

**AWM52**  
**2nd Australian Imperial Force and**  
**Commonwealth Military Forces unit war**  
**diaries, 1939-45 War**

**Item number: 8/2/16**

**16 Infantry Brigade**

**July 1941**

AUG 13 1941 WAR DIARY.

16 Bde

JULIS

AUG 13 1941

ack

1 Jul 41.

2/2 BN. are on six hours notice to move north . No details are yet available as to their destination or the role they are to play .

LIAISON SCHEME has been evolved by HQ 6 Aust Div, whereby officers are attached to different arms of the service for a certain period, thus living and working with the unit and absorbing the atmosphere of that unit . Arrangements are left for individual commanders to arrange mutually .

~~16 Bde~~  
8/2/41

WAR DIARY

JULIS

2 Jul 41.

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UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT flew over Julis Camp this evening; bombs were dropped in a northerly direction .

ALL BDE HQ STAFF are being trained to ride a motor cycle .

TALK ON LAYOUT and organisation of HQ on the move and in the field was included in todays syllabus of training . The Staff Captain, Captain I. McKenzie, spoke to HQ personnel on the subject . As we have now a fair proportion of reinforcements, the time devoted to the lecture was extremely valuable .

WAR DIARY.

JULIS

3 Jul 41.

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BRIGADE OFFICERS left today for Syria. The party included the Brigade Commander, Brigade Major and Lieuts. W. Darcey and A. Pepper .

In anticipation of a visit to Major-General A.S. Allen, before the party left there was much scurrying about to accumulate 2 lbs. of assorted nuts . General Allen had a passion for nuts of any sort, and the Brigade party saw to it that his weakness would be indulged, at least for a time, during the Syrian campaign .

2/2 BN. received a water cart today . They still lack transport and Bren guns, deficiencies that will have to be filled before they can possibly move into the firing line .

WAR DIARY

JULIS

4 Jul 41.

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AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE DAY . President Roosevelt's speech to his nation is awaited by the Allied forces with intense interest .

PARTY OF OFFICERS which left yesterday for Syria returned today . An account of the journey was given by the Brigade Major, Major H.H. Hammer . He said that the intention of the visit was to see the forward areas and to see Brigade and Battalion HQ's in operation and pick up any points of interest; to see the general nature of the country .

After crossing the border, the road to SAIDA (Sidon of old) runs parallel to the coast, and close to it . From the road to the coast the country is flat, but inland is hilly, rugged and difficult . From the nature of the country it was easy to understand why progress on the left flank had been rather slow. Evidence of points of resistance by Vichy troops lay along the route; there were many burnt-out vehicles and the remnants of an odd plane or two .

On arrival at Saida the party found a conference in progress between representatives from 1 Aust Corps and Army, Navy and Air Force leaders . It appeared that something was brewing . At 7 Aust Div HQ at Saida they were told that no enemy aircraft had been seen for a week at this stage, and the Allied forces were experiencing a most unusual thing in the course of the war to date - complete air superiority .

The ex-Brigade commander, Major-General A.S. Allen, was in fine spirits and was pleased to see his visitors, but thought that it was not the best moment to go further forward, and said that he would advise them as soon as he possibly could of the time when they could go further forward, and that then they would do so under his own personal care .

The party returned to Julis Camp on the evening of 4 Jul .

SAND TABLE EXERCISE and lecture on artillery was attended by 10 officers of the Brigade at 2/1 Fd. Regt, Khassa, this evening.

2/2 BN has been included on the order of battle of the Exporter force in Syria .

WAR DIARY

JULIS.

5 Jul 41.

AT 1000 HRS advice was received from HQ 6 Aust Div that 2/2 Bn. had been placed on the top of the priority list for the receipt of complete equipment .

It seems that soon 16 Aust Inf Bde will be a one battalion Brigade, with the reconstructed 2/1 Bn. as the battalion . Circumstances alter cases, but it does not seem to be in the best interests of efficiency to split Brigades; it would seem to have been a better policy to include 2/1 Bn. and allow the 16th to carry out it's Brigade function than to split units up and form Composite Brigades . In Greece it was proved that compositions of strange units into Brigades and Brigades Groups was NOT a success from the point of view of control and co-ordination; it would have been better to stick to original compositions despite the smaller difficulties .

TRAINING AMMUNITION HAD NOT been made available to 2/2 Bn. prior to their coming on top of the Priority List . 1800 rounds, all that 2/1 Bn. had, was given them to zero rifles and train recent reinforcements to fire their first few shots.

QUALITY OF NEW AUSTRALIAN RIFLE was reported to be very good.

ARRANGEMENTS have been made by Brigade with Division for Pioneer platoons to go to 6 Div Engineers for a 12 day period of training in Field Works . The course commences on 7 Jul . M.T. Drivers are to attend a special course, Regimental Sigs are to go to the A.I.F. Sig. School; and private arrangements have been made with the Armoured Training Regiment for 8 carrierxx drivers from 2/1 Bn. to do a short carrier driver and maintenance Course .

It was interesting to note that equipment available to Training Battalions is practically nil . Shortage of equipment at the moment has been passed on to Training units , The policy is shortsighted from the point of view that replenishment of trained personnel to take the place of casualties will be most limited . Let us hope that the policy will become a long-sighted one, and that it will be realised that the training units require equipment to train the reinforcements, and the issue of this equipment to them is just as important as it's issue to front line troops .

BRIGADE STRENGTH (HQ, 2/1 and 2/2 Bns.) is 79 officers, 1133 ORs.

WAR DIARY.

JULIS

6 Jul 41.

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IN VIEW OF THE REORGANISATION OF 2/1 BN and the shortage of officers following on the Crete episode, and the general shortage of reinforcements, a case was presented by this HQ to HQ 6 Aust Div, requesting that staff of the Training Battalion should, as far as possible, be released, and pointing out that, even when all of the reinforcements at the Training Depot and the Training Battalion were absorbed, the units of this Brigade would still be considerably below strength. It was probable that the Depot and training units would become a mere clearing ground for some months, and the members of the staff could be more advantageously employed with their units. Div HQ replied that the policy now be that the Brigade Commander establish close liaison with the Reinforcement Depot and 6 Aust Inf Tng Bde, and mutually arrange for the release of officers and other personnel of the staffs. As a result of this, certain appointments at the Training Battalion are temporarily unfilled, for instance, there is no officer filling the appointment of 2 i/c.

Several changes of staff were effected under this scheme of mutual cooperation, but on 4 Jul 41 HQ AIF (ME) communicated with the Reinforcement Depot and said that, as the changes had not been submitted to GOC, AIF, (ME), for approval (ME Order No 406 para 2 of 21 Jun 41), the officers who had changed places would stand by for return.

In the meantime, approval was formally asked for, and granted by signal.

JULIS7 Jul 41.

VILLAGES in the vicinity of Australian camps are to be visited periodically, under instructions received today. The purpose of these village visits is to fly the flag, as it is considered that there is still a possibility of Arab uprising; under the circumstances, Higher Command thinks it advisable to display the strength of the Allied forces.

NEW MESS TIN has made its appearance - the third type of mess tin to be issued to the Australian army. It was issued to 2/2 Bn. today; is circular in shape, and does not provide a vessel out of which to drink. The troops have been issued with tin or enamel mugs for drinking purposes.

BRIGADE HQ M.T. AND OFFICE STAFF are to be instructed in map reading, in order that all become proficient.



WAR DIARY

JULIS

8 Jun 41.

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DISCUSSION at HQ 6 Aust Div on Intelligence within the Division was attended by the Brigade Commander .

LIAISON OFFICERS appointed to this Brigade are:

Captain I. C. Fulton, senior liaison officer, liaising with 2/3 Bn.

Lieut . A.K. Bosgard, liaising with 2/2 Bn.

Lieut A.C. Pepper, liaising with 2/1 Bn.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS in the Pineios Gorge has been submitted to HQ 6 Aust Div in answer to a questionnaire sent on by them .

WAR DIARY

JULIS

9 Jul 41.

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GENERAL DENTZ has asked for armistice terms .

SECTION IN ATTACK was demonstrated to, and then carried out by, members of this HQ during the afternoon .

NIGHT ATTACK , carried out by 2/2 Bn on night of 9 Jul was attended by the Brigade Commander.

This HQ was in touch with the battalion throughout the exercise by R/T ; Brigade Intelligence Section functioned and ran an Intelligence Diary .

R/T VAN has visited units of the Brigade during the last few days, giving officers and ORs an opportunity of familiarising themselves with the procedure .

WAR DIARY

JULIS

10 Jun 41.

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NEED FOR VIGILANCE on the part of sentries was further stressed by this HQ today in a letter to commanders . In one of the Australian camps, three rifles were stolen and a sentry who tried to stop the thieves was shot and later died of the wounds received . Ever increasing watchfulness is essential if this sort of thing is to be stopped .

LOSSES OF PAYBOOKS by personnel of this Brigade is being viewed with great concern, as it is reported that paybooks are being purchased by enemy agents . Firm measures are being taken to stop such losses; snap inspections are being held where personnel are, without warning, ordered to produce their paybooks .

THE RED CROSS

On authority of DADMS Gaza Base Sub Area, and the ADMS 6 Aust Div, a large red cross was painted on the roof of the CRS . Later, Base countermanded the order and we were forced to obliterate it .

There is much conflict of opinion as to the wisdom of having the Red Cross on CRSs, but it is reported that the DADMS of Gaza informed OC, CRS that it was being considered as to whether all CRSs in local camps would be so marked.

WAR DIARY

JULIS

11 Jun 41.

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20 ALL RANKS are to attend a film on mechanics in the AASC lines next Thursday, 17 Jun . Later, 12 MT personnel will attend a maintenance and mechanics course at the AASC .

Every opportunity is being taken to use the specialist knowledge of other arms of the service while the Brigade is training at Julis. The depleted ranks of trained specialists in units necessitates this, and the other services have been most helpful, including the reinforcement training schools , who have taken certain of our personnel . The result of this will be seen in the near future in the general raising of the standard of performance of specialist duties .

WAR DIARY

JULIS

12 Jun 41.

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SUCCESSFUL SPORTS MEETING was held at Julis this afternoon in Browne lines . It was attended by Lieut. General Sir Iven Mackay and the Brigade Commander . Members of the AANS were there to lend a touch of colour to the proceedings, and to add to the embarrassment of a competitor in the Hop, Step and Jump . Capt . Fulton, of this HQ, gained a place in three events, and won the High Jump .

BRIGADE STRENGTH is 78 officers, 1129 other ranks , exclusive of 2/3 Bn., serving in Syria .

WAR DIARY

JULIS

13 Jun 41.

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ARMISTICE has been signed . The Battle for Syria is over, and much needless bloodshed has been avoided . With Russia still fighting and giving the Allied forces in the Middle East a much needed respite, things seem to be taking a turn for the better .

Major General Allen was present at the armistice negotiations .

BRIGADE COMMANDER AND B. M. visited Jaffa Range to see 2/2 Bn. firing rifle and Bren courses. They paid particular attention to the standard of marksmanship amongst reinforcements, which was generally poor.

AL JURA beach was, on 7 Jul, placed under control of 6 Aust Div, subject to regulations governing life-saving, patrols and safety precautions. On 13 Jul a complaint was received by HQ 6 Aust Div that some units which proceed to Al Jura beach were using tent sides and blankets for bivouac shelters. Base Area has directed, with the concurrence of 6 Aust Div, that the practice will cease immediately.

Fortunately, none of the units of this Brigade were involved, although battalions are taking the opportunity of making use of the beach by including a two-day tactical exercise at Al Jura in their weekly training syllabus.

A TENT WAS BURNED DOWN inexplicably in the lines of 2/2 Bn. yesterday. This is the second experience of this nature that the Brigade has had at Julis, the first instance being in June 1940.

A Court of Enquiry was immediately convened and reported that, in the opinion of the Court, the fire was caused by a spark from a cookhouse nearby, or by friction of the tent pole against the tent.

The T.O., in evidence, said that he recalled an incident at 2/2 Fd. Workshops where a pole or notice board in contact with a tent on a gusty day had caused friction resulting in fire.

TENT WAS REPORTED LOST by a unit yesterday.

Within a few hours, however, the tent was located in a ploughed field, cleverly concealed, by a black tracker attached to the Palestine Police Force. Parts of the tent were buried in different places.

As the thief would have had to cross the path of a patrol operating in the units lines, all units were warned of the necessity for more thorough and vigilant patrolling.

WAR DIARY.

JULIS

15 Jul 41.

BRIGADE COMMANDER AND B.M. visited Jaffa Range again today to watch 2/2 Bn. firing their practice shoot with the 3" mortar . It was reported that the shooting was satisfactory.

SHORT ASSAULT COURSE was carried out by personnel of this HQ during the afternoon .

TRAINING AMMUNITION has been allotted to the Brigade on the following scale:-

.455 pistol	50 rounds
.450 Sub MG	12000 "
2" Mortar(Smoke)	223 "
2" Mortar(HE)	217 "

An allotment between units was made( including 2/3 Bn.) and 2/1 and 2/2 Bn. were ordered to retain 10% of the ammunition received, for field exercises .

70,000 rounds of SAA has been allotted to the Brigade, available as from todays date but not yet received ; another 30,000 rounds will be made available on 30 Jul .



WAR DIARY

JULIS

16 Jul 41.

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L.O. FROM DIVISION , Capt. B.V. Wilson, visited this HQ today .

BRIGADE HQ FIRED rifles on the miniature range south of the camp this afternoon . Shooting was not good .

DOWN FROM SYRIA to Julis came Captain P.K. Parbury of 2/3 Bn. and late liaison officer for this HQ with that battalion . He now commands "A" company, 2/3 Bn. He said that the battalion had done good work in Syria - they had played a big part in the capture of Damascus and then had been brought round to the coastal sector to assist in the capture of DAMOUR . Casualties from battle had been light, but there had been a large incidence of sickness, and at all times the battalion had been considerably below strength .

GOC, AIF(ME) addressed officers of the Division today . Lieut.+ General <sup>Sir</sup> T. Blamey, CB, CMG, DSO, greatly impressed officers with the manner and text of his address, and left behind a feeling in everybody's mind that efforts would be increased to develop the Australian fighting forces to higher standards than ever before .

PARACHUTE AND AIRBORNE TROOPS formed the subject of a discussion at HQ 6 Aust Div this evening . The subject was introduced by Brigadier Vasey, who recounted his experiences on Crete, and later several other officers also told of what they had learned on the island and in Greece . The discussion was most informative and gave much food for thought . Later it is intended to discuss the matter again .

COMFORTS FUND issued cigarettes, toothpaste and brush and bootlaces today .

WAR DIARY

JULIS

17 Jul 41.

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TEMPORARY COMMAND of 16 Aust Inf Bde to Lt. Col. K.W. Wather, D.S.O., was promulgated in AIF List No. 37 of 12 Jun 41.

THE PRACTICE OF HITCH HIKING along the main road to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and return is to be stopped, and steps are being taken to prevent personnel from using the lifted thumb .

COPIES OF BRIGADES TRAINING POLICY , and notes on training, control and discipline, are appended to the Diary .

WAR DIARY

JULIS

18 Jul 41.

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LECTURE, first of a series for Brigade and Bn. IOs and I sergeants, was given at HQ 6 Aust Div this morning. The subjects were Intelligence within the Division and the Selection and Operation of OPs.

WAR DIARY

JULIS

19 Jul 41.

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BRIGADE STRENGTH is 75 offr, 1141 ORs (exclusive of 2/3 Bn.) a

A PARADE WAS CALLED to say farewell to Sgt. M.A. Stafford, who has been with this HQ since the days of Victoria Barracks and Ingleburn . A presentation was made to Sgt. Stafford.

WAR DIARY

JULIS

21 Jul 41.

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AFTER CHURCH PARADE this morning, units camped in Julis Camp marched past Sir Iven Mackay . The GOC 6 Aust Div took the salute at a base located on the main road in Leane Lines .

DIVISIONAL L.O. visited this Brigade this morning .

AN ARAB WAS SHOT and killed by a Security Patrol from A Coy, 2/2 Bn., last night . At 2215 hrs the patrol encountered a party of six Arabs, four mounted . The Arabs were ordered to halt, and then to dismount, whereupon they attempted to disperse in different directions . Shots were fired, and one man was hit . Four others were captured . The remainder escaped in the direction of the nearest village .

Majdal Police and HQ AIF Base Area were notified of the incident. The dead native was moved to a slit trench in Leane Lines, and the remaining prisoners were lodged in 2/2 Bn. Guard Room .

The dead Arab was armed with a curved sword . He had been shot in the body .

JULIS21 Jul 41.

BRIGADE COMMANDER AND B.M. called on units training in the field today. 2/2 Bn. were engaged in a platoon exercise, based on quick decision problems introduced according to the nature of the ground encountered.

JALADIYA village was also visited by the Brigade officers; 2/1 Bn. were in the vicinity. At the time of contact with 2/1 Bn., they were moving back to the camp areas, at the same time carrying out a section formations exercise.

In view of recent instructions to exercise the section commanders in control of their sections to the utmost limits, this did not appear sufficient to develop the section commander's control. Every opportunity should be taken in the field to exercise all commanders in a succession of simple situations, which should be developed from the time the camp is left until the sub units return. The men particularly find it very boring just to march aimlessly, but given simple situations every man is interested. Opportunities are given then for fire ~~direction~~ control and discipline, the use of ground and minor tactics.

JULIS22 Jul 41.

A TEWT, the first conducted by the Brigade since its participation in the Libyan and Greek campaigns, was held today for Coy Comds, Adjutants and Bn. HQ staff. The TEWT was conducted by Lt. Col K.W. Eather, D.S.O.; also present were the G1 6 Aust Div (Col. Sutherland) the G2 (Major Molloy), Bde. and Div L.O.'s, and Major Richardson of 2/1 Ed. Regt. The commanders main object in holding the TEWT was his desire to find out on what lines the senior officers of battalions thought and acted. The TEWT was a simple one, based on coy. in the attack with one bty of arty in support.

The result was generally satisfactory, and brought out points that need to be stressed in the future Brigade training policy. The artillery discussions during the TEWT were of some interest, and the general opinion now is that the FOO must be well forward with the forward troops.

SHOCK TO BRIGADE was the cancellation of our few rounds of 2" mortar ammunition - smoke and H.E. This was to have been used for training and all units were looking forward to getting some ammunition for training their personnel prior to battle. It is difficult to understand why there should be such a terrific shortage. The TSMG ammunition was reduced from 12,000 rounds to 3,000, and with 36 guns per battalion, this means about 28 rounds per gun.

The men MUST be trained, and to train them properly in the use of their weapons, they must have ammunition to fire. It is rather heartbreaking, but we carry on, doing our best to teach the men to shoot with dry guns.

The few rounds of 3" mortar, issued recently, and fired by 2/2 Bn., gave valuable training for all the personnel, and above all confidence in the weapon they were handling. If accuracy and confidence are required, we must have ammunition to fire in training.

TRANSPORT ALLOTMENT has almost been completed in the case of 2/2 Bn., and they now have all their trucks with three or four exceptions.

WAR DIARY

JULIS

24 Jul 41.

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DIVISIONAL L.O., Capt B.V. Wilson, called at this HQ today .

DISCUSSION AT HQ 6 Aust Div on ammunition supply within the unit and it's effect on the fire plan was attended by the Brigade Commander.



JULIS26 Jul 41.

DIVISIONAL L.O. called at this HQ today

Brigade Strength, excluding 2/3 Bn., who are still in Syria, is 74 officers and 1132 other ranks .

FOR THE FIRST TIME in the Brigade's history, an appeal against the finding of a District Court Martial was lodged . The appeal was lodged in terms of A.M.R.O. 589, which states :-

- 589 . 1. Any person committed by Court Martial who is aggrieved considers himself/by the finding or sentence may forward a petition to the confirming or reviewing authority through the usual channels.
2. If such petition raises any question of how it should be referred for report in the Commonwealth to the J.A.G. or D.J.A.G. or elsewhere to a D.J.A.G., L.S.O., or other officer of A.A.L.D.

JULIS28 Jul 41.

C.O. 2/3 Bn., Major J.R. Stevenson, who has been administering command of the battalion during most of the operations in Syria, stated that the battalion was now in Tripoli, and was responsible for garrisoning that area and for the maintenance of good relations with the French. He stated that the battalion had done a very satisfactory job in the Syrian campaign, and had received much commendation from the various Brigades under which it served. The casualties, of which we have no precise details as yet, were not great.

At times during the actions, companies attacked with a strength about equal to a platoon, sections on many occasions being only of three men.

Major Stevenson returned to his HQ at Tripoli today. HQ 7 Aust Div is just east of Beirut, and it is expected that Major General A.S. Allen may call here in the near future. The whole Brigade will be glad to see him.

DEMONSTRATION OF EXPLOSIVES, booby traps and demolitions was given to personnel of this HQ by Captain Gilmore, R.A.E.

DIVISIONAL L.O. called at this HQ today.

WAR DIARY

JULIS

29 Jul 41.

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INTELLIGENCE SECTIONS of battalions and this HQ went out to an area north west of Julis village and staged a manoeuvre giving the workings of I. within the Brigade . The morning spent in the field was valuable, in that many points arose which will have to be given attention during our later training . The exercise was under the direction of Capt. Fulton, and the Divisional I. officer, Capt. W.M. Knox, was present . The Brigade Major came out and gave us much valuable advice .

In the afternoon a conference of I.O.'s and sergeants was held and the morning's work was discussed .

WAR DIARY

JULIS

30 Jul 41.

A PECULIAR AND UNUSUAL SITUATION exists at the moment; we have been issued with some A Tk ammn. to carry out practices - but unfortunately there are no anti tank rifles to fire it . So it would seem that it is either one thing or the other - sometimes we have weapons and no ammunition, and sometimes ammunition and no weapons .

REINFORCEMENTS for the Brigade are expected in Palestine early next month . The policy laid down is that reinforcements will be retained at the Reinforcement Depot and trained for a period of two months before they are sent on to their units. Provided the Training battalion can handle approximately 750 men and has sufficient equipment, the policy would appear to be sound, as it relieves the units of the necessity of conducting two entirely different types of training .

ON REPORTS RECEIVED from battalion commanders on the standard attained in platoon training to date, it has been decided to continue further the platoon training period . It is realised that platoon training is the solid foundation of the unit in battle, and while the time is available it is preferred that the platoon standard be high rather than rush into company training . The position is being reviewed again on 16 Aug, when it is hoped that the required standard expected of officers, N.C.O.'s and men will have been reached .

"LIVE OUT AND TRAIN" is our new policy, it's object being to get all ranks away from the easy amenities of camp life, and make them work, eat and sleep in the open for a week at a time.

This is being done on a company basis, with decentralisation right down to sections; to develop a sense of responsibility, confidence and capability in the section commander and the junior leader is the aim of Live Out and Train .

A VERY INFORMATIVE ADDRESS on "A" matters was delivered to commanders at HQ 6 Aust Div by the DAAG, Major A.W. Sheppard .

LAYOUT OF BRIGADE HQ was demonstrated this afternoon to personnel. Later the selected position will be dug in - in accordance with the instructions laid down for hardening the troops with four hours digging .

WAR DIARY

JULIS

31 Jul 41.

A SAND TABLE TEWT was carried out today, so that all officers could be practiced in the issue of clear and concise verbal orders. The exercise is being carried out over a period of several days, commencing with the Brigade Commanders orders to the COs, and from then on the orders are to be passed from Bn. to coys, to platoons and to sections.

The TEWT proved very satisfactory.

SCHOOLS FOR PERSONNEL of this Brigade have been abundant since the return to Palestine. In addition to the usual Middle East schools, such as METS and MEWTS, the following schools have been arranged by liaison with other arms of the service and with Training battalions :-

6 Aust Div Regimental Sigs Course	9 - 26 Jun .	2 from 2/1 Bn 6 from 2/2 Bn.
N.B. 7 personnel from 2/3 Bn. withdrew from this course due to the movement of their unit .		
6 Aust Div Field Works Course	1 - 19 Jul	Pioneer Pl. 2/1 Bn 4 personnel 2/2 Bn.
N.B. On day 6, 3 offrs from Bde HQ		
	4 "	" 2/1 Bn.
	12 "	" 2/2 Bn. attended
Drivers & Maintenance Course AAOC Wing, Beit Jirja	14 - 21 Jul	10 from 2/1 Bn.
Water Duties Course under 2/1 Fd. Hyg. Sec.	5 - 12 Jul	2 from Bde, 2/1 Bn & 2/2 Bn.
Drivers & Maintenance Course <u>6</u> Aust Div AASC Julis	16 Jul -	3 from Bde HQ 8 from 2/1 Bn.
Carriers Drivers Course Armd. Tng. Regt		8 from 2/1 Bn.
Sig. Tng Bn. Course Mughazi	29 Jun - 14 Aug	19 from 2/1 Bn.
Bomb Recce Lecture	22 Jul	1 from Bde HQ 2 from 2/1 & 2/2 Bns
Regimental Sigs Course	21 Jul - 2 Aug	5 from 2/1 Bn. 6 from 2/2 Bn.
Drivers & Maintenance School	15 Jul - 1 Aug	5 from 2/1 Bn. 5 from 2/2 Bn.
Drivers MT School	28 Jul - 6 Aug	9 from 2/1 Bn. 3 from Bde HQ
Brigade Intelligence School	Bde HQ and unit I Sections	
Series of Lectures to BDE & BN IOs and I Sjts under auspices of Div HQ		

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 133

Part 1

1 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 1 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt C.H. Green, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Capt H.S. Conkey, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

To be detailed by 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Lieut H.J. Gjedsted, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut C.T. Colquhoun, ) 2/2 Aust.  
Lieut J.B. Harkness, ) Inf. Bn.  
Lieut D.S.I. Burrows, )

Next for Duty

Lieut J.P. Collins, ) 2/4 Aust.  
Lieut G.W.A. Ormiston, ) Inf. Bn.  
Lieut Y.W.J. Ormiston, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt D. Williams, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.  
Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.

*J.M. Kenji Capt*

.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION

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1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.  
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2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
45 Aust. L.A.D.  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.  
Camp Staff Officer.  
War Diary (2)  
File.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E .

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED.

JULIS  
CAMP.

No. 134

Part 1

2 July 41 T

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 2 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt H.S. Conkey, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Capt E.H. Hernfield, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust.  
Div.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Lieut H.J. Gjedsted, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Lieut J.E. Gannon, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust.  
Div.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut J.P. Collins,        ) 2/4 Aust.  
Lieut G.W.A. Ormiston, ) Inf. Bn.  
Lieut Y.W.J. Ormiston, )

Next for Duty

Lieut G.A. Dean,         ) A.A.S.C.,  
Lieut C.H. Rivers,     ) 6 Aust. Div.  
Lieut W.H. Handbury, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.

2. LEAVE.

As from Monday, 7 July 41, the following reduced fares will apply to personnel proceeding on 1 Day Leave :-

TEL-AVIV - 120 Mils.  
JERUSALEM - 170 Mils.

3. LAUNDRY SERVICE.

When articles of clothing are lost at Camp Laundries a claim, in duplicate, should be forwarded to the Camp Staff Officer. If the articles lost are NOT replaced within 72 hours, a new issue may be made by Unit Q.M., who will forward particulars to Camp Staff Officer, stating Army value of the items replaced.

4. SUMP OIL.

Units are advised that a small quantity of Sump Oil is available at Supply Column, HILL 69.

It is suggested that Units avail themselves of this offer owing to limited supply of Creosoli on issue.

*J. M. ...*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION - As for B.R.O., No.133 dated 1 July 41.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED.

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 135

Part 1

3 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 3 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day	Capt E.H. Hernfield, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.
Next for Duty	Capt S.C. Foote, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.
Duty Officer	Lieut J.E. Gannon, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.
Next for Duty	Lieut H.E. Shellberg, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.
Cinema Picquet Officers	Lieut G.A. Dean, ) A.A.S.C., Lieut C.H. Rivers, ) 6 Aust. Div. Lieut W.H. Handbury, )
Next for Duty	Lieut E.G. McDonald, ) 1 Aust. Lieut C.H. Jack, ) A/Tk. Regt. Lieut J.H. Cochrane, )
Field Medical Officer	Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Next for Duty	Capt R.T. Dalton, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.
Duty Unit	A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.
Next for Duty	1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.

2. CHEESE CLOTH.

Field Officers report that Units have insufficient Cheese Cloth to cover meat etc., in kitchens.

Indents should be submitted through the usual channels for this Expense Store.

*M. K. ...*

.....Major.  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION.

H.Q., 6 Aust. Div.  
A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.  
Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.  
1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.  
2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
45 Aust. L.A.D.  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.  
Camp Staff Officer.  
War Diary (2)  
File.



A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admn. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

No. 136

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP

4 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 4 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day Next for Duty	Capt S.O. Foote, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt. Capt C.F. Cowden, Sigs, 6 Aust. Div.
Duty Officer Next for Duty	Lieut H.E. Shellberg, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt. Lieut A.F. Whitebrook, Sigs, 6 Aust. Div.
Cinema Picquet Officers Next for Duty	Lieut E.G. McDonald, ) 1 Aust. Lieut C.H. Jack, ) A/Tk. Regt. Lieut J.H. Cochrane, ) Capt C.R. Parsons, ) Sigs, Lieut R.M. Caspersonn, ) 6 Aust. Div. Lieut B.A. Hamilton, )
Field Medical Officer Next for Duty	Capt R.T. Dalton, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt. Capt D. Williams, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.
Duty Unit Next for Duty	1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt. Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.

2. RESERVE RATIONS.

Units will render a certificate before the 7th day of each month to S.S.O., 1 Aust. Corps Troops Sup Col and D.A.D.S.T., H.Q., A.I.F. Base Area indicating the number of Reserve Rations held on the last day of the preceding month. (Div R.O. para 151)

3. JEWISH CHURCH SERVICE.

A Jewish Church Service will be held on Saturday 5 Jul 41, at 1030 hrs in the Reading Room, Royston Lines, BEIT JIRJA.

