for Arty support at first light.
 Owing to the bulk of the Bn having concentrated on HILL 560 a large gap had been created on the right flank of the 2/16 Bn. C.O. contacted Bde and one Pl 2/14 Bn were placed at his disposal to fill the gap. They arrived however after the situation on HILL 560 had been cleared up.
- 9 - JUL C.O. went forward with F.O.O. to HILL 560 at 0500 hrs. At this time all was quiet and patrols were sent forward to contact the enemy. They reported HILL 560 clear and A Coy immediately moved forward and occupied the position. The Hill was littered by enemy dead. C Coy moved platoons to protect right flank features previously covered by B and D Coys. B Coy were ordered to withdraw to the rear of EL BOUM to the DAMOUR RIVER to rest where they occupied a position in the bridge area south of AIN MIKHEIL. A fighting patrol from C Coy moved into the DAKOUN area and on to the village of ABEY and found that both places had been vacated by the ENEMY. At 1300 hrs D Coy moved along rd. DAMOUR-BEIT ED DINE to feature 567, a position which they held for four days. 17 Bde took over the front and for the first time since the opening of the campaign on June 8th, 21 Bde ceased to be leading troops.
- 10 - JUL Dispositions of the Bn were now, Bn Hq at EL BOUM, A Coy HILL 560, B Coy RIVER DAMOUR, C Coy DARAYA, and D Coy HILL 567 and DAMOUR-BEIT ED DINE rd block. All Coys enjoyed a day of well earned rest. The remainder of B Coy moved to support D Coy at the road block and were in position by 1630 hrs.
- 11 - JUL The Bn remained at rest during the day. Portion of C Coy moved to the beach via DAMOUR. C Coy patrol were sent out to locate enemy gun positions in the KAHR MATTA area. A recon patrol from D Coy encountered fairly heavy enemy fire, otherwise there was no enemy activity. At 2230 hrs news that hostilities would cease at 0001 hrs was received and C.O. decided to postpone a two days spell.
- 12 - JUL Bn stood to as usual and did not relax military precautions throughout the day. French Envoys went through to AGRE and there initialled the convention ending the fight. During the day Bn Hq, A, and C Coys moved to RIVER DAMOUR below EL BOUM.

July 1 - 31.

July 1-4;- "B" Ech. at Saïda.

B.H.Q. at Barja.

Rationing during this period was somewhat difficult. The Coy's were on very mountainous country. Rations were forwarded by Q trucks as far as possible, to a Mule park when they were then transferred on to mules in section containers. The rations were placed in sand bags, each containing sufficient complete rations for a section of men for 24 hrs - thus packed these were found to carry quite well strapped on to the saddle. In most instances the C.Q.M.S. of each Coy accompanied the rations right forward to their men. The trips sometimes were somewhat precarious owing to the very uneven and stony terrain, and last but not least, mules and accompanying personnel were shelled and fired on by M.G., in no uncertain manner - nevertheless the rations always reached their destination - owing to the very good work of the unit muleteers.

During this period, mules had to be rationed (bundled hay, barley, and sunflower seed) by the Q.M.

In the case of B.H.Q. at Barja, the Q truck was enabled to go right to its destination on quite a safe and good road - although somewhat winding in nature. B Coy at Bassier, on a very high feature, just North of B.H.Q. at Barja, had to "carry" their rations - in this case a very difficult job - entailing at least 40 men to move the Coy's 24 hrs rations. Whenever possible, hot rations in Hot Boxes were forwarded.

The dry rations, were fortunately well supplemented with the 6½ mils allowance - and composed mostly of tinned fruit, tomato soup, etc., - this proved a real boon. Oranges were plentiful also.

Also during this and later periods the troops preferred to make their own tea, and therefore tea and sugar was put in calico bags enough for 10 men for 24 hrs.

July 5.

Everybody was issued with 48 hrs dry rations in view of the impending attack on El Boom.

July 6-7.

Bn. in attack. B Ech making preparations to forward rations to the Coy's in their forward positions.

July 7.

On the night of the 7th. B Ech, was organised into a carrying party composed of every man who considered he was fit enough to emulate the mountain goat. It was decided that each was to fill his pack with rations, still on the section basis of 10 men for 24 hrs.

These men were then split up into Coy groups, led by their respective C.Q.M.S.. Then transport ferried the men and rations to the most forward practicable point, which was as far as 16th Bn., H.Q. on road North of Damour River. After a recce, the party walked over the river via pontoon bridge, and along the road to the foot of El. Boom. Thence up the hills to B.H.Q., a very hard pull indeed. From B.H.Q. the Coy groups split up, and went further to their respective Coy's. Everything went smoothly and rations were delivered.

(2)

- July 8. It was proved that on this day rations, could be transported right up to the R.A.P., at the foot of El Boom, by Q trucks. Also mules were organised from thence on to carry the rations to Coy's.
- July 9-12 During this period of time, the rationing etc., was conveyed as mentioned above without any undue difficulty.
- July 13 On this day hostilities ceased.
- July 14-15 The Bn., moved down to the river for a clean up, and hot meals were at once brought up to the men, also as many new clothes as possible were sent up, -as the state of the men's wear was somewhat bad owing to the very bad time they had had.
- July 16. B Ech which had been very successfully Brigaded to this time was busily engaged in preparing to move forward and join the Bn, which had moved to Hammana.
- July 17 Moved to Hammana, a very difficult journey for M.T. and encountered some trouble owing to the steep nature of the road.
- July 18 Settling in at Hammana, outfitting men and checking war equipment.
- 30
It was found that the Bn, had come through the campaign without losing in numbers, any automatic guns, whatsoever.

A. B. Bear Capt., Q.M.,
2/27 Bn., A.I.F

2nd /27th Bn. War Diary -Monthly Summary -" 6 T Pln."

July 1-31.

- July 1-2 B. Ech. at Saids
A. Ech at ²¹ man
B.H.Q. Ech. at Barja.
Movement of transport confined to Coy kitchen vehicles taking rations to Bn. R.V. where the food was transferred to mules for carrying to Coys.
B. Ech. was Brigaded under B.T.O.
A. Ech. operated under T.O.
B.H.Q. under orders of Adj.
- July 3-9 A. Ech moved under orders of 2 i.c. to Ain Maya.
Comfortable billets in banana plantation. Good over head cover with a clean running stream close handy.
B. Ech. just south of American College in orchard, Aerial saw cover only. Plentiful supply of water.
Only movement of A. Ech was amm. lorry going forward on several occasions.
On night of June 6 A. Ech supplied 14 personnel to act as carrying party for rations. Away all night unaided to hill climbing they did their job cheerfully.
- July 10- 15
A. Ech moved to new night site at Jyeh. Good billets near sea. Drivers were able to enjoy swimming. There is a dangerous undertow here, one driver from another unit being drowned on July 12.
Movement of all transport confined to Coy. and Q trucks to from B. Ech.
B.H.Q. Ech. moved to A. Ech. area 12 July.
Hostilities ceased 12 July.
Bridge over Damour river blown all tpt. had to move over Pontoon bridge. Congestion of traffic very bad owing to state and narrowness of the road. Kitchen trucks able to move along Damour river road as far as R.A.P. where rations were handled by mules.
July 14 Coy trucks moved to Coy sites where men were able to get clean clothes, etc.
July 15 Balance of A. Ech. moved along Damour river road preparatory to moving Bn. in convoy.
- July 16. 2I Troop carriers reported to area ~~xxxxxx~~ 1300 hrs.
Moved off in convoy at 1400 hrs. B. Ech. did not move with us as they were still Bded. Convoy consisted of 42 unit vehicles 2I troop carriers 3I vehicles of 2/6 Fd. Amb.
Destination Hamana. The route was over tortuous roads mainly second class and owing to the steepness and the sharp bends the heavy vehicles found great difficulty in handling the turns. Most of them having a short wheel base had to back and fill at almost every bend. This slightly disorganised the convoy and at one stage the convoy was spread over ten miles of roads.
There were several ~~leed-~~ break downs on the part of the English vehicles but there were 3 (three-) spare vehicles in the convoy troops were transferred and no undue time was lost. One English troop carrier got lost carrying 12 of C. Coy This was recovered. The main portion of the convoy reached Hamana by 2100 hrs. and the T.O. brought in the stragglers by 2200 hrs.
B. Coy vehicles moved direct to their area at ^{H.} Hamana under O.C. as did C. Coy to Deir Harf.
A Coy remained at Hamana till morning and left at 0530 hrs. for Antelias.

War Diary -Monthly Summary-"6 t Pln.

July 17 B.H.Q., H Coy and D Coy. at 1400 hrs. took over amm. dump at Hamana. All transport being Ech. and moved into Barracks at 1430 hrs. Good vehicles accomadation.-two large garages with petrol stove room concrete floor and inspection pit. These garages held 17 M.T. and the balance were parked around the various sheds in the Amm. barracks. E. Ech. under Sjt. Cramp arrived at area at 1700 hrs. Coy Kitchen trucks moved under guides to various Coy. areas and balance of vehicles to the M.T. park where Q store unloaded same.

July 19-23

~~ExMtx~~ 12 M.T including carriers and M/G were sent daily to L.A.D. for general inspection and over haul. Their report was quite satisfactory.

Carriers D.S. required new engines and springs.

~~Carriers required-~~

Carriers M.G. All class I and well cared for.

Carriers G.S. 12 class I, 1 class II, 1 class III.

Vans G.S. 25 class I, 12 class II.

N.B. A number of class II G.S. vans were classified thus owing to doors and wind screens missing

Otherwise mechanically they were in good order.

From the 19th July onward 2 A/A trucks were used daily for Inter Coy patrols and on July 20 leave parties started to Beyrouth each Coy sending 10 per cent of their strength.

The M.T. supplied the transport for all these parties.

Supplied 1-3 ton lorry and two drivers to A.C.F. Beyrouth.

They were away from unit till Aug. 6

One driver Knight .M.L. was sent to hospital from Beyrouth on Aug. 2.

From July 19 onward 1 platoon per day was transported to Saïda for bathing party.

July 24 Transport supplied to R.C. to bring kits up from AREA

Transport supplied for Coy change over.

D. Coy at Hamana barracks went to Deir Harf.

C. Deir Harf -----Antelias

Antelias -----Hamana Barracks.

Change over started at 0730 hrs. completed by ¹⁴⁰⁰~~1300~~ Hrs.

July 25 Transport supplied to take Capt. White to Haifa.

July 26 Driver Hardie, mechanic Wright, Cpl Nelson returned from 21st I.T.B. and were allotted to vehicles.

July 27 Received G.S. truck 20cwt from D.A.D.C.S to complete WE for 20cwt ~~MxTx~~ M.T.

July 30 T.C Recce. 2 day leave tour Damascus, Merdjayoun, Saïda, Hamana.

July 31 Damascus 2 day leave started, one platoon leaving each day. One M.T. supplied permanently for cooks situated at Damascus biv. site.

Capt. Nicholls had 2 M.T. supplied for 2 day road recce patrol. As each party required mechanic 6T Pln. kept very busy and maintenance of vehicles becomes difficult to maintain.

JUL.

11. A Coy received word from G-TO HQ to cease fire at 0001 hrs, and that hostilities had ceased. No movement from Hill 560 this day. Coy still remained in occupation.
12. Coy moved from Hill 560 at approx 1600 hrs to the Damour River
13. Coy rested and washed clothes and had general clean-up in preparation for move to Beyrouth.
14. Coy resting in Damour River.
15. Coy left Damour River with rest of Bn at 1400 hrs to proceed to ANTELIAS. Owing to slow nature of road, Coy was only able to get as far as HAMMANA by 2300 hrs, where we bivouacked for the night.
16. Coy left HAMMANA 0600 hrs, arrived at ANTELIAS 1130 hrs. Road very slow, especially latter portion. Difficulty was experienced in locating suitable place to bivouac.
17. Coy commenced training in mornings and swimming in afternoons. Guards and picquets placed on ammunition and stores in ANTELIAS and DJALL ED DIB. Commenced making inquiries and locating other ammunition and stores.
- 18.-
23. Coy continued same training. Collection of ammunition, etc. continues.
- 24~~X~~ A Coy relieved by C Coy. A Coy go to HAMMANA.
- 26-
31. Swimming to SAIDA. Remainder of Coy training and guards.

AUG.

- 1-
2. Two officers and 26 ORs two days' leave to DAMASCUS and MERDJAYCUN. Remainder of Coy normal duties.
3. Coy resting.
4. 24 men to SAIDA swimming.
5. A Coy relieved by C Coy at HAMMANA. D Coy relieved by A Coy at DEIR HARF.

(Signed) D.A.H. White

C.O. A Coy.

JUL 41.

- IX. Coy in position on road block. In the afternoon the Coy was
10. machine-gunned from the air by our own planes; there was no damage to our own troops but one man from the A/Tk gun supporting the Coy was slightly injured.
- X. The Coy was visited by the Officer Commanding from the Air
11. Force who apologised for the mistake. Our troops had not been seriously upset as there had been ample cover. At approx 2200 hrs on this night Lieut Lee was informed of the Armistice which to take effect at 2400 hrs. There was great rejoicing but no relaxation of vigilance, indeed to be on the alert had almost become second nature. Firing could be heard up to 0100 hrs the following morning but then a silence, a strange and uncanny silence seemed to fall on the countryside, like some signal heavy with premonition. Needless to say our great day of rejoicing was Sunday.
- XI. The silence still continuing, the troops began to realise that
12. hostilities had really ceased and a kind of nervous rejoicing set in. Everyone was delighted but a little doubtful.
- XII. The Coy was withdrawn to the Damour River for a clean-up and
13. a spell. Swimming and washing were partaken of with much glee and men turned their minds to cables, letters and so on. There was much talk of a victory march through Beyrouth but as Sunday had passed and we didn't think the march would be put off for a whole week, we knew our Bn would not march.
14. XIII. The Coy was still resting by the River. Recommendations for
XIV. further decorations were discussed but not sent in. A warning order for movement was received next day.
- XV. The Coy moved in the Bn convoy to our new position with Bn HQ
15. at HAMMANA. B Coy were to occupy a strategical position commanding EL METEN. Owing to misinformation by local inhabitants, the position actually occupied was south of EL METEN but overlooking the same valley. One truckload of 11 Pl under Sjt Blackmore had been left behind owing to engine trouble and did not catch up with the Coy until the following morning.
- XVI. In the afternoon the Coy cooker arrived and the troops spent
16. a short time making themselves as comfortable as possible. There was some difficulty about water but this was eventually solved by "tapping" one of the water pipes running along the road.
- 16-18. During this period "sorting-out" and elementary training was
commenced. Drill with and without arms, sututing, discussions on the campaign amongst ourselves, and the price of eggs and tomatoes with the villagers was the daily routine. A ~~xxxx~~ silk factory near-by was so pestered with visitors that even the habitual courtesy of the rab was broken down and men were "asked" to leave. The camp was continually pestered with small children until they eventually discovered the weight of the Aussie boot with a large leg inside it. Lieut Lee who had commanded the Coy since Adloun received his "third" amidst congratulations. We were all pleased that Lieut Skipper of C Coy had also been promoted.
- 18-31. On this day we received notice to move to HAMMANA Barracks.
On our arrival it was easy to see that black troops had previously been in occupation. Everywhere were bugs and fleas, hopping and crawling amongst the dirt and filth. Latrines, cookhouses, drains, everything was filthy. Regular fatigue periods were held to clean up the area. Gallons of disinfectant were used and still the hopping and crawling continued. Finally the assistance of the Pd Hygiene Sec was called in, but their

WAR DIARY, B COY (continued)

efforts seemed only to stir up the ire of the little creatures. However, in their anger they exposed themselves to risks never before undertaken and this enabled our men to combat ~~them~~ them more or less successfully.


The period from now until the 11 Aug was filled mainly by leave parties -- one day to Beyrouth, two days in a round tour of Damascus, Merjayoun, Saïda and Aaleyv, one day swimming parties to Saïda beach, afternoons and evenings to Aaley, and visits to inter-Bn and inter-unit competitions in swimming, tennis, etc. Two of our Coy, Cpl Scally and L/Cpl Dawson, represented the Bn in the swimming contest. Training, after fatigues and clean-up of the area, consisted of elementary drill, L.M.G., "Interest" lectures and short route marches. The Coy strength, already weak, was further considerably depleted by the great number of guards -- at one period as many as 35 men. This combined with continual leave parties and picquets, made any organised training an impossibility. The Coy was fortunate in not having many untrained personnel. During this period Capt Lee proceeded on six days leave to HAIFA, leaving the Coy under the care of Lieut Magarey. On his return he was constantly called away as a member of the Control Commission, and as Lieut Appelby, the only Pl Comd left, was away training N.C.C. schools, the Coy was left with only one officer, Lieut Magarey, and the ever stalwart Sjts. ^{absent}

On the 6 Aug Lieut Best who had been ^{absent} from the Bn since JULIUS days -- over five months -- to Movement Control work, returned to take over his old Pl, No. 11. With him was the inevitable Cavanagh, his batman. Both were made welcome, 11 Pl in particular being very pleased to see their old Pl Comd.

E. Magarey, Lieut.
2/10 B Coy.

DAMOUR AREA

Scale 1:12,500



Enlargement from DAMOUR
1:25,000
1:12,500

WAR DIARY.

Monthly Summary.

July 41.

DATE.

- Battis*
- Jul 1/4 Bn H Q remained at BARJA while Coys, from concealed fwd posns on southern slopes of R. DAMCOUR, by patrolling, observing enemy movements and recce of tracks down cliffs, made preparations for an attack on enemy defences on NORTH side R. DAMCOUR.
- 5 All Coys & Bn H Q moved fwd to lying up areas.
- 6 0230 hrs. With 2/16 Bn on left flank and two Coys of 2/14 Bn as guard on right flank the attack commenced. By 2200 hrs all Coys ^{2/14 Bn} had gained their objectives.
7. Posns consolidated and activities extended down spurs westwards to assist the 2/16 Bn.
- 8/9 Enemy reinforced on High ground West of Coy areas but possibility of a strong prepared enemy counter attack was forestalled by work of patrols and the concentration of remnants of three Coys on to Hill 500.
- 9/12 Bn "sitting down" on objectives anxiously awaiting news of the units which had gone though.
- 13 0001 hrs hostilities ceased and
- 14/15 Coys moved to R. DAMCOUR to repair some of the ravages of battle.
- 16 Movement fwd to areas East of BEYRCOUTH to occupy and guard enemy stores and garrisons.
- 17/31 Leave to visit towns and villages interspersed with periods of guarding and patrolling.

Summary of Battle Casualties.

	<i>Offis.</i>	<i>OR</i>
<i>KIA</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>WIA</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>99</i>
<i>D of W</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Missing</i>		<i>2</i>
	<i>16</i>	<i>132</i>

*M. P. W. T. H. Col
Comd 2/14 Bn*

2/27 BN AIF

HAMMANA,

MEDICAL DIARY - FOR FORTNIGHT 18/7/41
till 1/8/41.

2 Aug 41.


During this period 278 patients from 2/27 Bn have been treated in RAP. Of these approximately 60% were daily dressings for chronic sores, boils, carbuncles etc, about 10% for gastrointestinal infections - dysentery, diarrhoea, gastritis etc, about 10% for cases of acute follicular tonsillitis and other upper respiratory infections.

The remaining 20% were composed of a variety - the most prevalent being cases of suspected malaria of which there have been 15 cases evacuated and another 10 returned to unit after treatment. (Daily rate = 20 or 3.6%).

Evacuated to Fd Amb during this period have totalled 57 - a daily rate of 3.3 or 0.6%.

The daily sick rate of 3.6% is satisfactory and lower than the normal 5%. For this reason the general health of the troops can be said to be satisfactory. The daily evacuation rate of 0.6% is slightly raised but can be accounted ~~for~~ for by the high percentage of undiagnosed fevers, which under the circumstances must be evacuated to have a diagnosis of malaria proved or disproved and the moderate incidence of intestinal infections, many of which have been in the nature of food poisoning due to the unwise consumption of food from local vendors.

During the last week there has been a mild epidemic of acute tonsillitis, the incidence of which is still rising.



Capt.

July 1 - 31.

July 1-4;- "B" Ech. at Saida.

B.H.Q. at Barja.

Rationing during this period was somewhat difficult. The Coy's were on very mountainous country. Rations were forwarded by Q trucks as far as possible, to a Mule park when they were then transferred on to mules in section containers. The rations were placed in sand bags, each containing sufficient complete rations for a section of men for 24 hrs - thus packed these were found to carry quite well strapped on to the saddle. In most instances the C.Q.M.S. of each Coy accompanied the rations right forward to their men. The trips sometimes were somewhat precarious owing to the very uneven and stony terrain, and last but not least, mules and accompanying personnel were shelled and fired on by M.G., in no uncertain manner - nevertheless the rations always reached their destination - owing to the very good work of the unit muleteers.

During this period, mules had to be rationed (bundled hay, barley, and sunflower seed) by the Q.M.

In the case of B.H.Q. at Barja, the Q truck was enabled to go right to its destination on quite a safe and good road - although somewhat winding in nature. B Coy at Bassier, on a very high feature, just North of B.H.Q. at Barja, had to "carry" their rations - in this case a very difficult job - entailing at least 40 men to move the Coy's 24 hrs rations. Whenever possible, hot rations in Hot Boxes were forwarded.

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On the night of the 7th. B Ech, was organised into a carrying party composed of every man who considered he was fit enough to emulate the mountain goat. It was decided that each was to fill his pack with rations, still on the section basis of 10 men for 24 hrs.

These men were then split up into Coy groups, led by their respective C.Q.M.S.. Then transport ferried the men and rations to the most forward practicable point, which was as far as 16th En., H.Q. on road North of Demour River. After a recce, the party walked over the river via pontoon bridge, and along the road to the foot of El. Boom. Thence up the hills to B.H.Q., a very hard pull indeed. From B.H.Q. the Coy groups split up, and went further to their respective Coy's. Everything went smoothly and rations were delivered.

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B Ech which had been very successfully Brigaded to this time was busily engaged in preparing to move forward and join the Bn, which had moved to Hammana.

July 17

Moved to Hammana, a very difficult journey for M.F. and encountered some trouble owing to the steep nature of the road.

July 18

Settling in at Hammana, outfitting men and checking war equipment.

-31

It was found that the Bn, had come through the campaign without losing, in numbers, any automatic guns, whatsoever.

J. M. Beare

Capt., Q.M.,
2/27 Bn., A.I.F

OUTLINE OF PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON THE DAMOUR POSN - 2/27 Bn

On D1 the Bn will attack and capture the following objectives.

As a preliminary to the main attack the Bn will capture:

(1) The high ground immediately NORTHEAST of ED DALAMIYE.

The first objective will then be the track north of EL BOUM from the rd and track junction 12621974 to approx 12701976.

Second objective. The northern edge of the wooded area in 126198.

Third objective. DARAYA 12701990 to approximately 12601985.

One section REXI will support the attack and one section of the 2/3 medium machine guns will come under comd for the attack.

PRELIMINARY MOVES OF COMPANIES.

On D-1 A Coy will move on the reversd slope of the spur just SOUTH of EL BATTAL.

D. Coy will move onto the spur 800x SOUTHWEST of EL BATTAL.

C. Coy will move down into the creek bed near to hill 432.

B. Coy will move into the saddle between Hill 394 and 450.

These moves will be completed by 2200 hrs D-1.

BN HQ will move present location to ED REZANIYE.

THE SUBSIDIARY TASKS NORTHEAST of ED DALAMIYE will be undertaken by C. Coy supported by two detachments of mortars and one section REXI.

Artillery concentrations have been asked for from 0215-0230 at which time (0230) C. Coy will attack and capture this enemy feature.

EXPLOITATION. The main road NORTH of objective. They will immediately commence recce for the crossing of the river for the further move towards EL BOUM and will advise BN HQ immediately of the result.

*Suppl by
2/14/64*

*check
with
artillery
plan*

Palms to River

(2)

The attack on the first objective will be carried out by A. Coy and D. Coy.

They will move from their lying up posn by the track previously reconnoitred which passes east from EL BATTAL to the river and will then cross the river and move on to EL BOUM by the track which leads due east from 12551966 to EL BOUM.

Artillery concentrations on the river crossing will finish

0240 X at 0320 hrs and on the enemy machine gun post at 12651966
0245 X at 0325 hrs.

A. Coy will cross the river at *0240* ~~0320~~ hrs and will be followed by D. Coy. They will move up the line of the track to EL BOUM and be in posn to attack the first objective at 0440 hrs. A. Coy attack on the right and D. Coy on the left. A. Coy will send at least one sec to hill 498 in square 127197 to cover the right flank.

The capture of the second objective will be carried out by D. Coy at a time to be notified. They will place at least one sec on hill 560 to cover their right flank.

The third objective will be captured by B. Coy who will move from their lying up posn over by the route taken by A. and D. Coys or through C. Coy; as a third alternative they may move over the saddle 500x east of 432 and pass onto the main rd south of EL MOUGHIRA thence via C. Coy to a starting line which will be the line of the second objective. B. Coy will place at least one section on hill 512 to cover their right flank.

(3)

On completion of the capture of the first objective C. Coy plus 2 detachments Mortars will become Bn res.

MORTARS. One det will be placed under the command of A. and D. Coys.

BN HQ will move from ED REZANIYE to EL BOUM as soon as the second objective is captured.

The 2/14 Bn will be responsible for protecting our right flank along the main rd from BEIT ED DINE.

One Coy of the 2/14 will be prepared to assist C. Coy in their preliminary attack. This Coy will be moving SOUTHWEST along the rd from BEIT ED DINE cleaning up enemy posts in that area.

COMMUNICATIONS Lamps until Bn moves HQ to EL BOUM.

fwd 4/50 / Ground strips for air indication.

Wire will be laid fwd to coys from new HQ to EL BOUM.

A pack wireless will be attached to BN HQ for communication with Brigade.

~~THE~~ SUCCESS SIGNALS will be notified later.

~~THE~~ ~~3D~~ RAP. A collecting post will be established by C. Coy at the bridge 12621960. The RMO will be responsible for the establishment of a ~~new~~ similar collecting post near the bridge at 12551965.

It is not anticipated that wounded can be moved from these areas until main rd from DAMOUR to BEIT ED DINE is made good.

AMN SAA res will be established at EL REZANIYE.

2nd det. of Camm. A support attack of A & D Coys by obscuring fire from fwd slopes of Hill sqd.

