

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/2/16

16 Infantry Brigade

March - April 1941

KALAMATA.

DAWN of 26 April saw the long convoy of ALLEN GROUP entering their dispersal areas outside the town of KALAMATA. Here we are to embark. We were told to disperse among the olive groves and camouflage our vehicles as quickly as possible, in order to have the maximum possible concealment before the morning recce; this plane flew over regularly as clockwork each day at 0730 hrs.

Drivers worked feverishly with nets and branches sliced from the friendly trees, and the Brigade area was ready by the time the recce plane droned over us. Soon afterwards a bomber appeared and dropped a stick of bombs along the beach to our right, towards the jetty.

WE DUG slit trenches in the shade of the trees, and rested. Our M.T. drivers were particularly weary after their task of the preceding nights, driving over difficult roads from dusk till dawn. Their passengers were almost as tired. A slight shower of rain fell, but we slumbered on.

Through it all there was no rest for the Brigade Commander. Throughout the long hours of daylight he was in conference at KALAMATA, organising the embarkation of the troops under his command. To see 6,000 troops safely away, with the threat of enemy air action always imminent, is no small job; in fact, it is probably the biggest and most nerve wracking task that Brigadier Allen has yet undertaken.

Movement during the day was kept to the lowest possible minimum, and although planes flew over us they made no hostile action.

EDWARDS DARK WE BEGAN TO MOVE to our embarkation positions along the beach. The troops had been organised into numbered sections, and each had been allotted a time to commence moving towards the wharf, starting at 2200 hrs. Brigade HQ was split into two sections, Operations, consisting of the Brigade Commander, B.M., Staff Captain, L.O.2 (Lieut. Swinton) Captain Lovell, Captain Raftery and ten other ranks, & B Co. Two vehicles had been retained; the Brigade Commanders car and a 15 cwt. utility, nearly on its last legs. The remainder of the Brigade vehicles were left among the trees to the tender mercies of the wrecking squad.

GREEK CIVILIANS, inhabitants of the houses in the area where we assembled, maintained their attitude of friendliness all through, and seemed sorry to see us go. They gave the men food and water, talked with them, said "Some day you will come back".

AT TEN O'CLOCK long lines of troops began to march along the grey road by the beach towards the wharf. For an hour previously we had watched lights coming nearer and nearer to the shore, lights that meant safety for us. One by one the sections passed us and were swallowed up in the gloom. The night was almost moonless and the ceiling low. We were glad of that.

When the last group of marching men passed the site of Brigade HQ, we began to move. The utility, groaning under the weight of about a dozen officers and ORs, her two front springs gone, laboured along the beach road at walking pace. It was so dark that two of us walked in front of the bonnet, marking the boundaries of the road.

We reached the darkened and silent streets of the town. From the wharf we saw flashes of light, and as we arrived at the embarkation area we could distinguish the outlines of destroyers. Their function was first to transport the

KALAMATA26 April 41.

MEN to the waiting troopships outside the small harbour; and then to see that they arrived safely at their port of destination .

SUPERB ORGANISATION marked everything that the Navy did that night . With an absolute minimum of fuss they took the troops aboard, packing them tightly on the limited deckspace at their command, threading their way between the harbour lights without the assistance of a pilot boat with an absolute certainty that drew admiring ~~ixaxixx~~ comments from all on board . When we drew alongside the troopships sailors helped soldiers laden with weapons and equipment up the gangway, shepherded them to their quarters and had cup after cup of steaming tea ready for us to drink . "Thank God we've got a navy" was an almost universal comment .

THE ENTIRE MOVEMENT from Lamia to the point of embarkation had been carried out in excellent order . The embarkation itself maintained and improved that high standard of discipline . The wharves at Kalamata could accomodate two destroyers, each with a loading point at bow and stern . The men filed on board in single file, quietly and smoothly; when each destroyer had loaded it's complement, the troops left on the wharf sat down quietly and waited for the next destroyer to draw in . One would have thought that there were no enemy about, except for the thick darkness and the shaded lights .

AT SEA.27 April 41.

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS we found, after the embarkation had been completed, was split up over the three vessels in our convoy. The Brigade Commander, the B.M., and the I.O. were on the "City of London"; the Staff Captain, L.O.2 and other ranks of the O. Group were on the "Dilwara"; while our "B" Echelon were on the "Costa Rica", the smallest ship of the three.

The first thought of those on board was sleep; soon the decks, the mess rooms and recreation rooms were covered with recumbent forms. We slept, but not for long; at 0500 hrs we were instructed to draw lifebelts and issued with instructions to be followed in the event of air attack. AA crews were detailed; soon the upper decks presented a formidable picture as the Brens, twin Lewis and Vickers guns were mounted. There were over sixty automatic weapons to greet any Nazi bomber that considered we were an attractive target.

THE ALARM sounded for the first time ca. 0730 hrs, and, in accordance with instructions, those not engaged on AA work moved below to the mess decks. We heard the ack ack from the destroyers, the whine of Hun engines, and then our machine guns opened up as the raiders came within range.

Being bombed at sea was a new experience to us. We've had plenty on land, but this was our first taste of what merchantmen in the channel have been taking. For those below decks it was hard on the nerves, listening to the sound of the falling bomb and awaiting the result; but for those manning the guns it was the joy of battle, a sheer delight. For the first time since they saw the shores of Greece they felt they were giving it back as well as taking it from these damned machines; they set their teeth and poured a wall of lead into the sky.

Bombs fell near us, rocked the ship from bow to stern; but no damage was done, and a wild shout came from below decks as a jubilant "The count's four, boys" was relayed from the gun crews above.

BUT THAT WAS ONLY THE FIRST in a day of raids. Some of those below said it was the worst day they had spent, not excepting those long days on the road during the withdrawal when the roads were being perpetually bombed and machine gunned. It WAS a rather helpless feeling, sitting below when the alarm sounded, listening to the clamour that was going on outside, and wondering. Several times, when bombs fell perilously close and the vessel plunged, men started to their feet, looking with anxious eyes at the gangway; then someone would say "Sit down, sit down, you mugs - near miss" and calm was as quickly restored. There was never any danger of panic, despite all that the men had gone through; they sat and smoked cigarettes, they sang choruses to the accompaniment of an R.A.F. aircraftsman with a piano accordion, they played cards, they slept; and when the alarm sounded they adjusted steel helmets and life belts and waited.

THE DILWARA'S CAPTAIN said that we saved the ship. One plane braved the lead that our guns belched up at him, dived towards the ship; but he couldn't keep in his dive, couldn't take it. He veered ever so slightly from his course - and then he released an aerial torpedo that missed the ship by just enough. If he had held his dive, he would have hit us amidships.....

AT SEA27 APR 41.

And if that was true of the "Dilwara" it was equally true of the "City of London". On this vessel the fires were extinguished by a bomb landing perilously close; the lascars were put into a state of panic, the ship stopped. Stokers were called for among the soldiers on board; the position was made clear to the native personnel and they resumed duties. The Australians baked the bread, Australians manned the guns. One of the crew, an American, said that he had seen a few raids and some good barrages put up, but that he never seen anything like the barrage put up by the machine gunners of the "City of London". "The diggers will do me" he said.

THE LAST RAID brought the Nazis their only victory. The red flag had been flying on board the destroyers, but it was eventually taken down. The gunners relaxed. Then, out of the sun, a sergeant saw the glint of a propeller. He got the guns working, but too late to engage the raider before he straddled the "Dilwara" with a stick of bombs - bombs that fell fantastically close, that damaged us sufficiently to cause a leak, but did nothing that would hold up our ship. The German flew ~~and~~ on, and dropped another stick across the "City of London" that also went close but did not harm her, and on his last dive scored a near miss on the "Costa Rica".

A near miss - if it is near enough - will do as much damage to a large vessel as a direct hit, for concussion causes the plates to split. That is what happened to the "Costa Rica". She almost immediately developed a list, and two of our three escorting destroyers raced to her side. One ranged along the port side of the vessel, another to starboard, and in what seemed no time all personnel on board the damaged boat were taken off. There were three casualties.

The Navy claimed seven planes for the convoy, it is reported. Whether that balances the loss of one vessel it is hard to say - but after they had sunk the "Costa Rica" (at about 1400 hrs) they left us alone for the remainder of the voyage.

The plane in the last raid had climbed high into the sun, and then switched off his engines. The Navy gave us the all clear. Then the raider went into a long glide and was upon us before we had time to engage him; clever tactics, and they scored a bull.

ALLTHROUGH THE DAY the naval cooks kept up a continuous supply of steaming hot tea. That tea stood by us. And, when the raids were over, the remarkable resilience of the Australians enabled them to pick up spirits rapidly. Slumbers were sound that night.

AT SEA

28 April 41.

THERE WAS AN EARLY ALARM ca. 0800 hrs in the morning . A recon plane, perhaps - whatever it was, we were not attacked but kept sailing serenely onwards . Changes of course were frequent and there was much speculation as to where we were going . Alexandria, Port Said, Haifa - all were mentioned with an air of authority .

"B" ECHELON , we learned, had been taken by the two destroyers with the other troops on board the "Costa Rica" to Crete . We understand that they will be returned to us as soon as there is space available on shipping .

A QUIET DAY on board , glorious weather, and we were unworried by bombers .

AT SEA - EGYPT.

29 April 41.

IT WAS GOOD TO SEE ALEXANDRIA again, the harbour full of shipping and British planes in the air above us. And the day was perfect, sky blue and cloudless.

We disembarked just before noon, and lined up for a cup of tea. With the tea we were given a paper bag of fruit, chocolates and cigarettes. A lot of the troops came back for some more tea - and another paper bag.

THE TROOP TRAIN then puffed lethargically alongside the wharf and we entrained for IKINGI MARYUT. Egyptian trains are noted for their slowness and the terrific din that the driver makes with his whistle. Whistling, puffing and jolting, at last we moved away.

Lake Maryut was full of water - for Lake Maryut. The level was a great deal higher than we had seen it before, whether through heavy rains or artificial means we did not discover.

AT IKINGI we were fed once more and issued with blankets. That familiar desert camp has not altered.

After mess the canteens were opened, and we ended an idyllic day squatting in the sand sucking bottles of beer and swapping experiences. Friends who had not seen each other for months found each other in the canteen queue; brothers were re-united, stragglers found their units, some believed missing or dead were found to be still able to take a little nourishment. It was like a reunion night.

Before we bedded down we were told that reveille would be at 0600 hrs, and that we were to entrain after breakfast for PALESTINE!

FOR THIS MOVE, the Brigade will be under the command of Lt. COL. Lamb, 2/3 Bn.

REVEILLE - BREAKFAST and we embussed for the station ; entrained and were soon on our way . The Brigade HQ party were u/s Lieut . Smt Swinton, the Staff Captain having gone on ahead .

The journey through the Delta was a particularly slow one and it was late in the afternoon before we pulled in at Qantara .

QANTARA is probably more visited than any Egyptian town by our troops in the course of their duty - it is a regulation stop for meals for troops proceeding from Egypt to Palestine and vice versa - but they probably know less about it than any other . Qantara is a town where one crosses the canal, is fed, and is whisked away before one can even see what sort of a town it is . The platform is always full of hawkers, and money changers who turn Egyptian pounds into Palestine pounds - at an advantageous rate of exchange that never seems to be in line with that quoted in the papers .

At Qantara we were given another meal and then marched to a platform where a long train of cattle trucks greeted us . 8 hommes, 40 chevaux, says one bloke . No, said his pal ruefully, you're quite wrong - it's 40 hommes . You'll see.

Cattle trucks are not the most uncomfortable means of transport . They jerk you about . They make you feel every bump in the permanent way and a lot besides that aren't there at all .

And one poor chap had a bad case of Gyppo tummy....

AT NIGHTFALL we left Qantara and commenced our long journey across the desert of Sinai . It was hopeless to try and sleep, and even more hopeless to try and talk . So we pretended to doze.

MOVEMENT OF H.Q. 16 AUST. INF. BDE., JULIS TO TOBRUCH.
TO GREECE AND BACK TO JULIS

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1.	Departed Julis		31 Aug.40
2.	Crossed Egyptian-Palestine border		0800 hrs 1 Sept.
3.	Arrived Ismailia		1 Sept
4.	Departed Ismailia		2 Sept
5.	Arrived Helwan		2 Sept
6.	Departed Helwan		18 Oct
7.	Arrived Amiriya		18 Oct
8.	Departed Amiriya		12 Dec
9.	Arrived Mersa Hawala		12 Dec
10.	Departed Mersa Hawala		12 Dec
11.	Arrived Buq Buq Area		17 Dec
12.	Departed Buq Buq area		18 Dec
13.	Arrived Amiriyah Salum		18 Dec
14.	Departed Salum and entered Libya		19 Dec
15.	Arrived Position east of Fort Capuzzo		19 Dec
16.	Departed Position east of Fort Capuzzo		21 Dec
17.	Arrived position west of Fort Capuzzo		21 Dec
18.	Departed Position west of Fort Capuzzo		2 Jan 41
19.	Arrived assembly area Bardia		2 Jan
20.	Departed assembly area Bardia		3 Jan
21.	Arrived Post 45 Bardia		3 Jan
22.	Changed H.Q. Post 45 to Post 40		3 Jan
23.	Departed Post 40		8 Jan
24.	Arrived 1st Position Eladem Rd, South of Tobruch		9 Jan
25.	Departed 1st position		11 Jan
26.	Arrived 2nd position Bent el Araf		20 Jan
27.	Departed 2nd position Bent el Arag		20 Jan
28.	Arrived assembly area Tobruch		20 Jan
29.	Departed assembly area Tobruch		21 Jan
30.	Arrived Post 57 Tobruch		21 Jan
31.	Departed Post 57 Tobruch		22 Jan
32.	Arrived Fort Palastrino		22 Jan
33.	Departed Fort Palastrino		7 Mar
34.	Arrived Buq Buq	Night	7/8 Mar
35.	Arrived Matruh		8 Mar
36.	Departed Matruh		13 Mar
37.	Arrived Ikingi Mariut		14 Mar
38.	Departed Ikingi Mariut		17 Mar
39.	Arrived Alexandria Harbour		18 Mar
40.	Departed Alexandria		18 Mar
41.	Arrived Piraeus		20 Mar
42.	Departed Piraeus		21 Mar
43.	Arrived Daphne		21 Mar
44.	Departed Daphne (Road Party) (Train personnel later)		26 Mar
45.	Arrived Larvia (near Servia)		26/7 Mar
46.	Departed Larvia		1900 hrs 6 Apr
47.	Camped night 6/7 Apr roadside near Sofular		6/7 Apr
48.	Arrived Verria Pass		7 Apr
49.	Departed Verris Pass		12 Apr
50.	Easter Sunday - arrived Servia Pass near Larva		Village 13/14 Apr
51.	Departed Servia		14 Apr
52.	Arrived Ambulance Creek		14 Apr
53.	Left Ambulance Creek and travelled by night		16 Apr
54.	Arrived Larissa		17 Apr
55.	Makpyxopi Railway station	night	17/18 Apr
56.	Departed Makyxopi		18 Apr
57.	Rd Larissa - Volos	night	18/19 Apr
58.	Arrived Olive grove near Lamia		19 Apr
59.	Departed Olive grove about midnight from Lamia through Pass of Lamia to Brailos		19 Apr
60.	Arrived Brailos		20 Apr
61.	H.Q. Established in Cave <i>Amphiklia</i>		20 Apr.
62.	Departed from H.Q. Caves midnight		23/24 Apr
63.	Arrived Olive Grove near Eleusis		24 Apr.
64.	Departed Eleusis		24 Apr.
65.	Arrived Coast - Miloinear Argos		25 Apr
66.	Departed Miloi	2000 Hrs	25 Apr
67.	Night drive over hills of Peloponnesex		25/26 Apr
68.	Through Tripolis to Kalmatis		26 Apr
69.	At 2000 hrs H.Q. from Olive grove to House on beach		26 Apr

*Arrived Larvia
Departed "*

mf

CONTINUED

70. At ²³⁰⁰~~2400~~ hrs H.Q. from House to Wharf Kalmatis 26 Apr
71. Aboard Destroyer and then to Dilwarra about 0100 hrs 27 Apr.
72. At Sea - 27/28/29 Apr.
73. Arrived Alexandria 0830 Hrs 29 Apr.
74. Ikingi Maryuit Night 29/30 Apr
75. Aboard train to Palestine Night 30/1 Apr/May
76. Return to Julis 1 May

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M. Pearce

I. Sgt.

HQ. 16th Aust Inf Bde

27 MAY 41

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

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
10

H.Q., 2/2 Bn.,
A.I.F.
17 May 41

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

GREEK CAMPAIGN

Herewith attached Sequence of Events
relative to this units movements from time
of embarkation to Greece until arrival at
JULIS



Major

Admin. Comd. 2/2 Bn., A.I.F.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTSPeriod - Embarkation for GREECE to return to JULIS.

18 Mar. 41	Embarked "Bankura" at ALEXANDRIA.
19 " "	At sea.
20 " "	do.
21 " "	At sea. 1600 hrs. attack by five Dive Bombers. Tanker in convey damaged.
22 " "	Arrived PIRAEUS 1800 hrs.
23 " "	Settling in DAPHNE No. 2 Camp.
25 " "	M.T. moved at 0600 hrs. to SERVIA.
26 " "	Bn. left ROUF Station 1900hrs. for LARISSA.
27. " "	Bn. arrived NIKAII Camp LARISSA at 1300 hrs.
28 " "	Bn. left for SERVIA by M.T.
2 Apr. "	2 pls. "D" Coy. posted on mountains either side of camp on anti-parachute duties.
3 " "	Bn. recce. party left for VERIA PASS.
6 " "	News of German advance received at 0300 hrs.
7 " "	Bn. left for VERIA at 1805 hrs. Bn. moved into position on left of VERIA, 2/1 Bn. on right; rd. inclusive to 2/2 Bn.
8 " "	Digging in defensive position.
9 " "	do. do. do.
10 " "	"B" Echelon moved back to GERANIA area 1200 hrs.
11 " "	"A" Echelon vehicles and surplus stores left VERIA Pass at 0100 hrs.
12 " "	Bn. still in position but packed ready to move. First flight left on march to SERVIA area at 1900 hrs.
13 " "	Bn. arrived at VELVENDOS at 0430 hrs.
14 " "	Bn. arrived MOSKHOKHORI at 1400 hrs. and proceeded to occupy defensive position S. & W. of town 18 (N.Z.) Bn. on our left, 2/1 Bn. on our right, 2/3 Bn. res- erve.
15 " "	Improving defences. Withdrawal commenced at 2000 hr.
16 " "	0500 hrs: "A" and "B" Echelons moved to ZARKOS. 1100 hrs. Bn. em bussed near Ambulance Ck: and moved to PINEIOS River area and bivouaced.

16 Apr. 41 Transport rejoined at 2100 hrs.

17 " 41 Bn. occupied defensive position TEMPE area.
1700 hrs. warning order prepare to move A & B Echelons.
2200 Patrol activity.
2330 N.Z. Artillery firing on GONNOS Village.

18 " " 0200 hrs. M.T. moved LAMIA area.

19 " 41 0800 hrs to 1830 hrs Battle of PINEIOS River
0600 hrs. "B" Ech. arrived 20 miles SOUTH of LAMIA
on ATHENS Rd. and established straggler post.
2200 hrs. Capt. Hendry, "D" Coy. reported in.

20 " 41 0700 hrs. more stragglers arrived.
1100 hrs Bn. moved to Bde area 15 miles further South.

21 " 41 Reorganisation and Resting until 1500 hrs.
1500 hrs. Preparing to move GRAVIA area.
2000 " Left area (Composite Coy.) for KANLANI

22 " 41 0030 " Arrived KANLANI
Recce tracks and valley NORTH-WEST of village.

23 " 41 1900 " Orders received to move back to Bde area.
Bn. destroying surplus stores clothing etc.
Came under command of 2/3 Bn. for move.

24 " 41 0145 " Bde. moved to ELEFSIS.
0630 " Arrived ELEFSIS, lying up in olive grove
during day.
2030 " Moved via CORINTH to MILOI.

25 " 41 0600 " Arrived MILOI lying up during day.
2000 " Left for KLALAMATI via TRIPOLIS.

26 " 41 0645 " arrived KLALAMATI lying up during day.
2000 " formed upon beach for embarkation.
2330 " Embarked H.M.S. "HERO" Transhipped
H.M.T. "DILWARRA.

27 " 41 0330 " Put to sea - At sea, Escort 2 Cruisers
8 destroyers.
1400 " Dive bombed, COSTA RICA sunk.

28 " " At sea, sundry raids.

29 " 41 1300 " Disembarked ALEXANDRIA.
1730 " Arrived AMIRIYA.

30 " 41 0830 " Bn. left IKINGI MARYUT for Palestine.

1 May 41 0300 " Arrived KILO 89.
0530 " Moved by bus to JULIS.

Headquarters,
2/3 Bn. AIF.
JULIS.
19 May 41. 13

Headquarters,
16 Aust Inf Bde.,
JULIS.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN GREECE.
18 MAR 41 to 29 APR 41.

Herewith are quotations from 2/3 Bn War Diary giving
Sequence of Events in Greece as far as this Bn was concerned.

J. Lamb. Lt-Col.
Comd 2/3 Bn.
Les D. M. McGregor.
Major

Capt Lovell
for War Diary
HHH
26/5/41

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EXTRACTS FROM 2/3RD BATTALION WAR DIARY
18TH MARCH 1941 to 29TH APRIL 1941

TUESDAY
Mar 18.

Embarked H.M.S. GLOUCESTER, sailing from ALEXANDRIA at 1700 hrs.

WEDNESDAY
Mar 19

At about 1000hrs the air raid alarm sounded and everybody was ordered below. Three bombs were dropped from a height estimated at 3000 ft, but fell well astern, from then on the trip was uneventful.

Arrived at PORT PIRAEUS at 1600hrs, disembarked immediately, remained on the wharf while tea was distributed from the GLOUCESTER and then marched through the streets to DAPHNI NO 2 Camp some miles from the city and settled down to sleep about midnight.

The GREEK population gave a very hearty welcome waving, cheering and throwing *flowers*.

THURSDAY
Mar 20

Found that the camp was in delightful surroundings in the midst of an orchard, very bushy trees, fresh looking houses and beer gardens dotted about and the countryside was green as far as the eye could see, such a contrast from the barren desert.

The morning was spent in erecting tents and in the afternoon a Bn Parade, at which the C.O. addressed the troops on the GREEK situation, security matters and stressed the importance of being friendly with the people.

FRIDAY
Mar 21

Leave to ATHENS granted to a percentage of the Bn.

SATURDAY
Mar 22

"B" Echelon joined Bn. Had arrived at PORT PIRAEUS the previous day after an uneventful voyage.

More leave to ATHENS.

SUNDAY
Mar 23

Movement Order issued. Bn, less M.T., to move to LARISSA at 1300 hrs.

Moved by M.T. through ATHENS to Rly Station and left for LARISSA at 1300 hrs, during the trip the population gave the A.I.F. an extremely hearty welcome and showed it every kindness.

MONDAY
March 24

Still travelling NORTH at daybreak and arrived at LARISSA at 0700 hrs. Tea was given to the troops in the town square, and they then marched through the town, which was partly destroyed by earthquake and enemy bombing, and proceeded to a camp site in a green valley from where could be seen snowcapped MT OLYMPUS.

The camp, known as TEMPE, was situated about 7 miles west of LARISSA and 1/2 mile south of PENEIOS RIVER.

On arrival erected tents, dug slit trenches and prepared for a stay of some days.

TUESDAY
March 25

Stand To 0530 - 0630.

WEDNESDAY
March 26

Fine and warm. Route march and pl exercises carried out.

Transport joined Bn and dispersed near river. Bn now became split as each Coy was given a task which kept them separated until 7 Apr 41.

HQ Coy remained with Bn, the dispositions and duties of the other coys were

"A" Coy - to guard aerodrome at LARISSA.

"B" Coy - to take over control of LARISSA as far as traffic control and conduct of British Troops in the town were concerned, guarding D.I.D., R.A.O.C., and R.E. Dumps.

"C" Coy - ELASSON area, duty was guarding British Corps HQ and patrolling roads leading to the town.

"D" Coy - 1 Pl in VOLOS and the remainder of the coy guarding the aerodrome at ALMYROS.

THURSDAY
March 27

Coys moved to their respective areas, C Coy HQ were four miles SOUTH-EAST of ELASSON near the village of CLAOCHAIN.

These tasks continued until Monday, 7 Apr 41.

SUNDAY
6 Apr 41

In the late afternoon a Coy Comd conference was called at which orders were issued in preparation for a move NORTH to VERRIA PASS on the following day, the Bn to halt the first night at POLYMYLON, just at the bottom of the pass.

At midnight summer time was adopted, the clocks being put forward ~~xx~~ 1 hour.

MONDAY
April 7

Recce Party consisting of C.O., Coy Comds, 1 Offrs and 3 N.C.Os. from each coy, Pioneer Offr and 1 A/A Detach. left at daylight for VERRIA PASS, remainder of Bn followed later in the morning.

The Germans who were on the BULGARIAN Border had started their push SOUTH, but information regarding their exact movements was hard to get, rumors were rife.

The recce party halted at POLYMYLON while the Brigadier issued instructions, then the drive to the pass commenced.

The difference in the atmosphere was very noticeable and sleet set in.

The party reached a point about 1 1/2 miles NORTH of village of ZOODOKHOS early in the afternoon and from there the recce was made, then returned to POLYMYLON where the remainder of the Bn had just arrived. This was at approx 1800 hrs and coys were allotted areas and bedded down for the night

TUESDAY
April 8

Cold and cloudy, rained in afternoon. A and B Coys moved to their positions on VERRIA PASS, B Coy overlooking the flat country running NORTH.

WEDNESDAY
April 9

Very cold. C and D Coys moved to VERRIA PASS early in the morning. Gear had to be manhandled to Coy areas, very hard work up the steep mountain sides, but hastened the job as word was received that enemy may be in the vicinity by nightfall.

Most of the coy areas had snow drifts, the wind was biting and the country ~~and the country~~ rugged and the troops ~~found~~ found the conditions very severe, but they were uncomplaining.

WEDNESDAY
April 3
(Cont)

The Bn area was very great, some coys having a front of 1500 yds and the country was very rugged, it was impossible to cover many approaches, however the positions were made as strong as possible - digging was carried out in some areas and sangars built.

Tents were brought to the positions but could not be pitched owing to air observation.

B Echelon lost 3 vehicles, trucks going over the side and another breaking down beyond repair under the conditions.

THURSDAY
April 10

Sleet, snow and an icy wind - everybody cold and wet. Packs and surplus gear sent back to B Echelon.

Coy received warning order to move back to bottom of pass, but no move made, some coys had assembled their pls but these were sent back to re-occupy their positions.

One pl of A Coy went forward as protection to the Engineers whilst the road was being blown, and through some error the road was blown behind the protection pl and they had to abandon their transport consisting of 3 G.S. trucks.

German recon plane flew low over area but protection from air observation was afforded by low clouds which covered most of the features.

M.T., which was now Brigaded, moved back to an area near ELASSON.

FRIDAY
April 11

Good Friday, weather still bad, heavy snow storm. C Coy sent a patrol to YEROLEIVADON, situated in the valley about 5 miles NORTH of coy position, patrol was to contact GREEKS and find out if the roads leading to the village were patrolled, and how far from the Bn area were the GREEK forces.

Patrol left at 1300 hrs in heavy snowstorm and arrived at village approx 1530 hrs. There were GREEK soldiers moving up with supplies to their forward positions, which were in the mountains NORTH of the village.

Information gathered was that the roads leading to the village were protected and the nearest troops to the Bn were approx 2 miles away.

Patrol returned to coy area at 2000 hrs, but in the meantime orders to withdraw had been received and the coy had moved back to the bottom of the pass where a position was to be taken up in the vicinity of POLYMYLON, so the patrol continued on until it reached the coy at 0200 hrs.

Aircraft had been active during the day, but no attacks were made on Bn.

Bn commenced to withdraw in the afternoon and was at the bottom of the pass by midnight.

Donkeys had been hired and 12 allotted to each coy. Reserve Amn, Rations, tools etc were loaded on them and one man detailed to each as a driver.

These animals were exceedingly slow and unwilling workers, but they did sterling work and by the time their services were dispensed with they had won the admiration of all.

SATURDAY
April 12

Snowed heavily for 3 hours. Bn in extricating position covering withdrawal of the remainder of Bds from the pass. A Coy on right flank, C Coy on left, both coys covering flat ground in front and also protecting the road, B Coy astride road and at rear and D Coy.

Bn HQ and HQ occupied a Wadi running SOUTH.

Recon planes over several times. Arty, motorised troops and GREEK soldiers passed through all day going SOUTH.

SUNDAY
April 13.

Easter Sunday and the beginning of a nightmare march in a withdrawal to TITARION (ref maps OLYMPOS-VOLOS 1/250000-1197).

There was an air alarm just as Bn ~~was~~ began to move, but no attack. The track over the mountain was very slippery and the climb very steep. Troops and donkeys were heavily laden, the weather was warm and sunny. On reaching the top of the mountain range VELVENDOS could be seen far across the valley.

C Coy who were to protect the Bn crossing ALIAKMON RIVER arrived there at approx 1700 hrs, just in time to see 20 odd German planes bomb SERVIA. Engineers supplied tea to the troops before taking them across the river by punt. On arrival at the SOUTHERN side C Coy found that a Coy from 2/1 Bn was protecting the crossing so waited for remainder of Bn and went forward about 1/2 mile and the Bn bedded down for the night at about 2200 hrs.

Lieut AYRTON reports that from MOSKHOKHORI he and Major ABBOTT were carrying out a recce he could see German Troops at the river about 5 miles SOUTH-WEST of the punt the Bn at this time were still on the NORTH of the river in the vicinity IMERA. The Germans were examining SERVIA BRIDGE, there were armd cars, motor cycles and troops on foot. They later withdrew some distance back.

MONDAY
April 14

Stood to 0600-0700 hrs and at 1300 hrs moved SOUTH approx 2 miles to other side of VELVENDOS, when passing through Engineers issued rations. Rested during the afternoon. One German Recce plane flew low over Bn area and troops fired with brens and rifles, but the result was nil. Aircraft very active and SERVIA was severely bombed.

In the evening the C.O. issues orders for withdrawal to MOSKHOKHORI.

TUESDAY
April 15

Marched from midnight until arriving at MOSKHOKHORI at approx 0600 hrs. The track was very difficult, narrow and rough, and the troops and donkeys were still heavily laden, however cover of darkness had to be taken advantage of as it was known that the enemy had moved arty to a point just NORTH of ALIAKMON RIVER and the track up which Bn was climbing could be clearly seen and was within range of the guns, and the Bn on the narrow mountain track would present a splendid target for aircraft.

On arrival at MOSKHOKHORI the coys were dispersed in wadis and under trees and the troops then fed and slept, utterly exhausted.

German aircraft flew over all day, but luckily did not spot the Bn, the black crosses under the wings were now a familiar sight.

The rest was short lived for orders were received that the Bn was to occupy a position about two miles SOUTH of the present area and would move at approx 1200 hrs. This meant a further climb.

The move occupied all the afternoon as the Bn filtered through one section at a time and 400 yds between them.

Settled down for the night, but at 2300 hrs, roused and took over area occupied by 2/2 Bn.

WEDNESDAY
April 16

Completed occupation of 2/2 Bn area by 0500 hrs. Rained practically all day.

Position overlooked the ALIAKMON RIVER, the German arty was active, but were not firing in Bn area. Our arty was replying.

B Echelon moved to a position approx 8 miles west of LARISSA. Were bombed in the afternoon but no damage done.

Orders were ~~xxxxxxx~~ issued for Bn to withdraw SOUTH at 1630 hrs to a position on Rd SERVIA-BLASSON about 4 miles away. Food was now becoming scarce but received rations at Bn HQ before moving.

A gruelling march along a mountain track. Donkeys still being used but were becoming very tired.

THURSDAY
April 17

Arrived at the Rd SERVIA-BLASSON at about midnight but informed that must reach a further four miles over the pass where M.T. was waiting, all coys there by 0200 hrs.

Food and whisky issued to all troops here and then embussed the destination being LARISSA.

Moved by 0500 hrs and arrived at destination on Rd LARISSA-TRIKALLA about ten miles WEST of LARISSA.

