

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/2/21

21 Infantry Brigade
January 1946, Appendices

SUBJECT : OPERATIONAL REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

2/14 Aust Inf Bn

29 Jul 45

REF NO : 11/3/42

21 AUST INF BDE.

1. Reference your G1092 of 25 Jul 45 the report is submitted.
2. (a) Use of M2-2 Manpack Flamethrowers

These flame throwers were used on only one occasion by one company against wood and earth bunkers in the ADULT area. Two flame throwers were used with thin fuel and one with thick fuel was kept in reserve. On three occasions the ignitors failed to operate and it is thought that they may have become damp during transit.

Results obtained - bunkers set on fire and burnt out.

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- (b) Use of Matilda Tanks

Three tanks were brought forward across MANGGAR BESAR river but two were immediately knocked out by coastal defence guns and the third damaged. Three tanks were later brought forward to forward company to cover bunker positions on a ridge but were NOT used to engage targets.

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- (c) Use of 6 Pr Tk A Guns

One 6 pr was used against enemy bunker positions with excellent results. The gun was able to fire directly into the slits of the bunkers causing considerable damage and effectively knocked down armour plated doors on one bunker and put one 5 inch coastal gun out of action by a direct hit on the recuperator.

6 prs were co-ordinated in company defensive positions whenever possible and sited to cover road approaches but no tanks were used by the enemy.

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- (d) Use of 4.2 Inch Mortars

These mortars were mostly used for searching ground reported or thought to be occupied by enemy in gullies behind main defences. They were also used for DF and SOS tasks in front of forward companies. Targets were registered during day in areas selected by company commanders. On numerous occasions they were employed on harassing fire tasks throughout night on rear areas.

No report can be given on their accuracy on pin pointed positions as neutralisation appears to be the most effective use for them and they were employed in that capacity.

Well dug in base plate positions are necessary to gain accurate fire. On one occasion the rounds dropped closer to our own positions during one fire plan in support of our infantry and it is thought this was due to soft base plate positions.

The use of 4.2 inch mortar fire in conjunction with other supporting arms was necessary in conditions which prevailed at MANGGAR AIRSTRIP.

Enemy defensive positions were sited in depth, and in the re-entrants behind the ridges he had built shelters with overhead cover. The ability of the enemy to seek shelter in these bunkers or re-entrants while supporting fire was falling on his defences and then man these defences before the infantry reached objective renders heavy mortar fire necessary to fill in gaps and to search the dead ground which artillery and other supporting fire could NOT cover.

2. (d) Use of 4.2 Inch Mortars (cont)

The enemy positions were also spread over a wide arc and 4.2 inch mortars were invaluable in assisting in engaging new targets which might be located anywhere within arc of 180 degrees.

On one occasion 4.2 inch mortars could have given us quick close support, when artillery was out of range, if transport had been supplied. The ability to get these mortars forward where it is NOT possible to get artillery forward is limited only by the availability of transport.

Artillery cannot engage targets in deep gullies behind enemy defences as quickly as mortar fire can be brought to bear on them. 3 inch mortars cannot perform the same tasks as 4.2 inch mortars by reason of the greater range and their weight of bombs which is double that of our 3 inch mortar.

(e) Methods of defense against enemy infiltration at night

- (i) 4.2 inch, 3 inch mortars and artillery fire for DF and SOS tasks were allotted by forward companies each day and proved very effective in breaking up enemy counter attack against the coastal defence gun position in MANGGAR area. Daylight reconnaissance found many enemy casualties in front of our positions. Our troops were well dug in and artillery fire was falling quite safely within thirty yards of our positions.
- (ii) Booby traps were used on some occasions across tracks and roads and also warning devices made of tins but the ability of the enemy to locate and delouse our booby traps and then set their own so that casualties were caused to our inspecting parties, requires considerable skill in detailed camouflage for them to be effective. Also enemy set snipers to cover our booby traps after they had located them and waited for approach of our delousing parties.
- (iii) Naval illuminating shells were used on some occasions and are very effective in open or semi open country during attempts by the enemy to infiltrate into our lines. Their use is limited to the flat ground as it also illuminated our own troops occupying the higher ground in the vicinity.
- (iv) Patrolling just before stand to at night and again just before stand down in the morning is necessary to ensure security in immediate vicinity of company defensive positions and preventing enemy approaching close enough to observe either our defences or throw grenades.

3. GENERAL

Generally all methods used were simply the applications of the principles of war. The amount of supporting fire available to the battalion was greater than in any previous action and the maximum use was made of every type of supporting arm and weapon. The procedure adopted against heavy gun positions was as follows.

Excellent OPs were essential and were available from tops of high bunkers enabling good observation over all enemy defences. All OPs were well forward and gun positions were pin pointed from the flash when firing. Air, Naval, Artillery, Tank Attack, 4.2 inch and 3 inch mortar fire was quickly brought down firstly neutralising enemy fire which was causing casualties and then knocking out gun positions.

Air support consisted of LIBERATORS with bombs from 250 to 1000 lbs and LIGHTNINGs with NAPALM bombs. The napalm was very effective and great accuracy was obtained by means of

3. GENERAL

low level attacks. Their value lies in their demoralising effect on the enemy and is effective in either open or close country.

Throughout the action against heavy calibre guns up to 5 inch coastal guns, there were NO full scale infantry attacks even by companies.

Positions on the high ground were selected first and subjected to heavy fire. A complete fire plan was then drawn up to cover a fighting patrol and support it up to the enemy position. Air attacks were used first then supporting arms. Fire was continued until patrol was almost up to their objective. These tactics proved very effective and patrols were on the position before the enemy had recovered. By using small numbers as a fighting patrol casualties were kept to a minimum without reducing the effectiveness of the force. The balance of the company was held in reserve to be ready for quick deployment and consolidation. Because objectives selected were small ~~and~~, it was almost physically impossible to deploy a larger body of troops without causing undue casualties.

The enemy failed to defend his guns with infantry except on isolated occasions and relied mainly on the fire power of his heavy weapons to break up our attacks. Our leading company on approaching the positions was able to get across the airfield into a position where only mortar fire and air burst anti aircraft gun fire could be brought to bear on them. From this area one company eventually captured the coastal defence guns. During this action it was found that 50 per cent of the enemy mortar bombs failed to explode.

The value of quick consolidation was again proved during this campaign. Consolidation with troops and fire was essential and adequate time, NOT less than two hours, should be available for daylight consolidation if the inevitable counter attack is to be successfully broken up.


4. RAE ASSAULT DEMOLITION PARTIES

Engineer representatives were attached to each rifle company throughout the campaign and gave great assistance in locating, marking and delousing enemy mines and booby traps. Also assisted in setting our own booby traps.

On one occasion pack charges were used against concrete bunkers on the coastal defence gun position. One engineer with one charge was killed and it was NOT possible to reach him and use the charge. Another one thrown into a bunker failed to explode. One charge was afterwards tested and placed in a bunker and completely wrecked it.

During the assault landing this unit was reserve battalion and there was no clearing of mines or booby traps to be done in the beach head area.

Engineers were of great assistance at all times and co-operation between them and our pioneer platoon enabled the rapid repair of L of C. Bridges were repaired and the roadway cleared sufficient to allow Jeep traffic through to the battalion each evening.


-6. Lt-col
Comd 2/14 Aust Inf Bn

Subject :- OPERATIONAL REPORTS

Ref your G1092 of 25 Jul 45

21 Bde
2/16 AUST INFEN
AIF AUSTRALIA
01/4
Jul 45

21 AUST INF BDE.

Following is this unit's report upon the subjects enumerated in your G1092 of 25 Jul 45.

SECTION I

USE OF M2-2 MAN PACK FLAME THROWERS

1. These weapons were employed on F Day by the two forward Coys. On the left they were most effective in clearing pillboxes and the shorter tunnels, but would not penetrate more than a few feet into the larger ones.

The enemy broke each time they were used.

Thin fuel only was used.

They were not tried in jungle areas for the following reasons:-

2. It is not considered they would be very effective in the thick wet scrub as the heat and flame would be absorbed by the vegetation.

3. It was considered that the enemy, having no pillboxes, could be driven out without flame.

4. As a precaution against mechanical failures a specialist team was organised whose only duty was to service and maintain the weapons. One weapon which was filled on board ship failed to operate on F Day until re-serviced.

5. As the performance of the weapon when properly maintained is a constant, the only factors which influence its employment are:-

(a) The calibre and standard of training of the operator.

(b) Standard of training of the riflemen supporting the Flamethrower.

6. We treat the weapon not as support but as a primary weapon in close fighting. The riflemen support the flamethrower.

7. It is not considered that anything more than lessons taught in training can be gained.

SECTION II

USE OF MATILDAS

8. Matildas were not employed by this unit.

SECTION III

USE OF 4.2 INCH MORTAR

9. This weapon was used on F Day only. The target was considered an easy one and was well within range.

10. It was engaged rapidly, accurately and effectively and covered the advance of our troops.

11. It appears not to possess the pin point accuracy of the 3" mortar.

SECTION IV

METHODS OF DEFENCE AT NIGHT AGAINST ENEMY INFILTRATION

12. Definition of Infiltration - passing through our positions.

This subject needs much consideration from many angles.

Some Jap activity was wrongly classed as infiltration whereas they

were small fighting patrols against our own FDL's.
It is considered that sometimes they found themselves in front of our rear Coys by accident - not knowing our dispositions.

13. Consider the Objects of Infiltration

(A) Secure vital or important ground by surprise without fighting for it (no set piece attack etc.).

Instance To secure top of a hill when enemy known to be occupying the lower slopes only.

(B) Harass HQ and kill or capture key personnel.

Instance Passing through or round Bn lines to reach Bde HQs and destroy the command post and its occupants.

This would have a three fold effect as follows :-

It would upset a plan for a co-ordinated Bde effort either in attack or defence.

Cause a re-organisation of commanders and staff in the Bde with temporary loss of efficiency and probable immobility of the Bde during the re-organisation.

Cause a redistribution of forces and units within the Bde sector.

(C) To destroy our installations, dumps, transport, etc in rear areas.

14. The enemy operations of sending small parties up to our FDLs and throwing grenades, spears and firing weapons is not considered as infiltration but merely as the employment of small fighting patrols by night on harassing roles.

15. The tactics which consist of moving parties silently through the gaps between platoons, Coys, Battalions, Brigades, etc to occupy tactical ground unoccupied by us; to raid and destroy HQs or to destroy installations, dumps etc, really constitutes infiltration.

16. However, the defence and counter measure to both types of operation will be dealt with here.

SECTION V

DEFENCE AND COUNTER MEASURES AGAINST TACTICS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 14.

17. In open country the defensive measures will consist of :-

Skilful siting of weapons in Platoon localities as laid down in text books, so that all weapons may fire.

Fighting patrols operating well out across the enemy's front and flanks to intercept these parties.

A system of listening posts well forward aided by trip wires, warning devices, booby traps. The existence of these posts must be hidden from the enemy.

Maintenance of a small mobile reserve to counter attack these raiding parties. (The use of star shell at short and irregular intervals
Training troops to hold their fire until a target is identified

18. In close country the defensive and counter measures consist of :-

Skilful siting and thorough organisation of Company localities with visual and auricular communication between each post and its immediate neighbours

19. As the enemy generally leaves his positions and moves along the few good approaches, tracks, etc. to within 50 yards of our positions before deploying into the scrub, our fighting patrols will be sent out unseen before last light to cover the tracks and approaches leading from the enemy positions. His parties will then be destroyed at their source and he will be misled as to our actual positions. The patrols should move immediately after destroying the enemy parties as they will

not be strong enough to withstand a strong assault by the enemy and may be caught in his defensive fire.

20. Booby traps, trip wires, and warning devices are effective in close country because we have no troops moving about in front of us except on tracks which need not be booby trapped.

21. This unit's experience is limited to the above type of enemy activity and no instance of infiltration proper has been reported.

22. The measures described above when properly applied proved effective in turning back enemy raiding parties.

23. However, extensive consideration had been given by this unit in the period 1943 - June 1945 in the defeat of enemy infiltration and the following notes may be of use :-

SECTION VI

DEFENCE AND COUNTER MEASURES AGAINST TACTICS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 13 C

24. In open country the defensive and counter measures against infiltration proper should be :- *and*

- (1) (a) Continuous fighting patrols between Platoons, Coys and Battalion from rear to front and laterally.
- (ii) (a) Listening posts at selected points on exits from enemy positions.
- (c) Harassing fire from MMGs, Mortars and Arty between units.
(This course, unless we know the enemy intends to make an infiltration move, is likely to result in waste of ammunition).
- (d) The allocation of troops to the sole role of ground protection of dumps, installations and Headquarters.
- (e) If it is impossible to hold in strength some commanding ground in our rear, it should be picqueted so that warning may be given of enemy concentration there. Mobile reserves can then attack him in darkness before he has time to dig in. This ground should be previously registered by Arty and $\frac{1}{2}$ or Mortars so that our subsequent attack can be adequately supported.
- (f) The best counter measure consists of the maintenance of a completely mobile reserve with the role of locating and destroying infiltration parties. This reserve must be distinct from the reserve allotted the role of local counter attacks.

Note: In this Bn the HQs is invariably sited within a Coy defensive area, not the reserve Coy; as the mobility of the reserve is prejudiced if it has a dual role.

25. In close country the defensive and counter measures against infiltration should be :-

- (A) Skilful selection of vital ground for defence in Coy or larger localities.
- (B) Siting of HQ within the defensive system of a combatant unit or sub-unit which has been committed to the defence, *to hold a firm base*
i.e. It is usual to maintain a firm base - the HQ should be in the area.
If the HQ relies for protection on the reserve, the Commander automatically sacrifices freedom of action and mobility of the reserve.

- (C) Organisation of an inner defence ring around HQ.
- (D) Tactical siting of installations, dumps etc for easy defence against ground attack.
- (E) Patrolling of L of C from first light to just before last light.
- (F) Prior registration of tactically important features which we cannot occupy, to enable our reserve troops to attack the position as soon after first light as possible with adequate support.

Ref your Para 1 (f)

26. No report additional to my general report dated 24 Jul 45.

Hublet LT COL.
CCMD 2/16 AUST INF BN.

Subject: OPERATIONAL REPORTS.

2/27 Aust Inf Bn

G44/636

30 Jul 45.

21 Aust Inf Bde

1. Ref your G-I092 of 25 Jul 45.
2. Attached hereto please find reports giving information gained by this unit from operations conducted during the BALIKPAPAN operation.

Atcher
Lt-Col
Comd 2/27 Aust Inf Bn

OPERATIONAL REPORT

(a) Use of M2-2 Manpack Flamethrowers:

C The only occasion flamethrowers were used was on an enemy pillbox with satisfactory results. Several instances have occurred on long distance patrols when a flamethrower could have been used to advantage, but the present weight of this weapon precludes it from the arms of such a patrol.

(b) Matildas:

E During the assault landing, three MATILDAS were landed at H plus eight and a further six at H plus 33. Owing to bomb craters, fallen timber and other obstacles on the beachline the first tp of tanks did not reach the VASEY HIGHWAY in the vicinity of SPUR 1 until H plus 65 and did NOT reach CHARLIE SPUR along line of VASEY HIGHWAY until H plus 80. The fact that the tanks were landed on YELLOW beach instead of GREEN beach was a contributing factor to the delay. However it is felt that the support of tanks cannot be relied upon in the initial stages of a landing. It is recommended that the first tp of tanks ashore be dozer tanks. On a later occasion when tanks were used they were confined to the line of the road; their support was effective but no new lessons were learned.

(c) 6 Pounders:

Owing to the failure of the enemy to remain in his pillboxes and bunkers no opportunity was afforded to us to employ this weapon. It is considered that they would have proved invaluable had the enemy offered greater resistance. The policy of landing 6 pounders in the early assault waves should be adhered to.

(d) 4.2in Mortars:

NOT used.

(e) Methods of Defence at Night Against Enemy Infiltration:

The following methods were used on different occasions. Several enemy attempts were made to infiltrate during the first two nights of the operation, but none were successful. No new devices were used to stop infiltration. The following procedure was adopted and found effective:-

- (i) The area surrounding the defensive position was patrolled by day with a view to ascertain likely enemy lines of approach. The information thus gained influenced the placing of posts and sentries.
- (ii) Whilst high ground was always selected for the defensive position the heads of re-entrants leading into high ground must be covered owing to the enemy's habit of sometimes using the low ground for entrance rather than the high ground of the spurs.

(e) Methods of Defence at Night Against Enemy Infiltration (Cont)

- (iii) Patrols were sent out just prior to last light to locate signs of enemy movement in the vicinity of our defences. This precaution is felt necessary as the enemy often approaches as close as possible during the hours of daylight and then attempts to infiltrate during darkness. Further patrols are sent out on a similar mission in the early morning.
- (iv) The use of booby traps or other types of alarm to give warning of enemy approach have NOT been found effective owing to the movement of animals, such as dogs and monkeys which cause false alarms. The use of booby traps also restricts own movement.
- (v) The greatest safeguard against enemy infiltration at night are well-placed, well-briefed and alert sentries

(f) ENGINEER PARTIES with Assaulting Troops:

of 2/27 Bn attached.
(a) During the assault landing each Coy had two groups of Engineers. The first group (3 men) had the task of detecting and marking mines and booby traps. The second group (3 Engineers and 6 Bn Pioneers) were used as demolition teams.

(b) ~~In one Coy,~~ ^{asked} one sapper blew ⁱⁿ two enemy tunnels which held up our advance. These later were found to contain 17 enemy dead. Whilst the infantry can ~~(from its own resources)~~ effectively deal with pill-boxes, the use of engineers to demolish these defences, greatly assists the infantry. In the case of tunnels, which are often very long and afford complete protection to the enemy from infantry weapons, the use of sappers to seal the entrances is essential.

During the landing the Engineers and Pioneers were distributed over all craft in the first wave and carried bangalore torpedoes to destroy any wire obstacles above high water mark. On this occasion they were not called upon to perform this task, but it is considered that they must be available for this purpose in subsequent operations.

Bm

COPY

HQ 7 Aust Div
14 Sep 45

1. 7 Aust Div Adm Instr Q17 of 14 Sep reference initial maintenance phase two.

2. Adv LHQ advise the following items of initial maintenance now being supplied from MOROTAI on vessels AV1368 and AV2058. S and T supplies 274 tons Ord Stores 40 tons m now full amount required. Part initial maintenance engr stores 80 tons m POL 31 tons m. Balance initial maintenance to be supplied ex BALIKPAPAN. LANDOPS services will advise by signal details of MOROTAI loadings.

(sgd) AA & QMG 7 Aust Div
Lt Col

DISTRIBUTION

As for 7 Aust Div Adm Instr Q17

COPY

SECRET

Subject: OCCUPATION OF THE MAKASSAR AREA

HQ 7 Aust Div
14 Sep 45

7 AUST DIV ADM INSTR Q17

INFORMATION

1. The operation is being carried out in three phases:-
 - (a) Phase One: (i) Command and contact Group with a protective guard ex MOROTAI and BALIKPAPAN.
 - (ii) Approximate strength 200
 - (iii) -
 - (b) Phase Two: (i) One Bn Gp less one Coy from BALIKPAPAN.
 - (ii) Approximate strength 800
 - (c) Phase Three: (i) One Bde Gp less Bn Gp from BALIKPAPAN.
 - (ii) Approximate Strength 4000.
2. The force will be known as MAKFORCE. The force for Phase one comes under Comd Adv LHQ after it is established in the MAKASSAR area on a date to be notified by Adv LHQ; the remaining components come under comd of MAKFORCE on arrival at MAKASSAR.
3. Phase One of the operation is to be mounted from BALIKPAPAN not before 15 Sep 45. The dates of launching Phases Two and Three will be advised separately.

GENERAL MAINTENANCE PLAN

4. Phase One will move with 30 days initial maintenance and Phases Two and Three will move with 60 days initial maintenance, Particulars are shown in Appendix "A" attached.
5. Maintenance is to be carried out from BALIKPAPAN by 7 Aust Div.
6. Levels of supplies and stores to be maintained will be not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days except for Phase One which will be not less than 15 days and not more than 45 days. For particulars see Appendix "B" attached.

SHIPPING

7. (a) Shipping for movement of troops of Phases One and Two is being provided by RAN.
- (b) Shipping for initial maintenance of Phases One and Two comprises:-
 - (i) RAN vessel EDUARDO capacity 50 tons m, one or more trips as arranged by Adv HQ with RAN.
 - (ii) 125 ft wooden cargo vessel AV 1368 (230 m tons) and 120 ft steel cargo vessel AV 2058 (200 tons). These craft will remain on this task until initial maintenance has been built up to 60 days for whatever force is by that time at MAKASSAR. These craft will be available at BALIKPAPAN about 20 Sep.

