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17 Infantry Brigade

December 1942

785
DECEMBER 1942.

15 FEB 1943

17 Aust Inf Bde

Tuesday 1 Dec

Bde Comd visited 2/6 Bn area to inspect their preparations for dumps of amm, stores etc in their supply base for mobile operations. At this time the Bde was incurring a great loss of officers through transfers to militia units, attendance at schools in Australia, and illness. Officers attending a 4 weeks course in Australia would take approx 2 months to return to their unit; during this period a great additional strain was thrown on the shoulders of the remaining officers. Lieut K.C. Brougham from 2/6 Bn arrived at Bde HQ to assume the duties of SC(L) temporarily during the absence of Lieut Hutchison at Staff School in Australia. MacCoy resumed work on the Wedau strip. Following a Bde request, permission was granted by Milne Force to send a platoon patrol to Ahiona. Reports had been received of several more Japs in this area and it was decided to send a patrol led by Lieut Walters 2/5 Bn to beat up the area.

Wednesday 2 Dec

The operations log for today showed an Air Raid "Red" at 1444 hrs with the All Clear at 1501 hrs. After repeated enquiries as to damage caused by bombs that fell in their area during the above Alert, 2/6 Bn traced the grid reference to the field firing range and found that the "bombs" were bursts of 2" mortar smoke bombs. These bursts were seen by two American planes, who, mistaking the bursts for those of aerial bombs, radioed the air raid signal to their ground station. 17 Bde Pack Tpt were ordered to supply a det with 2 pack horses to carry stores from Turnbull Aerodrome to K.B. Mission for the use of 2/5 Bn Ahiona patrol on the morning of the 3 Dec. 2/10 Bn less one coy left at Wanigela moved up the coast to Porlock Harbour area where our 2/7 Bn carrier platoon was located and became part of the new Hansom Force.

Thursday 3 Dec

MacCoy were informed that if they could not extend the Wedau landing strip with the men and materials at present available, they would have to limit the length to 1000 yds as extra machinery could not be made available. Lieut Walters Ahiona patrol left at 0930 hrs. A signal was despatched to Lieut Walters to keep a lookout for some natives who claimed to have killed two Japs in the Ahiona area. 'B' Coy 2/7 Bn relieved 'D' Coy 2/9 Bn on aerodrome defence Gurney Field while 2/9 Bn carried out an exercise in which 'B' Coy 2/5 Bn would participate.

Friday 4 Dec

Bde Comd watched 2/5 Aust Fd Regt carrying out a calibrating shoot. Bde Comd suggested that he would send Lt-Col Starr, CO 2/5 Bn, who was just out of hospital after a bout of malaria, to Taupota and Wedau for a short rest cure and also to have a look at the landing strip. Capt MacFarlane, the new comd of the Taupota det, reported that he could not enlarge the strip without heavy machinery. 2/7 Bn Pnr Pl moved to Eaneanene to take part in construction work on the road in to 17 Bde Tng Centre.

Saturday 5 Dec

Air Raid Red was sounded at 0410 hrs with the All Clear at 0435 hrs. One unidentified plane came over at 6-10,000 ft flying from NE to SW. AA guns engaged and 39 rds were fired. No bombs were dropped and no damage done. Lieut Walters 2/5 Bn patrol reported by phone from K.B. Mission in the evening. They confirmed the killing of two Japs by natives and found one more dead Jap. No Japs were encountered by the patrol. MacCoy reported that a patrol from 24 Aust Fd Coy who had crossed the Stirling Ranges on foot were staying the night at Wamawamana and leaving the following day for Gili Gili.

Walters

Sunday 6 Dec

Lieut Walters 2/5 Bn Ahima patrol returned today bringing with them the effects of the Japanese dead. The effects were forwarded to Force HQ.

Walters

Monday 7 Dec

Maj-Gen Clowes, GOC Milne Force, after returning from two weeks leave on the mainland called upon Brig Moten. Discussion was had regarding the absolute necessity of removing the Medical Officer from Taupota to the mainland to deal with the problems of overcrowded hospitals and sickness amongst medical staffs. The matter had previously been raised by ADMS and Brig Moten had objected to the move unless sufficient arrangements could be made to cope with sick and wounded in that area. It was arranged that in an emergency serious cases would be evacuated by air or by the most readily available boat. Owing to the shortage of small craft it was not possible to station a boat there permanently. Arrangements were also made for a medical Sgt from 2/5 Bn to go across to take the place of the officer in question. Safe hand mail to NG Force and the Australian mainland was commenced today.

Walters

Tuesday 8 Dec

GI Milne Force called to see if we could make available a number of senior officers to assist the 2/9 Bn in tng for combined ops and sea landings. It was proposed to land 2/9 Bn from the sea at Buna. Maj Norris 2/6 Bn and Maj Rowan 2/5 Bn were made available for this purpose. The exercises to commence Wed 9 morning. In the afternoon an exercise with tanks was carried out in the 2/7 Bn area. As cruiser tanks could not be employed in their normal capacity in this jungle country it was proposed to use them as "I" tanks, except that owing to their thin skin it would not be possible to push them in front of infantry until the infantry had located and dealt with anti tank guns. Some success was obtained in indicating to tank crews by Verey lights (a) suitable river crossings by firing white lights in the direction of crossings (b) anti tank guns by a red light fired in the direction of the gun and (c) suitable targets for tanks, such as MG positions, by a green light fired in their direction.

Tuesday 8 Dec (Contd)

Chaplain the Rev C.R. Whereat, Senior Chaplain to the New Guinea Forces, came down to Milne Bay and stayed the night at Bde HQ. 17 Bde were informed that they would arrange for 2/7 Bn to take over the defence of Gurney Aerodrome from 2/9 Bn. The relief to be completed by 1200 hrs 9 Dec.

Wednesday 9 Dec

Milne Force arranged a demonstration of tanks firing on the move near 7 Bde HQ. As many officers as could be spared would attend. The relief of 'D' Coy 2/9 Bn on Gurney Field defence was effected by 'D' Coy 2/7 Bn at 1140 hrs.

Thursday 10 Dec

Advice was received that the expedition of 2/9 Bn to Buna had been cancelled and instructions to units were withdrawn. Bde Comd visited 3 Aust Convalescent Depot which had just been opened by Lt-col Purnell. The Depot capable of accommodating 5-600 patients, should assist materially in preventing many cases from being evacuated unnecessarily from the island. Brig Moten discussed with Maj Norris 2/6 Bn the opening of 17 Bde Junior Leaders School of which Maj Norris would be C.I. at Eaneanene Village as soon as the site had been prepared by 2/7 Bn Pnr Pl. A party of all COs, 2 i/c's and Coy Comds met to discuss the appreciations which officers had been asked to submit, dealing with certain tasks of 2/5 Bn in the 9 Bn area in the event of an invasion.

The following from Bde Comd -

Outline of address to Senior Officers of Bde on Wed 9 Dec.

Standard of Tactical Tng

1. Considerably concerned at poor nature of the solutions presented by the senior officers in the Bde in recent TEWTs.
2. Admittedly one hears the solution of one member only of a syndicate but if the solutions offered are at all representative of general standard, then there is ample scope for improvement.
3. In the main, plans far too complicated for the conditions involved, and on this account would have no prospect of success.
4. On one occasion when GOC was present he afterwards expressed alarm that at this stage in our training and after two years of war, the senior officers in the Bde are as backward as was indicated.
5. I informed the GOC that I did not consider the solutions offered represented a true picture of the general standard or the ability of the Senior officers of this Bde. The lack of clear thinking and decisions may be the inevitable product of syndicates, especially as officers are not practised in this method of dealing with problems.
6. As a result of demonstrations carried out back at Greta which were indicated to be the complete answer to attack and defence in jungle and semi-jungle warfare, some rather unsound impressions may have been gained by officers. At the time these exercises were carried out, I expressed complete disagreement with the lessons being taught - particularly defence - which was complicated and upset most of the sound lessons we have learned to respect. I can see a similarity with the solutions presented at recent TEWTs with this demonstration. We hope to eradicate these unsound impressions.
7. The easiest thing in war is to lead well trained men into a fight. The hard thing is to train them. One of the most difficult aspects in tng is the tng of officers, particularly in tactics.

Thursday 10 Dec (Contd)

7. (Contd)

We can easily get rusty - be inclined to rely on our practical experiences and satisfy our conscience by persuading ourselves that experiences are worth a ton of theory. If you have arrived at that stage take stock of yourself, you are becoming a menace to your unit and the lives of the men entrusted to your care. All these points boil down to the fact that we must improve our tng standards by every means in our power. By taking advantage of every school that is offered and by getting as much practice in tactical work as we can fit in, with TEWTs, Demonstrations, and Discussions.

Friday 11 Dec

Bde Comd visited Gurney Field with Maj Picken 2/7 Bn. In the defensive area recently taken over by 'D' Coy 2/7 Bn there were 6 Vickers guns which had not been manned because of the lack of trained personnel in 2/7 Bn. This matter was discussed with Maj Picken and it was found that most of the specialist groups in HQ Coy were below effective fighting strength. Instructions were given to build them up from rifle coys and to get down to training these men immediately. The names of some 20 officers were submitted for recommendation that their temporary ranks be made substantive. 2/5 Bn were ordered to prepare to take over the area now occupied by 2/9 Bn. Arrangements to be made to take over all maps, plans, and orders and possibly carriers. Detailed orders to be issued later.

Saturday 12 Dec

'J' Tp 3 Bty 2/1 Aust A Tk Regt moved from their present location to the vicinity of HQ 3 A Tk Bty and ceased to come under adm comd 2/5 Bn.

To this time no news whatsoever had been received from 2/7 Bn carrier platoon sent to 32 U.S. Div. News came through today from one of the boys who was in hospital at Port Moresby which seemed to indicate that they had only been able to put 5 carriers ashore near Buna. The remaining 8 carriers under a Sgt and one OR returned to Porlock Harbour. The one OR went down with malaria, leaving the 8 carriers with only one Sgt in charge. It was arranged to have the 8 carriers return here. The information about the others was vague. It appears that the whole platoon landed with the five carriers and had been engaged in at least two actions in which they suffered fairly heavy casualties. Indications were that both Lieut Ferguson and Lieut Walker were killed. One OR was killed while Sgts Locke and Taylor and a number of ORs were wounded. They were now apparently at 9 AGH at Port Moresby. As it was very difficult to find out what actually happened, Capt Cramp, OC 2/7 Bn Carrier Platoon, was being sent up to investigate. It was hoped to be able to place the remainder under comd 18 Bde. Progress by 32 U.S. Div at Buna had been very slow. Hence 2/9 and 2/10 Aust Inf Bns were being sent forward to land behind the Americans with a view to attacking through them and capturing Buna.

2/8 Aust Fd Coy were instructed to take over patrols in Waigani area from 2/5 Bn when 2/5 Bn moved into 2/9 Bn area. A false Air Raid Alarm went up in the Milne Bay area when M4 Gun picked up the sound of an MTB coming up the Bay. Thinking that it was a plane flying low they put on the Air Raid Red and opened up in the direction of the sound. M2 Gun after hearing the Red warning decided they would open up in the direction of the same sound. Direction finders were busy trying to pick up the plane. The game was called off after 58 rds

Saturday 12 Dec

had been fired from the two guns. No official warning was given at Bde HQ and much speculation was rife amongst the troops as to the reason for the unannounced bombardment.

Sunday 13 Dec

2/5 Bn patrols at Nowla, Gwenegwenarena, and Gomini Ford were relieved by 2/8 Aust Fd Coy. 2/5 Bn less one coy - 'D' at Taupota and Wedau - now occupied 2/9 Bn area. 2/9 Bn sailed about 0300 hrs for Buna area.

Monday 14 Dec

25 Aust Inf Bn moved up to Wanigala and Porlock Harbour on the North coast to take over bases recently vacated by 2/10 Aust Inf Bn. As a result of the change over the whole of the dispositions of the forces in Milne Bay would have to be recast. During the day Bde Comd carried out an inspection of 2/6 Bn area and saw a very well conducted exercise by "I" tanks. Inspection was made of the work done by 'C' Coy on Woods Plateau and Hays Plateau where a big impression had been made. The section posts constructed by 'C' Coy were probably the best that Bde Comd had seen around Milne Bay.

Tuesday 15 Dec

Lt-col Guinn, CO 2/7 Bn, received a letter from Sgt Taylor to say that he was in hospital at Port Moresby with a shattered arm. Sgt Taylor said that the boys of the carrier platoon did well, and was of the opinion that if the 2/7 Bn had been with them, nothing would have stopped them. Sgt Taylor was asked to supply further details. As a result of further enquiries made to Port Moresby the only information supplied was that Sgt Locke had been shot in the stomach and was also in hospital at Moresby.

Wednesday 16 Dec

Six officers were transferred to 17 Bde from militia forces on the mainland to replace offr's who had gone sick. Offr's could not actually be replaced from our own strength until such time as they were shown on the X List in Part 2 Orders. Part 2 Orders had not been issued since we left the Middle East. Unless the powers that be waive this provision it appears that we will never be able to replace offr's on the X List unless by reinforcements. It was proposed to take the matter up with the GOC.

Thursday 17 Dec

Today marked the first anniversary of the arrival at Bde HQ of Brig M.J.MOTEN to take over Bde Comd from Brig S.G.SAVIGE. The change over took place at Edsaya, a few miles from Damascus, and today finds the Bde in an entirely different type of country.

Friday 18 Dec

The following extract from the War Diary of 55 Bty 2/5 Aust Fd Regt was received today confirming the deaths of Lieuts Ferguson and Walker of 2/7 Bn carrier platoon.

5 Dec 42.

Maj Hall received a request at 0630 hrs that we should range the 2/1 Regt on their targets for today's attack. Numerous targets were successfully engaged throughout the day. Five Bren carriers arrived this morning and moved forward to lead the attack, resulting in all telephone communications being disrupted for an hour, despite the fact that all lines were overhead. Once again it was proved that Bren carriers are not tanks, as all five carriers were out of action in half an hour, and several men were killed, including Lieut Ferguson. The other subaltern died of wounds (Lieut Walker) received while attempting to salvage arms from the carriers. Small gains were made by all three Bns. It has been reported that Gen Waldron has been wounded today and Div Comd has been taken over by Gen Byers. Maj Hall spent the day from 0800 to 1800 at the Regt Inf fwd OP and gained the impression that American Inf are not fully aware of the advantages of "fire with movement". Reports were received from each of the Bn Comds taking part in the attack that the artillery support was entirely satisfactory, and 100 per cent accurate.

10 Dec 42.

Capt Nix spent some time with the B.C. and Capt Mueller, examining Maps and aerial maps of the area prior to occupying an OP. Four Bren carriers and the personnel have been placed under Maj Hall's comd temporarily, as the senior man left is a sgt.

11 Dec 42.

Col Martin is desirous of using Bren carrier personnel in the role formerly carried out by the 2/6 Ind Coy which has been detached from this Force. This was considered undesirable, and Maj Hall suggested an alternative role of Bren gun beach defence, which has been adopted.

12 Dec 42.

The Bren carrier personnel have been moved to an area where greater dispersal can be obtained. During the night two medium tanks were off loaded at Harricks. Lieut Curtis (Aust offr in charge) has been shown the "new" and "old" strip areas from tree OP. Following on a recce it has been decided to endeavour to recover two of the lost Bren carriers.

Saturday 19 Dec

The function of 17 Bde being to support any action of 9 Aust Bn in the event of a landing on the beach front held by 9 Bn, also to carry out offensive ops in that area, it was suggested to Milne Force that we clear an area just West of Route 16 with a view to constructing a line. No suitable tactical features exist in this area for forming a base to hold defensive positions. It was also proposed to burn off all the grass and clear the ground to the East of Gurney Field. The edges could be strongly fortified with the hope that any enemy movement in here could be dealt with by fire and possibly by the use of tanks. During the day BM made a recce of the area in a tank. Bde Comd made a detailed recce of 'A' Coy 2/5 Bn positions in the area of Hagita Ford. It was proposed to construct a strongly fortified area here.

Saturday 19 Dec (Contd)

The following Warning Order was issued to 2/5, 2/6 & 2/7 Bns:-

This Bde is to construct defensive line area Route 16. Clearing starts Monday 21 Dec. 2/6 Bn duty unit from Mon inclusive until 2/5 and 2/7 Bns finish area. One coy 2/7 Bn starts burning grassland East of Gurney Field and second coy plus coy 2/5 Bn start clearing ends Route 16. Detailed instns later. Anticipate stop tng when all coys on job. 'A' Coy 2/5 Bn continues improve own area.

Sunday 20 Dec

VX 57446 Pte A.J.Cameron of 2/7 Bn carrier platoon was brought to Bde HQ by Lt-col Guinn for interrogation by Bde Comd regarding the performance of 2/7 Bn carriers at Buna. Lieut Cowan G3 I HQ Milne Force was present at the interview. Maj Muir, BM, flew over Gurney Field area in a Gipsy Moth to have an aerial view of the proposed defensive cut west of Route 16.

Monday 21 Dec

Work by Bns on cut West of Route 16 commenced.

Tuesday 22 Dec

Wednesday 23 Dec

Thursday 24 Dec

Air Raid Red at 0520 hrs, All Clear at 0555 hrs, no incidents; was the only event of any importance this day. Brig Moten submitted a request to Brig Wootten, Comd 18 Aust Inf Bde, asking for his assistance in verifying the story of Pte A.J.Cameron of 2/7 Bn carrier platoon.

Friday 25 Dec

Bde Comd called at 2/6 Bn and attended church parade held in conjunction with 2/4 Aust Fd Coy (Maj C.Simpson). After the Church parade the troops marched past the Bde Comd. Inspection was made of 2/6 Bn cook houses and the preparation of Christmas dinner for the men. The cook houses were a model of cleanliness and good order and an excellent repast was being prepared. The same applied to 2/7 Bn arrangements. Comd then had a look at 2/5 Bn kitchens before going down to Bde 'B' Echelon. Owing to the shortage of turkey which had been sent over from Townsville by plane, the men of 2/6 and 2/7 Bns missed out. It was hoped to make this good for these men on New Years Day. An excellent Christmas dinner was provided for Bde HQ personnel at 'B' Echelon. Bde Staff Officers following the usual custom acted as stewards for the men. Christmas dinner for Bde offrs at 'A' Echelon in the evening

Friday 25 Dec (Contd)

finished off with a sing-song. Only one guest, Lt-col Mathews, CO 9 Bn, was present. Taking it all over it was a very quiet and subdued Christmas. Most of the troops agreed that the local "jungle juice" was a poor substitute for good old Aussie beer.

Saturday 26 Dec

Milne Force now became known as 11 Aust Div. The redesignation of certain units would be notified later. 17 Bde swimming carnival was held in the afternoon in a specially prepared pool on the Kalohi Creek. The organisation of the affair was excellent and the show went off in quick time; so fast was the programme carried out that the GOC, Maj-Gen Clowes, who called to have a look at some of the events found that it was all over before his arrival. Bde Comd who attended the carnival expressed the opinion that the event had not received the support from the units that it deserved. £100 in cash from regimental funds was distributed as prize money. Bde HQ personnel, who in the past record of sporting events had to bow down to relative numerical superiority, came to light with an equal second in the aggregate total of points. During the day Bde HQ 'A' Echelon area at Hagita House was besieged by a small army of natives who threw up several palm thatched native type huts and shelters in double quick time. As in Ceylon it was found that these huts were remarkably water tight and much cooler than the white man's ugly galvanised iron structures. Without stretching the point it would be safe to say that a dozen of these natives could build a hut capable of housing a platoon in 8-10 hrs using only materials cut from the jungle. The thatching is apparently prepared by the women in the native villages before the workers commence building.

Sunday 27 Dec

Due to the Christmas Day holiday, work proceeded as usual on the clearing of the Route 16 defensive strip. Bde Comd and B.I.O. travelled by Jeep to a point 25 miles beyond Ahiona on the North East side of Milne Bay. The track although sticky in parts was found to be quite passable to a Jeep. Time did not permit a further recce along the shores of the peninsula. An inspection was made in the Rabi area where the Japs had dumped their stores after the initial landing. A number of Jap landing barges were strewn around the beach, paying a silent tribute to the work of the RAAF. Most of them had received direct hits. Col Shean who was taking the place of Col Shulton as G1 Milne Force called upon Bde Comd. Col Shulton was returning to Australia to take comd of training schools.

Monday 28 Dec

Bde Comd carried out an inspection of Bde Tng Centre at Eaneanene accompanied by Col Shulton and Col Shean, the new G1 11 Aust Div. The visitors were greatly impressed by the work done and the business-like way the show was going on. Col Shean requested that we allot vacancies in the next school for NCOs in 7 Bde. This we were only too pleased to do. Maj-gen Clowes, GOC 11 Aust Div, was taken to hospital suffering from malaria.

Tuesday 29 Dec

The following letter, reproduced in full, was received by Lt-col Guinn from Capt N.E.Duell, HQ Coy 2/7 Bn.

"
Comd 2/7 Aust Inf Bn.

HQ Coy.
29 Dec 42.

On information received I went aboard hospital ship "MANUNDA" and saw Locke of 4 Pl. He looked far from well but told me that he was O.K. and the wound in his stomach was healing satisfactorily and that he hoped to be back with the unit as soon as possible. He stated that he was rear gunner in the carrier driven by Pte Cameron. Snipers were numerous and were standing on platforms built on fronds of coconut palms. He was only about 5-8 yds from where Lieut Ferguson was shot. He is certain that Lieut Ferguson was killed as he dropped on being shot and was not seen to move. Locke immediately shot and killed the sniper. Although wounded several times in the arm Sgt Taylor got out of the carrier to go to Lieut Ferguson, so Locke thinks, as he was asked to cover Sgt Taylor with fire. He was then hit in the stomach. He later saw a Jap near him and grabbed the Jap's rifle and after a tussle, took the rifle and killed the Jap - he then collapsed. He remembers Pte Seager being wounded and although he can't definitely say so, believes him killed, as he made a gurgling sound then was silent. After being wounded he must have been unconscious for 2-4 hrs - time judged by the sun. He heard a Jap talking and crawled near a pillbox and saw a rifle poking out - he then feigned death and collapsed again. He waited for dark and crawled towards American lines. He must have crawled right into their position as he heard a click of a rifle bolt and he called out "Yank!". Two Americans came and picked him up and took him to an RAP. It was then about 2300 hrs. He has no recollection of seeing any of the carrier platoon after he was hit, although he was told at Moresby in 2/9 AGH that Pte Lindsay and 3 others were talking to him and all he said was "You can't kill me". He stated that Lieut Walker was not in the show but he was later told that Lieut Walker had gone out to try and get Lieut Ferguson. Locke is certain that Lieut Ferguson was killed also Pte Seager and that he saw Pte Armstrong slumped over in a carrier and looked dead. He has nothing but praise for Lieut Ferguson and Sgt Taylor. Locke stated that he was wounded on 6 Dec and on 8th was taken to 10 USA Evacuation Centre, from there to 2/9 AGH on 18th, and on board "MANUNDA" 29th Dec. He states that he was told by Pte Lindsay that Sgt Foot has his wallet and P Book and could arrangements be made to have them sent on. I had only five minutes to see Locke, and although these notes are sketchy they confirm some already known facts.

Norman E. Duell, Capt. "

For further infm see "Report on Carrier Operations in Oro Bay, Cape Endaiadere Area as told by VX 57446 Pte A.J.Cameron to Lieut P.T.Gude 2/7 Aust Inf Bn", att as War Diary Appx No.1.

Tuesday 29 Dec

Brig Moten was called to 11 Div HQ to adm comd temporarily during the illness of Maj-Gen Clowes. Lt-col Guinn arrived at Bde HQ to adm comd 17 Bde during Brig Moten's absence.

Wednesday 30 Dec

Thursday 31 Dec.

CO 2/6 Bn Lt-col Wood was evacuated to hospital today also. Maj Jones assumed adm comd in his absence. In view of the progress that had been made on the Route 16 clearing, the tps were granted a half day for local adm and a full day holiday New Years Day.

W. Moten
Brig

2/7 AUST INF BN
19 Dec 42.

REPORT ON CARRIER OPERATIONS IN ORO BAY, CAPE ENDAIADERE AREA AS TOLD BY
VX 57446 PTE A.J.CAMERON TO LIEUT P.T.GUDE 2/7 AUST INF BN.

5 carriers landed at ORO BAY, 8 remaining carriers on ship which returned to PORLOCK.

Recce for carrier track was made by Lieut WALKER and Pte RUMPF. Was found to be impracticable owing to deep creeks. Lieut FERGUSSON moved to fwd areas in recce with Pte RUMPF who later met carriers on arrival at BOREO. 5 carriers loaded on barge were towed to village BOREO by naval craft. Left at approx 1930 hrs 3 Dec 42. Barge arrived BOREO at approx 2200 hrs after about 2 hrs journey. Point of disembarkation within range of enemy fire. Night very dark disembarkation successful. Unloading completed by approx 0200 hrs 4 Dec 42. Carriers were dispersed and maintenance carried out. Crews rested while Lieut FERGUSSON went fwd on recce. Lieut WALKER went to verify U.S.COMD Order to move at 1200 hrs 4 Dec 42.

Owing to sandbar being under observation and passable only at low tide, crossing was made by 4 carriers at approx 1930 hrs 4 Dec 42, while Sgt TAYLOR crossed by lower bridge.

NOTE: U.S.Troops had built a screen of fronds to screen higher bridge from observation as Japs from their right flank could observe all movement over bridge or sandbar.

Carriers moved along track past small native villages where AUST IND COY had its reserve area, to native clearing in coconuts. Carriers dispersed, crews rested.

Orders at that time: Carriers to move to S.L. in jungle for S.T. of 0830 hrs 5 Dec.
Heavy rain during night.

SITUATION AT CAPE ENDAIADERE

ENEMY: Occupied a def posn in COCONUT PLANTATION along coast. Frontage approx 150 yds consisting of line of M.G. strong posts. Depths of fd of fire from enemy fwd posts to jungle were approx 75 yds on coast widening inland. Numerous snipers occupied posn in palm trees.

OWN TPS: Own tps FDL's line of jungle SOUTH and WEST of enemy posn. 4 carriers manned by 2/7 Bn crews. 1 carrier manned by 2/5 Bn crews. Carrier crews consisted of four men-

Crew comd
2 rear gunners
1 driver.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
2/7	2/7	2/7	2/7	2/5
Lieut FERGUSSON	Sgt TAYLOR	Cpl URWOOD	Cpl WILTON	Cpl LUCAS
Cpl DAVIES	Pte CAMERON	Pte BENTLEY	Pte McQUEEN	
Pte PHILLIPS	" LOCK	" KEMP	" PINCOTT	3 ORs
" ARMSTRONG	" SEAGER	" CONWAY	" MacFARLANE	

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 5 DEC 42.

0600 Reveille and breakfast.
0700 Own bombers overhead flying to bomb JAP posns.
0815 Arrived area of S.P. on Track; from cover observed barrage from 25 prs and effect of US S.A. fire which was being directed into tree tops. Carrier formation at this time was Line Ahead with Sgt TAYLOR's carrier leading.

