

AWM52
2nd Australian Imperial Force and
Commonwealth Military Forces unit war
diaries, 1939-45 War

Item number: 8/3/16

2/16 Infantry Battalion

June 1941

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence
Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Part II,
and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages
will be prepared in manuscript.

~~WAR DIARY~~

Army Form C. 2

OR
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. of 2/16 Bn AIF from 1st June to 30th June

(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	June			
		1	Bn in Concentration area.	
		2	" " " " . Coys doing rifle exercises and route marches	
x		6	Bn preparing to move.	
		2230	Adv party under Maj Potts moved fwd to HURFEISH area	
		2300	Bn moved from lying up area.	
x		7	0400 Bn moved into assembly areas - C & D coys at HURFEISH, B coy & Bn HQ & HQ Coy at TARSHIHA A coy south of SUHMATA - A Coy with att tps constituted adv gd under 2 I/C . Tps remained in assembly areas to 2400 hrs.	
x		8	0001 Bn HQ moved from Assembly Area.	
x		0200	C & D coys went into action capturing YAROUN & AITAROUNE respectively & jointly capturing BENNT JBAIL. D coy cleared AIN EBEL. action completed by 0600 hrs. Casualties 1 OR killed, 1 offr & 12 ORs wounded.	
		0800	Adv gd moved on to TIBNINE - held up by rd blocks - TIBNINE captured & coln moved on by 1430 hrs.	
		1430	Adv continued to TYR - villages cleared on way.	
x		1709	TYR surrendered without action. Garrisoned by 2/14 Bn.	
		1800	Adv gd moved fwd to LITANI RIVER where enemy were in strong posns.	
		1830	Arty att to adv gd opened fire on enemy posn north side of LITANI RIVER.	
		1930	Enemy retaliated with arty - no damage.	
x		9	0600 Coys attacked posns on LITANI - order C coy left then A, B, D. During course of morning one pl of A Coy & 1 pl D crossed river under heavy MG fire.	
		1400	Arty gave support by shelling Mortar & MG posts on north side of river.	
		2000	Area cleared - casualties:- 7 killed, 6 missing believed killed, 54 wounded.	
		10	Area being mopped up - river bridged - MT crossing river.	
x		11	0800 2/27 Bn passed through to move fwd. 2/16 Bn rested.	
x		12	0900 Bn moved fwd to assembly area about 2 miles north of LITANI River.	
x		1200	Coys brought fwd to area south of ZEFTA-HABBOUCH rd.	
		13	0930 Slow firing from Arty on area south of SAIDA.	
x		1000	Coys passed SL and advd under barrage towards SAIDA. A coy on left - D on right.	
		1030	C followed behind A and B behind D under shell fire from enemy.	
x		1100	D pinned down by enemy tks - subsequently surrounded. A coy pressing fwd to within one mile of objective (River ZARE) becoming ambushed and forced to retire south of SAIDA to orchards SAHKET EZ ZEITOUN.	
x		1400	Remnants D coy retired to main rd south of river NAHR SHENIQUE.	
x		1700	A, C & B coys dug in for night.	

WAR DIARY

Army Form C. 2118.

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or
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. of 2/16 Bn AIF from 1 Jun to 30 Jun 41
(Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	Jun			
	14	0600	Coys still in orchard	
		1700	Coys driven back by tks to southern side of river NAHR.	
	15	0600	Coys remain in posn under cover	
		1030	Pl 2/3 MG Bn sent fwd to support Bn	
		1300	Coys move fwd	
		1500	SAIDA captured. B, C & D coys move north of town - A Coy garrisons town - <u>Bn HQ</u> established at <u>Boys College</u> .	
	16	1000	<u>Bn HQ</u> moves to house on outskirts of town.	
		1400	A Coy relieved as garrison & move north. Coys in posn. C & D coys fwd & B & A coys in res. Fwd coys north of ZARE River. 4offrs & 65 ORs join Bn as reinfts.	
	17	0800	Coys remain in posn & rest.	
		1800	Enemy warship shells Bn area.	
	18	1400	Coys move fwd to new posns slightly in adv of existing posns.	
		2200	Enemy patrol contacted - estimated strength, One Coy - All coys ordered to stand to.	
	19	0900	D coy moves to KAIFERMAYA. A Coy moves fwd to attack OUARDI EL ZENI.	
		1400	OUARDI EL ZENI captured - D coy moves in from right flank. Coys attack JADRA.	
		1800	JADRA occupied. A Coy - casualties 3 killed, 1 wounded. A Coy occupies JADRA, C Coy OUARDI ELZENI - D coy posn on right flank - B Coy in res.	
	20	1400	Bn HQ moved fwd to EL RMAILEH	
		1600	Coys move fwd to take up new line.	
		1800	Coys take up new posns. C on line running west from RAS NEBI YOUNES. Dcoys on right protecting right flank. A Coy on line running through from Coast through JADRA & BE YCHYE B coy in res east and south of QUADI EL ZENI.	
	21	0830	Aerial attack on vicinity Bn HQ & also in front of C coy between enemy lines & our own.	
		1800	No further activity - tps resting.	
	22	1000	CO visited Coys - Tps resting.	
	23		Tps resting	
	24	0900	D coy patrols fwd to BUASSUI thence to QASSOUBA. No enemy sighted	
		1610	Patrol returned	
		2000	C coy sent patrols fwd to make recce DAMOUR-SAIDA area.	
	24	2340	Patrols returned & reported no mines in prepared posn in rd block junc rds NEBI YUWIS	
	25	1400	Coy Comds conference.	
		1450	Fwd Coys (C & D) being shelled from directions DAMOUR. 18 Pl withdraws 75 yards.	
		1600	D coy sent patrols fwd for recce of tracks in area BARJA-BASSIR -296 - No enemy seen	

WAR DIARY

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or
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY. of 2/16 Bn AIF from 1 Jun 41 to 30 Jun 41
 (Erase heading not required).

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
	JUNE			
	25	1600	A & C coys advd to take up posn astride tracks QASSOUBA - EL HARAM.	
		1830	B coy advd towards JIYE & pt 174.	
		2000	Enemy shelled JIYE area for 30 minutes	
		2015	D coy moved 16 Pl astride rd at AIN MLISS	
		2300	C coy in posn	
		2400	B coy in posn	
	26	0330	A Coy in posn	
		0430	A coy sent out patrol towards EL HARAM to contact 2/27	
		1000	C coy sent patrol recce MAGSABA area. No enemy reported.	
		1300	Tps resting	
		1700	Enemy reported in CHEHIM village	
		1730	OO No 2 issued. A & C coys to adv to take ridge east-west ES SADIYATTI at 1945 hrs.	
		2000	Fwd Bn HQ moved to 12151937.	
		2120	C & A Coys reached objective without opposition - 4 prisoners.	
		2125	Enemy shelling over whole Bn area - commenced & continued to 0400 (27) no casualties.	
	27	0525	Navy bombarded DAMOUR	
		0535	Enemy bombers attack Navy	
		0545	Our bombers drive off attack. Navy puts to sea.	
		1030	Enemy arty fires on Bn area from direction hill 250 east of EL ATIQUA	
		1105	Enemy cease fire - no casualties	
		1630	CO returned to unit.	
		1930	Enemy arty shelled QASSOUBA area for 30 minutes.	
	28	1530	Navy shell fortifications in DAMOUR & area.	
		1600	Navy withdraw.	
		2000	A & B coys exchange posn - movement completed 2000 hrs	
	29	0917	NEVI STEPHENS and LO visit HQ	
		1100	Unidentified aircraft flew over DASA A area and our extreme right flank @ returned south	
	30	1030	Brig Savage 17 Bde and BM visit HQ	
		1130	Enemy arty shell rear Bn area - no casualties	
		1700	D coy move fwd preparatory to taking up C coy posns.	

Lieut. Col.
 C.O. 2/16 Bn. A.I.F.

- 1 Jun 41 The Bn is still resting at AFFULA. Portions of the day were spent by the coys on route marches and rifle drill. In the evening numbers of tps were entertained by the Jewish people at the MERHAVIYA settlement.
- 6 Jun The Bn remained here until 2230 hrs 6 Jun when an adv party under comd of Maj Potts moved fwd to HURFEISH near the PALESTINIAN-SYRIAN border. Later at 2300 hrs the main body of Bn moved to assembly areas. C & D coys at HURFEISH, B coy, Bn HQ & HQ coy at TARSHIHA - A Coy to SUHMATA.
- 8 " At 0200 hrs C & D coys began the Bn's offensive in the SYRIAN campaign by capturing YAROUN, AITAROUNE & jointly capturing BENNT JBAIL. D coy continued and cleared AIN EBEL & by 0600 hrs the action was completed. Lieut Barnett & 2 ors were wounded and Pte Connolly P was killed. The adv gd then moved to TITNINE where it was held up by a very effective rd block just south of the town. This was repaired by 1430 and the main coln moved on towards TYR. At 1709 hrs TYR surrendered and the 2/14 Bn garrisoned the town. At 1800 hrs the coln moved on towards LITANI River. Our arty opened up at 1830 hrs & at 1930 hrs the enemy retaliated with 75 mm guns but caused no casualties.
- 9 " At 0600 hrs coys moved off to attack enemy posns at LITANI River in the following order - C coy on the left with A, B & D on their right. At 0530 hrs a party of Commandoes were landed at the river mouth on either side of the river. These tps came under heavy fire and their objective of seizing the br was frustrated. During the course of the morning one pl of A Coy and D coy crossed the river under heavy MG fire. Whilst A Coy were attempting the crossing severe casualties were suffered and the OC coy, ~~-3-1/6-~~ was killed, & the 2 I/C & the comds of 7 & 8 pls were wounded. Early in the afternoon under arty support D coy and the remainder of A Coy under the comd of Capt Horley cleared the area. At 1030 hrs two French destroyers shelled Bn HQ & arty areas - one veh of 170 Lt A A Regt suffered a direct hit causing two deaths.
- 10 " On this day the river was bridged, MT crossed the river & the area was mopped up.
- 11 " The 2/16 Bn rested & the 2/27 Bn passed through to move fwd
- 12 ³ At 0900 hrs the Bn was moved fwd to an assembly area about two miles north of the LITANI River & at 1200 hrs the coys were brought fwd to an area south of ZEFTA-HABBOUCH rd. During the afternoon five EA machine gunned the main rd causing numerous casualties amongst a batch of prisoners who were being marched along the main rd
- 13 " At 1000 hrs the coys passed the SL & advd under barrage towards SAIDA; A Coy on left near main rd, D coy on right. The support coys followed at 1030 hrs, C behind A, B behind D. These res coys came under shell fire from the enemy. At 1100 D coy was pinned down by enemy tks and subsequently surrounded west of DARB ES SIM. A Coy pressed fwd to within one mile of objective which was the river ZARE becoming ambushed & forced to retire south of SAIDA to orchards SAHKET EZ ZEITOUN. At 1400 hrs the remnants of D coy retired to the main rd south of the river NAHR SHENIQUE. During the morning a Bren Carrier with Lieut Sanderson & crew of two were blown up by a mine while endeavouring to reach the fwd posn. All were killed. At 1530 hrs two vehs were taken fwd by WO i Stapleton with amm for the fwd coys. One was destroyed by an enemy tk. Lieut Harper showing great initiative & courage retrieved the other veh. Prior to the destruction of this veh Lieut Harper had retrieved a case of ST bombs but unfortunately had not been primed. At 1700 hrs A, C & B coys dug in for the night. During the day, Bn HQ area & arty posns were subjected to ~~six~~ ^{Eight.} aerial attacks, and four more during the night.

- 13 " In the course of the day's ops severe casualties were suffered by the Bn and Capt Horley & Inkpen were killed.
- 14 " The coys remained under cover in the orchards until 1700 hrs when enemy tks attacked & compelled them to retire to the south side of the river where the coys again took cover in the orchards.
- 15 " A pl of the 2/3 MG Bn which had moved up from PALESTINE that morning were sent fwd to support the Bn. This pl took up posn at 1030 hrs. About midday Maj Potts & Lieut Harper entered SAIDA & found that the town had been evacuated. Whilst the coys had remained under cover the enemy posn in & about the town had been subjected to a severe bombardment by the Navy and our arty. At 1300 hrs the coys moved fwd and entered the town at 1500 hrs receiving a good reception from the populace. B, C & D coys moved north of the town whilst A Coy acted as a garrison. Bn HQ was established at the Boys College in the town. During the afternoon Maj Potts went fwd to the River ZARE and came under MG fire.
- 16 " At 1000 hrs Bn HQ moved to a house on the outskirts of the town. C & D coys took up posns north of the river with A & B coys in res south of the river. A Coy have been relieved as town garrison by a coy of 2/3 Bn. At 1400 hrs 4 offrs & 65 ORs joined the Bn as reinfts.
- 17 " The coys remained in posn and rested. At 1800 hrs ~~tw~~ one French warship sailed down the coast to a pt south of SAIDA & then returned north shelling the fwd coys as it moved along. Our arty replied without result.
- 18 " At 1400 hrs the coy dispositions were changed, C & D coys moving fwd slightly, B coy crossing the river and taking up a posn on the right flank with A Coy in res south of the river guarding both bridges. At 2200 hrs an enemy patrol estimated at one coy was contacted & all coys stood to for the remainder of the night.
- 19 " At 0900 hrs D coy moved out to the right flank to KAFER MAYA to protect the flank whilst A Coy moved through B & C coys to attack ~~weddy~~ OUARDI EL ZENI. At 1400 hrs A Coy captured OUARDI EL ZENI and D coy then moved in from the flank and the two coys attacked JADRA which was occupied at 1800 hrs. A Coy lost three killed & one wounded. The coys then took up new posns, A Coy occupying JADRA, C coy OUARDI EL ZENI, with D coy on the right flank. B coy remained in res occupying the posn held ~~up~~ by C coy prior to the adv.
- 20 " At 1400 hrs Bn HQ moved fwd to EL RMAILEH. At 1800 hrs the coys took up new posns, C coy on a line running west from RAS NEBI YOUNS with D coy on its immediate right. A Coy held a line running from the coast through JADRA & ~~BEYCHYE~~ BEYCHYE, B coy remaining in res.
- 21 " At 0830 hrs our own aircraft bombed posns behind Bn HQ & in front of C coy. It was subsequently ascertained that the RAF had mistaken the exact posn of the Bn. The tps remained in posn & rested until the morning of 24 Jun.
- 24 " At 0900 hrs a patrol was sent from D coy through BUASSUI to QASSOUBA and returned at 1610 reporting no enemy sighted. Whilst the coys had rested during the previous days observers had noted enemy activity in the direction of QASSOUBA. At 2000 hrs C coy sent out a patrol to make a recce of SAIDA-DAMOUR rd north of coy posns. Patrol returned at 2340 hrs & reported no mines on rd near rd block north of RAS NEBI YOUNES.
- 25 " At 1300 hrs OC coys lunched with the CO & at 1400 hrs conference took place. At 1450 hrs C & D coys were shelled by enemy arty as a result of which OP in front of C coy was withdrawn temporarily and 18 Pl retired 75 yards. At 1600 hrs D coy sent a patrol fwd to recce tracks in area BARJA-BASSIR - hill 296 & reported no enemy sighted. At 1800 hrs C coy moved around RAS NEBI YOUNES to take up a posn on the left flank on the ridge to the north of QASSOUBA. It was followed by A coy which took up a posn on the right flank on the same ridge. A Coy encountered very difficult country & did not get into posn until 0400 hrs on 26 Jun. B coy occupied a posn between QASSOUBA and JIYE guarding the rd to BARJA. D coy remained in res on the ridge running to the coast at RAS NEBI YOUNES. Bn HQ moved in OUARDI south of RAS NEBI YOUNES

25 June (contnd)

- Whilst A & C coys were moving along main rd enemy shelled rd.
 At 2015 hrs 16 Pl moved to a posn astride main rd at AIN MLISS.
- 26 " At 0430 hrs A coy sent out a patrol to contact the 2/27 Bn at EL HARAM. At 1000 hrs C coy sent out a patrol to recce MAGSABA area - no enemy sighted. The tps spent the rest of the day resting. At 1700 hrs enemy activity was observed in CHEHIM. At 1730 hrs 00 No 2 was issued, instructing A & C coys to take ridge running through ES SADIYATT and ES SIYAR. at 1945 hrs. At 2000 hrs Bn HQ moved to 12151937. By 2120 hrs A & C coys took their objectives with little opposition - A Coy taking 4 prisoners. At 2125 enemy arty opened up fire on Bn area & bombardment continued until 0400 on 27 Jun - no casualties.
- 27 " At 0525 hrs Navy bombarded DAMOUR & at 0535 hrs was attacked by enemy bombers. Our fighters drove off enemy planes and navy put to sea. At 1030 hrs enemy shelled Bn posns from direction Hill 250 east of EL ATIQA & fire continued until 1105 hrs. During the evening the enemy shelled Bn posns concentrating a particularly heavy fire on posn occupied by 7 Pl.
- 28 " Tps remained in posn resting during the day. Whilst in the fwd areas the coys moved back behind the ridge during the day & fwd to the line to be held at night. At 2000 hrs A & B coys exchanged posns.
- 29 " Tps remained in posn resting ea. At 0917 NEVI STEPHENS visited Bn HQ.
- 30 " At 1030 hrs Brig SAVAGE, 17 Bde & BM visited Bn HQ. At 1130 enemy arty shelled rear Bn area with no casualties. At 1700 hrs D coy moved up to exchange posns with C coy change taking plce later in evening.

27
 17/5

2/16 AUST INF BN

SYRIA

In Syria

ALLIED TPS
Commandoes 9 Jun
2/14 Inf 8 Jun
2/27 Inf 9 Jun
2/3 MG Bn 16 Jun
(are mentioned in
Summary)

2/16 Aust
Inf Bn
Jun 41

PLANS

DEFENCE

QOASMIYE ENTRENCHED CAMP

2/16 Aust
Inf Bn
Jun 41

MINE FIELD

at SAIDA

PERSONNEL

RECOMMENDATION

for honours and awards

2/16 Aust
Inf Bn
Jun 41

2/16 AUST INF BN

SYRIA

JUN 41

OPERATIONS

MOVE TO SYRIAN BORDER from AFFLILA. 6 JUN.

FIRST ACTION at YAROUN, AITAROUNE and BENNT JRAIL captured by A Coy. AIN EEEL cleared by D Coy. 8 Jun

TYR surrendered 1709 hrs 8 JUN

LITANI RIVER crossed by A & D coys. 9 Jun.

ADVANCE TOWARDS SAIDA by whole Bn 13 Jun - A, B & C Coys in orchards SAHKET EZ ZEITOUN. D coy south of RIVER NAHR SHENIQUE.

SEVERE CASUALTIES suffered by D Coy 13 Jun.

RETIRE to orchards south of river by enemy tank attack.

SAIDA entered at 1500 hrs 15 Jun. BHC at BOYS COLLEGE. A Coy garrison town.

OUARDI EL ZENI and JADRA occupied by A & D Coys Jun 19.

ADVANCE CONTINUED north of QASSOUBA.

26 JUN A & C Coys took ridge running through ES SADIYATT and ES SIYAR.

PRISONERS many taken during campaign (summary)

By Lt Col A R Macdonald CO

Part B 10 Jun 41

1. STRUCK OFF STRENGTH

WX2811 Lieut A N Rose	31/5/41	WX4545 Lieut W T Elphick	31/5/41
WX2859 Pte Wiseman R K	23/5/41	WX2651 Cpl Brender J K	"
WX2827 " Flynn T J	31/5/41	WX2922 Pte Bralich V V	"
WX3000 Cpl Craik J W	"	WX3069 Cpl Jackson G	"
WX3185 Pte Hazelwood T W	"	WX4038 Pte Draper A W	"
WX4148 Pte Coxon L D	"	WX4210 " Moloney B W	"
WX4221 " Ryan H J	"	WX5621 " Riley G E	"
WX5677 Cpl Teede L P	"	WX7355 " Holloway P J	"
WX4321 L/Cpl Milloughby S A	"	WX4979 " Sewell E A	"
WX6488 Pte Stone W G	"	WX6599 " Smith J P	"
WX3097 " Gilbride A E	9/6/41	WX4159 " Frost T M	9/6/41
WX4163 " Brokenshire H J	"	WX3065 " Troy J L	"
WX3771 " Blair A	"	WX8260 " Kelly J C	"

2. STRUCK OFF STRENGTH

WX5652 Sgt Bastyan G D	30/5/41	To 1st OCTU Course No 11
WX2895 Pte Hislop H	29/5/41	Evacuated CCS
WX3151 L/Cpl Hillberg M S	23/5/41	"
WX4181 Pte Grose T J	29/5/41	"
WX4635 " Kilpatrick D J	"	"
WX4200 " Lee C C	30/5/41	"
WX8213 " Lewis J B	26/5/41	Transferred to 7 Aust Div Pet Coy ASC
WX3065 " Troy J L	7/6/41	To Detention Barracks
WX3097 " Gilbride A E	"	"
WX4169 " Brokenshire H	6/6/41	"
WX4159 " Frost T M	"	"
WX2928 " Beckett W	1/6/41	Evacuated to CCS
WX3187 " Davis L S	3/6/41	"
WX3572 " Cameron A J	5/6/41	"
WX3694 Cpl Innes R W	"	"
WX3743 Pte Barrett R J	2/6/41	"
WX4148 " Coxon L D	2/6/41	"
WX4227 " Maidment G B	4/6/41	"
WX4239 " Bracegirdle L	5/6/41	"
WX5776 L/Cpl Bentley A C	"	"
WX6577 Pte Lead F J	2/6/41	"
WX7580 " Sullivan A F	"	"
WX2799 " Connolly P A	8/6/41	Killed in Action
WX2816 Cpl Holmes A R	"	Wounded "
WX5751 Pte Daniels A B	"	" "
WX7918 " Matthews E	"	" "
WX3863 " Wright H	7/6/41	Evacuated to CCS
WX4030 " Palmer H E T	9/6/41	"
WX5849 " Powley V E	"	"
WX3917 " Stockhausen H	"	"
WX2615 " Williams L J	"	"
WX4249 " Hendry J D M	"	"
WX3772 " Waters T B	"	"
WX2646 " McQueen A J	"	"
WX3593 L/Cpl Martin E F J	"	"
WX4238 Pte Flozza A J	"	"
WX5696 " Wimbridge F O	"	"
WX7350 " Scott H J	"	"
WX5784 L/Cpl Mortimer A	"	"
WX2647 WOLL A M Sherman	"	Killed in Action
WX5621 Pte Riley G E	"	"
WX4544 Sgt Hood P B	"	"
WX5682 L/Cpl Gibson R C	"	"
WX5781 Pte Kelly J J	"	"
WX4374 " Robertson G H	"	"
WX2861 " Arthur F	"	"
WX5885 " Ward S J	"	"
WX2735 Sgt Hill T F	"	Wounded in Action
WX3283 A/Cpl Heseling F	"	"
WX5706 Pte Jenn J	"	"
WX5988 " Kennedy W M	"	"

3. PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS ETC

Service Number	Name	Rank	Date	Action
WX3264	Pte Davies G W		9/6/41	Wounded in Action
WX2661	Cpl Bates H G		"	"
WX3603	Pte Hammond L W B		"	"
WX4339	" Stewart A		"	"
WX4340	" Fennell C B		"	"
WX4265	" Ryan A		"	"
WX5601	" Mason D H S		"	"
WX4284	" Yates A L		"	"
WX5957	" Lennox D		"	"
WX4248	" Reed F T		"	"
WX3166	" Windsor J R		"	"
WX5701	" Rose B E		"	"
WX5698	" Harris C H		"	"
WX4349	Cpl Johnston S B		"	"
WX2900	Pte Burrows N E		"	"
WX2830	" Holmes J V		"	"
WX2978	" Jones L G		"	"
WX3031	" Roberts F J		"	"
WX4147	" Byrne L J		"	"
WX4657	" Hogan F W		"	"
WX5791	Cpl McKenzie J R		"	"
WX3176	" Antill J B		"	"
WX5993	Pte Devine F		"	"
WX5360	" Swinhoe A		"	"
WX3280	A/Cpl Duncan T J		"	"
WX2909	Pte Burgess J R		"	"
WX4298	" Parry L		"	"
WX4155	" Davis J F		"	"
WX6565	" Sticken J J		"	"
WX3738	" Plumpton J W		"	"
WX5637	" Martin J W		"	"
WX3655	" Holland J E		"	"
WX3808	" Banks G W		"	"
WX1952	Pte Collas O W		"	"
WX5780	Cpl Hounslow F E		"	"
WX3122	Pte Devine W K		"	"
WX521	Pte Spence W A		"	"
WX5705	" North T B		10/6/41	Evacuated CCS
WX4014	" Oliver H D		"	Wounded in Action
WX5707	" Thompson J A		"	"
WX3892	" Jackson W H		"	Evacuated to CCS
WX2998	" Potter G K		"	"
WX4187	" Lucas C H		"	Wounded in Action
WX4397	" Daynam G		8/6/41	"
WX3097	" Gilbride A E		10/6/41	"
WX3253	Lieut G W Wright		9/6/41	Evacuated CCS
WX1592	Capt I Johnson		"	Killed in Action
WX6159	Capt G H Godsall		8/6/41	Evacuated CCS
WX1596	Lieut E T J Barnett		"	Wounded in Action
WX1593	Capt J M Hearman		9/6/41	"
WX1597	Lieut W G Symington		"	"
WX2738	" M B G Meecham		"	"
WX1598	" F H Sublet		10/6/41	"
WX3374	Capt W Hopkinson		9/6/41	"
WX1599	Lieut B D N Langridge		"	"
WX2650	" R W G Meecham		"	"

3. PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS ETC

WX838 Sgt Warwick V W to be WOII wef 8/4/41 & appointed RQMS
 WX2384 L/Cpl Stewart A T to be Cpl 28/5/41
 WX5523 Pte Stuart E J to be A/Sgt 30/5/41 & relinquishes TGII from that date.
 WX4893 Pte Hughes G to be TG II " & posted to Int sec
 WX2276 " Connells " " " III 1/2/41 (dr - mechanic)
 WX2826 " Milstead A R do WX2872 Pte Anderson E to be TG III 1/2/41 (dr
 WX2915 " Jacobs F C do WX2937 " Inglebrecht N F do
 WX3157 " Tresidder F do WX3026 " McVeigh J do
 WX3167 " Elder W E do WX4308 " Farmer L A do
 WX5990 " Hedley-Bodds J T to be L/Cpl 30/5/41
 WX4658 L/Cpl Charlesworth A E relinquishes TG II 2/6/41 & transferred to D coy

W. Smith Lieut
 A/Adjt 2/16 Bn MIF

By Lt Col A. H. Macdonald GO

Part 1. 17 Jun 41.

1. ST. NICHOLAS (Battle Casualties)

WX5774	Pte Kerbosky A	11/6/41	Wounded	WX5755	Pte Haynes L A	11/6/41	Wounded
WX5886	" Whitten G H	12/6/41	"	WX4254	" Lauchlin T	13/6/41	"
WX5766	" Jarratt W H	15/6/41	"	WX1503	Capt D G Morley	"	K I A
WX3173	Lieut V H Holley	13/6/41	"	WX4545	Lieut V T Elphick	"	Wounded
WX1591	Capt F M B Inkpen	"	K I A	WX3583	Pte Taylor B J	"	K I A
WX3657	Pte Gadsby G	"	K I A	WX7389	" Hencock J W	"	Wounded
WX2855	L/Cpl Browne-Cooper P R	13/6/41	Wounded	WX4786	" North G M	"	"
WX4188	Pte Gadlolo C A	13/6/41	Wounded	WX3612	" Merritt V J	14/6/41	"
WX4771	" Pickett W A	"	"	WX2407	" Kirkland J W T	13/6/41	"
WX4176	" Garbutt W H J	"	"	WX4194	" Kelly B S	"	"
WX6528	" Wise W E	"	"	WX2746	Sgt Phillips A M	"	"
WX2384	Cpl Stewart A T	"	"	WX4773	Pte Walker F	"	"
WX3697	Pte Warman R	14/6/41	"	WX4736	" Adams A G	14/6/41	"
WX4282	" Tulloch J	"	"	WX4286	" Zeeb A	"	"
WX4251	Sgt Braecgirdle K B	13/6/41	"	WX2835	" Parker R	13/6/41	"
WX4243	Pte Launder D L	"	"	WX4354	" Wilson S F	"	"
WX6755	" Harriss C A B	11/6/41	"	WX3563	" Keogh D E	"	"
WX2886	" Gregory H E	13/6/41	"	WX5607	L/Cpl Scott J	"	"
WX4160	L/Cpl Cahill J H A	"	"	WX3911	Pte Meyers T E	"	"
WX3004	Pte McDonald P W	"	"	WX2638	Sgt Draper T A	"	"
WX6556	" McEann F E	"	"	WX5753	Pte Smith R V	"	"
WX5797	" Weston D C	"	"	WX4368	Pte Plunkett E	"	"
WX5659	" Cooper F B	"	"	WX3002	" Montgomery H R	"	"
WX7391	" Kewley J	14/6/41	"	WX3580	" Standfield P H	"	"
WX4373	" Craddock C	13/6/41	"	WX3823	" Bell L J	"	"
WX5645	" Souness I T	"	"	WX7388	" Wright A K	"	"
WX3530	Sgt Trotter F J	"	"	WX5801	" Gately A	"	"
WX4979	Pte Longman W J	"	"	WX2908	" Salvaris A R	"	"
WX7390	" Walker B	"	"	WX7387	" Dent H R	"	"
WX5772	" Morphew F T	"	"	WX4368	Sgt Vickers D H	"	"
WX2407	" Campbell N M	"	"	WX2912	Pte Boyce L W R	"	"
WX5769	" Lower E A	"	"	WX5803	" Patterson H	"	"
WX5779	" Conohie H P	"	"	WX7385	" Dynock T G	"	"
WX4363	" Beatty M G	"	"	WX4162	L/Cpl Ashley M	"	"
WX5639	Lieut F Senderson	13/6/41	K I A	WX4655	Pte Flannigan F C	16/6/41	K I A
WX5125	Pte Stapleton E P	"	K I A	WX3260	" Kelly J G	"	K I A
WX5626	" Smith C W	"	K I A	WX5704	" Clifton A	"	Wounded
WX5788	" Stockhausen F A	"	K I A	WX3167	" Elder W E	"	K I A
WX4228	L/Cpl Sadlier J C	"	K I A	WX2987	" Foster S G	"	K I A
WX4384	Pte Grey-Smith J	"	K I A	WX5660	" Douglas F P	"	K I A
WX3020	" Little J A	"	K I A	WX4788	" O'Dea P	"	K I A

2. ST. NICHOLAS (Evacuated to CCS)

WX5512	Pte Wolf S F	12/6/41	WX4029	L/Cpl Anderson L L	11/6/41
WX5637	" Dunning H W	11/6/41	WX4237	Pte Cleasby J E	11/6/41
WX2941	" Hillier H J	"	WX3198	" Herry J M	"
WX4324	" Cooke E A	"	WX3005	" Troy J L	"
WX5764	" White E S	"	WX4003	" Stewart L P	"
WX3242	" Moss P A	13/8/41	WX4635	" Kilpatrick D J	13/6/41
WX5990	" Hedley-Dodds J T	"	WX4296	" Webster J F	"
WX3039	" Streeter E J C	"	WX3094	" Rowley G A	"
WX5692	" Jones L W K	"	WX4737	" Cooper J	14/6/41
WX7678	" Byrne S S	"	WX3136	" Ross G M	13/6/41
WX4200	" Lee C C	"	WX3000	Cpl Craik J W	"
WX3857	" Chapman C W	"	WX3417	Pte Charles E F	"
WX5688	" Halkyard R W	16/6/41	WX2616	" Reid F	16/6/41
WX4659	Cpl Williams B	"	WX2928	" Beckitt T	"
WX6579	Pte Shulley H A	"	WX4375	" Clively E	"
WX4468	" Winston L J R	"	WX4158	" Anglesey D J	"
WX5998	" Seagrott A A	"	WX3677	L/Cpl Bennet S F	"
WX6331	" Jackson L	17/6/41	WX3529	" O'Loughlin H A	17/6/41
WX2973	Cpl Mills T R	"	WX5613	Pte Murray J P	"
WX5662	Pte Thomas S	"	WX7746	" Forbes T C	"
WX4275	" Reeves W	"	WX2827	" Flynn T J	"
WX3577	" HAM X M	12/6/41	WX3507	" STONE T	14/6/41

3. LIST ON ARRIVAL (X list & reinforcements)

WX3286	Pte Cotton L	11/6/41	WX4294	Pte Ramm G W E	11/6/41
WX5633	" Brown J J	12/6/41	WX6579	" Skulley H A	12/6/41
WX6585	" Mollamby H A	"	WX3605	" Hopkins J R	"
WX3633	" Tate E J	"	WX6580	" Hall J	"
WX3022	" Montgomery H	"	WX7983	" Munroe J N	"
WX4176	" Garbutt W H	"	WX4635	" Kilpatrick P J	"
WX4285	" Looby J D	"	WX6541	" Thompson J H	"
WX4261	" Riley H	"	WX3187	" Davis L S	"
WX2928	" Beckett W E Y	10/6/41	WX3173	Lieut V H Holley	"
WX3743	" Barratt R J	16/6/41	WX6495	Pte Lynch R J	16/6/41
WX8026	" Aitchison C R	"	WX7799	" Greene F O	"
WX7489	" McCormick J	"	WX7693	" Cook C	"
WX7369	" Murray F	"	WX7720	" McAtee T B	"
WX7825	" DeLargie D	"	WX7744	" Miller H L	"
WX8146	" Meddings G	"	WX7704	" Snelgar H J	"
WX7800	" Mackshaw R	"	WX8103	" Carlton G W	"
WX7941	" Steele H D	"	WX8033	" Flester A L	"
WX8054	" Penistan F	"	WX7815	" Piantea J	"
WX7690	" Rawes F	"	WX7823	" Rees J H	"
WX8058	" Regan J R	"	WX7848	" Richards G D	"
WX8038	" Wight G	"	WX7875	" Wilkinson J W	"
WX7874	" Wilkinson L	"	WX8104	" Williams K W	"
WX6494	" Williamson W T	"	WX7821	" Combs F	"
WX8032	" Payne K G	"	WX8016	" Boyle C	"
WX7783	" Taylor E A	"	WX7415	" Murphy E R	"
WX8037	" Wheatley T C	"	WX8036	" Anderson R V	"
WX7794	" Jacoby H G	"	WX8071	" Marshall J	"
WX8048	" MacPhail M	"	WX193	" McConville C	"
WX5767	" McDonald P G	"	WX7407	" McKechnie J	"
WX6589	" McKenzie R F	"	WX7944	" McLoughlin L A	"
WX8039	" McNamara E T	"	WX8069	" O'Flaherty H J	"
WX7803	" Kain W	"	WX6752	" Green A	"
WX5256	" Olsson B	"	WX8061	" Osborne A G	"
WX8105	" Ottaway L F	"	WX8043	" Hope J L	"
WX7691	" Hovell V A	"	WX7833	" Humphryson A	"
WX8060	" Kilner H D	"	WX7775	" Mannigan E J	"
WX7676	" Lintow E G	"	WX8102	" Lucas C	"
WX7839	" Madeo F	"	WX8075	" Manning C W	"
WX7920	" Markham L H	"	WX8044	" Ardagh G S B	"
WX8106	" Roberts J	"	WX7689	" Sage A G	"
WX7933	" Sermon R B	"	WX7912	" Sullivan G	"
WX7921	" Truslove J W	"	WX8057	" Watts G H	"
WX8055	" Callaghan A J	"	WX8052	" Cripps H	"
WX8064	" Davies W F A	"	WX8074	" Delower J D E	"
WX7696	" Dunworth P L	"	WX8072	" Edwards W G	"
WX8042	" Erridge G E	"	WX7866	" Forbes D	"
WX7951	" Fulward H J	"	WX8056	" Graham L	"
WX8022	" Grant W A	"	WX8065	" Granville A W	"
WX8066	" Granville H	"	WX7700	" Peacock J R	"
WX7802	" Gray T	"	WX7845	" Grimshaw F H	"
WX6757	" Hardy W H	"	WX4182	" Doran J	"
WX2985	Cpl Kern W J	"	WX3567	Sgt Salom A L	"
WX5649	Pte Friessbourg W	"	WX7862	Pte Aitken J	"
WX7753	" Alp W J	"	WX7949	" Angus D E	"
WX7654	" Ashbolt C J	"	WX7699	" Bartlett L A	"
WX7814	" Black D	"	WX8062	" Blechynden J A B	"
WX7688	" Brankstone H V	"	WX7946	" Burr J	"
WX6686	" Burrows S R	"	WX6507	" Byrne J L	"
WX3090	Lieut C D Kayler Thomson	"	WX3859	Lieut R J C Reid	"
WX2808	" C E O'Loughlin	"	WX11021	" N N C Scott	"
WX11021	" E B Maddigan	"	WX6434	" A C Poweraker	"

4. PROMOTIONS

WX2839 Cpl Tull H S to be A/Sgt 16/6/41 WX7989 Pte Morris C T to be A/Cpl 16/6/
WX3626 " Philbin J T do do WX6564 " Milroy W P do do
WX3831 Pte Moffat G to be A/Cpl do WX6546 L/Cpl Ripp G A to be A/Cpl do
WX4658 L/Cpl Charlesworth A E do 6/6/41 WX4760 Cpl Burgess D R " " A/Sgt 11/6/
WX3593 " Martin E F J do 11/6/41 WX5648 L/Cpl Dilworth C F J " A/Cpl "
WX5607 " Scott J do do WX4225 " Kirkham H C " " "
WX3003 A/Sgt Thompson H C rank of Sgt confirmed 17/6/41
WX3636 Cpl Haddy A C to be A/Sgt 17/6/41 WX2945 Cpl Dungey P B to be A/Sgt 17/6/
WX4037 A/Cpl Newhill R G rank of Cpl confirmed & to be A/Sgt 17/6/41
WX2893 L/Cpl Clifton C M to be A/Cpl 17/6/41 WX4050 L/Cpl Bell S to be A/Cpl 17/6/41
WX4222 L/Cpl Cubley J E do do WX4787 Pte O'Dea M do do
WX5768 Pte Hounslow S A do do WX4333 " Alcock A A do do
WX3695 A/Cpl Heck W S rank of Cpl confirmed 17/6/41
WX4658 A/Cpl Charlesworth A E rank of Cpl confirmed 17/6/41

5. APPOINTMENTS

WX3207 Pte Moore A J to be L/Cpl 11/6/41 WX4770 Pte Lee F W to be L/Cpl 11/6/41
WX5998 " Seagrott A A " " " 4/6/41 WX4271 " Taylor T " " " 4/6/41
WX2660 Pte Fleming J W posted to TGIII 4/6/41 (Range taker)

6. REVERSIONS

WX5768 Cpl Hounslow S A reverts to rank at own request 6/6/41
WX5780 " Hounslow F E do do

Almich Lieut
A/Adjt 2/16 Bn AIF

By Lt Col A B McDonald CO

Part B 2 Jul 41

1. STRUCK OFF STRENGTH (Battle casualties)

WX2785	Lieut E R O'Keefe	18/6/41	Wounded	WX2165	Pte Malarkey C	19/6/41	Wounded
WX3876	Pte Harvey J	19/6/41	"	WX4042	" Beattie G L	do	K I A
WX2949	" Natton S M	"	K I A	WX6585	" Hollamby H W	do	Wounded
WX3203	" Durbridge W N	"	Wounded	WX2839	Sgt Tull H S	do	"
WX3831	Cpl Moffat G	"	"	WX3683	Pte Street T	do	"
WX3852	Pte Pease H	"	"	WX3831	A/Cpl Moffat G	20/6/41	Died of W

2. STRUCK OFF STRENGTH (Evacuated to GCS)

WX4770	L/Cpl Lee F	18/6/41		WX5683	Pte Stafford R K	19/6/41	
WX5785	Pte Flower E L	19/6/41		WX2800	" Holt C F	"	
WX8044	" Ardagh G S B	"		WX7921	" Truslove J W	"	
WX4050	L/Cpl Bell S	"		WX4150	Cpl Dentow F A P	"	
WX3500	Pte Chandler G J	"		WX4366	Pte Robson G N	"	
WX4376	" Trigwell W J R	"		WX2922	" Bralich V	"	
WX7693	" Cook C	20/6/41		WX1973	" Lethlean W E	20/6/41	
WX3899	" Hanson E	18/6/41		WX3018	" Moloney D	18/6/41	
WX5756	" Insley R	"		WX6752	" Green A	"	
WX5689	" Dyke F	"		WX3558	" McKenzie W D	"	
WX2873	" Bickley W A	"		WX3080	" Morton T H	"	
WX4341	" Earnshaw G	21/6/41		WX6580	" Hall J	21/6/41	
WX5656	" Farmer R	"		WX4389	" Delaporte W L	"	
WX2961	" Griffiths R	"		WX8022	" Grant W A	"	
WX3049	" Stent E J	"		WX2858	L/Cpl Aitken P	"	
WX4046	L/Cpl Walsley	"		WX4156	Pte Delaney W D	"	
WX2651	Cpl Brander J K	"		WX3525	" Nott J	"	
WX4253	Pte Smith A L	18/6/41		WX3568	Cpl Impson H G	18/6/41	
WX4242	" Hearne J E	22/6/41		WX3571	Cpl Willis J H A	22/6/41	
WX4717	" Birch R	"		WX5504	Pte Foster P	"	
WX5826	" Brown A	"		WX2931	" Dymond H	"	
WX3207	L/Cpl Moore A	"		WX 8052	" Cripps H	"	
WX3008	Sgt Thompson H C	20/6/41		WX4541	Sgt McLaugh W E	20/6/41	
WX5647	Pte Astill N	21/6/41		WX5856	Pte Olsson B	22/6/41	
WX3515	L/Cpl Dennerly W	27/6/41		WX4893	Pte Hughes G	23/6/41	
WX6674	Pte McNeil J	23/6/41		WX4433	" Murphy S M	23/6/41	
WX4212	" Pilpel J	24/6/41		WX4178	" Hickman C J	24/6/41	
WX6587	" Poole L A	"		WX6503	" Tate K L	"	
WX5531	" Graham G W	"		WX3240	" Pike D B	"	
WX4262	" Ryan S J	"		WX7034	" Pearse H W T	"	
WX2821	" Clark K M	26/6/41		WX5787	" Ulleck R B	26/6/41	
WX6559	" Smith J P	"		WX3016	" Beswick H S	"	
WX4358	" Delaporte J E	"		WX4343	" Mill B J A	"	
WX2961	" Griffith R	"		WX8056	" Graham L	"	
WX4573	Cpl Ottewell J R	"		WX7654	" Ashbolt C J	"	
WX5623	Pte Baker J	"		WX4329	WOII R A Grenfell	"	
WX3936	A/Sgt Treasure V V	"		WX4266	Pte Maloney W T	"	
WX5990	L/Cpl Hedley-Dodds J	"		WX7920	" Markham A H	"	
WX4256	Pte Maskiell C	"				"	
WX3289	" Wade W L	"		WX4351	" Duce P	"	
WX7356	" Holloway P J	"		WX7983	" Munroe J Mc	"	
WX5183	" Bird R A	27/6/41		WX3658	" Cheesewright F W	"	
WX5758	" Hardwick E	26/6/41		WX2646	" McQueen A J	"	
WX7001	" Morris N E	"		WX5673	" Keane J E	"	
WX5966	Cpl Allnutt E R L	"		WX6537	" Betteridge C J	"	
WX5773	Pte Robinson W J	"		WX4344	" Herold E	"	
WX3882	7825 Pte Delargey P	28/6/41		WX4979	" Sewell E A	28/6/41	
WX3747	L/Cpl Grenfell T H	"		WX5794	" Tilby R W	"	
WX8060	Pte Kilner A V	"		WX4190	" Kempton C T	"	
WX78 21	" Combs F	"		WX8072	" Edwards W B	"	
WX2728	Lieut E J Blythe	30/6/41		WX11021	Lieut N N C Scott	30/6/41	
WX1576	Maj W J Wain	"		WX7172	Cpl Cullen R H	"	
WX5674	Pte Board L A	29/6/41		WX4762	Pte Hill F A	29/6/41	
WX3917	" Stockhausen H H	"		WX4119	" Hadlow E	"	

2. STRUCK OFF STRENGTH (Evacuated to CCS)

--Contd.

WX5783 Pte Burton W J	29/6/41	WX8069 Pte O'Flaherty H J	29/6/41
WX3591 " Needs L	"	WX5790 " Donovan E A	"
WX6495 " Lynch R J	"	WX4302 " Powell W J	30/6/41
WX3233 " Smart C A G	30/6/41	WX2891 " Smith A J	"
WX5602 " Rainbird A A	"	WX3134 " Wells L W	"
WX5648 Cpl Dilworth C F J	"	WX3792 " Palmer C J	1/7/41
WX5777 Bird S W	1/7/41	WX4218 " Meadows R E	"
WX3912 Pte Hack R S	"	WX2939 " Hilliard A	"
WX3071 " Kempton E G	"	WX4226 " Sims E R	"
WX5613 " Murray J T	"	WX2865 " Beebe L J	"
WX5686 " Platts R S	"	WX2613 " McGregor W R	"
WX7744 " Miller H L	"	WX4174 " Eatt A F	"

3. TAKEN ON STRENGTH (X list & reinfct)

WX5613 Pte Murray J T	18/6/41	WX5662 Pte Thomas S W	18/6/41
WX1593 Capt J M Hearman	23/6/41	WX2728 Lieut E J Blythe	23/6/41
WX7776 Pte Black A	"	WX8925 Pte Hodge P	"
WX8255 " Hickey J	"	WX6730 " McIntyre E J	"
WX8149 " Adamson J S	"	WX9353 " Vince J K	"
WX2979 " Lines C B	"	WX5501 " Graham D B	"
WX3714 " Rutter G M	"	WX5990L/Cpl Hedley-Dodds J	"
WX4243 " Launder D L	"	WX7986 Pte Cramp A V	"
WX7953 " Finlay A	"	WX2948 " Fry R	"
WX8142 " Rosser F N	"	WX7379 " Smart J H	"
WX8031 " Pascoe W	"	WX7708 " Ray H L	"
WX8316 " Cook R A	"	WX7729 " Williams R T	"
WX7359 " Ashworth A D	"	WX7922 " Bennett J P	"
WX6758 " Titterton E W	"	WX5183 " Bird R A	"
WX5774 " Korbosky A J	"	WX4030 " Palmer H E	"
WX5701 " Rose B E	"	WX5698 " Harris C H	"
WX2735 Sgt Hill T N	"	WX5757 " Daniels A D	"
WX2961 Pte Griffith R	24/6/41	WX1973 " Lethlean W E	24/6/41
WX1589 Cpt A Robinson	26/6/41	WX4322 " Griffiths J V	26/6/41
WX7788 Pte MacRae D	23/6/41	WX7791 " Stuart J	23/6/41
WX5623 " Baker J	23/6/41	WX4737 " Cooper J	28/6/41
WX3004 " McDonald P W	23/6/41	WX2816 Cpl Holmes A R	"
WX4203 " Day R	"	WX4363 Pte Beattie M G	"
WX5849 " Powley V E	"	WX5705 " North B	"
WX2852 " Browne-Cooper J O	"	WX5635 " Dusting H W	"
WX4237 " Cleasby J E	"	WX4237 Pte Power R	"
WX4239 " Braeogirdle L	"	WX3917 Pte Stockhausen H	"

4. PROMOTIONS

3936 Cpl Treasure V V to be A/Sgt	18/6/41	WX5693 L/Cpl Clarke M T to be A/Cpl	18/6/41
5669 " Page A B T " " " "	"	4177 Cpl Gray A H to be A/Sgt	20/6/41
4234 Pte Graffin A B " " A/Cpl	20/6/41	2834 Sgt Burbidge T to be WOII	23/6/41
WX4573 A/Cpl Ottewell J R rank of Cpl confirmed	21/6/41		
WX2658 A/Cpl Jamieson L H do do	23/6/41		
WX4173 Pte Hicks S A to be A/Cpl	23/6/41	4059 Cpl Foy T S to be A/Sgt	19/6/41
WX3865 L/Cpl Bremner L D to be A/Cpl	19/6/41	2743 " Wilson H to be A/Sgt	23/6/41
WX5824 " Harley K to be A/Cpl	23/6/41	3889 Pte Collas J E to be Cpl	27/6/41

5. APPOINTMENTS

WX7986 Pte Cramp A V to be L/Cpl	23/6/41	WX5668 Pte Bloomfield G to be L/Cpl	23/6/41
WX4182 " Doran J " " " "	"	WX5759 Pte Hunter J M	1/7/41
WX8149 " Adamson J S posted as sig & classified TGI	23/6/41		
WX8255 " Hickey J do			
WX2960 " Keeley J posted as dr-mech "		TGIII	29/6/41

6. TRANSFERS

WX1595 Capt R B MacKenzie to 21 Aust I T B	22/6/41
WX5107 Pte Liddell W H C do	
WX3250 Lieut G M McGee to No 7 special gp	23/6/41

Smith Lieut
A/Sgt dt 2/16 Bn AIF

S E C R E T

APPX II

FIELD RETURNS

BY

Lt Col A B MacDONALD CO 2/16 Bn

From 1 June 1941 - 31 June 1941

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

EPED (Unit.)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4
Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits one establishment)
*			
*			
*			
Lieut.-Colonels ...	1		
Majors ...	3		
Captains ...	8		
Lieutenants ...	23		3
2nd Lieutenants ...			
Quartermasters ...	1		
District Officers ...			
Totals ...	36		3

*Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Lieut	R N Rose	EPED	31 MAY 41	From 21 Aust ITB
"	W T Elphick	"	"	"

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

PART C.— DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known.)
Lieut	R N Rose	21 Aust ITB	
"	C E O'Loughlin	"	
"	R J C Reid	"	

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No.)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.
LT Col	SX 4357	A B McDonald	E P E D	yes	C O
Major	WX 1574	A W Polts	-	-	2 1/c
"	1576	W J Wain	-	-	OC HQ Coy
"	3373	A F Caro	-	-	OC C Coy
Capt	QX 6159	C N Gadsall	-	No	Adjt - Leave
"	WX 1588	D G Horley	-	yes	OC D Coy
"	1591	F M B Inkpen	-	-	2 1/c D Coy
"	1592	I Johnson	-	-	OC A Coy
"	3374	W Hopkinson	-	-	OC B Coy
"	3254	J K Murdock	-	-	Q M
"	1593	J M Hearman	-	-	2 1/c A Coy
"	1594	W A McKinnon	-	-	2 1/c C Coy
"	1595	R B McKenzie	-	-	2 1/c B Coy
Lieut	1596	E T J Barnett	-	-	PL Comdr
"	1597	W G Symington	-	-	-
"	1598	F H Sublet	-	-	-
"	1599	B D N Langridge	-	-	-
"	2639	T H Hodge	-	-	-
"	2650	R N G Meecham	-	-	-
"	2719	N M Symington	-	-	I O
"	2726	S H S Gill	-	-	Pl Comdr Asst Adjt
"	2731	J M O'Neill	-	-	Pl Comdr
"	2738	N B G Meecham	-	-	-
"	2748	A J Prosser	-	-	-
"	2801	T Oversby	-	-	-
"	2952	T Harber	-	-	T O
"	3250	G M McGee	-	-	Pl Comdr
"	3253	G N Wright	-	-	-
"	5639	F Sanderson	-	-	-
"	2840	W M Atkinson	-	-	-
"	2728	E J Blythe	-	No	School
"	1586	D K Goldsmith	-	yes	Pl Comdr
"	2875	F R O'Keefe	-	-	-
"	3173	V H Holley	-	No	Detached Duty SCAN
"	2811	R N Rose	-	yes	Rien P
"	4545	W T Elphick	-	-	-

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Capt	WX 3321	D R C Wilson	A A M C		Rmo
Chaplain	WX 1557	F R Burt			chaplain

E P E D

(Unit.)

1 Jun 41

(Date of Despatch.)

[Signature] Lieut. Col.
(Signature of Commander.)

C.O. 2718 Bn.

O T A B

(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS.

LUPA (Unit.)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1	2	3	4
Ranks.	Posted strength counting against authorised establishment (excluding attached).	Surplus to Establishment.	Reinforcements required (i.e., deficits one establishment)
Lieut.-Colonels ...	1		
Majors ...	3		
Captains ...	3		
Lieutenants ...	23		3
2nd Lieutenants ...			
Quartermasters ...	1		
District Officers ...			
Totals ...	36		3

*Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary (e.g., Major-General, Brigadier, etc).

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.

PART C.— DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known.)
Lieut	C E O'Loughlin		2 Aug 1918
	H J C Reid		

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No.)	If not present with Unit, state how employed.
Lt Col	SX 4357	A B McDonald	LUPA	Yes	C.P.
Major	UX 1574	AW Potts			2 Coy
	1576	WJ Wain			OC HQ Coy
	3273	AE CARO			OC Coy
Capt	QX 6159	CN Goddard			Adj.
	UX 1588	D.G. Harley			OC B Coy
	1591	FMB Inghen			2nd B Coy
	1592	I Johnson			OC A Coy
	3374	W Hopkinson			OC B Coy
	9254	J K Murdoch			QM
	1593	J M Henrman			4th B Coy
	1594	W A McKinnon			2nd Coy
	1595	R D McKenzie			2nd B Coy
Lieut	1596	ETJ Barnett			PL Condi.
Lieut	1597	W G Summington			
	1598	F H Sublet			
	1599	RAN Langridge			
	2639	TH Hodge			
	2650	RVC Maccham			
	2719	NNI Summington			I O
	2726	SMS Gill			PL Condi.
	2731	J M O'Neill			PL Condi.
	2738	ABC Maccham			
	2748	A J Prosser			
	2801	T Crossby			
	2952	T Harper			I O
	3250	CM McGee			PL Condi.
	3253	CN Wright			
	5339	F Sanderson			
	2840	WM Atkinson			
	2722	F J Blythe		No	School
	1586	D K Goldsmith		Yes	PL Condi.
	2875	ER O Keelha			
	3173	V H Harvey		No	detached Nov
	2811	R N Rose		Yes	Reint.
	4545	WT Phillips			

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive Rank.	Higher acting or temporary rank, if held.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Capt	UX 3321	DRC Wilson	ANMC		RMO
Chaplain	UX 1357	FR Burr			Chaplain

LUPA
(Unit.)
8.5.41
(Date of Despatch.)

Bill Lumsden
(Signature of Commander.)
Lieut. Col.
C.O. 2/16 Bn. A.I.F.
(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving).

FIELD RETURN OF OFFICERS

L U P A (Unit)

PART A.—STRENGTH, SURPLUS OR REINFORCEMENTS REQUIRED.

1 Ranks.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishment).
Lieut.-Colonels	1		
Majors	3		
Captains	3		
Lieutenants	17		
2nd Lieutenants	1		
Quartermasters			
TOTALS	25		

* Insert detail of higher ranks as necessary.

PART B.—PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS JOINED OR QUITTED DURING WEEK.

Officers JOINED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Lt-Col	AB Mc Donald	LUPA	27 Jun 41	From Leave
Capt	A Robinson	"	"	From 21 Aug ITB
"	J M Hearman	"	23 Jun 41	"
Lieut	E J Blythe	"	"	"

Officers QUITTED during week.

Rank.	Name.	Corps.	Date.	Cause.
Lieut	G M McGee	LUPA	23 Jun 41	To No 7 Spec GP
Capt	R B Mackenzie	"	22 Jun 41	To 21 Aug ITB

PART C.—DESCRIPTION OF OFFICERS WHOSE RETURN TO THE UNIT IS PARTICULARLY REQUESTED.

Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g., present whereabouts, if known)

PART D.—NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS ON STRENGTH.

(i) Officers posted to Unit (Total to agree with column 2 of Part A).

1	2	3	4	5	6
Substantive Rank, and higher temporary rank, if held.	Personal Number.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Whether present with Unit (Insert Yes or No).	If not present with Unit, state how employed.
Lt Col	SX 4357	A B McDonald	LUPA	Yes	CO
MAJOR	WX 1574	A W Polts	"	"	2 1/c
"	1576	W J Wain	"	"	OC HQ Coy
"	3373	A E Caro	"	"	OC C Coy
Capt	3254	J K Murdock	"	"	QM
"	1593	J M Hearman	"	"	OC A Coy
"	1594	W A McKinnon	"	"	OC D Coy
"	1589	A Robinson	"	"	OC B Coy
Lieut	2639	T H Hodges	"	"	Pl Condr
"	2719	N M Symington	"	"	IO
"	2726	S H S Gill	"	"	Pl Condr (Acting Adj)
"	2731	J M O'Neill	"	"	Pl Condr
"	2748	A J Prosser	"	"	"
"	2801	T Oversby	"	"	"
"	2952	T Harber	"	"	2 1/c A Coy
"	2846	N M Atkinson	"	"	Pl Condr
"	2728	E J Blythe	"	"	"
"	1586	D K Goldsmith	"	"	"
"	2811	R N Rose	"	"	"
"	11021	NMC Scott	"	"	"
"	11020	E B Madigan	"	"	"
"	3090	C D Kayler-Thompson	"	"	"
"	3859	RJC Reid	"	"	"
"	2808	C E O'Loughlin	"	"	"
"	6434	A C Fowleraker	"	"	"

(ii) OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM OTHER CORPS.