- (c) Shipping for subsequent maintenance of Phases One and Two is to be arranged by Adv LHQ with suitable trips of small ships vide (b) (ii) above, or similar vessels.
- (d) Shipping for movement of troops and initial and subsequent maintenance of Phase Three is to be arranged by Adv LHQ when practicable.

ENGINEER WORKS

8. (a) An airfield in each area will be rehabilitated to take C47 aircraft.
- (b) In the first instance existing wharfage will be rehabilitated to the standard necessary to meet the requirements of the force. Further construction will depend on the port facilities existing in the area and future arrangements for the resupply of the force concerned direct from Australia.
- (c) Coverage will be provided to accommodate all stores and supplies using existing facilities as far as possible.
- (d) In the first instance Engineer Scale A Accommodation stores will move with all forces. As shipping and labour permit this accommodation should be expanded to Scale B.
- (e) Engineer projects such as roads, water supply, EL light installations etc will only be developed to a standard necessary to meet the requirements of the force.
- (f) Japanese maintenance units and labour may be used for construction to the fullest extent.
- (g) Civil construction works which are not required for army purposes will not be undertaken without the prior authority of Adv LHQ.
- (h) In the event of local authorities requiring works of a rehabilitation nature an application stating all facts and aspects will be forwarded to Adv LHQ for consideration.
- (i) Existing construction will be used as far as possible!
- (j) The Force Commander will advise Adv LHQ and HQ 7 Aust Div as early as possible his requirements of Engineer stores to be moved with each of Phases Two and Three.

REFRIGERATION

9. (a) Unit refrigeration on the scale of 1/3 cu ft per man is to be provided by 7 Aust Div for each component of the force.
- (b) The Force Comd will advise Adv LHQ as soon as possible of any refrigeration available in the area.

STORES AND SUPPLIES

10. S & T Supplies

- (a) (i) In addition to initial maintenance of supplies Phases One and Two will be accompanied by such staple commodities of rations as are surplus to stocks in BALIKPAPAN and can be moved in the shipping available for the immediate relief of civilians.
- (ii) Details of normal method of supply for civilian relief and for maintenance of Japanese Forces in areas

taken over are contained in paras 20 and 21 of this instruction.

- (b) Six Days landing rations and two days voyage rations will accompany each component of the force.
- (c) (i) Fresh supplies are to be supplied from BALIKPAPAN by 7 Aust Div unless special arrangements are made by Adv LHQ.
 - (ii) Maximum use will be made of local produce without denuding the civil population.
- (d) POL.
 - (i) POL less AVGAS and AVOIL to accompany the force will be made up of 55 days in 44 gallon drums and 5 days in 4 gallon drums except for Phase One for which Japanese stocks will be used.
 - (ii) The following AVGAS and AVOIL in 44 gal drums will accompany the components of the force:-
 - Phase One - 5000 gals AVGAS plus 3% AVOILS
 - Phase Two - 24000 gals AVGAS plus 3% AVOILS
 - (iii) As far as is known no bulk oil installations exist nor is there any intention of erecting any such installations.
 - (iv) The Japanese Comd will be ordered to hand over all stocks of POL, petrol installations equipment and plant used therewith in the areas taken over the Force Comd. Under AMF supervision sufficient POL will be issued from these stocks to permit the running of Japanese vehicles as permitted by Force Comd. Japanese POL for use in AUST and Allied vehicles will be used only after testing of such stocks as to suitability.
 - (v) Japanese stocks of POL as proved suitable and up to standard will be used for all purposes in order to economise in AUST stocks.
 - (vi) Particulars of Japanese oil installations and stocks of POL in the areas under the control of the Force Comd will be advised to Adv LHQ and 7 Aust Div as soon as possible.

11. Ordnance and Ammunition

- (a) 10 days at contact rate will move with each component of the force.
- (b) Resupply to maintain this level will be on demand.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

12. (a) The Force Comd is responsible for civil administration and for the maintenance of law and order.
- (b) a NICA det will accompany the Force to assist the Comd the relationship and responsibilities of NICA to the Force Comd, and the duties of the troops to the civil population are set out in Appendix "C" to this instruction.

RAPWI

13. (a) Contact teams will carry out their normal functions in respect of all except DUTCH nationality and INDONESIAN nationals.
- (b) RNIA contact teams will be responsible for these functions in respect of DUTCH nationals and INDONESIANS.
- (c) Force Comd in consultation with his SMO will decide who are to be evacuated immediately and priority of evacuation, vide para 14 of this instruction.

14. Phases Two and Three

- (a) It will be the responsibility of the force commander to decide in respect of all PW and I which will be evacuated as transportation becomes available.
- (b) Destination of evacuated PW and I will be as decided by Adv LHQ.

MEDICAL

15. Phase One.

The following medical personnel should be included in Command Party.

- (a) 2 i/c of the Fd Amb which will eventually be used in subsequent phases of this operation.
- (b) Medical specialist from 2/12 AGH.

16. The duties of these MOs will be:

- (a) To select stretcher cases and according to accommodation in ship allotted any other appropriate hospital patients which will be carried to BALIKPAPAN for hospitalization on the return trip of the ship.
- (b) Make medical appreciation of the PsW and Internees with view to ascertaining commitments in this regard.

17. With regard to subsequent phases and evacuation plans no firm decision can be made until information obtained in Phase One is to hand. If consequently hospitalizations are few then hospitalization at BALIKPAPAN is feasible but if sufficiently in excess of 100 then the question of evacuation by Hospital Ship to MOROTAI can be considered.

18. "A" Branch Adm Matters:

In respect of matters connected with discipline, personal services and Mil Sec, the force will deal with this HQ direct.

LABOUR

19. (a) Control of labour both military and **civil** will be exercised by Force Comd and will be allotted in accordance with priorities determined by him.
- (b) Japanese Armed Forces may be used for labour as necessary and appropriate in the maintenance, restoration and operation of such of the civilian services as may be deemed essential to establish or preserve a minimum level of subsistence, prevent disease and epidemics, facilitate the maintenance of law and order, or serve the interests of the occupying forces.

CIVIL RELIEF

20. (a) Civil relief supplies are to be shipped under arrangements of Adv LHQ and NICA.
- (b) All civil relief supplies so arranged will be stored and distributed by the NICA unit in the area under the direction of the Force Commander.
- (c) In addition to the above, such supplies, rations as are available in mounting areas without reducing AMF stocks are to be taken with the Force for emergency relief.

MAINTENANCE OF THE JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

21. (a) Whilst in occupation it will be the responsibility of the Force Comd to ensure the maintenance of the Japanese Armed Forces in the area under the control of the force.
- (b) Attached as Appendixes "D" and "E" are provisional scales for rations and AASC expense stores for disarmed Japanese in areas occupied by the AMF. These are the maximum scales to be issued subject to availability of the commodities, or equivalents at the discretion of the Force Comd subject to the adequate maintenance of the civilian population in the area in accordance with Order No 3 issued to the Comd 2 Japanese Army.
- (c) In Phase two where MAKFORCE takes over control of the MAKASSAR area the Japanese comds will be ordered to advise the quantities of rations by types in the area. Issues in accordance with the ration scale will be made from these stocks under AMF supervision.
- (d) The Force Comd will instruct the Comd 2 Japanese Army to maintain the levels of supply laid down in this instruction. Where necessary Japanese equivalents will be used.
- (e) Commodities from AMF resources will only be shipped to maintain these levels where the Japanese are unable to do so.
- (f) Adv LHQ and 7 Aust Div will be advised of all Japanese stocks in the area as soon as possible.

COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT

22. (a) The Comd of the Japanese Armed Forces in the area will be required to collect all Japanese arms and equipment in accordance with Adv LHQ Operation Instruction No 5 Appendix "F" in the area under the control of the Force and deliver it to areas designated by the Force Comd where it will be kept under guard. (att as Appx "F" to this instr)
- (b) The Force Commander will forward particulars of all captured enemy equipment to Adv LHQ with copy to 7 Aust Div. Disposal will be advised on receipt of the above information.
- (c) All Japanese swords taken over by the force will be held under the custody of the force and particulars forwarded to Adv LHQ who will advise the manner in which they are to be disposed.
- (d) Attention is drawn to Adv LHQ Adm Instr No 51 of 9 Jul 45, copy of which is att as appx "G".

Lt-col
(sgd) AA & QMG 7 Aust Div

ACK
Signed at hrs

COPY

SECRET

Appendix 'A' to 7 Aust Div
Adm Instr Q17 of 14 Sep 45

INITIAL MAINTENANCE TO BE MOVED WITH FORCE

Phase	Force	Strength	Initial maint available from	ST TONS M Sups	ORD TONS M POL Stores	M ⁴ Ama	Canteens Tons M	Med M	Tons	Engrs Tons M	Others Tons M	Total Tons M	Remarks
1	One Coy Gp with contact teams etc	200	BALIKPAPAN (30 days)	24	36 (Avgas) and 3% avoil	8	2	9	1	-	1	81	Emergency relief supplies as stocks and shipping space are available
2	One Bn Gp less less Coy Gp	800	BALIKPAPAN (60 days for 1000)	234	260 Mogas & ADF plus 150 tons avgas & 3% avoil	110	11	90	21	300	20	1196	do
3	One Bde Gp less Bn Gp	4000	BALIKPAPAN (60 days for 4000)	942	1040 Mogas & ADF	440	44	360	83	1250	80	4239	

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Appendix 'B' to 7 Aust Div
Adm Instr Q17 of 14 Sep 45

LEVELS OF SUPPLY - MAKASSAR

Phase	Engr Stores	Supplies European incl Expense Stores	Japanese Rations	Hospital Supplies	POL	Medical & Dental	Ord Stores	Ann	Canteens	Misc
I	-	15/45 days for 200	-	15/45 days for 20 hosp- ital patients	7000 gals avgas & avoil	15/45 days for 200	15/45 days for 200	10 days contact 200	15/45 days for 200	15/45 days for 200
II	Special Project Stores	30/60 days for 1000	30/60 days for 1000	30/60 days for 1000	30/60 days for 1000 24000 galls& Avgas& Avoil	30/60 gals for 1000	30/60 days for all units on OOB	10 days contact	30/60 days for 1000	30/60 days for 1000
III	One CRE Depot plus special project stores	30/60 days for 5000	30/60 days for 22000	30/60 days for 300 hospital patients	30/60 days for 5000 24000 gals Avgas& Avoil	30/60 days for 5000	30/60 days for all units on OOB	10 days contact	30/60 days for 5000	30/60 days for 5000

CIVIL AFFAIRS

1. GENERAL

The Civil Affairs phases of these operations include:

- (a) The furnishing of minimum quantities of food, fuel, clothing, emergency shelter and medical, sanitary and other essential supplies necessary to preserve lines of communication and maintain the health and working capacity of the population and to preserve public order.
- (b) The early re-establishing of the Netherlands Indies Government within the occupied area.
- (c) The investigation of the possibility of restoring production, storage and loading facilities in the objective area.

2. NETHERLAND INDIES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION UNITS (NICAs)

(a) GENERAL

The Netherlands Indies Government has organised Civil Administration units (NICAs) as units of the Netherlands Indies Army and has made them available to assist Allied Army and Base Commanders in the discharge of their responsibility for Civil Administration and relief in occupied areas. The NICA units have the authority of the Netherlands Indies Government for administering, disciplining and employing the population in the area of operation in the manner best contributing to the success of the common effort against the enemy. They are not combat forces but are provided to relieve combat forces of the burden of civil administration.

(b) FUNCTION

The basic function of the NICA unit are:

- (i) The civil administration and control of all non-military individuals, whether native or otherwise, in re-occupied areas of the Netherlands Indies.
- (ii) The procurement, control and administration of civilian labourers.

(c) PERSONNEL

- (i) The Commanding Officer of the NICA Detachment (CONICA) will be in command of the NICA Detachment and will be responsible for the control and civil administration of all non-military individuals in re-occupied areas in accordance with established policies and will also provide overseers for labourers.
- (ii) Composition of the NICA unit will be as determined by NEI authorities for each projected operation.

3. ADMINISTRATION OF NON-MILITARY INDIVIDUALS

(a) CONICA will recommend to the Commander of the Force those individuals to be evacuated from the area of operations and will be responsible for those retained therein. The commander will be responsible for the evacuation of those individuals whose evacuation he has ordered or approved, and for the application of such restrictions to non-military individuals as he deems necessary. The Commander will inform NICA of those individuals evacuated and upon whom restrictions have been placed

(b) CONICA will -

- (i) Prevent the civil population from interfering with the military effort.
- (ii) Recruit labour for all purposes.
- (iii) Assist in establishing public safety measures.
- (iv) Stimulate local food production and fishing.
- (v) Institute measures for health and sanitation, including restoration of civilian hospitals.
- (vi) Re-establish the Netherlands Civil Administration in accordance with Netherlands East Indies law.

4. LABOUR - NEI

- (a) CONICA is responsible for recruiting, clothing, equipping housing, feeding, paying, working, hospitalising and disciplining labourers.
- (b) CONICA will designate an officer in charge of labourers who will:
 - (i) Be responsible for the efficient employment of labourers.
 - (ii) Allocate labourers to specific tasks in accordance with priorities established by the Commander.
- (c) The Commander will designate one officer who will indicate to CONICA the priority of the tasks to be performed by labour and all requisitions for use of labour will pass through this officer.
- (d) Transportation will be provided, as available, for carrying labourers from and to their compounds.
- (e) Labourers will not be attached to military units.
- (f) Labourers should preferably be employed in construction work, as couriers, clearing ground, in grass cutting, in malaria control, in general work in dumps and in unloading ships. They will not be employed in domestic duties or in tasks other than those mentioned above except in emergency.

5. RELATIONSHIP WITH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

- (a) AIB and CIC personnel are not part of NICA, have no jurisdiction over the administration or control of the civilian population in occupied area and will, in no case, be placed in a position of authority over CONICA or members of the NICA unit.
- (b) If AIB or CIC personnel require civilians for carrying out their duties, appropriate request will be submitted to the officer designated in accordance with para 5(c),

6. RELATIONSHIP OF TROOPS WITH CIVIL POPULATION

- (a) The population of the Netherlands Indies will be of great assistance to the command, once their confidence has been gained. Every effort will be made to maintain friendly relations with the population.
- (b) The following policies will be observed;
 - (i) Troops will not molest civil population.
 - (ii) Troops will not enter dwellings without permission of the inhabitants, except in the performance of duties.

- (iii) Troops will not obtain articles, including food-stuffs without the consent of the owners; items will be paid for at rates established by NICA.
- (c) Offenders will be apprehended and tried by the authorities set out hereunder:
 - (i) Member of NEI armed forces serving with NEI units shall be dealt with exclusively by NEI courts.
 - (ii) Members of AMF and other Allied Forces and non NEI persons accompanying those forces shall be dealt with exclusively by the Service Courts of the Force concerned.
 - (iii) NEI subjects serving with an Allied Force so as to be subject to the law of the force, may be dealt with by the Service Courts of that Force.
 - (iv) NEI authorities will make arrangements for the speedy trial in the vicinity by NEI Courts of NEI civilians who are alleged to have committed offences against persons, property or security of the Allied Forces, without prejudice to the power of C in C AMF, if military necessity in his judgment so requires to bring to trial before a military court of any such civilian.
 - (v) NEI civilians subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of NEI Courts may, in the absence of NEI authorities, be arrested by Allied Military Police and detained by them until handed over to NEI authorities.
 - (vi) Persons subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Allied Service Courts may be arrested by NEI police for offences against NEI law and detained until they can be handed over to appropriate Allied Service authority.
 - (vii) Mutual assistance to be given in making investigations, collecting evidence and securing attendance of witnesses in cases liable under respective jurisdictions.
- (d) Taxation
 - (i) Members of Allied Forces and persons accompanying these forces, their property and the property of their Govts, are exempt from taxation, including customs.
 - (ii) The Force Comd is to ensure that such property is not sold to the public except in agreement with Lieutenant Governor, NEI.

7. PAYMENT FOR SERVICES AND SUPPLIES

By arrangement between Australian and Dutch Governments, payment for all services and supplies for operations within NEI territory will be a charge against the Dutch Government.

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Appendix "D" to 7 Aust Div
Adm Instr Q17 of 14 Sep 45

DAILY RATION SCALE OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

Tea	2/7 ozs
Biscuits white	7 ozs
Flour white	1/2 ozs
Rice Unpolished	3 ozs
Salt	3/7 ozs
Edible Animal Fat	1/2 ozs
Dried Fruit	1/2 ozs
Tinned Fish	3 3/7 ozs
M & V	1-5/7 ozs
Condensed milk	1/2 ozs
Sugar	1/4 ozs
Native equivalent for potatoes fresh or dehydrated potatoes 2 ozs	8 ozs
Native equivalent for Onions fresh	2 ozs
or unattractive varieties of tinned vegetables	1-2/3 ozs

This scale indicates the maximum quantities of rations which may be issued. The calorific value approximates 1685 calories. Only such items and quantities will be issued as are necessary to supplement items available from Japanese stocks or local fresh equivalents to achieve a similarly balanced ration of a total calorific value of approximately 1685 calories.

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Appendix "E" to 7 Aust Div
Adm Instr Q17 of 14 Sep 45

PROVISIONAL SCALE OF ISSUE OF AASC EXPENSE STORES TO
SURRENDERED JAPANESE FORCES

Per 100 Japs per 7 days

Soap, Common	12 lbs
Soda Ash	6 lbs
Water Sterilizing Powder	1½ lbs
Chloride of Lime	½ lb
Mosquito spray	2 gals
Phenol	1 gal

Note:

This scale indicates the maximum quantities which may be issued. Only such items, and quantities as are considered absolutely necessary will be issued.

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Appendix 'F' to 7 Aust Div
Adm Instr Q17 of 14 Sep 45

UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR DISARMAMENT OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

1. Scope of Disarmament

(a) Complete disarmament (subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 below) of mobile regular Japanese Armed Forces is effected as a matter of highest priority. Base and L of C echelons are disarmed as rapidly as practicable.

(b) Arms of civilian defence units, auxiliaries and other para-military organisations etc. are collected through their own organisations in so far as is practicable.

2. Types of War Materials initially relinquished by the Japanese (with the exceptions as indicated in paragraph 3 below)

(a) Rifles, carbines, muskets, revolvers and pistols of all calibres.

(b) Heavy, medium and light machine guns, heavy, light and medium automatic guns and machine pistols of all calibres, their carriages, mountings and accessories.

(c) Guns, howitzers, mortars, and spigot projectors of all natures and calibres, as well as their carriages, mountings and accessories. All rocket parts, projectiles and non-recoil guns and flame throwers, their carriages, mountings and accessories.

(d) Projectiles, fixed ammunition and cartridges, filled or unfilled, for the weapons in a, b and c above and all fuses types or contrivances, to explode or operate them.

(e) Grenades, bombs, mines, demolition charges, rockets and self-propelled projectiles of all kinds, smoke, artificial mists incendiary and chemical charges of all types, filled or un-filled, all means for exploding or operating them.

(f) Bayonets, swords, daggers, lances and other side arms.

(g) Armoured fighting vehicles including tanks, armoured cars and self-propelled guns; multi-axled motor vehicles, wheeled, tracked or semi-tracked designed for military use. All types of special military vehicles such as wireless, ammunition, bridging or mobile workshops.

(h) Mechanical and self-propelled carriages for any of the weapons listed in the above categories.

(i) Railway rolling stock especially adapted for war purposes.

(j) Armour of all types used for protective purposes in war.

(k) Transport vehicles (prime movers and trailers, wheeled, tracked or semi-tracked), of any type used for war purposes. Pack military eqpt.

(l) Range finding, sound ranging and acoustic apparatus. Aiming and computing devices for fire control, including predictors and plotting apparatus; fire direction instruments; gun sights; fuse setters; calibration eqpt of all kinds for the calibration of guns, fire control radar and all other types of eqpt for war purposes.