- 0830 Barrage completed; carriers moved fwd. Lieut FERGUSON ordered carriers into pairs, sending one pair to each flank. Carriers made this formation as they moved fwd slowly. Carrier manned by 2/5 Bn ~~XXX~~ swung into line on Sgt TAYLOR's right. Lieut FERGUSON had moved to other carriers to give instructions, this brought his carrier onto Sgt TAYLOR's left. (Sgt TAYLOR received orders from O.C., members of crew were not conversant with orders).
- 0833 Lieut FERGUSON gave orders to move fwd at walking pace indicating U.S. tps would follow carriers in.
- 0836 After moving fwd in direction of enemy lines contact was made with enemy strong post (No.3). Carrier was stopped and post engaged by grenades thrown by crew. Time taken to neutralize post estimated to be approx 40 mins. Driver heard explosion from back of carrier during action later told by 2/5 carrier that it was mortar bomb. Pte SEAGER who was rear gunner did not fire after explosion.
- 0910 Moved to another strong post (No.1).
- 0915 Contact made from rear of enemy strong post close to shore. Tactics repeated until it was decided to move round to front of post to complete task.
- 0930 Heavy fire from Post No.2 caused Sgt TAYLOR to change his plan of moving to front of Post No.1 and he sent carrier into to engage the post with grenades. Carrier was reversed and moved back to posn where LMG fire was to be brought down on post. Sgt TAYLOR was badly wounded as carrier stopped and indicated that he would leave the carrier. The driver swung carrier to the left to cover his move from the carrier. This was most difficult as engine trouble was making the carrier difficult to keep moving. When Sgt TAYLOR was out and clear, the driver swung the carrier back to face the strong post which he engaged with rifle fire as the Bren had stoppage. The rear of the carrier appeared to be in a depression which caused the carrier to be lifted slightly in the front thus shielding the crew a little from sniper fire from the trees. The motor then stopped altogether. The driver's rifle jammed and he was attempting to clear stoppage on Bren when he was wounded in the head. The rear gunner, Pte LOCKE, indicated his intention to cover the driver as he moved out of the carrier and at the first burst the driver swung out to cover and worked his way back to U.S. lines where an orderly attended to his head wound and told him that the time was 1000 hrs.
- 1000 Pte LOCKE was wounded and came in later that night. Pate CAMERON
- 1020 was being assisted along the track through the jungle from the Aid Post to the village of BOREO when he saw Lieut WALKER come along from the other direction. Pte CAMERON feels sure that Lieut WALKER knew of Lieut FERGUSON being a casualty. Lieut WALKER left area where Pte CAMERON saw him and moved to area where carriers on the left flank were out of action. Lieut WALKER conacted Cpl WILTON in his fire position and was carrying a TSMG. He attempted to drive one carrier off the log on which it was bellied. This proved unsuccessful and he returned to Cpl WILTON and instructed him to hold his fire posn until he received orders. Cpl WILTON's crew observed Lieut WALKER making his way towards the carrier in area of Post No.2 and later between carrier and post. Pte CAMERON states that later in the afternoon of 5 Dec 42 he heard members of the carrier platoon discussing the casualties and understood from their conversation that a successful attempt had been made to locate Lieut WALKER. When located Lieut WALKER was still alive but died later and was buried near U.S. posns. Sgt FOOTE now i/c carrier platoon returned from fwd area later in the evening referred to the burial of Lieut WALKER. Pte CAMERON understood that #Sgt FOOTE had collected and taken charge of personal possessions belonging to personnel killed.
- Pte CAMERON states that during the morning he saw Lieut FERGUSON twice:
1. When he gave the orders to Sgt TAYLOR to pair carriers with 2/5 Bn crew and then swung away to the left flank carriers. (0830-0833).
 2. When he stood up in the carrier as it moved between posts 2 and 3. He saw Lieut FERGUSON standing up in his carrier which was stationery and facing NORTH. Lieut FERGUSON shouted to Sgt TAYLOR but they were unable to hear owing to noise.

It was after lunch when Pte CAMERON met Pte PHILLIPS in the village of BOREO and Pte PHILLIPS gave the following information:-
During the morning whilst driving Lieut FERGUSSON's carrier he was wounded in the arm and could not drive. Lieut FERGUSSON ordered him to man the .30 MG which had been mounted in the carrier, while he drove. Later the carrier bellied on some obstacle and was unable to move. Lieut FERGUSSON stood up and was fatally hit. Cpl DAVIES and Pte ARMSTRONG were both badly wounded at the same time.

205 Bn Pte CAMERON states that during the period 0935-0950 he saw the first AUST type carrier manned by 2/5 Bn carrier crew in a stationery posn facing the same post being engaged by his carrier. He is unable to state whether the carrier was manned or out of action at that time. He was told later by the crew they were forced to abandon the carrier as it was badly hit and out of action. The crew eventually retired with all weapons and worked their way back towards the U.S. FDL's. From there they took up a fire posn at approx 1010 hrs 2 members of this crew came out from the fire posn carrying the Bren guns and in cover, they corrected stoppages and returned to fire posns. As far as Pte CAMERON knows, no casualties were suffered by this crew.

CARRIERS OPERATING ON LEFT FLANK

No.3 Pte CAMERON is unable to make any full statement about this
Carrier carrier. He was told later by Ptes BENTLEY and MacDONALD
(Cpl that their carriers had become immobilised a short distance
Wilton) from U.S. lines. The crew under Cpl WILTON left their carrier
and occupied a fire position where they remained for two days.
Pte PINCOTT crawled back to the U.S. lines to advise their
location and returned with a message from Sgt FOOTE to with-
draw. The crew suffered no casualties.

No.4 After carriers were immobilised fwd of U.S. lines, Cpl ORPWOOD
Carrier was badly wounded. Under covering fire from rear gunners
(Cpl Dvr BENTLEY carried Cpl ORPWOOD to the U.S. lines and from
ORPWOOD) there he was evacuated to a Fd Hospital where he died later
in the afternoon. Pte KEMP was shot twice through the wrist
and Pte CONWAY shot through the arm also shrapnel wounds in
the chest whilst giving covering fire for the withdrawl of
Cpl ORPWOOD by Pte BENTLEY.

Tuesday 8 Dec 42. 4 carriers arrived from PORLOCK and were later taken over by the carrier pl. Thursday 10 Dec 42 Pte CAMERON was evacuated. At that time carrier personnel were concentrated BOREO VILLAGE Area. He did not know what their future role was to be.

Sgt FOOTE had previously been ordered back to hospital owing to back injuries incurred "off-loading" of carriers. After his back had been strapped, he was permitted to remain and in conjunction with Pte RUMPF carried out recces of fwd area during day and night.

In conclusion Pte CAMERON stated Sgt TAYLOR was an inspiration to his crew during the whole engagement.

(sgd) A.CAMERON.

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

No 8

AAF, E2T-173B ^{2116 UNIT LAD} (Unit)
STRENGTH 1

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4
Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment).
*			
*			
Lieut.-Colonels			
Majors			
Captains			
Lieutenants			
2nd Lieutenants			
Quartermasters			
Totals	1		

*Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known).

WDI

18 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
NO I

From infm received up to 1000 hrs 29 Aug 42.

PART IOperations(i) Land

61 Aust Inf Bn less D Coy established contact with enemy tps vicinity KB Mission approx 2400 hrs 25/26 Aug.

At 0650 hrs 26 Aug fwd elements of 61 Bn were holding KB Mission 61 Bn counter attack supported by arty. By nightfall the Bn was in occupation of high ground east of KB Mission.

Night 26/27 Aug the enemy attacked the Bn and it withdrew to a posn on the west bank of GAMA River.

At midday 27 Aug 2/10 Aust Inf Bn moved fwd of 61 Bn and at nightfall had reached a posn 600 yds east of KB Mission.

At 1945 hrs the 2/10 Bn was attacked by tks and small parties of inf. The main attack started at 2345 hrs. Being heavily engaged the 2/10 Bn withdrew to a creek west of KB Mission. En

Enemy forces penetrated to the west and during day 28 Aug were held on the east side of No 3 strip.

Further contact had NOT been established.

(ii) Sea

Nil.

(iii) Air

Since the afternoon of 25 Aug our fighter aircraft have destroyed 19 enemy barges (12 of these in MILNE Bay) and have engaged enemy aircraft overhead with great success.

Our aircraft have maintained strafing and bombing patrols over the Japanese lines and claim to have almost certainly destroyed one enemy tk.

Enemy losses in the air both from AA and our fighters have been considerable.

PART II(i) Summary of Air Recces

Nil

(ii) O of B

No positive infm.

(iii) Identification

Nil

(iv) Organisation

Nil

(v) Personalities

Nil

(vi) Eqpt (enemy)

Landing barges of from 40 to 45 feet in length, capable of 10 knots used between parent ships and the shore capable of carrying tk and eqpt.

Flame Throwers

Reports that flame throwers brought ashore by enemy were used for setting on fire native huts and other inflammable material.

Personal Eqpt

White coloured steel helmets (American type), rubber boots or boots adapted for tree climbing. Rubber belt, supporting pouch and small bayonet with sharp hook on handle. Small haversack. It is thought that enemy may be wearing metal breastplate.

Uniform

Similar type to Australian but of darker green colour. Other tps are wearing slacks and shirts, similar in pattern to our own.

(vii) TacticsLand - Tks.

Japanese have landed tks using following technique. Tk moves into area occupied by our tps and using powerful headlights locates our forces. Lights are then switched out and heavy MG fire directed at tps. As the tk stops enemy inf move in from flanks and converge onto tk, assisting it with further MG fire.

Speed with which these supporting inf reach tk suggests that they have utilised native canoes to move from point to point.

(Further notes on paras 6 and 7 will be found in Appendices "A" "B", "C" and "D.")

Stanley Hunt
Maj.
18 Aust Inf Bde.

APPENDIX "A"S E C R E TNOTES ON JAP TACTICS

(RECEIVED FROM 2/9 AUST INF BN)

Compiled from infm received from one offr and one OR 2/10 Aust Inf Bn.

UNIFORM

Jap uniform is green cloth, split toed cloth or canvas boot, knee-high, puttees. Steel helmet is covered with light khaki fabric. Inside front lining of helmet of offr's and NCOs is a small pouch for documents.

TACTICS

The Japs continually use the outflanking tactics. When they meet opposition they move out immediately and feel round the flanks to come round the back. If they are advancing to make contact they move openly firing shots now and then. As soon as they are fired on, having thus located the defence they move out for the flanks. Should they be headed for an objective they move to it, making detours around resistance and not bothering about the tps they pass but keep on. They make continual use of trees, climbing them quickly and settling among the branches. In their defensive posn manu coconut trees have had the tops cut out and a Jap lies on the top of the tree. They make no attempt to stand and fight it out, but are continually on the move. In making an advance they often move up behind an advancing line of Mortar fire. Once they are located they make no attempt to conceal their presence by silence but talk and yell to each other in loud voices. They are first rate tps and determined. In one case one Jap attacked a small armed body with bare hands yelling and waving his arms. They use amm liberally and apparently expenditure is no object. His shooting is bad. It is difficult to determine his local strength as he is on the move all the time. Tks carry a small searchlight the glass of which appears to stand up to SA fire.

S E C R E T

APPENDIX "B"
TO 18 AUST INF BDE INT SUMMARY NO I

At 10 CCS on 27 Aug at 1600 hrs the following report was made by Q17188 Pte DEEKS R M of 61 Bn AMF (D Coy 18 Pl):-

18 Pl was camped at factory at BUBULETA, which was bombed. Pl withdrew on Thursday night at 2400 hrs on seeing eight boats coming into harbour - two ships stood out and bombarded while six came in. Two ships started to bombard at 0330 hrs - ships withdrew at about 0600 hrs.

I stayed until 1200 hrs waiting to guide Pl from east cape through to voy. We were machine gunned four times during the day. Pte MARTIN and I left to locate Coy and followed rd west to within four miles of KB Mission. There were two ships on fire, one a launch and the other a two-masted schooner, and natives said Japs had machine-gunned and set then on fire. We returned to coast along creek for 300 yds when I was shot through shoulder by a Jap coming down creek on opposite side. MARTIN went behind Japs. I think Japs returned to hills for I heard shots.

The Japs wore white covered tin helmets (American type) and were armed with revolvers. The natives "went through" on the shooting. The natives were asked three times to return them to rd but they stressed fact that track throughout was shortest. I doubt this.

I saw drums (oil type) with long pipe leading through lifebuoy arrangement. There were Jap characters on side. These drums were from schooner to Jetty spaced at approx 200 yds with a triangle of sticks with 2 ft 6 inch high tin (nine inch D) between every two drums. There was a strong smell of carbide gas.

I returned to the jetty and saw a camp close to the shore which was well camouflaged. Then I went to the ship and found lifeboat with oars and rowlocks in which I rowed to GILIGILI. There was a killed Jap 1½ miles east from burned ship towards BUBULETA. I saw about six Jap barges (about 40 feet long) burning. While I was rowing back to GILIGILI a torch flashed from around KB Mission - one flash. Then came a signal from boat out at sea for five or ten minutes. All of a sudden there was a flash and explosion from out at sea near big ship. I did not actually see the ship, only the light. Signal was not seen when our aircraft flew over at approx 1900 hrs.

The Jap uniform was - white covered steel helmet, uniform similar to our own SD only darker green, rubber shoes, plate around chest (I think) as bayonet will not penetrate, haversack (about half the size of ours), biscuits, small bayonet, no eqpt except pouch and scabbard on belt, larger size pistol, sharp hook on handle of bayonet. I did not see any MGs or subMGs. Japs appear to get very excited on seeing our tps. Rd from east coast is not passable to tpt. I think natives are acting as guides to Japs as crossing of mountains is very difficult without guides.

DEEKS says - "I was lying behind log when Jap fired at me and missed. I jumped him. Jap was broad and about 5' 9" tall. I tried to bayonet him but bayonet would not penetrate his chest. We wrestled, I got the bayonet and stunned him breaking the bayonet. Then I killed him by pounding his head with the pistol.

The following infm was obtained from Lieut KEITH ? (then at 10 CCS but has since died):-

" At night the Japs do not appear to wear hats or boots. He saw TSMGs but no LMGs. The mortars used by Japs did not have much shrapnel. They appear to be poor shots individually but have great confidence in the Tommy gun. He said that two men with Tommy guns held up his Pl.

They appeared to make use of clearings for movement and avoided the jungle. He has heard that the Japs used automatic rifles but doubts it. Their grenades do not appear to be very effective.

Handwritten: "Note to note file"

Handwritten: "I See file" and "WPI"

SECRET ~~K150~~
Copy No _____

HQ MILNE FORCE INTELLIGENCE REVIEW NO 1

Compiled from info received to 0900 hrs 26 Oct 42.

SPECIAL NOTE:

CAPTURED MATERIAL AND UNIT TROPHIES

To be reproduced as widely as possible.

Appeals to units to send back as much captured material and documents as possible have been excellently answered. As a result, a great deal of valuable info has been obtained and our research experts have received many items of enemy eqpt of real importance.

In many cases, units are unselfishly sending back documents and material which they would have liked to keep as trophies especially items connected with some special event in the unit history.

WILL ALL UNITS ETC PLEASE NOTE THAT IF THEY ATTACH TO ANY ITEM THEM A NOTE SAYING THAT THEY WOULD LIKE THE ITEM RESERVED FOR THEM AFTER INSPECTION, GS (INT), ADV LHQ, WILL DO THEIR VERY BEST TO COMPLY. (The note should say where the item(s) should be sent.

It will not always be possible to send items back. They may be unique, or items of which our research experts are still short. In these cases, units will have the consolation of knowing that they have provided our side with something of real value. Nevertheless, GS(INT) will make every effort to return such items wherever possible.

(INGF Summary 28)

PART I.

OPERATIONS.

LAND.


KB-AHIOMA AREA: JAP stragglers are still being encountered in the MILNE BAY area. During Oct 4 JAPS have been captured. The largest party of JAPS seen during Oct was the party of 20 reported by natives at WAHARUBA on 23 Oct. The JAPS were in very poor condition, and one of them was unable to run away. He was captured by a native woman and boy.

TAUPOTA -WEDAU. A few JAP stragglers appear to be scattered along the NORTH coast EAST of TAUPOTA. Since 1 Sep approx 80 JAPS have been killed by the TAUPOTA and WEDAU patrols. Approx 50 were encountered during Oct. On 20 Oct TAUPOTA patrol reported the area WEDAU-TAUPOTA clear of JAPS. It is believed that small parties of JAPS still exist between AWATAMA and EAST CAPE.

GOODENOUGH ISLAND. On 11 Oct natives reported that the JAPS on GOODENOUGH ISLAND were concentrated in the KILIA MISSION area. They were mainly engaged in fishing in GALINAU LAGOON and loot in the native gardens. Guards were covering the approaches to KILIA MISSION. Enemy were using TALAKWAKWA village (about one mile NORTH of KILIA MISSION) for cooking purposes.

Handwritten initials/signature

BUIN (111) AIR.



1. RABAU: Ship Sightings

- 20 Oct: 58 Ships
- 22 Oct: 55 Large, 21 Small vessels.
- 25 Oct: 40 Ships

Attacks

- 17/18 Oct: B17 attacked RABAU HARBOUR, town, wharves, and LAKUMAI drone.
- 18 Oct: 1 large W/used ship hit.
- AM 23 Oct: B17s attacked shipping in harbour claiming direct hits on and probably sinking 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer 2 large merchant vessels. Probably damaged 1 large merchant vessel, 1 transport, 2 cargo vessels.
- AM 24 Oct: B17s attacked shipping in harbour, scoring direct hit on ships on 10000 ton probable tanker. Ship burst into flames emitting clouds of black smoke.

2. BUIN - FAISI area. Ship Sightings

- 18 Oct: 23 ships (incl 1 battleship) off Buin and SOUTH of TONOLEI HARBOUR.
- 19 Oct: 40 ships vic TONOLEI
- 20 Oct: 47 ships (incl 2 probable battleships)
- 22 Oct: 37 ships (incl 2 battleships) in TONOLEI HARBOUR
12 ships in FAISI HARBOUR.
- 23 Oct: 34 ships (incl 3 probable battleships) in TONOLEI HARBOUR
8 ships in FAISI HARBOUR.

Attacks.

- Night 17 Oct : B17s attacked shipping FAISI area. 1 heavy cruiser was damaged, 2 others possibly hit.
- Night 18 Oct : Our A/C attacked 7 enemy F/Ps in FAISI inlet. 6 are believed to have been destroyed.
- Night 19 Oct : Catalinas attacked shipping FAISI area. NIL hits 18 bombs dropped on SE end KAHILI strip.
- Night 21 Oct : 7 Catalinas attacked shipping TONOLEI. NIL hits.

3. BUKA.

Attacks.

17 Oct : Catalinas attacked BUKA drome, destroying 20 A/C and fuel and bomb dumps.

4. KAVIENG.

Ship Sightings

25 Oct : 1 cruiser, 1 tender, 1 transport.

5. GASMATA.

Reccs

19 Oct : 1 wrecked twin engined bomber on drome, also 2ZEKE. Large crater WEST end runway unfilled.

22 Oct : Drome apparently serviceable but NIL activity.

6. PILELO IS.

Reccs.

22 Oct : 4 seaplanes sunk off PILELO IS.

RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON ENEMY SHIPPING SINCE 17 OCT.

Probably Sunk	Damaged	Not Damaged	Possibly Damaged
1 cruiser 1 destroyer 2 merchant vessels	1 heavy cruiser 1 large U/I vessel 1 tanker	1 merchant vessel 1 transport 2 cargo vessels	2 cruisers

ENEMY (iii) AIR

HATFORCE:

At 1935 hrs 20 Oct 2 enemy twin-engined planes flew over from NW. At 1945 hrs the planes returned and circled area. At 2105 hrs planes flew low over the area, from SE.

MORESBY :

At 2010 hrs 23 Oct 2 planes dropped bombs vicinity WARDS DROME and 7 MILE DROME.

MILNE BAY :

At 2123 hrs 23 Oct an unknown number of U/I A/C approached from NE and flew over BAY. NO bombs were dropped.

LAE:

23 Oct B25s bombed LAE aerodrome. 2 enemy bombers were destroyed and 2 probably damaged.

2. ENEMY O D B.

LAND (1)

It is reliably reported that Ind Mtn Bdes numbered 3, 11, 14, 16 and 20 have been converted to Divs numbered 42, 60, 44, 69, 70 respectively. Chinese sources report that all I.M.B's are being converted to Divs.

(NGF SUMMARY NO 88)

(ii)

Unconfirmed reports of new identifications have been received by the War Office, and in view of known increase in Jap Divs, the existence of the following Units has been accepted :-

Tank Regts	11, 12 & 13.
Ind Mtn Arty Regts	5, 10, 20, 21, 33 & 111.
AA Arty Regts	7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14
Ind Engr Regts	5, 7, 9, 11, 12 & 15.
Comm (Telegraph) Regts	4, 9 & 14.
Automobile Regts	21, 22, 23, 31, 55 & 66.
Trench Mortar Bns	2, 14, & 21.

(NGF SUMMARY NO 88)

(iii)

Att as Appx "A" is the estimated enemy O of B for the South Seas Expeditionary Force.

(NGF SUMMARY NO 88)

2. ENEMY O D B

AIR (1)

Estimate of enemy land based A/C up to 30 Oct 42 is as follows :-

	31 Jul.	7 Aug.	13 Aug.	17 Sep.	25 Sep.	20 Oct.	30 Oct.	9 Oct
NEW BRITAIN								
NEW IRELAND	84	133	159	165	165	169	100	115
SOLOMONS	31	28	36	36	33	55	30	37
NEW GUINEA	35	10	9	31	30	6	6	...
TIMOR	17	27	40	9	9	12	12	21
BALI	25	25	25	12	12	12	12	12
AMBON	22	22	22	32	32	32	32	32
CELEBES	158	141	132	61	61	53	56	56
TOTAL	372	391	403	396	397	344	393	323

(COIC)

SEA.

Estimated naval strength :-

Battle ships	Hydrographic	Submarines	Destroyers	Destroyer escorts	Gunboats	Patrol boats	Miners	Special A/C	S/P
									Tenders

JABE'S

Fighting

Ships 1940

10	12	21	106	?	7	?	?
----	----	----	-----	---	---	---	---

COIC PT

MORSEBY No 92.

As at 15/6/42

11 ^a	12 ^b	9 ^c	89 ^d	60	11	3	20
-----------------	-----------------	----------------	-----------------	----	----	---	----

a. of which 3 damaged b. 5 damaged. c. 1 damaged.
d. 1 damaged.

3. IDENTIFICATIONS. - (i) Statements of PsW captured at IORIRAINWA area have further confused the identity of the force commanded by Maj-Gen HORII. They state :-

- (a) It is 34 Unit of 11 Div (ZENTSUJI Div)
- (b) 11 Div is commanded by Lt-Gen TAKENAI, HIROSHI.

(ii) Translations of captured documents and infm from other sources show :-

- (a) 55 Div and 11 Div were recruited from ZENTSUJI, JAPAN, and 55 Div is second div of 11 Depot Div.
- (b) 31, 32, 34 & 36 Units are linked together. 31 & 32 Units are written in such manner as to suggest Maj-Gen HORII and Col KOHARAKAWA respectively.
- (c) Lt-Col JOKA appears to be a comd of an arty regt, and 34 Unit is "TATE" 8417 (144 Regt) and 36 Unit is "TATE" 8420 (mtn arty or engr regt).

(iii) LHQ reports that, in Jan 42, 55 Div included 112, 143 & 144 Regts, although there was never at any time, either in CHINA or BURMA, an identification of 144 Regt. This would suggest that 144 Regt either never belonged to or is detached from 55 Div.

(iv) The fact that the force name "TATE" has been identified in this area suggests that it is part of 55 Div, and although never linked with 55 Div, adopted it for a name and number while retaining unit numbers of 11 Depot Div.

(v) It is known from most secret sources that Maj-Gen HORII commanded the NANKAI det that carried out the initial attack on RABAUL.

(vi) From the above, the following conclusions are drawn :-

- (a) Maj-Gen HORII was formerly Div Inf Comd 55 Div.
- (b) Force identified in this area consists of units of 55 Div and is commanded by Maj-Gen HORII.
- (c) The organisation of 31 Unit is as follows :-

11 DEPOT DIV

11 DIV

55 DIV

Lt-Gen TAKENAI

31 UNIT

DIV INF
Comd:- Maj-Gen HORII

32 UNIT

33 UNIT

34 UNIT

36 UNIT ?

"TATE" 8415
(112 Regt)

"TATE" 8416
(143 Regt)

"TATE" 8417
(144 Regt)

"TATE" 8420
(55 Mtn Arty)
Regt

Comd:-
Col KOHARAKAWA

Comd ?

Comd -
Col KUSUNO

Comd -
Lt-Col JOKA?


"NANKAI" Detachment.

(NGF Summary No 87)

COMMENT:

(a) The identification of TATE 8420 as 55 Arty Regt is hard to establish on the evidence available. As TATE 8420 it should logically be 55 Engr Regt. As Western 36 Unit it should be 55 Mtn Arty Regt. Further evidence necessary.

(b) P.W. lately interrogated by H G Force stated organisation of unit as follows :-



P.W. definitely stated ASAKURA Regt part of 11 Div. ASAKURA Regt can be identified from previous infm as 144 Inf Regt. Therefore seems almost certain that 144 Inf Regt never belonged to 55 Div.

(NGF SUMMARY NO 87)

(vii) It is now revealed that whilst Jap Units are being formed in depot divs they are designated by :-

- (a) A serial number
- (b) Prefix title based on the geographic subdivision of JAPAN into 5 areas, north, east, west, central and KOREA.

Units within depot divs are numbered serially throughout the above mentioned areas; thus although units from the 5 areas may have identical numbers the prefix in each case will be different.

When one or more units are formed from the same depot unit, the designation is the same, e.g. 44 Regt (11 Div) and 144 Regt (55 Div) were both known as "Western 34 Unit". Documents captured IORIBAINA area indicate that 144 Regt is still known as "Western 34 Unit". This a further confirmation that 144 Regt has never actually been an integral part of 55 Div.

As yet there is no evidence to suggest that this system of numbering units has been universally adopted by fighting units of Jap Army.

(viii) A notebook captured at NIURO indicates, but does not prove, that a second regt (41 Regt) is in this area. As far as is known, 41 Regt is part of 5 Div, although there are no indications that 5 Div has moved from JAVA, where it was last reported 13 Sep 42.

This div, a specially trained landing force commanded by Lt-Gen MATSUI, carried out successful landings in MALAYA and JAVA. The organization at May 42 was believed as follows :-

<u>5 Depot Div</u>			<u>5 Div</u>		
<u>Unit Numbers</u>					
Western	?	Unit	9	Inf	Bde
"	2	"	11	"	Regt
"	5	"	21	"	"
"	?	"	21	"	Bde
"	60	"	41	"	Regt
"	4	"	42	"	"
"	10	"	5	Fd	Arty Regt
"	7	"	5	Engr	Regt

3. IDENTIFICATIONS. (continued)

	<u>5 Depot Div</u> <u>Unit Numbers</u>	<u>5 Div</u>
Western	5 Unit	5 Cav Regt
"	6 "	5 Tpt Regt

If this identification is correct, it would appear that since the capture of MALAYA, 5 Div has been reorganised on a 3 regt basis and the 41 regt detached to the "HORII" Div (NANKAI detachment). Until further confirmation is available this must of necessity be treated with reserve.

(150) The following are new identifications :-

28 Regt and 7 Engr Regt landed at GUADALCANAL 18 Aug are part of a force known as the "IKKI" detachment.

P.S.W. state that 7 Div inf regts (26, 27 & 28) are now at ASAHIKAWA, JAPAN, under comd Lt-Gen KOITO.

It appears therefore that "IKKI" detachment was drawn from 7 Div, but it is not clear whether all or part of the above named regts were at GUADALCANAL.

(NGF SUMMARY NO 88)

4. ORGANIZATION. (i) Special Naval Landing Parties.

Set out below is a brief resume of infm gained from captured documents. Basic establishment of an S.L.P. is not known, but the most complete details so far obtained gives the strength and organization of KURE No 3 S.L.F. as at Feb 42 as follows :-

Bn HQ and HQ pl with att tps - sigs, engrs, tpt, medical and Intendance units.

No 1 (rifle) coy, strength 320, HQ pl, and 5 pls each 3 secs.

No 2 (QF gun) coy, strength 161, HQ pl, and 4 pls each 4 secs.

No 3 (MG) Coy, strength 209, HQ pl, and 3 pls each 3 secs.

No 4 (AA) Coy, strength 224, HQ pl, and 5 pls incl a S/L pl, an AA/MG and amn pl.

Total strength at Feb 42 - 1166 all ranks.

Strength just prior to embarkation for RABAUL from KAVIENG 20 Aug 42, - 761 all ranks.