B Coy WAR DIARY

1 Jul to 10 JUL

Tues 1 Jul Coy in posn dispersed at AAQLIYA. Some shells to rear of posn After dark coy moved to new posn on same area on reverse slopes of AAQLIYA for protection against enemy shelling

Wed 2 Jul
Observation of likely enemy C Ps Coy at rest Some shellin of area but no casualties.

Thurs 3 Jul
Coy at rest as for Wed

Fri 4 Jul
Routes for crossing DAMOUR river reced by Coy Comd and pl Comds Orders given for preparation for attack

Sat 5 Jul
All recces completed by 1200 hrs down to pl comds and Sec Comds Men to be left out of battle evacuated by 1100 hrs Coy area shelled but no casualties. At 2115 B Coy started to move to their lying up area for the night (ref may DAMOUR 1/25, CCC) 12571953. C coy were to attack at 0230 hrs and secure the woods in square 126195 A Coy followed by D coy were to move along pre-arranged track skirting the west of EL BATTAL and then east onto the EL BOUM rd and to be in occupation not later than 0440 hrs. Having captured the EL BOUM rd, A coy

Sun 6 Jul

~~were to move through onto a line ER ROUMANE, FOUR A CHAUX~~
~~B coy's role was to pass through A and D coys and~~
were to push onto the rd north of EL BOUM and consolidate, and D Coy were to move through them onto a line ER ROUMANE - FOUR A CHAUX. B Coy's role was to pass through A and D coys and move onto their objective the DARAYA feature. All night B coy were shelled and when they moved off at first light they were under a very heavy enemy barrage All the way from the lying up area to EL LABIYE the coy was very heavily shelled as it moved down the re-entrant skirting to the west of EL BATTAL onto the track south of EL LABIYE Here the coy encountered D Coy which had been severely disorganised by our own Howitzer barrage which was put down right onto A and D coys. The CC decided that D Coy were too disorganised to move fwd and having been informed that A coy were being heavily engaged decided to push on and take over D coys role. A message to that effect was sent back to Bn and the coy moved fwd. From EL LABIYE down the cliff to the river and up onto the EL BOUM rd the coy was very heavily shelled every time the men got up to move fwd shells were sent over. Then the coy moved fwd, passing through A coy on the right onto ER ROUMANE, where it was engaged by three enemy MG posts from the lower ground. The coy bored on with these posts, and one pl worked to the left and one to the right to engage the posts, while the centrl pl moved fwd onto the ground at X in FOUR A CHAUX With this posn occupied, the CC decided that although the enemy post was still occupied, being surrounded, they would move out at dusk and, as the way was open for another coy to move through at 1730, he sent up the success signal. One pl was sent up to the right onto feature 560 to protect the right flank

Mon 7 Jul

During the Sunday night a patrol of three was sent fwd to the enemy MG post and reported that it had been vacated, so at first light the feature vacated was occupied. During the morning Lieut T R KIMBER was evacuated with dysentery. The casualties up to this stage had been very light. That day the CC was called back to bn. The only change was the re-siting of Mr KIMBER's pl which was still not placed sufficiently high onto the feature 560

At 2100 hrs information was received from the CO that Mr DEAN the I C had been round the east of 560 and had heard diggings and B coy were to send up a strong fighting patrol to clean up supposedly small enemy det. A pl of D coy was to come under CC B Coy's comd to assist Mr LEE arranged for D coy to attack from the south while B coy pl was to attack from the west, While moving up to the posn firing was heard. The fighting patrol from B coy moved fwd and contacted D coy who said that the posn was too strongly held by enemy to be taken by two pls, so, having been instructed to return if such were the case, the two pls moved back to the west, where 10 pl of B coy had been moved up from lower down the feature to occupy the posn vacated by the fighting patrol (12 pl)

Mr LEE then gave orders for a coy attack from the south, with two pls of B coy (10 and 12), one pl of D coy, and a sec of A Coy under Sjt COWAN. The fwd pls moved up to within 100x of the enemy posn, but could not get further fwd owing to withering MG fire. The other pl and det of A Coy moved in but were also held up. The final assault was delayed at first light owing to the belief that the enemy wished to surrender. An offr came fwd and parleyed for peace, but his move was only a blind to enable enemy tops to crawl fwd onto a ledge overlooking our men, and they suddenly launched a dastardly attack with hand grenades, the officer disappearing behind a rock. The attack was beaten off by rifle and MG fire

Tues
8 Jul At first light on 8 Jul, B Coy HQ, who were occupying a posn midway between ER ROUMANE and FOUR A CHAUX saw approaching from the east 50 or 60 Frenchmen who, because of their formation, our men mistook for prisoners, until suddenly a shot was fired across their front, when the enemy went to ground and opened up. Our coy HQ, assisted by MMG fire, C coy LMGs, and mortars fired by a 2/5 bn det, kept the enemy engaged for six or seven hours, meeting with accurate enemy mortar guns which caused a few casualties. They eventually drove the enemy off after inflicting very heavy casualties.

At approx 1100 hrs a further counter attack by MGs, Mortars, and hand grenades was attempted by the enemy, but this was beaten off by our Light Machine Gunners, who despite far superior fire, out-shot the enemy posts. The position was maintained all day with casualties on our side growing larger throughout the day

At approx 1900 hrs, our tps saw 150 to 200 enemy tps move out to the north and north east of the feature, but they were out of range. Soon after the coy was relieved by A coy, who occupied our position and ten minutes later were fired on by mortars and MGs.

Wed
9 Jul The next morning A coy sent a patrol fwd onto the feature and found it vacated, so moved fwd to occupy. At approx 1220 hrs on 9 Jul the CO ordered B coy to withdraw to the rear of EL BOUM to the River DAMCUR to rest. The coy were ~~sent~~ back at the river by 1830 hrs, except for one sec left at FOUR A CHAUX to guard casualties and surplus gear, until mules could be sent out from Bn to pick these up. Posn of Coy 12541965

At 2200 10 pl of B coy was detached and sent up to support D coy at rd block situated at 12741951

Thurs
10 Jul Two pls at rest at 12541965 and 10 pl with D coy at rd block. during the morning the coy received a warning order to move at 1500 hrs to support D coy at rd block. The coy was in posn by 1630 hrs and Mr LEE went fwd to take over the comd of the defence of EL MOUGHIRA 12621953

Patrols were sent out during the night, but no contact was made with the enemy

A COY WAR DIARY

19 Jun 41 (AALMANE)

to 8 Jul 41 (Hill 56C)

A coy left AALMANE 2000 hrs 19 Jun. Route via JAMLIH to CURDANIE Arrived at this destination at first light following morning after bivouacking just south of village from 0300 hrs for few hrs. No opposition was encountered in occupation of village. The trip was very strenuous and all ranks were had of a few days comparative quiet.

The time at EL CURDANIE was spent in active patrolling as far forward as ER REZANIYE locating tracks. Patrols were sent to BARJA via SEBLINE on several occasions under Lieut SIMS, Sjt WARD and Sjt PURCELL. The track on this route was found to be very rough and unsuitable for movement of anything larger than a lightly equipped patrol. Patrols were also sent to BARJA via AIN EL ASSOUAD on several occasions, and then later were pushed fwd via BAASSIR to 374 and 296 and then on via BAASSIR-BAAQCUN-ER REZANIYE to 412. These patrols were mostly sent out at night and remained out all the following day and returned the following night. No enemy were encountered and very little enemy movement was seen on these patrols, but a lot of extremely valuable information was gained with regard to routes and tracks which was afterwards very valuable when moving forward. Lieut GILL led first patrol to 296 feature 412. Sjt WARD led first patrol to 296. Sjt PURCELL also led a patrol to 296.

A Coy's next move was to occupy the EL HARAM feature with two coys 16 bn extending to west. EL HARAM was left boundary and inclusive to A Coy. The coy moved from EL CURDANIE at 1500 hrs on about 25 Jun. Route: AIN EL ASSOUAD-BARJA-BASSIR- HALNI-BAAQCUN-ER REZANIYE to EL HARAM.

N.B. At EL CURDANIE reinforcements which were very acceptable arrived including Lieut GEDDES who took over 7 pl, and Lieut BELL who took over 8 pl and 19 CRs, including Sjt COWAN who had been evacuated sick about 8 to 10 days before. CSM TUCKER was evacuated sick from AALMANE and his duties were taken over by Sjt DALBY.

To continue with move to EL HARAM the route was a long one as well as being rough and so by the time the coy arrived at ER REZANIYE it was 2000 hrs. As it was getting late and the men required rest and a meal decided to bivouac for the night and occupy EL HARAM at first light. From information from a patrol from 16 Bn we knew that there were enemy at EL HARAM.

At first light the coy moved down twds EL HARAM and encountered light opposition from approx 14 enemy and an LMG. The 16 bn had sent out a strong patrol up the other way and between us we captured the LMG and 8 PW who were taken over by 16 Bn.

During occupation of this area, communication was very difficult for several days but eventually a line was established through 16 Bn, until one from our own Bn HQ was run through to us.

From the second night of our occupation we were regularly shelled by enemy arty and we several men with shell fire including one killed, Pte WILLIS. Also at periods each day enemy arty also shelled the area.

During occupation this area, CPs were pushed as far fwd as possible and small recon patrols were sent out. One patrol of Cpl MARTIN was surprised by enemy at feature 394 and Pte SAVAGE was lost, either killed or captured.

Patrols were also sent fwd to EL BATTAL. These were fighting patrols with a dual purpose of keeping enemy patrols from coming across the river on to the southern side, and also to try and discover a suitable track down to the river towards EL BOUM. Patrols were led by Lieut SIMS, Lieut GILL and Lieut GEDDES. These patrols eventually discovered a track through this very difficult country by which the bn could get round this difficulty, and they penetrated as far as the br below EL BOUM on more than one occasion. On one of these patrols an enemy patrol surprised one of our sections and one man was killed L/Cpl O'Leary. Most of these patrols were of a pl in strength.

On 5 Jul the coy was given the task of being the first coy of the bn to go over the track through the village of EL BATTAL and on up to EL BOUM, and then on up to the next feature. The Coy moved from EL HARA at approx 2000 hrs to EL BATTAL where they lay up till 1240 hrs then moved fwd down the very difficult track to the river. 9 pl under Lieut SIMS had been sent fwd early to prevent any enemy from coming up the track. The track from EL LABIYE is extremely difficult and slow and also from the river to EL BOUM is steep and slow. The coy was unable to accomplish the job in the time laid down. Also the mules with the det of 3" mortars and Vickers MG were unable to negotiate the track in the dark. No opposition was actually encountered at the river except enemy mortar fire from EL BOUM. The br was blown during the time of the descent from EL BATTAL. MG and rifle fire were encountered at EL BOUM, but as the coy pushed on the enemy withdrew and eventually EL BOUM was captured, with only one prisoner and one casualty with a shot through the ankle. Several 60 mm mortars and MGs, mules and other equipment were captured. The time was then approx 0615 hrs and by the time the coy was reformed and ready to move it was 0645 hrs, and as D Coy was still not to be found the coy moved fwd to its objective at 0700 hrs without D Coy. No opposition was struck on eastern end of objective but a very strong post was encountered at western end. This was eventually captured at approx 1500 hrs, Lieut GEDDES and Cpt MARTIN being killed. Sjt WARD and several others were wounded. 17 PW were taken. 11 killed and a number got away twds EL ATIQA. This job was eventually by 8 pl protecting our left flank, 7 pl moving to left flank. 9 pl gave covering fire while 7 pl endeavoured to get round enemy's right flank, but were held up by MG fire. ~~mmmmmmmm~~

In the meantime C and B coys had arrived at EL BOUM and with the help of their 2" and 3" mortars, and covering fire from 9 pl, 7 pl went in and captured the post. Sjt PURCELL by this time had taken over the pl as Mr GEDDES was killed early.

I then advised B coy to carry on and do the job allotted for D Coy, and for C Coy to remain as Bn reserve until the CO could be contacted.

The coy remained in this position for several days during which time they were shelled many times. A strong patrol of one sec from 9 pl was placed on 498 on the same day as the coy arrived at EL BOUM and remained there until 7 Jul when enemy made a counter attack on bn right flank about B coy area.

On the night of 6/7 Jul a fighting patrol of two sec under Sjt COWAN was sent to locate this standing patrol and return, but became embroiled in a fight with B coy and did not return. On morning of 7 Jul a sec was sent out as recce patrol to locate two previous patrols, which left 7 pl with two secs, 8 pl one sec, and 9 pl with two secs. As day progressed position of counter attack was obscure and a pl from A Coy consisting of two secs 9 pl and one sec 8 pl under Lieut SIMS was sent round right flank to try and relieve situation, plus, if possible, to get feature 560. This pl, plus all the other secs who had been sent out previously, contacted B Coy who was held up on 560, and were unable to get fwd as enemy had very strong force of MG and inf. Then later the remainder of A Coy moved up on 560, and at 2000 hrs, when enemy appeared to be withdrawing, made an attack, but were eventually held up by MG fire from 7 or 8 MG posts, and after trying to get round these posts with no success, decided to withdraw and ask for arty support next morning.

At 0530 next morning a small patrol was sent in and the enemy were found to have withdrawn. So at 0600 A Coy moved in and took over the posn.

The enemy had left a large amount of equipment of all kinds. The Coy fighting strength at this stage was approx 45. The men after this final stunt were very fatigued. Since being in occupation of 560 everything has been very quiet.

D A H WHITE Capt

B Coy WAR DIARY

25 Jun 41 to 10 Jul 41

Wed 25 Jun 41

Location JAMLIH 12201854 (SAIDA 1:50,000)
 Weather Warm to hot Slight breeze off sea.
 Water Good supply from spring in village.
 troops Able to wash clothes and themselves in village
 Movements Balance of 12 pl under Lieut MAGAREY shifted to road block
 12951834 Lieut GEDDES to act as 2 l/c for coy
 6 rnfcts added to 12 pl, inc Lieut KIMBER

Thurs 26 Jun 41

Movement 1300 hrs 10, 11 pls and coy HQ to move to A. SEBLINE 12261848
 In posn 1630 hrs Hot meal at 1900 hrs.
 Enemy activity: Patrolled right flank. No contact made 25 bn
 moved through our area about 2200 hrs twds CHEHIM.

Friday 27 Jun 41

Enemy activity: Isolated MMG and A/tk fire heard from CHEHIM. Our
 arty shelled on and about that town.
 Movement 1530 hrs advised to move balance of coy to BAASSIR 12351922.
 In posn 2000 hrs. Hot meal arrived per RSM, much appreciated
 as route was direct as ordered and over very steep country
 Dispositions: 10 pl rt flank, 11 pl res.
 Enemy activity: Nil in our area. Patrolled lt and rt flanks

Saturday 28 Jun 41: Dug in against air and arty. Good well in coy
 area for drinking and washing. Coy rested up.
 C Ps watching front and rt flank located enemy arty. Coy
 Comd and 2 i/c went fwd and C P-ed from feature 374. Pin
 pointed arty at ABEY and KEFR METTA
 Enemy shelled DESINE, HARDOUCHE and features on rt flank,
 also harassing fire on A and C coys in posn EL HARAM and ER
 REZANIYE respectively
 CO advised our arty would engage enemy arty at ABEY Our
 fire too short and to the left
 Hot meal and Sunday rations. Shell fire on above features
 during night. Our patrols - nil report.

Sunday 29 Jun 41

Coy at rest Enemy continues harassing fire particularly
 on range of hills near trig 747 Our aircraft patrolled in
 afternoon
 From 2200-2400 hrs, naval, air and arty activity, Exact
 targets unknown. Our patrols reported all quiet.

PHG GEDDES Lieut
 30 June 41

Monday 30 Jun 41

Two pls of the coy moved from Trig 375 at BAASSIR 12371932 to
 AAQLIYA Slight shelling en route. 12 pl moved by tpt
 and marched from rd block on JCUN rd (Ref map DAMOUR 1/50000
 127183 to Coast Rd, thence on to QUASSOUBA and by foot via
 EL HARAM, ER REZANIYE to AAQLIYA

C Coy WAR Diary

1 Jul 41 to

Tues 1 Jul Activity: Lieut J. SKIPPER again endeavoured to find a crossing of the River DAMCUR with a small patrol but once again the route proved impassable.

Wed 2 Jul Further observation and patrolling on the right of this position were carried out, as a result of sniping on our part enemy movement was negligible
On night 2/3 Jul Col MCTEN, Capt FRASER, and Cpl HGRSNELL reced a further possible route to the stone hut feature.

Thurs 3 Jul

A further study of the route to the stone hut Enemy movement on the right not great Little arty fire

Night 3/4 Jul Capt F J NICHOLLS and a small party reced route previously studied This route proved suitable and is likely to be used in the attack

Fri 4 Jul

Coy Comds of DASA B and D and of the 2/14 and 2/5 bns were shown over the ground in front and various features. At 1800 hrs at D Coy HQ an outline of our attack was given by MAJ DCBBS.

Sat 5 Jul

During the day preparations were carried out for the moves that night

Night 5/6 Jul Coy moved off from ER REZANIYE at 2100 hrs along track to saddle south of ED DALAMIYE, east across creek at 2300 hrs. At the creek the coy was rested for two and a half hrs

Sun 6 Jul After this spell the coy moved up tracks in readiness for the attack on the 245 feature (known as Stone Hut Feature) At 0230 hrs (zero) the attack went in on an enemy vacated area. Unfortunately the arty failed to lift in accordance with programme. No damage was done. Success signs were flashed back at approx 0330 hrs.

At 0415 hrs after some little delay in contacting the 14 bn we vacated the feature for that unit to occupy The coy moved off down main rd fully extended in formation to a point, reced by Mr LEE and a sec sec, where we crossed the River DAMCUR at approx 0500 hrs. Here the coy was rested. At 0800 hrs after a difficult climb the coy reached the olives in the vicinity of EL BOUM Here it was discovered that A coy on the first objective had met with opposition. C Coy was able to assist in using 2" Mortar on enemy. Shortly after this A coy put in a concentrated drive and the enemy posts were taken B coy moved through C coy with a view to taking and occupying the 2nd objective. This was done after a little opposition from enemy fire from a feature SW of the objective. Assisted by C Coy who overtook B coy as a result of the enemy fire Later in the night C Coy moved on and occupied the 3rd objective at approx 2235 hrs.

Monday 7 Jul

Posn, on feature secured. Standing patrols established with attention to the right flank 2/14 bn (two coys) moved through area approx 0900. Later in the morning 2/3 bn and 2/5 bn arrived on feature - say 1200 hrs. The 2/5 bn was not clear of this area until 1930 hrs. I considered this very unsatisfactory As instructed by DASA this coy sent out fighting patrol West from this posn This patrol met with enemy fire from a feature running SW from pt 225 to pt 104. The patrol was unable to move until arty fire was brought on to this feature when it was seen that the enemy moved away quickly in the direction of Pt 104. Assistance was asked for and supplied by 13 pl The whole of this feature was cleared from north to south, with the exception of pt 104 from which the the patrol, met by fire, were compelled to withdraw

C Coy War Diary (contd)

unfortunately Mr MULLIGAN of 13 pl and Pte A HAWKE of 15 pl were killed in this action

Tues 8 Jul

Early this morning, an attack was made by the enemy against B coy using LMG and 3" mortar. Assisted by 2/3 M G Coy and this coy by giving flanking fire from the spur south of this feature 12721987 across the enemy occupied western slopes of Trig 560 (12761982) A prisoner from this attack proved to be a member of 1 Bn 29 Regt (Algerian) which had left France as recently as 15 Jun Threats of counter attacks have been quelled in the early stages. At approx 1330 hrs enemy bombers appeared to bomb EL BOUM area. During the night an attack was launched by A B and D coys on the enemy in occupation of Trig 560. This coy stood to in readiness for emergencies. The attack was successful and the enemy was drawn off.

Wed 9 Jul

Little activity occurred during the morning: all seemed well in hand The enemy dead and wounded were buried and attended. These numbered approx 30 dead and 7 wounded. A fighting patrol led by Sjt MARTIN moved into the BAKCUN area, and on to the village of ABEY Both places had just been vacated by the enemy. This useful information was passed on to the Bde and Bn immediately.

Thurs 10 Jul

Continued burying of enemy dead on Trig 560 feature. Coy also engaged in the collection of enemy arms captured. These are as follows:

Hotchiss MMGs	6
" " mountings	4
Mortar 60 mm	1
" " tripod	1
Bombs, Mortar 60mm	22
Magazine haversacks LMG (ea 6 mags filled)	29
LMGs	12
Hotchkiss strip feed box (ea 12 strips filled)	13
Rifles short	14
long	31
1939	2
	<u>47</u>
Bayonets	6
Shovels	21
picks	16
Verrey pistol	1
Sundry equipment	

Fri 11 Jul

Mr LEE, togr with Sjt JOSE, were send on errand to KAFR MATTA to locate enemy gun positions through one ARIF who had volunteered to help the Force in any way 15 pl and portion of Coy HQ moved to the beach via DAMCUR, where they were able to swim and obtain a change of clothing from the pl or coy truck
Midnight 11/12 Jul hostilities in SYRIA ceased.

Thursday 12 Jul

No activity. Tps rested. At 1830 hrs commenced move from DARAYA to Bn area near 12561964 (DAMCUR 1/25000) Arrived that point 2200 hrs

Fri 13 JUL

Men washed clothes and swam in DAMCUR River Rested.

Sat 14 Jul

Further rest for men and preparations for BEYRCUTH

Sun 15 JUL

Moved from DAMCUR River via DAMCUR valley, ~~BEY~~, ALEY, BHAMDCUN, AIN SACUFAR, HAMMANA, to DEIR HARF arriving approx 2200 hrs

Mon 16 Jul

Coy took up tactical posn 14642125 (BEYROUTH 1/50,000) Village people expressed great delight in our arrival. The Mukhtar approached and satisfactory arrangements between tps and villagers made, in so far as town out of bounds, no sale of grog, villagers to stay out of our area, purchase of vegetable rations, use of ~~spring~~ spring.

Father Athanasius Yousef Hanna of St Georges Orthodox Greek Convent has been most generous and helpful in permitting the free use of their property and in offering to do anything possible to assist the tps.

All pl vehicles have been cleaned out and repacked. Latrines dug Mr Daniel OLIVER was contacted. He is well known identity of 51 years experience in SYRIA as an orphanage teacher He took myself and Lieut H KIMBER to interview a French Officer in connection with an invention This proved to be an improvement on the French type

Tues 17 Jul

*over
d July*

D Coy WAR DIARY

JUN 41

- 8 This coy was the vanguard coy to the Bn on D1 (8 Jun) 17 pl under instns from Bn Comd was sent fwd across the border together with two tps of GIFI and recce party from the 6 Fd Coy While here Lieut RUDD asked permission to deal with a strong enemy posn which WUVI had not taken. The attack was made with the covering fire of one lt tk and one A/tk gun and was successful in dislodging the enemy. Seven enemy dead were counted and two captured. Only one man (Pte AYLIFFE) was wounded, not seriously. Lieut RUDD estimates approx 100 of the enemy retired from the posn. The hill on which the enemy stood was particularly rough and the enemy posns exceptionally well concealed.
- 9 In the afternoon of 9 Jun the coy was placed under comd. of LUPA to assist in night attack across River LITANI. The bridge over this river was destroyed and crossing was slow by boat. A timed arty barrage was arranged but unfortunately a lot of the benefit of this was lost as it took longer to cross the river than was anticipated. The coy reached the top of the long hill which was the objective but were unable to secure the whole length owing to the heavy MG fire and accurate mortar fire of the enemy. After a while a patrol reported that barracks which the enemy had been occupying appeared to be empty and 18 pl was sent round our right flank to occupy the barracks. This pl surprised and captured a large party of the enemy and the other pls were able to go fwd. The coy succeeded in capturing its objective. Altogether approx 90 prisoners were taken with large quantities of food arms and amm. We were also able to release 20 of the Commando Force who had been taken prisoner. Casualties were two wounded, neither seriously.
- 10 Most of the morning following was spent in rounding up prisoners and vigorous patrolling to deal with snipers and LMG posts.
- 11 On 11 Jun the coy was detailed to watch eastern approaches to the area near KEFR BADDA, JEMJEM, and EL ONASPA. 18 pl on the KEFR BADDA flank successfully prevented four armed Cs from reaching the main coast rd, with small arms and mortar fire.
- 12 On 12 Jun the coy attacked a long hill near HASSANIYE. This hill was exceptionally steep. The attack was made at 1100 hrs under art support, also fire from WUVI and C Coy. The attack was successful and supporting fire was given to an attack by C Coy. One man, Pte La France, was killed and two men wounded. A number of prisoners were taken, the unit the 6 Regt of the Foreign Legion. In the afternoon the coy was just embussing when attacked and machine gunned by Fr planes. One man (Pte KEELAN L F, was killed and several very slightly wounded.
G C ISSACHSEN Maj
- 14 Map ref SAIDA 1/50,000
The coy was assembled on the high ground south of DARB ES SIM 11541755 in the vicinity of a monastery. The objective was MEY CUMIYE 11571758 and the start line was the ridge indicated by spot heights 127,192,220. B coy was on the right of this ridge, C coy was on the left. Start time was 1630 hrs and the attack was to be preceded by an arty barrage from 1600 hrs.
The coy left the assembly area at 1530 hrs. The route to the start line was over very difficult country and it became apparent that we would be late in getting there. According two messages were sent back to extend the barrage for half an hr. The coy crossed the start line at approx 1700 hrs, covered by fire from the supporting coys. Enemy fire was very heavy and on the left 18 pl was forced to the ground. 17 pl on the right and part of 18 pl pushed fwd and about 12 men reached the objective, which was by that time evacuated by the enemy.
The coy was completely disorganised and casualties fairly heavy including Lieut RUDD killed, Maj ISAACHSEN and Lieut CRAFTER being wounded. Under the circumstances and in the absence of information from the party at the objective, it was decided to withdraw them.

Jun 41

Lieut JACOBS and WO 11 CROCKER left from a point about halfway to the objective at 2100 hrs, to withdraw the party under cover of darkness. They came under heavy fire for about a minute as they approached, but on reaching the objective, found it deserted, the attacking party having already withdrawn on their own initiative by a different route.

15 Lieut JACOBS and CSM CROCKER returned at 0245 hrs on 15 Jun, and at dawn proceeded to reorganise the coy. The wounded were all collected and evacuated, and the coy took up a posn on the original start line and rested. There were about 20 casualties, Ptes GALLWAY and GIDDINGS being killed in addition to Lieut RUDD. There were a further 15 or so evacuated unable to stand the physical strain. Sjt J JOHNSON and Pte T W SUTCLIFFE have already been mentioned for conspicuous conduct.