Substantive rank, and higher temporary rank, if held.	Personal Number.	Name and Initials.	Corps	Date of attachment.	Nature of attachment.
Capt	WX 3321	DRC Wilson	AAMC		RMO
Chaplain	WX 1557	FR Burr			Chaplain

LUPA

(Unit.)

29 Jun 41

(Date of Despatch.)

[Signature] Lieut. Col.

C.O.S. 216 B (Signature of Commander.)

NEVI

(Bde., Divn., Area, etc., with which Unit is serving.)

FIELD RETURN OF OTHER RANKS.

LUPA (Unit) 28 Jun 41 (Date).

(To be furnished by all units and all Headquarter units.)

Part A. Strength, Surplus or Reinforcements required.

1 Detail.	2 Posted strength counting against authorized establishment (excluding attached).	3 Surplus to Establishment.	4 Reinforcements required (i.e. deficits on establishments).
W.Os. Class I.	1		
W.Os. Class II.	5		1
Squadron or Company Quartermaster-Serjeants			
Staff Serjeants	7		8
Serjeants	24		25
Corporals	48		288
Troopers, Privates, &c.	491		
TOTALS	576	*	322

* These totals should agree with the details shown in Part D on page 2 of Army Form W.3009.

Part B. Other Ranks attached from other Corps.

Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.	Detail.	Unit and Corps to which they belong.
	A A M C	3	
	A A O C	4	
	A A P C	1	
	A A Post C	1	
	Chapns Btm	1	
		10	

Part C. Description of other ranks whose return to the unit is particularly requested.

Army No.	Rank.	Name and Initials.	Corps.	Remarks (e.g. present whereabouts if known).
W15655	N2	Tasker JF	LUPA	

S E C R E T

APPX III a

MOVEMENT ORDERS

S E C R E T

Copy No 2

4 Jun 41.

21 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BATTALION GROUP ORDER NO 7.

Ref Map : HAIFA and BEISAN Sheets 1/100,000.

INFORM.

1. See 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp Int Summary No 1 issued in conjunction with these orders.
2. Aust Div Exporter Force moves to assembly areas general line ROSH PINNA 201264 - TARSHIBA 175268 - UMM AL FARAJ 161267.
3. Tps under cmd -

Two tps ROYALS
CHESHIRE Yeo (less one sqn)
"A" sqn 6 Aust Cav
2/4 Fd Regt
6 A Tk Bty
170 Lt AA Bty (less one tp).
2/6 Fd Coy
Det Sigs Aust Div Exporter
2/6 Fd Amb (less HQ Coy)

INTENTION.

4. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will assemble in the general area TARSHIBA 175268 - UMM AL FARAJ 161267 - AZZIB 159272.

METHOD.

5. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will be divided into colns as under :

- (i) Designated "DONCOL".
Cmd - Lt-Col A B MacDonald 2/16 Bn.
Two tps ROYALS
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav (less Lt Tk tps)
2/4 Fd Regt (less one bty)
Two tps 6 A Tk Bty (less two guns)
One tp 170 Lt AA Bty
2/6 Fd Coy (less one sec)
2/16 Bn
One coy 2/6 Fd Amb.
- (ii) Designated "NOTCOL".
Cmd - Lt-Col M J Moten 2/27 Bn.
Lt Tk Tps A Sqn 6 Aust Cav
One bty 2/4 Fd Regt
6 A Tk Bty (less two tps)
170 Lt AA Bty (less two tps)
One sec 2/6 Fd Coy
2/27 Bn
One coy 2/6 Fd Amb

Components of above colns come under cmd 0900 hrs D - 2.

(iii) Cheshire Yeomanry.

(iv) 2/14 Bn (with special and res roles).

6. Assembly areas are allotted as follows :-

/DONCOL

DONCOL - Area TARSHIHA 175268
 MOTCOL - " UMM AL FARAJ 161267
 Two coys
 2/14 Bn
 (less one pl) - " AZZIB 159272
 2/14 Bn
 (less above) - Wooded area 160265
 CHESHIRE
 YEO - ALKABRI 164268
 B Ech (all units) - UMM AL FARAJ (after departure of MOTCOL).

7. The movement will be carried out by night in accordance with Movement Table att as Appx "A".
8. During the move absolutely no lights will be used after passing SHA'AR HA AMAQIM 160236.
9. Immediately on arrival in assembly areas all vehs and personnel will be placed under cover and camflg. The various cols will "lie up" during the day of D - 1. No mvt of vehs will be permitted and such personnel mvt as is necessary will be made under cover.
10. Outline instns have already been issued for the further actions of cols after leaving the assembly areas and cols will move to the assembly area in the order they will leave for their subsequent action to reduce mvt in the assembly area to a minimum.

ADM.

11. B Ech all units move on D1 to UMM AL FARAJ after MOTCOL has vacated that area.
 The order of march of B Ech will be as follows -

(i)	All subunits "DONCOL"	}	Comd - Capt R White, Bde Tpt Offr
(ii)	HQ Bde Gp		
(iii)	All subunits "MOTCOL"		
(iv)	CHESHIRE YEO		
(v)	2/14 Bn		
12. B Ech remains this area until ordered fwd.
13. 5 Res MP Coy reports 1200 hrs D - 2. Units will have guides detailed ready to report to HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp as soon as signalled for.
14. Embussing Pts - Unit areas.
15. Further Adm Orders issued separately.

INTERCOMN.

16. Wireless silence during move and whilst in assembly areas.
17. HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp closes present location 0130 hrs D minus 1 and reopens ALBAHJA 159260 at same time.
18. DR routes fwd from Bde HQ will be by track AL BAHJA - AL KABRI and rd TARSHIHA - NAHARIYA.
 The main rd will NOT be used.

/19. Following -

S E C R E T

APR "A" to 21 Aust Inf Bde G
OO No 1.

Copy No

MOVEMENT TABLE.

ROUTE: AFFULA - RD JUNE 17762292 - SHINRON 170234 - SHA'AR HA AMAQIM 160236 - RD JUNE 15302458 - ACRE - NAHARIYA 159268 - TARSHIHA 17532687.

DISPERSAL PTS: Assembly areas as shown.

HALTS: 10 mins before every even hr (except DONCOL and MOTCOL).

Serial No (a)	Date (b)	Formation or Unit (c)	No of vchrs (d)	Place		SP (g)	Time past SP (h)	Speed to SP (j)	Speeds and Densities		Remarks
				From (e)	To (f)				mlh (k)	vchrs (l)	
1	D-3	"A" Sqdn 6 Aust Cav	18	AFFULA	SHA'AR HA AMAQIM 160236	Rd & track June 17442296	2030	6 mlh	6	30	Move to intermediate "lying up" area as already reced.
2	"	2/4 rd Regt	103			Rd June 17742248	2030				
3	D-2	"A" Sqdn 6 Aust Cav	18	SHA'AR HA AMAQIM	ASSEMBLY AREAS DONCOL & MOTCOL	Rd June 16102364	2030	6 mlh	6	30	
4	"	2/4 rd Regt	103								
5	D-2	2/14 Bn	19	AFFULA	AZZIB NAHARIYA	Rd June 17762292	2218				On reaching AZZIB all vchrs for these coys return to unit assembly area.
6	"	2/14 Bn	57				2230				
7	D-2	Rd Bde GP	17			Rd June 17742248		12 mlh	12	30	
8	"	DONCOL 6 (incl ty force)	218			Rd June 16952540	2345				6 halts 10 mins before every odd hr.
9	D-1	MOTCOL 6	167			" " " "	0140				
10	D-1	Vchrs serial No 5 above	19	AZZIB	WOODED AREA 160265	AZZIB	0340	12 mlh	12	30	Vchrs of 5vRes Mt Coy which lifted 2/14 Bn report to 25 Aust Inf Bde as soon as this move complete.
11	DI	2/6 rd Amb (less two coys)	30	AFFULA	AL BIRWA	Rd June 17742248	0800	20 mlh	20	15	
12	DI	B Ech all units	147	AFFULA	NAHARIYA	Rd June 16952339	1200	20 mlh	20	15	

CHESHIRE YEO moves to ass embly area across country under separate arrangements.

21 AUST INF BDE GP ADM INSPN No 1.
(Issued in conjunction with 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp
OO No 7.)

Ref Maps : HAIFA Sheet 1/100,000
SAFAD Sheet 1/100,000

1. AMN.

(a) Units will move to Assembly Areas with first line amn complete as follows :

(1) With man or gun -

Rifle	-	100
LMG	-	1000
.55 AP	-	200
T. SMG	-	250
3 in Mor HE	-	up to 75 if available.
3 in Mor Smok	-	45
2 in Mor HE	-	9
2 in Mor Smok	-	27

(ii) On A Ech vehs - the balance to G1098 scale. Normal replenishment will be carried out by units.

(b) Locations and times of opening of APs will be advised as situation develops, except for 2/4 Rd Arty, for which amn will be delivered by Bde Gp Comp Coy to Bty posns.

2. FCL.

(a) All vehs will proceed to Assembly Areas with tanks full and res on vehs as follows :

Cars - 8 gals
Vans - 12 "
Lorries - 16 "

(b) One veh from B Ech of inf bn in each coln will accompany its coln with sufficient pet to replace consumption during move to Assembly Areas. On completion of replenishment, these vehs will return to B Ech. *a to return to B Ech concentration area.*

(c) Two pet vehs from own unit will accompany 2/4 Rd Arty, 6 A Tk Bty, A Sqn 6 Aust Cav, to Assembly Area, one of which will replenish their vehs and return to B Ech. The other veh will accompany the colns on D1.

(d) Location and times of opening of PPs will be notified.

3. SUPS.

(a) Four days hard rations and the unconsumed portion of the day's ration will be taken from concentration area and carried as follows :

One day on the man, ✓
One day with the tps in the tp carrying ✓
vehs for consumption in Assembly Areas, ✓
Two days in A Ech vehs, ✓
One day in B Ech vehs. ✓

(b) One day's hard ration will be for consumption on D2 day and the remaining will be res.

/(c) Units -

- (c) Units will be maintained in the normal manner. Locations and times of MPs will be notified daily. ✓
- (d) Indents (AB55) will be submitted to Bde by all units in Gp by 0830 hrs daily. Indents will be for rations for consumption on the third day after rendition. ✓
- (e) Fully motorised units will carry the full four days rations plus the unconsumed days ration in their unit vehs from the Concentration Area.
- (f) Rations vehs of 2/14 Bn only will move fwd to the unit on D1 at a time and to a RV to be notified. They will be accompanied by water veh. ✓

4. Water.

- (a) The following res will be carried :

Cars	-	4 gals.
Vans	-	8 gals.
Lorries	-	16 gals.

- (b) Water tanks as under will accompany colns to the Assembly Areas:

From 2/16 Bn with DONCOL. ✓
" 2/27 Bn with MOTCOL.

All water bottles and water containers will be replenished to the scale shown in sub-para (a) before colns move out of Assembly Areas and the water tanks will then refill at the nearest WP to be notified later. On filling they will move fwd again and rejoin their respective colns.

- (c) Water tank of 2/14 Bn only will move fwd to the unit on D1 with ration vehs referred to in para 3 (d). ✓

- (d) Water for filling radiators will be obtained from creeks, etc., so far as possible.

- (e) Any additional res in addition to that in sub-para (a) which can be carried without overloading vehs will be taken.

- 5. BLANKETS, GREATCOATS. Blankets will be placed in packs and greatcoats rolled outside and att'd to packs. Packs will be carried in pl vehs.

6. MEDICAL.

- (a) A Coy 2/6 Fd Amb will accompany DONCOL and B Coy 2/6 Fd Amb will accompany MOTCOL. One Lt Sec plus one amb veh will be att'd to 2/14 Bn.

- (b) Evacuation will be by MAC direct from Fd Amb until MDS is est.

7. REC.

- (a) LA DS will move with B Ech.

- (b) Second line rec posts will be located on D1 at AL BAHJA 15892612. Mainshop will be located at AD DAMON 16742534. ✓

8. TRAFFIC.

- (a) TOPs will be est under arrangements of DAPM Exporter.

- (b) Traffic circuits as shown in map already issued will be adhered to, except

(1) on day 1 from 0600 hrs until 2000 hrs routes A7, A5, B3, B4 will be one way routes running North.

(ii) On nights D-2/D-1 and D-1/D1 from 2000 hrs until 0600 hrs route B5 is res for 25 Inf Bde Gp traffic.

9. FW.

(a) Collecting centres will be est at :

TYR - Gd detailed by 2/14 Bn.
SAIDA - Gd detailed by 2/16 Bn.

(b) PWS, under escort provided from above gds, will be sent back to cages est at MALIKIYA 198279 and JUEILA 170273. The actual cage to be used will be notified later when posn respecting COAST Rd is known.


(c) Gds at cages will be provided by tps quartered at the frontier camps in these areas.

10. STRAGGLERS. DAPM will arrange line of straggler posts along the frontier.

11. TPT. B Ech will be bded under BTO as from 1800 hrs D - 2. It will remain in the present area until 1000 hrs on D1 when it will move to the Assembly Areas UMM AL FARAJ and await further orders.

12. BURIALS. Attention is drawn to Aust Div Exporter Adm Instn No 6 of 3 Jun 41 on this subject, distributed to all units 4 Jun 41.

ACK.
Issued to Sigs.
Signed at 12⁰⁵ hrs.


Capt.
SC 21 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION

As for 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp OO No 7.

S E C R E T

Copy No _____

5 Jun 41.

21 AUST INF BDE GP OP INSTN No 14.

Ref Map : BEYROUTH Sheet 1/200,000.

2/16 Bn.

INFM.

1. There are small garrisons in the French frontier posts at AITAROUNE (strength unknown), BENNT JBAIL (about 50 Spahis), YAROUN (about 15 Spahis) and AIN EBEL (strength unknown). There are other posts to the west at REMEICHE, AITA ECH CHAAB, RAMIET, KH JEREINE, ALMA CHAAB, LABOUNA and NAQOURA. There is also a post at BLIDA on the front of 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp. The French frontier rd is patrolled frequently.
2. BENNT JBAIL is reported as being the HQ of the frontier garrison posts and may therefore be more strongly held than indicated above.
3. Exporter Force is entering SYRIA to capture the aerodromes at BEYROUTH and RAYAK. The force will move in two colns, the right coln via MERDJAYOUN to RAYAK and the left via EL MALIKIYA - TIBNINE - TYR to BEYROUTH. 21 Bde Gp is the left coln.
4. It is not known whether the French will oppose our adv and in the first place the opportunity for them to surrender is to be given (see separate notes on this aspect). Nothing, however, is to be permitted to delay our adv and the max force is to be applied immediately in the event of resistance.
5. The frontier posts mentioned in Para 1 must be captured as a preliminary to the main op. A track must also be built between the frontier rds at EL MALIKIYA and AITAROUNE.
6. The CHESHIRE YEO and 2/14 Bn are capturing the posts from incl REMEICHE to NAQOURA whilst 25 Bde Gp will capture BLIDA. 2/2 Pnr Bn will build the track EL MALIKIYA - AITAROUNE.

INTENTION.

7. 2/16 Bn will capture the posts AITAROUNE, AIN EBEL, BENNT JBAIL and YAROUN by 0430 hrs on D1, and cover the construction of the track across the frontier by one coy 2/2 Pnr Bn.

METHOD.

8. 2/16 Bn will not use more than two rifle coys with such mortar support as may be considered necessary.
9. The main essentials are :-
 - (a) to capture YAROUN early in the op so that the passage of MT on the frontier rd will not be so obvious,
 - (b) to destroy very early in the op the telephone wires leading to BENNT JBAIL from all directions,
 - (c) to carry out the op speedily and with as little noise as possible.
10. Garrisons are to be maintained at AITAROUNE and BENNT JBAIL until coy 2/2 Pnr Bn employed on track is available to take over.

ADM.

11. PW cage will be est by Div at EL MALIKIYA. Prisoners will be assembled at AITAROUNE and handed over there to coy 2/2 Pnr Bn /for escort

for escort to PW cage.

INTERCOMN.

12. The capture of each post will be reported by runner as follows :

YAROUN - to an offr of 2/16 Bn stationed at pt of entry across the frontier. This offr will then proceed to HQ DONCOL.

BENNT JBAIL,)
AIN EBEL and) - to HQ DONCOL at EL MALIKIYA.
AITAROUNE)

13. Code word for op will be "DONALD".

14. Password will be "FORD"
"WHICH FORD"
"DAYLES FORD".

[Handwritten Signature]
Maj.
BM 21 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK
Signed at 0921 hrs.
Issued to Sigs:

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>Copy No</u>
2/16 Bn	1
2/2 Pnr Bn	2
North SOMERSET YEO	3
Comd	4
File	5- 6
War Diary	7- 8
25 Aust Inf Bde	9

SECRET

Copy No 8

23 Jun 41.

21 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BDE GROUP OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS No 23.

Ref Map : SAIDA Sheet 1/50,000.

INFORM.

1. See 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp Int Summary No 6 dated 27 Jun 41 and Daily Sitrep.

INTENTION.

2. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will secure observation over the DAMOUR posn.

METHOD.

3. There will be no further adv beyond the present fwd posns except that 2/27 Bn will seize pts 412, 12521945 and 394, 12631947 to secure observation.
4. The inter-bn boundary which will also be the boundary for responsibility of infm is as under. "E" in EL ATIQA 124197 - Pt 158, 12411962 - ES SIYAR 12341952 (all incl 2/16 Bn) - EL KARAM 12321943 incl 2/27 Bn.
5. One sec MG Tp CHESHIRE Yeo will move to AAQLIYA area for right flank protection of 2/27 Bn and in such a posn that MG fire can be produced on rd BENT ED DINE - EL ATIQA.
6. Particular attention will be paid to concealment of posns and the above guns will not open fire except in the case of counter-attack or for a profitable target moving along the rd.
7. In the fwd area the minimum personnel are to be kept in exposed posns commensurate with security.
8. The area not held between our fwd posns and the enemy MDLs will be denied to the enemy at night by active patrolling and recce patrols will gain all possible infm re approaches to river and crossing pts.
9. 2/27 Bn will retain post of one Pl on rd JOUN - SAIDA.
10. One Tp CHESHIRE Yeo at EL MCHAIRIYA will be withdrawn and revert to cond of sqn on MERDJAYOUN Rd.
11. 2/27 Bn will retain one coy astride lateral rd at SEBLINE.

[Handwritten Signature]

Maj.

BM 21 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK

Signed at _____ hrs.
Issued to sigs.

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>Copy No</u>
CHESHIRE Yeo	1
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav	2
2/4 Pz Regt	3
6 A Tk Bty	4
170 Lt AA Bty	5
2/6 Pz Coy	6
Sigs	7
2/16 Bn	8
2/25 Bn	9
2/27 Bn	10

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>Copy No</u>
21 Aust Inf Bde Gp	
AASC Coy	11
2/6 Pz Amb	12
B Sec 14 Lt Pz Amb	13
25 Aust Inf Bde	14
7 Aust Div	15-17 (One for AITO)
Comd	18
NLO	19
File	20-21
War Diary	22-23

S E C R E T

APPX III b

MOVEMENT ORDERS

2/16 Bn

Ref: MAP sheet 1/100,000

SECRET
OO No 5
Copy No 24
5 Jun 41.

INFORM

- 1 See 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp Int Summary No 1
- 2 Aust Div Exporter Force moves to assembly area ROSE PINNA 201264 - TARSHIMA 175268 - UEM Lt P. RAY 161267.
- 3 DONCOL, component of Exporter Force, consists of :-
Lt Col A B Macdonald 2/16 Bn with under comd :-
Two tps Royals
A sqn 6 Aust Cav (less two lt tk tps)
2/4 Fd Regt less one bty
Two tps 6 A Tk Bty (less one sec) - (one gun reports 21 Aust Inf Bde
(one gun reports to TYR Force

One tp 170 Lt AA Bty
2/6 Fd Coy less one sec plus det Fd Park Coy
2/16 Bn less 2 secs 2 pl
One Coy 2/6 Fd Amb
- 4 TYR Force consists of :-
One rifle coy 2/14 Bn
Two mortar det 2/14 Bn
Two carriers 2/14 Bn
One A Tk gun 6 A Tk Bty
- 5 TYR Force comes under comd DONCOL at 0900hrs D-2 & remains under comd till TYR is taken.
- 6 One coy 2/2 Pnr Bn moves with DONCOL
- 7 One gun 6 A Tk Bty reports 21 Aust Inf Bde at 0900hrs D-2. One gun reports to TYR Force at 0900hrs D-2.

INTENTION

- 8 DONCOL, TYR Force & one coy 2/2 Pnr Bn will move by MT to assembly area TARSHIMA at 2345 hrs D-2

METHOD

- 9 Adv gd - Maj Potts with under comd :-

	Vehs	AFV or guns	MC
Engr mine party	1		
Two tps Royals		6	
* Four tps carriers 6 Aust Cav		12	
9 pl A coy	3		
Comd	1		3
c Recce Party 2/6 Fd Coy	2		
* One sec 2/4 Fd Regt	1	2	2
A coy less 9 pl	8		
One sec 6 A Tk Bty	1	2	
One sec 170 Lt AA Bty	1	2	
RAP	1		
	19	24	5
Main body :-			
HQ	4	1	6
A det - MC			3
one sec 4 pl		3	
one A Tk gun		1	
B det - MC			3
sec 4 pl		3	
one A Tk gun		1	
One sec 2 pl	1		
4 pl (less two secs)		3	
B coy	11		
* C coy	11		
3 pl	4		
* 2/4 Fd Regt less one bty less one sec	55	10	
2/6 Fd Coy less one sec less recce party	17		
* Det Fd Park Coy	9		
One sec 170 Lt AA Bty	1	2	
* D coy	11		
One coy 2/6 Fd Amb	8		3

9 Main body (contd)

	Vehs	AFV or GUNS	MC
Petrol & mechanics waggon 6 Aust Coy	2		
One sec 6 A Tk Bty	1	2	
One sec 2 pl	1		
TR Force	14	2	
x One coy 2/2 Pnr Bn	9		

x These units move separately to assembly area as per appx A but on move from assembly area will be in the above formation.

10 Movement - see appx A

11 No lights to be used after passing SHARH. AMAQIM 160236

12 Immediately on arrival in assembly areas all vehs & personnel will be placed under cover & conflag. Units will "lie up" in their areas during the day D-1 & from daylight till dark no movement of vehs will be permitted. Any movement of personnel necessary will be made under cover, necessary

ADM

13 B ech all units remain in present areas till ordered fwd then move to UMM AL FARAJ.

B ech will be ready to move at 0600hrs DL.

14 OC coys will arrange for one guide per coy to stand by at 1100hrs D-2 to guide MT of 5 Res MT Coy to coy areas.

15 Embussing pts - coy areas

16 OC HQ coy will arrange guides for guides for the coln & for sub unit assembly areas for traffic guides en route & for preparing areas for rapid dispersal.

17 Further adm orders will be issued separately.

INTERCOM

18 Wireless silence during move.

19 Bn HQ closes present location 2345hrs thence moves at head of main body to TARSHIMA where it re-opens on arrival.


ACK

Signed at 1430 hrs 5 Jun 41,
Issued through sigs

G H Eochall
Capt
Adjt 2/16 Bn AIF

Tracing A
Issued with 00 No 5

TRACING A to 00 No 5
Copy No 24



2/16 Bu

Appx A to OO No 5
Copy No 24
5 Jun 41.MOVEMENT TABLEROUTE: AFFULA - Rd June 17762292 - SHIMRON 170234 - SHA'AR HA AMAQIM 160236 -
Rd June 15302438 - ACNE - NAHARIYA 159268 - TARSHIMA 17532687.

SPEED: to SP & speed & density on march 12 min - 30 vtm.

~~BUSINESS AS USUAL assembly areas - see tracing - 1~~

DISPERSAL PTS : assembly areas - see tracing A

HALTS: at 10 min to every odd hr. First halt at 0050hrs.

Serial No	Date	Unit	No of Vehs	Place		Time Past		Remarks
				From	To	SP	SP	
1		D-2 C coy	11	AFFULA	areal rd june			
1a		D-2 D coy	11	"	"	16982340	2345	
						16982340		
2		Pnr coy	9	"	"	"	2348	
3		2/5 Fd Coy	1	"	area2	"	2350	
4		Two tps Royals	6	"	"	"	2350	
5		Four tps 6 Aust Coy	12	SHA'AR HA AMAQIM	area6	-	-	Moves separately. Reports to OC Adv gd 20:5hrs D-1 at area2
6		9 pl A coy	3	AFFULA	area2	rd june	2351	
		coy				16982340		
7		Comd	1	AFFULA	area2	"	2351	
8		R pty 2/6 Fd coy	2	AFFULA	"	"	2351	
9		Sec 2/4 Fd Regt	3	SHA'AR HA AMAQIM	area4	-	-	Moves with Fd Regt. Reports to OC Adv gd 2100hrs D-1 at area 2
10		A coy less 9 pl	8	AFFULA	area2	rd june	2352	
						16982340		
11		Sec 6 A Tk Bty	3	"	"	"	2353	
12		Sec 170 AA Lt Bty	3	"	"	"	2353	
13		RAP	1	"	"	"	2353	
14		HQ DONCOL	5	"	area3	"	2356	
15		Sec 4 pl	3	"	"	"	2356	
15a		A Tk gun	1	"	"	"	2356	
16		Sec 4 pl	3	"	"	"	2357	
16a		A Tk gun	1	"	"	"	2357	
17		Sec 2 pl	1	"	"	"	2357	
18		4 pl less two secs	3	"	"	"	2357	
19		B coy	11	"	"	"	2358	
20		3 pl	4	"	"	"	2359	
21		2/4 Fd Regt less one bty less one sec	66	SHA'AR HA AMAQIM	area4	"	-	

Serial No	Date	Unit	No of Vehs	Place		Time past		Remarks
				From	To	SP	SP	
22	D-1	2/6 Fd	17	AFFULA	area 7	rd junc	2400	
		Coy less					16982340	
		one sec less						
		R party						
23	"	Sec 170	3	AFFULA	area 3	"	0004	
		AM Lt Bty						
24	"	One coy		"	area 9	"	0004	
		2/6 Fd	8					
		Amb						
25	"	Pet 3	2	SHARAR	area 6	"	-	Moves independently. See serial 5
		Mechs		HA				
		6 Aust Car		ALAQIM				
26	"	Sec 6 A	3	AFFULA	area 5	"	0005	
		Tk Bty						
27	"	Sec 2 pl 1		"	area 3	"	0005	
28	"	TYRFORCE		"	area 8	"	0006	
		16						
29	"	Fd PK	9					Separate instns will be issued.
		Coy						

DISTRIBUTION :-

Copy No	Appx A	Tracing A	
1	1	1	HQ Coy
2	1	1	A "
3	1	1	B "
4	1	1	C "
5	1	1	D "
6 & 7 (copy for	² det Fd Plt	² Coy	2/6 Fd Coy
8	1	1	Royals
9	1	1	6 Aust Cav
10	1	1	2/4 Fd Regt
11	1	1	6 A Tr Bty
12	1	1	170 Lt AA Bty
13	1	1	2/3 Fd Amb
14	1	1	2/3 Pnr Bn
15	1	1	2/14 Bn (TYR Force)
16	1	1	2/27 Bn
17	1	1	21 Aust Inf Bde
18	1	1	25 " " "
19	1	1	Comd
20 - 21	2	2	F O
22	1	1	QM
23	1	1	I O
24 - 25	2	2	WD
26	1	1	File
27 - 28	2	2	Spare

2/16 Bn

SECRET
OO No 6
Copy No 23
6 Jun 41.

Ref : (SAFAD sheet - 1/100,000
(BEYROUTH sheet - 1/200,000
(HAIFA sheet - 1/100,000

NB - All names south of border ref SAFAID & HAIFA sheets & names north of border ref BEYROUTH sheet.

INTEL

- 1 There are small garrisons in the French frontier posts at AITAROUNE (strength unknown), BENNT JBAIL (about 50 spahis), YAROUN (about 15 spahis), & AIN EBDEL (strength unknown). The French frontier rd is patrolled frequently.
- 2 BENNT JBAIL is reported as being the HQ of the frontier garrison posts & may be therefore more strongly held than indicated above.
- 3 EMPLOYER FORCE is entering SYRIA to capture the aerodromes at BEYROUTH & RAYAK. The force will move in two cols, the left coln via AL MALIKIYA - TIBNINE - TYR to BEYROUTH. DONCOOL will lead the left coln & will have as the ultimate objective the BEYROUTH aerodrome.
- 4 It is not known whether the French will oppose our adv, & in the first place the opportunity for them to surrender is to be given. (See separate notes on this aspect) Nothing however must delay our adv & the maximum force is to be applied IMMEDIATELY in the event of resistance.
- 5 The post mentioned in para 1 must be captured as the preliminary to the main op. A track must also be built between the frontier rds at AL MALIKIYA & AITAROUNE by one coy 2/2 Pnr Bn.
- 6 CHESHIRE YCO & the 2/14 Bn are capturing posts from incl REMBEIGHE to NAQOURA while 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp will capture BLIDA.

INTERVIEW

- 7 C & D coys will capture posts AITAROUNE, YAROUN, BENNT JBAIL, AIN EBDEL by 0430hrs on D 1 & cover the construction of a track across the frontier by one coy 2/2 Pnr Bn as a preliminary to the adv of DONCOOL on TYR.

METHOD

- 8 (a) Route ; HURWEISH - SUSA - KAHR BIR'IM - Frontier rd - Pt 19792800 - SYRIA
Frontier rd - AITAROUNE - BENNT JBAIL - TIBNINE.
(b) SP : Rd junc 18822701
(c) C coy 2255 hrs D-1 passes SP
0015 " D1 arrives assembly area AL MALIKIYA
0035 " leaves FUP SYRIAN side of frontier wire
Objective - AITAROUNE
At a time to be decided by SG coy a small recon patrol will be sent fwd to cut the telephone lines to BENNT JBAIL & AIN EBDEL. This patrol will avoid the enemy & will complete its task at 0155 hrs.
(d) D coy 0020 hrs D1 passes SP
0100 " D1 arrives assembly area 19092749
0120 " leaves FUP SYRIAN side of frontier wire
Objective - YAROUN
(e) By 0200 hrs C coy will have surrounded AITAROUNE & D coy YAROUN. Every effort will be made to carry out this op without disturbing the enemy. At 0200 hrs the interpreter with each coy will enter the post with the intention of requesting the post to surrender.
On any sign of resistance the maximum force will be immediately applied.
(f) On capture of posts AITAROUNE & YAROUN :
C coy reports capture to bn HQ at AL MALIKIYA, moves fwd & attacks BENNT JBAIL from north & east.
D coy reports capture of YAROUN to adjt at 19092749, garrisons post & proceeds to attack BENNT JBAIL from south & west.
(g) On capture of BENNT JBAIL :
C coy will prepare to move fwd with main body.
D coy garrisons the post then proceeds to attack AIN EBDEL from the north

- 8 (h) On capture of AIN EBEL :
D coy will garrison post then prepare to move fwd in rear of main body as soon as post is taken over by coy 2/2 Pnr Regt.
- 9 Coy 2/2 Pnr Regt:
One veh with workingparty will go fwd with each of C & D coy & cut frontier wire.
The remaining vehs will follow in rear of D coy & proceed to dispersal area through wire at AL MALIKIYA.
Work not to commence on making track till 0205 hrs.
On conclusion of work coy will move fwd & take over garrisoning of AITAROUNE, BENNT JBAIL, & AIN EBEL when captured.
- 10 Adv gp: Pass SP at 0200 hrs - 8 mih - 20 vtm - move to AITAROUNE.
On report of capture of BENNT JBAIL continue the move ; rate in daylight 15 mih - 20 vtm. See appx A Op instn to comd adv gd.
- 11 Main body : Pass SP at 0240 hrs - 8 mih - 20 vtm . Rate in daylight - 15 mih - 20 vtm. See appx B Op instn for further move DONCOL.
- 12 AA will be mounted in lying up areas but firing will NOT take place unless under special orders from comd DONCOL.
- ADM
- 13 On capture of each post :
PW will be collected in a central area, offrs immediately separated from their men & senior offrs from junior offrs. All comm will be cut, wires to be cut in two places but telephone posts not to be cut down or destroyed, wireless sets collected & rds picqueted.
All arms & amm collected & placed in a central dump under gd.
All houses & buildings will be systematically searched, but civilians will be treated with respect unless they show signs of rioting in which cases they will be collected in a central area under gd.
If the post surrenders without fighting particular care is to be taken to treat the PW decently & maintain friendly relations.
Any Germans or Italians whether civilians or soldiers will be placed under a strong gd.
The post will be garrisoned & made secure prior to moving.
All MT will be taken to central area.
- 14 Vehs: C coy vehs move off rd at AL MALIKIYA then follow in rear of D coy vehs to BENNT JBAIL, pick up tps & coy rejoins coln & moves next after B coy
D coy vehs move off rd at 19092749 then all vehs less one follow in rear of adv gd to BENNT JBAIL. Disperse in any available area & pick up coy. Coy will move in rear of main body
Lights will not be used.
- 15 PW will be taken over by 2/2 Pnr coy with the exception of those from YAROUN where D coy will mop up & one sec escort PW tp Pt 19092749. They will be taken in remaining lorry to PW cage at AL MALIKIYA. The lorry & men will rejoin D coy at BENNT JBAIL.
- 16 Medical : Collecting posts will be established at pt 19092749 for YAROUN, AITAROUNE, BENNT JBAIL, & AIN EBEL.
Coy 2/6 Fd Amb will attend to casualties in these areas.
- 17 Interpreters : One interpreter will move with each ~~coy~~ of C & D coys & adv gd.
Special instns have been issued to each.

INTERCOLIN

- 18 Fwd bn HQ on rd at AL MALIKIYA till capture of AITAROUNE then at rear of adv gd till capture of BENNT JBAIL. Afterwards at head of main body.
- 19 No success sig to be used.
- 20 Watches will be synchronised by units DONCOL by 2200 hrs D-1. Sig offr will arrange this by DR with special watch.

- 21 Wireless silence in assembly area still zero hr to be notified. All sigs will be passed by DR.
- 22 DR route fwd from hqHQ will be by track AL BAHJA- AL KABRI & rd TARSHIHA - NAHARIYA.
The main rd will not be used.
- 23 Code word for op will be DONALD.
- 24 Pass word till 0500 hrs DL will be: answer to challenge "FORD"
by challenger "WHICH FORD"
answer "DAYLES FORD"
Pass word as from 0500 hrs DL will be in two parts :
challenge "WHERE IS THE KOOKABURRA"
answer "AT CANBERRA"

ACK

Signed at 1350 hrs
Issued through sigs

L H Goddall Capt
Adj 2/16 Bn ALF

Distribution :-

Copy No 1	HQ coy	Copy No 14	2/2 Pnr Bn
2	A "	15	2/14 Bn (TYRFORCE)
3	B "	16	2/27 Bn
4	C "	17	21 Aust Inf Bde
5	D "	18	25 Aust Inf Bde
6	Royals	19	Comd
7	6 Aust Cav	20-21	TC
8	2/4 Fd Regt	22	QM
9	6 A Tk Bty	23	IC
10	170 Lt AA Bty	24-25	WD
11-12	2/6 Fd Coy (copy for det Fd Pk)	26	File
13	2/6 Fd Amb	27-28	Spare

2/16 Bn

Ref: HAIFA sheet 1/100,000
SARAD sheet 1/100,000

SECRET
Adm Instrn No 1
Copy No 10
6 Jun 41

1 AMN

Coys will move to assembly areas with first line amm as under :-

(a) With man or gun

Rifle	--	100
LMG	--	1000
DOUBLE 5 IN	--	200
45 AUTO	--	250
3 MORHE	--	up to 75 if available
3 MORSMOX	--	45
2 MORHE	--	9
2 MORSMOK	--	27

(b) On A ech vehs - the balance to G1098 scale. Normal replenishment will be carried out by bn.

2 POL

(a) All vehs will proceed to assembly areas with this full & res on vehs as follows:-

Cars	-	8 gals
Vans	-	12 "
Lorries	-	16 "

(b) Pet veh will move with bn to assembly area where it will replace PET consumed during move. This veh will then return to B ech.

3 SUPR

(a) Four days hard ration plus the unconsumed portion of the days ration will be taken from concentration area & carried as follows :-

One day on the man
One day with tps in tp carrying vehs for consumption in assembly areas.
Two days in A ech
One day in B ech.

(b) One days hard ration will be for consumption on D2 & the remainder will be res.

(c) The full four days ration plus unconsumed days ration will be carried in coy vehs from concentration area

4 WATER

(a) The following res will be carried :-

Cars	-	4 gals
Vans	-	8 "
Lorries	-	16 "

(b) Water tks will accompany the bn to the assembly area. All water bottles and containers will be replenished to the scale shown in sub-para (a) before vehs move out of assembly areas. The water tks will then re-fill at WP as notified later. On filling it will rejoin unit.

(c) Water for filling radiators will be obtained from creek etc where possible.

(d) Any water additional to above which can be carried without overloading vehs will be taken.

5 BLANKETS & GREATCOATS

Blankets will be placed in packs & great coats will be rolled & att outside packs.

6 DRESS

- (a) Shirts & shorts will be worn during ops but long trousers will be taken to wear in assembly areas.
- (b) Felt hats will be worn & steel helmets carried on haversack in case of shelling.
- (c) Respirators & AG ointment will be carried.

7 MEDICAL

- (a) Coys will take Dovers cream for use in assembly areas
- (b) RMO 2/16 Bn will ensure that sufficient supplies of all necessary med stores are carried.
- (c) RAP 2/16 Bn will move with the Adv Gd.
A coy 2/6 Fd Amb will move with main body.
- (d) Evacuation will be by MAC direct from Fd Amb until MDS is established.

8 TRAFFIC

- (a) Instns issued separately. Maj Wain will be responsible for establishing necessary TCPs.
- (b) OC HQ coy will be responsible to establish TCPs at towns & defiles en route to BEYROUTH aerodrome for necessary direction & control of traffic.
- (c) He also will be responsible for control of the coln as ordered by comd DONCOL. The provost sec will work directly under his comd.

9 PW

- (a) Collecting centres will be established at :-
TYR - Gd detailed by 2/14 Bn
SAIDA - 5 Pl 2/16 Bn
- (b) PWs under escort provided from above gd will be sent to cages at MALIKIYA 198279 & JUEILA 170273. The actual cage for use will be notified later. On delivery of PWs escorts will return to SAIDA.

10 STRAGGLERS

Stragglers will be fwded to bn under arrangements DAPM.

11 TPT

B ech will be brigaded under BTO as from 1800 hrs D-2. It will remain in the present area until 1000 hrs on D1 when it will move to assembly area UMM AL FARAJ & await further orders.

12 BURIALS

Dead will be disposed of as per instns already issued.

13 PRIVATE PAPERS

All private papers & diaries will be destroyed in assembly areas. Coy comds will see that this is carried out & report to I O on completion.

14 COMFORTS

QM will maintain a res of comforts, cigarettes etc to be distributed on CO's order.

15 CANTEEN SUPPLIES

QM will endeavour to obtain canteen supplies prior to move of B ech. Lieut Gill will arrange necessary finance.

16 PERSONNEL TO REMAIN B ECH DURING OP

- (a) QM & staff & drs B ech vehs
- (b) COMS & coy storemen & bootmaker DCoy
- (c) Two secs 2 Pl
- (d) Lieuts Elphick & Rose

M. J. Bull

Ca. t

Adm Instn No 1
6 Jun 41

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Copy No 1	-	HO	coy
2	-	A	"
3	-	B	"
4	-	C	"
5	-	D	"
6	-	OL	
7	-	RMO	
8	-	Cond	
9 -10	-	AD	
11	-	File	
12 -14	-	Spare	

Instns to adv gd comd

INTENTION

- 1 Adv Gd will be responsible for the protection of the main body & will prevent delay to the main body's adv on BEYROUTH.

METHOD

- 2 The complete op will be divided into 6 stages:-
- (i) Capture of frontier posts by C & D coys.
 - (ii) Move of coln from BENNET JBAIL to TYR.
 - (iii) Investment of TYR by B coy & TYR Force
 - (iv) Passage of the LITANI R by Adv Gd assisted by C Bn SS
 - (v) Passage of SAIDA
 - (vi) Capture of aerodrome BEYROUTH by Adv Gd & main body.
- 3 The salient features of Adv Gd's role in the various stages are as follows

Stage (i)

Move into posn on frontier. Preparatory to stage (ii). Special pts - NO LIGHTS - MINIMUM OF NOISES - essential all vehs marshalled in correct order..

Push across frontier & be prepared to support C & D coys move on BENNET JBAIL. It is considered that some resistance may be met with at this post but rd mines are not anticipated nor are rd blocks. It is essential the Adv Gd brushes aside any opposition at this post & pushes on to TYR with a minimum of delay. The op by D coy on AIN ESSAL is not to delay the adv.

Stage (ii)

During stage (ii) it is anticipated that opposition will be encountered in the vicinity of TIBNINE & it is known that the town is occupied & there is a rd block on rd. TIBNINE can then be accepted as your next bound & resolute & immediate action will be necessary to get fwd if rd blocks appear to delay the adv & the engr pty cannot immediately remove them, then Rd arty will be used to remove them. This action will be taken if this should occur at any other pt.

If enemy is contacted at TEIR ZEBNA rd junc similar action will be taken & this bound made before adv continues.

It is not expected that further opposition will be encountered east of TYR.

Report pts at JELOUN & BORJ CHEMALI.

On passing TEIR ZEBNA two tps Royals will be sent fwd to cut comms on Coast rd north & south of TYR. They will then rejoin head of Adv Gd.

Stage (iii)

One tp Royals cuts comm north TYR, one tp Royals cuts comm south TYR, one tp then closes rd at ASIZINE. During this stage Adv Gd by passes TYR via rd through H in BRACHOUK & moves into posn for stage (iv)

Stage (iv)

(a) C Bn SS will have landed & attempted to secure the br head over the LITANI.

(b) Adv Gd will capture br intact as speedily as possible. This br is mined & enemy may destroy it. There are also rd blocks south of it. Trenches are in evidence across the river towards AITENAZE & defences have been seen on high gd near QUSMIYE. Should the br be destroyed Adv Gd will take action to cover the repair of the br by the engr & will recce the BORJ EL HAOUA area for a possible King. Effect a King as soon as it is possible to cross with either inf or vehs & push on & capture br at BOU EL ASSOUD.

No time is to be lost in informing HQ DONCOL if br is blown. Once the br hd is established the Adv Gd is to resume adv as rapidly as possible.

3 Stage (iv)

(c) Br at ABOU EL ASSOUD must be captured. As soon as br at ABOU EL ASSOUD is reached one tp of Royals will proceed via rd KAFFR ED B. DDA - LISAR - ED DOUER to HABBOUCH. Here it will contact right bde gp & report in via rd ZEMTA to head of adv gd at rd junc SW of HASSANIYE.

One tp will proceed via coast rd & contact other tp at rd junc SW of HASSANIYE.

Your next bound will be ES SAKIYA - ELIZA HMAN & if no opposition is encountered push on to first immediate objective rd HEDJAYOUN HABBOUCH - Coast.

Stage (v)

(a) One tp Royals by pass SAIDA & enter town from north. Three tp carriers & Aust Cav by pass SAIDA & invest town from NE, east, & SE.

(b) Adv Gd supported by lt tks invest town from south, locate & deal with enemy posts.

(c) Adv Gd will be prepared to secure features essential to attack by main body.

(d) One tp Royals proceeds via rd SAHINE - KANAME & contacts right coln at JEZZINE

(e) On capture of SAIDA a halt will be made on the intermediate objective until contact has been made with/25 Aust Inf Bde Gp or comd

permission to adv is given by comd bde gp.

Stage (vi)

Further instns will be issued at SAIDA for this stage

4 Rd Blocks & obstacles

The following are the KNOWN obstacles :-

- (i) Rd junc 189288
- (ii) COAST RD 171295
- (iii) COAST RD 105155
- (iv) COAST RD 106159
- (v) COAST RD 113173

INTERCOM

5 Pts of contact with right c oln (25 Bde Gp) :-

- HABBOUCH
- JEZZINE
- AIN SOFAR

6 (a) Gd to Gd 109 & 101 sets

(b) Gd to air
Recognition strips
strips at
HQ adv gd
HQ DONGOL

(c) Air to gd colour of day & message dropping

(d) White s uare to indicate posn fwd tps & AFVs to be dis layed on call from air by colour of day or by aircraft doing wing wagging

(e) HQ DONGOL will move at head of main body as per OO No 5

(f) Wireless silence until Zero (to be notified)

Distribution :-

- Copy No 1 - 14 Ad Gd
- 15 C copy 2/14 Bn
- 16 21 Aust Inf Bde
- 17 25 Aust Inf Bde
- 18 Comd
- 19 File
- 20- 21 ID
- 22 - 23 Spare

G H Goddard Capt

Adjt, 2/16 Bn, A.I.F.

2/16 Bn

OP INSTN

SECRET

Appx B issued with OO No6

Copy No 24

6 Jun 41

INFM

- 1 Vide 21 Aust Inf Bde Int Summaries Nos 1 & 2.
- 2 Exporter Force is to adv on D1 into SYRIA and seize the aerodromes at BEYROUTH & RAYAK. 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp is to advance on right of the axis METULIAH 204298- MERDJAYOUN 136159 - HASBAYD 145162 - RAYAK 175213. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp is to move on the left on the general direction Coast rd.
- 3 Inter bde boundary (all incl 21 Aust Inf Bde) EL MALIKIYA - TIBNINE - HABBOUCH - JEZZINE - MOUKHTARA - BAROUCH - AINSOFA
- 4 C Bn SS is landing near the mouth of the LITANI river at 0200 hrs D1 to secure a br head over that river and prevent the demolition of the br there & the br at ABU EL ASSOUD. This bn will remain in posn until DONCOL passes north of the river when it will withdraw.
- 5 DONCOL followed by TYR FORCE will move via the prepared track EL MALIKIYA - AITAROUNE thence via rd BENNT JBAIL - TIBNINE - TYR, thence via Coast rd to BEYROUTH.
- 6 MOTCOL is to move via the Coast rd from NAQOURA & is to follow in rear of DONCOL as soon as TYR is contained. If the Coast rd is blown between NAQOURA & TYR & passage is blocked MOTCOL will follow DONCOL via rd from EL MALIKIYA.
- 7 If Coast rd is open two tps (Lt tks) 6 Aust Cav will come under comd DONCOL for attack on TYR & remain under comd DONCOL.
- 8 DONCOL is to attack TYR & when captured it will be contained by TYR FORCE.
- 9 The CHESHIRE YCO is to move via the rd AIN EBEL - TIBNINE - DEIR ZEBNA - KAFAR SIR & gd the right flank.

INTENTION

- 10 DONCOL will cover the adv of 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp & seize the aerodrome at BEYROUTH.

METHOD

- 11 Outline sequence of ops is as follows :-
 - D-2 DONCOL followed by TYR FORCE plus one coy 2/2 Pnr Bn moves to concentration area TARSHIHA - HURFEISH.
- 12 D-1 All units lie up in concentration areas, no movement whatsoever in or about areas.
- 13 D1
 - (a) C & D coys move out & capture posts AITAROUNE, BENNT JBAIL, YAROUN & AIN EBEL.
 - (b) Coy 2/2 Pnr Bn prepares rd from EL MALIKIYA to SYRIAN FRONTIER rd.
 - (c) As soon as BENNT JBAIL is taken adv gd moves along TIBNINE rd
 - (d) Main body follows on.
Det A closes track at BAR ACHIT.
Det B closes rd at DEIR KIFA.
 - (e) Two tps Royals go fwd to main COAST rd & cut comm north & south of TYR, then proceed direct on LATINI river. One tp closes rd at ASIZIYE.
 - (f) Adv Gd by passes TYR by rd through M in NAACHOUK & proceeds direct to LATINI river, captures br head & exploits to ABOUEL ASSOUD.
 - (g) Main body supported by two tps Lt Tks which join from MOTCOL invests TYR & on completion of ops hands over to TYR FORCE, then proceeds north. One tp Royals proceeds via rd KAFAR BADDA - EDOUER - & contacts right bde at HABBOUCH. Then proceeds via rd ZEMTA to COAST rd. Remainder of coln proceeds northward by COAST rd & on reaching outskirts of SAIDA two tps Royals by pass & enter outskirts of SAIDA from the north.

- (h) 3 tps Carriers 6 Aust Cav by pass SAIDA & enter town from NE, east & SE; create alarms & despondency in town of SAIDA.
 - (i) Adv Gd supported by lt tks & one tp carrier push from south and locate enemy posns.
 - (j) Main body attacks enemy posns. On capture of SAIDA adv proceeds to north, One tp Royals contacts right coln at JEZZINE and proceeds via NORTHERN rd to BEIT EDDINE.
 - (k) One tp Royals moves via rd RHIRIFE & contacts first tp at BEIT EDDINE. Both tps report in at DAMOUR.
 - (l) Remainder of coln moves by available rds mainly COAST rd on DAMOUR.
 - (m) From DAMOUR a dash will be made to seize CHOUIFAT by investing it from the north & south and then proceed to capture BEYROUTH aerodrome, holding all rds west of A in CHIYAH.
- 14 The enemy may employ parachute tps against DONCOL. These will be dealt with without hindering the march of the main body by tps on the spot. Dets as necessary will be ordered out of the coln by comd DONCOL to deal with parachute tps not in close proximity to the coln.

ADM

- 15 See Adm Instn No 1 issued separately.

INTERCOM

- 16 (a) On capture of TYR, MOTCOL will be advised.
(b) A halt will be made at SAIDA & contact established with 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp at JEZZINE.
- 17 Gd to air
Recognition strips with Adv Gd HQ & HQ DONCOL.
- 18 Air to gd: Colour of day & message dropping. (Code list issued separately.)
- 19 White squares 6 x 6 to indicate posn of fwd tps & AFVs to be displayed on call from air by colour of day or by aircraft wing wagging.

ACK

Issued through sigs

Signed at 20 30 hrs

M H Godsell
Adjnt 2/16 Bn AIF Capt

Distribution :- As per OO No 6.

S E C R E T

APPX III c

MOVEMENT ORDERS

REF MAP - HAIFA and BEISAN sheets
1/100,000

ITEM

1. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp moves to assembly areas in the general area TIRSHIA 175263 - UH: AL PARAJ 161267 - AZZIB 159272.

2. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will be divided into colns as under:-

1. Designated "DCICOL"

Comd - Lt-Col A.B. MacDonald 2/16 Bn.

Two tps ROMAS

A. 3rd G Aust Cav (less Lt M: tps)

2/4 Pd Regt (less one bty).

Two tps 6 A.M. Bty (less two guns)

One tp 170 Lt A.A. Bty.

2/6 Pd Coy (less one sec).

2/16 Bn

One Coy 2/6 Pd Inf.

ii. Designated "MOCOL"

Comd - Lt-Col H. J. Meton 2/27 Bn

Lt M: tps A. 3rd G Aust Cav.

3 Bty 2/4 Pd Regt.

6 A.M. Bty (less two tps).

170 Lt A.A. Bty (less two tps)

One Sec 2/6 Pd Coy

2/27 Bn.

One Coy 2/6 Pd Inf.

Components of above colns come under comd 0900 hrs D-2.

iii. Cheshire Yeomanry.

iv. 2/14 Bn (with special and res roles).

3. **OPERATION**

2/27 Bn and att tps will assemble in area UH: AL PARAJ 161267.

MOD

4. The movement will be carried out by night in accordance with Movement Table att as Appx "A".

5. During the move absolutely no lights will be used after passing SH: AR HA MAQUH 160236.

6. Immediately on arrival in Assemble Area all vehs and personnel will be placed under cover and camflg. "MOCOL" will "tie up" during the day of D-1. No move of vehs will be permitted and such personnel movement as is necessary will be made under cover.

7. **ADM**

"B" Bch all units move on D1 to UH: AL PARAJ after MOCOL has vacated that area.

The order of march of "B" Bch will be as follows:-

- i. All sub-units "DCICOL"
- ii. HQ Bde Gp
- iii. All sub-units "MOCOL"
- iv. Cheshire Yeomanry
- 5. 2/14 Bn.

Comd - Capt White
Bde Tot Offr.

(2)

- 8. "B" Bk remains this area until ordered fwd.
- 9. One guide per Coy 2/27 Bn will report to BN HQ at 0900 hrs D-2 to lead HQ Coy vehs to Coy areas for transporting tps.
- 10. Embussing Pts - Coy Areas.
- 11. Further Mx Orders issued separately.

INSTRUCTIONS

- 12. Wireless silence during move and whilst in Assemble Areas.
- 13. HQ 2/27 Bn closes at KIFAR YITZEHIL at 0015 hrs D-1 and reports thereafter to the head of "LOTCOL".
- 14. DR routes fwd from Bdo HQ at AL BANJA 159260 will be by track: AL BANJA - AL KABRI and rd TAREHHA-MALARIYA to Assemble area. The main rd will NOT be used.

ACK.

Issued to Sigs.
Signed at _____ hrs.

[Signature]
 Capt
 Adj 2/27 Bn AIF.

DISTRIBUTION

HQ Coy	No. 1	170 Lt AA Bty No. 9
A. Coy	2	2/6 Pk Coy 10
B. Coy	3	2/6 Pk Amb 11
C. Coy	4	21 Inf Bde H.Q. 12
D. Coy	5	2/16 Bn 13
A. Sqn 6 Aust Cav	6	2/14 Bn 14
2/4 Pk Regt	7	Cond 15
6 A. M. Bty	8	Pilo 16
		War Diary 17
		18

at night by the movement of the vehicles...
 During the move absolutely no lights will be used...
 Immediately on arrival at the Assemble Area all vehicles...
 and personnel will be placed under cover and remain...
 "LOTCOL" will "go off" during the day of D-1. The...
 of vehicles will be permitted and such personnel movements...
 as is necessary will be made under cover.

For all units move on D1 to the AL BANJA area HQ...
 has been decided that...
 the order of march of the Bn will be as follows:-
 1. The Bn will be...
 2. The Bn will be...
 3. The Bn will be...
 4. The Bn will be...
 5. The Bn will be...
 6. The Bn will be...
 7. The Bn will be...
 8. The Bn will be...
 9. The Bn will be...
 10. The Bn will be...
 11. The Bn will be...
 12. The Bn will be...
 13. The Bn will be...
 14. The Bn will be...
 15. The Bn will be...
 16. The Bn will be...
 17. The Bn will be...
 18. The Bn will be...

MOVEMENT SCHEDULE - "KOTCOL" - Issued with 2/27 Dn O O NO. 5.

SECRET

Route - AMPULA - Rd June 17762292 - SHIRON 170254 - JHDA 160256 - Rd June 16952430 - AMUL - HIRIYA - 159268 - UH 161267.

Dispersion Pt - (a) Assembly areas previously pointed out to Unit Comds.
 (b) Guides will meet Coy's of 2/27 Dn at Rd June 15962680.
 (c) Sketch of dispersion area is att to copy No. ___ for info by Comd 170 Lt AA Bty.

Halts - Ten minutes before every odd hr.

Speeds and Distances to the Starting Point and on route - 12 MPH 50 VEH

"KOTCOL" crosses SP (Rd June) 16952340 at 0140 hrs D-1.

Serial No.	Date	Formation	No of vehs.	Place		Unit S.Ps	Times past Unit S.Ps	REMARKS
				From	To			
1	D-1	HC "KOTCOL" 4 of 2/27 Dn Coy 2/6 Pd Bty	2 10 9	Kofar Yehesgol	UH 161267	Rd June 16952340	0140 0140 0142	
2	D-1	One Sec 2/6 Pd Coy 6 Lt AA Bty (less two)	8 11	Halfway area	"	Rd June 17762292	0103 0105	To pass "KOTCOL" at 16952340 at 0145.
3	D-1	2/27 Dn (less 4 P1)	80	Kofar Yehesgol	"	Rd June 17762240	0045	To pass "KOTCOL" at 0147.
4	D-1	170 Lt AA Bty (less two tps)	7	JHDA 16642346	"	JHDA	0212	Join in rear of Serial 3.
5	D-1	"B" Ech all Units "KOTCOL".		AMPULA	"	Rd June 16952336	1200	20 MPH 15 VEH Halt 10 mins before each over hour.

