


AWM52
Australian Military Forces, Army headquarters,
formation and unit diaries, 1939-1945

1/4/1 CORPS

1 Australian Corps
General Branch (1 Aust
Corps 'G' Branch)

September 1945, part 1



1/4/1-0722

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted)

Unit GS Branch Hq 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 1945 To 15 Sep 1945

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
LOROTAI	8 September 1945		Ref Maps (not included) <u>Operation CASE ONE</u> : 2 TANK DIVISION 1:25,000 TARNAN NORTH 1:25,000 <u>Operation CASE SIX</u> : 30K10 SERIES 1:25,000 <u>NOTE.</u> A brief outline only will be given of current operations in the body of this report. Descriptions of operations are given in:- Daily Operational Signals to 30K	APPENDIX "B"
	1 Sep		<u>Operations CASE ONE CASE TWO CASE THREE CASE SIX.</u> Protective patrolling all areas. Occupation of Borneo by Australian Forces 3/320/ops A letter was sent to Adv Div, covering the plans submitted for the acceptance of the J. base surr. in BORNEO by 7 and 9 Aust Divs, which are/attached The 7 Aust Div plan was concurred in : it involved the use of 9 LCT and 12 LCM of the landing craft allotted to the formation, and the temporary use of PW cages, prior to organisation under Japanese officers in the Miri area. Amendments to 9 Aust Div plan were/suggested as follows : that the force to go to KUCHING should be not less than a bn/gp, and that the possibility of shipping Japanese forces from SANDAKAN, without the establishment there of our own	APPENDIX "D"

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted)

Unit GS Branch Hq 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	1 Sep		troops, should be explored. By air-lifting in relays the permanent provision of 2 LST, 4 LSM and 12 C47 aircraft in addition to the craft at present held by 1 Aust Div would suffice for all purposes except for the bn gp to go to KUCHING, for which an LST was required.	
			As attempts by Adv LHQ to contact Commanders of 2 Japanese Army and 37 Japanese Army had not been successful, authority was given to Commanders 7 and 9 Aust Divs to endeavour to establish contact with Japanese Commanders in their respective areas.	
			Adv LHQ was requested permission to disband Hq Comd 1 Corps Tps AASS, located on KOCOTAI, without a task.	
			1 Corps agreed with Adv LHQ's proposal that RAN Beach Commandos under Corps Command should revert to naval command and be placed under control of HQIC KOLUCCUS.	
			Final Daily Op Report Letter No 146 issued	APPENDIX
	2 Sep		Operations 0305 HRC Local and protective patrols without contact, except in square 5393 where a party of 25 Japanese was contacted. This party handed a note, requesting a rendezvous in the same area with interpreters on 3 Sep, to our patrol.	
			Operations 0305 HRC Local and protective patrolling: 19 Japanese were seen in the PADAS River area.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted.)

Unit GS Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	2 Sep		One C47 dropped supplies to Allied PW at LITTING Barracks, KUCHING. Two Beaufighters on reconnaissance over KUCHING were informed by air to ground communication of the number of Allied PW there. These were : children 38, women 243, men 1740, male stretcher cases 40. One SOA flying pennant was seen to take off from KUCHING airstrip towards PORT KAITUMA.	
			1 Aust Corps passed from operational control of HQ, SWPA at 1200H 2 Sep and transferred command Div HQ for all purposes.	APPENDIX "F"
			A signal was sent to 7 Aust Div and 9 Aust Div, directing that when 7 Aust Div was able to establish contact with 37 Jap Army, the GOC was to instruct the Japanese Commanders concerned. Local contact was also to be established.	
			Formal surrender of the Japanese Imperial Government Japanese Imperial HQ, and all Japanese and Japanese controlled armed forces wherever located was signed on the battleship MISSOURI in TOKYO BAY at 0900H 2-Sep 45.	
	3 Sep		Operations 0300 ONE Local and protective patrols. Progressive total Jap PW 522 Operations 05 00 TWO Local and protective patrols. Representative HQ 7 Aust Div contacted Rear Admiral NAMIYA at 563964. NAMIYA was unwilling to surrender until so instructed by Vice Admiral KANADA at SAMARINDA. Officer courier was sent to KANADA and arrangements made for wireless communication. Considerable troop movement was observed towards SAMARINDA and moving north along MILFOED Highway.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted)

Unit GS Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	3 Sep		<u>Operations OBCE SIX</u> Local and protective patrols. 3 Japs captured near BELAIT Ferry and 32 Japs seen in PADAS River area. Air reconnaissance was carried out over HUCH NG. 4 small craft on the river and 3 aircraft on the strip were observed. Messages were dropped on LINANG Barracks and the airstrip. Japanese were arranged for a rendezvous off HUCHING after 2 Sep. Amendment No1 to 1 Aust Corps Op Instruction No7 of 26 Aug was issued 30567 RAH Beach Commands under cmd 7 and 9 Aust Divs passed to command MCIC MOLONCHS at 0600 hrs 3 Sep. 7 and 9 Aust Divs were to continue to provide local adm facilities until further notice. Information concerning minefields on route LAHUAL-TAICONG FC (to be used by ships proceeding to HCHING) was received from 9 Aust Div. Landops was requested to supply any contrary or additional information available. A letter was sent to 7 Aust Div, informing them that the Cinc AF was accepting the surrender of the Commander Second Japanese Army, the HQ of which was located at PIEN NG. In order to do this, it might be necessary to send a battalion group there, this might have to be increased to a brigade if it proved necessary to occupy HCHASSAR. It was recommended that the Battalion group be drawn from 21 Aust Inf Bde. The Battalion group was to come under command Adv HQ on arrival at PIEN NG and was to be required to move from BALITAN on 7 days notice. Daily Operations Report letter to PIEN NG ceased.	APPE SIX "B"

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted)

(Erase heading not required.)

Unit GS Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	4 Sep		<u>Operations OBOE TWO</u> Local and protective patrols. Contact was established by wireless with Admiral RAADA at 0900 hrs. 3 Japanese envoys were to be sent to MOERADJAWA at 051100I, thence by PT boat to HQ 7 Aust Div. Air reconnaissance revealed general movement of troops towards SARILDA by road and river, also evacuation of sick north along HILFORD Highway. <u>Operations OBOE SIX</u> There was a minor clash between Japanese and an SD party at UMOG. 23 Japanese were seen at 427800—explosions were heard to the south. Information was received from KUCHING that Gen BABA, Commander 37 Japanese Army, or the Commander of Japanese forces in KUCHING, would report to CATALINA aircraft at mouth of the river SARAWAK at 051200I. If Gen BABA arrived, he was to be taken by air to MALAKA to sign the instrument of surrender. Further supplies were dropped on MANTAN Barracks, KUCHING. Japanese envoys were met in PULAU River area and instructions passed to them. Formations under command were advised that Second Japanese Army had informed us that instructions contained in message number two had been passed to Commander 37 Japanese Army. A guide to the policy to be adopted for demobilisation was forwarded to formations under command.	
	5 Sep		<u>Operations OBOE O.E.</u> Progressive total of Japanese PW 526. <u>Operations OBOE TWO</u> Local and protective patrols all areas. General movement of troops north to SARILDA continued. Supplies were dropped in PW camp at MALAKA. Japanese planes with	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted.)

Unit GS Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	5 Sep		green and white markings were observed at PARE PARE and SA PIA SA. Japanese envoys were met according to plan and escorted to HQ 7 Aust Div, and were to return on 6 Sep to SA MINDA. But lists of PW and their locations and Japanese Army and navy forces in BUKU BAR were obtained. <u>Operations CBAI, SA</u> Local and protective patrols saw only 34 Japanese in PADAS River Area. Contact was made with a Japanese officer, very exact of HQ 7 Aust Div and a message was received. Air recon plane observed Japanese at BUKU BAR and reported all points unworkable and buildings in water front badly damaged at BUKU. A Japanese landed on BUKU River, HQ 7 Aust Div, and made contact with Japanese forces. Further supplies were dropped on BUKU barracks. No enemy shipping was sighted. A message was received by HQ 7 Aust Div, through 7/43 Aust Div, from Lt Gen BUKU Commanding 37 Japanese Army, saying that as soon as negotiations for surrender were completed between Commander 2 Japanese Army and 31st AF, he would negotiate direct with HQ 7 Aust Div. This message was passed to HQ 7 Aust Div with a request for advice of anticipated date of surrender by 2 Japanese Army, and requesting that Lt Gen BUKU be instructed to surrender to HQ 7 Aust Div forthwith. ADV HQ was arranging with HQ 10th AF for a vessel to pick up Commander 2 Japanese Army and staff at PARE PARE. BAY for movement to BALIKPAPAN where they were to be flown to HQ CBAI.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted)

Unit GS Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	6 Sep		<u>Operations 0800-1700</u> Supplies were dropped on PW compound at K. 13347 and a radio message from PW was received, giving the numbers there as being 1100 British, Dutch and Japanese PW, including 164 sick. Supplies of food and vitamin extract were requested. 2 planes with green and white markings were seen at K. 1311 0800 and 3 others at K. 1301 1300. Supplies were dropped on PW camp at K. 1301. At 1700 a message asking for vitamin tablets was sent out on the ground. Envoys from Vice Admiral Kanada returned to headquarters at K. 1301 1301. Kanada supplied call signs for Japanese PW camps and locations via K. 1301 1301 and location of PW camps at K. 1301 1301. He was requested to mark prison camps and to inform us when this was done. A staff officer from K. 1301 1301 arrived at K. 1301 1301 with a copy of the conveyance of the Emperor's wishes and a copy of the Imperial rescript, brought by his Imperial Highness HORUMITO to S. G. 1301. <u>Operations 0800-1700</u> Local and protective patrols saw only 26 Japanese in K. 1301 1301 River area. A J. 1301 1301 flew to K. 1301 1301 with an officer authorized to continue negotiations with the local Japanese Commander Maj Gen YAMURA. An instructions was issued stating that unit censorship, including the censorship of mail from recovered PW, would cease as from 7 Sep 45.	

GSI/1534/27/5

APPENDIX "H"

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C-2118.
(Adapted)Unit GS Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	7 Sep		<u>Operation OSOE. The</u> Supplies were dropped on mole PW camp at LAMASSAR and radio communication was established. Possible PW camps located at LI BOE L and KAMPIL both contain approximately 1600 women and children of mixed nationalities. There was a high rate of sickness and medical supplies were urgently required. At the civilian internee camp at PARE PARE there were 6 medical officers and sufficient medical personnel in the camp, as well as 2 Aust PW. Vice Admiral KANADA instructed to report to rendezvous at 1100 L 6 Sep to proceed to allied warship. Texts of messages passed between HQ 7 Aust Div and KANADA are included in the sitrep. He was given permission to wear his sword at the surrender ceremony, when it would be handed over to GOC 7 Aust Div. <u>Operations OKEDIX.</u> SRD reported a clash with enemy near RAHAI, without casualties to SRD. 60 Japanese were reported in upper BELAIT village. Well armed Japanese were moving from TUNJER towards BAH. 10 enemy were seen in the PADAS River area. CATALINA sent to KUCHING returned the same day with Lt Col WALSH, senior allied officer at LITING Barracks, released on parole for discussion regarding PW. WALSH returned to KUCHING 7 Sep with med supplies, wireless set and two medical officers. Supplies were dropped on LITING Barracks.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted)

(Erase heading not required.)

Unit G3 Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	8 Sep		<u>Operations CBCE TWO</u> At 081100I Vice Admiral KAMADA with Chief of Staff one staff officer and interpreter were met at MOROTAI by 7 PT boats and taken on board HMAS BURDEKIN at 081150I. The instrument of surrender was signed at 8 bells. Details of conditions etc are contained in 1 Corps sig G0711. SANDIEPHEAN convoy collected by HL at 081100I. ETA BALIKPAPAN PM 10 Sep. Japanese report wireless being installed at SANDIEPHEAN PW camp KAMALAN. Vice Admiral KAMADA was instructed to inform BURDEKIN PORTMOUTH SANDIEPHEAN and Gen BABA of his signature of Instrument of Surrender. Japanese party from SANDIEPHEAN arrived BALIKPAPAN ex HMAS GASCOYNE, 081630I and departed for MOROTAI by air 081710I. Mitchell sortie established contact with MALASSAR main PW camp at 080800I. Maj GIBBONS was camp administrator. There were 600 women 800 children, all Dutch, at LIMBOING. MALASSAR camp contained 2 Australians 122 Americans, 470 British, 508 Dutch. Extremely bad conditions ruled in both camps and supplies were requested. This was being arranged. <u>Operations CBCE SIX</u> Local and protective patrolling without contact. 32 Japs were seen in PADAS River area. Slow convoy KUCHING force sailed LASUAN 081300I. Supplies were dropped on KUCHING. Vice Admiral KAMADA signed Instrument of Surrender for all Japanese forces in DUTCH BORNEO and tendered his sword to GOC 7 Aust Div on HMAS BURDEKIN at 081200I Sep 45. GOC directed that USS WILLOUGHBY and nineteen PT boats were available to assist in the occupation and evacuation of PW in the LASUAN-KUCHING area.	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted)

Unit GS Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45.

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	9 Sep.		<u>Operations CBCE TWO</u> A ir reconnaissance was carried out over SAMARINDA, A BSA A and SA BSA BSA. Movement of Japanese towards SAMARINDA by foot and MT was continuing and included stretcher cases and walking wounded. Leaflets containing CirCs proclamation were dropped and read. Supplies were dropped on KAMPILI and MAAGSAR and wireless contact was established. More internees were to be released in the SOUTH CHINEAS as accommodations became available. Sick personnel from DEMASAR (120) and PARE PARE (66) had arrived in MAAGSAR. A meeting was observed at PARE PARE. Smaller strip at MA DAI was serviceable and work had commenced on main strip. Details of personnel held at MAAGSAR were received. They included 6 English and 4 American women and survivors from ships EXETER (331) ENCOUNTER (31) and STROGOLD (29). <u>OVER ACTIONS CBCE/SIX.</u> Patrols continued without contact except for 27 Japanese seen in the PADAS River area. A CATALINA landed at SA DAI at 0900ICI with Col JUNE 33 and party for parley with Colonel BRUNA. There were no PW at Sa Dain, the last one having died in Aug 45, but there were 9 at BEL BOTO.	
	10 Sep		<u>Operations CBCE TWO.</u> Supplies were air-dropped on MAAGSAR, PARE PARE and MA DAI GAY. A party went to SAMARINDA by air with the object of extracting further information from Vice Admiral MAADA concerning the implementation of surrender instructions. MAADA advised SINGAPORE, SOURABAYA, PONTIANAK and BANDJERASIN and all forces under his command at night of 6-Sep that he had signed unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C-2118.
(Adapted.)

Unit GS Branch HQ 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	10 Sep		In DUTCH BORNEO. 2/25 Aust Inf Bn commenced move to SA. GGA SANGGA. Japanese strengths were : MELAK, 204, SA. AR. DA 1030, LOMKOLCE 317 SANGGA SA. GGA 1323. Hospital cases amounted to 2160. Command 25 Aust Inf Bde held at conference with The Japanese Commander at SEMOI, Rear Admiral KOMIYA. It was arranged that Japanese troops should come in from SEMOI and SEPANOE (total 6-700 plus 100 civilians) on 11 and 12 Sep and from LENTAWIR on 12 Sep. 100 sick British Indian PW arrived at BALIKPAPAI 1011001. Japanese envoys arrived HQ 7 Aust Div 1000451. Operations CBOE SIA. Patrolling continued without contact except for 17 Japanese seen in PADAE River area. Supplies were dropped on KUOHING. Lt Gen SADA Commander 37 Jap Army arrived LABUAN 1011001. and at 16101 formally surrendered to GOC 9 Aust Div all Japanese troops in BRITISH BORNEO and LABUANA ISLANDS. At 16301 staff discussions with Japanese Chief of Staff commenced and continued until 23001. Conference was to be resumed 11 Sep. Jap emissaries were contacted by 24 Aust Inf Bde at 054375 and surrender negotiations continued. Japanese were instructed to move all troops south of JESSEBTON to JESSEBTON within 3 days. Second slow convoy for KUOHING sailed 9 Sep. ETA KUOHING 1114001. Maj Gen HAMAGUCHI Japanese Commander KUOHING was ordered to surrender to CRA 9 Aust Div on 11 Sep. 1 Aust Corps Operation Instruction No 7 dated 21 Aug 45 General Order no 1, to replace appx "E" of above was issued 1 Aust Corps Special Intelligence Summary No 4 issued	
				APPENDIX "I"
				APPENDIX "J"

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C-118.
(Adapted.)

Unit GS Branch HQ 1 Aust Corp Date and Time. From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	11 Sep		<u>Operations 0800 TMO.</u> Supplies were dropped on ALABARAWA BANJOE BRICE NIKHAMI Rings, as well as SARAWA and other areas in JAWA. 2 Bombarangs covered occupation of SA. JAW SA. JAW by our forces. Landings effected at 1400I without incident, and Japanese all dispersed. 440 Japanese, including Rear Admiral KAWA, located at BALIK APAN at 1100I. <u>Operations 0815 TMO.</u> Jap Gen KAWA, Japanese commander at TUKU, G. surrendered to 9 Aust Div at 1114+01. Staff discussions with Jap Gen KUROKO, Chief of Staff 37 Japanese Army, continued. The use of unit censor stamps was discontinued - 351/1547/27/A Notification was sent to all concerned that 1 Aust Corps closed at 151200I Sep 45. Corps ops came under 351 Adv HQ 351055 7 Aust Div, 9 Aust Div and 26 Aust Inf Bde were to pass from command 1 Aust Corps to Adv LHQ at 151200I Sep 45 351055	APPENDIX "L" APPENDIX "L" APPENDIX "L"
	12 Sep		<u>Operations 0800 TMO</u> 2 Bps landed on KAWA AR strip and made contact with Maj KAWA, RA, PW camp administrator, who reported that supplies dropped had vastly improved morale and physical condition of PW. US and 2 Aust PWs returned to BALIK APAN in 1 condition. KAWA KAWA advised that Vice Admiral KAWADA's command was overall naval forces of JAWA. JAWA also operational command	

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form G.2118.
(Adapted)Unit GS Branch No 1 Aust Corps Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	1945 12 Sep		of army forces at T. HAN, N. HAN and S. HAN. The HANs were under operational control of HAN. HAN was authorized, subject to consent of HAN, to send food supplies from S. HAN to S. HAN. 304 Japanese arrived at S. HAN and were placed in a compound at S. HAN. Envoys from S. HAN returned to S. HAN by air at 121000, with representatives of the 7 Aust Div. The latter were to be around S. HAN. 35 Indian PWs in fair condition were located there. Japanese were cooperative. Over signs 03.5 SIX. 29 aircraft covered HAN 12.1 to 1600. 303 9 Aust Div and party went to and returned from HAN by air. 303 inspected PW there, returning at 121300. Col. HAN, Commander of Japanese forces at S. HAN, arrived at HAN by air. Japanese envoys from HAN and HAN were again contacted. 1 Aust Corps Special Intelligence Summary No 5 issued (KNI, HAN and HAN 121000)	
	13 Sep		Operation S. HAN Japanese were trapped at HAN, HAN, HAN, HAN, HAN, HAN and HAN. The occupation of S. HAN was proceeding without incident. Japanese PWs from HAN, HAN, HAN and HAN were sent to HAN. Maj Gen HAN was requested to prepare HAN river for S. HAN landing to evacuate 3 British PWs and Senior Dutch PW to HAN. HAN 17 HAN could not be used for the occupation.	APPENDIX "H"

WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.2118.
(Adapted.)

Unit EE Division No. 1 Dist Corps Date and Time.—From 13-9-45 To 15 Sep 45

Place.	Date.	Hour.	Summary of Events and Information.	Remarks and references to Appendices, Diaries, &c.
	1945 13 Sep		For the occupation of SINGAPORE. Report from Vice Admiral KAMADA stated that DUTIES were rioting at SINGAPORE and had occupied S. 1311. Japanese forces in S. 1311 were moving to S. 1312.	
			Japanese forces Japanese Force was established in Government Office and town was completely under control at 131200Z. Allied aircraft carrying 1st Air Force arrived at 131200Z. 1st Air Force due to leave for S. 1311. Col. 1311, Col. 1312, Col. 1313, Col. 1314, were moved to Col. 1311 at 131200Z.	
			A letter of receipt of the 1st standard of 1st Air Force sent to the 1st Air Force for the 1st Air Force to 7th Div 1311 131200Z	1311 131200Z
			Also to 1312 1st Air Force for 1st Air Force 1311 131200Z	1311 131200Z

Unit SS BR. of HQ 1 Inst 3006 Date and Time.—From 1 Sep 45 To 15 Sep 45

6432 11.43 St 4506 A. H. PETER. Acting Govt. Printer.

100x B.

MESSAGE OUT

FROM : 1 AUST CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 01 1025 I

TO : (1) GEQ SWPA

INFO : (2) LANDFORCES (3) LANDOPS (4) FORLAND (5) ADV RAAF COMD
(6) CG EIGHTH US ARMY

G0653 (.) SECRET (.) daily operational report 146 period 302400I to
312400I (.) BALIKPAPAN - BRUNEI BAY (.) protective patrolling all areas (.)
TARAKAN (.) further 16 PW taken

If liable to be intercepted or to fall
into enemy hands this message must be
sent IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATORS INSTRUCTIONS
Degree of Priority

IMMEDIATE to (1) and (6)
(3) and (5) SDS

.....*W. H. Boyle Capt for*.....Brig.

Distributed by GS 1 Sep 45.

Comd	CE
FGS	Svy
DA & QMG	CSO
G2 Ops	A (3)
G2 Op Report	Q (5)
G Int (2)	BMB
G Air	War Diary (2)
CCRA	

MESSAGE OUT

FROM: 1 AUST CORPS

Date-Time of Origin .02.09.19.I.

TO: (1) GHQ SWPA

INFO: (2) LANDFORCES (3) LANDOPS (4) FORLAND (5) ADRAAFCCM
(6) CG EIGHTH US ARMY

G0659 (.) SECRET (.) daily operational report 146 period 312400I
to 012400I (.) BALIKPAPAN - BRUNEI BAY (.) protective patrolling
all areas (.) TARAkan (.) no report(.) as 1 aust corps passes
to the command Adv LHQ as from 1200Ihrs 2 sep this will be the
final operational report covering the OBOE series of operations
which will be rendered to GHQ SWPA

If liable to be intercepted or
fall into enemy hands this
message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originators Instructions

Degree of Priority

IMMEDIATE to (1) (6)

SDS to (3) (5)

Signed *W. K. ...* Brig

Distributed by GS 2 Sep 45:

PA to GOC
BGS
DA&QMG
G 2 (Ops)
G 2 (Op Report)
G (Int) (2)
G (Air)
CCRA
CE
Svy
CSO
A (3)
Q (5)
EMB
War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

FROM : I CORPS

031000Z

TO LANDOPS

G0666 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep number 147 period 012400I to 022400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) local and protective patrols NMS except square
5393 party 25 enemy contacted (.) enemy handed note to our patrol re-
questing RV same area 3 sep with interpreters (.) air (.) nil (.)
own and enemy cas unchanged (.) BRUNEI - 9 div (.) local and protective
patrols NMS except 19 japs PADAS river area (.) air (.) third mission one
C-47 dropped supplies to allied PW LINTANG BARRACKS KUCHING (.) two
beaufighters recce LINTANG BARRACKS received air to ground communication
number of allied PW (.) children 38 (.) women 243 (.) men 1740 (.) male
stretcher cases 410 (.) one SONIA flying pennant seen to take off from
KUCHING strip and fly towards PONTIANAK (.) own and enemy cas unchanged
(.) TARAKAN - 26 bde (.) no report

If liable to be intercepted or to fall
into enemy hands this message must be
sent in CIPHER

IMPORTANT

.....J.S. Brodwin... Capt... for Brig

Distributed by 'GG' 3 Sep 45

Cord
BGS
DA & JMG
G2 Ops
G2 Op Report
G Int (2)
G Air
CCRA
CS
SVY
CSO
A {3}
2 {5}
BMB
War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

FROM : 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 04 1230 I

TO : LANDOPS

G0676 (.) SECRET (.) sitreps number 148 period 022400I to 032400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) local and protective patrols NMS (.) TEMPADONG
PENADJAM sector representative HQ 7 div contacted rear admiral NAMIYA naval
capt ENDO at 563964 (.) NO hostile action by enemy but NAMIYA unwilling
negotiate without approval vice admiral KAMADA at SAMARINDA (.) offr courier
despatched to KAMADA and arrangements made for W/T comm (.) own and enemy
cas unchanged (.) air (.) JAVA MAKASSAR sea shipping search (.) white a/c
with green cross SOURABAYA airfield (.) red and white flag observed SOEMENEP
MADOERA (.) two warships incl one corvette type and approx 3000 ton vessel
SOURABAYA harbour (.) 300 EUROPEAN PW in compound SE of town (.) building
marked PW (.) PONTIANAK KOTAWARINGIN KETAPANG little activity observed (.)
SAMARINDA SANGGA SANGGA MILFORD highway (.) considerable tp mov towards
SAMARINDA (.) nine river steamers observed 917446 all carrying enemy (.)
MILFORD highway MENTAWIR road junction (.) considerable tp and MT mov NORTH
along highway (.) 2000 ton vessel making 10 knots mov on course 010 degrees
area of CAPE AROE (.) BRUNEI - 9 div (.) local and protective patrols NMS
except 3 japs captured 3 miles WEST of BELAIT ferry and 32 japs seen in
PADAS river area (.) progress total jap PW 134 (.) air (.) recce KUCHING
area 4 small craft on river 3 a/c on strip 100 japs NORTH of strip (.)
messages dropped LINTANG barracks and airstrip (.) following results air
ground comm jap forces KUCHING since 29 aug (.) japs unable comm by wireless
but will send ^{reps} to RV off KUCHING after 2 sep (.) one airborne 2 engine jap
a/c with pennant and white crosses seen EAST of KUCHING (.) shipping sightings
NIL (.) TARAKAN - 26 bde (.) local and protective patrols (.) progress total
jap PW 522 (.) air (.) NIL

If liable to be intercepted or to fall into enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATORS INSTRUCTIONS

Degree of priority

IMMEDIATE

.....Brig

Distributed by GS 4 Sep 45.

Comd, BGS, DA & QMG, G2 Ops, G2 Op Report, G Int(2), G Air, CCRA, CE, Svy,
CSO, A (3), Q (5), BMB, War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

FROM : 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 05 09/51I

TO : LANDOPS

G0680 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep number 149 period 032400I to 042400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) est contact KAMADA by W/T in english at
040900I KAMADA sending three envoys to report MOERADJAWA 051100I
thence by PT boat to HQ 7 div for instrs (.) BRUNEI * 9 div (.) 20
bde (.) 2/15 bn patrol UKONG reports minor clash between SRD party
and japs south UKONG (.) 24 bde (.) 23 japs vicinity 427880 (.)
explosions heard south of that area (.) KUCHING (.) following infm
received by ground to air comn on 4 sep (.) quote (.) lt gen BABA
comd 37 jap army or comd jap forces KUCHING will report to CATALINA
a/c at mouth river SARAWAK at 051200 hrs (.) BABA will personally
ensure safety of any allied force arriving KUCHING (.) unquote (.)
rep GOC 9 div arriving RV 051200 hrs (.) if BABA present he will be
requested proceed LABUAN by catalina to sign local instrument of
surrender if not present rep will be impressed necessity immediate
compliance by BABA with order to contact GOC 9 div (.) one C47 a/c
dropped further sups LINTANG BARRACKS soon to be recovered (.) PAPAR
river area (.) resulting messages dropped this area jap envoys came
to RV north of PAPAR and infm regarding surrender and requirements of
9 div were passed (.) 26 bde (.) no report

If liable to be intercepted or to
fall into enemy hands this message
must be sent in CIPHER.

Originators Instructions
Degree of Priority

IMMEDIATE

Boyle Capt
Signed.....Brig.

Distributed by 'GS' 5 Sep 45

Comd	CE
BGS	Svy
DA & QMG	CSO
G2 Ops	A (3)
G2 Op Report	Q (5)
G Int (2)	BMB
G Air	War Diary (2)
CCRA	

MESSAGE OUT

FROM :: 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 051545 .I

TO :: LANDOPS

00685 (.) SECRET (.) further to our sitrep number 149 of 050951I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) local and proective patrols NMS (.) air (.)
PONTIANAK KOTAWARINGIN (.) photo coverage only (.) SAMARINDA SANGGA SANGGA
ANGGAJA MILFORD highway (.) general mov tps towards SAMARINDA both by
road and river (.) MILFORD highway MENTAWIR rd junction (.) general
evacuation NORTH along road of sick and wounded (.) SEHOI (.) enemy
tps disclosed posn (.) CAPE SAMBAR BANDJERMASIN (.) normal PRAHU activity
coast and rivers (.) approx 20 INDONESIANS under enemy guard BANDJERMASIN
gaol (.) leaflets dropped KOEALADJELAI PANKALANBOEDEN KOTAWARINGIN (.)
SINGARADJA three stationery barges (.) IBOES TANDJOENG LOMBOK strait one
barge sighted each area no cargo or pers observed/leaflets dropped SOEMBAWA
BESAR ATAS and SINGARADJA (.) one sub one 4E flying boat SOURABAYA harbour
(.) TANDJOENG PERAK three possible BETTY one TOPSY (.) some EUROPEANS
observed in SOURABAYA (.) MALANG airfield six possible TOPSY with green
crosses and five serviceable TONYS (.) MALANG GAGZ deserted (.)
EUROPEAN women in MALANG township seen waving fans and DUTCH flags (.)
DUTCH MALAYAN and ENGLISH leaflets dropped over MALANG (.) CENTRAL JAVA (.)
several EUROPEANS observed near houses SEMARANG (.) nuns and priests at
monastery possibly LEMBANG (.) camps at AMBARAWA and BANJOEBIROE
crowded with women and children incl EUROPEANS (.) welcome freedom in
white paint on roof for recognising buildings (.) nuns and EUROPEAN men
and women seen in MAGELANG (.) leaflets dropped AMBARAWA and BANJOEBIROE
and supplies in womens camps (.) WEST JAVA (.) ^{thirty twin engined aircraft} incl SALLYS
HELENS BETTYS and three TOPSYS With green and white markings (.) ANDIR
some OSCARS and two TOPSYS with green and white markings (.) one single
engine F TASIKMALAJA (.) large PW camp observed BANDOENG with DUTCH flags
flying and some MUST hats observed (.) large PW camp TJIMAHI all male
EUROPEANS (.) leaflets dropped CHERIBON TASIKMALAJA GAROET BANDOENG
TJIMAHI (.) BATAVIA (.) STRUISWIKK prison BATAVIA crowded with women
and children DUTCH flags displayed (.) one TOPSY with green and white
markings KEMAJORAN A/P (.) leaflets dropped over BATAVIA (.) special

- 2 -

G0685 CONTINUED

mission WEST JAVA BATAVIA (.) ANDPK buildings BATAVIA crowded with
women and children (.) some EUROPEAN women seen in streets

If liable to be intercepted or to
fall into enemy hands this message
must be sent IN CIPHER.

Originators Instructions
Degree of Priority

IMMEDIATE

H. K. G. ...
Signed.....Brig

Distributed by 'GS' 5 Sep 45

Comd
EGS
DA & QMG
G2 Ops
G2 Op Report
G Int (2)
G Air
CCRA
CE
Svy
CSO
A (3)
Q (5)
BMB
War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

FROM :: 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 06/0201

TO :: LANDOPS

G0698 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep number 150 period 042400I to 052400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) local and protective patrols all sectors NMS (.)
air (.) SAMARINDA SANGGA SANGGA MILFORD HIGHWAY (.) general movement
of enemy troops continues towards SAMARINDA (.) MAKASSAR (.) supplies
dropped on PW camp (.) photographs taken PW compound MANDAI (.)
PARE PARE (.) one HELEN with green and white markings on aerodrome (.)
SANGGA SANGGA (.) float plane with green and white markings (.)
miscellaneous (.) jap envoys met according to plan and escorted to
HQ 7 div for conference 051445I (.) arrangements made for submission
of detailed list of PWs and PW camp locations and jap army and naval
forces in DUTCH BORNEO (.) envoys remaining night 5/6 sep at
BALIKPAPAN and will return SAMARINDA area am 6 sep (.) BRUNEI - 9 div
(.) local and protective patrols all sectors NMS except 34 japs in
PADAS river area (.) EAST of BEAUFORT contact made with jap offr envoy
and message received according to our G0695 of 052400I (.) air (.) SAPONG
estate (.) 5 offr seen (.) SANDAKAN (.) all piers unserviceable (.)
buildings on waterfront badly damaged (.) KUCHING (.) 1 catalina landed
on SARAWAK RIVER and contact made with JAP forces (.) recce by
mosquitoes showed normal activity (.) supplies dropped LINTANG
barracks (.) shipping sightings NIL (.) TARAKAN - 26 bdo (.) enemy cas
PW progress total 526 (.) air activity NIL

If liable to be intercepted
or to fall into enemy hands
this message must be sent
IN CIPHER

Originators Instructions
Degree of Priority

IMPORTANT

Signed.....