S J JACOBS Lieut

Jul 41

3 At 1100 hrs on 3 Jul, the coy left the posn on the SEBLINE-KEFR MAYA by MT and moved to QUASSCUBA via the CUADI ZEINI. From QUASSCUBA coy moved east up the mule track to ER REZANIYE and then across the valley to BAAQCUN, where we took up a posn for the night.

4 Next morning the coy had orders to move back to a posn between EL HARAM and ER REZANIYE on the south side of the track. From there preparations were made for the attack on the DAMCOUR defences, which began early on the morning of 6 Jul. At 2030 hrs 5 Jul Coy moved

5 along tracks to resting place in the valley south of 257. At 6
6 0130 hrs 6 Jul Coy moved to EL BATTAL. Here the coy came under heavy concentration from our arty. The CC was wounded, one officer killed, besides several other casualties, one of whom

subsequently died. The CC ordered the coy to move back. Pts dispersed, lost contact with each other. 18 pl Comd contacted Bn HQ and was ordered to endeavour to reorganise coy and push on in support of A Coy. By the time any semblance of order was restored B coy moved through and D Coy followed. The coy moved to 278 in support of A coy. During 7 and 8 Jul standing patrols were

7 supplied on spur 250. On 7 Jul 16 pl patrolled feature 560 contacting strong enemy posns. Coy received orders at 0415 hrs

8 8 Jul to support 16 pl and B coy and also a pl of A coy. 17 pl moved immediately, while 18 pl which was on patrol at 250 moved half hr later. 17 Pl were held up on north slope of 218, engaging enemy. 18 pl contacted Bn HQ, then pushed on slowly

9 twds 560, until forced to go to ground. At approx 1100 hrs, 17 pl retired, having suffered several casualties. 18 pl remained in posn until 1945 hrs, then advanced to 560, contacted A coy, and attacked enemy posts. (At 0130 hrs 9 Jul, 18 pl under A Coy comd, withdrew with A Coy to await further orders.)

Meanwhile 16 pl having contacted enemy at 560 at midnight 7/8 Jul, after a brisk engagement withdrew down south slopes of 560 until contact was made with B coy at first light. Then 16 pl attacked 560 with two pls B Coy and one pl A coy, but could not clear enemy from posn in pines. Remained in posn east of pines until relieved by A coy at 1900 hrs 8 Jul, when withdrew further down slope ~~with~~ for the night. [At

1300 hrs 9 Jul D Coy moved via Transit Camp along rd DAMCOUR- BEIT ED DINE to feature 567. The Coy occupied this posn for four days.

11 on the 11 Jul Lieut KIMBER took out a recce patrol which encountered fairly heavy enemy fire, but there was otherwise no enemy activity.

Armistice was declared while the coy was on 567. 36 hrs afterwards, coy withdrew to the River

Hugh KIMBER Lieut

CC D Coy 13 Jul 41

DASA

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div,
1 Jul 41.

INT SUMMARY No 36
(based on infm received up to time of typing)

1. Ops.

COASTAL area:

2/27 Bn now holding pt 394. Some shelling both sides.
2/25 Bn continued penetrations Eastwards and last reported vicinity HASROUT (13151885).
Enemy opposition encountered. Cav patrols report no enemy at MAZRAAT ED DAHR (130185) and have pushed on towards JELLIYE (131186) and EL MTOLE (132186) which are believed held by enemy.

JEZZINE area:

1400 hrs Enemy arty active rd JEZZINE-ROUM.
Sporadic mortar fire hills 1284 and 1332 also on rd at 13671799.
Some MGs placed at 13451825 to engage enemy area WADI NAGRAT.
2/14 Bn out of comn therefore no report.
Enemy shelled high ground area 133179 and ZHALTA rd.
Demolitions have been prepared at 12991817 rd embankment. Also at culverts 13011809 and 13411794.

MERDJAYOUN sector: No change.

Extreme right flank:

DAMASCUS sector. MAZAR front. Situation unchanged. Arty CP reports small enemy movement area 179180. Hostile shelling night 29/30 Jun 2030 hrs in DIMAS area and 0655 hrs in area 189183. Otherwise nothing to report.
Northern area. Enemy estimated two lorried inf coys one bty arty and 14 AFVs attacked NEBEK dawn 30 Jun. Attack driven off. Enemy patrols in QTAIFE area also driven off.

2. Tac/R.

DAMOUR - West and South to BEIT ED DINE, NMS.
YAROUTI - BEIT ED DINE, NMS.
River 124198 - large fire observed.
120188 - considerable activity staff cars.
No sign defences of DAMOUR but cover 100%.
138190 - 7 MT South.
138190 to JEZZINE, NMS.
JEZZINE - our patrols active all rds radiating from JEZZINE.
DAMOUR - 2 MT stationary.
HASBAYA - NMS.
HASBAYA-ER RAFID (159181) - 4 MT.
160185 - 6 MT facing North.
160185-BAR ELIAS, NMS.
JDEIDE (172190) - 40 MT scattered.
MAZRAA (176182) - 12 MT.
Rd junc 179184 - 50 MT dispersed.
179181 - 20 MT dispersed.
182186 - 150 MT dispersed.
Gun posn (177183) - appeared to be damaged by shell fire.

3. RAF Op Summary up to 2000 hrs 29 Jun 41.

Ten bombers attacked barracks and stores PALMYRA. Barracks missed but the stores were hit with small bombs and incendiaries. 10,000 pamphlets dropped. Four bombers attacked Presidency at BEYROUTH. Twelve by bombs hit target and three overshot. Awaiting photographic confirmation.

(2)

Seven Tomahawks escorting raids on PALMYRA - no interception.

Eight Tomahawks destroyed four Glen-Martin's and damaged one unidentified aircraft on QUSEIR aerodrome. One Glen-Martin shot down into sea off BEYROUTH.

Twelve sorties Fleet protection - no interception.

Four sorties local defence - no interception.

Recce: One Hurricane photo survey DIMAS area.

One Blenheim Strat/R shipping TRIPOLI and aerodrome, also TELKALOKH, HOMS, BAALBECK and satellites RAYAK and BEYROUTH. Pamphlets dropped HOMS and BEYROUTH.

One Blenheim was attacked by three Dewoitines and two Potez at LATAKIA. Recce abandoned; no damage to our aircraft.

Completed 0200 hrs.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary No 35,
plus WOPJ (C)

R. W. Cameron, Capt
for Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

2/27 Bw
1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.11

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 30 Jun to 1200 hrs 1 Jul 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

Ref: LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 Series

1. GROUND

Our Operations

In the DAMASCUS area on the afternoon of 30 Jun an enemy force composed of two companies of infantry and one troop of horsed cavalry supported by 14 tanks attacked the Free French positions at NEBEK.

A vigorous counter attack proved highly successful and the enemy withdrew leaving 30 dead and 15 prisoners in our hands, together with four 35-R tanks one of which was undamaged and is in running order.

FF casualties were very slight.

In the MERDJAYOUN and JEZZINE sectors the day was marked by enemy shelling and by active patrol activity on our part. One of our patrols in broken country at 140178 due west of JEZZINE had a successful encounter with a small party of the enemy and took 14 prisoners, identified as belonging to 1/6 Foreign Legion.

A successful action in the COASTAL SECTOR on the night 29/30 Jun carried out by 2/27 Aust Inf Bn gave us the high ground at Pt 394, which possesses good observation. Cav patrols on the right flank have now occupied MAZRAAT ED DAHR (129184) and EL JLEILIYE (130185), where a sharp engagement took place.

2/25 Aust Inf Bn are pushing eastward against enemy opposition and have established positions in the vicinity of HASROUT (13151885).

2. SECURITY

The translation of a German document captured in the Western Desert operations reveals the following story.

A German soldier had a notebook giving details of German dispositions. Against all orders, he took this into action and was captured. His notebook, with this valuable information, was taken from him by a British soldier. Against all orders and commonsense, this British soldier failed to hand the notebook in to his Intelligence Officer but kept it as a souvenir. A fortnight later the British soldier was in turn captured by the Germans who thus got back their precious notebook. The value of the information which we lost through this stupidity is clearly shown by the tone of the German document referring to its recovery.

3. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

The following have been identified in the NEBEK area:-

- One tp Spahis
- One coy 16 R.T.T.
- One mixed coy

Enemy Defences

The following information has been received from a DRU. E who is considered reasonably reliable.

The br between JDEIDE and MOUKHTARA has been prepared for demolition. The rd AIN MATOUR - BAADARANE - MASSER ECH CHOUF is good.

Demolition has been prepared at 12991817 rd embankment, also at culverts 13011809 and 13411794.

4. RUSSIA

Attached as Appendix "A" is an extract from the GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation.

5. AIR

Our Operations

RAF bombers again attacked stores and barracks at PALMYRA. A number of direct hits was observed on both targets but the extent of the damage caused is not known.

The Citadel and military depot at SOUEIDA were also attacked and direct hits were observed on both targets. Pamphlets were dropped on the town.

RAF fighters attacked aircraft on the ground at BAALBEK on 30 Jun. 5 twin engined aircraft were reported damaged or destroyed. Buildings and personnel were also heavily machine gunned.

This morning RAAF fighters again attacked aircraft on landing grounds at QUSEIR and BAALBEK.

The large monoplane reported attacked at QUSEIR on 29 Jun was again attacked and burnt out.

At BAALBEK 12 - 15 aircraft were attacked on the landing ground. 4 POTEZ 63 were damaged but not burnt. One unidentified aircraft was left in flames.

All our aircraft returned safely.

NOTE: Pilots report that all POTEZ 63 damaged at BAALBEK were painted battle ship grey. No yellow was visible.

Enemy Operations

Effective enemy air action in area CHATEAU OUEMERE (386294) is reported. Extent of damage or casualties has not yet been reported.

6. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

The following Recces were carried out:-

Sortie No.1: 1000 to 1045 hrs over DAMASCUS - BAR ELIAS - HASBAYA area. Pilots report indicated the position in this area as fundamentally unchanged since previous recce.

Sortie No.2: 1000 to 1045 hrs over the coastal area revealed that the br over the DAMOUR river at 125197 has been blown. In the balance of the area NMS.

Strat/R 0800 to 1000 hrs along rds DAMASCUS - QTALIFE - HOMS and tracks leading off these roads failed to locate column of 63 MT reported to have been moving in those areas.

The following is an analysis of both Enemy and Own AIR FORCE losses in SYRIA from the commencement of hostilities to 23 Jun. The figures have been taken from an RAF HQ Summary.

	TYPE	ENEMY		OWN
		DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	
1. By BOMBING	POTEZ 63	2	2 Damaged	1 Blenheim-
	GLEN MARTIN	-	1 3 Damaged	Crashed
	MORANE	1	2 Damaged	on
	CR 42	-		landing.
	UNIDENTIFIED	4		
2. GROUND STRAFFING	MORANE	1		
	CR 42 --	1		
	PORTEZ 63)	10	12 -	
	GLEN MARTIN)		6 damaged	
	DEWOITINES		8 damaged	
UNIDENTIFIED				
3. FIGHTER ACTION		15	4	7 Fighters 1 damaged
4. AA ACTION		16	1 damaged	
	<u>TOTALS</u>	50	17 Probables 26 damaged	8- and 1 damaged.

7. GENERAL.

(a) Questioned as to the reaction of the inhabitants to the British capture and occupation of DAMASCUS, a local inhabitant expressed the opinion that everyone was delighted. Further questioned as to the reason for this he replied, "Because the British have so much money".

(b) The following interesting information comes from the GHQ Weekly Review of the Military Situation.

The Petrol problem in SYRIA is so difficult that the Vichy French garrisons have been ordered to report daily on their petrol state and there has been an instance of an official being unable to leave an important centre because of complete lack of petrol there.

(c) Germany. Translation of order by 15 German Armd Div. The FUHRER has ordered that the issue of tobacco to members of the armed forces is to be based on the principle of the abolition of smoking. It is therefore, strictly ordered that the tobacco ration be issued to smokers only. Non-smokers will receive the substitutes laid down and will draw, as far as stocks allow, an issue of 30 grammes of boiled sweets in place of the tobacco ration.

W. L. ...
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION :

As per Int Summary No. 10.

Taken from GHQ Weekly Review of Military Situation.

RUSSIA

HITLER is still faithful to his doctrine of the concentration of effort safeguarding his right flank by an agreement with TURKEY and reducing German activities in Western EUROPE and the Middle East to a minimum, he has cast the full weight of the German war machine against RUSSIA. Hitler's ultimate objectives are clear, the seizure of Russian oil, grain and heavy industries to enable the German war machine to continue. But it is as yet too early to discern the immediate objectives. He has announced that the campaign has opened on the whole vast front from the BALTIC to the BLACK SEA; but whether the strongest pressure will develop against the UKRAINE only or whether an attempt will be made to bring about the complete collapse of all RUSSIA by shattering blows on a wide front is not yet clear. One thing however, is clear. The whole plan is based on the conception of the successful blitzkrieg. The Germans have staked all on finishing the war this year. If RUSSIA can maintain resistance until late autumn, it should spell catastrophe for GERMANY.

It may be worth while to consider shortly to what extent we may indirectly benefit from the conflict. Our real knowledge of the value of the Russian Army is so little that there are widely divergent opinions as to what resistance it can put up. At least, it is hoped that the effort of overcoming the Red Army will cost the Germans losses which cannot very quickly be made good.

In the worst case, we can expect that it will be some weeks if not months before the Germans are free to turn full military pressure in some other direction.

The Red Air Force now has the opportunity to bomb oilfields and industrial installations in ROUMANIA and in Eastern Germany which are out of range of our bombers. It should be possible for Russian submarines to make precarious if not impossible the supply of oil from ROUMANIA to ITALY via the BLACK SEA, thus thrusting this very heavy traffic back on to the already overloaded land communications through the BALKANS. The Russian Navy should also be able to interfere with the German Iron ore trade from the Northern Swedish ports. Even the most pessimistic view gives us two months as the minimum in which GERMANY can reduce RUSSIA and reorganise her forces, especially her air forces, for a major effort on another front.

As regards the Red Army, its reorganisation under Marshal TILLOSHENKO has been veiled in haze of mystery. The Finnish campaign showed up grave weaknesses, especially in leadership and administration, which have since been a subject of earnest attention. The system has been dropped of placing in all units a Political Commissar of equal rank and greater influence than the Unit Commander himself. It was found that the study of KARL LINDBERG was not the best preparation for modern battle. The Commissar is now a subordinate and the military Commander is in command. The Russian Army is organised on the same lines as most European armies, especially the German, but with perhaps one outstanding difference, namely, that the Russian infantry division contains a tank battalion in its establishment. RUSSIA is numerically strong in A.F.V. In addition to infantry division tank battalions, she is believed to have 65 tank brigades each of about 165 tanks. How she can use and supply these vehicles is yet to be discovered, as is their mechanical and fighting value. Her total army at the present is estimated a minimum of 183 infantry divisions, 45 cavalry divisions, 65 tank brigades and 16 motorised brigades, the majority of which are disposed on her western front. The Russian Air Force is directly under Army control and is also strong numerically. Its technical and operational efficiency have yet to be tested. The main weaknesses we may expect to find will be shortage of trained Staff Officers, the generally low standard of Commanders and failure in maintenance and other directions where skilled tradesmen are necessary. On the other hand, reports have for some time agreed that the morale and discipline of the Russian soldier is high. Superior Command is believed not to shrink from the prospect of losses and GERMANY may find that she has a difficult opponent. It is not improbable that German armoured formations at the outset will penetrate deeply into Russian territory but the Germans may find that this is like hitting a pillow. The traditional Russian defence has lain in

drawing the enemy on, lengthening his lines of communication and denying him local resources by thorough destruction. Whether in face of the vast and experienced German forces Marshal TIMOSHENKO will be able to maintain control and coordination of effort, and succeed in denying to GERMANY the prizes which she seeks, remains to be seen. One of the chief difficulties the Marshal will have to contend with will be the supply of fuel oil to his vast forces. The inadequate communications by which this oil reaches RUSSIA from the oilfields will be a first objective of the German ground and air forces.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCEHQ 7 Aust Div,
30 Jun 41.INT SUMMARY No 35.

(based on infm received up to time of typing)

1. Ops.Coastal Sector:

Patrols of 2/16 and 2/27 Bns gained pts of observation on DAMOUR defences. FDLs now on line ES SADIYATTE-ES SEYAR-EL FESTEQAANIYE-ER RAZANIYE. Increased enemy shelling along whole front during past 24 hrs, particularly area held by 2/27 Bn A Coy area 12521940. Suitable retaliatory measures taken. Arty and Navy bombarded known enemy defences in DAMOUR this morning. 2/25 Bn captured DARAYA and AANOUT and is now astride rd CHEHIM-RHARIFE at approximately 13001881. Patrol enemy cav seen moving from MEJBALOONA (124185) to JAMLIEH (122185) and later on rd RHARIFE to HASROUT. Br at 12351970 has been blown with rd blocks on North side of the river.

JEZZINE Sector:

2/31 Bn attacked and occupied hills 1332 (13771806) and 1284 (13731803).
2/14 Bn occupied KHARAT (13951803).
2/33 Bn reports only lt elements on outskirts RACHAYA EL FOKHAR and area 14021591. Estimated one pl.
Unconfirmed report hostile bty located 13801624.

MERDJAYOUN Sector:

Cav patrols report no enemy at KAHR HAMAME. Otherwise no change.

Extreme right flank:

DAMASCUS Sector - unidentified tp movement 0800 hrs area RAS EL AIM (179177).
Most of 2/3 Aust Inf Bn reported cut off 28 Jun have since rejoined formation.
13 FF Bde have made contact with enemy estimated one pl inf, two guns, 3 tanks and five armd Cs at DEIR AATIYE (246236).
Otherwise no change.

2. General.

Infm from PW:-

1. At NIHA there are five houses on right of br. In the most Southern houses 13981842 there are 75 mm guns and three other guns nearby.
2. There is a coy of RLE at 14041838.
3. Also a HQ at 14041 843 just under A of NIHA. A bn of RTS is also reported in the area.

3. Caravan route.

Caravan route reported KAHR MAYA (134187) - AIN EL QASSAB (124192) - BERJAIN (127192) - AIN EL HOUR (128193) - DABBIYA (127192).
DABBIYA overlooks DAMOUR and rd DAMOUR-BEIT ED DINE (136196).
Report claims route would protect our tps from gangs operating in coastal hills. Enemy retreating to DAMOUR would be cut off.

(2)

4. Tac/R. (1100-1215) 28 Jun.

Nothing to report except that 15-20 MT seen proceeding East of 122188 well dispersed and went under cover when aircraft came over.

124187 (KAFR MAQA) ten MT well dispersed.

Following rds NMS:-

JEZZINE-BEIT ED DINE.

BEIT ED DINE-YAROUTI.

BEIT ED DINE-North and West to DAMOUR.

KHALDE-YAROUTI.

DAMOUR - NMS.

5. RAF Op Summary to 2000 hrs 28 Jun 41.

Bombers attacked barracks and store buildings at PALMYRA. No hits on the barracks were observed but the stores were hit and fires started.

Bomber aircraft attacked ry sidings and hangars at RAYAK. One direct hit was made on the ry line and one stick of bombs straddled ry line.

Fighters escorting one of above raids encountered six Glen-Martins attacking our tps in PALMYRA area. All six enemy aircraft shot down in flames.

Aircraft employed for Fleet escort duties and protection over PALESTINE - no interception.

Aircraft recce LATAKIA, REIDAN, MUSLIMIYA and HAMA, TRIPOLI, TELKELATH, HOMS, QATINE, QUSEIR, RASS BAALBEI, BAALBEK, DEJOUNIER, BEYROUTH, PALMYRA, REKSUKMINE, NURABBA and JUFFA.

Completed 0800 hrs 29 Jun.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary No 34,
plus WOPU

RW Brill
Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

TO NEVI
FROM DASA

PATROL REPORT

SECRET

SENT BY	STRENGTH		INTENTION	ROUTE		INFORMATION OBTAINED	DATE	PATROL TOMORROW
	OPRS	ORS		OUT TIME	IN TIME			
DASA A	2	1PA	To Recce Broad River 12541964	EL BAGSI - EL BATTAL - ELABIYE - Rd Junc. 12591963 along rd to a pt 12541964 2030 hrs	Same as OUT 0430 hrs	within 40yds Br when 2 sentries were contacted one at each end. Red flame shot over patrol		
DASA B	15yds	7ORS	9/ any enemy in vicinity rd and rd junction	left BAASSIR at 2100 hrs to rd 12461924 then fork track to 12531928 continued south to rd at 12441926 then to rd junc 12581936	Same as OUT 0345	voices heard at 2315 at HALNI rd 12591928 at 0110 Nothing to report	PL sent out as standing patrol for observation DOVER. until dark	
DASA C	1	-	Recce enemy in vicinity of Wadi	left ERREZANIYE across country to just S of Trng 394 to track leading East to track 12611956 running NW.	Same as OUT	Nothing to report		

LOG OF MESSAGES

1 JULY, 1941.

III

SERIAL NO	DATE	TO	FROM	PRECIS	ACTION TAKEN	
1	1	0821	1007	DASA C	Stand-to Report. Nothing to report.	Adj. Io notified.
2	1	0930	0940	NEVI	Aircraft Recognition Signals for 2-3 July. (Attached)	" " Ack.
3	1	0955	1007	DASA C	Shelling Report from 2100 hrs 30 Jun to 0900 hrs 1 Jul. Brief harassing fire was experienced in this area from 2400 hrs to 0130 hrs and again from 0200 hrs to 0230 hrs. All were beyond our position and no damage was done.	Shelling + Bombing Report to NEVI.
4	1	1730	1750	NEVI	Sitrep (Attached)	Info entered on Sit Reaps.
5	1			DASA C	Report from C Coy OP (Attached)	"
6	1	2000		DASA 12	Standing Patrol Report (Attached)	Reported to NEVI on Patrol Report
7	1	0900		DASA C	Patrol Report on Recce to Samour Crossing (Attached)	"
8	1	0846		DASA B	Report on Recce Patrol (Attached)	"
9	1			DASA B	Patrol Report (Attached)	"
10	1	1145	1155	DASA C	Reported by REXI. During early hours this morning, approx 0230 - 0430, at intervals 3 or 4 vehicles (tracked) described as being similar to carriers, moved along road DAMOUR - BEIT ED DINE in direction of DAMOUR. Between 0430 and 0500 a heavy vehicle, not tracked and described as "home made AFV," moved along same rd in direction of DAMOUR and later returned in direction of BEIT ED DINE.	Reported to NEVI 1225 hrs

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No. 102

No. of Groups


OFFICE DATE STAMP

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

GR.

OUT



(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

~~GOLE LUPA DASA DONE REXI WIYA WOPU~~

FROM

NEVI

Originator's Number

0114

Date

1

In Reply to Number

SITREP	patrols	South	bank	DAMOUR	river
estab enemy patrols on rd along north bank					
of river @ enemy have at least one SL in area					
SW of ELBOUM @ patrol GIF1 at MAZRAAT ED					
DAHR reported reported enemy in EL JLEILIYE					
ABXAPD and EL MTOLLE ABEXPD @ GEKU shelled					
both these pts causing evacuation by enemy					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
Forms C2128/13.	Wt. 36169/1798.	1,000M. pads. 12	/39. B.& S. Ltd.	51-5537.							

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

of former which was then occupied by patrol
 GIF-1 @ GEKU inflicted known casualties @
 DONE patrol occupied HASROUT without
 opposition @ intermittent shelling by enemy
 of fwd areas DAMOUR sector no casualties @
 all informed

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1730

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

To DASA

FROM DASA C. Int Cp

JUL 1st 41

activities DASA C. AREA

1855 hrs 30 Jun until hrs 1 Jul 41.

30 Jun.

1855 Schrapnel bursts continually for 25 mins
over area occupied by 13 pl on feature 394
1920 - until 2005 Shells of a heavier type than
formerly used & which issued a larger
flash on exploding in addition to
larger volumes of smoke. about 20-22
shells in all. Most of the shells landed
on ~~the~~ BAAQOVN feature & over toward
HALNI. about 203 went to our left & fell
in gully near of DASA H area. no casualties
then only intermittent shelling until
2359 when the heavier type of shell
again used & this time about 15 in all &
4 duds passed low over us & landed near
BAAQOVN area again.

1 Jul 0155 at it again - about 10 shells plus
3 duds. exactly same as 2359 hrs
stunt. no casualties

GENERAL DASA Skipper with 4 ORs left on an
important recon & rtd approx
0450 hrs. Objective not quite
reached. Personnel report gone to
DASA MOTIEN.

by Mr Skipper

2

From 2030 hrs until 0500 hrs in
conjunction with another OR I
participated in a special Sentry
duty watching for the double green
from 394. One hr on & one off watches.
At 0237 one green plane appeared
on our feature between our & A's
areas. Sighted clearly by Ops on
394. Careful enquiries failed to
reveal how, why or where this
plane was fired.

1100 - On rpt report from Resi re
AFVs on Damon - But Dune rd -
DASA Nicholls notified Bn & I
went unperformed FOO

1300 - From this feature nothing of the
arty shell could be observed
although Resi observed that
our first fire produced loud
explosion followed by extensive
fire among enemy guns at
ABBAY apparently ammunition
Dump hit. NO further detail

3

From 2000 hrs today
14 pl & 13 pl will exchange
posns @ 15 pl will continue
protecting Resi at their
usual posn (412) ⊗

Pt Mc GEE will handle
all reports dealing with 394 ⊗

Standing Patrol Report 12PL
1 Jul '41

0530. Own two carriers moved out in
seat of Div. Cav. to MONASTERY
(Ref Map Saida 1:50,000) 12631833 to
cover withdrawal of Cav. if nec.

Nil report of any.
Cav report for ^{any} ~~the~~ pos. W of MAZRAAT
EB DEIR still vacated and their
patrols pushed on beyond the village
without contacting any.

Mill in ravine still under observation
and patrol of two sent to track
junction with main JUAN Rd to
contact and follow any donkey
trains but with nil result.

2000 hrs.

W. M. J. [unclear]
Lieut.

Report on Patrol to seeee Damour River
crossing at 12621961. 30/1 July.

Ref DAMOUR 1/25000

Commencing from house due South of
group of houses on Trig 394 there is no
track but it is picked up after some
features. Track winds Snake-like &
then becomes fairly straight as it switches
SE. Commences very rough with rocks
& loose stones & later becomes quite a
good track as it approaches southern
tributary of river. Track could not
be found as shown on map where it
turns sharply back in NW direction.
A thorough search was made in this
area & no track could be found &
the steep nature of the ground is agst
a track existing as shown on map.
However track follows down to
150 feet of creek & then switches NW
about 150x down to creek where it

disappears into creek. Here creek
was waded. Water fast moving
at abt six inches ~~deep~~ deep when it
passes over rocks where forded.