[Signature] Capt
 Adj: 2/27 Dn AIF.

2/27 Bn O O IC. 6

SECRET
Copy No 15
7 Jun 41

REF MAPS - BIRROUTH Sheet 1/200,000
HAIFA Sheet 1/100,000

ITEM

1. Vide 21 Aust Inf Bde Int Summaries 1 and 2 issued to all concerned.
2. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp is moving on D1 into SYRIA to seize the aerodrome at BIRROUTH and the Eastern and Northern entrances to BIRROUTH between ZAMJAR 134215 and AMELIAS 137220.
OBJECTIVE - Rd RAYAK - BIRROUTH west of AIN SOPAR (incl)
Intermediate Objectives-
First - Rd MIRDJAYOUN - MADBOUCH - COAST.
Second - Rd JESSINE - SAIDA.
21 Aust Inf Bde Gp is being divided into the following cols -
 - (a) DONCOL - Composition as per O O 5.
 - (b) HQCOL - -do-
 - (c) TYR FORCE
Comd Capt S. Howden 2/14 Bn
One Coy 2/14 Bn and att tps.
To be utilised to garrison TYR after capture.
 - (d) CHESHIRE VOLUNTEERS (less one Sqn).
 - (e) 2/14 Bn (less TYR FORCE).
4. C BN 33 is landing near the mouth of the LITANI RIVER at 0200 hrs D1 to secure a br head over that river and prevent the demolition of the br there and the br at ABU EL ASSOUD. This Bn will remain in posn until DONCOL passes NORTH of the river when it will withdraw from the Gp.

INTENTION

5. HQCOL will seize the Eastern and Northern entrances to BIRROUTH between ZAMJAR 134215 and AMELIAS 137220.

METHOD

6. Adv Gd

Comd Maj O. S. Isaachsen - 2/27 Bn.
Two tps Lt Banks A. Sqn 6 Aust Cav.
Recco party 2/6 Pd Coy.
One Sec 2/4 Pd Regt.
One Sec 170 Lt AA Bty.
D. Coy 2/27 Bn
4 pl (less one sec) 2/27 Bn.
One D.R.

Units come under comd 1200 hrs D-1.

7. A. Tk Protection of DONCOL

Comd - Maj G.G. Schneider
6 A. Tk Bty (less 2 Tps).
To move in first instance with Adv Gd.

MAIN BODY (In order of March)

One Sec 4 pl 2/27 Bn.
HQ HQCOL
A. Coy 2/27 Bn.
One Gun 170 Lt AA Bty.
One Sec 2/6 Pd Coy (less Recco Party)
8 Bty 2/4 Pd Regt (less one sec).
2/27 Bn (less A & D Coys & 4 pl)
One Gun 170 Lt AA Bty and remaining vehs of Bty.
One Coy 2/6 Pd Amb.
Spare and Workshop Wksh 5 Res M.A. Coy.

(2)

9. Rear HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde moves in rear of MOFCOL.
10. MOFCOL will move from Assembly area and halt with leading elements of the coln at rd June 15962680 at 0500 hrs D1.
11. The Adv Gd Comd will detach Lt Tanks, Recce Party 2/6 Pd Coy and one pl of inf in lorry and this detachment will arrive in area immediately NORTH of Rd June 161276 at 0530 hrs D1 and await orders from MOFCOL Comd. If the COAST rd is declared safe, they will be required to clear this rd of blocks and enemy posts between ISHADAROUH and RACHIDINE. When DONCOL reaches COAST rd, Lt tanks of MOFCOL will join DONCOL Pl of inf referred to above will wait at RACHIDINE and rejoin Adv Gd when latter arrives
12. Adv of MOFCOL via the COAST rd will only take place after TYR has been captured by DONCOL.
13. Should the COAST rd be rendered ~~it~~ impassable, MOFCOL will be diverted to follow DONCOL, via EL MALIKIYA-TIBHINE 189289 and TYR.
14. A.A. DEFENCE
 - (a) Every available IMG will be mounted in the tp carrying vehs for AA defence whilst on the move and a continuous watch maintained.
 - (b) 170 Lt AA Bty will be prepared to detach guns to cover the passage of Bridgeheads and defiles as may be encountered. They will return to their original place in the coln as soon as the rear of the coln has passed.
 - (c) In case of high level bombing the coln will continue to adv.
 - (d) In case of low level bombing and machine gunning from the air the coln will halt and the men dispersed under control. As soon as the attack has ceased the men will immediately return to their vehs and the coln will proceed.
15. It is not known whether the French will oppose our adv and in the first instance the opportunity for them to surrender will be given. Nothing however must delay the adv and the maximum force is to be applied immediately resistance is met.

ADM

16. P.W. Collecting centres will be established at TYR and SAIDA.

On capture of prisoners they will be collected in a central area, offrs immediately separated from the men, senior offrs from Junior Offrs. All arms and amm will be collected and placed in a central dump under gd. If a post surrenders without fighting particular care will be taken to treat the P.W. decently and to establish friendly relations. Any Germans or Italian whether civilian or soldiers will be placed under a strong guard.

INTERCOM

17. HQ MOFCOL moves at head of Main Body.
18. Communication within the coln will be by D.R. Units will carry recognition strips for Ground to Air, Air to Ground.

Colour of the day and message cropping (See supplementary Code list issued separately)
Air Force message bags will be handed in with the message to BL.

(3)

White square 6' x 6' to indicate posn fwd tps and AMVs to be displayed on call from air by color of day or by aircraft doing a series of "wing wobbles".
Wireless silence until ZERO.

Password in two parts -

Question - Where is the KOCKLABURRA.

Answer - At CAIDERRA.

ACK.

Signed at 0800 hrs.

Issued to Sigs.



Capt

Adj't 2/27 Bn AIF.

DISTRIBUTION

A. Coy	Copy No. 1	D. Sec 5 Rec H.Q. Coy	Copy 13
B. Coy	2	21 Inf Bde	14
C. Coy	3	2/16 Bn	15
D. Coy	4	2/14 Bn	16
HQ Coy	5	Cond	17
MI	6	File	18
Lt Col Cond A Sqn	} 7	War Diary	19
6 Aust Cav.		20	
8 Bty 2/4 P.A. Regt	8	Spares	21
6 A. M. Bty	9		22
170 Lt M. Bty	10		
Sec 2/6 P.A. Coy	11		
Coy 2/6 P.A. Amb	12		

*Ack H. Hickey Pte
Sig. Btl. 1600 hrs.
8 Jan. 41*

APPX IV a

INT SUMMARY

SECRET1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 1

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 20 Jun to 1200 hrs 21 Jun 41.

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

1. GROUND.Our Operations.

(a) The two main areas of operations have been DAMASCUS and MERDJAYOUN. At DAMASCUS 13 FF Bde with 5 Ind Inf Bde have been attacking. The FF attack on JEBEL-EL-LELB was held up until late on 20 Jun when the Foreign Legion made a successful flank attack on Pt 743 and on SAHAYYA (195165), which enabled 13 FF Bde to advance to QADEM Station. On the left however, 5 Ind Inf Bde moved fwd against opposition to the outskirts of BEZZE where despite vigorous resistance they maintained their position.

(b) In the MERDJAYOUN sector 25 Bde have made several attempts to recapture the town. The attack of 2/25 Bn from the North on 19 Jun was unsuccessful and they were later compelled to withdraw to river line. On the South side our tps occupied a line about two kilos short of KHIAI fort, which was held by enemy. In late afternoon 20 Jun it was found KHIAI was no longer held by enemy and 2/2 Pnr Bn, supported by a MG coy attacked and were able to advance about three kilos.

(c) Elsewhere there has been little change. The enemy forces in SOUEIDA are reported to be surrounded by hostile DRUZE tribesmen. From QOUNEITRA a force has been sent up to help in the attack on DAMASCUS. On the coastal sector our tps have taken very little offensive action pending the fall of DAMASCUS. Our car patrols are on a line near RAS NEBI YOUNES and our inf are consolidating at JADRA.

2. AIROur Operations.

At 1300 hrs Tac/R reported 70-80 MT stationary facing N.E. on the DAMASCUS-BEYROUTH rd at 178105. This column was successfully attacked by fighters and by bombers later in the day.

Enemy Operations.

Three enemy fighters attacked one of our Tac/R machines over DAMASCUS. Our machine returned undamaged.

Four enemy bombers attacked tp concentration and rds South of DAMASCUS during the afternoon. Little damage was caused.

3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES.

Tac/R over DAMASCUS between 1500 hrs-1800 hrs report a number of large explosions resembling demolitions, among barracks buildings and supply depots.

At 0730 reports state that 30 MT were observed moving North West on DAMASCUS-BEYROUTH rd at 173107. A further 40 MT was observed parked off the road at 171195. These MT were later attacked by our fighters, but results are not yet to hand.

No movement was observed on the BEERDJAYOUH-MACHRARA-ZAHLE or the BEERDJAYOUH-NASDAYA-NASHAA rds. The rds BEYROUTH-GADRA and BEYROUTH-NASHAA were likewise free of MT.

On the aerodrome at RAYAK five enemy aircraft were observed. The pilot was unable to state their degree of serviceability.

4. ENE MY IDENTIFICATIONS

Attached Appendix "A" shows enemy Order of Battle.

5. ENE MY DISPOSITIONS.

Attached Appendix "B" shows grouping by sectors and changes.

6. ENE MY ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT.

i. It is reported that the enemy have been using incendiary bullets in their low flying MG attacks

ii. From interrogations of PIs it is learnt that the Vichy French are trying to mobilize the civilian population and are commandeering farm tractors to supplement their MT.

iii. Organisation 6 R.L.E. (6th Foreign Legion)

Prior to Dec 40 the 6 R.L.E. consisted of 4 bns each 4 coys each coy 4 pls, the 4th coy in each bn was an MG coy, i.e. (4, 8, 12, 16).

After French campaign 1940 the organization was changed. Nos 4, 8, 12, 16 coys ceased to exist. The 4th Pl in each rifle coy was dissolved and added to the other pls to bring them to strength. A new 4th (MG) Pl per coy took its place, these pls being taken from the old MG coys. Each MG pl has OC Lieut, 20 ORs (plus "Muletiers"- ammunition carriers), four 8 mm HOTCHKISS (1914/15) MGs. Each gun has a crew of five.

K. A. Williams

DISTRIBUTION :

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps.

Force HQ P & TJ	1	CSO	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
6 Div	20	G	1	Aust LO, GHQ, JIE	1
7 Aust Div	24	I	1	AHQ Melbourne	2
Free French	1	A	1	File	1
84 L of C Area	1	Q	1	War Diary	1
"C" Flt 208 Sqn	1	DDST	1	Spare	1
GOC	1	ADOS	1		
BGS	1	DDIS	1		
CCRA	1	HQ AIF JIE	1		
CE	1	HQ AIF BASE AREA	1		
CCRA C Tps	1	Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1		

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 1

APPENDIX 'A'

VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs 21 Jun 41

1. BEIRUT - DAMOUR Area

1/24 R.I.C. Presume moved north from SAIDA
2/24 R.I.C. " " " " "
3/24 R.I.C. " " " " "
2 Bn 6 R.L.E. Moved from BAALBECK 17/6.
4 Bn 6 R.L.E. " " " "
HQ 9 R.T.A.
1 and 2 Coys 1 Bn 9 R.T.A.
17 R.T.S. - 2 coys
2 and 3 btys LE Arty Moved from SAIDA 16/6.
6 Sqn 4 Spahis " " BEIT EL DINE
1 Bn Senegalese
2/6 R.C.A. (incl 15 tanks)
Sqn 8 Spahis - Balance of
Det 33 Engr Bn
Det 43 Communication Bn
4 AA Btys

2. JESSINE Area

2 Coy 1 Bn 6 R.L.E. Left HOMS 14/6.
3 Coy 1 Bn 6 R.L.E. " " "
2 Bn 17 R.T.S. (Less 8
Coy casualties) " DAMASCUS 13/6.
R.L.E. Arty Gp - One Bty
6 R.C.A. - Some elements

3. MERDJAYOUN Area

3 Bn 6 R.L.E. From DAMASCUS 17/6.
1 Bn 16 R.T.F.
1 and 2 Bns 22 R.T.A? Moved from BEIRUT 18/6.
Note: 2 Bn KHIAM.
1 B.C.L.
Det 631 Pioneer Bn.
Three btys arty

QOUNEI FRA Area (Formerly in) Present location
unknown.

1 Bn 6 R.L.E. Moved from HOMS 14/6
1 and 3 Bns 17 R.T.S.
3 B.D.L.
60 MET
Small group armd cars
9 tanks (Probably some captured and some knocked out)

5. DAMASCUS Area

HQ 6 R.L.E. Moved from HOMS 14/6
11 Coy 4 Bn 6 R.L.E.
HQ 10 North African Half Bde
5/1 R.T.M.
6 R.C.A. - possibly one sqn incl 6 A/Tk guns
Four btys - two 105 mm, two 75 mm
1 Gp Partizans
3 Lt Desert Coy
Three unidentified btys (One probably mountain arty 65 mm)
Circassian Lt Cav - 16, 18 Sqn, one unidentified sqn
Portion 7 R.C.A.
29 R.T.A., 3 Bn, 9, 10 & 11 Coys - 15.6.41

6.

SOUEIDA - EZRAA AREA

2 Bn 16 R.T.T.
11 Coy 4 Bn 16 R.T.T.
5 Coy 1 Bn R.T.I.
4 Coy 16 R.T.T.
Gp L.E. Dr (Druse Cav)
Six tanks
Fifteen armd cars

Moving east to SOUEIDA 18/6

7.

BAALBEK - TRIPOLI AREA

One Bn Colonial I f
One Bn Syrian Inf
Two Bns Levant Inf
Two Btys 1 R.A.M.L.

8.

LATTAKIA - HOMS AREA

1 Coy 1 Bn 6 R.L.E.
6 " 2 Bn "
Three bns Levant Inf
1 Armd Car Pl
One coastal defence bty

Reported left for ?

9.

RAYAK AREA.

5 Coy 2 Bn 6 R.L.E.

Moved 14/6 from BAALBEC.

10.

JEBEL DRUZE AREA

HQ 3 Bn 9 R.T.A.
5/1 R.T.I.
4 Bn 16 R.T.T.
One Bn 17 R.T.T.
Druse Cav.

From BEIRUT 18/6

Sqns moving to SOUEIDA.

11.

ALEPPO AREA.

HQ 16 R.T.T.
4 Bn Levant Inf
4 Sqn Syrian Cav
One Bty 75 mm.

12.

PALMYRE AREA.

15 Coy 4 Bn 6 R.L.E.
1 Lt Desert Coy.

13.

BEIR-ES-ZOR - ABU KEMEL AREA

6 B.D.L.
2 Lt Desert Coy
2 Lt Mech Unit
2 Gp Levant Metropolitan arty.

14.

TEL-LOTCHEN AREA.

6 B.D.L.
21, 23, 24, 25, 28 Lt Sqns
5 Sqn Djezireh Cav.

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 1.

APPENDIX "B"

VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs on 21 Jun 41.

Sector	Inf Bns	Cav horsed	Cav Mech	Arty	+	-	Remarks
BEIRUT-DAMOUR	7	2	1	2 (fd) 4 (AA)	2 bns	2 sqns (H) 1 sqn (H)	
JEZZINE	2 ¹	Unknown	Probably 1 sqn	1 (Fd)			
HERDJAYOUN	5	Unknown	Unknown	3 (Fd)	2 bns		
QOUNEITRA	4	Unknown	Probably 1 sqn	Unknown	1 ¹ bns		Present locations unknown
DAMASCUS	3	5	Probably 2 sqns	7	1 sqn (H)	1 bty (Fd) 2 Bns	
SOUEIDA-EZRAA	2	1	1 ¹	Unknown	2 bns 1 sqn (H)		
BAALBEK-TRIPOLI	4	Unknown	Unknown	2			
LATTAKIA-HOHS	3 ¹	Unknown	1	1 (cstl def)			
RAYAK	1 coy						
JEBEL DRUZE	3	At least one	Unknown	Unknown	2 bns	5 lt sqns	
ALEPPO	1 ¹	1	1	Unknown			
PALMYRE	1 coy	1	Unknown	Unknown			
DEIR-ES-ZOR ABU KEHEL	1	1	1	At least two			
TEL KOTCHEK	1	5 lt sqns 1 ORD					

LUPA

SECRET

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 2

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 21 Jun 41 to 1200 hrs 22 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

NOTE. It is learnt from the BBC 1400 hrs News Service today that hostilities have begun between GERMANY and RUSSIA on a 2000 kilometre front - from FINLAND to the Black Sea.

ITALY declared war on RUSSIA at 1530 hrs this afternoon. Further details not yet available.

1. GROUND.

Our Operations.

(a) DAMASCUS Sector: After severe fighting MEZZE was captured by 5 Ind Bde yesterday and 2/3 Aust Inf Bn was established astride the DAMASCUS road about 198176. The FF forces later entered DAMASCUS itself yesterday and, although there was hand to hand fighting in the barracks area for some time, the whole city and the Citadel was occupied and all resistance ceased by 1800 hrs 21 Jun. The Free French pushed on and now hold BARZE 204180 with patrols further north. The formal entry of Gen GENTIL-HOIME was probably made last night. 16 Inf Bde is now in the AARTOUZ area and a column from QOUNEITRA has moved up along the QOUNEITRA - DAMASCUS road to junction with them.

(b) In the MERDJAYOUN sector there has been little change in the situation. The enemy is constructing field works with wire obstacles east of the town and our arty has shelled the barracks.

(c) Elsewhere the position is static with normal patrol activity only. On the coast our inf are holding a line east of RAS NEBI YOUNES and also astride the road SEBLINA 123188 - EL QUARDANIYE 123187 - JAMLIYE 122186.

2. AIR

Our Operations.

MT concentrations NW of DAMASCUS and IIT convoys retiring from DAMASCUS were attacked by our fighters and bombers. Tac/R reports at 1800 hrs show that damage was done to the enemy IIT.

Enemy Operations.

No enemy activity reported.

3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCEES.

At 1200 hrs 60 MT were reported moving NE through QTAIFE.

Three Tac/Rs reported considerable numbers of ITT moving NW along DAMASCUS - BEYROUTH rd especially between DIMAS and MASNAA. Only small numbers of ITT were reported moving south along the MASNAA - HASBAYA rd and the ZAHLE - MERDJAYOUN rd. These were believed to be supply ITT only.

Total EA destroyed to date by AA fire 7 on 6 Div front and 4 on 7 Aust Div front. These are confirmed crashed aircraft.

4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS.

A further bn 16 RTT has been identified in the SOUEIDA - EZRAA area. In the LATTAKIA - HOMS area 2 troops of Fd Arty have been located.

Attached Appendix "A" shows enemy Order of Battle. It differs from that sent out with Int Sum No 1 in that identified units have been set out in the following order:- Inf, Cav (Horsed), Cav (Mech), Arty (Fd), Arty (AA), Engrs, Miscl.

It is learnt that CHTUARA (161209) is a type of transit camp and that units moving from DAMASCUS and ALEPPO to MERDJAYOUN area have staged the night there.

Casualties to the Foreign Legion in action against our troops have been heavy, one coy having 100 casualties and two other coys have only 20 men left in each.

The morale of those on the coast is low, particularly owing to our heavy Naval bombardment.

In addition PW reports the following defences at KHALDE, south of BEIRUT as at Jan 41. Four cement casemates covering approaches to BEIRUT from the shore as well as trenches on other side of BEIRUT, as precautions against attempted landings. A bty of four 75 mm guns. Guns in front of the electric plant and one 25 mm A/Tk gun between the village and BEIRUT.

5. ENEMY ORGANISATION AND EQUIPMENT.

A summary of the principal features of VICHY tanks encountered by our troops is attached as Appendix "B".

Kalwa

DISTRIBUTION :

Force HQ P & TJ	1	CSO	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
6 Div	20	G	1	Aust LO, GHQ, ME	1
7 Aust Div	24	F	1	AHQ Melbourne	2
Free French	1	A	1	File	1
84 L of C Area	1	Q	1	War Diary	1
"C" Flt 208 Sqn	1	DBST	1	Spare	1
GOC	1	ADOS	1		
BGS	1	DDIS	1		
CCRA	1	HQ AIF ME	1		
CE	1	HQ AIF BASE AREA	1		
CRE C Tps	1	Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1		

Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 2

APPENDIX "A"

VICH FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs 22 Jun 41

1.

BEIRUT - DAMOUR SECTOR

INF	1/24 R.I.C.	Presumed moved north from SAIDA
	2/24 R.I.C.	Presumed moved north of SAIDA
	3/24 R.I.C.	Presumed moved north from SAIDA
	6 L.E. 2 Bn	Moved from BAALBEK 17/6
	6 L.E. 4 Bn	Less 13 and most of 14 Coys (captured)
	9 R.T.A. HQ	
	9 R.T.A. 1 Bn 1 & 2 Coys	
	17 R.T.S. Two coys	
CAV (Horsed)	4 Spahi 6 Sqn	Moved from BEIT ED DINE
	1 Bn Senegalese	
	8 Spahi - one sqn	Less elements captured
CAV (Mech)	2/6 R.C.A.	
ARTY (Fd)	6 L.E. 2 Bty	Moved from SAIDA 16/6
	6 L.E. 3 Bty	" " "
ARTY (AA)	Four AA Btys	
ENG	33 Eng Bn	Detachment
MISCL	43 Communication Bn	Detachment only

2.

JESSINE SECTOR

INF	6 L.E. 1 Bn 2 Coy	Left HOMS 14/6
	6 L.E. 1 Bn 3 Coy	" " "
	17 R.T.S. 2 Bn	Less casualties sustained by 8 Coy
CAV (Mech)	6 R.C.A. 2 Gp 3 Sqn	
ARTY	6 L.E. - one bty	

3.

MERDJAYOUN SECTOR

INF	6 L.E. 3 Bn	Moved from DAMASCUS 17.6
	16 R.T.T. 1 Bn	
	22 R.T.A. 1 Bn	Moved from BEIRUT 18/6
	22 R.T.A. 2 Bn	
	1 B.C.L.	PW reports large percentage has deserted: Unconfirmed
ARTY	Three btys	
MISCL	631 Pioneer Bn	Detachment

4.

QOUNEITRA SECTOR

N.B. Formerly located in this area, but present location unknown.

INF 6 L.E. 1 Bn Moved from HOMS 14/6
17 R.T.S. 1 Bn
17 R.T.S. 3 Bn
3 B.D.L.

CAV (Mech) ? R.C.A. Probably one sqn R.C.A. less some tanks captured and/or knocked out

5.

DAMASCUS SECTOR

INF 6 L.E. HQ Moved from HOMS 14/6
6 L.E. 4 Bn 11 Coy
5/1 R.T.M.
29 R.T.A. 3 Bn 9, 10 & 11 Coys

CAV (Horsed) 1 Gp Partisans
3 Lt Desert Coy
Circassian Lt Cav 16, 18 and one unidentified sqn

CAV (Mech) 6 R.C.A. Possibly one sqn including 6 A/Tk guns
7 R.C.A. Portion, one sqn?

ARTY Four btys Two 105 mm, two 75 mm
Three unidentified btys

6.

SOUEIDA - EZRAA SECTOR

INF 16 R.T.T. 2 Bn
16 R.T.T. 3 Bn
16 R.T.T. 4 Bn 11 Coy
1 R.T.M. 1 Bn 5 Coy

CAV (Horsed) Gp E.L. Dr (Druse Cav) Moving east to SOUEIDA 18/6

CAV (Mech) 7 R.C.A. - probably one sqn

MISCL 43 Communication Bn Detachment

7.

BAALBEK - TRIPOLI SECTOR

INF One bn Colonial Inf) Some at least probably
One bn Syrian Inf) moved south
Two bns Levant Inf)

ARTY 1 R.A.M.L. - two btys

8. LATTAKIA - HOMS SECTOR
INF 6 L.E. 1 Bn 1 Coy
6 L.E. 2 Bn 6 Coy
Three bns Levant Inf?
CAV (Mech) One armd car pl
ARTY Two AA btys
One coastal defence bty
9. RAYAK SECTOR
INF 6 L.E. 2 Bn 5 Coy Moved from BAALBEK 14/6
10. JEBEL BRUZE SECTOR
INF 9 R.T.A. 3 Bn From BEIRUT 18/6
5/1 R.T.M.
16 R.T.T. 4 Bn
17 R.T.T. - one bn
CAV (Horsed) Druse Cav Sqns moving to SOUEIDA
11. ALEPPO SECTOR
INF 46 R.T.T. HQ
4 B.D.L.
CAV (Horsed) 4 Sqn Syrian Cav
ARTY One bty 75 mm
12. PALMYRE SECTOR
INF 6 L.E. 4 Bn 15 Coy
CAV (Horsed) 1 Lt Desert Coy
13. DEIR-ES-ZOR - ABU KEMEL SECTOR
INF B.D.L.
CAV (Horsed) 2 Lt Desert Coy
CAV (Mech) 2 Lt Mech Unit
ARTY Bn Levant Metro Arty
14. TEL-KOTCHEK SECTOR
INF 8 B.D.L.
CAV (Horsed) 21, 23, 24, 25, 28 Lt Sqns
Five sqns Djezireh Cav

1 AUSTRALIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 2

APPENDIX "B"

INFORMATION ON FRENCH RENAULT TANKS

M 35 AMR Lt TANK

Weight - 5 tons
Height - 6'6"
Length - 12'6"
Width - 5'3"
Crew - 2
Armour basis - .5 inch approx
One .5" (approx) Heavy MG
Two light MGs
Carries 220 rds for heavy and 2250 rds
light MG
Speed - 31 mph
Suspension - 4 bogie wheels
1 bogie
2 ind. bogie wheels fore and aft
Radius - 125 miles
Ground clearance 1'2"
Crosses 4 foot 3 inch trench
Fords 1'8"
Step 1'8"
Intercomm: Wireless, Flag, Lamp

R 35 (Light Medium) A squat heavy type tank with powerful
RENAULT engine

Weight - 12 tons (approx)
Height - 8'1"
Length - 13'2"
Crew - 2
Armour - On turret 2½" armour plate, on bulge
immediately below turret 1½" armour
plate. Remaining armour 2" BUT NOT
ARMOUR PLATE
One 1.5" (approx) gun
One Lt MG (coaxially mounted)
Carries 100 rds for gun and 2400 rds for Lt MG
Speed - 12 mph
Suspension - 5 bogie wheels. Two pairs of
bogies with scissors articulation.
One independent bogie wheel.
Radius - about 90 miles
Ground clearance - 1'2"
Crosses 5 feet 3 inch trench
Fords 2'7"
Step 2'11"
Intercomm: Wireless and flag

Notes on R 35

1. Our 25 pdr A.P. will pierce this tank.
2. At long range our 2 pdr A.P. will pierce this tank anywhere below turret and below bulge immediately below turret.
3. If the instruction to fire low is carried out our 2 pdr will stop this tank.
4. At short range (in view of tests against GERMAN 40 mm armour plate) our 2 pdr will penetrate anywhere unless angle of blow is too glancing.
5. Space inside tank very limited - no seat for driver, crew cannot, with any efficiency, be men of over 5'2" in stature.

LUPA

- 5 -

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 5

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 24 Jun 41 to 1200 hrs 25 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

SPECIAL NOTE: Will anybody who has good photographs of operations in CRETE especially those showing parachutists or gliders, either in the air or on the ground, please lend copies to G.S.I.? These will be returned safely within short time. Photographs should be addressed to G.S.I. (a) G.H.Q., Middle East and have a note of the owner's name and address.

1. GROUND

Our Operations

(a) DAMASCUS Area: 16 Inf Bde have moved up through QATANA gap in the face of some opposition and are now astride rd DAMASCUS - BEIRUT 1 kilo SE of DIMAS. They are now meeting MG and arty fire. FF have occupied MAARABA (203182) and QASTAL (240220). RH is being moved to DAMASCUS.

(b) MERDJAYOUN Area: Our attack has been continued. KHEIBE and BMERIQ are in our hands. We hold high ground 1/2 kilo NE of MERDJAYOUN itself. In front of HASBAYA the enemy are reported to be holding line from near BALATE to RACHAYA EL FOKHAR.

(c) At JEZZINE the position is obscure but some fwd tps have been forced to withdraw a short distance by enemy counter-attacks. Enemy are strong in arty and mortars.

(d) In the coast sector there has been considerable offensive patrol activity and our arty with RN have been shelling enemy posns in front of DAMOUR.

2. AIR

Our Operations

Two dive bombing attacks were carried out by RAF bombers against BEIRUT harbour. Direct hits were registered on the jetty on each occasion.

RAYAK aerodrome was again attacked and hits scored on buildings and dumps.

In a raid on the fort at SOUEIDA three direct hits were observed but the extent of damage caused is unknown.

During the day fighters of RAF and RAAF provided protection over units of the fleet and carried out a number of offensive sweeps over the forward areas and enemy aerodromes. No enemy aircraft was encountered.

ENEMY OPERATIONS

Enemy bombers attacked DAMASCUS 0345 hrs. Extent of the damage caused not yet reported.

No enemy fighter action has been reported during past 24 hrs.

3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Strat/R morning 24 Jun 41 reported following. At ALEPPO 5 AC on the aerodrome. 12 trucks in railway yard, but no railway movement. A large number of new wooden huts was observed along the road between ALEPPO and HOMS.

Tac/R between 1500 and 1600 hrs 24 Jun 41 reported the road blown at 14261626 and a road block at 142163. 15 MT well spaced were observed moving North between RACHAYA and MASNAA. The roads MERDJAYOUN to JDITAI and MACHRHARA to RACHAYA were reported clear of any movement.

Considerable numbers of MT were reported dispersed off the DAMASCUS - BEYROUTH road between BARELIAS and SABBOURA. As our own troops were believed to be operating in the DIMAS area at the time it is difficult to say how much of this MT belonged to the enemy and how much to the allied forces.

This morning's Tac/R carried out between 0645 and 0730 hrs over the same area reported NMS HASBAYA area and 10 MT facing North between RACHAYA and MASNAA and 50 MT between MASNAA and DIMAS. For the balance of the area NMS was reported.

A Tac/R at 1715 - 1815 hrs 24-Jun over the route DAMASCUS - EL QARYATEIN (290253) EN NEBK (243231) - DAMASCUS revealed a total of only 8 single MT moving in various directions.

Round DAIROUD and extending SW for 6 miles the pilot saw a line of large circular holes about 20 yds apart; and commencing at 223188 and running due east for approx 6 miles another line of holes was observed. The pilot was unable to suggest for what purpose these holes had been constructed.

4. ENEMY INTENTIONS

There are indications that the general immediate plan of the enemy is to fight strong delaying actions on the ANTI- LEBANON and between MERDJAYOUN and RACHAYA EL OUADI while holding his posns from DAMOUR to BEIT ED DINE and in front of JEZZINE.

There is reason to believe that his ultimate intention is to withdraw to the quadrilateral DAMOUR - BEIT ED DINE - CHTUARA - RAS BAALBECK - TRIPOLI and to put all he has into the defence of this line.

5. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

9 tanks and 3 armd cars have been captured NW of DAMASCUS. This reduces the number of identified enemy mechanised sqns in the area to 2.

Personalities: It is reported that General BERGERET, the Vichy Air Minister is proceeding to SYRIA to take over command of the Air Forces.

From captured documents and statements of P/Is, the following unconfirmed information is promulgated.

4 B.D.L. has moved from ALEPPO to the JEZZINE area.

It seems probable that at least the equivalent of one bn R.I.C. was recently moved from the BEIRUT - DAMOUR sector to the DAMASCUS area.

2/22 and 3/22 R.T.A. now in BEIRUT - DAMOUR sector.

15, 16 and 18 Sqns Tch in DAMOUR sector.

2/9 R.T.A. in MERDJAYOUN sector.

Elements 1 R.S.M. area SOUEIDA.

6. ENEMY ARMoured EQUIPMENT

The following are notes on the composition of the enemy Mech Cav Sqns:-

In December 1940 68 Tank Bn was disbanded while at HOMS, and reformed as the 2 R.D.C. (Regiment de Decouvert et de Combat). Some two months ago the title was again changed to 7 R.C.A.. It is not as yet known what organizational alteration these changes involved, but the present composition of this unit is believed to be as follows:-

HQ - 1st Group - 2nd Group

Each group of four sqns of two tps. Each tp has 5 tanks (Model 35R) with a crew of two. Total number of tanks - 40.

Each sqn has in addition two recce tps of Armd cars. These recce-tps are supposed to be composed of DODGE armd cars and with a 37 mm gun and a 7.5 mm MG,

The organization of 6 R.C.A. is thought to be similar.

Prior to the commencement of hostilities, the Vichy French were thought to possess 90 tanks (Model 35R) equally distributed between 6 R.C.A. and 7 R.C.A.

7. GENERAL

The following is the gist of a report from an officer who watched the German airborne landing on CRETE (GSI Middle East Summary 396). During the first full scale attack, troops went into their slit trenches or other cover. They stayed in them until the strafe finished, under the impression that airborne troops could not land in that particular area while such intensive firing was going on. The officer noticed, however, that for some time following the landing of a glider, one German plane appeared to be firing directly around it and he came to the conclusion that the Germans might at this critical juncture be using blank ammunition, a change over which could not easily be detected by our troops on the ground. The total immunity of a house in a small area which was being thoroughly strafed during a glider landing also aroused this officer's suspicions.

It is obvious that if defending troops can be induced to take cover during the actual landing of airborne troops, the task of the latter is very much easier; the use of blank ammunition, if believed by those on the ground to be real, would have this effect.

The following information has been compiled from recent reports received covering Enemy Air Tactics.

1. It is reported from Army sources that a single ME 110 circled slowly over our forward troops recently and then emitted black smoke. Thinking the aircraft had been engaged and hit by one of our fighters, troops left their slit trenches whereupon the ME 110 dived, and carried out a machine gun attack.

2. After recent attacks on troops, German aircraft have flown away at only 10 - 15 feet above the ground - below the angle of fire of A.A. guns and on several occasions hand grenades have been thrown from German aircraft.

W. A. ...
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION

As per 1 Aust Corps Intelligence Summary No. 3
with the addition of AIL0 11 Sqn RAF

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 7

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 26 Jun to 1200 hrs 27 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

1. GROUNDOur Operations

(a) Continuous pressure has been maintained on the enemy line astride rd DAMASCUS - BEIRUT and part of JEBEL MAZAR has been seized by 2/2 Aust Inf Bn. It is reported the enemy are preparing to evacuate the whole posn and 16 Inf Bde are therefore pressing their attack. To the North FFF have occupied NEBEK 40 miles NNE of DAMASCUS.

(b) In MERDJAYOUN area attacks by our tps have been driven back to line from which they started and the enemy appears to be holding his present posns in force.

(c) No material change in the JEZZINE sector.

(d) In the Coastal area offensive activity has been continued and 2/16 and 2/27 Bns now hold ES SAADIYATE (122195) and ES SAYAR (123195). Further to the right 2/25 Bn has occupied CHEHIM (127188) and MAZBOUD (127187) after some opposition from tanks and armd cars.

2. AIROur Operations

During the night 25/26 bombers of RAF attacked destroyers and the mole in BEYROUTH Harbour. Bombs fell in the target area but results are so far unknown.

On the evening of 26 Jun bombers attacked a petrol dump at TELKALAH. High explosive and incendiary bombs were seen to fall on the dump and railway siding causing a number of large fires.

RAAF fighters again attacked the aerodromes at HOIS, QUSEIR and RYAK. At HOIS 4 fighters, a petrol dump, an ammunition dump and a railway truck were destroyed by fire. A number of MT, a hangar and some huts were machine gunned at QUSEIR. No aircraft were visible. At RYAK 3 aircraft were machine gunned but no results were observed. MT on the DAMASCUS - BEYROUTH Rd and on the MASNAA - HASBAYA Rd were machine gunned and a number were seen to be damaged considerably. Later the same squadron carried out a fighter patrol over the forward troops, but failed to intercept any enemy aircraft.

RAAF fighters carried out a further attack against RYAK aerodrome and destroyed a further 3 fighters and 1 bomber on the aerodrome. 6 other fighters, 10 bombers, the watch tower and hangars were heavily machine gunned.

As the result of the above operations one RAAF machine was damaged and force landed in our lines. The pilot was unhurt. All other aircraft returned to their base.

Enemy Operations

Three enemy aircraft machine gunned the DAMASCUS aerodrome at 0545 hrs today. No damage or casualties resulted.

3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Tac/R between 1030 and 1130 hrs 27 Jun reported 200-250 MT in area 180185 and 173187.

NMS HASBAYA and BEIT ED DINE areas. - Between DAMOUR and YAROUTI - 3 only MT were observed.

The above indicates no change in the situation since the Tac/R carried out between 1200-1345 hrs on 26 Jun when the report was identical

A Strat/R carried out during the afternoon of 26 Jun located one oil tanker in TRIPOLI harbour and two tankers in BEYROUTH Harbour. These vessels had been previously reported moving South in TURKISH waters.

4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

No 5 Coy 2/6 LE previously shown in RAYAK is now in the BEIRUT - DAMOUR Sector. One coy of the 1/6 LE formerly at HOMS has been identified in the JEZZINE Sector (Unconfirmed).

In the MERDJAYOUN Sector a further 40 CIRCASSIANS have surrendered.

Personalities: It is learnt that General DENTZ was at BEIT ED DINE on the 21 Jun.

5. ENEMY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

In addition to the figures given in yesterday's Summary a further 8 enemy tanks and 7 armd cars have been destroyed.

The totals are now: 26 Tanks and 19 Armd Cars destroyed and captured

8 in ...
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION:

Force HQ P & TJ	1	SLO	1
6 Div	20	I	1
7 Aust Div	24	A	1
Free French	1	Q	1
84 L of C Area	1	DDST	1
"C" Flt 208 Sqn	1	ADOS	1
AILO 11 Sqn RAF	1	DDMS	1
AILO 3 Sqn RAAF	1	HQ AIF ME	1
57 Lt AA Regt RA	1	HQ AIF Base Area	1
GOC	1	Rear HQ 1 Aust Corps	1
BGS	1	HQ 6 Aust Div	1
CCRA	1	Aust LO GHQ ME	1
CE	1	AHQ MELBOURNE	2
CRE C Tps	1	File	1
CSO	1	War Diary	1
G	1	Spare	1

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO 8

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 27 Jun to 1200 hrs 28 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

WARNING: IRAK PETROLEUM COY'S PLANE

I.P.C. will be using a civil aeroplane along the whole length of pipe line from HAIFA to KIRKUK as from 28 Jun. A description of the plane is as follows: Twin-engined biplane painted silver with red, white and blue stripes on wing tips and on the rudder. It carries civil markings. All troops should be warned to avoid firing on this plane.

Ref: LEVANT: 1/200,000 and 1/50,000 Series.

1. GROUNDOur Operations

(a) DAMASCUS sector. MAZAR front: The report that the enemy was preparing to evacuate his posns astride DAMASCUS • BEIRUT rd on the MAZAR feature proved unfounded. 16 Inf Bde with 2/3 Aust Inf Bn on their left attacked morning 27 Jun and met with initial success, 2/3 Aust Inf Bn capturing the summit 179181. Later the enemy counter-attacked strongly and forced 16 Inf Bde to withdraw to their original defensive line 188184 - 186181 • 182177. It is reported that one coy of 2/3 Aust Inf Bn failed to extricate itself.

(b) To the north FFF still occupy QTAIFE and NEBEK and report NEBEK area clear of enemy.

(c) Elsewhere there has been no change in the situation. Our tps have consolidated on posns previously occupied and there has been intermittent shelling and patrol activity.

2. AIROur Operations

RAF bombers twice attacked enemy batteries and MT concentrations West of DAMASCUS. Some hits were observed among the MT but the results of the attacks against the batteries are as yet unknown.

RAF fighters were engaged in protective patrols over the fleet off the Syrian coast.

RAAF fighters carried out protective patrols over our bombers West of DAMASCUS on 27 Jun 41.

The same squadron encountered 6 GLEN MARTIN bombers over PALMYRA this morning. All 6 enemy aircraft were shot down in flames without loss to the RAAF.

to

Enemy Operations

During afternoon 27 Jun 41 an enemy aircraft groundstroffed MT and troops on the coast rd. No casualties have been reported.

3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

A Strat/R between 0830-0930 hrs 27 Jun reported 20 enemy aircraft on RAYAK landing ground (it is possible that most of these are damaged), 12 destroyers and 1 cargo ship in BEYROUTH harbour and 5 made up trains between HOMS and RAYAK.

One large ship and 5 sea planes in TRIPOLI harbour. N.M.S. at sea as far as CYPRUS.

Tac/R between 0800 and 0845 hrs 28 Jun 41 reported 10 MT dispersed round HASBAYA, a total of 24 MT on HASBAYA- MASNUN rd proceeding in both directions as single vehicles. 70 MT in area round rd junction 179184 and 60 MT dispersed between 172191 and 174196.

Tac/R between 1100 hrs and 1200 hrs 28 Jun reported the bridge at 12381969 over the DAMOUR river as being badly blown. Road blocks have been placed on north side of river. The balance of the western area was covered by low lying cloud and observation was difficult.

4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

The Bn of 24 R.I.C. which had been reported as having moved from BEIRUT to the DIMASCUS area has been identified in the DIMAS area. It is not however the 3 Bn but the 1 Bn.

Prisoners from this unit state that some time ago 3 Bn was dissolved and incorporated in 1 and 2 Bns. The bulk of 1 Bn being European French personnel and 2 Bn mostly natives. Further they state the Rgt now bears the title Regiment Mixte Colonial (R.M.C.) in lieu of R.I.C. (Regiment Infanterie Colonial). This information has not been confirmed.

It appears that 1 Bn which at the outbreak of hostilities was at TRIPOLI, travelled via BEIRUT to SAIDA where it was engaged in operations for about one week. It was then withdrawn to BEIRUT for a week's rest, after which it proceeded to the DIMAS area in lorries.

Of the three btys 105 mm 2/1 R.A.M.L. reported in DIMAS area only two have definitely been identified. In view of a report from the JEZZINE sector that large calibre shells were being used, it is reasonable to suppose that the third 105 mm bty is in that area.

General: At HOMS the enemy has his main tank depot and repair shops.

Personalities: Col. AMMANDRICH, the enemy tank commander, is regarded by the French as an expert in Mechanical Warfare. It is now reported that General BERGERET (The Vichy Air Minister) has returned to FRANCE.

ERRATUM: Ref Summary No.7, para 1, line 3. "2/2 Aust Inf Bn" should read "2/3 Aust Inf Bn".

W. W. W.
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

DISTRIBUTION: As per Summary No.7

2/16 Bn

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.9

Compiled from information received from
1200 hrs 28 Jun to 1200 hrs 29 Jun 41

- (a) Items side-lined in the margin will not be reproduced in any form.
- (b) Information contained herein is for circulation down to Lt-Colonels' Commands only.

Ref: Maps - BEIRUT: 1/200,000	SAIDA: 1/50,000
" 1/50,000	DAMOUR: 1/25,000
JEZZINE: 1/50,000	

NOTES:

Will all recipients of this Summary who NEED any of the publications listed below, kindly notify GSI HQ 1 Aust Corps as early as possible, stating the number of copies of each ALREADY IN POSSESSION and the number required.

GERMANY

- Pocket Notes on Identifications of German Units
- Notes on Enemy Army Identifications, Germany
- Brief Notes on the Organization, Equipment and Tactics of the German Army.
- Periodical Notes on the German Army, Nos 32, 33 and 34 (down to Bns and equivalent)

OTHERS

- Notes on the French Army (Down to Brigades and equivalent)
- Manual of Military Intelligence in the Field, Pamphlets Nos 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Down to Bns and equivalent)

1. GROUND

Our Operations

- (a) DAMASCUS Sector: On the MAZAR front there has been no marked change in the situation. Our tps still occupy the defensive line indicated yesterday. Enemy arty has shelled the rd junc at 194179 and EA have bombed QATANA and AARTOUZ without much result. Most of the coy of 2/3 Aust Inf Bn who were reported as cut off on the summit of JEBEL MAZAR on 27 Jun have since made their way through to our lines.
- (b) To the north FFF still occupy NEBEK and have met enemy forces at DEIR AATIYE (246239).
- (c) In the MERDJAYOUN and JEZZINE sectors there has been little change. Our cav patrols have been active and have located the enemy in RACHAYA EL FOKHAR 143158.
- (d) In the Coastal sector patrols from 2/16 and 2/27 Bns have gained points of observation on the DAMOUR defences and an FDL line has been extended through ES SADIYATT and ES SIYAR to EL FESTEQANIYE and ER REZANIYE. 2/25 Bn have pushed forward and

occupy DARAYA 129189. There has been a marked increase in enemy shell fire in the last 24 hrs. A surprising incident was the move of an enemy horsed cav patrol through MEJDALOUNA 12371848 to JAMLIEH 12141854 about 1800 hrs last night. Counter measures were at once taken by 21 Aust Inf Bde but no further reports have yet been received.

2. AIR

Our Operations

On 28 Jun RAF bombers attacked the barracks and stores at PALMYRA. Direct hits were scored on the stores and large fires started. On the return trip direct hits were observed on the railway siding at RAYAK.

An enemy camp in the PALMYRA area was attacked early this morning. Bombs were seen to fall on the target but results are unknown.

Fighters of RAF and RAAF carried out protective patrols over our bombers and units of the fleet without intercepting any enemy aircraft.

Enemy Operations

In the coastal sector enemy air activity has increased during the past five days. A number of machine gun attacks by low flying aircraft is reported.

At 1230 hrs 28 Jun 5 enemy aircraft attacked QATANA area with incendiary and HE bombs. No casualties resulted.

Sixty bombs were dropped by 5 enemy aircraft which attacked the AARTOUZ (188165) area at 1915 hrs. One officer was killed and one OR wounded. Two of the aircraft believed hit by AA.

At 0530 hrs this morning one DEWOITINE fighter was shot down by AA fire in the DAMASCUS area. The pilot was killed.

3. SUMMARY OF AIR RECCES

Strat/R during the morning 28 Jun reported 13 fighters 2 light aircraft and one four engined machine on the landing ground at RAS BAALBEK and one small ship in TRIPOLI harbour.

Tac/R 0800 to 0930-hrs this morning reported NMS on the HASBAYA - MASNAA rd and 60 - 70 MT well dispersed round rd junc 179184. There is no fresh digging in the area 179184. No AA was observed

Tac/R 1100 - 1215 hrs over the coastal area covered following route:-

JEZZINE - BEIT ED DINE - YAROUTI - DAMOUR - BEIT ED DINE - RHARIFE - JADRA - YAROUTI.

15 to 20 trucks were observed moving east at 122188 and 10 MT dispersed 125187. Balance of task NMS.

Visibility during all recces reported very good.

4. ENEMY IDENTIFICATIONS

A new O of B is attached as Appendix "A".

Personalities: The commander of the HASBAYA area is Col. ALBORG who has received instructions to keep on fighting at all costs. It is reported that ALBORG is keen to remain in the good graces of General DENTZ.

General ARALBOSSE has been inspecting the defences of DAMOUR several times during the last ten days.

5. ENEMY ARMS AND EQUIPMENT

A French officer who recently joined the Free French Forces, was previously with 6 R.C.A. in SYRIA.

He is adamant that at the commencement of operations by us there were 90 model 35R tanks in possession of the Vichy French, 45 with 6 R.C.A. and 45 with 7 R.C.A.

Numerous conflicting reports are continually being received about the original number of tanks of this model, but there seems little reason to doubt the truth of the above statement.

Advice has been received that of the 26 tanks quoted in Summary No.7 as having been captured or permanently lost to the enemy, 9 which were taken at QATANA were practically obsolete and only used for training purposes. They were not R 35s.

It is now computed that 26 out of the original 90 35R tanks are in our hands.

There are reasons to believe that of the balance of 55, a number have been damaged and are out of commission

From the statements of a number of PWs the range of the 81 mm Mortar seems to be approx 2500 yds.

A subsidiary repair workshop for tanks is at ST. ELIE, close to the sea in the BEYROUTH area

About 150 armd Cs have been built locally. Their armour plate consists of two layers of plate with a layer of wood in between and is said to be effective. About 50 of these cars are armed with a 37 mm gun, the remainder with MGs.

6. ENEMY DEFENCES

Inf from PW considered fairly reliable. The following lines of defence in the Coastal Sector have been reported but as yet are unconfirmed:

First Line: DAMOUR
Second Line: KHALDE
Third Line: CHOUEIFAT, ALEY, BHAMDOUN

In addition to bridges and roads previously reported mined the following mines have been laid:-

Br at BAAL EL NAAME 12442003. The river under the br is dry at present and mines have been laid in the river bed and also on the br itself. Mines have also been laid in other dry creek beds near the Coast rd where vehicles would be forced to detour by demolition of brs.

The following rds have been mined:-

CHEHIM to MAZBOUD
AANOUT - GHARIFE - BEIT ED DINE

The mines have been placed across the rd some 10 metres before the barricades from the side of the British front.

There is a bty of 75 mm guns near the NAHR EL KELB, north of BEYROUTH.

There were (12 Jun) three medium guns near the X rds in HASMIYE. These guns were removed on 14 Jun.

Coastal Guns: 2 guns at 2006 on hills east of (BAOUAOCHE) These guns were at ABEY (13102000) on 24 Jun and fired on Royal Navy during their bombardment of DAMOUR. The range was too great and the guns have now been moved to their present posn. These coast defence guns are either 120 mm or 155 mm guns and have an approx range of 12000 yds. This means that they can now fire on any ship 6000 yds from the shore.

At KHALDE there is a big gun which is believed to be 9 metres long and has a range of 20 Kilos. Between KHALDE and DAMOUR there are many MG nests covering the area between the foot of the hills and the coast on both sides of the rd.

There is another big gun north of KHALDE at a place called BIR HASSAN. This gun is as big and has the same range as the KHALDE gun. Between the two big guns there are MG nests all along area on both sides of the road.

IO did not see pill boxes on the coast but barbed wire was observed all along the coast from BEYROUTH to DAMOUR.

7. GENERAL

Several PWs interrogated have been very impressed with the accuracy of our arty fire. One stated that during our attack on MERDJAYOUN on 19 Jun, in the first 20 minutes his coy suffered the following casualties: one capt., one lieut., two NCOs and 15 ORs killed, 40 odd wounded.

The following information comes from PW or local inhabitants and can be considered reasonably reliable.

There is a petrol store (180 tons) at BAABDA (133212). The store is partly underground and is situated between the sta and the rd BAAEDA - HADETH.

Tps are concealed in the gardens of DAMOUR, CHOUEIFAT and KAFR CHIMA. They hope to repeat the tactics followed at SAIDA.

On 16 Jun the Mufti of the LEBANON while trying to persuade Gen DENTZ to declare BEYROUTH an open town pointed out that the French seemed more ready to make a battlefield of BEYROUTH than of PARIS.

British and Australian prisoners are being kept in the quarantine sta near the river at BEYROUTH as a staging post on their way north.

A lot of propoganda about the bad treatment they will receive if they become prisoners is being spread amongst the enemy.

The civilian population of DAMOUR has been evacuated and tps are billeted in the town. Tks, Armd Cs and trucks are also in the town and are hidden in side streets.

The following interesting information concerning the Vichy Air Force in SYRIA has been received from an informer:-

Aircraft, mostly of the "Dewoitine" fighter type, are maintained at BAALBECK, larger aircraft being kept at RAYAK. At BAALBECK the number of aircraft very seldom exceeds 20 machines. Fuel for the planes is kept in aluminium painted barrels of 50 gallons each, and hidden in trenches covered with earth on the southern end of the drome. The approximate number of barrels is placed at about 175, divided amongst 6 or 7 trenches. The landing ground is divided into two distinct areas by a road or track running across the ground from east to west. The northern end of the ground is used exclusively for dispersed aircraft, and around the benzine at the southern end are MG emplacements. To the southern extremity some 3 kilos from the landing ground, there is a small hill surmounted by about 3 heavy AA guns and about 4 light guns. Due east of these defences at a lower level is a camp occupied by the ground staff personnel. This camp lies north of a small village of some 50 or 60 houses. At a point some 15 kilos north of the landing ground are situated further AA defences, consisting of a similar disposition of guns as that at the southern end. Apart from being sunken emplacements, it appears that NO attempt is made to camouflage their presence. There is another benzine point to the east of the landing ground, lying south of the rd connecting this landing ground with the main BAALNEK rd. Apart from Air Force personnel there does not appear to be any military units in the vicinity. The road to the landing ground leaves the main BAALBEK - HOMS rd at a point about 5 kilos due north of BAALBEK, and then 7 kilos due west.

DISTRIBUTION as per Summary No. 7
with the addition of 85 Base Sub Area

A. H. H. H.
Lt-Col
GS 1 Aust Corps

1 AUST CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO.9

APPENDIX "A"

VICHY FRENCH ORDER OF BATTLE

From information received up to 1200 hrs 29 Jun 41

Areas are in alphabetical order.

1.

ALEPPO

CAV (Horsed) E.L.N.S. (Syrian Cav) - four sqns
CAV (Mech) R.C.A. - one sqn (Thought to have moved to
DAMASCUS sector)
ARTY 2 R.A.M.L. HQ and HQ Bty
1/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty 75 mm (Horsed?)
2/2 R.A.M.L.
1 Bty 75 mm Lorryborne
Unidentified portion thought to have moved south,
probably to DAMASCUS area.
ENG 3/33 Eng Bn
MISCL 1/43 Communication Bn

2.

BAALEBK

ARTY 1/1 R.A.M.L. - one bty 105 mm, one bty 65 mm

3.

BEIRUT - DAMOUR SECTOR

INF 2/24 R.M.C.
2/6 LE
1/16 R.T.T.
17 R.T.S. - two coys - possibly DAMASCUS ?
3rd Levant $\frac{1}{2}$ Bde HQ
2 B.C.L.
3 B.C.L.
2/22 R.T.A. (P.W. - unconfirmed)
3/22 R.T.A. (P.W. - ")
CAV (Horsed) 6/4 Spahi
8 Spahi - one sqn
CAV (Mech) 2/6 R.C.A.
ARTY 6 LE Arty Regt and three btys 75 mm
R.A.C.L. 3 Gp (Coastal Defence) - 7 Bty 145 mm
8 " 164 mm
4 Gp (A.A.) - 10 Bty 75 mm
11 " 75 mm
4/1 R.A.M.L. 10 Bty (A.A.) 25 mm
Lebanese Coastal Defence Bty 75 mm
ENG 1/33 Eng Bn
Special Eng Coy
" Telephone Coy
MISCL 43 Communication Bn 3 and 4 Coys
631 Pioneer Bn (A detachment only)

4. DAMASCUS SECTOR

The exact location of these troops is at present uncertain. The forces which were defending DAMASCUS have withdrawn west in the general direction road DAMASCUS - RAYAK. North in the general direction road DAMASCUS - HOMS.

INF 4/6 LE 11 Coy?
5/1 R.T.A.
1/9 R.T.A.
3/9 R.T.A.
1/17 R.T.S.
3/17 R.T.S.
1/24 R.M.C. from BEIRUT

CAV (Horsed) 1 Gp Partizan 13 Sqn
Circassian Lt Cav
12 Sqn
13 "
14 "
18 "
33 "
41 "
42 "
3/1 R.S.M. - from RAYAK
4 Spahi Regt?

CAV (Mech) 6 R.C.A. - probably one sqn including 6 A/Tk guns
1/7 R.C.A.

ARTY Gp 1 R.A.M.L. (2 Gp Motorised of two btys 105 mm
one bty 47 mm A/Tk)
13 Bty 65 mm (Mountain)
1 R.A.M.L. 16 Bty (A/Tk) 47 mm
3/1 R.A.M.L. 8 Bty (AA) 75 mm Motorised

ENG 2/33 Eng Bn
2/43 Communication Bn
B.P.I.C. 4 and 6 Coys (Indo-Chinese Labour Bn)

MISCL 1/29 Horsed Transport Coy

5. DEIR-EZ-ZOR - ABU KEMEL

INF 6 B.D.L.

CAV (Horsed) 2 Lt Desert Coy

CAV (Mech) 2 Lt Mech Unit ?

ARTY 2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty mixed 65 mm and 75 mm
Lorryborne

6. HAMA

INF 7 B.D.L.

7. HOMS

CAV (Horsed) 2 Sqn Levant Line Cav ?

CAV (Mech) One pl Spec Arnd Cars

8. JEZZINE SECTOR

INF 1/6 LE
2/17 R.T.S.
4 B.D.L. (From ALEPPO - P.W.)

CAV (Mech) 2/6 R.C.A. 3 Sqn

ARTY 6 LE 1 Bty (75 mm)
One bty 105 mm
One bty 75 mm (PW - unconfirmed)
Lebanese Mtn Bty 65 mm (PW)

9. LATTAQUIE

INF 2 B.D.L.
5 B.D.L.