Leave should be granted to all ranks desiring to attend, and transport arranged if possible. (Div R.O. para 152)

4. VENEREAL DISEASE.

P.A.C. facilities will be made available in all unit lines. (Div R.O. para 153)

5. TRANSFERS TO PROVOST COY.

As it is essential that 6 Aust. Div. Pro. Coy be built up to establishment as quickly as possible, it is desired that C.O.s will give favourable consideration to every application for transfer to that unit. (Div R.O. para 154)

6. AUDIT - REGIMENTAL ACCOUNTS.

A return is required each month certifying that the Audit Board has carried out an audit of all Regimental accounts.

This Board should comprise the 2 i/c of the unit and one other member, with accountancy qualifications if possible.

The return is to show the balance of accounts in Officers Mess, Sergeants Mess, and Supplementary Ration Account, and it is to be forwarded by 15th of each month.

Attention is drawn to the responsibility of the C.O. for ensuring that all accounts are paid promptly. (Div R.O. para 155)

7. CAMOUFLAGE EQUIPMENT.

H.Q. 1 Aust Corps has laid down the priority of issue of Camouflage Equipment, as and when same becomes available, as follows :-

- (1) A.F.V.s
- (2) 1st Line Transport.
- (3) 2nd Line Transport.
- (4) Corps Troops. (Div R.O. para 156)

8. COURTS OF INQUIRY - PRISONERS OF WAR.

Attention is drawn to the procedure for the assembly of Courts of Inquiry on Officers and other ranks who are taken prisoners of war by the enemy and for disposal of proceedings as laid down in F.S.R., Vol 1, Sec 28(1)

The authority for deciding that a Court shall be assembled will be the Divisional Comd under whom the individual was serving.

O.s.C. units are responsible for bringing to the notice of the Divisional Comd any cases in which they consider the convening of a Court of Inquiry advisable. (Div R.O. para 157)

9. ORGANISATION - GRAVES REGISTRATION AND INQUIRIES.

The Graves Services of the A.I.F., U.D.F., and N.Z.E.F. have now been unified with those of the British Forces under Assistant Director, Graves Registration and Enquiries, Middle East.

In future, Burial Returns from the Combined Forces in the Middle East will be submitted in duplicate to A.A.G. 2nd Echelon, G.H.Q., M.E.

In the case of the A.I.F., U.D.F., N.Z.F. F., and Indian Army a copy will also be sent to their respective 2nd Echelons.

Units and Chaplains in the Sudan will forward Burial Returns to Adv British O. 2.E., Sudan, who will, in turn, forward same to 2nd Echelon, M.E., after the necessary information for registration has been extracted by O.C., Graves Registration Unit, Sudan.

The present procedure for reporting burials in PALESTINE and TRANS-JORDAN will cease forthwith, and returns will now be submitted direct to A.A.G., 2nd Echelon, G.H.Q., M.E. (Div R.O. para 158)

10. RELEASE OF GRAVES PHOTOGRAPHS.

Photographs (postcard size) of graves of A.I.F. personnel buried in War Cemetery at GAZA, ISMAILIA, CAIRO, PORT SAID, and ALEXANDRIA since 1st Jan 40, are now available, and may be obtained on written application to Graves Registration and Enquiries Unit, A.I.F. Charge per photograph will be 25 mils (Palestine) which will be forwarded with application. (Div R.O. para 159)

11. CASH SHORTAGES - AUSTRALIAN ARMY PAY CORPS.

Full particulars of all cash shortages will be submitted to Chief Paymaster, A.I.F., for consideration by an Investigating Committee, to consist of :-

- C.P.M., A.I.F.
- Chief Auditor, A.I.F.
- Nominee of Comd. H.Q., A.I.F. Base Area.

The Committee will examine each case and will submit to H.Q., A.I.F. (M.E.), an opinion as to liability and a recommendation as to further action to recover the amount of the shortage or to write off such shortage. (Div R.O. para 160)

12. OUTSTANDING MESS ACCOUNTS.

As Para 503, Chapter XIV, of S.O.s, A.I.F., has caused doubts concerning the extent of the power to deduct amounts owing to a Mess, it is brought to attention that A.M.R. 785 provides as follows :-

"The amount of any money owing by an Officer, W.O, or N.C.O. to a Mess authorised under these Regulations may, with the approval of the Formation, etc, Commander, be deducted from any pay and allowance due, or to become due, to the Officer or Soldier."

(Div R.O. para 161)

13. SURPLUS RIFLES AND WEB EQUIPMENT.

Commanding Officers will ensure the return to the nearest Aust Ord Depot of all rifles and web equipment held in excess of the present strength of the unit.

A.I.F. Order (M.E.) No. 335 of 9 May 41 is cancelled.  
(Div R.O. para 162)

14. UNSERVICEABLE STOCKINGS - CONVERSION TO HOSETOPS.

Unit Commanders will take independent action to ensure that the feet of unserviceable stockings, woollen, are cut off and the legs of the stockings used as hoesetops.

Unit Commanders will also ensure that any unserviceable stockings in excess of unit requirements, after the above action has been taken, are returned to nearest Aust. Ord. Depot.  
(Div R.O. para 163)

15. CLOTHING - MOTOR CYCLISTS.

(a) Helmets, crash, despatch riders, will in future be issued on the scale of one for each despatch rider and motor cycle orderly of all units. Indents will be submitted through the usual channels.

(b) Helmets, Khaki, rubber-proofed, motor cyclists, are withdrawn from general use, and units in possession of these items will return them forthwith to the nearest Aust Ord Depot.

(c) All War Equipment Tables E2 Series will be amended by the inclusion of helmets, crash, under Section A1.  
(Div R.O. para 164)

16. USE OF CIVIL PETROL PUMPS.

Considerable difficulty is being experienced in accounting for petrol drawn from authorised civilian pumps, owing to AF G 825 not being fully and accurately completed. In future, units will ensure that all AFs G825 show clearly and legibly name of unit, date and quantity of petrol drawn, and that a clear signature is given.  
(Div R.O. para 165)

17. CHURCH SERVICES - Sunday 6 July 41.

(a) Mass (Roman Catholic) will be celebrated at 0700 and 1000 hrs in the CINEMA.

(b) Holy Communion at 0700 hrs in Recreation Room, A.A.S.C. Lines.  
Holy Communion at 0700 hrs in Salvation Army Hut, H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. Lines.

(c) COMBINED CHURCH PARADES.

2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn., 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn., 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn., Sigs., 6 Aust. Div at 0900 hrs in the CINEMA.  
H.Q. 6 Aust. Div. and 1 Aust A/Tk Regt at 0900 hrs in Recreation Room, 1 Aust. A/Tk Regt Lines.  
A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div. at 0945 hrs in Recreation Room, A.A.S.C. Lines.

.....  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION.

- H.Q., 6 Aust. Div.
- Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.
- A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.
- 1 Aust. A/Tk Regt.
- 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.                      Camp Staff Officer.
- 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn                      War Diary (2)
- 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn                      File.
- 45 Aust. L.A.D.
- C.R.S.
- 2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.

W. 1000  
A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 137

Part 1

5 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 5 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day	Capt C.F. Cowden, Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.
Next for Duty	Lieut A.A. Stewart, 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Duty Officer	Lieut A.F. Whitebrook, Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.
Next for Duty	Lieut S. Burrell, 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Cinema Picquet Officers	Capt C.R. Parsons, ) Sigs., Lieut R.M. Caspersom, ) 6 Aust. Div. Lieut B.A. Hamilton, )
Next for Duty	Lieut G.L. Leaney, ) 2/1 Aust. Lieut C.J. Prior, ) Inf. Bn. Lieut R.D. Hull, )
Field Medical Officer	Capt D. Williams, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.
Next for Duty	Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Duty Unit	Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.
Next for Duty	2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.

2. CIVILIAN CARS & DRIVERS.

Guards and Sentries have been observed permitting Civilian Car Drivers to enter Camp Lines without examining their passes.

Unit Commanders will ensure that a proper instruction is included in all orders to Guards. Sentries failing to observe the instructions will be dealt with accordingly.

3. BUILDINGS.

No painting or structural alterations to buildings in JULIS CAMP area will be effected without reference to H.Q., A.I.F. Base Area, GAZA.

4. LEAVE.

Some difficulty is experienced in ordering buses for 1 day Leave as Nominal Rolls and Fares are NOT reaching the Camp Staff Office by 1630 hrs on the day preceding leave. Units are now advised that buses will be ordered for the numbers in hand at 1630 hrs and all other leave will be cancelled.

5. VINEYARDS.

The practice of picking grapes in neighbouring vineyards will cease immediately. Apart from the consequent compensation claims, the practice constitutes theft. Future cases will be dealt with and punished accordingly.

*M. King*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION - As for B.R.O. No. 136, dated 4 July 41.

A U S T R A L I A N   I M P E R I A L   F O R C E

R O U T I N E

O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 138

Part 1

6 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 6 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day Next for Duty	Lieut A.A. Stewart, 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn. Capt J.C. Rishworth, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Duty Officer Next for Duty	Lieut S. Burrell, 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn. Lieut D.S.I. Burrows, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Cinema Picquet Officers	Lieut G.L. Leaney, ) Lieut C.J. Prior, ) 2/1 Aust. Lieut R.D. Hull, ) Inf. Bn.
Next for Duty	Lieut C.H. Anderson, ) Lieut D.N. Fairbrother, ) 2/2 Aust. Lieut J.B. Harkness, ) Inf. Bn.
Field Medical Officer Next for Duty	Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn. Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Duty Unit Next for Duty	2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

*W. J. Darcey*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION

H.Q., 6 Aust. Div.  
Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.  
A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.  
1 Aust. A/Tk Regt.  
2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
45 Aust. A.A.D.  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.  
Camp Staff Officer.  
War Diary (2)  
File.

*Was Draft*

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E .

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP.

No. 139

Part 1

7 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 7 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt J.C. Rishworth, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Capt H.S. Conkey, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Lieut D.S.I. Burrows, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Lieut J.P. Collins, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut C.H. Anderson, ) 2/2 Aust.  
Lieut D.N. Fairbrother, ) Inf. Bn.  
Lieut J.B. Harkness, )

Next for Duty

Lieut W.M. Gray, ) 2/4 Aust.  
Lieut J.B. Wells, ) Inf. Bn.  
Lieut H.S. Mullins, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Capt R.T. Dalton, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.

*J.W. Kenzie Capt*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION

- H.Q., 6 Aust. Div.
- Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.
- A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.
- 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.
- 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.
- 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
- 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.
- 45 Aust. L.A.D.
- C.R.S.
- 2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.
- Camp Staff Officer
- War Diary (2)
- File

A U S T R A L I A N   I M P E R I A L   F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

No. 140

--

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP

8 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 8 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt H.S. Conkey, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Capt R.H. de G. Nugent, A.A.S.C.,  
6 Aust. Div.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

To be notified  
Lieut B.H. Trend, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut W.M. Gray, ) 2/4 Aust.  
Lieut J.B. Wells, ) Inf. Bn.  
Lieut H.S. Millins, )

Next for Duty

Lieut J.E. Gannon, ) A.A.S.C.  
Lieut L.J. Tinkler, ) 6 Aust. Div.  
Lieut J.F.H. Brown, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt R.T. Dalton, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.  
Capt D. Williams, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.

*J.W. Kenzie Capt*

.....Major.  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION:

H.Q., 6 Aust. Div.  
Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.  
A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.  
1 Aust. A/Tk Regt  
2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
45 Aust. L.A.D.  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.  
Camp Staff Officer  
War Diary (2)  
File

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

No. 141

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP

9 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 9 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day

Capt R.H. de G. Nugent, A.A.S.C.,  
6 Aust. Div.

Next for Duty

Capt C.R. Powell, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.

Duty Officer

Lieut A.K. Bosgard, H.Q., 16 Aust. Inf.  
Bde.

Next for Duty

Lieut A.C. Pepper, H.Q., 16 Aust. Inf.  
Bde.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut J.E. Gannon, ) A.A.S.C.,  
Lieut L.J. Tinkler, ) 6 Aust. Div.  
Lieut J.F.H. Brown, )

Next for Duty

Lieut J.L. Risby, ) 1 Aust.  
Lieut R.J. Macintosh, ) A/Tk. Regt.  
Lieut O.H. Allom, )

Field Medical Officer

Capt D. Williams, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.  
Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

Next for Duty

Duty Unit

A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.  
1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.

Next for Duty

*H.H. Hammer*  
.....Major.  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION :

H.Q., 6 Aust. Div.  
Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.  
A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.  
1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.  
2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
45 Aust. L.A.D.  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.  
Camp Staff Officer  
War Diary (2)  
File



A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E

O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP.

No. 142

Part 1

10 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 10 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day.	Lieut. E.H. Jackson Hope, 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Next for Duty	Capt. D.L.B. Goslett, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Duty Officer	Lieut. W.L. Darcey, HQ. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.
Next for Duty	Lieut. R.J.F. McIntosh, " " " "
Cinema Picquet Officers	Lieut. R.D. Hull ) 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn. Lieut. C. Traise ) Lieut. A.J. Simpson. )
Next for Duty	Capt. J.B. Roberts ) Sigs., Lieut. H.L. Thompson ) 6 Aust. Div. Lieut. J.C.B. Watson )
Field Medical Officer	Capt. L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Next for Duty	Capt. P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Duty Unit.	2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Next for Duty	2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn. (Sigs., 6 Aust. Div Cinema Picquet only).

2. LEAVE.

All units are advised that under no circumstances is leave in PALESTINE to be granted on Sat. 12 Jul, Sun. 13 Jul, or Mon. 14 Jul 41. A strict check on all personnel will be made at irregular and frequent intervals during this period. (Div. R.O. para 149).

3. SANITATION.

Field Officers constantly draw attention to the lack of use of sump oil in Urinals and Latrine buckets.

These orders have, from time to time, drawn attention to the fact that sump oil may be obtained at BARBARA Work shops and units will ensure that this oil is drawn and used liberally.

4. CHURCH SERVICES - Sunday 13 Jul. 41

(a) Mass (Roman Catholic) will be celebrated at 0700 and 1000 hrs in the Cinema.

(b) Holy Communion

0700 hrs in Recreation Room, A.A.S.C. Lines ( for personnel of A.A.S.C. and 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.)

0700 hrs in Recreation Room, 2/4 Bn Lines ( for personnel of 2/1 and 2/4 Bns, Sigs., 6 Aust. Div. and H.Q., 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

(c) Combined Church Parades.

0900 hrs in Cinema for all units except A.A.S.C. and 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.

0900 hrs in Recreation Room, 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt. Lines.

0945 hrs in Recreation Room, A.A.S.C. Lines.

The Officer Commanding Combined Church Service at Cinema will be Lt. Col. F.O. Chilton, D.S.O.

5. ROUTINE ORDERS, 6 Aust. Div.

Routine Orders, No. 15, dated 9 Jul 41, by Maj. Gen. Sir Iven G. Mackay, K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D., Commander 6 Aust. Div., issued herewith, will be read and have the same force and effect as if repeated in these orders.

-----

*H. H. Hammer*  
.....Major.  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOTICES.

FOUND at Camp Cinema, Hat, F.S. - no markings.  
Owner may have same on application to Camp Staff Officer.

SPORTS MEETING.

JULIS Championship Sports Meeting will be held at A.A.S.C., BROWNE Lines at 1330 hrs on Sat. 12 Jul. 41.  
All competitors must be at the starting points 5 minutes before the event is timed to start.  
It is hoped that units will turn out in large numbers and give their sporting representatives every support.

.....

DISTRIBUTION:

- H.Q., 6 Aust. Div.
- Sigs., 6 Aust. Div.
- A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.
- 1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.
- 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.
- 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.
- 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.
- 45 Aust. L.A.D.
- C.R.S.
- 2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.
- Camp Staff Officer.
- War Diary (2)
- File.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E .

R O U T I N E O R D E R S .

BY

Lt.-Col. K. W. Eather , D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED.

JULIS  
CAMP.

No. 143

Part 1

11 July, 1941

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 11 July, 41.

Field Officer of the Day.  
Next for Duty.

Capt. D.L.B. Goslett, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Capt. N.W.P. Farrell, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.

Duty Officer.

Lieut. R.J.F. McIntosh, H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

Next for Duty.

Capt. I.C. Fulton, " " " "

Cinema Picquet Officers.

Capt. J.B. Roberts ) Sigs.,  
Lieut. H.L. Thompson ) 6 Aust. Div.  
Lieut. J.C.B. Watson )  
Lieut. L.F. Hallett ) 2/4 Aust.  
Lieut. D.A. Follington ) Inf. Bn.  
Lieut. H.S. Mullens )

Field Medical Officer.  
Next for Duty.

Capt. P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Capt. D; Williams, A.A.S.C., 6 Aust. Div.

Duty Unit.  
Next for Duty.

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.

2. INSPECTIONS BY R.E. REPRESENTATIVES: Further to H.Q. 6 Aust. Div.  
Circular No; 100/C1/2 of 24 Jun., 41, re Barrack Damages:-

Numerous occasions have been reported recently of Units refusing to accept responsibility for barrack damages. It is pointed out that foster unit personnel take over on behalf of the incoming unit and it is the responsibility of the Unit taking over the Lines to ensure that all items taken over by the foster personnel are checked and deficiencies noted. This check is therefore the basis of Engineer Stores on charge to the Lines and deficiencies on subsequent monthly inspections are the responsibility of the Unit occupying the Lines. Every assistance is to be given to R.E. representatives during their tour of inspection.

3. PASSES CIVILIAN DRIVERS.

(a) Units will ensure that civilian drivers upon reporting to a Unit will report to Camp Staff Office before being taken on strength.

(b) When a civilian driver is dismissed or replaced, his pass must be taken and handed to Camp Staff Office.

4. DRESS - GUARDS & SENTRIES.

The turnout of Guards at this H.Q. is not satisfactory. Units are directed to ensure that Guards are mounted properly turned out and the N.C.O. in charge be conversant in his duties and instructed to maintain the standard required of a H.Q.'s Guard.

5. MOVEMENT THROUGH BDE. H.Q. LINES. The attention of all ranks is to be directed to the fact that the practice of personnel of units moving indiscriminately through lines of this H.Q. is to cease forthwith. Troops when moving through on business will keep to the roadways.

*H. H. Hammer*  
.....Major,

B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION.

As per B.R.O. No. 142  
of 10 July, 41.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E .

R O U T I N E O R D E R S .

BY

Lt.-Col. K. W. Eather , D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED.

JULIS  
CAMP.

No. 144

Part 1

12 July, 1941.

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 12 July, 41.

Field Officer of the Day.  
Next for Duty.

Capt. M.K.Rungie, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Capt. E.H.Hernfield, AASC 6 Aust. Div.

Duty Officer.  
Next for Duty.

Capt. I.C.Fulton, H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.  
Lieut. A.K.Bosgard, " " " " "

Cinema Picquet Officers.

Lieut. L.F.Hallett, 2/4 Aust Inf. Bn.  
Lieut. D.A.Follington, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Lieut. H.S.Mullens, " " " "

Next for Duty.

Lieut. C.H.Riders, AASC 6 Aust. Div.  
Lieut. G.A.Dean, " " " "  
Lieut. W.H.Handbury, " " " "

Field Medical Officer.  
Next for Duty.

Capt. D.Williams, AASC 6 Aust. Div.  
Capt. L.V.Armati, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

Duty Unit.  
Next for Duty.

2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
AASC 6 Aust. Div.

*H.H. Hammer*  
.....Major,  
B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION.

H.Q. 6 Aust. Div.  
Sigs, 6 Aust. Div.  
A.A.S.C. 6 Aust. Div.  
1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.  
2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
45 Aust. L.A.D.  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.  
Camp Staff Officer.  
War Diary (2)  
File.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 145

Part 1

13 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 13 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day Next for Duty	Capt E.H. Hernfield, AASC 6 Aust. Div. Lieut G.S.Cox
Duty Officer Next for Duty	Lieut A.K. Bosgard, H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. Lieut A.C. Pepper, H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.
Cinema Picquet Officers	Lieut C.H. Rivers, ) AASC Lieut G.A. Dean, ) 6 Aust. Div. Lieut W.H. Handbury, )
Next for Duty	Lieut E.H. Jackson Hope ) 2/1 Aust Inf Lieut G. Millard ) Bn Lieut R. Hull )
Field Medical Officer Next for Duty	Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn. Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Duty Unit Next for Duty	AASC 6 Aust. Div. 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.

*H.H. Hammer*  
.....Major,

B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

DISTRIBUTION.

H.Q. 6 Aust. Div.  
Sigs, 6 Aust. Div.  
A.A.S.C. 6 Aust. Div.  
1 Aust. A/Tk. Regt.  
2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/4 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
45 Aust. L.A.D.  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust. Fd. Amb.  
Camp Staff Officer.  
War Diary (2)  
File.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 146

Part 1

14 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 14 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Lieut G.S. Cox, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt E.H. King, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Lieut A.K. Bösgard, H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde.  
Lieut W.L. Darcey, H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut E.H. Jackson-Hope, ) 2/1 Aust  
Lieut G. Millard, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut R.D. Hull, )

Next for Duty

Lieut C.H. Anderson, ) 2/2 Aust  
Lieut W.J. McPherson, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut C.T. Colquhoun, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn  
Capt D. Williams, AASC, 6 Aust Div.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/1 Aust Inf Bn  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn

2. AUDIT BOARD.

The following Officers will comprise Audit Board of HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde :-

Capt I.C. FULTON.  
Lieut A.K. BOSGARD.  
Lieut A.C. PEPPER.

3. FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES.

A tent has been destroyed by fire in Julis Camp. Units will make a careful survey of buildings and tents and will ensure that a plentiful supply of petrol tins filled with sand and water are at hand. Empty petrol tins can be obtained from Dump at MAJDAL.

*H.H. Hammer*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

NOTICES.

LOST - One Wristlet Watch at Sports Meeting, 12 Jul 41.  
Finder please return to these HQs.

DISTRIBUTION : As for B.R.O. No.145 dated 13 Jul 41.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

No. 147

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP

15 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 15 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt E.H. King, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt M.K. Rungie, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Lieut W.L. Darcey, H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde  
Lieut R.J.F. McIntosh, H.Q. 16 Aust.  
Inf Bde

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut C.H. Anderson, ) 2/2 Aust  
Lieut W.J. McPherson, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut C.T. Colquhoun, )

Next for Duty

Lieut K.T. McKellar, ) 2/4 Aust  
Lieut B.E. O'Mara, ) Inf Bn  
Lieut E.P.A. Smith, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt D. Williams, AASC 6 Aust Div.  
Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

2. COMPLIMENTS.

It has been noted that Guards & Sentries are NOT paying the correct compliments according to ranks.

Guard Comds will ensure that prior to Guard mounting all members of the Guard are fully aware of the correct compliments.

During the Guards Tour of Duty the Guard Comd will frequently check to see that this is being carried out.

*L.H. Hammer*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOTICES.

6 Aust Div Concert Party.

This party will perform at 2 sessions - 1800 hrs and 2000 hrs at JULIS CINEMA, Friday 18 Jul 41. Admission FREE.

Units will give this Concert the widest publicity.

FOUND.

Identity Discs - NX 59334 S. COOK.  
Owner may have same on applying to Camp Staff Office.

DISTRIBUTION : As for B.R.O. No. 146 dated 14 July 41.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E .

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 148

Part 1

16 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 16 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt M.K. Rungie, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt P.H. Ferris, AASC 6 Aust Div.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt I.C. Fulton, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde  
Lieut A.K. Bosgard, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut K.T. McKellar, ) 2/4 Aust  
Lieut B.E. O'Mara, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut E.P.A. Smith, )

Next for Duty

Capt T.A.S. Ibbitson, ) Sigs  
Lieut A.A. Mömsen, ) 6 Aust Div.  
Lieut F.C. Hewetson, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
AASC 6 Aust Div.

*H.A. Hammer*  
.....Major.  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

NOTICE.

LOSS OF PASS.

It is notified that the following pass has been lost :-

Pass 18875 issued to HOROWITZ MEIR by DCRE Beit Jirga.

It is requested that sentries on duty and all Provost personnel be informed of above and that a strict check be made to ascertain if this pass is being used to enter other camps.

In the event of this pass being found could it be notified to this H.Q. as soon as possible and the holder detained for interrogation.

DISTRIBUTION :

H.Q. 6 Aust Div.      Camp Staff Officer.  
Sigs 6 Aust Div.      War Diary (2)  
AASC 6 Aust Div.      File.  
1 Aust A/Tk Regt.  
2/1 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
45 Aust L.A.D.  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust Fd Amb.



AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

Ref. File T/1/41

*War Diary*

Headquarters  
16 Aust Inf Bde  
16 July 41

2/1 Aust Inf Bn  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn

SYLLABUS - TRAINING POLICY

1. The following syllabi will be submitted by units by 1800 hrs each Saturday. One copy only will be forwarded.

- (a) General training
- (b) Officers training
- (c) N.C.O's training
- (d) Syllabus for training
  - i. "I" Sec - including sniper training
  - ii. Signal Pl.
  - iii. A.A. Pl.
  - iv. Carrier Pl.
  - v. Mortar Pl
  - vi. Pioneer Pl. - not more than half day devoted to camp duties - remainder on Pioneer specialist duties.
  - vii. M.T. Drivers and Fitters.

2. Opportunity should now be taken to have discussions with the various personnel of the Administrative Pl. on such subjects as :-

- (a) Office work in the field
- (b) Sanitation and Hygiene in the field.
- (c) Water duties.

3. Attention must be given to the training of such personnel as :-

- (a) Stretcher Bearers
- (b) R.M. Police
- (c) Armourers
- (d) Batmen - as orderlies etc.
- (e) Training for additional personnel
  - i. Spare drivers
  - ii. Signallers
  - iii. Intelligence personnel
  - iv. Snipers.

4. Officers and N.C.O's.

The duration of Officers and N.C.O's special training classes to be held outside of normal training hours will be NOT less than 5 hours per week and will NOT include time for preparation of the next day's syllabus.

5. Training Policy. The following lessons will be given special attention during the completion of P1 training period to the end of July:-

- (a) CONTROL by ALL Junior Leaders
- (b) Weapon Training including Range Practices.
- (c) Fire control and fire discipline.
- (d) Fighting attacks by ;-
  - i. A.F.V's.
  - ii. A.F.V's and Infantry in cooperation.
  - iii. Enemy Aircraft.
- (e) Action against Parachute and Airborne Troops.
- (f) Minor tactical situations to develop :-
  - i. Alertness.
  - ii. Sense of duty.
  - iii. Military initiative.
  - iv. Aggressive spirit.

6. Platoon Training. The standard to be reached by the week ending 2 Aug 41 will be the completion of P1 training. A report will be submitted to this H.Q. by C.O's on 29 Jul 41 on the standard attained with special paras devoted to discipline control and the points set out in para 5 above.

*H. H. Hammer*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

Ref File T/1/41

Headquarters  
16 Aust Inf Bde

16 July 41

2/1 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
-----

TRAINING - CONTROL - DISCIPLINE.

1. TRAINING.

(a) The present platoon training period is the basis of all future work and is the solid foundation of the preparation of the whole unit for battle.

(b) The building up and moulding of the platoon as a fighting unit, highly trained and disciplined must receive the whole-hearted efforts of all concerned - the men, Sec Comd, Pl Comd, Coy Comd and the Bn Comd.

(c) A high standard is to be set - so high that only constant vigilance, alertness and efficiency on the part of all Officers and N.C.O.s indefatigably straining every nerve to produce the desired result.

(d) Lack of equipment will NOT be regarded as a reasonable excuse for lack of progress in training.

Improvisation, imagination and pooling of available weapons will be applied to the fullest extent.

2. CONTROL.

(a) There have been many evidences recently of the Junior Leader allowing the control of the private soldier to slip through his fingers. Orders have been given, but those orders were NOT carried out in their entirety.

(b) Instances have been noted where lack of control on the part of Junior Commanders and ill-discipline on the part of the men were most apparent but action taken against it has been neglected owing to the UNSEEING EYES of the more senior commanders present.

(c) The Junior Leader and Senior Leader must be ever alert to bad control by subordinates, ill-discipline and lack of obedience on the part of the men, and take immediate steps to ensure there is no repetition. Not one incident should be allowed to pass unchecked.

(c) The principle is to set a high standard of control to be achieved by all leaders. Only the BEST is good enough and there must be a continual drive until the BEST is attained.

(d) The sec comd must be allowed to lead his section in all phases of training.

The over-enthusiasm of the Pl Comd or his lack of confidence in the ability of the Sec Comd to control his section must never be a reason for Pl Comds to train and control the Pl as a whole.

Decentralization of command must be practiced - the Sec Comd given every opportunity to train and command his section.

If the Pl Comd lacks confidence in the ability of his subordinates, then it is his responsibility to train and teach his N.C.O.s. If the N.C.O. fails, it is the job of the Pl Comd to replace him.

N.C.O.s must be encouraged and given every chance to exercise their commands. The Sec Comd has to command his section in battle and it necessarily follows that he must command it in training.

3. DISCIPLINE.

(a) It is desired that units in every way raise the standard of discipline. It is felt that at times there is a certain laxity in the maintenance of discipline and the result is reflected in the general demeanour of the men when off parade, on leave, in the cinema and canteens.

(b) Discipline is not the dumb obedience which may be obtained on parade, but the willingness of the man to obey at any time, his good behavior on all occasions and his pride in himself, his turnout and his unit.

(c) The Commander is looking forward to a marked improvement in the general discipline of all units by the end of the Pl training period.

(Sgd) H.H.HAMMER Major.

B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Admin. Comd. 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 149

Part 1

17 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 17 July 41

Field Officer of the Day Next for Duty	Capt P.H. Ferris, AASC 6 Aust Div. Lieut A.G. Sanderson, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn.
Duty Officer Next for Duty	Lieut A.K. Bosgard, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde Lieut A.C. Pepper, HQ 16 Aust Inf Ide.
Cinema Picquet Officers	Capt T.A.S. Ibbotson, ) Sigs Lieut A.A. Momsen, ) 6 Aust Div. Lieut F.C. Hewetson, )
Next for Duty	Lieut R.D. Hull, ) 2/1 Aust Lieut C. Traise, ) Inf Bn. Lieut A.J. Simpson, )
Field Medical Officer Next for Duty	Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn. Capt D. Williams, AASC 6 Aust Div.
Duty Unit Next for Duty	AASC 6 Aust Div. 2/1 Aust Inf Bn.