Here it was learnt that the 21 N.Z. Bn had been in contact with the enemy in the coastal sector NORTH-EAST of LARISSA and had suffered 113 casualties.

Lieut-Col LAMB issued orders for Bn to take up a defensive position astride a road to left of N.Z. position.

The Bn area was about 12 miles NORTH-EAST of LARISSA and just SOUTH of the PENELOIS RIVER.

Coy Comds went forward with C.O. to make recon, Bn following, however going through LARISSA the convoy was split owing to there not being sufficient guides in the town and when the Bn arrived at the debussing point coys were without many of their men as some trucks had taken the LAMIA ROAD and in some cases did not locate Bn for three days.

B Coy area was on high ground overlooking the river and the flat country on both sides.

C Coy in the centre.

D Coy guarding left flank.

A Coy was on patrol.

Coys were in position by 2330. Some troops who had gone astray whilst passing through LARISSA arrived during the evening. The situation was quiet.

A Coy sent out two patrols in carriers one under command of W.O.11. MacDougal to area near SYKOURION and the other went to AGYIA under command of Lieut Gall. They were not seen again until after the battle.

FRIDAY
April 18

Nothing of importance happened until approx 1100 hrs when the Germans commenced to dive bomb and machine gun our positions. This was kept up intermittently until approx 2100 hrs. There were some casualties and M.T. ~~xxxxxxx~~ destroyed but the damage was not very great.

German troops were observed by B and C coys at approx 1100 hrs on the far side of the river, making in our direction. Accurate arty fire caused them to withdraw behind a low hill in rear where they remained for some time.

FRIDAY
April 18
(cont)

At this stage the C.O. arrived at C Coy HQ and issued instructions to the effect that if the enemy crossed the river C Coy would counter-attack. At 1300 hrs, the enemy, who appeared to be made up of three Bns, again advanced towards the river. They were engaged by MMG, LMG and Arty fire, D coy 2/2 Bn bearing the brunt of the attack. They succeeded in fording the river at a point where it was 4ft to 5ft deep. At this stage C Coy were preparing to counter-attack when a message was received to the effect that the Bn would withdraw in conjunction with D Coy 2/2 Bn. It was then 1500 hrs, and withdrawal to the new line of defence was completed by 1630 hrs. The object of this line was to cover the withdrawal of our forward troops. The Brigadier later informed us that we were to hold this line until 0300 hrs, 19 Apr 41.

The new line consisted of B Coy on high ground on right flank, C Coy on the left flank and D Coy 2/2 Bn in rear, two NZ 25 pounders Comdr the road itself and a squadron of NZ Div Cav spread fanwise in front of the whole line.

Heavy ground-strafting by enemy aircraft preceded the attack which took place at about 1800 hrs. This attack was led by a number of tanks, which were held at bay by the NZ 25 pounders. Lack of ammunition eventually caused the withdrawal of these guns and the whole force moved back about one mile and formed a new line again astride the road. By this time darkness had fallen, and it was decided to ~~allow~~ the tanks to penetrate the line while the force lay in wait for the infantry in rear. The tanks, however, after passing the first line of infantry became aware of our presence and opened fire. Our own troops replied vigorously with small arms and A T rifles which caused him to withdraw. This tank stopped some short distance away, and was considered knocked out by our action.

At this time the C.O. ordered our withdrawal, which was carried out per M.T. in the direction LARISSA. This town was found to be in enemy hands so our M.T. turned South-East to the VOLOS Road. Some went through this way, but owing to the darkness and the state of the roads the force was split up and many lost contact with the main body.

SATURDAY
April 19

Bn HQ was established in an area of hilly country near AMPICKLIA, where we were joined by many of the troops lost the previous night. B Echelon was established some 22 miles ~~NORTH-WEST~~ of our position.

South East.

(LEVADEIA)

SUNDAY
April 20

Severe air-raid on nearby aerodrome and road. Areas occupied by us also bombed and machine-gunned. Troops were well dispersed and no casualties suffered. Convoys machine-gunned on the road by MESSERSCHMITTS, some casualties inflicted and M.T. destroyed.

MONDAY
April 21

Bn ordered to move to hilltops, no movement during daylight hrs, 0600-2000 hrs,. These tactics succeeded and we were not observed by the German Recce planes. Enemy planes machine-gunned some of our troop carriers and destroyed several. Orders issued to move at 0530 hrs next day.

TUESDAY
April 22

Troops moved down the hill at 0530 hrs, but move was cancelled. Machine gun attack from the air during day. B Echelon established kitchen in nearby farm-house, and men had first hot meal in days.

WEDNESDAY
April 23

Orders issued at 0900 hrs to move that night. Troops to carry as much arms, amm, and food as possible also carry ground sheet. All else to be dumped. Hot meal again at night. Embussed at 2300 hrs, crossed start line at 0030 hrs

THURSDAY
April 24

Bn travelled all through early hours of the morning moving via BRALLOV, LIVEDEIA, THIVE, KRVIKDUKI and halting at ELEFSIS at 0700 hrs, some miles short of our destination, MEGARA. During the night we passed many GREEK soldiers without rifles, and who were already disporting themselves in odd articles of civilian raiment.

We camped all day in Olive Groves in which were standing crops and were effectively hidden from enemy recon planes which flew over frequently. There was much aerial and A A gun activity in this area, and several enemy planes were brought down.

Bn moved out that night at 2015 hrs, with orders to move on a further eighty miles to MILOY via MEGARA, KORINTHOS and ARGOS.

FRIDAY
April 25

Arrived at destination about dawn, dispersing M.T. in bush covered fields and immediately camouflaging all vehicles. The men were fed and slept until about 1600 hrs when orders were issued to C and D Coys to move immediately to KARATIANE. Major ABBOTT was in charge of this force which was to act as flank guard to convoys moving SOUTH to the port of KALAMAI. It was considered likely that the enemy may land troops at PYRGOS and advance to our right flank in the vicinity ~~in the vicinity~~ of KARATIANE, so Major ABBOTT's force was sent to check this force should it appear, and orders were issued that we should hold our positions till the last man and the last round were finished.

SATURDAY
April 26

Bn moved on to Olive Groves outside KALAMAI and there awaited the return of C and D Coys. The day passed without incident and orders were issued at 1500 hrs to withdraw to KALAMAI at 1600 hrs, via KARATIANE, MEGALOPOLIS, PARADISEI, OIKHALIA, SKALA, ARPHARA and THOURIA.

This was done, and eventually the force joined the Bn about dusk and moved onto the beach to await its turn to embark.

The Bn marched about two miles in the dark to the docks where we were taken off by the Destroyer HERO and transhipped to the troop-carrier DILWARRA, at about 0200 hrs, where we had our first cup of tea in many days.

SUNDAY
April 27

The DILWARRA sailed at about 0400 hrs, and when daylight came we found we were one of a convoy of ships escorted by one cruiser and six destroyers. We had many LMGs mounted on the deck for AA protection the official number being about fifty.

During that day we were raided five times and on two occasions suffered near misses. Some plates were buckled slightly but no serious damage was done, and we were all glad when night descended. During these raids our AA LMG fire power was more than doubled by enthusiastic bren gunners. Our ship directly accounted for five for certain, and damaged others.

MONDAY
April 28

Beautiful weather. No air raids.

(8)

21

TUESDAY
April 29

Arrived at ALEXANDRIA after breakfast and disembarked
about mid-day.

(1)

Ref. File R/2/44

Headquarters,
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

29 July 41.

Headquarters,
6 Aust. Div.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN GREECE

16 AUST. INF. BDE.

With reference to your 504/G the attached reports are submitted on the operations of this Bde in GREECE.

The reports are as follows :-

A. General report on the operations in GREECE.

Traces attached are :-

- (i) Defensive positions at VERROIA and SERVIA and routes out from SERVIA to embussing point at point 1142.
- (ii) Dispositions at PENEIOS GORGE.
- (iii) Reserve positions at BRALLOS area.


B. Comments and lessons with special reference to

- (i) Staff Control.
- (ii) Employment and Value of L.O's.
- (iii) Assistance given by supporting arms.
- (iv) General.

C. A & Q Experiences of 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

D. Report by 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.

E. Report by 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.


.....Lt-Col.
Temporarily Commanding
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

A

REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN GREECE.

The participation of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. in the operations in GREECE may be divided into nine separate phases.

- Phase
1. ALEXANDRIA to DAPHNE.
 2. DAPHNE to SERVIA.
 3. SERVIA to VERROIA.
 4. VERROIA to SERVIA.
 5. SERVIA to PENEIOS GORGE.
 6. PENEIOS GORGE.
 7. PENEIOS GORGE to BRALLOS area.
 8. BRALLOS to KALAMAI.
 9. KALAMAI to ALEXANDRIA.

REF. MAPS :-

ATHENS	1-1,000,000	
EDESSA	1-100,000	(Sheet C3072)
MT OLYMPUS	1-100,000	(Sheet C3066)
LARISSA	1-100,000	(Sheet C3060)
ATHENS	1-250,000	(Sheet S3040)

COMPOSITION OF FORCE :-

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

Commander - Brig. A.S. Allen, C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D.
 Brigade Major - Major H.H. Hammer.
 Staff Capt. - Capt. I.S. McKenzie.

2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.

C.O. - Major R. Oram (Admin. Comd. - Lt.Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O., evacuated to hospital from AMIRIYA).

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

C.O. - Lt-Col. F.O. Chilton, D.S.O.

2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

C.O. - Lt-Col. D.J. Lamb.

PHASE 1.ALEXANDRIA to DAPHNE.

The 16 Aust. Inf. Bde Comd., Brig. A.S. Allen, C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D. had moved from TOBRUK on 8 Mar. 41 to MERSAH MATRUH, where partial re-equipping was carried out. The Bde then moved to AMIRIYA when re-fitting was completed and the Bde was ordered to move with the Fifth Flight Lustre Force. However, this move was speeded up and the Bde moved with the Fourth Flight on the 18 Mar. 41.

M.T. was sent on M.T. Ships and the personnel entrained at IKINGI for the personnel ships at ALEXANDRIA. The 2/1 and 2/2 Bns moved in the early morning of 18 Mar. 41 and embarked on Merchant Ships leaving ALEXANDRIA at about midday. The 2/3 Bn entrained from IKINGI at 1235 hrs on the 18 Mar. embarking on H.M.S. GLOUCESTER which sailed at 1700 hrs. on 18 Mar. 41, arriving at PORT PIRAEUS at 1600 hrs on 19 Mar. 41, several hours ahead of the remainder of the Bde. The Bde H.Q. personnel on the S.S. FIONA arrived at PIRAEUS on the early morning 20 Mar. 41. The 2/2 Bn on the S.S. BANKURA arriving on the 22 Mar. 41, having moved in a "slow" convoy which was attacked by 5 dive bombers on 21 Mar. 41. Their L.M.G's were used most effectively in keeping the bombers away from this ship.

The Bde on disembarkation moved to DAPHNE Camp situated about 10 miles North West of ATHENS on the main ATHENS-LARISSA Road where it remained in training until 26 Mar. 41.

Here the Bde was in close touch with an A.I.F. Liaison Group, with Force H.Q., under Lt-Col. H. Wells, 1 Aust. Corps. Capt. J.H. Lovell, H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde., was also temporarily attached to this Group, rejoining the Bde at VERROIA.

At this stage no indication of the role of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde could be given definitely but it was anticipated that the Bde would eventually move North to the VERROIA area.

During the DAPHNE period the G.O.C. A.I.F. (M.E.) Lieut-Gen. Sir Thomas Blamey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., visited the Bde Comd. Brig. A.S. Allen and discussed the general situation.

The Bde had become divorced from its transport and main stores owing to the late arrival and unloading of M.T. Ships but as the units had retained sufficient gear to live "hard" they were able to carry on until the arrival of M.T. and stores.

PHASE 2.DAPHNE to SERVIA.

2/3 Bn was ordered to move to LARISSA from DAPHNE on 23 Mar. 41, to take up Security duties in that area and the Bn moved by train at 1300 hrs the same day.

The remainder of the Bde was kept rather in suspense for the next few days and the order to move to SERVIA came very suddenly. The Bde transport moved by road to SERVIA on 26 Mar. 41, via the route ELEFSIS - THIVE - LEVADEIA - BRALLOS - LAMIA - LARISSA - ELASSON - SERVIA, with the intention of making the journey in two days, the first day's objective being a suitable bivouac area just North of LAMIA.

This was achieved, the Bde reaching an area at SERVIA selected by the Bde Comd. who had moved on ahead of the column, at about 1600 hrs on the 27 Mar.

The move was a particularly good one as the transport had to negotiate the narrow and winding mountain roads and passes - only one vehicle failed to finish the journey being temporarily out of action with a broken wheel and bent axle. The whole of the daylight hours were used for movement and by using relief drivers the convoy was able to make good time over the difficult journey.

The 7 Aust. Div. Provost met the column on the Pass South of LAMIA and guided it through to its bivouac area North of LAMIA doing particularly helpful work. It was the more helpful as the convoy had only one motor cycle available, and this was being used by a small recon party responsible for guiding, moving on ahead of the convoy.

The only petrol point available was at LARISSA and on the morning of the second day all petrol vehicles distributed to vehicles petrol reserves still held, and moved ahead of the convoy to LARISSA to fill up, and joined the convoy as it drove through LARISSA later. This enabled the convoy to carry on without a halt at the LARISSA bottleneck and gave the Bde an ample P.O.L. reserve for any further move beyond SERVIA.

It is interesting to note that a N.Z. column which followed immediately in rear of the Bde convoy from DAPHNE, its destination being the KATERINE area, took an extra day to negotiate the same distance as the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde convoy. The only explanation is that this Bde took advantage of all the daylight hours. On the morning of the second day the column passed several columns still bivouacing on the side of the road and was able to take advantage of a clear run through.

The personnel of the 2/1 and 2/2 Bns left by rail from ATHENS on 26 Mar. arriving without incident in LARISSA where arrangements had been made with 81 Base Sub Area (Brig. Parrington) to lift them to SERVIA by M.T.

The area selected for the Bde area at SERVIA in the vicinity of the village of LAVA, was later to be part of the defensive position of the 4 N.Z. Bde. The Bde was dispersed over a large area and tents and vehicles camouflaged. The broken ground was found to be excellent for concealment.

Major. C.R.V. Edgar, 2/2 Bn was appointed to administer comd. of 2/1 Bn.

During the stay of the Bde at SERVIA the opportunity was taken immediately for the Comd. to recon forward to the VERROIA Pass and the VEVE Pass and to liaise with all the Greek and British Comds. in those areas. A general knowledge of the areas over which it was possible the Bde would operate was quickly obtained. C.O.'s were sent over these areas to get a general picture of the country. Indications of the possible area pointed more directly at VERROIA Pass and a recon camp was established there with representatives from all units including 2/3 Bn which was still in the LARISSA area. With the assistance of the Greeks (12 Gk. Div. H.Q. at SOFULAR, Col. KARABATIS Comd.) who were occupying this area, the Bde recon party was shown the Greek positions and a detailed knowledge of this defensive position was obtained.

PHASE 3.

SERVIA to VERROIA.

26

The value of the use of this time spent in recce was proved later when the Bde received an urgent signal to move to the VERROIA Pass area, due to the German advance into SALONIKA.

At this stage the Bde was under comd. of 1 Aust. Corps and although the move was ordered no guarantee of transport for troop carrying could be given. As an alternative means, arrangements were at once made to use unit transport to ferry troops from SERVIA to VERROIA Pass. This, however, was unnecessary as late in the afternoon of the day ordered to move, troop carrying vehicles arrived.

Guides had been sent forward to SOFULAR area where the Bde was to stage for the night - the move being completed by approximately 2300 hrs. Although this staging area had NOT been reced, the sending of a recce party forward with guides by day, enabled bivouac areas to be selected and the Bde moved in at night - quietly and quickly.

The Bde Comd. who, during the move, had been forward to VERROIA on a recce, joined the Bde at the staging area and then moved to 12 Gk. Div. H.Q. at SOFULAR and made arrangements to take over the Greek positions at VERROIA Pass the next day, 7 Apr. 41.

At first light the next morning, 7 Apr. 41, the Bde moved forward and the difficult task of moving into position over this mountainous country commenced. Transport could only keep to the main road and all stores and amm had to be manhandled. However, this was practically completed by the end of the first day.

Brig. Vasey, 19 Aust. Inf. Bde. called to discuss the situation. He expected to take up a position in rear of 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. However, the 19 Aust. Inf. Bde was almost immediately afterwards sent to the VEVE Pass in the West.

The situation now was :-

- (a) N.Z. Div. on right flank including to R. ALIAKMON.
- (b) 16 Aust. Inf. Bde Group astride VERROIA Pass to R. ALIAKMON.
 - i. 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn on right excluding main road. (Major I.R. Campbell, D.S.O. now appointed to comd. 2/1 Bn)
 - ii. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn on left including main road.
 - iii. 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn in reserve on left of main road, inclusive.
 - iv. 2/2 Fd. Regt. was under comd.
 - v. 2/1 Fd. Amb. was situated on track, square 1119, just South of the village of POLYMYTON with two A.D.S's forward on the VERROIA Pass.
 - vi. One Tp of British 6" How. which had been attached to Greeks.
 - vii. B Echelon brigaded - located in the POLYMYTON area. All unit Carriers were attached and were responsible for closing the "back door" to the Pass and an anti-parachute role on the flats in the SOFULAR area.

(c) 12 Gk. Div. on left flank with the right flank resting on YEROLEIVADON square 1429.

Attached is Trace "A" showing the dispositions.

Communications from Bde to units were by line. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country, contact by L.O's and Bde conference attendances were most difficult and fatiguing and took up a good deal of time.

Digging was difficult and with a combination of digging and stone sangars, weapon pits and posts were constructed. No wire was available other than that constructed by the Greeks. A/Tk. Mines were NOT available.

Some demolitions on the Pass had been prepared by the Greeks and were later taken over by the 1 Fd. Coy. It was found later that these were located as shown on Trace "A". There were four on the Pass and an additional one about one and half miles South of VERROIA village.

Forward supply dumps were established on the main road - ten days' rations and second line amm were asked for - a donkey supply service was established on the 8 Apr. 41 and units were now assured of good supplies.

On 8 Apr. 41, the Bde received a signal from 1 Aust. Corps that it was responsible for co-ordination of civilian traffic control with the Greek authorities in VERROIA and the B.M., Major H.H. Hammer was sent to discuss the matter with Maj-General KRISTALIS, who apparently was an area commander. He assured the B.M. that all civilians had been ordered to remain in their villages and if there was any movement it would NOT be via the main routes but by tracks. This was very much a fact, as later, despite the evacuation of SALONIKA there was NOT a great deal of civilian traffic, although for a short time there was a steady thin stream restricted by the demolitions of the VERROIA Pass.

As the B.M. left VERROIA for Bde. H.Q. at about 2000 hrs a huge Greek convoy was moving through, Southwards, over the Pass towards SERVIA. It took the B.M. 5 hours to make the journey of approximately 14/15 miles. On arrival at Bde H.Q. this M.T. movement was reported by line to 1 Aust. Corps at about 0100 hrs. and the information was received that the Germans had broken through the Greeks in SALONIKA. The Bde was also informed that the 1 Armd. Bde was in the SALONIKA area and would NOT withdraw over the VERROIA Pass. However, this was NOT the case as in the early morning of the 9 Apr. the 1 Armd. Bde passed through.

The situation was most obscure and very little information was available from Corps. The Bde then referred to the prepared demolitions and was told that further information would be sent on. A little later, 1 Aust. Corps telephoned to say that the responsibility for demolitions was delegated to the Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. Units were warned of the situation and the B.M. was sent at about 0300 hrs. on 9 Apr. to blow the demolitions at VERROIA and the four others in the Pass. He took with him one Pl of 2/3 Bn to hold the road block.

A control point on the road near Bde H.Q. reported that the 1 Armd. Bde was passing through and a check was kept on all vehicles moving along the road.

The B.M. passed a continuous stream of vehicles moving Southwards on his way North to VERROIA and en route ascertained that the whole of 1 Armd Bde was withdrawing along this route.

At one stage in the darkness when questioning a Tank Comd. where the tail of the column was, he was held up at the point of the revolver as a suspected Fifth Columnist. However, that was soon fixed and he proceeded to the demolition point at VERROIA arriving at daybreak.

Here he contacted the tail of the Armd. Bde and was joined by a small rearguard of the Armd Bde consisting of :-

- One Pl. Infy.
- Two Tanks.
- Two A/Tk. Guns.
- Two 25 pdrs.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde knew nothing of this arrangement but the two parties combined and formed a rearguard at the demolition point.

There was no sign of the enemy and as there were several Greek Army vehicles coming through, the road was NOT demolished. Further, the Armd. Bde stated that some bridges beyond VERROIA had been demolished and that they had NOT recently had contact with the enemy.

Brig. C.S. Steele, M.C., V.D., 1 Aust. Corps, then arrived and at 0900 hrs, the road was demolished. The explosion was good but the result was poor - a soft earth bank on one side merely filling the cavity made and Greek soldiers were walking over it in a few minutes.

The B.M. then returned to Bde. H.Q. and with the Comd. proceeded to the road block and decided to withdraw the covering force as the block was several miles in front of the Bde position. It was also decided to blow the road in the four remaining prepared points. The B.M. was left to carry out this task but held the demolitions for several hours to allow several guns of a Greek horsed Arty Regt. to withdraw over the Pass and lorries to pick up shells from amm dump forward of the demolitions.

Finally at dusk the demolitions were carried out, the four road blocks being excellent. These were all covered by fire.

That day a plane had been reconoitring and machine-gunning most of the day but did little damage.

During the next few days there was a recce plane over the area most of the day although no sign of enemy troops were seen until just at the final withdrawal of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde from VERROIA to SERVIA.

The weather was extremely cold, heavy snow had been experienced for some days - the troops standing up to the bad conditions very well in the high ground of 3000 - 5000 ft. No shelter or bivouac tents were available and these would have been of great value in this area.

PHASE 4.

VERROIA to SERVIA.

Warning orders were received on the 10 Apr. 41 that a withdrawal to the SERVIA area was likely and on orders from 1 Aust. Corps all 16 Aust. Inf. Bde transport was ordered to move to GERANIA area. The units were to march back from VERROIA.

The Bde was apparently moved back by foot owing to the shortage of transport at this stage and the possible congestion of road traffic on the KOZANI-SERVIA Road during the withdrawal of 19 Aust. Inf. Bde and other troops from the VEVE Pass.

Tactically there seemed to be no special point in moving the troops back by foot across this mountainous country.

Orders were somewhat vague - the move was apparently dependent on the situation of the 19 Aust. Inf. Bde on the VEVE Pass but on the 12 Apr. the final order to move was given and the withdrawal commenced on the night of the 12 Apr. 2/3 Bn had already been sent out to occupy a covering position in the POLYMYTON area to protect the Bde withdrawal mainly in case of a parachute landing South of VERROIA Pass or a break through on the VEVE Pass the road from which joined the VERROIA Road from KOZANI.

The troops travelled light - haversacks, one blanket, ground sheet, four days' rations, some picks and shovels. About 12 donkeys per Coy were available to carry the heavier loads. One Medical Det. from 2/1 Fd. Amb. was sent with each unit.

Arrangements had been made to destroy the road at the Southern end of the Pass and these demolitions were carried out on the early morning of 13 Apr. 41 covered by a Coy from 2/3 Bn.

Little was known of the general position but information had been received that the 4 N.Z. Bde was to act as a covering force on the SERVIA Pass; the SERVIA Bridge over the R. ALIAKMON was to be destroyed and the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde was to take up a position on the right of 4 N.Z. Bde from KASTANIA along the general line of the TITARION Range, Trig. 1839 and a line East to AG DEMETRIOS. No indication could be given where the right flank of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde would rest. Units were ordered to move to areas as follows :- 2/1 Bn - right, 2/2 Bn - left along the general line of the TITARION RIDGE, 2/3 Bn in reserve in the area M.AG. ANTONIOU in square 1093 (see Trace "A") and it was hoped that Bde H.Q. would obtain further information regarding areas after its movement back to SERVIA and before units reached the defence line.

The route taken by units was as follows :-

VERROIA Pass - POLYMYTON - LEVENTES - AVLEANNA - IMERA - ALIAKMON River crossing - VELVENDOS - MOSKHOKHORI - TITARION - approximate distance of 30 miles on the map but considerably more when the nature of the country was taken into account. The march was most fatiguing and when the units did arrive at their destination they were very weary.

Special mention must be made of the work of a Det. of 2/1 Fd. Coy, under Lieut. S.B. Cann, which was responsible for all demolitions on the Pass, the preparation of the crossing over the R. ALIAKMON and for general assistance.

H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde which had been working with only an operational H.Q. forward, moved by road the same night via SERVIA and established a temporary H.Q. at the village of LAVA. The Brig. visited 6 Aust. Div. and gave them the general situation of the Bde. on 13 Apr.

All L.O's and the "I" Officer were sent forward to reconnoitre the tracks in the area allotted and the Brig. visited 4 N.Z. Bde H.Q. (Brig. Puttick).

The B.M. was sent back to 1 Aust. Corps at ELASSON to make arrangements for supply to the units. It was obvious that many donkeys and mules would be required. Rations, water, amm, blankets and boots were wanted. Brig. W.H. Bridgeford was able to arrange with Force H.Q. for the Bde to commandeer all animals and forage required and arrangements were made for supply.

The G.O.C. A.I.F. (M.E.) gave the location of the Bde's right flank which was Trig. 1839, square 1495, inclusive to 16 Aust. Inf. Bde, the N.Z's being on the right.

The B.M. returned to B Echelon at GERANIA at about 0300 hrs on 14 Apr. and made arrangements with the Bde Rear H.Q.

- (a) To commandeer animals and forage at first light.
- (b) Establish F.S.D. - one on the tract in 0890 and another at LEI VADION square 1791.
- (c) B Echelon personnel sent to operate the donkey supply train to dumps in the unit areas.

These arrangements worked smoothly ~~and~~ the next day and unit dumps were established in the forward areas prior to the arrival of the Bns.

On the 14 Apr. Bde shifted its Adv. H.Q. to a ravine in square 0891. Here in this area for the first time a series of heavy bombing attacks were experienced, mainly directed at some British medium guns. At no time was Bde H.Q. itself bombed mainly due to the concealment provided by the narrow and bushy ravine.

Rear Bde H.Q. and B Echelon remained in the GERANIA area. Line communications between both H.Q. was NOT directly possible but rear H.Q. were able to use 6 Aust. Div. communications and also maintained a daily personal contact.

Unit L.O's with verbal orders were sent out to contact units as they marched into their defensive areas. Bde Sigs had established a line from Adv. H.Q. to the forward area near the village of KASTANIA and Bde H.Q. had continuous contact with the forward area. The country was most difficult - horses were tried but they simply could not get over the country and the L.O's used donkeys to carry their rations and gear. All L.O's did a sterling job in this area and were able to meet their units and guide them into position.

A message was received from 6 Aust. Div. on 14 Apr. that Bde was now to revert from 1 Aust. Corps to under command of 6 Aust. Div. A 6 Aust. Div. operation order dated the 14 Apr. 41 gave as the intention "To occupy a position for protracted defence on the general lines TITARIAN RIDGE 1895 - ESCARPMENT GOULES 9797 - RYMNION thence N.W. to KPENI 8595."

PHASE 5.

SERVIA to PENEIOS GORGE.

The 2/2 Bn had moved into position on the late afternoon of 14 Apr. and late on the 15 Apr. were ordered to withdraw, the 2/3 Bn to take over the 2/2 Bn position as the 2/3 Bn moved South from MOSKHOKHORI. The 2/2 Bn although very fatigued after their gruelling march from VERROIA Pass left the position at about 0200 hrs on the 16 Apr. 41 to an assembly area on the main road just South of Trig. 1142 (square 1088) arriving at the assembly area at 1000 hrs after 8 hours of strenuous marching over country that could offer nothing better than goat tracks. All ranks were by this time in a very weary condition. Boots were practically worn out and clothes were torn. The spirit of the men, however, was excellent. Rations were ready for issue to the Bn prior to embussing.

The C.O. 2/2 Bn was met and guided to Bde H.Q. where the Comd. instructed him that the Bde had been ordered to move to the ZARKOS area about 16 miles West of LARISSA to face West to meet a possible German threat from that direction. The 2/2 Bn was to take up a holding position until the arrival of the 2/3 Bn and 2/1 Bn which were still moving into position.

B Echelon and Carrier Pl had been sent from the GERANIA area to ZARKOS area.

The 2/2 Bn was to embuss at the assembly point for the move to ZARKOS. On the arrival of the C.O. 2/2 Bn at the embussing point he was met by an L.O. from 1 Aust. Corps with a message that his destination would NOT now be ZARKOS but PENEIOS GORGE and that he was to report to 1 Aust. Corps at ELASSON for further orders. There the C.O. received orders to move to PENEIOS GORGE N.E. of LARISSA to assist the 21 N.Z. Bn which had been in contact with the enemy.

Fortunately the B.M. was present when the C.O. 2/2 Bn received his change of orders and was able to inform the Brig. of the altered plan. A repeated message was then received from 1 Aust. Corps ordering 16 Aust. Inf. Bde less 2/2 Bn to move to the area SYN THOMAI about 8 miles West of LARISSA and be available to occupy the original position facing West or to move N.E. PENEIOS GORGE to assist 2/2 Bn.

2/3 Bn was ordered to move out of its present position to the same assembly area as 2/2 Bn and embuss for SYN THOMAI. 2/1 Bn had NOT on the early morning of 16 Apr. reached its position on the TITARION RIDGE. Its march into position was considerably more difficult and it was late on the 16 Apr. when the Bn was contacted and ordered to continue its move to embuss on the KATERINE Road South of LEIVADION (Square 1791) where the Bn arrived during the early morning of 17 Apr.

The Bde I.O. (Capt. Lovell) and Staff Capt. Learner (Capt. P.J. Woodhill) had been sent to LEIVADION to assist the 2/1 Bn and later reported that the Bn had been ordered to come under comd. of 17 Aust. Inf. Bde West of LARISSA but were switched to Divisional Reserve South of LARISSA. The 2/1 Bn was never with the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde after this and throughout the remaining action in GREECE it was detached from this Bde. The Bn as a whole was destined not to rejoin the Bde, for, after the evacuation from GREECE, it went to CRETE and was not evacuated to EGYPT. From its remnants and with reinforcements the 2/1 Bn was reformed at JULIS in May 41.

In the meantime the Brig., 16 Aust. Inf. Bde had been instructed by 6 Aust. Div. that there was a general withdrawal from the SERVIA Pass area and that he was to call on his way to SYN THOMAI at 6 Aust. Div. and then 1 Aust. Corps at ELASSON.

The 2/3 Bn arrived at its embussing point at 0200 hrs on 17 Apr. 41 and moved to its destination SYN THOMAI.

The Brig. and B.M. reported at 6 Aust. Div. on the night 16 Apr. - there was heavy rain and much mud and slush and the road carrying the Southward bound traffic was covered with vehicles at a very high density.

6 Aust. Div. instructed the Brig. to report to 1 Aust. Corps at ELASSON for further instructions.

This was done at about 0200 hrs on the morning of 17 Apr. and the B.G.S. who was endeavouring to get some sleep under a tree, with the aid of a torch and map, gave the Brig. instructions to move to PENEIOS GORGE. The 16 Aust. Inf. Bde (less 2/1 Bn) was to take under command all troops there. The troops were as follows :-

H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.	(Brig. A.S. Allen)
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.	(Lt-Col. F.O. Chilton)
2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.	(Lt-Col. D.J. Lamb)
21 N.Z. Inf. Bn.	(Lt-Col. Mackie)
4 N.Z. Fd. Regt (less one Bty)	(Lt-Col. Parkinson)
One Troop 18 Pdrs. N.Z.	
Four Carriers, 2/11 Aust. Inf. Bn.	
Seven Carriers, 2/5 Aust. Inf. Bn.	

The intention was to prevent the enemy taking LARISSA from the EAST. The only information available was that the 21 N.Z. Bn had been in position North of PENEIOS GORGE - there had been contact with the enemy and the 21 N.Z. Bn had been reported to have lost one quarter of its strength. This was later found to be incorrect - only 35 casualties being inflicted. It was found too that the 21 N.Z. Bn had withdrawn to South of the PENEIOS River.