CAV (Mech) Spec pl Armd Cars

ARTY 2/2 R.A.M.L. - one bty 65 mm Lorryborne
One Coastal Defence bty (2 R.A.M.L. ?)

10. MERDJAYOUN SECTOR

INF 2/9 R.T.A. ?
3/6 LE
1/22 R.T.A.
1 B.C.L.
2/16 R.T.T. (PW - unconfirmed)

CAV (Horsed) 15 Sqn Tcherkess (Mostly wounded PW)
16 " "
38 " "

CAV (Mech) One sqn ?

ARTY Three btys

MISCL 631 Pioneer Bn (A detachment only)

11. PALMYRE

INF 4/6 LE 5 Coy

12. RAKKA

23 E.L.Djz reported moving from HASSETCHE to RAKKA

13. RAYAK - ABLAH

ARTY iii/1 R.A.M.L. 7 Bty 75 mm Motorised AA and one
other similar bty
iv/1 R.A.M.L. 25 mm 11 Bty ? Motorised AA

14. SOUEIDA

INF 4/16 R.T.T. 11 Coy ? (Formerly at EZRAA)
1 R.S.M. - one gp

CAV (Horsed) One sqn ?

15.

TEL KOTCHEK

INF

8 B.D.L.

CAV (Horsed)

Djezireh Cav 21, 24, 25, 28 Lt Sqns

16.

TRIPOLI

INF

1 B.D.L.

ARTY

1/2 R.A.M.L. ? One bty 75 mm (Horsed)

Thought to have moved south

12 Bty 4 R.A.C.L. 75 mm AA

9 Bty 3 R.A.C.L. (Coastal Defence) half 90 mm
half 75 mm

UNPLACED

3/16 R.T.T. Was at EZRAA (Probably DAMASCUS)

3 B.D.L.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

Copy No 5

HQ Aust Div Expter

INF SUMMARY No 20
(infm up to 5 Jun 41)

Ref Map: BEYROUTH 1/200,000

1. "Att as appx is a list of abbreviations used to denote units of French Army in SYRIA.
2. The following are some notes on the defence of SYRIAN towns and aerodromes. The infm contained in these notes was obtained from several different sources and, although the sources are considered reliable, must be treated with some res until confirmation has been received. The date of receipt is given after each item of infm. Att as appx "A" is trace giving additional infm.

(a) BEYROUTH.

- i. AA practice takes place daily (14 May).
- ii. At MAR YUSEF (approx 133217) is the biggest gun in SYRIA and also 6 guns of smaller size. About 200 French and 150 native tps are in this area.
- iii. Stores of MCs are located in QUARTIER WEYGAND (approx 131218) (21 May)

(b) Forces defending the aerodrome.

- i. 21 lt tanks
- ii. 20 armd Cs
- iii. Two coys Senegalese tps (probably 2 BMS)
- iv. 3 bn of 17 RTS - stationed in the St. Elie and Joffre Barracks within two kilos of aerodrome (12 May)

NB. This infm is NOT in accord with previous reports which showed the 3 bn of 17 RTS as being stationed at DAMASCUS.

v. Four AA guns snuffiff at BEYROUTH overlooking Kettanehs Service Sta and many in posn along harbour. (No details this location at this HQ) (3 Dec 40)

vi. AA guns located at ANTELEAS (3 Dec 40)

- vii. 210 mm guns at pt where KELB River enters sea (3 Dec 40)
- viii. Bty of 75 mm at "Scap Works".
- ix. Bty of 75 mm at BIR HASSAN (near aerodrome).
- x. Bty of 75 mm at "Radio Levant" Sta at CHALDEA.
- xi. Bty of 75 mm at Burcough near St. Michel (approx 131218).
- xii. Bty of 25 mm half near electric light coy (approx 131218) and half in the fort of BEYROUTH.

(c) Work is being effected at night on the shore East of BEYROUTH Harbour. It is thought this might be for new coastal bty (17 Feb 41)

(d) RAYAK.

i. Tps at RAYAK (30 Apr 41):

- Three French coys.
- One gp de Chasse (fighter aircraft).
- One gp de Bombardement (bombers).
- One coy "Autonome" of bn du Levant.
- 200 native tps.

ii. Carefully planned defensive works have been completed in and around the aerodrome and are stated to be manned partly

by Germans and partly by French personnel.

iii. According to a report dated 17 May 75 mm AA guns and tanks were moved from RAYAK to ABIAH and four 1" AA and numerous MGs were retained for the defence of RAYAK aerodrome. A later report dated 24 May states that tanks have been moved to RAYAK from the Northern and Eastern garrisons (presumably ALEPPO and DAMASCUS).

3. The following is further infm obtained relative to the LITANI River and various brs:-

(a) LITANI River.

Little infm is available regarding the LITANI River. It is a perennial stream; its westerly course flows through a gorge 1000 feet high in places. There are no details of its width or current, although infm has been received that near QASMIYE it is slow, sluggish and deep, about 40 feet wide, with steep sides and cannot normally be forded.

(b) Br 105156 - QASMIYE Br.

Crosses the LITANI River, carrying the coast rd BEYROUTH - NAQOURA. It is built of stone, has one single arch with a width of 60 metres and height of 10 metres. It will take loads of 20 tons. This br is mined and there are two rd blocks on the South side. It is protected by sangers and the rd is covered by MGs and A Tk guns.

(c) Br 106159 - JISR ABOU EL ASSOUD.

No infm available except that it will take a 20 ton load.

(d) Br 132157 - KHANDALI Br.

Over LITANI River on route SAID - COUNEITRA. The br is 60 metres long, 15 metres high and 5 metres wide. Exact capacity not known but can take heavy MF. Alongside there is an old br, not suitable for heavy traffic. This br is guarded by native police. It is not known if it is mined.

(e) Br 147181 - CARAOUN Br.

On rd MERDJAYOUN - ZAHLE. Rd crosses LITANI River after passing along a narrow defile. No further infm available though the br is not thought to be mined. Can take heavy MF. Exact capacity not known.

4. French tps likely to be encountered in the frontier areas.

(a) The frontier area falls into four general sectors:

- i. JEBEL DRUSE - JEBEL TENF.
- ii. JEBEL DRUSE.
- iii. METULLAH - JEBEL DRUSE.
- iv. The coast to METULLAH (SYRIAN - PALESTINE frontier).

(b) The SYRIAN native tps, particularly the native cav, do not form a very strong fighting force. The French colonial tps are fairly well trained, although the fighting potentiality of any det will depend on its offr. Generally speaking all tps are likely to obey their offr, whose personal sympathies are therefore important.

The Senegalese offr are the most pro-Vichy and anti-British. Their rank and file are stupid and obedient.

The Spahi offrs are probably anti-de Gaulle, though not necessarily anti-British. Their tps are well disciplined.

In the North African inf regts opinion amongst the offrs is believed to be fairly evenly divided. The same applied to the Moroccans, who have not yet been reported in the frontier area, and to the arty. Discipline is probably fair.

The native SYRIAN regts include some native offrs, who are likely to put personal advantage before patriotism.

In the Druse Cav discipline is not high. Whilst they would probably follow their offrs, at least at first, it should be remembered that they have a traditional friendship with us. Their fighting value outside their own country is probably not high.

The Foreign Legion has a very high disciplinary tradition. The rank and file are of a higher standard of education and are drawn from many nations including a proportion of Germans. Here again they would probably follow their offrs. If the latter were to decide on resistance the Legion would fight well.

The Bedouin Lt Desert Coys are officered by Frenchmen of a high professional standard. In the rank and file tribal loyalty comes before loyalty to SYRIA.

(c) Tps believed to be in the frontier area are as follows (see att chart):-

- a. Sector (i). Lt desert coys consisting of camel and mechanised dets recruited from Bedouin and officered by French regular offrs. Probably unable to put up any resistance against a well trained European force, but capable of countering weak raiding parties.
- b. Sector (ii). Druse cav. Tunisian inf.
- c. Sector (iii). SYRIAN irregular cav have probably been withdrawn, and dets of SYRIAN inf (B.D.L) may have replaced them. Tunisian inf. Senegalese inf. Foreign legion. Chasseurs d'Afrique (mechanised, French and native.)
- d. Sector (iv) Native SYRIAN cav (Chasseurs Libanais) Algerian inf. Tunisian Spahis.

5. Times of Sunrise, Sunset, Moonrise and Moonset in G.M.T. for Latitude 32°30'N, Longitude 35°E.

Date	JUN 41.				
	Sunrise	Sunset	Moonrise	Moonset	Moon's phase
1	0233	1642	0801	2122	First quarter
2	0233	1643	0901	2201	
3	0233	1643	1003	2240	
4	0232	1644	1106	2320	
5	0232	1644	1211	-	
6	0232	1645	1318	0001	
7	0232	1646	1426	0046	
8	0232	1646	1534	0135	Full moon
9	0232	1646	1640	0228	
10	0232	1646	1741	0327	
11	0232	1647	1835	0428	
12	0232	1647	1925	0530	
13	0232	1648	2009	0632	
14	0232	1648	2047	0732	

The Spahis are probably anti-British, though not necessarily anti-British. Their ops are well described.

(2)

Date	Sunrise	Sunset	Moonrise	Moonset	Moon's phase
15	0232	1648	2122	0829	
16	0232	1649	2156	0924	Last quarter
17	0232	1649	2230	1018	
18	0232	1649	2303	1112	
19	0232	1650	2336	1204	
20	0232	1650	-	1257	
21	0232	1650	0012	1350	
22	0232	1650	0051	1442	
23	0233	1650	0133	1534	
24	0233	1651	0219	1624	New moon
25	0234	1651	0309	1713	
26	0234	1651	0402	1800	
27	0234	1651	0458	1843	
28	0234	1651	0556	1924	
29	0234	1651	0655	2004	
30	0235	1651	0757	2042	

NOTE: For PALESTINE Summer Time add three hrs to G.M.T.

6. Please ack.

R. W. Cameron Capt.
for Col.
Aust Div Reporter.

DISTRIBUTION.


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ADMS Aust Div Exporter	3
Aust Div (Exporter)	
Pro Coy	1
DADOS Aust Div Exporter	1
Aust Div (Exporter) Cav	4
Royals	1
Greys	1
Rear HQ	1
C	4
AQ	4
War Diary	2
Spares (for units on coming under cmd)	6

Date	Sunrise	Sunset	Moonrise	Moonset
1	0232	1648	2122	0829
2	0232	1649	2156	0924
3	0232	1649	2230	1018
4	0232	1649	2303	1112
5	0232	1650	2336	1204
6	0232	1650	-	1257
7	0232	1650	0012	1350
8	0232	1650	0051	1442
9	0233	1650	0133	1534
10	0233	1651	0219	1624
11	0234	1651	0309	1713
12	0234	1651	0402	1800
13	0234	1651	0458	1843
14	0234	1651	0556	1924

ABBREVIATIONS

<u>Abbreviation</u>	<u>Full French Title</u>	<u>English Equivalent</u>
A.C.	Anti-char	Anti-tank
A.M.	Automitrailleuses	Armd Cs
B.C.C.	Bataillon Chars de Combat	Tank bn
B.C.L.	Bataillon Chasseurs Libanais	Lebanese Rifle Bn
B.D.L.	Bataillon du Levant	Levant Bn
B.M.T.S	Bataillon de marche Tirailleurs Senegalais	Senegalese Rifle Bn
<u>Colonial tps:</u>	Tps of the regular French Army who spend half their service at stations in France and half in the Colonies.	
C.L.D.	Compagnie legere du desert	Lt Desert Coy
C.S.T.L.	Commandement superieur des troupes du Levant	Gen Staff
D.C.A	Defense contre avion	AA
E.L.Dj.	Escadron leger Djezireh	Djezireh Lt Cav
E.L.Dr.	" " Druse	Druse Lt Cav
E.L.N.S	" " Nord Syrie	North Syrian Lt Cav
E.J.Tch	" " Tcherkess	Circassian Lt Cav
Etr.	Legion Etrangere	Foreign Legion
Genie	Le Genie	Engineers
Gp	Groupe or Groupement	Sub-division of a regt
H.C.F.	Haut Commissariat Francais	French High Commissioner
Intendance		Sup service
<u>Metropolitan:</u>	Tps (French and native) belonging to the French Army in France and North Africa.	
Mtn		Pack tpt
P.A.R.E.M.		Sub regional wkshops
Partizan		Irregular lt cav
Porte		Lorry borne (arty)
P.R.R.E.M		Regional wkshops
R.A.C.L.	Regiment d'artillerie coloniale du Levant	Colonial Arty Regt
R.A.M.L.	Regiment d'artillerie metropolitane du Levant	Metropolitan Arty Regt of Mideast
R.C.A	Regiment Chasseurs d'Afrique	African Rifle Regt
R.I.C	Regiment d'infanterie coloniale	Colonial inf regt
R.T.A	Regiment Tirailleurs Algeriens	Algerian Rifle Regt
R.T.M.	Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains	Moroccan Rifle Regt
R.T.S.	Regiment Tirailleurs Senegalais	Senegalese Rifle Regt
R.T.T.	Regiment Tirailleurs Tunisiens	Tunisian Rifle Regt
S.A.	Spahis Algeriens	Algerian Lt Cav
S.M.	Spahis Marocains	Moroccan Lt Cav
Sp.	Troupes speciales: Tps recruited and maintained by local governments, but trained and partly officered by French.	
S.T.	Spahis Tunisiens	Tunisian Lt Cav
T.L.	Territoires des Liban	Lebanon district
T.N.S.	Territoires Nord Syrie	North Syrian district
Train		Tpt corps
Transmissions		Sigs
T.S-S.	Territoires Sud-Syrie	South Syrian district

DIAGRAM SHOWING TYPE OF TROOPS ON THE FRONTIER - CSI/130/1. 51 May 41.



2/16

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ Aust Div Exptor, 3
16 Jun 41.

INT SUMMARY No 21.

(based on infm received up to 1800 hrs -
15 Jun 41)

NEVI Coln.

1325 MEY OUIMYE captured. A large quantity of stores and amm found. Southern part of SAIDA appeared to be empty so one bn attacked from South on general line of main rd while the bn which had taken MEY OUIMYE pushed North through JABAL AAEBY towards the main rd SAIDA - JEZZINE.

1330 SAIDA reported captured.

ZOVA.

0515 Leading bn occupied KISSOUE, second bn advancing on TEL KISSOUE (1915 hrs).

KISA.

1915 Bn from area TAIBE (194155) patrolling fwd to MOUKELBE.

0730 Col Collets cav occupied NAJHA.

1330 JEBEL KELB captured. Footing secured on JEBEL APRIZ. Col Collet about to attack QARAHTA. MUKHELBE reported captured but not confirmed.

WIVA Coln.

2040 JEZZINE occupied. Enemy horsed cav and inf reported retreating North. Br immediately South of JEZZINE blown. Deviation for ME has been arranged.

YADU disposed East of br 136176: two coys area town astride rd leading North, two coys high ground East of and overlooking town.

BESI being sent along SAIDA rd to contact NEVI. Expect establish physical contact DROV this morning.

Tac/R Report.

1640 NMS JEZZINE to BEIT ED DINE. Ten very large and five medium MET (definitely enemy) BEIT ED DINE - YAROUD - SAIDA; 14 MET SW 129182 and five MET East 136179.

RAF Op Summary up to 2000 hrs, 14 Jun 41.

Blenheims bombed ALEPPO aerodrome where bombs fell amongst 17 dispersed aircraft, burning one and damaging others.

Tac/Rs were carried out of the KISWE area. A Strat/R was made of LATTAKIA, BEYROUTH and ALEPPO.

Sixteen sorties were carried out over our fwd tps, by "Tomahawks", in the SAIDA area. Twelve further sorties were carried out over the left flank by "Gladiators".

A force of "Swordfish" of the Fleet Air Arm intercepted French cargo ships off TURKEY. These vessels were last reported steering a SE course under the orders of the "Swordfish".

INFM ON FRENCH RENAULT TANKS.

The following infm on French Renault tanks is fwded to assist identification:-

- M25 AMR Lt Tank - Weight 5 tons.
 Crew - 2.
 Armour basis - 13 mm.
 One 13 mm heavy MG.
 Two lt MGs.
 Carries 220 rds for heavy and 2250 rds for lt gun.
 Speed - 31 mph (maximum).
 Radius - 125 miles.
 Crosses 4 feet 3 inch trench
 Intercomm: Wireless, flag lamp.

- R35 - Weight 11 tons.
 Crew - 2.
 Armour basis - 40 mm cast steel.
 One 37 mm gun.
 One lt MG (coaxially mounted).
 Carries 100 rds for gun and 2400 rds for lt MG.
 Speed - 12½ mph (maximum).
 Radius - about 90 miles.
 Crosses 5 feet 3 inch trench.
 Intercomm - wireless and flag.

ACK.

RW Cameron Capt
for Col.
 GS Aust Div Exporter.

Distribution:

- NEVI (10)
- WIVA (9)
- VEPI (6)
- GENO (4)
- SLAP (2)
- G (2)
- MC (1)
- NARE (3)
- BIPA (1)
- TEXE (1)
- DOXI (1)
- War Diary (2)

10
2/16
AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ Aust Div Expters,
17 Jun 41,

INT SUMMARY 22

(based on infm received up to 1800 hrs,
16 Jun 41.)

NEVI COLN.

- 1755/15 NEVI took over SAIDA and imposed 8 o'clock curfew, disarming the gendarmerie. The mayor or equivalent civilian in SAIDA was told that if they all behaved themselves the rule of the city by NEVI would be benign.
- 2130/15 Fwd tps held up by MG fire from North of the br over AQUALI River and LUPA and DASA occupied a posn on the South of the river. This br has been reported intact.
- 1645/16 Sig party from NEVI laying line between NEVI and WIVA reported that they were unable to establish contact because two villages on the route had been re-occupied. Otherwise posn unchanged.

WIVA COLN.

- 0140 Intense enemy traffic observed going East on rd RHARIFA-BEIT ED DINE-MOUKHTARA with lights. Twenty five enemy MP on rd MACHRHARA-JEZZINE coming West.

MONCOL.

- 2010 IBLES SAKI having been captured by the enemy MONCOL present line RACHAYA EL FOCKA incl KHIAM village, Northern edge of MERDJAYOUN with possibility of further withdrawal against attack being organised from RASHAYA EL FOCKA but not before daylight.
Unconfirmed report states seven tanks destroyed. Confirmed report one plane shot down by AA.
- 0845/16 Three enemy tanks attacked KHIRBE but were repulsed, two being destroyed by our A Tk guns.
Rd at 137152 demolished by POJO.
- 0932 Mortar bombing and LMG vicinity KHIAM FORT. No further fire from IBELES SAKI or RACHAYA.
- 0944 Mortar fire ceased.
- 1045 BIDA occupying RACHAYA EL FOCKA. Lt LMG from that direction. Our guns shelling MERDJAYOUN.
- 1118 Further mortar vicinity KHIAM FORT.
Enemy patrol engaged West of KHESSE. No other activity East of MERDJAYOUN.
- 1542 KHIAM FORT evacuated for demolition. Posn now held 300 yards South of Fort.
- 1710 B coy entered POSTE CHRISTOFINI last night. Slight resistance only from cav. NOT a gun area but an OP.
A coy and C coy recaptured KHIAM FORT and now hold.
C coy drove enemy from RACHAYA EL FOCKA towards FERDISSE.
Line BMERIQ-KHIAM FORT being consolidated.
Extreme right flank.

2040/15 The following sitrep was received from MILPAL:-

"5 Ind Bde captured TEL KISSOUE 0935 hrs.
Free French captured JEBEL ABU ATRIZ.
Collet apparently held up.
Enemy counter attacked on KISSOUE about 1400 hrs, reported held up.
TJFF at EZRAA were counter-attacked by Armd Cs, tanks and MT coln about 1400 hrs and withdrew to SHEIKH MESKINE which enemy may now have reached.
Believe enemy AFVs operating towards QOUNEITRA from NE.

1200/16 MILPAL report SHEIKH MESKINE still held by our tps.
Enemy cav reported East and SE of DERRAA.
Considerable bombing of DERRAA. Two enemy aircraft shot down.

Tac/R Reports.

0715 30 MET South of JEZZINE.
0716 20 MET South of 138184.
0720 60 MET South of 139192.

All above MET stationary facing South on rd making good use of overhanging trees for cover. Probably many more too well concealed to be seen from air.

0830-0940 Five MET unlike enemy, one trailing gun at 137180. NMS remainder JEZZINE and North BEIT ED DINE, West to DAMOUR and South to 192195.

Four MET 121193, one MET North 119190.
Fifteen inf East 117182.

NMS SAIDA, NMS SAIDA-JEZZINE.
1630 From 136159 to 145182 8 MET and 12 inf at 143173.
1645 From 154175 to 143164 NMS.
1700 From 136178 to 135195, 60 MT all types and 20 inf.
1715 From 135195 to 119187 NMS.
1730 24 MET going South from MERDJAYOUN.

RAF Op Summary up to 2000 hrs 15 Jun 41.

Strat/Rs were carried out in the DAMASCUS and KISWE area.
Tac/Rs carried out along the QOUNEITRA-DAMASCUS rd in search of reported AFVs.

The following fighter action was carried out:- No 3 RAAF Sqn (Tomahawks) made 30 sorties in the KISWE and EZRAA areas, successfully attacking five armd Cs and four tanks and shooting down two Glen Martins.

No 80 Sqn (Hurricanes) made 25 sorties over HM ships and over SAIDA and JEZZINE, destroying one JU 88 and damaging two more. Gladiators made sixteen sorties. Four Gladiators met twelve DEWOITINES, destroying one and damaging another. One Gladiator is missing.

Extracts from BF in P & TJ Daily Int Summaries No 7 and 8.

IRAQ. - Ops:

A reliable estimate of the strength of the forces operating under FAWZI KAWAKJI now places their numbers at about 500 men and 71 trucks. The discrepancy between this estimate and figures quoted in previous reports is probably explained by the irregular character of these forces, which are likely to vary greatly in strength from day to day. A report has been received that an envoy from FAWZI KAWAKJI has arrived in the British lines and that negotiations have begun.

SYRIA - Topographical.

Route MERDJAYOUN-SARHBINE-ZAHLE: At QARAOUN (146181) the rd crosses the LITANI river by a concrete br, which is believed to be prepared for demolition. On the North side there is a square approach, but on the South the rd bends sharply to the East with a gradient. 100 yards South of the bridgehead and approximately 40 yards West of the rd it is thought there is a single gun emplacement, probably containing a small calibre gun for defence against low-flying aircraft. Immediately North of the br is what appears to be a military stores dump.

Route NAQOURA-BEYROUTH: Br (124198), near the junc of the rd to BIT-ED DINE, is either stone or concrete. It is 120 yards long, including the approaches, and, at the narrowest pt, 30 feet wide. The width of the stream at this pt is 35 feet. The approaches are good, the rd being fairly flat on the South side.

General.

Rumours continue to be received of VICHY French reinforcements being sent from North AFRICA, and of French naval forces being on their way to SYRIA. While there is, at present, no confirmation, the enemy air force has been considerably reinforced.

IRAQ - Ops.

ABU KEMAL AREA. It is reported that VICHY French motorised forces in ABU KEMAL have now withdrawn. FAWZI KAWAKJI is also stated to have returned to MEYADIN. Local authorities have requested the British forces to occupy the town. There is still a French garrison which has not yet withdrawn.

VICHY FRENCH O of BY

A. JEBEL DRUZE.

4 Bn 16 Tunisian Tirailleurs
Five sqns Druse Cav.

B. DAMASCUS SECTOR.

3 and 4 Bns 6 Foreign Legion.
Two bns 29 Algerian Tirailleurs.
Two bns 17 Senegalese Tirailleurs.
5 Bn 1 Moroccan Tirailleurs.
3 Bn Levant Inf.
1 Gp 7 Chasseurs d'Afrique.
6 Chasseurs d'Afrique.
16 and 18 Sqns Tchekess.
One gp Partisans.
3 Lt Desert Coy.
Eleven btys arty.
Six 75 mm A Tk guns.

C. BEYROUTH SECTOR.

Three bns Colonial Inf.
Two bns Algerian Tirailleurs.
Two bns Senegalese Tirailleurs.
3 Bn Lebanese Inf.
Two sqns Syrian Cav.
Two sqns 6 Chasseurs d'Afrique.
One sqn 8 Algerian Spahis.
Five arty btys.
Four AA btys.

D. BAALBEK-TRIPOLI.

2 Bn 6 Foreign Legion.
One bn Colonial Inf.
Two bns Levant Inf.
One bn Syrian Inf.
Two btys 1 RAML.

E. LATTAKIA - HOMS.

1 Bn 6 Foreign Legion.
Three bns Levant Inf.
One Armd C Pl.
1 Coastal Defence Bty.
Three Foreign Legion Btys.

F. ALEPPO.

- 4 Bn Levant Inf.
- 4 Sqn Syrian Cav.
- One Bty 75 mm.

G. PALMYRE.

- Two coys 4 Bn 6 Foreign Legion.
- 1 Lt Desert Coy.

H. DEIR-EZ-ZOR - ABU-KEMAL.

- 6 Bn Levant Inf.
- 2 Lt Desert Coy.
- 2 Lt Mech Unit.
- 2 Gp 2 Levant Metropolitan Arty.

I. TEL KOTCHEK.

- 3 Bn 6 Foreign Legion.
- 8 Bn Levant Inf.
- 21, 23, 24, 25, 28 Lt Sqns.
- 5 Sqns Djezireh Cav.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary 21.

*RW Mill call
for Col.*

GS Aust Div Exporter.

C. BEYRUTH SECTOR.

- Three Bns Colonial Inf.
- Two Bns Algerian Tirailleurs.
- Two Bns Senegalese Tirailleurs.
- 3 Bn Lebanese Inf.
- Two sqns Syrian Cav.
- Two sqns 6 Chasseurs d'Afrique.
- One sqn 8 Algerian Spahis.
- Five arty blys.
- Four AA blys.

D. BALBEK-TRIPOLI.

- 2 Bn 6 Foreign Legion.
- One Bn Colonial Inf.
- Two Bns Levant Inf.
- One Bn Syrian Inf.
- Two blys 1 RAML.

E. LATAKIA - HOMS.

- 1 Bn 6 Foreign Legion.
- Three Bns Levant Inf.
- One Army C Pl.
- 1 Coastal Defence Bty.
- Three Foreign Legion Blys.

General.

IRAG - GDS.

VICRY BATTALION 0 of BK

A. LEBEL DREZE.

- 4 Bn 16 Tunisian Tirailleurs
- Five sqns Djeze Cav.

- 1 Col.
- 1 GS Aust Div Exporter.
- Two Bns 17 Senegalese Tirailleurs.
- 3 Bn 1 Moroccan Tirailleurs.
- 3 Bn Levant Inf.
- 1 Gp 7 Chasseurs d'Afrique.
- 6 Chasseurs d'Afrique.
- 16 and 18 Sqns Tchekkas.
- One Gp Partisans.
- 3 Lt Desert Coy.
- Eleven arty blys.
- Six 75 mm A Tr Guns.

2/16

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ Aust Div Exporter,
18 Jun 41.

INT SUMMARY No 24

(based on infm up to 1800 hrs,
18 Jun 41.

1. Ops.

NEVI COLN.

1300 Cav patrol at RAS NEBI YOUNES (119191) drove back enemy AFV patrol advancing down rd at 1200 hrs. Cav standing patrol now established at RAS NEBI YOUNES. Otherwise situation unchanged.

WIVA COLN.

A surprise attack by the enemy on the morning of 17 Jun failed and the entire adv gd was captured. Through the day the enemy poured men into the attack in small parties and it was assumed that their object was to surround and to attempt to infiltrate in small parties. During the night 17/18 Jun little activity took place.

2130/ Strong opposition from North. Identified three bns. Reinfts
17 asked for.

0715/ WUVI reported to WIVA.
18

18 Jun Enemy activity after daylight was light MG fire and intermittent shelling of approaches. Arty sniped at vehs entering JEZZINE. The enemy believed to have only three 4-gun btys but have ample amm. Reported enemy concentration two miles North of JEZZINE which may be preparation for an attack.

1005 Enemy shelling rd JEZZINE-SAIDA from BKIFA (128184) and MAZRAAT EB DEIR (129184).

MERDJAYOUN Area.

1800/ Report received that MERDJAYOUN FORT shelled intensely for short
17 periods during day, direct hits being obtained and a magazine blown up. Unconfirmed report states that one of the six tanks reported in the town has been knocked out.

0900/ Enemy still holding MERDJAYOUN FORT with our forces occupying
18 posns astride the main rds North and South of the town. MONCOL on the right has withdrawn from the KHIAM FORT and is occupying a line South of the fort.

1745 Posn at MERDJAYOUN and KHIAM unchanged.

Extreme right flank.

1240 Attack on MEZZE and DAMASCUS by ZOVA and KISA held up by shelling. Further attack on these objectives being prepared.

QOUNEITRA fell about 1830 hrs 17 Jun. The Queens attacked on the rd from the South with covering fire by our MGs on the rd from the br. All entrances to the town were closed after its occupation and a thorough search made for the enemy. Many of these, however, were assumed to have discarded their uniforms and to be wearing civilian clothes, which made identification difficult. The Royal Fusiliers in the town apparently had been evacuated early in the day and taken to JAZSSAA. Of the French arty some were 75 mm.

2. GENERAL.

Reliable infm reports that the French are issuing large numbers of rifles to villages in DAMASCUS area. Unlikely they will make use of them as they dislike the French.

A Polish deserter, wishing to join the Free French, was interrogated at this HQ on 17 Jun and gave the following infm:-

Unit: 9 Coy 3 Bn 6 Regt Foreign Legion.

The bn left DAMASCUS on 13 Jun and travelled by MT via main rd DAMASCUS-BEYROUTH to CHTUARA (162208) and then to KAHER MECHKI arriving 16 Jun. There his unit debussed and marched in two colns towards MERDJAYOUN:

(a) The right coln consisting of:-

Two coys 3 Bn
1st Bty Legion Arty (75 mm)
Four A Tk guns
15 tanks

moving from KAHER MECHKI-SOHMOUR-DEBBINE towards MERDJAYOUN.

(b) The left coln consisting of:-

One coy 3 Bn
5 tanks

moved via NABATT to rd junc approximately one mile East of MERDJAYOUN towards MERDJAYOUN.

Just prior to these colns coming into the area, two bns of Levanese inf used the same route towards MERDJAYOUN. After arrival in the area one sec, plus one mortar (63 mm) were sent to KHIAM. On the night of 16/17 Jun he deserted and travelling across country to the frontier he gave himself up to our forces at KAHER GILADI.

He also stated that in his bn there were approximately 150 Poles, the majority of whom would just as soon fight with the British as against them.

3. Tac/Rs.

0800 1 MET facing South 228268.
0805 3 MET 228277.
1 MET probably AMC 229284.
0810 19 MET mostly facing NE at X rds 234288.
NMS main rd from 234288 to 2 miles NE.
0815 NMS tracks SE from QOUNEITRA.
QOUNEITRA appears quite normal.
0820 5 MET. South 225278
0955 KARACOL area (124204). 3 MET stationary - no other movement.
YAROUTI-BEIT ED DINE NMS.
1010 BEIT ED DINE-BAROUK, 1 MET going West.
1025 BEIT ED DINE-JEZZINE, 40 MET stationary between BEIT ED DINE and 139192. 2 MET going North.
1035 Pt 146182 down track to 136158.
1045 MERDJAYOUN area. 30 MET 50 inf at 139163. 8 MET at 142160.
1050 About 20 MET at approximately 137152. 2 MET going SE direction QOUNEITRA.
1055 Our patrols of tanks on JEZZINE-BEIT ED DINE rd.

ACK.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary No 21.

Riv Camera Capt
for Col.
GS Aust Div Exporter.

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ Aust Div Exporter,
20 Jun 41.

INT SUMMARY No 25

(based on infm received up to 1800 hrs,
19 Jun 41.)

1. OPS.

(a) NEVI COLN:

- 0835 Fwd patrols fired on by MG in village QUADI EL ZEINI.
- 0845 Enemy MG post located 500 yards North of QUADI EL ZEINI in timber.
- 1345 Our patrols were held up by a rd block at rd junc near QUADI EL ZEIN, covered by MG fire from JADRA. When one of our tanks broke through the rd block, an A Tk gun hidden in bushes beside the rd about 20 yards away opened fire putting the tank out of action and killing one offr. A Bren carrier close behind opened fire on the bushes with a Boyes rifle, killing the gun crew and putting the gun out of action.

Part of LUPA is now attacking JADRA where a PW states there are 70 men, 4 hy MGs and 2 mortars.

1800 JADRA captured with A Tk gun and 20 to 30 PW.

(b) MERDJAYOUN Area:

0430 A and B Coys .MORO. attacked MERDJAYOUN from NW with arty support. Both Coys reached their first objectives on the NW edge of the village at 0530 hrs. A Coy continued to adv and occupied Western edge of village within approximately 600 yards of the fort where they were held up by French tanks (not certain whether 3 or 5).

0615 A Coy consolidating on line taken and awaiting sticky bombs.

1420 A Coy MORO entered the town. MG fire from SE of CASTLE HILL. B Coy MORO 2 pls in cemetery with two tanks endeavouring but unable to dislodge them. D Coy MORO at top of wooded gully in copse, were counter attacked but held out.

1500 HUTA attacked town from South and SW entering the town.

1525 Arty engaged KHIAM Fort and IBELES SAKI.

1545 VEPI received sticky bombs and sent them on to MORO.

Our arty engaged enemy tank clearing a rd block from rd to chalk pits.

1650 Enemy recce bombers and fighter escort at 23000 feet dropped leaflets on their own forces.

1755 Report from arty OP which went with some inf 500 yards into the town and sat on a roof top registering hits on exit rds. This patrol only met disultory MG fire.

1900 POJO reported situation unchanged.

(c) JEZZINE Area:

1740/ Eleven enemy planes bombed JEZZINE. Some damage done including
18 Hotel Egypt destroyed.

0900/ Our forces consolidated North of JEZZINE, otherwise posn unchanged.
19

(a) Extreme right flank:

The following sitrep received from BIPA:

"SOUEIDA Area: Local Jebel Druzes are reported to have surrounded Vichy French Garrison, EZRAA not occupied by either side. DAMASCUS Sector: 5 Ind Bde situation still obscure. MOUEDDAMIYE captured and rd to MEZZE opened. 5 Inf Bde believed now in MEZZE area. Vichy counter attack held on front of 13 FF Bde. Deserter reports general withdrawal from DAMASCUS in progress. No degree of reliability stated. QOUNEITRA area: Enemy MT coln still located five to ten miles NE of QOUNEITRA with rd block and armd Cs at 223287."

KAJU reports enemy colns which withdrew from QOUNEITRA composed possibly two bns and a few tanks still in existence. Although definite reports still lacking possible that it may reappear DAMASCUS sector.

2. PW statement - Coastal area 19 Jun 41:

Unit: 2 Bn 6 Regt Foreign Legion.

PW belonged to coy consisting of many Spaniards.

Bn stated to hold line YAROUTI-DAMOUR; evidently in depth.

PW statement - MERDJAYOUN area 19 Jun 41.

(a) One bn Tunisian Inf from ALEPPO and several tanks arrived in MERDJAYOUN last night.

(b) CHTUARA (161209) is a type of transit camp and that units moving from DAMASCUS and ALEPPO to MERDJAYOUN area have stayed the night there.

(c) That casualties to the Foreign Legion in action against our forces have been hy, one coy having 100 casualties and two other coys have only 20 men left in each.

(d) That the morale of those on the coast is low, particularly owing to our hy naval bombardment and to short rations.

PW reports the following defences at KHALDE, South of BEYROUTH as at Jan 41:

Four cement casemates covering approaches to BEYROUTH from the shore as well as trenches on other side of BEYROUTH, as precautions against attempted landings.

A bty of four 75 mm guns. Guns in front of the electric plant and one 25 mm A Tk gun between the village and BEYROUTH.

3. GENERAL:

The following extract from instns which were issued to all concerned by the local military comd at MERDJAYOUN were received amongst captured documents:-

"...I amplify my instns on the attitude to be maintained in the case of GAULLIST action already detailed verbally at the last conference:- FIRE WITHOUT WARNING on any body of individuals, no matter what their uniform may be, who try to parley..."

4. Identifications from PW 19 Jun 41:

In MERDJAYOUN 17 Jun 41:-

6 th Regt Foreign Legion.

3rd Bn No 1 Coy at MERDJAYOUN on the reverse slope of the town.

No 2 Coy in Fort.

3rd Bn No 3 Coy in res at KAIFR HOUN (may have been there prior to 14 Jun, not later as our tps occupied area on 14 Jun).

COUNEITRA area - 1st Bn, 6 Foreign Legion.

Near BEYROUTH - 2nd Bn, 6 Foreign Legion.

4th Bn on coast rd (severe casualties after SAIDA).

One bn Tirailleurs Tunisiens from ALEPPO in MERDJAYOUN area (possibly 16th Regt 3rd Coy).

5. Tac/Rs.

Sortie No 1. Report on air recce 0540-0610 hrs 19 Jun 41.

1. 5 stationary armd Cs observed dispersed at 242297.
2. 12 MET facing North dispersed 235289 - 239290.
3. 8 MET stationary, facing North 138162.
4. 138163 and track North 147177 NMS.
5. MACHRHARA and track West to JEZZINE, NMS.
6. 2 stationary MET at QUARAUOUN.
7. Track 147177 - KAIFR MECHKI 155175 NMS.
8. 3 MET facing SW at 152172.
9. 2 MET facing SW at 145164.
10. 15 large MET stationary facing NE with head of coln at rd junc 143163.
11. 2 MET facing SW at 140160.

Sortie No 2. Report on air recce 0545-0615 hrs 19 Jun 41.

1. No enemy aircraft on aerodrome or indication of attack developing at MEZZE.
2. 175186 to 197175 NMS.
3. 4 stationary MET at 189165.
4. 12 MET parked under trees at 184159.
5. Tracks leading North from DAMASCUS to SAIDNAYA - very badly defined, NMS.
6. SAIDNAYA SE to AABRA, NMS.
7. 100 MET facing NE, parked off rd between 206177 and 216183.
8. All tracks between main NE and main SE rds from DAMASCUS run through very close and wooded country, NMS on any of these tracks.
9. Rd DAMASCUS SE to KIJJANE, NMS.
10. No AA fire nor enemy aircraft was encountered.

1730 hrs to 1745 hrs:

1. 2 MET JEZZINE.
2. 4 MET 138183.
3. 12 MET 138188.
4. 2 MET 137192.
5. 10 MET BEIT ED DINE.
6. NMS BEIT ED DINE to BAROUK.
7. 2 MET YAROUTI.
8. NMS BEIT ED DINE to YAROUTI.
9. 6 MET 119187.

6. Royal Air Force Op Summary up to 2000 hrs 17 Jun 41.

HOMS aerodrome was bombed. A rly br 8 miles South of MEIDAN-EKBES on the TURKISH frontier was also bombed. Strat Rs were made over BEYROUTH and LATAKIA. Several Tac Rs were carried out. Tomahawks of No 3 RAAF Sqn attacked MT and tps at COUNEITRA. 80 Sqn carried out protective patrols over the Fleet.

Op Summary up to 2000 hrs 18 Jun 41.

A bombing attack was made on SUWEIA and pamphlets were dropped on EZRAA and BOURAQ. The military br South of MEIDENEKBES was again attacked and four bombs struck the rly. Close bombing sup was

given to our tps on the right flank. Destroyers were bombed in BEYROUTH Harbour where a near miss was scored. Recces were made of ALEPPO, HOMS, LATAKIA, BEYROUTH and RAYAK. Swordfish of the Fleet Air Arm made a moonlight swoop in search of shipping between BEYROUTH and TRIPOLI.

No 3 RAAF (Tomahawks) carried out a protective patrol over the SAIDA-JEZZINE rd. Gladiators patrolling over our fwd tps South of DAMASCUS shot down two Dewoitine fighters. An offensive patrol was carried out in the SAIDA area as a result of reports of an attack anticipated from infm from a reliable source. No interception was made.

ACK.

Pro Camera Capt
for Col.
GS Aust Div Exporter.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary No 21

plus 16 Inf Bde.
ADMS Aust Div Exporter.

[Faint, mostly illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. Some legible fragments include:]
Royal Air Force of Summary up to 2000 hrs 14 Jun 41.
On Summary up to 2000 hrs 18 Jun 41.
A bombing attack was made on SWIRIA and... were dropped on...
attacked and four bombs struck the city. Close bombing was again...
Tomahawks of No 3 RAAF Sqn attacked... and the...
carried out.
Great RA were made over BEYROUTH and LATAKIA. Several... were...
EXERS on the TURKISH frontier was also bombed.
HOMS aerodrome was bombed. A fly of 8 miles South of MEDAN-

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div,
21 Jun 41.

INT SUMMARY No 26

(based on infm received up to 1800 hrs,
20 Jun 41.)

1. Ops.

COASTAL Area - situation unchanged.

JEZZINE Area:

1615 Twin engined enemy bomber shot down by AA fire. Otherwise situation unchanged.

MERDJAYOUN Area:

2100/19 Enemy counter attacked with inf and tanks. MORO forced to retire to line of LITANI river. Enemy appear to have received reinforcements and tanks. Otherwise situation unchanged.

Extreme right flank:

SOUEIDA Area: No report.

DAMASCUS Sector:

On right flank 13 FF Bde attacked 1830 hrs 19 Jun but was not successful. VICHY forces still astride rd KISSOUE-DAMASCUS. On left 5 Ind Inf Bde occupied outskirts MEZZE by 0530 hrs. Civilian sources state guns and tps leaving DAMASCUS for posn 12 miles North. Tac/R at 0530 hrs reports 63 MT on rd 183184.

2. PW statement:

PW who surrendered vicinity MERDJAYOUN at 0500 hrs 20 Jun from 1 Bn 22 RTA stated:-

- (a) That 1 and 2 Bns 22 RTA left BEYROUTH by MT on 18 Jun, arrived MERDJAYOUN area same day.
- (b) The MT was immediately sent back.
- (c) 1 Bn 22 RTA went into res MERDJAYOUN area and took up posn in a fig tree grove on outskirts of MERDJAYOUN.
- (d) 2nd Bn 22 RTA went to KHIAM.
- (e) At 0330 hrs on 19 Jun the 2 Bn RTA plus 1 Bn Chasseurs Lebanese, who were already in KHIAM, were awakened preparatory to making an attack (presumably on 2/33 Bn).
- (f) Total units identified in area:-

3 Bn 6 Regt Foreign Legion.
1st Bn Tunisian Inf.
1st and 2nd Bns RTA.
1st Bn Chasseurs Lebanese.

3. TAC/R. 1000-1045 hrs:

5 MET North 137159.
5 MET South 144174.
At 142191 two tanks and 25 inf stationary.
158200 to 144174 - NMS.
124198 to 134195 - NMS.
134188 to 119188 - NMS.

4. RAF Op Summary up to 1900 hrs 19 Jun 41.

Bombing attacks were carried out against MT and tp concentrations at QATAWA. Leaflets were dropped on VICHY tps on the left flank.

A Strat R was carried out of BEYROUTH and TRIPOLI Harbours, petrol dumps at TEL KALAKH and RAYAK aerodrome.

Tomahawks and Hurricanes carried out protective patrols over HM ships and Gladiators patrolled over our fwd tps on the right flank.

R.W. Cameron Capt
for Col.

GS 7 Aust Div.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary No 21 plus DUEET. ADMS 7 Aust Div.

On right flank 15 FR Bde attacked 1830 hrs 19 Jun but was not successful. VICHY forces still outside rd KISSOU-DAMASCUS. On left 5 Ind Inf Bde occupied outskirts MESSE by 0530 hrs. Civilian sources state guns and tps leaving DAMASCUS for posn 12 miles North. TAC/R at 0530 hrs reports 63 MT on rd 183184.

- (a) That 1 and 2 Bns 22 RTA left BEYROUTH by MT on 18 Jun, arrived MERDIAVOUN area same day.
- (b) The MT was immediately sent back.
- (c) 1 Bn 22 RTA went into res MERDIAVOUN area and took up posn in a fig tree grove on outskirts of MERDIAVOUN.
- (d) 2nd Bn 22 RTA went to KHAM.
- (e) At 0330 hrs on 19 Jun the 2 Bn RTA plus 1 Bn Chasseurs Lebanese, who were already in KHAM, were awakened preparatory to making an attack (presumably on 2/33 Bn).

3 Bn 6 Regt Royal Tank Legion.
1st Bn Tank Legion.
1st and 2nd Bns RTA.
1st Bn Chasseurs Lebanese.

TAC/R. 1000-1045 hrs:

5 MT North 134158.
5 MT South 14414.
At 14151 two tanks and 25 Inf stationary.
158200 to 14414 - NMS.
14418 to 14418 - NMS.
14418 to 14188 - NMS.

RAP Op Summary up to 1900 hrs 19 Jun 41.

Bombing attacks were carried out against MT and tp concentrations at GATAWA. Bombs were dropped on VICHY tps on the left flank.

LUPA

SECRET

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div,
22 Jun 41.

INT SUMMARY No 27

(based on infm received up to 1800 hrs,
21 Jun 41.)

1. Ops.

Coastal Area: Situation unchanged.

JEZZINE Area: Situation unchanged.

MERDJAYOUN Area:

1015/ Shelling on Port KHIAM and BMERIC. Guns believed of greater
20 calibre than 75 mm.

Sporadic shelling during day on KHIRBE, LEAA and LITANI crossing.

1430/ Northern and Eastern slopes KHIAM RIDGE shelled.
20

Extreme right flank:

SOUEIDA Area: No report received.

DAMASCUS Area:

After savage fighting MEZZE was completely captured. Vichy counter-attack repulsed and 200 PW taken, including two cols.

The civil authorities surrendered the keys of DAMASCUS to the Free French, who now occupy the whole city and citadel with the sole exception of the barracks, where hand to hand fighting continues. Considerable casualties were suffered by both sides.

PEXO astride rd DAMASCUS-BEYROUTH, area 198176.

2. PW Statement:

An NCO PW, who surrendered in the coastal area from 2 Bn 6 Regt Foreign Legion, states very definitely that 30 German bombers with French pilots landed at RAYAK on 16 Jun. He also stated that enemy tps were very demoralised by our lt tanks which, from their height, they took to be 60 ton tanks.

3. Tac/R (1545-1630 hrs)

- 9 MT facing South MACHIRARA 143177
- 2 MT facing South " 155200
- 2 tanks (medium) moving West 156207
- 3 MT moving South 124198
- 3 MT moving South 129208

H. G. Lewis
for Capt.
Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

Distribution:

as per Int Summary No 21
plus ADMS 7 Aust Div.
DUET

SECRETAUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCEHQ 7 Aust Div,
22 Jun 41.INT SUMMARY No 28

(based on infm received up to time of production)

1. Ops.

Coastal Area: Situation unchanged. Normal patrolling only.

JEZZINE Area: Enemy shelling rds West and South of town.
Otherwise no change.MERDJAYOUN Area:OP from Fort KHIAM reports enemy are preparing defences and erecting wire East of the town. Otherwise no change.
No activity in front of our tps NW of MERDJAYOUN.Extreme right flank:DAMASCUS Sector. The following is copy of sitrep received at 1200 hrs 22 Jun 41:-

"Sitrep. DAMASCUS Sector. All resistance ceased by 1800 hrs 21 Jun and city is occupied by Free French. Believed formal entry of Gen Le Gentilhomme made last night but no official confirmation. Free French forces moved North to cover city and now hold BARZE 204180. DUET about 3 kilos West of KISSOUE. UPEF in posn near AARTOUZ protected by rd blocks. ZOVA about MEZZE with PEXO on DAMASCUS rd to North. Situation quiet but sound of hy shelling to West possibly on rd MEZZE-AARTOUZ. Coln from QOUNEITRA reached JAZSAA 177151 by 0945 hrs. After delay caused by large undefended rd block coln moved on and believed now near AARTOUZ. No casualties reported.

2. General:

Att as appx is a revised Vichy French O of B.

It is reported that the inhabitants of DERA'A are robbing anyone they come across be it Arab, British or Vichy soldiers. They are said to have collected a large quantity of French war material including 1500 rifles and 40 mules.

There is no confirmation so far of the report that the Druzes have rebelled and surrounded the Vichy forces at SOUEIDA.

3. Rd Recce: Route rd junc 12301604 to village of AD CHITE 12051571.
Ref Map BEYROUTH 1/200,000.

1. Recce of above rd was made on 21 Jun 41.

2. Notes with speedo readings:-

Speedo

68.65 At rd junc in NABATIYE (12591608)

70.65 Turn South at junc 12301604 towards HAROUF.

- 70.7 Dry creek crossing. Rd is very rough with natural stone outcrops and no gravel or binding. Blinding is available in small patches of cultivation on roadside. Width 10-12' speed 5-10 mph. Low gear is necessary for rough surface but grade not excessive.
- 71.1 Village of HAROUF 12231597. Alignment and surface still bad. Speed 5-10 mph.
- 71.4 End of village at watering well. Passing places available in village.
- 71.7 End of very steep pinch into village of JIB CHITE 12141586. Rd now 8-9' wide. No blinding and still virgin rock surface.
- 72.0 Down hill to creek crossing 12161575. Drainage is down centre of track. Width 10' with possible passing pts. Surface all needs blinding which is locally available.
- 72.3 Creek crossing 12161575. 15% grade up to AD CHITE.
- 72.5 Start of village AD CHITE 12041572.
- 72.6 End of trafficable track in AD CHITE. Beyond this pt track leads through AD CHITE and is not wide enough for motor vehs. Parts in village are 40% grade and corners are too narrow for turning of a veh. Beyond AD CHITE the track degenerates into a camel and donkey path, impracticable to MT.

3. General.

In its present condition the track as far as AD CHITE would be very difficult for tracked vehs and a 5-10 mph route for pneumatic tyred traffic. Blinding throughout is required. If a route South of AD CHITE is desired, widening of the present camel track to 10-12' wide with passing places, would need to be constructed. The country is limestone rock and all widening work would need compressors and explosives. By-pass AD CHITE also required.

ACK.

Time of production. 2200 hrs.

R. W. Cameron Capt
for Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

Distribution:

as per Int Summary No 21,
less DOXI
plus ADMS 7 Aust Div.
DUET.

VICHY FRENCH 0 of B.From infm received up to 1200 hrs 23 Jun.1. BEYROUTH - DAMOUR Area.

1/24 RIC Presume moved North from SAIDA.
 2/24 RIC " " " " " "
 3/24 RIC " " " " " "
 2 Bn 6 RLE Moved from BAALBECK 17 Jun.
 4 Bn 6 RLE " " " " " "
 HQ 9 RTA
 1 & 2 Coys 1 Bn 9 RTA
 17 RTS - 2 coys
 2 and 3 btys LE Arty Moved from SAIDA 16 Jun.
 6 Sqn 4 Spahis " " BEIT ED DINE.
 1 Bn Senegalese
 2/6 RCA (incl 15 tanks)
 Sqn 8 Spahis - Balance of
 Det 33 Engr Bn.
 Det 43 Comm Bn.
 4 AA Btys.

2. JEZZINE Area.

2 Coy 1 Bn 6 RLE Left HOMS 14 Jun.
 3 Coy 1 Bn 6 RLE " " " "
 2 Bn 17 RTS (less 8
 Coy casualties) " DAMASCUS 13 Jun.
 RLE Arty Gp - One Bty
 6 RCA - Some elements

3. MERDJAYOUN Area.

3 Bn 6 RLE From DAMASCUS 17 Jun.
 1 Bn 16 RTT Moved from BEYROUTH 18 Jun.
 1 and 2 Bns 22 RTA Note: 2 Bn KHIAM.
 1 BCL
 Det 631 Pnr Bn.
 Three btys arty.

4. COUNEITRA Area. (Formerly in) Present location unknown.

1 Bn 6 RLE Moved from HOMS 14 Jun.
 1 and 3 Bns 17 RTS
 3 BDL.
 60 MET.
 Small gp armd Cs.
 9 tanks (probably some captured and some knocked out).

5. DAMASCUS Area.

HQ 6 RLE Moved from HOMS 14 Jun.
 11 Coy 4 Bn 6 RLE
 HQ 10 North African Half Bde
 5/1 RTM.
 6 RCA - possibly one sqn incl 6 A Tk guns.
 Four btys - two 105 mm, two 75 mm.
 1 Gp Partizans.
 3 Lt Desert Coy.
 Three unidentified btys (one probably mountain arty 65 mm)
 Circassian Lt Cav - 16, 18 Sqn, one unidentified sqn.
 Portion 7 RCA.
 29 RTA, 3 Bn, 9, 10 & 11 Coys - 15 Jun 41.

3. SOUEIDA - EZRAA Area.

2 Bn 16 RTT.
11 Coy 4 Bn 16 RTT.
5 Coy 1 Bn RTM.
4 Coy 16 RTT.
Gp LE Dr (Druse Cav)
Six tanks
Fifteen armd Cs.

Moving East to SOUEIDA 18 Jun.

7. BAALBEK - TRIPOLI Area.

One Bn Colonial Inf.
One Bn Syrian Inf.
Two Bns Levant Inf.
Two Btys 1 RAML.

8. LATTAKIA - HOMS Area.

1 Coy 1 Bn 6 RLE
6 Coy 2 Bn 6 RLE
Three bns Levant Inf.
1 Armd C Pl
One Coastal defence bty.

Reported left for ?

9. RAYAK Area.

5 Coy 2 Bn 6 RLE

Moved 14 Jun from BAALBEK.

10. JEBEL DRUZE Area.

HQ 3 Bn 9 RTA
5/1 RTM.
4 Bn 16 RTT
One Bn 17 RTT
Druse Cav

From BEYROUTH 18 Jun.

Sqns moving to SOUEIDA.

11. ALEPPO Area.

HQ 16 RTT.
4 Bn Levant Inf.
4 Sqn Syrian Cav.
One Bty 75 mm.

12. PALMYRE Area.

15 Coy 4 Bn 6 RLE.
1 Lt Desert Coy.

13. DEIR ES ZOR - ABU KEMEL Area.

6 BDL.
2 Lt Desert Coy.
2 Lt Mech Unit.
2 Gp Levant Metropolitan arty.

14. TEL KOTCHEK Area.

8 BDL.
21, 23, 24, 25, 28 Lt Sqns.
5 Sqn Djezireh Cav.

VICHY FRENCH O of B.

From infm received up to 1200 hrs 21 Jun 41.

<u>Sector</u>	<u>Inf Bns</u>	<u>Cav horsed</u>	<u>Cav mech</u>	<u>Arty</u>	<u>+</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
BEYROUTH-DAMOUR	7	2	1	2 (fd) 4 (AA)	2 bns	2 sqns (H) 1 sqn (M)	
JEZZINE	2½	Unknown	Probab ly one sqn	1 (Fd)			
MERDJAYOUN	5	Unknown	Unknown	3 (Fd)	2 bns		
QOUNEITRA	4	Unknown	Probably one sqn	Unknown	1½ bns		Present loc- ations unknown
DAMASCUS	3	5	Probab ly two sqns	7	1 sqn (H)	1 bty (Fd) 2 bns	
SOUEIDA-EZRAA	2	1	1½	Unknown	2 bns 1 sqn (H)		
BAALBEK-TRIPOLI	4	Unknown	Unknown	2			
LATTAKIA-HOMS	3½	Unknown	1	1 (coast def)			
RAYAK	1 coy						
JEBEL DRUZE	3	At least one	Unknown	Unknown	2 bns	5 lt sqns	
ALEPPO	1½	1	1	Unknown			
PALMYRE	1 coy	1	Unknown	Unknown			
DEIR ES ZOR ABU KEMEL	1	1	1	At least two			
TEL KOTCHEK	1	5 lt sqns 1 ORD					

REBEL
ABU
KEMEL

MAJESTY'S

LUPA
SECRET

AL...
N-V24.VI.4.1
K/0800

(Lablest)

6

LET KOLCHER	I	I OHD adpa 2 JF				
DE	I	I	I	amo Vf Jena		
BV...ABE	I	col	I	UJKLOM UJKLOM		
VTEBBO	JF	I	I	UJKLOM		
TEBET DEBKE	2	one Vf Jena	UJKLOM	UJKLOM	and S adpa	2 JF
BVAUK	JF					
UJLWKLIV-HONS	2F	UJKLOM	I	det (over)		
BVAIBEK-LEIBOFF	2	UJKLOM	UJKLOM	S		
SOUEIDV-EXYVA	S	I	JF	UJKLOM	(H) I adp and S pna	
DVKVCOIS	2	2	adpa I amo JF adp		(H) I adp	and S (H) I adp
COJIEBVA	4	UJKLOM	one adp JF adp	UJKLOM	JF pna	UJKLOM adpa JF adp
NEBTVXOUM	2	UJKLOM	UJKLOM	2 (H)	2 pna	
TEBZIE	2F	UJKLOM	adp JF one JF adp	I (H)		
BEAKOALH-DVROUH	2	S	I	2 (VA) 3 (JF)	and S adpa	(H) I adp (H) adpa
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ON HIS

FROM THE RECORDS OF THE...