2. CHURCH SERVICES - Sunday 20 Jul 41.

- (a) Mass (Roman Catholic) will be celebrated at 0700 hrs in 2/4 Aust Inf Bn Recreation Hut, GELLIBRAND LINES.  
A.A.S.C. Recreation Hut, BROWNE LINES, at 0800 hrs.  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn Recreation Hut, GODDARD LINES, at 0900 hrs.

Unit Comds will arrange for R.C. personnel parading for Combined Church Parade at CINEMA to be marched to the Mass last above mentioned.

(b) Holy Communion.

0700 hrs in Recreation Room A.A.S.C. Lines (for personnel of A.A.S.C. and 2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec.)  
0700 hrs in Recreation Room, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn Lines (for personnel of 2/1 and 2/4 Bns, Sigs 6 Aust Div and HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde)

(c) Combined Church Parades.

0900 hrs in the CINEMA for all units except A.A.S.C. 6 Aust Div and 2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec.

0915 hrs in Recreation Room, A.A.S.C. Lines.

The Offr Comd Combined Church Service at the CINEMA will be Major C.R.V. EDGAR.

*L.H. Hammer*  
.....Major.  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

DISTRIBUTION : As for B.R.O. No. 148 dated 16 Jul 41

P.T.O

NOTICES

FOUND.

Wallet, marked G.M.M. NX 2033.

Note Book - Cpl A.J. STEEN.

The above items are held at the Camp Staff Office.

A Watch owned by QX 8632 E.G. BULLOCK is held at Camp Staff Office.

Owner may collect same on application at abovementioned Office.

Capt R.H. Ferris, AASC & Aust Div  
 Lieut A.G. Sanderson, S/I Aust Div  
 Lieut A.K. Bosgard, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde  
 Lieut A.C. Pepper, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde  
 Capt T.A.E. Thompson, Sigs  
 Lieut A.A. Thomson, S/I Aust Div  
 Lieut F.C. Lawson, S/I Aust Div  
 Lieut R.D. Hill, S/I Aust Div  
 Lieut C. Trill, S/I Aust Div  
 Lieut A.J. Simpson, S/I Aust Div  
 Capt P.A. Tomlinson, S/I Aust Div  
 Capt D. Williams, AASC & Aust Div  
 AASC & Aust Div  
 S/I Aust Div

2. CHURCH SERVICES - Sunday 20 July 41.

(a) Mass (Roman Catholic) will be celebrated at 0700 hrs in S/I  
 Aust Inf Bn Recreation Hut, GELLIBRAND LINES.  
 A.A.S.C. Recreation Hut, BROWN LINES, at 0800 hrs.  
 S/I Aust Inf Bn Recreation Hut, GODDARD LINES, at 0900 hrs.

Unit Comd will arrange for R.C. personnel pending for Combined Church Parades at CINEMA to be mentioned in the Mass last above mentioned.

(b) Holy Communion.

0700 hrs in Recreation Room A.A.S.C. Lines (for personnel of  
 A.A.S.C. and S/I Aust Div Sec.)  
 0700 hrs in Recreation Room S/I Aust Inf Bn Lines (for personnel  
 of S/I and S/A Bns, Sigs & Aust Div and HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde)

(c) Combined Church Parades.

0900 hrs in the CINEMA for all units except A.A.S.C. & Aust Div  
 and S/I Aust Div Sec.  
 0915 hrs in Recreation Room, A.A.S.C. Lines.

The City Comd Combined Church Services at the CINEMA will be  
 Major C.R.V. EDGAR.

H.H. [Signature]  
 B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E

O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporary Administering Command 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

No. 150

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP

18 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 18 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Lieut A.G. Sanderson, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn  
Capt C.H. Green, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Lieut A.C. Pepper, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde  
Lieut W.L. Darcey, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut R.D. Hull, ) 2/1 Aust  
Lieut C. Traise, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut A.J. Simpson, )

Next for Duty

Lieut R.M. Moore, ) 2/2 Aust  
Lieut G.H. Wickham, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut W.J. McPherson, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn  
Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/1 Aust Inf Bn  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn

2. SECURITY - UNIT NAME ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS ISSUED TO PERSONNEL:

Army Driving Licence (AAF-G11) makes provision for the insertion of the holder's unit, and of any to which he may be transferred. As this form is carried at all times no unit name will appear on the driving licence. The letters AIF only will be inserted.

It has been found that the Paybooks of reinforcements and others recently arrived from Australia have not had the unit name removed. Particular care will be taken to check the Paybooks of new arrivals in the unit for security breaches of this nature. (Div R.O. para 184)

3. DISTRIBUTION LISTS:

The Distribution Lists advised in DRO No 123 dated 25 Jun are cancelled.

Correspondence will, until further orders, be distributed in accordance with Distribution Lists attached as Appendix "A"  
(Div R.O. para 185)

4. COMMUNICATIONS.

With reference to DRO para 124 of 25 Jun 41, after "CRA" in sub-para (b) "Emergency Operations", add "CRE" (Div R.O. para 186)

5. STATIONERY- WASTE.

Only one copy of correspondence need be forwarded to this HQ. The practice of forwarding two copies of letters is wasteful and unnecessary.  
(Div R.O. para 187)

6. HITCH-HIKING:

The practice of hitch-hiking along roads is dangerous and delaying to M.T. All unit Comds will take steps to put down this habit.  
(Div R.O. para 188)

7. SPECIAL INVESTIGATION STAFF - PROVOST SERVICE.

Additional personnel are required for the Special Investigation Staff, Provost Service, HQ, AIF (ME) The work is of a highly secret and confidential nature, and only the best type of soldier is required.

Recommended applications will be submitted to this HQ by 1000 hrs on 22 Jul 41 and DAPM 6 Aust Div will interview the selected candidates.

The minimum rank is L/Cpl carrying Specialist Pay at the rate prescribed for Trade Group II. A considerable number of Sgts is required. (Div R.O. para 189)

8. THEFT:

All losses by theft will be reported by Signal or telephone to DAPM 6 Aust Div. Civil Police will be informed only if the losses are serious and never unless DAPM 6 Aust Div is also informed.  
(Div R.O. para 190)

9. DISCIPLINE:

All units will submit to this HQ by 0900 hrs on 19 Jul 41 a return showing the Charge Reports received by them from DAPM, TEL AVIV and JERUSALEM, since 1 Jun 41, and awards made against the soldiers concerned.

As from 21 Jul 41, such returns will be rendered to this HQ by 0900 hrs each Monday.

10. VENEREAL DISEASE.

C.O.s of Units will ensure that lectures are given to all troops under their command.

Units without R.M.O.s will arrange for R.M.O. of the nearest unit that has such to lecture to their troops.

Particular care will be taken that all reinforcements receive instruction regarding V.D. (Div R.O. para 192)

11. CONSERVANCY - USE OF CRESOLI.

A number of cases has occurred where Cresoli has been used for the cleansing of Latrine Buckets.

Attention is directed to para 7 of "Special Conditions" of the current Conservancy Contract, which states "Latrine Buckets will be cleansed daily on the washing slab and shall be oiled".

On NO account will Cresoli be used for the above purpose, as the use of disinfectants renders the Otway Pits inoperative.  
(Div R.O. para 193)

12. GAMBLING:

It has been reported that gambling is still being permitted in Canteen buildings. This will be stopped immediately. All unit Picquets will be ordered to take adequate measures to put down this practice.

This order applies equally to the Soldier's Club in TEL AVIV and unit Leave Picquets will pay particular attention to this form of indiscipline.  
(Div R.O. para 194)



13. LOOT AND TRAFFIC IN ARMS;

It has been definitely established that members of H.M. Forces have been selling captured arms and ammunition.

From this, it is clear that the existing orders on this subject are not being obeyed. All ranks are reminded that it is forbidden to retain in their possession any public enemy property found on the battlefield. Anyone who disposes of captured arms to any other person is directly assisting the enemy. Such action is an offence punishable by imprisonment.

Any captured war material in the possession of Army personnel will be surrendered immediately.

This order will be repeated in all unit orders and brought to the notice of all ranks.

Div. R.O. Para 195.

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14. LEAVE.

Until further orders SYRIA will be visited only by personnel proceeding on duty.

No application to visit any part of it on leave will be granted.

Div. R.O. Para 196.

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15. BOMBING OF FISH - EL JURA.

It has been reported that troops have been "borrowing" fishermen's boats at EL JURA and, in exchange giving them explosives. These explosives have been used for fish bombing and even more serious things.

Units will take steps to ensure that no soldiers are permitted to carry any explosives for unauthorised pursuits.

Div. R.O. Para 197.

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16. WEARING OF PILOT'S AND OBSERVERS WINGS.

Pilots' and Observers' Wings are badges peculiar to the Air Force and are to be worn by members of the Australian Imperial Force only when serving with the Royal Australian Air Force.

Div. R.O. Para 198.

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17. AWARDS OF COMPENSATION AGAINST OFFENDERS IN ORDER TO PREVENT FINANCIAL LOSS TO THE A.I.F.

(a) As a result of offences committed by members of the A.I.F., in some cases loss or damage has been caused to property or persons belonging to the A.I.F., and in others the A.I.F. has been put to the expense of paying compensation to private individuals or to local public authorities.

(b) Offenders, as part of their punishment for the offence, will be made to pay for the loss, damage or expense they cause.

Unless he is put under stoppages of pay in the Summary Award of Court-Martial sentence, there is ordinarily no way of recovering from an offender compensation for the loss and expenses caused by his offence. See Army Act Sec 46 (7) and Rules of Procedure R. 6 (3).

P.T.O.

(c) Attention is drawn to Army Act SS 137 and 138 and to Defence Act S 97, by virtue of which a member of the A.I.F. who commits an offence can, by means of a Summary Award or Court-Martial sentence, be put under stoppages of pay in order to recover from him any of the following amounts:-

- (i) The amount of any expenses, loss damage or destruction caused to any private person or public authority by the commission of the offence.
- (ii) The amount of any loss of or damage or destruction done by the offender to any buildings or property, whoever the owner thereof may be.
- (iii) The amount of any loss of or damage or destruction done by the offender to any arms, ammunition, equipment, clothing, instruments, or regimental necessaries or military decorations, or to any other article owned by the Commonwealth of Australia or by a unit of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth.

(d) C.O.s and superior military authorities of the A.I.F. will therefore take the following steps to enable compensation for such loss, damage and expense to be recovered from the offenders by Summary Award of Court-Martial sentence :-

- (i) In each charge there should be stated the nature and value of any expense, loss, damage or destruction alleged to have been caused by the offence. If the C.O. has not already obtained adequate information regarding the extent of the losses and expenses caused by the offence, the accused, after being charged, should, if the circumstances of the case are not sufficiently grave to justify his being held in custody, be released pending the receipt of further information, without prejudice to his re-arrest in accordance with A.M.R & O 404. The C.O. should take all necessary steps to obtain the requisite information as soon as possible thereafter.
- (ii) C.Os (and also summary authorities within the meaning of the Army Act S 47) should, whenever losses or expenses have been caused to any public authority or private person by the offence for which they convict the accused, include in each Summary Award an Award of stoppages of pay as compensation in respect of such losses or expenses. Such an award of compensation can be inflicted conjointly with any other summary or minor punishment (A.M.R & O 418 (7) (a)). C.Os, in awarding compensation will award it as a stoppage of pay and for a specific sum (A.M.R. & O 418 (b)). Correct forms of sentence are to be found in the second appendix to the Rules of Procedure (Manual of Military Law, P.758 (t)), and should always be followed.
- (iii) A C.O., before applying for a Court Martial against any member of the A.I.F. under his command will ascertain, and will include in the "particulars" of the charges, as accurate details as possible concerning the amount of losses and expenses caused to the Army or to any private or public person or body as a result of the offence with which the accused is charged (Rules of Procedure, 13 (F) and First Appendix (note (23)))

If the accused's C.O. does not include such details in the "particulars", the convening officer will ascertain such details and ensure that they are included in the "particulars" of the charge before the accused is arraigned and tried. This Order will be repeated in unit Orders. (Div RO para 199)

18. AUSTRALIAN ARMY CANTEEN SERVICE - MESS ACCOUNTS:

Accounts due to the Australian Army Canteen Service will be paid, in the case of :-

(a) Sergeants' Messes - 7 days after the 15th day of the month and 7 days after the last day of the month.

(b) Officers' Messes - 7 days after the last day of the month. (Div R.O. para 200)

19. APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION OF OFFICERS, A.I.F.

Forwarded with these Orders is a copy of AIF (ME) Order 285. This is forwarded as many units apparently have lost their copies.

If these Orders are studied carefully, it should not be necessary to return AIF Forms A22(a) and A33(a) so frequently. (Div R.O. para 201)

20. ISSUE & RECEIPT VOUCHERS:

Units transferring stores to other units or returning stores to 2 A.O.D. will ensure that TWO copies of A.F.G. 1033 are forwarded to DADOS 6 Aust Div immediately transfer is effected. (Div R.O. para 202)

21. VACANCIES - MOVEMENT CONTROL STAFF:

Vacancies exist for Officer appointments on Movement Control Staff. Units will submit to Bde HQ names of Officers recommended, together with a full statement of their service and qualifications on or before 1000 hrs 22 Jul 41.

*James Kenzi* Capt. for  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

NOTICES.

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY.

The following Special Order of the Day has been issued by General Sir Archibald P. Wavell, G.C.B., C.M.G., M.C., and is published for your information:-

"On leaving the Middle East, I wish to express my grateful thanks to all those who have served me so well and so loyally during the two years I have held the Command. We have won some great successes, which will find a place in history, thanks to your skill, courage and hard work. We have had some failures and set-backs, when you have been out-matched in numbers and equipment; never in fighting qualities or endurance. Your magnificent spirit has been shown not only on our many fronts but in those places behind the lines where the unceasing work of preparation and maintenance goes on, which is so essential to success in battle. I shall always be very proud to have commanded the forces in the Middle East, representative not only of the mighty power of the British Commonwealth, but also of many other nationalities who have chosen to fight on rather than submit to injustice and oppression.

I know that you will maintain the same dauntless spirit and fighting qualities under my successor, and under his leadership you will win other victories. As Commander-in-Chief India, I shall hope to continue the close co-operation which already exists between the

Middle East and India whose magnificent troops have played so great a part in the campaigns here.

From my heart I thank you for the past and wish you all success in the future.

LOST:- Outside JULIS Cinema at about 1145 hrs 16 Jul 41.  
"DOXA" Waterproof Watch, with Stainless Steel Band.  
Finder please return to H.Q. 6 Aust Div.

LOST :- Brown Paybook Envelope containing Paybook (No 16500) and papers  
Photos and Identity Cards. Lost between 6 Aust Div HQ and  
HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.  
Finder please return to HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.

6 AUST DIV CONCERT PARTY.

The 6 Aust Div Concert Party will be appearing at JULIS Cinema on Friday 18 Jul at 1800 hrs and 2000 hrs.

Admission free.

The Palestine Broadcasting Society announces the following Australian features on B.B.C., Friday 18 Jul 41 :-

1730 hrs - Irlene Ralph (Violinist)

19 Jul 41 - 1030 hrs Howard Marshall - Talks with English Test Cricketers.

DISTRIBUTION :

- H.Q. 6 Aust Div.
- AASC 6 Aust Div
- Sigs 6 Aust Div
- 2/1 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/4 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/1 Aust Fd Amb.
- C.R.S.
- Camp Staff Officer
- War Diary (2)
- File

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Issued in conjunction with 6 Aust Div R.O. No16

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>List "A"</u>	<u>List "B"</u>	<u>List "C"</u>	<u>List "D"</u>
5	16 Aust Inf Bde (pass to 2/1 & 2/2 Bns)	1	3	3	13

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 151

Part 1

19 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 19 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt C.H. Green, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt H.S. Conkey, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Lieut W.L. Darcey, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde  
Capt I.C. Fulton, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut R.M. Moore,            ) 2/2 Aust  
Lieut G.H. Wickham,        ) Inf Bn  
Lieut W.J. McPherson,     )

Next for Duty

Lieut J.P. Collins,         ) 2/4 Aust  
Lieut G.W.A. Ormiston,     ) Inf Bn  
Lieut J.D. Holdsworth,     )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

*John Kenzie Capt*

.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

DISTRIBUTION:

HQ 6 Aust Div  
AASC 6 Aust Div  
Sigs 6 Aust Div  
2/1 Aust Inf Bn  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn  
2/4 Aust Inf Bn  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust Fd Amb  
45 Aust L.A.D.  
Camp Staff Officer  
War Diary (2)  
File

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 152

Part 1

20 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 20 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt H.S. Conkey, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt J. Morgan, AASC 6 Aust Div.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt I.C. Fulton, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.  
Lieut A.K. Bosgard, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut J.P. Collins, ) 2/4 Aust  
Lieut G.W.A. Ormiston, ) Inf Bn  
Lieut J.D. Holdsworth, )

Next for Duty

Lieut D.J. Arbuthnot, ) AASC  
Lieut W.H. Handbury, ) 6 Aust Div.  
Lieut G.A. Dean, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
AASC 6 Aust Div.

2. NATIVE FRUIT SELLERS.

All Guards and Sentries and Regimental Military Police will be instructed forthwith to move on all native fruit sellers appearing on the main or Camp roads until they are outside the camp limits.

Orders to this effect will immediately be inserted in Orders for Guards.

3. CANTEENS.

Unit Comds will ensure that Canteens are swept out thoroughly prior to the opening time for each session.

*Jim Kenzie Capt*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

N O T I C E

LOST:- Wallet, containing Paybook (No. 114894) and Drivers Licence No. 17424 belonging to VX 2298 Dvr N. FLETCHER.  
Finder please return to HQ, AASC 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION: As for B.R.O. No. 151 dated 19 Jul 41.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E

O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED  
No. 153

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP  
21 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 21 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day	Capt J. Morgan, AASC 6 Aust Div.
Next for Duty	Lieut B. Fletcher, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn.
Duty Officer	Lieut A.K. Bosgard, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.
Next for Duty	Lieut A.C. Pepper, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.
Cinema Picquet Officers	Lieut D.J. Arbuthnot, ) AASC Lieut W.H. Handbury, ) 6 Aust Div. Lieut G.A. Dean, )
Next for Duty	Lieut C. Traise, ) 2/1 Aust Lieut A.J. Simpson, ) Inf Bn. Lieut R.E. Powell, )
Field Medical Officer	Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.
Next for Duty	Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.
Duty Unit	AASC 6 Aust Div.
Next for Duty	2/1 Aust Inf Bn.

*J.H. Hamner*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

N O T I C E S

LOST SECURITY PASS.

Notification has been received from Field Security Service, G.H.Q. M.E. that Security Pass No. 412 (Green folding pass, with writing in English and Arabic, Description, Signature and Photo) has been lost and it is possible that this pass may be in the possession of some unauthorised person.

It is requested that all Provost personnel be informed of the above and a strict watch kept for this pass. In the event of it being found could it be notified to this H.Q. as soon as possible

The following articles have been handed to the Camp Staff Officer by the owner of the Civilian shop recently closed near the Swimming Pool :-

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>OWNER</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>OWNER</u>
1 Dressing Gown	Edwards	1 Blouse	Edwards
1 Watch	Dick	1 Watch	Douglas
1 Watch	Woods	Order J9	Mitchell
Order J11	Holt	Shirt	Lieut Bussel

A number of films and prints are also held and will be handed over on application to Camp S.O.

FOUND: Identity Discs - NX 15346 - R.A. SMALL  
Owner apply to Camp S.O.

DISTRIBUTION: As for B.R.O. No.152 dated 20 Jul 41

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 154

Part 1

22 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 22 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Lieut B. Fletcher, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt C.H. Green, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Lieut A.C. Pepper, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.  
Capt I.C. Fulton, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut C. Traise, ) 2/1 Aust  
Lieut A.J. Simpson, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut R.E. Powell, )

Next for Duty

Lieut D.N. Fairbrother, ) 2/2 Aust  
Lieut D.S.I. Burrows, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut C.H. Anderson, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.


Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/1 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

2. CINEMA.

Unit Comds will ensure that the following order is promulgated to all ranks:-

Under no circumstances will any man be allowed to remain inside the Cinema who is NOT wearing a Shirt or Jacket. Cinema Picquets will be instructed to enforce this order strictly.

  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

N O T I C E

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

The following Special Order of the Day has been issued by General Sir H. MAITLAND WILSON, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the British Forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and is published for your information :-

"FOR COMMUNICATION TO THE TROOPS.

The Secretary of State for War on behalf of the Army Council, on sending congratulations on the conclusion of the campaign in Syria, wishes the following message to be conveyed to the Troops:

Thank the Troops from the United Kingdom, Australia and India and the Free French Forces under your command for their gallantry and endurance in arduous fighting over difficult country. You will share my hope that never again will Imperial Troops have to fire upon the brave soldiers of a recent Ally, nor the Free French Forces oppose their countrymen in battle.

P.T.O.



I mourn with you the losses you have suffered in this conflict, unnatural but forced upon us."

Temporarily Commanding Officer

DISTRIBUTION:

- HQ 6 Aust Div
- AASC 6 Aust Div
- Sigs 6 Aust Div
- 2/1 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/4 Aust Inf Bn
- 45 Aust L.A.D.
- C.R.S.
- 2/1 Aust Fd Amb
- Camp Staff Officer
- War Diary (2)
- File

Field Officer of the Day  
 Next for Duty  
 Only Officer  
 Next for Duty  
 Cinema Picquet Officers  
 Next for Duty  
 Field Medical Officer  
 Next for Duty  
 Duty Unit  
 Next for Duty

*Handwritten signature*  
 Major  
 5.M. 10 Aust Inf Bde

NOTICE

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

The following Special Order of the Day has been issued by General Sir H. MATTHEW WILSON, G.B.E., K.O.B., D.S.O., Commanding the British Forces in Palestine and Trans-Jordan, and is published for your information.

"FOR CONVEYANCE TO THE TROOPS"

The Secretary of State for War on behalf of the Army Council, on sending congratulations on the conclusion of the campaign in Syria, wishes the following message to be conveyed to the Troops:

Thank the Troops from the United Kingdom, Australia and India and the Free French Forces under your command for their gallantry and endurance in arduous fighting over difficult country. You will share my hope that never again will our brave troops have to fire upon the brave soldiers of a recent Ally, nor the Free French Forces oppose their countrymen in battle.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

No. 155

Part 1:

JULIS  
CAMP

23 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 23 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt C.H. Green, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
To be notified later.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt I.C. Fulton, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.  
Lieut A.K. Bosgard, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut D.N. Fairbrother, ) 2/2 Aust  
Lieut D.S.I. Burrows, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut C.H. Anderson, )

Next for Duty

Capt C.F. Cowden, ) Sigs,  
Lieut J.B. Roberts, ) 6 Aust Div.  
Lieut P.C. Bennett, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

2. LEAVE PARTY PICQUETS.

Units are reminded that Leave Party Picquets will report to Camp Staff Officer at 0700 hrs daily at the CINEMA. In future a serious view will be taken of any neglect or lack of punctuality in this regard.

3. DRESS - CINEMA PICQUET

As from to-night, 23 Jul 41, Cinema Picquet will wear Trousers, K.D. Special.

*L.H. Hammer*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

N O T I C E.

FOUND. At Camp Cinema, 2 Forage Caps, NX 14083 D. STEWART., 1 unmarked.  
Owners apply to Camp Staff Officer.

DISTRIBUTION: As for B.R.O. No.154 dated 22 July 41

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E .

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 156

Part 1

24 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 24 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day Next for Duty	Capt H.S. Conkey, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn. Capt R.H. de G. Nugent, AASC 6 Aust Div
Duty Officer Next for Duty	Lieut A.K. Bosgard, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde Lieut A.C. Pepper, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
Cinema Picquet Officers	Capt C.F. Cowden, ) Sigs Lieut J.B. Roberts, ) 6 Aust Div Lieut P.C. Bennett, )
Next for Duty	Capt E.H. Hernfield, ) AASC Capt J. Morgan, ) 6 Aust Div Lieut C.C. Marr, )
Field Medical Officer Next for Duty	Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn
Duty Unit Next for Duty	2/4 Aust Inf Bn. AASC 6 Aust Div.

2. JULIS SWIMMING POOL.

A complaint has been received from the manager of this Pool that personnel are obtaining admission without payment.

Any future cases will be severely dealt with.

*H.H. Hammer*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

N O T I C E

S P O R T I N G F I X T U R E .

CRICKET. The draw for Sunday 27 Jul is :-

Div H.Q. )  
2/4 Bn ) On Div H.Q. Ground.

Pro Coy )  
2/1 Bn. ) On A/Tk Ground.

A.A.S.C. )  
2/2 Bn. ) On A.A.S.C. Ground.

Sigs. )  
Pay & Postal ) On Cinema Ground.

16 Bde HQ Has use of Bde HQ Ground.

Units to arrange starting times and equipment between themselves. It is desired that these be a full day's match. Units will advise Amenities Office of result of match.

PT.O.

BOXING.

Entries will be submitted to Amenities Office, 6 Aust Div, by Friday 25 July for a Boxing Tournament, eliminations to be held at the boxing ring, JULIS Camp, Wed 30 Jul at 1800 - 2000 hrs and each following night.

Weights:-	Feather	up to	9	stone	
	Light	" "	9	"	9 lbs
	Welter	" "	10	"	7 "
	Middle	" "	11	"	4 "
	Heavy	" "			

No limit to the number of entries from each unit. Bouts will be 3 rounds of 2 minutes duration, and 1 minute spell.

0.79

DISTRIBUTION:

- HQ 6<sup>th</sup> Aust Div
- AASC 6 Aust Div
- Sigs 6 Aust Div
- 2/1 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/4 Aust Inf Bn
- 1/1 Aust Fd Amb
- C.R.S.
- 45 Aust L.A.D.
- Camp Staff Officer
- War Diary (2)
- File

advise  
0.79

(S)

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 157

Part 1

25 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 25 July 41

Field Officer of the Day	Lieut B.H. Trend, AASC 6 Aust Div.
Next for Duty	Lieut P. Barclay, 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.
Duty Officer	Lieut A.C. Pepper, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
Next for Duty	Capt I.C. Fulton, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
Cinema Picquet Officers	Capt E.H. Hernfield, ) AASC
	Capt J. Morgan, ) 6 Aust Div.
	Lieut C.C. Marr, )
Next for Duty	Lieut. E. Jackson Hope ) 2/1 Aust. Inf.
	Lieut. G. Leaney ) Bn.
	Lieut. J. Crowe )
Field Medical Officer	Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.
Next for Duty	Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.
Duty Unit	AASC 6 Aust Div.
Next for Duty	2/1 Aust Inf Bn.

2. REGISTERED POST:

(a) Personnel are advised to send by registered post any packet - not exceeding one (1) lb weight - containing valuable enclosed. The additional fee is 3d.

(b) Registered articles are checked from hand to hand and safeguarded against loss during transit.

(c) These should not be placed in a posting receptacle but presented at an Army Post Office, where a receipt will be issued.

(d) Registered packets must be properly packed and securely wrapped. Linen, canvas or calico is the most suitable type of cover.

(Div R.O. para 204)

3. TECHNICIANS:

A.A.S.C. 6 Aust Div is at present considerably short of technical personnel. The vacancies are for the undermentioned branches, and C.O.s are requested to agree to any transfers to fill them:-

Welders, Fitters, Mechanics MT, Carpenters,  
Electricians, Painters and Signwriters. (Div R.O. para 205)

4. DEDUCTIONS OF FIELD ALLOWANCE FROM CLAIMS FOR RE-IMBURSEMENT OF MESS AND HOTEL ACCOUNTS.

Certified claims may be submitted by members of the AIF for re-imburement of Field Allowance debited to them for any period spent in another Mess, other than AIF, and for any period in excess of 14 days during which they were on duty in locations where rations and quarters were not available.

This provision will not apply to deductions made for periods prior to 1st Jan 41. (Div R.O. para 206)

5. TYRE PRESSURES:

Considerable damage is being caused to roads through vehicles working with excessive tyre pressures.

While excessive pressures cause damage to roads, under-inflation rapidly destroys the tyres. Special attention must therefore be paid to maintaining correct tyre pressures at all times. (Div R.O. para 207)

6. STRETCHERS, AMBULANCE - ILLEGAL USE OF:

It has been brought to notice that troops are using stretchers, ambulance, as beds. Stretchers will only be used for legitimate purposes.

Os.C will take immediate steps to stop this practice and will take disciplinary action where necessary. (Div R.O. para 208)

7. PAINING OF STEEL HELMETS:

It has been reported that the rims of steel helmets, and the heads of the bolt securing the lining to the helmets, are giving away the position of troops by reflecting the rays of the sun. This is the result of the paint wearing off.

Units will ensure, therefore, that these portions of steel helmets are regularly touched up. Indents for paint required will be submitted through the usual channels. (Div R.O. para 209)

8. TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS:

The number of traffic accidents involving third parties only, now amounts to approximately one hundred per week. This figure is excessive and must be reduced in the interests of efficiency and economy. Most accidents are caused by neglect of elementary traffic regulations or by speeding.

It is the responsibility of Commanding Officers in Charge of Transport to ensure that adequate instructions on these points are given to all drivers under their command and to take severe disciplinary action where they are disobeyed or neglected.

It is the duty of all Officers and other ranks to report cases of speeding and bad driving immediately and all such reports are to be investigated most carefully.

This order is to be repeated in Unit Orders and Commanding Officers are to have this Order specifically brought to the notice of all drivers under their command at least once every month. (Div R.O. para 210)

9. PHOTOGRAPHS.

The practice of forwarding to Australia personal photographs taken in such a manner as to show the portrait superimposed or inset on facsimile Australian Bank Notes in the blank oval space reserved for the water-mark will cease. The possession of such photographs in Australia constitutes an offence under the Commonwealth Bank Act, and any person within the Commonwealth in possession thereof is liable to prosecution.