- (m) The following types of signal eqpt less such eqpt as may be necessary for the control of the Japanese Forces.
- (i) All radio/wireless transmitting sets and/or transceivers with ancillary equipment held by formations below Army Headquarters and at corresponding Naval Commands, subject to such exceptions as Commander in Chief prescribes.
 - (ii) All secrecy eqpt whether designed for wire or radio.
 - (iii) All code and cipher systems including cipher machinery and secret writing and eqpt with full information regarding their method of working.
 - (iv) Copies of all signal documents.
 - (v) Copies of all frequency allotments.
 - (vi) All military and civil radio broadcast and communication stations.
 - (vii) All Radar Equipment.
 - (viii) All signal dumps of the field armies.
 - (ix) Air signal eqpt as designated.
 - (x) Naval signal eqpt as may be indicated.
- (n) Searchlights and their means of direction and control.
- (o) Monoculars, binoculars and telescopes for war purposes.
- (p) Military survey and drawings instruments and all eqpt for flash spotting, sound ranging or any other means of detecting and locating guns, mortars or rockets.
- (q) Maps, map reproduction stores and equipment and survey data adapted to military purposes, aerial photos and photo eqpt including stores and cameras.
- (r) Engineering tools, eqpt, plants and stores specially adapted for military purposes. Bridging material of military types or fixed or floating supports, infantry footbridges, pneumatic boats, assault boats and assault boat motors.
- (s) All camouflage, dazzle and decoy devices.
- (t) Propellents, explosives, pyrotechnics, liquified gases, and any components destined or suitable for the propulsion, explosion, charging, filling of, or use in connection with, the war material in the above categories.
- (u) Asphyxiating, lethal, toxic, incapacitating or similar substances and products in any form intended or capable of being used for war purposes. All contrivances, weapons and containers intended for their use, storage or transport.
- (v) Gas masks and collective protective devices for military purposes and all defensive eqpt (including chemicals and clothing) whether for individual or collective use, which are capable of being used to detect or protect against the military use of chemical agents.
- (w) Gasoline, oils and greases used for the operation of maintenance of any of the war materials previously mentioned.
- (x) Marine chronometers.
- (y) Other Japanese Army Air Forces war materials as designated by Comd Air Forces.

(z) Other Japanese Navy war materials as may be indicated by (Comd Naval Forces).

3. Types of War Materials Retained by the Japanese as Required to Serve the Interests of the Occupation Forces.

(a) Minimum number of rifles together with ammunition for same required for authorized armed guards.

(b) Cargo trucks for supplu purposes on a scale consistent with availability and minimum requirements.

(c) The minimum number of engineer, signal, railway and medical services unarmoured technical vehicles required to maintain authorized lines of communications and to care for the sick and wounded.

(d) Horse drawn vehicles may be retained together with horses, mules and the necessary type harness therefore.

(e) All signal eqpt except that outlined in sub-paragraph 2(m) above.

(f) Necessary maps may be retained for adm purposes.

(g) Engineer tools, eqpt, bridging material, plants and stores, necessary to maintain authorised lines of communications.

(h) Necessary gasoline, oils and greases for two weeks operation of vehicles which are not placed in dumps.

(i) Japanese Army Air Forces war materials as designated by Comd Air Forces.

(j) Japanese Navy war materials as may be indicated by Comd Naval Forces.

(k) All remaining war materials and stores required for adm purposes as not specifically delimited in paragraph 2 above.

ACCOUNTING FOR ENEMY PROPERTY AND REQUISITIONING
OF CIVILIAN PROPERTY IN OBOE OPERATIONS

ENEMY PROPERTY

1. Property of the Japanese Armed Forces or of the Japanese Government or any Japanese public authority recovered in areas occupied by the AMF will be treated as booty. It becomes the property of the Commonwealth, and not of the individual member of the unit taking it into possession.
2. Where a reasonable doubt exists as to whether Japanese property is public or private property it will be treated as public property (i.e. as booty) until the contrary is proved.
3. Captured enemy equipment will be disposed of as directed by GROs G 473/43 and G 238/44. All other booty will be dealt with as prescribed in the following paras.
4. Japanese machinery and equipment erected in sites on any oilfield will not be dismantled except under the orders of a Div or Bde Comd, who will only give the permission for it to be dismantled for urgent operational reasons.
5. (a) All other Japanese materials and supplies which fall within the category of booty will be collected and where practicable, delivered as soon as possible to nearest Eng S&T, Ord or Salvage depot or dump, as may be appropriate, by the unit occupying the area in which the materials and supplies are. In the event of large quantities of supplies or stores being captured it may be more practicable to place a guard and the appropriate service personnel at this site, than to attempt to move the booty to a service dump. An inventory of it will be made at the depot or dump and the materials and supplies taken on charge.
(b) Where there is no appropriate service dump or depot, the unit recovering the materials and supplies will collect them into one salvage dump and make an inventory by appropriate classifications - e.g., engineer stores, ordnance stores, miscellaneous.
(c) As soon as completed, the unit making the inventory will forward a copy through normal channels to the appropriate Base Sub Area.
6. (a) After being taken on charge, the materials and supplies may be issued for Army purposes in the normal manner.
(b) If any of the materials and supplies are required by BBCAU, or NICA, the Div Comd or any service representative authorised by him may approve of the issue of all or part of the requirements of BBCAU or NICA, as the case may be.

PRIVATE PROPERTY

7. Subject to paras 9, 10 and 11 of this instruction, private property of civilians will not be taken or requisitioned except through BBCAU or NICA, as the case may be.

8. (a) Notwithstanding paragraph 7, in the case of urgent operational necessity, a Div or Bde Comd may authorise the requisitioning of private property.

(b) An inventory of the property so requisitioned will be made, recording the nature, description, quantity and condition of the property, and the name of the owner, where known, or where the name is not known, the location of the property at the time of requisitioning.

(c) A copy of the inventory will be forwarded forthwith to BBCAU or NICA, as the case may be.
9. In all other cases, requisitions for private property will be submitted to BBCAU or NICA, as the case may be, which will take the necessary action to complete the requisition and make the property available to the unit for which it is requisitioned.
10. Where it is necessary to remove private property which has been damaged during the course of operations, the property will be treated as salvage and will be collected in a salvage dump. It may be issued from the salvage dump as required by any of the services or by BBCAU or NICA as the case may be.
11. Where practicable and the property can be readily indentified an inventory will be made giving the description, quantity and condition of the property, the name of the owner, if known, and the location in which the property was. A copy of the inventory will be forwarded to BBCAU or NICA as the case may be.

Subject: OPERATIONAL REPORTS

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde

Ref No: G 1102

30 Jul 45

7 Aust Div (2)

Reference 7 Aust Div G17/1/550 of 24 Jul 45, the following reports are submitted :-

1. FLAMETHROWERS

(a) FROGS - NOT used by this Brigade.

(b) MANPACK - M2

(i) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn report

These flamethrowers were used on only one occasion - against wood and earth bunkers in the ADUIT area. Two flamethrowers were used with thin fuel, and one with thick fuel was kept in reserve. On three occasions the ignitors failed to operate and it is thought that they may have become damp during transit.

Results obtained - bunkers set on fire and burnt out.

(ii) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn report

1. These weapons were employed on F Day by the two forward companies. On the left they were most effective in clearing pillboxes and the shorter tunnels, but would NOT penetrate more than a few feet into the larger ones.

2. Thin fuel only was used and the enemy broke each time.

3. They were NOT tried in jungle areas for the following reasons :-

(a) It is not considered they would be very effective in the thick wet scrub, as the heat and flame would be absorbed by the vegetation.

(b) It was considered that the enemy, having no pillboxes, could be driven out without flame.

4. As a precaution against mechanical failures, a specialist team was organised, whose only duty was to service and maintain the weapons. One weapon, which was filled on board ship, failed to operate on F Day until reserviced.

5. As the performance of the weapon when properly maintained is a constant, the only factors which influence its employment are :-

(a) The calibre and standard of training of the operator.

(b) Standard of training of the riflemen supporting the flamethrower.

6. We treat the flamethrower not as a support weapon, but as a primary weapon in close fighting. The riflemen support the flamethrower.

(111) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn report

The only occasion flamethrowers were used was on an enemy pillbox with satisfactory results. Several instances have occurred on long distance patrols when a flamethrower could have been used to advantage, but the present weight of this weapon precludes it from the arms of such a patrol.

2. MATILDAS

(a) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn report

Three tanks were brought forward across MANGGAR BESAR River but two were immediately knocked out by coastal defence guns and the third damaged. Three tanks were later brought forward to forward company to cover bunker positions on a ridge but were not used to engage targets.

(b) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn - did NOT use tanks.

(c) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn report

During the assault landing, three MATILDAS were landed at H plus 8 and a further six at H plus 33. Owing to bomb craters, fallen timber and other obstacles on the beach line the first tp of tanks did not reach the VASEY HIGHWAY in the vicinity of SPUR 1 until H plus 65 and did NOT reach CHARLIE SPUR along line of VASEY HIGHWAY until H plus 180. The fact that the tanks were landed on YELLOW Beach instead of GREEN Beach was a contributing factor to the delay. However it is felt that the support of tanks cannot be relied upon in the initial stages of a landing. It is recommended that the first tp of tanks ashore be dozer tanks. On a later occasion when tanks were used they were confined to the line of the road; their support was effective but no new lessons were learned.

3. 6 pr Tk A GUNS

(a) One 6 pr was used against enemy bunker positions with excellent results. The gun was able to fire directly into the slits of the bunkers. It caused considerable damage and effectively knocked down armourplated doors on one bunker and put one 5-in coastal gun out of action by a direct hit on the recuperator.

(b) 6 prs were coordinated in company defensive positions whenever possible and sited to cover road approaches. No tanks were used by the enemy, however.

4. 4.2-in MORTARS

(a) 4.2-in mortars engaged targets rapidly, accurately and effectively throughout the operation. They do NOT appear to be quite as accurate however, as the 3-in mortar, a factor which is compensated by their greater range and weight of bomb.

(b) They were mainly used for searching ground reported or thought to be occupied by enemy in gullies behind main defences. They were also used for DF and SOS tasks in front of forward companies. Targets were registered during day in areas selected by company commanders. On numerous occasions they were employed on harassing fire tasks throughout night on rear areas.

- (c) Well dug in base plate positions are necessary to gain accurate fire. On one occasion the rounds dropped too close to our own positions and it is thought this was due to soft base plate positions.
- (d) The use of 4.2-in mortar fire in conjunction with other supporting arms was necessary in conditions which prevailed at MANGGAR Airstrip. Enemy defensive positions here were sited in depth, and, in the reentrants behind the ridges, he had built shelters with overhead cover. The ability of the enemy to seek shelter in these bunkers or reentrants while supporting fire was falling on his defences, and then man these defences before the infantry reach the objective, renders heavy mortar fire necessary to fill in gaps and to search the dead ground which artillery and other supporting fire can NOT cover.
- (e) Where enemy positions were spread over a wide arc, 4.2-in mortars were invaluable in assisting in engaging new targets located anywhere within arc of 180°degrees.

5. RAE ASSAULT DEMOLITION PARTIES

- (a) During the assault landing each company of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn had two groups of engineers attached. The first group (3 men) had the task of detecting and marking mines and booby traps. The second group (3 engineers) and 6 battalion pioneers) were used as demolition teams. Engineers and pioneers were distributed over all craft in the first wave and carried bangalore torpedoes to destroy any wire obstacles above high water mark. On this occasion they were not called upon to perform this task, but it is considered that they must be available for this purpose in subsequent operations.
- (b) Ashore, one sapper blew in two enemy tunnels which held up our advance. These later were found to contain 17 enemy dead. Whilst the infantry can effectively deal with pillboxes, the use of engineers to demolish these defences is of great assistance. In the case of tunnels, which are often very long and afford complete protection to the enemy from infantry weapons, the use of sappers to seal the entrances is essential.
- (c) Small engineer detachments accompanied forward companies at all times throughout the campaign and were found essential in locating, marking and delousing mines and booby traps. The Brigade suffered only one casualty from enemy mines or booby traps.
- (d) A demolition team, with pack charges, accompanied the infantry and was effectively used against concrete bunkers on the CD gun position.

6. GIII (AIR) AND AIR SUPPORT PARTIES

- (a) The attachment of a GIII (Air) to a Brigade Headquarters is considered essential, particularly during operations.
- (b) His responsibilities are :-
- (i) Liaise with Air Support Party.
 - (ii) Coordination of unit requests for air support.
 - (iii) Advice on type of air support available, and most suitable for each task.
 - (iv) Assistance to units in direction of aircraft on to targets.
 - (v) When not employed on air matters, he can perform the functions of a GIII on Bde HQ.

- (c) The Air Support Party is equally essential during operations for the coordination and passing back of air requests.

7. METHODS OF DEFENCE AGAINST ENEMY INFILTRATION

- (a) The enemy's objects in infiltration proper are :-

- (i) To secure, and establish himself upon, vital ground without fighting for it.
- (ii) Harass HQs and kill or capture key personnel; or
- (iii) Destroy installations, dumps, transport etc in rear areas.

None of these, except several abortive attempts on a water point, were encountered in this operation.

- (b) On the other hand, at least one deliberate counter attack was made at night, and several small fighting patrols contacted our positions. It is highly probable that some at least of these patrols were lost and did NOT know of our positions until they blundered into them.

- (c) Counter measures employed:-

Against deliberate counter attack -

(i) Pre-registered DF and SOS arty, MMG and mortar tasks, in which fire was brought down within 30 yards of our FDLs. Provided we are well dug in, this is the most effective method.

(ii) Trip wires and booby traps as warning devices. In jungle there is practically no movement of our own troops during the night, except along tracks which can be left untrapped. In open country, particular care must be exercised in siting and notifying the location of, booby traps.

(iii) In open country standing patrols and listening posts sited well forward and carefully concealed, can also give warning. In jungle, any enemy movement detected would be too close to these posts for DF fire to be brought down.

(iv) In open country again, fighting patrols well out in front of our positions; star shells at irregular intervals; and, a small mobile reserve for counter attack, are additional safeguards.

Against enemy fighting patrols -

(i) Booby traps and warning devices, subject to the limitations mentioned above.

(ii) In jungle, small patrols can move up the track and occupy positions close to the enemy's FDLs at last light. Enemy patrols usually follow the tracks to within 50 yards of our positions before deploying and they can often be caught as they leave their FDLs.

(iii) In open country, continuous patrolling between companies and platoons, from front to rear and laterally, is essential.

- (d) In all cases, occupation of the vital ground and the careful selection, construction and camouflage of individual positions, are the primary consideration.

- (e) Dumps and installations can only be protected by :-

(i) Siting them on ground which is favourable for defence.

(ii) Allotting a suitable force for their close protection.

(iii) Providing an adequate system of warning.

(f)

Star shells are very effective in open or semi-open country but their use must be carefully coordinated. If put up by troops occupying low ground, they may disclose the positions of those on higher ground, in the vicinity.

John Doughty Brig
Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde

Subject: OPERATIONAL REPORTS

HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde

Ref No: G 1102

30 Jul 45

7 Aust Div (2)

Reference 7 Aust Div 017/1/550 of 24 Jul 45, the following reports are submitted :-

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(1) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn report

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Results obtained - bunkers set on fire and burnt out.

(11) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn report

1. These weapons were employed on F Day by the two forward companies. On the left they were most effective in clearing pillboxes and the shorter tunnels, but would NOT penetrate more than a few feet into the larger ones.

2. Thin fuel only was used and the enemy broke each time.

3. They were NOT tried in jungle areas for the following reasons :-

(a) It is not considered they would be very effective in the thick wet scrub, as the heat and flame would be absorbed by the vegetation.

(b) It was considered that the enemy, having no pillboxes, could be driven out without flame.

4. As a precaution against mechanical failures, a specialist team was organised, whose only duty was to service and maintain the weapons. One weapon, which was filled on board ship, failed to operate on F Day until reserviced.

5. As the performance of the weapon when properly maintained is a constant, the only factors which influence its employment are :-

(a) The calibre and standard of training of the operator.

(b) Standard of training of the riflemen supporting the flamethrower.

6. We treat the flamethrower not as a support weapon, but as a primary weapon in close fighting. The riflemen support the flamethrower.

(iii) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn report

The only occasion flamethrowers were used was on an enemy pillbox with satisfactory results. Several instances have occurred on long distance patrols when a flamethrower could have been used to advantage, but the present weight of this weapon precludes it from the arms of such a patrol.

2. MATIIDAS

(a) 2/14 Aust Inf Bn report

Three tanks were brought forward across MANGGAR BESAR River but two were immediately knocked out by coastal defence guns and the third damaged. Three tanks were later brought forward to forward company to cover bunker positions on a ridge but were not used to engage targets.

(b) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn - did NOT use tanks.

(c) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn report

During the assault landing, three MATIIDAS were landed at H plus 8 and a further six at H plus 33. Owing to bomb craters, fallen timber and other obstacles on the beach line the first tp of tanks did not reach the VASEY HIGHWAY in the vicinity of SPUR 1 until H plus 65 and did NOT reach CHARLIE SPUR along line of VASEY HIGHWAY until H plus 180. The fact that the tanks were landed on YELLOW Beach instead of GREEN Beach was a contributing factor to the delay. However it is felt that the support of tanks cannot be relied upon in the initial stages of a landing. It is recommended that the first tp of tanks ashore be dozer tanks. On a later occasion when tanks were used they were confined to the line of the road; their support was effective but no new lessons were learned.

3. 6 pr Tk A GUNS

(a) One 6 pr was used against enemy bunker positions with excellent results. The gun was able to fire directly into the slits of the bunkers. It caused considerable damage and effectively knocked down armourplated doors on one bunker and put one 5-in coastal gun out of action by a direct hit on the recuperator.

(b) 6 prs were coordinated in company defensive positions whenever possible and sited to cover road approaches. No tanks were used by the enemy, however.

4. 4.2-in MORTARS

(a) 4.2-in mortars engaged targets rapidly, accurately and effectively throughout the operation. They do NOT appear to be quite as accurate however, as the 3-in mortar, a factor which is compensated by their greater range and weight of bomb.

(b) They were mainly used for searching ground reported or thought to be occupied by enemy in gullies behind main defences. They were also used for DF and SOS tasks in front of forward companies. Targets were registered during day in areas selected by company commanders. On numerous occasions they were employed on harassing fire tasks throughout night on rear areas.

- (c) Well dug in base plate positions are necessary to gain accurate fire. On one occasion the rounds dropped too close to our own positions and it is thought this was due to soft base plate positions.
- (d) The use of 4.2-in mortar fire in conjunction with other supporting arms was necessary in conditions which prevailed at MANGGAR Airstrip. Enemy defensive positions here were sited in depth, and, in the reentrants behind the ridges, he had built shelters with overhead cover. The ability of the enemy to seek shelter in these bunkers or reentrants while supporting fire was falling on his defences, and then man these defences before the infantry reach the objective, renders heavy mortar fire necessary to fill in gaps and to search the dead ground which artillery and other supporting fire can NOT cover.
- (e) Where enemy positions were spread over a wide arc, 4.2-in mortars were invaluable in assisting in engaging new targets located anywhere within arc of 180 degrees.

5. RAE ASSAULT DEMOLITION PARTIES

- (a) During the assault landing each company of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn had two groups of engineers attached. The first group (3 men) had the task of detecting and marking mines and booby traps. The second group (3 engineers) and 6 battalion pioneers) were used as demolition teams. Engineers and pioneers were distributed over all craft in the first wave and carried bangalore torpedoes to destroy any wire obstacles above high water mark. On this occasion they were not called upon to perform this task, but it is considered that they must be available for this purpose in subsequent operations.
- (b) Ashore, one sapper blew in two enemy tunnels which held up our advance. These later were found to contain 17 enemy dead. Whilst the infantry can effectively deal with pillboxes, the use of engineers to demolish these defences is of great assistance. In the case of tunnels, which are often very long and afford complete protection to the enemy from infantry weapons, the use of sappers to seal the entrances is essential.
- (c) Small engineer detachments accompanied forward companies at all times throughout the campaign and were found essential in locating, marking and delousing mines and booby traps. The Brigade suffered only one casualty from enemy mines or booby traps.
- (d) A demolition team, with pack charges, accompanied the infantry and was effectively used against concrete bunker on the CD gun position.

6. GIII (AIR) AND AIR SUPPORT PARTIES

- (a) The attachment of a GIII (Air) to a Brigade Headquarters is considered essential, particularly during operations.
- (b) His responsibilities are :-
 - (i) Liaise with Air Support Party.
 - (ii) Coordination of unit requests for air support.
 - (iii) Advice on type of air support available, and most suitable for each task.
 - (iv) Assistance to units in direction of aircraft on to targets.
 - (v) When not employed on air matters, he can perform the functions of a GIII on Bde Hq.

- (c) The Air Support Party is equally essential during operations for the coordination and passing back of air requests.

7. METHODS OF DEFENCE AGAINST ENEMY INFILTRATION

- (a) The enemy's objects in infiltration proper are :-

- (i) To secure, and establish himself upon, vital ground without fighting for it.
- (ii) Harass HQs and kill or capture key personnel; or
- (iii) Destroy installations, dumps, transport etc in rear areas.

None of these, except several abortive attempts on a water point, were encountered in this operation.

- (b) On the other hand, at least one deliberate counter attack was made at night, and several small fighting patrols contacted our positions. It is highly probable that some at least of these patrols were lost and did NOT know of our positions until they blundered into them.