...

HQ 7 Aust Div,
23 Jun 41.

INT SUMMARY No 29

(based on infm received up to time of typing)

1. Ops.

Coastal Area: Posn unchanged. Normal patrols.

JEZZINE Area:

0945 Cheshire Yeo engaged by hy enemy arty fire.

1520 Coy-
2/31 Bn during attack on pillbox vicinity 139187 came under hy fire and withdrew to area 138185.

Reported enemy arty seemed heavier calibre to-day but not confirmed.

MERDJAYOUN Area:

0517 2/33 Bn attacked towards high ground NW from KHIAM and captured hill feature. KORR then continued attack in Northerly direction and captured hill feature about 138159. Enemy MG and arty fire hy.

1140 KORR last reported on high ground endeavouring to make progress towards IBELES SAKI but being shelled from IBELES SAKI, HASBAYA and RACHAYA EL FOCCA.

138158

1425 KORR on "pimple" endeavouring to make progress towards final objective but being held up by MG fire from spur to North. MG being engaged by our arty.

Extreme right flank:

DAMASCUS Sector. FF forces established posts RHAZLANIYE 218161 and KHANE AYACHE 222187 but forced withdraw several kilos from latter owing to water difficulties. Attack from BARZE 205180 successful and FF consolidated on high ground of CHARDI feature 206183. 5 Ind Inf Bde consolidating same feature astride rd DAMASCUS-BEYROUTH. 16 Inf Bde began attack 2000 hrs 22 Jun through QATANA towards rd junc 178181. It has been confirmed that Gen Gentilhomme entered town.

2. Tac/R. (morning 23 Jun).

184170 five MT stationary.

184181 to 188180 fifteen MT moving West.

179183 twenty MT off rd.

180188 thirty MT stationary facing North.

182191 ten MT facing North.

177186 fifteen MT moving West.

172191 150 MT on West of rd, possibly derelicts.

BEYROUTH-DAMASCUS rd no signs new defences.

MASNAA twenty MT moving West.

BAR ELIAS to 168200 twenty MT moving South.

CHTAURA no life.

ZAHLE to MERDJAYOUN and laterals East NMS.

ACK.

Completed 2030 hrs.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary No 28.

Pro Comd Lt Col
for Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

LUPA

The following is information of German attacks at
Corinth and in Crete.

PART 1 CORINTH.

1. About 0615 hrs 26 April an intensive low level bombing attack began over an area of about two miles in circumference on either side the bridge. About 0650 hrs this was accompanied by attacks with small cannon and M.Gs from fighter aircraft.
2. During the latter period about 2000 parachutists dropped into the centre of the area from a height of about 300 to 400 ft. The troop carriers arrived in threes at a very slow speed. Air attack in the landing area stopped but continued all round.
3. Parachutes were coloured white for personnel and grey black and red for stores. Parachutes appeared to have special device for rapid opening. Some parachutists carried red flags with a swastika in white circle for putting on the bonnets of captured vehicles.
4. The enemy were able to produce intensive small arm and mortar fire within the minutes after ~~ten~~ parachutes had dropped.

PART 11 CRETE.

5. Simultaneous attacks by parachute troops and gliders were made at 0800 hrs 20 May in the CANEA and MALEME areas. Attacks on RETIMO and HERAKLION were also made about 1615 hrs on the same date.
6. Parachutists landed well away from troop dispositions in some cases. In the CANEA MALEME area they covered an area 8 miles by 3 miles and numbered between three and four thousand. At HERAKLION and RETIMO the area was smaller but still a large one extending over several miles.
7. Parachutes were of three colours, white, grey-green, and brown. The proportion of white parachutes were approximately one in twentyfour. Personnel were carried in white and grey-green parachutes and stores in grey-green and brown. The average height of the drop was 300 ft. All parachutes had quick opening apparatus. Parachutists immediately collected their arms and knew where to go but those who landed in occupied areas had such terrible casualties that they hid and took no active part in the proceedings for several hours.
8. Arms carried on person of parachutists were an automatic pistol, four hand grenades, and a large knife. A proportion carried tommy guns strapped to their backs. All other weapons were carried in separately dropped containers which had to be located and opened, a process occupying several minutes. Those who landed further away prepared where possible runways for troop carrying aircraft. Light arty and armed carriers landed later in troop carrying aircraft.
9. Gliders were in tows of from two to five and carried twelve men with arms and equipment. Gliders landed anywhere where cultivation or barren ground existed and attacked weaker posts of defences. Some gliders and aircraft landed on beaches.
10. All attacks were preceded by dive bombing and machine gunning of A.A. and troop positions. Dive bombers pointed out our positions to the enemy troops.
11. Total parachutists landed was estimated for the first day as follows :-

CANEA 1890
MALEME 1770
RETIMO 1200
HERAKLION 2000.

PART 111/.....

PART 111 LESSONS

1. (a) Aerodromes being the enemy main objective they must be organised for all round defence (including pillboxes) specially as parachutists may drop behind defences. Defences including artillery must be in depth. Artillery in sites with cover proved more useful than those situated in the open with an all round field of fire.

(b) All ranks/^{of}all arms must be armed with rifles and bayonets and high proportion of tommy guns to protect themselves and, in the case of artillery, their guns.

(c) By day it should be easy to deal with parachutists, but it must be remembered that parachutists may land at night and secure an aerodrome. The main problem is to deal with the enemy air borne troops and as it is impossible to be strong everywhere there must be strong mobile reserves centrally placed, preferably with tanks.

(d) Defence must be offensive. Immediate action by mobile reserves is essential to prevent the enemy settling down and in order to secure quick action a good system of intercommunication is vital. Any delay may allow enemy air attacks to prevent movement.

(e) During the dive bombing phase A.A. and L.M.Gs should remain silent unless required to protect our own aircraft on the ground.

(f) A.A. layout should include dummy A.A. guns and alternative positions, and the positions of A.A. guns should be continually changed.

(g) Arrangements must be made quickly to render aerodromes liable to attack temporarily unfit for landing.

(h) Equally important to the quick action of the mobile reserve is the provision of fighter aircraft support, the existence of which might prevent any air borne landing from succeeding or at least reduce enemy effort.

Foregoing are interim lessons which may be modified as result of views of special interservices committee examining operations.

LUPA

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div,
26 Jun 41.

INT SUMMARY No 32

(based on infm received up to time of typing)

1. Ops.

Coastal Area:

Further adv was made this morning when 2/16 and 2/27 Bns occupied high ground running East from coast to KASSOUBA.

JEZZINE Area:

No change. Our patrols and arty harrassing enemy.

MERDJAYOUN Area:

No change. Enemy reported holding line astride rd from 140163 SE along fwd slopes to FERDISSE area and are digging in. A further 40 Circassians have surrendered.

Extreme right flank: Sitrep up to 1945 hrs 25 Jun.

DAMASCUS Area:

13 FF Bde entered DASTAL (239220) and have one coy on rd three miles South NEBER (231243). SAID NAYA (209135) has been occupied. 16 Inf Bde, with two coys 2/3 Aust Inf Bn on left, made slight advances only in centre and on left. 4 Fd Regt had five guns knocked out North of COL DE YAAFOUR (188174) by hy counter bty fire and withdrew to South. Hy arty fire also from rd block 185181. 2/3 Aust Inf Bn, less two coys, at QATANA.

2. Tac/R - 1200 to 1345 hrs.

Coast rd - NMS.
BEIT ED DINE - NMS.
BEIT ED DINE to 152172 - 12 horsed cav moving South.
HASBAYA to RACHAYA EL OUADI - 4 vehs moving South; 6 vehs moving North.
159176 - 8 vehs dispersed.
170196 - 4 vehs moving East.
178184 - 220 vehs well dispersed. Also digging in this area.

3. RAF Op Summary up to 1900 hrs, 24 Jun 41.

Bomber action - Two Albatrosses of 859 Sqn dive-bombed BEYROUTH Harbour at dawn. Hits on jetty, missing destroyer alongside. Three aircraft of No 11 Sqn bombed RAYAK aerodrome scoring direct hits on rail sidings and buildings. Seven sorties attacked Fort at SOUEIDA scoring three direct hits.

Fighter action - Five Hurricanes of 80 and 260 Sqns escorted Albatrosses above returning from BEYROUTH. Five Hurricanes of above sqns did Fleet protection. Four Hurricanes of same sqns did local defence. All the above made no interceptions. Ten Tomahawks of 3 Sqn did sweeps over RAYAK - no interceptions.

Recce - One Blenheim of No 11 Sqn - Strat/R of LATAKIA-ALEPPO-HOMS-TRIPOLI-BEYROUTH.

Additional bomber action - Three Swordfish of 815 Sqn dive-bombed BEYROUTH night of 23/24 Jun. One stick of bombs fell on jetty alongside a destroyer.

RAF Op Summary up to 2000 hrs 25 Jun 41.

Bomber action - Two Blenheims of No 11 Sqn bombed hostile bty NW of ADIMAS but no hits registered.

Fighter action - Tomahawks of No 3 Sqn made seven sorties as protective patrol over our tps at PALMYRA. Shot down three Potez 63s (confirmed) and one unconfirmed in air combat SW PALMYRA. Hurricanes of No 80 Sqn made eleven sorties in sweeps over RAYAK area - three interceptions.

Recce - No 11 Sqn reported little change in dispositions of shipping.

4. Enemy Armd Eqpt.

The following are notes on the composition of the enemy mech cav sqns:-

In Dec 40 68 Tank Bn was disbanded while at HOMS, and reformed as the 2 RDC (Regt de Decouvert et de Combat). Some two months ago the title was again changed to 7 RCA. It is not as yet known what organizational alteration these changes involved, but the present composition of this unit is believed to be as follows:-

HQ - 1st Gp - 2nd Gp

Each gp of four sqns of two tps. Each tp has 5 tanks (Model 35R) with a crew of two. Total number of tanks - 40.

Each sqn has in addition two recce tps of armd Cs. These recce tps are supposed to be composed of DODGE armd Cs and with a 37 mm gun and a 7.5 mm MG.

The orgzn of 6 RCA is thought to be similar.

Prior to the commencement of hostilities, the Vichy French were thought to possess 90 tanks (Model 35R) equally distributed between 6 RCA and 7 RCA.

5. WARNING.

A case has been reported of hostile armd Cs approaching a post under cover of a white flag, and then opening fire. All units are advised to take precautions against the repetition of such an occurrence.

6. General.

The following is the gist of a report from an offr who watched the German airborne landing on CRETE. During the first full scale attack, tps went into their slit trenches or other cover. They stayed in them until the strafe finished, under the impression that airborne tps could not land in that particular area while such intensive firing was going on. The offr noted, however, that for some time following the landing of a glider, one German plane appeared to be firing directly around it and he came to the conclusion that the Germans might at this critical juncture be using blank amn, a change over which could not easily be detected by our tps on the ground. The total immunity of a house in a small area which was being thoroughly strafed during a glider landing also aroused this offr's suspicions.

It is obvious that if defending tps can be induced to take cover during the actual landing of airborne tps, the task of the latter is very much easier; the use of blank amn if believed by those on the ground to be real, would have this effect.

The following infm has been compiled from recent reports received covering Enemy Air Tactics:-

1. It is reported from army sources that a single ME 110 circled slowly over our fwd tps recently and then emitted black smoke. Thinking the aircraft had been engaged and hit by one of our fighters, tps left their slit trenches whereupon the ME 110 dived, and carried out a MG attack.

(3)

2. After recent attacks on tps, German aircraft have flown at only 10 - 15 feet above the ground - below the angle of fire of AA guns and on several occasions hand grenades have been thrown from German aircraft.

Completed at 2000 hrs.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary No 30.

NW Cameron Call
for Col.
GS 7 Aust Div.

LUPA

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div,
28 Jun 41.

INT SUMMARY No 34.

(based on infm received up to time of typing)

1. Ops.

Coastal sector: No change.

JEZZINE area: No change.

MERDJAYOUN area: No change.

Extreme right flank: (sitrep 1200 hrs 28 Jun)

DAMASCUS Sector. JEBEL MAZAR front. Leicesters, Queen's and 2/3 Aust Inf Bn attacked 27 Jun. Two coys 2/3 Bn captured summit 179181. Queen's seized lower slopes same feature. Enemy counter-attacked successfully about 1500 hrs and forced our tps back to original defensive posn 188184-186181-182177. One coy 2/3 Bn failed to extricate itself. Northern area. FF Forces occupy QTAIFE and yesterday captured NEBEK. Otherwise no change.

2. Tac/R.

70 MT area rd junc 179184.

60 MT between 172191 and 174196.

35 MT moving on tracks and rd between HASBAYA and MASNAA.

3. RAF Op Summary up to 1900 hrs 27 Jun.

Bomber action: 45 (B) Sqn - Four Blenheims against bty and 200 MT reported area West of DAMASCUS. Bty not located. 2330 lbs of bombs dropped on MT but no hits observed.

No 11 (B) Sqn and 45 (B) Sqn sent five and four sorties respectively against same target, 4000 lbs GB and 690 incendiary bombs being dropped. Some hits obtained amongst MT, awaiting photographic result. 229 (TB) Sqn - One Swordfish sweep Vichy shipping Syrian coast North of BEYROUTH at dusk 26 Jun. Small merchant ship attacked with torpedo but no hit obtained.

Fighter action: 260 (F) Sqn and 80 (F) Sqn - Eleven sorties of Hurricanes over Fleet. Protective patrols and seven sorties on defence. No interceptions.

3 Sqn - Eleven sorties bomber protection. No interceptions.

Recce: One Hurricane 208 Sqn recce PALMYRA, REK SUKHANEIRABBA and JUFAA. One Blenheim of No 11 Sqn recce LATAKIA Harbour and rail movement ALEPPO. Returned with engine trouble. One Blenheim recce aerodromes HOMS, QUSEIR, BAALBECK, RAS-BALFBECK, TALIA, RAYAK and rd movement between HOMS and BAALBECK.

R.W. Cameron
for Col.

GS 7 Aust Div.

Completed 2000 hrs.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary No 33.

Reference paragraph 2.

Since this report was drafted Morrocan troops have been reported in sector (iii).

2/16

FRENCH TROOPS TO BE ENCOUNTERED IN THE FRONTIER AREAS.

1. The frontier area falls into four general sectors.
 - (i) JEBEL DRUZE - JEBEL TENF.
 - (ii) JEBEL DRUZE.
 - (iii) METULLAH - JEBEL DRUZE.
 - (iv) The coast to METULLAH (SYRIAN - PALESTINE frontier).

2. The Syrian native troops, particularly the native cavalry, do not form a very strong fighting force. The French colonial troops are fairly well trained, although the fighting potentiality of any detachment will depend on its officers. General speaking all troops are likely to obey their officers, whose personal sympathies are therefore important.

The Senegalese officers are the most pro-Vichy and anti-British. Their rank and file are stupid and obedient.

The Spahi officers are probably anti-de Gaulle, though not necessarily anti-British. Their troops are well disciplined.

In the North African infantry regiments opinion amongst the officers is believed to be fairly evenly divided. The same applies to the Moroccans, who have not yet been reported in the frontier area, and to the artillery. Discipline is probably fair.

The native Syrian regiments include some native officers, who are likely to put personal advantage before patriotism.

In the Druze cavalry discipline is not high. Whilst they would probably follow their officers, at least at first, it should be remembered that they have a traditional friendship with us. Their fighting value outside their own country is probably not high.

The Foreign Legion has a very high disciplinary tradition. The rank and file are of a higher standard of education and are drawn from many nations including a proportion of Germans. Here again they would probably follow their officers. If the latter were to decide on resistance the Legion would fight well.


The Bedouin Light Desert Companies are officered by Frenchmen of a high professional standard. In the rank and file tribal loyalty comes before loyalty to Syria.

3. Troops believed to be in the frontier area are as follows (see attached chart):

- (a) Sector (i). Light desert companies consisting of camel and mechanized detachments recruited from Bedouin and officered by French regular officers. Probably unable to put up any resistance against a well trained European force, but capable of countering weak raiding parties.
- (b) Sector (ii). Druze cavalry. Tunisian infantry.
- (c) Sector (iii) Syrian irregular cavalry have probably been withdrawn, and detachments of Syrian infantry (B.D.L.) may have replaced them. Tunisian infantry. Senegalese infantry. Foreign Legion. Chasseurs d'Afrique (mechanized, French and native).
- (d) Sector (iv) Native Syrian cavalry (Chasseurs Libanais). Algerian infantry. Tunisian Spahis.

31 May 1941.

DIAGRAM SHOWING TYPE of TROOPS on the FRONTIER G.S.I./130/1 31/May



G.S.I.-31.5.41-L.S.

animals.

Ajil became very wealthy and was more interested in commerce than desert politics at the time of his death. He died of heart failure on 13th November, 1940. It is doubtful if his son Suquf will be capable of maintaining the ascendancy of his family in the same way as his father.

(d) BENI SAKHR or SUKHUR. (Ahl Ash Shimal).

BENI SAKHR GROUP.

Tribes -	Beni Sakhr.	Shaikh Mithqal Ibn Faiz, and Haditha Al Khoraisa.
	Sirhan.	Shaikh Hindi Ibn Kiaiber.
	Isa.	Shaikh Mujhim Ibn Mahli.
	Sirdiya.	Shaikh Saud Ibn Fawwaz.
	Sherarat.	No important Shaikhs.

The Beni Sakhr number about 5,000 tents, of which about half belong to the Sherarat. The latter are a curious tribe not considered by the others to be of pure descent. They occupy a subordinate social position and are considered to be rather like gipsies. Though classified with the Beni Sakhr they are really clients to them. They migrate between the JAUF in winter and AMMAN in summer, usually near the Beni Sakhr. They are expert hunters of game.

The headquarters of the Sirhan tribe is at MAFRAQ, and they number only 400 tents. The Isa number 150 tents, and live from MAFRAQ to the east of UM AL JIMAL. The Serdiya number 100 tents and live near UM AL JIMAL.

(e) AHL AL JEBEL.

AHL AL JEBEL GROUP. These are the nomadic Arab tribes of the JEBEL HAURAN, now known as the JEBEL DRUZE. Before the Druze occupied this JEBEL in about 1080, the Ahl Al Jebel were lords of the mountain, they are now reduced to somewhat restless submission to the Druzes, to whom they act as herdsmen.

They are at feud, from time immemorial with the Ruwallah and the Beni Sakhr. They are formidable fighters on foot, and their native lava country in which they can defy the camel and horse charges of the desert tribes.

Relations with the TRANSJORDAN Government are excellent.

SETTLED TRIBES.

(f) DRUZE.

The Druze, whose leader is Sultan Pasha El Atrash of QURAYYAH used originally to live in the LEBANON. They have a mysterious religion, a mixture of Mohammedanism and magic. After the troubles between the Druze and the Maronites which resulted from the association of the French with the Maronites in about 1860, the majority of the Druze moved into the JEBEL HAURAN, now known as the JEBEL DRUZE. The latest census gives 53,334 Druze in LEBANON, and 79,428 in the JEBEL DRUZE.

Owing perhaps to the interest taken in them by the British Government, and the assistance they obtained from Colonel Churchill, British Consul-General at BEIRUT in 1860, when the Druze were attacked by the French, the Druze have always been well disposed towards the British. Before they could be induced to recognise the French Mandate in March, 1921, it was found necessary to concede to them a wide measure of independence under a Native Governor with a French advisor

/ The first Governor

The first Governor was Salim Pasha Al Atrash, and on his death in 1923, the elective Council of the Druze elected the French advisor, Captain Carbillet, as his temporary successor.

The first trouble between the French and Sultan Al Atrash arose in July, 1922, owing to a man accused of attempting to assassinate General Gouraud, having been seized and sent off under arrest when he sought asylum in Sultan's house at QURAYYAH. Sultan demanded his supplicants release, and when his demand was ignored, turned out his followers and successfully attacked and put out of action a French column of 3 armoured cars which was on its way to fetch the prisoner. He then took to the mountains until granted an amnesty by the French on the first anniversary of the declaration of independence.

The next trouble arose in April, 1925, when a delegation from the Druzes laid before General Serrail complaints against Captain Carbillet's tyrannous regime, and demanded a Native Governor in accordance with the 1921 Agreement.

General Serrail refused their demands, invited the five Chief Druze leaders to meet him in DAMASCUS, and had the three who accepted his invitation (Hamad Bey, Nassif Bey and Abdul Ghaffar) arrested. Sultan Al Atrash immediately mobilised his followers and commenced a most serious revolt. General Dentz, then a Captain, was political advisor to General Serrail at that time.

The campaign opened with a disastrous defeat of the French forces with heavy casualties, and the capture of French guns and ammunition. Further successes followed and by October the insurgents were fighting in DAMASCUS.

The sensational victories of Sultan Al Atrash, gave him as much prestige in SYRIA as Abdul Karim's victory over the Spaniards at ANWAL had given him in MOROCCO. He was joined by many outside his own tribe, and the French thinking he was supported in DAMASCUS by the Hizb Ash Sha'biya or Peoples' Party, arrested six of the party leaders. The President, Dr. Shahbandar, and the members of the Bakri family escaped to the JEBEL DRUZE, where a National Syrian Government was proclaimed.

Operations, which included the destruction of a great part of DAMASCUS by shell fire, lasted until 17th February, 1926, when the end of the insurrection was signalled by a proclamation of a general amnesty of all rebels who should surrender within a specified period, with 39 exceptions.

Sultan Al Atrash took refuge in TRANSJORDAN, and this is one reason why he is so well disposed towards us.

During these operations, Sultan's son, Zayd Ul Atrash, showed conspicuous skill as a commander.

Since 1926 the feudal community of the Druze, who have always proved difficult to control under every administration of SYRIA, have remained comparatively quiet. Of late there have been signs of restlessness amongst them. It was reported recently that one of the Druze leaders visited TRANSJORDAN with the intention of interesting the Amir Abdullah in a revolt in SYRIA. The Amir refused to give him an interview and he returned disappointed.

Reports from many sources indicate that the Druze are ready and willing to rise against the French with very little encouragement, and it is also reported that various political parties in SYRIA are in touch with the Druze with a view to a possible general rising.

The various leading families of the Druze are constantly at feud with each other, so it would be rash to expect the whole tribe to be pro-British. Sultan Al Atrash, Ali Beg Al Nejm al Atrash, Muhamad Izz Aldin Al Hajebi, and Ali Al Abaid of SUEIDA seem well disposed. Sheki Arslan, a Lebanon Druze, has long been in German pay, and is now believed to be in GERMANY. Adel Arslan of the

/ same family

same family is also certainly pro-Axis.

(g) HAURANIS.

The Hauranis, who inhabit the plain country known as the Mukra, West of the JEBEL DRUZE, are sturdy Arab peasant proprietors, among whom is a Christian minority belonging to the Syrian Orthodox Church.

Settlement in a rich agricultural region has improved their physical type, and they are taller and stronger than their bedouin cousins. They make good infantry, but will fight in no quarrel but their own. Living in villages they are vulnerable to reprisals and slow to commit themselves to revolt. They joined Zayd Ul Atrash in his advance on DAMASCUS in November, 1925, and there have been reports recently that exasperated by the conduct of the Senegalese troops in their area, the Hauranis are contemplating revolt against the French, but are too short of funds to be able to do much.

While little could be expected in the way of assistance from the Hauranis so long as the French remain masters of the situation in SYRIA, they would certainly be friendly towards any British troops operating in their country, and in the event of our taking the offensive with apparent success, they might give us active support.

(h) METAWALEH.

The Metawaleh are Shi'ah Mohammedans of Iranian origin. They are said to number about 200,000 of which 150,000 are located in the LEBANON. They are poor and despised by the Sunnis and Christians. They speak Arabic, but have little sympathy with the Arabs who regard them as bad neighbours. Their villages compare badly with the other villages of the LEBANON, but they have a rich and educated class which live in the larger towns. Ahmed Bey El Assad is said to be their leading chieftain.

They are said to be anti-Government and usually ready for revolt. In November, 1925, however, when called upon by Zayd Ul Atrash to join his raiding columns of Druze and Hauranis, they preferred to sit on the fence until they saw which side was going to win, and after the French counter-offensive started to succeed in December, 1925, they decided to keep the peace. Their attitude now is likely to be similar and little assistance can be expected from them unless we make a successful offensive movement.

(i) ISMAYLIYAH.

Are a small sect of the Shi'ah branch of the Mohammedan religion, from whom the Assassins were recruited in the middle ages. They number in SYRIA about 24,000. Their religious head is His Highness the Agha Khan, and his son Prince Ali Khan has considerable influence amongst them. They are reported to be poor and despised, but are very exclusive and were at one time a terror in the LEBANON.

They have kept quiet of late, but might be induced to help the British in operations in their country if they were handled rightly. They hate the Sunni Arabs so would have to be handled directly and not through their Mohammedan elements in SYRIA.

(j) MAGHARBEH (or MOGHRABI).

The Magharbeh of westerners are Moslems from NORTH AFRICA who began to migrate into PALESTINE and SYRIA early in the eighteenth century, when they came to a great extent to enlist in the Mercenary Infantry of the Turkish Pashas.

When the French conquered ALGERIA in the nineteenth century, a great many more arrived.

/The present leader

The present leader of the Magharbeh in SYRIA is the Amir Said Al Jazairli, whose ancestor was Abdul Qadir, who made his peace with the French after their conquest of ALGERIA.

Amir Said Al Jazairli is said to be a member of the late Dr. Shahbandar's Peoples' Party, of which he was offered the leadership but refused. He is apparently very pro-British, and would welcome a British occupation of SYRIA, mainly on account of bad treatment he has recently received from the French.

There is a Cavalry Regiment in SYRIA, enlisted from the Margharbeh, about 400 strong. The Commandant is Husni Beg As Zaim. This Regiment is reported to be in a rather mutinous state.

Ali Pasha Al Abidiyeh claims to be leader of the Magharbeh community in TRANSJORDAN.

(k) CIRCASSIANS.

(1) General History.

The Circassians, whose own name for themselves is Adighe, are comparatively new settlers in PALESTINE, SYRIA and TRANSJORDAN. They originate from the CAUCASUS, which lies on the Eastern shores of the BLACK SEA. For many centuries the tribes of the CAUCASUS were at feud with the people to the North of them, in what became RUSSIA, and wars were frequent.

The first real footing gained by the Russians in the CAUCASUS was not until the end of the Eighteenth century, and during the first half of the Nineteenth century they were constantly at war there.

In 1862, a large number of the Circassians were forced to migrate to BULGARIA and ROUMANIA, and in the war of 1877 the advance of RUSSIA into TURKEY again forced the people to move. These came to SYRIA and TRANSJORDAN where they were eventually granted lands by Sultan Abdul Hamid. The Treaty of BERLIN in 1878 gave an added impetus to this migration.

The Shabsough tribe was the first to leave, setting off by ship in 1878. En route a fire occurred on board and 700 lives were lost. Some fourteen or fifteen families eventually reached TRANSJORDAN, and founded the first Circassian colony in AMMAN.

In 1880, the first families of the Qabirtay and Bzadough tribes arrived, the former going to AMMAN, and the latter founding Wadi Sir village.

In successive years up to 1909, fresh parties of the Qabirtay and Bzadough arrived in TRANSJORDAN, and founded a Colony at JERASH, and built villages at NA'OUR and RESEIFE. The total number of Circassians in TRANSJORDAN is about 5,500.

In 1907 the Chechens, also from the CAUCASUS, arrived. Having left their native country in 1905 they lived for a year in ANATOLIA. The Turkish Government then offered them land in TRANSJORDAN, and they marched down by way of ALEPPO and founded villages at ZERKA, SWEILE and SUKHNE.

The only Circassian villages in PALESTINE are at KUFR KEMMA and REHANIYA. and the total number of Circassians in PALESTINE is about 900.

In SYRIA there are estimated to be about 15,000 to 20,000 in the following Circassian villages in the QUNEITRA district :- KHISHNIYE, FAZAR, JOUEIZA, BAREIKA, BIRAJAM, SELMANIYE, RUHINA, MUDARIYE, AIN ZE AN, MANSOURA, QUENETRA. There are also colonies at HOMS and ALEPPO, making some 40,000 in all in SYRIA.

In their early years of settlement, the Circassians met with

/ considerable opposition

considerable opposition from local Arab tribes, but by a judicious playing-off of inter-tribal enmities gained friends until strong enough to look after themselves.

(ii) Characteristics.

Being from the CAUCASUS, the Circassians are a fair-skinned race. Although Moslems they are by inclination monogamous. They are not particularly quick-witted, but are reliable, brave, good fighters, and very loyal to whoever they may be serving. They are industrious, and work hard on the land, their interests being agricultural.

Most of them are accomplished performers of the Circassian dance of which they are very fond. Their head-dress is the sheepskin Kalpack.

Their language is their own, and it is hard to say on what ancient language it is based since it seems to be like no other. Also the various dialects vary so much that a Qabirtay, for instance, cannot understand a Sheshan. An additional difficulty is that until very recently the language was not and could not be written. Writing, using Latin script, has now been produced in the last twenty years, but it is not at all widely known yet, even in the CAUCASUS and is not used in this part of the world. Most Circassians speak, read and write, Arabic.

(iii) Leading Families and Persons.

In TRANSJORDAN, the leading family is the Janbek family. They are influential, and members of the family hold posts in the Arab Legion and I.P.C.

In SYRIA, the leading men are Salim Zacheria Bzado of QUNEITRA, and Salim Fahmi Bzado of MANSOURA. The leading families are the Bzado, Qabirtay, Hatokai, Abzagh and Abaza.

(iv) Employment in the Forces.

In TRANSJORDAN, Circassians hold posts in the Government, Arab Legion and Transjordan Frontier Force. In the T.J.F.F. there are, at the present time, 263 Circassians.

In SYRIA, complete units of the local forces are formed of Circassians. These are known as the Groupement Cherkas, and it is believed that there are seven or eight Squadrons, all being Cavalry. They are armed only with rifles and a few L.M.Gs. and there is one French Officer per Squadron.

PART II.

NOTES ON NON-MUSLIM ELEMENTS AND RACIALMINORITIES IN SYRIA.

(a) The principal non-Muslim element in SYRIA are the Alawiyyin, the Maronites, the Armenians, Jews and Assyrians.

(b) ALAWIYIN (ALOUITES).

This is the French name for the sect that was formerly known as Ansariyah or Nusairiyah. They are probably indigenous, and are believed to be still pagan in religion.

Turkish administration had only been intermittently effective over the Ansariyah of the coastal range, North of the LEBANON, and as infidels and wild highlanders they were alternately repressed and neglected under the Ottoman regime.

At first they offered a violent resistance to the French, but when the French created the Alawi State, capital Latakia, with frontiers which gave 150,000 Alawiyyin the predominance over 100,000 members of other communities, the Alawiyyin became devoted adherents of FRANCE. This was the more whole-hearted as, unlike the Maronites, they had no previous expectations against which to measure French performance.

The latest report on the attitude of the Alawiyyin is that "they remain comparatively quiet and desire neither the infiltration of Syrian Nationalist ideals, nor do they desire the continuation of French domination".

Some of them regard TURKEY as their national ally, and a fairly strong propaganda is afoot for joining the Alawi State to TURKEY.

Latest census give their number as 274,486 in SYRIA, and 6,000 in LEBANON.

(c) MARONITES.

Are Arab Christians, the latest census gives their numbers as 227,000 in the LEBANON, and 11,000 in the rest of SYRIA.

The sect was originally Monothelite, but is now in communion with the Roman Catholic Church.

There are Maronite colonies in EGYPT, WEST AFRICA and North and South AMERICA.

Prior to 1840, the Maronites and the Druze lived together in the LEBANON on fairly good terms, though the numerical superiority of the Druze gave them the advantage, and the Maronites had to be careful in their attitude towards them.

Early in the Eighteenth century, the Maronites came under French influence, and confident of the protection of their French friends, the Maronites became less obsequious than they had been towards their Druze neighbours. Their change of attitude together with fear as to what this foreign protection might lead caused the Druze enmity towards the Maronites which came to a head in 1840 in violent encounters and massacres of the Maronites which lasted intermittently for years.

The French sent a military expedition to SYRIA in 1860, and drove

/ the majority of the

the majority of the Druze out of the LEBANON, since which time the Maronites have virtually controlled the district.

When the French took over the Mandate for SYRIA, the Maronite community was the nucleus round which the LEBANESE national movement formed, and though they have not perhaps received all that they expected from the French, they have naturally been staunch supporters of the Mandatory Power.

After the collapse of FRANCE, the Maronites showed great anxiety as to their future. Being in communion with the Church of ROME, it was natural that some at least should look with favour on the arrival of the Italians. A pro-Italian party was organised, and the Maronite Bishop of BEJRUT, Ignatius Mubarak, was reported to be pro-Italian and an influential member of the party.

The Maronite patriarch, Anton Arida, is reported, however, to have refused to pay his respects to the Italian commission and to have reaffirmed his unshaken loyalty to the French. Later he is reported to have realised that the future of SYRIA no longer depended on the French and to be now looking towards BRITAIN for support.

A political party, called the Hizb El Dasbouri, is the political and temporal instrument of the Maronites. It is led by Sheikh Bishara El Khouri who is assisted by Bishop Abdullah, said to be a very astute ecclesiastic.

The policy of this party is to seek support from GREAT BRITAIN, though some would have preferred Catholic ITALY. The influence of Nazi GERMANY on the latter country has, however, caused her to be mistrusted. The party are said to be willing to agree to the union of the LEBANON with SYRIA, provided GREAT BRITAIN will guarantee to protect Lebanese and particularly Maronite interests.

(d) ARMENIANS.

(i) Estimated numbers of Armenians are :-

SYRIA (Armenian Orthodox)	113,000.
(Armenian Catholic)	18,000.
PALESTINE	7,000.
TRANSJORDAM.	1,000.

In SYRIA they are scattered but most of them are in the ALEPPO area. In PALESTINE they are mostly in JERUSALEM and JAFFA, and in TRANSJORDAN, mostly in AMMAN.

/the

(ii) Tradition and/history of the last 50 years have made all Armenians pro-British and French. The policy of the Armenian Church has always been democratic and the principals of Fascism and Communism are equally repugnant to them. In SYRIA there have also been and there still exist close ties between the Armenians and the U.S.A. These ties are educational, financial and personal, and arise out of the work done by the American Relief and other organisations at the end of the last war. The Armenian Protestants are closely linked with the American Church, most educated and therefore influential Armenians have been educated in American Missionary Schools or the American University in BEIRUT, Nearly all Armenian teachers are American educated and receive pay from U.S.A. and many families have some relatives in the U.S.A. The influence of the Armenian Church is dominant amongst most of the uneducated peasant class, and therefore the bulk of the Armenians in SYRIA are definitely pro-British though their influence is small.

The Armenian Roman Catholics are the only important body of Armenians that could be made pro-Axis under Papal and Maronite influence, but there is no evidence as yet in support of this.

Naturally there exist unemployed and disgruntled men with some

/ education who would, ...

education who would, for financial gain, advocate any policy that suited them. It is thought that these professional agitators, though they may be vocal, would exercise little influence.

The political parties are:-

(a) Dashnaktsagans (Socialist - Revolutionaries).

They constitute the principal party, but are not really important as the bulk of the Armenians pay little or no attention to Armenian politics or politics of any sort for that matter. They are very anti-U.S.S.R. as they were expelled from SOVIET ARMENIA for being too "bourgeois" and have also been expelled from the Third International. They have always been very anti-Turk as well. Recently there has been a split in the Party in SYRIA on the criticism of anti-U.S.S.R. propaganda. One group contends that destructive criticism of the U.S.S.R. is a waste of time and can only serve to exacerbate the Russians to their detriment in the U.S.S.R. The rest are not prepared to alter their policy and this split is said to have weakened whatever little influence the party ever had.

(b) Huntehakians (Social - Democrats).

They are moribund and inactive and have little influence at all.

The main factor governing the Armenian attitude in SYRIA is the Arab attitude. It has been the policy of the Armenians for the last twenty years to side with the Arabs. This policy has been dictated by the numerical superiority of the Arabs and the fear that in any eventual communal strife, the French would be unable to protect the Armenians adequately. The Armenians would be unable and unlikely to oppose the Arabs.

(iii) PALESTINE.

The Church is the dominant factor and refuses to recognise the Dashnaktsagans who have, however, obtained recognition from the Palestine Government by disguising themselves as the "Armenian Red Cross Society" and the "Armenian Educational Society".

(iv) TRANSJORDAN.

The Armenians are very few numerically, and extremely pro-British. They are happy and prosperous in TRANSJORDAN and attribute the good treatment they receive to British influence.

PART III.

NOTE ON THE PEOPLES OF THEJEZIRAH.

(a) Al JEZIRAH is "the island" between the two rivers the TIGRIS and EUPHRATES.

For many decades the principal occupants of this region have been a number of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes.

The great Shammar tribe is the most powerful with some 2,400 tents. Less important tribes are the Abu Khamis, Agaidat, Jabur, Baggara, Afadli, Walidi (Wulda), and Abu Sha'ban.

In addition to the Arabs, there are Kurds, Yezidis and Circassians, while there has recently been established a colony of Assyrians on the Khabur River.

(B) KURDS.

(i) General. The Kurds are said to be an Aryan race, but the name covers a heterogeneous collection of tribes, which include a considerable admixture of other races as Aramaean, Arab, etc.

Kurds are found in SYRIA, TURKEY, IRAQ and IRAN.

(ii) Kurds in the JEZIRAH. Those living in the JEZIRAH were at one time more or less under the influence of the Milli Kurd confederacy whose headquarters is at VERAN SHAHR, and in the days of Ibrahim Pasha Milli towards the end of the last century they gave him some assistance in his struggle with the central Turkish Government. Since the division of the country between TURKEY and the French, this influence has become much less.

Immediately East of the EUPHRATES there are two small tribal confederacies, approximately North of a line from URFA to BIRIDJIK are the Beshki, and South of this line in an area roughly URFA - BIRIDJIK - SERRIN - KULTEPE are the Berazi. The latter tribe occupies land both in TURKEY and SYRIA on either side of the artificial frontier formed by the ALEPPO - BAGHDAD railway. For this reason they are the first tribe in the JEZIRAH with which contact is likely to be made by troops based on the railway.

The nominal head or Rais El Berazi is the Agha of the Allaudin sub-tribe. Mustapha Ibn Shahin whose brother Bozan Ibn Shahin is also influential. They live at MAQTELE, close to ARABPUNAR railway station.

The Shahins have a blood feud with another sub-tribe within the Berazi confederacy, the Khetkhan whose Agha is Basrowi of MAZRAAT SOUFI, about 10 miles due South of ARAB PUNAR railway station.

Such is the influence of this feud that the whole confederacy is divided into factions over it, one supporting Basrowi and the other the Shahins. In almost each sub-tribe, of which there are about eight in the confederacy, there is a pro-Basrowi and a pro-Shahin faction. The result is that whatever line is taken by the Shahins or Basrowi, the other faction is certain to oppose it. In 1918, when a British force first came to this district, the fact that the A.P.O. at Brigade Headquarters was friendly with Basrowi seriously prejudiced our relations with the opposing faction, and it took time and tact to get them to co-operate with us.

/ Characteristics.

Characteristics.

The Kurds are a sturdy capable race and though said to lack the intelligence, subtlety and imagination of the Arab, they are more industrious and capable workers. They are quick tempered, but generous and hospitable to a degree that is at times embarrassing.

Normally extremely taciturn, the Kurd is reported to be somewhat dense and lacking in humour. This is not apparent among the Kurds of JEZIRAH.

The feudal spirit is very strong, and the tribesmen will readily take up arms at the word of his chief. He is even more callous and reckless in taking human life than the Arab, and is capable of extreme brutality.

So far as they have definite religious views, they are orthodox Sunni Mohammedans, but though each village will include certain deeply religious men in their religion is not very strictly observed by the majority. Women are most of treated with more respect than amongst the Mohammedan races.

The tribal Chief among Kurds is called Agha. The title "Sheikh" being given to religious leaders.

Though usually belonging to the tribe, and elected on his death from amongst the sons or close relations of the last Agha, the Agha is not always of the same stock as the tribesmen. One Agha of a sub-tribe of the Berazi is an Albanian, while some others were important local men who were appointed Agha through the influence of the Turkish Government.

When this occurred it usually divided the tribe into followers of the new Agha, and those who accepted the leadership of the son of the late Agha.

The Kurds in the JEZIRAH live in houses during the winter and tents during the summer. It is suggested that the fleas drive them out of their houses in warm weather, certainly they do not move far from their villages when they move out into their tents.

They have a good supply of horses and can turn out a considerable number of mounted fighting men. They are reported to have better staying powers than the Arabs in a fight, but under modern conditions their value is negligible unless enlisted in regular units.

Saladin, who fought Richard Coeur de Lion, was a Kurd, and Bastawi of the Khetkhan claims to be his descendant.

(C) ASSYRIANS.

The Assyrians, sometimes known as Turkish Nestorians, claim descent from the Assyrians who ruled the land of the two rivers some 4,000 to 5,000 years ago.

Ethnologically they appear to be of various types, possibly Turanian, Mongol and Aramaean, but they are all bound together by their religion which is Christianity of a form inclined to Protestantism.

Prior to the war of 1913 - 1918, they lived in an area stretching N.E. from AMADIA to LAKE URMLIA, and though their form of Government was practically autonomous, they were nominally Turkish subjects.

When the Grand Duke Nicolas advanced to ERZERUM in 1915, the Assyrians raised the standard of revolt and joined forces with the Russians. When the Russians withdrew after the the revolution, the Assyrians fought their way through to join the British forces in MESOPOTAMIA, arriving there about the time of the Armistice.

They were supported in refugee camps by British funds until

/ arrangements

arrangements could be made to place them in villages, and men of military age were enlisted in battalions of Levies under the R.A.F.

It was natural that they should regard the British as their protectors, and that a certain arrogance based perhaps on this feeling of protection should have antagonized the Muslim Iraqis.

When British protection was withdrawn, they suffered considerable hardship in IRAQ, and a massacre took place on 1st September, 1933, at SIMEL, N.W. of MOSUL. As a result of enquiries which took place after this incident, the French Government in SYRIA offered to place land on the KHABUR RIVER in the JEZIRAH at their disposal, and there is now a colony of some 12,000 settled in villages along the KHABUR RIVER.

A French Officer, Captain Vuilloud, put in charge of the colony took a real interest in their welfare, and they now have well found villages surrounded by cultivated land watered by a good system of pumps from the river.

They keep much to themselves, and what their position would be if the French left SYRIA is uncertain. The original inhabitants regard them with something of the same feeling with which the Palestine Arab regarded the early Jewish colonists, and are inclined to envy them their better villages and better methods of cultivation.

Most of the men have received military training in Levy Battalions in IRAQ, but are reported to be uneager to fight again for any cause but their own. Though they owe gratitude to the British, they feel that they were finally let down. Their original friendship with RUSSIA has been revived and they might, under certain circumstances, prove fruitful soil for communist propaganda.

Their religion, which has a considerable hold on them, would be the best safeguard against communism, but at present the Mar Shimun, their religious leader, is a refugee in CYPRUS, and not permitted to visit the Assyrian Colony in SYRIA.

(D) YAZIDIS.

The Yazidis are probably of Kurdish origin, and they speak a dialect of Kurdish.

They form a very distinct group owing to their peculiar religion which has cut them off from their neighbours and caused them to be feared and disliked by both Moslems and Christians. They are called Devil worshippers because while believing in a good and a bad power, they consider it wise to conciliate the latter. Being disliked by and cut off from their neighbours, they turn naturally to foreigners for friendship and protection.

They have always appeared pro-British, and they sheltered a number of Christian refugees during the war 1914 - 1918. However, during the trouble of 1933, they assisted the Arabs and Kurds in the looting and destruction of Assyrian villages.

Their principle shrine is at SHEIKH ADI, 27 miles N.N.E. of MOSUL. The Yazidis tribes stretch from the Shaikhan District, North East of MOSUL to the JEBEL SINJAR, and so they are partly in IRAQ territory and partly in French SYRIA.

They have at times incurred the suspicion of the Iraq Government who believe that they play a double game with the two Governments under whose administration they fall.

They are a settled agricultural people in the plains, but maintain a tribal organisation in the JEBEL SINJAR. Though those in the JEBEL are somewhat wilder and may indulge in desert raiding, the Yazidis as a whole are quiet, peaceful, law-abiding people, but with little intelligence and low standards of education and morality. Those enlisted in the IRAQ Army appeared to be of good solid type and became good rifle shots.

SYRIA - GEOGRAPHICAL.

- I. SYRIA is divided into four districts.
1. THE LEBANON, bounded on the South by the PALESTINE - SYRIA frontier, on the East by the HERMON (JEBEL ES SHEIKH) - ANTI LEBANON range, and on the north by the road TRIPOLI - HOMS.
 2. SOUTH SYRIA, bounded on the SOUTH by the SYRIAN - TRANSJORDAN and SYRIAN - IRAQ frontiers, on the Northeast by a line in the desert which follows the curve of the EUPHRATES and lies about 70 miles to the Southwest of it, and on the West by the boundaries of LEBANON and the ALAOUTES. This area includes the two districts of the HAURAN and the JEBEL DRUZE.
 3. NORTH SYRIA, bounded on the South by the SOUTH SYRIAN border, on the East by the IRAQ frontier, on the North by the TURKISH frontier and on the west by the ALAOUTES frontier. The Western portion is known as NORTH SYRIA proper. and the Eastern portion as the JEZIREH.
 4. ALAOUTES, bounded on the South by the LEBANON, on the East by SOUTH SYRIA and on the North by the TURKISH frontier (HATAY).

II. THE LEBANON.

1. MOUNTAINS. The whole region is mountainous, and falls into two main ranges, the LEBANON and the ANTI LEBANON, separated by the BUKAA plain in the South and the BAALBEK plain in the North. The highest points of both ranges are towards the North and the elevation gets less towards the South. The ANTI LEBANON is more barren and thinly inhabited than the LEBANON. The highest mountain is MOUNT HERMON (9,000 Feet).
2. PLAINS.
 - (a) Coastal strip running from KASMIYE to TRIPOLI is very rich in cultivation.
 - (b) BUKAA, traversed by the LITANI river. Soil very fertile and water plentiful. In certain places it is very marshy.
 - (c) BAALBEK PLAIN. Very fertile with a rich red soil. This plain is watered by the upper reaches of the ORONTES river.
3. RIVERS.
 - (a) LITANI (LEONTES) RIVER, rises in the LEBANON mountains North of BAALBEK and flows Southwards until it reaches the latitude of TYR when it turns Westward through a gorge whose sides are in some places more than 100 feet high.
 - (b) ORONTES RIVER (NAHR LEL ASI), rises North of BAALBEK and flows through HOMS and HAMA, thence through a narrow rocky gorge to the Northern extremity of the ANSARIE range when it passes sharply to the West through the plains of ANTIOCH.
 - (c) NAHR EZ ZAHRAN, rises in the MERDJAYOUN area and flows through a narrow gorge to the sea South of SAIDA.
 - (d) NAHR BEIRUT, rises in the HAMANA area and flows through a deep gorge to the sea at BEIRUT.
 - (e) NAHR EL KELB (DOG RIVER), rises in the AIN KAREM area and flows through a deep gorge to the sea at MAR YUSSUF.
 - (f) In addition there are numerous other small streams flowing Westwards from the LEBANON which go through deep gorges and are considerable streams when in spate.

4. TOWNS

- (a) TYR. A decayed fishing port on a sandy island. Population 5,240, roughly half Shiite Moslems and half Christian.
- (b) MERDJAYOUN. 780 metres altitude. 2,532 inhabitants, mostly Christian. Maintains a considerable garrison.
- (c) SAIDA. Small port, surrounded by a fertile district. Population 11,276, majority Sunnite Moslems.
- (d) BEIRUT. Residence of the French High Commissioner, and also administrative centre of LEBANON. Its harbour facilities are the most extensive on the SYRIAN coast. Considerable French garrison regularly maintained.
- (e) RAYAK. Military station at the junction of the broad gauge ALEPPO railway line with the narrow gauge BEIRUT - DAMASCUS line. It is of considerable strategic importance, a garrison is always maintained there, and it is the Headquarters of the French Air Force in SYRIA. The aerodrome is the largest constructed aerodrome in SYRIA, and planes of any size can land there.
- (f) BAALBEK. Situated between the fertile plain of the BUKAA and the plain watered by the upper reaches of the ORONTES. Population 5,000 majority Moslems.
- (g) TRIPOLI. A town of 33,000 inhabitants, mainly Moslems. The port is not comparable with that of BEIRUT, but it affords a good anchorage. It is the North-western terminus of the KIRKUK Pipe Line.

III. SOUTH SYRIA

1. MOUNTAINS.

- (a) THE ANTI LEBANON. (See para. II, 1 above.)
- (b) THE JEBEL DRUZE. This is a mountainous area, and for administrative purposes is regarded as separate from SOUTH SYRIA. It is inhabited mainly by Druzes. It is a volcanic massif, rising at its highest point 5,910 feet above sea level. The top of the mountain forms a vast plain from which emerges a series of broken cones with old volcanic craters on their summits. The ground is covered with blocks of basalt which makes cultivation difficult, but the soil is enriched by volcanic debris and is very productive. The principle crops are wheat, barley and peas. Around SUWEIDA and some of the other villages are extensive vineyards and a certain number of fruit trees. There is a scarcity of water in the mountain, and in the South there are hardly any springs. In recent years a proper water supply system for the town of SALKHAD has been built by the French. Water cannot be relied upon in many of the villages in summer. Communications are difficult in this area, and this has enabled the inhabitants to resist central authority with a good deal of success on several occasions.
- (c) THE LEGA. This is a huge lava belt lying Northwest of the JEBEL DRUZE, and is 26 miles from North to South and 20 miles from East to West. The whole area is impassable to M.T. and practically impassable to cavalry, and the tracks through it are tortuous and difficult. There are occasional deposits of rich soil in depressions between the volcanic lakes and these are cultivated by the inhabitants. Owing to its inaccessibility the LEGA from time immemorial has been refuge of desperate characters.

2. PLAINS.

- (a) East of a line JEBEL DRUZE - HOMS - HAMA the country is a desert, /although it is not particularly

although it is not particularly flat. When there is no rain the going is good for M.T. almost anywhere in this area. Aircraft can also land at most places. After rain the area is impassable for M.T. until it dries up again.

- (b) THE HAURAN. This area is bounded on the South and West by the PALESTINE - TRANSJORDAN frontiers, on the East by a line SUWEIDA - DAMASCUS and on the North by MOUNT HERMON. The plain is very fertile and produces wheat, but there is in general a shortage of water. The chief towns are KUNEITRA, SHEIKH MISKAINA, and DERA. There is a satisfactory water supply at these points.

3. RIVERS.

- (a) YARMUK. This river flows into the JORDAN at JISR ESSAGHIR. Where it flows along the TRANSJORDAN frontier it goes through a deep gorge which cannot be crossed by tanks.
- (b) There are other rivers and water courses in the area which are considerable streams when in spate, but dry up in the summer.

4. TOWNS.

- (a) DERAA. Junction of the HAIFA - DAMASCUS and DAMASCUS - AMMAN railways. 528 metres high. 6,500 inhabitants, mostly Sunnite Moslems. It is a place of considerable local importance.
- (b) SUWEIDA. Capital of the JEBEL DRUZE. 920 metres altitude. 4,725 inhabitants, nearly all Druzes.
- (c) KUNEITRA stands at the junction of the SAFAD - DAMASCUS and the SUWEIDA - SAIDA roads. Some fortifications erected by the French. Centre of CIRCASSIAN settlements. The inhabitants of the village are mostly Circassians.
- (d) DAMASCUS. Ancient administrative capital of the TURKISH province of SYRIA, and seat of Moslem learning second in importance only to EL AZHAR at CAIRO. A chain of hills on which there are some old forts manned by the French dominate the city from the North. From DAMASCUS roads branch North to ALEPPO, East to RUTBA and BAGHDAD, Southwest to HAIFA and West to BEIRUT. Its only railway communication is the narrow gauge HLJAZ railway which connects with the broad gauge railway at RAYAK. The outskirts of DAMASCUS on the South are fertile and well watered and there are many gardens and orchards.
- (e) PALMYRA. A desert town on the TRIPOLI - KIRKUK Pipe line, garrisoned by the French. There is a lake to the South and good landing facilities for aircraft.
- (f) HOMS. At the junction of the DAMASCUS - ALEPPO road with the TRIPOLI-ALEPPO road. The town normally contains a considerable French garrison. To the Southwest there is a lake on which sea-planes can be landed. The town itself has 55,000 inhabitants, mostly Moslems. The town is also of strategic importance as it commands the Eastern end of the pass between the high ground of the ANTI LEBANON to the South and high ground of the JEBEL ANSARIYA to the North.
- (g) HAMA. On the ORONTES. Population 55,000, of whom 11,000 are Christians. The DAMASCUS - ALEPPO road crosses the ORONTES by a bridge here. The town lies in a small depression surrounded by hills, and in summer the climate is hot and damp.

SYRIAN RAILWAYS

Summary of information held at this Headquarters. It is not exhaustive.

1. ROUTES

RAYAK - ALEPPO 206 miles.

ALEPPO - MAIDAN EKBES (Turkish frontier) 72 miles.

ALEPPO - TEL KOTCHEK (Iraq frontier) 325 miles.

HOMS - TRIPOLI 63 miles.

BEIRUT - DAMASCUS 93 miles.

BEIRUT - MAMELTEIN 11 miles.

DAMASCUS - EL HAMME 120 miles.

EZRAA - SOUEIDA 30 miles.

2. GAUGES

BEIRUT - RAYAK - DAMASCUS - DERA A - EL HAMME 1.04 metres.

EZRAA - SOUEIDA (Decaville Rly) Narrow gauge.

Other railways are normal gauge 1m44.

3. MAXIMUM GRADIENT

Between BEIRUT and DJITA maximum of 70 mm in the metre and there is a 'cog wheel' arrangement to enable the engine to take it.

4. TUNNELS

BEIRUT is kilo 0.

14.50 km ARRAYYA Length 160 metres.

33.25 km MEDLRIJE " unknown.

38.00 km BEIDAR " 300 metres.

140.00 km SOUK WADI BARRADA " unknown.

There is a viaduct at kilo 39.

There are no tunnels on the RAYAK - ALEPPO line.

5. WEIGHT OF LINE PER METRE.

BEIRUT - DAMASCUS 23 kilos per metre.

DAMASCUS - DERA A 22 kilos per metre.

6. MAXIMUM TRAFFIC DENSITY.

Approximate one train per hour.

7. LOADS ON TRACK.

The maximum load on the narrow gauge track is 15 tons per truck.

On the Decaville Rly. it is 10 tons.

8. ENGINES AND ROLLING STOCK

Seven types (Swiss) engines between BEIRUT and RAYAK. They weigh 65 tons when coaled and watered, and have cog wheels. (See para.3)

There is also a concentration of 50J type engines (German) and 350 waggons (French) in working order at ALEPPO.

8. FUEL.

(i) Kind. Coal. Some engines are rumoured to be converted to oil.

(ii) Coal yards. BEIRUT, RAYAK, HOMS, ALEPPO, TRIPOLI, DERA. Supply for not more than six months at full rate.

10. BRAKES

Narrow Gauge. - Vacuum brakes.

Normal Gauge - Hand brakes worked by sound signals from the engine.

11. WORKSHOPS.

RAYAK, DAMASCUS, ALEPPO.

Small workshops - BEIRUT, TRIPOLI.

Minor repair shops - DERA, HOMS.

12. MAXIMUM SAFE SPEEDS PER HOUR.

Normal gauge	50-60	kilos	per	hour.
BEIRUT - DAMASCUS	25	"	"	"
RAYAK - DAMASCUS	35	"	"	"
DAMASCUS - NASSIB	50	"	"	"
DERA - BOSRA	50	"	"	"
DERA - TELL CHEHAB	45	"	"	"
TELL CHEHAB - SAMAKH	40	"	"	"

13. TURNTABLES

BEIRUT, RAYAK, DAMASCUS, ALEPPO, TRIPOLI.

14. CURVES.

Minimum curve is that of the circumference of a circle whose diameter is 100 metres.

15. JUNCTIONS.

BEIRUT, RAYAK, DAMASCUS, DERA A, HOMS, MOUSLIMIE.

16. SHUNTING & MARSHALLING YARDS

SAMAKH, ALEPPO, TEL KOTCHEK.

17. VULNERABLE POINTS.

Line EL HAMME - DERA A.