The Brig. then moved to SYN THOMAI, arriving at daylight and issued orders to 2/3 Bn to move to the area MAKRYKHORI astride the road and railway (square 4351), the C.O. 2/3 Bn to get further orders when the Brig. was more informed. B Echelon (less 2/1 Bn) was ordered to the area, road junction (4141). Adv. Bde H.Q. then moved through LARISSA to the PENEIOS GORGE area and the Brig. contacted C.O. 2/2 Bn and C.O. 21 N.Z. Bn and after a conference issued verbal orders for the defence of PENEIOS GORGE and the protection of LARISSA from the Eastern approaches.

Throughout all this movement from VERROIA Pass to PENEIOS GORGE the Comd. and staff were only able to snatch short periods of rest. The opportunity was taken while riding in vehicles to get some sleep.

It was a strenuous period and all reserves, mentally and physically, were overdrawn.

PHASE 6

PENEIOS GORGE 17/18/19 Apr. 41.

The story of the events at PENEIOS is told in the reports of the C.O.'s 2/2 Bn and 2/3 Bn together with an explanatory report by H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

It was obvious on the 18 Apr. when the German launched his attack along the PENEIOS River as far East as PARAPOTAMOS (square 4156) that the enemy had disposed of his large force (estimated one Division) prior to the arrival of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde, to cross the river and sweep down through LARISSA.

Had this been possible on the 18 Apr. the main forces of the Australian and N.Z. Divisions would have been cut off at LARISSA and the story of GREECE may have been an entirely different one.

However, the approaches to LARISSA were denied on 19 Apr. 41 when all forces had cleared LARISSA.

PHASE 7

PENEIOS GORGE to BRALLOS.

The Bde had become somewhat disorganised on its move back along the LARISSA - VOLOS Road to the destination ATALANDI ordered by N.Z. Div., the Bde coming under its command for the withdrawal. At VOLOS a road control point ordered Bde. H.Q. to BRALLOS to come under comd. again of 6 Aust. Div. Not all of the Bde troop carrying vehicles were instructed to move via LAMIA to BRALLOS, in fact, most of them continued on to the original destination at ATALANDI where they were sent on further South.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde B Echelon which had moved on the night of 17 Apr. had reached the area of LEVADEIA (sheet S3040 square 06) intact at about 0800 hrs. on 19 Apr., established a road control point South of the junction of the LAMIA and ATALANDI Roads and directed Bde personnel back to the BRALLOS area.

The 2/2 Bn which had been cut off at PENEIOS GORGE, with the exception of D Coy (Capt. Hendry) which returned to BRALLOS area, made its way to the coast and a considerable number of the personnel including the C.O. eventually joined the Bn at JULIS after a series of extraordinary adventures which took men through TURKEY, many others making their way, with the aid of Greeks, to CRETE and thence to PALESTINE. Many, however, were left behind at the evacuation of CRETE.

The Brig. and B.M. reported to H.Q. 6 Aust. Div. at BRALLOS at 0730 hrs. on 20 Apr. to be greeted with a heavy bombing attack. The Brig. received his further orders from the G.O.C. (Maj-Gen. Sir Iven G. Mackay, K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.) during this attack, the Bde being ordered to go into reserve at AMFIKLIA (square 42).

The general situation at this stage was for the British Forces to take up a defensive position on the THERMOPOLAE Line with the Aust. Forces on the LAMIA Pass, South of LAMIA, and the N.Z.'s on the right flank East to the sea.

The situation on the 20 Apr. with the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. was :-

- ^{Bde} Adv. H.Q. in wadi 4426 (AMFIKLIA).
- Rear Bde. H.Q. and B Echelon - LEVADEIA.
- 2/1 Bn - detached with 19 Aust. Inf. Bde.
- 2/2 Bn - LEVADEIA.
- 2/3 Bn - AMFIKLIA.

The approximate strengths of units at this time were :-
2/2 Bn 250 all ranks; 2/3 Bn 500 all ranks.

Enemy aircraft were very active on this day, 20 Apr. continually bombing and machine gunning any targets of opportunity throughout the daylight hours. They kept up a continual road patrol, almost completely immobilising transport.

That day of road straffing raised the query for a policy regarding the movement of transport while the road was being patrolled by enemy planes. It produced the common answer that the transport must carry on; but as much movement as possible to be done at night.

This Bde did a considerable amount of movement by M.T. at night and it was found to work very satisfactorily. Where the necessity arose to move by day it was insisted that the transport must carry on. Dispersion, concealment and camouflouge was practiced and there were few losses.

The 2/2 Bn (Major C.R.V. Edgar, Admin. Comd.) was ordered by Bde to move forward from LEVADEIA to AMFIKLIA on 21 Apr. but in the meantime 6 Aust. Div. ordered the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde to take up a defensive position on the GRAVIA Pass facing West in the area of Point 1253 (square 23) and Point 2008 (square 22).

The Bde Comd. went forward to recce the area and to liaise with Brig. Savige (17 Aust. Inf. Bde). Bn recce parties joined the Bde Comd. and Bns were ordered to R.V. in the GRAVIA area. A message was received on the morning of the 22 Apr. from 6 Aust. Div. "no move until further orders" and the move to GRAVIA was not completed.

PHASE 8.

BRALLOS to KALAMAI.

Another message arrived at Bde H.Q. by L.O. that the Comd. or a representative was required to report to H.Q. 6 Aust. Div. to attend a conference immediately and Major Hammer (B.M.) attended. The G.O.C. (Maj-Gen. Sir Iven G. Mackay, K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.) then informed the B.M. that it was intended to evacuate GREECE and that Brig. A.S. Allen would be responsible for the movement Southwards of the ALLEN GROUP to consist of the following troops :-

- ALLEN GROUP :- Comd. Brig. A.S. Allen.
- H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.
 - "J" Sec. Sigs - 6 Aust. Div.
 - 45 Aust. L.A.D.
 - 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
 - 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.
 - H.Q. 17 Aust. Inf. Bde.
 - "K" Sec. Sigs - 6 Aust. Div.
 - 46 Aust. L.A.D.
 - 2/5 Aust. Inf. Bn.
 - 2/6 Aust. Inf. Bn.
 - 2/7 Aust. Inf. Bn.
 - C Coy plus No.6 Pl. 2/1 Aust. MG Bn.
 - 2/1 Fd. Regt. R.A.A. - 6 Aust. Div (less one Bty and (less one Det. under Comd. 19 Aust. Inf. Bde.)
 - "E" Sec. Sigs - 6 Aust. Div.
 - 43 Aust. L.A.D.
 - 2/2 Fd. Coy. R.A.E.
 - 2/2 Aust. Fd. Amb.

The ALLEN GROUP was to move on "B" night 23/24 Apr. to the MEGARA Beach area (square 04) to await embarkation. The General discussed many points to be considered in the move.

Brig. S.G. Savige visited 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q. the same day, 22 Apr. and arrangements were made for the withdrawal to MEGARA. The 17 Aust. Inf. Bde co-operated whole-heartedly and the move was highly successful.

Brig. A.S. Allen established a Group H.Q. using the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde H.Q. operational staff - placed 16 Aust. Inf. Bde under comd. of Lt-Col. Lamb and divided the Group into two sections :-

- A Sec. - 16 Aust. Inf. Bde (less 2/1 Bn)
- B Sec. - 17 Aust. Inf. Bde and attached troops.

The move was carried out at night - 6 Aust. Div. had ordered no move East of road junction Y5123 before 0200 hrs 24 Apr 41 owing to the use of the road by other M.T. convoys.

All unit transport was used for troop carrying plus a few A.A.S.C. vehicles and three days extra rations were carried, more to be taken if available.

The ALLEN GROUP was met at ELEFSIS at daybreak, 24 Apr. by Col. C.E. Prior who ordered the Group to lie up during the day in the thick olive groves on each side of the main ATHENS Road. This was done quickly and effectively and although there was a continual movement of enemy aircraft over the area, it was not bombed.

The Bde. Comd. was then called to 6 Aust. Div. H.Q. and instructed that further troops were to be added to the ALLEN GROUP and that embarkation would NOT now take place at MEGARA. The Group was to move to MILOI, South of ARGOS with a possible further move to KALAMAI in the South of GREECE, the probable time of embarkation to be night 26/27 Apr. 41.

X The ALLEN GROUP was now organised into four Sections consisting of :-

H.Q. ALLEN GROUP - Comd. Brig. A.S. Allen (16 Aust. Inf. Bde)
Major H.H. Hammer " " " "
Capt. D.J.H. Lovell " " " "
Capt. R.R. Vial (6 Aust. Div.)
Lieut. W.M. Knox " " " "

A SECTION - Comd. Lt-Col. D.J. Lamb.
H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.
"J" Sec. Sigs.
45 Aust. L.A.D.
One Pl. Corps Guard.
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

B SECTION - Comd. Brig. S.G. Savige, DSO, MC, ED.
H.Q. 17 Aust. Inf. Bde.
"K" Sec. Sigs.
46 Aust. L.A.D.
One Pl. Corps Guard.
2/5 Aust. Inf. Bn.
2/6 Aust. Inf. Bn.
2/7 Aust. Inf. Bn.
2/8 Aust. Inf. Bn.
2/1 Fd. Regt. R.A.A.
"E" Sec. Sigs.
43 Aust. L.A.D.
2/2 Aust. Fd. Amb.
2/2 Fd. Coy. R.A.E.

C SECTION - Comd. Lt-Col. T.N. Gooch.
2/1 Aust. M.G. Bn.
6 Aust. Div. Troops.
6 Aust. Div. Sigs.
1 A/Tk. Regt. R.A.A. (less H.Q.)

D SECTION - Comd. Lt-Col. R. Kendall.
1 Aust. Corps Sigs.
1 Aust. Corps Engineers.
One Pl. Corps Guard.
Det. Corps Petrol Park.
One Provost Coy.

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The move to MILOI was commenced at 2130 hrs, 24 Apr. a distance of about 90 miles, the column arriving there at daylight on the 25 Apr. where again areas were allotted to Secs. and vehicles dispersed and concealed.

The move was difficult owing to the uncontrolled movement of many small convoys using this road. However, the Group arrived intact at MILOI with the exception of the 2/6 Bn which was detached en route by the area Comd. at ARGOS to take up a position on the CORINTH CANAL.

Here the Group was joined by several small parties who were either lost or had not received any definite orders.

Enemy planes were active throughout the day but once again the Group rested during the day, unmolested.

Orders for the final stage to KALAMAI were issued by the BDE. Comd. on the afternoon of the 25 Apr. and the column moved off at 2000 hrs on the route MILOI - TRIPOLIS - KALAMAI.

The road was very mountainous throughout but the large column negotiated it successfully and arrived at KALAMAI before daylight on the 26 Apr. ALLEN GROUP H.Q. had moved on ahead, made contact with the Embarkation Staff (Brig. Parrington), where allotted dispersal areas, and were awaiting to direct the Secs of the Group on their arrival at KALAMAI. Dispersal was completed by 0700 hrs in the morning of the 26 Apr., the cover available for concealment being excellent. Enemy planes made a recce during the day - dropped a stick of bombs along the wharf road for no apparent reason and although there were about 20,000 troops concealed in this area awaiting embarkation, no attack was made on the area. Concealment must have been very good and it does bring out the point that large bodies of troops can lie up in areas unobserved during the day, despite close recce by enemy planes, provided of course, that there is suitable cover.

To summarize the move from AMFIKLIA to KALAMAI from 0200 hrs 24 Apr. to 0700 hrs 26 Apr.

Organisation.

- (a) The ALLEN GROUP was divided into four Secs. with a small Group H.Q. The Comd. (Brig. A.S. Allen) dealt only with the "Section" Comds - orders and instructions were kept as simple as possible.
- (b) The strength of the Group was approximately 6000 men and 600 vehicles.
- (c) An advanced recce party moved several hours ahead of the column and it was able to get back information regarding the route and the lying up areas.
- (d) Group H.Q. moved ahead of the column and was able to get early first hand knowledge of the parking areas, usually in the darkness, and arrange allotment to Secs. Secs. sent representatives who moved at the head of the column and orders were issued to them by Group H.Q. for dispersal.

Route.

AMFIKLIA - LEVADEIA - ELEFSIS - ARGOS - MILOI - TRIPOLIS - KALAMAI.

Distances and Terrain.

Night 23/24 Apr. AMFIKLIA to ELEFSIS - about 90 miles.

Night 24/25 Apr. ELEFSIS to MILOI - about 90 miles.

Night 25/26 Apr. MILOI to KALAMAI - about 90 miles.

The mileages taken from the map are not a true indication of the distances covered as owing to the winding roads over the mountains the distance negotiated must have been considerably more.

The march throughout was an exceedingly good one and the M.T. Drivers are to be commended for their sterling work. In the darkness, driving from dusk to daylight, using only dim lights, it was no easy task and coupled with the very mountainous and winding roads, the performance and march discipline of the drivers was very satisfactory.

6 Aust. Div. Provost gave valuable assistance during the march and the work of its members lightened the difficulties of the route and darkness.

Rations and P.O.L. The value of carrying adequate ration and P.O.L. reserve was brought out. The original move was to be to MEGARA but actually the Group travelled an additional 180 miles. At ELEFSIS the Group was ordered to take an additional 7 days' rations and an ample P.O.L. reserve. This was on top of reserves already being carried from BRALLOS area.

Many of the troops that joined the Group en route were without rations and at KALAMAI many of British, Cypriot and Palestinean and Yugo Slavian troops who comprised the balance of the 20,000 troops were very short of rations.

The Group was able to leave behind on embarkation sufficient rations to keep these men going.

Enemy Aircraft. Despite continual enemy air recce for the three days and nights of the move not one attack was launched on the Group. The enemy apparently did not use his planes at night and during the day adequate dispersion, concealment and camouflouge prevented air attacks.

General. The co-operation of "Section" Comds throughout was commendable as was the work of all ranks.

Throughout the move Group H.Q. had complete control and although there were no signal communications or despatch riders, control was kept with Liaison Officers, the establishment of a report center on the march and at rest. "Section" Comds reported immediately on reaching each new location and arrangements were made for a further conference for the next move.

It was interesting to note how well the move was conducted, based on simple verbal orders and the close co-operation of all Comds.

KALAMAI.

Brig. A.S. Allen then established close contact with Embarkation H.Q. (Brig. Parrington) who stated that his information was practically nil. He had no communication with Force H.Q. - was not sure of the night of embarkation - when the ships would arrive and how many troops could be lifted. ALLEN GROUP was ordered NOT to destroy vehicles until instructed by Embarkation H.Q. Brig. Parrington stated that he was awaiting the arrival of a Naval Officer for further information.

No indication could be given of the method of embarkation, whether from the wharf or by small boats off the beach to the ships. Brig. Parrington was surprised at the large number of troops awaiting embarkation - about 20,000.

Brig. A.S. Allen arranged for all Australian troops to be embarked first and preliminary arrangements were made for an embarkation, either from the wharf or beach.

In the afternoon of the 26 Apr. 41 the Naval Officer arrived, conferred with Brig. Parrington and then Group H.Q. was informed that little information was available - that the ships may arrive that night - time was unknown. It was then decided to hand the Group vehicles over to Brig. Parrington for use by the remaining troops. Later, at a most inconvenient time, this was countermanded and the Group was instructed to destroy the vehicles with the result that some drivers were delayed and were NOT embarked that night.

It was anticipated that with the large number of troops of various nationalities and services in the area that there may be some difficulty in the ALLEN GROUP, holding its first priority of embarkation and 17 Aust. Inf. Bde were instructed to detail one Bn to guard the embarkation point and prevent troops other than those ordered, from embarking.

PHASE 9.

KALAMAI to ALEXANDRIA.

At about 2200 hrs, lights were seen out to sea and a destroyer pulled alongside the wharf. The order was received to commence embarkation and the "Sections" embarked in the order - "Sections" B, D, A, C.

The method of embarkation was for two destroyers to run alongside the wharf, fill up with troops, move out into the Bay and tranship the troops to three small merchant ships, CITY OF LONDON, DILWARRA, COSTA RICA.

Control was extremely good - the behaviour of the troops was excellent and with the ready help of the Navy about 10,000 or 11,000 troops were embarked. Some attempt was made by other troops to embark but in the main they were circumvented until all Australians on the wharf were aboard.

At the last minute just as Group H.Q. were leaving on the final destroyer, it was reported that some of the drivers had not returned from destroying vehicles and Capts P.J. Woodhill and R.R. Vial were ordered to stay and organise any remaining Australian troops in the area and embark them on the following night. It must have been somewhat of a disappointment for these two officers to be left behind and it reflects great credit on them for the ready and cheerful way in which they accepted their task.

The last destroyer left at about 0430 hrs. on the 27 Apr. and transhipped the troops to the CITY OF LONDON at about 0500 hrs and the convoy proceeded on its way.

The arrangements by the Navy on the actual embarkation was most praiseworthy. The merchant service was equally helpful and the troops were given food and tea as soon as they boarded the ship. On the CITY OF LONDON were at least 3,500 troops - the normal capacity of the ship as a trooper was 1,400 troops.

In anticipation of a German bomber reception at daylight, all Bren Guns on the ship were organised for A.A. defence, and when the first attack came at about 0800 hrs. on 27 Apr., 81 L.M.G's opened fire from the CITY OF LONDON. The other ships

of the convoy were similarly organised and the whole convoy fought back vigorously. The men were exhausted from a strenuous campaign but with their back against the wall, they fought the German planes all that day with every weapon that would fire.

The German was not unsuccessful and in the afternoon of the 27 Apr. scored a near miss on the COSTA RICA and she sank fairly quickly. Destroyers were quickly on the spot, removed the troops and took them to CRETE. Seven or eight enemy planes were reported to have been destroyed during the day's operations.

At this time it was not known whether the convoy was to proceed to CRETE or EGYPT, but on the second day out from GREECE, 28 Apr. it was apparent that CRETE was not the destination and the convoy finally disembarked at ALEXANDRIA at about 0900 hrs on 29 Apr. 41.

All Australian troops were entrained for AMIRIYA and were issued with any necessary clothing etc. and sent forward to PALESTINE.

From the time the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde had left TOBRUK on 8 Mar. 41, proceeded to GREECE on the 18 Mar. and returned to ALEXANDRIA on the 29 Apr. 41, it had been through a period of hard campaigning.

The strain of fatigue, unusual conditions of mountainous country, snow and cold, almost continuous movement, either forward or back, made the going hard but the troops, as a whole, stood up to it well.

There was an additional strain on Commanders, Officers and Staff and at times they had to struggle through periods of great fatigue. This clearly indicates that with Commanders and Staff there should be organised periods of rest so that they are able to function with clear minds, and that properly controlled rest, during a campaign is just as much a duty as any other task.

CASUALTIES. From the information available the casualties directly resulting from the GREECE Campaign are as follows :-

	Bde. H.Q.		2/1 Bn.		2/2 Bn.		2/3 Bn.		Total.	
	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.
Killed	-	3	1	5	-	2	-	1	1	11
Wounded	1	-	1	1	-	10	-	18	2	29
Missing	-	1	6	-	5	108	-	67	11	176
Total	1	4	8	6	5	120	-	86	14	216

Further information made available by units of this Bde disclose the total casualties from the GREECE and CRETE Campaigns to be :-

	Bde. H.Q.		2/1 Bn.		2/2 Bn.		2/3 Bn.		Total	
	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.	Off.	Ors.
Killed	-	2	1	5	-	2	-	7	1	16
Wounded	-	-	1	1	-	10	-	-	1	11
Missing	3	35	32	576	8	178	1	125	44	914
Total	3	37	34	582	8	190	1	132	46	941

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REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN GREECE

16 AUST. INF. BDE.

COMMENTS AND LESSONS.

The following report deals with comments and lessons on Staff control, employment and value of L.O's, supporting arms, and general as requested in 6 Aust. Div. 504/G.

1. STAFF CONTROL.

The system in general, used for Bde H.Q. in the GREECE Campaign was as follows :-

- (a) An advanced or operational H.Q.
- (b) Rear H.Q.

Adv. H.Q. With the operational H.Q. were the Commander, Brigade Major, I.O. and staff, L.O's, one or two clerks, Sig. H.Q., and one pl. Corps Guard Bn.

It was usual that either the Commander or B.M. were always present at Adv. H.Q. or within close call.

L.O's were kept in touch with the whole situation, making at least one daily call to units or whenever necessary.

It was found that a small Adv. H.Q. enabled better concealment from air observation. Any personnel unnecessary for operational H. Q. were kept at Rear H.Q.

A traffic control point was always established for dispersing of vehicles of visitors and guiding to H.Q.

Rear H.Q. In the main, the whole of unit Echelons, A and B were brigaded, the Rear H.Q. being co-ordinated by the Staff Capt. who controlled a separate administrative H.Q.

Unit 2 i/c maintained a liaison between fwd unit H.Q. and B Echelon.

The Rear Bde Staff kept in close touch with Adv. Bde H.Q. and throughout this system of Adv. and Rear H.Q. worked smoothly. Very often the contact was made at night, supplies were sent up by night, therefore limiting movement around operational H.Q. by day.

Rear H.Q. locations were usually selected from the point of view of concealment and dispersion.

2. LIAISON OFFICERS.

Bde L.O's. These officers were found to be invaluable throughout the GREECE Campaign.

The nature of the terrain imposed great strain on their physical powers. It is necessary for them to be young, fit and capable of considerable physical effort. With it all they must be clear-minded and able to express the orders and intentions of the Commander.

It is felt that one per unit on occasions is insufficient and that there should be a reserve to relieve the strain on L.O's.

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This would permit them to obtain sufficient rest and maintain them in a high state of efficiency throughout the campaign.

The L.O. who is completely in the picture can deliver and express the verbal orders of the Commander more clearly than the issue of written orders.

Div. L.O. The use of a Divisional L.O. was effective during the campaign and was of great assistance to the Bde. Comd. He was on most occasions able to give a clear conception of the bigger picture and to give general information which was of use to the Bde.

Throughout the GREECE Campaign, Capt. B.V. Wilson, 6 Aust. Div. was in liaison with the Bde and the highest commendation is expressed for his work. In view of the enemy air activity his journeys to and from the various H.Q. must have been extremely hazardous.

At all times Capt. Wilson was able to give a clear and lucid statement of what was required and throughout the campaign the Commander (Brig. A.S. Allen) had the utmost confidence in him.

General. It is felt that all L.O's should be in close association with the Commander, to know his mind and intentions. The L.O. therefore is more able to express the Commander's intentions and orders to the subordinate Commanders.

3. ASSISTANCE BY SUPPORTING ARMS.

Artillery.

(i) The 2/2 Aust. Fd. Regt. R.A.A. was in support of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde at VERROIA but the enemy was NOT in contact. However, the closest co-operation was experienced with the 2/2 Aust. Fd. Regt.

(ii) The only other Arty support was by the 4 N.Z. Fd. Regt. (less one Bty) and one Troop N.Z. A/Tk. Guns at PENEIOS GORGE on the 17/18 Apr. 41 and a report has already been submitted with reference to the action of this Regt.

M.M.G. There was no allotment of M.M.G. to this Bde during the GREECE Campaign.

With the very wide fronts taken up by the Bde on the various positions the long range fire of the medium machine gun would have been invaluable for filling gaps and protecting flanks.

At PENEIOS GORGE a Coy of machine guns would have had "made to order" targets but unfortunately there were none with the Force.

Engineers. As mentioned already in the body of the main report the 2/1 Aust. Fd. Coy R.A.E. gave great assistance at VERROIA on the withdrawal from VERROIA to SERVIA etc. The close co-operation of all ranks was most commendable.

Signals. When in fixed positions line communication was found to be most satisfactory mainly due to the extra line carried by "J" Sec. Sigs which enabled line communication over the extremely wide fronts.

Later when the units of Bde were on the move across country from VERROIA to SERVIA communications was only by L.O. Had Bns been able to carry wireless on donkey pack or a pack set on the man, communications could have been maintained.

In the withdrawal, with last minute "get-aways", the decision nearly always had to be made whether to maintain communications to the end and leave some line or take up the line and be without communications. Wireless contact at these stages would have maintained the communication and solved the problem.

"J" Sec. Sigs (Lieut. I.J. Ibbotson) did all that was possible at all times and their devotion to their duty and keenness throughout is worthy of record.

General. It has been our experience that with all Australian units there is a readiness and eagerness to co-operate in battle.

The highest co-operation is always experienced when units of all arms know each other, particularly the Commanders, and are used to working together in the same group.

Hastily got together forces, while not doubting their desire to co-operate, usually is more of an individual affair and the force or group is not welded together as a team with full recognition of the command of the immediate superior Commander.

Familiarity with the personal characteristics of the various subordinate Commanders is highly desirable - mutual confidence is developed - it makes for the general cohesion and co-operation of all arms of the force - and there is a more rapid assimilation of orders and execution of the plan in battle.

4. GENERAL.

Enemy aircraft.

After initial attacks it was realised that little damage was done by bombing. Machine gunning perhaps did slightly more damage to vehicles on the move.

If enemy aircraft were attempting to destroy the road, he made a bad fist of it as at no stage was the transport of this Bde held up by the road being completely destroyed.

It is necessary for transport to maintain the distances allotted and to keep moving.

Unless directly attacked it is not necessary to fire but if attacked, to retaliate vigorously with controlled fire.

Concealment, camouflage, dispersion make targets uneconomical from the attacker's point of view - limits observation and consequently the possibility of attack.

There must be a careful selection of B Echelon areas and it may be better to increase distances between Adv. and Rear H.Q. to obtain effective cover.

PENEIOS GORGE. The various heavy bombing and M.G. attacks throughout the day provided harassing and covering fire for the enemy to continue their attack.

At about 1900 hrs. on 18 Apr., 27 planes attacked the rearward position when the enemy infantry and tanks were approaching from 2000/3000 yds away. The intention of the E.A. may have been as follows :-

- (a) To harass and destroy our troops.
- (b) To encourage a heavy amn expenditure at a vital stage of the defence. Here our troops fought back vigorously and the amn expenditure must have been tremendous.

- (c) To give supporting fire during the approach of enemy infantry and tanks and divert the attention of our defending troops. This permitted the enemy to get into close contact and manoeuvre into position against a minimum of defensive fire.

This points clearly to the fact that fire must be controlled and in close contact situations, the position must be closely watched so that only portion of the defence is anti-aircraft while the remainder observes and deals with attacking infantry and tanks.

It may be a strong point in favor of a heavier and longer range A.A. weapon being allotted to Bde with the sole responsibility of protecting units, thus freeing, in the main, infantry weapons to deal with ground attacks by enemy infantry.

Air. The enemy with his complete air superiority in GREECE had the opportunity at all times to recon positions held - obtain sufficient knowledge of dispositions and plan his attack accordingly. This gave the German a very distinct advantage quite apart from the additional advantages of close bomber and machine gun support to his ground forces.

It was obvious that there was very close co-operation between the air and ground forces and that the enemy aircraft were given definite specific tasks to carry out.

Transport. When this Bde embarked from EGYPT to GREECE at least 50% of its transport had a very limited life owing to the operations in LIBYA. By good march discipline, continual and careful maintenance and the hard work of the 45 Aust. L.A.D. (Capt. J.A. Raftery) most of the Bde transport carried on throughout the campaign until it was finally abandoned on the evacuation from GREECE.

Weapons. All weapons were found to be effective during the campaign. The 3" Mortar was most effective in defence at PENTIOS GORGE, about 300 3" Mortar bombs were fired from the two Mortars in one day with very good fire effect. They did much to restrict the enemy advance and inflicted very heavy casualties.

A.A. L.M.G. The opinion has already been expressed that a larger calibre A.A. weapon with more hitting power than the .303 should take the place of the present A.A. Pl. weapon. It is further suggested that each Bde Group should have attached heavier A.A. weapons to deal with low flying aircraft attacks.

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NARRATIVE AND LESSONS

A & Q EXPERIENCE OF 16 AUST INF BDE DURING

GREEK CAMPAIGN.

GENERAL

2/3 Aust. Inf Bn. moved by train and road from DAPHNE to LARISSA, train party moving on 23 Mar 41, road party 2 days later. The troops travelled in third class Railway carriages in contrast to the cattle trucks used by 2/1 and 2/2 Aust Inf Bns.

The Carriers were taken on floats, similar to those used in EGYPT, two days after the train party.

2/3 Bn rationed from D.I.D. LARISSA. As the Coys of the Bn were on Security duty at various strategic points, Coy transport moved to Coy areas on arrival at LARISSA.

2/1 and 2/2 Aust Inf Bns left DAPHNE on 26 Mar. by two separate trains. 2/2 Aust Inf Bn moved at 1900 hrs and 2/1 Aust Inf Bn at 2100 hrs.

On arrival at LARISSA, personnel of these Bns were ferried to the SERVIA Area, where rations were drawn daily at D.I.D. in that area.

2/3 Aust Inf Bn left LARISSA on 6 Apr 41 and was convoyed by N.Z. Reserve M.T. Coy to the VERROIA area. B Echelon transport was brigaded in the vicinity of the town of POLYMYTON. During the whole time that units were in the area, very little transport was taken up the Pass, donkeys being used to ration Coys in the VERROIA area.

After the Bde's withdrawal from VERROIA to SERVIA, B Echelon transport was again brigaded.

This transport was never bombed. Extremely wide dispersion and the first genuine attempt at camouflage, seem to have been effective. It was whilst the Bns were taking up their new positions in SERVIA area that the need for more donkeys became apparent. Several officers were detailed to commandeer donkeys and hand receipts to owners with the promise of payment. As a matter of fact, the venture was entirely successful and some hundreds of donkeys were acquitted within 48 hours. Rationing to Bns from the D.I.D. between GERANIA and SERVIA operated by means of donkeys.

A withdrawal by B Echelon from SERVIA to THOMAI was carried out by night, but the first elements left B Echelon area in daylight in groups of 10 vehicles so as to achieve wider dispersion. There were many low hanging clouds and there were no attacks by air.

The withdrawal of the troops from SERVIA by Corps Reserve M.T. was most successful owing to the dense clouds which prevented aircraft action. Transport was late in arriving and much of the journey had to be carried out in broad daylight.

On arrival at THOMAI new dispositions were given for the Bde North East of LARISSA. B Echelon vehicles (except 2/1 Aust Inf Bn which was NOT under command) were dispersed in soft ground and owing to the rains which had fallen on the previous days, many vehicles were bogged. The Carriers were again employed to extricate bogged vehicles, and during the day B Echelon vehicles moved under Bde arrangements to PENEIOS area. The position was a cramped one but every advantage was taken of small areas in which a few vehicles could be dispersed, and again there was no attack by air, in spite of many recce planes, and much bombing of LARISSA and the GORGE.

As warnings had been given that the road LARISSA - LAMIA would be congested on the following day, the Commander ordered B Echelon to be withdrawn at 0200 hrs. during the night 17/18 Apr 41.

Conditions during the withdrawal of the M.T. from LARISSA to LAMIA are dealt with in the statement by the M.T.O., 2/3 Aust Inf Bn, attached hereto.

Whilst in the BRALLOS area no real problems of supply were encountered, as ample supplies were available at D.I.D's at LAMIA and LEVADEIA. B Echelon area was selected just North of LEVADEIA and although about 30 kilometres in rear of the forward units, was found entirely satisfactory from every point of view. Despite several bombing and machine gun attacks, little damage was done.

The transport was dispersed on both sides of the road. On the East side of the main road there were plenty of trees, but none on the West. More bombs were dropped on the West, but again, wide dispersion was almost a complete answer even to dive bombing. Vehicles were used as little as possible during the day time. Liaison between rear and forward H.Q.s was made at night and was found to be adequate.

The withdrawal from the BRALLOS area to the ultimate evacuation at KALAMAI was achieved with a minimum of vehicle casualties. As a recce party moved in advance each day and selected bivouac and dispersion areas for transport and troops, ample rations were available from abandoned D.I.D's at ATHENS Racecourse and ARGOS and other points en route.

One of the most important lessons of the campaign was brought out by the fact that at KALAMAI before evacuation. 4 days' rations were taken by each man of this Bde. Although these rations were NOT used on board ship, they proved valuable to the personnel who were landed at CRETE.

WEAPONS

Weapons generally gave a better performance in GREECE than in the desert, mainly due to the lack of dust. There was an acute shortage of Oil, G.S. and flannelette for cleaning purposes.