This order will be repeated in Unit Orders. (Div R.O. para 211)

10. AUSTRALIAN ARMY PROVOST CORPS - TRANSFER TO:

Transfers to the Australian Army Provost Corps are required immediately. Applicants must be of good physique, minimum height 5 ft. 8 in., have no punishments recorded on A.F. B.122, and have served in a forward area under fire. Men who are required to wear spectacles will not be accepted.

Applications to be forwarded through proper channels to this HQ. (Div R.O. para 212)

11. PAYBOOKS - LOSS OF:

(a) Commanding Officers will ensure that Paybooks remain in the possession of the soldier at all times.

(b) Cases of loss occasioned by the negligence or carelessness of the soldier are to be severely dealt with as breaches of military discipline.

(c) Commanding Officers will carry out periodical check parades for the purpose of establishing :-

(i) The identity of soldiers without Paybooks.

(ii) The early detection of fraudulent or irregular entries.  
(Div R.O. para 213)

12. SHRINKAGE OF KHAKI DRILL SHORTS AND TROUSERS:

Shrinkage up to one inch in waist and leg measurements is occurring in Khaki Drill Shorts and Trousers obtained under Local contracts.

Commanding Officers will make allowance for this when submitting indents. (Div R.O. para 214)

13. BOTTLES, OIL, AND PULL-THROUGHS:

Heavy wastage in bottles, oil, and pull-throughs is occurring. Commanding Officers will ensure that stricter supervision is exercised in regard to the carrying of these items in butts of rifles. When pull-through cords become unserviceable the weights must be returned to the nearest Aust OD. (Div R.O. para 215)

14. CAREFUL HANDLING OF PETROL:

As a result of imprudent handling of petrol, fires have occurred recently whereby soldiers and property belonging to the AIF have suffered much loss or damage.

Unit Commanders will ensure that every precaution is taken when it is necessary for personnel to handle petrol or other inflammable liquids. (Div R.O. para 216)

15. DRESS.

Headdress will be worn in the street at all times. Hats or caps will not be carried in the hand or on the shoulder. (Div R.O. para 217)

16. ISSUES OF FUEL:

Cotton Seed Cake may now be issued as fuel in lieu of coal or fuelwood.

The following scale of equivalents will be used:-

5 lbs Cotton Seed Cake = 8 lbs Fuel wood or  
4 lbs Coal. (Div R.O. para 218)

17. MT RESTRICTIONS, ALEXANDRIA:

(a) Vehicles MT are forbidden to move in ALEXANDRIA between 2100 hrs and daylight unless carrying a Special Permit stating nature of duty.

(b) Special permits may be obtained on personal application from C.O., A.I.F. Details, CAIRO, or Camp Comdt, HQ, AIF (ME).  
(Div R.O. para 219)

18. U.S. CLOTHING.

All U.S. Clothing will be returned to 2 AOD and NOT to Base Area Salvage Section. (Div R.O. para 220)

**19. PROVISION OF FRESH MILK:**

In order to save shipping space it is necessary to utilise all available fresh milk. As the supply of fresh milk in PALESTINE is not sufficient to meet the whole WD requirements, issued will be made to units as selected by OCs D.I.D.s.

The scale will be  $\frac{1}{4}$  pint per man per day.

For units selected, the following information is given :-

(a) Fresh milk will be obtained from D.I.D.s and it is pointed out that every precaution is being taken to ensure the arrival of milk in fresh and sound condition, but units must also take adequate precautions to prevent its turning sour before consumption. The necessity of sterilising milk to avoid risk of infection is stressed. All fresh milk will be boiled before consumption.

(b) Containers are the property of the Contractor and it is imperative that they are returned to the D.I.D.s on the day they are received. The number of containers available is strictly limited and units will make suitable arrangements for holding the milk pending consumption.

(c) Units will ensure that containers are washed out with COLD clean water immediately they are emptied.

(d) Units will be charged for lost or damaged containers.

(e) The fullest co-operation of Commanding Officers of the units selected to draw fresh milk is essential to make this scheme a success. (Div R.O. para 221)

**20. BLACKOUT REGULATIONS:**

Personnel staying at the King Solomon Hotel, TEL AVIV, on overnight leave have been infringing the Blackout regulations by opening windows without first putting out the light.

All personnel will strictly comply with the ARP Regulations issued by the Local Authorities in any town in PALESTINE. Disciplinary action will be taken against any person failing to do so.

To be repeated in Unit Orders. (Div R.O. para 222)

**21. THEFTS, ROBBERIES, SHOOTING INCIDENTS, INJURIES TO CIVILIANS:**

The following is the procedure to be adopted in reporting theft of arms, equipment, stores or personal property :-

(1) If Arms and/or amm are involved, report to:-

- (i) Force H.Q.
- (ii) Div H.Q.
- (iii) Bde H.Q.
- (iv) Civil Police
- (v) Camp Staff Officer
- (vi) FSS Sec, AIF (ME) Base Area.

(2) If equipment or property other than arms and amm, report to:-

- (i) Bde H.Q.
- (ii) Div H.Q.
- (iii) Civil Police
- (iv) Camp Staff Officer
- (v) FSS Sec, AIF (ME) Base Area.

Before any raids are made upon civilian property or traps laid to catch Civilians suspected of stealing property and/or dealing in arms, the following will be informed:-

- (i) Bde H.Q.
- (ii) Div H.Q.
- (iii) Civil Police
- (iv) FSS Sec, AIF (ME) Base Area

(Div R.O. para 223)



22. ROAD ACCIDENT REPORTS:

The following is the procedure to be adopted when any vehicle of a unit under Command of 6 Aust Div is involved in any road accident which results in damage to a Military vehicle or a Civil vehicle, or injury to Military personnel or Civilians:-

- (1) Date, time and place of accident and number of vehicle is to be reported to Bde H.Q. by Signal or by telephone.
- (2) If Civilians are involved, DAPM 6 Aust Div and Civil Police at nearest Police Post to the scene of accident are to be notified.
- (3) As soon as practicable, Army Form A3676, Outer Cover and Inner Sheets "A" and "B" are to be forwarded to this H.Q.
- (4) When Court of Inquiry has been ordered, the completed proceedings, in duplicate, are to be forwarded to this H.Q.  
(Div R.O. para 224)

23. CHURCH SERVICES - Sunday 27 July 41:

- (a) Mass (Roman Catholic) will be celebrated at 0700 hrs in 2/4 Aust Inf Bn Recreation Hut, GELLIBRAND LINES.  
A.A.S.C. Recreation Hut, BROWNE LINES, at 0800 hrs.  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn Recreation Hut, GODDARD LINES, at 0900 hrs.

Unit Comds will arrange for R.C. personnel parading for Combined Church Parade at CINEMA to be marched to the Mass last abovementioned.

(b) Holy Communion:

0700 hrs in Recreation Room, AASC Lines ( for personnel of AASC and 2/1 Aust Fd Hygiene Sec)  
0700 hrs in CINEMA for all units other than AASC.

(c) Combined Church Parades.

0900 hrs in the CINEMA for all units except AASC 6 Aust Div and 2/1 Aust Fd Hygiene Sec.  
0915 hrs in Recreation Room, AASC Lines, for AASC and 2/1 Aust Fd. Hygiene Sec.

*H.H. Hammer*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

NOTICE

LOST. Paybook Cover containing Paybook, money and Officer's Identification Cards (Greek and Egypt), also private papers.

Finder please return to H.Q. 6 Aust Div.

DISTRIBUTION: As for B.R.O. No 156 dated 24 July 41

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E .

R O U T I N E O R D E R S .

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather , D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

No. 158

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP

26 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 26 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Lieut P. Barclay, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn  
Capt. A.A. Buckley, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt I.C. Fulton, H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde  
Lieut R.J.F. McIntosh " " " "

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut E. Jackson Hope ) 2/1 Aust  
Lieut G. Leaney ) Inf Bn  
Lieut J. Crowe )

Next for Duty

Lieut I.B. Ferguson ) 2/2 Aust  
Lieut G.H. Wickham ) Inf Bn  
Lieut C.H. Anderson )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn  
Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/1 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

-----  
*J. M. Kenji* Capt  
.....Major,

B.M. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E .

R O U T I N E O R D E R S .

BY

Lt. Col. K. W. Eather, D. S. O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED.

JULIS  
CAMP.

No. 159.

Part 1.

27 July 1941.

1. DUTIES.

To mount at Retreat, 27 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day	Capt A. A. Buckley, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.
Next for Duty.	Capt H.S. Conkey. 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.
Duty Officer	Lieut R.J. McIntosh 16 Aust Inf Bde. #a
Next for Duty	Lieut S.M. Percival 16 Aust Inf Bde. "
Cinema Picquet Officers	Lieut I.B. Ferguson ) 2/2 Aust
	Lieut G.H. Wickham ) Inf Bn.
	Lieut C.H. Anderson )
Next for Duty	Lieut D.N. Fairbrother ) 2/2 for
	Lieut J.M. Blaymey ) 2/4 Aust Inf
	Lieut R.C. Moore 9Bn.
Field Medical Officer	Capt P.A. Tomlinson 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.
Next for Duty	Capt L.V. Armati 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.
Duty Unit	2/2 Aust Inf Bn
Next for Duty	2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

*P. H. Conkey*  
B/M 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Distribution.

H.Q. 6 Aust Div  
AASC 6 Aust Div  
SIGS 6 Aust Div  
2/1 Aust Inf Bn  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn  
2/4 Aust Inf Bn  
45 LAD  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust Fld Amb.  
2/1 Fld Hyg.  
Camp Staff Officer.  
War Diary (3)  
File.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E

O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

No. 160

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP

28 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 28 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt H.S. Conkey, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt P.H. Ferris, AASC 6 Aust Div.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Lieut S.M. Percival, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.  
Capt I.C. Fulton, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut D.N. Fairbrother, ) 2/2 Aust  
Lieut J.M. Blamey, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut R.C. Moore, )

Next for Duty

Lieut R.G. Tayles, ) AASC  
Lieut J.W. Jenner, ) 6 Aust Div.  
Lieut G.F. Norton, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
AASC 6 Aust Div.

*H.H. Hammer*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde.

N O T I C E S.

LOSS OF PASSES

It is notified that the following passes have been lost :-

Pass No. C 19373 issued to MOHD. ABDUL RAHMAN, labourer  
" " C 18996 " " HILMI MUSHAMED EL SUVEIRKI  
" " C 6002 " " HUSSEIN MOH'D KANOVA

It is requested that the sentries on duty and all provost personnel be informed of above, and a strict watch made to ascertain if these passes are being used to enter other camps.

In the event of these passes being found, could it be notified to this H.Q. as soon as possible, and the holder detained for interrogation.

A.I.F. OFFICERS SHOP - A.A.O.C.  
GAZA.

The above shop is open for business as follows :-

Week Days - 0900 to 1230  
1400 to 1730

Sundays - 1400 to 1730

A Price List has been forwarded to all Units in JULIS CAMP.

DISTRIBUTION: As for B.R.O. No. 159 dated 27 July 41.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED  
No. 161

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP

29 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 29 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Capt P.H. Ferris, AASC 6 Aust Div.  
Lieut P. Barclay, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt I.C. Fulton, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.  
Lieut A.C. Pepper, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Lieut R.G. Tayles, ) AASC  
Lieut J.W. Jenner, ) 6 Aust Div.  
Lieut G.F. Norton, )

Next for Duty

Capt J.B. Roberts, ) Sigs  
Capt C.R. Parsons, ) 6 Aust Div.  
Capt L.N. Tribolet, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

AASC 6 Aust Div.  
2/1 Aust Inf Bn.

2. DRESS:

Ref Div R.O. No. 145 and para 2, Bde R.O. No. 154, Unit Comds will ensure that a charge will be preferred in respect of all breaches of these orders.

*H.H. Hammer*

.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

DISTRIBUTION:

HQ 6 Aust Div.  
AASC 6 Aust Div.  
Sigs 6 Aust Div.  
2/1 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/4 Aust Inf Bn.  
45 Aust L.A.D.  
C.R.S.  
2/1 Aust Fd Amb.  
2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec.  
Camp Staff Officer  
War Diary (2)  
File.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E

R O U T I N E O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

No. 162

Part 1

JULIS  
CAMP

30 July 41

1. DUTIES.

To Mount at Retreat, 30 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty

Lieut P. Barclay, 2/1 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt B. Brock, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Officer  
Next for Duty

Lieut A.C. Pepper, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.  
Lieut S.M. Percival, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Cinema Picquet Officers

Capt J.B. Roberts, ) Sigs  
Capt C.R. Parsons, ) 6 Aust Div.  
Capt L.N. Tribolet, )

Next for Duty

Lieut D.J. McNeill, ) 2/2 Aust  
Lieut I.B. Ferguson, ) Inf Bn.  
Lieut D.S.I. Burrows, )

Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty

Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.  
Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

2/1 Aust Inf Bn.  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

2. FIELD OFFICERS' REPORTS:

In future Field Officers' Reports will be more detailed and the column headed "Action taken by Fd O." will be filled in.

3. COURTS OF INQUIRY:

Attention of units is drawn to the fact that Courts of Inquiry do NOT make a "finding". However it may be called upon to report on an incident.

4. CIVILIAN CAR DRIVERS' PASSES:

Units are reminded that Civilian Car Drivers' Passes expire on the 31 Jul. Units will ensure that these passes are presented for renewal NOT later than 1600 hrs 30 Jul 41.

*J.M. King*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

N O T I C E S

B.B.C. PROGRAMMES FOR 27 JULY - 2 AUGUST.

In this week's "Starlight" programme at 16.15 hrs on Sunday (which is rebroadcast from JERUSALEM), the star is Albert Wheelan. Other Australian artists appearing during the week are Helen Baines and Frank Layton (0945 hrs on Thursday).

All the other features appear at their usual times. In "Calling Australia" on Saturday, 1030 hrs, Howard Marshall will interview English Test Cricketers.

P.T.O.

Lt. Col. K.M. ... D.S.O.

**LOST:** Lost in or near Latrine in GELLIBRAND LINES, West of 2/2 Aust. Inf Bn Transport Shed, at approx 1830 hrs on 26 Jul 41, Paybook No. 181555 by NX 47816 Pte ROBISON A.E., 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.

**DISTRIBUTION**

- HQ 6 Aust Div
- AASC 6 Aust Div
- Sigs 6 Aust Div
- 2/1 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/2 Aust Inf Bn
- 2/4 Aust Inf Bn
- 45 Aust L.A.D.
- C.R.S.
- 2/1 Aust Fd Amb
- 2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec
- Camp Staff Officer
- War Diary (2)
- File

Field Officer of the Day  
Next for Duty  
Duty Officer  
Next for Duty  
Cinema Project Officers  
Next for Duty  
Field Medical Officer  
Next for Duty  
Duty Unit  
Next for Duty

**3. FIELD OFFICERS' REPORTS:**

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Attention of Units is drawn to the fact that Courts of Inquiry do NOT make a "finding". However it may be called upon to report on an incident.

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Units are reminded that Civilian Car Drivers' Passes expire on the 31 Jul. Units will ensure that these passes are presented for renewal NOT later than 1500 hrs 30 Jul 41.

Major  
B.M. 18 Aust Inf Bn

**NOTICES**

**B.B.C. PROGRAMMES FOR 27 JULY - 2 AUGUST.**

In this week's "Spotlight" programme at 10.15 hrs on Sunday (which is rebroadcast from JERUSALEM), the star is Albert Wheelin. Other Australian artists appearing during the week are Helen Baines and Frank Layton (10.45 hrs on Thursday).

All the other features appear at their usual times. In "Calling Australia" on Saturday, 10.30 hrs, Howard Marshall will interview English Test Cricketers.

A U S T R A L I A N I M P E R I A L F O R C E S

R O U T I N E                      O R D E R S

BY

Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O.

Temporarily Commanding 16 Aust Inf Bde.

NOT TO BE  
PUBLISHED

JULIS  
CAMP

No. 163

Part 1

31 July 41

1. DUTIES:

To Mount at Retreat, 31 July 41.

Field Officer of the Day Next for Duty	Capt W.B. Caldwell, M.C. 2/2 Aust Inf Bn. Capt N.W.P. Farrell, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.
Duty Officer Next for Duty	Lieut S.M. Percival, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde Lieut R.J.F. McIntosh, HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde
Cinema Picquet Officers	Lieut D.J. McNeill, ) 2/2 Aust Lieut I.B. Ferguson, ) Inf Bn. Lieut D.S.I. Burrows,)
Next for Duty	Lieut H.S. Mullins, ) 2/4 Aust Lieut J. Johnson, ) Inf Bn. Lieut G.W.A. Ormiston,)
Field Medical Officer Next for Duty	Capt P.A. Tomlinson, 2/4 Aust Inf Bn. Capt L.V. Armati, 2/2 Aust Inf Bn.
Duty Unit Next for Duty	2/2 Aust Inf Bn. 2/4 Aust Inf Bn.

2. CHURCH SERVICES - Sunday 3 August 41:

- (a) Mass (Roman Catholic) will be celebrated at 0700 hrs in 2/4 Aust Inf Bn Recreation Hut, GELLIBRAND LINES.  
A.A.S.C. Recreation Hut, BROWNE LINES, at 0800 hrs.  
2/2 Aust Inf Bn Recreation Hut, GODDARD LINES, at 0900 hrs.

Unit Comds will arrange for R.C. personnel parading for Combined Church Parade at CINEMA to be marched to the Mass last above mentioned.

(b) Holy Communion:

0700 hrs in Recreation Room, AASC Lines (for personnel of AASC and 2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec)  
0700 hrs in CINEMA for all units other than AASC.

(c) Combined Church Parades:

0900 hrs in the CINEMA for all units except AASC 6 Aust Div and 2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec.  
0915 hrs in Recreation Room, AASC Lines, for AASC and 2/1 Aust Fd Hyg Sec.

The Officer Commanding the Combined Church Service in the CINEMA will be Lt-Col L.J. WELLMAN.

*H. H. Hammer*  
.....Major  
B.M. 16 Aust Inf Bde

DISTRIBUTION: As for B.R.O. No.162 dated 30 July 41.



AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES

5 copies

July 11

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Goddard Lines.  
Julis Camp.  
10 Jul. 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

OPERATIONS IN GREECE.

75 APPENDIX "G"

Ref. File R/2/16.

1. A full report on the PENEIOS GORGE action in which this Bn. was involved, has already been submitted.

2. The following comments are submitted on the general lessons brought out by the campaign :-

(a) SIGNALS:-

The wide frontages held (which appear to be normal under the present conditions) emphasise the inadequacy of existing signal equipment. The following improvements are urgently needed:-

- (i) A much larger quantity of wire.
- (ii) An increased establishment of telephones.
- (iii) Provision of Pack R/T. sets - also a more powerful set for communication with "B" Echelon. which is often many miles in rear.

(b) PACK TRANSPORT :

This Bn. was compelled to adopt improvised mule and donkey 1st. Line transport. It is believed that similar conditions apply in Syria, and that in other parts of the Middle East pack is an essential means of transport. Other European armies maintain Mountain Divisions. It is submitted that training in pack 1st line transport should be given to infantry units.

(c) "SCRATCH" FORCES:

The great disadvantages of hastily assembled forces combining different arms was amply borne out in the experience of this Bn. It is essential that units likely to fight together in war should train together so as fully to develop mutual confidence.

3. The following suggestions has been made by an Officer of this Bn. which, in my opinion, has much to commend it and is forwarded for consideration, especially having regard to para 2 (c) :-

(a) In most operations of war an infantry Bn. will have supporting it, A/Tk. guns and M.M.G's. A normal allotment is likely to be one tp. of 4 A/Tk. guns and one pl. of M.M.G's. to a Bn.

(b) It is suggested that such A/Tk. and M.M.G. pls. be raised and trained in the same manner as the old A/Tk. Coy. - i.e. one tp. of guns and one M.M.G. pl. from each Bn.

(c) In many conditions Bren Carriers will best operate brigaded.

(d) With the foregoing in mind, the suggestion is that a brigade "support group" be constituted as follows :-

- Group H.Q.
- H.Q. and three tps ATk guns.
- H.Q. and three pls M.M.Gs
- H.Q. and three Carrier Pls.

As the situation required, sub-units would either be allotted to Bns, or kept brigaded. It is even possible that two or more of such groups may be combined to form part of a highly mobile Div. force.

Jocillon Lt.Col.  
Comd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Goddard Lines.  
Julis Camp.  
10 Jul. 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

OPERATIONS IN GREECE.

Ref. File R/2/16.

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3. The following suggestion has been made by an Officer of this Bn. which, in my opinion, has much to commend it and is forwarded for consideration, especially having regard to para 2 (c) :-

(a) In most operations of war an infantry Bn. will have supporting it, A/Tk. guns and M.M.G's. A normal allotment is likely to be one tp. of 4 A/Tk. guns and one pl. of M.M.G's. to a Bn.

(b) It is suggested that such A/Tk. and M.M.G. pls. be raised and trained in the same manner as the old A/Tk. Coy. - i.e. one tp. of guns and one M.M.G. pl. from each Bn.

(c) In many conditions Bren Carriers will best operate brigaded.

(d) With the foregoing in mind, the suggestion is that a brigade "support group" be constituted as follows :-

- Group H.Q.
- H.Q. and three tps ATk guns.
- H.Q. and three pls M.M.Gs
- H.Q. and three Carrier Pls.

As the situation required, sub-units would either be allotted to Bns, or kept brigaded. It is even possible that two or more of such groups may be combined to form part of a highly mobile Div. force.

*Louison* Lt. Col.  
Comd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Goddard Lines.  
Julis Camp.  
10 Jul. 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

OPERATIONS IN GREECE.

Ref. File R/2/16.

1. A full report on the PENEIOS GORGE action in which this Bn. was involved, has already been submitted.

2. The following comments are submitted on the general lessons brought out by the campaign :-

(a) SIGNALS:-

The wide frontages held (which appear to be normal under the present conditions) emphasise the inadequacy of existing signal equipment. The following improvements are urgently needed:-

- (i) A much larger quantity of wire.
- (ii) An increased establishment of telephones.
- (iii) Provision of Pack R/T. sets - also a more powerful set for communication with "B" Echelon, which is often many miles in rear.

(b) PACK TRANSPORT :

This Bn. was compelled to adopt improvised mule and donkey 1st. Line transport. It is believed that similar conditions apply in Syria, and that in other parts of the Middle East pack is an essential means of transport. Other European armies maintain Mountain Divisions. It is submitted that training in pack 1st line transport should be given to infantry units.

(c) "SCRATCH" FORCES:

The great disadvantages of hastily assembled forces combining different arms was amply borne out in the experience of this Bn. It is essential that units likely to fight together in war should train together so as fully to develop mutual confidence.

3. The following suggestion has been made by an Officer of this Bn. which, in my opinion, has much to commend it and is forwarded for consideration, especially having regard to para 2 (c) :-

(a) In most operations of war an infantry Bn. will have supporting it, A/Tk. guns and M.M.G's. A normal allotment is likely to be one tp. of 4 A/Tk. guns and one pl. of M.M.G's. to a Bn.

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As the situation required, sub-units would either be allotted to Bns, or kept brigaded. It is even possible that two or more of such groups may be combined to form part of a highly mobile Div. force.

*Louillon* Lt. Col.  
Comd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES

R/S Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Goddard Lines.  
Julis Camp.  
10 Jul. 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

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As the situation required, sub-units would either be allotted to Bns, or kept brigaded. It is even possible that two or more of such groups may be combined to form part of a highly mobile Div. force.

*Louise* Lt. Col.  
Comd. R/S Aust. Inf. Bn.

13 Jul. 41.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/3 AUST INF BN  
AT PENEIOS GORGE - REF. MAP LARISSA 1/100,000

1. 2/3 Aust Inf Bn having moved from VERROIA to SERVIA was then ordered by 16 Aust Inf Bde to proceed by road to SYN THOMAI T2334 (Ref. Map LARISSA 1-100,000) during the night 16/17 Apr. 41. The Bn arrived at SYN THOMAI in the early morning of 17 Apr 41 and I was met by the Bde Comd who issued further orders.

2. I was told that Bde HQ and my Bn had been ordered to join the 2/2 Bn and 21 N.Z. Bn in the PENEIOS GORGE area. The Bde Comd instructed me to move 2/3 Bn (less one Coy) to that area and to take up a defensive position astride the LARISSA-TEMPE Road in the area MAKRYKHORION-MAKRYKHORI. I was to join the Bde Comd in that area as soon as I got my Bn under way and receive further orders when the Comd had clarified the position at PENEIOS GORGE.

The Bde Comd stated that 1 Anzac Corps were concerned about the right flank South of PENEIOS GORGE and the road running South-West from SYKOURION and West from AGYIA and the routes leading into these towns from the North and East. I was instructed to send one Coy (A) with two Secs Carriers to patrol these towns and roads.

Later in the morning of 17 Apr I joined the Bde Comd and was told that the enemy were North of the PENEIOS River, the 21 N.Z. Bn had withdrawn to the TEMPE Village area and the 2/2 Bn was holding a defensive position in the EVANGELISMOS area. Information was given that the 4 N.Z. Fd. Regt. (less one Bty), one Tp of 18 pdrs and two troops of A/Tk Guns were attached to the Bde Group.

3. Orders were then given by Brig. A.S. Allen for 2/3 Bn to dispose as follows :-

- (a) One Coy (C) to take up a position on the high ground to the North of MAKRYKHORI to overlook PARAPOTAMOS and the PENEIOS River. This Coy was to contact D Coy of the 2/2 Bn which had moved to the same area with a similar task and to come under comd of D Coy 2/2 Bn.
- (b) One Coy (B) on the high ground just North of Bde H.Q. in square 4552 with a reserve role.
- (c) The remaining Coy (D) less one Pl, one of which had become detached on the move through LARISSA, and Bn HQ to take up a reserve position astride the road in square 4250 and 4350.
- (d) One Pl of B Coy was sent forward to report to 2/2 Bn for patrol duties.

The occupation of these positions was completed on the late afternoon of the 17 Apr 41.

No information of the time for which the positions had to be held was available at this stage, the Bde Comd stating that he was awaiting further information and orders but thought it might possibly be a few days.

There was no wire or A/Tk mines available. Communication to Coys was by runner owing to the lack of line communication.

4. I then kept in close contact with Bde HQ and was informed that there had been some enemy patrol activity along the PENEIOS

River during the night 17/18 Apr 41. During the morning of the 18 Apr 41, it was apparent that the enemy were making a determined effort to cross the river on the left of 2/2 Bn and on the extreme left flank as far around as the village of PARA POTAMOS.

I was instructed to keep my reserve Coy mobile in case it was necessary to assist the two Coys from 2/2 and 2/3 Bns on the left.

At about midday on 18 Apr I was present at Bde HQ when a telephone message from 21 N.Z. Bn stated that enemy tanks had broken through the village of TEMPE and that the Bn was withdrawing into the hills. 2/2 Bn was informed and Bde efforts to contact the N.Z. Bn by line again were fruitless.

5. About mid-afternoon a L.O. from 6 Aust Div arrived at Bde HQ with information that the probable time of withdrawal of the Bde would be about dusk that day and that further orders would be given by N.Z. Div.

6. A tentative plan had been drawn up by Bde HQ for the withdrawal. Later in the afternoon, after a visit by a N.Z. L.O. and Maj.Gen. Freyberg when the time given for the position to be held was 0300 hrs on 19 Apr, I was instructed to establish a rearward position astride the road from the high ground, including Trig. 214, square 4351 to Trig. 125 in square 4150.

One Sqn N.Z. Div. Cav which had joined the Bde late in the afternoon to assist the withdrawal was holding the gap between the 2/2 Bn and my reserve position, astride the road and railway in square 4452.

The rearward position was established to assist the withdrawal of 2/2 Bn who were to move in reserve South astride the road to area Trig 292, square 4346.

7. Reports had been received that the two Coys on the left flank (MAKRYKHORI) were in contact and I was instructed to inform both Coys that they were to withdraw to the rearward position at dusk. This was about 1430 hrs. on the 18 Apr. I contacted the Coy Comd myself and told him to pass the instruction on to the Coy of 2/2 Bn.

I was also ordered to send my reserve Coy (D) to the left flank them and to cover their left flank in the withdrawal. However, just as the trucks were ready to move the third heavy enemy bombing attack took place and three of the vehicles were set on fire and several casualties occurred. Several L.M.G's and A/Tk Rifles being destroyed.

At about 1730 hrs. or a little later, the two left Coys appeared in the Bde HQ area stating that they had been surrounded and were forced to withdraw. They were sent immediately to the rearward position.

8. Information had been received by Bde HQ that N.Z. Arty and Carriers were seen withdrawing South down the road and the Bde Comd instructed me to stop all movement Southwards and to place all such parties in position on the rearward position. This was done, with some difficulty in a few cases and I twice had to draw my Revolver to force N.Z. Guns into position.

9. At about 1800 hrs. on 18 Apr. Bde HQ shifted from its location and Brig Allen joined me on the rearward line and discussed the disposition with me. The dispositions now were :-

- (a) B Coy 2/3 Bn (McGregor) on right.
- (b) C Coy 2/3 Bn (Murchison) centre.
- (c) D Coy 2/2 Bn (Hendry) on left.

- (d) Two or three N.Z. 25 pdrs in A/Tk role.
- (e) Carriers covering the right and left flanks.
- (f) H.Q. and D. Coy (less two Pls) in reserve.
- (g) N.Z. Cav Sqn as a protecting screen in front but which a little later withdrew to the reserve area.

An officer was posted to collect any 2/2 Bn parties and to send them back to the reserve position selected for the 2/2 Bn. As far as I know none returned through the rearward position.

In the distance tanks could be seen South of EVANGELISMOS area and enemy movement in the MAKRYKHORI area.

At this stage about 20 bombers which had been seen to bomb LARISSA proceeded towards our area and having located the rearward position, machine gunned it for 20/30 minutes. The troops fought back vigorously but it had given the tanks and infantry the opportunity to cover the intervening ground under cover of the fire from the planes and very quickly after we were in contact with the enemy.

10. At about 2100 hrs the Carriers were seen to pull out from the flanks and move to the rear. The N.Z. Arty also withdrew and later I found that C Coy 2/3 Bn and D Coy 2/2 Bn had withdrawn without orders from me, being forced out by tanks which had penetrated the position on the left flank.