Viaduct HERE DERE (near Turkish frontier).

DERA A junction. Shuttle at ARAYA. Points at ALEY.

Level-crossing over the TRIPOLI road at BEIRUT.

18. GENERAL.

The general condition of the line is good and there is no shortage of spare parts or material. Most of the rolling stock is French or Belgian.

Some of the bridges are in need of repair and there is a severe shortage of "charbure de calcium" for this purpose.

SECRET

SYR/A/ORG/XV/GSI

Subject:- SYRIA - SUPPLY

Forwarded herewith are some notes on the administrative organization of the French Army in Syria, based on information received at this Headquarters.

Jerusalem,
29th March 1941.

J.A. Levey
for Colonel.
General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

Distribution:-


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H.Q., 7 Aust. Div.	4	9 to 12
H.Q., 1 Cav. Div.	7	13 to 19
H.Q., T.J.F.F.	2	20 & 21
H.Q., R.A.F., F.&T.J.	2	22 & 23
H.Q., R.A.F., Habbaniya, Iraq.	1	24
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O.C., Arab Legion	1	27
X.2.	2	28 & 29
A.S.O., Haifa	1	30
A.L.O. Amman	1	31
A.I.G., (C.I.D.)	1	32
Free French Liaison Officer.	4	33 to 36
Chief Secretary.	1	37
File.	1	38
B.o.S.	1	39
G.O.	3	40 to 42.

SYRIA - COMMANDS

Commandement superieure des troupes du Levant.

G.O.C. Gen. Dentz.

H. Q. BEIRUT.



SYRIA - Supply.

Map Levant 1:200,000 series.

I. AMMUNITION

Normally ammunition is placed in Central Dumps, from which it passes to the Distributing Centre for distribution to Main Reserve Dumps. Main Reserve Dumps feed small dumps known as Security Munitions. These in turn feed Mobilisation Munitions which is a reserve of ammunition carried by units.

Owing to the activities of the Italian Armistice Commission, and the fact that road and rail communications between BEIRUT and HAMMANA are very vulnerable, it is probable that a clear cut distinction between the various types of dump is not being observed in SYRIA.

CENTRAL DUMP - - HAMMANA 151210
 TALIA 185221 (under control of Italian armistice commission.)

DISTRIBUTING CENTRE - BEIRUT (Bir Hassan).

MAIN RESERVE DUMPS

ALEPPO 293473	HOMS 241309	TRIPOLI (Alma)
(? transferred to RIYAK)	MEZZE 198174	RIYAK 176213
DEIR EZ ZOR 560380	SOUEIDA 225085	ABLAH 172214


SECURITY MUNITIONS

SOUEIDA 225085	DERAA 183076	BAALBEK 195229
SALKHAD 240061	EZRAA 197103	HASSETCHE 606510
SHAABA 232101	DAMASCUS Forts	ALEPPO Citadel
AHIRE (?Aire 224075)	RACHAYA 160173	DEIR EZ ZOR 560380
BOSRA AL HARIRI 206099	CHRISTOFINI (Merdjayoun)	
BOSRA ESKI SHAM 218064	KHLAM 138155.	

There is also a possible secret dump 19 kms E.S.E. of ALEPPO.

II. PETROL

MAIN DEPOT TELL KALALK 200303
 or
 BEIRUT (may be distributing centre)
 ABLAH 172214 (Aviation only)



III. FOOD SUPPLY

Normally BEIRUT is the main centre of supply. At present however the Intendants at ALEPPO, DAMASCUS and DEIR EZ ZOR have power to make local purchases and let out local contracts.

INTENDANT-GENERAL BEIRUT (St. Michel)

INTENDANTS. ALEPPO.
DAMASCUS.
DEIR EZ ZOR.

DISTRIBUTION POINTS. SOUEIDA LATTAKIA
MERDJAYOUN HOMS
SAIDA HAMA
TRIPOLI.

IV. WORKSHOPS

P.R.R.E.M. (Depot and Repair Shop) BEIRUT

(Aviation workshops) RAYAK (This may have been moved recently to DAMASCUS or TRIPOLI).

P.A.R.L.M. (Repair Shops) ALEPPO
DAMASCUS
DEIR EZ ZOR.


UNIT WORKSHOPS. ABLAH
BEIRUT
DAMASCUS
TRIPOLI
SOUEIDA

In addition there is 1 mobile workshop (consisting of one spare parts lorry and one machine tools lorry) to every 100 vehicles.

V. MARSHALLING YARDS

Railway marshalling yards exist at the following places.

- RAYAK 176213
- MALAKA 167211
- DAMASCUS
- ALEPPO
- TRIPOLI
- TEL KOTCHEK 719550
- HOMS.



DAMASCUS - SOUEIDA - SALKHAD

General description of route

The main road is about 150 k.m. long and is open to all forms of traffic. Starting from SALKHAD, the road commences at an altitude of 1200 metres and descends gradually until it reaches SOUEIDA, which is 850 metres high. From SOUEIDA to DAMASCUS the road descends further, leaving SOUEIDA the road passes EL MARJAA (noted for its fresh water springs),

S Y R I A - Routes

1. SALKHAD - SOUEIDA - DAMASCUS.

2. MAFRAQ - DERA'A - DAMASCUS.

3. SAMAKH - FIQ - BUTMEIYE.

4. JISR BANAT YACOUB - QUNEITRA - DAMASCUS.

5. QUNEITRA - MERDJAYOUN.

6. SAFAD - MERDJAYOUN - ZAHLE.

7. MERDJAYOUN - SAIDA.

8. NAQURA - BEIRUT.

Map Ref:- LEVANT 1:200,000.

Difficulties and obstacles

The following difficulties and obstacles may be encountered:

(i) Numerous small wells in country between SALKHAD and DAMASCUS would impose some delay on movement off the road in dry weather.

(ii) Valley north of KHARABIB (1915).

(iii) Four kms. South of KIBOU, lava patch on west of road and plantations on the east.

(iv) The village of KIBOU is surrounded by high ground on the North, East and West. A bridge carried the road over the WADI EL A'ONU.

(v) Plantations and orchards on the outskirts of DAMASCUS.

(vi) O.C., T.J.F. states that there are no road bridges in the area which, if destroyed, could not be detoured in a few hours.

ROUTE NO.1.

SALKHAD - SOUEIDA - DAMASCUS.

1. General description of route.

The main road is about 150 k.m. long and is open to all forms of traffic. Starting from SALKHAD, the road commences at an altitude of 1200 metres and descends gradually until it reaches SOUEIDA, which is 920 metres high. From SOUEIDA to DAMASCUS the road descends further. Leaving SOUEIDA the road passes EL MAZRAA (noted for its fresh water springs), SEJEN (218094), BUSRA EL HARARI (206099) to SHEIKH MISKIN (544 metres high). From here the road turns right past the villages of FGUEH (190112), TELL KOUTEIBE (190115), QANAYE (192120), SANAMEIN (191126), RHABARHIB (195138), KISSOUE (197157), and finally reaches DAMASCUS. In the sector SALKHAD - MAZRAA it is 4 metres wide, and sector SHEIKH MISKINE - DAMASCUS it is 6 metres wide. The sector SALKHAD - SHEIKH MISKINE is poorly asphalted, but the sector SHEIKH MISKINE - DAMASCUS is tarmaced, and repairs, including strengthening of culverts, were completed in June 1940.

2. Movement off the road.

It is generally difficult to move off the road, because:-

- (a) sector SALKHAD - SHEIKH MISKINE runs through the JEBEL DRUSE, which is almost impassable off the tracks, and South of the LEDJA which is impassable off the tracks. A strong French mechanised column was destroyed by the Druzes between SALKHAD and SOUEIDA in 1925, largely because it could not get off the road to manoeuvre.
- (b) sector SHEIKH MISKINE - DAMASCUS is passable off the tracks in dry weather, but the road runs for long stretches on an embankment. The surrounding plain is liable to be flooded during the winter (November to March).
- (c) As the road approaches DAMASCUS it runs through gardens with high hedges, making it difficult to get off in a hurry

3. Defiles and obstacles.

The following defiles and obstacles may be encountered.

- (i) Numerous small wadis in country between SHEIKH MISKINE and DAMASCUS would impose some delay on movement off the road in dry weather.
- (ii) Valley North of RHABARHIB (195138).
- (iii) Four kms. South of KISSOUL, lava patch on West of road and plantations on the East.
- (iv) The village of KISSOUE is commanded by high ground on the North, East and West. A bridge carried the road over the NAHR EL A'ONJ.
- (v) Plantations and orchards on the outskirts of DAMASCUS.
- (vi) O.C., T.J.F.F. states that there are no road bridges in the area which, if destroyed, could not be detoured in a few hours.

4. Cover.

- (i) Woods near KAFER (234077) and MAZRAA (220093).
- (ii) Troops can remain well hidden in the lava belt to the East of the road, but vehicles would have to be hidden by artificial means.
- (iii) Plantations and orchards on outskirts of DAMASCUS afford good cover.
- (iv) There are remains of ancient citadels in the area which might provide some shelter against air attack.

5. The route.

Kms. SALKHAD, altitude 1200 metres. Prominent site. Accommodation for about 1000 men in fort. Population 25000, mainly Druze, with some Greek Orthodox Christians. No running water, but special tanks have been constructed to collect ample supplies of rain water in the winter (plan of the water supply held at Force Headquarters). Christian tribes are:- FALLAREH YD. MEHAMMETH and NASSER. The Druzes in the neighbourhood are under the leadership of the ATRASH /family.

19. KAFER (234077). Pop. 800.

27. RAHA (229082). Pop. 300. Well supplied with water.

32. SOUEIDA (227085). Altitude 920 m. Pop. 6000. Accommodation for about 5000 men in barracks. Water facilities are good as there are four sources of supply. Electric light system. The town is the capital of JEBEL DRUZE. Following tribes inhabit the district.-

Christian - CHEHADE, HAZINA, ASSAFINE.

Druze - - OBEID, AL ATRASH.

41. MEZRAA (220093). Noted for its fresh water supplies and government agricultural station.

43. SEJEN (218094). Pop. 650. Majority DRUZE, the rest Circassians. A road leads from SEJEN right into the LEJA region.

58. BOSRA EL HARIRI (206099). (This village has wells with pumps but supply sufficient for local needs. The tribes around the village are:-

YASSINE - Chief SHEIKH AKIL YASSINE.

AL HARARI - Chief SHEIKH SALAME HARARI.

SALLAUTE - A Bedouin tribe. Chief AHMAD GOSSEIN.

Arabs of the LEJA. - Sheikh TALLAL ABU SOLEIMAN.

The last two are recognised as local magistrates by the French.

Near the railway line at EZRAA (195102), is a landing ground suitable for military aircraft.

/77. SHEIKH MISKINE.

77. SHEIKH MISKINE (188099). Altitude 544 metres. Pop. 2500. Police post, and telephone service. Junction of roads leading to DERRAA (183076), QUNEITRA (156133), SHEIKH SAAD (176100) and DAMASCUS. From here the route turns North passing a number of small hamlets, most of which have a plentiful water supply. A perennial stream runs from SHEIKH MISKINE to the YARMUK.

104. SANAMBIN. Altitude 708 metres. There is a road from this village suitable for light traffic only, leading South East to Ezraa (197103) and by-passing SHEIKH MISKINE.

117. RHABARHIB (195138). Altitude 710 metres. Pop. 1500. Telephone and police post.

137. KISOUE (197157). Pop. 2000. Situated on DAMASCUS - DERRAA railway. Water is plentiful. From here to Damascus country is fertile and well cultivated.

158. DAMASCUS. Altitude 690 metres. Pop. 250,000. System of canals brings water to the city. Two railway stations. One line leads to BEIRUT and ALEPPO, the other to DERRAA and PALESTINE. Town possesses a tramway system, and most of the amenities of a modern city.

6. Alternative routes.

In the event of the main road being rendered impassable the following alternative routes exist between SALKHAD and SOUEIDA, but are only suitable for light traffic.

(i) SALKHAD - after 5 kms. along the main road, turn right for EL KRLIE (229067) - HESSAS (226068) - SOUEIDA.

(ii) SALKHAD - BOSRA EASKI CHAM (218064) (good water) - AIRE (224075) Residence of Emir HASSAN, EL ATRASH. *

(iii) SALKHAD - ORMANE (245064) - MELAH (253063) - BENAM (250068) - SOUEIDA.

The following is an alternative route from SOUEIDA to DAMASCUS.

SOUEIDA - CHAHBA (233101) - KHOLKOLE (224125) - BURAQ (219137) - KISOUE (197157) - DAMASCUS.

* Emir HASSAN is the Governor of the JEBEL DRUZE, appointed by the French. He is regarded as a French puppet. The leader with most prestige is SULTAN PASHA ATRASH.

ROUTE NO.2.

MAFRAQ - DERA A - DAMASCUS.

This route passes through SHEIKH MISKINE. DAMASCUS see Route No.1.

For details of sector SHLIK H MISKINE-

1. General description of route.

From MAFRAQ road bears North-West across hilly stony country with several bad crossings to REMTHA (174069). Surface of road is poor. From REMTHA road is straight to DERA A. From DERA A to DAMASCUS surface is good and road 6 metres wide. An alternative passable track, leads from MAFRAQ - NASIB (190068) - DERA A.

2. Movement off the road.

In dry weather vehicles can manoeuvre off the track in any direction between MAFRAQ and REMTHA. Movement possible, but more restricted around DERA A.

3. Defiles and obstacles.

Bad wadi crossings between MAFRAQ and REMTHA.

4. Cover.

- (i) Fair cover in wadis about 2 miles North of MAFRAQ.
- (ii) JEBEL EZ ZEUMLE, South of DERA A dominates town and southern approaches.

5. The route.

kms.	MAFRAQ - Telephone.	Aerodrome.	I.P.C. pumping station.
32	REMTHA. Pop. about 3000. Telephone. Water supply, which needs to be filtered; uncertain June - January. Country round very open. No cover from air.		
39	DERAA. Altitude 528 m. Pop. about 9000. Accommodation for 1000 men in barracks. Electric light. Consists old town and modern town. Valley between towns holds a reervoir. Railway junction. Landing ground suitable for military aircraft to the West.		

kms.

25 SHEIKH MISKINE.

Sector SHEIKH MISKINE - DAMASCUS described in Route I.

6. Alternative routes.

(i) MAFRAQ parallel to railway line to DERRAA - EZRAA - SHAQRA - QANAYE - DAMASCUS. Poor; dry weather only.

(ii) DERRAA - MUZERIB - SHEIKH SA'AD - NAWA - JASIN - ENKHEL - SANAMEIN - DAMASCUS. Poor; dry weather only.

ROUTE NO. 3.

SAMAKH - FIQ - BUTMEIYE

1. General description of route.

The road is better in summer than in winter, but is only suitable for light traffic and the country round is difficult. Starting from SAMAKH, the road goes along the Sea of GALILEE to KAHR HARIB (142092), and thence to FIQ (145093). EL AAL (150097), KHISFIN (157102) to DJOUKHADAC (159110). Here the road forks, one track leading to QUNAYTRA and one to SHEIKH MISKINE. The road to BUTMEIYE (163113) is only a mule track.

Total distance 50 kms.

2. Alternative routes.

None.

ROUTE NO.4.

JISR BANAT YACOUB - QUNEITRA - DAMASCUS.

1. General description of route.

The road is 97 kms. long, and average width 6 m. It is suitable for all kinds of traffic all the year round. Sector JISR BANAT YACOUB - QUNEITRA is asphalted. Sector QUNEITRA - AARTOUZ (188164), good, but not asphalted. Sector AARTOUZ - DAMASCUS asphalted. The road ascends from sea-level near JISR BANAT YACOUB and passes through stony ground and mountainous plateau up to QUNEITRA, altitude 980 m. Some 20 kms after QUNEITRA the country becomes rather swampy and is composed mainly of volcanic lava. From AARTOUZ the country becomes wooded and fertile, and the road crosses the BEIRUT - DAMASCUS railway 2 kms before reaching DAMASCUS.

2. Movement off the road.

(i) Movement difficult on sector JISR BANAT YACOUB - QUNEITRA owing to the ground being covered with large boulders.

(ii) Sector QUNEITRA - DAMASCUS. Movement possible in dry weather, but hampered by patches of swamp and small wadis.

(3) Sector QUNEITRA - DAMASCUS. Difficult to get off the road in a hurry owing to high hedges and orchards.

3. Defiles and obstacles.

(i) About 4 kms Southwest of QUNEITRA dominant cone-shaped hill commands the road.

(ii) 20 kms. Northeast of QUNEITRA the road is carried by small bridges across a succession of wadis. If these bridges were destroyed they might impose a temporary check on movement as the ground to the North is lava, and to the South is swamp, and therefore difficult to detour.

(iii) About 5 kms further on the road runs across a lava patch, making it difficult to get off the track.

(iv) At SAASSAA (176150) the road crosses river on concrete and steel bridge.

ROUTE MAP

4. Cover.

- (i) There is little cover, other than that afforded by dead ground, until the road reaches AARTOUZ.
- (ii) AARTOUZ - DAMASCUS, good cover is afforded by hedges and orchards.

5. The route.

Kms. JISR BANAT YACOUB.

6. NEFANE (145122).

9. EL ALLEQA (146124).

25 QUNLETRA (157133). Altitude 980 m. Pop. 3,000. Accommodation for troops unknown, but probably good. (Present French garrison about 1000 men). Ample supplies of water and local products such as wheat, maize, hops and meat. There are many Circassians in the district, the chief of whom is SALIM ZACHERIA BEADO of QUNLETRA.

47. CHOUKATLIYE (171144).

57. SAASSAA (176150).

65 OUM ECH CHARATITE (180154).

79 AARTOUZ (190167).

95 MEZZE (outskirts of DAMASCUS) (199175).

97 DAMASCUS.

6. Alternative route.

The alternative route, which can only be used by cavalry and pack transport, is as follows:-

QUNLETRA - JABA (167136) - MAYEINE (173140) - OSMANIYE (173142) - DEIR MAKER (177144) - KENAKER (183147) (good water supplies) - ABBASIYE (187156) - BOUAIIDIYE (187159) - DROUCHA (187161) - AARTOUZ.

Cover

QUNLEITRA - MERDJAYOUN

1. General description of route.

This road, which is not asphalted, but is suitable for all forms of transport all the year round, is 44 kms. in length, and has an average width of 4 m. The Sector QUNLEITRA - BANIYAS is comparatively level. The sector BANIYAS - MERDJAYOUN goes through deep valleys and is difficult. Leaving QUNLEITRA the road passes many windmills, and reaches MANSURA (155135), MASSADA (152145), and crosses the valley of the Wadi SA'ARI. From here the road rapidly descends and crosses a river at two points near BANIYAS. From BANIYAS the road starts to incline, and crosses four bridges. The frontier between SYRIA and the LEBANESE REPUBLIC is passed at a distance of 8 kms from BANIYAS and the road continues straight on to MERDJAYOUN.

2. Movement off the road.

- (i) Sector QUNLEITRA - BANIYAS, movement very difficult.
- (ii) Sector BANIYAS - MERDJAYOUN, movement almost impossible.

3. Defiles and obstacles.

- (i) 18 kms Northwest of QUNLEITRA, crossing of the Wadi SA'ARI (very deep).
- (ii) Near BANIYAS, the road crosses the river by two bridges; one of these bridges was constructed in 1928, and the other is an ancient one. Both are prepare for demolition.
- (iii) 1 km Northwest of BANIYAS, bridge over the Wadi KACHABI.
- (iv) 3 kms. from BANIYAS, bridge over Wadi EL ASAL.
- (v) 6 kms. from BANIYAS, bridge over a small stream.
- (vi) 10 kms from BANIYAS, bridge over the HASBANI RIVER. This bridge was constructed in 1928.

The last four bridges are probably prepared for demolition.

4. Cover.

- (i) Sector QUNLEITRA - BANIYAS, very little cover.
- (ii) Area BANIYAS, several wadis.

/ (iii) BANIYAS CASTLE

(iii) BANUYAS CASTLE might provide some cover from air attack.

(iv) Woods round MERDJAYOUN would also provide cover.

5. The route.

Kms. QUNEITRA (for particulars see route 4).

3 MANSURA (155135). Pop. 1500 CIRCASSIANS. To the left of this village the road runs to WASIT (6 kms) where there is a Bedouin tribe known as AL FADEL, the Chief of which is the EMIR FAOUR, an important person locally and a Deputy in the Syrian Parliament.

16 MASSADA. 3 kms to the Northeast there is a lake, BIRKLT RAM.

24 BANUYAS (145147) Altitude 380 m. Pop. 1000 Moslems. Police Post; telephone service. Situated at the foot of Mount Hermon. Stands at the junction of two valleys, wadi HASHABI and Wadi SA'ARI, and has a plentiful water supply. The surrounding district is fertile and there is an abundance of fruit, vegetables, wheat, etc. On a hill there are the ruins of an ancient fortress, which commands two valleys. This castle has not fallen completely into ruins, and could still be used for observation and ambush.

44 MERDJAYOUN. Altitude 780 m. Pop. 4/5000. Majority are GREEK Orthodox Christians. The district is very fertile and well irrigated by a number of rivers.

6. Alternative routes.

(i) Sector QUNEITRA - BANUYAS. Road suitable for light traffic only. AIN EL HAJEL (153137) - ZAOURA (147142) - AIN FITE (146143) - BANUYAS.

(ii) Sector BANUYAS - MERDJAYOUN. No alternative route available to any form of traffic other than by mountain tracks.

ROUTE NO. 6.

SAFAD - MERDJAYOUN - ZAHLE

1. General description of route.

This road is approximately 133 kms long and is suitable for all kinds of traffic South of MERDJAYOUN. North of MERDJAYOUN the road deteriorates. It is an all weather road, but not asphalted, and it is reported that the suitability of the road for the heaviest forms of transport is doubtful. Starting from SAFAD the road runs to the West of the HULEH Valley and thence on a general line West of the LETANI Valley. Water supply is therefore plentiful at most places on the route.

2. Movement off the road.

Much of the sector MERDJAYOUN - ZAHLE is in the vicinity of woods and it is possible to get off the road to take cover. It does not appear practicable to manoeuvre off the road.

3. Defiles and obstacles.

- (i) The village of QLEEA (134156) has the reputation of being a strong position.
- (ii) For 29 kms North of MERDJAYOUN the road appears to run through a narrow defile.
- (iii) Junction of two rivers at AMIQ (153197).

4. Cover.

- (i) In general the ground traversed is more suitable than on the other routes for cover in event of attack by aircraft.
- (ii) Several woods and forests close to sector MERDJAYOUN - ZAHLE.

5. The route.

<u>Kms.</u>	SAFAD.
8	ROSH PINNA (131116).
49	METTULLAH.

kms

59 QLEEA. Marenite population. Reputation as a fortress. Chief personage is IBRAHIM FRANCIS, whose family owns land in the HULEH.

64 MERDJAYOUN (details see Route 5).

68 Cross-roads (13701580).

96 SAGHBIN (147186) Pop. about 1200.

98 AMIQ (153197). Pop. about 1000. Stands at junction two small rivers. Important personage in village is ELIAS TOHME SIKAF, Deputy in Lebanese Parliament, and owns land both in AMIQ and ZAHLE.

120 QAB ELIAS (158206). Pop. about 2000 including many Christians. Constructed in tiers on the side of a small hill

125 CHTAURA (161209). Altitude 900 m. Telephone service. Small population - all Christians. Hedges and gardens afford cover. Road now improves. Excellent water facilities.

133 ZAHLE. Altitude 945 m. Pop. about 35,000 (?) One of the principal towns in the LEBANON. Good water supply. Railway station on main BEIRUT - DAMASCUS line at MOALQA (167211) 2 kms away.

6. Alternative routes.

MERDJAYOUN - HASBAYA (145163) (Druze; Chief is Sheikh HUSSEIN KAISSE) - RACHAYA (160173) - CHTAURA (161209). Sector MERDJAYOUN - RASHAYA reported not asphalted, but an all weather road. No definite reports about RACHAYA - CHTAURA, but it is probable the whole route is passable for light traffic.

ROUTE NO.7.

MERDJAYOUN - SAIDA.

1. General description of route.

This route, which is 48 kms in length, is in good condition and available for all types of transport the whole year round. Starting from MERDJAYOUN the road bears Southwest and passes QLEEA. Shortly after this village the road turns sharply NORTH, and crosses the Litani river at KHARDALE 12½ kms from MERDJAYOUN. The road then continues Northwest and joins the main NAQURA - BEIRUT road at a point 9 kms South of SAIDA. Both food and water supplies are ample in the area traversed by this route.

2. Movement off the road.

Most of this road follows the valley of the ZAHERANI river, and movement off the road is therefore restricted. A number of villages lie on both sides of the road and can be reached by tracks which are only suitable for the lightest form of traffic.

3. Defiles and obstacles.

- (i) The greater part of the road runs through the ZAHERANI valley.
- (ii) The LITANI river crossing (13151543). Two bridges, one modern and one old. The old one will not take heavy transport.
- (iii) Road junction (11311731). Bridge over the ZAHERANI River.

4. Cover.

Cover is scarce except in so far as it is afforded by cultivation.

5. The route.

kms. MERDJAYOUN.

3 Road junction (13411559).

15 KAHR TIBNIT (129158).

Kms.

19 NABATIYE (136161) Altitude 450 m. Pop. about 5000, most of whom are SHIITE. The most important family here is the ZAHER family, at the head of which is SHEIKH SOLIMAN ZAHER.

22. HABBOUCH (126164).

26. DEIR EZ ZAHRAN (124166).

31. ZLEFTA (119168).

39. Road junction (11311731) (Joins main NAQURA - BEIRUT road).

48 SAIDA. A small fishing port. Pop. about 50,000, composed of all sects of Moslems, Christians and Jews. It is an important business centre and handles large quantities of imports and exports for the Hinterland. The important families are BEZRI, ZENI, OSSEIRAN, DEBBAIN and ATIE.

6. Alternative routes.

There are no satisfactory alternative routes.

ROUTE NO. 8.

NAQURA - BEIRUT.

1. General description of route.

This route, which is 112 kms in length, is in first class condition and suitable for every form of transport. Leaving NAQURA the road runs parallel to the coastline to TYR (099149), which is sometimes also spelt SOUR. It then crosses the LITANI river and reaches SAIDA, and then continues through DAMOUR (124300) and CHOUEIFAT (130208) to BEIRUT.

2. Movement off the road.

Movement off the road is in general difficult as the road keeps to the coast the whole way. The few places where detours are possible have been mined.

3. Defiles and obstacles.

(i) For the first 18 kms the road keeps alongside a cliff and can easily be rendered completely impassable by the enemy. It might, however, be possible to detour this sector, which is the most demolished sector of the whole road, by making a track between our frontier road at SURUH (107129) and KIRBET AL MANSOURAH (113126) to RAMIET (109131) and REMEICHE (115127) respectively on the French frontier road, and thence by AIN EBEL (118131) and TIBNINE (119140) to TYR.

(ii) The road runs over numerous bridges, the most important of which are -

(a) NAHR EL EZZIYE 16 Kms North of NAQURA.

(b) The LITANI River at QASMIYE (108156) (Sketch of the defences held at this Headquarters).

(c) Bridge over the NAHR RHEDIR 2 kms North of CHOUEIFAT (130208).

(iii) The road is commanded by high ground to the east, practically the whole way.

(iv) It is reported that all bridges and possible detours are prepared for demolition throughout the route, but it is also reported that owing to the ease with which the actual road can be rendered impassable the French have made less defensive preparations in this area than they have on the Eastern side of the frontier.

4. Cover.

(i) Cover for troops, but not for M.T. exists in the NAQURA area.

(ii) Cover for both troops and M.T. may be found in the area CHOUEIFAT.

5. The route.

Kms. RAS NAQURA. (SYRIA - PALESTINE frontier).

4 NAQURA (094133).

22 TYR (099149). Pop. 7000. The majority of the inhabitants are SHIITE Moslems, and the remainder GREEK Orthodox Christians. The town is built on an Island connected to the mainland by a sandy isthmus. The small port is only used by fishermen, as it is not large or deep enough for bigger vessels.

44. EL KODAR (109169).

Kms

59 SAIDA (117186) (For particulars see route No.7)

81 DAMOUR (124200). Pop 1/2000. The most important family is the GORAYEB, the head of which is FARID GORAYEB. The village struggles along the road for about 2 kms.

93 CHOUEIFAT (130208). This village is the home of the ARSELAN family, noted for their pro-German sentiments. The head of the family, EMIR SHAKIB ARSELAN, is at present in GERMANY.

112 BEIROT.

6. Alternative routes.

With the exception of the possible detour noted in paragraph 3(i), there is no alternative through route. North and East of SAIDA there are many tracks connecting villages, which could be traversed by troops without M.T.

Cover

(i)

(ii)

The route

Kms.

4

28

44

SAIDA (117186)

Subject:- Order-of-Battle - SYRIA.

SYR/E/STRAT/I/GSI.

S E C R E T.

1. The attached Order-of-Battle is based on information received at Headquarters, British Forces in Palestine and Transjordan, up to 19th March 1941. Previous issues are cancelled.
2. Amendments will issued periodically by this Headquarters.
3. Please acknowledge receipt on attached Army Form A.16.

Jerusalem.
27th March 1941.

J.A. Letroy
Colonel.
General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

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A.S.O. Haifa.	1.	30.
A.L.O. Amman.	1.	31.
A.I.G., (C.I.D)	1.	32.
Free French Liaison Officer.	4.	33 to 36.
Chief Secretary.	1.	37.
File.	1.	38.

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COPY NO.....

ORDER OF BATTLE

FRENCH FORCES IN SYRIA

(Ref. map - Levant 1:200,000 series).

March 1941

NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS

A.C.	Anti-tank.
A.M.	Automitralleuses (Armoured cars)
B.C.C.	Bataillon Chars de Combat (Tanks)
B.C.L.	Bataillon Chasseurs Libanais.
B.D.L.	Bataillon du Levant.
B.M.T.S.	Bataillon de marche Tirailleurs Senegalais.
Colonial troops.	Troops of the regular French army who spend half their service at stations in France and half in the Colonies.
C.L.D.	Compagnie legere du desert.
C.S.T.L.	Commandement superieur des troupes du Levant (Gen.Staff).
D.C.A.	Defense contre avion.
E.L.Dj.	Escadron leger Djezireh (Djezireh Light Cavalry)
E.L.Dr.	" " Druse (Druse Light Cavalry).
E.L.N.S.	" " Nord Syrie (N.Syrian Light Cavalry).
E.L.Tch	" " Tcherkess (Circassian Light Cavalry).
Etr.	Legion Etrangere (Foreign Legion).
Genie	Engineers.
Gp.	Groupe or Groupement (sub-division of a regt.)
H.C.F.	Haut Commissariat Francais.
Intendance.	Supply service.
Metropolitan.	Troops (French and native) belonging to the French Army in France and North Africa.
Mtn.	Pack transport.
P.A.R.E.M.	Sub Regional workshops.
Partizan	Irregular light cavalry.
Porte.	Lorry borne (Artillery).
P.R.R.E.M.	Regional workshops.
R.A.C.L.	Regiment d'artillerie coloniale du Levant.
R.A.M.L.	Regiment d'artillerie metropolitaine du Levant.
R.C.A.	Regiment Chasseurs d'Afrique.
R.I.C.	Regiment d'infanterie coloniale.
R.T.A.	Regiment Tirailleurs Algeriens.
R.T.M.	Regiment Tirailleurs Marocains.
R.T.S.	Regiment Tirailleurs Senegalais.
R.T.T.	Regiment Tirailleurs Tunisiens.
S.A.	Spahis Algeriens.
S.M.	Spahis Marocains.
Sp.	Troupes speciales. Troops recruited and maintained by local governments, but trained and partly officered by French.
S.T.	Spahis Tunisiens.
T.L.	Territoires des Liban.
T.N.S.	Territoires Nord Syrie.
Train	Transport Corps.
Transmissions.	Signals.
T.S.S.	Territoires Sud-Syrie.

/Notes.....

COMMANDS AND STAFF

1. C.S.T.L.

G.O.C.	General Dentz.
2 i/c	General Fougere.
Chief of Staff	Colonel Le Courtier.
1re Bureau (A)	?
2me " (I)	?
3me " (Operations)	Comdt. Marion.
4me " (Q)	Comdt. Cherriere.
5me " (Security)	Capts. Rondeau and Ollion.
Chief Artillery Officer	Col. Carbonier.
O.C., G.D. and A.A. Arty	Col. Cannone.
Chief Signal Officer	Comdt. Brygoe
Chief Special Service Officer	Comdt. Teze.
Chief Ordnance Officer	Comdt. Moulin.

2. Area Commanders.

T.L. (Beirut)	Col. Beucler
T.S.S. (Damascus)	Gen. Delhomme.
T.N.S. (Aleppo)	Col. Rottier.

3. Sub-Area Commanders.

JEBEL DRUZE	Col. Bouvier
DJEZIREH	Col. Ardouin
ALAOUTES	Col. Jordan.

4. Special Service Officers.

S.S.Os are officers seconded for political and intelligence duties amongst the native population, and for security. In the Jebel Druse, Djezireh and Alouites (where the Military Commander is also the H.C's delegate) they are also in direct control of the administration.

Throughout the rest of Syria and Lebanon (except Beirut and Saida) they have not direct control of administrations, but report on how it is carried on.

Lately the S.S.Os have also been put in charge of food distribution.

/Chef de Bataillon TEZE

COMMANDS AND STAFF (continued)

4. Special Service Officers (cont).

I.

Chef de Bataillon TEZE Inspecteur General des services Speciaux du Levant. Capitaine Gonthier Capitaine Lesur	: Mohafazat d'Alep. : Capitaine Duge de Bernonville - Alep. : Lieutenant Dubois - Alep. : Capitaine Michelette - Arab - Pounar. : Capitaine Dunyach - Djerablous. : Capitaine Gave Jean - Azaz. : Capitaine Daniau - Afrine. : Capitaine Lemeveu - Alep. : Capitaine Gave Pierre - Kafert - Harim. : Capitaine Lavarde - Idlib. : Capitaine Tinel - Djisir-el-Choghour.
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II.

Mohafazat de Damas et du Hauran. Capitaine Deangeli - Damas Lieutenant Michaux - Damas Lieutenant Pellat - Damas Capitaine Vabre - Nebek Capitaine Macquart - Douma Capitaine Meric - Kuneitra Capitaine Guerinet - Deraa. Mohafazat de Homs et de Hama Capitaine Bouttin - Hama Capitaine Chapotot - Homs Lieutenant Franceschini - Selemieh Territoire Autonome des Alaouites Capitaine Blondel - Lattaquie Capitaine Loheac - Kessab Lieutenant Briet - Haffe Lieutenant Biree - Djebel Capitaine Branchet - Massyaf Capitaine Thiriat - Tartous Lieutenant Rondeau - Tell-Kallah Mohafazat de Djezireh Capitaine Azziz - Hassetche Lieutenant Jcuanjean - Hassetche. Lieutenant Courtot - Hassetche. Lieutenant Grimaldi - Andivar. Lieutenant Michel - Kamechlie Lt. Barazer de Lannurien - Kamechlie Lieutenant Houel - Ras-el-Ain	: Mohafazat de l'Euphrate : Capitaine Lacroix - Deir-ez-Zer. : Lieutenant de Maigret - Deir-ez-Zor. : Lieutenant Castella - Deir-ez-Zer. : Lieutenant de Pelladot - Tell-Abiad. : Lieutenant Pourra - Rakka : Capitaine Pourcel - Abou-Kemal. : Territoire autonome du Djebel-Druze. : Capitaine Prochasson - Souida. : Lieutenant Sergent - Soueida. : Capitaine Louvel - Chabah. : Lieutenant Grebessac - Salkad. : Controle des Tribus Bedouines. : Capitaine Meyer - Damas. : Capitaine Leroy - Palmyra. : Capitaine Terras - Maaret-el-Noman : : III. : Capitaine Gacon - Tripoli. : Lieutenant Riaucou - { : Lieutenant Hehrard - Merdjayoun.
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(I) INFANTRY

(a) Metropolitan Troops. (See Notes and Abbreviations.)

1. 9th R.T.A.

H.Q., and H.Q. Coy.

BEIRUT 1221

1st Bn.

KFAR SHIMMA 131209

and
KHALDE 127207

2nd Bn. (Comdt. Dillemann)

DERAA 183076

and
SHEIKH MISKINE 188099

3rd Bn

BEIRUT 1221

One Coy.

DJOUNEIH 140228

Two platoons.

HAMMANA 151210

2. 22 R.T.A.

H.Q., and H.Q. Coy.

SAIDA 117181

1st Bn. (Comdt. Trousseau)

MERDJAYOUN 136159

One Coy.

NABATIYEH 126161

2nd Bn. (Comdt. Belloi)

SAIDA 117181

Two coys.

MIYE MIYE 119179

3rd Bn. (Comdt. Laie)

KASMIYAH 105155

One Coy.

TYR 099148

One Coy.

ALMA ASH SHAB 098131

? Dets.

LABOUNA 095130

KH. JEREMIE 104131

RAMLET 109131

3. 16 R.T.T.

H.Q., and H.Q. Coy.

ALEPPO 293473

1st Bn

" "

2nd Bn

" "

One platoon

HAIR-DAJR

4.	10th North African. Half Brigade.		
	H.Q., and H.Q. Coy.	SOUEIDA	226085
	5/1 R.T.M.		
	One platoon	CHAHBA	232101
	4/16 R.T.T.	SOUEIDA	226085
	One Coy.	SALKHAD	240061
5.	6th Foreign Legion.		
	H.Q., and H.Q. Coy. (Col. Barre)	HOMS	241309
	1st Bn. (Comdt. Jouve)	"	"
	No.1 Coy. (Capt Delatre)	"	"
	No.2 Coy	" (Citadel)	"
	No.3 Coy. (Capt. Comiti)	" (Town)	"
	M.G. Coy. (Capt. Orsini)	" (Citadel)	"
	2nd Bn. (Comt Bricey)	BAAIBECK	195229
	No.4 Coy.	"	"
	No.5 Coy. (Capt. Michand)	"	"
	No.6 Coy. (Lt. Clement)	HOMS	241309
	M.G. Coy. (Capt. Potez)	BAALBEK	195229
	3rd Bn. ? (Comdt. Boitel)	DAMASCUS	204175
	(Dets in the forts around Damascus)		
	4th Bn. (Capt. Ourtamet)	KISSOUE	198157
	No.13 Coy. (Capt. Dobrowski)		
	No.14 Coy. (Capt. Laine)		
	No.15 Coy (Capt. Collot)	One Coy. is at PALMYRA	385289
	M.G. Coy. (Capt. Bonnot)		

(b) Colonial troops (See Notes and Abbreviations)

6. 24th R.I.C.

H.Q., and H.Q. Coy. (Col.G.Picot) TRIPOLI 058279

187888	ALMATAI	1st Bn	"	"
"	"	2nd Bn	"	"
207334	MASRIE	3rd Bn	One Coy.	BEIRUT 1221

7. 17th R.T.S.

187888	ALMATAI	H.Q. and H.Q. Coy. (Col.Horault?)	DAMASCUS	204175
170330	TARTOUS	1st Bn (Col.Millet)	QUNEITRA	158132
187888	ROAD	One Coy.	AIN ZIWAN	156129
		One Coy.	MANSURAH	155134
		Dets?	TELL ABU KHANZIR	152126
860380	DEIR ES ZOR		ALLEQA	146124
			TELL ABU EL NADA	155130
408450	RAQA	2nd Bn	DAMASCUS	204175
445280	TEL ABIAH	One Coy.	QADEM	201170
682380	ABU KEMAL	3rd Bn (Comdt Pacaud)	DAMASCUS	204175
645378	CAJCHILYK			
730388	DIRIK			
603310	HARBACH	1st B.M.T.S.	TRIPOLI	
818318	AMUD	2nd B.M.T.S.	BEIRUT	

(These Bns are self-contained and may be moved about rapidly)

136138	MENDALYON	1st B.C.I.		
138138	KHALI	Two Coys.		
160173	RACHAYA	One Pl.		
	SHURJI GHAMIM	2nd B.C.I.		
1381	BEIRUT	One Coy.		
151310	HABANA	One Coy.		
172330	ANKHILAS	3rd B.C.I.		
	"	One Coy.		
136318	TELL DIB	One Coy.		
172334	DOURAYE	One Coy.		

(c) Special troops (See notes and abbreviations)

8.	1st LEVANT Half-Brigade	H.Q.	LATTAKIA	157398
		2nd B.D.L. (Comdt. van Copenolle)	"	"
		One Coy.	MASSIAF	207357
		Two Pl.	KASAB	177442
		5th B.D.L. (Comdt Cottrelle)	LATTAKIA	157398
		One Coy.	TARTOUS	170330
		One Coy.	RUAD	163324
9.	2nd LEVANT half-brigade.	6th B.D.L. (Capt. Buisson)	DEIR EZ ZOR	560380
		One Coy.	RAQQA	408450
			and	
		One Pl.	TEL ABIAD	445580
		8th B.D.L. (Comdt. Berges)	ABU KEMAL	625280
		One Coy.	QAMICHLIYE	645573
		One Coy.	DERIK	730595
		One Coy.	HASSETCHE	603510
		Dets.	AMUDA	618578
			TEL ALLO	694558
			TAURAMISH	
			TELL KOTCHEK	719550
			RAS AL AIN	543547
10.	3rd LEVANT Half-brigade.	1st B.C.L.	MERDJAYOUN	136159
		Two Coys.	KHAIM	138155
		One Pl.	RACHAYA	160173
		2nd B.C.L.	SHUKRI GHANIM	
		One Coy.	BEIRUT	1221
		One Coy.	HAMMANA	151210
		3rd B.C.L.	ANTELIAS	137220
		One Coy	"	"
		One Coy	TELL DIB	136219
		One Coy	DOUBAYE	137224

11. Independent units

1st B.D.L. (Comdt Mahmoud)	TRIPOLI	058279
One Coy.	RAYAK	175213
One Coy.	TELL KALALK	200203
3rd B.D.L.	SAASA	177150
One Coy.	EZRAA	198102
4th B.D.L. (Comdt Souli)	ALEPPO	293473
One Pl.	IDLIB	235447
One Pl.	MAIDAN AKBES	240541
One Pl.	AZAZ	274515
7th B.D.L.	HAMA	245354

12. C.L.D. (Meharistes) Mech and Camel

1st C.L.D. (Capt. Fourier) (Recently reinforced by 2 mech. secs)	DMLIR	238188
? det (camels)	MELAH	254053
2nd C.L.D. (recently reinforced by 1 mech. sec.)	DEIR EZ ZOR	560380
One Armd. Car Sec.	HASSETCHE	606510
3rd C.L.D. (recently reinforced by 2 mech. sec.)	PALMYRA	385289
Dets.	ABU SHAMAT	
" " " "	ZILAF	300110
" " " "	TENF	425173

(II) ARTILLERY

(a) Metropolitan

13. 1st R.A.M.L.

H.Q., and H.Q. Bty.

DAMASCUS

1st Gp. (mountain, semi-mech)

BAALBEK

195229

One Bty 105 mm

"

"

One Bty 65 mm

"

"

2nd Gp. (Motorised)

DAMASCUS

Three Btys 105 mm (long)

"

One Bty 47 mm A/T

"

3rd Gp. (Motorised A.A.)

RAYAK

176213

One Bty. 75 mm

"

"

One Bty 75 mm.

DAMASCUS

One Bty. 75 mm.

ABLAH

172214

4th Gp. (Low-flying A.A. motorised)

ZAHLE

166212

One Bty. 25 mm.

"

"

(10th) " " " "

BLIRUT

1221

(12th) " " " "

ALEPPO

293473

(11th) " " " "

RAYAK

176213

Attached sections

One sec. 75 mm A/T

QUNEITRA

156133

" " " " "

SHEIKH WISKINE

188099

" " " " "

DERA'A

183076

" " old fortress guns DAMASCUS

14. 2nd R.A.M.L.

H.Q., & H.Q., Bty.

ALEPPO

293473

1st Gp. (horsed)

"

"

Two Btys. 75 mm

"

"

2nd Gp.

One Bty. 75 mm (Lorryborne)

ALEPPO

293473

One Bty. 65 mm (" ")

LATTAKIA

157398

One Bty. mixed 65 mm and 75 mm (Lorryborne)

DEIR EZ ZOR

560380

One Coastal Defence Bty (in course of formation)

LATTAKIA

157398

15. R.A.C.L.

H.Q., and H.Q. Bty.

BEIRUT 1221

1st Gp. (Motorised)

One Bty 155 mm. BEIRUT 1221

One Bty 75 mm " "

Not clear whether these sections are independent or attached to 1st Gp. (One Sec. 75 mm A/T TYR 100148 (One Sec. 75 mm A/T MERDJAYOUN 135159

2nd Gp. (mountain)

1/2 Bty 105 mm QUNEITRA 156133

1/2 Bty 65 mm " "

3rd Gp. (Coastal Defence)

7th Bty. 145 mm BEIRUT (Lighthouse)

8th Bty. 164 mm " (Dog River)

9th Bty (half 90mm half 75 mm) TRIPOLI

4th Gp.

10th Bty 75 mm. BEIRUT (Soap works)

11th Bty 75 mm. " (Bir Hassan)

13th Bty 75 mm TRIPOLI

16. Foreign Legion Artillery Gp.

Three Btys. 75 mm. HOMS 241309

(b) Special

Attached

Lebanese mountain artillery battery 65 mm HASBAYA 145163

Lebanese Coastal Defence 75 mm, half at BEIRUT (Lazaret)

" " " (Quarantine)

(III) CAVALRY and mechanised units.

(a) Metropolitan

17.	6th R.A.C. (Tanks and Armd. Cars)	BEIRUT	1221
	5th (Armd Car) Sqn.	ALEPPO	293473
	4th (Light Tank) Sqn.	"	"
	7th R.A.A. (Tanks and Armd. Cars)		
	H.Q., and 1st Gp.	DAMASCUS	
	2nd Gp.	ABLAH	172214

18.	4th Tunisian Spahis (Comdt. Quatrebarbes)		
	5th Sqn.	TYR	099148
	6th Sqn. (Capt. Poitn)	MERDJAYOUN	135159
	less dets (Lieut Dercoufile)	ADEISSE	131147
		METULLA	135150
	(Lieut. Coq.)	BLIDA	129134

19.	1st Moreccan Spahis (Comdt de Chaleon)	ALEPPO	
	? One Sqn.	TRIPOLI	

20.	1/8 Algerian Spahis	BEIRUT	1221
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(b) Special troops. (See Notes and Abbreviations)

21.	Gp. Levant Line Cavalry.		
	H.Q.	HOMS	241309
	3rd Sqn.	"	"
	4th Sqn.	HAMA	245354

22.	Gp. Chasseurs Libanais.		
	H.Q. (Comdt. Taillet)	TYR	099148
	One Sqn. Dets at	BINT JEBAIL	121132
		BLIDA	129134
		TIBNIN	119140
		REMEICHE	115127
	One Sqn. (? de la Chauvelaix)	MIYEMIYE	119179

23. Gp. E.L.Dj.

H.Q.	HASSETCHE	606510
21st Sqn	RAS AL AIN	543547
One Tp.	DEIR BISSIE	593574
23rd Sqn.	HASSETCHE	606510
24th Sqn.	AIN AROUS	445580
25th Sqn.	QAMACHILYE	645573
28th Sqn.	DERIK	730595

24. Gp. E.L.N.S.

H.Q.	ALEPPO	293473
19th Sqn.	IDLIB	235447
20th Sqn.	HAFTE	180406.
26th Sqn.	BAB	315491
27th Sqn.	AZAZ	273514
Two Tps.	RADJOU	235525

25. Gp. L.E.Dr.

H.Q. (Capt. de la Barge Certeau)	SOUEIDA	226085
1st Sqn.	CHAABA	232101
2nd Sqn.	SOUEIDA	226085
3rd Sqn.	AL ANATE	249045
? det	IMTAN	250053
4th Sqn.	Ghariye	234050
Dets	DIBINE	226055
	UMMEL RUMMANE	238045
	KH. AWAD	239043

26. Gp. L.L. Tch.

H.Q. (Capt. de la Joliniere)	DAMASCUS	
12th Sqn. (Capt. de la Guerrinere)	QUNEITRA	156133.
1 tp.	NAIRUN	144122
1 tp.	AIN SEMSEN	146121
1 tp.	KABIR HARIM	

(Probably dets. at ALLEQA (146123) and FIQ (145083) as well. (Not confirmed)

26. (continued)

13th Sqn. (Capt. de Carmejane)	BANIAS	145146
1 Tp.	MASRADE	151145
(probably Dets. at EL MORHEUR ECH CHAABA but not confirmed)	EL GHAJA (near AIN FITE)	143148
	RHADJAR	146144
	AIN FITE	139149
		146144
14th Sqn. (? Capt. Sarazin)	BOSRA	209065
(probably dets. at but not confirmed)	TAIBE	196069
	NASSIB	190088
	SAHAM DJOLAN	191071
15th Sqn. (Lieut. Lonisson)	DUMA	212181
16th Sqn. (? Capt. Blondel)	DERA'A	183076
1 Tp	KARAKH	
1 Tp	YADOUDE	179081
(probably Dets. at but not confirmed)	TAFAS	180088
	CHADJARA	162093
18th Sqn.	KISSOUE	198159

27. Gp. Partizans Tcherkess

It is reported that seven Sqns. have been raised, viz. 36th, 37th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 41st and 42nd. The 41st and 42nd were reported to be motorised and commanded by Capt. Colteaux de Coumont. The Sqns. were said to be in the DAMASCUS area.

A usually reliable source gives the following locations of eleven Partizan Sqns., but not their numbers. It is therefore probable that the seven Sqns. previously reported are included, but the location of the motorised Sqns cannot be determined.

H.Q.	EZRAA	197103
30th Sqn.	"	"
1st Gp. One Sqn.	KOCHRLJIH	
One Sqn.	KHISFINEJEH ?	157102
2nd Gp. One Sqn.	DERA'A	183076
One Sqn.	TELL SHAHAR	170083
3rd Gp. One Sqn.	YUBAL AL KASHAB	
One Sqn.	HADOR	? 239073
4th Gp. One Sqn.	NAVE	
One Sqn.	SHEIKH SAAD	176100
5th Gp. One Sqn.	SANAMAIN	191126
One Sqn.	KHABBAD	200122.

28.	<u>Special Light Motor M.G. Platoon.</u>		
	No.1 platoon	HQMS	241309
	No.2 Platoon	LATTAKIA	157398
	Light Armd. Car Unit (Capt. Verriere)	TYR	100148

(IV) TRANSPORT.

(a) Metropolitan Troops.

29.	<u>29th Train</u>	BEIRUT	1221
	H.Q.	"	"
	No.2 Coy. (horsed & mech.)	"	"
	No.102 Coy. (Mech.)	"	"
	No.1 Coy. (horsed)	DAMASCUS	
	No.101 Coy. (Mech.)	"	

30. Motor Transport Group.

	H.Q.	BORJH BRAJNE	131212
	626 Coy.	" "	"
	628 Coy.	HADITH	131210
	Depot	BEIRUT	

(b) Special Troops (See Notes and Abbreviations)

	One Syrian Coy. (Mech)	ALEPPO	293473
	One Lebanese sec. (Mech.)	BEIRUT.	

(V) ENGINEERS.

(a) Metropolitan troops.

32. 33rd Bn. Sappers and Miners.

	H.Q., and one Coy.	BEIRUT	
	One Coy.	DAMASCUS	
	One Coy.	ALEPPO	293473
	<u>86th Bn. Sappers and Miners</u>	TRIPOLI	

33. 43rd Communication Bn.
 H.Q. BEIRUT
 One Telegraph Coy. " "
 One W/T Coy. " "
 One Coy. (mixed W/T and telegraph) ALEPPO
 " " " " " " DAMASCUS

34. 1st Bn. Indo-Chinese (Labour)
 " H.Q. BEIRUT
 " (One Coy. (horse)) " "
 " One Coy. (horse) ALEPPO
 " One Coy. (horse) DAMASCUS
 " One Coy. (horse) ABLAH 172214

35. 631st Bn. Madagascar (Labour)
 H.Q. and One Coy. BEIRUT
 " One Coy. KUSSAIR 229285
 " One Coy. TRIPOLI
 " One Coy. TALIA 185221

(b) Special Troops. (See Notes and Abbreviations)
 36. Sapper-Miner Coy. BEIRUT
 Railway Coy. EZRAA 197103
 Telegraph Coy. BEIRUT

(VI) WORKSHOPS.

37. P.R.R.E.M. BEIRUT
 P.A.R.E.M. DAMASCUS
 P.A.R.E.M. ALEPPO

REPORT ON THE WATER SUPPLY IN SOUTHERN SYRIA

Reference Maps:- Levant 1:200,000 (to which co-ordinates refer).
GSGS 25551 1:1,000,000.
Palestine & Transjordan 1:250,000.

1. GENERAL

It can be assumed that there is an ample supply of water in all the larger towns, but in villages the supply is more precarious... While some villages have a plentiful supply all the year round, others run short of water towards the end of summer. There are certain perennial streams, numbers of good wells, but villages not possessing these rely on cisterns or storage tanks often cut out of the rock. These are called birkets or Birkas.

2. PERENNIAL STREAMS.

- (a) Area S. and S.W. of DAMASCUS. Perennial streams run from:-
 - (i) GHARIYE (193082) past TELL SHEHAB (170083 into the YARMUK.
 - (ii) WADI EL HARIR from Cheik MESKINE (188098) into the YARMUK.
 - (iii) The Nahr el Auaj from E. slopes of Mt. Hermon through KISSOUE (198157) to the BAHRET HIJJANA (230150) the mud-flats 25 S.E. of DAMASCUS. A branch runs past GHABAGAHIB village (195138).
 - (iv) From the S.W. slopes of Mt. Hermon runs the WADI ASSEL, which joins the upper reaches of the JORDAN about 6 miles S.E. of METULLA, and several other small streams.
- (b) Southern LEBANON.
 - (i) The River LITANI runs from near RAYAK (176213) past MERDJAYOUN (135159) into the sea just North of TYR (100148).
 - (ii) NAHR EL SAHRAR, the NAHR ES SARUNIE and several other streams run from the LEBANON Hills into the Mediterranean between TYR and BEIRUT. These are shown on the map.

3. BEIRUT WATER SUPPLY

There is a large irrigation scheme in connection with Lake YAMMOUNE (175243) which is in the hills about 12 miles N.W. of BHALBLEA. It is reported that there are fourteen municipal sources of supply which produce together 35,000 cubic metres of water per day, or approximately 2½ million gallons, of which 11,000 are available for BEIRUT.

4. WELLS.

- (a) HAURAN AREA.
 - (i) Wells with pumps and abundant water.
 - KHIRBET EL GHAZALEH (101089)
 - EL HAREK (203089)
 - KEREK HAURAN (206083)
 - (ii) Wells with pumps - water sufficient for local use only.
 - BISRA EL HARIRI (206099).
 - M'ALMEH DER'A (188078).
 - OTHAMN (185081).
 - EL YADOUDEH (178082).

/(iii) Wells with pumps and

(iii) Wells with pumps and engine.

JASIA (180117).
 EL HARREH (175125).
 KIRFEH.

(b) JEBEL DRUZE AND EASTERN HAURAN.

UM EL MEYADEEN (192072) with engine. Supply poor, dries up after much pumping.
 EL MUSEIFIREH (205076) Wells 2 - 3 Km from village.
 SHAHBA (232101). Several wells.
 BOSRA ESKI SHAM (219064). Good wells at BOSRA.
 SUWEIDA (225085). Excellent wells, water sufficient for 5,000 men per day.
 EL MUJEMIR (223072) (Village of BERJES EL HANOUD).
 SEHWAT HILMAWI (village of HAMZEH EL DERWISH).
 EL QURAYYAH (229066) (village of SULTAN EL ATRASH).

5. SPRINGS.

(a) HAURAN.

TABAKAT EZZEIDI.	The Spring of this	} All these water Springs have pumps and engines. The quantity is sufficient for 1,000 to 1,500 men only.
SAIDA (DER'A) (195076).	well is in difficult country.	
EL JIZEH (203070)	Spring	} sufficient for 1,000 to 1,500 men only.
KEHEIL (199076)	Spring.	
KHIRBEH (215072)	Spring.	
SHAIKH SAAD (176100)	Big Spring.	} Several big springs and reservoir.
NAWA (178105)	Several big springs and reservoir.	
TEL EL JABI (170108)	- ditto -	} Several good springs.
EL MESMIEH (210132)	Several good springs.	
DIER 'ALI	- ditto -	} Spring with pumps and engine.
KEFRE SHEMS (185131)	Spring with pumps and engine.	
AZRU'	A big spring with engine and pump for the use of the Army.	} A good Spring.
TAFIS (180088)	A good Spring.	
DA'IL (185090)	Small spring in a well,	

(b) JEBEL DRUZE AND EASTERN HAURAN

South and South east of SUAIDA there are a number of springs, including a very good one at BEDR, see para (7). There are no Springs South of SALKAD.