Distributed by GS 6 Sep 45

Comd	Svy
BGS	CSO
DA & QMG	A (3)
G2 Ops	Q (5)
G2 Op Report	BMB
G Int (2)	War Diary (2)
G Air	
CCRA	
CE	

MESSAGE OUT

FROM : 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 07 // 35 I

TO : LANDOPS

G0701 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep number 151 period 052400I to 062400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops NIL (.) air (.) MAKASSAR supplies dropped PW
compound MAKASSAR and following radio message received by a/c from PW (.)
MAKASSAR area 1100 PW BRITISH DUTCH JAVANESE incl 164 sick (.) further message
requests supplies food and vitamin extracts (.) MALIMPOENG two HELENS observed
on aerodrome one with green and white markings (.) LOEMEDJANG PERAK two flying
boats and one twin engined tpt plane (.) AMBARAWA supplies dropped on PW camp
(.) BANJOE BIRDE message in DUTCH reading milk vitamins stomach liver spoilt
on ground at prison camp (.) surrender negotiations (.) envoys from vice admiral
KAMADA returned RV at MOEARADJAWA at 061030I (.) KAMADA supplied call signs
BANDJERMASIN PONTIANAK JESSELTON via SOERABAYA (.) also location/^{of} PW camps at
SEPAKOE 9 degrees 55 mins SOUTH 116 degrees 45 mins EAST at POEROEKJAOE
0 degrees 35 mins SOUTH 114 degrees 34 mins EAST at KANDANGAN 2 degrees 46 mins
SOUTH 115 degrees 16 mins EAST (.) also despatched order to mark PW camps and
let us know when marked (.) also a staff officer/^{came} to KAMADA's HQ from SOERABAYA
with a copy of the conveyance of the EMPEROR's wishes and a copy of the
IMPERIAL RESCRIPT issued for all the jap soldiers which his IMPERIAL HIGHNESS
HORUHITO despatched by the EMPEROR had brought to SINGAPORE (.) BRUNET - 9 div ()
local and protective patrols continued with NMS except 26 japs in PADAS river
area (.) air (.) CATALINA flew to KUCHING with offr authorised continue
negotiations with local jap commander maj gen YAMAMURA (.) no other air ops ()
TARAKAN - 26 bde (.) no report

If liable to be intercepted or to fall
into enemy hands this message must be
sent IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATORS INSTRUCTIONS

Degree of Priority

IMPORTANT

H. K. G. M. May

.....Brig

Distributed by GS 7 Sep 45.

Comd, BGS, DA & QMG, G2 Ops, G2 Op Report, G Int(2), G Air, CCRA, CE, SVY CSO,
A (3), Q (5), BMB, War Diary (2).

MESSAGE OUT

FROM: 1 AUST CORPS Date-Time of Origin 08 // 15 I

TO: LANDOPS

G0706 (.) secret (.) sitrep number 152 period 062400I to 072400I
(.) BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops NIL (.) air (.) a/c over MAKASSA
successfully dropped sups on male PW camp (.) radio comms est with
PW camp (.) PW advise female camp located LIMBOENG and KAMPILI
both contain approx 1600 women and children mixed nationalities (.)
high rate sickness both camps med sups urgently required (.)
civilian internee camp PARE PARE (.) 8 med offrs and sufficient
med pers in male camp also 2 aust PW (.) details nationalities
pers located LIMBOENG camp to be given 8 sep (.) sups oats flour
yeast vegemite milk marmite required male PW camp (.) radio
frequency required to enable contact with BALIKPAPAN (.)
surrender negotiations (.) vice admiral KAMADA instructed report RV
to
1100 hrs 8 sep to proceed allied warship (.) this later confirmed
by message from KAMADA (.) BRUNEI - 9 div (.) 20 bde (.) SRD report
clash with enemy vicinity RAGANI location NOT known (.) SRD cas NIF
(.) 60 japs reported in village upper BELAIT (.) japs well armed
moving from TANAJOR towards LABI 9684 (.) 24 bde (.) 10 enemy
seen PADAS river area (.) air (.) CATALINA to KUCHING on 6 sep
returned same day with lt col WALSH sen allied offr LINTANG BARRACK
PW camp released on parole for discussions re PW (.) WALSH per
CATALINA returned KUCHING 7 sep with med sups wireless set and 10
med offrs (.) C47 dropped sups LINTANG BARRACKS (.) ground sign
displayed SAPONG ESTATE and SANDAKAN (.) TARAKAN - 26 bde (.) no
report

If liable to be intercepted
or fall into enemy hands
this message must be sent
IN CIPHER

Originators Instructions
Degree of Priority

IMMEDIATE

Signed *[Signature]*, Brig.

Distribution as for Sitrep No 151

MESSAGE OUT

FROM: 1 CORPS Date-Time of Origin 08 0745I
TO : LANDOPS

G0708 (.) SECRET (.) further to sitrep number 152 period 062400I to 072400I (.) BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) MAKASSAR local air recce reported no enemy move surrender negotiations (.) extracts follow from signals passed between AUSTRALIANS and KAMADA (.) from 7 div at 070910 (.) message 18 (.) will you advise BANDJERMASIN to call this HQ on 7800 kcs using sta code name of JAKE (.) first transmission will be expected from BANDJERMASIN on completion of your call at 1400 hrs (.) also advise location wireless sta using call sign ZH23 ZH32 ZH20 ZH22 ZH11 (.) from KAMADA at 071520I (.) ref your no 18 (.) misapprehension regarding comm with BANDJERMASIN duly instructed our representative however fear little delay account preparation wireless apparatus etc (.) call signs of wireless sta used to be as under but understand they converge to BANDJERMASIN and are not in op (.) ZH11 PANGKALANBOEOEN det ZH20 KOTABAROE picket ZH32 SELETAN LOOKOUT ZH23 KOENJIT LOOKOUT ZH22 PASIR LOOKOUT (.) from KAMADA at 0935I (.) ref your message 14 could you possibly arrange vice admiral KAMADA wear his sword all the time as admiral TOGO and gen NOGI honoured admiral ROGERWENSKY and gen STESSEL with this privilege (.) from 7 div at 070935I (.) message 19 (.) ref carrying sword vice admiral KAMADA will wear sword until ceremony of signing instrument of surrender when sword will also be tendered in formal surrender and accepted by GOC 7 div (.) from 7 div at 071000I (.) message 20 ref mov of envoy and PW from BANDJERMASIN (.) are there any mines laid entrance of BARITO (.) if so you will take immediate steps to clear and mark channel through minefields (.) you will posn small craft entrance channel by 0800 8 sep 45 (.) our vessel will arrive vicinity S BARITO at 1000 hrs 8 sep 45 (.) your envoy and the PW will be in small craft at entrance minefield at 1030 hrs 8 sep 45 (.) longitude and latitude

of proposed entrance to channel through minefield will be despatched to GEORGE as soon as possible (.) acked message from KAMADA at 071430 I (.) ref your message 18 NO mines in SOUTH BARITO (.) 2 (.) instructed BANDJERMASIN posn a small craft carrying a white flag at 114 28E 3 44S under authority 0300 5 sep 45 and await arrival your vessel (.) all PW will be unable to join as advised this morning (.) from KAMADA at 071210I (.) 7 sep message number 2 PONTIANAK district CHINESE and natives anti-JAP feeling risen high recently must be prepared maintain peace by present small force of 500 arranging concentration safe place desire expedite your advance there will advise concentration point later (.) from 7 div at 071405I (.) message number 21 (.) one (.) your message ref dep sea-plane (.) what pers and instrs is plane carrying SOURABAYA (.) two (.) ref your message BRITISH PWs (.) in view location PWs at KANDANGAH and road communications KANDANGAH to BANDJERMASIN instruct maj gen UNO to have PW at RV on 8 sep as arranged in my letter carried by capt TSUTIHASHI (.) from KAMADA at 071214I (.) 7 sep message number 3 (.) JAP sea-plane arrived here 5th will leave at 1300 today from SAMARINDA for SOURABAYA which kindly note (.) from KAMADA at 071510I (.) message number 6 ref your number 21 (.) our sea-plane carried papers only which are required by superior comd for remedial work (.) from KAMADA 071810I message 7 regarding ceremony (.) signature tomorrow 8 sep we are still without telegraphic permission both from lt gen BABA and SINGAPORE navy please keep wireless in op until 2200 tonight will communicate you further on receipt their telegrams (.) message from KAMADA at 072134I (.) message 9 subject to alteration own message 7 regret no authority received from lt gen BABA yet please postpone ceremony of signature tomorrow 8 sep 45 (.) will advise you further on receipt thereof (.) from 7 div at 072115 I (.) message number 23 (A) . whether you receive what you consider definite instructions from BABA or NOT you will carry out the arranged plan to report to RV at 1100 hrs 8 sep to proceed to allied warship (.)

-3-

from KAMADA at 2212I (.) message number 11 ref your number 23 will
report to RV at 1100 8 sep to proceed to allied warship (.)

If liable to be intercepted or to
fall into enemy hands this message
must be sent in CIPHER

.....*Francis H. Coff*.....Brig

DISTRIBUTED BY 'GS' 8 Sep 45

PA to GOC
BGS
DA & QMG
G2 Ops
G2 Op Report
G Int (2)
G Air
GCRA
CE
Svy
CSO
A (3)
Q (5)
BMB
War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

WAR DIARY

FROM :: 1 AUST CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 09/210 I

TO :: LANDOPS

GO711 (.) SECRET (.) sitrep number 153 period 072400I to 082400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) surrender negotiations (.) surrender of KAMADA (.)
at 081100I KAMADA with chief of staff one staff offr and interpreter
met at MOERADJAWA by 7 PT boats and taken on board HMAS BURDEKIN at
081150I (.) KAMADA tendered sword as token of surrender which was
accepted (.) instrument of surrender of all JAP forces in DUTCH BORNEO
signed at first stroke of eight bells (.) KAMADA handed local order no
1 based on gen order no 1 with appropriate adjustments to apply to
DUTCH BORNEO (.) obtained detailed information on unit comd strs
locations (.) names all PWs and internees (.) details minefields
craft MT stores POI hospital estimated strs (.) complete infm will be
despatched after collation and translation (.) further instrs then
issued to KAMADA (.) contact SEMOI will be made 10 sep (.) further
contact SANGGA SANGGA 11 sep (.) SANGGA SANGGA force to concentrate
ANGGANA 10. sep (.) sick will concentrate bank MAHAKAM river (.) no
other troop mov to take place (.) ordered to construct auster strip at
SAMARINDA (.) RAJAH of TENGGARONG to be liberated and have freedom to
use japs comms (.) mov of force at PONTIANAK reported by KAMADA to be
taking place to JAVA to cease (.) no natives to be employed after 11
sep without permission (.) arms to be placed in central dump with no
more than 10 armed guards at any dump (.) BANJERMASIN envoy collected
by ML at 081100I etc BALIKPAPAN pm 10 sep (.) 3 british internees and
senior dutch offr expected reach BANDJERMASIN 13 sep (.) following
instrs japs report wireless established in PW at POEROEKTJAHOE but no
contact yet made (.) jap report SAMARINDA is installing WT in PW camp
KANDANGAN (.) KAMADA dubious about reception by BABA of information
that KAMADA has signed away whole of DUTCH BORNEO (.) KAMADA instructed
inform SOURABAYA PONTIANAK BANJERMASIN and BABA of his action today (.)
jap party from CELEBES arrived BALIKPAPAN ex HMAS GASCOYNE 081630I and
departed by air for MOROTAI 081710I (.) air ops (.) following infm recd
MAKASSAR area (.) MITCHELL sortie est contact MAKASSAR main PW camp at
080800I ceased 081000I (.) text reads (.) maj GIBBONS is camp administrat
possible native unrest based on newspaper articles (.)

- 2 -

opinion of authorities confirmed by DUTCH (.) street demonstrations by
supporters of govt (.) women camp in LIMBOENG 600 women 800 children all
DUTCH (.) MAKASSAR camp 2 AUSTRALIANS 122 AMERICANS 470 BRITISH 508 DUTCH (.
PWs MAKASSAR in all 4000 ill health condition LIMBOENG extremely bad (.)
bombed and set on fire 17 jul necessitated move jungle (.) following sups
requested blankets footwear clothing toilet articles med sups food (.)
suggest hospital ship take off approx 600 women and children as soon as
possible this position needs priority (.) landing grounds will be serviceabl
and marked by Monday (.) request prior warning of intention to land (.) no
serviceing facilities (.) and (.) W/T frequencies allotted (.) 7 div will
ensure sups dropped daily (.) as this area outside div responsibility will
await instns any other action (.) wireless contact est between RAAF
BALIKPAPAN and PW camp MAKASSAR approx 082000I (.) --

arrangements made to drop medical supplies for women PW at LIMBOENG and camp
SAKARINDA SEPAKOE area (.) tac R reports continued jap mov along MILFORD
highway towards SAMARINDA (.) unable reach location reported PW compound
at SEPAKOE (.) DUTCH BORNEO (.) supply dropping to allied PW at POEROETJAO
successful (.) 100 male whites observed (.) BRUNEI - 9 div (.) local and
protective patrolling with NMS except 32 japs in PADAS river area (.) wirelc
comm est LABUAN - KUCHING (.) ack received from BABA for 2 letters dropped
081000I (.) BABA states he anticipates arriving LABUAN 1000 hrs 10 sep (.)
slow convoy KUCHING force sailed from LABUAN 081300I (.) air (.) supplies
and message dropped KUCHING (.) messages dropped SAPONG ESTATE JESSELTON ULM
LIMBANG (.) TARAKAN - 26 bde (.) no report

If liable to be intercepted or to
fall into enemy hands this message
must be sent IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATORS INSTRUCTIONS

Degree of Priority

IMPORTANT

..... *H. K. A. S. M. S.* Brig

Distributed by 08 9 Sep 45.

Same as for Sitrep No 152.

MESSAGE OUT

FROM :: 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 10/270 I

TO :: IANDOPS

G0720 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 154 period 082400I to
092400I (.) BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops (.) NIL (.) air (.) SAMARINDA
ANGGANA SANGGA SANGGA areas (.) japs show few reactions to aircraft
natives waved (.) groups of buildings at ANGGANA marked with red crosses
NOT previously marked (.) colliery at LOAKOELOE still working (.)
MILFORD highway (.) mov of japs by foot and MT towards SAMARINDA
continues incl stretcher cases and walking wounded (.) leaflets C in Cs
proclamation dropped all these areas read by many japs (.) MAKASSAR
area (.) supplies dropped KAMPILI and MAKASSAR (.) W/T contact begins (.)
SOUTH CELEBES more internees will be released as accn available in town
great difficulties at DENPASAR (.) approx 120 sick from this camp
already in MAKASSAR (.) 86 sick arrived MAKASSAR 8 sep from PARE PARE
where understand many dutch civil adm offrs (.) ^{ends (.)} at 1600I T-3/R observed
meeting in progress at PARE PARE one mile south PW camp (.) jap and
indonesian flags at table 50 tps paraded and person addressing crowd (.)
a few japs at table many natives present (.) 4 MT and 2 staff cars (.)
meeting dispersed by approach a/c (.) MANDAI (.) smaller strip
serviceable and 700 natives working on badly damaged main strip (.)
RAMBANG (.) aerodrome grass covered but serviceable (.) BATAVIA (.)
supplies dropped STRUISWICK ANDEK POLOWIA DORP (.) KEMAJORAN (.) one
SALLY green cross (.) BANDOENG (.) sups dropped (.) PONTIANAK
BANDJERMASIN (.) nil activity (.) leaflets C in Cs proclamation dropped
PONTIANAK MANGAPINOH PANGKASANBO (.) surrender negotiations (.)
SAMARINDA (.) representatives of 7 div will land from CATALINA at
SAMARINDA at 101100I (.) SEMOI (.) 108 british indian PW being released
and returned to BALIKPAPAN ETA 101400I (.) BANDJERMASIN (.) ETA
japanese envoys BALIKPAPAN 100845I (.) misc (.) MAKASSAR (.) by wireless
from PW MAKASSAR to BALIKPAPAN (.) names of six english women and one son
and four american women at KAMPILI camp (.) english pers include
numbers from ships 331 EXETER 81 ENCOUNTER 29 STRONGHOLD at unnamed
camps MAKASSAR area (.) BRUNEI - 9 div (.) patrols continue MMS except

29 japs PADAS river area (.) air (.) NIL (.) surrender negotiations (.)
one CATALINA landed SANDAKAN 091010I col CUMMINGS and party parley
representative colonel OTSUKA (.) no PW at SANDAKAN last PW died aug
(.) 9 PW at BEL BOTO (.) TARAKAN - 23 bdo (.) no report

If liable to be intercepted or
to fall into enemy hands this
message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originators Instructions
Degree of Priority

IMPORTANT

Signed.....*W. K. Kain*.....

Distributed by GS 10 Sep 45

Comd
BGS
DA & QMG
G2 Ops
G2 Op Report
G Int (2)
G Air
CCRA
CE
Svy
CSO
A (3)
Q (5)
HMB
War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

FROM :: 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 111120 I

TO :: LANDOPS

G0724 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 155 period 092400I to
102400I (.) BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops (.) NIL (.) air (.) MAKASSAR and
JAVA sea searches (.) normal native craft activity one catalina supply
drop AMBARAWA successful (.) supply drop MAKASSAR successful/101130I WT
contact MAKASSAR FW camp report as follows require NICOTINE acid 1000
grammes (.) MANDAI airfield available landing will be marked from 11 sep
onwards (.) doing utmost for release of civilians situation difficult (.)
WT contact ends (.) two mitchell a/c supply drop MAKASSAR and PARE PARE (.)
one catalina special mission to SAMARINDA landed MAHAKAM river opposite
town of SAMARINDA (.) carried party object extract further infm from vice
admiral KAMADA ref effective implementation surrender instrs (.) two
boomerangs escorted catalina landing and take off SAMARINDA (.) PONTIANAK
BANDJERMASIN missions (.) supply drop KANDANGAN successful (.) tac recce
(.) no sorties flown (.) implementation of surrender (.) one (.) KAMADA
advised SINGAPORE SOERABAYA PONTIANAK BANDJERMASIN and all forces under
his comd at night of 8 sep that he had that day signed unconditional
surrender of all JAPANESE armed forces in DUTCH BORNEO (.) SAMARINDA area
(.) one (.) 2/25 inf bn commenced move to SANGGA SANGGA (.) two (.)
encampments of JAPANESE sick and wounded along the MAHAKAM river are at
ANGGANA SAMARINDA LOADJANAN LOAKOELOE TENGGARONG MOEARAKAMAN KOTABANGOEN
MOEARAMOENTAI MOEARAPAHOE (.) three (.) japanese strength (.) MELAY 204
SAMARINDA 1038 LOAKOELOE 317 SANGGA SANGGA 1323 (.) four (.) total
hospitalised 2180 (.) five (.) total MT 37 motor cars 85 trucks (.) six
(.) water craft comprise 3 landing craft 10 trg boats 15 motor launches
one 150 ton auxiliary sailing craft (.) seven (.) rice supplies (.)
LOAKOELOE 64 tons SAMARINDA 156 tons / SANGGA SANGGA 180 tons (.)
sufficient supply japanese in area for 2 months (.) eight (.) fuel
(.) supplies/SAMARINDA 120 kilolitre a/c gasoline 150 kilolitre benzine (.)
SEMOI area (.) one (.) comd 25 inf bde conference with rear admiral
NOMIYA japanese most co-operative (.) two (.) japanese strengths (.)
SEMOI SEPAKOE 400 fit troops 200 to 300 sick troops 100 japanese
civilians (.) three (.) arrangements completed for japanese from SEMOI area
to come in on 11 sep and from SEPAKOE on 12 sep (.) four (.) japanese

MENTAWIR area will move down MILFORD HIGHWAY to our posns 12 sep (.) five
 (.) approx 108 BRITISH INDIAN PW were brought to BALIKPAPAN area 101100I some
 suffering from beri-beri (.) BANDJERMASIN area (.) one (.) JAPANESE
 envoys naval capt GATC maj HIRAMATO and interpreter MORITA arrived 7 div
 area 100845I (.) detailed infm later (.) envoys being returned by
 catalina 11 sep (.) KANDANGAN PW camp (.) wireless comms est with camp
 10 sep (.) PW advise (.) PW being well treated and in good health (.)
 greetings sent 7 div by 118 women and children (.) BRUNEI - 9 div (.)
 ops (.) patrolling continued NMS except 17 japs PADAS river area (.)
 air (.) one C47 a/c dropped sups LINTANG barracks KUCHING (.) surrender
 implementation (.) lt-gen BABA comd 37 jap army arrived LABUAN 101100I
 and at 1610I formally surrendered to GOC 9 div all jap tps in BRITISH
 BORNEO and NATOENA ISLANDS (.) at 1630I staff discussion with maj-gen
 KURODA chief of staff 37 jap army commenced and continued until 2300I
 (.) conference will be resumed 11 sep (.) 24 inf bde (.) jap emissaries
 contacted at 654375 at 091345I and surrender negotiations continued (.)
 arrangements made for permanent contact point at KAWANG for WT comms
 daily between JESSELTON and HQ 24 inf bde and for telephone link to be
 established between JESSELTON and KINARUT within three days (.) jap
 instructed to move all tps SOUTH of 705458 to NORTH of that point by
 evening 10 sep and to withdraw all tps SOUTH of JESSELTON to JESSELTON
 within three days (.) KUCHING force (.) second slow convoy sailed 9 sep
 (USS BARNES and USS WILLOUGHBY sailed 10 sep)(.) all eta KUCHING 111400I
 (.) maj-gen YAMAMURA jap comd KUCHING has been ordered to surrender to
 CRA 9 div on 11 sep

If liable to be intercepted or to
 fall into enemy hands this message
 must be sent IN CIPHER.

Originators Instructions
 Degree of Priority

IMPORTANT

Signed.....

Distributed by 'GS' 11 Sep 45

Comd	G Int (2)	CSO
BGS	G Air	A (3)
DA & QMG	CCRA	Q (5)
G2 Ops	CE	BMB
G2 Op Report	Svy	War Diary (2) ✓

MESSAGE OUT

FROM : 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 12 /025 I

TO : LANDOPS

G0731 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 156 period 102400I to 112400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops (.) NIL (.) air ops (.) sups dropped AMBARAWA BANJOE
BIROE TJIMAH I FW camp and camp near rly SOUTH of TJIMAH I (.) ANDIR and KALIDJATI
airfd serviceable (.) approx 30 buildings marked FW at TJIMAH I (.) DUTCH flags
flying both towns (.) words INDONESIA MERDIKA PCE INDONESIA (written along main
rd at TJIMAH I) (.) sup drop BATAVIA STRUISWIJK ANDEK POLO - ADORP and large
INDO CHINA camp one mile SOUTH of POLO - ADORP along main rd (.) on KEMAJORAN
airfd words quote replace WT sets broken unquote also FW with arrow pointing
NORTH (.) tac R (.) two boomerangs covered occupation by own tps SANGGA SANGGA
from entrance of MAHAKAM river to town itself and subsequent disembarkation (.)
no local incident occurred (.) IMPLEMENTATION OF SURRENDER (.) SAMARINDA area (.)
no untoward incidents reported by 2/25 inf bn who landed SANGGA SANGGA at
111400I (.) all japanese less essential guards disarmed by 102400I (.) SEMOI
area (.) 440 japanese were landed at BALIKPAPAN at 111109I incl rear admiral
NOMIYA and staff (.) BANDJERMASIN area (.) envoys/^{due}return BANDJERMASIN 111100I
will now be returned 120930I owing operational requirements aircraft (.) FW
camp/^{KANDANGAN}advises total numbers FW 74 women and 44 children (.) BRUNEI BAY - 9 div (.)
ops (.) KUCHING force (.) first lift arrived KUCHING/^(.)maj gen YAMAMURA jap comd
KUCHING surrendered to CRA 9 div on board HMAS KAFUNDA at 111445I (.) 24 inf bde
(.) attempts to contact japs at JESSELTON by WT on given frequencies unsuccessful
(.) LABUAN (.) staff discussions with maj gen KURODA chief of staff 37 jap army
continued (.) general enemy infm obtained (.) air ops (.) 6 mosquitoes 11
beaufighters 8 kittyhawks covered landing KUCHING force (.) messages dropped
SANDAKAN LIMBANG UKONG RIAM rd (.) TARA KAN - 26 bde (.) no report

If liable to be intercepted or to fall
into enemy hands this message must be
sent IN CIPHER.)K/ a m

ORIGINATORS INSTRUCTIONS

Degree of Priority

IMPORTANT

Distributed by GS 12 Sep 45.

As for Situation Report No 155.

MESSAGE OUT.

FROM : I CORPS

13/11/0 I

TO : LANDOPS

G0752 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 157 period 112400I to
122400I (.) BALIKPAPAN 7 div (.) ops (.) nil (.) air ops (.) MAKASSAR
(.) two B25's one USAAF and one RAAF landed MAKASSAR strip today (.)
contact made with maj GIBBONS RA FW camp administrator who was previously
reported as RAOC (.) maj GIBBONS advised that sups dropped had vastly
improved morale and physical condition PW (.) no further landings will
be made on MAKASSAR strip until further improvement has been made to
strip (.) BUS and 2 aust PW were returned to BALIKPAPAN (.) mental and
physical condition of PW are reasonable (.) implementation of surrender
(.) SAMARINDA area (.) report from 2/25 inf bn delayed and will be
despatched later (.) following request by NOIC MOLUCCAS on naval chain
command following infm given by KAMADA (.) C in C SECOND SOUTH FLEET in
SOERABAYA is vice admiral YAICHIROSHIBATA extent of his comd having been
all japanese naval forces and civil administration organisation in JAVA
DUTCH BORNEO CELEBES FLORES LESSER SUNDAS TIMOR HALMAHERA AMBOINA and
ARAFURA ARCHIPELAGO (.) extent KAMADA's command prior aust landing was
all naval forces in DUTCH BORNEO also operational comd of army forces
TARAKAN BALIKPAPAN BANDJERMASIN (.) PONTIANAK operationally under army
comd KUCHING (.) KAMADA informed that C in C AMF approves mov shipping from
SOERABAYA to SAMARINDA with food sups subject SEAC consent (.) SEMOI
SEPAKOE area (.) 204 japanese arrived BALIKPAPAN and were removed to
MANGGAR concentration area (.) 337 japanese from MILFORD HIGHWAY MENTAWIR
area placed in compound 583630 (ref map BALIKPAPAN 1:25000) (.)
BANDJERMASIN area (.) envoys from maj gen UNO were returned to
BANDJERMASIN by catalina together with representatives HQ 7 div at
121100I (.) representative HQ 7 div was conducted over water supply
warehouses wharves machine shops possible HQ buildings hospital and PW
camp (.) 65 indians from 2/15 punjab regt were located at PW camp
BANDJERMASIN (.) condition PW fair (.) all facilities functioning (.)
attitude of japanese co-operative (.) BRUNEI BAY - 9 div (.) ops (.)
nil (.) air ops (.) 16 kittyhawks 4 mosquitoes 7 beaufighters 2 venturas

- 2 -

covered KUCHING 1200I to 1630I (.) 1 catalina flew GOC and party
LABUAN - KUCHING return (.) 1 catalina brought in col OTSUKA comd
JAPANESE forces SANDAKAN (.) implementation of surrender (.) 24 inf
bde (.) japanese envoys from JESSELTON and TENOM again contacted (.)
local surrender negotiations continued (.) KUCHING (.) GOC 9 div
visited KUCHING and inspected allied PW returning 121930I

If liable to be intercepted or
to fall into enemy hands this
message must be sent IN CIPHER.

Degree of Priority
IMPORTANT

Signed.....*William May*.....

Distributed by GS 13 Sep 45

Comd
BGS
DA & QMG
G2 Ops
G2 Op Report
G Int (2)
G Air
CCRA
CE
Svy
CSO
A (3)
Q (5)
BMB
War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

San Diego

FROM :: 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 10/220 I

TO :: LANDOPS

G0720 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 154 period 082400I to
092400I (.) BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops (.) NIL (.) air (.) SAMARINDA
ANGGANA SANGGA SANGGA areas (.) japs show few reactions to aircraft
natives waved (.) groups of buildings at ANGGANA marked with red crosses
NOT previously marked (.) colliery at LOAKOELOE still working (.)
MILFORD highway (.) mov of japs by foot and MT towards SAMARINDA
continues incl stretcher cases and walking wounded (.) leaflets C in Cs
proclamation dropped all these areas read by many japs (.) MAKASSAR
area (.) supplies dropped KAMPILI and MAKASSAR (.) W/T contact begins (.)
SOUTH CELEBES more internees will be released as accn available in town
great difficulties at DENPASAR (.) approx 120 sick from this camp
already in MAKASSAR (.) 86 sick arrived MAKASSAR 8 sep from PARE PARE
where understand many dutch civil adm offrs (.) ^{ends (.)} at 1600I T13/R observed
meeting in progress at PARE PARE one mile south PW camp (.) jap and
indonesian flags at table 50 tps paraded and person addressing crowd (.)
a few japs at table many natives present (.) 4 MT and 2 staff cars (.)
meeting dispersed by approach A/c (.) MANDAI (.) smaller strip
serviceable and 700 natives working on badly damaged main strip (.)
RAMBANG (.) aerodrome grass covered but serviceable (.) BATAVIA (.)
supplies dropped STRUISWICK ANDEK POLOWIA DORP (.) KEMAJORAN (.) one
SALLY green cross (.) BANDOENG (.) sups dropped (.) PONTIANAK
BANDJERMASIN (.) nil activity (.) leaflets C in Cs proclamation dropped
PONTIANAK NANGAPINOH PANGKASANBO (.) surrender negotiations (.)
SAMARINDA (.) representatives of 7 div will land from CATALINA at
SAMARINDA at 101100I (.) SEMOI (.) 108 british indian PW being released
and returned to BALIKPAPAN ETA 101400I (.) BANDJERMASIN (.) ETA
japanese envoys BALIKPAPAN 100845I (.) misc (.) MAKASSAR (.) by wireless
from PW MAKASSAR to BALIKPAPAN (.) names of six english women and one cor
and four american women at KAMPILI camp (.) english pers include
numbers from ships 331 EXETER 81 ENCOUNTER 29 STRONGHOLD at unnamed
camps MAKASSAR area (.) BRUNEI - 9 div (.) patrols continue NMS except

29 japs PADAS river area (.) air (.) NIL (.) surrender negotiations (.)
one CATALINA landed SANDAKAN 091010I col CUMMINGS and party parley
representative colonel OTSUKA (.) no PW at SANDAKAN last PW died aug
(.) 9 PW at BEL BOTO (.) TARAKAN - 23 bde (.) no report

If liable to be intercepted or
to fall into enemy hands this
message must be sent IN CIPHER

Originators Instructions
Degree of Priority

IMPORTANT

W. K. Kain
Signed.....

Distributed by GS 10 Sep 45

Comd
EGS
DA & CMG
G2 Ops
G2 Op Report
G Int (2)
G Air
CCRA
CE
Svy
CSO
A (3)
Q (5)
EMB
War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

FROM :: 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 111120 I

TO :: LANDOPS

G0724 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 155 period 092400I to
102400I (.) BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops (.) NIL (.) air (.) MAKASSAR and
JAVA sea searches (.) normal native craft activity one catalina supply
drop AMBARAWA successful (.) supply drop MAKASSAR successful (.) 101130I WT
contact MAKASSAR PW camp report as follows require NICOTINE acid 1000
grammes (.) MANDAI airfield available landing will be marked from 11 sep
onwards (.) doing utmost for release of civilians situation difficult (.)
WT contact ends (.) two mitchell a/c supply drop MAKASSAR and PARE PARE (.)
one catalina special mission to SAMARINDA landed MAHAKAM river opposite
town of SAMARINDA (.) carried party object extract further infm from vice
admiral KAMADA ref effective implementation surrender instrs (.) two
boomerangs escorted catalina landing and take off SAMARINDA (.) PONTIANAK
BANDJERMASIN missions (.) supply drop KANDANGAN successful (.) tac recce
(.) no sorties flown (.) implementation of surrender (.) one (.) KAMADA
advised SINGAPORE SOERABAYA PONTIANAK BANDJERMASIN and all forces under
his comd at night of 8 sep that he had that day signed unconditional
surrender of all JAPANESE armed forces in DUTCH BORNEO (.) SAMARINDA area
(.) one (.) 2/25 inf bn commenced move to SANGGA SANGGA (.) two (.)
encampments of JAPANESE sick and wounded along the MAHAKAM river are at
ANGGANA SAMARINDA LOADJANAN LOAKOELOE TENGGARONG MOEARAKAMAN KOTABANGOEN
MOEARAMOENTAI MOEARAPAHOE (.) three (.) japanese strength (.) MELAK 204
SAMARINDA 1038 LOAKOELOE 317 SANGGA SANGGA 1323 (.) four (.) total
hospitalised 2180 (.) five (.) total MT 37 motor cars 85 trucks (.) six
(.) water craft comprise 3 landing craft 10 trg boats 15 motor launches
one 150 ton auxiliary sailing craft (.) seven (.) rice supplies (.)
LOAKOELOE 64 tons SAMARINDA 156 tons SANGGA SANGGA 180 tons (.)
sufficient supply japanese in area for 2 months (.) eight (.) fuel
(.) supplies/SAMARINDA 120 kilolitre a/c gasoline 150 kilolitre benzine (.)
SEMOI area (.) one (.) comd 25 inf bde conference with rear admiral
NOMIYA japanese most co-operative (.) two (.) japanese strengths (.)
SEMOI SEPAKOE 400 fit troops 200 to 300 sick troops 100 japanese
civilians (.) three (.) arrangements completed for japanese from SEMOI area
to come in on 11 sep and from SEPAKOE on 12 sep (.) four (.) japanese

- 2 -

MENTAWIR area will move down MILFORD HIGHWAY to our posns 12 sep (.) five
(.) approx 108 BRITISH INDIAN PW were brought to BALIKPAPAN area 101100I some
suffering from beri-beri (.) BANDJERMASIN area (.) one (.) JAPANESE
envoys naval capt GATC maj HIRAMATO and interpreter MORITA arrived 7 div
area 100845I (.) detailed infm later (.) envoys being returned by
catalina 11 sep (.) KANDANGAN PW camp (.) wireless comms est with camp
10 sep (.) PW advise (.) PW being well treated and in good health (.)
greetings sent 7 div by 118 women and children (.) BRUNEI - 9 div (.)
ops (.) patrolling continued NMS except 17 japs PADAS river area (.)
air (.) one C47 a/c dropped sups LINTANG barracks KUCHING (.) surrender
implementation (.) lt-gen BABA comd 37 jap army arrived LABUAN 101100I
and at 1610I formally surrendered to GOC 9 div all jap tps in BRITISH
BORNEO and NATOENA ISLANDS (.) at 1630I staff discussion with maj-gen
KURODA chief of staff 37 jap army commenced and continued until 2300I
(.) conference will be resumed 11 sep (.) 24 inf bde (.) jap emissaries
contacted at 654375 at 091345I and surrender negotiations continued (.)
arrangements made for permanent contact point at KAWANG for WT comms
daily between JESSELTON and HQ 24 inf bde and for telephone link to be
established between JESSELTON and KINARUT within three days (.) jap
instructed to move all tps SOUTH of 705458 to NORTH of that point by
evening 10 sep and to withdraw all tps SOUTH of JESSELTON to JESSELTON
within three days (.) KUCHING force (.) second slow convoy sailed 9 sep
(USS BARNES and USS WILLOUGHBY sailed 10 sep)(.) all eta KUCHING 111400I
(.) maj-gen YAMAMURA jap comd KUCHING has been ordered to surrender to
CRA 9 div on 11 sep

If liable to be intercepted or to
fall into enemy hands this message
must be sent IN CIPHER.