From the reports I have received there were at least five enemy tanks penetrated the position. The tanks were closely followed by infantry and prior to the assault we were subjected, to what appeared to be heavy mortar fire - the mortars probably being brought up under cover of the air attack.

With an officer from Bde HQ I halted them about 1500 yds in rear of the forward position and took up another stand. B. Coy 2/3 Bn (McGregor) had remained in position and I then ordered him to withdraw to the second rearward position.

There was a considerable amount of M.T. parked in the rearward area including a large number of N.Z. Troop Carrying Vehicles which suddenly appeared to panic and rushed Southwards along the road to the ford in square 4246. Here a N.Z. 25 pdr was jammed in the ford halting all the traffic for some considerable time although some vehicles had already passed through.

When the ford was eventually cleared the time was approx. 0030 hrs. 19 Apr.

11. After the second position had been established I received reports that the tanks had followed up and were again amongst the troops in the second rearward position. The Bde. Comd had previously discussed with me that if the occasion arose a final stand could be made behind the swamp and I therefore ordered a further withdrawal to this position.

However, this was almost impossible as there was a complete jamb on the ford. The force withdrew Southwards a short distance remaining North of the Swamp and I received reports that the enemy had NOT followed them up. Later when the ford was cleared I ordered the force to mount the vehicles and move to ATALANTA as previously instructed. The rear elements of the force cleared the road junction in square 4141 at approx. 0400 hrs on 19 Apr 41.

I contacted Bde H.Q. again at the ford where they were endeavouring to clear the M.T. over the ford.

Earlier I had instructed A Coy 2/3 Bn (Capt. Parbury) to withdraw his two Pls in the SYKOURION and AGYIA area to the road jamb in square 4141 and these Pls joined the column as it moved through.

In the early hours of the morning of the 19 Apr tracer bullets and flares were seen apparently on the road in the direction of LARISSA and later when approaching the road and railway crossing in square 3839 this fire could still be seen and I received several reports that the road was held by the enemy and several vehicles had been halted.

I therefore decided it would be better to divert all vehicles possible along the tracks leading East from the road and make the VOLOS Road by that means. I informed the Bde Comd who was further back in the column and the force moved via these tracks, eventually joining the VOLOS Road about daybreak although in the meantime it had split into several parties.

By this time the convey was very mixed and I waited at the road junction in square 4141 until the last vehicle had passed. This would be approximately 0400 hrs on 19 Apr.

13. As far as I know the casualties from this action were 1 killed, 18 wounded and 67 missing.



AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY FORCES

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Goddard Lines,  
Julis Camp,  
4 Jul. 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

RE OPERATIONS OF 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
REVENUES CORPS.

In reference to the numbered questions in 6 Aust. Div's. No. 2/1001/3 of 13 Jun. 41. I submit herewith a report on the operations of the Bn.

The answers to the questions are as follows:-

- (1) See para 4 of report.
- (2) See paras. 29 and 37. The position occupied by 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn. was held until approx 1900 hrs 13 Apr.
- (3) See para 30.
- (4) See paras 37 and 38.
- (5) See paras 40 and 38.
- (6) About 1845 hrs. See para 37.
- (7) None. This coy was withdrawn by 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. See para 27.
- (8) Approx 80 - 100 see para 41.
- (10, 17 and 18) See para.

*Lochlainn* Lt. Col.  
Comd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/2 AUST. INF. BN. AT PENIOS GORGE

1. The following is a brief summary of the events preceding the operations at PENIOS.

(a)

On 11 Apr. 41 two rifle Coys and part of H.Q. Coy commenced the withdrawal from VERRIA pass to take up a position on the night of 4 N.Z. Bde at SERVIA. Bn. H.Q. and the remainder of the Bn withdrew early the following evening and marched over the mountains continuously until approximately 1500hrs on 13 Apr. The new positions were reached by the rearmost tps about midnight on the night 14/15 Apr. 41.

(b)

The next day (15 Apr) was spent in the occupation of the new position, which covered a wide front in very mountainous country. About dusk an L.O. arrived from 16 Bde with orders to move out and assemble in the southern end of the SERVIA pass, and that our position was to be handed over to 2/3 Bn. The area was left at about 0800hrs and the assembly area reached at about 1000hrs where an M.T. convoy was waiting to move the tps.

(c)

I immediately reported to the Bde Comd and received from him orders to move to ZARKOS area and there to take up a defensive position. I was informed that the Bn cpt and Carrier Pl. had already been sent to ZARKOS.

(d)

On returning to the embussing area I was met by an L.O. from 6 Div. who informed me that the Bn was under comd of Corps and then gave orders for the Bn to proceed to PENIOS area. I was instructed to report at once to Corps H.Q.

(e)

As a result of the difficult conditions at VERRIA pass and the subsequent forced marches and lack of sleep, all ranks were very tired at this stage, but otherwise in good spirits.

2. On receipt of the above instructions I went to Corps H.Q. at ELASSON where I saw Brig. ROWELL and the G-2 Col ELLIOTT. I was informed

- (a) that 21 N.Z. Bn. had been occupying a position on the coast near PLATANON,
- (b) the 21 N.Z. Bn had been attacked by German forces, and that there had been no information back for some hours,
- (c) that the final signals received by wireless from 21 N.Z. Bn (which I was shown) were in the opinion of the B.G.S. of a disquieting nature, and he did not know if any of the Bn would be left,
- (d) that Brig CLOWES had been sent out that day to try to ascertain the position, but had not then returned.

3. Brig. ROWELL informed me that I would have the following troops under comd -

- One Bty of an N.Z. Pd. Regt.
- One tp N.Z. ATK guns
- Composite carrier Pl from 5 and 11 Bns.
- Det. Tp carrying Coy A.A.S.C.
- Det. of a Pd. Arb.

A W/T tender was to be attached for intercommunication with Corp  
...CORPS...

4. My orders were to move to the ELATEA area S.W. of the PENIOS Gorge and to take such steps as I thought best to hold that approach for a possible period of three to four days. It was pointed out that it was impossible to give more explicit instructions.
5. After seeing DAQMG regarding amn. and med. arrangements, I set off shortly after noon for PENIOS in a car lent by Corps. I met Brig. CLOWES near LARISSA. He told me he had contacted 21 N.Z. Bn. which was withdrawing along the Gorge. He was unable to say what action the N.Z. Comd. proposed taking and suggested that I endeavour to contact Lt.Col. MacKAY and agree on a course of action with him.
6. Meanwhile the convoy had become somewhat disorganized owing to congestion of traffic and bombing attacks. Some AASC vehicles also had difficulty in finding the road out of LARISSA. I left the Adjt. on the road to halt and organize tps as they arrived and drove through LARISSA locating and directing tp carrying vehicles and carriers of 5 and 11 Bns.
7. I then went ahead to PENIOS area with the carrier Pl. and located Lt.Col. MacKAY near TEMPE Village shortly before dusk. He told me that his Bn. (less one pl.) was bivouaced in the village, the remaining pl being in position covering a road block about 3 miles down the gorge. He stated that his Bn. had been practically surrounded at the PLATANON position, but had managed to fight their way clear and had not been pursued. His casualties amounted to 35, and they had lost a lot of equipment including all signal gear. He had under his comd a tp of 25 pdrs guns, which, however, were short of amn. Lt.Col. MacKAY further stated that his tps. were feeling fatigued and the strain of recent fighting. As it was now dark it was agreed that I should meet him early next morning and mutually arrange for the defence of the position.
8. In the meantime the Bn. under Maj. Cohen had bivouaced several miles S.W. of TEMPE and when I arrived back I found that the N.Z. Bty. of 25 pdrs and the N.Z. tp of A/Tk. guns had also arrived. I arranged for the Comds to attend the conference with Lt.Col. MacKAY next morning. Later in the night the 2 i/c. arrived with the Bn. tpt, which had previously gone to ZERKOS.
9. In company with Lt.Col. MacKAY, Lt.Col. Parkinson (Comd. of the N.Z. Fd. Regt., a bty. of which was under my comd.) and the N.Z. A/Tk. Comd, I made a recce. of the S.W. portion of the Gorge as far as the main road block (517612). Other obstacles which had been prepared comprised:-
  - (a) Railway tunnel near PLATANON blocked.
  - (b) Road crater N.E. of the road block above referred to.
  - (c) Railway tunnel at 517615 blocked.
  - (d) Railway bridge at TEMPE destroyed (This was also used as a vehicular crossing).

The question of Comd. arose and Lt.Col. MacKAY suggested that the entire force should be under his Comd. In view of my instructions from Corps, I refused. It was agreed that, as 21 N.Z. Bn. was already in the Gorge, it should be disposed as shown on the attached sketch, whilst 2/2 Bn. should occupy a position in depth at the entrance to the defile, with the additional role of protecting the left flank along PENIOS River, as I considered enemy action from GONNOS area probable. The 4 2pdr. guns were disposed in defiladed positions along the defile in 21 N.Z. Bn's. area, except for one gun commanding the southern exit from TEMPE.

Arty tasks included harassing fire on the road block at 517612 should the pl be unable to maintain its position there. Arrangements were also made for O.P's. to enable observed shooting within 21 N.Z. Bn's. position, along PENIOS river and in front of "C" Coy., 2/2 Bn. The tp. of 25 pdrs. with 21 N.Z. Bn. was attached to the Bty. under my comd.

In addition I agreed to patrol forward down the Gorge and to endeavour to ascertain whether or not the crossing place at the N.E. exit had been seized by the enemy. I also arranged to piquet the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS and to patrol North of the river as soon as a means of crossing the river could be found.

I also arranged to run a line from my H.Q. to 21 N.Z. Bn. H.Q. also to lend that Bn. certain wire and signal gear.

10. After leaving Lt.Col. MacKay, I met my own Coy. Comds. and made a brief reconnaissance with them. Except for "D" Coy., the dispositions then decided on are as shown on the attached sketch. In the meantime, the Bn. had been moved forward under Maj. Cohen and had taken up temporary positions. During the morning 3 Australian A/Tk. 2 pdr. guns arrived and it was decided to dispose them in 2/2 Bn. area. Lt.Col. Parkinson supervised detailed dispositions of these guns.

11. At about 1300 hrs. on 17 Apr. Brig. Allen, Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde, arrived at my H.Q. and told me he had been appointed to Comd. the force at PENEIOS and that 2/3 Bn. was on its way to the area.

I briefly outlined the situation, explained the dispositions and took Brig. Allen forward to meet Lt.Col. MacKay. The latter pointed out the dispositions of his tps.

Brig. Allen approved of 2/2 Bn. dispositions subject to moving "D" Coy. further to the left, to the position now shown on the sketch map attached. He also emphasised the importance of the high ground to the East of EVANGELISMOS. Brig. Allen also outlined the proposed dispositions of 2/3 Bn. and said he would attach a pl. of 2/3 Bn. to me to help hold the gap along the river between my main position and "D" Coy.

12. Shortly after I had left Brig. Allen, about 1530-1600 hrs. Capt. King ("B" Coy.) reported that No.11 Pl., which had been sent forward to patrol the lower portion of the Gorge (vide para 9) had made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of the road block, and that an enemy tank was at the obstacle. I telephoned this information to Bde. also to Lt.Col. MacKay and asked the latter to assist especially by the tps. he had placed on the right flank.

13. During the afternoon several reports were received from Coys. of movement of small bodies of men with animals on the high ground overlooking GONNOS.

Very signals were also fired on these hills on several occasions as enemy recon. planes flew overhead. 21 N.Z. Bn. also reported that their tps. in ANPELAKIA area had been fired on from the high ground on the East. "A" Coy. had already been ordered to send one pl. to piquet the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS, "B" Coy. was later warned that it might be required also to send a pl. to the same area. At that time "B" Coy. had one pl. in action at the road block, and another pl. reconnoitring the river for means of crossing.

14. Late in the afternoon of 17 Apr. Brig. Allen and Lt. Col. Parkinson visited my H.Q., Lt. Col. MacKay was also present. It was decided to move certain of the Australian A/Tk. guns to positions further forward, and also to bring forward two 25 pdrs. in an A/Tk. role. An officer of 2/1 Pz. Coy. having arrived, it was also decided to "crater" the road just forward of TRIPS Village, where it could be adequately covered by fire.

15. Between 2100 hrs. and 2200 hrs. I received reports from the Comd. and Pl. Sjt. of the patrol which had encountered the enemy at the road block. The forward elements of Pl. had been pinned to the road in the floor of the Gorge by fire from a tank which had been brought along the Ry. line as far as the blocked tunnel. The remainder of the pl. managed to get into positions on the southern slope of the Gorge. The enemy were engaged until dark when the patrol succeeded in getting away losing 3 killed and some wounded. The pl.

of 21 N.Z. Bn. had withdrawn from its position covering the road block when first fired on and no assistance was given by 21 N.Z. Bn., though defence of the block had been one of its tasks.

16. As stated above the N.Z. force had destroyed the railway and vehicular bridge at TEMPE. Eventually a small punt was discovered on "D" Coy's. front and a fighting patrol under the Comd. of Lieut. Colquhoun was sent across the river during the late afternoon to ascertain whether or not GONNOS was occupied, and generally whether enemy tps. were present in the lower foothills across the river between GONNOS and TEMPE. The Comd. reported to me by telephone on his return about 0200 hrs. 18 Apr. He found enemy tps. in GONNOS. Contact was made later with several German patrols. He also saw small bodies of tps. with pack tpt. moving towards ELEA. Certain uniform and equipment were taken for purposes of identification. A detachment of 3 men was left to guard the punt. These were attacked by a superior force but fought it off.

17. "C" and "A" Coys. were instructed to patrol our bank of the river continuously during the night and fire was exchanged with several small German parties on the opposite bank. It was then thought that these parties were attempting to cross or reconnoitring for crossing places.

18. Early in the morning 18 Apr. (about 0700 hrs.) German tps. were reported to be advancing S.E. towards the river from the direction of GONNOS.

An hour or so later it was reported that a force estimated at one bn. was moving S.E. from GONNOS towards the river between TEMPE and "D" Coy's. position.

At the same time another force which Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy.) estimated also as a bn. was reported moving in a westerly direction from GONNOS.

The general lines of attack are shown on the attached sketch map.

19. Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy.) reported that the above enemy movements presented good arty. targets. Lt. Col. Parkinson (whose H.Q. were alongside mine) told me his O.P.'s. on "D" Coy's. feature had not yet been established. He immediately sent across a wireless truck and F.O.O. and in the meantime Capt. Hendry directed the battery's fire by telephone, with considerable effect, but unfortunately the best targets had been lost by the delay.

20. On receiving Capt. Hendry's report that enemy tps. were making for the river on his left, and out of range of his weapons, I sent 2/2 Bn. Carrier Pl. to intercept the attempted crossing and placed it under comd. of "D" Coy. The pl. succeeded in stopping the enemy. The Pl. Comd., Lieut. Love, was seriously wounded during this engagement and the pl. had several other fatal casualties. It was found later however that enemy tps. had crossed the river and outflanked our position further still to the left.

21. During the morning "C" Coy. and the composite carrier pl. (5 and 11 Bns.) and Mortar Pl. succeeded in preventing any enemy at the centre and the main enemy pressure seemed to be on the left of "D" Coy's. position. A fighting patrol was sent out by "D" Coy. to find out if the village of PARAPOTAMOS was occupied. It returned shortly after midday and reported a sharp engagement with the enemy in and near the village.

22. I was concerned about the threat to my left flank especially as "D" Coy. Comd. had been unable to contact the Coy. of 2/3 Bn. to his rear. I discussed the situation with the Bde. Comd. and he arranged to ascertain the location of this Coy. and see that they were told the situation.

23 During the morning I had several telephone conversations with Lt.Col. Mackay. He agreed to his carrier Pl being used to help fill the gap between my main position and D Coy., and asked me to take the Pl undermy command as he had no means of communication. This I did. Lt.Col. Mackay told me that the village (TEMPE) was being shelled by mortars and that he was engaging enemy on the opposite bank of the river. During all our conversations he never indicated that his position was at all serious or that he intended to withdraw

24 Telephone communication with 21 N.Z. Bn ceased about midday. No notification that they were closing down was given us. I was told shortly afterwards that this Bn had withdrawn. About the same time I received a report from "C" Coy that N.Z. tps had reported that tanks were in TEMPE. I instructed "C" Coy to warn the N.Z. 105mm gun which was sited in their area to cover the exit from the village. Shortly after this "C" Coy reported that the crew had gone, and had removed the breech block.

25 From now on many N.Z. tps commenced withdrawing in unformed bodies through our position, though most of the Bn apparently moved up into the hills to the East. Efforts were made by Lt.Col. Parkinson, Major Cohen and others to stop and collect these men, but most of them had no weapons or equipment. However, one complete Pl under Lieut. Southworth reported to me and was given a task supporting the centre of the position which it carried out in a very creditable manner during the remainder of the day.

26 From about 1500 hours enemy pressure along the river in the centre of the Bn position increased and tps succeeded in crossing the river near the bend west of EVANGELISMOS. They were held by L.A. and 3" mortar fire on the near bank and very heavy casualties were inflicted on them. During this period the forward Coys came under fairly heavy H.M.C. and mortar fire. A dive bombing attack was also carried out, apparently on tps in rear of our position.

27 Towards 1600hrs Capt. Hendry (D Coy) reported that enemy infiltration on his left flank had become serious. It was agreed that he should withdraw his pl from the river bank and counter attack with it in conjunction with 2/2 Bn Carrier Pl. Shortly afterwards the line to D Coy went and I was told by my Sig officer that the position of the enemy now made it impossible for a line party to effect repairs. Some time later (between 1630 and 1700hrs) firing ceased on "D" Coys position, and I heard no further fire from them.

I had assumed, until my return from Greece, that this Coy had been surrounded and unable to continue the fight. I now know however that Capt. Hendry received orders from Bde H.Q. through 2/3 Bn to withdraw along the ridge in co-operation with the Coy of 2/3 Bn on the same feature.

28 Between 1600 and 1630hrs, Maj.General Freyberg spoke to me from Bde H.Q. He wished to know the situation generally and the whereabouts of 21 N.Z. Bn., and whether he could get a message to the latter. I told him that this was impossible. This was the last communication I had with Bde during the battle the line apparently being cut. I understand a line party went back from my Sig. Centre.

29 Until the line to Bde H.Q. went, I had been in the closest touch throughout the battle with the Brig. or B.M. During the afternoon I was informed that the Bde Group was to withdraw at 0300hrs 19 Apr but that it was hoped to get this time put forward. The B.M. also gave me an outline plan of how the withdrawal would probably be affected.

50. As far as I can remember, I received no directions from Brig. Allen as to the status of the H.Q. Bty. which had been placed under my comd. by Corps. In fact, Lt.Col. Parkinson maintained his H.Q. alongside mine, and I should like to say that I have nothing but praise for his conduct and co-operation. However, the arty. support in fact given was very disappointing. The following is a summary of arty. actions:

- (a) Harassing fire on the forward road block during night 17/18 Apr. after the patrol from "B" Coy. had withdrawn. This was a nap shoot and its effect is not known.
- (b) Fire on enemy tps. moving out of GCHNOS on morning of 18 Apr. (See para. 19). This was not as effective as it should have been, because O.P.'s. had not yet been established in "D" Coy's. area; I am unaware of the reason. By the time controlled fire became possible, the enemy adopted more dispersed formations and did not present such favourable targets.
- (c) Fire intended to cover the rearmost road block just forward of HEMPE. This fire in fact fell in "C" Coy's. area, and was stopped by Lt.Col. Parkinson. It was not resumed.
- (d) During the early afternoon Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy.) informed me that the P.O.O's. were about to leave his area. I believe there were two O.P.'s. Lt.Col. Parkinson was with me at the time and he ordered them specifically to remain. However, Capt. Hendry reported shortly afterwards that they had gone.
- (e) During the early part of the afternoon it was reported that some of the guns had moved out. This was not in accordance with Lt.Col. Parkinson's orders. When the attack across the river developed in the afternoon effective arty. fire could not be developed for this reason and because of the absence of O.P.'s. However, Lt.Col. Parkinson sent for a wireless truck and an O.P. was established close to Bn.H.Q. Both Maj. Cohen and I pointed out the task we wished carried out, but the fire of the remaining guns could not be got on to the target and finally ceased altogether. Lt.Col. Parkinson appeared very distressed at this stage and told me he had sent back a senior officer "to give the gunners 10 minutes drill to pull them together."

31 At this stage "B" Coy and Bn.H.Q. area were under constant fire from H.M.G's. on the feature previously occupied by "D" Coy. and from across the river. These areas also came under mortar fire. Enemy were observed mounting what was thought to be a mountain gun on hill which had been occupied by "D" Coy.

32. About 1700 hrs. "C" Coy. reported that some tanks had entered its locality; also that enemy snipers and men armed with "Tommy Guns" had worked round on the high ground on the right front south of the river previously held by 21 N.C.Bn., and were causing difficulty as the Coy. was now under fire on three sides. I had previously ordered the withdrawal back to their respective Coys. of the Pls. from "A" and "B" Coys. covering the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS as their reports indicated no enemy in that area. I gave instructions for Lieut. Loftus ("A" Coy.) to be intercepted on his way back and for him to endeavour to relieve this pressure above "C" Coy. Lieut. Loftus is missing and I do not know if he received these instructions.

33. At about this time (1700 hrs.) the line to "C" and "A" Coy. went. Linsmen attempted to restore the line but had not succeeded by the time these forward Coys. had withdrawn.

34

Initially the tanks in "C" Coy. area engaged our posts with M.G. and 2 pdr. fire for approximately half an hour, but with very little effect. The infantry fired on the tanks with S.A. fire and A/Tk. rifles but without apparent effect. The absence of Molotov Cocktails or bombs of the S.T. type was felt. After about half an hour infantry advanced with the support of the tanks and H.M.G.'s, and mortars across the river. Certain of the tanks, followed by infantry, swung right between the road and the river. The position then was that "C" Coy. was being attacked from the front and both flanks. They had already been forced to abandon prepared localities in the case of two pls. and take up new positions by reason of the withdrawal of 21 N.Z. Bn.

Capt. Buckley was unable to communicate with me and decided shortly after 1730 hrs. to withdraw his Coy. easterly on to the high ground. The withdrawal appears to have been well organized and carried out. In the light of all the facts now known to me Capt. Buckley's decision was justified. Casualties in his Coy. included two pl. Comds. Lieuts. Lovett and Holroyd, neither of whom could be evacuated. Capt. Buckley sent a runner to inform me of his withdrawal but owing to the distance and the route he had to follow the message did not arrive until approximately 1830.

35

From about 1500 hrs. onwards, the two pls. of "A" Coy. were in action against German tps. who had succeeded in crossing the river. The action of these pls. in cooperation with 3" mortars and fire from carrier pls. held the enemy close to the river.

At about 1730 this Coy. also came under rifle fire from the higher ground to its right rear.

At approximately 1755 two tanks came in along the road from the right flank. One was knocked out by a 2 pdr. gun, the other was hit and withdrew. A few minutes later a tank attack, closely followed by infantry developed between the road and the river. There were about 10 tanks engaged. The Coy. locality was also under heavy fire from H.M.G.'s, and Mortars across the river.

As previously stated, line communication with Bn. H.Q. had gone. Capt Caldwell states that he was forced to withdraw his pl. to the high ground East and, in the circumstances, I consider his action justified. He sent a runner to advise me of his action. One of the two pl. comds. was seriously wounded.

36.

Tanks had now fanned out on the flat ground West of EVANGELISMOS and engaged carriers and their personnel forcing them to retire along the LARISSA Road. I was informed that several carriers were knocked out. Some tanks approached EVANGELISMOS along the road and were engaged by a 25 pdr. gun sited near the road opposite Bn. H.Q. At least one tank was knocked out by this gun which continued firing until its ammunition limber was destroyed by a tank shell. The crew then withdrew through Bn. H.Q. carrying the breech block with them. This left only one 2 pdr. gun sited in a defiladed position about 75 yards from Bn. H.Q. About 1830 or perhaps several minutes later, runners arrived almost simultaneously from "C" and "A" Coys. reporting their withdrawal.

37.

Shortly afterwards I looked back at the abovementioned 2 pdr. gun and found it had gone. No orders for its withdrawal were given and it had not been in action. A few minutes previously I had told the Comd. I expected him to stay and he left me to join this detachment. I cannot remember this officer's name.

The position now was that "C", "A" and "B" Coys' localities had gone, and there were no remaining A/Tk. defences. A number of tanks were approaching with infantry from the North and across the flat on the N.W. Enemy tps. could also be seen to the left rear on the foothills S.W. across the flat. My remaining tps. comprised "B" Coy. and certain H.Q. Coy. personnel organiz-



ed for defence in Bn. H.Q. area.

I discussed the situation with C.O. "B" Coy. I was of the opinion that although this Coy. could probably continue the fight against enemy infantry for a short time, it would shortly be entirely surrounded by infantry as well as tanks. Furthermore, it would not prevent or delay enemy infantry passing rearwards via the flat to the West. I therefore ordered Capt. King and other personnel at rear of Bn. H.Q. to withdraw at approx. 1345 hrs.

My orders to "B" Coy. were to withdraw into the hills to the East, the reasons being that the flat area to the West and South was already covered by H.M.G. fire, and tanks <sup>which</sup> were already in "B" Coy. area and moving across the flat, would inevitably destroy any tps. attempting to withdraw along the road.

The withdrawal of "B" Coy. was carried out in an orderly fashion, covered by a rear party under Capt. Brock.

39 Bn. H.Q. was finally evacuated about 5.10 minutes after "B" Coy. had been ordered to withdraw. At <sup>this</sup> stage two tanks had penetrated around and behind Bn. H.Q. in a S.W. direction and inflicted a number of casualties at very close range.

39 Bde. H.Q. were not notified of the withdrawal of the forward Coys. I only became aware of their withdrawal several minutes before ordering the withdrawal of "B" Coy. and Bn. H.Q. The only means of Communication left was by runner and I do not think a runner would have had much chance of getting to Bde. H.Q. I am now aware that a L.O. from Bde. H.Q. attempted to get to my H.Q. about this time in a Bren Carrier but was forced to turn back.

40 The type of tank operating against us appeared to be of the A11 or A1V type, carrying H.G. and cannon. Capt. Buckley of "C" Coy. reports that 6 of these tanks were in his Coy. locality for about half an hour preceding the main attack. When the attack developed he states that there were more tanks but cannot state the number. Capt. Caldwell of "A" Coy. states that 10 tanks attacked his position. He later counted between 20 and 30 tanks.

Estimates of up to 50 tanks in the later stage have been made. Capt. Caldwell was in a position to see and his figures can be regarded as a reliable minimum.

41 It is difficult to estimate the total casualties during the action. During the later stages it became impossible to evacuate from forward tps.

Four Officers were wounded. Two were very seriously wounded, another was unable to move and was captured. A fifth officer is missing and is considered to have been killed. Lieut. Mc Pherson of 2/3 Bn. (who was attached) was also badly wounded.

Until the main attack developed at about 1500 hrs on 13 Apr., casualties are estimated at approx. 10 killed and 30 wounded. After that hour it became impossible to evacuate casualties from forward positions. It is impossible to state casualties during this later stage with any accuracy, but total casualties during the action are estimated at between 30 and 100.

42 In my opinion the following points are worthy of comment:-

(a) The necessity for R/T communication within the Bn. as an alternative means.

(b) The great value of the 3" Mortar and the desirability of a greatly increased establishment.

(c) The value of the Bren Carrier pl. as a mobile reserve in this type of action.

The plan of withdrawal for the Bn. during night 18/19 Apr. depended upon the retirement to the M.T. Coy. which, during the day, had been dispersed in rear of 2/3 Bn.. As already pointed out, any retirement in this direction became impossible.

Owing to the rugged nature of the country, any control of coys., or intercommunication, became impossible after the withdrawal Eastwards commenced. Each Coy. cmd. independently came to the conclusion that the only course open was to attempt to get to the coast, and either then make along the coast with a view to rejoining the British Forces at LAMIA or secure boats.

*Loxton* Lt. Col.  
Cmd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

4 dnl 41

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCES

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Goddard Lines.  
Julis Camp.  
4 Jul. 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

RE OPERATIONS OF 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
PENEIOS GORGE.

In reference to the numbered questions in 6 Aust. Div's. No. S/1001/G of 18 Jun. 41. I submit herewith a report on the operations of the Bn.

The answers to the questions are as follows:-

- (1) See para 4 of report.
- (2) See paras. 29 and 37. The position occupied by 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn. was held until approx 1900 hrs 18 Apr.
- (3) See para 39.
- (4) See paras 37 and 38.
- (5) See paras 40 and 38.
- (6) About 1845 hrs. See para 37.
- (7) None. This coy was withdrawn by 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. See para 27.
- (8) Approx 80 - 100 see para 41
- (16, 17 and 18) See para.

Louise Lt. Col.  
Comd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 2/2 AUST. IMP. BN. AT PENIOS GORGE

1. The following is a brief summary of the events preceding the operations at PENIOS.
- (a)  
On 11 Apr. 41 two rifle Coys and part of H.Q. Coy commenced the withdrawal from VERRIA pass to take up a position on the right of 4 N.Z. Bde at SERVIA. En. H.Q. and the remainder of the Bn withdrew early the following evening and marched over the mountains continuously until approximately 1500hrs on 13 Apr. The new positions were reached by the rearmost tps about midnight on the night 14/15 Apr. 41.
- (b)  
The next day (15 Apr) was spent in the occupation of the new position, which covered a wide front in very mountainous country. About dusk an L.O. arrived from 16 Bde with orders to move out and assemble in the southern end of the SERVIA pass, and that our position was to be handed over to 2/3 Bn. The area was left at about 0200hrs and the assembly area reached at about 1000hrs where an M.T. convoy was waiting to move the tps.
- (c)  
I immediately reported to the Bde Comd and received from him orders to move to ZARKOS area and there to take up a defensive position. I was informed that the Bn tpt and Carrier Pl. had already been sent to ZARKOS.
- (d)  
On returning to the embussing area I was met by an L.O. from 6 Div. who informed me that the Bn was under comd of Corps and then gave orders for the Bn to proceed to PENIOS area. I was instructed to report at once to Corps H.Q.
- (e)  
As a result of the difficult conditions at VERRIA pass and the subsequent forced marches and lack of sleep, all ranks were very tired at this stage, but otherwise in good spirits.
2. On receipt of the above instructions I went to Corps H.Q. at KLABSON where I saw Brig. ROWELL and the G-2 Col ELLIOTT. I was informed
- that 21 N.Z. Bn. had been occupying a position on the coast near PLATANON,
  - the 21 N.Z. Bn had been attacked by German forces, and that there had been no information back for some hours,
  - that the final signals received by wireless from 21 N.Z. Bn (which I was shown) were in the opinion of the B.G.S. of a disquieting nature, and he did not know if any of the Bn would be left,
  - that Brig CLOWES had been sent out that day to try to ascertain the position, but had not then returned.
3. Brig. ROWELL informed me that I would have the following troops under comd -
- One Bty of an N.Z. Fd. Regt.
  - One tp N.Z. ATK guns
  - Composite carrier Pl from 5 and 11 Bns.
  - Det. Tp carrying Coy A.A.S.C.
  - Det. of a Fd. Amb.
- A W/T tender was to be attached for intercommunication with Corps  
...CORPS...