A faint track was found on Eastern
side of creek & this was followed to
where it again disappeared into creek
after abt 2000.

Follow creek along still on Eastern
side on a sort of track until abt 4000
feet or came to a cliff where we were
able to pass over a little way on rock
ledge but soon came to a bare face
which could not be negotiated.

Cliff exists on either side of creek &
there is no well defined track & in
my opinion it would be impracticable
to move a body of troops by this route.

A prominent feature was found to
exist to the East of 432 divided from
it by a very deep gully. The creek
line running North & South is shown
on map but not the contours. However

Saida map 1/50000 shows this clearly
The creek line whenever the map branches
off to the West with a fork at the top
could not be found on the ground.

Note. There is a possibility that track
switching NW does exist but such
a thorough search was made for
this track that I feel that even if
it did exist it would be impractical
to take a large body of men over it
owing to the steepness of the slopes over
which if it does exist it would pass.
The objective of patrol was not reached
as explained above.

I have a scheme for a daylight recon
which I will take to decision.

J. D. Higgins
Lieut.
Patrol Comd.

0900.

1 July 1941.

To D.A.S.A. B.

From IIPh

Report on Reece Patrol.

INTENTION

To ascertain if any enemy in vicinity of road & ROAD JUNCTION XIVK AQWY

Strength of Patrol. Sgt Blackmore & 7 ORs.

Method. The Patrol left starting point BASSIR at

2100 hrs 30 June 41 & proceeded along road to

^{1246 1924}
AEHD XNIC. Then along foot path to

AEUB XLEO. & continued south meeting

^{1253 1928}
road at AECC XLEY.

The road ^{1244 1926} was followed to road junction

^{1258 1936}
AITP XQWJ.

Orchard groves along route & village at HALNI were searched

The Patrol lay up at ^{1256 192} XEUD AQES. from 2330 hrs 30 June 41 to 0150 hrs 1 July 41.

Overlooking RD Junction + WATER COURSE
XETD AQEN.

No enemy were encountered on route, but voices were heard at XECLALWX.

Whilst Patrol was searching HALNI at 2315 hrs. & again at XEUL AQEP. at 0110 hrs

Voices were clearly heard but intelligible speech was slow & of European accent

Artillery were firing in direction of H A L N I
but not at H A L N I.

Some stragglers fell in vicinity of Patrol
laying up position X E U D A Q E J.

Patrol left X E U D A Q E J. at 0150 hrs 1 June 41 &
returned via same route

Arrived at A E B D X N B W at 0345 hrs. 1 June 41

0846 hrs. 1 June 41

J. Blackmore sgt

1 July 1941

LOG OF MESSAGES

~~IN~~ OUT

Serial No	DATE	TO	TO	To FROM	DETAILS	ACTION TAKEN
1	1	2002		NEVI	Herewith documents discovered in vicinity of Trig 394.	
2	1	0830		NEVI	Ack. Aircraft Recognition Signals.	
3	1	1350		NEVI	Ack. Aircraft Recognition Signals 2-3 July.	
4	1	1710		DASA DEAN, SANDISON, CADDY, WARBURTON	Duty offs night 1/2 June 41 as follows. 2030 - 2230 Lieut SANDISON 2230 - 2430 Lieut DEAN 2430 - 0230 Lieut WARBURTON 0230 - 0430 Lieut CADDY In future the last off on duty will make logt and hand over Duty Offs Book. Ack.	
5	1	2035		DASA B ECH	Tea and sugar urgently required by DASA C. Send same food to mule pack immediately and notify DASA C at what time they can collect same from mule pack in morning. DASA C can be notified by L/T at R.A.P. Ack.	

arty

TANK KILLING FOR ENGINEERS - PART 2

Since the issue of Part 1, nine 12 ton Mr tks have been killed 2 prs, this does not include numerous arm cars and the 2 pr remains only purely tk killing weapon.

In defence its use is easy, and the majority of tks have been killed in that role.

In attack, sufficient success has not been gained, and the following facts must be borne in mind:-

- (a) That the bait for tks against attacking tps will be assaulting inf.
- (b) That the proven facts regarding the 2 pr are:-
 - i. That up to 500x three shots will kill the Mr 12 ton tk.
 - ii. Up to 800x (more in some cases) ton shots are necessary, but --
 - iii. One tk was killed at 1100x. This tk, on examination, had been penetrated at that range, and, in addition, had two 2 pr shells embedded to their length in the thickest armour.

4. From experiments carried out, the best point of aim is where the turret meets the body, as usually the tracks will be obscured by undergrowth or covered by rock walls.

5. In the attack, if 2 prs are to be permitted to kill tks, it is essential that:

- (a) The number of tk approaches be limited to two or three by the use of artificial tk obstacles and A tk mines. The latter will probably have to be laid by special parties, moving fwd with the fwd inf coys.
- (b) That the inf line of attack is confined to areas in, and defiladed by tk-proof localities.
- (c) A tk recon parties which will include the 3jts i/c guns should move on foot with fwd coys, choosing routes of adv for i/tk guns and making recon of suitable i/tk gun posns.
- (d) The guns themselves, if portee, should be backed from bound to bound once inf gain contact and tk attack is imminent and, if towed, one at least should always be in action while the other, or others, moves. This aspect has been discussed in detail with A/tk offrs.

6. If inf casualties are to be avoided and tanks killed with tk-killing weapon, then the basic factor, in attack as well as in defence, must be the A tk plan.

7. To repeat a previous statement, the tk likes soft prey and the A tk gun must be placed on the line to that prey. The most attractive bait for tks will always be inf unprotected by i/tk guns.

8. If captured tks be available for use, they will be an important addition to i/tk protection if used as mobile armoured A tk guns in conjunction with the 2 pr, as the Mr A tk gun will not definitely stop its own tks.

9. In the preparation of the arty plan, counter-preparation tasks should include any possible tk "lying up" areas, as frequently tks have been moved and kept moving by accurate fire from fd guns. Comds should not, however, regard the fd gun as a tk killing weapon when the 2 pr is available.

131156
132186

DASA C


Night 1/2 Jul

Report of Recce Patrol Area 12661952 - 12591957

Patrol of Lt. J.W. Skipper and two CRs. Moved down under cover of darkness to a point in grove approx 12641953. Patrol made a short recce to find track leading back in s. S.W. direction. A track was noted.

Party baid up during night. Two men were heard moving around party during night and a tin hat was heard to apparently fall off and hit a rock. On hearing noise I called softly to others, and the call may have been heard by the two men as no further approach was heard.

Party picked up likely track at break of day and followed in N.W. direction. Track commenced strongly then faded into a goat track over very difficult country, until eventually it came to a stop where it faded out. Trek appeared at this point to be much higher up than that shewn on map. Point reached was approx as shewn on diag hereunder.



No track could be seen down below and the nature of the ground was against it exist ng there. Two CPs were observed on crest of feature immediately east across tributary of Damour River.

Home was made in daylight by climbing up twds Trig 394 and switching left to track. Although in full view to observers, were not troubled by them. The track followed would be impossible to a large body at night because of slides and drops.

INF SUMMARY NO 7

Based on infm reced from 1300 hrs 27 Jun to 0900 hrs 1 Jul 41.

Ref Maps :- SAIDA)
DJEZZINE) 1/50000

1. GROUNDOUR OPERATIONS

- (1) FDLs 2/16 Bn and 2/27 Bn now on line from KARACOL (12101950) - ES SADIYATT (12231952) - ES SIYAR (12401952) - ER REZANIYE (12531947) with 2/27 Bn on right. Active patrolling to obtain pts of observation on DAMOUR defences. During night 29/30 C Coy 2/27 captured pt 394 (12551957) taking 5 prisoners. Our arty continues harassing fire on known enemy defences, particularly on hostile btys. 2/25 Bn captured DARAYA and AANOUT at 1400 hrs 29 Jun and have consolidated astride rd CHARIFE - AANOUT at (13001881). Enemy withdrew from MAZRAAT ED DAHR (12981847) at approx 1000 hrs 30 Jun. One tp A Sqn 6 Div Cav occupied this village which was then shelled by a hostile bty from the direction CHARIFE. 30 Jun 2/25 Bn patrols to HASROUT came under by enemy arty fire and were forced to withdraw to AANOUT. Patrol to EL ZAAROUYE reported no enemy seen. Today 2/25 Bn are patrolling to HASROUT and to the high ground NW of EL MCOLLE. One tp A Sqn 6 Div Cav at MAZRAAT ED DAHR patrolling towards EL JLEILYE.

ENEMY OPERATIONS

Enemy arty activity has increased during the past 48 hrs, much of which has fallen on areas not occupied by our tps. Enemy hy guns (145mm) being used in conjunction with 75mm guns. During hy shelling on A coy 2/27 Bn night 28/29 approx 200 shells were fired. 10% of shells did not explode. Lge percentage enemy amm is of 1918 manufacture and fragmentation is very poor due to impure explosives. Enemy defensive works continuing on North side of DAMOUR river but very little movement during day. Enemy force (approx 200) of MF, cav and inf consolidated in CHARIFE (13381890). Patrols A Sqn 6 Div Cav at MAZRAAT ED DAHR report enemy consolidating at EL MCOLLE in orange groves and also along WADI BEIZOUN.

2. AIR

Our planes have been active against concentrations of enemy tps and tpt. Enemy air activity has decreased. One recce plane flew over this area at 1550 hrs 29 Jun.

3. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

Five PWs captured during attack on pt (394) were far better type of legionaire than any previously captured and would NOT divulge any infm other than their name, rank and unit.

All were from 5 Coy 2 Bn 6 RLE.

No further identification yet obtained re garrison of DAMOUR

4. ENEMY DISPOSITIONS(1) DAMOUR

Inf disposns as per Int summary No 6.

Defensive works being improved, extent not known.

Gaps in wire around 2 Bn RLE are all on the West side near the coast rd. The town of DAMOUR has been completely evacuated by civilians and enemy AFVs are hidden in the streets and buildings

Arty : The number of guns in DAMOUR seems to have been increased

/and some hy.....

and some by guns (145 or 155mm) have been located.
HBs have been reported in the following posns.

Map Ref of HB DAMOUR SHEET 1/50000	No of Guns	Type	Have shelled Area at	Source of infm
12701969	1	HOW	South of EL HARAM at (12351940)	Observation
House at 12422006	1	75mm	"	Observation from OP at pt 171
12451990	4	75mm	No reports	Infm PW (uncon- firmed)
12581974	8 ? probably 4	75mm	Area NEBI YOUNES 12101922	(1) PW (unconfirm (11) Guns evident ly firing at ex- treme range dur- ing 2/16. An att- ack on QASSOURA Observation
12642018	4	75mm	12341955	Observation
12892007	2	145 or 155 mm	fired on navy but shells fell short	Night observation
13081999	1	155mm	South of EL HARAM 12351940	"
13061992	1	155mm	"	"
Area near AHEY probably gun at (13061992)	2	by (155mm)	AANOUT	Sound bearing 7 $\frac{1}{2}$ ^o and observation of flashes from OP at 12881898
AATRINE - approx 13451915	6	75mm	Rd at 130189	Sound bearing 71 ^o from OP at 12881898
AATRINE - approx 13451915	3	75mm	OP at 12981875	Sound bearing 45 ^o from OP.

(11) AANOUT - BEIT ED DINE area.

Location	Date	Infm	Source
BEIT ED DINE	daily from 20-30 Jun	Tp concentration and MP movement HQ of enemy forces in COASTAL sector	TAC R and Infm PW
	28 Jun	Trucks loaded with amm in olive groves NE of BEIT ED DINE at approx 13641958	Deserter
DEIR EL QAMAR	27 Jun	MG nests in wadi at approx 13341949. North of the town in olive groves approx 13451964 there are some tks and Armad Cs	PW (unconfirmed)
BAAKLINE	27 Jun	tps and tks hidden in trees East of village.	Local Arab not very reliable)
	29 Jun	2 A Tk guns and 10 MLs at (13431940) covering rd to CHARIFE	Reliable
AIN DRAFIL (129202)	26 Jun	"Many" tps (French and Senegalese) and some vehs	Reliable source
		/DAKOUN (130199).....	

DAKOUN 130199	29 Jun	3 or 4 guns (75mm?) at Western exit of village.	Reliable
	26 Jun	"Many" tps and vehs	Unreliable
KA FR HIM 131195	29 Jun	Br at 13271949 has been destroyed	Reliable
CHARIFE or RIHARIE	26 Jun	Br at 13361940 prepared for demolition. 29 Jun - About 500 tps. Some	Reliable
	29 Jun	cav located FONTAINE DE BAZOUN 2 1/2 Km from CHARIFE on the rd to HASROUT. Large force reported (approx 400)	"
MTOULLE or EL MTOULLE 13201865	30 Jun 29 Jun 30 Jun	About 100 tps seen in this area Patrols A Sqn 6 Div Cav report enemy in this area	Reliable
	1 Jul	Enemy consolidating in orchards and in WADI BEIZOUN.	Patrol 6 Div Cav
EL JIILLIYE (13081857)	30 Jun	Patrols A Sqn 6 Div Cav report enemy holding this village. Probably tps withdrew from MAZRAAT ED DAHR at 1130 hrs 30 Jun	"
EL ZAAROUYE (130187) BEIKOUN	30 Jun	2000 hrs patrol 2/25 Bn report no enemy seen.	Patrol
	28 Jun	About 300 tps with MGs and five guns of large calibre (75mm) Two of these guns located 600 metres West of village at approx 13541870.	Arab of good int.

(iii) DAMOUR - BEYROUTH

It has previously been reported by a PW that Gen ARABLOSSE has mentioned the following lines of defence between DAMOUR and BEYROUTH :-

First Line	DAMOUR
Second Line	KHALDE
Third Line	CHOUKIFAT - ALEY - BHAMDOUN

DAMOUR is known to be held very strongly and the defences have been strengthened during the past week. No definite infm has been recd that the second and third lines have been prepared but concentrations of tps and vehs have been reported in those areas.

Other conflicting reports from PWs state that DAMOUR is the last line of defence between DAMOUR and BEYROUTH. However the country surrounding KHALDE and CHOUKIFAT lends itself to defence and it seems probable that if driven out of DAMOUR the enemy would make a further stand on either his second or third line. The following infm has been recd during the past week on this area.

(KHALDE

Two hy coast defence guns (see sketch in int summary No 6)
A Tk guns sited to fire along main coast rd. (See sketch att to PW infm of 19 Jun)

Inf

A deserter from the French Arm'd corps at BEIT ED DINE gave the following infm. 27 Jun.

"At KHALDE I saw a large force of Senegalese, Foreign Legion, Moroccans and others. The tps are all along the coast from BEIT BEYROUTH to KHALDE, they are chiefly inf. Between KHALDE and DAMOUR there are many MG nests on both sides of the rd covering the area between the foot of the hills and the coast.

Another deserter from 1 Sqn 6 Regt Chasseurs d'Afrique gave the following infm 27 Jun.

" At KHALDE there are two hy guns on which the French count very much to hold the British adv. There is a sec of Senegalese tps at KHALDE. At a spot two kilos SE of KHALDE (12752080) I saw a bn of "CHASSEURS LIBANAIS" comd by Lieut SEMAHIA and possibly another Lebanese capt.

/This infm although.....

This infm although unconfirmed seems to indicate that a line of defence is being prepared South of KHALJE but the reports must at present be treated with reserve.

CHOUEIFAT

Tac R reports have frequently reported concentrations of vehs in this area.

FW infm 28 Jun

There is a post for repair of military vehs and a small garrison of Moroccans.

Tps are hidden in the gardens and trees East and West of the Coast rd.

BEYROUTH

Available infm re the town of BEYROUTH and surrounding defences is shown on the marked maps attached.

5. GENERAL

- (i) On 23 May 10 Germans went to SAIDA to organise the defences.
- (ii) The French Col who commanded the tps at QASMIYE on the LITANI has been arrested and imprisoned for not trying.
- (iii) On 16 Jun the Mufti of the Lebanon while trying to persuade Gen DENIZ to declare BEYROUTH an open town pointed out that the French seemed more ready to make a battlefield of BEYROUTH than of PARIS.
- (iv) About 150 Arm'd Cs have been built in BEYROUTH. Their armour plate consists of two layers of plate with a layer of wood in between and is said to be effective. About 50 of these cars are armed with a 37mm gun and the remainder with MGs.
- (v) On the att map a prison in the outskirts of BEYROUTH is clearly marked. In view of the fact that the prison contains an American journalist and a number of anti-Vichy personnel it is desired that as far as possible it should not be subjected to shell fire.

J. Hume
 Lieut
IO 21 Aust Inf Bde

BEIRUT

Reference to pin points on map B/7.

NOT TO BE TAKEN IN THE AIR

NOTE : Any corrections to pin points based on reliable information will be appreciated.

Half-blackened circle - A/A Guns, O.

Black circle with cross - C.D. Guns, O.

Due to the small scale of the map, fuel tanks and buildings had to be shown in groups.

1. Aerodrome building and W/T.
2. Ammunition dump, position on the map is approximate.
3. Barracks (Desgrées du Dou).
4. Barracks (Sarrail).
5. Barracks (Quartier Granger)
6. Barracks (Veillotte)
7. Barracks (Quartier Foch)
8. Barracks (Joffre)
9. Barracks (DIM)
10. Iron Works
11. Headquarters ?
12. Barracks (Gey)
13. Grand Serail
14. Naval Dockyard
15. Coal stocks on jetty
16. Tramway depot and power station
17. Army petrol stores
18. Barracks (Lazaret)
19. Barracks (Camp St Michel)
20. Barracks (Quartier Weygand)
21. Remount Depot
22. Barracks (HQ of Commandant Trabaud)
23. Barracks (Camp Mailler)
24. Artillery Barracks
25. Tram depot
26. Barracks (Quartier Petain)
27. Barracks (Quartier Franchet D'esperey)
28. Barracks
29. Railway station with sidings
30. Railway station
31. Bridge
32. Bridge
33. Oil Installations
34. Oil Installations
35. Oil Installations
36. Oil Installations
37. To coast battery and W/T station $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles away.
38. W/T station $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles away
39. Soap factory
40. CD battery $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles away
41. W/T Station
42. Bridge.
43. Customs and warehouses with full port facilities.
44. Military base - full port facilities with railway sidings running to end of wharf.
45. Military telephone exchange
47. Residence des Pins. (Residence of General DENTZ).
48. Hotel Metropole
49. Offices of Radio Orient
50. Surete
52. Hotel Normandy.

TOP SECRET

1. AIR MAIL LETTER CARDS

- (a) As from 15 Jul 41, a reduced rate air-mail letter card service to Australia will be introduced.
- (b) The postage rate will be threepence, and Australian stamps only may be used. Although the cost is much less than the ordinary air-mail letter, there will be no distinction in speed of despatch and delivery.
- (c) The concession is available to all members of the Imperial Forces in H.M.
- (d) On application at any British Army P.O. AIF personnel may avail themselves of the similar British air-mail letter card service for correspondence with persons in United Kingdom.
- (e) The letter card is designed to provide a writing space of one and a half pages, quarto size. Censorship arrangements will apply as in the case of letters. All ranks are specially warned that if anything is enclosed, the card will be sent by ordinary surface mail.
- (f) A first issue of letter cards will be made to units by Stationery Depot, Printing and Stationery Services, Palestine. Units will requisition for subsequent requirements from Stationery Depot, Printing and Stationery Services.

2. FRIABLET OF UNDELIVERABLE POSTAL ARTICLES

In accordance with National Security (General) Regulations promulgated by the Minister for the Army, the following procedure will be adopted with all unclaimed unregistered postal articles (other than letters, postcards and commercial papers):-

Newspapers and Periodicals. Undeliverable newspapers and periodicals, clearly distinguishable as such, shall be distributed, at the discretion of the senior postal representative with the force, among other members of the unit of address or made available as reading matter to hospitals, convalescent camps or recreational centres for troops. The address labels or covers should, in such cases, be destroyed, or the addresses completely obliterated before such distribution is effected.

Parcels and Packets. Undeliverable parcels and packets shall be opened at the Overseas Base Post Offices and such contents as are suitable for the purpose shall be handed over to the accredited representatives of the Australian Comforts Fund and the Australian Red Cross Society for general distribution to the troops. Items of sentimental value shall, however, be withheld from distribution and wherever possible returned to the senders.

Officers Commanding will ensure that the foregoing instructions are given effect in accordance with the technical instructions issued by the A.D.P.S. H.Q. A.I.F. (M.E.) for the guidance of unit postal orderlies.

3. COMMUNICATION OTHER THAN THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS.

i. Many applications, requests and submissions are being made direct to Formation etc H.Q. and to Australia, instead of through the proper military channels.

ii. Unit censors will ensure that matter of the nature referred to is disposed of in accordance with the provisions of AMR & O's 1568(1) and 1569(1) which provide:-

"Correspondence to be referred to superior authority will be forwarded through each officer in the chain of command. The same principle will be followed in communications by a superior to a subordinate authority. A superior authority who communicates directly with a subordinate authority will usually notify his action to any intermediate authority."

An application from an officer will be submitted to his C.O. An application from a soldier will be made to his company, etc., commander who will, if the nature of the application requires, lay it before the C.O."

PART "D"

CLASSIFICATIONS

- SK 4775 Pte Hodgkinson H.L. classified Up Cpl Carpenter 23 Jun 41.
- SK 3489 Pte Bruce I.J. classified A/Dr M.F. 1st Class 1d Cp iii from 12 Jun. (Carriers)
- SK 3998 Pte Garrett D.W. " A/Dr M.F. 1st Class 1d Cp iii 16 Jun "
- SK 3882 Pte Richardson J.W. classified Up Cp i A/Dricklayer 1 Jul 41.
- SK 3096 Pte Anderson H.J. classified Up Cp ii Mason 1 Jul 41.

PROMOTIONS

- SK 2803 Cpl Wright B.S. promoted A/Sjt as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 3610 Pte Rothe J.W.M. promoted A/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 4405 Pte Vandell M.L. promoted A/Cpl as from 26 Jun 41.
- SK 4008 L/Cpl Martin A.K. promoted A/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 9905 L/Cpl Hodgson J.G. promoted A/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 3533 Pte Allwood R.C. promoted A/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 3631 Cpl Baker S.C. promoted A/Sjt as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 3063 L/Cpl Ganley promoted A/Cpl as from 1 Jul 41.
- SK 3362 L/Sjt Purcell R.H. promoted A/Sjt as from 1 Jul 41.

APPOINTMENTS

- SK 3108 Cpl Eashmar AFC appointed I/Sjt as from 26 Jun 41.
- SK 3962 Cpl Leckie M.H. appointed I/Sjt as from 26 Jun 41.
- SK 4157 Pte Wicks R.J. appointed L/Cpl as from 26 Jun 41.
- SK 4566 Pte Ryan R.W. appointed I/Cpl as from 26 Jun 41.
- SK 3063 Pte Ganley appointed L/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 10109 Pte Savage H.H. appointed L/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 9873 Pte Price S.H. appointed I/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 4828 Pte Hunt R.P.C. appointed I/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 3513 Pte C'Leary G. appointed I/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 8371 Pte Hamilton A. appointed I/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 3586 Pte Luck A. appointed I/Cpl as from 1 Jul 41.
- SK 10066 Pte Lannion J.J. appointed I/Cpl as from 1 Jul 41.

J. M. Capt.

81/PSJK/3 - 300,000 - 17 4-41

DASA
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(Labelst)

ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE
FASTEN Envelope by gumming this Label across Flap
OPEN by cutting Label instead of tearing Envelope.

1. AIR MAIL LETTER CARDS

- (a) As from 15 Jul 41, a reduced rate air-mail letter card service to Australia will be introduced.
- (b) The postage rate will be threepence, and Australian stamps only may be used. Although the cost is much less than the ordinary air-mail letter, there will be no distinction in speed of despatch and delivery.
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War diary

PART "B"

CLASSIFICATIONS

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- SK 3489 Pte Bruce I.J. classified 1/Dr H.L. 1st Class Td Cp 111 From 12 Jun. (Carriers)
- SK 3998 Pte Garrett D.W. " 1/Dr H.L. 1st Class Tp Cp 1116 Jun "
- SK 3882 Pte Richardson J.M. classified Tp Cp 1 1/Bricklayer 1 Jul 41.
- SK 3096 Pte Anderson H.J. classified Tp Cp 11 1/Mason 1 Jul 41.

PROMOTIONS

- SK 2803 Cpl Wright B.S. promoted 1/Sjt as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 3610 Pte Rothe J.W.T. promoted 1/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 4405 Pte Vandell T.L. promoted 1/Cpl as from 26 Jun 41.
- SK 4008 L/Cpl Martin A.K. promoted 1/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
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- SK 3631 Cpl Baker S.C. promoted 1/Sjt as from 25 Jun 41.
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- SK 3362 L/Sjt Purcell R.T. promoted 1/Sjt as from 1 Jul 41.

APPOINTMENTS

- SK 3108 Cpl Lashmar A.C. appointed 1/Sjt as from 26 Jun 41.
- SK 3962 Cpl Leckie M.L. appointed 1/Sjt as from 26 Jun 41.
- SK 4157 Pte Wicks R.J. appointed 1/Cpl as from 26 Jun 41.
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- SK 8371 Pte Hamilton A. appointed 1/Cpl as from 25 Jun 41.
- SK 3586 Pte Luck A. appointed 1/Cpl as from 1 Jul 41.
- SK 10066 Pte Mannion J.J. appointed 1/Cpl as from 1 Jul 41.

J. M. Kept
ADPT DASA.

3. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

Many applications, requests and examinations are being made to the Director of the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, for the purpose of obtaining copies of the records of the names of the persons who served in the Australian Army during the war. The Director is pleased to supply such copies to the persons who apply for them, provided that the application is made in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The following instructions apply to the persons who apply for such copies:

1. The application should be made in writing to the Director, Canberra, and should be accompanied by a photograph of the applicant. The photograph should be a recent one, and should be of the same size as the photograph of the applicant which is attached to the application form. The photograph should be placed in the envelope with the application form, and the envelope should be addressed to the Director, Canberra.

2. The application should be made by the person who served in the Australian Army, or by a person who is entitled to act on behalf of the person who served in the Australian Army. The person who is entitled to act on behalf of the person who served in the Australian Army is the person who is named in the application form as the person who served in the Australian Army.