Originators Instructions
Degree of Priority

IMPORTANT

Signed.....

Distributed by 'GS' 11 Sep 45

Comd	G Int (2)	CSO
BGS	G Air	A (3)
DA & QMG	CCRA	Q (5)
G2 Ops	CE	BMB
G2 Op Report	Svy	War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

FROM : 1 CORPS

Date - Time of Origin 12 1025 I

TO : LANDOPS

G0731 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 156 period 102400I to 112400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops (.) NIL (.) air ops (.) sups dropped AMBARAWA BINJOE
BIROE TJIMAH I FW camp and camp near rly SOUTH of TJIMAH I (.) ANDIR and KALIDJATI
airfd serviceable (.) approx 30 buildings marked FW at TJIMAH I (.) DUTCH flags
flying both towns (.) words INDONESIA MERDIKA PCE INDONESIA (written along main
rd at TJIMAH I) (.) sup drop BATAVIA STRUISWIJK ANDEK POLO - ADORP and large
INDO CHINA camp one mile SOUTH of POLO - ADORP along main rd (.) on KEMAJORAN
airfd words quote replace WT sets broken unquote also FY with arrow pointing
NORTH (.) tac R (.) two boomerangs covered occupation by own tps SANGGA SANGGA
from entrance of MAHAKAM river to town itself and subsequent disembarkation (.)
no local incident occurred (.) INFLEMENTATION OF SURRENDER (.) SAMARINDA area (.)
no untoward incidents reported by 2/25 inf bn who landed SANGGA SANGGA at
111400I (.) all japanese less essential guards disarmed by 102400I (.) SEMOI
area (.) 440 japanese were landed at BALIKPAPAN at 111109I incl rear admiral
NOMIYA and staff (.) BANDJERMASIN area (.) envoys/^{due}return BANDJERMASIN 111100I
will now be returned 120930I owing operational requirements aircraft (.) PW
camp/^{KANDANGAN}advises total numbers PW 74 women and 44 children (.) BRUNEI BAY - 9 div (.)
ops (.) KUCHING force (.) first lift arrived KUCHING/^(.)maj gen YAMAMURA jap comd
KUCHING surrendered to CRA 9 div on board HMAS KAFUNDA at 111445I (.) 24 inf bde
(.) attempts to contact japs at JESSELTON by WT on given frequencies unsuccessful
(.) LABUAN (.) staff discussions with maj gen KURODA chief of staff 37 jap army
continued (.) general enemy infm obtained (.) air ops (.) 6 mosquitoes 11
beaufighters 8 kittyhawks covered landing KUCHING force (.) messages dropped
SANDAKAN LIMBANG UKONG RIAM rd (.) TARA KAN - 26 bde (.) no report

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sent IN CIPHER.)K'au

ORIGINATORS INSTRUCTIONS

Degree of Priority

IMPORTANT

.....

Distributed by GS 12 Sep 45.

As for Situation Report No 155.

MESSAGE OUT.

FROM : I CORPS

13/11/0 I

TO : LANDOPS

G0752 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 157 period 112400I to
122400I (.) BALIKPAPAN 7 div (.) ops (.) nil (.) air ops (.) MAKASSAR
(.) two B25's one USAAF and one RAAF landed MAKASSAR strip today (.)
contact made with maj GIBBONS RA PW camp administrator who was previously
reported as RAOC (.) maj GIBBONS advised that sups dropped had vastly
improved morale and physical condition PW (.) no further landings will
be made on MAKASSAR strip until further improvement has been made to
strip (.) BUS and 2 aust PW were returned to BALIKPAPAN (.) mental and
physical condition of PW are reasonable (.) implementation of surrender
(.) SAMARINDA area (.) report from 2/25 inf bn delayed and will be
despatched later (.) following request by NOIC MOLUCCAS on naval chain
command following infm given by KAMADA (.) C in C SECOND SOUTH FLEET in
SOERABAYA is vice admiral YAICHIROSHIBATA extent of his comd having been
all japanese naval forces and civil administration organisation in JAVA
DUTCH BORNEO CELEBES FLORES LESSER SUNDAS TIMOR HALMAHERA AMBOINA and
ARAFURA ARCHIPELAGO (.) extent KAMADA's command prior aust landing was
all naval forces in DUTCH BORNEO also operational comd of army forces
TARAKAN BALIKPAPAN BANDJERMASIN (.) PONTIANAK operationally under army
comd KUCHING (.) KAMADA informed that C in C AMF approves mov shipping from
SOERABAYA to SAMARINDA with food sups subject SEAC consent (.) SEMOI
SEPAKOE area (.) 204 japanese arrived BALIKPAPAN and were removed to
MANGGAR concentration area (.) 337 japanese from MILFORD HIGHWAY MENTAWIR
area placed in compound 583630 (ref map BALIKPAPAN 1:25000) (.)
BANDJERMASIN area (.) envoys from maj gen UNO were returned to
BANDJERMASIN by catalina together with representatives HQ 7 div at
121100I (.) representative HQ 7 div was conducted over water supply
warehouses wharves machine shops possible HQ buildings hospital and PW
camp (.) 65 indians from 2/15 punjab regt were located at PW camp
BANDJERMASIN (.) condition PW fair (.) all facilities functioning (.)
attitude of japanese co-operative (.) BRUNEI BAY - 9 div (.) ops (.)
nil (.) air ops (.) 16 kittyhawks 4 mosquitoes 7 beaufighters 2 venturas

- 2 -

covered KUCHING 1200I to 1630I (.) 1 catalina flew GOC and party
LABUAN - KUCHING return (.) 1 catalina brought in col OTSUKA comd
JAPANESE forces SANDAKAN (.) implementation of surrender (.) 24 inf
bde (.) japanese envoys from JESSELTON and TENOM again contacted (.)
local surrender negotiations continued (.) KUCHING (.) GOC 9 div
visited KUCHING and inspected allied PW returning 121930I

If liable to be intercepted or
to fall into enemy hands this
message must be sent IN CIPHER.

Degree of Priority
IMPORTANT

Signed.....*William May*.....

Distributed by GS 13 Sep 45

Comd
BGS
DA & QMG
G2 Ops
G2 Op Report
G Int (2)
G Air
CCRA
CE
Svy
CSO
A (3)
Q (5)
BMB
War Diary (2)

MESSAGE OUT

FROM : 1 CORPS
TO : LANDOPS

Date - time of origin 15 / 030 I

G0767 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 159 period 132400I to 142400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops (.) nil (.) air ops (.) two TOPSYS at PERAK and one
at KALIBANTENG with green crosses (.) sups dropped AMBARAWA and BANJOEBIROE (.)
implementation of surrender (.) SAMARINDA area (.) 60 INDONESIAN PW moving
to SAMBODJA ETA 151700I (.) SEMOI SEPAKOE MENTAWIR area (.)^{2/7}cav regt on
MILFORD highway (.) contacted lt comdr TAGUCHIE and 174 OR and ordered force to
report to kilo 58 by 151700I (.) BANDJERMASIN area (.) 3 BRITISH and senior
DUTCH PW to be brought off from BARITO river by catalina at 151300I (.) jap
request 2 reps DUTCH PW meet comd 2/3 inf bn at government wharf 161100I (.)
our reply affirmative (.) occupational force due to land BANDJERMASIN at
161200I (.) PONTIANAK area (.) all forces this area ordered to concentrate
KUCHING area (.) MAKASSAR area (.) 7 div reps report satisfactory progress
ashore at MAKASSAR as reported G0977 and G0978 of 14 sep 45 both to LANDOPS (.)
BRUNEI BAY - 9 div (.) ops (.) 20 bde SITNOR (.) 24 bde (.) one (.) jap
emissaries contacted at 2/43 bn contact point (.) following infm recd (.) force
on immediate front 2/43 bn comd by maj WATANABE strength 495 incl 100 hospital
cases and 200 sick NOT in hospital (.) 3 weeks rice (.) 13 INDIAN PW incl 9 sick
at TENOM (.) no other PW or internees in area (.) two (.) jap emissaries from
JESSELTON contacted again at KINARUT (.) following infm recd jap strengths (.)
area JESSELTON PENAMPANG MENGATAT 1787 (.) area KOTA BELUD TUARAN 740 (.) area
TAMPAROLI RANAU 150 TAMBANAN 100 (.) KUCHING force (.) maj gen YAMAMURA
established with skeleton HQ in AUST area under guard (.) collection of jap
arms proceeding (.) infm being satisfactorily supplied by japs except comd PW
compound SUGA burnt all records before arrival AUST forces (.) japs at SIBU
proceeding to KUCHING thence to BAU (.) patrol investigating native report of
2000 DAJAKS 40 miles from KUCHING (.) pers evacuated from KUCHING 13 sep (.) 133
AUST 456 BRITISH 37 DUTCH and 57 male internees (.) air ops (.) boomerangs
located HQ AYKIO force RIAM road possible HQ KAMAMURA on LIMBANG river

If liable to be intercepted or to fall into
enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATORS INSTRUCTIONS
Degree of Priority
IMPORTANT

.....Brig

Distributed by GS 15 Sep 45:- as for Situation Report No 158.

MESSAGE CUT

FROM : 1 CORPS

Date - time of origin 15 / 030 I

TO : LANDOPS

G0767 (.) SECRET (.) situation report number 159 period 132400I to 142400I (.)
BALIKPAPAN - 7 div (.) ops (.) nil (.) air ops (.) two TOPSYS at PERAK and one
at KALIBANTENG with green crosses (.) sups dropped AMBARAWA and BANJOEBIROE (.)
implementation of surrender (.) SAMARINDA area (.) 60 INDONESIAN PW moving
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BRUNEI BAY - 9 div (.) ops (.) 20 bde SITNOR (.) 24 bde (.) one (.) jap
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2000 DAJAKS 40 miles from KUCHING (.) pers evacuated from KUCHING 13 sep (.) 133
AUST 456 BRITISH 37 DUTCH and 57 male internees (.) air ops (.) boomerangs
located HQ AYKIO force RIAM road possible HQ KAMAMURA on LIMBANG river

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enemy hands this message must be sent IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATORS INSTRUCTIONS
Degree of Priority
IMPORTANT

.....
.....Brig

Distributed by GS 15 Sep 45:- as for Situation Report No 158.

APR "D"

SECRET

Subject: OCCUPATION OF BORNEO BY AUSTRALIAN FORCES

HQ 1 Aust Corps
1 Sep 45.
G/328/ops.

Adv LHQ (2)

Reference paragraph 7 Adv LHQ signal message 00478
of 251030I Aug.

1. The plans submitted for the acceptance of the Japanese surrender in BORNEO by 7 and 9 Aust Divs, together with the covering letters of the Divisional Commanders, are attached.

7 AUST DIV PLAN

2. The plan involves the minimum use of shipping and a minimum requirement of Australian forces for the occupation of the area.

The plan is based on 7 Aust Div retaining nine LCT and 12 LCM of the landing craft at present allotted to that formation. The adoption of the plan may involve the temporary use of PW cages for some of the enemy forces prior to their organisation under control of their own officers in the SANDAKAN area, and will involve the maintenance of the enemy forces to the extent that they are not self contained, or cannot maintain themselves by their own efforts in that area.

Provided these bases and limitations are acceptable the plan is concurred in.

9 AUST DIV PLAN

3. The plan submitted is concurred in except in the following particulars:-

(a) It is considered that the force to go to KUCHING initially should be not less than a battalion group, so that the disarmament of the enemy can be effected at the same time as the release of the PW.

(b) That when information from the Japanese Commander is obtained, the possibility of shipping Japanese from the SANDAKAN area to a more central area without establishing our forces at SANDAKAN should be explored.

4. Shipping for 9 Aust Div

By using the shipping in relays, the permanent provision of two LST, four LSTs and twelve C 47 aircraft in addition to the craft at present with the division would suffice for all the tasks enumerated in 9 Aust Div plan, except that

given in paragraph

- 2 -

3(a) above for which purpose the temporary allotment of one LST or equivalent shipping would be required.

5. In 9 Aust Div plan provision of shipping for the concentration of Japanese forces from outlying areas to central areas, has not been made. Without an allotment of shipping for this purpose, the only shipping available would be the returning voyages of the re-supply shipping.

(sgd) H. Wells Brig

for Lieutenant-General.
Commanding 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 1 Sep 45:

PA to GOC

DA&MG

G (Int)

War Diary (2)

File

APPENDIX E

SECRET

Subject: DAILY OPERATIONAL REPORT NO 146.

HQ 1 Aust Corps
1 Sep 45.
G/329/Ops.

GHQ, SWPA

Copy to:

7 Aust Div
8 Aust Div
26 Aust Inf Bde
LEQ
Adv LHQ
Forward Echelon LHQ
Adv RAAF Command
CG Eighth US Army

No 146 - Period 2400I 30 Aug to 2400I 31 Aug 45.

Reference Maps BORNEO Series 1/25,000

1. BALIKPAPAN - 7 Aust Division

(a) Weather and Visibility

The weather was showery and overcast throughout the last 24 hours. Visibility was only moderate.

(b) Operations

Local and protective patrolling continued in all areas without contact.

2. BRUNEI BAY - 9 Aust Division (less 26 Aust Infantry Brigade Group)

(a) Weather and Visibility

The weather was overcast with scattered showers during the day. Visibility was only moderate.

(b) Operations

One company 2/15 Aust Infantry Battalion moved from LIMBANG to UKONG following reports of enemy activity in that area. Forty JAPANESE were seen in the PADAS River area. There was no contact.

3. TARAKAN - 26 Aust Infantry Brigade Group

(a) Weather and Visibility

The weather was showery and cloudy throughout the day with moderate visibility.

(b) Operations

An additional sixteen PW were brought in.

V. C. Tan
for Lieutenant-General.
Commanding 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 1 Sep 45.

As for Daily Op Letter No 145.

791X-5

Subject: CHANGE OF COMMAND 1 AUST CORPS

MINUTE

G/7418/SD.

G (Int)
A
Q
CE
3vy
CSO
Arty
War Diary (2)

1. 1 Aust Corps passes from the operational control of GHQ SWPA at 1200I hours 2 Sep 45 and comes under command of Adv LHQ for all purposes.
2. Direct communications by 1 Aust Corps with GHQ SWPA will cease from that time. Branches and Services will examine future requirements in respect to the rendition of periodical reports and where necessary will render such reports to Adv LHQ.

GS
2 Sep 45.

A. J. Wall
Brig, GS.

1100X 'G'

MESSAGE OUT.

FROM : I CORPS

03 11230 I

TO : 7 DIV 9 DIV 26 INF BDE

GO667 (.) SECRET (.) amst no 1 to 1 corps op instr 7 of 28 aug
(.) para 13 (f) after quote control signal comms unquote add
quote apprehend and take into custody all comds staffs and guards
of PW camps and any persons suspected of having committed
atrocities unquote (.) para 14(b) first line delete quote a
general order unquote substitute quote an order unquote para 14(c)
delete general unquote (.) the term general order will NOT now be
used except in reference to general order no 1 military and naval
prepared by supreme commander for the allied powers

If liable to be intercepted or to
fall into enemy hands this message
must be sent in cipher.

Originators Instructions
Degree of Priority

H. K. ...
Signed.....

Distributed by GS 3 Sep 45

FA to GOC
RCS
DA & DMC
G Int
A
Q
War Diary (2)
File

APPX 4

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: UNIT CENSORSHIP

HQ 1 Aust Corps
3 Sep 45
GSI/1534/27/5

1. Unit Censorship including censorship of mail from recovered PW will cease as from 7 Sep 45.
2. Until further instructions are given it is essential that Unit Censor Stamps continue to be impressed on all communications in order to receive army postal concession rate.
3. Censorship of parcels will continue to be carried out by Pd Censorship Dets to prevent dispatch of Arms, Explosives and army Equipment.

H. F. Lehigh
Brig. Gen.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION:

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1 Aust AL Gp (AIF) (5)	CCRA (1)
1 Aust Op Report Team (AIF) (1)	CE (1)
SHO RAN Beach Unit (11)	Svy (1)
5 Aust Pd Svy Coy (AIF) (1)	CSO (1)
2/1 Aust A Topo Svy Coy (1)	Chaplains (3)
1 Aust Corps Sec Int Corps (AIF) (1)	ST (1)
'U' Aust FS Sec (AIF) (1)	Med (16)
1 Aust Corps Det 1 AAAPIG (3)	Dental (6)
1 Aust Visitors and Observers Sec (1)	Ord (1)
1 Aust Corps Pd Cash Office (1)	DADOS 1 Aust Corps Tps (4)
1 Aust Corps Postal Unit (1)	EME (1)
1 Aust Armd Div Pro Coy (1)	CEME 1 Aust Corps Tps (10)
1 Aust Corps Sal Unit (AIF) (1)	Catering (1)
1 Aust MH Pd Team (1)	Pay (1)
1 Aust Corps Det DPR LHQ (1)	Legal (1)
1 Aust Corps ATIS Adv Ech (1)	Postal (1)
1 Flt 1 Aust Mob Met Sqn (AIF) (1)	Pro (1)
1 Aust Corps det Unit Maint	War Graves (1)
Inspection Sec (1)	Education (1)
LHQ GS Eqpt Pd Sec (1)	Amenities (1)
118 Aust Mob Cinema Unit (1)	Sal (1)
PA to GOC (1)	Camp (1)
BGS (1)	File (1)
G (1)	War Diary (2)
G (Int) (1)	

APPX I

TOP SECRET

Subject: 1 AUST CORPS OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO 7 DATED 28 AUG 1945.

HQ 1 Aust Corps
10 Sep 45
G/339/ops.

7 Aust Div (3)
9 Aust Div (3)
26 Aust Inf Bde (2)

1. Herewith copies of amended General Order No 1 issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to GHQ Imperial Japanese Army. This document will replace the Appendix 'E' attached to 1 Aust Corps Operation Instruction No 7.

H/Wells. Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Distributed by GS 10 Sep 45:

PA to GOC

BGS

DA&QMG

G (Int)

A

Q

War Diary (2) ✓

File

TOP SECRET

Amended Appendix 'E'
to 1 Aust Corps
Operation Instruction
No 7 of 28 Aug 45.

GENERAL ORDER NO 1 - MILITARY AND NAVAL

1. The Imperial General Headquarters by direction of the Emperor, and pursuant to the surrender to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers of all Japanese Armed Forces by the Emperor, hereby orders all of its Commanders in Japan and abroad to cause the Japanese Armed Forces and the Japanese-controlled forces under their command to cease hostilities at once, to lay down their arms, to remain in their present locations and to surrender unconditionally to Commanders acting on behalf of the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the British Empire, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as indicated hereafter or as may be further directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Immediate contact will be made with the indicated Commanders, or their designated representatives, subject to any changes in detail prescribed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and their instructions will be completely and immediately carried out.

- (a) The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within China, (excluding Manchuria), Formosa and French Indo China North of 16 degrees North Latitude, shall surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek.
- (b) The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Manchuria, Korea North of 38 degrees North latitude, Karafuto, and the Kurile Islands, shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East.
- (c) (1) The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within the Andamans, Nicobars, Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China South of 16 degrees North latitude, Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Lesser Sundas (including Bali, Lombok, and Timor), Booroo, Ceram, Ambon, Kai, Aroo, Tanimbar and Islands in the Arafura Sea, Celebes, Halmahoras and Dutch NewGuinea shall surrender to the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command.
- (2) The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within Borneo, British New Guinea, Bismarcks and the Solomons shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, Australian Military Forces.
- (d) The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the Japanese mandated islands, Bonins, and other Pacific Islands shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet.

- (e) The Imperial General Headquarters, its Senior Commanders, and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in the main islands of Japan, minor Islands adjacent thereto, Korea South of 38 degrees North latitude, Ryukyus, and the Philippines shall surrender to the Commander-in-Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific.
- (f) The above indicated Commanders are the only representatives of the Allied Powers empowered to accept surrender, and all surrenders of Japanese Forces shall be made only to them or to their representatives.

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters further orders its Commanders in Japan and abroad to disarm completely all forces of Japan or under Japanese control wherever they may be situated, and to deliver intact and in safe and good condition all weapons and equipment at such time and at such places as may be proscribed by the Allied Commanders indicated above.

Pending further instructions, the Japanese Police Force in the main Islands of Japan will be exempt from this disarmament provision. The Police Force will remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for the preservation of Law and Order. The strength and arms of such a Police Force will be proscribed.

2. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, without delay after receipt of this order, complete information with respect to Japan and all areas under Japanese control, as follows:

- (a) Lists of all land, naval, air and anti-aircraft units showing locations and strengths in officers and men.
- (b) Lists of all aircraft, Military, Naval and Civil, giving complete information as to the number, type, location and condition of such aircraft.
- (c) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled Naval Vessels, surface and submarine and Auxiliary Naval Craft in or out of commission and under construction giving their position, condition and movement.
- (d) Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled Merchant Ships of over 100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under construction including Merchant Ships formerly belonging to any of the United Nations which are now in Japanese hands, giving their position, condition and movement.
- (e) Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing locations and layouts of all mines, minefields, and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith.
- (f) Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including

airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas.

- (g) Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.

3. Japanese Armed Forces and Civil Aviation Authorities will insure that all Japanese Military, Naval and Civil Aircraft remain on the ground, on the water, or aboard ship, until further notification of the disposition to be made of them.

4. Japanese or Japanese-controlled Naval or Merchant vessels of all types will be maintained without damage and will undertake no movement pending instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Vessels at sea will immediately render harmless and throw overboard explosives of all types. Vessels not at sea will immediately remove explosives of all types to safe storage ashore.

5. Responsible Japanese or Japanese-controlled Military and Civil Authorities will insure that:

- (a) All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, be removed according to instructions of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
- (b) All aids to navigation be reestablished at once.
- (c) All safety lanes be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of (a) above.

6. Responsible Japanese and Japanese-controlled Military and Civil Authorities will hold intact and in good condition pending further instructions from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the following:

- (a) All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies, and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in section 4 of this order).
- (b) All land, water and air transportation and communication facilities and equipment.
- (c) All Military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.
- (d) All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of all

implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by any military or part-military organization in connection with its operations.

7. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters shall furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, without delay after receipt of this order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of section 6 above, indicating the numbers, types and locations of each.

8. The manufacture and distribution of all arms, ammunition and implements of war will cease forthwith.

9. With respect to United Nations Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees in the hands of Japanese or Japanese-controlled authorities:

- (a) The safety and well-being of all United Nations Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees will be scrupulously preserved, to include the administrative and supply service essential to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care until such responsibility is undertaken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
- (b) Each camp or other place of detention of United Nations Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees together with its equipment, stores, records, arms, and ammunition will be delivered immediately to the command of the senior officer or designated representative of the Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
- (c) As directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees will be transported to places of safety where they can be accepted by Allied authorities.
- (d) The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will furnish to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, without delay after receipt of this order, complete lists of all United Nations Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, indicating their locations.

10. All Japanese and Japanese controlled Military and Civil Authorities shall aid and assist the occupation of Japan, and the Japanese controlled areas by forces of the Allied Powers.

11. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and appropriate Japanese Officials shall be prepared, on instructions from Allied Occupation Commanders, to collect and deliver all arms in the possession of the Japanese Civilian population.

12. This and all subsequent instructions issued by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or other Allied Military Authorities will be scrupulously and promptly obeyed by Japanese and Japanese controlled Military and Civil Officials and private persons. Any delay or failure to comply with the provisions of this or subsequent orders, and any action which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines to be detrimental to the Allied Powers, will incur drastic and summary punishment at the hands of Allied Military Authorities and the Japanese Government.

13. The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters will immediately advise the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers the earliest date and time at which information called for in Parts 2, 7 and 9(d) can be submitted.

War Diary

APPX. A. J.

SECRET

Copy No 67

I A N S T C O R P S
S P E C I A L I N T E L L I G E N C E
S U M M A R Y . . N O 4

10 SEP 48 G2: I ANST CORPS

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Please destroy after perusal.

1 AUST CORPS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.4

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POPULATION AND ALLIED PW

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'E' MOSAIC-PINKING AREA

ATTACHED

Maps 1:125,000

HAPANG
PARE PARE
PANGADJENE
PANGAR
PANGARING

-1-
PART I

1. ENEMY:

GENERAL

In their occupation of the Southern CELEBES the enemy have concentrated their main forces at MACASSAR, KENDARI, POMELAA and MANDAR GULF. The nickel mines at POMELAA contributed greatly to JAPAN's war production but over recent months the restricted shipping facilities have caused a withdrawal from the sector.

PARE PARE is now probably the main base in the CELEBES and serves as a port for the troops grouped in the PINRANG area and across to PALAPO and MASAMBA on the GULF of BONE. The main cluster of airfields are located in the MACASSAR area and, as a result, a large force of enemy troops is probably disposed in the area. It is known that an extensive barge system was in existence along the southwestern coast from MACASSAR to SALLIAR Island and no doubt staging points have been established along the route. These outlying garrisons probably consisted of naval troops but since 2 Sep there has probably been a general withdrawal towards MACASSAR.

2. STRENGTH BY AREAS

In all there are estimated to be 18,500 Japanese troops in the CELEBES and of this total some 12,500 are thought to be disposed in the southern part of the island. However, in view of the fact that movement of troops through the Southern CELEBES was in progress up to the time when hostilities ceased it is possible that there may be some variation in the above figures.

HQ of 2 ARMY which controls the forces in the CELEBES and east to DUTCH NEW GUINEA is now located at PINRANG having moved from MANOKWARI recently. This HQ has probably absorbed a number of the staff officers from the disbanded 2 ARMY and 19 ARMY which were operative in the area. The main combat unit is 57 IMB with HQ at MACASSAR and consisting of 372, 373, 375 and 377 Indep Inf Bns plus sig, engr and arty elements. Although movement of 57 IMB to Southern CELEBES has been in progress for some time, a large part of the brigade remains at KENDARI.

In detail, units identified in the Southern CELEBES are as follows:

2 ARMY HQ

: Located PINRANG and under command of Lt Gen TESHIMA, Fusataro, the HQ probably totals 250 with a small detachment at MACASSAR.

57 IMB

: Comd Maj. Gen ENDO, Shinichi, the brigade consists of four battalions. HQ and troops in the MACASSAR area are estimated to total 3000 with the remainder in the KENDARI sector.

5 DIV

: Elements totalling about 750 are located at MACASSAR en route from the AMBON area to JAVA.

43 FD A.A. Bn

: Not definitely located but elements are probably at PINRANG with the bulk of the force at MACASSAR. Total strength is estimated at 250.

24 SIG REGT	: Commanded by Lt.Col OKAMOTO, Kakajiro, the main part is located in DUTCH NEW GUINEA with a detachment of about 50 at PINRANG.
4 SOUTHERN ARMY SIG UNIT	: A detachment of about 50 is carried at MACASSAR.
2 ARMY SIG UNIT	: Estimated as 150 strong this unit is probably serving 2 ARMY at PINRANG.
98 INDEP WIRE COY	: Estimated to total 50 troops and probably located MACASSAR.
87 INDEP WIRELESS PL	: Carried at MACASSAR and probably totals 50 men.
92 INDEP WIRELESS PL	: Estimated 50 strong and carried MACASSAR.
2 ARMY FD FREIGHT DEPOT ORD " } MT " }	500 in all carried MACASSAR. Bulk of units probably remain in HALMAHERAS, AMBON and DUTCH NEW GUINEA.
5 FD HP UNIT	: Part estimated at 50 is carried MACASSAR.
13 FD POSTAL UNIT } 270 FPO } 385 FPO }	Total about 25 troops located in the SINGKANG-KILOSI area.
3 SHIPPING TPT COMD	: Totals about 150 troops with branches at MACASSAR, PARE PARE, SINGKANG. The unit HQ is at SINGAPORE.
14 DEBARKATION UNIT	: Commanded by Maj KUNE, Hachiro, about 100 troops from the unit are at PINRANG.
SHIPPING ENGRS	: About 250 troops of an u/i regiment are operating in the southern sector mainly based on MACASSAR and PINRANG.
38 SPECIAL LAND DUTY COY	: May be 100 strong located at MACASSAR.
32 AIR SECTOR COMD	: Located at LIMBOENG and would not exceed 50 troops.
109 AIRFIELD BN	: Possibly BANDAI with strength 250 and commanded by Capt MIZUTANI, Isao.
117 AIRFIELD BN	: Commanded by Capt HAGINO, Jinichi and located at LIMBOENG. Strength is estimated at 250.
119 AIRFIELD BN	: Commanded by Capt KARA, Takeshiro, and located at PINRANG with strength 250.
121 AIRFIELD BN	: Located at PINRANG 250 strong.
41 AIRFIELD COY	: Carried at PARE PARE with strength estimated at 150.

1 AIRFIELD CONSTR COND: Located at LILBOENG under command of Col MATSUZAKI, Kesanitsu. Strength would not exceed 50.

133 AIRFIELD CONSTR UNIT: Unlocated but tentatively carried MANDAI with strength 250.

23 BASE FORCE: Commanded by Vice Adm MORIICHI, Osugi and 1050 strong. This HQ controls all naval forces in the CELEBES area of whom a large part are on the southeastern peninsula in the KENDARI area. The HQ is in MACASSAR.

3 GUARD FORCE: About 550 troops of this force are garrisoning outposts in southwestern CELEBES under control of 23 BASE FORCE.