It is apparent from captured operational orders that the organization of S.L.P's is very elastic and allows of considerable expansion or reduction to suit any particular task.

In the NE area there are a number of S.L.P's which have portions detached for particular operations. If each unit has been heavily drawn on a force consisting of parts of different S.L.P's would have to be used, which would account for the mixture of units at MILNE BAY.

(ii) Reference made in broadcasts from TOKYO 19/20 Sep of citations being presented to Jap paratps indicate that both the Army and Naval Airforces have separate parachute units.

The Army Unit "KUM" participated in the attack on SINGAPORE and later carried out parachute ops at PALEMANG. Naval Paratps mentioned were part of Special Naval Landing Units that captured MENADO (CELEBES) and KOEPANG (TIMOR) Jan/Feb 42.

(NGF SUMMARY NO 88)

5. PERSONALITIES. (i) The following Comds' names have been reliably reported for 28 Div (FORMOSA) :-

G.O.C. Div Inf	- SUZUKI, YOSABURO	6/41
C. of S.	- KAMIGOE, MORIJE	5/41
? Regt Comd	- HAYASHI, YOSHIHIDE	8/41
? Regt Comd	- MATSUI, NOBUYOSHI	8/41.

(ii) Lt-Gen ISHIMOTO, Sadanao, formerly G.O.C. 48 Div is now G.O.C. 21 Army. Present G.O.C. 48 Div is reported to be Lt-Gen NAKANO.

NOTE: While there is a doubt whether both 28 & 48 Div exist, it has been decided by War Office, LONDON, and A.H.Q., INDIA, to omit 48 Div from the O of B until additional info justifies its inclusion.

(NGF SUMMARY NO 88)

6. EQUIPMENT. (i) Ref Milne Force Summary No 25 para 6 - Armour piercing magnetised bomb. The following are instns for disarming the bomb (to be read in conjunction with sketch shown as Appx "B") :-

No pressure to be placed on (A).
If safety pin (B) is missing, a piece of 12 gauge wire to be pushed through.
Fuze is taken out by unscrewing locknut (C) with spanner, distance between faces on locknut $\frac{7}{8}$ ".
Detonator and cap (D) to be unscrewed from main fuze body (E)

Action of fuze :-

When (A) is depressed, lock balls (F) are pressed outwards by spring behind striker (G) clearance provided by sliding action of (A). Striker (G) is then free (if safety catch is out) to come in contact with cap (H)

(NGF SUMMARY NO 87)

(i) Att as Appx "D" is sketch showing a mortar T"88" fuse found KURO area.

(ii) Att as Appx "E" is sketch (actual size) showing miniature land mine as used by the Japs in ADMIRALTY IS ops 6 - 11 Apr 43.

COMMENT: Apparently identical with our own Pistol, Ground Spike.

(NGF SUMMARY NO 88)

7. TACTICS. GERM INFESTED GRAIN. A report recently received states that lge quantities of barley maize and corn were dropped by Jap A/C over NANYING district, CHINA. After examination by Chinese Medical Corps it was discovered that the grain contained cholera germs.

The report points out that this is not the first occasion the Japs have used this method of warfare.

(NGF SUMMARY NO 88)

9. GENERAL: Morale of Jap tps.

(i) A press message from N.YORK quotes a correspondent at CHUNGKING as saying that "Jap soldiers in CHINA are no longer the same sort of fighters who came to the country 5 years ago, intoxicated with possibilities of easy conquest. They admittedly, are still tough adversaries, but the enemy's spirit appears to be appreciably demoralized. There was a time when no Jap soldier would surrender, preferring to suicide.

9. GENERAL (Continued).

But Chinese propoganda behind the enemy lines apparently is proving effective because the number of prisoners is rapidly increasing."

(ii) Attached as appx "F" is a summary of of Jap A/C carrs, potential carrs, and S/P carrs, based on infm up to Sep 42. (NGE SUMMARY NO 87)

Further documents captured MILNE BAY giving details of ops of the KURE No 3 S.L.F., reveal that portion of this force participated in the mopping up of TAIASEA (NEW BRITAIN) from 8 to 21 Apr 42.

The object was to destroy any remnants of the Aust force, and although there is no mention of contact with our troops, much infm of their movements and activities was passed. See the maps by a German missionary - BERNHARD FRANKE.

A proclamation was issued to FRANKE instructing loyalty to the Jap Army, to which he agreed and co-operated day and night in the mopping up ops.

In summing up the ops, the Jap comd stated that sufficient billeting facilities existed for 150 men and recommended that a garrison force should be established because of the possibility of further remnants of the Aust Force passing through the area.

This garrison may still be located at TAIASEA.

PART III

TOPOGRAPHICAL.

1. MAPS: Considerable progress is being made in mapping and maps of the greater part of Milne Bay Area are in process of being revised. 7 Aust Inf Bde has prepared a 4" to 1m map of the Northern section of the "Gilli Gilli" sheet. 13 Aust Inf Bde has contributed valuable information on tracks in the area. Some air photos have been received from RAAF.

Force HQ has now been able to compile a second edition of the Milne Bay (Provisional) 2" map. This map will be on issue as soon as prints are received from N.G.F.

A resurvey of the area embraced by the "WAIGANI" 3" map is now under way and a revised "WAIGANI" 2" sheet will be prepared in the near future.

As yet it has not been possible to carry out any survey work on the Taupota, Wedau area.

2. AIR PHOTOGRAPHS.

The greater part of the Milne Bay area has been photographed, but owing to pressure of work RAAF has not yet been in a position to furnish full prints.

A "track" map is being prepared, to show the principal tracks in the area and leading from the areas. This map will be issued shortly.

3. NAME OF WATER BETWEEN NEW GUINEA AND SOLOMON IS.

It has been decided by the Comd of S.W.P.A., with the concurrence of the Comd S.P.A., that in order to avoid confusion, the water area between NEW GUINEA and SOLOMON IS will, in future, be named the SOLOMON SEA.

The limits of the SOLOMON SEA are defined as follows :-

Water area NE of LOUISLADE ARCHIPELAGO - SW NEW GUINEA; south of NEW BRITAIN - CAPE ST. GEORGE;

TOPOGRAPHICAL (Continued)

gt of the SECTION IS 33; north of the line
CIRCUIT SURVEILLANCE - north point of SECTION IS -
CIRCUIT SURVEILLANCE.

(1943 SURVEILLANCE 10 33)

4. WORK ON TRACK BOOKS

As the existing maps of this area are incomplete, formations under command and Allied patrols have been asked for all available topographical information. So that a standard method of recording would be used, and no details overlooked, a questionnaire and notes have been sent to all concerned (copy att - Appx "9"). While this has proved very satisfactory to date, any suggested addition or improvements would be appreciated. (The departure from headings as set out in F.S.R. Vol II, Appx II - roads, should be noted.)

PART IV

OTHER FRONTES

Ref sketch map Sun 25, MORSEY, SUN 4 mile
street:

(a) MORSEY. From interrogation of P.W. captured in this area the following info has been gained :-
The enemy force at MORSEY consisted of one inf regt, a para arty unit and an engr unit. This force was ordered to attack MORSEY by land and was to be supported by an attack from the sea. The enemy had expected to be in MORSEY by 20 Sep. One P.W. stated that there had been rumours of a big naval battle and that their navy had been unable to help them.

Due to heavy casualties and increasing supply difficulties the force of the Jap drive had appreciably diminished by 11 Sep when MORSEY was reached. The enemy then dug in, apparently waiting for the sea borne attack on MORSEY. When this did not eventuate a general withdrawal began. Our ops found no enemy in MORSEY on 26 Sep, and, apart from finding many dead from disease and starvation and a few sick stragglers, were unable to regain contact until 6 Oct when the enemy was located by patrols in def posn north and south of TEMPLETON'S CROSSING, on the tracks from MORSEY and KIAI.

The main body of our ops made contact on the MORSEY-TEMPLETONS track on 12 Oct when they attacked and drove the enemy back 1500 yds. The enemy was holding the main track in depth and defending tenaciously.

The nature of the country (high razor-backed features) rendered manoeuvre difficult but by 15 Oct our ops had outflanked two Jap posns and the enemy had withdrawn across the HORA CK to posns 1/2 hrs south TEMPLETON'S CROSSING.

By 15 Oct the main body of a fresh Lde had arrived at MORSEY. LINE MORSEY was re established as an air dropping centre.

On the morning of 16 Oct the fwd bn supported by a bn on the left flank unsuccessfully attacked across HORA CK. The supporting bn passed through and drove the enemy beyond TEMPLETON'S CROSSING. This forced the enemy on the left track to withdraw, thus clearing both tracks to TEMPLETONS.

The fwd bn seized the high ground east of TEMPLETONS and at first light on 17 Oct began an encircling movement round enemy's left flank. This was successful and two cols dug in astride the track in rear of the enemy, whose resistance was stiffening. On 18 Oct the enemy launched three local counter attacks which were beaten off and increased his patrol activity. His mortar fire was intense, and no adv was made by our ops during the day. Our ops commenced further encircling movements on both flanks. On 19 Oct pressure was increased on the Jap posns.

OTHER TROOPS (Continued)

On the 1 Oct, the JAPS passed through BELANO and SAME (19 mls NNE BELANO) burning native villages with the object of antagonising the natives against our tps. At 0100L/2 our tps entered SAME (50 mls NE DILLI) and the same day 300 JAPS moved from AILLEU to the DAI SOLOI River.

On 5 Oct approx 700 JAPS with 200 horses, left MOABISSE en route to DILLI.

PART V.

MILITARY SECURITY.

INFORMATION: Whilst conducting a camp check recently, an FS Sec found personal envelopes bearing a Bn designation, which immediately established the fact that the area had been occupied by the Bn mentioned. Further search revealed a set of S.Os, indicating that the negligence displayed was not merely a fault on the part of the tps, but that a bad example had been set by the Bn Hq.

Incidences of this kind demonstrate a poor standard of unit security and a complete lack of appreciation of the far reaching results that might accrue should this material have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

MATERIAL: During a search for missing stores made by the same FS Sec 50 lbs of gelignite was found. This material had obviously been abandoned some time previously and no efforts had been made to retrieve it.

(NGF Summary No 37)

CENSORSHIP: The standard of unit franking offers has been good. There is still evidence of offers either not reading correspondence or being ignorant of what is required of them. Repeated reference to tp movements and casualties have been excised by the Base Censor. Use of green envelopes is still being abused. In all cases where breaches have occurred, evasion of censorship has been the motive, and has caused delay in mail despatch. Mail so delayed is being referred back to the originator and disciplinary action taken. Tps should be advised that Green Envelopes are as open to censorship as any other mail, and the privilege of use is granted for the sole reason of providing a medium of privacy within the unit.

(NGF Summary No 38)

PASSPORTS IN ENEMY HANDS. Advice has been received from the Royal Netherlands Legation that Dutch passports, A.22701 and A2310 previously reported as probably in enemy hands, are now in safe hands.

Milne
G.S. MILNE FORCE

Distribution:

As for MILNE FORCE Intell Sum No 54, plus 4 copies to 2/5 Fd Regt.

Distribution of Appendices:

	A	B	C	D&E	F	G.
12 Aust Inf Bde Copy Nos	1-3	1	1-2	1-3	1-2	1-4
17 " " "	4-6	2	3-4	4-6	3-4	5-9
18 " " "	7-8	3	5	7-8	5	10-11
2/5 Fd Regt	9-10	4	6	9	6	13-14
AADC	11	5	7	10	7	-
A Hy Bty RAA	-	6	8	11	-	-
RAF	12	7-8	9-10	12-15	8	-
USASOS	13-14	9	11-12	16-17	9	-
HAFORCE	15	10	13	18	10	15
ADMS	16	11	14	19	17	-
ADOS	-	12	-	20	-	-
NGIC	-	-	-	-	12	-
FILE	17-18	13-14	15-16	21-22	13-14	15.

HQ NEW GUINEA FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 88
of 19 Oct 42

APPX "A"

5

ORDER OF BATTLE
FOR THE
SOUTH SEAS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
from infm to 8 Oct 42.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
<u>HQ 17th Army</u>	RABAUL	Considered definite
HQ HORII Div	RABAUL	HQ may be in the LAE-SALAMAUA area but no concrete evidence.
144 Inf Regt	KOKODA Area	1, 2 and 3 Bns were possibly forward at MENARI, 8 Sep.
3 Mtn Arty Regt	One Bn IORIBAIWA No 3 Bty identified. 27 Sep.	The number of the regt is uncertain.
15 Ind Engr Unit	KOKODA	A doubtful identification
41 Inf Regt	KOKODA area	From Cap. Doc. but unconfirmed.
58 Inf Regt	Possibly LAE area.	Not identified, but there are indications that it is connected with NEW GUINEA.
SASEBO No. 3 SNLP	BUNA	Doubtful identification, probably only part at BUNA.
YOKOSUKA No 5 SNLP	BUNA	Doubtful identification, probably only part at BUNA.
No 14 Pnr Unit	SALAMAUA & LAE	Doubtful identification.
<u>65 DIV</u>	RABAUL	Slight indications only of this Div being in the RABAUL area. Composition is as known in the PHILIPPINES. It is presumed that this Div is under 17th Army.
122 Inf Regt	"	
141 " "	"	
142 " "	"	
Bde Engr Unit	"	
Bde Comm "	"	
Bde Fd Hosp	"	
<u>16 DIV</u>	RABAUL	Slight indications only of this Div being in the RABAUL area. Composition is that as known in the PHILIPPINES. It is presumed that this Div is under 17th Army.
9 Inf Regt	"	
20 " "	"	
33 " "	"	
16 Div Recce Unit	"	
22 Fd Arty Regt	"	
16 Div Sig Unit	"	
16 Div Tpt Unit	"	
10 Ind Engr Unit		Att to 16 Div during PHILIPPINES OPS.
51 Tpt Unit		Att to 16 Div during PHILIPPINES OPS.
21 Engr Uniy	RABAUL	Att to 16 Div during PHILIPPINES OPS.
2 Tel Unit	"	" " " " " " " "
Med Unit	"	" " " " " " " "

(OVER)

UNIT	LOCATION	REMARKS
YOKOSUKA No.1 SNLP	RABAUL	Not a definite identification
No.12 Pnr Unit	KAVIENG	" " " "
<u>14TH ARMY</u>	KAVIENG	No concrete evidence for this army being in the SWPA. It was thought that if it existed it might control ops in the SOLOMONS. Latest indications are that 17th Army is connected with these.
<u>KAWAGUCHI Div</u> (former 35 Bde)	GUADALCANAL	Reasonably certain.
4 Inf Regt	"	(Comd Col NAKAGUMA) believed connected with KAWAGUCHI Det in this area and placed with it tentatively to form this Div.
114 Inf Regt	"	Formerly with 35 Bde but not identified.
124 Inf Regt	"	Identified
28 Inf Regt } 7 " " }	"	PSW from GUADALCANAL state that the IKKI ARMY DET previously connected with this area was drawn from 7 Div.
SASEBO No.1 SNLP	"	Not definitely identified.
SASEBO No.6 SNLP	BUIN-FAISI	" " "
MAIZURU No.4 SNLP	GUADALCANAL	Part only, not definitely identified.
<u>Xt Div</u>	JALUIT	Probably at JALUIT & TRUK, but the forces there are probably Bde Gps at the most.

(Adv LHQ Intell Summary No.10)

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(over)

ENEMY DEFENCES - IORIBAIWA AREA

(Infm from preliminary recce 2/6 Fd Coy)


Note - All bearings taken from centre of village

1. Posns on steep hill (110°600 yds 163°700 yds) Working on these bearings the defended area opens out fan-like from the village. Posns are dug in a fairly thin line on the eastern side of the ridge until the creek is crossed. Here they are ~~thickened~~ considerably and stretch across to the southern bearing, so covering the entire length of the water-course. One man pits seem to be first choice in this area and the average space between was about 20 feet. Platforms (approx 14 ft x 6 ft) had been cut into the side of the hill among the pits and seemed to have been used for sleeping etc, although they seemed to be sited in with the general defence plan. Also Hotchkiss type amm strips were found in these platforms together with cartridge cases. All these pits etc were linked together with tracks but on account of the heavy timbering overhead, would not be visible from the air. A bush fence had been erected across this area and was four feet in height. There was an average of four rails in the fence and the seizings were made with about 14 gauge galvanised wire. Outside this obstacle there was an alarm wire (Aust type sig wire) about ankle height, with a meat tin tied on to it at about 5 feet intervals. Summing up, the posn was well developed to weapon pit stage, the main point being that good contact could be maintained throughout the area.
2. Small (approx pl) defended area. 188°500 yds. This area was picked as a fairly good example of a small defended area semi-developed. It defended portion of what would be his main front (in the vicinity of the track to the village) and a MG pit was sighted along the path which led to IORIBAIWA. Here again all posts could maintain contact quite well and fire could be brought to bear on any point fwd of the bush fence which ran across three parts of his front. There again single and two-man pits were used and in the lower portion of the area platforms were again built into the side of the hill. What looked to be a HQ of some sort was dug into the hill and was deeper than most of the defences. It had a recess cut into the back portion which looked to be big enough for a wireless or some such apparatus.
3. Area 26°1000 yds. This area was situated on either side of the track on the razor-like ridge along which lies the pass to NAURO. Other than a few posns along the top of the ridge the area seems to be confined mainly to fairly comfortable living quarters. These are cut into the sides of the ridges and average about 16 feet in length and about 9 feet in width. The floors are of barked bush poles and the framework of the superstructure is of small timber lashed with vines, wire or rope. They have good headroom for small types and most of them are fitted with shelves and stands constructed out of bush timber. The roof is mainly skillion type running back into the hills. The covering of these dwellings are bush leaves etc on the sides and canvas on the top which incidently appears to be pieces of Aust tents. On evidence taken around this area, such as empty alcohol bottles, suitcases, papers, etc, we concluded that this must have been HQ and rest area for a fairly large orgn. Slightly further down the ridge was a dwelling, which appeared by the medical stores scattered around, to be an RAP or ADS. Taken generally, the area seemed too comfortable to have been done by advancing tps and it was surmised that labour bns were used.


HQ NEW GUINEA FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 87.
of 11 Oct 42.

DESCRIPTION OF JAP WEAPON PITS - IORIBAIWA AREA


SINGLE MAN PIT - In most cases round with a grass floor. Some are square, being about 30" x 30". Some are quite 3' deep while others are deeper, but three feet seems to strike a good average. Spoil is thrown all round.




TWO-MAN PIT. Two-man pits are oval shaped and are the same depth as a single pit. The spoil is thrown usually all round, except where the pit is in steep country, when the spoil is thrown to the front to build a level parapet.



MG PIT. MG pits are arc-shaped with all spoil thrown fwd. Platform on ground level with about 6" parapet in front.




COMM TRENCH Comm trench is approx 18" wide and 2' deep with no batter on sides.




of 11 Oct 42.

SKETCH OF ENEMY DEFENCE WORKS - IORIBAIWA AREA

APPROX POSN OF WORKS DESCRIBED




HQ & REST AREA



LEGEND

- ⌂ DWELLING
- POSITIONS



PLATOON AREA

- SINGLE MAN PIT
- TWO MAN PIT
- ⌒ M C PIT
- PLATFORMS APPROX 6' X 5' X 18' DEED

GS I(a) NGF.

of 17 Oct 42.


CAPTURED EQPT - NAURO AREA

Fuse Percussion - Mortar T"88"


5

Action - On loading into the mortar the safety pin is withdrawn. Due to acceleration, the brass ferrule sets back overcoming the stirrup spring and allowing the 4 brass segments to be thrown out.

On striking an object offering sufficient resistance, the white metal cap (to which striker needle is att) is driven in, overcoming the creep spring, and forcing the striker needle into the detonator, thus setting up a detonating wave which passes through the gaine explosive into the main filling.



Jap Eopt - Minature land mine as used in ADMIRALTY IS ops.



(Captured Document No 24)

of 17 Oct 42.


CAPTURED EQPT - NAURO AREA

Fuse Percussion - Mortar T"88"

6


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GS I(a) NGF.

Jap Eqpt - Minature land mine as used in ADMIRALTY IS ops.



(Captured Document No 24)

of 11 Oct 42.

JAPANESE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

1. Hereunder are set out brief notes of Japanese aircraft carriers believed to be in commission as at Sep 42.

Some of the carriers in question are grouped into carrier divs and some are believed to be unassigned. 5 Japanese aircraft carriers have been destroyed in the Coral and Midway battles, namely Akagi, Kaga of Cardiv. 1, Hiryu and Soryu of Cardiv. 2, and Ryukaku of Cardiv. 5. Recently, new carriers have been brought into commission and the carrier divisions have been regrouped. There is considerable uncertainty as to the new grouping and although there are indications that Shokaku and Zuikaku comprise Cardiv. 1, Ryujo and Hitaka Cardiv. 2, and Hiyo ? and Hayataka Cardiv. 4, this organization is given tentatively and is subject to correction.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Name	Overall Length	Tonnage	Speed	AA Armament	A/C Complement	Remarks
HAYATAKA	720ft.	27,500			60	New carriers-- converted Kasiwara Maru or Idzumo. Also known as Junyo
HITAKA	720 ft	27,500			60	New carrier -- sister ship of Hayataka -- converted Kasiwara Maru or Idzumo. Believed to be identical with Hiyo, but this not finally established, and Hiyo may be additional carrier
HIYO						See remarks column Hitaka.
HOSHO 5	510 ft	7,470	26 kts	A x 5.5" 2 x 3.15"	36	Mainly employed for ferrying A/C
KASUGA MARU		16,500			48	" " "
NISSHIN MARU		9,000	20 kts		45	Due to be commissioned July, 42.
NITTA MARU	720 ft	27,000				Believed to have been commissioned as carrier, but conversion never confirmed.
RYUJO	545 ft	7,100	25 kts	12x 5" 2 A MG	32	
SHOKAKU	765 ft	15,000	30 kts	12x 5"	63	Damaged in Coral Sea Battle. Since repaired. First line carrier generally employed in major operations.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (contd)

Name	Overall Length	Tonnage	Speed	AA Armament	A/C Complement	Remarks
ZUIHO		12,000	19 kts		45	A new carrier. Has been employed for ferrying, but may be first line carrier. Converted submarine tender Takasaki.
ZUIKAKU	765 ft	15,000	30 kts	12x5"	63	Sister ship of Shokaku. First line carrier.

POTENTIAL CARRIERS

2. The following vessels which have been operating as passenger vessels are classed as potential carriers. During their construction certain structural plans were carried out to facilitate conversion:

Name	Date Built	Gross Tonnage	Maximum Speed	Length	Estimated Plane Capacity
KAMAKURA	1930	17,498	21	560'	48
ASAMA	1929	16,975	21	560'	48
TATUTA	1930	16,975	21.7	560'	48
TAIYO	1911	14,457	19	560'	40
NITTA	1939	17,200	22.5	559'	48
YAWATA	1939	17,200	22.5	552'	48
ARGENTINA	1939	13,000	22	545'	36
BRAZIL	1939	13,000	22	545'	36
					TOTAL -352

It should be noted that at this date Brazil Maru was not undergoing conversion as she has been extensively employed for troop transport purposes during operations in the Pacific.

SEAPLANE CARRIERS

3. Of the list of seaplane carriers set out below at least four were originally laid down as seaplane carriers, namely, the Chitose, Chiyoda, Kamoi and Notoro. The remaining tenders in the list are converted Marus. It is not suggested that the list comprises all the seaplane carriers at present employed by the Japanese; it only comprises those that have come under notice in the Pacific campaign. It is possible that some of the Marus named in the list are not seaplane carriers in the full sense of the term; some of them may only be adapted for ferrying A/C and some of them may be tenders for servicing A/C. It is known that many more Marus are employed in operations with the Japanese Naval Air Service, some of which may be oilers, maintenance and repair ships and the like. At least one whaling Factory Ship has been used for ferrying numbers of A/C.

SEAPLANE CARRIERS

Name	Air Wing	A/C.
CHITOSE	11	14
CHIYODA	11	14
KAMOI	24	10
NOTORO	12	10
FUJIKAWA MARU	22	10
KAMIKAWA MARU	11	10
KENJO MARU	25	10

SEAPLANE CARRIERS (contd)

Name	Air Wing	A/C
GOSHU MARU	24	10? (Used for ferrying personnel)
HISHIN MARU		10
KAGU MARU		10
KINAGAWA MARU		10
KINUGASA MARU		10
KINRYU MARU		10?
KIYOZUMI MARU	24	10
OKITSU MARU	24	10
KOBE MARU	23?	10
SHINSEI MARU		10
KIYOKAWA MARU	25	13
NARUTO MARU		10
SOUYU MARU	24	10

(Intell Infm Memo No12)

SUGGESTED HEADINGS FOR PERSONS SUBMITTING RECCE REPORTS ON TRACKS
(as distinct from Svy infm)

1. Time and date of starting.
2. Time and date of finishing.
3. Estimated mileage.
4. Width of track (Suitable for MT, HT, tps or carriers)
5. Surface of track - Will it break down in wet conditions?
6. Grades.
7. Landmarks which can be observed at measured bearings and estimated distances from points on track. Subsequent bearings to same landmark. (e.g. To attempt to tie track by bearings and est distances from known points).
8. Country adjacent to track - for cover, dispersal &/or for overland movements.
9. Local supplies and accommodation.
10. Crossings of rivers, creeks, swamps, saddles, passes etc at "x" hrs or "y" miles (approx). Details of approaches to watercourses, depth and width of stream, direction of flow, name of stream if possible. Nature of saddle or pass. - Is it a definite defile etc?
11. Native contacts. Villages at (---). Attitude of natives to own and enemy tps.
12. Pests encountered.
13. Weather.
14. Remarks on reliability of map used. Suggestions for correction.
15. Daily stages and times of start and finish of daily march (giving hours marched each day.)
16. Exact details of load carried, how carried, arms & eqpt taken, number and type of personnel in party, whether pushing on or moving under "march" conditions. This infm is to gauge the speed of the party so that hours walked may be tied with estimated distance covered.

NOTE: (a) The report should be furnished in standard military fashion (Part I, II, III being as accurate a sketch as possible under the circumstances.)

(b) Report will be signed by person submitting. Shows name, rank, unit and date of signature.

(c) Part I should contain infm as to the reason for the recce.

SECRET

COPY NO 9.

17 AUST INF BDE INT. SUMMARY NO. 1.

(From 0600 hours 19 Oct to 0600 hours 21 Oct.)

PART I. : OPERATIONS

Own : Land

On 17 Oct, 2 Japs were captured by a party from 61 Bn approx 4 miles up WEHYRIA Ck at DUA DUA. They were unarmed, wore no boots and were in very poor condition.

Own : Air

Our recce A/c reported nil sightings of enemy shipping in approaches to MILNE BAY, 17 and 18 Oct.

Enemy : Land

TAUPOTA 4 Japs were found dead on 17 Oct.

Believed approx 40 Japs in area between AWAURIA BAY and BENTLEY BAY.

PART II.

1. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES.

SOLOMON IS. - 18 Oct

EAST of BOUGAINVILLE IS. : 1430 hrs. 2 heavy cruisers, 2 small U/I vessels in posn $05^{\circ}525$, $157^{\circ}30'$ E course 280° , speed 20 knots.

Off BUIN strip BOUGAINVILLE IS. : 1630 hrs. 13 ships incl 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 2 carriers, 7 U/I smaller ships.

20 miles SOUTH of TONOLEI HARBOUR BOUGAINVILLE IS. : 10 vessels dispersed.

2. O. OF B.

Following is LHQ est. of Jap. forces based in RABAU based on infm to 7 Oct.

NEW BRITAIN : HQ 17 Army (and possibly 14 Army)
16 Div.
55 Div less 2 regts in New Guinea.
65 Div (may be 4 Div).

PAPUA (BUNA - KOKODA - TEMPLETON'S CROSSING):

Two regts 55 Div.

(MILNE BAY) : Remnants of

KURE	No. 5	Spec	NLP
KURE	No. 5	"	"
SASEBO	No. 5	"	"
YOKOSUKA	No. 5	"	"
10 Pnr Unit.			