- (c) Counter measures employed:-

Against deliberate counter attack -

- (i) Pre-registered DP and SOS arty, MMG and mortar tasks, in which fire was brought down within 30 yards of our FDLs. Provided we are well dug in, this is the most effective method.
- (ii) Trip wires and booby traps as warning devices. In jungle there is practically no movement of our own troops during the night, except along tracks which can be left untrapped. In open country, particular care must be exercised in siting and notifying the location of, booby traps.
- (iii) In open country standing patrols and listening posts sited well forward and carefully concealed, can also give warning. In jungle, any enemy movement detected would be too close to these posts for DP fire to be brought down.
- (iv) In open country again, fighting patrols well out in front of our positions; star shells at irregular intervals; and, a small mobile reserve for counter attack, are additional safeguards.

Against enemy fighting patrols -

- (i) Booby traps and warning devices, subject to the limitations mentioned above.
- (ii) In jungle, small patrols can move up the track and occupy positions close to the enemy's FDLs at last light. Enemy patrols usually follow the tracks to within 50 yards of our positions before deploying and they can often be caught as they leave their FDLs.
- (iii) In open country, continuous patrolling between companies and platoons, from front to rear and laterally, is essential.

- (d) In all cases, occupation of the vital ground and the careful selection, construction and camouflage of individual positions, are the primary consideration.

- (e) Dumps and installations can only be protected by :-

- (i) Siting them on ground which is favourable for defence.

(ii) Allotting a suitable force for their close protection.

(iii) Providing an adequate system of warning.

(f)

Star shells are very effective in open or semi-open country but their use must be carefully coordinated. If put up by troops occupying low ground, they may disclose the positions of those on higher ground, in the vicinity.

Leslie H. Donnelly,
Brig
Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde

REPORT BY COMD MAKFORCE

REF LANDOPS OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO 8

1. At this stage it would be impossible to write a report which could attempt to portray exactly what MAKFORCE has achieved so far at MAKASSAR, without producing a lengthy thesis. This is because the problems met have been subjective rather than objective. However, following are points which may be of assistance to LANDOPS in deciding policy:-

2. Owing to delay in arrival of troops for Phases II and III, certain encroachments into the tasks of Phases II and III had to be made with the troops of Phase I.

For example, in order to fulfil task as in para 8(g), tasks of Phase II as set out in paras 9 (a) and (b) had to be carried out. Control of Japanese Force movements and transport had to be established in order that food would be available for the civil population of MAKASSAR, and so prevent the possibility of our task as set out in para 10 (f) becoming difficult. Thus, preventive steps had to be taken with the force available for Phase I, to carry out the Phase III task as set out in para 10(f).

3. NICA have been handicapped to a considerable degree by lack of numbers. However, CO NICA has made pleasing progress in taking over civil administrative organization and services from the Japanese civil organization. This is not yet complete but he should have taken over by 1 Oct. This will relieve me of many problems, provided I can keep him supplied with the necessary 'going' transport to maintain his essential services.

4. With my 2/27 Bn which arrived yesterday I will be able to take over many of the duties now being carried out by Japanese Navy personnel south of the line 5 degrees S Latitude. I will not be able to relieve all Japs however. In view of the scattered nature of dumps and points to be guarded, I cannot yet give a firm final plan for the guarding of all dumps.

5. The transport situation has given me most cause for concern. It is far from good, as Japanese transport on which we depend is inadequate and in poor condition. I have established control of all ex Japanese controlled transport South of the line 5 degrees S Latitude, and it has all to be registered. There is no civil transport of any military value available. What few private cars there are, are necessary to keep civil affairs moving. With more transport I consider that I could expeditiously fulfil my tasks of Phases I, II and III, and enable the minimum number of troops to be necessary here in minimum time. My transport requirements are being submitted with my requested additional requirements for Phase III.

6. For the carrying out of my tasks I consider that:-

- (a) I will need more than one battalion, and probably the best part of two, to carry out guarding duties and occupying of key points South of the line 5 degrees South latitude.

- (b) I will need one battalion to supervise the disposal of Japanese Equipment, and the concentration of the Jap into the areas finally approved by LANDOPS, in areas north of the line 5 degrees S Latitude where it runs across the South Western Peninsula, and in areas in the South Eastern Peninsula.
- (c) Therefore I will need my complete brigade (battalions are weakened owing to release of long service personnel) plus the necessary arms and services to maintain them and carry out special tasks.
- (d) I will require additional transport. The additional requirements I consider I need to complete my tasks are attached as appendix "A".

7. To facilitate and speed up the disposal of Japanese stores and equipment in the South Western Peninsula North of the line 5 degrees S Latitude, I have issued orders to Commander Second Japanese Army to commence concentrating stores in the PARE PARE Area in such a way that their subsequent movement, either out to sea for destruction or to MAKASSAR for storage, is facilitated. So far I have taken no other action with regard to the Japs in the areas north of the line 5 degrees S latitude.

8. Briefly, my outline plan for the use of my battalions is as follows:-

- (a) 2/27 Bn (arrived MAKASSAR 27 Sep) to be billeted in area near MAKFORCE Headquarters, and to take over control of the most important points south of the line 5 degrees S latitude. As much as is within the capabilities of the battalion will be taken over.
- (b) 2/14 Bn to be billeted in Dutch Military Barracks, and take over remaining duties South of the line 5 degrees S latitude.
- (c) 2/16 Bn to arrive and move to an area somewhere about PARE PARE. The exact place is subject to reconnaissance. When settled in, this unit will supervise the disposal of property, and the concentration of Japanese forces. That task complete, I will consider moving this battalion back to the MAKASSAR area, and maintaining only the minimum patrols north of the line 5 degrees S latitude, subject to the situation at that time, and the requirements of LANDOPS.
- (d) With regard to the South East Peninsula, I wish to defer my recommendation until I can examine more fully the situation there concerning equipment and steps needed to guard it. My action in this area depends on the plan submitted by Comd Jap Second Army in accordance with your order Number 10 para 3, and whether or not it is approved.

At the moment I am thinking that the best course to take at KENDARI is to send in a company to supervise the disposal of Jap equipment, by destroying unwanted material, and concentrating valuable material into a central dump. Having done this, the Jap could be moved to the PARE PARE area by moving cross country to the Gulf of BONE, thence by small craft across the Gulf of BONE to the South Western Peninsula. The final disposal of valuable material kept at KENDARI would be a matter for consideration when more information is available.

- (a) The method of dealing with small parties of Japs in more isolated parts is a matter for consideration after further examination of the problem is made.

9. The most difficult problem to be overcome is the financial one. The position becomes more and more confusing as each minute passes and the NEI Government still delays a decision as to whether the Jap currency will be honoured later or not. It is my considered opinion that the NEI Government will lose very much prestige if the decision keeps on being delayed. It is also my opinion that out of the situation the Australian Government and the British Empire may get some of the bad consequences.

I consider that this is a matter for the highest diplomatic circles, and strongly recommend that the Australian Government be advised to demand a quick decision from the NEI Government. This is a matter out of which much harm can come to AUSTRALIA.

Ernest S. Doughty,

Brig
Comd MAKFORCE

26. September 1945

OPERATION - OBOE TWO

PART I - PLANNING

1. Problems encountered in planning were due to four main factors :-

- (a) The late arrival of planning teams at MOROTAI and the consequent reduction in planning time to less than a considered minimum.
- (b) The absence of a trained MLO, with complete shipping data, who could have relieved the G Planning Staff of the technical aspect of loading the ships and producing loading tables, diagrams and lists.
- (c) The attempted fusion of US and Australian methods of planning. Either system is sound on its own, but they can NOT be linked without causing confusion and increasing the difficulties of planning generally.
- (d) The absence of any co-ordinating or bidding authority for the large number of small units and detachments (eg, Corps Troops, Base Area, RAAF Units) allotted to the brigade convoy. Despite all possible efforts within the time available, many of them could NOT be contacted, nor could anyone, who was prepared to state their requirements, be found.

2. No special methods were needed to solve these problems. They were overcome by extra work. A Firm Brigade Landing Table was, in effect, never issued. Amendments to the draft copy were issued from time to time to meet changes in units' requirements, and the amended draft table was eventually used for the operation. This was the direct result of the above factors.

3. It is strongly recommended that, where RAAF units are included in the force, a RAAF LO be attached to the Brigade Staff throughout the planning period.

PART II - OPERATIONS

1. Apart from being landed on the wrong beach, the operations on F Day went according to plan.

2. On F plus 1, 2/16 and 2/27 Aust Inf Bns continued to clear and consolidate their areas. 2/14 Aust Inf Bn commenced their advance along VASEY HIGHWAY, and secured SEPINGGAN airstrip without opposition.

3. The inland flanking move of 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt towards SEPINGGAN met opposition at LADY feature late on F plus 1 but, after harassing fire during the night, the enemy withdrew and the feature was occupied by 0730 hrs on F plus 2. As SEPINGGAN had been secured, the Cav were ordered to move North, establish a patrol base on JELLY and patrol all tracks to the North and East.

4. On F plus 2, 2/16 Aust Inf Bn took over 2/27 Aust Inf Bn's area in addition to their own; 2/27 Aust Inf Bn moved to SEPINGGAN and took over defence of the airfield from 2/14 Aust Inf Bn; and, 2/14 Aust Inf Bn continued advance towards MANGGAR. Slight opposition in the BATAKAN BESAR area was overcome and 2/14 Aust Inf Bn occupied a position in this area for the night.

5. On F plus 3, 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt encountered increasing enemy opposition in the JACK, GAME, GATE area. 2/14 Aust Inf Bn, with under command one coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn (to patrol and clear all side tracks) pushed on to MANGGAR. At 1230 hrs A Coy 2/14 Aust Inf Bn had crossed the MANGGAR BESAR river and reached the NE end of the strip, when hitherto concealed enemy guns, including a 5" Naval gun, 75 mm, and dual purpose AA guns, opened up. A Coy dug in, the enemy guns were engaged with naval, artillery and 3" mortar fire and, by dusk, B Coy had crossed the river and occupied a position on the North of the strip.
6. On F plus 4, 2/14 Aust Inf Bn engaged enemy positions with air, naval and artillery fire. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn took over patrolling of tracks and areas to the North and NE and SEPINGGAN. 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt continued patrolling the area North and NW of their base at JELLY and found the enemy still holding GATE.
7. On F plus 5, 2/16 Aust Inf Bn less two coys moved to the GAME area and took over from 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt. After further naval, air and artillery bombardment 2/14 Aust Inf Bn captured, and consolidated on, the CD (5" Naval) gun position. 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt and 2/27 Aust Inf Bn continued patrols in the area between VASEY and MILFORD HIGHWAYS.
8. On F plus 6, 2/14 Aust Inf Bn brought down naval, air and artillery bombardment on further located gun positions. Remainder of 2/16 Aust Inf Bn concentrated on JACK and harassed the enemy with artillery and mortar fire. 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt relieved 2/27 Aust Inf Bn on SEPINGGAN and 2/27 Aust Inf Bn less B Coy concentrated immediately West of MANGGAR BESAR. Apart from several patrols North in the MANGGAR KETJIL area, and B Coy patrols in HAIL area, 2/27 Aust Inf Bn remained in reserve.
9. On F plus 7, 2/14 Aust Inf Bn continued neutralising the enemy positions with naval and artillery fire. 2/16 Aust Inf Bn, after bringing down heavy artillery and mortar concentrations, occupied GATE feature. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn and 2/7 Aust Cav (Cdo) Regt continued patrolling and encountered several small enemy positions. B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn found that the enemy had occupied HAIL.
10. On F plus 8, 2/14 Aust Inf Bn, after naval and artillery concentrations, occupied the remaining features which overlooked the airstrip. 2/16 Aust Inf Bn advanced to GRAND and encountered the enemy in position. After engaging with artillery fire they occupied the feature. 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn moved to HAIL area and took over from B Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn.
11. On F plus 9, 2/14 Aust Inf Bn consolidated their positions and patrolled North to the ADJIRADEN river without contact. 2/16 Aust Inf Bn continued their advance, contacted enemy dug in on ENVOY, and engaged them during the night with artillery fire. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn continued their patrols. 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn occupied HAIL feature and patrolled forward towards ENVOY.
12. On F plus 10, 2/16 Aust Inf Bn advanced and occupied ENVOY where they were relieved by 2/3 Aust Cdo Sqn. The battalion less D Coy, which remained on JACK, returned to their bivouac area on the coast. D Coy 2/27 Aust Inf Bn moved through 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and occupied a position on the ADJIRADEN river.
13. On F plus 11, 2/27 Aust Inf Bn occupied BANGSAL with one coy and established the remainder of the battalion in the LAMAROE area. Patrolling continued on other fronts.
14. From this date onwards, the operations of the brigade consisted of patrolling in strength. Enemy were located in the jungle area West of MANGGAR, and isolated parties were encountered along the tracks between SEPINGGAN and BATOCHAMPUR. Wherever the Jap was found in strength, artillery and mortar fire was brought down and the positions occupied, usually with no opposition.

15. On 18 Jul 2/27 Aust Inf Bn moved to SAMBODJA, established a patrol base and patrolled and cleared the areas to the East, North and West. They returned to the LAMAROE area on 20 Jul 45.

PART III - LESSONS

1. Fire Support

Of the old lessons, that of the use of fire support, was perhaps the one best demonstrated throughout this operation. The maximum available fire power was brought to bear on the enemy, on every occasion, before committing the infantry to the assault. The result was measured by the low casualty rate.

2. Application of Principles of War

Speed and maintenance of the objective were the principles underlying the advance along VASEY HIGHWAY to MANGGAR. The provision of an additional company from 2/27 Aust Inf Bn to clear tracks on the flanks of the advance, enabled the 2/14 Aust Inf Bn to reach their objective as a complete unit. The result was that the enemy was surprised and caught off balance. His forces were split into small components, which never managed to re-concentrate into a composite fighting force.

3. Battle Procedure

In the planning stages of this operation, planning teams were really the R Groups, enlarged to suit the particular task. It is felt that the old and tried principle, that R Groups should be always well forward, and called as far forward as possible when need for them appears likely, was not followed on this occasion. It is considered that planning would have been assisted very much if all planning teams, down to unit teams, had been brought forward to MOROTAI as soon as warning of the impending operation had been received.

4. Open Country and Jungle

Wherever possible we should fight the enemy in open country and destroy him in situ. Once we are drawn into the jungle after him, the balance swings in his favour. Observation is poor, our fire power can NOT be used so effectively, and it is often necessary to pull back while the fire is brought down. This means breaking contact and then closing with the enemy again - a procedure which will inevitably result in casualties to moving troops, in this case our own.

5. Tracks

Most of the enemy's main tracks were undisclosed at the time of our landing. The importance of these, and the extent of the enemy's preparation of them, was not completely appreciated at first. They were all well made, built up tracks, from 6 to 8 feet wide, with dumps of food, ammunition and clothing placed at intervals throughout their length. Well prepared positions, with bunkers and weapon pits, were sited along them on the most favourable tactical features. They provided him with excellent positions for flank protection of his main forces, well stocked lines of withdrawal, and quick routes onto our own L of C. Intensive patrolling is essential; first to locate these tracks; second, in strength, to clear them; and third, continuously, to retain control of them. Dumps of food, ammunition, etc, must be immediately destroyed by these patrols, unless it is intended to hold the position.

6. Use of "Sniper" Guns

Enemy guns were usually located in concrete, or log and earth, emplacements, and fired over open sights. Although indirect arty fire will neutralise these guns, it will seldom knock them out. Often, a direct hit with at least a 1000 lb bomb would be necessary. In these circumstances the 6 pr, and 25 pr fired over open sights, are of utmost value. The accuracy of their fire provided the solution to the problem of "getting at" these enemy guns.

7. Communications

(a) In jungle country, especially where maps are not always accurate, patrols often find difficulty in pinpointing their positions. Where a patrol has to move several thousand yards to its objective, or its final approach is to be preceded by a concentration of mortar or artillery fire on the objective, some visual system of establishing the patrol's position is essential. 2" mortar smoke, parachute flares or a VEREY flare, fired by the patrol ten minutes before the support fire is to come down, are three methods of indicating their position. In addition, it is often advisable to fire one round artillery smoke onto the objective ten minutes before the main concentration. If the patrol is too close, this will give them time to get clear of the area.

(b) Flares were also found a good supplementary means of communication for patrols to indicate their progress in jungle country, when observation is possible from open ground or from the air, over the stretch of jungle.

(c) The more important patrols must be provided with wireless communications. 108 to 108 proved unsatisfactory, but each patrol can use a 108 set back to the brigade 22 set at Bn HQ, thereby increasing the range and reliability of communications.

(d) Pigeons were also successfully used for long range patrols, for which wireless could not be provided.

8. General Comments

Attached as Appendix "A" are general comments which were included in the report prepared by 2 Aust Op Report Team.

PART IV - FUNCTIONING OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

1. 3" Mortars

(a) 3" mortars again proved their worth, both in attack and defence.

(b) 3" mortar smoke was found the only suitable means of indicating targets to aircraft.

(c) The new type 3" mortar baseplate is satisfactory provided that it is well "bedded down" on a firm base of logs and sandbags.

2. 4.2" Mortars

(a) The 4.2" mortars were very successfully used on SOS tasks to break up enemy counter attacks. Although NOT as accurate as the 3" mortar, the longer range and heavier bomb provide ample compensation.

(b) Extra signal personnel are required to lay lines from battery to OPs. In this case they had to be provided from battalion resources.

3. Artillery

(a) Artillery support was adequate and completely effective throughout the operation.

(b) Artillery smoke is NOT suitable as a means of indicating ground targets to aircraft, as it diffuses and obscures the target area.

4. Flamethrowers

In themselves, the M-2 Manpack Flamethrowers are very effective. They should be regarded as a normal infantry weapon and provided on the WE of a battalion as their efficiency is greatly reduced, from the maintenance aspect, by the "pool" system.

5. Wireless

(a) 108 sets are still NOT satisfactory in jungle country.

(b) The No 46 sets worked perfectly at all stages of the operation.

(c) No. 22 sets functioned well.

6. Jungle Carts

Although this brigade found in previous campaigns that jungle carts were not of very much use, and looked on them with disfavour, it was found during this operation that for an advance along a road such as that used by 2/14 Aust Inf Bn to MANGGAR they could be quite useful.

7. General

Weapons and other equipment were generally satisfactory.

Ivan S. Douglas

Brig
Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde

S E C R E T

APPENDIX "A" to
21 AUST INF BDE REPORT
OPERATION - OBOE TWO

GENERAL COMMENTS

OPERATION - OBOE TWO

1. I have little comment to make on the BALIKPAPAN operation. The Task Force Plan, in its conception and execution, was extremely sound, and rewarded with unqualified success.
2. Fortunately the whole Division was allotted to the task. With two brigades we could not have exploited our initial success to the full, and could not have kept up the momentum of the attack while the Jap was off balance, as we did. With three brigades we were able to extend very quickly our bridgehead to a point beyond which there was no need to hasten. After that we could take things at a comfortable pace, thus lessening the number of our own casualties. It appears very clear to me that our total casualties for the campaign would have been far higher had we only had two brigades. This should be an illustration of the need to send enough troops on a mission to enable the task to be completed quickly.
3. The second point to note was the use of fire power. The operation was a lesson on the use of fire power. Many Australians have tended to become "New Guinea minded" as far as the use of fire power and mobility go. The old hands of this division remember the OWEN STANLEYS where they had no artillery; GONA, where 250 rounds of 25 pr was all we could accumulate for the final assault on the MISSION and where one tank would have saved 200 lives if we had only had it; the MARKHAM and RAMU VALLEYS where we were an airborne division, and where the artillery support available though on a far more liberal scale than before, was subject to the obvious limitations imposed by the need for supply by air. I hope that all young men of this division will remember the demonstration of the use of fire power, and its effect, given to them in "Exercise BALIKPAPAN" as we call it, so that they will be fire power minded in the future, and inspire other people to be fire power minded.
4. The third matter I want to raise is that of supplies. During the planning period it became obvious that certain types of ammunition would be in short supply. We could not get all the 3" mortar ammunition for example, that brigade commanders thought they might need. There were very few white phosphorus grenades available. The reason given for the shortage was that supplies had been calculated on war usage rates based on past campaigns. Now, in planning for an operation the basis of supply must be what is considered necessary by the commander who is to be responsible for the particular operation, and not some theoretical figures, called "war usage rates" calculated from the past. I agree that experience of the past should be used as a guide but a guide only and not a master. The war usage rates of past campaigns can be taken by the Commander, and the conditions of the past campaigns can be compared with those anticipated in the projected one. Then the commander - and the commander alone - can decide what will be the war usage rate likely in his coming campaign. It is the war usage rate calculated with regard to the conditions of the campaign to come, and not a war usage rate calculated from the past (although this may be used as a guide) that should determine supplies. As a corollary a commander should be given as early notice as possible of the conditions under which he will operate and people must not say "no!" to his requests for what he considers necessary.
5. In the BALIKPAPAN operation we got by easily with what we brought. But this does not affect the above argument in any way. Had the Jap fought harder we would have used far more ammunition.