3. The application should be made as soon as possible after the death of the person who served in the Australian Army, and should be made before the expiry of the period of time specified in the application form for the making of the application.

4. The application should be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and should be accompanied by the fee specified in the application form.

5. The application should be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and should be accompanied by the fee specified in the application form.

6. The application should be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and should be accompanied by the fee specified in the application form.

7. The application should be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and should be accompanied by the fee specified in the application form.

8. The application should be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and should be accompanied by the fee specified in the application form.

9. The application should be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and should be accompanied by the fee specified in the application form.

10. The application should be made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, and should be accompanied by the fee specified in the application form.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCEHQ 7 Aust Div,
2 Jul 41INT SUMMARY No 37

(based on infm received up to time of typing)

1. Ops.

Coastal Sector: 2/25 Bn patrols have reached HASROUT and EL ZAAROUYE. Enemy reported at EL JLEILIYE-CHARIFE and EL MTOLE. Patrols have been sent to observe what enemy are located in these areas. Intermittent shelling of fwd areas but no casualties.

JEZZINE Sector: 2/3 Bn pushing patrols out towards WADI NAGRAT. Enemy shelled 2/14 Bn HQ during morning and afternoon but no damage or casualties. Our arty shelled enemy at EL MTOULIE 1300 hrs. Fire seen falling on enemy.

MERDJAYOUN Sector: No change.

DAMASCUS Sector: Enemy attack on NEBEK afternoon 30 Jun driven off by counter-attack. Three enemy tanks knocked out, one captured in running order. At 1300 hrs convoy coming from PALMYRA turned round and went back NE. Free French armd C recce evening 30 Jun from QTAIFE to COL at 29 kilos NE of NASRIYE without incident. Considerable movement mules NW YAAFOUR (182176)

2. Tac/R.

Tac/R which covered rd NASRIYE (250214) - EL QARYATEIN (290253) - PALMYRA and tracks between this and HOMS - QTAIFE rd reported as follows:-

6 MT dispersed 285248.
Landing ground with wireless masts and hangar at 282272.
Balance of area NMS.

3. RAF Op Summary up to 2000 hrs 30 Jun 41.

Ten bomber sorties attacked barracks and stores PALMYRA. Some hits reported. Three sorties attacked Citadel and military depots EL SOUEIDA. Hits observed both targets and pamphlets dropped on the town. Ten fighter sorties attacked BAALBECK and satellite landing grounds. Five twin-engined aircraft damaged or destroyed. Building and personnel heavily machine-gunned. Six sorties local defence - no interception. One Tac/R area NE of PALMYRA. One recce aerodrome FURQLUS and ry sta and yards HAMA, ALEPPO, MEIDAN EKES, br KURD KOLUK, HEREDERE and LATAKIA harbour.

4. Enemy eqpt.

A report has been received stating that the French in SYRIA sent 15,000 rifles, 5,000,000 rounds SAA, twelve 155 mm howitzers, 30 A Tk guns with 2,500 rpg and an unspecified number of hand grenades to IRAQ during Rashid Ali's tenure of office. Previous reports have been received on the transfer of munitions from SYRIA to IRAQ, which, while the details do not agree, give approximately the same totals. One bty of 155 mm howitzers is known to have been sent, and the French are reported to be making prodigious efforts to get them back. It may be assumed that the arms sent from SYRIA to IRAQ were from stocks held under the control of the Italian Armistice Commission. They held amongst other weapons 21,700 rifles, 37 155 mm howitzers and 234,000 grenades, and a quantity of SAA and arty amn. It was not known that they held A Tk guns.

Distribution: As per Int Summary No 36

Ridambal Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

DASA

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div,
2 Jul 41.

NEWS SUMMARY No 9.

(0900 hrs 1 Jul to 0900 2 Jul 41)

1. Gen Wavell has been appointed GOC in C, INDIA. Gen Auchinleck has been appointed GOC in C, Middle East. It was Gen Auchinleck who conducted the operations which lead to the capture of NARVIK and who was later responsible for organising the defence of Southern England. He became GOC in C, India, early this year.

It was pointed out in London that since Gen Wavell assumed the supreme command in the Middle East he had waged five major campaigns. The change will give him the opportunity to take a much needed rest, it was said.

In future there is to be a permanent member of the British War Cabinet stationed in the Middle East. This will be Mr. Oliver Lyttleton, who will have his HQ in Cairo. He will be able to assume much of the responsibility which had formerly fallen on the shoulders of the GOC in C in matters not directly associated with the conduct of operations.

2. Land operations.

EUROPE: According to the latest communique from the Soviet command five major battles are being fought on the Eastern European front. There is little detail available, but it would appear that the Germans are making some progress in the Far North around MURMANSK and in the MINSK sector. Elsewhere the Russians are either making progress or at least holding all enemy attempts to advance. This is particularly the case on the river Pruth, where, right from the start of the operations the Germans have expended both men and material with lavish prodigality without attaining any noticeable results.

The German High Command has stated simply that "Everything is in a state of flux". It has been admitted that German reserves have had to be called up, and it has been pointed out that under the conditions obtaining lines of communication could be easily dislocated by the determined efforts of enemy armoured columns, and that even the HQ of higher formations could not be regarded as inviolable. Special emphasis has been laid on the Russian aptitude for building well camouflaged field fortifications in a very short time.

AFRICA: Libya - no change.

ABYSSINA: The latest batch of Italian prisoners mentioned in a recent summary have now been assessed at 3,000, including two generals and a brigadier.

ASIA: It is reported that on the Syrian front Free French forces are continuing their advance successfully along the general line DAMASCUS-HOMS.

3. Air operations.

EUROPE: Enemy activity over Britain last night was again on a very reduced scale. The brunt of our operations was borne by the German seaplane base at BORKUM, where much damage was done to slipways and hangars. One enemy aircraft was shot down and the RAF lost one bomber.

There are no details to hand of air operations on the Eastern European front.

AFRICA: Tripoli was heavily raided again yesterday. One 20,000 ton ship in the harbour was hit severely, another slightly smaller

is believed sunk, and troops disembarking on the quayside were heavily machine-gunned. On a nearby aerodrome six aircraft were destroyed on the ground.

In offensive sweeps over Cyrenaica during yesterday seven enemy aircraft were destroyed for the loss of one of our own.

4. General.

The principle has been established by Free French HQ in London that it is the aim of the Free French to make Syria an independent sovereign state as soon as the country has been completely occupied.

It has been reported in London that the Empire Air Training Scheme is now well ahead of schedule.

Manufacturers of aircraft in the United States are to pool certain of their resources in order to make possible the delivery of 500 heavy bombers to Great Britain in the shortest possible space of time.

BBC News Bulletin 0915 hrs 2 Jul 41.

D. H. Glavin
Cpt.
Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

Distributions:

As per Int Summary.

73

2/27

19 Jun 41

Ref Map - BEYROUTH 1/200000
SAIDA 1/50000

The following info has been obtained from three POW captured in the QUADI-EL-ZEINI area.

Each prisoner was captured at different times and interrogated separately. This info also confirms previous reports of enemy forces and dispositions in the COASTAL sector.

1. IDENTIFICATIONS

(1) QUADI EL ZEINI area
7 Coy of 2 Bn 6 Regt Foreign Legion - Comd Capt PAINTE

(2) DAMOUR area - Comd Col BARRE
5 and 6 Coys of 2 Bn 6 Regt Foreign Legion - Bn Comd
Maj BRISE

2 Bn of 24 Mixed Colonial Regt

Portion of 16 TUNISIAN Regt has been seen in DAMOUR area.

3 GDL (Groupe du Levant) artillery bty is also in this area.

2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS - See trace att

UNIT	STRENGTH	DISPOSITION
2 Bn FOREIGN LEGION 5,6&7 coys	Three inf coys One MG coy One HQ Coy Bn is not up to full strength although it is thought that reinforcements arrived 18 Jun. Each inf coy at present has - approx 90 men two 60 mm mortars 4 LMGs HQ Coy has - four 80 mm mortars other details not known MG coy has - 12 lvy MGs	7 Coy - QUADI EL ZEINI area This coy has been covering the road block at 11901382. Holding post on high ground SE of JADDA 500m from rd block. Has 4 lvy MGs and two 80 mm mortars. This coy has also been covering engr parties wiring the rd between QUADI EL ZEINI and DAMOUR 5 & 6 Coys - area on hill at 12471973. This post is heavily fortified and weapons are sited for all round defence. Very deep trenches have been dug in the olive trees on the hill and all weapons are dug in and protected by rock "sangers" Eight lvy MGs and four 80mm mortars in this area. On top of this hill is a single story red roof house with gable roof. 50 yds in rear of this house is the HQ of the 2 Bn Foreign Legion. Mortar posts unknown. The whole post is surrounded by a triple concertina fence and a double apron fence. There is also a strong wire fence running from the mouth of the river DAMOUR at 1230-1973 across the front to 1250 1974.

5 & 6 coys

UNIT	STRENGTH	DISPOSITION
5 & 6 Coys (cont'd)		Four hvy MGs are sited on the edge of the olive grove on the Western slope of the hill. Two of these fire along the front wire to the mouth of the river DAMOUR. The other two guns fire on the bridge over the river DAMOUR at 12371969 and also SE along the rd and river EL ANTIQA - AIN MIKHAIL. The disposition of the remaining 4 hvy MGs are not known but some of them will probably be sited for defence of EASTERN flank and the rear.
2 Bn 24 Mixed Colonial Regt	Approx 450 Weapons similar to 2 Bn Foreign Legion.	Disposed along coast from mouth of river DAMOUR to 12402018 to prevent landing of tps from the sea. Tps are well dug in and hidden in the olive groves near the coast. This Bn is composed of BENEZAISE tps who are not good fighters.

The number of 75 MM arty guns in the DAMOUR area is doubtful. It seems certain however that there are at least four 75 mm guns in DAMOUR area. The 3 GDE (Groupe du Levant) was at SAIDA and it is reported that nine of its twelve guns were damaged at SAIDA. However the gun repair workshops are at BHEROUTH and this bty may have received new guns.

A Tk Guns - 25 mm (see trace att)

All rds leading to DAMOUR from the SOUTH and SE are covered by A Tk guns. As all AV movement is confined to the rds owing to the thickly planted groves on the WEST and steep hills on the right of the COAST RD, attack by AVs would meet hvy opposition.

TKs and ARMD Cs

Approx 7 tk (8 - 10 tons) and 4 armd Cs reported in the DAMOUR area. At present these AVs are patrolling the rds leading from DAMOUR but could be used against tps in the orange groves as they were used at SAIDA.

MINEFIELDS

The following pts on the rd DAMOUR - SAIDA are believed to be mined.

Br over River DAMOUR at 12371969	Bridge is made of stone or concrete and including approaches is 120' long. It is 15' above the water level and has two arches. The centre arch contains the demolition charge. The br itself is NOT mined but mines have been laid 100' along rd SOUTH from br & 100' NORTH of br. It is not known whether mines have been laid along the river banks.
Br at 12081918	Mined on br and for 20' North and South. PWs state br not prepared for demolition.
Rd June 12111920	Mined at rd June and also for 150 yds along rd BARZA - NEBI YOUNES.
Rd June 11901888	Rd block covered by fire from JADRA at 11981888. 7 Coy of 2 Bn Foreign Legion were ordered to lay mines at this rd June but it is thought mines have NOT yet been laid.

/River DAMOUR

RIVER DAMOUR

This river is about 35 yds wide near the br but wider further EAST. The water is approx one or two feet deep near the br and becomes even shallower between the br and the coast.

The bed of the river is rocky.

The northern bank of the river is planted with banana trees and the banks on the Western side of the br are very low and passable to AFVs. EAST of br the banks become steeper and would not be passable to AFVs.

NAVAL TARGETS

All enemy posns mentioned above are visible from the sea.

PW states that the tps are very frightened of NAVAL fire and their morale is very low.

GENERAL


One PW stated that there are tps in the area SW of BARJA at 1807-1900 but this was NOT confirmed by the other PWs.

There are many lateral tracks running from the COAST rd and these will need careful recon to ascertain whether they will be passable to AFVs. PW states that tps from DAMOUR have been using these tracks but he knows little of their general condition.

The area held by 5 & 6 coys 2 Bn Foreign Legion is sited for all round defence but is more vulnerable from the EAST or rear than the front.

J. Bunn Lieut
10 NEVI

198



DISPOSITION LEGEND

- Two storied-red roof house. Used as Arty OP. One 75mm gun 10 yds SOUTH of house in trees and grass. ● A
- Triple concertina wire and one row Double apron fence. X
- Two heavy MG's. →
- 516 coy △
- Single story gable roof house. △
- 2 Bn IR- 50 yds in rear of house. Trenches in olive trees. ⊞
- mines ▬
- 25mm A/Tk gun behind stone wall, on rd junc. ● B
- 25mm A/Tk gun in edge of trees. ● C
- 25mm A/Tk gun 20 yds NORTH of rd, dug in with umbrella top camouflage ● D
- River fordable here banks very low. K X

Prepared for dems.
 ---000---

196

REF SANDA SHEET 1:50000

SCALE 1/24000 = 1 MILE (APPROX)

124

22 Jun 41

The following infm was obtained from two Arabs who crossed the line on the night of June 19/20 and returned night of 21/22. The men were of moderate intelligence but this infm should be treated with reserve.

Ref Map LEVANT 1: 50000 SAIDA and BEYROUTH Sheets.

1. No tps seen in or around JIYE (12151927).
2. Two telephone wires running East and West were seen on the high ground immediately South of JIYE.
3. There is a br on the main rd just North of JIYE. Our bombardment straddled but did not destroy the br.
4. About 30 soldiers were seen moving West along the wadi immediately south of QASSOUBA (12171931). There was one sailor (?) in the party.
5. One Algerian sentry only was seen in EL HARAM (12351942)
6. No tps seen in ES SIYAR (12301952)
7. The main br across the DAMOUR river is said to be mined or prepared for demolition. It is closed to civilians.
8. The river was crossed by the br South of AIN MIKAIL (12551964). There is some water in the river but it could be waded. 100 yds past the main br (12371969) there is a small br across a dry wadi. The main br is apparently prepared for demolition. There are signs of the rd surface having been broken on the West side of the br. Wires were seen but they could not be traced to the suspected location of the charge. There is a tent containing 3 Indo-Chinese (?) soldiers 150 yds South of the br.
9. EL ATIQA (12481975) is reported "surrounded by wire".
10. There is a reported ammn dump in the grove at 12451975.
11. Two guns "pointing out to sea" are reported (12441976).
12. There is a sec post not dug in at rd and track junc 12421987.
13. 30 metres past this junc there are A Tk mines by the rdside apparently ready for placing on the rd.
14. There are more mines 100 metres further north.
15. The houses on the main rd for about 100 yds after entering DAMOUR are used as billets for tps.
16. About 8 tks were seen in DAMOUR on the 20th but they were not there on the 21st.
17. 70 yds before the northern end of DAMOUR there is a gun which can cover the rd to the South from a small loophole in a wall. Only the muzzle can be seen. From the description it might be either a 75mm or the flash eliminator of a 25 A Tk gun. There are also reported to be MGS in the same area but these were not seen.
18. The "Colonel's office" (HQ?) is said to be situated in a house at 12451997 immediately opposite the church, in DAMOUR.
19. There is a rd block between DAMOUR and NAAME.
20. There is a rd block on the br North of NAAME.
- / 21. From a point.....

21. From a point at about 12642060 to the North of KHALDE the beach is wired against landings.
22. There were no tps seen between NAAME and KHALDE.
23. At about 12712069 there is a clump of palms under which are hidden several wireless lorries.
24. The br at KAER CHIMA 13122099 is said to be mined. There is a rd block.
25. There is an MT pk in the woods Southwest of the racecourse in BEYROUTH at about 12962153. About 15 tks were seen.

J. Gunn Lieut
IO 21 Aust Inf Bde

23 Jun 41

The following infm has been obtained from three deserters from the 3 Coy 2 Bn 6 Regt Foreign Legion, who gave themselves up at 2045 hrs 22 Jun to DASA D.

1. All Coy strengths at 120, normal est 200.

2. -Disposns 2 Bn Foreign Legion
6 Coy - on spur just west of Olive Grove at 12471974. Task is to cover River and Br and across Banana Groves to the sea. Two secs (28 men) well forward covering the Br (12371969)

5 Coy - about first A in EL ATIQA
Task to cover front along the river to the East.

Res Coy - spread between MAR MIKHAIL and DAMOUR.
Note This coy is the 7 Coy which withdrew from QUADI EL ZEINI and is now only about half strength.

Bn HQ - Commandant (major) BRISE
located 800m east of OLIVE GROVE and just south of track at 12571973.
Bn HQ in telephonic communication with Force HQ. Carries R/T sets yet unused.
Cars can reach Bn HQ but no other MT traffic is permitted. HQ is in natural cover and has been dug in.


2 Bn 24 Mixed Colonial Regt

disposed in Banana groves on West of coast rd to prevent beach landing from river to SAHEL ED DAMOUR.

3. General

- (1) Amn Dump and ration dump at 12421991 near two houses on West side of main rd 100 yds north of Rd Junc. All carrying fwd of these dumps is by pack mule.
- (2) Tank repair shop at 12421991 in next house north of amn pt. All tanks report there regularly. There are approx 12 lt tanks in DAMOUR area.
- (3) In addition to A Tk guns previously reported in summary of 19 Jun there is another gun at 12391973. There is a house on either side of the rd at this pt and the gun is in the wadi directly East of these houses and about 100 yds away.
- (4) Patrols are maintained across the front contacting coys north of the river. Patrols only use a Password which is the name of their coy comdr. Otherwise no password and only single sentries posted.
- (5) River is fordable practically anywhere but there are deep pools towards the bridge at isolated posns.
- (6) Morale Approx 130 Spaniards in this Bn and they have no wish to fight. All are very scared of naval fire. French in North SYRIA do not want to fight and many offr's have been outspoken and have disappeared accordingly.
Native tps are very young and Legionnaires have poor opinion of them. They have been expecting an attack for days and are very fed up with everything. Offr's seem to have defeatist views and are NOT confident.
The tps are fed continuously with propoganda that we are barbarians, pagans, Indians, short of rations and amn and are poor fighters.

NOTE The above infm should be treated with reserve and mainly serves as confirmation of previous summaries issued.


Lieut
IO NEVI

INFM PW No 5 - 25 Jun 41.

Ref Map : SAIDA 1/50,000.

1. Area JIYE - DAMOUR.

(1) Rd blocks reported at the following places :

12071913
12121920
12131936
12151957

These rd blocks have also been prepared for mines but it is reported that no mines have yet been laid.

(ii) WADI QASSOUBA from 12131936 - 12241938. Four to five AFVs and 50 tps holding this area. One AFV believed knocked out by our arty at 1030 hrs this morning. This patrol has orders to delay enemy but if attacked in force they are to withdraw to DAMOUR defences. Later report, 1135 hrs, from ZERI reports one staff car and 3 AFVs entered trees in QASSOUBA. These were engaged immediately and one staff car and one AFV were seen to leave the trees.

(iii) ES SADIYATT - ES SIYAR

One pl consisting of 1WO, 2 NCOs 17 ORs at 12101952. Similar Pl at 12201935

This pl has orders to withdraw to DAMOUR defences if attacked strongly.

Note Battle discipline of enemy forces is very high and patrols from DASA 24 Jun report no movement seen in this area. Enemy must be very well concealed and apparently no movement allowed.

2. DAMOUR DEFENCES - See sketch APPX "A" att

- (i) There are 6 houses on hill at 12481975. All these houses are being used either as HQs, OPs or weapon emplacements.
- (ii) Most of the trees are very small, but on the fwd slope of the hill there are four high trees close together. On the left edge of these trees there is a 60 mm mortar in a pit. Under these trees and near the most Easterly one are 3 LMGs covering approaches from the front and EASTERN flank.
- (iii) There are three hvy MGs on house as shown on sketch. These guns cover the br at 12551965 and also the river from this br to the WEST.

3. DEDUCTIONS

Enemy are well dug in with "rock sangers" protecting them from small arms fire. If held up from this position in the EL ATIQA area, a careful field glass recce should locate enemy posns. Mortar and arty fire should then prove the most effective means of putting enemy weapons out of action.

Enemy morale is very poor and a determined attack on these posns combined with arty, naval and mortar fire has a good chance of forcing him to surrender quickly.

TOPOGRAPHY

The area to the EAST of the COAST rd is very rugged and AFVs will NOT be able to operate except on rds. There is a possibility of tks being used in the area

/ near the coast.....

near the coast and just SOUTH of the river at 12301978 but owing to the br being mined and the Northern banks of the river heavily wired these tks would have difficulty in getting inside the wire and would meanwhile be vulnerable to naval and arty fire.

4. GENERAL

DASA patrols report little movement in DAMOUR area. Unconfirmed report states civilians are evacuating DAMOUR.

12151837
12151838

J. J. J. Lieut
10 21 Aust Inf Bde

These blocks have also been prepared for mine but reported that no mines have yet been laid. AIV and 3A are holding this area. The AIV believed knocked out by our arty at 1000 hrs this morning. This patrol has orders to delay enemy but if attacked in force they are to withdraw to DAMOUR defences. Later report, 1115 hrs, from NERI reports one shell out and 3 AIV entered trees in QASSOUM. These were engaged immediately and one shell out and one AIV were seen to leave the trees.

Note little discipline of enemy forces in very high and patrolling from DASA 24 hrs report no movement seen in this area. Enemy must be very ill coordinated and apparently no movement allowed.

2. DAMOUR DEFENCES - See sketch APK "A" etc

- (1) There are 6 houses on hill at 12411975. All these houses are being used either as HQ, OP or weapon emplacements.
- (2) Most of the trees are very small, but on the top slope of the hill there are four high trees close together. On the left edge of these trees there is a 60 mm mortar in a pit. Under these trees and near the most heavily one are 3 lines covering approaches from the front and BARRAGE tank.
- (3) There are three very low houses as shown on sketch. These are covered by br at 12301978 and also the river from this to the WEST.


3. DEFENCES

They are well dug in with low barriers, projecting from the hill and are very high. It held up from this position in the NW area, a certain kind of glass vessel should have to empty down. Mortar and arty fire should then prove the most effective means of putting enemy weapons out of action. Enemy would be very poor and a detailed attack on these points combined with arty, naval and mortar fire has a good chance of forcing him to surrender quickly.

TOP SECRET

The area to the EAST of the COAST is very rugged and AIV will not be able to operate except on the... there is a possibility of the being used in the area... near the coast.....

FROM INFM RECEIVED UP TO 1100HRS 25 JUN — APPX A to previous sketch, 19 Jun.



- A Two storied-red roof house, used as cty OP. One 75mm gun 10 yds south of house in trees and grass.
- Triple concertina wire and one row Double apron fence.
- 2 - Two heavy MG's.
- - Single story gable roof house.
- 2 Bn HQ - 50 yds in rear of house.
- - Trenches in olive trees.
- - mines
- 25mm A/Tk gun behind stone wall, on rd junc.
- C - 25mm A/Tk gun in edge of trees.
- F - 25mm A/Tk gun 20 NORTH of rd, dug in with umbrella top camouflage
- K - River fordable here banks very low.
- D - 25mm A/Tk gun in group of 3 houses.

Coy Dispositions

4 Very prominent trees, 60mm Mortar on left, 3 MMGs in the trees.

■ 6 Houses on Hill Top

○ M

2 Jul

Report DASA C C.P. (15 P1)

To NEVI
from DASA

0700 - 0800 Hrs Move movement noticed in Blockhouse area One of two men at various times move from vicinity of large rock down to large blockhouse thence to bitumen rd- 2nd class rd junc, across bitumen rd to vicinity large evergreen tree At this point they went out of sight but as they appeared to be carrying water bottles it is presumed that there is either a well or H.Q. in this area At odd times men are seen to move in and out of large blockhouse. At 0830 hrs Senagalese tps noted grooming two mules in front of large blockhouse For the last hour or two the tps in the vicinity of the large rock seem to have been resting. Since 0445 hrs no movement has been noticed on the bitumen rd or track to the immediate front.

0845 Hrs. Our arty now shelling the vicinity of village KAFR MATTA. Our shells are falling west of where enemy arty was a couple of days ago. There does not seem to be any enemy guns in this locality now but enemy arty fire seems to be coming from a point north of Hill 560.

Four mules, two of them led, left large blockhouse and moved along bitumen rd in an easterly direction. Three Senagalese armed with rifles in charge.

Sgd H.J. Katekar Lieut
0900 hrs

Sgd A.H. Thomson
I Sec
DASA

1536 Hrs 2 Jul 41

DASA A Patrol

To NEVI
From DASA

Strength 1 Pl Leader Lt Sims.

Route EL HARAM 12531946 - along track to tk Junc 12471953-EL LABIYE
Thence one party of 1 NCO and 3 CRs down reentrant NE from EL
LABIYE then return and go down track going east from EL LABIYE

Second party of Patrol Leader, Eng, and 2 CRs were to follow tk
east from EL LABIYE for approx 400x then follow on level round feature to
reentrant 12571958, down this reentrant to River and then along
river and road and back up track to EL LABIYE Then whole pl to
return same route

Report

Third sec of pl got cut off and missed remainder of pl on outward journey
and therefore did not reach destination. After endeavouring locate rem
rest of pl, returned to camp at approx 0330.

Track from 12531946 to 12471953 is rough but could be travelled by mules
with difficulty. From this point to EL LABIYE track is O.K. for inf.
and mules. A small party of 3 men was left at EL LABIYE and two parties
then went forward on routes already described.

Report from left patrol under Cpt Scott. This patrol followed the
reentrant, a faint track N.E. EL LABIYE, but failed to find track to river,
then returned to EL LABIYE and endeavoured to follow track leading east f
from EL LABIYE. When approx 400x down this track a patrol was heard
approaching from opposite direction. The party went to ground close to track
Party appeared and weren't seen to be enemy. One of our ptes moved and was
seen by enemy who shot him at point blank range (Pte O'Leary). Patrol
leader and two other men escaped, picked up small party at EL LABIYE, and
returned to camp 0430 hrs. Enemy estimated at approx one pl armed
with automatic rifles and grenades and mortars which they fired at patrols
Enemy fired flare or Verey Light which brought down arty barrage in area
12451953.

Report re second patrol under Lieut. Sims. This party followed track as
described before but twds bottom of reentrant found a cliff which they were
unable to negotiate. They then decided to remain in o.p. Lieut Sims
and Eng., and 2 CRs remained and sent remainder of Pl home. Lieut Sims
is remaining in observation all day and is going to endeavour to locate
track and return tomorrow morning.