4. My orders were to move to the ELATEA area S.W. of the PENIOS Gorge and to take such steps as I thought best to hold that approach for a possible period of three to four days. It was pointed out that it was impossible to give more explicit instructions.
5. After seeing DAGNS regarding amm. and med. arrangements, I set off shortly after noon for PENIOS in a car lent by Corps. I met Brig. CLOWES near LARISSA. He told me he had contacted 21 N.Z. Bn. which was withdrawing along the Gorge. He was unable to say what action the N.Z. Comd. proposed taking and suggested that I endeavour to contact Lt.Col. MacKAY and agree on a course of action with him.
6. Meanwhile the convoy had become somewhat disorganized owing to congestion of traffic and bombing attacks. Some MASC vehicles also had difficulty in finding the road out of LARISSA. I left the Adj. on the road to halt and organize tps as they arrived and drove through LARISSA locating and directing tp carrying vehicles and carriers of 5 and 11 Bns.
7. I then went ahead to PENIOS area with the carrier pl. and located Lt.Col. MacKAY near TEMPE Village shortly before dusk. He told me that his Bn. (less one pl.) was bivouaced in the village, the remaining pl being in position covering a road block about 3 miles down the gorge. He stated that his Bn. had been practically surrounded at the PLATANON position, but had managed to fight their way clear and had not been pursued. His casualties amounted to 35, and they had lost a lot of equipment including all signal gear. He had under his comd a tp of 25 pdrs guns, which, however, were short of amm. Lt.Col. MacKAY further stated that his tps. were feeling fatigued and the strain of recent fighting. As it was now dark it was agreed that I should meet him early next morning and mutually arrange for the defence of the position.
8. In the meantime the Bn. under Maj. Cohen had bivouaced several miles S.W. of TEMPE and when I arrived back I found that the N.Z. Bty. of 25 pdrs and the N.Z. tp of A/Tk. guns had also arrived. I arranged for the Comds to attend the conference with Lt.Col. MacKAY next morning. Later in the night the 2 i/c. arrived with the Bn. tpt, which had previously gone to ZARKOS.
9. In company with Lt.Col. MacKAY, Lt.Col. Parkinson (Comd. of the N.Z. Fd. Regt., a bty. of which was under my comd.) and the N.Z. A/Tk. Comd, I made a recce. of the S.W. portion of the Gorge as far as the main road block (517612). Other obstacles which had been prepared comprised:-
  - (a) Railway tunnel near PLATANON blocked.
  - (b) Road crater N.E. of the road block above referred to.
  - (c) Railway tunnel at 517615 blocked.
  - (d) Railway bridge at TEMPE destroyed (This was also used as a vehicular crossing).

The question of Comd. arse and Lt.Col. MacKAY suggested that the entire force should be under his Comd. In view of my instructions from Corps, I refused. It was agreed that, as 21 N.Z. Bn. was already in the Gorge, it should be disposed as shown on the attached sketch, whilst 2/2 Bn. should occupy a position in depth at the entrance to the defile, with the additional role of protecting the left flank along PENIOS River, as I considered enemy action from GONNOS area probable. The 4 Spdr. guns were disposed in defiladed positions along the defile in 21 N.Z. Bn's. area, except for one gun commanding the southern exit from TEMPE.

Arty tasks included harassing fire on the road block at 517612 should the pl be unable to maintain its position there. Arrangements were also made for O.P's. to enable observed shooting within 21 N.Z. Bn's. position, along PENIOS river and in front of "C" Coy., 2/2 Bn. The tp. of 25 pdrs. with 21 N.Z. Bn. was attached to the Bty. under my comd.

In addition I agreed to patrol forward down the Gorge and to endeavour to ascertain whether or not the crossing place at the N.E. exit had been seized by the enemy. I also arranged to piquet the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS and to patrol North of the river as soon as a means of crossing the river could be found.

I also arranged to run a line from my H.Q. to 21 N.Z. Bn. H.Q. also to lend that Bn. certain wire and signal gear.

10. After leaving Lt.Col. MacKay, I met my own Coy. Comds. and made a brief reconnaissance with them. Except for "D" Coy., the dispositions then decided on are as shown on the attached sketch. In the meantime, the Bn. had been moved forward under Maj. Cohen and had taken up temporary positions. During the morning 3 Australian A/Tk. 2 pdr. guns arrived and it was decided to dispose them in 2/2 Bn. area. Lt.Col. Parkinson supervised detailed dispositions of these guns.

11. At about 1300 hrs. on 17 Apr. Brig. Allen, Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde, arrived at my H.Q. and told me he had been appointed to Comd. the force at PENEIOS and that 2/3 Bn. was on its way to the area.

I briefly outlined the situation, explained the dispositions and took Brig. Allen forward to meet Lt.Col. MacKay. The latter pointed out the dispositions of his tps.

Brig. Allen approved of 2/2 Bn. dispositions subject to moving "D" Coy. further to the left, to the position now shown on the sketch map attached. He also emphasised the importance of the high ground to the East of EVANGELISMOS. Brig. Allen also outlined the proposed dispositions of 2/3 Bn. and said he would attack a pl. of 2/3 Bn. to me to help hold the gap along the river between my main position and "D" Coy.

12. Shortly after I had left Brig. Allen, about 1530-1600 hrs. Capt. King ("B" Coy.) reported that No.11 Pl., which had been sent forward to patrol the lower portion of the Gorge (vide para 9) had made contact with the enemy in the vicinity of the road block, and that an enemy tank was at the obstacle. I telephoned this information to Bde. also to Lt.Col. MacKay and asked the latter to assist especially by the tps. he had placed on the right flank.

13. During the afternoon several reports were received from Coys. of movement of small bodies of men with animals on the high ground overlooking GONNOS.

Verex signals were also fired on these hills on several occasions as enemy recon. planes flew overhead. 21 N.Z. Bn. also reported that their tps. in AMPELAKIA area had been fired on from the high ground on the East. "A" Coy. had already been ordered to send one pl. to piquet the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS, "B" Coy. was later warned that it might be required also to send a pl. to the same area. At that time "B" Coy. had one pl. in action at the road block, and another pl. reconnoitring the river for means of crossing.

14. Late in the afternoon of 17 Apr. Brig. Allen and Lt. Col. Parkinson visited my H.Q., Lt. Col. MacKay was also present. It was decided to move certain of the Australian A/Tk. guns to positions further forward, and also to bring forward two 25 pdrs. in an A/Tk. role. An officer of 2/1 Pd. Coy. having arrived, it was also decided to "crater" the road just forward of TEMPE Village, where it could be adequately covered by fire.

15. Between 2100 hrs. and 2200 hrs. I received reports from the Comd. and Pl. Sjt. of the patrol which had encountered the enemy at the road block. The forward elements of Pl. had been pinned to the road in the floor of the Gorge by fire from a tank which had been brought along the Ry. line as far as the blocked tunnel. The remainder of the pl. managed to get into positions on the southern slope of the Gorge. The enemy were engaged until dark when the patrol succeeded in getting away losing 3 killed and some wounded. The pl.

of 21 N.Z. Bn. had withdrawn from its position covering the road block when first fired on and no assistance was given by 21 N.Z. Bn., though defence of the block had been one of its tasks.

16. As stated above the N.Z. force had destroyed the railway and vehicular bridge at TEMPE. Eventually a small punt was discovered on "D" Coy's. front and a fighting patrol under the Comd. of Lieut. Colquhoun was sent across the river during the late afternoon to ascertain whether or not GONNOS was occupied, and generally whether enemy tps. were present in the lower foothills across the river between GONNOS and TEMPE. The Comd. reported to me by telephone on his return about 0200 hrs. 18 Apr. He found enemy tps. in GONNOS. Contact was made <sup>with several German patrols</sup> ~~later~~ <sup>he also saw</sup> small bodies of tps. with pack tpt. moving towards ELEA. Certain uniform and equipment were taken for purposes of identification. A detachment of 3 men was left to guard the punt. These were attacked by a superior force but fought it off.

17. "C" and "A" Coys. were instructed to patrol our bank of the river continuously during the night and fire was exchanged with several small German parties on the opposite bank. It was then thought that these parties were attempting to cross or reconnoitring for crossing places.

18. Early in the morning 18 Apr. (about 0700 hrs.) German tps. <sup>were</sup> reported to be advancing S.E. towards the river from the direction of GONNOS.

An hour or so later it was reported that a force estimated at one bn. was moving S.E. from GONNOS towards the river between TEMPE and "D" Coy's. position.

At the same time another force which Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy.) estimated also as a bn. was reported moving in a westerly direction from GONNOS.

The general lines of attack are shown on the attached sketch map.

19. Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy.) reported that the above enemy movements presented good arty. targets. Lt. Col. Parkinson (whose H.Q. were alongside mine) told me his O.P.'s. on "D" Coy's. feature had not yet been established. He immediately sent across a wireless truck and F.O.O. and in the meantime Capt. Hendry directed the battery's fire by telephone, with considerable effect, but unfortunately the best targets had been lost by the delay.

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22. I was concerned about the threat to my left flank especially as "D" Coy. Comd. had been unable to contact the Coy. of 2/3 Bn. to his rear. I discussed the situation with the Bde. Comd. and he arranged to ascertain the location of this Coy. and see that they were told the situation.

- 23 During the morning I had several telephone conversations with Lt.Col. Mackay. He agreed to his carrier Pl being used to help fill the gap between my main position and D Coy., and asked me to take the Pl undermy comd as he had no means of communication. This I did. Lt.Col. Mackay told me that the village (TEMPE) was being shelled by mortars and that he was engaging enemy on the opposite bank of the river. During all our conversations he never indicated that his position was at all serious or that he intended to withdraw
- 24 Telephone communication with 31 N.Z. Bn ceased about midday. No notification that they were closing down was given us. I was told shortly afterwards that this Bn had withdrawn. About the same time I received a report from "C" Coy that N.Z. tps had reported that tanks were in TEMPE. I instructed "C" Coy to warn the N.Z. ATk gun which was sited in their area to cover the exit from the village. Shortly after this "C" Coy reported that the crew had gone, and had removed the breach block.
- 25 From now on many N.Z. tps commenced withdrawing in unformed bodies through our position, though most of the Bn apparently moved up into the hills to the East. Efforts were made by Lt.Col. Parkinson, Major Cohen and others to stop and collect these men, but most of them had no weapons or equipment. However, one complete Pl under Lieut. Southworth reported to me and was given a task supporting the centre of the position which it carried out in a very creditable manner during the remainder of the day.
- 26 From about 1500 hours enemy pressure along the river in the centre of the Bn position increased and tps succeeded in crossing the river near the bend West of EVANGELISMOS. They were held by L.A. and 3" mortar fire on the near bank and very heavy casualties were inflicted on them. During this period the forward Coys came under fairly heavy H.E.O. and Mortar fire. A dive bombing attack was also carried out, apparently on tpt in rear of our position.
- 27 Towards 1600hrs Capt. Hendry (D Coy) reported that enemy infiltration on his left flank had become serious. It was agreed that he should withdraw his pl from the river bank and counter attack with it in conjunction with 2/2 Bn Carrier Pl. Shortly afterwards the line to D Coy went and I was told by my Sig officer that the position of the enemy now made it impossible for a line party to effect repairs. Some time later (between 1630 and 1700hrs) firing ceased on "D" Coys position, and I heard no further fire from them.  
I had assumed, until my return from Greece, that this Coy had been surrounded and unable to continue the fight. I now know however that Capt. Hendry received orders from Bde H.Q. through 2/3 Bn to withdraw along the ridge in co-operation with the Coy of 2/3 Bn on the same feature.
- 28 Between 1600 and 1630hrs, Maj.General Freyberg spoke to me from Bde H.Q. He wished to know the situation generally and the whereabouts of 31 N.Z. Bn., and whether he could get a message to the latter. I told him that this was impossible. This was the last communication I had with Bde during the battle; the line apparently being cut. I understand a line party went back from my Sig. Centre.
- 29 Until the line to Bde H.Q. went, I had been in the closest touch throughout the battle with the Brig. or B.M. During the afternoon I was informed that the Bde Group was to withdraw at 0300hrs 19 Apr but that it was hoped to get this time put forward. The B.M. also gave me an outline plan of how the withdrawal would probably be effected.



30. As far as I can remember, I received no directions from Brig. Allen as to the status of the N.Z. Bty. which had been placed under my comd. by Corps. In fact, Lt. Col. Parkinson maintained his H.Q. alongside mine, and I should like to say that I have nothing but praise for his conduct and co-operation. However, the arty. support in fact given was very disappointing. The following is a summary of arty. actions:
- (a) Harrassing fire on the forward road block during night 17/18 Apr. after the patrol from "B" Coy. had withdrawn. This was a map shoot and its effect is not known.
  - (b) Fire on enemy tps. moving out of GONNOS on morning of 18 Apr. (See para. 19). This was not as effective as it should have been, because O.P.'s. had not yet been established in "D" Coy's. area; I am unaware of the reason. by the time controlled fire became possible, the enemy adopted more dispersed formations and did not present such favourable targets.
  - (c) Fire intended to cover the rearmost road block just forward of ~~THEMPE~~. This fire in fact fell in "C" Coy's. area, and was stopped by Lt. Col. Parkinson. It was not resumed.
  - (d) During the early afternoon Capt. Hendry ("D" Coy.) informed me that the F.O.O's. were about to leave his area. I believe there were two O.P.'s. Lt. Col. Parkinson was with me at the time and he ordered them specifically to remain. However, Capt. Hendry reported shortly afterwards that they had gone.
  - (e) During the early part of the afternoon it was reported that some of the guns had moved out. This was not in accordance with Lt. Col. Parkinson's orders. When the attack across the river developed in the afternoon effective arty. fire could not be developed for this reason and because of the absence of O.P.'s. However, Lt. Col. Parkinson sent for a wireless truck and an O.P. was established close to Bn. H.Q. Both Maj. Cohen and I pointed out the task we wished carried out, but the fire of the remaining guns could not be got on to the target and finally ceased altogether. Lt. Col. Parkinson appeared very distressed at this stage and told me he had sent back a senior officer "to give the gunners 10 minutes drill to pull them together."
31. At this stage "B" Coy and Bn. H.Q. area were under constant fire from H.M.G.'s. on the feature previously occupied by "D" Coy. and from across the river. These areas also came under mortar fire. Enemy were observed mounting what was thought to be a mountain gun on hill which had been occupied by "D" Coy.
32. About 1700 hrs. "C" Coy. reported that some tanks had entered its locality; also that enemy snipers and men armed with "Tommy Guns" had worked round on the high ground on the right front south of the river previously held by 21 N.Z. Bn., and were causing difficulty as the Coy. was now under fire on three sides. I had previously ordered the withdrawal back to their respective Coys. of the Pls. from "A" and "B" Coys. covering the high ground East of EVANGELISMOS as their reports indicated no enemy in that area. I gave instructions for Lieut. Loftus ("A" Coy.) to be intercepted on his way back and for him to endeavour to relieve this pressure above "C" Coy. Lieut. Loftus is missing and I do not know if he received these instructions.
33. At about this time (1700 hrs.) the line to "C" and "A" Coy. went. Linesmen attempted to restore the line but had not succeeded by the time these forward Coys. had withdrawn.

34

Initially the tanks in "C" Coy. area engaged our posts with M.G. and 2 pdr. fire for approximately half an hour, but with very little effect. The infantry fired on the tanks with S.A. fire and A/Tk. rifles but without apparent effect. The absence of Molotov Cocktails or bombs of the S.T. type was felt. After about half an hour infantry advanced with the support of the tanks and H.M.G's. and mortars across the river. Certain of the tanks, followed by infantry, swung right between the road and the river. The position then was that "C" Coy. was being attacked from the front and both flanks. They had already been forced to abandon prepared localities in the case of two pls. and take up new positions by reason of the withdrawal of 21 N.Z. Bn.

Capt. Buckley was unable to communicate with me and decided shortly after 1730 hrs. to withdraw his Coy. easterly on to the high ground. The withdrawal appears to have been well organized and carried out. In the light of all the facts now known to me Capt. Buckley's decision was justified. Casualties in his Coy. included two pl. Comds. Lieuts. Lovett and Holroyd, neither of whom could be evacuated. Capt. Buckley sent a runner to inform me of his withdrawal but owing to the distance and the route he had to follow the message did not arrive until approximately 1830.

35

From about 1500 hrs. onwards, the two pls. of "A" Coy. were in action against German tps. who had succeeded in crossing the river. The action of these pls. in cooperation with 3" mortars and fire from carrier pls. held the enemy close to the river.

At about 1730 this Coy. also came under rifle fire from the higher ground to its right rear.

At approximately 1755 two tanks came in along the road from the right flank. One was knocked out by a 2 pdr. gun, the other was hit and withdrew. A few minutes later a tank attack, closely followed by infantry developed between the road and the river. There were about 10 tanks engaged. The Coy. locality was also under heavy fire from H.M.G's. and Mortars across the river.

As previously stated, line communication with Bn. H.Q. had gone. Capt Caldwell states that he was forced to withdraw his pls to the high ground East and, in the circumstances, I consider his action justified. He sent a runner to advise me of his action. One of the two pl. comds. was seriously wounded.

36.

Tanks had now fanned out on the flat ground West of EVANGELISMOS and engaged carriers and their personnel forcing them to retire along the LARISSA Road. I was informed that several carriers were knocked out. Some tanks approached EVANGELISMOS along the road and were engaged by a 25 pdr. gun sited near the road opposite Bn. H.Q. At least one tank was knocked out by this gun which continued firing until its ammunition limber was destroyed by a tank shell. The crew then withdrew through Bn. H.Q. carrying the breech block with them. This left only one 2 pdr. gun sited in a defiladed position about 75 yards from Bn. H.Q. About 1830 or perhaps several minutes later, runners arrived almost simultaneously from "C" and "A" Coys. reporting their withdrawal.

37.

Shortly afterwards I looked back at the abovementioned 2 pdr. gun and found it had gone. No orders for its withdrawal were given and it had not been in action. A few minutes previously I had told the Comd. I expected him to stay and he left me to join this detachment. I cannot remember this officer's name.

The position now was that "C", "A" and "B" Coys' localities had gone, and there were no remaining A/Tk. defences. A number of tanks were approaching with infantry from the North and across the flat on the N.W. Enemy tps. could also be seen to the left rear on the foothills S.W. across the flat. My remaining tps. comprised "B" Coy. and certain H.Q. Coy. personnel organiz-

COPY OF MESSAGE SENT TO G COY 2/3 BN  
(PASSED ON TO O.C. D. COY 2/2 BN)

W 2

To HAZA C  
From HAZA

HAZA B is now withdrawing (.) you will withdraw  
forthwith but will coordinate your withdrawal  
with coy of 2 bn nearest to you (.) use own tpt  
move with 2 bn (.) regret no other instructions

(sgd) E.S. Walker Lieut

1545

ed for defence in Bn. H.Q. area.

I discussed the situation with C.O. "B" Coy. I was of the opinion that although this Coy. could probably continue the fight against enemy infantry for a short time, it would shortly be entirely surrounded by infantry as well as tanks. Furthermore, it would not prevent or delay enemy infantry passing rearwards via the flat to the West. I therefore ordered Capt. King and other personnel at rear of Bn. H.Q. to withdraw at approx. 1945 hrs.

My orders to "B" Coy. were to withdraw into the hills to the East, the reasons being that the flat area to the West and South was already covered by E.M.G. fire, and tanks were already in "B" Coy. area and moving across the flat, would inevitably destroy any tps. attempting to withdraw along the road.

The withdrawal of "B" Coy. was carried out in an orderly fashion, covered by a rear party under Capt. Brock.

38 Bn. H.Q. was finally evacuated about 5-10 minutes after "B" Coy. had been ordered to withdraw. At <sup>this</sup> stage two tanks had penetrated around and behind Bn. H.Q. in a S.W. direction and inflicted a number of casualties at very close range.

39 Bde. H.Q. were not notified of the withdrawal of the forward Coys. I only became aware of their withdrawal several minutes before ordering the withdrawal of "B" Coy. and Bn. H.Q. The only means of Communication left was by runner and I do not think a runner would have had much chance of getting to Bde. H.Q. I am now aware that a L.O. from Bde. H.Q. attempted to get to my H.Q. about this time in a Bren Carrier but was forced to turn back.

40 The type of tank operating against us appeared to be of the Allie or A IV type, carrying M.G. and cannon. Capt. Dackley of "C" Coy. reports that 6 of these tanks were in his Coy. locality for about half an hour preceding the main attack. When the attack developed he states that there were more tanks but cannot state the number. Capt. Caldwell of "A" Coy. states that 10 tanks attacked his position. He later counted between 20 and 30 tanks.

Four Estimates of up to 50 tanks in the later stage have been made. Capt. Caldwell was in a position to see and his figures can be regarded as a reliable minimum.

41 It is difficult to estimate the total casualties during the action. During the later stages it became impossible to evacuate from forward tps.

Officers were wounded. Two were very seriously wounded, another was unable to move and was captured. A fifth officer is missing and is considered to have been killed. Lieut. Mc Pherson of 2/3 Bn. (who was attached) was also badly wounded.

Until the main attack developed at about 1500 hrs on 18 Apr., casualties are estimated at approx. 10 killed and 30 wounded. After that hour it became impossible to evacuate casualties from forward positions. It is impossible to state casualties during this later stage with any accuracy, but total casualties during the action are estimated at between 80 and 100.

42 In my opinion the following points are worthy of comment:-

(a) The necessity for R/T communication within the Bn. as an alternative means.

(b) The great value of the 5" Mortar and the desirability of a greatly increased establishment.

(c) The value of the Bren Carrier pl. as a mobile reserve in this type of action.

The plan of withdrawal for the Bn. during night 18/19 Apr. depended upon the retirement to the M.T. Coy. which, during the day, had been dispersed in rear of 2/3 Bn.. As already pointed out, any retirement in this direction became impossible.

Owing to the rugged nature of the country, any control of coys., or intercommunication, became impossible after the withdrawal Eastwards commenced. Each Coy. cmd. independently came to the conclusion that the only course open was to attempt to get to the coast, and either then make along the coast with a view to rejoining the British Forces at LAMIA OR secure boats.

*G. G. Hilton*

Lt. Col.

Comd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

4 Jul 41

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE.

Ref. File R/2/44

*Return to Same lang*

Headquarters,  
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

29 July 41.

Headquarters,  
6 Aust. Div.  
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REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN GREECE

16 AUST. INF. BDE.

With reference to your 504/G the attached reports are submitted on the operations of this Bde in GREECE.

The reports are as follows :-

A. General report on the operations in GREECE.

Traces attached are :-

- (i) Defensive positions at VERROIA and SERVIA and routes out from SERVIA to embussing point at point 1142.
- (ii) Dispositions at PENEIOS GORGE.
- (iii) Reserve positions at BRALLOS area.

B. Comments and lessons with special reference to


- (i) Staff Control.
- (ii) Employment and Value of L.O's.
- (iii) Assistance given by supporting arms.
- (iv) General.

C. A & Q Experiences of 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

D. Report by 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.

E. Report by 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

*File*

  
.....Lt-Col.  
Temporarily Commanding  
16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

A.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN GREECE.

The participation of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. in the operations in GREECE may be divided into nine separate phases.

- Phase
1. ALEXANDRIA to DAPHNE.
  2. DAPHNE to SERVIA.
  3. SERVIA to VERROIA.
  4. VERROIA to SERVIA.
  5. SERVIA to PENEIOS GORGE.
  6. PENEIOS GORGE.
  7. PENEIOS GORGE to BRALLOS area.
  8. BRALLOS to KALAMAI.
  9. KALAMAI to ALEXANDRIA.
- 

REF. MAPS :-

ATHENS	1-1,000,000	
EDESSA	1-100,000	(Sheet C3072)
MT OLYMPUS	1-100,000	(Sheet C3066)
LARISSA	1-100,000	(Sheet C3069)
ATHENS	1-250,000	(Sheet S3040)

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COMPOSITION OF FORCE :-16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

Commander - Brig. A.S. Allen, C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D.  
 Brigade Major - Major H.H. Hammer.  
 Staff Capt. - Capt. I.S. McKenzie.

2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.

C.O. - Major R. Gram (Admin. Comd. - Lt. Col. K.W. Eather, D.S.O., evacuated to hospital from AMIRIYA).

2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

C.O. - Lt. Col. F.O. Chilton, D.S.O.

2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

C.O. - Lt. Col. D.J. Lamb.

PHASE 1.

ALEXANDRIA to DAPHNE.

The 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. Comd., Brig. A.S. Allen, C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D. had moved from TOBRUK on 8 Mar. 41 to MERSAH MATRUH, where partial re-equipping was carried out. The Bde. then moved to AMIRIYA when re-fitting was completed and the Bde. was ordered to move with the Fifth Flight Lustre Force. However, this move was speeded up and the Bde. moved with the Fourth Flight on the 18 Mar. 41.

M.T. was sent on M.T. Ships and the personnel entrained at IKINGI for the personnel ships at ALEXANDRIA. The 2/1 and 2/2 Bns moved in the early morning of 18 Mar. 41 and embarked on Merchant Ships leaving ALEXANDRIA at about midday. The 2/3 Bn entrained from IKINGI at 1235 hrs. on the 18 Mar. embarking on H.M.S. GLOUCESTER which sailed at 1700 hrs. on 18 Mar. 41, arriving at PORT PIRAEUS at 1600 hrs. on 19 Mar. 41, several hours ahead of the remainder of the Bde. The Bde. H.Q. personnel on the S.S. FIONA arrived at PIRAEUS on the early morning 20 Mar. 41. The 2/2 Bn on the S.S. BANKURA arriving on the 22 Mar. 41, having moved in a "slow" convoy which was attacked by 5 dive bombers on 21 Mar. 41. Their L.M.C.'s were used most effectively in keeping the bombers away from this Ship.

The Bde. on disembarkation moved to DAPHNE Camp situated about 10 miles North West of ATHENS on the main ATHENS-LARISSA Road where it remained in training until 26 Mar. 41.

Here the Bde. was in close touch with an A.I.F. Liaison Group, with Force H.Q., under Lt-Col. H. Wells, 1 Aust. Corps. Capt. J.H. Lovell, H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde., was also temporarily attached to this Group, rejoining the Bde. at VERROIA.

At this stage no indication of the role of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. could be given definitely but it was anticipated that the Bde. would eventually move North to the VERROIA area.

During the DAPHNE period the G.O.C. A.I.F. (M.E.) Lieut-Gen. Sir Thomas Blaney, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. visited the Bde. Comd. Brig. A.S. Allen and discussed the general situation.

The Bde. had become divorced from its transport and main stores owing to the late arrival and unloading of M.T. Ships but as the units had retained sufficient gear to live "hard" they were able to carry on until the arrival of M.T. and stores.

PHASE 2.

DAPHNE to SERVIA.

2/3 Bn was ordered to move to LARISSA from DAPHNE on 23 Mar. 41, to take up Security duties in that area and the Bn moved by train at 1300 hrs the same day.

The remainder of the Bde. was kept rather in suspense for the next few days and the order to move to SERVIA came very suddenly. The Bde. transport moved by road to SERVIA on 26 Mar. 41, via the route ELEFSIS - THIVE - LEVADEIA - BRALLOS - LAMIA - LARISSA - ELASSON - SERVIA, with the intention of making the journey in two days, the first day's objective being a suitable bivouac area just North of LAMIA.



This was achieved, the Bde. reaching an area at SERVIA selected by the Bde. Comd. who had moved on ahead of the column, at about 1600 hrs. on the 27 Mar.

The move was a particularly good one as the transport had to negotiate the narrow and winding mountain roads and passes - only one vehicle failed to finish the journey being temporarily out of action with a broken wheel and bent axle. The whole of the daylight hours were used for movement and by using relief drivers the convoy was able to make good time over the difficult journey.

The 7 Aust. Div. Provost met the column on the Pass South of LAMIA and guided it through to its bivouac area North of LAMIA doing particularly helpful work. It was the more helpful as the convoy had only one motor cycle available, and this was being used by a small recon party responsible for guiding, moving on ahead of the convoy.

The only petrol point available was at LARISSA and on the morning of the second day all petrol vehicles distributed to vehicles petrol reserves still held, and moved ahead of the convoy to LARISSA to fill up, and joined the convoy as it drove through LARISSA later. This enabled the column to carry on without a halt at the LARISSA bottleneck and gave the Bde. an ample P.O.L. reserve for any further move beyond SERVIA.

It is interesting to note that a N.Z. column which followed immediately in rear of the Bde. convoy from DAPHNE, its destination being the KATERINE area, took an extra day to negotiate the same distance as the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. convoy. The only explanation is that this Bde. took advantage of all the daylight hours. On the morning of the second day the column passed several columns still bivouacing on the side of the road and was able to take advantage of a clear run through.

The personnel of the 2/1 and 2/2 Bns left by rail from ATHENS on 26 Mar. arriving without incident in LARISSA where arrangements had been made with 81 Base Sub Area (Brig. Farrington) to lift them to SERVIA by M.T.