6. Fourthly I might mention the flamethrowing tanks which were to have been available but for some reason or other were not put on a ship at BRISBANE. As it was we didn't want them, but it might have been different. It appears as though some individual was to blame for their non-despatch, and such an oversight is criminal. I'm afraid the only way to overcome and eliminate such errors is to shoot someone.

7. Fifthly, planning. I consider that complete planning teams, right down to unit teams, should be the first elements of the Division to move. They should be moved as early as possible, to the place where planning is to be done. They are then available when and as required, and no harm is done if they are not required immediately.

8. The last thing I want to comment on is the report which has to be submitted in detail each night. This means that the Brigade Commander or Brigade Major must wait up until late, when he should be resting so that he can conduct an unexpected battle if need be. It further means that senior officers' efforts are spent in writing the history of the past, while they should be spent in ensuring that the history of the future is one which we might well be proud. The maximum time each night should be devoted to preparations for the next day's work. I recommend that the Daily Operation Letter be discontinued and that we depend on Sitreps as in the past.

9. I have no other comments which I wish to make here.

Ivan H. Dougherty

Brig
Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde

PART I - PLANNING

1. Problems encountered in planning were due to four main factors :-

- (a) The late arrival of planning teams at MOROTAI and the consequent reduction in planning time to less than a considered minimum.
- (b) The absence of a trained MLO, with complete shipping data, who could have relieved the G Planning Staff of the technical aspect of loading the ships and producing loading tables, diagrams and lists.
- (c) The attempted fusion of US and Australian methods of planning. Either system is sound on its own, but they can NOT be linked without causing confusion and increasing the difficulties of planning generally.
- (d) The absence of any co-ordinating or bidding authority for the large number of small units and detachments (eg, Corps Troops, Base Area, RAAF Units) allotted to the brigade convey. Despite all possible efforts within the time available, many of them could NOT be contacted, nor could anyone, who was prepared to state their requirements, be found.

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Wherever possible we should fight the enemy in open country and destroy him in situ. Once we are drawn into the jungle after him, the balance swings in his favour. Observation is poor, our fire power can NOT be used so effectively, and it is often necessary to pull back while the fire is brought down. This means breaking contact and then closing with the enemy again - a procedure which will inevitably result in casualties to moving troops, in this case our own.

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(b) Flares were also found a good supplementary means of communication for patrols to indicate their progress in jungle country, when observation is possible from open ground or from the air, over the stretch of jungle.

(c) The more important patrols must be provided with wireless communications. 108 to 108 proved unsatisfactory, but each patrol can use a 108 set back to the brigade 22 set at Bn HQ, thereby increasing the range and reliability of communications.

(d) Pigeons were also successfully used for long range patrols, for which wireless could not be provided.

8. General Comments

Attached as Appendix "A" are general comments which were included in the report prepared by 2 Aust Op Report Team.

PART IV - FUNCTIONING OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

1. 3rd Mortars

(a) 3rd mortars again proved their worth, both in attack and defence.

(b) 3rd mortar smoke was found the only suitable means of indicating targets to aircraft.

(c) The new type 3rd mortar baseplate is satisfactory provided that it is well "bedded down" on a firm base of logs and sandbags.

2. 4.2nd Mortars

(a) The 4.2nd mortars were very successfully used on SOS tasks to break up enemy counter attacks. Although NOT as accurate as the 3rd mortar, the longer range and heavier bomb provide ample compensation.

(b) Extra signal personnel are required to lay lines from battery to OPs. In this case they had to be provided from battalion resources.

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(a) Artillery support was adequate and completely effective throughout the operation.

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In themselves, the M-2 Manpack Flamethrowers are very effective. They should be regarded as a normal infantry weapon and provided on the WE of a battalion as their efficiency is greatly reduced, from the maintenance aspect, by the "pool" system.

5. Wireless

(a) 108 sets are still NOT satisfactory in jungle country.

(b) The No 46 sets worked perfectly at all stages of the operation.

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6. Jungle Carts

Although this brigade found in previous campaigns that jungle carts were not of very much use, and looked on them with disfavour, it was found during this operation that for an advance along a road such as that used by 2/14 Aust Inf Bn to MANGGAR they could be quite useful.

7. General

Weapons and other equipment were generally satisfactory.

Ivan H. S. ...
Brig
Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde

S E C R E T

APPENDIX "A" to
21 AUST INF BDE REPORT
OPERATION - OBOE TWO

GENERAL COMMENTS

OPERATION - OBOE TWO

1. I have little comment to make on the BALIKPAPAN operation. The Task Force Plan, in its conception and execution, was extremely sound, and rewarded with unqualified success.
2. Fortunately the whole Division was allotted to the task. With two brigades we could not have exploited our initial success to the full, and could not have kept up the momentum of the attack while the Jap was off balance, as we did. With three brigades we were able to extend very quickly our bridgehead to a point beyond which there was no need to hasten. After that we could take things at a comfortable pace, thus lessening the number of our own casualties. It appears very clear to me that our total casualties for the campaign would have been far higher had we only had two brigades. This should be an illustration of the need to send enough troops on a mission to enable the task to be completed quickly.
3. The second point to note was the use of fire power. The operation was a lesson on the use of fire power. Many Australians have tended to become "New Guinea minded" as far as the use of fire power and mobility go. The old hands of this division remember the OWEN STANLEYS where they had no artillery; GONA, where 250 rounds of 25 pr was all we could accumulate for the final assault on the MISSION and where one tank would have saved 200 lives if we had only had it; the MARKHAM and RAMU VALLEYS where we were an airborne division, and where the artillery support available though on a far more liberal scale than before, was subject to the obvious limitations imposed by the need for supply by air. I hope that all young men of this division will remember the demonstration of the use of fire power, and its effect, given to them in "Exercise BALIKPAPAN" as we call it, so that they will be fire power minded in the future, and inspire other people to be fire power minded.
4. The third matter I want to raise is that of supplies. During the planning period it became obvious that certain types of ammunition would be in short supply. We could not get all the 3" mortar ammunition for example, that brigade commanders thought they might need. There were very few white phosphorus grenades available. The reason given for the shortage was that supplies had been calculated on war usage rates based on past campaigns. Now, in planning for an operation the basis of supply must be what is considered necessary by the commander who is to be responsible for the particular operation, and not some theoretical figures, called "war usage rates" calculated from the past. I agree that experience of the past should be used as a guide but a guide only and not a master. The war usage rates of past campaigns can be taken by the Commander, and the conditions of the past campaigns can be compared with those anticipated in the projected one. Then the commander - and the commander alone - can decide what will be the war usage rate likely in his coming campaign. It is the war usage rate calculated with regard to the conditions of the campaign to come, and not a war usage rate calculated from the past (although this may be used as a guide) that should determine supplies. As a corollary a commander should be given as early notice as possible of the conditions under which he will operate and people must not say "no!" to his requests for what he considers necessary.
5. In the BALIKPAPAN operation we got by easily with what we brought. But this does not affect the above argument in any way. Had the Jap fought harder we would have used far more ammunition.

6. Fourthly I might mention the flamethrowing tanks which were to have been available but for some reason or other were not put on a ship at BRISBANE. As it was we didn't want them, but it might have been different. It appears as though some individual was to blame for their non-despatch, and such an oversight is criminal. I'm afraid the only way to overcome and eliminate such errors is to shoot someone.

7. Fifthly, planning. I consider that complete planning teams, right down to unit teams, should be the first elements of the Division to move. They should be moved as early as possible, to the place where planning is to be done. They are then available when and as required, and no harm is done if they are not required immediately.

8. The last thing I want to comment on is the report which has to be submitted in detail each night. This means that the Brigade Commander or Brigade Major must wait up until late, when he should be resting so that he can conduct an unexpected battle if need be. It further means that senior officers' efforts are spent in writing the history of the past, while they should be spent in ensuring that the history of the future is one which we might well be proud. The maximum time each night should be devoted to preparations for the next day's work. I recommend that the Daily Operation Letter be discontinued and that we depend on Sitreps as in the past.

9. I have no other comments which I wish to make here.

Ivan V. Dougherty

Brig
Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde

21 AUST INF BDE REPORTCopy No. *N*.....OPERATION - OBOE TWOPART I - PLANNING

1. Problems encountered in planning were due to four main factors :-

- (a) The late arrival of planning teams at MOROTAI and the consequent reduction in planning time to less than a considered minimum.
- (b) The absence of a trained MLO, with complete shipping data, who could have relieved the G Planning Staff of the technical aspect of loading the ships and producing loading tables, diagrams and lists.
- (c) The attempted fusion of US and Australian methods of planning. Either system is sound on its own, but they can NOT be linked without causing confusion and increasing the difficulties of planning generally.
- (d) The absence of any co-ordinating or bidding authority for the large number of small units and detachments (eg, Corps Troops, Base Area, RAAF Units) allotted to the brigade convey. Despite all possible efforts within the time available, many of them could NOT be contacted, nor could anyone, who was prepared to state their requirements, be found.

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3. It is strongly recommended that, where RAAF units are included in the force, a RAAF LO be attached to the Brigade Staff throughout the planning period.

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1. Apart from being landed on the wrong beach, the operations on F Day went according to plan.

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2. Fortunately the whole Division was allotted to the task. With two brigades we could not have exploited our initial success to the full, and could not have kept up the momentum of the attack while the Jap was off balance, as we did. With three brigades we were able to extend very quickly our bridgehead to a point beyond which there was no need to hasten. After that we could take things at a comfortable pace, thus lessening the number of our own casualties. It appears very clear to me that our total casualties for the campaign would have been far higher had we only had two brigades. This should be an illustration of the need to send enough troops on a mission to enable the task to be completed quickly.
3. The second point to note was the use of fire power. The operation was a lesson on the use of fire power. Many Australians have tended to become "New Guinea minded" as far as the use of fire power and mobility go. The old hands of this division remember the OWEN STANLEYS where they had no artillery; GONA, where 250 rounds of 25 pr was all we could accumulate for the final assault on the MISSION and where one tank would have saved 200 lives if we had only had it; the MARKHAM and RAMU VALLEYS where we were an airborne division, and where the artillery support available though on a far more liberal scale than before, was subject to the obvious limitations imposed by the need for supply by air. I hope that all young men of this division will remember the demonstration of the use of fire power, and its effect, given to them in "Exercise BALIKPAPAN" as we call it, so that they will be fire power minded in the future, and inspire other people to be fire power minded.
4. The third matter I want to raise is that of supplies. During the planning period it became obvious that certain types of ammunition would be in short supply. We could not get all the 3" mortar ammunition for example, that brigade commanders thought they might need. There were very few white phosphorus grenades available. The reason given for the shortage was that supplies had been calculated on war usage rates based on past campaigns. Now, in planning for an operation the basis of supply must be what is considered necessary by the commander who is to be responsible for the particular operation, and not some theoretical figures, called "war usage rates" calculated from the past. I agree that experience of the past should be used as a guide but a guide only and not a master. The war usage rates of past campaigns can be taken by the Commander, and the conditions of the past campaigns can be compared with those anticipated in the projected one. Then the commander - and the commander alone - can decide what will be the war usage rate likely in his coming campaign. It is the war usage rate calculated with regard to the conditions of the campaign to come, and not a war usage rate calculated from the past (although this may be used as a guide) that should determine supplies. As a corollary a commander should be given as early notice as possible of the conditions under which he will operate and people must not say "no!" to his requests for what he considers necessary.
5. In the BALIKPAPAN operation we got by easily with what we brought. But this does not affect the above argument in any way. Had the Jap fought harder we would have used far more ammunition.

6. Fourthly I might mention the flamethrowing tanks which were to have been available but for some reason or other were not put on a ship at BRISBANE. As it was we didn't want them, but it might have been different. It appears as though some individual was to blame for their non-despatch, and such an oversight is criminal. I'm afraid the only way to overcome and eliminate such errors is to shoot someone.

7. Fifthly, planning. I consider that complete planning teams, right down to unit teams, should be the first elements of the Division to move. They should be moved as early as possible, to the place where planning is to be done. They are then available when and as required, and no harm is done if they are not required immediately.

8. The last thing I want to comment on is the report which has to be submitted in detail each night. This means that the Brigade Commander or Brigade Major must wait up until late, when he should be resting so that he can conduct an unexpected battle if need be. It further means that senior officers' efforts are spent in writing the history of the past, while they should be spent in ensuring that the history of the future is one which we might well be proud. The maximum time each night should be devoted to preparations for the next day's work. I recommend that the Daily Operation Letter be discontinued and that we depend on Sitreps as in the past.

9. I have no other comments which I wish to make here.

Ivan H. Dougherty

Brig
Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde

REPORT BY COMD MAKFORCE

REF LANDOPS OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO 8

1. At this stage it would be impossible to write a report which could attempt to portray exactly what MAKFORCE has achieved so far at MAKASSAR, without producing a lengthy thesis. This is because the problems met have been subjective rather than objective. However, following are points which may be of assistance to LANDOPS in deciding policy:-

2. Owing to delay in arrival of troops for Phases II and III, certain encroachments into the tasks of Phases II and III had to be made with the troops of Phase I.

For example, in order to fulfil task as in para 8(g), tasks of Phase II as set out in paras 9 (a) and (b) had to be carried out. Control of Japanese Force movements and transport had to be established in order that food would be available for the civil population of MAKASSAR, and so prevent the possibility of our task as set out in para 10 (f) becoming difficult. Thus, preventive steps had to be taken with the force available for Phase I, to carry out the Phase III task as set out in para 10(f).

3. NICA have been handicapped to a considerable degree by lack of numbers. However, CO NICA has made pleasing progress in taking over civil administrative organization and services from the Japanese civil organization. This is not yet complete but he should have taken over by 1 Oct. This will relieve me of many problems, provided I can keep him supplied with the necessary 'going' transport to maintain his essential services.

4. With my 2/27 Bn which arrived yesterday I will be able to take over many of the duties now being carried out by Japanese Navy personnel south of the line 5 degrees S Latitude. I will not be able to relieve all Japs however. In view of the scattered nature of dumps and points to be guarded, I cannot yet give a firm final plan for the guarding of all dumps.

5. The transport situation has given me most cause for concern. It is far from good, as Japanese transport on which we depend is inadequate and in poor condition. I have established control of all ex Japanese controlled transport South of the line 5 degrees S Latitude, and it has all to be registered. There is no civil transport of any military value available. What few private cars there are, are necessary to keep civil affairs moving. With more transport I consider that I could expeditiously fulfil my tasks of Phases I, II and III, and enable the minimum number of troops to be necessary here in minimum time. My transport requirements are being submitted with my requested additional requirements for Phase III.

6. For the carrying out of my tasks I consider that:-

- (a) I will need more than one battalion, and probably the best part of two, to carry out guarding duties and occupying of key points South of the line 5 degrees South latitude.

- (b) I will need one battalion to supervise the disposal of Japanese Equipment, and the concentration of the Jap into the areas finally approved by LANDOPS, in areas north of the line 5 degrees S Latitude where it runs across the South Western Peninsula, and in areas in the South Eastern Peninsula.
- (c) Therefore I will need my complete brigade (battalions are weakened owing to release of long service personnel) plus the necessary arms and services to maintain them and carry out special tasks.
- (d) I will require additional transport. The additional requirements I consider I need to complete my tasks are attached as appendix "A".

7. To facilitate and speed up the disposal of Japanese stores and equipment in the South Western Peninsula North of the line 5 degrees S Latitude, I have issued orders to Commander Second Japanese Army to commence concentrating stores in the PARE PARE Area in such a way that their subsequent movement, either out to sea for destruction or to MAKASSAR for storage, is facilitated. So far I have taken no other action with regard to the Japs in the areas north of the line 5 degrees S latitude.

8. Briefly, my outline plan for the use of my battalions is as follows:-

- (a) 2/27 Bn (arrived MAKASSAR 27 Sep) to be billeted in area near MAKFORCE Headquarters, and to take over control of the most important points south of the line 5 degrees S latitude. As much as is within the capabilities of the battalion will be taken over.
- (b) 2/14 Bn to be billeted in Dutch Military Barracks, and take over remaining duties South of the line 5 degrees S latitude.
- (c) 2/16 Bn to arrive and move to an area somewhere about PARE PARE. The exact place is subject to reconnaissance. When settled in, this unit will supervise the disposal of property, and the concentration of Japanese forces. That task complete, I will consider moving this battalion back to the MAKASSAR area, and maintaining only the minimum patrols north of the line 5 degrees S latitude, subject to the situation at that time, and the requirements of LANDOPS.
- (d) With regard to the South East Peninsula, I wish to defer my recommendation until I can examine more fully the situation there concerning equipment and steps needed to guard it. My action in this area depends on the plan submitted by Comd Jap Second Army in accordance with your order Number 10 para 3, and whether or not it is approved.

At the moment I am thinking that the best course to take at KENDARI is to send in a company to supervise the disposal of Jap equipment, by destroying unwanted material, and concentrating valuable material into a central dump. Having done this, the Jap could be moved to the PARE PARE area by moving cross country to the Gulf of BONE, thence by small craft across the Gulf of BONE to the South Western Peninsula. The final disposal of valuable material kept at KENDARI would be a matter for consideration when more information is available.

- (e) The method of dealing with small parties of Japs in more isolated parts is a matter for consideration after further examination of the problem is made.

9. The most difficult problem to be overcome is the financial one. The position becomes more and more confusing as each minute passes and the NEI Government still delays a decision as to whether the Jap currency will be honoured later or not. It is my considered opinion that the NEI Government will lose very much prestige if the decision keeps on being delayed. It is also my opinion that out of the situation the Australian Government and the British Empire may get some of the bad consequences.

I consider that this is a matter for the highest diplomatic circles, and strongly recommend that the Australian Government be advised to demand a quick decision from the NEI Government. This is a matter out of which much harm can come to AUSTRALIA.

Ivan A. Dougherty,

Brig
Comd MAKFORCE

26. September 1945

CONTINUATION REPORT
ON
OPERATIONS OF MAKASSAR FORCE

Ref Maps: AERONAUTICAL SERIES 1: 1,000,000
Sheets A4 and B4

GENERAL

1. This report is a continuation to the Report on Operations of MAKASSAR FORCE 22 Sep to 20 Dec 45, and covers the period 21 Dec 45 to 2 Feb 46, when responsibility for the SOUTH CELEBES was handed over to 80 Ind Inf Bde.
2. The main activities of MAKASSAR FORCE during this period have been concerned with preparation for the handover to BRITISH and DUTCH forces.
3. With one exception, there has been no change in the political situation in the SOUTH CELEBES. With the establishment of RNIA troops in country centres and the withdrawal of AMF forces, some minor unrest may be expected. See para 32 below.

JAPANESE FORCES

4. On 31 Dec 45 MAKASSAR FORCE expended its area of responsibility to include all the then Japanese area of responsibility and the Force area now coincides with the area of the SOUTH CELEBES Residency.
5. All Japanese forces incl HQ Second Japanese Army were ordered to be moved into the main concentration area at MALIMPOENG. They were relieved of all responsibility for civil adm and maintenance of law and order. See Appendix "A" for the preliminary orders issued on this subject.
6. To consolidate previous orders to the Japanese and to provide a clear cut plan of concentration to hand over to the relieving Brigade, MAKASSAR FORCE Instr No 12, which is attached as Appendix "B", was issued.
7. It was necessary to leave small parties of Japanese as guards on dumps in various places. Once again, this was due to lack of transport and it is estimated that the last stores will not be concentrated, nor the guards removed until 28 Feb 46.
8. The date for completion of this new concentration, excl guards mentioned in para 7 above, was 15 Jan 46. This date was subsequently extended to 20 Jan 46 and by that time concentration had been effected.
9. A map showing strength, location, duty and

weapons allotted each Japanese detachment is attached as Appendix "C".