To NEVI

from DASA

30 June At first light small standing patrol sent out into North west of feature to watch activity road CHEHIM - MEJDALOUNA) EL MGHAIRIYE Small yeomanary patrols seen but no other activity Patrol withdrawn 1700 hrs.

Cav reports concentrations of enemy at MTCULLE (ref BEYRCUTH 1/200,000) 182136, RHARIFE 184139 and REHt F196135 Patrol sent South into ravine (ref SAIDA 1/50,000) 12351827 where track leads back into JUAN There is a mill at this point and I had suspicions that foodstuffs were being sent through the south of JUAN and to further East. No donkey trains located however

Enemy Cav (mtd) patrol rumoured to be approaching, but nothing further seen or heard.

1 July 0530 hrs Our two coys moved out in rear of Div Cav to Monastir (ref (ref SAIDA 1/50,000) 12631833) to cover withdrawal of Cav if necessary Nil report of enemy

Cav reports former enemy posn West of MAZRAAT EB DEIR still vacated and their patrols pushed beyond the village without contacting enemy.

Mill in ravine still under observation and patrol of two sent to watch track junction with main JUAN rd to contact and follow any enemy donkey trains, but with nil result.

2 July 0930 hrs Report that while in JUAN at approx 0600 hrs, where I was starting, Inf patrols of Mr Kimber and three G.R.s contacted Div Cav, and they informed me that message just received from their fwd carriers that former enemy posn West of MAZRAAT EB DEIR had been re-occupied by French forces Ref Map Beyrough 1/200,000 Enemy posn 12941848,

30 Jun/ 1 Jul 41

Patrol Recce DAMCUR River Crossing 12621961

To NEVI

From DASA

(Ref DAMCUR 1/25,000)

Commencing from house due South of group of houses on Trig 393 there is no track, but it is picked up further down feature. Track winds snakelike, then becomes fairly straight as it switches S.E. Commencing very rough with rocks and loose stones it later becomes a good track as it approaches southern tributary of River. Track could not be found as shown on maps, where it turns sharply back in N.W. direction. A thorough search was made in this area and no track could be found and the steep nature of the ground is against a track existing as shown on map. However track follows down to 150 ft of creek, and then switches N.W. about 150 yds down to creek, where it disappears into creek. Here creek was waded. Water fast running and about 6 inches deep where it passes over rocks where forded.

A faint track was found on eastern side of creek and this was followed to where it again disappeared into creek after about 200 yds.

Follow creek along still on eastern side on a sort of track until about 400 yds further on. I came to a cliff where we were able to pass for a little while on a rock ledge but soon came to where the face could not be negotiated.

Cliff exists on either side of creek and there is no well defined tracks and in my opinion it would be impracticable to move a body of troops by this route.

A prominent feature was found to exist to the East of 432 divided from it by a very steep gully. The creek line running North and South is shown on map but not the contours. However SAIDA 1/50,000 shows this clearly. The creek line shown on the maps branching off to the West with a fork at the top could not be found on the ground.

NOTE There is a possibility that track switching N.W. does ~~not~~ exist but such a thorough search was made for this track that I feel that even if it does exist it would be impracticable to take a large body of troops over it owing to the steepness of the slope over which if it does exist it would pass.

The objective of patrol was not reached as explained above.

(SIGNED) LIEUT SKIPPER,
C Coy.

Special Report

0930: Report that while in JUAN
at approx 0600 when I was starting
Inf. patrol of McKimber and three
I contacted Div. Cav. passing thro'
and they informed me that message
just received from their fwd carriers
that found my pos W of MAZRAAT
EB DEIR had been re-occupied
by French Forces. (Ref. Map Beyruth
1:200,000) My pos ~~1294~~ 12941848.

0940
2 Jul '41

B. M. M. M.
Lieut.

Report No 2 · 15 PL O.P. 2 JUL 41

0700 to 0830 more movement noticed in block house area. One or two men at various times move from vicinity of large rock down to large block house. then to bitumen road - 2nd class road junction across bitumen road to ^{vicinity} large ever green tree, at this point they went out of view but as they appeared to be carrying water bottles it is presumed that there is either a well or head quarters in this area. At odd times men are seen to move in and out of large block house, at 0.830 Senegalese troops noted grooming two mules in front of large block house, these mules appear to be stabled in large block house. For the last hour or two the troops in the vicinity of the large rock seem to have been resting.

Since 0.445 hrs no movement has been noticed on the bitumen road or tracks to the immediate front.

0845. our artillery now shelling the
vicinity of village Kafir Matta.
our shells are falling west of where
enemy artillery ~~was~~ a couple of days
ago. there do not seem to be any
enemy guns in this locality now
but enemy artillery fire seems to be
coming from a point north of hill
569. 4 mules, 2 of them had
left large block house and moved
along butcher road in an easterly
direction. 3 Senegalese armed
with rifles in charge.

M. H. G. H. H.
H. H. H. H.

0900 hrs

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN
OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP
4

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

DASA

FROM

DASA B

Originator's Number

L1

Date

2

In Reply to Number

ENEMY	guns	located	at	BEYROUTH	200,000
AIX	ERZN	⊙	grid	bearing	from
O.P.	to	guns	28°	⊙	O.P.
situated	at	trig	point	35T	BEYROUTH
200,000	AICD	trig	XNEZ	⊙	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1049

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

1050

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
L	1052	R.A.	Lyon								

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

NEVI

FROM

DASA

Originator's Number

B 2

Date

2

In Reply to Number

DASA B

report

enemy

guns

AIQXERZN

0

OP

Trig

375

AICD XNEZ

0

Bearing

to

guns

28°

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

*Frank Brown
Sgt - Int Sec*

SIGNED

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SIGNED

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1115

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T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

LOG OF MESSAGES

IN

2 JULY 1941

SERIAL No	DATE	T.O.O.	To. R.	FROM	PRECIS	ACTION TAKEN
1	2	0815	0900	NEVI	Aircraft Recognition signals for 3-4 July. Actk (Attached)	Actk
2	2	0940		DASA B	Special Report on 12 PL Patrol. (Attached)	Reported to NEVI on Patrol Report
3	2	0900		DASA C	Report from 15 PL OP (Attached)	"
4		1049		DASA B	Location of enemy guns AIQXERZN O.P. AICD XNEZ Bearing 28°	Reported to NEVI

SERIAL No	DATE	T.O.O.	To.	OUT
1	2	1204	NEVI CUNNEEN	DASA RICE reports that unable to locate lity as requested, but feels sure this could be done from high ground 2 miles (approx) NW of CHEAM.
2	2	1500	NEVI	Enemy arty located at ABRTXNLE. Grid bearing from O.P. 44°. Arty situated at Trg BST, ref. AIBD XNEW. Arty OP notified

5 Jul 41.

INF INFM

The following infm was received from a local inhabitant who has been in BEYROUTH for about a fortnight on special pro-Allied activities. He is of good int and appears to be a fairly accurate observer. He states that he served for two years in the Spanish Civil War. He is probably reliable.

Ref maps BEYROUTH 1/200000 - DJEZZINE 1/50000.

Observations were made on 30 Jun.

1. The JABAL EL MOUBARAKE (132185) is not occupied by the French.
2. The line of the NAHR BESRI is not defended or very lightly so.
3. MFOULLE (131186) observed at 1000 hrs, 30 Jun. Astride the rd MFOULLE - CHARIFE (133189) and about 600 metres from MFOULLE is one coy of Senegalese and some cav.
4. CHARIFE. Astride the rd CHARIFE - MFOULLE and about 1 kilo South of CHARIFE there were two sqns of Spahis and one coy of Senegalese. One bty of 75mm was about to be installed on the JEBEL KHALOUE. It appeared that they were going to be located fairly near the rd.
5. At the br at pt 669 (13311877) there were two armd Cs. The br is prepared for demolition, the exploder being located 15 yds West of the br.
6. The br at 13271948 is already destroyed.
7. The informant suggested that the destruction of the brs at NAHR ES SAFA (147203) and JISR EL CADI would effectively cut the com of the French. He understood that both brs were prepared for demolition and were well guarded but suggested that air bombing might be effective in view of the presence of demolition charges.
8. The veh repair shops are located in the two most West-erly blocks of the QUARTIER PETAIN. See BEYROUTH 1/13100.
9. The guns at BASBA (BSATA) (13321845) are situated North of the rd and not South of it. The location is given as 500 metres NE of the village.

J. J. J. J. Lieut
10 21 Aust Inf Bde

7/7
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

SECRET

HQ 7 Aust Div,
3 Jul 41.

INT SUMMARY No 38

(based on infm received up to time of typing)

1. Ops.

COASTAL Sector: Enemy arty activity increased during last 24 hrs. During night 1/2 Jul patrols 2/16 and 2/27 Bns recce tracks and possible crossings DAMOUR river. Patrol 2/25 Bn contacted enemy HASROUT. Patrol 2/25 Bn entered EL JEILIYE capturing one PW and six horses; remainder escaped.

JEZZINE Sector: 2/31 Bn patrols held up at 137181 owing to enemy fire from escarpment to their NE. Patrol last reported proceeding down WADI to West of rd towards AARAY (137182) where enemy is reported.

2/33 Bn taken action to counter any enemy attack from IACHRHARA. Both enemy and our arty active during morning. 11 Bty 2/6 Fd Regt OP observed hostile shells landing near AANOUT. 2/6 Fd Regt reports arabs state that 200 enemy arrived at QARAAOUN (148181).

MERDJAYOUN Sector: No change.

DAMASCUS Sector: HQ 13 FF area night 1/2 Jul quiet. Enemy inf holding outskirts DEIR AAQIYE (249239).

JIREDJIR (236238) not held by enemy but is patrolled by them at night.

Infm received by HQ FF Forces of 12 tanks NW of DEIR AAQIYE and 8 AFVs in JEBEL dominating QARA (244245).

Adv HQ 6 Div reports slight local activity between patrols on left of 5 Ind Bde. Otherwise no change.

2. Tac/R.

BETER (139185) - two MT off rd. Shells bursting. Guns observed firing just North of rd and immediately North of A in JIBLAIYE (137186).

Six MT East rd just North BEIT ED DINE.

Pt 12452010 South of br rd block and digging under way on both sides of rds. Suspected mines being placed.

About 300 yards East of br and along line running NW-SE line of four large empty holes about 20 yards apart. NE from this line of holes are two smaller holes. NE again two large holes. All holes empty. Suspected defensive posn and possible site for bty. Remainder Tac/R NMS.

3. RAF Op Summary up to 1930 hrs 1 Jul 41.

Bomber action: 10 sorties against PALMYRA Barracks, a number of direct hits being obtained. Three sorties against CITA, MILITIRE, SUEIDA.

Fighter action: Ten sorties Hurricanes PALMYRA area, no interception. Three sorties Hurricanes defence of HAIFA - no interceptions. Seven sorties Tomahawks ground attacked aerodromes RAYAK valley. Two unidentified aircraft burnt, four POTEZ 63s shot up. Eight sorties Tomahawks ground attacked on rds, destroying two lt tanks and 20 MT.

Recce: One sortie Blenheims Strat/R BEYROUTH, HOMS, RAYAK valley.

One sortie Hurricanes BEYROUTH, SUEIDA.

One sortie Hurricanes Tac/R QTALIFE.

Two sorties photographic recce BEYROUTH.

4. General.

A Vichy French airman captured in the PALMYRA area was ignorant that Germany and Russia were at war.

4. General (continued)

It is reported that there have been demonstrations at BEYROUTH demanding that, as in the case of DAMASCUS, French tps should evacuate the town. Vichy tps are said to have fired on the demonstrators, and to have wounded several. It is also claimed that bread in BEYROUTH is being sold for two Syrian pounds a kilogram.

W. H. Hill
for Col.
CS 7 Aust Div.

Completed 0800 hrs.

Distribution:

- 17 Aust Inf Bde (8)
- 21 Aust Inf Bde (8)
- 25 Aust Inf Bde (8)
- RAA 7 Aust Div (6)
- RAE 7 Aust Div (1)
- Sigs 7 Aust Div (1)
- ASC 7 Aust Div (1)
- G (4)
- AQ (1)
- ADMS (1)
- 2/4 Fd Amb (1)
- 2/6 Fd Amb (1)
- Rear HQ (3)
- 1 Aust Corps (1)
- 6 Div (1)
- 6 Aust Cav (3)
- 170 Lt AA Bty (1)
- War Diary (2)
- File (1)
- Spare (3)

DASA SECRET

149

11936

SECRET

33

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

ALL ND TRUC- ONS	IN
	OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

DASA DOBBS

FROM	Originator's Number	Date	In Reply to Number
DASA	T2	3	

new	copy	poems	of	DASA	B
LIYA	1262 1940	DASA	D	BAAQOUN	1256 1937
D	These	copy	will	be	at
re	poems	to	receive	ration	tonight.

MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

[Handwritten signature]

SIGNED

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T.H.I.

0810

READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

DASA HQ

FROM

DASA

Originator's Number

T1

Date

3

In Reply to Number

Two	Prisoners	with	six	minutes	to
report	to	DASA	C	by	1200
has	today	0	Personnel	to	see
repaired	to	remain	with	copy	for
out	one	night			

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

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SIGNED

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T.H.I.

T.O.R.

EM	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

DASA

FROM

WUVI

Originator's Number

295

Date

3

In Reply to Number

-

DASA	MOTEN	has	arranged	with	WUVI
CANNON	so	provide	guides	for	WUVIA
and	WUVIB	moving	from	BARJA	to
KRAMDECH	tonight	⊙	Ptes	WOODLEY	and
WATSON	of	WUVI	Int	sec	will
report	with	this	⊙	would	appreciate
if	they	could	be	shown	as

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

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T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

Page 2

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

<i>much</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>route</i>	<i>as</i>	<i>is</i>	<i>safe</i>
<i>in</i>	<i>daylight</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>could</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>allowed</i>
<i>to</i>	<i>assist</i>	<i>guides</i>	<i>to night</i>	<i>⊙</i>	<i>The</i>
<i>Coys</i>	<i>concerned</i>	<i>have</i>	<i>been</i>	<i>instructed</i>	<i>to</i>
<i>pick</i>	<i>up</i>	<i>WOODLEY</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>WATSON</i>	<i>at</i>
<i>DASA</i>	<i>to night</i>				

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

*NOT to be given to
Sig for despatch*

TIME OF ORIGIN

1115

SIGNED

SIGNED

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T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

Patrol Report - DASA.A. 2 to 3 Jul.

Patrol Leader Lt Sims

Strength of Ptt. 1 off IRAE pl, 2 OR's

Route: EL HARAM, & then by same track as Lt Bell.
to EL LABIYE. - Track leading E to Rd. & River, along River
200 yds N.W. to Sandy Beach.

Times: Patrol departed 0830. 1 Jul. Returned 0230 3 Jul

Report: Track running E from EL Labuye is very
difficult to locate, & finally comes out on main
Rd. 500 yds E of Bridge. Steep & very brushy in
parts but can be negotiated by animals. River
can be crossed at almost any point.

Banana Orchards are all along River between
River & Rd.

Country on Northern side of River opposite TK Junction
is exceptionally steep (too steep to negotiate
except on TK to EL BOUM).

Country also appears very steep from
EL BOUM TK Junction to a point South
of EL ATIQA. Cover on these slopes is several

west of E1 Barr Track. (Rocks Only). ReEntrants appear
to be only means of approach to Square 126197
from South.

Enemy Observed at. one MG. fired from spot 12631964
exact location unable to be located. No Enemy
movement seen west of this point to square
124497. In this area Enemy Posts were
located at 12481973 (small Orchard). Stone wall
along Eastern side covers 3 MG Posts. off top
Right-hand corner of orchard at what appears
to be a gateway TK leads to dug in Position
100 yds to E. This post has at least 8 men.
at 12491975 prominent group of Pines
with small Orchard on Southern edge. This
appears to be a HQ. as all movement was
between outposts & this point.

At 12501976 Two small Rocky Hills with few
trees. Stone work can be seen which appears
to hide MG Posts. The number of men seen
in this area approx 12. 70 yds further NE up
spiral Round Brick Building appears to be AA Post

At 12481974 Red Roofed Shed in trees. If movement
seen but ~~not~~ no actual posts located.

P.T.O

3

at 1244 1975 2 Enemy Posts appear to be
facing Bridge on Coast Rd. ^{AT} 1248 1982. Prominent rock
~~is~~ about K in MAR MIKHAIL. Enemy Post seen
on Northern slope which appears to be able to
fire NE & NW up to extent.
Line surrounds whole position at EIATIQA.

Patrol leader considers that movement of troops
in area from ELLABIYE to Bridge would be very
difficult without quite a lot of noise, especially in
large numbers. Country is rough & rocky & gorges
re-echoes any noise. Best crossing of river
appears to be at either side of Bridge. Banks
of River on northern side are steep & too high
to be negotiated by men.

Asst White

N.B. A line of telephone wire in several places
~~is~~ ~~seen~~ ~~at~~ ~~places~~
El Rahye to 1255 1963. The wire was VIR cable between
& was running ^{from terraces} ~~from~~ forward from house
across TK up slopes towards upper slopes of A394.
similar cable seen to be running along Western side of Bridge

Report of two men left in ⁴ observation
by Lt Sims.

These two men were left - by Lt Sims ~~to~~ at
1215 on 2nd July returned at 0830 2nd July.
Location here. 12571961.

Report. Patrol of approx 50 Enemy seen moving
down track from a small knoll SE of their
O.P. which appears to be a continuation of
hill 394. Also 1 enemy with truck seen
on same track.

Enemy seen to be mending wire
where it had been cut by Lt Sims.

D. White left

Keep

Patrol Report DASA: A. ^{2/3 Jul} 3/4 Jul

Patrol Leader, A. Bell.

Strength of Plt one Pl.

Route EL HARAM - ER REZANIYE - Th. Junc. - 12461953 -
ELLABIYE.

Times, Patrol left 0830. Return 0400.

Report. Quite a good track discovered on this sent
as far as ELLABIYE (mules could negotiate
this track).

Patrol Leader combed area for 2 1/2 hrs in vicinity
ELLABIYE to 1258 - 12551962 - 1964, with
different small detachments from Pl, also himself
but was unable to locate track. At one point
road could be seen but country too steep to get
down to it. All the slopes in this area
are steep & very thick with scrub. No Enemy
were seen. Patrol cut 2 telephone wires at 12551962
Patrol returned by same Route.
DASA White off

To DASAIO
From DASA.C. Int Cp. JULI 2 Jul

From 1930 hrs 1 Jul - 1730 hrs 2 Jul

Continued Special Sentry duty
throughout night & investigated
refl & M.G. shots at 0130 to find
that it concerned DASA TA
who made the necessary
reports. During the night
enemy arty fired to and
near Baqnon area again.
No casualties or damage
0700 Newi Furlay & Dasa Toys
arrived on H.O. just as I
was leaving on special
piece for suitable adv.
route. Called on 15 pl with
instructions to employ
snipers from approx
1261.1950. Witnessed
sniper fire on French

near block house at rd
June 1269 1955. Soon afterwards
an M.L. opened fire on Desa
Katakhar & self - missed us.
I then came on red roofed
house at 1261 1950 - area
where Artz had shelled
on the earlier. I informed
Artz Pzly Comd within
15 mins & he said that
he would deal with the
matter immediately after
Cooperating with Navy
at 1300 hrs. I then continued
my recce & made my
way to 14pe at 394 where

3

I contacted Pte Melgee
who reported
at 2130 - 1 Jul Art. Foo
arrived feature & I escorted
him over feature & pointed
out ~~necessary~~ various
OP sites. Art. eventually
selected OP. 0130 heard
rifle shots 0150 enemy
art. opened up but shells
passed over feature and
landed South. Continued
until 0210 hrs.

1150 enemy art. & mortar
fire to left of 394. No
damage. No new
enemy activity seen
but only in places
reported on 1 Jul. I
assisted in change over
of 134 US ps. So far

flank feature draws enemy
fire. Can move on left
flank with more ease.

Thoney's report Ctd -
Returned to Coy HQ 1630 hrs
after a round trip but
found it impossible to
recommend any definite
& passable route north-
wards. On return heard
amm dump at Damon
hit & subsequent explosion
heard that Cpl Raftery had
reported matter so did not
clutter up line.

1745 hrs
J. H. Loney
P.C.

To DASATO

From DASAC (Int Cp) Jul - 3 -

From 1815 hrs 2 Jul - 0730 hrs 3 Jul

with Dasa Nicholls. I left at
1820 on another special recon
for suitable route & the laying
out of Gd further North. We
were subject to Super fine
flood by Mt. Gunc while
east of Mt 2. Fine coming
from Mt Gunc 1269 1955.
Causing us to wait until
dusk to move off under
further fine. Ret to HQ at
2050 @ 2100 to have a recon
2110 noise like ATV. flood by a
Dor R heard on Damon
Burr & Dene R
2130 from to Six legs heard same
road.

To DASA

SECRET

From E GPMcsee (Pte)

2 JUL 41

1 JUL 41

2000 hrs went to position 100+ east of Trig to find enemy slit trench.

Found only three ground sheets and bayonet scabbard.

2030 hrs Right flank o.p. reported in.

Observed during day:-

1 0645 hrs armed C from direction BEIT

ED DENE stopped Block house at approx

1259 1945 departing at 0700 East.

2 1145 four mounted horsemen with two

load horses stopped at Blockhouse

3 1900 pack horses laden stopped at Block

house

4 sentry or observer posted on rock

just above Blockhouse.

2200 Relieving unit arrived. Guided comdr over area + indentifying features. assisted in posting OPs + sections.

Guided two FOO over area and indentifying feature, + places where enemy activity seen.

located another enemy slit trench found only few rations - including one large tin sliced pineapple

2340 Declared myself off duty.

0430 took observers to day OP on left flank. Pointed out to them and new comdr place where enemy activity seen. no enemy movement then visible

0630 contacted FOO. OP for right flank to remain on old feature. AEDMXQCK new OP for left flank est at AMTXALFV.

3

0930 observed right flank but could not obtain view of Block-house and could see no sign of enemy activity. Observed one hr

1145 FOO went to right flank.

almost immediately shell and, I think, mortar fire opened on left top of trig. and left spur, approx 10 shells. Some shells also fired

tuds 432.

1300 left O.P. returned and reported slight enemy movement, the enemy going to earth as our arty was ranging during morning. No

movement in areas, other than mentioned in last report, was observed. Shortly before 1300 hrs

shell fire from navy fell on stony ridges AETCANYS and north

tuds DAMOUR

1430. observed from left flank.
Slight enemy activity nothing new
observed.

1600 smoke alongside house on
left edge of town, approx A1WQ
XWLY, followed by explosions,
many severe, continually till
1715 hrs, then intermittently till
1745 hrs. arty ranging shot
had accidentally hit enemy
amm dump.

During night 1/2 JUL
0050 hrs rifle & mg fire and
what sounded like grenade explosions
were heard from direction

EL ATQA.

0150-0210 shell fire fell along
slope AITVANUE

1930 . left O.R. reported:

- 1 Men from Stony ridges and orchard 12471974 went to house, with red roof at 12431978 with water bottles.
- 2 Wire was seen in front of sec posts at 12471977
- 3 What appeared to be a m/c or side car or possibly a small carrier was seen at 12491944 (will report to FOO).
- 4 Fire at amn dump.
- 5 at about 1530 a m/c - side car raced at high speed into through DAMOUR. Shelling of site of dump had just started by navy shelled b/n Stony Ridges and south of DAMOUR ceasing about 1345 hrs
- 7/ about 1600 about 4 men

(6)

with packs & full marching
gear came from DAMOUR
to Stony Ridge & remained
there.

SPM See Pt

2 JUL 41

2000 hrs

Rifle & LMG fire for 2-3
minutes heard from direction
river junction 126 196

SPM

Report No 3

15 Pl. O.R.

2 JUL 41

0900 - 1700 hrs.

Continued observation throughout the day. At 1045 hrs our sniper fired several shots at 2 enemy who showed themselves in vicinity of block-houses. An enemy sniper with L.M.G. appeared to fire back from vicinity of the barbed wire several bursts went harmlessly over our heads. As a result of our sniping enemy remained very concealed. At 1430 hrs enemy movement noted on crest about 200' east of blockhouses. Several enemy seen to occupy gun emplacements in rocky outcrop above dark coloured sea-faced cliff. Enemy moved carefully. I did not present wood & white target for snipers.

Enemy emplacements appear
to be built in with thick
rock & concrete works. Map Ref.

DDMVA/265/1958.

Otherwise no movement
noted on roads & tracks under
our observation during this
period. Enemy positions
noted would be ideal target
for our arty.

A. J. Ketcher
Squad

1700 hrs

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No. 88

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN
OUT

No. of Groups.
GR. 1

OFFICE DATE STAMP
NEVI-2.VII.4.1
TELEGRAPHS

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO LUPA DA SA

FROM NEVI

2/13 Amv 04 Bn.
2/15 Amv 04 Bn.

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

0118

2

Reps

PEXO

FUMI

arrive

night

3/4

Jul

to

live

with

LUPA

DASA

0

Time

and

place

notified

later

ack.