GILBERT IS. -

2. O. OF B. (Contd)

GILBERT IS. :

YOKOSUKA No.6 Spec NLP (en route)

GUADALCANAL :

SASEBO No.1 Spec NLP
35 Bde Gp (probable)
Pnr Unit (possible)
One Div (unidentified)

JALUIT :

(in MARSHALL ISLANDS)

one Div (unidentified).

3. IDENTIFICATIONS

(i) 144 Inf Regt and 55 Engr Regt have been identified in KOKODA area. This confirms the identification of XD Div as 55 Div.

(ii) Reproduced below is a sketch showing a brass identity disc captured at IORIBAIWA 28 Sep.

Div Code Name (TATE)		2 believed to be number of coy.
		8)
		4) Serial No. of unit
Soldier's Name {		2) (55 Engr Unit).
	0)	

In the event of discs of this type being captured the serial no. of the unit should be immediately signalled as an identification.

(iii) Another form of identification worn by Jap tps in IORIBAIWA area is a small cloth insignia strip worn vertically on the left breast. This bears the unit and the soldiers name. On the right breast a small cloth tag marked with a black square is worn. Its meaning is not known.

(iv) Collar badges captured at IOROBAIWA confirm that Jap badges of rank are being thus worn now.

NOTE :- To be repeated in all unit summaries.

4. ORGANIZATIONS

NIL.

5. PERSONALITIES

NIL.

6. EQUIPMENT

(i) The use by the enemy of a 60 mm QF gun is reported from the OWEN STANLEY RANGE. This type has not been previously identified but is believed by NGF to be a dual purpose A TK and Fd gun. It is believed that the regimental gun coy off 144 Inf Regt is equipped with two 60 mm QF guns and two 75 mm mountain guns.

6. EQUIPMENT (ii) -

6. EQUIPMENT (Contd)

- (ii) At CORREGIDOR, the Japs are reported to have used a bomb which bursts with a huge flame. Two of these dropped exploded about 500 feet above the ground.

7. TACTICS

O.C. A Coy 2/9 Aust Inf Bn which has been patrolling WAGA WAGA Area reports that when Jap parties are led by an officer or an N.C.O. they follow dry creek beds and avoid making noises.

8. C.W.

- (i) No indication of immediate preparation by the enemy for C.W. have been reported up to the present in NG area. However, it is considered that JAPAN will not hesitate to use C.W. if it should appear advantageous. Timely warning of enemy intentions to use gas can only be obtained if formations and units co-operate by fwding the following infm :-

- (a) The carrying of respirators by JAP soldiers.
- (b) The carrying of unusual eqpt.
- (c) JAP uniforms (to test for impregnations).
- (d) All types of weapons and munitions especially if markings vary from the usual.
- (e) Reports of dumps or demolitions liquid or containers of unusual nature.

- (ii) A captured document indicates that the supplementary canister of the JAP respirator is intended for use against Carbon Monoxide, generated by fire in warships, or by underwater explosion. It is effective against concentrations of Carbon Monoxide up to 3%.

9. GENERAL

- (i) The following from a PW interrogation illustrates the JAP attitude to capture and should be brought to the notice of all ranks :

"The PW expressed a keen desire to return to JAPAN after the war but was anxious that NO advice of his capture be fwded to his wife or relatives as this would bring shame upon his wife and family."

(ii) Crashed Aircraft

Extracted from HQ MILNE FORCE G.S. Instruction No 1. :-

"(a) GENERAL

It will be a vital necessity to make the best possible use of any evidence which may fall into our hands as the result of the capture of enemy aircraft and crews and to ensure that our crashed aircraft are not interfered with by unauthorised persons.

(b) RESPONSIBILITY OF ARMY UNITS

It is the responsibility of the nearest army unit to supply a guard, unless the aircraft is brought down near an RAAF establishment.

The primary duty of the guard is to ensure that there is no unauthorised pilfering or search of the aircraft or the area of the crash.

(b) RESPONSIBILITY OF ARMY UNITS -

9. GENERAL (Contd)

(ii) Crashed Aircraft (Contd)

"(b) RESPONSIBILITY OF ARMY UNITS (Contd)

The unit making the capture will immediately get in touch with Force HQ and RAAF HQ.

The guard will remain until RAAF Intelligence and Technical officers make all necessary searches for documents and technical data.

(c) DISPOSAL OF AIRCRAFT

The crashed aircraft is to be deemed the property of the RAAF whose representatives will make arrangements for disposal according to their judgment.

(d) DISPOSAL OF DOCUMENTS

All documents found on prisoners and/or aircraft are to be sent by the quickest means to Air Intelligence, RAAF HQ, TOWNSVILLE. Documents may be briefly examined prior to despatch. They should be put in separate parcels clearly marked with identification marks of aircraft and date, time and location of crash.

(e) DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS

Aircrew prisoners must be kept segregated and forbidden to talk among themselves. There must be no fraternisation or communication except for such medical attention as may be necessary.

Aircrew prisoners will be sent under guard by the most available means to RAAF HQ, TOWNSVILLE. "

(iii) Identification Names of JAP A/C.

In reporting of crashed enemy aircraft, type of aircraft will be substituted by identifying names. A list of these names is att. as Appx "A".

(iv) The following infm is from a U.S. Army M I publication :-

"The Japs wear a piece of clothing like a towel (the FOONDOHSHEE) wrapped around their waist and between their legs. This has numerous folds and is used for secreting papers, weapons, etc. Japs strongly resent removing it but prisoners should be made to strip covered by rifles and the cloth should then be examined for hidden articles."

(v) The attention of all ranks will be directed to the danger existing through the presence of crocodiles in local streams.

PART III. - TOPOGRAPHICAL

(i) LANDING STRIPS

WEDAU reports landing strip now 600 yds long by 30 yds wide bearing 235 deg and gives a comfortable landing for MOTH aircraft. Strip is 1300 yds from WEDAU on bearing of 213 deg.

TOPOGRAPHICAL (ii) -

PART III. - TOPOGRAPHICAL

- (ii) Recent reports on tracks in this area are att. as Appx "B" to this summary.

PART IV. - OTHER FRONTS

Ref Map BUNA SALAMAUA Strat.

- (a) MAROUBRA. 15 Oct 3 Bn moved round left flank of 2/33 Bn to cut main track, while one coy 2/33 Bn moved into posn on right flank to co-operate with 3 Bn. Three mortar dets from 16 Bde moved up to support further attack. Enemy not patrolling and holding fire until our fwd tps press closely. 2/25 Bn continuing to probe enemy front and flanks - 2/31 Bn patrolling KAGI area.

3 Bn succeeded in cutting main track causing enemy to withdraw. 2/33 Bn advanced through 3 Bn at 1500 L/15 to south bank of EORA Ck. Japs reported holding north bank, br demolished.

16 Oct. 2/33 Bn continuing attack.

- (b) KUMUSI VALLEY. Natives reported Japs crossing KUMUSI R. by rope br at PAIVA QH 8787 Aust "D" Patrol vicinity QH 8783.

PART V. - SECURITY

- (i) It is reported that a raid on NUBO (SALAMOA area) by our troops was unsuccessful because the enemy knew of the impending attack, probably from native intelligence.

- (ii) MORALE. Attempts to break down morale of tps in operational stations have been brought to notice.

In one instance, a soldier endeavoured to impress listeners by erecting a vivid mental picture of the horrors of modern warfare.

This type of fifth column activity, if allowed to continue, would have a marked effect on imaginative tps, and eventually lead to lowering morale throughout the army. Cases such as these in this area should be reported immediately, and drastic action taken against offenders.

- (iii) CENSORSHIP.

Green envelopes must not be used for discussions of military matters. It has been noted that offr's have been using green envelopes. This privilege applies only to O.Rs.

It is evident that some unit franking offr's are not sufficiently aware of the serious consequences which may follow the leakage of infm conveyed through the mail.

In a recent censorship on the mail from a Bde, no less than 36 per cent of the mail which had been franked and bore the unit censor stamp conveyed infm of projected movements and the most flagrant offenders were officers who franked their own letters.

(iii) CENSORSHIP -

PART V. - SECURITY (Contd)

(iii) CENSORSHIP (Contd)

If this serious breach of discipline persists, it will eventually lead to the withdrawal of this privilege from officers.

NOTE : To be repeated in all unit summaries.

(Adv LHQ Summary No. 7)
(NGF Int Summary No 83)

Ramphel ^{Unit}
for Major.

B/M. 17 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION :

Copy No. 1 HQ Milne Force
2 2/5 Aust Inf Bn
3 2/6 Aust Inf Bn
4 2/7 Aust Inf Bn
5 3 Bty 1 Aust A/Tk Regt
6 Comd
7 B/M.
8 Officers to Note File.
9 File
10-12 War Diary.

SUPPLEMENT TO 17 AJST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.1.

GOODENOUGH IS.

A captured message from the Jap force on GOODENOUGH IS. discloses that there are more than 300 Japs marooned there in the area of GALIWUA BAY. They are short of weapons and ammunition and are living on native food. They are endeavouring to communicate with BUNA by messengers sent by canoes.

APPX "A" TO 17 AUST INF BDE INT SUMMARY NO.1
FROM 0600 hrs 19 OCT TO 0600 hrs 21 OCT

J. PANESE AIRCRAFT

Non-operational in S.W.P.A.

List of Identifying Names (Replacing Serial Numbers)

<u>FIGHTERS</u>	<u>Identifying Name</u>
Type 96, SSF, Mitsubishi	CLAUDE
Type 97, SSF, Mitsubishi	ABDUL
Type 97, SSF, Nakajima	CLINT
Type 97, SSF, Mitsubishi Mitsu	SANDY
Type 97, 2SF, F/P	ADAM
Type 98, SSF, Kawasaki	PERRY
Type 98, 2SF, Mitsubishi	DICK
Type 0, 2E SSF, Mitsubishi	HARRY
Type 1, SSF, Mitsubishi	RAY
Type 1, SSF, Kawasaki	JIM
Type , SSF, Mitsubishi Mitsuto	BEN
AT 27, SSF,	GUS
Suzukazo 20, SSF	ONAR
T.K. 4, 2E, SSF	FRANK
T.K. 19, SSF,	JOE
ME 110, 2E, SSF, Messerschmitt	DOC
<u>RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION</u>	
Type 94, RF/P, Kawanishi	ALF
Type 97, RF/P, Aichi	BOB
<u>TORPEDO AND DIVE BOMBERS</u>	
Type 96, D/B, Mitsubishi	SUSIE
Type 96, T/B, Nakajima	JEAN
Type 97, T/B, F/P, Kawanishi Kawa	MABEL
Type 1, D/B, Nakajima	DOT
JU 87B, D/B, Junker	IRENE
<u>LIGHT BOMBERS</u>	
Type 97, LB, Kawasaki	MARY
Type 97, LB, Kamikazo	BABS
Type 98, LB, Mitsubishi	SONIA
Type 1, LB, (ground attack), Nakajima	JOYCE
<u>MEDIUM BOMBERS</u>	
Type 96, MB, Nakajima	EVE
Type 97, MB,	JULIA
Type 98, MB, Mitsubishi	LOUISE
Type 98, MB, Nakajima	BESS
Type , MB, unidentified	MAISIE
BR 20, MB, Fiat	RUTH
JU 88, MB, Junkers	JANICE
Type , BF/P, Aichi	IONE
Type 0, MB, Mitsubishi	GWEN
<u>FLYING BOATS</u>	
Type 96, 3E F/B, Mitsubishi	BELLE
Type 98, 1E F/B, Aichi	LAURA
Type 99, 2E F/B, Kawanishi	CHERRY
Type 99, 4E, F/B	JOAN

Used in S.W.P.A. -

JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

Used in S.W.P.A.

List of Identifying Names

FIGHTERS

	<u>Identifying Name</u>
Type 97, SSF	NATE
Type 0, SSF	ZEKE
Type 0, SSF, F/P	RUFE
FW 190, SSF	FRED
ME 109F, SSF	MIKE

RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION

Type 95, RF/P	DAVE
Type 0, OF/P	PETE

TORPEDO AND DIVE BOMBERS

Type 97/3, T/B	KATE
Type 99, D/B	VAL

MEDIUM BOMBERS

Type 96, Mk IV, MB	NELL
Type 97, MB	SALLY
Type 1, MB	BETTY

FLYING BOATS

Type 97, 4E, F/B	MAVIS
------------------	-------

(COIC 5 Oct 42)

APPX "B" TO 17 AUST INF BDE INT SUMMARY NO. 1.
FROM 0600 hours 19 OCT to 0600 hours 21 OCT.

TRACK REPORTS

Ref Maps SAMARAI 1/4" to 1 mile.
GILI GILI and WAIGANI 1" to 1 mile.

HAGITA FORD

Become impassable to all vehs periodically after heavy rain.

TRACK RUBBER PLANTATION (941982) - GWENAGWENARENA (936044)

2 Oct. First 1 1/4 miles motor rd with gravelled surface, first 1/3 mile being through rubber plantation and the remainder through coconut plantation. From here it is a foot track, overgrown in places.

Track runs parallel KANIPOKA CREEK throughout crossing it five times. All fords are shallow.

Surrounding country is flat with light jungle and wait a while. It is possible to traverse it in all directions. The trail has been widened and blazed as a main track.

TRACK ROUTE 13 at 916992 - GWENAGWENARENA (936044)

Track leaves WATER TOWER on a bearing of 40 deg magnetic, crosses WAIGANI CREEK at 220 yds, then reenters the creek and follows up the bed for 900 yds. At 926012 there is a sharp rise, then a descent to sago swamp at 930016.

At 939034 track joins track RUBBER PLANTATION (941982) - GWENAGWENARENA.

Vegetation is coconut plantation to WAIGANI FORD then light jungle to 930016; then sago swamp followed by dense jungle to approx 934022. Thence light jungle.

KANIPOKA CREEK

This creek runs into the NAIWARI near KALAKALA VILLAGE (937973). It has a gravel bottom throughout. With the exception of plantation area from 938979 to 943004 banks are covered with light jungle and wait a while. From approx 938980 to 943004 banks are precipitous averaging 20 feet in height, and creek is 20 feet wide and one foot deep. From 943009 north banks are flat and creek varies from 20 to 60 feet in width with average depth of 1 foot.

MULLINS HARBOUR

The southern coastline from FYFE BAY (Square L01) to the entrance to MULLINS HARBOUR is shallow and rocky with either steep hills to the waters edge or swampy flat with small beaches. There are many small islands. MULLINS HARBOUR is calm and shallow and the entrance is closed by sand spit giving a depth of 9'. East of WERI WERI (12 mls SW of TOMONAU) are mangrove swamps with many inlets. These swamps are black slimy mud, crocodile infested and with a putrid smell. The track along MULLINS HARBOUR is marked with pieces of tin nailed to trees. Without these, the route would be impossible to follow.

TRACK BALAGA-DUABO -

TRACK BALAGA-DUABO

Distance 10 miles. Travelling time 7 hours with porters. 5½ hours with small party travelling unloaded and with no long halts.

Vegetation

Jungle throughout. Only clearings are native gardens and flats along GOMINI RIVER covered with bladey grass six feet high.

Track

BALAGA-DUGAMA. Through flat country wet and muddy but mud not more than six inches deep, four shallow fords and one footbridge.

GOMINI RIVER. Ford is difficult to find. It is 150 yds long and four feet deep (river in flood) crossing the river at 145 degrees.

GOMINI RIVER-PIWEEPI. Flat muddy track at least four feet wide. Eight shallow fords and three footbridges.

PIWEEPI-DUABO MISSION. Narrow track (two feet in places) estimated to rise over 1000 feet in about two miles.

AFVs

The track from PIWEEPI to BALAGA could be used by Lt tanks but there are several obstacles, the main one being the GOMINI RIVER. This would require at least 200 yds of bridge. Several of streams at present crossed by footbridges would be A Tk obstacles until bridged. Except in isolated spots Tks would be unable to leave track.

TRACK 910982-DUGAMA

This track is true to map GILI GILI 3" to 1 mile. It commences on south bank of MAIWARA RIVER half way between two fords. This pt has been blazed. Southern end of track joins track BALAGA-DUABO 20 yds west of DUABO village track. Has been well used but recently jungle growth has obscured odd pts.

Vegetation is light jungle with no open areas. Track forms a satisfactory short cut to DUGAMA for portage parties.

TRACKS 898982 DUGAMA and 893983 DUGAMA

No evidence of the tracks has been found.

TRACK 945983 - TRACK JUNC 926929

Motor track to edge of jungle, thence well defined track four feet wide but narrowing to two feet in places. Fords over MAIWARA RIVER and GOMINI RIVER not over 2½ feet deep. Track is wet and runs through swampy country but would save up to two hours travelling time to DUABO compared with route 945983 BALAGA-DUABO.

TRACK MAIWARA-GIBARA

The following additional infm has been received. Passability. The track is impassable to any veh whatsoever. There are innumerable creeks and long stretches of mud requiring corduroy. There are portions of track although narrow suitable for any veh, but it is split by so many obstacles that a veh would never reach these pts.

From GIBARA RIVER the track junc 004890, the track is covered by 9 to 24 inches of mud. On 17 Sep 42 a sec of lightly loaded men took 38 mins to march less than 1000 yds and this can be taken as a maximum rate for this stretch.

OBSTACLES

MAIWARA RIVER -

OBSTACLES

MAIWARA RIVER. Although falling on 18 Sep was still waist high, and ford was 80' long.

UPPER NIHANIHA RIVER. ((84942). Bridge requires 4 hrs work by one sec, lengthening northern end to make a satisfactory inf crossing.

UNNAMED CREEK (980935). Single tree bridge, requires hand ropes to make a satisfactory crossing.

NIHA NIHA RIVER. Native ferry takes four men and is in very bad repair. Crossing took 30 mins for 36 men. Not fordable owing to slimy bottom.

GOMINI RIVER. Ford breast high but after rains river floods swamp area on southern bank. Canoe crossing took 1 hr for 56 men despite use of tow line.

GIBARA RIVER. Ferry takes 4 men and is in very bad repair. Crossing took 35 mins for 6 men. Not fordable owing to slimy bottom. This river would be difficult for craft of two foot draft and is closed at mouth by a sand bar only negotiable at flood tide.

Area Junc MAIWARA RIVER-KALOHI CREEK. The country consists of swampy dense jungle thick with mosquitoes. Natives will not live in this area because of danger of malaria. Movement is difficult except on tracks river junc MEDOWA and river junc DONA DONA.

SOUTHERN APPROACHES

MAIWARA RIVER - KALOHI CREEK

The MAIWARA RIVER is navigable to flat bottomed barges similar to Jap M.L.C. as far as its junc with KALOHI CREEK. Inf can advance along both banks.

KALOHI CREEK is not navigable but is fordable anywhere by inf. Inf can approach along both banks but dense jungle along both sides confines approach to immediate banks of creek.

At DONA DONA there is a jungle path leading east to Route 9 near junc Routes 9 and 3. From DONA DONA to HAGITA FORD there is a track passable to jeeps. It is estimated that it would take three hours to bring a coy from the mouth of the MAIWARA RIVER to DONA DONA. Travelling from DONA DONA to HAGITA via track $\frac{3}{4}$ hour.

TRACK GIBARA-MAIWARA

This is good track and would be passable to MT in dry weather and tracked vehs in wet if rivers were bridged at the following pts :- 008958, 985943, 982926, 989918, 994909. At these pts rivers are. Tk obstacles and NINA NINA, GOMINI and GIBARA Rivers are not fordable by inf. These rivers including the MAIWARA are navigable to flat bottomed barges.

Shipping by launch to GIBARA and taking track to DUABO which is passable to MT gives a much shorter route to DUABO than via BALAGA.

NORTHERN APPROACHES

Route 978995 (west of HAGITA) - EANEANENE to KALOHI CREEK

972018 - This track is passable to carriers as far as EANEANENE and with a small amount of work such as clearing of logs off pathway could be made passable as far as 2900 yds north of EANEANENE. This is the government track to the north coast. Further recesses north of KALOHI CREEK are being undertaken. ANGAU advises that it takes 5 hours travelling time from the North Coast to HAGITA. From pt 972018 KALOHI CK to HAGITA FORD is passable to tps. The general vegetation is dense but penetrable and there are many paths leading south.

A good foot path leads from North of HAGITA HOUSE through the jungle to Route 1 at point 989002 and could be used as an alternate counter attack route to STRIP 1 if Route 1 was denied.

13 AUSTRALIAN INF BDE INT SUMMARY NO 6
(From 0600 21 SEP to 0600 24 SEP 42)

OFFICER'S FILE

PART IOPERATIONSOWN - LandNORMANBY ISLAND

The following reports that approx 70 survivors from the Jap destroyer sunk by our aircraft on 11 Sep 42 were at MALANA and SOLASOLA, NORMANBY IS. One coy 2/10 Aust Inf Bn was despatched to NADI NADI NORMANBY IS on HMAS STUART on 20 Sep. The coy disembarked at NADI NADI morning 21 Sep and moved by track and launch to MALANA. Signs of Jap occupation were seen but natives reported that the Japs had retired to the jungle. Eight Jap prisoners were taken in the jungle of whom six were wounded left behind by Japs and one wounded by our fire. On 23 Sep three Jap bombers and six fighters flew over NADI NADI but took no action. Our tps reembarked with prisoners and returned to MILNE BAY evening 23 Sep. One of the prisoners is stated by natives to be the commanding officer of the destroyer.

22 Sep. WEDAU reported encounter six Japs at LARONAI. Japs escaped, indications were found that some had been wounded.

Enemy - LandWEDAU

21 Sep natives report large party of Japs at HIOGE (L2964) and party of six with 1 MG at LAVORA (L2070). This last party was possibly the one encountered on 22 Sep by our patrols at LARONAI.

Area KB - ANIOMA Patrols sent to WAHUHUBU to search for suspected enemy tks reports that no tk was seen and that only tracks were estimated fortnight old. Some Japs seen one possibly wounded. It is estimated that 30 Japs are in area in gps of two or three all extremely wary.

GOODENOUGH IS A captured message from the Jap force on GOODENOUGH IS discloses that there are more than 300 Japs marooned there. They are short of weapons and amm and are living on native food. They are endeavouring to communicate with BUNA by messenger sent by canoe.

PART II

• SUMMARY OF AIR RECON - Nil sightings MILNE BAY area.

• O of B - MILNE FORCE estimates enemy strength - R.A.A.F. (MILNE BAY) EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

On 12th to 20 Sep 42.

	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
	KURT No 5 S.L.F.	608
	SASEDO No 5 S.L.F. (part only)	197
	10 PNR UNIT	380
	Original Landing Force	<u>1185</u>
Reinforcements	No 2 COY YOKUSUKA S.L.F.	230
	Probably at least one other coy	230
		<u>460</u>

Total 1645

Note:- Identification of other units may indicate that portions of them were also in the area.

(MILNE FORCE INT SUM NO 10)

17 Aust Inf Bde

WPI

SECRET

18 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 10

(Based on information received to 1500 hrs 28 November 1942)

PART I

Received 3/12/42
Time 1000 hrs
8/99/25

(1) OPERATIONS

(i) Land

27 Nov One Jap captured by natives at AHIOMA.
11 Nov One Jap killed by native near TAUPOTA.

A patrol sent out to investigate the native report of eight Japs at MOKUKU near EAST CAPE on 31 Oct reported NO japs in the area. GOODENOUGH ISLAND. A brief account of the operation which took place on 22/25 Oct is given as Appx "A."

(ii) Sea

There have been nil sightings of enemy vessels in the sea lanes approaching MILNE BAY.

(iii) Air

Our B17s and BEAUFORTS continue to maintain recce patrols over the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO and the SOLOMONS.

Our B17s and BEAUFORTS have also attacked enemy shipping at HUON GULF and have bombed and strafed enemy posns at BUNA.

PART II

(2) O of B

(3) IDENTIFICATIONS

No reports since HQ Milne Force Intelligence Review No 3 (2/9, 2/10, 2/12 Aust Inf Bns only)

(4) ORGANISATION

Extracts from Allied Land Force Aiv HQ Notes on Japanese Landing Forces and Pioneer Units).

" The Japanese make full use of the flexibility of organisation. The size and composition of a force to carry out a specific mission is determined by the job to be done.

" The organisation of the task force will cut across administrative lines and put several platoons of different companies together under command of an officer from another unit.

" They take several infantry units, Machine gun units, arty and whatever else is needed and put them together. This is done both for attack and defence."

Examples:-

(a) KURE No 3 Special Landing Force (used in SOLOMONS)
Strength 15 offrs 115 ORs
Fire Power:-

	1ST COY	2ND COY	3RD COY	4TH COY	TOTAL
LMGs	19	5	1	-	25
HMGs	-	-	12	2/4	14/16
QF Gun	-	2	-	-	2
80 mm AA	-	-	-	4	4
Gren Dischargers	18	-	-	-	18

(b) MAIZURU NO 2 Special Landing Force (used in SOLOMONS)
Strength 11 offrs 1058 ORs

	1ST COY	2ND COY	3RD COY	SPECIAL SERVICES	TOTAL
Machine Gunners	61	58	43	64	226

		Fire Power			
LMG	55	HMG	12	Automatic pistols	34
Rifles	800	Pistols	270	Gren Throwers	33
13 mm MGs	4	Inf Guns	4	Flame throwers	10
Mtn Guns	4	Searchlights	5	Radios	6
Lt Armd cars	2	Comd cars	5	Trucks	24
		Tractor	1	Water trucks	2

(5) PERSONALITIES

No reports since HQ Milne Force Int Review No 3.

(6) EQUIPMENT(a) Enemy

Air. A twin-engined A/C described as similar to a Douglas transport has been sighted in the NEW GEORGIA area. It is possible that this A/C was a MITSUBISHI MC-20 tpt. It is possible that the Jap is using this tpt for the carriage of supplies but on the other hand the association of this type of A/C with previous parachute ops at PALEMBANG and KOEPANG may be significant. The identifying name 'TOPSY' has been allotted to this A/C.

(Milne Force Int Review No 3)


(b) Own

"Notes on Tanks" by OC B Sqn 2/6 Armd Regt att as Appx "B."

(7) TACTICS

(1) Notes. Taken from Allied Land Forces Adv HQ.

"Extracts from other captured documents of the KURE No 3 Special Landing Force."

Defence Against Landings

Remarks The frontage assigned to a pl for defence of a beach is remarkably wide. This is probably the frontage assigned for security rather than the actual defence. In the case of a landing against the shore held this thinly, the above defences would be reinforced by a mobile reserve.



Emplaced light machine gun.

A coy will usually have two pls in the front line (and one in reserve). The most effective range of the light machine gun is up to 400 metres. As the effective range of the FMG is about 1500 yds an average of two guns should be assigned to each inf coy.

(ii) Att as Appx C is sketch of part of enemy defences on spur 500 yds north of TEMPLETONS CROSSING.

(iii) Att as Appx D are notes on 'Jap Methods of Defence and Tactics MYOLA-TEMPLETON CROSSING Area.'

(8) C.W.

Nothing to report.

(9) GENERAL(i) Captured Documents

Captured documents are one of the most important sources of infm available to Intelligence. Even the most unlikely document or paper may prove an important link in the chain of infm.

Experience has shown that the Jap soldier has a natural tendency to keep a detailed record of everything that happens to him or of which he hears. In the same way as he invariably carried a camera and photographed all he saw when travelling.

Documents are still being received from MILNE BAY giving much valuable infm regarding organisation and tactics which will prove useful in future ops.

Even though ops in any particular area may have already terminated it is still essential that all documents be fwded to the nearest HQ clearly marked with place and date of capture.

(Milne Force Int Review No 3)

(ii) Enemy Morale

The following extracts from Japanese Diaries illustrate the effect of air attack on enemy morale. It would appear that even attacks which cause little or no damage produce a deep pessimism in the Japs.

(a) From a diary captured in Milne Bay Ops:-

"KAWIENG 27 Aug. Finally my opportunity for which I had waited so long has come and I shall be able to display my ability.