10. Details of the contents of dumps is shown in Appendix "D".

RNIA

11. The general plan for the handover of responsibility for SOUTH CELEBES was as follows:-
- (a) RNIA troops should relieve Aust tps in country centres.
 - (b) 80 Ind Inf Bde should remain in reserve in MAKASSAR, and, at the same time, relieve those portions of our force stationed there.
12. Attached as Appendix "E" is copy of MAKASSAR FORCE INSTR NO 13 which covers the dispositioning of RNIA Troops. The only variations to this order were:-
- (a) 162 G Coy ex AMBON was moved direct to PALOPO and 134G Coy was warned for movement to KOLAKA.
 - (b) Owing to FIM activities at PALOPO, 134G Coy, which was due to sail for KOLAKA on 24 Jan was sent to PALOPO to reinforce the garrison there.
13. Two coys of 51 Bn at BANGKOK have not yet arrived.
14. On 25 Jan command of all RNIA troops in SOUTH CELEBES was assumed by HQ RNIA MAKASSAR.
15. On 23 Jan FIM extremists, who are believed to have come from KOLAKA area, attempted to obtain control of PALOPO. Several buildings were set on fire and it was estimated that 400 FIM were involved. They established themselves in a large portion of the town and 162 G Coy were unable to dislodge them.
16. In response to requests from PALOPO and from 2/16 Aust Inf Bn, 134G Coy was removed to PALOPO in HMAS QUIBERON. They arrived PALOPO 24/2001 and after firing some star shells over the area held by the FIM 134 G Coy landed without incident. By 1600 hrs that day the FIM had been dispersed and the town was under control.
17. To prevent possible movement of FIM into the CENTRAL CELEBES, 131 G Coy from EWREKANG, despatched a pl to establish a road block between RANTEPAO and PALOPO on 25 Jan 46. Similarly, 50 Bn from PARE PARE established a road block on the track MAKALE - RANTEPAO - PALOPO.
18. It is not anticipated that any serious trouble will develop, now that all key points are occupied. In any case, FIM demonstrations are ineffective owing to lack of coordination.

BRITISH AND INDIAN TROOPS

19. ALFSEA LIAISON SECTION, consisting of staff and service reps arrived at MAKASSAR on 7 Jan 45 to make preliminary arrangements for the arrival of 80 Ind Inf Bde Gp which was to relieve 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp.
20. The most urgent task was that of finding and allotting accommodation. It was obvious that three major units would have to be under canvas and immediate action was taken to obtain tentage from BALIKPAPAN. In the meanwhile 2/6 Aust Inf Coy commenced prefabricating cookhouses, kitchens and latrines. A tentative allocation of Indian units to areas was made. MAKASSAR FORCE Instr No 5 was issued on 10 Jan 46 covering the reception and accommodation of the incoming brigade and the outline plans for evacuation of 21 Aust Inf Bde. Copy of this instruction is attached as Appendix "F".
22. The Adv Party of 80 Ind Inf Bde Gp arrived on 12 Jan 46 and some minor adjustments to the allocation of unit areas was made. Bde Group reps joined their Australian counterparts and worked together from then on in all details of the handover.
22. The Commander 80 Ind Inf Bde arrived on 22 Jan 46 and gave a firm decision on the allocation of units to areas. One major unit (23 Ind Mountain Regt) had by this time been deleted from the OOB and the Bde Cmdr decided to request a reduction in certain units.
23. The final OOB of 80 Ind Inf Bde Gp is attached as Appendix "G".
24. The Bde HQ, one bn and certain Div tps arrived MAKASSAR on 31 Jan 46 and the balance of the Bde Gp on 4 Feb 46. Cmd passed from 21 Aust Inf Bde to 80 Ind Inf Bde at 1000 hrs on 2 Feb 46.
25. As 80 Ind Inf Bde was also relieving HQ MOROTAI FORCE, Cmd MOROTAI FORCE visited MAKASSAR 22/23 Jan 46 and discussed details of the handover.
26. Within the SOUTH CELEBES RNLA were made responsible for the military control of the MAKASSAR FORCE area of responsibility and 80 Ind Inf Bde tps remained in MAKASSAR as reserve.

AUST TPS

27. The evacuation of Aust tps commenced on 14 Jan 46 with the embarkation of 600 low priority personnel for First Aust Army Area.
28. 2/14 Aust Inf Bn with a portion of 2/16 Aust Inf Bn and detts from various arms and services embarked on KANIMBLA and sailed on 23 Jan 46. Owing to heavy rains it was not possible to move 2/14 Aust Inf Bn from PARE PARE to MAKASSAR and KANIMBLA therefore sailed to PARE PARE and embarked 2/14 Aust Inf Bn by Landing Craft.

29. 2/27 Aust Inf Bn and 2/16 Aust Inf Bns less that portion of board KANIMBA together with dets from Bde HQ and Arms and Services embark on WINCHESTER VICTORY on 3 Feb 46.
30. The balance of the force incl rear parties embark on approx 10 Feb 46.
31. All AMF equipment held by the units of MACKASSAR FORCE was disposed of to the incoming BRITISH UNITS prior to RNLI. Copy of MACKASSAR FORCE Instr No 10, covering this subject is attached as Appendix "H".

POLITICAL SITUATION

32. On 29 and 30 Dec 45, MICA arranged a reception for all the Rajahs, Karings and Chiefs of SOUTH WEST CILIBES. The arrangements included a formal gathering, a luncheon, pictures and sports events over the two days, and was very successful in that all the native rulers accepted the invitation and thereby re-affirmed their intention to cooperate.
33. Immediately following this CONICA called together and established an advisory committee to consider matters concerning the future administration of SOUTH CILIBES. The task of the committee was stated as twofold, viz
- Possible
- (a) To consider the wishes, grievances and objections of the various groups of the civil population in all matters concerning future policy and government.
- (b) to work out the necessary modification and changes of policy which are required to meet the wishes of the majority of the population.

The committee consisted of the following:-

Chairman	Abdullah daeng Mappedjhi
Members	Mr Binol
	Prof Dr A.A. Gense
	R... Darmanto
	Dr J.W. de Klein
	R.O. Simatoepang
	Abdoel Salam
	Mr Teng Tjin Leng
	Mr K.L.Th. Tjia
	Dr S.J. warouw
Secretary	M. Hoehiddin

Except for the PALOPO incident on 23/24 Jan the situation in the SOUTH CILIBES has been very satisfactory from the political aspect.

ATTACHMENTS

34. Attached hereto as Appendices "I" and "J" respectively are reports on the Signal and Medical aspects of the Force. (One copy of only of the Medical Report is available and is attached to the copy for MH & I).

[Signature] Maj
Bm 21 Aust Inf Bde

2 Feb 46

APPENDIX "A"

MESSAGE FORM

DATE : TIME OF ORIGIN
241525 I

FROM: HAKPOONG
(for action)

TO: GUARDED HEADQUARTERS SECOND JAPANESE ARMY
(for information)

2/14 2/16 2/27 Inf Bns, HIOA, RHIA, 2/2 Sup Dep Coy
SO (S) IO SIG O LANDOPS DOFR OS

GO 553 unclassified (.) reference C in C AMF message 330 to
Second Japanese Army (.) you will take the following action (.)

- ONE (.) all personnel in the present area of responsibility
Second Japanese Army including your HQ will concent-
rate at HAKPOONG by 15 Jan 46 with the following
exceptions (.) A (.) adequate guards will be maintain-
ed on all stores which cannot be moved by 15 Jan 46 (.)
in this connection you will advise immediately
tonnage location and type of stores to be moved (.)
B (.) PANGSODONG 300 fishing personnel HAKPOONG 60
SITONG 50 KASARK 200 MADJEE 100 MANGSODIA 150
producing soy bean paste paper oils charcoal LENO
spinning mills 11 (.) further instructions will be
issued later about these places (.)
- TWO (.) civil administration personnel will move immediately
(.)
- THREE (.) the following areas will be evacuated first KALOSI
HAKPOONG POLEWALI (.)
- FOUR (.) you will maintain your wireless communications
within SOUTH CHINESE only until further instructed
by this HQ (.)
- FIVE (.) you will so organise the movement of your HQ that
you are at all times in communication and functioning

This message may be sent as
written by any means incl
wireless

ORIGINATORS DESIRE OF PRIORITY

BY HAND

P. B. Connolly

Capt

APPX B
Amended to 30/1/46

35
COPY NO.....

MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION NO 12

JAN 4 1946

Advanced Headquarters
Second Japanese Army

GENERAL

1. This instruction is a consolidation and amendment of MAKASSAR FORCE Instructions Nos 2 and 6 concerning the concentration of Japanese Forces;
2. MAKASSAR FORCE Instructions Nos 2 and 6 and MAKASSAR FORCE Administrative Instruction No 1 except in so far as it relates to purchases for December are hereby cancelled.

CONCENTRATION

3. The main concentration area is at MALIMPOENG. Boundaries of this area are shown on sketch attached as Appendix "A".
4. All Japanese naval and army personnel and civilians, with the exception of those authorised as per Appendices "B" and "C", will be concentrated in the main concentration area at MALIMPOENG by 15 Jan 46.
5. All personnel remaining as per Appendix "C" will be concentrated by 28 Feb 46.

PERSONNEL AUTHORISED TO REMAIN OUTSIDE MALIMPOENG CONCENTRATION AREA

6. Permanently

The personnel shown in Appendix "B" may be stationed permanently, in the areas specified, for the purposes shown therein. This, however, is subject to periodical review.

7. Temporarily

The personnel shown in Appendix "C" may remain, in the areas specified, as guards until stores have been cleared from dumps, but, in any case, NOT later than 28 Feb 46. In the meantime this will be subject to periodical review.

WEAPONS

8. The following weapons and ammunition may be retained, subject to further orders :-

- | | |
|---|---|
| (a) Within the concentration area and areas specified in Appendix "B" | (i) 200 rifles and 60 rounds per rifle
(ii) 1 pistol and 30 rounds per |
|---|---|

Officers down to
and incl Majors
and Lt Comdrs

- (b) For guards as specified - (i) 200 rifles and
in Appendix "C" 60 rounds per
rifle
(ii) 1 pistol and
30 rounds per
officer

9. You will submit to this HQ by 15 Jan 45 a
return showing:-

- (a) Allotment of rifles to each area specified
in Appendices "B" and "C", separately.
- (b) A nominal roll of all officers authorised to
carry pistols, showing rank, name and location.
10. (c) All persons authorised to carry arms will
be issued with a permit as specified in para
4 to MAKASSAR FORCE letter G249 of 2 Nov 45.

VEHICLES

11. You may retain the following vehicles for use
within the concentration area and between this area and
subsidiary areas:-

- (a) Cars 5
- (b) Trucks 20
- (c) Vans (various) 10

12. All other transport will be controlled by 2/14
Aust Inf Bn, and will be used to concentrate Japanese
stores.

13. The maximum continuous use will be made of all
available vehicles for this purpose.

FOOD AND NECESSARIES

14. Rice

- (a) You are authorised to continue concentration
of 1700 tons of rice, from dumps already
under your control, at RAFANG.
- (b) Issue of this rice, in accordance with the
authorised scale, will be controlled by
2/8 Aust Sup Depot Fl.
- (c) This rice is sufficient for your forces until
approximately 30 Jun 46. After that date rice,
up to the authorised scale, will be purchased
through NICA, under arrangements between the
Dutch and Japanese Governments.

15. Vegetables etc.

- (a) The cultivation areas already allotted have
been increased by the addition of the

u.

emergency areas specified in Appendix "B" to MAKASSAR FORCE Instruction No 3.

- (b) The present allotted areas are shown in Appendix "A" attached.
- (c) By intensive cultivation of these areas and any suitable land within the concentration area, you will make yourselves self sufficient in vegetables by 28 Feb 46.
- (d) Until these areas are productive, but not after 28 Feb 46, you will be permitted to purchase locally these balancing items. This will only be effected, however, under arrangements this HQ. You will submit your requirements for investigation by this HQ and NICA, at least 14 days prior to the desired date of purchase.
- (e) Details as to method of purchasing these supplies will be issued by this HQ in the form of Administrative Instructions when required.

16. Other necessaries to be purchased locally

Meat, edible oil, firewood, limestone and bark may be purchased, up to the authorised scale, under similar arrangements to those applicable to vegetables.

17. Necessaries to be produced within Concentration Area.

Permission is given for the production of the following necessaries within the Concentration Area:-

- (a) Soy
- (b) Miso
- (c) Lince
- (d) Toilet Paper

18. Fishing

- (a) The fishing area and ports shown in sketch attached as Appendix "D" are allotted for your use, subject to the following restrictions:-
 - (i) No dynamite, ammunition or other explosive of any kind will be used.
 - (ii) There will be absolutely no interference with Indonesian fishermen. Whenever Japanese and Indonesian interests clash the Japanese will give way and move to another area.

(iii) Certain areas marked "Rajah's Private Ground - Fishing Prohibited" will be OUT OF BOUNDS to all Japanese

(b) The numbers of personnel allotted for fishing duties is shown in both Appendices "B" and "D".

19. General

(a) All Japanese are forbidden to attempt to make local individual purchases of food from natives, or to obtain food from any source other than through the authorised method of supply as set out above.

(b) Any Japanese found engaged in this practice will be arrested.

CONTROL OF PERSONNEL

20. Each Japanese will be issued with a pass, as per pro forma attached as Appendix "E", stating his name, area in which stationed etc, and in case of personnel on transport or communication duties, the areas through which he must pass in carrying out such duties.

21. These passes will be prepared by this HQ and passed to you for completion of details by 15 Jan 46.

22. They will be carried by the Japanese at all times and will be produced on demand by any Officer or Other Rank of the Allied Services

23. Movement of Japanese will be restricted to the areas and routes indicated on sketch attached as Appendix "F". Any Japanese found in any other area after 15 Jan 46 will be immediately arrested and may be shot on sight.

24. (a) Routes shown in BLUE may be used up till 28 Feb 46.

(b) Routes shown in RED may be used permanently.

INTER COMMUNICATION

24. The only wireless communications which are authorised are those shown in Wireless Diagram attached as Appendix "G".

25. By 15 Jan 46 all other Japanese Wireless Stations will be closed down and the personnel moved to the Concentration Area. The equipment will be dismantled and handed over to the nearest AMF HQ.

ACK

Time of Signature

042200Z
J. K. ...

Issued through

S 14, 5

Chief of Staff MAKASSAR ^{Major} FORCE

Copies to:


2/14 Aust Inf Bn	2 -	3
2/16 Aust Inf Bn		4
2/27 Aust Inf Bn		5
21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec		6
2/2 Aust Sup Depot Coy	7 -	8
N.I.C.A.	9 -	10
R.N.I.A.	11 -	12
HQ MOROTAI FORCE		15
Comd		16
BM		17
SC		18
SC (Q)		19
SC (A)		20
IO		21
TO		22
File	23 -	24
War Diary	25 -	26
Spares	27 -	46

TOTAL AREA	
A. River bend	100 Ha
B. Soelili	70 "
C. Tiroeng	30 "
D & E Baroe	70 "
Total 270 "	

TOTAL PERSONNEL	
A.	1000
B & C	1000
D & E	750
Total 2750	



APPX A

1. Area A1	80 Ha
2. A2	12 "
3. A3	5 "
4. Tpt by river craft	
5. Required also for firwood and paper making	
6. 1000 personnel	



1. Area E	20 ha
2. Area D	50 "
3. Tpt by hand cart	
4. 750 personnel	

1. Area B	70 Ha
2. Area C	30 "
3. Tpt by hand cart	
4. 1000 personnel	

 Cultivation Areas
 Concentration Area

APPENDIX 'B' to MAKASSAR
 FORCE INSTRUCTION NO 12
 OF 4 JAN 45

PERSONNEL AUTHORISED TO REMAIN PERMANENTLY
 OUTSIDE MALLIMPOLNG CAMP SUBJECT TO PERIODICAL REVIEW

<u>SERIAL No</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1	Area A	1500	Cultivation
2	Areas A and B	1000	Cultivation
3	Areas D and E	750	CULTIVATION
4	LANGA	60	Fishing
5	BENTENG	192	Hospital Staff (patients additional)
		150	Cultivation
		100	Loading parties & guards
		130	Tn duties at SADANG REVIS (some at PADOLEKKOE)
6	SOLLILI	460	Hospital staff (patients additional)
		300	Cultivation
7	MALLIMPOLNG AIRSTRIP	45	Aerodrome Staff
8	PARE PARE	31	Liaison personnel
		40	working party
9	MAKASSAR	70	Liaison Office
		350	Working party
10	KABERE	500	See Ser 11
11	PANBOESOLANG	300	Fishing
12	TONI YAMAN	250	Ship repairing, soy, oil, soap, charcoal etc production
13	POMELAA	150	Guards & Technicians
14	RAPANG	30	working party on issue of supplies
15	KENDARI	12	Technical personnel
16	SOLNGGOLMINASA	2	1 Technician at Power Sta 1 Leper

APPENDIX 'G' to MAKASSAR
 FORCE INSTRUCTION No 12
 of 4 Jan 46

PERSONNEL AUTHORISED TO REMAIN OUTSIDE
 MALIMPOENG CAMP UNTIL CLEARANCE
 OF STORES

SERIAL NO	LOCATION	NUMBER	REMARKS
1	WOTOE	30	
2	PALOPO	62	
3	RALOMPON	30	
4	RANTEPAO	100	Until 30 Apr 46
5	BALANA	80	
6	TALCLIP	50	
7	TONDON	35	
8	MAKALE	75	
9	KALOSI	80	Until 30 Mar 46
10	MAMOEDJOE	20	
11	RAPANG	100	
12	LANGA	40	
13	ENREKANG	50	Until 30 Apr 46
14	TONITAMAN	80	


(NOTE:- Unless otherwise specified these personnel will be concentrated by 28 Feb 46.)

JAPANESE SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAMME

APPENDIX 'D'

<u>FAMBOESOEANG</u>	
Salting works	
Office	
Repair yard	
Personnel	
Fishermen	200
Salting	40
Repairs	50
Office	10
Total	<u>300</u>

<u>LANGA</u>	
Port of distribution	
Office	
Salting works	
Personnel	
Fishermen	30
Salting	20
Office	10
Total	<u>60</u>



PRO FORMA FOR
JAPANESE LOCATION PASS

- JAPANESE LOCATION PASS -

Number:

Rank:

Name:

Unit:

Location:


Duties:

Remarks: (for example:- Transport driver
between RAPANG and RANTAPAO
via ENREKANG)

(Signed) (Rank)
Comd (Unit)

AUTHORISED ROUTES & AREAS FOR MOV'T OF JAPANESE

APPX 'F'



LEGEND

— May be used up to 26 Feb only

— May be used permanently


▨ Any routes may be used within this area.

Main road as far as Makassar

APPENDIX "G" to
MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION
NO 12 of 4 JAN 1945.

WIRELESS DIAGRAM

ARMY AND NAVY LINKS



Places shown in brackets will be closed down
as forces are withdrawn to MALIMPOENG.

LOCATION MAP JAPANESE FORCES

APPX 'C'

RFI: 1,000,000

REF MAPS AERONAUTICAL SHEETS A4 & B4


TABLE B
PERSONNEL REMAINING TEMPORARILY OUTSIDE MALIMPOENG CONCENTRATION AREA

PERSONNEL		DUTY	WEAPONS	
AS RETURN	AUTHORIZED		PISTOLS	RIFLES
30	30	GUARDS ON DUMPS	1	8
30	30	"	1	5
62	62	"	5	15
110	100	"	5	25
80	80	"	-	17
35	35	"	-	8
50	50	"	-	10
20	20	"	1	5
100	100	"	11	20
75	75	"	3	15
80	80	"	5	30
50	50	"	1	12
40	80	"	5	13
61	40	"	2	7


TABLE A
PERSONNEL REMAINING PERMANENTLY OUTSIDE MALIMPOENG CONCENTRATION AREA

PERSONNEL		DUTY	WEAPONS	
AS RETURN	AUTHORIZED		PISTOLS	RIFLES
300	300	FISHING	-	10
80	250	SHIPBUILDING - PRODUCTS SOY, OIL, BEAN, SOAP	-	18
394	1500	CULTIVATION	2	25
192	192	HOSPITAL STAFF	1	9
150	150	CULTIVATION	-	5
100	100	LOADING PARTY'S GUARDS	-	5
164	130	TRANSPORT DUTIES SADRANG RIVER (HOME AT ANDREKKE)	-	5
596	750	CULTIVATION	-	5
60	60	FISHING	-	4
460	460	HOSPITAL STAFF	3	11
600	300	CULTIVATION	-	10
1225	1000	CULTIVATION	-	10
31	31	LIAISON PERS	1	-
38	40	WORKING PARTY	-	-
30	30	ISSUE OF SUPPLIES	-	-
45	45	AERODROME STAFF	-	3
450	500	PRODUCTION, SOY, PAPER, SOAP, CHARCOAL ETC	-	-
68	70	LIAISON STAFF	5	-
442	350	WORKING PARTY	-	-
2	2	TECHNICIAN - POWER STA	-	-
149	150	GUARDS & TECHNICIANS	3	3
62	12	TECHNICIANS	4	-

MALIMPOENG 13256
SEAMEN ON SHIPS 228
UNDER ARREST (MANDAI) 175
MISSING 92
TABLE A 4316 - TABLE B 823 7139
GRAND TOTAL 20890



SCALE 1 inch to 16 miles (APPROX)



PREPARED BY INT SEC 21 AUST INT BDE 21 JAN 46

LIST OF THE JAPANESE STORE AT EACH DUMP IN SOUTH WEST CELEBES.