It was noted that the Greek weapons were kept in exceptionally good condition. It appeared that much time was spent in care and cleaning of weapons, and from enquiries from platoon commanders, this fact seems to have impressed our men very deeply.

RATIONING

Following are extracts from reports on rationing :-

2/1 Aust Inf Bn.

The normal system of rationing was followed by this Bn prior to move from VERROIA PASS.

After orders were received to evacuate VERROIA, 4 days rations were drawn by Coys from a Bn dump which had been formed in B Echelon area. These rations sufficed until 16 Apr 41 when Bn moved to LARISSA area. There a further 4 days' rations were taken from an abandoned D.I.D. and these kept the Bn until a delivery of 1 days' ration was effected at THERMOPYLAE PASS by A.A.S.C. on 21 Apr and 22 Apr 41.

From thereon the Bn rationed itself from abandoned D.I.D's

2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

From 8 Apr 41 until 12 Apr 41, 2/2 Bn had 10 days' rations on hand - 4 days' with each man and 6 days' dumped at VERROIA PASS.

When Bn withdrew to KASTANIA - MOSKOHORIA, 4 days' rations per man were carried on the man. When passing through VOLVENDOS on 14 Apr a further one day's ration per man was collected from dump established at that village.

Meanwhile B Echelon at GERANIA had acquired an additional 10 days' supply of rations from the forward Supply Dump, vicinity GERANIA, and three days' per man were taken over the mountains by donkey and dumped at the Shrine (rear of Bn position). Of these rations one day per man could only be delivered to Coys before the withdrawal from this position commenced on 16 Apr.

At the Bn embussing point on SERVIA - LARISSA road, in vicinity Trig. 1142, a further 2 days' rations per man were drawn on 17 Apr from the dump established there by B Echelon.

From Trig. 1142 Bn moved to PENEIOS area and occupied a defensive position at EVANGILISMOS. B Echelon was established 2 miles S.W. of Bde H.Q. which was at MARKYHORION.

10 days' rations were secured from abandoned R.A.S.C. Dump, LARISSA, and brought forward to B Echelon area, where part were distributed to Coys evening 17 Apr.

After withdrawal 18 Apr most of the men of Bn were cut off, and foraged for their own food during their journey to CRETE, EGYPT and PALESTINE.

B Echelon and D Coy moved by M.T. to KALAMAIA in stages. They replenished supplies at BRALLOS 22 Apr and ARGOS 24 Apr where plenty of rations were available from abandoned R.A.S.C. Dumps.

TRANSPORT

Following is an extract from a report by M.T.O. 2/3 Bn which illustrates the performance of unit M.T. during the campaign :-

The vehicles on the whole gave a good performance. The petrol issued was of a higher standard than that used in the desert, and the absence of dust and the clearness of the air tended to make conditions ideal for motors. There were no serious breakdowns and all repairs were fixed by unit fitters.

Driving generally in GREECE was very difficult. The roads, although good in most cases, were very narrow, and on mountain passes many hair-pin bends were encountered. On leaving the main roads, dirt roads were encountered; these were built up to a height of about 2 feet and during the rain were difficult to negotiate, the surfaces being very greasy.

The drivers of vehicles played a very important part in the Greek Campaign and enough praise cannot be given them. Their vehicles at all times were ready for immediate use, and the drivers at times worked for at least 20 hours per day. The standard of maintenance was excellent. After leaving LARISSA, drivers were subjected during many hours of the day to continual road straffing but carried on under these difficult conditions and supplies to forward troops were never at any time held up. Drivers generally showed particular devotion to duty under difficult conditions.

Casualties to drivers were nil in 2/3 Bn and casualties to vehicles were also nil.

The withdrawal from LARISSA to LAMIA was the most trying day for vehicles and drivers alike. At 0630 hrs a flight of bombers appeared and bombed a bridge on the main road, making the road impassible for at least six hours. The absence of road discipline in many units was noticed here; at one time there were three lines of traffic along the road, and about one yard between vehicles, making an easy target for aircraft. Many vehicles were destroyed here,

but fortunately none of of this Bn. Right throughout the day there was continual bombing and ground strafing, making movement almost impossible.

At KALAMAIA all vehicles were destroyed by draining the oil and then running the engines until they seized.

(Sgd) I. McKenzie Capt.
S.C. 16 Aust Inf Bde.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

48
D

JULIS CAMP
"HOBBS" LINES
H.Q. 2/1 Aust
Inf Bn
29 June 41

H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde

LESSONS - CAMPAIGN IN GREECE

The following lessons were brought out during the campaign in GREECE :

INTERCOMMUNICATION:

The means of communication available in a Bn at present are insufficient for warfare in which the Bn has to cover large fronts such as were occupied by this Bn at VERRIA PASS 6000 X.

Bn HQ was out of touch with 3 forward Coys for over 6 hours due to denseness of scrub and topography making it extremely difficult to lay lines. Runners took 2 hours to reach two of the forward Coys. Provision of pack wireless sets would have solved this situation. Communication between Brigade and Bn was also subject to long delay and use was made of the Greek military line during the first 12 hours.

DUMPING OF RATIONS AND AMMUNITION:

Owing to the limited means of access to our position at VERRIA it became evident early in the operation that to maintain supplies, both of rations and ammunition, dumping would be necessary. A forward dump was established in the Bn HQ area and this was replenished from a main dump off the road about 1 mile SOUTH of KASTANIA. The need for careful reconnaissance and selection of these areas for dumps, during the preliminary reconnaissance for occupation of a defensive position of the nature of the one held by us, is emphasised.

CAMOUFLAGE AND COVER:

The need for constant practice in camouflage in defensive, particularly progressive camouflage of works, was noticed and also the value of shadow, both as an aid to camouflage of works, and as the best means of protection from observation by aircraft of personnel. It is suggested that more exercises embodying these two points could be introduced into our training.

As I was not with the Bn in the latter stages of the campaign in GREECE and the other Officers now with the unit have no further lessons to bring out, this report only covers the move to, and occupation of, defensive position at VERRIA PASS.

(Sgd) C.R.V. Edgar Major
Adm Comd 2/1 Aust Inf Bn

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

49 E
2/2 Aust Inf Bn
Goddard Lines.
JULIS CAMP
10 Jul 41

16 Aust Inf Bde.

OPERATIONS IN GREECE

Ref File R/2/16.

1. A full report on the PENEIOS GORGE action in which this Bn. was involved, has already been submitted.

2. The following comments are submitted on the general lessons brought out by the campaign :-

(a) SIGNALS :-

The wide frontages held (which appear to be normal under the present conditions) emphasise the inadequacy of existing signal equipment. The following improvements are urgently needed :-

- (i) A much larger quantity of wire.
- (ii) An increased establishment of telephones.
- (iii) Provision of Pack R/T sets - also a more powerful set for communication with B Echelon which is often many miles in rear.

(b) PACK TRANSPORT :-

This Bn was compelled to adopt improvised mule and donkey 1st Line transport. It is believed that similar conditions apply in SYRIA, and that in other parts of the Middle East, pack is an essential means of transport. Other European armies maintain Mountain Divisions. It is submitted that training in pack 1st Line transport should be given to infantry units.

(c) "SCRATCH" FORCES :-

The great disadvantage of hastily assembled forces combining different arms was amply borne out in the experience of this Bn. It is essential that units likely to fight together in war should train together so as fully to develop mutual confidence.

3. The following suggestion has been made by an officer of this Bn which, in my opinion, has much to commend it and is forwarded for consideration, especially having regard to para 2 (c) :-

- (a) In most operations of war an infantry Bn will have supporting it, A/Tk guns and M.M.G's. A normal allotment is likely to be one tp. of 4 A/Tk guns and one pl. of M.M.G's to a Bn.
- (b) It is suggested that such A/Tk and M.M.G. pls. be raised and trained in the same manner as the old A/Tk Coy - i.e. one tp. of guns and one M.M.G. pl. from each Bn.
- (c) In many conditions Bren Carriers will best operate brigaded.
- (d) With the foregoing in mind, the suggestion is that a brigade "support group" be constituted as follows :-

Group H.Q.
H.Q. and three tps A/Tk guns.

H.Q. and three pls. M.M.G's.
H.Q. and three Carrier Pls.

As the situation required, sub-units would either be allotted to Bns, or kept brigaded. It is even possible that two or more of such groups may be combined to form part of a highly mobile Div. force.

(Sgd) F.O. Chilton Lt-Col.
Comd. 2/2 Aust Inf Bn

Phase 3.

SERIAL 1. + 1A.

Issued during occupation
of VERROIA PASS.

THREAT FROM PARACHUTE TROOPS AND METHODS
OF RECOGNITION OF FRIENDLY TROOPS.

NOTE:- Part I of this document is to be read to all Ranks of
the British Troops in GREECE.

PART I.

Phase 3

1. (a) German Forces in BULGARIA are known to include air borne
units and parachute troops.

The air borne troops are carried in troop-carrying aircraft
which may land in any suitable area, and discharge troops
armed with Tommy guns, explosives, mortars, motor cycles
and even small howitzers.

(c) Parachute troops may also descend with similar armament -
the small howitzers descending in several "loads" which are
assembled on landing.

2. In operations against HOLLAND, one of the main factors which
contributed to the success of German parachute troops, was the
confusion caused by landing in foreign military uniforms and civilian
dress: (as nursemaids, Priests, etc). Parachute troops include good
linguists, and it should be remembered that the English language is
widely spoken in GERMANY.

3. All ranks must therefore be able to differentiate:-

(a) Between friendly troops and enemy troops wearing our uniforms
and speaking English.

(b) Between genuine Greek troops or genuine Greek civilians, and
enemy troops disguised as same.

4. (a) The methods of recognition will be given out verbally to all
ranks.

(b) It will be impressed on all ranks that the methods of
recognition are MOST SECRET. If the enemy becomes warned
of these, his parachute troops will be drilled in their use,
and there may be a resulting loss of life.

(c) Means of recognition must always be available on the person
since failure to respond to a challenge may result in the
loss of life.

1020h
R1 12/4

THREAT FROM PARACHUTE TROOPS AND METHODS
OF RECOGNITION OF FRIENDLY TROOPS.

NOTE:- The contents of this document will be explained verbally to all ranks.

PART II.

1. The order to adopt recognition means and procedure will be "PARACHUTE TROOPS ALERT".
2. The code word for despatch by signals in clear for the order "PARACHUTE TROOPS ALERT" will be "FLIGHTING".
3. (a) Initial warning that parachute troops are in action will most probably originate from the fighting troops. Warning may be received from other sources through Force HQ., or Formation HQs.
- (b) All ranks on seeing parachute troops descending, or when they receive the order "PARACHUTE TROOPS ALERT" will immediately adopt the procedure detailed below.
4. (a) The first duty of individuals on seeing parachute troops descending, is to ensure that a warning is passed on. Sub-units, units and formations will signal the code word "FLIGHTING" followed by the area in which parachute troops are landing, in a message franked "EMERGENCY OPERATIONS". This message should be passed by the fastest means available to all terminals with which contact is possible, and in addition will be addressed to Force HQ, which will be responsible for further action.
- (b) The passage of messages of type described above will take priority over all other signals.
- (c) The descent of parachute troops will be obvious to troops in the area of landing, but the warning is essential in case the enemy succeeds in "lying-up", or in case he descends at dusk, with a view to night activities.
5. To cover instances when warning has not been received by isolated parties of troops, the procedure will be that any body of troops meeting other troops who are not displaying recognition symbols, will challenge with the order "PARACHUTE TROOPS ALERT". The answer for this challenge will be the immediate display of recognition symbols. It will be realised that failure to respond immediately may result in the loss of life.

RECOGNITION OF FRIENDLY IMPERIAL TROOPS.

6. The universal recognition symbol for all ranks of the "BRITISH TROOPS IN GREECE" will be displayed as follows:-

A pair of Eyeshields Anti-Gas will be strapped around the rim of the head-dress INSIDE OUT. In the case of the Mk II Eyeshields this implies that the white absorbent pad will be displayed outwards. The Eyeshields will not be "clipped up" as for wearing over the eyes, but will "flap" over the forehead.

7. Vide Operational Standing Orders, the respirator will be worn at all times in the forward areas, from the day that hostilities against GERMANY commence in this theatre of war. In rear areas respirators must at all times be readily accessible. Commanders will ensure that all ranks are in possession of the approved scale of Eyeshields Anti-Gas, and that they are carried in the respirator haversack.

- 8. The practice common to some D.Rs and M.T. drivers, of wearing goggles over the head-dress will be discontinued. At rest they may be worn round the neck.
- 9. (a) In addition to the recognition symbol described above formations will adopt challenges, of the type described in INTERIM OPERATIONAL STANDING ORDERS, para 25 etseq.
- (b) Such challenges will only come into force when the "PARACHUTE TROOPS ALERT" Order obtains. All ranks will be warned that the special challenges are MOST SECRET.
- (c) It will be explained to all ranks that the special challenges are only applicable within formations, and that THE ONLY UNIVERSAL TOKEN COMMON TO ALL BRITISH TROOPS IN GREECE is that described in para 4 above.
- 10. At the present the R.A.F. have no recognition system; information on this subject will be issued later.

RECOGNITION OF GENUINE GREEK ALLIES.

11. The question of recognition symbols to enable genuine Greek Allies to be recognised is under consideration, and instructions will be issued later.

ALL CONCERNED ARE AGAIN REMINDED THAT THE ESSENCE OF RECOGNITION SYMBOLS AND OTHER DEVICES FOR COMBATING THE THREAT FROM PARACHUTE TROOPS IS SECRECY. IF THE SECRET IS DIVULGED THE RESULT WILL BE ENABLED TO CAUSE CONFUSION AND UNNECESSARY LOSS OF LIFE.


SECOND UNIVERSAL RECOGNITION SYMBOL FOR UNIVERSAL TROOPS.

- 12. The Eyeshields Anti-Gas symbol will be considered as an interim measure only.
- 13. (a) By 20 Apr 41 formations will ensure that all ranks are in possession of a flat TIN disk, to be carried in the pocket of the respirator.
- (b) The tin disc may be the top of a standard cigarette tin, (e.g. 50 Players tin) or will be a cut-out tin disc of similar size. The disc will be punched with a small hole and provided with a string so that it can be tied on to the equipment or to the pocket of uniform jacket etc. It will in fact be worn on the front of the person in a conspicuous position.
- (c) The actual date on which the tin disc symbol will supplant the Eyeshields Anti-Gas will be notified later.
- (d) Formations will report by 20 Apr 41 that all ranks have been provided with tin recognition discs.

Headquarters
British Troops in Greece.
AHQ/1033/G(0)
8th April 1941.

For
RTK Belcher
Brigadier,
General Staff.
Maj GS

6881 AN



Notes

- (1) C Coy on extended front, as country untimbered whereas A+B thick scrub
- (2) Defensive Fire Tasks = (diagonal lines symbol)
- (3) C.P " " = (dots symbol)
- (4) 3" MORTAR " " = (horizontal lines symbol)
- (5) D Coy patrol tops of wadis leading up from RIVER
- (6) C Coy standing patrol

21. Bm
 prepared map by
 Major I. P. Campbell
 1A
 5/4

DUTIES OF UMPIRES

(See Instructions for Training 1933 Chap VIII.)

1. CHIEF UMPIRE

- (i) He will exercise general control over the progress of the exercise and will ensure that the schedule of events in accordance with Appendix... is followed.
- (ii) He will control the actions of the Umpires by means of signals communications through the Commanding Officer.
- (iii) He will collate the umpires reports and forward same to Bn. H.Q. at the conclusion of the Battle Practice.

2. UMPIRES

- (i) They will control the movements of their sections in accordance with the time schedule set out in Appendix... and the orders of the Chief Umpire.
- (ii) They will make a written report on the Pro-forma provided for the purpose and forward same to the Chief Umpire at the conclusion of the practice.
- (iii) They will at all times, see that the Orders of the Safety Officer are put into effect immediately.
- (iv) They will wear the distinguishing marks as shown in Appendix....

3. The Director and all Umpires will wear a White Arm band 6 inches wide on each arm as a distinguishing badge.

(Sgd) A.C. Kidd, Major A.I.C.
Adjutant 1/19 Battalion.

Phase 4

SERIALS IB - 6

14 Apr 41

Copy No: /

6 AUST DIV CO No. 3

Ref Maps: KOZANI Sheet C 2466, Mt OLYMPUS C 3066.

INFORMATION

1. Anzac Corps (1 NZ Div and 6 Aust Div) is now in occupation of a def posn on a general line OLYMPUS - R ALIAKMON.

The sector allotted to Anzac Corps is from incl OLYMPUS through TITARIAN RIDGE to R ALIAKMON thence to KTENI 8595.

Corps posn will be known as OLYMPUS - A ALIAKMON posn.

The posn is held by 1 NZ Div on the RIGHT and 6 Aust Div on the LEFT. 12 Gk Div is on LEFT of 6 Aust Div. Dividing line between 1 NZ Div and 6 Aust Div is line through 184955 - 172930. The junc between 6 Aust Div and 12 Gk Div will be in KARASIA - KTENI area.

2. 6 Aust Div withdrew according to programme from delaying posn at FLORINA GAP and has now rejoined Anzac Corps. This withdrawal was executed after an engagement with the enemy lasting two days.

Following tps now under comd 6 Aust Div:

16 Aust Inf Bde (from 0600 hrs 14 Apr)
4 NZ Bde
One Bn 6 NZ Bde
2/1 MG Bn (less one Coy)

Arty.-

64 Med Regt RA
7 Med Regt RA (less one Bty)
6 Pd Regt NZA
One Bty 7 A Tk Regt NZA

3. Air reports indicate enemy moving SOUTH in some strength from PTOLEMAIS by MT. NO contact has yet been made, although armd cars were seen at SERVIA br late evening of 13 Apr.

INTENTION

4. 6 Aust Div will occupy a posn for PROTRACTED DEFENCE on general lines TITARIAN RIDGE 1895 - ESCARPMENT GOULES 9797 - RYMNION thence NW to KTENI 8595.

METHOD

5. Posn will be occupied with three Bdes fwd.

RIGHT - 16 Aust Inf Bde
CENTRE - 4 NZ Bde
LEFT - 19 Aust Inf Bde

Boundaries.-

6. Between RIGHT and CENTRE incl to 4 NZ Bde - NORTH and SOUTH line through KASTANI.

56
IB

7 Between CENTRE and LEFT incl to 19 Inf Bde - line of river from pt 307 in sq 9396 to pt 669 sq 9090.

8 MGs: One Coy under comd 19 Inf Bde.
Two Coys under comd 4 NZ Bde.

9 Arty: 2/8 Fd Regt) support 19 Aust Inf Bde.
2/3 Fd Regt)

6 Fd Regt NZA supports 4 NZ Bde.

Med Arty superimposed on whole front.

A Tk: One Bty 1 A Tk Regt RAA under comd 19 Inf Bde.
" " 7 A Tk Regt NZA supports 4 NZ Bde.
" " 11 A Tk Regt RAA - reserve.

10 Defensive fire: Calls for DF through Bde HQ.

Signal: GREEN over RED over GREEN
signal lights.

Rate of fire: 3 mins rapid, 2 mins pause,
2 mins normal.

Programme NOT rptd unless called for.

Task table issued later.

11 Engr: The tasks in order of priority:-

(1) Comms incl construction of lt br over R ALIAKMON
in 19 Inf Bde sector.

(2) A Tk obstacles incl mine field on front with
priority to the approaches to the pass.

Defences.- All defences will be dug in and wired. The preparation of all defences must be carried on with utmost vigour and they will be sited with full consideration given to counter the GERMAN infiltration tactics employed successfully by them at FLORINA GAP.

Progressive programme will be prepared by Bdes and Regts and reports submitted to HQ 6 Aust Div every three days. Priority in wiring will be given to fwd localities.

INTERCOMN

12. HQ 6 Aust Div located 123823.

13. Line - L/T will be regarded as the primary means of comn, and will be provided to the HQs of all Inf Bdes and from CRA 6 Aust Div to CCMA and all Fd Regts.

14. Wireless - W/T sets will be allotted as follows:
2 to 19 Aust Inf Bde
1 each to 4 NZ Bde and 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Continuous W/T watch will be retained but may be relaxed and fixed schedule working observed at the discretion of comd Sigs 3 Aust Div.

R/T will be used only in cases of dire necessity, and then only by an offr.

13 DR.- DRLS between 6 Aust Div and fwd units less 19 Aust Inf Bde will be arranged.

A "ferry service" once daily between 6 Aust Div and 19 Aust Inf Bde will be arranged.

ACK

Time of Signature: 1445 hrs.

Method of Issue: LOs and Sigs.

R. B. Shepherd
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Copy No.</u>
16 Aust Inf Bde	1
19 Aust Inf Bde	2
4 NZ Inf Bde	3
RAA 6 Aust Div	4
RAE 6 Aust Div	5
Sigs 6 Aust Div	6
AASC 6 Aust Div	7
GOC	8
G	9-10
AQ	11-12
ADMS	13
DADOS	14
SOME	15
DAPM	16
Anzac Corps	17
File	18-19
War Diary	20-21

This is
a copy of
a message, the
original of which
was taken by 6 Div
DHS to Adv. Bde HQ
at 1305 on 14 Apr 41

(2)

59

SERVIA

13

BELT assumes comd. OROT and att. tps. LUDA and att. tps. as
from 0600 hrs. 14 Apr. (1) Inter-div. boundary between OROT
and GERANIA as arranged 184955 to 172930. (2) SOS for ANZAC Corps
is green red green. (3) 2/1 Aust. M.G. Bn. less 2 Coys. come
under LUDA. (4) ^{one} M.G. Coy under BELT. and 1 M.G. Coy Corps
Reserve Area, GERANIA. ACK.

T60 1730

T41 1820

TOR 1850 on ✓

14 Apr 41

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No. *But 16*

OFFICE DATE STAMP

JUN 13 1943

SIGNALS

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

SERVIA area

No. of Groups.

GR.

3

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

OR OT

16. Aust Bde

FROM

BELT

6 Aust Div

Originator's Number

0 59

Date

13

In Reply to Number

following received from UNBA and passed
 for information and action (.) dividing
 line between GEPA (N.2) and OR OT as
 follows (.) 184955 to 172930 (.)
 VARMA incl BELT

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1530

IMPORTANT

SIGNED

SIGNED

Maj

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

153 78

T.O.R.

1305-07 1400

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

OROT

(79)

(6)

Important

Phase 4

SECRET
Copy No. 20
21 Apr. 41.

61
4

6 AUST. DIV.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 22.

(Issued in conjunction with 6 Aust. Div. O.O. No. 5 dated 20 Apr. 41)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAYOUT

Ref. Maps.: - 1:250,000 S.3040 ATHENS

Commencing 21 Apr. 41, Adm. Layout of 6 Aust. Div. is shown hereunder:-

1. DIV. H.Q.

Adv. Div. H.Q. is established at Y5416.

A.A. & Q.M.G., D.A.Q.M.G., C.R.E., D.A.P.M., A.D.M.S..

Rear Div. H.Q. is established at Y5811.

C.A.A.S.C., D.A.D.O.S., S.O.M.E., D.A.A.G., L.S.O., Chaplains.

2. WATER.

Water will be drawn by units from existing supplies in their area after testing by R.M.O.s. Attention is drawn to F.S. P.B. Pamphlet 5, Pages 31 and 32. Strict control must be exercised to ensure that all drinking water is sterilized by boiling and chlorinating. W.P. Div. H.Q. units AYIA MARINA Y531 6.

3. SUPPLIES. POL & AMMUNITION.

Supplies, POL, and Amm., will be drawn by 1st Line tpt from GRAVIA Supply Depot, located at Y3234. Div. H.Q. units will draw from No. 9 F.S.D. at Y5118.

4. PROVOST.

Traffic Control:- As from 1200 hrs. 20 Apr. 6 Aust. Div. Pro. Coy. will be responsible for traffic control on:-

- (a) Main rd from but NOT inclusive road Junc Y6115 northwards.
- (b) Road through ELATIA to but NOT inclusive rd Junc. Y6318.

Stragglers:-

D.A. P.M. will arrange with Camp Comdt. for a Stragglers Post to be established at Rear Div. H.Q. where stragglers from all units in the Force will be collected. Camp Comdt. will arrange to despatch personnel from all units 6 Aust. Div. to Bde or Regimental H.Q. as the case may be. All stragglers from New Zealand and English forces will be despatched to Corps Collecting Centre on Road approx Y6212. Camp will arrange to accommodate and ration stragglers.

5. MOVEMENT OF M.T.

Experience has shown that the threat of Air Raids on dark nights is negligible, probably due to the difficulties of taking-off and landing on improvised aerodromes being used by the enemy. On the other hand, a large percentage of vehicles lost during the recent withdrawal was due to vehicles being driven over the sides of narrow and dangerous roads.

The G.O.C. therefore directs that:-

- (a) Vehicle traffic by day must be reduced to an absolute minimum. Where such movement is essential, vehicles will move at a density of NOT more than 8 v.t.m.
- (b) Headlights, dimmed in accordance with regulations, will be used on nights where the driver has difficulty in seeing the road.
- (c) Vehicles approaching each other will use side lights only to avoid glare.
- (d) On moonlight nights when the road is reasonably visible, headlights will NOT be used, except as required on difficult deviations.

P.T.O.

(e) Headlights will NOT be used on roads forward of Advanced Bde. H.Q. of forward Bdes, except where there is no likelihood of the reflection being seen by the enemy by ground observation.

(f) During movement at night vehicles will NOT be at greater density than 18 v.t.m.

(g) Every vehicle will have a lookout man who will give warning of the approach of aircraft. On warning being given, headlights will be put out.

(h) On every occasion when vehicles are halted headlights will be switched off. The lookout man (or spare driver) will move forward to the next vehicle ahead to give his driver warning when that vehicle resumes movement.

(i) In convoys, an Officer or Senior N.C.O. will ride in the front seat on the basis of one to every 10 vehicles. This Officer or N.C.O. will be responsible for the fluidity of movement, and will walk ahead to ascertain the cause of any stoppage, and cause movement to be resumed as soon as possible.

6. MEDICAL.

The evacuation of casualties from the forward area will be through one of the following channels:-

A.D.S.	SKANNOS	Y3236
Amb Staging Post		Y3434
M.D.S.		Y3727

First Aid Posts have been established at the following Points.

Y3232	Y432 6	Y3932	Y6114
-------	--------	-------	-------

Motor Amb under arrangements of A.D.M.S. will maintain a patrol on roads at regular intervals.

7. POSTAL.

6 Aust. Div. Postal Unit is established at Rear Div. H.Q. Y5811. Units will collect incoming from and deliver outgoing mails to 6 Aust. Div. Postal Unit.

8. RECOVERY.

(a) L.A.D.s will effect 1st line repairs and will recover vehicles requiring 2nd and 3rd line repairs to 1st line Recovery Post at Y6212.

(b) No. 5 Recovery Section Repair Det is located North of LEVADEIA at Y62 12.

9. ORDNANCE.

All units under Comd will submit Indents to D.A.D.O.S. 6 Aust. Div. in quadruplicate as soon as deficiencies occur.

10. R.E. STORES.

R.E. Stores Dump is located at GRAVIA Ry Sid. Demands for R.E. Stores will be submitted to C.R.E.

11. PACK ANIMALS.

(a) 50 Pack Animals and Muleteers each have been allotted under Comd. 17 and 19 Aust. Inf. Bdes. for delivery of supplies etc. to forward positions.

(b) S.S. O. will arrange for forage to be made available in the vicinity of GRAVIA Supply Depot as from 22 Apr. 41. Bdes will submit Indents for forage on the scale of 3 lbs. per animal per day through to usual channels.

12. BURIALS.

Separate instructions are being issued.

Handwritten signature: Claude A. Priori

Col.
A.A. & Q.M.G. 6 Aust. Div.

63

3

DISTRIBUTION: List "B". plus
Anza c Corps (2)
N. Z. Div. (2)
2/1 M.G. Bn. (1)
War Diary (2)
File (2)

Copy of message as
per arrangement with 12 Apr 41
12 Gk Div 0300 hrs
Sgt Nash 12/4/41

Phase 4

5

Written at 12 Gk Div
at SOFULAR on the
night of withdrawal
from VERROIA Pass
H H H

or Capt Parkbury
or Col Lamb.

The bearer has the
permission of the Brigade
Commander O.R.O.T. to take
a message to troops still
in the area. These troops (Greeks)
will move immediately
& should pass the demolition
point by 0400 hrs on 13 Apr.
The order to demolish should
not be given before ~~these troops pass~~
this point unless enemy action forces
an earlier demolition. There will
be 1 officer & 30/40 units of A.H. Hammer Bn
86 Regt.

SERVIA

6/60

Dear Bugader

The two new boys arrived at MOSKOKHORI at 1630 I hope to get them into approved areas tonight.

The men are extremely tired & most have blistered feet etc. However, their spirits are bright.

Our new position is terribly long. As you know the main trouble is communication with the rear. It will take a two days trip to get anything forward, and I am most concerned. We have only a very small amount of ammo (just what could be carried on the men). We have about 3 days rations with us.

In most urgent needs 66
an Am. & Tools.

Weapons O.K.

Yours sincerely
Louchier

Note to 16 Bde HQ
after arrival by 2/2
BN at SERVIA

Phase 5.

SERIALS 7-9.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

Phase 5.

OUT

COPY

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

7

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO BELT

1st Aust Coy for Command OROT

FROM UNBA

1st Aust Corps

Originator's Number

0 315

Date

16

In Reply to Number

OROT	less	NEJE	plus	JOBE	NOW
goes	SYN	THOMAI	available	either	to
occupy	original	posn	facing	WEST	or
to	move	NE	to	assist	NEJE
area	PENEIOS	GORGE			

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1630

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

68

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

Move from ZARKHOS

OUT

SEA VIA

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

8

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

~~UNIT~~ rptd ONOT

~~David of DEIR~~

16 Aust of Bae

FROM

BRIT

6 Aust div

Originator's Number

0 108

Date

16

In Reply to Number

ref	map	MOUNT	OLYMPUS	1/100000	(.)
thirty	vehs	waiting	rd	and	track
junc	194836	until	0500	hrs	17
apr	to	move	you	to	ZARKHOS
area	(15	miles	WEST	of	LARISSA)
(.)	after	0500	hrs	17	apr
vehs	will	be	in	dispersal	area

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

69

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

No. of Groups.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

GR.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

-2-

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

off	rd	SOUTH	of	194856	(.)
move	along	rd	until	met	by
guide	who	will	lead	you	to
veh	dispersal	area	(.)	vehs	will
NOT	remain	dispersal	area	later	than
2000	hrs	17	apr		

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1835

SIGNED

SIGNED

IMMEDIATE

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

10

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

No. of Groups.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

GR.

Handwritten: Haza 2/3
Vega 2/2
Juni 2/1

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

Handwritten: 2/3 BN

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

HAZA rppd OROT

Handwritten: 2/3 Aust Inf Bn

Handwritten: 9

FROM

BELT

Handwritten: 6 Aust Div

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

0 109

16

your	destination	now	SYN	THOMAI	T2335
(.)	route	as	before	except	turn
eastwards	and	net	westwards	at	rd
junc	T1834	ref	map	sheet	S3066
1/250,000	(.)	further	instns	from	your
comd	on	your	arrival	destination	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

Handwritten: 1st address
By hand 2nd address

1940

SIGNED

SIGNED

Handwritten: Maj

IMPORTANT

T.H.I.

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

Handwritten: 11

91465097

Phase 6

SERIALS 10-13

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No.
	OUT		OFFICE DATE STAMP

10

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO BELT (6 Aust Div)

FROM O ROT (6 Aust Inf Bde)

Originator's Number: I 30 Date: 18 In Reply to Number:

Enemy	to the	broken	through	at	gap
and	further	up	to	left	at
upward	to	to	to	to	are
in	direction	drop	of	to	attack
but	can	only	be	own	but
of	other	people	thru	to	covered

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS: <i>As written</i>	IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER.	ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY: <i>As clear</i>	TIME OF ORIGIN: <i>1335</i>
---	---	--	--------------------------------

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

73

MESSAGE FORM

COPY.

Serial No.