RABAUL 28 Aug. Though KURE 5 SLF succeeded in making a landing in the face of the enemy at RABI it seems they were bombed.

Finally I am going to the place where I have wanted so long to go.

AT SEA 29 Aug. There was an air raid by two planes which dropped bombs. They fell about 50 metres from the ship. Gosh, it was frightful. Though they went away in a hurry I am still worried.

RABI 30 Aug. Two enemy planes appeared in the sky overhead at 1500. I cannot hope to live and see my native land again. The enemy plane is fiercely shooting at us. What a dangerous devil!

----- We are now in the midst of coordinating the operation with KURE 5 SLF. Dear parents, brothers (older and younger), nieces and nephews, don't cry when I am dead. I am going to be the foundation for the empire.

(b) From a Diary captured in KOKODA - IOREBAIWA Ops.

"7 Sep. The village was raided from the air. Two of the boys were killed and one wounded. For the first time I experienced the horror of an air raid 'Death is a fate' No use being pessimistic. Advance to Port MORESBY believing in final victory.

(end of diary)

(Milne Force Int Review No 3)

PART III(10) TOPOGRAPHICAL

Ref Map Milne Bay - provisional 2" second edition.

From O36015 on Route 8 to BOBS 044015 a track suitable for Jeeps has been made.

A rd suitable for MT has been made from 052017 (on Turnbull Aerodrome) to track junc 012019.

Major
B.M. 18 Aust Inf Bde.

COMD	---
B.M.	---
B.M.(L)	---
S.C.	---
S.C.(L)	---
L.O.	---
L.O.1.	---
L.O.2.	---
L.O.3.	---
SIG.O.	---
T.O.	---
SUPP.O.	---
GD.PI. COMD.	---
O.M.E.	---
AMEN.O.	---

Received 1/1

Time hrs

78

On 25 Aug seven Jap barges were strafed by our A/C on the beach at GALAIWAU BAY, GOODENOUGH IS. The barges were destroyed but not before more than 300 Japs were able to land in the vicinity of KILIA MISSION. These Japs were part of SASEBO No 5 S.N.L.P. Their object was to land at TAUPOTA and cross the STIRLING RANGE to join the main Jap attack on MILNE BAY. The destruction of the barges prevented this.

During their stay Japs stole native food, and supplies were also dropped by their own A/C. They made their HQ in KILIA MISSION area and established defensive posns with guards over the tracks.

On 22 Oct an Allied Force was despatched with the role of destruction of all Japs on GOODENOUGH IS and with further orders to recce and construct landing strip on the island.

The force split into two parties; Beach 'A' Party which landed at TALEBA BAY, and Beach 'B' Party which landed at Mud Bay. Disembarkation which was successful commenced at 0130 hrs 23 Oct and 2102 hrs 22 Oct on respective beaches.

23 OCT: 'A' Party engaged Japs at approx 0600 hrs. The Party reached NIUBULA CK but, heavily counter attacked by the enemy using MGs and Mortars, partly broke contact with the enemy at 1045 hrs. The party reembarked and landed at MUD BAY at 0200 hrs on 24 Oct.

Casualties inflicted on the enemy during this encounter were 32 dead counted, 2 MGs destroyed and 3 LMGs.

Meanwhile B Party which had formed a base at MUD BAY commenced its approach march to KILIA MISSION at 2300 hrs 22 Oct. It met with difficulty in the very steep and slippery track over the range and at dawn the party was two hours march from the objective.

At 0830 hrs our rwd elements made contact with the Japs approx half a mile north of Kilia Mission.

During the morning an attack was launched but due to the heavy and accurate enemy fire and the heavily wooded country (rarely was it possible to get a field of view of more than 10 yards) our tps were unable to cross the enemy's FDLs.

At 1600 hrs our tps withdrew north of KILIA MISSION and formed a perimeter camp for the night.

24 OCT: During the morning another attack was launched, but did not succeed in penetrating the enemy posns.

At 1100 hrs three enemy A/C attacked our posns.


The afternoon was spent in patrolling. Between 1900 hrs and 0100 hrs 25 Oct firing was heard from enemy posns.

25 OCT: At 1300 hrs our tps penetrated the enemy lines encountering no resistance and KILIA MISSION was occupied. Patrols sent out located only two Jap stragglers.

During the afternoon it was reported that approx 200 Japs had landed early 25 Oct at WARUMA on South Coast FERGUSSON IS from three vessels. The Japs had evidently evacuated GOODENOUGH IS on night 24/25 Oct. The firing heard there was apparently used to cover their withdrawal.

26 OCT: On 27 Oct we were advised that Japs had left WARUMA at 1900 hrs 26 Oct.

Since then there has been no report of any Japs remaining on FERGUSSON IS.



TO BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH APPX 'A'

General
Characteristics of Arm'd Formations.

- (a) Arm'd Mobility
 (b) Instant readiness for action whether halted or moving (guns already mounted). Less accurate fire when moving.
 (c) Cross country performance. Limited by heavy timber, some water obstacles, swampy or very rocky ground and wide trenches.
 (d) Rapid dispersion and concentration (Mobility and Wireless Communication). Quick action or concealment.
 (e) Night Operations. Generally not suited for night fighting. Limited visibility without lights considerably reduces cross country performances. Roads and tracks may be used for approach marches. Headlamps are fitted and might be used for night fighting. Tks can guard avenues of approach, but lose mobility.
 (f) Limitation of personnel. Small number, hence unsuitable for dismounted action. When closed down greater strain on crews.

Org of Arm'd Sqn

Sqn HQ - 4 tks - OC, 2 i/c, C.R.L. & SSM.
 4 Tps each 3 tks. Tp leader Sgt, Cpl.
Total 16 tks (4 reserve tks with this sqn).

Crew 4 Men - Comd, Driver, Gunner & Leader-Operator.

Total tk crews - 7 offrs, 57 ORs	=	64
Plus B Ech and spare crews (82 ORs)	=	146
Plus special personnel att from regt for this force	=	174
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>		

B 1 Ech (close to tks)

1 DR & OCs Jeep
 2 Scout Jeeps
 1 petrol truck (3-ton)
 1 amm " "
 1 Fitters " "
 1 Battery Charging Carrier

B 2 Ech

1 Amn truck (3-ton)
 1 petrol " "
 1 Q stores " "
 1 cooks " "
 2 spare crews "
 1 RAP truck (15-cwt)
 1 Ration " "
 1 office " "
 1 SQMS " "

Attached

1 water truck
 1 Div Sigs Truck (3-ton)
 3 Jeeps
 2 15-cwt

DETAILS OF TKS

Type American M3 Light (Gen Stewart)
Weight 14 tons Length 14' 7" Height 8' 8" Width 8'
Engine 250 HP 7 cyl radial air-cooled engine.
Max Speed 40 mph (officially) Will do more but normal maximum 30 on good ground.

Armour Average hull thickness 1". Belly $\frac{1}{2}$ ". Turret front $1\frac{3}{4}$ ".

Armament 1 37 mm Gun QF
 (2-pdr, 5-15 rds per min) } Co-axially in turret.
 1 .30 Browning MG }
 1 .30 " front of hull
 1 .30 " " AA outside turret
 1 .45 Thompson
 4 pistols
 1 Verrey pistol
 10 grenades

Ammunition (Tentative)

Type	In Tank	With B Ech
37 MM AP	35	28
37 MM HE	68	52
.30 Tracer	2000	1000
.30 AP	4000	2000
.45 Thompson	250	100
.38 Pistol	12	6
Grenades	10	5
Verey Ill	10	5
" Red	5	2
" Green	5	2

Performance

Ground Clearance $16\frac{1}{2}$ "
 Fording Depth $3\frac{1}{2}$ 7"
 Spanning width 5'
 Max climbing angle 50 deg
 Max speed 40 mph (see page 1)
 Fuel capacity 45 gals plus 30 in quick release tank (Total 72 gals)
Cruising Range Normal Australian country about $1\frac{1}{2}$ mpg = 90 mls
 Estimated consumption here " $\frac{3}{4}$ " = 54 "

Wireless Communication

Fitted with No 19 set, in effect consisting of -

- (1) Internal communication set (Crew comd to crew)
 - (2) Short range R/T set max 1000 yds (security and avoidance of heavy traffic)
 - (3) Main set. R/T range at least 25 miles.
- Very quick to switch from send to receive.
 Can communicate with inf 108 Pack set.

GENERAL+(1) Operation of Tks

From what has been seen of the area during two weeks 10-22 Nov it is considered that the vehs could move on rds up to 20-25 mph, all bns can safely be crossed and in most cases, alternative creek crossings could be found and used.

With the ground in its present condition possibly 10 mph could be averaged across country. Palm grove drains offer little difficulty. "Grouzers" or detachable non-skid bars are carried for bolting on the tracks - used as are tyre chains. If a veh bogs, the other two in the tp can usually tow it out with little delay.
 (Emphasis on constant contact and mutual support in the troop)

(2) Night Fighting. Capabilities are limited and ground protection is necessary.


Tks are NOT normally used for night fighting (see para e page 1) but headlights are fitted and in urgent situations could probably do a useful job.

(3) Coconut palms could probably be knocked over fairly easily. Value in dealing with Jap snipers? Siren is fitted. Value as moral effect in attack.

(4) Identification of tanks by our forces

It is suggested that units be supplied with silhouettes diagrams of our tks. They are distinctive and easily recognised apart from the yellow square (Sqns sign) on the turret.

(5) Ground telephone lines are likely to be broken by tk treads if on a hard road, and in these instances it would be better if cables were kept 10 feet off the ground or laid beneath the surface.



MG POST WITH CRAWL TRENCH

O ONE MAN PITS

SCALE APPROX 3" = 100 YDS

APPX 'C' TO 13 AUST INF BDE.
INT. SUM. N° 10 of 28 NOV 42

JAP METHODS OF DEFENCE AND TACTICS MYOLA-TEMPLETONS CROSSING AREA
(Infm compiled from notes of Bn IOs 25 Bde)GENERAL

1. The action fought by ? Bn between MYOLA and TEMPLETONS CROSSING was along a narrow ridge on the crest of which runs the main track. The whole length of the ridge is covered by dense jungle and in parts consists mostly of bamboo.
2. First contacted by a coy, the enemy withdrew up a ridge previously reconed and prepared. All approaches to the posn were covered by fire and well camouflaged, circular one man pits were used by each individual soldier. These are 2-3' across and afford good protection especially from grenades.
3. It appears that the Jap keeps his head down and fires burst after burst from his MG, blindly spraying the area in front and below his posn, creating much noise in an attempt to intimidate the attacker. On the other hand MG posts covering the main track were cunningly chosen for posn and field of fire. Natural camouflage such as beside the butt of a large rotting tree with flanged roots or behind a small natural ridge beside the track were used to advantage. Posns were well sited both for frontal, rear and flank protection.
4. The number of tps actually "standing to" in his posns appeared few but when ground was gained his counter attack was in good strength. It is difficult to say whether he keeps a mobile reserve or whether he is actually in strength throughout the posn. To occupy most of his front at the same time would solve the problem of his counter-attacking force.
5. The main defence has been by MG and LMG with a few riflemen moving to points of vantage as our tps move fwd. Hand and discharger grenades were used extensively. The grenades make a loud report on exploding but cannot be compared with ours for effect, e.g. "a grenade struck one soldier in the stomach, but apart from shock the only effect was to blow his eqpt off." T89 shells from the discharger burst in the trees, others were juds. The main effect of these is nuisance value.
6. The Jap likes to move his LMG or MG from place to place during the day, e.g. "one offr after recon was quite certain that there was no automatic weapon in one posn, but when attacked shortly afterwards, a MG opened up at the first indication of mvt by our tps."
7. It is obvious that our 3" Mortar is disliked by the Jap. Several times during a shoot, much shouting, yelling and general disturbance has been heard.
8. On one occasion when our attack drove the Jap out he appeared to panic running from side to side and firing wildly with everything he had but then our tps were forced to withdraw by the weight of the counter attack, confirming the belief that he holds a mobile force in reserve.

CONCLUSION

9. For some time this Bde has been attacking Japs occupying defensive posns well sited and camouflaged. In spite of the fact that our tps have been attacking up hill against prepared posns, they have inflicted many more casualties than reconed. This could be due to superiority of weapons but reports tend to confirm the belief that this success is due to the fact that that Jap seems to depend on quantity rather than quality, and fires heavily but blindly at any sign of attack. This might have served well against semi-trained tps, but gives away his posn against trained and determined attackers who hold their fire. The amount of fire from a Jap posn is not a true indication of his strength judged by our standards.

(7 Aust Div)

WDT

APPX "F" 55

HQ NEW GUINEA FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 91
of 3 Nov 42.

MOONRISE AND MOONSET TABLES

NOV 1942.

R = Moonrise

S = Moonset

Times given are Eastern Summer Time, i.e. in "L" time
as used in AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA. (For G.M.T. subtract
11 hrs.)

NOV.	R & S.	PORT MORESBY LAE SALAMAUA	BUNA	GASMATA	MILNE BAY	RABAU KAVIENG	BUKA PASSAGE
1	R	0053	0048	0400	0359	0358	0342
	S	1250	1245	1237	1236	1235	1219
2	R	0138	0133	0125	0124	0123	0107
	S	1338	1333	1325	1324	1323	1307
3	R	0222	0217	0209	0208	0207	0151
	S	1427	1422	1414	1413	1412	1356
4	R	0306	0301	0253	0252	0251	0235
	S	1517	1512	1504	1503	1502	1446
5	R	0350	0345	0337	0336	0335	0319
	S	1608	1603	1555	1554	1553	1537
6	R	0436	0431	0423	0422	0421	0405
	S	1701	1656	1648	1647	1646	1630
7	R	0523	0518	0510	0509	0508	0452
	S	1754	1749	1741	1740	1739	1723
8	R	0611	0606	0558	0557	0556	0540
	S	1850	1845	1837	1836	1835	1819
9	R	0702	0657	0649	0648	0647	0631
	S	1950	1945	1937	1936	1935	1919
10	R	0758	0753	0745	0744	0743	0727
	S	2052	2047	2039	2038	2037	2021
11	R	0855	0850	0842	0841	0840	0824
	S	2153	2148	2140	2139	2138	2122
12	R	0956	0951	0943	0942	0941	0925
	S	2253	2248	2240	2239	2238	2222
13	R	1056	1051	1043	1042	1041	1025
	S	2352	2347	2339	2338	2337	2321
14	R	1154	1149	1141	1140	1139	1123
	S	-	-	-	-	-	-
15	R	1251	1246	1238	1237	1236	1220
	S	0045	0040	0032	0031	0030	0014
16	R	1347	1342	1334	1333	1332	1316
	S	0143	0138	0130	0129	0128	0112
17	R	1441	1436	1428	1427	1426	1410
	S	0226	0221	0213	0212	0211	0155
18	R	1531	1526	1518	1517	1516	1500
	S	0311	0306	0258	0257	0256	0240
19	R	1620	1615	1607	1606	1605	1549
	S	0354	0349	0341	0340	0339	0323
20	R	1710	1705	1657	1656	1655	1639
	S	0437	0432	0424	0423	0422	0406
21	R	1758	1753	1745	1744	1743	1727
	S	0520	0515	0507	0506	0505	0449
22	R	1847	1842	1834	1833	1832	1816
	S	0604	0559	0551	0550	0549	0533

(Over)

NOV.	R & S.	PORT MORESBY LAE SALAMAUA	BUNA GASMATA	MILNE BAY	RABAU KAVIENG	BUKA PASSAGE	
23	R	1936	1931	1923	1922	1921	1905
	S	0649	0644	0636	0635	0634	0618
24	R	2025	2020	2012	2011	2010	1954
	S	0735	0730	0722	0721	0720	0704
25	R	2113	2108	2100	2059	2058	2042
	S	0822	0817	0809	0808	0807	0751
26	R	2201	2156	2148	2147	2146	2130
	S	0909	0904	0856	0855	0854	0838
27	R	2249	2244	2236	2235	2234	2218
	S	0955	0950	0942	0941	0940	0924
28	R	2334	2329	2321	2320	2319	2303
	S	1043	1038	1030	1029	1028	1012
29	R	-	-	-	-	-	2346
	S	1131	1126	1118	1117	1116	1100
30	R	0017	0012	0004	0003	0002	-
	S	1219	1214	1206	1205	1204	1148

WPI

APPENDIX "A" to

HQ FIRST AUST ARMY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.13

NOTES ON AREA BETWEEN BUNA-GONA and PORT MORESBY.

In general terms the area between BUNA-GONA and PORT MORESBY may be divided into two parts, a natural barrier - the OWEN STANLEY RANGE - forming the line of demarkation. The section NORTH of the range is included in the NORTHERN DIVISION of PAPUA, and the section to the SOUTH in the CENTRAL DIVISION.

(a) Northern Division.

1. GENERAL:-

In the NORTH the three main centres - BUNA, KOKODA and IOMA - form roughly an equilateral triangle with IOMA as apex. This area may be subdivided into two regions - coastal and mountain. The coastal sec is level and swampy and extends inland in places for approx 40 miles. The rest of the district is a series of hills and mountain chains with fertile valleys and some plateaux.

2. COASTAL:-

The coastline comprises chiefly open beaches except for three small anchorages affording shelter for small vessels in all weather at BUNA, SANANANDA (4 m. NW of BUNA), and MAMBARI. Beaches are short and steep, and the coast sandy and level except at AMBASI, where steep slopes rise from the beach. There are landing places at ERORO, BASABUA, GONA and AMBASI. There is much swamp in the coastal sector through which, in the dry season, many native tracks run. Swamps are subject to flooding when rivers overflow their banks.

3. INLAND:-

The country, which includes large areas of thick scrub affording excellent cover from air observation, rises at an average rate of 2 ft per mile from BUNA towards KOKODA.

From the NORTHERN portion of the area the rivers are the MAMBARI, OPI, KUMUSI, AMBOGO, GERUWA, SAMBOGO and ERORO. All are liable to flooding. They flow swiftly through the mountain areas over rocky beds and become sluggish approaching the sea, flowing over muddy bottoms. The MAMBARI and KUMUSI are navigable for small craft; average width in normal seasons is 60 yds.

HYDROGRAPHER'S RANGE is in the SOUTHERN part of the area. Mt. LAMINGTON (5000') is approx 30 miles from BUNA towards KOKODA. Mt. GREEN (1000') is on the edge of the MAMBARI SWAMPS, on the rd between IOMA and KOKODA.

4. COMMS:-

A surveyed rd from BUNA to KOKODA is suitable for foot traffic; distance 62 m. or 2½ days walking time. This track is in excellent condition. The only steep part is about 8 miles on the BUNA side of OIVI. Tracked vehs could go from the coast to KOKODA if a few rd repairs were made, and two river crossings built. There are numerous streams to cross but they are small and only 12 to 18 inches deep.

Road suitable in dry weather for light motor traffic runs from SANANANDA to SANGARA.

Track from IOMA to AWALA (55-60 miles) is in good condition and fairly flat. It crosses three fairly large streams which

Lr speedie to read.
DAG 16/8.

B1 HQ 17 Aust 137 BDF

cannot be forded in the wet season. Travelling time
foot.

A track leads along beach from AMBASI to GONA MISSI,
thence SW to AMBOGA where it meets the main rd BUNA - KOKODA.

5. AERODROMES:-

There are landing grounds suitable for extension at
KOKODA, YODDA and IOMA.

6. CLIMATE:-

The climate is humid and heavy tropical rain may be
expected from Nov to May. For the rest of the year rainfall is
somewhat lighter. Average annual rainfall - KOKODA 128"; BUNA 113".

(b) Central Division.

1. SOUTH of KOKODA is the almost impenetrable OWEN STANLEY RANGE
with foothills and rivers which make the Central Division, in which
PORT MORESBY is situated, a difficult terrain for an invading force
moving from BUNA via KOKODA.

1. GENERAL:-

The terrain between PORT MORESBY and KOKODA is generally
rugged. The area includes the OWEN STANLEY RANGE with heights up to
13,000'. The centre of the rugged area is about THE GAP, through
which the main track to the NORTH passes at an elevation of 7000'.
THE GAP is 20 miles SOUTH of KOKODA.

2. COASTAL:-

PORT MORESBY is guarded by a reef with an entrance through
BASILISK PASSAGE deep enough for vessels up to 20,000 tons. Apart
from landing facilities afforded by the harbour, its wharves and
foreshores, landings could be made at ELA BEACH, a strip three-quarters
of a mile long on the EASTERN side of the town.

BOOTLESS INLET, approx 12 miles to the WEST of PORT MORESBY
is skirted mostly by mangrove swamps with the exception of a small
beach at DOKUNA where a landing could be effected. An overland
passage could be made by SEVEN MILE VALLEY to PORT MORESBY.

3. INLAND:-

In the MORESBY area hills rise close to the coast. These
are peculiar in that one side may be timbered while the other side will
carry only grass. Immediately behind PORT MORESBY is the ANSTRALABE
RANGE and rising behind this again is the OWEN STANLEY RANGE. The
ranges rise almost sheer in parts and are covered by dense jungle.

The only stream of any importance is the LALOKI RIVER
which flows into REDSCAR BAY. A low level br crosses it 26 miles
from PORT MORESBY.

The OWEN STANLEY RANGE reaches great heights at such points
as MT. VICTORIA (13,200'), MT. ALBERT EDWARD (13,000') and MT.
SCRATCHLEY (over 12,000').

4. COMNS:-

A good metalled rd connects PORT MORESBY with SOGERI (25
miles). The second section, from SOGERI to KOKODA (55 miles) comprises
a native track over extremely rugged country. The OWEN STANLEY range
is crossed through THE GAP (7000'), 20 miles SOUTH of KOKODA.
Numerous streams impede passage, some crossed by cane suspension brs,
but most by fallen log brs. Walking time PORT MORESBY - SOGERI is
1½ days, and SOGERI - KOKODA 5½ days.

5. CLIMATE:-

Wet season extends from Nov to May, annual fall at PORT
MORESBY being 33". Rain falls principally during night.

Received 22/11/42
Time 1650 hrs
8/99/18

Colonel

I" file
WPI

SECRET
K 183

NO MILNE FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 50
(From 0900 hrs 20 Nov to 0900 hrs 22 Nov)

PART 1

OPERATIONS

OWN (iii) AIR

(a) Sightings

BUN-FAISI AREA

18 Nov : 12 ships incl 6 destroyers, 4 cargo, 1 sloop, 1 tanker.
20 Nov : 11 ships incl 1 possible battleship or heavy cruiser, 3 possible light cruisers, 3 destroyers, 2 cargoes (1 apparently smoking), 2 u/i vessels.

RABAUL HARBOUR

20 Nov : 48 vessels stationery incl 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 submarine, 4 cargo vessels, 1 tpt, 40 u/i vessels.

KAVIENG

19 Nov : Approx 12 ships east of NORTH CAPE.
20 Nov : 17 vessels east of KAVIENG.

BUKA PASSAGE

20 Nov : 4 transports, 6 small cargo vessels.

IN TRANSIT

21 Nov :

At 1530 hrs 4 destroyers in posn $06^{\circ} 45' S, 150^{\circ} 00' E$, approx 35 miles S.S.W. GASMA TA course 230 speed 30.
At 1630 hrs this convoy was in posn $06^{\circ} 55' S, 149^{\circ} 36' E$ and had altered its course to 260.

(b) Attacks

Aerial activity for 19 Nov was restricted due to adverse weather conditions.

BUNA CONVOY (See Intell Sum 49)

19 Nov : Nothing was seen of the cruiser and destroyer successfully bombed by B 17's on the evening 18 Nov and as the presumed third vessel was sighted some distance away, and moving from the area, it is reasonable to presume that the 2 vessels before mentioned were either sunk or totally disabled -

COIC Daily Sum 19 Nov

KAVIENG

Catalinas attacked KAVIENG early a.m. 19 and 20 Nov. 1 a/e was destroyed and 1 probably destroyed in the two attacks.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

ALROUBRA : Our tps continue to advance. On 20 Nov our fwd elements were reported to be in contact one mile south of GOMA and advancing to capture it. On the main WAIROPE-BUNA track our leading tps were held up by enemy due south of SOPUTA and were attacking to clear this area at first light 20 Nov.

American tps were attacking enemy at CAPE ENDAIAREBE on Nov 19. Enemy MGs and mortars were located in this area. A patrol from DOBODURA contacted enemy north of the GIE.

On 19 Nov our tps captured a serviceable 150wv truck and 80 gals petrol on track SW of SOPUTA.

KANGA

On 19 Nov it was reported that one .5 AA gun had been installed at MUBO. The increased nervousness of the enemy is noticeable. Jap patrols increased to 70 or more personnel are covering MUBO to LIBBIA. Native carriers move under hgd and Japs in MUBO area have used MG and mortar fire on surrounding bush for three successive mornings and on a br and track at dusk.

Feverish Jap activity is reported at HEATH'S PLANTATION.

(Signature)
Col OS
G. S. MILLER FORCE

DIST

(As for Intell Sum No 49)

COMD	<i>Copy</i>	
B.M.	<i>Alan</i>	
B.M.(L)		X
S.C.	<i>John</i>	X
S.C.(L)		
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L.O.1.	<i>GA</i>	} OTN file
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Received 22/11/43

5 Copies

"I" FILE ~~OTN~~

WPI

Time 1020 hrs

1/9/17

HQ MILNE FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 49.

SECRET K.133

PART I

OPERATIONS:

(Own (iii) AIR

(a) Sightings.

RABAUL

17 Nov:

Possibly 50 ships of various sizes, mostly merchant, but 3 or 4 warships distinguished. Pilot considers 2 or 3 u/i ships smoking.

BUN-FAISI AREA

17 Nov:

31 vessels incl 2 lt cruisers, 7 destroyers, 11 cargo vessels, 1 probably repair ship, 10 small vessels.

IN TRANSIT

0827 hrs 18 Nov:

B.17 sighted 5 warships approx 70 miles north of BUNA course 70°. No troops observed on board from 500 ft. Subsequent sightings indicated force disposed on various courses.

1100 hrs 19 Nov:

1 destroyer in VITIAZ STRAITS in posn 05° 30'S, 147° 35' E. Course 330°, speed 25 knots.

1445 hrs:

1 destroyer in VITIAZ STRAITS abt 20 miles off CAPE GLOUCESTER heading north, speed 20 knots.

1445 hrs: " "

2 large cruisers which were shadowed to entrance ST. GEORGE'S CHANNEL heading north, speed 25 knots.

1700 hrs 19 Nov:

Reliable report 1 by cruiser, 1 destroyer both hove to off HELDSBACH.

1915 hrs " "

Same source reports these vessels last seen in squall moving N.E. in VITIAZ STRAITS.

(b) Attacks.

BUNA AREA

18 Nov:

B.17's attacked 3 warships of convoy of 5 warships (see Sightings above). Nil hits. At 2210 hrs 6 B.17's attacked enemy force of 1 lt cruiser, 2 destroyers in HOLNICOTE BAY. One direct hit was scored on lt cruiser causing explosions and fire, also one direct hit amidships on destroyer which was seen to open amidships. The force was first sighted one mile N.E. GONA MISSION with many small boats filled with tps between warships and shore. Our recce a/c reported nil enemy a/c or shipping BUNA area at 0837 hrs 19 Nov.

RABAUL

17 Nov:

14 B.24's attacked shipping. Report from only one a/c so far received. 2 direct hits on probable large merchant vessel. 2 or 3 other u/i ships seen smoking.

BUN AREA

16 Nov:

Catalinas attacked KAHILI drome. Bombs were dropped on blast bays and mainland causing 6 large fires and explosions. 3 a/c were destroyed.


LAE

17 Nov:

Beaufighters destroyed 2 bombers and 1 Zero. B.25's dropped bombs in dispersal areas and on operation building. 5 bombers and 6 Zeros were reported destroyed on the ground.