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1645

SIGNED

Montgomery

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

1652

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No. *84*

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR. *2*

OFFICE DATE STAMP



(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

ZERI ~~EXX~~ LUPA DASA RODU TETE

FROM

NEVI

Originator's Number

0117

Date

2

In Reply to Number

All	units	will	take	immediate	steps
to	reduce	number	of	vehs	fwd
of	RAS NEBI YOUNES	to	an	absolute	minimum
o	All	non-essential	vehs	will	be
taken	clear	of	that	area	and
kept	back	with	B	ech	ACK ✓

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1635

SIGNED

[Handwritten Signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

1648

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

ALL
IND
RUC-
NS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

DASA HARRY

DM

DASA

Originator's Number

T14

Date

2

In Reply to Number

Immediate steps	to	be	to	be	taken
to	reduce	number	of	vehs	fuel
of	RAS	NEBI	YOUNES	to	an
absolute minimum		0	all	now	essential
vehs	will	be	taken	clear	a/
that	area	and	kept	back	with
B	Zch	0	ack		

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2007

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

ITEM	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No. *70*

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS


IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP



Shelbunyeo
2/6 Fed Coy RMC.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO REXI DASA RODU DOBA

FROM NEVI

Originator's Number

0116

Date

2

In Reply to Number

DASA	withdraws	dets	at	JOUN	MAZBOUD
EL QUARDANIE	and	SEBBLINE	at	0800	hrs
3	Jun	o	REXI	will	provide
garrison	each	of	one	tp	at
JOUN	EL MGHAIRIYE	and	SEBBLINE	by	that
hour	o	ACK			

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN
1622

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

ALL
ND
TRUC-
ONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

*DASA for
maint*

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

DASA MAGAREY

M

DASA

Originator's Number

T 10

Date

2

In Reply to Number

REXI	will	relieve you by	0800	has
3	fully	0	has	been
arranged	to	report	you	at
OBIS	has	3	to	up
you	PL	to	and	thence
by	foot	to	DASA	B
at	BAASIR	0	Ack	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY

*Thos
Capt*

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

SIGNED

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1925

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

ME N	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

ALL
ND
TRUC-
ONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

*MR A RICE
modified 18th August
J.B.*

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

DASA RICE

DM

DASA

Originator's Number

T11

Date

2

In Reply to Number

17	and	18	Pls	are	relating
under	you	could	0800	has	3 July
0	make	arrangements	to	with draw	18 PL
at	0800	his	0	DASA	making
arrangements for		17 PL	to	more	direct
to	KEFAR	MAYA	0	Pls	being
revised	by	REXI	as from	0800 hrs	0 out

MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY HANDS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1930

[Signature]
Capt

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups. GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO **DASA 17 PL**

FROM **DASA** Originator's Number **T 11** Date **2** In Reply to Number

you	are	to	be	returned	by
REXI	by	0800	us	3	fully
O	on	completion	of	hand	over
PL	to	via	direct	to	DASA
D	at	KEFAR	MAYA	O	DASA
RICE	notified	O	ack		

MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY SIGNED
[Signature]

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1937

SIGNED (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

DASA HARRY

FROM

DASA

Originator's Number

T12

Date

2

In Reply to Number

Tpt
MAGAREY
0815
0

required
PATROL
to
Rck

to
on
transport

report
JOUN
PL

to
Rd
to

DASA
at
BARJA

MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1940

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN
OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

DASA DOBBS.

FROM

DASA

Originator's Number

T 13

Date

2

In Reply to Number

DASA	MAGAREY	returns	To	DASA	B
Morning	3	July	41	0	17
and	18	PL	of	DASA	D
return	16	KEFAR	MAYA	Morning	3
July	0	The	above	being	returned
July	REXI	July	0800	had	3
July	41	0	Act's		

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

2000

SIGNED

[Signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

MESSAGES IN.

No	DATE	TOO	FROM	Messages	Notes
1	2 JUL	1645	NEVI	Reps PEXO + FUMI attached to DASA night 3/4	
2	2	1648	NEVI	Reduction of number of vehs fwd of RAS NEBI YOUNES	OC 6 PM notified
3	2	1652	NEVI	Withdraw deta JOUN, MAZ BOUD EL QUARDANIE + SEBLINE at 0800 hrs 3 JUL	D Coy, 12 PI 17 PI, 6 PI, 2 1/2 notified
1	3	1100	DASA A C	Patrol Report Lt Sims & Lt Bell Int Gp OP reports	TO NEVI.
		1115	WUVI.	Guyle BARTA to WOODLEY KRAM DECH for WUVI A + WUVIB	

MESSAGES OUT

1	3.	0720	DASA HQ	Two Pioneer with six mines to report to DASA C.
		0810	DASA DOBBS.	Posns of DASA B RAQLIYA + DASA D BAAQOIN on night 3 JUL.

R O By

Maj J.G. Dobbs,
A/Comd 2/27 Bn AIF.

31 Jul 41.

12

DUTY

Mounting 1630 hrs 31 Jul 41.

Battalion Orderly Offr - Lieut Caddy.

Battalion Orderly Sjt - Sjt Isaachsen.

Work for Duty

Battalion Orderly Offr - Lieut Bell

Battalion Orderly Sjt - Cpl Coombe.

2. OFFICERS RECORD OF SERVICE - Further particulars are required from Offrs in this Unit in order to complete their records of service. Offrs are requested to interview the Adjt in this connection at their earliest convenience.

3. CANTEEN ORDERS - Personnel are advised that it is not now necessary to have canteen orders stamped with Unit stamp. It is, however, still necessary to have the orders signed by an Offr before presentation at canteen.

4. TOWN PICQUET - B. Coy will supply town picquet on SATURDAY, 2nd AUGUST 1941. Personnel, Lieut B.A. Magarey and 30 ORs. Picquet will report to DILL, 84th of C at his office in Grande Seraille, Beyrouth by approximately 0800 hrs. Transport will be provided.

5. CAMP AREA - CONTROL OF TRAFFIC.

(a) Fruit sellers and hawkers of goods generally are NOT to be permitted entry to or to operate in the vicinity of camp areas.

(b) It is the responsibility of ~~the~~ B Coy Comd to ensure compliance with the above.

6. LOOT AND UNLAWFUL TRADING

It has been definitely established that members of H.K. Forces have been selling captured arms and ammunition.

From this, it is clear that the existing orders on this subject are not being obeyed. All ranks are reminded that it is forbidden to retain in their possession any public enemy property found on the battlefield. Anyone who disposes of captured arms to other persons is directly assisting the enemy, since such arms find their way to those who work for the enemy. Such action is an offence punishable by a sentence of two years imprisonment.

Any captured war material in the possession of army personnel will be surrendered immediately.

7. THROWING OF BOMBS AND GRENADES AND FIRING OF SMALL ARMS FROM TRAINS.

Some cases of throwing bombs and grenades and the firing of small arms from trains have been reported.

This practice constitutes a serious offence for which, if proved at a Court Martial, a severe sentence of imprisonment may be awarded and, if fatal injuries result, the offender is guilty of manslaughter and is liable to penal servitude for life.

In view of their seriousness, all such offences are to be regarded as Court Martial offences.

8. Nominations for Unit typist are required to reach this HQ not later than 1700 hrs on SATURDAY, 2 AUGUST 1941.

A high standard of efficiency is desired and preference will be given to persons who are qualified shorthand typists.

The person selected will be appointed to the Bn Orderly Room Staff.

J. Hatcher Lieut
Adjt 2/27 Bn AIF.

NOTICES

LOST - Black leather wallet containing -

1-100 Lira note - 6.9d. stamps - 15-3d. stamps and canteen order
addressed S. J. Badcock. Inform to this Bn HQ immediately.

War Diary

R O By

Maj J.G. Dobbs,
A/Comd 2/27 Bn AIF.

WINDSOR, 31 Jul 41.

NO. 12

1. DUTIES

Mounting 1630 hrs 31 Jul 41.
Battalion Orderly Offr - Licut Caddy.
Battalion Orderly Sjt - Sjt Isaachsen.
Next For Duty
Battalion Orderly Offr - Licut Bell
Battalion Orderly Sjt - Cpl Coombe.

2. OFFICERS RECORD OF SERVICE - Further particulars are required from Offrs in this Unit in order to complete their records of service. Offrs are requested to interview the Adjt in this connection at their earliest convenience.

3. CANTEEN ORDERS - Personnel are advised that it is not now necessary to have canteen orders stamped with Unit stamp. It is, however, still necessary to have the orders signed by an Offr before presentation at canteen.

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6. LOST AND STOLEN IN THE

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M. Ketcher Licut
Adjt 2/27 Bn AIF.

NOTICES

LOST - Black leather wallet containing -
1-10Livre note - 6-9d. stamps - 15-3d. stamps and canteen order
addressed S.F. Badolet. Inq to this Bn HQ immediately.

War Diary

Notes on political situation in Syria for the
guidance of Officers Commanding L. of C. Areas &c.

1. The situation at present in Syria is that martial law has been proclaimed in all areas occupied by our troops.

In article 3 in the proclamation it is pointed out that martial law in no way supersedes the existing civil law and that all functionaries, Courts, councils &c. will continue to carry out their duties. Every support should therefore be given to them in their work.

2. The local gendarmerie is responsible for law and order and it is not - in a country like Syria - possible for them to secure this unless they are armed. Unless therefore there is serious reason to doubt their goodwill they should be left in possession of their arms and at least a limited amount of Ammunition.

A small squad of Palestine police officers and constables have been incorporated into the Field Security police and are attached to the Political officers for liaison duties with the local gendarmerie and for general political duties where necessary.

3. All dealings with the local officials and population and with French officials should whenever possible be carried out through the political officers or the police officers attached should the political officers be away.

4. As it has been agreed that General Catroux and the Free French will be responsible for all political negotiations with the Syrians and for the machinery of administration in Syria and the Lebanon it may be expected that Free French officials will be posted by General Catroux either to fill vacancies caused by the flight of officials or in substitution of unsatisfactory ones. This will inevitably produce a certain amount of dissatisfaction amongst the Syrians who are all of them looking forward to the termination of the French regime. These officials should be given every support possible in their duties, but should any actions of theirs appear likely in the opinion of the political officers and the military commander to lead to trouble which might endanger the security of the troops it is always open to the commander to insist for military reasons that such actions be discontinued. Interference is however to be avoided if possible.

5. Local inhabitants will very likely produce on the least provocation petitions and complaints. These should not be encouraged but referred to the Political officers. Complaints against French administration should be largely discounted as the Syrians are likely to lose no opportunity of playing us off against the French and vice-versa. Some of them will however be a genuine expression of feeling. No expression of opinion should normally be made on any such complaints but the maker should merely be told that their petition has been forwarded to the correct authorities.

6. In the event of trouble taking place such as riot, looting, sabotage &c. which necessitates the actual application of martial law military courts will have to be set up and authority should be applied for by telegram to set up such court or courts.

7. Good relations with the Syrians are of the greatest importance and personal contact with the notables and people will help to ensure these. The possibility, however, of accusations by the French against us of propaganda against them should not be lost sight of.

P.T.O.

8. The situation of the French is a difficult one: they have a strong desire to re-establish themselves not only in actuality but also to their own minds; they are conscious that they are not welcome to the Syrians and they labour under the disadvantage vis-a-vis the latter that any measures of material relief are known to emanate from us, and the credit goes to us. They must be expected therefore to be rather prickly and sometimes to assert themselves in an unwise manner vis-a-vis both us and the Syrians. Complete openness both with them and the Syrians will produce the best results as we have no hidden aims - merely the one purpose of clearing out the Axis from Syria and denying it to them in the future.

2.

SECRET.

H.Q. 1 Aust. Corps.
1 Jul. 41.

The foregoing Notes on the political situation in Syria under Force H.Q. CR/Pal/17643/A. of 19 Jun. 41 are forwarded for information and guidance.

W. Bridgeford

Brig.
D.A. & Q.M.G. 1 Aust. Corps.

Distribution:-

All units.

PATROL REPORT DASA A 1 to 3 JUL

Patrol Leader - Lt Sims

Strength of Patrol - 1 offr, 1 RAE epl, 2 ORs.

Route - EL HARAM, then by same track as Lt Bell to EL LABIYE - track leading E to Rd and River. Along river 200 yds NW to Sandy Beach.

Times - Patrol departed 0630 1 Jul, returned 0230 3 Jul.

Report - Track running E from EL LABIYE is very difficult to locate and finally comes out in main rd 500 yds E of Br. Steep and very twisty in parts but can be negotiated by mules. River can be crossed at almost any pt. Banana orchards are all along river between river and rd. Country on Northern side of river opposite track junction is exceptionally steep (too steep to negotiate except on track to EL BOUM). Country also appears very steep from EL BOUM track junction to a pt South of EL ATIQA. Cover on these slopes is scarce West of EL BOUM track (rocks only). Re-entrants appear to be only means of approach to Square 126197 from South.

Enemy observed at - One MG fired from spur 12631964 exact location unable to be located. No enemy movement seen West of this pt to square 124197. In this area Enemy Posts were located at 12481973 (small orchard). Stone wall along Eastern side covers 3 MG Posts. At top righthand corner of orchard at what appears to be a gateway track leads to dug in position 100 yds to East. This post has at least 8 men. At 12491975 prominent group of pines with small orchard on Southern edge. This appears to be a HQ as all movement was between outposts and this pt.

At 12501976 two small rocky hills with few trees, stone work can be seen which appears to hide MG posts. The no of men seen in this area approx 12. 70 yds further NE up spur round brick building appears to be AA post. At 12481974 red roofed house in trees. Tp movement seen but no actual posts located.

At 12441975 spur 2 enemy posts appear to be facing br on Coast rd. At 12481982 prominent knoll about K in MAR MIKHAL Enemy post seen on northern slope which appears to be able to fire NE and NW up Re-entrant. Wire surrounds whole posn at EL ATIQA.

Patrol leader considers that movement of tps in area from EL LABIYE to Br would be very difficult without quite a bit of noise, especially in large numbers. Country is rough and rocky and gorge re-echos any noise. Best crossing of river appears to be at either side of br. Banks of river on northern side are steep and too high to be negotiated by men.

NB Lt Sims cut telephone line in several places at approx EL LABIYE to 12551963. The wire was VIR cable 6 strand and was running from ~~the~~ forward from house across track up slopes towards upper slopes of trig 394. Similar cable seen to be running along Western side of br.

Report of two men left in Observation by Lt Sims.
These two men were left by Lt Sims at 1215 on 1 Jul and returned at 0830 2 Jul.
Location Approx 12571961.

Report Patrol of approx 50 enemy seen moving down track from a small knoll SE of their OP which appears to be a continuation of hill 394. Also 1 enemy with mule seen on same track. Enemy seen to be mending wire where it had been cut by Lt Sims.

INT INFM NO 7

The following info has been received from an agent of good intelligence. He is considered reliable.

Ref Maps : BEYROUTH, SAIDA, JEZZINE 1 : 50000
BEYROUTH 1 : 200000

1. There were three 75 mm guns located at ARBY, of these one was knocked out by the Navy yesterday (2/7) at 1320.

The remaining two guns are sited approx 50 yds West of the most Westerly of the two churches in ARBY is about 13072001. These guns can fire as far as AANOUT 129188.

2. There is one gun "in some olive trees between the rd and the village". There are also 200 Algerian and Senegalese.

3. The three 75 mm guns at KHALDI are situated about three kms South of the wireless sta and to the West of the rd. There is a hub nearby for the gun crews. The guns are surrounded by wire and one of them is in concrete.

4. There are no tps at DEIR EL QAMAR.

5. The SERAIL at BEIT ED DINE is used as a general am store. It is apparently situated at about 13581957. There is also a petrol store some little distance to the West of the SERAIL.

6. Demolitions are prepared on the rd South of BEIT ED DINE and on the rds leading to RHARIFE and MOUKHTARA south of the fork at 13551947.

7. The br at JISR EL QADI is prepared for demolition with 250 Kgs of dynamite. The river banks are 25 metres high and if the br is blown it would be impossible to pass traffic across.

8. The French are using the rd BEYROUTH - ALEY - SOUK EL GHAFI - CHEMLIEN - EINAB JISR EL QADI - DEIR EL QAMAR - BEIT ED DINE for the tpt of material and stores.

9. The main am and explosives dump of the country is situated about 200 metres West of the rd AIN SOPAR - HAMMANA and about 2 kms North of the rd junction at 14972074. The am is stored in about 50 round concrete pillboxes. To the west of the pillboxes are the huts for the gd and 200 metres further West still is the American Hospital marked with a Geneva Cross.

10. The large br at NAHR ES SAFA 147202 is not yet prepared for demolition. It is one of the few that is not.

J. Bennett
Lieut
10 21 Arct Inf Bde

Subject:- Withdrawal from GHEILA.

General Headquarters,
Middle East,
Cairo.

Headquarters,
X X X X X X
Palestine and Trans-Jordan.
X X X X X X

CRME/9188/AFV.

9th June, 1941.

1. As a result of the recent withdrawal from GHEILA certain lessons of importance were learnt and are forwarded herewith for information.

2. One of the primary causes of the failure was the hopeless mechanical state of 3rd Arm'd. Bde. While it is realised that this was not the fault of 3rd Arm'd Bde it emphasises the extreme importance of all Commanders and especially higher Commanders and Staff being constantly in the picture as to the "lefe" available in armoured units at any time.

Only then are they in a position to make their plans fit in with the mechanical possibilities.

It is the responsibility of Unit and Formation Commanders of A.F.V's to keep their Superiors always informed of their mechanical situation.

3. The importance of having a good knowledge of the ground over which the retirement may take place cannot be overstressed.

That the escarpment South of BENGHAZI proved practically impassable for vehicles between SOULEIDIMA and REGIMA led to a block at the ravine U-EL-GATTARA (10 miles S.E. of BENGHAZI) on the late afternoon of 3rd April which might have had disastrous consequences had an air attack developed.

Many other instances occurred where transport became stuck or lost through lack of knowledge of the country.

It should be almost a matter of drill for all Units to be inquisitive and thorough in making reconnaissances whenever possible. Information gained should be reported to higher authority who can then co-ordinate and circulate to all concerned.

In a retirement particularly when transport is short dumps may be the easiest method of supplying troops. Dumps however must be :-

- (a) Adequately guarded against attack by A.F.V's.
- (b) On the line of retirement.

In these operations two large dumps were provided but one at MSUS fulfilled neither of the above conditions, and as a result it was a constant source of anxiety and was eventually destroyed prematurely.

There is no doubt that supply by dump lessens the mobility of an armoured formation and if the decision is made to supply by dumps this restricted mobility must be accepted. Any attempt to change the axis of withdrawal away from the dumps is fraught with the gravest danger.

5. The enemy in all his attacks, whether from ground or air made a dead set against wireless vehicles. The best solution to counter this would appear to be to have dummy wireless masts on all vehicles, and this is being put in hand. This method of attack was most effective in breaking and hampering communications and might be adopted by us when the opportunity occurs.

6. The supply of petrol is so vital to a mechanized force that it is essential that a full complement of 2nd. line transport should be available. This is particularly the case in a withdrawal when it is most unsound to rely on improvised columns or 3rd Line transport being sent forward into the battle at the last moment.

In CYRENAICA owing to shortage of transport such improvisation was inevitable, but the majority of 3rd line companies have neither the organisation nor the training for operations in the desert. It must be remembered that the fear of shortage of petrol is a constant anxiety to all Commanders both senior and junior and is apt to cramp their initiative as well as their actions.

7. In principle in a withdrawal tanks should be kept in the area where it is proposed to give battle decisively.

Any long distance movement with tanks will result in many small mechanical breakdowns, but where as in an advance such breakdowns can be repaired and the tanks again made serviceable in a short time in a withdrawal they will nearly always result in a total loss.

8. The fact that armoured formations must often fight dispersed makes it essential that the plan be widely and exactly known. Very divergent impressions of the plan of withdrawal were held by four key officers who escaped. None of their accounts agree.

9. The decisive importance of air support was clearly illustrated. Before and during the retirement the enemy had complete superiority in the air. The result of this was twofold.

(a) He was able to attack our transport columns with complete impunity. On two occasions at least he completely destroyed a petrol convoy.

(b) He was able to replenish his columns by air supply. A replenishment area served by at least seven large Junkers 52 was found 5 miles South of MECHILI immediately after the surrender.

(sgd) ?

for

Lieut-General,
Chief of the General Staff.

Report 15 Pl 3 Jul 41.

0800 hrs. O.P. established on saddle at SOUTHERN end of feature EAST of 432. Map ref DAMOUR 12681944. DASA HORSNELL and 6 ORs. From this point the valley, villages and creek lines for a distance of 4 miles EAST could be observed, also tracks in the valley and stretches in the bitumen road to the NORTH, continual observation of the Block houses and the Ridge in square MAP REF 126195 could be made until 1630; no enemy noted in the above area, nor vehicular movement on the rd. Between 0800 and 1000 hrs a large number of Wags escorting pack mules laden with their belongings came out of the valley and moved past the O.P. in the direction of SAIDA.

Leaving O.P. at 0800 hrs Pte PARNELL moved to high ridge 528 (map ref 127193) thence in an EASTERLY direction for a distance approx. 2 miles to a point (map ref DAMOUR 131193) approx. He arrived at this point at 1100 hrs and observed for 3 hrs; the villages, country and rds to the N.E; then he returned to our O.P. via the creek line. NO enemy were noticed by PARNELL, the only vehicle seen was a dark limousine from direction DEIR ELCAKAR and disappeared behind village of KAHERILIN. At about 1000 hrs our snipers near O.P. fired at culverts under bitumen rd in order to see if they were enemy gun posns. No return fire from these posns, but LMGs from BLOCKHOUSE area opened up. One presumably on fixed line, along re-entrant between 432 and O.P. Another posn on F.L. along creek line EAST of O.P. I contacted DASA B at 1400 hrs at village AQLUJA. Advised DASA MAGAREY about ~~our~~ our fwd posns, then recce route to O.P. then to creek from there; noted practicable route to bitumen rd. Owing to noise suggest it inadvisable to dig on roadways. If mines are laid, suggest we cover same with A/T rifle and other SAA fire from O.P. feature, range ~~sq~~ approx. 700x.

1700 hrs.

(Sgd) H.J. Katekar, Lieut.

21 Aust Inf Bde,
2/27 Bn AIF,
1 Jul 41.

35 tons
27 HE 2 1/2
9 Smoke

21 Aust Inf Bde.

PERSONNEL TO BE LEFT OUT OF BATTLE.

List of above personnel is as follows:-

Very Pistol

Offrs

- SX 2929 Maj J.G. Dobbs 2 i/c
- SX 4550 Lieut T.F. Gill A. Coy ✓
- SX 4840 Lieut B.A. Magarey B. Coy
- SX 2926 Lieut J.W. Skipper C. Coy ✓
- SX 2922 Lieut H.R.R. Kimber D. Coy ✓
- SX 6219 Lieut G.H. Fawcett HQ Coy. ✓ *JACOBS.*

WOs

- SX 3085 WO1 D.G.L. Stewart B ✓
- SX 4606 WO1 H.A. Lyndon C ✓

Sigs

- SX 5896 Sjt J.G.R. Blackmore. B ✓
- SX 3082 Sjt E.P. Martin. C ✓
- SX 3238 A/sjt Macdonald G.C. D ✓

ICOs

- SX 9684 Cpl E.R. Edwards B. Coy
- SX 4944 L/Cpl F.H. Harper B. Coy
- SX 3171 Cpl K.C. Rogers C. Coy
- SX 3943 Cpl P.R. Robertson C. Coy
- SX 3919 Cpl A.C.C. Tomer D. Coy ✓
- SX 3912 Cpl A.V. Weir D. Coy ✓
- SX 2769 L/Sjt A. Isaachsen HQ Coy
- SX 6430 Cpl D.S. Hawker A. Coy ✓
- SX 4732 Cpl S.C. Scott A. Coy. X

Rank and File

- SX 2875 Pte Double A. Coy ✓
- SX 3291 Pte Hillier S. A. Coy ✓
- SX 5907 Pte Kendall G.J. A. Coy X
- SX 4179 Pte Crouch W.F. A. Coy ✓
- SX 10968 Pte Budarick L.B. A. Coy ✓
- SX 3579 Pte Everett H.J. A. Coy ✓
- SX 3809 Pte Rattley V.G. A. Coy X
- SX 3805 Pte Hicks L.C. A. Coy ✓
- SX 3609 Pte Carter R.H. X
- SX 3225 Pte Fisher R.G. B. Coy
- SX 4360 Pte Churcher H.L. B. Coy
- SX 3477 Pte Roland W.K. B. Coy
- SX 5868 Pte Oliver W.B. B. Coy
- SX 3431 Pte Hay T.L. B. Coy
- SX 4522 Pte Wright C.H. B. Coy
- SX 9768 Pte Fleming C.J.C. B. Coy
- SX 4086 Pte Hardy G.A. B. Coy
- SX 4253 Pte Macdonald J.H. B. Coy.
- SX 4343 Pte Griffiths R.J. C. Coy
- SX 5087 Pte Phillips V.F. C. Coy
- SX 3469 Pte Parslow A.H. C. Coy
- SX 4379 Pte Hughes G.T. C. Coy ✓
- SX 4523 Pte Wilson T.F. C. Coy
- SX 4637 Pte Redman S.W. C. Coy
- SX 8206 Pte Carroll J.E. C. Coy
- SX 3077 Pte Baker H.H. C. Coy
- SX 4323 Pte Robertson D.J.
- SX 10336 Pte Brown K.L. D. Coy ✓
- SX 9378 Pte Hicks W.L.H. D. Coy
- SX 3888 Pte Cumber A.E. D. Coy
- SX 11564 Pte Hayes P.W. D. Coy ✓
- X 10470 Pte Macdonald R.S. D. Coy
- SX 5200 Pte Collins W.A. D. Coy
- SX 5393 Pte Burnett A.W. D. Coy
- SX 11586 Pte Carpenter W.G.
- SX 3376 Pte Haniford J. D. Coy ✓

2/27/41

(2).

Rank and File (Contd)

SX 4602 Pte Hand A. Signalman.
SX 4603 Pte Beasley A.G.H.A. Signalman.
SX Pte Barrett T.C.B. Signalman.

SX 4091 Pte Thomson D.W. Mortarman
SX 3101 Pte Driscoll H.E. Mortarman. } Two from C

SX 36032 Pte Warren J.H. M.T. Dr Carriers
SX 4024 Pte Aldridge J.H. M.T. Dr Carriers.

SX 4357 Pte Miles L.E. M.T. Dr.
SX 4443 Pte Jackson A. M.T. Dr
SX 4345 Pte Katcher G.S. M.T. Dr
SX 3374 Pte Bedson L.G. M.T. Dr

Thomas Capt.
for

Lt-Col
Comd 2/27 Bn AIF.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No. 6

No. of Groups.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

GR.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

WUVI CUSWORTH rptd DASA

FROM

WUVI

Originator's Number

029

Date

4

In Reply to Number

vehicle	required	to	transport	rece	party
WUVI	strength	six	other	ranks.	from
vicinity	WUVI A.	comds	vehicle	near	DASA
at	AEWZXQAX	at	approx	2100	hrs
to	WUVI	⊙	ack		

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1645

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

1703

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
L	1725	Moore									

SUMMARY OF INFEM No 6.

2 Jul 41.

1. Infm from Inhabitant of DAMOUR.

The following infm was obtained from an inhabitant of DAMOUR who left that place on 28 Jun. He is of very good int.

- (i) There were two full cols in DAMOUR. The informant deduced that there were two regts in DAMOUR.
- (ii) There were some tps and guns at EL HAMRA.
- (iii) There were eight guns at EL HUSN. This is apparently near the track junc about 600 metres Northwest of EL BOUM.
- (iv) At BAUCOURTI (BAOURBICHE 12801) there is a big gun which is reputed to have come from AREY.131200.
- (v) Immediately South of the first D in SAHEL ED DAMOUR (in the groves West of the rd) there is a small dry Wadi which runs under a br. The bed of this Wadi is mined in the vicinity of the rd.
- (vi) There is barbed wire from this this br (para 5) to the seashore and then North along the shore to a pt West of BAAL EN NAAME.
- (vii) There are guns and MIs on the small spur immediately South of the figure 66 at the South Eastern extremity of DAMOUR village.