No. of Groups.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

GR.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

BELT (6 Aust Div)

FROM

OROT (16 Aust Inf Bde)

Originator's Number

I 30

Date

18

In Reply to Number

enemy	tanks	broken	through	at	gap
and	further	inf	to	left	as
explained	to	L O	(.)	we	are
endeavouring	to	dispose	of	the	tanks
but	can	only	do	our	best (.)
other	people	should	be	warned	

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CIPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

In clear
Important.

TIME OF ORIGIN

1335

D.J. Lovell Capt

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

714

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
Forms C2128/13.	Wt. 36169/1798.	1,000M. pads. 12	/39. B.& S. Ltd.	51-5537.							

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN
OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

10A.

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO ~~182418~~ OROT rptd UNBA

(Allenforce rptd 1 (East Camp))

FROM

BELT *(6 East 200)*

Originator's Number

0 116

Date

18

In Reply to Number

following is

copy

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THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

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(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

75

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

-2-

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

hrs	19	apr	(.)	thinning	out
may	commence	earlier	but	roads	to
and	from	LARISSA	reserved	6	NZ
bde	until	0001	hrs	19	apr
(.)	one	sqn	div	cav	regt
now	on	way	to	assist	your
withdrawal	and	under	comd	until	you

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

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T.O.R.

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MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

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OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

-3-

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

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THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

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IMMEDIATE by LO

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.) to OROT.

T.H.I.

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T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

By N2 L.O.
at 1630 hrs on 18 Apr 41
HHH

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

ALLENS FORCE

11

FROM

GEPA (N2 AWP)

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

0 220

18

You	under	control	GEPA	0	Essential
HANK	clears	LARISSA	before	you	0
You	will	deny	to	enemy	NW
and	SE	line	through	rd	fork
A1A1	until	0300	hrs	19	Apr
U @ You	may	then	out	earlier	but
rd	in	LARISSA	reserved	for	HANK

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

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T.H.I.

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T.O.R.

78

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

②

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

0 220

until	0001	Ans	19	Apr	①
One	sqn	MILK	now	on	very
to	assist	you	withdrawal	①	Under
you	coms	until	you	also	LARISSA
when	it	reverts	to	MILK	①
you	subsequent	withdrawal	covered	by	MILK
①	Route	after	LARISSA	to	VOLOS

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

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T.O.R.

19/1

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

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THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

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T.H.I.

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T.O.R.

80

WEJE (v/v Bw)

18/4/41

81

advise
Arty & HAK

You to commence to
with draw to rearward
position when you
consider desirable. ^{Finagley} Break
contact just after dark.

HAZA holding astride
road area 200 contour
& Station T44 (1/250,000)

Move through HAZA
to high ground in rear
on right to astride road
& flat to a flat bushy
Knoll in foothills.

Position is to be held until
0300 unless otherwise advised

Commander meet you
at Red Roof ^{Station} house on road behind
HAZA - HH Hammer Map.

82

Notes of Orders issued to
ALLIED FORCE for the
withdrawal at PENEIOS GORGE.
Orders were issued separately &
verbally

HH Hammer

Major.
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

Allens Force Withdrawal Order

83/18/4/101

GENERAL ALLENS FORCE withdraws to VOHOS area on LARISSA-VOHOS Rd
thence to ~~the area of VOHOS~~ ATAHANDI.

1. (a) HAZA withdraws to high ground in rear
in the area T4348 ^{well} & protect withdrawal
of Main Body ALLENS FORCE

12

(b) B Coy will occupy the area T4348

(c) all remaining elements of HAZA to be
collected by C.O. HAZA & given a defensive
area to cover the withdrawal of Main Body.

(d) Carriers of all units collected by C.O.
HAZA + sited on left flank of area
T4348 across to River.

(e) C Coy HAZA to come under command
NEJE.

(f) Time to move - verbal order given.

2. (a) ILER transport to arrive today to pick
up ILER.

(b) ILER breaks contacts & route marches to
transport moving through NEJE.

(c) Time to move - already retreating
C.O. to reorganise & move in orderly
withdrawal to transport.

3. (a) NEJE will hold enemy advance & endeavour
to see N.Z. Bn through - then withdraw
to transport area through HAZA & NZ
Div Cav Sqn

(b) Carriers of command to be withdrawn
before completely involved to the line
T3951 - T4550. to hold until withdrawal
of all Allens Force.

④ (a) N.2. Arty will remain present location taking up an A/Tk Role. + to stem advance of enemy along road + to left flank

(b) If + when situation becomes serious + before completely involved will withdraw some guns to the Phase 2 area of N.2. Div Cav Squ. on an A/T Role.

(c) Remaining guns to move to Vohos area

(d) Guns with NZ Cav Squ to move with Cav Squ.

⑤ (a) N.2. Div Cav Squ

Phase 1 Occupy a line across main road forward of track crossing main road T3848 - T4448.

Phase 2 withdraw to line T3951 - T4550. Hold this line until withdrawal of all ALLAN FORCE.

Phase 3 on withdrawal of all ALLAN FORCE HAZA withdraws followed by Carriers on left of rear line followed by NZ Div Cav Squ.

(b) mine to move at each phase in rear of ALLAN FORCE

⑥ (a) A/T Guns to withdraw as per the phases set out in Para 5 for NZ Div Cav Squ.

(b) mine to move move with NZ Div Cav Squ.

⑦ (a) AMBULANCE (a) Move on receipt of order to area T4243 thence move with Main Body to area Vohos or beyond

(b) - one Mobile Sec move on receipt of this order to Rd + track Junctn T3939. MELIA. T5327.

(c) Remainder to Village ~~WARRATS~~ ~~T5371~~ to collect wounded ~~thence~~ along LARISSA-Vohos Route.

10. Special Note: Route + destination
now as follows:-

Destination ref map ATHENS 1/1000,000
ATHLANTE Square C 11

Route: Present location - LARISSA -
VEHESTIYON (via LARISSA - VOLOS Rd) - AHMIROS -
PTELEO - LAMA - MOLOS - KNEMIS - ATHANTE.

11. C.O's to ^{to force Gunn under} ~~attend~~ ^{report} conference at T4343
on right road of the forked road junction
on arrival in first rearward position.

8. Force HQ ~~BRANCH~~ (a) Present location until order to move to new
 Junction of Road, Railway + Tracks
 43939 thence HARISSA - VOHOS Rd
 between NEJE and HAZA reopening
 at Vohos.

(c) Further H.Q. locations to be notified.

9. Admin (a) weapons, ammun + tools to be
 loaded on vehicles wherever possible.

10. Special Note: ATALANDI.

General Patterson

By the above parties

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

12A

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO	GEPA rptd BELT		
FROM	OROT (16 Aust Inf Bde)	Originator's Number. I 31	Date 18
			In Reply to Number

posn	acute	⊙	have	been	forward
to	withdraw	⊙	now	holding	posn
in	line	451 551	to	pt	125
425505					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

Howell capt

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

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T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

86

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

Copy

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

OUT

N Z Div rptd 6 Aust Div

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

GEPA rptd BELT

FROM

OROT (16 Aust Inf Bde)

Originator's Number

I 31

Date

18

In Reply to Number

position	acute	(.)	have	been	forced
to	withdraw	(.)	now	holding	position
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425505					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

D.J. Lovell Capt

SIGNED

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SIGNED

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

In Cipher
Immediate

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TIME OF ORIGIN

2000

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

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13 88

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/2 AUST. INF. BN. AT PENIOS GORGE.

1. The following is a brief summary of the events preceding the operations at PENIOS.

(a)

On 11 Apr. 41 two rifle Coys and part of H.Q. Coy commenced the withdrawal from VERRIA pass to take up a position on the right of 4 N.Z. Bde at SERVIA. Bn. H.Q. and the remainder of the Bn withdrew early the following evening and marched over the mountains continuously until approximately 1500 hrs on 13 Apr. The new positions were reached by the rearmost tps about midnight on the night 14/15 Apr. 41

(b)

The next day (15 Apr) was spent in the occupation of the new position, which covered a wide front in very mountainous country. About dusk an L.O. arrived from 16 Bde with orders to move out and assemble in the Southern end of the SERVIA pass, and that our position was to be handed over to 2/3 Bn. The area was left at about 0200 hrs. and the assembly area reached at about 1000 hrs. where an M.T. convoy was waiting to move the tps.

(c)

I immediately reported to the Bde Comd and received from him orders to move to ZARKOS area and there to take up a defensive position. I was informed that the Bn tpt and Carrier Pl. had already been sent to ZARKOS.

(d)

On returning to the embussing area I was met by an L.O. from 6 Div. who informed me that the Bn was under comd of Corps and then gave orders for the Bn to proceed to PENIOS area. I was instructed to report at once to Corps H.Q.

(e)

As a result of the difficult conditions at VERRIA pass and the subsequent forced marches and lack of sleep, all ranks were very tired at this stage, but otherwise in good spirits.

2. On receipt of the above instructions I went to Corps H.Q. at ELASSON where I saw Brig. ROWELL and the G-2 Col. ELLIOTT. I was informed

- (a) that 21 N.Z. Bn had been occupying a position on the coast near PLATAMON.
- (b) the 21 N.Z. Bn had been attacked by German forces, and that there had been no information back for some hours.
- (c) that the final signals received by wireless from 21 N.Z. Bn (which I was shown) were in the opinion of the B.G.S. of a disquieting nature, and he did not know if any of the Bn would be left.
- (d) that Brig CLOWES had been sent out that day to try to ascertain the position, but had not then returned.

3. Brig. ROWELL informed me that I would have the following troops under comd :-

- One Bty of an N.Z. Fd. Regt.
- One tp N.Z. A/Tk guns.
- Composite carrier Pl. from 5 and 11 Bns.
- Det. Tp carrying Coy A.A.S.G.
- Det. of a Fd. Amb.

A W/T tender was to be attached for intercommunication with Corps

4. My orders were to move to the ELATEA area S.W. of the PENIOS Gorge and to take such steps as I thought best to hold that approach for a possible period of three or four days. It was pointed out that it was impossible to give more explicit instructions

5. After seeing DAQMG regarding amm. and med. arrangements, I set off shortly after noon for PENIOS in a car lent by Corps. I met Brig. CLOWES near LARISSA. He told me he had contacted 21 N.Z. Bn. which was withdrawing along the Gorge. He was unable to say what action the N.Z. Comd. proposed taking and suggested that I endeavour to contact Lt-Col. MacKAY and agree on a course of action with him.

6. Meanwhile the convoy had become somewhat disorganised owing to congestion of traffic and bombing attacks. Some AASC vehicles also had difficulty in finding the road out of LARISSA. I left the Adj. on the road to halt and organise tps as they arrived and drove through LARISSA locating and directing tp carrying vehicles and carriers of 5 and 11 Bns.

7. I then went ahead to PENIOS area with the Carrier Pl. and located Lt. Col. MacKAY near TEMPE Village shortly before dusk. He told me that his Bn. (less one Pl.) was bivouaced in the village, the remaining Pl. being in position covering a road block about 3 miles down the gorge. He stated that his Bn. had been practically surrounded at the PLATAMON position, but had managed to fight their way clear and had not been persued. His casualties amounted to 35, and they had lost a lot of equipment including all signal gear. He had under his comd a tp of 25 pdr guns, which, however, were short of amm. Lt. Col. MacKAY further stated that his tps were feeling fatigued and the strain of recent fighting. As it was now dark it was agreed that I should meet him early next morning and mutually arrange for the defence of the position.

8. In the meantime the Bn under Maj. Cohen had bivouaced several miles S.W. of TEMPE and when I arrived back I found that the N.Z. Bty. of 25 pdrs and the N.Z. tp of A/Tk. guns had also arrived. I arranged for the comds to attend the conference with Lt.Col. MacKAY next morning. Later in the night the 2 i/c. arrived with the Bn. tpt, which had previously gone to ZANKOS.

9. In company with Lt.Col. MacKAY, Lt.Col. Parkinson (Comd. of the N.Z. Fd. Regt., a bty. of which was under my comd.) and the N.Z. A/Tk. Comd. I made a recon. of the S.W. portion of the Gorge as far as the main road block (517612). Other obstacles which had been prepared comprised :-

- (a) Railway tunnel near PLATAMON blocked.
- (b) Road crater N.E. of the road block above referred to.
- (c) Railway tunnel at 517615 blocked.
- (d) Railway bridge at TEMPE destroyed (This was also used as a vehicular crossing).

The question of Comd. arose and Lt.Col. MacKAY suggested that the entire force should be under his Comd. In view of my instructions from Corps, I refused. It was agreed that, as 21 N.Z. Bn. was already in the Gorge, it should be disposed as shown on the attached sketch, whilst 2/2 Bn. should occupy a position in depth at the entrance to the defile, with the additional role of protecting the left flank along PENIOS River, as I considered enemy action from GONNOS area probable. The 4 2-pdr. guns were disposed in defiladed positions along the defile in 21 N.Z. Bn's area, except for one gun commanding the southern exit from TEMPE.

Arty tasks included harassing fire on the road block at 517612 should the pl. be unable to maintain its position there. Arrangements were also made for O.P.'s. to enable observed shooting within 21 N.Z. Bn's position of a 25 pdr PENIOS River. In view of the attached, to the Bty. under my comd.

90

In addition I agreed to patrol forward down the Gorge and to endeavour to ascertain whether or not the crossing place at the N.E. exit had been seized by the enemy. I also arranged to piquet the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS and to patrol North of the River as soon as a means of crossing the river could be found.

I also arranged to run a line from my H.Q. to 21 N.Z. Bn. H.Q. also to lend that Bn. certain wire and signal gear.

10. After leaving Lt. Col. MacKay, I met my own Coy. Comds. and made a brief recce. with them. Except for "D" Coy., the dispositions then decided on are as shown on the attached sketch. In the meantime, the Bn. had been moved forward under Maj. Cohen and had taken up temporary positions. During the morning 3 Aust. A/Tk. 2 pdr. guns arrived and it was decided to dispose them in 2/2 Bn. area. Lt. Col. Parkinson supervised detailed dispositions of these guns.

11. At about 1300 hrs. on 17 Apr. Brig. Allen, Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde., arrived at my H.Q. and told me he had been appointed to Comd. the force at PENEIOS and that 2/3 Bn. was on its way to the area.

I briefly outlined the situation, explained the dispositions and took Brig. Allen forward to meet Lt. Col. MacKay. The latter pointed out the dispositions of his tps.

Brig. Allen approved of 2/2 Bn dispositions subject to moving "D" Coy further to the left, to the position now shown on the sketch map attached. He also emphasised the importance of the high ground to the East of EVANGELISMOS. Brig. Allen also outlined the proposed dispositions of 2/3 Bn. and said he would attach a Pl of 2/3 Bn. to me to help hold the gap along the river between my main position and "D" Coy.

12. Shortly after I had left Brig. Allen, about 1530-1600 hrs. Capt. King ("B" Coy.) reported that No. 11 Pl., which had been sent forward to patrol the lower portion of the Gorge (vide para 9) had made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of the road block, and that an enemy tank was at the obstacle. I telephoned this information to Bde. also to Lt. Col. MacKay and asked the latter to assist especially by the tps. he had placed on the right flank.

13. During the afternoon several reports were received from Coys. of movement of small bodies of men with animals on the high ground overlooking GONNOS.

Veroy signals were also fired on these hills on several occasions as enemy recce. planes flew overhead. 21 N.Z. Bn. also reported that their tps. in ANPELAKIA area had been fired on from the high ground on the East. "A" Coy. had already been ordered to send one Pl. to piquet the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS, "B" Coy. was later warned that it might be required also to send a Pl. to the same area. At that time "B" Coy. had one Pl. in action at the road block, and another Pl. reconnoitring the river by means of crossing.

14. Late in the afternoon of 17 Apr. Brig. Allen and Lt. Col. Parkinson visited my H.Q., Lt. Col. MacKay was also present. It was decided to move certain of the Aust. A/Tk. guns to positions further forward, and also to bring forward two 25 pdrs. in an A/Tk. role. An officer of 2/1 Fd. Coy having arrived, it was also decided to "crater" the road just forward of TEMPE Village, where it could be adequately covered by fire.

15. Between 2100 hrs. and 2200 hrs. I received reports from the Comd. and Pl. Sgt. of the patrol which had encountered the enemy at the road block. The forward elements of the Pl. had been pinned to the road in the floor of the Gorge by fire from a tank which had been brought along the Ry. line as far as the blocked tunnel. The remainder of the Pl. managed to get into positions on the southern slope of the Gorge. The enemy were engaged until dark when the patrol succeeded in getting away losing 3 killed and some wounded. The Pl.

of 21 N.Z. Bn had withdrawn from its position covering the road block when first fired on and no assistance was given by 21 N.Z. Bn., though defence of the block had been one of its tasks.

16. As stated above the N.Z. force had destroyed the railway and vehicular bridge at TEMPE. Eventually a small punt was discovered on "D" Coys front and a fighting patrol under the Comd. of Lieut. Colquhoun and was sent across the river during the late afternoon to ascertain whether or not GONNOS was occupied and generally whether enemy tps were present in the lower foothills across the river between GONNOS and TEMPE. The Comd. reported to me by telephone on his return about 0200 hrs. 18 Apr. He found enemy tps in GONNOS. Contact was made with several German patrols later. He also saw small bodies of tps, with pack tpt, moving towards ELBA. Certain uniform and equipment were taken for purposes of identification. A detachment of 3 men were left to guard the punt. These were attacked by a superior force but fought it off.
17. "C" and "A" Coys, were instructed to patrol our bank of the river continuously during the night and fire was exchanged with several small German parties on the opposite bank. It was then thought that these parties were attempting to cross or reconnoitring for crossing places.
18. Early in the morning 18 Apr. (about 0700 hrs.) German tps were reported to be advancing S.E. towards the river from the direction of GONNOS.
- An hour or so later it was reported that a force estimated at one Bn. was moving S.E. from GONNOS towards the river between TEMPE and "D" Coy's position.
- At the same time another force which Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy) estimated also as a Bn. was reported moving in a Westerly direction from GONNOS.
- The general lines of attack are shown on the attached sketch map.
19. Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy) reported that the above enemy movements presented good arty. targets. Lt. Col. Parkinson (whose H.Q. were alongside mine) told me his O.P.'s on "D" Coy's feature had not yet been established. He immediately sent across a wireless truck and F.O.O. and in the meantime Capt. Hendry directed the battery's fire by telephone, with considerable effect, but unfortunately the best targets had been lost by the delay.
20. On receiving Capt. Hendry's report that enemy tps were making for the river on his left, and out of range of his weapons, I sent 2/2 Bn. Carrier Pl. to intercept the attempted crossing and placed it under comd of "D" Coy. The Pl. succeeded in stopping the enemy. The Pl. Comd., Lieut. Love, was seriously wounded during this engagement and the Pl. had severaly other fatal casualties. It was found later however that enemy tps. had crossed the river and outflanked our position further still to the left.
21. During the morning "C" Coy, and the composite carrier Pl. (5 and 11 Bns), and Mortar Pl. succeeded in preventing any enemy crossing the river at the centre and the main enemy pressure seemed to be on the left of "D" Coy's position. A fighting patrol was sent out by "D" Coy. to find out if the village of PARAPOTAMOS was occupied. It returned shortly after midday and reported a sharp engagement with the enemy in and near the village.
22. I was concerned about the threat to my left flank especially as "D" Coy. Comd. had been unable to contact the Coy. of 2/3 Bn. to his rear. I discussed the situation with the Bde. Comd. and he arranged to ascertain the location of this Coy. and see that they were told the situation.

23. During the morning I had several telephone conversations with Lt. Col. Mackay. He agreed to his carrier Pl. being used to help fill the gap between my main position and "D" Coy., and asked me to take the Pl under my command, as he had no means of communication. This I did. Lt. Col. Mackay told me that the village (TEMPE) was being shelled by mortars and that he was engaging enemy on the opposite bank of the river. During all our conversations he never indicated that his position was at all serious or that he intended to withdraw.
24. Telephone communication with 21 N.Z. Bn. ceased about midday. No notification that they were closing down was given us. I was told shortly afterwards that this Bn had withdrawn. About the same time I received a report from "C" Coy that N.Z. tps had reported that tanks were in TEMPE. I instructed "C" Coy. to warn the N.Z. A/Tk. gun which was ^{sited} sighted in their area to cover the exit from the village. Shortly after this "C" Coy reported that the crew had gone, and had removed the breech block.
25. From now on many N.Z. tps commenced withdrawing in unformed bodies through our position, though most of the Bn apparently moved up into the hills to the East. Efforts were made by Lt. Col. Parkinson, Major Cohen and others to stop and collect these men, but most of them had no weapons or equipment. However, one complete Pl under Lieut. Southworth reported to me and was given a task supporting the centre of the position which it carried out in a very creditable manner during the remainder of the day.
26. From about 1500 hrs. enemy pressure along the river in the centre of the Bn position increased and tps succeeded in crossing the river near the bend West of EVANGELISMOS. They were held by L.A. and 3" mortar fire on the near bank and very heavy casualties were inflicted on them. During this period the forward Coys came under fairly heavy H.M.C. and mortar fire. A dive bombing attack was also carried out, apparently on tpt in rear of our position.
27. Towards 1600 hrs. Capt. Hendry (D. Coy) reported that enemy infiltration on his left flank had become serious. It was agreed that he should withdraw his Pl from the river bank and counter-attack with it in conjunction with 2/2 Bn Carrier Pl. Shortly afterwards the line to "D" Coy went and I was told by my sig. Officer that the position of the enemy now made it impossible for a line party to effect repairs. Some time later (between 1630 and 1700 hrs) firing ceased on "D" Coy's position, and I heard no further fire from them.
I had assumed, until my return from GREECE, that this Coy had been surrounded and unable to continue the fight. I now know however, that Capt. Hendry received orders from Bde. H.Q. through 2/3 Bn to withdraw along the ridge in co-operation with the Coy of 2/3 Bn on the same feature.
28. Between 1600 and 1630 hrs, Maj. General Freyberg spoke to me from Bde. H.Q. He wished to know the situation generally and the whereabouts of 21 N.Z. Bn., and whether he could get a message to the latter. I told him that this was impossible. This was the last communication I had with Bde during the battle; the line being apparently cut. I understand a line party went back from my sig. Centre.
29. Until the line to Bde. H.Q. went, I had been in the closest touch throughout the battle with the Brig. or B.M. During the afternoon I was informed that the Bde. Group was to withdraw at 0300 hrs. 19 Apr. but that it was hoped to get this time put forward. The B.M. also gave me an outline plan of how the withdrawal would probably be effected.

30. As far as I can remember, I received no directions from Brig Allen as to the status of the N.Z. Bty. which had been placed under my comd by Corps. In fact, Lt. Col. Parkinson maintained his H.Q. alongside mine, and I should like to say that I have nothing but praise for his conduct and co-operation. However, the arty. support in fact given was very disappointing. The following is a summary of arty action :-
- (a) Harrassing fire on the forward road block during night 17/18 Apr after the patrol from "B" Coy. had withdrawn. This was a map shoot and its effect is not known.
 - (b) Fire on enemy tps. moving out of GONNOS on morning of 18 Apr. (See para. 19). This was not as effective as it should have been, because O.P's. had not yet been established in "D" Coy's area; I am unaware of the reason. By the time controlled fire became possible, the enemy adopted more dispersed formations and did not present such favourable targets.
 - (c) Fire intended to cover the rearmost road block just forward of TEMPE. This fire in fact fell in "C" Coy's area, and was stopped by Lt.Col. Parkinson. It was not resumed.
 - (d) During the early afternoon Capt Hendry ("D" Coy.) informed me that the F.O.C.s were about to leave his area. I believe there were two O.P's. Lt. Col Parkinson was with me at the time and he ordered them specifically to remain. However, Capt. Hendry reported shortly afterwards that they had gone.
 - (e) During the early part of the afternoon it was reported that some of the guns had moved out. This was not in accordance with Lt.Col. Parkinson's orders. When the attack across the river developed in the afternoon effective arty. fire could not be developed for this reason and because of the absence of O.P's. However, Lt.Col. Parkinson sent for a wireless truck and an O.P. was established close to Bn. H.Q. Both Maj. Cohen and I pointed out the task we wished carried out, but the fire of the remaining guns could not be got on to the target and finally ceased altogether. Lt. Col. Parkinson appeared very distressed at this stage and told me he had sent back a senior officer "to give the gunners 10 minutes drill to pull them together."
31. At this stage "B" Coy and Bn.H.Q. area were under constant fire from H.M.G's. on the feature previously occupied by "D" Coy. and from across the river. These areas also came under Mortar fire. Enemy were observed mounting what was thought to be a mountain gun on hill which had been occupied by "D" Coy.
32. About 1700 hrs. "C" Coy. reported that some tanks had entered its locality; also that enemy snipers and men armed with "Tommy Guns" had worked around on the high ground on the right front south of the river previously held by 21 N.Z. Bn., and were causing difficulty as the Coy. was now under fire on three sides. I had previously ordered the withdrawal back to their respective Coys. of the Pls. from "A" and "B" Coys. covering the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS as their reports indicated no enemy in that area. I gave instructions for Lieut Loftus ("A" Coy) to be intercepted on his way back and for him to endeavour to relieve this pressure above "C" Coy. Lieut Loftus is missing and I do not know if he received these instructions.
33. At about this time (1700)hrs) the line to "C" and "A" Coy went. Linesmen attempted to restore the line but had not succeeded by the time these forward Coys. had withdrawn.

34. Initially the tanks in "C" Coy. area engaged our posts with H.C. and 2 pdr. fire for approximately half an hour, but with very little effect. The infantry fired on the tanks with S.A. fire and A/Tk. rifles but without apparent effect. The absence of Molotov Cocktails or bombs of the S.T. type was felt. After half an hour infantry advanced with the support of the tanks and H.M.C's. and mortars across the river. Certain of the tanks, followed by infantry, swung right between the road and the river. The position was then that "C" Coy. was being attacked from the front and both flanks. They had already been forced to abandon prepared localities in the case of two Pls. and take up new positions by reason of the withdrawal of 21 N.Z. Bn.

Capt. Buckley was unable to communicate with me and decided shortly after 1730 hrs. to withdraw his Coy easterly on to the high ground. The withdrawal appears to have been well organised and carried out. In the light of all facts now known to me Capt. Buckley's decision was justified. Casualties in his Coy. included two Pl. Comds. Lieuts. Lovett and Holroyd, neither of whom could be evacuated. Capt. Buckley sent a runner to inform me of his withdrawal but owing to the distance and the route he had to follow the message did not arrive until approximately 1830 hrs.

35. From about 1500 hrs. onwards, the two pls. of "A" Coy. were in action against German tps. who had succeeded in crossing the river. The action of these Pls. in co-operation with 3" mortars and fire from carrier pls. held the enemy close to the river.

At about 1730 hrs. this Coy also came under rifle fire from the higher ground to its right rear.

At approximately 1755 hrs. two tanks came in along the road from the right flank. One was knocked out by a 2 pdr. gun, the other was hit and withdrew. A few minutes later a tank attacked, closely followed by infantry developed between the road and the river. There were about 10 tanks engaged. The Coy. locality was also under heavy fire from H.M.C's and Mortars across the river.

As previously stated, line communication with Bn. H.Q. had gone. Capt. Caldwell states that he was forced to withdraw his Pls. to the high ground East and, in the circumstances, I consider his action justified. He sent a runner to advise me of his action. One of the two Pl. comds was seriously wounded.

36. Tanks had now fanned out on the flat ground West of EVANGELISMOS and engaged carriers and their personnel forcing them to retire along the LARISSA Road. I was informed that several carriers were knocked out. Some tanks approached EVANGELISMOS along the road and were engaged by a 25 pdr. gun sited near the road opposite Bn. H.Q. At least one tank was knocked out by this gun which continued firing until its ammunition limber was destroyed by a tank shell. The crew then withdrew through Bn. H.Q. carrying the breech block with them. This left only one 2 pdr. gun sited in a defiladed position about 75 yds. from Bn. H.Q. At about 1830 hrs. or perhaps several minutes later, runners arrived almost simultaneously from "C" and "A" Coys. reporting their withdrawal.

37. Shortly afterwards I looked back at the abovementioned 2 pdr. gun and found it had gone. No orders for its withdrawal were given and it had not been in action. A few minutes previously I had told the Comd. I expected him to stay and he left me to join his detachment. I cannot remember this officer's name.

The position now was that "C", "A" and "D" Coys' localities had gone, and there were no remaining A/Tk. defences. A number of tanks were approaching with infantry from the North and across the flat on the N.W. Enemy tps. could also be seen to the left rear on the foothills S.W. across the flat. My remaining tps comprised "B" Coy. and certain H.Q. Coy personnel organised for defence in Bn. H.Q. area.

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I discussed the situation with O.C. "B" Coy. I was of the opinion that although this Coy. would probably continue the fight against enemy infantry for a short time, it would shortly be entirely surrounded by infantry as well as tanks. Furthermore, it would not prevent or delay enemy infantry passing rearwards via the flat ~~to~~ to the West. I therefore ordered Capt. King and other personnel at rear of Bn. H.Q. to withdraw at approx. 1845 hrs.

My orders to "B" Coy were to withdraw into the hills to the East, the reasons being that the flat area to the West and South was already covered by H.M.C. fire, and tanks which were already in "B" Coy area and moving across the flat, would inevitably destroy any tps attempting to withdraw along the road.

The withdrawal of "B" Coy. was carried out in an orderly fashion, covered by a rear party under Capt. Brock.

38. Bn. H.Q. was finally evacuated about 5-10 minutes after "B" Coy. had been ordered to withdraw. At this stage two tanks had penetrated around and behind Bn. H.Q. in a S.W. direction and inflicted a number of casualties at very close range.

39. Bde. H.Q. were not notified of the withdrawal of the forward Coys. I only became aware of their withdrawal several minutes before ordering the withdrawal of "B" Coy. and Bn. H.Q. The only means of communication left was by runner and I do not think a runner would have had much chance of getting to Bde. H.Q. I am now aware that a L.C. from Bde. H.Q. attempted to get to my H.Q. about this time in a Bren Carrier but was forced to turn back.

40. The type of tank operating against us appeared to be of the All or A IV type, carrying M.C. and cannon. Capt. Buckley of "C" Coy. reports that 6 of these tanks were in his Coy locality for about half an hour preceding the main attack. When the attack developed he states there were more tanks but cannot state the number. Capt. Caldwell of "A" Coy. states that 10 tanks attacked his position. He later counted between 20 and 30 tanks.

Estimates of up to 50 tanks in the later stage have been made. Capt. Caldwell was in a position to see and his figures can be regarded as a reliable minimum.

41. It is difficult to estimate the total casualties during the action. During the later stages it became impossible to evacuate from forward tps. Four officers were wounded. Two were very seriously wounded, another was unable to move and was captured. A fifth officer is missing and is considered to have been killed. Lieut. McPherson of 2/3 Bn. (who was attached) was also badly wounded.

Until the main attack developed at about 1500 hrs. on 18 Apr. casualties are estimated at approximately 10 killed and 30 wounded. After that hour it became impossible to evacuate casualties from forward positions. It is impossible to state casualties during this later stage with any accuracy, but total casualties during the action are estimated at about 80 and 100.

42. In my opinion the following points are worthy of comment :-

- (a) The necessity for R/T communication within the Bn. as an alternative means.
- (b) The great value of the 3" Mortar and the desirability of a greatly increased establishment.
- (c) The value of the Bren Carrier pl. as a mobile reserve in this type of action.

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The plan of withdrawal for the Bn during night 18/19 Apr. depended upon the retirement to the M.T. Coy which, during the day, had been dispersed in rear of 2/3 Bn. As already pointed out, any retirement in this direction became impossible.

Owing to the rugged nature of the country, any control of Coys. or intercommunication, became impossible after the withdrawal Eastwards commenced. Each Coy. cmd. independently came to the conclusion that the only course open was to attempt to get to the coast, and either then make along the coast with a view to rejoining the British Forces at LAMIA or secure boats.