123 NAVAL AIR DEF UNIT: About 200 strong and probably located in MACASSAR.

102 NAVAL HOSPITAL: A branch of some 250 personnel is located at MACASSAR.

Little information is available regarding the detailed distribution of enemy strength in Southern CELEBES but a tentative allotment of strength has been based on native reports of activity as follows:

SW Sector:

MALILI - PALOPO	500	
MADJENE - POLEWALI	500	
PARE PARE - PINRANG	2000	
SINGKANG	250	
SALEMO IS	50	
MACASSAR AREA	5000	
BIRA - KADJANG	750	
TAKALAR - BINGKALAPA	750	
SALAJAR IS	250	
		10,050

SE Sector:

POHELEA	850	
KENDARI	1600	
		2,450
		<u>12,500</u>

These dispositions are shown on the map attached as Appendix "A".

3. PHYSICAL CONDITION

Over recent months there has been considerable sickness among Japanese troops in the area, a condition which is further aggravated by the shortage of medical supplies. The main sicknesses are malaria and dysentery with some minor cases of beri-beri.

4. PERSONALITIES

2 ARMY HQ

GOC Lt.Gen TESHIMA, Fusataro

C of S

Staff Offr Lt.Col RYOMI, Tsugio

Ord. Dept

Chief Col HATTORI, Shojiro or SAKAMOTO, Toru

Intend Dept

Chief Col INOUE, Yoneo
Att Lt.Col SAKURADA, Sushichi

Med Dept

Chief
Att Lt.Col HOJO, Kazusato

Judicial Dept

Chief Col TAKAHASHI, Kazuo

During the past 12 months, 2 Army has moved from MANOKWARI to PIIRANG and it is possible that some of its staff officers may have not been able to leave cut-off areas and move with the Army HQ. In order to replace these losses, 2 Army may have absorbed some officers of 2 Area Army which was disbanded at PIIRANG. For this reason, senior officers of 2 Area Army who have not been identified with new appointments are set out hereunder:-

Col	SHIBUYA, Teruo (Inf)	Lt.Col	SETO, Naoji (Med)
Lt.Col	FUJII, Takehiko (Inf)	Lt.Col	SHIGAKI, Kazuo (Pharm)
Lt.Col	KASAHARA, Yoshinobu (Intend)	Lt.Col	TOHITA, Shiro (Med)
Lt.Col	OGAMI, Masaie (Inf)		

57 IMB

GOC: Maj.Gen ENDO, Shinichi

372 Indep Inf Bn: Maj SAGARA, Keen
373 " " " : Capt HAKAMURA, Takeji
375 " " " : Capt IWAMOTO, Mitsugi
377 " " " : Maj TAKANOBE, Takao.

5. FOOD RESOURCES

As far as can be determined, it was the Japanese practice in CELEBES to take 50% of rice and maize crops and a large percentage of other crops. Village headmen collected the Japanese share and handed it to the Village Chief for delivery to the Japanese Nantako office. 40% of cattle and poultry was confiscated by the Japanese.

Drums containing rice have been reported stored in buildings in MACASSAR but the extent of these supplies is not known.

6. MEDICAL RESOURCES

Medical supplies have been reported stored in a brick building 50 yards south of the PARE PARE racecourse and also in the vicinity of MANDAI airfield.

7. ORDNANCE RESOURCES

Vehicles

There appears to have been considerable vehicular traffic throughout SW CELEBES. One informant reported having seen 70 Japanese trucks in MACASSAR, together with 100 smaller vehicles and 50 motor cycles with tenders.

POL

There are fuel storage tanks as well as dumps of petrol in drums in the MACASSAR area.

Drums of petrol have also been reported in a dump 500 yards south of the shipyard at PARE PARE. There are large petrol tanks near the new pier at PARE PARE.

8. SHIPPING

The most recent sightings do not suggest that the enemy has many vessels at his disposal in SW CELEBES. Some 10 70/300 ton vessels are probably available in the area, together with 100 or more barges, schooners and luggers.

9. DEFENCES

The annotated map attached as Appendix "A" shows enemy defences as located from native and photo interpretation reports. Little detail is available regarding these defences but it would seem that the main concentrations are in the MACASSAR and PARE PARE areas.

In the MACASSAR area gun emplacements have been reported on LAE Island and these may be intended for coastal defence. In addition to these guns, positions probably exist along the coastal sector south from MACASSAR where extensive trenches and weapon pits have been prepared.

At PARE PARE the main defences consist of numerous machine gun positions covering the coastal approaches, with possibly two CD guns protecting the harbour.

In general there has been little preparation of defences reported from inland sectors, but it can be expected that local preparations have been made at all occupied points along the coast.

PART II - POPULATION AND ALLIED PW

POPULATION

1. DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

The population of CELEBES numbers approximately 4½ millions and includes some thousands of foreign Asiatics, such as Chinese and Arabs. Population is very unevenly distributed with 2/3 of the island almost uninhabited. The most thickly populated area is the district of MINAHASSA in the north, with a density of 105 persons to the square mile. In other populated areas the density is about 57 to the square mile or less.

The population of the "Government of the CELEBES" (which includes the SE and SW peninsulas) numbered over 5 millions. Of them it is estimated that more than half live in the SW peninsula.

The settlements of Southern CELEBES are located mostly on the coast and at the mouths of rivers, for trade purposes and because of the mountainous interior.

2. RACE

The native population is divided into 7 fairly distinct groups:

TOALAS are found all over the island, sometimes in small communities but often scattered among other groups.

FORANAS live in the mountain districts of Central, SE and Eastern CELEBES.

BOEGINESE occupy the southern part of the east coast and a large part of the interior of the southern peninsula and are found in many trading centres along the coast.

MACASSARS live mostly in the southern and western extremities of the island and, like the BOEGINESE, to whom they are closely allied in racial characteristics, are found in most trade centres.

MINAHASSAS occupy the northern extremity of CELEBES.

GORONTALANSE are found mainly in the western and southern districts of the NE peninsula.

MANDARS are a large distinct group who live in the west coast area near CAPE MANDAR.

The Boeginese and Macassars are therefore the two groups of natives most likely to be encountered.

They were originally Pagans, then were influenced by Hinduism before embracing Mohammedanism. Traces of Paganism and Hinduism still exist in their creeds. Their ancient animism survives in their worship, possibly totemistic, of the crocodile and eel.

They are energetic and keen traders, proud, passionate and vindictive, and devoted to feasting, gambling and cockfighting. Except for the Chinese, they handled most of the trade. They are fine shipbuilders and sailors.

They live chiefly on rice, maize and fish. They are extremely industrious and weave materials and make articles in gold and silver. They cultivate rice, Turkish wheat, coffee, coconuts, collect forest produce, hunt and fish and keep buffaloes, cattle and horses.

They are proud and independent people, resenting any interference in their own affairs, but once their confidence has been gained are entirely trustworthy. Most of them speak Malay but they have a language of their own.

3. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Pre War

For administrative purposes, in Dutch times the island came under the direct rule of a Governor responsible to the Governor General of the NEI. It was divided into two divisions:

- (a) The Government of the CELEBES, which included only the SE and SW peninsulas of the island and the adjacent islands.
- (b) The Residency of MANADO, which included the NE peninsula and Central CELEBES, together with BANGGAI and SANGHE Islands.

Under Japanese Occupation

The control of CELEBES is vested in the Japanese Navy and the MINSEIBU organization, with HQ at MACASSAR, is responsible for the administration. Local control is exercised by the MINSEIBU offices, branches of which are known to exist at PARE PARE and MACASSAR.

The MINSEIBU offices appear to control a number of districts, each under a District Chief (Hoekoem Besar). Each District Chief controls several Under District Chiefs (Hoekoem Kadoea) who exercise control through Village Chiefs. The villages are divided into a number of Djagas (or household groups) each under a Headman (Kepala Djaga) assisted by a number of leaders (Penimpin).

This system of District, etc, Chiefs is apparently that which was employed before the Japanese occupation.

MACASSAR was policed in Nov 44 by the Indoneses and Makassarese wearing the former NEI Government uniforms. They were not unduly severe in their treatment of the people.

4. ATTITUDE OF NATIVES

As elsewhere, the natives have come to hate the Japanese because of the difficult living conditions imposed on them, the lack of food and clothing, the severe regulations, the taking of their women, beatings for the slightest offences. The Chinese were treated exactly as the rest of the population.

5. MEDICAL CONDITION

There appears to have been an increase in malaria, dysentery and tropical ulcers, mainly in the larger towns such as MACASSAR and PARE PARE. There is a general shortage of medical supplies, including quinine.

With the exception of 20 Indonesian nurses, the staff of the former Dutch hospital at MACASSAR is Japanese. Local inhabitants may receive clinical treatment at 25 cents per week.

6. FOOD RESOURCES

Inhabitants of outlying areas appear to have subsisted on locally grown foodstuffs but, as far as can be determined, food supplies in the larger towns have been poor. Some shortages have been

reported from PARE PARE while, in MACASSAR, by Oct 44 local inhabitants were rationed to 2 litres of rice per day. The rice was brought by truck from PARE PARE. Some vegetables could still be brought at that time.

7. INTERNAL CONDITIONS

A copy of SRD Miscellaneous Intelligence Report No 7, dealing with conditions in SW CELEBES under Japanese occupation is attached to this summary as Appendix "B".

ALLIED PW AND INTERNEES

8. NUMBERS AND LOCATION

The table of Allied PW submitted by the Japanese Mission showed the following PW held in the MACASSAR Temporary Internment Camp:

	Navy		Army		
	Offrs	OR	Offrs	OR	
Dutch	2	146	18	190	
Part Dutch	2	75	5	162	
US	1	154		1	
British	4	539		2	
Australian				4	
Total	9	1024	23	359	1415

It is believed that PW were moved to JAVA after the date of preparation of this table and later information suggested that at 31 Aug 1945 PW were held at MACASSAR, comprising 452 British, 3 Australian, 122 US, 427 Dutch and 1 other. A message from the PW on 6 Sep stated that 1100 PW (of whom 400 were British) were then held at MACASSAR, including 25 sick with dysentery.

Other information of 31 Aug suggests that 2262 internees were then held in CELEBES, comprising

MINADO	421 Dutch	
	25 Others	445
SOUTHERN CELEBES	6 Aust	
	5 US	
	1743 Dutch	
	9 British	
	3 Canadian	
	50 Others	1816

Of the figure of 2265 internees submitted by the envoys at MANILA, 556 were reported imprisoned and 45 males, 621 females and 839 children at large (presumably on parole).

Some indication of the present distribution of PW and internees throughout Southern CELEBES camps is provided by one report that PAGINTOMANG (6 miles SE of MACASSAR) housed 1627, PARE PARE 582, MACASSAR 1101. These figures will have been reduced by the movement of PW to JAVA mentioned above.

Aircraft have reported sighting 200 women (40% of whom were white) in a camp at LIMBOENG and have reported a probable camp at SOENGGOELAYASA.

Addendum to PART 1 PARA 2

JAPANESE STRENGTHS - CILLEBES

The official strengths furnished by Lt Gen TESHIMA, GOC
2 Army, at MOROTAI on 10 Sep are as follows:

Army Tps	14,222	
Naval Pers.	<u>4,328</u>	18,550
Other personnel under Japanese control:		
Japanese civilians (presumably civilian employees)	1,344	
Japanese (unspecified but presumably traders, etc)	5,809	
Formosans	851	
Indonesian labourers	<u>4,125</u>	<u>12,129</u>
Total personnel		<u>30,679</u>

PART 111

TOPOGRAPHY

Ref maps SOG 1:50,000 series
Maps - Appendices 'A', 'C', 'D' and 'E'

1. GENERAL

- (a) Area Studied: The area covered by this Review is the SW Peninsula of CELEBES, the Northern boundary being an imaginary line drawn from MADJENE to PALOPO.
- (b) Physiography: The terrain is mostly covered by rugged mountains with some flatter areas in centre of the Peninsula surrounding Lakes SIDERANG and TAMPE and along the East and West coasts. The area can be sub-divided geographically into three sectors, namely:-
- (i) Northern covering the Northern portion of the Peninsula South to PIRANG and RAPANG. This sector really is the Southern extremity of the mountain mass which entirely covers the Western side of CENTRAL CELEBES. On the West lie the Southern slopes of the QUARLES Mountains which rise to over 10,000 ft and on the East lie the LATIROJONG Mountains rising to 11,286 ft in Mt RAKTERARIO. The two ranges form a solid mountain barrier blocking approach to the SW Peninsula from the North except by known roads and tracks.
- (ii) Central which is bounded on the North by an East-West line through PIRANG and RAPANG and on the South by a line from MADJENE to SIMDJAI. The Central sector consists of two parallel plains and two mountain ranges parallel to the plains. There are flats on each coast with ranges rising to 2,500 ft on the East and 4,500 ft on the West, divided by a plain surrounding Lakes SIDERANG and TAMPE and the WALALAL River.
- (iii) Southern which apart from a continuation of the Coastal plain along the West coast is an extensive mountain mass surrounding Mt LOMFORATANG (9415 ft).
- (c) Vegetation and Cultivation: The information available under this heading is of an extremely general nature. Broadly the flat areas alternate between rice paddies and grasslands whilst the lower slopes of the mountain are covered with secondary growth and the upper heights rain forest. From aerial photographs held of limited areas it would seem that there are small stands of timber dotted over the plains and that the cultivation is fairly intensive.
- (d) Development: SW CELEBES is the most highly developed and populated portion of the island. It is served reasonably well with motor roads which connect all major towns on the Peninsula and an MT road runs North from PALOPO to PARIGI on the Gulf of GORONTALO. Formerly there was a railway from MAKASSAR to TAMBORA at the SW corner of the peninsula but it has been abandoned. There are some large towns in the area and MAKASSAR, the Capital, had a pre-war population of 80,000.
- (e) Seasons: There are two major seasons, namely

November-March	NW monsoon
April -October	SE monsoon

- (f) Time: Pre-war standard time of the CELEBES was 8 hours ahead of GMT.

2. SEAFAR APPROACH

- (a) Coastline: Most of the East and West coasts of SW CELEBES are beset with navigational dangers. No charts of the Gulf of BONI are held but it is reported that the coast is extremely dangerous and that prahus do not sail close in shore at night. From available maps it appears that numerous small islands shoals and reefs lie off the shore for distances up to 20 miles. The approach to the South appears to be clear and along the NW shore in the Gulf of MANDAR similar conditions apply. Apart from the Gulf of MANDAR islands reefs and shoals lie off the West coast for a distance of about 30 miles. There is no information available concerning landing beaches in SW CELEBES.
- (b) Hinterland: Except along the South and NW coasts where the mountains rise almost directly from the shore the coastline is backed by flat country and on the East coast it is reported to be marshy.

3. ANCHORAGES AND PORT FACILITIES

(a) MAKASSAR

- (i) General: This is the main port in the area and is the most developed harbour. It was the fourth largest port in the NEI.
- (ii) Approaches: The best approach to the harbour appears to be from the South although it is possible to approach from the North.
- (iii) Protection: The harbour is protected from Westerly, South Westerly and North Westerly winds but is exposed to the North and the South.
- (iv) Capacity: The harbour area measures about 3000 yds by 1000 yds with depths varying between 30 and 60 ft.

(v) Facilities

Wilhelmina Wharf: A wooden wharf 1755 ft long with 24 ft of water alongside. It has been damaged superficially by Allied bombing.

Juliana Quay: A concrete wharf 4400 ft long with 30 ft of water alongside. Pre-war this wharf was equipped with steam cranes but it is not known whether any still remain. The Coal wharf on the North end of the quay has two 3-ton coal grabs, only one of which is operative.

Prahu Harbour: This lies behind the Southern extremity of the Juliana Quay and is 918 ft long by 240 ft across. In effect this harbour is a small boat refuge.

- (vi) Warehouses: There were a number of warehouses and customs sheds behind the wharf but a considerable portion of these buildings has been destroyed.
- (vii) Installations: There are a number of slipways, coaling sheds and oil depots and pipelines in the dock area.

(b) PARE PARE

- (i) General: The port was used by fairly large steamers in pre-war days but it did not possess any facilities of moment.
- (ii) Approaches: The seaward approaches are clear and free of obstructions.
- (iii) Protection: The harbour is almost entirely landlocked and should be protected in all seasons.
- (iv) Capacity: The area of the harbour is about 7000 yds by about 4000 yds with depths varying between 30 and 54 ft.
- (v) Facilities: There are numerous jetties and a quay in the harbour, but the depth of water alongside is unknown. It is thought, however, that large ships could not tie up at the quay or any of the jetties.
- (vi) Warehouses: All buildings on the quay have been destroyed by Allied bombing.
- (vii) Installations: No information available.

(c) MADJENE

MADJENE lies on a small bay on the NE corner of the area. The approaches are clear and depths in the bay vary between 20 and 70 fathoms. There is a stone jetty but the depth alongside is unknown. There appear to be no unloading facilities.

(d) PALOPO

PALOPO is situated in the NE corner of the area studied and although it had no berthing facilities for large ships vessels up to at least 5000 tons can anchor $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile from the end of the pier. There is a pier 4000 ft long built out over tidal flats with 10 ft of water alongside.

4. COMMUNICATIONS

There is no detailed information available concerning the roads and tracks, but it is thought that most of the roads are well maintained and vary between 12 and 18 ft in width. The communications available are delineated on the map Appendix 'A'.

So far as is known none of the rivers is navigable.

5. AIRFIELDS

(a) KALIMPOENG

- (i) Locality: KALIMPOENG is situated about 25 miles NNE of PARE PARE.
- (ii) Obstructions: Nil
- (iii) Runways:

North/South	5000 ft by 350 ft
NW/SE	6000 ft by 350 ft
- (iv) Surface: The North/South runway is surfaced with sand or gravel whilst the other runway is overgrown.
- (v) Serviceability: On 8 Jul 45 both runways were unserviceable.

- (vi) Dispersal: Dispersal bays are available for 15 to 20 aircraft.

(b) MANDAI

- (i) Locality: MANDAI is the airport for MAKASSAR and is located 10 miles NE of that city.
- (ii) Obstructions: There is a sharp conical hill (Mt PATANEE) 2 miles WNW of the Airfield.
- (iii) Runways: East/West 5100 ft by 185 ft
NW/SE 5340 ft by 180 ft
- (iv) Surface: Both runways are surfaced.
- (v) Serviceability: On 8 Jul 45 the East/West runway was unserviceable whilst the NW/SE runway was serviceable for 2600 ft at the SW end.
- (vi) Dispersal: There are all told 31 revetments.

(c) LIMBOENG

- (i) Locality: LIMBOENG Airfield is situated on the GORONTALO River 14 miles SE of MAKASSAR.
- (ii) Obstructions: Nil
- (iii) Runways: NW/SE 4700 ft by 320 ft
ENE/WSW 6600 ft by 320 ft
NE/SW 4100 ft by 300 ft
- (iv) Surface: All runways are surfaced.
- (v) Serviceability: On 8 Jul 45 the NW/SE runway was serviceable for 4100 ft by 170 ft and the second runway was serviceable but rough for 5450 ft by 210 ft.
- (vi) Dispersal: There are 16 dispersal points and 9 revetments.

(d) BOELOEDOWANG

- (i) Locality: BOELOEDOWANG airfield is located 30 miles SSE of MAKASSAR and 18 miles SSE of LIMBOENG.
- (ii) Obstructions: Nil
- (iii) Runways: NW/SE 4600 ft by 300 ft
NE/SW 4750 ft by 300 ft
- (iv) Surface: The NW/SE runway is surfaced but the other runway is not.
- (v) Serviceability: No recent information.
- (vi) Dispersal: There are 47 revetments and 40 handstandings.

(e) BINGKALAPA

- (i) Locality: BINGKALAPA airfield is located at the South end of the peninsula 60 miles SE of MAKASSAR.
- (ii) Obstructions: Nil
- (iii) Runways: The runway is aligned NW/SE and measures 5000 ft by 350 ft.

- (iv) Surface: It is surfaced and should be an all weather airfield.
- (v) Serviceability: No recent information.
- (vi) Dispersal: There are 10 revetments.

(f) MASAMBA

Pre-war there was a grass emergency landing ground 1950 ft by 660 ft. It is not known whether this airfield has been maintained or developed by the Japanese.

6. SEAPLANE ALIGHTING AREAS

Seaplanes can alight and take off at MADJENE, POLSWALI, PARE PARE, MAKASSAR and PALOPO.

7. LOCAL RESOURCES

(a) Food

It is thought that the area would be more than self sufficient but there is no definite information available.

(b) Industries

The only industry of any consequence about which there is any information is small shipbuilding, which has been developed intensively by the Japanese. Shipbuilding yards exist at MADJENE, POLSWALI, PARE PARE, MAKASSAR, BIRA and PALOPO.

(c) Water

There should be abundant supplies available from surface water and shallow wells. Pre-war PARE PARE, MAKASSAR and PALOPO had town supplies. There is no information available as to the capacity of the supplies at PARE PARE and PALOPO but MAKASSAR provided over 450,000 gallons per day. The MAKASSAR water supply was reticulated and was drawn from the river and from wells.

The Japanese have dammed the SIDAING River in the vicinity of PIRANG but it is thought that the dam is purely for irrigation purposes.

(d) Constructional Materials

(i) Timber: Hardwoods, teak, ebony, sandelwood and copal are available in various areas.

(ii) Stone and Sand: Sand is readily available from beds of shallow creeks and rivers and limestone and granite are found in hilly districts but generally under several feet of overburden. Asphaltic limestone for road surfacing is found in quantity on SOLTONG Island.

8. TOWNS

(a) MAKASSAR

(i) General: MAKASSAR is the capital, chief port and commercial centre of the CELEBES. It had a pre-war population of 84,000 (including 3,000 Dutch). It was the fourth largest port in the NEI and handled 6,600,000 tons of shipping in 1938.

(ii) Buildings: See map - Appendix 'C'.

(iii) Industries and Installations: Gas works, cement factory, bolt and nail factory, teakwood factory (joinery), coconut oil factories, powerhouse, engineering shops, rattan case factory, ^{and} sawmill. There are also some new factories constructed by the Japanese but their purpose is unknown.

(iv) Camp Sites: It should be possible to find suitable camp areas in the vicinity of the city.

(b) PARE PARE

(i) General: PARE PARE had a pre-war population of about 3,600, and is located in an intensively cultivated area.

(ii) Buildings: See map - Appendix 'D'.

There are about 2,000 residences and huts.

(iii) Industries and Installations: Power house, rope factory and timber mill.

(iv) Camp Sites: There are suitable areas on rising ground behind the town.

(c) PINRANG

(i) General: PINRANG is located at an important road junction from which communications radiate to all points of the compass. It is situated 15 miles North of PARE PARE. It is the location of HQ 2 Jap Army.

(ii) Buildings: See Mosaic - Appendix 'F'.

(iii) Camp Sites: There should be suitable sites in the coconuts surrounding the town but the ground may be damp.

9. MEDICAL

The more common diseases include Malaria, Dengue, Filaria (Elephantiasis), Tropical ulcers, Pulmonary diseases, Conjunctivitis, Diphtheria, Venereal Diseases and Dysentery. There was some Cholera reported in 1940. There are numerous brothels in the towns and promiscuity is rife among the people. Venereal diseases were very prevalent.

10. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

(a) Rainfall

The following are the average rainfall figures for MAKASAR:-

Jan	18 ins.	Jul	1 in.
Feb	14 "	Aug	Nil
Mar	15 "	Sep	Nil
Apr	6 "	Oct	1 in.
May	2 "	Nov	4 "
Jun	1 "	Dec	22 "

Total 84 ins.

(b) Temperature

Mean temperatures range between 66° and 72° with absolute extremes of 94° and 66° on the coast. The temperature falls below 50° at high altitudes in the mountains.

(c) Humidity



The average is about 85% throughout the year.

11. STRATEGICAL DISTANCES

The following are sea and air distances in nautical miles from
MAKASSAR:-

<u>Place</u>	<u>Sea</u>	<u>Air</u>
SYDNEY	3,210	2,687
BRISBANE	2,740	2,389
DARWIN	910	823
KOLPANG	530	398
BIM	195	195
SOERABAJA	425	425
B. TAVIA	770	770
SINGAPORE	1,060	1,011
BANGKOK	1,940	1,860
S. IGON	1,540	1,026
BRUNEI	1,070 (via North Borneo)	660
KUCHING	1,030	670
BANDJERBASIN	360	312
BALLINAPPAH	360	279
TARAKAN	580	516
ALBON	640	531
SAJALANI	770	720
MOROTAI	1,000	686

APPENDIX "A" TO I AUST CORPS
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
NO. 4 S. W. CELEBES



SERVICES RECONNAISSANCE DEPARTMENT

7 Sep 45

MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE REPORT No 7

CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTH-WEST CELEBES

UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION

SOURCES: REFIS Interrogation Reports.

ATIS Interrogation Reports and captured documents.

Far Eastern Bureau Fortnightly Intelligence Reports.

1. ADMINISTRATION

(a) General

Following the Dutch administrative pattern for the Great East (CELEBES, DUTCH BORNEO, the LESSER SUNDAS and DUTCH NEW GUINEA), the Japanese have set up their Central Naval Administration Headquarters at MACASSAR. This authority, which is known as the Minseifu, is divided into two main sections - Economics and Finance Affairs (Keizai Bu) and Political Affairs (Seiji Bu), and exercises supervision over District Naval Administrative Headquarters in the former Dutch Residencies. These subordinate authorities, known as Minseibu, exercise spot control over local affairs, but in matters of wider concern are more closely supervised by the Minseifu. That, at least, appears to be the theoretical arrangement, but in practice the system seems to have undergone a measure of decentralisation, possibly due to a dislocation of sea communications.

The Minseifu, being the highest authority on economic and political matters, is the natural focal point for the operations of the Japanese political and economic Intelligence agency - the Tokumu Kikan. This is now largely a civilian body, and in MACASSAR (as in all occupied territories) works hand-in-glove with the civil administration. MACASSAR is therefore the chief Intelligence centre for the whole of the Navy-controlled area.

From interrogation of local people, it appears that the head of the Minseifu in 1942-43 was a Japanese named OKADA, but recent interrogation of a Japanese administrative official indicates that the office was filled last year by a former high official of the Japanese Home Office, named YAMAZAKI. This official is said to hold the equivalent rank of a vice-Admiral.

The Japanese appear to have found a number of useful collaborators among educated and influential people, thus easing the burden on their administration. Though cordial hatred of the Japanese is fairly general, the inhabitants of the

CELEBES have not proved unduly refractory, partly because the Japanese have been relatively tactful in their handling of the people and have displayed a certain measure of respect for their cultural standards. According to the Domei agency, native leaders have been appointed to such important posts as that of Mayor of MACASSAR and supervisor of PARE PARE Prefecture. Local sources state the Mayor of MACASSAR is a Macassarese named MADJANOEDDIN DAENG MALEWA. It is probable, however, that he is merely deputy mayor, under a Japanese administrator.

In general, the Japanese appear to have followed the Dutch system of native self-Government under Radjas and Sultans (appointed from old ruling families), but with characteristic mistrust have been careful to see that strict supervision is exercised over their activities. They have shown little disposition to interfere with established local customs and beliefs, where these can be permitted to exist without inconvenience to the Japanese authority. For some time past, the Japanese have been brooding the peoples of the Naval Administrative area with the idea of eventual independence, and in MACASSAR Japanese residents have made a show of supporting the scheme. The scheme appears to have gone no further than the establishment of Advisory Councils (composed of Japanese-appointed native representatives, who are "privileged" to make suggestions on political and economic affairs to the naval administration, and the setting-up of Independence Preparatory Committees to look into the question of final independence. It is noteworthy that, even with the prospect of an early relinquishment of their conquered territories, the Japanese have been very chary of making a bold gesture of complete independence, indicating a large measure of mutual mistrust beneath the surface.

Described as the largest autonomous province of the CELEBES, the Sultanate of BOMBAY is said to be still functioning. If Japanese propaganda is to be believed, ANCHI HAPFANZUKI SULTAN IBRAHIM, Sultan of BOMBAY, is one of their most useful collaborators. A Domei broadcast dated 1 July stated that the Sultan was "unanimously elected" president of the SOUTH CELEBES National Reconstruction Association, which is a complementary body to the Independence Preparatory Committee, referred to above.

(b) Courts and Justice

From what little information there is available, the judicial system differs very little from that prevailing elsewhere in the INDIES. Offences against native customs are heard by Indonesian magistrates. Those accused of petty crimes are taken to the local police commandant, who usually has them beaten and sentenced to prison. More serious crimes and political offences are dealt with by the service police (Kempei Tai or Tokei Tai).

(c) Taxation and Revenue

Income tax at the rate of 4 to 7 per cent is deducted from earnings, which is said to be an increase on pre-war rates. As before the war, taxes may be remitted by personal labour, or (in the case of agricultural communities) by providing the Administration with a specified portion of the crop.

(d) Posts and Telegraphs

Only Japanese may use the telegraph facilities at MACASSAR, but the privilege of using the telephone is extended to administrative officials and shopkeepers. Direct telephone connection is said to exist between MACASSAR and TAKALAM, LIMBONG, MALINO, MARES and TJAIDA. At MACASSAR to the latter half of last year, mail was accepted, subject to censorship, for other parts of the NEI, letters costing 10 cents and post-cards 5 cents. Although Dutch designs (excepting those displaying the Queen's head) are used for stamps in other parts of the CELEBES, the Japanese have brought out special issues at MACASSAR. Some of the lower denominations are said to carry a picture of Mt FUJIMAMA. The 10-cent stamp has a red background with a black anchor and Japanese characters superimposed; the design for the 5 cent stamp is similar, except that the background is blue.

(e) Public Health

Unlike many other parts of the NEI, hospitalisation and clinical treatment are still available in the CELEBES for local inhabitants, though the supply of medicines is only fair to poor, and outside the main centres most people are dependent on herbs. Malaria, beri-beri, cholera, dysentery and tropical ulcers are the chief diseases, and the incidence is stated to have increased considerably since the Japanese occupation. Tuberculosis is also stated to be increasing. Scarcity of food, with attendant malnutrition, scarcity of medicines, and the inexplicable Japanese disregard for elementary hygiene which is observed everywhere in occupied territories, are the main reasons for the deterioration of public health. There are no regular sanitary services, though women, children, prisoners and occasionally able-bodied men may be rounded up from time to time to clean the streets. Judged by pre-war standards, the streets are in a filthy condition, and animals killed during air raids are left rotting indefinitely in the streets, polluting the air and attracting swarms of flies.

Hospital patients are charged fees, and patients have the choice of three classes of hospitalisation, with payments graduated accordingly. No money means no hospital attention. Food and attention, however, are so poor that many people who can afford to pay are reluctant to enter hospital. At MACASSAR, the former Dutch hospital is said to be staffed chiefly by Japanese, assisted by 20 Indonesians (possibly nurses).

An interesting sidelight was given by a BATAVIA broadcast of July 13, which indicated that the Japanese were trying to "pass the buck" to the Indonesians for the poor state of the health services. The announcement plausibly stated that the management of civilian hospitals in the CELEBES, formerly under the joint control of Japanese and Indonesian doctors, had been transferred completely to Indonesians as a first step towards independence. A new modern hospital, the announcement went on, was to be opened in MACASSAR under Dr J.S. RAVEL (spelling uncertain), a member of the Provincial Council, assisted by six other Indonesian doctors and about 20 Indonesian male and female nurses. It is more probable however, that the real reason for putting Indonesians in

charge of civilian hospitals is the shortage of medicines and the increasing difficulty of providing adequate treatment, for which the Japanese are anxious to escape the blame.

There is no information concerning the incidence of venereal disease, but brothels are said to be visited by a doctor once weekly. Several brothels occupied by about 20 Japanese women are stated to be located on the HOOGEWEG (MACASSAR), about 50 yards from the former Resident's house and the intersection of PARANG and KARADIAJAWEG. There are probably many other brothels in MACASSAR besides these, as 100 Javanese girls are said to have been imported and subsequently recruited as prostitutes in Aug 44.

(f) Education

Up to late last year there appears to have been no serious dislocation of educational services, but if conditions in MENADO (NORTH CELEBES) are any guide to conditions existing elsewhere, all schools were closed by March this year, and most of the children set to work in gardens to alleviate the food shortage. When schools were operative, attendance appears to have been free to Indonesians of school age. Besides the usual items in the curricula, the Japanese introduced the study of Japanese language and culture, and forbade any use of the Dutch language. Emphasis was also laid on physical and military training, and a good deal of time was taken up with cadet training and the use of firearms.

A large technical college for training Indonesians for the Japanese merchant marine was established in MACASSAR for recruits aged from 10 to 20 years, the course lasting six months and embracing seamanship, engineering and wireless telegraphy. It is believed, however, that Allied air attacks have forced the evacuation of the majority of the trainees to PARE PARE.

(g) Public Utilities and Transport

The MACASSAR power house was operating in Oct 44, supplying workshops and mills in the vicinity and providing electric lighting for those who could afford the rates. Domestic lights, however, had to be out by 2 P.M. Gas was available in better-class residences occupied by the Japanese.