GOODENOUGH IS. OPERATION
(22-25 Oct 42)

Received 19/11/42
Time 1105 hrs
M 98/16



On 25 Aug 7 JAP barges were strafed by our A/C on the beach of GALAIWAI BAY, GOODENOUGH IS. The barges were destroyed, but not before more than 300 JAPS were able to land in the vicinity of KILIA MISSION. These JAPS were part of SASEBO No.5 S.N.L.P. Their object was to land at TAUPOTA and cross the STIRLING RANGE to join the main JAP attack on MILNE BAY. The destruction of the barges prevented this.

During their stay JAPS stole native food, and supplies were also dropped by their own A/C. They made their HQ in KILIA MISSION area and established defensive posns with guards over the tracks.

On 22 Oct an Allied Force was despatched with the role of destruction of all JAPS on GOODENOUGH IS, and with further orders to recon and construct landing strip on the Island.

The force split into two parties: Beach 'A' party which landed at TALEBA BAY, and Beach 'B' party which landed at MUD BAY. Disembarkation which was successful, commenced at 0130 hrs, 23 Oct and 2102 hrs 22 Oct on respective beaches.

23 OCT: 'A' party engaged JAPS at approx 0600 hrs. The party reached NIUBULA CK but, heavily counter attacked by the enemy using MG's and Mortars, party broke contact with the enemy at 1045 hrs. The party re-embarked and landed at MUD BAY at 0200 hrs on 24 Oct.

Casualties inflicted on the enemy during this encounter were 32 dead counted, 2 MG's destroyed and 3 LMG's.

Meanwhile 'B' party, which had formed a base at MUD BAY, commenced its approach march to KILIA MISSION at 2300 hrs, 22 Oct.

HQ MILNE FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 47(From 1900 hrs 14 Nov 42 to 0900 hrs 16 Nov 42)PART IOPERATIONSOWN (111) AIR(a) SightingsBUN-FAISI AREA

- 14 Nov : At 0640 hrs 7 U/vessels
At 0800 hrs 10 vessels consisting of 2 corvettes, 7 cargo ships, 1 tanker.
At 1910 hrs 22 vessels, consisting of 4 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 2 corvettes, 2 tankers, 1 sloop, 8 cargo vessels.
- 15 Nov : At 1200 hrs 9 vessels consisting of 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 2 MV's, 3 U/I vessels.

KAVIENG

- AM 14 Nov : 4 vessels - at least 18 probable bombers on drome.

IN TRANSIT

- 0730 hrs
14 Nov : Convoy of 20 vessels consisting of 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 4 transports 10/12000 tons and 8 transports of 6/8000 tons in posn 07° 45' S, 157° 20' E approx 90 miles E.S.E. FAISI, course 135, speed 15 to 20 knots.
- 0920 hrs
14 Nov : 1 poss S/P tender, 10/12000 tons, 1 U/I vessel 4000 tons in posn 02° 45' S, 150° 40' E off STEFFEN STRAIT, course 105, speed 10 knots.

GUADALCANAL

- AM 14 Nov : B17 returning from that area reported apparent naval engagement observed from 15 miles south taking place between PAVUVU ISLAND and YSABEL ISLAND. Gunfire seen and splashes from where shell hit water. 2 ships appeared to be on fire.

(b) Attacks

- 14 Nov : B 17's attacked convoy (above) S. E. FAISI. Nil hits. Strafing of 10,000 ton tpt caused fire.

BUNA AREA

- 14 Nov : Beamfighters strafed huts and buildings BUNA area and sank large heavily laden canoe with possible stores on KUMUSI RIVER.

PART IVOTHER FRONTSMAROUBRA

Our tps surrounded enemy posns west of ILIMO and were attacking at first light 13 Nov. Meanwhile fwd tps continued to press east and attacked the enemy holding KUMUSI crossing, driving them back. We hold the crossing area. Some of the enemy fled north abandoning casualties.

Infm obtained GORARI area reveals that one enemy bn of total strength 19 Offrs and 567 ORs lost 12 Offrs and 429 ORs killed and wounded up to 2 Nov. Infm from D W indicates that Japs are avoiding main track by using obscure jungle trails. Rice is stated to be only Jap ration but is plentiful. Another D W stated casualties amounted to half strength in some Jap units.

BUNA

Enemy dets from INONDE and SINEMI are reported to have withdrawn to BUNA and SANAKAPA.

KANGA

On morning 14 Nov smoke was observed through haze off TAMI ISLAND moving towards LAE.

M. J. Milne
for Col.
S. A. MILNE

Distribution

(as for Intell Sum 46)

OTHER FRONT

Our troops surrounded enemy forces west of TAMI and were attacking at first light 13 Nov. Meanwhile the 4th Div moved to press east and attacked the enemy holding position, driving them back. We held the crossing and some of the enemy fled north abandoning casualties.

SUMMARY OF ABC NEWS BULLETIN 1900 L/ 15NEW GUINEA

Australian columns advancing eastward have driven the enemy from WAIROPI. American columns are closing in from the south. The capture of WAIROPI paves the way for the advance into BUNA. Australians found no signs of organised enemy resistance around the WAIROPI RIVER. For the first time, the Japanese have left their seriously wounded behind. From the air, the victorious Australian troops were seen swimming in the clear water of the WAIROPI RIVER. The Japanese had slaved to keep the bridge over the WAIROPI RIVER intact but they could not succeed.

It is reported that when the Japanese dead are counted, the figure will be well over the 1000 mark. The Japanese fought it out to the finish at CIVI and GORARI and only a few prisoners were captured. The Australians are now pressing on towards BUNA, the main Japanese base in PAPUA. The Commander of the Australian forces has stated: "It is now BUNA or bust and we will not bust."

There is no news of a clash between American and Japanese forces in the BUNA area but it is known that the Americans are moving to attack.

SOLOMONS

News of a large naval battle in the SOLOMONS is being awaited in Britain and the United States. Axis powers reported that the battle took place off GUADALCANAL last Thursday. No news has been released of the result of the battle but it is known that there are heavy losses on both sides. The Japanese admit the loss of two destroyers and damage to one battleship.

NORTH AFRICA

The fight for TUNISIA is becoming the most serious phase of the NORTH AFRICAN campaign. The Allied movement eastward is continuing. Operations are shrouded in secrecy. Fairly heavy forces of Italians have landed in TUNIS by sea and air convoys. The Germans are trying hard to drive a wedge between the Allied armies moving from the Colonies to the east and other Allied armies moving from the east through LIBYA. The aerodrome at BONA has been occupied by Anglo-American paratroops.

The 8th Army has now driven 100 miles or more into enemy territory. It is still sweeping on and is capturing many prisoners.

The defeat of the German-Italian troops in Egypt has caused deep concern in Italy. Demands have been made in some quarters for the withdrawal of Italy from the war.

General Franco has informed President Roosevelt that Spain did not wish to break present Spanish-American relations.

RUSSIA

From Russia comes news of bitter fighting in STALINGRAD. Correspondents have been talking of a possible early Russian offensive. The enemy has thrown its forces against the factory area of STALINGRAD and fierce battles have taken place in the last three days. In the CAUCASUS reinforcements have been thrown back by the Russians.

The war correspondent of the London "Times" predicts a big Russian offensive in the winter. He says "The Russian house is in order in spite of insistent enemy attacks."

LOCAL NEWS TO 2300 L/15

There is nothing to report.

WDI

SECRET
K 170

HQ MILNE FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 45

(From 0900 hrs 10 Nov 42 to 0900 hrs 12 Nov 42)

PART 1

OPERATIONS

OWN (iii) AIR

(a) Sightings

BUIN-FAISI AREA

- 9 Nov : 33 ships stationary . 3 possible cruisers and 3 possible cargo vessels in transit.
4 U/I a/c took off from KAHILI drome.
- 10 Nov : 61 vessels incl 6 cruisers, 2 sloops, 33 destroyers, 17 cargo vessels, 2 tankers, 1 passenger.

BUNA

- 10 Nov : A/c report 5 heavy a/a gun posns abt 2 1/2 miles EAST SOPUTA. Estimated 3 inch.

(b) Attacks

NEW IRELAND:

- 9 Nov: Our A/C bombed 1 transport approx 5000 tons on course 160° down coast. Vessel beached on lower tip of NEW IRELAND on west coast.

KAVIENG

- 8 Nov: Catalinas bombed runway and dispersal area.

OIVI-BUNA

- 9 Nov: 8 B.26's attacked BUNA dropping 162 100 lb bombs in target area.
6 A.20's dropped 239 fragmentation bombs in OIVI area and made seven strafing runs in support of our tps.
9 Beaufighters strafed WT Station POPONDETTA. 1 barge burnt 2 hit at SANANANDA. Villages ISIVITA to KAKANDETTA strafed.
- 10 Nov: 3 B.26's bombed and strafed SOPUTA area paying particular attention A/A posns (mentioned in sightings above). Several bombs were seen to fall close to gun posns.
A.20's also bombed and strafed enemy posns in the SOPUTA area with good results blowing one gun out of gun pit and causing explosion of amn.
3 Beaufighters strafed huts, vehicles and dumps in this area.

LAE

- PM 9 Nov: Catalina sighted 1 destroyer about 90 miles from LAE. Bombs were dropped. Nil hits.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS.

MARCOUBRA:

On afternoon 6 Nov our attack on right flank resulted in capture of two spurs south of OIVI. One by MG captured. An enemy counter attack on this posn was repulsed with by Jap casualties. 7 Nov our tps engaged in outflanking movt contacted and engaged enemy elements SE GORARI.

Our tps maintained steady pressure on OIVI posn where Japs offered stubborn resistance. Our mortar shoots were successful. On 8 Nov our tps in the OIVI area were containing and harrassing enemy forces estimated at two reduced bns. Our tps in GORARI area moved around enemy east flank and engaged enemy rear. Jap casualties have been by and in one action Japs lost 100 men.

On 9 Nov our tps moving around enemy east flank occupied a large village believed to be GORARI and drove the enemy back to the NE.

BUNA:

7 Nov Japs were reported moving from WARISOTA and SINEMI to PENGPEAPI (midway between INONDE and HORANDA). On 8 Nov unconfirmed native reports indicated Japs assembling at POPONDETTA, SAMANIA and SUPUTA. On 9 Nov natives reported Japs using MT as far west as AVALA. Natives interrogated on 10 Nov gave infm indicating some Jap movt from BUNA northerly towards SALAMAU. Extent and route of movt NOT yet known.

Archibald
Col
GS MILNE FORCE.

DISTRIBUTION:-

As for Intelligence Summary 44.

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WAI

HQ MILNE FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 35
(From 0900 hrs 20 Oct 42 to 0900 hrs 22 Oct 42)

PART I.

OPERATIONS.

OWN (I) LAND.

TAUPOTA - WEDAU

Fighting patrol which returned from TOPURA 1200 hrs 20 Oct, reported no contact with JAPS. The area between WEDAU and TAUPOTA is considered clear of JAPS for the present.

OWN (II) NAVAL

GUADALCANAL.

11 Oct : Our task forces intercepted an enemy convoy 6 miles west SAVO ISLAND causing probable 1 enemy loss of 4 to 5 destroyers, 2 heavy cruisers and 1 transport.
(NEA Airtel Sum 15 Oct)

OWN (III) AIR

ATTACKS - BOUGANVILLE.

Night 19 Oct : Catalinas attacked shipping SAISI area and KAHILL aerodrome. Nil hit on shipping; 1 bomb 15 ft from stern of large transport. 18 bombs on SW end of KAHILL strip.

GUADALCANAL.

10 Oct : Our aircraft scored direct hits on 2 light cruisers and destroyed 10 enemy aircraft. Enemy installations from POINT CRUZ (North coast of NEW GEORGIA) to WEST CAPE (West coast of NEW GEORGIA) were bombed and strafed.

12 Oct : 10 Allied aircraft attacked 3 destroyers, one of which was later reported sinking.
(NEA Airtel Sum 14)

ENEMY (III) AIR.

MORESBY. 2120 to 2135 hrs 20 Oct. 1 U/I enemy bomber made two runs over MORESBY HARBOUR and 7 mile area. Nil report of any bombing yet received.

PART II

1. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES.

1200 hrs 20 Oct SUIN HARBOUR : 17 ships comprising 1 battleship 1 s/p tender, 8 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 8 cargo vessels.

1245 hrs 20 Oct RABAUL HARBOUR : 58 ships comprising 1 aircraft carrier, 1 s/p tender, 34 large ships, 22 medium ships (report incomplete).

3. IDENTIFICATIONS

20 Oct. Documents captured by 3 Bn TEMPLETONS area again identified TATE 8417 (144 Regt) and indicates 1 and 2 Bns still in fwd areas.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS.

GUADALCANAL.

7 to 10 Oct : In fighting on these 4 days Allied casualties were 85 killed and 125 wounded. Enemy casualties 253 killed.

COMD	
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BM(E)	
SC	
SC(L)	
LO	
LO1	
LO2	
LO3	
SIG.O	
T.O	
SUPP.O	
GDPI.COMD	
OME	
AMEN.O	

mm

13 Oct : Enemy shore arty shelled our beach posns and transports, but their bty was silenced by gunfire from our destroyers. No damage was caused to our transports.

(a) MARCEBRA.

18 Oct : Encircling move by 2/25 Bn proceeding. Patrol 2/31 Bn with W/T moving up track KAGI-SERREGINA-ALOLA. 2/2 Bn and adv party 2/1 Bn moving MYOLA to TEMPLETONS KING. Constant pressure on enemy all day but no advance. Enemy mortar and fwd patrol activity increased. 3 Bn remains in contact on main track 800 yds north TEMPLETONS with two coys on main track behind enemy. Three local counter-attacks repulsed by 3 Bn inflicting 50 casualties. 2/25 Bn less two coys and 2/33 Bn 200 yds north TEMPLETONS on high ground east and west of track respectively. No report from two coys 2/25 Bn encircling enemy from east but firing heard. Recce patrol 2/25 Bn approaching main track from west last reported four miles SW ALOLA expected arrive ALOLA night 18 Oct. No further report fighting patrol 2/31 Bn. Early 19 Oct 2/2 Bn moving to posn adjoining 2/33 Bn on right Bde Hq and 2/1 Bn moving fwd from MYOLA.

19 Oct : Afternoon two pls 3 Bn forced enemy off spur fwd of 3 Bn posn. Enemy casualties 20. JAPS retaliating with intense mortar fire also appear to be using 75 m.m. as well as 3 1/2 m.m. guns. Three patrols 2/2 Bn moving high ground east flank. Fwd patrol contacted enemy three miles north TEMPLETONS one mile east of track where enemy appears to be consolidating from. No report other two patrols. Comd 16 Bde assumed control fwd area 0700 L/20.

20 Oct: 2/2 Bn moving around east of 3 Bn to swing in on enemy flank fwd of 3 Bn. 2/1 Bn moving to 3 Bn posn to exploit any success 2/2 Bn. 3 Bn to withdraw when posn secure. 2/3 Bn moving fwd from MYOLA to posn astride track at present held by 2/33 and 2/25 Bns. On relief 2/25 Bn moves to cover ASC dump approx 1 mile south TEMPLETONS. On relief Hq 25 Bde with 3 and 2/33 Bns will move MYOLA area.


(Att as Appx A is sketch map of KOKODA-MYOLA area).

(b) KANGA. No report.

(c) HATFORGE.

20 Oct: L.O. Reports by rain and flood MUSA river has prevented majority leading Bn 128 US from crossing. Recce patrol DOVE KING MUSA river reports tracks DOVE area waist deep in mud. Moving both Bns 128 US to mouth MUSA river where ferry established to PONGANI. Anticipate 180 reach PONGANI by 20 Oct.

G.S. MILNE FORCE
Col.
G.S. MILNE FORCE



APPX 'A'
 MILNE FORCE
 SUMMARY
 NO 35

WALKING TIMES	
MYOLA - TEMPLETONS	4 1/2 HRS
TEMPLETONS - EORACK CK	4 HRS
EOACK - ALOLA	3 1/2 HRS
ALOLA - DENIKI	4 HRS
DENIKI - KOKODA	4 HRS
ALOLA - NARO	9 HRS
NARO - KOKODA	4 1/2 HRS
DENIKI - FILA	2 HRS
ALOLA - ABUARI	1 HR
ABUARI - MISSIMA	4 HRS
MISSIMA - FILA	4 HRS

KAGI - 3 1/2 HRS
 EORACK - 4 1/2 HRS
 MANARI - 7 HRS

4 DAYS
 SCALE APPROX 1" = 1 MILE
 FORM LINES APPROX 300 FT

19 Oct 42.

HQ MILNE FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 33(From 0900 hrs 17 Oct to 0900 hrs 19 Oct)

PART I

OPERATIONS.OWN(i) LAND.

On 17 Oct 2 JAPS were captured by a party from 61 Bn approx 4 miles up WEHVRIA CK at DUA DUA. They were unarmed, were no boots and were in very poor condition.

They offered little resistance. The prisoners were sent by plane to N.G. Force on 18 Oct.

OWN(iii) AIR.

Our recce a/c reported nil sightings of enemy shipping in approaches to MILNE BAY, 17 and 18 Oct.

ENEMY (i) LAND.TAUPOTA

4 JAPS were found dead on 17 Oct. It is believed that 2 of them escaped wounded from an encounter on 7 Oct, while the other 2 are those who escaped in the encounter at AWAIAMA on 15 Oct.

PART II

1. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCESSOLOMON IS -18 Oct

East of BOUGAINVILLE IS: 1430 hrs. 2 heavy cruisers, 2 small U/I vessels in posn 05° 52'S, 157° 30'E course 280°, speed 20 knots.

Off BUIN Strip BOUGAINVILLE IS

1630 hrs: 13 ships, incl 1 battleship, 3 cruisers, 2 carriers, 7 U/I smaller ships.

20 miles South of TONOLEI HARBOUR BOUGAINVILLE IS

10 vessels dispersed.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS.

Ref Map BUNA SALAMAUA strat.

(a) MAROUBRA. 15 Oct 3 Bn moved round left flank of 2/33 Bn to cut main track, while one coy 2/33 Bn moved into posn on right flank to co-operate with 3 Bn.

Three mortar dets from 16 Bde moved up to support further attack. Enemy not patrolling and holding fire until our fwd tps press closely. 2/25 Bn continuing to probe enemy front and flanks. 2/31 Bn patrolling KAGI area.

3 Bn succeeded in cutting main track causing enemy to withdraw. 2/33 Bn advanced through 3 Bn at 1500 L/15 to south bank of EORA CK. JAPS reported holding north bank, br demolished.


16 Oct. 2/33 Bn continuing attack.

(b) KUMUSI VALLEY Natives reported JAPS crossing KUMUSI R by rope br at FAIVA QH 8787 Aust 'D' Patrol vicinity QH 8783.

(c) KANGA Fwd patrols SALAMAU - MUBO area state JAPS have sup bases and tp concentrations KOMIATUM and LOGUI. 200 tps at LOGUI. 3 inch AA guns KOMIATUM HILL. Natives all neighbouring villages impressed to repair track SALAMAU - MUBO and carry stores.

6. CAPTURED EQUIPMENT.

A parcel containing articles taken in action in New Guinea between 26 Aug and 3 Sept 42 has been recovered by HQ BURNELLAND L of C Area. The infm contained in various articles would have been of considerable operational value at the time of capture. Similar instances of laxity on the part of tps, franking offrs and Unit Censors have resulted in the loss of valuable infm.


Col.
GS MELNE FORCE.

Distribution:

(As for Intell Summary 32 plus 5 copies : 17 Aust Inf Bde.)

f.m.

Alcy

SECRET. I-125
Copy No. 8
20 Oct 42. WDI

HQ MILNE FORCE INTELL SUM NO 34

(From 0900 hrs 19 Oct to 0900 hrs 20 Oct 42)

PART I

OPERATIONS.

OWN (111) AIR.

19 Oct. All sightings by our a/c in shipping lanes to MILNE BAY

Attacks 18 Oct

Night 17/18 Oct: B17's attacked shipping FAISI area. 1 heavy cruiser was damaged, 2 others possibly hit. Near misses on large seaplane tender and other ships. 1 ship was observed burning off BUIN.

B17's attacked RABAUL HARBOUR, town and wharves and LAKUWAI drone. Results unobserved.

B25 scored direct hit on seaplane PILELO IS near ARANE, NEW BRITAIN.

MUBO was bombed.

PART II

1. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

18 Oct

BUKA 1 destroyer, 1 cruiser, 1 merchant vessel

KALIENG 2 destroyers, 1 transport 8000 tons.

SWKAVIENG 1 seaplane tender and small escort vessel.

19 Oct

TOMOLEI AREA 1520 hrs 19 Oct.

40 ships incl 2 carriers, 1 seaplane tender, 8 heavy cruisers, 10 light cruisers or destroyers, 8 MVs, 11 U/I smaller vessels.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

(a) MAROUBRA: 16 Oct. 0830L 2/33 Bn attacked to force EORA CK coming south TEMPLETON'S CROSSING while 2/25 Bn renewed its attack. During day 2/33 Bn advance forced enemy opposing 2/25 Bn to withdraw. 2/33 Bn followed by 3 Bn maintained advance driving back enemy rear parties. Disposed evening 16 Oct fwd coy 3 Bn 2 miles south of EORA CK village. Remainder 3 Bn and 2/25 Bn north of jung tracks from MYOLA and KAGI. 2/33 Bn at TEMPLETON'S XING and had seized high ground to east. HQ 25 Bde TEMPLETON'S XING.

Patrol of 2/31 Bn sent out morning 16 Oct to locate DOUGLAS crashed dropping sups EFOGI NORTH located wrecked A/C west KAGI all crew dead.

17 Oct. First light two Coys 3 Bn began encircling movement and Jap east flank. 2200 L/17 3 Bn in contact 800 yds north TEMPLETON'S. The two coys astride track dug in near enemy posn. Enemy using 37 mm and hy mortars.

Throughout day 3 Bn continued attack enemy front and rear. Enemy casualties 41. Two lt mortars and much eqpt captured. In evening enemy made several local counter-attacks but repulsed with heavy casualties.

2/25 and 2/33 Bns east and west track respectively 200 yds north TEMPLETON'S. First light 18 Oct det 2/25 Bn will move against enemy's left flank.

HQ 25 Bde opened TEMPLETON'S 1500L/17. 16 Bde moving up 18 Oct to maintain impetus of attack.

Patrol 2/25 Bn reced track from MYOLA to NW found it little used and rough.

17 Oct one sick PW being held NAURO.

No infm when and where captured.

(b) KANGA FORCE

16 Oct force left for MUBO - SALAMAUA area.

BUNA area. Native reports indicate no enemy stationed ORO BAY but occasional small patrol visits from BUNA where large gun sited JIROPA PT. Reports also state small dett enemy WAIROPE SANGARA SOPUTA BUNA with labour corps.

SALAMAUA area enemy estimated 500, MUBO 500, KOMIATUM 200 and LOGUI 200.

LAE O.P reports by explosions considered possibly from arty piece newly installed.

Col.
GS MILNE FORCE.

Distribution:

As for Intell Sum No 55.

19 Oct 42.

7 AUST INF BDE

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 4

Based on information recd up to 1200 hrs 19 Oct 42

SECTION A. OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE1. ENEMY DISPOSITIONSRABI - K.B. ANIOMA AREA

- 28 Sep. 1 Jap killed 200 yds N of WAGA WAGA. Jap had no arms and no food.
- 29 Sep. Our patrol encountered a party of 12 Japs in the hills N of LILIOA. Five were killed incl one offr. In the vicinity of WAGA WAGA the body of an Aust Soldier was found tied to a tree.
- 8 Oct. One Jap shot by a patrol 800^x N of RABI. Jap in good physical condition armed with rifle and carrying equipment in good repair.
- 17 Oct. Two Japs were captured by a patrol from 81 Bn approx 4 miles up WEHURIA CK at DUA DUA. They were unarmed, wore no boots and were in a poor condition. They offered no resistance. They were sent by plane to N.G. Force on Oct 18.

WEDAU AREA

- 28 Sep. 4 Japs killed GUAGUNAKI
- 2 Oct. Our patrol killed 6 Japs.
- 3 Oct. 1 Jap found dead at LARONAI.

TAUPOTA AREA

- 2 Oct. Our patrol killed 2 Japs.
- 8 Oct. Our patrol located and killed a party of 4 Japs in a deep gorge 3 miles South TAUPOTA, Japs were armed with 3 rifles and ample amm.
- 9 Oct. 4 Japs killed one mile S of PUNI PUNI.
- 17 Oct. 4 Japs found dead.

HIOGE AREA: Party of 4 Japs intercepted by natives on beach at HIOGE

- 3 Oct. Natives killed Japs using small cal rifle, shotgun and knives

2. ENEMY AIR ACTION

- 4 Oct. TORLESSE IS reports a plane, believed to be Japanese, has crashed on the beach at MOTORINA IS. It is said to have crashed on 10 Sep. The day after the plane crashed, 2 shots were heard on the Island.
- 9 Oct. One of our B 17's was attacked by enemy fighters over COLLINGWOOD BAY. Our A/C returned safely.

3. OUR AIR ACTIONShip Sightings.

A.M. 24 Sep our A/C reported 4 schooners North side PANA POMPOM IS. P.M. 24 our A/C reported no sign of schooners.

1050 hrs 25 Sep 10 cruisers, 3 cargo ships, 6 destroyers, 5 gunboats at FAISI HARBOUR.

0735 hrs 26 Sep Hudsons sighted a 500 ton vessel at 08^o 35' S 152^o 12' E, course 290^o, speed 8 knots.

Two Hudsons attacked, both scoring near misses, causing the vessels to stop.

A strike force of four Beaufighters and one Hudson was dispatched to attack. The Hudson scored two direct hits and one near miss, setting the vessel alight. The strafing by the Beaufighters caused it to burn fiercely. It is possible that the vessel was a wireless ship.

A Catalina returning from a night mission on 26 Sep at BUKA, saw 2 searchlights on WOODLARK IS. Light tried to locate aircraft without result. A Hudson, accompanied by Beaufighters was sent out on 27 Sep to search for and attack lights or enemy activity. Aircraft failed to locate target.

27 Sep. 1 cruiser in DAMPIER STRAIT West of NEW BRITAIN, course 270°, speed 15 knots.

1140 hrs 27 Sep. BOUGAINVILLE IS off MOILA Pt, 1 probable carrier, 2 light cruisers, 1 transport 7000 to 10000 tons. Off BUIN, 3 light cruisers, 4 cargo vessels 5000 to 8000 tons. Off FAISI, 1 cargo vessel.

TONOLEI HARBOUR, 1 merchant vessel, 1 destroyer.

30 Sep. Beaufighters attacked a loaded barge near BUNA and considered it destroyed. Three Hudsons attacked BILLI, 2 Zeros probably shot down, 1 Hudson was damaged.

2 Oct. In recce over GOODENOUGH IS. P.M. 2 P 39's reported 1 sail boat anchored CAPE WATTS, and 7 or 8 possible barges near COCONUT POINT.

3 Oct. A Hudson on recce at dawn 3 Oct reported Nil sightings WOODLARK and GOODENOUGH Is. No barges were visible at COCONUT POINT.

Night 2/3 Oct. 10 Beaufighters attacked enemy shipping in the FAISI Area. 3 cruisers and 2 merchant vessels were attacked with torpedoes at close range. No results were observed but it is considered improbable that there were misses.

Oct 2. 6 B 17's attacked shipping in RABAU. 1 15,000 ton tpt was hit and set on fire. 1 7,000 ton tpt was hit and left smoking. 1 cruiser and 1 U.I. vessel were probably hit.

1140 hrs 27 Sep. BOUGAINVILLE IS off MOILA Pt, 1 probable carrier, 2 light cruisers, 1 transport 7000 to 10000 tons. Off BUIN, 3 light

FAISI and RABAU Areas. Off FAISI, 1 cargo vessel. RABAU HARBOUR, 1 merchant vessel.

FAISI Area - A.M. 3 Oct 7 Cruisers
8 Destroyers
5 Merchant vessels
2 Tenders

TONOLEI - A.M. 3 Oct 7 Cruisers
3 Destroyers
5 Merchant vessels
1 Seaplane tender

S.W. BUKA passage A.M. 3 Oct 1 Cruiser
1 Seaplane tender

5 Oct. BUIN - FAISI Area 45 vessels consisting of 1 prob battleship, 6 cruisers, 20 destroyers, 10 cargo vessels 2 tankers, 6 U.I. vessels.