APPX D

(as of 28th January 1946)

Second Japanese Army.

Serial No:	D u m p :	Guards:	Number of Rifles:	J a p a n e s e S t o r e s :							Remarks:
				Rations Rice and others:	Clothing:	Daily necessities and camping gear:	F u e l :	Medical supplies:	T o t a l :		
1.	Rantepao.	70	17	Rice & others. 265 tons	Soldier's boots & others. 115 m ³	Farming tools. 193 m ³	Light oil & others. 78 m ³	Quinine & others. 120 m ³	902 m ³		
2.	Tondon.	30	8	Salt. 82 "					123 "		
3.	Makale.	30	8	Rice & others. 41 "	Shirts & trousers & others. 20 "	Stationery & others. 26 "			108 "		
4.	Kalosi.	80	18	" 682 "	" 9 "	Daily necessities & others. 39 "	Heavy oil & others. 152 "		1,223 "		
5.	Enrekang.	50	12	" 505 "					758 "		
6.	Rappang.	86	35	" 642 "		" 21 "	" 210 "		1,194 "		
7.	Pinrang.	23	5	Unhulled rice. 33 "					50 "		
8.	Benteng.			Unhulled rice & others. 120 "				Miscellaneous medicines. 140 "	320 "		
9.	Bankae.			Salt & others. 3 "					5 "		
10.	Mapili.			Unhulled rice & others. 26 "					39 "		
11.	Langa.	40	7	Unhulled rice. 75 "					113 "		
12.	Palopo.	62	15	Rice & others. 440 "	" 10 "	" 114 "			784 "		
13.	Wotoe.	30	8		" 15 "	" 12 "			27 "		
14.	GRAND TOTAL:	501	133	2,914 "	169 "	405 "	440 "	260 "	5,646 "		

NOTES:

1. The Rations at Mapili are being moved to Toniaman. The movement will be completed by the end of January.
2. One ton of rations has been calculated as equal to 1.5 cubic metres.

8 Jan 46

MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION NO 13

Ref Maps: AERONAUTICAL SERIES 1 : 1,000,000
Sheets A4 and B4

GENERAL

1. This instruction deals with the relief of AMF Forces in SOUTH CELEBES, excl MAKASSAR, by RNIA Forces.
2. As far as possible firm dates have been given but all dates are liable to some variation.

TASKS OF RNIA RELIEVING FORCES

3. The general tasks of the RNIA forces will be:-
 - (a) Establish units, coys and detachments in the strengths and locations specified in para 6 below.
 - (b) Maintain law and order in the towns in which located and the surrounding districts.
 - (c) Provide protection, if necessary, for NICA and assist NICA to re-establish civil administration in the respective areas. In this regard, see particularly para 16 below.
 - (d) Establish road blocks as necessary on the main comm system to check unauthorised movement of vehicles and personnel.
 - (e) In the case of PARE PARE force (50 Bn):-
 - (i) control the concentration of Japanese force at MALIMPOENG and subsidiary areas in accordance with instructions contained in MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION No 12 of 4 Jan 46, and any amendments to that instruction, ^{which} may be issued later.
 - (ii) Supervise the concentration at PARE PARE, RAPANG, MALIMPOENG and BENTENG of all remaining Japanese stores and war materials from the areas specified in Appendix "C" to MAKASSAR FORCE INSTRUCTION No 12.
 - (f) Consistently patrol the country, by vehicle and on foot, between the main centres at which forces are located.
 - (g) Carry out such other tasks as may be ordered from time to time.

ALLOCATION OF FORCES TO AREAS

4. In general terms RNIA forces will take over from all AMF forces outside MAKASSAR area in equivalent strength.
5. In addition, certain new areas will be occupied.
6. Final dispositions will be as follows:-
- | | | |
|------------------------|---|--|
| (a) PARE PARE | - | 50 Bn RNIA less one pl
MP Coy |
| (b) (i) ENREKANG | - | 131 G Coy RNIA |
| (ii) MADJENE | - | One Pl 50 Bn |
| (c) SINGKANG | - | 51 Bn RNIA less three
coys |
| (d) WAT AMPONE | - | A Coy 51 Bn RNIA |
| (e) PALOPO | - | 134 G Coy RNIA |
| (f) MAKALE | - | B Coy 51 Bn RNIA |
| (g) (i) BONTHAIN | - | 132 M Coy RNIA less
two pls |
| (ii) DJENOPONTO | - | One pl 132 M Coy RNIA |
| (iii) BOELAKOMBA | - | One pl 132 M Coy RNIA |
| (h) KOLAKA | - | ¹³⁴ 162 G Coy RNIA |
| (i) KENDARI | - | 151 G Coy RNIA |
| (j) MAKASSAR (Reserve) | - | 133 M Coy RNIA
Marine Coy RNN
C Coy 51 Bn RNIA |
7. Initially 131 G Coy RNIA will establish one pl at MADJENE. On arrival 50 Bn RNIA, this pl will rejoin the coy at ENREKANG and will be replaced by one pl from 50 Bn.

APPROXIMATE DATES OF OCCUPATION OF AREAS

8. RNIA forces will occupy their respective areas by approximately the following dates:-
- | | | |
|------------------|---|--|
| (a) 11 Jan 46 | - | 132 M Coy RNIA - ex MAKASSAR to
BONTHAIN -
DJENOPONTO-
BOELAKOMBA
area to relieve
coy 2/16 Aust
Inf Bn |
| (b) 12/13 Jan 46 | - | 131 G Coy RNIA - ex MAKASSAR to
ENREKANG with
one pl at
MADJENE |

3.

- (c) 19 Jan 46 - 50 Bn RNIA - ex BALIKPAPAN to PARE PARE to relieve 2/14 Aust Inf Bn
- (d) 23 Jan 45 - ¹⁶² 134 G Coy RNIA - ex ~~MAKASSAR~~ ^{AMBON} to PALOPO to relieve coy 2/16 Aust Inf Bn
- (e) 25 Jan 46 - 51 Bn RNIA - ex BALIKPAPAN to SINGKANG and WATAMPONE to relieve 2/16 Aust Inf Bn less three coys
- (f) On arrival - B Coy 51 Bn - ex BANGKOK to MAKALE
(probably 31 Jan 46) C Coy 51 Bn - ex BANGKOK to MAKASSAR
¹³⁴ 162 G Coy - ex ~~MAKASSAR~~ ^{AMBON} to KOLAKA

COMMAND

9. (a) RNIA Bns and coys will come under operational comd of the AMF units they relieve until such AMF units are withdrawn.
- (b) Units and sub units are grouped for this purpose as follows:-
- (i) 50 Bn RNIA with under comd - under comd
MP Coy and 131 G Coy RNIA 2/14 Aust Inf Bn
 - (ii) 51 Bn RNIA less C Coy with - under comd
under comd ¹³⁴ 134 G Coy RNIA 2/16 Aust Inf Bn
 - (iii) 132 M Coy ¹⁶² RNIA - under comd
2/27 Aust Inf Bn
10. (a) As from the date of withdrawal of each AMF unit or detachment, the relieving RNIA unit or detachment will come under direct comd HQ RNIA MAKASSAR.
- (b) HQ RNIA MAKASSAR remains under comd the Allied Occupation Force throughout.
11. RNIA Coys at KOLAKA, KENDARI and MAKASSAR remain under direct comd SORNIA throughout.
12. These latter coys are:-
- (a) 151 G Coy - KENDARI
 - (b) ¹³⁴ 162 G Coy - KOLAKA (on arrival)
 - (c) C Coy 51 Bn
 - (d) 133 M Coy
 - (e) 138 Dep Coy
 - (f) 139 Staff Coy
 - (g) Marine Coy RNN

13. In all cases in which AMF troops are relieved by RNIA troops, the AMF troops will be left in the same area for approximately one week. This is desirable to enable RNIA troops to become familiar with the local situation and to effect a complete handover.

ALLOCATION OF AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY

14. When AMF Forces are withdrawn, RNIA units will be responsible for the respective areas as shown on trace attached as Appendix "A".
15. In general terms these are as follows:-
- (a) 50 Bn with under comd
131 G Coy and MP Coy - the western half of the SW CELEBES peninsula from excl PANTJANA to the north boundary of the South CELEBES Residency and east to incl ENREKANG.
- (b) 51 Bn less C Coy with
under comd 134 G Coy
162 - The general area of the Divisions of BONE and LOEWOE extending from excl SINDJAI to incl WOTOE and west to incl SINGKANG and MAKALE.
- (c) Under direct comd HQ
RNIA - (a) The S.E. CELEBES peninsula
132 M Coy
133 M Coy
151 G Coy
134 162 G Coy
C Coy 51 Bn
Marine Coy RNN
138 Depot Coy
139 Staff Coy
(b) The South portion of the SW CELEBES peninsula from south of the general line PANTJANA-SINDJAI

STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES AND NICA IN SOUTH CELEBES

16. (a) By Allied agreement, the Comd of Allied Military Forces in SOUTH CELEBES is responsible, within the area of the former SOUTH CELEBES Residency for:-
- (i) supervising the disarmament of, and controlling Japanese Forces in the area.
- (ii) civil administration and maintenance of law and order until such time as the lawful civil government of the N.E.I. is once again functioning. To assist the Comd in the discharge of this responsibility a NICA unit forms part of the Allied Force.
- (iii) in pursuance of (ii) the old N.E.I. laws are to be applied and enforced by Officers of NICA subject only to such further orders which the Allied Comd may be obliged, in the interests of good order, to issue.

- (b) It follows that the only form of government for the time being in SOUTH CELEBES is a military administration of which NICA is an integral part. The orders and instructions of NICA have the authority of the Force Comd. It is the duty of Officers comd detached units and sub units to take all measures practicable to establish the authority of NICA and ensure that its instructions in civil matters are carried out.
- (c) On 29 Oct 45 Comd MAKASSAR FO CE issued the proclamation attached as Appendix "D". This has been promulgated in areas occupied by Australian troops.
- (d) The civil population, through their leaders, have been fully informed of the foregoing. They have also been told that the final form of civil government to replace the present military administration will be decided after conferences to be held in the future between the Dutch Government and Indonesians in accordance with the declared policy of Queen Wilhelmina and the Dutch Government.
- (e) It is desirable that all officers of the relieving forces be acquainted with the foregoing.

MOVEMENT AND ESTABLISHING OF RNIA FORCES

17. Separate instructions will be issued by this H for each of the moves specified in para 8 above.

TRANSPORT

18. The provision, allocation and control of all transport used for the movement and for maintenance of RNIA forces will be the direct responsibility of HQ RNIA MAKASSAR.

19. SUPPLIES

20. MEDICAL

21. AMMUNITION

22. PETROL

23. WATER

24. ACCOMMODATION

} Under arrangements of
H. RNIA MAKASSAR

INTERCOMMUNICATION

25. Prior to withdrawal of AMF Troops

When RNIA units and detachments are established as per para 7 above, and prior to the withdrawal of the AMF forces from the respective areas, AMF comms, both line and wireless, and DRLS will be used by RNIA.

26. From date of withdrawal AMF Troops

(a) Line

The existing line comn system, which is the Civil trunk line system as shown in Diagram attached as Appendix "B" will be taken over by RNIA as from the time AMF troops are withdrawn.

(b) Wireless

(i) Wireless Diagram, showing final wireless comn links as from the time RNIA take over responsibility, is attached as Appendix "C".

(ii) Although NOT yet finally decided, RNIA will probably take over existing wireless sets from respective AMF units and detachments which they relieve.

(c) Wireless sets for RNIA detachments to be established in areas NOT now occupied by AMF, will be provided by HQ RNIA.

(d) DRLS

DRLS will be the responsibility of HQ RNIA.

27.

ACK

From date of withdrawal AMF Troops

(a) Line

The existing line system as shown in Diagram attached as Appendix "B" will be taken over by RNIA as from the time AMF troops are withdrawn.

A. G. Roberts

Major

Chief of Staff MAKASSAR FORCE

Time of Signature 080900I

Issued through Sigs

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO

2/14 Aust Inf Bn	1
2/16 Aust Inf Bn	2
2/27 Aust Inf Bn	3
RNIA	4-18
2/6 Aust Fd Coy	19
21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec	20
2/2 Aust Sup Depot Coy	21
2/25 Aust Tpt Pl	22
2/6 Aust Fd Amb	23
2/125 Aust Bde Ord Fd Park	24
2/125 Aust Bde Workshops	25
HQ MOROTAI FORCE	26-27
SORNIA MOROTAI	28
Comd	29
BM	30
SC (Q)	31
SC (A)	32
IO	33
TO	34
File	35-36
War Diary	37-38
Spares	39-46

(a) Line

The existing line system as shown in Diagram attached as Appendix "B" will be taken over by RNIA as from the time AMF troops are withdrawn.


A. G. Roberts

Major

Chief of Staff MAKASSAR FORCE


AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF RNIA TROOPS

APPX 'A'
TO MAKASSAR FORCE INSTR
NO 13



APPENDIX 'B'
to MAKASSAR FORCE
INSTRUCTION No 13


LINE DIAGRAM
CIVIL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM



APPENDIX 'C'
to MAKASSAR FORCE
INSTRUCTION No 13

WIRELESS DIAGRAM

R.N.I.A.



APPENDIX 'D'
to MAKASSAR FORCE
INSTRUCTION No 13

PROCLAMATION

BY

BRIGADIER F O CHILTON DSO

COMMANDER AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES MAKASSAR

The following are offences against Allied Military Control in the South West CELEBES.

- (a) Carrying or being in possession of Arms or Weapons of any kind. This includes all kinds of firearms, hand grenades, explosives, swords, kris and spears. Any person found carrying arms or Weapons of any kind may be shot.
- (b) The holding of processions or demonstrations of any kind.
- (c) Violence or threat of violence to any person.
- (d) Giving aid or assistance to any person guilty of any offence.
- (e) Refusing to sell food, clothes or any other daily necessities of life normally sold owing to racial or social differences.
- (f) Interfering with the free use of Public Highways.
- (g) Sabotage or destroying or interfering with public services, and/or Allied Military Installations including waterworks, electricity and gasworks, telephone, telegraph cable works and radio broadcasting stations. Those guilty of this offence may be shot.
- (h) Robbery and looting.
- (i) Wearing of any uniform, not being members of the Allied Military Forces, or members of the Police Force.
- (j) Drilling or participating in any form of Military Training.

The above orders will be strictly enforced by all Forces under my command.


(Sgd) F O Chilton Brigadier
Commander AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES
MAKASSAR

29 October 1945.

DISPOSITIONS OF RNIA TROOPS AS AT 31 JAN '46

RF 1:1,000,000.

REF MAPS AERONAUTICAL SHEETS A4 & B4



SCALE: 1 inch to 16 miles (approx)

MILES 20 15 10 5 0 20 40 80 MILES

PREPARED BY INT SEC 25AUST INT BDE 28 JAN '46

Provosts

Copy No. *37*

Amended

HQ, MAKASSAR FORCE

10 Jan 46

MAKASSAR FORCE ADM INSTR NO 5

HANDOVER TO 80 IND INF BDE GP

GENERAL

1. This instruction is a preliminary instruction on the handover to 80 Ind Inf Bde Gp.

PHASE I

2. It is anticipated that 80 Ind Inf Bde Gp will arrive MAKASSAR ex SAIGON between 20 Jan 46 and 25 Jan 46. Exact timings will be notified later.
3. The whole of this force which amounts to approx 4800 British and Indian troops will be accommodated in MAKASSAR and the surrounding district.
4. MAKASSAR FORCE is responsible for the reception and accommodation of these units.
5. An advance party of 80 Ind Inf Bde Gp, representatives of all arms is due to arrive MAKASSAR at any time. These personnel will live with the respective AMF units, which their own units are to relieve, and will assist in all matters concerning the reception of and accommodation of the incoming troops.
6. A further 1800 British and Indian troops will be included eventually in 80 Ind Inf Bde Gp. At present it is not anticipated that these personnel will arrive before 31 Jan 46. They do NOT relieve any AMF units.

ALLOCATION OF ACCOMMODATION TO 80 IND BDE

7. Areas and accommodation to be occupied by the units of 80 Ind Inf Bde Gp are shown in Appendix "A".

FOSTERING

8. AMF units responsible for fostering the respective British units are shown in Appendix "A".
9. Fostering units will ensure that guides meet incoming units on arrival and that all possible facilities are made available at such time as incoming units are settled.
10. Separate instructions will be issued with regard to meals, but generally speaking it will NOT be necessary to provide hot meals for Indian troops, British troops will be provided with a hot meal.

ERECTION OF CAMPS

11. General

Tented camps will be required for three major units, each approx 850 strong.

12. Location

These camps will be established by 20 Jan 46 in the following areas :-

- (a) MANDAI AIRFIELD
- (b) KOENINGPLAAN
- (c) CAMPILI

13. The camp at KOENINGPLAAN will be used as a Staging Camp only. Separate instructions have already been issued on this. (See MAKASSAR FORCE Instr No QG818).

14. Responsibility of 2/27 Aust Inf Bn

2/27 Aust Inf Bn will be responsible in conjunction with 2/6 Aust Fd Coy for layout and erection of these camps and, in addition preparation of 2/16 Aust Inf Bn Barracks for reception of one additional major unit.

15. Responsibility of 2/6 Aust Fd Coy

Engrs will be responsible for provision and erection of:-

- (a) Kitchens
- (b) Latrines
- (c) Showers

12.

Location

(c) Showers

(d) Water Points.

As far as resources will permit, the scale on which these will be provided will be as shown in Appendix "B".

16. Tentage

Sufficient tentage is expected to arrive ex BALIKPAPAN for coverage where necessary. Fostering units will draw tentage from 176 F.O.D. as required.

17. Accommodation Stores

Indents for necessary ord stores will be forwarded to Ord Officer MAKASSAR FORCE forthwith and marked "for (unit) 80 Ind Inf Bde. Stores will be drawn from 176 F.O.D., who will, on behalf of MAKASSAR BOD (ALPSEA) issue requirements on AB108.

15. Responsibility of 2/6 Aust Fd Coy

18. British and Indian facilities will NOT be in close proximity to one another, and once occupied, Indian camp sites will be OUT OF BOUNDS to all Aust personnel.

12.

16.

13.

EXISTING BUILDINGS

19. Units responsible for fostering British units which are to be accommodated in the buildings specified in Appendix "A", will make a detailed recce of such buildings and make a sub allocation of available facilities.
20. Where kitchens, latrines, showers and water points are not available up to the scale shown in Appendix "B", this HQ will be notified by 12 Jan 46, the number and type of each of the above facilities required.
2/6 Aust Fd Coy will supply and instal such facilities to the limits of their resources.
21. Fostering units are responsible to ensure the buildings are completely clean and ready to receive the incoming units by 20 Jan 46.

LABOUR

22. Labour as required by fostering units will be requisitioned for through "A" Branch MAKASSAR FORCE who will make necessary arrangements for provision. Fostering units should make necessary arrangements for transport of labour to camp sites from compound.

TRANSPORT ARRIVING FOR BRITISH FORCES

23. 30 vehicles which are arriving for British Forces on RIVER MURRAY will be taken over for temporary use by MAKASSAR FORCE during the period of fostering in British forces and relief of AMF.
24. On arrival of RIVER MURRAY drivers will be provided as follows:-
- | | |
|-------------------------|------------|
| 2/2 Aust Sup Dep Coy | 10 Drivers |
| MAKASSAR Force Tpt Pool | 20 Drivers |
25. These drivers will perform two tasks as follows:-
- (a) Take over as vehicles are unloaded and take them to British Vehicle Park in Jap Concentration Barracks in rear of 2/16 Aust Inf Bn Barracks.
- (b) Take over, maintain and be responsible for driving 30 vehicles as required until they are handed over to British Relieving Force.
26. These vehicles and drivers will come under command of 2/2 Aust Sup Dep Coy as soon as taken over.

BRITISH VEHICLE PARK

27. A park for all British vehicles arriving will be set up in Jap Concentration Barracks. Exact location will be pointed out by Ord Officer MAKASSAR FORCE to units and services concerned.
This park is designed to hold all vehicles arriving ex BALIKPAPAN. The first consignment will be loaded on RIVER MURRAY which is expected to commence unloading on 13 Jan 46.

vicinity
2/25 W/SAC PS

28. Responsibilities towards these vehicles are as under:-

(a) Ordnance Responsibility

176 FOD will make necessary arrangements for receiving, vouchering and checking all vehicles with ALFSEA ORD Rep. Any arrangements necessary for replacement of casualties will be made through Ord Rep. ALFSEA and Senior Ord Officer MAKASSAR FORCE.