The town water supply was still in operation, and there were no restrictions on the use of water.

At WATAMTORE, electricity for lights was still available. In Nov 44 rail services were discontinued, and about the same time taxis and three wheeled native vehicles disappeared from the streets. There is nothing to indicate whether bus services are still being maintained, but a skeleton service is probably in operation. Bicycles are seldom seen nowadays, due to a shortage of tyres.

II. POLICE AND ESPIONAGE

(a) Kempei Tai and Tokai Tai

As in other Navy-controlled areas, both the Kempei Tai (military police) and Tokubetsu Kaisatsutai Tai (naval police,

usually referred to as Tokei Tai) have been identified in the CELEBES.


The Kempei Tai and Tokei Tai have a much wider sphere of activity than our own military police, being important instruments of the Intelligence and counter-espionage policy of the Tokumu Kikan. It is not known whether their functions overlap, or whether their activities have been in some way divided.

The Tokei Tai has its headquarters in the former Dutch police office on GOA GOA WEG, MACASSAR. Agents are quietly placed in the civil police force, and in village communities, where they can keep their fingers on the pulse of the community. Ordinary cases of subversion are dealt with by the Tokei Tai, but all significant information is passed on to the Tokumu Kikan, which is interested in the wider aspects of public morale. The latter body, however, is a highly secret organisation and keeps well in the background. In JAPAN, it is an offence even to mention its name.

The acute spy consciousness characteristic of the Japanese has been noted by informants from MACASSAR. The Tokei Tai is stated to make prosecutions on the flimsiest of pretexts. Because a man had omitted to take in his washing and extinguish his kitchen fire during an air raid, he was immediately accused of being an Allied spy. Carelessness and forgetfulness are excuses which the Tokei Tai finds hard to accept.

Military police normally wear a white brassard with the Japanese characters for "MP" superimposed in red. Other types of brassard have also been observed, and there is some evidence that misleading badges are frequently worn in the interest of secrecy.

The Tokei Tai in the CELEBES is reported to wear a uniform similar to that of the Kempei. The distinguishing badge of the Navy - an anchor - is worn in front of a field service cap. On the collar, at the front, are two black metal, yellow-edged tabs; yellow flower emblems are also worn on the collar. Information from Dutch BORNEO, however, states that a white brassard with a red design illustrated opposite is worn on the left arm by members of the Tokei Tai.





(b) Civil Police

The Dutch civil police were retained by the Japanese after the occupation of MACASSAR as Minseibu police (Kaisatsu). There is some conflict of opinion concerning their uniforms. One source states that they wear the former NEI Government uniforms, but another holds that they were issued with RNI

army uniforms which had remained in store in the barracks. The latter source adds that in 1944 they were issued with new uniforms, consisting of short-sleeved khaki shirts, khaki shorts, stockings and boots. They continued to wear the former NEI police caps, but exchanged the shield and crown badge for one bearing the sakura (cherry blossom) emblem. Celebes police are said to be armed with a Dutch carbine and a klewang (native cutlass).

This body functions under the service police, which is the senior police organisation. Duties of the civil police include criminal matters, traffic control, health preservation, trade regulation and secret inquiry. The general impression seems to be that the civil police exercise their authority harshly.

Badges of rank are said to be worn by all Indonesian police on the left sleeve above the elbow, the general motif being a white sakura on a black background 6 cm square. This badge is worn by constables in front of their caps as well as on their sleeves. Badges worn by chief constables, inspectors and chief inspectors, respectively, carry one two and three chevrons above the badge. The Commander of Police (Saisatsu Tyo) also wears three chevrons above the badge, but of a wider type (see opposite). (Identifications made N. CELEBES).



(c) Special Service Organisation

Although it is known that the Tokumu Kikan headquarters for the Navy-controlled area is at MACASSAR, there is no information concerning the activities of its branches in the CELEBES. Australian military operations in Dutch BORNEO, however, have uncovered the activities of Tokumu Kikan branches there. It may be assumed that those operating in the CELEBES function similarly.

The Japanese PW who has supplied the following information states that the Navy's counterpart of Tokumu Kikan is known as Joho Kikan. According to his statement, Joho Kikan at BANDJERMASIN consisted of an investigation and propaganda section. The former section maintained records of the populace, took necessary measures in regard to counter-espionage, and posted agents in villages, offices and native shops (probably per medium of the Tokai Tai). The propaganda section consisted of 14 naval NCOs, 7 Japanese plainclothes detectives, 200 male Indonesians and a few Chinese. The Indonesians were assigned to the main civil and commercial offices, where they worked for about six months before moving to another office. The Chinese were usually members of the crews of small sailing ships. Duties of the propaganda section were mainly educational. Propaganda films were shown, and public lectures were given in the Japanese language and customs. School teachers were propagandists.

trained for the job at Kempei Tai headquarters at TOKIO. There were six such teachers at BANDJERBASIN, and students were unaware that their teachers were special agents. Joho Kikan co-operated with the Tokai Tai and military forces in connection with arrests, searches, etc.

III. PW AND INTERNEES

Available information indicates that civilians and ex-RNI Army personnel are the only classes of internees in SE CELEBES. The following camps have been referred to by informants :-

MACASSAR (at Kg SAMBONG DJATA, near the southern boundary of the town); Information dated Nov 44 indicates that there are 300-400 European internees and ex-RNI personnel. The latter were stated to be hard-worked, but appeared to be in good health.

PAKATO (05°15'S 119°30'E): Information dated Nov 44 indicates that there are 150 Ambonese ex-RNI Army PW here. They are stated to live at the village undisturbed by the Japanese.

KIMELI (not shown on any map, but stated to be about 9 kms SE of SOENGGOMINASA, which is on the railway line running southward from MACASSAR): Information dated Nov 44 states that Dutch women are interned here. Informant states that they were forced to grow their own food from seed supplied by the Japanese. A plough was provided, but as there were no beasts to pull it the women were forced to drag it round the field themselves. No provision was made for medical treatment, and contact with them was forbidden.

UNSPECIFIED HILL STATION (100 kms inland from MACASSAR) Dutch women's camp. Internees said to be living a normal life. (Oct 43)

FARE FARE: Information dated Aug 43 states that Dutch civilians are interned in the former Dutch military barracks.

IV. POLITICAL AND SOCIAL

(a) Social Life under Japanese Occupation

Though the Japanese have been inclined to regard the CELEBES as one of the "show pieces" of their southern territories, there is little to impress the Western visitor. The prevailing impression is one of drabness and hardship, with a strong undercurrent of fear and mistrust of the Japanese. The streets are almost devoid of traffic, schools are closed and public transport has been cut to the bone. Food and clothing are extremely short, except for those who are actively collaborating with the Japanese, and the residents of MACASSAR go about their daily work with pinched faces and tattered clothing. However, the clothing position here does not appear to be as acute as it is elsewhere in the Indies, but it was noticed in August last year that many people were wearing clothing made from plaited jute. The kopiah (native cap) is no longer being made from cloth, and reeds are being used as a substitute. Office workers - presumably Japanese - wear the usual white drill suits, with open or closed collars.

The residents of MACASSAR have a local newspaper, the "Pewartu Selebes", which may be purchased for 3 cents a copy. They have also a local radio station, and for the benefit of those who have no wireless sets there are loudspeakers at various points around the city. There is a picture theatre on MARAD-EKAWEG. The newspaper tells the people in Dutch Malay of Japanese victories and carries scarcely veiled threats of what happens to those who do not co-operate with the Japanese. The radio gives Japanese news propaganda, with an admixture of Indonesian music. Those who go to the picture theatre learn still further about Japanese military successes and economic progress in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. There are few avenues for innocent amusement, and the furthest the Japanese seem to have gone in this direction is in the production of a children's newspaper with a comic section. An illustration of how the Japanese policy of "all work and no play" has affected the morale of the population is afforded by the closure of the pony race track between SINDJAI and SULO-KO. Only one race meeting has been held here since the Japanese occupation, whereas before the Japanese came, meetings used to be held every Sunday and were quite a feature of community life. The closure of the track caused extreme annoyance.

The prevailing atmosphere of gloom is intensified by the public execution every now and then of some Indonesian suspected of working for the Allies. Spies are everywhere, reporting suspicious movements and anti-Japanese talk, and the spectre of a visit to the Kempei or Tokai office for interrogation and torture is ever-present in the minds of the population. The Japanese try to be friendly, but the Indonesians have little to thank them for. They remember the dislocation the Japanese have caused with their normal mode of life, the seizures of foodstuffs, and the exactions of forced labour. With their innate assumption of superiority, their injustice, their rigid temperament and their cruelty, the Japanese have earned nothing but the hatred of the majority of the civilised peoples of the SW CELEBES.

(b) Organisations of Inhabitants

The regimentation of social life through the Heko spy system (see ATIS Research Bulletin on this subject) operates in the CELEBES, as it does throughout the Japanese homeland and conquered territories. This system makes the preservation of the peace and the elimination of anti-Japanese talk a communal responsibility.

The youth organisation known as the SEINENDAN has been identified. Recruits are given military training, taught to spy on one another, and are used as a convenient source of labour and as auxiliary police. Sockarcla (who in JAVA and SUMATRA are regarded as voluntary militia) seem to be used merely as casual labourers. The Koi Ko (a labour corps in JAVA and SUMATRA) is, by a curious inversion of roles, the organisation most akin to the Javanese Sockarcla, and their alleged military exploits during the recent campaign in Dutch BORNEO have been played up by Japanese propagandists. Though they have been seen in the CELEBES wearing Dutch military uniform, or civilian clothing with a Japanese-type cap and some form of identification badge, they are labourers rather than soldiers, and work around Japanese barracks and on military roads and installations. In Navy-controlled areas they appear to be

given a fairly thorough training in military drill and the use of firearms so that they may be used as front-line troops in an emergency.

As the Japanese have some appropriate organisation for almost every phase of social life, there are doubtless many social organisations in addition to the quasi-military organisations referred to above. Their purpose, generally, is to facilitate control by the Japanese, to provide a source of labour or specialised service, and to act as a convenient receptacle for propaganda. One such organisation in MACASSAR is a so-called benevolent society known as BADAN PENGAWASAN KEAMANAN O.MOEM, which is under the direction of an Indonesian named NADJAMUDDIN DAENG MALEWA. Its objects are vaguely described as "co-operating with the Japanese", but according to one informant its activities included the provision of prostitutes for Japanese brothels.

(c) Religious Organisation

Their favouritism for Oriental culture inclines the Japanese towards the Mohammedans, but there is no persecution of the Christian faith. Services in Christian churches are not only permitted, but the Christian religion (which has been firmly boxed into an organisation controlled from TOKIO) is encouraged and exploited for propaganda purposes. The Japanese have stifled their natural antipathy towards Western culture in the interests of expediency.

The organisation embracing all Christian faiths, Catholic and Protestant, is known as the Nippon Kirisutokyodan (otherwise the Japanese Christian Religion). It was started early last year, when representatives were sent out to the CELEBES, BORNEO, the MOLUCCAS, JAVA, SUMATRA and MALAYA. However, it is in the CELEBES, particularly in the Northern CELEBES, that it has prospered the most. The organisation is under the firm control of the naval administration of the CELEBES and has no individuality. The name of the famous Japanese Christian leader KAGAWA, who is widely recognised as a sincere Christian, is not associated with it, although his name would have great propaganda value. This fact is significant.

The Japanese have found this organisation useful for carrying out social amelioration that would otherwise be the direct responsibility of the administration. By acknowledging the Christian religion, they have prevented the formation of clandestine religious associations and actively hostile groups. Further than this, the Japanese administration can use the religious organisations for the dissemination of subtler types of propaganda, and occasionally elicit assistance in administrative matters. For instance, a committee was set up within the last few months in the MACASSAR sub-organisation, ostensibly for the purpose of investigating the living conditions of "enemy" nationals and providing relief. The Domei report giving this information provides the key by explaining that the committee "will also assist to place clerks and typists with Japanese firms". In other words, clerks and typists who are ready and willing to collaborate with the Japanese are assured of speedy release from internment and an immediate improvement in their living standards. It is very doubtful whether those who remain adamant on the question of collaboration would obtain any better treatment through the good offices of the Japanese-Indonesian Christian Organisation.

When the Japanese occupied the CELEBES, they immediately suppressed the existing Muslim organisation and set up another under the leadership of Japanese. With the fall of OKINAWA and the imminent defeat of JAPAN, Japanese leadership was withdrawn with a flourish of propaganda about Indonesian race consciousness in the imminence of Indonesian independence. Foreshadowing this move was a propaganda announcement that an Islamic college would be opened in MACASSAR, staffed by graduates of the "world famous" AZEAL University in EGYPT, and providing a three-year course of instruction for Muslims. These moves came too late to be of any real value to the Japanese in winning the confidence of the Mohammedans, but on the long view they probably have a purpose. By promising the Mohammedans special consideration, the Japanese no doubt hope to leave a favourable impression of Japanese rule behind them; this intention is clearly behind the promise of independence for Indonesia, although they have lacked the courage to make a really impressive gesture.

V. ECONOMIC

(a) General

Living conditions in the SE CELEBES are very poor, although the poverty of the people is not as extreme as it is in some other parts of the INDIES. Many factors have contributed to this state of affairs. These include the dislocation of trade due to the destruction of seagoing vessels and a shortage of land transport; the destruction by bombing of food stores; the demands of the Japanese armed forces and resident Japanese, who have first claim on all food stocks; and the lack of encouragement to food producers, who are poorly paid and left with only the barest necessities for their own consumption.

Most of the trade in and around MACASSAR has been concentrated in the hands of the administration and Japanese monopolists, who buy produce at low prices and charge what the traffic will bear when reselling. The Japanese seem to take no pains to disguise their exploitation of the local peoples.

Clothing is virtually unobtainable, except by those who are collaborating actively with the Japanese, but it is sometimes offered by the Japanese in exchange for products they need. Students at the MACASSAR Training School for Merchant Seamen are given a pair of trousers and a shirt during their training period, and on graduating are given two sets of clothes after returning their training uniform.

The daily ration of rice in MACASSAR is said to be two litres per family irrespective of size, but the supply, being dependent on overland transport, seems to be irregular. At times purchasers are offered damaged rice from burned stores. The price of rice jumped from 5½ cents to 12 cents per kg in the period from the beginning of Japanese occupation to October last year. Vegetables were sold at 25 cents for a daily supply (pre-war, 5 cents), cassava, 35 cents per kg (5 cents), coffee, 96 cents per kg (30 cents), sugar 16 cents (6 cents). Vegetables, cassava and coffee are not rationed, but supplies of these are also poor. Salted and fresh fish are given only to the Japanese and those in their employ.

In MACASSAR, food and other commodities can be obtained only from four distributing agencies whose names are shown on the ration cards. Unrationed foodstuffs are displayed in the markets, but Indonesian civilians are not permitted to make their purchases until just before closing time, which is around 1700 hours. At NATAMPONG, all shops are closed and food stalls have disappeared from the streets.

Prices for foodstuffs, however, are stated to be cheaper at MACASSAR than at MINADO, according to an informant who has been in both places.

Native restaurants have been closed at PARE PARE, and it is stated that the only fare offering at these places elsewhere is coffee and fried bananas.

A labour regulation office has been established by the Japanese in MACASSAR. Coolies (who are called "Romousha" because it is said to sound better than "coolie") are paid from 25 cents to a guilder a day. Impressed labourers are fed but not paid.

The Japanese claimed that the population of MACASSAR was over 100,000 in Apr 44 despite air raids. Previous to this, it was claimed that the population had been increasing considerably, reaching a total of 125,000 by March 1943 -- an increase of 40,000 on the figure at the end of 1942. In most cities in the KEI, the Japanese claim that the population has enormously increased, and they infer that the increase is due to the prosperity of cities under Japanese occupation. The real reason is very different. The dislocation of economic life under Japanese occupation has caused large numbers of unemployed and starving labourers to converge on the big cities in search of food and shelter. By April 1944, it appears, a reverse motion had been set in train, due to heavy air raids and the shortage of food and shelter which had then become more acute. There is no recent information to indicate the present position in regard to these migratory trends.

(b) Finance, Currency and Banking

After the first year of occupation, Dutch currency was replaced by Japanese paper money in denominations ranging from one cent to 10 guilders. Dutch money was called in, but many people were undeterred by the penalties provided and retained their savings. Possibly in deference to the value placed by people in silver currency, the Japanese brought out a small aluminium-coloured coin, which was so light that it would float on water. The people have no confidence in Japanese currency, partly because of their lack of faith in the Japanese and partly because it can be used to purchase so few commodities. The inflationary tendencies that have developed since the Japanese occupation are evident in prices paid on the black market, where Indian sarongs were selling in mid-1944 for prices ranging from 75 to 100 guilders. To get as much as possible of the surplus currency out of circulation, the Japanese continue to encourage saving. The post office savings bank at MACASSAR is still operating, and people are encouraged to invest their money on fixed deposit at the MACASSAR branch of the Bank of TAIWAN. An investor requires 100 guilders to make an initial deposit and is paid interest at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

(c) Commerce and Industry

Japanese firms and the administration have a virtual monopoly of all trade, which allows them to squeeze the population to the utmost. Japanese firms work in very close co-operation with the naval administration, not only in the matter of trade, but in regard to espionage and propaganda activities. One of the chief trading concerns in MACASSAR is MITSUI OSEKA KAI, whose offices are at the house of the former Major of Chinese at MACASSAR (TSEONG LIONG HOEI, now deceased). This firm appears to have a monopoly of sea trading, and to exercise control over all native ships. Travellers are required to obtain permits from the office of MITSUI OSEKA KAI, which has as its emblem a red circle with a red cross in the centre, known locally as "Tjap Road" or "trademark wheel".

Another firm known as NISSAN OSEKA KAI has been referred to by interrogees. This appears to be connected with the above and to handle matters dealing with the purchase of commodities from natives.

The dry fish business is in the hands of a firm known as TAINDO or TOINDO.

Nothing is known of the activities of the pre-war concern known as the GILLES COLONISING COMPANY, which is a branch of the SOUTH SEAS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. Ostensibly concerned with copra trading, it appeared little concerned by the failure of the copra market and had long been suspected of espionage activities.

In the area of MACASSAR the Japanese have established cotton mills, a cement factory (said to be working 24 hours a day) and a paper mill. The only information concerning the latter comes from a TOKIO broadcast, which states that work was commenced in May last year and early this year the plant was supplying half the district's requirements of coarse toilet paper. A very good quality paper, the broadcast claimed, was now being produced from kapok and bark fibres without the use of caustic soda and other chemicals previously considered essential.

The establishment of cotton mills follows upon the official stimulation of cotton production, and although claims have been made by Japanese propagandists concerning the growth of the cotton industry in the GILLES it appears that the industry can do little more than supply the needs of the Japanese themselves - and there is no evidence that it is doing this adequately. It is not clear whether the mills are power or hand-operated.

The ship-building yards at MACASSAR are famous throughout the INDIES, and the sturdy wooden products of these yards carried a considerable trade in peace time. These yards and the yards at PARE PARE have been seriously damaged by bombing attacks. Photographs taken in January this year show that no attempt had been made up to that time to rebuild the ship-building area at PARE PARE, which had been almost completely destroyed the previous October. Small wooden ships of the Sugar-Charlie class were being built here before the attack. However, it was noticed in January that a new timber pool was being formed about half a mile south-east of the original pool, and that one large building - probably a

timber mill - and eight smaller structures were located in the vicinity.

Even before the attack on PARE PARE, the shipping position had become so acute that the Japanese were resorting to rafts for sea transport. A Japanese propaganda broadcast stated that a raft measuring 100 metres by 50 metres arrived at MACASSAR "from overseas" on 28 May 44. The broadcast added that "rafts such as these will greatly ease the shipping problem".

(d) Agriculture

The Japanese have severely exploited all classes of agriculturists. They take as much as 80 per cent of the rice crop at a cost of 3 cents a litre, and frequently the remaining 20 per cent is insufficient for the grower and his family to live on. In this case, he has the alternative of increasing his crop (and 80 per cent of this increase would also be taken by the Japanese), or of buying from the stores at three to four times the price he has been paid by the Japanese for his own produce.

The production of food crops has also been affected by the diversion of land and labour to the growing of cotton. Seeds are issued free to village heads by a firm in MACASSAR known as B.S.K.K., and villagers are ordered to plant them in specified areas. The crop is delivered to the Japanese, and what little evidence is available suggests that no payment is made. Owing to unsuitable climate and soil, many of the bushes are reported to have died.

Large areas of tapioca and maize are under cultivation.

The produce of the vegetable gardens around MACASSAR is sold to Japanese agents in the markets, who auction it to stall holders in MACASSAR and adjacent villages.


Only small quantities of damar, rattan, coconut oil, coffee and areka nuts are sold to the Japanese, prices paid being too low to encourage trade. A certain amount of coconut oil, however, is manufactured for sale among friends. The small trade turnover effected is mainly with the Toradjas in the up-country areas, but when freight charges are deducted from the prices received there is very little profit.

(e) Fisheries

Fish undergoes the same trade process as vegetables. It is purchased by Japanese middlemen and auctioned to stall holders in MACASSAR and adjacent villages. A large proportion is set aside for drying and salting. Fishermen encounter the identical hardships of rice-growers, the Japs requisitioning the quantities that they need at pre-war rates, without caring whether the fisherman is left a sufficient quantity for his needs. His hardships are further increased by a shortage of fishing tackle. Fish production has fallen off so badly that the Japanese have begun to breed fish in salt ponds for their own use. Tacitly admitting the shortage, Tokio Radio announced on 8 Feb 45 that 10 tons of fish a month would be imported into MACASSAR from JAVA for the consumption of residents. Whatever imports may have been made, the Japanese residents and their collaborators doubtless received a share, but judging by the general treatment of the local population it may be taken for granted that they would be very lucky to get any.

VI. ENEMY AGENTS AND COLLABORATORS

There is very little information concerning the names of Japanese agents and collaborators in the SW CELEBES. The Sultan of BONE, according to Japanese propaganda, has been an active collaborator, but there is no independent testimony against him. Many village chiefs in the Sultanate appear to treat their villagers well. However, PIDATOE KONGKONG (a Bogginese woman, "Arco" of Salomeko) is stated to be pro-Japanese and to treat villagers badly. The Indonesian deputy-mayor of MACASSAR is said to be NADJAOEDJIN DAENG MALEWA, a Macassarese. He is also alleged to be the leader of a so-called benevolent society in MACASSAR, known as BADAN PENGAWASAN KEANAKAN ORMOEM, which is alleged to provide prostitutes for Japanese brothels. The supervisor of FARE-FARE prefecture is also said to be a native leader. In Dec 43 a Dr I.S. RATOELANGI was said to be acting as adviser to the Japanese naval C in C at MACASSAR.





PARE - PARE

S.W. CELEBES

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
INFORMATION COLLATED BY GSI (t) 1 AUST CORPS
FROM ALL AVAILABLE SOURCES
BOMB DESTRUCTION AS AT 1 JUN 45



GSI (t) 1 AUST CORPS.
6 SEP. 45.

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PINRANG
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APPENDIX "E"
 TO I AUST CORPS SPECIAL
 INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
 No 4 - BW CELEBES




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

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A. M. S. 1041 (1st Edition, 1943)
Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army,
by the Army Map Service, Indianapolis, Ind. 1943
Data Project Administration Project O. P. 155-100
Compiled from Netherlands Topographic Service maps of
Celebes and Dependencies (Southwest) 1:50,000, 1914-1923

LEGEND

Primary Highways ———— Bamboo
Secondary Highways ———— Rice Paddy
Improved Roads ———— Palm
Unimproved Roads ———— Woodland
Trail and Cart Tracks - - - - -
Primary Military Airfield ○
Secondary Civil Airfield ⊕
Emergency Field +



CONTOUR INTERVAL 100 FEET
POLYCONIC PROJECTION
N. E. 1. EQUATORIAL ZONE GRID (Blue)
Projection: Lambert Conformal Conic
Origin: Equator & 110° East
False Co-ordinates: 3,900,000 meters East
Scale Factor: 999,997

HEIGHTS IN FEET


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POLYCONIC PROJECTION
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TO GIVE A GRID REFERENCE ON THIS SHEET			
LETTER: Must be used for this sheet. Give a four figure grid reference from A-J and 1-10. For example, the full coordinates are 119°00' E, 5°00' N. USE ONLY THE LETTERS PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OR ON THE FACE OF THE MAP.			
POINT III A		LETTER K	
East	4	North	1
East	8	North	4
East	12	North	7
East	16	North	10
East	20	North	13
East	24	North	16
East	28	North	19
East	32	North	22
East	36	North	25
East	40	North	28
East	44	North	31
East	48	North	34
East	52	North	37
East	56	North	40
East	60	North	43
East	64	North	46
East	68	North	49
East	72	North	52
East	76	North	55
East	80	North	58
East	84	North	61
East	88	North	64
East	92	North	67
East	96	North	70
East	100	North	73
East	104	North	76
East	108	North	79
East	112	North	82
East	116	North	85
East	120	North	88
East	124	North	91
East	128	North	94
East	132	North	97
East	136	North	100

NO. 46 MAKASSAR
5500 E11900/30

001158F







A.M.S. 7641
First Edition (A.M.S. 1) 1942
Second Edition (A.M.S. 2) 1944
Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, by the
Army Map Service (14), Washington, D. C., 1944. Compiled from
Census 2: 10 000 Topographic Detail 1923 1930.
Netherlands Hydrographic Charts 144: 1440, 1441, 1939.

LEGEND

- | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| Impervious # of square feet..... | |
| Impervious by street front..... | |
| Taxing..... | |
| Department Number (if known)..... | Different use than Department use may |
| Department boundary (Sketch map)..... | |
| Neighborhood boundary (Sketch map)..... | |
| District boundary (Sketch map)..... | |
| Tree canopy..... | |
| Soil..... | |
| Common tree types..... | |
| Road, ward name (fill in)..... | |
| Scale..... | |
| Parking ground..... | |
| Phonebank number (see note)..... | |
| Note..... | |
| Environmental Information..... | |
| Specialty survey area..... | |



Scale 1:125,000



CONTOUR INTERVAL 100 METERS

PSYCONIC PROJECTION	
H. E. J. EQUATORIAL ZONE GRID (Blue)	
Projection	1-sphere (Conical Orthographic)
Reference	Bessel
Longitude	Equator & 110°E
False Cyl Origin(s)	3 100 000 meters East
of Origin	900 000 meters North
Scale Factor	997

HEIGHTS IN METERS

GLOSSARY 50000 F

- [illegible]


The numerals which follow (and are not shown) are just
of an arbitrary numbering system established by the
British in distinction between lines of different names.

TO HAVE A GROUP MEETING ON THE STREET LETTER SENT TO ALL THE GROUP MEMBERS REMARKS: THE GROUP MEMBERS WERE TOLD THAT THE MEETING WAS ON THE STREET AND THAT THEY SHOULD GO THERE AT THE TIME SPECIFIED. THE GROUP MEMBERS WERE TOLD THAT THE MEETING WAS ON THE STREET AND THAT THEY SHOULD GO THERE AT THE TIME SPECIFIED.	
NAME: [REDACTED] ADDRESS: [REDACTED] CITY: [REDACTED] STATE: [REDACTED] ZIP: [REDACTED] DATE: [REDACTED] SIGNATURE: [REDACTED]	

MAKOERING

5500-E11930/30

001159G



War Diary

APPX 'K'

UNIT CENSOR STAMPS

HQ 1 Aust Corps
11 Sep 45
GSI/1547/27/4

1. The use of Unit Censor Stamps will now be discontinued.
2. Army Post Office postmarker is sufficient for entitlement of concession rate postage.
3. Please recall all Unit Censor Stamps held by your formation or unit and return to this HQ.
4. Nil returns will be submitted.

C. H. Evans Maj
for Brig.
GS 1 Aust Corps.

DISTRIBUTION:

7 Aust Div
9 Aust Div
26 Aust Inf Bde
RAA 1 Aust Corps
RAE 1 Aust Corps Tps
'A' Aust Corps Sigs
HQ Comd 1 Aust Corps Tps AASC
1 Aust Combined Ops Sec
5 Aust Fd Svy Coy
2/1 Aust Topo Svy Coy
'U' Aust FS Sec
1 Aust Visitors and Observers Sec
1 Aust Corps Fd Cash Office
1 Aust Corps Postal Unit
1 Aust Armd Div Pro Coy
1 Aust Corps Sal Unit
1 Aust Corps Det Unit Maint. Inspection Sec
'G'
Camp
AO

APPX L

MESSAGE OUT

FROM: 1 CORPS

Date-Time of Origin 11/7/45 I

TO: LANDOPS 1 CORPS SEC INT CORPS
 1 OP REPORT TEAM 1 CORPS ATIS ADV ECH
 1 COMBINED OPS SEC 1 CORPS DET 1 AAPI GP
 1 CORPS DET DPR 'U' FS SEC
 1 FLT 1 MOB MET SQN HQ COMD 1 CORPS TPS AASC
 1 MH FD TEAM A COY 2/12 FD AMB
 LHQ GS EQPT FD SEC 11 MCU
 HQ RAA 1 CORPS 290 IAD
 5 FD SVY COY 319 IAD
 2/1 TOPO SVY COY 1 CORPS FD CASH OFFICE
 HQ A CORPS SIGS 1 CORPS POSTAL UNIT
 HQ 22 L OF C SIGS 1 ARMD DIV PRO COY
 3 ARTY SIG TP SIB DET 1 CORPS
 63 WIRELESS SEC 1 VISITORS AND OBSERVERS SEC
 23 PL 2/1 GD REGT

INFO: 7 DIV 9 DIV 26 BDE

SD1854 (.) unclassified (.) HQ 1 corps closes at 151200I sep 45 (.)
 at the same time following units come under direct comd adv LHQ (.)

HQ 1 Corps	1 Corps Sec Int Corps
1 Op Report Team	1 Corps ATIS Adv Ech
1 Combined Ops Sec	1 Corps Det 1 AAPI Gp
1 Corps Det Public Relations	U FS Sec
1 Flt 1 Mob Met Sqn	HQ Comd 1 Corps Tps AASC
1 MH Fd Team	A Coy 2/12 Fd Amb
LHQ GS Eqpt Fd Sec	11 MCU
HQ RAA 1 Corps	290 IAD
5 Fd Svy Coy	319 IAD
2/1 Topo Svy Coy less det	1 Corps Fd Cash Office
HQ A Corps Sigs with all secs	1 Corps Postal Unit
at present under its comd and	1 Armd Div Pro Coy
290 IAD	SIB Det 1 Corps
HQ 22 L of C Sigs with all secs	1 Visitors and Observers Sec
at present under its comd	
3 Arty Sig Tp RAA	
63 Wireless Sec	
23 Pl 2/1 Gd Regt	

This message may be sent as WRITTEN

Originators Instructions
 Degree of Priority

Signed *A. J. Wall* Maj

SDS

Distributed by GS 11 Sep 45:

PA to GOC	CE	Ord	War Graves
G (Int)	SVY	DADOS 1 Corps Tps	Education
DA&QMG	CSO	EME	Amenities
A	Chaplains	Catering	Sal
Q	ST	Legal	Camp
ACMG(E)	Medical	Postal	File
DAMS	Dental	Pro	War Diary (2) ✓

900X - 17

MESSAGE OUT

FROM :: 1 CORPS Date - Time of Origin 11/7/45

TO :: 7 DIV 9 DIV 26 BDE

INFO :: LANDOPS 1 TAF RAAF ADRAAFCOM NOIC MOLUCCAS

SD1855(.) restricted (.) WEF 151200I sep 7 DIV 9 DIV and 26 BDE pass
from comd 1 corps to comd adv LHQ (.) HQ 1 corps closes at the same
time

This message may be sent
AS WRITTEN by any means
incl wireless.

B. J. Wall
THW

Distributed by GS 11 Sep 45

PA to GOC	Ord
G (Int)	DADOS 1 Corps Tps
DA & QMG	EME
A	Catering
Q	Legal
AQMG(E)	Postal
DAMS	Pro
CE	War Graves
Svy	Education
CSO	Amenities
Chaplains	Sal
ST	Camp
Med	File
Dental	War Diary (2) ✓

War Day

17/11/45

SECRET

Copy No. 66

1 AUST CORPS
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY

No 5

KAI TANIMBAR & AROE ISLANDS

12 SEPT 45 * GSI 1 AUST CORPS

1 AUST CORPS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.5 -

KAI, TANIMBAR and AROE ISLANDS

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- MAP - SELAROE ISLAND WEST
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- AERONAUTICAL SHEET - KAI, TANILBAR, AROE ISLANDS

PART 1

ENEMY

1. GENERAL

Following the occupation of BABO in DUTCH NEW GUINEA the Japanese moved forward and established bases on the main islands of the ARAFURA SEA, namely the KAI, AROE and TANIMBAR Islands. The main consideration was given to the preparation of airfields from which they could cover the approaches to northern AUSTRALIA, and, as a result, activity and concentration of troops has been centred on airfield groups.