RABAU 15 to 20 ships in the harbour including 1 prob battleship and seaplane tender.

BUNA Area 0820 hrs 2 destroyers
1 Tpt.

7 Oct. Two Beaufighters strafed KILIA MISSION AREA vicinity CAPE WATTS, GOODENOUGH IS. but reported no sign of enemy activity.

Ship sightings to 1200 L/7

3 Oct 1525 L CHOISEUL ISLAND 4 Cruisers
Course 110° speed 20 knots

4 Oct 0900 L RABAU HARBOUR 8 Cruisers
TONOLEI - A.M. 3 Oct 9 Destroyers
7 Cargo vessels (2 of which are possibly S/P tenders)
1 Seaplane tender
3 Gun boats

5 Oct 1245 LU90 mls S.W. of GASMATA 3 Oct 1 Lt Cruiser
1 Destroyer
1 Tpt (10,000 tons)


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RABAU 15 to 20 ships in the harbour including 1 prob battleship and seaplane tender.

BUNA Area 0820 hrs 2 destroyers

7th Aust Inf Bde Intelligence Summary No 4

CAPTURED EQUIPMENT



SKETCH OF JAPANESE MONEY CAPTURED AT MILNE BAY
 THIS IS INTENDED FOR INTRODUCTION IN CAPTURED ISLANDS
 UNLIKE THEIR NORMAL CURRENCY THESE NOTES ARE
 NOT NUMBERED



6 Oct 1020 L Anchored in harbour
near KAVIENG.

1 probable Battleship
1 Lt Cruiser
1 Hy Cruiser
2 Cargo vessels

6 Oct 1430 L BUIN - FAISI

5 Cruisers
18 Destroyers
1 Tanker
13 Cargo vessels
1 probable MUTU class Battleship

11 Oct. Rescue aircraft sighted one 10,000 ton tpt escorted by one destroyer in posn $05^{\circ} 40' S$ $152^{\circ} 55' E$. Five direct hits were scored on tpt with 250 lb bombs. Transport carried deck cargo of 12 Zeros. Ship was left stationary.

12 Oct. Our Aircraft strafed KILIA MISSION area on GOODENOUGH IS. No signs of life were observed. KILIA MISSION was again strafed A.M.
13 Oct.

RABAU

On night 8/9 Oct 30 Fortresses and 3 Catalinas attacked, hitting targets in the town area and starting many large fires.

On night 9/10 Oct RABAU was again heavily attacked. Large fires were started and one U.I. vessel was observed burning.

LAE. On 9 Oct 14 B 25's and 9 Beaufighters bombed and strafed drome and wharf areas. It was later reported that there were several explosions heard from amn dumps. A total of 4 bombers and 11 fighters were observed wrecked on the drome.

4. ENEMY SIG ACTIVITY

9 Oct. Enemy W/T communication had decreased.

5. ENEMY NAVAL

Sightings as per paras "OUR AIR ACTION"

0945 hrs 26 Sep. One destroyer reported in posn $155^{\circ} 25' E$ $07^{\circ} 45' S$, South of BOUGAINVILLE IS. course 340° speed 25 - 30 knots.

6. CHEMICAL WARFARE

No indications for immediate preparations for C.W. by the enemy have been reported up to the present in the N.G. area.

The Japs however, are well prepared to conduct offensive chemical warfare should it be advantageous to do so, and it is considered that JAPAN will not hesitate to resort to C.W. when a suitable occasion permits itself. Indications concerning C.W. would be obtained from the collation of a number of isolated and perhaps insignificant scraps of infm from various areas of operations.

Timely anticipation of enemy intentions to use gas can only be obtained if formations and units will co-operate by forwarding infm of the following nature.

- (i) The carrying of respirators by JAP soldiers
- (ii) The carrying of unused equipment
- (iii) Jap uniforms (to test for imprignation)
- (iv) All types of weapons and munitions, especially if the markings vary from the usual.
- (v) Reports of dumps or demolition of dumps containing liquid or containers with an unusual odour.

7. ENEMY O.D.B. DETAILS

AIR. Estimates of enemy land based A/C based on infm to 25 Sep 42 as follows:-

AREAS	F	B	F/B	F/P	Tpt & Obsvn A/C	Total
NEW BRITAIN	35	88	18	4	20	165
NEW IRELAND						
NEW GUINEA	17	7		6		30
SOLOMONS	20	20	18	30		88
TIMOR	6	3				9
BALI	9				3	12
AMBON	9	8	8	7		32
CELEBES	18	9	12	19	3	61
TOTAL	114	135	56	66	26	397

(vi) A. TK GUN.

Att as appx "P" is a sketch and brief report on the Jap A.Tk gun taken from the tank captured in MILNE BAY Ops.

11. BOMB INTELLIGENCE & REPORTS

(a) It is suspected that a clockwork delay fuze may be incorporated in JAPANESE bombs. Detailed infm should be reported through normal channels and direct to E in C, L.H.Q. immediately this new type of fuze is encountered.

(b) It is also suspected that NOSE FUZE TYPE "X", long delay, is likely to be used in some JAPANESE incendiary bombs. Reports should be furnished as in para "a" above when such use of this fuze, or other type delay action fuze, can be confirmed.

(c) The attention of all units is directed to the necessity for prompt reporting of all infm vital to Bomb Disposal work so that other units and Allied Forces may be informed.

(Allied Land Forces in S.W. Pacific Area (B 1 Technical Instruction No 70).

12. AIR.

"NEWS WEEK" magazine (published in U.S.A.) dated 27 Jul 42 states that in order to get away when close pressed, the Jap pilots are now known to have a smoke-bomb device att under the engine nacelles of A/C. The Pilot starts smoke pouring from his engine, goes into a dive and, after his pursuer abandons him as finished, pulls out of the dive and departs.

The above is confirmed by tactics used by JAP pilots in the recent MILNE BAY operations when Zeros dived away emitting dense black smoke, giving the impression of being shot down but pulled out of the dive and escaped, flying away just above the tops of trees.

(H.Q. MILNEFORCE Intelligence Summary No 20)

Great importance is att to the large number of makers' name plates affixed to the various components of JAP A/C and their eqpt, from which the Directorate of Air Intelligence is able to derive considerable intelligence as to the rate of production etc. In order to assist this directorate in the above regard, it is requested that any Army personnel concerned with the locating of crashed enemy A/C, especially in the N.G. area, should immediately endeavour to advise the nearest Air Intelligence Officer of the fact. If no Air Unit is in the area, he should as soon as possible, endeavour to send to the nearest Army or Air H.Q. such Makers' Plates as may be available, from the crashed A/C appropriately labelled with the following:-

The name or description of the part from which it came,
The type of A/C,
The location of the A/C.

(H.Q. MILNEFORCE Summary No 28)

SECTION B ENEMY TECHNICAL AND ADM INTELLIGENCE

13. WORKS Nil

14. REAR ORGANISATION Nil

SECTION C GENERAL INTELLIGENCE

15. ENEMY TACTICS IORIBAIWA AREA.

Att as appx "G" are examples of JAP tactics given by soldiers in fwd areas and by others in hospital.

KOKODA AREA

Att as appx "H" are notes on JAP Tactics based on infm supplied by offrs of 39 Aust Inf Bn.

GENERAL. Att as appx "J" are notes and conventional signs taken from a captured N.C.O's notebooks in the area. He should be reported to the nearest Army or Air H.Q.

16. CENSORSHIP

Censorship regulations have been released to allow tps to mention that they are in NEW GUINEA, but mention or inference of any particular location in NEW GUINEA is not permitted.

Green envelopes must not be used for discussion of military matters. A large number of green envelope letters from MILNE BAY area have been sighted describing the recent action. It had also been noted that offrs have been using green envelopes. The privilege of the green envelope applies only to O.R's.

preparations to distribute this currency amongst natives in the N.G. area. No reports have yet been recd of any attempts to circulate JAP currency in the MILNE BAY area although an A.N.G.A.U. Officer in the TUFU district reports that Japs are paying the natives Jap money, mostly paper. Any further reports of Jap currency being circulated in the N.G. area should be immediately reported to this H.Q.

It is evident that some unit franking offrs are not sufficiently aware of the serious consequences which may follow the leakage of infm conveyed through the mail.

In a recent censorship check on the mail from a bde, no less than 36% of the mail which had been franked and carried the unit censor stamp conveyed infm of projected movements, and the most flagrant offenders were offrs who franked their own letters.

If this serious breach of discipline persists, it will eventually lead to the withdrawal of this privilege from offrs.

17. JAP MORALE "FAMOUS LAST WORDS"

The following are extracts from a JAP diary in the MEKARI area.

- (a) To reach PORT MORESBY will be difficult, but without fail, this major operation will be carried out.
- (b) I have faith in the final victory, we advance to MORESBY.

18. CURRENCY

A JAP one pound and a ten shilling note, printed in English was found on the body of an enemy soldier in MILNE BAY and indicates preparations to distribute this currency amongst natives in the N.G. area. No reports have yet been recd of any attempts to circulate JAP currency in the MILNE BAY area although an A.N.G.A.U. Officer in the TUFU district reports that Japs are paying the natives Jap money, mostly paper. Any further reports of Jap currency being circulated in the N.G. area should be immediately reported to this H.Q.

(H.Q. MILNEFORCE Intelligence Summary No 20)

Att as appx "I" is a sketch illustrating the pound note.

R.M. Jones Lieut.
A.I.O. 7 Aust Inf Bde.

Issued through Sigs.
with 10 appxs.

- Appx "A" Organisation of "YANO" Unit.
- Appx "B" Report on interrogation of prisoners taken on NORMANBY IS.
- Appx "C" Description of TAISHO "II" L.M.G.
- Appx "D" Translation of an instruction pamphlet with "type 93 No 3 Respirator".
- Appx "E" Sketch of JAP Magnetesid Bomb.
- Appx "F" Sketch and brief report on A.Tk gun taken from tank captured in MILNE BAY Cps.
- Appx "G" Notes on JAP tactics IORIBA IWA
- Appx "H" Notes on JAP tactics KAKODA area.
- Appx "I" Shetch illustrating JAP pound note
- Appx "K" Distribution of JAP forces.

6 J Attack & conven signs

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7 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 4.

to 19 Oct 42.

ORGANISATION & STRENGTH - "YANO" NAVAL LANDING UNIT
IDENTIFIED AT MILNE BAY

UNIT	ORDER	RANK	NAME	ATT TO UNIT		SEC NCOs	RANKS	TOTAL
				NCOs	MARINES			
BN HQ	O.C. ADJT. COLOUR BEARER.	COMD LIEUT	YANO NAGADA					45
	BN ATT TPS	SUB-LIEUT	ONISHI	1 2	5			
	LEADER HQ PL.	W.O.				3	30	
No 1 COY	COY LEADER	SPEC SERVICE	KOMURA					197
	ATT TO COY	LIEUT						
	HQ PL LEADER	W.O.	ISHII	2			34	
	No. 1 PL	"				3	46	
	No. 2 PL	"				4	42	
No. 3 PL	"				6	50		
No 2 COY	COY LEADER	SUB-LIEUT						224
	ATT TO COY	1st Class						
	HQ PL LEADER	W.O.		2	2		51	
	No. 1 PL	"				2	39	
	No. 2 PL	"				2	28	
	MG PL	"				2	45	
	AA PL LEADER	"				3	30	
No 3 COY	COY LEADER	SPEC SERVICE	MARUYAMA					125
ATT TO COY	SUB-LIEUT							
HQ PL LEADER	1st Class							
No. 1 PL	W.O.	KOGI		2		3	33	
No. 2 PL	"					3	37	
SIGNAL UNIT	LEADER	"		2		4	9	15
ENGR UNIT	LEADER	SGT				3	29	33
TPT UNIT	LEADER					4	44	48
MEDICAL UNIT	LEADER UNIT	LIEUT SUB-LIEUT 1st Class	SAO OGAWA	2		3	24	32
INTEND- ANCE	LEADER	LIEUT	SAKITANI					43
	ATT TO UNIT	SUB-LIEUT 1st Class SPEC SERVICE SUB-LIEUT 2nd Class ?	NAKAJIMA	6		4	29	
TOTAL			32					729
SUM TOTAL								761

7 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 4to 19 Oct 42REPORT ON PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION OF JAP
P.W. TAKEN AT NORMANBY ISLAND 23/9/42.1. NAMES:

1. HAMANAKA, HARUO
2. HIKIURA, SHOMI
3. OHONINE, YOSHIMASA
4. INOUI, TOYOTAKA
5. FUJITA, SHIGESHI
6. TAKAKI, HIBAO
7. UCHINO, TOSHIROU
8. TSUTA, AKIRA.

The above P.W., all ORs, were members of the crew of the JAP destroyer YAYOI, which was bombed and sunk by A/C on 11 Sep. The full compliment of the destroyer was 200.

Over half the crew were lost, including the Comd - YASUTAKE, SHIRO (TAISA).

The destroyer YAYOI, left JAPAN on 15 Aug, proceeded direct to SAIPAN, arriving there on 20 Aug, thence to RABAUL, arriving approx 27 Aug.

The voyage, on which the destroyer was sunk, was the third such voyage made by the destroyer, the purpose on each occasion being to land provisions or take off members of the original JAP landing force. On these voyages, the YAYOI co-operated at different times with the destroyers ARASHI, MUTSUKI and ISOKAZE and the cruiser TENRYU.

At the time of sinking, the YAYOI was accompanied by the ISOKAZE, which was not badly damaged and returned toward RABAUL.

One P.W. stated that on the night 6/7 Sep or 7/8 Sep up to 200 JAP wounded were evacuated and returned to RABAUL. Some prisoners had the impression that a considerable number of wounded were to be picked up on the night 11/12 Sep. The destroyer had been previously in touch by W/T with JAPS on shore.

I was not able at the time to establish the spot where these remaining JAPS were to be taken on board the destroyer or destroyers.

Concerning the sinking of the destroyer, P.W. state that about 1600 hrs on 11 Sep they were attacked by approx 10 A/C, 5 of which attacked from the bow and 5 from the stern.

Almost immediately the destroyer sank by the stern in flames.

Approx 50 men, some of them badly burnt, took to the two ships boats and after drifting about all night, reached a beach at NORMANBY ISLAND at dawn on 12/9. While the badly wounded rested under the coconut trees, the remainder went up into the mountains in search of food. The natives encountered were at first a little afraid, but later gave members of the party some food. (HAMANAKA, HARUO states that subsequently a party of natives gave him up to Aust troops).

Each day members of the party who were able to walk, split up into small groups and went up into the mountains in search of food. They re-assembled on the beach after dark. Later, due to strafing from our A/C, the party withdrew into the mountains.

The survivors from the YAYOI had neither weapons, food, med supplies nor W/T equipment.

7 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 1to 19 Oct 42CAPTURED JAP EQPT - TAISHO "11" LMG1. GENERAL

Taisho 11 means the eleventh year since the accession of Taisho in 1911 or in other words A.D. 1922. "MAMBU" is the popular name by which the L.M.G. is known.

The L.M.G. is gas operated and, in some respects, appears to be a modified copy of the Browning automatic rifle. The method of feed, consisting of a hopper attached to the left side of the body opposite the feed opening and charged with clips of cartridges is however, unique. A bad feature of the gun is the ejector of "Lewis" type which is pivoted in an external bracket on the left of the body and can easily be damaged.

2. DETAILS

Calibre	6.5mm (.256")
Weight of gun (without hopper)	20 lbs 5 ozs
Weight of gun (with empty hopper)	22 lbs 7 ozs
Weight of barrel	3 lbs 2 ozs
Length of gun overall	43 $\frac{1}{2}$ in
Length of barrel	19 $\frac{1}{2}$ in
Maximum (cyclic) rate of fire	500 rds per min.
Practical rate of fire	100-150 rds per min
Capacity of feed hopper	6 clips of 5 rounds each
Sights	Barleycorn foresight, open V backsight graduated from 300- 1500 m.
Mounting	Permanently graduated attached bipod, the L.M.G. is sometimes fired off a tripod mounting.
Rifling	4 grooves, L.H. Concentric, 1 turn in 8 ins.
Provision for firing single shots	none

3. SAFETY

A safety lever 7 on the left of the trigger guard is shifted downward until approximately vertical for "safe". In this position its lower end engages two small notches in the side of the trigger guard and cannot easily be displaced. For "fire", the safety lever is rotated backward and upward until it points horizontally to the rear.

The safety lever is attached to the end of a pin, part of which is cut-away. When the safety lever is set at "safe" the solid portion of the pin obstructs the trigger, whereas, when it is set at "fire" the cut-away allows the trigger to operate freely and depress the sear.

4. PREPARATION FOR FIRING

Raise the cover of the feed hopper and insert six clips of cartridges. Bring the cover down smartly so as to drive the cartridges from the clips on to the platform at the bottom of the hopper. Cock the gun by pulling back the cocking handle, until the bent of the piston 1 engages the bent of the sear. Push the cocking handle forward until its catch clips into the body.

The gun is now cocked and ready for firing.

5. ACTION OF THE MECHANISM

On pressing the trigger, the nose of the trigger depresses the sear, thereby disengaging it from the bent of the piston 1 and compressing the sear spring. The piston 1 is now driven forward by the compressed return spring and causes the bolt 11 and locking piece to travel along guides in the body. During this forward movement, the feed lever, working in a cam slot in the piston, displaces the platform and feed pawl to the right, the bolt 11 drives a round into the chamber and the extractor rides over the rim of the cartridges. As the bolt goes forward it also engages beneath the nose of the ejector 4, causing it to rise out of the body and at the same time forcing the tail down into the body. Towards the end of the forward movement, lugs on the locking piece 12 ride down vertical slots in the body assisted by inclined surface on the piston post. Final locking occurs when a projection on the bottom of the bolt makes contact with a stop in the body and the piston still moving forward completes the

completes the/

full locking of the bolt by the action of the inclined surfaces on the piston post. Finally the piston post strikes the rear end of the firing pin which is thus driven forward to strike the cap and fire the cartridge in the chamber.

As the bullet is driven out of the barrel, a portion of the gases escapes through a vent and thence through the gas regulator 5 into the gas cylinder to strike the head of the piston and drive the piston back. When the piston has travelled approximately $\frac{3}{8}$ inch to the rear, it engages the bolt and causes the locking piece to rise up the vertical slots in the body assisted by inclined surfaces on the piston post, thereby unlocking the breech. The rear end of the firing pin, being engaged in an inclined slot in the locking piece is withdrawn from the face of the bolt by the rising of the locking piece. During continued rearward movement of the piston, the bolt and locking piece travel along the guides in the body and the empty case is extracted and ejected through the ejection opening in the right of the body. Meanwhile the feed lever displaces the platform and feed pawl from right to left. Backward travel is finally asserted by the full compression of the return spring and the impact of the locking piece against the buffer 10.

When the return and buffer spring reassert themselves, the piston bolt and locking piece are driven forward again. Then, if pressure of the trigger is maintained, the gun will fire automatically until the ammunition is expended, when the bolt will close on an empty chamber; if, however, the trigger is released before the ammunition is expended, the sear spring will re-act, causing the sear to rise and engage the bent of the piston, holding the breech open and empty.

6. MECHANICAL SAFETY

The firing pin is prevented from striking the cartridge cap prematurely by its rear end being masked by the locking piece 12 until locking has been completed, when the locking piece, having moved down the back of the bolt, un.masks the firing pin which can then be struck by the piston post.

7. REGULATION OF RATE OF FIRE.

The rate of fire can be adjusted by means of the gas regulator 5 which has five orifices marked 10, 15, 18, 20 and 28 respectively, the number indicating the diameters of the orifices in millimetres. The gas regulator has a positioning catch 6 with a spring - loaded plunger which engages slots in the front end of the gas cylinder.

8. EXTRACTION.

Primary extraction occurs during the unlocking of the breech as the locking piece rises and the bolt commences its rearward movement, and full extraction when the breech is fully unloaded and the piston, bolt and locking piece are being driven back together.

The extractor is of Mauser type and is located on top of the bolt on the right. A slot is cut in the breech face of the barrel to accommodate its head.

9. EJECTION

As already mentioned, the ejector 4 is of "Lewis" type and is pivoted in a bracket on the top left edge of the body which is formed with two openings; one for the nose and the other for the tail of the ejector. The ejection opening is formed in the right of the body near its front end.

During the forward movement of the piston and bolt, the bolt head raises the nose of the ejector upward out of the body and thus forces the tail of the extractor to descend and project through the corresponding opening in the body.

On rearward movement of the piston, its rear end engages the tail of the ejector causing the ejector nose to descend through the opening in the body and enter the ejection slot in the bolt. Then, as the piston moves further to the rear, the nose of the ejector engages the base of the cartridge and the cartridge is ejected through the ejection opening.

CARTRIDGE OILING SYSTEM

A rectangular gravity oil reservoir 8 is arranged over the feed opening in the body and, as the rounds are fed into the gun, they engage a perforated spring-loaded lubricator fitted to the reservoir and by this action causes oil to flow through the perforations. The reservoir is totally enclosed except for a small valve above the lubricator and a filler opening closed by a screwed plug 9.

completes the/

full locking of the bolt by the action of the inclined surfaces on the piston post. Finally the piston post strikes the rear end of the firing pin which is thus driven forward to strike the cap and fire the cartridge in the chamber.

As the bullet is driven out of the barrel, a portion of the gases escapes through a vent and thence through the gas regulator 5 into the gas cylinder to strike the head of the piston and drive the piston back. When the piston has travelled approximately $\frac{3}{8}$ inch to the rear, it engages the bolt and causes the locking piece to rise up the vertical slots in the body assisted by inclined surfaces on the piston post, thereby unlocking the breech. The rear end of the firing pin, being engaged in an inclined slot in the locking piece is withdrawn from the face of the bolt by the rising of the locking piece. During continued rearward movement of the piston, the bolt and locking piece travel along the guides in the body and the empty case is extracted and ejected through the ejection opening in the right of the body. Meanwhile the feed lever displaces the platform and feed pawl from right to left. Backward travel is finally asserted by the full compression of the return spring and the impact of the locking piece against the buffer 10.

When the return and buffer spring reassert themselves, the piston bolt and locking piece are driven forward again. Then, if pressure of the trigger is maintained, the gun will fire automatically until the ammunition is expended, when the bolt will close on an empty chamber; if, however, the trigger is released before the ammunition is expended, the sear spring will re-act, causing the sear to rise and engage the bent of the piston, holding the breech open and empty.

6. MECHANICAL SAFETY

The firing pin is prevented from striking the cartridge cap prematurely by its rear end being masked by the locking piece 12 until locking has been completed, when the locking piece, having moved down the back of the bolt, un.masks the firing pin which can then be struck by the piston post.

7. REGULATION OF RATE OF FIRE.

The rate of fire can be adjusted by means of the gas regulator 5 which has five orifices marked 10, 15, 18, 20 and 28 respectively, the number indicating the diameters of the orifices in millimetres. The gas regulator has a positioning catch 6 with a spring - loaded plunger which engages slots in the front end of the gas cylinder.

8. EXTRACTION.

Primary extraction occurs during the unlocking of the breech as the locking piece rises and the bolt commences its rearward movement, and full extraction when the breech is fully unloaded and the piston, bolt and locking piece are being driven back together.

The extractor is of Mauser type and is located on top of the bolt on the right. A slot is cut in the breech face of the barrel to accommodate its head.

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As already mentioned, the ejector 4 is of "Lewis" type and is pivoted in a bracket on the top left edge of the body which is formed with two openings; one for the nose and the other for the tail of the ejector. The ejection opening is formed in the right of the body near its front end.

During the forward movement of the piston and bolt, the bolt head raises the nose of the ejector upward out of the body and thus forces the tail of the extractor to descend and project through the corresponding opening in the body.

On rearward movement of the piston, its rear end engages the tail of the ejector causing the ejector nose to descend through the opening in the body and enter the ejection slot in the bolt. Then, as the piston moves further to the rear, the nose of the ejector engages the base of the cartridge and the cartridge is ejected through the ejection opening.

CARTRIDGE OILING SYSTEM

A rectangular gravity oil reservoir 8 is arranged over the feed opening in the body and, as the rounds are fed into the gun, they engage a perforated spring-loaded lubricator fitted to the reservoir and by this action causes oil to flow through the perforations. The reservoir is totally enclosed except for a small valve above the lubricator and a filler opening closed by a screwed plug 9.

11. COOLING SYSTEM

The barrel is air-cooled, radiation being assisted by a heavy ribbed barrel casing and ribs on the projecting portion of the barrel at the muzzle end.

12. MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Return Spring: The return spring is a coiled spring of the common single strand type fitted over a return guide rod 3 on the back block. The front end of the return spring engages in a hole in the rear end of the piston.

On the return spring is $15\frac{1}{2}$ inches long (free length), has 87 coils $\frac{7}{16}$ inch outside diameter and $\frac{1}{16}$ inch thick.

(b) Firing Pin: The firing pin is not spring-loaded and withdrawal is effected by engagement of its rear end in an inclined slot in the locking piece.

(c) Sear: The sear consists of a spring-loaded plunger of circular cross-section in the top of which is machined a square faced bent for engagement with a corresponding square faced bent on the piston.

(d) Butt: The butt which incorporates the firing mechanism, is joined to a wooden shoulder by a swan-necked steel pressing. A steel butt plate is screwed on the rear end and a sling swivel on the right of the shoulder piece.

(e) Buffer: The buffer 10 is a two pronged piece fitted in the top of the back block, which carries the return spring guide rod 3, and held in position by a spring loaded screw. The prongs engage the lugs of the locking piece, absorbing the excess energy in the backward action and assisting the return spring in the forward movement.

(f) Bipod: The bipod consists of two legs attached to a collar just behind the foresight bracket by rivets which also act as axis pins. The legs fold, but do not clip against the body and are unusually long, being approximately 17 inches overall.


13. STRIPPING

(a) Barrel changing: It is not an easy matter to change the barrel when hot.

(b) Information regarding stripping: A full stripping sequence is not available, but the following details may be of assistance:-

- (i) The barrel casing is screwed on the front of the body and positioned by a pin on the left.
- (ii) The barrel is a sliding fit in the barrel casing and is secured by a tapered pin at the front end of the casing.
- (iii) The gas regulator screws into the front end of the gas cylinder.
- (iv) Before the breech can be stripped, the catch on the body locking pin must be disengaged and the pin rotated until the projection on its left end is in line with the slot in the body. The body locking pin can then be pulled out and the back block, etc, removed.
- (v) The butt is dovetailed into the rear of the body and secured in position by a retaining pin inserted from left to right.
- (vi) The feed hopper is attached to the body by a split pin and a retaining catch.

(Adv LHQ Intell Sum No 6)



DETAILS

CALIBRE	6.6MM (256)	MAX. RATE OF FIRE	450 R.P.M
WEIGHT LOADED	25 lb ?	NUMBER OF ROUNDS	306 clips of 3
EFFECTIVE RANGE	1,000 .. ?	AIR COOLED - GAS OPERATED	

Type of Feed -- Amm is fed from a wedge shaped box magazine on the left side of the breech mechanism. The magazine holds 30 rds in 6 clips. The rounds are put into the magazine in their charges, held down by a hinged cover and fed through the gun from left to right.

7 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 1

to 19 Oct 42

INSTRUCTION LEAFLET FOR RESPIRATOR

Captured MILNE BAY
received ADV LHQ - 2/9/42

On cover -

Instruction leaflet for
"Type 93 No 3 Respirator"
"(Auxiliary canisters are supplied when necessary from a separate issue.)"