Springs exist at:-

EL TAIYIBE (195069) Spring 4 to 5 km. from the village.
 SALKHAD (240061). Many springs.
 DEBBIN (235055) (Village of FARIS AL ATRASH).
 IRSAS (225078)) A Spring at KLEIB HAURAN supplies
 ARRA (222075)) ample water which runs in the Wadi.

6. CISTERNS AND RESERVOIRS.

(a) During the advance of General Allenby's cavalry in the autumn of 1918, water was found in cisterns and was often the only supply. Reliance cannot, however, be placed on cisterns except during the late autumn, winter and spring, when there is plenty of rain. In summer the water becomes scarce and undrinkable owing to animal dirt and carelessness.

/(b) In JEBEL DRUZE and

(b) In JEBEL DRUZE and Eastern HAURAN.

NASIB (190068). Rain storage cisterns.
 ET TAIYIBE (195069) Rain water storage tanks.
 WADI EZ-ZEIDI (200070). Big reservoirs from which water is supplied to ET TAIYIBE village.
 EL MOSEIFIREH (205077) Cisterns and springs.
 UM WALAD (215079) Cisterns.
 BOSRA ESKI SHAM (219065). Very big cistern, small spring, good wells as BOSRA.
 ANAZ (238051) Cisterns.
 SUWAIDA (225085) There are two engines for pumps, one at EL MESKHAR and the other in the Fort. Water is reported to be sufficient for 5,000 men per day. No details as to tanks.
 SHAHBA (232102) A reinforced reservoir has been constructed for the military post.
 UM RUMIAN (231053) (village of HAMED EL ATRASH). Cisterns and a spring 2 - 3 kms. from the village.

(7) PIPED WATER SUPPLY IN SOUTHERN JEBEL DRUZE.

(a) The source of the supply is a spring called BEDR, near the road from SUWAIDA to SALKHAD and about half-way between these two towns.

(b) The water from this spring is collected in a Reservoir from which it is piped to a tank on the top of the citadel rock at SALKHAD.

(c) The citadel of SALKHAD is built on a very steep narrow rocky crag, which must be several hundred feet high, and is only accessible by one path. On the small platform at the top are built 3 or 4 barrack huts, in which one company of infantry used to be stationed. On this platform, and about 20 yards from the nearest hut, is the water cistern. This reservoir is a distribution centre for the southern villages, and is fed from one pipe coming from the North, while the exit pipes are controlled by a row of turn cocks. This cistern measures about six metres by six metres by 4 or 5 metres deep. It will be seen from this that this SALKHAD cistern is not a large reservoir, but merely a distribution centre. The water is said to be running through it almost continuously.

(d) The water destined for the frontier villages is reported to go from SALKHAD to a further cistern at TELL AL HABAS, between SALKHAD and the village of MASHQUQ. The water has now reached all frontier villages, including IMTAN (250052), ANAT (249045), KHIRBET AWWAD (240041), SOMMA (245052), MASHQUQ (241053), SHANIRA (245048).

(e) Every village is to be provided with a cistern 4 metres by 4 x 4, from which water is to be distributed to taps and animal water troughs.. No storage tanks have as yet been erected in the frontier villages of ANAT and KIRBET AWWAD, but in the latter village the pipes supply runs with the old village cistern or birket.

(f) The central distributing cistern at TELL AL HABS is said to measure approximately 20 x 20 x 8 metres (to be accepted with reserve). From this reservoir three pipes branch off -

- (i) S.E. to IMTAN (250052)
- (ii) South to SOMMA (SAMMEL EL BARADANE) (245052) SHANIRA (CHENNIRE) (245048) and ANAT (249045).
- (iii) South and South West to MASHQUQ (241051) (MECHKTAK) ANZ (238051) GHARIYA (233050) and KHIRBET AWWAD (KHIRBET ABUAD) (240041). (Spellings in brackets refer to French map).

/ (g) A trench for a

(g) A trench for a water pipe is reported to be being dug between SALKHAD and BOSRA (218064). This may be with a view to supplying BOSRA from the SALKHAD system.

BOSRA, being in the HAURAN and SALKHAD in the JEBEL DRUZE, such an arrangement for supply BOSRA with water from a system paid for by the JEBEL DRUZE budget would be unlikely in peace time, but may be a war time measure.

(h) There are many catchment cisterns in the JEBEL DRUZE which contain ample water in the winter and as late as April or May. In the autumn this water would not be available.

(i) The only water on the TRANSJORDAN side of the frontier is from deep drilled wells at MAFFRAQ and H.5. Otherwise the nearest water is at AZRAQI and SHELLALA wells between REMTHA and IRBID. There is a small well at JAWA, approximately 350170.

(v) PIPED WATER SUPPLY IN SOUTHERN JEBEL DRUZE

(a) The source of the supply is a spring called BARR near the road from SUWALDA to SALKHAD and about half-way between these two towns.

(b) The water from this spring is collected in a reservoir from which it is piped to a tank on the top of the citadel rock at SALKHAD. 17th January 1941.

(c) The citadel rock at SALKHAD is built on a very steep narrow rocky crag, which must be several hundred feet high, and is only accessible by one path. On the small platform at the top are built 3 or 4 barrack huts, in which one company of infantry used to be stationed. On this platform, and about 20 yards from the nearest but, is the water cistern. This reservoir is a distribution centre for the southern villages, and is fed from a pipe coming from the North, while the exit pipes are controlled by a row of turn cocks. This cistern measures about six metres by six metres by 4 or 5 metres deep. It will be seen from this that this SALKHAD cistern is not a large reservoir, but merely a distribution centre. The water is said to be running through it almost continuously.

(d) The water destined for the frontier villages is reported to go from SALKHAD to a further cistern at TELL AL HABAS, between SALKHAD and the village of MASHQUN. The water has now reached all frontier villages, including DAN (23002), AMAT (23003), KHIRRET AWAD (24001), SOMMA (24002), MASHQUN (21003), SHAKIRA (24003).

(e) Every village is to be provided with a cistern 4 metres by 4 x 4, from which water is to be distributed to taps and animal water troughs. The storage tanks have as yet been erected in the frontier villages of AMAT and KHIRRET AWAD, but in the latter village the pipes supply runs with the old village cistern or birket.

(f) The central distributing cistern at TELL AL HABAS is said to measure approximately 20 x 20 x 8 metres (to be covered with reservoir) from which three pipes branch off -

- (i) 2.5 to 3 km (23002)
- (ii) South to SOMMA (24001) and AMAT (24002)
- (iii) South and South West to MASHQUN (21003) and KHIRRET AWAD (24001)

(g) A trench for a

NOTES on French troops in SYRIA.

1. SYRIA is divided into six military commands:-
ALAOUITES, NORTH SYRIA, DJEZIREH, SOUTH SYRIA, JEBEL DRUZE, LEBANON.
2. Troops in SOUTH SYRIA and JEBEL DRUZE are commanded by General DELHOMME with Col. BOUVIER commanding in JEBEL DRUZE.
3. (a) Troops in JEBEL DRUZE are :-
10th North African half Brigade.
Druze Light Cavalry.
Probably some partizan cavalry.
- (b) Dispositions.
The Druze Light Cavalry and partizans on the frontier. The 10th North African half brigade in reserve in SOUEIDA area.
4. (a) Troops in SOUTH SYRIA are:-
- | | |
|------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| One tank and armd. car Regt. | Five gps. Partizans. |
| Six Infantry Bns. | One bty. 47 mm. A/T. |
| Two Light Desert Coys. | Three secs. 75 mm. A/T. |
| Seven Sqns. native Cav. | Six lorry borne 75 and 65 mm. |
- (b) Dispositions:-
On the frontier. Native Cav. Partizans, two Inf. Bns., and A/T artillery.
In the desert. Two light Desert Coys.
In reserve. Four Inf. Bns., one Tanked Armd. Car Regt., Six lorry borne btys.
5. (a) Troops in the LEBANON under command of Col. BEUCLER.
- | | | | |
|--------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|
| 14 Inf. Bns. | 2 mountain btys. | 2 horsed btys. | 7 A.A. btys. |
| 7 Cav. Sqns. | 5 motorised btys. | 1 A/T bty. | 5 C.D. btys. |
- (b) Dispositions:-
On the frontier 2 Cav. Sqns. and 2 Inf. bns.
Coast 1 Cav. Sqn. and 5 Inf. bns.
Remainder in reserve.
6. (a) Troops in NORTH SYRIA and JEZIRAH commanded by Col. ROTTIER.
- | | | | |
|------------|------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| 6 Inf Bns. | 8 Cav. Sqns. | 1 Light Desert Coy. | 1 Armd. Car Sqn. |
| 1 bty A.A. | 1 Light Tank Sqn | 2 lorried btys. | |
- (b) Dispositions:-
Cav. in posts along the frontier.
Remainder in centres such as ALEPPO, DEIR EZ ZOR, QAMICHLYE.
7. Troops in ALAOUITES commanded by Col. JORDAN.
- | | | |
|-------------|-----------------|-------------|
| 2 Inf. Bns. | 1 motor m.g.pl. | 1 C.D. bty. |
| 1 Cav. Sqn. | 1 bty lorried | |

9th April, 1941

SUMMARY OF ORDER OF BATTLE

FRENCH TROOPS.

G.O.C. and 2nd i/c	Gen. DENTZ, Gen. FOUGERES
Lebanon	Col. BEUCLER
South Syria	Gen. DELHOMME
North Syria	Col. ROTTIER
Alaouites	Col. JORDAN
Jebel Druze	Col. BOUVIER
Djezireh	Col. ARDOUIN

I N F A N T R Y

Regiment	Personnel	Vehicles		Guns			Page	
		Horsed	M.T.	L.M.G.	M.G.	25m.m. Mortars A/T		
9 R.T.A.	3000	190	60	110	50	12	17	1
22 R.T.A.	3000	190	60	110	50	12	17	1
16 R.T.T.	2200	140	53	74	34	10	13	1
10th 1/2 Br. N.A.	2200	140	53	74	34	10	13	2
6th Foreign Legion	3850	240	67	148	64	14	22	2
24 R.I.C.	2600	155	55	95	40	10	17	3
17 R.T.S.	3000	190	60	110	50	12	17	3
1st B.M.T.S.	800	60	15	36	16	-	5	3
2nd B.M.T.S.	800	60	15	36	16	-	5	3
TOTAL	21,450	1,365	438	793	354	80	126	

C A V A L R Y

Regiment	Personnel	Vehicles		Guns			Page			
		Horsed	M.T.	Armd Cars	Armd Lorries	Tanks		L.M.G.	M.G.	25m.m. A/T
6th C.d'A	1000?	-	20	14	37	45	-	-	-	8
7th C.d'A	1000?	-	20	14	37	45	-	-	-	8
4th R.S.T.	700	20	34	-	-	-	40	8	4	8
1st R.S.M.	700	20	49	-	-	-	40	8	4	8
1/8 R.S.A.	350	10	20	-	-	-	20	4	2	8
TOTAL	3,750	50	143	28	74	90	100	16	10	

■ ■ ■
ARTILLERY

Regiment	Personnel	Guns			A.A.		A/T	Coast	Page		
		65	75	105C	105L	155	25			75	47
1st R.A.M.L.	2500 (approx)	4	18	4	12	-	24	-	8	-	6
2nd R.A.M.L.	1000 (")	8	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	6
R.A.C.L.	2200 (")	2	8	2	-	4	-	12	-	12	7
Foreign Legion Arty. Gp	550 (")	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	6,050	14	54	6	12	4	24	12	8	16	

SPECIAL TROOPS

INFANTRY

Regiment	Approx. Strength	Page
1st Levant Half Bde	1600	4
2nd. " " "	1600	4
3rd " " "	2500	4
1st B.D.L.	800	5
3rd B.D.L.	800	5
4th B.D.L.	800	5
7th B.D.L.	800	5
C.L.D. (1,2 & 3)	900	5
TOTAL	9,800	

CAVALRY

Regiment	Approx. Strength	Page
Esc. du Levant (2)	300	8
Chasseurs Libanais	300	8
E.L.Dj.	800	9
E.L.N.S.	600	9
E.L.Dv.	600	9
E.L.Tch.	900	9
Partisans Tch.	1800	9
TOTAL	5,300	10

ARTILLERY

Regiment	Approx. Strength	Page
Bty. Libanais de montagne	150	7
Bty. Libanais de cote	200	7
TOTAL	350	7

SYRIAN POLITICAL PARTIES.

PARTY. Arab Name.	Authorised English Translation.	Leading Personalities.	Political Aims.	Remarks.
(1) Hai'at Ash Sha'biya ash Shahbandariyeh.	The Peoples' Party.	(1) Hassan Hakim. Said Haidar. Zaki el Khatib. Sh. Mohamed el Ashmer. Dr. Munir Ajlani. Fawzi el Bakri. Nazi el Mouayiad. Osman el Sharabati. Sultan Pasha el Atrash. Khalil Matouk.	Favour a loose federation of Arab States under the aegis of GREAT BRITAIN, i.e. SYRIA, PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN.	Anti-GERMAN. Have lost influence since the murder of Dr. Shahbandar. They favour the Amir Abdullah as head of the Federation.
(2) El Qutla el Wataniya.	The National Bloc.	(2) Jamil Mardam. Saadullah Jabri. Lutfi el Haffar. Ihsan Jabri. Nabeh el Azmeh. Hashim El Atashi. Dr. Kayyali. Shukri el Kuwatli. Fakhri el Baroudi. Jamil Ibrahim Pasha of ALEPPO.	Opposed to Syrian Popular Party (see Serial 5). Against all foreign interference in SYRIA.	The Party is divided into two main groups. The larger group follows Jamil Mardam and the smaller comprising the Istiqlal follow Shukri Kawatli. The larger Party is again divided - Southern Area under the leadership of Jamil Mardam and the Northern Area under Jamil El Ibrahim Pasha of ALEPPO and Dr. Kayyali. Jamil Mardam is said to favour a Federation of SYRIA with IRAQ. The Party is pro-GERMAN.
(3) Hizb el Istiqlal.	Istiqlal Group of the National Bloc.	Shukri Kuwatli. Adib Khair. Riad Sulh. Nabeeh El Azmeh. Adel el Azmeh. Ihsan El Jabri. Afif El Sulh. Shakib Arslan.	Working for complete independence and a union of SYRIA and PALESTINE under Ibn Saud.	Has GERMAN connections. Pro-Nazi. A part of the National Bloc. Is in very close touch with Ibn Saud.

PARTY. Arab Name.	Authorised English Translation.	Leading Personalities.	Political Aims.	Remarks.
(4) Usbat el Amal el Qaumi.	League League of National Action.	Fahmi el Mahayri. Abdul Kadir Midimi. Ahmed Sharabati. Shafiq Sulieman. Abu el Hada El Yaffe.	Freedom of foreign control.	Directed from IRAQ. Now said to be cooperating with the National Bloc.
(5) Hizb el Qaumi as Souri.	Syrian Popular Party.	Anton Sa'adeh. Kamil Kamil (Druze). Maamoun Ayas. Asa'ad el Ashghar. Mansour Abedin.	Independence, favouring complete Pan-Arab federation, with strong Nazi/Fascist tendencies.	Membership reported to be 20,000/30,000 with branches in LEBANON, SYRIA, PALESTINE and TRANSJORDAN. Leaders paid by Nazis.
(6) Hizb el Amal as Souri.	National Labour Party.	Othman el Sharbati. Fuad Rossin.		Affiliated to Syrian Popular Party.
(7) Hizb el Dastouri.	Constitutional Party.	Sh. Bishara El Khouri.		Lebanese. Mainly Maronite. Pro-British. Is opposed by Emile Iddeh and Khair El Din Ef Abdab.
(8) Hizb el Shio' as Souri.	Syrian Communist Party.	Khalid Baghdash.	Communist revolution.	Claims 40,000 members of which 40% are Armenian.
(9) Wadi el Arab.	The Arab Club.	Said Fattah el Imam.		Affiliated to Syrian Popular Party. Pro-German.

PARTY. Arab Name.	Authorised English Translation.	Leading Personalities.	Political Aims.	Remarks.
(10) Nadi el Ittihad el Arabi.	The Arab Unity Club.			
(11) Nadi el Ayoubi.	The Ayoubi Club.			
(12) Hizb el Mustakil.	Independent Party.			
(13) Other organisations of little importance are :-		Kata'ib el Lilnaniya, Najjadi el Islamiya. Qumsan el Haddadiya. Hizb Allah. Hai'at al Ulema. Independent Youth Movement.		

Jerusalem,
11th November, 1940.


SECRET

2/16

The attached information is subject to correction by air photographs.

ROUTE 3


SAMAKH - QUNEITRA - DAMASCUS (145 km)
 (All bridges prepared for demolition).



ROUTE 70.

MAFRAQ - DERRA - DAMASCUS. (Distance 91 miles)

All bridges capacity 20 tons prepared for demolition.




(NOTE: Concrete road blocks at DERRA and SHEIKH MISKINE are placed so that a detour would necessitate passing over rocky or marshy ground.)

Jerusalem.
2nd June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

ROUTE 2513.

SAFAD - MERDJAYOUN - QABB ELIASS - ZAHLE (Distance 83 1/2 miles)




2nd June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan

ROUTE 2502.

MERDJAYOUN - RACHAYA - ZAHLE. (Distance 80 kms - 50 miles)




Jerusalem.
2nd June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

ROUTE 1.

RAS NAQOURA - BEIRUT (Distance 66 3/4 miles)

All bridges will take 20 tons, except that over Nahr Awaillah.




General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

2nd June 1941.

ROUTE 58

QUNEITRA - MERDJAYOUN - SAIDA. (Distance 57 miles).



June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence) British Forces in Palestine & T. J.

NOTES ON SUGGESTED METHOD
OF TREATING FRENCH GARRISONS.

1. Vast numbers of the French tps in Syria dislike the idea of firing either on British tps or on Free French tps. They are, however, professional soldiers and will feel themselves in honor bound to defend the posns allocated to them. The extent to which honor will drive them in this direction is problematical and it is felt that if a genuine pretext were available for ceasing resistance it would probably be accepted.
2. The best pretext to offer is the maximum possible force and air attack or outflanking and encirclement movements on the ground would have a decided effect in this direction. It is imperative that there must be an air or land bombardment immediately resistance is offered in order to provide a suitable pretext for yielding.
3. Seizure of their command posts and the issue of orders from such posts is also an important factor as orders from this source would more readily be obeyed.
4. Senior off rs are the greatest danger. If captured they must be completely segregated from junior offrs and men and allowed no contacts whatever. Junior offrs should be segregated from the men and allowed no contacts.
5. Food will have a great appeal and bread, coffee and wine would be most acceptable as there is a shortage in these commodities.
6. Pamphlets are being prepared together with the location of units and the best methods of approach to each. French-speaking British offrs and possibly some French offrs will accompany the fwd tps.
7. A suggested theme upon which to build up a story is that we are here to win the war for the French and free them from the Germans - therefore, why fight?
8. Demonstrations in force and an obvious determination to employ it immediately, and, if necessary, an actual application of maximum force is the most likely means to avoid serious fighting and thereby casualties.

For issue down to P/Guards

APPX V

COY REPORTS & RECOMMENDATIONS

CC
2/36 Bn

Report on D Coy 2/16 Bn

This coy crossed the frontier opposite YAROUN at 0115 hrs 8 Jun and reached the town at 0200 hrs. It was much larger & more straggling than it offered from our side of the frontier.

It was difficult to find the military post & as our two guides could not speak a word of English we had to search around ourselves.

We found the post at 0224 hrs and Lieut Atkinson & myself with one of my orderlys smashed in the door and we got 7 Spahis, 1 LMG & 8 horses plus gear, amm etc.

No 1 sec under Cpl Weick were put in charge of the prisoners, horses & LMG & took them all back to the frontier where a truck waited for him. It was now very dark & it took nearly an to collect the coy and get moving on our next objective BENNT JBAIL. We marched 3 miles across the hills on the goat track in one hour and not one man dropped out. It was first light as we got to the town so we decided to push straight on to the Barracks.

As we commenced to cross the market square we came under rifle fire from thr front in the rear of the Barracks. Mr Barnett led 18 Pl round the left and I moved with 17 Pl round to the right. I heard heavy LMG & rifle fire from the left & it turned out 18 Pl had got into the main rd & ran into approx 70/80 spahis saddling up & withdrawing north.

They were engaged & six horses were dropped & we killed one French offr & six Spahis & captured 1 French soldier & 2 Spahis & wounded 2 more Spahis. Mr Barnett was seriously wounded & 1 OR was wounded.

I then captured the local police station with the police force & 5 custom officials.

The whole action only lasted about five minutes. I left No 2 & 3 secs of 16 Pl to hold the town & pushed on to AIN EBEL with the rest of the coy ie. 2 Pls and coy HQ, myself & 2 orderlys. We found no enemy there but was told that 3 French offr & 40 Spahis had withdrawn northwards at 0430 hrs. I left 2 secs to hold the town & made back to BENNT JBAIL with the remainder.

We searched the town ~~etc~~ & got 1 MMG, 3 LMG amm posts saddlery etc. At 1300 hrs we handed over to the 2/2 Pioneer Bn & joined the main body which was still moving through the town.

In the attack on the Latani River we were in res but were ordered to get 3 LMGs fwd at first light to assist the fwd coys fire power & to hand 2 LMGs over to the Carrier Pl. We also supplied 2 parties each of 24 men to carry fwd the assault boats for A & C coys. The party with A coy did not return & 7 of them got across the river with the pl of A coy.

At approx 0730 hrs we were ordered fwd by the CO. I sent Lieut Atkinson fwd to recce while I brought the coy fwd.

When we got behind the buildings I found B & part of A coy held up by mortar fire & MG fire from the right flank.

Maj Potts told me A coy were to try & get fwd at 0800 hrs followed by B & then by this coy.

We waited 15 mins & nothing happened & then orders came from the rear to get D coy onto the Bridge head.

We formed up - pls - extended line & doubled through the MG fire.

I moved with Lieut Atkinson at the head of 18 pl (which had just been taken over by Lieut Elphick - place of Lieut Barnett) followed 16 pl followed by coy HQ.

We got through to the river bank with 18 pl & Lieut Atkinson went back to get 16 pl & the rest of the coy. He brought fwd 16 pl & a sec of 17 pl. We found out later the Pl Comd was a casualty & the whole of coy HQ, - ord room Cpl, 2 runners & 2 sigs had been knocked out by mortar bombs.

We then pushed round to the right along the bank to where A coy's assault boat was & got the coy across. I went fwd

with 6 men & covered the landing on the other Bank & Mr Atkinson brought the other over 6 at a time. Our strength was then approx 70 with 5 LMGs.

We then moved round to the right to clean up the MG posts on the right flank.

We ran into Lieut Sublet who had 28 men (incl 7 D coy). He had two secs fwd of the br head held up by MG posts & was also moving to the right with his other sec.

We got within 500x of the posts & Mr Atkinson tried to get round the front while we gave covering fire but he could not move at all as the MG fire was intense.

We left A coys sec & 2 LMGs of ours to engage the posts & withdrew to the river Bank.

I then sent Lieuts Atkinson & Elphick back to Bn to report the posn & get up arty or mortars while I moved with the rest of the coy to try the left flank. We had not gone far when both offrs returned with a telephone & FOO, Capt Gaunt of the 2/4 Fd Regt. We gave the men a half hour spell & moved back to the right. We organized 2 pls of 25 men each & under the covering fire of the remainder & with ten mins arty concentration the enemy posts were assaulted & captured. We got 5 MMGs, 3 LMGs, 38 prisoners & killed approx 30 of the enemy with only 3 casualties that required evacuation.

The whole attack only took 25 mins.

We then decided to work left along the Ridge running parallel to the river & clean up the posts holding up A coy. The arty was to fire 5 mins & then the 2 pls moved in from the right. The second attack got 12 more prisoners incl a wounded offr, 2 MMGs & one 75 mm gun & we killed several other enemy.

We were just teeing up for the third attack when we discovered from one of the prisoners - a Sous offr - that another coy of his Bn (22 Algerian) was on the ridge behind our first objective with 4 MMG.

As we were told to watch the right flank I ordered Mr Sublet to get his pl fwd on the right & sent my own 2 pls to support him in case the coy attacked us. I reported to Bn & was told B coy would be over soon & the CO would like me to try & get the ridge on the left overlooking the Barracks. It was then 1800 hrs.

B coy then arrived & my plan was to leave my 2 pls on the right, withdraw A coy into res & attack with B & about 14 odds & sods of D coy & take the arty FOO fwd with me. We moved fwd at approx 1930 hrs. The adv was held up for a while by a MMG post which wounded Lieut Langridge & killed his orderly, but Cpl Sadlier & another D coy NCO & myself got round the back of the post and got 6 prisoners.

We then pushed on to the top of the ridge overlooking the Barracks about 500x south.

It was just dark & we hoped to get the arty going & capture the Barracks but the telephone conked out. We got 70 prisoners incl 5 offrs - Cpl Sadlier got 20 himself.

We could not let Bn know where we were & the FOO had an idea that the arty was opening where we were at 2130 hrs so we withdrew at 2100 hrs intending to return before first light next morning.

We got back just in time to receive an OO to attack the feature we had just left. As it was then too late to carry out the timings ordered, I got back to Bn, reported the posn & got fresh orders.

I returned across the river & sent B coy back to the feature & put A coy (now 3 pls) fwd of the br head & left D coy on the right flank.

Next morning D coy pushed fwd & killed approx 20 more enemy in another post.

In the afternoon we located the enemy posts on the ridge on the right & got up a FOO but a patrol found the posts deserted except for Arab looters.

We got another 4 MMG, 1 mortar & 1 A Tk gun plus a quantity of stores, amm etc & records from these posts.

Throughout the ops the men behaved splendidly notwithstanding

11 Jun 41

C Coy Report

C coy advanced into SYRIA to take Frontier Post AITAROUNE & BENNT JBAIL.

No opposition encountered at AITAROUNE and the police post was taken containing 1 NCO & 3 ORs without trouble. Time was lost here finding our way through the village.

The coy moved towards BENNT JBAIL and when within about a mile of the town encountered an outpost containing LMGs. 15 Pl in the lead were forced to ground momentarily, but showing good leadership, Lieut O'Neill took his pl forward to assault the outpost. Eventually 15 pl cleared the ridge, the op causing us 1 killed, 1 wounded. During this assault WX2816 Cpl Holmes A R, although shot through the shoulder continued to lead his sec until the ridge was consolidated. The coy arrived at BENNT JBAIL just as D coy were cleaning out the Barracks, were not able to assist greatly as D coy had practically cleared the enemy out. The crossing of the LITANI river was most difficult op & the bulk of the credit goes to the SS Bn led by Maj Keys. The SS Bn advanced up towards the bank of the river and the boats were carried fwd by 14 pl of C coy. Owing to the heavy fire encountered it was only possible to get one boat to the river bank. Great bravery was shown by WX5648 L/cpl Dilworth C F J, WX2861 Pte Arthur F, WX6755 Pte Harris C & WX4387 Pte Archibald T in getting this boat fwd under heavy mortar, LMG & rifle fire. Unfortunately Pte Arthur was killed during this effort. On reaching the bank L/cpl Dilworth & Archibald ferried two boat loads of Commandoes across under heavy fire. This small party eventually caused the enemy to surrender. L/cpl Dilworth was outstanding in the efforts to gain the crossing. Pte Harris, although wounded showed exceptional coolness and brought back several messages under fire. Pte Archibald also did a very fine effort in assisting with the boat fwd and ferrying across tps. In the evening the Coy attempted to clear the ground fwd to the road but struck a particularly strong post & was forced to withdraw. Lt O'Neill again showed coolness in extricating his pl from a difficult posn WX3848 Pte White, WX5623 Pte Baker J, WX5650 Pte Jenner L, WX3911 Pte Meyers & WX4717 Pte Birch R, the coy SBS did sterling service in attending to the wounded. Pte White was outstanding and attended & evacuated wounded the whole day. It is recommended that he be made a Sgt in charge of SBS. Cpl Mackenzie showed bravery in guiding secs fwd to the place where the crossing was made. He worked continuously the whole day and was eventually wounded in the evening. WX5606 Pte Neale V A, Lt O'Neill's orderly, ~~desse~~ deserves mention He assisted greatly in getting the pl fwd. WX5759 Pte Hunter J, one of the Sigs att to the coy, struck to his job throughout the day and was continuously under fire.

Maj
~~In other mentions personnel are commended for their bravery~~
~~at the Litani River.~~
Dilworth & Archibald are recommended for their bravery in assisting to get the personnel across first & in assisting to ferry ferrying men across the river while under fire. Pte White & Baker J are also mentioned for their bravery in attending to the wounded which is recommended for their excellent work & bravery in evacuating wounded from the river area.

D Coy
LUPA

Adj
LUPA

Advance on SAIDA 13 Jun 41 - D coy

The Coy moved up to the FUP ready to adv by 0935hrs. We moved from the river bed at 0945hrs under cover of the barrage & the coy was late moving over the rd which was the starting ~~et~~ line.

Owing to the openness of the right flank the coy got ahead of A coy whos adv was through graves & orchards. Capt Horley slowed the coys adv so as to keep in line with A coy but was forced to continue the adv as we came under heavy MG fire from the Hills on the right flank & fire from the Groves on the left.

The coy was forced to go to ground & about 40 men with Capt Horley & Lieut Atkinson were isolated in a small grove which was surrounded by tks & swept by MG fire. It was in this Grove that Capt Horley was killed.

The Grove came under heavy mortar fire & to save further casualties th coy was withdrawn. We were not able to move across the flank to A coy as the enemy tks had command of that posn.

The coy was organised into 5 secs in the rear area & we had att 1 sec of B coy.

We moved up & took a posn in, a Grove behind the 2/14 Bn.

ND

B coy.
17 Jun 41

CO

Recommendations for Bravery

Sir,

I have to recommend the following personnel for Decoration during the action of the attack on SAIDA:-

WX 3568 Cpl Impson H G
3536 Pte O'Halloran M
2643 Sgt Dickson T J M

The above are members of 10 Pl of B coy which attacked the above town from the right flank. After the attack had progressed some 1500 yards this coy was subjected to a C attack by enemy tks which was successful in disorganising our attack.

When the tks first came on, the coy was disposed 12 Pl on right, 10 Pl on left and 11 Pl centre in res.

During the tk action Sgt Dickson showed good leadership in recovering two secs of 10 Pl from the open ground and withdrew them to the orchard while myself and another pte from the carriers engaged them with Boyes A Tk Rifle. Cpl Impson covered the break of his cec by throwing hand grenades at the leading tk. Impson was standing to perform this task and was open to withering fire the whole time. Pte O'Halloran stayed with ~~the~~ his LMG to blind the tk by firing at it and between these two men they forced the tk to veer off. In the subsequent rally in the orchard these three men assisted me no end in holding the pl together. Impson was particularly cool and resourceful.

I therefore recommend that these three men be recommended for Decoration

(sgd) R B MacKenzie Capt
OC B Coy

During the tank action Sgt
Dickson showed good leadership
in recovering 2 secs of 10 PL
from the open ground and with
drew them to the orchard while
myself and another pte from the
carriers engaged them with the
Boys A K Rifle. Cpl Impson
covered the break of his section
by throwing hand grenades
at the leading tank. Impson
was standing to perform this
task and was open to withering
fire the whole time. Pte O'Haller
-an stayed with his LMG to
blind the tank by firing at
it and between these two men
they forced the tank to veer off.

In the subsequent rally in the
orchard these three men assisted
me no end in holding the
platoon together. Impson was

B Coy.

17 June 41

The CO

Sir,

Recommendations for Bravery.

I have to recommend the following personnel for decoration during the action of the attack on SAIDA.

WX Cpl Impson B.

WX

Pte O'Balloran M.

WX

Sgt Dickson J.

The above are members of 10 Pl of B Coy which attacked the above town from the right flank. After the attack had progressed some 1500 yards this Coy was subjected to a counter attack by enemy tanks which was successful in disorganising our attack.

When the tanks first came on the Coy was disposed 12 Pl on right 10 Pl left and 11 Pl centre reserve.

Particularly cool and resourceful.
I therefore recommend that
these three men be recommended
for decoration.

R. MacKenzie Capt
O.C. B Coy

Type for WD
✓

Home for OC B Coy
Signature on Bn CO?
✓

APPX VI

LITANI RIVER BATTLE

INTENTION

1. 2/16 Bn AIF will capture MAJOR RIDGE from the WATER TOWER incl BARRACKS to the WHITE QUARRIES on MAIN COAST RD & to contain the left flank.

METHOD

2. Objective & areas of responsibility - sketch att.

Area (1) B & D coys under comd Capt Horley right flank will be contained by at least 1 pl facing in easterly direction & sufficiently far out to cover the br. The present arty plan as being carried out will continue until 2000 hrs. If main objective BARRACKS - end of rd BARRACKS - BRIDGE isn't complete by this time a halt will be made until ~~XXXX~~ 2130 hrs, at 2130 hrs the FOO will be responsible for bringing down arty concentrations in accordance with the plan already issued by CO 2/4 Fd Regt.

It is important that no concentrations fall west of a line east of rd BARRACKS - BRIDGE.

Area (2) The attack on this area will be carried out by D coy 2/27 Bn, arty plan as arranged by CO 2/4 Fd Regt. Start time 2130 hrs. Start line - line of RIVER.

No concentrations in this area must fall outside area bounded by rd MAIN COAST - BARRACKS - BRIDGE.

A coy to cover br being prepared by 2/6 Fd Coy

Area (3) Objective - line running parallel to the rd & 300 x to the west of it, the present method of attack & disposal of strong pts will be persisted with until 2000 hrs, then a stop will be made until 2130 hrs.

At 2130 hrs the FOO co-operating with C coy will arrange concentrations to cover the coy objective as decided by the CO 2/4 Fd Regt

No concentrations must fall nearer to the MAIN COAST RD than 300 x west

These instns cancel all previous orders regarding SL & objectives. Coys will consolidate on objective.

ARTY PLAN

Right FOO fires 4 progressive concentrations between 2130 hrs - 2200 hrs
Left FOO similar
Right FOO does not fire west on left WINDING ROAD to BARRACKS.
Left FOO does not fire east of MAIN ROAD i.e. rd running WEST on left of the QUARRIES.
Centre One Bty will fire four concentrations on CENTRE RIDGE between the rd to BARRACKS & the MAIN RD - 2130 hrs - 2200 hrs.

All informed

2/16 Bn AIF

INFM

1. The enemy is holding a strong defensive posn on the north bank of the LITANI R. It is established that he has fwd posts on the north bank of the R & it is probable that his patrols are on the south side.

Recce parties came under heavy arty & MG fire during the evening of 8 Jun 41.

The br over the R has been blown.

2. The adv gd contacted the enemy at 1730 hrs & the main body was ~~br~~ brought fwd at 1800 hrs & vehs disposed in area.

3. The Commandos' (SS Force) is to land at 0430 hrs north of the R mouth & establish a br head. The signal for the capture of the posn will be five very lights of any color. No further infm regarding action of SS Force.

INTENTION

4. DONCOL will attack & capture BARRACK RIDGE.

METHOD

5. If action of SS Force not complete by 0530hrs
A coy to establish a br head near pt where br is blown. Objective right of BARRACK RIDGE
B coy to cover the op from high gd to the right & to be allotted LMG from 9 carriers.
C coy to cross at R bend 105156 - objective BARRACK RIDGE.
Assault boats to be made available for A & C coys. D coy to supply carrying parties.
D coy in res in re-entrant near BERGOULIYE & is to pass through to line of rd JEM JEM when br head is made.
3 pl support attack from re-entrant in rear of B coy
2 pl AA duties veh dispersal areas.
4 pl guns dismounted & support attack from B coy area.
6. A sqn 6 Aust Cav carrier tps to support the attack from right flank. Tk tps remain in res & be ready to exploit as far as KAFFIR BADDA as soon as Xing completed.
One tp to go fwd & close rds to each ELOUSTA & JEM JEM.
7. 2/4 Fd Regt Depending on posn of SS Force to give concentration on areas (a) re-entrant south of BARRACK RIDGE
(b) re-entrant east of main northern rd
(c) selected targets.
8. 6 A Tk Bty One tp to go fwd with adv gd to KAFFIR BADDA. One gun to each of carrier tps Aust Cav to cover rds to EL OUSTA & JEM JEM
9. 170 Lt A A Bty less one tp Two guns to cover Xing of R. & Remaining
Two guns ready to move fwd to KAFFIR BADDA
10. 2/6 Fd coy Recce party fwd for removal of mines & recce of posn for preparation of br.
11. When op is complete adv gd assumes normal role.

ADDENDUM TO OP INSTN No 16.

After Para 2 insert new Para :

2A. PW reports one bn SENEGALESE 600 yds North of QASHIYA 108156,
naval bombardment this area asked for, no firing after 2200
hrs.

After Para 9 Insert new Para :

9A. First objective : Rd MERDJAYOUN - COAST. Arm'd patrols may go as
far North as Rd JEZZINE - SAIDA.

9B. Arty with CANCOL remain in present posn covering LITANI River
till last possible moment.

SECRET

Copy No 7

9 Jun 41.

21 AUST INF BDE GP OP INSTN No 16.

Ref Map : BEYROUTH Sheet 1/200,000

INFM.

1. 2/16 Bn is held up on the line of the LITANI River with elements of two coys on the North bank and the remainder on the south bank. There are also some elements of an SS bn on the North bank.
2. The enemy defence is based primarily on MG and Mortar posts.

INTENTION.

3. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will capture the high ground immediately north of the LITANI River and continue the adv Northward on the BARRACK Rd.

METHOD.

4. Commencing at 2130 hrs today 2/16 Bn will est a br head over the LITANI River in its present area and clear the high ground immediately to the North and as far West as BARRACK Rd incl. It will also capture the enemy posts on the shore on the North side of the River. D Coy 2/27 Bn is placed at the disposal of 2/16 Bn as a res.
5. 2/6 Rd Coy, with working party provided by 2/14 Bn under arrangements made by unit COs will construct a felling boat br over the LITANI River commencing as soon after 2130 hrs today as is practicable.
6. Immediately the br is completed 2/27 Bn will pass over the br head and occupy the high ground NE of the main rd and West of BARRACK Rd.
7. The above ops will be supported by 2/4 Rd Regt firing concentrations on known enemy posts from Zero to a time to be arranged mutually between the comds 2/16 Bn and 2/4 Rd Regt.
8. Assuming the enemy posns North of the LITANI River are cleared, 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will continue the adv Northward with the following adv gd :

To be known as MOFCOL.

Comd	: Lt-Col M J Moten 2/27 Bn
Under comd	: Two tps ROYALS
	A Sqn 6 Aust Cav
	2/4 Rd Regt less 7 Bty
	One tp 170 Lt AA Bty
	6 A Tk Bty less one tp
	One sec 2/6 Rd Coy
	Wireless det Div Sigs
	2/27 Bn
	B Coy 2/6 Rd Amb
	D Sec 5 Res MT Coy

All tps come under comd as from receipt of this order.

No vehs will cross River until 0430 hrs.

9. The main body will be known as GANCOL and will be constituted as under :

Comd	: Lt-Col W G Cannon 2/14 Bn
Under comd	: 7 Rd Bty
	One tp 6 A Tk Bty

One tp 170 Lt AA Bty
2/6 Fd Coy less one sec
W/T det Div Sigs
2/14 Bn
B Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb
C Sec 5 Res MF Coy

A Coy less lt sec 2/6 Fd Amb joins CANCEL after evacuating LITANI River area.

Rear Bde HQ will move in the rear of CANCEL.

- 10. 2/16 Bn will reorganize North of the LITANI River and occupy a defensive posn on the high ground astride BARRACK Rd.
- 11. 6 A Tk Bty will detach one gun for local protection Adv Bde HQ.

ADM.

- 12. Medical. ADS will remain at present location opposite KILO 27 post on TYR - BEYROUTH Rd.
- 13. B Coy 2/6 Fd Coy with MOTCOL. A Coy will remain to clear LITANI River area, then joins CANCEL with 14 Lt Sec Fd Amb.
- 14. Tpt. B Ech will remain at present location until further orders.
- 15. Other adm orders by sig message.

INTERCOMN.

- 16. Adv Bde HQ moves in rear MOTCOL.
- 17. LOs with units from Zero, LO 2/16 Bn rejoins Adv HQ when it crosses river.
- 18. Sig comms as per diagram att.
- 19. Ground to Air :

- (a) RAF tender with Adv HQ
- (b) Recognition strips

Air to Ground :


Colour of the day and message dropping

- 20. Password. See OO No 8 Para 24.

[Handwritten Signature]
Maj.
EM 21 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK.
Signed at 1845 hrs.
Issued to Sigs.

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>Copy No</u>	<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>Copy No</u>
2/14 Bn	1	5 Res MF Coy	16
2/16 Bn	2	Aust Div Exporter	17 - 20
2/27 Bn	3	(1 AILO, 1 INLO)	
Sigs	4	Comd	21
59 LAD	5	SC	22
9 Pl Aust HQ Gd Bn	6	LOs	23 - 25
Det ROYALS	7	Bde TO	26
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav	8	Camp	27
CHESHIRE Yed	9	File	28 - 29
2/4 Fd Regt	10	War Diary	30 - 31
6 A Tk Bty	11	Spare	32 - 35.
170 Lt AA Bty	12		
2/6 Fd Coy	13		
2/6 Fd Amb	14		
14 Lt Fd Amb	15		



DRAWN AT 1835 H.
9 JUN 41

APPX VII

SAIDA BATTLE

APPX VIII

DAMOUR

BATTLE

21 AUST INF BDE GP OP INSTN NO 17.

Ref Map : BEYROUTH 1/200,000.

INFM.

1. The enemy are holding a strong defensive posn astride the COAST Rd at INNSARIYE 108165. Our fwd elements are immediately south of ADIDUN.

INTENTION.

2. 21 Bde Gp will capture the INNSARIYE posn and exploit to the high ground overlooking track running west through ESSAKIYE.

METHOD.

3. Fwd tps - 2/27 Bn.
4. Zero - 2400 hrs 10 Jun.
5. Arty support - 2400 hrs to 0200 hrs. First fire falls on line from INNISARIYE eastwards to the COAST Rd from 2400 to 2405 hrs - then lifts 400 yds for five mins and a further 400 yds for 10 mins. Five mins harrassing fire on track through ESSAKIYE from 0020 to 0025 hrs.
6. SOS - Green over green.
7. Arty SOS - line of WADI running East and West South of ESSAKIYE.
8. 2/14 Bn less two coys passes through 2/27 Bn at 0445 hrs 11 Jun and continues the adv to secure the br over the NAHR EZ ZAHRANI. Armd patrols will recce north as far as SAIDA.
9. The following tps come under comd 2/14 Bn as from receipt of this order :
 - A Sqn 6 Aust Cav
 - One bty 2/4 Fd Regt
 - 6 A Tk Bty less two tps
 - One sec 2/6 Fd Coy
 - One coy 2/6 Fd Amb
 - B Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb
 - W/T det Div Sigs.
10. 2/16 Bn plus two coys 2/14 Bn is responsible for the defence of the br head over the LITANI River and will be relieved by CHESHIRE Yeo on 13 Jun at 0001 hrs.
11. One tp 2/4 Fd Regt will be under comd 2/16 Bn as from 0500 hrs 11 Jun for defence of br head..
12. CHESHIRE Yeo will maintain a garrison of one tp in TYR as from 2000 hrs 10 Jun.
13. 2/27 Bn will dispose one coy as follows :
 - (a) astride rd NABATIYE - ABOU EL ASSOUAD about 107159
 - (b) JEM JEM
 - (c) EL QUASTA

14. Bde Gp Res :

Two tps ROYALS.
CHESHIRE Yeo.

15. 170 Lt AA Bty will be disposed to cover crossings over LITANI River.
ADM.
16. As necessary by Sig message.

INTERCOMN.

17. LOs with fwd bns from Zero.
18. W/T vehs as per present allocation.
19. HQ Bde Gp remains present location unless otherwise notified.

ACK.
Signed at *2015* hrs.
Issued to Sigs.

[Signature]
Maj
EM 21 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION

As per Op Instn No 16.

2/27 Bn C O No. 7

REF MAP BYAROUH SHEETS 1/50,000 and
1/200,000

SECRET
Copy No 15
12 Jun 41.

1. MEMI - Enemy forces have withdrawn to SAIDA. It is reported that this force may be reinforced by a Sqr of SPANIS.
2. On right flank 100 FORCE has reached area DIMBID:
14851685 - ZILLAYA 14271690. 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp is re-organising in MERD-JAYOU AREA.

OPERATION

3. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will adv 13 Jun and seize the line BAASIR 123192 - MEEI YOUNES 121193.

METHOD

4. Adv sqd - Comd - Lt Col A.B. MacDonald 2/16 Bn.
A. Sqn 6 Aust Div.
2/4 Pd Regt less one bty.
One tp 6 A M Bty
One tp 170 Lt M Bty.
One sec 2/6 Pd Coy.
2/16 Bn.
A. Coy 2/6 Pd Amb.
One sec 5 Res M Coy.
5. Main body - Comd - Lt Col M J Moten 2/27 Bn
One Bty 2/4 Pd Regt
6 A M Bty less two tps.
170 Lt M Bty less one tp.
2/6 Pd Coy less one sec.
2/27 Bn
D. Coy 2/6 Pd Amb.
One sec 5 Res M.
6. Flank sqd Rd HABATIYI - MASSANIYI.
Comd Lt Col W.C. Cannon 2/14 Bn.
One tp 6 A M Bty.
2/14 Bn / B Sec 14 Lt Pd Amb.
7. Bde Gp res - CHESHIRI YHO.
8. SECURITY PATROLS - Comd Maj Schneider 6 A M Bty
Maj Schneider will report Lt Col M J Moten 0600 hrs
13 Jun.
9. Main body will be responsible for the security of the COAST Rd and will be prepared to picket the flank rds leading in from the east between DARB NS SHI 116177 and objective for the day.

ADM

10. Offrs leading tps in action will not wear Offr pattern kit. Badges of rank will be marked on shoulder straps and not as at present. They will carry rifles and generally look as much like an OR as possible.

INTERCOM

Bn HQ closes 0600 hrs thereafter head of the main body.

Signed at 0100 hrs 13 Jun.

Issued by Sigs.

Distribution as per CO6.

[Signature] Capt
2/27 Bn AIF.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

LFC LFL LFZ VLFN - Z - D - L

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

15

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

REXI GIFI ZERI RODU WUVI LUPA DASA

FROM

NEVI

Originator's Number

PS 62

Date

12

In Reply to Number

AP

established at

SMUOXT

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CIPHER**.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1505

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

1500

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
	1512										

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

Z L

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

OUT

31

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

LOPA WCVI JASA

FROM

NEVI

Originator's Number

T 136

Date

12

In Reply to Number

Please return all unwanted maps to the hq for return to map depot. Also collect unwanted maps from units under command if possible.

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT AS WRITTEN BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CIPHER.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

1410

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

1522

T.O.R.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
W	150		Keto								

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

**CALL
AND
INSTRUC-
TIONS**

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

TO

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

WUVI

LUPH

FROM

NEVI

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

<i>WUVI</i>	<i>provides</i>	<i>as</i>	<i>soon</i>	<i>as</i>	<i>possible</i>
<i>patrol</i>	<i>of one</i>	<i>sect of</i>	<i>carriers</i>	<i>under an officer</i>	
<i>with one</i>	<i>atk gun down</i>		<i>rd running east</i>	<i>to</i>	
<i>HABBOUCH</i>	<i>endeavors to</i>		<i>contact</i>	<i>patrols</i>	<i>from</i>
<i>WIVA</i>					

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CIPHER**.

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

Immediate

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
<i>W</i>	<i>1030</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>								
Wt.3631	4/21. 11	2,500 pds.	2/40.	C.B.&S. Ltd.	T 51/5895.						

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS

IN

OUT

No. of Groups.
GR.

OFFICE DATE STAMP

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

TO

*✓ IF only
WU VI*

FROM

NEVI

Originator's Number

Date

In Reply to Number

HABBOUCH

reported clear

of

enemy

Intercepted

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT **AS WRITTEN** BY ANY MEANS.

IF LIABLE TO BE INTERCEPTED OR FALL INTO ENEMY HANDS, THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT **IN CIPHER.**

ORIGINATOR'S INSTRUCTIONS
DEGREE OF PRIORITY

TIME OF ORIGIN

SIGNED

SIGNED

(BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY.)

T.H.I.

SYSTEM IN	TIME IN	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER	SYSTEM OUT	TIME OUT	READER	SENDER
<i>W</i>	<i>1415</i>	<i>H D</i>	<i>Deary</i>								

T.O.R.

MESSAGE FORM

Serial No.

CALL AND INSTRUCTIONS	IN	No. of Groups GR.	OFFICE DATE STAMP.
	OUT		

(ABOVE THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)

TO **LUPA WUVI DASA**

FROM NEVI	Originator's Number i 137	Date 12	In Reply to Numbers
------------------	-------------------------------------	-------------------	---------------------

<i>Infm</i>	<i>P.W</i>	<i>⊙ SAIDA - 2 Bn R.T.A less two coys</i>	
<i>- sqw SPAHIS - one 25-mm gun - SAIDA is organised for coy defence - not very strong posn - ⊙ next enemy line of defence</i>			
<i>CHOUEIFAT - ALEY - BHAMDOUN</i>			
<i>- AIN SOFAR. ⊙</i>			

This message may be sent AS WRITTEN by any means	If liable to be intercepted or fall into enemy hands, this message must be sent IN CIPHER	Originator's instructions Degree of periority <i>Important</i>	Time of origin. 1540
--	---	--	--------------------------------

Signed <i>Hammam hint</i>				Signed (BELOW THIS LINE IS FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY)							
System in	Time in	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender	System out	Time out	Reader	Sender

T.H.I.
T.O.R
C.E.A. 5/40. 50.000 pads.

S E C R E T

Copy No. _____

11 Jun 41.

21 AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BDE OP INSTM No 1B.

Ref Map : BEYROUTH Sheet 1/200,000.

INFM.

1. Enemy continuing delaying action on coastal plain. Leading elements own tps have reached line of rd NABATIYE - COAST.
2. Right coln Aust Div Exporter captured MERDJAYOUN 11 Jun.

INTENTION.

3. Objective for 12 Jun is the rd JEZZINE - SAIDA. Armed patrols may exploit North to the line RHARIFE 133189 - QUADI ZEINE 119188.

METHOD.

4. Adv Gd :

Comd - Lt-Col M J Moten 2/27 Bn
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav
2/4 Fd Regt less one bty
170 Lt AA Bty (less two tps)
One tp 6 A Tk Bty
One sec 2/6 Fd Coy
W/T det Div Sigs
2/27 Bn
B Coy 2/6 Fd Amb
One sec 5 Res MF Coy (to lift 2/27 Bn - time and place of embussing to be arranged between Comds.)

5. Van gd is to comprise A Sqn 6 Aust Cav, not more than one tp arty, carrier pl 2/27 Bn and recon party engineers.
6. Inf will be lorry-borne and held sufficiently far back behind the van gd to avoid small arms fire.
7. Adv gd will move at 0430 hrs through the fwd elements of 2/14 Bn.
8. The following tps will comprise the main body in order of march :

Comd : Maj J E M Calder 2/6 Fd Coy
One tp 2/4 Fd Regt
One tp (less one sec) 170 Lt AA Bty
6 A Tk Bty (less two tps)
2/6 Fd Amb (less B Coy)
2/6 Fd Coy (less one sec)

Main body moves not before 0800 hrs : SP Rd June 113174.
Time of move confirmed by Sig message.

9. This coln will be joined later in the day by 2/16 Bn (lorry-borne) at which time comd of the coln will pass to Lt-Col A B MacDonald.
10. 2/14 Bn less one coy will be responsible for effectively protecting the right flank of the coln at the junc of the rds MERDJAYOUN - COAST and HAIFA - BEYROUTH. One sec 6 A Tk Bty placed under comd as from receipt of this order.
11. One coy 2/14 Bn will remain in the LITANI River area, clear the battlefield of our own and enemy dead and bury the bodies. It will rejoin the unit on completion of this task.
12. 2/16 Bn will be relieved by CHESHIRE Yeo at 0001 hrs 12 Jun and, less one coy, will concentrate in the area West of the main rd and North of the LITANI River. 5 Res MF Coy will lift this bn to the area ADLOUN commencing 1200 hrs. Time and place of reporting of MF by direct liaison between two units concerned. One sec 6 A Tk Bty is placed under comd as from 1200 hrs.

- 13. One coy 2/16 Bn will be utilised as a flank gd at EL QUASDA, JEM JEM and astride the NABATIXA Rd near KAHR BADDA.
- 14. 170 Lt AA Bty will leave one sec under cmd CHESHIRE Yeo for AA and A Tk defence purposes at the LITANI River br.
- 15. CHESHIRE Yeo will maintain a garrison in TYR and the responsibility for public security measures will rest with the cmd of that unit.
- 16. Remainder of Bde Gp not detailed above will remain in Bde Gp res and move as ordered later.

ADM.

- 17. Issued separately by Sig messages.

IMPERCOMM.

- 18. Adv Bde HQ remains present location, alteration if any notified by Sig messages.
- 19. Allocation W/T sets as at present.
- 20. Two LOs with Adv Gd from Zero.

[Handwritten Signature]

Maj.
HM 21 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK.

Signed at 2030 hrs
Issued to sigs.

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No

2/14 Bn	1
2/16 Bn	2
2/27 Bn	3
HQ Corps Gd Pl	4
Sigs	5
59 IAD	6
CHESHIRE Yeo	7
A Sqn 5 Aust Cav	8
2/4 Rd Regt	9
6 A Tk Bty	10
170 Lt AA Bty	11
2/6 Rd Coy	12
2/6 Rd Amb	13
B Sec 14 Lt Rd Amb	14
5 Res MT Coy	15
25 Aust Inf Bde Gp	16
Aust Div Exporter	17 - 18
Aust Div Exporter (for AILLO)	19
Cmd	20
SC	21
LOs	22 - 24
Bde TO	25
Comp	25
File	27 - 28
War Diary	29 - 30
Spares	31 - 35

2/16 Bn

SECRET
Int Summary No 1
Copy No
7 Jun 41

The following infm has been received from an offr of the Free French Forces but the accuracy of it cannot be guaranteed.

- (a) There are five defensive lines between the frontier & BEYROUTH. The first is a line of posts on the French Frontier rd; the second a fairly strong defensive posn north of the LITANI River; the third a line of posts on the rd MERDJAYOUN - HABBOUCH - COAST; the fourth from BAAKLINE to BARJA 123191 and the fifth from ALLEY 140208 to CHOUEIFAT 131209.
- (b) This offr stated that garrisons as under were on our line of adv :
- BENNT JBAIL - one coy 22 Algerian Bn
TYR - one coy 22 Algerian Bn, two 75 mm guns, two A Tk guns & a number of armd Cs.
North of LITANI River - one bn less one coy Algerians.
KHALDE - one bty 75 mm guns.
There may be other garrisons of which he is unaware.
- (c) He stated further that lt tks patrol the rd between TYR & BEYROUTH
- (d) The rd MERDJAYOUN - HABBOUCH is reported to be mined in the vicinity of NADJARIYE 114173 for a distance of about one mile.

The following are copies of messages received from MILPAL & KAJU :-

5 Jun : Fairly reliable source reports 250 ANNAMITE tps withdrawn from MERDJAYOUN area to unknown destination in north. Comment. This may indicate withdrawal of tpt as ANNAMITES are usually tpt drs. Same source reports preparations for mining all tracks in MERDJAYOUN area. Also except for brs prepared for demolition no explosives have yet been placed in posn. Report requires confirmation.

Now considered possible French may have tk carriers as lorriers were possibly converted 1939. French Military official in SYRIA hitherto honest but not pro-British asked interview district commissioner at METULLAH. He stated any British attack on LEBANON would be bitterly resisted and that French would ask for German assistance. Also that there were no Germans except air force personnel in SYRIA. Comment. Impression given that the story was a plant. Fairly reliable report now states 400 Germans arrived BEYROUTH in the CANADA. This is first confirmation BBC broadcast in this sense.

The following is extract from report by GSI British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan dated 4 Jun 41 :-

SYRIA

Tps on the SYRIA-TRANSJORDAN & SYRIA-PALESTINE frontier areas appear to be being reinforced. Reports are received of reinfts in the MERDJAYOUN area & of considerable activity at QOUNEITRA.


Gen de Verdillac, who recently succeeded Gen Fougere in cmd of tps in SYRIA, is a personal friend of Marshal BETAINE.