(Sgd) F.O. Chilton Lt. Col.
Cmd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

4 July. 41.

COPY OF MESSAGE SENT TO 2 COY 2/3 BN
(PASSED ON TO O.C. D. COY 2/2 BN)

W 2

To HAZA C
from HAZA

97

HAZA B is now withdrawing (.) you will withdraw
forthwith but will coordinate your withdrawal
with coy of 3 bn nearest to you (.) use own tpt
move with 2 bn (.) regret no other instructions

(sgd) E.S. Walker Lieut

1545

19 Jul. 41.

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REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/3 AUST INF BN
AT PENEIOS GORGE - REF. MAP LARISSA 1/100,000

1. 2/3 Aust Inf Bn having moved from VERROIA to SERVIA was then ordered by 16 Aust Inf Bde to proceed by road to SYN THOMAI T2334 (Ref. Map LARISSA 1-100,000) during the night 16/17 Apr. 41. The Bn arrived at SYN THOMAI in the early morning of 17 Apr 41 and I was met by the Bde Comd who issued further orders.

2. I was told that Bde HQ and my Bn had been ordered to join the 2/2 Bn and 21 N.Z. Bn in the PENEIOS GORGE area. The Bde Comd instructed me to move 2/3 Bn (less one Coy) to that area and to take up a defensive position astride the LARISSA-TEMPE Road in the area MAKRYKHORION-MAKRYKHORI. I was to join the Bde Comd in that area as soon as I got my Bn under way and receive further orders when the Comd had clarified the position at PENEIOS GORGE.

The Bde Comd stated that 1 Anzac Corps were concerned about the right flank South of PENEIOS GORGE and the road running South-West from SYKOURION and West from AGYIA and the routes leading into these towns from the North and East. I was instructed to send one Coy (A) with two Secs Carriers to patrol these towns and roads.

Later in the morning of 17 Apr I joined the Bde Comd and was told that the enemy were North of the PENEIOS River, the 21 N.Z. Bn had withdrawn to the TEMPE Village area and the 2/2 Bn was holding a defensive position in the EVANGELISMOS area. Information was given that the 4 N.Z. Fd. Regt. (less one Bty), one Tp of 18 pdrs and two troops of A/Tk Guns were attached to the Bde Group.

3. Orders were then given by Brig. A.S. Allen for 2/3 Bn to dispose as follows :-

- (a) One Coy (C) to take up a position on the high ground to the North of MAKRYKHORI to overlook PARAPOTAMOS and the PENEIOS River. This Coy was to contact D Coy of the 2/2 Bn which had moved to the same area with a similar task and to come under comd of D Coy 2/2 Bn.
- (b) One Coy (B) on the high ground just North of Bde H.Q. in square 4552 with a reserve role.
- (c) The remaining Coy (D) less one Pl, one of which had become detached on the move through LARISSA, and Bn HQ to take up a reserve position astride the road in square 4250 and 4350.
- (d) One Pl of B Coy was sent forward to report to 2/2 Bn for patrol duties.

The occupation of these positions was completed on the late afternoon of the 17 Apr 41.

No information of the time for which the positions had to be held was available at this stage, the Bde Comd stating that he was awaiting further information and orders but thought it might possibly be a few days.

There was no wire or A/Tk mines available. Communication to Coys was by runner owing to the lack of line communication.

4. I then kept in close contact with Bde HQ and was informed that there had been some enemy patrol activity along the PENEIOS

River during the night 17/18 Apr 41. During the morning of the 18 Apr 41, it was apparent that the enemy were making a determined effort to cross the river on the left of 2/2 Bn and on the extreme left flank as far around as the village of PARA POTAMOS. 99

I was instructed to keep my reserve Coy mobile in case it was necessary to assist the two Coys from 2/2 and 2/3 Bns on the left.

At about midday on 18 Apr I was present at Bde HQ when a telephone message from 21 N.Z. Bn stated that enemy tanks had broken through the village of TEMPE and that the Bn was withdrawing into the hills. 2/2 Bn was informed and Bde efforts to contact the N.Z. Bn by line again were fruitless.

5. About mid-afternoon a L.O. from 6 Aust Div arrived at Bde HQ with information that the probable time of withdrawal of the Bde would be about dusk that day and that further orders would be given by N.Z. Div.

6. A tentative plan had been drawn up by Bde HQ for the withdrawal. Later in the afternoon, after a visit by a N.Z. L.O. and Maj.Gen. Freyberg when the time given for the position to be held was 0300 hrs on 19 Apr, I was instructed to establish a rearward position astride the road from the high ground, including Trig. 214, square 4351 to Trig. 125 in square 4150.

One Sqn N.Z. Div. Cav which had joined the Bde late in the afternoon to assist the withdrawal was holding the gap between the 2/2 Bn and my reserve position, astride the road and railway in square 4452.

The rearward position was established to assist the withdrawal of 2/2 Bn who were to move in reserve South astride the road to area Trig 292, square 4346.

7. Reports had been received that the two Coys on the left flank (MAKRYKHORI) were in contact and I was instructed to inform both Coys that they were to withdraw to the rearward position at dusk. This was about 1430 hrs. on the 18 Apr. I contacted the Coy Comd myself and told him to pass the instruction on to the Coy of 2/2 Bn.

I was also ordered to send my reserve Coy (D) to the left flank them and to cover their left flank in the withdrawal. However, just as the trucks were ready to move the third heavy enemy bombing attack took place and three of the vehicles were set on fire and several casualties occurred. Several L.M.G's and A/Tk Rifles being destroyed.

At about 1730 hrs. or a little later, the two left Coys appeared in the Bde HQ area stating that they had been surrounded and were forced to withdraw. They were sent immediately to the rearward position.

8. Information had been received by Bde HQ that N.Z. Arty and Carriers were seen withdrawing South down the road and the Bde Comd instructed me to stop all movement Southwards and to place all such parties in position on the rearward position. This was done, with some difficulty in a few cases and I twice had to draw my Revolver to force N.Z. Guns into position.

9. At about 1800 hrs. on 18 Apr. Bde HQ shifted from its location and Brig Allen joined me on the rearward line and discussed the disposition with me. The dispositions now were :-

- (a) B Coy 2/3 Bn (McGregor) on right.
- (b) C Coy 2/3 Bn (Murchison) centre.
- (c) D Coy 2/2 Bn (Hendry) on left.

- (d) Two or three N.Z. 25 pdrs in A/Tk role.
- (e) Carriers covering the right and left flanks.
- (f) H.Q. and D. Coy (less two Pls) in reserve.
- (g) N.Z. Cav Sqn as a protecting screen in front but which a little later withdrew to the reserve area.

An officer was posted to collect any 2/2 Bn parties and to send them back to the reserve position selected for the 2/2 Bn. As far as I knew none returned through the rearward position.

In the distance tanks could be seen South of EVANGELISMOS area and enemy movement in the MAKRYKHORI area.

At this stage about 20 bombers which had been seen to bomb LARISSA proceeded towards our area and having located the rearward position, machine gunned it for 20/30 minutes. The troops fought back vigorously but it had given the tanks and infantry the opportunity to cover the intervening ground under cover of the fire from the planes and very quickly after we were in contact with the enemy.

10.

At about 2100 hrs the Carriers were seen to pull out from the flanks and move to the rear. The N.Z. Arty also withdrew and later I found that C Coy 2/3 Bn and D Coy 2/2 Bn had withdrawn without orders from me, being forced out by tanks which had penetrated the position on the left flank.

From the reports I have received there were at least five enemy tanks penetrated the position. The tanks were closely followed by infantry and prior to the assault we were subjected, to what appeared to be heavy mortar fire - the mortars probably being brought up under cover of the air attack.

With an officer from Bde HQ I halted them about 1500 yds in rear of the forward position and took up another stand. B. Coy 2/3 Bn (McGregor) had remained in position and I then ordered him to withdraw to the second rearward position.

There was a considerable amount of M.T. parked in the rearward area including a large number of N.Z. Troop Carrying Vehicles which suddenly appeared to panic and rushed Southwards along the road to the ford in square 4246. Here a N.Z. 25 pdr was jammed in the ford halting all the traffic for some considerable time although some vehicles had already passed through.

When the ford was eventually cleared the time was approx. 0030 hrs. 19 Apr.

11.

After the second position had been established I received reports that the tanks had followed up and were again amongst the troops in the second rearward position. The Bde. Comd had previously discussed with me that if the occasion arose a final stand could be made behind the swamp and I therefore ordered a further withdrawal to this position.

However, this was almost impossible as there was a complete jamb on the ford. The force withdrew Southwards a short distance remaining North of the Swamp and I received reports that the enemy had NOT followed them up. Later when the ford was cleared I ordered the force to mount the vehicles and move to ATALANTA as previously instructed. The rear elements of the force cleared the road junction in square 4141 at approx. 0400 hrs on 19 Apr 41.

I contacted Bde H.Q. again at the ford where they were endeavouring to clear the M.T. over the ford.

Earlier I had instructed A Coy 2/3 Bn (Capt. Parbury) to withdraw his two Pls in the SYKOURION and AGYIA area to the road jamb in square 4141 and these Pls joined the column as it moved through.

In the early hours of the morning of the 19 Apr tracer bullets and flares were seen apparently on the road in the direction of LARISSA and later when approaching the road and railway crossing in square 3839 this fire could still be seen and I received several reports that the road was held by the enemy and several vehicles had been halted.

I therefore decided it would be better to divert all vehicles possible along the tracks leading East from the road and make the VOLOS Road by that means. I informed the Ede Comd who was further back in the column and the force moved via these tracks, eventually joining the VOLOS Road about daybreak although in the meantime it had split into several parties.

By this time the convey was very mixed and I waited at the road junction in square 4141 until the last vehicle had passed. This would be approximately 0400 hrs on 19 Apr.

13. As far as I know the casualties from this action were 1 killed, 18 wounded and 67 missing.

SECRET.

Headquarters,
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

10 July, 41.

REPORT BY H.Q. 16 AUST. INF. BDE. ON
OPERATIONS 16 AUST. INF. BDE. AT PENEIOS GORGE.

These remarks are submitted to amplify reports by 2/2 and 2/3 Bns and should be read in conjunction with reports from these units.

1. In addition to orders received by 2/2 Bn direct from 1 Aust. Corps, Brig. A.S. Allen, Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde on arrival at the PENEIOS GORGE area on 17 Apr. 41 made the following arrangements:-

- (a) 2/2 Bn dispositions, in general, to stand.
 - (b) One Pl 2/3 Bn to thicken up center.
 - (c) One Coy (C) of 2/3 Bn to come under command of D Coy, 2/2 Bn on the extreme left flank (MAKRYKHORI).
 - (d) One Pl 2/3 Bn to assist 2/2 Bn in patrol work on night 17/18 Apr 41 .
 - (e) Arrangements to patrol enemy and our side of PENEIOS River on night 17/18 Apr.
 - (f) N.Z. Arty, one Tp A/Tk. Guns and 2/5, 2/11 Composite Pl Carriers which were under command of 2/2 Bn on order of 1 Aust Corps to remain under command 2/2 Bn.
 - (g) i; Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde was unable to give any definite time to hold the position. Only information available indicated probable time to be two or three days.
- ii. Later, information on 18 Apr from L.O. 6 Aust Div indicated that the time of withdrawal may be about dusk on 18 Apr 41.
- iii Further information to Bde H.Q. by N.Z. L.O. and Maj. Gen. Freyberg at about 1700 hrs 18 Apr instructed the Bde to deny the area until 0300 hrs on 19 Apr 41 until N.Z. and Aust Bdes had withdrawn through LARISSA.

This time to deny the area was telephoned to C.O. 2/2 Bn immediately on receipt of the order.

2. (a) From information received the 2/2 Bn held its position until about 1900 hrs on 18 Apr 41.

This was in spite of a complete withdrawal of the 21 N.Z. Bn which was holding the GORGE area forward of the village of TEMPE. An excited telephone message from the C.O. 21 N.Z. Bn at about midday on the 18 Apr stated that the "Tanks are through the village (TEMPE) and we are withdrawing to the hills". No further communication could be established with H.Q. 21 N.Z. Bn.

(b) Preliminary arrangements had been made earlier in the day for the withdrawal of the 2/2 Bn to a rearward position, covered by the 2/3 Bn, astride the road and

railway at Trig 292 (square 4346). The time to withdraw notified when further information was received by Bde H.Q. After advising the 2/2 Bn that the position was to be held until 0300 hrs 19 Apr, line communications to 2/2 Bn were severed and despite efforts by Bde linesmen, who did not return from this duty, communications were not re-established.

- (c) Confirmation of the withdrawal plan and a verbal order for 2/2 Bn to thin out and break contact at dark was sent from Bde H.Q. by 2/2 Bn L.O. who travelled in a Carrier at about 1730 hrs.

At about 1900 hrs the 2/2 Bn L.O. returned and reported that he was unable to get through to the 2/2 Bn with the order. Fwd N.Z. Arty told him that enemy tanks had surrounded 2/2 Bn H.Q. and the L.O. thought he could see parties of the Bn withdrawing into the hills. He was unable to get his Carrier across the intervening ground to contact Bn H.Q.

- (d) Lieut. Hill-Griffiths was then ordered to take a Carrier Sec to the BALFI (square 4649) to endeavour to contact 2/2 Bn but reported at dark that he was unable to locate any members of the Bn.

3. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report para 39.
4. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report paras 37 and 38.
5. (a) This is answered in 2/2 Bn report paras 38 and 40.
(b) All reports clearly indicate that enemy tanks penetrated the 2/2 Bn position and continued on to attack the rearward position being held by the 2/3 Bn.
6. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report para 37.
7. (a) 2/2 Bn informed Bde H.Q. that line communication with D Coy on the extreme left flank had ceased and it was arranged for Bde to be responsible for the control of this Coy.
(b) The C.O. 2/3 Bn was instructed to inform his C Coy, with a message to be passed on to D Coy, 2/2 Bn to withdraw from the left flank (MAKRYKHORI) at about dusk.

However, these Coys withdrew at about 1700 hrs on 18 Apr, Capt Porter, S i/c D Coy 2/2 Bn, stating that the Coy had been surrounded and hard pressed and were forced to withdraw. These Coys were sent on immediately to C.O. 2/3 Bn to take up a position in the rearward area.

8. This is answered in 2/2 Bn report para 41.
9. This is answered in 2/3 Bn report paras 1-3.
10. The time given to C.O. 2/3 Bn to deny the position was 0300 hrs 19 Apr 41. The line to be denied was given by L.O. N.Z. Div at about 1700 hrs on 18 Apr 41 as a N.W. and S.E. line through road junction in square 4141.

Defensive positions were taken up forward of this line and the position was denied until 0300 hrs on 19 Apr 41.

The C.O. 2/3 Bn in his report shows that the rear elements of the force crossed the road junction in square 4141 at 0400 hrs on 19 Apr 41.

11. The two left Coys, D Coy 2/2 Bn and C Coy 2/3 Bn withdrew from the first rearward area without orders from C.O.

2/3 Bn who was in command of the rearward position, having been forced out by enemy tanks and infantry. This attack followed an enemy aircraft machine gun attack by approximately 20 planes and heavy concentration of mortar fire. Carriers and Arty also withdrew without orders but the C.O. 2/3 Bn halted them and established a second rearward position about 1500 yds in rear.

B Coy 2/3 Bn was then ordered to withdraw to the second position on orders by C.O. 2/3 Bn.

12. This is answered in 2/3 Bn report paras 10, 11.
13. See para 11 above and 2/3 Bn report para 10.
14. (a) The order that the position was to be denied until 0300 hrs on 19 Apr 41 was conveyed to C.O. 2/3 Bn at approximately 1700 hrs 18 Apr.
(b) Bde H.Q. was in very close contact with the forward area in the first rearward position and immediately on withdrawal of the two left Coys and the Carriers at about 2100 hrs, the C.O. 2/3 Bn informed the Bde Comd, and an officer from Bde H.Q. was sent to assist Lt.Col. Lamb to halt the withdrawal and establish the second rearward line.
(c) Bde H.Q. then moved to the ford (square 4246) where a N.Z. 25 Pdr was bogged in the ford and assisted in clearing the obstacle. Many A.S.C. vehicles, mostly those sent to pick up the 21 N.Z. Bn who were not there to use them, made for the ford and caused a general state of confusion of vehicles. This took some time to clear.
(d) In the meantime C.O. 2/3 Bn informed Bde H.Q. that enemy tanks had attacked the second rearward position and he had ordered a further withdrawal to south of the marshy country, (square 4245) via the ford. This was in accordance with a general plan of withdrawal arranged by the Bde Comd with C.O. 2/3 Bn if he considered it necessary.
(e) The confusion of vehicles was such that the further withdrawal of the force was almost impossible.
Several guns successively plunged into the side of the ford, mainly through lack of control, and completely blocked it and some difficulty was experienced in clearing the H.I. traffic.
(f) During this phase the C.O. 2/3 Bn reported that the rear-guard had withdrawn but were still north of the ford and that the enemy in the darkness had not followed them up. This would be approximately 0030 hrs on 19 Apr;
(g) The final withdrawal from this position was then arranged by the Bde Comd with C.O. 2/3 Bn, the rear elements crossing the road junction (square 4141) at about 0400 hrs 19 Apr.
15. This is answered in 2/3 Bn report para 13.
16. (a) The N.Z. Arty and A/Tk guns had been placed under command of 2/2 Bn by 1 Aust Corps. A further TP of Aust A/Tk guns arrived on 17 Apr and were placed under command of 2/2 Bn by Brig. A.S. Allen. The N.Z. A/Tk guns coming under command of 21 N.Z. Bn.
Brig. A.S. Allen also arranged for the N.Z. Pdr Arty to remain under command of 2/2 Bn.
(b) C.O. 2/3 Bn took control of some guns that had withdrawn

from the forward area without orders and placed them in an A/Tk role on the first rearward position. Bde H.Q. had received information that several guns had pulled out and ordered C.O. 2/3 Bn to take charge of them.

- (c) Details of Arty support given are as shown in 2/2 Bn report - para 30.

The remarks on the failure of the N.Z. Arty are supported by the fact that it was necessary for the Bde Comd to inform the C.O. N.Z. Arty that his guns were withdrawing without orders and that he was expected to stand and fight.

Phase 7

SERIALS 14-18

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

Phase 7

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

14

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

BELT

6 Aust Div

ape

FROM

OROT

16 Aust Inf Bde

Originator's Number

01

Date

22

In Reply to Number

NEJE

already

moved

area

APOSTOLIAS

Y23

night

21/22

apr

o

In

view

of

order

NOT

to

move

will

they

remain

until

further

ordered

or

return

to

OROT

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

0830

SIGNED

A.H. Hammer Capt

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

107

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

No. of Groups.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

GR.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

OROT Rein HQ (contd)

ape

15

FROM

OROT 16 Bde

Originator's Number

03

Date

23

In Reply to Number

One	man	left	in	charge	vehicles
with	knowledge	of	area	number	of
vehicles	and	their	locations	is	the
will	then	proceed	on	24	aprs
with	OROT	order	140	party	is

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

108

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.

GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

16

TO

TATTA

19 Inst Lt Bde

are

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM

OROT

16 Bde

Originator's Number

04

Date

23

In Reply to Number

Regret	unable	to	supply	you	with
space	transport	of	wood	just	received
that	many	of	our	men	are
straggling	back	along	coast	road	of
we	therefore	are	sending	all	our
space	in	hope	of	pickings	them
up					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1245

SIGNED

H. Hammer

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

109

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
Forms C2128/13.	Wt. 36169/1798.	1,000M. pads. 12	/39. B.& S. Ltd.	51-5537.							

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

No. of Groups.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

GR.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

OROT Gen HQ

ape

17

FROM

OROT.

16 Bde

Originator's Number

05

Date

23

In Reply to Number

War mail boxes	Diary should	Records be	official taken	papers in	and office
records	if	at	NOT all	destroy possible	valuable
appoint box	someone	responsible	for	carrying	each
but	do	keep	to	a	minimum
		NOT	be	too	ruthless

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

A.H. Hammer

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

SIGNED

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1720

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

W/11

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

1. List of Majors to 6 Aust Div
fit to command.

2. Security still apply - protect area
Palestine - lost before - frequent
hit inspect twice weekly anybody
short to be suitably dealt with.

MESSAGE FORM

Phase 7

S E C R E T

19 Apr, 41.

18
111

NOTES FOR GOC 6 AUST DIV

Action Taken on Occupation of THERMOPYLAE LINE by Elements
6 Aust Div.

1. Inf.

19 Bde getting into posn to cover the entrances to PASS with 2/4 Bn on LEFT, 2/1 Bn occupying an area embracing the loop in the road, and 2/5 Bn on the RIGHT. 2/5 Bn has NOT yet arrived in posn. 2/8 Bn is in support and occupying the feature in rear of 2/1 Bn. It is proposed that 2/11 Bn should go into Bde res on the feature closing the entrances to the valley in the vicinity of the ry tunnel. There will thus be three Bns fwd and one in res.

The approaches exist up towards HILL 1399 and these should be covered when the 17 Bde comes in, or possibly when the NZ dispositions are known. For the present, one Coy of MGs has been placed under comd 19 Bde, and it has been suggested that comd 19 Bde close these approaches with one Pl of MGs on each. The remainder of the Coy to be disposed in the area of the Bde res on penetration tasks up the ry valley.

2. Arty.

2/2 Fd Regt will be in posn tonight to support 19 Bde and have been disposed in the general area of Bde res.

A Tks.

CRA has the matter in hand, and is assessing their fire power and conferring with comd 19 Bde as to their most suitable employment.

3. RAE

Elements of both 2/1 and 2/2 Fd Coys are in the area but 2/1 Fd Coy is NOT yet available as it is still being employed on demolition tasks. Offrs have been sent fwd to contact comds 17 and 19 Bdes with a view to ascertaining their immediate requirements. CRE knows the Fd Coys' dispersal area.

~~Signature~~

Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

112

Phase 8

11

SERIALS 19-21

Ref Maps: ATHENS 1/250,000

19

INFORMATION -

1. Own tps - ANZAC CORPS is continuing its withdrawal Southwards and the RM and RAF are co-operating in the withdrawal.

The withdrawal will be covered by a NZ Bde and attached Aust tps occupying a def posn astride the rd THIVE - ELEPSIS three miles South of KREIKOUKI (E 07).

2. Enemy - There has been NO contact on the BRAILOS front except for a few instances of long-range artillery shelling.

INTENTION -

3. 6 Aust Div will withdraw Southwards.

METHOD -

4. The withdrawal from present locations will be carried out in three phases:

5. Phase 1. The withdrawal of certain units to the covering posn mentioned in sub-para 1.

The following units will proceed independently by RT on 22 Apr to RV one mile SOUTH of KREIKOUKI and come under command Comd 4 NZ Inf as on arrival.

- 2/5 Fd Regt, RAA 6 Aust Div
- F Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
- 41 LAD
- 3 Bty 1 A Tk Regt RAA 6 Aust Div
- 2/8 Fd Coy RAE
- D Coy 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
- 2/1 Fd Amb

3:14

6. Recce parties of above units will report to rep NZ Bde at RV mentioned in sub-para 5 by 1600 hrs 22 Apr 41.

7. Route - rd LANIA - ISVADEIA - THIVE - KREIKOUKI.

8. Time - All ~~units~~ units enumerated in sub-para 5 to be clear of rd junc (V 6014) by 2330 hrs 22 Apr.

9. Phase 2 -

Withdrawal during the night 23/24 Apr 41, of units enumerated below, from present locations to posns to the South.

(a) ALLEN GP - Comd: Brig A.S. ALLEN CBE, DSO. Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde.

- Tps: H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde
- J Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
- 45 LAD
- 2/2 Aust Bn
- 2/3 Aust Bn
- HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde
- K Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
- 46 LAD
- 8/5 Aust Bn
- 2/5 Aust Bn
- 2/7 Aust Bn
- G Coy plus 3 Pl 2/1 Aust (MG) Bn
- 2/1 Fd Regt RAA 6 Aust Div (less one bty)
- and (less det under comd 19 Aust Inf Bde)
- H Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div

Amb
Det with
PROT. - See Co. amb
RAF Stores

Major Edgar
Select areas suitable
for blocks of so many vehicles
+ blocks for so many groups
of men.

Dark 40 Vfm 10 mth
Light 10 Vfm 20 mth

2/2 Fd Coy RAE
2/2 Fd Amb

(b) Div Tps Gp: Comd : Lt-Col G.E.LUCAS MC. GRE 6 Aust Div.

Tps: HQ 6 Aust Div
Int Sec 6 Aust Div
B Sec FSS
6 Aust Div Imp Pl
6 Aust Div Postal Unit
6 Aust Div Salvage Unit
Det 1 Aust Gd Bn
Det 6 Aust Pro Coy
HQ RAA 6 Aust Div
HQ RAE 6 Aust Div
HQ AASC 6 Aust Div
HQ Sigs 6 Aust Div
HQ and No.1 Coy
HQ Nos 2 and 3 Coys
42 LAD
HQ and A Coy (less one pl) 2/1 Aust(MG)Bn
2/8 Aust Bn (less det with 19 Aust Inf Bde)
Dismounted personnel of 1 A Tk Regt
RAA 6 Aust Div.

- 10. Route - both gps rd LANIA - LEYADEIA - THIVE - KREIKOUKI - ELEFSIS (E 25) - MEGARA (E 04)
- 11. SP - as determined by Gp Comds.
- 12. Times - Comd ALLEN Gp will determine Start Time after conferring with Comd VASEY Gp but NO movement of vehs of ALLEN Gp will take place EAST of rd junc Y5125 before 0200 hrs 24 Apr 41. Head of Div Tps Gp will NOT pass rd junc Y 6014 before 0901 hrs 24
- 13. Tpt - Personnel will move in 1st LT supplemented by troop- (Apr. carrying vehs made available under arrangements made by 6 Aust Div.

All additional troop-carrying MT is moving into the fwd area during the night 22/23 Apr 41 and on arrival will come under command Gp Comds and Comd Div Tps Gp.

The MT will be disposed as follows on arrival:-
Div Tps Gp (for dismounted personnel of 1 A Tk Regt)
MAVRONERI (Y 50)
16 Aust Inf Bde - present location AMAKLIA area.
19 Aust Inf Bde - 2/5 and 2/7 Bns in vicinity Y 2835
Bde HQ and 2/6 Bn in vicinity Y3233

- 14. (c) 2/2 Fd Pk Coy RAE will move under orders GRE 6 Aust Div 23 Apr 41. Route and destination as for other gps of Phase 2.
- 15. Phase 3 - Withdrawal 19 Aust Inf Bde and att tps from present location to destination night 24/25 Apr 41.
VASEY Gp - Comd - Brig G.A. VASEY, CBE. DSO.
Comd 19 Aust Inf Bde.
Tps - HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde
I Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
79 LAD
2/1 Aust Bn
2/4 Aust Bn
Two Coys 2/3 Bn
2/11 Aust Bn
2/2 Fd Regt RAA 6 Aust Div
4 Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
40 LAD
Det one bty 2/1 Fd Regt RAA 6 Aust Div.

HQ 1 A Tr Regt AAA 6 Aust Div (less three
 btys)
 H Sec Sign 6 Aust Div
 44 LAD
 2/1 Pd Coy RAE
 2/2 Pd Amb
 80 LAD
 Det 6 Aust Pro Coy

- 16. Route - rd LAMIA - LEVADONIA - ELINFSIS - KORINTHOS (D 64) - ARGOS (D 41).
- 17. Time - Gp will clear rd June Y 6014 by 0030 hrs 25 Apr.
- 18. Tpt - Personnel will move by 1st LP supplemented by troop-carrying vehs made available by 6 Aust Div. All additional WF is moving into the fwd area during night 23/25 Apr 41 and comes under command Comd VASBY Gp from the time of arrival. RV as determined later.
- 19. Parachute protection -
 - (a) Units are responsible for their own concealment areas.
 - (b) 1 Armd Bde has been made responsible for the THIVE area.
- 20. AA fire - Gps and units will make clear to all tps that after leaving defensive posns and moving to concealed areas AA fire will NOT be opened unless the aircraft are actually attacking them.
- 21. Demolitions - Within its own area each Bde will be responsible for as complete demolitions as can be made. Comds 16 and 17 Aust Inf Bdes will obtain approval from HQ 6 Aust Div before authorising any demolition. In default of orders to blow the Engr offr or OR in charge of each demolition will fire the charge if it is in IMMEDIATE danger of falling into enemy hands intact.

*Policy
 Lookouts*

ADM

- 22. Arms and Equipment - The kit of ORs will be limited to Marching Order and whatever else may be conveniently carried therein. In the case of offr, if it is desired, such articles as may be carried in a small suitcase or kit bag may also be taken.
- 23. Supplies - All ranks will carry three days' rations on the man.
- 24. Petrol - All vehs will commence the journey with full tanks and in addition the following will be carried :-
 - Lorries 30 cwt and over - three cases
 - Vans 1 ton and under - two cases
 - Cars - one case
 Oil in proportion will also be carried.
- 25. Meals - NO stops on the rd for meals.
- 26. Engrs. - Engrs will be spaced by secs throughout gps.
- 27. Tools - All vehs will carry picks and shovels which must be carried to concealment areas to dig slit trenches.
- 28. Clearance of Route - These orders provide for the MSA vehs of LADs to travel with the various Gps. They will move in the coln as detailed by Gp Comds and their main function will be to keep the route clear for movement. NO attempt will be made to repair a veh if the repair or adjustment is likely to take more than 5 minutes. All vehs which cannot be got moving within 5 minutes will be removed from the rd and disabled.

delete

Vehs will NOT be set on fire, if a fire does occur it must be extinguished at once.

- 29. Traffic Control - 6 Aust Div Pro Coy will be responsible for traffic control throughout the route. For this purpose Dets will be placed under orders of each of ALLEN and VASEY Gps. Separate instructions have been issued to DAFN. Pro Coy will arrange to mark with shielded lights all defiles and obstacles, lamps for this purpose will be drawn from Camp by OC Pro Coy.
- 30. Road Discipline - Attention is directed to 6 Aust Div Admin Instrn No.22 dated 20 Apr 41 which will strictly adhered to with the exceptions that:-
 - (a) Side lights only will be used.
 - (b) Density 40 vms during darkness.
 - (c) Speed 10 mph.

The decision as to whether vehs will halt when an air raid warning is given will rest with Gp Comds but if vehs do halt they will pull well to the right of the rd before they are abandoned.

- 31. Destruction of Stores - Owing to the nature of the withdrawal it is essential that only the minimum number of vehs be employed in the move and that these vehs be used only for the transport of personnel and essential arms,ammunition, equipment etc as enumerated above.

All guns, carriers, non-essentials, vehs including water carts will be destroyed under unit arrangements, but the destruction by burning or explosion of these items of equipment is NOT to be resorted to. Maximum deception must be attempted and vehs and guns left in their present locations.

The breech blocks of guns will be removed and taken to the destination. Gun amm will NOT be destroyed.

Destruction will be delayed as long as possible but it is essential that everything left behind is rendered unserviceable.

All tents will be left standing in their present locations.

INTERCOMM.

- 32. HQ 6 Aust Div closes present location 1900 hrs 23 Apr 41. Sigs 6 Aust Div will arrange for one 109 set. (accompanied by all a vailable MORs) to listen for calls from 19 Aust Inf Bde and if any are received to draw out of the coln and accept any message offered.

ACK.

Time of signature 2030 Hrs.

A. D. Marshall
 Colonel,
 G.S. 6 Aust Div.

Method of Issue: Sigs

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No.

16 Aust Inf Bde	1	DABOS	16
17 Aust Inf Bde	2	SOME	17
19 Aust Inf Bde	3	DAFM	18
RAA 6 Aust Div	4 - 5	Postal	19
RAE 6 Aust Div	6	2/1 Aust (MG) Bn	20
Sigs 6 Aust Div	7	2/3 Aust Inf Bn	21
AABC	8	ANZAC Corps	22
COG	9	NZ Div	23
G	10 - 11	4 NZ Bde	24
AQ	12 - 15	War Diary	25-26
DAAG	14	File	27-28
ADMS	15		

Phase 8SECRET

117

6 AUST DIV OP INSTN No. 5

Copy No:

23 Apr 41.

20

TO: ✓ OROT IRSE TAMO MAJA KUSI DACI Med DAPM Q

1. Ref 6 Aust Div OO No. 6, para 28, delete from "no attempt will be made" to end of para, and in para 1 alter location of covering posn from three miles SOUTH of KRIEKOUKI to one mile SOUTH of KRIEKOUKI.
2. All tps will be warned that the convoys will be dispersed at destination in concealment areas for lying up by day. Embarkation will then take place during the following night or nights, and the colns will be led to beaches by Embarkation Staff. Strict control of personnel whilst in the concealment areas is absolutely essential. Bathing is to be prohibited, as is any other unnecessary movement in or about the concealment areas.
3. Gun sights and all optical instruments, together with signal stores incl wireless sets, will be taken to destination.
4. The GOC transmits this personal message: "This is the time when all our training and control must be exerted to the full. Duty is duty and everyone on duty must be at his post. Units must be ready with self help to keep the withdrawal moving steadily and under control. Every officer must pull his weight, using all his initiative, energy and courage to carry out this movement in military order. Cool heads."