The area selected for the Bde. area at SERVIA in the vicinity of the village of LAVA, was later to be part of the defensive position of the 4 N.Z. Bde. The Bde. was dispersed over a large area and tents and vehicles camouflaged. The broken ground was found to be excellent for concealment. Major C.R.V. Edgar, 2/2 Bn was appointed to administer comd. of 2/1 Bn. During the stay of the Bde. at SERVIA the opportunity was taken immediately for the Comd. to recon forward to the VERROIA Pass and the VEVE Pass and to liaise with all the Greek and British Comds. in those areas. A general knowledge of the areas over which it was possible the Bde. would operate was quickly obtained. C.O.'s were sent over these areas to get a general picture of the country. Indications of the possible area pointed more directly at VERROIA Pass and a recon camp was established there with representatives from all units including 2/3 Bn which was still in the LARISSA area. With the assistance of the Greeks (12 Gk. Div. H.Q. at SOFULAR, Col. KARABATIS Comd.) who were occupying this area, the Bde. recon party was shown the Greek positions and a detailed knowledge of this defensive position was obtained.

PHASE 3.

SERVIA to VERROIA.

The value of the use of this time spent in recon was proved later when the Bde. received an urgent signal to move to the VERROIA Pass area, due to the German advance into SALONIKA.

At this stage the Bde. was under cmd. of 1 Aust. Corps and although the move was ordered no guarantee of transport for troop carrying could be given. As an alternative means, arrangements were at once made to use unit transport to ferry troops from SERVIA to VERROIA Pass. This, however, was unnecessary as late in the afternoon of the day ordered to move, troop carrying vehicles arrived.

Guides had been sent forward to SOFULAR area where the Bde. was to stage for the night - the move being completed by approximately 2300 hrs. Although this staging area had NOT been recon, the sending of a recon party forward with guides by day, enabled bivouac areas to be selected and the Bde. moved in at night - quietly and quickly.

The Bde. Cmd. who, during the move, had been forward to VERROIA on a recon, joined the Bde. at the staging area and then moved to 12 Gk. Div. H.Q. at SOFULAR and made arrangements to take over the Greek positions at VERROIA Pass the next day, 7 Apr. 41.

At first light the next morning, 7 Apr. 41, the Bde. moved forward and the difficult task of moving into position over this mountainous country commenced. Transport could only keep to the main road and all stores and amm had to be manhandled. However, this was practically completed by the end of the first day.

Brig. Vasey, 19 Aust. Inf. Bde, called to discuss the situation. He expected to take up a position in rear of 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. However, the 19 Aust. Inf. Bde. was almost immediately afterwards sent to the VEVE Pass in the West.

The situation now was :-

- (a) N.Z. Div. on right flank including to R. ALIAKMON.
- (b) 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. Group astride VERROIA Pass to R. ALIAKMON.
  - i. 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn on right excluding main road. (Major I.R. Campbell, D.S.O. now appointed to cmd. 2/1 Bn).
  - ii. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn on left <sup>in</sup>cluding main road.
  - iii. 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn in reserve on left of main road, inclusive.
  - iv. 2/2 Fd. Regt. was under cmd.
  - v. 2/1 Fd. Amb. was situated on track, square 1119, just South of the village of POLYMYTON with two A.D.S's forward on the VERROIA Pass.
  - vi. One Tp of British 6" How. which had been attached to Greeks.
  - vii. B Echelon brigaded - located in the POLYMYTON area. All unit Carriers were attached and were responsible for closing the "back door" to the Pass and an anti-parachute role on the flats in the SOFULAR area.

- (c) 12 Gk. Div. on left flank with the right flank resting on YEROLEIVADON square 1429.

Attached is Trace "A" showing the dispositions.

Communications from Bde. to units were by line. Owing to the mountainous nature of the country, contact by L.O's and Bde. conference attendances were most difficult and fatiguing and took up a good deal of time.

Digging was difficult and with a combination of digging and stone sangers, weapon pits and posts were constructed. No wire was available other than that constructed by the Greeks. A/Tk. Mines were NOT available.

Some demolitions on the Pass had been prepared by the Greeks and were later taken over by the 1 Pd. Coy. It was found later that these were located as shown on Trace "A". There were <sup>four</sup> on the Pass and an additional one about one and half miles South of VERROIA village.

Forward supply dumps were established on the main road - ten days' rations and second line amm were asked for - a donkey supply service was established on the 8 Apr. 41 and units were now assured of good supplies.

On 8 Apr. 41, the Bde received a signal from 1 Aust. Corps that it was responsible for co-ordination of civilian traffic control with the Greek authorities in VERROIA and the B.M., Major H.H. Hamner was sent to discuss the matter with Maj-General Kristalis, who apparently was an area commander. He assured the B.M. that all civilians had been ordered to remain in their villages and if there was any movement it would NOT be via the main routes but by tracks. This was very much a fact, as later, despite the evacuation of SALONIKA there was NOT a great deal of civilian traffic, although for a short time there was a steady thin stream restricted by the demolitions of the VERROIA Pass.

As the B.M. left VERROIA for Bde. H.Q. at about 2000 hrs a huge Greek convoy was moving through, Southwards, over the Pass towards SERVIA. It took the B.M. 5 hours to make the journey of approximately 14/15 miles. On arrival at Bde. H.Q. this M.T. movement was reported by line to 1 Aust. Corps at about 0100 hrs. and the information was received that the Germans had broken through the Greeks in SALONIKA. The Bde. was also informed that the 1 Armd. Bde. was in the SALONIKA area and would NOT withdraw over the VERROIA Pass. However, this was NOT the case as in the early morning of the 9 Apr. the 1 Armd Bde. passed through.

The situation was most obscure and very little information was available from Corps. The Bde. then referred to the prepared demolitions and was told that further information would be sent on. A little later, 1 Aust. Corps telephoned to say that the responsibility for demolitions was delegated to the Comd. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. Units were warned of the situation and the B.M. was sent at about 0300 hrs. on 9 Apr. to blow the demolitions at VERROIA and the four others in the Pass. He took with him one Pl. of 2/3 Bn to hold the road block.

A control point on the road near Bde. H.Q. reported that the 1 Armd Bde. was passing through and a check was kept on all vehicles moving along the road.

The B.M. passed a continuous stream of vehicles moving Southwards on his way North to VERROIA and en route ascertained that the whole of 1 Armd Bde. was withdrawing along this route.

At one stage in the darkness when questioning a Tank Comd. where the tail of the column was, he was held up at the point of the revolver as a suspected Fifth Columnist. However, that was soon fixed and he proceeded to the demolition point at VERROIA arriving at daybreak.

Here he contacted the tail of the Arm'd Bde, and was joined by a small rearguard of the Arm'd Bde, consisting of :-

One Pl. Infy.  
Two Tanks.  
Two A/Tk. Guns.  
Two 25 pdrs.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde. knew nothing of this arrangement but the two parties combined and formed a rearguard at the demolition point.

There was no sign of the enemy and as there were several Greek Army vehicles coming through, the road was NOT demolished. Further, the Arm'd Bde. stated that some bridges beyond VERROIA had been demolished and that they had NOT recently had contact with the enemy.

Brig. C.S. Steele, M.C., V.D., 1 Aust. Corps, then arrived and at 0900 hrs. the road was demolished. The explosion was good but the result was poor - a soft earth bank on one side merely filling the cavity made and Greek soldiers were walking over it in a few minutes.

The B.M. then returned to Bde. H.Q. and with the Comd. proceeded to the road block and decided to withdraw the covering force as the block was several miles in front of the Bde. position. It was also decided to blow the road in the four remaining prepared points. The B.M. was left to carry out this task but held the demolitions for several hours to allow several guns of a Greek horseed Arty. Regt. to withdraw over the Pass and lorries to pick up shells from an dump forward of the demolitions.

Finally at dusk the demolitions were carried out, the four road blocks being excellent. These were all covered by fire.

That day a plane had been reconnoitring and machine-gunning most of the day but did little damage.

During the next few days there was reconce plane over the area most of the day although no sign of enemy troops were seen until just at the final withdrawal of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. from VERROIA to SERVIA.

The weather was extremely cold, heavy snow had been experienced for some days - the troops standing up to the bad conditions very well in the high ground of 3000 - 5000 ft. No shelter or bivouac tents were available and these would have been of great value in this area.

#### PHASE 4.

#### VERROIA to SERVIA.

Warning orders were received on the 10 Apr. 41 that a withdrawal to the SERVIA area was likely and on orders from 1 Aust. Corps all 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. transport was ordered to move to GERANIA area. The units were to march back from VERROIA.

The Bde. was apparently moved back by foot owing to the shortage of transport at this stage and the possible congestion of road traffic on the KOZANI - SERVIA Road during the withdrawal of 19 Aust. Inf. Bde. and other troops from the VEVE Pass.

Tactically there seemed to be no special point in moving the troops back by foot across this mountainous country.

Orders were somewhat vague - the move was apparently dependent on the situation of the 19 Aust. Inf. Bde. on the VEVE Pass but on the 12 Apr. the final order to move was given and the withdrawal commenced on the night of the 12 Apr. 2/3 Bn had already been sent out to occupy a covering position in the POLYMYTON area to protect the Bde. withdrawal mainly in case of a parachute landing South of VERROIA Pass or a break through on the VEVE Pass the road from which joined the VERROIA Road from KOZANI.

The troops travelled light - haversacks, one blanket, ground sheet, four days' rations, some picks and shovels. About 12 donkeys per Coy. were available to carry the heavier loads. One Medical Det. from 2/1 Fd. Amb. was sent with each unit.

Arrangements had been made to destroy the road at the Southern end of the Pass and these demolitions were carried out on the early morning of 13 Apr. 41 covered by a Coy. from 2/3 Bn.

Little was known of the general position but information had been received that the 4 N.Z. Bde. was to act as a covering force on the SERVIA Pass; the SERVIA Bridge over the R. ALIAKMON was to be destroyed and the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. was to take up a position on the right of 4 N.Z. Bde from KASTANIA along the general line of the TITARION Range, Trig. 1839 and a line East to AG DEMETRIOS. No indication could be given where the right flank of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. would rest. Units were ordered to move to areas as follows :- 2/1 Bn - right, 2/2 Bn - left along the general line of the TITARION RIDGE, 2/3 Bn in reserve in the area M.AG. ANTONIOU in square 1093 (see Trace "A") and it was hoped that Bde. H.Q. would obtain further information regarding areas after its movement back to SERVIA and before units reached the defence line.

The route taken by units was as follows :-

VERROIA Pass - POLYMYTON - LEVENTES - AVLEANNIA - IHERA - ALIAKMON River crossing - VELVENDOS - MOSKHOKHORI - TITARION - approximate distance of 30 miles on the map but considerably more when the nature of the country was taken into account. The march was most fatiguing and when the units did arrive at their destination they were very weary.

Special mention must be made of the work of a Det. of 2/1 Fd. Coy., under Lieut. S.B. Cann, which was responsible for all demolitions on the Pass, the preparation of the crossing over the R. ALIAKMON and for general assistance.

H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. which had been working with only an operational H.Q. forward, moved by road the same night via SERVIA and established a temporary H.Q. at the Village of LAVA. The Brig. visited 6 Aust. Div. and gave them the general situation of the Bde. on 13 Apr.

All L.O's and the "I" Officer were sent forward to recon the tracks in the area allotted and the Brig. visited 4 N.Z. Bde. H.Q. (Brig. Puttick).

The B.M. was sent back to 1 Aust. Corps at ELASSON to make arrangements for supply to the units. It was obvious that many donkeys and mules would be required. Rations, water, amm, blankets and boots were wanted. Brig. W.H. Bridgeford was able to arrange with Force H.Q. for the Bde. to commandeer all animals and forage required and arrangements were made for supply.

The G.O.C. A.I.F. (M.E.) gave the location of the Bde's right flank which was Trig. 1839, square 1495, inclusive to 16 Aust. Inf. Bde., the N.Z.'s being on the right.

The B.M. returned to B. Echelon at GERANIA at about 0500 hrs. on 14 Apr. and made arrangements with the Bde. Rear H.Q.

- (a) To commandeer animals and forage at first light.
- (b) establish F.S.D. - one on the track in 0890 and another at LEI VADION square 1791.
- (c) B. Echelon personnel sent to operate the donkey supply train to dumps in the unit areas.

These arrangements worked smoothly the next day and unit dumps were established in the forward areas prior to the arrival of the Bns.

On the 14 Apr. Bde. shifted its Adv. H.Q. to a ravine in square 0891. Here in this area for the first time a series of heavy bombing attacks were experienced, mainly directed at some British medium guns. At no time was Bde. H.Q. itself bombed mainly due to the concealment provided by the narrow and bushy ravine.

Rear Bde. H.Q. and B Echelon remained in the GERANIA area. Line communications between both H.Q. was NOT directly possible but rear H.Q. were able to use 6 Aust. Div. communications and also maintained a daily personal contact.

Unit L.O's with verbal orders were sent out to contact units as they marched into their defensive areas. Bde. Sigs had established a line from Adv. H.Q. to the forward area near the village of KASTANIA and Bde. H.Q. had continuous contact with the forward area. The country was most difficult - horses were tried but they simply could not get over the country and the L.O's used donkeys to carry their rations and gear. All L.O's did a sterling job in this area and were able to meet their units and guide them into position.

A message was received from 6 Aust. Div. on 14 Apr. that Bde. was now to revert from 1 Aust. Corps to under command of 6 Aust. Div. A 6 Aust. Div. operation order dated the 14 Apr. 41 gave as the intention "To occupy a position for protracted defence on the general lines TITARIAN RIDGE 1895 - ESCARPMENT COULES 9797 - KIMNION thence N.W. to KEENI 8595."

#### PHASE 5.

#### SERVIA to PENEIOS GORGE.

The 2/2 Bn had moved into position on the late afternoon of 14 Apr. and late on the 15 Apr. were ordered to withdraw, the 2/3 Bn to take over the 2/2 Bn position as the 2/3 Bn moved South from MOSKHOKHORI. The 2/2 Bn although very fatigued after their gruelling march from VEROIA Pass left the position at about 0200 hrs. on the 16 Apr. 41 to an assembly area on the main road just South of Trig. 1142 (square 1088) arriving at the assembly area at 1000 hrs. after 8 hours of strenuous marching over country that could offer nothing better than goat tracks. All ranks were by this time in a very weary condition. Boots were practically worn out and clothes were torn. The spirit of the men, however, was excellent. Rations were ready for issue to the Bn prior to embussing.

The C.O. 2/2 Bn was met and guided to Bde. H.Q. where the Comd. instructed him that the Bde. had been ordered to move to the ZARKOS area about 16 miles West of LARISSA to face West to meet a possible German threat from that direction. The 2/2 Bn was to take up a holding position until the arrival of the 2/3 Bn and 2/1 Bn which were still moving into position.

B Echelon and Carrier Pl had been sent from the GERANIA area to ZARKOS area.

The 2/2 Bn was to embuss at the assembly point for the move to ZARKOS. On the arrival of the C.O. 2/2 Bn at the embussing point he was met by an L.O. from 1 Aust. Corps with a message that his destination would NOT now be ZARKOS but PENEIOS GORGE and that he was to report to 1 Aust. Corps at ELASSON for further orders. There the C.O. received orders to move to PENEIOS GORGE N.E. of LARISSA to assist the 21 N.Z. Bn which had been in contact with the enemy.

Fortunately the B.M. was present when the C.O. 2/2 Bn received his change of orders and was able to inform the Brig. of the altered plan. A repeated message was then received from 1 Aust. Corps ordering 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. less 2/2 Bn to move to the area SYN THOMAI about 8 miles West of LARISSA and be available to occupy the original position facing West or to move NE PENEIOS GORGE to assist 2/2 Bn.

2/3 Bn was ordered to move out of its present position to the same assembly area as 2/2 Bn and embuss for SYN THOMAI. 2/1 Bn had NOT on the early morning of 16 Apr. reached its position on the TITARION RIDGE. Its march into position was considerably more difficult and it was late on the 16 Apr. when the Bn was contacted and ordered to continue its move to embuss on the KATHERINE Road South of LEIVADION (Square 1791) where the Bn arrived during the early morning of 17 Apr.

The Bde. I.O. (Capt. Lovell) and Staff Capt. Learner (Capt. P.J. Woodhill) had been sent to LEIVADION to assist the 2/1 Bn and later reported that the Bn had been ordered to come under comd. of 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. West of LARISSA but were switched to Divisional Reserve South of LARISSA. The 2/1 Bn was never with the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. after this and throughout the remaining action in GREECE it was detached from this Bde. The Bn as a whole was destined not to rejoin the Bde. for, after the evacuation from GREECE, it went to CRETE and was not evacuated to EGYPT. From its remnants and with reinforcements the 2/1 Bn was reformed at JULIS in May 41.

In the meantime the Brig., 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. had been instructed by 6 Aust. Div. that there was a general withdrawal from the SERVIA PASS area and that he was to call on his way to SYN THOMAI at 6 Aust. Div. and then 1 Aust. Corps at ELASSON.

The 2/3 Bn arrived at its embussing point at 0200 hrs on 17 Apr. 41 and moved to its destination SYN THOMAI.

The Brig. and B.M. reported at 6 Aust. Div. on the night 16 Apr. - there was heavy rain and much mud and slush and the road carrying the Southward bound traffic was covered with vehicles at a very high density.

6 Aust. Div. instructed the Brig. to report to 1 Aust. Corps at ELASSON for further instructions.

This was done at about 0200 hrs. on the morning of 17 Apr. and the B.C.S. who was endeavouring to get some sleep under a tree, with the aid of a torch and map, gave the Brig. instructions to move to PENEIOS GORGE. The 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. (less 2/1 Bn) was to take under command all troops there. The troops were as follows:-

H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. (Brig. A.S. Allen)  
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn. (Lt-Col. F.O. Chilton)  
2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn. (Lt-Col. D.J. Lamb)  
21 N.Z. Inf. Bn. (Lt-Col. Mackie)  
4 N.Z. Fd. Regt (less one Bty) Lt-Col. Parkinson)  
One Troop 18 Pdrs. N.Z.  
Four Carriers, 2/11 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Seven Carriers, 2/5 Aust. Inf. Bn.

The intention was to prevent the enemy taking LARISSA from the EAST. The only information available was that the 21 N.Z. Bn had been in position North of PENEIOS GORGE - there had been contact with the enemy and the 21 N.Z. Bn had been reported to have lost one quarter of its strength. This was later found to be incorrect - only 35 casualties being inflicted. It was found too that the 21 N.Z. Bn had withdrawn to South of the PENEIOS River.

The Brig. then moved to SEN THOMAS, arriving at daylight and issued orders to 2/3 Bn to move to the area of MAKRYKHORI astride the road and railway (square 4351), the C.O. 2/3 Bn to get further orders when the Brig. was more informed. B. Echelon (less 2/1 Bn) was ordered to the area, road junction (4141). Adv. Bde. H.Q. then moved through LARISSA to the PENEIOS GORGE area and the Brig. contacted C.O. 2/2 Bn and C.O. 21 N.Z. Bn and after a conference issued verbal orders for the defence of PENEIOS GORGE and the protection of LARISSA from the Eastern approaches.

Throughout all this movement from VERROIA PASS to PENEIOS GORGE the Comd. and staff were only able to snatch short periods of rest. The opportunity was taken while riding in vehicles to get some sleep.

It was a strenuous period and all reserves, mentally and physically, were overdrawn.

#### PHASE 6

#### PENEIOS GORGE 17/18/19 APR. 41

The story of the events at PENEIOS is told in the reports of the C.O's 2/2 Bn and 2/3 Bn together with an explanatory report by H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

It was obvious on the 18 Apr. when the German launched his attack along the PENEIOS River as far East as PARAPOTAMOS (square 4156) that the enemy had disposed his large force (estimated one Division) prior to the arrival of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde., to cross the river and sweep down through LARISSA.

Had this been possible on the 18 Apr. the main forces of the Australian and N.Z. Divisions would have been cut off at LARISSA and the story of GREECE may have been an entirely different one.

However, the approaches to LARISSA were denied on 19 Apr. 41 when all forces had cleared LARISSA.



PHASE 7

PENEIOS GORGE TO BRALLOS.

The Bde. had become somewhat disorganised on its move back along the LARISSA - VOLOS Road to the destination ATALANDI ordered by H.Z. Div., the Bde. coming under its command for the withdrawal. At VOLOS a road control point ordered Bde. H.Q. to BRALLOS to come under command again of 6 Aust. Div. Not all of the Bde. troop carrying vehicles were instructed to move via LAMIA to BRALLOS, in fact, most of them continued on to the original destination at ATALANDI where they were sent on further South.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde. B Echelon which had moved on the night of 17 Apr. had reached the area of LEVADEIA (sheet S 3040 square 06) intact at about 0800 hrs. on 19 Apr., established a road control point South of the junction of the LAMIA and ATALANDI Roads and directed Bde. personnel back to the BRALLOS area.

The 2/2 Bn which had been cut off at PENEIOS GORGE, with the exception of D Coy (Capt. Hendry) which returned to BRALLOS area, made its way to the coast and a considerable number of the personnel including the C.O. eventually joined the Bn at JULIS after a series of extraordinary adventures which took men through TURKEY, many others making their way, with the aid of Greeks, to CRETE and thence to PALESTINE. Many, however, were left behind at the evacuation of CRETE.

The Brig. and B.M. reported to H.Q., 6 Aust. Div. at BRALLOS at 0730 hrs. on 20 Apr. to be greeted with a heavy bombing attack. The Brig. received his further orders from the G.O.C. (Maj-Gen. Sir Iven G. Mackay, K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.) during this attack, the Bde. being ordered to go into reserve at AMFIKLIA (square 42).

The general situation at this stage was for the British Forces to take up a defensive position on the THERMOPOLAE Line with the Aust. Forces on the LAMIA Pass, South of LAMIA, and the H.Z.'s on the right flank East to the sea.

The situation on the 20 Apr. with the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. was :-

- Adv. Bde. H.Q. in wadi 4426 (AMFIKLIA).
- Rear Bde. H.Q. and B Echelon - LEVADEIA.
- 2/1 Bn - detached with 19 Aust. Inf. Bde.
- 2/2 Bn - LEVADEIA.
- 2/3 Bn - AMFIKLIA.

The approximate strengths of units at this time were :-  
2/2 Bn 250 all ranks; 2/3 Bn 500 all ranks.

Enemy aircraft were very active on this day, 20 Apr. continually bombing and machine gunning any targets of opportunity throughout the daylight hours. They kept up a continual road patrol, almost completely immobilising transport.

That day of road strafing raised the query for a policy regarding the movement of transport while the road was being patrolled by enemy planes. It produced the common answer that the transport must carry on; but as much movement as possible to be done at night.

This Bde. did a considerable amount of movement by M.T. at night and it was found to work very satisfactorily. Where the necessity arose to move by day it was insisted that the transport must carry on. Dispersion, concealment and camouflage was practiced and there were few losses.

The 2/2 Bn (Major C.R.V. Edgar, Admin. Comd.) was ordered by Bde. to move forward from LEVADISIA to AMFIKLIA on 21 Apr. but in the meantime 6 Aust. Div. ordered the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. to take up a defensive position on the GRAVIA Pass facing West in the area of Point 1253 (square 23) and Point 2008 (square 22).

The Bde. Comd. went forward to recon the area and to liaise with Brig. Savige (17 Aust. Inf. Bde). Bn recon parties joined the Bde. Comd. and Bns were ordered to R.V. in the GRAVIA area. A message was received on the morning of the 22 Apr. from 6 Aust. Div. "no move until further orders" and the move to GRAVIA was not completed.

### PHASE 8.

#### BRALLOS to KALAMAI.

Another message arrived at Bde. H.Q. by L.O. that the Comd. or a representative was required to report to H.Q. 6 Aust. Div. to attend a conference immediately and Major Hammer (B.M.) attended. The G.O.C. (Maj-Gen. Sir Iven G. Mackay, K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D.) then informed the B.M. that it was intended to evacuate GREECE and that Brig. A.S. Allen would be responsible for the movement Southwards of the ALLEN GROUP to consist of the following troops :-

ALLEN GROUP :- Comd. Brig. A.S. Allen.  
H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.  
"J" Sec. Sigs - 6 Aust. Div.  
45 Aust. L.A.D.  
2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
H.Q. 17 Aust. Inf. Bde.  
"K" Sec. Sigs - 6 Aust. Div.  
46 Aust. L.A.D.  
2/5 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/6 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
2/7 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
C Coy plus No. 6 Pl. 2/1 Aust. MG Bn.  
2/1 Fd. Regt. R.A.A. - 6 Aust. Div (less one Bty and (less one Det. under Comd. 19 Aust. Inf. Bde.)  
"E" Sec. Sigs - 6 Aust. Div.  
43 Aust. L.A.D.  
2/2 Fd. Coy. R.A.E.  
2/2 Aust. Fd. Amb.

The ALLEN GROUP was to move on "B" night 23/24 Apr. to the MEGARA Beach area (square 04) to await embarkation. The General discussed many points to be considered in the move.

Brig. S.C. Savige visited 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q. the same day, 22 Apr., and arrangements were made for the withdrawal to MEGARA. The 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. co-operated whole-heartedly and the move was highly successful.

Brig. A.S. Allen established a Group H.Q. using the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. H.Q. operational staff - placed 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. under comd. of Lt-Col. Lamb and divided the Group into two sections :-

A Sec. - 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. (less 2/1 Bn)  
B Sec. - 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. and attached troops.

The move was carried out at night - 6 Aust. Div. had ordered no move East of road junction Y5123 before 0200 hrs. 24 Apr. 41 owing to the use of the road by other M.T. convoys.

All unit transport was used for troop carrying plus a few A.A.S.C. vehicles and three days extra rations were carried, more to be taken if available.

The ALLEN GROUP was met at ELEFSIS at daybreak, 24 Apr. by Col. C.E. Prior who ordered the Group to lie up during the day in the thick olive groves on each side of the main ATHENS Road. This was done quickly and effectively and although there was a continual movement of enemy aircraft over the area, it was not bombed.

The Bde. Comd. was then called to 6 Aust. Div. H.Q. and instructed that further troops were to be added to the ALLEN GROUP and that embarkation would NOT now take place at MEGARA. The Group was to move to MILOI, South of ARGOS with a possible further move to KALAMAI in the South of GREECE, the probable time of embarkation to be the night 26/27 Apr. 41.

The ALLEN GROUP was now organised into four Sections consisting of :-

H.Q. ALLEN GROUP - Comd. Brig. A.S. Allen (16 Aust. Inf. Bde)  
 Major H.H. Hammer " " " "  
 Capt. D.J.H. Lovell " " " "  
 Capt. R.R. Vial ( 6 Aust. Div. )  
 Lieut. W.M. Knox " " "

A SECTION. - Comd. Lt-Col. D.J. Lamb.  
 H.Q. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.  
 "J" Sec. Sigs.  
 45 Aust. L.A.D.  
 One Pl. Corps Guard.  
 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn.

B SECTION. - Comd. Brig. S.G. Savige, DSO, MC, ED.  
 H.Q. 17 Aust. Inf. Bde.  
 "K" Sec. Sigs.  
 46 Aust. L.A.D.  
 One Pl. Corps Guard.  
 2/5 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
 2/6 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
 2/7 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
 2/8 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
 2/1 Fd. Regt. R.A.A.  
 "E" Sec. Sigs.  
 43 Aust. L.A.D.  
 2/2 Aust. Fd. Amb.  
 2/2 Fd. Coy. R.A.E.

C SECTION - Comd. Lt-Col. T.N. Cooch.  
 2/1 Aust. M.C. Bn.  
 6 Aust. Div. Troops.  
 6 Aust. Div. Sigs.  
 1 A/Tk. Regt. R.A.A. (less H.Q.)

D SECTION - Comd. Lt-Col. R. Kendall.  
 1 Aust. Corps Sigs.  
 1 Aust. Corps Engineers.  
 One Pl. Corps Guard.  
 Det. Corps Petrol Park.  
 One Provost Coy.

The move to MILOI was commenced at 2130 hrs, 24 Apr. a distance of about 90 miles, the column arriving there at daylight on the 25 Apr. where again areas were allotted to Secs. and vehicles dispersed and concealed.

The move was difficult owing to the uncontrolled movement of many small convoys using this road. However, the Group arrived intact at MILOI with the exception of the 2/6 Bn which was detached en route by the area Comd. at ARGOS to take up a position on the CORINTH CANAL.

Here the Group was joined by several small parties who were either lost or had not received any definite orders.

Enemy planes were active throughout the day but once again the Group rested during the day, unmolested.

Orders for the final stage to KALAMAI were issued by the Bde. Comd. on the afternoon of the 25 Apr. and the column moved off at 2000 hrs. on the route MILOI - TRIPOLIS - KALAMAI.

The road was very mountainous throughout but the large column negotiated it successfully and arrived at KALAMAI before daylight on the 26 Apr. ALLEN GROUP H.Q. had moved on ahead, made contact with the Embarkation Staff (Brig. Parrington), were allotted dispersal areas, and were awaiting to direct the Secs. of the Group on their arrival at KALAMAI. Dispersal was completed by 0700 hrs. in the morning of the 26 Apr., the cover available for concealment being excellent. Enemy planes made a recon during the day - dropped a stick of bombs along the wharf road for no apparent reason and although there were about 20,000 troops concealed in this area awaiting embarkation, no attack was made on the area. Concealment must have been very good and it does bring out the point that large bodies of troops can lie up in areas unobserved during the day, despite close recon by enemy planes, provided of course, that there is suitable cover.

To summarize the move from AMFIKLIA to KALAMAI from 0200 hrs 24 Apr. to 0700 hrs. 26 Apr.

#### Organisation.

- (a) The ALLEN GROUP was divided into four Secs. with a small Group H.Q. The Comd. (Brig. A.S. Allen) dealt only with the "Section" Comds - orders and instructions were kept as simple as possible.
- (b) The strength of the Group was approximately 6000 men and 600 vehicles.
- (c) An advanced recon party moved several hours ahead of the column and it was able to get back information regarding the route and the lying up areas.
- (d) Group H.Q. moved ahead of the column and was able to get early first hand knowledge of the parking areas, usually in the darkness, and arrange allotment to Secs. Secs sent representatives who moved at the head of the column and orders were issued to them by Group H.Q. for dispersal.