Since early 1944, the airfields throughout the area have fallen into disuse and as the combat forces held in the islands were serving no useful purpose a program of withdrawal west came into operation. This gradual withdrawal has been in progress for some time but was more or less terminated on 3 Aug 45 when the hospital ship TACHIBANA MARU was intercepted in the BANDA SEA whilst carrying 1500 evacuees from TOEAL.

2. STRENGTHS BY AREAS

GOC 2 Army has advised that the forces under Japanese control in the KAI, AROE and TANIMBAR Islands total the following:-

Japanese Army personnel	9,033	
" Navy "	<u>640</u>	9,673
Japanese civilians	203	
Formosans	1,031	
Indonesian labourers	<u>1,155</u>	<u>2,389</u>
		<u>12,062</u>

Although the actual disposition of these personnel is not known, it is estimated that the Army and Navy personnel are distributed as follows:

KAI ISLANDS	4,000
AROE ISLANDS	2,850
TANIMBAR ISLANDS	2,850

3. DISPOSITIONS

Information from GOC 2 Army in addition to that previously held shows the following main dispositions in the islands:-

KAI ISLANDS:

Rear HQ 5 DIV: (CofS: MAJ.GEN. MARUCHI, Itsuo)
 2 Bn 11 Inf Regt
 1 Bn 42 Inf Regt
 1 Bn 5 Arty Regt
 1 Coy 5 Engr Regt

AROE ISLANDS:

HQ 21 Inf Regt (COMD: COL SASAKI, Yoshio)
1 Bn 21 Inf Regt
3 Bn (-9 Coy) 5 Arty Regt
3 Coy 5 Engr Regt
Part 4 Fd Hosp

TANIMBAR ISLANDS:

HQ 42 Inf Regt: (COMD: COL KIKAWA, Akira)
1 Bn 42 Inf Regt
2 Bn (-4 Coy) 5 Arty Regt

In addition to the above the following units are located in the islands although specific locations are not known:

Part 44 Fd AA Bn
50 Indep Fd AA Bty
3 Indep Engr Regt (Part)
190 L of C MT Coy
2 Water Purif Unit
Fd Ord Depot)
Fd MT Depot) Parts only
Fd Freight Depot)
1 Sea Tpt Bn (elements)
4 Shipping Engr Regt)
7 " " " ") Elements only
14 " " " ")
15 Airfield Coy
27 Airfield Coy
31 Airfield Coy
118 Airfield Constr Unit
25 Base Force (part)
5 Guard Force (part)
7 Guard Force (part)
25 Naval Air Def Unit
35 " " " "
36 " " " "

4. RESOURCES

No information is held which might give an indication of the extent of enemy resources - whether of food, medical supplies, POL or transport - in the KAI, AROE or TANIMBAR ISLANDS.

The only information supplied by the delegation from 2 Army in this regard was that there are very few small craft available in the area.

5. DEFENCES: See Map attached as Appendix 'A'.

KAI ISLANDS: The enemy concentrated the bulk of his forces in the TOEAL-LANGGOER area and in the vicinity of the airfields at LEFTOAR, FAAN, DOEROA, DOELAH and LANGGOER, and it can be expected that the bulk of defences are also located in these sectors. Although the airfields have fallen into disuse, AA fire was encountered from several positions in Feb 45.

AROE ISLANDS: The main shipping anchorages are at DOBO and TABERFANE and HQ for the area appears to have been established at DOBO.

A group of airfields were located east of NGAIBOR on TRANGAN Island and although they never at any time reached important grading no doubt a number of troops have been held in this sector.

-3-

No AA defences are known to exist but photos taken in Sep 44 revealed some coast defences including two 75 mm guns at NGAIBOR.

TANIMBAR ISLANDS: The main concentrations in these islands have been at LARAT in the north, SAUMLAKI on the southern tip of JAMDENA Island and at ADAOET and LINGAT Bays on SELAROE Island.

Although some patrols may have ventured along the east coast of JAMDENA Island from SAUMLAKI, the main activity has been the movement by small craft bringing supplies from LARAT to SAUMLAKI and SELAROE Island.

There are no known defences in these islands.

PART II

ALLIED PW AND LOCAL INHABITANTS

ALLIED PW

1. LOCATION OF CAMPS

PW camps have been reported from time to time to exist as follows:

AROE ISLANDS

Nil

TANIMBAR ISLANDS

SELAROE ISLAND:

JAMDENA ISLAND:

ADAOET BAY

SAUHLAKI

AYER BESAR

LAOERANG

KAI ISLANDS

KAI DOELAH ISLAND

2. NUMBERS OF ALLIED PW

It is believed that all PW were to be evacuated from the eastern NEI and the report of the Japanese Mission to MANILA failed to reveal the existence of any Allied PW in the camps listed above.

As, however, PW have since been found to be held in AMBON CERAH, despite belief to the contrary, it is clear that only the local Japanese commanders know the exact position in regard to PW held in areas under their control.

Thus, although GOC 2 Army has no information concerning PW in the KAI AROE TANIMBAR Islands, some may well be present.

Earlier reports held suggest that the maximum numbers of PW likely to be encountered are:

KAI ISLANDS

25 NEI

TANIMBAR ISLANDS

800 NEI.

LOCAL INHABITANTS

3. POPULATION

The estimated total population of each of the groups of islands is as follows:

TANIMBAR ISLANDS

35000

KAI ISLANDS

60000

AROE ISLANDS

20000

Only a few hundreds in each case are other than local natives. These few hundreds comprise in the main Chinese with some Indonesians from other parts of NEI.

In the TANIMBARs the population is concentrated in the following localities while the remaining areas are virtually uninhabited:

SELAROE Island

East coast and NE peninsula JAMDENA Island

SEIRA Island

FORDATE Island

MOLOE Island

MILAK Island.

More than half the population of the KAI Islands live in the Great Kai Group, while 7000 live in the KOER DREI Group, 9000 in the RAJIDOE Group and 12000 in the Little Kai Group.

4. RACIAL CHARACTERISTICS

AROE ISLANDS

The Aroenese are a very primitive people, of Papuan origin and mostly pagan, with a number of Christians and Mohammedans. The pagans have rarely engaged in warfare but are a friendly and obedient people. The natives at DOBO speak Malay as well as their own language but elsewhere the knowledge of Malay is poor.

KAI ISLANDS

The Kaians are primitive in general culture but less than a third are still pagan, the remainder being divided equally between Christians and Mohammedans. They are normally a friendly people, although bloody internal warfare was only checked by the Dutch comparatively recently.

TANIMBAR ISLANDS

The Tanimbarese are also of mixed Alfur stock, with a preponderance of Papuan characteristics, including dark skin and fuzzy hair. They are primitive and lazy and mostly pagan.

They formerly fought savagely amongst themselves and indulged at one time in cannibalism. Now drunkenness is prevalent amongst them.

Most of the younger people speak Malay but there five other languages spoken in this group.

5. ATTITUDE OF NATIVES

AROE ISLANDS

The pagan Aroenese will probably have submitted quietly to the Japanese. The Christians, however, are strongly pro Dutch and have resisted the Japanese. The Mohammedans, however, expected to profit from the Japanese rule and have probably been armed by them.

KAI ISLANDS

The large number of Mohammedans in these islands means that, in all likelihood, the bulk of the population is either friendly or neutral to the Japanese.

TANIMBAR ISLANDS

Sections of the population resented the Japanese imprisonment and killing of priests but generally the population is thought to be rather apathetic to the Japanese occupation.

6. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Pre War

These islands were included in the TCEAL Division of the Residency of the MOLUCCAS.

The Asst. Resident of the Division was stationed at TOEAL in KAI ISLANDS. Each group comprised a separate subdivision, each under a Controleur.

The Controleurs were stationed as follows:

KAI ISLANDS	TOEAL
TANIMBAR ISLANDS	SAUMLAKI
AROE ISLANDS	DOBO.

As elsewhere in the NEI, the village is the unit of native administration, with a village council comprising the Village Chief (Crang Kaja), heads of the nobility (Kepala soa) and other functionaries according to native law.

Under Japanese Administration

Nothing is known of the Japanese administration of the area, but, based on experience elsewhere, the framework of the existing administration has probably been retained and the administrative and police systems brought under Japanese control.

TOPOGRAPHY.

KAI ISLANDS - 'A'

1. GENERAL (Map Appx 'C')

KAI Islands consist of some 46 islands and islets and may be divided into four groups as follows:-

- (a) KOER Island: Together with the KAIMER group some six miles north and the DRIE GEBROEDERS group about 11 miles south of KOER Island. This chain of islands running roughly north/south, lies about 40 miles west of TOEAL. All are low coral islands, except KOER, which reaches an elevation of nearly 1,400 ft. Most of the population is concentrated in KOER.
- (b) The TAJANDOE Group: Of nine low, densely wooded coral islands and islets of very irregular shape and surrounded by wide coral reefs. The group lies approximately 25 miles west of TOEAL, and the larger islands are inhabited.
- (c) The NOEHOE ROWA (or LITTLE KAI) Group: Of some 30 coral islands and islets, the largest of which is NOEHOE ROWA, 22 miles by seven miles. The next largest island is KAI DOELAH, off the NE end of NOEHOE ROWA and separated from it by a very narrow channel. TOEAL, the largest settlement and administrative centre of the entire KAI Group, is situated on the west coast of KAI DOELAH Island, just north of the narrowest portion of ROSENBERG Strait.
- (d) NOEHOE TJOET (or GREAT KAI) Island; and a few very small islands near to its shores. NOEHOE TJOET is 48 miles long and a little over five miles in its widest part. It is mountainous and very rugged. Its mountains reach 1,720 ft in the south and 2,650 ft in the north, rising steeply from the east coast but sloping more gently to the sea in the west. Both coasts are well populated. The population is estimated at 30,000 of which a few are pagans, about 30 per cent Mohammedan and the remainder Christians. They live in prosperous villages along the coast. The interior of the island is uninhabited. ELAT, second largest settlement in the KAI group, is located at the head of the Bay of ELAT, near the centre of the west coast. Of the whole KAI group, the islands of NOEHOE ROWA, KAI DOELAH and NOEHOE TJOET are the most important because of their larger populations and general development.

Table of Distances Direct from TOEAL (nautical miles)

NERAUKI	480 miles
DARWIN	420 "
DOBO	88 "
SAUMLAKI	160 "
DILLI	465 "
KOEPANG	610 "
AMBON	297 "
MOROTAI	540 "
BALIKPAPAN	980 "
MAKASSAR	800 "

2. ANCHORAGES

- (a) TOELAL: Off TOELAL, and northward of it, there is a sheltered anchorage area nearly two miles long, north and south, and a least width of $3\frac{1}{2}$ cables, with depths of 9-15 fathoms. A beacon used to stand on the end of the shallow spit extending northward from the point just westward of the township. The anchorage generally used is in 11-13 fathoms with that point bearing 167 degrees.
- (b) DOELAH: A safe anchorage may be obtained off DOELAH Village during the SE monsoon. A depth of 19 fathoms is reported a quarter of a mile off the village. During the NW monsoon violent squalls occur, accompanied by a short sea. Vessels should then anchor temporarily southward of the reef lying off the eastern end of DOE ROWA Island.
- (c) LANGGOER: ROSENBERG Strait, between NOEHOE ROWA and KAI DOELAH is a winding channel $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in width at its southeastern end, but decreases to about 100 yds between the Catholic Mission Headquarters at LANGGOER and TOELAL. The channel is not more than 18 inches deep at its shallowest point and is, therefore, navigable only for prahus and small launches at high water. To the south east of LANGGOER there is good anchorage in depths of 8 to 9 fathoms, but the southeastern entrance to ROSENBERG Strait is so narrow, shallow and crooked, that the anchorage is not used by vessels drawing over 6 feet. All larger ships bound for LANGGOER anchor off TOELAL.
- (d) WATLAN: The reef on the eastern side of KAI DOELAH is steep-to but the Pilot says that anchorage may be found in 20 fathoms of water.
- (e) TELOK OEF: In the inlet of TELOK OEF, on the southern coast of NOEHOE ROWA, there is an anchorage protected against both monsoons. Minimum depths are 5 to 6 fathoms. The inner part of OEF Bay is largely surrounded by flat and swampy shores with mangrove swamps, but near the entrance the coast is steep-to and here KAMPONG OEF stands on the eastern side, and KAMPONG OHOITOM, with a church on the western side. There is also anchorage in the bight westward of TELOK OEF between CAPE ARAT and CAPE DOAN, off the village of OHOIDEER TOETOET.
- (f) OHIRA: An anchorage occasionally used by schooners is off the village in depth (from the chart) of $5\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms. There is fair protection in all seasons and ample swinging room.
- (g) TOTCAD Road: The west coast of NOEHOE ROWA, south of SALAER village, forms a wide bight (SOENGAI SERBAI) narrowing to a creek, which penetrates the island deeply in a southerly direction almost to its southern coast. There is good anchorage off WAHROE Island, west of the entrance in 9 to 18 fathoms over a width of $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile. A small jetty at Kg. TOTCAD can accommodate launches and prahus. Further south there is a second jetty at the village of LETFOEAR. The small flat island of TOAD in the bight is inhabited.
- (h) NGILGOF
It is known that vessels on the KPM have anchored off the headland here to load copra from barges which were loaded at the beach in NGILGOF Bay. Anchorage depth is not known but the chart shows deep water.

- (1) DOE ROWA Island: There is good anchorage area off the SE side of the island where the fringing reef is narrowest. This stretch of coast lies between the SE end of the two runways of the airfield. There is no beach here and the shore consists of cliffs 25-30 feet high. DOE ROWA Strait has a navigable width of about 700 yards with an average depth of 25 fathoms in the centre. On the northern side of the navigable channel is the reef which extends westward and southward from DOE ROWA Island, and also a detached reef lying a little further southward at the western entrance. These reefs were marked by two beacons, both of which are left close northward when passing through the strait.
- (j) ELAT (NOEHOE TJOET Island): Main anchorage on the west coast of NOEHOE TJOET is at ELAT Bay. It was a regular place of call for KPM vessels. The bay affords fairly safe anchorage in both monsoons, being safe from all except northerly winds. These, however, are frequent during the NW monsoon so that the harbour is not rated very highly by ships' masters at these times. The bay is roughly circular, with a diameter of about 1 1/2 miles, and an anchorage in 13-16 fathoms. There are several rocky patches in the bay, which in peace time were well marked by beacons and buoys. A stone jetty, about 110 yds long, projects from the point on the NW side of ELAT.

3. LANDING FACILITIES AT IMPORTANT PLACES

- (a) DOELAH: At DOELAH, during HW, Japanese barges used to load and unload at the beach on either side of the jetty. Motor trucks were unloaded straight on to the beach, the sand being hard enough to carry them even when loaded. These operations had to be carried out quickly as the landing barges were not allowed to stay at the beach for longer than half an hour. (Whether this was a precaution against our air attacks, or because the ebb tide would strand barges is not known.) Two masted wooden ships, with an estimated 6 ft draught, came alongside the head of the jetty. This jetty is built of coral and is about 300 ft long. It crosses the fringing reef to deep water and is about 10-12 ft wide. It is wide enough for only one truck at a time, but the widened head could take two trucks. Stores were transferred direct from the ship to the trucks. Several large waringin trees at the foot of the jetty should form a useful guide to landing craft. The foreshore is all sand and dries for 80-90 yards. At HW the sand beach is 2-3 yards wide. The village of DOELAH, at the foot of the jetty, comprises some 80-90 huts and has a large mosque. The largest of the waringin trees at the foot of the jetty has a look-out platform, but this was seldom manned. The village was used for the storage of large quantities of supplies. The old footpath which runs SW from the village to NGADI and on to TOEL has been improved into a MT road, which, however, is wide enough to take only one truck at a time. It has been widened at places to allow vehicles to pass. Just south of NGADI, a branch road leads to the west end of the DOELAH runway.
- (b) TOEL (See Appx 'B') TOEL, the administrative centre of the K.I Islands, was formerly a thriving, but very small, settlement with few European inhabitants and an insignificant population of Islanders and native Kaiose. From the air the settlement at LANGGOER, a few miles to the South,

appears much more impressive than TOEL. In the town are the residences of the Assistant Resident, Contreleur, several minor government officers, police barracks, a small customs house, hospital and jail, a Catholic school, a native market place and a small native settlement. Fronting the northern part of the village is a small coral boat pier with a white cupola on which there is a flagpole. It is large enough for barges and launches only. Westward of the village is a white godown with a small jetty, alongside which a launch cannot go at low water.

- (c) LEBETAU (KAI DOELAH Island): LEBETAU Village consists of about 20 huts under coconut trees. There is a large waringin tree on the edge of the beach about the middle of the village and it should be possible to pick this out from some distance to sea. A coconut plantation with a depth of about 80 yards adjoins the beach for 550 yards north of the big tree. At the northern end of the plantation there is a T-shaped building in a clearing. The coastal track, eight feet wide, runs about 30 yards from the shore under the coconut trees. This track continues northward past the T-shaped building to the village of TAMEDIAN, near CAPE SERBAT. Farther inland, behind the coconut plantation, the terrain is covered with scrub and taller trees. Behind the village the bush is sparse and beyond this is a cultivated area. About 100 yards south of the big tree is the stone jetty 270 feet long and about 12 feet wide. A T-head about 45 feet long has been built on the end of it. The jetty crosses the reef to deep water. Southward of the jetty, the coast track runs very close to a suitable landing beach and continues to DOELAH, 1½ miles to the south. The terrain adjacent to the beach for several hundred yards south of the jetty is covered with low scrub for a depth of 300 yards, beyond which the forest begins.
- (d) WATRAN: Between the villages of OHOITAHAIT and WATRAN, on the east coast of KAI DOELAH, there is a bay with a sand and gravel beach behind a coral bar. This bar lies about 500 yards offshore at OHOITAHAIT and OHITEL but only 350 yards at WATRAN. Between this bar and the drying reef at the beach there is a trough of deep water. This trough is about 200 yards wide opposite OHOITAHAIT and 150 yards wide opposite WATRAN. It has a depth of water of about 20 feet at LW. The bottom is sand. The coral bar is shallow enough at LW for fishermen to wade along it. At ordinary LW some of the tops of the coral pinnacles show above water. There are openings along this coral bar about 400-500 yards south of WATRAN. The biggest opening is about 50 yards wide and was used by the deeper draught native boats to approach the village during LW. There should be about five feet of water over the bar at HW and it is considered that craft with 3½ feet draught could cross it between half flood and half ebb. The best part of this rather difficult beach for landing operations is that from opposite the northern extremity of WATRAN village to about 400 yards southward of this point. Landing should be restricted to the period between half flood and half ebb at Springs. The coast is sheltered during the NW monsoon, but very exposed during the SE season. The beach further north of WATRAN should be avoided because of the more dangerous nature of both the bar and reef. At OHOITAHAIT there is a shoal water a mile offshore. The terrain adjoining the beach along the whole bay is low and open and consists of garden areas and scrub to a depth inland of 800-900 yards. Beyond this there are patches of sparse forest. About 1,200 yards westward of OHOITAHAIT is the freshwater lake of DANAU PANIL.

A well-used MT road runs close to the beach from OHOITAHAIT, through OHITEL to WATRAIN, where another MT road runs WSW to TOEAL. A road from OHITEL cuts across to the WATRAIN-TOEAL road which it joins about 800 yards west of WATRAIN. Another well-used MT road branches off this road and runs NW to the east end of DOELAH airfield. This road runs about 600 yards south of lake DANAU PANIL. All these roads are fairly level but there is a slight rise behind WATRAIN and the road to TOEAL remains level after passing this rise until it dips down rather steeply into TOEAL. OHOITAHAIT consists of about 45 huts, OHITEL of nearly 80 and WATRAIN of about 40 huts. WATRAIN also has a small jetty.

- (e) LANGGOER: The northernmost of the two jetties at LANGGOER was constructed by the Mission. It is about 270 feet long, and 10 ft wide. It is built of coral for about 240 ft; the head, about 30 ft long, being of timber. The piles of the timber portion are of ironwood and have a diameter of 15-18 inches. There is a light railway track on the jetty running from the head to the warehouses of the mission at the foot of the jetty. This track can be easily removed as it is not an integral part of the jetty structure. The jetty is well built and is considered to be strong enough to bear MT. At LW there is 3-4 ft of water at the head. The southern jetty is built entirely of coral and is about 280 ft long and 12 ft wide. It is considered to be strong enough to bear MT. At LW there was a depth of six feet at the head of this jetty. The 2½ fathom line lies about 300 yards off the shore opposite the jetties. There is shoal water 200 yards NNE of the jetty at the entrance of the narrow channel to TOEAL. Possible landing beaches in this area are confined to a beach 100 yards north to 150 yards south of the jetties at LANGGOER and another, 250 yards long at the small cape just south of WEARILIR. Although the beaches are not good because of patches of beach-sandstone, landing operations with craft drawing 3½ feet can be carried out for the period between half flood and half ebb.
- (f) ROEMAT: At ROEMAT, a village of 40-50 huts, there is a coral jetty 70 feet long and about 12 ft wide at the northern extremity of the village. There is a soft sand beach 12 feet wide along the frontage of the village and for some distance northward of the jetty. The foreshore to this beach consists of a gravel shelf, on the seaward side of which there is pinnae coral. It dries to a width of 150 yards. North and south of the beach there are two coral and sand bars. The village has a church, on slightly higher ground about 150 yards behind the jetty, and this should be a useful landmark.
- (g) OEF: There is no jetty at OEF, but the sand beach between the village and Tg JERBAKAR can be reached by boats or landing craft at all tides of the tide. An 8 ft wide footpath over very easy ground connects OEF with DJAR and the villages on the east coast of NOEHOB ROWA. There is a small sand beach on the west shore of OEF Bay, almost opposite the village of OEF. At this beach are two or three huts. This little settlement is called SERWAV. Travellers going from DJAR to OHOIDEERTOETOE, on the west coast of the island, crossed OEF Bay by boat from OEF to SERWAV, from where there is a footpath to OHOIDEERTOETOE. The beach at OHOITOM, a village south of SERWAV, also on the west shore of OEF Bay, has a gravel beach behind a reef which is dangerous because of the rocks lying on it.

- (h) OHIRA: The villages of CHIRA and OHIRAN (correctly spelt CHOIR and CHOIREN) lie on the shore of a wide sandy bay on the west coast of NOEHOE ROVA Island. The beach is only a few feet wide at HW, but dries to a width of 300 yards opposite the two villages and somewhat less to northward. The portion which dries is hard sand and contains no rocks or coral. Landing craft drawing $3\frac{1}{2}$ ft can use this beach during the period between half flood and half ebb at Springs. The beach is well sheltered during the SE monsoon, but there is often considerable surf on it during the NW monsoon and landing operations during that season are not recommended. The village of OHIRA contains about 70 huts, a mosque and a church. OHIRAN is much smaller and has about 40 huts and a mosque. About half the inhabitants of OHIRA are Christian, the remainder are Mohammedan. OHIRAN is mainly Mohammedan. There are good wells in both villages, but the level of the water in them sinks during ebb tides and rises during flood, though the water remains fresh.
- (i) LETFOER: At the village of LETFOER (LETWOELAN) which lies about 350 yards west of the west end of the airfield there is a jetty, slightly more than 160 ft long. The SOENGAI SERBAI here has a depth of three fathoms at LW Springs. The jetty was in existence before the Japanese occupation. A footpath which runs close to the east shore of the SOENGAI SERBAI connects LETFOER Village with the village of OHOILLEBOE (DIAN SERANI) to the north and HEWOE to the south. The path to the north crossed the inlet north of OHOILLEBOE by a causeway and bridge, which however is now damaged, and continues northward up the west coast of the island through the villages of DEBOET, NGAMAR etc., The Japanese have converted the path from the airfield to HEWOE into a MT road, after crossing the airfield this road continues northward to FAN and LANGGOER airfields. The construction of this road probably indicates that stores are delivered to this airfield by MT from the WITDEK barge unloading point. From the east end of the runway a footpath crosses the island to IBRA, a village $3\frac{1}{4}$ miles east of the airfield. A small jetty at TOTOND on the western side of the inlet can accommodate launches and prahus.
- (j) DEBOET: The village of DIAN is practically one with the much larger village of DEBOET, with its 100 huts and large church. A street runs from in front of the church to the shore, and ends in a short jetty or wharf. A bridge, now partly destroyed, spans the mouth of the inlet between DIAN and OHOILLEBOE (DIAN SERANI) about 600 yards to the south. This bridge, 120 yards in length, appears to have five supports, over which passed a wooden footwalk. It is not suitable for vehicular traffic.
- (k) NGILGOF: In NGILGOF Bay, the reef extends for 600 yards from shore. The channel between this reef and the small island of HAEU to the south has a depth of over 25 fathoms. At LW the reef uncovers almost completely, and has no appreciable slope. It is flat and smooth, being covered with hard sand. There are no rocks on it, and it is suitable for MT everywhere in the bay except for a soft patch just inside the high cape forming the western limit of the bay. At HW, the sea reaches the top of the sand beach. This beach can only be reached by landing craft drawing $3\frac{1}{2}$ ft for a short period during HW Springs. There are about 75 huts and a church in the village. Prior to the Japanese occupation, it had over 700 inhabitants who were all Christians. Just off the NW corner of the village there is a small stream which, after flowing in a ravine 20 ft deep, disappears into the ground a short distance from the village. There are also 3 wells in a small detached coconut plantation about the spot where the stream disappears.

The water in stream and wells is often brackish.

- (1) DOELAH LAOET (DOE ROM. Island): A sand beach stretches from DOELAH LAOET Village westward around the point for about 700 yards. A coral bar fronts the whole NE coast of DOE ROM. Island, but between DOELAH LAOET and the point 300 yards westward of it, this reef is only 40 yards off the shore and there is no deep water between it and the beach. The beach is 20 yards wide at LW. It can be reached for a short period at HW by landing craft drawing $3\frac{1}{2}$ ft. The water is usually clear enough to see any obstructions on the reef. The beach is well sheltered during the SE monsoon, but exposed during the NW monsoon.

There is a 300 ft long jetty about 350 yards NE of the eastern end of the northernmost of the two runways. This jetty can only accommodate barges or small boats and is connected to both runways by a well-used road. A MT road connects the jetty with the two runways and extends to the village of TAWINOHOI on the east coast of the island.

An 8 ft wide footpath connects TAWINOHOI with DOELAH LAOET, a village on the NE coast. There is also a road from DOELAH LAOET to the western end of the northernmost runway.

- (m) ELAT (NOEHOE TJOET Island): The small village of ELAT is located on the southeastern shore of ELAT Bay, east of a small point and a reef on which are the islands of SEAT, KRAD and NOEHOE ROE. There is an entrance between SEAT and KRAD for small craft and prahus. A stone pier about 100 yards long projects to a depth of 16 feet from the point on the northwestern side of the village. There is a red-roofed customs shed on this pier. In the shoal water abreast the village there is a disused pier, at the foot of which stands a flagstaff. The village of ELAT contains no European houses other than the customs shed, police barracks and a few government cottages, the principle one being that of the Ambonese Bestuurs Assistent (Assistant District Officer). An excellent trail leads across the island to J.MTIL and the trails northward and southward along the coast are well kept. The trails are steep in places and bicycles cannot be used except between ELAT and WATOEAR, 6 miles to the south. Six main tracks cross the island from east to west, making it possible to visit any part of the territory in any season by a water journey plus a short, but steep, climb and descent across the hills. By far the best and most travelled of these trails is from ELAT to J.MTIL. Two others that are well known are from T.MANGIL to WEDOEAR and from FER to OEWAT (near WATKOEAN). The remaining three are more tracks across the hills.

4. AIRFIELDS

- (a) General: There is a compact group of airfields lying within a rectangular area 17 miles north/south and $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles east/west. All runways are now unserviceable.

- (1) LINGGOER 5.40'S 132.44'E.

On east coast of NOEHOE ROM, three miles south of TOEAL

Runway: East/west 4900' x 475'. Coral surface.
unserviceable.

Dispersal: Extensive dispersal areas north and south of the runway. Five taxiways. Fifteen fighter and 16 bomber revetments and unprotected dispersal points for 41 fighters and 18 bombers. Hardstanding capacity for further 40 fighters and 20 bombers.

Buildings Several small buildings. Probable stores areas and south and SW of the runway. Jetties at facilities: LANGGOER and WATDEK.

Extension: Possible to extend eastward for about 800 feet by removing obstructions at the site of the village.

Communications: MT roads to LANGGOER, WATDEK and KOLSEER.

Engineering

Materials: Abundance of coral. Good timber (ironwood) is obtainable in fair quantities in the island and from KAI DOELAH Island.

(ii) DOELAH: 5.35'S 132.46'E

On the west coast of KAI DOELAH Island approximately 4½ mls north of TOEL.

Runway: WNW/ESE. 4100' x 350'. Possibly a sand dressing. Unserviceable.

Dispersal: South dispersal loop has 12 dispersal points for fighter aircraft. The north dispersal loop has 5 bomber revetments and 10 unprotected bomber dispersal points. Hardstanding capacity for further 30 fighters and 20 bombers.

Buildings No buildings.
and Jetties at DOELAH and
Facilities: LEBETAU.

Extension : Unknown but believed possible.

Communications : MT road from west end of runway to DOELAH-TOEL coastal road. Road from east end of runway to WATRAN on east coast of island.

Engineering

Materials: Unlimited coral limestone. Good timber, including ironwood.

(iii) DOEROA 5.33'S 132.43'E.

On the eastern end of DOEROA Island 6½ miles due north of TOEL.

Runway: Two parallel runways NW/S E 1200ft apart.
No 1 6300' x 500' }
No 2 4750' x 300' } Both unserviceable.

Dispersal: Large dispersal areas with 48 dispersal points. Hardstanding capacity estimated at 40 fighters and 30 bombers.

Buildings and Facilities: No buildings. Jetty for small boats and 350 yards NE of eastern end of northernmost runway.

Extension : Unknown.

Communications : A MT road connects the two runways and extends to TAWINHOI on the east coast of the island. There is also a road from DOELAH LAOET to the western end of the northernmost runway. A new MT track runs along the coast east of the airfield.

Engineering Materials: Both timber and coral limestone are plentiful on the island.

(iv) FAAN 5.42'S 132.44'E.

On NOEHOE ROWA Island, 2½ miles south of LANGGOER and one mile inland from the east coast.

Runway: East/west, 1300' x 310'. Surface was partly sealed. Unserviceable.

Dispersal: Two fighters and 22 bomber revetments, 36 dispersal points, and hardstanding capacity for 40 fighters and 20 bombers.

Buildings and Facilities: Fifteen buildings for personnel and stores. Jetties at LANGGOER.

Extension: At least 1000' each end of the runway appears possible.

Communications: MT road from airfield to LANGGOER. Another constructed by the Japanese from west end of the runway to KOLSEER. Probable MT road to LETFOEAR airfield.

Engineering Materials: Both timber and surfacing material are plentiful in the immediate vicinity of the airfield.

(v) LETFOEAR 5.46'S 132.42'E.

On the east shore of SOENGAI SERBAI, NOEHOE ROWA Island, nine miles SSW of TOEAL.

Runway: NW/SE 5700' x 340'. Unserviceable and neglected.

Dispersal: Two fighter revetments. Eighteen fighter and 28 bomber dispersal points. Hardstanding capacity for 10 fighters and 10 bombers.

Buildings and Facilities: No buildings. Jetty at LETFOEAR which has 350 yards west of the west end of the runway.

Extension: Not practicable.

Communications: MT roads to EWOE and FAAN and LANGGOER airfields.

Engineering Materials: Adequate supplies of limestone and timber available. Water from wells or from fresh water stream at EWOE.