(b) AEME Responsibility

Senior AEME Officer will be responsible for the provision of the following:-

- (i) Recovery and repair sec at ships side to perform initial servicing of vehicles as they are unloaded.
- (ii) Provision of sufficient maintenance personnel to maintain vehicles prior to being taken over by British forces.
- (iii) Marshalling of vehicles as they arrive at Vehicle Park.

(c) Guarding

2/27 Aust Inf Bn is responsible for providing sufficient guards to protect vehicles until relieved of responsibility by relieving British Forces.

29. Transport of British Troops to Camp Site

Details will be issued later when requirements are known in accordance with arrival of shipping.

PHASE 2

1. General

The outline plan for evacuation of AMF Forces is as follows :-

14 Jan 46	Embark approx 800 low priority personnel in TAOS VICTORY for LAE.
20-21 Jan 46	Embark balance 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and three Coys 2/16 Aust Inf Bn in HMAS KANIMBLA for AUSTRALIA total 800
27 Jan 46	Embark 2/27 Aust Inf Bn, 2/16 Aust Inf Bn less three Coys and certain Units to be notified later for AUSTRALIA. Total 700.
First Week Feb 46	Embark balance MAKASSAR FORCE less certain minor detachments and rear parties to be notified later. Total 700.
7 Feb 46	Embark rear parties and minor dets.

2. Staging

Staging in MAKASSAR will be reduced to a minimum.

3. For the embarkation of personnel for LAE on 14 Jan 46, personnel will be staged in 2/16 Aust Inf Bn Barracks from 12 to 14 Jan 46. For this purpose 2/27 Aust Inf Bn will be responsible for feeding and accommodation of these personnel and their organisation for embarkation. Documentation incl Nominal Rolls will be completed by this HQ. Separate instructions have been issued on this matter.

4. For the embarkation of 2/14 Aust Inf Bn and 2/16 Aust Inf Bn on 21 Jan 46 on KANIMBLA, 2/16 Aust Inf Bn troops will stage in 2/16 Aust Inf Bn Barracks under arrangements 2/16 Aust Inf Bn. 2/14 Aust Inf Bn will move by MT direct from PARE PARE to the ship.

Separate instructions will be issued later.

5. Except as below, remaining personnel will live in their present areas up till date of embarkation and move direct to ships :-

(a) 2/16 Aust Inf Bn less three Coys will be staged at the Staging Camp.

(b) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn may be staged in the Staging Camp.

6. Documentation

See MAKASSAR FORCE's letter AG205 of 10 Jan 46, and 226651 of 21 Dec 45.

7. Equipment for Return to Australia

ALFSEA, RNIA and NICA requirements are not yet firm, but Bns may anticipate handing over the major portion of their W.E. before embarking.

8. Technical units will be advised individually as to equipment not required here.

ACK.

Time of Signature: 2000 hrs

Staff Captain (Q) MAKASSAR FORCE

Issued by : Sigs

DISTRIBUTION

List "B" plus

ALFSEA LIAISON/SEC (10)
80 IND BDE (12)

(b) 2/27 Aust Inf Bn may be staged in the Staging Camp.

Documentation

See MAKASSAR FORCE's letter AG205 of 10 Jan 46, and 226651 of 21 Dec 45.

7. Equipment for Return to Australia

ALFSEA, RNIA and NICA requirements are not yet firm, but Bns may anticipate handing over the major portion of their W.E. before embarking.

8. Technical units will be advised individually as to equipment not required here.

APPENDIX "A" TO MAKASSAR
 FORCE ADM INSTR NO 5 OF
 10 JAN 46

RESPONSIBILITY OF FOSTERING BRITISH UNITS AND THEIR LOCATION

Ser	Unit	Approx Str		Location	Fostering Unit
		BT	IT		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	HQ 80 Ind Inf Bde	20	95	Police Barracks- GOUVENERS LAAN	HQ MAKASSAR FORCE
2	80 Ind Inf Bde Sig Sec	3	100	" " "	" " "
3	80 Ind Inf Bde - IAD	2	35	CELEBES - HOTO HETHOOLGE PAD	" " "
4	4/17 DOGRA	15	800	Staging Camp KONINGSPLAAN	2/27 Aust Inf Bn
5	3/1 GR	15	800	2/16 Aust Inf Bn Barracks	" " "
6	1 Kamaon	15	800	MANDAI	" " "
7	422 Ind Fd Coy	4	258	School ref 449330	2/6 Aust Fd Coy
8	102 Coy RIASC (Div Tpt)	8	450	Kapok Factory	2/2 Sup Dep Coy
9	32 Ind Comp Pl	1	50	School House ref 450341	" " "
10	55 Fd Amb	27	255	MELINO/YMCA	2/6 Aust Fd Amb
11	Det 120 Ind Ord Sub Pk Ind Inf Wksps Coy & Recce Det	6	180	Block of 12 Houses ref 443311	2/125 Aust Bde Workshops
12	3 Secs 20 Ind Div Pro Unit	7	20	School House ref 456330	1st 7 Div Pro Coy
13	122 Ind FPO		4	Police Barracks GOUVENERS LAAN	HQ MAKASSAR FORCE
14	604 FS Sec	6	4	School ref 456330	" " "
15	Sub Sec 1010 Ind		10	School ref 450341	2/2 Aust Sup Dep Coy
16	852 Ind Petrol- eum Pl	1	20	BPM Pet Dump	" " "

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
17	416 Sup Pl (lt)	1	40	School ref 450341	2/2 Sup Dep Coy
18	9 Mob Surgical Unit	1	3	MDS ref 448316	2/6 Aust Fd Amb
19	24 Ind CCS	23	150	" " "	" " "
20	16 Ind Ophthalmic Unit	2	3	" " "	" " "
21	Dets CLCT (this may read Det SEATIC)	6	8	School House ref 456330	Det 7 Div Pro Coy
22	125 Fd Cash Office	4		Police Barracks GO VENERIS LAAN	HQ MAKASSAR FORCE
23	3 secs 52 Ind Kine Unit	3	3	" " "	" " "
24	Det 20 Div Sigs	5	3	" " "	" " "
25	Det 8 CCFMA	3	5	School 450341	2/2 Sup Dep Coy
26	69 Ind AMU	2	74	Jap Naval Hosp	2/6 Aust Fd Amb
27	20 Ind AMU	2	74	" " "	" " "
28	1 Ind Dental Unit	2	4	MDS	" " "
29	4 Mob FANY Canteen and WVS	15		Jap Houses	
30	Sisters Mess of 24 Ind CCS	11		RAAF House	
31	4 Ind Dental Unit	2	5	MDS	2/6 Aust Fd Amb
32	46 Port Det RAMC	3	-	MDS	" " "
33	8 Ind Ord Mob Laundry	6	106	Water Works	Det Mob Laundry
34	36 Unit Institute (IT)	2	4	Club "Harmonie"	-
35	10 Unit Institute (BT)	2	4	B.O.R.s Institute	-
36	Ind Dental Mech Unit	1	2	MDS	2/6 Aust Fd Amb
37	Ind Sub Depot Med Stores	2	29	Ref Cross House	" " "
38	242 Ind Docks Op Coy		490	Jap Naval Hosp	2/6 Aust Fd Coy
39	C LEBES Adv Ord Dep	11	141	Seaplane Base	176 F.O.D.
40	23 Amenities Stores Depot	3		MDS	2/6 Aust Fd Amb
41	225 Ind Line Sec	-	66	Oranje Hotel	21 Inf Bde Sig Sec
42	68 Fd Hyg Sec	8	70	" "	" " "

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
43	206 Ind Air Liason Sec	4	3	Oranje Hotel	21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec
44	209 Ind Med W/T Sec	16	18	" "	" "
45	256 Ind Cipher Sub Sec	6	1	" "	" "
46	52 Ind Ind Fd LAD	4	6	CELEBES Motors	21 Bde HQ
47	69 Ind Independont Ambulance	1	3	MDS	2/6 Aust Fd Amb

APPENDIX 'B' to
 MAKASSAR FORCE ADM INSTR
 No 5 of 10 Jan 46

SCALE OF ACCOMODATION - 80 IND BDE

Serial	Description	Number	Remarks
1.	Cook House and Food Preparation Room		
	Offrs	1	
	WOs and Sjts	1	
	ORs - British	1	
	Indian	1	
2.	Ration Stores	1	This may be tents marquee or tents oblong
3.	Latrines		
	Offrs	5%	
	WOs and Sjts	2%	
	OR - British	4%	
	Indian	4%	
4.	Urinals		
	Offrs)		
	WOs and Sjts)		
	OR - British)	1%	
	Indian)		
5.	Ablutions and showers	4%	
6.	Accommodation - Tentage		
	Offrs	40 sq ft per head	
	OR	20 sq ft per head	

ORDER OF BATTLE

APPENDIX "G"

80 IND INF BDE

1. HQ 80 Ind Inf Bde
2. 80 Ind Inf Bde Sig Sec
3. 80 Ind Inf Bde LAD
4. 4/17 DOGRA
5. 3/1 GR
6. 1 KUMAON
- 7.
8. 422 Ind Fd Coy
9. Det 80 Ind Div Sig
10. 102 OT Coy incl Workshops Sec
11. 37 Ind Composite Pl
12. 55 Ind Fd Ash
13. Det 120 Ind Sub Park
14. 64 Ind Inf Workshops Coy
15. 2 Secs 20 Ind Div Pro Unit
16. 122 Ind FFO
17. 604 Fd Sec
18. 1 Sub Sec 1010 Fd Bakery Unit
19. Det 852 Ind Post Pl
20. 410 Sup Pl (Lt)
21. Det 8 CCFFA
22. 9 Mob Surg Unit
23. 24 Ind CCS
24. 16 Ind Ophthalmic Unit
25. 40 Ind AMU
26. 70 Ind Dental Unit (BT)
27. Det 3 GLCP
28. 135 Fd Cash Office

- 29. 5 Units 58 Inf Mob Kino Sec
- 30. 4 Mob Canteen PAKYS.
- 31. 5 Ind Dental Unit (BT)
- 32. 46 Port Det HANG
- 33. Half Ind Mob Laundry and Bath Unit
- 34. 38 Ind Unit Institute (IT)
- 35. 10 Unit Institute (BT)
- 36. Ind Dental Mech Unit
- 37. Ind Sub Depot Med Stores
- 38. P1 242 Ind Docks Cp Coy
- 39. 400
- 40. 23 Ammunition Stores Depot
- 41. 325 Ind Line Sec
- 42. 63 Ind Pd Hygiene Sec
- 43. 208 Ind Air Liaison Sec (Type G (1))
- 44. 209 Ind Med Wireless Sec
- 45. 256 Ind Cipher Sub Sec
- 46. 52 Ind Pd IAB
- 47.
- 48. WMB Party

29 Jan 46

MAKASSAR FORCE ADMINISTRATION INSTRUCTION NUMBER 10

GENERAL

1. The purpose of this instr is to lay down the procedure by which Units, Arms and Services will dispose of Unit Equipment, Stores and Base Installations. It is covered in two parts as follows:

Part One - Disposal of Unit Stores and Equipment

Part Two - Disposal of Bulk Service Stores

PART ONE

UNIT EQUIPMENT AND STORES

1. On dishandment of a unit, or on receipt of Emnarkation Instr, the undermentioned procedure will be adopted:-

(a) Units will prepare transfer vouchers in accordance with para 2 below covering all items of equipment and stores and submit to Ord Offr MAKASSAR FORCE for approval.

(b) On approval as above, stores will then be returned by units to RSD.

2. Items will be dealt with as follows :-

Ammunition	AAF G1033s	to 176 FOD	
Weapons	" "	" " "	Without F114s
Vehicles-WE	" "	" " "	All vehicles will be delivered to 2/125 Bde Wksp and G4s will be prepared.
-Captured	G 52	" " "	
Controlled Stores	AAF G1033s	" " "	
General WE	" "	" " "	
Accomodation Stores	" "	" " "	
Surplus Clothing	" "	" " "	

When preparing G1033s no more than ONE section will appear on each form.

REGIMENTAL PROPERTY

3. Any stores which are the property of the Unit may be disposed of to local purchasers at the discretion of Unit COs.

UNIT BAND INSTRUMENTS

4. These will be returned to Australia with Unit for disposal in L of C Areas. Further instructions as to final disposal are expected. Units will advise particulars of tonnages required for this equipment.

TYPEWRITERS, REFRIGERATORS AND WIRELESS SETS

5. Where these are to be taken over by incoming British Units they may be handed over in situ to relieving unit. Where units are vacating present location and NOT handing over to British Units they will be returned to RSD for disposal to ALFSEA.

AMENITIES, EQUIPMENT HELD AS REGTL PROPERTY

6. These items will be disposed of in accordance with this HQ AG 109 of 5 Jan 46.

The disposal of these goods, as regimental property is at the discretion of COs. However it is suggested that preference be given to ALFSEA units.

PART TWO

1. Heads of Services as under will dispose of all stores and supplies surplus to AMF requirements as set out in respective Appendices to Adv HQ AMF Adm Instr 98 :-

Appendix A	-	Engineers
"	B	Sigs
"	C	Med
"	D	E & T
"	E	Ordnance

2. The following Services will take special action as follows:-

(a) Canteens

OC Bulk Canteen will make necessary arrangements to hand all surplus stocks over to NAAFI. Details of rationed items for return to Australia will be forwarded to 'Q' Branch NOT later than 21 Jan 46.

(b) Red Cross

Transactions will be effected by Red Cross Rep direct with ALFSEA Rep.

(c) Amenities

Amenities Offr MAKASSAR FORCE is responsible for handover of all surplus amenities eqpt direct to ALFSEA. Details of any items for return to Australia will be forwarded to reach this HQ at earliest. Mobile Cinema eqpt will be transferred to RNIA except jeep which will be transferred on custody basis.

(d) YMCA and Salvation Army

This eqpt will be retained for use on return to Aust. Representatives will submit details to 'Q' branch immediately, of items to be returned incl jeeps and trailers.

ORDNANCE

3. Items of Ordnance eqpt which are now held and which will be returned by units in accordance with Part One, will be disposed of as follows:-

(a) Weapons

These are NOT required by ALFSEA. A firm decision is expected from RNIA at an early date but it is anticipated that some if NOT all will be required by them. Those NOT required will be crated and prepared for return to Australia.

(b) Accomodation Stores

6. The respective service reps of ALFSEA Liaison Sec are the only authorised signatures for any transfers and transfers will NOT be made to unit reps of 80 Ind Inf Bde.

Issued through Sigs

Signed at 192145I

W. Fisher Capt
Staff Captain (Q) MAKASSAR FORCE

DISTRIBUTION

LIST 'B' Plus

ALFSEA LIAISON SEC 10 copies
80 IND INF BDE 12 "

Appendix I

SIGNAL REPORT - MAKASSAR FORCE

GENERAL SIGNAL SITUATION

1. The Force was fortunate in having a complete civil telephone system at its disposal. It was only necessary to lay local lines from units in the city area to a Force HQ switchboard, and outward lines to the Civil Exchange.
2. Wireless presented little difficulty as ample Japanese high powered transmitters (up to 1 Kilowatt) were still operational and could be taken over for AMF use.
3. In addition, the Dutch technicians who were employed on civil communications before the war, were released from internment and had the knowledge necessary to re-open them quickly.
4. As it now stands, the signal system consists of a civil phone and telegraph network linked to a local army switchboard at Force HQ. As a supplementary means, wireless is worked on schedule to outlying Battalions and to certain isolated companies.

LINE

5. The civil telephone and telegraphic network in the Southern CELEBES is comprehensive. Trunk lines are galvanised iron wire on wooden poles. The poles are in good condition generally, but the speech characteristics of GI wire is not good. In addition the system has deteriorated during the Japanese occupation owing to lack of maintenance.
6. If the communications are to be brought up to normal standards, a complete changeover to copper routes together with the replacement of earth return circuits with metallic pairs must be considered.
7. For all ordinary purposes, extensive maintenance, straining, scrub clearing and replacement of broken insulators would bring the lines up to good workable standard. Lack of transport is the limiting factor in this.
8. All keypoints are linked by DC telegraph superimposed on the speech channels.

MAKASSAR FORCE

9. Local lines in the city area are multi-pair underground cable from a central exchange to terminal poles in selected streets. The cable is terminated in waterproof metal boxes at the base of steel distribution poles. Air-line from individual subscribers terminates on the nearest underground terminal pole (called "Kaabelpaals" and abbreviated to "YKP's"). In the case of buildings and blocks requiring a number of extensions, a special multi-pair cable is run underground direct from the exchange. These cables are called "Ringkabel".
10. A considerable amount of UG cable was sabotaged by the Dutch during and before the Japanese occupation. This is in the process of being repaired.
11. The present Civil exchange is housed temporarily in a partly completed Japanese building. Switching equipment consists of five 100 line Japanese magneto boards.


436000 437000 44 45 46

MAKASSAR

SHEET 1 of 2 SHEETS



35
34
33
32
31
30
29
28



-LEGEND-

1	CUSTOMS HOUSE
2	ADMINISTRATION CENTRE
3	POST OFFICE
4	POLICE STATION
5	GAOL
6	MARKET
7	MILITARY HOSP
8	PALACE
9	RESERVOIR
10	JAP BARRACKS
11	DUTCH BARRACKS
A	2/27 BN
B	BRIGADE HQRS
C	MIN. SWEEPING
D	VEHICLE PARK
E	EMPRESS HOTEL
F	BURGOMASTER
G	R.A.A.
H	FD AMBULANCE
I	JAP FD COY
J	BEACH ORD. DET.
K	RADIO STN
L	
- UNDERGROUND CABLE -	
CABLE POLE	
TERMINATION OR UNDERGROUND CABLE	
CIVIL NET	
1	WIRELESS CONTROL ROOM
2	CIVIL NET TRANSMITTING STATION
3	CIVIL NET RECEIVING STATION
4	OLD DUTCH STATION

- STREET MAP -
MAKASSAR

COMPILED FROM MAP SUPPLIED BY DUTCH MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES

SCALE: 1 : 10 000




NOTE Persons using this Map are asked to advise Aust Army HQ of errors & omissions noticed

-EXAMPLE MAP REF - MARKETS © - 425333 -

MAKASSAR

SHEET 2 of 2 SHEETS



327000

12. Mr ZINN, lieutenant in the Dutch Homeguard, is in charge of all civil communications in the Southern CELEBES. He was employed in that capacity before the war and has an excellent knowledge of all existing installations. His office is located in MARADEKJA WEG.
13. Maintenance of all lines, civil and army, in the MAKASSAR FORCE area is the responsibility of 21 Aust Inf Bde Sig Sec. Civil lines are maintained under army supervision by Dutch and Indonesian technicians.
14. Appendix "A" gives a comprehensive diagram of the Underground Cable and Dutch installations in the city area.
15. Appendix "B" shows Army line diagram.
16. Appendix "C" shows in diagramatic form the trunk lines and telegraphic installations in Southern CELEBES.

UNDERWATER CABLE

17. Before 1939, Marine Cable existed between CELEBES and JAVA, between neighbouring islands, and North and South CELEBES. Due to high maintenance costs it is not proposed by the Dutch to operate these any further.

WIRELESS GENERAL

18. Comparatively stable wireless communications can be maintained in the Southern CELEBES with low power Army Sets (22 Sets (Aust)) at distances up to 200 miles.
19. An army 133 set was landed with the force together with a heavy wireless detachment. They established the rear link to MOROTAI and laterals with BALIKPAPAN and AMBON.
20. Later a 1 Kilowatt Japanese Naval transmitter was put on this link and the 133 set kept in reserve in case of power failure.
21. All Japanese wireless in use by the AMF is maintained by the Japanese under the care of M. Hagitani - a civilian technician. Transmitters are keyed by remote control from HQ MAKASSAR FORCE.
22. Mobile No 22 sets are being used extensively in the MAKASSAR city area by town patrols. For this purpose 6 additional sets were allotted to the force.
23. Appendix "D" gives army wireless diagram with ^{POWERS} and types of sets used.

S.D.S.

24. Local runs in the MAKASSAR city area are made three times daily. Runs to SINGKANG via PARE PARE are made on the even dates of the month.

ARMY LINE DIAGRAM


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
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
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CORRECTED TO. - Otabooi
CHECKED BY. - [Signature]



WIRELESS DIAGRAM MAKFORCE

DATE

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APPENDIX 'D'
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