A. W. [Signature]
Colonel,
GS, 6 Aust Div.

H.H.H.
23 April

21

Ref Map: ATHENS 1/250.000

INFORMATION

1. (a) The enemy are in LAMIA and have made some contact on BRALLOS Front.
2. (a) ANZAC Corps is continuing its withdrawal Southwards and the R.N. and R.A.F. are co-operating.
(b) The withdrawal is being covered by a force astride the rd THIVE - ELEFSIS one mile South of KREIKOUKI (E07)
(c) D Armd Bde is responsible for parachute protection of THIVE Area.
(d) Q6 & 17 Aust Inf Bdes with attached Units will form the ALLEN GROUP.

INTENTION.

3. ALLEN Gp will withdraw Southwards.

METHOD

4. Composition of ALLEN Gp: Comdr. Brig A.S. ALLEN
H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde
J Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
45 L.A.D.
2/2 Aust Bn.
2/3 Aust Bn
H.Q. 17 Aust Inf Bde
K Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div
46 L.A.D.
2/5 Aust Bn
2/6 Aust Bn.
2/7 Aust Bn.
C Coy Plus 6 Pl 2/1 Aust M.G. Bn.
2/1 Fd Regt RAA 6 Aust Div (Less one bty) and Less det under comd 19 Aust Inf Bde)
E Sec Sigs 6 Aust Div.
43 L.A.D.
2/2 Fd Coy R.A.E.
2/2 Fd Amb.

MOVE

5. Withdrawal will commence on night 23/24 Apr 41. The head of ALLEN Gp will NOT pass Rd Junct Y 5123 before 0100 Hrs 24 Apr 41.

ROUTE

6. BRALLOS - LEVADEIA - THIVE - KREIKOUKI - ELEFSIS (E25) - MEGARA (E04)

S. P.

7. Rd Junct Y 5123

START TIME.

8. (a) 0100 Hrs 24 Apr 41.

119

Start Time Contd

(b) The head of 17 Aust Inf Bde will NOT cross the Start Point before 0130 Hrs. Contact will be made with the rear vehicle of the 16 Aust Inf Bde to prevent double banking on the move to Start Point.

9. ORDER OF MARCH.

2/3 Bn.
2/2 Bn.
Op. H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde / 1st Line H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde
- - - - -

2/2 Fd Amb
H.Q. 17 Aust Inf Bde
2/2 Fd Coy (Less dets)
2/1 Fd Regt
2/5 Bn
2/6 Bn
Bde Op H.Q.
2/7 Bn.

RECCE PARTY

10. Major C.V. Edgar -2/2 Bn. has proceeded with Unit representatives and guides to destination Point and will be responsible for allocation of vehicle and personnel dispersion areas.

11. SPARE VEHICLES

Spare vehicles will move at the rear of the Unit Columns to pick up stragglers. An Officer is to be in charge of spare vehicles to control lifting of personnel from immobilised vehicles.

DENSITY AND SPEED.

12. During the hours of darkness - 40 V.T.M. and 10 m.i.h. and as soon as visibility is sufficient changed to 10 v.t.m. and 20 m.i.h.. If possible the m.i.h. will be increased from the head of the column. In this case the V.T.M. will be maintained and the vehicles in rear will conform to the accelerated speed. A Rd Control Point will be dropped by the leading vehicle to indicate the change in density and speed.

PROTECTION AND CONTROL.

13. Units will appoint an Officer or N.C.O. to command each vehicle and he will be responsible for the march discipline and protection of vehicle and personnel. At destination point he will assume control of the vehicle personnel as a fighting Unit. All troops will be warned that the convoys will be dispersed at the destination in concealment areas for lying up by day. Embarkation will then take place during the following night or nights and the columns will be lead to beaches by EMBARKATION Staff. Strict control of personell whilst in the concealment areas is absolutely essential. Bathing is to be prohibited as is any other unnecessary movemnet in or about the concealment areas.

(b) A. Protection. It is left to the discretion of vehicle commanders to carry out any action that he considers necessary to protect vehicles and personnel against enemy aircraft and parachute attack.

120

13 (b) Contd

Vehicle Commanders are to be impressed that the move is to be carried on so that the column is NOT unnecessarily impeded.

(c) Supervising Officers for Blocks of 10 Vehicles are to be dispersed throughout the column to exercise control over vehicle commanders of the blocks of 10 vehicles.

(d) ~~ADD~~ ranks must be engendered with the spirit of SELF HELP to carry out this operation successfully.

LIAISON

14. Two L.Os from 17 Aust Inf Bde will report to 16 Aust Inf Bde H.Q. at 2130 Hrs on 23 Apr 41 to move with Commander ALLEN Gp.

MEDICAL

- 15. (a) One Motor Amb in rear of 2/3 Bn.
- (b) One Motor Amb in rear of 2/2 Fd Amb
- (c) One Motor Amb in rear of 2/5 Bn.
- (d) One Motor Amb in rear of 2/6 Bn.
- (e) One Motor Amb in rear of 2/7 Bn.
- (f) A medical Mobile Section in rear of Group Convoy.

ADMN

16. Administrative Instructions will be carried out as per 6 Aust Div O.O. No. 6 of 22 Apr 41. and 6 Aust Div Admn Instr 22 of 21 Apr 41, except where this order varies these instructions.

INTERCOMN?

17. 16 Aust Inf Bde H.Q. closes present location at 0045 Hrs on 24 Apr 41, thereafter at the head of column. On arrival at destination a report centre will be established on road at head of debussing point. Comdr of 17 Aust Inf Bde will report the arrival of his section of the Group. The head vehicle (H.Q. Vehicle) at the head of the column will be recognised by khaki cloth draped on the front and rear of the leading vehicle.

GREEKS

18 On no account are any orders to be accepted from GREEK Soldiers or civilians and Group H.Q. will be notified immediately of interference by GREEKS.

H.H. Hammer
.....Major.
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde
For ALLEN GROUP

DISTRIBUTION:-

- 1 Copy 16 Aust Inf Bde
- 2 Copies 17 Aust Inf Bde
- 1 Copy File
- 1 War Diary
- 1 6 Aust Div.

The GOC transmits this personal message: " This is the time when all our training and control must be exerted to the full. Duty is duty and every-one on duty must be at his post. Units must be ready with self help to keep the withdrawal moving steadily and under control. Every Officer must pull his weight, using all his initiative energy and courage to carry out this movement in military order. Cool heads. "

23 Apr 41.

17 Aust Inf Bde O. O. No. 7.

Ref Maps ATHENS 1/250,000

Information.

1. 6 Aust Div is being concentrated to undertake a new strategical role which will probably mean embarkation and a landing which necessitates moving as lightly equipped as possible.

The move will be covered by a N.Z. Bde and attached Aust tps occupying a def posn astride the rd THRIVE-ELEFSIS three miles south of KREIKOUKI (E.07).

2. Enemy. There has been no contact on the BRAILOS front except for a few instances of long range artillery shelling.

Intention.

3. The Bde Gp will move as part of ALLEN Gp to a new location on night 23/24 Apr.

Method.

4. The move will be in accordance with the attached timetable.

5. Tps will be carried on unit MT plus 21 3-ton trucks per Bn.

6. An officer or reliable NCO will be in comd of each truck which becomes the unit.

7. Bren guns with mountings fixed to meet air attack will be carried in each truck.

8. IMGs and A T. rifles with full establishment of mags loaded, also Thompson guns and amn will be carried by each sec.

9. First line amn will be carried by distributing two bandoliers per man and at least one box per vehicle.

10. Picks, shovels and axes will be issued to all vehicles and the whole establishment so distributed. On debussing each unit comd will see that tools are carried.

11. Two Pls 2/7 Bn on their left flank will come under comd 2/6 Bn for purposes of the move. 2/7 Bn to inform 2/6 Bn of their locations.

12. MG Pls under comd will remain with Bns and move with them. All Mk VIII Z amn will be carried.

13. It is imperative that fluidity of movement be maintained in order to reach the destination during the hours of darkness.

14. In event of delays caused by damaged vehicles or roads, the offr will take charge of his unit as a working party to clear the obstruction. THIS IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE. All vehicles which cannot be got moving within 5 minutes will be removed from the rd and disabled.

15. COs will impress on offrns and NCOs the great importance of taking comd in all circumstances and under any emergency.

16. Sidelights only will be used on vehicles. These will be extinguished in event of an air attack and at any halt.

17. The comd of each vehicle is responsible for dismounting two men at each and every halt to see that the driver is awake and that vehicles move on again with the convoy. Also in the event of a temporary stoppage to ensure that following vehicles are signalled on.

18. Other than as in para 17 there will be no overtaking within the convoy.

19. Windscreen glasses will be removed from all vehicles including troop carrying tpt provided.

20. In event of an air attack offrns and NCOs will take comd to prevent long dispersion of tps and to overcome delay in re-embussing. Not only does the success of our move depend on this and the clearing of rds, but the safety of the force remaining depends on this movement being completed according to schedule.

21. Comds will be responsible to meet land attack as well as air attack, particularly from parachutists, and tps will dig in immediately on arrival at their destination. At this location no movement whatsoever will be allowed during daylight.

22. Parachute protection :

(a) Units are responsible for their own concealment areas.

(b) 1 Arm'd Bde has been made responsible for the THRIVE area.

23. A.A. fire. Units will make clear to all tps that after leaving defensive positions and moving to concealed areas AA fire will NOT be opened unless the aircraft are actually attacking them.
24. Tps may be informed of the necessity for the maintenance of steadfastness.

Admin.

25. It is anticipated that one Recovery vehicle will be attached to each Bn.
26. It is of the utmost importance that tps be equipped as lightly as possible and to ensure this the following action will be taken.
- (a) All documents will be destroyed, but on NO ACCOUNT will anything be destroyed by fire.
- (b) All optical instruments will be carried.
- (c) Signal instruments only will be carried. The balance of their equipment will be destroyed.
27. Dress - Fighting order with greatcoats. Officers will take only that which they can carry.
28. Three days rations will be carried by all ranks and filled W.Bs. Further rations will be available at destination. NO stops on the rd for meals.
29. Any tents erected will be left standing.
30. Water tanks will be destroyed and all non-passenger carrying vehicles. If any have to be destroyed, the destruction will be effected at "B" echelon area and not in fwd areas. All vehicles that can be used for tp carrying will be taken.
31. Vehicles will NOT be set on fire, if a fire does occur it must be extinguished at once. Destruction will be delayed as long as possible, but it is essential that everything left behind is rendered unserviceable.
32. Traffic control. 6 Aust Div Provost Coy will be responsible for traffic control throughout the route.
33. Petrol. All vehicles will commence the journey with full tanks and in addition the following will be carried :
- Lorries 30 cwt and over - three cases.
Vans 1 ton and under - two cases.
Cars - one case.
- Oil in proportion will also be carried.
34. 2/2 Fd Amb is attaching one Motor Amb and one 30-cwt truck for walking wounded to each Bn. (Also one M.A. with Mobile Sec).
- Intercomm.
35. Bde Op HQ will close at present location and move in front of 2/7 Bn and behind 2/6 Bn.
36. 2/6 Bn will liaise with Arty for the passage to embussing point. An offr will report to Arty HQ when Bn is ready to move through the Arty lines and to effect the passage of the Bn with least possible interference with their fire plan.
37. 2/7 Bn is to advise this HQ when the leading vehicle is loaded, when Op HQ will close down.

Ack.

Method of issue LO & Sigs.
Signed at 14.40 hrs.

[Signature]
Major,
Bde Major, 17 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION :

Copy No. 1	2/5 Bn	Copy No. 9	S.C.	Copy No 17	Gd Pl Comd
2	2/6 Bn	10	I.O.	18	Coy 2/1 MG Bn
3	2/7 Bn	11	LO 1	19	6 Aust Div
4	2/1 Fd Regt	12	LO 2	20	16 Aust Inf Bde
5	2/2 Fd Coy	13	T.O.	21	19 " " "
6	2/2 Fd Amb	14	Sig O.	22	2/2 Fd Regt
7	Comd	15	Sup O.	23	File
8	B.M.	16	O.M.E.	24-26	War Diary
				27-30	Spares.

Leave food elements 9.30 am

Reserve sneak out after 1900 hrs

Left km, 9 ^{pm} ~~pm~~ food elements
* Thinning out after dark

Right food elements 9.30
then out after dark

Working on + Sept

23 124

SECRET

FORCE HQ OPERATION ORDER NO. 14.

Copy No. 19.....

23 Apr 41.

Ref Map G.S. 1 : 1,000,000.

INFORMATION

1. As given in Force "I" Summaries.
2. Force is now organised as:-

ANZAC Corps	}	Force Tps.
80 Base Sub-Area		
82 Base Sub-Area		
4 H		
3 R. Tanks		
NZ Reinforcement Bn		
Aust Reinforcement Bn		

INTENTION

3. British Troops in GREECE will withdraw from GREECE.

METHOD.

4. Covering posn will be occupied by one NZ Div on ridge South of ERYTHRAI.
5. Embarkation.
 - (a) Formations will withdraw to Collection Areas and thence be marshalled to Beaches, vide Appendix "A".
 - (b) Areas of location of Collection Areas and Beaches are shown at Tracing "A" and Appendix "C".
 - (c) Comds. of Collection Areas will establish guides at a suitable pt on the rd approach to their respective areas. This pt will be marked by a "tin" lantern. Exact locations are given at Appendix "C".
 - (d) Comds. of units and sub-units will report to Collection Area HQ on arrival.
6. Organisation of Collection Areas and Beach Parties:
 - (a) Staffs are detailed at Appendix "B".
 - (b) Functions of above staffs and general embarkation procedure is given at Appendix "E".
7. Responsibility for withdrawal orders.
 - (a) ANZAC Corps: will ensure withdrawal orders are issued to all units under Comd. and in support incl units of 1 and 2 Bde under Comd NZ Div and A.I. units in Corps area.

/(b)...

- (b) 80 Base Sub-Area: will ensure that (with exception of 4 H, 3 R. Tanks, NZ Reinforcement Bn and Aust Reinforcement Bn) all units, sub-units, dets, parties and stragglers in ATHENS area are cleared to collection areas by dawn 26 Apr 41 incl guards and sentries and individual offrs.
- (c) 82 Base Sub-Area: will ensure that all units, sub-units, dets and stragglers in the area, incl THALISS, are withdrawn to Collection area MEGARA by dawn 25 Apr 41, incl rd control, AA units and N.P. posts.
- (d) A.A.D.C.: will be responsible that AA units and dets do in fact withdraw, and will arrange maximum protection for ARGOS aerodrome during withdrawal period.
- (e) "I" Branch: C.S.O. will ensure all sign units are withdrawn as they become available.

8. Rd Movement.

- (a) Movement by rd will be at night. Sidelights will be used, to ensure maximum practical speed.
- (b) Breakdowns will be cast aside, and passengers transferred to other vehicles. Towing is forbidden.
- (c) Offrs on MCs will mingle in cols to assist in rd control.
- (d) As from 1500 hrs 24 Apr Formations leaving the front will be responsible for their own traffic control as services of 82 Base Sub-Area will be withdrawn on night 24/25 Apr 41.
- (e) Such movement as is inevitable by day will be made at 5 (five) V.T.M.

9. Force HQ Protection Sqdn: will be formed at DAPHNE Camp under 80 Base Sub-Area out of all remaining tanks of 1 Armd Bde, 4 H and 3 R.T.R. Its further movement will be ordered by Force HQ where it will maintain a liaison offr.

ADH.

- 10. (a) Destruction of Military Stores. see Appendix "D".
- (b) Explosions and burning (other than documents) will be avoided as far as possible.
- (c) Documents.

All documents will be destroyed by fire, except those concerning pay and accounts of ORs, which will be taken away.

/11....

11. Dress.

Greatcoats worn, full equipment (less pack) incl respirator. Hard rations may be carried in greatcoat pockets. No other articles whatsoever will be permitted in the lighter craft, and it will be a special duty of Beach parties to ensure this order is obeyed.

12. Further adm orders are being issued separately.

INTERCOMM.

13. (a) Force HQ. Force HQ (less Battle HQ) will be evacuated vide Appendix "A"

(b) Force Battle HQ Will remain until all tps are evacuated, and its further movements are uncertain. it will remain in W/T contact with EGYPT and CRETE.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Time of Signature.....
Method of Issue.....

R. W. Belchem Maj GS
Brigadier,
General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy Nos.

ANZAC Corps	1	-	30
80 Base Sub-Area	31	-	35
82 Base Sub-Area	36	-	45
O.C. 4 H			46
O.C. 3 R. Tanks			47
NZ Reinforcement Bn			48
Aust Reinforcement Bn			49
Cond. Collection Area	50	-	54
RAPHEIA			
PORTO RAFTI	55	-	59
MAGALA	60	-	64
THEODHOR	65	-	69
NAUPLION	70	-	74
Cond Beach Party "C"	75	-	79
"D"	80	-	84
"J"	85	-	89
"K"	90	-	94
"Q"	95	-	99
"T"	100	-	104
Full Branch Dist. Force HQ	105	-	139
Force Sigs	140	-	
Capt Tweedie for IDEAST	141	-	145
War Diary	146	-	147
File	148	-	149
Spare	150	-	155.

Serial No.	Unit.	Night 22/23	Night 23/24	Night 24/25	Night 25/26	Night 26/27	Approx Nos.	Remarks
1.	First NZ Bde Gp	Front covering Posn.	Covering Posn	Covering Posn	Move to THEODORA Collecting Area	Embark J Beach	4000	Tpt returned to ANZAC Corps on arrival at Covering Posn
2.	Second " " "	-	Front to Lie-Up +	"Lie-Up" Beaches C & D for embarkation			3000	1500 men to each Beach
3.	Third " " "	-		Front to "Lie-Up" +	Lie-Up to Beaches C & D for embarkation		6000	3000 to each Beach
4.	First Aust Bde Gp	-	Front Lie-Up+	Lie-Up Beach J for embarkation			4000	
5.	Second " " "	-	-	Front Lie-Up+	Lie-Up to Beach P for embarkation		4000	
6.	HQ ANZAC Corps	-	Front -MANDRA	MANDRA to Beach J for embarkation			5000	
7.	Base details (first party) and R.A.F.	Base -NAUPLION area (Rd and Rail)		Embarkation at Beach S	-	-		Move from Base as ordered by 80 B.S.A.
8.	Base details (second party) includes Yugo-Slavs and Force HQ (less Battle HQ)	-	Base to NAUPLION	Base -NAUPLION	-	Embarkation Beaches S&T	5000 S 2000 T	Move from Base as ordered by 80 B.S.A.
	4H				Location NAUPLION	Embarkation Beach S	500	

Serial No.	Unit	Night 22/23	Night 23/24	Night 24/25	Night 25/26	Night 26/27	Approx Nos.	Remarks
10.	3 R. Tanks	Covering Posn GLYPHADA 3	-	-	Location - NAUPLION	Embarkation Beach S	400	less Sqn for protection Force HQ
11.	NZ Reinforcement Unit				Base -NAUPLION	Embarkation Beach T	350	
12.	Aust " "				" "	Embarkation Beach S	350	
13.	82 Base Sub Area (1 Armd Bde)			Location Beach P	Embarkation Beach P		1200	
14.	Force Battle HQ				ATHENS - NAUPLION			
15.	Force HQ			ATHENS - NAUPLION				
16.	Dets 82 Base Sub Area		THEBES - ATHENS (Rail)	ATHENS - NAUPLION (Rail)		Embarkation Beach S	1200	

NOTES: (1) + Where Units are shown as proceeding to "Lie-Up" they will proceed to their respective Beach Collecting areas if possible, but will halt at dawn of rd lie up if this point has not been reached.
 (2) All arrangements for provision of the necessary lifting transport for ANZAC Corps will be made by HQ ANZAC Corps with the assistance of vehicles sent up by Force HQ.
 (3) All arrangements for provision of the necessary lifting transport for units other than RAF or ANZAC Corps will be made by 80 Base Sub Area.
 (4) Written orders will be sent to O i/c Collecting Area at each respective Beach stating whether the transport will be returned or destroyed in the collecting area under the orders of the O i/c Collecting Area.

Staffs for Collecting Areas & Beach Parties.1. Area RAPHENA - ("C" Beach)

(a) Collection Area.

Comd)	Detailed by ANZAC Corps.
Staff)	

(b) Beach Party ("C" Beach)	1500 of S econd NZ Bde Gp	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u> Apr 24/25
-----------------------------	------------------------------	-------------	--------------------------

Comd)	Detailed by ANZAC Corps.
Staff)	

(c) Units or Formations to Embark at this head

	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Date</u>
	1500 of Second NZ Bde Gp	Apr 24/25

	3000 of Third NZ Bde Gp	Apr 25/26
--	----------------------------	-----------

Collecting Area and Beach Staffs Embark with last Unit 25/26

2. Area PORTO RAFFI - ("D" Beach)

(a) Collecting Area

Comd)	Detailed by ANZAC Corps.
Staff)	

(b) Beach Party ("D" Beach)

Comd)	Detailed by ANZAC Corps.
Staff)	

(c)	<u>Units to Embark</u>	<u>Date</u>
	1500 of Second NZ Bde Gp	Apr 24/25
	3000 of Third NZ Bde Gp	Apr 25/26

Collecting Area and Beach Staffs embark with last units 25/26.

3. Area MAGARA ("P" Beach)

(a) Collecting Area

Comd	Lt-Col BARTER
Staff	Capt CLARKE
	Reps AUSCORPS
	Rep NZ Div

(b) Beach Party ("P" Beach)

Comd	Lt-Col MARNHAM
Staff	Major MACRAE
	Major SPENCE
	Capt MACGREGOR
	Rep AUSCORPS

(c) <u>Unit or Formation to embark</u>	<u>Date</u>
Second Aust Bde Gp	25/26
82 Base Sub Area (1 Armd Bde)	25/26

Collecting Area and Beach Staff embark with last Unit 25/26.

4. Area NAUPLION. ("S" & "T" Beaches)

(a) Collection Area

Comd) Lt-Col COURAGE
 Staff of HQ 66 Gp AMPC
 one Offr detailed by Q(M)

(b) Beach Party ("S" Beach)

Comd Major SEAGRIM
 Staff one Offr detailed by Q(M)
 three Offrs (A.I.L.Os)

(c) Beach Parties ("T" Beach)

Comd)
 Staff } To be detailed by ANZAC Corps

(d) <u>Units or Formations to Embark</u>		<u>Date</u>
Base Details (first party) RAF details	S	24/25
5000 Base Details (Second Party) (includes YUGO-SLAVS & Force HQ less Battle HQ)	S	26/27
4H	S	26/27
3 R.Tanks	S	26/27
Aust Reinforcement Unit	S	26/27
Dets 82 Base Sub Area	S	26/27
2000 Base Details	T	26/27
NZ Reinforcement Unit	T	26/27

Collecting Area and Beach parties embark with last parties on 26/27.

Positions of Collecting Areas and BeachesRef 1/500,000 MAP B.T.G.61.

Collecting Area -----	Beach -----	Collecting Area Guides will meet at-----
RAPHINA (West of at 5648)	C (6248)	Rd 5347
PORTO RAPHTI (West of at 5835)	D (6233)	Rd June 5535
MEGARA (SE of at 0649)	P (0647)	Rd 1050
THEODORA (NE of at 8647)	J (8544)	Rd 9047
NAUPLION (NE of at 5709)	{ S (5204) T (6000) }	Rd June 4712

Demolitions.

The policy as regards Demolitions will be as follows: -

(a) GENERAL.

- (i) Shell Installation PERAMA
 - (ii) Shell Standard & Socumbel (DRAPEDZONA)
 - (iii) Ristes Installations
 - (iv) Seaplane Base
 - (v) British Petrol Dump (SKARAMANGA)
- } To be Destroyed.
-
- (vi) No. 1 A.A.D.
 - (vii) " 2 A.A.D.
 - (viii) " 3 A.A.D.
 - (ix) " 4 A.A.D.
- } Only essentials need be destroyed.
-
- (x) Ordnance Depot MENIDI
 - (xi) Australian Ordnance Depot
- } Hand over to Greeks.
-
- (xii) British Petrol Dump KEPHISSIA Rd
 - (xiii) British Petrol Dump GLYPHADA
- } Destroy
-
- (xiv) No. 4 L of C Vehicle Park. (see para (d) below.
 - (xv) R.E. Store
 - (xvi) R.E. Wkshops
 - (xvii) R.A.S.C. Supplies
- } Hand over to Greeks.
-
- (xviii) W.T. Stations at LOUTSA
VAKISA
MARATHON Rd

NOTE: Items No. 5, 12, 13 can suitably be destroyed by rifle fire.

(b) ROAD.

On suitable localities in depth in forward areas by ANZAC Corps, and on road pass South of ERTHRAI by 4 NZ Bde, in greatest possible depth.

(c) RAIL.

Arty demolitions which will delay enemys advance or hinder his action will be blown. Rail demolitions for long term effect will NOT be undertaken.

(d) M.T.

A very large amount of M.T. will be arriving in new areas with tps. In the early moves some of this will be required for later stages and should not be destroyed. It will be the responsibility of rear Bdes to organize R.E. demolition squads in each area who will systematically destroy all M.T. dispersed in their area, by smashing the radiator and batteries and breaking the engine casing with a sledge hammer. All implements and tyres will also be rendered unserviceable. This work can be undertaken on responsibility of Bdes as soon as it is known that their M.T. will no longer be required.

(e) GUNS.

Will be rendered useless by removal of breach mechanism. All gun sights will be brought away.

(f) TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, WIRELESS etc.

All portable equipment of a technical nature will be removed. What cannot be removed will be destroyed.

(g) GENERAL.

The general policy will be that nothing useful in the way of military equipment shall be allowed to fall into the enemys' hands. NO fires will be lit and on no account whatever are POL to be destroyed by fire.

(h) The following bridge will be destroyed when our troops are forced to withdraw behind them and in any case on final withdrawal. Preparation demolitions will be arranged by Comdrs as follows: -

(i) KHALKIS - (preparation and execution order under 82 Base Sub Area arrangements.)

(ii) CORINTH - (preparation under CE, execution order of Offr of HQ British Forces in Greece)

(iii) Other bridges destruction of which would have suitable delaying effects on enemy advance.

(j) ANIMALS.

Horses will be shot. Mules will be handed to the Greeks.

DOCUMENTS.

All secret documents less war diaries will be destroyed by fire before they are in danger of falling into enemy hands.

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ADMINISTRATIVE.

1. (a) Supplies, P.O.L. and Amn and Water are to be dumped as tabulated as below under arrangements to be made by S.T. Force H.Q.

Place	Water	No. Rations	P.O.L. galls.	Amn. Boxes SAA	Date to be stocked.	Remarks
KHALKIS	Rely on local resources	12000 /	5000+	30 Boxes SAA	24/4	/ 3 dys for BdeGp +50 miles for BdeGp
MARKOP-LION	4000	24000 /	2000	30 Boxes SAA	23/4	/ 3 dys for 8000
MEGARA	4000	24000 /	1000	"	23/4	"
Pt 8 miles E. of CORINTH	4000	24000 /	2000	"	23/4	"
ARGOS	2000	90000 /	40000+	200 Boxes SAA	23/4	/ 6 dys for 15000 + 300 mile for 1200 vehicles

(b) The N.Z. Bde holding the ERYTHRAI covering position will draw from B.S.D. Race Course in its own transport. The maintenance of the remaining Inf Bde Gps in the line will continue as at present. If Aus Corps require more supplies to be sent up the necessary demand will be submitted to S.T. Force H.Q. It is hoped that no further supplies will be needed between now and 24th April when these Bdes will be within reach of supplies as specified in sub-para (a) above.

(c) Transport. 50 lorries have been released from the Force H.Q. Pool and are proceeding to H.Q. Aus Corps tonight in compliance with their request for additional transport.

Medical

2. Medical resources under control of D.M.S. Force H.Q. are being allotted for use during the withdrawal and evacuation :-

Location	Beach	Unit	Date to be ready	Remarks
RAPHENA	C	Sec Fd AmbP with Amb Car attached	24/4	Pto be supplemented by Bde Gp on arrival
PORTO RAFTI	D	Fd Amb less two Secs with Amb Car attd	24/4	"
LAVRION	E	Sec Fd AmbP with Amb Car attd	24/4	"
MEGARA	F	Sec Fd AmbP with Amb Car attd	23/4	"
8 miles E. of CORINTH	J & K	Fd Amb less 2 Secs with Amb car attd	23/4	"
ARGOS	U T S & R	Sec Fd AmbP to be followed by C.C.S. when available. Two Amb Cars to be attached.		"
ATHENS		26 Gen Hospital 5 Aus Gen Hosp. ...A.C.=		=to form a pool of amb cars to be controlled by 26 Gen Hosp and cars to be sent to relieve those sent in with casualties from outside.

(b) Serious casualties unfit to travel will be evacuated to 26 Gen Hospital and 5 Aus Gen Hosp in ATHENS area as long as the road is open. Casualties which cannot be removed after the evacuation will remain in the Dressing Stations of Fd Ambs or C.C.S. to be taken over by the enemy, in accordance with the terms of the Geneva convention.

TO BE ISSUED TO COMDRS OF TPS ONLY.

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ENEMY EFFECT ON WITHDRAWAL PLAN
.....

1. The enemy may press the withdrawal so strongly as seriously to affect the plan. He may attack strongly and prevent the fwd tps from disengaging, or he may land a few troops by air in front of or behind our forward troops.
2. If at any time troops find their line of withdrawal cut off they may by bold action be able to break through. If not they should take to the hills where they are for the time being more secure and should make their way to the coast in order to be picked up by H.M. Ships or by Caiques.
3. A service of Caiques has been organized on both sides of the mainland (EUBOEA and PETO PONNELE) and in the Gulf of CORINTH. They have orders to watch for signals from tps on shore and to be off till night fall and then come in and take them off. A liberal reward has been promised to the Captain of any C aique who saves a member of the forces and lands him in CRETE or delivers him to one of H.M. Ships.
4. It must be remembered that we are amongst a friendly population who will do all in their power to help and that the enemy's difficulties in rounding up tps who may be out off are very great indeed. With sound planning, care and bold action, much can be done to outwit him and to reach the Coast in safety.
5. The morale of some troops has been affected by recent enemy attacks. The C ommander attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of morale. Cases have recently occurred where transport drivers refused to return from base areas whither they had brought troops. The G.S.C. directs that strong disciplinary action be taken against offenders.

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25

BEACH ORGANISATION FOR EVACUATION.

1. Attached diagrams (Appx A1 and A2) show specimen layouts of the organisation for the evacuation. It must be realised that these are only diagrams and that the actual geographical layout must in each case be decided on the spot.
2. Troops for evacuation are collected in a Collecting Area. This Area requires an Area Staff whose responsibilities are to receive, disperse, administer control and despatch the forces to be evacuated.
3. The troops are despatched from the Collecting Area to the Assembly Area on demand from the Military Landing Officer working in conjunction with the Navy Officer in charge who is the Beach Master:
4. The Assembly Area is a reservoir for the Point of Embarkation on the beach.
The Assembly Area is maintained to capacity during the period of embarkation by the order of the Principal Military Landing Officer on the beach addressed to the Collecting Area Cadr
When the lighters or Landing Craft are about to arrive at the beach, the beach master will request the M.L.O. to bring forward from the Assembly Area a specified number of troops.
5. Traffic control is provided by the beach organisation under the direction of the Principal Military Landing Officer.
6. The Assembly Area including the beaches is under the control of a Staff, for which special provision has to be made.

The composition of the Staff for each beach is:-

- | | |
|--------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1 P.M.L.O. | Lt-Colonel. |
| 4 M.L.O's | Majors or Captains if possible. |
| 10 M.C.O's | To assist M.L.O's |
| 6 M.P's | |
| 4 Despatch Riders. | |

cycles.