5. POSSIBLE SEAPLANE ALIGHTING AREAS (for greater details see "anchorage")

- (a) TOEL: TOEL anchorage would make a suitable seaplane alighting area.
The area is nearly two miles long, north and south, and a least width of $3\frac{1}{2}$ cables, with depths of 9-15 fathoms. A beacon used to stand on the end of the shallow spit extending northward from the point just westward of the township. The anchorage generally used is in 11-13 fathoms with that point bearing 167 degrees. Vessels of the KPM line formerly made regular calls here.
TOEL and WATDEK, a mile SSW of TOEL, have stone jetties, both of which are, however, only large enough for barges and launches.
- (b) LANGGOER: The northern end of ROSENBERG Strait, off the village of LANGGOER, is calm in both seasons, but the southern part of the strait is not sheltered during the SE monsoon. Sea-planes can land on the sheltered area of water to the SE of LANGGOER in the NW season. The alighting area runs SE for about two miles and is from three-quarters to one mile wide. Before the Japanese occupation, seaplane mooring buoys were provided, which were moved to the TOEL alighting area for the SE season.
- (c) TELOK OEF: This bay, on the south coast of NOEHOE ROWA, is well protected in the NW monsoon and moderately so in the SE monsoon. Steamers of the KPM occasionally called here to load copra and ironwood. The anchorage lies about 600 yards SW of Tg JERBAKAR, the cape just north of the village of OEF. This bay affords a good alighting area in the NW monsoon, with a clear run of over two miles in a NW-SE direction.
- (d) SOENGAI SERBAI: The widest part of this inlet, which is well protected in both monsoons, is between the villages of LETFOEAR and EWOE. The inlet runs practically N/S and there is a clear run of $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles between these two villages. There is shoal water off the west bank, but along the east bank the channel has a least depth of almost 10 feet and a width of 350 yards. A rock, which uncovers at LW, lies 350 yards NW of LETFOEAR village. A stone jetty, rather more than 160 ft long, crosses the muddy foreshore at this village.

6. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

There are no telegraph or telephone lines on any of the KAI Islands. There was formerly a small wireless station at TOEL with a short-wave receiver and a small transmission set. It maintained connections with nearby stations such as DARWIN, MERAUKE, SAUMLAKI, etc.

7. ROADS AND TRACKS

- (a) General (see map appx 'C')

Pre-war most of the villages were connected by footpaths six to eight feet wide, on many of which there were short, steep inclines. At such places the path was often stepped. The bridges were built of timber, but as there was no wheeled traffic, except bicycles on the islands the roads were never built to carry heavy loads or vehicles. Since the Japanese occupation, several of these paths, especially those leading to airfields, have been widened into roads. The present condition of the roads is unknown/probably they would stand up to moderate use. but

(b) Descriptions

- (i) KAI DOELAH Island: From the village of DOELAH on the west coast an old footpath which ran SW from the village to NGADI and on to TOEL has been improved into a MT road, which however is wide enough to take only one truck at a time. It has been widened sufficiently in places to allow vehicles to pass. Just south of NGADI a branch road leads to the west end of the DOELAH runway. On the east coast a well-used track runs close to the beach from OHITEL, through OHITEL to WATRAN where another MT road runs WSW to TOEL. A road from OHITEL cuts across to the WATRAN-TOEL road which it joins about 800 yds west of WATRAN. Another well-used MT road branches off this road and runs NW to the east end of DOELAH airfield. This road runs about 600 yds south of LAKE DANAU ENIL. All these roads are fairly level but there is a slight rise before WATRAN and the road to TOEL remains level after passing this rise until it dips fairly steeply into TOEL. The coastal track from TAMEDAN to DOELAH is about 8 ft wide but is probably not passable to MT.

(ii) NOEHOE ROVI

The Japanese have improved many of the old bicycle tracks in the vicinity of LANGGOER and FAAN airfields and now have a convenient network.

A road between LANGGOER and WATDEK is possibly suitable for MT.

The old bicycle track from LANGGOER to DEBOET (west coast) has been widened and improved by the Japanese as far as the FAAN airfield. The enemy has also constructed a road from KOLSEER (near the west end of LANGGOER Strip) to the west end of FAAN strip. The footpath from KOLSEER to NGABOEB appears to be now fit for MT between KOLSEER and a point three-quarters of a mile along it. At this point a new MT road has been built running westward to a deep hollow known as the WEAR ROAD. The old bicycle track from KOLSEER to NAAMLONG (LO'ON) and WELANIT appears to be frequently used.

South of LANGGOER a coastal footpath, 8 ft wide, runs 50-80 yds inland along the coast to WEARLILIR, FAAN to SATHEAN, and then continues to IBRA and further southward to OEF. A branch turning westward near NGOEWOEL, crosses the northern part of the island and continues up the west coast to TOTOD.

A footpath which runs close to the east shore of the SOENG-I SERBI connects LETFOEAR Village with the village of OHOLLEBOE (DIAN SERANI) to the north and EWOE to the south. The path to the north crossed the inlet north of OHOLLEBOE by a causeway and bridge, which however is now damaged, and continues northward up the west coast of the island through the villages of DEBOET, NGAMAR etc., The Japanese have converted the path from the airfield to EWOE into a MT road. After crossing the airfield this road continues northward to FAAN and LANGGOER airfields. The construction of this road probably indicates that stores are delivered to this airfield by MT from the WATDEK barge unloading point.

From the east end of the runway a footpath crosses the island to IBRA, a village $\frac{3}{4}$ miles east of the airfield. From NGABOEB, the village west of FAAN airfield, and the only inland village on the island the Japanese have constructed roads to NAAMLONG in the north, NGAMBAR on the

west coast, FAAN airfield, and into NGIDIOEN Peninsula to the NW, destination of which is unknown.

- (iii) NOEHOE TJOET Island: The paths on NOEHOE TJOET are much inferior to the footpaths on NOEHOE ROWA and KAI DOELAH Islands, both as regards width and surface. The main reason for this is, of course, the much more broken and mostly mountainous terrain of NOEHOE TJOET. The surface of the paths is composed of rock (basalt) and coral which is often covered with moss. During the wet season these paths are very slippery. The average width of the NOEHOE TJOET paths is about 3 feet, whereas on NOEHOE ROWA they are about 8 feet wide. A path follows the coast entirely around the island and in addition six main tracks cross the island from east to west, making it possible to visit any part of the territory in any season by a water journey plus a short, but steep, climb and descent across the hills. By far the best and most travelled of these trails is from ELAT to JANTIL. Two others that are well known are from TAMANGIL to NEDOEAR and from FER to OEWAT (near WATKOERAN). The remaining three are mere tracks across the hills.

- (iv) DOE ROWA Island: An MT road connects the two runways of the airfield and extends to the village of TAVINOHOI. An 8 ft wide footpath connects TAVINOHOI with DOELAH LAOET on the NE coast. There is also a road from DOELAH LAOET to the western end of the northernmost runway. A new MT track runs along the coast east of the airfield to a jetty.

8. RESOURCES

- (a) Food: Prior to the Japanese occupation, the KAI Islands were nearly self-supporting. In former times a certain amount of rice was imported, as well as limited supplies of canned fish, fruit, carbonated water, etc. In 1938 an effort was made to replace the rice by native-grown sawch rice from the southern and eastern part of NOEHOE ROWA Island. This area had, for years, grown a local supply, but had not exported. In 1938 some 5-6 tons were exported to KAKISSAR and AMBON, in 1939 the export was nearly doubled, and by 1941 it amounted to nearly 100 tons. It is thought that this supply of food, if kept in the KAI Islands, will be sufficient to make the archipelago entirely self-supporting. Other native foods are "embal", maize and other roots and vegetables such as okra, tomatoes, egg plant, onions, Lombok etc. Wild pigs are abundant. Fish are caught in nets, by hook and line, and in long arrow-shaped fish traps. Tropical fruits are, of course, present.
- (b) Minerals: No minerals have been reported from any of the islands. They have been looked over for oil by several of the larger oil companies, but no drilling has been done.

9. WATER

ROWA

In the NOEHOE Group the drinking water supply is normally obtained from wells, and there is no likelihood of a shortage. These wells were usually sunk near the coast but several villages on NOEHOE ROWA (NGILGOF, NGAMAR, LANGGOER, FAAN and SATHEAN among others) had to fetch their drinking water from wells sunk some distance inland as water from wells near the villages was brackish.

There are a few freshwater springs on NOEHOE ROWA. A copious spring lies a mile or two eastward of the village of EWOE, on the east bank of the SOENGAI SERBAI. The overflow of this spring forms a stream which runs into the SOENGAI at the southern end of EWOE. There is a small spring about 2 miles from NGAMAR on the road from NGAMAR to NGJOEB.

It lies on the south side of the road and is called KEAR EOL. About halfway along the road from DEBOET to LANGGOER, and some 200 yards west of this road, there is another small spring known as the KEAR KID.

The WEAR ROD:3 is a group of freshwater springs in a deep hollow about one mile due north of NGAJOE. On NOEHOE TJOET there are numerous springs and streams and there is no difficulty in obtaining fresh water. All water, whether from wells, streams or springs should be treated before being used for drinking purposes.

10. MEDICAL

General conditions in K.I Islands are about the same as those found in other islands in this general region (see TANIMBAR Report). On the whole climatic conditions are not unfavourable, temperatures are never excessively high and rains are not too heavy. While all the usual tropical diseases are known, they are definitely no worse nor no milder than in other similar areas.

The only known pre-war hospitals were a small one at TOEL and another at K.TLAR near ELAT. Facilities and accommodation are not known.

11. CLIMATE AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

(a) The climate is fairly good for Europeans due to the steady sea breeze, which holds during either monsoon. This is a factor in alleviating the effect of high temperature and humidity. The most oppressive weather is experienced in the monsoon change between SE and NW monsoons.

(b) Rainfall: Rainfall is seasonal, being affected by the prevailing wind directions to a large extent. The wet season occurs during the NW monsoon, and is rather definite from Dec to Apr. A marked dry season is experienced in Aug, Sep and Oct at the height of the SE season. Transitional months when rainfall is intermediate are Nov and Apr to Jul.

The rainfall is generally of an intermittent nature, with periods of hot sunshine between rain squalls and heavy showers.

Average daily falls are slightly greater in the wet months when there are about 20 rain days per month, the average daily amount being about half an inch greater than in the dry season.

From examination of records for other stations it appears that a fall of 10 inches in one day is not unlikely in the wet months, decreasing to about 2-5 inches in one day in the drier months. Thunder is most frequent in the first half of the wet monsoon.

(c) Winds: NW monsoon blows as a regular air-current from Nov till Mar or Apr, being occasionally interrupted by strong SW winds, and less frequently by north winds and calm periods. The SE monsoon, which blows from Apr till Oct or Nov, is steadier and its velocity is more uniform than is the case with the west monsoon.

(d) Temperature and Humidity: The mean temperature varies little during the year, as shown by the following table:

Monthly Mean of Air Temperature at TOEAL

Jan	81.1	degrees F
Feb	82.0	"
Mar	81.7	"
Apr	82.0	"
May	81.3	"
Jun	80.4	"
Jul	78.8	"
Aug	80.2	"
Sep	82.2	"
Oct	82.7	"
Nov	81.5	"
Dec	81.3	"

Mean of Air Temperature for year - 81.3 degrees F

Highest temperature recorded was 95 degrees F, and the lowest 72.5 degrees F. Relative humidity is greatest during the wet season (Dec to Mar) and falls to a minimum during the months of least rain (Aug, Sep, and Oct). In all months, night-time values generally exceed 90%, frequently approaching saturation. Daytime values are lowest during a few hours about midday, and it is estimated that mean monthly values of relative humidity about noon vary from 65%-75% in Aug, Sep and Oct, to 80%-85% from Dec to Mar.

TANIMBAR - 'B'1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION (See appendices D,E)

The TANIMBAR Group comprises the comparatively large island of JAMDENA, 70 miles in length with a maximum width of 25 miles, partially surrounded on the west, north and south by 65 small islands, islets and coral atolls. Only the eastern coast of JAMDENA is comparatively open and free from obstruction, but even here there are wide fringing reefs along the shores, and some offshore shoals and patches.

All the islands are surrounded by fringing reefs.

The western coast of JAMDENA is generally low and swampy, and the fringing reef wider than on the east coast. The centre of the island is covered by a plateau sloping down to the west and averaging 300 feet elevation, mostly covered by rain forest. Round this central plateau is a belt of undulating country which reaches the coast on the east along practically its whole length, with a few higher hills near the coast, the highest being about 800 feet high.

TABLE OF DIRECT DISTANCES FROM SAUMLAKI (Nautical Miles).

AMBON	318 miles
DARWIN	260 "
DILLI (TIMOR)	350 "
DOBO (MOE Is)	220 "
MERAUKE	540 "
MOROTAI	630 "
TOEL	160 "
ELIHAPAN	960
KOEPANG	490
MAKASSAR	740

2. ANCHORAGES AND LANDINGS(a) SAUMLAKI (see photo appx 'D')

SAUMLAKI Bay provides the best anchorage in the TANIMBAR Group. There is a splendid harbour the whole year round in depths of 13-30 fathoms, the usual anchorage being 325 yards off the end of the pier in 15 fathoms.

Approaches to SAUMLAKI Bay are clear, but wide reefs fringe the coastline. Approach to the bay can be made from the east by the eastern entrance of EGERON STRAIT or from the west through that strait, either north or south of ANGGARMASA Island thence to between RITJAWIT Rock and MATKOES Island, or to the south of MATKOES Island.

A stone jetty at the town about 500 yards long extends out to the edge of the reef. The depth off the end is about 2½ fathoms at LW. There is no crane or lifting gear available. A small boat wharf and a landing stage were used by launches small enough to cross the reef.

(b) SELAROE ISLAND

There are three anchorages around the island:

LEMIAH Anchorage: In a small bay on the west coast 12 miles NE of the SW extremity of the island. The depth is seven fathoms two miles offshore, and inside a break in the reef about 600 yards wide. The anchorage is exposed to the NW monsoon and could not be used in that season.

OLENDIR Anchorage: There is anchorage in seven fathoms in a bay about five miles SW of the northern tip of SELAROE. The entrance is about half a mile wide and is approached from northward. The anchorage is sheltered from the SE monsoon and also from westerly and SW winds.

ADJOET Bay: The bay lies on the southern side of EGERON Strait and some 18 miles SW of SAUMLAKI. EGERON STRAIT is clear and presents no difficulties either from the east or the west or from SAUMLAKI. The route from the latter is usually between MATKOES Island and MATJAWAT Rock. Vessels of the KPM called regularly at ADJOET Village on the eastern side of the bay near the entrance. There is a stone jetty close northward of the village. The usual anchorage is close off this jetty, but sheltered anchorage could be had throughout the length of the bay, in depths of $6\frac{1}{2}$ to 12 fathoms. Depths alongside the jetty formerly permitted only small boats, but a 60 ft floating extension has been added, bringing it into deep water to facilitate loading and unloading of large ships.

Photographs show that practically all the houses in the village have now been destroyed or removed.

A reports states that three liberty wharves have been built in the bay. Two just south of ADJOET and the third at KORE. This is considered unlikely.

Landings could probably be made at HW on beaches in LINGAT Bay and also LEMIAH Anchorage. These are the two bays between which is the narrow neck of the island. LEMIAH Anchorage should be used during the SE season (Jul-Nov) and LINGAT Bay during the NW monsoon.

(c) ANGGERAMAS. Island

Good anchorage can be had on the eastern and western sides of the island according to season. One good site is in the strait between ANGGERAMAS and JAMDEMA Islands.

(d) MATKOES Island

Large vessels can select anchorage in EGERON STRAIT anywhere around the island according to the season and the condition of the sea. Only small vessels can reach the shore. A small jetty is located at the northern end of the island opposite a few coolie huts.

(e) MITAK Bay

The inner part of MITAK Bay is not suitable for large vessels but excellent anchorage is found for one or two ships up to 200 tons. During the SE season (Jul to Nov) heavy swells break off the northern shores of the bay but off the village of LOERANG and its fine white sandy beach, protected anchorage in one to four fathoms can be found by going inshore.

(f) EAST COAST JAMDNA Island

Generally speaking, the anchorages in this section are usable only in the NW season (Dec - Jun). Following are the recognized anchorages:

TOMBOER	-	7 fathoms
AROEI D.S	-	12 "
ALOESI	-	15 "
KILM.S. LAMB.SEMBOOM	-	16 "
WATOEROE	-	11 "
MANGLOESI	-	18 "
WATHOERI	-	23 "

Practically all of the beaches at villages along this section are inaccessible except at HW, owing to the fringing reef. There are no landing facilities except a few small native landing stages.

(g) LARAT Island

The main anchorage is in RITABEL Bay. It is a rectangular area nearly $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles long and half a mile wide, with depths of 5-10 fathoms and muddy holding ground. No swell is felt except during strong NW winds. The bay lies at the western end of LARAT Island, where there are three villages, BOEGIS, RIDOL and BABAR, known collectively as LARAT, or sometimes RITABEL. They were on the inner and eastern side of RITABEL Bay.

Recent photographs reveal that the main part of the village has been destroyed or removed. On the western side of the bay is the small village of LILLING LOEAN on the reef-encircled island of LOETOER.

At LARAT (RITABEL) is a small, well-constructed jetty with an L-shaped head made of coral, stone and timber. The jetty is about 300 feet long, about 20 ft wide, and has a loading capacity of 10-20 tons. The water alongside, which is 15 feet at LW, is deep enough for small slips and launches. The height of the docking is approx 10 feet above LW.

(h) MOLOE Island

Sheltered anchorage in the NW season can be found in 16 fathoms of water in LOKI Bay on the east coast. In the east monsoon (Jul - Nov) the best anchorage is in 22 fathoms off ODODO Village on the west coast. Craft drawing 3 ft 6 ins could probably land at the adjacent villages at HW.

(i) SERIA Island

Large vessels can anchor in WILLOETOE instead, which is in JAMDNA Strait off the village on the north of SERIA Island. It is sheltered in both seasons, and there is ample swinging room in 15-20 metres.

There is a protected anchorage for small craft between SERLA and JAMDENA, and the narrow, shallow strait separating the two islands can be navigated by launches and small sloops, but nothing larger.

There are two small landing stages at SERLA Village which can only be reached over the reef at HW. The reef narrows at the eastern end of the village and landing could be made on a small beach at any time.

- (j) Vessels of the KPM used an anchorage off the village of LATADILAM. Although the anchorage is one mile offshore it is very close to the reefs, and vessels are warned against attempting to approach closer. Small vessels can find shelter from the SE monsoon in the small bay four miles south of LATADILAM Village. Boats drawing 3 ft 6 ins can reach a small beach fronting the village at HW.

3. AIRFIELDS

(a) SELAROE

The only known operational airfield in the TANNIAR Islands, a single strip situated on an MT road running from LINGAT Village to Cape TOEWAOE in the southern part of SELAROE Island.

Runway : East-West. 5500'x500'. Unsurfaced. Probably unserviceable.

Dispersal: Lanes running north and south from each end of runway. Hardstanding capacity for 30 fighters and 20 bombers.

Buildings: Probable dumps and buildings south of the runway in wooded country.

Extension: Runway capable of extension to the west to make the total length 8000 feet.

Engineer

Material : Water supplies are unknown in the vicinity of the field but there are wells at the native villages nearby. Gravel and coral for surfacing are available from the hill just south of the runway. Timber is available in limited quantities in the vicinity.

Commun-

ications : The strip is connected by MT road to LEMIAN anchorage and LINGAT Bay which were the probably unloading places for incoming stores. The state of the track to AD.OET Village is unknown, it may be jeepable.

4. POSSIBLE AIRFIELD SITES

(a) SAUMLAKI PENINSULA - 7.58'S, 131.19'E.

Photos taken in Nov 43 show what appears to be a survey line about 1000 yards long running due eastward from a point about 500 yards east of the SAUMLAKI-LAOERANG road. Prolonging this line westward would cut the road about 1 1/2 miles north of SAUMLAKI jetty. The terrain here appears to be suitable for the construction of an east-west air strip with a maximum length of 4800 feet. The area is covered with scrub but should not be difficult to clear.

Surfacing material is available in abundance from the limestone ridges southward of this site. Timber is plentiful and labour should be available from the nearby villages. Communications are provided for by the motor road to SAUMLAKI where the jetty and the safe all-the-year-round anchorage in the bay afford facilities for the landing of stores, etc.

(b) MATKOES Island - 3.03'S, 130.12'E.

The Dutch had planned to construct two runways running east and west across the island in the saddle between two hills. These runways formed a narrow X and were to be approx 4800 ft and 4500 ft respectively, with a width of 600 ft. The surface was to be of coral.

Construction on the runways was stopped in Dec 41 at a time when all the coconut trees had been felled and cleared on the longer of the two runways and most of the grading had been completed.

Photographs indicate that there is no enemy activity on the island, and that no further work upon the runways has been done by the Japanese.

5. POSSIBLE SEAPLANE ALIGHTING AREAS

(a) SAUMLAKI Bay

SAUMLAKI Bay offers a large area of water sheltered the whole year around, although occasionally during the SE monsoon a fairly heavy ground swell entering the bay from EGGERON Strait may prevent seaplanes from taking off.

During the Dutch administration there were three Netherlands Navy-type seaplane mooring buoys in the bay. There are no slipways or other facilities, but there is plenty of local material available for construction. The village has a coral stone jetty about 500 yards long and 25 ft wide. The depth of water off the end is about 16 ft at LW.

(b) JAMDEN Strait

In the sheltered waters of JAMDEN Strait it appears that several areas a half mile long could be found free of reef patches, with good depths of water. One such area is between the islands of SERLA and SELOE, and another is between KESWOE Island and MAKATIAN Village (on JAMDEN Island).

(c) RITABEL HARBOUR (LARAT Island)

This harbour, on account of the low terrain surrounding it, is not well protected at any time. However, it could be designated as an emergency landing area. It is 1½ miles due north and south, and a quarter of a mile wide.

(d) ADAOET Bay

This area has been suggested as a possible seaplane alighting area. However, the surrounding terrain is not high enough to protect the bay from the prevailing winds, and, as the bay runs NE/SW, seaplanes may be subjected to cross winds when taking off or alighting. The bay is too narrow in a NW/SE direction, except near the mouth, where there is considerable swell in both monsoons. It could, however, be designated as an emergency alighting area.

There is good anchorage, well protected in both monsoons, at the head of the bay.

6. ACCOMMODATION

Owing to the present filthy living conditions of both Japanese and natives it is considered that there would be no buildings suitable for billeting our troops. However, after cleaning, the Catholic Mission and Controleur's house at SAUMLAKI could probably be used.

7. TOWNS AND VILLAGES

(a) SAUMLAKI: (See photo Appx 'D')

Before the Japanese came SAUMLAKI's population was not more than a dozen Europeans, 30-40 Chinese, 500-750 islanders, including Ambonese, Menadonese, Keicse, Timorese and Javanese, and several hundred Tanimbarese, including those at the Catholic missionary schools. The Europeans included the Controleur, an inspector of police, a Catholic priest, five lay brothers and several nuns.

Seen from the bay the most prominent buildings in the town are the three-storey nuns' quarters of the Catholic Mission standing on the highest part of a low, gently rounded hill to the rear of the town, and the Controleur's house near the seashore. The church and other mission buildings are hidden behind heavy foliage. The nuns' quarters and the dormitory of the lay brothers, with two storeys, are the only two buildings in the town with more than one floor. The pasar (market), Chinatown, and the commercial section lie north of the end of the town. All European buildings have corrugated iron or insulated shingle roofs, and cement tile or wooden floors. There is a small jail and police barracks. About 1000 yds south of the town is a government leper hospital with accommodation for about 30 patients.

The amount of imported food consumed in SAUMLAKI was very small. Imported rice, canned meats and fish were used in very moderate quantities. Native vegetables, maize and ladang rice were the main articles of food. When a few dozen refugees arrived just before Japanese occupation the food situation became serious. Even this small addition was enough to disturb the delicate balance between supply and demand.

SAUMLAKI obtains its water from a spring situated in the hills about a mile to the rear of the shore. It is piped to all the larger buildings, and is also available in the market. The supply becomes meagre during the dry season, and is usually shut off for certain periods each day. Most of the larger houses have concrete tanks in their backyards which were filled during the wet season and used during the drier months.

(b) ADAOET - 8.07'S 131.07'E. The small port of ADAOET at the NE end of SELAROE Island was a regular port of call for steamers of KPM. The village was small and had only one European building, a godown near the shore. Population was about 500. Recent photographs show that practically all the houses have now been either destroyed or removed. A small, well-constructed, stone pier is still intact.

(c) LARAT - 7.07'S 131.43'E. Recent photographs reveal that, as a result of Allied bombing, not a building is left standing in the main part of the village. Some have probably been removed to safer parts of the island. The village previously had an estimated population of 1500, with some modern, European-style houses to the NW of the end of the jetty. The jetty is still standing; it is small but well constructed, with an L-shaped head. Constructed of coral, stone and timber, the jetty is about 300 feet long and

about 20 feet wide. Depth alongside is 15 ft at LW. Native vegetables, maize, and katjang idjoe (a small green pea) are grown locally, but in limited amounts. Drinking water was obtained from cement cisterns behind individual houses, while washing water was obtained from a spring situated near the NW end of the main street.

8. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

There were no telegraph or telephone facilities. A small wireless station at SAUMLAKI was destroyed upon Japanese occupation.

9. RESOURCES

- (a) Foodstuffs: The staple diet was originally sago, but in recent years its place has been usurped by jagong, or maize, augmented by ladang rice, vegetables, coconuts, fish, pork and some wild buffalo meat. Sago is still part of the natives' diet, and sago trees are grown in all swamps near inhabited places as a reserve food supply for years of crop failure. Many of the ordinary crops are harvested twice a year. In recent years the cultivation of upland or ladang rice has become fairly extensive on the hillsides on the east coast of JAMDENI Island. There was even a small export of rice, together with katjang idjoe, a small, hard, green pea rich in vitamins which is eaten as a supplement to rice in order to prevent beri beri and other deficiency diseases. Katjang idjoe is grown on LARAT Island, and also on the east coast of JAMDENI.

The sago of the villages of WERHATUNG and MAKATIAN, on the west coast of JAMDENI, is important for the supply of SAUMLAKI and adjacent villages.

Sugar cane is grown for home use. The sugar palm (gular areng) is grown in many villages. Wine and distilled spirits are made from the young palm as well as from the coconut. As well as the above, the usual tropical fruits and vegetables grow wild and in gardens. These include breadfruit, bananas, pawpaw, pandanus, sweet potatoes, yams, taro, cassava and pineapples.

Pigs are abundant in all Christian villages, and pork is the meat ordinarily seen in all Christian market places.

- (b) Construction Materials: Very little is known of the timber trees, but it seems evident that both hardwood and softwood would be available in the large areas of forest. However, there were no sawmills in the area, so probably good timber is scarce. There is ironwood on LARAT Island, and probably in other areas. The timber available should be suitable for at least temporary construction. Yellow wood exists in some places; it is a hardwood, but of no great size. Limestone and coral may be found in most of the hilly islands of the group, but access may be difficult owing to lack of roads.
- (c) Water: During the rainy season (December-May) the problem is not so much to find water as to get rid of it. In the dry season however, the main source of supply is from shallow wells at the many villages, and in a few places from springs. Wells should not be dug too deeply, as the less salty water is found near the surface. Owing to the use by the native population and the danger of pollution, all drinking water from wells should be boiled or chlorinated.

- (d) Native Labour: Adequate native labour is available near all inhabited areas. The natives are less robust than the average Papuan, but somewhat heavier than the Timorese. Although they are easy to handle, they are lazy and do not accomplish much work. The Tanimbar native takes life philosophically and troubles little over anything beyond his immediate living requirements. Drunkenness is prevalent amongst the men, and to some extent amongst women and children.

10. ROADS AND TRACKS (Map Appx 'E')

- (a) General Description of Communications: Except on SELAROE Island and in the vicinity of SAUMLAKI Town, land communication in the Group has been limited to the barest requirements. Practically all inhabitants of the islands live on the coasts, and transport and communication are almost wholly by water. Any inland tracks are merely native pads, and little is known of them.
- (b) MT Roads: The only tracks suitable for MT are those on SELAROE Island and near SAUMLAKI town, and near LARAT Village, which have been improved by the Japanese. The track in SELAROE runs from ELIASSE village at the southern tip of the island along the west coast, then crosses the island past the airfield to LINGAT Village. It continues to KANDAR with a branch track to opposite the landing place at LEMIAN Anchorage. From KANDAR the track runs NE, and there is a connection by trail with the MT track running SW from ADAOET village. From SAUMLAKI the MT tracks run to ALILIT and LAOERANG villages on the east coast of JAMDENA Island. At LARAT the only evidence of the tracks is in photographs taken on 1 Jun 44. The coverage is limited, and the only information that can be given about the tracks is that they run inland from LARAT village. It is not known where they end. The roads are not surfaced and, especially in the wet season, could not take heavy traffic.
- (c) Horse Tracks: The track from SAUMLAKI to LAOERANG mentioned above continues along the east coast of JAMDENA Island as far as WATHOERI and is suitable for horse travel. The three small rivers between TOMBOER and ALOESI villages are a mile wide at their mouths and must be crossed on rafts.
- (d) Native Tracks: Remainder of the tracks are probably easy to follow but information about them is lacking. In many instances they lead through swamp or forest country, and improvement would be difficult.

11. RIVERS

Little is known of the rivers, but all are slow-flowing and muddy, and hold little significance as a means of water transportation or communication. The rivers present an obstacle to foot travel, not because of depth, but because they are mostly crocodile infested, and, in their lower reaches, fringed with mangroves.

12. MEDICAL

- (a) General: The TANIMBAR Group may be classed as reasonably healthy. Malaria is the most prevalent disease. The climate is similar to that of surrounding areas, and tends to be most trying during the inter-monsoon period, when the winds are light and variable, and the atmosphere humid and oppressive.

- (b) Malaria: The islands are stated to be less malarious than New Guinea mainland, although no figures for spleen rates are available. Both benign tertian and subtertian forms of the disease are encountered.
- (c) Other Diseases: These include dysentery, tropical ulcer, framboesia, pulmonary diseases, tuberculosis, venereal disease, and leprosy.
- (d) Hospital Accommodation: In SAUMLAKI there was a mission hospital in the charge of a native doctor with accommodation for 36 patients. The equipment was simple, but minor operations could be performed. A short distance south of SAUMLAKI the Government maintained a leper hospital which usually had 20-30 patients.

13. CLIMATE AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS:

- (a) Rainfall: The year is divided into two well-defined seasons, dry and wet. The east monsoon is dry, the west monsoon is wet. For SAUMLAKI the dry season is from Jul to Oct or Nov, the wet from Dec to May or Jun. Overland, rainfall generally occurs during the afternoon and evening hours, whereas on the coast there is tendency for it to fall during the night and early morning. The rainfall is of the intermittent type, occurring mostly in heavy showers of short duration, often associated with squalls. The maximum and minimum monthly falls are not known, but for the wet months (from Dec to May) amounts of 20 inches would probably be the maximum, and one or two inches the minimum amounts. In the dry months the maximum amounts are estimated at four to eight inches, the least being only a few points or no rain at all.
- (b) Winds: The prevailing winds are seasonal in character. The NW monsoon blows from Nov till Mar or Apr, being occasionally interrupted by strong SW winds, and less frequently by north winds and calm periods. The SE Monsoon, which blows from Apr till Oct or Nov, is steadier and its velocity is more uniform than is the case with the west monsoon.

AROE ISLANDS - 'C'

1. General Description (see Map - Appx 'G')

The group consists of five large islands (KOLA, WOKAM, KOEROOR, MAIKOOR and TRANGAN) but these are separated by such narrow channels that they have the appearance of one very large island. There are also numerous smaller islands grouped round the five large ones, most of them connected to the principal islands by reefs, but some separated by navigable channels.

The islands are generally of coral limestone formation and there are no great elevations. There are undulating hills in the south and SW of TRANGAN. The highest of these is Mount BAIN, which is 295 feet high, and is situated NE of the cape of the same name, at a distance 3 miles from it.

There are a number of small rivers in the islands, the largest being the SOANGAI NGAIBOR, which flows from near the village of POPDJETOER on TRANGAN Island to $\frac{3}{4}$ ml north of the village of NGAIBOR on the west coast. During the rainy season it is fresh almost to its mouth which is about 230 feet wide. It is navigable by launches and similar small craft for a short distance only.

Apart from the narrow salt water channels which separate the principal islands, there is an important inlet, the SOANGAI SERWATOS, opening on the west coast of TRANGAN which penetrates to the centre of the island in a southeasterly direction.

The interior of the WOKAM, KOEROOR and MAIKOOR islands is flat and inclined to be swampy especially in the rainy season. Some of the islands and most of the channels and river banks, including those of the SOANGAI SERWATOS, are fringed with mangrove.

The interior of all the principal islands except TRANGAN, is covered with forests producing good timber. Sawmills at P. KENARI and on the west coast of WOKAM Island, near DOBO, cut and exported large amounts of iron wood obtained from these forests.

TRANGAN Island has large patches of savannah and grass and alang-alang plains, between areas of forest.

The soil is fairly good but apart from copra, the islands did not export agricultural products, the natives producing only sufficient for their own requirements. The principal exports were pearl shell, copra and ironwood.

Nearly all the native villages are on the coast or on the shores of the salt water channels which separate the principal islands. Only TRANGAN has some villages which are not situated near waterways.