Efficacy of Respirator

1. If wearing Type 93 No 3 Respirator you can carry on operations unharmed in the midst of almost any kind of gas. But don't forget limitations such as the following:
 - (a) Where there is a deficiency of oxygen in the air, as for example on the outbreak of fire in a poorly ventilated room the respirator has no effect.
 - (b) When the density of the gas is great from the beginning a slight leakage may be experienced, (but this is rare).
 - (c) The main canister gives no protection against carbon monoxide. On the occasion of a fire in a warship, an underwater explosion and other cases where carbon monoxide is present you must be sure to use the supplementary canister at the same time. But the supplementary canister is effective only if the density is 3% or less. If it is higher an oxygen-mask is necessary for protection.
2. The main canister is effective in the presence of gas for a total of about 80 hours. When gas is not present, wearing the mask has little effect on its life, provided that every high degree of moisture is not inhaled.

Directions for Use.

3. The respirator may be carried as the ordinary side type, and, according to arrangement, as the back-borne type.
For the side type the carrying cord is put under the arm (or round the back) and the waist cord tied close.
For the back-borne type, pass one end of the carrying-cord through the ring and couple the other end to the buckle. Tie the waist-cord fast.
4. When carrying the respirator screw in firmly the connecting part of the canister and the connecting tube and make completely air-tight. Do not discard or lose the bottom stopper but insert into its holder.
5. Putting on respirator as follows -
 - (a) First examine inside of respirator, particularly examine whether the exhaling valve is working or not.
 - (b) Rub inner and outer surfaces of the eye-glass with the accompanying cloth and smear on anti-dim compound. In applying the compound first rub clear the inner surface and breathe all over it. Then lightly rub anti-dim compound several times on to one end of the glass, spread it with the cloth over the whole surface, and wipe off what remains adhering so that the whole is transparent.
 - (c) Adjusting the head-harness: The 1st and 2nd straps should be previously adjusted to fit the head. Loosen the 3rd strap to its full extent and grip the 2nd and 3rd straps lightly on the right and left with both hands. First put the chin into the chin part of the mask, then fix the crown of the head into the corresponding part separating the back straps. Finally, tighten the right and left ends of the 3rd strap to a suitable degree so as to make perfectly air-tight.
 - (d) Having finished putting on the mask stop up the hole in the bottom of the canister with the palm of the hand or grip strongly the connecting tube so as to interrupt inhalation. Then breathe in softly so as to test whether the respirator is air-tight.
6. When the mask is on adjust the carrying cord so that the haversack is at a position where the connecting tube has enough play not to hinder movements of the head.

- 7. Removing the respirator loosen the 3rd strap on both sides to its full extent, then gripping the lower part of the respirator gradually remove it completely from the chin.
- 8. Since it is necessary to put on and remove the respirator swiftly and surely, repeated practice is required.
- 9. When using the auxiliary canister this is already attached, and only by altering the cock is the distinction made between its use and disuse.

First take the main canister out of the haversack, then join the connecting part of the auxiliary canister to the lower end of the main canister so that they interlock firmly. Give about 90 turns so that the two will be quite airtight and then replace in haversack. Then use by turning the reversible cock to the position 'On' in the presence of carbon monoxide, and to the position 'Off' in its absence.

(Type 93 No 2 Auxiliary Canister may also be attached and used)

Overhaul and Storage

- 10. After every use the respirator must be thoroughly overhauled and then stored according to regulations.
 - (a) With the cleaning cloth wipe the inside of the respirator clean from perspiration, saliva etc. If there are bad stains they must be wiped clean with pure water or respirator cleaning fluid (mixture of 90% alcohol and 10% water. If gasoline is used for this purpose there is danger of damage to the rubber through melting. Again, when going to use a respirator already used by another, be sure to disinfect respirator by wiping clean with respirator cleaning fluid.
 - (b) When carrying out ordinary overhaul, if the outlet valve is very moist it must be removed from the valve-seat and overhaul carried out; but care must be taken to leave no scraps of thread, dirt etc.
 - (c) If the respirator is soaked with seawater, antiseptic or other such liquids, it must be washed with pure water and allowed to dry in the shade.

- 11. Storage of respirator as follows -
 - (a) Separate the canister from the connecting tube and cork firmly both the mouth and the underneath stoppers.
 - (b) Put the straps inside the face piece and place in haversack without folding double. When doing this the upper part of the canister should be fitted correctly into the facepiece to prevent any change in shape. The connecting tube should be coiled round the outlet valve roughly in the shape of the character and put into the haversack.
 - (c) The anti-dim compound and cleaning cloth together with the instruction leaflet must be placed in the pocket, with the cord passed through the buttonhole to prevent their loss.
 - (d) Leaving the carrying cord as it is wind the waist cord round the lower part of the haversack.

Preservation and Inspection

- 12. Keep the respirator as cool as possible and choose a dry place for it.
- 13. If rubber manufactured goods are stored for long in an irregular position they lose their original shape and cannot be brought back to it. The respirator must definitely be stored according to the prescribed method.
- 14. When in use the respirator should be included in the daily superficial overhaul of small arms, and also inspected in the weekly overhaul of small arms.

Defective parts should be immediately repaired.


- 15. Parts included in the Type 93 No 3 Respirator are as follows:-

- Respirator 1
- Main canister 1
- Haversack 1
- Anti-dim compound 1
- Cleaning cloth 1
- Instruction leaflet 1


(Adv LHQ)

7 BDE INTELL SUM. N° 4 19 Oct 44

APPX E



BOMB IN CARRYING CASE



BOMB READY FOR USE

7 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 4.to 19 Oct 42Report on 37 mm Japanese Anti Tank GunBy LIEUT ARMSTRONG 101 A.I.A.

BARREL The barrel is 47 1/2 ins long and is devoid of any guides to prevent it turning in the rough cast steel Body Block.

BODY BLOCK. The body block is a stepped rough cast steel block, bored longitudinally to receive the barrel. This boring has a bronze lining which is in turn grooved to distribute grease injected externally through 2 nipples.

The lower section of the body block is similarly bored to receive the Buffer and Recuperator System.

The whole block is covered with 1/4 in steel plates to prevent enemy fire fracturing the metal. To the rear of the block is fitted a steel partition which enables the gun to be fitted into the tank. This partition is constructed in two parts; the inner allows traverse; the outer: elevation & depression.

BREECH. The breech is self-closing and self-ejecting. The Breech Ring and Barrel are in one piece.

The breech block contains an intricate Firing Mechanism incorporating a fixed-type striker. Compensation for a weak striker spring is made by the addition of extra steps on the striker post.

Unlike our 2 pdr A.Tk gun, the LBM (Lever Breech Mech) operates directly on to the Rack which in turn is meshed with the Rack Pinion. The rack pinion then operates the Actuating Shaft.

A shield is fitted to a bracket to the left of the breech and acts as a protector for the operator who, by the way, loads, lays and fires himself.

On the inner side of this shield is a Recoil Scale capable of registering recoil up to 210 m.m. (8 3/8 ins) I would estimate the normal recoil to be 190 to 200 m.m. (7 5/8 to 8 ins).

BUFFER and RECUPERATOR This is a moving cylinder, fixed piston, liquid and spring type. The gun on being fired, recoils, compressing the spring and forcing the liquid over the head of the piston.

On run-out, the compressed springs reassert themselves and the liquid is forced through two by-passes past the piston head. Final run-out is controlled by a Control Plunger entering a Control Chamber.

The Buffer Springs, two (2) in number, are each 9 1/2 ins (free length) long. One spring is Right wound; the other Left wound. The springs (2) separated by a 1/4 in. parting plate fit over the buffer cylinder and inside the lower and smaller of the two longitudinal-borings in the body block. The springs are compressed by a screwed collar screwed into the front of the body block.

The buffer cylinder is connected to the breech by a bayonet axis pin.

GENERAL. The gun is a Q.F. (Quick Firing) 37 m.m. bore (1 1/2 in approx) with a Semi-Automatic Breech. It is a Direct Fire weapon; shoulder controlled and is aimed by means of a telescope.


REMARKS. Broadly speaking this gun is a crude and cheap COPY of the ENGLISH 2 Pdr ANTI TANK GUN with the exception of the striker (complete) and some parts of the breech mechanism.

Throughout the steel used is very mild and a FILE run across any part produces a deep scratch.

I would say that the accuracy of the gun would be decreased by each shot. Assuming that the ammunition fired is, in comparison to the corresponding British ammo., of lower m.v., then the above inaccuracy would diminish somewhat.

CAPTURED JAPANESE 37MM ANTI TANK GUN
SCALE 2" = 1 FT (APPROX)

HPPX "F"



7 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 4
to 19 Oct 42.

NOTES ON JAP TACTICS - IORIBAIWA AREA

The following examples of Jap tactics were given by soldiers in the forward area and by others in hospital :-

- i. Japs move in groups of three or four in line abreast. The middle man will shake a tree to attract our attention, and when an Australian shows himself in trying to locate the noise he is shot by Japs on the flank.
- ii. A Jap will step into the open in front of where he judges our defence line to be and shout "Shoot Aussie". If our tps respond other Japs open fire on our positions.
- iii. Enemy tps endeavour to draw our fire in order to pin point our positions. They then range their mortars accordingly.
- iv. Similarly, they draw our fire about dusk. Having thus obtained a knowledge of our positions, they execute flanking movements under cover of darkness and have our tps surrounded by dawn.
- v. HQs are said to be openly approached on occasions with a request for the Colonel - sometimes by name, with the object of shooting him as soon as he has been identified.
- vi. Long vines attached to trees are pulled vigorously from a distance of about 20 ft. When our men fire on the tree their positions in turn are raked by Jap fire.
- vii. Japs infiltrate into our lines at night and give false orders in very good English.
- viii. They are said on one occasion to have impersonated one of our patrols, approaching our positions as such.
- ix. Our line of fire is learned by noting the nicks made in trees by the bullets from our MGs.
- x. Japs use a great deal of natural camouflage and have been described as "walking bushes". In one instance our men fired on a bush that was seen to move and found that five Japs had been concealed behind it.
- xi. In some Jap attacks tps in the rear of the actual attackers will fire and yell, giving our tps the impression that the enemy are further away than they actually are.
- xii. They have been known to use a false front when attacking. When opposition is met, a small body of their tps keep our front occupied, while the main body does a flanking movement.
- xiii. Japs are very patient and will wait for hours for our tps (One soldier commented that Australians move, cough and talk too much, thus giving away their positions.)
- xiv. Jap orders are given by word of mouth about ten minutes before the attack which is carried out in silence (except assaults, which are accompanied by much yelling). As they are also reported to do a lot of chattering amongst themselves, the giving of commands for attack could NOT be distinguished by our tps.
- xv. The Japs have a habit of chanting from the distance about five minutes prior to an attack. It seemed that they were being urged by an offr but this man could never be seen.
- xvi. Japs who draw fire are frequently dressed in khaki, while others who fire on our positions are well camouflaged and remain absolutely silent. These are hard to see.
- xvii. They make good use of equipment captured from us and wear our boots, slacks etc.

("C" Sec FSS 20 Sep 42)

7 AUST INF BDE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No 4.to 19 Oct 42.The following notes taken from H.Q. NEW GUINEA FORCE INTELLIGENCE
SUMMARY NO 85 of 25 Sep 42ON JAPANESE TACTICS - KOKODA AUG 42

(Are based on material supplied by offrs of 39 Aust Inf Bn)

IMPORTANCE OF THE HIGH GROUND

In the ECORA CREEK valley, the Jap out-flanking movements were all directed at getting comd of the high ground. On the right flank, having driven our patrols back down the track to ABUARI, they established themselves at once on top of the ridge and left the ABUARI-KAELI track uncovered. They apparently hoped that our patrols would push straight down the track and expose themselves to an attack on the west of the creek, they maintained pressure on our posns there almost continuously while their out-flanking forces worked along the ridge. Once they got the high ground, they -

- (a) got by mortars and MMGs up there and fired on Bde and bn HQs and from the opposite side of the valley raked the track and the flank of our fwd posns;
- (b) pushed along the ridge till our fwd posns were out-flanked, then they cut-in behind them;
- (c) dug-in and established themselves on the ridge at once. They did not try to hold them merely with patrols. Once established there, they apparently pushed patrols down to attack our HQ and L of C.

ATTACKS ON PREPARED POSNS.

Both Lt-Col HONNER and Capt SYMINGTON of 39 Bn stated that in attacks on prepared posns the Japs adopted a standard procedure.

Before they attacked, they felt around for some time, looking for soft spots. Once they had chosen their pt for attack, they persisted and persisted in attacks. If these failed, they switched to another pt, hammered at it for a while, but always went back to their original pt of attack. They might switch from A to B or even C, but they always come back and hammered hardest at A, the pt they had chosen first. Col Honner believes that comds should be on their gd and should NOT weaken their defences in the sector originally attacked in order to strengthen another attacked sector. The Jap invariably has returned to attack the original sector.

Everywhere, the enemy has persisted strongly with his attacks in spite of losses. He concentrates such pressure against the sector attacked and sustains it so strongly that Osg must keep reserves to throw in at the attacked pt, no matter how small their forces.

Both Capt Symington and Col Honner say that before the Jap launched attacks against 39 Bn posns, they heard distinct chanting. It started way back - apparently the local comd chanting orders or some national inspiration song. The chant was then taken up by the junior comds in turn from pl to sec. The chanting could be easily heard and it gave our tps at least 5 mins warning of the impending attack. (This apparently occurred only when the Jap was about to launch an attack from prepared posns close to our FDLs).

Capt Symington reports that otherwise the enemy tactics in attack are more or less orthodox. The following tactics were noted:-

- (a) The enemy had no preparatory fire. His tps crept up through the forest until fired on. Then they went to ground while mortars and LMG fire were directed against our posns. Under cover of this, they attacked by ordinary fire and movement. MG fire was very hy and very wild - apparently for moral effect.
- (b) The attack followed preliminary shooting-up with mortars. MMGs and LMGs. In such cases, the enemy often made considerable noise and made no attempt at surprise.
- (c) While some tps attacked, moving from tree to tree and firing as they went and supported by LMG fire from the flanks, other tps crawled unseen through the grass or undergrowth some distance ahead of the moving tps. The crawling tps got up within grenade range and then proceeded to put down a "grenade barrage" under cover of which the

(d) Sometimes the enemy is extremely quiet moving through the jungle. Other times, his tps move around like raw recruits. This is no doubt a ruse, but it is not always used for the same purpose. Sometimes the aim appears to be to draw our fire and disclose our posns; at other times, it is to distract the attention of the tps from an attack from another flank being silently prepared. At other times, the real attack has come from the direction of the noise (apparently in such cases the enemy has thought that we would think the noise was only a decoy). The lesson seems to be that if he makes a noise it is exceptional and you must be on your gd.

It is reported that the enemy uses his tps in gps of about 50. They are apparently self-contained gps with their own 60-mm mortar and W/T. They seem to change these gps frequently and to bring in fresh tps as soon as one gp gets tired. Their change-overs of tps during action is said to be very well done.

If the Japs fail in their first attempts on a posn, they seem to bring their own FDLs right up to within 50 yds of ours wherever possible. Hence the importance of being able to dig-in.

GENERAL

(a) The Japs go to great trouble to recover their dead (they then burn them). They will crawl to within a few yards of our tps to recover a wounded man or even a body.

It has been suggested that any man seen to fall should be watched, as it may be possible to snipe enemy going to his aid. The enemy do this in our case. Once they dragged the body of a dead man some hundreds of yards and propped him up in front of our FDLs, expecting us to send out tps to bring him in. The body was covered with fire. They do the same thing in the case of weapons. A patrol lost its Bren; two men were sent back to get it - they couldn't get near it because of the enemy fire.

(b) Beware of thinking that TSMG or Bren fire from a posn means that tps occupy it. The enemy has large numbers of captured weapons and uses them - sometimes as a deliberate decoy - eg, when Capt Symington's coy were in KOKODA, they expected help to be sent to them. One morning they saw two figures in Australian uniforms and slouch hats sneaking not too unobtrusively down a back track leading to their posn. Apparently our tps were intended to think that these were fwd scouts of a patrol. Then from just near this track, a mortar began bombing our posns. After a few rds, there was a burst of TSMG fire from this area and there was no more mortaring. No move was made by Symington's tps and the scouts went away. (The Jap camflgd head-dress consists of a circular board which supports the netting and slips over helmet, and resembles a camflgd Australian hat).

(c) It is most important that ofrs and NCOs should not show themselves more than possible. Even the absence of insignia of rank is inadequate, for leaders inevitably show their posn by their behaviour. Apparently, Jap snipers wait for hrs. observing our posns looking for a chance to pick off a leader.

(d) Don't be misled by evidence of disorder into thinking enemy has withdrawn. 2/16 Bn found track one day littered with garments, dixies, amm cases, arms, etc. They did NOT push down the track but looked for enemy, who had withdrawn up hill to high ground flanking the track.

HQ MILITARY FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 40

(From 0900 hrs 30 Oct 42 to 0900 hrs 1 Nov 42)

PART IOPERATIONSOWN (iii) AIR(a) SightingsRABAUL HARBOUR - Estimated 60 ships, incl 55 large, 25 small.
A.M. 30 Oct.BUIN-FAISI AREA - 17 warships, 1 possible converted a/c carrier,
1815 hrs 30 Oct. 1 S/P tender, 10 merchant vessels, 6 small
vessels, 2 merchant vessels beached. 1 warship
very low in water and sinking.
4 flying boats, 12 float planes.(b) AttacksBUIN HARBOUR -
30 Oct.B 17's attacked shipping. Two direct hits and 1
near miss on presumed battleship. 4 very close
misses on light cruiser anchored off TAURATO
ISLAND. 1 near miss on a/c carrier.TONKLEI

30 Oct.

1 hit on U/I ship causing fire and 2 possible
hits on U/I vessel of destroyer size.PART IVOTHER FRONTSMARUBRA28 Oct. Attack along whole front continued. Enemy forced
back further 600 yards on left flank. Advance
slow due to difficulty of terrain and tenacity
small bodies of enemy dug in isolated posns. At
0900 hrs 2/25Bn commenced move to high ground
west ALOLA.2/3 Bn surrounded final rear posn held by enemy
strength 100 on steep slopes of spur to left
of track. Posn was well prepared and held until
dusk when stormed in final bayonet charge,
preceded by grenade barrage. Enemy casualties
30 killed, 20 wounded. Our casualties slight.2/1 Bn meanwhile maintained constant pressure
astride main track.

G.S., MILITARY FORCE.

DISTRIBUTION

(as for Intell Sum No 39)

FORM NO 1000 (REV 1/42)

HQ MILNE FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 41

(From 0900 hrs 1 Nov 42 to 0900 hrs 3 Nov 42)

- PART 1 -

OPERATIONS -

OWN (iii) AIR (a) Sightings

RABAUL AREA

31 Oct : 36 vessels incl 3 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 8 destroyers, 2 tankers, 1 S/P tender, 5 transports, 12 cargo vessels, 1 U/I warship probably hit and listing, 1 sunken cargo vessel.

11 Zeros were encountered. 2 probably and 1 possibly shot down.

1 Nov: 30 vessels in harbour.

BUIN-FAISI AREA

31 OCT: 8 merchant vessels, unknown number cruisers and destroyers, 3 seaplane carriers, 1 large heavy cruiser, 1 small heavy cruiser in BUIN-TONOLEI area.

In large merchant vessel, 1 escort vessel, 3 U/I vessels.

1 Nov: 49 ships incl 6 cruisers, 1 sloop, 20 destroyers and gun boats, 3 mystery ships, 15 cargo vessels, 1 tanker and 3 submarines.

IN TRANSIT

0855 hrs

1 Nov: 1 cruiser, 2 merchant vessels north of NEW BRITAIN in posn $03^{\circ}56'$ S, $150^{\circ}19'$ E, course 225° speed 15 knots

1125 hrs

2 Nov: 2 transports 15,000 tons, 2 destroyers at $07^{\circ}20'$ S, $148^{\circ}40'$ E, course 10° , speed 16 knots.

(b) Attacks

RABAUL

a.m. 31 Oct: B 17's attacked shipping and observed direct hit on U/I vessel starting fires. 8 bombs were dropped among 5 large U/I vessels causing large column of smoke.

BUIN-FAISI AREA

a.m. 31 Oct: B 17's attacked shipping. 2 direct hits and 2 very near misses on 1 Monitor type warship, seen to explode. 2 very near misses light cruiser, probably severely damaged. 1 direct hit on merchant ship and possible damage to other ships.

a.m. 1 Nov: B 17's attacked shipping. 3 near misses pontoon ship. 1 near miss medium transport with 1000 pound bomb. 1 possible hit on destroyer. 1 direct hit on gunboat. 11 bombs dropped on KAKILI strip.

LAE

31 Oct : Catalina bombed LAE 'drome and strafed and bombed buildings at SALEMAUA

1 Nov : B 25's bombed 'drome, dropping 34 500lb. demolition bombs in target areas

ENEMY (I) LAND

K.B. - ANIOMA ARIM

Natives report 6 Japs at ANIOMA p.m. 31 Oct. JAPS came from north, searched factory for food and went back into hills.

ENEMY (111) AIR

1 Nov : A 20's attacked by 15 to 20 Zeros near LAE. 1 Zero probably destroyed, 1 A20 damaged and crash landed on return.

3 B 25's on armed recon attacked by approx 10 Zeros 20 miles north of BUNA. 1 B 25 crash-landed on return, 2 killed 3 injured.

LAE

1 Nov : 18 fighters reported on 'drome. 7 more landed p.m.

PART IV

OTHER FRONTS

MAROUBRA

Following the successful attack by 2/3 Bn on enemy posns on 28 Oct, 15 Bde continued advance on 29 Oct with fwd elements pressing against retreating JAPS. 25 Bde continued their flanking move on left towards ALOLA

On morning 30 Oct 15 Bde occupied ALOLA with fwd elements exploiting on tracks ISURAVA ABUARI and to west.

Our advance continued at first light 31 Oct with 15 Bde exploiting ABUARI track on right, 25 Bde on left. 3 Bn moving up to hold ALOLA and collect supplies dropped that area.

Adv HQ 7 Aust Div moving to ALOLA 31st Oct.

On 28 Oct enemy bomber landed on LAE aerodrome. Approx 15 men deplaned. Work continuing on 'drome.

Reports indicate that JAPS are consolidating their perimeter around LAE extending up the MARKHAM Valley to HEATHS and along the coast to SINGAU.

COMD	
B.M.	---
B.M.(L)	---
S.C.	---
S.C.(L)	---
I.O.	---
L.O.1.	---
L.O.2.	---
L.O.3.	---
SIG.O.	---
T.O.	---
SUPP.O	---
GD.PI. CMD.	---
O.M.E.	---
AMEN.O	---

Received 3 11 42.
 Time 1600 hrs
 M

W. J. ...
 Col.
 G.S., MILITARY FORCE

DISTRIBUTION

Intell Sum No 40)

5/99/3

HQ MILITARY FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 39
(From 0930 hrs 28 Oct 42 to 0900 hrs 30 Oct 42)

PART IOPERATIONS.OWN (i) LAND.

KB - AHIOMA area
28 Oct:

Patrol from 2/6 Bn sent out to intercept party JAPS reported vicinity WAHAHUBA 25 Oct, ambushed 5 in that area. 4 were killed and one was taken prisoner.

OWN (iii) AIR.

(a) Sightings.

RABAU.

1020 hrs 27 Oct. 41 vessels in harbour area incl 25 possible warships.
20 F/P's on water.

BUIN-FAISI area.

1115 hrs 27 Oct. 27 vessels incl possible a/c carrier, 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 8 4-engined F/P's on water.

1240 hrs 29 Oct. 42 vessels incl 2 battleships, 1 converted a/c carrier, 1 S/P tender, 3 light cruisers, 8 light cruisers, 12 merchant vessels, 11 destroyers, 3 small auxiliaries, 1 U/I vessel.

KAVIENG.

27 Oct.

Nil shipping. 15 bombers on aerodrome. Recc a/c attacked by 4 zeros; 1 possibly destroyed.

(b) Attacks.

RABAU.

27/28 Oct.

9 B 17's attacked shipping. 1 U/I vessel was hit and explosion was heard from warship.

BUKA.

27/28 Oct.

5 catalinas attacked causing 5 fires. Buildings hit and tents and quarters strafed. Fire visible 80 miles.

GASMATA.

B 25's strafed aerodrome installations. Light accurate A/A fire encountered SE corner of aerodrome.

PART IVOTHER FRONTS.MAROUERS.

26 Oct.

16 Bde continued attack throughout day. By 1800 hrs 2/3 bn had gained fwd slope of precipitous spur and was making progress in heavy rain against JAPS offering stubborn resistance from prepared posns. Enemy counter attacked at dusk but was repulsed. 2/1 bn harassing enemy with mortars. 2/51 bn preparing advance along high ground left of track in support 16 Bde.

MARCOUBRA (Continued)

27 Oct.

16 Bde pushed enemy back approx 1000 yds along track and spur on left of track. Isolated pockets enemy remain but steady progress continuing. In view of advance 2/51 Bn not now moving to left. 2/25 Bn moving to high ground west of ALOLA 28 Oct.

W. J. ...
Col.
GS MILITARY FORCE.

DISTRIBUTION:

(As for Intell Sum No 38)

COMD	
B.M.	
B.M.(L)	
S.C.	
S.C.(L)	
I.O.	
L.O.1.	
L.O.2.	
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T.O.	
SUPP.O.	
GD.PI. COMD.	
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AMEN.O.	

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HQ MILNE FORCE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 36
 (From 0900 hrs 22 Oct 42 to 0900 hrs 23 Oct 42.)

PART I.

OPERATIONS.

OWN (111) AIR.

(a) Rece : NIL sightings of enemy shipping in sea lanes to MILNE BAY 22 Oct.

BUEN FAISI AREA

1130 hrs 21 Oct : 2 battleships (probably)
 7 cruisers
 18 destroyers (incl some gunboats)
 2 S/P tenders (probably)
 2 submarines
 16 merchant vessels.

FAISI HARBOUR.

1015 hrs 22 Oct : 2 cruisers 7000 tons
 1 probable submarine
 2 destroyers
 2 cargo vessels 4000 to 5000 tons
 5 U/I small vessels

SONOLEI HARBOUR :

1015 hrs 22 Oct : 2 probable battleships
 1 probable a/c carrier
 2 probable heavy cruisers
 4 probable light cruisers
 12 destroyers
 2 submarines
 5 cargo vessels. 5000 to 7000 tons
 9 U/I small vessels.

ENEMY (111) AIR.

HATFORCE

: 1935 hrs 20 Oct. 2 enemy twin engined planes flew over from N.W. At 1945 the planes returned and circled area. At 2105 hrs planes flew low over the area from S.E.

PART IV.

OTHER FRONTS. (Ref Map MORESBY 4" Strat.)

(a) MAROUBRA.

20 Oct : Reports received rather corrupt now being checked but it appears that there was intense fighting throughout the day. 2/2 Bn moved north along ridge due east TEMPLETONS intention swing in two coys on enemy left flank. Patrols 2/2 Bn simultaneously worked around his right flank dispersing JAP patrol encountered and killing 3.

By 1600 L all Coys 2/2 Bn held up by enemy in strong posn high ground and using LMGs and by mortar fire with considerable effect. 1610 L 2/1 and 3 Bn mortars began combined shoot in support of 2/2 Bn. Enemy LMGs difficult to locate. No estimate enemy casualties, our known casualties exceed 70 repeat 70.

Relief of 25 Bde as follows:

2/33 Bn relieved by 2/3 Bn 1700L/20 moved AASC dump South TEMPLETONS. Will be relieved by 2/25 Bn 0750 L/21 and move MYOLA area. 3 Bn relieved by 2/1 Bn but standing by as res for present.

Det 6 Ind Coy BARUMBILA QH 8782 no report enemy.

(b) KANGA:

LAE O.P. report approx 20 men observed moving two QF guns to hill NW end runway. AAF previously pinpointed AA posn in immediate vicinity. KAPA KAPA - JAURE area. US recce patrol reached URVABA QH 9078 returned JAURE QJ 0058 18 Oct. Further recce coy and 110 personnel for dropping sta expected JAURE by 19 Oct. 2 Bn 126 US Regt vicinity KALI KODOBU moved JAURE 18 Oct.

G.S. MILNE FORCE.