As colonel he was chief of staff of the VIME area near METZ in 1937. He commanded a div in the Battle of France. He is reported to have brains, but to lack drive & not to be particularly popular with the tps.

Infm re Renault R35 tks in use by French

The following is copy of report received from Force HQ:-

" French reported to have some tks type Renault R35 weight 11 tons armament one 37 mm gun, armour 40 mm. Distinguishing features 5 bogie wheels & three horizontal rubber suspension units. Large turrets with episcopes & periscope. No further details or photos".

 Licut
IO 2/16 Bn AIF

2/16/62

SECRET

Copy No 1

7 Jun 41.

21 AUGST INF BDE GP OP INSTN NO 15.

Evidence is mounting that the French tps in SYRIA will resist. The minimum time therefore is to be spent in parleying and the maximum force available applied quickly. In order to save unnecessary casualties to the civilian population of towns en route, the towns should be surrounded, telephone communications cut, and an offer with an interpreter, sent in under a flag of truce to demand an unconditional surrender.

2. It is not possible to forecast at this stage the trend of events after the frontier is crossed. It seems probable, however, that the first serious resistance will be encountered North of the LITANI River in which area a force of at least one bn of Algerians is reported. The leading elements of DONCOL when approaching this area therefore should be well covered by A Tk guns and by fd arty. It would be unwise for much lorry-borne inf to be pushed up with the fwd elements in view of their vulnerability.
3. Leading elements approaching QASMIYE and the LITANI River crossing must be forewarned of the presence there of the SS Bn and of the fact that enemy MGs are reported in posn on the north bank.
4. The protection of the LITANI River crossing by AA guns is essential. A permanent det of two guns may be placed there later.
5. In suggesting that the first opposition of note may occur at SAIDA the possibility of some trouble from TYR must not be overlooked as it tks, armd cars and inf, in addition to two 75 mm guns and two A Tk guns are reported there. An early recce for bty posns along the TIBNINE - TYR rd must form portion of DONCOL's plan so that arty fire may be quickly brought to bear on any centres of resistance at TYR.
6. Should a halt be necessary on the line of the rd JEZZINE - SAIDA to await contact with 25 Bde Gp, the following pts are to be borne in mind by DONCOL :
 - (a) Disposns to be in depth to facilitate dispersal of MP;
 - (b) Immediate recce to JEZZINE to contact 25 Bde Gp;
 - (c) Armd patrols fwd to the general line BEIT ED DINE - BAAKLINE - YUROTI.
7. In the adv north of the line JEZZINE - SAIDA the importance of four places en route to BEYROUTH must be borne in mind, viz :
 - KHALDE - four 75 mm guns.
 - CHOUIEFAT - pro-German settlement and garrison town.
 - ALEY (139208) - reported amn dump.
 - BHAMDOUN (about 143208) - reported petrol dump.
8. One source of infm indicates that there is a strong defensive posn between ALEY and CHOUIEFAT.
9. On this sec of the adv I may, after DONCOL has taken CHOUIEFAT, divert MOTCOL via the route CHEMLEN 135205 - ALEY and att to it additional mobile tps. MOTCOL, after securing ALEY would have to leave a garrison there and move to the general line as laid down in OO No 8.
10. During the ops against BEYROUTH armd Cs will be required to patrol the rds BEYROUTH - RAYAK as far west as AIN SONAR and BEYROUTH - TRIPOLI as far north as NAER EL KELE.
11. The first action against BEYROUTH will be to isolate the town, destroy telephone comm unications leading from it and send in a

Guards and
order

Ref from lesson

flag of truce. DONCOL will seize the aerodrome immediately, dispose tps for its defence and occupy posns between HSAIME and the COAST about BIR HASSEN 127214. MOTCOL will est posts on the rds from incl ZAAJAR 134215 and ANTELJAS 137220.


- 12. Special instns regarding entry into BEYROUTH and the pts to be taken first will be issued later but DONCOL and MOTCOL should make plans at this stage for organizing up to 4 colns of varying strength incl lt tks, carriers, A Tk guns and a coy or pl of inf.
- 13. The factors which have to be considered in devising any plan are :
 - (a) the strength and attitude of the garrison;
 - (b) the attitude of the French Navy, about six ships of which are in BEYROUTH HARBOUR;
 - (c) the desire of the British Navy to avoid shelling BEYROUTH unless absolutely necessary.
- 14. In broad principle, however, the plan will be to infiltrate small colns from DONCOL and MOTCOL to strategic pts such as :- Radio Broadcasting stations, Muncipal offices, Power Station, Hotels Normandie and Metropole, Residence of High Commr, Military and civil telephone exchanges.
- 15. The locations of all of these are shown on the map already issued. Arty will recce bty posns to enable it to take on the enemy bty posns and AA defences as shown on the enemy location map.
- 16. No special mission is being provided to administer the town when captured but certain people who are familiar with it will be available to assist me. British martial law will be imposed immediately on occupation and a curfew introduced.
- 17. The probable moves of 2/14 Bn during the adv will be to concentrate in TYR area, thence QUADI ZEINE area 118188 utilising the line of the rd to RHARIFE 134188 as a dispersal area. 2/14 Bn will take over the garrison of SAIDA on arrival and the dets of 2/16 Bn left there will rejoin their own unit without delay. Orders will be issued for these moves when the time is opportune for them to take place.

ACK.
Issued to sigs.
Signed at hrs.

My [Signature]
Brig.
Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde.

<u>DI STRIBUTION</u>	<u>Copy No</u>
DONCO L	1
MOTCOL	2
2/14 Bn	3
CHESHIRE YEO	4
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav	5
ROYALS	6
2/4 Rd Regt	7
Comd	8
File	9- 10
War Diary	11- 12

LAYOUT OF WIRELESS COMMINS WITHIN NEVI FORMATION.



2/4 Fd Regt

DAXA 2/6 Jd Regt

DRAWN AT 0700 Hrs
6 JUN 41.

21 AUST INF BDE GP OO NO 8.

Ref Maps : BEYROUTH Sheet 1/200,000
HAIFA and SAFAD Sheets 1/100,000.

INFM.

1. Vide 21 Aust Inf Bde Int Summaries Nos 1 & 2.
2. Exporter Force is to adv on D1 day into SYRIA and seize the aerodromes at BEYROUTH and RAYAK. 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp will adv on the right on the axis METULLAH 204298 - MERDJAYOUN 136159 - HASBAYE 145162 - RAYAK 175213.
21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will move on the left on the general axis COAST Rd.
3. Inter bde boundary (all incl 21 Aust Inf Bde) - EL MALIKIYA 198271 - TIBNINE 188289 - HABBOUCH 126164 - JEZZINE 136179 - MOUKHTARA 139191 - BAROUCH 145196 - AINSOFA 148207 - (all incl 25 Aust Inf Bde) HAMMANA 151210 - MROUJ 152219.
4. 5 Ind Inf Bde and Free French Forces are operating on the right of the 25 Bde Gp.
5. C Bn SS is landing near the mouth of the LITANI River at 0200 hrs D1 to secure a br head over that river and prevent the demolition of the br there and the br at ABU EL ASSOUD. This bn will remain in posn until DONCOL passes North of the river when it will withdraw from the op.

INTENTION.

6. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will seize the aerodrome at BEYROUTH.

METHOD.

7. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will be divided into the following colns :

(a) To be known as "DONCOL"

Comd - Lt-Col A B MacDonald 2/16 Bn
Two tps ROYALS (armd Cs)
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav (less tk tps)
2/4 Fd Regt (less one bty)
Two tps 6 A Tk Bty
One tp 170 Lt AA Bty
2/6 Fd Coy (less one sec)
2/16 Bn
One coy 2/6 Fd Amb
C Sec 5 Res MT Coy

(b) To be known as "MOTCOL"

Comd - Lt-Col M J Moten 2/27 Bn
Two tk tps A Sqn 6 Aust Cav
One bty 2/4 Fd Regt
6 A Tk Bty (less two tps)
170 Lt AA Bty (less two tps)
One sec 2/6 Fd Coy
2/27 Bn
One coy 2/6 Fd Amb
D Sec 5 Res MT Coy.

Rear HQ 21 Aust Inf Bde moves in rear of MOTCOL.

- (c) To be known as TYR FORCE and to be utilised to garrison TYR after capture :

/Comd -

Comd - Capt S Howden 2/14 Bn
C Coy 2/14 Bn
Two carriers 2/14 Bn
Two dets 3 Pl 2/14 Bn
One gun 6 A Tk Bty

- (d) CHESHIRE YEO (less one sqn)
- (e) 2/14 Bn (less TYR FORCE)

8. Objective : Rd RAYAK - BEYROUTH west of AIN SOFAR (incl).

Intermediate Objectives : First, Rd MERDJAYOUN - HABBOUCH - COAST.
Second, Rd JEZZINE - SAIDA.

A halt will be made on second objectives until contact has been made with 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp or permission to adv is given by Bde. Armd patrols will however be sent fwd of this objective during any period that the adv is delayed.

Pts of contact with 25 Bde Gp are
HABBOUCH
JEZZINE
AIN SOFAR.

DONCOL is responsible for establishing contact at these pts.

9 Separate instns have been issued to the following units for the creation of br heads at the places shown :

(a) DONCOL : YAROUN 189276 - AIN EBEL 189279 - AITAROUNE 194280 - BENNT JBAIL 191281.

(b) CHE SHIRE YEO : KH JEREINE 172279 - RAMIET 179279 - AITA ECH CHAAB 182278 - REMEICHE 185275.

(c) 2/14 Bn : ALMA CHAAB 167279 - LABOUNA 164277 - NAQOURA 163281 - ISKANDAROUN 166284.

10. As soon as the enemy posts YAROUN, AIN EBEL, AITAROUNE and BENNT JBAIL have been captured by DONCOL a track will be built by one coy 2/2 Pnr Bn from the PALESTINE frontier rd at EL MALIKIYA to join up with the French frontier rd. DONCOL will cross the frontier by this track at 0445 hrs and adv via TIBNINE 189289 and TYR 170296.

11. TYR FORCE will follow immediately after DONCOL and will be under comd until placed in TYR as garrison. Tpt for TYR FORCE will be drawn from extra vehs of C and D Sub-sections of 5 MT Res Coy.

12. CHESHIRE YEO, on completion of task in para 10 above, will adv via TIBNINE - TIERZEBNA 187295 - SRIFA 187298 to KAHR SIR 121154. It will be prepared to turn from the East any defences on the line of the R LITANI should DONCOL be held up South of the R. Any orders for this op will be given by DONCOL at rd junc 186294 South of TIER ZEBNA. If not required for this op, CHESHIRE YEO will proceed to area ZEBDEINE 124160 - HABBOUCH and provide flank protection astride the rds NABATIYE - ABOU EL ASSOUD 106159 and HABBOUCH - COAST during night D1/D2.

13. MOTCOL will move from Assembly Areas and halt with the leading elements of the coln at rd junc 15962680 at 0500 hrs and there await orders from Gp Comd. If the COAST Rd is passable, MOTCOL will send det to clear the rd as far North as RACHIDLIE 170293. Further adv of MOTCOL via the COAST Rd will only take place after TYR has been captured by DONCOL. The responsibility of advising MOTCOL of the capture of TYR rests with DONCOL.

14. Should the COAST Rd be rendered impassable, MOTCOL will be /diverted -

diverted by Gp Comd to follow DONCOL.

15. The action to be taken on arrival at BEYROUTH will be covered in an op instrn to be issued but DONCOL must seize aerodrome and approaches between HSAIME 132214 and the COAST while MOTCOL seizes the Eastern and Northern entrances between ZAAJAR 134215 and ANTELIAS 137220.

ADM.

16. See Adm Instrn No 1 issued separately.

INTERCOMM.

17. Ground to ground : W/T dets will be provided as under :

- (a) Adv Bde Gp HQ - 109 sets
- (b) DONCOL - 109 and 101 sets
- (c) MOTCOL - 101 set
- (d) 2/14 Bn - 101 set.

18. Ground to air :

- (a) RAF Tender with Adv Bde Gp HQ
- (b) Recognition strips.

19. Air to Ground : Color of day and message dropping (see supplementary code list issued separately). Sig layout diagram is being issued separately.

20. White square to indicate posn fwd tps and AFVs to be displayed on call from air by color of day or by aircraft flying a series of "S" turns.

21. Adv Bde Gp HQ at RAS EN NAQURA till ISKANDAROUN captured thence via COAST Rd. If rd destroyed at that pt, follows DONCOL. Wireless silence until zero.

22. Rear Bde HQ moves in rear of MOTCOL.

23. LOs with DONCOL and MOTCOL as from 2000 hrs D - 1.

24. Password in two parts :-

Question; Where is the KOOKABURRA
 Answer, At CANBERRA.

ACK.
 Signed at 0745 hrs.
 Issued to sigs.

M. J. Mear
 Maj.
 RM 21 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION	Copy No
2/14 Bn	1
2/16 Bn	2
2/27 Bn	3
Sigs	4
59 LAD	5
B Sqn ROYALS	6
CHESHIRE YEO	7
North SOMERSET YEO	8 (for infm)
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav	9
2/4 Rd Regt	10
6 A Tk Bty	11
170 Lt AA Bty	12
2/6 Rd Coy	13
21 Aust Inf Bde Gp	
ASC Coy	14

DISTRIBUTION	Copy No
A Coy 2/E Pnr Bn	15
2/6 Rd Amb	16
5 Res MT Coy	17
25 Aust Inf Bde Gp	18
Aust Div Exporter	
" " " (for AIL0)	19-20
Comd	21
LOs	22
Bde TC	23-25
File	26
War Diary	27-28
Spare	28-29
	30-32

2/16 Bn

Ref: HAIFA sheet 1/100,000
SAFAD sheet 1/100,000

SECRET
Adm Instn No 1
Copy No 8
6 Jun 41

1 AMN

Coys will move to assembly areas with first line amm as under :-

(a) With man or gun

Rifle	--	100
LMG	--	1000
DOUBLE 5 IN	--	200
45 AUTO	--	250
3 MORHE	--	up to 75 if available
3 MORSMOK	--	45
2 MORHE	--	9
2 MORSMOK	--	27

(b) On A ech vehs - the balance to G1098 scale. Normal replenishment will be carried out by bn.

2 POL

(a)

All vehs will proceed to assembly areas with tks full & res on vehs as follows:-

Cars	-	8 gals
Vans	-	12 "
Lorries	-	16 "

(b) Pet veh will move with bn to assembly area where it will replace PET consumed during move. This veh will then return to B ech.

3 SUPS

(a) Four days hard ration plus the unconsumed portion of the days ration will be taken from concentration area & carried as follows :-

One day on the man
One day with tps in tp carrying vehs for consumption in assembly areas.
Two days in A ech
One day in B ech.

(b) One days hard ration will be for consumption on D2 & the remainder will be res.

(c) The full four days ration plus unconsumed days ration will be carried in coy vehs from concentration area

4 WATER

(a)

The following res will be carried :-

Cars	-	4 gals
Vans	-	8 "
Lorries	-	16 "

(b) Water tks will accompany the bn to the assembly area. All water bottles and containers will be replenished to the scale shown in sub-para (a) before vehs move out of assembly areas. The water tks will then re-fill at WP as notified later. On filling it will rejoin unit.

(c) Water for filling radiators will be obtained from creek etc where possible.

(d) Any water additional to above which can be carried without overloading vehs will be taken.

5 BLANKETS & GREATCOATS

Blankets will be placed in packs & great coats will be rolled & att outside packs.

6 DRESS

- (a) Shirts & shorts will be worn during ops but long trousers will be taken to wear in assembly areas.
- (b) Felt hats will be worn & steel helmets carried on haversack in case of shelling.
- (c) Respirators & AG ointment will be carried.

7 MEDICAL

- (a) Coys will take Dovers cream for use in assembly areas
- (b) RLO 2/16 Bn will ensure that sufficient supplies of all necessary med stores are carried.
- (c) RAP 2/16 Bn will move with the Adv Gd.
A coy 2/6 Fd Amb will move with main body.
- (d) Evacuation will be by MAC direct from Fd Amb until MDS is established.

8 TRAFFIC

- (a) Instns issued separately. Maj Wain will be responsible for establishing necessary TCPs.
- (b) OC HQ coy will be responsible to establish TCPs at towns & defiles en route to BEYROUTH aerodrome for necessary direction & control of traffic.
- (c) He also will be responsible for control of the coln as ordered by comd DONCOL. The provost sec will work directly under his comd.

9 PW

- (a) Collecting centres will be established at :-
TYR - Gd detailed by 2/14 Bn
SAIDA - 5 Pl 2/16 Bn
- (b) PWs under escort provided from above gd will be sent to cages at MALIKIYA 198279 & JUEILA 170273. The actual cage for use will be notified later. On delivery of PWs escorts will return to SAIDA.

10 STRAGGLERS

Stragglers will be fwded to bn under arrangements DAPM.

11 TPT

B ech will be brigaded under BTO as from 1800 hrs D-2. It will remain in the present area until 1000 hrs on D1 when it will move to assembly area UMM AL FARAJ & await further orders.

12 BURIALS

Dead will be disposed of as per instns already issued.

13 PRIVATE PAPERS

All private papers & diaries will be destroyed in assembly areas. Coy comds will see that this is carried out & report to I O on completion.

14 COMFORTS

QM will maintain a res of comforts, cigarettes etc to be distributed on CO's order.

15 CANTEEN SUPPLIES

QM will endeavour to obtain canteen supplies prior to move of B ech. Lieut Gill will arrange necessary finance.

16 PERSONNEL TO REMAIN B ECH DURING OP

- (a) QM & staff & drs B ech vehs
- (b) COMS & coy storemen & bootmaker D Coy
- (c) Two secs 2 Pl
- (d) Lieuts Elphick & Rose

M. J. ...

Ca. t

Adm Instn No 1
8 Jun 41

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Copy No 1	-	HQ coy
2	-	A "
3	-	B "
4	-	C "
5	-	D "
6	-	QI
7	-	RMO
8	-	COND
9 -10	-	WD
11	-	File
12 -14	-	Spare

APPX VIII

DAMOUR BATTLE

C Coy

SECRET

2/14 Bn, Op instrn No 1
Copy No. 3.....
7 Jun 41

GENERAL

1. B coy pl and B coy HQ details under comd Capt Gowling will be ready to move from Lying Up area at 2400 hrs 7 Jun. Outline task - attack on French MAQOURA from the South, Detailed order to be issued.
2. Control of IT. Ref Bde Instrn of 6 Jan will be brought into practice immediately.
3. Security of Personnel. It must be realised that now and henceforth we are in dangerous territory and all offrs will see that provisions for security are a first consideration no matter how tired the men may be.
4. In addition to instrns already issued on Malarial precautions, the following pts are to be noted. SYRIA is known to be slightly malarial and where other satisfactory protection can be obtained, creek beds should be avoided when tps are dispersed.
5. Special Party (Lieutts Allan, Kyffin and ORs) Tanks patrol between TYR and ISKANDAROUN. Attempt constn of rd block to allow crews to be engaged by SAA if attempts are made to remove block.
6. Baggage, Special Party. A coy will take over responsibility of baggage from Lieut Allan as from 1900 hrs.
7. The CO directs that all ranks will now be issued with direct orders on the nature of the task in hand, ie the 2/14 Bn will capture French Posts, the first task, in the initial stages of the British occupation of SYRIA.
8. Probable moves of 2/14 Bn will be to concentrate in TYR Area thence QUADI ZEINE Area 118188 utilising the line of the rd to RIARIFE 134188 as a Dispersion Area. 2/14 Bn will take over the garrison of SIADA from 2/16 Bn dets on arrival.
9. Interpreters. Lieut Ralphs is acting as interpreter. All interpreters will wear white cloth tied to both shoulder straps.
10. The following Passwords will be used:
 - (a) tps contacting YEO will use "SOMERSET"
 - (b) otherwise password will be "BILLA"
"WHICH BILLA"
"BILLABONG"
 - (c) after capture of French Frontier Posts and when bn moves password will be:
"WHERE IS THE KOOLABURRA"
"AT CANBERRA"

ACK
Issued through sigs
Signed at 16.30 hrs.

J.P. Buckle Capt
Adjnt 2/14 Bn, AIF

Distb List B plus Lieut Allan

3rd June, 1941.

REPORTS ON FOLLOWING PRINTS.

I. CHEIKH MISKINE - RHABARHEB. Strip. 70 prints.

CHEIKH MISKINE. NORTH of the road junctions to the SOUTHEAST of the town is a small defended area containing the following :

2 x 75 mm. field guns - 1 covering each road junction.

3 M.G. immediately to the EAST, and 3 M.G. immediately to the WEST of the junctions. The main road junction has been prepared for demolition.

At the roadside NORTH of the town is a small trench system containing 3 M.G. To the NORTHWEST is one small trench system and one M.G. emplacement. There are also 4 small isolated trenches holding 5 M.G.

Approximately 1 mile SOUTH of SARAMEIN is a column of infantry proceeding in a NORTHERLY direction.

There is nothing further to report on the above strip.

II. STRIP NAQOURA - TYR. 31 prints.

Information as follows. Reference 1/200,000 sheet BEIRUT.

4 gun A/A. point 161277.

Road mined and prepared for demolition, point 164283.

Nothing further to report for this strip.

III. STRIP TYR - EL KHODOR. 38 prints.

BRIDGE OVER LITANI RIVER AT QASMIYA. Owing to the comparatively small scale of the prints a detailed account cannot be made but information is as follows:

The hills immediately NORTH of the bridge are defended. On the slope of the hill some 650 x NORTH of the bridge is a shelf facing SOUTH on which is seen some 3 M.G. and 2 suspected mortars. Nearer the top of the hill are various trenches and what is suspected to be a further number of mortar emplacements. From the above point for a distance of some 1500 x NORTH the hills are defended in a similar manner. On these hills is a barracks and stores dump.

IV. STRIP EL KHODOR - EL AATIQA. 43 prints.

Wire can be seen from point 113174 to point 114175, also from point 117178 NORTHEAST for a distance of approximately 400 x.

The bridge over the river at EL AATIQA has been prepared for demolition, the NORTH abutment having been mined.

V. STRIP EL AATIQA - BEIRUT.

Information as follows :

Trench system and 6 M.G. point 131208.

A Headquarters or building of military importance at pt.132210.

M.T. park, point 131211.

Wireless station, point 131212.

Large stores depot, point 132213. At this point can be observed parts of what appears to be a trench system running through a grove. However, there are no weapons visible.

⁴
A gun A/A and Headquarters at point 132216.

Large stores dump, point 133216.

Nothing further to report on the above strip.

VI. STRIP REMEICHE-FRONTIER) Show nothing of military importance.
VII. STRIP EL MALIKIYA - BINNT JBAIL)

J. Mortimer Lloyd
Lt. RA.

O/C Section.

SG 2/2/44

HQ Aust Div Exporter
23 Jun 44

Recognition of Aircraft

Instances have occurred of friendly aircraft being fired at by our own AA defences, in some cases with fatal results. This is particularly likely to occur under the following conditions:-

- (a) On the introduction of a new type of aircraft into a theatre of ops.
- (b) On the transfer of AA personnel to a fresh theatre of ops where unfamiliar but friendly aircraft are engaged in ops.

2. ME has asked formations in conjunction with RAF Comds, to take the following action:

- (a) AA Defence Comds to be informed when any new type of friendly aircraft is to operate in the area under your cmd.
- (b) All practicable steps to be taken to familiarise AA personnel with all types of friendly aircraft in use.

DISTRIBUTION:
List E

B. W. Chapman
Col.
GS Aust Div Exporter.

S E C R E T

Copy No 2

12 Jun 41.

21 AUST INF BDE GP OP INTEN No 19.

Ref Map : BEYROUTH Sheets 1/50,000. and 1/200,000.

INFM.

1. Enemy forces have withdrawn to SAIDA which is based on a coy defence. It is reported that this force may be reinforced by a sqn of SPAHIS.
2. On right flank TOD FORCE has reached area DNEIBE 14851685 - ZELLAYA 14271690. 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp is reorganizing in NEBD-JAYOUN AREA.

INTENTION.

3. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will adv 13 Jun and seize the line WASSIR 123192 - NEBI YOUNES 121193.

METHOD.

4. Adv gd -

Comd : Lt-Col A B MacDonald 2/16 Bn
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav
2/4 Rd Regt less one bty
One tp 6 A Tk Bty
One tp 170 Lt AA Bty
One sec 2/6 Rd Coy
2/16 Bn
A coy 2/6 Rd Amb
One sec 5 Res MT Coy

5. Main body -

Comd : Lt-Col M J Moten 2/27 Bn
One bty 2/4 Rd Regt
6 A Tk Bty less two tps
170 Lt AA Bty less one tp
2/6 Rd Coy less one sec
2/27 Bn -
B Coy 2/6 Rd Amb
One sec 5 Res MT

6. Flank gd : Rd NABATIYE - HASSANIYE.

Comd : Lt-Col W G Cannon 2/14 Bn
One tp 6 A Tk Bty
2/14 Bn / B sec 14 Lt Rd Amb.

Patrol one sec carrier pl and one A Tk gun under comd of an offr will be provided by flank gd to patrol rd NABATIYE - HASSANIYE and contact patrols 25 Aust Inf Bde Gp at HABBOUCH.

7. Bde Gp res -

CHESHIRE Yeo

8. Adv gd will move at 0430 hrs through fwd elements 2/27 Bn.
9. Inf will be lorry-borne and held sufficiently far back to avoid small arms fire.
10. Main body will be responsible for the security of the COAST Rd and will be prepared to picket the flank rds leading in from the east between DARB ES SIM 116177 and objective for the day.

- 11. Flank gd 2/14 Bn will be prepared to release two coys to garrison SAIDA in the event of other garrison not coming fwd.

ADM.

- 12. Issued separately by Sig messages.

INTERCOMN.

- 13. Adv Bde HQ remains present location, alteration if any notified by Sig messages.
- 14. Allocation W/T sets as at present.
- 15. Lcs with Adv Gd and Main body from Zero.

M. G. Murray

ACK.
Signed at 1845 hrs
Issued to sigs.

Maj.
BM 21 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No

2/14 Bn	1
2/16 Bn	2
2/27 Bn	3
HQ Corps Gd Pl	4
Sigs	5
59 LAD	6
CHESHIRE Yeo	7
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav	8
2/4 Rd Regt	9
6 A Tk Bty	10
170 Lt AA Bty	11
2/6 Rd Coy	12
2/8 Rd Amb	13
B Sec 14 Lt Rd Amb	14
5 Res MT Coy	15
25 Aust Inf Bde	16
Aust Div Exporter	17 - 18
Aust Div Exporter (for AILC)	19
Comd	20
SG	21
Lcs	22 - 24
Bde TO	25
Camp	26
File	27 - 28
War Diary	29 - 30
Spares	31 - 35.

21 AUSTRALIAN INF BDE OP INSTN No 21.

Ref Maps : BEYROUTH 1/200,000, SAIDA and JEZZINE
1/50,000 Sheets.

INFORM.

1. As per 21 Aust Inf Bde Int Summaries and daily Sitreps.
2. 2/25 Bn (less one coy) came under comd 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp at 0800 hrs 25 Jun.

INTENTION.

3. 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp will capture the high ground including the following features - Bend in rd 121194 - EL HARAM 12351942.

METHOD.

4. Fwd tps : 2/27 Bn on the right, 2/16 Bn on the left.
5. The adv of 2/16 and 2/27 Bns will be as already agreed upon, objectives and boundaries as already indicated to bns by Bde Comd. Timings will be arranged mutually between two comds.
6. 2/4 Rd Regt will support the adv by arrangements made direct between Comd 2/4 Rd Regt and Comds 2/16 and 2/27 Bns.
7. A Sqn 6 Aust Cav and 6 A Tk Bty will support the adv on the left flank, details by direct liaison with Comd 2/16 Bn and the comds of above units.
8. 170 Lt AA Bty will continue to give close protection of 2/4 Rd Regt and will liaise direct with that unit.
9. Dets 2/6 Rd Coy as at present will remain under comd 2/16 Bn and will support the adv by clearing rd blocks, A Tk mines, etc, and by assistance in constructing own rd blocks.
10. After consolidation on the objective, active patrolling will be carried out as follows :
2/27 Bn : East to ER REZANIYE 125194
2/16 Bn : fwd to ES SIYAR 123195 and
ES SADIYATT 122195.

ADM.


11. By Sig message as necessary.

INTERCOMN.

12. W/T allocation as at present.
13. LOs with fwd units forthwith.
14. Bde HQ remains present location - Comd gp location notified by Sig message.

ACK.

Signed at 1335 hrs.
Issued to Sigs.


Maj.
BM 21 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION

As Over.

DISTRIBUTION.

Copy No

2/16 Bn	1
2/27 Bn	2
2/25 Bn	3
HQ Corps Gd Pl	4
Sigs	5
59 IAD	6
CHEESHIRE Yeo	7
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav	8
2/4 Fd Regt	9
6 A Tk Bty	10
170 Lt AA Bty	11
2/6 Fd Coy	12
21 Aust Inf Bde ASC Coy	13
2/6 Fd Amb	14
B Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb	15
25 Aust Inf Bde Gp	16
Aust Div Exporter	17 - 19
(One for AILLO)	
NLO	20
Comd	21
SC	22
LOs	23 - 25
File	26 - 27
War Diary	28 - 29
Spares	30 - 33

S E C R E T

Copy No 2

25 Jun 41.

21 AUST INF BDE OP INSTN No 22.

Ref Maps : BEYROUTH 1/200,000
SAIDA and TEZZINE Sheets 1/50,000.

Comd 2/25 Bn.

INFM.

1. See 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp Int Summary No 4 and daily sitreps.

OBJECT.

2. You will clear the enemy from the area CHEHIM 127188 - DARAYA 129189 - AANOUT 129188.

METHOD.

3. After clearing the enemy from the above posns you will occupy a defensive posn astride the rd CHEHIM - RHARIE about pts 774, 13101870 - 781, 13081879 - 738, 13081880.
4. You will pay particular attention to your right flank in view of enemy disposns at MAZMOURA 129185 - MAZRAAT ED DAHR 130184.
5. You will occupy pt 832, 13201876 if it provides good observation fwd.
6. After consolidation you will patrol to EL ZAAROUYE 130187, EL MTOLIE 132186 and HASROUT 131188 and report whether these areas are occupied or otherwise. Active patrolling in this direction and to other pts in the vicinity which you consider worth investigating will be continued.
7. You will provide an effective rd block with A Tk mines at a pt on the rd which can be covered by your fire from your defensive posn.
8. You will have under comd the following :
One A Tk gun, 6 A Tk Bty,
Det 2/6 Fd Coy,
One W/T set, Div Sigs,
B Sec 14 Lt Fd Amb.
9. One tp 2/4 Fd Regt will be in support and an OPO will be made available to you after you have cleared CHEHIM. Up till that stage arty support will be provided by the OPO already in posn SE of SEBLINE.
10. You will advise immediately the number of mules required to pack mortars and amm and SAA.
11. Tp carrying vehs are not to proceed East of SEBLINE.
12. A Ech vehs are not to proceed East of SEBLINE until CHEHIM has been cleared, when they may be moved at your discretion.
13. The time at which you commence this op will be decided in consultation with me after your recce.

ACK.

Signed at hrs
Issued to sigs.

J. Stevens
Brig
Comd 21 Aust Inf Bde.

DISTRIBUTION.

See over

S E C R E T

Copy No 4

24 Jun 41.


CHESHIRE Yeo
A Sqn 6 Aust Cav
2/4 Rd Regt
2/16 Bn
2/27 Bn
C Coy 2/3 Bn

Ref Map : SAIDA Sheet 1/50,000.

Consequent upon the withdrawal of C Coy, 2/3 Bn, from garrison duties in SAIDA the following redistribution of tps under comd 21 Aust Inf Bde will take place.

- (1) One tp CESHIRE Yeo will be withdrawn from MERDJAYOUN - COAST Rd garrison and will relieve C Coy 2/3 Bn as garrison in SAIDA.
- (2) One tp from JEZZINE-rd garrison will move to village EL MGHAIRIYE 124186 and remain in that area, patrol the tracks towards MAZBOUD 126186 and observe the rd MAZBOUD - CHEHIM.
- (3) B Coy 2/27 Bn will move one pl to the area of the rd block and demolition on the rd SAIDA - JOUN. This pl will take particular care to guard against outflanking. The OC will familiarise himself with all details of the demolition prepared and will be responsible for the firing of the demolition on receipt of orders from these HQ or if attacked in such force that it is clear that the pl cannot hold out.

ACK.


Brig.
BM 21 Aust Inf Bde.

S E C R E T

The attached information is subject to correction by air photography.

LUPA

HQ and
B Ech

21 AUST INF BDE

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL

25 Jun 41

ALL UNITS 21 Aust Inf Bde Gp

The following memo is repeated and will be placed under the notice of all offrs under your comd.

"In spite of numerous warnings from these Headquarters, indiscreet talk concerning military movements and intentions continues among offrs of all ranks. As an example, the Commander-in-Chief himself was recently approached by a lady who enquired about moves of certain formations. On being taken to task for indiscretion, the lady seemed genuinely surprised and said that "everyone in Cairo" was aware of the moves and that she knew her information was correct" as she had it from several senior officers". Criticism of higher authority which is usually uninformed, criticism of other Services without full knowledge of the facts and problems involved, and talk of a distinctly defeatist strain have also been noticeable and have not been without their effect on the rank and file.

2. The Commander-in-Chief considers that this does little credit to the Forces under his command, and is subversive of discipline and morale. He has given instructions that any case of this nature in which an Ofpr is involved shall be tried by Court Martial. He reminds Offrs of their obligation under Military law to report at once to high authority any cases which come to their cognisance.

3. The above is to be brought to the notice of every Ofpr in the Command.

Comment on the above should be unnecessary but it is the ofpr or man who thinks "there cant be any harm in repeating this infm" who causes the greatest harm.

Every ofpr and OR must seriously consider everything he says not only lest he should give away infm but also lest an interpretation which is not meant be placed on what he says.

This is absolutely necessary as there have been known cases of unbelievable stupidity in this matter by otherwise reasonably intelligent personnel.

Security of infm, it must be stressed, is just as important a part of battle discipline as concealment, camouflage, dispersion, etc etc and a unit whose personnel talk too much cannot be considered an efficient unit.

Units will arrange for all offrs to initial a copy of this letter and will render a certificate to these HQ when all offrs have done so.

H. M. M. M. M.
Maj.
21 Aust Inf Bde.

CO _____
S/C _____
OC HQ Coy *W. J. ...*
I/O _____
Sig _____
ajadl. *ES*
Plan Ofpr _____

HC 7 Aust Div,
26 Jun 41.

NEWS SUMMARY No 3.

0900 hrs 25 Jun to 0900 hrs 26 Jun.

1. Air Ops.

EUROPE: It was reported by the BBC at 1900 hrs 25 Jun that the raids carried out by the RAF over GERMANY during the night 24/25 Jun were the heaviest in history. They were executed by large forces of bombers, including the heaviest and biggest machines, escorted by fighters and heavy damage was done in all target areas. Two of our bombers failed to return.

COLOGNE, KIEL and DUSSELDORF were among the objectives bombed. Russian planes bombed WARSAW and DANZIG.

German raids over Britain were on a small scale during the night 24/25 Jun, being concentrated particularly upon Merseyside, where some damage was caused and some casualties inflicted.

ASIA: Bomber aircraft have attacked the citadel at SOUEIDA and railway concentrations at RAYAK, with good effort. Aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm have bombed shipping in BEYROUTH Harbour and rds.

AFRICA: Severe damage has been caused at BENGHAZI by bomber aircraft of the RAF. One Italian bomber was shot down over the African coast. One of our aircraft is missing.

2. Land Ops.

EUROPE: The Russian High Command has claimed the destruction of a German motorised unit, and reports advances in several places. In another sector Russian cavalry charged and dispersed a German mechanised column, after it had been dive-bombed by Russian planes.

AFRICA: Nothing to report.

ASIA: A force advancing into SYRIA from IRAQ is reported to have surrounded PALMYRA.

3. Political and General:

Reports state that Germany is short of rolling stock; that the harvest is not up to expectations; that in consequence Germany is in even greater need of a rapid victory than before. Her willingness to precipitate war with Russia for the sake of the rich cereal yielding Ukraine would seem to substantiate the truth of at least a portion of these reports. Failure to obtain control of this region would, therefore, prove an immense embarrassment to the Hitler regime.

STOP PRESS

It has been reported that this morning No 3 Sqn R.A.A.F. executed a most successful operation. At HOMS aerodrome they destroyed four enemy aircraft on the ground, an ammunition dump, a petrol dump, and a railway truck, which was seen to go up in flames.

At RAYAK they destroyed three fighters on the ground. At RACHAYA EL OUADI they ground strafed twelve MP and two armoured cars. The roof of one armoured car was seen to fly off. Flying along the road to HASBAYA they saw a staff car which they ground strafed. The occupants dived for cover, but it is claimed that all were knocked out. At QUASIR the hangers were ground strafed. Our sqn suffered no losses.

It is also reported that during the afternoon of 25 Jun aircraft of the same sqn fell in with four POTEZ 63s in the vicinity of PALMYRA. They shot down three in flames and when last seen the fourth was losing height rapidly with one engine on fire. Our planes suffered no loss.

BBC News, 0915 hrs, 26 Jun: It is reported that the Soviet forces have repulsed all enemy attempts, and in Southern Poland have counter-attacked heavily and regained much ground which had been lost. On the Rumanian front Russian forces have occupied the whole of the frontier and defied all attempts at penetration.

The German High Command has admitted this, and also the fact that during yesterday they lost 76 planes while disposing of no more than 17 Russian planes.

Soviet airforce has carried out intensive raids over Eastern Germany, and has also bombed ten towns in Finland.

From the West Germany has been subjected to the most intensive air raids ever carried out by the RAF, both by day and night. It has been stated in London that operations on a similar scale will take place incessantly.

Sweden is calling her reserves to the colours.

It is reported that the United States Govt is planning to give all possible aid to Russia by sending armaments to VLADIVOSTOCK.



D. G. Cewe
Capt.
GS 7 Aust. Div.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary

LUPA

MAILS
MAILS



STOP PRESS

It has been reported that this morning No 3 Sqn R.A.A.F. executed a most successful operation. At HOME aerodrome they destroyed four enemy aircraft on the ground, an ammunition dump, a petrol dump, and railway truck, which was seen to go up in flames.

At BAYAN they destroyed three lighters on the ground. At BAC... EL QUADI they ground scattered five... and two armoured cars. The... of one armoured car was seen to fly off. Flying along the road... HARBAY they saw a staff car which they ground stalled. The occupants... lives for cover, but it is claimed that all were... At... the... were ground stalled... suffered no loss.

INPM PW No 5 - 25 Jun 41.

Ref Map : SAIDA 1/50,000.

1. Area JIYE - DAMOUR.

(1) Rd blocks reported at the following places :

- 12071913
- 12121920
- 12131936
- 12151957

These rd blocks have also been prepared for mines but it is reported that no mines have yet been laid.

(ii) WADI QASSOUBA from 12131936 - 12241938. Four to five AFVs and 50 tps holding this area. One AFV believed knocked out by our arty at 1030 hrs this morning. This patrol has orders to delay enemy but if attacked in force they are to withdraw to DAMOUR defences. Later report, 1135 hrs, from ZERI reports one staff car and 3 AFVs entered trees in QASSOUBA. These were engaged immediately and one staff car and one AFV were seen to leave the trees.

(iii) ES SADEYATT - ES SIYAR
One pl consisting of 1WO, 2 NCOs 17 ORs at 12101952. Similar Pl at 12201955
This pl has orders to withdraw to DAMOUR defences if attacked strongly.
Note Battle discipline of enemy forces is very high and patrols from DASA 24 Jun report no movement seen in this area. Enemy must be very well concealed and apparently no movement allowed.

2. DAMOUR DEFENCES - See sketch APPX "A" att

- (i) There are 6 houses on hill at 12481975. All these houses are being used either as HQs, OPs or weapon emplacements.
- (ii) Most of the trees are very small, but on the fwd slope of the hill there are four high trees close together. On the left edge of these trees there is a 60 mm mortar in a pit. Under these trees and near the most Easterly one are 3 LMGs covering approaches from the front and EASTERN flank.
- (iii) There are three hvy MGs on house as shown on sketch. These guns cover the br at 12551965 and also the river from this br to the WEST.

3. DEDUCTIONS

Enemy are well dug in with "rock sangers" protecting them from small arms fire. If held up from this position in the EL ATIQA area, a careful field glass recon should locate enemy posns. Mortar and arty fire should then prove the most effective means of putting enemy weapons out of action.

Enemy morale is very poor and a determined attack on these posns combined with arty, naval and mortar fire has a good chance of forcing him to surrender quickly.

TOPOGRAPHY

The area to the EAST of the COAST rd is very rugged and AFVs will NOT be able to operate except on rds. There is a possibility of tks being used in the area

/ near the coast.....

TESTS CARRIED OUT WITH A BRITISH 2-POUNDER


ANTI-TANK GUN AGAINST A GERMAN MARK IV TANK
21 AUGUST INF BDE

26 Jun 41

All Units

USE OF 2 PR A TK GUNS

1. Owing to misuse and misunderstanding of the characteristics of 2 Pr A Tk Gun grave rumours have spread reflecting on the value of this gun. These rumours are to be counteracted at once and correct use made of the 2 Pr A Tk gun.
2. The 2 Pr A Tk gun is NOT a long range gun and whilst its maximum range is over 2000 yds its destined maximum EFFECTIVE range is 600 yds. Firing above 600 yds serves only to waste amm and to disclose the posn from which the gun is firing. The longer fire can be withheld the better.
3. At 100 yds the gun will pierce 3 inches of German armour plate. Attention is drawn to the fact that 2 Pr A Tk guns were used successfully against by German tks in FRANCE. Att is a report on actual trials with a German Mark IV tk.
4. It is to be stressed that some rds striking armour at an acute angle may be deflected. The French tk lately encountered has 2½" armour plate on the turret, 1½" armour plate just below the turret and 2" plain steel from a level just above the tracks to the ground. The dr is protected only by 1" armour plate. Its tracks are vulnerable to A Tk rifle.



Maj
21 AUGUST INF BDE

LOPA

AUSTRALIAN IMPERIAL FORCE

HQ 7 Aust Div,
24 Jun 41.

NEWS SUMMARY NO 1.

The following are the chief items of news from the BBC bulletin
0900 hrs, 24 Jun 41:-

1. RUSSO-GERMANIC WAR.

- (a). The Germans are reported to have captured BREST LITOVSK,
23 Jun.
- (b) Since ops started on this front the Russians claim to have
destroyed 300 German tanks and 128 German aircraft. 5000
German prisoners have been taken in fierce fighting.
- (c) German air attacks on this front have been concentrated
upon the Baltic Naval bases and especially upon LENINGRAD.

2. ABYSSINIA.

A further 8000 prisoners have been taken by the Imperial forces.

3. General.

It is reported that newspaper opinion in the United States is
agitating in favour of an immediate entry into the war.

Distribution:

As per Int Summary.

LUPA

TIMES OF SUNRISE, SUNSET, MOONRISE AND MOONSET
IN G.M.T. FOR LATITUDE $32^{\circ}30'N$, LONGITUDE $35^{\circ}E$

JULY 1941


Date.	Sunrise.	Sunset.	Moonrise.	Moonset.	Moon's Phase.
1.	0236	1652	0858	2120	
2.	0236	1652	1001	2200	First Quarters.
3.	0236	1652	1106	2242	
4.	0236	1652	1211	2328	
5.	0237	1652	1317	----	
6.	0237	1651	1422	0017	
7.	0238	1651	1524	0112	
8.	0238	1650	1621	0210	Full Moon.
9.	0239	1650	1714	0312	
10.	0240	1650	1801	0414	
11.	0240	1650	1842	0516	
12.	0241	1650	1920	0615	
13.	0242	1649	1957	0712	
14.	0243	1649	2030	0809	
15.	0243	1649	2103	0903	
16.	0243	1648	2137	0956	Last Quarter.
17.	0244	1648	2212	1049	
18.	0244	1648	2249	1141	
19.	0245	1647	2330	1234	
20.	0246	1646	----	1326	
21.	0246	1646	0014	1417	
22.	0247	1645	0102	1507	
23.	0248	1645	0155	1555	
24.	0248	1644	0251	1641	New Moon.
25.	0249	1644	0348	1723	
26.	0250	1643	0448	1804	
27.	0250	1642	0550	1843	
28.	0251	1642	0652	1922	
29.	0251	1641	0754	2001	
30.	0252	1640	0858	2042	
31.	0253	1639	1002	2126	

Note :- For Palestine Summer Time, add three hours to G.M.T.

ROUTE 1.

RAS NAQOURA - BEIRUT (Distance 66 3/4 miles)

All bridges will take 20 tons, except that over Nahr Awailih.




General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

2nd June 1941.

ROUTE 1 (sheet 1)

BEIRUT - TRIPOLI (Distance 53 1/2 miles)

All bridges to bear 20 tons, with 15% margin of safety.
Good tarred and metalled road.




June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence)
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

ROUTE 1 (sheet 2)

TRIPOLI - LATTAQUIE. (Distance 93 1/2 miles)

All bridges to bear 20 tons, with 15% margin of safety. Good tarred and metalled road.




General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

June 1941.

ROUTE 2.

JISR BANAT YACOUB - QUNEITRA (Distance 16 miles)



June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.


ROUTE 3

SAMAKH - QUNEITRA - DAMASCUS (145 km)
 (All bridges prepared for demolition).

Through difficult country. Only suitable light traffic. 2nd class road.

Good road; metallised and asphalted.

Good road, but not asphalted. Movement off road possible but difficult in dry weather. Good metallised road. and asphalted road.



ROUTE 58

QUNEITRA - MERDJAYOUN - SAIDA. (Distance 57 miles).

Good road. Passable for all types of traffic the whole year round. As road follows valley of the Zaherani river, movement off the road is restricted.


Road mined in various parts of this stretch.

Many road blocks on this stretch.

Road not asphalted but suitable for all forms of transport all the year. Average width 4 1/2 yards.

Passes through deep valleys and is difficult. Movement off road is almost impossible.

Level road. Movement off road difficult.



June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence) British Forces in Palestine & T. J.


ROUTE 70.

MAFRAQ - DERRA - DAMASCUS. (Distance 91 miles)

All bridges capacity 20 tons prepared for demolition.

First class tarmaced road. Repairs, including strengthening of culverts etc., completed June 1940. Sometimes flooded in winter. Country generally suitable for tanks.

Poor surface. Over-hilly and stoney country. Bad wadi crossings.




(NOTE: Concrete road blocks at DERRA and SHEIKH MISKINE are placed so that a detour would necessitate passing over rocky or marshy ground.)

Jerusalem.
2nd June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

ROUTE 70.

DAMASCUS - ZAHLE - BEIRUT. (Distance 64 1/2 miles)



June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

SECRET

GSI/163/1.

ROUTE 2502


MERDJAYOUN - HASBAYA - ZAHLE.

(To be attached to underground plan of this route issued on 2nd June 1941)

North of KHIAM and south of HASBANI BRIDGE, the road is mined at a place where it is built up on the side of a steep hill. On the eastern side of the road there is a sheer drop of about 55 yards into a wadi. Were this particular spot on the track blown up it would be impossible for traffic to make a detour.

ROUTE 2122.

QADRASS - BINT JEBAIL - TYR. (Distance 34 miles)




June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence)
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

ROUTE 2502.

MERDJAYOUN - RACHAYA - ZAHLE. (Distance 20 kms - 50 miles)

NO demolitions known on this road.




Jerusalem.
2nd June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

ROUTE 2513.


SAFAD - MERDJAYOUN - QABB ELIASS - ZAHLE (Distance 83 1/2 miles)



2nd June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan

SHEIKH MESKINE - EZRAA - SHAABA - HIJANE - DAMASCUS.
(Distance 89 miles)



June 1941.

General Staff (Intelligence).
British Forces in Palestine & Transjordan.

The following info has been obtained from three POW captured in the QUADI-EL-ZEINI area.

Each prisoner was captured at different times and interrogated separately. This info also confirms previous reports of enemy forces and dispositions in the COASTAL sector.

1. IDENTIFICATIONS

(1) QUADI-EL-ZEINI area
 7 Coy of 2 Bn 6 Regt Foreign Legion - Comd Capt PATE

(2) DAMOUR area - Comd Col BARRE
 5 and 6 Coys of 2 Bn 6 Regt Foreign Legion - In Comd Maj PRISE

2 Bn of 24 Mixed Colonial Regt

Portion of 16 TUNISIAN Regt has been seen in DAMOUR area.

3 GDL (Groupe du Levant) artillery bty is also in this area.

2. STRENGTH AND DISPOSITIONS - See trace att.

UNIT	STRENGTH	DISPOSITION
2 Bn FOREIGN LEGION 5,627 coys	Three inf coys One MG coy One HQ Coy Bn is not up to full strength although it is thought that recruits arrived 18 Jun. Each inf coy at present has - approx 90 men two 60 mm mortars 4 IMGs HQ Coy has - four 80 mm mortars other details not known MG coy has - 12 hvy MGs	7 Coy - QUADI EL ZEINI area This coy has been covering the road block at 11901802. Holding post on high ground SE of JADRA 300' from rd block. Has 4 hvy MGs and two 80 mm mortars. This coy has also been covering enemy parcels mining the rd between QUADI EL ZEINI and DAMOUR 5 & 6 Coys - area on hill at 12471876. This post is heavily fortified and weapons are aimed for all round defence. Very deep trenches have been dug in the olive trees on the hill and all weapons are dug in and protected by rock "sangars". Eight hvy MGs and four 80mm mortars in this area. On top of this hill is a single story red roof house with gable roof. 50 yds in rear of this house is the HQ of the 2 Bn Foreign Legion. Mortar posts unknown. The whole post is surrounded by a triple concertina fence and a double apron fence. There is also a strong wire fence running from the mouth of the river DAMOUR at 1230-1973 across the front to 1250 1874.

5 & 6 coys

UNIT	STRENGTH	DISPOSITION
5 & 6 Coys (cont'd)		Four hvy MGs are sited on the edge of the olive grove on the western slope of the hill. Two of these fire along the front wire to the mouth of the river DAMOUR. The other two guns fire on the bridge over the river DAMOUR at 12371869 and also SE along the rd and river EL AATIQA - AIN MIKHAIL. The dispositions of the remaining 4 hvy MGs are not known but some of them will probably be sited for defence of EASTERN flank and the rear.
2 Bn 24 Mixed Colonial Regt	Approx 450 Weapons similar to 2 Bn Foreign Legion.	Disposed along coast from mouth of river DAMOUR to 12402018 to prevent landing of tps from the sea. Tps are well dug in and hidden in the olive groves near the coast. This Bn is composed of SENEGALESE tps who are not good fighters.

The number of 75 MM arty guns in the DAMOUR area is doubtful. It seems certain however that there are at least four 75 mm guns in DAMOUR area. The 3 GDL (Groupe du Levant) was at SAIDA and it is reported that nine of its twelve guns were damaged at SAIDA. However the gun repair workshops are at BEXROUTH and this bty may have received new guns.

A Tk Guns - 25 MM (see trace att)

All rds leading to DAMOUR from the SOUTH and SE are covered by A Tk guns. As all AVMovement is confined to the rds owing to the thickly planted groves on the WEST and steep hills on the right of the COAST RD, attack by AVMs would meet hvy opposition.

TKs and ARMD Cs

Approx 7 TKs (8 - 10 tons) and 4 armd Cs reported in the DAMOUR area. At present these AVMs are patrolling the rds leading from DAMOUR but could be used against tps in the orange groves as they were used at SAIDA.

MINEFIELDS

The following pts on the rd DAMOUR - SAIDA are believed to be mined.

Br over River DAMOUR at 12371869	Bridge is made of stone or concrete and including approaches is 120' long. It is 15' above the water level and has two arches. The centre arch contains the demolition charge. The br itself is NOT mined but mines have been laid 100' along rd SOUTH from br & 100' NORTH of br. It is not known whether mines have been laid along the river banks.
Br at 12081915	Mined on br and for 20' North and South. Pts state br not prepared for demolition.
Rd June 12111920	Mined at rd June and also for 150 yds along rd BARJA - NEBI YOUNES.
Rd June 11901882	Rd block covered by fire from JADRA at 11981888 7 Coy of 2 Bn Foreign Legion were ordered to lay mines at this rd June but it is thought mines have NOT yet been laid.

/River DAMOUR

RIVER DAMOUR

This river is about 35 yds wide near the br but wider further EAST. The water is approx one or two feet deep near the br and becomes even shallower between the br and the coast.

The bed of the river is rocky.

The northern bank of the river is planted with banana trees and the banks on the Western side of the br are very low and passable to AFVs. EAST of br the banks become steeper and would not be passable to AFVs.

NAVAL TARGETS

All enemy posns mentioned above are visible from the sea.

PW states that the tps are very frightened of NAVAL fire and their morale is very low.


GENERAL

One PW stated that there are tps in the area SW of BARJA at 1207-1900 but this was NOT confirmed by the other PWs.

There are many lateral tracks running from the COAST rd and these will need careful recon to ascertain whether they will be passable to AFVs. PW states that tps from DAMOUR have been using these tracks but he knew little of their general condition.

The area held by 5 & 6 coys 2 Bn Foreign Legion is sited for all round defence but is more vulnerable from the EAST or rear than the front.

J. Bannan Lieut
IO NEVI



DISPOSITION LEGEND

- Two storied-red roof house. Used as Arty OP. One 75mm gun 10 yds SOUTH of house in trees and grass. • A
- For Evl read. AFV.
- Triple concertina wire and one row Double apron fence. X
- Two heavy MG's. →
- Single story gable roof house. △
- 2 Bn HQ- 50 yds in rear of house. Trenches in olive trees. ⊞
- mines ▬
- 25mm A/Tk gun behind stone wall, on rd junc. • B
- 25mm A/Tk gun in edge of trees. • C
- 25mm A/Tk gun 20 yds NORTH of rd, dug in with umbrella top camouflage • D
- River fordable here banks very low. K
- 1 bridge covered by LME ---

REF SAIDA SHEET 1:50000

SCALE 4 3/10" = 1 MILE (APPROX)

H.R.G. 1 ME from 56y 100 metres from next MG post. left rear of patch covered by LME (MME?)

1 sec. 1 Ad/pt
 2 MCO
 17 m
 2 LMGs. } 5 h
 } layers.

MER



27

Cape Sadeyatt
 orders to fire valley
 & move

Spanish prisoner says
 he deserted because
 he recognised Hun plumes
 attacking fleet claims
 to have seen sign
 on way

60 m
Merton

1 m left there
 2 on each side

5 L M G s



LUPA

V/E mess from C Coy.

Report C. Coy Patrol @ no mines located @ Road
prepared for mining road junction NEBI YOUNES @
Anti/tank gun emplacements located NORTH bridge
KNISSET and rd. junc. NEBI YOUNES @ Patrol
continued to T101 no enemy located @ Patrol
returned 2315 hrs.

MESSAGE FORM



THE SAILORS AND SOLDIERS' CHURCH OF ENGLAND
HELP SOCIETY

FOUNDED 1915

24/6/194

Report on Patrol from Lupa Pan (17Pz.) to Feature
296.

Started Patrol at 0900 hrs & moved out through 18Pz area to Baija. People of Baija very friendly & pleased to see us, no sign of hostility at all, they reported patrol of horsemen in front of us.

Moved from Baija to Baouie moving on left of orchard passed feature 336. At Baija contacted Mr Show of Cheshin Yomony with his patrol. His interpreter reported no enemy east of Damrou but large body of troops in Banana grove between El Hamra & Damrou. Troops there are making themselves comfortable & digging trenches. River so shallow & calm he waded over at all places has one bridge (reports of natives). Natives reported that one bombardment of Damrou was accurate & that two pro British notables in Damrou were shot by French.

Moved from Baouie to feature 375 (part of Village) & then to 296 where I contacted sniper & small patrol from ~~Area~~ DASA "A". They had nothing to report time 1150 hrs. From 296 searched Qanqaba & saw at 1200 hrs combination cycle outfit move out, & one man moved down into Wadi. (probably where troops (if any) are) ^{then is} another loud blast where Wadi meets road.



THE SAILORS AND SOLDIERS' CHURCH OF ENGLAND
HELP SOCIETY

FOUNDED 1915

194

Moved back east of feature 374 & around top of Baasir & into back of Bayja. At Bayja we were greeted by everyone possible & entertained. Cool drink coffee & a good spread of everything possible they even wanted to kill the fatted calf.

The Mukhtars? (about a dozen of them) were very happy that we were moving through & were looking forward to British rule. Their problem at the moment is food as they can't get to Saida or Beyrouth. I promised them I would bring the matter before the right quarters. We moved back through our lines at 1600 hrs

Howard
Hunt.