Table of Distances Direct from DOBO

	<u>Nautical miles</u>
MERAUKE	404
DARWIN	454
TOJAL	88
SAUMLEKI	219
AMBON	380
DILLI	543
KOEPANG	687
MOROTAI	595
MANASSAR	880
BALAPAPAN	1,070

2. Anchorage

- (a) DOBO: DOBO harbour lies between WOKAM and WAMAR Islands. Bounded on the North by the coast of WOKAM, extending south-eastward of TANDJONG MALAKAFANI and on the South by the northern side of WAMAR. The channel at the western entrance is about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide, becoming gradually narrower towards DOBO. The channel is restricted by a broad drying reef extending from each side, in some places nearly half a mile, and sometimes projections of the 3 fathom line reduce the navigable channel to a width of $2\frac{1}{2}$ cables. The bank of the northern shore opposite DOBO was reported to extend farther to the southward than charted. The sandy spit on which DOBO is built can be closely approached. Reefs, some of which dry, lie in the channel over 1 mile eastward of DOBO. TANDJONG OELAR, the southern entrance point of DOBO harbour, is a low rocky point of which two rocks are above water.
- The least water in the channel leading to DOBO is $6\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms with from 7 to 16 fathoms in the anchorage.
- DOBO harbour can be used as an anchorage for one cruiser, 4 submarines, some destroyers and several groups of seaplanes. When the anchorage behind WAMAR is used, many ships can be anchored at DOBO. The inner road is just enough for a large ship such as a cruiser to swing. Best anchorage is in the centre of the channel where it is widest.
- (b) FATOSREI (WAMAR Island): Just north of FATOSREI village on the east coast of WAMAR there is good anchorage in $4\text{--}5\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms. Southeastward of the village is a jetty for boats.
- (c) KENARI: Anchorage about 400 yards west of the main jetty. Depth unknown but probably about 4 fathoms.
- (d) DJEDAN Island ($5.25^{\circ}\text{S } 134.41^{\circ}\text{E}$): There is good anchorage for a large vessel $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the SE coast.
- (e) DJOEDIN Island ($6.53^{\circ}\text{S } 134.37^{\circ}\text{E}$): Anchorage may be had during the SE monsoon (May-Oct) in a depth of 9 fathoms off the west end of the island.
- (f) SE coast TRANGAN Island: Eastward of Tg. NGABORDAMLOE there is an extensive roadstead, about 9 miles long and $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles wide, with depths of 6 to 15 fathoms, which would provide good anchorage for a number of vessels of all sizes during the NW monsoon. It is sheltered from all weather from west, through north to east. The roadstead is roughly parallel with the shore, and lies from 1 to 4 miles from the beach. The entrance to it, for large vessels, is through a passage, 2 miles wide, between the $1\frac{1}{2}$ fathom shoal lying $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles southward of Tg. NGABORDAMLOE, and the $1\frac{1}{2}$ fathom shoal lying 2 miles further eastward. Vessels of draught not exceeding 16 feet may reach the roadstead by passing over the banks lying between the $1\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms shoal just mentioned and DJEH Island, lying about 14 miles further eastward, but the two shoals, each carrying about $2\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms of water, lying 5 miles westward of DJEH Island, must be avoided. The area is well surveyed and clearly shown on Dutch Chart 234 and B.A. Chart 470.
- (g) S. SERWATOE: SOENGAI SERWATOE ($6.27^{\circ}\text{S } 134.07^{\circ}\text{E}$) which divides TRANGAN island into two parts. The western entrance is 1 mile wide, but is fronted by a large bank over which there are depths of 1 to 18 feet. A channel with a width of about 2 cables and a least depth of $2\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms leads over this bank. SOENGAI SERWATOE affords sheltered anchorage for small craft.

(h) SOENGAI MAIKOOR (6.10'S 134.07'E) has a broad, deep entrance and can be safely navigated on soundings at least as far as TABERFANE village, located 2½ miles east-southeastward of TANDJONG NGONI, the southern entrance point of the channel; vessels of the KPM occasionally called at this village. Good anchorage for cruisers.

(i) SOENGAI WOKAI: Anchorage in the western entrance for cruisers. (See also "Channels" Sec.6 (a))

(j) BABI Island (5.55'S 134.09'E): Two anchorages are used by small craft visiting the island-during the S- monsoon, about ¼ mile NE of the northernmost point in 5 to 10 fathoms of water and during the NE monsoon, ¼ mile off the beach at the eastern end of the island in about the same depth of water. None of the pilots make any mention of these anchorages.

2. Landing Facilities at Important Places

(a) DOBO (see Town Plan - appx 'F'): At the tip of the spit of land on which DOBO is built, there is a jetty about 200 ft long. At HW it has sufficient depth alongside the head to accommodate a vessel drawing 10-12 feet. The jetty is well built and can carry heavy loads.

A jetty on the east side of the point belonging to the Celebes Trading Coy, has been destroyed.

In their main landing at DOBO in Jul 42 the Japanese used a beach at the SW end of the town. The approach to it is over a wide, sand covered reef.

The destruction of the small town is almost complete. Nothing now remains except the steel towers of the W/T station and a few houses.

Roads and tracks from the jetty through the town showed activity in 1944, probably connected with the transport of supplies from the jetty to the wooded areas west of the town.

(b) FATOREI (YAKAR Island): A beach runs NW from Cape KARKALI and forms the southern coast of the bay at the head of which is the village of FATOREI. The beach is well sheltered during both monsoons and landing craft drawing 3 ft 6 in could reach the shore in the period between half flood and half ebb. The country adjacent to the beach is low and flat. The major portion of Cape KARKALI is planted with coconut trees.

Just west of the cape, there is a small boat jetty at the head of which there is a depth of a little over 6 feet at HW.

From FATOREI a track leads to DOBO.

(c) West Coast Wakan Island: Landing on practically any part of the west coast of the island could be made by craft drawing 3 ft 6 ins at HW. A RT road leading to DOBO skirts the coast.

(d) WOKAM Sawmill: On the coast of WOKAM Island almost directly across the strait from DOBO is a Japanese sawmill with a slipway in a fairly good state of repair capable of accommodating vessels of 30-36 ft in length with a draught of up to 5 feet. There is also a jetty 50 ft long 9 feet wide depth alongside 4 ft.

(e) KENARI Island:

-33-

This small island was mainly occupied by a sawmill, with the attendant dwelling houses and stores. Drinking water had to be brought from elsewhere. The island has a wooden jetty 120 yards long with a head 40 feet long and a coral jetty 100 yards long with a head 50 feet long. Both had a minimum depth of 8 feet at LW at the head of the jetty. Next to the main jetty and running parallel with it was a lugger slipway 100 yards long and 5 yards wide. The water depth above the slipway wagon was 8 feet. The slip could be used by vessels up to 60 tons with a draught of $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet. On the east side of the island, rails run down into the water from the sawmill.

The usual anchorage was about 400 yards west of the main jetty.

- (f) FATOEDJOERING (NW end of MAINOOR Island): There is a Japanese owned plantation on the peninsula. At the plantation on the east side of the cape there is a schooner jetty approx 300 feet long, with a depth alongside of 8 ft at LW. There are a good house four copra sheds and four copra driers. Drinking water may be had from four wells and three large rainwater tanks near the house.

Stretching for 450 yards on either side of the jetty is a gradually shelving sand beach suitable for landing.

A plantation road runs across the peninsula from the jetty.

- (g) TABERFANE (NW end of TRANGAN Island): There is a good sand beach from Cape NGOMI eastwards past TABERFANE. The best landing place is a stretch from 600 yards west of the village around to a jetty which is 600 yards SE of the village. The jetty was built by the enemy and is about 100 yards long, extending beyond the reef into deep water.

The terrain in the vicinity of the beach is low and flat and adjacent to the beach is almost entirely planted with coconut trees. There are many tracks in the area and a well-kept MT road leads westward from the village. Water is obtained from wells.

- (h) West Coast TRANGAN Island: The whole length of the beach between KILAR KILAR (KABALANUKIN) and NGABOR could be used for landing with craft drawing 3 ft 6 ins during a period between half flood and half ebb tide. Trails run inland from the coastal villages to FOPDJETOER, and continue as a possible MT road to DOKA BARAT airfield.

- (i) DOKA BARAT: Supplies are probably brought to the DOKA BARAT airfield by way of the SERALTOE River to a jetty on the east bank between the villages of DOKA BARAT and LAININIR. As an MT road from the SW end of the strip ends abruptly at the BARAT River, it is probable that the stores were transhipped at the jetty to lighter draught barges and brought up the BARAT River to this roadhead.

- (j) South east Coast TRANGAN Island: The coast from the base of the peninsula which terminates in Tg. NGABOROMLOE, northeastwards to Tg. GOLDJOERING is fringed by an excellent sand beach, suitable for landings at all states of the tide. It is, however, very exposed in the SE monsoon when there is swell and surf at the beach.

The enemy have been active on this portion of the coast and a number of dug-outs and weapon pits have been constructed on ridges and around the villages.

- (k) SIA: Landing facilities here are unknown but in view of the existence of a road from the village to the airfield and the probability of supplies being unloaded here by barge it is reasonable to assume that there is either a small jetty or landing stage or a suitable beach.

4. Towns and Villages

- (a) Towns: The only town of importance was the capital, DOBO on WAMAR Island. It had a big Chinese bazaar and several houses and offices of European officials, hospital, Police barracks, etc. The destruction of the town is almost complete only a few houses and the jetty remaining (see Town Plan - Appx 'F'). Health at DOBO was good there being only about 5% malaria.

The jetty can be used for heavy transport. The roads are of sand and clay and would probably be soft in wet weather.

- (b) Villages: Native villages are found along the coast and banks of the channels. The size of the villages varies from 100 to 1000 inhabitants and the largest are found on the east coast of TRANGAN Island. Housing conditions are poor although there had been some improvement made in the years immediately prior to the war.

In the bigger villages there are mostly schools of the Presbyterian Mission. Sometimes there is also a church. Most of the natives live an easy and lazy life.

5. Roads and Tracks (See Map - Appx 'G')

- (a) General: There is a road suitable for MT running from DOBO along the north coast of WAMAR and down the west coast to DJOERDJELA. In addition there are some plantation roads and the Japanese have constructed MT roads in the vicinity of the three airfields on TRANGAN Island. The present condition of the roads is not known.

The interior of most of the islands is densely forested and except on TRANGAN there are few tracks.

- (b) WAMAR Island: The DOBO-DJOERDJELA road is about 8 miles long and 13 feet wide, of sand and clay and liable to be soft in wet weather. There are wooden bridges about 60 feet long at about one mile and two miles from DOBO. These bridges cross ravines 15-20 feet wide and the road would probably be impassable to MT if they were destroyed.

From DOBO footpaths run to FATOLREI village on the SE coast and to WANGIL and DJOERDJELA on the west coast.

- (c) TRANGAN Island: The exact status of some of the tracks on TRANGAN are not known. The Japanese have constructed roads in the vicinity of the airfields and it is possible that jeeps at least can travel to both the east and west coasts.

Tracks lead inland from the villages on the west coast to meet at POPDJETOR and from there possible MT roads continue to DOKA BARAT and TRANGAN airfields.

A track passable to MT leads from TRANGAN airfield to SIA, and another to BILTOLREOR both on the east coast.

A trail skirts the SE coast of the island from BATOE GOJANG to NIEUW KREI.

In the southern part of the island trails run from TAFERLIAR to NGAIBOR and to SIA, while north of the SERWATOE there are trails from the airfields to ERESIX and FATLABATA on the S. MAIKOOR.

6. Water Transport

Waterborne transport is used extensively throughout the islands and a large number of small craft are to be found at every

village. These are suitable only for short fishing trips or coastwise travelling.

(a) Salt Water Channels

The salt water channels separating the islands of the main group are of considerable importance. All of these are navigable by small boats and some are navigable for vessels of considerable size. The more important are listed below:

- (i) S. KOLA MATOE (5.24'S 134.28'E): Between WARILAOE and KOLA islands, navigable for vessels with a length of 300 ft and unlimited draught. Local knowledge is not necessary. A deep channel in which there are no detached dangers. The reefs on either side are generally marked by discoloured water.
- (ii) S. MANOLIBAI (MANOLIBAI): Between WOKAM and KOBROOR islands, this is the most important of the channels through the AROE Islands. Since the eastern part of the channel has not been surveyed, local knowledge is necessary for its navigation. It is about 28 miles long and has a minimum depth of $3\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms.

It is stated that on account of the sharp bends and the unsurveyed eastern mouth, only ships with a maximum length of 105 feet and a maximum draught of 16 feet could navigate this "soengai."
- (iii) S. WORKAI (6.03'S 134.15'E): Between KOBROOR and MAIKOOR Islands. Can be used only by vessels with a length of 95 to 105 ft. The draught is unlimited. The western entrance can be used by large vessels. Local knowledge is necessary.
- (iv) S. MAIKOOR: Between MAIKOOR and TRANGAN Islands. Is only navigable for very small craft. This "soengai" has a broad, deep entrance at the western side, and can be safely navigated on soundings at least as far as TABERFANE village, located $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles ESE of TANDJONG NGONI on the southern side of the channel. Vessels of the RPK occasionally called at this village. A large and very steep rock which uncovers at low water lies in mid-channel opposite TABERFANE village. Although this channel is said to be deep all the way to the eastern side of the islands, it is reported to be only a few yards wide in places. On the north side of the western part of the channel there are several villages amongst which are MAIKOOR, DJARACAMIN and WANGAL; none of these is important.
- (v) S. SERATOE: Divides TRANGAN Island into two parts but has been surveyed only as far as the mouth of the SOENGAI LOLOOR, a small tributary, $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles inland from the western entrance of the channel. This entrance is 1 mile wide, but is fronted by a large bank over which there are depths of 1 to 18 feet. A channel with a width of about 2 cables and a minimum depth of $2\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms leads over this bank. The monsoons are reported to cause this channel to shift. Inside the bar the channel is wider and deeper, but entering vessels should favour the western shore in order to avoid a drying reef that projects from the shore opposite TANDJONG DEREHI. This "soengai" is only navigable for small vessels but the Japanese are believed to have used it to transport supplies to the airfields on TRANGAN Island.

(b) Rivers

- (i) S. HOKMER: Five miles south of Tg. NGCMI. Navigable by very small vessels. S. LOETOR and S. REBI, 4 and 8 miles further south are similar.
- (ii) S. NGAIBOR: About $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile northward of NGAIBOR, the largest village on the western side of TRANGAN, S. NGAIBOR, the largest fresh water river in the AROS Islands flows into the sea. During the rainy season the river overflows its banks and is fresh almost to its mouth which is about 75 yards wide. It is navigable by very small vessels only.

7. Airfields

- (a) TRANGAN (06.45'S 134.18'E): Situated inland on the SE part of TRANGAN Island.

Runways: No.1 north/south 4600' x 240'
No.2 NNE/SSW 3000' x 130'

Airfield completely neglected.

Dispersal: Dispersal lanes lead from the north and south ends of No.1 runway and from the east side of No.2 runway to at least 11 well dispersed points on the fringes of nearby clumps of trees.

Extension: Not possible.

Engineer Facilities: As the island is mainly composed of coral limestone, surfacing material should be plentiful. Good timber is obtainable in fair quantities in the island or from the other principal islands of the group.

Communications: A well used road runs between the south end of the strips and BILTOBOR, on the SE coast of TRANGAN Island.

The road from GARLEI (a village near the southern extremity of the SERWATOL River) to the strips was not in use by MT traffic at 26 Oct 43.

MT tracks lead from the north end of No.1 runway towards the east coast. Other MT tracks lead south from the south end of the same runway through a flight gap area of felled trees to a thickly wooded area.

Supplies to the airfield are probably brought from DOBO by barge down the SOENGAI WORKAI (the channel between the island of KOBROOR and MAIKOOR) then along the east coast to SIA, 5 miles SE of the airfield, and thence by possible MT road. An alternative route would be up the SERWATOL River by barge as far as DOKA TIMOER and then by possible MT road via DJEIA to the airfield.

- (b) DOKA BARAT (06.37'S 134.15'E): The strip is about 3000 yards ENE of DOKA BARAT village on TRANGAN Island, and approximately 10 miles NNE of TRANGAN Airfield. The airfield is now neglected.

Runway: NE/SW 4850' x 260'

Dispersal: A dispersal loop leads from the NE end of the runway and rejoins the strip near its centre.

Extension: Not possible.

Engineering Facilities: Coral limestone and timber are available.

Communications: An MT track about one mile long runs from the SW end of the runway almost due west of the BARAT River. About 750 yards west of the runway, another road branches off the first road and runs in a general northeasterly direction to DOKA TIMOER airfield.

An MT track runs southwestward from the west bank of the SARWATOL River opposite DOKA BARAT and possibly leads to the village of POPUJETOR.

Supplies are probably brought to this airfield by way of the SARWATOL River to the jetty on the east bank between the villages of DOKA BARAT and LAINILIR. As the MT trail from the SW end of the strip ends abruptly at the BARAT River, it seems reasonable to presume that stores were transhipped at the jetty mentioned above, into lighter draft barges and brought up the BARAT River to this roadhead.

- (c) DOKA TIMOER (06.34'S 134.16'E): Situated just NE of DOKA BARAT Airfield on TRANGAN Island.

Runway: N/S 4500 feet long. Barricaded probably unserviceable.

Dispersal: One revetment. Unprotected dispersal points for 16 fighters and additional hardstanding capacity for 10 fighters and 5 bombers.

Extension: Unknown.

Engineering Facilities: Coral limestone and timber available.

Communications: MT road to DOKA BARAT Airfield.

8. Seaplane Alighting Areas

- (a) TABERFANE: TABERFANE village is situated on the NW end of TRANGAN Island, on the south bank of the SOENGAI MAIKOOR.

The enemy commenced to make constant use of this area as a float plane base at the beginning of May 43, and maintained strength there for some time.

The alighting area runs NW/SE and is approximately 4 miles long northwestwards of TABERFANE and about the same length up the river, southeastwards of the village. The latter area would give considerable shelter during the NW monsoon. There is a large rock, on a 4 fathom bank in the middle of the channel opposite the village. This rock is only uncovered at low springs.

No slipways are apparent, but the shore is suitable for beaching seaplanes. A large area SW of TABERFANE is well tracked and contains at least one and possibly more revetted buildings. The nature of the tracks indicates that the area is probably both a personnel and a dump area.

- (b) SOENGAI SARINTOE: The mouth of this river, on the west coast of TRANGAN Island is known to have been used by the enemy as a dispersal point for seaplanes. In May 43 after an attack by our aircraft on his TABERFANE seaplane base, several floatplanes were seen on the beach opposite the village of ALARDJIR and on the seaward side of Tg. DERENI at the mouth of the river.

During the SE monsoon the 400 yard wide channel running northwestwards of Tg. DERENI could be used as an alighting area. The river, between the cape on the north bank of the river south of ALARDJIR, and the island of WARDJA could be used as an alighting area during the NW monsoon.

- (c) DOBO: The alighting area in the harbor at DOBO has a direction approximately NW/SE and has ample length and breadth. It was used by flying boats of the Royal Netherlands Navy.

Landing and take-off is possible at all times. Berths for 6 to 9 flying boats can be found on the east side of DOBO during the NW monsoon, and on the west side during the SE monsoon.

9. Signal Communications

There was a wireless station at DOBO, which during the war was removed to a native garden on the outskirts of the village. It had communication with ALBON, BANDOENG and DARWIN.

There was no telephone or telegraph.

10. Resources

- (a) Foodstuffs: The staple diet of the population is sago.

All foodstuffs for the foreign population at DOBO, about 3000 persons, were imported, although near DOBO there were some Chinese and native vegetable gardens which supplied DOBO and the Japanese fishing fleet.

Most of the sago, ubi and ketella comes from TRANGAN and used to be transported to DOBO to make up for the shortage of rice there.

Meat and fish are plentiful. Deer and pig are numerous and on POELAU BABI there were about 150 head of cross-bred Bali cattle.

- (b) Construction Materials: Coral limestone is available on most of the islands.

Valuable timber "Intsia amboinensis", is found in quantity. It is chiefly worked in POELAU WASIR, POELAU OEDJIR, WOKAM and MAIKOOR, for the saw-mills at POELAU KENARI and WOKAM. It is a hardwood and may be used for all forms of construction and bridging work. It is known locally as "kajoe besi". Another excellent constructional timber is known locally as "kajoe linggoea."

- (c) Water: Water supply is normally from wells and, except in POELAU KENARI, there is no likelihood of shortage.

11. Medical

The general health in the Group is similar to that in KAI and TANIMBAR Islands. There are no diseases that are peculiar to the AROE Islands alone. Malaria is prevalent in many villages but there is only a little at DOBO.

There was a hospital at DOBO with a small operation room and accommodation for 50 patients. It has been destroyed and there is now probably no hospital accommodation in the Group.

12. Meteorological Conditions

- (a) Climate: The climate of the AROE Islands is generally healthy except during the first few months of the SE monsoon, when there are usually epidemics of fever. The climate is warm, moist and stable. The weather is seldom influenced to a pronounced degree by travelling cyclones, hence the changes in winds and attendant weather conditions are almost wholly diurnal and seasonal in character.

The mean annual temperature is 80°F throughout this region. As the daily range is small at sea and in low areas near the sea, day temperatures are not excessively high, averaging for the year about 86°F as a daily maximum. Night temperatures are relatively high. The minimum at places near the sea is about 75°F as an average for the year. The annual range of temperature is also small, there being only about 2°F difference between the warmest months (Oct and Nov) and the coolest months.

- (b) Rainfall: The rainy season occurs during the NW monsoon, from Oct or Nov to Mar. The wettest months are Dec to Mar, when it rains on an average every other day.

The driest months are Aug and Sep, when rain falls, on an average, on seven days in each month.



- (c) Winds: The NW monsoon sets in at the end of Nov with southerly and southwesterly winds but soon assumes a northwesterly direction within a couple of points on either side.

During the second half of Mar the general direction of the wind is from NW to west, but easterly winds are experienced occasionally; rainstorms occur about mid-day. Variable winds are usual in Apr during the change of the monsoon--on some days SE winds prevail, accompanied as a rule by much rain.

The east monsoon sets in about the 20th of Apr with winds of little force, varying in direction between SSE and ENE.

From the end of May till the middle of Oct the monsoon is generally strong between SE and SSE, reaching its greatest force in Jun, Jul and Aug, after which it decreases gradually in strength until Oct when light variable winds and calms occur and continue through the latter part of Nov.

ENEMY DISPOSITIONS & DEFENCES - ARAFURA SEA APPENDIX "A"





• LEGEND


BARGE STAGING POINTS. *

ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS. —

AIRFIELDS —



0011608



TOEAL KAI ISLANDS




SCALE



TOEAL KAI ISLANDS
UNNAMED BUILDINGS ARE DESTROYED

1:250,000

[illegible]

SAUMLAKI
TANIMBAR I.




Scale



GSI 1 ARST CORPS

Reproduced by 2nd Army Corps



TOWN PLAN DOBO


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
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BUILDINGS INTACT [REDACTED]
OTHER BUILT UP AREAS DESTROYED

APPENDIX "F"
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SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY NO 5




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
AROE ISLANDS

SECOND EDITION SUPA 2

1:250,000



LEGEND
 Reef
 Shoal
 Bank
 Island
 Cape
 Point
 Bay
 Harbor
 Canal
 Ditch
 Road
 Railroad
 Telegraph
 Lighthouse
 Beacon
 Buoy
 Mole
 Breakwater
 Jetty
 Pier
 Wharf
 Quay
 Dock
 Basin
 Tide gauge
 Ferry
 Ferry route
 Ferry schedule
 Ferry company
 Ferry agent
 Ferry master
 Ferry crew
 Ferry passengers
 Ferry cargo
 Ferry mail
 Ferry telegraph
 Ferry lighthouse
 Ferry beacon
 Ferry buoy
 Ferry mole
 Ferry breakwater
 Ferry jetty
 Ferry pier
 Ferry wharf
 Ferry quay
 Ferry dock
 Ferry basin
 Ferry tide gauge



GLOSSARY
 TO TUNONG CAPE
 P. P. ISLAND
 S. S. RIVER

CONTROL: Hydrographic Chart No. 1000, Philippine Islands
 Scale: 1:250,000
 Date: 1950
 Author: U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office
 Editor: U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office
 Publisher: U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office
 Distribution: U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office
 Copyright: U.S. Navy Hydrographic Office
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HEIGHTS AND DEPTHS IN METRES

1:250,000

Scale 1:250,000

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NEUTRALITY STATEMENTS

Statement	Yes	No
1. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the United States.		
2. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Philippines.		
3. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the United Kingdom.		
4. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Netherlands.		
5. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the France.		
6. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Italy.		
7. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Japan.		
8. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Germany.		
9. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Spain.		
10. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Portugal.		
11. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Belgium.		
12. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Luxembourg.		
13. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Switzerland.		
14. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Austria.		
15. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Hungary.		
16. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Czech Republic.		
17. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Slovakia.		
18. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Poland.		
19. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Czech Republic.		
20. The Aroe Islands are under the control of the Slovakia.		


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HEIGHTS AND DEPTHS IN METRES



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
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

1 : 63,360

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES GRID
SOUTHERN ZONETANIMBAR ISLANDS
SELAROE ISLAND EASTREFER TO THIS MAP AS:
N° 0437 SELAROE ISLAND EAST 1 INCH SERIESWARNING: FORM LINES ONLY, NOT CONTOURS
INTERVAL APPROXIMATELY 50 FEET

Prepared by Australian Survey Corps. Topography compiled by 2/1 Aust Army Topo Coy from Trimetrogon Photography missions: COO 10, 10A, 11 Aug 43, COO 450C, 13 Jun 43, COO 25/15, 15 Mar 44, by No 1 P.R.U./RAF; PEN 17/2, Run No 15, 7 Apr 44, PEN 45/1, 22 Sep 43, and large scale Air Photography mission: PEN 17/2, Run No 16/3, K67-5, K67-6, 7 Apr 44, by 289th Bomb Group 5th Air Force US Army. Additional information obtained from Allied Geographical Section and Netherlands Government Charts, Nos 382, 383. Form lines determined by Parallax measurements. Scale, Azimuth and Grid Position are controlled by positions scaled from Chart No 382, as follows: Adacet Jetty Lat 8°07'39.6" Long 131°06'46.8", Asoetoeboen Island Lat 8°03'41.5", Long 131°16'16.0", Saumlaki Jetty Lat 7°58'56.5", Long 131°17'41.5".
Reproduced by 2/1 Aust Army Topo Coy, May 44.
Lambert Conical Orthomorphic Projection.



RELIABILITY DIAGRAM

A: RELIABLE FROM VERTICAL AIR PHOTOS
B: FAIRLY RELIABLE FROM OBLIQUE AIR PHOTOS

Feature	Symbol
Motor Road and Bridge	—
Foot Track	—
Reported Track	—
Telegraph Line	—
Highway	—
Sea Plane Base	—
Aeronautical Station	—
Trig Station	—
and Altitude	—
Spot Elevation	—
Native Village (small or large)	—
Building	—
Church or Mosque	—
Native Garden or Cultivation	—
Jungle or Dense Forest	—
Open Forest	—
Scattered Timber	—
Shrub (Dense or Light)	—
Secondary Growth	—
Plantation (rubber, coconut, etc.)	—
Swamp (recent or recent)	—
Swamp (recently inundated)	—
River or Stream	—
Reef	—
Contours - Form Lines (numbers and facing uphill)	—
Cliffs	—

Feature	Symbol
Motor Road and Bridge	—
Foot Track	—
Reported Track	—
Telegraph Line	—
Highway	—
Sea Plane Base	—
Aeronautical Station	—
Trig Station	—
and Altitude	—
Spot Elevation	—
Native Village (small or large)	—
Building	—
Church or Mosque	—
Native Garden or Cultivation	—
Jungle or Dense Forest	—
Open Forest	—
Scattered Timber	—
Shrub (Dense or Light)	—
Secondary Growth	—
Plantation (rubber, coconut, etc.)	—
Swamp (recent or recent)	—
Swamp (recently inundated)	—
River or Stream	—
Reef	—
Contours - Form Lines (numbers and facing uphill)	—
Cliffs	—

Officers using this map are requested to make any necessary additions and amendments on the map itself and forward same to Survey Directorate, H.Q. of Force concerned.

001165D





National Garden of Cultivation
 Jungle or Dense Forest
 Open Forest
 Scattered Trees
 Scrub (Thicket)
 Secondary Growth
 Plantation (either commercial
 Mangroves
 Swamp (either transitional)
 Marsh (either transitional)
 River or Stream
 Reef
 Contours - Form Lines (usually not forming a hill)
 Cliffs






THIRD EDITION
Revised Dec. 1943

ALL SERVICE USERS OF THIS MAP are requested to make necessary corrections hereon and return it to R.A.A.F. Headquarters through the usual channels.
NOTE: Adequate surveys of the area covered by this sheet have not been made. SPOT HEIGHTS MAY THEREFORE BE INACCURATE.


SHEET B.6

FOR USE IN DAYLIGHT
OR UNDER RED LIGHT

Equatorial Scale 1:1,000,000
Mercator Projection



TO FIND CONVERSION ANGLE
Place ruler on map to join
the two points to be converted
and read the angle at the
intersection of the ruler
with the Conversion Angle
Scale at the bottom of the
sheet.



Aerodromes (Symbol, Name, Altitude)
Customs Aerodromes
Emergency Landing Ground
Alighting Area (with facilities)
Relaying Airway Light
Obstructions (with height above ground and in feet)
If not lighted
If lighted

Radio Facilities, with Call Sign & Height of Mast above ground
Broadcasting Station
Communication Station
Meteorological Station
Maritime Beacon
Direction Finding Station
Isogonic
Radio Range

Railway Line
Roads: Main
Secondary
Tramway
Light Railway
Tramway
Altiude in feet
2610 Contour in Feet
Power Transmission Line
Telegraph Line
Homesite
Outpost
Quay
Wharf
Windmill
Weir
Lock
Marine Light
Edge of Timber

Bore
Well
Tank
Dam
Spout
Waterhole
Rockhole
Claypan
Spring
Marsh or Swamp
Mangrove
Watercourse
Surge
No Surveyed
Shoals with Sea Depth in Fathoms
Marine Sand
Reef
Position Doubtful
Plantation




PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF R.A.A.F. HEADQUARTERS.
CONTROL: Aeronautical maps 1:1 million (the principal)
Topographical Survey, Hydrographic Survey.
PHOTOGRAPHY: Department of Interior and R.A.A.F. Headquarters.
COMPILED: Department of Interior and R.A.A.F. Headquarters.
REPRODUCTION: Department of Interior and R.A.A.F. Headquarters.

KEY TO ADJOINING SHEETS
A.5 A.6 A.7
B.5 B.6 B.7
C.5 C.6 C.7

NOTE
Green tint represents
high ground and does
not necessarily imply
presence of timber

SHEET
B.6
THIRD EDITION

001167F



Expt "D"

RESTRICTED

Subject: INTELLIGENCE 7 AUST DIV

HQ 1 Aust Corps
13 Sep 45
GSI/1557/123/2

7 Aust Div

Copy to:

DMI Adv HQ
War Diary (2) ✓

1. It is desired to place on record the appreciation of General Staff Intelligence of this HQ of the high standard of Intelligence maintained throughout the planning and conduct of the OBOE Two Operations by 7 Aust Div.
2. Although the Div Intelligence Staff should not have been adequate, as it was not designed to fulfil the special requirements of amphibious operations nor for the control of the very large number of special intelligence organisations, which were attached for these operations, the intelligence passed to this Headquarters was in volume, quality and presentation most satisfying. It is considered that this high standard of intelligence work throughout the campaign was made possible by the efficiency, knowledge and sheer hard work of all intelligence sections of the Division.
3. The co-operation at all times of the Intelligence Staff of 7 Aust Div with this Headquarters left nothing to be desired.

J. F. Chiffoleau
Brig
GS 1 Aust Corps

File P-

Subject: INTELLIGENCE 26 AUST INF BDE

HQ 1 Aust Corps
13 Sep 45
GSI/1555/123/2

26 Aust Inf Bde

Copy to:

DHI

War Diary (2) ✓

It is desired to place on record the appreciation and congratulations of General Staff (Intelligence) of this Headquarters for the work performed by Captain NELSON and the Intelligence Sections within the Brigade during the planning and conduct of the TARAKAN Operation.

Seldom has a Brigade Intelligence Officer been called on to control such a large number of specialized units in conjunction with the detailed and extensive work required for the mounting and conduct of an amphibious operation. The Brigade Intelligence Section was acknowledged to be insufficient for the task but the accuracy, speed and presentation of information supplied to this Headquarters was all that could be desired.

It is considered that the high standard of intelligence work throughout the campaign was made possible by the knowledge, efficiency and hard work of all the Intelligence Sections of the Brigade and the special Units attached. The work of Captain NELSON in coordinating and presenting the information was of the highest order.

B. J. Selfield
GS 1 Aust Corps Brig Corps