2. Infm from Agent.

The following infm was obtained from a local inhabitant who was sent over the line on the night of 29/30 Jun. Observations were made on the day of 30 Jun. The agent is of fair int.

- (i) ZAROURIYE (130187) : About 60 soldiers (French, Algerian and Senegalese) and two sailors. On being questioned one of the soldiers said that they were going to BEIKOUM (136187). They were then in process of packing up.
- (ii) JIEILIYE (129193) : About 30 tps. This party was also leaving shortly for BEIKOUM.
- (iii) MAZERAAT EB DEIR (129185) : Six tanks and about 100 British or Australian tps were encountered.
- (iv) MFOULIE (132195) : There were no tps in the village itself. There were some tps on a hill about 600 metres NE of the village. They appeared to be in posn to cover the rd from MAZRAAT EB DEIR. One gun had previously been located in the vicinity of the village but the local inhabitants stated that they had not heard the gun firing for two days and presumed that it had been removed.
- (v) BSABA (134185) : No tps in village itself. Some tps located on a hill South of the rd and West of the village. One gun was sited near the mosque at the Southern edge of the village.
- (vi) BEIKOUM (136187) : There were about 50 soldiers and one gun on a small hill immediately West of the village.
- (vii) No observation was obtained on the hillside North of the Wadi BASRI but the villagers thought that there were no tps South of the rd.
- (viii) The rd MAZRAAT EB DEIR - MFOULIE) BEIKOUM is not tarmac but is very good. The rd BEIKOUM - BEIT ED DINE is poor but it is passable to MF and vehs could pass it in most places.


/3. Int Infm -----

3. Int Infs.

The following info is supplied by an agent.

- (i) It is reported that a large number of Vichy tps are concentrated at BIKEL (?) village.
- (ii) A number of French tps have been withdrawn from BKIFA to HAZRAAT ED DEIR. At the entrance to HAZRAAT ED DEIR there are about twenty Senegalese tps, all of whom are manning MG nests.
- (iii) A number of armed deserters are to be found in the villages of HOUMINE, QAZZA and Arab Tabbaya.
- (iv) At about 3 a.m. on 30 Jun about 12 armed Senegalese soldiers passed through MACHDOUCHE village. They were challenged by the "NATOUR" of the village at whom they fired. They were proceeding in the direction of NABATIYEH village.

(Note) : The veracity of the above is not guaranteed.


Lieut.
10 21 Aust Inf Bde.

7 Aust Div Cir 6 25

A/UK Minefields.

1. A/UK mines will normally be laid by RAI or under RAI supervision. On occasions, however, they may be laid by all arms.
2. In order
 - (a) to minimise casualties among our own tps, and
 - (b) to facilitate subsequent lifting of mines,
 it is essential that all minefields laid be reported and accurately recorded.
3. To this end all units laying A/UK mines will immediately fwd through usual channels to give Div HQ (copies) and to HQ RAI (one copy) a report and sketch plan showing:
 - i. Location of minefields in sufficient detail to enable it to be found readily on the ground. Accurate map ref will be stated (eight figures on 1: 200,000 map), and accurate distances and bearings given from at least two fixed marks. In this connection mile posts and such other objects as may be readily moved by shell fire or otherwise are NOT "fixed marks".
 - ii. Layout of field, showing lengths and bearings of legs, spacing of mines in rows, No of rows, spacing of rows etc.
 - Total number of mines in legs and in field. (This is important and must be accurate in order that unit lifting mines may be sure all have been removed). Where different types are used, number of each type should be shown.
4. Similar report will also be furnished when any of our own minefields or parts of them are lifted.
5. Where feasible, the RAI unit in the relevant area will be informed by any other unit laying or lifting A/UK mines, and will record particulars and fwd details to HQ RAI.
6. HQ RAI will collate intelligence received and prepare schedules and sketches of current minefield positions in relevant areas for:
 - i. Issue to subordinate formations.
 - ii. Forwarding to higher formations.
 - iii. Div Records.
7. Enemy A/UK mines.
 Enemy A/UK minefields will normally be cleared by RAI, but portion of, or paths through, fields may often need to be cleared by other arms. The following principles will govern the clearance of enemy fields:
 8. Where required for our own ops, or for the safety of our own tps, enemy A/UK mines will be disarmed, removed and stacked - "fuses" separate from balance of the mines.
 9. Where operational requirements or safety considerations do NOT demand removal of mines, they may be left in place, surrounded by a trip wire about 18" above ground and marked with sign "DANGER MINES".
 10. Enemy A/UK minefields discovered should be reported to the nearest RAI Unit for attention.
 11. Instruction of other arms.
 Every opportunity will be afforded RAI, and RAI will take every opportunity to instruct other arms in handling of A/UK mines, both our own and enemy.
 12. Marking Own Minefields.
 A board with a black triangle (9" sides) will be placed along minefields.

(Jgd) J.H.A. Chapman,
Col
G3 7 Aust Div.

SUBJECT - Enemy system of defence.

S E C R E T

Force H.Q.
CR/PAI/17550/L/G.
2 Jul 41.

1 Aust Corps
10 Ind Div
Habforce
5 Cav Bde
6 Cav Bde
E.J.P.F.
Haifa Fortress Area
Jam Area
Lydda Area

} for information.

1. The enemy recently has been adopting a system of defence in depth covered by a line of observation with small posts, IMGs etc. When this line of observation is captured he counter-attacks to re-take it from positions in rear. These counter-attacks have had far too great a measure of success. This requires the attention of all commanders.
2. To counter the immediate counter-attack it is necessary for the attack to be organised in depth
 - (a) to take the position
 - (b) to complete consolidation
 - (c) to react against any counter-attack.
3. As regards (b), the first essential is for the troops capturing the position to be re-formed and organised for defence immediately. This entails platoon and section leaders getting a grip on their men at once and telling them off into defensive posts. This is very largely a question of training and discipline. Consolidation may also entail the bringing forward heavier weapons, mortars, H.Gs, A/Tk guns and mines (the latter if the ground gives opportunity for counter-attack by tanks) as well as wire, sandbags, etc.
4. With reference to 2 (c) counter-attacks must be repulsed and made costly to the enemy, not only by the fire from the consolidated position, but also by the reaction of company reserves held for the purpose, who should be ready to meet the enemy should he succeed in effecting a lodgement. There is a psychological moment for this when there is bound to be a lull in the firing. This gives the opportunity for the use of the bayonet, a weapon which the troops of the nationalities we are fighting dislike intensely.

Brigadier,
General Staff.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

NEVI

FROM

DASA

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

ACK

CR/PAL/16073/9 of 29 JUN

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

*Fredk. S. Burns
Sgt - Int Sec.*

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

DASA

SECRET

Subject- CIPHER MESSAGES- Stereotyped Openings.

*Pls ack to NEV!
Jas G Kealy
Cipher Cpl.*

FORCE HQ
CR/PAL/16073/G
29 Jun 41.

HQ AIF Base Area
1 Aust Corps
HABFORCE
5 Cav Bde
6 Cav Bde
TJFF

JERUSALEM Area
LYDDA Area
HAIFA Fortress Area
84 L of C
85 L of C
Desert L of C.

Ref CR/PAL/16073/G of 15 May 41, copies of which are att for formations marked.

1. It has come to notice that the procedure laid down in the above instr is NOT being fully complied with.
2. Formations must realise that the use of stereotyped openings to messages affords considerable help to the enemy in breaking down our ciphers.
3. It is clearly the responsibility of all to do everything in their power to safeguard our ciphers and originators must underline the stereotyped openings so that the cipher staff can transfer them to the text of the message.
4. A very common beginning is:-
"Following for -----from-----full stop."
This still appears countless times at the commencement of messages. It must be underlined.

Signed Brig
General Staff.

CR/PAL/16073/G
15 May 41.

1. For security reasons all stereotyped beginnings to cipher messages must be avoided. Examples of such beginnings are "Situation Report", "Warning Order", "Stock State", "Following Casualty reported from-----" "Reference" etc etc.
2. When the case of such openings is inevitable it is possible for the cipher staff to enclose the opening within brackets at a convenient place in the text. On deciphering, the phrase will be replaced at the commencement of the text.
3. It is not always possible for cipher staffs to identify stereotyped openings, particularly in busy offices. It is therefore the responsibility of all originators when signing their messages in the right hand signature space to either:-
 - (a) avoid such stereotyped openings or
 - (b) if they must use them, to underline the phrase concerned so that it can readily be identified if the message has to be enciphered.
4. All cipher operators should be instructed that :-
 - (a) In concealed address messages the opening phrase should be enciphered as part of the message preamble which, under existing rules, is enciphered within the text.
 - (b) In non-concealed address messages the opening phrase should be enciphered within brackets near, but not at, the beginning of the message.
 - (c) In every case the phrase should be repeated at the commencement on deciphering.

Signed. Capt.
General Staff

SECRET

Copy No. 6

4 Jul 41

INT INFM NO 7

The following info has been received from an agent of good intelligence. He is considered reliable.

Ref Maps : BEYROUTH, SAIDA, JEZINE 1 : 50000
BEYROUTH 1 : 200000

1. There were three ~~hy~~ guns located at ABEY, of these one was knocked out by the Navy yesterday (2/7) at 1320.

The remaining two guns are sited approx 50 yds West of the most Westerly of the two churches in ABEY is about 13072001. These guns can fire as far as AANOUT 129188.

2. There is one gun "in some olive trees between the rd and the village". There are also 200 Algerian and Senegalese.

3. The three CD guns at KHALDE are situated about three kms South of the wireless sta and to the West of the rd. There is a hut nearby for the gun crews. The guns are surrounded by wire and one of them is in concrete.

4. There are no tps at DEIR EL QAMAR.

5. The SERAIL at BEIT ED DINE is used as a general amn store. It is apparently situated at about 13581957. There is also a petrol store some little distance to the West of the SERAIL.

6. Demolitions are prepared on the rd South of BEIT ED DINE and on the rds leading to RHAKIFE and NOUVEFARA south of the fork at 13581947.

7. The br at JISR EL QADI is prepared for demolition with 250 Kgs of dynamite. The river banks are 25 metres high and if the br is blown it would be impossible to pass traffic across.

8. The French are using the rd BEYROUTH - ABEY - SOUK EL GHAF - CHEMIEN - EINAB JISR EL QADI - DEIR EL QAMAR - BEIT ED DINE for the tpt of material and stores.

9. The main amn and explosives dump of the country is situated about 200 metres West of the rd AIN SOFAR - HAMMANA and about 2 kms North of the rd junc at 14972074. The amn is stored in about 50 round concrete pillboxes. To the west of the pillboxes are the huts for the gd and 200 metres further West still is the American Hospital marked with a Geneva Cross.

10. The large br at MAHR ES SAFA 147202 is not yet prepared for demolition. It is one of the few that is not.

J. L. ... Ident
10 21 Aust Inf Bde

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR,

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

DASA A B C D

FROM

DASA

Originator's Number

IS

Date

4

In Reply to Number

Push	over	all	cairns	of	stones
in	food	areas	as	these	are
good	aiming	marks	for	mortars	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

*Fred S. Burr
Jt. Officer.*

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CIPHER.**

SIGNED

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1646

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

Report 15 Pl. 3 July '41. 1

0800 hrs. O.P. established on saddle at SOUTH-ERN end of feature EAST of 4320 map ref. DAMOUR 1268, 1944. DAZA HORNELL and 6 other R's. From this point the valley, villages, and creek lines for a distance of 4 miles East could be observed also tracks in the valley and stretches in the bitumen road to the North, continual observation of the Block houses, and the Ridge in square map ref. 126 195 could be made until 1630, no enemy noted in the above area, not vehicular movement on the road. Between 0800 and 1000 hrs a large number of Wogs escorting pack mules laden with their belongings came out of the valley and moved past the O.P. in the direction of SAIDA

Leaving O.P. at 0800 hrs Pte PARNELL moved to high ridge 528 (map ref. 127193) thence in an **EASTERLY** direction for a distance approx 2 miles to a point (map ref. DAMOUR 131193) (approx). He arrived at this point at 1100 hrs and observed for 3 hrs. the villages country & roads to the N.E. then he returned to our O.P. via the creek line. NO enemy were noticed by PARNELL, the only vehicle seen was a dark limousine from direction DEIR ELOAMAR and disappeared behind village of KA FER-ILIN. At about 1000 hrs our sniper near O.P. fired at culverts under bitumen road in order to see if they were enemy gun pits. No return fire from these pits, but l.m.g's from BLOCKHOUSE area opened up, one presumably on fixed line along re-entrant between 432 and O.P. another pits. on F.L. along creek-line EAST of O.P. I contacted DAZA.B at 1400 hrs at village Aqlyta. Advised DASA MAGARE about our gun pits then recce route to O.P. then to check from there noted practicable route to bitumen road. Owing to noise, suggest

Report. 15 Pl. 4 JUL 41

Acting on OC's instructions
established standing patrols
at new track (DAMOUR
12581952) - 7 sec. and
on saddle (12681944) - 9 sec.
on 3 JUL 41 @ ~~at~~

In charge of fighting patrol
(10 OR's) left 9 sec's standing
patrol H.Q. at 2115 hrs
proceeded along track to
creek crossing (12751945), then
left 2 men to cover our
withdrawal, thence along track
to group of houses (12731948)
thence due North to 2nd
class board @ Time of arrival
at houses 2315 hrs @ Houses
clear of enemy; no enemy
movement noticed in
vicinity @ Houses occupied
by Wogo @ Interviewed 3
of them, difficult to understand

it inadvisable to dig on roadway. If mines
are laid, suggest we cover same with A/T
rifle and other S.A.A fire from O.P. feature,
range approx 700'.

A. J. Katchur
Lieut

1700 hrs

2

Apparently they are short
of food. Detailed 2 men
Pvt. Parnell a brown to remain
behind in concealment near
the house until 1800 hrs
Today and continually watch
reports of Wago a black horse
feature. These men shd.
reach PLHQ by 2100 hrs
On return journey patrol
reached Creech crossing at
2400 hrs. Accompanied by
30 R's proceeded in westerly
direction along line of creek
leaving balance of patrol to
wait for return patrol
Approx 0200 hrs. Proceeded
along creek for some distance
then climbed towards 2nd
class road to track-watercourse
junction (12721952)
Distance along track in
westerly direction to track-

3

Creek crossing (12681953)
① Arrived there at 0215
hrs ① attempted to find
practicable crossing ① visibility
poor as moon behind hills =
decided to lie low until first
light ① crossed creek at 0415
hrs - water 1 ft deep - thence
along track leading to
Hill 3940 ① arrived Pt HQ
at 0600 hrs (very sootied) ①
Comments on tracks

Track down to first creek
crossing very steep, but well
defined ① by side it rather
dangerous for passage of
trips and impossible to
avoid considerable noise ①
would be much better if
boots spunged or rubber-
soled ① Trip from creek
to 2nd class road very
practicable ①

Track from ⁴ 2nd Class Road
to other Creek Crossing good
also track from Creek Crossing
to Hill 394 quite practicable.

My Hatford
hunt

0800 hrs

Report by Capt F. J. Nicholls on success of
route from coys. present position to Stone Hut
feature.

As a result of patrols I have formed the
opinion that the best route from this coys
present position to the Stone Hut feature is
as marked on the tracing below.

The first portion of the route - from
Et Rezaniye to the saddle SOUTH of Ed Dalamiye
- is rough going but not steep. It has
no pitfalls. The route on to the Orchard is
steep and rough, but it is quite practical.
From the Orchard on the going is good.
The ford at the creek is suitable for troops
to cross - the depth of the water being approx
8-10. The track from the creek on is
excellent - not steep nor is it stoney.
The ridge therefore should be negligible. This
portion of the route zig-zags up the

Tracing from DAMOUR 1/25,000.

P.T.O.



direction of the 2nd class road - may be
pinned and Stone Butte.

Time. Based on my patrol's findings
last night I consider that it would
take 3 hours to move a company from the
present position to the creek ford
from the point to the left of the feature a
company should be able to make the 2nd class
road to the creek. These findings allow
for a patrol of all necessary points.

I have conferred with Mr. Mitchell
of the 1st Coy. and he considers that his
squad of guides can assist in engaging
various targets that may prove troublesome
during our move.

Doctors.

Mr. Clappett of 3 Pl. has viewed
the area and considers that he can
ably assist in the "beating-up" of the Stone
Butt feature.

Artillery.

I wish to confer with an artillery
officer to confirm their ability to engage
this area, as the surrounding features
may make this difficult.

F. J. Nicholls

Capt.

0857

4 Jul 41

Report

15 Pl

4 Jul 41

Observed ~~from~~ ^{at} O.P. on
Northern Slopes of Hill 432
noted no enemy movement
on block-house feature
today. Our arty fired on
feature 2 shells falling
in occupied area, one
on large rock. Observes
at ~~East~~ O.P. East of Hill
432 did not notice
any enemy movement to
the front today. Ptes
Parnell & Brown who
were stationed in group
of houses on other side of
Creek remained in observation
until 1630 hrs and
arrived at Pl HQ at
1820 hrs and reported as
follows.
(1) 0730 hrs native youth

driving mule laden with
hay arrived at houses
having approached along
2nd Class Road from West.

(2) 0930 hrs 4 mules laden
with hay led by natives
arrived at houses along
same route

(3) 1215 hrs - Pt Parrell
noticed one enemy move
from vicinity of Hochhaus
down slope to bitumen
road where he disappeared
from view.

No other enemy seen
Occupants of houses seemed
very friendly and provided
our observers with food

W. Hatcher
Lieut

1945 hrs

Report of Patrol Night 4/5 Jul

Patrol leader Lt Sims

Strength one Pl

Times Depart 0830
Return 0400.

Route. Er Rezanye - El Battal - El Lebye.

Report. No Enemy or small arms fire seen.
While at El Lebye Enemy put down
barage first between El Lebye &
El Battal for approx 6 hrs. then I moved
back along track towards El Lebye. Pl
and I moved Pl further North so as to get
protection under reverse slopes at El Lebye
& shells then actually fell just where
Patrol had been. Range then came
down on East & West sides of El Lebye
for approx 15 hrs. Then moved to

forward slopes & terraces of El Labuye
(actually just N. of Ullap). They
continued harassing here just anywhere
in ~~the~~ the areas previously shelled.
& were still shelling after Al returned.
Guns ~~of~~ appeared to be in square
126198.

Patrol leader is of opinion that there
is an Enemy O.P. somewhere on forward
slopes of 394. (Northern slopes).

~~Dist~~ White left -

Questions

1. Third route block from Assemble point via standing patrol not practically advisable to take. OK
2. Capt Rice is concerned about feature 250 suggests arty fire on that during advance from River and to first objective. OK
3. Capt Nicholls also requires arty fire on feature 250 on first attack. 0215-0230 OK
4. Arty fire on Block House awaiting pinpoint refer from Decon. + fire to F.O.B. ✓
5. Two houses north of road and mines to mine rd as marked. If wide they be covered by REXI. - by 14 Bw mine's north
6. Maj Dolbe's main's movement drivers suggests 4 from 5 PL 2 from 2 PL 1 R 5 H. anyway.

To DASA

SECRET

From GPMcSee (Pte)

3 JUL 41

2 JUL 41

2140 hrs Sentry reported sound of AFV on BEIT ED DENE Road. Went to right flank but could hear nothing. Contacted O.P. on right flank who reported seeing two light tanks at 12601958 moving away, at 2110 hrs. At 2130 hrs he heard the sound of more AVF, estimated by sound at 4 to 6 vehicles. O.C. telephoned Coy HQ and Bn Duty Officer. Contacted left O.P. but up to 2230 hrs ^{and 0430 hrs} he heard nothing. At 0430 hrs right OP reported hearing at 0115 hrs the sound of an AFV starting, but the sound stopped immediately.

3

Right O.P. also reported that at 2100 hrs, he heard sound of digging near river in front of his position. Sound continued on-off all night.

also that during night signal lights ^(not morse) were flashing among hills ^{EAST} to the east but he could not identify which hills.

Left O.P. reported that 2355 hrs + 0345 hrs 2/3 JUL LMG + rifle fire was heard for 2 or 3 minutes each coming from direction YERATE

1800 hrs left O.P. reported:

First enemy movement observed at 0800 hrs when Gps commenced wiring left of small orchard approx ~~1248~~ 1250 1975 continuing till 1000 when arty shelling commenced.

at 1400 hrs enemy movement was seen on STONY RIDGE 12411973 and in orchard 12481972

3

movement was for short duration and very little movement seen since.

At 1100 hrs I observed large truck stationary at 12871948. Informed FOO who passed on informn to OP covering area.

1100 hrs to 1200 hrs with DASA NICHOLLS observing slopes to right.

at 1040 hrs five shells fell on slope at 12511951

PL HQ		AITSANDG
OPs	Right	AEVGALDS
	Left	AEUBANDE

SPM^{see} (Pt)

3 JUL 41

1900 hrs

DASA

SECRET

From 2PM^cSec Pte

4 JUL

2100 hrs 3 JUL Guided party to well at XECPXNVK for water. Distance one Km. very rough steep track.

0145 hrs 4 JUL Observer from night OP returned to report mortar, LMG and rifle fire for about 4 mins in vicinity XIDE XNYP

0500 hrs Left OP returned. Confirmed fire from near EL BOUM. Otherwise all quiet

1100 hrs E. Arty fire fell vicinity hill 432. About five shells fell in vicinity XETKXLVR

1300 hrs Left O.P. reported slight enemy movement in vicinity STONY RIDGE and EL ATIQA but not outside areas previously mentioned.

(2)

0300 hrs DASH LEE observed
enemy mortar near blockhouse
XEDKXQT ~~ED~~ Coy HQ and 15 PL
notified

SPMclue (pl)

4 JUL 41

1900 hrs

Report by Lieut Bell to O.C. A Coy,
with reference to patrol clearing
El Battal of all enemy, on 4 Jul 41,

Object of patrol. To clear El Battal
of all enemy, and leave one
section there, occupying El Battal
as a standing patrol.

No 8 Pl moved from El Harraun
at 1630 hrs, and proceeded to El Battal,
as a fighting patrol. We combed
the village of El Battal and to
extent of 300 yards in all directions
from the centre of the village, no
enemy being found there!

No 4 section remained at
El Battal as a standing patrol.
The remainder of pl returning to
El Harraun at 1930 hrs.

J. D. Bell Lieut. 2030 hrs

To DASA

DASA B

R2 4

Two men moved over
crest of AIPBXNUF
appear to have taken
up posn at apex
of white patch same
feature

1953

1956

Reported to NEVI.

Dasa

2

Dasa B. R1 4

Further movement on H1PBXNUF
5 men appeared to be laying
cable @ Three pack mules moving
east to west across skyline

1905

1906

Forwarded to
NEVI

To DASA
From DASA B

4 JUL

Obvious movement of
believed enemy troops
across skyline of feature

AIPB XNUFO

Movement WEST to EAST

STRENGTH 30 to 40 men

1800

Forwarded to
NEVI

To DASA C.

4100

From Pte OLIVER, 11 pl DASA B.

By 0500 hrs today 4 Dec 41, with three other ORs we took up an OP post at an orchard in the right front of DASA B. HQ. We observed main road & extreme right flank.

0925 Saw 2 plumes spotting from Bald Hill across & above rd (ie Trig 567). They moved hesitantly ~~behind~~ a mound to their left. A few mins later Enemy arty opened up - shells on right of DASA B.

0940 Men reappeared from mound & continued spotting from the mound. About 10 to 15 mins later they returned to the Bald Hill.

1000 The 2 men went back to the mound again within a few mins. the Enemy arty again. This time firing at the BARRACON feature. After the arty first fire a definite delay for a few mins before extensive firing started. Immediately after the firing ceased (6) men appeared from behind the mound. Each of them wearing equipment. The first 2 men observed were NOT wearing equipment.

over page

Ref. DADA 1/5000

4561 5821
1285 1954

Although no times of further
activity were kept
at regular intervals of 2 or
3 men (always well deployed)
moved from the heel to the
mount always on the one
track.

On an occasion, approx
midday same procedure
as earlier incident carried
out before another enemy
arty fire directed to Daba B
right flank, started.

I left the OP about 1330
at that time there was
still mount at the Bald Hill
& by the mount.

In all it is estimated
that 7 or 9 men were
engaged in this position.

Report phoned to Lt Stirling O.P. 432
who is to see what he can do about it.

J.S.S.

Block House - map Ref. 12701955

Believed to be occupied by enemy

Facts leading to this belief

Jul 1. 1 Armed car seen to ~~at~~ approach position
halt at blockhouse for 15 mins then
turn & return via same route. Belt and Lane
Road.

Jul 2 Donkeys & pack mules seen to move
into this area - but not seen
to leave.

Jul 4 Digging heard in Raven bed just
below this position.
During afternoon Lieut J. Lees observed
what he believes to be a 4" mortar.

Al Dea Lieut

10. Dasa 4 Jul 41

This information was requested during
conference, being pointed out as a
position requiring particular arty fire.

To Dasa c

From Dasa "c" O.P.

4 July Report from right O.P.

0715 hrs Heavy Arty fire from beyond Damour

1100 hrs. One man left house by road -

junction & walked along old track towards
Beit-Ed-Dere & was joined by 3 other men.

All went into valley & out of sight.

1145 One man left olive grove left of El Baum

moved downhill 1/3 of way from village
& disappeared from sight into possible MG post

1314 Arty searched ground around El Baum

No movement seen

1600-1830 No movement seen, Enemy Arty

fire from near Coast

1930 Several figures seen near El Baum

vicinity two red roofed houses, fires
were lit & 4 men believed to be wops

Report from left O.P

1310-1420 Navy searched ground E.L. Atiqua

1440 5 men emerged from dug in post
left of E.L. Atiqua

1450 3 men emerged from same area
followed by several others who loitered
in area

1800 Our troops moved in battle order
through area left of E.L. Battal
Enemy & own arty opened fire

2200-0300 Our Arty fired on posts left of
E.L. Atiqua.

0130 Enemy barrage fell on fwd slopes
of 394 & ceased at 0235. First shells
fell below O.P., later shells fell
vicinity Damour bridge & well down
in valley

2200 Beyrouth bombed for several hrs.
Fire seen from 0200-0430

John Dhee Lieut.