As many as possible of the above should be mounted on motor

7. Each collecting area may serve as many as three beaches and as many as two Assembly Areas may be required for each beach.
8. A Field Ambulance is required for each Collecting Area. An M.D.S. is established in the Collecting Area. An A.D.S. with ambulance and stretcher parties is established in the Assembly Area. An R.A.P. is established in proximity to the beach if this is necessary in addition to the A.D.S.
9. Notes on the responsibilities of the various officers concerned are attached. In addition the following general points must be emphasised.
 - (a) It is vital to the success of the operation that men should be moved from Assembly Areas to beaches only as and when called for by the Beach Master. No one must move from Assembly Area to Beach until ordered to do so.
 - (b) Fullest use must be made of cover by day.
 - (c) Vehicles must not be driven closer to beaches than the area selected for vehicle destruction.

- (a) Collecting area to
- (b) Assembly area to
- (c) Point of Embarkation on Beach.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF OFFICERS OF BEACH ORGANISATION.Responsibilities of Officer Commanding Collecting Area.

The O.C. Collecting area is responsible:-

- (i) for reception of units and formations sent to his area.
- (ii) for directing through his area to other collecting areas units and formations destined for those other areas. (This will happen only where a coast road runs through a collecting area).
- (iii) for selection of a point for M.T. destruction and for ensuring that M.T. is destroyed.
- (iv) for sending forward to Assembly Areas sufficient personnel to keep these areas full.
- (v) for the selection of a Regulating Point and the marking of routes from Collecting Area to Assembly Areas.
- (vi) for ensuring that the orders of the Beach Commander regarding A.A. and ground protection are known to troops and carried out.

Responsibilities of M.L.O. i/c Embarkation Area.

M.L.O. i/c Embarkation Area is responsible:-

- (i) for the handling of all troops from the time of their arrival at the Control Point, until embarked by the M.O. i/c Beach.
- (ii) that troops are allotted to Assembly Areas at Control Point.
- (iii) for the selection of Control Point and Assembly Areas, if not already chosen by higher authorities and pointed out to M.L.O. The latter should afford as much cover as possible, and be within reasonable distance from the beach so that troops can be readily called forward as required.
- (iv) for the selection of routes between the Control Point and Assembly Areas, and between the Assembly Area and the Beach. Routes to be easily identified and suitably marked for night and day use.
- (v) That the Officer i/c Control Point carries out his duties properly, and that the necessary signs are maintained by night and day at this Point;

/(vi) ...

- (vi) That the Officer i/c Assembly Area distributes the troops in accordance with his instructions; that this area is not overcrowded, and that sufficient troops are immediately available in the area as required by the N.O. i/c on the Beach.
- (vii) That the Military Officer i/c on the Beach carries out his duties properly, maintaining sufficient troops at the embarking points as required by the N.O. i/c, and that embarking points are suitably marked for night or day use, as required by the N.O. i/c.
- (viii) That, should an M.L.C. at an adjacent beach be able to embark more men than he has available; sufficient men should be handed over to him to maintain a steady flow from all beaches.
- (ix) That, on the Rear Guard Commander taking over control, the Officers and O.A.'s under his charge are embarked as early as possible.
- (x) That the orders of the local Commander regarding A.A. and ground protection are known to troops and carried out.

Responsibilities of Officer i/c Assembly Area.

Officer i/c Assembly Area is responsible:-

- (i) to carry out instructions as given by the M.L.C. i/c Embarkation Area.
- (ii) To see that no more than the required number of troops are present in the Assembly Area at any one time. Other troops should be held between the Control Point and the Assembly Area in covered positions previously selected.
- (iii) To see that troops are suitably distributed in the Assembly Area.
- (iv) To send forward troops for embarkation as required by the O. i/c Beach, taking care that no troops go forward without orders.

Responsibilities of Officer i/c Control Point.

- (i) To carry out instructions as given by the M.L.C.
- (ii) To maintain suitable signs by night and day to guide troops to their correct Assembly Areas.
- (iii) To allocate troops to Assembly Areas at Control Point.
- (iv) To take charge of Military Police at Control Point.

/Responsibilities of O. i/c Beach ..

~~5~~
140


Responsibilities of Officer i/c Beach.

- (i) To carry out instructions as given by the M.L.O.
 - (ii) To work in close conjunction with the N.O. i/c Beach, and to ensure that troops are called forward from the Assembly Area as required by him.
 - (iii) To see that the troops embark in an orderly manner and that the instructions of the N.O. i/c as to the numbers to embark in each boat are adhered to.
 - (iv) To see that all arms and equipment as ordered are taken on board.
 - (v) To ensure that each embarkation point is suitably marked for day or night use.
-

Appendix "A1" to GP/1 dated 21 April 1941.

DIAGRAM OF BEACH ORGANISATION.


141



Division of
Responsibility between
Beach Organisation
(PMLO) and Collecting
Area.

5
142
—

DIAGRAM OF SPECIMEN BEACH ORGANISATION.



MESSAGE FORM

Serial No. 4

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN Recd 1130 hrs
OUT HHH

No. of Groups. GR. 26

OFFICE DATE STAMP
YF
24 APR 41

DR-P

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO KUSI MATA DACI OROT IRSE UPDS SNUG MED DAPM CAMP
TINY HERO FLEX

FROM	Originator's Number	Date	In Reply to Number
<u>BELT</u>	<u>Q 57</u>	<u>24</u>	
<u>Please advise strength by units for</u>	<u>embarkation</u>	<u>and</u>	<u>to be informed</u>
<u>and</u>	<u>VASEY</u>	<u>groups</u>	<u>shown</u>
<u>to</u>	<u>be</u>	<u>shown</u>	<u>separately</u>
<u>inform</u>			

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

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Signed

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY
Immediaty

TIME OF ORIGIN
0700
T.H.I. 0949

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.
1/32

16 Aust Inf Bde (for ALLEN GP).

144
27

Administrative Notes.

ELEFSIS

Present Location

0930 24 Apr 41
hrs.

1. Rations. units to draw up to 7 days Rations at ATHENS Racecourse, in addition to rations already carried by the man.
2. P.O.L units to replenish petrol supplies & to double reserves previously held i.e.
30 cart + over - 6 cases.
one ton - 4 "
15 cart + cars - 2 "
oil to be carried in proportion to above.
3. Vehicle + Personnel Strengths. (a) 17 Aust Inf Bde will submit strengths of personnel + vehicles of unit attached to its section of the GROUP. to ALLEN GP HQ by 1400 hrs 24/4/41
(b) 16 Aust Inf Bde units to submit strengths to Bde HQ. by 1200 hrs.
4. Vehicle Maintenance Maintenance to vehicles must be carried out with as little movement as possible. It is essential that vehicles are serviced to be able to carry out the next phase of the operation.
5. Leave Under no circumstances will any member of ALLEN GP leave present location. The only personnel + vehicles permitted to leave area will be those on special duty & units must record their absence.
6. P.A.D units will post air sentries. Defence is to be passive unless deliberately attacked. The policy is for men to lie up during the day

6. P.A.D.
(contd)

and rest. Movement is completely restricted & close supervision must be kept with regard to concealment of men & vehicles.

Further movement may be expected tonight and drivers should obtain all rest possible during day in preparation for further night move.

7. Location of Units (a) ALLEN GP H.Q. is just east of sign 81 on main rd.
(b) Units to contact GP H.Q. & notify locations.

(c). As dispersal may have caused some lack of contact. units are to immediately locate all vehicles & personnel under their command and advise men of the main points of the above notes & issue a warning for a further move for the night 24/25 Apr 41.

Personnel must hold themselves ready for a move at a moment's notice & the move must be carried out without confusion or the mixing of units.

8. Stragglers

Unit will establish a collecting post on the main rd in their unit area.

9. Medical

Medical arrangements will remain the same as on the march to this area.

10. Water

Unit will recce for water points in area.

H.H. Hammer
Major
B19 16 Aust Inf Bde
(for ALLEN GP).

16 Aust Inf Bde O.O.

for ALLEN GROUP

SECRET

146

Issued at
ELEFSIS.
(MANDRA)

IN THE FIELD
24 Apr 1941

28

Ref map 1/250,000 ATHENS

INFORM Confirmation of verbal orders issued at 1600 hrs 24 Apr 41
by Brig. A.S. ALLEN.

1. No further info regarding enemy.
2. (a) ALLEN GP is to proceed on further phase of withdrawal to evacuate GREECE.
- (b) ALLEN GP. is increased by the following units and groups:-

2/8 Bn - to be attached to 17 Aust Inf Bde.

6 Aust Div Sub Units (Lt Col Crook command)

1 ANZAC CORPS. Sigs & Corps Sps (Lt Col Kendall command)

INTENTION

3. ALLEN GP will move to MIKOI on the night 24/25 Apr 41

METHOD

4. ORDER OF MARCH :-

Section A { Op. H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde.
2/3 Bn
2/2 Bn.
H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Section B. 17 Aust Inf Bde.

Section C 6 Aust Div troops.

Section B 2/8 Bn.

Section D 1 Aust Corps Sigs & Corps Sps.

5. Route :- Present location - ELEFSIS - MARGARA - KORINTHOS
KHILIE MEDHION - ARGOS - MIKOI.

6. Start Point - Rd + Rlyway Crossing E 1753.

7. Start Time - 2130 hrs.

8. Traffic Control. 6 Aust Div Provost will be responsible for traffic control on route.

9. Protection 2/3 Bn will send two vehicle parties under officer control to protect defile in Square 594 and canal sq. 594 against possible sabotage or attack. Parties to arrive at destination at 2045 hrs. after passing of convoy protection parties will join the tail of column.

- 10. Rations Four days extra rations will be drawn making a total of seven days to be carried.
- 11. P.O.L. Petrol will be drawn as follows:
 - 30 cwt trucks or over - 6 cases,
 - 15 cwt + one ton - 4 "
 - Cars - 2 "
- 12. Medical arrangements will be as for move on night 23/24 Apr 41.
- 13. Move The general policy as set down for vehicle commanders + march discipline in 16 Aust Inf Bde O.O. 23 Apr 41 still apply and commanders will ensure there is no relaxation on the part of all ranks.
- 14. Comforts Comforts + Ordnance Stores will be available for distn at AR 505 on the morning of 25 Apr 41 on a pro rata basis of personnel.
- 15. Speed + Density By night 40 V.t.m - No. i.t. will be set by the leading vehicle ~~which~~ compatible with the nature of the road + performance of vehicles in the convoy. The 40 V.t.m will be maintained at all speeds.
- 16. Destination Point Troops will lie up during the day 25 Apr 41 + will be prepared to move to KALAMAI on the night 25/26 Apr. No destruction of vehicles will take place unless ordered by Commander ALLEN GP or 16 Aust Inf Bde Brigade Major.
- 17. INTERCOM ALLEN GP H.Q. closes present location 2100 hrs. Thereafter a report center at Head of column. On arrival 171001 Sections of GP will report to Report Center which will be recognised by Khaki streamers fore + aft of vehicle.
 Issued at 1600 hrs. H.H. Hammer Capt
 B. 17. 16 Aust Inf Bde - (For Allen Force)

Lt Col St John

29

148

ALLEN FORCE had good run last night + reached MANDRA area before first light this morning where it has lain concealed during day so far.

VASEY FORCE is not going to ARGOS area as originally intended but comes into MANDRA area on arrival tomorrow morning. Instead ALLEN FORCE moves from this area to ARGOS collecting area after dusk this evening.

Your recce will therefore be for Brig ALLEN instead of Brig. VASEY. The Brig Allen requires you to recce collecting area + areas 10, 20 + 30 miles this side so that you will know if suitable lying up areas with cover exist where they are to be found.

Having done this recce will you meet Brig Allen on the ROAD 30 miles this side of ARGOS with all information you have been able to gather re lying up places etc.

If you have your spare offrs with you, ^{if you have} would you arrange for them to picket COLINTH & direct column tonight thro' ~~two~~ COLINTH & any other defiles they can manage - you consider necessary. 149

You & your officers ^{10th} will on completion of move of ALLEN Force come under command Brig Allen & embark with his force.

Brig Allen may reach point on road 30 miles from ALGOS by Midnight, so will you be watching for him as from that hour.

16th Bde (Brig ALLEN) Field Number is 81.

E. F. Herring CPT
6 Aust. Div.

24 | 4 | 41

14. 25 hrs

Phase 8

~~150~~
~~145~~

20

Orders issued
by C.O. 7/3 Br
after verbal instruction
from Comd

ALLEN GROUP

Information

15L
175

(1) enemy may land at Pyrgos
maintain the flank of our force
moving to KALAMI.

(2) you have 2 Rifle Coys to do job

Station

(3) act as adv. gd. to force moving
from Mytilene to Megalopolis
& from where your adv. gd.
duties will cease & you will
take up a flank ~~gd. position~~
position at approx. KARYTAINA
to protect the flank of the
convoy.

you may be required to
hold this position to protect
the flank of the remainder
of the force moving through
on this route.

unless so ordered you
will retire from this
position in time to rejoin
the Bk. of at MALAMAI
9 2000 hrs. on 26 Apr 41

you will establish refect canteen
at a easy recongnize place
at Megalopolis.

152

you will ~~the~~ organize your
available m.t. to carry this
force in the most suitable
or suitable vehicles for the
job. ~~you~~

you will carry on the
man & on the truck 6 day
Rations, water, P.O.L., & Asense

S.A.A.

The price will comprise:

2. Cays of 2/3 P.M.

Comd by. Major. J. Abbott. D.S.O

153

31

In lieu of A.F. C2128

To: - Aust Bde (By hand of L.O.) Rptd Comdr PELOPONESE ANZAC CORPS (By hand of L.O.) 6 Aust Div. By hand of L.O. through ANZAC Corps. FOAM (Immediate) Q S & T Brig PARRINGTON "J" Beach.

From: - PIGO

0.702

23


Ref Map 1/1,000,000 (.) in view of changed situation the Aus Bde Group moving night 23/24 Apr will NOT embark at J Beach on 24/25 Apr but will retain MT and move to area NEA KIOS - MYTOI South of ARGOS on night 24/25 Apr (.) orders for subsequent move of MT on completion of this task will be issued through Comdr PELOPONESE

This message to be sent in Cipher.

IMMEDIATE

T.O.O.

General Staff
General Staff.



1. Hold on to M.T.

2. If good site found before this place then there is more to go.

3. If different view due to place named

[Faint handwritten notes and a small sketch at the bottom left of the page.]

MESSAGE FORM

25

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

(By SDR)

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP



TO Rear Anzac Corps HQ (ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

FROM Force HQ Originator's Number 0 CD Date In Reply to Number

ALLEN (KALAMATA) beach Collection MT destroyed	Gp for Z area will disposal	will embarkation area KALAMAI NOT order	now night KALAMAI Brig repeat follow	proceed 26/27 O PARRINGTON NOT O	KALAMAI at Command O be ACK
---	--	--	---	---	--

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS. IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER. ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY SDR TIME OF ORIGIN 15 10

Signed: [Signature] (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.) T.H.I. 1515

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R. 1515

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

A B C D *see*

apl

FROM

ALLEN gp

Originator's Number

01

Date

26

In Reply to Number

<i>concentrate</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>units</i>	<i>apart</i>	<i>section</i>	<i>of</i>
<i>ALLEN</i>	<i>gp</i>	<i>in</i>	<i>your</i>	<i>area</i>	<i>with</i>
<i>view</i>	<i>moving</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>beach</i>	<i>assembly</i>	<i>area</i>
<i>east</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>party</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>time</i>	<i>to</i>
<i>move</i>	<i>at</i>	<i>short</i>	<i>notice</i>	<i>later.</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>organise</i>	<i>concentration</i>	<i>units</i>	<i>gps</i>	<i>1 officer</i>	<i>or NCO</i>
<i>its</i>	<i>ops</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>No movement</i>	<i>of vehicles</i>	<i>in concentration</i>

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

[Signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

155

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
Forms	C2128/13.	Wt. 36169/1798.	1,000M. pads. 12	/39.	B. & S. Ltd.	51-5537.					

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP



(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

(2)

FROM

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

ORs

0

no

movement

of

vehicles

in

concentration

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1310

SIGNED

[Handwritten signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER

T.O.R.

156

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No.
	OUT		OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO *A B C D* *ape*

FROM *PLANT 94*

Originator's Number. *02* Date *26* In Reply to Number

<i>You</i>	<i>will</i>	<i>arrangement</i>	<i>to</i>	<i>render</i>
<i>instructions</i>	<i>forward</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>vehicles</i>	<i>abandoned</i>
<i>road</i>	<i>by</i>	<i>you</i>	<i>see</i>	<i>whether</i>
<i>mile</i>	<i>KALOMAI</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>report</i>	<i>this</i>
<i>in</i>	<i>computer</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>NO</i>	<i>destruction</i>
<i>for</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>orders</i>	<i>regarding</i>	<i>vehicles</i>
<i>area</i>	<i>will</i>	<i>be</i>	<i>issued</i>	<i>later</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS:

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN *1300*

SIGNED (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

157

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No.
	OUT		OFFICIAL DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

D Sec

ape

FROM

ALLEN GP

Originator's Number.

03

Date.

26

In Reply to Number

<i>send</i>	<i>transmit</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>members</i>	<i>present</i>	<i>copy</i>
<i>will</i>	<i>all</i>	<i>NCOW</i>	<i>possible</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>ALL</i>
<i>of</i>	<i>HW</i>	<i>by</i>	<i>1930</i>	<i>has</i>	<i>0</i>
<i>you</i>	<i>process</i>	<i>transmit</i>	<i>ask</i>		

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

D. J. [Signature]

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

Important

1845

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.H.I.

T.O.R.

158

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No.	OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT			

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

A B C D

apl

FROM

ALL F-11 90

Originator's Number.

04

Date.

26

In Reply to Number

<i>1st</i>	<i>2nd</i>	<i>3rd</i>	<i>4th</i>	<i>5th</i>	<i>6th</i>	<i>7th</i>	<i>8th</i>	<i>9th</i>	<i>10th</i>
<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>
<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>
<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>
<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>
<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>
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<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>	<i>15 11</i>

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

159

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number.

Date.

In Reply to Number

<i>in message M/T</i>	<i>is carried</i>	<i>particulars</i>	<i>to be sent</i>	<i>immediately</i>	<i>to the</i>
<i>concerning</i>	<i>O.</i>	<i>Please</i>	<i>report</i>	<i>to the</i>	<i>command</i>
<i>regarding</i>	<i>the</i>	<i>same</i>	<i>as</i>	<i>the</i>	<i>above</i>
<i>mentioned</i>	<i>in</i>	<i>the</i>	<i>message</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>the</i>
<i>the</i>	<i>message</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>the</i>	<i>message</i>	<i>of</i>
<i>the</i>	<i>message</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>the</i>	<i>message</i>	<i>of</i>
<i>the</i>	<i>message</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>the</i>	<i>message</i>	<i>of</i>
<i>the</i>	<i>message</i>	<i>of</i>	<i>the</i>	<i>message</i>	<i>of</i>

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ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED
(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

54

MESSAGE FORM.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS.	IN	No. of Groups GR.	Serial No. OFFICE DATE STAMP
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

FROM

Originator's Number.

Date.

In Reply to Number

<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>
<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>
<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>
<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>
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<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>	<i>1400</i>

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS:

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CYPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS DEGREE OF PRIORITY.

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN.	TIME IN.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.	SYSTEM OUT.	TIME OUT.	READER.	SENDER.

T.O.R.

160

161
~~161~~



Phase ~~AA~~ 9

SERIAL 32

REPORT BY

JULIS CAMP.
4 May 41.

CAPT P. J. WOODHILL

162
32

The Commander,
16 Aust Inf Bde.

Sir,

1. After the embarkation of the main body of the "Allen Force" in the night 26/27 Apr. 41 at KALAMAI, Capt. R. R. Vial and myself remained behind in accordance with your orders to assist any members of the "Allen Force" who remained to embark on following nights.
2. When the last destroyer left on the above night, a number of men from 17 Aust Inf Bde remained on the wharf. They were in charge of Capt Gray, S.C. 17 Aust Inf Bde. Capt Tyrell of that Bde was also there.
3. On the morning of 27 Apr 41 at about 1000 hrs I attended the conference of Brigadier Parrington, commanding at KALAMAI, and there met Lieut. Col. Harlock, 2/1 Fd Regt., commander, who informed me that he had remained behind because part of one of his batteries had not got away on the previous night. Lieut. Col. Harlock was appointed to command the Australian contingent, and Capt. Vial and myself put ourselves under his orders.
4. We collected particulars of Australian troops as set out in the next para. Numbers are approximate in some cases, as all notes were destroyed. The numbers remained approximately the same up to the night of 28/29 Apr 41, though there were in all 20 or so deaths among A.I.F. personnel from air action during 27 and 28 Apr 41.

	<u>Offrs.</u>	<u>O.Rs.</u>
5. 2/1 Fd Regt. (included Lt. Col. Harlock, <i>Major Peter</i> Lieuts. Manning and Flynn).	7	64
16 Aust Inf Bde (Capt. Vial, Capt. Woodhill, batman and 2 stragglers)	2	3
17 Aust Inf Bde. (Capt. Gray, Capt. Tyrell, most of the men were attached drivers)	2	50
2/5 Bn. (Lieut. Sweet and transport drivers)	1	53
2/6 Bn. (Lieut. Benz and transport drivers)	1	50
2/7 Bn. (Lieut. Young and transport drivers)	1	50
Corps Petrol Coy.		20
2/1 M.G. Bn. (Capt. Hindmarsh)	1	4
Corps Sigs.		20
DAPHNI Staging Camp (Major Silverstone, Lieut. Ordish, Capt. Sapsford A.A.M.C.) the majority of the O.Rs. were wounded and were evacuated on 20/29 Apr. 41)	4	40
Corps H.Q. (W.Os. Foley, Edgar, Burdett)		7
	<u>19</u>	<u>361</u>

6. Brigadier Parrington allotted the A.I.F. force under Lt. Col. Harlock priority after the British 80 Base Sub-Area. When a protest was made, it was explained that 80 Base Sub-Area was required to start work at once in a new area.
7. On the night 27/28 Apr, 41 all troops assembled for embarkation in the Order 80 Base Sub Area (about 1200), A.I.F. (380), New Zealand E.F. (about 800 men under Major McDuff comprising the N.Z. Reinforcement Bn.) followed by some 1000 or so white British troops and a large number of Palestinians, Yugoslavians, Greeks, Lascars and Cypriots, in all about 9,000 men.
8. No ships arrived on this night, and at about 0100 hrs. the troops were marched away to dispersal areas.
9. On 28 Apr. the orders for embarkation were unchanged. No

further A.I.F. personnel were found. Urgent enquiries were made for Capt. Porter and personnel from DAPHNI but no information could be obtained of them except that they were part of a force under Lt.Col. Hatchison. Major Silverstone said that he understood this force was to embark at another beach. 156
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10. At about 1800 hrs. on 28 April 41 an officer from the three Hussar squadrons, which were part of the Amoured Brigade covering the embarkation, reported that the enemy was not within contact at a point 25 miles from KALAMAI on the main road. Three companies of the N.Z. Bn. were also sent to cover the embarkation.

11. At about 2000 hrs. the column assembled for embarkation, and when the head of the column reached the road junction on the beach road where a number of fishing boats were beached, heavy enemy M.G. and artillery fire opened from the direction of the docks.

12. The enemy appeared to be scattered through the town and dock area, and was thought to be about 4 companies of motorized infantry with a 60-pounder gun, three tanks and a number of heavy Breda type anti-tank rifles, together with numerous machine guns. Major McDuff of the N.Z. Reinforcements and Lt.Col. Herlock arranged parties of Australians and New Zealand troops to drive out the Germans. Some assistance was received from the British troops, but not much, as the troops were base units. There was firing for several hours, but eventually about 0100 hrs. the Germans were all killed or captured. 80 prisoners were taken.

13. While the fight was in progress two destroyers appeared, but no other vessels were with them, and they did not approach the harbour. It is believed that most of the 40 G.Rs. from DAPHNI were wounded, and were lifted in ships boats from the destroyers with the other wounded. Other than these, it is unlikely that any A.I.F. personnel got away that night.

14. At about 0300 hrs. Brigadier Parrington ordered all troops to assemble on the beach, and at about 0400 hrs a conference of officers was held, at which Brigadier Parrington said that he had received news that the Navy could not do any more owing to action by the enemy fleet, and that no more troops could be shipped from KALAMAI, and that under these circumstances he would at once send a message to the enemy intimating that he would surrender with his force on the beach at day-break and those who did not wish to partake in the surrender were to be clear of the area by 0500 hrs.

15. Lt.Col. Harlock and Capt. Gray explained the position to the men and said that they themselves would stay. No reflection on these officers can be made by this fact, for they appeared utterly exhausted by the night's battle, in which they took an active part, and Brigadier Parrington seemed to intimate that officers in charge of troops should consider it their duty to stay.

16. Capt. Vial and myself decided to escape south, if possible. At about 0500 hrs. I saw Brigadier Parrington and said, "Capt. Vial and myself intend to try to escape south". He said "It is not much use going that way, as the Germans are coming up from the South". I said, "Nevertheless, we will give it a try". He said "Well, good luck". We spoke to a number of A.I.F. soldiers in the dark and told them it was a personal choice for each man, but that we were going south. It is emphasised that at this stage, there was very little undamaged transport left.

17. Capt. Vial and myself, together with my batman, then went by motor to a village on the coast about 10 miles South of KALAMAI at the end of the motor road. Here the car was damaged and we set off on foot south along the coast.

18. About 5 miles further south we discovered a schooner of about 50 tons burden afloat in a small cove. We boarded her and about 50 others who were also passing by came aboard her. Capt. Vial took charge of the preparing of the vessel for sea and I went away to the village to look for the owner, who had a vital part of the engine. 164

19. In my absence the enemy bombed, and machine gunned, and sunk the vessel and 7 of the 50 passengers were killed by drowning or otherwise. I was told by survivors that Capt. Vial saved the lives of several of the personnel on board who could not swim, or who were wounded.

20. At about lunch time I was informed by some Greeks that a boat would sail that night for Crete from TRACHILI, a village on the coast (about 10 miles further south). I sent a message to the party remaining near the schooner and set out for TRACHILI.

21. After an extremely hazardous walk around the cliff face, I arrived at TRACHILI and was told there by an English speaking Greek that there was no boat at TRACHILI, but that there was an army officer who had sent a message saying that a boat would leave LAMIMA, a town in a bay of the same name, a further 8 miles south.

22. Leaving a message for Capt. Vial, I set out for LAMIMA, and after a difficult march along the cliff face, reached a wadi about 1 mile from LAMIMA at nightfall. There were about 20 soldiers in and around this wadi including 4 A.I.F. men. When the column attempted to go on towards LAMIMA the man in the lead, Cpl. McFarlane, Royal Corps of Signals, was stopped by an English officer in uniform who said he was Capt. McNab, a British Intelligence Officer stationed in the district. I was at the rear of the column and did not speak to, or see Capt. McNab, but the Corporal, who was an intelligent N.C.O., was quite satisfied about his bona fides. He sent information that a German motor cycle patrol was in possession of LAMIMA and hence our column could not go further, but that we should send a soldier in disguise to contact a Greek (who was named) in the village, and this Greek would hide us in the neighbourhood. I sent in a Greek speaking Cypriot soldier in civilian dress who saw some German soldiers in the village, but could not find the named Greek.

23. The column of 20 men spent the night in the hills near the village and early in the morning of 30 April 41 I was told by a Greek civilian through the Cypriot as interpreter that the Germans were preparing to advance to capture a party of soldiers.

24. There was said to be another party of soldiers hidden in the neighbourhood, but as we were unarmed except for one rifle and my pistol, I thought it best to go back towards TRACHILI. Some of the column accompanied me, while about half determined to hide near LAMIMA. Some of this party set out in a rowing boat and were picked up by a destroyer. On the way back some shots were fired at us, but were too far away to do any damage.

25. On arrival at TRACHILI some hours later I was accompanied by a number of men whom I had met on the way and advised to return, as I considered TRACHILI would be the last village on the sea coast to be reached by the Germans, owing to the very difficult tracks approaching it.

26. At TRACHILI I reported to Lt. Col. Geddes, a British officer of 30 Base Sub Area. As senior officer he had assumed command of the troops around the village and at about 1600 he told me that he had already written and sent a note to the Germans (in English and German) saying that there were a number of English, Australian and New Zealand troops near the village and that he would surrender and hold the troops there.

27.

27. There were about 100 troops in the area round the village but most of them were unwilling to surrender, preferring to try their luck in the inland country.

28. At TRACHILI I met Capt. Vial who had come up the previous night. I wish to draw attention to the spirited conduct of this officer. He constantly inspired his companions to make further efforts to escape and was quite fearless in trying every expedient which might benefit the whole of the troops attempting to escape. He was the leading spirit in organizing escape on the schooner mentioned in para. 18, and saved several lives. Although he lost most of his clothes and his boots, he walked many miles over sharp rocks. Having arrived at TRACHILI he went back ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ for some miles to obtain a skiff, and when this was not possible, he returned. He inspired the A.I.F. personnel to continue their efforts to escape on 30 Apr. and fitted out a skiff to set out to obtain help. Although this skiff was leaking badly he rowed out about 5 miles into the open sea in broad daylight, as it had been reported that British warships had come up the gulf. This was a particularly courageous act as German patrol planes were on the watch all day. Perhaps a note of this paragraph could be forwarded to 6 Aust Div.

29. Capt. Vial and I organized the troops into watches with signallers for the night 30 Apr./1 May, and kept a boat ready to go out if any naval vessels came in sight. Several trips were made by us out into the sea.

30. At about 0100 hrs on 1 May, lights were reported off the village and replies were made by signallers with torches and the boat was sent out. Three destroyers "Isis", "Kimberly", and were off the village, and 129 soldiers including some Greek and Yugoslavs were taken off in the ships' boats. Lt.Col. Geddes and all British officers embarked too.


31. The destroyers then called at the wadi near LAMIMA above mentioned, and took off about 15 troops, being some of those who were with me there. One destroyer was delayed by the wreck of her motor boat on the rocks near the wadi.

32. A final count revealed that the destroyers took off a total of A.I.F. consisting of 5 officers (Capt. Vial, Capt. Woodhill, Lieut. Sweet, Lieut. Manning and Lieut. Flynn) and 69 O.Rs. Everything possible was done by the Navy for our comfort and we were taken direct to Port Said, arriving there on the afternoon of 2 May 41.

33. The party of 5 officers and 69 O.Rs. were taken charge of by Lieut.Col. Hobbes and sent to A.I.F. Staging Camp, KANTARA, issued with blankets and some clothing and sent on 3 May 41 to join their respective units in PALESTINE.

P. J. Woodhill

Capt.



Rough Sketch.


PJ Woodhall (Capt
4 May 44)

AREOPOLIS
(motor road)

TRACE B

Showing disposition of ALLEN FORCE - Peneios Gorge

To be superimposed on Sheets C3060 LARISA and C3066 MOUNT OLYMPUS - THE BALKANS 1:100,000




Reference

- 25 Pdrs Battery Post
- 25 Pdrs ATK Guns
- 2 Pdr " "
- Headquarters Bde, Bn, Coy.
- Road Block
- Mainlines of Enemy Advance - 18 Apr morning
- NZ 21 Bn.
- Aust 2/2 Bn
- " 2/3 Bn
- Retrward Positions

10001/2

TRACE C

TO BE SUPERIMPOSED ON ATHENS MAP 1:250,000.



LEGEND.


- Adv Bde H.Q. P
- Rear Bde H.Q. O
- 2/2 Bn. 1st Posn U
- 2/2 Bn. 2nd Posn R
- 2/3 Bn. S



DISPOSITIONS OF 16 AUST INF BDE AT BRALLOS
(2/1 AUST. INF. BN. THEN 1/2 19 AUST INF BDE)

10001/3.

2/6
13/7



TRACE "A"

SHOWING -

A) 16 MUST INF BDE POSITIONS AT VERROIA PASS

B) ROUTE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM VERROIA PASS TO EMBUSSING POINTS FOR MOVE TO LARISSA

TO BE SUPERIMPOSED ON MAPS

EDESSA 1:100,000

MOUNT OLYMPUS 1:100,000

X ROAD BLOCKS

NOTE - HEIGHTS SHOWN IN METRES

1000/1