#### Route.

AMFIKLIA - LEVADEIA - ELEFSIS - ARGOS - MILOI - TRIPOLIS - KALAMAI.

#### Distances and Terrain.

Night 23/24 Apr. AMFIKLIA to ELEFSIS - about 90 miles.

Night 24/25 Apr. ELEFSIS to MILOI - about 90 miles.

Night 25/26 Apr. MILOI to KALAMAI - about 90 miles.

The mileages taken from the map are not a true indication of the distances covered as owing to the winding roads over the mountains the distance negotiated must have been considerably more.

The march throughout was an exceedingly good one and the M.T. Drivers are to be commended for their sterling work. In the darkness, driving from dusk to daylight, using only dim lights, it was no easy task and coupled with the very mountainous and winding roads, the performance and march discipline of the drivers was very satisfactory.

6 Aust. Div. Provost gave valuable assistance during the march and the work of its members lightened the difficulties of the route and and darkness.

Rations and P.O.L. The value of carrying adequate ration and P.O.L. reserve was brought out. The original move was to be to MEGARA but actually the Group travelled an additional 180 miles. At ELEFSIS the Group was ordered to take an additional 7 days' rations and an ample P.O.L. reserve. This was on top of reserve already being carried from BRALLOS area.

Many of the troops that joined the Group en route were without rations and at KALAMAI many of British, Cypriot and Palestinean and Yugo Slavian troops who comprised the balance of the 20,000 troops were very short of rations.

The Group was able to leave behind on embarkation sufficient rations to keep these men going.

Enemy Aircraft. Despite continual enemy air recon for the three days and nights of the move not one attack was launched on the Group. The enemy apparently did not use his planes at night and during the day adequate dispersion, concealment and camouflage prevented air attacks.

General. The co-operation of "Section" Comds. throughout was commendable as was the work of all ranks.

Throughout the move Group H.Q. had complete control and although there were no signal communications or despatch riders, control was kept with Liaison Officers, the establishment of a report center on the march and at rest. "Section" Comds. reported immediately on reaching each new location and arrangements were made for a further conference for the next move.

It was interesting to note how well the move was conducted, based on simple verbal orders and the close co-operation of all Comds.

#### KALAMAI.

Brig. A.S. Allen then established close contact with Embarkation H.Q. (Brig. Parrington) who stated that his information was practically nil. He had no communication with Force H.Q. - was not sure of the night of embarkation - when the ships would arrive and how many troops could be lifted. ALLEN GROUP was ordered NOT to destroy vehicles until instructed by Embarkation H.Q. Brig. Parrington stated that he was awaiting the arrival of a Naval Officer for further information.

No indication could be given of the method of embarkation, whether from the wharf or by small boats off the beach to the ships. Brig. Parrington was surprised at the large number of troops awaiting embarkation - about 20,000.

Brig. A.S. Allen arranged for all Australian troops to be embarked first and preliminary arrangements were made for an embarkation, either from the wharf or beach.

In the afternoon of the 26 Apr. 41 the Naval Officer arrived, conferred with Brig. Parrington and then Group H.Q. was informed that little information was available - that the ships may arrive that night - time was unknown. It was then decided to hand the Group vehicles over to Brig. Parrington for use by the remaining troops. Later, at a most inconvenient time, this was countermanded and the Group was instructed to destroy the vehicles with the result that some drivers were delayed and were NOT embarked that night.

It was anticipated that with the large number of troops of various nationalities and services in the area that there may be some difficulty in the ALLEN GROUP, holding its first priority of embarkation and 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. were instructed to detail one Bn to guard the embarkation point and prevent troops other than those ordered, from embarking.

#### PHASE 9.

#### KALAMAI to ALEXANDRIA.

At about 2200 hrs, lights were seen out to sea and a destroyer pulled alongside the wharf. The order was received to commence embarkation and the "Sections" embarked in the order - "Sections" B, D, A, C.

The method of embarkation was for two destroyers to run alongside the wharf, fill up with troops, move out into the Bay and tranship the troops to three small merchant ships, CITY OF LONDON, BILWARRA, COSTA RICA.

Control was extremely good - the behaviour of the troops was excellent and with the ready help of the Navy about 10,000 or 11,000 troops were embarked. Some attempt was made by other troops to embark but in the main they were circumvented until all Australians on the wharf were aboard.

At the last minute just as Group H.Q. were leaving on the final Destroyer, it was reported that some of the drivers had not returned from destroying vehicles and Capts. P.J. Woodhill and R.R. Vial were ordered to stay and organise any remaining Australian troops in the area and embark them on the following night. It must have been somewhat of a disappointment for these two officers to be left behind and it reflects great credit on them for the ready and cheerful way in which they accepted their task.

The last Destroyer left at about 0430 hrs, on the 27 Apr. and transhipped the troops to the CITY OF LONDON at about 0500 hrs. and the convoy proceeded on its way.

The arrangements by the Navy on the actual embarkation was most praiseworthy. The merchant service was equally helpful and the troops were given food and tea as soon as they boarded the ship. On the CITY OF LONDON were at least 3,500 troops - the normal capacity of the ship as a trooper was 1,400 troops.

In anticipation of a German bomber reception at daylight, all Bren Guns on the ship were organised for A.A. defence, and when the first attack came at about 0800 hrs. on 27 Apr., 81 L.M.G's opened fire from the CITY OF LONDON. The other ships

of the convoy were similarly organised and the whole convoy fought back vigorously. The men were exhausted from a strenuous campaign but with their backs against the wall, they fought the German planes all that day with every weapon that would fire.

The German was not unsuccessful and in the afternoon of the 27 Apr. scored a near miss on the COSTA RICA and she sank fairly quickly. Destroyers were quickly on the spot, removed the troops and took them to CRETE. Seven or eight enemy planes were reported to have been destroyed during the day's operations.

At this time it was not known whether the convoy was to proceed to CRETE or EGYPT, but on the second day out from GREECE, 28 Apr. it was apparent that CRETE was not the destination and the convoy finally disembarked at ALEXANDRIA at about 0900 hrs on 29 Apr. 41.

All Australian troops were entrained for AMIRIYA and were issued with any necessary clothing etc. and sent forward to PALESTINE.

From the time the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. had left TOBRUK on 8 Mar. 41, proceeded to GREECE on the 18 Mar. and returned to ALEXANDRIA on the 29 Apr. 41, it had been through a period of hard campaigning.

The strain of fatigue, unusual conditions of mountainous country, snow and cold, almost continuous movement, either forward or back, made the going hard but the troops, as a whole, stood up to it well.

There was an additional strain on Commanders, Officers and Staff and at times they had to struggle through periods of great fatigue. This clearly indicates that with Commanders and Staff there should be organised periods of rest so that they are able to function with clear minds, and that properly controlled rest, during a campaign is just as much a duty as any other task.

CASUALTIES. From the information available the casualties directly resulting from the GREECE Campaign are as follows :-

	Bde. H.Q.		2/1 Bn.		2/2 Bn.		2/3 Bn.		Total.	
	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.
Killed	-	3	1	5	-	2	-	1	1	11
Wounded	1	7	1	1	-	10	-	18	2	29
Missing	-	1	6	-	5	108	-	67	11	176
<b>Total.</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>216</b>

Further information made available by units of this Bde disclose the total casualties from the GREECE and CRETE Campaigns to be :-

	Bde. H.Q.		2/1 Bn.		2/2 Bn.		2/3 Bn.		Total.	
	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.	Off.	Org.
Killed	-	2	1	5	-	2	-	7	1	16
Wounded	-	-	1	1	-	10	-	-	1	11
Missing	3	35	32	576	8	178	1	125	44	914
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>582</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>941</b>

REPORT ON OPERATIONS IN GREECE.

B.

16 AUGUST. INF. BDE.

COMMENTS AND LESSONS.

The following report deals with comments and lessons on Staff control, employment and value of L.O's, supporting arms, and general as requested in 6 Aust. Div. 504/C.

1. STAFF CONTROL.

The system in general, used for Bde. H.Q. in the GREECE Campaign was as follows :-

- (a) An advanced or operational H.Q.
- (b) Rear H.Q.

Adv. H.Q. With the operational H.Q. were the Commander, Brigade Major, I.O. and staff, L.O's, one or two clerks, Sig. H.Q., and one pl. Corps Guard Bn.

It was usual that either the Commander or B.M. were always present at Adv. H.Q. or within close call.

L.O's were kept in touch with the whole situation, making at least one daily call to units or whenever necessary.

It was found that a small Adv. H.Q. enabled better concealment from air observation. Any personnel unnecessary for operational H.Q. were kept at Rear H.Q.

A traffic control point was always established for dispersing of vehicles of visitors and guiding to H.Q.

Rear H.Q. In the main, the whole of unit Echelons, A and B were brigaded, the Rear H.Q. being co-ordinated by the Staff Capt. who controlled a separate administrative H.Q.

Unit 2 i/c maintained a liaison between fwd unit H.Q. and B Echelon.

The Rear Bde. Staff kept in close touch with Adv. Bde. H.Q. and throughout this system of Adv. and Rear H.Q. worked smoothly. Very often the contact was made at night, supplies were sent up by night, therefore limiting movement around operational H.Q. by day.

Rear H.Q. locations were usually selected from the point of view of concealment and dispersion.

2. LIAISON OFFICERS.

Bde. L.O's. These officers were found to be invaluable throughout the GREECE Campaign.

The nature of the terrain imposed great strain on their physical powers. It is necessary for them to be young, fit and capable of considerable physical effort. With it all they must be clear-minded and able to express the orders and intentions of the Commander.

It is felt that one per unit on occasions is insufficient and that there should be a reserve to relieve the strain on L.O's.



This would permit them to obtain sufficient rest and maintain them in a high state of efficiency throughout the campaign.

The L.O. who is completely in the picture can deliver and express the verbal orders of the Commander more clearly than the issue of written orders.

Div. L.O. The use of a Divisional L.O. was effective during the campaign and was of great assistance to the Bde. Comd. He was on most occasions able to give a clear conception of the bigger picture and to give general information which was of use to the Bde.

Throughout the GREECE Campaign, Capt. B.V. Wilson, 6 Aust. Div. was in liaison with the Bde. and the highest commendation is expressed for his work. In view of the enemy air activity his journeys to and from the various H.Q. must have been extremely hazardous.

At all times Capt. Wilson was able to give a clear and lucid statement of what was required and throughout the campaign the Commander (Brig. A.S. Allen) had the utmost confidence in him.

General. It is felt that all L.O's should be in close association with the Commander, to know his mind and intentions. The L.O. therefore is more able to express the Commander's intentions and orders to the subordinate Commanders.

### 3. ASSISTANCE BY SUPPORTING ARMS.

#### Artillery.

(i) The 2/2 Aust. Fd. Regt. R.A.A. was in support of the 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. at VERROIA but the enemy was NOT in contact. However, the closest co-operation was experienced with the 2/2 Aust. Fd. Regt.

(ii) The only other Arty support was by the 4 H.S. Fd. Regt. (less one Bty) and one Troop H.S. A/Tk. Guns at PENEIOS GORGE on the 17/18 Apr. 41 and a report has already been submitted with reference to the action of this Regt.

M.M.C. There was no allotment of M.M.C. to this Bde. during the GREECE Campaign.

With the very wide fronts taken up by the Bde. on the various positions the long range fire of the medium machine gun would have been invaluable for filling gaps and protecting flanks.

At PENEIOS GORGE a Coy of machine guns would have had "made to order" targets but unfortunately there were none with the Force.

Engineers. As mentioned already in the body of the main report the 2/1 Aust. Fd. Coy. R.A.E. gave great assistance at VERROIA on the withdrawal from VERROIA to SERVIA etc. The close co-operation of all ranks was most commendable.

Signals. When in fixed positions line communication was found to be most satisfactory mainly due to the extra line carried by "J" Sec. Sigs which enabled line communication over the extremely wide fronts.

Later when the units of Bde were on the move across country from VERROIA to SERVIA communication was only by L.O. Had Bde been able to carry wireless on donkey pack or a pack set on the man, communications could have been maintained.

In the withdrawal, with last minute "get-aways", the decision nearly always had to be made whether to maintain communications to the end and leave some line or take up the line and be without communications. Wireless contact at these stages would have maintained the communication and solved the problem.

"J" Sec. Sigs (Lieut. I.J. Ibbotson) did all that was possible at all times and their devotion to their duty and keenness throughout is worthy of record.

General. It has been our experience that with all Australian units there is a readiness and eagerness to co-operate in battle.

The highest co-operation is always experienced when units of all arms know each other, particularly the Commanders, and are used to working together in the same group.

Hastily got together forces, while not doubting their desire to co-operate, usually is more of an individual affair and the force or group is not welded together as a team with full recognition of the command of the immediate superior Commander.

Familiarity with the personal characteristics of the various subordinate Commanders is highly desirable - mutual confidence is developed - it makes for the general cohesion and co-operation of all arms of the force - and there is a more rapid assimilation of orders and execution of the plan in battle.

#### 4. GENERAL.

##### Enemy Aircraft.

After initial attacks it was realized that little damage was done by bombing. Machine gunning perhaps did slightly more damage to vehicles on the move.

If enemy aircraft were attempting to destroy the road, he made a bad fist of it as at no stage was the transport of this Bde. held up by the road being completely destroyed.

It is necessary for transport to maintain the distances allotted and to keep moving.

Unless directly attacked it is not necessary to fire but if attacked, to retaliate vigorously with controlled fire.

Concealment, camouflage, dispersion make targets uneconomical from the attacker's point of view - limits observation and consequently the possibility of attack.

There must be a careful selection of B Echelon areas and it may be better to increase distances between Adv. and Rear H.Q. to obtain effective cover.

PHENIX CORGE. The various heavy bombing and M.C. attacks throughout the day provided harassing and covering fire for the enemy to continue their attack.

At about 1900 hrs on the 18 Apr., 27 planes attacked the rearward position when the enemy infantry and tanks were approaching from 2000/3000 yds away. The intention of the E.A. may have been as follows :-

- (a) To harass and destroy our troops.
- (b) To encourage a heavy gun expenditure at a vital stage of the defence. Here our troops fought back vigorously and the gun expenditure must have been tremendous.

- (c) To give supporting fire during the approach of enemy infantry and tanks and divert the attention of our defending troops. This permitted the enemy to get into close contact and manoeuvre into position against a minimum of defensive fire.

This points clearly to the fact that fire must be controlled and in close contact situations, the position must be closely watched so that only portion of the defence is anti-aircraft while the remainder observes and deals with attacking infantry and tanks.

It may be a strong point in favor of a heavier and longer range A.A. weapon being allotted to Bde. with the sole responsibility of protecting units, thus freeing, in the main, infantry weapons to deal with ground attacks by enemy infantry.

Air. The enemy with his complete air superiority in GREECE had the opportunity at all times to reconce positions held - obtain sufficient knowledge of dispositions and plan his attack accordingly. This gave the German a very distinct advantage quite apart from the additional advantages of close bomber and machine gun support to his ground forces.

It was obvious that there was very close co-operation between the air and ground forces and that the enemy aircraft were given definite specific tasks to carry out.

Transport. When this Bde. embarked from EGYPT to GREECE at least 90% of its transport had a very limited life owing to the operations in LIBYA. By good march discipline, continual and careful maintenance and the hard work of the 45 Aust. L.A.D. most of the Bde. transport carried on throughout the campaign until it was finally abandoned on the evacuation from GREECE.

Mortars. All weapons were found to be effective during the campaign. The 3" Mortar was most effective in defence at PANILOS GORGE, about 300 3" Mortar bombs were fired from the two Mortars in one day with very good fire effect. They did much to restrict the enemy advance and inflicted very heavy casualties.

A.A. L.M.C. The opinion has already been expressed that a larger calibre A.A. weapon with more hitting power than the .303 should take the place of the present A.A. Pl. weapon. It is further suggested that each Bde. Group should have attached heavier A.A. weapons to deal with low flying aircraft attacks.

NARRATIVE AND LESSONS

A & Q EXPERIENCE OF 16 AUST INF BDE DURING

GREEK CAMPAIGN

GENERAL

2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn moved by train and road from DAPHNE to LARISSA, train party moving on 23 Mar. 41, road party 2 days later. The troops travelled in third class Railway carriages in contrast to the cattle trucks used by 2/1 and 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bns.

The Carriers were taken on floats, similar to those used in EGYPT, two days after the train party.

2/3 Bn rationed from D.I.D. LARISSA. As the Coys of the Bn were on security duty at various strategic points, Coy transport moved to Coy areas on arrival at LARISSA.

2/1 and 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bns left DAPHNE on 26 Mar. by two separate trains. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn moved at 1900 hrs. and 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn at 2100 hrs.

On arrival at LARISSA, personnel of these Bns were ferried to the SERVIA Area, where rations were drawn daily at D.I.D. in that area.

2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn left LARISSA on 6 Apr. 41 and was convoyed by N.Z. Reserve M.P. Coy to the VERROIA area. B Echelon transport was brigaded in the vicinity of the town of POLYMYTON. During the whole time that units were in the area, very little transport was taken up the Pass, donkeys being used to ration Coys in the VERROIA area.

After the Bde's withdrawal from VERROIA to SERVIA, B Echelon transport was again brigaded.

This transport area was never bombed. Extremely wide dispersion and the first genuine attempt at camouflage, seem to have been effective. It was whilst the Bns were taking up their new positions in SERVIA area that the need for more donkeys became apparent. Several officers were detailed to commandeer donkeys and hand receipts to owners with the promise of payment. As a matter of fact, the venture was entirely successful and some hundreds of donkeys were acquired within 48 hours. Rationing to Bns from the D.I.D. between GERANIA and SERVIA operated by means of donkeys.

A withdrawal by B Echelon from SERVIA to THOMAI was carried out by night, but the first elements left B Echelon area in daylight in groups of 10 vehicles so as to achieve wider dispersion. There were many low hanging clouds and there were no attacks by air.

The withdrawal of the troops from SERVIA by Corps Reserve M.P. was most successful owing to the dense clouds which prevented aircraft action. Transport was late in arriving and much of the journey had to be carried out in broad daylight.

On arrival at THOMAI new dispositions were given for the Bde, North East of LARISSA. B Echelon vehicles (except 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn which was NOT now under command) were dispersed in soft ground and owing to the rains which had fallen on the previous

days, many vehicles were bogged. The Carriers were again employed to extricate bogged vehicles, and during the day B Echelon vehicles moved under Bde arrangements to PENEIOS area. The position was a cramped one but every advantage was taken of small areas in which a few vehicles could be dispersed, and again there was no attack by air, in spite of many recon planes, and much bombing of LARISSA and the GORGE.

As warnings had been given that the road LARISSA - LAMIA would be congested on the following day, the Commander ordered B Echelon to be withdrawn at 0200 hrs. during the night 17/18 Apr. 41.

Conditions during the withdrawal of the M.T. from LARISSA to LAMIA are dealt with in the statement by the M.T.O., 2/3 Aust. Inf. Bn, attached hereto.

Whilst in the BRALLOS area no real problems of supply were encountered, as ample supplies were available at D.I.D's at LAMIA and LEVADEIA. B Echelon area was selected just North of LEVADEIA and although about 30 kilometres in rear of the forward units, was found entirely satisfactory from every point of view. Despite several bombing and machine gun attacks, little damage was done.

The transport was dispersed on both sides of the road. On the Eastside of the main road there were plenty of trees, but none on the West. More bombs were dropped on the West, but again, wide dispersion was almost a complete answer even to dive bombing. Vehicles were used as little as possible during the day time. Liaison between rear and forward H.Q's was made at night and was found to be adequate.

The withdrawal from the BRALLOS area to the ultimate evacuation at KALAMAI was achieved with a minimum of vehicle casualties. As a recon party moved in advance each day and selected bivouac and dispersion areas for transport and troops, ample rations were available from abandoned D.I.D's at ATHENS' Racecourse and ARCOS and other points en route.

One of the most important lessons of the campaign was brought out by the fact that at KALAMAI before evacuation. 4 days' rations were taken by each man of this Bde. Although these rations were NOT used on board ship, they proved invaluable to the personnel who were landed at CRETE.

#### WEAPONS

Weapons generally gave a better performance in GREECE than in the desert, mainly due to the lack of dust. There was an acute shortage of Oil, G.S. and flannelette for cleaning purposes.

It was noted that the Greek weapons were kept in exceptionally good condition. It appeared that much time was spent in care and cleaning of weapons, and from enquiries from platoon commanders, this fact seems to have impressed our men very deeply.

#### RATIONING

Following are extracts from reports on rationing :-

##### 2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn.

The normal system of rationing was followed by this Bn prior to move from VERROIA PASS.

After orders were received to evacuate VERROIA, 4 days'

rations were drawn by Coys from a Bn dump which had been formed in B Echelon area. These rations sufficed until 16 Apr. 41 when Bn moved to LARISSA area. There a further 4 days' rations were taken from an abandoned D.I.D. and these kept the Bn until a delivery of 1 days' ration was effected at THESSOPYLAS PASS by A.A.S.C. on 21 Apr. and 22 Apr. 41.

From thereon the Bn rationed itself from abandoned D.I.D's.

### 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.

From 8 Apr. 41 until 12 Apr. 41, 2/2 Bn had 10 days' rations on hand - 4 days' with each man and 6 days' dumped at VERROIA PASS.

When Bn withdrew to KASTANIA- MOSEKHORIA, 4 days' rations per man were carried on the man. When passing through VOLVENDOS on 14 Apr. a further one day's ration per man was collected from dump established at that village.

Meanwhile B Echelon at GERANIA had acquired an additional 10 days' supply of rations from the forward Supply Dump, vicinity GERANIA, and three days' per man were taken over the mountains by donkey and dumped at the Shrine (rear of Bn position). Of these rations one day per man could only be delivered to Coys before the withdrawal from this position commenced on 16 Apr.

At the Bn embussing point on SERVIA-LARISSA road, in vicinity Trig. 1142, a further 2 days' rations per man were drawn on 17 Apr. from the dump established there by B Echelon.

From Trig. 1142 Bn moved to PENEIOS area and occupied a defensive position at EVANGILISMOS. B Echelon was established 2 miles S.W. of Bde H.Q. which was at MAREKHORION.

10 days' rations were secured from abandoned R.A.S.C. Dump, LARISSA, and brought forward to B Echelon area, where part were distributed to Coys evening 17 Apr.

After withdrawal 18 Apr. most of the men of Bn were cut off, and foraged for their own food during their journey to GREECE, EGYPT and PALESTINE.

B Echelon and D Coy moved by H.T. to KALAMAYA in stages. They replenished supplies at BRALIOS 22 Apr. and ARGOS 24 Apr. where plenty of rations were available from abandoned R.A.S.C. Dumps.

### TRANSPORT

Following is an extract from a report by M.T.O. 2/3 Bn which illustrates the performance of unit M.T. during the campaign :-

The vehicles on the whole gave a good performance. The petrol issued was of a higher standard than that used in the desert, and the absence of dust and the clearness of the air tended to make conditions ideal for motors. There were no serious breakdowns and all repairs were fixed by unit fitters.

Driving generally in GREECE was very difficult. The roads, although good in most cases, were very narrow, and on mountain passes many hair-pin bends were encountered. On leaving the main roads, dirt roads were encountered; these were built up to a height of about 2 feet, and during the rain, were difficult to negotiate, the surfaces being very greasy.

The drivers of vehicles played a very important part in the Greek Campaign and enough praise cannot be given them. Their vehicles at all times were ready for immediate use, and the drivers at times worked for at least 20 hours per day. The standard of maintenance was excellent. After leaving LARISSA, drivers were subjected during many hours of the day to continual road strafing but carried on under these difficult conditions and supplies to forward troops were never at any time held up. Drivers generally showed particular devotion to duty under difficult conditions..

Casualties to drivers were nil in 2/3 Bn and casualties to vehicles were also nil.

The withdrawal from LARISSA to LAMIA was the most trying day for vehicles and drivers alike. At 0630 hrs a flight of bombers appeared and bombed a bridge on the main road, making the road impassible for at least six hours. The absence of road discipline in many units was noticed here; at one time there were three lines of traffic along the road, and about one yard between vehicles, making an easy target for aircraft. Many vehicles were destroyed here, but fortunately none of this Bn. Right throughout the day there was continual bombing and ground strafing, making movement almost impossible.

At KALAMATA all vehicles were destroyed by draining the oil and then running the engines until they seized.

(Sgd) I. McKenzie Capt.  
S.C. 16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

D

JULIS CAMP  
"HOBBS" Lines  
H.Q. 2/1 Aust  
Inf Bn  
29 June 41

H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde

LESSONS - CAMPAIGN IN GREECE.

The following lessons were brought out during the campaign in GREECE :

INTERCOMMUNICATION:

The means of communication available in a Bn at present are insufficient for warfare in which the Bn has to cover large fronts such as were occupied by this Bn at VERRIA PASS 6000 X.

Bn HQ was out of touch with 3 forward Coys for over 6 hours due to denseness of scrub and topography making it extremely difficult to lay lines. Runners took 2 hours to reach 2 of the forward Coys. Provision of pack wireless sets would have solved this situation. Communication between Brigade and Bn was also subject to long delay and use was made of the Greek military line during the first 12 hours.

DUMPING OF RATIONS AND AMMUNITION:

Owing to the limited means of access to our position at VERRIA it became evident early in the operation that to maintain supplies, both of rations and ammunition, dumping would be necessary. A forward dump was established in the Bn HQ area and this was replenished from a main dump off the road about 1 mile SOUTH of KASTANIA. The need for careful reconnaissance and selection of these areas for dumps, during the preliminary reconnaissance for occupation of a defensive position of the nature of <sup>the</sup> one held by us, is emphasised.

CAMOUFLAGE AND COVER:

The need for constant practice in camouflage in defensive, particularly progressive camouflage of works, was noticed and also the value of shadow, both as an aid to camouflage of works, and as the best means of protection from observation by aircraft of personnel. It is suggested that more exercises embodying these two points could be introduced into our training.

As I was not with the Bn in the latter stages of the campaign in GREECE and the other officers now with the unit have no further lessons to bring out, this report only covers the move to, and occupation of, defensive position at VERRIA PASS.

Sgd C.R.V. Edgar Major  
Adm Comd 2/1 Aust Inf Bn.



2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.  
Coddard Lines.  
JULIS CAMP.  
10 Jul. 41.

16 Aust. Inf. Bde.

OPERATIONS IN GREECE.

Ref. File R/2/16.

1. A full report on the PERMIOS CORGE action in which this Bn. was involved, has already been submitted.
2. The following comments are submitted on the general lessons brought out by the campaign :-

(a) SIGNALS :-

The wide frontages held (which appear to be normal under the present conditions) emphasise the inadequacy of existing signal equipment. The following improvements are urgently needed :-

- (i) A much larger quantity of wire.
- (ii) An increased establishment of telephones.
- (iii) Provision of Pack R/T sets - also a more powerful set for communication with B Echelon which is often many miles in rear.

(b) PACK TRANSPORT :

This Bn was compelled to adopt improvised mule and donkey lst. Line transport. It is believed that similar conditions apply in SYRIA, and that in other parts of the Middle East, pack is an essential means of transport. Other European armies maintain Mountain Divisions. It is submitted that training in pack lst. Line transport should be given to infantry units.

(c) "SCRATCH" FORCES:

The great disadvantage of hastily assembled forces combining different arms was amply borne out in the experience of this Bn. It is essential that units likely to fight together in war should train together so as fully to develop mutual confidence.


3. The following suggestion has been made by an officer of this Bn which, in my opinion, has much to commend it and is forwarded for consideration, especially having regard to para 2 (c) :-

- (a) In most operations of war an infantry Bn will have supporting it, A/Tk. guns and M.M.C's. A normal allotment is likely to be one tp. of 4 A/Tk. guns and one pl. of M.M.C's. to a Bn.
- (b) It is suggested that such A/Tk. and M.M.C. pls. be raised and trained in the same manner as the old A/Tk. Coy - i.e. one tp. of guns and one M.M.C. pl. from each Bn.
- (c) In many conditions Bren Carriers will best operate brigaded.
- (d) With the foregoing in mind, the suggestion is that a brigade "support group" be constituted as follows :-

Group H.Q.  
H.Q. and three tps A/Tk. guns.  
H.Q. and three pls. M.M.Cs.  
H.Q. and three Carrier Pls.

As the situation required, sub-units would either be allotted to Bns, or kept brigaded. It is even possible that two or more of such groups may be combined to form part of a highly mobile Div. force.

(Sgd) F.O. Chilton Lt-Col.  
Comd. 2/2 Aust. Inf. Bn.



TRACE "A"

SHOWING -

- A) 16 AUST INF BDE POSITIONS AT VERROIA PASS
- B) ROUTE FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM VERROIA PASS TO EMBUSSING POINTS FOR MOVE TO LARISSA

TO BE SUPERIMPOSED ON MAPS

EDESSA 1:100,000

MOUNT OLYMPUS 1:100,000


X ROAD BLOCKS

NOTE - HEIGHTS SHOWN IN METRES

# TRACE B.


Showing dispositions of ALLEN FORCE — Peneios Gorge.

To be superimposed on sheets C3060 LARISA and C3066 MOUNT OLYMPUS — THE BALKANS  
1/100,000.



### Reference.

- 25 Pds. Battery Post.
- 25 Pds A Sh Guns
- 2 Pdr " "
- Headquarters 3d Bn Coy
- Road Block
- Main Lines of Enemy.
- Advance 18 Apr. Morning
- NZ 21 Bn.
- Aust 2/2 Bn
- " 2/3 Bn
- Rearward Posns.



LEGEND.

- Adv Bde H.Q. .... P
- Rear Bde. H.Q. .... O
- 2/2 Bn. 1st Posn. .... O
- " " 2nd " .... O
- 2/3 Bn. .... O

Dispositions of 16 Aust. Inf. Bde. at BRALLOS.  
(2/1 Aust. Inf. Bn. then u/c 19 Aust. Inf. Bde.)